【2015-10-30】 最近听到不少诸如“别让孩子学中文或读中文材料以免受其毒害”之类的，我看有点反应过度了，说几点看法： 1）中文（即汉语官话之书面语）不是很好的语言，特别是在表达精确而复杂的结构性内容时， 2）但这不好不是该语言的“本性”决定的，而是因为它缺乏被高密度大强度的运用于此类精确表达的历史， 3）认为学某种语言就会被该语言所特有的思维模式所困住，这种想法过于语言决定论了， 4）有些人确实会被语言困住，但那是因为他们自己足够蠢，或信息条件足够闭塞， 5）语言没什么固有不变的本性，使用者总是在不断改造它，当某种表达需求足够强烈、频繁而普遍时，新成分就会被创造出来， 6）就认知能力发展而言，拼音化和非拼音化书面语各有好处，有机会各学一门挺好， 7）但不学也没什么大不了的，因为发展符号认知能力的其他机会很多，错过一种也无所谓， 8）当代中文材料里垃圾居多，这没错， 9）但因此而认为孩子学中文时接触这些材料会把脑子学坏，是没有道理的过度恐慌， 10）许多孩子确实被教坏了，比如学到很多坏的思考方法，习得很多坏的文化， 11）但这不是因为接触了太多垃圾，而是因为没机会读到好东西， 12）希望将孩子隔离在垃圾之外，这既无必要，也做不到，哪里都有很多垃圾，英文世界也是， 13）重要的是要让他有机会接触好东西，品味都是靠多吃练出来的。  

【2015-10-29】 @海德沙龙 《欧元危机背后的微观病灶》在有关欧元危机的报道和评论中，货币政策、财政赤字、物价、失业率等宏观因素总是处于议论焦点，微观层面却很少得到关注，经济学家Christian Thimann在比较了各欧元国过去15年贸易差额后发现：顺差国顺差恒增，逆差国逆差同样恒增，这只能从微观方面理解 @whigzhou: 分隔顺差区和逆差区的界线真是太眼熟了～ @whigzhou: 日耳曼vs非日耳曼，新教vs天主教/东正教，文化禀赋真是千年难改啊 @whigzhou: 个人责任vs命苦赖别人，重诺守信vs说话当放屁，遵守规则愿赌服输vs习惯性耍赖……

【2015-10-27】 @whigzhou: 昨天参加了一个初中同学会，除少数几位，都是我30年没见过的同学，我把大部分时间都花在使劲逐一辨认上了，直到散会这任务也还没完成，这是我有生以来最真切而密集的体验到长期记忆如何被逐渐唤起，人脸似乎在其中履行了主要的索引功能，往往在凝视一张面孔几分钟之后，一些往日情景突然就浮了出来。 @whigzhou: 回想起不少有意思的情景：1）我们班2/3以上同学是农村的，老师也有不少是农村的，学校有农忙假，不过每年只有一次，但因为当时还流行双季稻和冬小麦，所以每年有两次农忙，春天那次没有假期，结果，那一周教室里常常只剩下不到一半学生，还经常有父母跑到教室里把孩子喊回家干活； @whigzhou: 2）有个女同学突然变得很忧郁，常暗自哭泣，后来就没来上学了，一打听，说是嫁人了，家里穷，是换亲；另一个女生比我高一级，也换亲了，但她没服从，因为太喜欢读书，而且成绩年纪第一，结果逃到亲戚家躲起来了，后来上了中专好像 @whigzhou: 3）许多同学最终被我认出来，是因为曾经和我同桌，我的同桌比谁都多，因为入学排座位是按身高，我在第二排，后来不断有同学要求往前换，我却巴不得往后靠，而且我在老师眼里属于“眼不见为净”那种，所以换座提议总是得到批准，于是最后我就在末排了，结果就有了许多前同桌。 @二逼青年批话多:换亲是类似于童养媳？ @whigzhou: 不是，童养媳是“答应嫁过来为条件的收养”，换亲是双方各自将女儿嫁给对方的儿子，这是两个都备不起彩礼的穷家庭的解决方案 @whigzhou: 4）说起同桌，我们小学的排桌政策是尽可能男女混桌，据说用意是利用男女生之间的敌意来建立相互监督和制约机制，而到初中，排桌政策就换成了尽可能同性同桌，无论好坏，这两个政策倒确实有着坚实的发育心理学基础，青春期、男女生之间从敌意/对抗到吸引的转变，好像就是从初一开始； @whigzhou: 5）我们镇人口两千多，我们中学还服务周边农村两万多人，但那时农村入学率低不少，所以农村学生比例大约在2/3，回想起来，当时在学生中间，城镇对农村是一条最明显的社会界线，不过我好像天生就对此类社会界线缺乏敏感，我的玩伴以农村孩子居多，似乎还因此被排斥在城镇孩子的玩圈之外， @whigzhou: 不过我当时对此懵然不觉，回想起来好像真是这样，昨天吃饭时分桌是自发的，但城乡界线依然清晰，而我不知不觉就坐在了农村那桌上，我对社会交往中的一些隐秘规范和模式太迟钝了，往往事后很久才察觉到，这一定造成了许多沟通无效，让我听不出别人的某句话在暗示什么  

And There Shall be an Über for Everything … Including Goats 无处不Uber，山羊亦如是 作者：Michelle Martin @ 2015-8-26 译者：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：张三（@老子毫无动静地坐着像一段呆木头），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：花花公子，http://www.playboy.com/articles/uber-goats-rental Tammy Dunakin sits in a lawn chair in the shade of her R-pod camper trailer watching her brush-removal team at work. Her crew of 60 is spaced haphazardly across a weedy hillside that rises to meet Highway 99 in downtown Seattle. 在露营车旁边的阴凉地里放一把草坪躺椅，Tammy Dunakin悠闲地坐在上面，看着她正在工作的灌木清除队。她的60位伙计地散布在一片杂草丛生的山坡上。山坡向上延伸，同西雅图市中心的99号公路相接。 At least half of the workers are napping or resting in the shade. The others are wandering about or snacking. It’s typical for this crew. They’re goats. 然而，此时至少有一半的伙计在树荫下打瞌睡或休息，其他的不是在闲逛就是在吃零食。但这其实是这个团队的常态。因为——他们毕竟是山羊啊：） People walking by are surprised and delighted. They ask questions and snap photos through the fence. They stop. They look. They linger. 路过的人们都露出了惊讶和兴奋的表情。隔着栅栏，他们问这问那，又忙着拍照。他们停下来，围观，久久不愿离去。 “Seriously? This is pretty awesome,” one man says to Dunakin before continuing on his way. “不是逗我吧？这可真酷毙了。”一个路人停下脚步对Dunakin说。 “Goats out of context,” says Dunakin, the owner of Rent-a-Ruminant, which is based on nearby Vashon Island. “It grabs people’s attention. People absolutely love goats. Everyone—and I mean every single person who sees them—leaves with a smile on their face. It makes them happy. It makes my day.” “想不到是山羊吧，呵呵。”Dunakin说道，她是“租个反刍动物回家”公司的老板，公司位于附近的瓦雄岛（Vashon Island）。“这成功地抓住了人们的眼球，人们超爱山羊的。所有人——我是说每一个看到这些山羊的人——离开时都会面带笑容。这带给他们快乐，也让我非常开心。” When Dunakin started her clients were private landowners. Eleven years later, goats are in high demand and getting more popular all the time. Now she also has requests from planned communities, transportation departments and even police departments for clearing shrubbery in high-crime areas. Dunakin刚开始这门营生时，顾客都是私有土地主。11年过去了，山羊越来越受欢迎，需求旺盛。现在Dunakin也会收到来自规划型社区、交通部门的订单，甚至警察局也会请她去清理罪案多发地区的灌木丛。 In March, Amazon Home Services launched with goats as a top offering. “My email exploded,” says Dunakin. “I got hundreds of requests. No one was expecting that kind of response.” 三月份，亚马逊推出“家庭服务”主页的时候高榜热推了“山羊”服务。“我的邮箱都被挤爆了！” Dunakin说，“我收到数以百计的订单，真没想到市场反应竟然这么热烈。” This is Uber, but with goats, and more proof that thanks to technology meeting ingenuity meeting demand, there will soon be an “Uber” for everything. 这其实就是山羊除草服务的Uber模式。越来越多的事例表明，有赖科技，创意和需求的结合，用不了多久，什么东西都可以来“Uber”一把。 Dunakin’s herd has grown to 115 working goats, and she now has more than enough work to keep them all busy from April to October. Livestock-loving entrepreneurs are stepping up to fill the growing demand. Dunakin has trained and licensed 10 others through her affiliate license program, and she plans to franchise in 2016. More than 50 grazing providers across the United States and Canada can be found here. Dunakin的羊群已经增加到了115头，而且已经有足够的活儿让它们从四月一直忙到十月。网站“Livestock-loving”上的企业家们正纷纷加入进来，去满足不断增长的需求。通过其“成员认证计划”，Dunakin已经培训了十家公司并给它们颁发了证书，而且她打算在2016年开始进行特许经营。美国和加拿大已有50多家提供吃草服务的商家。 Goats are browsers as opposed to grazers. Unlike cows, which mostly stick to munching grass, goats prefer a variety of plants. They’ll eat thorny Himalayan blackberries, stinging nettles, ivy – it’s a long list. Goats are the high school boys of the animal kingdom. 山羊是食草动物里的“扫货客”。同基本只吃草的牛不同，山羊喜欢的植物多种多样。它们能吃带刺的喜马拉雅黑莓、叶子上长满刺人蜇毛的荨麻、常青藤——这份菜单长着呢。山羊是动物王国里的高中男生。 They like to climb. They traverse steep slopes with ease. Their digestion destroys some weed seeds such as blackberry seeds, and they fertilize the soil as they go. They also help to keep fire danger low. 它们还喜欢攀爬，陡峭的山坡也能轻松越过。它们的消化系统能破坏掉诸如黑莓等植物的种子，而且它们会沿路给土地“施肥”。它们还能降低火灾的风险。 If they are deployed at the right time of year and contained—not always an easy task—using livestock such as goats is arguably one of the best, greenest ways to remove pesky weeds and unwanted vegetation. And best of all, you don’t have to own a goat to reap the benefits—you can rent. 在一年中的适当时候将畜群“分派”出去，而且让它们安分守己，有时并不是件容易的事。但如果做到了，那用像山羊这样的牲畜来清除讨厌的杂草和不想要的植被，可以说是最好、最绿色环保的方式了。而且最棒的是，眼下你不用实际拥有一头山羊就能享有这些好处——你可以租了。 It’s not a solution for everyone. I received an estimate through Amazon Home Services for a tenth-of-an-acre parcel. At $650 it seemed a bit steep for a mow. I get it, though. The goats have to be transported to the property, the wrangler stays with them the entire time, and she has to set up electric fencing to keep the goats out of the garden beds and any plants that are toxic to them. 这一解决方案也并不是能适用于每个人。之前我通过亚马逊家庭服务网站收到了一份为十分之一英亩土地提供除草服务的估价，是650美刀，作为割草服务，这个要价似乎贵了点。但我也可以理解，毕竟山羊们得先被运到这里，然后牧羊人得同它们一直呆在一起，她还必须拉起一个电栅栏以便把山羊同花坛和对它们有毒的植物分开。 I’ll stick with a push mower, but goats make a lot of sense for people with some combination of steep slopes, gnarly weeds, significant acreage, restoration goals or a desire to do good for the planet. 我还是会选择手推式剪草机。不过对于那些拥有大片土地，土地上有陡峭山坡和粗硬扭结杂草，希望恢复土地的肥力，或者想保护环境的人来说，山羊还是很不错的选择。 Mark Stranahan has all but the steep slopes. He hired Dunakin’s goats in June to come out to his land on Vashon Island for the second year in a row. 除了没有陡坡，Mark Stranahan 在瓦雄岛的土地符合以上所有条件。他六月时请Dunakin的羊来给他的土地除草，而这已是连续第二年了。 “What goats eat, it’s incredible. I had a huge nasty thicket of blackberry bramble with branches an inch thick, and they ate it all. It’s amazing what they can accomplish in terms of clearing,” says Stranahan, who is an architect and consultant who has been living in Ann Arbor, Mich., for part of the year. “山羊这吃货可真是让人难以置信。我有一大片讨厌的茂密黑莓林，枝丫都有一英寸粗，可山羊把它们都吃光了！说到清理，它们的能力简直令人惊异。”Stranahan说道。Stranahan是一位建筑师和顾问，每年都有部分时间生活在密西根州的安娜堡（Ann Arbor, Mich.）。 Last year the goats worked his four acres of meadows and alder forests for nine days, and this year they cleared the weeds in a week. How did they shave three days off? More experience? Better pay? Cloud-based solutions? Actually, the land starts to recover, and it becomes easier to maintain. 去年，山羊群在他四英亩的牧场和桤树林里足足干了九天，而今年在一周之内就搞定了。它们是怎么省下三天时间的呢？更有经验了？薪水更多了？还是用了云计算？事实上，只是土地开始恢复了而已，这让保养工作变得容易了。 “It’s nice to wander out with a hot cup of coffee and see the goats,” Stranahan says. “端着一杯热咖啡到地里散步，看看羊，真是一种享受。”Stranahan 说。 Not so entertaining is when the goats get out. Set free, they will eat gardens and ornamental plants (and get sick goat bellies or worse), and they will clamber up onto anything they can, including the roof of your car or home. This is why hiring is the best way to go. 可当山羊跑出去时，可就没有这么惬意了。要是放任不管，山羊们会吃掉花园和装饰植物（这会让他们拉肚子，甚至更糟），它们能爬就爬，包括你的车顶和房顶。所以租用（而不是自己养）是最好的方式。 “I lived with a couple of goats in a previous era on a previous hippie farm,” Stranahan said. “They are damned difficult roommates. The clickety-clack of little goat hooves on your Alfa Romeo will piss you right off.” “早年在一个嬉皮士农场，我曾同几只羊一起生活过，” Stranahan 说，“它们真是超级难处的室友。小羊蹄子在你的阿尔法·罗密欧牌爱车上的踢踏声，能把你当场气疯。” Stranahan likes a good goat-based solution because, well, it’s cool. Stranahan喜欢一个不错的“羊方案”，嗯，因为这很酷。 “Local vegan food is cool, roller-derby is cool, and goats are cool,” he said. “当地的纯素食很酷，轮滑阻拦赛（roller derby）很酷，还有山羊也很酷。”他说。 Having them quickly graze off weed populations every few seasons is an excellent way to encourage re-vegetation and restoration of natural plant succession. And it’s more fun. People don’t come visiting with a picnic if you’re spraying pesticides. 让山羊们每隔几个季节就来啃食田间杂草，是促进植被恢复和自然植物更替的好办法，而且也更有乐趣。要是你喷洒除草剂的话，人们是不会来野餐的。 Russ Ayers might agree. He’s the landscape manager of the 2,200-acre Issaquah Highlands, a master-planned community in the foothills of the Cascade Mountain Range. He has hired goats to come eat weeds on about 18 acres of the steepest, toughest terrain—land where the community tried using human crews before discovering it was just too rough and risky. Goats have been coming for five years. They are born to take on steep hillsides where weed-eaters wear out and where men grow weary and get injured. Russ Ayers大概也会同意的。他管理着2200英亩的伊瑟阔高地（Issaquah Highlands），这是卡斯克德山脉（Cascade Mountain Range）脚下一片精心规划的社区。Russ Ayers已经雇山羊来为其中最陡峭、最艰难的18英亩土地清除杂草。之前社区是用人力来完成这项工作的，但发现那样太艰难，风险太高了。山羊们已经连续过来五年了。它们天生就是爬陡坡的好手——那些地方会让除草机报废，让人累坏，而且容易受伤。 “They do a great job,” Ayers says. “它们干得很棒。”Ayers 说。 When they’re done, the fire fuel load is virtually zero. They chomp it down and fertilize the fields and by early fall the grass is green and about six inches tall. The goats cost a quarter of what a human crew costs. 山羊们清理完后，土地上的可燃物基本就没有了。它们嚼完那些可燃物，还给土地施肥。等到了早秋时节，绿草就有6英寸高了。雇佣山羊的费用只有雇佣工人的四分之一。 To accomplish the same tasks, a human crew would need to cut, bag, haul, dump and fertilize—each step with a cost and carbon footprint that the goats obliterate in the game of who’s greener. 要完成同样的工作，一个工人需要先修剪，再打包拖走，然后倒掉，最后再施肥——每一步都有成本并产生碳排放。山羊可不会产生碳排放，在绿化环保的比拼里稳操胜券。 if you’re in the market for a goat rental, Dunakin has a few tips. Find an outfit that stays with the goats, unless you want to end up on the news. If the animals escape, a speedy response is essential. Check the company’s rating with the Better Business Bureau as well as reviews from previous clients and on sites such as Angie’s List. Make sure they are insured and that they provide water and shelter for the animals. 如果你正打算从市场上挑选山羊租赁服务，Dunakin有几条建议给你。为山羊配齐整套控制装备【译注：大概是指前面提到的控制山羊活动范围的电网之类设施】，除非你想上新闻。如果动物们逃跑了，快速反应是必须的。从非盈利点评组织Better Business Bureau那里查看该公司的评级，同时从以前的客户那里或类似Angie’s List这样的网站上了解该公司的服务水平。确保他们是买了保险的，并会为动物们提供饮水和栖身之所。 If restoration of native vegetation is your goal, An Peischel, a small ruminant extension specialist at Tennessee State University, suggests making sure the herd you hire has experience with your particular types of vegetation. There is a lot of science around what goats can do, naturally, and factors such as time of year, elevation and even sex of the goats can make a difference in what the goats will eat when. With the right timing, goats can eradicate certain weeds and promote native plants. 田纳西州立大学的小型反刍动物推广专家An Peischel建议，如果你的目标是想恢复当地植被，那你要搞清楚你所雇佣的畜群是否对你想处理的特定植物有经验。关于山羊天生可以做什么有许多科学研究，诸如季节、海拔甚至性别等因素，都会对山羊什么时候吃些什么产生影响。选对了时间，山羊就可以清除特定的杂草，促进当地植被的生长。 Dunakin’s adorable employees have perennial appeal. She and her goats have been highlighted in The Wall Street Journal, Newsweek and “The Colbert Report,” among other places, but Dunakin says she has at least one more goal. “I know that when I get on ‘Ellen,’ I have arrived.” Sigh. We hope Playboy will do for now. Dunakin可爱的伙计们一年到头都那么受欢迎。她和她的山羊们已经在包括《华尔街日报》、《新闻周刊》和“科尔伯特报告”节目在内的许多媒体中被重点报道过了。但Dunakin说她至少还有一个目标：“要是有朝一日能上艾伦秀，那就圆满了。”哎，其实此刻上《花花公子》也不赖啊，我希望。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Beginning of the End of Religious Freedom 宗教自由终结的开始 作者：David Harsanyi @ 2015-8-21 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Reason，http://reason.com/archives/2015/08/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-religious-fr Compelling bakers to bake cakes part of a broader drive to limit faith-based decisions by private businesses. 强迫糕点师制作蛋糕是限制私营企业基于信仰作决策的广泛攻势的一部分 Just in case you need a refresher: Back in 2012, a baker in the Denver suburb of Lakewood was asked by a gay couple to make them a wedding cake—two years before gay marriage was even legalized in Colorado. The owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, declined to participate in Charlie Craig and David Mullins' celebration because such an event conflicted with his Christian faith. 也许你需要重温一下：2012年，在丹佛市郊的莱克伍德，一对同性恋人要求一名糕点师为他们制作一个婚礼蛋糕——那是科罗拉多州同姓婚姻合法化之前两年的事了。“杰作蛋糕”的店主，Jack Phillip，拒绝让自己参与进Charlie Craig和David Mullins的婚礼，因为这与他的基督教信仰相冲突。 Here are a few things Phillips didn't do: He didn't query consumers about their sexual preferences. He didn't bar same-sex couples from purchasing a cake at a place of public accommodation. He didn't ask consumers traveling in same-sex pairs to leave his shop. He didn't hang a "No Gays Allowed" sign in his window. Phillips没有做以下这些事情：他没有查问顾客的性取向。他没有禁止同性伴侣在公共场所购买蛋糕。他没有要求出双入对的同性客人离开他的店铺。他也没有在窗户上挂“同性恋勿入”的牌子。 What he could never have known when he first opened his shop was that celebrating gay marriages would be a precondition for making a living. And when you consider that there are at least a few dozen other bakeries within a short drive from Masterpiece Cakeshop that could have accommodated the couple's celebratory pastry needs, why would he? 他刚开店的时候绝对想不到，为同性婚姻服务会成为谋生的前提条件。你想想，“杰作蛋糕”周边极短车程以内就有至少好几十家其它烘焙店，它们原本都能帮这对恋人制作婚礼蛋糕，这让他怎么想得到呢？ Yet instead of exhibiting a basic level of tolerance (or dignity), two priggish bullies decided to call the authorities when Phillips refused to bake them a cake. And the cultural commissars at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission soon ruled that he had discriminated against the couple. 然而，在Phillips拒绝为他们制作蛋糕之后，这两位自命道德高尚的霸道人物，没有表现出起码的宽容（或体面），而是决定报告政府。科罗拉多民权委员会的文化专员很快就裁定Phillips歧视了这对同性恋。 The shop was not only ordered to alter store policy and start baking cakes for gay weddings—or else face debilitating fines, a consequence often reported on by the media—but also forced to provide comprehensive staff training, ensure compliance and then file quarterly obedience reports with the government for two years. In these reports, Phillips has to describe exactly which remedial measures the shop has taken to conform and document the reasons any other patrons were denied service. 这家店不但被勒令店铺更改规定，从今往后要为同性婚礼制作蛋糕——否则就要面临惩罚性罚款，媒体对此后果多有报道——而且还被强制要求开展全面的员工培训、保证遵守规定并在两年内每季度定期向政府提交合规报告。Phillips在报告中必须具体描述店里为了合规都采取了何种整改措施，并要记录店里拒绝为任何其他主顾提供服务的原因。 So, you know, I'm sure this is exactly how Thomas Jefferson imagined America would turn out when he was writing the Declaration of Independence. 所以，你知道的，我确信托马斯·杰弗逊写《独立宣言》时就料到美国未来会变成这样。 Phillips appealed the decision, and a three-panel Colorado Court of Appeals unanimously decided that Masterpiece Cakeshop's policy against creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples was a "discriminatory and unfair practice," further ruling that the shop must continue to answer to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission or else be run out of business. Phillips对这一判决提出了上诉，结果由三人组成的科罗拉多上诉法院一致裁定“杰作蛋糕”拒绝为同性伴侣制作婚礼蛋糕的方针乃是“歧视性的不公正行为”，同时判决该店必须继续听从科罗拉多民权委员会的要求，否则就要停止营业。 Incredibly, the court acknowledged in its decision that it would have looked at the First Amendment arguments more closely had the gay couple ordered a cake with some explicit messaging that advocated gay marriage. In other words, the Colorado Court of Appeals believes that the threshold for denying religious liberty is the presence of advocacy. The court has effectively tasked itself with determining for you when religion should matter. 令人难以置信的是，法院在其判决中承认，假如当事的同性伴侣在订购蛋糕时明确传递了提倡同性婚姻的信息，那么法院会更为仔细地考虑宪法第一修正案。换句话说，科罗拉多上诉法院认为，否定宗教自由的门槛乃是公开提倡。法院因此实质上为自己赋予了一项任务：替你决定什么时候宗教是要紧的。 If nothing else, it's comforting to know that Colorado can force an orthodox Muslim butcher to make sausages for a polyamorous, bisexual bachelor/bachelorette party, as long as no one asks the butcher to outwardly promote swine and free love. 别的不论，以下事实实在让我们感到安慰：科罗拉多可以强迫正统的穆斯林屠户为开放多偶、双性恋的单身派对制作猪肉肠，只要没人要求这位屠户公开推广猪和自由性爱。 In any event, I'm sure there will be an appeal. But seeing as most Americans are fine with gay marriage and simultaneously put off by unpleasant (though deceptive, in this case) words such as "discrimination" and "prejudice," the courts—nearly always driven by the vagaries of public opinion—will find a way to force all to comply. 无论如何，我确信还会有场上诉。但看到多数美国人都觉得同性婚姻没什么大不了，同时又容易因“歧视”和“偏见”等令人不快（尽管在本案中这一不快是有欺骗性的）的词汇引发反感，几乎总是被反复莫测的公共意见所左右的法院总会找到办法来令所有人顺从。 This will go for any other businesses even tangentially related to weddings, such as food catering, music and so on. And the crusade will accelerate until the legal lynch mob gets to religious institutions. No doubt advocates will work backward to come up with a great legal rationalization for all of it. 这甚至还会延伸到只与婚礼擦边的行业，比如酒席承办、音乐伴奏等等。这场讨伐运动还会愈演愈烈，直到那些利用法律行私刑的暴民们一路杀到宗教组织那里。毫无疑问，支持者们会事后努力，为所有这一切进行法律上的合理化。 All of this is not to say that in American life, the minority should never be compelled to surrender to some form of majoritarianism, judicial force or government. In this case, though, the minority does not have the ability to compromise without abandoning its faith. The other side refuses to compromise precisely because of this reality. And courts and commissions around the country are willing to destroy businesses—businesses that sometimes took a large part of a lifetime to build—by ignoring one of the most vital functions of the First Amendment. 以上所论当然不是说，在美国人的生活中，少数派永远不应该被迫向某种形式的多数主义、司法机关和政府让步。只不过，在眼前的这一案例中，少数派没有能力在遵从自己信仰的条件下达成妥协。而另一方之所以拒绝妥协，恰恰就是因为这一现实。而全国各地的法院和委员会无视第一修正案的最关键功能之一，愿意去摧毁企业——有时还是某些人花了大半辈子才建立起来的企业。 The position of these businesspeople, unlike Southern racists decades ago, in no way undermines the newfound right of gay Americans to marry, nor does it inhibit them from enjoying freedom or finding happiness. In this case, only one side is attempting to legislate morality. 与几十年前南方的种族主义者不同，这些生意人的立场完全不会破坏美国同性恋者新近得以确立的结婚权利，也不会阻止他们享受自由和追求幸福。在本案中，只有一方试图将道德问题法律化。 If you admit—and many rational people do, even those who quarrel with the reasoning behind religious obstinacy—that millions of Christians hold some form of a genuine, long-standing religious conviction that prohibits them from celebrating gay marriages but you still support state coercion against them, then you might as well just concede that religious freedom isn't compatible with your conception of a contemporary society. 如果你承认——许多理性的人都会承认，即便是那些反对固执宗教思维的人——数以百万计的基督徒持有某种真诚的、存在已久的宗教信念，使得他们不可能去庆祝同性婚姻，但你还是支持国家对他们采取强制措施，那你就不如直接承认宗教自由与你所理解的现代社会不相容。 Whereas at one time the state wouldn't substantially burden religious exercise and would use the least restrictive means to further "compelling interests," the state today is inclined to substantially burden a Christian by the mere fact that someone's feelings are hurt. 从前，国家并不会实质性地增加宗教活动的义务，并以最不具有限制性的方式推动“重大迫切利益”。然而现在，国家已倾向于实质性地加重基督徒的义务，只是因为有人的感情受到了伤害。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Coddling of the American Mind 美国精神的娇惯 作者：GREG LUKIANOFF，JONATHAN HAIDT @ 2015-9 译者：Horace Rae（@sheldon_rae） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Atlantic，http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ In the name of emotional well-being, college students are increasingly demanding protection from words and ideas they don’t like. Here’s why that’s disastrous for education—and mental health. 以情感安康为名，大学生如今愈发强烈地要求保护自己，不愿听到他们不喜欢的言语和思想。下文解释了为什么这一趋势无论对教育还是心理健康都是灾难性的。 Something strange is happening at America’s colleges and universities. A movement is arising, undirected and driven largely by students, to scrub campuses clean of words, ideas, and subjects that might cause discomfort or give offense. Last December, Jeannie Suk wrote in an online article for The New Yorker about law students asking her fellow professors at Harvard not to teach rape law—or, in one case, even use the word violate (as in “that violates the law”) lest it cause students distress. 当今美国高校中存在一个奇怪的现象。一场运动正在蓬勃发展，它不受引导，主要由学生推动，目的是把可能造成冒犯或引起不适的言语、思想和议题从校园中清除出去。去年12月，Jeannie Suk在《纽约客》一篇在线文章中写到，有法学院的学生要求她在哈佛的同僚停止讲授强奸法——有一次，甚至要求他们停止使用“violate”一词（比如在“that violates the law”中）【译注：该词兼有“违反”、“侵犯”、“亵渎”与“强奸”之义】以免引起学生不适。 In February, Laura Kipnis, a professor at Northwestern University, wrote an essay in The Chronicle of Higher Education describing a new campus politics of sexual paranoia—and was then subjected to a long investigation after students who were offended by the article and by a tweet she’d sent filed Title IX complaints against her. 今年二月，西北大学教授Laura Kipnis在《高等教育纪事报》上发表了一篇文章，讲述高校里新出现的一种性妄想政治，有学生因为被这篇文章以及她发布的一条推特所冒犯，对其提出基于“第九条”的控诉【译注：指《联邦教育法修正案》第九条，禁止教育领域性别歧视】，她因此遭受了漫长的调查。 In June, a professor protecting himself with a pseudonym wrote an essay for Vox describing how gingerly he now has to teach. “I’m a Liberal Professor, and My Liberal Students Terrify Me,” the headline said. A number of popular comedians, including Chris Rock, have stopped performing on college campuses (see Caitlin Flanagan’s article in this month’s issue). Jerry Seinfeld and Bill Maher have publicly condemned the oversensitivity of college students, saying too many of them can’t take a joke. 今年六月，一位使用化名以保护自己的教授为Vox写了一篇文章，描述他现在在教学中需要多么小心翼翼，文章的标题是：“我是一名自由派教授，我被我的自由派学生吓坏了”。包括Chris Rock在内的许多当红谐星，已经不在大学校园演出了（详情见Caitlin Flanagan在本月杂志上的文章）。 Jerry Seinfeld和Bill Maher已公开批评大学生的过度敏感，说他们中太多人连一个玩笑也开不起了。 Two terms have risen quickly from obscurity into common campus parlance.Microaggressions are small actions or word choices that seem on their face to have no malicious intent but that are thought of as a kind of violence nonetheless. For example, by some campus guidelines, it is a microaggression to ask an Asian American or Latino American “Where were you born?,” because this implies that he or she is not a real American. 有两个晦涩的术语已经变成了校园里的日常用语。“微冒犯”（microaggression）表示表面本无恶意但仍被认为具有侵犯性的小举动或用语选择。举个例子，某些校园规则规定，询问亚裔或拉丁裔美国人“你出生在哪里？”就是一种“微冒犯”，因为这一提问暗示了这个人不是真正的美国人。 Trigger warnings are alerts that professors are expected to issue if something in a course might cause a strong emotional response. For example, some students have called for warnings that Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart describes racial violence and that F. Scott Fitzgerald’sThe Great Gatsby portrays misogyny and physical abuse, so that students who have been previously victimized by racism or domestic violence can choose to avoid these works, which they believe might “trigger” a recurrence of past trauma. “刺激警告”是上课时教授们在讲授易触发强烈情绪波动的内容前被认为应该发出的警告。举个例子，有些学生要求教授预先警告Chinua Achebe的《瓦解》包含有种族暴力内容，F. Scott Fitzgerald的《了不起的盖茨比》描绘了厌女症和肢体暴力。他们认为这些著作可能会“刺激”过往的心灵创伤，因此之前遭受过种族主义和家庭暴力伤害的学生就可以选择跳过这些著作。 Some recent campus actions border on the surreal. In April, at Brandeis University, the Asian American student association sought to raise awareness of microaggressions against Asians through an installation on the steps of an academic hall. The installation gave examples of microaggressions such as “Aren’t you supposed to be good at math?” and “I’m colorblind! I don’t see race.” But a backlash arose among other Asian American students, who felt that the display itself was a microaggression. The association removed the installation, and its president wrote an e-mail to the entire student body apologizing to anyone who was “triggered or hurt by the content of the microaggressions.” 一些近期的校园现象近乎荒诞。今年四月，为了引起对针对亚裔的“微冒犯”的重视，布兰迪斯大学亚裔美国学生联合会在一个学术报告厅的台阶上做了一个展示，内容是“微冒犯”的例子，比如“你们不是应该非常擅长数学吗？”和“我是色盲！我分辨不出种族。”但是另一些亚裔美国学生则提出强烈反对，他们认为这个展示本身就是一种“微冒犯”。后来联合会撤除了这些展品，会长向全体学生发了一封电子邮件，向所有“被‘微冒犯’伤害或刺激”的人道歉。

