在夏威夷住了半个月，三个地方，一些印象： （没去过美国其他地方，所以不能确定哪些适用于整个美国） 【开车】 A1）交通规则很合理，特别是小路与大路之间关系的处理，使得大路上的主车流可以达到很高速度，许多单车道无封闭无隔离的路都可开到60mph。 A2）几乎人人超速，超速标准和小费差不多：15-20%。 A3）除了超速这一点，其他方面普遍很规矩。 A4）夏威夷没有执法摄像头。 A5）吃了张罚单，因为我没把买的停车票放在可见位置上，在线申辩，48小时后出了结果，降级为警告，还算顺利。 【吃饭】 B1）餐馆多，类型丰富，选择充裕。 B2）所有餐馆无论其他方面如何，有两点是共同的：食材好，凡肉菜肉量都很大。 B3）菜单很难看懂，点菜前是我翻字典最频繁的场合，往往翻了也没用，全靠Yelp帮忙。 B4）但靠Yelp也有问题，因为这边餐馆菜单好像普遍更新很快，几个月前的菜往往就没了。 B5）营业时间非常参差，每店不同，高度类型依赖，以喝酒为主的店关得晚，其余较早。 B6）好馆子排队很普遍。 B7）能喝到好咖啡的饭馆很少，大街上卖咖啡的地方也不多，这点比较意外。 B8）几乎所有店都有筷子，不过没见过好筷子，都是很低档的方便筷。 B9）见到的几家中餐馆都是粤菜馆，烧腊很地道，比我在广州吃到的好，其他菜品本地化程度较高，而且改变方向是合我胃口的。 B10）中餐馆的定位偏低端。 【烟与酒】 C1）买酒买烟都要身份证，胡子再白也没用。 C2）饭馆点酒喝酒不用身份证，没胡子也不用。 C3）香烟很贵，7-Eleven卖$9.39一包，沃尔玛$8.12，查了下，原来夏威夷烟价全美第三，仅低于纽约和芝加哥。 C4）不过有次偶尔发现一家韩国人开的社区小店，小雪茄卖4毛9一根，可以顶4支香烟，价钱跟一支香烟差不多，还不用身份证，呵呵。 【文化梯度】 依次住了三个地方，Hilo，Kailua-Kona和Honolulu，可以明显感觉到一个文化梯度： D1）Hilo居住密度低，宅地面积大，乡村感浓厚，没见过三层以上高楼，造型夸张的越野车极多，行人很少，游客少，民风友善热情，路遇陌生人大多会打招呼，守规矩，安静，干净，除了很小一块downtown，其他地方餐馆和商店很少，吃饭贵； 除了11号公路的一小段，几乎没有两车道或更宽的公路，更没有封闭或双向隔离路，闹市区之外极少红绿灯，随时随地有车位，在Hilo开车时我从未因其他车的举动而踩过一脚刹车（我在美国的第一脚重刹车是在Kailua-Kona踩的，当时一辆车从小路上窜出来，虽然算不上危险，但已明显短于安全距离了）。 D2）Honolulu居住密度高，宅基小，高楼大厦多，更像大城市，有好几条封闭隔离公路，H1公路最宽处每向六车道；大量单行道，合法车位很难找，紧凑型小汽车占多数，游客多，路遇陌生人很少打招呼，不守规矩的情况较多，路上和景区也较脏，饭馆多且便宜。 D3）Kailua-Kona介于两者之间，但更偏近Hilo（虽然Kailua人口只有Hilo的1/3，但看上去更像大城市）。 【其他】 E1）电线杆都是木头的。 E2）美甲店多。 E3）大家用现金的频率比我预期的高。 E4）流浪汉挺多见。 E5）人普遍很友善，碰到的最不友好的三个人依次是机场安检、7-Eleven收银员、沃尔玛收银员。（ps.7-Eleven收银员似乎是个特别苦逼的群体，我就没见他们笑过，相比之下，快餐店收银员和加油工都很热情，想不出其中区别在哪里。） E6）夏威夷有不少牧场，养了许多牛，但据Kailua的房东（是位教夏威夷历史的教师）说，当地人吃的牛肉都是从大陆进口的，因为那里没有屠宰场。 E7）半个月没打过喷嚏，也没咳嗽过。 E8）雾霾还是有点用处的，可以防晒。  

Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy 谷物、可收夺性和等级制 作者：Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：VoxEU，http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers. 传统理论认为，等级制和国家产生的缘由在于：人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出，上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此，仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区，才会产生等级制和国家。 What explains underdevelopment? 欠发达的原因是什么？ One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equator. Acemoglu et al. (2001) point to extractive institutions as the root cause for underdevelopment. Besley and Persson (2014) emphasise the persistent effects of low fiscal capacity in underdeveloped countries. 我们这个时代最为紧迫的问题之一就是存在许多欠发达国家，而政府失灵在这些国家极为常见。它们大多数都位于赤道附近。Acemoglu等（2001年）认为，榨取型制度是欠发达的根本原因。Besley和Persson（2014年）强调，欠发达国家财政能力的低弱具有持久影响。 On the other hand, Diamond (1997) argues that it is geographical factors that explain why some regions of the world remain underdeveloped. In particular, he argues that the east-west orientation of Eurasia resulted in greater variety and productivity of cultivable crops, and in larger economic surplus, which facilitated the development of state institutions in this major landmass. Less fortunate regions, including New Guinea and sub-Saharan Africa, were left underdeveloped due to low land productivity. 而另一方面，Diamond（1997年）则提出，地理因素能够解释为什么世界某些地区会停留在欠发达状态。具体来说，他指出，欧亚大陆的东西走向使得适合驯化的谷物产量更大、种类更多，也使其经济剩余更多，后者为这块大陆上的国家制度的发展提供了便利。至于那些不那么幸运的地域，诸如新几内亚、撒哈拉以南非洲等，就因为土地生产率低下而停留在了欠发达状态。 In a recent paper (Mayshar et al. 2015), we contend that fiscal capacity and viable state institutions are conditioned to a major extent by geography. Thus, like Diamond, we argue that geography matters a great deal. But in contrast to Diamond, and against conventional opinion, we contend that it is not high farming productivity and the availability of food surplus that accounts for the economic success of Eurasia. 在最近的一篇论文（Mayshar等，2015年）中，我们主张：财政能力和国家机构的维系，很大程度上受地理条件限制。因此和Diamond一样，我们认为地理条件异常重要。不过与Diamond和其他传统观点不同的是，我们认为欧亚大陆的经济成功并非源于高农业生产率和获得粮食盈余的可能性。

• We propose an alternative mechanism by which environmental factors imply the appropriability of crops and thereby the emergence of complex social institutions.
• 我们提出了一个（用于解释国家起源的）替代机制：环境因素决定谷物的可收夺性，从而决定了复杂社会制度的产生。

To understand why surplus is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of hierarchy, consider a hypothetical community of farmers who cultivate cassava (a major source of calories in sub-Saharan Africa, and the main crop cultivated in Nigeria), and assume that the annual output is well above subsistence. 为了理解为什么粮食盈余既不是等级制产生的必要条件，也不是充分条件，让我们假设：有这么一个种植木薯（撒哈拉以南非洲的一种主要热量来源，尼日利亚的主要农作物）的农民群体，并且假设每年的产量远远超过生存所需。 Cassava is a perennial root that is highly perishable upon harvest. Since this crop rots shortly after harvest, it isn't stored and it is thus difficult to steal or confiscate. As a result, the assumed available surplus would not facilitate the emergence of a non-food producing elite, and may be expected to lead to a population increase. 木薯是多年生宿根植物，收获以后很容易腐烂。既然这种作物在收获后不久就会腐烂，它就不会被贮藏，因此很难被盗取或征用。结果就是，这种假定可以获得的粮食盈余将不会促成那些不事农业生产的统治精英的产生，而且可能会导致人口增长。 Consider now another hypothetical farming community that grows a cereal grain – such as wheat, rice or maize – yet with an annual produce that just meets each family's subsistence needs, without any surplus. Since the grain has to be harvested within a short period and then stored until the next harvest, a visiting robber or tax collector could readily confiscate part of the stored produce. Such ongoing confiscation may be expected to lead to a downward adjustment in population density, but it will nevertheless facilitate the emergence of non-producing elite, even though there was no surplus. 现在设想另外一个种植谷类作物的农民群体——比如小麦、稻米或者玉米，且假定这些作物的年产量只能刚好满足每个家庭的生存需求，没有任何盈余。因为粮食作物要在很短时间内收割完毕，并需要一直贮藏到下次收获，所以袭击而来的盗贼或者税吏可以很容易地拿走储藏量的一部分。这种不断出现的损失，可能会导致人口密度下降，但是它却会促进不事生产的统治精英的产生，尽管完全没有粮食盈余。 Emergence of fiscal capacity and hierarchy and the cultivation of cereals 财政能力及等级制的产生与谷物栽培的关系 This simple scenario shows that surplus isn't a precondition for taxation. It also illustrates our alternative theory that the transition to agriculture enabled hierarchy to emerge only where the cultivated crops were vulnerable to appropriation. 这个简单的设想表明，粮食盈余并不是税收的前提条件。同时，它也说明了我们所提出的新理论——农业转向促成了等级制的萌生，但这一过程只会发生在所培植的作物很容易被掠夺的地方。

• In particular, we contend that the Neolithic emergence of fiscal capacity andhierarchy was conditioned on the cultivation of appropriable cereals as the staple crops, in contrast to less appropriable staples such as roots and tubers.
• 具体来说，我们认为，财政能力与等级制在新石器时代出现，需要一个前提条件：以易于收夺的谷类为主要作物，而不是以不易收夺的块根和块茎作物等为主要作物。

According to this theory, complex hierarchy did not emerge among hunter-gatherers because hunter-gatherers essentially live from hand-to-mouth, with little that can be expropriated from them to feed a would-be elite. 根据这一理论，狩猎采集者群体中间没能产生复杂的等级制，是因为他们本质上是现挣现吃的，在他们身上很难征用到足够的资源来供养潜在的统治精英。

• Thus, rather than surplus facilitating the emergence of the elite, we argue that the elite only emerged when and where it was possible to expropriate crops.
• 因此，并非粮食盈余促进了统治精英的出现。我们认为，只有在粮食收成容易被征用的地方和时期，才会产生统治精英。

Due to increasing returns to scale in the provision of protection from theft, early farmers had to aggregate and to cooperate to defend their stored grains. Food storage and the demand for protection thus led to population agglomeration in villages and to the creation of a non-food producing elite that oversaw the provision of protection. 鉴于防备盗窃所带来的收益是随规模递增的，远古时代的农民们必须聚集在一起共同合作来守护他们的储粮。因此，食物贮藏和保护的需要使得人口集聚成村落，并且创造了负责提供保护而不事农业生产的精英。 Once a group became larger than a few dozen immediate kin, it is unlikely that those who sought protection services were as forthcoming in financing the security they desired. This public-good nature of protection was resolved by the ability of those in charge of protecting the stored food to appropriate the necessary means. 而一旦某个群体的数量超过了几十个直系亲属的规模的话，那么这些寻求保护性服务的人们就不太可能心甘情愿地支付维持众人渴望的安全所需的费用。解决安全保卫的这种公共物品性质，要求那些负责保护储粮的人提高自身对于必要财产的征用能力。

• That is, we argue that it was this transformation of the appropriation technology, due to the transition to cereals, which created both the demand for protection and the means for its provision.
• 也就是说，我们认为，是由于征用技术随着谷物种植出现而发生转变，才既创造了对于安全保卫的需求，也创造了提供安全保卫的手段。

This is how we explain the emergence of complex and hereditary social hierarchy, and eventually the state. 这就是我们解释复杂的、世袭性的社会等级制乃至国家最终形成的方法。 Applied to Diamond's prototypic contrast between Eurasia and New Guinea, our theory suggests that the crucial distinction between these two regions is that farming in Eurasia relied on the cultivation of cereals, while in New Guinea it relied mostly on the cultivation of tubers (yam and taro, and, more recently, sweet potato) and bananas, where long-term storage is neither feasible (due to perishability) nor necessary (because harvesting is essentially non-seasonal). 应用于Diamond对比欧亚大陆和新几内亚的原型理论，我们的理论表明：这两个地域之间最关键的差别是欧亚大陆的农业依赖于谷物栽培，而新几内亚依赖的主要是块茎作物（白薯，芋头，最近也有甘薯）和香蕉，这些作物既不可能长期保存（因为易腐性），又没有必要长期保存（因为收获时节基本上是非季节性的）。 This provided farmers in New Guinea with sufficient immunity against bandits and potential tax collectors. More generally, we contend that the underdevelopment of tropical areas is not due to low land fertility but rather the reverse. Farmers in the tropics can choose to cultivate highly productive, non-appropriable tuber crops. This inhibits both the demand for socially provided protection and the emergence of a protection-providing elite. It is a curse of plenty. 这使得新几内亚的农民们对抢匪和潜在的税吏有足够的免疫力。更一般地说，我们认为，热带地区的欠发达原因并不是土壤产出低，而是恰好相反。热带地区的农民可以选择种植高产量而不易收夺的块茎作物。这样就既抑制了对于作为社会公共品提供的保护的需求，也妨碍了负责提供保护的统治精英的出现。这是一种资源诅咒。 In the empirical section of our paper we demonstrate that, contrary to the standard productivity-and-surplus theory, land productivity per se has no direct effect on hierarchy. We also show that, consistent with our theory, the cultivation of roots or tubers is indeed detrimental to hierarchy. 在论文的实证部分，我们证明了，与标准的生产率—盈余理论不同，土地生产率本身对于等级制形成没有直接影响。我们同时也表明，种植块根和块茎作物确实是不利于等级制的形成，这与我们的理论一致。 Empirical finding 实证结果 These results are established by employing two datasets with information on social hierarchy: a cross section and a panel of countries. For our cross-sectional analysis we use Murdock's (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, which contains information on cultural, institutional, and economic features of 1,267 societies from around the world at an idealised time period of first contact with Europeans. Our main outcome variable is ‘jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community’. The Ethnographic Atlas also provides information on the major crop type grown by societies that practice agriculture. 上述结果是基于应用两个包含社会等级制信息的数据集而得出的：一组是截面数据，一组则是面板数据。在截面分析中，我们使用了Murdock的“民族志图集”（1967年），其中包含了世界各地1267个社群在刚刚接触欧洲人的理想化时间段内的文化、制度和经济特征方面的信息。我们主要的结果变量是“超越地方性社群的管辖层级”。“民族志地图”里面也提供了各个从事农业的社群所种植的主要作物种类的信息。 Since the cultivated crop is a decision variable, we instrument for the crop type by using data on land suitability for different crops from the Food and Agriculture Organisation. We first show that the decision whether to cultivate cereals as a main crop depends positively on the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers (in terms of potential caloric yields per hectare). 因为农作物是我们模型中的决策变量【编注：指模型中可加以控制或先于其他参数而改变的主动变量】，我们利用联合国粮农组织有关土地对不同作物之适宜性的数据，来推测各社群的农作物类型。首先我们分析表明，是否将谷物作为主要作物，实际上依赖于谷物对于块根和块茎作物的生产率优势（以每公顷的潜在热量产出计算）。 We then find that societies tend to have a more complex hierarchal organisation where the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers is higher, as predicted by our theory. Furthermore, we find that societies that practice agriculture are more hierarchical only where they cultivate cereals. This means that societies that cultivate roots and tubers have similar levels of hierarchy to those of pastoral or foraging societies. 而后我们发现，那些谷物比根块茎作物拥有更高生产率优势的社群，往往会拥有更复杂的层级机构，这与我们所提理论的预期相符。此外，我们发现，在从事农业生产的社群中，只有种植谷物的那些才具有更多的等级性质。这意味着，种植根块茎的社群与游牧社群或采集社群具有相似的社会分层水平。 We also show that land productivity, measured by the potential yield of calories per acre of the most productive crop in each area, does not affect hierarchy once we control for the productivity advantage of cereals. Thus, our empirical findings challenge the conventional argument that it is increased land productivity that leads to more hierarchical societies. 我们还展示了，一旦控制了谷物的生产率优势，土地生产率（以每个地方最适应生产的作物的每英亩潜在热量产出计算）就不会影响社会等级性。因此，我们的实证结果质疑了土地生产率提高导致社会等级性增强的传统理论。 Although this cross-sectional analysis accounts for a wide range of confounding factors, we cannot rule out completely that omitted variables may bias the estimates. To overcome this concern, we employ another dataset compiled by Borcan et al. (2014). This is a panel, based on present-day boundaries of 159 countries, with institutional information every five decades over the last millennium. 虽然这个截面分析考虑到了很多干扰因子，但我们依然不能完全排除遗漏某些变量造成推算偏差的可能性。为了解除这一疑虑，我们应用了另外一个由Borcan等人（2014年）编制的数据集。这是一项历时性数据，以159个国家的现代边界为基础，包含有过去一千年中每隔五十年的制度信息。 This panel enables us to exploit the ‘Columbian exchange’ of crops across continents as a natural experiment. The new crops that became available after 1492 in the New and the Old World changed both the productivity of land and the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers in the majority of the countries in the sample. 这项历时性数据使得我们可以把农作物跨越各大陆的“哥伦布交换”当作一个自然实验来利用。对于样本国家中的大多数而言，新旧两个大陆在1492年之后所得到的新型农作物都既改变了他们的土地生产率，也改变了谷物相对块根块茎作物的生产率优势。 Consistent with our theory, the panel regressions confirm that an increase in the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers has a positive impact on hierarchical complexity, while an increase in land productivity does not. 与我们的理论一致的是，基于历时性数据的回归分析证实：如果谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势增加，那就会对社会分层的复杂性产生正面影响，而土地生产率的增加则不会引发这种正面影响。 Concluding remarks 结论 These findings support our theory that it is not agricultural productivity and surplus per se that explains more complex hierarchical societies, but rather the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers, the type of crop that is cultivated as a result, and the appropriability of the crop type. Given that the productivity of roots and tubers is typically high in the tropics, these results also support the claim that deep-rooted geographical factors may explain the current weakness of state institutions in these regions. 这些发现支持了我们的理论：农业生产率和粮食盈余本身并不能解释更为复杂的等级制社会的出现，毋宁说，它们之出现，原因在于谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势，也就是由此导致的栽培农作物的种类选择以及此种农作物的可收夺性。鉴于块根块茎作物在热带地区产量一般来说更高，上述结论也支持这样一种说法：这些地域的国家机构的孱弱现状，可能从深层次的地理原因方面可以得到解释。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

More Education = Less Terrorism? Studying the Complex Relationship Between Terrorism and Education 教育会减少恐怖主义？对教育与恐怖主义之间复杂关系的研究 作者：Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks @ 2015-12-04 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Political Violence @ a Glance, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/12/04/more-education-less-terrorism-studying-the-complex-relationship-between-terrorism-and-education/ In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, education is often advocated as an antidote to terrorism, the idea primarily being that education may make individuals less vulnerable to the false promises of extremist ideologies. For instance, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, Eli Wiesel – the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize laureate – argued: 在恐怖袭击的余波中，教育经常被提出来作为疗治恐怖主义的解药。基本的想法是，教育可以增强个人对于极端主义意识形态虚假承诺的免疫力。比如说，在2001年纽约和华盛顿特区的911恐袭发生之后，Eli Wiesel（1986年诺贝尔和平奖得主）声称： What is it that seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate terrorism. “究竟是什么把一些年轻人推向恐怖主义？就是因为它简单粗暴。盲从狂热者没有问题，只有答案。而教育就是消除恐怖主义的方法。” While intuitive, the academic evidence on the terrorism-education nexus tends to be more pessimistic. On the national level, education is usually found to share little relationship with terrorism. What is more, on the individual level, there is evidence that the more educated are more likely to become terrorists. 但是，关于恐怖主义与教育之间的联系，尽管听起来很直观，但学术依据却寥寥无几。在国家层面上，人们发现，教育一般与恐怖主义联系甚微。更有甚者，在个人层面上，有证据表明接受过更高教育的人群反而更可能会变成恐怖分子。 For instance, education may fuel terrorism by raising the probability of terrorist success (i.e., the “productivity of terrorists”) through the use of high-capacity (i.e., well-educated) operatives. Indeed, due to the positive effect of individual human capital endowment on terrorist success, terrorist organizations tend to be particularly interested in selecting more educated members. 比如说，受过教育的恐怖分子会因为实行高技能（也就是受过良好教育）行动而在恐怖活动成功率（也就是“恐怖分子的生产率”）上有所增加，这样，教育可能就加剧了恐怖主义。实际上，由于个人的技能天分对于恐怖行动成功与否具有积极影响，恐怖组织特别倾向于选召受过更好教育的成员。 In our new study, we provide a framework to better understand the apparently complex interaction between terrorism and education, trying to reconcile the popular narrative that education may remedy terrorism with the prevalent academic viewpoint that education – if anything – is associated with more terrorism. 在一项新研究中，我们提出了一个理论框架来更好地理解恐怖主义与教育之间看似很复杂的关系，并且尝试调和两个观点：即教育可以纠正恐怖主义这一大众叙事，和教育只会与恐怖主义增加相联系的流行学术观点。 We argue that there is some truth to both the optimistic and pessimistic views regarding the terrorism-education nexus. The ultimate effect of education on terrorism is linked to country-specific circumstances which moderate whether the pacifying or inflammatory effects of education on terrorism prevail. 我们认为，对于恐怖主义-教育关系的悲观和乐观看法各有可取之处。教育对于恐怖主义的最终效用是与特定的国家环境相联系的，在不同的国家环境中，教育可能缓和也可能加剧恐怖主义的流行。 Education always increases the individual and society-wide prospect of socioeconomic and political participation as well as individual productivity and intellectual capacity (where the latter may further magnify individual expectations about one’s politico-economic position in society). That is, education always creates “great expectations.” 教育总是会增加个人和全社会的社会经济和政治参与度，同时也会提升个人的创造能力和才智（而后者也许会进一步提高个人对于自己在社会中政治经济地位的期望）。也就是说，教育总是会创造“远大前程”抱负。 Sound country-specific conditions help these expectations to materialize, thus reducing incentives for terrorism. For instance, more educated individuals unsurprisingly expect higher wages; however, higher wages are only likely to materialize when country-specific conditions are sound (e.g. as the economy grows, as labor market competition due to demographic pressures is limited, or as corruption and nepotism do not strongly distort labor market outcomes). 健康的特定国家状态能帮助这些理想成为现实，因此减弱恐怖主义的动机。例如，受过更高教育的人群不出意料会期望更高的薪水；然而，更高薪水只会在特定国家状态很健康时才可能实现（例如经济保持增长，因人口压力而导致的劳动力市场竞争不大激烈，或者腐败和裙带关系并未强烈扰乱劳动力市场运转）。 By contrast, when country-specific conditions are poor (e.g. slow economic growth, strong labor market competition, and distortions due to youth bulges and corrupt institutions), the same “great expectations” are likely to end in frustration, consequently facilitating recruitment to terrorist violence. 与之相反，当特定国家状态很差劲时（比如经济增长缓慢，劳动力市场竞争激烈，青年人口膨胀和制度腐败），同样的“远大前程”就很可能会以受挫告终，因此就会为恐怖分子的暴力行动提供后备力量。 Under such circumstances, education may actually facilitate mobilization by amplifying feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement that arise from unaddressed socioeconomic and politico-economic grievances and unrealized socioeconomic and political participation. This is because education is expected to make it easier for individuals to recognize injustice and discrimination, leading to the uncomfortable – but plausible – situation where more education facilitates radicalization. 这样的情况下，因为社会经济和政治经济方面的不满没有得到解决，同时社会参与和政治参与愿望没能实现，教育实际上会增强由此产生的挫折感和权利受损感，从而促进社会动员。这是因为，教育很可能会使个人更容易察觉不公正和歧视，从而导致那种令人不安却合情合理的情况：更多的教育反而促进极端化。 What is more, the highly-educated may find “careers” in terrorism particularly attractive. When country-specific conditions are poor, the rewards offered by terrorist organizations to skilled operatives (wages, political influence, but also martyrdom) may be closer to the especially high expectations of the educated about personal income and political influence than anything the regular labor market can offer. 不仅如此，高学历人群可能还会发现恐怖主义的“职业生涯”特别具有吸引力。当特定国家状况非常不堪时，恐怖组织提供给技术人员的酬劳（工资、政治影响力、还包括殉道感）会更加符合高学历人群对于个人收入和政治影响力的极高期望，这是任何常规劳动力市场都不能提供的。 We test our theoretical framework on a sample of 133 countries for the 1984-2007 period. Our findings can be summarized as follows: 我们用1984年至2007年间133个国家的样本检验了我们的理论框架。我们得出的结果可以归结如下：

• A “naïve” statistical model for the complete sample of 133 countries, we find that education – in line with the narrative of the academic literature – tends to correlate positively, albeit only weakly, with terrorism.
• 一个针对133个国家的完整样本的“幼稚”统计模型中，我们发现教育——与学术文献的描述一致——与恐怖主义趋向于正相关，尽管仅仅是弱相关性。
• To account for country-specific conditions we identify two groups of countries that differ strongly with respect to their economic, politico-institutional, and demographic conditions. Conditions in the first group are markedly poorer, exhibiting a weaker rule of law, poorer protection of human and property rights, slower economic growth, but higher levels of corruption, population growth, and inflation.
• 为了阐明特定国家状况，我们区别出经济、政治制度和人口条件完全不同的两组国家。第一组的状况明显较差，表现出较差的法治环境、人权和财产权利保护不力、经济增长缓慢、而且腐败问题更严重、人口增长过快、通货膨胀严重。
• For the group of poorly developed countries (often located in Latin America, Asia, or Sub-Saharan Africa), we find that variables reflecting lower education (primary education, literacy rate) are associated with more terrorism, while higher education (university enrollment) does not play a role.
• 在发展状态较差的这组国家（普遍位于拉丁美洲、亚洲或者撒哈拉以南非洲）中，我们发现反映初等教育水平的参数（小学教育、识字率）与滋生更多恐怖主义相关联，而高等教育水平（大学入学率）则并没有什么影响。
• For the group of countries in which conditions are more favorable, we find no positive association between lower education and terrorism. Instead, we find a negative (terrorism-reducing) and statistically significant effect of higher education (university enrollment) on domestic terrorism.
• 对于另外一组情况更好的国家，我们发现初等教育和恐怖主义之间没有什么正相关。相反，我们发现高等教育（大学入学率）对于国内恐怖主义的影响为负（即会减少恐怖主义），且这种效应在统计上很显著。

