说说川普吧。平时懒得说这些事情，过年集中说几句。 先说好的。 【亮点】 从已报道的人事安排看，川普的国内政策看起来不错，至少会比希拉里好很多，特别是教育部、劳工部、环保局、卫生部的人选，是其中几大亮点。 从这些人选，加上共和党在国会的多数，有几项前景比较肯定： 1）联邦最低工资不会提高，大好事； 2）势头正盛的特许学校不会受阻挠； 3）暖球党在联邦政府内将全面失势，气候与环境相关的管制会有松动，甚至许多预算和职位会被取消； 4）页岩革命的势头将不会在联邦层面受阻挠，此事的国际后果比国内后果意义更大； 【医保】 川普说要废[[Obamacare]]，但具体怎么弄不太明确，不过他挑了个重量级共和党国会大佬掌管卫生部，此人有医生背景，且此前在医保案上投入很多，提了个替代方案，貌似这事情会是川普的一个政策重点。 废Obamacare自然是好事，不过替代方案会怎么样很难说，推不推得动也大为可疑。 医保是个大坑，消耗政治资源极多，收获却很渺茫，弄不好的话，川普的势头和共和党团结很可能都被它拖垮。 【移民】 边境控制会加强，难民配额会减少甚至取消，这是好事。 不过，对于造成问题的拉丁移民，移民动力比司法控制的影响重要得多，而实际上，拉丁移民的动力近些年正在削弱，所以这件事情上川普其实没有多大发挥余地。 同时，他可能去削减技术移民，那是坏事，而且不像非法移民难控制，削减合法移民配额会有立竿见影的效果。 两类移民有着完全不同的选择机制，限制后一类属于自残。 【大法官】 稍乐观，川普提名的大法官肯定比奥巴马和希拉里的好，但也不必期望太高，我稍稍乐观是因为我觉得他可能对这事情不太感兴趣，所以会听从共和党主流意见。 【金融管制】 相比环境方面的管制，金融管制的后果严重的多，比如Sarbanes-Oxley和Dodd-Frank，但从川普的民粹倾向和他对待企业的态度看，不太能指望他在放松金融管制方面有多大作为。 【政治正确】 川普带来的最好前景可能是政治正确紧箍咒的打破，许多人们敢怒不敢言的烂事将得到遏制，一些蒙尘已久的常识正义得以恢复，西方传统价值观有机会再次扬眉吐气。   再说坏的。 【宪政传统】 川普不是个尊重宪法和宪政传统的人，远远不是，在这一点上，除罗斯福外，我想不出比他表现更差的美国总统，其他政客藐视宪法还会偷偷摸摸遮遮掩掩，他连遮掩都不会，这是他最令我反感的地方。 我曾反复说过，宪法≠《宪法》，复制宪法文本、议事程序、政府结构很容易，但达致宪政均衡却很难，既有的均衡依靠参与各方对传统的尊重以及对违背传统之后果的预期。均衡一旦打破很难恢复，川普很可能是个破坏者。 以候选人身份公然威胁媒体，勒令制造企业回迁，暗示不接受选举结果……，有些恶劣做法（第三项尤其恶劣）虽不会有短期后果，但会改变人们的预期——原来这么没下限的事情也是可以被接受的啊？ 【经济政策】 川普人选中最烂的一个就是[[Peter Navarro]]，此人要么是蠢蛋，要么是哗众取宠的投机分子，对Navarro的青睐最清楚的展示了川普对经济问题的理解力。 【基础设施建设】 蠢。暴露了骨子里的国家干预主义。 【跨国公司】 现在还不清楚川普会如何拿跨国公司下手，如果贸易保护法案通不过或者不起作用，会不会从其他方面下阴招？比如海外利润，避税问题，EB5配额，其他管制陷阱？如果川普果真把制造业回归当成重点，跨国公司估计没好日子过。 【贸易保护】 从专门为Navarro设立新机构（National Trade Council）这个动作看，川普的保护主义看来不会是空话了。 废[[NAFTA]]的后果之一将是正在退潮的墨西哥移民猛增，这我之前说过。 假如贸易保护是专门用来打击中国的，那倒还说得过去，但必须明白这是为打击中国而付出的代价，不是收益，判断他是否明白这一点，可以看他是否为此而从其他方面寻求弥补，比如向盟友和潜在盟友提供更好的贸易条件，从川普对待TPP的态度看，不太可能。 乐观点是，国会大概不会同意将关税提至两位数，大概也不会废NAFTA和WTO，而川普能做的主要是停止推动更多自由贸易协定，在行政分支的权限内展开贸易战，设置一个个双边壁垒，推动贸易相关的管制，果若如此，其伤害将小于Smoot-Hawley法案。 【西方联盟】 川普可能做出的最坏事情将在外交方面，具体说就是：挫伤盟友，毁掉联盟。 美国总统在内政上推动能力有限，尤其是那些利益牵扯广泛的事情（比如税收、医保和最低工资），但在国际事务上行动能力要强得多，而这恰恰是川普最危险的地方。 打击中国，强挺以色列，踢开联合国，这些都很好，问题是，毁掉西方联盟这一件事，足以抵消其他全部好处百倍不止。 停掉TPP的前景已经挫伤了不少亚太盟友，未来假如在南海问题上甩手，西方联盟的这条腿就折了。 从川普对待普京的态度看，他很可能抛弃东欧和GUAM的盟友（后者实际上已经破裂了）。 最重要也最令人痛惜的被挫伤者或许将是英国，本来，英国退欧是强化盎格鲁联盟并以此为基础重建世界秩序的一次良机，但川普极可能毁掉这个机会，在这一点上他比希拉里更指望不上。 【总结】 从截止目前的表现看，川普将带来许多好东西，但不幸的是，他在最重要问题上极可能犯的错误，将让这些好处全部黯然失色。 当然，也可能我看错了，他或许不会犯下我所预料的错误，他过去的姿态或许只是一种姿态，果若如此，将是美国之幸，文明之幸。 所以我在此设定一个开关：假如未来的进展证明他的贸易保护政策仅仅用来打击文明的敌人，假如他积极拥抱退欧后的英国，不抛弃盟友，不牺牲其利益，不将他们推向敌人怀抱，我会立即黑转粉，并满心喜悦的承认自己看错了。  

【2016-12-28】 一群马其顿学生玩营销号逗川普粉的故事，有趣～ 几点观察： 1）这种东西大概不会改变个体的投票选择，但可能会略微提高川普粉投票率， 2）主要功能是心理按摩，没人在意从中得到什么信息， 3）类似游戏对左派玩不动，因为主流媒体已经为他们提供足够多按摩师了，而川普粉的饥渴恰好是个生态空档， 4）facebook看来也是养营销号的好地方， 5）社交网让模因学终于有了可施展的地方，貌似，  

【2016-12-23】 @海德沙龙 《伊斯兰改革是否可能？ ​​​​》 一种观点认为激进派和原教旨主义并不能代表伊斯兰，后者总体而言是和平宽容向善的，另一种观点认为基本教义决定了伊斯兰只能陷于目前这种不堪的状态，而在Daniel Pipes看来，第一种观点无视了当前的基本事实，第二种观点则既与伊斯兰历史不符…… @海德沙龙:Pipes指出了两个难以否认的历史事实：1）在历史上，伊斯兰社会并未被束缚于基本教义，2）假如基本教义能够如此决定一个宗教群体的社会生活和制度走向，那么基督教世界的近代转变同样不会发生。 @whigzhou: Pipes对历史的回顾很有价值，可以清除最简单的那些错误，但他的乐观展望并没有说服力 @whigzhou: 依我看，1）伊斯兰改革当然可能，而且已经发生了，不止一次，2）当代伊斯兰主义就是一种伊斯兰的新教运动，3）宗教改革中诞生的教派通常都是激进的和原教旨主义的，4）基督教改革最初也产生了各种激进和暴力教派，以及宗教战争，5）基督教新教运动最终达致的可意结果和教义没多大关系， @whigzhou: 6）基督教世界最终迎来的政教分离、宗教宽容和信仰自由，不是任何新旧教义的逻辑后果，而是既已存在的文化背景、制度基础和政治权力结构共同作用的结果，这个（广义的）制度框架将教派冲突约束在令其有可能向宪政均衡收敛的限度之内，类似的事情发生在另一个环境中，结果十有八九是糟糕的， @whigzhou: 7）实际上，这一最终的均衡只有我们局外人在事后看来才是理想的，而在参与其中的任何教派眼里，那既不是他们期望的，也不是他们想要或喜欢的 @whigzhou: 8）在美国，新教运动和教派分化其实从来没有停止过，新教派伴随一轮轮大觉醒不断涌现，其中绝大部分是和平的，据此你很容易得出结论：新教基本上是和平的，这当然没错，但你也很可能进而断定：这一宗教『本质上』就是和平的，其教义决定了它是和平的，那就错了， @whigzhou: 试想，在一次次教派裂变中，只要出现一个非和平的变种，同时又没有宪政确保其他教派不受其伤害，那么其他教派要么（A）消失，要么（B）也变成暴力教派，要么（C）谋求自己动手建立秩序（从而破坏政教分离原则） @whigzhou: 9）那么，伊斯兰可能得到良性改革所需要的文化/政治条件吗？当然不会，因为大英帝国早已解散，如今连羞涩勉强版的美帝国也正在解散  

封侯拜爵的神仙们 辉格 2016年12月11日 中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称，宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗，有史料可查者即有92个，扣除名号重复者，还有50多个，粗略估算，全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间，看来古代中国人『积极造神，见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。 如此多神仙得到敬拜，还要归功于神仙来源的多样化，和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性；早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿，比如司掌某种自然力的自然神，或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神，然而自中古以降，一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。 这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物，因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力；认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官，参加过某次战役，遭受过冤屈，或者离奇死亡——总之，任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方都可以让他们获得候选资格，但真正确立其神灵地位的，是『灵验』事迹，即有人在向他祈求佑助时得偿所愿。 在《变迁之神》一书中，人类学家韩森考察了此类神祗的兴起，发现其数量在宋代经历了爆发性增长，而之所以神界能容得下如此规模的神口增长，是因为他们都是地方性的，其神力作用半径不过数十里，各地若想有神可求，就得自己造一个，而同时，造神逻辑本身确保了新神的供给：灵验的随机性意味着总是不断会有旧神失宠，新神崛起。 有趣的是，帝国朝廷对这场民间造神运动颇为热心，从11世纪初起，宋廷便挑选一些信众认可度较高的地方神祗予以官方承认，编入祀典，许多还授予官爵名号，拨给公款用于立碑修庙；一旦某神获得这样的官方地位，地方官便有责任定期组织祭祀敬拜活动，甚至提供财政和劳役支持。 韩森注意到，从1075年起，为地方神仙封授官爵的做法大面积铺开，并在此后成为政府的一项常规职能，其规模甚大，每年封授数十位神仙，每次封授都要经历一个繁杂的流程，涉及尚书省、礼部和太常寺的众多衙门，还有地方政府的两轮灵验性查证，那么，朝廷为何要花费大量行政与财政资源来做这样一件看起来没有实际功效的事情呢？ 要理解这一点，我们最好将它和帝国的另一项重要制度——科举——对照着看；表面上，科举只是为帝国选拔官员的（它也确实有这功能），但实际上，它最重要的功能是为全民提供一部开放、全面覆盖且贯通到底的社会上升阶梯，而在此之前，上升通道往往为数十个门阀豪族所垄断，其他人只能凭借战功、偶然的恩宠、内乱造成的重新洗牌等非经常性机会来谋求晋身。 科举的这一功能对赢取精英阶层的广泛效忠从而强化帝国权力起着极为根本的作用，它让人口中最富有、最有才智、最有野心的那些人将其视为实现抱负的好机会，而假如没有这样的机会，他们很可能去支持其他潜在的权力中心，或者以官方所不愿看到的方式施展抱负，因而对帝国权力构成威胁。 科举也是推行官方价值体系和历史叙事的工具，求取功名者心甘情愿接受和传播官方说辞，而一旦取得功名便成为这一体系的既得利益者因而有足够动机去维护它，并将其渗透植入到他们拥有巨大影响力的家族传统和地方文化中。 虽然只有百分之几的成年男性参与科举，取得功名者更少，但无论是巩固还是颠覆帝国权力基础，这都是最有能量的一群人，而且，科举功名带来的权力、财富、士绅特权，甚至仅仅是读写能力，都会将他们置于家族和地方社区的领袖地位，因而笼络他们就笼络了他们所在的家族和地方。 从唐代起，帝国通过封授土司对未归化地区实施羁縻政策，科举与士绅特权的结合，其实就是对政治结构中帝权难以直接通达的部分实施羁縻，通过士绅羁縻家族与地方，类似的，为地方神仙封授官爵，则是对民间信仰与崇拜活动的羁縻。 之所以神仙也需要羁縻，是因为，对于世俗权力，神是个危险的存在，每个神灵名下都可能凝聚起一套价值观，道德规范，行为准则，乃至行动纲领，其中每一样都可能与官方版本相冲突，都有潜力在权力竞争中成为敌方的动员与组织基础，特别是当它们被一个独立的僧侣团体所控制时，就更危险了。 凭借封授制度，朝廷有机会对神祗进行筛选、约束、引导、改造和控制，很明显，他们会竭力排除最危险的那些神，比如有着另一套行为准则的道德神，或一神教中极具动员力的排他性神，或有着现成经典因而其合法性可能被僧侣组织掌握的神，还有附带着行动纲领的弥赛亚，而最合他们胃口的，将是那些不具有全国性动员能力的地方神，以及能够提供现世佑助却又毫无道德要求的功利神，或许并非巧合的是，后两种恰是此后中国最流行的神灵。  

The sobering evidence of social science 来自社会科学的证据发人深省 作者:George F. Will @ 2016-07 译者:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sobering-evidence-of-social-science/2016/07/06/4a3831f8-42dd-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html The report was so “seismic” — Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s word — that Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration released it on Fourth of July weekend, 1966, hoping it would not be noticed. But the Coleman Report did disturb various dogmatic slumbers and vested interests. And 50 years on, it is pertinent to today’s political debates about class and social mobility. So, let us now praise an insufficiently famous man, sociologist James Coleman, author of the study “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” 这份报告如此‘有震撼力’，用Daniel Patrick Moynihan的话来说，以至Lyndon B. Johnson政府选择在1966年独立日前的周末发布这份报告，冀望无人留意【编注：7月4日为美国独立日，乃公共假日，Fourth of July weekend就是恰好与独立日连上的那个周末，1966年7月4日为星期一，故此周末为独立日前之周末】。但“Coleman报告”确实惊扰了教条主义者的昏睡和既得利益团体的算盘。50年后，这份报告和眼下关于阶层和社会流动性的政治辩论仍息息相关。那么，让我们赞誉一位名气还不够大的男士，研究著作《教育机会的平等》的作者，社会学家James Coleman。 In 1966, postwar liberalism’s confidence reached its apogee. From 1938, when the electorate rebuked Franklin Roosevelt for his plan to “pack” the Supreme Court, through 1964, congressional Republicans and conservative Democrats prevented a liberal legislating majority. But Johnson’s 44-state victory that year gave Democrats 68 Senate seats and a majority of 155 in the House. 1966年，战后自由主义者的自信心膨胀到最高峰。1938年，选民严厉抨击了富兰克林·罗斯福“填充最高法院”的计划。自那时至1964年，多亏国会中的共和党议员和保守派民主党议员，自由主义者未能掌握立法机构多数议席。然而，1966年，约翰逊拿下来44个联邦州，民主党人在参议院占有68席，在众议院以155席拿下多数席位。 Effortless and uninterrupted prosperity seemed assured as the economy grew in 1965 and 1966 by 10.7 percent and 7.99 percent, respectively. So, a gusher of tax revenue coincided with liberalism’s pent-up demand for large projects. It hoped to meld two American traits — egalitarian aspirations and faith in education’s transformative power. 1965年和1966年的经济增长率分别为10.7%和7.99%，唾手可得且无间断的繁荣看似已不在话下。于是，井喷式的税入增长恰逢自由派对大项目压抑已久的热情，如同干柴烈火。自由派希望将两大美国特色融为一体——追求人人平等的志向和教育推动变革的信念。 The consensus then was that the best predictor of a school’s performance was the amount of money spent on it: Increase financial inputs, and cognitive outputs would increase proportionately. As the postwar baby boom moved through public schools like a pig through a python, almost everything improved — school buildings, teachers’ salaries, class sizes, per-pupil expenditures — except outcomes measured by standardized tests. 那时的共识是，学校经费数目是预测该校学生表现的最佳指标：增加经费投入，学生的认知水平会成比例地上升。二战后婴儿潮横扫公立学校，如同一头猪通过巨蟒体内，公立学校的任一方面几乎都比以往更上一层楼——校舍、教师薪资、班级规模、平均每个学生的经费投入——唯一的例外是由标准化考试衡量的学生表现。 Enter Coleman, and the colleagues he directed, to puncture complacency with the dagger of evidence — data from more than 3,000 schools and 600,000 primary and secondary school students. His report vindicated the axiom that social science cannot tell us what to do, it can tell us the results of what we are doing. He found that the best predictor of a school’s outcomes was the quality of the children’s families. And students’ achievements are influenced by the social capital (habits, mores, educational ambitions) their classmates bring to school: 让Coleman和受其指导的同僚上台，用证据之匕首——从3000所学校和60万名小学、初中生处收集的数据 —— 刺破自满的气球吧。Coleman的报告印证了一个公理：社会科学无法指导我们行事，它能告诉我们的是行动的后果。Coleman发现，预测某校学生表现的最佳指标是学生家庭的素质。学生的学业表现受其同学带到学校的社会资本（习惯、规矩、教育方面的进取心）的影响： “One implication stands out above all: That schools bring little influence to bear on a child’s achievement that is independent of his background and general social context; and that this very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities with which they confront adult life at the end of school.” “一个暗含推论尤为突出：将学生的家庭背景和社交圈子的影响排除后，学校教育对学生的学业成就影响极小；这意味着由家庭、社区和同侪环境带来的水平不均等，将一路伴随他们毕业，成为他们开启成人生活时面临的不均等。” Coleman’s report came exactly one year after — and as an explosive coda to — what is known as the Moynihan Report, which was leaked in July 1965. Moynihan, then a 37-year-old social scientist in Johnson’s Labor Department, presented in “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action” what then counted as shocking news: 23.6 percent of African American births were to unmarried women. Coleman的报告恰好于“Moynihan报告” 发表一年后面世，为后者燃起之火添柴加薪。 Moynihan在1965年7月被人泄露于众。当年Moynihan 37岁，是约翰逊执政下劳工部的一名社会学者,他的研究《黑人家庭：国家行动的案例》，成为令时人震惊的新闻：23.6%的非裔美籍婴儿由未婚女性所生。 Today 71 percent are. Almost 47 percent of all first births are to unmarried women, and a majority of all mothers under 30 are not living with the fathers of their children. 如今这个数字为71%。将近47%的头胎新生儿由未婚女性所生，大多数30岁以下的母亲和孩子的父亲分居。 The causes of family disintegration remain unclear, but 51 years ago Moynihan and then Coleman foresaw the consequences. Moynihan said the “tangle” of pathologies associated with the absence of fathers produces a continually renewed cohort of inadequately socialized adolescent males. Socializing them is society’s urgent business if it is to avoid chaotic neighborhoods and schools where maintaining discipline displaces teaching. Coleman documented how schools are reflections of, rather than cures for, the failure of families to function as the primary transmitters of social capital. 家庭解体的原因尚未明朗，但51年前Moynihan和Coleman先后预见到家庭解体的后果。Moynihan称，父亲缺位造成的种种困扰，源源不断地产生了一代社会化不充足的青春期男性。使他们充分社会化是社会的当务之急，否则难以避免产生混乱的社区和学校，在那里维持纪律取代了正常教学。学校本应是首要的社会资本传递途径，现在却成了家庭溃败的倒影，而非家庭溃败的解药，这一切都被Coleman记在笔下。 The extraordinary synergy between Moynihan and Coleman was serendipitous. Today, their baton of brave and useful sociology has passed to Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute. His “Losing Ground” (1984) was an autopsy of 1960s aspirations. His “Coming Apart” (2012) explores the social consequences — we are wallowing in the political consequences — of a bifurcated society in which many do very well while many others are unable to reach even the lowest rungs on the ladder of upward mobility. Moynihan和Coleman两项研究的协同增强效应，纯属意外。如今，他们勇敢、实用的社会学接力棒，传到了美国企业研究所的Charles Murray手上。Murray《站不住脚》（1984年出版）一书解剖了1960年代那场失败的壮举。他的《四分五裂》（2012年出版）一书探索了社会两极分化带来的社会后果。社会两极分化的表现是，许多人非常出色，而另外的很多人甚至连社会爬升阶梯的最低梯级都够不着，我们正在两极分化的政治后果中打滚。 Coleman’s evidence that cultural rather than financial variables matter most was not welcomed by education bureaucracies and unions. Similarly, we now have more than half a century of awkward, and often ignored, evidence about the mostly small and evanescent effects of early-childhood education. Today’s Democratic Party fancies itself “the party of science”; Barack Obama pledged, in his first inaugural address, to “restore science to its rightful place.” Social science, however, is respected by Democrats only when it validates policies congenial to the interests of favored factions. 比起经费投入，文化因素是最重要的影响变量，教育官僚机构和工会并不青睐Coleman提出的证据。与此情况相仿，早期儿童教育效果微弱，转瞬即逝，这方面令人尴尬、常被忽略的证据，我们已经积累了50多年了。如今民主党幻想自身为“科学之党”；贝拉克·奥巴马在他首个总统任期的就职演讲中，誓言“恢复科学理应占有的地位。”然而，仅在社会科学论证支持的政策有利于民主党所偏袒的利益团体时，民主党人才会尊重社会科学。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Dunbar High School After 100 Years 百年后的Dunbar 高中 作者:Thomas Sowell @ 2016-10-04 译者:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 来源:RealClearPolitics,http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/10/04/dunbar_high_school_after_100_years_131956.html One hundred years ago, on October 2, 1916, a new public high school building for black youngsters was opened in Washington, D.C. and named for black poet Paul Laurence Dunbar. Its history is a story inspiring in many ways and appalling in many other ways. 一百年前，1916年10月2日，一座为年轻黑人而设的公立高中教学楼在华盛顿特区投入使用。这座教学楼以非洲诗人 Paul Laurence Dunbar 的姓氏命名，它的历史是个令人既振奋又惊骇的故事。 Prior to 1916, the same high school had existed under other names, housed in other buildings -- and with a remarkable academic record. 在1916年前，这所高中以其它名字运营，在另外的建筑中教学，教学成果显著。 