过感恩节，“白人屠杀印第安人”的话题又冒了出来，大伯我也说两句。 1）所谓种族灭绝当然是胡扯，极左分子新近编造的“人民历史”，不值一驳； 2）殖民者与土著确实有不少冲突，其中一个重要原因是定居者与非定居者对土地权利有着截然不同的观念； 3）殖民早期这个问题并不太严重，因为相对于北美的广阔地域，殖民者人数极少，他们与土著所偏爱的生态位也十分不同； 4）殖民者与印第安人的关系因美国独立而大幅恶化，后来的西进运动（特别是铁路开始向西延伸后）更加剧了冲突，时而发展成战争； 5）这一转折的原因之一是人口增长，第二个原因也很重要：殖民者不再受英国政府的约束，在此之前，帝国的北美政策是，保障殖民者福祉的同时，尽可能拉拢印第安人，将其视为对抗法国和西班牙的盟友，所以需要约束殖民者过度向阿巴拉契亚以西扩张，至少扩张势头不要那么猛烈； 6）独立之后，在对待土著的态度上也分成两派，大致上，越是偏向精英主义的，越倾向温和友善政策，越是平民主义的，越倾向强硬敌对扩张政策，后者的代表是民主党之父安德鲁·杰克逊，其主要名声、成就和政治资本，就是打印第安人（顺便一提，联邦政府的系统性腐败也是从他开始的）； 7）这两派的分歧让人想起罗马故事，格拉古兄弟也是民粹主义者，哥哥提比略想用土地改革（没收大地产分给失业穷人）讨好贫民，结果被打死了，十年后，弟弟想出了更好的办法：去掠夺新近归附小亚细亚属国的财富来给穷人发福利，这样既讨好了穷人，也不得罪贵族； 8）一般来说，一个强国，若民粹分子得势或上台，其邻国、友邦、属国的平民往往没好果子吃，希特勒和查韦斯就不说了，美国工会得势的年代，亚洲工人就不可能有现在这么多工作机会，美国工会的残余势力至今还在喊着要把就业机会夺回来；    

【2015-11-29】 @研二公知苗: 不是法国变了，法国一直是强制文化同化政策实施最彻底的国家，所有“强制世俗化”论者想过的招法国都对移民用过，德国不给土耳其劳工（甚至在德国出生的后代）公民权也保守诟病。不是所有问题都能靠骂左派解决。 @whigzhou: 对价值认同的要求和强制同化是两码事，虽然有时候听起来有点像 @whigzhou: 一种态度是：我们现有的共同体有赖于一些基本的价值认同，假如你不接受这些价值，我们就把你拒绝在共同体之外，假如你威胁到共同体，我们就要设法削弱、压制或消灭你，但我们未必有兴趣改造或同化你 @whigzhou: 假如你们像Amish那样表明自己是无害的，那么尽管你们的文化和价值观和我们格格不入，也不妨碍我们容忍你存在，总之，这种态度是共同体自我中心的，而非普世主义的，共同体内外适用不同行为规范，对改造和同化他人没有兴趣，当然，假如他人主动追随和归化，那也是好的。 @whigzhou: 另一种态度是：人类拥有一组共同价值，它代表着文明和进步，是普世的，是公共之“善”，国家经由社会契约而具有了推行这些价值的当然合法性，它有义务将这些善推及于全人类，将每个人改造成合格公民 @whigzhou: 法左、马左、进步主义、五四青年，都是后一种倾向，当年的种族改良计划和优生学运动，都是左翼进步主义推动的，直到60年代之前，在美国推动种族主义政策最起劲的，也向来是进步左派 @whigzhou: 归结起来，两种态度的共同点是：都认识到社会制度需要一些价值共识，而根本的分歧点在于普世性，普世主义者认为，这些共同价值是基于共同人性的自然价值，生活在这些价值得到尊重的社会，是人与生俱来的自然权利，因而保护这些权利的规范是普适的自然法，不存在共同体内外之分。 @whigzhou: 回到法国的同化政策，最初，法左的普世主义要求他们去改造殖民地文化，结果只不过是破坏了当地传统，当北非移民大批涌入时，普世主义又让他们无法拒绝，结果只好用国家权力强行同化，当同化政策看起来也不管用时，多元化政策就被提了出来。 @whigzhou: 但欧式多元化其实并非多元文化共存，而是修正原有的价值共识，令其容纳新元素（伊斯兰），排挤旧元素（基督教），最终形成的文化仍是高度单一和排他性的，只是受排挤压制的少数派换了人 @谢小姜:移民难民来的时候有谁会说“我不接受你们的价值”？ @whigzhou: 如果来自某个群体或某种文化的移民（统计上）总是违背入籍誓言并危及共同体，可以停止接纳这一来源的移民啊，共同体不是一定要接纳任何来源的移民  

#1：规模局限的含义 #2：扩张的动力 #3：祖先的记忆 #4：婚姻粘结剂 #5：青春的躁动 #6：武人的兴起 #7：暴力的垄断

超越邓巴数#7：暴力的垄断 辉格 2015年11月2日 马克斯·韦伯（[[Max Webb]]）将国家定义为一种垄断暴力的实体，即，它宣称在其领地内，只有它自己或经它允许，才能合法的使用暴力；这一定义（或至少作为判别标准之一）被政治学家普遍采纳，它确实抓住了国家的核心特征，对暴力的垄断，是私人武装组织向国家转变过程中的关键一步，假如一个社会始终没有任何组织能做到这一点，它便处于无政府状态。 之所以会发生这样的转变，是出于利益最大化的需要，当武装组织从特定劫掠对象那里榨取财富时，假如他预期这是与对方的最后一次遭遇，那么最优策略便是洗劫一空，但是由于活动范围总是受限于地理、交通和生态条件，劫掠者往往只能从十分有限的一群受害者那里渔利，此时，竭泽而渔，毁坏潜在劫掠对象的生计，或将其吓跑，皆非最佳策略。 这一点和经济学家阿瑟·拉弗（[[Arthur Laffer]]）就政府税收政策所提出的一条原理类似：当税率从低水平提升时，税入增加，但税率提升同时也在削弱税基，达到某个临界点之后，继续提高税率反而会减少税入；同样，在长期劫掠/勒索关系中，也存在一个相当于拉弗极限的最优剥削策略。 然而，要实施最优剥削策略，就必须垄断暴力，否则，你不竭泽而渔，别人也会，你精心呵护税基，结果却只是让竞争者占了便宜；为了避免这种特殊的公地悲剧，武装组织就需要在其势力范围内排除竞争者，从而将公地私有化，变成专属领地。 一旦垄断地位建立起来，这些组织的行为模式也随之而改变，索取定期贡赋将取代机会主义的劫掠行动，因为定期收保护费比伺机劫掠省事多了，遭遇的反抗也少得多，对于无力保护自己的弱者，纳贡也好过整日担惊受怕、生死难卜，固定的纳贡-保护关系对双方都是更有效率的安排，它避免了对抗所造成的阻值耗散，当然，这一安排的道德含义则另当别论。 实际上，取得优势地位的武装组织，只要有机会，总是会谋求在自己地盘内垄断暴力并建立此类纳贡保护关系，尽管我们很难追溯国家起源之前的这段发展，但从那些因各种原因而陷入无政府状态的社会中，可以看到这一模式反复出现，其中被研究的最多的一个例子，是西西里黑手党。 西西里的历史是被一连串形形色色的外来政权轮番转手的过程，就像一个成长过程中换了十几次爹妈的苦命孩子，民众对政权历来深怀疏离感和不信任；拿破仑战争期间英国人推行的土地改革逐渐瓦解了原有的封建体系，特别是长子继承制的废除，导致贵族的大地产不断分割，经过两代人之后，西西里的土地主数量从两千增加到了两万，和土地贵族相比，这些小地产主既无能力也无意愿保留他们的私人武装以维持地方秩序。 1860年的加里波第革命给了西西里本已脆弱不堪的社会秩序以致命一击，一时盗贼蜂起，但混乱并未持续太久，一种新型组织很快扮演起了地方秩序维护者的角色，它通常由一位权势人物（主要是早先替贵族打理地产的管家）网罗数十位追随者，组成恩主-门客关系，向当地土地主和商户勒索保护费，同时替他们防范盗贼，摆平争端，以及对抗政府管制和逃避关税。 如同其他黑社会组织一样，明确领地边界并在边界内实施垄断，是每个黑手党的头号诉求，领地之争也是各黑手党组织（名为“家族”，其实并非血缘组织）之间时而发生火并的主要原因；最常见的领地纷争，发生在一个家族为执行其保护任务而需要进入另一家族领地打击盗贼时，或者当某家族首领身亡，其旧“客户”安全信心动摇，转而向其他家族寻求保护时；为了减少领地纠纷，各黑手党家族还组成了被称为“委员会”的协调机构。 垄断暴力有着重要的制度含义，它迫使垄断者不得不扮演起纠纷裁决者的角色，而同时禁止针对其客户的同态复仇和自我执行等传统自力救济措施，因为这些措施很难和普通攻击或勒索行动区分开来，而后两种都是对他本人的直接挑战；比如甲从乙店里强行拿走几袋面粉，说是乙欠他的，于是乙向收了他保护费的丙求助，此时丙就必须查明实情之后才能决定如何行事，特别是当甲也是他的客户时，更不能单听偏信。 然而，等到自力救济既已发生，再要查明真相并实施矫正，就会变得非常困难，而且自力救济往往会发展成轮番报复和血仇循环，造成大量不可逆的后果，最初的是非曲直早已湮没于漫长纷争之中，后果更是无从矫正，如此一来，组织所提供的保护便失去了可信度，所以，可行的做法是干脆禁止自力救济（当然会有一些必要的豁免，比如紧急情况下的自卫），一切纠纷必须提交保护者裁决后才可实施矫正行动。 这样，保护组织便承担起了一种司法职能，它不同于传统部落社会常见的司法机制，后者的仲裁结果通常没有强制性，其约束力仅仅来自熟人社会的道德压力，因为这些社会缺乏拥有压倒性武力的组织可为裁决提供执行力，而且即便有这能力也未必有意愿，因为强制执行总要得罪一方，而社会秩序和其他公共品一样，大家都希望搭便车，却不愿为维护它而付出高昂代价，但垄断性保护组织就不同了，领地内的秩序直接关系到保护费收益，同时他也拥有执行能力。 对暴力的垄断不仅表现为抵御外部攻击和压制内部冲突，也体现在对对外攻击行动的约束上，因为攻击会招致报复，而报复行动常无差别的落在整个群体头上，这既抬高了保护成本，也会破坏保护组织与邻近组织的友好关系，从而危及其领地控制，所以只有符合组织外交策略的对外攻击才会被允许，假如没有这样的约束力，外交策略便无法展开；那个人人都是战士，谁都可以自由组队、自主选择对象发起攻击的时代，一去不复返了。 正如诺齐克在《无政府、国家与乌托邦》中所分析那样的，在某一群体内取得支配地位的保护组织，为了有效履行其保护责任，不得不约束所有群体成员的行为，无论是不是向其缴纳保护费的客户；结果，无论出于裁决纠纷的需要，还是约束行动的需要，保护组织必须向群体成员施加一套行为规范，它将部分取代原先由自发协调所形成的社会习俗。 至此为止，政治学家用于识别一个国家的那些元素，已逐一就绪了：一个职业化的统治团队，一块边界明确的领地，对暴力的垄断，常规化的财政来源，向社会成员施加一套行为规范，具有强制执行力的司法系统；从霍布斯自然状态中，巨人利维坦正森然浮现。 在此过程中，并没有自由人自愿向利维坦让渡权利这样的事情，只有威胁和恐惧之下基于利益考虑所达成的均衡，一些社会契约论所宣称的让渡契约，只是基于后来才出现的政治伦理，为将国家起源过程合理化而作出的理论虚构，这些伦理原则显然不存在于前国家社会，因而不可能被用来规范最初的让渡和缔约过程，相反，它们是国家所建立的和平秩序长期持续的结果，有些甚至只是近代化过程的新近产物。 国家的诞生改变了社会结构的发展方向和节奏，将大型社会的组织从社会关系协调问题转变成了政治组织和控制经营问题，统治团队无须与被统治的各群体保持熟人关系，只须通过定期征收赋税、裁决纠纷和惩罚叛逆来反复宣示统治权，在文官系统建立起来之后，核心权力集团甚至无须与下层官僚保持熟人关系，只须确保他们既可履行职责又不掌握武力即可。 只要能组建起一个紧密合作且拥有压倒性武力的统治团队，便可通过征服既有的、已经略具规模的定居社会而创建大型国家；在15世纪以前，秘鲁高原从未有过比酋邦更大的政治实体，每个酋邦约几万人，印加帝国的创建者只用了数十年时间，便逐个征服了这些酋邦，建立了一个拥有上百万平方公里领土、上千万臣民的帝国，这还是在没有车马和文字的条件下做到的。 在有了更强大的武器（特别是进攻武器）、更好的交通和通信工具、基于文字的更高效管理与控制手段之后，征服将更迅速，统治也更有效，所以，伴随着每一次重大技术和组织创新，就会有一轮大型国家创建运动，秦灭六国从长平之战算起也只用了40年，最后决战只花了10年，成吉思汗家族在三代之内就征服了大半个文明世界，如此快速而大跨度的征服，说明征服者根本不需要和被征服者具有文化同质性，而这是以往维系社会的必要纽带。 大型国家在其广阔领地中所建立的和平秩序，将众多小社会连结成了大社会，尽管占人口多数（常有90%左右）的农民仍生活在村镇庄园等小型熟人社会，但和平条件下变得更繁荣的分工和贸易，也孕育了许多更具流动性的专业阶层，武士、文官、行商、工匠、艺人，其活动范围和社会关系都突破了旧有的社区边界和家族结构，他们不仅在各社群之间建立了交流网络和联系纽带，也创造了一种全国范围的共同文化和通用语。 春秋战国时期“士”阶层的兴起演示了这一效果，士最初源自那些在宗法制下难有出头机会的诸侯幼子们，因为长子继承制，幼支小宗的地位随世代更替而不断跌落，特别是当土地充分开发、领地扩张也达到极限之后，次级分封无法继续，小宗子弟为维持其社会地位，必须发展某种专业技能，以求服务于某位领主。 早期的士大多是武士，因为武人是最早分化出的专业阶层，但逐渐的，他们发现还有众多专业技能可以发展，于是有了文士、谋士、策士、术士、方士……，最终形成所谓诸子百家；得益于贵族之间广泛的姻亲关系，他们都能在各国找到接待和庇护者，有能力周游列国寻找效力机会，因而这一阶层变得极具流动性，到战国时，他们已在各国取代世袭公卿的地位，也正是在此期间，该阶层创造并代表了华夏共同文化和民族认同。 这样，至少对于精英阶层，他们所面对并且感知到的，俨然已是个六合四海、布履星罗、轮运辐集、熙熙攘攘的大社会了。  

【2015-11-27】 @托派的李二锅 我大清是中国历史上少见的拿得出手的辉煌盛世，非要抱贼秃驴的大腿说明您大脑该上上油了。 @whigzhou: 所谓盛世不就是把专制推向极致，士大夫人格尊严降至最低嘛，电报出现之前，帝权没法比这更专横了 @whigzhou: 周亡之后，帝国盛世不少，开明时代也不少，但唯一称得上开明盛世的，只有两宋，当然，帝权爱好者最鄙视两宋了 @whigzhou: 推崇汉武、唐宗、朱和尚、满清、蒋氏民国的，都是帝权爱好者，自由爱好者喜欢的都是春秋、窦后、魏晋、两宋、北洋，简单粗暴的划分，但挺有效。  

