【2016-08-24】 @whigzhou: 当前各国（特别是欧日）央行往系统里拼命灌钱、毫无节制抬高杠杆的劲头实在有点疯狂了吧，照这么买下去，流通中的企业债全进央行了，日本央行甚至直接买股票，到明年大企业都变国企了，想想不久前他们还在痛责私人银行家头脑发热，事实证明，论无视风险制造泡沫的胆量，有谁比得过政府呢？ ​​​​  

【2016-07-19】 @隐藏的火星人:我就想问辉总，兼顾后果和公平的最好的策略是什么，对待绿化 @whigzhou: 宪法容许范围内可做的很多，比如停止穆斯林移民，犯罪移民驱逐出境（像瑞士），取缔国内赞助恐怖主义的组织，禁止国内政治组织接受伊斯兰主义组织或政权（比如沙特政府）的捐款，在公职人员中展开忠诚调查（即麦卡锡行动） @whigzhou: 从佛罗里达Boca Raton伊斯兰中心 ([[ICBR]])的例子可看出有多少早该做事情没做，ICBR与恐怖组织的关系确凿无疑，毫不掩饰，十几年来屡屡被联邦政府抓包和定罪，却始终活得好好的，不久前还被棕榈滩县选为投票点，直到本次惨案发生遭大量抗议后才换地方 http://t.cn/RtzHREz @whigzhou: 类似例子比比皆是，几乎是常态 【2016-08-24】 @whigzhou: 终于有动作了  

【2016-08-22】 @海德沙龙: 《被遗忘的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀》 1979年底，由中国支持的毛主义政党津民盟（ZANU）和由苏联阵营支持的津人联（ZAPU）联手打败罗德西亚政权，和所有成功掌权的革命政党一样，津民盟上台之后随即将矛头指向津人联，展开了一场大屠杀，并于1987年将津人联吞并，30年后，屠夫们仍安然在位。  ​​​​ @whigzhou: 穆加贝到现在还没想明白，我做的这么干净利落——权也夺了，同志也洗了，土地都分了，白人全赶跑了，甚至连万恶的金钱也消灭干净了——为什么得奖的不是我？  

The Surprising Failure Of Food Labeling 食品标签的意外失败 作者:Omri Ben-Shahar @ 2016-06-28 译者:Shawn Lai(@NiGuoNiGuoNi) 校对:王涵秋 来源:promarket.org,https://promarket.org/surprising-failure-food-labeling/ If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information. 如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择，他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。 Food labeling is one of the least objectionable types of regulation bursting into the scene in recent decades. It is also one of the least successful.  It is also one of the least successful. 食品标签是近几十年来闯入市场的管制政策中争议最少的一种，同时也是最失败的一种。 The ongoing explosive debate about labeling foods produced from genetically engineered crops, known as GMOs, is a testament to how important food labeling is perceived. Congress is currently in the midst of tight legislative battle on the enactment of a national GMO labeling bill, to override state labeling laws. But GMO labeling is only one front in the food labeling agenda. 最近的关于标签转基因食品（也就是GMO）的火热争论证实了食品标签多么被看重。为了取代各州原有的标签法案，国会目前正处于一场关于制定全国性转基因标签法案的激烈立法战争之中。但是转基因标签只是食品标签议程表的一个方面。 “Labelists” (folks who embrace mandated labeling as an effective form of regulation) have successfully pushed for an assortment of food labels over the past two decades. Obamacare, for example, requires (as do many local laws) the prominent posting of calories in restaurants. “标签主义者”（那些认为强制性标签是一种有效管制的人）已经在过去二十年中成功推进了各种食物的标签立法。举例来说，奥巴马医改要求（很多地方法律也是如此）将食品的卡路里张贴在餐馆的显眼处。 First Lady Michelle Obama, a well-intentioned food labelist, is promoting what she regards as a labeling success—the “Nutrition Facts” chart found on every packaged food. Many cities in the U.S. have adopted a new hygiene labeling  for restaurants—mandatory signs displaying a sanitation grade of A, B, or C. 作为一个出于好意的食品标签主义者，第一夫人米歇尔·奥巴马正在推动一项她所认为的标签事业胜利的项目——在所有包装食品上标注“营养价值”表。很多美国城市都为餐馆采用了一种卫生标签——强制性地将卫生情况分为A, B, C。 And numerous other labels are mandated or proposed: country of origin labels, safe-handling labels, food justice, even “activity equivalent” labels that would tell consumers the number of minutes they would have to jog to burn the calories eaten! 除此之外，还有大量其他标签是强制性的或建议性的：原产地标签，安全使用标签，食品正义性标签【译注：证明食品的生产过程中不涉及不平等或违反人权的情况】，甚至还有告诉消费者需要慢跑多少分钟来消耗他们所摄入卡路里的“同等运动量”标签！ Big Hopes For Labels 寄托于标签的希望 There is a widespread belief that food labeling would do social good. The First Lady predicts that nutrition labeling will “make a big difference for families all across this country” and “help solve the problem of child obesity.” The NYC Commissioner of Health is confident that restaurant hygiene labels “gives restaurants the incentive to maintain the highest food safety practices.” And the Royal Society for Public Health in England claims that the activity-equivalent labels would “prompt people to be more mindful of the energy they consume” and “encourage them to be more physically active.” 很多人认为食品标签对社会有益。第一夫人预言营养标签会“对全国各地的家庭产生重大影响”并且“帮助解决儿童肥胖问题”。纽约市的卫生局局长确信餐馆的卫生标签“激励了餐馆保持最高的食品安全水平”。英国皇家公共卫生协会宣称“活动等同量”标签会“激励人们更多地关注他们所摄入的能量”并且“鼓励他们去更多地活动身体”。 It is easy to see why labelists hang such high hopes on labels. People are motivated to eat well, so if they make poor food choices it must be because they have poor information. The solution seems obvious: deliver simple information. This would offset the half-truths and misleading messages that food advertising and front-of-the-package claims make. Indeed, when surveyed, consumers often nod in agreement and support more labels and more information, further kindling labelists’ conviction in the value of their enterprise. 很容易看出为什么标签主义者在标签上寄托了那么多的希望。人们都想吃的好，所以如果他们在食品方面选择不当一定是因为他们得到的信息不到位。如此一来解决方案显而易见：传递全面的信息。这些会抵消食品广告和包装封面上的宣传所带来的误导。事实上，调查显示消费者通常也认同更多的标签和更多的信息，这进一步助长了标签主义者对他们事业的自信。 Disappointing Reality 令人失望的现实 But in reality there is little to celebrate: food labels don’t work! Study after study shows that labels have failed to promote even modest dietary improvements. Perhaps most surprising is the failure of calorie labeling. When fast food chains were ordered to post calorie counts, everyone expected a drop in calories consumed and in serving sizes. 但是事实上却没有什么好高兴的：食品标签根本没有用！大量研究显示标签根本没能推动哪怕一点膳食方面的进步。也许最让人吃惊的是卡路里标签的失败：当快餐连锁店被命令标注卡路里数值时，所有人都以为卡路里消费量和食物的大小都会下降。 But no! Research found almost no significant change. Even when minor reduction was spotted, it was not clinically meaningful. A modest exception is Starbucks: with labeling, customers were found to consume 6% fewer calories per transaction (interestingly, the effect is due to food, not beverage choices). 但是并不是这样。研究显示几乎没有显著变化。即使有微量的减少，也不具备任何临床上的意义。有一个不大不小的例外发生在星巴克：当使用标签时，消费者平均每单消费减少了6%的卡路里（有趣的是，这些变化是发生在食物而非饮料的选择上）。 But even such small effect does not carry over beyond the elite food market. Calorie labels have of no effect on low income people or on adolescents. A survey of all the evidence concludes “calorie labeling does not have the intended effect of decreasing calorie purchasing or consumption.” 但是即使是这么小的效果在高端食品市场以外却没有发生。卡路里标签在低收入群体和年轻人身上没有效果。一项证据完备的调查总结道：“卡路里标签没有达成预期的减少卡路里消费或摄入的效果。” Take another example, perhaps the crown jewel of food labelism: the Nutrition Data box on packaged food. It is widely thought successful, because people notice and use these labels to compare food products. It is even regarded a model for labeling reforms in other areas—a template for improved financial or data privacy disclosures. 举另一个也许是食品标签主义最核心的例子：包装食品上的营养数据表。这个标签被广泛认为是成功的，因为人们可以用这些标签去比较不同的食物产品。这甚至被认为是一个其他领域标签改革的模范——一个先进的金融或数据隐私公开的模版。 Unfortunately, despite their prominence, Nutrition Data labels have not delivered the desired effect. People might choose to eat fewer calories per meal, but then remain hungrier for snacks. Indeed, in the past generation—the time during which these labels were perfected—the number of average “eating occasions” per day increased from 3½ to 5, and the overall daily consumption of calories increased by 400. Not exactly a resounding success. 不幸的是，尽管非常出名，营养数据标签并没有起到想要得到的作用。人们可能会选择每餐摄入较少的卡路里，但是因此他们会更饥饿然后去吃零食。实际上，在上一代人中——那是标签最完美的时代——平均每天“进食次数”从3.5次上升到了5次，总计每天卡路里摄入量增加了400，可见这并不是一个令人瞩目的成功。 The disappointing performance of food labels is confirmed in other contexts. Despite early enthusiasm about the perceived success of restaurant hygiene grades in Los Angeles, newer and more comprehensive data collected by Stanford’s Daniel Ho suggests that grades have not made restaurants cleaner or reduced the incidence of foodborne illness. Similarly, the “organic” label had the unintended effect of lowering the quality of organic foods. And the list of failed labels and disclosures extends well beyond the food area, and has been documented thoroughly. 食品标签令人失望的表现也在其他背景下得到了证实。尽管人们对于早期洛杉矶餐馆的卫生评级方面的成功抱有极大的热枕，但由斯坦福大学的Daniel Ho搜集的更新的和更加全面的数据表明，卫生评级并没有让餐馆变得更加干净或是减少食物传播疾病的发生率。无独有偶，“有机”标签起到了降低有机食物质量的反作用。各种失败标签以及其他失败的公开信息的案例远不仅限于食品领域，并且被详细记录。 Beyond Food Labels 食品标签之外 If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information. Unlike choosing mortgages or colleges, choosing healthy food is not complicated. People have enough experience to know that a double cheeseburger with bacon (1400 calories at Hardee’s) is not healthy, even without labels that quantify this intuition. For many, the problem is commitment. Another diet book or better labeling is a superfluous response to what is at core a question of willpower. 如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择，他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。不同于选择贷款或大学，选择健康食物并不复杂。人们已经有足够的经验来判断一个夹了培根的双层芝士汉堡（在Hardee’s卖的那种有1400卡路里）并不健康，并不需要标签来量化这个直觉。对于大多数人，问题在于坚持。再多一本关于膳食的书或是更好的标签都是徒劳无功的，因为关键在于一个人的意志力。 Tax on unhealthy food may help, as it did with cigarettes, but also ignite too much political resentment. For consumers in under-served communities where obesity is prevalent, the problem is lack affordable supply of better food. Here, social policy should begin by improving access to grocery choices. 对不健康食物征税可能有用，正如同征税对减少吸烟有用一样，但是这同时引起了很多政治争端。对于那些住在超重问题普遍，生活不便的社区的人们来说，问题是缺少负担得起的健康食物的供应。在这种地方，社会政策应该始于增加购物的渠道。 But access is not enough. Healthy food has to be affordable, suggesting that some type of need-based subsidy is required. Access and subsidies are effective but expensive policies. They require budgets. This explains why labelism is winning the day: for the government, food labels are really cheap. 但是光有渠道不够。健康的食物必须不能太贵，这意味着有些基础需求的补贴是需要的。渠道和补贴确实有效，但是代价高昂，因此需要政府的预算。这解释了为什么现在标签主义占上风：对于政府来说，食品标签实在是太便宜了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