In 1899, when it was called "the M Street School," a test was given in Washington's four academic public high schools, three white and one black. The black high school scored higher than two of the three white high schools. Today, it would be considered Utopian even to set that as a goal, much less expect to see it happen. 1899年，当时学校还叫“ M 街学校”，华盛顿特区四所公立高中进行学业测试，三所白人高中，一所黑人高中。黑人高中的成绩高于其中两所白人高中。如今，人们会认为设立这样的目标本身就是做白日梦，更别说指望其变为现实。 The M Street School had neither of two so-called "prerequisites" for quality education. There was no "diversity." It was an all-black school from its beginning, and on through its life as a high quality institution under the name Dunbar High School. 优质教育所需的两项所谓“前提条件”，M街学校通通没有。没有“多样性”。一开始就是全黑人学校，直到保持高质量教学水平的Dunbar高中时期，依然如此。 But its days as a high quality institution ended abruptly in the middle of the 1950s. After that, it became just another failing ghetto school. 然而，这首优质教学之歌在1950年代中期戛然而止。之后，Dunbar 高中沦为又一所溃败的贫民窟学校。 The other so-called "prerequisite" that the M Street School lacked was an adequate building. Its student body was 50 percent larger than the building's capacity, a fact that led eventually to the new Dunbar High School building. But its students excelled even in their overcrowded building. 另一项所谓的“前提条件”——一座适宜教学的大楼——M街学校也没有。全校学生数量超过建筑物设计容纳人数50%，因此才兴建新的Dunbar高中教学楼。尽管如此，学生成绩依然优秀。 Some students at the M Street School began going to some of the leading colleges in the country in the late 19th century. The first of its graduates to go to Harvard did so in 1903. Over the years from 1892 to 1954, thirty-four of the graduates from the M Street School and Dunbar went on to Amherst. 在19世纪晚期，M街学校开始有学生考上国内顶尖大学。1903年，该校首次有学生考入哈佛大学。1892至1954年间，M街学校和Dunbar高中合共有34名毕业生考入 Amherst 学院【译注：位于马萨诸塞州的一所精英男校】 Of these, 74 percent graduated from Amherst and 28 percent of these graduates were Phi Beta Kappas. Other graduates from M Street High School and Dunbar became Phi Beta Kappas at Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth and other elite institutions. 这些学生中，74%顺利从Amherst 学院毕业，其中28%毕业生为最高荣誉优等生。其他M街学校和Dunbar 高中的一些毕业生，在哈佛、耶鲁、达特茅斯和其它精英院校成为最高荣誉优等生。 Graduates of this same high school pioneered as the first black in many places. These included the first black man to graduate from Annapolis, the first black woman to receive a Ph.D. from an American institution, the first black federal judge, the first black general, the first black Cabinet member and, among other notables, a doctor who became internationally renowned for his pioneering work in developing the use of blood plasma. 这一所高中的毕业生在多个领域都是首次取得杰出成就的黑人。包括第一名从美国海军学院毕业的黑人男生，第一名从美国高等院校获得博士学位的黑人女性，第一名黑人联邦法官，第一名黑人将军，第一名黑人内阁成员。在众多取得不凡成就的黑人中，特别值得一提的是，在保存血浆以供使用方面做出开拓性工作的一名享誉全球的黑人医生【译注：Charles Drew】 How could all of this come to an abrupt end in the 1950s? Like many other disasters, it began with good intentions and arbitrary assumptions. 这一切怎么会在1950年代突然完结？跟很多灾难一样，一切以善意和武断的假设前提开始。 When Chief Justice Earl Warren declared in the landmark 1954 case of "Brown v. Board of Education" that racially separate schools were "inherently unequal," Dunbar High School was a living refutation of that assumption. And it was within walking distance of the Supreme Court. 1954年里程碑式的“ 布朗诉教育委员会” 一案宣判，Earl Warren大法官代表的多数判词称种族隔离的学校‘ 在本性上就是不平等的’，Dunbar高中是对这一假设前提活生生的反驳。学校就位于最高法院的步行距离之内。 A higher percentage of Dunbar graduates went on to college than the percentage at any white public high school in Washington. But what do facts matter when there is heady rhetoric and crusading zeal? Dunbar高中毕业生考入大学的比例高于华盛顿特区内任何一所白人公立高中。但在令人头脑发热的修辞和运动式的热情面前，事实又有什么用呢？ There is no question that racially segregated schools in the South provided an inadequate education for blacks. But the assumption that racial "integration" was the answer led to years of racial polarization and turmoil over busing, with little, if any, educational improvement. 毋庸置疑，南部各州的种族隔离学校未能为黑人提供足够的教育。但种族“融合”才是解决之道的假设导致连年的种族极化和骚乱，用几近于无的教育成果提升来代替种族隔离的校巴。 For Washington, the end of racial segregation led to a political compromise, in which all schools became neighborhood schools. Dunbar, which had been accepting outstanding black students from anywhere in the city, could now accept only students from the rough ghetto neighborhood in which it was located. 对华盛顿特区而言，种族隔离的结束导致一项政治让步。所有学校都转为就近入学的学区学校。Dunbar 高中此前一直在全市范围内招收学业突出的黑人学生，现在只能从学校周边的贫民窟社区招收学生。 Virtually overnight, Dunbar became a typical ghetto school. As unmotivated, unruly and disruptive students flooded in, Dunbar teachers began moving out and many retired. More than 80 years of academic excellence simply vanished into thin air. 几乎一夜之间，Dunbar高中变为一所典型的贫民窟学校。没有学习动力、没有规矩和爱捣蛋的学生涌入学校后，原先的教师开始离开、退休。80多年的教学成果随风飘逝。 Nobody, black or white, mounted any serious opposition. "Integration" was the cry of the moment, and it drowned out everything else. That is what happens in politics. 不论黑人或白人，没有人提出任何严肃的反对意见。“融合”是当红的口号，让其它都沉没于海底。这就是政治领域正在发生的事情。 Today, there is a new Dunbar High School building, costing more than $100 million. But its graduates go on to college at only about half the rate of Dunbar graduates in earlier and poorer times. Politics can deliver costly "favors," even when it cannot deliver quality education. 如今，Dunbar新高中教学楼耗资超过1亿美元。但学校毕业生的大学入学率仅为早期贫穷世代的一半。哪怕政治无法提供优质的教育，一样可以提供昂贵的“惠泽”。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

‘When life hands you a lemon, just bite in’ “如果生活递给你一个柠檬，那就去咬它吧” 作者:Judith Rich Harris @ 2016-09 译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:The Psychologist, http://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-29/september/when-life-hands-you-lemon-just-bite Judith Rich Harris takes Lance Workman through her extraordinary fightback against entrenched views of child development. Judith Rich Harris对话Lance Workman，对已被深深认同的儿童发展心理学观点作出了非同寻常的回击。 Judith Rich Harris is a psychologist and author. Judith Rich Harris是一位心理学家和作家。 【译注：粗体字是Workman的提问，常字体是Harris的回答】 I first become aware of you when I read The Nurture Assumption in 1998. In it you proposed that a child’s peer group has greater influence on development than her parents. Can we begin by outlining this theory? 我第一次认识你是读到你1998年出版的《教养的迷思》。在书中你提到，同龄人群体对孩子成长的影响大于父母。我们从简要概括这个理论开始，好吗？ Group socialisation theory was my attempt to solve a puzzle I had encountered while writing child development textbooks for college students. My textbooks endorsed the conventional view of child development – that what makes children turn out the way they do is ‘nature’ (their genes) and ‘nurture’ (the way their parents bring them up). But after a while it dawned on me that there just wasn’t enough solid evidence to support that view, and there was a growing pile of evidence against it. 群体社会化理论是我在撰写儿童发展心理学的大学教材时试图解决的难题。我的教材赞同儿童发展心理学的传统观点——是‘先天本性’（基因）和‘后天培养’（父母养育他们的方式）共同使孩子们形成他们的做事方式。但一段时间后我明白了，并没有足够确凿的证据支持这个观点，同时，反对证据却越来越多。 The problem was not with the ‘nature’ part – genes were having their expected effect. But ‘nurture’ wasn’t working the way it was supposed to. In studies that provided some way of controlling for or eliminating the effects of heredity, the environment provided by parents had little or no effect on how the children turned out. 问题不在于‘天性’部分——基因有其预期效果。不过‘培养’并未如大家所认为的方式发生作用。在一些以某种方式控制或消除了遗传作用的研究中，父母提供的环境对孩子如何变成后来的样子很少或者没有影响。 And yet, genes accounted for only about 50 per cent of the variation in personality and social behaviour. The environment must be playing some role. But it wasn’t the home environment. So I proposed that the environment that has lasting effects on personality and social behaviour is the one the child encounters outside the home. 然而，基因改变个性和社会行为的作用大约只占50%。环境肯定发挥着一定的作用。但这不是家庭环境。因此我认为，持久影响孩子个性和社交行为的环境是其面对的家庭之外的环境。 This makes sense if you think about the purpose of childhood. What do children have to accomplish while they’re growing up? They have to learn how to behave in a way that is acceptable to the other members of their society. How do they do this? Not by imitating their parents! Parents are adults, and every society prescribes different behaviours for children and adults. 如果想想童年的目标，你会发现这是有道理的。随着孩子长大他们不得不做什么呢？他们不得不学习他们的社交圈里其他成员可以接受的行为方式。他们如何做到这一点？不是通过模仿父母！父母是成年人，社会给孩子和成人规定了不同的行为。 A child who behaved like his or her parents (in any context other than a game) would be seen as impertinent, unruly or weird. So the first step in becoming socialised must be to figure out what sort of person you are. Are you a child or an adult? A male or a female? In complex societies there are more categories, but age and gender were probably enough for the small groups of hunter-gatherers of our ancestors. 在除游戏之外的任何情境下，孩子若像父母那样行事，会被视为不得体、任性或怪异。因此，社会化的第一步是弄清楚你属于哪类人。是孩子还是成人？男人还是女人？复杂社会分类更多，但年龄和性别对于我们祖先的狩猎采集小团体可能足够了。 Once a child had identified with a particular social category – let’s say, female child – her next job would be to learn how to behave like the others in her category. A social category is an abstract concept, not necessarily an actual group of children. My use of the term ‘peer group’ turned out to be misleading. I should have said ‘social category’ or perhaps ‘reference group’. 一旦一个孩子明确了自己属于某个特定社会类别——比方说，女童——她接下来的工作将是学会如何像她这个类别的其他人一样行事。一个社会类别是一个抽象概念，并非儿童的实际群体。我后来发现使用‘同龄人群体’这个术语是个误导。我应该说‘社会类别’或者‘参照群体’。 Why?  为什么？ The problem with ‘peer group’ was that it made people think ‘friends’. Group socialisation theory is not about the influence of friends. Friendships are relationships. Socialisation is not a product of relationships. ‘同龄人群体’这个词的问题在于，它让人想到‘朋友’。群体社会化理论无关朋友的影响。友谊是关系。社会化不是关系的产物。 The expanded theory presented in my second book, No Two Alike, explains why. The theory is based on the idea, put forth by evolutionary psychologists such as Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, that the human mind is modular, a collection of specialised devices which each evolved as a solution to a specific problem or need. 我在第二本书《没有两个人是一样》中提出的扩展理论解释了其中缘由。这个理论基于如进化心理学家Leda Cosmides和John Tooby所提出的思想，即人类大脑是模块化的，是一套随着解决某个特定问题或需要而进化出的专门化元件的集合。 I proposed that there are three such devices involved in social development – the relationship system, the socialisation system and the status system. These systems work more or less independently; sometimes they even issue contradictory commands. They collect different kinds of information from the environment and process it in different ways. Friendships – like parent–child relationships – are in the purview of the relationship system, which collects data on specific individuals and makes fine distinctions among them. The socialisation system, in contrast, doesn’t bother with individuals – it computes means. It forms a prototype for each social category. The child is influenced by the norms of the social category she identifies with, even if she never interacts personally with any of its members. 我提出三种元件参与社会发展——关系系统、社会化系统和身份系统。这些系统或多或少独立工作；有时他们甚至发出相互矛盾的命令。它们从环境中收集不同种类信息并以不同方式进行处理。友谊——如亲子关系——属于关系系统范畴，它收集特定个体的数据，并在它们之间做出精准区别。相反，社会化系统与个体无关，它计算的是平均情况。它构成了每种社会类别的原型范式。孩子是被其身份认同的社会类别的规范所影响，即便她从未亲自与群体其他成员发生互动。 The Nurture Assumption completely split the field. People either said it was a serious step forward in our understanding of child development or they just weren’t having any of it. I’m in the first camp – it changed my view of child development. But why do you think there was so much hostility? 《教养的迷思》彻底分裂了这个研究领域。要么有人说这是我们理解儿童发展心理向前迈进的重要一步，要么就说它什么也不是。我是前者，它改变了我关于儿童发展心理学的看法。但是，为什么对它有这么多敌意呢？ Part of the problem was the media coverage, which was often headlined ‘Do parents matter?’. Parents were understandably irked by the question. (My answer, by the way, is: Of course parents matter!) 部分问题出在媒体报道，它们常用‘父母重要吗？’这样的标题。可以理解家长们被这样的问题搞得苦恼不已。（顺便说一句，我的回答是：当然，父母重要！） But the real opposition to my work came from the academic world – from professors of developmental psychology. Some of these people had spent their entire careers doing studies designed to support the traditional view of child development. Then some troublemaker pops up – a complete nobody, with no PhD and no academic affiliation – and announces that the professors are wrong and their studies are worthless. You wouldn’t expect them to greet me with open arms, would you? 但是对我工作的真正反对来自学术世界——发展心理学的教授们。他们中的一些人毕其全部职业生涯做研究，旨在支持儿童发展心理学的传统观点。然后一些捣乱者冒了出来——不知何方人士，没有博士学位，没有学术任职——就胆敢声称教授们是错误的，他们的研究毫无价值。你不会指望他们张开双臂欢迎我，对吗？ You were particularly critical of their correlational studies of development.  你对于发展心理学相关研究表现的特别有批判性。 I still see those worthless studies all the time – they get a lot of publicity. I see them as a shameful waste of time and research money. I see them as reminders that I failed in my goal of reforming the methodology of developmental psychology. 我总是仍然看到那些毫无价值的研究——他们获得大量宣传。我认为这是时间和研究经费的可耻浪费。我将这些视为对我改革发展心理学之方法论的雄心所受挫折的提醒。 The studies are worthless because the results they produce are ambiguous, so the researchers can interpret them any way they please. Let’s say they find a correlation between how often a family eats dinner together and how well their teenager manages to stay out of trouble. Such results are presented as evidence that eating dinner with their parents has ‘protective’ effects on teenagers. 这些研究毫无价值，因为其结果模棱两可，研究者以他们乐意的任何方式解释之。比方说，他们找到了一家人多久一起共进晚餐和青少年多大程度上努力不出乱子之间的相关性。这个结果作为与父母共进晚餐对青少年有‘保护’作用的证据呈现出来。 But the research method provides no way of controlling for, or estimating, the effects of inherited genes on the teenagers’ behaviour. (Conscientious parents tend to have conscientious children.) No way of controlling for what I call ‘child-to-parent effects.’ (Parents are more likely to enjoy eating dinner with well-behaved teenagers.) No way of controlling for the teenagers’ own willingness to show up at dinnertime. (Teenagers are less likely to enjoy eating dinner with their parents if they are doing things their parents don’t approve of.) The researchers assume that, even though these other factors might play a role, some of the correlation must be due to the beneficial effects of family dinners. That is a logically indefensible assumption, not supported by studies that do provide the necessary controls. 