Social mobility: why does private school give you such a leg up? 社会流动性：为什么私立学校能助你一臂之力？

作者：Matt Dickson @ 2015-8-18 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Conversation，https://theconversation.com/social-mobility-why-does-private-school-give-you-such-a-leg-up-45739 Ever since John Major declared his shock at the dominance of the privately educated throughout Britain’s “upper echelons of power”, there has been a brighter spotlight shone on the way top professions in society are dominated by a selective elite. 约翰·梅杰曾对私立学校毕业生在英国“权力梯次上层”的支配地位表示震惊，自此以后，优选精英如何占据社会顶层职业就受到越来越多的关注。 Addressing this problem has never been more important for UK social mobility. With the re-shaping of the economy towards services, it’s predicted that four out of five future jobs will be in these professions, making them key to the future of social mobility. 对于英国的社会流动性而言，处理这个问题的重要性前所未有。由于经济正在向服务业转型，预计未来有五分之四的工作岗位将来自这些顶层职业，因此它们就成为未来社会流动性的关键。 Alan Milburn’s 2012 report into fair access to the professions showed 43% of barristers, 54% of chief executives, 51% of top medics and 54% of leading journalists attended private schools. Nationally, only 7% of children attend private schools. Alan Milburn 2012年关于公平职业机会的报告显示，43%的高级律师、54%的行政总监、51%的高级医生以及54%的新闻行业领袖念过私立学校。而全国范围内，现在只有7%的儿童在私立学校读书。 Research from the UCL Institute of Education and the University of Cambridge found that in a raw comparison, graduates who had attended private schools were 32% more likely to gain a “high-status” job – defined as the “higher managerial, administrative or professional” occupations – than state-school graduates from similar family types. 伦敦大学学院教育研究所和剑桥大学的研究发现，以来自相似家庭类型的大学毕业生做粗略比较，曾念过私立学校的比只念过公立学校的毕业生，找到“高等”工作的可能性要高出32%。该项研究将“高等”工作界定为“管理上、行政上或专业性上较高的”职业。 Even when accounting for other factors that could be driving this difference – such as a person’s grades in school, the university they attended, the course and qualification they got, or their age and gender – people who went to private school were still 8% more likely to access a high-status job after leaving university. 有一些其它因素也可能促成这一差异，比如在校成绩、所念大学、所修课程和专业资格、以及年龄与性别等。但即使将这些因素全都考虑在内，念过私立学校的学生大学毕业后获得高等工作的可能性仍然要高出8%。 A new report from the Sutton Trust and upReach charities has taken the analysis a step further. The report found that six-months after finishing university, private school graduates in high-status jobs are earning £670 per year more than those from the state sector in the same high-status positions, even after taking into account any differences in age, gender, university attended and degree obtained. Three years later, this gap has grown such that a private-school graduate is on average earning £2,198 per year more than the comparable state-school graduate. Sutton Trust和upReach两家慈善机构新近发布的一份报告对此问题做了进一步的分析。报告发现，大学毕业6个月后，即使将年龄、性别、所念大学及所获学位的差异都考虑进去，从事高等工作的私立学校毕业生，年收入也比从事同样职业的国立学校毕业生多出670磅。三年之后这种差距拉得更大，相比于国立学校毕业生，私立学校毕业生平均每年收入要多2198磅。 Elite firms look for ‘soft skills’ 精英公司想要“软技能” What is it about private schooling that causes this to happen? When it comes to getting a job and progressing up pay scales, there are always other factors apart from grades that are difficult to measure, such as self-confidence, assertiveness, ambition, determination or communication skills. These may differ between the average private and state school students and may be driving the difference. 念私立学校有什么不同，以至于出现上述差异呢？在找工作和提高收入等级时，除了成绩之外，总还有一些其它难以衡量的影响因素，比如自信、坚定、抱负、决心或沟通能力等。私立和公立学校学生一般在这些方面可能有些不同，并可能因此导致了上述差异。 This is consistent with other research from the Sutton Trust which has found that applicants to high-status jobs from less-privileged backgrounds lack self-confidence. Recent research from the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (SMCP) looking at recruitment to elite law, accountancy and financial services firms also identified that the differences in the non-academic skills of graduates from different school types played a key role in explaining different access to jobs and career progression. 这与Sutton Trust的另一项研究发现是一致的：出身弱势群体的人在申请高等工作时更加缺乏自信。社会流动性与儿童贫困委员会近期对法律、会计和金融服务等精英公司的招聘进行了研究，他们同样发现，在解释找工作和职业发展机会上的差异时，来自不同类型学校的毕业生在非学术技能上的差异是一个关键因素。 These elite firms look to recruit and promote “talent”. Their definitions incorporate the sort of non-academic skills that are not lacking in private school students, but can be lacking even among the most academically able state-school students. 这些精英公司想要招聘和提拔的是“才干之士”。在他们对“才干之士”的定义中，包含了私立学校学生从不缺乏的那些非学术技能，而在这些方面，即便是学术上最为杰出的公立学校学生也可能存在不足。 Gap in grades remains stark 成绩差距依然显著 There are policies that can help break down these barriers. The first requirement is to close the gap in attainment between different types of school. IFS research comparing the pay of state and privately educated people across all professions, found a 12% pay gap, half of which can be explained by prior attainment and the university subsequently attended. So, much of the gap is down to what happens in school. 有一些政策可以打破上述壁垒。第一个必须要做的，就是缩小不同类型学校在学业成就上的差距。英国财政研究学会对公立和私立学校毕业生在各类行业的薪酬水平进行了比较研究，发现其间存在12%的差距，该差距有一半源于早前的学业成就及随后所念的大学。因此，差距的很大一部分来自于在校经历。 The SMCP research also supports previous work that suggests attending “elite” universities and the course studied is becoming more and more important for access to top professions and higher pay. If we look at the difference in A-level attainment in the sort of “facilitating” subjects (such as maths, sciences and languages) that are preferred by the elite institutions, there is a suggestion that the gap between state and private school is narrowing. 前引社会流动性和儿童贫困委员会的研究结果也支持早前的一项研究，后者认为，接受“精英”大学教育及所学课程对于进入顶层职业和获得更高报酬的重要性与日俱增。精英机构更为偏爱那些使得进一步学习变得容易的“促进性”科目（比如数学、科学和语言等），如果我们去看中学高级水平考试中这些科目上的成绩差异，似乎有迹象表明，公立和私立学校之间的差距正在缩小。 Among 18-year-olds in 2004, 7.8% of state-school students had A*-B in three or more of these A-level subjects, compared with 21.6% of private school students. By 2010 the gap had closed slightly, largely due to a dip in independent schools' performance, but the proportion of state-school students attaining the grades required to access elite universities remains constant. 2004年的全部18岁学生中，有7.8%的公立学校学生在三门以上的中学高级水平考试“促进性”科目中得到了B或以上成绩，与之相比，私立学校学生则有21.6%。到了2010年，这一差距已略为减小，主要是因为独立学校的表现有所下滑，但取得精英大学最低录取成绩的公立学校学生比例并没有变化。   Unsurprisingly then, there is little evidence that the gap in attendance at elite universities has changed over time for students from comparable family backgrounds who attend state and private schools. The proportion of children who go to elite universities from the highest income group (which it is assumed includes private school attendees) was approximately 28% in 2010-11, compared to 12% for the next highest income group. However, this 16 percentage point gap is all but eliminated when researchers take into account how students did at A-level. 因此毫不奇怪，现在也没有什么证据表明家庭背景近似的公立和私立学校毕业生之间的精英大学录取差距有什么变化。2010-11年，最高收入群体的子女（假定包括私立学校入读者）就读精英大学的比例约为28%，与之相比，次高收入群体则为12%。不过，一旦研究人员将学生们在高级水平考试中的表现也考虑进来，这个16个百分点的差距也几乎完全不存在了。 More mentoring, earlier 更多、更早的辅导 So, the big question is how to improve the A-level results of students from state schools. After examining what can help predict better performance at A-level for bright but less advantaged students, research from Oxford University has suggested a series of policies to help boost performance by bright but less advantaged students. 因此，最大问题是如何提高公立学校学生的高级水平考试成绩。牛津大学一项研究考察了哪些因素有助于预测那些聪明但出身弱势的学生在高级水平考试中取得好成绩，并提出了帮助这一类学生改善表现的一系列政策建议。 These range from access to high-quality pre-school, daily homework, encouraging reading for pleasure, and educationally enriching activities outside of school, to greater guidance regarding the choice of subjects at GCSE and A-level likely to pay the highest future dividends in university access and beyond. 其中包括接受高质量学前教育的机会、每天做家庭作业、鼓励出于兴趣的阅读、开展具有教育意义的课外活动，还包括在普通中学教育证书和高级水平考试中为学生的科目选择提供更多指导，以帮助学生选择那些在未来的大学经历及以后人生中回报最大的科目。 The need for greater guidance, advice and mentoring for state-school pupils is also endorsed by the Sutton Trust research into recruitment for the financial services sector. These policy recommendations are now being implemented in a project that began in 2014 in which four major banks – Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Lloyds – are providing “end-to-end” support to young people from state schools. They will get help to develop non-academic skills both at school and university and then receive mentoring while in the job. 公立学校学生需要更多的指导、建议和辅导，这一点也得到了Sutton Trust关于金融服务行业招聘的一项研究的支持。这些政策建议现已在一个始于2014年的项目中得到实施，四家大银行——巴克莱、德意志银行、汇丰以及劳埃德——通过该项目向公立学校的年轻人提供“从头到尾”的支持。这些年轻人在中学和大学时都能得到培养非学术技能方面的帮助，工作以后还能得到辅导。 These closer links between state schools and professions was also identified by Milburn, who suggested that work experience placements, internships and university sandwich-year courses can all be routes to improve the transition for state students from school, through university and into the “upper echelons” of British society. Milburn也发现了这种公立学校和职业之间的紧密联系，他建议通过工作经验职位、实习期以及带“三明治年”的大学课程【译注：英国大学一种学制，大学期间有一年为实习期，通常为第三年】等途径，来帮助公立学校学生更好地实现从中学到大学最后进入英国社会“梯次上层”的转化。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Plastic Bags Are Good for You 塑料袋是个好东西 作者：Katherine Mangu-Ward @ 2015-10 译者：混乱阈值 （@混乱阈值） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Reason，http://reason.com/archives/2015/09/01/plastic-bags-are-good-for-you/ What prohibitionists get wrong about one of modernity's greatest inventions 禁用主义者对现代最伟大发明之一的理解错在何处 Here is a list of things that are thicker than a typical plastic grocery bag: A strand of hair. A coat of paint.A human cornea. 以下所列物品都比普通的塑料购物袋要厚：一绺头发、一层涂漆、人类的眼角膜。 High-density polyethylene is a miracle of materials science. 高密度聚乙烯是材料科学的一项奇迹。 Despite weighing less than 5 grams, one bag can hold 17 pounds, well over 1,000 times its own weight. At about a penny apiece, the bags are cheap enough for stores to give away and sturdy enough to carry home two gallons of milk in the evening and still be up to the task of scooping Cujo's poop the next morning. 尽管自身不足5克，一个塑料袋却可以装载17磅的重物，这超过它自身重量足足1000多倍。塑料袋非常便宜，大约每个才一分钱，商店不介意免费发放；塑料袋也非常牢固，晚上装着两加仑牛奶回家后，第二天早上还能用来装宠物狗的粪便。 Yet almost as soon as grocers started offering their customers the choice of "paper or plastic?" these modern marvels became a whipping boy for environmentalists, politicians, and other well-intentioned, ill-informed busybodies. Plastic bags for retail purchases are banned or taxed in more than 200 municipalities and a dozen countries, from San Francisco to South Africa, Bellingham to Bangladesh. 然而几乎就在杂货商开始让顾客选择“纸袋还是塑料袋？”的时候，这些现代奇迹却开始沦为环保主义者、政客和其他出于善意却知之甚少的好管闲事者的替罪羊。从旧金山到南非，从贝灵汉到孟加拉国等超过200个市和十多个国家，禁用零售塑料购物袋，或对其征税。 Each region serves up its own custom blend of alarmist rhetoric; coastal areas blame the wispy totes for everything from asphyxiated sea turtles to melting glaciers, while inland banners decry the bags' role in urban landscape pollution and thoughtless consumerism. 每个地区都炮制出各自版本的危言耸听之词；海岸区域把从窒息而死的海龟到冰川融化的一切问题都怪在这纤弱袋子头上，而内陆地区的宣传则谴责塑料袋造成了城市污染和没心没肺的消费主义。 But a closer look at the facts and figures reveals shaky science and the uncritical repetition of improbable statistics tossed about to shore up the case for a mostly aesthetic, symbolic act of conservation. 然而如果你仔细审视事实和数据就会发现，上述做法在科学上牵强附会，对荒谬的统计数字不加鉴别、人云亦云。人们用它们来支撑的，差不多只是一种审美上的、符号化的环保行动。 How did one of the most efficient, resource-saving inventions of the 20th century become an environmentalist bugaboo? 那么，20世纪最具有效率、最节省资源的发明之一是如何成为环保人士眼中的妖孽的？ Research 研究 Before 1800, if you bought or traded for an object, you were pretty much on your own to get it home. People carried baskets for the little stuff and wheeled carts for the bigger items, often toting scraps of canvas or other durable fabric to wrap messier or more fragile goods, such as meat or pastries. This was back when the germ theory of disease was yet to be broadly accepted, and there were not yet Laundromats on every street corner. 在十九世纪之前，如果你购买或交换到一件物品，基本上需要靠自己把物品带回家。如果是小件物品，人们用篮子装，大件则用轮车载。人们还常常携带帆布或其它耐用织物来包裹较脏乱或较易碎的物品，比如肉或糕点。那时细菌致病的理论尚未被广泛认同，自助洗衣店也还没有遍及每一个街角。 In the early 19th century, paper became cheap enough that merchants started using it to package their wares, tying off the bundles with string—a huge leap for both convenience and sanitation. The paper bag was invented in the 1850s, but it wasn't until the 1870s that a factory girl named Margaret Knight cobbled together a machine that cut, folded, and glued flat-bottomed paper receptacles. 19世纪早期，因为纸价变得足够低，商人开始用纸张包装商品并用绳子捆绑——这在便捷和卫生方面都是一个巨大进步。纸袋发明于1850年代，但直到1870年代，才由一个叫Margaret Knight的女工拼装出了一台可以剪裁、折叠并粘合平底纸袋的机器。 While the brown paper bag seems like the height of humdrum to modern eyes, Knight's machine was kind of a big deal: She won a bitter intellectual property fight to receive one of the first patents ever awarded to a woman, and was eventually decorated by Queen Victoria for her efforts. Over time, the paper bag got cheaper and stronger and sprouted handles, but it remained essentially unchanged, comfortably dominating the stuff-schlepping market for the next 100 years. 那种棕色纸袋如今看起来平淡无奇，但当时Knight的机器在某种意义上却是一个了不得的发明：她赢得了一场艰苦的知识产权官司，成为最早获得专利的女性之一，并因此最终获维多利亚女王授勋。随着时间推移，纸袋变得更便宜，更坚固，并长出了手环，但本质未变，在随后的100年里轻松地主宰了物品携带市场。 Meanwhile, German chemist Hans von Pechmann was messing around with methane and ether in a lab in 1898 when he happened to notice a waxy precipitate called polymethylene. Unfortunately, no one could puzzle out what to do with the goo, so another 30 years would pass before DuPont chemists stumbled upon a similar compound, polyethylene. This time, the British figured out they could use it to insulate radar cables, which is where the substance served its war duty. 与此同时，1898年当德国化学家Hans von Pechmann在实验室中捣鼓甲烷和乙醚时，他碰巧注意到一种被称为聚亚甲基的蜡状凝结物。不幸的是，当时没人知道这种黏糊糊的东西能用来干什么。又过了30年，杜邦公司的化学家们偶然发现了一种相似的化合物：聚乙烯。这一次，英国人发现他们可以用聚乙烯来为雷达的电线做绝缘层，这就是聚乙烯在战时的功用。 In 1953, Karl Ziegler of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (later re-christened the Max Planck Institute, for obvious reasons) and Erhard Holzkamp invented high-density polyethylene (HDPE) and soon after figured out how to use it to make pipes. Ziegler even snagged a Nobel Prize for the invention in 1963. 1953年，“威廉皇帝研究所”（后因众所周知的原因改名为“马克斯·普朗克研究所”）的Karl Ziegler和Erhard Holzkamp发明了高密度聚乙烯（HDPE），并很快设法用该物质制造管子。Ziegler还因为这项发明获得了1963年的诺贝尔奖。 But GustafThulinSten is the real hero (or villain, depending on your point of view) of our tale. An employee of the Swedish company Celloplast, Sten was the person who had the inspiration to punch holes into the side of super-thin tubes of HDPE, thus creating the ubiquitous, filmy "T-shirt bags" we know and love (to ban) today. 然而，在塑料袋的传奇故事里，真正的英雄（或恶棍，取决于你怎么看）是Gustaf Thulin Sten。作为瑞典Celloplast公司的雇员，Sten想出了在HDPE超薄管的一侧打孔的主意，创造了今天我们所熟知并热爱（或希望禁止）的无处不在的薄膜般的“T恤袋”。 In a 1993 book that claims to reveal the "hidden life of groceries and other secrets of the supermarket," journalist Vince Staten pinpoints the moment that the global takeover of the plastic bag became inevitable: a 1985 gathering of the New Materials and Profits in Grocery Sacks and Coextrusions Conference at a Holiday Inn in Somerset, New Jersey, at which a representative from Chem Systems announced that plastic bags were 11.5 percent cheaper than paper. 在一本出版于1993年的书里，记者Vince Staten声称揭示了“杂货业的隐秘生活以及超市的其它秘密”。作者指出了塑料袋风靡世界的决定性时刻：1985年，在新泽西州Somerset的假日酒店，举行了一个叫做“杂货袋和压膜袋的新材料和利润大会”的活动。会上，来自Chem Systems的代表宣布塑料袋比纸袋要便宜11.5%。 Just like that, the world changed. Plastic bags were stocked in 10 percent of grocery stores in 1983, according to Plastics World magazine. By 1985 it was 75 percent. "Paper or plastic?" immediately became an everyday question, a punchline, and a source of angst. 就这样，整个世界都变了。根据《塑料世界》杂志的信息，1983年时10%的杂货店备有塑料袋，到了1985年这个数字上升到了75%。 “纸袋还是塑料袋？”立刻成为了日常问句，脍炙人口的妙语，以及忧虑之源。 Almost from the beginning, plastic bags were controversial. After several high-profile suffocation deaths of children, manufacturers worked together to create a public safety campaign, staving off regulation and reducing accidents. As grocers substituted plastic for paper to bolster their bottom lines, suburban shoppers, who preferred to line up flat-bottomed paper bags in the backs of their cars, complained, even as urban shoppers rejoiced at the ability to comfortably and reliably carry more than two bags at a time. 几乎从一开始，塑料袋就备受争议。在数起备受瞩目的儿童窒息死亡事件发生后，塑料袋生产商聚在一起搞了一个公众安全运动，以此来延缓对塑料袋的监管，并减少事故的发生。杂货商用塑料袋代替纸袋以节约成本后，尽管市区购物者因为从此可以舒适稳当地同时手提多个袋子而感到高兴，那些更喜欢在车后摆满平底纸袋的郊区购物者却对此有了怨言。 The booming environmental movement was initially flummoxed. Forest conservation was a big deal in the '80s, a point in favor of plastic. But fossil fuels were a no-no, so maybe paper was better? Both types of bags at the time were tough to recycle. The debate raged on, leaving eco-conscious shoppers unclear about the best course of action. 蓬勃兴起的环境运动最开始被搞懵了。森林保护在80年代是件大事，使用塑料袋在这方面能得分。但是耗用化石燃料也是要不得的，那么也许纸袋更好？这两种购物袋在当时都不容易回收利用。争论持续升温，让有环保意识的购物者搞不清楚到底哪种选择最好。 Reduce 减少使用 In 2010, Guinness World Records named plastic bags the most ubiquitous consumer item in the world. But peak bag may already be upon us. 2010年，吉尼斯世界纪录把塑料袋确认为世界上最普及的消费品。然而，塑料袋使用的最高峰也许已然临近。 In 2007, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to prohibit plastic bags, citing concerns about water pollution and waste disposal. Chicago, Austin, Portland, and nearly all of Hawaii soon followed suit, chiming in with complaints about wastefulness, climate change, and more. 2007年，出于对水污染和垃圾处理的担忧，旧金山成为了美国第一个禁用塑料袋的城市。随后芝加哥、奥斯丁、波特兰和几乎整个夏威夷都群起效仿，它们纷纷抱怨塑料袋导致浪费、气候变化和其它问题。 Chinese officials banned plastic bags two months before hosting the 2008 Olympics, for the same reason they banned high-emissions vehicles and daytime pajama-wearing-such unsightly displays didn't match up with the image the People's Republic wanted to present to the world. In China, they call the floating sacks "white pollution." South Africans refer to bags snagged in bushes as their "national flower." 中国官员在2008年奥运会举办前两个月禁止了塑料袋，理由与他们禁止高排放汽车以及白天穿睡衣相同——这些不雅景观与人民共和国想要展现给世界的形象不相符。在中国，人们把漂浮的塑料袋称为“白色污染”。南非人则将缠在灌木丛中的塑料袋称为他们的“国花”。 In Washington, D.C., concern about used plastic bags finding their way down storm drains, through the Anacostia River, and into the Chesapeake Bay was the primary justification for the capital city's 5-cent bag tax in 2010, under the slogan "Skip the Bag, Save the River." In 2006, the California Coastal Commission claimed that plastic bags make up 3.8 percent of beach litter, and a few years later the California Ocean Protection Council upped the ante to 8 percent of all coastal trash. Last year the Dallas City Council pinned 5 percent of the area's refuse on bags. 2010年，首都华盛顿特区对每个塑料袋征税5美分，口号是“救救河流，不用塑料袋”，主要的理论依据是废弃塑料袋会被冲进雨水道，通过阿纳卡斯提亚河进入切萨皮克海湾。