Harem queens in the corporate world 职场的宫斗明星 作者：Michael O.Church @ 2015-11-01 译者：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：龙泉（@L_Stellar） 来源：Michael O. Church，https://michaelochurch.wordpress.com/2015/11/01/harem-queens-in-the-corporate-world/ I recently came across a New York Times article about shitty behaviors that our society often associates with the female gender. It’s about the stupid, catty, bitchy behavior that makes for an entertaining evening in a film like Bridesmaids, but that actually wastes an enormous amount of emotional energy and gives the female gender a bad name. The choice paragraph, in my opinion, is this one (emphasis mine): 近日偶然读到《纽约时报》上的一篇文章，讲的是我们社会常常扣到女性头上的那些烂事，那些愚蠢的、阴险的、碧池的行为。这些破事充斥着《最爆伴娘团》这样的电影。它也许能为一个无聊的夜晚带来些消遣，实则是在浪费观众的感情，还给女性加上一个坏名头。下面的选段，在我看来就是个例子（粗体是我加的）：

There are two main theories of why women are competitive in indirectly aggressive ways. Evolutionary psychology, which uses natural selection to explain our modern behaviors, says that women need to protect themselves (read: their wombs) from physical harm, so indirect aggression keeps us safe while lowering the stock of other women. 关于为何女性通过间接的攻击性方式展开竞争，有两种理论。进化心理学利用自然选择解释现代人类行为，这种理论认为，女人要保护她们自己（意思是：她们的子宫）免受物理伤害，而间接攻击性可以在削弱其他女性的同时让自己处于安全境地。 Feminist psychology chalks up this indirect aggression to internalizing the patriarchy. As Noam Shpancer writes in Psychology Today, “As women come to consider being prized by men their ultimate source of strength, worth, achievement and identity, they are compelled to battle other women for the prize.” In short: When our value is tied to the people who can impregnate us, we turn on each other. 女权心理学家把这笔账算到父权制的内化头上。正如Noam Shpancer 在《今日心理学（Psychology Today）》上写的：“当女人需要男人的奖励来获得她们终极的力量、价值、成就和身份认同时，她们就被迫同其他女人开战来争取这份奖励。”简而言之，当我们的价值与那些能让我们受孕的人绑在一起时，我们只好彼此反目。

“Indirect aggression” is the author’s more-polite term for passive aggression, and here’s what I take out of the article. I’ll withhold personal comment, so please don’t get offended just yet. From the article: “间接攻击性”只是作者对“消极攻击性”的礼貌说法。这里我摘抄了一些原文。至于我的个人看法就先忍着不说了，所以请不要觉得被冒犯。

• women, in a system where their value is attractiveness as assessed by men, work to undermine each other.
• 在一个其价值就是对男人的吸引力的体制里，女人们想方设法诋毁彼此。
• women generally prefer passive aggression over overt conflict.
• 比起公开的冲突，女人通常更倾向于消极攻击性。
• women exhibit an especial and envious hatred toward highly attractive women, that is divorced from the reality of that person.
• 女人会对富有吸引力的女人表现出强烈的嫉妒心，不管这个有吸引力的女人实际状况如何。

Is this true of “women”? Well, it’s true of some women, and not of others. 这是真的吗？也许对一些女人适用，但对其他女人则不然。 Now, I want to talk about these horrible patterns of behavior: passive-aggression, cattiness, sabotage, bitchiness. I’ve seen a lot of this stuff in my decade in the software career. And, here’s the thing… most of the worst offenders have been men. 现在我想谈谈这些可怕的行为模式：消极攻击、阴险、搞破坏、碧池作派。在从事软件行业的十年中，我目睹了太多这种破事。而且，事实上，大部分最坏的讨厌鬼都是男性。 In my personal opinion, malicious social aggressions are not especially gendered. Women may be two to three years ahead in this game during high school and college, because they’re farther along (in general) when it comes to social development, but corporate executives’ cattiness makes high-school cheerleader drama look innocent in comparison. 我个人认为恶意的社会性攻击行为并不特别与性别挂钩。在高中或大学，女人也许早两三年开始玩这些手段，毕竟女性通常成熟得更早。但是跟公司里的高管比起来，啦啦队长们的伎俩实在太过幼稚。 That humans perceive certain styles of aggression as being gendered is, however, telling. Stereotypically “male” aggression’s virtue is that it is short-lived and honest; its vice is that it’s brutal and often disproportionate (and if it leads to violence, its effects can be permanent). 不过，人们将某些特定类型的攻击性视作与性别相关，还是有些道理的。刻板印象中，“雄性”攻击行为的特点是短暂而直白；缺点是其致命性且往往不成比例（如果还导致了暴力，那效果可能是永久的）。 For a contrast, the “female” aggression has the virtue of precision, but the vice of being dishonest, long-lived, and cancerous. In reality, we observe all classes of aggression in all genders of people, so why do we have this need to create a gendered correlation? I think the answer is, and I’m going to have to define this word (lest it be useless) patriarchy. 相反，“雌性”的攻击行为有着精确的特点，但缺点是遮遮掩掩、长时间的、癌症般恶性增殖的。现实生活中，我们在所有性别中都会观察到所有类型的攻击行为，那为何我们要创造出针对性别的分类呢？我想答案就是我将不得不定义的一个词（免得它没什么用）：父权制。 What is patriarchy? I’m going to use it to mean a society in which women are largely blocked from holding official power, and in which male dominance (often backed by threat of physical harm, whether delivered personally or through a military) is the prevailing force in determining which men get power. 什么是父权制？我将用它描述这样一种社会：在这种社会中女性基本被排除在正式权力之外，男性的支配地位（往往由威胁对他人进行身体伤害来获得，不管这种威胁是由个人还是军队来表达）是无处不在的力量，决定了哪些男人可以获得权力。 A large number of men, for the record, lose in a truly patriarchal society, because the high-status men take the lion’s share of the rewards and sexual attention and the rest get very little. The extreme of patriarchy is a polygynous society in which high-status men are afforded large numbers of “wives”, most of whom experience the status of chattel slaves. 准确地说，相当大部分的男人在一个真正的父权社会里是失败的，因为上层男性像狮子一样占据大部分资源和性关注，而其他男人则所得无几。极端的父权制表现为一夫多妻的社会形态，上层男性供养得起许多“妻子”，她们中大部分的地位其实就是男人的财产。 Patriarchy is morally reprehensible and it is good that our society is beginning to reject it, but it’s important to acknowledge its probable normalcy in our evolutionary frame. Men are physically stronger than women, and humans are not naturally monogamous, and there is a general observed tendency in humans to desire to “possess” others, at least in terms of their sexuality. That this would lead to a world, speaking of most of human history, in which powerful men owning harems isn’t surprising. In that lens, it seems inevitable. 父权制在道德上是应受谴责的，好在我们的社会已经开始抵制它了，但值得声明的是，在进化的框架内父权制可能是种常态。男人的身体比女人强壮，人类也不是天生就实行一夫一妻制，而人类被证明有一种“拥有”他人的倾向，至少是在性上拥有他人。这就导致在人类历史长河中，总是出现有权势的男人拥有“后宫”。从这个角度看，这似乎不可避免。 What is this supposedly “female” pattern of “indirect” social aggression all about? Well, it’s about polygynous patriarchy. In a monogamous society, children usually inherit the social status of the parents. If it’s a monogamous patriarchy, the status of the father will be weighted more heavily. In a polygynous patriarchy, the warlord or chieftain with 20 wives might have 150 children, so having a high-status father isn’t enough to confer social status to the children, because there are just too many alpha-brats to give that status and wealth to everyone. 这些跟“女性模式”的“间接”社会性攻击行为有什么关系？这就要说到一夫多妻制的父权制社会了。在一夫一妻制的社会中，孩子们总能继承父母的社会地位。但如果是在一夫多妻制的父权制社会里，军阀或酋长可能拥有20个妻子、150个孩子，这样一来，有一个地位显赫的父亲并不足以确保孩子的社会地位，因为有太多小兔崽子可以被给予地位和财富了。 Often, the children with the best chance of inheriting the father’s wealth, status and connections are those born to the most favored wives. If a woman achieves that status, her children will be heirs, and the other womens’ children will be labelled bastards. Obviously, a woman who is in a harem has an evolutionary incentive to want to be that favored wife. 通常，最有希望继承父亲财产、地位和社会关系的小孩是那些最受宠的妻子所生。如果一个妻子取得那样的地位，她的小孩就会是继承人，而其他女人的小孩就会被贴上私生子的标签。显然，“后宫”中的女人在进化论上有动机去成为那个受宠的妻子。 Passive aggression works well for a woman in a harem who is campaigning to become queen of the harem. Let’s consider how this contest works: 消极攻击行为对一个试图称霸后宫的女人来说很适用。让我们来看看这场竞赛是如何展开的：

• fitness or “performance” or “merit” will be judged by an owner who is largely distant from the day-to-day operations (e.g. division of labor) within the harem.
• 男主人将对适应性也即“表现”或“优点”打分，而他并不了解后宫中的日常运作（比如劳动分工）。
• overt violence against a potentially superior competitor will be judged as destruction of the owner’s property, and punished. It will also fail to make the target appear less fit, from an evolutionary perspective.
• 对潜在竞争者的公开暴力会被认为是对主人财产的破坏而遭受惩罚。从进化论的角度看，这也不会减损被攻击者的适应性。
• however, emotional cruelty, abuses of power, and other “indirect” aggressions will cause a targeted competitor to become discouraged, stressed-out, or depressed, and therefore appear less healthy (that is, less fit) to the owner-husband.
• 然而，感情上的残酷、玩弄权术或其他“间接”攻击行为却能导致目标竞争者变得气馁、备受压力或抑郁，进而在男主人眼里变得更不健康（因而适应性较低）。

What is an aspiring harem queen going to do? She can’t gain her status through physical dominance, as men in such societies often did, because provable harm to other women will cause her to lose favor with the man who ultimately selects the winner. 一个野心勃勃的宫斗明星会如何行动呢？她不能像一夫多妻社会中的男人通常所做的那样，用暴力优势来获得地位，因为对其他女人公开的加害会让她失去男人的宠爱，而最终的胜者由男人决定。 Anyway, physical injury doesn’t make a woman look genetically unhealthy, and is therefore less likely to sway the opinion of the owner/husband (if we assume that he’s also acting under evolutionary imperative); while the long-term effect of emotional violence (and stress) will make the target appear sickly and suggest genetic inferiority. 总之，身体伤害不能让一个女人在遗传上看起来不健康，因而也就无法动摇男主人/丈夫的看法（假设他也遵从进化的视角行事）；而长期的情感暴力（和压力）会让目标看起来病态，暗示了其遗传劣势。 In the modern world, harems mostly don’t exist. There is some harem-queen behavior in American high schools and colleges, related to the severe desirability differential between the men and the women at that age, and the intense competition (for women trying to attract the few unusually mature men) that this creates. 在现代社会，后宫几乎不存在。在美国的高中和大学里存在一些宫斗行为，这同那个年龄段男女愿望的强烈差异有关，也同由此导致的强烈竞争（女人们试图吸引少数格外成熟的男人）有关。 18-year-old women are physically attractive to men of all ages; 18-year-old men are attractive to… no one they can legally date. So I suspect there is some incentive for harem queen behavior, given how few desirable men there are in those ghettos for adolescents that we call schools. 18岁的女人对所有年龄段的男人都有身体上的吸引力，而18岁的男人对他们能合法约会的人都……没有吸引力。所以考虑到在我们称之为学校的贫民区里很少有男人满怀野心，我怀疑这些宫斗行为有其激励因素。 Of course, the men become more desirable and mature as they grow up, and the women seem to grow out of any harem-type behavior, and given that the teenage years are a period in which everyone’s pretty fucked up, I’m going to guess that the overall behavior of women isn’t any worse than that of men. The movies give us adolescent “mean girls” for entertainment’s sake, but I don’t think that such meanness is gendered. 当然，随着年龄增长，男人会变得越来越有野心，而女人则似乎会逐渐抛弃这些宫斗行为。考虑到我们每个人的青少年时期都是一团糟，我猜总的来看女人的行为并不比男人更坏。为了娱乐性，电影总是给我们塑造出青春期的“恶毒女孩”，但我不认为这些恶毒跟性别有关。 Let’s jump away from adolescent drama (it’s not that interesting) and focus on the corporate world. The parallels are shocking. 让我们抛开这些青春期的闹剧吧（没那么有趣），看看职场，这里的勾心斗角令人震惊。

• corporate competitors strive for a “favored subordinate” status, because the odds, for a person not born into it, of joining the ownership class are only slightly better than those of a woman in the neolithic era becoming a man.
• 公司里的竞争者拼命成为“受宠的下属”，因为对一个普通职员来说，挤进老板阶级的概率，也就比新石器时代的一个女人变成男人的概率大那么一点点。
• fitness or “performance” is judged by parties who are distant from the action and oblivious to day-to-day operations and any emotional or political drama that might be going on. They are about as capable of assessing individual merit as neolithic harem-owning men were at assessing genetic health among their wives.
• 适应性或“表现”由远离公司日常运作的圈子裁决，他们不知道公司里上演的那些感情和政治戏码。他们评估个人优点的能力同新石器时代的后宫主人评估自己妻子的能力没差别。
• like attractive women in pre-monogamous societies’ harems, people who threaten to out-perform the others draw undesirable attention and adversity within the harem. They’re sometimes singled out and set up to fail.
• 就像前一夫一妻社会后宫里的有吸引力的女人一样，那些造成“力压群芳”威胁的人，会在后宫里招来他们不想要的关注和麻烦。他们有时会被孤立并注定失败。
• obvious interference with a potentially superior competitor’s performance (much less physical harm against that person) will push the perpetrator out of favor, as “The Company” will view that as damage to its own property.
• 对潜在的优胜者施以明显的干预（更不用说直接的身体伤害）会让作祟者失去宠信，因为公司会将这视作对公司财产的损害。
• non-obvious (from the owner’s perspective) interference or aggression toward a potentially superior competitor can degrade that person’s apparent performance and is therefore the weapon of choice.
• 因此对潜在优势竞争者（对公司所有者）不明显又能损害他的方式也就成了可选的武器。

Corporate executives can be understood, then, as successful harem queens. Under this lens, the entire corporate world makes sense. The CEO isn’t the alpha male, but the champion bitch. 由此，公司的高管们可以被理解为成功的宫斗之星。在这个视角下，整个职场的情况才说得通。CEO不是男主人，而是成功加冕的碧池。 So who’s the alpha male? Well, it’s arguably “The Company” or “shareholders” or rich people or “capital”. We’ve personified Mammon, and then gone a step further. We’ve created an alpha male more powerful than any actual human can be. As I’ve said before, that’s not a corporate “person” but a god. 那么谁才是“男主人”？这尚有争议，有的说是“公司”，有的说是“债权人”、富人或是“资本”。既然我们已经把钱财比作了魔鬼，不妨更进一步。我们已经创造出一个“男老大”，他比任何实实在在的人类都更有权力。正如我以前说过的，那是个神而不是企业的某人。 Worse yet, this alpha male isn’t one corporate “person”/god but the whole professional system, a supreme and supremely intangible meta-god among the myriad corrupt gods that our socioeconomic system has made. 更糟的是，这个男老大不是某个企业的人或神，而是整个职业系统，我们的社会经济体系造就的许许多多堕落之神中一个超然存在的、不可触摸的元神。 One could imagine, in a corrupt and slowly declining religious order, harem-queen behavior among the priesthood, and that’s basically what we have within the secular priesthood of corporatism. This kind of shitty behavior, clearly, was never limited to women. And now we have a society that runs on it. 你可以想象，在一个堕落的、逐渐衰败的宗教秩序下，神职人员间的宫斗伎俩，而那就是在世俗的公司主义下我们所面对的。这些破烂伎俩，显然不会仅仅局限于女人。我们现在的社会就在这个基础上运行。 Tyler Durden, in Fight Club, lamented that “We’re a generation of men raised by women”. Now, Fight Club was on to something. The male gender in the U.S. is failing and has been failing for some time. (It’s even worse in societies that are more thoroughly corporatized. Look up Japan’s salaryman culture and then read up on its hikikomori and “herbivore men”.) Tyler Durden在《搏击俱乐部》中哀叹“我们是由女人抚养长大的一代”。现在，这部电影言中了某些事实。美国的男性正在并已经衰败。（在那些公司化更彻底的社会里，情况更糟。看看日本的白领文化再研究下“蛰居族”和“食草男”吧。） There is a toxic something in many advanced societies that has been emasculating men over the past forty years. But it is not that we were “raised by women” (I’ve seen neither evidence of declining paternal involvement, nor that increasing maternal influence is detrimental) and it’s not the fault of feminism. 过去五十年，发达社会里的某种毒素一直在阉割男性，但不是所谓我们“被女人抚养长大”（我没有发现男权衰落的证据，也没有发现影响力日益增长的女权有什么坏处），也不是女权主义的错。 It’s the fault of corporatism. We’ve created a society that requires us to believe that our richest people are “alpha males”, when they are actually champion harem queens– preening private-sector social climbers. This has spawned a generation of men who are far too concerned with others’ opinions of them (and of the schools they went to, and of the jobs they held) and mostly unable to succeed on their own or think for themselves. 是社团主义的错。我们创造了一个社会，这个社会要求我们相信最富有的人就是“男老大”，而他们其实是胜出的宫斗明星——沾沾自喜的私企里的攀高枝者。这孕育出太过关心他人看法的一代（他人对自己所在学校的看法、对自己工作的看法），这代人大部分都无法靠自己取得成功或是独立思考。 One might make the counterargument that the macho-subordinate “bro” culture that is observed in some corporate environments (such as most Silicon Valley startups) is, to the contrary of my argument, excessively masculine. Actually, it’s just stupidly masculine. There’s a lot of posturing going on in it, and women are justified to find that posturing threatening, but it’s just another form of the harem-queen game. 有人可能持相反的观点，认为在一些公司环境（比如多数硅谷创业公司）里看到的职员间的“兄弟”文化很是阳刚——同我所说恰恰相反。其实，那不过是愚蠢的阳刚罢了。这里面有太多的故作姿态，而女人们理应视这姿态为一种威胁，那不过是另一种形式的后宫游戏罢了。 The difference, in the young macho-subordinate culture, is whom these wannabe harem-queen men are whoring themselves out to. In the adult corporate world, their target is the amorphous nondescript alpha-male-figure (i.e. the invisible ultra-powerful humanoid that evolves into a god) known as “capital”. 所不同的是，在这种年轻的兄弟文化中，当婊子玩手腕的是男人自己。在成年人的公司世界里，他们的目标是无形的、难以捉摸的男老大形象（比如看不见的拥有终极权力的类人的神），它更广为人知的名字是“资本”。 A seasoned corporate executive knows that his job isn’t to slut it up for a specific manager or CEO but to make himself maximally attractive to the system itself, and that system’s god persona is too aloof for it to be assigned a definite gender, so it does not suffice to appease one presumed aspect of it. Consequently, it demands an appearance that is bland, inoffensive, and neutrally toned. 一个老练的高管明白，他的工作不是为了某个特定的经理或CEO职位而变身荡妇，而是最大限度地让自己对这个系统保有吸引力；他也明白这个系统是如此的超然冷漠，它不能被安上一个性别。因而仅仅满足某个设想的要求是不够的。于是所需要的就是一种圆滑无棱角的、不具攻击性的、中性的腔调。 On the other hand, the macho-subordinate brogrammers haven’t figured out yet that they should focus on their attractiveness to a larger system rather than their immediate bosses. They’re still powdering themselves for the visual delight of, say, a 30-year-old and invariably male founder. This drives them not toward the manicured, soft-faced look of the corporate executive, but toward the absurdity of the frat boy who exhibits the worst traits of masculinity in caricature, but whose membership in such a pointless, groupthink-driven organization shows his desperate need for approval. Therefore, the macho-subordinate brogrammer culture of Silicon Valley does not refute my claim that corporate competition is a harem-queen dynamic; rather, it supports it. 另一方面，那些阳刚的程序员兄弟们还没弄明白，他们应该在意的是自己对更大系统而非顶头上司的吸引力。他们还在为了博取一个30岁老顽固投资人的欢心而涂脂抹粉。这不会让他们看起来更像美过甲的、面容姣好的公司高管，只会把他们推向古惑仔式的荒诞，让他们展示漫画中那种男子气概里最糟糕的特质，而这种哥们义气在这种无意义的、团队思维导向的公司组织里只是暴露了他们对晋升的极端渴望。因此，硅谷程序员间流行的阳刚文化并未与我的观点相悖，即，公司里的竞争其实就是宫斗戏码，相反，恰恰支持了我的观点。 Right now, the world is run mostly by cowardly, talentless, champion harem queens angling for approval from that invisible god we call “capital”. That’s unfortunate, and my view is that it has to end. In order to get this far, human society had to overcome many challenges, and it seems that the 21st century is destined to bring us more challenges (e.g. climate change, religious radicalism, economic inequality and petroleum depletion) and I don’t think that we can handle a single one of them with the business leadership that we’ve got. 如今这个世界基本上被一群懦弱平庸的宫斗明星所把持，他们费尽心思讨“资本”这个看不见的神欢心。这情况太不幸了，在我看来，必须终结。为了达到这个目的，人类社会必须克服许多挑战。21世纪似乎注定带给我们更多挑战（比如气候变化、宗教极端主义、经济不平等和石油的耗尽），而我不认为我们能在现有的商业领导下解决其中任何一个问题。 So who should be running the world? To be honest, there are some men whom I consider supremely qualified, and there are some women whom I consider supremely qualified. Gender, to me, is irrelevant. However, we need independent thinkers, and this means that the harem-queen world (for which, many of the worst offenders are men) has got to go. 那么谁应该来掌控这个世界？老实说，我认为有一些男人很有资格，一些女人也非常合格。性别，对我来说，无关紧要。我们需要独立的思考者，而这意味着后宫世界（它的许多捍卫者都是男性）必须滚蛋。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Australia, home to the world's largest camel herd 澳大利亚，世界最大的骆驼之乡