How Americans Got Red Meat Wrong 美国人对红肉的理解怎么错了 作者:Nina Teicholz @ 2014-06-02 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:The Atlantic,http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/how-americans-used-to-eat/371895/ Early diets in the country weren't as plant-based as you might think. 我国的早期饮食并不像你所想的那样以植物为主。 The idea that red meat is a principal dietary culprit has pervaded our national conversation for decades. We have been led to believe that we’ve strayed from a more perfect, less meat-filled past. Most prominently, when Senator McGovern announced his Senate committee’s report, called Dietary Goals, at a press conference in 1977, he expressed a gloomy outlook about where the American diet was heading. 几十年来，红肉乃饮食首恶的观念一直在我们国家的争论中普遍流行。有人告诉我们，现在我们已经偏离了过去那种更为健康、吃肉更少的传统。最出名的一件事是，在1977年一次媒体发布会上，参议员McGovern代表其所在的参院委员会宣读了名为《膳食指导》的报告。会上他曾对美国人饮食的演变提出了一种非常悲观的展望。 “Our diets have changed radically within the past 50 years,” he explained, “with great and often harmful effects on our health.” These were the “killer diseases,” said McGovern. The solution, he declared, was for Americans to return to the healthier, plant-based diet they once ate. “过去50年，我们的饮食发生了剧烈变化，”他解释道，“对我们的健康构成了巨大且往往是有害的影响。”McGovern还说，“这些都是致命的疾病”。他宣称，解决办法就是：美国人要回归他们以前食用的那种更为健康、以植物为主体的饮食。 The justification for this idea, that our ancestors lived mainly on fruits, vegetables, and grains, comes mainly from the USDA “food disappearance data.” The “disappearance” of food is an approximation of supply; most of it is probably being eaten, but much is wasted, too. Experts therefore acknowledge that the disappearance numbers are merely rough estimates of consumption. 我们的祖先主要吃水果、蔬菜和粮食，这种想法的依据主要来自美国农业部的“食物消散数据”。食物的“消散”只是供给量的近似值；其中大部分大概是被食用了，但也有许多是被浪费了。因此，专家们承认，食物消散数据只是对食物消费量的大概估计。 "I hold a family to be in a desperate way when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel." “我认为，如果一个主妇的猪肉桶都见底了，那这个家庭应该很窘迫。” The data from the early 1900s, which is what McGovern and others used, are known to be especially poor. Among other things, these data accounted only for the meat, dairy, and other fresh foods shipped across state lines in those early years, so anything produced and eaten locally, such as meat from a cow or eggs from chickens, would not have been included. McGovern和其他许多人使用的数据来自1900年代，这些数据质量之糟糕是出了名的。不说其他，这些数据只体现了早年间跨州贩卖的肉类、乳品和其他新鲜食物。因此，本地生产并消耗的一切东西，比如牛所产之肉或母鸡所产鸡蛋，都没有计算在内。 And since farmers made up more than a quarter of all workers during these years, local foods must have amounted to quite a lot. Experts agree that this early availability data are not adequate for serious use, yet they cite the numbers anyway, because no other data are available. And for the years before 1900, there are no “scientific” data at all. 由于那时候农牧民在劳动力中占到了四分之一强，因此本地食品总量必定相当大。尽管专家们同意，早期的这一食物可获得性数据并不能够用于严肃场合，可他们还是会引用这些数字，因为没有其他数据可用。至于1900年之前，那就根本没有任何“科学”数据了。 In the absence of scientific data, history can provide a picture of food consumption in the late-18th- to 19th-century in America. 尽管缺乏科学数据，但有关18世纪晚期至19世纪美国的食物消费，历史仍能给我们提供一幅画面。 Early Americans settlers were “indifferent” farmers, according to many accounts. They were fairly lazy in their efforts at both animal husbandry and agriculture, with “the grain fields, the meadows, the forests, the cattle, etc, treated with equal carelessness,” as one 18th-century Swedish visitor described—and there was little point in farming since meat was so readily available. 根据许多记录，早期的美洲殖民者都是“漫不经心”的农牧民。不管是在牲畜饲养，还是在农业种植方面，他们的工作都相当懒惰。正如18世纪一位瑞士访客所说，他们“对于粮田、牧场、森林和牲畜等等，都一样的随意对待”。由于肉食唾手可得，费力农牧也没多大意义。 Settlers recorded the extraordinary abundance of wild turkeys, ducks, grouse, pheasant, and more. Migrating flocks of birds would darken the skies for days. The tasty Eskimo curlew was apparently so fat that it would burst upon falling to the earth, covering the ground with a sort of fatty meat paste. (New Englanders called this now-extinct species the “doughbird.”) 在殖民者的笔下，此地的野生火鸡、鸭子、松鸡、野鸡等等都异常丰富。迁徙的鸟群遮天蔽日，好几天都没完。极北杓鹬美味可口，而且极为肥硕，掉到地上竟然还会炸开，能让泥土表面盖上一层肥腻的肉糊。（新英格兰人将这一现已灭绝的物种称作“面团鸟”。） In the woods, there were bears (prized for their fat), raccoons, bobo­links, opossums, hares, and virtual thickets of deer—so much that the colo­nists didn’t even bother hunting elk, moose, or bison, since hauling and conserving so much meat was considered too great an effort. A European traveler describing his visit to a Southern plantation noted that the food included beef, veal, mutton, venison, turkeys, and geese, but he does not mention a single vegetable. 森林里还有熊（因其肉肥而贵重）、浣熊、食米鸟、负鼠、野兔以及跟灌木一样密集的野鹿——猎物如此繁多，以至于殖民者都不愿意费力去捕杀麋鹿、驼鹿或野牛，因为他们觉得要把这么多肉拖回家保存实在太费劲了。一位造访南部某种植园的欧洲旅客提到，当地人的食物包括牛肉、小牛肉、羊肉、鹿肉、火鸡和鹅，他可没有提及任何一种蔬菜。 Infants were fed beef even before their teeth had grown in. The English novelist Anthony Trollope reported, during a trip to the United States in 1861, that Americans ate twice as much beef as did Englishmen. Charles Dickens, when he visited, wrote that “no breakfast was breakfast” without a T-bone steak. Apparently, starting a day on puffed wheat and low-fat milk—our “Breakfast of Champions!”—would not have been considered adequate even for a servant. 小孩子牙都还没长齐，就已经开始喂食牛肉。英国小说家Anthony Trollope于1861年造访美国后曾说，美国人所吃牛肉是英国人的两倍。Charles Dickens访美后则写道，如果没有一块T骨牛排，“早餐就不成其为早餐”。显然，即便是对仆人而言，早上吃点膨化小麦和低脂牛奶——我们的“早餐之冠”——也是不够的。 Indeed, for the first 250 years of American history, even the poor in the United States could afford meat or fish for every meal. The fact that the workers had so much access to meat was precisely why observers regarded the diet of the New World to be superior to that of the Old. 实际上，在美国人最初的250年历史中，即便是国内最穷的人，每顿也能吃得起肉或者鱼。劳动者如此容易吃上肉，这一事实正是当时的观察者认为新大陆饮食优于旧大陆的原因所在。 “I hold a family to be in a desperate way when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel,” says a frontier housewife in James Fenimore Cooper’s novel The Chainbearer. “我认为，如果一个主妇的猪肉桶都见底了，那这个家庭应该很窘迫。”在James Fenimore Cooper的小说《戴锁链的人》中，一位西部边疆家庭主妇如此说道。 In the book Putting Meat on the American Table, researcher Roger Horowitz scours the literature for data on how much meat Americans actually ate. A survey of 8,000 urban Americans in 1909 showed that the poorest among them ate 136 pounds a year, and the wealthiest more than 200 pounds. 研究者Roger Horowitz在其著作《把肉食端上美国餐桌》中四处搜求文献，想要找到美国人到底食用多少肉食的数据。1909年针对8000位美国城市居民的一份调查显示，受访者中最贫穷的每年食肉136磅，最富裕的则超过200磅。 A food budget published in the New York Tribune in 1851 allots two pounds of meat per day for a family of five. Even slaves at the turn of the 18th century were allocated an average of 150 pounds of meat a year. As Horowitz concludes, “These sources do give us some confidence in suggesting an average annual consumption of 150–200 pounds of meat per person in the nineteenth century.” 在1851年发表于《纽约论坛报》上的一份食品预算中，一个五口之家每天可以得到2磅肉。在18世纪初，即便是奴隶，每年平均也可以得到150磅肉。正如Horowitz所总结的，“这些资料让我们可以多少有点自信地推测：在19世纪，每年的人均肉食消耗量平均大概是150至200磅。” About 175 pounds of meat per person per year—compared to the roughly 100 pounds of meat per year that an average adult American eats today. And of that 100 pounds of meat, about half is poultry—chicken and turkey—whereas until the mid-20th century, chicken was considered a luxury meat, on the menu only for special occasions (chickens were valued mainly for their eggs). 也就是说，每人每年大概175磅肉。与之对比，平均每个成年美国人现在每年大概食肉100磅。在这100磅肉中，大概有一半是禽肉——即鸡肉和火鸡。与之相比，在20世纪中叶以前，鸡肉一直被视作为奢侈肉类，只在特殊场合才能进菜谱（母鸡因为能生蛋而价值颇高）。 Yet this drop in red meat consumption is the exact opposite of the picture we get from public authorities. A recent USDA report says that our consumption of meat is at a “record high,” and this impression is repeated in the media. 然而，红肉消耗量下降这一事实，与我们从公共权威那里得到的印象大相径庭。美国农业部近期的一份报告说，我们的肉食消耗量正处于“历史最高记录”，而且这一说法还在媒体上反复流传。 It implies that our health problems are associated with this rise in meat consumption, but these analyses are misleading because they lump together red meat and chicken into one category to show the growth of meat eating overall, when it’s just the chicken consumption that has gone up astronomically since the 1970s. The wider-lens picture is clearly that we eat far less red meat today than did our forefathers. 这一说法暗示，我们的健康问题与肉食消耗量增加有关。但是这种分析是误导性的，因为它们将红肉和鸡肉并为一类、混为一谈，以此来证明总体食肉量的增加。实际上，只有鸡肉消耗量才于1970年代以后出现了极大增长。把视野放宽的话，图景很清晰：今天我们所食用的红肉量远远不能与我们的祖先相比。 Meanwhile, also contrary to our common impression, early Americans appeared to eat few vegetables. Leafy greens had short growing seasons and were ultimately considered not worth the effort. And before large supermarket chains started importing kiwis from Australia and avocados from Israel, a regular supply of fruits and vegetables could hardly have been possible in America outside the growing season. 同时，还有一件事也与我们通常的印象相反，早期美国人似乎蔬菜吃得很少。绿叶蔬菜生长季节短，人们最终觉得它们不值得费心种植。而且在大型连锁超市为我们从澳大利亚进口猕猴桃、从以色列进口鳄梨之前，只要生长季节一过，要想在美国实现果蔬的常规供应就几乎不可能了。 Even in the warmer months, fruit and salad were avoided, for fear of cholera. (Only with the Civil War did the canning industry flourish, and then only for a handful of vegetables, the most common of which were sweet corn, tomatoes, and peas.) 即便是在温暖的月份，因为担心霍乱，人们也会避开水果和生吃蔬菜。（罐头行业只是内战以后才开始兴盛起来，而且那也只是罐装少量蔬菜，最常见的主要有甜玉米、西红柿和豌豆。） So it would be “incorrect to describe Americans as great eaters of either [fruits or vegetables],” wrote the historians Waverly Root and Rich­ard de Rochemont. Although a vegetarian movement did establish itself in the United States by 1870, the general mistrust of these fresh foods, which spoiled so easily and could carry disease, did not dissipate until after World War I, with the advent of the home refrigerator. By these accounts, for the first 250 years of American history, the entire nation would have earned a failing grade according to our modern mainstream nutritional advice. 所以，历史学家Waverly Root和Richard de Rochemont说，“认为美国人是水果或蔬菜的大量食用者，这种说法是错的”。尽管美国在1870年确实出现了一次素食运动，但美国人对这类非常容易腐烂、可能携带疾病的新鲜食物普遍存疑，这种疑虑直到一战以后随着家用冰箱的出现方才消散。根据这些资料，在美国历史的头250年，要是参照我们现在主流的营养学建议，整个国家得分都会不及格。 During all this time, however, heart disease was almost certainly rare. Reliable data from death certificates is not available, but other sources of information make a persuasive case against the widespread appearance of the disease before the early 1920s. 然而，在整个这一时期，心脏病几乎难得一见。基于死亡证明的可靠数据现在还没有，但其他方面的信息令人信服地证明，在1920年代前期以前，心脏病并没有大面积出现。 Fat intake rose 12 percent from 1909 to 1961, but it was owing to an increase in the supply of vegetable oils, which had recently been invented. 从1909年至1961年，脂肪摄入量提高了12%，但这是因为人类新近发明了植物油，其供给增加了。 Austin Flint, the most authoritative expert on heart disease in the United States, scoured the country for reports of heart abnormalities in the mid-1800s, yet reported that he had seen very few cases, despite running a busy practice in New York City. Nor did William Osler, one of the founding professors of Johns Hopkins Hospi­tal, report any cases of heart disease during the 1870s and eighties when working at Montreal General Hospital. 19世纪中期，美国最权威的心脏病专家Austin Flint曾在全国上下搜集心脏异常病例的报告，最后却说案例寥寥无几，尽管他当时在纽约的生意非常繁忙。约翰·霍普金斯医院的创始教授之一William Osler，在他于1870年代及1880年代在蒙特利尔综合医院工作期间，也未提及任何心脏病案例。 The first clinical description of coronary thrombosis came in 1912, and an authoritative textbook in 1915, Diseases of the Arteries including Angina Pectoris, makes no mention at all of coronary thrombosis. On the eve of World War I, the young Paul Dudley White, who later became President Eisenhower’s doctor, wrote that of his 700 male patients at Massachusetts General Hospital, only four reported chest pain, “even though there were plenty of them over 60 years of age then.” 关于冠状动脉血栓的首份临床描述出现于1912年，而1915年的一本权威教材——《动脉疾病及心绞痛》——则根本没有提及冠状动脉血栓。一战前夜，年轻的Paul Dudley White（后来曾为艾森豪威尔总统担任医生）写道，他在马萨诸塞综合医院的700名男性病人中，只有4个报告有胸痛，“尽管他们中许多人已经过了60岁年纪。” About one fifth of the U.S. population was over 50 years old in 1900. This number would seem to refute the familiar argument that people formerly didn’t live long enough for heart disease to emerge as an observable problem. Simply put, there were some 10 million Americans of a prime age for having a heart attack at the turn of the 20th century, but heart attacks appeared not to have been a common problem. 1900年，美国人口中大约有五分之一超过50岁。有种常见的论调认为，以前的人寿命不够长，所以心脏病根本还来不及成为一个显著问题。不过上述数字似乎能够驳斥这种论调。简单地说，在20世纪初，大约有1000万美国人已经到了容易发生心脏病的年纪，但那时候心脏病似乎并不是一个常见问题。 Ironically—or perhaps tellingly—the heart disease “epidemic” began after a period of exceptionally reduce meat eating. The publication of The Jungle, Upton Sinclair’s fictionalized exposé of the meatpacking industry, caused meat sales in the United States to fall by half in 1906, and they did not revive for another 20 years. 讽刺地是，或者说颇能说明问题的是，心脏病的“流行”发生在食肉量出现异常减少之后。Upton Sinclair出版的《屠宰场》一书以小说形式对肉类加工业进行了揭露曝光，导致1906年美国肉类销售量直接减半，此后20年都没能恢复。 In other words, meat eating went down just before coronary disease took off. Fat intake did rise during those years, from 1909 to 1961, when heart attacks surged, but this 12 percent increase in fat consumption was not due to a rise in animal fat. It was instead owing to an increase in the supply of vegetable oils, which had recently been invented. 换句话说，食肉量的减少恰好发生于冠心病猛增之前。1909年到1961年期间，当心脏病出现激增时，脂肪摄入量确实也增加了，但是脂肪消耗量上增加的这12%并不来自动物脂肪的增加。相反，它来自植物油供给的增加，后者新近才被发明出来。 Nevertheless, the idea that Americans once ate little meat and “mostly plants”—espoused by McGovern and a multitude of experts—continues to endure. And Americans have for decades now been instructed to go back to this earlier, “healthier” diet that seems, upon examination, never to have existed. 尽管如此，美国人过去吃肉很少、“主要吃植物”的观念——McGovern和许多专家都信奉这一点——还在继续流传。而且，过去几十年，美国人接受的指导一直是，他们应该回归这种更早、“更健康”的饮食。只不过，经验证发现，这种饮食习惯从未存在过。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden 窗户税：税收超额负担的一个案例 作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html For economists, the "excess burden" of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn't just the amount of money collected--it's also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the "window tax," first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows. 经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念：纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子，就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征，直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于，低收入人群就此选择生活在很少或没有窗户的房间里。 Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab review the history of the window tax and provide actual estimates of how it affected the number of windows per house in their article, "The Window Tax: A Case Study in Excess Burden," which appeared in the Winter 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (where I have toiled in the fields as Managing Editor since 1987). Wallace E. Oates 和Robert M. Schwab在《经济展望杂志》（2015/冬）的《窗户税：超额负担之案例分析》一文中回顾了窗户税历史，并给出了其影响家庭平均窗户数的估测值（我自1987年起担任杂志总编）。 The article popped back into my mind earlier this week when I learned that Oates, a highly distinguished economist based at the University of Maryland since 1979, died last week. One of Oates's specialties was the area of local public finance, and his 1972 book on Fiscal Federalism, is a classic of that subfield. 前几天，我听说Oates已于上周去世，心里不禁又浮现起这篇文章。这位卓越的经济学家自1979年起一直任教于马里兰大学。他擅长的领域之一是地方公共财政，其1972年出版的《财政联邦主义》正是这一领域中的经典。 Here are some facts about the historical window tax, courtesy of Oates and Schwab. 下面引用Oates与Schwab写到的一些历史。

