A dangerous myth about who eats fast food is completely false 关于都有谁吃了美国快餐的一个危险误区 作者：Roberto A. Ferdman @ 2015-9-18 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：龟海海 来源：The Washington Post，http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/09/18/rich-parents-might-look-down-on-fast-food-but-its-actually-their-kids-who-eat-it-the-most/ There's a popular narrative about poor families and fast food: They eat more of it than anybody else. It’s dangled as evidence for the high rate of obesity among poorer Americans --  and talked about even by some of the country’s foremost voices on food. "[J]unk food is cheaper when measured by the calorie, and that this makes fast food essential for the poor because they need cheap calories," Mark Bittman for The New York Times in 2011. 有个流行的说法讲的是贫困家庭和快餐的关系：他们吃的快餐比谁都多。这种说法被人视为贫困美国人高肥胖率的根据——甚至这个国家食品界的一些权威人物也会这么讲。Mark Bittman 2011年在《纽约时报》上写道：“以卡路里来衡量，垃圾食品更便宜，这就使得快餐成为穷人必备，因为他们需要便宜的卡路里。” But there’s a problem with saying that poor people like fast food better than others. It’s not true. 但是，贫困人口比其他人更喜欢快餐这种说法是错误的。 New data, released by the Centers for Disease Control, show that America's love for fast food is surprisingly income blind. Well-off kids, poor kids, and all those in between tend to get about the same percentage of their calories from fast food, according to a survey of more than 5,000 people. More precisely, though, it's the poorest kids that tend to get the smallest share of their daily energy intake from Big Macs, Whoppers, Chicken McNuggets, and french fries. 疾病控制中心发布的新数据显示，美国人对快餐的狂热出人意料地和收入并无关系。根据一项针对5000多人的调查，富孩子、穷孩子以及所有处于两者之间的孩子，从快餐中获取的卡路里占比趋于相同。不过，更准确而言，在每日的能量摄入中，正是在最穷的孩子身上，来自巨无霸、皇堡、麦乐鸡和炸薯条的份额最小。 As shown in the chart above, children born to families living just above the poverty line and below get roughly 11.5 percent of their calories from fast food. For everyone else, the portion is closer to 13 percent. 上表显示，对于来自刚过贫困线及贫困线以下家庭的孩子，约有11.5%的卡路里来自快餐。对于所有其他人，这个比例接近13%。 Surprisingly, the better-off children—those between the ages of 2 and 11 years—lead the pack. The average percentage of calories coming from fast food for kids with working and middle class parents is 9.1 percent. But poor kids only get 8 percent of their calories food. 令人惊讶的是，在儿童——即2至11岁的孩子——中，富孩子处于领先。父母为工人阶级和中产阶级的孩子，源自快餐的卡路里比例平均为9.1%。贫困线以下的孩子该比例则仅有8%。 For teenagers, it's those born to the poorest families, once again, who rely on fast food the least. 青少年也一样，生于最贫困家庭的，对快餐依赖最少。 The data offer sobering insight into America's seemingly impenetrable love for fast food. More than a third of all children and adolescents living in the country still eat some form of fast food on any given day, a number which hasn't budged in decades, according to the CDC. 美国人对快餐的狂热令人费解，上述数据为此提供的见解发人深省。疾控中心数据表明，任选一天，我国都仍有超过三分之一的儿童和青少年会食用某种快餐，这个数字几十年没有变过。 And many children are getting alarmingly high proportions of their diet from chicken nuggets and french fries. About a quarter of all kids in the United States get 25 percent of their calories from fast food. And 12 percent of kids get more than 40 percent of their calories from fast food. 并且，许多孩子的食谱中炸鸡块和炸薯条的份额之高令人担忧。全美所有孩子中约有四分之一从快餐中获取的卡路里达到25%。有12%的孩子从快餐中获取的卡路里超过40%。 The data also help to discredit the notion that fast food — or, at the very least, unhealthy food — only preys on the poor. The concept of food deserts, lower income areas where healthy food is scarce or expensive or both, has given rise to the idea that poorer populations rely on fast food out of necessity and convenience. 数据同样否定了一个观念：快餐——或至少是不健康食物——只损及穷人。食物沙漠——健康食品或稀有或昂贵或两者兼有的低收入地区——这一概念导致了一种看法：贫困人口出于必然性与便利性的缘故，更为依赖快餐。 While there's evidence that income does appear to affect the relative nutritional value of foods people eat—food stamp participants, for instance, tend to procure the same amount of calories as everyone else but from substantially less healthy foods—there doesn't seem to be the same proof that that gap is attributable to fast food. 当然，有证据表明，收入似乎确实会影响人们所吃食物的相对营养价值。比如，使用食品券的人所获取的卡路里数量与其他人趋于相同，但其中大量来自相对不那么健康的食品。但要说在快餐问题上也存在这样的差距，则没有类似的证据。 Child obesity, though it has fallen off in recent years, is still historically high in the United States. American kids are far more likely to be overweight than those living in most other countries. The epidemic has affected poorer children disproportionately, but it would be foolish to overlook the fact that roughly 12 percent of high income children are obese. The deterioration of the American diet hasn't helped. But nor has kids's sustained love for fast food in this country. 尽管近些年来，儿童肥胖有所下降，但它仍处于美国历史上的高位。与绝大多数其它国家的孩子相比，美国孩子出现体重超标的可能性要高得多。这种流行病对较贫穷的孩子影响更大，但如果我们看不到约12%的高收入家庭孩子患有肥胖症这一事实，那也是不妥的。美国食谱的恶化让问题雪上加霜。同样，我国孩子对快餐的一贯热爱也同样没起到什么好作用。 Fast food remains a problem for the whole of American youth. Children, independent of socioeconomic status, are bombarded with advertisements for fast food. The industry spends billions of dollars each year on marketing, much of which is used to target children and teenagers. A 2012 study by the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity found that kids were seeing between three to five fast food ads on television every day. 对所有美国年轻人而言，快餐仍是个难题。不分社会经济地位，孩子们都处于快餐广告的狂轰滥炸之中。这个行业每年花费几十亿进行市场推广，其中许多就是针对儿童和青少年。食品政策与肥胖拉德中心2012年一项研究发现，孩子们每天在电视上看到的快餐广告有3-5种。 And those commercials appear to be working. On all children. 这些广告似乎在所有的孩子们身上起作用。 Rich parents might roll their eyes at Big Macs and french fries, but it's their kids who like them most. 富裕的父母可能会对着巨无霸和炸薯条翻白眼，但他们的孩子对这些爱不释手。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

National Medal of Science Awarded To Political Scientist Robert Axelrod 政治学家Robert Axelrod获颁国家科学奖章 作者：Eric Michael Johnson @ 2014-12-30 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 来源：The Evolution Institute，https://evolution-institute.org/article/20003131/ Why do we choose to cooperate and how can we promote greater cooperation in world affairs? These are the questions that Robert Axelrod has pursued for more than 40 years. His career has been an interdisciplinary exploration that has encompassed mathematics, political science, and evolutionary biology. Now, his signature achievements in the areas of game theory and complex systems have earned him the highest scientific honor that the United States can bestow: the National Medal of Science. 我们为何选择合作？我们如何在世界事务中推进更大程度的合作？这些都是Robert Axelrod追问了40多年的问题。他的整个职业生涯都致力于跨学科研究，涉及数学、政治科学与进化生物学。如今，他在博弈论和复杂系统领域的标志性成就使他获得了美国可授予的最高科学荣誉：国家科学奖章。 I first encountered Axelrod’s work during my graduate studies working with great apes. His suggestion that cooperation could evolve as an adaptive strategy was an inspiration for me in a field still dominated by the view that selfish interests were the primary driver of evolution. After several years of watching bonobos – one of our closest evolutionary relatives – as they peacefully shared their resources with groupmates and avoided violence at all costs, I was eager for an alternative explanation. 我第一次接触Axelrod的著作，还是在研究生阶段研究类人猿的时候。他提出，合作有可能发展为一种适应策略。当时我所在的领域仍被自利乃进化的基本驱动这一观点所主导，而他的观点对我深有启发。我那时已对人类的进化近亲之一倭黑猩猩进行了好几年观察，发现它们与群体成员和平共享资源，不惜代价避免暴力，所以我特别渴望看到一种替代解释。 Axelrod’s publications with the celebrated evolutionary biologist William Hamilton had put the study of cooperation on a new foundation. What’s more, his application of this work to political science offered the potential for an evolutionary framework that could help reduce violence and encourage mutual aid between nations and peoples. Axelrod和知名进化生物学家William Hamilton的共同作品已为研究合作奠定了新的基础。不仅如此，在将这一成果应用于政治科学之后，他还提出了一种进化论框架的潜在可能，该框架将有助于在国家与民族之间减少暴力、鼓励合作。 Axelrod first pursued a degree in mathematics before receiving his PhD in Political Science from Yale University in 1969. After brief stints working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on Senator Eugene McCarthy’s failed presidential campaign that pledged to end the Vietnam War, Axelrod taught at UC Berkeley before becoming a professor of Political Science and Public Policy at The University of Michigan. Axelrod先获得了数学学位，1969年又获得耶鲁大学政治学博士学位。他曾在国防部长办公室以及参议员尤金·麦卡锡誓将结束越战的失败的总统竞选中短暂工作。此后，Axelrod任教于加州大学伯克利分校，后来成为密歇根大学的政治科学与公共政策教授。 It was Axelrod’s work with computer simulations involving the Prisoner’s Dilemma game that launched his scientific career. In the game, two people who committed a crime are arrested and each is placed in solitary confinement for interrogation. If one betrays the other, the first goes free while the second is sentenced to three years in prison. If they both betray one another, they each receive two years. But if they both keep silent, they receive the minimum penalty of one year each. Under this scenario, the best individual strategy would be to betray the other. However, in actual trials, people were much more likely to cooperate than would be expected under the assumption of rational self-interest. Cooperation and altruism seem to be innate characteristics of the human species. Axelrod对“囚徒困境”博弈的计算机模拟工作开启了他的科学事业。在此类博弈中，两个被捕的罪犯被分别单独拘禁，接受审问。如果其中一个出卖另一个，那么前者就能得到自由，而后者将被处以3年牢狱。如果两人都出卖彼此，那么将各获2年牢狱。但是，如果两人都保持沉默，他们得到的就都是最轻惩罚，即1年牢狱。在这种情形中，最佳的个人策略是背叛同伙。但是，在现实审判中，较之依据理性自私假设得出的预期，人们合作的可能性要大得多。合作和利他似乎是人类的一种天性。 Axelrod has been able to extend his model of cooperation from animals in nature, down to cancer cells, and up to conflicts involving rival superpowers. His books include The Evolution of Cooperation, The Complexity of Cooperation, and Harnessing Complexity. He has been published in Science, Nature, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, World Politics, and the Journal of Peace Research. During his extensive career, his work on cooperation has been cited more than 9,000 times by researchers across academic disciplines. Axelrod已将其合作模型大为拓展，从自然界的动物向下延伸至癌细胞，向上延伸至对立强权之间的冲突。其著作包括《合作的进化》、《合作的复杂性》和《驾驭复杂性》，并曾在《科学》、《自然》、《美国国家科学院院刊》、《世界政治》与《和平研究杂志》等期刊上发表论文。在漫长的学术生涯中，他关于合作的研究已被各个学科的研究者引用过9000多次。 It was my distinct honor to talk with Professor Axelrod last week from his current position in the U.S. State Department. In our discussion, he reflected on his work with evolutionary biologist William Hamilton, how cooperation can be promoted within groups, and what this ultimately means for a planet caught in the thrall of competing national powers. 上周，我无比荣幸地与目前在美国国务院就职的Axelrod教授进行了交谈。在谈话中，他回顾了他与进化生物学家William Hamilton的著作，并思考了团体内部如何促进合作以及这对一个深受国际竞争困扰的星球最终意味着什么。

【“复杂系统研究中心” 的创始成员，摄于1980年代。 从左至右：Michael D. Cohen, Robert Axelrod, William Hamilton, Arthur Burks, John Holland, Rick Riolo, Michael Savageau, and Carl Simon. 图片蒙密歇根大学福特公共政策学院惠赐。】