In sum, our empirical analysis thus provides support for our theoretical framework, where the eventual effect of education on terrorism depends on the presence of further moderating conditions. We argue that our theoretical framework  not only explains the Middle Eastern experience of terrorism by rather well-educated terrorists, but also explains the recent series of popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, which similarly seem to have been fueled by advances in education and a lack of economic and political participation. 总而言之，我们的实证分析为我们的理论框架提供了支持：教育对恐怖主义的最终影响是由更进一步的约束条件决定的。我们认为，我们的理论框架不仅能解释中东地区产生高学历恐怖分子的恐怖主义经验，也能解释最近阿拉伯之春中的系列人民起义，两者相似，似乎都是因教育进步而经济与政治上的参与度却很低而导致的。 Similarly, historical events in the West – such as the revolutionary waves in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th century – where educational advances, when coupled with poor structural conditions,  promoted instability are in line with our theoretical framework. 类似的，西方世界的一些历史性事件——比如西欧在十八和十九世纪的革命浪潮——也与我们的理论框架相一致：当时教育实现进步，同时存在糟糕的结构性条件，两相结合导致了不稳定。 Our study indicates that the linkage between terrorism and education is likely to depend on country-specific (macroeconomic, institutional, etc.) conditions. We invite future research to analyze further which country-specific conditions matter the most to the mechanics of the nexus. Also, studying the role of education content, gender disparities in education, and education inequality may prove helpful to furthering our understanding. 我们的研究表明，恐怖主义和教育的联系很可能依赖于特定国家状态（宏观经济、国家制度等）。我们期待更进一步的研究能够深层次分析究竟是哪一种特定国家状态在这一相关机制中有着最大的影响。同时，研究教育内容、教育上的性别差距和教育不平等等因素扮演的角色，也会对深化我们的理解有所助益。 From a policy perspective, our findings indicate that education produces “great expectations” and may result in “hard times” (terrorism) when those expectations are not met. This suggests that a sole strengthening of education in less developed countries may not help in the war on terror and may even prove – at times – counterproductive. 从政策角度看，我们的分析指出，教育会产生“远大前程”，而当这些抱负没有实现时，就可能导致“艰难时世”（即恐怖主义）。这提示了，在欠发达国家单独加强教育可能不会对反恐战争有帮助，甚至结果可能是——至少偶尔是——帮倒忙。 Rather, the promotion of education should be accompanied by domestic and international efforts to ameliorate poor socioeconomic, politico-institutional, and demographic conditions to make it possible for the promise of education to actually materialize. 实际情形是，提升教育水平应当伴随有国内和国际共同努力来改善社会经济上的、政治制度上的以及人口上的糟糕状态，这样才可能使得教育所许诺的希望真正变现。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Making Americans 造就美国人 作者：Will Morrisey @ 2015-11-25 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Online Library of Law and Liberty， http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/25/making-americans/ English settlers in America might have intended to transmit the traditions of the mother country to subsequent generations. This didn’t exactly happen—partly because the settlers disagreed amongst themselves about which of those traditions deserved preservation, and partly because the experience of life in North America challenged many of the traditions they did want to preserve. The disagreement and the adaptation together led, eventually, to a political revolution. 来到美洲的殖民者们也许曾经试图让来自祖国的传统在他们的后代身上延续下去，但这最终未能实现——部分是因为这些殖民者无法就哪些传统值得被保留达成一致，部分是因为在北美的生活经历让许多他们曾希望保留的传统受到了挑战。他们的这些分歧和适应行为最终导致了一场政治革命。 Malcolm Gaskill puts it bluntly: “Migrants did have one thing in common: they were no longer in England, and they had to get used to it.” Malcolm Gaskill直言不讳地写道：“这些移民的确有一个共同点：他们不再生活在英格兰了，而他们必须去适应这种新生活。” His new book tracks what happened to the English in their three (very different) principal areas of settlement: Virginia, New England, and the Caribbean. He also keeps an eye on what the English who stayed at home—financing these expeditions and attempting to rule them from afar—thought and did, especially in competition with the Spanish, who had settled large swaths of the New World a long time before their geopolitical rivals in London really got started. 他的新书追踪了弗吉尼亚、新英格兰和加勒比这三个（差别非常大的）主要殖民区域中发生在这些英国殖民者身上的历史。在书中，他同样关注了那些为这些殖民者的远征提供财力支持，并试图在遥远的英国统治他们的英国人的所想所为，尤其是他们与西班牙人之间的竞争——西班牙人早在他们伦敦的地缘政治对手开始向“新大陆”进军之前很久就已经在那里占据了大片土地。 This gives Between Two Worlds: How the English Became Americans a lot to do, but the author, a professor of early modern history at the University of East Anglia, manages his unruly topic by considering each of the first three settler generations in turn. 这些内容让写作《两个世界之间：英国人是如何成为美国人的》这本书成了一项繁重的任务，但本书作者，一位在东安格利亚大学研究早期现代史的教授，通过分别研究最初的三代殖民者，成功地处理了他所面对的这一难以驾驭的课题。 Gaskill deals in his prologue with the inauspicious 16th century beginnings of the project, remarking that the English understandably modeled their efforts on the recent conquest of Ireland, the wild tribes of which reminded them of their own pre-Roman-conquest ancestors and of the North American peoples. Gaskill在本书序言中讨论了16世纪初英国人开拓北美殖民地时所遇到的不顺利的开端，并提到英国人当时的殖民行为仿照的是他们最近对爱尔兰的征服，这并不稀奇，那里的蛮族部落让他们想起了自己的祖先在“罗马征服”之前的样子和现在的这些北美原住民。 The first settlement, at Roanoke, “Virginia” in 1585—named for Elizabeth, the Virgin Queen, of course—vanished from the earth like Prospero’s insubstantial pageant. To this day, we don’t know what happened to its more than 100 inhabitants. 他们1585年在以“童贞女王”伊丽莎白命名的“弗吉尼亚”的罗阿诺克建立了第一个殖民地，后来就像莎翁笔下普罗斯彼罗的虚幻盛宴一样从地球上消失了。直到今天，我们还是不知道那一百多位居民身上发生了什么。 The years 1607 to 1640 mark Gaskill’s first generation of permanent settlers. Of the four million English in 1600, thousands would journey to the New World during this period. Half of them went to the West Indies, slightly more than a third to the Virginia/Chesapeake area, only 15 percent to New England. 从1607年到1640年，Gaskill所定义的第一代永久殖民者来到了北美。1600年生活在英国的四百万人口中，有数千人将在这一时期踏上前往“新大陆”的旅途。他们中的一半去了西印度群岛，略多于三分之一去了弗吉尼亚/切萨皮克地区，仅有15%去了新英格兰。 Motives varied, but as the “southerly” movement of the new arrivals  suggests, the prospect of a mild climate fit for rich plantations and an interest in “resisting Spanish Catholics—the dark lords of an American empire”—figured prominently in English ambitions. 虽然动机各不相同，但这些新来者们向南方的迁移说明，对适宜大型种植园的温和气候和“抵抗美洲帝国的黑暗领主——西班牙天主教徒们”的兴趣是英国人的主要野心所在。 To wrest land from the infidels of Spain and from pagan indigenes—better still, while converting the latter to Protestant Christianity—reconciled, at least to the satisfaction of the English, desires for both liberty and empire. (Two centuries later, Thomas Jefferson’s formula, “the empire of liberty,” would address the same paradox, albeit in very different terms.) 至少对于英国人来说，从西班牙异端以及异教的土著人手中夺取土地——要是能同时将后者转变为新教基督徒就更好，这恰好将英国人既追求自由又寻求建立帝国统治的两个目标统一了起来。（两个世纪之后，托马斯·杰弗逊提出的“自由帝国”一词也回应了同一悖论，虽然是以一种非常不同的形式。） Upon ascending the throne in 1603, James I followed a two-track strategy with Spain. He made peace while endorsing some New World plantations. King James’ restraint in New World settlement bespoke not only diplomatic caution but also the worry (prescient, as it would happen) that large English settlements in the New World might upset England’s place “in the hierarchy of nations.” 自从1603年登上王位，詹姆士一世就以一种“双轨策略”来对付西班牙。在向“新大陆”的一些种植园提供支持的同时，他也维持着与西班牙之间的和平关系。詹姆士国王在“新大陆”殖民事业上的克制不仅仅显示出他在外交上的谨慎，同时也表现出他的一种担忧：英国在“新大陆”的大规模殖民活动可能会打乱本国在“国家的层级体系”中所处位置（之后发生的事情也证明了这一担忧的确很有先见之明）。 The New World tail might someday wag the Old World dog. He took care not to use the Crown’s money for investment, leaving colonization to private speculators who nonetheless remained under royal control. Hence the Virginia Company and the Plymouth Adventurers, both established in 1606. “新大陆”的发展终有一天会对“旧大陆”构成尾大不掉之势。他小心翼翼地避免使用皇室的钱进行投资，将殖民活动留给那些仍然处于皇室控制之下的私人投机客们。正是在这种背景下，弗吉尼亚公司和普利茅斯探险者公司同时在1606年成立了。 The former reached the Chesapeake Bay under the command of Captain John Smith the following year, founding Jamestown and meeting resistance above all from the Indian chiefs or Paw-Paws, who recognized a rival form of worship when they saw one. As Gaskill puts it, “Indian suspicion on one side, and a haughty sense of entitlement on the other, guaranteed an Anglo-Indian future steeped in misery and bloodshed.” 弗吉尼亚公司的船队在John Smith船长的指挥下于次年来到了切萨皮克湾，他们建立了詹姆斯敦，并且遇到了一些印第安首领（也称Paw-Paw）【校注：根据原书，此处应为paw-waw，印第安人中的神职人员】的抵抗，他们把任何与他们有着不同崇拜的人都视为敌人。正如Gaskill所写道的，“一边是多疑的印第安人，而另一边则是英国人傲慢的特权感，这为之后盎格鲁-印第安人之间血腥而悲惨的历史埋下了伏笔。” And this notwithstanding the marriage of the entrepreneur John Rolfe to “Pocahantas” (her real name, Mataoka, concealed from the English), optimistically renamed “Rebecca,” after the Biblical mother of two nations. She died less than a decade later, after a publicity tour of England, taking the rather faint hope of peaceful intermarriage and Christian conversion of the Indians with her. 尽管来自英国的企业家John Rolfe娶了土著公主“宝嘉康蒂”（她的真名Mataoka却不为英国人所知），并且她还起了一个富有乐观精神的新名字“Rebecca”——圣经中两个民族的母亲【编注：据《旧约·创世纪》，利百加（Rebecca）为以撒（Issac）之妻，生孪生子雅各（Jacob）和以扫（Esau），分别为以色列人和以东人（Edomites）的始祖，有些说法认为阿拉伯人是以东人后裔。】，但仅仅过了不到十年，她在一次宣传性质的英国之旅后就去世了，同时也带走了本就十分渺茫的和平联姻以及将印第安人转变为基督徒的希望。 The real answer to lasting English settlement in America was political thought. “Adventurers had to learn that merely installing English settlements in America was not enough,” Gaskill writes. “They had to identify things that made England work socially, politically, and economically and reproduce them. Peopling the land was the key.” 英国人在美洲维持长期殖民的真正答案在于政治思想。“探险者们必须懂得，仅仅在美洲建立英国殖民地是不够的，”Gaskill写道。“他们必须找出那些让英国在社会层面、政治层面和经济层面得以运转下去的东西，并将这套东西移植到新大陆上，让其生根发芽。在这片土地上繁衍生息才是关键。” If ever a people were, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous phrase, forced to be free, it was the English in North America. More specifically, they were forced to think, and to think politically. It was a habit that would eventuate in independence and republicanism, nearly two centuries later. 如果历史上确有一群人——用卢梭的名言来说——是被迫成为自由人的，那说的就是北美洲的英国人了。更准确的说，他们是被逼着去思考政治问题。这个习惯最终在大约两个世纪之后孕育出了美国的独立和共和主义。 The Indian nations and tribes, who had been engaged in fierce geopolitical struggles amongst themselves for centuries, quickly saw the danger of any substantial territorial encroachments by the newcomers. At best, the white strangers might be deployed against traditional enemies. 那些已经陷入彼此之间的地缘政治斗争长达几个世纪的印第安民族和部落们，很快就发现了新来者们带来的巨大的领土入侵威胁。对他们来说，在最好的设想之下，可以利用这些白种陌生人攻击自己的宿敌。 Incidentally, one of the merits of Between Two Worlds is its treatment of the Indians—a treatment free of the American triumphalism of the old accounts, and also of the condescending sympathy for “Native Americans” fashionable in the past half-century. 顺便提一下，《两个世界之间》这本书的优点之一就是其中对印第安人的处理——它摆脱了陈腐的美国必胜心理，同时也摆脱了过去半个世纪中流行的那种带有优越感的对“美洲原住民”的同情心态。 Gaskill describes but makes no attempt to justify the sudden attack on Jamestown masterminded by the apparently friendly Powhatan chief, Opechancanough, whose men murdered 387 unsuspecting settlers in March 1622, then mangled the carcasses. Gaskill仅仅是描述了由那位之前表现得明显很友好的Powhatan部落酋长Opechancanough所策划的对詹姆斯敦的突袭，而完全没有试图为其辩护，在这场发生于1622年3月的突袭中，Opechancanough酋长的部下们杀死了387名毫无戒心的殖民者，之后还将他们的尸体砍得支离破碎。 After that, “Throughout the Atlantic world, men decided that Indians could not be trusted.” Settler eminences now began to speak not of intermarriage, peaceful trade, and conversion but of the right of war and the law of nations exercised against savages. 在那之后，“在整个大西洋世界中，人们决定不再信任印第安人。”殖民地的精英们不再谈论与印第安人通婚、和平贸易或者说服他们皈依基督教，而开始谈论战争权利以及针对野蛮人的国际公法。 As for the Plymouth Adventurers and their descendants, the New Englanders faced analogous circumstances but with a different set of Indian nations, in a harsher climate; and they arrived with more intense religious aspirations. A band of Protestant dissidents landed at “New Plymouth” in 1620, settling in territory where the local tribe had been eradicated by disease. 而对于普利茅斯探险者公司及其后继者们，这些新英格兰人所面临的处境与弗吉尼亚公司非常类似，只是他们所面对的是一些不同的印第安民族，和更加严酷的气候，而他们在到达时也怀揣着更加强烈的宗教愿望。一群持异见的新教徒在1620年到达了“新普利茅斯”，并在一个被疾病所消灭的当地部落所在地建立了殖民地。 Interestingly, Gaskill notes that the Mayflower Compact was no “democratic constitution but a company contract to bind the strangers to order upon landing, a quick fix before formal authority was established.” (Many of the Pilgrims were Dutch.) 有趣的是，Gaskill提到，“五月花号公约”实际上并不是什么“民主宪法，而是一份为了让那群陌生人上岸之后能够服从命令的公司合同，是在正式权力机构建立之前的一条权宜之计”。（这些最初的移民中很多都是荷兰人。） In the same vein, he points out that this and similar settlements in New England didn’t establish beachheads for political liberty; John Winthrop’s 1630 Salem founding was a theocracy supervised by God’s vicegerent, Mr. Winthrop. 同样地，他还指出，该殖民地和新英格兰地区的其他殖民地所建立的，并非是政治自由的桥头堡；John Winthrop于1630年在塞勒姆建立的殖民地是一个在上帝的代理人——也就是Winthrop先生本人——监督之下的神权政体。 The settlements were democratic only in Tocqueville’s social sense: No titled aristocrats made the trip. By “liberty” the settlers meant, in the frank words of one, a world free of bishops. 这些殖民地仅仅在托克维尔所说的社会意义上，才有些民主的样子：越洋而来的人群中不存在拥有头衔的贵族。对于这些殖民者而言，借用他们中某人的坦率说法，“自由”仅仅意味着一个没有主教的世界。 As for the West Indies, settlers worried less about Indians than about the heat, the hurricanes, and the disease-carrying mosquitoes. There, a new aristocracy began to take shape, based on slaves who were imported from Africa to work in a climate Europeans could not bear to work in. By the 1630s the Virginia settlers were beginning to do the same thing. The portentous social distinction between South and North had begun to take shape. 对于那些来到西印度群岛的殖民者们，相比印第安人，更加困扰他们的是炎热的天气，狂暴的飓风，还有蚊虫带来的疾病。在那里，一种新的贵族政治开始成型，而它的基础则是从非洲引入的黑奴，只有他们才能在欧洲人无法忍受的气候里劳作。而到了1630年代，弗吉尼亚的殖民者们也开始做同样的事情。北美大陆的南部和北部之间令人不安的社会差异开始逐步成型。 Having made his peace with Spain, James I faced increasingly sharp resistance to his rule from Protestants at home, their suspicions roused especially by the king’s attempts to marry his eldest son to one Catholic princess after another (success came in 1625, when the future Charles I wedded Henrietta Maria of France). By the time the second generation of English Americans took charge, relations with Indians had become foreign relations, slavery was giving rise to a set of New World aristocrats, and civil war loomed in England itself. 在与西班牙握手言和之后，詹姆士一世国王面临着来自国内新教徒日益锐利的抵抗。国王不断地试图让自己的长子迎娶一位又一位天主教公主的行为（最终在1625年，未来的查理一世成功地迎娶了法国的Henrietta Maria公主）特别激起了他们强烈的质疑。第二代英裔美洲殖民者登上历史舞台之后，他们与印第安人之间的关系已经成为了一种外交关系，而奴隶制则成就了一批新大陆的新贵，与此同时，内战的阴霾开始笼罩在英国上空。 With the war, second-generation colonists, writes Gaskill, “were forced to examine their consciences and allegiances to decide what being English meant and what it meant to belong physically and spiritually to America.” Gaskill写道，随着英国内战的进行，第二代殖民者“被迫去审视他们的良知和忠诚，以确定英国人的身份究竟意味着什么，以及在肉体和精神上都归属于美洲又意味着什么。” The First English Civil War— which pitted a new and more absolutist monarch, Charles I, against Oliver Cromwell and his Puritan “Roundheads”—stirred existing factions in North America, engaging them not only in the political thought forced upon the first generation but in regime-changing political thought. These passions mixed with passions aroused by the already worsening settler-Indian relations. 第一次英国内战——这次内战让一位更加崇尚专制的新国王查理一世陷入了与奥利弗·克伦威尔和他的清教徒“圆颅党”们的斗争——搅浑了北美英国殖民者之间本已存在的分歧，这让他们不仅仅需要面对上一代殖民者们被迫进行的政治思考，还需要作出与政权更替有关的新政治思考。而更糟的是，这些感情还与被已经持续恶化的殖民者和印第安人之间的关系所激起的感情杂糅在了一起。 Puritan victory in England meant that it became, briefly, more like New England. A new Reformation was imposed, this one described as a “Reformation of manners,” including capital punishment for adultery and what Gaskill calls “a united front against popery.” (The draconian law against adultery never saw rigorous enforcement—probably a good thing for the sake of continued English population growth. One emigrant to Virginia wrote that the deer in his new country were as numerous as cuckolds in England.) 简单地说，清教徒的胜利意味着英国变得更像新英格兰了。清教徒们实施了一次新的宗教改革运动，这次叫做“礼俗改革”，包括对通奸行为实施死刑以及Gaskill所说的“对罗马天主教的联合抵制。”（惩罚通奸行为的严厉法律从来没有被严格执行过——也许对于人口的持续增长来说，这反而是件好事。一位来到弗吉尼亚的移民曾写道，在他的新国家里，鹿的数量几乎和英国戴绿帽子的男人一样多。） Puritan victory did not bring dismantlement of the king’s wartime bureaucracy, which the Puritans simply took over, continuing extralegal absolutism but in clerical garb. The new republic saw the abolition of the House of Lords, the established church, and the monarchy, but the empowered Cromwell and Parliament had no more intention to frame a liberal republic than had the Puritan fathers of New England. 清教徒们的胜利并没有清除掉服务于国王的战时官僚体系，他们直接接管了这个体系，并继续维持着凌驾于法律之上的专制主义，只是站在它背后的换成了一群穿着牧师衣服的人。新的共和政府废除了议会上院，废黜了国教和君主，但是大权在握的克伦威尔和议会并不比那些建立了新英格兰殖民地的清教徒们更希望建立一个自由的共和国。 Although a bit lax in enforcing the adultery laws, both England and New England went after suspected witches, with England initiating the attacks and (surprisingly, given subsequent accounts) surpassing the New England courts in handing down convictions. At least New England magistrates “insisted on proof of a satanic pact,” unlike their more ardent English-Puritan counterparts. 虽然在执行惩罚通奸的法律上有些松懈，但在英国国内和新英格兰都掀起了搜捕女巫的运动，这事情最初在英国发起，且英国法庭判定的有罪女巫多于新英格兰的法庭（与后世的记录相对照，这一点很令人吃惊）。至少新英格兰的地方法官们会“坚持要求拿出女巫与魔鬼订过契约的证据”才会定罪，而不像他们更加富有激情的英国清教徒同僚们那样随意。 Fleeing in defeat, Royalists went to the West Indies, sometimes to Virginia. When Parliament threatened to pursue them across the water, they allied themselves with local champions of self-government as putative advocates of—what else, if not the tradition of the English common law (for which the Stuarts and their allies had previously shown little regard). 在经历了失败之后，英国的保皇党们逃向了西印度群岛，也有一些去了弗吉尼亚。当议会威胁要跨过大西洋追捕他们时，他们与当地的自治拥护者们结成了同盟，并把他们假想为——除了英国普通法的传统之外，还能是别的什么呢——的拥护者（但斯图亚特王室及其同盟者在之前可并没有对这一传统表现出多少尊重）。 Cromwell’s designation as “Emperor of the West Indies” put English republicanism, such as it was, on the side of statist centralization. Because the monarchy had sold off most of its lands under the Tudors, the new statists had no choice but to obtain revenues through taxation. 克伦威尔的“西印度群岛皇帝”头衔将英国本已破败不堪的共和主义完全变成了中央集权。由于王室已经在都铎时期卖掉了大部分土地，新来的中央集权者们别无选择，只能通过征税来获得收入。 Back along the Chesapeake, Catholics and Protestants fought each other in Maryland, with Protestants from as far away as Massachusetts joining the fight, which the Protestants eventually won at the Battle of Severn (near Annapolis) in 1655. 再看切萨皮克湾沿岸，天主教徒和新教徒们此时正在马里兰打得不可开交。新教徒一边的参战者甚至有从马萨诸塞远道而来的，最终于1655年在赛汶河（靠近安纳波利斯）战役后获得了最终的胜利。 By the time of Cromwell’s assassination in 1658, New England and Virginia had established themselves economically. Trade began to eclipse religiosity in both places. As it did in England: Charles II, crowned in 1660, proved considerably more latitudinarian in doctrine and in morals than were the Puritans. 到1658年克伦威尔被刺杀时，新英格兰和弗吉尼亚已经能够在经济上自食其力了。在这两个地区，贸易的影响力都已大大超过宗教。在英国也是如此：1660年登上王位的查理二世表明自己在宗教和道德方面比之前的清教徒们要开明得多。 Increased trade also brought greater demand for slaves, especially in the West Indies; not only Africans but English prisoners, Scottish rebels, and the ever-beleaguered Irish were “barbadosed.” Charles II did prove disappointing to merchants in one important respect: Needing revenues as much as his father and as much as Cromwell, he renewed the stiff regulation of trade. 贸易的繁荣同样刺激了对奴隶的更大需求，在西印度群岛尤其如此。不但是非洲人，甚至连英国犯人、苏格兰反叛者和那些一直处于英格兰围困下的爱尔兰人都被放逐到了巴巴多斯充当奴隶。查理二世的确在一个重要的方面让商人们大失所望：他和他的父王还有克伦威尔一样，需要大量的收入，所以他恢复了之前对贸易的严厉管制。 As Gaskill observes, the English civil/revolutionary wars proved to Americans that their difficulties with the mother country arose not simply as a result of defective regimes—monarchs and parliaments alike exacted revenues and demanded obedience—but as a result of the empowerment of the modern state, quite apart from its regime form. A century later, their descendants’ Declaration of Independence excoriated not only the monarch/tyrant but also the Parliament for, among other things, sending tax collectors to eat out their substance. 正如Gaskill所观察到的，英国的革命和内战向美国人证明：他们与祖国之间的问题不仅仅出于有缺陷的政权——不论是君主还是议会，都向他们榨取大量的收入，并且要求他们的绝对服从——而更是肇源于现代国家的权力，不仅仅是政体形态的问题。一个世纪之后，他们的后人发表的“独立宣言”中不仅仅严厉地声讨了暴虐的君主，也同样声讨了英国议会派遣税务官来剥削他们财富的行为。 Increased trade also spelled trouble for the Indians. The more prosperous the American English became, the more numerous they were; the more numerous they were, the more land they wanted. In Virginia, especially, where plantation owners had locked up the best land, new settlers pressed westward. 贸易的繁荣同样给印第安人带来了麻烦。北美的英国人越是兴旺，他们的人数就会变得越多；而他们的人数越多，就会想要越多的土地。特别是在弗吉尼亚，那里的种植园主们已经圈定了最好的土地，而新来的殖民者则不得不向西去开拓新的土地。 Meanwhile the British Empire set down its own, grander, imperial policy. In the words of diarist John Evelyn: 与此同时，大英帝国则确定下了它自己更加宏大的帝国政策。用日记作者John Evelyn的话来说就是：

Whoever Commands the Ocean Commands the Trade of the World, and whoever Commands the Trade of the World Commands the Riches of the World, and whoever is Master of that Commands the World it self. 谁控制了海洋，谁就能控制全世界的贸易，而谁控制了全世界的贸易，也就控制了全世界的财富，而他也就成为了整个世界的主宰。