---

According to the most-basic tenets of psychology, helping people with anxiety disorders avoid the things they fear is misguided. 按照最基本的心理学原则，帮助焦虑症患者逃避他们所惧怕的事物是完全错误的。

---

This new climate is slowly being institutionalized, and is affecting what can be said in the classroom, even as a basis for discussion. During the 2014–15 school year, for instance, the deans and department chairs at the 10 University of California system schools were presented by administrators at faculty leader-training sessions with examples of microaggressions. The list of offensive statements included: “America is the land of opportunity” and “I believe the most qualified person should get the job.” 这种新的风气正在渐渐制度化，而且正在影响课堂上可以讲授的内容，甚至成为讨论问题的基础。例如在2014-15学年间，行政官员在教职员领导培训课程上为加州大学系统10所院校的院长和系主任们介绍了“微冒犯”的例子。冒犯性语言的清单包括：“美国是充满机会的国度”和“我相信这份工作应该给最有资格的人”。 The press has typically described these developments as a resurgence of political correctness. That’s partly right, although there are important differences between what’s happening now and what happened in the 1980s and ’90s. That movement sought to restrict speech (specifically hate speech aimed at marginalized groups), but it also challenged the literary, philosophical, and historical canon, seeking to widen it by including more-diverse perspectives. 媒体通常将这种变化描述为政治正确的复兴。这种说法部分正确，尽管现在发生的事情和上世纪八、九十年代发生的事情存在着重大差异。过去的运动试图限制言论（尤其是针对边缘群体的仇恨言论），但是它们也挑战文学、哲学和历史各方面的正统，试图通过容纳更加多元的视角来对之加以拓展。 The current movement is largely about emotional well-being. More than the last, it presumes an extraordinary fragility of the collegiate psyche, and therefore elevates the goal of protecting students from psychological harm. The ultimate aim, it seems, is to turn campuses into “safe spaces” where young adults are shielded from words and ideas that make some uncomfortable. 当下的运动则主要关注情感安康。不仅如此，它假定大学生的心理脆弱不堪，因此提升了保护学生免受心理伤害这一目标的重要性。这场运动的终极目标，似乎是要屏蔽一切让学生不舒服的言语和观点，把大学校园变成一个“安全场所”。 And more than the last, this movement seeks to punish anyone who interferes with that aim, even accidentally. You might call this impulse vindictive protectiveness. It is creating a culture in which everyone must think twice before speaking up, lest they face charges of insensitivity, aggression, or worse. 再进一步，这场运动试图让每一个妨碍这一目标的人受到惩罚，无心而为也不可原谅。你可以把这种冲动的念头称作“报复性保护”，它正在创造一种文化，在这种文化下，每一个人都必须三思而后言，以免被人指控麻木不仁、有攻击性，甚至更糟糕的罪名。 We have been studying this development for a while now, with rising alarm. (Greg Lukianoff is a constitutional lawyer and the president and CEO of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, which defends free speech and academic freedom on campus, and has advocated for students and faculty involved in many of the incidents this article describes; Jonathan Haidt is a social psychologist who studies the American culture wars. The stories of how we each came to this subject can be read here.) 我们研究这场运动已有一段时间了，情况越来越吓人。（Greg Lukianoff是一名宪法律师学者，也是个人教育权利基金会的主席兼CEO。该基金会致力于捍卫校园中的言论自由和学术自由，并且曾声援那些卷入本文所描述诸多事件的学生和教师；Jonathan Haidt是一位社会心理学家，他研究美国的文化战争。关于我们各自都是如何开始研究这个课题的，请见这里http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/greg-lukianoffs-story/399359/） The dangers that these trends pose to scholarship and to the quality of American universities are significant; we could write a whole essay detailing them. But in this essay we focus on a different question: What are the effects of this new protectiveness on the students themselves? Does it benefit the people it is supposed to help? 这种趋势对学术研究和美国大学教育的质量构成了严重威胁；我们可以写一整篇论文来详细论述。但是本文关注的是另一个问题：这种娇呵严护对学生自身有什么影响？它是否能帮助到它本打算帮助的人？ What exactly are students learning when they spend four years or more in a community that polices unintentional slights, places warning labels on works of classic literature, and in many other ways conveys the sense that words can be forms of violence that require strict control by campus authorities, who are expected to act as both protectors and prosecutors? 对无意的怠慢加以管制，给经典文学作品贴上警示标签，以其它种种方式传达这么一层意思：言词可能构成暴力，需要受到既被视作保护者又被视作检举人的校方的严格控制——学生花了四年甚至更多时间生活在这样的社区之中，究竟会学到什么呢？ There’s a saying common in education circles: Don’t teach students what to think; teach them how to think. The idea goes back at least as far as Socrates. Today, what we call the Socratic method is a way of teaching that fosters critical thinking, in part by encouraging students to question their own unexamined beliefs, as well as the received wisdom of those around them. Such questioning sometimes leads to discomfort, and even to anger, on the way to understanding. “不要教学生思考什么，要教给他们如何思考。”这句话在教育圈内广为人知。这一理念最早起码可追溯至苏格拉底。现在，我们把鼓励批判性思考的教育方法——部分通过鼓励学生质疑自己未经检验的信念以及从周遭等所接收到的知识——称作“苏格拉底法”。在通往理解的道路上，这些质疑可能带来不适，甚至引起愤怒。 But vindictive protectiveness teaches students to think in a very different way. It prepares them poorly for professional life, which often demands intellectual engagement with people and ideas one might find uncongenial or wrong. The harm may be more immediate, too. 但是报复性保护则教育学生以一种完全不同的方式思考。它无法给学生的职业生涯提供多少帮助，因为在职场我们往往需要与我们不认同甚至认为是完全错误的观点和人进行智识交锋。报复性保护也会带来更直接的伤害。 A campus culture devoted to policing speech and punishing speakers is likely to engender patterns of thought that are surprisingly similar to those long identified by cognitive behavioral therapists as causes of depression and anxiety. The new protectiveness may be teaching students to think pathologically. 致力于管制言论和惩罚发声者的校园文化容易导致一种思维方式，它与早已被认知行为治疗师们确认为焦虑症和抑郁症病因的那种思维方式惊人相似。新的保护可能会令学生陷入病态思维。 How Did We Get Here? 何以到了这一步？ It’s difficult to know exactly why vindictive protectiveness has burst forth so powerfully in the past few years. The phenomenon may be related to recent changes in the interpretation of federal antidiscrimination statutes (about which more later). But the answer probably involves generational shifts as well. Childhood itself has changed greatly during the past generation. Many Baby Boomers and Gen Xers can remember riding their bicycles around their hometowns, unchaperoned by adults, by the time they were 8 or 9 years old. In the hours after school, kids were expected to occupy themselves, getting into minor scrapes and learning from their experiences. 想要弄清为什么过去几年报复性保护如此猖獗并不容易。这一现象可能与最近对联邦反歧视法条的解释变化有关（以下稍后再详论这一点），但是答案也可能涉及代际差异，如今的孩童时代和上一代很不一样了。许多“婴儿潮一代”和“X一代”【译注：约指1965-1975年间生人】还有在家乡骑自行车四处兜风的记忆，当时他们只有八九岁，没有父母陪伴在旁。放学后，孩子们应该自己玩自己的，受些小挫折并从经验中吸取教训。 But “free range” childhood became less common in the 1980s. The surge in crime from the ’60s through the early ’90s made Baby Boomer parents more protective than their own parents had been. Stories of abducted children appeared more frequently in the news, and in 1984, images of them began showing up on milk cartons. In response, many parents pulled in the reins and worked harder to keep their children safe. 但是在1980年代，“放养”的童年越来越少了。1960年代到1990年代初的罪案攀升，使得婴儿潮时期出生的父母们比他们自己的父母更加护犊心切。拐卖儿童的事情越来越常见，在1984年，被拐卖儿童的照片都开始出现在牛奶盒上了。因此，许多家长勒紧了缰绳，努力保证自己孩子的安全。 The flight to safety also happened at school. Dangerous play structures were removed from playgrounds; peanut butter was banned from student lunches. After the 1999 Columbine massacre in Colorado, many schools cracked down on bullying, implementing “zero tolerance” policies. In a variety of ways, children born after 1980—the Millennials—got a consistent message from adults: life is dangerous, but adults will do everything in their power to protect you from harm, not just from strangers but from one another as well. 学校也加强了对安全的重视。操场上的危险游乐设施被拆除；学生午餐中禁用花生黄油。自从1999年科罗拉多州科伦拜恩大屠杀之后，许多学校严厉惩处欺凌事件，实行“零容忍”政策。生于1980年之后的一代——即“千禧一代”——以不同方式从大人们那里得到了一致的信息：生活危机满布，但大人们会竭尽所能保护你们免受伤害，既要防范陌生人，也要防范你们同伴。 These same children grew up in a culture that was (and still is) becoming more politically polarized. Republicans and Democrats have never particularly liked each other, but survey data going back to the 1970s show that on average, their mutual dislike used to be surprisingly mild. 同是这一批孩子，成长在一个政治上日益两极分化的文化中（这一两极化今天仍在继续）。共和党人和民主党人从来都互无好感，但是回溯到1970年代的调查数据显示，两党相互厌恶的程度总体来看也曾出奇地温和。 Negative feelings have grown steadily stronger, however, particularly since the early 2000s. Political scientists call this process “affective partisan polarization,” and it is a very serious problem for any democracy. As each side increasingly demonizes the other, compromise becomes more difficult. A recent study shows that implicit or unconscious biases are now at least as strong across political parties as they are across races. 此后，负面情绪就一直在稳步扩张，在进入新世纪后尤其严重。政治学家称这种现象为“情绪性党派两极化”。这对任何一个民主政体都是很严重的问题。鉴于一方一直在妖魔化另一方，达成共识就越来越困难。近来有研究显示，党派之间隐形和无意识的偏见，丝毫不逊色于种族之间的偏见。 So it’s not hard to imagine why students arriving on campus today might be more desirous of protection and more hostile toward ideological opponents than in generations past. This hostility, and the self-righteousness fueled by strong partisan emotions, can be expected to add force to any moral crusade. A principle of moral psychology is that “morality binds and blinds.” Part of what we do when we make moral judgments is express allegiance to a team. But that can interfere with our ability to think critically. Acknowledging that the other side’s viewpoint has any merit is risky—your teammates may see you as a traitor. 所以，我们不难想象为什么现在的学生比上几代人更加渴望受保护，对意识形态对立方有更强烈的敌意。这种敌意和由强烈党派感情激发的自命正直感，可想而知就是各种道德讨伐的助推器。道德心理学的一条原则是：“道德约束人，也让人盲目。”我们在作出道德判断的时候，同时也表达了对一个群体的忠诚。但是这可能会影响我们进行批判性思考的能力。承认对手的观点具有任何的合理性，风险都很大——队友们可能会把你当成叛徒。 Social media makes it extraordinarily easy to join crusades, express solidarity and outrage, and shun traitors. Facebook was founded in 2004, and since 2006 it has allowed children as young as 13 to join. This means that the first wave of students who spent all their teen years using Facebook reached college in 2011, and graduated from college only this year. 社交媒体使得加入道德讨伐易如反掌，也让表达团结与愤怒和排斥叛徒变得更加容易。Facebook成立于2004年，从2007年开始，它就允许低至13岁的孩子加入。这意味着第一批从青少年时期起就一直在用Facebook的孩子在2011年进入大学，今年才大学毕业。 These first true “social-media natives” may be different from members of previous generations in how they go about sharing their moral judgments and supporting one another in moral campaigns and conflicts. We find much to like about these trends; young people today are engaged with one another, with news stories, and with prosocial endeavors to a greater degree than when the dominant technology was television. But social media has also fundamentally shifted the balance of power in relationships between students and faculty; the latter increasingly fear what students might do to their reputations and careers by stirring up online mobs against them. 第一批真正的“社交媒体原生族”与此前几代人的不同之处，在于他们如何分享道德判断，在道德运动与道德冲突中如何彼此支持。这种趋势有其可喜之处：当今的年轻人与其他人在互相联系，分享新鲜事，与以电视为主导技术的时期相比，对社会交往更为投入。但是社交媒体也从根本上打破了学生和教师之间的权力平衡：后者越来越害怕学生会在网上煽动暴民打击自己，从而损害自己的名声和职业前途。 We do not mean to imply simple causation, but rates of mental illness in young adults have been rising, both on campus and off, in recent decades. Some portion of the increase is surely due to better diagnosis and greater willingness to seek help, but most experts seem to agree that some portion of the trend is real. 我们并不打算暗示一种简单的因果关系，但是近几十年来，不管在校内还是校外，青年人患心理疾病的比例都在上升。比例的提高，一定有部分是源于更高的诊断水平和更强的求诊意愿，但是大部分专家似乎都同意，这一统计趋势至少有部分是反映了患病率的真实上升。 Nearly all of the campus mental-health directors surveyed in 2013 by the American College Counseling Association reported that the number of students with severe psychological problems was rising at their schools. The rate of emotional distress reported by students themselves is also high, and rising. 2013年，所有接受美国高校咨询联合会调查的校园心理健康指导员都报告说，自己学校患有严重精神疾病的学生数目在上升。学生自己报告的情绪焦虑比率也很高，而且还在上升。 In a 2014 survey by the American College Health Association, 54 percent of college students surveyed said that they had “felt overwhelming anxiety” in the past 12 months, up from 49 percent in the same survey just five years earlier. Students seem to be reporting more emotional crises; many seem fragile, and this has surely changed the way university faculty and administrators interact with them. The question is whether some of those changes might be doing more harm than good. 2014年，美国高校健康联合会的一个调查显示，54%的大学生表示在过去12个月中“感受到了高度焦虑”，五年前同一调查的结果是49%。学生们报告的情绪危机似乎越来越多；许多人非常脆弱，这当然也改变了高校教师和行政人员与他们互动的方式。问题就是，是否其中有些改变可能弊大于利？ The Thinking Cure 思维治疗 For millennia, philosophers have understood that we don’t see life as it is; we see a version distorted by our hopes, fears, and other attachments. The Buddha said, “Our life is the creation of our mind.” Marcus Aurelius said, “Life itself is but what you deem it.” The quest for wisdom in many traditions begins with this insight. Early Buddhists and the Stoics, for example, developed practices for reducing attachments, thinking more clearly, and finding release from the emotional torments of normal mental life. 几千年来，哲学家们都已经认识到，我们看到的不是生活的本来面目：我们看到的是被我们的期望、恐惧以及其他情感所扭曲的一个版本。佛说：“我们的生活是我们心智的创造物。”马可·奥勒留说：“生活就是我们认为的样子。”在许多文化传统中，对智慧的追求就始于这种观点。例如，早期佛教徒和斯多葛主义者就有通过实践训练去抑制情感，理清思维，以及从日常精神生活的情绪折磨中寻求解脱。 Cognitive behavioral therapy is a modern embodiment of this ancient wisdom. It is the most extensively studied nonpharmaceutical treatment of mental illness, and is used widely to treat depression, anxiety disorders, eating disorders, and addiction. It can even be of help to schizophrenics. No other form of psychotherapy has been shown to work for a broader range of problems. 认知行为治疗是这种古老智慧的现代体现。它是精神疾病非药物疗法中被研究的最多的一种。它被广泛应用于治疗抑郁、焦虑症、进食障碍以及药物成瘾，甚至被用于帮助治疗精神分裂。据我们目前所知，没有其它任何心理治疗方法能治疗更多的疾病。 Studies have generally found that it is as effective as antidepressant drugs (such as Prozac) in the treatment of anxiety and depression. The therapy is relatively quick and easy to learn; after a few months of training, many patients can do it on their own. Unlike drugs, cognitive behavioral therapy keeps working long after treatment is stopped, because it teaches thinking skills that people can continue to use. 研究普遍表明它治疗焦虑和抑郁的功效与抗抑郁药物（比如百忧解）不相上下。这种疗法相对容易学，掌握快，只需几个月的训练，许多患者就可以自行运用了。与药物不同，认知行为疗法在疗程结束后仍长期有效，因为它教给患者的思维方法还能继续使用。 The goal is to minimize distorted thinking and see the world more accurately. You start by learning the names of the dozen or so most common cognitive distortions (such as overgeneralizing, discounting positives, and emotional reasoning; see the list at the bottom of this article). Each time you notice yourself falling prey to one of them, you name it, describe the facts of the situation, consider alternative interpretations, and then choose an interpretation of events more in line with those facts. 认知行为治疗的目标是尽量令患者减少思想扭曲，从而能更精确地观察世界。开始时，你需要学习最常见的十几种认知扭曲的名目（比如以偏概全、低估正面信息，以及情绪化推理等；完整列表见文章末尾）。每当你发现自己陷入了其中某种扭曲状况，先对号入座，描述真实状况，思考其他的解释方式，接下来选择与事实较一致的解释。 Your emotions follow your new interpretation. In time, this process becomes automatic. When people improve their mental hygiene in this way—when they free themselves from the repetitive irrational thoughts that had previously filled so much of their consciousness—they become less depressed, anxious, and angry. 新的解释会引导你的情绪。经过一段时间训练之后，这一处理程序会变得很自动。如果以这种方式改善自己的精神健康状况，人们会将自己从原本充斥于意识中的重复性非理性思想中解脱出来，他们的抑郁、焦虑和愤怒都会随之得到缓解。 The parallel to formal education is clear: cognitive behavioral therapy teaches good critical-thinking skills, the sort that educators have striven for so long to impart. By almost any definition, critical thinking requires grounding one’s beliefs in evidence rather than in emotion or desire, and learning how to search for and evaluate evidence that might contradict one’s initial hypothesis. But does campus life today foster critical thinking? Or does it coax students to think in more-distorted ways? 这种疗法与正规教育有着不言而喻的相似之处。认知行为疗法教授良好的批判思维方法，而这正是教育者们长久以来努力要传授的。不论怎么说，批判思维都需要把信念建立在证据而非情感或欲望之上，并且需要人们学习如何寻找可能与自己最初假设相抵触的证据，并加以评判。但是，当今的大学教育鼓励批判思维吗？还是这种教育方式在诱使学生以更扭曲的方式思考？ Let’s look at recent trends in higher education in light of the distortions that cognitive behavioral therapy identifies. We will draw the names and descriptions of these distortions from David D. Burns’s popular book Feeling Good, as well as from the second edition of Treatment Plans and Interventions for Depression and Anxiety Disorders, by Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland, and Lata K. McGinn. 让我们按照认知行为疗法界定的各种扭曲来审视近期高等教育中出现的新趋势。我们所使用的思维扭曲的名称和描述，取自David D. Burns广受欢迎的著作《感觉良好》和 Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland和Lata K. McGinn的著作《抑郁症和焦虑症的治疗计划及干预措施》（第二版）。 Higher Education’s Embrace of “Emotional Reasoning” 高等教育欣然接受“情绪化推理” Burns defines emotional reasoning as assuming “that your negative emotions necessarily reflect the way things really are: ‘I feel it, therefore it must be true.’ ” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define it as letting “your feelings guide your interpretation of reality.” But, of course, subjective feelings are not always trustworthy guides; unrestrained, they can cause people to lash out at others who have done nothing wrong. Therapy often involves talking yourself down from the idea that each of your emotional responses represents something true or important. Burns将“情绪化推理”定义为：预先假定“你的负面情绪一定反映了事实：‘我感觉是这样，所以事情一定是这样’”。 Leahy、Holland和McGinn将其定义为任凭“你的情绪引导你对现实的解释”。但是，主观感受当然并不一定可靠；如果不受抑制，它可能令人们无端指责完全无辜的人。治疗方案通常包括劝自己放弃这种想法：你的每一个情绪反应都代表了重要的或真实的事情。 Emotional reasoning dominates many campus debates and discussions. A claim that someone’s words are “offensive” is not just an expression of one’s own subjective feeling of offendedness. It is, rather, a public charge that the speaker has done something objectively wrong. It is a demand that the speaker apologize or be punished by some authority for committing an offense. 情绪化推理主导了许多校园讨论和辩论。宣称某人的用词“有冒犯性”并不只是表达对于冒犯的主观感受，而是公开指责此人犯了客观错误。这是一种要求，要求说话人道歉，或者要求有关当局惩罚他，因为他犯下了罪行。 There have always been some people who believe they have a right not to be offended. Yet throughout American history—from the Victorian era to the free-speech activism of the 1960s and ’70s—radicals have pushed boundaries and mocked prevailing sensibilities. Sometime in the 1980s, however, college campuses began to focus on preventing offensive speech, especially speech that might be hurtful to women or minority groups. The sentiment underpinning this goal was laudable, but it quickly produced some absurd results. 总有些人相信自己拥有不被冒犯的权利。不过，纵观美国历史——从维多利亚时代到1960和70年代的言论自由运动——激进分子一次次拓展边界，蔑视当时盛行的敏感情绪。然而，在1980年代的某个时候，大学校园开始注重管制冒犯性言论，尤其是可能会对女性或少数族裔造成伤害的言论。这一目标所基于的情操值得赞扬，但是它很快就催生了一些荒诞的后果。

---

What are we doing to our students if we encourage them to develop extra-thin skin just before they leave the cocoon of adult protection? 如果我们鼓励学生在离开成年人的保护茧之前长出一副超级薄弱的外壳，我们究竟是在做什么？