Eric Michael Johnson: To begin with, I would like to talk with you about your work with the evolutionary biologist William Hamilton. In my opinion, this was a model of interdisciplinary collaboration that enriched both fields. How did you end up working with him? Eric Michael Johnson（以下简称J）：首先，我想和你谈谈你与进化生物学家William Hamilton合著的著作。我认为，这是本跨学科合作的典范，对两个领域均很有促进。你是如何同他建立合作的？ Robert Axelrod: I approached him because I thought that my work on the Prisoner’s Dilemma would have applications to biology. First I got in touch with Richard Dawkins and it was he who suggested Bill Hamilton who, at the time, was visiting The University of Michigan where I was. I didn’t even know he was there. Robert Axelrod（以下简称A）：我去找他，是因为我觉得我对囚徒困境的研究可能在生物学上得以应用。首先我是跟Richard Dawkins接触，是他推荐的Bill Hamilton。Hamilton当时正访问我所在的密歇根大学。那时候我甚至都不知道他就在那儿。 When I looked him up and told him about my basic idea, he thought it was quite interesting. As you know, before he died of course, he was a world-class evolutionary biologist most noted for showing that animals often cooperate when they are closely related to each other. But my suggestion was a different idea: that cooperation could also be based on reciprocity. 当我找到他，把我的基本想法跟他一说，他觉得特别有意思。你当然知道，他生前曾是世界级的进化生物学家，特别是以指出亲缘关系密切的动物之间经常进行合作这一点而出名。不过我提出的是个不同的想法：合作也可能基于互惠。 To my delight, Bill immediately saw the value of this approach and he thought we could develop some useful applications for biology. He had already used game theory in some of his work, although he didn’t regard himself as a game theorist. We decided to write an article for Science, which is probably the world’s leading scientific journal. 令我高兴的是，Bill立马看出这一方法的价值，并且认为我们可以在生物学上提出一些有益的应用。他此前已在自己的一些研究中用过博弈论，尽管他并不自视为一个博弈理论家。我们决定给《自然》写篇文章，那大概是世界上最好的科学杂志。 Bill was able to bring the relevance to biology and speak directly to evolutionary biologists in a way that I could not and I brought the original theory. Then we worked out some of the elaborations together. We were really fortunate in that, not only was the article accepted, it was chosen as the best article of the year in Science magazine. It certainly gave my later work a mark of scientific credibility. Bill把生物学引入进来，并且以一种我做不到的方式直接与进化生物学家对话，而我提供的则是原创理论。然后我们共同把某些细节阐述部分解决了。我们运气很好，文章不仅被采用了，还被选为《科学》杂志的年度最佳论文。这当然给我以后的工作提供了科学可信性。 Johnson: What is one of your fondest memories of working with Hamilton? Can you paint a scene of how one of your collaboration sessions played out? J：关于你和Hamilton的合作，你最愉快的记忆是什么？你能描绘一下你们进行合作的场景吗？ Axelrod: One of the characteristics I remember about him is that when we were talking about an idea he might suddenly stop and think very deeply about it. I learned to keep quiet and let him ponder. Many times he would come up with a really interesting next step. Of course, sometimes he would come up with something completely different because he had given up pondering the topic at hand and his mind had gone off in some other direction. I could never tell which it would be. It was a lot of fun. A：我记得他有个特点，就是当我们在讨论一个想法时，他可能会突然停下来，陷入深思。我后来学会在这时候保持安静，让他沉思。好多时候，他会想出一个特别有意思的下一步措施。当然，有时候他也会想出一个完全不同的东西，因为他已没在思考我们手头的事，思想早已离题到别的方向去了。我永远没法预知到底会如何。这很有意思。 Johnson: You were both so generous with one another in how you described your work together. For example, Hamilton wrote in his autobiography that your collaboration added to his own biological insights. Would you say that it also added to your own perspective on political science? J：在描述你们之间的合作时，你们俩对彼此都非常慷慨大度。比如，Hamilton在他的自传中就说，你们的合作增加了他自己对生物学的理解。你觉得这一合作也拓宽了你自己对政治科学的视角吗？ Axelrod: It certainly gave me a deeper sense of the fundamentals that we were studying. It wasn’t something specific like trench warfare, which was one of my examples. I saw that this model could be applied in many different places. For example, as you may know, I later developed another application related to this work as it had to do with cooperation among cancer cells. The same thing happened for him and, several years later, he came up with another idea that he wanted to try out on me related to parasites. A：这当然让我对我们当时正研究的基本原理有了更深的理解。它不是堑壕战这么具体的东西，堑壕战是我那时使用的案例之一。我领会到，这个模型能应用于许多不同的地方。比如，如你所知的，我后来论述了与该项研究有关的另外一个应用，涉及癌细胞之间的合作。对他而言，事情也是如此。数年之后，他提出了另外一个与寄生物有关的想法，想要征求我的看法。 Johnson: This would have been your joint paper on the origin of sex. J：这应该就是你们关于性别起源的合作论文了。 Axelrod: Yes, his idea was quite amazing. You see, at the time we did not have a good explanation for the fact that almost all large animals and plants reproduce sexually. This was a serious puzzle because it meant that only half of adults – the females – could reproduce. This is a huge cost in evolutionary terms, so there must be something very valuable about it. The fact that sex is so universal means it must be something that large animals and plants have in common. A：对，他的想法确实神奇。你知道，对于几乎所有大型动植物都采用有性繁殖一事，我们当时并没有一个好的解释。这是个很重要的谜题，因为它意味着只有半数的成年个体，即雌性，能进行繁殖。从进化的角度来看，这是个巨大的代价，所以必定对应特别大的价值。而由于性别的存在是那么普遍，这种价值必定是大型动植物所共有的。 Bill’s idea for what they have in common was the need to resist parasites. Parasites evolved to mimic our cells so that our immune system wouldn’t attack them. As a result, they can evolve around thirty times faster than we can since their generation time is so short. If you were to reproduce asexually it would mean you’d have an offspring that was almost identical to you, so the parasites that are adapted to you would also be adapted to your offspring. However, by reproducing sexually our offspring are quite different from us. Therefore, the parasites have to start all over. Bill’s idea was that sexual reproduction is an adaptation to resist parasites. It is just a brilliant idea. Bill认为这是为了抵抗寄生物。寄生物进化得能够模拟我们的细胞，使自己不受免疫系统的攻击。结果是，它们的进化速度比我们快30倍，因为它们的世代时长特别短。如果你进行无性繁殖，那就意味着你的后代将跟你几乎一模一样，那么适应了你的寄生物将同样适应你的后代。而有性繁殖使后代与我们大为不同。因此，寄生物得从头开始进化适应。Bill的看法就是，有性繁殖是为抵抗寄生物而产生的一种适应。这真是个绝妙的想法。 Johnson: How did you end up coauthoring the paper with him? J：你是如何跟他合写这篇论文的？ Axelrod: He said to me that he didn’t have a way of modeling this concept because it inherently involved many genes and, in the formal model, you could only add two or three different genes before the whole thing got too complicated with all of the interaction effects. I used a technique that John Holland at University of Michigan had developed called the genetic algorithm. This was a computer simulation of the genetics and allowed us to handle dozens of genes in one simulation. A：他告诉我他找不到方法为这个概念建模，因为它本身涉及许多基因。而在正式的模型中你只能加入两到三个不同的基因，再多就会由于交互作用变得过于复杂。我使用了一种叫做遗传算法的技术，是由密歇根大学的John Holland开发的。这是对基因的一种计算机模拟，一次模拟能处理好几十个基因。 This was just what we needed and we developed a simulation to demonstrate that this idea, at least in principle, was viable. It was a lot of fun to first have one idea of mine that I took to Bill only to have him come back with an idea of his own that I helped do simulations on. 我们就需要这个。我们建模展示了这一想法至少在理论上是可行的。这事确实很有意思，之前是我拿着一个想法去找Bill，结果促使他提出了一个他自己的想法，然后他又来找我帮忙对这个想法进行模拟。 Johnson: So it was a meeting of complementary minds. You would build on one another’s ideas and inspiration. J：这就是头脑的互补。你们互相发展对方的观点和灵感。 Axelrod: Right. I remember he said in his memoirs that we were both quite serious about aesthetics. We like simple theories and want to get to the fundamentals of things. We both had a background in mathematical modeling and game theory so, even though we came from different disciplines, we had some important things in common. A：对。我记得他在回忆录里说我们俩都非常看重美感。我们都喜欢简单的理论，渴望获得事物的基本原理。我们都曾接受过数学建模和博弈论的训练，所以尽管我们属于不同的学科，但在许多重要方面有共同点。 In addition, I had been fascinated with evolution ever since high school and had taken it quite seriously. I thought a lot about evolutionary biology although I certainly was not a professional. But it meant that he and I could communicate well together because I knew many of the basics in a way that political scientists wouldn’t normally be expected to. 除此之外，自高中时起我就一直对进化很是着迷，也很重视。我经常思考进化生物学的问题，当然我肯定不是这方面的专家。但这意味着我和他之间能够很好地交流，因为我知道很多政治科学家通常不会知道的基础知识。 Another thing that he mentioned in his memoirs is that neither one of us had any need to one up the other or establish who had made the biggest contribution. There was never any need to be overly modest just out of the sake of politeness, which I think is common in Britain and something Bill was used to from his time at Oxford. He was simply a delight to work with. 他在回忆录中还提到另外一件事，就是我们都没想要压过对方或者要论谁的功劳大。我们也从未觉得有必要出于礼貌的考虑而表现的过分谦虚，这一点我想在英国很普遍，而Bill自其牛津时代起就已习惯如此。与他合作真的非常愉快。 Johnson: You have also taken on other evolutionary questions over the years. One of the debates I have always been interested in is that you have been critical of some evolutionary psychologists, such as Joseph Henrich at University of British Columbia where I am based, who argue that there are specific genes for prosocial traits. Instead you advocate for more general-purpose capabilities such as language and foresight. Do you think there is an overreliance among some evolutionary researchers on genetic mechanisms for understanding the nature of cooperation and altruism? J：多年以来，你也曾研究过其它进化问题。我历来很感兴趣的争论之一是，你一直对一些进化心理学家，比如我所在的英属哥伦比亚大学的Joseph Henrich，持批评态度。Henrich认为存在能够导致亲社会特性的特定基因。而你则主张（亲社会特性来自于）用途更为一般化的能力，如语言和预见能力。你是否认为某些进化学研究者在试图对合作和利他的本质进行理解时过分依赖基因机制？ Axelrod: I think that genetics certainly plays a role. But I am kind of agnostic about just how big the role of genetics is in human behavior. For example, there is no doubt that an important genetic basis exists in both human and nonhuman animals for cooperation with kin. What I was addressing was how specific those genetic components have to be. A：我认为基因确实发挥了作用。但是对于基因在塑造人类行为中的作用有多大这一问题，我有点倾向于不可知论。比方说，人类以及动物的亲缘间合作，毫无疑问存在非常重要的基因基础。我那时候要搞清楚的是，这些基因成分要具体独特到何种程度。 Henrich was moving towards the side where they are highly specific and identifiable. My collaborator and I were saying that it could be explained by much more general capacities that were evoked for this purpose. It wasn’t a major difference. Genes are important but I’m not a purist who believes they drive everything. Obviously culture is important too. Henrich倾向于认为它们十分特定且可识别。我和我的合作者则认为亲缘间合作可以由更一般化的能力来解释，这些能力就是为此目的而产生的。这并不是大分歧。基因很重要，但我不是个纯粹主义者。我不认为一切都由基因推动。显然文化也很重要。 Johnson: When Darwin was trying to understand the origin of morality in The Descent of Man he adopted a group selection model where those individuals that displayed selfish tendencies would be punished whereas those that displayed traits benefitting the group would be rewarded. Christopher Boehm followed up on this idea in his book Moral Origins that came out a few years ago. Do you find that the evolution of cooperation has come full circle back to where Darwin originally was? J：当达尔文在《人类的由来》一书中试图理解道德的起源时，他使用了一种群体选择模型。在这个模型中，表现出自私倾向的个体会被惩罚，而表现出有益于群体的特征的个体会得到奖励。Christopher Boehm在几年前出版的著作《道德起源》中进一步发展了这种观点。你是否认为合作的进化论兜了一整个大圈子，回到了达尔文所在的起点？ Axelrod: I think that Darwin’s speculation is quite plausible. At the time he couldn’t really establish it by studying large numbers of societies and identifying those that thrived and those that didn’t. A：我认为达尔文的猜想似乎相当合理。那时候他不可能研究大量的社会，并确认哪些兴盛，哪些没有，然后真正证实他的猜想。 The idea of group selection, until recently, has had a pretty bad reputation in biology because some non-scientists wildly misused it, saying that if the British were so successful it must be because they were genetically better. But in the last ten years or so biologists have come to agree that, under certain conditions, one can get group selection. 在生物学中，群体选择这一观点直至最近名声都很差，因为它曾被一些非科学家滥用，他们宣称英国人如此成功必然是由于他们在基因上更为优秀。但在过去约十年间，生物学家们已经达成共识，认为在特定条件下确实存在群体选择。 If one small band of humans are better at cooperating than some other band whom they are competing with, the first may well be able to outperform the second either through getting more food or maybe even by fighting and killing them. I think it is a common principle that cooperation is invoked in the service of competition. Cooperation with insiders serves competition with outsiders. 如果一伙人比正与他们竞争的另外一伙人更善于合作，那么第一伙人或许能够远胜第二伙人，这或者是由于他们能获取更多食物，或者由于他们可能干脆将第二伙人打败并消灭。合作之产生是为了竞争，我认为这是一条一般性原则。与内部人合作是为了与外人竞争。 Johnson: You modeled this very process in the journal Nature with what you refer to as tags. You show that cooperation could increase even without reciprocity or high levels of relatedness. If enough individuals with the same tag were in a group they might cooperate simply because they shared these tags. Could you expand on that? J：你在《自然》杂志上为你刚说的这一过程建立了模型，用的是你所谓的“标记”。你指出，即使没有互惠性或程度很高的亲缘关系，合作也可能增进。如果一个群体中具有相同“标记”的个体足够多，他们也可能纯粹因为共享同一种“标记”就相互合作。你能对此加以阐释吗？ Axelrod: The idea of tags was actually developed by John Holland. Tags are completely arbitrary pieces of information that other people can observe, such as your accent or your skin color or the color shirt you wear. These are signals as to what group a person is a member of and this can lead to ethnocentrism or cooperating with others that are similar to you. A：“标记”这个想法实际上是由John Holland提出的。“标记”就是别人能够观察到的任意信息，比如你的口音或肤色或你所穿的有色衬衫。这是一种信号，表明某人所属的群体，而它会引发本族中心主义或相似的人们之间的合作。 Even if those things are completely arbitrary initially, they can come to take on meaning. They become correlated with traits that include reciprocity. Of course, the question gets tricky and interesting in that somebody else can have this trait or be part of the in-group but then abuse that and not cooperate. 即使这些标记最初是完全任意的，它们也能逐渐承载意义。它们开始与某些特质相关，其中包括互惠性。当然，某人也可能具有某种特质或是这个内部团体的一份子而滥用了这一点，不与他人合作。这时候问题就变得更棘手也更有趣。 I remember Groucho Marx once said that, “The secret of success is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake those, you’ve got it made.” One of the purposes of our simulation is to study the conditions under which defectors are not able to take over a population even though, in the short run, they can do well. 我记得Groucho Marx曾经说过，“成功的秘诀就是诚实和公平交易。如果能假装如此，你已然成功。”我们所做模拟的一个目的就是要研究在什么条件下背叛者即使能短期得利也无法骗过整个群体。 Johnson: Do these models suggest that there is room for cultural and institutional change in order to promote cooperation in world affairs? For example, you wrote an article for The New York Times along with Scott Atran about how we should talk to terrorists. J：这些模型是否表明，世界事务中存在通过文化和制度变革来推动合作的空间？比方说，你曾和Scott Atran一道为《纽约时报》写过一篇文章，讨论我们应该如何跟恐怖分子对话。 Axelrod: That’s right. As an interesting side note, you may know that this year I am working in the State Department on a fellowship. I was a little worried that I might not get a security clearance because I actually have talked to terrorists. But I have been up front about this so it turned out not to be a problem. I was still able to get my clearance. A：对。顺便说个有趣的事。你可能也知道我今年正在国务院做研究员。我起先还有点担心通不过安全审查，因为我真地跟恐怖分子交谈过。不过我对此一直都很坦率，所以最后也没什么事。我还是通过了审查。 Johnson: So is this the kind of thing that could be utilized? By employing various tags and emphasizing shared cultural traits we might enter into closer dialogue that would promote cooperation. J：那么我们能对标记加以利用对吗？通过调用多种多样的标记，通过强调共享的文化特征，我们有可能更为深入地对话，从而可能推动合作。 Axelrod: That is the aspiration. But there are some groups, and perhaps ISIL is one of them, where there is not a lot to talk to them about. A：这是我们的期望。但是对于某些群体，可能跟他们就没多少可谈的，ISIL可能是这种情况吧。 Johnson: You noted in one of your autobiographical papers that your father was a painter and that he represented what was important on a given day by what he left out. In your early work you emphasized the Prisoner’s Dilemma because, at the time, the world was in a conflict between rival superpowers. How has the changing world situation altered what you find important and how has that influenced what you include, or don’t include, in your models? J：在你的一篇自传文章中，你曾提到你的父亲是个画家，他会通过留白来表现某个特定日子里的重要事物。你在早期著作中强调的是囚徒困境，因为当时世界正处于超级大国的对立冲突之中。世界情势的变化是如何改变你对何者重要这一问题的认识的？这又如何对你的模型包括或不包括哪些东西产生影响呢？ Axelrod: Obviously we’re not in a strict bipolar situation today like the United States and the Soviet Union were in the dominant confrontation during the Cold War. Now there are a number of power centers and, you might say, a two-sided game is only part of the issue. A：很显然，我们现在面临的并非严格的两极态势，这跟冷战的时候已经不一样了，那时美国和苏联的对抗主导了局面。现在有很多权力中心，你可以说，双边游戏只是整个问题的一部分。 However, there are still lots of bilateral issues such as between Russia and its neighbor Ukraine. The United States and China also have a complex relationship that has elements of both cooperation and competition. In terms of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, a particularly important feature is that it represents an established power relating to a rising power. 不过，现在也仍然存在大量的双边问题，比如俄罗斯与其邻国乌克兰之间。中美之间的关系也很复杂，既有合作，也有竞争。就中美关系而言，一个特别重要的特征在于，它代表的是一个既存大国与一个崛起大国之间的关系。 Those situations have often led to war in the past. That has been a difficult relationship to manage. I think it is important that we recognize and promote the cooperative aspects and possibilities, just as President Obama did with the President of China on their agreement over climate change. We should build a cooperative relationship where we both have a common interest in the outcome. 历史上这种情形通常会导致战争。这一直是一种难以处理的关系。我认为，认识到并推进利于合作的各种方面和可能性，就像奥巴马总统和中国主席在气候变化问题上达成一致那样，是很重要的。在共同利益所在之处，我们应该建立合作关系。 Johnson: So this would still fall into the Prisoner’s Dilemma model. But it seems that there would be a high potential for noise, something that you wrote you wish you had considered more in your earlier work. J：那么这仍然会陷入囚徒困境。不过似乎出现噪音的可能性会很高，关于这个事，你曾写道，你颇为遗憾没能在早期著作中加以更多考虑。 Axelrod: That’s right. For our purposes, instead of using the term noise it’s misunderstanding. One side may think it is perfectly reasonable and the other side might think it is breaking the norms that they should be following. An example of this is cyberspace where the United States gets quite angry that the Chinese are stealing industrial secrets and the Chinese don’t regard that as necessarily any different from normal espionage which everybody accepts that other countries do. A：对。就我们的目的而言，使用“噪音”这个词汇，不如使用“误解”。一方认为极为合理的，另一方则认为破坏了彼此应当遵守的规则。这方面的一个例子是中国人在互联网上偷窃产业机密，美国对此非常恼怒，而中国人并不觉得这一定跟被普遍接受的别国所进行的常规间谍活动有什么区别。 Johnson: This would tie in with Elinor Ostrom’s work as it relates to the digital commons and how to manage that. J：这就跟Elinor Ostrom关于数字公地及如何对之进行管理的文章有关了。 Axelrod: Right. You have clearly done a thorough job of looking at my vitae. (Laughs) A：对。你显然认真细致地检查过我的履历表。（笑） Johnson: I’ve been reading your work for quite a while. J：我读你的作品可有一段时间了。 Axelrod: But you’re right. I think it is important that we sustain the tremendous value of the Internet as a common resource that helps all economies to thrive and helps individuals, businesses, and countries. It is under challenge now because some countries, for example Germany, are promoting the idea that the data generated in their country should stay in their country. This sounds reasonable but it also risks the Balkanization of the Internet and undermining the collective good. A：你是对的。因特网有助于所有经济体的繁荣，有助于所有的个体、企业和国家。我认为，维持它作为这种公共资源的巨大价值非常重要。这一点现在正受到挑战，因为有些国家，比如德国，正在宣扬一种观点，认为本国产生的数据就应该留在国内。这种说法听起来合理，但同时也有将网络割据化、破坏集体利益的危险。 Johnson: You are the first political scientist to be awarded the National Science Medal in United States history. While this award may represent the pinnacle of your career, it certainly is not the end. Where do you plan to go next? J：你是美国历史上首位获得国家科学奖章的政治科学家。尽管这一奖励可能代表着你的学术生涯的顶峰，但它显然不会是终点。你下一步打算朝哪走？ Axelrod: (Laughs) Two things, I have a serious interest in cyber conflict and what we can do to avoid or manage conflict in cyberspace. This could get very serious if one country causes blackouts in another or interferes with the financial system as a way to pressure the other instead of bombing them. A：（笑）两件事，一是，对于网络冲突以及我们避免及处理网络空间冲突的可能措施，我十分感兴趣。这个问题可能变得非常严重，比如一个国家在另外一个国家制造出信号中断，或者干扰他国的金融系统，以这种方式，而不是轰炸，来向他国施压。 Because we don’t have established norms of what counts as armed conflict there could be a good deal of misunderstanding. One side could think they didn’t escalate very much and the other side could take action that is very serious. We understand the escalation ladder for conventional warfare, for example, but we really don’t have a common understanding for the various types of cyber conflict. I think it has a serious potential for misunderstanding so I’m interested in those issues and have an article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences about the timing of cyber conflict. 因为对于什么算作武装冲突，我们并没有确定的规范，因此就可能存在大量的误解。一方可能认为其措施并没有剧烈升级，而另一方则可能采取非常严肃的行动。对于常规战争之类的危机升级阶梯，我们是熟悉的，但对于各种各样的网络冲突，我们确实没有什么共识。我认为这里存在引发误解的极为严重的可能性，所以我对这些问题很感兴趣。我在《美国科学院院刊》上发过一篇文章，就是关于网络冲突的时机掌握。 The other thing I have been interested in is learning about the State Department, about how organizations make decisions, and how policies develop using this opportunity to see policy formation from the inside. 我一直感兴趣的另一件事，是想了解国务院，想通过这次机会从内部观察政策形成的过程，了解组织如何做决策以及政策是如何形成的。 Johnson: Looking inside the sausage factory. J：深入肉肠工厂里面去看个究竟。 Axelrod: Right. A：对的。 Johnson: One final question I have for you is that, despite all of the crises in the world today and a seemingly gridlocked political system at home, what continues to give you hope? J：我想提的最后一个问题是，如今世界上有如此多的冲突，而国内政治体系则似乎陷入僵局，面对这种情况，是什么让你继续存有希望？ Axelrod: One important fact is that we have not had great power wars for a long time. I suppose the last time would have been the United States and China fighting in the Korean War from 1950-53. That was sixty years ago. We have not had a great power confrontation in all that time and even the Korean War was quite limited. A：一个重要的事实是，我们已经很久没见过大国之间的战争了。我觉得最后一次可能是1950-53年中美之间的朝鲜战争。那都是60年前的事了。这么长的时间没有发生过大国冲突，而且即便是朝鲜战争，那也是相当有限的。 I think it is possible, and it’s certainly hopeful, that major powers can find non-violent ways of dealing with each other and making their interests known to the other side. But it is not guaranteed. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious danger and major differences exist between the United States and Russia in this area. And, of course, jihadism is a serious threat to the world. 大国之间能够找到非暴力的方式来打交道，以让对方知晓自己的利益，我认为这是可能的，而且必定很有希望。但这一点没有保证。核武器的扩散是个严重的危险，而美俄两国在这个领域存在重大分歧。此外，圣战运动当然也是对世界的严重威胁。 But none of these are as serious as World War I or World War II or as dangerous as the Cold War. We could have had hundreds of millions of people dead in a single day if the Cuban Missile Crisis didn’t go well, for example, or if some of the Berlin confrontations had escalated. So I am hopeful that the world is not as dangerous as it was then and that great powers can continue to deal with each other without periodic wars that seemed to be so common in the past. 不过，所有这些都不如一站或二战那么严重，也不如冷战那么危险。比如，如果古巴导弹危机没处理好，或者如果某次柏林对峙得以升级，我们一天就可能死掉几亿人。所以，世界不再像从前那样危险，大国之间能够继续与彼此打交道而不走向在过去似乎极为常见的周期性战争，对于这一点，我是抱有希望的。 Johnson: Thank you for taking this time to talk with me. I personally have gained a lot from reading your work over the years and I can’t tell you how thrilled I am that you have received this honor. J：谢谢你花时间与我交谈。过去多年间，我本人从阅读你的作品中收获良多。你获得这一荣誉，我的激动无以言表。 Axelrod: Well, thank you very much. I appreciate that. I enjoyed talking with you as well. A：啊，特别感谢你。我很感激。与你交谈我也很享受。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Is the Human Vagina So Big? 为什么人类阴道那么大 作者：Holly Dunsworth @ 2015-12-03 译者：小册子（＠昵称被抢的小册子） 校对：林翠（＠cwlinnil） 来源：The Evolution Institute，https://evolution-institute.org/blog/why-is-the-human-vagina-so-big/ We are obsessed with penis and testicle size. Yet, we can barely say “vagina” and when we do we’re usually talking about the vulva. 我们总是着迷于阴茎和睾丸的尺寸，却极少谈及“阴道”，就算我们提到了，一般也只是讨论外阴。 Everyone’s come across some article somewhere on-line that is thrilled to share how big human penises really are, for primates, and to explain why they evolved to be so big. It’s not really the length, but the girth. Alan Dixson is your go-to on this. He’s conservative in his assessment of the literature on penis size and even he concedes that human penis “circumference is unusual when compared to the penes of other hominoids (apes)” (p. 65 in Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems). 每个人都见过，网上的一些文章在兴奋不已地告诉你，人类的阴茎在灵长类中有多大，为什么会进化成这么大。其实所谓的大，不是指长度，而是指茎围。说到这个话题，你去问Alan Dixson就准没错。他对有关阴茎大小的文献一贯持比较谨慎的态度，但连他也承认，人类的阴茎“周长和其他人猿的阳具相比是个异数” （见《性选择与人类繁衍系统起源》第65页） A favorite explanation for the big phallus is female mate choice, that females selectively make babies with males who have larger and, presumably, more pleasurable semen delivery devices. This is backed up by studies. When life size projections of naked men are shown to female subjects, they say they find the ones with bigger ones to be more attractive. [This is exactly how mate choice works where I live, how about you?] 对阳具大型化的一个比较受欢迎的解释是雌性交配偏好，也就是说雌性倾向于选择与有着较硕大、想来也较受用的“精液注射器”的雄性交配产子。这一理论得到了一些研究的支持。有研究让女性受访对象看真实大小的裸男幻灯片，她们纷纷表示阳具伟岸的男性比较有吸引力。（这完全符合我日常所见的择偶选择，你呢？） Other explanations include male competition. If you can deliver your package to the front yard but the other guy can deliver to the front door, his is more likely to be carried inside the house first. Or, if he can steal away what you just delivered, then, again, his package has yours beat. Thanks to his big penis he’s more likely to pass on his winning penis genes than you are to pass on your loser penis genes. Loser. 雄性竞争也是一种解释。如果你只能把包裹投递到院子里，但另一个人可以把包裹放到屋门前，那他的包裹先进屋的几率就高一些。又或者，如果他可以偷走你刚送的包裹，那他的包裹也一样打败了你的。因为器材比较大，他延续他那“赢茎”基因的可能性比你延续你那“输茎”基因的可能性也就比较大。于是你就完蛋了。 All this is just terribly fun to write about and I’m not even going nuts (gah) like they do. And they do. They really do. And all over the Internet they do: “Evolution of human penis” gets 53,000 hits just on scholar.google alone, and about 832,000 on Google. 写这些东西真是好玩死了，而我又不会像他们那样疯狂，咔咔。他们真是挺疯的，不骗你。男人在网上有这么疯：搜索“人类阴茎的进化”，仅仅在谷歌学术上就得到了53,000个结果，在整个谷歌上则得到了832,000个。 But doesn’t it make sense that for a penis to be somewhat useful it has to be somewhat correlated to vagina size? 但是，如果阴茎要发挥功能，难道不是应该和阴道的大小联系起来才说的通吗？ I’m talking about all penises in the universe and all vaginas too. Sure there’s variation, but a penis can’t be too wide. It helps to be long, probably, but it can’t be too long. 我在讨论的是地球上所有的阴茎，和地球上所有的阴道。当然它们会有差异，但阴茎也不能太粗。长应该是有好处，但也不能太长。 So neither pleasure nor psychology need matter at all, just function associated with some sort of fit. Pleasure and psychology are never invoked to explain penis morphology in other animals. If anything, it’s the cornucopia of horrifying, not pleasing, animal penises that begs for evolutionary explanations. 其实肉体欢愉和心理需要都根本不重要，重要的只是与大小匹配相关的功能。肉体欢愉和心理感受从来就没有被拿来解释其他动物的阴茎形态。如果非要从进化论的角度看，就要去解释太多种并不讨喜，反而可怕的动物阴茎了。 Wouldn’t you explain the size and shape of the key by the size and shape of the lock? So wouldn’t it be a little more scientifically sound to hypothesize that the human penis is sized and shaped like that because it fits well into the human vagina? 你在解释钥匙的大小和形状的时候，不是以锁的大小和形状为参照的吗？因此，人类阴茎之所以是如此的大小和形状，是为了要匹配人类的阴道，这种猜想在科学上不是比较合理么？ Sure, it gets chicken-and-eggy or turtles-all-the-way-downy, but c’mon. Isn’t it a bit obvious that the privates that fit inside the other privates are probably correlated? You’d think that even the people who have never had intercourse would default to this explanation for the evolution of the human penis. 当然，这会演变成一个鸡先蛋先，又或者是龟下有龟的问题【译注：”It’s turtles all the way down”来自一则古老的轶事，体现逻辑上的无限递归，后来成为一句玩笑话，用来表达表面立于不败之地，而实则回避逻辑问题的境况】。不过，拜托，互相契合的灵长类体征具有相关性，这不是很明显吗？你应该会同意，就算没有性经验的人，不需多想也会接受这个有关人类阴茎进化的理论吧。 But we’re rarely, if ever, told that human penises are relatively girthy because human vaginas are. It’s always about male competition or female preference. 但我们极少，甚至从没有听人提过，人类的阴茎之所以比较粗大，是因为人类的阴道比较粗大。大家总是在研究那些雄性竞争和雌性偏好的理论。 Sure, we may be a little weird compared to our close relatives for not having a baculum (penis bone), and maybe that’s the sort of thing you want to explain for whatever reason, but does human penis size and shape need a uniquely human story? 人类阴茎没有骨骼，和人类的近亲相比这也许显得有些奇怪，你可能会出于种种原因想为这一现象找个解释。但人类阴茎的大小和形状有别于其它动物，真的需要一个独特的解释吗？ Assuming it’s correlated to the vagina like it probably is in many other species,* then no it doesn’t… unless the size and shape of the human vagina has an exceptional story. 有不少其他动物的阴茎大小和形状很可能和它们的阴道相关，假设人类也是如此，那除非人类阴道的形态有异于其它动物，否则人类阴茎的形态不应该有什么特别。