Charles II resumed the strategy that had been set down decades earlier by the disgraced Francis Bacon, that of “merg[ing] politics, profit, and natural philosophy”—the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate, and particularly the British estate. 查理二世重新采用了由失势的弗朗西斯·培根【译注：培根于1621年被控贪污受贿，被判罚金和监禁，后来虽被豁免，但政治生涯却因此终结】在几十年前所定下的策略，也就是“将政治、利益和自然哲学合而为一”——通过征服自然来解放人的状况，特别是英国人的状况。 By now, about 60,000 English settlers lived in New England. Metacom, or “King Philip” of the Wampanoags, began a major war against them. “This was for the second generation what sea crossings and scratch-building had been for the first: a hardening, defining experience.” 此时已有大约6万名英国殖民者生活在新英格兰。Metacom，即万帕诺亚格部落的“菲利普王”发动了一场针对这些英国人的大规模战争。“对于第二代殖民者们来说，这场战争的意义就像是乘船渡海和白手起家对于第一代殖民者的意义一样：这是一次定义并强化他们身份的经历。” Using what we now call guerrilla tactics, the coalition of Indian tribes fought through the bitter winter of 1675-76, taunting their captives with the question, “Where is your God now?” Gaskill describes the “extravagant cruelty” of Indian and Englishman alike: “Indians tortured because martial ritual required it, the English to obtain intelligence.” 通过使用今天被称为游击战的战术，印第安部落联军在1675-76年的寒冬里奋勇作战，并讥讽他们的俘虏，问他们“现在你的上帝去哪儿了？”Gaskill在描述印第安人和英国人时都使用了“过分残忍”这个相同的字眼：“印第安人折磨俘虏，因为这是他们尚武仪式的要求，而英国人折磨俘虏则是为了获得情报。” Two thousand settlers died before the Indian coalition surrendered in July 1677. Sporadic Indian raids continued, and the colonists duly noted that their British brethren had offered no protective aid aside from parish collections, “which were mere gestures.” Nor did the British prove any more helpful in Maryland, where settlers put down a similar uprising. 在1677年7月印第安联军投降之前，有两千名殖民者死于这场战争。此后，印第安人零星的袭击仍在持续，而这些殖民者们也很好地意识到：他们的英国同胞除了搞一些教堂募捐之外，并没有为他们提供什么别的保护，“而这完全是一些象征性的帮助。”而在马里兰，英国人也并没有证明自己能够提供更多的帮助，那里的殖民者们也镇压了一场类似的印第安人起义。 By the third generation, writes Gaskill, “experience set the colonists apart, creating opposition internally and with England.” Struggles with Indians continued; in the north the tribes began to ally with the French, another Catholic enemy. Catholic James II ascended the throne in 1685, after Charles II died, intensifying the worries of Anglo-American Protestants. 到第三代殖民者的时候，“在北美不同地区的经历将这些殖民者们分隔开来，在他们内部和他们与英国之间造成了对立。”Gaskill写道。与印第安人的斗争仍在继续；在北部，印第安部落开始与英国殖民者的另一个天主教敌人法国结盟。信奉天主教的詹姆士二世于1685年查理二世死后登上英国王位，而这进一步加剧了盎格鲁-美利坚新教徒们的担忧。 West Indian and Virginian settlers added to their slave populations and simultaneously to their worries about slave rebellions. Along the Chesapeake, in the 1680s alone the slave population rose from 4,500 to 12,000. This increase also decreased incidences of manumission; a people engaged in demographically-based dominance of the Indians had no intention of being overwhelmed by emancipated African slaves. 西印度群岛和弗吉尼亚的殖民者增加了他们的奴隶数量，而这也同时加剧了他们对奴隶叛乱的担忧。在切萨皮克湾沿岸，仅仅在1680年代奴隶数量就从4500人上升到了12000人。而这种数量增加也降低了奴隶解放运动事件的几率；一群忙于在人口数量上对印第安人形成优势的殖民者绝不希望自己在数量上被那些被解放的非洲奴隶们超过。 No solution—even in theory—to any of these ethno-political or religio-political dilemmas was available to Americans until a writer of the time, John Locke, began publishing. A political regime founded upon the principle of equal natural rights could form the basis of racial and religious peace in a political community that actually framed laws to conform to that principle. 即使从理论上说，当时也没有任何办法能够帮助美国人解决这些民族政治和宗教政治难题，直到那个时代的一位作家开始著书立说，他就是约翰·洛克。如果一个政治共同体的法律确实能遵从平等的自然权利原则，那么它那建立在此原则之上的政权就能够为种族间和宗教间的和平提供基础。 Gaskill mentions Locke in passing but mistakes his natural rights philosophy for “pragmatism.” What made the third generation of Americans react against the excesses of the last witch-hunting spasm, in 1690s Salem, was not pragmatism but an understanding of Christianity that Americans in New England were the first to begin to integrate into their laws. Gaskill在书中顺带提到了洛克，但却将他的自然权利哲学误认为是“实用主义”。面对1790年代塞勒姆掀起的最后一场追捕女巫的过分风潮，第三代美国人奋起反对，而促使他们这么做的并不是什么“实用主义”，而是基于对基督教义的理解，新英格兰的美国人也率先将这种理解整合到了他们的法律中。 Writes Gaskill: “Boston’s Brattle Street Church was founded in 1698 not upon scriptural literalism, the ‘New England way,’ or a covenant, but upon nature, reason, and inclusiveness”—in other words, upon a combination of Christianity and Lockean philosophy. What remained of the older generations, he concludes, was a legacy of “extraordinary courage.” Gaskill写道：“波士顿Brattle街教堂建立于1698年，它的建立并非基于‘新英格兰式’的圣经字面主义，或基于一个宗教誓约，它的基础是自然、理性与包容。”——换句话说，它建立在基督教和洛克哲学的结合之上。他总结道，老一代人为新的殖民者们所留下的遗产仅仅是他们“非凡的勇气”。 The commercial republic of the future would prove battle-ready, to the dismay of its enemies for centuries to come. 这个未来的商业共和国将会证明它已经做好了战斗的准备，而这将让它此后数个世纪的敌人们都感到沮丧。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

‘I was tossed out of the tribe’: climate scientist Judith Curry interviewed 被踢出局的气候学家，采访Judith Curry 作者：David Rose @ 2015-11-28 译者：龟海海（@龟海海） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The Spectator，http://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/11/i-was-tossed-out-of-the-tribe-climate-scientist-judith-curry-interviewed/ For engaging with sceptics, and discussing uncertainties in projections frankly, this Georgia professor is branded a heretic 由于在全球变暖问题上和怀疑论者打交道，还坦率地谈论预测的不确定性，这位来自美国佐治亚理工学院的教授被指斥为异端。 It is safe to predict that when 20,000 world leaders, officials, green activists and hangers-on convene in Paris next week for the 21st United Nations climate conference, one person you will not see much quoted is Professor Judith Curry. This is a pity. Her record of peer-reviewed publication in the best climate-science journals is second to none, and in America she has become a public intellectual. 可以明确的说，下周在巴黎举行的第21届联合国气候变化大会上，两万参会者将包括各国领导人、官员、环保主义者和各种跟班，但是你恐怕不太可能听到Judith Curry教授的声音。这很让人遗憾。她在气候学顶尖期刊上发表的经同行评审的论文数量首屈一指，而且她在美国还是一位公共知识分子。 But on this side of the Atlantic, apparently, she is too ‘challenging’. What is troubling about her pariah status is that her trenchant critique of the supposed consensus on global warming is not derived from warped ideology, let alone funding by fossil-fuel firms, but from solid data and analysis. 然而，她在大洋彼岸却不受待见，很明显，她太诘问不休咄咄逼人了。但她的这种受排斥地位颇为棘手，因为她对据称的全球变暖共识的尖刻批判并非基于意识形态扭曲，更不是由石化企业赞助的，而是基于真切的数据和分析。 Some consider her a heretic. According to Professor Michael Mann of Pennsylvania State University, a vociferous advocate of extreme measures to prevent a climatic Armageddon, she is ‘anti-science’. Curry isn’t fazed by the slur. 有人把她看成是个异端。宾夕法尼亚州立大学的Michael Mann 教授一直呼吁运用极端手段防止气候“末日决战”灾难发生，就曾称Curry为“反科学”份子。Curry并未被这一诽谤吓慌。 ‘It’s unfortunate, but he calls anyone who doesn’t agree with him a denier,’ she tells me. ‘Inside the climate community there are a lot of people who don’t like what I’m doing. On the other hand, there is also a large, silent group who do like it. But the debate has become hard — especially in the US, because it’s become so polarised.’ 她告诉我：“怪我咯，他把所有和他意见不同的人都叫做‘抵赖派’。在气候研究群体中，有很多人讨厌我所做的事。但是，的确有那么一大群沉默份子喜欢我的观点。但讨论已经变得困难重重——尤其是在美国，已经严重两极化了。” Warming alarmists are fond of proclaiming how 97 per cent of scientists agree that the world is getting hotter, and human beings are to blame. They like to reduce the uncertainties of climate science and climate projections to Manichean simplicity. They have managed to eliminate doubt from what should be a nuanced debate about what to do. 全球变暖的危言警世者总喜欢宣称，97%的科学家都已同意人类活动导致了世界变暖的观点。他们喜欢忽略气候科学和气候预测的不确定性，像摩尼教徒那样以善恶二元对立论简化问题。关于我们要做什么，本来需要细致讨论，但经过他们努力，现在一切疑虑都被忽略了。 Professor Curry, based at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, does not dispute for a moment that human-generated carbon dioxide warms the planet. But, she says, the evidence suggests this may be happening more slowly than the alarmists fear. 这位来自亚特兰大市佐治亚理工学院的Curry教授，从没有说过要质疑人类排放二氧化碳使地球变暖这个事实。但她提到，证据表明，变暖速度可能比那些危言警世者所担忧的要慢得多。 In the run-up to the Paris conference, said Curry, much ink has been spilled over whether the individual emissions pledges made so far by more than 150 countries — their ‘intentional nationally determined contributions’, to borrow the jargon — will be enough to stop the planet from crossing the ‘dangerous’ threshold of becoming 2°C hotter than in pre-industrial times. Curry提到，迄今已有超过150个国家提出了减排目标承诺——行话叫做“国家自主贡献”，巴黎峰会预热阶段，大部分媒体都在讨论这些目标是否能够确保地球不会超过预警阈值——比工业化时代之前变暖2℃。 Much of the conference will consist of attempts to make these targets legally binding. This debate will be conducted on the basis that there is a known, mechanistic relationship between the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and how world average temperatures will rise. 会议的一个主要内容就是要让这些目标在法律上生效。进行这种讨论需要一个前提：我们已经掌握了大气二氧化碳浓度与世界平均气温提升程度之间的数学关系。 Unfortunately, as Curry has shown, there isn’t. Any such projection is meaningless, unless it accounts for natural variability and gives a value for ‘climate sensitivity’ —i.e., how much hotter the world will get if the level of CO2 doubles. 遗憾的是，Curry已经表明，我们没有掌握。任何此类预测都是没有意义的，除非我们在预测中把气候的自然变异考虑进去，并能够为“气候敏感度”定一个值——即当二氧化碳浓度翻倍时，地球会升温多少度。 Until 2007, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) gave a ‘best estimate’ of 3°C. But in its latest, 2013 report, the IPCC abandoned this, because the uncertainties are so great. Its ‘likely’ range is now vast — 1.5°C to 4.5°C. 截止2007年，联合国政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）给出的“最佳预测”是3℃。但是，在2013年最新的报告中该部门放弃了这一数字，因为不确定因素太多。现在，“可能值”的变动范围很大，在1.5℃—4.5℃之间。 This isn’t all. According to Curry, the claims being made by policymakers suggest they are still making new policy from the old, now discarded assumptions. Recent research suggests the climate sensitivity is significantly less than 3˚C. ‘There’s growing evidence that climate sensitivity is at the lower end of the spectrum, yet this has been totally ignored in the policy debate,’ Curry told me. 这还没完。Curry接着说到，决策者们提出的种种主张，表明他们还是在用旧的、已被弃用的假设来制定新政策。而最近的研究表明，气候敏感度显著小于3℃。“有越来越多的证据表明，气候敏感度是在变化范围的低值端，但是这在政策辩论中已经被完全忽略了，”她告诉我。 ‘Even if the sensitivity is 2.5˚C, not 3˚C, that makes a substantial difference as to how fast we might get to a world that’s 2˚C warmer. A sensitivity of 2.5˚C makes it much less likely we will see 2˚C warming during the 21st century. There are so many uncertainties, but the policy people say the target is fixed. And if you question this, you will be slagged off as a denier.’ “即使敏感度是2.5℃，而不是3℃，这也是实质性的区别，会直接影响到世界究竟会以多快的速度变暖2℃。如果敏感度是2.5℃，那么我们在21世纪遭遇全球变暖2℃的可能性就会大大降低。有这么多的不确定性，但制定政策的人却说目标已经定了。如果你怀疑这一点，你会被贬成一文不值的‘抵赖派’。” Curry added that her own work, conducted with the British independent scientist Nic Lewis, suggests that the sensitivity value may still lower, in which case the date when the world would be 2˚C warmer would be even further into the future. On the other hand, the inherent uncertainties of climate projection mean that values of 4˚C cannot be ruled out — but if that turns out to be the case, then the measures discussed at Paris and all the previous 20 UN climate conferences would be futile. In any event, ‘the economists and policymakers seem unaware of the large uncertainties in climate sensitivity’, despite its enormous implications. Curry补充道，她自己和英国独立科学家Nic Lewis一起完成的研究，甚至认为敏感度的数值可能更低。若是这样，全球升温2℃的日期甚至还在将来的将来。另一方面，气候预测固有的不确定性，意味着敏感度为4℃的可能性也不能排除。但是，若是如此，此次巴黎大会和之前20届联合国气候大会讨论的措施都是白搭了。无论如何，“经济学家和决策者似乎都没有意识到气候敏感度的巨大不确定性”，尽管这种不确定性影响极大。 Meanwhile, the obsessive focus on CO2 as the driver of climate change means other research on natural climate variability is being neglected. For example, solar experts believe we could be heading towards a ‘grand solar minimum’ — a reduction in solar output (and, ergo, a period of global cooling) similar to that which once saw ice fairs on the Thames. ‘The work to establish the solar-climate connection is lagging.’ 于此同时，执意认为二氧化碳是气候变化的祸首，也使得其他关于气候自然变异的研究被忽视了。例如，太阳研究专家认为我们可能正在进入一个“太阳活动极小期”——即太阳能量输出减少（因此意味着一个全球变冷期）。类似情况过去发生时，泰晤士河上都曾出现冰雕展览（泰晤士河封冻）。“确定太阳活动与气候变化之间的关系这项工作还很滞后。” Curry’s independence has cost her dear. She began to be reviled after the 2009 ‘Climategate’ scandal, when leaked emails revealed that some scientists were fighting to suppress sceptical views. Curry的卓尔不群让她损失惨重。自2009年“气候门”丑闻后，她就开始遭到辱骂。当时，有泄密邮件显示，一些科学家正组织起来强力压制怀疑论观点。 ‘I started saying that scientists should be more accountable, and I began to engage with sceptic bloggers. I thought that would calm the waters. Instead I was tossed out of the tribe. There’s no way I would have done this if I hadn’t been a tenured professor, fairly near the end of my career. If I were seeking a new job in the US academy, I’d be pretty much unemployable. I can still publish in the peer-reviewed journals. But there’s no way I could get a government research grant to do the research I want to do. Since then, I’ve stopped judging my career by these metrics. I’m doing what I do to stand up for science and to do the right thing.’ “那时我就说科学家应该更有公信力一点，并开始和一些持怀疑论的博客作家交流。我以为那可以缓和一下气氛。结果却是，我被踢出局了。如果我不是一名终生教授，而且即将退休，我绝不会寻根问底。如果现在我要去美国的学术圈重新找工作，估计没人请我吧。我现在仍然可以在同行评鉴期刊上面发表文章。但我已被封杀，不可能得到政府研究资助来做我想做的课题。自那以后，我停止了用这些东西来衡量我的职业生涯。我现在做的，只是坚持科学，做正确的事。” She remains optimistic that science will recover its equilibrium, and that the quasi-McCarthyite tide will recede: ‘I think that by 2030, temperatures will not have increased all that much. Maybe then there will be the funding to do the kind of research on natural variability that we need, to get the climate community motivated to look at things like the solar-climate connection.’ 她依然乐观的相信，科学会找回它的平衡，现在的这种麦卡锡主义式潮流终会退去。“我认为到2030年，温度还不会升至那么高，也许那个时候，我们会找到研究资金来做我们需要做的气候自然变异研究，也能让气候组织有动力去寻找太阳活动和气候变化之间的关联。” She even hopes that rational argument will find a place in the UN: ‘Maybe, too, there will be a closer interaction between the scientists, the economists and policymakers. Wouldn’t that be great?’ 她甚至期待联合国内部能允许气候问题上的理性争论，“让科学家、经济学家和决策者们有更好的互动。这也是可能的。那样不是更好？” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Your Brain Actually Works Better in Winter 为什么你的大脑在冬天更好用？ 作者：Christian Jarrett @ 2016-2-14 译者：董慧颖 校对：斑马（@鹿兔马朦） 来源：science of us，http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2016/02/debunking-the-myth-of-the-winter-blues.html#. It was terrifyingly cold in New York this weekend, and this cold snap occurred right as we’re entering the postholiday doldrums. It’s around the time of the year when people start to talk about seasonal changes to their mood and energy level — most commonly, seasonal affective disorder, or SAD. While SAD is a relatively new condition — it stems from research in the ‘80s — it has become a huge part of how we in the colder climes discuss winter. 这个周末，纽约出奇的冷，寒流在我们假日后的沉闷期突然来袭。差不多就是这时候，人们开始谈论他们情绪和精力的季节性变化——季节性情感障碍（SAD）是最常见的话题之一。虽然SAD是一种历史较短的疾患（起源于1980年代的研究），但它已然成为身处更冷气候中的人们谈论严冬时津津乐道的话题。 Everyone knows how winter affects certain people: It lowers their mood, makes them more prone to depression, and, in some cases, slows their mind to a crawl. There’s a reason for the popular image of someone wanting to just curl up in bed to wait out the duration of a frigid February afternoon. 大家都知道冬季会对特定人群产生何种影响：寒冬会使他们的心情变差，让他们更容易患抑郁症，在某些情况下还会让他们的思维变迟钝。二月里一个严寒的下午，某人只想蜷缩在被窝中，静待时间流逝——这种大众印象自有缘由。 But scientists are coming to realize that this might not be quite right. A pair of new studies challenge many of the popular assumptions about the psychological effects of wintertime, suggesting that we should look at the season in a new, brighter light. The weather might be gray and chilly, but the latest science says we humans are better at dealing with this than we usually give ourselves credit for, both in terms of our mood and the basic functioning of our brains. 但科学家开始意识到这或许并不准确。两项最新研究挑战了许多有关冬季带来的心理影响的流行假设；这提示我们应该用一种新的、更加乐观的视角看待这个季节。冬日的天气或许是灰暗而寒冷的，但最新研究表明：人类应对寒冬的能力比我们自以为的更好——无论是情绪方面，还是大脑基本功能方面。 The first study is a massive investigation published recently in Clinical Psychological Science involving 34,294 U.S. adults. It casts doubt on the very notion that depression symptoms are worse in the winter months. 第一项研究是最近发表在《临床心理科学》上的大型调查，共计34294名美国成年人参与。这项研究质疑了“冬季会恶化抑郁症状”这种观念。 The researchers, led by Professor Steven LoBello at Auburn University at Montgomery, asked their participants to complete a questionnaire about their depression symptoms over the previous two weeks. Crucially, the participants all completed the survey at different times of the year, allowing the researchers to look for any seasonal patterns. 由奥本大学（位于蒙哥马利）的Steven LoBello教授带领的研究人员要求参与者填写一份关于他们近两周抑郁症状的调查问卷。至关重要的是，所有参与者都在当年不同时期完成调查，这让研究人员能够在其中寻找季节性规律。 Contrary to what you might think, the results provided no evidence whatsoever that people’s depression symptoms tended to be higher in winter — or at any other time of the year. This lack of a seasonal effect was true whether looking at the entire sample or only respondents with depressive symptoms. The respondents’ geographical latitude and sunlight exposure on the day of the survey were also unrelated to depression scores. 可能与你的预期不同，研究结果并没有为“人们的抑郁症状在冬季（或一年中任何其他时间）更明显”这种说法提供任何支持证据。无论是根据全部样本，还是仅考虑拥有抑郁症状的受访者，这种季节性影响的缺失都成立。调查当天受访者所处的地理纬度和接受的光照量同样与抑郁指数无关。 The researchers are clear about what this means for what they call the “well­-entrenched folk theory” that winter brings on or worsens depression. Their results, they write, “cast serious doubt on major depression with seasonal variation as a legitimate psychiatric disorder.” 研究者很清楚，这项结果对于他们所谓的“根深蒂固的民间理论”所认为的冬季能带来或加重抑郁症的说法意味着什么；他们认为这项研究成果“严重质疑了将‘与季节有关的重性抑郁’认定为一种精神疾病的合理性。” They think the early studies on the concept of SAD were flawed by virtue of the fact that they selectively recruited people who said they suffered from winter-related mood changes — an approach that was likely susceptible to confirmation bias, or selectively interpreting evidence to support a theory you already have. 他们认为，关于SAD概念的早期研究错在选择性地招募认为自己正在遭受冬季相关的情绪变化的人——这种方法很容易受确认偏误的影响，还容易使研究者通对证据的选择性解释去支持自己已有的理论。 This makes intuitive sense. Once the concept of SAD was introduced, after all, it captured the public imagination and went on to spawn a whole industry based around ways to treat the “condition,” including using artificial light. 这一质疑在直觉上说得过去。毕竟，一旦SAD概念被引入，它就抓住了公众的想象力，继而催生了基于治疗这种“病症”的方法（包括利用人工光照）的整个产业。 In spite of the sketchy evidence for SAD, once it was accepted that the dark months affect our mood, it was only a small step to assuming that they probably have an adverse effect on our cognition, too — hence the internet now being full of articles on how to beat that winter sluggishness. 尽管SAD的证据质量较差，人们一旦接受“灰暗的月份会影响我们心情”这种看法，离假设冬季对我们的认知也可能有不良影响也就不远了——因此，互联网上充斥着有关“如何打败冬日倦怠”的文章。 But this idea, too, is challenged by a new piece of research. That paper, published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, looked at whether the time of year affects basic brain function. It’s one of the first studies to do so, and, like the depression-scores study, it seems to refute a common cultural understanding of the effects of cold, dark days. 但是一项新研究同样挑战了这个想法。这篇论文发表在《美国国家科学院院刊》，它就“年度时段是否会影响大脑功能”做了考察。这是最早涉猎该主题的研究之一，与前文中抑郁评分研究一样，这项研究成果似乎反驳了大众文化对于黑暗寒冷的日子所带来影响的理解。 The neuroscientists, led by Christelle Meyer at the University of Liège in Belgium, recruited 28 young men and women at different times of year to answer questions about their mood, emotions, and alertness; have their melatonin (a hormone that regulates the sleep cycle) levels measured; and complete two psychology tasks in a brain scanner. 由比利时Liège大学Christelle Meyer带领的神经科学家团队在一年中的不同时间招募了28名青年男女去回答关于自己心情、情绪和警觉性的问题；测试他们的褪黑激素（一种调节睡眠周期的激素）水平；并让他们在大脑扫描仪中完成两项心理任务。 One task was a test of vigilance and involved pressing a button as fast as possible whenever a stopwatch appeared at random intervals on-screen, and the other was a test of working memory, which involved listening to streams of letters and spotting when the current letter was the same as the one presented three items earlier. The basic idea was to see if the participants’ brain activity during these tasks was different depending on the season. 一项是警觉性测试，包括当屏幕上以随机时间间隔出现秒表时尽可能快地按按钮。另一项是工作记忆测试，包括听一连串字母，并认出和三个之前展示的字母一样的当前字母。该研究的基本宗旨是考察参与者在这些任务中的大脑活动是否会根据季节而不同。 The participants’ feelings of alertness, their emotional state, and melatonin levels mostly didn’t vary with the seasons, and they actually performed equally well on both tasks in the scanner regardless of the time of year, thus undermining the idea that the winter has an adverse effect on our mental abilities (more on this shortly). 参与者的警觉感、情绪状态、以及褪黑激素水平基本没有随季节而变化，而且实际上无论在一年中的什么时间，他们在两项于扫描仪中完成的任务里表现同样好，由此削弱了冬季会给我们的心理能力带来不利影响的想法。 One question on mood did show some seasonal variation, but participants’ moods were lowest in the fall, not winter. In terms of underlying brain function, participants’ neural activity was highest during the memory task for those participants tested in spring and lowest for those tested in the fall, so, far from being a special case, winter brain activity sat in the middle. 在关于情绪的其中一个问题上，数据确实表现出一定的季节性变化，但是参与者的情绪最低点在秋季，而不是冬季。在相应的大脑功能方面，记忆测试中，春季接受测试的参与者的神经活动最高，秋季接受测试者的神经活动最低。因此，冬天的大脑活动处于中间水平，并不特别。 Meanwhile, during the vigilance task, brain activity was lowest in the winter and highest in the summer. Some media outlets have interpreted this as evidence for winter sluggishness, but as the participants’ performance and alertness was as good in winter as at other times of year, their reduced winter brain activity can actually be seen as a sign of improved efficiency. For comparison, consider research showing how the more expert people become at a task, the less brain activity is seen while they perform that task, as the brain becomes more efficient. 同时，在警觉性测试中，大脑活动水平在冬季最低，夏季最高。一些媒体把这解释为冬季倦怠的证据，但是参与者在冬季的表现与警觉性和一年中其他时间一样好，他们减弱的冬季大脑活动可以看成是效率提高的一个标志。为了进行比较，请考虑另一些研究，它们揭示了，随着人们在任务中变得更专业，大脑执行该任务的效率提高，执行任务时的大脑活动会变得更低。 You could even think of this reduced winter neural activity as your brain entering a kind of “eco mode,” allowing it to perform as well as it does in summer but while consuming fewer resources. This makes sense from an evolutionary perspective: When resources are scarce and the weather is harsh, it’s obviously advantageous that the brain should be capable of performing basic tasks, especially those involving vigilance, in an economic fashion. (I should note that this is my interpretation — the researchers remain relatively neutral about the meaning of the seasonal effects they observed, and didn’t return an email I sent them inquiring about what those effects might mean.) 你甚至可以把这种冬季减弱的神经活动看成是大脑进入了一种“经济模式”，允许其和在夏天表现得一样好但同时消耗更少的资源。这从进化的角度来看说得通：当资源稀缺，天气恶劣时，如果大脑能以一种经济节能的方式执行基本任务，特别是涉及警觉性的任务，显然是有利生存的。（我有必要指出，这是我自己的解释——研究者对他们观察到的季节性影响的含义保持相对中立，并且没有回复我发给他们的质询这些影响背后意义的邮件。） This suggestion that our mental function might actually be enhanced in winter is actually backed up by a (frequently ignored) study published in the late 1990s in Applied Cognitive Psychology. Researchers at the University of Tromsø in Norway tested 62 participants on a range of mental tasks in winter and again in summer (some completed them in winter first, the others in summer, thus balancing out any practice effects). 我们的心理功能实际上有可能会在冬季增强这一看法，事实上还被1990年代末发表在《应用认知心理学》的一项（经常被忽视的）研究支持。挪威特罗姆斯大学的研究者测试了62名参与者在冬季和夏季的一系列心理测试（一部分参与者先在冬天完成，其余参与者在夏季完成，因此排除任何练习效应）。 This was just about the perfect setting for such a study, since the contrasts were so extreme: Tromsø is located more than 180 miles north of the Arctic Circle, meaning there is virtually no sunlight in Tromsø during the winter and no darkness in the summer. 对于此种研究这是一个完美的设定，因为对比是如此极端：特罗姆斯位于北极圈以北180多公里，这意味着实际上特罗姆斯的冬季几乎没有阳光，夏季几乎没有黑暗。 Across the battery of tests, the researchers found little evidence of seasonal effects, but those they did find were largely in favor of a winter advantage. In winter, participants performed better on two different tests of reaction time, and they showed evidence of enhanced mental control on the well-established Stroop test that involves naming color words while ignoring the ink color they are written in. Only one test showed a slight summer advantage, and that was for verbal fluency. 在一系列测试中，研究者只发现了很少有关季节性影响的证据，但是只要是他们是他们找到了的，大部分有利于冬季优势。在冬季，参与者在两项不同的反应时间测试中表现更好，并且在著名的斯特鲁测试中，涉及到报出颜色词汇而忽略写下它们所用的墨水颜色，他们表现出精神控制增强的证据。只有一个测试显示了轻微的夏季优势，那是涉及语言流利性的。 Summing up their findings, Dr. Tim Brennan and his colleagues wrote that “despite the subjective feeling one may have that one is mentally sluggish in winter, our data do not lend empirical support to the intuitive claim.” 总结他们的发现时，提姆布伦南博士和他的同事们写道：“尽管主观感觉一个人或许在冬季精神上会倦怠，我们的数据却并没有为这种直觉断言提供经验支持。” Many people dislike winter for obvious reasons, and the idea that these darker months make many of us profoundly miserable and cognitively impaired fits a narrative about this being a difficult time of year (as Adam Gopnik wrote, “one of the most natural metaphors we make is of winter as a time of abandonment and retreat. The oldest metaphors for winter are all metaphors of loss”). 很多人出于显而易见的理由不喜欢冬季，人们认为这些阴暗的月份让许多人极度痛苦、认知受损，这种想法迎合了关于这一年度艰难时期的一段描述——亚当·戈普尼克写道，“我们最自然的隐喻之一是将冬季比作放弃和退缩的时期。而且关于冬季最古老的隐喻全都关乎失去。” But we should be cognizant of how our expectations shape the way we experience the world — it may be the case that, after hearing over and over and over that winter slows us down, making us more sluggish and sad, we interpret days when we’re feeling down for other reasons as proof that it’s winter’s fault. 但我们应该认识到，我们的期望会塑造我们体验世界的方式——以下状况是可能的：当一遍又一遍听到冬季会使人迟钝，让我们变得倦怠和悲伤时，我们会把自己因其他原因感到沮丧的事例归罪于冬季。 Sure, the winter presents us with many practical challenges, like coping with colds and flu and getting to work through the snow, but what these new studies suggest is that the season doesn’t have some mystical, malevolent effect on our brains. If anything, the data suggest that our minds are more sprightly at this time of year than in the summer. Now there’s some news to brighten your day — even if it’s an abysmally cold, short one. 当然，冬季会给我们带来很多实际的挑战，比如应对感冒和流感、穿过雪地去上班，但是这些最新研究显示，冬季并不会对我们的大脑有神秘的、恶毒的影响。如果说有影响，这些数据显示我们的思维在每年这个时候比起夏季更加活跃。现在总算有了些好消息来照亮你的日子——即使是一个极冷极短的冬日。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Education Does Not Fix Poverty 为什么教育不能解决贫困问题 作者：Matt Bruenig @ 2015-12-2 译者：龟海海 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Demos，http://www.demos.org/blog/12/2/15/why-education-does-not-fix-poverty Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute claim to have hatched a bipartisan consensus plan for reducing poverty. As exciting as that sounds, the details of the plan, unfortunately, won't be available until David Brooks unveils them at an event on December 3rd. Nonetheless, it's clear from the materials they have released that the consensus plan will focus on three things: education, marriage, and work. 布鲁金斯学会和美国企业协会声称已研究出一个双方都认同的计划来减少贫困【编注：布鲁金斯学会和美国企业协会分别是美国自由派和保守派阵营最具影响力的智库】。尽管听起来很令人激动，但不幸的是，David Brooks要等到12月3日的一个活动上才会公布这个计划的详情。尽管如此，根据他们之前所公布的一些资料，他们的共同计划将主要集中在三个方面：教育，婚姻和工作。 In the next few posts, I will attack all three focuses as misguided. Today's focus will be on education, easily the most misguided of the three. 在随后的文章中我会逐步抨击所有这三个误导性的焦点。今天我将说一说教育，也是三个中最具误导性的。 1. Rehearsing the Education Poverty Argument 1. 回顾教育改变贫穷的观点 To see where the education poverty argument goes wrong, it's helpful to explain what that argument is first. In this post, I am going to do that by pretending initially that we are in the year 1991. That year has no special significance other than that it's the year the modern Census education questions begin. 要看清这个教育改变贫穷的观点哪里不对劲，有必要先解释一下这个观点是什么。在本文中，我会首先假装我们生活在1991年。那一年除了人口普查中开始出现教育相关问题，没有什么特别的事件。 So imagine you are an education-focused poverty person living in 1991. You peer out into the world of basic social statistics and you see this graph of adult poverty rates broken down by education: 那么我们来想象一下，你生活在1991年，并且关注通过教育改变贫穷。你往基础社会统计的世界里张望，看到这幅按教育程度统计的成人贫穷率图表：   You notice something very striking about the graph: the higher the education, the lower the poverty rate. You go back out into the social statistics universe and you see this graph breaking down the distribution of adults across the various educational groups: 你在该图表里发现一些很令人震惊的东西：学历越高，贫困率越低。 然后你再回到社会统计领域之中，看到这幅成年人的教育程度分布图： You combine this graph with the poverty rate graph in your mind and you have an epiphany. Because the lower educational bins have higher poverty rates and the higher educational bins have lower poverty rates, if we change the composition of adults such that a greater percentage of them wind up in the higher educational bins, that will mean lower overall poverty. 你把该图和之前的贫穷率图表综合起来，然后你瞬间顿悟。因为低学历的格子里有较高贫困率，高学历的格子里有较低贫困率，如果我们把成年人的组成换一换，多一点人落入较高学历的格子里，那总体的贫困率就会降低。 So, for instance, if we could move 9 points off the "less than high school" bar and on to the "associate" (or better) bars, we would definitely see lower poverty. After all, you are moving people out of a high poverty bin and into low poverty bins. Similarly, if you could move 6.5 points of the "high school" bar and on to the "associate" (or better) bars, you'd see lower poverty for the same reason. 举个例子，如果我们把“低于高中”中的9个百分点，移动到“大专”（或以上）的格子里去，我们肯定会看到更低的贫困率。总之，你是在把人从高贫困率的格子里，移动到低贫困率的格子里去。类似的，如果你能把“高中”中的6.5个百分点，移动到“大专”（或以上）的格子里，你同样会看到更低的贫困率。 2. It Didn't Work 2. 然并卵 Since 1991, we have done precisely what the education-focused poverty people said to do. Between 1991 and 2014, we steadily reduced the share of adults in the "less than high school" and "high school" bins and increased the share of adults in every other bin: 从1991年起，我们完全按照这帮关注教育改善贫穷的人所说的去做。在1991年和2014年之间，我们稳步降低了成人中“低于高中”和“高中”的比率，令其他人群比率提高： By 2014, the share of adults in the "less than high school" bin declined 9 points from 20.6% to 11.6%. The share of adults in the "high school" bin declined 6.5 points from 36% to 29.5%. Meanwhile, the share of adults with an Associate degree went up 3.9 points, the share with a Bachelor's degree went up 8.3 points, and the share with a post-Bachelor's degree went up 4.8 points. 截至2014年，成年人中“低于高中”这部分已经降低了9个百分点，从20.6%降到了11.6%。成年人中“高中”这部分下降了6.5个百分点，从36%降到了29.5%。同时成年人中拥有大专学历的上涨了3.9个百分点，拥有学士学位的上涨了8.3个百分点，拥有学士以上学历的增长了4.8个百分点。 If the poverty rates for each educational bin remained the same, then the upward redistribution of adults from the lower bins to the higher bins would have led to lower overall poverty. But that's not what happened. 如果各个教育层次的贫困率都保持不变，将成年人从低学历移向高学历应该导致整体贫困率下降才是。但是，这却并未发生。 Instead, the poverty rate for each educational bin went up over this time and overall poverty didn't decline at all. In fact it went up. 实际上，各个教育层次的贫困率在这一时期都上升了，总体贫困率根本没有降低，反而是上升了。 By 2014, the "less than high school" poverty rate had increased 3.7 points. The "high school" poverty rate increased 4.6 points. "Some college" went up 4.1 points, "associate" went up 3.8 points, "bachelor's" went up 2.1 points, and "post-bachelor's" went up 1.7. Despite the educational gains, overall adult poverty in 2014 was actually 1.1 points higher than in 1991. 截至2014年，“低于高中”这栏的贫困率提高了3.7个点。“高中”的贫困率增长4.6个点。“专科院校”增长了4.1个点，“大专”上升3.8个点，“学士”增长2.1点，“学士以上”上升1.7点。尽管学历水平得到提高，但2014年的总体贫困率却比1991年高了1.1个点。 As the adults migrated up the educational bins, they took the poverty into the higher educational bins with them: 随着教育程度提高，成年人把贫困也带入了更高的教育程度之中： Over this period, the share of poor adults with "less than high school" education plummeted 20.1 points from 48.3 points to 28.2 points. Every other educational bin saw share gains of 2.6 to 5 points. 在这期间，贫困成年人中“低于高中”文化水平的占比大跌了20.1个点，从48.3%降到了28.2%。其余每个教育程度都大约增长了2.6到5个点。 Adults these days are as educated as they have ever been, but poverty is no lower than it was in 1991. This is not because the few lingering people with "less than high school" have soaked up all the poverty. Quite the contrary: poverty has simply moved up the educational scale. The poor in 2014 were the most educated poor in history. 如今成年人的教育程度空前之高，但是贫困率并不比1991年低。这不是因为少数学历“低于高中”又游手好闲的人占据了贫困。正好相反，贫困问题在向高教育程度人群转移。2014年的贫困人口是有史以来教育程度最高的。 3. Why It Doesn't Work 3. 为什么没有用 There are a number reasons why aggregate education gains do not necessarily translate into aggregate poverty declines. I will discuss three here. 总体教育程度提高未必转化为总体贫困率下降，这当中有很多原因。我在此说三点。 First, handing out more high school and college diplomas doesn't magically create more good-paying jobs. When more credentials are chasing the same number of decent jobs, what you get is credential inflation: jobs that used to require a high school degree now require a college degree; jobs that used to require an Associate degee now require a Bachelor's degreee; and so on. 第一，发出更多的高中和大学文凭并未能像变魔术般的创造出更多高薪工作。当更多更闪耀的文凭来争夺同样多的好工作时，你得到的是文凭通胀：那些本来要求高中文凭的工作现在要求大学文凭；那些本来要求大专学历的工作现在要求本科学历，依此类推。 Obviously the supply of good-paying jobs is not a fixed constant of nature, but there is no reason to think that the supply will automatically go up to match the number of people with the necessary credentials. The types of jobs available in a society, and their level of compensation, is determined by many factors (demand, worker power, technology, global competition, natural resources, etc.) that have little to do with the number of degrees that society is minting. 显然，好工作的供给并非一成不变，但也没有理由相信好工作会随着合格的文凭增多而增多。社会中的工作类别，以及薪金水平，是由很多因素决定的（需求，工会力量，技术，全球竞争，自然资源，等等），这些因素和社会上颁发的文凭数量并没有多大关系。 Second, having more education does not necessarily increase people's productive capacity. Those in the know will identify this as the old "signaling v. human capital" point. The short of it is that, even if jobs did automatically pop into existence to match people's level of productive ability, it's not at all clear that college education necessarily does a lot to increase people's productive ability. Instead, what college education does (at least in part) is signal to employers that you have a certain level of relative "quality" over others in society. 第二，接受更多教育并不意味着更高的生产率。内行人会发现这是古老的“信号传递对人力资本”理论的要点【编注：这是解释教育程度与薪酬水平关系的两种理论，前者认为文凭传递了有关个人禀赋的信号，后者认为教育确实提升了人力资本的生产率】。简单地说，即使自动会有工作职位来匹配人们的产出能力水平，大学教育是否对提高人们的产出能力有很大作用也完全不明确。而大学教育所做的是（至少一部分是）向雇主发出一个信号：你相比社会上其他的人“优秀”一些。 As more people get degrees, the value of this signal declines, but more importantly, the point is that the degree was always a signal, not a productivity enhancer. 然而，当越来越多的人拿到文凭时，这个信号就变弱了，更重要的是，文凭永远只是一个信号，并非产出能力的推进器。 Third, poverty is really about non-working people: children, elderly, disabled, students, carers, and the unemployed. The big things that cause poverty for adults over the age of 25 in a low-welfare capitalist society—old-age, disability, unemployment, having children—do not go away just because you have a better degree. 第三，贫困的是那些不工作的人：孩子，老人，残疾人，学生，照顾家人者和无业者。在一个低福利资本主义社会，导致25岁以上成年人贫困的罪魁祸首——老龄化，残疾，失业，育儿——不会仅仅因为你有了个更好文凭而消失。 These poverty-inducing circumstances are social constants that could strike anyone of us and do strike many of us at some point in our lives. To the extent that education does nothing to provide better income support for those who do find themselves in these vulnerable situations, its effect on overall poverty levels will always be weak, or, as with the US in the last 23 years, totally nonexistent. 这些导致贫穷的境况在社会中总是存在的，我们每个人都有可能遇到，并且必定有很多人在生命中的某一个时刻会遇到。既然教育不能帮助那些身处窘境的人们或得更多收入，那它对整体贫困水平的影响就必然很微弱，或者正如在美国过去23年的情况那样，根本不存在。