• William III intended it as a temporary tax, just to help out with the overhang of costs from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the most recent war with France. But it ended up lasting 150 years.
• 威廉三世原本只是为了摆脱1688年光荣革命和上一次英法战争带来的财务超支而暂时实行窗户税，不料它最后却延续了150年。
• "An important feature of the tax was that it was levied on the occupant, not the owner of the dwelling. Thus, the renter, not the landlord, paid the tax. However, large tenement buildings in the cities, each with several apartments, were an exception. They were charged as single residences with the tax liability resting on the landlord. This led to especially wretched conditions for the poor in the cities, as landlords blocked up windows and constructed tenements without adequate light and ventilation ..."
• “该税的一个重要特征是：征收对象是住户而非房产所有者。因此，纳税人是租户而非房东。不过城区多套房公寓楼是例外。收税官将多套间整体看做单元住宅向房东征税。这就使得城市贫民的生活状况非常悲惨，因为房东们会把窗户封起来，所修套间的光照和通风都不足……”
• The window tax was thought of as improvement on the "hearth tax," that Charles II had imposed in 1662. "The tax was very unpopular in part because of the intrusive character of the assessment process. The `chimney-men' (as the assessors and tax collectors were called) had to enter the house to count the number of hearths and stoves, and there was great resentment against this invasion of the sanctity of the home. The window tax, in contrast, did not require access to the interior of the dwelling: the “window peepers” could count windows from the outside, thus simplifying the assessment procedure and obviating the need for an invasion of the interior."
• 窗户税是被当作“炉灶税”的一个改良版本而提出来的，后者由查理二世于1662年开征。“炉灶税极度招人厌，部分原因在于评估过程的侵犯性。‘烟囱工’（当时对估税员和收税员的称呼）必须进到房间里面数壁炉和火炉的数目。对于这种侵犯产权神圣性的做法，人们怨声载道。与之相比，窗户税则不需要进入住所内部：‘窥窗工’从外头就可以数清窗户数目，从而简化了评估程序，无需再闯进房内。”
• The window tax was intended as a visible measure of ability to pay: that is, a high-income person would live in a place with more windows than a low-income person. But at the time, it was widely recognized that windows were a very imperfect proxy for wealth. Adam Smith wrote about this problem of window tax in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations: “A house of ten pounds rent in the country may have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet so far as his contribution is regulated by the window-tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state.”
• 窗户税的本意是用有形的手段判断有支付能力的人：即高收入者所住之处的窗户多过低收入者。但在当时，普遍认为，拿窗户作为财富的表征并不十分完善。亚当·斯密1776年在《国富论》中就窗户税的这一问题写道：“乡间10镑租金的房屋，有时比伦敦500镑租金房屋的窗户还要多。前者的住户比后者的住户通常要穷得多，但尽管如此，只要是由窗户税来规定捐额，前者就得贡献更多金钱以支援国家。”
• When the rates on the window tax went up, it was common for owners of homes and apartments to block or build over many or all of their windows. The results on human well-being were severe. "A series of studies by physicians and others found that the unsanitary conditions resulting from the lack of proper ventilation and fresh air encouraged the propagation of numerous diseases such as dysentery, gangrene, and typhus. ... A series of petitions to Parliament resulted in the designation of commissioners and committees to study the problems of the window tax in the first half of the 19th century. In 1846, medical officers petitioned Parliament for the abolition of the window tax, pronouncing it to be `most injurious to the health, welfare, property, and industry of the poor, and of the community at large'."
• 一旦窗户税的税率上涨，宅子和公寓的所有者定会大量甚或全部封堵或筑死其窗户。人的福祉受到严重影响。“医疗工作者和其他许多人所做的一系列研究发现，缺乏适当通风和新鲜空气的不卫生环境，助长了如痢疾、坏疽和斑疹伤寒等众多疾病的蔓延……议会收到大量请愿书。于是在19世纪上半叶，众多专员和委员会得以受指派着手研究窗户税的问题。1846年，卫生部门官员向议会申请废除窗户税，称其‘对于贫民及整个社群的卫生、福祉、产权和勤勉极其有害’。”
• Here's Charles Dickens writing in 1850 about the window tax in Household Words, a magazine that he published for a number of years: “The adage ‘free as air’ has become obsolete by Act of Parliament. Neither air nor light have been free since the imposition of the window-tax. We are obliged to pay for what nature lavishly supplies to all, at so much per window per year; and the poor who cannot afford the expense are stinted in two of the most urgent necessities of life.”
• 1850年，查尔斯·狄更斯在他多年主持出版的杂志《家常话》中如此描写道：“‘像空气一样自由’这条谚语已经因议会而过时。自窗户税开征后，无论是空气还是光线都不曾免费过【译注：“自由”与“免费”的英文都是free】。我们被迫为大自然慷慨的恩赐付费，只要时间、窗户还在，而无法承担这笔开支的穷人，只能在这两样至关紧要的生活必需品上节约。”