但是研究方法却没有提供任何控制或者估计遗传基因影响青少年行为的方法（有责任心的父母的孩子往往有责任心）。没有控制我所说的‘从孩子到父母的影响’（父母更乐意与举止礼貌的孩子共进晚餐）。没有控制青少年自己乐意露面的晩餐时间（如果青少年正在做父母不认可的事情，他们不大可能喜欢与父母共进晚餐）。研究者认为，尽管其他因素可能有一定作用，但一些相关肯定是由于家庭晚餐的正面作用。这是一个逻辑上站不住脚的假设，并且没有得到那些确实控制了其他因素的研究的支持。 I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to state that The Nurture Assumption pretty much made you famous almost overnight. It’s not only a radical alternative to traditional ideas, but also a real ‘page-turner’. Was it your intention to write in that style? 我不觉得《教养的迷思》几乎让你一夜之间出名是夸张的措词。这本书不仅对传统观点来说是激进的，也是真正的‘新篇章开启者’。用这种风格写作是你的目的吗？ Actually, I started out by writing a traditional article and publishing it in a traditional journal, the Psychological Review. No one called it a page-turner. In fact, though it did get some favourable responses from people in other areas of psychology, it was completely ignored by the audience I was hoping to reach – those professors of developmental psychology. 实际上，我一开始是要写篇传统文章发表在传统期刊《心理学评论》上。没有人把它称为新篇章开启者。事实上，尽管它确实得到了其他心理学领域的积极反响，但却被我希望能看到它的观众——发展心理学领域的教授们——完全忽略了。 So I decided to go over their heads, as it were, and take my message directly to the general public. If you’re writing a book on a complex topic and you want people to read it, you have to make it interesting. It also helps if you can give your readers an occasional laugh. My model for how to write a book for the general public was Steven Pinker’s The Language Instinct. 因此我决定，这么说吧，越过他们，直接把我的研究呈现在广大公众面前。假如你正在写一本复杂话题的书，还希望有人读它，那你就要让它有趣起来。如果读者时而笑出声来，那也有所帮助。我所借鉴的如何为广大公众写书的模本，是Steven Pinker的《语言本能》一书。 Pinker of course went on to write several more books for the public – all page turners, and in many cases game changers. I noticed that he dedicated The Blank Slate to ‘Don, Judy, Leda and John’. I would assume that three of these are Don Symons, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. Would I be right in thinking you are the Judy?  当然，Pinker为大众写了不少书——全都是新篇章开启者，许多情况下还是游戏改变者。我注意到他把《白板论》一书献给‘Don, Judy, Leda and John’。我猜其中三个是Don Symons, Leda Cosmides和John Tooby。你是Judy，对吗？ Yes. Steve and I became e-mail friends after I sent him a copy of my Psych Review paper and some comments on The Language Instinct. After we had exchanged a few e-mails, he asked, ‘Have you ever thought of writing a book?’ It wasn’t exactly a new idea to me, but it was nice to have the encouragement. 是的。在我给他寄送了我写的《心理学评论》论文拷贝和对《语言本能》一书的个人见解后，Steve和我成了电邮笔友。后来，我们互通了一些电子邮件，他问我：“你有没有想过写一本书？”这对我实在不是新想法，但它是很好的鼓励。 I think Steve was particularly receptive to my arguments because he’s a psycholinguist. I often use examples from psycholinguistics in explaining my theory, for two reasons. First, the outcome is usually obvious. You don’t need fancy statistical tests to decide whether or not someone has a foreign accent. Second, language and accent are among the very few social behaviours in which genetic differences play no role at all. Whether you speak Japanese or Swahili, whether your accent is Oxbridge or Liverpudlian, has nothing to do with heredity. But it does have a great deal to do with social context. The children of immigrants have the same accent as the other kids in the neighbourhood, even if they use their parents’ native language at home. Around the world, it is quite common for children to use one language at home and a different one outside the home, or one language with Mummy and a different one with Daddy. 我感觉Steve特别能接受我的观点，因为他是心理语言学家。我经常使用心理语言学例子解释我的理论，有两个原因。首先，结果通常显而易见。不需要花哨的统计学计算来确定某人是否有外国口音。其次，语言和口音是极少数遗传基因差异不起作用的社会行为之一。无论你说日语或者斯瓦希里语，无论你操牛津剑桥口音或者利物浦口音，均与遗传无关。而它确实与社会背景有很大关系。即便在家说父母亲的母语，移民孩子的口音与其他邻居孩子也一样。在世界各地，常常可见孩子在家使用一种语言而出门使用另外一种，或者和妈咪说一种语言而和爹地说另一种。 A central tenet of my theory is that social behaviours are tightly linked to the context in which they were acquired. It’s a mistake – one that’s incorporated into all the major theories of child development – to assume that children automatically generalise what they learn, from one context or person to another: Mummy is nice to them so they expect everyone to be nice to them. But discrimination, not generalisation, is the default setting of the baby’s mind. 我的理论的核心要义是，社会性行为与从中习得它的社会情境紧密相连。假设孩子自动将所学内容一般化，从一种情境或一个人推及另外一种或另一个人：就像妈咪善待他们，因此期待人人善待他们——这个假定被植入了儿童发展学的所有重要理论中，但它是错误的。相反，区别对待而非一般化处理，是婴儿心理的默认设置。 Many of the behaviours that children acquire at home would be counterproductive elsewhere. Children who dominate their younger siblings at home would be making a mistake if they tried to treat their schoolmates the same way, especially if they happen to be small for their age. Fortunately, children don’t make that mistake. Firstborns are no more likely than laterborns to try to dominate their peers. 孩子在家习得的许多行为在别处则是有害无益的。在家对弟妹指手划脚的孩子，如果试图以同样方式对待同学，就犯错了，尤其如果他们碰巧在同龄人中个头偏小。幸运的是，孩子不会犯类似错误。排行高的孩子不比排行低的孩子有更多可能性对同龄人指手划脚。 Of course, some of the things children learn at home are useful elsewhere. Those who learn to speak the local language, or to read, or to play a musical instrument, don’t have to acquire these skills all over again when they step outside. But they don’t trot them out automatically. They are tentative at first, until they’re sure that the behaviour or skill they learned at home will also work in the new setting. 当然，也有孩子在家学习的一些事情在别处是有用的。掌握了言说和阅读本地语言或演奏乐器的人，走出家门不必重新学习这些技能。但是，他们不必机械地小跑离家出来。他们先试探，直到确信那些在家里学到的行为或技能在新的环境设定中也管用。 For a young child, it’s safer to discriminate than to generalise. The child’s mind is not short of storage space. A child can store different rules of behaviour for every setting, and different expectations for every individual he or she encounters. 对于小孩子，区别对待比一般化处理更安全。孩子的意识不缺存储空间。可以为不同环境设定存储不同行为规范，以及为他所与之交往的每个人分别存储各自对对方的期望。 Your goal in No Two Alike was to explain why individuals differ so much, even if they grew up in the same family, right? 您写《没有两个人一样》一书是解释为什么每个人如此不同，即使他们在同一家庭长大，对吗？ Right. I realised a couple of years after The Nurture Assumption was published that I had done only half the job: I had explained only how children get socialised. Socialisation is a process that causes children to become more similar in behaviour to their same-sex peers. And yet, despite being socialised, children continue to differ from one another in personality and social behaviour. 对。《教养的迷思》出版后过了几年，我发现自己只做了一半工作：我只解释了孩子是如何社会化的。社会化是导致孩子行为处事更像同性同龄人的过程。尽管被社会化，孩子们的个性和社会行为仍然彼此不同。 If anything, the differences widen during childhood and adolescence. I made some ineffectual efforts to deal with that problem in The Nurture Assumption, but I didn’t have a theory to account for it till I wrote the second book. The improved version of the theory presented in No Two Alike explains how children can, at the same time, become more similar to their peers in some ways and more different in other ways. 很可能，个体差异在孩童期和青春期扩大了。在《教养的迷思》中我做了些无效努力面对这个问题，但没有理论可以解释它，直到我写第二本书。《没有两个人一样》提出的改进版理论解释了为什么孩子在一些方面与同伴更相似，与此同时在另一些方面却变得更为不同。 There was a fair bit of replying to arguments put forward by critics of The Nurture Assumption. Was that one of the aims? 之前你针对《教养的迷思》批评者所提出的观点给出了不少直接回应。那是你的写作目的之一吗？ It was. I was tired of journalists telling me that my theory must be wrong because some expert at some big university had told them that there were plenty of studies that disproved it. I searched diligently for the studies they cited. In some cases they were nowhere to be found; at any rate, they had never been published in a peer-reviewed journal. In other cases a study had been published but the results didn’t do what the experts claimed – they didn’t disprove my theory. In one case, a study they cited actually did the opposite – it supported my theory! 是的。我厌烦了记者告诉我，我的理论肯定错误，因为某些著名大学的某些专家已经告诉他们，有大量研究反驳我的理论。我努力分析他们引用的研究。有些研究什么也没发现；不管怎么说，它们从未在同行评议的学术期刊上发表。另一些研究，发表的一项实验没获得专家声称的实验结果——并没有反驳我的理论。一个研究援引的一项实验结果实际上恰好相反——它支持我的理论！ That 1995 Psychological Review piece you mentioned won the George A. Miller award for an outstanding article in general psychology. There was a certain irony about that? 你提到的1995年那篇《心理学评论》文章荣获了George A. Miller心理学杰出论文奖。这是某种嘲讽吗？ In 1960 I was a graduate student in the Department of Psychology at Harvard. One day I got a letter saying that the Department had decided to kick me out of their PhD programme. They doubted I would ever make a worthwhile contribution to psychology, the letter said, due to my lack of ‘originality and independence’. The letter was signed by the acting chairman of the Department, George A. Miller! 1960年，我是哈佛大学心理学系研究生。有一天，我收到一封信，说系里已经决定把我排除在博士项目之外。信中说，由于我缺乏‘原创性和独立性’，他们对我做出有价值的心理学贡献表示怀疑。这封信正是由代理系主席George A. Miller签署的！ Sometimes, when life hands you a lemon, you should just bite in. Getting kicked out of Harvard was a devastating blow at the time, but in retrospect, it was the best thing that Harvard ever did for me. It freed me from the influence of ‘experts’. It kept me from being indoctrinated. Many years later, it enabled me to write The Nurture Assumption. 有时，当生活递给你一个柠檬时，你就应该咬它。当时被踢出哈佛是一个毁灭性打击，但现在回想起来，这是哈佛为我所做过的最好的事情。这让我从‘专家’的影响解脱出来。让我不被灌输。许多年以后，让我写出《教养的迷思》。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes. 伊斯兰教能够被改革吗？历史和人的本性告诉我们：能。 作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08 译者:Tankman 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here. 《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上：伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。 Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate? 伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退，激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗？或是能被改革，变得更加温和，现代且与邻为善呢？伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利，并给穆斯林信仰自由，接受现代金融和司法的基本原则，而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗？ A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that "radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution," the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, "He's wrong. Sorry about that." She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point. 越来越多的分析家认为不会，穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情，这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中，成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注：一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物，以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题，温和伊斯兰是解药”时，她说：“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕，追求同一目标，和相同的敌人战斗，但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。 My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge. 我的论述有两部分。第一，很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的；第二，革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。 Arguing Against Essentialism 对本质主义的驳斥 To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion's core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past. 声称伊斯兰不可被改变，则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解，而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误，因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切，包括对圣典的解读，随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。 Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran's interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of "no compulsion in religion," and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam. 只有不考虑人类本性，无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁，一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变，像圣战，奴隶，高利贷，“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且，我们容易想到过去的1400年，很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi'i，al-Ghazali，Ibn Taymiya，Rumi，Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。 However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam's scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country's history would lead to a distorted understanding. 可兰经和圣训也许是中心，而不是穆斯林经验的全部；从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国；忽略了这个国家的历史，会导致认知的扭曲。 Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today's Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline. 换一种说法就是，中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的，今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟，它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业，1969年我进入该领域时，我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起，到今天享有着巨大能量；如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大，那么它也可能衰落。 How might that happen? 这种变化可能会如何发生呢？ The Medieval Synthesis 中世纪整合 Key to Islam's role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia's prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much. 伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的；而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢？一个刑罚体系，要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争，遵循这禁令是不可能的；实际上，穆斯林发起的战争中，约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地，坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。 To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad. 为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求，前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法，允许放松一些伊斯兰法条，而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal（花招）和其他方式，遵循法律的形式，同时否定其实质。比如，为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家，很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。 This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam's "medieval synthesis" in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists: 沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》（1983）中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象，不切实际的要求，翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中，它减低了沙利亚的力度，使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行，同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali，在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话： One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to "compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court." As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, "Social patterns were in great contrast to the 'official' picture presented by these 'formal' sources." Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of "the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian." 律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时，“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。” While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12^th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18^th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability. 虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪，它并未克服一个基本的弱点：它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本，或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷，面对原教旨主义者的挑战，它仍然是脆弱的。实际上，前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战，包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中，原教旨主义的努力最终被软化，中世纪整合重新回到轨道，而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色，助长了其不稳定性。 The Challenge of Modernity 现代性的挑战 The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization. 中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断，传统观点来看，这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中，把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向：西方化或是伊斯兰化。 Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile. 西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象，他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法，代之以同类领域的西方做法，比如不利用法律确立宗教，妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前，这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运，对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。 But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back. 但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多，而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底，西方化表面上看起来强大，实则不然，因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高，有话语权的精英，而广大民众则被压制。 Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam. 从1930年代起，抗拒因素开始组织起来，发展他们自己的力量，尤其是在阿尔及利亚，埃及，伊朗，和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果，呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般，坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。 Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West. 虽然排斥西方，这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动，依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身，比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设，比如国家优先于个人，可以接受暴力斗争，和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术，尤其是军事和医疗方面。 Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways. 通过创造性的努力，伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长，最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者，霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中，显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件，和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序，在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步，用各种创新且极端的方式，变革社会，实行伊斯兰教法。 For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls' schools and music stores. The Islamists' influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas. 比如，在伊朗，什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者，并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗，塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身，你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱，头巾和罩袍。 Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country's established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism. 虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型，相比法西斯和共产主义，伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动，被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党（AKP）领导着，已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台，AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕，借助该国已经建立的民主制度，和良好的施政表现，逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量，而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。 The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction. 伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健，但是它们的势头并不是由来已久，也并不保证能持续下去。实际上，像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样，伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力，其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗，明确体现了这点。 Toward a Modern Synthesis 通向一个现代的整合 If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a "modern synthesis" comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps. 若要打败伊斯兰主义，反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景，来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点，他们可以回溯历史，尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力，对照“中世纪整合”，来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等，和不信伊斯兰者和平共存，并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。 Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans. 在此，把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较，不无益处。五个世纪前，犹太教徒，基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的，借贷收利息则不被允许。最终，经过了苦涩和反复的辩论，犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点；今天，没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。 Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, ("pretend" because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.) 然而在穆斯林当中，这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年，沙特阿拉伯在1962年，毛里塔尼亚在1980年，官方禁止了蓄奴，奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在（尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦）。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元，并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息，（“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。） Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else. 穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好，并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教，他们必须模仿其他一神教，改变自己宗教在蓄奴，利息，妇女权益，背教自由，司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。 When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy. 当一个改革的，现代的伊斯兰涌现，它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益，统治异教徒的观念，圣战，或者自杀性恐怖主义，它也不会要求对通奸，危害家族荣誉，渎神和背教者处以死刑。 Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women: 在这一新的世纪，一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下：

• Saudi Arabia's Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn't end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
• 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒，把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚，但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
• Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
• 土耳其神职人员已经同意，让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜，并且和男人一起祷告。
• The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
• 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
• Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
• 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
• A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
• 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议，认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰，事实上应该被惩罚。
• A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
• 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法，反对多妻制。

Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include: 其他显著进步，不一定局限于妇女权益方面，包括：

• The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
• 沙特政府终止了Jizya（向非穆斯林征收人头税）。
• An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
• 一个伊朗法庭，判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
• Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
• 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会，开始就处决背教者展开辩论。

All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times. 同时，倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法，如果不是着眼于改进，那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir，一个沙特女记者，大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利，和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴，包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责，但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论，在以前时代这是无法想象的。 Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad's example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today's Muslims make of it. 和其中世纪的先行者一样，面对原教旨人士的攻击，现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子，然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是，已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果，有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想，并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念；它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。 Policy Implications 政策含义 What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims? 反对伊斯兰教法，哈里发国，和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢？ For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process. 对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林，最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义，而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力，通过慷慨和无私，达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者，必须也经过可能是数十年的努力，发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态，然后推广它。在这个过程中，解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。 Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey's AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism. 非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰：第一，坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登，也可以是隐秘鬼祟，表面合法的政治性运动，如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍，但他却更有效，危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由，法律面前人人平等和其他人权，珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。 Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization. 第二，非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天，这些人物弱小零散，且面对着艰巨的任务，但是他们确实存在，他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权，代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。 Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum. Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。 July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title "What Is Islam?" 2013年7月7日更新： Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章，标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。 Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at "Islam's Future." 2013年10月1日更新：六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章，我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。 Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2^nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that "Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation." So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all. 2014年4月10日更新：虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段，并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道，“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以，她也许开始接受我的观点了。 Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that "When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history." 2016年2月4日更新：我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰，门外汉讨论文本，内行讨论历史。” Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking's illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's headquarters (as photographed by me). It's a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above. 2016年2月24日更新：这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片，也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划，这版本似乎并不让人激动。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Sex on TV: Less impact on teens than you might think 电视上的色情内容: 对青少年的影响比你想象的少 作者:Christopher Ferguson @ 2016-08-02 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 来源:https://theconversation.com/sex-on-tv-less-impact-on-teens-than-you-might-think-61957 Few people would doubt that sex is ubiquitous in media – whether movies, television, music or books – and that teens today have unprecedented access to all of it. It’s often taken for granted that this easy access to “sexy media” has an influence on teenage sexuality. 性在媒体上无处不在，这个论断少有人质疑。无论电影、电视、音乐或书籍，对当今的青少年而言，有关性的一切信息触手可及，这种便捷史无前例。人们经常理所当然的认为，随处可见的“色情媒体”会对青少年性行为产生影响。 Specifically, the worry is that teens may have sex earlier or engage in higher-risk sexual activities such as having multiple partners or exposing themselves to potential pregnancies or STDs. In 2010 the American Academy of Pediatrics even published a position paper claiming that sexually explicit media could promote risky teen sexual behavior. 具体来说，人们担心的是青少年可能更早发生性行为，或者参与高风险性行为。比如与多位同伴有性行为，或者暴露于怀孕或染上性病的风险中。2010年美国儿科协会甚至发表了一篇意见书，声称色情媒体可能诱发青少年危险性行为。 But government data find that teens are actually waiting longer than in the past to have sex. And teen pregnancy rates are at historic lows. How is it possible that sexy media has such a pernicious effect even as teen sexuality is becoming healthier? 然而政府数据显示，事实上青少年发生性行为前的等待时间比过去更长。且现时未成年人怀孕率处于历史最低点。色情媒体如此有害，而青少年性行为反而比以往健康，这怎么可能呢？ I’ve spent more than a decade researching how media – like video games or advertising – influences youth behavior. What fascinates me is how society interacts with media, often embracing salacious content while simultaneously blaming it for societal problems, whether real or imagined. 我花了超过十年的时间研究视频游戏和广告之类的媒体如何影响青少年行为。让我着迷的是，社会如何与媒体相互作用。媒体经常热衷于色情内容，同时却将之归咎于真实或假想中的社会问题。 So my colleagues and I decided to look at the research on sexy media and teenage sexual behavior to see how the strong the link between the two is. 于是我和我的同事们决定研究色情媒体和青少年性行为的关系，看看这两者之间的相关性有多高。 Sexy media doesn’t predict sexual behavior 色情媒体不是性行为的有效预测变量 Despite the common assumptions about sex in the media and its alleged effects on teens, the evidence behind the link is weak. Some studies find evidence for a small effect (perhaps in some circumstances but not others), while others find no evidence for any effect. 尽管人们声称媒体上的性信息会影响青少年，这个受到普遍认同的假设前提并未得到多少证据支持。有些研究发现了微弱效应存在的证据（可能在某些情形下有相关性，其它情形下没有），然而另一些研究没有发现存在任何影响的证据。 