******

Technical note. For this post, I used the Official Poverty Metric (OPM) to measure poverty. This is mainly because it's the only metric for which publicly accessible microdata exists back to 1991. The OPM is deeply flawed because it excludes from its calculation taxes, tax credits, and non-cash benefits like WIC, Section 8, and Food Stamps. 技术性注解：在本文中，我运用了官方贫困数据（OPM）来量化贫困，主要是因为这是唯一公众可以查找到的1991年前的微观数据。由于没有考虑所得税、税收抵免，以及包括低收入妇女儿童健康营养补助，《住房法案》第八章下的住房补贴和食物救济券在内的非现金福利，该OPM数据有很大的缺陷。 Because the alleged poverty-reducing mechanism of higher educational attainment is that it increases market income (not welfare income or income from refundable tax credits), the OPM's flaws are not really relevant here. In short, the OPM, despite its problems, works perfectly fine here. 因为所谓高学历可以减少贫困的观点着眼于提高市场收入（而非福利收入或税收抵免返还），所以与OPM的缺陷并不相关。简而言之，尽管OPM有所不足，但在这里引用绝对没有问题。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The case of the missing “u”s in American English 美式英语缺失的u 作者：Olivia Goldhill @2016-1-17 译者：林翠(@cwlinnil) 校对：小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源：Quartz，http://qz.com/596395/the-case-of-the-missing-us-in-american-english/ When my American editor asked me to research why Brits spell their words with so many extra ‘u’s, I immediately knew he had it all wrong. As a British journalist, it’s perfectly obvious to me that we have the correct number of ‘u’s, and that American spelling has lost its vowels along the way. 我的编辑，美国人，约我写文探讨英国人拼写词汇时用到的那么多额外的u，我第一反应是他从提法上就错了。在我这位英国记者看来，毫无疑问，我们用的u不多不少，是美国人不知从何时起丢掉了一些元音。 “Color,” “honor,” and “favor” all look quite stubby to me—they’re positively crying out to be adorned with a few extra ‘u’s. 像color，honor，favor这样的词，以我看来又粗又短——正不停哭叫着要找回那些额外的u来装扮其容貌。 But it turns out that the “o(u)r” suffix has quite a confused history. The Online Etymology Dictionary reports that –our comes from old French while –or is Latin. English has used both endings for several centuries. Indeed, the first three folios of Shakespeare’s plays reportedly used both spellings equally. 但其实，o(u)r这个后缀来历挺复杂。查在线词源词典，-our来自古法文，-or来自拉丁文。曾经有好几百年，两种结尾同时在英文里使用。例如，在莎士比亚戏剧前三版的对开本里，据说两种拼写就不加区分。 But by the late 18th and early 19th centuries, both the US and the UK started to solidify their preferences, and did so differently. 但在十八世纪后期至十九世纪前期，美国人和英国人各自确立了截然不同的偏好。 The US took a particularly strong stand thanks to Noah Webster, American lexicographer and co-namesake of the Merriam-Webster dictionaries. Webster was a language reformer and, as Merriam-Webster.com notes, the creator of a dictionary in 1806 that attempted to rectify some of the inconsistencies he observed in English spelling. He preferred to use the –or suffix and also suggested many other successful changes, such as reversing “re” to create “theater” and “center,” rather than “theatre” and centre.” 美式拼写立场特别明确，这要归功于美国词典编纂家诺亚·韦伯斯特，即《韦氏词典》的韦氏。韦伯斯特是当年的语言革新人物，据公司官网Merriam-Webster.com 提供的资料，他在1806年出版词典，目的之一是澄清某些不一致的英文拼写。他选择了后缀 -or，除此还有很多得到采用的改动，比如对调 -re为-er后，造出theater和center，代替了原有的theatre和centre。 However, other Webster proposals, such as changing “tongue” to “tung,” “women” to “wimmen,” “island” to “iland,” and “thumb” to “thum” were ultimately rejected. 韦伯斯特也有过一些别的提议，后来没有得到认可，例如把tongue换成tung，women换成wimmen，island换成iland，thumb换成thum。 Meanwhile in the UK, Samuel Johnson wrote A Dictionary of the English Language in 1755. Johnson was far more of a spelling purist than Webster, and decided that in cases where the origin of the word was unclear, it was more likely to have a French than Latin root. “We have few Latin words, among the terms of domestick use, which are not French,” wrote Johnson. And so he preferred –our to –or. 而在英国，塞缪尔·约翰逊博士于1755年编就《英文字典》。约翰逊博士远比韦伯斯特更热衷于拼写纯正化。并且断定，如果一个词来源不清楚，那它更可能拥有法文词根，而非拉丁词根。约翰逊博士的说法是：“我们平常用的词里面，非法语来源的拉丁词不多。”所以， -our与 -or之间他选择 -our。 “I have endeavoured to proceed with a scholar’s reverence for antiquity, and a grammarian’s regard to the genius of our tongue,” he wrote. As such, he “attempted few alterations.” 他写道：“学者崇奉古老传统，语法家则看重吾辈口舌之灵巧，我始终以此两者自勉。”有鉴于此，他“尽量不作改动。” So while the UK chose to preserve linguistic roots, the US opted to modernize spelling. And if you’re wondering which country got it right, the answer is, well, neither. Language is constantly evolving, and the US and UK simply went their different linguistic ways. 总而言之，在英国人选择保护词源时，美国人则选择改革拼写。谁对谁错的问题没有意义。语言在不断地演变，英美只是走上了不同进化道路，如此而已。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Kremlin’s Theatre of Tyranny 克里姆林宫的暴君戏 作者：Mark Galeotti @ 2015-12-26 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：龟海海 来源：Russia!，http://readrussia.com/2015/12/26/the-kremlins-theatre-of-tyranny/ Modern Russia is no haven of human rights, but nor is it a “vicious tyranny,” a heavy-handed autocracy, a neo-Stalinism in the remaking or any of the other exercises in horrified hyperbole indulged in by some commentators. 现代俄罗斯并非人权避风港，但它也算不上“邪恶暴政”、铁腕独裁，或某些评论家乐此不疲的怂人听闻——新斯大林主义东山再起。 The irony, though, is that sometimes it suits the Kremlin to seem so. If in the days when archetypal political technologist Vladislav Surkov was the Kremlin’s choreographer in chief, the name of the dramaturgiya was fake democracy, then today it often appears to be fake tyranny. 不过讽刺的是，有时候克里姆林宫看上去还真好像配得上这些评价。如果说在弗拉基斯拉夫·苏尔科夫这位典型的政治技术家担任克里姆林宫舞蹈总监时【译注：苏尔科夫是俄罗斯“主权民主”概念的主要提出者，该概念意在区别于西式民主】，演技（dramaturgiya）的定义叫做“伪民主”的话，那么如今它似乎更应该叫做“伪专制”。 Shooting Itself in the Foot? 砸自己的脚？ Consider, for example, the latest, spine-chilling initiative of the Duma, granting the security forces the right to open fire on crowds, on women (so long as they do not appear pregnant, a bizarre humanitarian grace note or a genuflection to the need to reverse demographic decline?), or even on the disabled, if necessary to prevent or defeat a terrorist attack. 比如，想想国家杜马最近通过的那个令人不寒而栗的法案吧。该法案授予安全部队为阻止或打击恐怖主义，必要时可以对人群、妇女开火（怀孕的除外，这到底是个奇怪的人道主义装饰音符呢，还是为了扭转人口衰退的不得已之举呢？），甚至对残疾人开火的权利。 Between the very subject matter – time to pass some new macabre ordnance on the right way and time to shoot your own citizens – and what it seems to say about the Kremlin’s fear of its own people, it understandably attracted attention and alarm amongst both Russian and Western observers. 不难理解，这一事件本身——是时候该颁布新规：如何在正确的时间和方法对付本国公民——以及它所透露出的克里姆林宫对自己人民的恐惧，都引来了包括俄国和西方在内的观察人士的注意及警惕。 And so it should, especially as it coincides with apparent moves to strengthen the very arms of the state most concerned with suppressing the populace. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) as a whole, for example, has had to absorb a 10% across the board budget cut, the OMON riot police appear to have been protected from any cuts. Although they represent only a small proportion of the MVD, nonetheless that inevitably means more cuts in regular, front-line policing. 这是理所应当的，特别是此事发生的同时，俄国还明显采取行动要强化与镇压民众最为密切相关的政府强力部门。比如，虽然内务部（MVD）作为一个整体必须承受10%的全面预算削减，但“特种部队”（OMON）的防暴警察似乎得以免遭任何削减。虽然他们只是内务部里的一个小单位，但即便如此，这也必然意味着普通的一线警务将承担更多的预算削减。 Indeed, it emerged that the MVD is investing in, amongst other projects, lots more of a type of grenade launcher called the RGS-50M, increasing its stocks of them five-fold. This is essentially an anti-riot weapon, used to fire rubber bullets and stun and gas grenades, and very much an OMON toy. 事实上，我们发现，内务部投入的许多项目中，有一项是加大力度购买某种叫做RG5-50M的枪榴弹发射器，其在内务部的存量已经翻了5倍。这主要是一种防暴武器，用于发射橡胶子弹、眩晕手榴弹和毒气手榴弹，基本上就是OMON的玩具。 Put together, all this suggests that the Kremlin, perhaps aware that the regime’s standing is rather less secure than those misleading sky-high personal approval ratings for Putin might suggest, is arming itself against some Moscow Maidan. With labor unrest on the rise – the truckers protesting road tolls are just the most visible tip of a disgruntled iceberg – and the 2016 Duma elections bound to focus public attention on promises made and broken, they may have a point. 所有这些综合起来看，表明克里姆林宫可能意识到，俄政权的地位并不像普京那些极高的个人支持率所错误显示的那样牢靠，因而正在武装自己，防止某种“莫斯科广场革命”发生。由于劳工骚乱在增加——抗议收取过路费的卡车司机只是愤怒冰山上最为醒目的一个小角，且2016年杜马选举必将吸引民众对选举许下的承诺和未实现的许诺的关注，克里姆林宫可能没想错。 Certainly news that the government, not least the Federal Protection Service (FSO), the Kremlin’s Praetorians, are monitoring opinion in the localities and throwing money at those looking most likely to experience unrest, seems also to suggest this. 当然，也有新闻提到，俄罗斯政府，尤其是身为克里姆林宫“禁卫军”的联邦警卫署（FSO）正在监测各地舆情，并且正在向那些最可能出现骚乱的地方砸钱。这似乎也能说明问题。 The interesting thing, though, is that the news of the RGS-50M purchase was covered by government news outlet TASS. And quite why did the Duma (because let’s face it, while a forum for all kinds of crazies to say all kind of crazy things, it doesn’t go to the bathroom without the nod from the Kremlin, let alone pass a bill) actually feel the need to enshrine the dos and don’t see of massacre in a law? 不过，有趣的是，购买RGS-50M的新闻是由政府新闻机构塔斯社报道出来的。而且杜马究竟为什么觉得有必要将“大屠杀指南”写进法律也是个问题（因为，说实在的，尽管杜马是个各种疯子在一起讨论各种疯事的论坛，但要是没有克里姆林宫点头，它连厕所都不敢上，遑论通过什么法律）。 Here, after all, is the dirty little secret of all governments: when they feel they must, they kill, and generally wherever and whenever the circumstances dictate. The Federal Security Service (FSB), the main subject of the new law, would not check the statute books before shooting presumed terrorists regardless of whether they were women or disabled. 毕竟，我们这里说的是所有政府共有的不可告人的秘密：当他们觉得必要时，只要为形势所迫，无论何时何地，他们都会杀人。新法的主角——联邦警卫署——在射杀可疑恐怖分子之前可不会去翻阅法律全书，不管后者是妇女还是残疾人。 But then again, neither would any Western security service. This is not, after all, a law encouraging heedless massacres and Bloody Sundays to be held every other month. Nor is the FSB governed by the 2011 Law on Police, which does set definite guidelines on the use of lethal and non-lethal force. So why make a song and dance of what would seem to be expressions of combined viciousness and insecurity? 不过话说回来，任何西方安全部门都不会这么做。毕竟这条法律并不是鼓励每隔一个月来一次随性的大屠杀或“血腥星期天”。联邦警卫署也不属2011年《警察法》管辖，但该法倒确实对使用致命和非致命武力有明确指导。所以，问题来了，为什么要载歌载舞的演这么一出给世人看，而其内容看起来仅仅是在表达邪恶与不安全感呢？ The Kremlin’s Gold Standard 克里姆林宫的黄金标准 Increasingly, it is references in the press to First Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Zolotov that seem to represent the gold standard, pun intended, of the Kremlin’s scare tactics. The former head of Putin’s bodyguard and one of his judo sparring partners, Zolotov has the reputation of being a maximalist in waiting, the kind of political policeman eager for the orders to deploy the knout and the iron fist. 媒体对内务部第一副部长维克托·佐罗托夫的报道，正日益成为克里姆林宫恐吓战术的黄金标准（此处一语双关）。佐罗托夫曾是普京的保镖头目，还是他的柔道陪练。他以随时待命的“最高纲领派”而出名，是那种极度渴望受命使用皮鞭和铁拳的政治警察。 After years as head of the presidential security detail, in 2013 he was moved to the MVD where he quickly rose from deputy commander of the Interior Troops to first deputy minister in charge of, hardly incidentally, this militarized domestic security force. 佐罗托夫曾任总统警卫部队负责人多年，于2013年调往内务部，很快就从内务部队副司令升为掌管这一负责国内保卫的军事力量的第一副部长，这绝非偶然。 Periodically, rumors float around in the press that he is poised to replace Interior Minister Viktor Kolokoltsev, a career policeman who, despite occasional forays into the kind of aggressive rhetoric seemingly expected of someone in his job, shows every sign of wanting to be a cop rather than a political enforcer. 媒体上定期地出现同样的谣言，说他被钦点接替内务部长维克多·科洛科利采夫。科洛科利采夫是位职业警察，尽管他也不时说出一些身处其位者可以预料会说出的咄咄逼人的言辞，但种种迹象表明他就是想做一个警察，而不想做政治打手。 Kolokoltsev succeeded a career political policeman, the former KGB officer Rashid Nurgaliev, and he was greeted with relief and enthusiasm within the MVD. Moving another political policeman into his office would likely be unpopular with the rank and file, as well as being a depressing symbol of a newly-repressive turn from the Kremlin. 科洛科利采夫的前任是一位职业政治警察，前KGB特工拉希德·努尔加利耶夫。科洛科利采夫上任时，内务部可是松了口气，热烈欢迎。这个位置上要是再来一个政治警察很可能不太受欢迎，无论是他的资历，还是作为克里姆林宫新压制转向的可悲象征。 However, unless and until the Kremlin feels it needs a tougher hand at the MVD, Zolotov’s greatest value appears to be precisely in his role as the bogeyman. Simply by airing the notion of his ascension, with all that could imply, is a way of signaling both that the Kremlin could empower much more fearsome agents and also that things are by no means as bad as they could be. 不过，除非且直到克里姆林宫当真觉得内务部需要一位更强硬的人手，否则佐罗托夫的更大价值恐怕恰恰在于扮演好他的唬人怪兽角色。只要散布一下他将升职的想法，这一猜想的隐含信息就能起到双重信号作用：既表明克里姆林宫可能把权力交给更为可怕的特工，同时也表明事情远没有到可能的最坏情况。 The Emperor’s New Armor 皇帝的新盔甲 So welcome to the theatre of tyranny. A style of governance which actively encourages the appearance of being tougher and nastier than it really is, and at the same time enthusiastically telegraphs that it could be tougher and nastier still. Behind all this posturing, after all, is a regime which can at best be considered a ‘soft’ or maybe ‘parsimonious’ authoritarianism. 所以，欢迎观看暴政大戏。这种统治风格积极鼓励自己表现得比实际上更为强硬、更为卑鄙，同时还狂热地宣扬自己可以再强硬一些、再卑鄙一些。不过，在所有这类装腔作势背后站着的，却是一个最多只能被视作“软”专制或“吝啬”专制的政权。 This is not in any way to whitewash or condone what it does, which ranges from targeted political trials all the way through to condoning a climate in which journalists dissidents and other inconveniences may be harassed, attacked even killed. We need to recognize the very real cases of abuses of individual rights and political repression. 这么说绝非是要洗白或原谅它的所作所为——从打击目标明确的政治审判，到纵容那些骚扰、攻击甚至杀害异议记者和其他刺头的罪行，等一系列行径。我们要意识到，俄罗斯存在着个人权利遭受损害和政治压迫的真实情形。 However, in many ways and compared with many countries (including, arguably, the West’s uncomfortable NATO ally, Turkey), it is much less profligately abusive than it might be. Its strategy is to deter resistance by making it appear futile and dangerous. 不过，从许多方面看，并与许多其他国家（包括可以说是西方在北约内的尴尬盟国土耳其）相比，俄罗斯的残暴并没有到肆无忌惮的地步，而它本有能力做到这一点。它的战略就是要威慑反抗，让反抗看起来危险无比、看起来徒劳无功。 In this respect, there is a striking parallel between the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic policy. Both depend on making Russia appear not only stronger than it is, but more ruthless, unpredictable and downright crazy, so it seems easier to accommodate than challenge it. 就此而言，克里姆林宫的对外与对内政策之间存在一个惊人的相似之处。两者都依赖于一个办法：不仅要把俄罗斯塑造得比实际更为强悍，而且要塑造得更为残暴、更反复无常、更疯狂透顶，从而使得与之通融协调显得比与之对抗挑战要容易。 And it works really well. Until the day that it meets someone more ruthless, unpredictable and crazy (whether Islamic State or Erdogan) or someone happens to wonder just how strong the emperor’s new armor really is. 这个办法效果很不错。除非有一天它撞上了一个更残暴、更无常并且更疯狂的家伙（不管是伊斯兰国还是埃尔多安），或者撞上了一个碰巧想要弄清皇帝的这套新铠甲到底有多牢靠的家伙。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Hive Mind 蜂巢思维 作者：Robin Hanson @ 2015-11-13 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：龟海海 来源：overcomingbias.com，http://www.overcomingbias.com/2015/11/statestupidity.html Some people like murder mystery novels. I much prefer intellectual mysteries like that in Garett Jones’ new book Hive Mind: How Your Nation’s IQ Matters So Much More Than Your Own: 有些人喜欢看谋杀悬疑小说，而我则更青睐那些智力悬疑类著作，例如Garett Jones的新书《蜂巢思维：为什么你们国家的整体智商水平甚至比你自己的智商还要重要》中所描述的：