Oates and Schwab work with a mix of data on the number of windows in a sample of houses in Shropshire and economic theory about household behavior when confronted with taxes to generate an admittedly rough estimate that on average, collecting a certain amount of money through the window tax created an excess burden--in terms of the costs of living in a place with fewer windows--equal to an additional 62% of the value of the tax. Oates和Schwab将什普罗郡样本住宅的窗户数据和面对个税居民行为经济理论结合起来，得出一个粗略的估计：整体说来，因窗户税那笔钱产生的超额负担——就人们选择住在窗户较少的住所这一行为成本而言——相当于税赋的62%。 Oates and Schwab ask why the window tax lasted so long, give its many problems, and offer an appropriately cynical answer: "Perhaps the lesson here is that when governments need to raise significant revenue, even a very bad tax can survive for a very long time." 既然窗户税问题如此之多，Oates和Schwab就追问为何它能持续如此之久。他们给出的回答是一种恰到好处的冷嘲：“也许，此处的教益就是，如果政府需要显著增加收入，那么即便是极为恶性的税种也能存活很长一段时间。” I didn't know Oates personally, but I had one other job-related interaction with him back. Along with his work in local public finance, Oates was also well-known as an environmental economist. His 1975 book, The Theory of Environmental Policy (written with William Baumol) was highly influential in setting the direction of what at the time was a fairly new and growing field. 我私下里和Oates并无深交，但之前曾因工作关系和他有过另外一次互动。除了在地方公共财政领域的成绩以外，Oates还以环境经济学家的身份知名。他1975年的著作《环境经济理论与政策设计》（与William Baumol合著）影响极大，为当时这个相当年轻、正在成长的领域设定了方向。 In 1995, Oates was a co-author in one of the most downloaded and cited exchanges the JEP has ever published on the subject of what is sometimes called the "Porter hypothesis." 1995年，以人称的“波特假说”为主题，Oates与人合作，为《经济学展望杂志》写了一篇文章，成为该刊史上下载和引用得最多的文章之一。 Michael Porter made the argument--bolstered by a large number of case studies, that when environmental goals are set in a strict way, but firms are allowed flexibility in how to achieve those goals in the context of a competitive market environment, firms often become quite innovative in meeting those environmental goals. 以大量案例研究为支撑，迈克尔·波特提出了如下论点：当环境目标被严格设定且企业在竞争中可以灵活发挥时，企业为达成这些目标通常会变得富有创造性。 Indeed, Porter argued that in a substantial number of cases, the innovations induced by the tough new environmental rules save enough money so that the rules end up imposing no economic costs at all. In the Fall 1995 Journal of Economic Perspectives, Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde make their case in "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship," (9:4, 97-118). 事实上，波特认为，在相当多的案例中，由严厉的环保新规所引发的创新能够省出足够的款项，使得这些规定最终不增加任何经济成本。在《经济展望杂志》1995/秋，波特和Claas van der Linde通过《环境/竞争力关系新概念一探》（9:4, 97-118）一文对此作了论述。 The authorial team of Karen Palmer, Wallace E. Oates, and Paul R. Portney respond in "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?" (9:4, 119-132). Oates and his co-authors took the position that while the costs of complying with environmental regulations do often turn out to be lower than industry predictions that were made when the rule was under discussion, it goes too far to say that environmental rules usually or generally don't impose costs. I wrote about some more recent evidence on this dispute in "Environmental Protection and Productivity Growth: Seeking the Tradeoff" (January 8, 2015). Karen Palmer、Wallace E. Oates和Paul R. Portney用《强化环保标准：收益/成本范式还是零成本范式？》（9:4, 119-132）一文做出回应。Oates和共同作者们的立场是：尽管遵守环保规制的成本最终总会低于起初制定时的业界预测，但却不能说它往往或一般情形下不会增加成本。我曾就此讨论提供了一些最新佐证，见《环境保护与生产率增长：寻找权衡》一文（2015-01-08） （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-08-21】 @whigzhou: 两宋之间温州一定发生了点什么……浙东学派，绍兴师爷，宁波帮商人，似乎都能从这张表里看出点苗头。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 这还是对各路解额施加了限制之后的情况，否则数字会更夸张。 @南洋首富: 二件事：1、永嘉学派大兴办学打下的基础。2、乾道二年特大水灾温州人死了一大半，空地吸引莆田泉州仙游移民，而闽南人热衷科举。永嘉学派的办学普及加上闽南移民带来的热衷科举文化，使温州进士大增。 @whigzhou: 受教受教～ @whigzhou: 贾志扬《宋代科举》//@Mr-Pudding:请问这是什么书？  

【2016-08-20】 @whigzhou: 对比两组数据挺有意思，左图是美国黑人比例最高的前10个城市（city），从84%到56%不等，右图是黑人比例最高的前10个都市区（metropolis），从48%到31%，左图蓝色数字是对应都市区的黑人比例，很明显，在这些城市，白人中产者基本上放弃了内城，这个趋势估计还会延续下去，最终产生一批黑人城市。 @whigzhou: 这些城市的共同特点是犯罪率极高，1/3-1/2的成年黑人男性被关在牢里，民主党长期垄断权力，福利计划一个接一个，政府开支和税率不断上涨，公立学校一团糟，大片街区沦为废墟，官僚机构腐败透顶…… @whigzhou: 这是内城/郊区的分化，类似的分化也发生在城市之间，未来也会发生在州与州之间。 @whigzhou: 有些城市通过土地管制、建筑管制和分区规划把房价抬的极高，也起到了挤出贫穷黑人的效果，过去二十年湾区的黑人比例就在下降 @whigzhou: 相对于现代文明生活，黑人确实有些弱点，但要是没有民主党过去半个世纪不遗余力地残害，也不至于落得这个地步 @whigzhou: 残害政策从两个方向同时下手：压制他们人性中所有积极向善的倾向，纵容娇惯他们所有坏的那些方面：用最低工资法剥夺工作机会，用福利救济削弱工作激励和家庭责任，用禁毒法施饵下套，用平权法强化种族身份，总统和司法部长赤膊上阵煽动种族对立……所有你能想到的把他们往坏里带的办法，全用上了 @路人萨维:辉总的意思是太傻了政策形同残害，还是故意的？ @whigzhou: 一开始应该不是故意的，毕竟谁都没有这样的远见，只是民主党惯于玩族裔政治而已，但那么多年过去，效果这么明显，再变本加利的坚持玩，就有点故意了 @whigzhou: 动员少数群体，强化族裔身份，玩族裔政治和裙带政治，是民主党的看家本领，看看坦慕尼协会的历史就很清楚 @whigzhou: 有人可能对60年代民主党180度大转身感到困惑，其实一点不奇怪，他们的族裔/身份政治把戏是一贯的，改变的只是选择哪些族裔/身份群体建立票仓 @whigzhou: 所以无论站在哪一边，他们决不能让黑人这个身份标签消失 @whigzhou: 对黑人来说，不幸的是，他们被挑中时，正是福利主义大跃进之际，结果就被坑惨了 @whigzhou: 当然黑人自身的弱点也起了作用，自律性、延迟满足、责任心方面，比起有着数千年文明历史的民族都差一些，因而福利主义和娇惯政策负面激励效果也更显著 @沉思之后：黑人自身的问题才是主因吧。即便没有民主党的政策，全世界哪个黑人主导的国家或地区繁荣了呢？反之，北欧以及荷兰福利主义和娇惯政策也不少，但是黑人少，也还在持续繁荣中 @whigzhou: 可是平权运动之前美国黑人的状况要好很多啊，非洲人自己未能建立好国家，不等于他们不能作为少数群体在已经建立的好国家中获得良好发展 @SenatusPopulusqueRomanus: 日耳曼人没有数千年文明史，埃及、巴比伦文明史最长。 @whigzhou: 日耳曼人的文明化进程少说也有一千五百年了吧 @whigzhou: 文明化不是全部（在何种文明中被文明化也很重要），但很关键，所有中东来源的移民群体中，波斯裔表现最好，不是没缘由的  

【2016-08-17】 @whigzhou: 《危险、担忧与公共政策》 某类危险的死亡几率越高，就越“值得担心”，也越值得在公共政策上得到优先处理？ @whigzhou: Pinker式乐观主义就是出于类似的无知，仅以死亡率/谋杀率之类简单数字衡量公共安全，忽略了安全问题的很多重要方面，举个简单例子：A/B两个城市谋杀率同为千分之五，A的谋杀案均匀分布于全市，B的全部集中于其第9区，两市市民对公共安全的感觉完全不同，而且这种不同十分合理。 @whigzhou: 再极端一点，假如B市的谋杀案全部属于黑帮火拼，那么该市良民就会（十分合理的）觉得这个城市非常安全 @whigzhou: 这就是为什么面向非特定人群的恐怖攻击，尽管造成的伤亡对社会总他杀率的贡献率很低，但仍足以引起恐慌，并值得被当作重大安全问题对待，的理由所在

【2016-08-14】 @whigzhou: 只有将竞争在性别间完全隔离，才可能让男女运动员拿到数量大致相同的奖牌，同理，必须实行某种（有形或无形的）种族隔离制度，才可能让各种族在职业竞技场上获得大致相同的报酬和晋升机会，现在你们大概明白平权法的精髓所在了吧？ @去了哪儿的人: 不知道为吗没有这样的言论——某族人居然一块金牌都没，种族歧视啊，领这种奖是一种侮辱。 @whigzhou: 更奇怪的是竟然没有人主张将赛事分成17个性别举行，可能是因为最近黄金太贵～  

【2017-08-11】 Google 做了他有生以来最下贱的一件事情。 ​​​​ Google那件事，我再多说几句，首先是两个事实：1）计算机科学和软件工程是择业倾向中男女对比最强烈的专业，这在几乎所有文明国家都一样，2）现实中，纠正这一差异的最有效办法是剥夺女性在其他领域的发展机会，比如沙特，计算机科学毕业生中女性比例高达59%，伊朗可能更高，详情可见nintil.com的系列帖子， 然后是一个哲学问题：3）假如一个身高1.40米的人进了某NBA球队，我们可能给予他比其他球员更多赞叹，而这一额外赞叹所基于的理由正是我们对如下事实的认识：身高小于1.50米的人篮球打得好的机会大大低于其他人， 同理，Damore所指出的事实本应成为人们对女程序员发出额外赞叹的理由，但有些人却认为这是认定Damore无法与女同事有效共事的理由。  