One reason the evidence may not be conclusive is that there are practical and ethical limitations to conducting research. We can’t run experiments where teens watch different TV shows and we wait around to see who has sex. This means research often relies on self-reported data. What we do is ask teens to report on their sexual behavior and their media preferences, as well as other variables we might like to control for (such as personality or family environment) and see if correlations exist. 证据可能不够有说服力的原因之一是，开展此类研究有操作上的和伦理上的限制。我们不能在青少年观看不同电视节目的地方进行实验，并且在周围等待，看谁发生了性行为。这意味着研究经常依赖自我报告的数据。我们所做的是，让青少年报告他们的性行为和偏好的媒体，以及我们可能想控制的其它变量（比如性格和家庭环境），来看是否存在相关性。 With this in mind, my colleagues Patrick Markey at Villanova and Danish researcher Rune Nielsen and I conducted a meta-analysis of 22 studies with over 22,000 participants that examine the correlation between sexy media and teenage sexual behavior. A meta-analysis lets us look for commonalities in the results, and is something that had not been done previously with this pool of research. 出于这种考虑，我和在维拉诺瓦的同事Patrick Markey，还有丹麦研究员Rune Nielsen进行了一项对22个研究，包含超过2.2万参与者的荟萃分析，来检验色情媒体和青少年性行为之间的相关性。这个荟萃分析让我们寻找已有研究结果中的共性，这批研究此前未做过荟萃分析。 All of the studies in the meta-analysis looked at depictions of sexual situations, nudity, partial nudity or explicit discussions of sex in television shows or movies easily accessible to minors (and thus excluded pornography). 这次荟萃分析里的研究都着眼于电视节目上对行为情景的描述、裸露、部分裸露或者公开讨论的性内容, 或者容易被未成年人接触到的电影 （因此排除了色情文学）。 In particular, we were curious to see whether sexy media predicted teen sexual behavior once other variables had been controlled. For instance, maybe boys tend to watch sexier media and also are more sexually risk-taking. Or perhaps youth who are more liberal in terms of personality are more open both to sexy media and earlier sexual initiation. Perhaps a difficult family background is the underlying key to understanding any correlation between media use habits and actual sexual behavior. 我们特别好奇的是，一旦其它变量受到控制，色情媒体接触行为能否预测青少年性行为。例如，可能男孩更倾向于观看更色情的媒体内容，并且愿意承担更多的性风险。或者有更自由人格的青少年更易于接受色情媒体和早期性启蒙。也许一个复杂的家庭背景是理解媒体使用习惯和实际性行为相关性背后的关键。 Ultimately, this is what we found. Once other factors such as family environment, personality or even gender were controlled, sexy media exposure did not meaningfully correlate with teen sexual behavior. 最后，这是我们的发现。一旦其它因素，比如家庭环境、性格甚至性别都受到控制，色情媒体的曝光与青少年性行为没有显著的相关。 Contrary to common fears, sexy media doesn’t seem to have any practical significance for when teens first have sex or start other sexual behaviors. This lack of correlation is a warning sign we might be on the wrong track in trying to blame media for teen sexual risk-taking. 与常见的恐惧相反，色情媒体内容似乎对青少年首次性行为或者进行其它性接触的时间没有任何实际影响。缺乏相关性是一个警告信号，我们将青少年冒险的性行为归咎于媒体的观点可能是错误的。 Why doesn’t media influence teens? 为什么媒体内容影响不了青少年？ There are numerous theories that discuss how individuals and media interact. However, many older media effects theories didn’t consider why people were drawn to media, how they processed it, or what they hoped to get from it. Such theories assumed viewers simply irrationally and purposelessly imitated what they saw. Most of the papers we examined in our meta-analysis were tests of these basic, automatic, media effects theories. 有很多理论讨论个人和媒体如何相互影响。然而，许多早期媒体效应理论没有考虑为什么人们被媒体内容吸引，他们如何处理媒体内容，或者他们想从媒体内容中得到什么。这些理论假设观众只是简单非理性和无目的地模仿他们观看的内容。我们荟萃分析里的大多数论文就是这些基本、自动的媒体效应理论的实验测试。 In the past few years, some scholars (myself included) have specifically called for the retirement of these older media effects theories. This is because the evidence increasingly suggests that fictional media such as feature movies or sitcoms media is too remote to have a clear impact on consumers' behavior, especially compared to families and peers. 过去几年，一些学者（包括我自己）号召淘汰这些早期媒体效应理论。越来越多的证据表明，像故事电影和情景喜剧这样的虚构媒体内容太遥不可及，不足以对消费者的行为产生清晰明确的影响，尤其是与家庭和同龄人这两个因素相比。 In addition, emerging evidence suggests that young children process fictional media differently from real events. If small children are able to process a difference between fictional events and real events, we can assume that teens don’t really expect media to reflect reality. 此外，新出现的证据表明，年轻的孩子处理虚构媒体的方式不同于真实事件。如果小孩子都能够辨别虚构事件和真实事件之间的差异，我们可以假设青少年从来没有真正想过媒体反映了现实。 Our results regarding the limited impact of media also fit with the observations from societal data. Despite a plethora of sexual media available to teens, a crisis of risky teen sexual behavior has not emerged. 我们关于媒体有限影响的研究结果也符合来自社会数据的观察。尽管青少年接触到种类繁多的色情媒体，高风险青少年性行为的危机并没有出现。 We watch what we’re interested in watching 我们观看我们感兴趣的 Newer models of media use suggest that it is the individuals who consume media, not the media itself, who are the driving agents of behavior. Evidence suggests that users seek out and interpret media according to what they want to get from it, rather than passively imitating it. 较新的媒体使用模型表明，是消费媒体内容的个人而不是媒体本身，驱动了行为。有证据表明，用户根据他们想要从中得到什么来寻找和解读媒体，而不是被动的模仿。 People don’t generally accidentally watch media, sexual or otherwise, but are motivated to do so because of preexisting desires. 人们通常不是偶然地观看媒体、性或者其它，而是被先前存在的欲望驱动。 For instance, some recent studies have indicated that youth seek out media that fit with preexisting motives, called a selection effect, but that media don’t necessarily lead to further problem behaviors. For example, research suggests that some teens who are already aggressive might be interested in violent video games, but playing such games doesn’t make kids more aggressive. 例如，最近的一些研究显示青年人寻求适合先前已经存在的动机的媒体，这被称为“选择效应”。但是媒体并不一定导致进一步的问题行为。比如，研究表明一些本来就已经好斗的青年人可能对暴力视频游戏感兴趣，但玩这样的游戏并没有让孩子更好斗。 That’s a point that sometimes seems ignored when we talk about teens and sex. Interest in sex is a largely biologically motivated process; fictional media really isn’t required. Teens will become interested in sex all on their own. 这就是当我们谈论青少年与性时，有时候会忽略的一点。对性的兴趣很大程度上是生物性驱动的过程，虚构媒体并非必需。青少年自发的对性产生兴趣。 Parents have more influence than the media 父母比媒体影响更大 Parents can rest a bit easier since the evidence suggests that media isn’t a primary driver of teen sexuality. 父母们可以松口气了，因为证据表明媒体不是一个青少年性行为的主要驱动力。 To the extent media has any impact at all, it is likely only in a vacuum left by adults reluctant to talk to kids about sex, especially the stuff kids really want to know. 即便媒体能施加影响，也只是在一个由成人所留下的真空内起作用，有些成人不愿意跟孩子谈论与性有关的话题，尤其是孩子真正想知道的事情，由此便产生了真空。 How do you ask someone out on a date and how do you handle it if they say no? What does sex feel like? When is it OK to have sex? What are the risks and how do you avoid them? In the face of patient, empathic and informative discussions about sex by adults kids trust, the media likely has little influence. 你怎么邀请别人出去约会？如果他们拒绝了，你怎么处理？性爱是怎么样的？什么时候可以发生性行为？性行为有什么风险，你怎么避免这些风险？在成人与孩子之间互相信任、耐心、有同理心和有理有据的讨论面前，媒体可能几乎没有影响。 Ultimately, whether media have salacious or more conscientious portrayals of sexuality, we should not expect media to replace conversations with youth by parents, guardians and educators. 最后，无论媒体是否有露骨或更谨慎的性描写，我们都不应期待媒体取代父母、监护人和教育工作者与青少年的谈话。 I’m not suggesting everyone run out and buy “50 Shades of Grey” for their teen, but if teens happen to come across it (and they will), it’s not the end of the world. 我不是建议每个人都跑出去买《五十度灰》给他们的小孩，但是如果青少年无意中发现这本书（他们肯定会），这不是世界末日。 The important thing for parents is to talk to their kids. 作为父母，重要的是和他们的孩子谈一谈。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Misogynist Origins of American Labor Law 美国劳动法的仇女起源 作者:Jeffrey Tucker @ 2016-02-17 译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 来源:FEE,https://fee.org/articles/government-s-war-on-women-1900-1920/ Many now credit government for past progress in gender equality, mostly because of late 20th-century legislation that appeared to benefit women in the workplace. This is a distorted view. Few know that government at all levels actually sought to prevent that progress. 如今许多人把过去在性别平等上的进步归功于政府，主要是因为二十世纪后期的立法看似让职业女性受益。然而这个观点与现实不符。鲜为人知的是，各个层级的政府都曾企图阻挠这种进步。 A century ago, just as markets were attracting women to professional life, government regulation in the United States specifically targeted women to restrict their professional choices. The regulations were designed to drive them out of offices and factories and back into their homes — for their own good and the good of their families, their communities, and the future of the race. 一个世纪前，正当市场吸引女性进入职场之际，美国的政府管制刻意将女性作为目标人群，限制她们的职业选择。这些管制措施的目的是把女性从办公室和工厂驱赶回家中——为了女性和她们家庭、社区，以及民族的未来。 The new controls — the first round of a century of interventions in the free labor market — were designed to curb the sweeping changes in economics and demographics that were taking place due to material advances in the last quarter of the 19th century. The regulations limited women’s choices so they would stop making what elites considered the wrong decisions. 这些新的控制措施——是整整一个世纪对自由劳动力市场的干涉浪潮的第一波——意在阻止由于十九世纪最后二十五年物质进步所带来的经济和人口统计上的巨大变化。管制措施限制了女性的选择，这样她们就无法做出当时社会精英眼中的“错误”决定。 The real story, which is only beginning to emerge within the academic literature, is striking. It upends prevailing narratives about the relationship between government and women’s rights. Many cornerstones of the early welfare and regulatory state were designed to hobble women’s personal liberty and economic advancement. They were not progressive but reactionary, an attempt to turn back the clock. Women’s Work Is Not New 女性工作不是什么新鲜事 It was the freedom and opportunity realized in the latter period of the 19th century that changed everything for women workers, opening up new lines of employment. The growth of industrial capitalism meant that women could leave the farm and move to the city. They could choose to leave home without having married — and even stay in the workforce as married women. They enjoyed more choice in education and professional life than ever before. New clerical jobs, unknown a century earlier, were everywhere to be had. Women’s wages were rising quickly, by an impressive 16 percent from 1890 through 1920. Nor were women working at “exploitative” wages. A Rand corporation study of wage differentials discovered an interesting fact: women’s wages relative to men’s were higher in 1920 than they were in 1980. 新的文书类工作在那之前一个世纪还不存在，而此时已经到处都是。从1890年至1920年女性的工资快速上升，涨幅高达16%。女性的工资并非是“剥削性”的。兰德公司一项关于工资差异的研究揭示了一个有趣的事实：1920年女性工资相对于男性工资的比率要高于1980年。 The Law Intervenes 法律介入 And yet, these were also the years in which we first saw government intervention in the labor market, much of it specifically targeting women. As historian Thomas Leonard argues in his spectacular book Illiberal Reformers (2016), an entire generation of intellectuals and politicians panicked about what this could mean for the future of humanity. 然而，在那些年政府首次开始介入劳动力市场，明确针对的目标主要是女性。正如历史学家Thomas Leonard在其力作《非自由的改革者（Illiberal Reformers）》中指出的，整整一代的知识分子和政治家恐慌于女性工资上升会给人类未来带来的影响。 Society must control reproduction and therefore what women do with their lives. So said the prevailing ideology of the age. We couldn’t have a situation in which markets enticed women to leave the control of their families and move to the city. 社会必须控制生育，因而也就必须控制女性的人生。那个时代盛行的意识形态如是说。市场引诱女性离开家庭的控制搬迁到城市，这种情况让人无法接受。 Though they are called Progressives, the reformers’ rhetoric had more in common with the “family values” movement of the 1970s and ‘80s — with pseudoscientific race paranoia playing the role that religion would later play. In many ways, they were the ultimate conservatives, attempting to roll back the tide of history made possible by the advance of the capitalist economy. 尽管他们被称为进步主义者，这些改革者的话语倒跟1970和80年代的“家庭价值观”运动有更多共同点——也包括日后宗教也运用的伪科学种族妄想狂那一套。在许多方面，这些人是终极的保守主义者，他们企图使资本经济的进步带来的历史浪潮倒流。 They were incredibly successful. Over a 10-year period between 1909 and 1919, 40 states restricted the number of hours that women employees could work. Fifteen states passed new minimum wage laws to limit entry-level jobs. Most states created stipends for single-parent families, specifically to incentivize women to reject commercial life, return to protected domesticity, and stop competing with men for wages. 他们大获全胜。1909年至1919年的十年间，40个州限制了女性雇员可以工作的小时数。15个州通过了新的最低工资法来限制初级工作职位。大多数州制定了对单职工家庭的津贴，特意激励女性抵制商业生活回归被保护的家庭生活，同时不再与男人在职场上竞争。 Such laws were completely new in American history (and in almost all of modern history) because they intervened so fundamentally in the right of workers and employers to make any sort of contract. The Progressive agenda involved government deeply in issues that directly affected people’s ability to provide for themselves. It also created unprecedented impositions on both employees and their employers. Such laws would have been inconceivable even 50 years earlier. 这些法律在美国历史上（同时也在几乎整个现代历史上）没有先例。原因在于它们如此根本性地介入了工人和雇主订立任意契约的权利。在一些直接影响人们自给自足能力的议题上，进步主义的议程和政府关联极深。同时进步主义创立了前所未有的税项，同时向雇主和雇员征收。这样的法律即使在五十年前也是不可想象的。 How did all this happen so fast, and why? 政府的干预如何迅速实施？为何能得逞？ The Inferiority of Women 女性的劣势 Richard T. Ely, the hugely influential founder of the American Economic Association and the godfather of progressive economics, explained the issue clearly, laying the groundwork for the laws that followed. His 1894 book Socialism and Social Reform expressed a panic about women’s entry into the workforce: Richard T. Ely 是美国经济协会极具影响力的创建者，也是进步主义经济学的教父。他曾清楚地阐述了这个问题，为之后产生的法律打下了基石。他在1894年发表的著作《社会主义与社会改革》中对女性加入劳动力大军表达了恐慌：

Restrictions should be thrown about the employment of married women, and their employment for a considerable period before and after child-birth should be prohibited under any circumstances. There should also be a restriction of the work-day, as in England, for children and young persons under eighteen, and for women. Such a limitation having beneficial effect upon the health of the community…. Night work should be prohibited for women and persons under eighteen years of age and, in particular, all work injurious to the female organism should be forbidden to women. 应该限制雇用已婚女性，在任何情形下，都应该禁止雇用处于分娩期前后的女性，禁止雇用期应该相当长。我们应该仿效英格兰，限制儿童、十八岁以下的年轻人和女性的工作时长。这种限制利于社会健康发展。……应该禁止女性和不满十八岁者上夜班，尤其应该禁止女性从事那些损害女性生理机体的工作。