2006年，加州海岸委员会声称塑料袋在海滩垃圾中占3.8%，几年后加州海洋保护委员会把塑料袋在所有海滨垃圾的份额提高到8%。去年，达拉斯市议会认定辖区内垃圾的5％由塑料袋构成。 But the definitive American litter study—yep, such a thing exists—reports much lower figures. The 2009 Keep America Beautiful Survey, run by Steven Stein of Environmental Resources Planning, shows that all plastic bags, of which plastic retail bags are only a subset, are just 0.6 percent of visible litter nationwide. 然而关于美国垃圾的权威研究——没错，这种研究确实存在——发布的数字要低很多。2009年，由“环境资源规划”组织的Steven Stein发起的一项名为“保持美国的美”的调查显示，所有塑料袋加在一起仅占了全国可见垃圾的0.6%，而塑料购物袋只是塑料袋中的一小类。 And those California data? They come from the International Coastal Commission (ICC), which the California Coastal Commission notes relies on information "collected by volunteers on one day each year, and is not a scientific assessment." (This insight, and many others in this story, is derived from a study produced last year by Julian Morris and Brian Seasholes for Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes reason.) 那么加州的数据从何而来？它来自国际海岸委员会（ICC）。加州海岸委员会提到，该数字 “由志愿者每年花一天搜集，并非科学评估”。（这个见解，以及此文中很多其它见解，都来自去年由Julian Morris和Brian Seasholes为“理性基金会”所作的研究，该基金会是一家非营利组织，出版刊物Reason。） In D.C., a 2008 analysis prepared for the city's Department of the Environment by the Anacostia Watershed Society found that plastic bags were only the third-largest contributor to litter in the river, after food wrappers and bottles and cans. 在华盛顿特区，2008年一份由“阿纳卡斯提亚流域协会”为市环境部提供的分析报告发现，塑料袋只是河流垃圾的第三大来源，排在食物包装和瓶罐之后。 Stein's study did find plastic bags in storm drains, but again, they made up only about 1 percent of the total litter. Stein的研究确实在雨水道中发现了塑料袋，然而，塑料袋同样仅占垃圾总量的1%。 Some plastic bags do find their way into the sea, of course. And one of the other concerns cited for the banning and regulation of plastic grocery bags is the safety of marine wildlife. The Blue Ocean Society for Marine Conservation is just one organization among many that claim that more than 1 million birds and 100,000 marine mammals and sea turtles die each year from eating or getting entangled in plastic. 当然，有些塑料袋确实进入了海洋。人们禁用或管制塑料购物袋时的忧虑之一，就是海洋野生动物的安全。包括“蓝色大洋海洋保护协会”在内的很多组织声称，每年有超过一百万只鸟和十万以上的海洋哺乳动物以及海龟因为吞食塑料袋或被塑料袋缠绕而死，。 Morris and Seasholes reconstructed an elaborate game of statistical telephone to source this figure back to a study funded by the Canadian government that tracked loss of marine animals in Newfoundland as a result of incidental catch and entanglement in fishing gear from 1981 to 1984. Importantly, this three-decade-old study had nothing to do with plastic bags at all. 针对上述数字，Morris和Seasholes重建了一个复杂的统计学电话游戏【校注：电话游戏即由一个人小声跟下一个人说一句话，不断传递，最终得出荒谬结果】，将其来源追溯到一项由加拿大政府资助的研究。这项研究将纽芬兰的海洋动物减少归咎于1981年至1984年间的误捕和捕鱼装备的缠绕。重要的是，这项三十年前的研究完全和塑料袋无关。 Porpoises and sea turtles are undeniably charismatic megafauna—the pandas of the deep—and it's understandable that environmental groups would want to parade them around in a bid to drum up sympathy, almost certainly driven by the sincere belief that plastics put the beloved animals at grave risk. But in the end, there's little evidence that that's true. 不可否认，鼠海豚和海龟都是极具魅力的巨型海洋动物——它们就像深海中的熊猫——并且，环保团体几乎肯定是受真诚的信念所驱使，认定是塑料袋让这些可爱的动物陷入危险境地，并想拉着它们招摇过市以竭力争取同情，这是可以理解的。但归根到底，没有什么证据证明确有其事。 As David Santillo, a senior biologist with Greenpeace, told The Times of London, "It's very unlikely that many animals are killed by plastic bags. The evidence shows just the opposite. We are not going to solve the problem of waste by focusing on plastic bags. With larger mammals it's fishing gear that's the big problem. On a global basis plastic bags aren't an issue." 就像绿色和平组织的高级生物学家David Santillo对《泰晤士报》所说的那样，“许多动物被塑料袋害死是不太可能的。证据显示情况恰恰相反。如果我们把重点放在塑料袋上，垃圾废料问题是得不到解决的。对大型哺乳动物来说，捕鱼装备才是大问题。从全球范围来看，塑料袋并不是个问题。” Reuse 重复利用 But what about larger-scale impacts, such as climate change? Where do grocery bags stack up there? A 2011 study from the U.K.'s Environmental Agency attempted to quantify the emissions footprint both of plastic bags and of their substitutes. Holding the typical HDPE grocery bag up as the standard, researchers found that the common reusable non-woven polypropylene bag—the ubiquitous crinkly plastic tote, typically made with oil—had to be used at least 11 times to hold its own against an HDPE grocery bag. Cotton bags had to be used an amazing 131 times to do the same. 那么大范围的影响，比如气候变化，又如何呢？购物塑料袋与此有何关系？英国环境局在2011年做了一项研究，尝试量化使用塑料袋及其替代品的碳排放量。以普通的高密度聚乙烯（HDPE）购物袋作为比较基准，研究者发现，常见的可重复使用无纺聚丙烯袋——那种四处可见的起皱塑料袋，一般以石油作原料——至少需要重复使用11次才能在排放量上匹敌HDPE购物袋。要达到同样的水平，棉布袋则需重复使用惊人的131次。 In 2007, for a brief moment, the "It bag" wasn't a $30,000 Hermes Birkin, it was a cotton tote designed by Anya Hindmarch that read: "I'm NOT A Plastic bag." Celebrities from Ivanka Trump to Keira Knightly were snapped toting the sold-out satchels for glossies like Life&Style and Grazia. While we can never know for sure, it seems wildly unlikely that Ivanka Trump has carried 131 loads of groceries in her life, much less in that particular bag. 在2007年，“It bag”（“当季必备包包”）曾经一度不是价值三万美元的爱马仕铂金包，而是由Anya Hindmarch设计的一款棉布包，上面印着几个字：“我不是塑料袋。”从Ivanka Trump到Keira Knightly等社会名流都拎着这个销售一空的手提包，为诸如Life&Style和Grazia的精美杂志拍定型照。尽管我们永远没法肯定，但看起来Ivanka Trump一辈子曾提过131袋生活杂物的可能性相当小，更不用说用这种小提包了。 What's more, those U.K. Environmental Agency figures assume the HDPE bag is not being reused. Nor do they account for the energy and materials needed to regularly wash the reusable bags in hot soapy water. Other alternatives did perform somewhat better in the global-warming matchup, including paper bags (which would have to be reused three times to match the single-use HDPE bag's footprint) and another type of reusable bag made of low-density polyethylene (four times). 此外，上述英国环境局的数字是基于HDPE购物袋不会被重复使用的假设得出的，他们也没有把用热肥皂水定期清洗可重复使用购物袋时所需的能源和材料考虑在内。一些其它替代品确实在防止全球变暖方面中表现更好，包括纸袋（需要重复使用三次才能和一次性HDPE袋在碳排放量上相当）和另一种可重复使用的低密度聚乙烯袋（需要重复使用四次）。 About 65 percent of Americans report that they repurpose their grocery bags for garbage. By contrast, a survey by the marketing research firm Edelman Berland found that consumers reported forgetting their reusable bags on 40 percent of grocery trips and opted for plastic or paper instead. 大约有65%的美国人称他们会用使用过的购物袋装垃圾。与此形成对比的是，由市场研究公司Edelman Berland所做的一项调查发现，消费者称他们去购物时有40%的可能性忘记携带可重复使用的购物袋，最终需要用塑料袋或纸袋来代替。 Prior to the movement to ban plastic bags, many American homes had a nook, cranny, or drawer that functioned as a kind of grocery-sack clown car. It seemed that whatever the size of the container, an infinite number of bags could be stuffed inside. My family called it the bag o' bags. As in: "Katherine! This mold experiment has gone on long enough! Go get me a bag from the bag o' bags so that I can throw it away," or "Karina, you better remember to get a bag from the bag o' bags for that wet swimsuit, unless you want the books in your backpack to get wet." If we wound up with an unmanageable surplus, we could just drop the bags at the recycling centers that used to sit in the parking lots of most suburban grocery stores. 在禁用塑料袋运动之前，许多美国家庭都有个角落、缝隙或抽屉，用作放购物袋小丑车。不管那个地方大小如何，似乎总是可以不断地往里面塞袋子。我家称之为“袋之袋”。比如：“凯瑟琳！这东西都生霉很久了！从袋之袋里拿个袋子给我，我好把这玩意丢掉。”，或是“卡琳娜，你要不想把你背包里的书都弄湿，最好记得从袋之袋里拿个袋子来装湿泳衣。”。如果我们有太多用不掉的多余袋子，只要放到以前大多数郊区杂货店的停车场里都有的回收中心去就可以了。 Then there are the frequently unmeasured consumption consequences of the bans themselves. For example, in San Francisco, after the grocery/retail plastic bag ban went into effect in 2007, depriving customers of a source of free bags, sales of still legal, low-density polyethylene plastic bags shot up 400 percent. 禁令本身还有很多尚未搞清的消费后果。举个例子，旧金山对零售购物塑料袋的禁令在2007年生效后，消费者无法再获得免费购物袋了，结果仍旧合法的低密度聚乙烯塑料袋的销量飙升了400%。 Recycle 回收 "It takes 12 million barrels of oil to produce the 100 billion plastic bags that are thrown away in the U.S. every year." Versions of this claim show up everywhere from New York Times editorials to Save the Bay pamphlets. But the origins of the figures are murky and the dramatic tone is misleading. Even if the number is accurate, it is almost a literal drop in the bucket: Americans consume a total of about 19 million barrels of oil a day. “在美国，每年一千亿只废弃塑料袋需要耗费1200万桶原油来生产。”这类说法的不同版本出现在从《纽约时报》社论到《拯救海湾》宣传册的各种地方。然而这个数字的原始出处却是模糊不清的，而且其夸张口吻也有误导性。就算这个数字是准确的，这也几乎真正是九牛一毛：美国人每天消费大约1900万桶原油。 But as Morris and Seasholes point out, all that fretting about oil use "is surprising, not least because nearly all HDPE bags are produced from natural gas, not oil. Indeed, between 1981 and 2012, on average only 3.2% of polyethylene bags were made from oil. The reason is simple: it is far less expensive to produce ethylene, the feedstock for polyethylene, from natural gas (methane) than from oil." While the price of oil has recently declined, the assumption that plastic bags are made primarily from oil remains false. 然而就像Morris和Seasholes指出的那样，这种所有关于原油使用的焦虑“都是令人惊讶的，尤其是因为几乎所有的HDPE袋都是由天然气而非原油制造的。事实上正是这样，在1981年到2012年间，平均只有3.2％的聚乙烯袋由原油制造。原因很简单：用天然气（甲烷）生产乙烯这种制造聚乙烯的原材料要比用原油便宜得多。”尽管原油价格最近下降了，这种认为塑料袋主要由原油制造的想法依然是错误的。 In 2010, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Americans threw away 690,000 tons of HDPE bags. Of those, approximately 30,000 tons were recycled. That means a total of 660,000 tons were discarded, mostly into landfills (approximately 82 percent of non-recovered municipal solid waste goes to landfill; 18 percent is incinerated). That same year, Americans also chucked almost exactly the same amount of "reusable" polypropylene bags (680,000 tons), of which zero were recovered. In other words, those polypropylene reusable bags actually constituted a slightly higher proportion of all bags going to landfills. 根据美国环境保护局的说法，美国人在2010年丢弃了69万吨HDPE袋，其中大约3万吨被回收。这意味着总共有66万吨袋子被废弃，主要是被丢入垃圾填埋场（城市非再生固体废弃物中大约有82％进入垃圾填埋场；另外18%被焚烧）。同年，美国人还丢弃了几乎重量相当的“可重复使用”聚丙烯袋（68万吨），没有任何回收利用。换句话说，在流入垃圾填埋场的袋子里，可重复使用的聚丙烯袋占比事实上还要稍高一些。 In April, NPR's Planet Money reported on the economics of plastic recycling, and noted that while recycled plastic from bags and sacks was once a profitable industry, times have changed. The prices of oil and gas have fallen, which means it is cheaper to just make new bags rather than undertake the laborious process of recycling the old ones. As Tom Outerbridge, who runs a Brooklyn recycling center called Sims, explained, "We can't afford to put a lot of time and money into trying to recycle it" if no one's buying the final product. 今年四月，美国全国公共广播电台的“地球财富”节目报道了塑料回收中的经济学，并指出尽管从袋子中回收塑料以前是一项盈利的事，现在情况已经变了。原油和天然气的价格已经下降，意味着直接生产新的袋子要比通过复杂费力的程序对旧袋子回收利用更便宜。布鲁克林一个叫做Sims的回收中心的运营商Tom Outerbridge解释说，如果没人购买最终产品，“我们就无法在塑料袋回收上投入大量时间和金钱”。 Reject 拒绝 In March, The Washington Post reported on the surprising strength of the plastic bag industry in the face of regulatory onslaught. 今年三月，《华盛顿邮报》报道了塑料袋制造业在凶猛的管制面前所展现出来的惊人力量。 In 2008, officials in the deep blue city of Seattle voted to impose a 20-cent fee on both plastic and paper single- use bags. "There's a competitive side to seeing who can come up with the most progressive legislation," city councilman and former local Sierra Club leader Mike O'Brien told The New York Times. 在2008年，深蓝之城西雅图的官员们投票决定对塑料和纸质的一次性袋子收取每个20美分的费用。“这么做有攀比的一面，就是看看谁能搞出最进步主义的立法，”市议员、“塞拉聚乐部”【校注：美国环保组织】在当地的前领导者Mike O’Brien这样告诉《纽约时报》。 But industry rallied before the implementation date, spending $1.4 million on a citywide ballot measure to repeal the fee. The referendum campaign was a success; Seattle voters rejected the surcharge, which would have been the most punitive in the nation, in 2009. Still, three years later, Seattle became the fourth city in Washington State to approve an outright plastic- bag ban, along with a 5-cent fee on paper bags. 但业界在该法规实施之前团结了起来，投入140万美元举行了全市范围的投票表决活动来撤销该收费。这场公决运动成功了；西雅图人投票拒绝了这项本会在2009年成为全国之最的惩罚性额外收费。然而，三年后，西雅图还是成了华盛顿州第四个通过彻底禁用塑料袋的城市，同时还对纸袋征收5美分的费用。 In Dallas, a coalition of plastic bag manufacturers are challenging a 5-cent markup that the city has imposed on single-use bags. Hilex Poly (now Novolex), Superbag Operating, the Inteplast Group, and Advance Polybag argue that the fee is illegal under an obscure Dallas law that states: "A local government or other political subdivision may not adopt an ordinance, rule or regulation to: prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law; [or] assess a fee or deposit on the sale or use of a container or package." 在达拉斯，塑料袋生产商联盟正在挑战市政府对一次性袋子每个5美分的收费政策。Helix Ploy（即如今的Novolex），Superbag Operating，Inteplast Group和Advance Polybag这些公司认为收费是非法的，他们的依据是一条模糊的达拉斯的法律：“地方政府或其它政治分区不能实施条例、规则或规定来：出于控制固体废弃物的目的，不经州法律授权，禁止或限制容器或包装的贩卖或使用；（或）对贩卖或使用容器或包装进行收费或收取保证金。” In Georgia, the state Senate got a little meta, passing a ban on bag bans last session, which would have pre-emptively prevented restrictions. While the bill failed in the House, it may prove to be a model for other state pre-emptions around the country. 在佐治亚，州参议院的做法有点元规则的性质，在上个会期通过了一项对塑料袋禁令的禁令，该禁令将能预防性地阻止禁塑令。这个法案虽未能在州众院中通过，但可能在全国范围成为预防性立法的典型，被其它州效仿。 Ground Zero of the plastic wars, unsurprisingly, is California. Last year, Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown signed a statewide ban against plastic grocery bags that was scheduled to take effect this July 1. But the implementation has been stalled, thanks to 800,000 signatories to a petition circulated by the American Progressive Bag Alliance, a new group funded by plastics manufacturers. Voters will now have to ratify the ban on their 2016 ballots for it to go into effect. "This is a cynical ploy by out-of-state interests desperate to delay a ban already adopted in more than 100 communities across California," a spokesperson for Brown told the Associated Press. 不出所料，塑料袋之战的中心战场是加州。去年，民主党州长Jerry Brown签署了一项在全州禁止塑料杂货袋的法令，原计划在今年七月一日投入实施。然而由于塑料品生产商资助的一个新团体“美国进步派袋子联盟”发起的一项请愿获得了80万个签名支持，禁令未能如期实施。现在选民只有等到2016年进行投票批准，禁令才能实施。“这是州外利益集团耍的冷漠自私的手段，他们拼命要推迟这项已被全加州超过一百个社区采用的禁令”，Brown的发言人告诉美联社。 Of course, if there's some banning going on, you can always rely on Congress to muscle in on the action. Rep. James P. Moran (D–Va.) has repeatedly introduced a bill to create a national 5-cent tax on all disposable plastic or paper bags supplied by stores to customers. The bill typically dies quietly in committee, but perhaps Moran was hoping that, as Gandhi famously didn't say: "First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they attack you, then you win." 当然，哪里有禁令，哪里就会有国会伸手掺和进来。来自弗吉尼亚的民主党众议员James P. Moran已多次提出一项在全国范围内对所有由商店向顾客提供的一次性塑料袋或纸袋征收5美分税的法案。一如既往，法案在委员会无声无息地胎死腹中，但也许Moran希望的是，就像那句甘地没说过的名言：“一开始他们无视你，然后他们嘲笑你，接下去他们攻击你，再然后你就胜利了。” Regurgitate 反刍 【译注：regurgitate也有呕吐的意思，这里可能是一语双关：重复使用的袋子有时脏得令人作呕。】 As I write this, a load of reusable grocery bags is tumbling around in my dryer. In the course of researching this article, I got so thoroughly grossed out by the malevolent horror lurking in my pantry that I had to stop writing and start washing. 就在我写此文时，一堆可重复使用的杂货袋正在我的烘干机内翻滚。在对此文的内容进行调研时，我被潜伏在我的餐具室内的可怕的脏东西彻底恶心到了，不得不停止写作开始清洗。 I may love plastic bags, but I'm not immune to cultural and economic pressure, so when I remember to, I tote my reusable bags to the store like a good little yuppie. But this ostensibly modern act brings me back to conditions a little too reminiscent of the sub-hygienic reality faced by my great-great-grandmother, with her blood-and-crumb-covered reusable canvas wrapper. 我也许喜欢塑料袋，但我并不能对文化和经济压力免疫，因此我要是想得起来，就会像个善良的雅皮士一样带着可重复使用的袋子去商店购物。然而这个表面上现代的行为会把我带回到不太卫生的现实情境，非常容易让我想起我的曾曾祖母和她那满是血污和面包屑的可重复使用的帆布袋子。 If you're like most people, here's what you have probably done at least once: Put a leaky package of chicken in your cloth or plastic tote. Then go home, empty the bag, crumple it up, and toss it in the trunk of your car to fester. A week later, you go shopping again and throw some veggies you're planning to eat raw into the same bag. Cue diarrhea. 如果你和多数人一样，那么你肯定经历过下述事情：把一包汁水滴漏的鸡肉放进你的布袋或塑料包中。然后回家，拿出鸡肉，把袋子揉成一团扔进车的后备箱让其发霉发臭。一周后，你又去购物，把一些你准备生吃的蔬菜丢进同一只袋子。腹泻就是这么来的。 A 2011 survey published in the journal Food Protection Trends found coliform bacteria in fully half of the reusable shopping bags tested in a random survey of shoppers in Arizona and California. The same 2014 Edelman Berland study that found consumers frequently forgot their bags also unearthed the fact that only 18 percent of shoppers reported cleaning their bags "once a week or more." An article in the Journal of Infectious Diseases traced a 2010 outbreak of norovirus to nine members of an Oregon soccer team who had touched or eaten food stored in a contaminated reusable bag. 根据2011年一项发表在《食品保护趋势》杂志上的调查，在对亚利桑那和加州的购物者进行随机调查时，他们发现有足足半数的可重复使用购物袋中存在大肠型细菌。前面提到的2014年Edelman Berland那项发现消费者经常忘带购物袋的研究，还发现了这样一个事实：只有18%的购物者声称他们每周清洁购物袋“至少一次以上”。一篇登在《传染疾病杂志》上的文章发现，2010年诺如病毒爆发的起因是九名俄勒冈足球队员接触或食用了存放在被污染的可重复使用袋子中的食物。 Your cute reusable tote decorated with whimsical watercolors of eggplants may actually be causing those stomach cramps. 你肚子疼的罪魁祸首，事实上也许是你那装点着奇形怪状的茄子水印、可爱无比的可重复使用袋呢。 Reconsider 重新考量 Set your mind back to 1999, before our current wave of bag crackdowns, but well after the "plastic" answer to "paper or plastic?" began giving environmentalists the tremors. In that year's Oscar-winning American Beauty, an ambitious young filmmaker within the dull confines of suburbia captures an iconic image of a plastic sack—that product of banal late-capitalist excess—twirling artistically in the wind. 把思绪转回到1999年，那时还没有目前这波对塑料袋的打击取缔。但面对“纸袋还是塑料袋？”这一问题，回答“塑料袋”已经开始让环保主义者战栗。在那年获得奥斯卡奖的电影《美国丽人》中，一位雄心勃勃的年轻制片人在郊区生活的无聊框架内抓住了一幅具有象征意义的塑料袋的画面——晚期资本主义无聊纵欲的产品——在风中艺术地旋转。 "And this bag was just dancing with me," he says dreamily. "Like a little kid begging me to play with it. For 15 minutes. That's the day I realized that there was this entire life behind things, and this incredibly benevolent force that wanted me to know there was no reason to be afraid, ever." “这袋子只是在和我跳舞，”他梦幻般地说道。“像一个小孩恳求我和它玩耍。玩15分钟。那天，我意识到，在所有一切事物背后，有个完整的生命，而且有种不可思议的博爱的力量要我知道没有理由感到害怕，永远都没有。” Though it was meant as irony, there was an essential (if accidental) truth behind the speech. The technology behind plastic grocery bags is so useful it won a Nobel Prize. Employing an unimaginably small amount of base material, manufacturers can create tools of surprising strength and durability. Far from being the environmental threat activists make them out to be, plastic bags are not particularly to blame for clogged sewers, choked rivers, asphyxiated sea animals, or global warming. Instead, they are likely our best bet for carrying all of our junk in a responsible manner. 尽管本意是为了讽刺，这段话背后却有一种基本的（也许是凑巧的）真相。塑料购物袋背后的科技是如此有用，使其赢得了诺贝尔奖。利用一些用量小到无法想象的基本材料，制造者可以创造出具有惊人强度和耐用性的工具。与环保威胁论积极分子所描绘的形象大相径庭的是，实际上塑料袋并未导致下水道堵塞、河流填塞、海洋动物窒息或全球变暖。相反，如果我们要负责任装走垃圾，它们可能是最佳选择。 Don't believe the haters. Plastic bags are good for you. 别相信那些心怀怨恨的人。塑料袋是个好东西。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