[水禽雌雄生殖器官协同变异的图例。标星型的为雄性生殖器，箭头指向的是女性生殖器。图片来自“水禽雌雄生殖形态的协同进化”。DOI编码: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000418]

Does it? We wouldn’t know. There are zero (look!) articles titled “Why is the human vagina so big?” 究竟有没什么特别呢，我们不知道。从来都没有文章（你自己看！）以“为何人类的阴道那么大”为题。 Until right now. 直到现在才有。 Here we go. If we were going to answer it the same way we’ve long explained the human penis, and other animal penis shapes, then we’ve got a few ideas… 来吧，如果以我们长期以来解释人类和其他动物阴茎形态的思路，来回答这一问题的话，我们可以有如下一些解释…… Because walking upright made the vagina conspicuous and males thought a bigger vagina was better. Because big vaginas outcompete small ones at catching sperm. Because of male pleasure from coitus with a big vagina. Because of heat dissipation or thermoregulation. Because of a tradeoff with brain size. 因为直立行走让阴道外露，雄性认为阴道大一点比较好。因为大点的阴道比小点的更易于捕捉精子。因为大一点的阴道令雄性性交更舒服。因为有利于散热和调节体温。因为这是针对脑量增大的折衷方案。 And of course, we’d need to demonstrate that the human vagina is in fact larger, relative to body size, than the vaginas of other primates. Regardless, a sound answer to the question of vagina size and shape focuses on childbirth, wouldn’t you say? She’s got to be big enough to push out a baby and, for humans, it’s a great big baby. 当然，我们需要证明人类阴道相对于身体的比例，比起其它灵长类动物来说的确要更大。无论如何，难道你不觉得要回答人类阴道大小形状的问题，重点应该放在分娩上吗？阴道得足够大才能把婴儿生出来呀，人类婴儿的个头可大得很。

[红毛猩，大猩猩，黑猩猩与人类的对比。这些数值偏离了灵长类总体的回归分析。数据来自Dunsworth等人，2012年，PNAS第 109(38)：15212-15216]

So if there’s an exceptionally human story for the great big human penis, that exceptional story originates not in a woman’s orgasms, not in her pornographic thoughts or her lustful eyes, but in her decidedly unsexy “birth canal.” 所以如果人类阴茎硕大有什么特别原因的话，那原因既不是来自女人的性高潮，也不是来自女人的淫思欲眼，而是来自于那毫无性感可言的“产道”。 And I dug up a nice little note to explain this to us all written by Dr. Bowman, a gynecologist, back in 2008 for the Archives of Sexual Behavior which is magnificent. It starts out giving the only vagina-size-based, not to mention childbirth-based, explanation for human penises that I can find in the literature (which is thankfully cited by Dixson in his book mentioned above). But it still manages to bring the explanation beyond the vagina and onto another proud triumph: “In sum, man’s larger penis is a consequence of his larger brain.” 我找到了妇科医生Bowman于2008年发表在《性行为档案》上的一篇文章，该文很好地向大家解释了上述问题。文章开始以阴道大小和分娩需要为切入点来解释人类阴茎的大小，这是我能找到的以阴道大小来解释阴茎大小的唯一文献，从分娩需要着眼就更不用说了。这要感谢Dixson在前文提到的书中引用了这一资料。Bowman在文中还站在一个比阴道更高的层次，去解释这个问题：“总而言之，人类阴茎巨大是脑量增加的后果”。 After you clean up the coffee you just spat onto your computer screen, you can read it all for yourself by clicking on the link up there (or emailing me for the pdf). 你可以先把喷到电脑上的咖啡抹干净，然后点击上面的链接，通读一下那篇文章（想要pdf格式的可以发邮件给我）。 Guess who didn’t read it? That study in PNAS, mentioned above, that showed women naked penises, got a high attractive score for the big ones, and thinks that’s evidence for mate choice now, today, let alone back when (I’m going to speculate that) women had a tiny bit less of it. 你猜谁没有读过那篇文章？就是文章开头提到的那项研究的研究者【编注：指本文第三节提到的“让女性受访对象看真实大小的裸男幻灯片”的那项研究】，他们把阴茎赤裸裸地呈现给女人看，让那些大家伙拿到高分，然后认为拿到了交配偏好在当代的证据，至于过去女人眼福稍浅（我只是猜的）的年代是什么情况，就更不用废话了。 Point is, the literature rages on with the special explanations for the big penis with nary a big vagina in sight. 重点是，各路文章热火朝天地为大阴茎找了各种特别的原因，却对大阴道视而不见。 But you heard it here, at least. 但起码你在这里听说了。 Childbirth is why the human vagina is so big and, consequently, why the male penis is so big. It’s pretty straightforward. Yet we’re still left scratching our heads as to why the penis question endures. 分娩导致了人类阴道如此巨大，进而导致人类阴茎如此巨大。这很直观。然而大阴茎的话题经久不衰，这很令我们挠头。 Is evolutionary science averse to big vaginas? 难道进化研究是反大阴道的么？ Does nobody love a big vagina? 难道就没人喜欢大阴道么？ Because that’s just ridiculous. Everybody came from one. 这很荒谬，每个人都是从那儿出来的呀。