If the reference to the “female organism” sounds strange, remember that this generation of intellectuals believed in eugenics — using state force to plan the emergence of the model race — and hence saw women mainly as propagators of the race, not human individuals with the right to choose. 如果书中所谓的“女性生理机体”听着别扭，请记住那一代知识分子相信优生学——即使用国家的力量来制定生产模范种族的计划，因此他们将女性主要看成生育者，而非拥有选择权利的个人。 For anyone who believed that government had a responsibility to plan human production (and most intellectuals at the time did believe this), the role of women was critical. They couldn’t be allowed to do what they wanted, go where they wanted, or make lives for themselves. This was the normal thought pattern for the generation that gave the United States unprecedented legal restrictions on the labor market. 对于任何相信政府有责任对人类生育做规划的人（当时大多数知识分子确实相信）来说，女性的角色至关重要。女性不能被允许做自己想做的事，去她们想去的地方，或过她们自己想要的生活。这就是当时一代人通常的思维模式，而正是这种思维模式让美国政府对劳动力市场进行前所未有的法律限制。 The Supreme Court Weighs In 最高法院的介入 Consider the Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which considered state legislation on maximum working hours and decided in favor of the state. Oregon was hardly unusual; it was typical of the 20 states that had already passed such laws directed at women’s freedom to choose employment. From the text of Colorado’s law passed in 1903: “No woman” shall “work or labor for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day … where such labor, work, or occupation by its nature, requires the woman to stand or be upon her feet.” 看一下Muller诉俄勒冈州这个最高法院案例，最高法院认可对最大工作小时数的州立法，并做了对州政府有利的判决。俄勒冈州并非特别，它只是已经通过此类针对女性选择工作自由的法律的二十个州的典型。在1903年通过的科罗拉多州的法律这样写道：“没有女性”应该“在一天的24小时中进行8小时以上的工作或劳动……这里指的是需要女性站立完成的工作、劳动或职业。” The decision in Muller v. Oregon, then, ratified such laws all over the country. Today, this case is widely considered the foundation of progressive labor law. What’s not well known is that the brief that settled the case was a remarkable piece of pseudoscience that argued for the inferiority of women and hence their need for special protections from the demands of commercial enterprise. That brief was filed by future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis. 于是，最高法院对Muller诉俄勒冈州案的判决正式批准了全国范围内此类法律。今天，该诉讼被普遍认为是进步主义劳动法的基础。而不为人所周知的是，终结该诉讼的那份简报是一篇令人称奇的伪科学文章，该简报论述了女性的劣势，认为女性需要特殊的保护使她们免受商业公司侵害。这份简报正是后来成为最高法院法官的Louis Brandeis提交的。 The Weird and Awful “Brandeis Brief” 奇怪又糟糕的“Brandeis简报” The “Brandeis Brief” argued that the law had to stop the massive influx of women into the workplace because women have “special susceptibility to fatigue and disease,” because female blood has more water in it than men’s blood. Their blood composition also accounts for why women have less focus, energy, and strength generally, according to the brief. “Brandeis简报”认为法律必须制止大量女性流入劳动力大军，因为女性“特别容易疲劳和生病”，原因是与男性相比，女性血液中含有更高比例的水分。按照这份简报的说法，女性的血液成分比例也解释了为何女性通常在注意力、精力和体力上逊于男性。。 “Physicians are agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in the powers of persistent attention and application.” “医生们认同女性在一切和耐力有关的方面从根本上弱于男性的观点：这些方面包括肌肉力量，神经系统的能量，持续保持注意力和坚持的能力。” Moreover, “In strength as well as in rapidity and precision of movement women are inferior to men. This is not a conclusion that has ever been contested.” 此外，“不仅在力量上，在速度和动作的精确度上，女性都劣于男性。这一结论从未受到过质疑。” Long hours are “more disastrous to the health of women than to men,” the brief explained. Government therefore needed to regulate work hours for the “health, safety, morals, and general welfare of women.” 长时间工作“对女性健康的损害要大于对男性，”该简报这样解释道。因此政府需要为了“女性的健康、安全、道德，以及生活幸福”对工作时长进行管制。 Restrictions on work hours were therefore essential. “It is of great hygienic importance on account of the more delicate physical organization of woman,” the brief said, “and will contribute much toward the better care of children and the maintenance of a regular family life.” 因此限制工作时间就至关重要。“考虑到女性生理组织更脆弱，（限制工作时间长度）在卫生上具有重大意义”，该简报这样写道，“这对关爱儿童和维持正常家庭生活都非常有益。” This brief is also notable for being the first to combine science, however bogus, and public policy in an appeal to the Supreme Court. 这份简报另一个闻名于世的原因，是它首次在向最高法院的上诉中将科学——尽管是冒牌货——与公共政策结合在一起。 Florence Kelley’s Dream of Nonworking Women Florence Kelley的女性不工作梦想 One might suspect that the entire effort was a male-driven one to stop female progress, but that’s not the case. A leader in the campaign for such labor interventions was writer and activist Florence Kelley. Modern progressives celebrate her activism for maximum work hours, the 10-hour workday, minimum wages, and children’s rights. Indeed, she is considered a great hero by the sanitized version of history that progressives tell each other. 现在可能有人会怀疑这整个事情都是男性驱使的，意在阻止女性进步，但事实并非如此。支持政府介入劳动力市场的运动的一位领导者Florence Kelley是一名作家兼激进分子。现代进步主义者颂扬了她在最大工作时长、十小时工作制、最低工资和儿童权益上的激进主义。没错，在进步主义者相互传颂的历史洁本中，她是一位伟大的英雄。 Before we cheer her accomplishments, however, we should look at Kelley’s driving motivation. Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, she explained that she wanted a minimum wage as a wage floor to stop manufacturing plants and retail outlets from employing women for less than they could otherwise employ men. 但在为她的成就欢呼之前，我们应该看看Kelley的动机。在发表于《美国社会学杂志》的文章上，她解释道，她支持最低工资标准是因为最低工资相当于工资门槛，可以不让工厂和零售商店以低于男性工资的标准雇佣女性。 Retail stores, she wrote, tend to “minimize the employment of men, substituting them for women, girls, and boys, employed largely at less than living wages.” It was precisely such competition from women and children that Kelley intended to stop, so that men could earn higher wages and women could return to traditional roles. 她写道，零售商店倾向于“将雇佣的男性数量最小化，取而代之的是以低于基本生活工资的薪酬雇佣女性，女孩和男孩。”Kelley希望制止的正是这些来自于女性和儿童的就业竞争，这样男性就可以赚更多工资，而女性则可以回归她们的传统角色。 In her book Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905), Kelley said that long working hours had to be ended for women because commercial life was introducing “vice” into communities (“vice” for this generation was the preferred euphemism for every manner of sexual sin). Worse, women were choosing commercial life over home “on their own initiative.” 在出版于1905年的《一些通过立法获得的伦理好处》一书中，Kelley认为女性长时间工作必须被阻止，因为商业化生活正在将“恶习”带入社区（那一代人更喜欢用“恶习”这一委婉说法来指代任何与性相关的罪孽 ）。而更糟的是，女性在商业化生活和家庭二者间选择了前者，完全是“自己主动的”。 Kelley considered it necessary to restrict women’s rights for their own “health and morality,” she said, and also to boost men’s wages so women would stay home under the care of their mothers, fathers, suitors, and husbands. Kelley认为有必要为了女性的“健康和道德”限制女性权利。在书中她写道，限制女性权利也是为了推动男性工资的增长，从而使得女性可以留在家中受她们的父母、求婚者和丈夫们的照顾。 Moreover, to make such work illegal would make “righteous living” more practical for women. If they stopped being rewarded in wages, they would return to domestic life. Kelley even regretted the invention of electricity because it allowed women to work late at factories, when they should be at home reading to children by firelight. 此外，将女性长时间工作定为非法会使得“正直的生活”对女性来说更为实际可行。如果女性不再受工资回报的奖励，她们就会回归家庭生活。Kelley甚至还为电的发明感到遗憾，因为是电让女性可以夜晚在工厂工作，而此时她们本应在家中的炉火旁给孩子们讲故事。 In Kelley’s view, the ideal role of women with children is not to enter commercial life at all: “Family life in the home is sapped in its foundation when mothers of young children work for wages.” It’s an opinion with which some may still sympathize, but should such an opinion be imposed on working families by coercive legislation? For this paragon of progressive social reform, it was clear that lawmakers had to force women back into the home. 在Kelley看来，女性面对孩子的理想角色是完全不进入商业化生活：“当小孩的母亲们为工资工作时，家庭生活的基础被削弱了。”现在有些人依然支持这样的观点，但这样的观点应该通过强制性立法被强加于双职工家庭吗？按照这种进步主义社会改革的范式，立法者必须强迫女性回家。 Florence Kelley and the movement she represented sought to disemploy women and get everyone back to a premodern form of domestic living. She wanted not more rights for women but fewer. The workplace was properly for men, who were to get paid high wages sufficient for the whole family. That was the basis for her support of a range of legislation to drive women out of the workforce and put an end to the new range of options available to them, options that many women were happy to choose. Florence Kelley与她代表的运动，追求的是女性不被雇佣以及所有人都回归现代之前的家庭生活。她要的不是女性拥有更多权利，而是更少。工作场所适合男性，因为他们在那里能获得高薪酬，足够养活全家人。就是基于这样的理念，她支持通过广泛的立法将女性从工作场所驱逐出去，使女性不再有一系列新的选项——很多女性乐于选择的选项。 Fear the Women of East Prussia 对东普鲁士女性的恐惧 All this scholarship and activism is one thing, but what about the popular press? 这些学术研究和激进主义是一回事，那大众传媒又怎么样呢？ Professor Edward A. Ross, author of Sin and Society, spoke out in the New York Times on May 3, 1908. In an article titled “The Price Woman Pays to Industrial Progress,” Ross warned that America’s “fine feminine form” was endangered by commercial society. Edward A. Ross教授是《罪与社会》一书的作者。他在1908年3月3日纽约时报上一篇题为《女性为产业进步所付出的代价》文章中警告了“精致的女性气质”正在被商业化社会所危害。 If women were permitted to work, an evolutionary selection process would govern their reproduction to the detriment of the human race. The graceful women who would otherwise bear beautiful children would be pushed out of the gene pool and replaced by “squat, splay-footed, wide-backed, flat-breasted, broad-faced, short-necked — a type that lacks every grace that we associate with women.” 如果允许女性工作，进化选择过程会主宰她们的生育，危害人类。本来会生养漂亮孩子的优雅女性会被挤出基因池，取而代之的将是“矮胖、八字脚、宽背、平胸、脸蛋平庸、脖子短的女性——这种类型的女性在任何方面都不能让我们把女性优雅与之相联系。” Ross’s example: “the women of East Prussia,” who “bear a child in the morning” and “are out in the field in the afternoon.” Ross举的例子是“东普鲁士女人”，她们“在早晨刚生完孩子”，“下午就下地”。 The professor explained that women who had worked in factories would not make suitable bearers of children. “Think of the discouraging situation of the young man who after he has been married two or three years finds he has a wife who at the age of 28 or 30 has collapsed, become a miserable invalid, suffering aches and pains all the time.” Why, she might find herself “unable to keep the home attractive.” And all of this “because of just a few extra dollars added to the profits of the employer or a few extra dollars saved to the consumer.” 该教授解释说，在工厂工作的女性不会是合适的生养者。“试想一下这样令人沮丧的情况：一个年轻男人在和他妻子结婚两三年后发现她在28或30岁的年纪垮掉了，终日一身病痛。”这样的妻子可能会发现自己“无法把家里弄得漂亮”。而这一切“仅仅是为了让雇主多赚几美元，或是让消费者多省几美元”。 Because of the dangerous combination of employment and natural selection, Ross contended, the government had to extend a hand to help these women by limiting working hours and establishing a high bar to enter the workforce: minimum wages. 由于雇佣劳动和自然选择的危险结合，Ross主张政府必须通过限制工作时长，并对进入劳动力市场设置高门槛——即最低工资——向女性伸出援手。 Only through such enlightened interventions could government save women from the workplace, so that they could return to the maternal duties of rearing “girls who have the qualities of fineness — grace and charm.” 政府只有通过这样高明的干预才能将女性从工作场所中拯救出来，这样女性才能回归母亲的角色，抚养“具有优雅和美丽这些优秀特质的女孩”。 Is This Satire? 讽刺否？ If this reads like satire, sadly it is not. Nor were such views unusual in a generation of ruling-class intellectuals, politicians, and activists that embraced eugenics and rejected capitalism as too random, too chaotic, too liberating. Their plan was to reestablish and entrench by law the family and marital structure they believed in, which absolutely precluded a generation of women making individual choices over their own lives. Every trend panicked the eugenic generation. They fretted about the falling birth rate among those who should be reproducing and the rising birth rate among those who shouldn’t be. They worried about morals, about competition, about health, about culture. Most of all, they regretted the change that a dynamic economy was bringing about. 所有的时代趋向都让相信优生学的一代人恐慌。他们担心本应生养的群体的生育率在下降，而那些本不应生育的群体的生育率却在上升。他们忧虑于道德、竞争、健康和文化。所有问题中他们最担心的是充满活力的经济即将带来的改变。 Thus, from 1900 through 1920, a period that set the stage for a century of interventions in the labor market, hundreds of laws stifling women were passed in every state and at the federal level, too. None dared call it misogyny, but this is real history, however rarely it is told. 因此，1900至1920年间，政府为干预劳动力市场打好了舞台，这种干预持续了一个世纪。数以百计窒息女性的法律在所有州以及联邦层面上通过。没人敢称之为厌女，但这是真实的历史，尽管很少被说起。 Feminists against Regulation 对抗管控的女权主义 Laws that disemployed thousands of women nationwide led to vast protests. The Equal Opportunity League, an early feminist organization in New York, lobbied the state legislature to repeal the bans on work. And it received quite the press coverage. 使全国范围内成千上万的女性失去工作的法律导致了大范围的抗议。机会平等联盟是一个位于纽约的早期女权组织，它游说州立法机构废除对女性工作的禁令，得到了相当多的媒体报道。 “So-called ‘welfare’ legislation is not asked for or wanted by real working women,” the league said. “These ‘welfare’ bills are drafted by self-styled social uplifters who assert that working women do not know enough to protect themselves.” “所谓的“福利”立法不是真正在工作的女性要求或内心想要的，”该联盟如是说。“这些“福利”法案由自封的社会提升者起草，他们认为工作的女性不知如何保护自己。” “Are women people? Women are no longer the wards of the State and a law that is unconstitutional for a man voter is equally unconstitutional for a woman voter.” “女性也是人吧？女性不再是州政府的被监护人，对男性投票人来说违宪的法律对女性投票人来说一样违宪。” “Working at night is not more injurious than working in the daytime,” the league argued. “Many women prefer to work at night because the wage is higher, opportunities for advancement greater, and women with children can enjoy being with their child after school hours in the day time.” “在晚上工作不比在白天工作更有害”，该联盟这样认为。“许多女性喜欢在晚上工作是因为工资更高，升职的机会更大，而且有孩子的女性可以在白天孩子放学后和孩子在一起。” In fact, the phrase “equal pay for equal work” was not created to mandate higher wages for women. It was a league slogan invoked to argue against laws that made it “a crime to employ women even five minutes after the eight-hour day.” The phrase emerged as a preferred slogan to protest in favor of free markets, not against them. 事实上，“同工同酬”这一警句的出现并非为了强制提高女性工资。它是联盟的一句口号，用来反对那些认定“8小时工作时间之外即使多雇佣女性5分钟也是犯罪”的法律。这一广受欢迎警句的是作为亲市场而非反对自由市场的口号而提出的。 The Equal Opportunity League also passionately opposed the minimum wage law. Such laws, it argued, “while purporting to be for [women’s] benefit, would really be a serious handicap to them in competing with men workers for desirable positions.” 平等机会联盟也积极地反对最低工资法。联盟认为这样的法律“尽管本意是为了照顾（女性）利益，实质上却让女性在与男性工人竞争好职位时受到严重妨碍”。 In short, the conclusion of the League is that these proposed bills and laws, ostensibly intended to protect and shield the woman worker, will, if permitted to stand, unquestionably work her industrial ruin and throw her back into the slough of drudgery out of which she is just emerging after centuries of painful, laborious effort to better her condition. ("Women’s Work Limited by Law," New York Times, January 18, 1920) 简单来说，联盟的结论是这些提议中的法案和法律表面上意在保护女性工人，实际上一旦通过则毫无疑问会毁坏女性的职业生涯，将女性赶回家务重活的泥沼。而女性在经历数个世纪痛苦艰难的努力后才刚刚脱离这一泥沼而改善了自己的状况。（《女性的工作被法律所限》，《纽约时报》1920年1月18日。） Restriction Becomes Liberation? 限制变成了解放？ The fairy tale version of history says that during the 20th century, government freed women to become newly empowered in the workplace. The reality is exactly the opposite. Just as the market was granting women more choices, government swept in to limit them in the name of health, purity, family values, and social uplift. Such laws and regulations are still around today, though they have been recharacterized in a completely different way. As Orwell might say, somewhere along the way, restriction became liberation. 历史的童话版本说，在20世纪政府给予了女性自由，让女性在工作场所拥有了权利。真相恰好相反。市场给予女性更多的选择，而政府却插手进来以健康、纯洁、家庭价值观和社会地位提升等名义限制女性的选择。这类法律和法规在今天仍然存在，虽然它们以完全不同的方式被重新描绘。正如奥威尔所说，在通往动物庄园路途中，不知从何处起，限制变成了解放。 (Author’s note: I’m grateful to Thomas Leonard’s Illiberal Reformers for providing the footnotes I followed to write this piece. Also, much more rethinking of Progressive Era politics and its impact on the family is discussed in Steven Horwitz’s Hayek’s Modern Family, newly published by Palgrave.) （作者附言：非常感激Thomas Leonard的《非自由的改革者》，循着该书提供的脚注，我写下了此文。另外，对进步时代的政治及其对家庭之影响的更多再思考，在Steven Horwitz所著的由Palgrave最新出版的《哈耶克的现代家庭》一书中有更多讨论。） （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