作者：Sarah Bell @ 2013-5-19 译者：沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：BBC News，http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22522695 Australia is famous for its wildlife - kangaroos, koalas and numerous species of snakes and spiders - but it is also home to the world's largest herd of camels. There are about 750,000 roaming wild in the outback and they cause a host of problems. 澳大利亚因野生动物而闻名遐迩：袋鼠、考拉以及种类众多的蛇类与蜘蛛。不过，澳大利亚还是世界最大的骆驼之乡。约有75万匹只骆驼生活在澳大利亚的广袤内陆【译注：本文outback一词专指澳大利亚人烟稀少的广袤内陆地区，后文皆译作“内陆”】，并制造了很多麻烦。 Camels were imported to Australia in the 19th century from Arabia, India and Afghanistan for transport and heavy work in the outback. But when the internal combustion engine came along and they were no longer needed, several thousand were released into the wild. 骆驼是19世纪从阿拉伯、印度和阿富汗进口到澳大利亚的，在内陆用于运输和重体力工作。不过随着内燃机的出现，它们就派不上用场了，当中有几千匹被放生到野外。 With no natural predators and vast sparsely-populated areas in which to roam, the camels have flourished and are having a huge impact on the wilderness. 骆驼在内陆没有天敌，活动范围又是广阔的人口稀疏地区，因而得以大量繁衍，如今正对野生环境造成巨大影响。 "One of the biggest problems is that they drink large amounts of water. They gulp down gallons at a time and cause millions of pounds worth of damage to farms and waterholes which are used to water stock. They also drink dry waterholes belonging to the Aborigines," says explorer and writer Simon Reeve. “其中一个大问题是，它们饮水量巨大。骆驼一次能灌下好几加仑的水，给农场和储水塘造成的数百万磅损失。它们还能把澳洲土著民的储水塘给喝干。”探险家、作家Simon Reeve如是说。 "Camels are almost uniquely brilliant at surviving the conditions in the outback. Introducing them was short-term genius and long-term disaster." “论到在内陆环境中生存，骆驼的出色能力无与伦比。把它们引入内陆，短期来看是天才之举，长期来看则是灾难。” Lyndee Severin runs a one-million-acre ranch west of Alice Springs in the Northern Territory that has been overrun by the camels. 北领地【译注：又称澳北区】的骆驼现已泛滥成灾，Lyndee Severin就在该区爱丽丝泉市的西部经营着一个百万英亩的大牧场。 "They do a lot of damage to infrastructure for us, so there's a lot of damage to fences. They break tanks, they break pumps, they break pipes, they break fences - fences have been our biggest concern," she says. 她说：“它们对我们的基础设施造成了巨大破坏，围栏大量受损。它们把蓄水池搞坏，把抽水泵搞坏，把管子搞坏，把围栏搞坏。我们最担心的就是围栏。” But her concern is not confined to her own business - the camels put pressure on native Australian species by reducing food sources and destroying their habitats. "They will just take everything in the landscape and if they destroy the trees and eat the grasses there's no kangaroos, no emus, no small birds if there's no trees, no reptiles," she says. 但她所担忧的不只是自己的生意。骆驼给澳大利亚本土的生物物种带来了巨大压力，因为它们减少了食物供应，破坏了本土物种的栖息地。她说：“它们会吃地上的一切东西。如果它们把树都毁掉，草都吃掉，就不会再有袋鼠，不会再有鸸鹋，不会再有小鸟，没有树，也不会再有爬行动物。” Severin and her team shoot the beasts, often from helicopters, and leave them to rot where they fall. "It's not something that we enjoy doing, but it's something that we have to do." Severin及其团队会射杀这些野兽，一般是从直升机上射杀，并让其就地腐烂。“我们并不喜欢做这种事，但又必须做。” Camels roam freely across an area of 3.3 million sq km (1.3 million sq miles) encompassing the states of Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland, as well as the Northern Territory. They are mainly Dromedaries, but some are Bactrian camels. Humans have introduced dozens of species into Australia - including wild horses, pigs, goats, dogs, cats, rabbits and foxes - and these have now become a major problem for the ecosystem. 骆驼在包括西澳、南澳、昆士兰及北领地在内的330万平方公里（合130万平方英里）范围内自由出没。它们主要是单峰驼，但也有一些双峰驼。人类已将数十个物种引入澳大利亚，包括野马、猪、羊、狗、猫、兔子和狐狸等，这些动物现在已为生态系统带来了一个严重的问题。 In 2010 the Australian government endorsed a control plan, the Australian Feral Camel Management Project, which aimed to reduce camel densities through culling and mustering the animals for sale. Between 2001 and 2008 it was estimated there were up to a million feral camels in the outback, but thousands were culled under the project. 2010年澳大利亚政府签署了一项名为“澳大利亚野生骆驼管理项目”的控制计划，意在通过选择性地捕杀并出售骆驼来减低骆驼的密度。2001至2008年间，内陆的野生骆驼数量估计多达100万，但该项目已宰杀其中数千匹。 Animals Australia, a pressure group, described this as a "bloodbath". For its part, RSPCA Australia says it would support a national approach to feral camel management, only if "the programmes are clearly explained and justified... and use the most humane methods available". 压力集团“动物澳洲”将该计划称为“大屠杀”。而澳大利亚“皇家防止虐待动物协会”（RSPCA）则说它愿意支持采取全国性的办法来控制野生骆驼，但要求“对规划进行清楚的解释和论证……并采用能够用到的最人道方法”。 But many farmers feel that they do not have much choice - and must do what they can with or without a national programme. The economic cost of grazing land loss and damage by feral camels has been estimated at 10m Australian dollars (£6.6m). 然而，许多农场主感到他们并没有什么选择余地，而且不管有没有全国性规划，他们都必须采取可行措施。据估计，野生骆驼导致牧场流失和破坏，其带来的经济损失已达1000万澳元（合660万英磅）。 "Killing them seems a tragic waste to many of us but the sheer logistics involved mean there is little choice. It is an issue I find more and more as I travel around the world. Humans introduce animals into fragile ecosystems. What do we do about it?" says Reeve, who is presenting a new series on Australia for BBC television. Reeve说：“对我们许多人而言，杀害它们似乎是一种可悲的浪费，但单单其中所涉及的物流运输就意味着我们没多少别的选择。随着我在世界各地旅行，我越来越多地发现这种事。人类将动物引入脆弱的生态系统。我们该拿它怎么办？” Reeve现在正为BBC电视台一套新的澳洲系列节目担任主持。 "It's not enough for us to stand back and say I can't bear to see animals being killed. If we are going to make ourselves gods by meddling with an ecosystem then we have to take the responsibility to sort it out." “置身事外，说自己不忍看到动物们被杀害，这并不够。既然我们把自己变成了干预生态系统的神，那我们就必须承担起责任、解决问题。” Ian Conway, who runs the 1,800 sq km Kings Creek cattle ranch, also near Alice Springs, believes there is a better way of managing their numbers - rounding camels up and selling them for their meat. Ian Conway也在爱丽丝泉市附近经营一家1800平米、名为Kings Creek的牧牛场。他相信有更好的方法来控制骆驼数量：围捕它们，出售骆驼肉。 Camels range over a vast area and can travel more than 40 miles in a day, so his team uses a helicopter to spot "mobs" of camels. They are then rounded up using heavily-modified off-road vehicles and put into a holding pen, before being sold to the Middle East. 骆驼的活动范围很广，且一天能走40英里，所以Conway的团队使用直升机去寻找骆驼“小队”。然后使用经大幅改装的越野车将它们围起来，关在畜栏里，最后卖到中东去。 Conway, who has been mustering animals for more than 40 years, says: "There's no difference to camel and beef, in fact to a lot of people who live on camel like we do, prefer it to beef." Some are also sold as riding camels, he adds. Conway干围捕动物这一行已有40多年。他说：“骆驼肉和牛肉没啥区别，事实上好多跟我们一样以骆驼肉为食的人，觉得它比牛肉要好。”也有些骆驼是卖出去做骑乘用的，他补充说。 "The Saudis are always interested in them but they are looking for a specific camel. I've got a bloke who wants beauty camels at the moment. The bulls are no good. They like the cows because of their thin heads, but the cows have got to have their lips hanging, for what reason I don't know," says Conway. “沙特人对骆驼总是特别感兴趣，不过他们对骆驼有特定要求。现在就有个家伙找我要漂亮的骆驼。公的不行。母骆驼脑袋瘦小，沙特人喜欢，不过得是嘴唇下垂的母骆驼，不知道为啥，”Conway说。 He thinks a round-up is more humane than the alternative. "They just shoot them and nothing is done with them. We don't know if they lay there for days. I'd like them to come into the yard like this and be sold as meat or riding camels," he says. 他认为围捕比其他处理方法更为人道。“他们就拿枪打，别的都不管。我们都不知道骆驼是不是会在那儿躺好几天。我还是愿意像这样把它们弄到畜栏里来，然后当做食用或骑用骆驼卖掉，”他说。 In many outback areas it is not cost-effective to round up and sell the camels. But Conway is convinced that with the right investment this could become a profitable way of protecting ranches and the environment. 在许多内陆地区，围捕并出售骆驼并不划算。但Conway坚信，只要投资得当，这种保护牧场和环境的办法将会有利可图。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why do the largest animals have the tiniest sperm? A brief investigation. 为什么全球最大动物的精子却是最小的？一份简要调查报告。 作者：Brian Resnick @ 2015-11-20 翻译：Drunkplane(@Drunkplane) 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Vox.com，http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2015/11/20/9768864/largest-animals-have-the-tiniest-sperm Stefan Lüpold is a sperm guy. The Swiss evolutionary biologist did his masters work on sexual selection and bat genitalia, his PhD on the evolution of bird sperm, and a postdoctorate on how fruit fly sperm compete. "I’m fascinated by the almost unlimited diversity in both size and shape of sperm," he writes me in an email from Zurich, describing his chosen sub-sub-discipline. Stefan Lüpold 是个精子达人。这位瑞士进化生物学家硕士时研究的是性选择和蝙蝠的生殖器，博士时研究的是禽类精子的进化，博士后时则研究果蝇的精子如何竞争。“精子大小和形状近乎无穷的多样性让我着迷。”他从苏黎世给我发来电邮，讲述了他所选择的这一学科分支。 I've emailed him because he's recently found evidence to answer a perplexing question: Why are sperm so weird? 我给他发邮件是因为他最近的发现能回答一个令人费解的问题：精子为什么这么诡异？ Mice, for instance, have sperm that's twice as long as elephants'. The world's longest sperm belongs to a fruit fly. And across the animal kingdom, sperm take on extremely odd and varied shapes and sizes. The "tadpole" shape we most associate with sperm is not at all common outside of mammals. Rat and mice sperm can have hook-like attachments on their heads. "In some species they seem to allow sperm to connect by their heads and form so-called sperm trains," Lüpold says. "These groups of sperm seem to swim faster than individual sperm." Fascinating! 举例来讲，老鼠精子的长度是大象精子的两倍。世界上最长的精子属于一种果蝇。纵观整个动物王国，精子的形状和大小极其古怪和多变。“蝌蚪”状这一我们最为熟悉的形状在哺乳动物以外根本不常见。老鼠精子的头部会有钩子形状的附属物。“一些物种的精子似乎可以通过头部连接在一起，形成所谓的精子列车。” Lüpold说，“这种精子群似乎比单个的精子游得更快。”多么神奇！ From an evolutionary perspective this raises an intriguing question: Why are sperm so varied among different species when they all have the exact same purpose — fertilizing eggs? 从进化的角度看，这带来一个引人入胜的问题：所有的精子都有一个相同的目的——让卵子受精，但为什么不同物种的精子相差如此巨大？

[Four wildly different shapes of sperm, as illustrated in the text Sperm Competition and the Evolution of Animal Mating Systems (only 700 pages long!). A) Silverfish sperm, B) sponge sperm. C) molluscan sperm.,D) gyrinid beetle sperm.] 【四种截然不同的精子形状，来自《精子竞争和动物交配系统的进化》一书（也就700页而已啦！）A) 蠹虫的精子 B) 海绵的精子 C)软体动物的精子 D) 一种豉甲的精子】

Lüpold has a theory. Analyzing the sperm of 100 species of mammals, he and a co-author found a pattern amid the chaos: the larger the species, the smaller the sperm. The results were recently published in Proceedings B, a journal of the Royal Society of London. Lüpold有个理论。他和一位合著者分析了近百种哺乳动物的精子后，从这千头万绪中发现了一个规律：物种个体越大，精子越小。最近其成果已发表在伦敦皇家学会的《Proceedings B》杂志上。 Why would evolution favor such a pattern? Lüpold explains that longer sperm has some advantages — they are better at "elbowing" aside the competition. But it also takes a lot of energy to make long sperm, which larger animals can't afford. So it's a trade-off: 为什么进化倾向于这样一种规律？Lüpold 解释说，更长的精子具有某些优势——它们更能将竞争者“排挤”开；但是制造长精子会消耗大量能量，这是大型动物无法负担的，所以这是一种权衡取舍。

If there were no constraints on sperm production and assuming that longer sperm are advantageous, each male would probably produce lots of impressively big sperm. But in nature there are always constraints because resources and energy are not unlimited. For a testis of a given size, producing bigger sperm thus means it cannot produce as many of them (producing big sperm takes more resources, energy and time). 如果在精子生产方面没有限制，并且假设更长的精子确实更有优势，那么每个雄性也许会造出大量个头大得吓人的精子。但是自然界中总是存在种种限制，因为资源和能量不是无限的。对给定大小的睾丸来说，生产更大的精子意味着它生产的精子数量会减少（生产大精子会消耗更多资源、能量和时间）。 So, whether investing more in sperm size or in sperm number to maximize sperm competitiveness really depends on the circumstances, for example the size of the female reproductive tract. In large species, the female reproductive tract is massive compared to the tiny sperm, so sperm can easily be lost or diluted in it. Males have to compensate by transferring more sperm. Simply making longer sperm really wouldn’t make a difference in an elephant. They would have to be incredibly large. So males are better off making lots of tiny sperm. 所以，为了将精子的竞争力最大化，是在精子尺寸还是精子数量上“投资”取决于环境条件，比如雌性的生殖道。对大体型的物种来说，雌性的生殖道相较微小的精子来说太大了，所以精子很容易在其中迷失或被稀释掉。雄性只能通过投送更多的精子来弥补损失。简单通过制造更长的精子对大象来说于事无补，精子得大到离谱才行【编注：是指大到离谱才能产生阻挡其他精子的效果】。所以对雄性来讲，更好的策略是制造大量的小精子。

This inverse correlation between animal size and sperm size might be a consistent pattern across the animal kingdom. Almost all animals with sperm longer than a 10th of a millimeter, he explains, weigh less than one or two pounds. "Our results certainly suggest a unifying pattern that is likely to explain much of the diversity in mammalian sperm size and possibly beyond," he says, while noting more research is still needed. 动物的体型尺寸和精子尺寸之间这种负相关关系也许是动物王国里的普遍规律。几乎所有精子尺寸长于十分之一毫米的动物，体重都不超过一两磅。“我们的研究成果明确揭示了一个统一的模式，基本可以解释哺乳动物精子的多样性，也许还不止于此。”Lüpold说，然而他同时也表示还需要做更多的研究。 The mammal with the longest sperm? It's not the human. That distinction belongs to the honey possum, a very small (they grow to 3.5 inches long ) marsupial that lives in western Australia. They are adorable. Their sperm is 350 micrometers (.014 inches) long. 拥有最长精子的哺乳动物？不是人类。这一殊荣属于长吻袋貂，一种生活在澳大利亚西部的非常小（它们能长到八九厘米长）的有袋动物。它们很是可爱。它们的精子有0.356毫米长。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

A Trick For Higher SAT scores? Unfortunately no. SAT高分有诀窍？很不幸，不是。 作者：Terry Burnham @ 2015-4-20 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：AEON, http://www.terryburnham.com/2015/04/a-trick-for-higher-sat-scores.html Wouldn’t it be cool if there was a simple trick to score better on college entrance exams like the SAT and other tests? 如果SAT之类的大学入学考试和其他考试都有得高分的简单诀窍，岂不是很爽？ There is a reputable claim that such a trick exists. Unfortunately, the trick does not appear to be real. 根据某个著名说法，确实有诀窍。不幸的是，这一诀窍似乎并不可靠。 This is the story of an academic paper where I am a co-author with possible lessons for life both inside and outside the Academy. 这里要讲的是我参与写作的一篇学术论文的故事，它对学术内外的生活可能都会有些教益。 In the spring of 2012, I was reading Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking, Fast and Slow. Professor Kahneman discussed an intriguing finding that people score higher on a test if the questions are hard to read. The particular test used in the study is the CRT or cognitive reflection task invented by Shane Frederick of Yale. The CRT itself is interesting, but what Professor Kahneman wrote was amazing to me, 2012年春，我读了诺贝尔奖获得者Daniel Kahneman的书《思考，快与慢》。Kahneman教授讨论了一个非常有趣的发现，如果考试时的问题很难看清，人们得分就会更高。这一研究中用到的具体考试，是由耶鲁大学的Shane Frederick发明的“认知反应任务”（CRT）【译注：应为“认知反应测试”，原文有误】。CRT本身很有意思，但Kahneman教授的说法更是令我惊愕。

“90% of the students who saw the CRT in normal font made at least one mistake in the test, but the proportion dropped to 35% when the font was barely legible. You read this correctly: performance was better with the bad font.” “通过正常字体阅读CRT试卷的测试学生中，有90%至少会做错一道题，但如果试卷字体勉强才能辨认，这个比例就会下降到35%。把这句话读准了：坏字体伴随着好成绩。”

I thought this was so cool. The idea is simple, powerful, and easy to grasp. An oyster makes a pearl by reacting to the irritation of a grain of sand. Body builders become huge by lifting more weight. Can we kick our brains into a higher gear, by making the problem harder? 我觉得这简直太爽了。这个想法简单、有力且容易掌握。蚌壳受沙粒刺激作出反应，就会生出珍珠。健身者加大举重重量就会增加块头。我们是否能通过把问题搞难，来加大大脑马力？ Malcolm Gladwell also thought the result was cool. Here is his description his book, David and Goliath: Malcolm Gladwell也觉得这个结论很爽。以下是他在《大卫与歌利亚》一书中的描述：

The CRT is really hard. But here’s the strange thing. Do you know the easiest way to raise people’s scores on the test? Make it just a little bit harder. The psychologists Adam Alter and Daniel Oppenheimer tried this a few years ago with a group of undergraduates at Princeton University. First they gave the CRT the normal way, and the students averaged 1.9 correct answers out of three. That’s pretty good, though it is well short of the 2.18 that MIT students averaged. Then Alter and Oppenheimer printed out the test questions in a font that was really hard to read … The average score this time around? 2.45. Suddenly, the students were doing much better than their counterparts at MIT. “CRT真是很难。但这里有个怪事。要提高人们的考试得分，你知道什么方法最简单吗？只需把考题整得更难一点。心理学家Adam Alter和Daniel Oppenheimer几年前在普林斯顿大学拿一群本科生做过实验。首先他们用常规方式搞了一次CRT考试，学生平均表现是3道题里做对1.9道。很不错，但比起麻省理工学生平均做对2.18道可差远了。然后Alter和Oppenheimer用一种很难辨读的字体打印了测试问题……这次的平均得分？2.45。学生们突然就比麻省理工的对手要强了。”

As I read Professor Kahneman’s description, I looked at the clock and realized I was teaching a class in about an hour, and the class topic for the day was related to this study. I immediately created two versions of the CRT and had my students take the test - half with an easy to read presentation and half with a hard to read version. 读着Kahneman教授的上述描写时，我看了看表，发现还有约一个小时我就要去上课，课程当天的主题正与这一研究相关。我立即就制作了两种版本的CRT——一半易读、一半难读，让我的学生去考。

(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents (1) 球棒和球共需1.1美元。球棒比球要贵1美元。请问球需多少美分？ (1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents (in my experiment, I used Haettenschweiler - I do not know how to get blogger to display Haettenschweiler). (1) 球棒和球共需1.1美元。球棒比球要贵1美元。请问球需多少美分？（考试中，此处用的是Haettenschweiler字体）

Within 3 hours of reading about the idea in Professor Kahneman’s book, I had my own data in the form of the scores from 20 students. Unlike the study described by Professor Kahneman, however, my students did not perform any better statistically with the hard-to-read version. I emailed Shane Frederick at Yale with my story and data, and he responded that he was doing further research on the topic. 在读过Kahneman教授书中的观点后不到三小时，我就拿到了自己的数据——20个学生的成绩。不过，跟Kahneman教授所述研究不同，统计上而言，我的学生在难读版测试中并没有表现更好。我把我的故事和数据邮寄给了耶鲁的Shane Frederic，他当时说他正在就此问题做进一步研究。 Roughly 3 years later, Andrew Meyer, Shane Frederick, and 8 other authors (including me) have published a paper that argues the hard-to-read presentation does not lead to higher performance. 大概三年以后，Andrew Meyer, Shane Frederick及其他8名作者（包括我）发表了一篇论文，论证说，难读的试题并不会带来更好的成绩。 The original paper reached its conclusions based on the test scores of 40 people. In our paper, we analyze a total of over 7,000 people by looking at the original study and 16 additional studies. Our summary: 最早那篇论文的结论来自40个人的测试得分。我们的论文则通过检视原初研究和其余16项研究，分析对象总数超过7000人。我们的总结是：

Easy-to-read average score: 1.43/3 (17 studies, 3,657 people) Hard-to-read average score: 1.42/3 (17 studies, 3,710 people) 易读版平均得分：1.43/3（17项研究，3657人） 难读版平均得分：1.42/3（17项研究，3710人）

Malcolm Gladwell wrote, “Do you know the easiest way to raise people’s scores on the test? Make it just a little bit harder.” The data suggest that Malcolm Gladwell’s statement is false. Here is the key figure from our paper with my annotations in red: Malcolm Gladwell写道，“人们要想提高考试得分，你知道什么方法最简单吗？把考题整得更难一点。”数据显示，Malcolm Gladwell的说法是错的。以下是我们所写论文的关键图表，我的注解标红：   I take three lessons from this story. 从这个故事中我得到三条教训。 1.Beware simple stories. 1.提防简单的故事 “The price of metaphor is eternal vigilance.” Richard Lewontin attributes this quote to Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener. “比喻的好处须以永恒的警惕换取。”Richard Lewontin将这一名言归于Arturo Rosenblueth 和 Norbert Wiener所说。 The story told by Professor Kahneman and by Malcolm Gladwell is very good. In most cases, however, reality is messier than the summary story. Kahneman教授和Malcolm Gladwell讲的故事非常动听。但在多数情况中，现实都比简洁的故事要凌乱。 2.Ideas have considerable “Meme-mentum” 2.观念具有相当大的“模因惯性” “And yet it moves,” This quote is attributed to Galileo when forced to retract his statement that the earth moves around the sun. “但是它仍在运转”，这一名言被认为是伽利略被迫收回其地球绕日运动学说时所说。 The message is that It takes a long time to change conventional wisdom. The earth stayed at the center of the universe for many people for decades and even centuries after Copernicus. 启示就是，要改变传统观点需要花费很长时间。在哥白尼之后的数十年甚至数世纪中，地球对许多人而言仍是宇宙的中心。 I expect that the false story as presented by Professor Kahneman and Malcolm Gladwell will persist for decades. Millions of people have read these false accounts. The message is simple, powerful, and important. Thus, even though the message is wrong, I expect it will have considerable momentum (or meme-mentum to paraphrase Richard Dawkins). 我预料，由Kahneman教授和Malcolm Gladwell所说的错误故事会继续存在几十年。数百万人读过这些错误说法。这个讯息简单、有力且重要无比。因此，尽管它是错的，我预测它会具有相当大的惯性动量（或借用Richard Dawkins的话说，模因惯性）。 One of my favorite examples of meme-mentum concerns stomach ulcers. Barry Marshall and Robin Warren faced skepticism to their view that many stomach ulcers are caused by bacteria (Helicobacter pylori). Professor Marshall describes the scientific response to his idea as ridicule; in response he gave himself an ulcer drinking the bacteria. Marshall gives a personal account of his self-infection in his Nobel Prize acceptance video (the self-infection portion starts at around 25:00). 我最喜欢援引的模因惯性例证之一跟胃溃疡有关。Barry Marshall和Robin Warren认为许多胃溃疡源于细菌（幽门螺杆菌），这一观点遭到质疑。Marshall教授称，科学界的反应是认为他的观点十分可笑；作为回应，他服用细菌并让自己患上了溃疡。在其接受诺贝尔奖的视频中，Marshall自己描述了这一自我感染经历。 3.We can measure the rate of learning. 3.我们可以测量学习的速率 We can measure the rate of learning. Google scholar counts the number of times a paper is cited by other papers. I believe that well-informed scholars who cite the original paper ought to cite the subsequent papers. We can watch in real-time to see if that is true. 我们可以测量学习的速率。“谷歌学术”计算某论文被其他论文征引的次数。我认为，渊博的学者，在引用了原初的研究论文之后，也应该引用其后相关的论文。我们能实时观测这一想法是否为真。

Paper 论文	Comment 备注	citations as of April 20, 2015 2015.4.20之前引用数	citations as of today 迄今为止引用数
Alter et al. (2007). "Overcoming intuition: metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 136(4): 569. Alter等人（2007）。“克服直觉：元认知困难能激活分析推理”，《实验心理学杂志：总论》 136（4）:569	Original paper showing hard-to-read leads to higher scores 最早提出难读导致高分的论文	344	click for current count 点击链接查看当前数字
Thompson et al. (2013). "The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency as metacognitive cues for initiating analytic thinking." Cognition 128(2): 237-251. Thompson等人（2013）。“回答流利性和感知流利性作为推动分析推理的元认知触发物”，《认知》 128（2）：2237-251	Paper contradicts Alter at. al by reporting no hard-to-read effect. 与Alter等人相左，报告不存在“难读高分”效应的论文	38	click for current count 点击链接查看当前数字
Meyer et al. (2015). "Disfluent fonts don’t help people solve math problems." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144(2): e16. Meyer等人（2015）。“繁难字体对于人们解决数学问题并无助益”，《实验心理学杂志：总论》 144（2）: e16	Our paper summarizing the original study and 16 others. 我们概述原初研究和后续16项研究的论文	0 (this “should” increase at least as fast as citations for Alter et. al, 2007) 0（引用数的增长速度“本应”至少与Alter等人2007年论文相同）	click for current count 点击链接查看当前数字

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

ISIS简史：全球最可怕的恐怖组织是如何长成的 ISIS, a history: how the world's worst terror group came to be

作者：Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：VOX，http://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9760284/isis-history To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria — why it exists, what it wants, and why it commits terrible violence of which the Paris attacks are only the latest — you need to understand the tangled story of how it came to be. 如果想了解伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（ISIS）——为什么它会存在，它想要什么，还有为什么它会犯下诸如最近的巴黎恐怖袭击之类可怕暴行——你需要了解在它成长历程中所发生的曲折故事。 The group began, in a very different form, in 1999. In the 16 years since, it has been shaped by — and has at moments helped to shape — the conflicts, physical and ideological, of the Middle East. 该组织始建于1999年，但它在当时的形式与现在大不相同。在之后的16年中，它被中东的武力和意识形态冲突所塑造，也时而塑造着这些冲突。 Here, then, is a concise history of the rise of ISIS from its earliest origins to the present day. It is the story of one of the richest and most powerful terrorist organizations ever to exist — but it's also a story that reveals the ways in which ISIS has proven much weaker than you might think. 在这里，我将呈现ISIS从最初的起源直到今天的一部简明历史。这是关于史上最富有也最强悍的恐怖组织之一的故事——但这个故事也同样揭示了，ISIS的一些所作所为，证明了它实际上比人们所想象的要脆弱得多。 1989–1999: The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the beginning of ISIS 1989-1999：苏联的阿富汗战争和ISIS的发端

【Abu Musab al-Zarqawi（即扎卡维）在伊拉克。】

You cannot understand ISIS without understanding al-Qaeda and the history they share, as well as the differences, there at the beginning, that would ultimately divide them. And al-Qaeda's origin story begins with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 如果不了解基地组织以及它和ISIS的共同历史，还有它们之间一开始就存在的差异（正是这些差异让它们最终分道扬镳），你就无法真正地了解ISIS。基地组织的故事最初始于苏联在1979年入侵阿富汗。 Soviet aggression shocked the Muslim world, galvanizing roughly 20,000 foreign fighters to help Afghans resist Soviet forces. That's where Osama bin Laden met a number of other young radicals, who together formed the core of the al-Qaeda network. 苏联的侵略震惊了整个穆斯林世界，并激起了大约2万名外国战士帮助阿富汗人抵抗苏联军队。正是在那里，奥萨马·本·拉登遇上了一群年轻的极端分子，他们共同组建了基地组织网络的核心团队。 The Soviets withdrew in 1988, but they left a puppet regime in place, and the war continued. The next year, a Jordanian man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah joined them. 苏联人在1988年撤离了阿富汗，但是他们留下了一个傀儡政权，而战争也还在继续。第二年，一个名叫Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah的约旦人加入进来。 Al-Khalaylah would, years later, achieve global infamy under his nom de guerre, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He would found the group that became what we today call ISIS. 几年后，al-Khalaylah以他的别名Abu Musab al-Zarqawi（即扎卡维）在全球臭名昭著。他创建了在今天被我们称之为ISIS的恐怖组织。 When Zarqawi first traveled to Afghanistan, in 1989, he wasn't all that religious: He was, as Mary Anne Weaver writes in a definitive Atlantic profile, something of a petty thug. But once there, he met a man named Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading proponent of violent, fundamentalist Islam. Maqdisi converted Zarqawi to his cause. 当扎卡维在1989年第一次来到阿富汗时，他并不是那么满怀宗教热情：正如Mary Anne Weaver在《大西洋月刊》发布的一份权威传略中所写道的，他当时只不过是个小流氓。但一到阿富汗，他就遇上了一个名叫Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi的暴力伊斯兰原教旨主义的主要倡导者。Maqdisi按照自己的理念改造了扎卡维。 Zarqawi would not meet bin Laden for years, and the two men built up allies and followers independently from each other — a dynamic that made Zarqawi's network even more extreme than bin Laden's. 在之后的数年中，扎卡维都还没有遇上本·拉登，两人各自独立地建立起了自己的盟友和追随者网络——在此过程中，扎卡维的网络甚至比本·拉登的更极端。 "Whereas bin Laden and his cadre grew up in at least the upper middle class and had a university education, Zarqawi and those closest to him came from poorer, less educated backgrounds," Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes. "Zarqawi’s criminal past and extreme views on takfir (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) created major friction and distrust with bin Laden when the two first met in Afghanistan in 1999." “本·拉登和他的核心骨干都至少是在上层中产阶级长大的，而且也都受过大学教育，而扎卡维和他的亲信们则来自较贫穷，教育程度也较低的阶层，”华盛顿近东政策研究所的学者Aaron Zelin如此写道。“1999年扎卡维在阿富汗首次见到本·拉登时，他的犯罪前科和他关于塔克菲（通过将另一名穆斯林控诉为异教徒，而为将他杀死的行为提供穆斯林教法上的合法性）的极端观点在两人之间造成了很大的摩擦和不信任感。” 2003–2009: The rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Iraq 2003-2009：伊拉克基地组织的兴衰