Over a decade ago I began my research into how IQ matters for nations. I soon found that the strong link between average IQ and national productivity couldn't be explained with just the conventional finding that IQ predicts higher wages. IQ apparently mattered far more for nations than for individuals. 在十年前我开始研究智商对国家意味着什么。我很快就发现，国民的平均智商与国家生产率之间的强相关性，并不能以高智商预示着高薪资这一传统发现来解释。智商对国家的作用显然比对个人重要得多。 In my early work, I estimated that IQ mattered about six times more for nations than for individuals: your nation’s IQ mattered so much more than your own. That puzzle, that paradox of IQ, is what set me on my intellectual journey. … 在我早期的研究中，我曾经做过一个估测，智商对国家所发挥的作用要比对于个人所发挥的作用高大约6倍，也就是说：你所在国家的平均智商水平比你自己的智商水平要重要的多。这个谜题，或者叫“智商悖论”，让我踏上了这条智力探索的漫漫长路... I’ll lay out five major channels for how IQ can pay off more for nations than for you as an individual: 我将在下面列举五个方面的依据说明智商对国家的影响要远远超出对个人的影响： 1. High-scoring people tend to save more, and some of that savings stays in their home country. More savings mean more machines, more computers, more technology to work with, which helps make everyone in the nation more productive. 1. 高智商的人更会储蓄，而其中的部分储蓄将留在他们的母国。更多储蓄意味着更多的机器，更多电脑，更多可运用的技术，而这些都能帮助生活在这个国家的所有人变得更有效率。 2. High-scoring groups tend to be more cooperative. And cooperation is a key ingredient for building higher-quality governments and more productive businesses. 2. 高智商的群体倾向于更具合作性。而合作则是建设更高质量的政府和更高效企业的一个关键因素。 3. High-scoring groups are more likely to support market-oriented policies, a key to national prosperity. People who do well on standardized tests also tend to be better at remembering information, and informed voters are an important ingredient for good government. 3. 高智商的人群更倾向于支持亲市场政策，这是国家繁荣的关键。那些在标准智商测试中得分更高的人同样也在记忆信息方面拥有优势，而博闻多识的选民是构建良好政府的重要因素。 4. High-scoring groups will tend to be more successful at using highly productive team-based technology. With these “weakest link” technologies, one misstep can destroy the product’s value, so getting high-quality workers together is crucial. Think about computer chips, summer blockbuster films, cooperative mega-mergers. 4. 高智商的人群在使用那些高效的基于团队协作的技术上要做得更好。在这些“最弱一环”【编注：Weakest Link是BBC二台的一档竞赛游戏节目，参赛者需一环扣一环的连续正确解答问题，以最终赢得奖金，每一回合过后，参赛者互相投票选出该回合的“最弱一环”，当选者出局离场。】技术中，任何一步差错都可能会毁掉整个产品的价值，所以让高素质工人进行协作至关重要。想想那些电脑芯片，夏季震撼的电影大片，还有巨型公司的兼并，都是此类协作的产物。 5. The human tendency to conform, at least a little, creates a fifth channel that multiplies the effect of the other four: the imitation channel, the peer effect channel. Even a small tendency to conform, to act just a little bit like those around us, too try to fit in, tends to quietly shape our behavior. If you have cooperative, patient, well-informed neighbors, that probably makes you a bit more cooperative, patient, and well-informed. 5. 人类多少有一点顺从倾向，这创造出了能够放大上述四类作用的第五种效应：那就是模仿效应，或“伙伴效应”。即使是很小一点顺从倾向，也就是行动得更像我们身边的人一些，或者说试图适应身边的人，都很可能在潜移默化中塑造我们的行为。如果你拥有富于合作性，有耐心而且博闻多识的邻居，那么这可能也会让你也变得更有合作性，更耐心，也更博闻多识。 Of course, test scores don’t explain everything about the wealth of nations: I’m only claiming that IQ-type scores explain about half of everything across countries – and much less within a country.

当然，智力测试得分无法解释关于国家富裕程度的一切：我只是说智商类测试得分能够解释国家间大约一半的财富差异——而对一个国家内部的差异，它能解释的部分则要小得多。 The question of why IQ matters more for nations than individuals does indeed seem quite important, and quite puzzling, and Jones is to be praised for his readable and informative book calling it to our attention. And the five explanations Jones offers are indeed, as he claims, channels by which each of us benefits from the IQ of the people around us. 为什么智商对于国家的影响相比对个人的影响要大得多这个问题看来的确很重要，而且也着实是个谜，因此我认为本书作者Jones应该为他这部兼具可读性和信息量并让我们充分意识到这个问题的著作而获得称赞。如他所言，上面所提到的五种解释的确都是我们受益于自己身边人群智商的渠道。 However (you knew that was coming, right?), when we benefit from the IQ of people nearby who are within the scope of shared social institutions, then institution access prices can reflect these benefits. For example, employers can pay more for a smart employee who is not only more productive personally, but also raises the productivity of co-workers. Landlords can offer lower rents to people that other renters want to be near. Stores can offer discounts to customers that other customers like nearby when they are shopping. And clubs can offer discounts to entice memberships from those with which others like to associate. 然而（你知道我会这么说的，对吧？），当我们在共享社会机构的范围内从身边人群的智商中受益时，这些机构的准入价格便可体现这种益处的大小。例如，雇主可以为一名不仅自己生产率高，而且还能提升同事生产率的雇员发放更多的工资。土地主可以向其他租户都愿意靠近的那家租户收取更低的地租。商店可以向那些在购物时有很多人愿意接近的顾客提供折扣价格。而俱乐部也可以通过向那些其他人都愿意结交的人提供折扣来吸引他们成为自己的会员。 So simple economic theory leads us to expect that the benefits that smart people give to others nearby, within these shared priced-entry institutions, will be reflected in their incomes. 因此简单的经济理论便可让我们得出这样的预期，那些聪明人通过共享一个有偿准入的机构而带给身边人的好处，将最终反映在他们的收入上。 Specifically, people can plausibly pay more to live, club, shop, and work near and influenced by others who are more patient, cooperative, informed, and reliable. So these local benefits of smart associates do not plausibly explain the difference between how individual and national IQ correlate with income. 具体地说，人们完全可以花更多钱以换取生活在这些更有耐心，更富合作性，更博闻多识，也更可靠的人身边，在其附近购物，参与社团活动，并受其影响完全。所以这些聪明的被结交者们为身边人带来的局部收益，并不能合理地解释个人智商与收入的相关性为何不同于与国家平均智商与收入之间的相关性。【编注：意思是，假如高智商个体能够以本节所述方式将其带给身边人的利益（一种正外部性）内化为私人收入，这一相关性差别就不会存在。】 To explain this key difference (a factor of six!) we need big market or government failures. These could result if: 想要解释这一关键差异（第六个因素！），我们需要看看大市场或者政府的失败。下面几个原因可能导致这样的结果：

• Small social institutions such as firms, clubs, malls, and rental housing suffer some severe and as yet unidentified market failures which prevent them from favoring the smart.
• 诸如企业，俱乐部，超市和房屋租赁这类小型社会机构，可能会经历一些严重而又找不到原因的市场失灵，这阻止了它们对于聪明人的偏好。
• Benefits from the smart span such long social distances that they are not encompassed by shared social institutions with low enough transaction costs to allow deals to favor the smart. Maybe, for example, large metropolitan areas just can’t make effective deals on policies to favor attracting the smart, and pushing away the stupid.
• 聪明人所带来的好处，所发挥作用的社会跨度太大，以至于它们无法以足够低的交易成本被囊括进一个共同的社会机构中，从而让该机构能够做出偏爱聪明人的安排。举例来说，也许大都市地区的确无法就吸引聪明人并赶走蠢人的政策达成有效的安排。
• Governments with structures that fail to prevent the stupid and impatient from greatly influencing government policy. Such prevention might happen via restricting the franchise in democracies, by auctioning governance to a highest bidder, or via institutions like futarchy tied to long-term outcomes.

有组织构架的政府，可能也无法阻止那些愚蠢而缺乏耐心的人对其政策施加巨大影响【编注：此句原文语法不完整，姑作此解】。此类预防性措施的可能实现途径是，通过将治理权拍卖给出价最高者，来限制民主机制中的选举投票权，或者通过类似futarchy的制度【译注：futarchy是由经济学家Robin Hanson设想的一种制度，在其中，候选人只提出价值主张供选民选择，而采用何种政策来追求这些价值的问题，则交给一个预测市场（比如赌博市场或其他金融衍生品市场）来回答。】而将政策与长期后果捆绑在一起。 This third explanation seems by far the most plausible to me, especially via the government impatience channel. After all, while the stupid might be persuaded to see a benefit in adopting government institutions that give more influence to the smart, the impatient may just not see much benefit from their point of view in having a more patient government. 第三种解释在我看来是最合理的（且远比其他解释高明），特别是在政府治理缺乏耐心这方面。毕竟，即使那些愚蠢的人能被说服，看到让聪明人在政府机构中发挥更大影响力的好处，那些目光短浅的人却很可能无法看到拥有一个更加富有耐心的政府能为他们带来多少好处。 Adopting this as my tentative explanation, I must admit to now being more nervous about allowing more impatient and stupid immigrants, though as Bryan Caplan points out, that still allows for taking on billions of smart immigrants. 我必须承认，在把这作为我的一种尝试性解释的同时，我对于这个国家接纳更多没耐心且愚蠢的移民这一政策感到担忧，虽然如Bryan Caplan所指出，该政策让我们拥有了接纳数十亿聪明移民的机会。 But even if I’m now mildly more reluctant to take on certain kinds of immigrants, I’ll blame that mainly on our poor governance institutions, which give too much weight to the stupid and the impatient. 不过，尽管现在我对接纳某些特定类型的移民变得更不情愿了，我还是会将这主要归咎于我们糟糕的治理机构，是它们把过大的权重放给了那些愚蠢而不耐心的移民。 P.S. I’m aware that Jones has a formal model wherein a certain kind of nation-IQ correlation is larger than a certain kind of individual-IQ correlation. 补充：我知道Jones有一个正规模型，在这个模型中，某种特定的国家财富与智商之间的相关性要大于个人财富与智商之间的相关性。 The model has two industries, one where reliability matters greatly, and one where it matters much less, and two kinds of workers, a set of identical and very reliable workers and another set of less reliable workers who vary in their reliability. 该模型假设有两种产业，可靠性在其中的一种产业中非常重要，而在另一种产业中则不那么重要，同时还假设有两类工人，其中一类工人有着相同水平的高可靠性，而另一类工人的可靠性水平较低且参差不齐。 Only the identical very reliable workers work in the industry where reliability matters a lot, but some of these workers also work in the industry where reliability matters less, and within that second industry, there is only a weak correlation between reliability and wages. But if we compare nations that differ in the value of the high identical reliability among the workers in the industry where reliability matters, we’ll see that national income varies greatly with this reliability parameter. 在可靠性很重要的产业中工作的，都是那些拥有同等高度可靠的工人，而同样也有一些拥有相同水平的高可靠性工人在另一个对可靠性要求不那么高的产业里工作，在这第二个产业中，工人的可靠性和工资水平之间仅仅有很弱的相关性。但如果我们在国与国之间比较那些在对可靠性要求较高的产业中工作的拥有同等高可靠性工人的价值，那么可靠性这个参数会导致的差异就大得多了。 Yes this is a valid formal model, but it seems fragile and I doubt it robustly generalizes well to more complex situations; I just don’t think it works as a robust account of why national IQ matters more than individual IQ for wages. 的确，这是一个有效的正规模型，但它看起来很脆弱，而且我对该模型能否被稳健地推广到一些更加复杂的情境中去也表示怀疑；原因是我不认为它能够作为一个稳健的解释来说明为什么国家的智商水平对工资的影响要大于个人的智商水平。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Tom Holland: We must not deny the religious roots of Islamic State Tom Holland: 我们不能否认伊斯兰国的宗教根基 作者：Tom Holland @ 2015-3-17 译者：Horace Rae 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：News Statesman，http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/03/tom-holland-we-must-not-deny-relgious-roots-islamic-state Its jihadis call for a global caliphate. So why deny religion drives Isis? 伊斯兰圣战者呼吁建立一个全球哈里发帝国。所以，我们何以否认伊斯兰国乃由宗教所驱动？ in 1545, a general council of the Western Church was convened by Pope Paul III in the Tyrolean city of Trent. The ambition of the various bishops and theologians in attendance was to affirm Catholic doctrine in the face of the Protestant Reformation. Accordingly, when the council issued its first significant decree on 8 April 1546, it was targeted very precisely at what the delegates saw as most noxious about Luther and his followers. 1545年，教皇保禄三世主持的天主教会大公会议在提洛尔地区的塔兰托召开。与会的主教和神学家们想要在新教改革如火如荼之际巩固天主教信条的地位。于是，1546年4月8日，当会议发布第一条重要教令时，其对象很明确，就是被代表们视为罪大恶极的路德及其追随者。 Whereas Protestants, following Luther’s lead, aspired to strip away the cladding of tradition and learn the will of God from scripture alone, the Council of Trent condemned this ambition as a pernicious heresy. Divine revelation, it declared firmly, was not confined to the Bible. Tradition, too, “preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession”, expressed the essence of Christ’s teachings. To doubt this was no longer to rank as Christian. 跟随路德指引的新教徒们决意打破传统，只从经文中领悟上帝的意志。塔兰托大公会议谴责这种想法，称其为罪大恶极的异端邪说。会议坚持，神圣启示并非只存在于《圣经》之中。传统——“经由连续传承而被保存在天主教会中”——也同样能传达上帝教导的实质。质疑这一说法的人将被剥夺基督徒身份。 It is in a kindred spirit that Mehdi Hasan, in his article in last week’s issue of the New Statesman, would deny the title of Islamic to Islamic State, also known as Isis. That Isis militants, in justifying their actions, can quote the Quran, or the example or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, does not necessarily make them orthodox Muslims. 在上周New Statesman 杂志刊登的一篇文章中，Mehdi Hasan也表达了类似的想法：否认伊斯兰国的“伊斯兰”特性。尽管伊斯兰国的战士们在为其行为辩解时大可引用《古兰经》或先知穆罕默德的行迹或言论，但这并不能令他们成为正统的穆斯林。 Islam, like Christianity, is more than the sum of its scriptures. Over the course of its near 1,500 years of existence, an immense corpus of commentary and interpretation has accrued. “. . . the religion’s teachings in every age are determined by scholarly consensus on the meaning of the complex scriptural texts.” So declares Timothy Winter, the director of the Cambridge Muslim College, as quoted by Hasan. It is an assertion that would not have looked out of place in the decrees of the Council of Trent. 就像基督教一样，伊斯兰教的内涵远比经文总和丰富得多。在它1500余年历史中，无数人对它做过解释和评论，“……在每个时代，教义都是由关于复杂经文之内涵的学术共识决定的。” Hasan 引用剑桥穆斯林学院院长Timothy Winter如此说到。这种主张如果插到塔兰托会议的纲领中去，也不会令人觉得格格不入。 The problem faced by the orthodox religious authorities in the Muslim world, however, is very similar to that which confronted the Catholic Church in the 16th century: escaped genies are tricky things to get back into bottles. The same impulse that prompted Luther to affirm the primacy of scripture over Catholic doctrine has also long been at work in Islam. 然而，正统穆斯林权威现在面对的问题与16世纪困扰天主教会的问题很相似：逃脱的精灵很难回到瓶子里。促使路德把经文置于天主教信条之上的念头在伊斯兰教中也是由来已久。 As far back as the 13th century, a scholar based in Damascus by the name of Ibn Taymiyya proposed that the surest way to know God’s purpose was to study the practices of the first three generations of Muslims: the “forebears”, or “Salafs”. Reports of what Muhammad and his earliest followers had done, so he argued, should always trump subsequent tradition. Like Luther, Ibn Taymiyya was condemned as a heretic; but he also, again like Luther, blazed a momentous trail. 早在13世纪，大马士革一位名叫Ibn Taymiyya的学者就认为，领悟真主意图最稳妥的方法就是研习最早三代穆斯林（“先贤”，或称“萨拉菲”）的事迹。他宣称，关于穆罕默德及其最早期追随者所作所为的记载，永远比后来形成的传统更为权威。正如路德一样，Ibn Taymiyya也曾被斥为异端；但是，还是跟路德一样，他同样开辟了一条重要道路。 Salafism today is probably the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world. The interpretation that Isis applies to Muslim scripture may be exceptional for its savagery – but not for its literalism. Islamic State, in its conceit that it has trampled down the weeds and briars of tradition and penetrated to the truth of God’s dictates, is recognisably Salafist. 萨拉菲主义可能是当今世界扩散最迅速的伊斯兰教运动。伊斯兰国对伊斯兰经文的解释，在其野蛮性上或许颇为罕见，但是在字面主义上却绝对正宗。伊斯兰国幻想自己消灭了宗教传统中的毒草，洞悉上帝的旨意，这很明显是萨拉菲主义的特质。 When Islamic State fighters smash the statues of pagan gods, they are following the example of the Prophet; when they proclaim themselves the shock troops of a would-be global empire, they are following the example of the warriors of the original caliphate; when they execute enemy combatants, and impose discriminatory taxes on Christians, and take the women of defeated opponents as slaves, they are doing nothing that the first Muslims did not glory in. 当伊斯兰国战士毁坏异教神祗的雕像时，他们效仿的是先知的先例；当他们宣称自己是未来统治世界的帝国的骁勇之师时，他们效仿的是最早的哈里发国的军队。当他们处决敌军战士，对基督徒征收歧视性的税目，以及把被打败对手的女人当作奴隶时，没有一件不是初代穆斯林引以为豪的。 Such behaviour is certainly not synonymous with Islam; but if not Islamic, then it is hard to know what else it is. 这种行为与伊斯兰教肯定不是百分之百相符的；但要是说这种行为不是伊斯兰的，那就很难说它到底是什么了。 Admittedly the actions of those signed up to Islamic State are unlikely to have been inspired exclusively by religious teachings. Many of those fighting for Isis may indeed, as Hasan points out, be varnishing their taste for violence or power with a sheen of piety. But the same was true of those inspired by Luther’s teachings – not to mention the early Muslims themselves. 诚然，伊斯兰国的这些行为不可能仅仅由宗教教义驱动。Hasan指出，isis的许多斗士，可能仅仅是将他们对权力和暴力的欲望粉饰为了对神的虔诚。但是，被路德的教导所鼓舞的人也是如此呀——更不要提那些早期的穆斯林们了。 Back in the time of the Salafs, avarice and religiosity frequently coincided. When a slave revolt erupted in Syria and Iraq less than 50 years after the death of Muhammad, the Arab conquerors were outraged. “These slaves are our booty,” one of them exclaimed. “They were granted us by God!” 在萨拉菲们的时代，虔诚与贪婪往往同时发生。穆罕默德去世不到50年，叙利亚和伊拉克爆发了奴隶起义，阿拉伯征服者们大发雷霆，其中一人宣称“这些奴隶是我们的战利品，他们是真主赐予我们的！” Jihadis in Raqqa have tweeted in similar tones about uppity Yazidi slaves. To imagine that religious motivation can somehow be isolated from the complex swirl of ambitions, fears and desires that constitute human nature is to fall for an illusion: that religions, contingent as they are, and as subject to evolution as any other manifestation of culture, exist as abstract ideals. 在推特上，拉卡的圣战者对不易控制的雅兹迪奴隶也有相同的论调。如果我们假想宗教驱动力可以从构成人类本性的野心、恐惧、欲望所组成的复杂漩涡中独立出来，我们就会陷入一种幻觉：宗教飘忽不定，并且如同其他文化表现形式一样总在持续演变，只是作为抽象理念而存在。 The truth is that in Islam today, as in Christianity during the Reformation, the spectrum of those who practise the faith is widening to convulsive effect. Hasan’s dismissal of two Isis recruits from Birmingham as “religious novices” echoes the horror of Catholic scholars such as Thomas More at the pretensions of Protestant tailors and tinkers. 真相是，今日的伊斯兰教就如同宗教改革期间的基督教一样，信徒们的思想差异极大，造成了令人震惊的后果。Hasan对Isis从伯明翰招募的两名成员不屑一顾，称之为“宗教菜鸟”，这种反感与Thomas More等天主教学者面对新教裁缝和修补匠的主张时的感觉一样。 Just as in the early 16th century the printing press and the efforts of translators such as Luther and Tyndale served to democratise knowledge of the Bible, so in the 21st century has the ready availability on the internet of the Quran and the hadiths in the vernacular enabled rappers, security guards and schoolgirls all to bandy scripture. 正如16世纪时出版印刷业以及路德和廷代尔等翻译者曾对《圣经》知识平民化作出过贡献一样，在21世纪，网络上译成本地语言的《古兰经》及《穆罕默德言行录》唾手可得，这也使得说唱艺人、保安和女学生们都能把经文挂在嘴边。 To complain that quranic verses which mandate crucifixion or beheading are being cited without reference to the traditions of Islamic jurisprudence is to miss the point. It is precisely because Isis militants imagine themselves the equivalent of Muhammad’s companions, blessed with an unadorned understanding of God’s commands, that they feel qualified to establish a caliphate. 指责他们不参考伊斯兰教法传统就直接引用那些鼓励刑罚和砍头的《古兰经》经文，这种批评没有抓住要点。正是因为Isis战士认为他们自己等同于穆罕默德的同伴，被赐予了对真主旨意的准确理解，他们才认为自己有资格建立哈里发国。 “My people,” so Muhammad is once said to have warned, “are destined to split into 73 factions – all of which, except one, will end up in hell.” Who, then, Muslims have often wondered, will gain paradise? Isis, like so many of the various other sects that have emerged in the course of Islamic history, appears confident of the answer. 据说穆罕默德曾经警告过：“我的人民注定要分裂成73个派别，除了一个，其他的都要下地狱。”穆斯林们一直在疑惑：究竟是谁会上天堂？正如历史上涌现出的其他伊斯兰教派别一样，Isis对这个问题的答案似乎很自信。 It is not merely coincidence that IS currently boasts a caliph, imposes quranically mandated taxes, topples idols, chops the hands off thieves, stones adulterers, executes homosexuals and carries a flag that bears the Muslim declaration of faith. If Islamic State is indeed to be categorised as a phenomenon distinct from Islam, it urgently needs a manifest and impermeable firewall raised between them. At the moment, though, I fail to see it. 现在，IS夸口自居为哈里发，征收《古兰经》要求的税目、推倒偶像、砍掉盗贼的手、把通奸者石刑处死、处死同性恋者，并且采用穆斯林的见证言作为旗帜，所有这些都并非巧合。如果伊斯兰国一定要被定义成与伊斯兰教毫无关系的现象，那么两者之间就需要树立一堵明白无误、密不透风的防火墙。现在，我还没有看到这堵墙。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Republicans prefer politicians with deep voices 共和党选民更青睐声音低沉的政治家 作者：Aarhus University @ 2015-11-24 译者：Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：EurekAlert，http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2015-11/au-rpp112415.php A deep voice and a square jaw are important assets for conservative politicians. For politicians on the liberal side, it's more important to have gentle features. That's the conclusion of two recent scientific articles from Aarhus University. The implication is not only that physical features have a larger impact on voter preferences than previously thought but also that different physical features appeal to different voter segments. 拥有低沉嗓音和方形下巴对于保守派政客而言是非常重要的资产。而对于自由派政客，拥有相对柔和的特性则更为重要。这是最近两篇出自奥尔胡斯大学的科学论文所得出的结论，这两篇文章不仅表明身体特征对选民倾向的影响比以前所认为的要更大，而且指出不同的身体特征会吸引不同的选民群体。 The results run counter to the ideal that voters in democratic societies make their decisions after carefully weighing the pros and cons of the political programs put forward by the various parties, according to Lasse Laustsen and Michael Bang Petersen from the university's Department of Political Science, who carried out the research. 这项研究是由奥尔胡斯大学政治科学系的Lasse Laustsen和Michael Bang Petersen做的，研究所得出的结果与那种认为民主社会选民会在仔细权衡各政党所推行的政治纲领的利弊之后再做出选择的设想恰好背道而驰。 "A deep tone of voice appeals to conservative voters. More generally, conservative voters seem to have a preference for politicians who look physically strong and masculine, while liberal voters prefer those who have less dominant features and seem more accommodating, perhaps even slightly feminine," said Laustsen. Laustsen指出：“低沉的嗓音会吸引保守派选民。更一般的来说，保守派选民似乎倾向于外表看上去更强壮，更阳刚的政客，而自由派选民则更喜欢不那么强势而且更随和，甚至可能有点轻微女性化的政客。” The new studies form an example of how political scientists can achieve a deeper understanding of political behavior by using a broader variety of research tools. The approach is increasingly adopted by political scientists all over the world, including John Hibbing, a professor of political science at University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 这一使用多种研究工具的新研究为政治学家树立了深入理解政治行为的典范。全世界的政治学家正在逐步采用这种研究方式，内布拉斯加－林肯大学政治学教授John Hibbing就是其中之一。 "It's a fairly limited niche, but it's growing. What Laustsen and Petersen do is both exciting and important. Some people may be uncomfortable knowing that our preferences are determined by forces that we don't entirely understand. But of course, as scientists we still have to deal with it," said Hibbing, who didn't take part in the Laustsen and Petersen's research. “这是个相当有限的细分领域，但是在不断发展壮大。Laustsen和Petersen的工作既令人兴奋又非常重要。我们的（政治）倾向被我们没有完全理解的力量所决定，这一点会令许多人感到不舒服。但是我们作为科学家当然还是要应对它。”Hibbing说。Hibbing本人没有参与Laustsen和Petersen的研究。 One of the articles is based on data from US politics and demonstrates that Republican voters are more likely than voters from the Democratic camp to vote for politicians with deep voices. To understand why this is, you have to dig a little deeper, according to Laustsen. Republican voters prefer strong politicians - or politicians whose deep voices make them sound like they are strong - because they believe the world is a more dangerous and menacing place than Democratic voters, he said. 其中一篇论文基于美国政治的数据，证明了共和党选民较之民主党阵营选民更倾向于选择嗓音低沉的政客。在Laustsen看来，要理解其中原因，需要进一步挖掘这项事实。他认为共和党选民倾向于身体强壮的政客，或者嗓音低沉的政客——嗓音低沉使得他们听起来比较强壮——是因为共和党选民相信真实世界要比民主党选民所认为的更加险恶。 "If you hold up images of objects that people consider dangerous or unpleasant, for example of large spiders, and then measure the production of sweat from people's fingertips (skin conductance response), you get an indication of spontaneous physical reaction. In these cases, conservative voters react more strongly than liberal ones. This could indicate a large visceral difference in the way these voter groups perceive the world," Laustsen said. Laustsen说：“如果你举起人们觉得危险或者令人不适的物体图片，比如说巨型蜘蛛，然后测试观察者指尖的出汗量（皮电反应），你会看到身体自发的应激反应。在这类试验中，保守派选民比自由派选民的反应更为激烈。这可能表明这些选民群体在认知世界的层面上有着很大的本能上的差别。” Laustsen and Petersen's research proceeds from the observations that in order to understand the behavior of modern humans, you need to look into the evolutionary history that has shaped the psychology producing this behavior. 为了理解现代人类的行为，必须从产生行为的心理着手，而人类的进化史塑造了自身的心理。基于这样的看法，Laustsen和Petersen的研究就由此入手。 In prehistoric times when the ancestors of modern humans were roaming the East-African savannah in small groups, it made sense to support the strongest members of the tribe when confronted with danger. Psychological mechanisms which 30,000 years ago saved our ancestors from being devoured by saber-toothed tigers and other fierce animals continue to be at work today, explaining, among other things, why people vote as they do along the left-right continuum. 史前时代，现代人类的祖先组成许多小群体漫游在东非稀树大草原上。这样，在遇上危险时支持群体里的最强壮者就显得尤为重要。三万年前的心理机制保护了我们的祖先不被剑齿虎和许多其他猛兽吞噬殆尽，而同样的心理机制至今仍在发挥作用。这就能解释许多事情，包括为什么人类在投票时（所表现出的政治倾向）会沿从左到右的光谱排列。 "There are evolutionarily important reasons for the structure of our psychology. Our ancestors had to make a decision about which leader to follow, and it was crucial for their survival and reproduction that they picked the right one. As a species we are pre-programmed to think in a certain way about who we would like to be in charge. This affects choices that we make even today," said Petersen. “我们的心理结构是具有进化意义上的重大缘由的。我们祖先必须就领袖人选作出抉择，选择正确的人选对于他们的生存和繁衍极其重要。作为一个物种，我们被预先设定好以某种特定方式来考虑谁才是我们中意的领导者。这甚至一直在影响今天我们所作出的决定。”Petersen说。 Is this knowledge useful for the politicians? For example, would it be helpful for conservative politicians to tone down their dominant, masculine personality traits in hopes of snatching voters further to the left who tend to find less dominant features more attractive? 这项知识对政客有用吗？举例来说，保守派政客是否可以通过软化他们的强势个性特征来吸引更加左翼、更加青睐没有太多强势特征的人选的选民？ "Democrats are often seen as empathic, compassionate types. Republicans, by contrast, are often considered as strong leaders with a moral compass. This kind of subjective views may have real importance in cases where a Republican candidate is seen as more empathic than his Democratic opponent and trespasses into his territory. Perhaps he can gain some votes there," he said. Petersen指出：“民主党人往往被视为富于同情怜悯的类型。与之相对，共和党人往往被认为是具有道德模范特性的强大领袖。这样的主观印象也许会在某些场合发挥重大作用，比如在一个共和党候选人比他的民主党对手显得更具有同情心，侵入了后者的基本盘的情况下，这位共和党候选人将会挣来一些（偏左翼的）选票。” Can the voters use these new insights for anything? It's always better to be aware of what causes you to have the preferences you have. But the roots of our likes and dislikes are buried so deep in the subconscious that the two authors doubt there is very much to do about them. 选民们能通过这些新洞见干些什么呢？了解到你的倾向由何而来当然是很不错的。但是我们喜恶的根源是如此深埋在潜意识中，以至于两位作者不觉得我们能在此有什么作为。 "We can't necessarily do very much to control this. Some American research indicates that participants in lab tests are able to determine which of two unknown candidates they like more after having been exposed to images of them for less than 0.1 second. This suggests that these processes are really fast and subconscious. So I think it's hard to rein in," Laustsen said. Laustsen说“我们不一定能够控制这个。一些来自美国的研究指出，实验室测试的参与者们会在看到两位陌生候选人图片的0.1秒之内决定出他们的偏好。这显示了做出选择的过程非常快速，且深深扎根于潜意识中。所以我认为很难去驾驭这一过程。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Mali was attacked 马里缘何被袭击 作者：Ian Birrell @ 2015-11-20 译者：黑色枪骑兵（@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Capx，http://www.capx.co/166181-2/ So here we go again. First the tragic slaughter of innocents in Paris, followed by that tense, bloodstained hunt for the murderers. Now 170 largely-foreign hostages have been seized by gunmen in an upmarket hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako. 一而再、再而三。首先是无辜巴黎人民遭受悲惨屠杀，然后是紧张而又血腥的追凶。现在，170名主要为外国人的人质，又被武装分子扣押在马里首都巴马科的一所高档酒店里。 The 140 guests being held reportedly include people from France, China and Turkey, along with 30 hotel staff; at least we can give thanks that members of Western air crews along with many others escaped amid the chaos of the assault. There are reports of deaths, while special forces are moving in. 据报道，与30名酒店工作人员一同被扣押的140名房客来自法国、中国和土耳其。值得庆幸的是，“西部航空”的职员以及其他一些人借着袭击时的混乱而得以逃脱。报道称，特种部队进入时，有死亡消息传出。 There are strong chances, sadly, that this is instant blowback from the shocking events in France. The rather soulless Radisson Blu hotel is a well-known landmark in the dusty Malian capital; a British journalist who interviewed one of the country’s famous musical bands told me he stayed there just weeks ago. The capital felt secure when I was last there a couple of years ago, yet sadly it is no surprise to see that the jihadists have struck back in this beautiful yet battered nation. 令人沮丧的是，这次事件很可能是之前震惊世人的巴黎事件的即时反弹。那座没有灵魂的丽笙酒店是灰蒙蒙的马里首都的知名地标建筑，一个曾经采访过该国最著名乐队的英国记者告诉我，仅在两周前他还住在那里。几年前我在那里时，这座都城还能让人感到安全，但是令人伤感的是，伊斯兰圣战者杀回这个美丽而又饱受折磨的国度并不让人感到意外。 For two decades Mali was seen as a model democracy, with many analysts ignoring its corrosion through corruption and drug trafficking across the desert. Then it collapsed three years ago following an almost-accidental coup led by a disgruntled army captain, which was seized immediately by Toureg rebels seeking independence in the north. 二十年来，许多分析人士忽略腐败和穿越沙漠的贩毒活动对马里的侵蚀，一直视其为民主政治的模范。三年前，在一场由一位心怀不满的陆军上尉发动的近乎偶然的政变中，这个国家倒下了，之后她迅速被一直寻求北部独立的图阿雷格反抗军掌握。 They were well-armed after returning from fighting for their long-term supporter Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and one key figure had fallen under the spell of Islamic radicals; soon, moderates were forced aside and the huge desert areas fell under the control of fundamentalists. 他们曾为其长期支持者——利比亚的穆哈迈尔·卡扎菲——作战，归来之后就变得武装精良。而且他们的一位核心人物已经中了伊斯兰激进分子的魔咒。很快，温和派被迫让位，这片广阔的沙漠地区落入原教旨主义者之手。 Islamist groups allied to al Qa’ida had grown rich exploiting traditional Saharan smuggling routes as cocaine began to carve its way through west Africa en route to Europe, then boosted their income by kidnapping tourists visiting cities such as the wondrous Timbuktu. Having captured the region, foreign fighters poured in to create a caliphate in the desert. 与基地组织关系密切的各种伊斯兰组织，先是抓住可卡因开始经西非由空运输往欧洲的机会，利用传统的撒哈拉走私线路大发横财，之后又通过绑架古城（例如神奇的廷巴克图城）的游客来增收。在控制这个地区之后，来自其他国家的伊斯兰武装分子涌入当地，在沙漠中建立了一个哈里发国。 Yet it is important to note their imposition of hardline sharia law – with women forced to cover up, tombs destroyed, adulterers stoned and thieves having hands cut off – was alien to both Tuareg tradition and the sufistic Islam of the south. The banning of music in a nation famous worldwide for so many of its astonishing artists was especially shocking. 值得注意的是，他们强制推行的强硬伊斯兰教法——强迫妇女裹紧全身，毁坏墓穴，对通奸者施以石刑，砍掉偷窃者的手——既非图阿雷格传统，也和南部苏菲派伊斯兰格格不入。在一个因杰出艺术家层出不穷而蜚声国际的民族中禁止音乐，这种做法尤为令人震惊。 So there was immense popular support when a 4,000-strong French force invaded in support of the inept and poorly-equipped Malian army two years ago. They took rapid action when it looked like the bustling trading port of Mopti with its population of 120,000 people was about to fall to the militants. 因此，两年前一支4000人的法国部队进入马里，支援作战力弱、装备差的马里部队时，受到了热烈的欢迎和支持。当莫普提这一繁华的贸易港口和当地12万人口即将落入武装分子之手时，他们采取了快速行动。 Yet while they drove away Islamist militias and re-imposed a veneer of democracy, the fissures in this alluring country remained close to the surface. The new president has done little to restore faith in politics, while tensions remain between Tuaregs and southerners. 然而，尽管他们把伊斯兰武装分子驱逐了出去，并再次扶持建立起名义上的民主，但这个美丽国度的裂痕依旧呼之欲出。新总统没能重建民众对政治的信任，图阿雷格人和南部人民之间的紧张关系依旧持续。 In Mali, as elsewhere in parts of Africa, Muslim fanatics tapped into faultlines created through corruption, discrimination and poverty. And as we see again today, the jihadists may have been defeated but never disappeared. It was easy for them to melt back into the desert, surfacing again and again to strike back at their enemies. 就像非洲的其他地方一样，马里的穆斯林狂热分子利用了腐败、歧视和贫穷所造成的社会裂痕。正如我们今天再次看到的一样，圣战分子可以被打败，但是绝不会消失。对于他们来说，藏身沙漠，然后再次出来回击他们的敌人相当轻松。 United Nations blue helmets have been attacked so often it was seen as the most dangerous of their missions around the world, with 53 peacekeepers killed. There have also been deadly attacks on hotels and restaurants popular with foreigners, even in Bamako. 联合国维和部队多次被袭，53名维和人员丧生，使得驻防此地被看作全世界最危险的。即使在巴马科，针对外国人经常光顾的酒店和餐馆的致命袭击也时有发生。 These depressing events in Bamako prove two things. First, there are huge hurdles ahead in the fight to restore stability in the Sahel, many of which policymakers blinkered by the past have barely begun to understand. And second, that the worldwide war with Islamic militants has few boundaries. This is perhaps the most terrifying aspect of the latest attack. 在巴马科发的这些令人沮丧的事件证明了两件事：第一，想要重建萨赫勒地区的稳定局势的话，还有很多巨大的障碍亟待破除，然而许多眼光局限于过去的决策者尚未意识到这个问题；第二，伊斯兰激进分子在世界范围内发起的战争没有边界。这可能是最近这次袭击最令人恐惧的地方。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The benefits of carbon dioxide 二氧化碳的益处 作者：Matt Ridley @ 2015-10-20 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：淡蓝 来源：作者个人博客，http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/the-benefits-of-carbon-dioxide/ Global greening may save more lives and forests than warming costs 比起变暖之害，全球绿化有可能拯救更多生命和森林。 My Times Column on the surprisingly large benefits of carbon dioxide emissions: 我在的《泰晤士报》上的专栏分析了二氧化碳排放所带来的令人震惊的巨大好处： France’s leading television weather forecaster, Philippe Verdier, was taken off air last week for writing that there are “positive consequences” of climate change. Freeman Dyson, professor emeritus of mathematical physics and astrophysics at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, declared last week that the non-climatic effects of carbon dioxide are “enormously beneficial”. Patrick Moore, a founder of Greenpeace, said in a lecture last week that we should “celebrate carbon dioxide”. Philippe Verdier，法国电视天气预报员中的佼佼者，因写到气候变化具有“积极效应”而于上周被调离播报岗位。Freeman Dyson，普林斯顿大学高等研究院数学物理学和天体物理学荣休教授，上周称，二氧化碳的非气候影响“极为有益”。Patrick Moore，绿色和平组织创始人之一，在上周的一次讲座中说，我们应该“为二氧化碳而欢庆”。 Are these three prominent but very different people right? Should we at least consider seriously, before we go into a massive international negotiation based on the assumption that carbon dioxide is bad, whether we might be mistaken? Most politicians today consider such a view to be so beyond the pale as to be mad or possibly criminal. 这三位杰出而各不相同的人物说的对吗？基于二氧化碳有害的假设而展开大规模国际谈判之前，我们至少应该严肃地思考一下，有没有可能我们是错的？今天，大多数政客都将这视作无比出格、近乎疯狂，甚或是有罪的观点。 Yet the benefits of carbon dioxide emissions are not even controversial in scientific circles. As Richard Betts of the Met Office tweeted last week, the “CO2 fertilisation effect” — the fact that rising emissions are making plants grow better — is not news and is discussed in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 然而，在科学圈里，二氧化碳排放的好处连“颇可争议”都谈不上。正如英国气象局的Richard Betts上周的一条推文所说的那样，“CO2的施肥效应”——即逐渐增加的排放量使得植物生长得更好——并不是新闻，而且曾在政府间气候变化专门委员会的报告中得到讨论。 The satellite data show that there has been roughly a 14 per cent increase in the amount of green vegetation on the planet since 1982, that this has happened in all ecosystems, but especially in arid tropical areas, and that it is in large part due to man-made carbon dioxide emissions. 卫星数据显示，自1982年以来，地球上的绿色植被总量大约增长了14%。这种增长出现于所有生态系统中，但在干旱的热带地区最明显。并且，大部分增长主要源于人为的二氧化碳排放。 Last week also saw the publication of a comprehensive report on “Carbon Dioxide — the Good News” for the Global Warming Policy Foundation by the independent American scientist Indur Goklany, to which Freeman Dyson wrote the foreword. The report was thoroughly peer-reviewed, as was almost all of the voluminous literature it cited. (Full disclosure: I helped edit the report.) 上周，更有一份关于“二氧化碳——大好消息”的很全面的报告出炉，这是由美国独立科学家Indur Goklany向全球变暖政策基金会（GWPF）提供的，并由Freeman Dyson作序。该报告经过了充分的同行评议，报告所引用的巨量文献也几乎全都如此。（大曝光：我参与编辑了该报告。） 11 Goklany points out that whereas the benefits of carbon dioxide are huge and here now, the harms are still speculative and almost all in the distant future. There has so far been — as the IPCC confirms — no measurable increase in droughts, floods or storms worldwide, no reversal in the continuing rapid decline in deaths due to insect-borne diseases, and no measurable impacts of the continuing very slow rise in global sea levels. Goklany指出，二氧化碳的好处不但巨大，而且就在眼前，其害处则仍是推测性的，且几乎全部都只会出现于遥远的未来。迄今为止——如政府间气候变化专门委员所确认的——世界范围内的干旱、洪涝或暴雨并未出现可衡量的增加，虫媒传染病致死病例持续快速减少的现象并未逆转，全球海平面极为缓慢的持续上升也并没有产生可衡量的影响。 In stark terms, Bangladesh is still gaining land from sedimentation in its rivers’ deltas, has suffered no increase in cyclones, but has benefited from reduced malnourishment to the tune of billions of dollars from higher crop yields as a result of carbon dioxide emissions. 粗暴点说，孟加拉国现在仍然不断从其河流三角洲的沉积中获得土地，并未因大气气旋增加而备受折磨，却得益于因价值数十亿美元的粮食增收所带来的营养不良减少，而这正是二氧化碳排放的结果。