（本文删节版发表于《长江日报·读周刊》） 塑造行为的多重机制 辉格 2016年12月2日 人的行为方式千差万别且变化多端，这也体现在我们描绘行为的形容词的丰富性上：羞涩，奔放，畏缩，鲁莽，克制，放纵，粗野，优雅，勤勉，懒散，好斗，随和……这些词汇同时也被用来描绘个体性格，有些甚至用来辨识文化和民族差异，由此可见，尽管人类行为丰富多变，却仍可识别出某些稳定而持久的模式。 那么，究竟是哪些因素，经由何种过程，塑造了种种行为模式呢？在以往讨论中，流行着一种将遗传和环境影响对立两分的倾向，仿佛这两种因素是各自独立起作用的，最终结果只是两者的线性叠加，就像调鸡尾酒，人们关注的是各种原料的配比，五勺基因，两勺家庭，两勺学校，再加一勺『文化』，一个活蹦乱跳的文明人就出炉了。 这种将成长中的孩子视为受影响者或加工对象的视角，是不得要领的，实际上，成长是一个主动学习的过程，基因和环境的关系更像软件中代码和数据输入的关系，基因编码引导个体从环境中采集数据，以便配置自身的行为算法，把代码和数据放一起搅一搅不可能得到想要的功能，在软件工程中，也没人会谈论代码和数据对算法表现分别有多大比例的影响。 正如马特·里德利（[[Matt Ridley]]）在《天性经由教养》中所阐明，成长是遗传代码随教养进程依次执行的过程，然而，对于这一过程具体如何展开，迄今只有零散的论述，而缺乏一幅系统化的全景图，幸运的是，心理学家朱迪·哈里斯（[[Judith R.Harris]]）在《教养的迷思》中提出的开创性见解，为我们拼凑这样一幅系统流程草图提供了便利。 对于个人，最持久而一致的那些行为特征被称为人格，主流人格心理学识别了经验开放性、尽责性、外向性、亲和性、情绪稳定性这五个最具一致性的特征，它们很大程度上是先天的（遗传差异可解释一半以上的人格差异），并且至少从成年后就伴随终身，在不同场景中的表现也相当连贯。 但人格并不直接对应行为模式，个人在决定如何行事时，还会考虑所在群体的规范，并借助由文化所传承的整套符号，正因此，有着相似人格的两个人，在不同文化或同一文化的不同群体中，会表现出十分不同的行为，比如同样一个外向型高亲和度的人，在向客人表达亲热时，是拥抱、亲吻、抚手，还是捶胸、拍肩、摸头，将随文化而异。 在这方面，儿童有着非凡的学习能力，只须借助少量样本，便可构建出一个范本模式，据此判断在何种情景下怎么做才是地道的、妥贴的；而且他们十分清楚不同群体和不同性质的关系中适用不同规范，家人、亲戚、邻里、同学、朋友、陌生人之间的规范学习和范本建模将分别进行，学习结果独立存储，并在相应场景下被激活。 哈里斯指出，这一学习过程主要在年龄相近的同侪群体中自发进行，长辈的做法会被参考，但训导和传授的努力几乎是徒劳的，当孩子们从某些线索发现长辈的做法已过时落伍，会毫不犹豫的弃之不顾，甚至当缺乏可供参照的样本时，他们也会经由群体内协调而创造出一种全新规范，就像他们创造克里奥尔语和尼加拉瓜手语那样。 在规范学习中，并非所有样本都被同等对待，那些看起来更受青睐和尊崇，更具号召力和支配力——总之地位更高——的个体，其行为将被赋予更高权重，而青少年在识别哪些是高地位受尊崇个体方面，有着敏锐直觉（其中受异性青睐程度是关键线索之一，这也是性选择得以发生的重要途径），正是通过这样的学习和协调过程，社会等级结构代复一代自我再生。 识别、追随和效仿群体中的尊贵者，并努力为自己赢得体面和尊贵（因为这会为个体带来切实的利益），是文化进化的一大动力机制，它维持着社会的等级结构和价值阶梯，也推动着风尚潮流的循环轮替，值得一提的是，性选择也在其中发挥了殊为关键的作用，因为识别高地位者的一大线索便是受异性青睐的程度，同时这一青睐也是对追逐地位和追随群体价值取向的重要激励。 习得规范进入群体之后，下一步便是确立自己在群体中的位置，个体出于自身的人格特质和资源与天赋条件，在群体中寻找适合自己的生态位，个体差异也将随此选择而展开，同时其行为方式会在群体规范所给定的框架之下，按照自身地位及与群内他人的关系而调整。 上述『先同化后分化』的两阶段模型，可帮助我们理解青春期躁动这一极为普遍的文化现象，青春期躁动表现为跟风盲从，集体狂热，缺乏个性与独立思考，强烈且富有攻击性的团体意识和民族主义，这实际上是一个强化群体认同的机制，在部落社会，它常以严酷的成人礼和结伙对外攻击等更正规和有组织的方式进行。 在经历躁动过程的严酷考验之后，个体习得规范并被纳入群体，同时，考验过程中的表现也将决定他未来在群体内的地位，一旦这一过程结束，成员身份确立，各自找到自己的生态位，躁动与狂热便会消退，规范的强制性和集体义务将逐渐放松，大家分头过自己的小日子去了，但躁动中所建立的群体认同、团伙情谊和个人间关系纽带仍将长期存续，并服务于更为功利性的目标。 两阶段模型也可解释一个哈里斯所强调、且常被忽视的现象：尽管人格具有相当高一致性，但同一个人在不同社会情境中的行为模式仍可十分不同，不同到像两个人那样，比如一位长兄在家里对弟妹们表现出长子所常有的那种强势和支配性，在学校却可能甘做跟班小弟，一个在办公室里沉默寡言的人在兴趣社团中却滔滔不绝、能言善辩，一个父母跟前的乖孩子在街头帮派中也许是个狠角色，哈里斯将此称为人格多面性，或许也就是人们常说的多重人格。 这是因为从先天人格特质到具体行为模式之间，经过了自我生态定位和个性展现，而这是针对不同群体分别进行的，当个人进入这些群体时，将根据自身禀赋优势和价值取向与该群体规范和价值阶梯的匹配程度作出定位，从而展现人格的不同侧面：是争当其领导者？努力向上爬的积极分子？寻求庇护的弱势追随者？还是不太情愿的服从者？或三心两意的投机分子？不同定位的行为差异是显而易见的。  

【2016-12-04】 @innesfry 发布了头条文章：《进化是不可避免的吗？》 @innesfry:基因、代谢物、蛋白质和核酸序列拥有的拓扑性质，使进化成为可能。可进化性可能是复杂网络的一个基本特征，达尔文进化可能不仅仅是生物学的组织原理，而且是“物理定律”，是信息在复杂系统中组织的必然结果。 @whigzhou: 此文大意是，一个系统若要成为可进化的，其基因型集合与表现型集合之间的映射关系须满足两个条件：1）每个表现型平均对应足够多等效基因型，这意味着中性变异的概率很高，2）同一表现型所对应的等效基因型在编码空间上相距较近，这意味着小步幅变异（相比大步幅变异）更可能是中性的。 @whigzhou: 反过来说，假如编码冗余率很低，或等效基因型在编码空间上随机分散，则系统是不可进化的 @whigzhou: 我觉得这两个条件还是蛮平凡的～ @茶博未:貌似还有一条：编码空间中各viable的等功能子集之间有足够多的相切（或邻近）区域？ @whigzhou: 嗯嗯，可供随机游走的连接通道（我也不知道怎么表达准确），也就是他说的拓扑关系  

BOOK REVIEW: ALBION’S SEED 书评：《阿尔比恩的的种子》 作者：SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27 译者：Tankman 校对：沈沉（@沈沉-Henrysheen） 来源：http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/ I. Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does. 《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注：阿尔比恩，英国旧称，据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松，而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何，我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书，他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上，此书做到了这点。 In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US. 在学校，我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”，这是一个最不多元化的群体，并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景，宗教，社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层，令其与其他阶层隔绝，而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。 I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects. 我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景：一个波多黎各生存狂，一个非洲财阀，以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险，相互竞争，来占领领土和资源。你能探索的，不单单只是对新世界拓殖，而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。 What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states. 当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展，不受其他群体影响时，你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢？《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。 Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s. Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种：在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒，在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”，在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会，以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注：指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。 II. A: The Puritans A：清教徒 I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity. 我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人，而后在接下来的364天，就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派，对英国国教会持异议，而且遵从他们特有的严厉，勤奋，厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。 Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors. 他们中的大多数，来自东英吉利，是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国，部分是因为他们感到被迫害，但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶，如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活，他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。 I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream. 我知道五月花，我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋，我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。 Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.” 清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派，其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民，其拥有读写能力的比例，是英国平均水平的两倍；在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代，大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方，受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响；历史学家Havelock Ellis发现，“相比英国的其他任何地区，该地很大程度上以文艺，科学和知识成就著称。” Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”. 而且，只有最好的清教徒，才能被允许来到马萨诸塞；Fischer写道，“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”，而且“不适合该地的移民，则被放逐到其他殖民地，或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”，这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。 INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS: 关于清教徒的一些有趣事实： 1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”. Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格，以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。 2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us'” 马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手，从他嘴里喊出五个词：‘来帮助我们’”。 3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark. 新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克 4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.” 马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力；Fischer记录了一个故事：一个旅行者问一个男人“您是在此地服侍的牧师吗？”被问者纠正了他的问题，“先生，我是统治此地的牧师。” 5. The Puritans tried to import African slaves, but they all died of the cold. 清教徒试图进口黑奴，但是黑奴全部死于严寒。 6. In 1639, Massachusetts declared a “Day Of Humiliation” to condemn “novelties, oppression, atheism, excesse, superfluity, idleness, contempt of authority, and trouble in other parts to be remembered”. 1639年，马萨诸塞发起了“羞辱日”，以谴责“新潮，压迫，无神论，纵欲，奢侈，懒散，轻视权威以及其他引人注目的麻烦”。 7. The average family size in Waltham, Massachusetts in the 1730s was 9.7 children. 1730年代，在马萨诸塞的Waltham，平均家庭规模是9.7个孩子。 8. Everyone was compelled by law to live in families. Town officials would search the town for single people and, if found, order them to join a family; if they refused, they were sent to jail. 按照法律，每个人都必须生活在家庭中。城镇官员会搜查镇中的单身者，如果发现，则会命令其加入一个家庭；如果单身者拒绝，则会被投入监狱。 9. 98% of adult Puritan men were married, compared to only 73% of adult Englishmen in general. Women were under special pressure to marry, and a Puritan proverb said that “women dying maids lead apes in Hell”. 98%的清教徒成年男子都结了婚，而英国成年男子总体的结婚率为73%。要求妇女结婚的压力特别大，一句清教徒格言说“没结婚的女人死后在地狱里带领着猿猴”。【译注：这一格言大意是谴责独身主义，但字面意思难考，一说是因为猿猴在当时人看来是没有价值的动物，肉不可吃，也不能做驼兽或者看家。】 10. 90% of Puritan names were taken from the Bible. Some Puritans took pride in their learning by giving their children obscure Biblical names they would expect nobody else to have heard of, like Mahershalalhasbaz. Others chose random Biblical terms that might not have technically been intended as names; “the son of Bostonian Samuel Pond was named Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”. Still others chose Biblical words completely at random and named their children things like Maybe or Notwithstanding. 90%清教徒的名字都取自圣经。一些清教徒引以为豪的是：用他们料想没人听过的圣经中的生僻词给孩子取名，并以此夸耀自己的学问，以至于他们可以预期人们从来没听过这个名字，比如 Mahershalalhasbaz【译者注：掳掠速临，抢夺快到。见圣经以赛亚书第八章1节】。另一些则随机取用圣经中的词，有些词技术上说本不是用来做名字的；“Bostonian Samuel Pond的孩子被起名为 Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”【译者注：前四个单词作为孩子的名，引自圣经但以理书第五章25节。四个单词都是亚兰文的度量单位，表示神已经数算过巴比伦的岁月，神已称量了巴比伦的道德】。也有些人，完全随机取用圣经中的词，给他们的孩子取名为Maybe或者是Notwithstanding。 11. Puritan parents traditionally would send children away to be raised with other families, and raise those families’ children in turn, in the hopes that the lack of familiarity would make the child behave better. 传统上，清教徒父母把孩子送给别的家庭寄养，作为交换，他们也寄养别人家的孩子，他们希望家中缺失亲情可以让孩子们被管教得更好。 12. In 1692, 25% of women over age 45 in Essex County were accused of witchcraft. 在1692年，Essex郡25%的45岁以上妇女被控为女巫。 13. Massachusetts passed the first law mandating universal public education, which was called The Old Deluder Law in honor of its preamble, which began “It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the scriptures…” 马萨诸塞通过了第一部强制普及公共教育的法律，被称为“老说谎者法案”，因为其前言的开头写道：“老牌说谎者撒旦的一个主要活动，就是阻止人们接触到经文的知识……” 14. Massachusetts cuisine was based around “meat and vegetables submerged in plain water and boiled relentlessly without seasonings of any kind”. 马萨诸塞的饮食基本上是“白水炖煮肉和蔬菜，不加任何调料”。 15. Along with the famous scarlet A for adultery, Puritans could be forced to wear a B for blasphemy, C for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, and so on. 除了著名的表示通奸的红字A，清教徒还因为渎神被强制穿上B（blasphemy），因为造假被穿上C（ counterfeiting ），因为醉酒被穿上D（ drunkenness ），如此种种。 16. Wasting time in Massachusetts was literally a criminal offense, listed in the law code, and several people were in fact prosecuted for it. 在马萨诸塞，浪费时间是一种犯罪行为，列在法条上，并有几人的确因此被起诉。 17. This wasn’t even the nadir of weird hard-to-enforce Massachusetts laws. Another law just said “If any man shall exceed the bounds of moderation, we shall punish him severely”. 这还不是难以被执行的马萨诸塞法律的极点。另一条法律说：“如果任何人超越了适度的界限，我们将对其进行严惩。” Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote of Massachusetts Puritanism: “The underlying foundation of life in New England was one of profound, unutterable, and therefore unuttered mehalncholy, which regarded human existence itself as a ghastly risk, and, in the case of the vast majority of human beings, an inconceivable misfortune.” Harriet Beecher Stowe就马萨诸塞的清教主义写道：“新英格兰生活的基础是一种深刻微妙，无法言说，因此也就未被说破的惆怅，即人类的存在本身就是一种可怖的风险，绝大多数人，其存在是一种不可思议的不幸。” And indeed, everything was dour, strict, oppressive, and very religious. A typical Massachusetts week would begin in the church, which doubled as the town meeting hall. There were no decorations except a giant staring eye on the pulpit to remind churchgoers that God was watching them. 而且的确，一切都是严厉，严格，压抑并且非常宗教化的。马萨诸塞典型的一周生活开始于教堂，其规模是镇议事厅的两倍。教堂里没有别的装饰，除了牧师讲道台上的一个巨大眼睛，提醒来教堂的人们上帝在看着他们。 Townspeople would stand up before their and declare their shame and misdeeds, sometimes being forced to literally crawl before the other worshippers begging for forgiveness. THen the minister would give two two-hour sermons back to back. The entire affair would take up to six hours, and the church was unheated (for some reason they stored all their gunpowder there, so no one was allowed to light a fire), and this was Massachusetts, and it was colder in those days than it is now, so that during winter some people would literally lose fingers to frostbite (Fischer: “It was a point of honor for the minister never to shorten a sermon merely because his audience was frozen”). Everyone would stand there with their guns (they were legally required to bring guns, in case Indians attacked during the sermon) and hear about how they were going to Hell, all while the giant staring eye looked at them. 