How big is the average penis? 丁丁的平均尺寸 作者：David Shultz @ 2015-3-15 翻译：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Science，http://news.sciencemag.org/biology/2015/03/how-big-average-penis “I was in the pool!” George Costanza’s distress at the “shrinkage” of his penis after exiting a cold pool was hilarious in the 1994 Seinfeld episode, but for many men concern over the length and girth of their reproductive organ is no laughing matter. Now, a new study could assuage such worries with what may be the most accurate penis-size measurements to date. “那是因为我刚从冰冷的池子里出来！”在1994年播出的一集《宋飞传》里，可怜的男主角George Costanza在被朋友嘲笑萎缩的丁丁后，懊恼地大叫。这一幕成了《宋飞传》经典的搞笑桥段，但对许多男士来说，生殖器的长短粗细可不是闹着玩的。现在，有一份最新研究也许能平抚男士们的担忧。这份研究里的丁丁尺寸测量数据也许是迄今为止最为精确的。 Many earlier studies relied on self-reporting, which doesn’t always yield reliable results. “People tend to overestimate themselves,” says David Veale, a psychiatrist at the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. So when Veale and his team set out to settle the score on penile proportions, they decided to compile data from clinicians who followed a standardized measuring procedure. 在此之前，许多研究都依赖自行报告的数据，结果往往并不可靠。“人们倾向于高估自己。”David Veale说。Veale是英国国民保健属（NHS）-南伦敦及莫兹利信托基金的精神病学家。所以当Veale和他的团队着手评估阴茎尺寸时，他们决定采用来自临床医生的数据，因为医生们会遵照一个标准的测量程序。 Published today in the British Journal of Urology International, their new study synthesizes data from 17 previous academic papers that included measurements from a total of 15,521 men from around the world. The data enabled the researchers to calculate averages and model the estimated distribution of penile dimensions across humanity. 他们今天发表在《英国国际泌尿学杂志》上的研究报告综合了之前17份学术论文的成果，包括对全世界15521名男士的测量数据。这些数据让研究人员得以计算出阴茎大小的平均值，并对人类阴茎尺寸的大致分布建立模型。 “It still just strikes me how many men have questions and insecurities and concerns about their own penis size. We actually do need good data on it,” says Debra Herbenick, a behavioral scientist at Indiana University, Bloomington, who was not involved in the study. Debra Herbenick说，“如此多的人对自己的阴茎大小抱有疑问、不安全感和关切，这让我颇为惊奇。我们真是需要一份靠谱的数据。”Herbenick是印第安纳大学伯明顿分校的行为科学家，并未参与这份研究。 According to the team’s analysis, the average flaccid, pendulous penis is 9.16 cm (3.61 inches) in length; the average erect penis is 13.12 cm (5.16 inches) long. The corresponding girth measurements are 9.31 cm (3.66 inches) for a flaccid penis and 11.66 cm (4.59 inches) for an erect one. 根据Veale团队的分析，阴茎松弛下垂时平均长9.16cm（3.61英寸），勃起时长13.12cm（5.16英寸）；相应的，阴茎松弛时的平均周长为9.31cm（3.66英寸），勃起时的周长为11.66cm（4.59英寸）。 A graph of the size distribution shows that outliers are rare. A 16-cm (6.3-inch) erect penis falls into the 95th percentile: Out of 100 men, only five would have a penis larger than 16 cm. Conversely, an erect penis measuring 10 cm (3.94 inches) falls into the 5th percentile: Only five out of 100 men would have a penis smaller than 10 cm. 从尺寸分布图上我们可以看到异常值是很少的。一根勃起时16cm（6.3英寸）长的阴茎已处在第95个百分位处：100个男人中，只有5位的阴茎勃起长度大于16cm。相反，一根勃起时10cm（3.94英寸）长的阴茎位于第5个百分位：100个男人中只有5位的阴茎勃起长度小于10cm。 Gentlemen, if you’re eager to see how you measure up, you’ll need to follow the same measurement procedure used in the study. All length measurements were made from the pubic bone to the tip of the glans on the top side of the penis. Any fat covering the pubic bone was compressed before measurement, and any additional length provided by foreskin was not counted. Circumference was measured at the base of the penis or around the middle of the shaft, as the two sites were deemed equivalent. 先生们，如果你很想知道自己“长方几何”，那你就需要依照研究中采用的测量方法去测量。长度均从耻骨测起，到阴茎上方的龟头顶端。覆盖耻骨的脂肪在测量前应被压平，包皮延伸的长度都概不作数。周长则是测量阴茎根部或中部，一般两者的数值相等。 The researchers concluded that there was no strong evidence to link penis size to other physical features such as height, body mass index, or even shoe size. Yes, it seems that the only definite conclusion that can be drawn about a fellow with big socks is that he probably has big feet. 研究者们得出结论：并没有有力证据表明，阴茎的大小同诸如身高、体重指数或脚的大小等其他体征相关。是的，对于一个穿大号袜子的哥们，你唯一能确定的似乎只是他有双大脚。【译注：西方有“脚大鸟大” 之说。】 Likewise, the study found no significant correlation between genital dimensions and race or ethnicity, although Veale points out that their study was not designed to probe such associations, because much of the data used were from studies of Caucasian men. 同样，该研究也没有发现生殖器的大小同种族或民族有何显著联系。不过Veals也指出，他们的研究并不是为揭示此种联系而设计的，因为他们采用的大量数据都是来自针对白人的研究。 It’s easy to laugh at poor George Costanza for his shrunken manhood, but some reports suggest that only about 55% of men are satisfied with their penis size. Some seek potentially dangerous surgical solutions to a problem that, according to Veale, is often only in their head. Men “seem to have a very distorted picture of what [size] other men are, and what they believe they should be,” Veale says. 嘲笑可怜的George Costanza那泄了气的命根固然轻松，可一些报告显示只有55%的男性满意自己的丁丁尺寸。一些男人求助于有潜在风险的外科手术来解决“问题”，而这一“问题”——依Veals之见——只不过是他们臆想出来的罢了。男人们“似乎对其他男人的尺寸、自己该有的尺寸，有非常扭曲的看法。”Veals说道。 Pornography, in which male performers are often selected for their extremely large genitalia, may be partly to blame. Similarly, Herbenick points to the myriad spam e-mails that assert that 17.78 cm (7 inches) is average for an erection, when in reality such a member would place its owner in about the 98th percentile. It’s best to just ignore those ads in any case, Veale says. “There are no effective lotions or potions or pills.” 也许色情作品难辞其咎，那里面的男演员通常都是经过挑选的，生殖器尺寸大得惊人。Herbenick指出，那些宣称17.78cm（7英寸）才是勃起丁丁平均长度的垃圾邮件也是满天飞的祸害，而实际上17.78cm已位于第98个百分位了。Veale 说，无视这些广告就好了，“没有什么神油和猛药，统统不管用。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