******

P.S. Unfortunately a few scholar.google searches led me to find no cross-species comparisons of mammalian vagina lengths or any vaginal measures. It may be out there, but I haven’ t found it. I found some measures for bitches… DOGS! And some heifers… COWS! So I’ve got to compile some data if I’m to do this properly. Baby size might be a way to do this. P.S. 我在谷歌学术搜索了一下，可惜没有找到不同哺乳动物阴道长度或尺码的对比。也许有，但我找不到。我倒是找到了狗娘的尺码……是真的母狗啦！还有牛逼的尺码……也是真的母牛啦！所以如果要认真对比的话，我得收集整理一些数据才行。通过分析婴儿的大小可能也是一个办法。 P.P.S. p. 73 in Dixson has Figure 4.3 with nine primate species’ penile and vaginal lengths plotted. Thanks Patrick C. for reminding me where I’d seen something like this and where to point readers! P.P.S. Dixson书中第73页的图表4.3，列出了九种灵长类动物的阴茎与阴道的长度。谢谢Patrick C.提醒我曾经看到过这样的图表，让我可以告诉读者上哪里找。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Tails of Great Soccer Players 伟大足球运动员的窄尾分布 作者：Jacob @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：Put A Number On It!，http://putanumonit.com/2015/11/10/003-soccer1/ Isn’t it strange that the Chinese aren’t world champions in every single team sport? Here’s why it’s strange: China has 19% of the world’s population. For individual sports that may not be a huge deal: if tennis ability and opportunity are distributed equally around the world, there would be only a 19% chance that the best tennis player hails from China and 81% that he is Swiss, Serbian, Spanish, Scottish or from any other country. It is somewhat surprising seeing the top 5 superior servers and strikers of soft springy spheres with swings of stringed racquets all come from sovereign states that start with “S”, but that’s a separate story. 中国没能在所有团队运动项目中成为世界冠军着实是件奇怪的事情。这之所以奇怪，是因为中国拥有着全世界19%的人口。对于个人运动项目来说，也许这个数字还并不算太大：如果打网球的能力和机会在全球均等地分布，那么全世界最好的网球运动员来自中国的概率仅有19%，而他来自于瑞士，塞尔维亚，西班牙，苏格兰或者任何其它国家的概率则有81%。全世界最具统治力的5名网球选手都来自于国名以“S”开头的国家这件事情的确有点令人吃惊，但那是另一件事情。 In team sports that should be different. If soccer talent was equally spread China should have on average 19 of the top 100 players in each generation, almost never less than 11. Countries like Spain, Germany and France on the other hand would expect to have 1 player in the top 100, maybe 2 or 3 if they’re lucky. That would be no match for the loaded Chinese squad. Even a top 3 player can’t dominate all by himself in a team-based sport like soccer, as evidenced by the below picture of sad Ronaldo. 在团队运动中情况则完全不同。如果踢足球的天赋在世界上均等地分布，那么平均而言，在每一代世界上最好的100名球员中，中国会拥有19个，而这个数字几乎绝不可能低于11。另一方面，西班牙，德国和法国这些国家则通常只会有1名球员进入全球前100名，即使幸运的话也最多只有2或3名。而他们的队伍应该完全无法与皆由精英组成的中国队抗衡。毕竟，即使是排名世界前3的球员也无法在足球这样的一项团队运动中靠一己之力统治比赛，下图中C罗悲伤的表情充分证明了这一点。 And yet, the Chinese team is not good at soccer, and I’m putting that milder than some. The Chinese men’s national soccer team is ranked 84th in the world, a few spots below Antigua and Barbuda – a nation with a population of 90,000. That’s roughly equal to a single neighborhood in Shanghai. 但实际上中国足球队的水平并不高，而我的这种表述方式已经比一些人温和得多了。中国男子国家足球队的世界排名是第84位，他们的积分比安提瓜和巴布达还要低上几分，而这个国家的人口仅有9万，几乎只相当于上海的一个街区。 Motivation is often brought up as an explanation: perhaps the Chinese have the talent and opportunity to play soccer, but all 1.3 billion of them choose not to. Perhaps instead of playing soccer they choose to study. Those that play soccer the least and study the most can go into medicine, and those that study hardest of all and have no room for soccer make it into top medical schools in the US. 常被提到的一个理由是动力不足：也许中国人拥有踢足球的天赋和机会，但是13亿中国人却选择不去踢。也许他们宁愿把时间花在学习上。那些踢球踢得少，读书读得多的孩子可以去学医，而那些在学习上最用功以至完全没时间踢球的孩子将在未来进入美国最好的医学院。 Certainly we don’t expect those Chinese to play soccer at all, and yet below is a group photo of the Emory University medical school soccer club. The summer I was there we played at least 4 hours a week. You can easily find me on the photo, I’m one of three non-Chinese people on the team. 显然我们不会相信中国人完全不踢足球，下面是一组埃默里大学医学院足球俱乐部的照片。在那个夏天，我每周至少在那里踢上4个小时足球。你可以轻松地在照片上找到我，我是那支球队里仅有的三名非华人球员之一。 The success of a national soccer team should depend on two factors: the pool of available players (population) and some combination of natural talent, infrastructure and opportunity that determine roughly how successful an average person in that country can be at soccer. I’ll call the combined second thing national soccer affinity, and will immediately note that it’s a huge simplification to throw so many disparate things into a single factor. 一支国家足球队的成功主要依赖于以下两个因素：可供他们选择的球员人数，还有某种天赋、基础设施和机遇的组合，这大体上决定了这个国家的普通人能在足球方面所能达到的平均高度。在后文中我会将这种组合称作一个国家的“足球亲和性”，并会很快提到将如此多不相关的东西整合到一个因子里实际上是一种极大的简化做法。 My goal is to separate the effects of population, so affinity is basically everything that’s independent of a country’s total size. I am making no guesses regarding the components of soccer affinity (maybe it’s all about having enough sunshine days for kids to play outdoors), only in the comparison between countries. The question I want to investigate is: 我的目标是将人口因素单独分离出来，所以“亲和性”这个概念基本就是所有与一个国家的人口数量不相关的因素。我也不会对“足球亲和性”这个概念的具体组成做任何的猜测（也许它只涉及有足够多晴朗的日子让孩子们在室外踢球），而仅仅是在国家之间进行比较。我想探索的问题是： Relative to their population, which countries are the best and worst at soccer? And why? 相对于其人口数量，哪些国家在足球方面做得最好？而哪些国家又做得最差？为什么？ If we imagine that soccer affinity is normally distributed, a country’s population is the size of the bell curve and the national affinity is how far to the right on the ability axis the center of the bell curve is. The level of a country’s national team is how far on the ability axis the best 11 men and women are. 如果我们假设“足球亲和性”这个因子服从正态分布，一国的人口就是钟形曲线的面积，而一个国家的“足球亲和性”则可以被定义为钟形曲线的中心线在能力轴上的投影与原点之间的距离。而该国国家队的水平则取决于该国最优秀的11名男球员和女球员在能力轴上所处的位置。 Clearly, having a larger bell curve (more people at every level of play) and shifting the curve to the right (better players on average) should both contribute to boosting the level of the national team. The fact that there are over 15,000 Chinese for each Antiguan, and yet the soccer teams are comparable in level, presents the following puzzle: 很显然，拥有一个面积更大的钟形曲线（在各种水平上都拥有更多的人口）以及让钟形曲线向右移动（更高的球员平均水平）都有助于提升一国国家队的水平。而中国的人口是安提瓜人口的15000倍，但这两国的国家队水平却处于同一档次这一事实则向我们提出了如下的难题： Why does it seem that national team level depends on affinity much more than on population? 为什么国家足球队的水平对“足球亲和性”的依赖程度要远远高于对人口的依赖程度？ The answer to that puzzle is: Because the tails of a normal distribution fall much faster than you think. 而这个问题的答案是：因为一个正态分布的尾部下降的速率比你想象的要快得多。 In plain(er) English: every point on a bell curve is some distance away from the middle (the mean). The further away from the mean you go the less points there are (lower curve). These distances are often measured in standard deviations, or SD, shown by the vertical red lines on the picture. On a standard bell curve, just over 68% of the points are found a distance of less than 1 SD from the mean in either direction. 更直白的就是：钟形曲线上每个点和中心（也就是平均值）都存在一个距离。与平均值的距离越远，这个水平上的点数也就越少（在曲线上就越低）。而与中心的距离通常是以标准差计的（在图中用红色的垂直线条表示）。在一个标准的钟形曲线上，有68%的点都会落在均值两端一个标准差的距离之内。 Looking naively at the familiar bell picture, it seems that the curve drops sharply over the first 2 or 3 SD to either side and then levels off around 0 when you move further away. That’s extremely misleading: the relative height of the curve actually drops faster the further out you go. It’s invisible on the chart because the line further than 3 SD out is squished very close to 0. The height of the curve at 1 SD is 4.5 times higher than that at 2 SD. The curve at 5 SD is 250 times higher than that at 6 SD and it keeps getting steeper and steeper. 如果我们直观地看一下这条熟悉的钟形曲线，看起来曲线两端在距离中心最初的两三个标准差内下降得非常快，而在之后更远的距离上就会在零附近以一种接近水平的方式缓慢下降。而这实际上会造成巨大的误导：事实上，距离中心越远，曲线的相对高度下降的速度越快。但由于在3个标准差之外，曲线被压缩到了非常接近0的高度，所以在图上我们看不到。曲线上1标准差处的高度是2标准差处的4.5倍，而5标准差处的高度则是6标准差处的250倍，而随着离中心越来越远，曲线的陡峭程度还在不断上升。 The best male soccer player in China (Zheng Zhi?) is almost literally one in a billion, which means that he’s almost 6 standard deviation better than the average Chinese. If the population of China doubled (they’re working on it!), there would be 2 players as good as Zheng is. However, if the population of China became just one standard deviation better at soccer, there would be over 200 players at least as good, and a few dozen who are much better. 中国最好的男性球员（是郑智吗？）在中国差不多是十亿里挑一了，这意味着他的水平比中国人的平均足球水平要高6个标准差。如果中国的人口增加一倍（他们的确在努力这么干！），那么中国将会出现两个和郑智一样优秀的球员。然而，如果中国人的平均足球水平能够提高一个标准差的话，那么中国就会有超过200名球员和郑智水平一样高了，而且还会有几十名球员的水平比他高得多。 It could be that a normally distributed soccer skill model is wholly wrong, but it does seem to explain some of what we see in reality. For anything that’s distributed roughly like a bell curve, the quality of the best people in a large enough group (like a country) depends much more on small differences in the average level than on large differences in total population. Hey, I wonder if that’s why so many Nobel prize winners are… *gets repeatedly electrocuted* 实际上这个正态分布的足球水平模型可能是完全错误的，但是它看起来的确解释了一些我们在现实中观察到的现象。对于任何一个分布接近钟形曲线的群体，在一个足够大的群体（比如一个国家）中，水平最高者的能力更多地取决于平均水平上的微小差异，而人口总数上的巨大差异所发挥作用则要小得多。嘿，现在我开始怀疑这就是为什么如此多的诺贝尔奖得主都死于触电的原因了。 Whoops, sorry about that. Let’s see this effect in action on the one trait that we can all agree is close to normally distributed and varies among nations: human height. 抱歉这个梗有点欠。让我们通过一个特征来看看这种效应的实际力量，该特征的近似正态分布得到了大家认可，而且在国家间存在差异：那就是人的身高。 The average Indian dude (sorry for the androcentrism, ladies, there’s just better data on male heights and male soccer teams) is 165 cm (5′ 5″) and there are roughly 630 million of them. The average Norwegian dude is 180 cm (5′ 11″) and there are 2.5 million. The standard deviation of male height is around 6 cm around the world. If heights were distributed in a perfect normal bell curve with those parameters they would look like: 印度6.3亿成年男性（女士们，抱歉了，这里看起来似乎有点大男子主义，但有关男性身高和男子足球队的数据质量的确更好）的平均身高是165厘米（5英尺5英寸）。而挪威250万成年男性的平均身高则是180厘米（5英尺11英寸）。全世界身高的标准差大约是6厘米。如果身高完全服从一个由这些参数构建的正态钟形分布，那么看起来将会像下图这样： As we plot them side by side, the Indian curve completely dwarfs the Norwegian one, even for pretty tall dudes. There are 9 Indians who are exactly 180 cm (5′ 11″) tall for every Norwegian. 5′ 11″ is tall, but not super tall. The higher mean effect only kicks in for the real outliers, so let’s zoom the above plot in to the really tall dudes. 当我们把整个分布画在一起，印度的曲线看起来完全压倒了挪威的曲线，即使对于身高很高的成年男性也是这样。印度和挪威身高180（5英尺11英寸）厘米的人口数量比例是9比1。5英尺11英寸算是高了，但并不是非常高。高均值效应只有在那些真正的异常值上才会起作用，那么让我们将图上那些真的很高的成年男性所对应的部分放大看看。 Here, the picture reverses completely. There are 100 times as many Norwegians above 195 cm (6′ 4″) as there are Indians. Under a normal distribution assumption, the tallest Indian at 6′ 7″ would only match the 1,000th tallest Norwegian. 在这里，情况完全颠倒了过来。身高超过195厘米（6英尺4英寸）的成年男性数量，挪威和印度的比例是100比1。在正态分布的假设之下，印度最高的成年男性的身高将是6英尺7英寸，而这个身高在挪威人中只能排在第1000位。 It’s important to remember that a normal bell curve is a very simplistic model, real life is messy, and Dharmendra Singh is 8′ 1″. Even inside the realm of mathematics, a normal distribution has narrower tails (the height drops faster as you get away from the mean) than most other widely used distributions that look sorta like a bell curve (like the student’s t or the gamma distributions). A normal model underestimates the number of outliers and overstates the importance of shifting the mean. 我们必须记住的是，正态分布的钟形曲线是一种非常简化的模型，真实情况要复杂得多，实际上印度最高的男性Dharmendra Singh的身高是8英尺1英寸。即使在数学王国中，相比其他大多数常用的看起来像钟形曲线的分布（例如学生t分布或gamma分布），正态分布也有着窄得多的尾部（这意味着在远离均值时，曲线下降的速度更快）。一个正态分布模型会低估异常值点的数量，同时会高估平均值移动的重要性。 With that said, my main point stands: it should not surprise anyone that the achievement of extreme performers doesn’t strongly depend on the population of a country but does on the average. There doesn’t have to be something horribly wrong with China to account for its disappointing soccer team, they could be just a little bit to the left of other countries on national soccer affinity. 但即使考虑到这些情况，我的主要观点仍然成立：那些表现极端出众的个体的出现并不太依赖于一国的人口数量，而非常依赖于该国在这方面的平均水平。中国国家足球队令人失望的表现背后也许并没有什么错得离谱的东西，这也许只是因为中国在“足球亲和性”的分布上稍微靠左了一些而已。 We still don’t know what makes up soccer affinity, just that it’s enough to explain the disconnect between populations and team performance. With the math lesson behind us comes the fun part: in the next posts we’ll rank the world’s countries by average soccer affinity, throw a bunch of data at it to see what it correlates with, and see if can get any insight into what makes countries good or bad at soccer. 我们仍然不知道“足球亲和性”是由哪些因素构成的，但它足以解释人口和团队表现之间脱节的现象。在我们的这节数学课之后才是真正有趣的部分：在接下来的几篇文章中，我们将会把世界各国按照平均的“足球亲和性”进行排名，通过一系列的数据来看看它与哪些因素相关，并试着获得一些关于是什么让一个国家在足球方面表现得好或不好的深入见解。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Generosity won’t fix our shortage of organs for transplants 慷慨解决不了可移植器官的短缺 作者：Tyler Cowen @ 2015-12-28 译者：龟海海 校对：小册子（＠昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Washington Post，http://www.aei.org/publication/generosity-wont-fix-our-shortage-of-organs-for-transplants/ Each week, In Theory takes on a big idea in the news and explores it from a range of perspectives. This week we’re talking about government compensation for organ donors.  《华盛顿邮报》的“理论”栏目每周都会从新闻中选取一个大胆话题，从不同角度进行探索。本周我们的主题是政府对器官捐献者的补偿。 Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. She is the editor of “When Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney Donors.” Sally Satel 是美国企业研究所常驻学者和耶鲁大学医学院的精神病学讲师，也是《当利他主义不够时：补偿捐肾者的理由》一书的主编。 My interest in the national organ shortage began one steamy afternoon in August 2004. That day, my doctor told me my kidneys were failing. As a physician myself, I knew immediately that I would need to find a replacement organ or else face a shortened life tethered to a dialysis machine. My search was rocky at first, but finally I did get a kidney from a casual friend — now a very dear one. 我对国内器官匮乏的关注始于2004年八月一个闷热的下午。那天我的医生告诉我，我的肾快要不行了。作为一名内科医生，我立刻知道我需要找到替换的器官，否则我将命不长久，而且余生都要栓着透析机。 At the time of my search, there were about 60,000 people on the national waiting list maintained by the United Network for Organ Sharing. Today, a decade later, there are roughly 101,000. Meanwhile, donation rates from both living and deceased donors are effectively flat. The death toll is 12 people per day — individuals who could not survive the years-long wait for an organ. 根据我当时搜索的结果，美国器官共享网络的全国等待名单上大约有6万人。十年过去了，如今上面大约有10万1千人。与此同时，活体和死亡捐献率都走势平平。结果就是每天有12人由于多年得不到新器官而死亡。 Clearly, our current organ transplant policy is a qualified failure. And it is because our current system, by law, mandates altruism as the sole legitimate motive for organ donation. We need to give more healthy young and middle-age people a reason to become living donors. 显而易见，我们现今的器官移植政策是十足的失败。那是因为按照法律，利他主义是器官移植唯一的合法动机。我们需要给健康的年轻人和中年人足够的理由来让他们加入活体器官捐献者的行列。 Tragically, altruism is not enough. The yield from public awareness campaigns, the organ procurement teams that meet with families of the recently deceased and the reimbursement for donors’ expenses has leveled off. Moving to an opt-out system, under which we would harvest people’s organs at death unless they had earlier indicated they didn’t wish to donate them, can do only so much — relatively few people die in ways that leave their organs suitable for transplantation. 不幸的是，利他主义并不够。公众宣传活动，器官采集团队造访最近有亲人去世的家庭，为捐助者报销费用，这些措施的效果已趋于耗竭。即使在捐献者死去时默认可以采集器官（除非他们早先曾表明不愿意捐献），成效也不会太好——大多数人的死亡方式决定了他们的器官不适合移植。 So, to save lives, let’s test incentives. A model reimbursement plan would look like this: Donors would not receive a lump sum of cash; instead, a governmental entity or a designated charity would offer them in-kind rewards, such as a contribution to the donor’s retirement fund; an income tax credit or a tuition voucher; lifetime health insurance; a contribution to a charity of the donor’s choice; or loan forgiveness. 所以，为了救人，我们可以试试激励机制。一个理想的补偿计划应该是这样的：捐献者不会收到一笔现金，但政府部门或者指定的慈善机构会为他们提供非现金奖励，例如：向捐献者的退休基金供款，所得税抵免或者学费代金劵，终生健康保险，向捐献者指定的慈善机构捐款，或者债务豁免。 Meanwhile, the law can impose a waiting period of at least six months before people donate, ensuring that they don’t act impulsively and that they offer fully informed consent. Prospective compensated donors would be carefully screened for physical and emotional health, as all donors are now. These arrangements would filter out financially desperate individuals who might otherwise rush to donate for a large sum of instant cash and later regret it. 与此同时，法律可以规定捐献者在捐献前有至少六个月的冷静期，以确保他们不是冲动行事，而是经过周详考虑才决定同意。和现在所有捐献者一样，有偿捐献者也需要经过仔细筛选以保证身心健康。这些措施可以把那些急着等钱用的人过滤掉，他们会为了那笔钱而冲去捐献，但事后追悔莫及。 The donors’ kidneys would be distributed to people on the waiting list, according to the rules now in place. (People who wanted to donate a kidney to a specific person — say, a father to a son — would still be able to, alongside this system.) Finally, all rewarded donors would be guaranteed follow-up medical care for any complications, which is not ensured now. 根据现行规则，捐出来的肾将分配给那份等待名单上的人。（如果有人想把肾捐献给指定的人，例如，父亲捐给儿子，也同时可以做到。）最后，所有有偿捐献者都将得到术后并发症的跟踪治疗，这个规定是现在没有的。 The good news is that the general notion of incentivizing donations is gaining traction. A 2009 poll of the membership of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons revealed that 80 percent supported or were neutral toward the provision of tax credits for donors. In 2014, the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons published the results of a workshop in which the societies expressed approval of testing third-party, in-kind incentives. A few weeks ago, the American Medical Association passed a resolution in favor of testing the effect of incentives on living and deceased donation. (A reward for deceased donation could take the form of a funeral subsidy or a contribution to the estate of the deceased.) 好消息是，为捐献提供激励的观念正日益赢得关注。2009年一项针对美国器官移植外科医生协会的调查显示，80％的协会成员对向捐助者提供税收抵免持赞成或中立态度。2014年，美国器官移植协会（AST）和美国器官移植外科医生协会公布了他们一个研讨会的结果，在该研讨会上，两个协会对试行来自第三方的非现金奖励表示支持。几周前，全美医疗协会（AMA）通过决议，支持测试为活体和死后器官捐献提供激励的效果。（死后捐赠的奖励，可以葬礼补贴或并入死者遗产的方式实现。） The objections I heard years ago seem to be wearing thin. Take the objection that rewarding donors “commodifies the body.” We already commodify the body, speaking strictly, every time there is a transplant: The doctors get paid to manipulate the body. So does the hospital and the agency that obtains and transports the organ. Why would we now object to enriching the donor — the sole individual in this entire scenario who gives the precious item in question and assumes all the risk? 多年前我所听到的反对声音，如今似乎越来越少了。例如，有人反对说奖励捐献者是“人体商品化”。其实，严格来说我们早就将人体商品化了，每一次移植手术，医生们都是拿着薪水在操纵着人体。那些获得和运输器官的医院和中介机构亦是如此。那我们现在为什么要反对给捐献者报酬呢？在整件事里面，捐献者才是唯一一个提供宝贵器官和承担所有风险的人。 At the heart of the “commodification” claim is really the concern that donors will not be treated with dignity. But dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions in their own best interest, protect their health and express gratitude for their sacrifice. Material gain, per se, is not inconsistent with this. The true indignity is to stand by smugly while thousands of people die each year for want of an organ. 诟病“人体商品化”，其核心实际是担心捐献者得不到有尊严的对待。但我们尊重他们有为自己做出最有利决定的能力，保证他们的健康，对他们的牺牲表示感激，这些就保证了尊严。物质上的获益，实质上与此并不矛盾。真正不光彩的，是眼见每年数以千计的人在等待器官中死去，却还站在一旁洋洋自得。 Some worry that that rewarded donation will attract only low-income people. This is possible, though only a trial project can provide the answer. But even if this turns out to be the case, why doubt the capacity of low-income people to make decisions in their own interest? From the standpoint of the recipient, it is low-income individuals who stand to benefit the most, as they are disproportionately represented among those waiting for a kidney. 有人担心奖励捐献只会吸引低收入人群。这是有可能的，但只有通过试验计划才可以得到答案。但即便事实就是如此，我们又为什么要去怀疑低收入人群基于自身利益作决定的能力呢？从器官接收者的角度看，受益最大的正是低收入人群，因为他们在等待新肾的名单上比例偏高。 Yet regardless of who ends up donating, any plan must ensure that donors’ decisions are thoroughly informed, their health is protected and they are amply rewarded. As the organ waiting list grows, the need to test incentives becomes stronger and stronger. 然而，无论谁来捐献，任何一个计划都必须确保捐献者在做决定前得到充分的信息，他们将得到健康保障和足够的奖励。由于器官等待名单日益增长，试行“激励计划”也变得越来越迫切。 We need to liberate patients from the tyranny of “the gift.” It’s glorious when you are the recipient, as I know better than most, but the penalty for being unlucky should not be premature death. Hollow moralizing from critics in the face of so much needless suffering must be replaced by sensitive and pragmatic policy. 我们需要将病患从“礼物”观念的思想束缚中解放出来。能得到器官捐赠当然非常美好，对此我比绝大多数的人都深有体会，但运气不好的病人也不应该就这样英年早逝。在如此众多不必要的痛苦折磨面前，批评者空洞的道德说教，必须被通情达理且切实可行的政策所取代。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Market for Human Hair 人发市场 作者：Alex Mayyasi @ 2015-12-02 译者：Horace Rae 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Priceonomics，http://priceonomics.com/the-market-for-human-hair/ The Venkateswara Temple in Tirumala, India, had a problem. 印度Tirumala的Venkateswara寺有了个麻烦。 Thirty to forty million pilgrims visit the temple each year, and in a gesture of humility and sacrifice, 10% to 25% of them, men and women both, have their heads shaven. Every day, the Venkateswara Temple staff fills giant vats with human hair, and for a long time, its staff burned thousands of pounds of hair—a noxious process that produces toxic gases like ammonia and was eventually banned by the Indian government in the 1990s. 每年有三千到四千万名朝圣者造访这间寺院。为了表示谦恭与牺牲，他们中10%－25%的人会剪掉自己的头发，其中男女皆有。每天，Venkateswara寺的工作人员要把头发塞进大桶里。很长一段时间，工作人员会把上万磅头发烧掉，这一行为十分有害，会产生氨气等有毒气体。1990年代，这种行为最终被印度政府禁止。 By then, however, they had discovered a new way to get rid of the hair: sell it for millions. 不过，那时候他们已经找到了一种解决头发问题的新方法：把它们卖掉，大赚一笔。 When fashion companies make wigs—and when stylists tape or weave hair extensions into customers’ hair in salons—they want to use real human hair. To get it, they rely on places like the Venkateswara Temple, which sells its hair in annual auctions. In 2014, fashion companies bid almost $12 million for what temple employees call “black gold.” 时装公司生产假发时，或者发廊的造型师给顾客接假发时，都想使用真正的人发。为了获得人发，他们依赖类似Venkateswara寺这样的地方。Venkateswara寺会在年度拍卖中出售头发。2014年，时装公司出价将近1200万美元，购买这种被寺院员工叫做“黑金”的东西。 The Tirumala Temple auction is part of a multi-billion dollar market for human hair—a global endeavor that includes collecting long locks to make fashionable hairpieces and its more industrial counterpart of turning hair into fertilizers, stuffing for clothes, and even amino acids used in pizza dough. Tirumala的寺院拍卖只是数十亿美元规模的人发市场的一部分。这一全球性行当包括收集长发以制作时髦假发，还包括更加工业化的部分：把头发制成化肥、衣服填充物，甚至做成披萨面团制作中用到的氨基酸。 Nearly everyone has hair they discard without a thought. Yet it can also be one of the world’s most precious resources, and businesses can’t get enough of it. 几乎所有人都会想也不想地扔掉头发。但是，同时，它也能成为世界上最宝贵的资源，许多公司对头发的需求总是多多益善。 From Tirumala to the Salon 从Tirumala到发廊 A quality wig made of human hair sells for thousands of dollars in the United States, and hair extensions made of real hair can sell for several hundred or thousand dollars. But it takes a lot of work to turn the hair of Venkateswara pilgrims into a luxury product. 在美国，一顶使用人发制作的优质假发可以卖到数千美元，人发制作的接发材料也可以卖到数百甚至上千美元。但是，要把Venkateswara朝圣者们的头发变成昂贵的商品，有很多事情需要做。 When companies buy hair from the temple for as much as $700 per pound, it contains sweat, blood, and lice. The temple warehouses reek from mildew and fungus. Investigative journalist Scott Carney visited Tirumala and called the hair a “foul-smelling heap.” As 600 barbers each shave a head every 5 minutes, they leave bloody scalps and hair balls littering the floor. 当厂商以每磅700美元的价格从寺院买来头发时，头发中还有汗水、血块和虱子。寺院的仓库散发着霉味。调查记者Scott Carney造访Tirumala时，把那里的头发形容为“一大堆恶臭”。大约600名理发师，每位理发师每隔5分钟剃光一个头，血淋淋的头皮和发球就会杂乱地铺在地上。 It takes someone in the industry to recognize why the hair is so valuable. Only long women’s hair is sold at auction—the temple sells men’s hair at a pittance for industrial uses—and since many pilgrims come from humble, rural towns, they have not used shampoos or styled and treated their hair in ways that damage it. 只有业内人士才能认识到为什么头发如此宝贵。只有女性的长发能在拍卖中出售——而男性头发则被寺院低价出售，用作工业用途。因为许多朝圣者来自偏远贫穷的村庄，他们没有用过洗发水，也没有做过发型，而且他们对付头发的方式对它造成过损伤。 To transform the best (longest) hair from trash into treasure, teams of workers untangle the hair, sort it by length, pick out lice and other particles, wash and dry it, and dye it a variety of colors. Companies then either ship the hair out to salons where stylists will sew, tape, or bond the extensions into customers’ hair, or sew the hair into wigs. 为让最优质（最长）的头发变废为宝，需要许多工人团队把头发理顺，按长度分类，把虱子和其他东西挑出来，之后把头发洗净并干燥，然后把它们染成不同的颜色。厂商要么把这些头发送到发廊，发廊的造型师会把头发编织、粘贴或者嫁接在顾客的头发上；要么把它们编织成假发。 The process is incredibly labor intensive. “To make a high-end wig,” says Mo Hefnawy of Lori’s Wigsite, one of many retailers of wigs made by Indian and Chinese manufacturers, “someone sat there with a needle and sewed a few hairs at a time. It takes 3 or 4 days.” 这一过程需要大量劳动力。中国或印度所产假发的众多经销商之一，Lori’s Wigsite的Mo Hefnawy说：“为了生产出一顶优质假发，需要有人坐着，用缝针一次编织几根头发。这一过程需要3天到4天。” Retailers like Lori’s Wigsite sell wigs made of fake, synthetic hair, and they cost $250 where a human hair wig would cost $1,500. But synthetic wigs don’t last as long, can’t be styled, and look and feel less natural. Most people want wigs made of real hair, Hefnawy says, but Lori’s sells more synthetic wigs than human hair wigs because they are more affordable. 类似Lori’s Wigsite这样的经销商也出售人工合成毛发制作的假发，这种假发的价格是250美元，但是真发制成的假发要1500美元。但是合成假发很快就会损坏，也不能做造型，看起来摸起来也没有那么自然。Hefnawy说，大部分人都想要真发制成的假发，但是Lori’s出售的合成假发比人发假发多，因为前者更加便宜。 The majority of Lori’s customers suffer hair loss from chemotherapy or conditions like alopecia. A minority are religious women who buy wigs as an alternative to modestly hiding their hair, and some older men and women buy wigs to cover thinning hair. Lori’s 的顾客大多是因化疗或脱发症而脱发的人，一小部分女性宗教信徒购买假发是为了隐藏起自己的头发以示谦恭，还有一些老年人购买假发来遮盖自己日益稀薄的头发。 For the moment, though, hair extensions are increasingly popular among young women who want to quickly change their hairstyle or buy the long, thick hair celebrated in shampoo commercials. Among other celebrities, Victoria Beckham, Beyonce, and Kylie Jenner of Kardashian fame are known for wearing extensions. 但是现在，一些年轻女性想要迅速改变发型，或是想要洗发水广告中那样的浓密飘逸的长发，所以接发在她们中间非常流行。明星中间，像Victoria Beckham， Beyonce以及Kardashian家的Kylie Jenner，都因接发而闻名。 Prices have increased with popularity. In several burglaries of hair salons, thieves ignored cash registers and went straight for hair extensions worth tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. 随着接发流行开来，其价格也水涨船高。在一些针对发廊的盗窃案中，窃贼们对收款机视而不见，径直去寻找接发用的假发，其价值常高达数万甚至数十万美元。 When nonprofits like Locks of Love ask people to donate their hair (to make hairpieces for children suffering from hair loss), they are not asking because long hair is hard to find. The human hair market is well established, and anyone can go online and instantly order hair by the pound. 当“一缕关爱”（Locks of Love）这样的非营利性组织号召人们捐出头发（用来给脱发的孩子制作假发）时，不是因为长发难以得到。人发市场已经相当成熟，所有人都可以上网，即刻预订头发，按磅计价。 Locks of Love asks for donations because hair is so expensive that many patients can’t afford thousand dollar wigs. “一缕关爱”号召人们捐头发，是因为头发过于昂贵，许多患者买不起价值数千美元的假发。 The Secret Life of Hair 头发的隐秘故事 The market for human hair has always been a mechanism for getting hair from people in poor areas to those who need or want it in wealthier ones. 人发市场向来是个从贫穷地区的人手中获取头发，然后把头发卖给富裕地区有需要的人的机制。 History is full of examples of human hair being treated as a valuable commodity. Archeologists have discovered human hair wigs held together with resin and beeswax in Ancient Egyptian tombs. Upper class men in 18th century Europe wore long periwigs made of human or horse hair, and thieves commonly worked in teams to steal and resell them. An observer of an annual “hair harvest” in a poor Italian village in the 19th century described seeing girls “sheared, one after the other, like sheep.” Their hair went to Parisian markets that sold 200,000 pounds of human hair each year. 历史上，人发成为昂贵商品的例子俯拾皆是。考古学家们已经在古埃及的墓穴中发现了用树脂和蜂蜡粘合的人发假发。十八世纪，欧洲上流社会的男性会佩戴人发或是马鬃制作的假发。当时的盗贼常常会组团盗窃、转卖假发。十九世纪，在一个贫穷的意大利村庄，有人曾见证了一年一次“头发收割”，他写道，自己看见女孩们“一个接一个地剃头，就像剪羊毛一样”。她们的头发会被出售到巴黎市场，那里每年有20万磅人发售出。 The difference today is that the market has changed with globalization. Hair does not move from provincial Europe to capital cities; it moves from poor countries to wealthy ones. The vast majority of hair and hair products come from India and China and are sold in the United States and Europe. 与过去相比，现在的不同是，人发市场已经因全球化而改变。头发不再从欧洲的乡下被运往首都，而是从贫穷国家运往富裕国家。绝大多数头发与发制品来自印度和中国，并被出售到美国和欧洲。 In the hair industry, no one bothers to equally celebrate each and every person’s hair. For them, hair is a product, and the way they talk about hair reflects economic and social realities—and made us squirm. 在人发产业中，没人会费心去平等的称颂每个人的头发。对他们来说，头发就是物品，他们谈论头发的方式反映了经济和社会的现实——且令我们不安。 “Indian hair is best,” retailers and manufacturers told us without hesitation. They cite the strength of Indian hair and how plentiful it is thanks to places like the Venkateswara Temple. But its most valuable attribute is that it closely resembles caucasian hair. “Oriental hair is used,” one industry expert bluntly added, “because there is a lot of it.” “印度人的头发最好，”经销商和生产厂家毫不犹豫地告诉我们。他们谈论印度头发的强韧度，以及拜Venkateswara寺这种地方所赐的巨大供应量。但是它最具价值的因素是它和白人头发的相似性。“我们使用东方人的头发，”行内专家坦白道，“因为东方人的头发供应量很大。” Hair flows from poor countries to rich countries, but when a woman with blond hair is willing to sell her hair, the market pays incredibly well. Destitute Russian women regularly sell their blond hair for fifty to several hundred dollars. Mo Hefnawy says he knows a young woman whom wig makers flew out from Indiana and paid $1,500 for her hair, which they made into an $8,000 wig. 头发从贫穷国家流入富裕国家，但是当金发女人愿意卖出她的头发，市场给出的价格特别慷慨。贫穷的俄罗斯女人定期卖掉自己的金发，能卖到五十美元甚至上百美元。Mo Hefnawy说他认识一个年轻女人，假发制造商为了她的头发从印第安纳州远道飞来，付给她1500美元，用她的头发制作的假发售价8000美元。 Africa also bucks global trends: despite the prevalence of poverty in many countries, Africa is an importer of hair. Elaborate wigs may no longer separate royalty from commoners, but hair has not lost its political and economic relevance. 非洲则逆全球趋势而行。尽管非洲的大部分国家都十分贫穷，但非洲是头发进口地。精致的假发可能不再能区分王室与平民，但是头发还没有丧失其政治和经济意义。 Projects like My Nappy Roots and Good Hair have explored the efforts that black people, especially women, go through to style their hair, and in particularly the time and expense of straightening their curly hair—often with the help of hair extensions. Responding to this question of why “women adopt a concept of ‘beauty’ that is not based on the natural characteristics of their hair,” Al Sharpton says in Good Hair, “We wear our economic oppression on our heads." 诸如 My Nappy Roots和Good Hair之类的项目发现，黑人，尤其是女性，会费尽心力给头发做造型，尤其是他们会费时费财地去把他们的卷发拉直——这一过程经常需要接发。在回答“为什么女性不把她们与生俱来的头发特征当作美的标准”这一问题时，Al Sharpto在Good Hair中说：“我们头上戴的是经济压迫。” As a result, hair extensions and products are popular among African Americans and wealthy Africans, but hair traders have little interest in black hair. 因此，接发和假发产品在非裔美国人和富裕的非洲人之间非常流行，但是，头发经销商对黑人头发的兴趣有限。 Collecting Hair at Scale 规模化采集 If you ask people in the industry where they get human hair, they talk about temples in China and India like the Venkateswara Temple. 如果你询问业内人士他们的原料来自何处，他们会谈到中国和印度的寺庙，比如Venkateswara寺。 It’s no surprise they do; collecting hair from pilgrims is an elegant solution to manufacturers’ need for human hair. Shaving one’s head is a traditional, voluntary practice that avoids the exploitive undertones of desperate women selling their hair. Most pilgrims don’t know that the temple sells their hair. But we have not seen reports of religious leaders pocketing millions. The temple administrators have used the proceeds on gold wall panelling for the temple, but they say they primarily spend the money on charitable endeavors like feeding the needy and running hospitals. 这么做并不令人惊讶；从信徒那里收集头发是满足生产厂家头发需求的完美方案。剃发是一种有历史渊源而且自愿的行为，这就避免了走投无路的女性忍痛卖发的剥削寓意。大部分朝圣者不知道寺院卖掉了他们的头发。尽管如此，我们并未听说寺院管理者因此腰缠万贯。他们用这笔钱给寺院的墙板镀金，但他们声称这笔钱优先用于慈善用途，比如施粥行善或资助医院。 Yet only a minority of hair comes from temples. In India, a regional Minister for Textiles and Commerce told The Guardian, “all the Indian temples together contribute only 20 out of every 100 locks of premium hair sold abroad.” The Minister added, “Where the rest comes from, we have no idea.” Retailers and wholesale providers we spoke to voiced similar uncertainty. 但是只有一小部分头发来自寺庙。在印度，某地方的纺织和商业部部长告诉《卫报》，“印度所有寺庙出售的头发只占出口优质头发的20%。”他补充道：“剩下的头发是哪里来的，我们就不知道了。”与我们交谈过的零售商以及批发商同样语焉不详。 We do know that collecting hair is a large, decentralized undertaking that employs tens of thousands of people in India alone. Barber shops and salons collect and sell hair—both long hair sold to fashion companies and short hair sold cheaply to be used as stuffing, fertilizer, or, once broken down into component chemicals, in industrial uses ranging from food to pharmaceuticals. Waste pickers scrounge hair from trash and dumpsters. Hair traders visit villages—in a slum outside Chennai, a bell announces a trader’s arrival—to buy hair with either cash or trinkets and hair accessories. 我们知道，收集头发是一个巨大的去中心化产业，仅在印度就有数万人参与。理发店和发廊收集并出售头发，长发卖给时装公司，短发则被低价出售，用来制作填充物、化肥，或者被分解成化学物质，制作从食物到药品制剂的各种产品。垃圾分拣员在垃圾堆中寻找头发。头发收购人们寻访村庄——在Chennai周边的一个贫民区，铃声宣告着他们的到来——用现金或是小装饰品以及发饰购买头发。 The traders may buy hair that women have collected from combs and brushes, or the scenes may resemble the shearing of 19th century Italian villagers. No one can say exactly how often, but hair is not always sold willingly. Press has reported on husbands who receive $10 for their wives’ hair. One Indian woman told The Guardian, “I was held down by a gang of men who hacked at my hair… the police don't care, they will do nothing to protect women.” In Russia, prison wardens have admitted to forcibly cutting female inmates’ hair in order to sell it. 收购人买到的头发可能是妇女们从梳子或是刷子上收集来的，也有可能出现像十九世纪意大利村庄中一样的剃发场景。没人知道剃发的准确频率，但是，出售头发并不总是自愿的。媒体曾经报道过丈夫出售妻子的头发获得十美元报酬的事情。一个印度女人告诉《卫报》：“我被一群男人按倒在地，他们抢走了我的头发……警察漠不关心，他们不做任何保护妇女的事。”在俄罗斯，有狱卒承认曾经强迫女性犯人剃发，然后卖掉。 Whether it’s people scrounging hair from dumpsters or men forcing women to give up their hair, the hair business can be a dirty one. 不论是在垃圾桶里搜捡头发，还是男性强迫女性出售头发，头发行业有时十分肮脏。