【2006年，伊拉克北部不明身份的反美武装。】

Zarqawi returned from Afghanistan, and in 1999 in Jordan formed his own group, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ), or the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. For the first few years, Zarqawi's group was a bit player among jihadists, overshadowed by al-Qaeda. But this was the group, then little known, that would later become ISIS. 从阿富汗回来之后，扎卡维1999年在约旦建立了自己的组织，名为Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad（JTWJ），或叫“一神论与圣战组织”。在最初的几年中，扎卡维的组织和基地组织相比相形见绌，在众多伊斯兰圣战组织中只是个小玩家。但这个在当时还默默无闻的组织就是日后ISIS的雏形。 In 2003, the US led its invasion of Iraq and changed, in the world of jihadists, everything. 2003年，美国领导了对伊拉克的入侵行动，这完全改变了伊斯兰圣战者的世界。 The American-led war, by destroying the Iraqi state, left much of the country in chaos. Foreign fighters and extremists began moving into Iraq, assisted by Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, which sought to bog down the US. Zarqawi and his group were among them. 由美国所主导的伊拉克战争摧毁了伊拉克的国家机器，让这个国家的大部分地区陷入混乱的深渊。在力图将美国拖入泥潭的叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的帮助下，来自外国的战士和极端分子开始涌入伊拉克，而扎卡维和他的极端组织也在其中。 The Sunni extremists who arrived found a friendly audience among former Iraqi soldiers and officers: The US had disbanded Saddam Hussein's overwhelmingly Sunni army, which was disbanded in 2003, creating a group of men who were unemployed, battle-trained, and scared of life in an Iraq dominated by its Shia majority. 这些来到伊拉克的逊尼派极端分子在伊拉克前政权的士兵和军官中找到了一批知音：美国在2003年解散了效忠于萨达姆·侯赛因，以逊尼派占压倒性多数的军队，从而创造了一个受过实战训练的失业军人群体，他们对于生活在一个由占人口多数的什叶派统治的国家感到十分恐惧。 Zarqawi's group, as it fought in Iraq, grew to prominence, attracting al-Qaeda's attention. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, for which he would receive access to its funds and fighters. His group was renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and it became the country's leading Sunni insurgent group. 扎卡维的组织在伊拉克的战斗中不断成长壮大，最终吸引到了基地组织的注意。2004年，扎卡维宣誓向基地组织效忠，以换取基地组织所提供的资金和战士。他的组织被更名为伊拉克基地组织（AQI），而该组织也成为了伊拉克境内最主要的逊尼派武装力量。 AQI didn't just fight the Americans, it also attacked fellow Iraqis. It bombed Shia mosques and slaughtered Shia civilians, hoping to provoke mass Shia reprisals against Sunni civilians and thus force the Sunnis to rally behind AQI. It worked, and it's a tactic ISIS still uses today. It also helped spark a civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shia. 伊拉克基地组织不仅仅与美国人作战，它同样也攻击伊拉克同胞。它炸毁什叶派的清真寺并且屠杀什叶派平民，力图煽动什叶派对逊尼派平民的大规模报复，从而迫使逊尼派聚集在自己的羽翼之下。这一策略取得了成功，并且直到今天ISIS还在使用这样的策略。而这也引发了一场伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派之间的内战。 But these methods were too vicious even for al-Qaeda, which warned Zarqawi to cool it. He ignored the warnings, and AQI came to hold a swath of territory in Sunni parts of Iraq, roughly along the lines of what ISIS controls there today. Yet between 2006 and 2009, it all came crashing down: 但即使对于基地组织而言，这样的方法也显得太恶毒了，于是基地组织警告扎卡维，让他把事态冷却下来。但扎卡维无视这一警告，而伊拉克基地组织则进一步占领了伊拉克逊尼派聚居的一片土地，与ISIS今天在这里所控制区域的边界相仿。然而在2006年和2009年之间，这一切几乎都土崩瓦解了：

【由AQI和其他逊尼派叛乱团体控制的领土。】

Starting in 2006, AQI's extremism began to backfire. Sunni tribal leaders, who had always hated living under AQI's harsh and often violent rule, became convinced that the Shias were starting to win Iraq's sectarian civil war. To avoid being on the losing end of a bloody war, they up took arms against AQI in a movement called the Awakening. 从2006年开始，伊拉克基地组织所贯彻的极端主义开始遭遇挫折。那些对于生活在伊拉克基地组织严酷而暴力的统治之下一直心怀怨恨的逊尼派部落长老们开始相信，什叶派将会赢得这场伊拉克的宗派内战。为了避免在一场血腥战争中成为失败的一方，他们发起了一场称为“觉醒”的运动，武装反抗伊拉克基地组织。 Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a US airstrike, and the US increased its troop presence in Iraq that year and the next. But it was, more than anything else, the Awakening that defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq. 扎卡维在2006年死于美军空袭，而美国在当年和次年都往伊拉克增派驻军。但是在打败伊拉克基地组织的过程中，“觉醒”运动所发挥的作用还是超过了任何其它因素。 By 2009, almost all of AQI's fighters were dead or in prison, and the group was a shadow of itself. But it had learned a valuable lesson: Dissent from Sunnis under its rule could be disastrous. That's why, years later, ISIS has slaughtered members of Sunni tribes, such as Iraq's Abu Nimr, en masse. It sees brutality as the best way to prevent a replay of the 2006 uprising that led to its downfall. 到2009年，几乎所有伊拉克基地组织的战士都已被歼灭或是被关进了监狱，组织几乎名存实亡。但是它学到了宝贵的一课：受其统治的逊尼派的不满可以带来灾难性的后果。这也是为何在几年之后，ISIS屠杀了一些逊尼派的部族成员，例如对伊拉克Abu Nimr部落的集体屠杀。为防止类似2006年那场导致它衰落的起义重演，它将残酷暴行视为最佳的预防措施。 2010: Iraq begins unraveling, setting the stage for AQI's comeback 2010年：伊拉克开始解体，并为伊拉克基地组织的回归创造了舞台

【伊拉克前总理Nouri al-Maliki（马利基）。】

ISIS was able to rise from AQI's ashes in no small part because of Iraq's catastrophic internal politics. ISIS之所以能从伊拉克基地组织的废墟之上重新崛起，很大程度上是由于伊拉克灾难性的国内政治。 "Iraq was the essential incubator," according to Fred Hof, who for part of 2012 served as the Obama administration's special adviser for the transition in Syria. “伊拉克是ISIS成长所必需的孵化器”，Fred Hof如此评论道。2012年有段时间，他曾担任奥巴马政府关于叙利亚过渡时期问题的特别顾问。 By 2010, "Iraq finally had relatively good security, a generous state budget, and positive relations among the country’s various ethnic and religious communities," Zaid al-Ali, author of The Struggle for Iraq's Future, wrote in Foreign Policy. But it was squandered. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stripped political opponents of power, appointed his cronies to run the army, and killed peaceful protestors. 到2010年，“伊拉克终于拥有了相对较好的安全局势，宽松的国家预算，国内各种族和宗教群体之间的关系也比较积极，”《挣扎中的伊拉克》的作者Zaid al-Ali在《外交政策》杂志上写道。但这些有利形势最终都被浪费掉了。伊拉克总理Nouri al-Maliki（马利基）剥夺了政敌们的权力，安排自己的亲信控制军队，并且杀害了一些和平抗议者。 Most importantly, he reconstructed the Iraqi state on sectarian lines, privileging the Shia majority over the Sunni minority. This exacerbated Iraq's existing sectarian tensions: Sunni Iraqis falsely believed themselves to be Iraqi's majority (owing to Saddam-era propaganda) and saw Maliki as depriving them of their rightful control of the state. He only deepened their belief that the Iraqi state was fundamentally illegitimate. 而最重要的是，他按照宗教派别重塑了伊拉克，让占人口多数的什叶派获得了比占人口少数的逊尼派更多的特权。这加剧了伊拉克国内本已存在的宗派紧张局势：伊拉克的逊尼派总是误以为他们才是伊拉克真正的“多数派”（这要归因于萨达姆时期的宣传），因而觉得马利基在剥夺他们对国家应有的控制权。逊尼派认为伊拉克现政府根本不具有合法性，而马利基的做法加深了他们的这一信念。 By this time, al-Qaeda in Iraq had a new leader: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi who had a background in serious religious scholarship. Under his leadership, AQI began allying with former officers from Saddam Hussein's army and recruited disaffected Sunnis. Iraq's own government, unintentionally, gave them exactly the opening they needed to regain strength. 此时，伊拉克基地组织有了一位新领袖：巴格达迪，他是一个拥有着严肃宗教学术背景的伊拉克人。在他的领导下，伊拉克基地组织开始与一些前萨达姆军队的军官建立同盟，并且招募了一些对伊拉克现政府极度不满的逊尼派穆斯林。伊拉克政府在不经意间为他们的东山再起提供了绝佳机会。 "Raw political sectarianism in Iraq was the main causal factor [in ISIS's rise]," Hof writes. “伊拉克国内原始的政治宗派斗争是ISIS再次崛起的主要原因，”Hof如此写道。 August 2011: AQI's remnants move into Syria — with a little help from Assad 2011年8月：在阿萨德的一点帮助下，伊拉克基地组织的残余力量进入叙利亚

【叙利亚叛军哀悼战友的死亡。】

Around this same time, Syria erupted in Arab Spring protests that became a civil war. In March 2011, Syrian demonstrators took to the streets to demand Bashar al-Assad step down. Almost right away, the Syrian regime began slaughtering protestors in an attempt to provoke a civil war. 几乎在同一时间，叙利亚 爆发了“阿拉伯之春”运动，而这最终演变成了一场内战。在2011年3月，叙利亚的抗议者占领了大街小巷，要求巴沙尔·阿萨德下台。叙利亚政权很快开始屠杀抗议者，以图引发内战。 "It was very much a strategic decision that the regime made, to militarize the conflict right away," Glenn Robinson, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me in a phone conversation. "I think, in their mind and correctly, if this becomes a political battle where populations matter, the regime probably only has support of a third of the country ... the opposition has the numbers." “迅速地将这场冲突军事化，实际上是阿萨德政权所采取的一项相当有战略意义的决策”，美国海军研究生院的副教授Glenn Robinson在一次电话采访中如此对我说。“我认为，在他们看来，如果这场冲突演变成一场人口因素起重要作用的政治斗争，阿萨德政权可能仅仅能获得全国三分之一人口的支持……反对派则占据着人口的大多数，这个判断是正确的。”【编注：叙利亚1700万人口中，74%为逊尼派，控制政权的阿拉维派（什叶派的一个支派）仅占12%。】 Perhaps the most devious part of this strategy was Assad's deliberate effort to promote Islamic extremism among the opposition. In amnesties issued between March and October 2011, Assad released a significant number (exact counts are hard to know) of extremists from Syrian prisons. Hof called this an "effort to pollute the opposition with sectarianism": Assad gambled that if his enemies were Islamic militants, then the West wouldn't intervene against him. 也许这一策略中最为邪恶的部分在于，阿萨德蓄意地在反对派中散布伊斯兰极端主义。在2011年3月到10月的大赦中，阿萨德从叙利亚监狱中释放了相当数量（很难得知准确数字）的极端分子。Hof称之为“一项试图用宗派主义污染反对派阵营的举措”：阿萨德赌了一把，如果他的敌人是伊斯兰激进武装分子，那么西方各国就不会采取针对他的干预行动。 In August 2011, Baghdadi sent a top deputy, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, to Syria to set up a new branch of the AQI in the country. Joulani succeeded, establishing Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012. Joulani's fighters quickly proved themselves to be some of the most effective fighters on the Syrian battlefield, swelling their ranks with new recruits. 2011年8月，巴格达迪将他的得力副手Abu Mohammad al-Joulani派往叙利亚，以在叙境内建立伊拉克基地组织的新分支。Joulani的行动获得了成功，他在2012年1月建立了一个名为Jabhat al-Nusra（即努斯拉阵线）的组织。Joulani的战士们迅速证明了他们是叙利亚战场上最高效的战斗群体之一，并通过招募大量新成员提升了组织的地位。 At this point, Baghdadi's original group was still in Iraq alone. It had not become ISIS. But to understand how it did, you have to see the larger forces that opened his way. 巴格达迪的组织此时仍仅限于在伊拉克境内活动，它还没有成为那个令人谈之色变的ISIS。如果想要了解它后来是如何做到这一点的，你需要了解一下为巴格达迪铺平道路的那些更加强大力量。 Early 2012: Syrian jihadists get their "angel investors" 2012年初：叙利亚的圣战者迎来了他们的“天使投资人” Today, ISIS is the world's richest terrorist group, its funding coming mostly from various extortion schemes in the territory it controls. But back in 2012, foreign donations played a crucial role in growing the group from the poor organization it was then into the monster it is today. 今天，ISIS是世界上最富有的恐怖组织，它主要依靠在控制区进行各种掠夺来获得资金。但回到2012年，在这个当时还穷困潦倒的组织成长为今天这头恐怖怪兽的过程中，来自国外的捐助扮演了关键角色。 In 2012, money flew into Syria from the Gulf Arab states — places like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The key investments in ISIS didn't come directly from those countries' governments, but rather from private individuals living there who wanted to see the Assad regime fall — and perhaps to promote extremism itself. 2012年，来自波斯湾阿拉伯国家（例如科威特、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔）的资金涌入了叙利亚。ISIS所得到的主要投资并不直接来自这些国家的政府，而是来自生活在这些国家的国民，他们希望看到阿萨德政权倒台——也可能只是为了推行伊斯兰极端主义。 "These rich Arabs are like what 'angel investors' are to tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred," former US Navy Admiral and NATO Supreme Commander James Stavridis told NBC last June. "Groups like al-Nusra and ISIS are better investments for them [than moderates]." “这些阿拉伯富豪所扮演的角色就像是科技初创企业的‘天使投资人’，唯一的区别在于，他们的目的是创立一些旨在煽动仇恨的极端组织，”前美国海军上将和北约总司令James Stavridis将军在去年6月向NBC表示，“（相对于温和派），像努斯拉阵线和ISIS这样的组织对他们而言是更好的投资。” Though these donors have since faded in importance, they were invaluable at the time. "The individuals," Stavridis explained, "act as high rollers early, providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly capable of raising funds through other means, like kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling women into slavery, etc." 虽然这些捐款人的重要性自此逐渐减退，但他们在当时对ISIS是无价之宝。Starvridis将军解释道，“这些富人在早期一掷千金，为极端组织提供了种子基金。而一旦这些组织能够站稳脚跟，他们就完全有能力通过其它的手段获得资金，例如绑架人质，走私石油，将妇女贩卖为奴等等。” But while the Gulf financiers' intent may have been to hurt Assad, they actually ended up propping him up by playing into his strategy of promoting extremism. 虽然这些波斯湾“投资人”最初可能是为了打击阿萨德政权，但结果却是通过散布极端主义而成了阿萨德的棋子，最终帮助了阿萨德。 "It was a service of incalculable value to the Assad regime: It enabled him to say — albeit inaccurately — that he was the alternative to terrorism and sectarianism," Hof told me via email. “这对阿萨德政权是无价之宝：这让他可以说——虽然并不准确——自己是恐怖主义和宗派极端主义之外的另一个选项，”Hof通过电子邮件对我说。 July 2012: The great ISIS prison break begins 2012年7月：ISIS的大规模劫狱行动开始

【伊拉克在2009年重开阿布格莱布监狱。大约四年之后，ISIS从这里释放了500-1000名囚犯。】

There's one chapter of the story of ISIS's rise that very rarely gets mentioned: its spectacular series of attacks on Iraqi prisons in 2012 and 2013. These prison breaks supplied it with a huge infusion of recruits, and also illustrates how effectively ISIS took advantage of the Iraqi government's weakness. 在ISIS的崛起中，有一个很少被人们提起的重要章节：它在2012年和2013年间对伊拉克境内的监狱发动了一系列惊人的袭击。这一系列的劫狱行动为它注入了大量新鲜血液，而这同时也显示了ISIS多么懂得利用伊拉克政府的弱点。 In July 2012, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a statement to his loyalists. "We remind you of your top priority, which is to release the Muslim prisoners everywhere," he said, "and making the pursuit, chase, and killing of their butchers from amongst the judges, detectives, and guards to be on top of the list." 巴格达迪在2012年7月向他的效忠者们发布了如下声明：“我们在此提醒你们，当前的首要任务是在各地解放被关押在监狱里的穆斯林，而从法官、警探和守卫中找出那些迫害他们的人，追捕并杀死这些刽子手，也是你们极其重要的任务。” This was, unambiguously, a call to break former Iraqi insurgents out of jail — and ISIS followed their leader's order. Over the next year, they attacked a number of prisons across Iraq, freeing somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 inmates. 毫无疑问，巴格达迪这是在号召自己的支持者帮助伊拉克的前叛乱分子越狱——而ISIS成员也忠实执行了领袖的命令。在接下来的一年中，他们袭击了伊拉克境内的多所监狱，并放出了其中的大约1000名囚犯。 These included, former CIA analyst Aki Peretz writes, "many terrorists [that] elite US military forces caught over the years and then handed over to the Iraqi government when the United States turned over custody of its prison facilities in 2010." 前中央情报局分析员Aki Peretz写道：“这其中包括许多由美军精英部队在过去数年中抓捕的恐怖分子，在美国2010年向伊拉克移交监狱设施时，他们也被交给了伊拉克政府。” People incarcerated for common crimes were also recruited. "Prisoners convicted of criminal charges provide advantages to the terrorist group, because they could have been recruited during their incarceration," Peretz writes. "Even if common criminals were able to resist jihadist persuasion efforts while in prison, they may now feel indebted to their 'liberators.'" 一些之前因普通罪行而被送进监狱的人也在ISIS的招募之列。“受过犯罪指控的囚犯对恐怖组织很有价值，因为他们可能在服刑期间就已经被招募了，”Peretz写道，“这些普通罪犯即使在狱中能够经受住圣战分子的劝说，他们在逃出监狱之后也可能对这些‘解放者’心存感激。” This won ISIS a rapid infusion of manpower — and also illustrates that well before the 2014 crisis, we had signs that the Iraqi state was falling apart in a way that would empower extremists. The ISIS crisis didn't come out of nowhere, in other words: It was a slow motion disaster with plenty of advance warning. 这为ISIS迅速注入了大量人力——同时也表明，早在2014年的危机之前很久，已经有了一些迹象让我们就能够看到伊拉克国家的解体方式将会增强极端势力。ISIS危机并不是凭空出现的，换句话说：这实际上是一场“慢动作”的灾难，而且有着大量的预先警示。 April 2013: ISIS officially becomes ISIS — and divorces al-Qaeda 2013年4月：ISIS正式成为“伊斯兰国”——并与“基地组织”分道扬镳

【一个ISIS战士拿着组织的旗帜。】

As all this was happening, Baghdadi's organization was still named al-Qaeda in Iraq. But Baghdadi worried that Joulani — his commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, the group in Syria — was acting too independently and would quit AQI to make Jabhat al-Nusra a separate group. 发生了那么多事情，巴格达迪的组织在此时仍然叫伊拉克基地组织。但是巴格达迪开始担心，他的手下Joulani——也就是叙利亚努斯拉阵线的首领——行动变得过于独立，而这可能会让他决定退出伊拉克基地组织，将努斯拉阵线变成一个独立的组织。 In April 2013, Baghdadi did something dramatic: He asserted unilateral control over all al-Qaeda operations in both Syria and Iraq. To demonstrate this change, he renamed AQI "the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria" — or ISIS, for short. 2013年4月，巴格达迪做了一件戏剧性的事情：他声称自己单方面控制了叙利亚和伊拉克境内所有的基地组织行动。为了证明这一点，他将伊拉克基地组织更名为“伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国”——简称ISIS。 This didn't sit well with Joulani, who appealed to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, who'd never really trusted AQI, sided with Joulani — a decision that Baghdadi rejected. ISIS and al-Qaeda eventually split, dividing the jihadist movement in Syria. 而Joulani则对此感到不满，他向基地组织领导人Ayman al-Zawahiri（即扎瓦赫里）申诉此事。扎瓦赫里从来就没有信任过伊拉克基地组织，他站在了Joulani一边——而巴格达迪则抵制了他的这一决定。ISIS和基地组织最终分道扬镳了，叙利亚境内的圣战运动也就此分裂。 This left ISIS to "gradually emerge as an autonomous component within the Syrian conflict," Brookings Doha's Charles Lister writes, by absorbing Nusra fighters and territory in northern and eastern Syria. It ended up taking firm control of much of this territory, establishing a de facto capital in the northern city of Raqqa. 在这之后，通过在叙利亚北部和东部地区吸收努斯拉阵线的战士和领地，ISIS“作为一个完全独立的组织逐渐在叙利亚内战中成长壮大”，布鲁金斯学会多哈分会的Charles Lister写道。最终，ISIS牢牢地控制了该区域的大部分地区，并在叙利亚北部城市拉卡建立了一个实质上的首都。 Assad, for his part, was perfectly happy to leave ISIS alone — particularly as it primarily fought other rebel groups. "ISIS almost never fought the Assad regime," Robinson says. "They were much more focused on fighting other opposition groups and gaining land their opponents had already acquired." 对于阿萨德来说，他非常乐于对ISIS置之不理——部分原因是它主要在与叙利亚的其它叛军组织作战。“ISIS几乎从来没有和阿萨德政权打过仗，”Robinson说。“他们更专注于和其它反对派组织作战，并且抢占他们的领地。” By February 2014, Zawahiri had had enough. He formally exiled ISIS from al-Qaeda, leading to what Zelin describes as "open warfare in Syria" between the groups. Today, the groups continue to struggle over territory and ideological control over the global jihadist movement. 到2014年2月，扎瓦赫里终于受够了ISIS的所作所为。他正式将ISIS逐出了基地组织，这导致了这两个组织间开始爆发冲突，Zelin称之为“叙利亚境内的公开战争”。直至今天，ISIS和基地组织仍然在争夺领地，以及对全球伊斯兰圣战运动的意识形态控制权。 This dynamic, in part, drives ISIS's brutality: One of the group's key means of capturing foreign fighters' hearts and minds is through public, over-the-top slaughter that wins their attention. 这在一定程度上也助长了ISIS的残暴作风：该组织在吸引外国战士的人心方面最强的杀手锏之一，就是通过公开而极端残暴的屠杀行为来吸引注意。 June 2014: ISIS sweeps northern Iraq and declares a caliphate 2014年6月：ISIS横扫伊拉克北部，并宣布建立哈里发国家

【Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi。（巴格达迪）】

This is the moment when everything that had happened before in ISIS's rise came to a head. On June 10, 2014, a force of about 800 ISIS fighters defeated 30,000 Iraqi government troops to capture Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. In the next two days, ISIS fighters swept through Iraq's heavily Sunni northwestern and central provinces — coming, at their peak, extremely close to Baghdad. 经过之前所发生的一切之后，ISIS的崛起迎来了高潮。2014年6月10日，一支由800名ISIS战士组成的军队战胜了3万名伊拉克政府军，攻占伊拉克第二大城市摩苏尔。其后两天，ISIS战士横扫了逊尼派人口集中的伊拉克西北部和中部省份——在他们推进到最远的时候，曾一度非常接近巴格达。 This blitzkrieg built on months of ISIS momentum. In January, ISIS had seized control of Fallujah, a former AQI stronghold in western Iraq. The Iraqi government's repeated inability to retake Fallujah in the following months illustrated the depleted and incompetent state of the Iraqi army after years of Maliki's mismanagement. 这场闪电战建立在ISIS持续数月的凌厉攻势之上。在1月份，ISIS已经占领了费卢杰——伊拉克基地组织之前在伊拉克西部的重要堡垒。伊拉克政府军在之后几个月中数次试图夺回对费卢杰的控制权，但全都无功而返，这也表现出在马利基多年的糟糕治理之后，伊拉克政府军已经筋疲力尽，无力回天。 The conquest of Mosul and much of northern Iraq led a triumphant Baghdadi to declare his territory a "caliphate" on July 4. By this, Baghdadi meant that ISIS was now a state — and not just any state but the only Islamically legitimate state in the world. All Muslims, Baghdadi said, were obligated to support the nascent Islamic state in its struggle to hold and expand its land. 征服摩苏尔以及伊拉克北部大片地区，令志得意满的巴格达迪在7月4日宣布在他领地上建立了一个“哈里发国”。巴格达迪想借此宣示ISIS现在是一个国家——不是一个平常的国家，而是全球唯一在伊斯兰教义上合法的国家。巴格达迪表示，所有的穆斯林都有义务支持这个新生的伊斯兰国守卫并扩张领土。 Establishing a caliphate had long been the goal of the entire jihadist movement. By declaring that he had actually created one, Baghdadi gained a huge leg up on al-Qaeda in the struggle for global jihadist supremacy. 建立一个哈里发国一直以来都是整个伊斯兰圣战运动的目标。通过宣称建立一个这样的国家，巴格达迪在对全球伊斯兰圣战运动领导权的争夺中，获得了相对于基地组织的巨大优势。 Since then, ISIS has "succeeded in attracting far, far more recruits" than al-Qaeda, Will McCants, the director of the Brookings Institution's Project on US Relations With the Islamic World, told me. This has also has allowed it to gain a following among foreign terrorist groups, with major ISIS franchises in Libya, Egypt's Sinai desert, and Nigeria. 从那以后，ISIS比基地组织“成功地招募到了多得多的新鲜血液”，布鲁金斯学会美国与伊斯兰世界关系研究项目主任Will McCants如此对我说。这还使得ISIS能够获得其它境外恐怖组织的效忠，这些追随者主要在利比亚，埃及的西奈沙漠和尼日利亚。 But ISIS had also taken a task with burdens beyond what it can perhaps sustain. By committing to actually governing a swath of territory in Syria and Iraq as a state, ISIS couldn't rely purely on insurgent tactics or hiding among civilians. It needed to engage in pitched conventional battles to defend its land. 但与此同时，ISIS也承担了一项超出其能力的任务。由于承诺将叙利亚和伊拉克的一片土地作为一个国家来治理，ISIS不能继续仅仅依赖武装暴乱或是藏身于平民之中这类策略。它将要面对守卫领土的常规战斗。 "When they declared the caliphate, their legitimacy came to rest on the continuing viability of their state," Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told me last October. In the coming year, this would prove to be a serious problem for the group. “当他们宣布建立哈里发国，他们的合法性就建立在这个国家持续生存的状态之上，”保卫民主基金会的一位资深研究员Daveed Gartenstein-Ross去年十月对我说。在之后的一年中，事实证明这是ISIS所面对的一个严重问题。 August 2014: ISIS makes its first huge mistake — invading Kurdistan 2014年8月：ISIS犯下第一个大错——入侵库尔德斯坦

【2015年，一个身处与ISIS战争前线的库尔德战士】

Ever since its AQI days, ISIS had been prone to ideological and political overstretch. 从伊拉克基地组织年代开始，ISIS就已经热衷于在意识形态和政治上的过度扩张。 "To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law," Graeme Wood explains in an excellent Atlantic feature on ISIS's theology. One condition is that "the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law." Once the caliphate is established, "the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph." “一个人如果想成为哈里发，就必须满足逊尼派教法中所规定的诸多条件，”Graeme Wood在一篇发表在《大西洋月刊》上的关于ISIS宗教意识形态的出色专题文章中写道。其中一个条件就是“哈里发必须拥有一块他能够实施伊斯兰教法的领土。”一旦建立了哈里发国家，“发动战争以扩张哈里发国的领土就成为了哈里发本人的一项重要责任。” Everything we know about ISIS suggests that both its fighters and Baghdadi himself earnestly believe this. This is what led them to attack Iraq's Kurds. 从我们对ISIS的了解来看，不论是ISIS战士还是巴格达迪本人都虔诚地相信这一点。而这也导致了他们攻击伊拉克库尔德人。 Iraq's Kurdish minority controls a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Iraq, and has a powerful military force known as the peshmerga. For the first half of 2014, they had been content to sit out the ISIS conflict. 伊拉克的库尔德少数民族控制着伊拉克东北部一块半自治的区域，并且拥有一支被称为“自由战士”的强大军事力量。在2014年上半年，他们还安于与ISIS井水不犯河水的状态。 But in August 2014, ISIS decided to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, quickly advancing to within several miles of the capital, Erbil. It also launched a genocidal campaign against a minority group known as the Yazidi, who are ethnically Kurdish. 但在2014年8月，ISIS决定入侵伊拉克的库尔德斯坦，并迅速推进到库尔德斯坦首府阿尔比尔之外仅仅数英里的地方。它还发动了一场针对少数教派雅兹迪派的种族清洗行动，而雅兹迪人在种族上属于库尔德人。 This brought the peshmerga into the war, which have since dealt ISIS a series of stinging defeats. It also drew the United States into the war: President Obama's bombing campaign against ISIS initially began as a limited intervention to protect American personnel in Erbil and stem the slaughter of the Yazidis. ISIS的这一行径令库尔德“自由战士”加入战团，并多次痛击ISIS。美国也卷了进来：奥巴马总统对ISIS的轰炸行动最初就是为了保护阿尔比尔的美国人并阻止对雅兹迪人的屠杀而实行的一项有限干预措施。 ISIS's progress into Kurdistan was reversed. Pressed by Kurds, a regrouping Iraqi military, Iranian-backed Shia militias, and US aircraft, ISIS began to fall back. By early 2015, ISIS began taking losses: The heavily Sunni city of Tikrit fell to Iraqi forces in April. ISIS进军库尔德斯坦失败了。在库尔德人，重新集结的伊拉克军队，由伊朗支持的什叶派武装，以及美国空军的共同打压之下，ISIS开始撤退。到2015年初，ISIS开始遭受进一步的损失：逊尼派居民占多数的提克里特的控制权在4月被伊拉克军队夺走。 "The Islamic State ... will lose its battle to hold territory in Iraq," Douglas Ollivant, the former national security adviser for Iraq under both George W. Bush and Obama, wrote in War on the Rocks this February. "The outcome in Iraq is now clear to most serious analysts." “伊斯兰国...将无法守住他们在伊拉克的领地，”曾在布什政府和奥巴马政府担任伊拉克问题国家安全顾问的Douglas Ollivant在今年二月发表在网站War on the Rocks上的一篇文章中写道。“绝大多数严肃的分析家都已经看清了他们在伊拉克的结局。” June 2015: ISIS's capital comes under threat 2015年6月：ISIS的首都受到威胁

【6月25日左右叙利亚北部战线的地图。注意库尔德人的阵地离拉卡有多近。】

In Syria, things had long looked better for ISIS than they had in Iraq: the multi-sided civil war meant that there was no unified, reliable force to challenge them. But in mid-2015, Syrian Kurds began threatening ISIS's territory. 一直以来，ISIS在叙利亚所面临的局面看起来都要比在伊拉克好得多：多方内战意味着不会有联合武装力量持续向他们发起挑战。但是在2015年年中，叙利亚的库尔德人也开始威胁ISIS在叙境内的领地。 ISIS, as in Iraq, had attempted to invade and conquer the territory within Syria that is dominated by Kurdish groups — and came damn close. In October 2014, ISIS nearly seized Kobane, a Kurdish stronghold on Syria's northern border with Turkey. 就像在伊拉克一样，ISIS也曾经在叙利亚境内试图侵略并征服由库尔德人统治的领地——并且差一点就得逞了。2014年10月，ISIS几乎攻占了库尔德人在叙利亚北部与土耳其接壤的边境要塞科巴尼。 But the Kurds held out for months. In January, aided by US support and US-led coalition air strikes, they pushed ISIS out of Kurdish territory. Then they kept going, seizing ISIS territory elsewhere in Syria. They advanced to within 30 miles of ISIS's de facto capital at Raqqa. 但是库尔德人坚守了数月。2015年1月，在美国的支持以及美军主导的多国联合轰炸之下，他们将ISIS从库尔德人的领地中赶了出去。之后他们进一步攻占了ISIS在叙利亚境内的一些其它领地，甚至推进到离ISIS的实际首都拉卡不到30英里的位置。 The Soufan Group, a private intelligence firm focusing on terrorism, described the Kurdish-led advance on Raqqa as the "most serious symbolic and meaningful threat [to ISIS] since it declared itself a caliphate almost one year ago." 专门关注恐怖主义的私人情报公司Soufan集团，将库尔德人领导的向拉卡进军的行动称作“自从大约一年前ISIS宣称成为一个哈里发国之后，它所遭受的最具象征意义和实际意义的威胁。” These Kurdish victories showed that ISIS was running up against the limits of its military strategy. Since last June, the group has been fighting too many enemies on too many different fronts. Its ability to maneuver rapidly around its territory has been limited by coalition airstrikes. Slowly but steadily, it has been losing ground. 库尔德人的胜利表明，ISIS所采取的行动超出了其军事能力的上限。自从去年6月开始，他们已经在太多的战线上与太多的敌人作战。它在自己领地内部的快速机动应变能力也受到了多国联合空袭的限制。事实上，它正在缓慢而稳定地失去根据地。 ISIS "lost something like 25 percent of their territory" since its peak last summer, McCants says. 相比去年夏天的顶峰，ISIS已经“失去了他们大约25%的领地”，McCants说道。 Autumn 2015: ISIS turns to international terrorism 2015年秋：ISIS开始发动国际性恐怖袭击

【巴黎Bataclan音乐厅周围的哀悼者】

On November 13, terrorists attacked several locations around Paris, killing more than 130 and wounding more than 380. ISIS claimed responsibility, and the French government has said that it believes the group was responsible. 在今年11月13日，恐怖分子在巴黎的多个地点发动了恐怖袭击，造成130多人死亡，380多人受伤。ISIS宣称对此次恐怖袭击负责，而法国政府在之前也已表示他们相信ISIS应对此次事件负责。 So why, as it slowly loses ground in Iraq and Syria, bit by bit losing the caliphate that has been its primary focus, might ISIS be sending fighters abroad at this critical moment? 那么，当ISIS正慢慢地在伊拉克和叙利亚丧失阵地，一点点失去这个曾是它主要奋斗目标的哈里发国之时，为什么却在这个生死攸关的时刻将它的战士们送到国外去发动恐怖袭击呢？ ISIS thrives on a narrative of victory. In order to sell itself as the prophesied return of the caliphate, it needs to show that its victories are inevitable and divinely inspired. If it's losing territory, then it needs to sell its narrative through other means. That means claiming "victory" over foreign enemies by hitting them with terrorist attacks. Indeed, Paris wasn't the only foreign attack ISIS has launched: ISIS suicide bombers have hit Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. It also claimed responsibility for taking down a Russian civilian airliner in Egypt's Sinai desert. ISIS是建立在一个关于胜利的叙事之上的。为了将自己塑造成伊斯兰预言中的哈里发帝国的形象，它需要展示出它的胜利是必然而神启的。如果它正在失去领土，那么它就必须通过其它方式来延续这个胜利的叙事。通过向外国敌人发动恐怖袭击来表示 “战胜了”他们，便是一种方式。显然，巴黎惨案并不是ISIS在国外所发动的唯一恐怖袭击：ISIS在科威特，黎巴嫩和沙特阿拉伯都发动过自杀式炸弹袭击。它还宣称对在埃及西奈沙漠中炸毁俄罗斯民用客机的事件负责。 "Much of ISIS's ideological support and recruiting strength emanates from a narrative that it is victorious," J.M. Berger, the co-author of ISIS: A State of Terror, explains via email. The Paris attack "changes the conversation from 'ISIS is contained' on November 12 to 'ISIS is rampaging uncontrollably' on November 14." “ISIS在意识形态上所获得的支持以及招募新员的能力在很大程度上都建立在一个它是胜利者的叙事之上，”《ISIS：一个恐怖国家》的合著者J.M. Berger在电子邮件中向我解释道。巴黎恐怖袭击“将人们所谈论的话题从11月12日的‘ISIS已经受到遏制’转变为了11月14日的‘ISIS的疯狂行为完全不受控制’。” Moreover, ISIS may believe that terrorist attacks are its best way of striking back against — and maybe, it believes, deterring — foreign attacks. (The French are part of the US-led coalition bombing ISIS in Syria and Iraq). That conclusion would likely be wrong, but ISIS may still believe it. 此外，ISIS可能还相信恐怖袭击是回击——甚至是阻止——外国敌人攻击的最佳方式。（法国参与了美国主导的对叙利亚和伊拉克境内ISIS的联合轰炸）。这个结论很可能是错误的，但ISIS也许仍然执着地相信这一点。 "I think it has made the calculation that it can no longer pursue its expansion strategy in Syria and Iraq without changing the calculations of the enemies currently halting its expansion," McCants says. "These attacks would be a way of inflicting costs on them." “我认为ISIS应该已经算计过，凭借自己身的实力，如果不改变那些正在阻止它扩张的敌人所面对的利害格局，它就无法继续实施在叙利亚和伊拉克的扩张策略，”McCants如此说道。“这些恐怖袭击就是对敌人们造成伤害的一种方式。” But here's one final scary twist: ISIS may not have planned it at all. The attack could have been independently undertaken by European IS

人类进化历程中的音乐 Music in Human Evolution 作者：Kevin Simler @ 2015-10-16 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 来源：Melting Asphalt，http://www.meltingasphalt.com/music-in-human-evolution/ I just finished the strangest, most disconcerting little book. It's called Why Do People Sing?: Music in Human Evolution by Joseph Jordania. 我刚刚读完了一本让人称奇，又极为令人不安的小书——Joseph Jordania的《为什么人们会唱歌？——人类进化历程中的音乐》。 If the title hasn't already piqued your interest, its thesis surely will. The thesis is wild, bold, and original, but makes an eerie amount of sense. If true, it would be a revolution — and I don't use the term lightly — in how we understand the evolution of music, cooperation, warfare, and even religion. 如果这个标题还不足以激起你的兴趣，那么书中的理论一定会让你兴味盎然。该书论点狂野大胆又富于原创，但却合乎情理到可怕的程度。如果成立，它将成为我们理解音乐，人类合作，战争甚至宗教之演化过程的一项革命性理论——我一般不轻易使用“革命性”这个词。 I have my reservations about Jordania's theory (and his book), but I'll save them for a later time. As Daniel Dennett once wrote about another remarkable theory: 对于Jordania的理论（以及这本书）我仍有一些保留意见，但我打算把它们留到以后再讨论。正如Daniel Dennett曾就另一项卓越理论所写道的：

I think first it is very important to understand [the] project, to see a little bit more about what the whole shape of it is, and delay the barrage of nitpicking objections and criticisms until we have seen what the edifice as a whole is. After all, on the face of it, [the project] is preposterous... [but] I take it very seriously. 我认为首要的任务是理解这项理论，多看看它的整体是什么样的，在我们完全看清整个理论大厦前，不要急着接二连三地提出那些挑剔的反对和批评。尽管该理论表面看来荒诞不经……但我会很认真地对待它。

These are exactly my feelings about Jordania's project. Seemingly preposterous, but worth taking very seriously. 对于Jordania的工作，我的感觉也正是如此。它看似荒谬，却值得我们非常认真地对待。 0.STYLIZED FACTS 0.典型事实 I'm going to share Jordania's theory with you, but first I want to present a set of "stylized facts" — curious, disparate, and nearly inexplicable phenomena that would seem to have little relation to each other. Then I'll present the theory that (uncannily) links them all together and explains everything. 下面我将与你分享Jordania的理论，但首先，我想向你呈现一组“典型事实”——这是一组奇怪的，完全不同的，而且几乎无法解释的现象，互相之间看起来也没什么联系。之后，我会展示这项能够（以一种不可思议的方式）将它们联系在一起并且解释这一切现象的理论。 OK, brace yourself. Here come the facts: 打起精神，做好准备。让我们来看看这些“典型事实”：

• When our ancestors [1] first moved from the forest to the savannah, we were not yet capable of making tools. But early hominid evolution tended away from a physiology that would have helped us hunt and/or defend ourselves from predators. Our canine teeth receded, we became slower and weaker, and we didn't develop tough skin (in fact the opposite).
• 当我们的祖先第一次从森林中迁徙到热带稀树草原时，人类还没有获得制造工具的能力。但从生理学上看，早期原始人类的进化却并不利于人们狩猎以及防御捕食者。人类的犬齿退化了，运动变得缓慢，身体也变得更弱，而且也没有进化出坚韧的皮肤（事实上恰恰相反）。
• Lion evolution and migration seems to have mirrored early hominid patterns, both spatiotemporally and (in some ways) behaviorally and morphologically. Lions, for example, are the only social species of cat.
• 狮子的进化以及迁徙模式看起来与早期人类恰好互为镜像，不论从时间和空间上，还是从（某些方面的）行为和形态上说都是如此。举个例子，狮子是唯一一种群居的猫科动物。
• Humans are the only ground-dwelling species that sings. There are over 4000 singing species — mostly birds, but also gibbons, dolphins, whales, and seals. But they all sing from water or the trees. When a bird lands on the ground, it invariably stops singing.
• 人类是唯一一种会唱歌的地栖动物。世界上有超过4000种会唱歌的物种——其中大多数都是鸟类，此外还包括长臂猿，海豚，鲸类和海豹。但是这些物种全都是在水中或者树上唱歌。不论哪种鸟类，一旦降落到陆地上，它都会停止歌唱。
• Of all singing creatures, humans are the only ones who use rhythm.
• 在所有会唱歌的生物中，人类是唯一会使用韵律的。
• When we sing, we almost always dance, even if it's just nodding along or tapping a foot. Both singing and dancing (whether together or separate) are group activities used across the world in tribal bonding rituals. Isolated ethnic groups have remarkably similar styles of song and dance.
• 当我们唱歌时，我们几乎也总会跳起舞来，即使这种“舞蹈”也许仅仅是随着歌声点头，或者用脚打着节拍。歌唱和舞蹈（不论是同时或是分开进行的）是在世界各地的部落情感强化仪式中广泛使用的集体活动。相互孤立的族群常有着非常相似的歌曲和舞蹈风格。
• Rhythmic chanting and dancing induce trance states.
• 有节律的吟唱和舞蹈会诱导人进入恍惚状态。
• Early hominids quite possibly ate their dead, and (some while later) definitely started burying them. The instinct to preserve a dead human body from mutilation, and then to dispose of it, is fairly universal. E.g. we strive to retrieve corpses even from a battlefield.
• 早期的原始人很有可能食用同类尸体，但（在晚些时候）肯定开始埋葬尸体了。保护尸体不被损毁，将尸体妥善处置，是一种相当普遍的人类本能。一个典型的例证是，人们即使在战场上也会努力将同伴的尸体取回。

I hope you are intrigued. Each of these facts is hard to explain even in isolation. So a theory that can unify and account for all of them will have to be either profound or crazy — or both. 我希望上述事实激发了你的好奇心。这些事实中的每一条即使是孤立地来看也很难解释。一个能对这些事实做出统一解释的理论要么很深刻，要么很疯狂——也许二者兼有。 At this point I'm going to present Jordania's theory as clearly and comprehensively as I can. I'll interpolate a bit and add my own explanatory flare, but the ideas come straight out of his book. 接下来我将尽可能清晰而全面地展示Jordania的理论。我会不时插入一些自己的解释性看法，但其中的观点则直接来自于他的著作。 1.HUNTERS OR SCAVENGERS? 1.猎人还是腐食者？ When human ancestors first descended from the trees and stepped out onto the grasslands, they faced two critical problems: acquiring food and defending themselves from predators. We'll discuss food acquisition in this section and defense in the next section, but as you'll see they're linked by a similar mechanism. 当人类祖先第一次从树上下来走进草原时，他们面临着两个至关重要的问题：获取食物以及防御捕食者的捕杀。我们会这一节里讨论食物的获取，之后在下一节里讨论防御问题。但正如你将看到的，这两个问题实际上是由一种类似的机制联系在一起的。 I hadn't thought deeply about these problems until I read Jordania's book. I always imagined, naively, that early humans had been "hunter-gatherers." While this is true of later humans, it's almost certainly not true of our earliest savannah-dwelling ancestors. Gathering? yes. But hunting, especially big-game hunting, was out of the question. As I mentioned, our earliest ancestors hadn't yet learned how to make or use tools beyond simple rocks and sticks, and we were fairly weak. 在读到Jordania的书之前，我从来没有深入地思考过这些问题。我总是天真地设想，早期人类是“狩猎-采集者”。虽然之后的人类的确如此，但对于最早生活在热带稀树草原上的人类祖先而言，这几乎是不可能的。他们会采集食物吗？是的。但是狩猎，尤其是大规模的群体狩猎，则是完全不现实的。我之前提到过，除了简单的石块和树枝以外，我们最早的祖先还没有学会如何制造和使用工具，而且人类的身体也相当弱。 Yet we certainly ate meat — the archaeological record is pretty clear on that. So there's a growing consensus that we were actually scavengers (or perhaps "scavenger-gatherers"). 但是当时的人类显然是吃肉的——在这方面有相当清楚的考古学证据。所以现在学术界有了一种越来越强的共识，认为早期人类实际上是食腐者（或者也可称为“食腐-采集者”）。 Now there are two types of scavenging, two strategies for "carcass acquisition": passive and confrontational. Passive scavenging occurs when the scavenger comes across an undefended carcass. If the carcass was the result of a natural (non-predatory) death, there will be plenty to eat, assuming the scavenger finds it before putrefaction sets in (about 48 hours). 食腐行为可以分为两类，分别对应着两种不同的获取尸体方式：被动式获取和对抗式获取。当食腐者发现一具无守卫的尸体时，我们称之为被动式食腐。如果尸体是自然死亡（而非被捕食）的结果，就会有大量可供食用的肉，前提是食腐者能在尸体腐烂之前找到它（这个时间窗口约为48小时）。 But even if the carcass was killed and eaten by a predator, there's going to be some meat left on the bone. And, just as important, inside the bone. Marrow was an excellent source of calories for our early ancestors, and we were in a unique position to access it, since we could use rocks as primitive tools to break the bones open. 但即使尸体被某个掠食者杀死并吃掉，骨头上也会剩下一些肉。而且同样重要的是，在骨头里面也有可供食用的东西。对于我们早期祖先而言，骨髓是一种优质的能量来源，而且人类在获取骨髓方面处于独特的优势地位，因为人类可以将石头作为一种原始工具将骨头砸开。 The archeological record shows bones that were repeatedly smashed with "hammering stones," as well as bones that had scrape-marks, indicating that we also used sharp stones to carve off some of the clingier meat. 考古学记录显示，有些骨头被反复地用“锤石”敲碎，而有些骨头上则有刮擦的痕迹，这表明人类同样会使用锋利的石头以切下一些粘在骨头上的肉。 Now, confrontational scavenging is where it gets interesting — and also more circumstantial. Confrontational scavenging, also known as power or aggressive scavenging, happens when an animal (or group of animals) comes across a carcass that's in the process of being eaten, whether by the original predator or another scavenger. In this case, a confrontation ensues, and to the victor go the spoils. 相对来说，对抗式的食腐行为则更有趣，虽然支持证据也更为间接。对抗式食腐也被称为力量式或侵略式食腐，它通常是指当一只（或一群）动物遭遇了一具正在被其他动物（可能是最初的捕食者，也可能是其它食腐者）食用的尸体。在这种情况下，对抗随之而来，而胜者则将获得战利品。 Whether our ancestors practiced confrontational scavenging is hard to determine, given the evidence available to us at this point, but it's not a crazy idea. It happens all the time in the (non-human) animal kingdom, as when a pack of hyenas scares a lion away from its kill. 通过当前所能获得的证据，我们很难确定人类祖先是否有过对抗式食腐行为，但这并不是一个疯狂的想法。在动物王国（不包括人类）中，对抗式的食腐行为时刻都在发生，例如一群鬣狗会将一头狮子从它杀死的猎物身边吓走。 2.DEFENSE FROM PREDATORS 2.防御捕食者的捕杀 Along with finding food, defense from predators is crucial to the survival of any species, and ours presents a puzzle. 除了寻找食物之外，防御捕食者的捕杀对于任何物种的生存而言都至关重要，而我们祖先在这方面则给我们留下了一个谜题。 We definitely had predators — lions, principally, but also other big cats (jaguars, leopards), as well as hyenas and maybe crocodiles. (Or more accurately, the ancestors of those species, since they've been evolving just as we have. Hyena-ancestors, for example, were much larger than their modern descendants.) 很明显，有些动物会捕杀人类——主要是狮子，但也包括其它的大型猫科动物（美洲虎，豹子等），此外，鬣狗，可能还有鳄鱼，也会将人类当作捕猎对象。（更准确地说，是这些动物的祖先，因为和人类一样，这些物种也一直在进化。举例来说，鬣狗的祖先就比它们生活在今天的后代要大得多。） Physically, early humans were quite weak — and getting weaker with each generation. As I mentioned earlier, our canines were receding and our skin was growing softer. And we were getting bigger, it's true, but not stronger. Our size developed in service of bipedalism, which made us both weaker and slower(!). 从身体上说，早期人类是很弱的——而且还在一代代地变得更弱。正如我之前所提到的，人类的犬齿在退化，而且皮肤也变得更加柔软。人类的体型在变得更大，这是事实，但并没有变得更强壮。人类的体型是为了适应两足行走而变得更大，但这却让人类的身体变得更弱，也变得更慢。 A chimpanzee, for instance, is roughly twice as strong as a modern human, and can run just as fast if not faster. In the general case, bipedalism results in slower sprinting speeds, even if it increases efficiency (allowing us to walk/run for longer stretches). 例如，黑猩猩身体的强壮程度大约是现代人的两倍，而且并不比人类跑得慢。总体上说，两足行走降低了人类短距离奔跑的速度，即使它的确提升了效率（这让我们能够行走/奔跑更长的距离）。 Across the animal kingdom there are various strategies for evading or defending against predators, known in the literature as antipredator adaptations. Each adaptation defends against one of the four stages of predation: detection, attack, capture, and consumption. 在整个动物王国中，存在许多不同的躲避或防御捕食者捕杀的策略，这些策略在文献中被称为反捕食者适应性。每一种适应性都是为了防御猎食过程中的四个阶段之一：侦查、攻击、捕捉和摄食。 To evade detection, for example, most species pursue a strategy of crypsis, aka hiding. To evade capture, species rely on speed, burrowing, climbing into trees, etc. And to evade consumption, species develop physical defenses like claws, fangs, horns, shells (or at least a tough hide), venom, etc. 例如，为了躲避捕食者的侦查，多数物种都会采用一种保护色策略，或者叫隐藏策略。而不同的物种会依靠速度、挖洞、爬树等不同方式来躲避捕食者的捕捉。为了逃避捕食者的摄食，各物种进化出了多种身体上的防御机制，例如利爪、尖牙、长角、贝壳（或至少是一个坚硬的藏身之所）、毒液等等。 But early humans weren't doing any of these things. Physiologically, we weren't getting stronger or faster, or developing sharper claws or teeth or tougher skin. Nor were we trying to hide. Habitual bipedalism has its benefits, but going unnoticed in the grass certainly isn't one of them. 但是早期人类却没有做到以上的任何一件事情。生理上，人类没有变得更强壮或更快速，也没有进化出尖利的爪牙或强韧的皮肤。人类也没有试图将自己隐藏起来。习惯于两足行走当然有它的好处，但是这却让人类无法在草丛里行走时不被发现。 In fact, we seem to have evolved to become more noticeable, more conspicuous. We grew taller, we sang and made noise (the only animal who sings from the ground), we painted our bodies, and we developed strong body odor. [2] 事实上，人类似乎进化得更加容易引起注意了。人类变得更高，唱歌并且发出噪音（人类是唯一一种会在地上唱歌的动物），在身体上绘上色彩，并且进化出了浓重的体味。[2] The strategy of being conspicuous is known as aposematism: apo (away from) + sematism (signalling) = counter-signalling. Aposematism is an antipredator adaptation which prevents an attack from happening in the first place, by making it easier for the predator to recognize you as unprofitable. 这种故意引起注意的策略通常被称作“警示信号”（aposematism）：这个词的词根apo-意为“远离”，-sematism则意为“信号”，合起来的意思就是“反向信号”。“警示信号”是一种能从根源上防止捕食者发动攻击的反捕食者适应性策略，它让捕食者很容易地意识到将你作为捕食对象是一件无利可图的事情。 Species who counter-signal (aposematically) abound in nature, but they all have something up their sleeves, so to speak. Being conspicuous is a viable strategy only when you're advertising an otherwise invisible weapon. Consider the following aposematic species from across the animal kingdom: 自然世界中有许多采取这类（有警示作用的）“反向信号”策略的物种，但是可以说所有这些物种都有自己的杀手锏。只有当你的行为实际上是为了突出某种看不见的武器时，故意引起注意才是一个有效的策略。让我们来看看动物王国中的这些采用“警示信号”策略的物种：