---

Among the most famous early examples was the so-called water-buffalo incident at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1993, the university charged an Israeli-born student with racial harassment after he yelled “Shut up, you water buffalo!” to a crowd of black sorority women that was making noise at night outside his dorm-room window. 此类事件最出名的早期案例有发生在宾夕法尼亚大学的所谓“水牛事件”。1993年，该校指控一名生于以色列的学生有种族骚扰罪行，因为他对一些晚上在他宿舍窗外吵闹的黑人女生联谊会成员喊道：“闭嘴，你们这群水牛！” Many scholars and pundits at the time could not see how the termwater buffalo (a rough translation of a Hebrew insult for a thoughtless or rowdy person) was a racial slur against African Americans, and as a result, the case became international news. 当时，许多学者和专家都不理解“水牛”这个词是如何构成对非洲裔美国人的种族诽谤的（实际上，水牛是对希伯来语一个辱骂词汇的粗糙翻译，指不顾旁人或吵闹不堪的人），所以，这件事一时成了国际新闻。 Claims of a right not to be offended have continued to arise since then, and universities have continued to privilege them. In a particularly egregious 2008 case, for instance, Indiana University–Purdue University at Indianapolis found a white student guilty of racial harassment for reading a book titled Notre Dame vs. the Klan. The book honored student opposition to the Ku Klux Klan when it marched on Notre Dame in 1924. Nonetheless, the picture of a Klan rally on the book’s cover offended at least one of the student’s co-workers (he was a janitor as well as a student), and that was enough for a guilty finding by the university’s Affirmative Action Office. 从那时起，对“不被冒犯的权利”的要求开始不断增长，各大学也不断加以纵容。比如，发生在2008年的一个影响极其恶劣的案件中，印第安纳大学与普渡大学印第安纳波利斯联合分校认定一名学生干犯种族骚扰罪行，因为他阅读了一本名叫《圣母大学vs.三K党》的书。这本书纪念了1924年三K党进军圣母大学时反抗他们的学生。虽然如此，该书封面上的三K党集会照片至少冒犯了该学生的一名同事（后者也是学生，同时还是一名楼管）。该大学的反歧视办公室认为这种行为足以构成种族骚扰。 These examples may seem extreme, but the reasoning behind them has become more commonplace on campus in recent years. Last year, at the University of St. Thomas, in Minnesota, an event called Hump Day, which would have allowed people to pet a camel, was abruptly canceled. Students had created a Facebook group where they protested the event for animal cruelty, for being a waste of money, and for being insensitive to people from the Middle East. The inspiration for the camel had almost certainly come from a popular TV commercial in which a camel saunters around an office on a Wednesday, celebrating “hump day”; it was devoid of any reference to Middle Eastern peoples. Nevertheless, the group organizing the event announced on its Facebook page that the event would be canceled because the “program [was] dividing people and would make for an uncomfortable and possibly unsafe environment.” 这些例子也许看起来比较极端，但它们背后的逻辑在大学中近年来越来越常见。去年在明尼苏达州的圣托马斯大学，一个叫驼峰日的活动——意在让人们有机会抚摸一下骆驼——被紧急取消。学生们创建了一个Facebook群组抗议这个活动，理由是虐待动物，浪费金钱，并且不顾及中东学生的感受。该活动的灵感几乎可以肯定是来自一个很受欢迎的电视广告：在某个周三，一只骆驼绕着办公室悠闲散步，庆祝“驼峰日”；它完全和中东人没有关系。尽管如此，活动组织者还是在他们的Facebook主页宣布取消活动，因为“这个活动会造成隔阂，并且可能造成使人不适甚至不安全的环境”。 Because there is a broad ban in academic circles on “blaming the victim,” it is generally considered unacceptable to question the reasonableness (let alone the sincerity) of someone’s emotional state, particularly if those emotions are linked to one’s group identity. The thin argument “I’m offended” becomes an unbeatable trump card. This leads to what Jonathan Rauch, a contributing editor at this magazine, calls the “offendedness sweepstakes,” in which opposing parties use claims of offense as cudgels. In the process, the bar for what we consider unacceptable speech is lowered further and further. 正因为学术圈广泛禁止“批评受害者”，所以质疑一个人的情感状态是否合理基本上不可接受（讨论是否真实就更不用说了），尤其是当情感与群体归属有关的时候。一句单薄的“我被冒犯了”，已成了无往不胜的杀手锏。这就导致了本杂志特约编辑Jonathan Rauch所称的“受辱竞赛”现象：双方都以声称遭到冒犯为武器。在这个过程中，界定“不可接受言论”的门槛越来越低。 Since 2013, new pressure from the federal government has reinforced this trend. Federal antidiscrimination statutes regulate on-campus harassment and unequal treatment based on sex, race, religion, and national origin. Until recently, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights acknowledged that speech must be “objectively offensive” before it could be deemed actionable as sexual harassment—it would have to pass the “reasonable person” test. To be prohibited, the office wrote in 2003, allegedly harassing speech would have to go “beyond the mere expression of views, words, symbols or thoughts that some person finds offensive.” 从2013年起，来自联邦政府的压力更为这种趋势推波助澜。联邦反歧视法对校园中基于性别、种族、宗教和民族的冒犯和不平等对待进行规制。直到不久前，教育部民权署仍规定只有“客观上具有冒犯性”的言论才能被认定为可提起诉讼的性骚扰——它必须通过“公允人”测试【译注：是一种程序机制，用于判别一个明事理的、情感和价值取向适度的、且处于中立地位的社会典型成员，在有关情境中将会持何种看法，最常见的公允人测试是陪审团裁决】。2003年，民权署写道，被指为骚扰的言论必须“不仅仅只是令某些人感到冒犯的观点、言语、符号或思想的表达”，才需要禁止。 But in 2013, the Departments of Justice and Education greatly broadened the definition of sexual harassment to include verbal conduct that is simply “unwelcome.” Out of fear of federal investigations, universities are now applying that standard—defining unwelcome speech as harassment—not just to sex, but to race, religion, and veteran status as well. Everyone is supposed to rely upon his or her own subjective feelings to decide whether a comment by a professor or a fellow student is unwelcome, and therefore grounds for a harassment claim. Emotional reasoning is now accepted as evidence. 但是在2013年，司法部和教育部把性骚扰的范围大大扩展，将仅仅“令人反感”的言语也包括了进去。由于害怕联邦政府的调查，现在各大学正将这种标准——把令人反感的言论定性为骚扰——从性领域扩展应用到种族、宗教，以及兵役状况方面。所有人都应该以自己的主观感受为依据来判定教授或同学的评论是否令人反感，并以此作为控告骚扰的依据。情绪化推理现已被当做证据来看待了。 If our universities are teaching students that their emotions can be used effectively as weapons—or at least as evidence in administrative proceedings—then they are teaching students to nurture a kind of hypersensitivity that will lead them into countless drawn-out conflicts in college and beyond. Schools may be training students in thinking styles that will damage their careers and friendships, along with their mental health. 如果我们的大学在教导学生，他们的感情可以作为有力的武器——至少可以作为证据用于行政诉讼之中——那么，大学就是在培养学生的过度敏感，这会导致学生们陷入无休无止的冲突之中，无论是在校期间还是毕业之后。学校教授学生的思维方式，可能会毁掉他们的职业生涯、友谊，以及精神健康。 Fortune-Telling and Trigger Warnings “悲观预测”与“刺激警告” Burns defines fortune-telling as “anticipat[ing] that things will turn out badly” and feeling “convinced that your prediction is an already-established fact.” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define it as “predict[ing] the future negatively” or seeing potential danger in an everyday situation. The recent spread of demands for trigger warnings on reading assignments with provocative content is an example of fortune-telling. Burns把“悲观预测”定义为“预料事情会变糟”而且“确信自己的预测已是既成事实”。Leahy、Holland和McGinn将其定义为“对未来做出负面预测”或者从日常事件中看到潜在风险。近期，对具有刺激性内容的阅读材料发出“刺激警告”的要求正在增加，这正是“悲观预测”的实例。 The idea that words (or smells or any sensory input) can trigger searing memories of past trauma—and intense fear that it may be repeated—has been around at least since World War I, when psychiatrists began treating soldiers for what is now called post-traumatic stress disorder. 文字（或是气味或者任何一种感官输入）会使人回忆起往昔的伤痛，还会引起对这种伤痛再次出现的强烈恐惧，这种观点最早至少可追溯到第一次世界大战时期。当时，精神科医生们开始为士兵们治疗我们现在称之为“创伤后应激障碍”的疾病。 But explicit trigger warnings are believed to have originated much more recently, on message boards in the early days of the Internet. Trigger warnings became particularly prevalent in self-help and feminist forums, where they allowed readers who had suffered from traumatic events like sexual assault to avoid graphic content that might trigger flashbacks or panic attacks. 但人们相信，明确的刺激警告是近期才出现的，最早是在早期互联网的留言板上。刺激警告在自救论坛和女权论坛上广泛流行，这些论坛允许遭受过创伤（比如性侵犯）的读者避开可能引起创伤再现或恐慌发作的图片内容。 Search-engine trends indicate that the phrase broke into mainstream use online around 2011, spiked in 2014, and reached an all-time high in 2015. The use of trigger warnings on campus appears to have followed a similar trajectory; seemingly overnight, students at universities across the country have begun demanding that their professors issue warnings before covering material that might evoke a negative emotional response. 搜索引擎的热词统计显示，在网络上这一术语于2011年进入主流用语，2014年使用量激增，2015年的搜索量达到历史最高。“刺激警告”一词在校园里的使用情况也遵循着同一发展轨迹，仿佛一夜之间，全国的大学生们都开始要求教授在讲授可能引起负面情绪反应的内容前发出警告。 In 2013, a task force composed of administrators, students, recent alumni, and one faculty member at Oberlin College, in Ohio, released an online resource guide for faculty (subsequently retracted in the face of faculty pushback) that included a list of topics warranting trigger warnings. These topics included classism and privilege, among many others. The task force recommended that materials that might trigger negative reactions among students be avoided altogether unless they “contribute directly” to course goals, and suggested that works that were “too important to avoid” be made optional. 2013年，俄亥俄州奥柏林学院一个由行政人员、学生、近期毕业的校友和一名教员组成的特别工作组在网上发表了一份在线资料指南（之后因教职员工反对而撤回），罗列了应当提出“刺激警告”的题材，包括阶级歧视论和特权论，及许多其他内容。这个工作组建议全面剔除可能引起学生负面反应的内容，除非这些内容对课程目标“有直接作用”。工作组还建议将“不可不读”的书目调整成选读内容。 It’s hard to imagine how novels illustrating classism and privilege could provoke or reactivate the kind of terror that is typically implicated in PTSD. Rather, trigger warnings are sometimes demanded for a long list of ideas and attitudes that some students find politically offensive, in the name of preventing other students from being harmed. This is an example of what psychologists call “motivated reasoning”—we spontaneously generate arguments for conclusions we want to support. 那些“创伤后应激障碍”通常所牵涉的恐慌，很难想象会被描绘阶级歧视论和特权论的小说唤起或重新激发出来。确切地说，只有在某些学生眼中有政治冒犯色彩的一系列观念和言论才需要刺激警告，名为避免其他同学受伤害。这就是心理学家所称的“动机性推理”的实例：我们不由自主地为我们想要支持的结论制造论据。 Once you find something hateful, it is easy to argue that exposure to the hateful thing could traumatize some other people. You believe that you know how others will react, and that their reaction could be devastating. Preventing that devastation becomes a moral obligation for the whole community. Books for which students have called publicly for trigger warnings within the past couple of years include Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (at Rutgers, for “suicidal inclinations”) and Ovid’s Metamorphoses (at Columbia, for sexual assault). 如果你觉得某些东西令你憎恨，就很容易认为其他人与它们接触会受到创伤。你认为你知道别人会作何反应：他们可能会崩溃。避免这种情感崩溃成了整个社会的道德责任。最近几年，学生们公开要求提供刺激警告的著作包括弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫的《达洛维夫人》（在罗格斯大学，因“自杀倾向”）和奥维德的《变形记》（在哥伦比亚大学，因“性侵犯”）。 Jeannie Suk’s New Yorker essay described the difficulties of teaching rape law in the age of trigger warnings. Some students, she wrote, have pressured their professors to avoid teaching the subject in order to protect themselves and their classmates from potential distress. Suk compares this to trying to teach “a medical student who is training to be a surgeon but who fears that he’ll become distressed if he sees or handles blood.” Jeannie Suk在《纽约客》发表的文章讲述了在刺激警告盛行的时代讲授强奸法有多么困难。她写道，有些学生向教授施压，不许教授讲授这一课程，以免自己和同学们可能会承受精神痛苦。Suk将这种境况比作试图教“将要成为外科医生但害怕自己晕血的医学生”。 However, there is a deeper problem with trigger warnings. According to the most-basic tenets of psychology, the very idea of helping people with anxiety disorders avoid the things they fear is misguided. A person who is trapped in an elevator during a power outage may panic and think she is going to die. That frightening experience can change neural connections in her amygdala, leading to an elevator phobia. If you want this woman to retain her fear for life, you should help her avoid elevators. 然而，刺激警告还会带来更深层的问题，根据最基本的心理学原则，帮助焦虑症患者逃避他们所惧怕的事物是完全错误的。停电时被困在电梯里的人可能会慌了手脚，以为自己快要死了。这种可怕的经历会改变这个人大脑杏仁核中神经元的反应，导致电梯恐惧症。如果你想让这个女人在余生中保持恐惧，你就应该帮助她远离电梯。 But if you want to help her return to normalcy, you should take your cues from Ivan Pavlov and guide her through a process known as exposure therapy. You might start by asking the woman to merely look at an elevator from a distance—standing in a building lobby, perhaps—until her apprehension begins to subside. If nothing bad happens while she’s standing in the lobby—if the fear is not “reinforced”—then she will begin to learn a new association: elevators are not dangerous. (This reduction in fear during exposure is called habituation.) Then, on subsequent days, you might ask her to get closer, and on later days to push the call button, and eventually to step in and go up one floor. This is how the amygdala can get rewired again to associate a previously feared situation with safety or normalcy. 但是，如果你想让她回归正常，你就应该采用巴甫洛夫的方法，为她进行“暴露治疗”。开始时，你可以让这个女人远观电梯——比如站在大堂里——直到她的不安平复下来。如果站在大堂没有大碍，她的恐惧没有“加强”，她就会开始建立一个新的认识：电梯并不危险。（这种在接触过程中的恐惧消退叫做“习惯化”）。接下来几天，你可以要求她靠近电梯，再之后几天按下电梯按钮，最后走进电梯，上一层楼。这样，杏仁核就会将之前害怕的境况重新与安全和正常联系起来。 Students who call for trigger warnings may be correct that some of their peers are harboring memories of trauma that could be reactivated by course readings. But they are wrong to try to prevent such reactivations. Students with PTSD should of course get treatment, but they should not try to avoid normal life, with its many opportunities for habituation. 要求刺激警告的学生在这一点上可能是正确的：他们的某些同学可能还有创伤记忆，这些记忆可能被阅读材料重新唤起。但是他们要避免唤起这些记忆，却是错误的。患有创伤后应激障碍的学生理应得到治疗，但他们不应该试图回避正常生活，这样他们就错失了许多适应的机会。 Classroom discussions are safe places to be exposed to incidental reminders of trauma (such as the word violate). A discussion of violence is unlikely to be followed by actual violence, so it is a good way to help students change the associations that are causing them discomfort. And they’d better get their habituation done in college, because the world beyond college will be far less willing to accommodate requests for trigger warnings and opt-outs. 课堂讨论是偶然接触易于引发创伤回忆的事物（比如词语“强奸”）的安全环境。针对暴力的讨论不大可能伴随真实的暴力，所以这种讨论是帮助学生改变引发不适联想的一剂良方。并且，学生们最好在大学中完成适应过程，因为校园外的世界可不那么愿意满足学生对刺激警告的要求，或者让他们选择半路退出。 The expansive use of trigger warnings may also foster unhealthy mental habits in the vastly larger group of students who do not suffer from PTSD or other anxiety disorders. People acquire their fears not just from their own past experiences, but from social learning as well. If everyone around you acts as though something is dangerous—elevators, certain neighborhoods, novels depicting racism—then you are at risk of acquiring that fear too. 对于更多没有患创伤后应激障碍或其他焦虑症的学生来说，刺激警告的大范围应用也会滋长他们不健康的心理习惯。人们的恐惧，不仅仅来自于自己的经验，也来自于从社会学习。如果你身边的所有人都表现得像是害怕某种东西——电梯、某一片区域、描述种族主义的小说——你也有可能对此产生恐惧。 The psychiatrist Sarah Roff pointed this out last year in an online article for The Chronicle of Higher Education. “One of my biggest concerns about trigger warnings,” Roff wrote, “is that they will apply not just to those who have experienced trauma, but to all students, creating an atmosphere in which they are encouraged to believe that there is something dangerous or damaging about discussing difficult aspects of our history.” 精神医生Sarah Roff在《高等教育纪事报》的一篇在线文章中指出了这一点。Roff写道：“我对刺激警告最大的担忧在于，它不仅会影响受过创伤的学生，它还会影响所有学生。它创造了一种氛围，令学生相信讨论历史的阴暗面很危险，会造成伤害。”

---

The new climate is slowly being institutionalized, and is affecting what can be said in the classroom, even as a basis for discussion or debate. 这种新的风气正在渐渐制度化，而且正在影响课堂上可以讨论的内容，甚至成为讨论的基础。

---

In an article published last year by Inside Higher Ed, seven humanities professors wrote that the trigger-warning movement was “already having a chilling effect on [their] teaching and pedagogy.” They reported their colleagues’ receiving “phone calls from deans and other administrators investigating student complaints that they have included ‘triggering’ material in their courses, with or without warnings.” 去年，在《高等教育内部观察》的一篇文章中，七位人文学科教授写道，刺激警告运动“已经严重影响（他们的）教学。”他们说，他们的同事“接到院长和其他行政人员的电话，调查学生对他们的投诉：他们在有警告或无警告的情况下，在课程中包含了‘刺激性’内容。” A trigger warning, they wrote, “serves as a guarantee that students will not experience unexpected discomfort and implies that if they do, a contract has been broken.” When students come to expect trigger warnings for any material that makes them uncomfortable, the easiest way for faculty to stay out of trouble is to avoid material that might upset the most sensitive student in the class. 他们写道，一个刺激警告“保证学生不会遭受意外的不适，并且暗示如果这种情况出现了，教师们就违反了契约。”如果学生们要求在所有引起不适的材料前提供刺激警告，教师们避免麻烦的最佳方式，就是剔除有可能会冒犯班级中最敏感学生的材料。 Magnification, Labeling, and Microaggressions 夸大、贴标签和微冒犯 Burns defines magnification as “exaggerat[ing] the importance of things,” and Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define labeling as “assign[ing] global negative traits to yourself and others.” The recent collegiate trend of uncovering allegedly racist, sexist, classist, or otherwise discriminatory microaggressions doesn’tincidentally teach students to focus on small or accidental slights. Its purpose is to get students to focus on them and then relabel the people who have made such remarks as aggressors. Burns把“夸大”定义为“夸张描述事物的重要性”，Leahy、 Holland和McGinn把“贴标签”定义为“把自己或其他人归类于某些负面特征。”近期，大学中有越来越多的个案揭发所谓种族主义、性别歧视、阶级歧视，或者其他歧视性的微冒犯。这种趋势并不是就着事件引导学生们去关注细微或无意识的怠慢。它的目的就是让学生们关注这些东西，然后给说这些话的人贴上侵犯者的标签。 The term microaggression originated in the 1970s and referred to subtle, often unconscious racist affronts. The definition has expanded in recent years to include anything that can be perceived as discriminatory on virtually any basis. For example, in 2013, a student group at UCLA staged a sit-in during a class taught by Val Rust, an education professor. The group read a letter aloud expressing their concerns about the campus’s hostility toward students of color. Although Rust was not explicitly named, the group quite clearly criticized his teaching as microaggressive. In the course of correcting his students’ grammar and spelling, Rust had noted that a student had wrongly capitalized the first letter of the word indigenous. Lowercasing the capital I was an insult to the student and her ideology, the group claimed. “微冒犯”一词产生于1970年代，意指微妙的、通常属于无意识的种族冒犯。近些年，其定义已经扩展到包含几乎任何语境下所有被认为具有歧视性的言论和行为。举个例子，2013年加州大学洛杉矶分校的一个学生团体旁听了教育学教授Val Rust讲授的一节课。这个团体大声宣读了一封信，表示对校园里针对有色人种学生的敌意深感忧虑。尽管没有直接点Rust的名，这个团体显然是在批评他的教学有“微冒犯性”。在纠正学生的语法和拼写的过程中，Rust注意到一个学生错误地把“indigenous”（土著的）的首字母大写了。这个团体宣称，把首字母“i”小写侮辱了这名学生和她的意识形态。 Even joking about microaggressions can be seen as an aggression, warranting punishment. Last fall, Omar Mahmood, a student at the University of Michigan, wrote a satirical column for a conservative student publication, The Michigan Review, poking fun at what he saw as a campus tendency to perceive microaggressions in just about anything. Mahmood was also employed at the campus newspaper, The Michigan Daily. The Daily’s editors said that the way Mahmood had “satirically mocked the experiences of fellow Daily contributors and minority communities on campus … created a conflict of interest.” 就算是拿微冒犯开玩笑也会被视为冒犯，并带来惩罚。去年夏天，密歇根大学的学生Omar Mahmood为一份保守派学生刊物《密歇根评论》写了一篇讽刺性的专栏文章，讽刺他看到的当下大学中把一切都视作微冒犯的趋势。Omar Mahmood也供职于校报《密歇根日报》。《密歇根日报》的编辑说Mahmood“讽刺本杂志撰稿人和校园中少数族裔的经历”的方式“制造了利益冲突”。 The Daily terminated Mahmood after he described the incident to two Web sites, The College Fix and The Daily Caller. A group of women later vandalized Mahmood’s doorway with eggs, hot dogs, gum, and notes with messages such as “Everyone hates you, you violent prick.” When speech comes to be seen as a form of violence, vindictive protectiveness can justify a hostile, and perhaps even violent, response. 在Mahmood向两家网站——The College Fix和The Daily Caller——讲述了这一事件之后，《密歇根日报》解雇了他。后来，一帮女人在Mahmood家门口用鸡蛋、热狗、口香糖和写有诸如“所有的人都恨你，你这个暴徒”之类文字的便条大搞破坏。当言论被视作一种暴力时，报复性保护就为恶意报复，甚至暴力行为赋予了正当性。 In March, the student government at Ithaca College, in upstate New York, went so far as to propose the creation of an anonymous microaggression-reporting system. Student sponsors envisioned some form of disciplinary action against “oppressors” engaged in belittling speech. One of the sponsors of the program said that while “not … every instance will require trial or some kind of harsh punishment,” she wanted the program to be “record-keeping but with impact.” 今年三月，纽约州北部地区的伊萨卡学院，学生会甚至提议建立匿名的微冒犯举报机制。提议的学生设想出一套针对发表歧视性言论的“压迫者”的纪律性惩罚。该项目的一位提议者说，虽然“并不是每一个案例都需要审讯或者某种严酷惩罚”，但是她希望这个项目能“留下记录，产生影响”。 Surely people make subtle or thinly veiled racist or sexist remarks on college campuses, and it is right for students to raise questions and initiate discussions about such cases. But the increased focus on microaggressions coupled with the endorsement of emotional reasoning is a formula for a constant state of outrage, even toward well-meaning speakers trying to engage in genuine discussion. 当然了，人们的确会在大学校园发表委婉的或是稍稍遮掩的种族歧视和性别歧视言论，学生们质疑这种状况并发起讨论也是正确的。但是对微冒犯的关注持续增长加上对情绪化推理的支持，结果就是持续性的愤怒，这种愤怒甚至会针对真心想要讨论问题的善意说话者。 What are we doing to our students if we encourage them to develop extra-thin skin in the years just before they leave the cocoon of adult protection and enter the workforce? Would they not be better prepared to flourish if we taught them to question their own emotional reactions, and to give people the benefit of the doubt? 如果我们鼓励学生在离开成年人的保护茧、踏入工作岗位之前长出一副超级薄弱的外壳，我们究竟是在做什么？如果我们教会他们质疑自己的情绪化反应、不要妄下定论，他们难道不是会表现得更好吗？ Teaching Students to Catastrophize and Have Zero Tolerance 教导学生小题大做、零容忍。 Burns defines catastrophizing as a kind of magnification that turns “commonplace negative events into nightmarish monsters.” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define it as believing “that what has happened or will happen” is “so awful and unbearable that you won’t be able to stand it.” Requests for trigger warnings involve catastrophizing, but this way of thinking colors other areas of campus thought as well. Burns把“小题大做”定义为“把寻常的负面事物当做梦魇般的妖魔鬼怪”的夸大行为。Leahy、Holland和McGinn把它定义为相信“已发生或将发生之事糟糕得让人难以忍受，乃至你经受不住”。对刺激警告的需求中包含着小题大做的成分，但是这种思考方式也干扰了大学中的其他思想。 Catastrophizing rhetoric about physical danger is employed by campus administrators more commonly than you might think—sometimes, it seems, with cynical ends in mind. For instance, last year administrators at Bergen Community College, in New Jersey, suspended Francis Schmidt, a professor, after he posted a picture of his daughter on his Google+ account. The photo showed her in a yoga pose, wearing a T-shirt that read I will take what is mine with fire & blood, a quote from the HBO show Game of Thrones. 在大学管理者中，描述人身伤害时“小题大做”的情况要比你想象得普遍——有时候看起来像是抱着愤世嫉俗的目的一样。举个例子，新泽西州卑尔根社区学院的教授Francis Schmidt去年在他的Google+账号上发布了一张他女儿的照片之后，被该学院的管理者停职了。照片中，他女儿正做着瑜伽动作，T恤衫上写着“我要用血与火来赢回属于我的一切”，这句话引自HBO的电视剧《权利的游戏》。 Schmidt had filed a grievance against the school about two months earlier after being passed over for a sabbatical. The quote was interpreted as a threat by a campus administrator, who received a notification after Schmidt posted the picture; it had been sent, automatically, to a whole group of contacts. According to Schmidt, a Bergen security official present at a subsequent meeting between administrators and Schmidt thought the word fire could refer to AK-47s. 两个月之前，因为停教休假的请求被拒绝，Schmidt曾向学校表达过不满。在Schmid发布那张照片之后，照片被自动发送给了一组联系人。一位大学管理者得到了推送消息，然后把那张照片解读成了威胁信息。据Schmidt所说，在随后管理者与Schmidt会面时，一位出席的安全官员认为“火”也可能是暗指AK-47。 Then there is the eight-year legal saga at Valdosta State University, in Georgia, where a student was expelled for protesting the construction of a parking garage by posting an allegedly “threatening” collage on Facebook. The collage described the proposed structure as a “memorial” parking garage—a joke referring to a claim by the university president that the garage would be part of his legacy. The president interpreted the collage as a threat against his life. 然后还有佐治亚州瓦尔多斯塔州立大学长达八年的传奇官司。该大学开除了一名学生，因为他为了抗议一个室内停车场的修建，在Facebbok上发表了一幅据称有“威胁性”的拼贴画。那幅画把这个规划中的设施称为“纪念性”停车场。这是个玩笑，影射的是大学校长曾经说过的：这座停车场将会成为他为学校留下的遗产。这位校长将该拼贴画理解为死亡恐吓。 It should be no surprise that students are exhibiting similar sensitivity. At the University of Central Florida in 2013, for example, Hyung-il Jung, an accounting instructor, was suspended after a student reported that Jung had made a threatening comment during a review session. Jung explained to the Orlando Sentinel that the material he was reviewing was difficult, and he’d noticed the pained look on students’ faces, so he made a joke. “It looks like you guys are being slowly suffocated by these questions,” he recalled saying. “Am I on a killing spree or what?” 学生们表现出类似的敏感也就不足为奇了。举个例子，中佛罗里达大学的会计学讲师Hyung-il Jung在2013年被学校停职，因为学生举报他在一节复习课中表达了威胁性言论。Jung向《奥兰多哨兵报》解释说，他在辅导的材料很难，他还注意到了学生们脸上痛苦的表情，所以他开了一个玩笑。他回忆他当时曾说：“你们好像快要被这些问题憋死在这里了呢”，“我这不是在玩杀人游戏吗？” After the student reported Jung’s comment, a group of nearly 20 others e-mailed the UCF administration explaining that the comment had clearly been made in jest. Nevertheless, UCF suspended Jung from all university duties and demanded that he obtain written certification from a mental-health professional that he was “not a threat to [himself] or to the university community” before he would be allowed to return to campus. 在学生举报了Jung的言论之后，有差不多二十个人给中佛罗里达大学的管理部门发电子邮件，解释说那些明显只是玩笑话。尽管如此，中佛罗里达大学还是暂停了Jung的一切学校职务，并且要求他要在获得了来自精神健康专家的书面认可，证明他“对自己和学校成员都不构成威胁”之后，才能回学校上班。 All of these actions teach a common lesson: smart people do, in fact, overreact to innocuous speech, make mountains out of molehills, and seek punishment for anyone whose words make anyone else feel uncomfortable. 这些事情给了我们同一个教训：聪明人真的会对无伤大雅的言辞反应过度，小题大做，然后要求惩罚所有说过让任何一个人不舒服的话的人。 Mental Filtering and Disinvitation Season “思维过滤”和“撤邀时节” As Burns defines it, mental filtering is “pick[ing] out a negative detail in any situation and dwell[ing] on it exclusively, thus perceiving that the whole situation is negative.” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn refer to this as “negative filtering,” which they define as “focus[ing] almost exclusively on the negatives and seldom notic[ing] the positives.” When applied to campus life, mental filtering allows for simpleminded demonization. 按照Burns的定义，“思维过滤”是“从事件中筛选出负面细节，然后只抓住负面细节不放，因而认为整件事都是负面的。”Leahy、Holland和McGinn把它命名为“负面信息过滤”，他们把它定义为“只关注负面，很少留意正面。”把这一概念应用到大学校园，思维过滤使得不加考虑地妖魔化他人成为可能。 Students and faculty members in large numbers modeled this cognitive distortion during 2014’s “disinvitation season.” That’s the time of year—usually early spring—when commencement speakers are announced and when students and professors demand that some of those speakers be disinvited because of things they have said or done. According to data compiled by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, since 2000, at least 240 campaigns have been launched at U.S. universities to prevent public figures from appearing at campus events; most of them have occurred since 2009. 2014年的“撤邀时节”中，大量学生和教职员示范了这种认知扭曲。那是每年宣布毕业典礼演讲人的时间——通常是早春，由于某些演讲者做过的事和说过的话，学生们和教授们要求撤回对他们的邀请。根据个人教育权利基金会整理的数据，自2000年起，美国大学中至少发起了240场抵制公众人物出席大学活动的运动，其中大部分都发生在2009年以后。 Consider two of the most prominent disinvitation targets of 2014: former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, Christine Lagarde. Rice was the first black female secretary of state; Lagarde was the first woman to become finance minister of a G8 country and the first female head of the IMF. Both speakers could have been seen as highly successful role models for female students, and Rice for minority students as well. But the critics, in effect, discounted any possibility of something positive coming from those speeches. 让我们仔细想想2014年被要求撤回邀请的最知名的两个人：前国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯和国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁克里斯蒂娜·拉加德。赖斯是首位黑人女国务卿；拉加德是G8国家首位女财长，也是IMF首位女掌门人。这两个人都应该被视作女性学生的杰出榜样才是，赖斯还是少数族裔的榜样。但是，批评者们实际上认为这两人的演讲不可能有什么积极意义。 Members of an academic community should of course be free to raise questions about Rice’s role in the Iraq War or to look skeptically at the IMF’s policies. But should dislike of part of a person’s record disqualify her altogether from sharing her perspectives? 学者们自然可以自由地质疑赖斯在伊拉克战争中的角色，或者用怀疑的眼光审视IMF的政策，但是一个人的某一部分经历令人生厌就意味着这个人没有资格分享她的见解吗？ If campus culture conveys the idea that visitors must be pure, with résumés that never offend generally left-leaning campus sensibilities, then higher education will have taken a further step toward intellectual homogeneity and the creation of an environment in which students rarely encounter diverse viewpoints. And universities will have reinforced the belief that it’s okay to filter out the positive. If students graduate believing that they can learn nothing from people they dislike or from those with whom they disagree, we will have done them a great intellectual disservice. 如果大学文化传递的信息是“来访者必须纯洁无暇，其简历完全不曾伤害总体左倾的校园感情”，那么，高等教育就向智力同质化又迈进一步，并且为学生创造了一个遇不到多元化观点的环境。大学也将对“过滤掉积极方面是可以的”这一信念加以巩固。如果学生们毕业的时候相信他们从自己讨厌或反对的人那里学不到任何东西，我们就对他们的智力造成了很大伤害。 What Can We Do Now? 我们现在能做些什么？ Attempts to shield students from words, ideas, and people that might cause them emotional discomfort are bad for the students. They are bad for the workplace, which will be mired in unending litigation if student expectations of safety are carried forward. And they are bad for American democracy, which is already paralyzed by worsening partisanship. When the ideas, values, and speech of the other side are seen not just as wrong but as willfully aggressive toward innocent victims, it is hard to imagine the kind of mutual respect, negotiation, and compromise that are needed to make politics a positive-sum game. 这种试图把学生和可能令他们感情上不舒服的言语、思想和人物隔离开来的做法，贻害无穷。这种努力对职场无益，如果学生还对安全抱着同样的期望，他们在工作场所会陷入没完没了的官司。这对美国的民主也是有害的，这种民主本来就已经被日益恶化的党派纷争破坏得千疮百孔了。当对手的思想、价值观和言论不仅仅被看做是错误观点，而且被看做是对无辜受害人的蓄意伤害，很难想象我们还能找到令政治成为正和博弈的那种相互尊重、友好协商和相互妥协。 Rather than trying to protect students from words and ideas that they will inevitably encounter, colleges should do all they can to equip students to thrive in a world full of words and ideas that they cannot control. One of the great truths taught by Buddhism (and Stoicism, Hinduism, and many other traditions) is that you can never achieve happiness by making the world conform to your desires. But you can master your desires and habits of thought. This, of course, is the goal of cognitive behavioral therapy. With this in mind, here are some steps that might help reverse the tide of bad thinking on campus. 与其帮助学生避免接触他们必然遇到的言词和观点，大学更应该尽力武装学生，让他们在这个言论不受他们控制的世界里茁壮成长。佛教（以及斯多葛学派、印度教和许多其他传统思想）教给我们的真理之一就是，通过让世界顺应你的要求来获得快乐是永远不可能的。但是你可以掌控自己的思维习惯和欲望。当然了，这就是认知行为疗法的目标。意识到这一点以后，以下是一些可能帮助大学逆转不良思维的步骤。 The biggest single step in the right direction does not involve faculty or university administrators, but rather the federal government, which should release universities from their fear of unreasonable investigation and sanctions by the Department of Education. Congress should define peer-on-peer harassment according to the Supreme Court’s definition in the 1999 case Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. The Davis standard holds that a single comment or thoughtless remark by a student does not equal harassment; harassment requires a pattern of objectively offensive behavior by one student that interferes with another student’s access to education. Establishing the Davis standard would help eliminate universities’ impulse to police their students’ speech so carefully. 迈向正路最重要的一步，需要的不是教职员或者学校管理者，而是联邦政府。政府应该让大学免受教育部不合理的调查和处罚。国会应该按照1999年最高法院在Davis诉门罗郡教育委员会一案中的定义来确定“朋辈间骚扰”的定义。“Davis标准”认定学生所作的一句个别评论或者一句无心话语并不构成骚扰；只有干扰他人正常受教育而且蓄意冒犯别人的惯常行为方式才能构成骚扰。贯彻“Davis标准”，可以避免激发大学严厉管制学生言论。 Universities themselves should try to raise consciousness about the need to balance freedom of speech with the need to make all students feel welcome. Talking openly about such conflicting but important values is just the sort of challenging exercise that any diverse but tolerant community must learn to do. Restrictive speech codes should be abandoned. 大学本身应该深化认识，提醒大家在保证言论自由和保证每个学生都舒服之间需要取得平衡。公开谈论这种具有冲突性却又至关重要的价值，是每个多元而宽容的社会必须学会的挑战。限制性的言论准则应该被废除。 Universities should also officially and strongly discourage trigger warnings. They should endorse the American Association of University Professors’ report on these warnings, which notes, “The presumption that students need to be protected rather than challenged in a classroom is at once infantilizing and anti-intellectual.” 大学也必须从官方立场正式且严厉的阻止刺激警告的蔓延。大学应该赞同美国大学教授联合会关于刺激警告的报告，这份报告写道，“认为学生在课堂中应该受到保护，而不是面对挑战的想法，是把学生当小孩的行为，同时也是反智的”。 Professors should be free to use trigger warnings if they choose to do so, but by explicitly discouraging the practice, universities would help fortify the faculty against student requests for such warnings. 如果出于自愿，教授们应该有使用刺激警告的自由，但是，通过明确地反对刺激警告，大学也能帮助教授拒绝学生的此类要求。 Finally, universities should rethink the skills and values they most want to impart to their incoming students. At present, many freshman-orientation programs try to raise student sensitivity to a nearly impossible level. Teaching students to avoid giving unintentional offense is a worthy goal, especially when the students come from many different cultural backgrounds. 最后，大学应该重新思考他们最想教给学生什么样的技能和价值观。目前，许多面向新生的活动试图把学生的敏感性提升到一个不合理的高度。教导学生避免不小心冒犯别人很有意义，尤其是当学生来自各种不同文化背景的时候。 But students should also be taught how to live in a world full of potential offenses. Why not teach incoming students how to practice cognitive behavioral therapy? Given high and rising rates of mental illness, this simple step would be among the most humane and supportive things a university could do. The cost and time commitment could be kept low: a few group training sessions could be supplemented by Web sites or apps. But the outcome could pay dividends in many ways. 但是学生也应该得到教导，懂得如何生活在一个到处都有潜在冒犯的世界里。为什么不教导学生如何实施认知行为疗法呢？鉴于精神疾病的比率居高不下且仍在上升，把认知行为疗法教给学生就是大学能做的最人道、最有意义的事情了。时间和成本付出都可以很低：只需要几次集体培训课，剩下的就可以靠网站和手机应用来辅助完成，但是学生得到的回报是多方面的。 For example, a shared vocabulary about reasoning, common distortions, and the appropriate use of evidence to draw conclusions would facilitate critical thinking and real debate. It would also tone down the perpetual state of outrage that seems to engulf some colleges these days, allowing students’ minds to open more widely to new ideas and new people. A greater commitment to formal, public debate on campus—and to the assembly of a more politically diverse faculty—would further serve that goal. 例如，建立一套共用的术语，用来描述推理、常见认知扭曲和适当使用证据以引出结论的方法，将会促进批判思维和真正的辩论。这也能缓和近来似乎在大学不断蔓延的愤怒情绪，让学生更容易接受新思想和新人物。在校园内更多地致力于正式、公开的讨论，致力于汇集政见更为多元的教师，会进一步推动这一目标的实现。 Thomas Jefferson, upon founding the University of Virginia, said: 托马斯·杰斐逊在创办弗吉尼亚大学时说：

This institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it. 这一机构的根基在于不受限制的思想自由。因为在这里，我们跟随真理，不惧它把我们带到哪里；也无须忍受任何错误，只要允许理智与之自由对抗。

We believe that this is still—and will always be—the best attitude for American universities. Faculty, administrators, students, and the federal government all have a role to play in restoring universities to their historic mission. 我们相信这依旧是——并将一直是——对待美国大学的最佳态度。教师、行政人员，学生，以及联邦政府都有责任让大学回到完成其历史使命的轨道上。 Common Cognitive Distortions 常见的认知扭曲 A partial list from Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland, and Lata K. McGinn’sTreatment Plans and Interventions for Depression and Anxiety Disorders (2012) 这是来自Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland和Lata K. McGinn的《抑郁症和焦虑症的治疗计划及干预措施》（2012年）的一份部分清单。 1.Mind reading.You assume that you know what people think without having sufficient evidence of their thoughts. “He thinks I’m a loser.” 1.读心术。不需要足够的证据，你就认定自己知道别人想的是什么。“他认为我逊毙了。” 2.Fortune-telling.You predict the future negatively: things will get worse, or there is danger ahead. “I’ll fail that exam,” or “I won’t get the job.” 2.悲观预测。你对未来的预测是消极的：事情会越来越糟糕，或者前方危机四伏。“我考试要不及格了”，或者“我得不到这份工作”。 3.Catastrophizing.You believe that what has happened or will happen will be so awful and unbearable that you won’t be able to stand it. “It would be terrible if I failed.” 3.小题大做。你相信将发生或已发生的事情会糟糕得让人难以忍受。“如果我失败了就太糟糕了。” 4.Labeling.You assign global negative traits to yourself and others. “I’m undesirable,” or “He’s a rotten person.” 4.贴标签。你把自己或其他人归类于某些负面特征。“我不受欢迎”或者“他是个堕落的人。” 5.Discounting positives.You claim that the positive things you or others do are trivial. “That’s what wives are supposed to do—so it doesn’t count when she’s nice to me,” or “Those successes were easy, so they don’t matter.” 5.低估正面信息。你声称自己或者其他人做的有意义的事微不足道。“老婆就应该那个样子——所以她对我好不值一提。”或者“这些成功很容易取得，所以算不上什么成就。” 6.Negative filtering.You focus almost exclusively on the negatives and seldom notice the positives. “Look at all of the people who don’t like me.” 6.负面过滤。你几乎只关注负面信息，很少留意正面信息。“看看那些不喜欢我的人吧。” 7.Overgeneralizing.You perceive a global pattern of negatives on the basis of a single incident. “This generally happens to me. I seem to fail at a lot of things.” 7.以偏概全。你通过一件事就认定整体性的负面模式。“这种事总是发生在我身上。好像我有好多事都干不成。” 8.Dichotomous thinking.You view events or people in all-or-nothing terms. “I get rejected by everyone,” or “It was a complete waste of time.” 8.二元思维。你以非此即彼的方式审视人和事。“我被所有人拒绝”或“这完全是浪费时间”。 9.Blaming.You focus on the other person as the source of your negative feelings, and you refuse to take responsibility for changing yourself. “She’s to blame for the way I feel now,” or “My parents caused all my problems.” 9.迁怒于人。你把其他人当作自己负面情绪的来源，不愿意承担改变自己的责任。“我现在感觉这么糟全都是她的错”或“我所有的问题都是我父母造成的”。 10.What if?You keep asking a series of questions about “what if” something happens, and you fail to be satisfied with any of the answers. “Yeah, but what if I get anxious?,” or “What if I can’t catch my breath?” 10.杞人忧天。你一直问“如果某事发生了怎么办？”，并且对所有答案都不满意。“对，但是如果我变得焦虑怎么办？”或者“如果我喘不过气怎么办？” 11.Emotional reasoning.You let your feelings guide your interpretation of reality. “I feel depressed; therefore, my marriage is not working out.” 11.情绪化推理。你让情感引导你去解读现实。“我很沮丧，所以我的婚姻要完蛋了。” 12.Inability to disconfirm.You reject any evidence or arguments that might contradict your negative thoughts. For example, when you have the thought I’m unlovable,you reject as irrelevant any evidence that people like you. Consequently, your thought cannot be refuted. “That’s not the real issue. There are deeper problems. There are other factors.” 12.无法证伪。你拒绝任何和你的消极想法相抵触的证据或观点。举个例子，你认为“没人喜欢我”，你认为证明别人喜欢你的所有证据都毫不相干。所以，你的思想无法被驳斥。“事情不是这样的。肯定有更深层次的问题，还有其他因素。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Economic Inequality in Academia 学术界的经济不平等 作者：Richard Goldin @ 2015-8-13 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Who视之 来源：Counterpunch，http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/08/13/progressives-and-the-economic-inequality-in-academia/ In focusing on the wealthy as the singular source of economic inequality, progressive politics obscures the machineries of privilege which function at all levels of society. Individuals are trapped within these mechanisms; their lives lessened in ways that are far more damaging than the actions of the “one per cent.” 进步派政治活动聚焦于有钱人，将之作为经济不平等的唯一源头，从而未能看到在社会各个层面均在发挥作用的特权机制。个体受困于这类机制；他们的生活被削弱，其作用方式远比“1%们”【译注：指占人口总数1%的顶层富人】的行为更为有害。 Economic hierarchies are maintained not by brute force, but by strategies which rationalize the privilege of a few and the struggle of many. Within a multitude of economic contexts, structures of inequality are arduously perpetuated, even by those who consistently profess a belief in economic justice. Progressives need to analyze these contradictions and to expose the strategies which are utilized to justify hierarchy. 经济等级制的维系，并不依靠赤裸暴力，它依靠的是将少数人的特权和多数人的挣扎加以合理化的策略。在众多经济情境中，人们，哪怕是那些一贯声称自己信奉经济正义的人，都在竭力维持不平等的结构。进步派人士需要分析这类矛盾现象，并将那些用于为等级制辩护的策略公之于众。 Academia provides an excellent laboratory for this kind of analysis. Within academia, the contradictions between words and practices are particularly stark. Publicly, Professors often denounce the structures of privilege constructed by the top one per cent in this country. Privately, the small, tenured professorial class perpetuates a system through which it acquires disproportionate resources while condemning the majority of university faculty – non tenure-track adjuncts – to often live in near poverty. 学术界为进行这种分析提供了一个绝佳的实验室。言行不一在学术界特别突出。在公开场合，教授们经常谴责由我国顶层1%们构建的特权结构。但在私下里，人数很少的终身教授阶层维持着一个体系，并利用这一体系更多地获取资源，同时迫使大多数的大学教员——非终身教职轨道的受雇教员——经常处于近乎贫困的状态。【译注：美国大学的教师职位晋升分两条轨道，一条通往终身教授，俗称终身规（tenure-track），另一条是受雇教员，处于普通雇员地位，合同期较短，收入也较低。】 While there are clear economic incentives for university administrators to pay the majority of adjuncts severely depressed wages,the financial disparity between tenured/tenure-track Professors and non tenure-track adjuncts (often denoted as Instructors or Lecturers) is not solely an effect of administrative policies. Administrators and the professorial class are complicit in the maintenance of this economic hierarchy and each provides a certain degree of cover for the other. 对于大多数受雇教员，学校管理方出于明显的经济动机，只会支付极低的工资。但是，终身或终身轨教授与非终身轨的受雇教员（常被称为教员或讲师）之间所存在的财务差距，不仅仅是校方管理政策的结果。在维系这种经济等级制方面，校方和教授阶层狼狈为奸，彼此都为对方提供一些掩护。 When pressed on the disparity between their words and their practices, tenured faculty can point to university administrators as the real culprits of adjunct impoverishment. In return, administrators’ harsh financial calculations are softened and obscured by professorial rationalizations which interpret structural hierarchy as merit-based. 当终身教授的言行不一致遭到追问时，他们会将学校管理方指认为受雇教员遭遇贫困的真正祸首。而作为回报，教授们会对结构性的等级差异进行合理化，将之解释为基于品质的差异，于是管理方苛刻的财务算计便得到了柔化和遮掩。 The reinforcement of professorial class privilege begins with the hiring process for the few available tenure-track jobs. Excellence in teaching, without academic publications, will rarely qualify an applicant for a university level tenure-track position. Publishing without any evidence of teaching ability is far more acceptable. However, the current proliferation of graduate students with Ph.Ds., many with publications in top journals, has transformed the work of faculty hiring committees into something of a lottery. 教授阶层特权的强化, 始于数量不多的终身轨空缺岗位的招聘过程。对于一个大学终身轨职位，即使申请者教学特别出色，但只要没有学术出版物，那就不太可能合格。有出版物，但丝毫看不出能够教书的，相较而言明显更受欢迎。不过，由于现下拥有博士学位的毕业生数量激增，而且其中许多在顶尖期刊上发表过文章，教员招聘委员会的工作已经变成了一种抽奖。 Most Lecturers understand that “one’s position in the academic academy hierarchy is largely an accident of birth” and even some tenured faculty admit that their tenured colleagues “got lucky.” The result of this “luck of the draw” is financial security for the chosen few, and financial desperation for the non-tenure track adjuncts – a class that comprises almost seventy per cent of college and university faculties. 多数讲师明白，“一个人在学术研究机构的等级体系中的地位，很大程度上是一种因缘造化”，甚至连一些终身教员也承认他们的终身职同事“运气好”。这种“抽签撞运”的结果，就是被选中的少数人得到了财务保障，而非终身轨的受雇教员则财务窘迫，而后者几乎要占学院及大学教职员工的70%。 The primacy of publishing does not originate solely with the professorial class, but in its hands it has been re-purposed into a tool of class formation and preservation. Members of the faculty hiring committees evaluate new hires with the same criteria by which they were awarded their positions and which constitute their continued financial accumulation. This self-replication is then denoted as “merit;” a designation that separates new hires into two distinct groups while reassuring tenured faculty of their own superior worth. 发表（论文）至上，这并非全然源自教授阶层，但在他们手中，它已然改头换面成为了一种塑造和维护阶层的工具。教员招聘委员会的成员们，拿着他们过去曾据之以获得职位的、让他们得以持续积累财富的同一标准来评价新雇员。然后又把这种自我复制称为“品质”，用这种称呼把新雇员分成两个不同群体，并确保终身教员自己拥有高贵身价。 Even though the hiring process is, at best, a conjecture, once the separation between tenure-track Professor and Lecturer has taken place, the newly hired are fully constructed to align with their new class status. Lecturers are often considered to be hourly employees and their salaries are contingent on the number of courses taught. This compels them to teach as many courses as possible, though the vast majority are limited by course availability to being part-time. Financial survival often remains elusive, and many adjuncts are forced to go on public assistance and food stamps. 尽管招聘过程只能靠猜，可一旦终身轨教授和讲师的分野出现，新雇员就完全被框定了，只能去跟自己的新阶层身份对齐。讲师经常被视为钟点工，薪水因授课门数而异。这就迫使他们尽量多开几门课，然而绝大部分人还是因为可开课程门数受限而只能非全日工作。他们在财务上常陷于窘境，难以自保，许多受雇教员被迫寻求公共救济和食品券。 Tenure-track Professors, however, are often given as minimal teaching loads as possible and are eligible for paid time off from teaching in order to further their research. This disproportionate allocation of resources is designed to move tenure-track Assistant Professors smoothly along the path to tenured Associate and Full Professor. Each new title brings with it an increase in financial reward. A tenured Professor who is teaching far fewer courses and has far fewer students than a Lecturer might still earn five times the salary. 另一方面，学校却尽可能少地将教学任务压给终身轨教授。他们还有资格获得带薪休假，方便他们开展研究。设计这种不成比例的资源分配，是为了顺利推动终身轨助理教授沿着轨道转变为终身副教授和正教授。每一个新的头衔都附带着财务报酬的增加。一个终身教授，即使授课门数和所带学生都远远少于讲师，其薪水却仍是后者的五倍。 There is no significant financial path upwards for Lecturers. According to a recent survey report by the Coalition on the Academic Workforce (CAW) part-time faculty “experienced little in the way of a career ladder” measured as “higher wages after several years of work.” At the university level, continued excellence in teaching virtually never qualifies a Lecturer for a tenure-track position. But heavy teaching loads limit the ability of Lecturers to engage in the continued research and writing required for such positions. If a Lecturer takes time off for research, they receive no pay for that semester. The CAW notes that the professional commitment and support for part-time faculty is “dismal.” 讲师没有什么明显的的财务上升路径。根据学术劳动力联盟（CAW）近日的一份调查报告，“以工作几年以后工资上升”来衡量，非全日教员“极少经历过职业晋升阶梯”。在大学里，教学上长期出色对一名讲师有资格获得终身教职几乎毫无助益。沉重的教学负担还限制了讲师持续从事研究和写作以满足此类职位要求的能力。假如讲师在某个学期休假去做研究，他们就拿不到该学期的报酬。CAW指出，对非全日教员的职业承诺和职业支持“令人沮丧”。 However, simply increasing resources for Lecturers leaves the fundamental pivot point of the academic hierarchy untouched. The economic stratification within academia is built upon the disproportionate financial rewards given to those who publish articles or books in acceptable academic journals (or with acceptable publishers) over those who teach. Though this structure of incentives and rewards is universal within academia, the strongly disparate financial valuation given to publishing remains unquestioned. 不过，如果只是向讲师们增加资源，那就没有触及学术等级制的根本支点。学术界的经济阶层分化建立于一种不成比例的财务报酬之上，那些在合格的学术期刊（或合格出版社）发表文章或出书的人拿得太多，相比之下教书的人拿得过少。尽管这种激励和报酬结构在学术界极为普遍，但是，发表研究所得到财务估值高的极不相称，这一点无人质疑。 In many of the more theoretical fields of academia, such as political theory, publications are highly self-referential. Observations and arguments are not derived from, nor are they intended to mirror, the complex, multi-faceted contemporary political world. Instead publications refer to other publications in debates about the field’s own abstract conceptual structures. 在许多理论性较强的学术领域，比如政治理论，论文是高度自我引用的。其中的观察和论证既不源自于、也不是为了反映复杂多面的当代政治世界。相反，论文之间相互引证来引证去，只不过是就该领域自己的抽象概念框架之内辩论不休。 It is teachers dedicated to a challenging education who engage in the task of reworking and concretizing theories to make them relevant to students. It is in the classroom where the dialogue between theory and politics takes place; and it is the classroom which sends forth generations of students who can perceive, and possibly undermine, the rationalities of power. 正是那些献身于挑战性教育工作的教师，忙于将理论再加工和具体化，使之变得与学生（的现实关切）相干。正是在课堂上，理论与现实政治之间的对话方才得以发生；也正是从课堂里，送出一代又一代的学生，他们能够领会——还可能消解——权力合理性。 Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. No objective standard of measurement exists to financially quantify, and differentiate, these approaches or their contributions. Yet a vast and enduring economic hierarchy has emerged grounded in the supposed intrinsic hierarchy between the two. This financial hierarchy is not a dispassionate reflection of an objective reality; it is a strategic effect of the mechanisms underlying class formation and preservation. 通往知识的道路通常都由发表研究和课堂教学的相互作用而铺就。不存在什么客观的测量标准，能对这两条途径或它们的贡献做财务上的量化和区分。但是，两者之间的内在等级区分却已被假定，在这上面还生出一个巨大且持久存在的经济等级制。这种财务等级制不是对客观现实的一种公正反映；它是塑造和维护阶层的底层机制的策略效应。 The primacy of publishing, and the attendant allocation of resources, is utilized not merely to perpetuate two different economic classes, but also to create two different kinds of people. This creation allows the hierarchy of privilege to function as though it represents objective value differences both in terms of the work produced and the individuals who produce it. 发表至上及伴随而来的资源分配，不仅被用来维持两种不同的经济阶层，而且被用来创造两种不同的人。这种创造令特权等级制的运转好像是体现了一种客观的价值差异，既包括产品之间的价值差异，也包括制造产品的个体之间的价值差异。 In any economic hierarchy, once those at the bottom are positioned as “lesser,” all sorts of harms become permissible. Since the financial disparities in academia do not mirror any objective universal value differences in work or aptitude, the hierarchy between adjuncts and Professors needs to be maintained and reinforced by persistent invocations of professorial privilege. 在任何经济等级制中，一旦身处底层的人被定位为“次等”，那么各种伤害就都得到了许可。由于学术界的财务不平等并不反映任何工作或天资方面的客观的普世价值差异，因此受雇教员与教授之间的等级制就需要持续动用教授特权来加以维持和强化。 Even some tenured faculty are critical of the constant assertion of “prerogatives,” and the “arrogance, and fear of being lumped together with the Untouchable Other.” Tenured faculty become experts at delineating “who really counts as part of [the] professional community and who doesn’t.” 甚至一些终身教员都对频繁的“特权”主张以及“傲慢，害怕被人把自己与‘不可触碰的他者’归为一类”等持批评态度。终身教员在准确划分“谁真正属于专业共同体的一部分，谁不属于”方面都成了行家里手。 These protections of class difference require, and cultivate, a disdain for the processes of education, and construct teaching as a burden to be endured. The professorial class strategically utilizes this construction as though it represents an underlying reality – an exercise in class maintenance which punishes both adjuncts and students. 这类对阶层差异的保护，依靠并促进了对课堂教学的蔑视，并将教学塑造成了一种不得不忍受的负担。教授阶层有策略地利用了上述塑造，使之仿佛是对基本现实的反映——这是一种维护阶层的做法，它既损害了受雇教员，也损害了学生。 One of the few options currently available to adjuncts to improve their financial situation is a faculty union. But unions comprised of both tenured and adjunct faculty will never question the mechanisms which underlie the academic hierarchy. Instead, they will ask adjuncts to join in fights for general increases in faculty salaries which disproportionately benefit those who already earn the most. The trade-off for adjuncts is an incremental raise in pay in return for a reinforcement of the structures and relations which perpetuate their impoverishment. 受雇教员要改善其财务状况，当前只有不多的几个可用选项，其中之一就是教员工会。但是，由终身教员和兼职教员共同组成的工会永远不会质疑支撑学术等级制的上述机制。他们只会要求受雇教员参与普遍提高教员薪水的斗争，而这对那些已然挣得最多的人更为有利。这里发生的交换是，兼职人员报酬少量增加，但代价是进一步强化了那些延续他们的贫困状态的结构和关系。 The academic hierarchy will not be altered by resorting to arguments about fairness, equality or basic human decency. Unions composed solely of adjuncts must fight for far greater increases in adjunct salaries as part of a larger struggle to dismantle the entire professorial apparatus of privilege. All progressives should join in this effort. 诉诸公平、平等或人类的基本体面等论证，无助于改变学术界的等级制。纯粹由受雇教员组成的工会必须为这些教员薪水的更大幅度增长而斗争，并将之作为拆除整个教授特权体系的大型斗争的一部分。所有的进步派都应加入这一活动。 The gap between professorial words and actions exemplify the kinds of rationalizations which perpetuate exploitation at all economic levels. The power of the most wealthy in this country will not be impeded if their strategies can be simultaneously decried and emulated. Progressive politics must expose and disrupt these processes, wherever they occur. In this sense, the professorial class should be appearing frequently on progressive media. They have a lot to explain. 教授们的言行差异是在各个经济层面上帮助维持剥削的合理化策略的一个例证。如果这个国家的最富者们的策略在被人谴责的同时还会被人效仿，那么他们的权力将无可阻挡。进步派的政治活动必须揭露并破坏这些方法，不管它们发生在哪儿。在此意义上，教授阶层应当经常上上进步派的媒体。他们有很多事需要解释。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#3：祖先的记忆 辉格 2015年9月21日 早期人类社会不仅都是小型熟人社会，而且其中成员都是亲缘相当近的亲属，通常由少则六七个多则二十几个扩展大家庭组成；因为规模太小，这样的群体不太可能是将通婚关系限于其内部的内婚群体，而只能实行外婚，实际上往往是从夫居的外婚父系群，即，男性成年后留在出生群体内，女性则嫁出去，加入丈夫所在群体。 之所以父系群更为普遍，同样是因为战争；首先，群体间冲突的一大动机和内容便是诱拐或掳掠对方女性，而诱拐掳掠的结果自然是从夫居。 其次，在两性分工中，战争从来都是男性的专属，因而男性之间的紧密合作对于群体的生存繁荣更为重要，而我们知道，在缺乏其他组织与制度手段的保障时，亲缘关系是促成和强化合作关系的首要因素，而父系群保证了群内男性有着足够近的亲缘。 然而，也正是因为战争所需要的群体内合作倚重于亲缘关系，对紧密合作的要求也就限制了群体规模；因为亲缘关系要转变成合作意愿，需要相应的识别手段，否则，即便一种基于亲缘的合作策略是有利的，也是无法实施的；而随着代际更替，亲缘渐疏，到一定程度之后亲缘关系就变得难以识别了。 对于某位男性来说，群体内其他男性的脸上并未写着“这是我的三重堂兄弟，和我有着1/64的亲缘”，他头脑里也不可能内置了一个基于汉密尔顿不等式（rB>C）的亲选择算法，实际的亲选择策略，只能借助各种现成可用的间接信号，以及对这些信号敏感的情感机制，来引出大致符合策略要求的合作行为。 传统社会常见的父系扩展家庭里，几位已婚兄弟连同妻儿共同生活于同一家户，他们的儿子们（一重堂兄弟）从小一起玩耍，常被同一位祖母照顾，听同一位祖父讲故事，就很容易发展出家人间的亲密感，这种情感将维持终身，此后，当他们自己有幸成为父亲和祖父时，这一亲情便能够在他们各自带领的扩展家庭之间建立起强有力的合作纽带。 考虑到远古人类的寿命限制，很少有人能活着成为曾祖父，所以最理想情况下，一个人丁兴旺的家族，八九位已成为祖父的堂兄弟，各自率领着三四个核心家庭，构成一个五级父系群，其中辈份最低者拥有共同高祖父，这是个人能够从常规生活经历中感知到的亲缘关系的极限，而这个父系群的在世人数恰好接近邓巴数，当然，多数父系群没这么兴旺，因而人数会更少。 事实上，人类学家也发现，生活在前定居社会的人们，对祖先的记忆多半只限于祖父一辈，再往前就是一片朦胧，往往连名字都说不出；所以，若要将父系群扩展到更大规模，而同时又保持足够紧密的合作，必须借助其他手段来分辨亲缘关系。 办法之一是强化对共同祖先的记忆，在没有文字的时代，这不是件轻松的任务；用图腾和族徽等视觉符号来标识共同祖先和氏族身份，或许是最普遍的解决方案；另一种常见做法是，将从群体共祖通往在世者的系谱编成歌谣或口诀，在各种仪式性场合反复念诵，从而时常唤起在场者的祖先记忆。 南太平洋的萨摩亚人在这件事上就表现的特别认真，每个氏族都有一套叙述系谱的口诀，叫法阿鲁派加（fa'alupega），在萨摩亚村庄处理公共事务的政治集会福努（fono）上，每当一位酋长（代表村里一个氏族）入场时，所有在场的其他酋长都要吟诵前者的法阿鲁派加，表示对其身世的认可，当集会临近结束时，这一吟诵仪式会再重复一遍。 实际上，从自己的本名开始向前追溯、罗列一串父系祖先名，是初民社会中十分流行的做法，在形成稳定的姓氏之前，这是在正式场合称呼人名的常见方式，罗列的长度视需要而定，推测起来，很可能一直罗列到所有在场者的共祖为止，或者到某位声誉卓著的先辈。 这种呼名方式在现代阿拉伯人中仍可见到，而在其他民族中，长串父祖名（patronyms）逐渐被姓氏所取代，但往往仍保留一个父名作为中间名，比如斯拉夫人和荷兰人；出于类似理由，许多民族的多数姓氏，是由父名固化而来，犹太人姓名中的“ben”、阿拉伯人的“ibn”、北欧人的“-son”、爱尔兰人的“Mac-”、诺曼人的“Fitz-”，皆源于此类实践。 东亚人更熟悉的强化记忆方式，是立牌位、建宗庙、修祠堂，还有各种祭祖仪式，类似的祖先崇拜与祭祀活动几乎存在于所有定居社会（后来有些社会缺失这些仪式，通常是因为被晚近发展起来的某种高级宗教排挤了）；这些仪式表面上的理由是告慰祖先灵魂，实际上却履行着记忆共同祖先，族内定期聚会以强化血缘纽带，最终巩固群体内合作关系的社会功能。 每个定居民族都有自己的创世神话和始祖传说，始祖常常还会兼任创世之神，在吟诵和记忆共同祖先的一次次努力中，这些始祖的名称、形象和故事被固定下来，随着世代更替而逐渐变得遥远而神秘，最终被神化，或者被附会到某个既已存在的神灵上；这些神话的用意，并非像后来的哲学家那样，试图为世界存在或人类起源给出一个可信解释，而只是强化血缘纽带的一种叙事方式。 然而，祖先记忆和氏族历史叙事，只能为合作提供一种动机，尽管很重要，但并不能解决群体扩大之后必定带来的内部冲突；当父系群规模超出邓巴数时，其中关系最远的青年已是三重或四重堂兄弟，亲缘系数（r）只有1/64或1/128，这么弱的亲缘，很难说服个人冒着牺牲重大利益的风险去和并无深交的远亲合作，只有在群体面临急迫的外部威胁，或者在多方混战中选择站在哪一边、与谁结盟这种场合，才能起些作用。 要组成紧密而足够和谐的大型群体，还需要其他手段，最早发展出的办法是强化父权；试想，当前述五级父系群扩展到六级时，总人数就超出了邓巴数，但是，假如其中各分支的家长有能力约束其成员的行为，压制其攻击和报复行动（这是群体内冲突的主要来源），那就有了一种突破邓巴限制的方法：现在，群体和谐只需要家长们之间达成紧密合作即可。 如图所示，若每位家长控制一个十几二十人的扩展家庭，并且二三十位家长（他们是三重以内堂兄弟）组成合作联盟，那么群体规模便可达到三四百，而同时，群内每个成员需要长期交往密切合作的熟人数量仍处于邓巴数之下。这样，当分属两个支系的年轻人发生冲突时，纠纷便可由双方家长出面解决，或提交家长会议裁断，并迫使当事人接受裁决结果。 同样，当群体面临外部威胁，或谋求与其他群体结盟，或准备对外发动攻击等公共事务而需要集体行动时，家长联盟将充当决策与执行机构；也可以这样理解：通过强化父权，家长们把家族树最下面一两层排除出了维持群体团结所需要的那个关键合作圈子，从而避开了邓巴限制。 人类学材料显示，上述模式广泛存在于前国家定居社会，而且它正是在定居之后才出现的；游动性的狩猎采集社会大多是平等主义的，没有高度压制性的父权，长辈也很少向晚辈施加强制性规范，而一旦定居下来（或者游动性减弱），父权便出现了，并且在近代化之前的整个文明史上都占据主导地位；当今世界，凡国家权力所不及的定居社会，像阿富汗、索马里、中东和非洲的部落地区，父权仍非常强大，并且是维持基层社会秩序的主要力量。 父权的常见表现有：对家庭财产的控制，并尽可能的延迟分家，控制子女婚姻，社区内的老人政治；因定居而发展出的财产权，是家长执行父权的强大工具，爱尔兰传统社会的家长，会将财产牢牢控制在手里，即便子女都已成家也不分割家产；一些非洲部族的家长更夸张，当家庭财富增长时，优先用于为自己娶更多妻子，生更多孩子，而不是资助成年子女结婚成家（因而多妻往往与强父权相联系）。 这种做法发展到极致时，老男人们几乎垄断了娶妻机会，在非洲班图语民族（例如西非的约鲁巴人和豪萨人，肯尼亚的康巴人）的许多部落中，父权高度发达，多妻制盛行，男性在熬到40岁前很难娶到妻子，而十岁出头的年轻女孩常常被嫁给五六十岁的老男人；贾瑞德·戴蒙德在检查了大量人类学材料后发现，此类现象广泛存在于传统农牧业定居社会中。 其中原理，我们从进化生物学的亲子冲突（parent-offspring conflict）理论的角度可以看得更清楚：尽管父母和子女很大程度上有着共同利益，但两者利益仍有重大区别，父母希望在各子女间恰当分配家庭资源，以便总体上获得最佳繁衍成效，而每个子女都希望更多资源分给自己这一支，所以不希望父亲生太多孩子。 强大的父权改变了亲子冲突中的力量对比，压制了子女需求中偏离父亲愿望的部分，而且宗族组织的发展又强化了这一父权优势：原本，父代的多子策略高度受限于本人寿命，当预期寿命不够长时，继续生育意义就不大了，因为失去父亲保护的孤儿很可能活不到成年，但有了宗族组织，孤儿就有望被亡父的兄弟、堂兄弟和叔伯收养，甚至得到族内救济制度的帮助（救济制度最初就是伴随宗族组织的发达而出现的）。 将亲子冲突理论稍作扩展，可以让我们更好的理解家长制和部落老人政治：个人在家族树上所居层次（俗称辈份）越高，其个体利益和群体利益的重合度就越高，因而长辈总是比晚辈更多的代表群体利益，他们之间若能达成紧密合作，便有望维持群体和谐，并获得集体行动能力，而同时，因为长辈间亲缘更近，长期熟识的几率也更高，因而紧密合作也更容易达成。 父权和家长联盟为扩大父系群提供了组织手段，不过，若仅限于此，群体规模的扩张将十分有限，因为家长联盟的规模本身受限于邓巴数（还要减去每个支系的规模），若要继续扩张，要么让每位家长控制更多成员，要么让家长联盟发展出多个层级，无论哪种安排，高层联盟中的每位成员都将代表一个比扩展家庭更大的支系。 问题是：谁来代表这个支系？假如寿命足够长，一位曾祖父便可代表四世同堂的大家族（比扩展家庭多出一级），但活的曾祖父太少了；一种解决方案是选举，事实上，部落民主制确实存在于一些古代社会；不过，更自然的安排是让长支拥有优先权（说它“自然”是因为其优先权是自动产生的，无须为此精心安排程序机制），比如周代的宗法制，让长支（大宗）对幼支（小宗）拥有某些支配权，并作为族长代表包含二者的上一级支系。 于是就产生了一个三级宗族结构，理论上，这样的安排可以无限制的迭代，从而产生任意规模的宗族，而同时，每一层级的合作圈都限于几十人规模，因而每位家长或族长需要与之保持长期紧密合作关系的人数，也都限于邓巴数之下。 但实际上，组织能力总是受限于交通、通信和信息处理能力等技术性限制，还有更致命的是，委托代理关系和逐级控制关系的不可靠性，随着层级增加，上层族长越来越无法代表下层支系的利益，也越来越难以对后者施加控制，经验表明，具有某种集体行动能力的多级宗族组织，规模上限大约几千，最多上万。 在古代中国，每当蛮族大规模入侵、中原动荡、王朝崩溃、帝国权力瓦解之际，宗族组织便兴旺起来，聚族自保历来是人们应对乱世的最自然反应，古典时代以来的第一轮宗族运动，便兴起于东晋衣冠南渡之时；如果说第一轮运动主要限于士族大家的话，南宋开始的第二轮运动则吸引了所有阶层的兴趣，家族成员无论贫富贵贱都被编入族谱。 和聚居村落的结构布局一样，宗族组织的紧密程度和集体行动能力同样显著相关于所处环境的安全性，华南农耕拓殖前线，或者国家权力因交通不便而难以覆盖的地方，宗族组织便趋于发达和紧密；人类学家林耀华描述的福建义序黄氏宗族，血缘纽带历二十多代六百多年而不断，到1930年代已发展到15个房支，每房又分若干支系，各有祠堂，从核心家庭到宗族，共达七个组织层级，总人口近万。 类似规模的宗族在华南比比皆是，在宗族之间时而发生的大型械斗中，双方常能组织起上千人的参战队伍，可见其规模之大，行动能力之强；华南许多宗族部分的从福建迁入江西，又从江西迁入湖南，但许多迁出支系与留在原地的支系之间仍能保持定期联系。 共同祖先记忆、父权、家长制、族长会议、大型宗族组织，这些由扩大父系群的种种努力所发展出的文化元素，不仅为定居社会的最初大型化创造了组织基础，也为此后的国家起源提供了部分制度准备，父权和族长权，是早期国家创建者所倚赖的诸多政治权力来源之一。 当然，父系结构的扩展只是社会大型化的多条线索之一，要建立起数十上百万人的大型社会，还有很长的路要走，还要等待其他许多方面的文化进化，在后面的文章里，我会继续追寻人类文明的这段旅程。 （本系列文章首发于“大象公会”，纸媒转载请先征得公会同意。）  