CapX Reviews: By the People CapX评论:《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》 作者：Fred Smith @ 2015-9-13 译者：Lai Shawn（@NiGuoNiGuoNi） 校对：王涵秋（@你们都是乡非） 来源：CAPX，http://www.capx.co/capx-reviews-by-the-people/ Charles Murray, in his new book, By the People: Rebuilding Liberty without Permission, argues that America’s constitutional checks on the growth of spending, taxation, and regulation have largely been undermined. The result, he fears, is an America moving rapidly toward the kinder, gentler tyranny Alexis de Tocqueville warned about. Murray focuses—wisely in my view—on the massive expansion of federal regulations as the vehicle hurtling us down that road. 查尔斯·穆瑞在他的新书《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》中说到，美国对政府支出、税收、管制的宪法审查机制已经被严重破坏。他担心，其结果是美国快速滑向托克维尔所警告的“温和专制”。穆瑞认为，巨幅扩张的联邦政府管制像失控的汽车一样带着我们冲向这条道路。 Murray documents how the regulatory state, by shifting legislative powers to the Executive, has given Congress the green light to pass broad laws that are little more than aspirational resolutions—for better workplace safety, improved public health, energy conservation, clean air, safe drugs and food, you name it—while leaving the writing of rules to achieve these goals to anonymous, off-stage executive bureaucrats. 穆瑞讲述了，通过将立法权转移到行政分支，管制型国家是如何为议会大开绿灯，让它得以通过那些宽泛的法律的，而这些法律充其量只是些一厢情愿的决心——诸如提高工作环境的安全性，改善公众卫生状况，节约能源，清洁空气，确保食品药品安全等等。同时，为实现这些目的而制订具体规则的工作，却被丢给了幕后不知名的行政官僚。 Given this hollowing out of the Constitution, and the cultural and political changes that drove it, Murray concludes that America is so far down the road to serfdom that the political process can no longer restore the Founders’ vision of an institutionally constrained federal government. A solution, if one exists, must rely on massive civil disobedience and a populist and moral critique of regulatory predation. Yet, is it prudent to fully dismiss “normal” political approaches? 基于上述的宪法“中空化”，以及导致这一点的文化和政治上的变化，穆瑞认为美国已经在“通向奴役之路”上走得太远，以至于已经无法依靠正常的政治途径来将美国恢复成建国者们心目中那个其权力受制度性限制的联邦政府。如果有解决方案，那只能是依靠大规模的公民不服从运动和民粹主义者，以及对政府无情管制的道德批判。然而，完全忽略“正常”政治途径是不是谨慎的做法呢？ Murray’s first section, “Coming to Terms with Where We Stand,” tells the story of how Progressives, chafing at the limited government institutions bequeathed by the Founders, gutted constraints on federal power and unleashed the technocratic Leviathan, staffed by civil servants trained in scientific management and protected from political interference by the independent agency system. This is an oft-cited and depressing history but one that Murray summarizes well. 穆瑞书中的第一部分“面对现实”讲述了进步派是如何破坏国父们留下的有限政府制度，破坏对联邦政府权力的限制，释放出那头专家治国主义权力巨兽，这头巨兽由受过科学管理训练的公务员组成，并且免受独立机构的政治干预。这是一段常被提起的沉痛历史，但是穆瑞总结的很好。 His second section, “Opening a New Front,” develops his civil disobedience proposal, including the creation of a new group, the Madison Fund, to manage and finance that work and take on some support functions, such as educational and public affairs efforts. The moral case for civil disobedience, he argues, stems from citizens’ growing alienation from a government they feel no longer represents them. A government that has lost our trust, he argues, has lost legitimacy, which justifies civil disobedience. 该书的第二部分“开辟新战线”进一步阐述了他的公民不服从运动倡议，包括建立一个叫麦迪逊基金的新组织，用于管理和资助不服从运动，并且通过教育和公共事务去支持这项运动。他认为，公民不服从的伦理基础在于公民和政府越来越疏远，并且感到政府已经不再能代表他们。一个政府如果失去了人民的信任，就失去了其合法性，公民不服从运动也就有了正当的理由。 Murray suggests the Madison Fund might also offer “insurance” against regulatory predation, much like malpractice insurance gives professionals some financial protection from the threat of lawsuits. However, the diversity and complexity of regulations makes estimating risks, and thus setting premiums, very difficult. In fact, insurance as an alternative to regulation was once explored for Superfund and largely abandoned for these reasons. Moreover, the criminalization of many regulatory violations casts doubt on the ability of such insurance to survive in a hostile regulatory environment. 穆瑞建议，麦迪逊基金应为那些对抗管制掠夺的行动提供“保险”，这跟职业过失保险很像，后者帮助专业人士规避因职业行为而遭受诉讼所带来的财务风险。然而，政府管制的多样性和复杂性，让预估风险以及设置保险费率非常困难。实际上，保险作为管制的替代已经被 “超级基金”尝试过，又因上述理由而被放弃。此外，由于很多违反管制的行为已经被犯罪化，令人怀疑这种保险是否能在充满敌意的管制环境下幸存。 Murray suggests that many regulations are unenforceable, because there are far more parties subject to regulations than there are enforcers. As with highway speed limits, he notes, most drivers will rarely be ticketed as long as they go with the flow. Therefore, if large numbers can be induced to violate any specific regulation, that regulation will become unenforceable. Perhaps, but while the “flow defense” often works, some communities, rather than ease regulatory enforcement, create “speed traps” and impose large fines. Fierce, random enforcement is another way of ensuring less costly enforcement of compliance and makes Murray’s campaign less viable. 穆瑞提出，很多管制是无法强制进行的，因为监管对象的数量远超执法者。比如高速公路限速，大多数司机只要跟着车流就极少被罚款。因此，如果很多人被诱导去违反特定的法规，这个法规就无法被执行了。虽然“淹没防卫法”有时会奏效，但是很多地方，不仅没有放松执法，反而发明了“超速陷阱”（高速公路上一段严格执法的区域）并施加巨额罚金。大力度的随机执法是另一种确保低执法成本的方法，这让穆瑞的方法看上去难以实现。 Still, Murray hopes that organized resistance to overregulation might push lawmakers and regulators to adopt less burdensome regulatory practices. His cautious optimism stems from Herbert Stein’s famous quote, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” And as Murray notes, America’s regulatory burden is already massive, citing the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s recent estimate of federal regulatory costs at around $1.8 trillion annually. This suggests a “stop” may be imminent. 然而，穆瑞希望对过度执法的有组织抵抗或许会促使立法者和监管者采用不那么苛刻的管制措施。他的谨慎乐观态度来自于赫伯特·斯坦的名句“不能永恒的事物终将会停下。”穆瑞注意到，美国的管管负担已十分巨大，来自竞争性企业研究所的一份报告显示，联邦管制每年带来1.8万亿美元的成本，因此过度管制必须立刻被制止。 Murray is also cautiously optimistic that faith in the Progressive vision is fading. Progressivism was first premised on the notion that government guidance could ensure uninterrupted progress. Advances in the social and administrative sciences would enable the best and the brightest to regulate markets in the public interest. Civil service reforms would prevent ineptitude and corruption. Independent regulatory agencies would prevent political cronyism. Murray argues that the experiences of the last century have not been kind to these beliefs, resulting in progressivism losing some of its former appeal. 穆瑞同时谨慎乐观地认为，进步派的愿景正在逐渐失去光芒。进步主义的基本假设是，政府的引导可以确保社会持续进步，社会科学和行政科学的发展可以让最善良最聪明的人处于公众利益而规制市场，公民服务改革可以防止不平等和腐败，独立监管机构可以防止政治裙带关系。穆瑞认为，过去一个世纪的经验并不能支持这些想法，这使得进步主义正在丧失它之前的吸引力。 I’m less sure, given the current popularity of progressive firebrands like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. And the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Board is an exemplar progressive agency—run by experts with no accountability to elected officials, with a staggering and ever-widening array of regulatory powers, and self-financing to boot! 鉴于诸如伊丽莎白·沃伦和伯尼·桑德斯这些进步主义煽动者目前的旺盛人气，我对此并不那么确定。最近成立的消费者金融保护理事会是个典型的进步主义组织——由专家组成，无须对选举产生的官员负责，拥有令人震惊的广泛权力，甚至可以财政上自给自足地运作。 Murray next turns to the question of which criteria should determine those regulations suitable for challenge. Given the radical tone of Murray’s book, one might have expected an endorsement of a broad frontal attack on the regulatory Leviathan. Yet surprisingly, Murray’s target list is fairly narrow. He sees the original flurry of regulations in the late 19^th century as largely warranted. He exempts Internal Revenue Service regulations, seeing taxes as a legitimate role of government. He appears to endorse regulations designed to address issues related to externalities and public goods. He also argues against challenging regulations that enjoy overwhelming popular support. These exemptions mean a less aggressive challenge to the regulatory state. 穆瑞接下来讨论的是选择挑战哪些法规的标准。鉴于穆瑞的激进口吻，读者可能会猜想他将对“管制巨兽”发起全面攻势。然而让人吃惊的是，穆瑞的目标名单非常短。他认为源自19世纪末期的很多法律是正当的。他放过了国家税务总局，认为税收是政府的合法职能。他似乎同意那些与外部性和公共品相关的管制法规。他同时还反对挑战一些受到广泛支持的管制。这些豁免意味着他对管制型国家的挑战不是很具进攻性。 Murray’s exclusion criteria appear to be influenced by the successful strategy of the Institute for Justice (IJ), which has carved out an important niche challenging regulations that meet Murray’s rather restrictive criteria. IJ selects regulations that many see as unjust, seeks out clients likely to be viewed sympathetically by the public, and manages media strategies to frame their cases as examples of noble Davids fighting brutal regulatory Goliaths. 穆瑞的豁免名单似乎受到了“司法协会”（IJ）的成功策略的影响——他们选择加以挑战的管制恰好符合穆瑞的谨慎标准，挑选那些看起来不公平的管制法规，找出一些有望被公众同情的客户，并通过影响舆论把自己塑造成像挑战残暴巨兽歌利亚的大卫一样高贵的勇士，这一策略让他们开拓出了一个重要的生态位。 Yet, the Institute for Justice is not alone in its use of litigation to challenge regulations. To a limited extent, the free market movement already has created a “Madison Fund.” Free market policy organizations—the Pacific Legal Foundation, Becket Fund, Center for Individual Rights, Goldwater Institute, my own organization, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others—are taking on other complex regulatory challenges, with varying degrees of success and popular support. Murray might have discussed these efforts in greater detail. 然而，司法协会并不是唯一一个通过诉讼去挑战法规的。虽然规模不大，自由市场运动已经成立了一个“麦迪逊基金”。自由市场政策组织——太平洋法律基金会，贝克特基金，个人权利中心，戈德华特研究所，我自己的组织——竞争性企业研究所，以及其他各种组织，正在对管制展开复杂的挑战行动，取得了不同程度的成功和大众支持。穆瑞会在书中详细讨论了这些努力。 Murray seems to believe that common sense provides adequate guidance for sorting out “good” from “bad” regulations and that Americans oppose many of the bad ones. Yet, recent debates over financial, health, and environmental regulations cast doubt on this. Many feel that America is overregulated, but support specific regulations—such as for example, the left’s support for more restrictive environmental and financial regulations and the right’s calls for tighter security and immigration restrictions. 穆瑞似乎认为，凭常识足以区分“好”的和“坏”的管制，并且美国人都反对坏的那些。然而，近期关于金融、卫生、环境相关法律的争论让人怀疑这一点。很多人认识到美国被管的太多了，但却支持特定的管制——比如左派支持严格的环保措施和金融管制，右派呼吁更严格的安全措施和移民限制。 Citing polling data, Murray finds reason for optimism in the fact that trust in government is declining and that businesses view regulations as increasingly burdensome. But that does not necessarily indicate support for a specific reform agenda. Congress, too, has lost the trust of the American people, yet more than 90 percent of all Members of Congress are routinely reelected. 通过引用调查数据，穆瑞找到了乐观的理由——对政府的信任在下降，并且企业认为管制带给他们的负担正日益加重。但是这未必说明一项特定改革议程获得了支持。虽然国会同样失去了美国人民的信任，然而仍有超过90%的国会议员照样如期连任。 Lacking widespread support, Murray’s massive civil disobedience proposal is unlikely to prove a viable strategy. America’s early history experienced such an attempt to fend off federal taxation—the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790s. It enjoyed considerable local support, but was nonetheless quickly suppressed. 因为缺乏广泛的支持，穆瑞的大规模民众不服从策略并不可行。在美国的早期历史上有过抵抗联邦政府征税的行为——比如1790年代的威士忌叛乱，尽管这场抗税运动得到了当地大量支持，但仍被讯速镇压了。 Murray argues that an expanded effort might change all this. His proposed new and well-funded Madison Fund would organize protests, help businesses and individuals targeted by regulation, insure vulnerable parties against regulatory abuse, and ultimately strip regulators of their “white hat” public image. It would help, but as noted, many free market organizations are already doing much of this. Moreover, would many businessmen want to directly confront their overseers? And even if they did, would the public see them sympathetically? 穆瑞认为更大规模的支持可能会改变这些情况。全新的，资金充沛的麦迪逊基金可以组织抗议活动，帮助监管所针对的企业和个人，确保弱势团体也可以对抗滥用的权力，最终剥下监管者的正义外衣。这可能会有用，但是正如我们注意到的，已经有很多自由市场组织在做这些了。此外，会有很多商人想要直面他们的监管者们吗？而且即使他们愿意，公众会同情他们吗？ Murray seeks to addresses these challenges by drawing an analogy with the role civil disobedience, such as lunch counter sit-ins, played in advancing the civil rights movement. But this analogy falls short. The civil rights movement enjoyed widespread media, intellectual, and public support, including by many economic interests. Yet, it still took decades and required both a state-by-state as well as a national approach to bear fruit. Regulatory reform lacks this broad intellectual support and needs greater organized business support than it has received. 穆瑞将这些挑战类比成公民不服从运动，比如在推动了民权运动进程的静坐抗议。但是这些类比并不成立，因为民权运动有广泛的媒体、知识界和公众支持，包括很多出于经济利益考虑的支持。尽管如此，运动的成果仍然是在一个个州以及全国通过各种途径努力了几十年才获得的。管制改革缺少如此广泛的知识界支持，也缺乏更大的有组织商业支持。 Murray’s third and final section, “A Propitious Moment,” suggests reasons why his proposals need not be quixotic. America’s continued diversity, he suggests, makes one-size-fits-all regulation less attractive to large segments of the population. Technological innovations have rendered largely obsolete regulatory interventions intended to address information asymmetries and allowed entrepreneurs to bypass regulatory roadblocks, creating consumer constituencies before the regulators notice. Uber is a great example of both achievements. 穆瑞书中的第三也是最后一部分“一场胜算很大的运动”论述了为何他认为他的建议不是空想。美国长期持续的多样性，使得大多数人不会喜欢一刀切的管制。科技创新让那些为矫正信息不对称而设立的管制变得过时，也可以让企业家绕过监管，在监管者注意到之前就得到消费者的支持。Uber就是一个证明这两点的很好例子。 Murray has identified the regulatory challenge facing America. But his proposed reform strategy needs to be better developed if it is to achieve success. In my view, he is too optimistic about public attitudes toward the regulatory estate and the prospects for changing them. For instance, he suggests the federal bureaucracy is increasingly demoralized. Perhaps in some cases, but individuals and businesses at the regulatory reform frontier still find regulators to be self-confident, well-prepared, and aggressive. 穆瑞指出了美国所面临的管制挑战。但是若要取得成功，他提出的改革策略还有待完善。在我看来，他对公众的态度以及改变公众态度的可能性太过乐观。举个例子，他认为联邦政府官僚正逐渐失去其道德光环。这也许在某些情况下是对的，但在管制改革前线作战的个人和企业仍发现监管者们非常自信，准备充分，并具有进攻性。 Moreover, while the future Madison Fund might launch dozens of cases, regulations continue to proliferate. Murray seems to hope that the creative marketing of these cases will increase public anger at regulatory overreach, but they may not, given that many regulatory agencies still enjoy widespread public support. In fact, such efforts could even backfire, as irate regulators place resisting firms in the agency’s crosshairs. 此外，就算将来的麦迪逊基金可能会同时着手处理几十个针对过度管制的案件，同时却仍有更多的管制会不断诞生。穆瑞似乎希望对这些案例的营销会加深公众对过度管制的愤怒，但是他们也许根本不会，因为很多监管机构依然得到广泛支持。事实上，这些努力可能反而会帮倒忙，因为愤怒的监管者会 “重点关照”那些反抗的企业。 There are other approaches to reform, including legislation, such as the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would require Congress to vote on all regulations with $100 million or more in estimated annual costs (a threshold I’d like to see drop over time). Congress could also explore a one-in-one-out requirement for new rules, such as one now being tried in Canada, or even the one-in-two-out policy tried in the United Kingdom. States might also establish state regulatory ombudsmen to argue against both existing and new state regulations and to challenge on behalf of the state costly and restrictive federal regulations—that is, states might create their own Madison Groups. 但是还有其他改革方式，包括立法，比如REINS法案，这个法案要求所有每年花费一亿美元以上的监管措施都需要国会投票（我希望看到这个阈值越来越低）。国会可以尝试“一进一出”（每批准一项管制必须废弃之前的另一项）措施，就像加拿大已经在尝试的那样，甚至英国的“一进两出”。同时各州也可以设立管制巡察员来对抗已经存在的州法和新条例，挑战联邦政府加于各州的昂贵而又严格的管制——也就是说，各州可以建立自己的麦迪逊组织。 Murray deals only briefly with the business community’s role in the regulatory reform struggle. He notes, as economist Joseph Schumpeter did long ago, that, in the political world, business has too often been passive, or slipped into cronyism. Murray discusses the many reasons for this passivity. Firms are vulnerable to political retaliation, media attacks, shareholder activism, and consumer boycotts. Yet, Schumpeter also noted that business has critical resources—personnel, information, marketing and communication skills—needed for political success. And, as Murray notes, factors such as the slowing of innovation and the need for greater flexibility to operate in a global economy may be persuading some in the business community that this is a fight they must join and win. To do so, they need to ally with free market policy groups. 穆瑞只用了寥寥几笔简短地阐述了商业团体在改革中的角色。就像经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特很久以前就说过的那样，他认为在政治领域，企业要么消极被动，要么掉入裙带关系的陷阱。穆瑞认为以下几点造成了他们的消极。企业在政治报复，媒体攻击，股东维权，以及消费者抵制面前非常脆弱。但是熊彼特也指出，企业拥有重要的资源——人力，信息，市场和交流手段——这些都和政治成功有密切联系。此外，穆瑞也认为创新的减速和全球市场对运营灵活性提出的更高要求，会迫使企业加入这场战斗。为了获胜，他们必须和推广自由市场政策的组织结盟。 There are mutual advantages to such an alliance. Free market policy organizations are less vulnerable to political pressures, more credible as spokespeople, and skilled at crafting and promoting the narratives needed to advance the moral and intellectual case for reform. Meanwhile, businesspeople possess the localized knowledge, resources, and real-world experience to convey the human costs of overregulation. Businesses also enjoy cooperative links with their customers, employees, suppliers, and investors—relationships that give them both an audience and the clout to advance powerful narratives. 这种联盟可以给双方都带来好处。推广自由市场政策的组织更能应对政治压力，作为面对公众的发言人更容易被信任，并且擅长制造更具道德优势和知识水平的宣传攻势。同时，企业家具有本土化的知识、资源、和实打实的经验来转移过度管制的人力成本。企业家也更喜欢和他们客户、雇员、供应商、投资者的合作关系，这些人既是他们宣传的听众，也是推行这些宣传的重要力量。 In democratic market economies, most policy changes result from alliances of economic and moral interests. And indeed, such “Bootlegger and Baptist” alliances have long been a standard strategy used by those seeking greater political control of the economy. The cooperative efforts of trial lawyers and environmentalists, of consumer advocates and labor unions, explain much of the growth in regulation over the last decades. Our challenge, developed by Murray so well, is to learn from their successes. 在奉行市场经济的民主国家中，大部分政策改变都来自于经济利益和道德诉求的结合。实际上，类似“走私犯和教徒”的联盟很长时间以来一直是寻求对经济的更强政治控制的标准途径。诉讼律师、环保主义者、消费者保护组织，以及工会之间的合作，很大程度上导致了近几十年来增加的各种管制。正如穆瑞也提到过的，我们的挑战，就是从他们的成功中汲取经验。 Murray’s enthusiasm for reform is commendable, but those excited by his audacious plan must hope that he will lead an effort to advance it further. Stimulating resistance to regulation is key, but more will be needed to actually roll back Leviathan. The Progressives were successful in crafting the regulatory path to their goals, marketing that policy and gaining the influence and popular support to make it the dominant reality. Murray’s and our challenge is to find an equally effective strategy for economic liberalization. And Murray is well placed to suggest those next steps, having laid the intellectual groundwork for welfare reform in the 1990s, with his classic book, Losing Ground. Could Murray’s latest book provide the foundation for a new Doer/Thinker alliance? Stay tuned. 穆瑞对于改革的热情是值得赞扬的，但是那些因他的大胆计划而激动不已的人必须寄希望于他能更加完善这项计划。激起对管制的抵抗是关键，但更重要的是把权力关回笼子。进步派成功地借助管制实现了他们的目的，并且通过推销他们的策略，争取影响力和公众支持来使这些管制难以撼动。穆瑞和我们的挑战，是找出一套同样有效的策略来实现经济自由。在他的经典著作《倒退》中，穆瑞恰当的指出了，这些步骤如何为1990年代的福利改革打下了智识基础。那么，穆瑞的新书会为新一轮的实践家和思想家结盟提供基础吗？敬请期待。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#6：武人的兴起 辉格 2015年10月20日 农业出现之前，所有适龄男性都是战士，但没人将打仗作为谋生之道，因为战争或暴力攻击虽可能带来各种利益——战利品、个人声誉、女人、消灭资源竞争对手，等等——，却无法为个人提供经常性收入或可靠生活保障，所以当时并不存在一个职业武人阶层，社会分工充其量只是在性别与年龄段之间发生。 但农业改变了这一状况，畜群和粮食成了可供持续劫掠的资源，有望为劫掠者提供持久生活来源，从而使得战争成为一种有可能赖以为生的职业；可以说，农耕和畜牧创造了一种新的生态位，吸引一些人逐渐将生计建立在此之上；对于有着长久狩猎历史的人类，这一生态位并不太陌生，农牧群体的生活资料只是另一种猎物而已。 不过，该生态位起初并不十分诱人，因为人类毕竟是最可怕的动物，几万年前便已占据了食物链顶端，从他们口中夺食太危险了，而且人类有着强烈的复仇倾向，被攻击、特别是亲友被杀之后，无论是个人情感还是社会规范，都要求人们实施报复，实际上，血仇循环也是传统小型社会之间暴力冲突的头号起因。 但劫掠机会的持续存在，激励着一代代劫掠和反劫掠者不断开发新的战争技术和组织方法，同时，凭借地位分化和财富积累所带来的比较优势，最终将战争变成了一种可持续的生计模式；首先是武器的发展，早先的武器十分简陋，而且制作材料都是分布广泛、容易获得的石料、竹木、骨料、皮革和贝壳，尽管有些材料（比如黑曜石）需要从远处交换而来，但价格也相当便宜，所以每个人都有能力为自己制作和装备与别人质量效力相当的武器。 据人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔（[[Timothy Earle]]）介绍，丹麦日德兰半岛的新石器时代晚期古日耳曼遗存中，最常见的武器是一种石制匕首，数量极多，几乎每个墓葬和房屋遗址中都有几把，当地农民在犁地时还经常翻到；然而在进入青铜时代早期之后，主要武器变成了青铜剑，它们仅见于小部分墓葬，而且这些墓葬的位置、形式和随葬内容，皆与其他墓葬有着显著区别。 【图1】北欧新石器时代的燧石匕首 更有意思的是，这些铜剑多数安装的是朴素剑柄，且剑刃上可观察到较多砍削所留下的痕迹，但有少数安装了采用失蜡工艺铸造的豪华剑柄，且较少使用痕迹；很明显，拥有青铜剑的武士已有别于普通人，而豪华剑的主人则是地位显赫的权势人物；这一变化的原因不难理解：制造石匕首的燧石材料唾手可得，而青铜剑所需材料则是从数百公里外的南方经由长途贸易而来，其制造工艺也并非人人都能掌握。 【图2】北欧青铜时代早期的青铜剑，有些装有豪华剑柄 我们不妨从投资者或企业家的角度来考虑，武器和战争技术的发展是如何改变战争形态的：武器成本的提高，使得战争从一个重人力轻资产行业向重资产方向转变，让富裕者拥有了额外优势，他们的财力不仅让自己获得更强大的武器，还可以保障材料来源和武器制造能力，为那些贫穷但又渴望获取战利品的人提供装备，换取他们听从自己指挥，展开协调行动，从而组织起一支效忠于自己的队伍。 由于首领拥有分配战利品的权力，让他有了足够的激励采用更多重资产的战争手段，投资建造更为昂贵的战争器具，组织更大规模的劫掠行动；早期维京人在欧洲海岸河口发动的袭击都规模不大，通常只有几十条小船、一两百人，参与者地位也较平等，行动很少受头领节制，但随着易受攻击的沿岸村镇纷纷开始设防，成功袭击所需队伍日益庞大，船只也变得更大更昂贵，到十世纪时，袭击队伍常达到上百条船、数千人的规模。 【图5】维京海盗船 夏威夷群岛各酋邦的大酋长们建造的战船丝毫不逊色于维京海盗船，它基于波利尼西亚传统独木舟改造而成，将平衡浮木换成了第二独木船体，并添加了三角帆；1779年Kaleiopuu大酋长出迎库克船长的船队旗舰上，装载了20位桨手和40位战士，另一位大酋长Peleioholani拥有的一艘战舰，据说可装载160位战士，这样的大型战争装备，显然不是普通家庭所能负担，而传统独木舟却是每个家庭都有能力制造的。 【图6-7】波利尼西亚传统独木舟，有些带三角帆 【图3】夏威夷群岛的双体独木战船 【图4】1779年Kaleiopuu大酋长出迎库克船长的船队 盔甲、马匹、马具和战车同样昂贵，实际上，和早期农业社会的多数创新一样，这些新技术都是战争向重资产方向发展的结果，直到变得足够普及和廉价之后，才被用于容器和农具等和平用途；这些创新离不开有组织私人武装的崛起，试想，假如战争仍像前农业社会那样，以分散自发无组织的方式进行，战利品谁拿到归谁，那就没人会愿意在重资产型的新技术上进行高风险投资。 对战争从事者来说，财力优势也体现在风险抵御能力上，和农业生产相比，劫掠的机会来得更随机，成败也更难预料，万一身亡家人也可能失去依靠，由富裕者出面组织，便提供了一种保险机制，平时由首领保障食宿，作战时提供武器装备，战死后还可抚恤家人，这对于那些缺少资源的穷人非常有吸引力，这一风险差异，和当代自由职业者与受薪雇员之间的差异一样。 农业社会的制度结构恰好创造了对此类机会的旺盛需求，基于经营效率上的考虑，土地财产常有着抗分割倾向，因而较多采用长子继承制，得不到土地的幼子们的一条常见出路，便是投靠一位首领，成为职业武士，首领族内的穷亲戚、孤儿、还不起债的债务人、有特殊技能却无处施展者，都可能选择这条出路。 如此一来，这些权势人物便逐渐将具备战争所需技能的各种人才聚集在其身边，包括战士，武器和车船工匠，厨师伙夫，水手马夫，学者谋士，采购关键物资的行商，还有兼任历史学家、宣传部长和情报收集者的说书艺人和吟游诗人，通过为他们提供食宿、赞助和庇护，在战争中共同行动，分享战利品和保护费，首领与其追随者之间便建立起了一种稳固的恩主-门客关系（[[patronage]]）。 这是早期农业社会从部落向酋邦发展的关键一步，它开启了社会进化的一个全新阶段，社会结构与秩序不再仅仅通过自发协调而产生，权势人物开始主动创建组织，实施集中式控制，这一转折，类似于管理学家钱德勒（[[Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.]]）所指出的现代规模化企业取代传统个体商人的过程，企业这只“看得见的手”在局部代替市场配置资源、组织生产、协调供应链，将这些战争团队的首领称为第一批钱德勒式企业家，也并不过分。 门客制广泛存在于各大文明的黎明期，在酋邦形态的社会中，统治阶层由一群通过宗族或姻亲纽带联合起来的恩主（酋长）组成，其中权势最显赫而取得霸主地位的大恩主便是酋邦首领；北欧萨迦史诗传颂的英雄，荷马史诗中的英雄和所谓国王（[[basileus]]）们，都是拥有众多门客的大恩主，随从或侍卫亲兵组成了其军队，相互间征战不休，争夺霸主地位。 恩主-门客关系也是早期罗马的重要社会纽带和基础政治结构，罗马城创建者罗穆鲁斯本人便是位大恩主，早先的恩主（patronus）后来成了罗马王国的贵族（[[patricius]]），他们同时也是元老（[[senator]]）的来源；在王国早期，称呼元老的词是patres，意思是父亲或族长，与“恩主”和“贵族”同源，与此同时，那些追随效忠恩主的门客（pietas），变成了罗马的平民阶层（[[plebeian]]），这一词义演变揭示了从部落到酋邦的发展过程：权势家族通过收容大批门客而变成政治组织，其族长作为恩主而成为该组织的首领，这些首领继而联合成为罗马国家。 历史学家阿扎尔·加特（[[Azar Gat]]）在对照分析了希腊罗马文献后发现，类似的演变也发生在凯尔特和日耳曼社会，在波利比乌斯（[[Polybius]]）所描绘的公元前二世纪北意大利凯尔特人社会中，已经有了拥有大批门客的显赫恩主，但此时这些大人物与其随从之间的关系仍较为平等，每日聚宴畅饮，同吃同住，分享战利品和奢侈品，早期称呼门客随从的词汇也多与“朋友”同源，大人物只是众多战士和战争首领中最富有、最成功、最声誉卓著的那些，社会结构也仍由亲属关系所主导。 然而一个多世纪后，凯撒在《高卢战记》中描绘情况已迥然不同，门客们对恩主唯命是从，且已转变为常年作战的职业武士，最显赫恩主的私人武装扩张到上万人规模，居住在新近兴起的城镇里，恩主们俨然已成为高高在上的贵族统治阶层，早先的部落平等主义已不复存在。 基于门客制的新型组织一方面充分利用传统的宗族结构和姻亲网络，同时又大加改造；首领们突出强调自己所在家系，并将其直系祖先加以神化，强加给其他支系和氏族，成为社区共同祀奉的神祗，希腊诸神连同其谱系便如此被创造了出来，夏威夷酋长们甚至阻止平民记诵家谱，结果平民往往只记得祖父辈是谁，罗马的门客则常以收养的名义被并入恩主的氏族，采用其姓氏，收养传统在罗马贵族中一直盛行到帝国时代。 恩主们在网罗门客时，也突破了宗族结构和部落边界，在选择与谁合作的问题上，亲缘关系退居其次，专业素养、忠诚勇武、个人友情成为更优先的考虑，更直接的物质报酬和利益算计取代传统互惠关系而成为主要激励来源，亲属义务则被效忠盟誓等契约性义务所取代，战友情谊代替血缘亲情，基于职位的权力代替家长和长老权威……所有这些改变，都是走向专业化所必需，类似于家族企业在去家族化过程中所经历的变化。 这些武装组织最初是为了对外发动劫掠，获取战利品，可一旦建立，便成为一股改变社会政治结构的力量；那些频遭劫掠却无力自保的群体，可能会向劫掠者定期缴纳贡赋以换取安宁，或者向其他同类组织纳贡以寻求庇护；同时，存在此类组织的群体，会因其对外劫掠行动而惹来报复，而报复通常会无差别的落在整个群体头上，这样，即便那些并未依附于武装首领的社会成员，也不得不与之建立关系，以免躺枪。 此时事情可能朝两个方向发展，假如部落长老们的影响力足够强大，便可将这些武装组织置于自己的控制之下，建立起某种军事民主制，相反，假如武装首领更强大，便可能篡夺原本由长老会议所拥有的部落政治权力而成为僭主，全面接管部落的公共事务，而其门客就成了他的统治团队。 重要的是，那些在竞争中胜出的武装组织，必定是有能力慑服了周边若干群体因而得以从中勒索贡赋的组织，所以他们基于纳贡与庇护关系而建立的政治结构，必定是跨部落的，结果便是酋邦的建立；尽管此前也存在跨部落联盟，但联盟是一种类似于商会的松散组织，而酋邦则是真正的企业，它将推动社会以更紧密的方式走向大型化。 武装首领一旦建立起酋邦，便可凭借姻亲网络进一步强化对各部落的控制，常见做法是从各部落娶妻，并将女儿嫁给各酋长，正如祖鲁王国诞生前的情况；假如首领实力足够强大，还可将其宗族近亲安插进各部落，在夏威夷酋邦中，部落酋长都是大酋长的父系近亲，亲缘通常不远于一级堂兄弟，更低级的社区酋长则是大酋长的亲兵随从，他们都直接听从其指挥，平时照管农务、组织人力修缮灌溉系统，定期收缴贡赋，必要时有义务参与大酋长的作战行动。 在夏威夷的案例中，一个层级化的官僚系统已呼之欲出，随着武装组织之间的竞争推动武器和组织技术持续改进，酋邦的统治范围和控制能力日益扩展，由此所开启的组织和制度发展进程，将最终导致国家的诞生。 门客制所创造的武装组织，也留下了一种不可逆的遗产，在此后历史上，每当国家崩溃、社会失序之际，凡已经历过这一阶段的社会，都不会再退回到部落状态，而会在各种类似恩主-门客关系的模式下实现政治权力重组，并重建地方秩序，罗马衰亡后西欧封建体系的兴起，汉帝国崩溃后士族门阀收纳部曲荫客、拥家兵而自保的做法，皆属此类。  