• skunks and zorillas
• 臭鼬和非洲臭鼬
• bees, wasps, hornets, and velvet ants
• 蜜蜂，黄蜂，大黄蜂和蚁蜂
• black widows and redback spiders
• 黑寡妇蜘蛛和红背蜘蛛
• poison dart frogs and fire salamanders
• 箭毒蛙和火蜥蜴
• all manner of snakes, e.g. the coral snake
• 各种各样的蛇，例如珊瑚蛇
• flamboyant cuttlefish
• 火焰乌贼

Each of these species has a powerful defensive weapon — often some kind of venom/poison, but also noxious odors. And most species advertise this with distinctive coloration (bright and high-contrast), but some use other signals. Rattlesnakes and bees use sound, for example, and many species, including zorillas, 'mark their territory' using scents. [3] 所有的这些物种都拥有各自强大的防御武器——通常是某种毒液或毒物，也有一些是有毒气体。而其中大多数物种都会通过独特的颜色（艳丽而对比度鲜明的）来给自己的武器打广告，但有些物种也会通过其它信号来达到这个目的。例如，响尾蛇和蜜蜂使用声音，而包括非洲臭鼬在内的许多物种则通过气味来“标识”自己的领地。 Aposematism (being conspicuous) doesn't help an organism in a single encounter with a predator; in fact it's a liability. But it helps with repeated encounters. When a predator gets sprayed by a skunk or stung by a bee, it quickly learns to avoid future encounters with all members of the species. 这种（故意引起注意的）“警示信号”策略无法孤立地在一次与捕食者的遭遇中帮助某一个体逃出生天；事实上，这反而是一种拖累。但是一旦与捕食者的遭遇频繁地重复发生，这种策略就能发挥作用。当某个捕食者被臭鼬放出的气体熏到或是被蜂刺蜇过之后，它会迅速地学会在以后尽量避免去碰这些不好惹的物种。 All of this raises a most important question: how did early humans manage to get away with aposematism? What defensive weapons did we have up our sleeves? 所有这些都引出了一个最为重要的问题：早期人类是如何做到通过“警示信号”让捕食者远离自己的？他们到底有什么能够用于防身的“杀手锏”？ The answer probably won't surprise you: we used stones. It's how we used them (section 4) that's so unusual. 答案大概不会让你感到吃惊：人类会使用石器。但不寻常的地方则在于人类使用石器的方式（我们会在第4节讨论这个话题）。 3.STONES 3.石器 Stones were the most fundamental weapon at our disposal — the only means we had of causing actual physical damage to another animal. 石器是人类能够支配的最基础的武器——也是人类唯一能够对其它动物造成物理伤害的方式。 When we first started living on the savannah, we hadn't yet developed the hand/eye coordination necessary to hunt with stones (or to make and use other tools for that purpose). But self-defense is a much simpler proposition, for a number of reasons. 当人类最初开始在稀树草原上生活时，我们祖先还没有进化出使用石器捕猎所必需的手眼协调能力（或者制造和使用其它工具以进行捕猎的能力）。但由于以下的一些原因，使用石器自卫则是一个简单得多的命题。 First, using stones to hunt requires a lot of force and a lot of dexterity. You need to hit a target that's moving away from you at high speed, and gravity is not on your side. But defense is different. Defense happens up close. It's much easier to bash a lion with a large rock when the lion is coming toward you. And bringing the rock down allows gravity to work for you rather than against you. 首先，使用石器捕猎要求很大的力量以及很高的敏捷度。你需要能够准确地打中一个快速离你而去的目标，而且重力也并不站在你这一边。但自我防御则完全不同。通常防御都发生在很近的距离内。当一头狮子向你跑来时，用一块大石头砸中它会变得容易很多。而且将石头从上往下砸的动作也能够让重力助你一臂之力，而不是相反。 Moreover, attack and defense are fundamentally asymmetrical. Like in a lawsuit, where the prosecution assumes the burden of proof, in a hunt the predator assumes the burden of actually killing its prey. But to succeed at defense, you don't need to kill your would-be predator — you only need to injure it. If a lion or other competitor gets injured while attacking a human, it will flee the scene, opting to lose a meal rather than risk its life by continuing to fight. 除此之外，进攻和防御从根本上说也是两种完全不对称的行为。就像在一场诉讼中，举证的责任是由原告承担的，在一场捕猎中，杀死猎物的重担完全落在了捕食者的肩上。但是要在防御中获胜，你并不需要杀死潜在的捕猎者——你只需要弄伤它就行了。如果一头狮子或者其它捕食者在攻击人的时候受到伤害，它通常会逃离现场，相比于冒着生命危险继续搏斗下去，捕食者显然更愿意选择少吃这一顿。 And finally, defense was easier for early humans because we helped each other. In most of these circumstances (while being attacked and during confrontational scavenging raids), we had group members by our sides, ready to throw their own stones if others in the group became incapacitated. 最后，对于早期人类而言，防御捕食者之所以变得更容易，还因为人类会互相帮助。在绝大多数情况下（当遇到捕食者的攻击，以及在对抗式食腐的遭遇战中），人类拥有众多一起战斗的同伴，如果同伴中有人丧失了行动能力，他们时刻都准备着掷出手中的石头以帮助他。 Cooperation was indeed our biggest advantage, and our early ancestors refined it, quite literally, to a high art. 事实上，协作才是人类所拥有的最大优势，而我们的祖先则将这个优势发扬光大，毫不夸张地说，他们将协作上升到了艺术的高度。 4.AUDIO-VISUAL INTIMIDATION DISPLAY 4.恐吓性视听展示 Here, finally, is the crux of Jordania's thesis. His claim is that early humans developed a unique defense he calls the Audio-Visual Intimidation Display: 到这里，我们终于触及了Jordania理论中最关键的部分。他的观点是，早期人类发展出了一种被他称作“恐吓性视听展示”的独特防御机制。

My suggestion is that our ancestors turned loud singing into a central element of their defence system against predators. They started using loud, rhythmic singing and shouting accompanied by vigorous, threatening body movements and object throwing to defend themselves from predators. [4] 我对此的看法是，人类祖先将大声歌唱的行为转化为了对抗捕食者的防御机制中的一个核心要素。他们使用大声而富有节律的歌唱和叫喊，伴以有力而富有威胁性的身体动作以及向对方投掷各种物品来防御捕食者的进攻。

Before we go any further, I'd like you to see the AVID in action. Amazingly, some 'primitive' ethnic groups have maintained an AVID-like tradition into modern times. The kailao war dance of the Wallisian people and the Samoan cibi are two examples, but the best-documented tradition is the haka of the New Zealand Māori. 在我们更进一步之前，我希望你能够看看“恐吓性视听展示”（AVID）这种行为是什么样子的。令人惊讶的是，一些“原始的”人类族群将此类传统保留到了现代。瓦利斯群岛原住民的kailao战舞和萨摩亚人的cibi战舞是其中的两个例子，而被记载得最全面的此类传统则是新西兰毛利人的haka战舞。 Wikipedia describes the haka as 维基百科对haka战舞的描述如下：

a traditional ancestral war cry, dance or challenge from the Māori people of New Zealand. It is a posture dance performed by a group, with vigorous movements and stamping of the feet with rhythmically shouted accompaniment.... 新西兰毛利人的一种继承自祖先的传统战争呼喊、舞蹈或挑战形式。这是一种由群体表演的姿势性舞蹈，伴之以有力的动作和脚步的冲踏以及有节奏的大声喊叫... Various actions are employed in the course of a performance, including facial contortions such as showing the whites of the eyes and the poking out of the tongue, and a wide variety of vigorous body actions such as slapping the hands against the body and stamping of the feet. As well as chanted words, a variety of cries and grunts are used. 整个表演过程中包含了多种行为，包括面部表情的扭曲——例如翻出眼白和伸出舌头，以及一系列有力的身体动作——例如用手掌拍击身体和脚步的冲踏。还有高声喊出的话语，一系列的呼喊和低沉的咕哝声都被用于其中。

For a demonstration we now turn to YouTube. Here's a video of a haka by the New Zealand army, showing just how visually and auditorily intimidating it could be: 现在让我们上YouTube来看看haka战舞的演示。下面是一段新西兰军队表演的haka战舞，这段视频充分显示了这种战舞在视觉和听觉上具有多么强的恐吓力量： https://youtu.be/-rDoV0EBu44 And here's a more traditional version: 下面这段视频则记录了一段更传统的haka战舞： https://youtu.be/BI851yJUQQw The point of the AVID (of which the haka is the best-known example) is: “恐吓性视听展示”（haka战舞是其中最富盛名的例子）的意义在于：

• To intimidate competitors with loud sounds. Shouting in unison is clearly the best way to do this, because the result is far louder than any sound an individual human can make. But clapping, slapping, stomping, and banging rocks together would have added nicely to the cacophony.
• 用响亮的声音来恐吓对手。同时发出喊声显然是最好的办法，因为这种喊声比单独的一个人所能发出的声音要响亮得多。而同时伴以击掌，拍击身体，跺脚以及敲击石头这些动作则能够恰如其分地为这种刺耳的声音添油加醋。
• To intimidate competitors visually. The synchronized movements, body paint, and bizarre gestures (including facial expressions) would confuse and intimidate even the fiercest competitors.
• 在视觉上恐吓对手。这些同步的动作，身体上的绘画，以及奇怪的姿势（包括面部的奇怪表情）能够迷惑和恐吓甚至是那些最强悍的对手。
• To project the image of a single, powerful organism. As Jordania puts it, "rhythmically well-organized group vocalizations [and movements] send a strong message to the predator about the unity and determination of the group." Although the group is composed of individual humans, during an AVID the group acts as if it were a single, multiheaded, many-armed creature. In some ways it's a fiction, but as far as the competitor is concerned, if the movements and actions are sufficiently coordinated, the group becomes a unitary beast for all intents and purposes.
• 为了呈现一个强大的单一有机体的形象。如同Jordania所说，“富有节奏的有序的集体发声（和动作）向捕食者传递着关于这个群体的团结和决心的强烈信息。”尽管群体是由单独的个人组成的，在“恐吓性视听展示”的过程中，这样一个群体所表现出的行为就好像它是一个有着多个脑袋和无数只手的单一生物个体。从某种角度看来，这是一种欺骗行为，但是对于这个群体的对手来说，如果这种动作和行为足够地协调，这个群体实际上就成为了一只整一的怪兽。

Remember, the AVID would have been used for confrontational scavenging as well as defense against predators — and would have included rocks as physical weapons to fall back on when the intimidation display wasn't perfectly effective as a non-contact defense. 记住，“恐吓性视听展示”除了会在防御捕食者的攻击时使用之外，也同样适用于对抗性食腐的场景——而这种恐吓性的展示行为毕竟只是一种非接触的防御行为，一旦它不能完美地发挥作用，人们还需要求助于石头这样的物理性武器。 5.BATTLE TRANCE 5.“战斗恍惚”状态 Jordania also suggests that humans evolved a specific state of consciousness — the battle trance — to go along with the Audio-Visual Intimidation Display. This state has several characteristics: Jordania还认为，伴随着“恐吓性视听展示”行为，人类进化出了一种被称为“战斗恍惚”的特殊意识状态。这种状态有如下的几个特征：

• Analgesia and aphobia — no pain and no fear.
• 痛感缺失和恐惧缺失——感受不到疼痛和恐惧。
• Neglect of individual survival instincts.
• 忽视了个体的生存本能。
• Loss of individual identity and acquisition of a collective identity.
• 失去个人身份意识并获得集体的身份意识。

Central to the battle trance is the notion of collective or group identity: “战斗恍惚”状态的核心是集体（或群体）认同的概念：

Like in a well-established combat unit, where in the heat of the battle one can sacrifice his own life to save a friend's life, human ancestors developed the feel of group identity. The feel of group identity is based on the total trust and dedication of each member of the group to the common interest. 在一个稳固的作战单位中，当战斗进行得如火如荼时，一个战士可以为了拯救伙伴的生命牺牲自己。同样的，人类祖先也进化出了一种类似的集体认同感。集体认同感建立在对集体中所有成员的完全信任和对于集体共同利益的奉献精神之上。 Group identity kicks in when there is a critical situation, a mortal danger for survival of the group or any of its members. In such moments, the noble principle of 'One for all, all for one' rules any individual self-preserving instinct, fear and pain. 在某个生死攸关的时刻，当整个集体或其中某个成员的生存处于危险之中，集体身份意识就会发挥作用。在这样的时刻，“我为人人，人人为我”这种高尚的原则会超越任何个体的自我保护本能、恐惧和疼痛，主导集体成员的行为。

This state of consciousness may have originally evolved for parents (especially mothers) to defend their children when threatened, but it was repurposed for group defense and confrontational scavenging. And in the process, we developed a new trigger for it: rhythmic chanting and synchronized body movements. 这种意识状态可能最初是从父母（尤其是母亲）在受到威胁时保护孩子的本能中进化出来的，但之后被用于集体防御和对抗性食腐行为中。而在这个过程中，人类发展出了一种新的触发这种状态的机制：有节奏的吟唱和同步化的肢体动作。

Evolution supplied powerful neurological mechanisms to make this feeling a positive experience. Going into group identity brings the most exhilarating feelings to every member of the group. Every member of the group feels bigger, feel stronger, and virtually feels immortal.... Group members in such an altered state of mind, when they share total trust with each other, emotionally believe that the group cannot be defeated. 进化为将这种感觉变成一种积极的体验提供了强大的神经机制。进入集体身份意识状态为集体中的所有成员带来了一种最为振奋的感觉。集体中的所有人都感觉到自己变得更大，更强，并且几乎感觉到自己是不朽的……在这意识状态中，集体成员分享着对彼此的完全信任，他们会在感情上相信这个集体是不可战胜的。 This unique altered state of mind is supported (and most likely caused) by the powerful neurological substances such as endorphins and oxytocin, which are momentarily released in the brain when a critical survival situations arises. As the neurological substances are released into the brain, feelings of pain and fear are blocked, and total trust and exhilaration of being part of a supernaturally strong unit becomes overwhelming. 这种特别的意识状态是由诸如脑内啡（endorphin）和催产素（oxytocin）这类强大的神经物质所支持的（而且非常可能是由它们引发的），当某种生死攸关的状况出现时，大脑中会暂时释放出这些物质。一旦它们被释放到大脑中，疼痛和恐惧的感觉就被阻断了，而成为某个超自然的强大整体的一部分所带来的完全信任和振奋感则变得不可阻挡。

Actual combat isn't as central to our lives in the 21st century, but the battle trance and feelings of collective identity still echo in many of our modern rituals of solidarity, which I wrote about last year, and they're particularly pronounced in religion/politics and team/spectator sports. 真实的战斗在我们21世纪的生活中已经变得不那么重要了，但正如我在去年曾写道过的，在许多现代的团体性仪式中，我们仍然可以找到“战斗恍惚”和集体身份意识状态的影子。在宗教性/政治性活动以及集体性/观赏性体育项目中，它们表现得尤其明显。 6.CANNIBALISM (AND BURIAL) OF THE DEAD 6.吃掉（并埋葬）同类的尸体 As if Jordania's theory didn't cover enough ground already, he has one last surprise in store for us. He claims that early humans practiced cannibalism of their dead as a key part of their comprehensive antipredator strategy. 即使到了这里，Jordania的理论似乎仍然意犹未尽，他还为我们准备了最后一个惊喜。他声称，早期人类吃掉自己同类尸体这种行为实际上是他们整体的防御捕食者捕杀策略中非常重要的一环。 If you recall from section 2, the goal of aposematism is to advertise that, as a piece of prey, you are decidedly unprofitable for the predator. If a predator can easily recognize you (and other members of your species), and remembers getting burned during past encounters, it will quickly learn to stop attacking you in the first place. 回想一下我们在第2节里所提到的，“警示信号”这种策略的目的是让捕食者确认将你作为食物是一件无利可图的事情。如果捕食者能够轻易地认出你（以及你同类的其它成员），并且记起在之前的教训，它就会迅速意识到从一开始就不应该向你发起攻击。 Given this strategy, it's very important not to let the lions (or any other predator) get away with killing and eating a human. The more our ancestors were able to reinforce the message that humans are not a (good) meal, the safer they would be across repeated encounters. This was especially important for early humans because, unlike an actually poisonous species, human meat is worth eating, if a predator can get away with it. 在这种策略之下，不要让狮子（或者其它的任何捕食者）成功地杀死并吃掉人类就变得非常重要。人类祖先们越是能够强化“人类不是好食物”这条信息，在与捕食者们不断的重复相遇中他们就会越安全。对于早期人类来说这一点尤其重要，因为人并不是一种有毒性的物种，如果捕食者能够成功地捕杀人类，人肉其实是很有食用价值的。 This implies a heavy selection pressure for the following behaviors among our ancestors: 这就意味着，自然选择在引导人类祖先做出如下一些行为方面施加了很重的压力：

• If a predator attacks during a confrontation, make sure it gets injured.
• 如果捕食者在对抗中发动了攻击，必须保证将它弄伤。
• If a predator manages to kill one of your fellow humans, don't let it eat. Retrieve the body of your fallen comrade or your whole tribe will be in danger.
• 如果捕食者成功地杀死了你的同类，不要让它吃掉尸体。将你死去同伴的尸体弄回来，否则你的整个部落都将处于危险之中。
• When a human dies naturally, make sure the corpse is properly disposed of. The corpse is a liability because a predator will associate even a scavenged meal (of human meat) with 'profitability'.
• 当一个人自然死亡，必须保证尸体被以一种适当的方式处理掉。人类尸体实际上会成为一种负担，因为即使是一顿腐肉（人肉）大餐也会让捕食者认为吃人肉是有利可图的。

None of this implies that our ancestors had to practice cannibalism of their dead. Any means of keeping human meat out of the mouths of predators would have been effective. But there's some evidence that suggests cannibalism (stone scrapings on human bones similar to the scrapings on the bones of other animals), and if calories were hard to come by, it might have been an ecological necessity. 上面的任何一点都不意味着人类的祖先必须吃掉同类的尸体。任何一种不让人肉落入捕食者口中的方法都是有效的。但是一些证据表明人类的确会吃掉同类的尸体（人骨上和其它动物的骨头上都有类似的的石器划痕），而且如果能量并不是那么容易获取，吃掉同类尸体可能也是一种生态上的必要做法。 CONCLUSION 结论 There's so much more to say about this theory, but I'll save most of it for another time. 关于Jordania的这个理论，可说的还有很多，但我会把它们留到以后。 I'd just like to end by showing how some our beliefs and behaviors take on new significance in light of Jordania's theory, especially those that relate to how we handle the bodies of our dead. 我只是希望通过展示Jordania的理论能够如何为人类的一些信仰和行为赋予新的意义来结束这篇文章，特别是那些与我们处理同类尸体的方式相关的部分。 Funerary traditions vary widely around the world, but all have one thing in common: disposal of the body. Mechanisms include burial, entombment, mummification, burial at sea, sky burial [5], and ritual cannibalism, and even more exotic mechanisms like hanging coffins or tree burial. 世界各地的葬礼传统差异非常大，但是所有这些传统都有一个共同的特征：将尸体处理掉。处理尸体的机制包括土葬、墓葬、干尸化、海葬、天葬以及食人仪式，甚至还存在一些更加奇异的机制，例如悬棺葬和树葬等。 The common reasons given for disposal practices are all public-health-related, but intentional burial is at least 225,000 years old. Of course our ancestors wouldn't want a corpse rotting in their camp, but there's quite a leap from disposal to burial. Why not just drag the corpse away from camp and expose it to the elements? 通常人们对于这些处理尸体方式的解释都与公共卫生相关，但是人类从至少22.5万年前就开始有意识地埋葬尸体了。我们的祖先们当然不会希望尸体在他们的营地中腐烂，但是从处理掉尸体到埋葬尸体是一个不小的飞跃。他们为什么不只是简单地把尸体拖到远离营地的地方然后让它自然腐烂呢？ Jordania's theory doesn't predict how exactly we should dispose of our dead, but it predicts that we should care an awful lot about it (i.e. that it should be something sacred), and that we should be especially concerned that the body doesn't fall into the wrong hands. In Paleolithic times, this ensured that our ancestors retrieved the bodies of their comrades when they were killed by predators. Jordania的理论并没有对人类应该如何处理尸体做出具体的预言，但是它预测了人类应该对处理尸体的方式给予高度重视（例如，它应该是一种神圣的仪式），而且人类需要特别注意不能让尸体落入那些它不应该落入的对象手里。在石器时代，这意味着我们祖先会将他们被杀死的同伴尸体从捕食者那里抢回来。 But you can see vestiges of this in historic times — e.g. in our concern for salvaging bodies of the war dead. Mutilating or otherwise desecrating the war dead is an ancient practice, a ghastly way for the victor to show utter dominance over the loser. 但在历史上的各个时期中，你都能看到这种做法的痕迹——例如在战争中人们对于寻回战死者尸体的关切。毁尸或是以其它方式亵渎敌方战死者的尸体是一种古老的传统，这是一种胜者用以展示对失败者的完全统治的可怕方式。 And finally, Jordania's theory helps explain the religious nature of our funerary practices. Burial has always been a quintessentially religious practice. For example, we date the earliest religious behavior in our ancestors by when they started burying their dead. But religions are fundamentally about the living — a set of beliefs and practices that relate to collective identity and tribal cohesion. 最后，Jordania的理论还能够帮助解释人类葬礼活动的宗教性。葬礼一直是一项典型的宗教活动。例如，我们总是将人类祖先最早的宗教行为追溯到他们开始埋葬同类尸体的时刻。但是宗教从本质上说是关于活着的人的——它是一系列与集体身份意识和部落凝聚力相关的信仰和实践。 Why do religions care about the disposal of corpses? This has always puzzled me. It's always seemed like such a mundane concern. When someone dies, that should be the end of what we care about, and removing the body should be no more sacred than taking out the trash. Chimpanzees, for instance, can perceive when another chimp passes away (and mourn), but they soon lose interest in the body. 为什么宗教会关注处理处理尸体的方式？我长久以来都被这个问题困扰着。因为对尸体的处理看起来总是更像一个世俗的问题。当一个人死去，我们对于他的关注也应该随之结束了，而将尸体处理掉这件事情并不应该比我们清除垃圾的行为更加神圣。例如，当同类死去时，黑猩猩会对此有所感知（并感到悲伤），但是它们会迅速失去对同类尸体的兴趣。 But if Jordania is right, it's no coincidence that death rituals are intimately bound up with collective identity, because they're two parts of the same system. 但如果Jordania是对的，那么与死亡相关的仪式会与集体身份意识天然地联系在一起就并不是巧合了，因为它们实际上是从属于同一个体系的两个部分。 ------------------------------------ Update 2015/10/16. For the record, I don't think Jordania's theory explains (or even tries to explain) the lyrical aspects of music — only rhythm. But it's the only plausible account I've read that explains how music may have helped us survive. There's always the mate-selection hypothesis, of course. 更新于2015年10月16日。郑重声明，我并不认为Jordania的理论解释了（甚至仅仅是试图解释）音乐的抒情部分——他的理论所解释的仅仅是音乐的韵律部分。但这是我所读到过的唯一能够合理地解释音乐是如何帮助人类生存下来的理论。当然，关于这方面的理论还有配偶选择假说。 Endnotes 尾注 [1] human ancestors. I'm going to write about "human ancestors" and "early humans" — or sometimes simply "us" — knowing that there are more precise terms to describe the different stages (and branches) of our evolutionary path. Please forgive me — I'm not particularly steeped in the distinctions, and I doubt many of my readers are either. [1] 人类祖先。在下面我将会经常使用“人类祖先”以及“早期人类”——有时也会仅仅使用“我们”这个代词——来指代人类进化道路上的不同阶段（以及分支），虽然我知道还有更加精确的术语来描述它，但请原谅我在这里没有使用它们，因为我并不觉得这些术语之间的差异有多么重要，而且我怀疑我的读者中许多人也和我有同感。 [2] singing, body painting, body odor. It's unclear whether early humans actually sang habitually, painted their bodies, or had B.O., but modern humans certainly do, and there's a case to be made for our ancestors as well. Red ochre is noted as far back as 100,000 years ago, but earlier humans could easily have used simpler preparations like blood or berries, which would have left no trace in the archeological record. [2] 歌唱，体绘，和体味。现在仍不清楚早期人类是否会习惯性地歌唱、在身体上绘画、或者有体味，但现代人身上显然的确存在这些特点，而对于我们祖先而言，也的确存在这方面的可能性。氧化铁作为一种红色颜料最早可以追溯到十万年前，但早期人类也许能够轻易地使用血液和浆果这些更简单的颜料，而这些则并不会在考古学记录上留下痕迹。 [3] aposematism. A particularly interesting example is stotting — when a gazelle springs into the air by lifting all four feet off the ground simultaneously. Stotting is an aposematic display because (1) it makes the gazelle more visible, but (2) it's an honest signal of unprofitability. By stotting, a gazelle signals to a potential predator, "I'm in peak physical condition. Don't both chasing me, because I can easily outrun you." [3] “警示信号”策略。这方面一个特别有趣的例子是“跳跑”——这指的是羚羊四蹄同时离地，将身体弹到空中。“跳跑”之所以是一种具有警示信号的策略，主要是因为（1）它让羚羊更容易被看见，（2）这是一种真实地表明向羚羊发动攻击无利可图的信号。通过“跳跑”的动作，羚羊向潜在的捕食者发出了这样一个信号，“我的身体状态正处在巅峰。不用费工夫来追我了，因为我可以轻易地跑赢你。” [4] Audio-Visual Intimidation Display. I'm taking a couple liberties here. For one, Jordania calls it an "intimidating" display, but I prefer the noun form. But more substantively, Jordania lumps our morphological changes (bipedalism, hair, etc.) into the AVID, whereas I'm presenting the AVID as just the behavioral part (rhythmic chanting and dancing). [4] “恐吓性视听展示”。在这里我有两处自由发挥的地方。其一是Jordania在表达“恐吓性”这个意思时实际上使用的是intimidating这个词，但是我觉得使用名词形式更好一些。而更具实质意义的一点区别则是，Jordania将人类的一些形态学变化（例如双足行走，毛发等）也归入了“恐吓性视听展示”的范畴，而我仅仅对“恐吓性视听展示”的行为部分（有节奏地喊叫和舞蹈）进行了说明。 [5] sky burial. Yes, during a sky burial we let another animal eat our corpses, but they are always scavenging birds (e.g. vultures), never a potential predator. See also Dakhma for the Zoroastrian tradition. [5] 天葬。在天葬仪式中人类的确让别的动物吃掉了同类的尸体，但是这类动物都是腐食性的鸟类（例如秃鹫），而从来不会是某种潜在的捕食者。关于这个问题，可参考Dakhma对于琐罗亚斯德教传统的论著。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-01-21】 @海德沙龙 《枪支与死亡的奇妙相关性》 每次重大枪击案件都会激起一片强化枪支管制甚至禁枪的呼声，用来支持这一立场的各种数据中，有一个十分有趣、传播率也极高的指标，叫涉枪死亡率，那么，这个指标究竟能说明什么问题，以及在多大程度上说明问题呢？它被用来支持枪支管制的逻辑又是什么？ @whigzhou: 这是一种典型的组合式欺骗，一张图片配上一段文字，图片和文字本身都是真实的，但放在一起就会给人造成一种可预期的错误印象，假设一小孩把塑料袋套在头上玩，不幸窒息身亡，报道者配上文字：今年已有300人死于塑料袋窒息。从而给人留下一种“塑料袋是非常危险的日用品”的印象。 @whigzhou: 但事实上（假设），这300人中299人是用塑料袋自杀者，意外窒息者只有这一个 @whigzhou: 更恶劣的做法是，给这条新闻配上这样的文字：塑料袋在过去3年内已夺走5000条生命！未出现在报道中的事实是：其中4700条生命是误吞塑料袋的鱼  