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So far, the hair industry has not had its ethically-sourced moment. 到目前为止，人发行业还没有遭遇其道德溯源时刻。 American customers are typically unconcerned about the origins of extensions, the founder of a hair extensions trade group told the New York Times, other than to ask if they are hygienic. For retailers and manufacturers, the demand for hair makes it a financial necessity not to ask too many questions. 一位假发销售公司的创始人告诉《纽约时报》，美国顾客很少关心假发的来源，他们只在乎假发是不是卫生。对于零售商和制造商来说，在假发需求的驱使下，为了赚钱，最好还是不要问太多问题。 "The hair business is unlike any other," the owner of an Indian hair-exporting business told journalist Scott Carney. "In any other business, buying a commodity is easy; it's the selling it to retailers that is difficult. Here it's all reversed. It's simple to sell hair, just difficult to buy it." “人发产业跟其他产业都有所不同，”某印度头发出口企业的业主告诉记者Scott Carney说，“在其他行业中，商品买进很容易，将它卖给零售商就很难。但人发行业是颠倒过来的。头发卖出去很容易，买进来很难。” Better synthetic hair is coming. As China and India’s economic growth has reduced poverty, hair donors have been harder to find, which has increased prices and pushed companies to research alternatives. In the last 5 years, Mo Hefnawy of Lori’s Wigsite tells us, progress has been made on making synthetic wigs thicker and more heat-resistant. “I’d give it a few more years and they will have it,” he says. 更好的合成头发即将面世。随着中国和印度经济的增长，贫困有所减少，卖头发的人已经比以前更难找到了，这抬高了价格，促使企业研究替代方案。Lori’ Wigsite的Mo Hefnawy告诉我们，过去5年，在制造更浓密、更耐热的合成假发方面已有所进步。他说，“我想再过几年，他们会成功的。” Until then, though, a resource everyone has growing on the top of their head will remain a secretively lucrative commodity. 不过，在此之前，这种每个人头顶上都在生长的资源，仍将是一种鲜为人知的厚利商品。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Stanford researchers uncover patterns in how scientists lie about their data 斯坦福大学研究者揭示了科学家数据造假的模式 作者：Bjorn Carey @ 2015-11-06 译者：混乱阈值 （@混乱阈值） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Stanford University，http://news.stanford.edu/news/2015/november/fraud-science-papers-111615.html When scientists falsify data, they try to cover it up by writing differently in their published works. A pair of Stanford researchers have devised a way of identifying these written clues. 当科学家伪造数据时，他们就会试图在发表作品中写得不同，以达到掩盖的目的。两位斯坦福大学研究者设计了一种能识别这些写作线索的方法。 Even the best poker players have "tells" that give away when they're bluffing with a weak hand. Scientists who commit fraud have similar, but even more subtle, tells, and a pair of Stanford researchers have cracked the writing patterns of scientists who attempt to pass along falsified data. 当手握烂牌而虚张声势时，即使是最好的扑克玩家也会有一些使自己“露馅”的表现。学术造假的科学家也有类似的表现，尽管更不易察觉。而两位斯坦福大学的研究者破解了企图传播虚假数据的科学家们的写作模式。 The work, published in the Journal of Language and Social Psychology, could eventually help scientists identify falsified research before it is published. 发表在《语言与社会心理学期刊》的这项工作将来可以帮助科学家们在数据作伪的论文被发表前就把它们识别出来。 There is a fair amount of research dedicated to understanding the ways liars lie. Studies have shown that liars generally tend to express more negative emotion terms and use fewer first-person pronouns. Fraudulent financial reports typically display higher levels of linguistic obfuscation – phrasing that is meant to distract from or conceal the fake data – than accurate reports. 已经有相当数量的研究致力于理解说谎者说谎话的方式。研究表明，说谎者通常倾向于使用更多的负面情绪词汇，且更少使用第一人称代词。相比精确的报告，作假的财务报告的语言混淆——用来转移注意力和掩盖虚假数据的措辞——程度通常更为严重。 To see if similar patterns exist in scientific academia, Jeff Hancock, a professor of communication at Stanford, and graduate student David Markowitz searched the archives of PubMed, a database of life sciences journals, from 1973 to 2013 for retracted papers. They identified 253, primarily from biomedical journals, that were retracted for documented fraud and compared the writing in these to unretracted papers from the same journals and publication years, and covering the same topics. 为检查科学界是否存在相似的模式，斯坦福大学通讯学教授Jeff Hancock和研究生David Markowitz检索了生命科学期刊数据库PubMed从1973年到2013年间的被撤回论文。两位研究者找出了253份主要出自生物医学期刊的因造假被撤回的论文，并将它们与那些来自相同期刊相同发表年份、关于相同主题的未撤回论文进行了写作风格的比较 。 They then rated the level of fraud of each paper using a customized "obfuscation index," which rated the degree to which the authors attempted to mask their false results. This was achieved through a summary score of causal terms, abstract language, jargon, positive emotion terms and a standardized ease of reading score. 然后，对每篇论文，他们都用他们制定的“混淆指数”进行造假程度评分。“混淆指数”对作者试图掩盖伪造结果的程度进行评分，它由一些小项的得分求和得到。这些小项包括：因果词汇，抽象语言，专业术语，积极情绪词汇以及一个校准后的易读程度得分。 "We believe the underlying idea behind obfuscation is to muddle the truth," said Markowitz, the lead author on the paper. "Scientists faking data know that they are committing a misconduct and do not want to get caught. Therefore, one strategy to evade this may be to obscure parts of the paper. We suggest that language can be one of many variables to differentiate between fraudulent and genuine science." “我们认为混淆的真正目的是把真相搞混，”论文第一作者Markowitz说道，“伪造数据的科学家知道自己行为不当，且不想被抓。一个逃避被抓的策略就是让论文某些部分晦涩难懂。我们认为语言是可以用来分辨学术作伪与学术真实的变量之一。” The results showed that fraudulent retracted papers scored significantly higher on the obfuscation index than papers retracted for other reasons. For example, fraudulent papers contained approximately 1.5 percent more jargon than unretracted papers. 结果表明，因造假而被撤回的论文在混淆指数上得分远高于因其他原因被撤回的论文。比如，较之未撤回的论文，造假论文所用专业术语要多约1.5个百分点。 "Fradulent papers had about 60 more jargon-like words per paper compared to unretracted papers," Markowitz said. "This is a non-trivial amount." “比之未撤回的论文，每篇造假的论文要多出大约60个行话切口般的专业术语，”Markowitz说，“这是一个不可忽视的量。” The researchers say that scientists might commit data fraud for a variety of reasons. Previous research points to a "publish or perish" mentality that may motivate researchers to manipulate their findings or fake studies altogether. But the change the researchers found in the writing, however, is directly related to the author's goals of covering up lies through the manipulation of language. For instance, a fraudulent author may use fewer positive emotion terms to curb praise for the data, for fear of triggering inquiry. 两位研究者说，科学家们可能因为各种各样的原因伪造数据。之前的研究指出，“要么发表要么走人”的心态可能会驱使研究人员操纵研究发现，甚至伪造整个研究。然而上述研究发现的写作上的变化，其形成的直接原因是造假的作者希望通过操纵语言来掩盖谎言。例如，为了避免引人追究，造假的作者可能会使用较少的积极情绪词汇，抑制对数据的称赞。 In the future, a computerized system based on this work might be able to flag a submitted paper so that editors could give it a more critical review before publication, depending on the journal's threshold for obfuscated language. But the authors warn that this approach isn't currently feasible given the false-positive rate. 未来，基于这项成果的一个计算机化的系统也许可以根据某杂志设定的混淆语言阈值给提交的论文进行标识，而编辑则可以在发表前对那些被标识的论文做更严格的评审。但两位研究者也提醒，因为存在错报问题，该方法现阶段尚不可行。 "Science fraud is of increasing concern in academia, and automatic tools for identifying fraud might be useful," Hancock said. "But much more research is needed before considering this kind of approach. Obviously, there is a very high error rate that would need to be improved, but also science is based on trust, and introducing a 'fraud detection' tool into the publication process might undermine that trust." “科学造假越来越让学术界担忧，而自动识别造假的工具或许非常有用。”Hancock说，“但在考虑应用这种方法前，人们尚需进行更多研究。显然，目前很高的识别出错率需要改进。同时，科学基于信任，将‘造假检测’工具引入学术发表过程可能会损害这种信任。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Got a great relationship? You may want to thank your prehistoric grandmother 拥有美妙的关系？你可能想感谢你远古的祖母 作者：Jo Setchell @ 2015-09-08 译者：淡蓝 ([email protected]) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：THE CONVERSATION，https://theconversation.com/got-a-great-relationship-you-may-want-to-thank-your-prehistoric-grandmother-47181 I went to a cross-cultural wedding last weekend. The guests travelled across continents to be there, spoke mutually incomprehensible languages and came from different traditions. However, they all shared a common understanding of the relationship between the bride and the groom. Pair bonds are, after all, universal in human societies, despite being rare in other mammals. And we don’t exactly know why. 上周末我参加了一场跨文化的婚礼。源自不同的文化传统、说着彼此都听不懂的语言的婚礼嘉宾们穿越各大洲来到这里。虽然如此，对新郎和新娘的关系，他们却有着共识。在其他哺乳动物中罕见的配偶式结对，却实实在在地在全人类社会中普遍存在。而我们却不太清楚这是为什么。 Before the wedding breakfast, I chatted with a relaxed couple who had left their kids with their grandparents for the day. This is not unusual; UK grandparents babysit on average 76 times a year – and we often take it for granted. But now a new study finally gives grandparents the credit they deserve by arguing that long-term relationships actually evolved thanks to grandmothers helping out with kids in prehistoric times. 婚礼早餐之前，我与一对十分放松闲适的夫妇聊了会。那天他俩把孩子交给了他们的祖父母照看。这种做法应该不在少数；在英国，祖父母们每年平均照顾孙辈76次——而我们常常也觉得这是理所当然的。但是，现在一项新研究终于承认了爷爷奶奶们应得的功劳，研究认为，长期夫妻关系的进化产生，实际上多亏了远古时代祖母们对孩子们的照看。 The greatness of grandparents 祖父母的伟大之处 The question of why humans form pair bonds – the biological term for the strong affinity that develops between partners (often a male-female pair but not always) – is in fact one of the biggest puzzles in evolutionary anthropology. Humans are apes, yet our closest living relatives – chimpanzees and bonobos – have no such long-term relationships between male-female pairs. 人类为何会形成配偶式结对——生物学术语，指伴侣之间（常常是雌雄配对，但并不全然如此）发展出的强亲和关系——事实上是进化人类学上的最大谜题之一。人类是一种猿，可我们的现存近亲——黑猩猩和倭黑猩猩——的雌雄伴侣之间却不存在这种长期关系。 In the late 1990s, anthropologists put forward the “grandmother hypothesis” to explain why human females stop reproducing at a similar age to other great apes, but live markedly longer lives. Chimpanzees live into their 30s or 40s, but human females often live decades beyond their child-bearing years. 1990年代末，人类学家提出了“祖母假说”，以解释为何人类女性停止生育的年龄与其他大猿相仿，却明显更加长寿。黑猩猩可以活到30多或40多岁，人类女性却能在育龄后再活数十年。 The grandmother hypothesis was based on observations of the Hadza people, in Tanzania. Hadza people live by hunting and gathering food, like our ancestors, although, they are of course modern people. 祖母假说基于对坦桑尼亚哈扎族人的观察而提出。尽管哈扎族人象我们祖先一样，靠狩猎和采集食物而生，但他们当然也是现代人。 Older Hadza women dig up tubers to feed youngsters who aren’t strong enough to it themselves. The grandmother hypothesis suggests that this help allows daughters to have their next baby sooner than they would otherwise. Over time, grandmothers who lived longer and helped more had more grandchildren, who shared their genes for longer life and care of their grandchildren. Thus, these genes became increasingly common in the population and human lifespan increased. 年老的哈扎族妇女靠挖掘植物块茎来喂养不够强壮、不能自食其力的年幼者。祖母假说认为，这种帮助让女儿们能更快地孕育下一个宝宝，否则间隔时间会更久。随着时间推移，更长寿并能提供更多帮助的祖母们就拥有了更多的孙辈，这些孙辈会共享她们的长寿基因并再去照顾自己的孙辈。这样一来，这些基因在人口中变得越来越普遍，人类寿命就此增加了。 The evolution of partnership 伴侣关系的演变 The new study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, has used computer simulations to link this hypothesis to the evolution of pair-bonding in humans. The authors argue that long-term romantic relationships evolved due to a combination of people living longer and men remaining fertile longer than women. This situation led to a surplus of older men competing for younger, fertile women. 发表在《美国国家科学院院刊》上的一项新研究，用计算机模拟将这一假说与人类固定配偶关系的进化联系了起来。作者们认为，长期浪漫关系之所以进化出来，是因为人类越来越长寿，并且男性保有生殖能力的时间比女性更长。这种状况使得有更多相对较老的男性为年轻的育龄女性而相互竞争。 In fact, the study shows that the ratio of fertile males to fertile females in humans is twice as big as it is in chimpanzees, making humans very unusual mammals. This excess of males makes us more like birds. And birds are well-known for their pair-bonds. 事实上，这项研究显示，人类的育龄男女比，要比黑猩猩群体中的同一比例大两倍，这让人类成为十分不同寻常的哺乳动物。男性过多，使得我们更像鸟类，而鸟类的配偶关系是众所周知的。 Where many males compete for relatively few females, a male who develops a strong bond with one female will have more surviving offspring than males who seek numerous partners. The authors suggest that this created increasing incentives for men to “guard” their mate against rival males. 在数量更多的男性为相对较少的女性而彼此竞争时，与那些寻求众多伴侣的男性相比，同某一女性发展出强结合的男性将会拥有更多的成活后代。作者们认为，这就造成了很大的激励，促使男性去“守卫”他们的伴侣，赶走竞争对手。 While mate-guarding is not necessarily the same thing as pair-bonding, the authors argue that both involve a trade-off between paying attention to the current partner and seeking a new one. Of course, although the study concentrates on male strategy, females are not passive in this scenario – it takes two to bond. 当然，守卫伴侣与配偶关系未必是同一回事，作者们认为，两者有共同点，即都涉及在专心于当前伴侣和寻找新伴侣之间的权衡取舍。当然，尽管这项研究集中于男性的策略，女性在这一情景中也不是被动的——配偶结合需要两个人。 So, to put the wedding celebrations into their evolutionary context, perhaps it was the caring grandparents who led to the special relationship that we celebrated. A toast to the bride and groom … and one to their parents. 因此，把婚礼庆典放到进化论中来说，也许是因为那些曾经照看孙子的爷爷奶奶们，才造就了今天我们来庆祝的这种特殊关系吧。来吧，让我们为新娘和新郎干一杯……也为新人的父母干一杯。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Legacy of Liberalism 自由主义的遗产 作者：Thomas Sowell @ 2014-11 译者：Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 来源：National Review，http://www.nationalreview.com/article/392842/legacy-liberalism-thomas-sowell The current problems facing blacks in America owe more to the Great Society than to slavery. 美国黑人目前所面临的问题更多要归结于“大社会”的理念，而不是奴隶制
 Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said there were “phrases that serve as an excuse for not thinking.” One of these phrases that substitute for thought today is one that depicts the current problems of blacks in America as “a legacy of slavery.” 最高法院大法官Oliver Wendell Holmes曾说，使用某些习语是“停止思考的借口”。当今的一个代替思考的此类习语，就是将美国黑人眼下面临的问题描述为“奴隶制的遗毒”。 New York Times writer Nicholas Kristof asserts that there is “overwhelming evidence that centuries of racial subjugation still shape inequity in the 21st century” and he mentions “the lingering effects of slavery.” But before we become overwhelmed, that evidence should be checked out. 《纽约时报》作者Nicholas Kristof 断言：“有压倒性的证据显示，几个世纪以来的种族奴役依旧塑造着21世纪的不平等”，他也提到了“徘徊不散的奴隶制影响”。但在我们被这些证据“压倒”之前，应对它们进行仔细的检验。 The evidence offered by Mr. Kristof in the November 16 issue of the New York Times seems considerably short of overwhelming, to put it charitably. He cites a study showing that “counties in America that had a higher proportion of slaves in 1860 are still more unequal today.” Has he never heard statisticians’ repeated warnings that correlation is not causation? Kristof先生在11月16日的纽约时报上提供的证据看起来——说得好听一点——相当的缺乏“压倒性”。他引用了一项研究指出“美国那些在1860年保有更多奴隶人口的县今天仍然（比其他地方）更不平等。”他难道没有听过统计学家一直重复的关于相关性并非因果性的警告么？ The South long remained a region that blacks fled by the millions — for very good reasons. But, in more recent years, the net migration of blacks has been from the North to the South. No doubt they have good reasons for that as well. 历史上数百万黑人一直在逃离美国的南部各州，他们有很充足的理由。但是，在近些年里，黑人净流动的方向是从北向南的。毫无疑问，他们一定也有很好的理由这么做。 But there is no reason to believe that blacks today are unaware of the history of slavery or of the Jim Crow era in the South. Indeed, there are black “leaders” who seem to talk about nothing else. Yet blacks who are moving back to the South seem more concerned with the present and the future than with the past. 但是我们没有理由相信当今黑人会不知道有关黑奴的历史，或是Jim Crow时期的南部【译注：Jim Crow时期系指1876-1965年，其间美国南方各州陆续制订种族隔离法，这些法律被统称为Jim Crow法】。的确，有很多黑人“领袖”每天谈论的都是以上这些黑历史。然而朝南方移居的黑人们看起来更关心现在和未来，而不是过去。 Kristof’s other “overwhelming” evidence of the current effects of past slavery is that blacks do not have as much income as whites. But Puerto Ricans do not have as much income as Japanese Americans. Mexican Americans do not have as much income as Cuban Americans. All sorts of people do not have as much income as all sorts of other people, not only in the United States, but in countries around the world. And most of these people were never enslaved. Kristof关于过去奴隶制对现代影响的另外一个“压倒性”的证据是黑人的收入比白人要少。但是波多黎各人的收入也比不上日裔美国人。墨西哥裔美国人的收入也比不上古巴裔美国人。不仅仅是在美国，在全世界任何一种人都和另一种人的收入不一样。而这些人里的绝大多数都不曾被奴役。 If we wanted to be serious about evidence, we might compare where blacks stood a hundred years after the end of slavery with where they stood after 30 years of the liberal welfare state. In other words, we could compare hard evidence on “the legacy of slavery” with hard evidence on the legacy of liberals. 如果我们想要严肃地对待证据，我们应该将生活在奴隶制结束100年后的黑人与在自由派的福利国家生活了30年之后的黑人做比较。换句话说，我们可以比较一下“奴隶制的遗毒”和自由派的遗产。 Despite the grand myth that black economic progress began or accelerated with the passage of the Civil Rights laws and “War on Poverty” programs of the 1960s, the cold fact is that the poverty rate among blacks fell from 87 percent in 1940 to 47 percent by 1960. This was before any of those programs began. 尽管盛行的谬见声称，在1960年代民权法案通过和“对贫困宣战”项目实行后，黑人在经济地位上才开始进步或是开始加速进步。冰冷的事实却是黑人的贫困率从1940年的87%下降到了1960年的47%。而这是在任何相关法案或项目实行之前就已经发生了的。 Over the next 20 years, the poverty rate among blacks fell another 18 percentage points, compared to the 40-point drop in the previous 20 years. This was the continuation of a previous economic trend, at a slower rate of progress, not the economic grand deliverance proclaimed by liberals and self-serving black “leaders.” 在之后的20年里，黑人贫困率又下降了18%。相对应的，之前的20年里的降幅是40个百分点。这只是一个之前经济趋势的延续，只是进度放缓了，而并非自由派和自谋私利的黑人“领袖”所宣称的伟大经济援救的成效。 Ending the Jim Crow laws was a landmark achievement. But, despite the great proliferation of black political and other “leaders” that resulted from the laws and policies of the 1960s, nothing comparable happened economically. And there were serious retrogressions socially. 种族隔离制度的结束是一个里程碑式的成就。但是， 1960年代的法律和政策，除了导致政治上或是其他方面的黑人“领袖”数量激增之外，在经济上并没有什么与之相称的成就，而在社会问题上则有严重的倒退。 Nearly a hundred years of the supposed “legacy of slavery” found most black children being raised in two-parent families in 1960. But thirty years after the liberal welfare state found the great majority of black children being raised by a single parent. 在1960年代，生活在近百年的所谓“奴隶制遗毒”影响下的绝大多数黑人儿童是由双亲家庭抚养长大的。然而在自由主义福利国家建成30年之后，我们发现大多数黑人儿童是由单亲家庭抚养长大的。 The murder rate among blacks in 1960 was one-half of what it became 20 years later, after a legacy of liberals’ law-enforcement policies. Public-housing projects in the first half of the 20th century were clean, safe places, where people slept outside on hot summer nights, when they were too poor to afford air conditioning. That was before admissions standards for public-housing projects were lowered or abandoned, in the euphoria of liberal non-judgmental notions. And it was before the toxic message of victimhood was spread by liberals. We all know what hell holes public housing has become in our times. The same toxic message produced similar social results among lower-income people in England, despite an absence of a “legacy of slavery” there. 自由派的执法政策留下的遗产是，1980年代的黑人谋杀率提高到了20年前的两倍。公共住房项目在20世纪前半叶是干净而安全的地方，是人们在炎热夏夜无法负担空调费用时在外的居所。那时候公共住房项目对于住户的接纳标准还未被昏了头的自由派出于“不评判”的理念而降低或完全废除。而且当时自由派所鼓吹的有关黑人受害者身份的有毒思想还未被广泛传播。我们都清楚公共住房项目在我们的时代里成了怎样的黑暗地狱。同样的有毒思想在低收入的英国人身上也体现出了同样的社会效应，尽管在那里没有任何“奴隶制的遗毒”。 If we are to go by evidence of social retrogression, liberals have wreaked more havoc on blacks than the supposed “legacy of slavery” they talk about. Liberals should heed the title of Jason Riley’s insightful new book, Please Stop Helping Us. 如果我们追寻社会倒退的证据，就会发现，自由派给黑人造成的破坏要比他们口中所谓的“奴隶制遗毒”严重的多。自由派应当听听Jason Riley在他富有洞察力的新书的标题中提出的建议，《不要再帮助我们了》。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Boston Tea Party Myth 波士顿倾茶事件的迷思 作者：The debunker @ 2013-1-18 译者：Yuncong Yang（@kingsmill） 校对: 小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源：UnpopularTruth.com，http://www.unpopulartruth.com/2009/04/boston-tea-party.html The Boston Tea Party was not a protest against high taxes, but a protest of several things. Mostly it was an anti-monopoly protest. And it demonstrated colonial resistance to British interference in the American economy. 波士顿倾茶事件的目的并非抗议高额茶税，而是抗议其他一些东西，其中主要是反垄断。同时它也反映了当时美洲殖民地对英国插手殖民地经济的抵制。 A popular understanding of the Boston Tea Party is that the colonial Americans were protesting against high taxes on imported British tea. However, this is not the truth. This is a popular myth that this article clearly debunks. The truth is that the price of tea was actually lowered by the British. The lowering of the price was an attempt to give a monopoly to the East India Trading company. There were many reasons for the colonists to be angered by British manipulation and interference. 对波士顿倾茶事件的一种流行解读是：美洲殖民地的人民是要借倾茶抗议英国对进口的英国茶叶课以重税。然而这并非事实。本文就是要彻底打破这一广为流传的神话。实际上，英国人当时降低了茶叶价格，而压低茶叶价格是为了给予东印度公司垄断地位。英国的经济操纵与干涉之所以激怒了殖民者，是有多种原因的。 The Boston Tea Party, of course wasn't an actual party, but was a famous incident in American history in which some American colonists in Boston disguised themselves as Indians and dumped chests of tea into Boston Harbor as a protest. This protest by American colonists arose from two issues confronting the British Empire in 1773: the financial problems of the British East India Company, and an ongoing dispute about the extent of Parliament's sovereignty over the British American colonies. “波士顿茶会”当然不是真正的茶会，它是美国历史上的一起重要事件。波士顿的一些美洲殖民者在事件中化装成印第安人登上了英国货船，把一箱箱的茶叶倒进波士顿港来表示抗议。美洲殖民者的反抗源于当时英帝国面临的两个问题：一是东印度公司的严重财政问题，二是有关议会对英属美洲殖民地管辖权限的争议。