【2015-10-27】 @海德沙龙 【产业故事】《汽车推销员之死》汽车销售是个很特别的业态，不仅商业模式独特，经销商的政治势力也很强大，以至能让美国各州通过成文法将这一商业模式固化了下来，不然，这种模式原本很可能只适合于汽车业发展的特定阶段，那么，在如今产业变迁大潮中，它是否会幸存下来？ @whigzhou: 1）汽车巨头年产量几百上千万，面向数亿消费者，厂商-消费者社会关系距离十分遥远（基于邓巴限制，这一距离至少四层），2）汽车购买是重大决策。——在传统零售模式下，同时满足这两个条件的产业，经销商的地位就会较强，我猜。 @闲中隐:房地产为什么这么需要中介呢 @whigzhou: 中介和经销商不同，二级房地产是供需两端皆为海量参与者的市场，此类市场若商品为无差异类型，会倾向于形成集中式交易中心，若为高差异类型，则形成中介模式 @whigzhou: 修正：同为高差异商品，若购买行为非重大决策，则形成超市/商场模式，若为重大决策，则形成中介模式  

Death of a car salesman 汽车推销员之死 日期：2015-8-22 译者：迈爸（@麦田的字留地） 校对：Ghost（@Ghostmarine） 来源：The Economist，http://www.economist.com/news/business/21661656-no-one-much-likes-car-dealers-changing-system-will-be-hard-death-car-salesman No one much likes car dealers. But changing the system will be hard 没人喜欢汽车经销商，但改变销售体系很难。 THE internet was supposed to do away with all sorts of middlemen. Yet house sales are mostly conducted by estate agents, and car sales are still finalised in cavernous showrooms that smell of tyres. Technology is diminishing the role of car dealers, however. 互联网会让各种中间商消失。然而，房屋销售大多是通过房地产中介进行的，汽车销售仍然在弥漫着轮胎味的空旷展厅完成。但是，技术正在削弱汽车经销商的作用。 Customers are using the internet for much of the process of choosing a new car, and are increasingly getting loans and insurance online rather than buying them from the dealer who sells them their car. Some carmakers are seeking ways to bypass dealers too. 顾客们开始在互联网上完成新车挑选过程的很大部分，并且越来越多地通过网络获得贷款、购买保险，而不在销售汽车的经销商那里掏腰包。一些汽车制造商也正在寻求绕过经销商的途径。 In the motor industry’s early days, a century ago, manufacturers tried selling their vehicles at the factory gate, in shops they owned themselves, by mail order and through travelling salesmen. But eventually they settled on a system of franchising, in which independent dealers mostly sell just one maker’s models. 在一个世纪以前，汽车工业的早期，生产商试图在工厂门口、在自己拥有的商店里、通过邮件订购，或者通过旅行推销员来销售汽车。但最终，生产商选择了特许经销体系，在这一体系中，独立的经销商大多只卖一家制造商的车型。 Now, almost all of the 90m motor vehicles sold worldwide each year cross dealers’ forecourts. In America, the second-largest car market, their total revenues reached $806 billion in 2014. China’s car market, the largest, has rapidly come to resemble the West’s, with all its faults . 今天，全世界每年卖出的9000万辆车中，绝大部分都要经过经销商之手。2014年美国，这个世界第二大汽车市场，汽车经销商的总收入达到了8060亿美元。最大的汽车市场，中国，已经迅速效仿了这一西方模式，连同它的全部毛病。 Surveys show that car buyers find the experience of visiting a dealer boring, confrontational and bureaucratic, notes Nick Gill of Capgemini, a consulting firm. No wonder they try to avoid them. Ten years ago Americans visited five dealers before making a purchase, according to McKinsey, another consulting outfit, but now they visit 1.6 on average. The trend is similar elsewhere in the world. Nick Gill of Capgemini咨询公司的调查显示，购车者发现造访经销商的经历无趣，富有对抗性，还充满官僚习气。难怪顾客总是试图避开经销商。而另一个咨询机构麦肯锡的调查表明，十年前美国人在购车前要转五个经销商，但现在他们平均访问1.6个。世界其他地方的趋势是相似的。 In many cases car buyers turn up having already decided which model and which options they require; and, having checked price-comparison websites, how much they will pay. Almost all cars these days have decent performance and handling, so test drives are less important than ever. 很多情况下，购车者已经决定了他们所需要的型号和选配，并且，通过价格对比网站，他们也知道需要支付多少钱。今天几乎所有的汽车，都有着不错的操控和性能，所以试驾相比以往显得不是那么重要了。 Styling and branding—things that can be assessed without visiting a dealer—figure more prominently in buyers’ minds. The role of traditional car salesmen, geared for the hard sell, is waning. 客户越来越看重风格和品牌，而这些信息不需要访问经销商即可获得。需要一张铁嘴的传统销售岗位，正在逐渐消逝。 What motorists do want, though, is someone to talk them through all the features that cars come with these days—entertainment systems, navigation services, automated parking and so on. Carmakers are beginning to respond. 然而，驾驶者真正想要的是，有人来告诉他们现在车上的所有功能，比如娱乐系统、导航服务、自动泊车等等。汽车制造商正开始做出反应。 Since 2013 BMW, taking Apple Stores as its model, has been installing “product geniuses” in some larger showrooms, to talk potential buyers through its cars’ features without pressing them to close a sale. Daimler Benz, another German premium carmaker, and even Kia, a mass-market South Korean firm, have begun similar initiatives. 自2013以来，宝马向苹果商店学习，在一些较大的展厅设置了“产品天才”，与潜在买家讨论其汽车的特性，而不是催着顾客买辆车。另一家德国高级汽车制造商戴姆勒奔驰，甚至还有面向大众市场的韩国起亚，也开始了类似的举措。 Apple’s softer sell, which stresses its products’ design and whizzy features, helps to persuade customers to pay premium prices. Its selling methods have also succeeded in training customers to accept that the list price is the final price. 苹果的软推销，强调其产品的设计和新奇特性，有助于说服客户支付溢价。这种销售方法还成功地使客户接受标价即是最终售价。 In contrast, the motor industry has spent more than a century training buyers to expect haggling, followed by discounts. Yet customers say having to argue about the price is one of the things that puts them off dealers. 相比之下，汽车工业已经花了一个多世纪使客户希望讨价还价，目的就是为了折扣。然而，顾客们说，不得不讨价还价是他们避开经销商的原因之一。 Some firms are offering them ways to avoid it. Costco, a discount retailer, sold 400,000 new and used cars in America last year, using its buying power to get good deals, doing the haggling on behalf of motorists. Lexus, Toyota’s premium brand, is experimenting with haggle-free pricing in a handful of its American dealerships. 一些公司正提供避免这一困扰的办法。折扣零售商Costco，去年在美国销售四十万辆新车和二手车，利用其购买力代客户讨价还价，取得了不错的业绩。丰田的高端品牌雷克萨斯，正在一些美国经销商那里尝试免议价策略。 Some dealers are experimenting with selling cars online, or opening temporary “pop-up” showrooms in shopping centres. Others are offering to bring cars to a potential buyer’s home or workplace for a test drive. 一些经销商开始尝试在网上卖车，或在购物中心开临时“弹出”展厅。还有的给潜在购买者提供在家里或工作地试驾的机会。 But the most controversial experiment is the one that Tesla, a maker of expensive electric cars, is trying: cutting out the dealers altogether and selling directly to motorists. Two decades ago Ford and General Motors tried to revive this idea from the industry’s early days, but they were deterred by resistant dealers and restrictive laws in some American states. 但最具争议性的尝试是特斯拉，这样一个高价电动汽车制造商，正在努力完全踢开经销商，直接向驾车者销售。二十年前，福特和通用汽车试图重现这个汽车工业早期的想法，但由于美国一些州的法律限制和经销商的阻挠而被迫放弃。 The legislation, enacted in the 1950s to protect dealers from onerous terms that carmakers were trying to impose on them, is now being used to put the brakes on Tesla. It has battled to open stores in several states where direct sales are banned or restricted. 这项立法，于20世纪50年代颁布，以防止汽车制造商强加给经销商繁重的条款，现在却被用来阻止特斯拉。在禁止或限制直销的几个州，特斯拉的开店之战已经开始。 And it is winning most of its fights. New Jersey and Maryland recently overturned bans, though the struggle continues in Arizona, Michigan, Texas, and West Virginia. 特斯拉赢得了大部分的战斗。新泽西和马里兰州最近推翻了禁令，但在亚利桑那，密歇根，德克萨斯，西弗吉尼亚的抗争还在继续。 In other countries, although carmakers face no legal hurdle to selling directly, they certainly would face resistance from their dealer networks. Nonetheless, Hyundai, Daimler Benz, BMW and Volvo have set up small experiments in Europe to sell cars through their company websites. 在其他国家，尽管汽车制造商们的直销模式没有面临法律障碍，但肯定会面临来自经销商网络的阻力。尽管如此，现代、戴姆勒奔驰、宝马和沃尔沃已经开始尝试在欧洲通过其公司网站销售汽车。 Customers can use the sites to configure their new cars and pay a deposit. Volvo sold all 1,900 of a special version of a sports-utility vehicle it offered online last year, and it now wants to get its entire line-up for sale online by 2016. 客户可以使用网站配置他们的新汽车，并支付定金。去年，沃尔沃的某款定制版SUV，1900辆全部在网上出售，现在公司希望到2016年时，能够在网上销售全系列产品。 Daimler is mulling an expansion of pilot schemes in Hamburg and Warsaw. GM’s premium Cadillac brand plans to open several test-drive centres and virtual dealerships across Europe. 戴姆勒正在考虑对华沙和汉堡的试点方案扩展。通用汽车公司的高端品牌凯迪拉克，计划在欧洲增设几个试驾中心和虚拟商店。 In all these cases except that of Tesla, the final stage of the transaction is handled offline, by a dealer. Even so, such selling methods strengthen customers’ relationships with carmakers, so they may steadily weaken the case for having dealers. 除了特斯拉，在其他这些案例中，交易的最后阶段还是由经销商处理的。即便如此，这样的销售方法也加强了客户与汽车制造商之间的关系，因此可能会持续削弱经销商的地位。 This trend is set to be reinforced anyway, since most new cars will soon come with built-in mobile-internet connections that, among other things, will stream data directly to the manufacturer. 无论如何，这一趋势将得到加强，比如，大多数新汽车将很快内建移动互联网连接，数据将直接流向制造商。 By offering motorists such things as remote diagnostics and automatic updates to the software installed in their cars, the makers will have a ready-made excuse to stay in touch. 通过向驾驶者提供远程诊断，自动更新安装在他们汽车上的软件，制造商将有一个现成的借口与消费者保持联系。 If carmakers did eventually cut out the middlemen, it could mean higher profits for them, lower prices for buyers, or both. Daron Gifford of Plante Moran, a consulting firm, notes that the potential savings could run from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars per car. Since mass-market carmakers’ margins are so slim, it could have a striking effect on their profitability. 如果汽车制造商最终绕过了中间商，则可能意味着给制造商更高的利润，给购买者更低的价格，或两者兼具。咨询机构Daron Gifford of Plante Moran指出，每辆车能节约几百到几千美元。由于大众消费市场汽车制造商的利润很薄，这可能对他们的盈利能力产生显著的影响。 Aside from the prospect of capturing the retail margin, and building direct links with buyers, carmakers’ shareholders have another reason to support the idea of eliminating dealers. That is because many manufacturers have got into the bad habit of overproducing, and of using dealers’ forecourts as dumping-grounds for their excess stock. 除了获得零售利润，与买家建立直接联系，汽车制造商的股东有另一个理由来支持消除经销商的想法。因为许多制造商已经养成了过度生产的坏习惯，并利用经销商来消化多余库存。 In the trade it is called “channel-stuffing”: manufacturers twist dealers’ arms to take on their surplus cars, with a combination of juicy discounts and the threat of holding back more sought-after models. If cars were sold directly by the maker, and production were constantly tailored to match sales, the industry’s fortunes could be transformed. 在贸易中，这种做法被称为“渠道充塞”：制造商诱以利润丰厚的折扣，结合限制畅销车型供应的威胁，迫使经销商接收他们过剩的汽车。如果汽车是由制造商直接销售，生产不断适应销售，行业际遇则有望改变。 Dealers, predictably, are desperate to remain the source of new cars even though they often make little or no money flogging them. In Britain, typically two-thirds of revenues but less than a quarter of profits come from that part of the business. 可以预见的是，经销商渴望保持新车的供应，即使他们从新车销售中很少或根本没有赚到钱。在英国，新车业务通常在销售收入中占三分之二，却只带来不到四分之一的利润。 However, selling new cars is the engine that drives the rest of their business—finance, insurance, warranties and other aftermarket products. Buyers often bring their cars back for repairs and servicing. 然而，新车销售却能够带动其他业务，金融、保险、担保，以及其他售后产品。买家通常还会回来进行维修和保养。 Trade-ins provide dealers with a stock of used cars, another important source of income. In America, such ancillaries helped dealers survive in the six years to 2011, when they were selling new cars at a loss. 而以旧抵新能够为经销商带来大量二手车，这是另一个重要的收入来源。在美国，从2006到2011年这六年中，当经销商亏本销售新车时，二手车帮助他们度过了难关。 Online firms are replicating these services and chipping away at dealers’ local monopolies. Websites such as Edmunds and TrueCar in America, Carwow in Britain and Mobile.de in Germany let buyers quickly gather quotes from multiple dealers. 在线企业同样提供这些服务，并正在打破经销商的地方垄断。如美国的Edmunds，TrueCar，英国的Carwow和德国的Mobile.de，能让买家快速收集来自多个经销商的报价。 Likewise, cheap insurance, finance and warranties are easy to find online. Motorists may get a better price for their old cars from a site like webuyanycar.com in Britain than by doing a trade-in with a dealer. 同样，便宜的保险，金融和担保服务，很容易从网上找到。英国的车主可以从一个叫webuyanycar.com网站为旧车找到更好的价格，远比去经销商那里以旧抵新划算。 But just as some tourists still like to buy package holidays, there may always be some motorists who prefer a one-stop-shop that provides everything, and some who prefer to buy face-to-face rather than over the internet. 但正如一些游客仍然喜欢让旅行社包办一切，总有人还是喜欢提供一切的一站式商店，还有人更喜欢面对面购物，而不是通过互联网。 America’s National Automobile Dealers’ Association puts forward two other reasons why motorists are better off with things the way they are. First, it argues, the competition among dealers to sell any given model helps to keep the retail profit margin low—and if carmakers captured the retail margin for themselves, there is no guarantee that any of it would be passed on to customers. 就为什么驾车者应该通过经销商购车，美国的全国汽车经销商协会提出了两条理由。首先，他们认为，经销商之间的竞争，使得销售任何车型的利润率都很低，如果汽车制造商自己获得这部分零售利润，将无法保证其中部分利润返还给客户。 Second, when a model has to be recalled because of a safety problem, dealers have an incentive to contact owners of that model promptly, since they usually get paid by the carmaker to correct the fault. 其次，当某个车型因为安全问题被召回时，由于制造商经常会向经销商支付维修纠偏的费用，经销商也更有动力及时联系该车型的拥有者。 In America especially, car dealers are a forceful lobby, and unlikely to remain silent if carmakers try cutting them out of the picture. But their grip on the industry is loosening. The all-purpose dealership, encompassing sales of new and used cars, finance, insurance, servicing and parts, once made sense. 尤其在美国，汽车经销商是一个强有力的游说团体，如果汽车制造商试图脱离他们，经销商们不可能保持沉默。但他们对行业的控制正在松动。囊括新车和二手车销售，集金融，保险，维修和配件于一身的全能经销商，已经大势不再。 Now this business model is being squeezed. If car buyers take to online buying in large numbers, it may not be long before a mass-market carmaker follows Tesla’s lead and tries to muscle aside the dealers. If customers are happy to buy direct from the manufacturer, lawmakers certainly should not stand in their way. 现在，这个商业模式正在被挤压。如果购买汽车的人大量在线购买，不消太久，在大众市场方面，制造商就会追随特斯拉的步伐，尝试边缘化经销商。如果顾客很乐意直接从制造商那里购买，立法者当然不应该妨碍他们。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Europe: When the Macro Overshadows the Micro 欧洲：当宏观现象掩盖微观动因时 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-8-14 译者：小瑛 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com.br/2015/08/europe-when-macro-overshadows-micro.html Christian Thimann currently works with the French investment bank AXA while also holding an academic position at the Paris School of Economics. However, from 2008 to 2013 he was Director General and Adviser to the President at the European Central Bank, which makes his views on the economics and politics of the euro crisis especially worth considering. 在巴黎经济学院担任教职的Christian Thimann目前正与法国投资银行安盛合作。他在2008至2013年间曾任欧洲中央银行行长顾问，这个经历使他对欧元危机的相关经济和政治观点变得尤为重要。 He lays out his perspective in "The Microeconomic Dimensions of the Eurozone Crisis and Why European Politics Cannot Solve Them," which appears in the Summer 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Like all JEP articles, it is freely available online courtesy of the American Economic Association. (Full disclosure: I've worked as Managing Editor of JEP since the first issue of the journal in 1987.) 他在《经济展望杂志》2015年夏季刊上发表的“欧元区危机的微观视角，及为什么欧洲政治无法解决危机”一文，详细阐述了他的观点。像所有《经济展望杂志》刊登的文章一样，美国经济学会将其免费放到网上供大家阅览。（好吧我承认：我从1987年《经济展望杂志》创刊号开始就担任责任编辑）。 On the economics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the problems have microeconomic roots, not just macroeconomic ones. Here are a couple of intriguing figures. Thimann points out that since the inception of the euro, some economies have consistently run trade surpluses, while others have consistently run trade deficits. This figure shows the cumulative trade surpluses and deficits over time. What's especially interesting to me is the relative steadiness of these lines: countries with trade surpluses tend to add surpluses every year, countries with deficits tend to add deficits every year. Thimann认为，欧元区经济问题的根源不止在宏观，也有微观层面的根源。以下是一些有趣的图表。Thimann指出，自从欧元诞生开始，某些经济体持续贸易顺差而另一些一直贸易逆差。下图展示了各国历年来的累计贸易顺差和逆差。让我特别感兴趣的是这些曲线的相对恒定性：贸易顺差国盈余每年都在增加，而逆差国赤字亦逐年增长。   Thimann argues that a driving factor behind these trade imbalances arises out of the interaction between wages and productivity. If wages in a country are growing a lot faster than productivity, then in effect, the cost of producing in that country is rising and it will be harder for that country to sell in international markets. If two countries share the same currency, so that exchange rate adjustments are not possible, then a country where wages are growing much faster than productivity will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with countries where wage growth is more closely aligned with productivity growth. Thimann points out that in the trade deficit countries, compensation soared well above productivity growth almost as soon as the euro was in place. Thimann认为，这些贸易不平衡是工资和生产率综合作用的结果。如果一国的工资增长速度高于生产率增速，则该国生产成本将上升，因此其产品在国际市场上的销路不会好。如果两国货币相同，无法使用汇率调节手段，那么工资增长快于生产率增长的国家竞争力就不如工资和生产率增长速度相对一致的国家。Thimann指出，在贸易逆差国，薪酬增长速度高于生产率增长速度的现象几乎是与欧元的启用同时发生的。   Why is Greece not shown among the countries here? Thimann writes in the note under the table: "Greece is not shown in the chart because, while the productivity increase is broadly comparable to that of Portugal, the wage growth was even steeper, rising by 2008 to 180 percent of the 1998 value, hence exceeding the scale of the countries shown; wages have declined by about 20 percent since the crisis to 160 percent." 为何上表中没有希腊？Thimann在表注中解释：“表中没有希腊是因为，如果说希腊的生产率增长还能大体与葡萄牙相比的话，那么其工资增长则过于迅速，从1998年到2008年增长了180%，远高于其他国家，乃至无法在同一张表中展示；从危机开始到现在工资已经下降了20%，至160%”。 Why did wages rise so quickly in the trade deficit countries? Some countries saw real estate bubbles or surges in government borrowing that pushed up wages in a way that productivity growth could not sustain. Public-sector wages took off: "Over the first ten years of the euro, public wages grew by 40 percent in the eurozone as a whole and by 30 percent in Germany. But public sector wages rose by 50 percent in France, 60 percent in Italy, 80 percent in Spain, 110 percent in Greece, and 120 percent in Ireland." 为何贸易逆差国的工资增长如此快？有些国家存在房地产泡沫，或过多依靠政府借贷而非生产力的持续增长推动工资增长。公共领域工资暴涨：“欧元启头十年，整个欧元区公共部门工资的平均增长水平是40%，其中德国为30%。而这一数字在法国，意大利，西班牙，希腊和爱尔兰分别是50%，60%，80%，110%和120%。” A common justification given for the rapid wage increases was that price levels in many of the trade deficit countries were rising, often at 6-7% per year, and so there was a perceived need for wages to keep up. But for the purposes of international trade and competitiveness, what matters is the wage--not the rise in local-country prices. 通常对工资迅速增长的辩护是，因为贸易逆差国家物价水平增长迅速，多为每年6%-7%，所以名义工资也要相应增加。但在讨论国际贸易和竞争力问题时，关注点是工资，而不是某国物价。 Thimann goes into some detail about how the trade deficit countries in the eurozone also tended to impose rules and regulations leading to higher wages and restrictions on business. My favorite story of the heavy hand of regulation in Greece is one that Megan Green told on her blog back in 2012, but I've been telling it ever since. It's about finding yourself in a combination bookstore/coffee shop in Athens which, because of regulations, is not allowed at that time to sell books or coffee. Green writes: Thimann还深入细节描述了一个现象：欧元区内贸易赤字国家更倾向于制定提高工资且限制商业的政策和法规。我最喜欢的关于希腊严苛政策的描述，来自Megan Green 2012年发表的一篇博客文章，我经常提起它。文章描述了作者在雅典一家书吧的经历，由于政府规定，这家书吧当时既不能卖书也不能卖咖啡。Green写到：