【2016-01-19】 @大象公会 【为什么南方多江，北方多河？】为什么中国河流南方多称为“江”，北方多称为“河”？“江”、“河”又如何从长江黄河的专称泛化为一般河流通名？移民又是如何改变“江”、“河”的分布的？作者：@Serpens 、@qqflyaway_PKU @whigzhou: 好文，不过，“上古时期，黄河中上游植被条件尚好，泥沙含量较少，下游地区尚能保持比较稳定的河道。……黄河有文字记载的第一次大决口在周定王五年（公元前 602 年），此前黄河自大禹治水后一直安稳的流淌在“禹河故道”中。”——这一判断依我看不大可能成立。 @whigzhou: 更可能的情况是：上古黄河根本没有形成稳定的河道和明确的主干流，定王五年的决口之所以成为史载之首次，并不能证明此前河道稳定，更可能只是：1）此前没有主干道因而无所谓大决口，2）此前不存在将此类事件记录下来的制度/文化条件 @whigzhou: 大江河的冲积平原和三角洲，在经历长期农业开发之前，通常不会是一条主干流入海，更可能是漫流入大片大片的沼泽地，其中呈树根状分布着大量较小的入海水道，随着农业开发不断持续，入海水道才被逐渐约束到越来越少的干流中，沼泽也逐渐被排干，这一过程在珠江三角洲至今尚未完成。 @whigzhou: 上古黄河水系和华北平原处于何种状况，从古代城邑的分布也可看出端倪，华北平原的古城绝大部分沿太行山东麓、燕山南麓和山东丘陵北麓分布，在以安阳-廊坊-东营为顶点构成的三角形里，几乎没有古城邑  

【2016-01-15】 @海德沙龙 《数数能力的进化》 人类数数和使用数字的能力，是一项十分晚近的发展， 其历史很可能远远短于现代智人的历史，人类学家发现，多数狩猎采集群体的语言都缺乏表示比3更大数字的词汇，本文介绍了一项对澳洲语系的各语言中数字词汇演变的研究，其中有些很有意思的发现 @海德沙龙: 另外，显示计数能力的考古证据最早出现于四万多年前的中石器时代（一块叫Lebombo bone的骨头，上面有许多计数刻痕），而中石器时代正经历着一次认知革命。 @whigzhou: 计数、文字以及更一般的符号处理能力，让人类认知系统跨上了一个台阶，我在《沐猿而冠》中将之称为“第二轮升级” @whigzhou: 《信息简史》作者（见第二章）也认为符号处理能力是一种革命性的发展，因而有文字语言和无文字语言有着根本性的区别，我觉得很有道理，依我看，即便是习得了有文字语言的文盲，认知能力也大不同于只掌握了无文字语言的人 @whigzhou: 因为有文字语言能够编码高级而复杂的多的meme系统，而更高级复杂的meme系统同样可以惠及文盲，只要他习得该语言  