[This is the summary from Goklany's report: [以下为Goklany报告的总结： 1. This paper addresses the question of whether, and how much, increased carbon dioxide concentrations have benefited the biosphere and humanity by stimulating plant growth, warming the planet and increasing rainfall. 1. 本论文讨论了升高的二氧化碳浓度 是否以及多大程度上，以刺激植物生长、暖化地球、增加雨量的方式，使生物圈和人类受益。 2. Empirical data confirms that the biosphere’s productivity has increased by about 14% since 1982, in large part as a result of rising carbon dioxide levels. 2. 经验数据确认，生物圈的生产率自1982年以来已增加了大约14%，大部分是二氧化碳水平持续上升的结果。 3. Thousands of scientific experiments indicate that increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the air have contributed to increases in crop yields. 3. 数千项科学实验表明，提升大气中二氧化碳浓度，促进了农作物收成增加。 4. These increases in yield are very likely to have reduced the appropriation of land for farming by 11–17% compared with what it would otherwise be, resulting in more land being left wild. 4. 上述收成的增加非常有可能使得用于耕作的土地数量相对于产量未增长时数量减少了11-17%，导致有更多土地被抛荒。 5. Satellite evidence confirms that increasing carbon dioxide concentrations have also resulted in greater productivity of wild terrestrial ecosystems in all vegetation types. 5. 卫星证据确认，持续提升二氧化碳的浓度也在所有植被类型的野生陆地生态系统中导致了生产率提高。 6. Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations have also increased the productivity of many marine ecosystems. 6. 持续提升的二氧化碳浓度也增加了许多海洋生态系统的生产率。 7. In recent decades, trends in climate-sensitive indicators of human and environ- mental wellbeing have improved and continue to do so despite claims that they would deteriorate because of global warming. 7. 最近数十年，人类和环境健康方面的气候敏感指数的变化趋势已经且持续改善，尽管有人宣称它们将会因全球变暖而出现恶化。 8. Compared with the benefits from carbon dioxide on crop and biosphere productivity, the adverse impacts of carbon dioxide – on the frequency and intensity of extreme weather, on sea level, vector-borne disease prevalence and human health – have been too small to measure or have been swamped by other factors. 8. 与它在农作物和生物圈生产率上所带来的好处相比，二氧化碳的负面影响——在极端天气发生的频率和强度上，在海平面高度上，在传染病流行与人类健康上——实在太小以至难以测量，或被其他因素所抵消。 9. Models used to influence policy on climate change have overestimated the rate of warming, underestimated direct benefits of carbon dioxide, overestimated the harms from climate change and underestimated human capacity to adapt so as to capture the benefits while reducing the harms. 9. 用于影响气候变化政策的那些模型高估了变暖的速度，低估了二氧化碳的直接好处，高估了气候变化的害处，低估了人类适应变化从而抓住好处同时减少害处的能力。 10. It is very likely that the impact of rising carbon dioxide concentrations is currently net beneficial for both humanity and the biosphere generally. These benefits are real, whereas the costs of warming are uncertain. Halting the increase in carbon dioxide concentrations abruptly would deprive people and the planet of the benefits of carbon dioxide much sooner than they would reduce any costs of warming.] 10. 极有可能的是，对于人类乃至整个生物圈，二氧化碳浓度持续上升的影响时下大体上是一种净收益。这些好处真实可见，而暖化的代价则并不确定。若二氧化碳浓度上升戛然而止，当然可能减少暖化成本，但与此相比，也会更快地剥夺人类和地球自二氧化碳获得的诸多益处。]

It is worth remembering that commercial greenhouses buy carbon dioxide to enhance the growth of plants, so the growth responses are well known — and it’s not until carbon dioxide reaches five times current concentrations that the benefits level out. As Patrick Moore pointed out, those were normal levels for much of earth’s history. 我们最好记住这样一个事实，商业温室会购买二氧化碳来促进植物生长，所以生长率对二氧化碳的这种反应是众所周知的——并且，也不是只有当二氧化碳浓度到了当前水平的5倍时这种益处才显现出来。如Patrick Moore指出，足以促进生长的浓度，只须地球历史上多数时候的正常水平。 In addition, hundreds of “free-air concentration experiments” have measured how much increased carbon dioxide levels enhance crop yields in open fields. So it is fairly easy to work out how much carbon dioxide emissions are helping world agriculture: by about $140 billion a year, or $3 trillion in total so far. If reparations are to be paid, perhaps farmers should pay coal producers (full disclosure: I’m both). 此外，数百项“自由空气浓度试验”已经对大气二氧化碳水平提高多少会增加开旷地上作物产量进行了测量。所以要回答“二氧化碳排放对世界农业发挥了多大促进作用”这个问题就相当容易了：增产价值约每年1400亿美元，或迄今总计3万亿美元。如果说真要支付赔款，说不定农户还应该向煤炭生产商交钱呢（大曝光：我两种身份都有【编注：作者身为第5代Ridley子爵，拥有Northumberland郡的Blagdon庄园产业，该地产上有农地，也有两座煤矿，Ridley家族从中获取地租。】）。 Actually, this may be an underestimate: experiments show that crops tend to benefit more than weeds (most crops have a more responsive kind of photosynthetic machinery called C3, while weeds mostly have a less responsive kind called C4). 事实上，这还可能是种低估：有实验显示，农作物通常比杂草受益更多（绝大多数农作物都具备一种反应更敏捷的光合作用机制，叫做C3，而杂草的光合作用机制绝大部分是C4，后者反应敏捷度较低）。 Increased carbon dioxide enhances drought resistance in plants, benefiting dry regions such as the Sahel, which has greened significantly in recent decades. And Goklany calculates that we need 11-17 per cent less land for feeding the world than we would if we had not increased carbon dioxide levels: so emissions have saved — and enhanced the growth of — a lot of rainforest. 增加二氧化碳会加强植物的抗旱性，使干旱地区受益，如萨赫勒地区最近数十年已显著变绿。并且据Goklany计算，和二氧化碳水平上升前相比，现在养活全世界所需的土地数量可以少11-17%：也可以说，二氧化碳排放拯救了大量热带雨林——而且也促进了其生长。

[Here's one weed experiment, as described in Goklany's report: [以下为Goklany报告中描述的一项杂草实验： "A Chinese experiment tested this idea by enriching carbon dioxide levels over plots of rice to almost twice the ambient level. This enhanced the ear weight of the rice by 37.6% while reducing the growth of a common weed, barnyard grass, by 47.9%, because the faster-growing rice shaded the weeds. Figure 1 illustrates the differing responses to elevated carbon dioxide concentrations of rice, a C3 plant, and the green foxtail Setaria viridis, a grass some- times proposed as a genetic model system to study C4 photosynthesis."] “一项中国实验检测这个想法，通过在稻田上富集近两倍于周边水平的二氧化碳，将稻穗重量增加了37.6%，同时将稗子（一种普通杂草）的生长抑制了47.9%，因为快速生长的水稻遮挡了杂草。图1显示了不同植物对二氧化碳浓度提高的不同反应，水稻，一种C3植物，另一个则是狗尾草，后者常被当做C4光合作用研究的模式生物。”] [For instance a study published last week found the following: [比如，上周发表的一项研究有如下发现： Since 2012, the researchers have pumped extra CO2 into three of six basketball court-sized rings of 80-year-old bush. This has raised the CO2 concentration in the three plots to about 550 parts per million, up from the ambient level of 400 ppm. Measurements revealed that for each unit of water absorbed, the trees in the CO2-enriched rings reaped 35 per cent more carbon than the trees in the control plots.] 自2012年以来，在六块篮球场大小的、生长着80岁树龄灌木丛的环形地块上，研究者在其中三个地块灌注了超量的CO2，这三个地块的CO2浓度提升到了550ppm，而环境水平为400ppm。测量显示，针对每一吸水单位，富含CO2 的地块的林木所获得的碳量比控制地块要多出35%。]

Well, all right, but surely the climate harms will one day outweigh the growth benefits? Not necessarily. 好吧，就算是这样，但总有一天气候危害肯定会超过生长之利吗？未必。 At the moment, impacts from the modest warming we saw in the 1980s and 1990s are also positive: slightly fewer premature deaths, which peak in cold weather more than in hot weather, slightly longer growing seasons and so on. 目前看来，我们从1980年代和1990年代的最温和的变暖中所看到的影响是正面的：早逝数量稍有减少（早逝通常在天气寒冷时达到峰值，比在炎热时严重），生长季节稍有延长，等等。 A paper published last week concludes that if the world does warm significantly, China’s rain systems will shift north, increasing rainfall in the dry north and reducing flooding in the hot south. 而上周发布的一项报告得出的结论是，如果全球确实大幅变暖，那中国的降雨系统将会北移，北部干旱地区的雨量会持续增加，南方炎热地区的洪涝将持续减少。 Besides, human adaptation means we can capture the benefits and avoid the harms. The IPCC’s forecast warming range includes the possibility that we will still be enjoying net benefits by the end of the century, when the world will (it says) be three to 16 times richer per capita. The fastest way to cut deaths from bad weather today (such as the storm that just battered the Philippines) is to make people richer, not to make weather safer: we have already cut world death rates from droughts, floods and storms by 98 per cent in the past century. 此外，人类的适应能力意味着我们能够抓住好处，同时规避危害。IPCC预测的变暖范围中，便包含了我们在本世纪末仍能享受变暖净收益的可能性，那时全世界人均富裕程度将是目前的3-16倍（报告如是说）。今天，要减少因恶劣天气（如刚刚袭击菲律宾的暴风雨）致死数量的最快方法是让人们变得更加富裕，而不是使天气更安全：过去一个世纪中，我们已将因干旱、洪涝和暴风雨的世界死亡率降低了98%。 As Goklany demonstrates, the assessments used by policy makers have overestimated warming so far, underestimated the direct benefits of carbon dioxide, overestimated the harms from climate change, and underestimated the human capacity to adapt. 如Goklany所论证的，迄今政策制定者所用那些评估高估了变暖，低估了二氧化碳的直接好处，高估了气候变化的危害，低估了人类调整适应的能力。 Well, what about the ocean? Here too there’s good news. More carbon dioxide means faster growth rates of photosynthesisers in the sea as well as on land, an effect that is being observed in algae, eelgrasses, corals and especially plankton, such as the abundant creatures known as coccolithophores, whose biomass has increased by 40 per cent in the last two centuries. 好吧，那海洋呢？这里也有好消息。更多的二氧化碳，意味着海中能进行光合作用的生物生长速度也会更快，和陆上的一样，这一效应已在海藻、鳗草、珊瑚，特别是浮游生物（比如颗石藻这种数量巨多的生物）身上观察到，颗石藻的生物量过去20个世纪以来已增长了40%。

[This is what the authors said about coccolithophores: [作者们如此提到颗石藻： "Here, we present laboratory evidence that calcification and net primary production in the coccolithophore species Emiliania huxleyi are significantly increased by high CO₂ partial pressures. Field evidence from the deep ocean is consistent with these laboratory conclusions, indicating that over the past 220 years there has been a 40% increase in average coccolith mass. Our findings show that coccolithophores are already responding and will probably continue to respond to rising atmospheric CO₂ partial pressures, which has important implications for biogeochemical modeling of future oceans and climate."] “我们在此展示的实验室证据表明，由于更高的CO2分压，使得颗石藻物种的郝氏颗石藻的钙化和净初级生产量显著增加。采自深海的野外探查证据也与这种实验室结论一致，它们指明过去220年间，颗石藻种群的重量平均有40%的增长。我们的发现表明，颗石藻已经并且可能继续对持续上升的大气中CO2分压做出反应，这对未来的海洋和气候的生物地球化学建模具有重要含义。”]