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American colonists resented this favored treatment of a major company, (East India Company) which employed lobbyists and wielded great influence in Parliament. At this stage in American history rebellion was brewing beneath the surface of society. Colonial protests resulted in both Philadelphia and New York, but it was those at the Boston Tea Party that made their mark on American history. 美洲殖民者反对英国当局给予一家大公司(东印度公司)特别优待，该公司雇佣了大量说客，在议会里影响很大。在美洲历史的这一时期，反抗的种子已经在土壤下悄悄萌芽了。在费城和纽约都出现了殖民者的抗议活动，但在美国历史上留下了印迹的，是波士顿的倾茶者们。 John Hancock organized a boycott of tea from China sold by the British East India Company, whose sales in the colonies then fell dramatically. By 1773, the company had large debts, huge stocks of tea in its warehouses and no prospect of selling it because smugglers, such as Hancock, were importing tea from Holland without paying import taxes. 约翰·汉考克组织了一场针对东印度公司销售的中国茶叶的抵制运动，结果东印度公司在殖民地的营业额一落千丈。到1773年，东印度公司已是债台高筑，货仓里积压了大批卖不出去的茶叶——也没有卖掉的指望，因为汉考克等走私贩子正在从荷兰走私大量茶叶到殖民地，这些茶叶是不用交关税的。 The British government passed the Tea Act, which allowed the East India Company to sell tea to the colonies directly and without "payment of any customs or duties whatsoever" in Britain, instead paying the much lower American duty. This tax break allowed the East India Company to sell tea for half the old price and cheaper than the price of tea in England, enabling them to undercut the prices offered by the colonial merchants and smugglers. 英国政府为此通过了《茶叶法案》，允许东印度公司直接向殖民地销售茶叶，不需要在英国国内“缴纳任何关税或其他税收”，而只需缴纳低得多的殖民地赋税。这一税收优惠使得东印度公司可以把它的茶叶价格削减一半，甚至比它在英国卖得还要便宜。现在东印度公司能以低于殖民地商人和走私贩的价格销售茶叶了。 Bostonians suspected the removal of the Tea Tax was simply another attempt by the British parliament to squash American freedom. Samuel Adams, wealthy smugglers, and others who had profited from the smuggled tea called for agents and consignees of the East India Company tea to abandon their positions; consignees who hesitated were terrorized through attacks on their warehouses and even their homes. 波士顿人怀疑，取消东印度公司的茶税，纯粹是英国议会压制美洲殖民地自由的又一次努力。塞缪尔·亚当斯，富有的走私贩子和其他从走私茶叶中获利的人们呼吁东印度公司在殖民地的代理商和经销商不要再和东印度公司合作。那些犹豫不决的经销商受到了恐吓，他们的货仓，有时甚至是住宅，都遭到攻击。 The Truth Behind the Boston Tea Party: The Tea Act Actually Lowered Taxes 倾茶事件背后的真相是：《茶叶法案》实际上降低了茶叶的税负。 Many people today think the Tea Act—which led to the Boston Tea Party—was simply an increase in the taxes on tea paid by American colonists. Instead, the purpose of the Tea Act was to give the East India Company full and unlimited access to the American tea trade, and exempt the company from having to pay taxes to Britain on tea exported to the American colonies. It even gave the company a tax refund on millions of pounds of tea they were unable to sell and holding in inventory. 如今很多人认为最终导致波士顿倾茶事件的《茶叶法案》提高了美洲殖民地人民负担的茶叶税额。但事实正相反。茶叶法案的目的是要让东印度公司能够完全不受限制的参与美洲茶叶贸易，并免除东印度公司向美洲出口茶叶时应在英国支付的税收。法案甚至为东印度公司卖不出去而积压在手里的数百万磅茶叶提供了退税。 One purpose of the Tea Act was to increase the profitability of the East India Company to its stockholders (which included the King), and to help the company drive its colonial small business competitors out of business. Because the company no longer had to pay high taxes to England and held a monopoly on the tea it sold in the American colonies, it was able to lower its tea prices to undercut the prices of the local importers and the mom-and-pop tea merchants and tea houses, not only in Boston, but in every town in America. 《茶叶法案》的目的之一是提高东印度公司的股东回报率（英王本人也是股东之一），并帮助东印度公司把在殖民地与它竞争的小公司赶出市场。因为东印度公司不必再付高昂的英国关税，并在殖民地市场出售茶叶方面享有专营权，所以它就可以通过价格竞争打败本地的进口商以及那些家庭式的茶商茶店。不仅在波士顿是如此，在每一个美洲城镇都是如此。 This meddling infuriated the independence-minded colonists, who were, by and large, unappreciative of their colonies being used as a profit center for the multinational East India Company corporation. One historical interpretation is that the truth of the Boston Tea Party is that it was a protest against this meddling. The American colonists resented their small businesses still having to pay the higher, pre-Tea Act taxes without having any say or vote in the matter. (Thus, the cry of "no taxation without representation!") 英国议会对茶叶市场的干涉激怒了当时已经有意独立的殖民者。总体来说，他们对英国议会拿他们的殖民地来为东印度公司这家跨国企业创造利润非常不满。对波士顿倾茶事件的历史解读之一是，倾茶事件表达了殖民者对这种干涉的抗议。美洲殖民者愤恨于他们的小茶行依然要支付《茶叶法案》出台之前的高税率，而且在这件事上他们一点发言权都没有（因此才有“无代表，不纳税！”的口号）。 Even in the official British version of the history, the 1773 Tea Act was a "legislative maneuver by the British ministry of Lord North to make English tea marketable in America," with a goal of helping the East India Company quickly "sell 17 million pounds of tea stored in England ..." 即使在英国官方版本的历史里，1773年《茶叶法案》也被描述为“诺思勋爵内阁为使英国茶叶在美国打开销路而采取的立法计谋”，其目的是帮助东印度公司迅速“卖掉积压在英国国内的一千七百万磅茶叶……” "Taxation Without Representation" had a Populist Context which plays a large role in the Boston Tea Party “无代表，强征税” 这一抗议有着民粹主义背景，这种背景在波士顿倾茶事件中影响很大。 "Taxation without representation" also meant hitting the average person and small business with taxes while letting the richest and most powerful corporation in the world off the hook for its taxes. It was government sponsorship of one corporation over all competitors. “无代表，强征税”这句话的另一层意思是，政府以税收打击普通百姓和小企业，却让世界上最大最富有的公司免于税收之累。实质上，这就是政府扶持一家公司而打击所有竞争对手。 The Boston Tea Party Was Similar to Modern Day Anti-globalization Protests 波士顿倾茶事件很像今天的反全球化示威 The Boston Tea Party resembled in many ways the growing modern-day protests against transnational corporations and small-town efforts to protect themselves from chain-store retailers or agricultural corporations. With few exceptions, the Tea Party's participants thought of themselves as protesters against the actions of the multinational East India Company and the government that "unfairly" represented, supported, and served the company while not representing or serving the residents. 波士顿倾茶事件和今天的反跨国公司示威，以及小城镇为免受连锁零售商或农业大公司侵蚀而做出的自我保护，在许多方面都颇为相似。绝大多数倾茶事件的参与者认为他们的抗议对象是跨国运营的东印度公司及政府，英国政府“不公平的”代表着东印度公司的利益，它支持并服务于东印度公司，而非殖民地的居民们。