Good News Is Unplanned 好事无须规划 作者：Ronald Bailey @ 2015-10-30 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/30/good-news-is-unplanned Incremental, bottom-up, trial-and-error innovation yields moral progress, superior technologies, and greater wealth. Top-down mandates from centralized authorities are more likely to produce ethical disasters, technological stagnation, and persistent poverty. "Bad news is man-made, top-down, purposed stuff, imposed on history," Matt Ridley writes in The Evolution of Everything. "Good news is accidental, unplanned, emergent stuff that gradually evolves." 缓慢增长的、自下而上的、试错式的创新，产生了道德的进步、先进的技术和更多的财富。来自中央权威、自上而下的命令，最容易造成道德灾难、技术停滞和持续贫穷。“坏事都是人为的、自上而下的、刻意设计、故意强加给历史的东西，” Matt Ridley在《万物之进化》中写道。“好事都是意外的、未经计划的、缓慢进化的偶然事件。” Ridley, a British journalist who has written extensively about science, economics, and technological progress, begins by explaining the fundamentals of biological evolution by natural selection: Biological complexity evolves through random mutation followed by non-random survival. Ridley then argues that the Darwinian process is a "special theory of evolution" that is embedded in a more "general theory of evolution that applies to much more than biology." Ridley是一位广泛涉猎科学、经济学和技术进步的英国记者，在本书开头就解释了生物经由自然选择而进化的基础：生物的复杂性来自随机变异和紧随其后的非随机的适者生存。然后Ridley提出，达尔文过程（Darwinian process）只是一个特殊的进化理论，它包含在一个不止适用于生物学的更一般的进化论之中。 Decentralized evolution by trial and error, Ridley argues, is the chief way improvements have emerged in all sorts of human endeavor, including "morality, the economy, culture, language, technology, cities, firms, education, history, law, government, God, money, and society." As the 18th-century Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson argued, these phenomena are the result of human action, but not of human design. By book's end, Ridley has adeptly dismantled all forms of creationism, divine and Progressive. Ridley认为，通过试错而实现的分散进化是人类各种事业实现进步的主要途径，包括“道德、经济、文化、语言、技术、城市、公司、教育、历史、法律、政府、上帝、金钱和社会。”如18世纪苏格兰哲学家Adam Ferguson所说，这些现象都是人类行为的结果，而不是人类设计的结果。到书的结尾，Ridley已手法娴熟地拆解了所有类型的创造论，无论是诉诸神灵的还是进步主义的版本。 Consider the evolution of culture. More and more, cultural anthropologists have come to accept the view that—to quote a recent paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences—"human cultural groups have all the key attributes of a Darwinian evolutionary system." As Ridley explains, "Our habits and our institutions, from language to cities, are constantly changing, and the mechanism of change turns out to be surprisingly Darwinian: it is gradual, undirected, mutational, inexorable, combinatorial, selective and in some vague sense progressive." 不妨考虑一下文化的进化。越来越多的文化人类学家已经接受“人类文化群体具有达尔文进化系统所有的关键特征”——这一表述引自《行为与脑科学》上最近的一篇论文。Ridley解释道，“从语言到城市，我们的习性和制度都在不断变化，而令人吃惊的是，这些变化的原理被证明是达尔文式的：它是渐进的，无预定方向的，突变的，无情的，组合的，选择性的，并且在某种意义上是进步的。” One example: the institution of marriage. As our hunter-gatherer ancestors evolved into herders and farmers, polygamy became more common, since some men could now accumulate the resources needed to support and defend more than one woman and their progeny. However, polygamy has a big downside: Male sexual competition produces lots of violence. While some 80 percent of the distinct cultures identified by anthropologists still sanction polygamy, monogamy is by far now the most common form of marriage. Why? 举个例子：婚姻制度。随着我们狩猎采集的祖先演变成牧民和农民，一夫多妻制变得更常见，因为此时一些男性已能够积累起足够的资源来养活、守护多位女性及其后代。然而，一夫多妻制有个重大缺陷：男性性竞争会产生诸多暴力。尽管在已被人类学家辨明的不同文化中，约80%仍然实行一夫多妻制，但是到现在，一夫一妻制已经成了最常见的婚姻形式。为什么？ The University of British Columbia anthropologist Joseph Henrich and his colleagues argue that societies that adopted normative monogamy increased their social solidarity and trust thus enhancing "the competitive success of the polities, nations and religions that adopted this cultural package." The upshot is that in the modern world, cultures where polygamy still thrives tend to be marginalized, poor, and violent. 英属哥伦比亚大学的人类学家Joseph Henrich和他同事们认为，接受标准一夫一妻制的社会提高了社会的团结和信任，因此增加了“接受一夫一妻制这一文化一揽子方案的政治组织、国家和宗教的竞争成功率。”最终结果就是在当今世界，一夫多妻制仍盛行的文化多是被边缘化的、贫穷的和充满暴力的。 Henrich and his colleagues also speculate that "the peculiar institutions of monogamous marriage may help explain why democratic ideals and notions of equality and human rights first emerged in the West." This egalitarian impulse, interestingly, may behind the evolving inclination toward including same-sex unions in the institution of marriage. Henrich和他同事们推断，“一夫一妻的婚姻制度也可能有助于解释为何民主的典范和平等与人权的概念首先出现在西方。”有趣的是，这种平等主义的冲动或许隐藏在这样一种进化倾向背后，即向包括同性结合的婚姻制度的进化。 What about the evolution of economics? Prior to the 18th century, top-down extraction of wealth by elites from hapless serfs and peasants was the nearly universal form of economic and political organization among settled societies. The result was persistent and pervasive poverty. 那么经济的进化呢？18世纪以前，精英阶层对于不幸的奴隶和农民自上而下的财富压榨几乎是所有稳定社会普遍的经济和政治组织形式。结果是持续和普遍的贫穷。 As the University of Groningen economist Angus Maddison has shown, economic growth proceeded at the stately pace of less than 0.1 percent per year in Western Europe for more than 18 centuries, rising in constant dollars from $425 per year in AD 1 to $1,200 in 1820. Towards the end of that period, a socioeconomic mutation—market liberalism—arose in Britain and the Netherlands. 正如格罗宁根（Groningen）大学经济学家Angus Maddison所展示的，在长达18个世纪的时间里，西欧的经济增长都稳定在每年0.1%以下，以不变价美元计，从公元元年的425美元涨到了1820年的1200美元。到了这段时期的末尾，一个社会经济的巨变———市场自由主义——在英国和荷兰出现了。 As it spread around the world, the mutation proved highly advantageous to the societies that accepted some degree of it, enabling them to prosper. This "great enrichment," as the University of Illinois at Chicago economist Deidre McCloskey calls it, boosted average incomes 10- to 20-fold in those countries where the mutation took hold. 随着它传遍全世界，这一突变被证明对于那些多少接受了它的社会非常有利，让他们变得繁荣。这次“财富大爆发”（伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校经济学家Deidre McCloskey语）使得发生突变的国家人均收入翻了10到20倍。 Ridley cites the economists Nick Hanauer and Eric Beinhocker, who assert that unfettered commerce is "best understood as an evolutionary system, constantly creating and trying out new solutions to problems in a similar way to how evolution works in nature. Some solutions are 'fitter' than others. The fittest survive and propagate. The unfit die." Ridley引用了经济学家Nick Hanauer 和 Eric Beinhocker的观点，他们认为最好将自由商业“理解为一个像自然进化那样不断创造、并发明出解决问题之新方法的系统。有些方法比其他方法更能“适应环境”。最适应环境的存活并增殖。不适应的就灭亡。” The consequence of competition is constant innovation, which the economist Joseph Schumpeter neatly summarized as "creative destruction." After accounting for the contributions of labor and capital, economist Robert Solow calculated that nearly 90 percent of the improvements in living standards are due to technological progress. 竞争的结果就是不断的创新，经济学家Joseph Schumpeter将其巧妙地总结为“创造性破坏”。在算上人力和资本的因素后，经济学家Robert Solow计算得出，生活水平的提高中约90%归功于技术进步。 How about technological evolution? "Biology and technology in the end boil down to systems of information...and both evolve by trial and error," writes Ridley. "Technology is in a sense a continuation of biological evolution—an imposition of informational order on a random world." 技术进化又是如何呢？“生物和技术归根结底都是一些信息系统……而且都通过试错来进化，”Ridley写道。“技术在某种意义上是生物进化的延续——一种随机世界中信息秩序的排列。” Every technology is built by recombining earlier technologies. Ridley makes the arresting but persuasive claim that, far more often than not, "scientific breakthroughs are the effect, not the cause, of technological change." In other words, technologists' tools are what enable basic researchers uncover nature's secrets. 每种技术都建立在对早前技术的重新组合之上。Ridley做出了吸引眼球但又有说服力的论断，认为多数情况下，“科学突破是技术变革的产物，而不是成因。”换言之，技术专家的工具使得基础研究人员解开自然的奥秘。 One modest example is the invention of the microscope in the 1590s by the Dutch spectacle maker Zacharias Jansen. Another is the automated gene sequencer introduced by Applied Biosystems in 1987, which ultimately made the discoveries of the Human Genome Project feasible. 一个客观的例子就是1590年代由荷兰镜片制造商Zacharias Jansen发明的显微镜。另一个例子是1987年由Applied Biosystems公司引进的自动基因测序机，最终使得人类基因组计划变得可行。 Ridley also suggests that scientific central planning, especially in the form of public funding of research, poses problems. In 2015, for example, the Institute for International Economics found that research and development in "the business sector had high social returns, and hence contributed to growth, but there was no evidence in this analysis of positive effects from government R&D." Ridley还认为，对科学的中央计划会制造问题，尤其是以公共财政资助研究这种形式。比如说，国际经济研究所在2015年发现，商业部门的研发“有着较高的社会回报，而且因此促进了经济增长，但是该项分析中没有证据表明政府研发存在积极影响。” It would be really surprising if government R&D did not help give birth to some technological breakthroughs—nuclear power and the Internet leap to mind. Still, a 2014 paper published in PLoS Medicine estimated that 85 percent of public research resources are wasted. 如果说政府研发对于一些技术突破——毫无帮助，这肯定会让人非常吃惊——有人会想到核能和互联网这样的例子。然而，一篇发表在2014年《PLoS Medicine》 杂志上的论文估计，有85%的公共研究资源是被浪费掉的。 What's more, a 2015 study in PLoS Biology alarmingly suggested that half of all preclinical research is irreproducible. Replication and cumulative knowledge production are cornerstones of the scientific progress. This means that in U.S. that about $28 billion in annual public biomedical research funding, arguably, is squandered. 更有甚者，发表于《 PLoS Biology》的一项研究惊人地表明，一半的前临床研究都是不可重复的。重复和可累计知识的生产是科学发展的基石。这意味着美国每年的公共生物医药研究资金中，约有280亿美元可认为被浪费了。 And then there is the evolution of government. States emerged from protection rackets in which a gang monopolizing violence demanded payment of goods and services—taxes—in exchange for promises to defend local farmers and artisans from predation by rival gangs. "Tudor monarchs and the Taliban are cut from exactly the same cloth," summarizes Ridley. 然后是政府的进化。国家脱胎于暴力垄断集团的保护网机制，他们承诺保护当地农民和工匠免受竞争团伙的侵害，作为交换他们要求受保护者支付货物或服务——即税收。“都铎王朝的国王和塔利班都是一个模子刻出来的，”Ridley总结道。 But two to three centuries ago, the fractured polities of Western Europe provided an open, speculative space where novel ideas about property rights, free trade, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and limits on government could mutate and grow. Where those bottom-up conceptual mutations took hold, technological innovation sped forward, incomes rose, and civil liberties were recognized. 但是两三个世纪以前，西欧支离破碎的政体结构为有关财产权、自由贸易、宗教自由、出版自由、限制政府等新思想提供了开放的探索空间，让这些创新理念得以变化和生长。哪里发生了这些自下而上的观念突变，哪里的技术创新就会加速，收入增长，公民自由得到承认。 Once established, liberal societies are veritable evolution machines that frenetically generate new mutations and swiftly recombine them to produce a vast array of new products, services, and social institutions that enable ever more people to flourish. So far liberal societies are outcompeting—in the sense of being richer and more appealing—those polities that are closer to the original protection rackets. 自由社会一旦建成，它就成了一架真正的进化机器，疯狂地产生新突变，并迅速将突变重新结合生产出一系列新产品、新服务和新机构，使得更多人获益。到目前为止，在变得更富裕和更吸引人这方面，自由社会完胜那些更接近最初保护网机制的政体。 “Perhaps," Ridley hopefully suggests, "the state is now evolving steadily towards benign and gentle virtue." He adds, "Perhaps not." In support of evolving benignity is the fact that the ratio of countries rated as free by Freedom House increased from 29 percent in 1973 to 47 percent in 2007. “或许，”Ridley满怀希望地认为，“国家正在向着善意和温良的美德稳步进化着。”他补充道，“也可能不是这样。”支持良性进化的一个事实是，被自由之家（Freedom House）评定为自由国家的比例已经由1973年的29%增长到2007年的47%。 Since then the spread of liberty has faltered. Ridley notes that "creationism in government shows no signs of fading." Communism and fascism are examples of man-made top-down creationism that produced plenty of bad-news history in the last century. 但自那之后，自由的传播已缓滞不前。Ridley提到“关于政府的创世论没有衰退的迹象。”共产主义和法西斯主义便是人为的自上而下的创世论，导致了上世纪的诸多历史惨剧。 Biological evolution has no end goals; those creatures that survive reproduce. Presumably the sorts of cultural, economic, technological, and governmental evolution described by Ridley also do not have end goals. What survives, replicates. It is not impossible that some future cultural mutation might arise and outcompete market liberalism. Yet as a constant novelty-generating dynamo, market liberalism has pretty good chance of staying ahead of mutations that tend in more authoritarian directions. 生物进化没有终极目标；存活的生物繁殖不息。也许Ridley所描述的各种文化、经济、技术和政府进化也都没有终极目标。得以存留的就不断复制。未来出现一些文化突变并胜过市场自由主义也不是不可能。然而作为一个持久的创新发动机，市场自由主义很可能继续领先于那些倾向于专制的突变体。 There is another way to think of the developments that are the result of human action, but not of human design. Human beings, through a long process of trial and error (mostly error), are slowly discovering our own given natures. We chance upon habits, institutions, moralities that increasingly incline our inborn predilections toward promoting human flourishing. 还有另一种方式来思考那些由人类的行为而不是人类的设计所导致的发展。经过长时间的试错过程（大部分是错误的），人类正在慢慢发现自己的天性。我们有幸恰好发现了一些习性、制度和德性，它们越来越倾向于推动我们的先天偏好向着促进人类繁荣的方向发展。 Flourishing does not mean sheer biological reproduction. After all, it is those societies in which the market liberalism mutation took hold earliest that have the lowest fertility rates. Flourishing means something like the pursuit and enjoyment of more meaningful lives. 繁荣并不意味着单纯的生物繁殖。毕竟，出生率最低的正是那些最早抓住市场自由主义这一变异的社会。繁荣意味着追求并享受更有意义的人生。 As Ridley concludes, "It is a fair bet that the twenty-first century will be dominated mostly by shocks of bad news, but will experience mostly invisible progress of good things. Incremental, inexorable, inevitable changes will bring us material and spiritual improvements that will make the lives of our grandchildren wealthier, healthier, happier, cleverer, kinder, freer, more peaceful, and more equal—almost entirely as a serendipitous by-product of cultural evolution." Ridley总结道，“很可能21世纪会被坏消息带来的震惊所笼罩，但是也会经历美好事物近乎无形的进步。”渐进的、不可阻挡的、无可避免的改变，会带给我们物质和精神的进步，使得我们孙辈的生活更富足、更健康、更幸福、更明智、更友善、更自由、更和平且更平等——这几乎全都是文化进化的偶然副产物。” Ronald Bailey is a science correspondent at Reason magazine and author of The End of Doom (July 2015). Ronald Bailey是《Reason》杂志的科学通讯记者，也是《末日终结》一书（2015年七月）的作者。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Link Between State Gun Laws and Fatal Shootings Not as Simple as It Seems 各州枪支法与致命枪击案的关系并不像看起来那样简单 作者：Thomas A. Firey @ 2015-10-11 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/11/about-that-national-journal-gun-chart America has resumed its long-running debate on gun control, following the terrible attack at Umpqua Community College in Roseburg, Oregon, last week and two more shootings Friday, at Northern Arizona University and Texas Southern University. This time around, perhaps nothing has gotten more play than this tablefrom a short column by National Journal graphic artist Libby Isenstein. 在上周俄勒冈州罗斯堡乌姆普夸社区大学的可怕袭击和本周五北亚利桑那大学及德克萨斯南方大学的两起枪击案之后，美国有关枪支管制的长期争论再次开启。这一次，可能没什么比《国家杂志》平面艺术家Libby Isenstein在一篇简短专栏文章里的这张表格更出风头的了。 The chart ranks the states by their rate of "gun-related deaths" and notes whether each state has gun-restricting laws like background checks and waiting periods, or laws that expand gun accessibility and use, like concealed-carry and stand-your-ground rights. The chart’s implication is clear: the more gun restrictions, the fewer horrible crimes. 这张表格将各州按“涉枪死亡”率排名，并且标注了每个州是否有诸如背景审查和等待期这样的枪支管制法律，或者像隐蔽携带和无须退让权【译注："stand-your-ground" law是一种支持强自卫权的法律，允许个人在合理的认为自己身体或生命面临威胁时，不经退让躲避即可使用致命武力实施自卫。】这种扩大枪支获取和使用的法律。这表格的含义很明显：枪支管制越严，恶性犯罪越少。 Isenstein’s chart has since been posted on countless blogs, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages, with the subtext (and often the explicit text) that if troglodyte gun-rights supporters could appreciate simple statistics, they’d stop impeding common-sense gun controls that would deter terrible crimes like the one in Roseburg. President Obama also made this point explicit last week in a statement about the Roseburg shooting: Isenstein的表格至今已经被无数的博客、推特和Facebook页面转载，潜台词（而且经常是明说）就是，如果赞成持枪权的老顽固们能够领会这简单的数据统计，他们就不会再阻止常识性的枪支管制，像罗斯堡那样的恶性犯罪就不会发生。奥巴马总统上周在关于罗斯堡枪击案的一份声明中也明确表达了这一观点。 States with the most gun laws tend to have the fewest gun deaths. So the notion that gun laws don’t work, or just will make it harder for law-abiding citizens [to obtain guns] and criminals will still get their guns, is not borne out by the evidence. 枪支管控法最多的州往往枪击致死的人数最少。所以认为枪支法不起作用，或者认为它们仅仅使守法公民[获得枪支]更加困难而犯罪分子将仍然得到枪支的看法，是没有证据支持的。 The president’s comment has since received some critical scrutiny  from The Washington Post's "Fact-Checker" Glenn Kessler. And UCLA law professor and Post contributor Eugene Volokh criticized the National Journal table in a recent post  on the lack of a statistical link between gun control and overall homicide rates. 总统的观点已经被《华盛顿邮报》“真相检查者”Glenn Kessler仔细推敲过了。加州大学洛杉矶分校法学教授、《华盛顿邮报》投稿人Eugene Volokh在最近一篇文章中批评《国家杂志》的上述表格缺乏枪支管制和整体谋杀率之间的统计学关联。 Yet the chart continues to bounce around the Internet and the media. Its currency reveals how readily people seize on statistics they don’t really understand but think—in this case, wrongly—support their opinions, claiming the intellectual high ground while dismissing opposing viewpoints as hopelessly  ignorant, biased, and dishonest. 然而这个表格在互联网和媒体上持续发酵。这一趋势反映了人们多么倾向于利用他们并不真正理解但（错误地）认为支持其观点的统计数据，来占领智识高地并将相反观点斥为无可救药的无知、偏颇和不诚实。 First, let’s be clear about what Isenstein’s chart does show: a connection between "gun-related deaths" and certain gun laws. A simple statistical test offers decent evidence of such a relationship. But there’s a problem with using that evidence to conclude that more gun restrictions will reduce the number of fatal shootings. To understand why, consider the following story. 首先，让我们来搞清Isenstein的表格真正表达的是什么：涉枪死亡人数和某些枪支管控法之间的关联。一个简单的统计测试就能提供这种关系的有力证明。但是用这种证据得出加强枪支管制就会减少致命枪击案的结论是有问题的。为了理解当中的原因，请思考下面这个故事。 Suppose there are two towns, Chevyville and Fordburg. Many years ago, General Motors (GM) built a factory in Chevyville and its residents, in loyalty to their town’s largest employer, now all drive Chevrolets. In Fordburg, however, local leaders were so angry with GM for not building the plant there that they passed an ordinance banning Chevrolets. 假设有两个名为Chevyville 和 Fordburg的小镇。很多年前，通用汽车在Chevyville建了一个工厂，该镇的居民都忠于镇上最大的雇主，全都开雪佛兰汽车。然而在Fordburg，当地的领导人因通用不在该镇建厂而愤怒地通过了一条禁止雪佛兰汽车的法令。 Recently, some Chevyvillians noticed that every fatal car crash in town involved a Chevrolet, whereas Fordburg hasn’t had a fatal Chevy crash in years. Those folks assembled a damning chart comparing Chevyville and Fordburg’s Chevrolet-related fatal crashes and began demanding that Chevyville adopt Fordburg’s Chevrolet controls. 最近，一些Chevyville居民注意到镇上每起致命的车祸都与雪佛兰相关，然而Fordburg很多年都没有致命的雪佛兰车祸。于是这些人制作了一份表格，证据确凿地比较Chevyville和Fordburg两镇与雪佛兰相关的致命车祸数，并开始要求Chevyville实行同Fordburg一样的雪佛兰汽车管制。 The Chevyvillians aren’t really upset about Chevrolet-related fatal crashes, but about fatal crashes in general. It’s quite possible that Chevy-free Fordburg has the same rate of fatal crashes as Chevyville, but Fordburg’s crashes involve Fords, Dodges, and Toyotas. That becomes obscured by Chevyvillians’ focus on Chevrolets. If Chevyville’s leaders, persuaded by the chart, were to ban Chevrolets, residents would likely continue suffering the same fatal crashes they do now, just with other car brands. Chevyville居民并不是为与雪佛兰相关的致命车祸感到难过，而是为所有致命车祸感到难过。没有雪佛兰的Fordburg很可能与Chevyville有相同的致命车祸率，只不过Fordburg的车祸涉及福特、道奇和丰田的车子。但这些事实都被Chevyville居民对雪佛兰的关注所掩盖了。如果Chevyville的领导听信表格而禁用雪佛兰汽车，居民们很可能仍然会面对跟现在同样的致命车祸，只不过换了别的汽车品牌而已。 Isenstein (and many others)) makes a similar analytical move as the Chevyvillians: she focuses on gun-related deaths rather than all violent deaths. Her table shows that, in states where it’s easier to buy and carry a gun, violent deaths are more likely to occur from guns—but that doesn’t mean the violent death rate is higher in those states. Isenstein（还有很多其他人）的分析跟Chevyville居民类似：她关注涉枪死亡人数而不是所有的暴力死亡人数。她的表格显示，更容易买到和携带枪支的州更可能发生枪支导致的暴力死亡——但是这并不意味着这些州的暴力死亡比例更高。 Statistical testing 统计检验 The question that lies at the heart of the gun control debate is whether gun restrictions reduce the incidence of murder and other violent crime. To help answer that, we can compare Isenstein’s state law data to murder and violent crime rates from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Uniform Crime Reports  (UCR). 枪支管制辩论的核心问题，在于限制枪支是否能减少谋杀和其他暴力犯罪的发生率。为了回答这一问题，我们可将Isenstein的各州法律统计数据与司法统计局统一犯罪报告（UCR）的谋杀和暴力犯罪率相比较。 I did this with UCR data from 2012 (newer data aren’t yet available), resulting in 14 total test results (Isenstein’s seven laws multiplied by the two types of crime). The statistical test, known as a Pearson’s r, returns a value between 1 (indicating perfect positive correlation), 0 (no correlation), and –1 (perfect negative correlation). I arranged the tests so that negative numbers would indicate a relationship between more gun control and less violent crime. 我比较了2012年的统一犯罪报告，得出了总共14项检验结果（Isenstein七个方面的法规状况乘以两种犯罪类型）。这种称为Pearson积矩相关系数的统计检验会得出一个在1（表示完全正相关）、0（没有关联）、和-1（完全负相关）之间的值。在我组织的这个测试里，负数表示更多枪支管控法和较少暴力犯罪之间存在联系。 The results: In half of the 14 tests, the resulting coefficients were positive numbers, meaning that Isenstein’s gun restrictions had no more than a coin-flip chance of yielding the results that gun control supporters expect. Moreover, in all 14 cases, the coefficients were tiny, with nine smaller than +/– 0.1. Those results should make us highly skeptical that the gun laws have any effect—positive or negative—on murder and violent crime. 结果：在14项检验中，有7项得到的系数是正值，说明Isenstein的枪支限制得到枪支管制支持者预期结果的几率不会比抛硬币更高。而且，在全部14项检验中，相关系数都很小，有9项小于+/-0.1。这些结果应让我们高度怀疑，枪支法规是否对谋杀和暴力犯罪有任何影响——无论是正面的还是负面的。 I then slightly altered her law data in light of some peculiar data choices she made. For instance, Isenstein assumed that gun control changes implemented in 2015 affected gun-related deaths in 2013. She also treated states with court-established stand-your-ground (SYG) rights the same as states with no SYG, and different from states with legislatively enacted SYG rights. I used gun law data for 2012 (to match the crime data) and coded legislature-enacted SYG and court-imposed SYG the same. 然后我针对她对数据的一些特殊选择，稍微调整了她的法律统计数据。例如，Isenstein假定枪支管制法规在2015年发生的变更影响了2013年的涉枪死亡人数。她还将法院支持不退让权的州等同于没有不退让权的州，并且与立法确立不退让权的州区别开来。我用了2012年的枪支法规统计（为了匹配犯罪数据），并且将立法实行不退让权和法院承认不退让权等同视之。 I then repeated the statistical tests and the results were much the same as before. This time, nine of the 14 tests yielded positive numbers, indicating a correlation opposite of what gun control advocates expect. (In case you’re wondering about universal background checks, which President Obama is now considering expanding through executive order, both the murder and violent crime coefficients were positive numbers.) And again, all of the coefficients were tiny, with nine smaller than +/-0.1. 然后我再次进行了该统计检验，而结果跟之前相差无几。这一次，14项检验中有9项得到正值，显示与枪支管制支持者所预期的相关性相反。（若你想了解奥巴马总统正考虑通过行政命令来扩大的普遍背景调查的检验结果，我可以告诉你，它与谋杀和暴力犯罪的相关系数都是正值。）所有的系数都还是很小，有9个小于+/-0.1。 Finally, mindful of the possibility that a combination of gun laws could produce a "compounding" effect that alters crime rates but is undetectable when the laws are considered separately, I created an overarching variable intended to distill all of Isenstein’s law data into a single "gun restrictive" measure for each state. For violent crime, the resulting coefficient was 0.093 (again, a positive number, contrary to gun control advocates’ expectation), while murder was –0.012 (a negative number, but extremely tiny even when compared to the other tiny coefficients). 最后，枪支法规组合在一起时可能会产生影响犯罪率的“复合”效应，但在个别考察枪支法规时该效应未必能够被发现。考虑到这种可能性，我创造了一个全局变量，旨在将Isenstein的所有法规统计数据浓缩成每州一个的枪支限制程度值。对于暴力犯罪，得到的系数是0.093（又是正值，与枪支管制支持者预期相反），而谋杀的系数是-0.012（负值，但即使与其他很小的系数相比都极小）。 The results weren’t all bad for gun control. I performed the same statistical tests on 2012 state suicide rates and found that five of the seven coefficients yielded negative numbers, which is what gun control supporters would expect. Two of the cases (handgun registry and open-carry) yielded coefficients as large as –0.267 and –0.254—still pretty small, but much bigger than the crime coefficients. 结果并不是都不利于枪支管制。我对2012年各州自杀率做了同样的统计检验，发现得到的七个系数中有五个都是枪支管制支持者所期望的负值。有两项检验（手枪登记和公开携带）得到的系数较大，分别是-0.267和-0.254——仍然非常小，但比犯罪的系数要大得多。 So maybe gun control does have a small, beneficial effect on suicide. And it’s worth noting that nearly two-thirds of gun deaths are suicides. But currently the argument over gun control isn’t driven by concerns about suicide, but about violent crime. 所以或许枪支管制对减少自杀有微弱的有利影响。值得一提的是，近三分之二的涉枪死亡是自杀。但是如今有关枪支管制的争论并不是因为担心自杀，而是暴力犯罪。 Correlation, causation, and complexity 相关性，因果关系和复杂性 As damning as all this might appear, it shouldn’t be interpreted as proof that gun control (or gun access for that matter) has no effect on violent crime. My analysis suffers two serious shortcomings, which also plague Isenstein and her re-posters. 虽然看起来证据确凿，但上述分析并不应该被视为枪支管制（或者说枪支获取）对暴力犯罪没有影响的证明。我的分析有两个严重的漏洞，Isenstein和她的转发者们也面对同样的问题。 The first is the old dictum that correlation does not prove causation. Assume for a moment that our tests yielded stronger correlation coefficients; we still wouldn’t know whether they indicate that laxer (or tighter) gun controls led to higher murder and violent crime rates, or if the higher crime rates led to laxer (or tighter) gun controls as a result of public demand for different gun laws. Or some other cause could produce both higher murder rates and changes in gun laws. 第一个问题正如那句古老格言所说，相关性并不能证明因果关系。暂时假设我们的检验得出了强相关性，我们仍旧不能确定它们是否就表明更宽松的（或更严格的）枪支管制导致了更高的谋杀和暴力犯罪率，抑或是更高的犯罪率改变了公众对各类枪支管制法规的需求，从而导致了更宽松的（或更严格的）枪支管制。又或者，有一些其他原因能够同时导致更高的犯罪率和枪支法规的改变。 Another problem is that many factors besides gun laws likely affect murder and violent crime rates (and suicides, for that matter—see  Kessler's and Volokh's columns for more on this). Controlling for those factors could reveal different relationships (or non-relationships) than what Isenstein's table and my analysis suggest. 另一个问题是，除了枪支法规外还有很多因素也可能影响谋杀和暴力犯罪率（自杀也同样适用——更多信息请查阅Kessler和 Volokh的专栏）。调控了这些因素后所揭示出的关联性（或者非关联性），也许与Isenstein的表格和我的分析所显示的关联性并不一样。 Advanced statistical methods may be able to overcome those problems, and plenty of trees have been felled to provide paper for such academic analysis of American gun laws. Problem is, there's hardly a consensus among researchers as to whether any causal relationship has been found. (For a sense of the literature, see this.) The United States is hardly alone in this. 高级统计方法或许能克服这些问题，而有关美国枪支法规的这类学术分析已经汗牛充栋了。问题在于研究者对于是否发现了因果关系很难达成一致。（想感受一下相关文献，请看这里。）并不是只有美国面对这一问题。 For instance, though gun control advocates are now lionizing Australia's 1996 National Firearms Agreement restricting the licensing and ownership of different weapons, there appears to be no consensus among researchers as to whether the policy has reduced Australian homicide rates. (There does appear to be consensus that it has reduced suicide rates, though some researchers reach different conclusions.) 例如，虽然枪支管制的倡导者如今将澳大利亚的1996年国家枪支协定奉为杰作，该协定限制各种武器的许可和持有，但是研究者对于该政策是否降低了澳大利亚的谋杀率似乎并未达成共识。（人们在该政策能降低自杀率这点上倒似乎达成了一致，尽管有些研究者得出了不同结论。） The difficulty with this research is that it's hard to compare outcomes in the real world to outcomes in a hypothetical world where different gun laws exist but everything else is the same. Hence researchers' use of advanced mathematics and statistics. The problem is, unless you have a Ph.D. in some statistical science and a good appreciation of the specific issues involved in gun research, you'll be hard pressed to understand the critical points of that research, let alone form a knowledgeable opinion about which analyses are most likely correct. 这项研究的难度在于很难将现实世界的结果与假想世界的结果相比较，在假想世界中除了枪支法规不同外，其他所有条件都一样。然后研究者使用高等数学和统计学进行分析。可问题是，除非你有统计学的博士学位，而且对于涉枪研究的具体问题有深入的认识，否则你很难理解这一研究的关键点，更不用说对哪个分析更可能正确发表真知灼见了。 That brings us to the derisive comments accompanying all those posts of Isenstein's table. We now know the snark is misplaced. So why is the gun control debate, and American politics in general, so rife with such nastiness? 现在我们再来看那些针对转发Isenstein表格的嘲讽评论帖子。我们现在知道这些尖刻评论是不对的。那为什么枪支管制的辩论，以至普遍的美国政治，都有如此之多的龌龊事？ Part of the reason, understandably, is the stakes: gun control and gun rights involve some of the most cherished human values, including public safety, self-preservation, defense of innocents, privacy, and property rights. Part of the reason is simple fear: many people believe their risk of being victimized by violence is increasing (though the  data show the opposite). 有部分原因，可以理解，是利益：枪支管制和持枪权利牵涉到了一些人们最珍视的价值，包括公众安全、自卫权、正当防卫权、隐私权和财产权。有部分原因是仅仅出于恐惧：很多人相信他们被暴力侵害的风险正在提高（虽然数据显示并非如此）。 And part of the reason is the trend in American politics over the last century: government has imposed itself so broadly that many issues are now winner-take-all, and people are desperate to avoid being on the losing side. 还有部分原因是美国在过去一个世纪里的政治潮流：政府管控范围如此之广，以致于很多事情都是赢家通吃，所以人们竭力避免站在输家那一边。 Those factors, along with the muddled complexity of gun research, should encourage more civil, open-minded, and respectful debate about gun laws, not to mention greater modesty about what policy can accomplish. Unfortunately, the opposite is happening. There's a lot of Red team/Blue team, "my side is smart and caring/your side is stupid and cruel" bile. 这些因素加上枪支研究的错综复杂，本应促使有关枪支法规的辩论更文明、更开放、更尊重他人，更不用说对于政策所能达到的效果应持有更谦虚的态度。不幸的是，现在的情况完全相反。到处都是红蓝对决，还有“我方聪明有爱心，你方愚蠢且残忍”的怒气。 Adding further fuel to this angry fire is the simple fact that people who dislike guns usually also dislike—and want to stick it to—people who like guns, and vice versa. And that's a serious threat to American society, too. 一个火上浇油的简单事实是，不喜欢枪的人通常也不喜欢爱枪的人，而且态度坚定，反之亦然。这对美国社会也是一个严重威胁。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Small business divided on the benefits of the EU 英国小企业对于欧盟的好处意见不一 时间：@ 2015-9-17 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Capx，http://www.capx.co/external/is-the-eu-good-for-small-businesses/ In a survey of its 6,300 members, the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) found that 47% would vote for the UK to remain part of the EU, 41% would vote to leave and 11% are undecided. Of those who want to remain inside the EU, 35% would like to see powers transferred back to the UK, while a further 21% would like to see more reforms, compared to just 26% who want the EU to stay as it is. 小企业联合会（FSB）针对其6300家成员企业的调查发现，其中47%会投票支持英国留在欧盟，41%会投票支持脱离，另有11%尚未拿定主意。希望留在欧盟的企业中，有35%盼望英国能收回更多的自主权，另有21%盼望看到更多改革，与此相比，希望欧盟维持现状的只有26%。 The survey also found that while 50.5% of small businesses agreed or strongly agreed that EU membership is beneficial for the UK economy, only 35% agreed or strongly agreed that it was beneficial for their business. In regional terms, London had the largest majority in favour of remaining in the EU – 55% to 34% – while the East Midlands had the largest majority for leaving – 49% to 38%. 该调查还发现，尽管有50.5%的小企业同意或强烈同意欧盟成员国身份有益于英国经济，但只有35%的小企业同意或强烈同意这一身份有益于它们自己的生意。分区域来说，伦敦企业赞同留在欧盟的比例最高——55%对34%——而东米德兰企业赞同脱离欧盟的比例最高——49%对38%。 In nearly all regions, undecided small businesses would be able to swing the majority either way. If the UK were to leave the EU, 43% of the FSB’s members would like to see the UK strengthen trade links with the rest of the world, while 29% would want to see individual trade agreements with the EU and its member states, and 22% would want the UK to remain part of the European Economic Area (as Norway is). 几乎在所有地区，尚未拿定主意的小企业的数量都足以改变多数派的归属。如果英国将要脱离欧盟，FSB成员企业中有43%希望看到英国加强与世界其他地区的贸易关系，有29%希望看到英国与欧盟及其成员国单独签订贸易协定，有22%希望英国继续留在欧洲经济区（如挪威那样）。 Separately, in The Times, columnist Simon Nixon cites Open Europe’s proposals to safeguard the rights of non-Eurozone states within the EU, concluding though that there is no easy way to meet the UK’s promise of ensuring fairness between those inside and outside the Eurozone. 此外，专栏作家Simon Nixon在《泰晤士报》上提到了智库“开放欧洲”的建议，后者旨在保障欧盟非欧元区国家的权利，不过他的结论也认为，英国想要确保欧元区内外之间公平的承诺，这并不容易做到。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

社会是如何学会数到10的 How societies learn to count to 10 作者：Michael Erard @ 2015-9-25 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 来源：AAAS，http://news.sciencemag.org/brain-behavior/2015/09/how-societies-learn-count-10 In some traditional cultures, counting is as easy as one, two, three—because it stops there: Their languages have no words for higher numerals, and instead simply use varieties of words like “many.” But over time some societies acquired higher numbers, as the major languages spoken on the planet today must have done long ago. 在一些传统文化中，计数这件事就像数1，2，3这么简单——因为在这些文化中，计数到3就到头了。他们的语言中没有相应的词语来表示更大的数字，而只是简单地使用各种类似“很多”这样的词语。但随着时间的推移，一些社会获得了使用更大数字的能力，就像今天世界上的主要语言必然在很早之前就已经做到的一样。 Now, a new study of an Australian language family reveals how languages add, and sometimes lose, higher numbers—and how some languages lasted for thousands of years without them. 日前，一项关于澳洲语系的最新研究揭示了语言是如何获得（在某些时候也会丢失）更大数字的，以及一些语言是如何在没有这些更大数字的状态下延续了数千年的。 For some cultures, big numbers just don’t make sense. Take the shepherd who knows that he has the right number of sheep not by counting them one by one but by grasping the gestalt of his flock. That may sound strange to people from other cultures, says Patience Epps, a linguist at the University of Texas, Austin. 对于某些文化而言，大数字并没有什么意义。例如，牧羊人并不是通过逐一数羊来判断羊群数目是否是正确的，而是通过掌握其羊群的完型（gestalt）来做到这一点。对于来自其他文化的人们而言，这听起来可能很奇怪，来自德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校的语言学家Patience Epps说。 Indeed, she says she’s often asked by incredulous Americans how people with few numerals know, for instance, how many children they have. When she asks this of the Amazonian tribe she works with, “they look at me like it’s a weird question. They list the names, they count on their fingers, but they don’t go around with a quantity in their heads,” she says. 她还表示，自己的确经常被充满怀疑精神的美国人问起诸如此类的问题：那些只能使用有限几个数字的人是怎么知道他们有几个孩子的？当她向和她一起工作的亚马逊部落民问起这个问题时，“他们盯着我看，似乎这对他们来说是个很奇怪的问题。他们会列举孩子们的名字，用手指数孩子的个数，但在他们脑海里并不存在一个具体的数字，”她说道。 But once a society becomes complex enough to require more abstract counting, higher numerals are needed. Amazonian languages add numerals when groups that don’t know or trust each other begin trading goods and need to track exchanges more closely, Epps says. Something like this must have happened in familiar languages many millennia ago. 可一旦某个社会变得足够复杂，要求更多的抽象计数时，就需要更大数字了。当并不互相了解或信任的群体开始交易物品，并且需要更加密切地跟踪这些交易时，亚马逊原住民的语言中就加入了新的数字，Epps表示。在我们所熟悉的语言中，数千年前也一定发生过类似的事情。 Looking at how languages with only a few numerals add or lose them could provide insight into how humans build numeral systems. But uncovering these patterns of cultural evolution required data from many related languages with small numeral systems over a long period of time. 通过研究那些只有有限几个数字的语言是如何添加或者丢失数字的，我们可以洞悉人类是如何构建数字系统的。但想要揭示这些文化演化的模式，我们还需要来自多种互相关联的具有小型数字体系的语言的长期数据。 Enter the Pama-Nyungan language family, which once extended across most of Australia. It contains about 300 languages that are currently spoken by about 25,000 people, though in the past they may have numbered as many as 2 million. Most of these languages have numeral systems that stop at five. 现在让我们走进Pama-Nyungan语系，该语系曾一度扩张到了澳洲的大部分地区。它包含了大约300种不同的语言，当前大约还有25000人在使用这些语言，而在过去，使用这些语言的人数或许曾达到200万之多。这个语系中大部分语言的计数系统都没有比5更大的数字。 Yale University historical linguist Claire Bowern collected current and historical data about these languages, many of which are no longer spoken. Together with undergraduate researcher Kevin Zhou, she reconstructed how numerals in the language family evolved over about 6500 years, borrowing a method from evolutionary biology to explore how the Pama-Nyungan languages were related to each other and also how they changed over time. 耶鲁大学历史语言学家Claire Bowern收集了有关这些语言的当前和历史数据，而其中的大部分语言在今天已不再有人使用了。她和本科生研究者Kevin Zhou一起，还原了过去大约6500年里数字在该语系中的演化过程，借用一种进化生物学的方法探索了Pama-Nyungan语系中的各种语言是如何关联在一起的，以及如何随时间演变的。 The researchers plugged their data into a computer model, which then generated the most likely family tree for all the languages’ numeral systems. Then they tracked how those systems added or lost numerals within the tree. 两位研究者将他们获得的数据导入一个计算机模型中，该模型为所有这些语言的计数系统生成一棵可能性最大的“家族树”。之后，研究者们会追踪在这棵“家族树”中的这些计数系统是如何加入或是丢失数字的。 The upper limits of these Australian numeral systems most often varied between three, four, and five, the team reports this month in the Proceedings of the Royal Society B. Over time, even small numeral systems sometimes lost a numeral or two, but they mainly gained numerals—yet not by plodding up the number line, one numeral after another. 该研究团队在本月的《英国皇家学会学报B刊》上发表的研究结果显示，在这些澳洲计数系统中，数字的上界通常在3，4和5之间变化。随着时间的推移，即使是很小的计数系统有时也会丢失一个或者两个数字，但大多数情况下它们都会获得更多的数字——而这并不是通过沿着数轴缓慢地一个个增加数字来完成的。 Surprisingly, they tended to acquire numerals in bunches, leaping from five numerals to 10 or 20, for example. The numeral five was often the tipping point—once a system reached five, it was likely to add more numerals, up to 20. As a result, numeral systems with five as an upper limit are rare in Pama-Nyungan languages. 令人吃惊的是，这些系统倾向于一次性获得多个数字，例如从5个数字直接跳跃到10个或20个。数字5通常会成为引爆点——一旦一个计数系统达到了5，它就很有可能会加入更多的数字，直到20。而结果就是在Pama-Nyungan语系的语言中，很少有语言的计数系统的上界是5。 “This is surprising, given the predominance of fingers and toes as things to count,” Bowern notes. Adding or losing the numeral four was the most frequent change. (The words for “four” were most often composed out of words for “two,” not by creating or borrowing a new word that means “four,” showing how the numeral systems evolved.) “这个现象让人感到意外，尤其是考虑到手指和脚趾作为计数工具的主导地位，”Bowern评论道。而加入或是丢失数字4则是这些系统中最频繁发生的变化。（在这些语言中，表示“4”的词通常都是由表示“2”的词合成的，而不是来自创造或借用一个意为“4”的新词语，这也展现了这些数字系统的演化方式。） Bowern thinks that numerals were added in clusters for practical reasons: If you need to count above five, you probably need to go higher than seven or eight as well. And she speculates that perhaps a cognitive shift occurs at about five. “Once you generalize beyond five or so, it becomes easier to generalize to an infinite system.” Bowern认为数字以集群的方式被加入语言中是出于一些实际的原因：如果你需要数到5以上，那么你很可能也同样需要数到7或者8以上。同时她推测，一个认知上的变化会在5这个数值附近发生。“一旦你形成了超过5左右的数字概念，那么形成一个无限计数系统就变得更容易了。” “This is the kind of historical linguistics using computational methods that gives me a lot of confidence,” said Brian Joseph, a historical linguist at Ohio State University, Columbus, adding that “there are a lot of nonlinguists who apply this methodology to data that they don’t seem to control or understand.” “这些采用计算分析方法的历史语言学研究给了我很多信心，”来自位于哥伦布市的俄亥俄州立大学历史语言学家Brian Joseph说道。他还表示“有很多并非语言学家的研究者将这种方法应用在了一些看起来超出他们的掌控或理解的数据上。” “These conclusions seem sound to me,” agrees Russell Gray of the University of Auckland in New Zealand and director of the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History in Jena, Germany, “and remind us that cultural evolution doesn't always proceed incrementally.” “这些结论在我看来很合理，”新西兰奥克兰大学的Russell Gray对这项研究结果表示赞同，他同时还担任位于德国耶拿的马克斯·普朗克人类历史科学研究所的主任，“这也提醒我们，文化的演化并不总是以逐一递增的方式进行的。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Valorization of Envy 赋予嫉妒以价值 作者：Jason Brennan @ 2015-8-22 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Bleeding Heart Libertarians，http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2015/08/the-valorization-of-envy/ Robert Nozick, among others, wondered to what degree left-wing conceptions of social justice are mere attempts to valorize envy. (Extreme left-wing views in the US, in particular, tend to concentrated among privileged upper-middle class liberal arts grads in the 2% who are angry with the 1%.) As an example of an envious rant, check out this remarkable essay at Counterpunch, “The Economic Inequality of Academia”., by Richard Goldin.  An excerpt: 罗伯特·诺齐克，还有其他一些人，都曾想知道，左翼的社会正义概念在多大程度上仅仅是尝试给嫉妒定价。（尤其是美国的极左翼观念，其往往集中出现在来自优越的中产阶级上层、身处收入顶层2%的文科毕业生中，他们对那1%愤怒有加。）嫉妒的咆哮之例证，请看网站Counterpunch的这篇神奇文章：“学术界的经济不平等”，文章作者是Richard Goldin。以下是两段摘录：

Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. No objective standard of measurement exists to financially quantify, and differentiate, these approaches or their contributions. Yet a vast and enduring economic hierarchy has emerged grounded in the supposed intrinsic hierarchy between the two. This financial hierarchy is not a dispassionate reflection of an objective reality; it is a strategic effect of the mechanisms underlying class formation and preservation. “通往知识的道路通常都由出版和教学的相互作用而铺成。世上并不存在什么客观的测量标准，能为这两种方法或它们的贡献做财务上的量化和区分。但是，在两者之间被公众认受的内在等级区分之上，产生出了一个庞大且持久存在的经济等级制度。这种财务等级制度不是对客观现实的一种公正反映，它是塑造和维护阶层的社会机制的策略效应。” The primacy of publishing, and the attendant allocation of resources, is utilized not merely to perpetuate two different economic classes, but also to create two different kinds of people. This creation allows the hierarchy of privilege to function as though it represents objective value differences both in terms of the work produced and the individuals who produce it. “出版第一及伴随而来的资源分配，不仅仅被用来维持两个不同的经济阶层，而且被用来创造不同的两个人群。这种创造令特权等级制的运转好像是体现了一种客观的价值差异，当中既包括劳动成果之间的价值差异，也包括提供劳动的个体之间的价值差异。”

Some comments on the essay: 对此文我有几点评论： 1.Like many essays in this genre, it has its facts wrong. It claims that the majority of faculty are adjuncts, but that is just false. As Phil Magness documents here, at normal four-year, not-for-profit universities and colleges, the majority of faculty are tenure-track. Even when we include for-profit and community colleges, which rely disproportionately on adjunct labor, the majority of faculty in the US are not adjuncts. (See this post, too.) 1.跟诸多此类文章一样，这篇文章也有事实错误。它声称教员中多数都是兼职人员，这绝对是错的。Phil Magness已证明，在一般的四年制非营利性大学和学院中，多数教员是终身轨。即使将极为依赖兼职劳动力的营利性院校和社区学院都包括进来，美国的大学教员中多数也不是兼职。 Also, contrary to what everyone keeps saying, the number of tenure-track faculty slots has been increasing over the past 40 years. Here’s a chart with US Dept of Ed data, again from Magness: 并且，跟大家历来的说法相反，终身轨教职【译注：终身轨，美国大学一种教职序列，只有进入终身轨的教员方有可能转正为终身教授，因此又称预备终身】空缺数过去40年间一直在增加。下图还是来自Magness，数据采自联邦教育部： It’s bizarre that the madjunct crowd keeps repeating obviously false claims, such as that they make minimum wage. Can’t they make their point without lying? I suspect the issue here is that many of these people are postmodernists, and for postmodernists, the concepts of “truth” or “facts” are just attempts to wield power over others. Or perhaps Dr. Goldin is being funded by the Koch brothers as part of a neoliberal assault to undermine the credibility of academia. “疯狂兼职人”群体总是在重复明显错误的主张，比如声称自己赚的是最低工资。这真是奇特。他们在立论时就不能不撒谎吗？我怀疑此处的问题是，这些人中有许多都是后现代主义者，而对于后现代主义者，“真理”或“事实”这种概念都只是对他人行使权力的企图。或者，也许Goldin博士是得了科赫兄弟【译注：美国富豪，积极参与政治，资助传统基金会和加图研究所等保守派和自由意志主义智库，常被左派攻击为右派幕后黑手】的资助，正为一场旨在摧毁学术界公信力的新自由主义攻势出力。 2.The essay claims that the academic 1% do as well as they do because the burdens of teaching are shifted onto poorly paid adjuncts. But the rather obvious problem with this claim is that the places where the academic 1% reside are not the places that use lots of adjuncts. The top researchers end up in places like Princeton, Harvard, MIT, and Penn. These schools do not make heavy use of adjunct faculty. (Insofar as they do use them, many of their adjuncts are professionals with full-time jobs, who teach extra clinical classes in their law and business schools.) For Goldin’s argument to succeed, he’d have to show us that the reason the academic 1% do so well is because their employers somehow exploit the adjuncts working at other universities and colleges. 2.文章声称学术界的1%们之所以能有今天这样的表现，是因为教学负担被转移到了收入平平的兼职教员头上。但是这一断言的一个特别明显的问题是，学术界那1%所在的地方，就不是大量使用兼职人员的地方。顶级的研究人员都流向了如普林斯顿、哈佛、麻省理工、宾大等地方，而这些学校并没有大量使用兼职教员。（即使确实为它们所用的兼职人员，其中也有许多是拥有全职工作的专业人士，他们只在法学院和商学院里额外讲授实操课程。）Goldin的论证要成立，他就必须向我们证明，学术界的1%之所以能有今天的优异表现，是因为他们的雇主以某种方式剥削了其他大学和学院里的兼职工作人员。 I’m an academic 1-percenter, but it’s not because adjuncts do all my teaching for me. We do have a two-tier system, it’s true. In our system, the majority of faculty are extremely well paid tenure-track professors with high research expectations and low teaching loads; the minority are very well paid permanent teaching faculty with higher teaching loads. (According to this website, Goldin makes $30.5K a year, which is only a tiny fraction of what we pay our non-tenure track teaching faculty. Indeed, we pay our non-tenure-track faculty better than Cal State Long Beach pays their tenure-track faculty.) We use few adjuncts. 我就是学术界1%中的一个，但这不是因为兼职教员承担了我所有的教学事务。我们这里确实有一个双轨制，这是真的。在我们的这一制度下，教员的多数都是终身轨教授，报酬非常高，研究前景非常好，教学任务很轻；少数人则是长期职位（permanent）的教学教员，报酬很高，教学任务较重。（根据这个网站，Goldin每年能赚3.5万美元，只是我们这里的非终身轨教学教员报酬的一个零头。事实上，我们付给非终身轨教员的报酬比加州州立长滩分校【译注：即吐槽对象Richard Goldin任职的学校】付给其终身轨教员的还要高。）我们极少使用兼职教员。 I’m not making bank because Georgetown exploits adjuncts.  Martin Gilens isn’t making bank because Princeton exploits adjuncts. R. Edward Freeman doesn’t make bank because Darden exploits adjuncts. Rather, the exploited adjuncts are getting exploited elsewhere, at community colleges, small liberal arts colleges, third tier/low output “research” universities, and the for-profit colleges. 我不是因为乔治敦大学剥削兼职教员而发财。Martin Gilens不是因为普林斯顿大学剥削兼职教员而发财。R. Edward Freeman不是因为达顿商学院剥削兼职教员而发财。其实，被剥削的兼职教员是在别的地方被剥削的，比如社区学院、小型的文理学院、第三档或者低产出的“研究型”大学以及营利性学院。 3.Goldin has some interesting points about whether research is overvalued and teaching undervalued. But we should keep in mind the economics of the situation. Good teachers are a dime a dozen. It’s easy to find people who can teach low-level undergraduate courses well. It’s easy to teach these classes well, and many people can do it. The supply of good teachers is very high. But good researchers are rare. Most faculty cannot consistently publish in high-level venues. The supply of good researchers is low. (It’s easy to publish in obscure third and four-tier journals and presses, but difficult to publish in prestigious top-tier journals and presses.) Even if universities valued teaching and research equally, we’d expect the star researchers to be paid more than the star teachers, because star teachers are easy to come by. 3.关于研究是否估值过高而教学是否估值过低，Goldin提出了一些有趣的论点。但我们要牢记这种情形里的经济学道理。好的教师四处都有，我们很容易找到能把低水平的本科课程讲得很好的教师。这些课也容易教得好，很多人都可以做到。优秀教师的供给是很充足的。但优秀研究者则很少见。多数教员不能稳定地在高水平场合发表成果。优秀研究员的供给是不足的。（在不知名的三、四流杂志或出版社发表成果很容易，但在极富盛名的一流杂志和出版社就难了。）即使大学同等重视教学和研究，我们也会预期明星研究员所得的报酬比明星教师要多，因为明星教师得之不难。 I realize that as a Counterpunch author, it’s unlikely Goldin has ever seen an economics textbook. But I’d invite him to go to Cal State Long Beach’s library, check out Mankiw’s undergrad econ textbook, turn to pages 6-7, and read about the diamond-water paradox. Goldin是Counterpunch网站的作者，我估计他很可能从未看过任何经济学教材。但我很乐意邀请他去趟加州州立长滩分校的图书馆，借本曼昆的经济学本科教材，翻到第6-7页，读读钻石和水的悖论【译注：即价值悖论，水对人的生存极为重要，但市场价值远比无甚大用的钻石低】。 4.Consider this quotation: 4.思考一下文中这样一段话：

It is teachers dedicated to a challenging education who engage in the task of reworking and concretizing theories to make them relevant to students. It is in the classroom where the dialogue between theory and politics takes place; and it is the classroom which sends forth generations of students who can perceive, and possibly undermine, the rationalities of power. “从事理论修订和具体化这一任务，使之能被学生理解的，是那些献身于具挑战性的教育事业的教师；理论与政治之间的对话，是在课堂上进行的；一代又一代能够理解权力合理性，并且可能还会将之摧毁的学生，也是从课堂上走出来的。” Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. “通往知识的道路通常都由成果发表和教学的相互作用而铺成。” What should we make of this? Is coming up with general relativity less of an achievement than teaching it to undergrads secondhand? Is writing A Theory of Justice less of an achievement than teaching it to undergrads secondhand? Is writing the stuff that gets into the textbooks less of an achievement than teaching the textbook to undergrads? 我们该怎么去理解这段话？提出广义相对论的成就不如把它二手教给本科生？写出《正义论》的成就不如把它二手教给本科生？写出那些进入了教科书的东西，其成就不如向本科生讲授教科书？

Also, after reading Academically Adrift, it’s not clear to me that college teaching is undervalued. It might instead be overvalued. 而且，在读了《学术漂泊》以后，我都不太确定大学教学是否确实被低估了。它甚至有可能被高估了。 5.Goldin, like many writing in this genre, claims that academia is a lottery. This view is problematic. First, if it were a lottery, we’d expect that the type of people being hired as tenure-track at Harvard would have average credentials, but, on the contrary, the top schools tend to hire people with the best publication records. Second, the way the madjunct crowd reacts to their failure to secure good jobs doesn’t match how people react when they lose lotteries. My Uncle Freddy like to play the lottery from time to time. When he lost, he didn’t act surprised, claim that the system is unfair, and demand redistribution from the winners to the losers. Rather, he expected to lose, threw out his losing tickets, and kept living his life. If madjunct crowd sincerely believed that academia is a lottery, they would not act surprised or indignant that they lost and would move on with their lives. 5.跟许多写作此类文章的人一样，Goldin宣称学术界就是大抽奖。这种观点是有问题的。首先，如果确实是抽奖，我们就可以预期哈佛所聘用的终身轨人员将会是些成就处于平均水平的人，但是正好相反，顶尖学校都更倾向于聘用著述丰厚的人。第二，“疯狂兼职人”群体在没能保住自己的好工作时，其反应与人们抽奖落空后的反应并不相同。我的叔叔Freddy时不时就去抽奖。抽不中他也不觉得稀奇，不会说这个制度不公平，也不会要求中了奖的人把奖品拿出来和抽不中的瓜分，他只会丢了没中奖的彩票，生活照旧。如果“疯狂兼职人”群体真心觉得学术界就是抽奖，那他们就不会为自己的失败而感到惊讶或愤怒，只会继续自己的生活。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Dodd-Frank Is Already Failing 为何Dodd-Frank法案已经失败？ 作者：Paul G. Mahoney @2015-9-17 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 二校：龙泉（@L_Stellar） 来源：Library of Law and Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/09/17/why-dodd-frank-is-already-failing/ Five years after its enactment, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 remains controversial. Critics argue that the statute imposes disproportionately large compliance costs on small community banks, institutionalizes “too big to fail,” and drives up the cost of banking services to consumers. Comparing Dodd-Frank to past securities reforms, particularly those of the New Deal, shows that these three problems are related and are nearly inevitable features of post-crisis legislation. 自2010年执行起，五年了，《多德-弗兰克法案》仍饱受争议。批评者认为该法规对小型社区银行强加了不成比例的巨大合规成本， 将“大而不倒”制度化，同时抬高消费者享用银行服务的成本。将多德-弗兰克法案与过去的证券业改革——尤其是罗斯福新政中那些——相比较会发现，这三个问题是相互关联的，并且是后危机立法几乎不可避免的特征。 Every major financial reform in U.S. history was enacted in the aftermath of a substantial decline in equity prices. Each, in other words, was crafted during a time of public anger that politicians hoped to deflect from themselves to Wall Street. The congressional authors always compose a narrative of the stock market crash that blames unscrupulous financial intermediaries or public companies and insufficient regulation of the markets. 美国历史上每一次重大金融改革都是在股票价格大幅下跌后制定的。换句话说，每一次改革都是在群情激愤时精心制定，政治家们希望借此将公众愤怒的对象从自己转移到华尔街。国会的立法者总会借市场崩盘创造出一套说辞——指责金融中介机构、上市公司不道德的钻空行为和以往监管的不足。 Just as inevitably, proponents studiously avoid any suggestion that their own prior regulatory innovations had unintended consequences that contributed to the crash. Meanwhile, firms in the regulated industry concentrate on determining who the winners and losers may be under a new regulatory regime, so they can make sure they end up on the winning side. 必然地，支持法案的政客们刻意避免任何这样的看法：正是他们自己早先实施的监管革新，无意中促成了那次崩盘。同时，受监管的公司集中精力分辨出新监管体系下的赢家输家，以确保自己最终处在赢面。 This routine ensures that the primary losers from financial reform are investors and small, regulated firms. Costly new rules simultaneously serve the ends of Congress and the major financial institutions. They allow Congress to argue that it filled the regulatory gaps that it claims caused the crisis. Large firms can spread the new costs over a large number of transactions, giving them a structural advantage over their smaller and previously nimbler competitors. All firms will seek to pass on to their customers as many of the regulatory costs as possible. 这一惯常路数使得金融改革的主要输家必然是投资者和监管范围内的小型企业。成本高昂的新规定服务于国会和大金融机构的目标，这些规定让国会有资格宣称自己填补了其所宣称的那些监管空白。大公司则可以通过大量交易摊薄新增的成本，相比那些更小、曾经更灵活的竞争对手，这给了他们结构性优势。所有的公司都会尽可能的把监管成本转移给消费者。 All of this would be unfortunate but bearable if the new regulations generated benefits in excess of their costs. But that is unlikely with post-crisis legislation. The objective is to show the public that Congress is doing something and time is short. Congress knows relatively little about the details of market practices and so relies on the financial industry for information. 如果新规产生的收益大过成本，所有这些都还可忍受，尽管不算幸运。但是这对于后危机立法是不太可能的。立法的目的是为了向公众显示，国会有所作为而且行动迅速。他们对于市场行为的细节知之甚少，因此不得不依赖金融业者来获取信息。 The largest firms have skilled lobbyists and contacts with legislative staff. They argue, often successfully, that their ways of doing business are “best practices” and their competitors’ practices are shoddy or unfair. The process almost guarantees that the legislation will harm competition and therefore investors. Historically, that is precisely the pattern we observe, as demonstrated in my book Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails. 那些行业巨头都有熟练的游说人员，与立法者有着广泛联系。他们通常会成功地辩解，他们做生意的方式是“最佳实践”，而竞争者的做法是卑劣的、不公平的。这样的立法过程几乎确保了法律最后会有害于竞争，并进一步伤害投资者利益。从历史上来看，这正是我们观察到的模式，正如我在《白白浪费了一次危机：为何证券监管总是失败》一书中所展示的。 The New Deal securities reforms, often seen as the classic example of good regu lation, provide a cautionary tale. President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration argued that the 1920s were a time of widespread fraud and manipulation in the stock market, but there is scant factual basis for the claim. 罗斯福新政中的证券业改革常被视为良好管制的经典案例，其实是一则警示寓言。富兰克林·罗斯福总统和他的行政团队声称，1920年代的股市中充满了欺骗和操纵，但是这样的观点缺乏有力的事实依据。 As my book demonstrates, the best-documented cases of “fraud” were no such thing; the evidence proves mostly that Congress did not understand how securities markets operate. By going back and analyzing market reactions to earnings announcements, I also show that the markets did not view the disclosures they received as a result of mandates from the Securities and Exchange Commission as more informative than the stock exchange-mandated disclosures of the pre-SEC era. 正如我书中所说，记录最为详尽的“骗局”案例都是空穴来风；有关证据只是证明了国会并不了解证券市场如何运行。通过追溯和分析市场对盈利报告的反应，我还揭示了，市场不觉得，在SEC规制下，企业的信息披露比前SEC时代更有价值。 The 1920s were, on the other hand, a time of sharply increasing competition and innovation in the investment business. As a growing middle class looked for ways to invest its savings, a large industry of brokers, investment bankers, and investment managers developed to meet the demand. New entrants modernized the sales process, taking advantage of the rising number of households with telephones and radio sets. Like many creative new companies, they took business away from their more established competitors. 另一方面，1920年代是一个投资业务竞争和创新飞速发展的时期。由于成长中的中产阶级为其储蓄寻求投资的途径，一个由经纪人、理财顾问、投资银行家构成的大产业就发展起来满足这种需求。新入行者充分利用配有电话和老式收音机的家庭的不断增长，将销售过程现代化。正如许多有创新力的新公司那样，他们从老牌的竞争者手中抢过了生意。 The New Deal reforms put the brakes on this innovation and competition. At the urging of the old-line investment banks, the securities laws defined the new sales practices as misleading and forced the industry to return to the traditional syndicated method of public offerings at which the established investment banks excelled. The securities laws comprehensively regulated brokers, stock exchanges, and listed companies, subjecting small, regional businesses to costs they could not bear. 罗斯福新政改革遏止了这种创新和竞争。在传统投资银行的强烈要求下，证券法将新的销售模式认定为骗局，并强迫整个行业重返传统财团公开募股的方法，这正是老牌投资银行所擅长的。证券法全面管制经纪人、证券交易所和上市公司，使地方小型交易商背负它们不可能承受的成本。 The results were dramatic: 结果是触目惊心的：

• Industry concentration increased promptly and measurably. By my estimate, the New Deal securities laws increased the aggregate market share of the top five investment banks by 12 percent;
• 行业集中度快速、可见地提高。据我估计，罗斯福新政的证券法使得投资银行前五名市场占有率共提升12%。

• Smaller securities dealers based outside New York City began to exit the business despite having survived the worst phase of the Great Depression;
• 在纽约市以外的小型券商开始退出市场，尽管他们熬过了大萧条时最糟糕的时期。

• Regional stock exchanges began a terminal decline. Of the 41 exchanges in existence when the Securities Exchange Act went into effect in 1935, only 20 survived until 1938, despite the fact that many of them had survived the financial panic of 1907 and the recession of 1920-21;
• 地区性证券交易所走上穷途末路。在1935年，《证券交易法》开始实施时还存在41家证券交易所，到了1938年则只有20家交易所还存在，尽管这些交易所中大多数都成功走过了1907年的金融恐慌和1920～1921年的经济衰退。

• Regulators helped enforce anticompetitive practices such as fixed brokerage commissions that increased investors’ costs.
• 监管者推动了从业者的反竞争措施，比如执行增加投资者花费的固定佣金制。

Dodd-Frank, for its part, has a broader focus than the New Deal securities laws. It changes the regulatory framework for the entire financial system, including commercial banks, investment banks, investment managers, and insurance companies. 在这方面，多德-弗兰克法案的关注面要比罗斯福新政的证券法更宽广。它改变了整个金融系统的监管框架，包括商业银行、投资银行、投资经理人和保险公司。 Its counterproductive effects are therefore potentially even more far-reaching and costly to consumers. At the most basic level, it gives the federal banking regulators the authority to identify “systemically important” financial institutions. These are pre-cleared for a bailout during the next financial crisis. In return, they become in effect wards of the state, with regulators having broad discretion to oversee their business practices. 因此对消费者来说，它适得其反的影响有可能更加深远且代价巨大。从最基础的来说，它赋予了联邦银行监管人员鉴别何为系统重要性金融机构的权力。下一次金融危机要实行救援计划时，它们就会被预先判定无辜。作为交换，国家成了它们事实上的监护人，监管者对其商业行为有着广泛的自由裁量权。 Dodd-Frank also requires major changes to the over-the-counter derivatives market. Lawmakers argued that “opaque” and “risky” derivatives contributed substantially to the financial crisis. This is true only in the sense that anything that reduces the transaction costs of borrowing leads to more borrowing. 多德-弗兰克法案还要求场外衍生品市场做出重大改变。立法者认为“晦涩的”和“高风险的”衍生品实质上促进了金融危机。这种观点仅在如下意义上是正确的：任何降低借款交易费用的事情都会导致更多借贷行为。 The financial crisis was fundamentally a problem of financial institutions taking highly leveraged positions in mortgage-related assets. Derivatives are only one of many vehicles by which they did so. Leverage is the problem, not the specific contracts by which it is achieved. 这次金融危机从根本上说是金融机构用抵押资产贷款维持高杠杆化经营的问题。金融衍生品只是这些企业实现高杠杆化的众多工具之一。衍生品并不是金融危机背后的问题，高杠杆化才是。 Congress therefore devised a solution to a non-problem by requiring that many over-the-counter derivatives be centrally cleared, meaning there must be an institution (typically owned by other financial institutions) that guarantees each party’s performance to the other. These central clearinghouses are eligible for “systemically important” status and will be in line for bailouts during the next financial crisis as well. 国会因此给一个不存在的问题设计了解决办法，要求场外金融衍生品集中清算，这意味必须要有一个机构（通常由其他金融机构拥有）来保证各方对彼此履约。这些（场内）中央清算所有资格具备“系统重要性”，而且也将在下次金融危机时纳入救援计划。 There are plausible arguments that the 2007-2008 financial crisis was exacerbated by the unintended consequences of governmental policies, including interest-rate decisions by the Federal Reserve, housing policies administered by banking regulators, politically-driven risk weights within the risk-based system of capital requirements, and the tendency to bail out large institutions in financial distress. 有人不无理由的说，2007-2008年金融危机被政府政策的非意图后果加剧了，包括美联储的利率决议，银行监管部门的住房贷款政策，风险相关的资本要求中受政治影响扭曲的风险权重，还有在危机时救助大机构的倾向。 Dodd-Frank increases the likelihood that regulators’ missteps will be a significant contributor to the next financial crisis. But because governmental actors strongly resist admitting mistakes, it, too, will be blamed on “reckless” bankers, clearinghouses, insurance companies, or other financial intermediaries. 多德-弗兰克法案增加了因监管者过失导致下一次金融危机的可能性。但是因为政府机构总是死不认错，下次 危机也会被归咎于“不计后果的”银行家、清算所、保险公司、或者其他金融中介机构 。 And then the cycle will start again, with more regulations that will cause more unintended consequences for which Wall Street will be blamed. 然后这个循环又会开始，更多规定导致更多非意图后果。为此华尔街还会被指责。 Paul G. Mahoney is dean of the University of Virginia School of Law. 弗吉尼亚大学法学院院长 Paul G.Mahoney （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——