Looking Under Germany’s “Green” Hood 摘下德国的“小绿帽”看看 作者：Jamie Horgan @ 2016-05-27 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：babyface_claire (@许你疯不许你傻) 来源：The American Interest,http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/05/27/looking-under-germanys-green-hood/ Germany has tripled its renewable power production over the past decade. But how green is its energiewende, really? 过去十年间，德国可再生能源生产增加了三倍。但是，德国的“能源转型”（energiewende）到底有多绿色？ There’s no denying that the energiewende—Germany’s much ballyhooed and supposedly green energy transition—has accomplished a great deal in recent years, but whether the country (and the environment) is better off for it requires a closer examination. Let’s start with the good news and focus on the extraordinary growth of renewable energy in Germany over the past decade. 毫无疑问，“能源转型”——德国大肆宣扬的所谓绿色环保的能源转变计划——在过去数年间达成了很多目标，但该国（及其环境）是否因此而变好了，则需要更细致的考察。我们首先来看看好消息，关注一下过去十年间德国可再生能源的非凡增长。 According to data compiled in a recent briefing by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “[e]lectricity generated from renewable sources has tripled in Germany over the past 10 years.” Most of that added capacity has come from new wind and solar farms (a direct result of energiewende policies) and Berlin hopes to rely on renewables for more than four-fifths of its power by 2050—a remarkably ambitious goal. 根据美国能源情报署（EIA）最近发布的一份简报上搜集的数据，“过去十年间，德国的可再生能源发电量增加了三倍。”这种新增发电能力大部分来自于新建的风力发电厂和太阳能发电厂（这正是“能源转换”政策的直接成果），而且柏林还期望到2050年时其电力需求的五分之四能够依赖可再生能源——一个非常野心勃勃的目标。 But as much of a reach as that mid-century target appears to be, what Germany has already accomplished is nothing short of striking. Most of the time when we hear about the growth of renewables, the numbers only look impressive when you discuss them in terms of growth, and tend to pale in significance when you place them in the wider context of an energy mix. 虽然这个截至本世纪中叶的目标看起来很宏伟，但德国目前所取得的成绩也是十分夺目的。多数情况下，当我们听到可再生能源的发展时，只有在当你讨论增长时数字才令人印象深刻。如果把这些数字放到能源结构这一更大的背景中去，它的重要性往往就会相形见绌。 For example, there have been plenty of headlines recently about the stellar year renewables had here in the United States in 2015, with wind and solar respectively accounting for 41 and 26 percent of new electricity generation capacity. But looking under the hood, we find that after all of that growth, renewable energy sources still account for just 7 percent of our nation’s overall power generation (wind is at 4.7 percent while solar produces a measly 0.6 percent), a pittance next to real green workhorses like nuclear power (20 percent) or natural gas (33 percent). 比方说，我们已经在报纸上看过很多头条文章，谈论2015年是美国可再生能源的闪亮年份——风能和太阳能分别占到新增发电能力的41%和26%。但是揭开帽子一看，我们就会发现，在经历所有这些增长之后，可再生能源在全国发电总量中仍然只占有7%（风力发电占4.7%，而太阳能发电更是只有可怜的0.6%），与真正的绿色老马如核电（20%）或天然气（33%）相比差距甚远。 However in Germany, renewables contributed to a whopping 31 percent of electricity generation in 2015, and on particularly windy or sunny days that number spiked much higher. Environmentalists around the world are jumping up and down, pointing at this progress as evidence that renewables’ day has finally come. Still, most other countries aren’t exactly chomping at the bit to replicate energiewende strategies. Why is that? 但是在德国，可再生能源为2015年发电量贡献了31%，占比非常之高。而且，赶上风特别大或光照特别充足的日子，这个数字还能爬得更高。全球的环保主义者都手舞足蹈，认为这种变化正是可再生能源全盛之日终于来临的证据。然而，大部分其他国家却并没有迫不及待地想要复制“能源转型”这一战略。原因何在？ The growth of renewables didn’t occur because of market forces—wind and solar aren’t out-competing fossil fuels on price. Rather, Berlin had to subsidize their growth through the use of feed-in tariffs, which essentially guaranteed wind and solar producers privileged grid access and long-term, above-market rates for their power. The costs of these feed-in tariffs have been passed along to German consumers in the form of a green surcharge on their electricity bills. 因为，可再生能源的增加并不是市场作用的结果，风力和太阳能并不是通过价格优势而战胜化石燃料的。为了增加可再生能源发电量，柏林必须通过强制价回购政策（feed-in tariffs）对其进行补贴。这种补贴政策实质上为风力和太阳能发电厂提供了入网特权，并且让他们能在很长时间内以高于市场价的价格售电。这类强制价回购政策的成本被转嫁到德国消费者身上，他们的电费账单上因此增加了一种绿色附加费。 You don’t have to be a beltway insider to see how politically poisonous a policy predicated on higher power bills might be to leaders looking at their own energy mixes elsewhere in the world. At a time when oil and gas markets are fairly flooded with supplies and prices are correspondingly low, it’s an even harder sell for policymakers: “never mind that cheap (and relatively clean burning) natural gas. Here, have some expensive wind power.” 对于世界其他地方的政治领导人来说，面对他们国家的能源结构，这种只能由更高的电费账单才能维持的政策在政治上将会多么有害，你无需是个官场老手也能想明白。特别是，现在石油和天然气市场供给泛滥，因此价格相应很低，要说服政策制定者接受上述政策就更是难上加难了：“别理那些便宜（且相对而言更能清洁燃烧的）天然气了。来，用用更贵的风力发电。” These aren’t nominal price hikes, either. Feed-in tariffs double the average German household’s power bill, and according to the EIA, they’re spiraling up: 而且，这并非名义物价上涨。强制价回购政策使得德国家庭的平均电费上涨了一倍。根据EIA，目前它还在螺旋上升：

[O]ne surcharge for renewable electricity increased from 8.8% of the residential electricity price in 2010 to 17% in 2013…In 2014, the average sales-weighted retail price for residential consumption in Germany was about 35 cents/kWh, while the average residential retail price in the United States was about 13 cents/kWh. Along with Denmark, Germany has among the highest residential electricity prices in Europe. “民用电价格中因可再生能源而产生的一项附加费从2010年的8.8%上涨到2013年的17%……2014年，德国的民用电零售价格依销售额加权平均后为35美分/千瓦时，而美国的民用电平均零售价约为13美分/千瓦时。在民用电价格方面，德国与丹麦同居全欧之首。”