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In England, Parliament gave the East India Company what amounted to a monopoly on the importation of tea in 1698. When tea became popular in the British colonies, Parliament sought to eliminate foreign competition by passing an act in 1721 that required colonists to import their tea only from Great Britain. But many Americans purchased the less expensive, smuggled Dutch tea. 在英国，议会在1698年给了东印度公司实质上的茶叶进口专营权。当茶叶在海外的英国殖民地也开始变得抢手时，议会为消除来自海外的竞争于1721年通过了法案，要求各殖民地只能从英国进口茶叶。但许多美洲殖民者选择购买较廉价的荷兰走私茶。 The East India Company did not export tea to the colonies; by law, the company was required to sell its tea wholesale at auctions in England. British firms bought this tea and exported it to the colonies, where they resold it to merchants in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. 东印度公司当时并不直接向各殖民地出口茶叶。按照法律，东印度公司须将其茶叶在英国通过拍卖批发出去。英国企业将买到的这些茶叶出口到殖民地，然后再转卖给波士顿，纽约，费城和查尔斯顿的商人们。 In order to help the East India Company compete with smuggled Dutch tea, in 1767 Parliament passed the Indemnity Act, which lowered the tax on tea consumed in Great Britain, and gave the East India Company a partial refund of the duty on tea that was re-exported to the colonies. To help offset this loss of government revenue, Parliament also passed the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, which levied new taxes, including one on tea, in the colonies. Instead of solving the smuggling problem, however, the Townshend duties renewed a controversy about Parliament's right to tax the colonies. 为了帮助东印度公司与荷兰走私茶竞争，1767年议会通过了《免责法案》，该法案降低了英国国内消费茶叶的税率，并对经中间商再出口到殖民地的那部分茶叶退还部分关税给东印度公司。为弥补因此造成的政府收入减少，议会又通过了1767年的《汤森德税收法案》。该法案对殖民地开征了一些新税种，其中之一就是针对茶叶。然而新法案并没有解决茶叶走私问题，其规定的新税种却再度引发了有关议会对殖民地征税权的争议。 To fully understand the resentment of the colonies to Great Britain and King George III, one must understand that there were a series of events in which the colonists were treated unfairly. In previous years, the 13 colonies saw a number of commercial tariffs including the Sugar Act of 1764, which taxed sugar, coffee, and wine, the Stamp Act of 1765, which put a tax on all printed matter, such as newspapers and playing cards, and the Townshend Acts of 1767 which placed taxes on items like glass, paints, paper, and tea. The Tea Act of 1773 was the last straw. 要全面理解殖民地对英国及英王乔治三世的反感，就必须要意识到当时在一系列的事件中，殖民者都已经受到了不公平的待遇。在此前十多年中，十三个殖民地被加征了一系列的新税：1764年的《糖业法案》对糖，咖啡和葡萄酒征税；1765年的《印花税法》对上至报纸下至扑克牌的所有印刷品征税；1767年的《汤森德法案》则对诸如玻璃，油漆，纸和茶叶等货品征税。1773年的《茶叶法案》不过是最后一根稻草罢了。 "If our trade be taxed, why not our lands, in short, everything we posses? They tax us without having legal representation." —Samuel Adams “如果他们能对我们的贸易征税，那为什么就不能对我们的土地，或者我们所有的一切征税？他们向我们征税，却不给我们法定代表权。”——塞缪尔·亚当斯 In an attempt to transfer part of the cost of colonial administration to the American colonies, the British Parliament had enacted the Stamp Act in 1765 and the Townshend Acts in 1767. Colonial political opposition and economic boycotts eventually forced repeal of these acts, but Parliament left the import duty on tea as a symbol of its authority. Under the Townshend Act, many goods brought into the colonies were heavily taxed by the British. To attempt to appease the disgruntled Americans, these tariffs were repealed, except for tea, and they remained upset since the tax on tea remained in effect. 为了把管理殖民地的成本部分转嫁给美洲殖民地，英国议会于1765年通过了《印花税法》，于1767年通过了《汤森德法案》。殖民地的政治反抗和经济杯葛最终迫使议会废除了这些法律，但议会保留了茶叶进口的关税，作为其对殖民地握有管辖权的标志。按照汤森德法案，英国人对殖民地进口的许多商品都征收了重税。然后，为了安抚愤怒的殖民地人，除茶税外，所有这些关税都被废除了。但是殖民者依然不满，因为英国还在征收着茶税。 In an atmosphere of continuing suspicion and distrust, the British and Americans each looked for the worst from the other. In 1772 the crown, having earlier declared its right to dismiss colonial judges at its pleasure, stated its intention to pay directly the salaries of governors and judges in Massachusetts. 在长期持续的猜疑与不信任的气氛下，英国人和殖民者都在以最大的恶意揣测着对方。在1772年，王国政府宣布它有意直接向马萨诸塞的行政长官及法官们发放薪金。而在此前不久，它已宣称有权随意罢免殖民地的法官。 The situation remained comparatively quiet until May 1773, when the faltering East India Company persuaded Parliament that the company's future and the empire's prosperity depended on the disposal of its tea surplus. At this point, the East India Company was facing bankruptcy due to corruption, mismanagement, and competition. 直到1773年5月，形势还是相对平静的。就在5月，摇摇欲坠的东印度公司终于说服议会，东印度公司的未来及帝国的福祉都取决于手中积压的茶叶能否得到处理。此时，东印度公司已经因腐败，管理不善和市场竞争而濒临破产了。 The plan was to export a half a million pounds of tea to the American colonies for the purpose of selling it without imposing upon the company the usual duties and tariffs. With these privileges, the company could undersell American merchants and monopolize the colonial tea trade. Not only did this action create unfair commerce for the merchants of the colonies but it also proved to be the spark that revived American passions about the issue of taxation without representation. 东印度公司的计划是：将五十万磅茶叶卖到美洲殖民地去，政府将不对这些茶叶征收关税和其他赋税。有了这样的优惠条件，东印度公司就可以通过价格竞争挤掉美国茶商，进而垄断殖民地的茶叶市场。这一行动不仅仅对殖民地商人不公，事实证明，它还是一根导火索，重新点燃了殖民者对“无代表，强征税”的怒火。 Because the American tea market had nearly been captured by tea smuggled from Holland, Parliament gave the company a drawback (refund) of the entire shilling-per-pound duty, enabling the company to undersell the smugglers. It was expected that the American colonists, faced with a choice between the cheaper company tea and the higher-priced smuggled tea, would buy the cheaper tea, despite the tax. The company would then be saved from bankruptcy, the smugglers would be ruined, and the principle of parliamentary taxation would be upheld. 因为当时美洲茶叶市场已经基本被荷兰走私茶占领，议会决定将每磅一先令的茶叶关税全额退还给东印度公司，使之能借价格优势击败走私商人。议会认为，尽管有茶税，殖民者在便宜的东印度公司茶和较贵的走私茶中，应该还是会选择便宜茶的。这样既可以挽救东印度公司，使之免于破产，又可以将走私商人赶入绝境，还可以继续维持议会在殖民地征税的权威。 Resisting the Tea Act 反抗茶叶法案 Due to the popularity of inexpensive tea smuggled from Holland, British tea manufacturers were accumulating a large surplus of unsold tea, about 17 million pounds. 因为较为便宜的荷兰走私茶在市场上大为走红，英国茶厂积压了大量的滞销茶叶，累计达一千七百万磅之多。 Instead of rescinding the remaining Townshend tax and exploring inoffensive methods of aiding the financially troubled British East India Company,Parliament enacted the Tea Act of 1773, designed to allow the company to bypass middlemen and sell directly to American retailers 面对这种情况，议会并没有选择废除残余的汤森德税，也没有试图寻求不损害别人的办法来拯救东印度公司。相反它颁布了1773年《茶叶法案》，允许东印度公司不经中间商直接向美洲零售商销售茶叶。 In September and October 1773, seven ships carrying East India Company tea were sent to the colonies: four were bound for Boston, and one each for New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Americans learned the details of the Tea Act while the ships were en route, and opposition began to mount. Whigs, sometimes calling themselves Sons of Liberty, began a campaign to raise awareness and to convince or compel the consignees to resign, in the same way that stamp distributors had been forced to resign in the 1765 Stamp Act crisis. 1773年九月和十月间，七艘满载东印度公司茶叶的货船驶向殖民地，四艘前往波士顿，剩下三艘分别前往纽约，费城和查尔斯顿。这些船还在路上时，美洲殖民者就已经得知《茶叶法案》的细节，反抗情绪在逐步酝酿。有时自称“自由之子”的北美辉格党人发起了一场旨在让公众了解《茶叶法案》并说服或迫使东印度公司的分销商们放弃分销权的运动。在1765年《印花税法案》风波里，他们正是以这种方式迫使印花税票分销商放弃销售权的。 The truth is that the protest movement that culminated with the Boston Tea Party was not a dispute about high taxes. The price of legally imported tea was actually reduced by the Tea Act of 1773. Protestors were instead concerned with a variety of other issues. 事实上，以波士顿倾茶事件为终结的抗议运动并不是针对高税率的。1773年的《茶叶法案》事实上降低了合法进口茶叶的价格。抗议者们关心的是其他一些问题。 Several myths are wrapped up in the story of the Boston Tea Party. The familiar "no taxation without representation" argument, along with the question of the extent of Parliament's authority in the colonies, remained prominent. 波士顿倾茶事件的叙述里包含了若干迷思。广为人知的“无代表不纳税”主张，和议会的殖民地管辖权范围问题，至今仍在叙事中居于突出地位。 Some regarded the purpose of the tax program—to make leading officials independent of colonial influence—as a dangerous infringement of colonial rights. This was especially true in Massachusetts, the only colony where the Townshend program had been fully implemented. 另一些人认为，英国的征税方案旨在令殖民地高级官员免受殖民地影响，这是对殖民地权利的严重侵犯。这一说法在马萨诸塞格外真确，因为马萨诸塞是唯一一个完全执行了汤森德增税计划的殖民地。 Colonial merchants, some of them smugglers, played a significant role in the protests. Because the Tea Act made legally imported tea cheaper, it threatened to put smugglers of Dutch tea out of business. Other, legal tea importers who had not been named as consignees by the East India Company were also threatened with financial ruin by the Tea Act. 殖民地商人们——其中一些是走私者——在抗议中扮演了重要角色。因为《茶叶法案》降低了合法进口茶叶的价格，走私荷兰茶的商人们可能会被挤出市场。此外，那些没有得到东印度公司授权经销资格的合法进口茶商们也面临灭顶之灾。 Another major concern for merchants was since the Tea Act gave the East India Company a monopoly on the tea trade, it was feared that this government-created monopoly might be extended in the future to include other goods. And this served to alarm the conservative colonial mercantile elements into uniting with the more radical patriots. 商人们担忧的另一重点是《茶叶法案》使东印度公司垄断了茶叶贸易市场，而未来这种政府支持的垄断行为也可能扩展到其他的商品交易上。这些威胁刺激了较为保守的殖民地商界势力，使之逐渐与更激进的反英志士群体联合起来。 South of Boston, protestors successfully compelled the tea consignees to resign. Merchants agreed not to sell the tea, and the designated tea agents in New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston canceled their orders or resigned their commissions. 在波士顿南部，抗议者们成功迫使东印度公司的授权分销商放弃了分销权。商人们同意抵制东印度公司的茶叶。在纽约，费城和查尔斯顿，取得茶叶分销权的代理商们或取消订单，或放弃分销权。 In Charleston, the consignees had been forced to resign, and the unclaimed tea was seized by customs officials. There were mass protest meetings in Philadelphia, and eventually the Philadelphia consignees had resigned and the tea ship returned to England with its cargo. The tea ship bound for New York City was delayed by bad weather; by the time it arrived, the consignees had resigned, and the ship returned to England with the tea. 在查尔斯顿，授权经销商们被迫放弃了经销权，无人售卖的茶叶最后被海关官员扣押了。费城爆发了大规模的抗议集会，最终费城的授权经销商们也退出了，运茶船带着茶叶打道回府。前往纽约的运茶船被海上的恶劣天气耽搁了，等到它到达纽约时，当地的经销商们已放弃了经销权，它只好又带着茶叶回了英国。 Revolutionary sentiment mounted . . . 革命情绪升温…… In Boston, however, the tea consignees were friends or relatives of Governor Hutchinson, who was determined to uphold the law. The opposition, led by Samuel and John Adams, Josiah Quincy, and John Hancock, was determined to resist Parliamentary supremacy over colonial legislatures. 然而在波士顿，茶叶授权经销商们都是总督哈钦森的亲友，而哈钦森决意要实施《茶叶法案》。由塞缪尔和约翰·亚当斯两兄弟，约书亚·昆西和约翰·汉考克领导的反对派则决心抵抗议会凌驾于殖民地立法机构之上的威权。 Three ships from London, the Dartmouth, the Eleanor and the Beaver, sailed into Boston Harbor from November 28th to December 8, 1773. Loaded with tea from the East India Company, they were all anchored at Griffin’s Wharf but were prevented from unloading their cargo. 从伦敦来的三艘货船——达特茅斯号，艾莉诺号和河狸号——于1773年11月28日到12月8日间驶入波士顿港。三艘船满载东印度公司的茶叶，停泊在格里芬码头，但它们无法卸货。 When the first ship, the Dartmouth, reached Boston with the cargo of tea, the Sons of Liberty prevented owner Francis Rotch from unloading the tea, but they could not force the consignees to reject it. Rotch and the captains of two newly arrived ships, the Eleanor and the Beaver, agreed to leave without unloading the tea, but they were denied clearance by Governor Hutchinson. 当达特茅斯号运载茶叶首先到达波士顿时，“自由之子”成功阻止了船主弗朗西斯·罗奇卸货，但他们无法迫使授权经销商们拒绝接受这些茶叶。罗奇和另两艘刚到达的船——艾莉诺号和河狸号——的船长们同意不卸货就离开波士顿，但总督哈钦森拒绝放行。 According to the law, if the tea was not unloaded within 20 days (by December 17), it was to be seized and sold to pay custom duties. Convinced that this procedure would still be payment of unconstitutional taxes, the radical patriots resolved to break the deadlock. On December 14, Rotch was called before a mass meeting and ordered to seek clearance again to sail from Boston. But neither the customs collector nor the governor would grant it. 按照法律，如果这些茶叶不能在20天内(也就是到12月17日)卸下船，它们将会被海关没收拍卖来偿付关税。激进的反英志士们认为这样处理茶叶无异于缴纳违宪征收的茶税，于是他们决定要打破眼前的僵局。12月14日，志士们将罗奇船长召至一次大型集会上，并命令他再次申请驶离波士顿港，但无论是海关还是总督都拒绝放行。 Fearing that the tea would be seized for failure to pay customs duties, and eventually become available for sale, something had to be done. Demanding that the tea be returned to where it came from or face retribution, the Sons of Liberty, led by Samuel Adams began to meet to determine the fate of the three cargo ships in the Boston harbor. 如果不想让茶叶因滞纳关税被扣押拍卖而最终流入市场，就必须要采取行动了。塞缪尔·亚当斯领导的“自由之子”一方面声称如果这些茶叶不运回英国，他们就将采取报复行动，另一方面开始组织会议，讨论应该如何处理波士顿港内的这三艘货船。 On the cold evening of December 16, 1773, a crowd of several thousand spectators gathered and shouted encouragement to about 60 men disguised as Mohawk Indians. The band of patriots in Boston burst from the South Meeting House with the spirit of freedom burning in their eyes. The patriots headed towards Griffin's Wharf and the three ships. Quickly, quietly, and in an orderly manner, they boarded each of the tea ships. Once on board, the patriots went to work striking the chests with axes and hatchets. 1773年12月16日，一个寒冷的夜晚，波士顿街头聚集了几千名看热闹的群众，他们高声呐喊，为约六十名乔装成印第安莫霍克族的志士助威。这一伙波士顿反英志士从南方教堂议事厅冲了出来，他们个个眼中都燃烧着自由的火焰，冲向格里芬码头的三艘货船。志士们飞速而有序的分别登上了三艘货船，没有发出一点声音。一上船，他们就开始用斧头劈砍茶叶箱子。 Only the sounds of axe blades splitting wood rang out from Boston Harbor. Once the crates were open, the patriots dumped the tea into the sea. By nine o'clock p.m., the Sons of Liberty, with the aid of the ships' crew, had emptied a total of 342 crates of tea into Boston Harbor. Fearing any connection to their treasonous deed, the patriots took off their shoes and they swept the ships' decks, and made each ship's first mate attest that only the tea was damaged. 静悄悄的波士顿港里，只听到斧刃劈开木箱的声音。劈开箱子之后，志士们就把茶叶倒入海里。到晚上九点，“自由之子”们在船员的帮助下已经把三百四十二箱茶叶倒进了波士顿港。为免事后被发现他们与这一叛逆行径有何干系，志士们脱掉鞋子，擦干净了货船的甲板，并让各船大副宣誓作证：船上受损的只有茶叶，并无他物。 The furious royal government responded to this "Boston Tea Party" by the so-called Intolerable Acts of 1774, practically eliminating self-government in Massachusetts and closing Boston's port. 愤怒的英国政府对“波士顿倾茶事件”做出了反应，它颁布了被后世称为“1774年不可容忍法案”的一系列法律。通过这些法律，英国政府实质上取消了马萨诸塞的自治，并关闭了波士顿港。 The news of the destruction of the tea raised the spirit of resistance in the colonies. On April 22, 1774, the London attempted to land tea at New York. It was boarded by a mob, and the tea was destroyed. Similar incidents occurred at Annapolis, Md., on October 19 and at Greenwich, N.J., on December 22, and the tea was boycotted throughout the colonies. 倾茶事件的消息传遍了美洲殖民地，鼓舞着殖民地人民的反抗斗志。在1774年4月22日，伦敦号货船试图在纽约卸茶，结果一伙暴民登船毁掉了所有的茶叶。同年10月19日，马里兰州安纳波利斯也发生了同样的事件。12月22日，毁茶事件在新泽西州格林威治再度发生。所有殖民地都在杯葛英国茶叶了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-02-04】 @草莓酱改: 老太开捷达“碰伤”劳斯莱斯,赔死真就活该吗? http://t.cn/RbFAl6x @鹿兔马朦:@whigzhou 你们觉得呐？ @whigzhou: 我觉得原文说的有道理，赔偿应有个合理上限，若没有上限，那么把极端贵重的财产置于开放场所，便向他人强加了异乎寻常且难以负担的审慎责任 @tuxt520:这不是保险应该干的事吗 @whigzhou: 保险覆盖了当然好，但一个没有保险的世界里也可以谈论正义与合理性 @whigzhou: 而且保险定价也是以权利边界为基础的（同时保险的存在也会改变权利边界），因而保险并不会终结这一法律问题 @whigzhou: 我向来认为，将保护财产权免遭破坏的审慎责任过分加之于财产主人以外的他人，是一种不好的做法，当代专利制度便有着这一倾向，我在旧文《专利制度为祸日炽》中曾讨论过 @人格显示器: 该不该，合不合理，共同体说了算。如果在一个城邦中平民力量占了上风，毫无疑问这就不合理。如果是贵族占了上风，这就是合理的。理想的情况是公民大会对此提出法案，经元老院审议通过后形成一种各方都能接受法律。 @whigzhou: 你这是强共同体的看法，我还是喜欢开放社会，不喜欢强共同体  

【2016-02-04】 @海德沙龙 《一个动听故事的破碎及永生》 诺奖得主[[Daniel Kahneman]]在《思考，快与慢》里讨论了一个有趣的发现，若考试时问题很难看清，得分会更高。这里的所谓考试，是由Shane Frederick发明的“认知反应测试”（CRT），[[Malcolm Gladwell]]觉得这个结论很爽，便将此事写进了《大卫与歌利亚》一书 @熊也餐厅: 不知道什么原因不太喜欢daniel kahneman~ @whigzhou: 呵呵说我呢，我确实说不清楚为何不喜欢Kahneman，大概就是股气味吧，不好闻 @whigzhou: 这回总算让我抓到了小辫子，以后就方便跟人解释为何我不喜欢Kahneman了，ps.特别讨厌Gladwell，这老兄体味更重 @whigzhou: 心理学实验重复不出来原本不算什么大不了的事情，很多（可能是大部分）心理学实验都重复不出来，但拿着单个实验在通俗文章里添油加醋大说特说，就让我很不爽，这种通俗文章看起来很科学很有耐心（你看人家能把一个实验讲的那么明白细致连我都看得懂），其实还不如不提实验直接说道理。  