【2015-11-19】 @whigzhou: 我会疼爱她，保护她，决不让她受一点点伤害。——这些话我们常听到，小清新尤其爱听，但觉得这些话温暖动听的人，多半不知道那意味着什么，否则就不会有那么多无原则的反战分子了，没准备好去战斗的人，有什么资格说要保护家人免受伤害呢？所以并非谈论爱就没意义，而是他们不明白那在行动上意味着什么 @whigzhou: 假如你足够真诚，而不只是说说空话，就能闻到这几句话背后的血腥味，在一个霍布斯世界，要想确保家人免受伤害，你就必须（1）杀死某些不可理喻的邻居，或（2）用雷霆般的打击将其摄服，或（3）把他们控制起来，或（4）教会他们文明行事——这些方法一个比一个困难，你的实力决定了你可能作何选择。 @whigzhou: 美国条约体系（北约/澳新美/美日/美韩……）之外的国际社会，就是个霍布斯世界，至于联合国，那只是个笑话  

多年前我曾就中医发表过一些观点，今天不小心又提起这个话题，刚好这几年又有些新体会，再整理补充一下： 1）中医这个词的含义不太清楚，按较狭窄的用法，它是指一套理论体系（诸如阴阳五行、五脏六腑、气血经络、寒热干湿、温凉甘苦……），以及被组织在这套体系之内的各种治疗方法，而按较宽泛的用法，则囊括了所有存在于汉文化中的非现代医疗； 2）对于那套理论体系，我的态度是完全唾弃； 3）对于被归在中医名下的各种治疗方法，我的态度和对待其他前科学的朴素经验一样，持高度怀疑的态度； 4）但我不会像有些反中医者那样，做出一个强判断：它们都是无用的或错误的； 5）我相信，这些疗法中，有不少大概是有点用的； 6）然而，现代医疗的发展，大幅改变了利用这些可能用处的机会成本和得失比，依我看，改变的程度已达到：其中没有什么是值得考虑到，我甚至认为，作为医疗消费者，认真考虑这些可能用处，会显得很愚蠢； 7）考虑到中医界普遍拒绝按现代医学标准去审查旧疗法，对这些疗法持总体负面评价（即所谓一棍子打死），是完全合理的，在我看来，今天一位医生宣称自己是中医，或推崇中医，仅这一点，足以让他变得不值得信任； 8）但是这一评价方式不适用于过去，在现代医疗普及之前，一位相信传统疗法的医生，也完全可能是明智的、理性的、具有批判性头脑的，甚至具有一些朴素科学态度的，据我了解，许多被归为中医的医生，其实对那些理论说辞没什么兴趣，他们只是相信一些特定疗法，而且也愿意随经验而调整自己的信念； 9）我相信（虽然没什么经验依据），在近代以前，或多或少有点用处的中医疗法，很可能比现在多不少，但随着现代医疗的普及，幸存下来的中医疗法中，有用的比例降低了，剩下的基本上都是没用的；理由是， 10）在科学方法出现之前，对传统知识的筛选机制是基于个体经验和口碑传播的，这一选择机制有个特点：因果链容易从随机个体经验中得到识别的那些事情上，知识改进和积累更可能发生，而在因果链不容易识别的那些地方，便是迷信的温床； 11）在现代医疗普及的过程中，大众对待新旧疗法的态度上，上述筛选机制仍会起作用，因而，传统疗法中那些被用于因果链较明显的病症上因而很可能有点用的疗法，反而更容易被现代疗法所淘汰，结果，剩下的都是安慰剂，因果关系越是难以看清，对安慰剂的需求就越大，这大概就是当代中医的情况，在现代医疗的排挤下，它已经转变成了一个比以往远更纯粹的安慰剂产业。  

恐怖主义土壤肥沃，众多落后国家制度建设鲜有成就，甚至沦为失败国家，社会失序，这些问题其实有着一个共同的背景：西方文化和价值观对这些国家的精英或潜在精英失去了吸引力，或者，即便仍有吸引力，以往那个以西方价值为灯塔的、并且可供这些落后国家精英分子或有志青年向上爬升的社会阶梯，已经断裂了。 这一情景与维多利亚时代形成鲜明对比，那时所有已经接触西方的传统社会，无不仰慕西方文化，这些社会中禀赋优秀、志向高远、不安现状的青年，都清楚的知道，通往西方价值的阶梯在哪里，可以如何通过自身努力而一级级爬升，从而获得个人成就。 在晚清最后三十年，有点志向的青年都知道，学英语、接受西式教育、在铁路局、电报局、工厂等西式产业谋得一份差事、留学，都是令人艳羡的社会晋身之途，按西方模式创办现代企业、组织自治社区，甚至改革政治制度，这些成就可以为个人带来新的荣耀，赢得西方式的尊严和体面，甚至被女王封爵。 这就像之前科举阶梯，即便对不识字的人也是一目了然。 即便禀赋较差、地位较低的青年，无望获得这样的成就，也同样会受这一价值阶梯的影响，因为他身边总会有一些成功者、高地位者，他们的一举一动都在告诉他：什么才是更值得追求的价值，如何行事才显得更体面；这就好比，尽管科举体系仅仅容纳了社会极小部分成员（最多几十万），但其价值吸引力却影响了所有人的观念和行为。 上述价值阶梯之所以那么清晰可见，是因为西方元素的现场存在，其优势亲眼可见，不容否认，并且对个人可以伸手触及，而不像如今许多落后国家，可以在电视和互联网上看到，却遥不可及。 优势文化的现场存在所带来的价值引导作用，被社会学家称为橱窗效应，研究发现，晚清大量商业和政治制度创新，比如新式企业、商业行会、慈善机构的组织模式，都是橱窗效应的表现，许多都是照抄香港同类。 可是现如今，西方橱窗里只剩下商品和娱乐，制度元素都不见了。 这部价值阶梯的断裂，始于上世纪六十年代，西方从殖民地和保护国全面撤离；与此同时，一战后西方左派知识分子在文化上的自我否定运动，也在六七十年代达到高峰；九十年代，这一趋势因苏联崩溃而有所回潮，但很快又重新掀起，特别是在08年之后。 这一撤离之所以导致阶梯断裂，是因为，价值阶梯要起作用，必须和权力结构相对应，否则即便还有大批传教士、慈善组织、教师、人类学家、考古学家在现场，橱窗效应也会大大削弱，因为在价值吸引和文化仿效方面，多数人尤其是处于这一发展阶段的人，都是很势利很低俗的，谁发财谁有权势，就仰慕和效仿谁，村里首富开奔驰，就觉得奔驰是天下最好的车，当地土豪军阀以砍头剁手展示权力，大家就都觉得这才是赢得尊严和体面的可行方式，无论外人觉得金三胖多丑陋，在朝鲜那都是时尚先锋。 细说起来话就太长…… 总之，只要西方不在文化和价值观重建其自信心，本文开头所提到的那些问题，就不会有出路，更糟糕的是，西方世界本身也会因此而继续颓废下去，那才是真正的悲剧。  