That’s not to say coral reefs and fisheries are not in trouble — they are, but because of pollution, overfishing and run-off, not carbon dioxide. The tiny reduction in alkalinity (misleadingly termed “acidification”) caused by dissolved carbon dioxide is potentially negative in the distant future, but has been much exaggerated — as a big review of 372 studies has concluded. One recent experiment with a common Caribbean coral found that rising carbon dioxide levels would have no impact on its ability to build reefs for several centuries, while modest warming would actually help it slightly. 这并不是说珊瑚礁和渔场现在没有麻烦——它们有，但那是因为污染、滥捕和径流，而非二氧化碳。由二氧化碳分解所导致的碱度微量减少（“酸化”这个术语是误导性的）在遥远的未来是潜在负面的，但这也被极度夸大了——正如一份基于372项研究的大型综述所显示。近期针对一种普通的加勒比珊瑚所做的一项实验发现，提高二氧化碳含量对其在数世纪内形成珊瑚礁的能力没有影响，而且温和变暖实际上还对之稍有帮助。

[This is what that meta-analysis concluded from a comprehensive survey of all studies: [以下是在对所有的研究综述进行统合分析后得出的结论： "In summary, our analysis shows that marine biota is more resistant to ocean acidification than suggested by pessimistic predictions identifying ocean acidification as a major threat to marine biodiversity (Kleypas et al., 1999; Orr et al., 2005; Raven, 2005; Sponberg, 2007; Zondervan et al., 2001), which may not be the widespread problem conjured into the 21st century. Ocean acidification will enhance growth of marine autotrophs and reduce fertility and metabolic rates, but effects are likely to be minor along the range of pCO2 predicted for the 21st century, and feedbacks between positive responses of autotrophs and pH may further buffer the impacts."] “总之，我们的分析显示，与悲观预测将海洋酸化认定为对海洋生物多样性的一种主要威胁相比，海洋生物群更耐酸化。这种威胁不可能是21世纪的一个普遍问题。海洋酸化将加强海洋自养生物的生长，减少生育及代谢率，然而按照对21世纪的pCO2变动范围的预测，其效应很可能是轻微的，并且自养生物的积极响应与ph值之间的反馈机制可能进一步缓冲这种影响。”]

With tens of thousands of activists and bureaucrats heading for a UN conference in Paris next month, there is such vast vested interest now in demonising carbon dioxide that it will be hard to change the world’s mind. Freeman Dyson laments that “scientific colleagues who believe the prevailing dogma about carbon dioxide will not find Goklany’s evidence convincing”, but hopes that a few will try. Amen. 下月，有数万名活动人士和政府官员将奔赴巴黎的一个联合国会议，当下对二氧化碳的妖魔化背后有着大量的既得利益，很难改变世人的想法。Freeman Dyson叹惜“在二氧化碳问题上相信主流教条的科学界同行们将不会觉得Goklany的证据有说服力”，但希望仍有一些人会去尝试。阿门。

[Dyson went on: [Dyson接着说： "That is to me the central mystery of climate science. It is not a scientific mystery but a human mystery. How does it happen that a whole generation of scientific experts is blind to obvious facts? “对我来说，那就是气候科学的核心谜团。它不是个科学的谜团，而是人类的谜团。究竟是什么导致整整一代科学专家看不到明显的事实？ ...Indur Goklany has assembled a massive collection of evidence to demonstrate two facts. First, the non-climatic effects of carbon dioxide are dominant over the climatic effects and are overwhelmingly beneficial. Second, the climatic effects observed in the real world are much less damaging than the effects predicted by the climate models, and have also been frequently beneficial. ……Indur Goklany汇编了巨量证据来证明两个事实。第一，相比其气候效应，二氧化碳的非气候效应要突出得多，而且益处是压倒性的。第二，真实世界中观察到的气候效应，其破坏性大大低于气候模型的预测，而且经常是有利的。 I am hoping that the scientists and politicians who have been blindly demonizing carbon dioxide for 37 years will one day open their eyes and look at the evidence. 我一直希望，那些37年来盲目妖魔化二氧化碳的科学家和政治家们有一天能够睁开他们的眼睛，看看证据。 Goklany and I do not claim to be infallible. Like the climate-model experts, we have also evolved recently from the culture of the cave-children. Like them, we have inherited our own set of prejudices and blindnesses. Truth emerges when different groups of explorers listen to each other’s stories and correct each other’s mistakes."] Goklany和我并不自认绝对正确。跟那些气候模型专家们一样，我们也刚刚从洞穴儿童文化中进化出来。和他们一样，我们也继承了自己那套偏见和盲目。当不同的探索者群体相互倾听彼此的故事，相互纠正彼此的错误时，真相才会浮现。”]

Post-script: 附： This column produced a lot of commentary. In response to one especially misleading article in the Guardian, Indur Goklany made the following point: 本专栏引发了大量评论。在回应《卫报》上一篇具有相当误导性的文章时，Indur Goklany如此说道：

Your correspondent, Mr. Nuccitelli, hasn’t read with sufficient care the GWPF report he is criticizing. Had he done so, he would have known better than to present the figure from the IPCC of estimated crop yields through the year 2109, or repeat Dr. Betts' claim that studies on crops include CO2 effects, without noting that the vast majority of crop studies did not, in fact, consider CO2 effects. Specifically, the GWPF report (at page 29) notes: 你们的记者，Nuccitelli先生，并未充分仔细地阅读他所批评的GWPF报告。假如他仔细阅读了，他会明白更多而不仅仅是拿出IPCC对截止2109年的作物产量的估测数字，或只是重复Dr. Betts关于作物研究包含CO2效应的声明，而不去注意到事实上绝大部分作物研究并未考虑CO2效应。具体来说，GWPF报告（第29页）提到： The IPCC AR5 synthesis of modelled estimates of the impact of recent climate trends on yields for major staple crops notes, in a remarkable understatement, that ‘[s]ome included effects of positive carbon dioxide trends...but most did not’ (Ref. 175). In fact, only 2 of 56 studies considered carbon dioxide increases (Ref. 176). For this reason alone the IPCC’s claim that the impacts of global warming to date on agricultural productivity and food security are likely negative is suspect. IPCC第五次评估报告在综述有关最近气候趋势对主要作物产量之影响的模型估测时，以令人吃惊的轻描淡写口气提出，“其中有些考虑到了二氧化碳增加的影响……但多数则没有”（引用175）。事实上，56项研究中只有2项考虑了二氧化碳的增加（引用176）。仅此一点，IPCC关于迄今为止的全球变暖对农业生产率和食物安全的影响趋于负面的断言，便是很可疑的。 References 175 and 176 (within the quote) both refer to the IPCC AR5 WGII’s chapter 7 (on Food Security and Food Production Systems), page 492, Figure 7–2. Ref. 176 also notes that “Remarkably, according to Figure 7–2, the studies that considered carbon dioxide suggest that the carbon dioxide effect reduces yields.” To put that into plain English, these studies, or their interpretations, are not credible. 引用175和引用176（在引文以内）提及的都是IPCC第五次评估报告第二工作组部分第7章（“食品安全与食品生产体制”），第492页，图7-2。引用176还提到，“值得注意的是，根据图7—2，考虑了二氧化碳的那些研究提出，二氧化碳效应会减少产量。”直白地说，这些研究，或是他们的解释，都无法令人信服。 Note that the figure on future crop yields presented in Mr. Nutticelli’s article draws from Figure 7-2 referred to in the foregoing. 注意，Nutticelli先生的文章中展示的关于未来作物产量数据，就来自刚刚提到的图7-2。 The GWPF report also notes that impact assessments in general and crop studies in particular: GWPF报告还一般的，就影响评估，以及特别的，就农作物研究，指出： 1. Employ scenarios that overstate warming rates by anywhere between 2- to 4-fold. Even the IPCC has noted the tendency of models to exaggerate the rate of warming. See pages 24-25 of the GWPF report, and p. 769, Chapter 9, IPCC AR5 WGI. This matters for two reasons. Firstly, the world is unlikely to be as warm as projected by the IPCC’s scenarios. Secondly, the lower the rate of warming, the lower the magnitude of negative impacts. 1. 运用了夸大变暖速度2-4倍的设想场景。甚至连IPCC也已经注意到各类模型夸大变暖速度的倾向。见GWPF报告第24-25页，第769页，第9章及IPCC第五次评估第一工作组部分。这很重要，原因有二。第一，世界不太可能像IPCC设想场景那样温暖。第二，变暖速度越慢，负面影响的程度越低。 2. Do not fully account for technological change that ought to occur between now and 2109 (the date used in your correspondent’s figure), which would reduce the net negative impacts of climate change while simultaneously making it easier to adapt to them. 2. 没有充分考虑到从今至2109年间（贵刊记者的数据中所用日期）肯定会发生的技术变革 ，而这些技术变革将会在减少气候变化净负面影响的同时，使得适应它们变得更容易。 For all these reasons the IPCC’s estimates of future impacts are prone to large overestimates, and the figure presented by your correspondent is suspect, to put it mildly. 由于以上所有理由，客气点说，IPCC对未来影响的预测倾向于大大高估，而你们的记者所使用的数据则很可疑。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

It’s finally out–The big review paper on the lack of political diversity in social psychology 终于来啦：关于社会心理学缺乏政治多元性的大型综述论文 作者：Jonathan Haidt @ 2015-9-14 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：龟海海 来源：Heterodox Academy，http://heterodoxacademy.org/2015/09/14/bbs-paper-on-lack-of-political-diversity/ Heterodox Academy has its origins in a collaborative effort by five social psychologists and a sociologist to study a problem that has long been noted in psychology: nearly everyone in the field is on the left, politically. We have been working together since 2011 to write a paper explaining how this situation came about, how it reduces the quality of science published in social psychology, and what can be done to improve the science. (Note that none of us self-identifies as conservative.)  In the process we discovered the work of the other scholars in other fields who joined with us to create this site. “异端学院”发端于五位社会心理学家和一位社会学家对心理学领域早被注意到的一个问题的合作研究：该领域中几乎所有人都是政治上的左派。自2011年始，我们就一直在共同写作一篇论文，解释这一现象是如何产生的、它如何降低了社会心理学领域所发表的科学文章的质量，以及为改进这一科学可以做些什么。（注意我们之中没人自认为是保守派）在此过程中，我们发现了其他一些学者在其它领域的研究成果，他们加入了我们的队伍，一起创建了这个网站。 Our paper is finally published this week! A preprint of the manuscript was posted last year, but now we have the final typeset version, plus the 33 commentaries. Here is a link to the PDF of the final manuscript, on the website of Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Thanks to Paul Bloom for his wise and patient editorship.) Here’s a link to a page linking to HTML versions of all the documents. But because our article is long (13 dense pages) and the 33 commentaries are longer (another 31 pages) — and then there’s our response (another 7 pages) — we recognize that few people will ever read the whole package. 我们的论文终于在本周出版啦！我们去年曾贴出原稿的预印本，但现在我们已经有了排版稿，外加33条评论。以下是《行为与脑科学》杂志网站上最终稿的PDF版链接（感谢Paul Bloom明确且细致的编辑工作。）以下则是所有文档的HTML版的网页链接。不过，由于我们的文章很长（密密麻麻13页），那33条评论更长（加31页）——还有我们的回应（再加7页）——我们认为没什么人会读完全部材料。 For all these reasons, we offer here a “CliffsNotes” version, giving the basics of our argument using excerpts copied directly from the paper.  [Occasional comments from me–Jonathan Haidt–are interspersed in brackets] Please also see this post by Lee Jussim, explaining why we think this problem is so serious. In a later post Jarret Crawford summarizes the 33 commentaries on our article. 出于以上理由，我们现在提供一份“克里夫笔记”【导读荟萃】版，通过对论文的直接复制摘录，给出我们的论证要点。[间或在括号中加入了由我（Jonathan Haidt）写的评论]。此外，还请阅读Lee Jussim发布的这个帖子，他解释了我们为何认为这个问题很严重。在之后的一片帖子中，Jarret Crawford总结了33条关于我们文章的评论。 CITATION: Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Political diversity will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 1-13.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000430[and try this link, with no paywall, or this link to the preprint version] 引用：Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). 政治多样性将会改善社会心理科学。《行为和脑科学》, 38, 1-13.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000430[另外，试试这个链接，没有付费墙，或者这个预印本] ABSTRACT 摘要 Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity – particularly diversity of viewpoints – for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. 心理学家已向我们展示，多元性——特别是视角的多元性——对于提高创造力、促进新发现和解决问题的价值。但是，一般而言在学院心理学以及特别而言在社会心理学领域，却缺乏一种关键形式的视角多元性：政治多元性。 This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: (1) Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years. 本文考察了可见的证据，并为下列四个论断提供了支撑：(1)学院心理学过去曾有过相当大的政治多元性，但在过去50年间几乎已将其丧失殆尽。 (2) This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike. (2)这种政治多元性的缺乏，可能破坏社会心理科学的有效性，破坏可能通过这样一些机制发生：将自由派价值观预置于研究问题和方法中，引导研究者避开事关重大但在政治上不受待见的研究课题，并得出对自由派抑或保守派特征的错误描绘。 (3) Increased political diversity would improve social psychological science by reducing the impact of bias mechanisms such as confirmation bias, and by empowering dissenting minorities to improve the quality of the majority’s thinking. (3)增加政治多元性，能够改善社会心理科学，其途径包括降低偏见机制如确认偏误的影响，让持异议的少数派有机会改进多数派的思考质量。 (4) The underrepresentation of non-liberals in social psychology is most likely due to a combination of self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination. We close with recommendations for increasing political diversity in social psychology. (4)社会心理学中非自由派的人数不足，最有可能是自我选择、敌对气氛以及歧视等因素共同作用的结果。文章结尾我们就增进社会心理学中政治多元化提出了一些建议。

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1. Introduction 1. 导论 In the last few years, social psychology has faced a series of challenges to the validity of its research, including a few high-profile replication failures, a handful of fraud cases, and several articles on questionable research practices and inflated effect sizes… In this article, we suggest that one largely overlooked cause of failure is a lack of political diversity. We review evidence suggesting that political diversity and dissent would improve the reliability and validity of social psychological science… 过去数年间，社会心理学在其研究有效性上面临一系列挑战，包括一些众人瞩目的试验重复失败，一些造假事件，还有一些文章用的是有问题的研究操作和夸大的效应量……我们在本文中表明，此种失败的一个原因受到广泛忽视，即缺乏政治多元性。我们考察了相关证据，表明政治多元性和异议能够改进社会心理科学的可靠性和有效性…… We focus on conservatives as an underrepresented group because the data on the prevalence in psychology of different ideological groups is best for the liberal-conservative contrast – and the departure from the proportion of liberals and conservatives in the U.S. population is so dramatic. However, we argue that the field needs more non-liberals however they specifically self-identify (e.g., libertarian, moderate)… 我们将保守派这个代表性不足的群体作为关注焦点，因为在心理学中，不同意识形态群体的流行程度数据最适合进行自由派－保守派对比，也因为与全美人口的自由派与保守派占比相比，心理学领域偏差极为惊人。不过，我们论证道，这个领域需要更多非自由派，无论他们的自我认同具体为何（如自由意志主义者、温和派等）…… The lack of political diversity is not a threat to the validity of specific studies in many and perhaps most areas of research in social psychology. The lack of diversity causes problems for the scientific process primarily in areas related to the political concerns of the Left – areas such as race, gender, stereotyping, environmentalism, power, and inequality – as well as in areas where conservatives themselves are studied, such as in moral and political psychology. 多元政治的缺乏对某些特定领域（或许是大多数社会心理学领域）的研究有效性，并不构成威胁。多元政治的缺失造成问题的主要是科研过程中涉及那些跟左派的政治关怀有关的领域——如种族、性别、刻板印象、环保主义、权力和不平等，以及在那些研究对象就包括了保守派的领域——如道德和政治心理学。

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2. Psychology is less politically diverse than ever 2. 心理学的政治多元性之少史无前例 [In this section we review all available information on the political party identification of psychologists, as well as their liberal-conservative self descriptions. The graph below says it all. Whichever of those two measures you use, you find a big change after 1990. Before the 1990s, academic psychology only LEANED left. Liberals and Democrats outnumbered Conservatives and Republican by 4 to 1 or less. But as the “greatest generation” retired in the 1990s and was replaced by baby boomers, the ratio skyrocketed to something more like 12 to 1. In just 20 years. Few psychologists realize just how quickly or completely the field has become a political monoculture. This graph took us by surprise too.] [本部分我们就心理学家的政治党派认同以及他们对属于自由派还是保守派的自我描述，回顾所有可以找到的信息。下列图表说明了一切。不论你采用两种测量方法中的哪一种，你都能发现1990年后发生了一个重大变化。1990年代以前，学院心理学只是倾向左派。自由派和民主党比保守派和共和党多，比率为4:1及以下。但到了1990年代，“最伟大的一代”退休【译注：指1920年代生人，因其经历大萧条、二战、战后重建而与美国同铸辉煌而得此名】，“婴儿潮一代”取而代之【译注：指战后至1960年代中期生人】，这一比率飙升到12:1以上的程度。只用了20年。极少有心理学家意识到这一领域转变为一种政治单一栽培的快速程度和彻底程度。这个图标也令我们大吃一惊。] Figure 1. The political party and ideological sympathies of academic psychologists have shifted leftward over time. Circles show ratios of self-reports of liberal vs. conservative. Diamonds show ratios of self-reports of party preference or voting (Democrat vs. Republican). Data for 1924–60 is reported in McClintock et al. (1965). Open diamonds are participants’ recollections of whom they voted for; gray diamonds are self-reported party identification at time of the survey. Data for 1999 is reported in Rothman et al. (2005). Data from 2006 is reported in Gross and Simmons (2007). The right-most circle is from Inbar and Lammers (2012) and is the ratio of selfidentified liberal/conservative social psychologists. 图1. 学院心理学家的政治党派和意识形态倾向已经随时间流逝而趋向左转。圆形表示自陈自由派的与自陈保守派的比率。菱形则表示自陈的政党偏好或投票记录（民主党vs.共和党）的比率。1924-60年数据据McClintock 等（1965）。空心菱形是参与者对投票给谁的回忆；灰色菱形则是被调查时自陈的政党身份。1999年的数据据Rothman等（2005）。2006年的数据据Gross和 Simmons （2007）。最右边的圆形则来自Inbar和Lammers（2012），指的是自认自由派和自认保守派的社会心理学家之比。

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3. Three ways that the lack of diversity undermines social psychology 3. 多元性的缺乏对社会心理学造成破坏的三种方式 Might a shared moral-historical narrative [the “liberal progress” narrative described by sociologist Christian Smith] in a politically homogeneous field undermine the self-correction processes on which good science depends? We think so, and present three risk points— three ways in which political homogeneity can threaten the validity of social psychological science—and examples from the extant literature illustrating each point. 在一个政治同质化的领域内，一种共享的道德-历史叙事（社会学家Christian Smith所描绘的那种“自由进步”叙事），会破坏良好科学所赖以存在的自我纠正过程吗？我们认为会，并提出了三个风险点——政治同质性能够威胁社会心理科学有效性的三种方式，针对每一点，我们都从现存文献中提出例证来作了说明。 3.1. Risk point 1: Liberal values and assumptions can become embedded into theory and method 3.1. 风险点之一：自由派价值观和假设可能预装到理论和方法之中 The embedding of values occurs when value statements or ideological claims are wrongly treated as objective truth, and observed deviation from that truth is treated as error. 当价值陈述或意识形态主张被错误地当成客观真理对待时，或者与这一真理有出入的现象被观测到，却被当成错误对待时，价值观的预装就发生了。 [Example:] and McBride (2007) found that: 1) people high in social dominance orientation (SDO) were more likely to make unethical decisions, 2) people high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) were more likely to go along with the unethical decisions of leaders, and 3) dyads with high SDO leaders and high RWA followers made more unethical decisions than dyads with alternative arrangements (e.g., low SDO—low RWA dyads). [例证：]Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna和 McBride（2007）发现：1）社会支配倾向（SDO）高的人更可能作出不道德的决定，2）右翼权威主义（RWA）程度高的人更可能遵从领导人作出的不道德决定，以及3）高SDO的领导人与高RWA的追随者这一组合作出的不道德决定比其它形式的排列组合（如低SDO和低RWA组合）要多。 Yet consider the decisions they defined as unethical: not formally taking a female colleague’s side in her sexual harassment complaint against her subordinate (given little information about the case), and a worker placing the well-being of his or her company above unspecified harms to the environment attributed to the company’s operations. Liberal values of feminism and environmentalism were embedded directly into the operationalization of ethics, even to the extent that participants were expected to endorse those values in vignettes that lacked the information one would need to make a considered judgment. 不过，看看被他们界定为不道德的决定：在女性同事对其下属提出性骚扰投诉时不正式站在她的一边（几乎没有任何案件相关信息），工人将他或她所属公司的利益置于未明确说明的环境损害之上（这种损害被归罪于该公司的运营）。自由派的女性主义和环保主义价值取向被直接预装进了伦理概念的执行之中，甚至到了这种程度：在某个场景下缺乏信息的个体不得不做出审慎判断，仍指望参与者支持这些价值。 The appearance of certain words that imply pernicious motives (e.g., deny, legitimize, rationalize, justify, defend, trivialize) may be particularly indicative of research tainted by embedded values. 对某些特定词汇的使用，暗中指涉险恶的动机（如拒斥、合法化、合理化、正当化、维护、琐碎化等）。出现这些词汇，可能就具有特别的标志性，表明研究已被预装的价值观污染。 3.2. Risk point 2: Researchers may concentrate on topics that validate the liberal progress narrative and avoid topics that contest that narrative 3.2 风险点之二：研究者可能全神关注那些能够证实自由进步叙事的论题，避开那些对这一叙事构成质疑的论题 Since the enlightenment, scientists have thought of themselves as spreading light and pushing back the darkness. The metaphor is apt, but in a politically homogeneous field, a larger-than-optimal number of scientists shine their flashlights on ideologically important regions of the terrain. Doing so leaves many areas unexplored. Even worse, some areas become walled off, and inquisitive researchers risk ostracism if they venture in. 自启蒙运动以来，科学家们一直认为自己所做的，乃是拒绝黑暗、传播光明的事业。这个暗喻是恰当的，不过，在一个政治同质化的地界，把灯光照向境内那些在意识形态上很重要的领域的科学家数目实在是多得过分。这么做会令许多领域无人探索。更糟糕的是，有些领域还会被高墙围起来，任何求知好问的研究者胆敢冒险进入，就有被放逐的风险。 [Example:] Stereotype accuracy. Since the 1930s, social psychologists have been proclaiming the inaccuracy of social stereotypes, despite lacking evidence of such inaccuracy. Evidence has seemed unnecessary because stereotypes have been, in effect, stereotyped as inherently nasty and inaccurate (see Jussim, 2012a for a review). [例证：]刻板印象的准确性。自1930年代起，社会心理学家一直声称，社会刻板印象是不准确的，尽管他们拿不出相关证据。此类证据一直被视为毫无必要，因为刻板印象本身事实上已经被刻板印象化了，成了一种本质上恶劣且不准确的事物（评论见Jussim, 2012a）。 Some group stereotypes are indeed hopelessly crude and untestable. But some may rest on valid empiricism—and represent subjective estimates of population characteristics (e.g. the proportion of people who drop out of high school, are victims of crime, or endorse policies that support women at work, see Jussim, 2012a, Ryan, 2002 for reviews). 某些群体刻板印象确实无可救药地生硬粗糙、不可验证。但还有一些，则可能确实建立在有效的经验主义基础之上——并体现了对于人群特征的主观估计（比如高中辍学的人口比例、罪案受害者的人口比例、支持职业女性的政策的支持者比例等，评论见Jussim, 2012a和Ryan，2002）。 In this context, it is not surprising that the rigorous empirical study of the accuracy of factual stereotypes was initiated by one of the very few self-avowed conservatives in social psychology—Clark McCauley (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). Since then, dozens of studies by independent researchers have yielded evidence that stereotype accuracy (of all sorts of stereotypes) is one of the most robust effects in all of social psychology (Jussim, 2012a). 在这种氛围中，毫不稀奇，关于有事实基础的刻板印象之准确性，最严谨的经验研究是由社会心理学领域极少见的自陈保守派之一——Clark McCauley开创的（McCauley和Stitt, 1978）。自那以后，独立研究者的数十种研究已经得出证据，在所有社会心理学成果中，（关于所有种类的刻板印象的）刻板印象准确性之说乃是最为有力的之一（Jussim, 2012a）。 Here is a clear example of the value of political diversity: a conservative social psychologist asked a question nobody else thought (or dared) to ask, and found results that continue to make many social psychologists uncomfortable. McCauley’s willingness to put the assumption of stereotype inaccuracy to an empirical test led to the correction of one of social psychology’s most longstanding errors. 这是政治多元性之价值的清楚一例：一个保守派社会心理学家追问了一个别人都没想过（或敢于）去问的问题，并得出了一个让许多社会心理学家现在仍一直感到不舒服的结论。McCauley决心对刻板印象不准确这一假设进行经验验证，这就导致了对于社会心理学中最长寿错误之一的纠正。 3.3. Risk point 3: Negative attitudes regarding conservatives can produce a psychological science that mischaracterizes their traits and attributes 3.3 风险点之三：对于保守派的负面看法可能导致心理科学错误地描绘保守派的特征和性质 A long-standing view in social-political psychology is that the right is more dogmatic and intolerant of ambiguity than the left, a view Tetlock (1983) dubbed the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis…. But had social psychologists studied a broad enough range of situations to justify these broad conclusions? Recent evidence suggests not. 社会—政治心理学中存在已久的一个看法是，右派比左派更为教条，更不能容忍模棱两可。Tetlock（1983）将这种看法叫作“右派的死板”假说……但是，社会心理学家为了证明这种一般性的结论，是否研究过范围足够广泛的情形？近来的证据显示：并非如此。 The ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM; Crawford, 2012) posits that people on the political left and right are equally likely to approach political judgments with their ideological blinders on. That said, they will only do so when the premise of a political judgment is ideologically acceptable. If it’s objectionable, any preferences for one group over another will be short-circuited, and biases won’t emerge. 据“意识形态争议性前提模型”（IOPM; Crawford, 2012）推断，政治上的左派和右派戴着意识形态眼罩形成政治判断的可能性是一样大的。当然，这只会发生于政治判断的前提在意识形态上可以接受的情况下。如果这一前提是可争议的，那么偏好其中任意一个群体都会引起直接短路，偏见就不会出现。 The IOPM thus allows for biases to emerge only among liberals, only among conservatives, or among both liberals and conservatives, depending on the situation. For example, reinterpreting Altemeyer’s mandatory school prayer results, Crawford (2012) argued that for people low in RWA who value individual freedom and autonomy, mandatory school prayer is objectionable; thus, the very nature of the judgment should shut off any biases in favor of one target over the other. 由此，随着情况的不同，IOPM模型可让偏见仅出现于自由派中，或仅出现于保守派中，或同时出现于自由派和保守派中。比如，Crawford（2012）在重新解释Altemeyer的强制性学校祷告数据时论证到，对于右翼权威主义（RWA）程度低、看重个体自由与自主的人，强制性学校祷告是可争议的；因此，这一判断的性质本身会将任何重此轻彼的偏见排斥在外。 However, for people high in RWA who value society-wide conformity to traditional morals and values, mandating school prayer is acceptable; this acceptable premise then allows for people high in RWA to express a bias in favor of Christian over Muslim school prayer. 然而，对于RWA程度高、看重全社会对传统道德和价值观的遵从的人，强制性学校祷告是可以接受的；于是，这种可接受的前提就会让RWA程度高的人表达出重基督教校园祈祷者、轻穆斯林校园祈祷者的偏见。 Crawford (2012, Study 1) replaced mandatory prayer with voluntary prayer, which would be acceptable to both people high and low in RWA. In line with the IOPM, people high in RWA were still biased in favor of Christian over Muslim prayer, while people low in RWA now showed a bias in favor of Muslim over Christian voluntary prayer. Hypocrisy is therefore not necessarily a special province of the right. Crawford（2012，研究1）用自愿祈祷者代替强制祈祷者，于是前提变成了对于RWA程度高和低的两种人都可以接受。与IOPM模型预测一致，RWA程度高的人仍然存在重基督教祈祷者、轻穆斯林祈祷者的偏见，与此同时，RWA程度低的人现在表现出重穆斯林自愿祈祷者、轻基督教自愿祈祷者的偏见。因此，虚伪矫饰可不一定是右派的特殊地盘。 These example illustrate the threats to truth-seeking that emerge when members of a politically homogenous intellectual community are motivated to cast their perceived outgroup (i.e., the ones who violate the liberal progressive narrative) in a negative light. If there were more social psychologists who were motivated to question the design and interpretation of studies biased towards liberal values during peer review, or if there were more researchers running their own studies using different methods, social psychologists could be more confident in the validity of their characterizations of conservatives (and liberals). 这些例子说明，当一个政治同质化的知识群体的成员被鼓励用一种负面灯光去映照他们所理解的圈外人士（比如，冒犯自由进步叙事的人）时，追求真理的事业会受到何种威胁。如果在同行评审中，能有更多的社会心理学家被鼓励去质疑那些偏向自由派价值观的研究的设计和解释，如果能有更多的研究者采用不同的方法来进行他们自己的研究，社会心理学家就能对他们关于保守派（和自由派）的描绘的可信度拥有更多自信。