This is best encapsulated in an anecdote from my visit to Athens. A friend and I met up at a new bookstore and café in the centre of town, which has only been open for a month. The establishment is in the center of an area filled with bars, and the owner decided the neighborhood could use a place for people to convene and talk without having to drink alcohol and listen to loud music. 我在雅典的趣闻能充分说明这一点。我和一个朋友约在市中心一家开业仅一月的书吧见面。这一区周围都是酒吧，店主认为在这里开一间为需要小憩聊天但又不想喝酒精饮料听喧闹音乐的人们服务的店铺是个好主意。 After we sat down, we asked the waitress for a coffee. She thanked us for our order and immediately turned and walked out the front door. My friend explained that the owner of the bookstore/café couldn’t get a license to provide coffee. She had tried to just buy a coffee machine and give the coffee away for free, thinking that lingering patrons would boost book sales. 我们落座后向服务员点了咖啡。她对我们的光顾表示感谢后，立刻转身走出前门。我朋友解释说，店主无法取得出售咖啡的营业执照。她尝试买了一个咖啡机向客人免费提供咖啡，这样吸引客人光顾也能促进图书销售。 However, giving away coffee was illegal as well. Instead, the owner had to strike a deal with a bar across the street, whereby they make the coffee and the waitress spends all day shuttling between the bar and the bookstore/café. My friend also explained to me that books could not be purchased at the bookstore, as it was after 18h and it is illegal to sell books in Greece beyond that hour. I was in a bookstore/café that could neither sell books nor make coffee. 然而，免费提供咖啡也是非法的。店主只能请街对面的酒吧帮忙制作咖啡，而店员要终日往返于书吧和酒吧之间。我朋友还解释说，不能在店里买书，因为18点以后出售图书在希腊是违法的。我光顾的是一家既不能卖书也不能制作咖啡的书吧。

One story like this is a comedy. An economy in which stories like this are commonplace--and which is locked into a free-trade zone with countries sharing a common currency, is a tragedy waiting to happen. 仅仅一则这样的故事还只是趣闻，可是当一个经济体满是此类故事时，灾难随时都可能发生，更何况这个经济体还处于同周边国家共用同一种货币的自由贸易区内。 On the politics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the euro, the European Central Bank, and all the European-wide negotations over debt overshadowing these other issues. Normally, when a democratic country has miserable economic performance with high unemployment and slow growth, a common response is for its citizens to demand some policy changes from their politicians. 就欧元区的政治，Thimann认为，欧元、欧洲央行和有关债务问题的所有全欧层面的谈判掩盖了其他问题。一般情况下，当一个民主国家经济萧条，失业率高且经济增长缓慢时，民众通常会要求政治家修改政策。 But in the euro-zone, when a country has a miserable economic performance, the politicians of that country tell the citizens that it's not their fault. It's all the fault of the Euro-crats in Brussels, or Germans pulling strings behind the scenes, or the ECB. The politicians tell the voters that self-examination unnecessary and even counterproductive, because they to unite against the malign outsiders. 但在欧元区内，当国家经济不振时，政府会向民众辩解这不是他们的错，罪魁祸首是布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员，或是在背后操纵的德国，或是欧洲央行。政客们会告诉选民，自省没有必要甚至起反作用，因为他们要联合起来抵抗外敌。 Here are some concluding thoughts from Thimann: 下面是Thimann的一些结论性观点：

At the core of the economic crisis in the eurozone is the problem of unemployment in several countries. Roughly 18.2 million people are unemployed in early 2015. In about half the eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is below 10 percent, and in Germany it is actually below 5 percent (Eurostat data, February 2015), but in France, 10.7 percent of the labor force are unemployed; in Italy, 12.7 percent; in Portugal, 14.1 percent; in Spain, 23.2 percent; and in Greece, 26.0 percent. ... 欧元区经济危机的核心是一些国家的失业问题。2015年初大约有1820万失业人口。半数欧元国家的失业率在10%以下，德国甚至低于5%（欧盟统计局，2015年2月），但法国有10.7%的劳动人口没有工作，意大利12.7%；葡萄牙14.1%；西班牙23.2%；希腊26%…… It is legitimate to speak about this as a problem for the eurozone in the sense that economic policies in a single currency area are truly a matter of common concern, and also because high unemployment interferes with the smooth functioning of the eurozone, challenging its economic and political cohesion. But it is not accurate to attribute responsibility for the problem, or the solution, to the eurozone as a whole, to European institutions, or to other countries. 我们有理由将此视为一个欧元区问题，因为单一货币区内的经济政策是各国都关注的问题，同时高失业率妨碍欧元区正常运作，挑战其政治和经济凝聚力。但将问题的责任或解决方法归咎于欧元区整体、欧盟机构或其他国家，都是不准确的。 Jobs fail to be created in a number of these countries not because of a “lack of demand” as often claimed, but mainly because wage costs are high relative to productivity, social insurance and tax burdens are heavy, and the business environment is excessively burdensome. All of this should be viewed not in absolute terms,but in relative terms, compared with other economies in Europe and countries around the world where labor costs and productivity are more advantageous, and the business environment is friendlier. 许多国家未能有效创造就业，并不像通常认为的那样是由于“缺乏需求”，主要是因为相对于其生产率水平，工资过高，社会福利和税负过重，商业环境极其不友好。所有这些因素都不能绝对地看，而应相对地看，要和生产成本与生产率更有优势、商业环境更友善的欧洲和全球其他国家放在一起比较研究。 “Europe” is not an all-powerful actor in the field of national economic policies, but only a potentially useful facilitator. Only the country concerned is the legitimate and able party to improve its own economic functioning in line with its social preferences and economic setup. This is why European politics cannot solve the microeconomic dimensions of the eurozone crisis. Within individual countries, it is the governments, administrative authorities, social partners, and all other economic stakeholders that are the legitimate actors in the field of economic and social policies.... “欧洲”在国家层面的经济政策制定上并不是一个有力的参与者，仅有潜在的催化剂作用。只有各相关国家自己才有合法性也有能力依照自身社会偏好和经济结构，设法提高经济运行状况。这就是为什么欧洲政治无法解决欧元区危机微观因素的原因所在。在每一个国家中，经济和社会政策领域中真正有效的参与者是该国的政府，行政机构，社会伙伴和其他经济利益相关者…… For the eurozone countries, their economic and unemployment problems are not primarily a question about some countries versus other countries within the monetary union, but about finding their place in an open global economy—that is, about competing and cooperating successfully with advanced, emerging, and developing economies across the globe. 对欧元区国家，经济和失业问题主要不是货币同盟中国家间的问题，而是能否在开放的全球经济中找到自己的立足点，即成功与全球众多发达、新兴或发展中经济体展开经济合作的问题。 An inward-looking European debate on the distribution of the relative adjustment burden for structural reforms would dramatically overlook the much broader challenges of integration into the global economy. ... It may be more glamorous to focus on European monetary policy, the “European architecture,” or the “bigger macro picture.” But the real issue of—and solution to—the crisis in the eurozone lies in the mostly microeconomic trenches of national economic, social, and structural policies. 关于结构改革带来的重担如何在各国间分配这种纯欧洲内部的争论，会令人极度忽视融入世界经济的挑战……讨论欧洲货币政策，“欧洲铸造者”或“更宏观的图景”等可能显得高大上。但欧元区危机的症结和解决方法所在，主要是国家层面的经济、社会和结构政策的微观经济壕沟。

I think Thimann may understate the fundamental macroeconomic problems that are being created by the presence of the euro (as I've discussed here and here, for example). But he seems to me quite correct to emphasize that many European countries badly need structural, regulatory, and microeconomic adjustments. Moreover, politicians and voters in many of these countries would much rather assail the rest of Europe about international negotiations involving public debt and the euro, rather than face their domestic political issues. 我认为Thimann明白使用欧元带来的基本宏观问题（比如，我在http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2014/02/will-we-look-back-on-euro-as-mistake.html和http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2013/08/a-euro-narrative.html讨论过的）。然而，他所强调的很多欧洲国家急需结构、法规和微观经济调整，在我看来也是合理的。此外，在许多此类国家中，政治家和选民更愿意攻击其他欧洲国家在公共债务和欧元问题国际谈判中的立场，而不是面对本国的政治问题。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State 监管型国家的法治 作者：John Cochrane @ 2015-6 译者：Ether（@大小眼不能飞） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy） 来源：John Cochrane's blog，http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf 1.Introduction 1.引言 The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom. 美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意，而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济，但很少有人认识到，日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁，而这一点恐怕更加重要。 What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board? 银行敢对美联储叫板吗？券商对证券交易委员会（SEC）又敢怎样？医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部（HHS）或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗？一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢？医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗？我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗？ The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support. 这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵，国王之忧还在其次。但是，现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下，各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。 The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around. 过去800年，美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力，保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治，我们的民主脱胎于法治，而非相反。 This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now. 法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今，其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现；也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天，对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张，且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大，或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险，并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。 Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress. 没错，我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身：宽泛模糊的法律，政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。 Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course. 当然，利用法律和规章奖励支持者，惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。 Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger. 富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功，甚至可能延长了大萧条，但在政治上则取得了极大的成功，民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。 A label? 用什么标签好？ I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control. 我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。 Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money. 很多人称之为“社会主义”，但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里，私有企业是存在的，但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织，控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业，它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局，也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。 It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support their regulators politically. But Stigler’s regulators and business golf together and drink together, and the balance power is strongly in the hands of the businesses. “Capture” doesn't see billion-dollar criminal cases and settlements. And “capture” does not describe how national political forces use regulatory power to extract political support. 这也不是“捕获”。乔治·斯蒂格勒描述过受管制的企业“捕获”其监管者的过程，企业借监管之手排除竞争。斯蒂格勒所研究的受管制企业一定会在政治上支持其监管者。但是在斯蒂格勒的叙述中，监管者和商人一起打高尔夫一起喝酒，制衡的权力牢牢地掌握在企业手中。“捕获”中见不着上十亿美元的刑事案件及和解协议。“捕获”也不能描述国家政治力量如何利用监管权力攫取政治支持。 It’s not really “crony capitalism.” That term has a bit more of the needed political flavor than “capture.” Yes, there is a revolving door, connections by which businesses get regulators to do them favors. But what’s missing in both “capture” and “cronyism” is the opposite flow of power, the Devil’s bargain aspect of it from the point of view of the regulated business or individual, the silencing of political opposition by threat of regulation. 这也不是真正的“裙带资本主义”。这个词相比“捕获”多了一份应有的政治意味。的确，这里面有一扇旋转门，企业通过这种关系让监管者们施以援手。但无论“捕获”还是“裙带主义”都没能体现逆向的权力作用。对受管制的企业和个人来说，这是一笔与魔鬼的交易，是通过监管的威胁对政治反对的压制。 We’re headed for an economic system in which many industries have a handful of large, cartelized businesses— think 6 big banks, 5 big health insurance companies, 4 big energy companies, and so on. Sure, they are protected from competition. But the price of protection is that the businesses support the regulator and administration politically, and does their bidding. If the government wants them to hire, or build factory in unprofitable place, they do it. The benefit of cooperation is a good living and a quiet life. The cost of stepping out of line is personal and business ruin, meted out frequently. That’s neither capture nor cronyism. 我们正在迈入这样一种经济体制：很多行业只有少数几家大型的、卡特尔化的企业——比如6家银行、5家健康保险公司、4家能源公司等等。的确，他们受到保护，免于竞争，但保护的代价是企业政治上支持其监管者和行政机关，并听命于它们。如果政府想要他们雇工或者在无法盈利的地方建厂，他们就会照做。合作的好处是日子好过、生活太平。越界的成本就是个人和企业的毁灭，这种惩罚频繁出现。这既不是捕获也不是裙带主义。 “Bureaucratic tyranny,” a phrase that George Nash quotes Herbert Hoover as using is a contender. “官僚暴政”——这个乔治·纳什引自赫伯特·胡佛的短语倒是值得考虑。 Charles Murray, writing recently on the status of the regulatory state notes many of these issues. He totals 4,450 distinct federal crimes— just the law, not including regulations with criminal penalties, or the vastly greater number with civil penalties. He adds up the 175,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the vagueness of the enabling legislation — Congress only decrees that rules are “generally fair and equitable,” “just and reasonable,” prohibits “unfair methods of competition” or “excessive profits.” He notes the absence of judicial rights in administrative courts. He notes the wide scope of regulation and the comparatively tiny — but ruinous to those charged — enforcement: 最近，查尔斯·墨里在论述监管型国家的现状时关注了诸多类似议题。他一共数出了4,450条联邦刑事罪名。这还仅仅是法律规定，不包括附有刑事惩罚的行政规章或者数量更大的附有民事惩罚的规章。他核查了一共175,000页的《美国联邦法规汇编》，以及含糊不清的授权立法条款。国会仅要求规章条款“原则上公平、公正”、“公正、合理”，禁止“不公平竞争”或者“过分利得”。他指出，行政法庭上司法权利缺失。他还指出，规章管辖范围广泛，执法却相对不足，但执法的结果对被控诉者却是毁灭性的： the “Occupational Safety and Health Administration has authority over more than eight million workplaces. But it can call upon only one inspector for about every 3,700 of those workplaces. The Environmental Protection Agency has authority ... over every piece of property in the nation. It conducted about 18,000 inspections in 2013—a tiny number in proportion to its mandate. “职业安全与健康管理局有权管辖超过八百万个工作场所，但是每3,700个工作场所只能均摊到一个巡视员。环境保护署有权管辖美国每一处资产。2013年，它一共进行了18,000次检查，仅是其管辖范围中极小的一部分。” Murray advocates civil disobedience with insurance for the few zebras who get caught by the regulators. 墨里提倡每个公民都购买保险以弥补万一被监管者抓到所带来的损失，同时对管制采取不予合作的态度。 But by and large Murray deplores merely the silliness of and economic inefficiency of the regulatory state. This misses, I think, the greatest danger, that to our political freedom. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect. 但总体而言，墨里憎恶的只是监管型国家的愚蠢和经济不效率。我认为这漏掉了最大的危险，那就是对政治自由的危害。仅仅是想到有可能被环保署拜访这一点，就有显著的噤声效果。 And it also misses, I think, an explanation for how we got here. Regulators and politicians aren’t nitwits. The libertarian argument that regulation is so dumb — which it surely is — misses the point that it is enacted by really smart people. The fact that the regulatory state is an ideal tool for the entrenchment of political power was surely not missed by its architects. 我认为他还漏掉了一点：我们是怎么走到这一步的。监管者和政客都不是傻子。自由意志主义者关于监管很愚蠢的观点，尽管正确，但没有看到一点：这些法律法规也是非常聪明的人制定的。监管型国家的建造者肯定对其是保有政治权力的最佳工具这一点心知肚明。 Likewise, Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen make a good casethat most of the economic rationale for regulation has disappeared along with information. Uber stars are far more effective than the Taxi Commission. But the demand for protection and the desire to trade economic protection for political support will remain unchanged. “Protect the consumer” is as much a distracting argument in the Uber vs. Taxi debate as it was when the medieval guilds advanced it. 同样，亚历克斯·塔巴洛克和泰勒·考恩很好地证明了，大多数赞成监管的经济学原理已经随着充分的信息而消失。优步的星级评定远比出租车委员会有效，但是对监管保护的需求以及用经济上的保护来换取政治上的支持仍然不会改变。在优步和出租车之争中，“保护消费者”不过是个掩人耳目的论点，和中世纪行会利用它时一样。 Rule of Law: the Devil in the Details 法治：细节里的魔鬼 “Rule of law” and “regulation” are dangerous Big Vague Words. The rule of law is so morally powerful that the worst tyrants go through the motions. Stalin bothered with show trials. Putin put Pussy Riot on trial, and then they were “legally” convicted of and jailed for the crime of ”hooliganism.” Even Henry the Eighth had trials before chopping heads. Is this not rule of law? “法治”和“监管”是危险的模糊大词。法治在道德上如此有力，以至于最坏的暴君也要应付一下。斯大林费力搞出走秀似的审判。普京审判暴动小猫【译注：俄罗斯女性主义朋克乐队，经常在各大景点举办有关俄罗斯政治生活的行为艺术表演，都未经政府批准】，然后“依法”宣判“流氓罪”罪名成立并判入狱。甚至亨利八世把那么多人头砍下了之前也经过了审判。这难道不是法治吗？ No, of course, but it’s worth reminding ourselves why not as we think about bureaucracies. 当然不是，但在我们思考官僚体系的时候，值得提醒一下自己，为什么它们不是。 “Rule of law” ultimately is a set of restrictions to keep the state from using its awesome power of coercion to force your political support. If you oppose Castro, you go to prison. If you opposed Herbert Hoover, could you still run a business? Sure. If you oppose President Obama, or the future President Hilary Clinton can you do so? If you oppose the polices of one of their regulatory agencies, now powers unto themselves, or speak out against the leaders of those agencies, can you do so? If you support candidates with unpopular positions, can you still get the regulatory approvals you need? It’s not so clear. That is our danger. “法治”说到底是一系列对国家的限制，防止国家动用可怕的强制权力强迫你的政治支持。如果你反对卡斯特罗，你会被关进监狱。如果你反对赫伯特·胡佛，你还可以经营一家公司吗？当然可以。如果你反对奥巴马总统或者未来的希拉里·克林顿总统呢？如果你反对他们手下某个现已有权有势的监管机构的政策，或是公开反对他们的领导呢，你还可以继续经营公司吗？如果你支持立场不受欢迎的候选人，你还能获得经营公司所需的行政审批吗？答案并不清楚。这就是我们所面临的危险。 “Rule of law” is not just about the existence of written laws, and the superficial mechanics of trials, judges, lawyers, ad sentences. Rule of law lies deep in the details of how those institutions work. Do you have the right to counsel, the right to question witnesses, the right to discovery, the right to appeal, and so forth. Like laws, what matters about regulation, both in its economic efficiency and in its insulation from politics, is not its presence but its character and operation. “法治”不仅仅是成文法和形式上的审判、法官、律师和判决等机制。法治根植于这些制度如何运作的细节中。你是否有权利获得律师辩护、质证、证据开示、上诉，等等。和法律一样，不管是从经济效率还是政治独立性上来说，监管的要害不在于它的存在，而在于它的特点和操作。 Regulators write rules too. They fine you, close down your business, send you to jail, or merely harass you with endless requests, based on apparently written rules. We need criteria to think about whether “rule of law” applies to this regulatory process. Here are some suggestions. 监管者也制定规则。他们依据成文法开罚单、关闭你的公司、送你入监，或者就不停地提要求骚扰你。我们需要一些标准来思考“法治”一词是否适用于这套监管程序。以下是一些建议：

Rule vs. Discretion? 规则vs自由裁量？ Simple/precise or vague/complex? 简单／准确，还是模糊／复杂？ Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? 可知的规则vs溯及既往？ Permission or rule book? 批准，还是规则手册 Plain text or fixers? 直白文本，还是掮客？ Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? 普通执法还是专断执法？ Right to discovery and challenge decisions. 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。 Right to appeal. 上诉权。 Insulation from political process. 与政治活动隔离。 Speed vs. delay？ 快捷还是拖延？ Consultation, consent of the governed. 被治理人的意见和合意。  

• Rule vs. Discretion?
• 规则vs自由裁量？

This is really a central distinction. Does the regulation, in operation, function as a clear rule? Or is it simply an excuse for the regulator to impose his or her will on the regulated firm or person? Sometimes discretion is explicit. Sometimes discretion comes in the application of a rule book thousands of pages long with multiple contradictory and vague rules. 这是一个核心区别。在操作中规章是不是作为明确的规则发挥作用？还是规章仅是监管者对被监管公司和个人施加自身意志的借口？有时候自由裁量是很明确的，有时候自由裁量则来自对上千页且存在大量冲突、模糊规则的规章手册的运用。

• Simple/precise or vague/complex?
• 简单／准确还是模糊／复杂？

Regulations can be simple and precise — even if silly. “Any structure must be set back six feet from the property line” is simple and precise. Or the regulation can be long, vague and complex. “The firm shall not engage in abusive practices.” 规章可以简单、准确，即使其很愚蠢。例如“所有建筑必须在界址线后6英尺”，这就很简单、准确。规章也可以很长、模糊且复杂，比如“公司不允许从事违规行为”。 Many regulations go on for hundreds of pages. Long, vague, and complex is a central ingredient which gives the appearance of rules but amounts to discretion. 很多规章长达数百页。冗长、模糊、复杂是让规则成为自由裁量，只具有规则的表象的核心因素。

• Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions?
• 可知的规则vs溯及既往？

Is the rule book knowable ex ante? Or is it, in application, simply a device for ex-post prosecutions. Insider trading rules are, at present, a good example of the latter. The definition of “insider” varies over time, and there is really little hope for a firm to read a coherent rule book to know what is and is not allowed. Much better to stay on good terms with the regulator. 规则事先可知吗？还是其实只是一种溯及既往的工具。内幕交易规则就是后一种情况的很好例子。“内幕”的定义随时间而变，公司几乎不可能从一本融贯的规则手册中知道什么是允许的，什么不被允许。与其如此，还远不如和监管者搞好关系。

• Permission or rule book?
• 批准还是规则手册？

In one kind of regulation, there is a rule book. If you follow the rule book, you’re ok. You go ahead and do what you want to do. In much regulation, however, you have to ask for permission from the regulator, and that permission includes a lot of discretion. Environmental review is a good example. 有一种监管，依据就是一本规则手册。只要你遵循上面的规则就没事，你可以做其他任何你想做的。但是有很多监管，你需要征得监管者的批准，而批准则包括了很多自由裁量。环境审评就是一个好例证。

• Plain text or fixers?
• 通俗文本还是掮客？

Can a normal person read the plain text of the rule, and understand what action is allowed or not? Or is the rule so complex that specialists are required to understand the rule, and the regulatory agency’s current interpretation of the rule? In particular, are specialists with internal agency contacts necessary, or specialists who used to work at the agency? 一个普通人是否能够阅读规则的文本并理解何种行为被允许，何种不被允许？还是规则太复杂，想要理解规则需要专家，需要依靠监管机构对规则的最新阐释？特别是，是不是需要一个拥有监管机构内部关系的专家或者是前工作人员？ As a private pilot, I often bristle at the FAA’s mindless bureaucracy and the plain silliness of much of their regulation. But to their credit, there is a strong culture that the plain text of the rule counts, and each pilot should read the rules and know what they mean. That is a system much harder to misuse. Financial, banking, environmental, health care, and housing regulation stand on the opposite end of the spectrum. 作为一个私人飞行员，我经常恼怒于联邦航空管理局的无脑官僚做派和很多愚蠢的规章。但是有一点不得不承认，他们那里盛行一种文化，就是保持规则文本的通俗易懂，每一位飞行员都应该能读懂规则。在这种体制下，监管者滥用规则的难度就会加大。但金融、银行、环境、医疗保健、住房的规章却完全处于光谱的相反一端。

• Enforced commonly or arbitrarily?
• 普通执法还是专断执法？

Regulations that are seldom enforced, but then used occasionally to impose enormous penalties are clearly more open to political abuse. If Americans commit three felonies a dayin “conspiracy,” internet use, endangered species, wetlands, or employment and immigration regulations (just to start), but one in a hundred thousand is ever prosecuted, just who gets prosecuted is obviously ripe for abuse. 很少执行但偶尔用来施加重罚的规章显然更易被滥用。如果美国人每天都在有关“合谋”、互联网使用、濒危物种、湿地或雇佣和移民等等规章（远远还没数完）下犯下三项重罪，但是只有十万分之一的机率被起诉，那么挑谁来起诉这件事显然就成了滥权的温床。

• Right to discovery, see evidence, and challenge decisions.
• 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。

Do you have the right to know how a regulatory agency decided your case? Step by step, what assumptions, calculations, or interpretations did it use? Often not, and even in high profile cases. 你是否有权知道监管机构是如何裁决你的案子的？每一步，他们用了什么假设、如何计算或者解释？通常你无权知道，即使是要案。 For example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverageof Met Life’s “systemic” designation reports 比如，《华尔街日报》关于大都会人寿保险公司被划定为具有“系统性风险”的报道写道： The feds ...still refuse to say exactly which [threats] make MetLife a systemic risk or what specific changes the company could make to avoid presenting such a risk. “联邦政府……依然拒绝说明是什么（威胁）使得大都会保险公司具有系统性风险或者公司可以通过何种具体的改变来避免出现这种风险。” and continues ...MetLife says that…the government’s decision is based on mere speculation and “undisclosed evidentiary material.” 接着又提到： “大都会保险公司表示……政府的裁决是基于纯粹臆测以及‘未公开的证明材料’。” Since the case is still being decided, the point here is not the correctness or not of these charges. But the charges are a clear example of the kind of regulation that can go wrong (In fact, the miracle of the MetLife case is that the company had the chutzpah to sue. They are taking a big bet that FSOC doesn’t believe in revenge.) 因为案件尚无定论，这里的重点并非这些指控正确与否，而是这些指控作为一个清楚的例证，表明监管可以变味。（事实上，大都会保险公司一案的奇迹在于公司竟然敢起诉监管机构。他们在金融稳定监督委员不会报复上面押了好大一注。）

• Right to appeal.
• 上诉权。

And not just to the same agency that makes the decision! In law, the right to appeal is central. In regulation, the right to appeal is often only to appeal to the same agency that made the decision. The Chevron doctrine severely limits your ability to appeal regulatory decisions (and the regulations themselves) to any outside entity. As an example, continuing the above MetLife coverage, 这里说的不仅仅是向作出裁决的机构提出上诉！法律上，上诉权是核心。在监管中，上诉权通常只是向作出行政裁决的同一机构提出上诉。“雪佛龙原则”严重地限制了你向机构外其他实体对监管裁决（和监管本身）提起上诉的能力。作为例子，我们接着看关于大都会保险公司一案的报道。 The ... stability council “lacks any separation in its legislative, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.” That combined with MetLife’s inability to see the full record on which the decision was based made it “impossible” to get a fair hearing. 金融稳定监督委员会“缺乏立法、调查、起诉和司法各职能的分立”。加上大都会无法看到裁决依据的完整记录，这使得他们“不可能”得到一个公平的听证。 As in law, secret evidence, secret decisions, secret testimony; and legislature, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled in to one are classic ingredients for subverting rule of law. And, eventually, for using the machinery of law to silence political opposition. 和在法律领域一样，秘密证据、秘密裁决、秘密证词以及立法、起诉、判决、陪审和执行不加区分都是破坏法治的典型元素。最终，它们都是为了利用法律机器来压制政治反对。

• Insulation from political process.
• 与政治活动隔离。

There are many structures in place to try to ensure the “independence” of independent agencies. There is also a tension that we live in a democracy, so independent agencies can’t be too independent if they have great discretionary power. 目前有很多架构想要确保独立机构的“独立”。但在民主国家，这也带来一个内在的压力。独立机构如果有很大的裁量权，那就不可能太独立。 These important structures try to limit explicit party politics’ use of the regulatory state. They are less successful at limiting the bureaucracy’s use of its regulatory power to prop up its own separate fiefdom. They are also less successful at limiting unwitting political cooperation. When vast majorities of the bureaucracy belong to one political party, when government employee unions funnel unwitting contributions to candidates of that party, and when strong ideological currents link decisions across agencies, explicit cooperation is less necessary. 这些重要的架构都是为了限制政党政治对监管型国家的公开利用，但它们在限制官僚机构利用监管权力强化自己的独立王国上则不那么成功。在限制无意的政治合作上也不成功。当机构的绝大部分人属于一个政党时，当政府雇员工会无意中资助那个政党的候选人时，当强烈的意识形态动向将各部门的裁决关联起来时，公开的合作就没那么必要了。 And, though it was ever thus, the enormous expansion of the size, power, and discretion of the regulatory state makes the insulation structures more important, just as they are falling apart. 即使这样，监管型国家的规模、权力和自由裁量权的扩张也使得隔离架构更加重要，而这些架构却正在分崩离析。