当前中东乱局，看来只有大强度——二战以来的最大强度——干预才足以解决，但以我对美国干预方式的观感，恐怕既不会有好效果，也难以长期坚持。 美式干预的固有缺陷，让他在越南、阿富汗、伊拉克一次次陷入泥潭。 所谓美式干预，简单说有这样几个要点：

1. 推翻坏政权；
2. 扶持政治伦理上可接受的、战略上愿意配合的友好政权；
3. 干预费用由美国买单，包括大把军事和经济援助；
4. 好不容易扶持起来的友好政权，为了让它维持下去，不得不很大限度上容忍其违反规则和协议的鸡贼小动作（比如巴基斯坦、埃及和海外各国）；
5. 尊重主权（否则伊拉克早就该一拆三了）；

这一模式的问题是：

1. 推翻旧政权容易，但扶持新政权困难，往往很脆弱，依赖性很强，结果美军被长期拖在那里，越卷越深，无法脱身；
2. 军费开支膨胀乃至失控，加上伤亡数积累，过不了几年就丧失国内支持；
3. 有些问题不破坏主权根本解决不了，比如南斯拉夫。

越战以来，这个模式只在格林纳达和巴拿马这种情况单纯的迷你国家才成功过，在阿富汗和伊拉克都失败的很惨，但看不出有改弦更张的迹象。 美国人执着于这种模式，原因有几个：

1. 殖民地历史和独立建国经历，使得美国人有着根深蒂固的反殖民反帝倾向，远离旧大陆的和平环境又造成了孤立主义倾向，所以总是希望外科手术式的尽快解决问题，不愿将干预经常化和长期化；
2. 反殖民反帝倾向也导致他们特别愿意尊重主权和领土完整；
3. 战后对德国日本的占领和改造异常成功，这可能让他们对该模式抱有过度信心。

有关干预和秩序重建的困难，有各种分析，很多也都言之成理，可问题是，为何当年大英帝国以规模小得多的军队、少得多的军费、薄弱得多的财政基础，却能在那么广阔的世界维持相当水平的秩序？ 不妨看看一下英式干预有何不同：

1. 尽量不更换旧政权，这一点很重要，因为一个政权既然能够建立并自我维持，必定已经找到了足够的存在基础和可行的组织方式，而这些是很难从头建立的；
2. 向既有政权施加规范，不遵守就狠狠打，打到肉痛，但别推翻；
3. 抓住既有政权最心疼的利益要害（俗话叫捏住卵子）；
4. 干预费用主要由当地承担（有人可能会说落后国家怎么承担得起发达国家标准的军费开支？错了，秩序可以带来巨额红利，没有秩序，伊拉克石油可能一桶都运不出波斯湾，马关条约带来的FDI和工业增长，远远足以抵偿赔款额）；
5. 别拿主权太当回事，从伦理上说，非契约性国家的主权根本不值得尊重，扶谁灭谁，全看哪个对建立秩序有利，等到他们宪政发育成熟，转变成契约性国家，再尊重不迟；

很明显，这一模式是很帝国主义的，有人会说，当前政治环境下不可能，确实，不过部分的往这方向靠拢还是可能的，比如：

1. 南斯拉夫和塞尔维亚的主权就没尊重，不是也挺好？伊拉克为啥不能拆？
2. 第一次海湾战争的军费就摊了，后来的没摊，是因为美国让埃米尔们感觉太安全了，不像之前被萨达姆吓尿了裤子，要改变这一点，必须将干预经常化，也就是让他们时不时尿一次裤子；
3. 为此，就需要建立地区性的条约体系，类似冷战期间的东盟，实际上第一次海湾战争是建立此类体系千载难逢的良机，当时就该乘他们裤子未干把条约义务施加上去；
4. 有了条约体系，像卡塔尔给哈马斯一箱箱拎钱这种事情，一旦发现就得狠狠打；
5. 利比亚在阿拉伯之春前其实有望成为一个英式干预的案例，可惜半途而废；
6. 在中东这样的乱局中，出现危机的政权从来不少，美国应该抓住每次这样的机会，迫使危机中的政权接受条约义务，便可为后续干预提供合法性；

我对“该怎么办”这种问题向来兴趣不大，说这些，主要是为了回答这样一种可能的质疑：你的政治哲学究竟有何操作性含义？在现实政治问题上究竟对应何种做法？确实，这是一个合理质疑，所以，为了表明自己说的不是空话，就需要给出一个操作性的演示，但也仅仅是个演示（比方说，可以如此这般），并不打算仔细展开。

Walmart Is Changing Its Labor Model: How Many Workers Will Lose Their Jobs? 沃尔玛正在改变其劳工模式：有多少工人会因此而失业？ 作者：Tim Worstall @ 2015-9-06 译者：黑色枪骑兵（@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：福布斯，http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/09/06/walmart-is-changing-its-labor-model-how-many-workers-will-lose-their-jobs/ Walmart is quite significantly changing its labor model. Moving from a near hire any live body and let them get on with it one to something where people are well trained, well paid and presumably of rather higher productivity. 沃尔玛正在对其劳工模式进行大刀阔斧的改革。从之前的“几乎是个活人就愿意雇佣，并让他们一直干下去”逐步转变为“让员工接受更好的培训，拿到更高的薪水，以期带来更高的生产率”。 This is what many have been crying out for the company to do for years of course: move to something closer to the Costco model than the one that Walmart has traditionally pursued. 当然，许多人一直就迫切呼吁沃尔玛采取这些行动：从沃尔玛的传统模式转向更类似于Costco的模式。 However, as some like me have been pointing out all along there is a flip side to that change in models. Which is that the end aim is of course to employ fewer of those more productive people at those higher wages. 然而，一些人，比如我，自始至终认为这一模式改变存在负面影响。这种改革的最终目的，是以更高的工资雇佣数量更少但是生产率更高的员工。 The point being that if one can raise productivity levels by more than the increase in cost then of course profits will rise: that being the end goal for all shareholder owned companies. 这个观点的核心在于：如果提升的生产率超过所增的花费，收益就会提升——这是所有股份制公司的终极目标。 The interesting question is going to be how many people either lose or don’t get jobs as a result of this strategic change: and I’ll suggest a method by which we can calculate this a little later. 那么一个有趣的问题就来了：有多少人会由于这种战略性转变而失去或者得不到工作呢？稍后我会推荐一个计算这个数值的方法。 There’s two prongs to Walmart’s new approach. The first is to take a leaf from Henry Ford’s book with that $5 a day thing: 沃尔玛的新方案包括两部分。第一部分是照着亨利·福特的“每天五美元”画葫芦：

One motive is better public relations at a time when inequality is a hot-button political issue. But bottom-line calculations also play a role. 当分配不均成为一个热点政治话题的时候，更好的公共关系就成了动机之一。但实际利益计算也发挥了作用。 Employee turnover costs money—by industry estimates as much as $5,000 per front-line worker, or 20% to 30% of an entry-level salary. 员工的流动替换是要花钱的——按业内估计，每位一线工人的流动所费多达5000美元，也就是入门级薪水的20%到30%。 Standard turnover in retail is 50% in the first six months. If Wal-Mart can reduce this churn, persuading people to stay at least 12 to 18 months, it will save “tens of millions of dollars a year,” according to Ms. Oliver. 零售业员工在工作头六个月内的流动率通常是50%。如果沃尔玛能减少这种流动，劝说员工至少工作12到18个月，照Ms. Oliver 的估计，“每年能省下数千万美元”。

As I explained way back here, Henry Ford’s $5 a day was not what most people think it was. It was most certainly not, as all too many would have it, so that the newly richer workers could all buy a Model T. 我老早之前就已说过，亨利·福特的“每天五美元”并不是大多数人想象的那个样子。这么做的目的，根本就不是许多人所理解的那样，要让那些新富工人都能买T型轿车。 That would have been a great way to lose lots of money. A company cannot pay its own workers more, then see profits rise as they spend that cash on the company’s products. 想大把亏钱的人才会那么干。一个公司不能向他的员工支付更多薪水，并期待员工会把钱花到自家公司的产品上，然后公司利润会增加。 This is trying to raise yourself by your bootlaces. It also wasn’t about trying to create a vibrant midle class. What it was about was reducing the job churn on the assembly line. 这相当于是要拎着自己的靴带把自己提起来。这么做，也不是为了塑造一个有活力的中产阶级。它要做的，只是减少装配线上的人员流动。 Ford was getting through 50,000 workers a year in order to have 13,000 working on the line at any one time. That had vast recruitment and training costs. 福特每年雇佣50000名工人，以保证生产线上时刻都有13000名工人工作。这需要庞大的招募和训练费用。 So, that’s what Walmart is doing here. Let’s see if we can reduce those costs by having less churn. 所以，这就是沃尔玛现在要做的事。让我们看看减少人员流动能否减少这些花费。 That, in turn, means perhaps not bottom fishing in the labor market but improving pay relative to others so that people will stick around a little longer. 这反过来意味着，也许不再从劳动市场底层招人，而是比别家支付更高的工资，以期员工能待得更久。 This could well be a good move too but only time will tell. 这可能是一招好棋，但是效果只能交给时间检验了。 There’s also a second prong to the new strategy: 这项计划还有另一部分。

Front-line employees—cashiers, cart pushers and sales associates—will now spend their first months at the company in a supervised on-the-job training program. 现在，一线员工，比如收银员、手推车整理员和销售助理，入职后的头几个月会在公司接受有人指导的在职训练计划。 In the past, they sat through a few days of orientation and safety drills, many of them focused on compliance with environmental and health regulations. 过去，他们会耐着性子接受几天新人指导和安全训练，这些训练大多数集中在遵守环境条例和卫生条例上。 The only real job training happened in the store—knowledge passed on by more experienced employees. 在店里接受的唯一真正的工作培训是由更有经验的员工传授的知识。

There’s two sides to this. One is the obvious point that if you’re expecting your workers to stick around longer then you’re also going to be willing to invest in them rather more. 这件事是有两面性的。一方面很明显，那就是如果你预期你的雇员会待得更久，那么同样，你也将会更加乐于在他们身上投资。 Because you’ll be able to amortise your investment in them over that longer period that they’re working for you. 因为你在他们身上的投资会随着他们为你工作时间的增长而分期收回。 And there’s the more obvious point of that end goal: better trained workers will be, ceteris paribus, more productive. And thus we can see that Walmart is trying to move from one labor model to another: 另一个更为明显的作用就是终极目标的实现：训练更好的员工，让他们在相同条件下生产率更高。因此我们能明白沃尔玛正在推进劳工模式的转变：

Economists who study retail distinguish between “low-road” and “high-road” employers. One group keeps labor costs down, the other invests more in workers and reaps the benefits in higher productivity. Cost-conscious Wal-Mart is trying to move toward the high road. 研究零售的经济学家区分“低端”和“高端”雇主。前者压底劳工成本，后者会给员工更多的投资，然后通过更高的生产率获益。注重节约成本的沃尔玛正在向“高端”的方向靠拢。

This is all entirely traditional labor economics by the way, there’s nothing mysterious about any of it. However, there is a sting in the tail here. 顺便说一下，这全部都是传统劳动经济学的内容，没什么神秘的。然而，这里有一个令人始料未及的缺陷。 For well over a decade now I’ve been pointing out that yes, sure, Costco pays its workers very much better than Walmart does. But it also uses, per unit of sales, about half the labor that Walmart does. 十多年来，我一直在说，是的，没错，Costco支付给员工的薪水比沃尔玛要多很多。但是达成单位销量时，它用的劳动力大约是沃尔玛的一半。 Thus the shouting that Walmart can and should pay its workers like Costco does comes with that sting in that tail: for moving to the same pay structure would entail at least attempting to move to the same productivity levels. 因此“沃尔玛能够且应该像Costco一样支付工资”这种呼吁就有个意料之外的缺陷：因为采取相同的工资结构就意味着至少需要尝试把生产率拉到相同的水平。 Meaning that Walmart would employ about half the number of people per unit of sales than it currently does. 这就意味着，将来沃尔玛单位销量的雇工数量将只有目前数量的一半。 And now we’re seeing that Walmart is taking at least baby steps to that higher road labor model. And the interesting thing is going to be, well, is the prediction about employment levels going to come true too? 现在我们正目睹沃尔玛在向着“高端”劳工模式蹒跚学步。值得关注的事情将是，关于雇佣水平的预期真的会实现吗？ Just in a little more detail. Productivity is the amount of work (really, the amount of value added) that we get from one hour of labor. Raising productivity thus means getting more value added from one hour of labor. 再说得详细一点。生产率是劳动力每小时的工作量（实际上，是增加的价值量）。那么提高生产率就意味着从单位劳动量里得到更多的增加值。 And if sales are static that then obviously also means using less labor per unit of sales. 如果销售不变，那么这就明显意味着用更少的劳动力达成单位销量。 Thus raising productivity is the very same thing as saying that less labor is going to be used. This still holds even if sales or output rise: there’s still less labor going to be used than there would have been at the earlier, lower, level of labor productivity. 那么提高生产率就等同于使用更少的劳动力。销量或者产出上升的时候，这一点依然成立：需要用到的劳动力比之前劳动生产率水平更低的时候更少。 And the way to test it is pretty simple, because we can find the numbers we need to measure labor productivity in the Walmart accounts. 验证的方式很简单，因为我们能从沃尔玛的账目中找到所需的用来衡量劳动生产率的数字。 We know the number employed in the US….some 1.4 million….and we know what sales are in the US…$288 billion….so labor productivity is $205,000 and change per worker. 我们知道沃尔玛在美国的雇员数量，大约一百四十万，我们也知道它在美国境内的销售额，2880亿美元，所以劳动生产率是大约是每个员工205000美元多一点。 That’s actually sales not value added but that still gives us what we want, a number to compare over time (Costco’s sales per employee are about double this). 这个数据事实上是销售额而不是增加值，但是我们还是能从中得到我们想要的，即可以进行跨时段对比的数据。（Costco的每位雇员销售额大约是这个数字的两倍） As labor productivity rises as a result of more training and lower churn from the pay rises then we would expect to see this number rise. 当劳动生产率随着培训增加以及工资提升导致的流动率降低而增长时，我们可以预期上述数字会增加。 More sales per employee. And then we will also be able to calculate how many jobs have been lost to this rise in productivity. 每个员工将对应更多的销售量。然后我们就能计算出有多少工作岗位会由于生产率的上升而减少。 For, say, that sales rise to $250k per employee. We can then calculate how many employees would have been needed if productivity was still the old, lower, number. 因为，假设人均销量上升至25万美元。我们可以计算，如果生产率还是之前的老的、比较低的数值，那将需要多少雇员。 The number of jobs lost will therefore be the difference between the number actually employed and the number who would have been without the productivity gain. 工作岗位的流失量就是实际雇佣员工数和生产率增加之前本该雇佣的人数的差额。 Yes, obviously, we would need to discount this for the general inflation rate. 当然，我们要给这个数字打个折，因为存在通胀因素。 My prediction is that productivity will indeed rise at Walmart in the coming years. And also that sales per employee will rise, meaning that the number employed will fall. 我的预期是，沃尔玛的生产率确实会在未来几年逐步上升，人均销售额也会提升，这就意味着被雇佣的人数会减少。 Not fall necessarily from the current absolute level, but fall relative to where it would have been absent the productivity increase. 这种减少不是说其绝对值一定会低于当前水平，而是说它会相对地低于生产率没有增加时本该达到的水平。 Anyone want to bet against that prediction? 有人想跟我赌赌这个预测吗？ （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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