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4. Why political diversity is likely to improve social psychological science 4. 为什么政治多元性有可能改进社会心理科学 Diversity can be operationalized in many ways, including demographic diversity (e.g., ethnicity, race, and gender) and viewpoint diversity (e.g., variation in intellectual viewpoints or professional expertise). 将多元性这一概念变得可操作的方式很多，包括人口学多元化（如族群、种族和性别）和视角多元化（比如各种不同的知识视角或专业技能）。 Research in organizational psychology suggest that: a) the benefits of viewpoint diversity are more consistent and pronounced than those of demographic diversity (Menz, 2012; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998); and 组织心理学研究表明：a）视角多元化比人口学多元化的益处更为一贯、更为显著（Menz, 2012; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998）；又 b) the benefits of viewpoint diversity are most pronounced when organizations are pursuing open-ended exploratory goals (e.g., scientific discovery) as opposed to exploitative goals (e.g., applying well-established routines to well-defined problems; Cannella, Park & Hu, 2008). b）与追求利用性目标（比如，在界定明确的问题上执行已良好确立的例行程序）的组织相比，在追求开放式的探索性目标（比如，科学发现）的组织中，视角多元化的益处最为显著（Cannella, Park & Hu, 2008）。 Viewpoint diversity may therefore be more valuable than demographic diversity if social psychology’s core goal is to produce broadly valid and generalizable conclusions. (Of course, demographic diversity can bring viewpoint diversity, but if it is viewpoint diversity that is wanted, then it may be more effective to pursue it directly.) 因此，如果社会心理学的核心目标在于得出广泛有效且可以一般化的结论，那么视角多元性似乎比人口学多元性更有价值。（当然，人口学多元性能带来视角多元性，但如果我们需要的正是视角多元性，那么直接追求它可能更为有效。） It is the lack of political viewpoint diversity that makes social psychology vulnerable to the three risks described in the previous section. Political diversity is likely to have a variety of positive effects by reducing the impact of two familiar mechanisms that we explore below: confirmation bias and groupthink/majority consensus. 正是政治视角多元性的缺乏，才使得社会心理学在前一部分描述的三大风险面前显得很脆弱。通过削弱我们下面将讨论的两个我们熟知的机制的影响，政治多元性很可能具有多种多样的积极功效：确认偏误和群体思维/多数一致。 4.1. Confirmation bias 4.1 确认偏误 People tend to search for evidence that will confirm their existing beliefs while also ignoring or downplaying disconfirming evidence. This confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) is widespread among both laypeople and scientists (Ioannidis, 2012). Confirmation bias can become even stronger when people confront questions that trigger moral emotions and concerns about group identity (Haidt, 2001; 2012). 人们更喜欢为他们已有的信念搜罗证据，同时无视或轻视与既有信念抵触的证据。这种确认偏误（Nickerson, 1998）在外行和科学家中都很常见（Ioannidis, 2012）。当人们面对的问题还能够引发对于群体认同的道德情绪和关怀时，确认偏误可能会变得更为强烈（Haidt, 2001; 2012）。 Further, group-polarization often exacerbates extremism in echo chambers (Lamm & Myers, 1978). [and note from the graph above that social psychology has become an echo chamber since the 1990s] 此外，群体的极化通常还会在回音室中加剧极端主义（Lamm & Myers, 1978）。[并且注意，前面的图表已经显示，社会心理学自1990年代起已经变成了一个回音室]。 Indeed, people are far better at identifying the flaws in other people’s evidence-gathering than in their own, especially if those other people have dissimilar beliefs (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sperber et al., 2010). 实在来说，人们在别人的证据搜集过程中找出错误，可比针对自己时要得心应手得多，特别是当别人具有不同的信念时（如见Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sperber等, 2010）。 Although such processes may be beneficial for communities whose goal is social cohesion (e.g., a religious or activist movement), they can be devastating for scientific communities by leading to widely-accepted claims that reflect the scientific community’s blind spots more than they reflect justified scientific conclusions (see, e.g., the three risk points discussed previously). 对于目标在于社会团结的共同体（如一个宗教运动或激进运动）来说，这类事情也许是有益的，但是对于科学共同体来说，这将是毁灭性的。因为它们将会导致一些被广泛接受的论断产生，而这些论断更多反映的是科学共同体的盲点，而非科学上得到证明的结论（如见前文所论的三个风险点）。 The most obvious cure for this problem is to increase the viewpoint diversity of the field. Nobody has found a way to eradicate confirmation bias in individuals (Lilienfeld et al., 2009), but we can diversify the field to the point where individual viewpoint biases begin to cancel each other out. 对于这个问题，最显而易见的疗法就是增加该领域的视角多元性。从来没有人找到过在个体身上根除确认偏误的办法（Lilienfeld等, 2009），但我们可以不断增加一个领域的多元性，直到个体的视角偏见开始相互抵消。 4.2. Minority influence 4.2 众从 Minority influence research has focused on the processes by which minorities influence majority members’ (and thus the groups’) reasoning (e.g., Crano, 2012; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). Majorities influence decision-making by producing conformity pressure that creates cohesion and community, but they do little to enhance judgmental depth or quality (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). They also risk creating the type of groupthink that has long been a target of criticism by social psychologists (e.g., Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004; Janis, 1972)…. 众从研究聚焦于一种过程：少数派影响多数成员（进而是整个群体）的论证（如见Crano, 2012; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980）。多数派通过制造顺从压力影响决策，而这种压力能够创造凝聚力和共同体，但无益于提高决断的深度或质量（Crisp & Turner, 2011; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980）。他们也导致群体思维的风险，而这被社会心理学家诟病已久（如见Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004; Janis, 1972）…… There is even evidence that politically diverse teams produce more creative solutions than do politically homogeneous teams on problems such as “how can a person of average talent achieve fame” and how to find funding for a partially-built church ineligible for bank loans (Triandis, Hall, & Ewen, 1965)…. 甚至有证据表明，即使是在“某个资质平平的人如何成名”以及怎样为一个烂尾的教堂筹集资金，取得银行贷款这样的问题上，政治上多元的团队也比政治同质的团队更能找到创造性的解决方案。 In sum, there are grounds for hypothesizing that increased political diversity would improve the quality of social psychological science because it would increase the degree of scientific dissent, especially, on such politicized issues as inequality versus equity, the psychological characteristics of liberals and conservatives, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Social psychologists have shown these effects in many settings; they could take advantage of them within their own ranks. 总之，政治多元性的增加有助于改善社会心理科学的质量，这一假设是有理有据的，因为它会增加科学分歧的程度。当我们面对的是诸如不平等与平等、自由派和保守派的心理特征、刻板印象、偏见和歧视等等政治化的议题时，情况尤其如此。社会心理学家已经针对许多场合说明过此类效应；他们可以在自己的队伍中好好对其加以利用。

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5. Why are there so few non-liberals in social psychology? 5. 为什么非自由派在社会心理学中难得一见？ the evidence does not point to a single answer. To understand why conservatives are so vastly underrepresented in social psychology, we consider five explanations that have frequently been offered to account for a lack of diversity not just in social psychology, but in other contexts (e.g., the underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities in STEM fields, e.g., Pinker, 2008). 证据表明，答案不止一个。为了理解为什么保守派在社会心理学中的人数如此不足，我们考虑了五种解释，这五种解释不仅在说明社会心理学中多元性的缺乏时，而且在其它学术文章中也经常被人提到（如在STEM领域内妇女和少数族裔的缺乏，如见Pinker, 2008）【译注：STEM为科学、技术、工程和数学四个学科的英文首字母缩写】。 5.1. Differences in ability 5.1. 能力差异 [Are conservatives simply less intelligent than liberals, and less able to obtain PhDs and faculty positions?] The evidence does not support this view… [published studies are mixed. Part of the complexity is that…] Social conservatism correlates with lower cognitive ability test scores, but economic conservatism correlates with higher scores (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Kemmelmeier 2008). [Libertarians are the political group with the highest IQ, yet they are underrepresented in the social sciences other than economics] [难道保守派就是没有自由派那么聪明，取得博士学位和教职岗位的能力要差些？]证据不支持这种观点……[已有的研究形形色色。情况的复杂性部分体现在……]社会保守派与认知能力测试得分较低存在相关性，不过经济保守派则与得分较高存在相关性（Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Kemmelmeier 2008）[自由意志主义者是IQ最高的政治团体，但他们在除经济学以外的所有社会科学中人数均不足] 5.2. The effects of education on political ideology 5.2. 政治意识形态教育的影响 Many may view education as “enlightening” and believe that an enlightened view comports with liberal politics. There is little evidence that education causes students to become more liberal. Instead, several longitudinal studies following tens of thousands of college students for many years have concluded that political socialization in college occurs primarily as a function of one’s peers, not education per se (Astin, 1993; Dey, 1997). 许多人可能将教育视为“启蒙”，并相信经过启蒙的观念会与自由派政治一致。鲜有证据表明教育会使得学生更为趋向自由派。几项对数万名大学生的多年追踪研究倒是得出结论认为，大学里的政治社会化过程【译注：指个体形塑政治态度的过程】主要取决于一个人的同伴，而非教育本身（Astin, 1993; Dey, 1997）。 5.3. Differences in interest 5.3. 兴趣差异 Might liberals simply find a career in social psychology (or the academy more broadly) more appealing? Yes, for several reasons. The Big-5 trait that correlates most strongly with political liberalism is openness to experience (r = .32 in Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloways’s 2003 meta-analysis), and people high in that trait are more likely to pursue careers that will let them indulge their curiosity and desire to learn, such as a career in the academy (McCrae, 1996). An academic career requires a Ph.D., and liberals enter (and graduate) college more interested in pursuing Ph.D.s than do conservatives (Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009)… 有没有可能就是因为自由派觉得社会心理学（或更广泛而言，整个学术界）这种职业更有吸引力？有可能，理由有多个。与政治自由主义相关性最强的“五大”人格特点【译注：五大人格特点，指心理学上描述人格特征时常用的五维度模型，分别为外倾性、经验开放性、随和性、神经质和尽责性】就是“经验开放性”（在Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski和 Sulloways 2003年所做的meta分析中，r=0.32），而在这一特点上得分高的人更有可能从事能让他们的好奇心和求知欲得到满足的职业，比如学术事业（McCrae, 1996）。从事学术事业要求博士学位，而入读大学（和从大学毕业）的自由派比保守派更有兴趣谋求博士学位（Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009）…… Such intrinsic variations in interest may be amplified by a “birds of a feather” or “homophile” effect. “Similarity attracts” is one of the most well-established findings in social psychology (Byrne, 1969). As a field begins to lean a certain way, the field will likely become increasingly attractive to people suited to that leaning. 这种兴趣上的内在差异有可能通过“物以类聚”或“同性相爱”效应而得到放大。“同类相吸”是社会心理学中理据最为坚实的成果之一（Byrne, 1969）。随着某个领域开始向一个特定方向倾斜，那么对于适应这种倾斜的人，这个领域就很可能会变得越来越具有吸引力。 Over time the group itself may become characterized by its group members. Professors and scientists may come to be seen as liberal just as nurses are typically thought of as being female. Once that happens, conservatives may disproportionately self-select out of joining the dissimilar group, based on a realistic perception that they “do not fit well.” [See Gross (2013)]… 长此以往，群体本身就被其成员特征化了。教授和科学家可能会逐渐被视为自由派，就像护士经常被理解成为女性一样。一旦如此，保守派就可能自我选择不参加这种异己群体，因为他们有一种现实的认知：他们“合不来”（见Gross , 2013）…… Self-selection clearly plays a role. But it would be ironic if an epistemic community resonated to empirical arguments that appear to exonerate the community of prejudice—when that same community roundly rejects those same arguments when invoked by other institutions to explain the under-representation of women or ethnic minorities (e.g., in STEM disciplines or other elite professions). [Note: we agree that self-selection is a big part of the explanation. If there were no discrimination and no hostile climate, the field would still lean left, as it used to. But it would still have some diversity, and would work much better.] 自我选择很明显起了作用。但是，这种经验论证似乎是在为共同体的歧视行为洗白，如果一个知识共同体与之产生共鸣，这会太讽刺——而且，正是这同一个共同体，在其它机构使用同一论证来解释女性或少数族裔代表性不足的问题时（如在STEM学科或其它精英行业中），对自我选择解释表示了严厉的拒斥。[注意：我们同意，自我选择在原因中占了很大比例。如果不存在歧视、不存在敌对的气氛，这个领域仍然会左倾，正如它在1990年代之前那样。但是它仍会有某种程度的多元性，并会运作得好得多。] 5.4. Hostile climate 5.4. 敌对气氛 Might self-selection be amplified by an accurate perception among conservative students that they are not welcome in the social psychology community? Consider the narrative of conservatives that can be formed from some recent conclusions in social psychological research: compared to liberals, conservatives are less intelligent (Hodson & Busseri, 2012) and less cognitively complex (Jost et al., 2003). They are more rigid, dogmatic, and inflexible (Jost et al., 2003). Their lower IQ explains their racism and sexism (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008), and their endorsement of inequality explains why they are happier than liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008). 自我选择有没有可能因为保守派学生的一种正确认知——他们得不到社会心理学共同体的欢迎——而被放大？考虑一下我们能从最近的一些社会心理学研究结论中得出的关于保守派的叙述：比起自由派，保守派没那么聪明（Hodson & Busseri, 2012），认知复杂度没那么高（Jost等, 2003）。他们更死板、更教条、更不懂变通（Jost等, 2003）。他们IQ低，所以他们有种族主义和性别歧视（Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008），他们对不平等的支持正是他们之所以比自由派更快乐的理由（Napier & Jost, 2008）。 As conservative undergraduates encounter the research literature in their social psychology classes, might they recognize cues that the field regards them and their beliefs as defective? And what happens if they do attend graduate school and take part in conferences, classes, and social events in which almost everyone else is liberal? 当保守派本科生在他们的社会心理学课堂上接触到研究文献时，他们是否可能认出这种信号，猜到这个领域认为他们以及他们的信念存在缺陷？如果他们确实念上了研究生，那么当他们参会、上课、参加社会活动时，发现参与者几乎个个都是自由派，这时会发生什么？ We ourselves have often heard jokes and disparaging comments made by social psychologists about conservatives, not just in informal settings but even from the podium at conferences and lectures. The few conservatives who have enrolled in graduate programs hear these comments too, and some of them wrote to Haidt in the months after his 2011 remarks at the SPSP convention to describe the hostility and ridicule that force them to stay “in the closet” about their political beliefs—or to leave the field entirely. 我们自己就经常听到社会心理学家关于保守派的种种笑话和鄙夷的评论，这不仅出现于非正式场合，而且也出现在会议和讲座的讲台上。注册参加了研究生项目的几个罕见的保守派学生，也听到了这些评论，其中一些在听了Haidt在人格与社会心理学学会2011年年会上所发评论后的几个月里还曾给他写信。他们在信中描写到，敌对和嘲弄迫使他们将自己的政治信念藏在“深柜”——或干脆离开这个领域。 Haidt (2011) put excerpts from these emails online (in anonymous form); representative of them is this one from a former graduate student in a top 10 Ph.D. program: Haidt（2011）在网上贴出了这些邮件的摘录（以匿名形式）；其中一封的作者曾是排名前十的博士项目的研究生，很具有代表性：

I can’t begin to tell you how difficult it was for me in graduate school because I am not a liberal Democrat. As one example, following Bush’s defeat of Kerry, one of my professors would email me every time a soldier’s death in Iraq made the headlines; he would call me out, publicly blaming me for not supporting Kerry in the election. 要向你描述我在研究生院时因为不是自由派民主党而过得有多么艰难，我都没法开始。举个例子吧，布什打败克里之后，每逢有驻伊士兵死亡事件上头条，有位教授就会给我发邮件；他会指名道姓的公开指责我没在选举中支持克里。 I was a reasonably successful graduate student, but the political ecology became too uncomfortable for me. Instead of seeking the professorship that I once worked toward, I am now leaving academia for a job in industry. 作为一个研究生，我相当成功，但政治生态变得令我非常不舒服。我没有去谋求我曾为之奋斗的教授职位，而是离开学术圈，现在在实业部门工作。

Evidence of hostile climate is not just anecdotal. Inbar and Lammers (2012) asked members of the SPSP discussion list: “Do you feel that there is a hostile climate towards your political beliefs in your field?” 敌对气氛存在的证据并非只有个别逸闻。Inbar和 Lammers（2012）曾询问人格与社会心理学学会讨论组成员以下问题：“你是否觉得你所在的领域针对你的政治信念存在一种敌对气氛？” Of 17 conservatives, 14 (82%) responded “yes” (i.e., a response at or above the midpoint of the scale, where the midpoint was labeled “somewhat” and the top point “very much”), with half of those responding “very much.” 17个保守派中，14个（即82%）回答了“是”（即回应大于等于量表的中间选项，中间选项是“有些”，最大值则是“非常”），答“是”的人中又有一半回答的是“非常”。 In contrast, only 18 of 266 liberals (7%) responded “yes”, with only two of those responding “very much.” Interestingly, 18 of 25 moderates (72%) responded “yes,” with one responding “very much.” 与此形成对比的是，266个自由派中只有18个（即7%）回答了“是”，其中只有两个答的是“非常”。有意思的是，25个温和派中有18个（即72%）回答了“是”，1个答“非常”。 This surprising result suggests that the hostile climate may adversely affect not only conservatives, but anyone who is not liberal or whose values do not align with the liberal progress narrative. 这一令人惊讶的结果表明，敌对气氛所产生的负面影响不仅仅是对保守派而言，而且针对所有的非自由派，或者所有价值观不能与自由进步叙事相符的人。 5.5. Discrimination 5.5 歧视 The literature on political prejudice demonstrates that strongly identified partisans show little compunction about expressing their overt hostility toward the other side (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013; Haidt, 2012). Partisans routinely believe that their hostility towards opposing groups is justified because of the threat posed to their values by dissimilar others (see Brandt et al., 2014, for a review). 政治偏见方面的研究文献证明，认同感强烈的党徒毫不避讳公开表达对对方的敌意（如见Chambers等, 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013; Haidt, 2012）。党徒们例行公事般认为他们针对对立团体的敌视态度是合理的，因为异己分子威胁到他们珍视的价值（相关评论见Brandt 等, 2014）。 Social psychologists are unlikely to be immune to such psychological processes. Indeed, ample evidence using multiple methods demonstrates that social psychologists do in fact act in discriminatory ways toward non-liberal colleagues and their research. 社会心理学家不太可能对这种心理过程免疫。事实上，基于多种方法的大量证据表明，社会心理学家确实以歧视方式对待他们的非自由派同事及其学术研究。 [Here we review experimental field research: if you change a research proposal so that its hypotheses sound conservative, but you leave the methods the same, then the manuscript is deemed less publishable, and is less likely to get IRB approval] [我们这里来回顾一下实验性的实地研究：如果改动一下你的研究计划，使其假设看起来像个保守派假设，但研究方法保持不变，那么这个稿子发表的可能性在人们眼里就会降低，得到伦理委员会认可的可能性也会降低] Inbar and Lammers (2012) found that most social psychologists who responded to their survey were willing to explicitly state that they would discriminate against conservatives. Their survey posed the question: “If two job candidates (with equal qualifications) were to apply for an opening in your department, and you knew that one was politically quite conservative, do you think you would be inclined to vote for the more liberal one?” Inbar和Lammers（2012）发现，绝大多数接受调查的社会心理学家都愿意明白无误地表明，他们会歧视保守派。他们在调查中提出这样一个问题：“两个求职者（条件相同）申请你所在院系的空缺，你要是知道其中一个政治上特别保守，你觉得你会倾向于投票赞成更自由派的那个吗？” Of the 237 liberals, only 42 (18%) chose the lowest scale point, “not at all.” In other words, 82% admitted that they would be at least a little bit prejudiced against a conservative candidate, and 43% chose the midpoint (“somewhat”) or above. In contrast, the majority of moderates (67%) and conservatives (83%) chose the lowest scale point (“not at all”)…. 在237个自由派中，仅有42个（即18%）选择了量表上的最低值，“绝不会”。换句话说，82%的人承认他们至少会对保守派求职者有一点点歧视，43%选择了中间值（“有些”）及以上。与此形成对比的是，多数温和派（67%）和保守派（83%）选择了最低值（“绝不”）…… Conservative graduate students and assistant professors are behaving rationally when they keep their political identities hidden, and when they avoid voicing the dissenting opinions that could be of such great benefit to the field. Moderate and libertarian students may be suffering the same fate. 当保守派研究生和助理教授隐瞒他们政治派别时，他们是在依理性行事，然而如果他们缄默不言，那却将是这个领域的巨大损失。温和派和自由意志主义的学生或许也正在遭受同一命运。

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6. Recommendations 6. 建议 [Please see the longer discussion of recommended steps on our “Solutions” page. In the BBS paper we offer a variety of specific recommendations for what can be done to ameliorate the problem. These are divided into three sections] [建议措施的更长讨论，见我们的“方案”页面。在发表于《行为与脑科学》的文章中，我们提供了多种具体可行建议，以改进这一问题。建议分为三部分] 6.1. Organizational responses 6.1. 组织方面的回应 [We looked at the list of policy steps that the American Psychological Association recommended for itself to improve diversity with regard to race, gender, and sexual orientation. Many of them work well for increasing political diversity, e.g.,:] [我们查看了美国心理学会为增加自身的种族、性别和性取向多元性而建议的系列政策措施。其中许多同样可以有效的增加政治多元性，如……]

• Formulate and adopt an anti-discrimination policy resolution.
• 制定并采纳一项反歧视政策决议。
• Implement a “climate study” regarding members’ experiences, comfort/discomfort, and positive/negative attitudes/opinions/policies affecting or about members of politically diverse groups.
• 实施一项“气氛研究”，研究对象是其成员的经历，包括舒适的/不适的，以及他们持有的、会影响政治多样化的不同团体（或与他们有关）的积极/消极的态度/观点/政策
• Each organization should develop strategies to encourage and support research training programs and research conferences to attract, retain, and graduate conservative and other non-liberal doctoral students and early career professionals.
• 每一个组织都应该形成各种策略，鼓励和支持研究训练项目和研究会议去吸引、留住或毕业送走保守派及其他非自由派博士研究生和新入行的业内人士。

6.2. Professorial responses 6.2. 教授方面的回应 There are many steps that social psychologists who are also college professors can take to encourage non-liberal students to join the field, or to “come out of the closet”: 1) Raise consciousness [acknowledge publicly that we have problem]; 2) Welcome feedback from non-liberals. 3) Expand diversity statements. [i.e., add “political diversity” to any list of kinds of diversity being encouraged]. 同时身为大学教授的社会心理学家，可以采用多个措施来鼓励非自由派学生加入这个领域，或者“出柜”：1）提高意识[公开承认我们有问题]；2）欢迎非自由派的反馈。3）扩充有关多元性的声明。[即在任何形式的多元性鼓励列表中加入“政治多元性”]。 6.3. Changes to research practices 6.3. 改变研究做法 1.Be alert to double standards. 2. Support adversarial collaborations.  3. Improve research norms to increase the degree to which a research field becomes self-correcting. 1.警惕双重标准。2. 支持对抗性合作。3. 改进研究规范，以增加研究领域趋向自我纠正的程度。

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7. Conclusion 7. 结论 Others have sounded this alarm before (e.g., MacCoun, 1998; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994)… No changes were made in response to the previous alarms, but we believe that this time may be different. Social psychologists are in deep and productive discussions about how to address multiple threats to the integrity of their research and publication process. This may be a golden opportunity for the field to take seriously the threats caused by political homogeneity. 早已有人敲响过这一警钟（如MacCoun, 1998; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994）……对于之前的警钟却无人回应，不过我们相信这次可能有点不同。关于如何应对他们的研究和出版程序之健全性所面临的诸多威胁的问题，社会心理学家目前正在进行深入且卓有成效的讨论。现在也许就是严肃对待政治同质化所导致危机的黄金时期。 We have focused on social (and personality) psychology, but the problems we describe occur in other areas of psychology (Redding, 2001), as well as in other social sciences (Gross, 2013; Redding, 2013). 我们的焦点是社会（及人格）心理学，但我们所描述的问题也发生于心理学的其它领域（Redding, 2001），以及其它社会科学领域（Gross, 2013; Redding, 2013）。 Fortunately, psychology is uniquely well-prepared to rise to the challenge. The five core values of APA include “continual pursuit of excellence; knowledge and its application based upon methods of science; outstanding service to its members and to society; social justice, diversity and inclusion; ethical action in all that we do.” (APA, 2009). 幸运地是，心理学是唯一有准备来应对之个挑战的领域。美国心理学会的五大核心价值包括“不断追求卓越；基于科学方法的知识及其应用；对成员和社会的出色服务；社会正义、多元性和包容性；一切行动遵守伦理规范。”（APA, 2009）。 If discrimination against non-liberals exists at even half the level described in section 4 of this paper, and if this discrimination damages the quality of some psychological research, then all five core values are being betrayed. 如果针对非自由派的歧视存在，哪怕只达到本文第四部分所描述的一半水平，且如果这种歧视损害了某些心理学研究的质量，那就和五大核心价值背道而驰了。 Will psychologists tolerate and defend the status quo, or will psychology make the changes needed to realize its values and improve its science? Social psychology can and should lead the way. 心理学家会容忍并捍卫现状？还是心理学会作出必要改变，实现自己所珍视的价值，改进这一科学？社会心理学能够且应该带个好头。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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