Cheap energy is foundational for economic growth, and expensive electricity can be seen as a regressive tax on poorer households. Upper class homes might not notice their power bill doubling as a result of green surcharges because it makes up a much smaller slice of their monthly budget, but for working class families the cumulative effect of paying off that eco-premium can be devastating. 廉价能源对于经济增长具有基础性作用，而昂贵的电费则可以被看作是加于贫困家庭身上的一种累退税。电费账单因为绿色附加费而上涨一倍，这一点上层阶级家庭可能不会注意到，因为电费在他们的每月开支中只占到很小一部分，但对于工人阶级家庭而言，持续支付这种生态附加费的累积后果则非常大。 And that’s just the beginning of the energiewende‘s problems. Wind and solar power are by their very nature intermittent energy sources, meaning they can only supply the grid when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining. That’s a big problem for grid operators, because above all else, society needs its electricity supply to be dependable. 而这在“能源转型”所面临的诸多问题中还只是个开头。就其性质而言，风能和太阳能都只是间歇性的能量来源，只有刮风或出太阳的时候才能给电网供电。这对电网运营企业来说是个大麻烦，因为社会需要其电力供应稳定可靠，这一点至关重要。 Moreover, wind and solar farms tend to be much smaller and more numerous than coal- or gas-fired power plants or nuclear reactors (more on those later). The inconsistency of these renewables and their more distributed siting pattern both pose big challenges to grids, and Germany hasn’t updated its electricity transmission systems at the same pace as it has incentivized the development of green energy. 另外，相较于燃煤或燃气发电厂或者核电站（下文再详述），风力发电厂和太阳能发电厂一般都更小、更多。这些可再生能源发电厂的不稳定，以及更为分散的选址，都对输电网带来了极大的挑战，而德国虽然一直在刺激绿色能源发展，但并没有同步更新其电力输送网络。 As you might expect, that’s proving problematic. As seems to be the case with any new energy project, NIMBY-ism reared its head. Local German communities vigorously protested the construction of high-voltage transmission lines that would have brought power from offshore wind farms in the Baltic and North Seas southward. 不难预料，这必定是个麻烦事。跟几乎任何新建能源项目都会遭遇的一样，邻避一族首先出来阻扰。为了将电力从位于波罗的海和北海海边的离岸风力发电厂往南输送，需要修建高压输电线，而这在德国遭到了各地方社区的猛烈抵制。 Grid problems extend beyond the country’s borders to Germany’s neighbors, too. The Czech Republic and Poland have had to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to protect their own grids from surging German power on those especially sunny and breezy days. As the Czech Permanent Representative to the EU, Martin Povejšil, put it last summer, “if there is a strong blow of the wind in the North, we get it, we have the blackout.” 电网问题还越过国界，影响到了德国的邻国。为了保护各自的电网抵御大风或烈日天气里来自德国的电压突增问题，捷克共和国和波兰都已经花费了数亿美元。捷克驻欧盟的常任代表Martin Povejšil去年夏天就说：“如果北欧刮大风，我们有体会，我们会停电。” As Germany’s energiewende leads it down that road to 80+ percent renewables, these intermittency issues will become even more extreme. To get an idea of just how unreliable the German power supply has become, intraday energy trading in the German power market is now too volatile for humans to keep up, so traders have to rely on algorithms to do their jobs for them. 随着德国的“能源转型”政策朝着可再生能源发电占比80%以上的目标一路进发，上述因发电间歇而导致的问题将会愈演愈烈。为了了解一下德国的电力供应已经变得多不稳定，我们可以看个例子。德国电力市场的当日能源交易波动之大，单凭人脑已经无法跟踪，所以交易员们只能依靠计算机算法来做事。 But wait! There’s more. In some bizarre twist of tortured green logic, Germany’s “clean” energy transition also included the shuttering of the country’s only source of baseload (read: consistent) source of zero-emissions power: its fleet of nuclear reactors. This move was hastened by the 2011 Fukushima disaster, despite the fact that Germany, unlike Japan, straddles no tectonic boundary and therefore faces none of the same environmental challenges that the island nation does. 等一下！这还没完。在扭曲的绿色逻辑的古怪推理之下，德国的“清洁”能源转型还包括关闭该国唯一的零排放基载（即稳定可靠）电力来源——核反应堆机组。因2011年福岛事件爆发，这一举动得以加速，尽管德国跟日本不同，并不位于任何地质构造边界之上，因此也并不面临日本这一岛国所面临的任何类似环境挑战。 Whether you ascribe Berlin’s decision to snub nuclear power to fear or base political pandering to clueless environmentalists that have long held an anti-nuclear bias, the end result has been a loss of clean power, and most of that lost capacity has been replaced by the dirtiest fossil fuel around, coal—and not just any coal, but one of the dirtiest varieties of the sooty rock called lignite. 不管你认为柏林作出停止核能发电的决策是出于恐惧还是出于对愚蠢的环保主义者（他们从来都在偏执地反对核能）的可耻政治迎合，最终结果都很明白，那就是清洁电力变少了，而损失的发电量绝大多数又是由各种化石燃料中最脏的一种来填补的，那就是煤——而且不仅仅是普通的煤，而是这类乌黑矿石中最脏的一种，叫做褐煤。 Coal accounted for a plurality of Germany’s power production last year, a whole 44 percent of it, and until researchers discover a technological fix for the intermittency of wind and solar power, there’s not a great deal renewables can do to encroach on Old King Coal’s fiefdom. 煤炭在德国去年的电力生产中占比最高，总共达到44%。而且，除非研究者找到了风力和太阳能发电间歇性问题的技术解决办法，否则可再生能源要想蚕食“煤炭老国王”的领地，恐怕将无处下手。 If Germany was really serious about working towards a clean energy mix, they’d be spending less on propping up today’s generation of renewables and more on the research and development of the next generation of wind turbines, solar panels, and energy storage options that could allow those green energy sources to compete with fossil fuels on their own merit. 如果德国确实真的想要塑造出一个清洁能源结构，他们就应该少在扶持这一代可再生能源发电上花钱，多在研究开发下一代风轮机、太阳能电池板和储能设备等方面花钱，以便这些绿色能源能够凭自身的长处和化石能源进行竞争。 If Germany was really interested in acting as an eco-friendly example for the rest of the world, it would be embracing nuclear power (and investing in the next generation of nuclear technologies) with both arms, rather than shunning it in favor of lignite coal. 如果德国确实真的有心想要为世界其他地方做一个生态友好的典范，它就应该张开手臂拥抱核能（并在下一代核技术上增加投资），而不是有意回避核能，偏向褐煤。 Berlin hoped to set an example for the world with its energiewende, and there’s no denying that it has done just that—ten years ago, most would have scoffed at the notion that Germany could grow its renewable power generation as quickly as it has. However the German example isn’t a positive one, but rather a cautionary tale to world leaders of what can happen when you let environmentalist biases guide strategic energy planning. 柏林意图将“能源转型”政策树立为全世界的典范，而且无可置辩实现了这一目的——十年前，如果有人说德国的可再生能源发电量增长速度会有实际这么快，大多数人都会嗤之以鼻。但是，德国的样本并不是正面的。对于世界各国的领导人来说，它更像是一则警示寓言，提醒他们一旦让环保主义偏见主导战略性能源规划会有什么后果。 We can applaud the motivations of the energiewende—creating a sustainable energy mix is going to be a top priority not just for Germany but for our species over the coming decades—while still criticizing the tools it has tried to use to accomplish that goal. Regrettably, for all the impressive (and costly) progress Germany has made growing its renewable energy sector, it hasn’t seriously committed itself to the pursuit of an actually sustainable energiewende, hype be damned. 我们赞赏“能源转型”政策的动机。在未来数十年内，创建一个可持续的能源结构不但将是德国，而且将是整个人类种族的头等大事。但是，我们仍然可以批评德国用以实现这一目标的工具。尽管德国的可再生能源部门取得了引人注目（且昂贵的）长足增长，但遗憾的是，德国并没有认真地致力于追求一个真正可持续的“能源转型”，该死的炒作！ （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好 Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US 作者：Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13 译者：Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/ Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates. 美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西，一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。 It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have more economic mobility than the US. But what we admire about Nordic countries frays when you dig into their wealthiest 1%. 北欧国家确实有着更平均的财富和收入分配。他们在经济流动性方面也比美国表现得更好。但是当我们深入了解北欧国家的那1%最富有的人群时，我们的上述赞誉便可能遭到严重动摇。 Economists Simon Halphen, Wojciech Kopczuk, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner studied wealth among Danes(pdf). They observed that the extraordinary mobility found at lower levels disappears once you get into the very top of the wealth distribution. 三位经济学家Simon Halphen,Wojciech Kopczuk和Claus Thustrup研究了丹麦人的财富。他们观察到，丹麦较富及以下阶层中能看到的那种极高的经济流动性，在财富金字塔的最高层是不存在的。 If you are born into a family in the top 1% of wealth, odds are pretty good, you’ll end up there too. They estimate having parents in the 1% makes you 18 times more likely to be in the top 1% yourself; the odds double if your grandparents and parents were also in the 1%. 如果你出生在前1%的最富裕家庭，那么你就很可能一直留在这一阶层直到离世。他们估计，如果你的父母属于最富1%，那你进入最富1%的可能性就会增加18倍；如果你的祖父母和父母都属于最富1%，那么这一可能性会再增加一倍。 Studies also find that if a man’s father was not in the 0.1% he can forget about reaching the 0.1% in Sweden. The very wealthy ranks in Sweden tend to be dominated by the same family dynasties each generation. 研究还发现，对于一个普通瑞典人来说，如果他父亲不在财富积累的前0.1%，那么他自己也就别想着进入这0.1%的群体了。瑞典的财富排行榜往往被同样的豪族世家一代代把持着。 Nordic tax policy protects the wealthiest 1% by placing very high taxes on income and, by American standards, modest taxes on large inheritances. The high income taxes make it harder for a successful Scandinavian entrepreneur to earn his way into the top 1%. The low inheritance taxes make it relatively easy to pass on large estates. In America, income taxes are lower, and estate taxes higher on wealthy fortunes are higher. 北欧的税收政策保护最富有的1%人群，这体现在所得税极高，而大额遗产税与美国标准相比则要轻些。高所得税把斯堪迪纳维亚的成功企业家们拦在了1%的大门外。相对较低的遗产税给巨额遗产继承提供了方便。相较之下，美国的所得税较轻，而越富裕的人群所面对的遗产税也越高。 