一席演讲稿 2015年8月23日，上海   我今天被叫到这儿来，是因为我不久前写了本书，叫作《沐猿而冠》，书中一个核心主题是，人类文化是如何与我们的人性共同进化的，今天我想和大家分享其中的一些想法。 我们是谁？你是你所吃？——这个问题的答案中，文化扮演了何种角色？ 据说哲学家的一个基本问题是：我们是谁？ 或者——像传说中的北大门卫那样——用第二人称形式问：你是谁？ 18世纪的法国美食家萨瓦兰有句名言：“告诉我你吃些什么，我就能说出你是个什么样的人”，听上去有点道理。 确实，在古代农业社会，一个人要是天天吃肉，那我们就可以很有把握的断定他是个富人，甚至是位贵族；这么说是有历史依据的，最简单的一条证据是，考古学家发现，古代富人的身高明显高于穷人，而身高和营养条件，特别是肉类奶类的摄入量是有明确关系的。 所以古代平民百姓对富贵人物的一个称谓——大人——，在我们现代人看来好像是一种象征性的说法，但其实在字面上也是成立的，那时候，富贵者的身材确实普遍比穷人高大；所以工业革命之后，当大众也都吃得起肉了时，平均身高便迅速增长。 我们是谁？——这要看跟谁比，以及“我们”这个圈子画多大 不难看出，萨瓦兰在说那句话时，关注点是放在阶级身份上的，然而，当人们试图回答“我们是谁？”这个问题时，阶级或者阶层身份只是一个方面，我们还可以从其他许多方面来回答这个问题，具体选择哪个方面，取决于这问题是在何种情境下被提出的，或者说，我们是在跟谁比，以及，“我们”这个圈子画得有多大。 翻开一本百科全书，浏览一下其中的人物词条，你会发现，用来描绘一个人的诸多属性中，排在最前面的通常有性别、职业、民族，以及他所生活的地区、年代，还有他说的语言，信仰的宗教或者意识形态，所有这些方面，被我们称为文化特性，这些特性组合起来，构成了一个群体或者个人的文化禀赋。 现在我们回到萨瓦兰的立场，所有这些文化特性，都或多或少的体现在我们的饮食之中；比如就性别而言，男性对肉食的偏爱明显比女性强烈，而女性对小零食的偏爱则比男性强烈；就在几十年前，从吃不吃面食或者羊肉，就有相当大的把握判断一个人是南方人还是北方人，而通过对像鱼腥草这种比较特别的食物的偏爱，可以把一个人的家乡所在猜的更精确，至于猪肉禁忌和宗教身份之间的关系，就更不用说了。 除了“吃”，还可以从哪里窥视我们的文化特性？ 除了饮食之外，文化特性也会从其他行为上表现出来，实际上，我们完全可以把萨瓦兰那句话里“吃”这个动词，换成穿、住、行、玩等等其他动词，照样可以成立，当然，有效程度有所不同。 从一个人穿什么衣服、住在什么样的社区、家里有些什么家具、开什么车、周末有哪些娱乐活动，你多少都能看出一个人的文化背景、收入状况、教育程度，乃至他所特有的个性。当我们把所有这些方面合起来时，就得到了一个比较丰满完整的答案。 在当今时代，假如你想了解一个陌生人，我可以教你一个简单办法，拿过他的智能手机，看看里面装了些什么应用，心里大致就有点数了，效果可能比看简历更好。 谈论这些究竟有何意义？ 那么观察和谈论这种种文化特性究竟有什么意义呢？仅仅是因为它们本身有趣吗？就像昆虫爱好者，满世界抓虫子，做成标本，命名归类，描述其特性，贴上标签，然后陈列在博物馆里，好比我们在民俗博物馆里看到的各种所谓文化标本。 当然，做这些事情也可能蛮有乐趣，然而，作为一个对生活和对世界有着较多哲学兴趣的人，停留在这一层次上，是不能让我满意的，我希望，这些观察与思考，能够帮助我们更好的理解我们祖先所走过的历史，理解我们生活于其中的社会，以及我们成长于其中、将我们教化成为文明人的那些文化，并且，最终，让我们回过头来，更好的理解我们自己。 生物学家可以带给我们什么启发？ 幸运的是，多年前我阅读了几位生物学家的著作，比如德斯蒙德·莫里斯的《裸猿》和贾瑞德·戴蒙德的《第三种黑猩猩》，他们仿佛为我打开了一扇窗户，让我得以从一个更有利的角度观察这些事情。 生物学家的优势在于，他们会把人类和其他动物，特别是和我们的灵长类近亲放在一起做比较，从而获得一个更宽阔的视野，而且就像得到了一面镜子，通过对比，可以注意到许多以往被熟视无睹的现象，并且，当你从进化论的立场上考虑问题时，便会很自然的将人类所经历的漫长进化历史纳入观察背景之中。 那么，这种视角会带来什么启示呢？我想可以举几个例子。 睾丸透露了什么信息？ 比如动物学家会测量雄性的睾丸重量，并据此推测这一物种两性关系的基本模式，原理是，两性关系越混乱，雄性间的精子战争越激烈，就需要越大的睾丸来大量而迅速的制造精子，所谓精子战争，就是来自不同雄性个体的精子，在同一位雌性的身体里竞争到达卵子的机会。 动物学家在这么做时，也没放过人类，而测量结果发现，人类睾丸占体重的比例，在猿类中排在黑猩猩后面，大猩猩前面，这暗示了，人类配偶关系看来有着悠久历史，而且确实降低了性关系的混乱程度，但配偶关系的牢固和忠贞的程度并未达到大猩猩那种水平，这些推测，和我们所掌握的人类学材料也是吻合的。 那么阴茎呢？ 当动物学家将尺子瞄向雄性的另一个性器官时，他们看到的是一个更惊人的事实，人类的阴茎是所有灵长类中最硕大的，而硕大的阴茎往往和两性关系中的强迫行为有关，当雌性不配合、或者体型姿态不方便交配时，较为粗长的阴茎可以让雄性更容易完成交配，而人类在形体方面似乎不存在什么障碍，所以原因看来要从前一种去找。 一个有意思的对照是鸭子，雄性鸭子以强奸惯犯而出名，其阴茎长度和整个身体差不多，这就提示我们，人类历史上，强奸或许是相当普遍的现象，而且这一行为确实让擅于此道的男性留下了更多后代。 还有乳房？ 和男性器官相比，女性有一个器官就更让人震惊，那就是常年隆起的乳房，其他动物的乳房只有在哺乳期才会隆起，只有人类女性的乳房常年鼓胀挺拔，里面充塞着对哺乳毫无帮助的脂肪，实际上，半球状的乳房反而不利于哺乳，偶尔还会造成哺乳窒息。 很明显，乳房是个用来吸引男性的器官，这一点从男人的反应便可看出，色情艺术的创作者对此也是心知肚明；问题是，女性为何需要吸引男性，要知道，在绝大多数动物中，需要吸引异性的，都是雄性，所以往往雄性更漂亮，用生物学术语说，就是有更发达的第二性征。 女性的乳房迄今还是个谜，各种解释都没有得到学术界的公认，不过，我们至少可以明确一点：从很早开始，比如几万年甚至十几万年前，男性，至少一部分男性，已经在对配偶进行挑剔了，而动物界通常的法则是，只有雌性挑剔雄性，这暗示了我们远古祖先的择偶策略、家庭模式，乃至社会结构中，隐藏着一些我们迄今尚未探明的秘密。 牙齿，下巴和鼻孔 现在让我们再次回到萨瓦兰的话题，看看当我们采取生物学家的进化视角之后，能否在吃这个话题上发现一些新鲜而有趣的事实；动物学家在了解一种动物吃些什么之后，便可推测它们的牙齿大概会是什么样子，反过来也是，若要猜猜一种陌生动物吃些什么，掰开它们的嘴巴看看牙齿，也能猜个大概。 人类的牙齿组成和猪很像，因为我们都是杂食动物，切削用的门牙，穿刺撕裂用的犬牙，研磨用的臼齿，一应俱全，就像瑞士军刀，每样都不算突出，但很全面，不像食草动物，只有门牙和臼齿，也不像食肉的猫科动物，撕咬剪切能力超强，研磨能力却几乎没有，食物都是大块吞咽的。 但人类牙齿最显著的特点还不在这里，而是和我们的猿类近亲相比，人类的整个下颚和牙床都大大缩小了，而且排列的非常紧密，以至于最后几颗臼齿很难长出来，变成了所谓的智齿，结果是，我们的口吻部大幅内收，收到与颧骨对齐，嘴巴的开口度也变得很小。 这也导致了另外两个附带后果：我们有了下巴，而他猿类是没有下巴的，我们的鼻子拉长而且鼻孔朝下，而其他猿类的鼻孔是朝前的，想象一下，假如我们的口吻部没有内收，那么一个朝下的鼻孔就会被挡住，呼吸就会受影响。当然，鼻梁拉长还另有原因，大概是因为我们祖先从热带森林移居到了更寒冷的地带，因而需要更长的鼻道来加热吸入的空气。 对于如此剧烈的改变，唯一合理的解释是，人类不再那么依赖牙齿的咀嚼功能了，我们祖先一定很早就找到了代替牙齿的手段，人类学家考虑了两种可能性，一种是敲打和研磨，另一种是烹饪，前者意味着我们学会了使用石器工具，而后者意味着我们学会了如何控制和利用火；在结合了其他证据之后，人类学家推测，这一变化大约在170万年前，也就是我们的能人祖先生活的时代，就已经开始了。 眼白，眉毛和嘴唇 以上我谈论的一些身体特征，为我们理解我们祖先的生活方式和两性关系提供了线索，他们生活在何种环境中，吃些什么，如何加工的食物，有没有掌握烹饪技术，如何择偶，两性关系处于什么状态，等等，这些都是我们文化历史的重要组成部分。 然而，由身体特征所提供的线索，我们还可以对历史了解的更多，比如我们知道，人类是高度社会化的，我们的社会性与合作倾向，在灵长类中是最显著的，正因此我们才建立了今天这样结构复杂的社会，而这一点，在我们身体上同样留下了痕迹。 比如我们的眼白，其他猿类是没有眼白的，眼白是一种用于面对面交流的表情工具，通过观察眼白，你很容易了解对方的注视方向，从而推测他正在关注什么，这一点对于我们的语言能力非常关键，当我们说话时，会用一个代词或者名词指称某个对象，可是假如仅仅依靠词汇本身，听者其实很难明白对方所指的究竟是什么东西，这一点语言哲学家已经有过大量分析。 对于指称意图的领会，必须借助语音之外的其他线索，尤其是在儿童最初学习语言时，以及早期人类刚刚开始使用语言时，更是如此；提供其他线索的辅助手段有好多种，包括以手指物、目光跟随、共同注视，以及最高级也最困难的意图读取，而眼白可能就在其中发挥了关键作用。 另外，我们的眉毛和向外翻出的嘴唇，也是猿类中独一无二的，它们大概也都是表情工具，因为作为一种辅助交流手段，表情在语言以及其他社会交往中，都起着重要作用。 除了身体，我们还可以从哪里寻找线索？ 到此为止，我谈论的线索都来自身体，但除了身体特征之外，动物学家的这种进化视角，同样可以运用到人类的心理和行为特征上，甚至运用到我们所创造的人工制品和社会制度上，只要它们能够帮助我们理解人性和文化，理解社会与历史。 我想举几个例子来说明我的意思。 为什么有些东西看起来那么萌？ 养过宠物、玩过布偶娃娃、或者看过动画片的朋友都知道，有些形象大家都认为很萌很可爱，会激发出非常强烈、难以遏制的怜爱情感，娱乐、传媒和广告业都很清楚如何利用这种心理；为什么会这样？生理学家可能会告诉你，那都是催产素惹的祸，但这实际上并没回答我们真正的疑问，而且，为何我们觉得很萌的东西是这些而不是另一些？ 心理学家研究过这个问题，他们发现，这事情还是有规律可循的，几乎所有萌物，都带有一些婴儿特征，大脑袋、短腿、小鼻子小嘴、大而清澈的眼睛，较大的眼距，或者类似于婴儿啼哭的叫声，等等。 大自然为我们设计了对婴儿的怜爱心理，好让我们精心照料他们，这是很容易理解的，但人类的特别之处在于，男性对萌物也有强烈反应，这就表明，在怜爱这一心理机制得以塑造的那个年代，男性已经开始承担起和女性共同照料孩子的责任了，而这种情况在我们猿类近亲中是不存在的，即便在整个动物界，父爱也是比较少见的情况。 这一点，再结合其他线索（比如我前面提到的睾丸和乳房的特征），我们大概可以推测，婚姻和家庭是一种非常古老的文化现象，不大可能像过去某些学者所认为的那样，是农业起源之后才出现的。 邓巴数的历史启示 我们再来看看另一个更有意思的例子，大家可能都听说过邓巴数，这个数字所代表的那种理论是说，每个人与之维持持久关系的熟人，数量最多不超过200，通常只有100多。 所谓熟人的意思，不仅仅是说你认识这个人，而是说，你会把他当作一个特殊个体对待，会记住和他的交往历史，以及他和其他你认识的人之间的关系，虽然100多看起来不是很大的数字，但这些两两关系的数量却非常庞大，所以尽管我们的大脑已经比黑猩猩大了三四倍，但也很难处理更庞大的关系网络和交往历史了。 邓巴数理论对我们理解人类社会的进化史很有帮助，人类学家早就注意到，传统社会基本上都是小型熟人社会，这些社会的内部秩序主要靠熟人之间的合作与信任来维持，而这些人之所以相互熟识并生活在一起，是因为血缘和姻亲关系为合作互惠创造了前提。 在定居文明出现以前，不存在比熟人社会更大的社会结构，而邓巴数理论告诉我们，这不是偶然现象，而是人类的认知局限所造成的结果，实际上，人类学调查也发现，凡是依靠熟人关系维持的社会，一旦人口接近或超出邓巴数限制，就会发生分裂。 邓巴数理论带来的一个启示是，当后来我们建立起大型社会的时候，必定是找到了某些特别的组织手段和制度元素，来克服邓巴数局限；一种比较容易想到的可能性，是阶层分化和婚姻联盟，设想这样几个小型社会，它们各自都分化出了两个阶层：少数贵族和多数平民，然后，几个社会的贵族之间通过姻亲关系建立了上层熟人圈，于是，一个双层社会结构便诞生了，上层熟人圈成了其统治阶层，并且为这个较大社会的秩序维持提供了一种关系纽带。 类似的发展也可以以横向扩展的方式进行，前提是专业分工和职业分化，多个小型社会中，从事同一职业的个人之间，可以通过师徒关系或行会组织而建立职业熟人圈，从而将这些社会连结成一个更大的结构，另外，像宗教组织、同乡会、帮派、商会等等非血缘组织，也可以起着类似的作用。 邓巴数的当代启示 邓巴数理论带来的另一个启示，和当代生活有着更直接的关系，今天，多数人生活在城市，甚至是上千万人的大都市，与传统熟人社会截然不同，然而我们的基础认知能力却并没有很大改进，所以，当我们有机会接触那么多人，尤其是有了网络社交之后，就不可能像以往对待熟人那样对待遇到的每个人了。 于是我们便倾向于用以往对待陌生人的方式去对待他们，即便和他们的交往内容看起来不像是陌生人之间发生的那种，这一局面导致的一个结果是，标签横飞，因为我们无法将每个交往对象当作有血有肉的个体，而只能通过贴标签来加以识别和记忆，这是个浙江佬、理科生、文青、五毛、工业党、波士顿高华、法左、国奥、小粉红……这大概是都市时代和网络时代不可避免的场面，无论我们是否喜欢，都将不得不去面对和适应。 这些说法靠谱吗？ 我已经说了很多，最后我想声明一下，我不是生物学家，也不是心理学家，或人类学家，所以我不能担保我在这里说的东西都有着扎实的科学依据，我关心这些话题，更多是出于一种哲学上的兴趣，为了理解人类、理解世界、最终也更好的理解自己，毕竟，不是只有科学家才有探索世界的兴趣，我们普通人也可以保持这样的好奇心。 我今天谈论这些，还有之前写作《沐猿而冠》这本书，只是想分享我的心得，激起更多人的好奇心，说服你们也站到我努力呈现的这个视角上来，因为这个视角曾让我受益匪浅，从那个角度观察，相信你会看到一个更精彩更有趣的世界。 谢谢大家。  

最近在Quartz上读到一篇文章，There really is no such thing as speed reading，说的是快速阅读法并不可取，有点意思，说几点我的看法： 1） 我不怎么追求快速阅读，首先因为不太有这需要，其次是因为节奏太快会让我不舒服，不仅阅读，任何事情都是如此，我做什么事都喜欢慢吞吞的。 2） 不过有时候我也会读的很快，特别是碰到那些比较乏味枯燥但又觉得有必要过一下目的材料，此时便会抱着一种赶紧完成的工具性态度，所以也不会带来多少快感。 3） 有些书不可能读的快，因为它会时时发人深省，让你浮想联翩，或掩卷长叹，或长时间发呆，甚至浑身战栗，这是所有阅读体验中最迷人的部分，谁会蠢到去强行终止它呢？（除非你是在练房中术） 4） 此类体验最强烈，因而最读不快的，是那种在你的观念体系中制造了大地震的书，当你最终合上它、站起身时，窗外的世界已是另一个了；就我个人而言，造成这种级别大地震的书大概不到十本，包括初中物理课本（因为其中的原子论），高中生物课本（因为提到了进化论），大一时读的经济学课本，《自私的基因》，《格式塔心理学原理》；一旦你的观念体系被粉碎，需要努力加以重建，那就不可能是一个快捷的过程。 5） 有些书没那么震撼，只是制造一些小局部地震，或引发一些遐想，或帮助你把以往的种种念头串了起来，即便如此，也足以让你时时停顿下来，因而将阅读速度拖得很慢。 6） 当然，一本好书也不会处处都有让你放慢或停顿下来的内容，但假如它完全没有，那肯定算不上什么好书。 7） 不是好书未必不值得一读，有时候你需要往头脑里多灌些材料，此时，快速阅读法还是有其价值的（这一点我和Quartz那篇文章的作者看法有所不同）。 8） 假如你从来没有上面提到的那种体验，却仍坚持大量阅读，那实在让人佩服。 9） 再说说快速阅读这件事本身。依我看，快速阅读的秘诀在于对内容的预期，假如事先能够对后续内容的结构形成准确预期，速度可以非常快，因为此时信息的提取不再依赖于句子结构和文字顺序，通过非顺序的抓取一些特征性字眼，便可读个大概，对此我的解释是，你实际上已经预设了一个语义框架，阅读过程只是抓取特征字眼填进该框架。 10） 问题是，预期很可能是错的，此时可能引出两种结果：A）你意识到预期错了，不得不重新调整，于是速度被拖慢下来，B）你没意识到错误，于是误读、漏读、幻读（即凭空脑补）便出现了。 11） 第二种结果的最糟糕之处在于：它非但没有给你带来新知识新见解，反倒在不断强化你的固有陈见，从每本新书、每篇新文章里，你所看到的都是“对你早已拥有的透彻见解或英明判断的又一个例证”，此类阅读越多越勤快，你就变得越蠢越无知。  

最近和两位老同学吃饭，被问到了这个老掉牙的问题：

你说人活着究竟有什么意义？

可喜可贺，我终于被当作哲学家对待了。 当时比较仓促，而且我不想让这个话题占用太多时间，所以只说了几句，如果把我想说的都说出来，大概会是这样的： 1）如果你希望得到一个简洁明了的回答，那说明你的问题提错了。 2）生活的意义丰富而具体，不能指望一个简约的答案。 3）比如我喜欢吃这个或那个菜，它此时此刻带给的（无论是生理上的还是文化上的）满足，就是一种意义。 4）你可能会说，这种意义也太低级了吧？如果所存在的，无非是这样一些琐碎的意义，那生活也说不上多有意义啊。 5）嗯，有些意义确实低级或琐碎，但也有很多高级的啊，破解难题的满足，创造作品的成就，穿透重重迷雾而获得对社会与历史的洞察，对古老传统的追寻和皈依，道德上的坚守与认同…… 6）问题在于，你总是忍不住要去刨根问底的追问：那又是为了什么？……，可是，这样的追问必定将你带向更低级且越来越低级的回答。 7）经验和认识可以被还原，也需要被还原才能得到改进，但意义是经不起还原和降解的，把一架飞机拆成零件可以让你更好的认识其工作原理，但拆开后的那堆零件就不再是飞机了，特定的意义仅在特定层次上以特定结构（或模式）存在（即被体验到）。 8）略作自省即可发现，你能体验到低级的意义，也能体验到高级的意义，但你不能：既要求意义是高级的，又要求它是“基本的”或“终极的”。