• Speed vs. delay.
• 快捷还是拖延。

The regulatory process can take years, and a canny regulator need not explicitly rule against a political foe. Delay is enough. Lois Lerner herself didn’t deny applications. She just endlessly delayed them. The FDA similarly sits on applications, sometimes for decades. 监管流程可以耗费数年。一个狡猾的监管者并不需要作出明显不利于政治对手的裁决，拖延就够了。洛伊丝·勒纳【编注：勒纳是美国国税局处理税务豁免申请的部门负责人，从2010年起，该部门被发现对涉及保守派特别是茶党人士及捐赠对象的豁免申请施加额外苛刻的审查，2013年的国会调查确认了这些滥权行为的存在，国税局官方也予以承认，并导致勒纳先被停职，后来辞职。】本人并不拒绝任何申请，她只是无限地拖延。类似地，食品药品监督局也拖延审核申请，有时一拖就是几十年。 A central element of a new Magna Carta for regulatory agencies should be a right to speedy decision. If a decision is not rendered in say, 6 months, it is approved. 一部针对监管机构的新大宪章的核心元素，就应该是速决的权利。如果一项裁决，比如说6个月内未作出，就相当于得到批准。

• Consultation, consent of the governed.
• 被治理人的意见及合意。

The process by which rules are written needs to be reformed. Congress writes empowering legislation, usually vague and expansive. The agencies undertake their own process for rule writing. They usually invite comment from interested parties, but are typically free to ignore it when they wish. We are as supplicants before the King, asking for his benevolent treatment. 规则制定的流程需要改革。国会制定的授权法律通常模糊、宽泛。机构根据各自的流程制定规则。它们常常会邀请利益相关方提出意见，但当他们不愿意接受这些意见时，通常可以直接无视它们。我们就像国王面前的恳请者，乞求他的仁慈。 And that was before the current transformation. As exemplified by the EPA’s decision to brand carbon dioxide a pollutant (coverage here), to extend the definition of “navigable waters” to pretty much every puddle, HHS’ many reinterpretations of the ACA, and the Education Department’s “Dear Colleague” letters, even the barely-constrained rule-making process now proceeds beyond its previous mild legal and consultative constraints. 这还是发生在如今的转变之前的事。从环境保护局宣布二氧化碳为污染物（见报道），将“可通行水域”的范围延伸到几乎所有的池塘，到卫生与公共服务部数次重新解释患者保护与平价医疗法案，以及教育部的“致同僚的一封信”，都是例证。现在，即使原本就不怎么受约束的规则制定过程也突破了本已有限的法律和征求意见方面的约束。 A structure with more formal representation, and more formal rights to draft the rules that govern us, is more in keeping with the parliamentary lessons of the Rule of Law tradition. 在起草治理我们的规则方面，一个有着更为正式的代议机制和更为正式的权利的制度结构，将更加符合法治传统下的议会经验。 2.A Tour 2.浏览 Do we really have reason to be afraid? Let’s take a tour. 我们真的有理由害怕吗？我们来浏览一下。 These cases are drawn mostly from media coverage, which allows me a quick and current high- level tour. Each case, and many more that are unreported, and a serious investigation to the structure of our massive regulatory state, could easily be drawn out to book length. 以下案例大多来自媒体报道，让我得以对当前情况做一次鸟瞰式的快速浏览。每一起案件和更多没有报道的案件以及对大型监管型国家架构的严肃检视，都可以轻而易举地写成一本书。 My point is not so much a current scandal. My case is that the structure that has emerged is ripe for the Faustian political bargain to emerge, that the trend of using regulation to quash political freedom is in place and will only increase. 我的意图不是要讲一件当下的丑闻。我是认为，现已出现的架构很容易导致浮士德式政治交易的出现，使用监管来压制政治自由的趋势已经形成而且只会不断加强。 As we tour our current regulatory state of affairs, then, think of how well the current regime represents “rule of law,” how well it respects your freedom to speak, your freedom to object, your freedom to oppose the regulator and regulatory regime. Think how insulated it is against the strong temptations of our increasingly polarized, winner-take-all, partisan political system to use regulatory power as a means of enshrining political power. 当我们检视当前监管型国家的事务时，想一想现有体制体现了多少“法治”，它在多大程度上尊重了你的言论自由、反对自由和反对监管者及监管型政权的自由，想一想它与两极分化日益严重、赢家通吃、政党体系动用监管权力来固化政治权力的强烈冲动隔离得怎么样。 Banks 银行 Start with finance. Finance is, of course, where the money is. 从金融业开始。金融，顾名思义，是钱之所在。 The Dodd-Frank act is 2,300 pages of legislation, in which “systemic” is never defined, making a “systemic” designation nearly impossible to fight. The act has given rise to tens of thousands of pages of subsidiary regulation, much still to be written. The Volker rule alone — do not fund proprietary trading with insured deposits — runs now to nearly 1,000 pages. To call this Talmudic is to insult the clarity and concision of the Talmud. 《多德-弗兰克法案》有2,300页长，但里面并未定义何为“系统性的”。这就使得监管者对企业具有“系统性风险”的划定几乎无法反驳。法案也带来了上万页的附加规章，需要接着撰写的还有很多。单是沃尔克规则——禁止用参加存款保险的存款进行自营交易­­——现在就已经快1,000页了。以“塔木德式”来称呼它，是对塔木德之清晰、简洁的亵渎。【编注：塔木德是犹太教的一套口传律法，由拉比传承，记录该教的传统习俗和行为规范。】 The result is immense discretion, both by accident and by design. There is no way one can just read the regulations and know which activities are allowed. Each big bank now has dozens to hundreds of regulators permanently embedded at that bank. The regulators must give their ok on every major decision of the banks. 结果就是巨大的自由裁量权，既有意外也有蓄意。仅仅阅读这些规章绝无可能知道什么活动是被允许的。每家大银行现在都被永久性地安插了几十至几百个监管者。银行的每一项重大决定都必须得到监管者的批准。 The “stress tests” are a good case in point. Seeing, I suspect, the futility of much Dodd-Frank regulation, and with the apparent success of the Spring 2009 stress tests in the rear view mirror, such tests have become a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory efforts. But what worked once does not necessarily work again if carved in stone. “压力测试”是一个好例子。我怀疑是看到了众多多德-弗兰克规章的无效，同时，回顾过去又有2009年春天压力测试的成功，这些使得压力测试成了美联储加强监管的柱基。但是成功一次不代表常规化后次次都能成功。 In “stress tests,” Federal Reserve staff make up various scenarios, and apply their own computer models and the banks’ computer models to see how the banks fare. However, the Fed does not announce a set scenario ahead of time. They Fed staffers make up new scenarios each time. They understand that if banks know ahead of time what the scenario is and the standards are, then the clever MBAs at the banks will make sure the banks all pass. And billions of dollars hang on the results of this game. “压力测试”中，美联储职员制造不同的情境，然后应用联储自己的电脑模型和银行的模型来看银行如何反应。但是联储不会提前公布一组情境都有什么，美联储职员每次都制造一组新的情境。他们知道如果银行事先知道情境及标准，银行里那些聪明的MBA们就有办法保证银行通过测试。而数十亿美元系于这场游戏的结果。 Now, the Fed staffers playing this game, at least those that I have talked to, are honest and a- political. For now. But how long can that last? How long can the Fed resist the temptation to punish banks who have stepped out of line with a stress test designed to exploit their weakness? Is it any wonder that few big banks are speaking out against the whole regime? They understand that being an “enemy” is not the way to win approvals. 现在，参与这个游戏的联储职员，至少那些和我说过话的，都是诚实且无涉政治的。目前是这样，但这能维持多久呢？联储能够抵御诱惑多久，而不去惩罚那些在专门设计来利用银行弱点的压力测试中行为出格的银行？鲜有大银行敢于直言反对整个体系，这很奇怪吗？他们明白，成为“敌人”并不是获得审批的办法。 And the stress-test staff are getting handsome offers already to come work for the banks, to help the banks to pass the Fed’s stress tests. Ben Bernanke himself is now working for Citadel. 参与设计压力测试的联储职员现已从银行获得了待遇不菲的工作邀请，来帮助银行通过测试。本·伯南克自己现在就为城堡投资集团工作。 If this sounds like the cozy world of “capture,” however, remember the litany of criminal prosecutions and multibillion-dollar settlements. These are instigated by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, with much closer ties to the Administration, but they revolve around violations of securities regulations. Is it a coincidence that S&P, who embarrassed the Administration by downgrading U.S. debt, faced a $1.4 billion dollar settlement for ratings shenanigans, while Moody’s, which gave the same ratings, did not? Pay up, shut up, and stay out of trouble is the order of the day. 如果这听起来像是一个“捕获”的温馨世界，那请记住刑事诉讼和数十亿美元的和解下的哀鸣。这些都是由与行政分支关系更紧密的司法部长和司法部发起的，涉及的则是违反证券法规的行为。降低美国债务评级而让行政分支蒙羞的标准普尔因评级欺诈而面临14亿美元的和解，但给出同样评级的穆迪却没有受罚。这难道是巧合？破财消灾、闭上嘴、远离是非，是当今市场的生存之道。 The Wall Street Journal nicely characterized today’s Wall Street, quotingJohn J. Mack, Morgan Stanley's ex-chairman “Your No.1 client is the government,” which embeds “About 50 full-time government regulators.” 《华尔街日报》引述摩根士丹利前主席约翰·马克的话，漂亮地描述了今天华尔街的特点，他说：“你的头号客户是政府”，它安插了“大约50个全职监管者。” CFPB 消费者金融保护局 Another example: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice charged Ally Bank with discrimination in auto lending, and extracted a nearly $100 million settlement. Ally provides money to auto lenders. Lenders negotiate interest rates. Nobody is allowed to collect data on borrowers’ race. So Justice ran statistical analysis on last names and zip codes — Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding — to decide that minorities are being charge more than they should, essentially encoding ethnic jokes into law. 另一个例子：美国消费者金融保护局和司法部指控Ally银行在汽车贷款中歧视，并获取了一份价值约一亿美元的和解。Ally向汽车贷款放贷人提供资金。放贷人协商利率。不允许任何人收集借贷人的种族信息。所以司法部就通过贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法统计分析借贷人的姓和邮编作出裁决，认为少数族裔被收取了过高的费用——这等于是将种族笑话秘密地写入了法律。 Why did Ally pay? Sure, they might survive in court. But nobody wants to be branded a racist. And DOJ and CFPB have many more cards up their sleeves. CFPB now can disapprove any retail financial arrangement it deems “abusive,” and put Ally out of business. Ally为什么答应和解呢？当然，他们可能在法庭上获胜。但没人愿意被称作种族主义者。此外，司法部和消费者金融保护局袖子里还藏着很多牌。消费者金融保护局现在可以否决一切它们认为“滥用”的零售金融合约，它们可以让Ally破产。 Note in this case, there was no charge or evidence of discriminatory practice or intent. The case was purely that DOJ and CFPB didn’t like the statistics of the outcome. 注意，此案中并无歧视行为或意图的指控或证据。一切只因为司法部和消费者金融保护局不喜欢最后的数据统计分布。 More importantly, was this a knowable regulation, or a bill of attainder? Did CFPB and Justice make available the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding program on their website, and tell financial institutions “please download the BISG program, make sure you run loans through it, and that they come out with the right statistics?” Obviously not. This was an unknowable regulation. Ally had no way to make sure it was lending to the right last names. 更重要的是，这究竟是一条可知的规章，还是褫夺公民权的法案？消费者金融保护局和司法部有没有在网站公布贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法，并告诉金融机构“请下载该程序，根据它发放贷款并确保最终数据统计分布正确”？显然没有。这是一个不可知的法规。Ally无法保证它们把钱贷给了正确的姓氏。 Ominously, in Wall Street Journal coverage, 《华尔街日报》的报道带来了不详的预兆： Larger settlements may be on the horizon. J.P. Morgan...warned in a recent filing that it is discussing the issue of possible “statistical disparities” in auto lending with Justice. With more than $50 billion in auto loans on Morgan’s balance sheet at the end of last year, real or imaginary disparities wouldn’t have to be that large to generate a fat settlement. “更大的和解可能就在眼前。JP摩根……在最近提交的一份公告中警示投资者，它正在与司法部讨论汽车贷款中可能存在的‘统计偏差’问题。根据公司去年底资产负债表上超过500亿美元的汽车贷款，真实或者想象的偏差不必过大，也会产生巨额和解。” While the Obamacare (King v. Burwell) and gay marriage decisions soaked up the airtime in the summer of 2015, the Court’s upholdingof statistical discrimination and disparate impact stands as the greatest affront to liberty. Without even alleging discriminatory intent, without following any established procedure, the Justice Department can chew numbers as it feels, and based on statistical analysis brand you a racist and drag you to court. 尽管奥巴马医改案（金诉布维尔案）和同性恋婚姻判决占据了2015年整个夏天的聚光灯，但联邦最高法院对数据统计分布所体现的歧视和差别影响的认可才是对自由最严重的侵犯。甚至无需指称歧视意图，无需遵循任何现有程序，司法部就可以随意咀嚼数字，根据统计分析为你打上种族歧视者的标签，把你拖上法庭。 SEC 美国证券交易委员会 The SEC’s regulation of insider trading is a fine example of discretion run amok. There is no legal definition of insider trading. Other than corporate insiders (who have legal fiduciary responsibilities not to trade on information) there is little economic rationale for this witch hunt. The game is characterized by big suits with big settlements and novel theories. 证券交易委员会对内幕交易的监管是自由裁量权失控的一个很好例证。法律上没有内幕交易的定义。除去企业内部人（他们有法律上的受托人责任，不利用信息进行交易）之外，这种猎巫式的监管没有多少经济依据。这场游戏的特点是大案件、高额和解和新颖的理论。 And thus, big discretion. The SEC can ruin anyone it wants to. If you’re running a hedge fund and the SEC accuses you of insider trading, it grabs your computers and shuts down your business. Sure, 5 years from now you might win in court, but your customers left and the fund shut down the day they took the computers away. And appeal is only to the SEC itself. 于是，这带来了广泛的自由裁量权。证券交易委员会可以摧毁想要摧毁的任何人。如果你经营一家对冲基金，而证券交易委员会指控你内幕交易，它会带走公司的电脑，关闭你的公司。当然，5年后你可能赢下官司，但是客户全都离开了，基金公司也在取走电脑的那天关了。而且你就算上诉也只能上诉到证券交易委员会。 Robosigning 自动签名 During the financial crisis, many banks didn’t fill out all the forms correctly when foreclosing on houses. The charge was entirely about process — there was no charge that anyone was evicted who was paying his or her mortgages. From the Federal Reserve’s own press releaseswe learn that the Fed found them guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices.” 金融危机期间，许多银行取消房屋抵押赎回权时没有正确填写所有表格。这项指控纯粹只和流程有关，没有任何关于仍在还按揭的房主被驱逐的指控。从美联储自己的官方新闻通报中我们知道，美联储认为银行因“不安全、不合理的程序和操作”而犯有过错。 The Fed was acting in conjunction with a comprehensive settlement agreed in principle between the five banking organizations, the state Attorneys General, and the Department of Justice ... The Settlement Agreement requires these organizations to provide $25 billion in payments and other designated types of monetary assistance and remediation to residential mortgage borrowers. 在一项五家银行机构、各州检察长和司法部……之间达成的、内容广泛的原则性和解中，美联储也参与了联合行动。和解协议要求银行赔付给民宅按揭借贷者总额为250亿美元的款项和其他指定的资金支持和救助。 The Fed, a supposedly non-political independent agency devoted to bank safety and monetary policy, acted with the Administration, to transfer $25 billion dollars from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers (not the victims of robosigning, other borrowers) and “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” 美联储——一家理应政治中性、独立，致力于银行安全和实施货币政策的机构——和行政分支一起将250亿美元从银行股东那里转移给按揭借贷者（他们还不是自动签名的受害者）和“非营利性住房咨询机构”。 It’s a small example, but a concrete one. 这是一个小例子，但很实在。 Regulation in general is transitioning from widespread application of rules to sporadic but very large enforcement actions, frequently involving threat of criminal prosecution and ending in large settlements. Documenting this trend, the Wall Street Journalnoted the spread of Department of Justice Attorneys to regulatory agencies. For example, the EPA “described a strategy of pursuing larger, more complicated enforcement cases, albeit fewer in number.” 总体上看，监管正由规则的广泛适用转向不定期的大型执法活动，还经常伴随着刑事诉讼的威胁，并以大额和解而终结。在记录这一趋势时，《华尔街日报》注意到很多司法部律师转到了其他监管机构。比如，环境保护署“描绘了一个策略，就是追求更大、更复杂的执法案件，哪怕案件数量更少”。 Similarly,Larry Parkinson, another former federal prosecutor who runs FERC’s [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] investigations, described it as an outgrowth of shifting resources to more serious matters—like market manipulation—and away from more traditional violations. In 2008, for example, a majority of the agency’s penalties were against firms that violated requirements that natural-gas shippers maintain title to the gas. 类似地，拉里·帕金森，另一位前联邦检察官，现负责联邦能源监管委员会的调查，将此说成是资源从传统违法行为转移到更严重问题的结果，如市场操控。比如，2008年，该委员会的大部分处罚是针对那些违反天然气航运商必须保有天然气所有权这一规定的公司。 “Market Manipulation” is of course a lot more nebulous and discretionary than natural-gas title checks. “市场操控”当然比天然气所有权检查更加模糊、有更多自由裁量权。 The ACA, AKA Obamacare 患者保护与平价医疗法案，即奥巴马医改法案 The ACA is 2,700 pages, and the subsidiary regulation is so convoluted that there is an active debate on the page count of its actual regulations. Justice Scalia invoked the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment as protection against actually reading it. 奥巴马医改法案长达2,700页，配套法规也相当复杂，以至于其到底有多少页还存在争议。斯卡利亚大法官援引第八修正案——不得施加残酷和非常惩罚——来保护自己不去读它。 The Heritage foundation counted 1,327 waivers. Clearly, someone needing a discretionary waiver shouldn’t be a big critic of HHS or the law. 美国传统基金会统计到了1,327份弃权声明。显然，有人需要自主弃权，这不应算是对卫生与公共服务部或者这项法案的严厉批评。 The cartelization of health insurance and health care under the ACA is almost a textbook case of corporatism. The big hospitals doctors, and insurers get a protected small cartel. In return for political support for the ACA, HHS, state exchanges, and so on. And, the ACA itself being an intensely partisan question, that support already leaks into major party politics. 奥巴马医改法案下健康保险和医疗卫生服务的卡特尔化是社团主义的教科书式案例。大医院、医生和保险公司获得了一个受保护的小卡特尔。作为回报，他们从政治上支持医改法案、卫生与公共服务部及州立医疗保险交易所等等。由于医改法案本身已经成为了一个很严重的党派问题，对法案的支持也卷入到了政党政治中。 Writing on the consolidation of health insurance into two or three big companies, the Wall Street Journal quotesAetna CEO Mark Bertolini that the federal regulators “happen to be, for most of us now, our largest customer,” adding 《华尔街日报》在关于健康保险公司整合为两到三家大公司的报道中，引用了安泰保险首席执行官马克·伯特利尼的话说，联邦监管机构“对我们大多数人而言，现在恰好是我们最大的客户”。他又补充道： “So there is a relationship you need to figure out there if you’re going to have a sustained positive relationship with your biggest customer. And we can all take our own political point of view of whether it’s right or wrong, but in the end-analysis, they’re paying us a lot of money and they have a right to give us some insight into how they think we should run our business.” “所以如果你想要和最大的客户有一个长久积极的关系，就需要认清这个关系。关于对错，我们都可以有自己的政治观点，但是最终来看，他们支付我们很大一笔钱，他们有权利给我们一些见解，告诉我们该如何经营。” The Journal opined that “such domestication is part of ObamaCare’s goal of political control,” echoing my fear. 《华尔街日报》评论道，“这种驯服是奥巴马医改法案政治控制意图的一部分”，这呼应了我的忧惧。 United Healthwanted to join the California exchange Covered California. Many areas of California have only one or two insurers now, so competition and choice are clearly needed. But participation in the exchange needs prior regulatory approval, and United Health was denied. Why? The LA Times wrote 联合健康保险想要加入加州健康保险交易所——医保加州。加州很多地方现在只有一两家保险公司，所以显然是很需要竞争和更多选择余地的。但是参加交易所需要事先得到审批，联合健康保险被否决了。为什么？《洛杉矶时报》写到： Peter Lee, executive director of Covered California, said established insurers shouldn't be free to come in right away. Those insurers, he said, should not be allowed to undercut rivals who stepped up at the start and made significant investments to sign up 1.2 million Californians during the first open enrollment. “彼得·李，医保加州的执行董事，表示老牌保险公司不应该立刻自由进入市场。他说那些保险公司不应该被允许以更低地成本与那些在第一次公开登记时就进场，并为签下120万加州人作出巨大投资的对手竞争。” and quoting Lee further, 李还说， We think the health plans that helped make California a national model should not be in essence undercut by plans that sat on the sidelines. “我们认为帮助加州成为全国模范的保险计划不应该被那些坐在一边看热闹的计划比下去。” You can’t ask for a clearer example of a regulator, using discretionary power to cartelize his industry, protect incumbent profits, and punish a business for failure to support political objectives. He said nothing about United Health’s ability to serve California customers, or to abide by any regulation. 没有什么是比这个更明显的监管者的例子了，利用自由裁量权将他管辖的行业卡特尔化，保护既得利益，惩罚没能支持其政治目标的公司。李一点没提联合健康保险服务加州消费者的能力或者其遵守了所有的法规。 Again in California, reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Daughters of Charity Health system wanted to sell six insolvent hospitals to Prime, which agreed to take on their debt and a $300 million pension liabilities. Under state law, Attorney General Kamala Harris must approve nonprofit hospital sales or acquisitions, with only a vague guideline that such transactions must be “in the public interest.” But only four of Prime’s 15 California hospitals are unionized, so the Service Employees International Union was against the merger. Ms. Harris torpedoed the merger, despite a positive report form her own staff. 还是在加州，据《华尔街日报》报道，仁爱女儿连锁医院想要将六所破产的医院卖给基本医疗。后者同意接受破产医院的债务和3亿美元的养老金负债。根据州法律，非营利医院的收购或出售须得到州检察长卡马拉·哈里斯批准，而指导其审批的只有一条模糊原则，就是这一交易必须“符合公共利益”。但是基本医疗在加州的15家医院只有4家参加了工会，所以服务业员工国际工会就起来反对这一并购。哈里斯女士阻止了这次并购，尽管她自己的手下出具了对并购持正面评价的报告。 Was the event a political cave to unions, as represented by the Journal? Perhaps; perhaps not. What matters here is that it certainly could be, as the Attorney General has enormous discretionary power to approve or disapprove hospital mergers. Hospitals are well advised to stay on her good side. 这一事件是不是如《华尔街日报》报道的那样，是对工会的政治屈服呢？也许是，也许不是。这里真正重要的是，完全有可能如此，因为检察长有很大的自由裁量权批准或否决医院并购。医院得到的建议是乖乖站在检察长一边。 FDA 食品药品监督管理局 Henry Miller at Hoover tells the sad tale of the Aquadvantage salmon, submitted for review in 1996 and still under review20: 胡佛研究所的亨利·米勒说了关于AquAdvantage转基因鲑鱼的悲伤故事，这一品种1996年提交评审，到现在还在评审： ...Consider what they [FDA] have inflicted on a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon, which differs from its wild cohorts only by reaching maturity about 40 percent faster, as the result of the addition to its genome of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon... “……想一想食品药品监督管理局（FDA）对这一转基因大西洋鲑鱼都做了什么。这种鲑鱼与其它野生同类唯一不同的是比它们快40%达到成熟期，因为它的基因组中添加了帝王鲑的生长荷尔蒙基因……” It took FDA more than a decade just to decide how they would regulate the AquAdvantage salmon. Characteristically, they decided on the most onerous pathway, regulating the new construct in genetically engineered animals as though it were a veterinary drug, similar to a flea medicine or pain reliever. After several years of deliberation, regulators concluded as early as 2012 that the AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon has no detectable differences and that it “is as safe as food from conventional Atlantic salmon.” ... FDA用了超过十年时间来决定要怎样监管这种鲑鱼。跟往常一样，他们决定通过最繁复的路径来监管转基因动物体内的新构造，就像把它当作兽药，类似跳蚤药或者镇痛药那样对待。经过数年的研究，监管者早在2012年就得出结论认为这种鲑鱼没有可探知的差异，它“和大西洋传统鲑鱼一样安全”。 When the FDA completed its Environmental Assessment in April 2012 and was ready to publish it—the last necessary hurdle before approving the salmon for marketing—the White House mysteriously intervened. The review process vanished from sight until December of that year, when the FDA was finally permitted to publish the EA (the unsurprising verdict: “no significant impact”), which should then have gone out for a brief period of public comment prior to approval. 就在2012年4月FDA完成环境评价准备公布结果时——这也是最后一道挡在鲑鱼上市前的障碍——白宫却神秘地干涉了进来。审批过程从公众视野中消失了。直到那年12月，FDA才最终被批准公布环境评价，结果并不出人意料——“没有显著影响”。这之后理应是短暂的公开征求意见阶段，然后就是正式批准。 The reason for the delay in the FDA’s publishing the needed Environmental Assessment was exposed by science writer Jon Entine. He related that the White House interference “came after discussions [in the spring of 2012] between Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ office and officials linked to Valerie Jarrett at the Executive Office [of the President], who were debating the political implications of approving the [genetically modified] salmon. Genetically modified plants and animals are controversial among the president’s political base, which was thought critical to his reelection efforts during a low point in the president’s popularity.” 科学作家乔恩•昂蒂纳揭露了FDA推迟公布环境评价的原因。他谈到，白宫的干涉“发生于2012年春天卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳·西贝利厄斯的部长办公室和总统办公室瓦莱丽·贾勒相关的官员进行的一场讨论之后。这些官员的辩论围绕着批准转基因鲑鱼的政治影响。在总统的政治大本营，转基因植物和动物是有争议的话题。这一话题被认为在总统的支持率处于低点的时候对总统的再次当选至关重要。” Needless to say, 20 years of delay makes a project pretty unprofitable. 不用说，20年的拖延让转基因鲑鱼项目变得几乎无利可图。 This is a good example, because the FDA regulations prescribe a precise science-based process for evaluating a food. There are time limits for rendering decisions, which the FDA ignores. But strong political forces don’t like GM foods, science be damned. 这是一个绝佳的例子，因为FDA的法规规定了评价食品的一套基于科学的精确程序。作出裁决是有时限的，但被FDA忽略了。当强大的政治力量不喜欢转基因食品时，科学就屁也不是了。 EPA 环境保护署 A clean environment is important. Pollution is a clear externality. We can also regard it as a Nash equilibrium. Each competitor in an industry is happy to pay the extra money to produce cleanly if all his or her competitors do so. 清洁环境很重要。污染显然是一个外部性。我们也可以把它看作一个纳什均衡。如果竞争对手也这么做，行业里的每一个竞争对手都愿意花额外的钱清洁地生产。 But the modern EPA violates just about every one of my suggested bullet points for preserving rule of law in the regulatory bureaucracy, and is ripe for political misuse. Discretion vs. rules, the potential for endless delay, the need for ex-ante permission, and a politicized and partisan bureaucracy are just the beginning. 但是现代的环境保护署违背了我为在监管型官僚机构下维护法治所提出的几乎每一条建议，政治滥用就在眼前。自由裁量权而非规则、无限拖延的可能、事前批准的要求、政治化和党派化的官僚机构，这些都还只是开始。 In the Pebble Mine controversy, EPA issued a preemptive veto of a project before a request for review was submitted, and was found colluding with mining opponents. Note, I’m not opining on whether the mine was a good or bad idea. Merely that the process in view is clearly one that could be misused for political purposes, and that mine owners already must know not to speak ill of the EPA or administration with such sway over the EPA. 在佩柏金矿争议中，环境保护署在项目审批申请递交前就发出了事先否决，并且被发现和开采的反对方相勾结。请注意，我并不是在就开矿是好是坏发表意见。我要说的仅仅是，这个程序明显可以因政治目的而遭到利用，而矿主一定已经知道不要说环境保护署以及可以对其施加影响的其他机构的坏话。 The Keystone pipeline stands as the example par excellence of regulatory delay and politicization. Perhaps next to the EPA’s decision to take on carbon as a pollutant. Keystone石油管线是监管拖延和政治化的绝佳例证。可能仅次于环境保护署决定将二氧化碳列为污染物。 Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project. 如今，任何因其他理由——比如遮住了视野——而反对一个项目的人，都可以利用环境评估来加以阻止。在任何商业项目中，拖延跟否决一样有效。 The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed “crucifying” some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying: 环境保护署第六区主管阿尔·阿曼达里兹的小故事很有启发性。他建议把一些大的石油公司“钉死在十字架上”，以儆效尤。录音显示，他说： The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years. “罗马人曾经征服地中海地区的小村庄。他们进入某个土耳其小镇，将最先看到的五个人钉死在十字架上。然后整个镇子在接下来的几年都会很好管理。 ...we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly. ……我们确实有一些很有效的执法工具。如此，顺服便唾手可得，而且程度很高，来得很快，非常快。 According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases. 故事里，阿曼达里兹关闭了Range Resources，首批水力压裂公司之一。Range予以了回击，最终一位联邦法官作出了有利于Range的判决。但是一个通过杀鸡儆猴、明显增加企业合规成本来运作的机构，当然易于根据政治考量而选择 “钉死”哪些儆猴之鸡。 Internet 网络 The Internet is the central disruptive technology of our time. So far it has been “permissionless” — unlike just about every other activity in the contemporary United States, you do not need prior approval of a regulator to put up a website. 网络是这个时代核心的颠覆性科技。截至目前，它还是“无需审批”的。不像当代美国的其他任何活动，你不需要事前审批就能上线一个网站。 Pressure grew under the reasonable-sounding banner of “net neutrality,” though what was at stake was the right of some businesses to pay extra for faster delivery. “Net neutrality” meant outlawing business class. The FCC, a supposedly independent agency, studied the issue and found no reason to regulate the internet. 但是，在听似合理的“网络中立性”旗帜下，压力与日俱增，虽然这里受到危及的是一些公司通过额外付费来获得更快传输的权利。“网络中立性”意味着宣布通过额外付费取得一定特权不合法。联邦通信委员会（FCC）——一个本该中立的机构，研究了这个议题，然后发现没有理由监管网络。 One fine day in November 2014, FCC commissioner Tom Wheeler must have found horse head in bed. Well, more specifically a surprise public announcement from President Obama that “blindsided officials at the FCC” per WSJ coverage. 2014年11月某个美好的日子，FCC主席汤姆·惠勒一定在床上发现了一个血淋淋的马头【译注：电影《教父》梗】，更准确地说是奥巴马总统惊人的公开言论。据《华尔街日报》报道，奥巴马提到了“FCC那些钻进死胡同的官员”。 The result is not just “net neutrality” but to apply full telecommunications regulation circa 1935. In particular, this includes Title II rate regulation, in which the FCC has full power to determine what rates are “reasonable.” 奥巴马的言论带来的结果不仅仅是“网络中立性”，而是FCC将动用其约于1935年获得的全面电信监管权力。尤其是，这其中包括有关费用管制的第二条款。据此，FCC可以全权决定什么样的费用是“合理”的。 The FCC announces it will “forbear” to use that power. Along with its right, under the regulation, to impose content restrictions — yes, to tell you what to put on your website — and the “fairness doctrine.” But forebearance is discretionary. So, a company thinking of investing money in fiber-optic lines had better invest in good relations with the FCC and the Administration that apparently drives its decisions. FCC宣布他们会“克制”使用该权力，以及在该监管下实施内容限制（是的，就是告诉你网站放什么内容）和“公平原则”的权力。但是克制也是有裁量的。所以，一家打算投资光纤电缆的公司最好多多投资于它和FCC以及能够影响其裁决的行政分支的关系。 The “independence” of regulatory agencies is one of the key structures impeding widespread use of regulatory power to induce political support. The WSJ coverage of the politics behind the decision describes well how specific businesses’ access to the White House drove the result. On the commission, the 3-2 vote with 2 republicans issuing withering dissents speaks of the partisan nature of this regulation. 监管机构的“独立”是阻止广泛使用监管权力争取政治支持的关键架构之一。《华尔街日报》关于裁决背后的政治勾当的报道，很好地描述了特定公司通往白宫的门道是如何推动结果的。通信委员会3:2的投票结果，以及2名共和党挖苦式地发表少数意见，正说明了这一监管的党派政治本质。 Alas, the internet is all moving to Washington. Uber hired, straight from the Administration, well known tech wizard, David Pflouffe. Given Uber’s troubles with labor law — a California court recently ruling that its contractors are employees — and taxi regulation throughout the U.S., investing in politics is good business for Uber. 可叹的是，网络公司都向华盛顿涌来。优步直接从政府雇佣了著名的科技巫师大卫·普罗夫。鉴于优步面临的劳动法方面的麻烦（一家加州法庭最近裁定它旗下的合约司机是正式雇员）和在全美出租车法规面前遭遇的麻烦，投资于政治对它来说是一笔好生意。 Campaign finance 竞选筹款 Campaign finance law and regulation is all about restricting freedom of speech and altering who wins elections. So one should not be surprised about its political use to restrict freedom of speech and alter who wins elections. 竞选筹款的法律法规就是关于限制言论自由和改变胜选人的。所以对于它被政治性的用来限制言论自由和改变胜选人也不应感到意外。 Still, the recent trend is more troubling than usual. 但尽管如此，最近的趋势仍比往常更加令人不安。 Lois Lerner, director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Unit, famously derailed applications for nonprofit status from conservative groups, ahead of the 2012 Presidential election. Her main tactic was endless delay. All you need is for the election to pass. 洛伊丝·勒纳，联邦税务局免税机构部主管，在2012年总统大选前阻挠保守派团体获得非盈利性资格的申请【编注：被认定为非盈利性机构意味着其所获得的捐赠可以让捐赠者享受相应的税务豁免，按机构性质不同，豁免的可能是应税收入，也可能是应缴税额。】，并因此出名。她的主要战术就是无限期拖延。她需要的只是等到大选过去。 Scott Walker’s troubles are similarly renown. Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm filed “John Doe” probes against conservative issue advocacy groups, “blanketed conservatives with subpoenas, raided their homes and put the targets under a gag order” that they could not even reveal the fact of the investigation. It came to light, and is now in the courts, but not until well after the election. Walker won anyway, but might not have. 斯科特·沃克的麻烦也差不多出名。密尔沃基地区检察官约翰·奇瑟姆发起了一项针对保守议题倡导组织的“无名氏”调查。“给保守派人士发法庭传票来妨碍他们，突然查抄他们的家，为目标人士申请禁口令”，使得他们甚至无法揭露这些调查存在的事实。整件事直到选举之后很久才曝光，目前正在庭审阶段。不管怎样，沃克最后还是赢了，但完全可能因此而输掉。 The Administration has been pushing since 2010 to force nonprofits to disclose all donors, as campaigns must disclose contributors. It sounds innocuous: “Disclosures?” Who can be against that? Shouldn’t “big money” contributing to politics be public information? 政府自2010年以来一直在推动强令非营利组织公开捐款人，就像竞选必须公开捐助人一样。这听起来很无害。“公开”？谁敢反对？难道捐助政治的“大钱”不应该成为公开信息吗？ Not when the vast power of the regulatory state can come down on whomever it wants to. Tyrannies always start by making lists. Nixon at least had to compile his own enemies list. 当监管型国家的权力触角可以伸到它希望的任何人时，就不应该了。暴政都是从列名单开始的。尼克松至少还需要自己动手编列一份政敌名单。 Snowden 斯诺登 The Snowden affair taught us some important lessons about our government. The NSA collected phone call “metadata.” Well, it’s just who called who and not the content of phone calls (unless you call abroad), you may say. 斯诺登事件教给我们一些关于我们政府的重要教训。国家安全局收集电话“元数据”。你也许会说，只是谁打给谁，又不是电话的内容（除非打到国外）。 But even metadata is revealing. Suppose you called three cancer doctors, alcoholics anonymous, and two divorce lawyers. And you want to run for the senate. That kind of information is political dynamite. 但即使是元数据信息量也很大。假设你打给了三个癌症医生，匿名戒酒会和两个离婚律师。你还想要竞选参议员。这些信息在政治上就是爆炸性的。 The NSA has the content, not just metadata, of any emails that go abroad. The NSA likely has many Hilary Clinton’s missing emails. And Jeb Bushes’. Unless neither has ever written an email that rises to the embarrassment level of Mitt Romney’s 47% remark, the information to sink either campaign is likely sitting on NSA computers. 国安局掌握着发往国外的任何邮件的内容，不仅仅是元数据。国安局里很可能有很多希拉里·克林顿的失踪邮件。以及杰布·布什的。除非两人写过的邮件没有一封能达到罗姆尼47%言论【译注：罗姆尼2012年曾经在私下场合表示，有47%的选民无论如何都会选奥巴马，他们相信政府对他们有责任、有义务。罗姆尼表示自己不需要去担心这些人】的尴尬程度，否则击沉任意一个候选人的信息就在国安局的电脑里。 That information would never leak out, you say? Snowden proves the opposite. Any piece of information on a government computer is one Snowden, one Lois Lerner, or one Chinese hacker away from a twitter feed. 你说什么？信息永远不会泄露？斯诺登证明了信息会泄露。政府电脑里的任何信息离推特信息都只有一个斯诺登、一个洛伊丝·勒纳或者一个中国黑客的距离。 John Oliver’s Snowden interview contained an interesting revelation. The internet is an amazing thing. What do Americans do with it? They send around pictures of their private parts. And NSA employees regularly pass the pictures around to great hilarity. 约翰·奥利弗对斯诺登的采访披露了一个有意思的情节。网络是个奇妙的东西。美国人用它来干什么呢？他们到处发送自己私处的照片。而国安局职员经常传阅这些照片来取乐。 E-Verify 电子查证 As part of most immigration deals we are likely to see strong enforcement of the right of employees to work via e-verify. Every single human being who wishes to work in the United States must ask for the ex-ante permission the Federal Government. 作为绝大多数移民政策的一部分，我们可能会看到，借助电子查证，有关雇员工作权的法规得到了强有力实施。每个想在美国工作的人都必须征得联邦政府的事先准许。 Leave aside here the obvious question how the same government that runs the Obamacare website, and, as I write, has had all visa applications to the U.S. shut down for two weeks due to hardware failures, will manage this. Let’s focus on the political implications. 一个运营着奥巴马医改网站的政府，一个因为硬件故障关闭所有签证申请达两周的政府，如何能够管理电子查证？这里先别管这个明显的问题，我们把焦点集中到政治影响上吧。 This power will naturally expand. First, people without proper immigration documents. But once in place, why only enforce immigration laws? Already there are a long list of laws governing who can work and when and where. People must have the right licenses, the right background checks, union memberships and so on. Are you guilty in the latest SEC which hunt? E-verify can really make sure you never work in finance again, not so much as a bank teller. Or that a conviction for violating the endangered species act keeps you out of the work force. 这一权力会自然延伸。首先是没有正当移民文件的人。但是电子查证一旦到位，为什么只用来执行移民法呢？已经有一长串的法律管理着谁可以工作以及什么时候在哪儿工作。人们必须要有正确的执照、正确的背景审查、工会会员身份等等。在证券交易委员会最近的一次政治迫害中你有罪吗？电子查证可以确保你再也不能从事金融业，即使是银行柜员也不行。或者一项威胁濒危物种的行为的定罪，也可以把你隔离在劳动力市场之外。 Every tyranny controls its citizens by controlling their right to work. Do we really want every American who wants employment to have to ask for the ex-ante permission of the Federal Government of Edward Snowden and Lois Lerner? 任何暴政都通过控制公民的工作权来控制公民。我们真的希望每个想要工作的人都必需事先征得一个由爱德华·斯诺登和洛伊丝·勒纳组成的联邦政府的许可吗？ Transactions 交易 We have lost the right to transact privately in the terror and drug wars. The right to political dissent requires the ability to speak freely and privately; the right to earn a living despite political opposition; and the right to transact in private. All three are vanishing. 我们已经在反恐和禁毒战争中失去了私下交易的权利。政治异见的权利要求人们能够自由和私密地表达的可能性，政治反对者仍能谋生的权利，以及私下交易的权利。这三种权利都在消失。 You may have reveled in the ending of Stephen King’s Shawshank Redemption, in which the hero takes cash out of banks and heads to Mexico. Under today’s banking laws, that could no longer happen. 你也许很喜欢史蒂夫·金的《肖申克的救赎》的结尾，男主角从银行取出钱，前往墨西哥。在今天的银行法律下，这一幕再也不会发生了。 As a recent political example, Dennis Hastert was recently indictedf or violating the spirit of the $10,000 limit on bank withdrawals, by withdrawing amounts just shy of the limit. Hastert wanted the money, apparently, to pay blackmail to someone with an embarrassing personal secret. 最近的一个政治例子是，丹尼斯·哈斯特尔特最近因违背银行取款不超过10,000美元的宗旨而受到起诉。他取出的额度恰好略低于限额。原来，哈斯特尔特需要钱去支付某人利用其尴尬的私人秘密所进行的勒索。 Hastert is retired. But should aspiring politicians really have no privacy in their personal transactions? 哈斯特尔特退休了。但是有抱负的政客在私人交易中就真的没有任何隐私吗？ Education 教育 As Daniel Henninger put it: 正如丹尼尔·海宁格所说： ...historians of the new system will cite the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights’ 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter on sexual harassment as the watershed event. “新系统下的历史学家会将教育部民权办公室2011年关于性骚扰的致同僚信作为分水岭事件。” This letter—not even a formal regulation—forced creation of quasi-judicial systems of sexual-abuse surveillance on every campus in America. The universities complied for fear of lawsuits from enforcers at the Departments of Education and Justice. 这封信，甚至都不是一个正式的法规，但其强制建立了一个准司法体系，监视美国每一个校园的性侵害。大学都遵守这一要求，因为怕惹上教育部和司法部的官司。 The Justice Department’s Special Litigation Section and Housing and Civil Enforcement Section have forced numerous settlements from police departments, school districts, jails and housing agencies. Whatever the merits, the locals know the price of resisting Justice is too high. 司法部的特殊诉讼处及住房和民事执法处已经强制和解了好几起来自警察局、学区、监狱和住房机构的案件。不管是不是在法律上站得住脚，当地人知道抵抗司法部的成本太高。 National Review’s coverageof Laura Kipinis’ travails is a good example of the political use of this regulation. Professor Kipinis “wrote a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education arguing that college campuses are in a state of ‘sexual paranoia.’” She quickly became the subject of a “Title IX inquisition,” documented in her essayby that name. Though eventually cleared, the point is the use of regulatory power to silence speech. 《国家评论》对劳拉·吉普尼斯的痛苦经历的报道是这项监管被政治利用的一个好例子。吉普尼斯教授“在《高等教育纪事报》上写了一篇专栏，表示大学校园正处于一种‘性受迫害妄想狂’的状态”。她很快成为了“第九条调查”的对象，她在一篇文章里用的就是这个词。尽管最终洗清了嫌疑，重点是利用监管权力压制了言论。 3.A Magna Carta for the Regulatory State 3.为监管型国家寻求一部大宪章 The power of the regulatory state has increased steadily. And it lacks many of the checks and balances that give us some “rule of law” in the legal system. (A system which has its own troubles.) The clear danger we face is the use of regulation for political control. Each industry gets carved up into a few compliant oligopolies. And the threat of severe penalties, with little of the standard rule-of-law recourse, keeps people and businesses in line and supporting the political organization or party that controls the agencies. 监管型国家的权力已持续增长。它缺少了很多在法律体系（该体系也面临着自己的麻烦）里给我们带来一些“法治”的制衡。我们面对的最明显的危险，就是利用监管实现政治控制。每个行业都若干顺服的寡头所瓜分。严厉处罚的威胁，以及法治援助标准的缺失，让个人和公司对控制着监管机构的政治组织或政党既保持服从，又提供支持。 We’re not there yet. The Koch Brothers are not on the EPA “crucifixion” list, an investigation of every plant they own, or probes by the DOJ, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, and so on and so on. They could be. The Hoover institution retains its tax-exempt status despite writings such as this one. A free media still exists, and I can read all my horror stories in the morning Wall Street Journal, and the free (for now) internet. 我们还没到那一步。科赫兄弟公司还不在环境保护署的“钉死”名单上，他们旗下的工厂没有被逐一调查，也没有被司法部、国家劳动关系委员会、公平就业机会委员会、职业安全与健康管理局等等调查。但他们可能成为调查对象。胡佛研究所仍保有免税资格，尽管发表了类似于这篇文章的东西。自由媒体依然存在，每天早上我仍可在《华尔街日报》上读到各种恐怖故事。互联网（目前）也还是自由的。 But we are getting there. What stops it from happening? A tree ripe for picking will be picked. 但是我们正滑向那里。什么能够阻止它发生呢？一颗易于采摘的树最终会被采摘的。 The easy answers are too easy. “Get rid of regulations” is true, but simplistic like “get rid of laws.” What we learned in the 800 years since Magna Carta is that the character of law, and the detailed structures of its operation that matter. Law is good, as it protects citizens from arbitrary power. 简单的回答过于简单了。“取消监管”是真的，但和“取消法律”一样太过简化。大宪章以来的800年，我们学到的一样东西就是法律的特征以及它运作的详细架构很重要。法律是好的，因为它保护公民免于专断的权力。 It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one. 是时候为监管型国家起草一部大宪章了。规章需要按照我之前列的几点来制定。人们需要有挑战监管者的权利：证据开示权、对判决提出异议的权利、上诉权。是的，这就意味着制衡的场所在法庭。人人都恨律师，除了自己需要一个的时候。 People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor. 人们需要速决的权利。一个针对规章的“人身保护令”会起作用：如果任何裁决未在6个月内作出，则自动视为有利于你。 A return to economic growth depends on reforming the regulatory state. But the deeper and perhaps more important preservation of our political freedom depends on it even more. 经济的重新增长依赖于改革监管型国家，但从更深层或许也更重要的意义上说，我们政治自由的存续甚至更加依赖于这一改革。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-10-21】 @熊也餐厅:我有些搞不懂，这么多年香港的经济自由程度一直排全世界第一但是我真心不觉得是这样。 @whigzhou: 我觉得差不多啊，你感觉哪里不对呢？ @whigzhou: 其实城邦与大国不太好比，香港在许多方面占了特殊便宜：自由港，无军队，只有一级政府，夕阳产业容易移出因而工会很难维持……所以得分高是可以预料的 @whigzhou: 香港也没几个农民，而农民是许多国家阻挠自由贸易的重要势力和吃政府补贴的大头 @熊也餐厅:香港马路上整天有食品署的查询，警察也驱赶小贩。在我大袋鼠国从来没有看到过。 @whigzhou: 具体情况我不了解，但驱赶小贩未必是自由的扣分项，要看理由是什么，如果警察是应附近居民或商铺的扰民投诉而行动，就可能是在保护既有权利，如果警察是自作主张或依行政法条行事，才算负分 @whigzhou: 从居住密集度看，香港小贩引起扰民投诉的可能性显然比澳洲大 @熊也餐厅:[哈哈] 說實話我在我大袋鼠國就沒有見到過有什麼小販。down town 有時有賣鞋帶的其實就是乞丐 @whigzhou: 香港地铁是界限明确的私人空间，所以除非小贩已经长期占领其中某块特定地盘，驱赶是没问题的  