Tax policy may make it harder for rich Americans to maintain a spot in the top 1% generation after generation. It is hard to make a simple comparison between Nordic countries because American tax returns don’t include wealth holdings until people die and taxes are paid on their estates. But there is some evidence the richest Americans are more likely to be self-made entrepreneurs rather than members of family dynasties. 这样的税收政策可能使得富有的美国人难以一代代保持住财富最顶端1%的位置。但我们很难将北欧国家同美国简单地做比较，因为美国的纳税申报表是直到纳税人离世后征收遗产税时才会将持有财富计入征收。不过有一些证据表明最富有的美国人更多是白手起家的企业家，而不是富豪世家的成员。 A study by Kopczuk and Lena Edlund looked at estate tax data and observed that there are fewer women in the top 0.01% than in the 1960s. They argue that this is evidence of more self-made people cracking the 0.01% because heirs are equally likely to be male or female, but successful entrepreneurs tend to be male. Kopczuk和Lena Edlund所做的一项针对遗产税数据的研究显示，现在（美国的）财富顶端0.01%的人群中女性比例比1960年代时更少了。他们认为这是许多白手起家的人们挤进0.01%财富榜的表现，因为财富继承人总是男女均衡的，而成功的（白手起家）企业家则往往是男性。 The turnover in America’s top 0.01% comes from some combination of new entrepreneurs accumulating more wealth than established wealthy families, multiple heirs dividing fortunes, and estate taxes eroding family fortunes (though Kopczuk cautions there’s a lot of tax evasion when it comes to inheritances). 美国财富顶端的0.01%的流动是多重因素作用的结果，包括新晋企业家财富积累速度比老牌富豪家族更快、多个继承人分割财富和遗产税对于家族财富的侵蚀等（虽然Kopczuk告诫称美国的遗产税方面有相当程度的漏税逃税情况）。 Since most of the population lives outside the 1%, the mobility among the poor and middle class in Scandinavia is enviable and probably more important. But if you think the biggest threat to the economy is wealth concentration among the 1% being limited to a few powerful families, Scandinavia is not the utopia people make it out to be. 由于绝大多数人群与1%无关，北欧地区的贫穷和中产阶层的高流动性确实值得羡慕，或许也更为重要。但是如果你认为经济发展所面临的最大威胁是财富金字塔的顶层被极少数世家豪族霸占，那么北欧国家着实不是人们期盼的乌托邦。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Half Of Ferguson's Young African-American Men Are Missing 弗格森的半数非洲裔年轻男子不见了 作者：Adam Ozimek @ 2015-03-18 译者：bear 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Forbes,http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2015/03/18/half-of-fergusons-young-african-american-men-are-missing/ Michael Brown’s tragic death, violent protests including the shootings of police officers, a Justice Department investigation describing a pattern and practice of discrimination in the Ferguson police department, and the resignation of six city officials, including the police chief, have focused attention on racial divisions in this St. Louis suburb.  The Justice Department investigation alleges that the lack of diversity in the Ferguson police department, only 4 of 54 commissioned officers are African American compared to 67% of the town’s population, undermines the community’s trust of law enforcement. 圣路易斯郡郊区小镇弗格森的种族分裂近来一直极受关注，起因包括一系列事件：麦克·布朗悲剧性的死亡，暴力示威、包括对警察的枪击，司法部调查认为弗格森警察局存在歧视惯例和行为，包括警长在内的6名市政官员辞职。司法部的调查结果声称，全社区对执法的信任度受损，是由于弗格森警察局内缺乏种族多样性：54名现任警官中仅有四名非洲裔美国人，而该镇67%的人口是非洲裔。 An important but unreported indicator of Ferguson’s dilemma is that half of young African American men are missing from the community.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, while there are 1,182 African American women between the ages of 25 and 34 living in Ferguson, there are only 577 African American men in this age group.  In other words there are more than two young black women for each young black man in Ferguson.  The problem of missing black men extends to other age groups.  More than 40% of black men in both the 20 to 24 and 35 to 54 age groups in Ferguson are missing. 关于弗格森困境，一个重要但未被报道的指标是，这一社区中有一半的黑人年轻男性消失无踪了。根据美国人口统计局的数据，有1182名25至34岁的黑人女性生活在弗格森，但同年龄段的黑人男性只有557名。换句话说，弗格森的黑人年轻人中，每名男性都对应着2名以上女性。黑人男性缺席的问题也出现在别的年龄段。20岁至24岁段和35岁至54岁段都有超过40%的黑人男性不见了。 It is worth noting that there are approximately equal numbers of African American boys and girls, under the age of 20, in Ferguson (2,332 boys and 2,341 girls).  What has happened to young African American men in Ferguson?  There are several possibilities.  First, the Census counts only the civilian population, and excludes individuals serving in the Armed Forces.  Second, tragically, some of these young men have already died.  Third, Census figures do not include individuals who are incarcerated at the time of the survey.  Finally, the Census Bureau may undercount homeless men, men who are marginally attached to the community, and men who are primarily engaged in criminal behavior. 值得注意的是，黑人男孩和女孩的数量几乎是相等的，在20岁以下年龄段，弗格森有2332名黑人男孩和2341名黑人女孩。弗格森的年轻黑人男性到底去哪了？有几种可能。第一，统计局的数据仅仅包括了平民，不包括军中服役的。第二，十分悲惨，其中一些年轻男性已经死了。第三，人口统计数据没有包括调查时正在服刑的人员。最后，人口统计局低估了流浪汉的数量，这些男性生活在社会边缘，大多数都涉及犯罪活动。 While the problem of missing African American men is especially severe in Ferguson, young black men are absent from most U.S. cities.  In the neighboring cities of East St. Louis, IL and St. Louis, about 38% and 24% of African American men age 25 to 34 are absent from their communities, respectively.  On average, about 18 percent of young African American men are absent from large cities.  (This calculation is based on the combined population of 33 cities with the largest African American populations, home to about one quarter of African Americans in the U.S.)  In contrast, outside of large cities only about 4% of young black men are absent from their communities.  The challenges posed by an absence of black men in Ferguson are problems faced primarily by larger cities. 尽管黑人男性缺席问题在弗格森特别严重，但在大多数美国城市中，年轻黑人男性消失无踪的情况都存在。在伊利诺斯州的东圣路易斯市和圣路易斯市两个临近城市中，社区里分别大约有38%和24%的25至34岁黑人男性消失了。平均而言，大城市中大约有18%的年轻黑人男性缺席。（这个结果是根据33个黑人人口最多的城市计算出来的，覆盖了大约美国四分之一的非洲裔人口）作为对比，在大城市之外，只有4%的年轻黑人男性不在其社区之内。弗格森这种因年轻黑人男性缺席而造成的挑战，主要是较大城市面临的问题。 Outside of large cities the absence of young African American men is explained by gender differences in mortality rates and military service.  Almost two percent of African Americans between the ages of 25 and 34 are in the active military, and about 85% are men, so military service can explain a two percent shortfall in the civilian black male population. 除开大城市以外，其他地方的年轻黑人男性缺席现象可以用死亡率和军队服役上的性别差异来解释。25至34岁的美国黑人中，有大约2%在军中服役，其中约85%是男性，所以军队服役状况能够解释2%的男性黑人平民的数量差额。 Vital Statistics data indicate that about 96% of African American men will survive to the age of 30 compared to 98% of women.  Shorter life expectancies can explain why an additional two percent of young African American men are missing.  After adjustments for gender differences in mortality rates and military service, 14% of African American men age 25 to 34 are missing from our largest cities, and 47% are missing from Ferguson. 人口动态统计数据显示，大约有96%的美国黑人男性能活到30岁，而女性则有98%。男性相对更短的预期寿命可以再解释两个百分点的年轻黑人男性缺席现象。基于死亡率和军中服役状况上的性别差异进行调整后，我国大城市中有14%的25至34岁的黑人男性缺席，而弗格森则达47%。 Incarceration is the primary reason why young black men are missing from our largest cities.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics about 9.4% of African American men age 25 to 34 are incarcerated, compared to 0.6% of African American women.  However, an incredibly high incarceration rate would be necessary to account for all of Ferguson’s missing young black men.  Ferguson’s challenge is likely the result of a combination of problems including incarceration, criminal behavior, homelessness and substance abuse. 服刑是我国大城市中年轻黑人男性缺席的主要原因。根据司法统计局的数据，大约9.4%的25至34岁美国黑人男性正在服刑，而黑人女性则只有0.6%。然而，只有高到令人难以置信的服刑率，才能够解释弗格森年轻黑人男性缺席的总量。弗格森面临的挑战可能是一系列麻烦综合导致的结果，包括服刑、犯罪行为、无家可归和滥用药物。 It will be difficult for Ferguson to prosper economically as long as half of young black men are absent from the community.  According to Census data 60% of households with children in Ferguson are headed by women and 48% of these female-headed households are below the poverty line. 只要社区中始终有一半的年轻黑人男性不见踪影，弗格森的经济发展就会很困难。根据人口统计数据，在弗格森，60%的有孩子家庭由妇女当家，而这些由妇女当家的家庭中又有48%生活在贫困线以下。 Although the Justice Department views the racial disparity among Ferguson’s police officers as a potential cause of racial unrest in the community, the dearth of black police officers is also a consequence of the socioeconomic problems facing Ferguson’s African American community.  While there have been important changes in the past few decades, law enforcement is an occupation disproportionately represented by younger men.  According to the Census Bureau over 85% of police officers in the U.S. are men and only 13% are age 55 and above. 尽管司法部认为弗格森警察构成中的种族不平衡是该社区内种族矛盾的潜在原因之一，但黑人警察不足也是弗格森的黑人社区所面临的社会经济问题的结果。尽管在过去几十年有一些重大的改变，但执法行业依旧不成比例地由年轻男性主导。根据人口统计局，超过85%的美国警察是男性，只有13%是55岁以上的。 As Ferguson strives to achieve greater racial diversity in its police force, one of the first problems civic leaders will face is a shortage of young African American men from Ferguson who can fill positions in the police department.  Many of the socioeconomic problems that have caused these young men to be absent from their community will also make it difficult, if not impossible, for these men to pursue a career in law enforcement. 弗格森正在努力强化其警力配置中的种族多样性，但是，市政领导人将要面临的一个头等难题是：弗格森没有足够的年轻黑人男性来充任警察局的岗位。导致这些年轻人在各自社区中缺席的社会经济问题，同样也会使这些男性很难去从事执法行业，如果不是不可能的话。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