【2015-10-21】 @研二公知苗 想请教一下大家，关于国家对经济的干预程度，有没有比经济自由度指数更加直观的指标？ @whigzhou: 商业新闻中提到政府的新闻的比例，这个指标现在应该已经有条件获得了 @whigzhou: 其他许多直观指标也有价值，但都不够全面，比如首都规模，只适用于美国澳洲巴西等另建新都的国家，财政供养人口不能充分反映管制繁苛度，受贿普遍度则有很大文化差异且很难控制 @whigzhou: 不过这个也有缺陷，比如朝鲜就用不上，因为朝鲜没有商业新闻:( @研二公知苗: 像是阿根廷的梅内姆，为了减少私有化的压政治压力，增加了社会福利开支，这就使得梅内姆政府开支占GDP比重甚至比经济改革之前还高。 @whigzhou: 嗯，从北欧经验看，比起特权/管制/干预，高税收/高政府开支对经济的干扰其实要小很多 @研二公知苗:那请教辉格老师，华尔街日报的经济自由度指数作为一个综合指标怎么样？有一点缺陷是，这个指标覆盖的年份太少了。 @whigzhou: 我觉得挺好的，类似指标里可能是最好的，不过离我的期望还是有很大距离，主要问题是缺乏前瞻性  

超越邓巴数#2：扩张的动力 辉格 2015年9月14日 自从人类过上定居生活之后，便开始组织起规模越来越大的社会，这一趋势如此普遍的存在于各大文明中，以至给人一种印象：社会向大型化发展似乎是不可避免的；实际上并非如此，正如我在上一篇文章里所提到的，在定居之前的漫长历史（至少占整个智人历史的19/20）中，人类社会的规模始终处于邓巴数限制之下。 社会的大型化趋势不仅表现在不同群体间结成的政治实体日益扩张和复杂化——从几十人的游团，几百上千人的部落，几万人的酋邦，到数十上百万人的王国——，也表现在生活在同一定居点的单一社区的规模越来越庞大。 在大约一万年前，文明的黎明时分，文明摇篮新月沃地诞生了第一批有着永久性建筑的城市，据认为是史上最古老城市的杰里科（[[Jericho]]），拥有一两千居民；从大约六千年前开始，另一个文明摇篮乌克兰出现了一批拥有一万多居民的更大城市，其中包括印欧人祖先所建立的塔连基（[[Talianki]]）。 约一千年后，青铜时代的苏美尔人在两河地区建立的一系列城邦，人口更达到了四五万；到铁器时代，出现了新巴比伦这样人口过十万的大城市，随后数百年，欧亚多个文明中心进入了被哲学家卡尔·雅斯培（[[Karl Jaspers]]）称为“轴心时代”（[[Axial Age]]）的繁荣期，地中海世界、印度和中国都涌现了一批和巴比伦规模相当的城市。 城市的下一轮扩张伴随着地域辽阔的帝国的崛起，从迦太基、亚历山大到罗马，这些都市的规模和繁荣背后，是整个帝国的疆域和权力，而作为首个人口过百万的城市，罗马的规模为此后所有古代城市设定了上限（罗马的后继者，比如长安和巴格达，规模可能略大于罗马，但差距不明显），直到工业革命之后，这一上限才被伦敦所超越。 那么，是何种力量在推动社会规模——无论是政治实体还是聚居社区——不断扩大？考虑到这一扩张趋势普遍存在于各大洲相互孤立的文明中心，它显然不是偶然的；定居生活究竟带来了什么新情况，使得社会大型化成为不可避免的趋势？ 答案或许是战争。 前定居社会同样充斥着暴力冲突和有组织的群体间攻击（也就是战争），而且按冲突频率和死亡率算，其暴力程度远远超出后来的文明社会，大约1/5到1/3的男性死于暴力，游团一级小型血缘群体之间的关系，非常接近霍布斯所描绘的“自然状态”，很少有经常性的政治安排能够抑制群体间冲突。 这一背景提示了，或许定居化本身就改善了相邻群体间抑制冲突的前景，有关合作博弈的研究表明，博弈双方对持久交往的预期，将增进合作意愿，预期中的交往关系越长久，合作意愿越强，假如双方都认为这是最后一次交往，或者交往关系将在某个明确时间终结，那么背叛就成为最优选择——尽管与都选择合作相比，这给双方都带来更坏的结果。 一项案例研究很好的演示了这一原理，在一战的西线战场，当战争进入僵持状态时，前沿阵地上长期对峙的双方士兵之间，逐渐达成了一种默契：每天只在固定时间例行公事式的向对方射击，其余时间可以大胆走出战壕；在协约国军方高层察觉这一情况后，为打破这种默契，迫使前线军队积极行动，采取的措施是定期调防，以避免形成长久交往预期。 可以想象，相邻关系变动不居的游动性社会（无论是游猎、游耕还是游牧），很难建立牢固的信任与合作关系，定居者却相对容易做到；这种群体间合作关系，不仅帮助他们抑制相互间的冲突，还可以联合对付外来攻击者，或对其他群体发动攻击；这种关系一旦稳定下来，便在游团之上形成了部落或部落联盟一级的政治实体。 不过，这里并不存在一条截然分明的界线，因为首先，游动群体的游动程度是不同的，其次，游动路线并不是随机的，这两方面都和群体赖以生存的资源分布状况有关，当若干群体游动程度较小，或漫游路线较固定，或围绕某些关键资源而频繁持久发生关系时，他们之间就或多或少存在稳定的相邻关系，并据此而发展出一些合作性安排。 比如卡拉哈里沙漠的狩猎采集者桑人（!Kung），每当枯水期来临，相邻的十几个游团会聚拢到少数几个尚有水可取的天然水井附近，而平时他们则依靠各自巡游范围内的水源，这样的安排能够和平达成，离不开这些游团相对稳定的漫游范围和相邻关系；类似的情况，在干湿变化剧烈的热带草原畜牧者，和冬季草场高度稀缺的温带游牧者那里，也可看到。 然而，和稳定相邻关系比起来，定居农业带来的另一个变化，其影响要深远的多，那就是战争形态的改变；在前农业时代，战争的主要目的是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，以便为自己谋得更好的生存空间，当然还包括掳掠女性，抢劫则不在考虑之列，因为没什么东西可抢的，同样，对于被攻击者，除了生命之外，没有什么需要捍卫的。 与此相应，那时的主要战斗形式是伏击和偷袭，阵地战也有，但多半是仪式性的，就像集体约架，伤亡很小（这一点常误导早期观察者，让他们误以为前文明社会是相当和平的）；在伏击和偷袭战斗中，形势不利的一方会毫不犹豫的选择逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗；在非定居者的价值观中，逃跑无损于战士声誉，相反，死守或不利条件下坚持进攻，被认为是愚蠢的。 正是在这一点上，定居农业带来了根本性的改变，农耕者的生计全赖于庄稼、牲畜和存粮，逃跑很可能意味着饿死，所以在面临攻击时，不得不留下来捍卫家园。 可是这样一来，攻防双方的地位就变得十分不对称：进攻者可以从容选择进攻时机和攻击对象，形势不利可以随时撤逃，因而风险较小，而一旦得手，收益却极大，而防守者不知袭击何时发生，又不能逃跑，输了失去全部，赢了却也得不到什么，而假如对方来自游动群体，连报复的机会都很难找到；这样的成本收益对比，无疑会激励出大量针对定居者的攻击。 想象一下早期农民的处境，身处一个毫无安全感的霍布斯世界，周围还有许多非定居群体，而农业生产模式所必须依赖的存量财产，正为自己引来越来越多的敌人，随着这样的局面日益明朗，如何保卫家园便成为生死攸关的头等大事。 和此后的所有定点防卫者一样，农民首先作出的反应是修筑防御工事，并采取紧密聚居模式，形成设防村寨，这样，在面临攻击时，全村男性便可迅速集结，组织抵抗。 从考古记录可以看出，最初的农业定居点都是设防的；杰里科遗址围有一道六百米长的石墙，墙外挖了壕沟；多见于黎凡特的一种村落结构，比如安纳托利亚的加泰土丘（[[Çatalhöyük]]），由一群砖石房屋相互紧贴组成一个蜂窝状结构，没有侧面的门窗，也没有街道，只能靠梯子由天窗出入；门窗狭小也是上古农村住宅的普遍特征，吕宋山区伊富高人的房门狭小到必须侧身才能出入。 新月沃地还有许多村落是在山壁上凿出来的；乌克兰发现的几个五六千年前的万人大城，包括涅伯利夫卡（[[Nebelivka]]）、多布罗沃迪（[[Dobrovody]]）和之前提到的塔连基，都是设防城市；科罗拉多著名的印第安农业村寨梅萨维德（[[Mesa Verde]]），修建在一整块巨大石崖下面，这块向外伸出的巨石像一个罩子，保护了村庄的三个方向；在西北欧，许多新石器时代村庄都坐落于湖泊或沼泽中间，通过可开关的桥廊与外界相通；在没有山崖河湾江心洲等有利地势可依凭的地方，城墙与壕沟便是标准配置。 实际上，设防城镇并非像过去许多人认为的那样，是文明较成熟、政治结构较发达之后的才出现的，而是从一开始就伴随着定居农业，非如此就他们无法生存下来，这一点，我们从相当晚近的历史中仍可看出端倪；在农业帝国的广阔疆域中，越是靠近农耕拓殖前线，因而面临越多来自原住民的威胁，也越难指望国家力量保护的群体，就越倾向于紧密聚居并严密设防。 比如汉族农民的拓殖前锋客家人，建造了极重防御的大型围楼，还有带围墙壕沟的棋盘式致密村寨（所谓九井十八巷），有些还在四角设有碉堡；相反，在帝国核心腹地江南，农村民居是高度分散的，通常十几户人家沿河道散列成一长串（所谓宅基），房屋的封闭性也很弱，毫无防御能力；所以讽刺的是，山水派文人所描绘的那种三两农家零星散布，鸡犬相闻炊烟相望而互不相扰的安宁和谐场面，只有在帝国权力的卵翼之下才见得到。 然而，修筑防御工事带来了非常高昂的成本，是传统小型群体无力负担的，而且定点防卫所必需的阵地对抗，也对人数提出了很高要求；因为和伏击或偷袭战不同，阵地防御的有效性，常依赖于组织严密的密集阵列；假如阵列深度为四层（这相当于典型希腊步兵方阵的一半），那么，一个150人的小型群体，其全部成年男性也最多只能排成一个宽度不足五米的阵列，即便是防御最小型的村庄，即便该村庄在多个方向上有着天然屏障，这样的规模也是远远不够的。 所以，一旦就地防卫成为一种经常性的需要，超越邓巴数限制而组织更大型社会，就成了定居者攸关生死存亡的迫切任务；而一旦其中一部分群体这么做了，就会引发一系列连锁反应，迫使其他群体也走向大型化，并且越来越大；因为首先，当你周围的其他群体提升了防御能力之后，保持原状的群体就成了攻击者的优选对象。 其次，也更要命的是，在一个霍布斯世界里，不存在好人与恶棍之分，每个防御者也是潜在的攻击者，出于防卫需要而建立的新型组织，同样可以用于攻击，那些未能组织起来的群体，随时可能沦为听任宰割的羔羊，这样，最终幸存下来并扩张壮大的，是那些成功实现了大型化组织的群体。 幸运的是，在最初的定居者中，至少有一部分找到了有效的组织方法，帮助他们克服了相对于游动者的攻防劣势，否则，定居农业这种生活方式就无法维系下去，也就不会有此后的文明历史了，那么，他们是怎么做到的？