New documents allege Mugabe’s complicity in 1980s massacres 新文档指证穆加贝参与了80年代的一系列屠杀 作者：STUART DORAN @ 2015-05-18 译者：Tankman 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Dailymaverick,http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-05-18-new-documents-allege-mugabes-complicity-in-1980s-massacres/#.V0ShIfkrKwU Thousands of historical documents are becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and allege what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of Matabeleland's mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 导言：海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文档涉及多个领域，并指证了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并得以系统性实施的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的主要策划者。

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From January 1983, a campaign of terror was waged against the Ndebele people of western Zimbabwe, an outbreak of obscene violence that remains the darkest period in the country’s post-independence history, notwithstanding the bloody notoriety of the last decade-and-a-half. 自1983年一月，一场针对津巴布韦西部恩德贝勒人的恐怖运动被发起，这是一场不堪入目的暴行的开端，至今仍是这个国家独立后历史中最黑暗的时期。尽管该国近十五年来的历史之血腥也已臭名昭著。【译注：2000年该国政府启动了强制土改政策。】 But now, the new light is being shed on these days of horror. 但是现在，这些恐怖的岁月正被重新审视。 Thousands of historical documents that appear to expose the perpetrators are now becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and include, among others, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence assessments and raw intelligence garnered by spies recruited from within the Zimbabwean government. 海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文件似乎揭示了屠杀的真凶。这些文件涉及多个领域，包括但不限于：外交文书，情报评估和津巴布韦政府内部线人收集的原始情报。 These papers—augmented by the testimony of Zimbabwean witnesses finding courage in old age—appear to substantiate what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 一些津巴布韦目击者在晚年鼓起勇气做出的证言进一步增加了这些文档的分量。目前看来，这些文件证实了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并被系统实施的大屠杀的主要策划者。 The documents appear to show that the massacres were closely associated with an effort by Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party to eliminate opposition groups in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s independence. Zapu, a party led by nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, represented the main obstacle to that objective. Given that Zapu enjoyed overwhelming support among Ndebele, the Ndebele as a whole came to be seen as an impediment. In the words of Mugabe, the people of Matabeleland needed to be “re-educated”. 这些文件似乎表明，大屠杀和穆加贝的政党——津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线（简称津民盟）——在国家独立后试图消灭反对派的努力紧密相连。津巴布韦非洲人民联盟（简称津人联）是由对手、民族主义者加西亚·恩科莫领导的政党，是津民盟达到该目标的主要障碍。津人联在恩德贝勒人中拥有压倒性优势，故而恩德贝勒人整体被视作一种障碍。按照穆加贝自己的话说，马塔贝莱兰当地人需要被“再教育”。 The little that Mugabe has said since the 1980s on this taboo subject has been a mixture of obfuscation and denial. The closest he has come to admitting any form of official responsibility was at the death of Nkomo (1999), when he remarked that the early 1980s was a “moment of madness”—an ambivalent statement that perhaps reflected a fear of Ngozi (avenging spirits) more than anything else and one he has not repeated. More recently, he blamed the killings on armed bandits who were allegedly coordinated by Zapu (the original smokescreen) along with occasional indiscipline among soldiers of the army’s North Korean-trained 5 Brigade. 自1980年代以来，穆加贝甚少谈及这个禁忌话题。他对此事的稀少评论，其实是混淆和否认的混合物。他最接近于承认官方对屠杀负有任何责任的一次，是在恩科莫1999年过世时。当时他评论说，八十年代早期是个“疯狂时刻”——这个暧昧的表述也许反映了他对怨灵复仇的恐惧甚于其他任何事，而且此后他也再未提过。后来，他将杀戮的责任归咎于据称由津人联负责协调的武装土匪（这是最早释放的迷雾），以及军队第五旅士兵偶发的违纪行为，该旅是朝鲜训练出来的。 In the documents, his alleged co-conspirators tell a different story. In doing so, they controvert theories that Mugabe was poorly informed about the activities of errant subordinates. By March 1983, when news of the atrocities had leaked, prompting Western ambassadors and others to ask awkward questions, government ministers who were overseeing the operation quickly pointed to Mugabe, documents allege. 在文档中，穆加贝所称的阴谋分子讲述了一个不同的故事。他们否定了有关穆加贝对下属违纪行为知之甚少的说法。文档称，到1983年3月，暴行的消息已经走漏，促使西方大使们和其他人问起令人尴尬的问题，监督行动的政府部长们很快指向穆加贝。 Sydney Sekeramayi, the minister in Mugabe’s office with responsibility for Defence, was one. In a conversation with Cephas Msipa, one of the few remaining Zapu ministers of what had been a government of national unity, Sekeramayi, said that “not only was Mugabe fully aware of what was going on—what the 5th Brigade was doing was under Mugabe’s explicit orders.” Msipa later relayed this discussion to the Australian High Commission, which in turn reported it to headquarters in Canberra. 悉尼·塞克拉马伊，穆加贝内阁负责防务的部长，是其中之一。矶法·姆西帕是早先的联合政府中仍在位的少数几个津人联部长之一，在一次与他的对话中，塞克拉马伊说穆加贝“不仅完全知道事件的状况——而且第五旅的所为乃是基于穆加贝的明确命令。”之后姆西帕把这次讨论发送给澳大利亚高级专员公署，后者随即向堪培拉总部做了报告。 Msipa appears to be a credible witness in view of his amicable relationship with Mugabe. He had, for instance, shared a room with Mugabe for two years during their earlier career as teachers. Msipa had also welcomed Mugabe into his home when the latter returned from Ghana in 1960 and joined the struggle against white rule. 从和穆加贝的友好关系来看，姆西帕似乎应是可信的证人。例如，在两人早年一起当教师时，他和穆加贝做过两年室友。1960年，穆加贝从加纳回国加入反对白人统治的斗争时，姆西帕也欢迎他住在自己家。 Between 1980 and 1982, when tensions were rising between Zapu and Zanu, Msipa had served as a regular go-between and had spoken to Mugabe often. He continued to do so during the killings. Within Zapu, Msipa, a Shona-speaker, had consistently advocated amalgamation with Zanu, a line that had attracted the ire of Ndebele-speaking colleagues. 在1980年到1982年间，当津人联和津民盟关系紧张时，姆西帕常常作为一位中间人，频繁的和穆加贝对话。他在屠杀期间也继续这么做。在津人联中，姆西帕作为说绍纳语的一位，一贯支持和津民盟的合并，这一立场曾引起了很多说恩德贝勒语的同事的愤怒。 He was, therefore, considerably more sympathetic to Zanu and its leader than most in Zapu. And yet, after speaking to Sekeramayi and others in Zanu, he was convinced (as he told the Australians) that “the Prime Minister was right behind what had been happening in Matabeleland.” He added that he had never before had such a “crisis of my conscience” about remaining in government. 所以相比于大多数津人联成员，他明显更加同情津民盟及其领导人。然而，在和塞克拉马伊和一些津民盟成员对话之后，他确信（正如他告诉澳大利亚方面的那样）“站在马塔贝莱兰事件后面的正是总理。”他补充道：对于留在政府内任职，他以前从未有过现在这样严重的“良心挣扎”。 Sekeramayi was more circumspect in direct discussions with Western representatives, but nevertheless made clear that the massacres were no accident. The “army had had to act ‘hard’”, he told the British defence attaché, “but … the situation was now under control”. Later, Sekeramayi admitted to the British High Commissioner that “there had been atrocities”. 塞克拉马伊在直接和西方社会代表讨论此事时说话更为谨慎，但他还是很清楚地表明，大屠杀不是意外事件。“军队不得不采取‘酷烈’行动”，他告诉英国武官，“但是……现在形势已经得到了控制”。后来，塞克拉马伊向英国高级专员公署承认“曾有暴行发生”。 The documents also record that Msipa talked to other members of Zanu who revealed that the killings were not simply the whim of a small coterie, but the result of a formal and broad-based decision by the leadership of Zanu-PF. Eddison Zvobgo, a member of Zanu’s 20-member policy-making body, spoke of a “decision of the Central Committee that there had to be a ‘massacre’ of Ndebeles”. That statement squared precisely with 5 Brigade’s ethnocentric modus operandi. 文档也记录了姆西帕和其他津民联成员的谈话，那些成员揭露出屠杀绝不是一个小团伙的心血来潮，而是出自津民联领导层正式且广泛认同的决定。艾迪森·祖沃布戈，津民盟的二十人决策层之一，提到了一份“中央委员会的决定：必须要有一场针对恩德贝勒人的‘屠杀’”。这一说法和第五旅种族中心主义的作案手法完全吻合。 Mugabe’s heir apparent, the current First Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was a member of the Central Committee. But so, too, were others who have subsequently developed a reputation for moderation, not least because of their latter-day rivalry with Mnangagwa. Former Vice President Joice Mujuru heads that list. 穆加贝的指定继承人，现任第一副总统的埃默森·姆南加古瓦曾是中央委员会的一员。当然，后来展现出温和形象的许多其他人当时也在中央委员会中，他们之所以变温和，相当程度是因为他们此后需要与姆南加古瓦竞争。前副总统乔伊斯·穆朱鲁在这份名单上居首位。 The army commanders who directed the killings, many of whom still retain key positions in a security sector that underwrites the regime, are also shown in the documents to have been eager accomplices. Zvobgo commented that the first commander of 5 Brigade, Perence Shiri, had said the “politicians should leave it to us” with regard to “settling things in Matabeleland”. 文件也曝光了指导屠杀的部队司令官是积极的从犯，其中不少人仍然在强力部门身居高位，维持着这个政权的统治。祖沃布戈提到第五旅的司令官佩伦斯·希里曾说过，对于“搞定在马塔贝莱兰的事情”，“政治家们应该交给我们去做”。 Shiri is now the head of Zimbabwe’s air force. 希里目前是津巴布韦的空军司令。 Testimony from witnesses provides evidence that Shiri worked closely with many former members of Mugabe’s guerilla army, Zanla, notwithstanding a myth that 5 Brigade operated separately from the rest of the army. Those who assisted Shiri allegedly included the now chief of Zimbabwe’s defence forces, Constantine Chiwenga, who was this month awarded a doctorate in ethics by the University of KwaZulu–Natal. 证人证言提供证据说明：希里曾和许多穆加贝游击部队——津巴布韦民族解放军——的前成员密切共事，尽管仍有传言说第五旅是脱离全军单独行动的。那些据称曾协助希里的人包括现任津巴布韦国防部长康斯坦丁·奇温加。他在这个月被夸祖鲁－纳塔尔大学授予了伦理学博士学位。 During the killings, Shiri frequently consulted with Chiwenga, who was then using the nom de guerre Dominic Chinenge and was head of 1 Brigade based in Bulawayo. Chiwenga’s unit also provided a range of practical assistance, including logistical support for 5 Brigade and a base from which Shiri’s men operated when they made punitive raids on Bulawayo’s townships. 在屠杀期间，希里经常向奇温加请教，后者那时化名多米尼克·奇内格，是驻扎在布拉瓦约的第一旅的旅长。奇温加的部队也提供了各种实际支持，包括对第五旅的后勤支持，以及在希里士兵向布拉瓦约的城镇发动惩戒性打击时，为其提供基地。 The first six weeks of 5 Brigade’s attacks were massive in their intensity, but the documentary record shows that an order was given to curtail this phase after news of the massacres began to leak to the outside world. However, the killing did not end, but was instead scaled back and conducted in a more covert manner. 在第五旅袭击的头六周，攻击的烈度极大。但文档记录显示，当大屠杀的消息开始往外界泄露时，上面有命令要求进行收缩。然而，屠杀并没有终止，只是缩小了规模，采取了更秘密的形式。 Estimates of the death toll are frequently put at 20,000, a figure first mooted by Nkomo when the campaign was still underway. But on-the-ground surveys have been piecemeal and vast areas of Matabeleland remain under-researched. Fear and the death of many witnesses provide further challenges. 通常的估计认为死者有约两万人，这个数字最早是恩科莫提出来的，当时屠杀还在进行中。然而现场调查一直是零星散乱的，而且马塔贝莱兰很大部分区域仍未被调查。人们的恐惧，加之很多目击者死亡，也增加了调查难度。 A forensically-accurate number will never be possible, yet it seems possible that the standard estimate is too conservative. Oral testimony from Zimbabweans who were in key government positions during the 1980s disinters a host of killings that were previously unknown. Cumulatively, this testimony suggests that the breadth of the violence and the extent of official involvement could have been significantly underestimated. 一个法医学标准的精确数字也许永远不可能得到，然而通常的估计可能太过保守。1980年代在津巴布韦政府重要岗位任职的一批人的口头证言揭示了许多以前不为人知的杀戮事件。总的来说，这证言暗示暴力的程度和官方牵涉的程度可能被显著低估了。 Observers have always wondered how much of this was known to Western governments—and what they did about it. It is clear from the documents that they knew a great deal, even if some of the detail remained obscure. It is also clear that the polite questions asked by diplomats were—along with courageous representations by churchmen and their allies in Zimbabwe—pivotal to the government’s decision to reduce the violence. 观察家一直好奇于对此事西方社会的政府已经知晓多少？他们对此又做了什么？文档显示，他们无疑知道很多，即使细节仍不清楚。文档也很清楚的表明，外交官有礼节的质询，和教会人士及其津巴布韦盟友们的勇敢发声，这些是政府决定收敛暴行的关键。 Up to that point, there was no indication that the brutal force of the massacres would be curtailed. Nevertheless, Western governments did little once the massacres were brought down to a lower, but still savage, intensity. Perhaps as a sign that Western censure had its limits, the campaign in Matabeleland North continued during the remainder of 1983; 5 Brigade was redeployed further south in 1984. 到那时为止，没有迹象表明当时大屠杀的野蛮暴力会终止。但是一旦大屠杀的烈度变低，即使其仍然残酷，西方社会的政府却没什么作为了。在1983年剩下的时间，北马塔贝莱兰省的战争一直在持续，这仿佛代表了西方抗议的局限性；第五旅在1984年被重新部署到更南部。 It is a fact that the Western response to violence toward black countrymen in the 1980s was a pale shadow of the reaction to his attack on white farmers in 2000. Many Ndebele remain bitter about this inconsistency. While historians debate the dimensions of Zanu’s violence, for Western policy-makers and the domestic constituencies that are meant to hold them to account there's a need to reflect again on the price of inconsistency in the developing world. Aside from the human cost, Western advocacy of democracy and international justice will continue to be viewed with skepticism while such glaring contradictions remain. 事实上，西方对2000年时穆加贝袭击白人农场主做出了强烈反应，与之相比，他们在1980年代针对黑人村民所遭受暴行的反应要小得多。许多恩德贝勒人仍对这种前后不一心怀怨愤。当历史学家争辩津民盟暴力的程度时，西方的政策制定者和想让他们承担责任的国内选民则需要再次反思这种在发展中国家采取双重标准的代价。如果这么显眼的自相矛盾继续存在，除了生命成本外，西方对民主和国际正义的支持也会继续被人怀疑。 At the same time, an inordinate focus on the international dimensions of the Matabeleland massacres is to miss the point. Mugabe has instinctively sought to racialise and internationalise internal controversies of which he is the principal author or to invoke the spectre of neo-colonialism in the hope of support from fellow African leaders. 同时，对马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的关注过多聚焦于国际视角，这没有切中要害。出于本能，穆加贝常把主要由他引起的国内争端国际化和种族化，或者试图召唤新殖民主义的幽灵，希望借此获得非洲领袖们的支持。 Zimbabwe’s Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko recently made the claim that the Matabeleland massacres were “conspiracy of the West” and that Mugabe had nothing to do with them. Yet the new documentary material appears to underline once more that post-independence Zimbabwe’s greatest crimes and deepest wounds lie squarely at the feet of Mugabe and Zanu-PF. 津巴布韦的第二副总统费列克佐拉·姆波科最近声明：马塔贝莱兰大屠杀是“西方的阴谋”，穆加贝和此事没有任何干系。然而新的文档材料似乎再次昭示穆加贝和津民盟－爱国阵线应该为津巴布韦独立后最大的罪行和最深的创伤负责。 The documents appear to show that the killings were an internal affair, neither provoked nor sustained by outsiders, and that the atrocities were driven from the top by Zanu-PF in pursuit of specific political objectives. 现在看来，文档揭示了屠杀是个内政事件，并非由外部力量发起或支持，而且是津民盟－爱国阵线的领袖为了达到特定政治目的而发动。 Viewed across a period of several years and hundreds of files, the documents appear to provide evidence that—far from being a “moment of madness” in which supporters of rival parties went at each other— the massacres were but one component of a sustained and strategic effort to remove all political opposition within five years of independence, as Zanu leaders were determined to secure a “victory” against non-existent opposition in elections scheduled for 1985, after which there would be a “mandate” from the people to impose a one-party state. 经几年时间把数百份文件放在一起审阅，文档似乎证明了大屠杀绝对不是所谓的对立政党支持者相互攻击的“疯狂时刻”。津民盟领袖决意要压制尚未出现的反对，确保在计划于1985年举行的大选中“取得胜利”，以便之后顺应“人民的选择”施行一党专制，因此，大屠杀只是独立后五年内消灭一切政治反对派的持续行为和战略努力中的一环。 Dr Stuart Doran is an independent historian and author of a forthcoming book based on the new documentary material—Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, Zanu and the quest for supremacy, 1960–87. 【作者】斯图加特·道朗博士是一位独立历史学家，基于新的文档材料，他所著的《国度，权柄，荣耀：穆加贝，津民盟和对权力巅峰的追求，1960-87》一书即将问世。 Photo: A file picture dated 25 March 2005 shows Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe gesturing during a ZANU-PF rally near the town of Mbaira south of Harare, Zimbabwe. EPA/STR 【图注】一份摄于2005年3月25日的档案照片显示，在哈拉雷以南的玛巴拉镇，津巴布韦总统罗伯特·穆加贝在津巴布韦非洲民族联盟－爱国阵线（ZANU-PF）的集会上振臂高呼。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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