在讲道开始前，镇上的人坦白自己的羞耻和劣迹，有时真的是被强迫匍匐在其他敬拜者前，乞求饶恕。然后布道者会开始连续两场两小时长的证道。整个过程可以花掉六小时，而且教堂里没有取暖设施（出于一些原因，人们把所有的火药储存在教堂，所以那里禁止生火），而且这可是马萨诸塞，那时候天气比今天更冷，所以在冬季，有人真的会因为冻疮失去手指。（Fischer：“对布道者来说，从不因听众冻僵而缩短证道是一种荣耀。”）每个人站在那里，带着他们的枪（法律上，他们被要求携带武器，以防印第安人在其听讲道时袭击），听着他们将会怎样下地狱，整个过程，那巨大的眼睛一直盯着他们。 So life as a Puritan was pretty terrible. On the other hand, their society was impressively well-ordered. Teenage pregnancy rates were the lowest in the Western world and in some areas literally zero. Murder rates were half those in other American colonies. 所以一个清教徒的生活是非常恐怖的。另一方面，他们的社会有着令人印象深刻的良好秩序。未成年人怀孕率曾是西方世界中最低的，在某些地方则实际上为零。谋杀率则只有其他北美殖民地的一半。 There was remarkably low income inequality – “the top 10% of wealthholders held only 20%-30% of taxable property”, compared to 75% today and similar numbers in other 17th-century civilizations. The poor (at least the poor native to a given town) were treated with charity and respect – “in Salem, one man was ordered to be set by the heels in the stocks for being uncharitable to a poor man in distress”. 收入差距很低——“10%最富者只占有可税财产的20%-30%”，对比而言，今天这个比例是75%，17世纪时的其他文明也近似这个数字。穷人（至少是在镇上的本地穷人）受到尊重和接济——“在Salem，一个男人因为不肯接济一位在苦难中的穷人，被罚上脚枷示众”。 Government was conducted through town meetings in which everyone had a say. Women had more equality than in most parts of the world, and domestic abuse was punished brutally. The educational system was top-notch – “by most empirical tests of intellectual eminence, New England led all other parts of British America from the 17th to the early 20th century”. 政府通过镇上的议事会议得以运作，每个人在会上都有发言权。比世界其他地方，妇女享有更多平等，而家庭暴力则会遭到严酷惩罚。教育系统是顶尖的——“从十七世纪到二十世纪早期，在大多数有关智识能力的经验测试中，新英格兰领先所有其他北美的英国殖民地”。 In some ways the Puritans seem to have taken the classic dystopian bargain – give up all freedom and individuality and art, and you can have a perfect society without crime or violence or inequality. Fischer ends each of his chapters with a discussion of how the society thought of liberty, and the Puritans unsurprisingly thought of liberty as “ordered liberty” – the freedom of everything to tend to its correct place and stay there. 某种程度上，清教徒似乎选择了经典的敌托邦方案——放弃一切自由、个体性和艺术，得到一个没有犯罪、暴力和不平等的完美社会。Fischer在每一章的结尾部分都会探讨该社会如何看待自由，而清教徒毫不奇怪地认为自由是“有秩序的自由”——在这种自由下，万物都处于正确的位置，并且保持这种状态。 They thought of it as a freedom from disruption – apparently FDR stole some of his “freedom from fear” stuff from early Puritan documents. They were extremely not in favor of the sort of liberty that meant that, for example, there wouldn’t be laws against wasting time. That was going too far. 他们认为这是一种免于被扰乱的自由——显然富兰克林·罗斯福从早期清教徒的文档中，偷取了一些创意，用于他的“免于恐惧的自由”的理念。他们非常不喜欢某些类型的自由，比如，没有禁止浪费时间的法律。这种自由实在是过度了。 B: The Cavaliers B：骑士党 The Massachusetts Puritans fled England in the 1620s partly because the king and nobles were oppressing them. In the 1640s, English Puritans under Oliver Cromwell rebelled, took over the government, and killed the king. The nobles not unreasonably started looking to get the heck out. 马萨诸塞清教徒在1620年代逃离英格兰，部分是因为国王和贵族压迫他们。在1640年代，英国清教徒在奥利弗·克伦威尔的领导下反叛，夺取了政权，处死了国王。贵族在此时开始想要尽快逃离并不是没有原因的。 Virginia had been kind of a wreck ever since most of the original Jamestown settlers had mostly died of disease. Governor William Berkeley, a noble himself, decided the colony could reinvent itself as a destination for refugee nobles, and told them it would do everything possible to help them maintain the position of oppressive supremacy to which they were accustomed. The British nobility was sold. The Cavaliers – the nobles who had fought and lost the English Civil War – fled to Virginia. 自从詹姆斯敦最初一批殖民者中的大部分死于疾病，弗吉尼亚一度沦落得像一片废墟。殖民地长官 William Berkeley自己就是个贵族。他决定殖民地应该转型为一个避难贵族的目的地。他告诉避难的贵族，殖民地将会竭尽全力，帮他们维持其久已习惯的压迫性支配地位。不列颠的贵族地位标价出售。骑士党——在英国内战中顽抗继而失败的贵族——逃至弗吉尼亚。 Historians who cross-checking Virginian immigrant lists against English records find that of Virginians whose opinions on the War were known, 98% were royalists. They were overwhelming Anglican, mostly from agrarian southern England, and all related to each other in the incestuous way of nobility everywhere: “it is difficult to think of any ruling elite that has been more closely interrelated since the Ptolemies”. There were twelve members of Virginia’s royal council; in 1724 “all without exception were related to one another by blood or marriage…as late as 1775, every member of that august body was descended from a councilor who had served in 1660”. 历史学家交叉对比了弗吉尼亚移民的名单和英国的记录，他们发现，对于英国内战，立场可知的弗吉尼亚人当中，98%是保皇党。他们绝大多数都是国教徒，大部分来自英国南部的农业区，互相之间都有贵族间内婚的血缘关系：“很难想到自托勒密王朝以来，统治精英还有比这更近的亲缘关系”。弗吉尼亚皇家议会有十二名成员；在1724年“无一例外的彼此有着血缘或姻亲关系……迟至1775年，这一庄严机构的每个成员都是其1660年委员的后代”。 These aristocrats didn’t want to do their own work, so they brought with them tens of thousands of indentured servants; more than 75% of all Virginian immigrants arrived in this position. Some of these people came willingly on a system where their master paid their passage over and they would be free after a certain number of years; others were sent by the courts as punishments; still others were just plain kidnapped. The gender ratio was 4:1 in favor of men, and there were entire English gangs dedicated to kidnapping women and sending them to Virginia, where they fetched a high price. Needless to say, these people came from a very different stratum than their masters or the Puritans. 这些贵族不想自己做工，所以他们带来上万的契约仆佣；超过75%的弗吉尼亚移民以这个身份【编注：即契约仆佣】到来。一些人是自愿而来，主人支付了他们的旅费，他们在服务一些年份后会获得自由；另一些人则被法庭判罚来到这里；还有些人明显是被拐骗的。男女性别比是4：1，存在专门贩卖妇女到弗吉尼亚的英国黑帮，他们从中赚取高价。无需多言，相比于他们的贵族主人或清教徒，这些人来自一个非常不同的阶层。 People who came to Virginia mostly died. They died of malaria, typhoid fever, amoebiasis, and dysentery. Unlike in New England, where Europeans were better adapted to the cold climate than Africans, in Virginia it was Europeans who had the higher disease-related mortality rate. The whites who survived tended to become “sluggish and indolent”, according to the universal report of travellers and chroniclers, although I might be sluggish and indolent too if I had been kidnapped to go work on some rich person’s farm and sluggishness/indolence was an option. 来到弗吉尼亚的人多数都死了。他们死于疟疾，伤寒，阿米巴病，和痢疾。不像在新英格兰，在那里欧洲人比非洲人更好的适应了寒冷气候，在弗吉尼亚，欧洲人有着更高的疾病死亡率。参考旅行者的报告和编年史，幸存下来的白人倾向于变得“低迷和懒惰”，当然，我也许也会变得低迷和懒惰，如果我被诱拐到某个富人的农场做工而且可以选择低迷/懒惰的话。 The Virginians tried their best to oppress white people. Really, they did. The depths to which they sank in trying to oppress white people almost boggle the imagination. There was a rule that if a female indentured servant became pregnant, a few extra years were added on to their indenture, supposedly because they would be working less hard during their pregnancy and child-rearing so it wasn’t fair to the master. Virginian aristocrats would rape their own female servants, then add a penalty term on to their indenture for becoming pregnant. 弗吉尼亚人竭尽全力的压迫白人。确实，他们干过这种事。他们试图压迫白人的深度，超乎想象。有一条规矩：如果女性契约仆人怀了孕，她们的服务期会被延长几年，大概是因为她们的产出在孕期和抚育期会下降，这就对主人不公平。弗吉尼亚贵族们会强奸自己的女性仆人，而后给她们的服务期加上基于怀孕的惩罚期限。 That is an impressive level of chutzpah. But despite these efforts, eventually all the white people either died, or became too sluggish to be useful, or worst of all just finished up their indentures and became legally free. The aristocrats started importing black slaves as per the model that had sprung up in the Caribbean, and so the stage was set for the antebellum South we read about in history classes. 这种无耻妄为令人印象深刻。但是虽然有这些努力，最终所有白人不是死了，就是变得太低迷以至于无用，或者最糟糕的是他们结束了服务期限，在法律上变得自由了。贵族开始按照加勒比地区涌现的那种模式引进黑奴，于是我们在历史课上读到的内战前南方的一幕幕已经预备好上演。 INTERESTING CAVALIER FACTS: 关于骑士党的有趣事实： 1. Virginian cavalier speech patterns sound a lot like modern African-American dialects. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out why, but it’s strange to think of a 17th century British lord speaking what a modern ear would clearly recognize as Ebonics. 弗吉尼亚骑士党的说话腔调听来更像是现代非裔美国人。不用多想就能推测出原因，不过想到17世纪的不列颠贵族讲一口现在听来是黑人英语的腔调，的确很奇怪。 2. Three-quarters of 17th-century Virginian children lost at least one parent before turning 18. 四分之三的17世纪弗吉尼亚孩子在十八岁之前至少丧失父母之一。 3. Cousin marriage was an important custom that helped cement bonds among the Virginian elite, “and many an Anglican lady changed her condition but not her name”. 堂亲结婚是弗吉尼亚精英加固联盟的重要习俗，“很多国教徒女士改变了她们的境遇，但不改变其姓氏”。 4. In Virginia, women were sometimes unironically called “breeders”; English women were sometimes referred to as “She-Britons”. 在弗吉尼亚，并非出于讽刺，妇女有时被称作“育仔员”；英国妇女有时被称作“女不列颠人”。 5. Virginia didn’t really have towns; the Chesapeake Bay was such a giant maze of rivers and estuaries and waterways that there wasn’t much need for land transport hubs. Instead, the unit of settlement was the plantation, which consisted of an aristocratic planter, his wife and family, his servants, his slaves, and a bunch of guests who hung around and mooched off him in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality. 弗吉尼亚没有真正的城镇；切萨皮克湾是众多河流、河口和水路组成的迷宫，并不需要陆路运输的集散地。相反，殖民的基本单位是种植园，由一位贵族种植园主，他的妻子和家庭，他的仆人，他的奴隶，以及一群借着古已有之的好客传统依附寄生于主人的宾客们组成。 6. Virginian society considered everyone who lived in a plantation home to be a kind of “family”, with the aristocrat both as the literal father and as a sort of abstracted patriarch with complete control over his domain. 弗吉尼亚社会认为每个生活在种植园中的人多少都算是“家庭成员”，而贵族既是真正的父亲，也是控制自己地域的抽象家主。 7. Virginia governor William Berkeley probably would not be described by moderns as ‘strong on education’. He said in a speech that “I thank God there are no free schools nor printing [in Virginia], and I hope we shall not have these for a hundred years, for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divuldged them, and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!” 按现代观点，弗吉尼亚殖民地长官William Berkeley很可能算不上“重视教育”。他在一次演说中说“我感谢上帝，（在弗吉尼亚）没有免费学校和印刷术，而且我希望我们一百年也不要有这些东西，因为学习给世界带来不服从、异端、和结党，印刷术则传播上述这些，以及对最佳政府的诽谤。上帝让我们远离学校和印刷术。” 8. Virginian recreation mostly revolved around hunting and bloodsports. Great lords hunted deer, lesser gentry hunted foxes, indentured servants had a weird game in which they essentially draw-and-quartered geese, young children “killed and tortured songbirds”, and “at the bottom of this hierarchy of bloody games were male infants who prepared themselves for the larger pleasures of maturity by torturing snakes, maiming frogs, and pulling the wings off butterflies. Thus, every red-blooded male in Virginia was permitted to slaughter some animal or other, and the size of his victim was proportioned to his social rank.” 弗吉尼亚的休闲活动大多涉及打猎和血腥运动。大领主猎鹿，小绅士猎狐，契约仆人玩着奇怪的游戏来肢解鹅，年幼的孩子“杀死和折磨鸣禽”，而“在这一血腥游戏等级体系底部的则是男性幼童，为了长大后享受更大的猎杀愉悦，他们折磨蛇、残害青蛙、扯掉蝴蝶的翅膀。因此，每个热血的弗吉尼亚男性都被允许屠杀这样或那样一些动物，其受害者的尺寸则和他的社会等级成比例。” 9. “In 1747, an Anglican minister named William Kay infuriated the great planter Landon Carter by preaching a sermon against pride. The planter took it personally and sent his [relations] and ordered them to nail up the doors and windows of all the churches in which Kay preached.” “在1747年，一个叫William Kay的国教会牧师因为一篇反对骄傲的讲道，激怒了大种植园主Landon Carter。种植园主认为这是对其个人的冒犯，派出了他的亲属，命其钉死所有Kay牧师曾讲过道的教堂的门窗。 10. Our word “condescension” comes from a ritual attitude that leading Virginians were supposed to display to their inferiors. Originally condescension was supposed to be a polite way of showing respect those who were socially inferior to you; our modern use of the term probably says a lot about what Virginians actually did with it. 我们的“屈尊”一词来自于，弗吉尼亚的领袖应该对自己的下级表示的一种礼仪性态度。最初屈尊应该是一种礼貌的方式，对社会等级比自己低的人表示尊敬；我们现在对这个词的用法，很可能反映了当时弗吉尼亚人是怎么使用它的。 In a lot of ways, Virginia was the opposite of Massachusetts. Their homicide rate was sky-high, and people were actively encouraged to respond to slights against their honor with duels (for the rich) and violence (for the poor). They were obsessed with gambling, and “made bets not merely on horses, cards, cockfights, and backgammon, but also on crops, prices, women, and the weather”. 在很多方面，弗吉尼亚是马萨诸塞的反面。他们的谋杀率非常高，而人们实际上被鼓励用决斗（富人）和暴力（穷人）来回应对他们荣誉的轻慢。他们沉迷于赌博，“不仅仅在马，扑克，斗鸡，和十五子棋上打赌，而且还在庄稼，价格，妇女和天气上下注”。 Their cuisine focused on gigantic sumptuous feasts of animals killed in horrible ways. There were no witchcraft trials, but there were people who were fined for disrupting the peace by accusing their neighbors of witchcraft. Their church sermons were twenty minutes long on the dot. 他们的饮食注重巨大奢靡的欢宴，充斥着用各种可怕方法杀死的动物。这里没有女巫审判，倒是有人因为指控其邻居是女巫而犯了寻衅滋事被罚款的。他们的教会布道只有20分钟那么长。 The Puritans naturally thought of the Virginians as completely lawless reprobate sinners, but this is not entirelytrue. Virginian church sermons might have been twenty minutes long, but Virginian ballroom dance lessons could last nine hours. It wasn’t that the Virginians weren’t bound by codes, just that those codes were social rather than moral. 清教徒自然认为弗吉尼亚人是完全不遵法纪的邪恶罪人，但是这并不是完全正确的。弗吉尼亚教会的讲道也许只有20分钟，但其舞池中的交谊舞教学课可以长达九小时。并不是弗吉尼亚人不受法规约束，只是这些法规是社交上的，而不是道德上的。 And Virginian nobles weren’t just random jerks, they were carefully cultivated jerks. Planters spared no expense to train their sons to be strong, forceful, and not take nothin’ from nobody. They would encourage and reward children for being loud and temperamental, on the grounds that this indicated a strong personality and having a strong personality was fitting of a noble. 而且弗吉尼亚贵族并不仅仅是混蛋，他们是被精心教化过的混蛋。种植园主不惜代价训练他们的儿子，令其强壮、坚决，不受任何人摆弄。他们会因孩子们声音洪亮、感情激烈而加以鼓励和奖励，因为这意味着强烈的个性，而有强烈个性和做一个贵族是相符的。 When this worked, it worked really well – witness natural leaders and self-driven polymaths like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. More often it failed catastrophically – the rate of sex predation and rape in Virginia was at least as high as anywhere else in North America. 当这种做法奏效时，它确实有很好的效果——天然的领袖和自我激励的博学者例如乔治·华盛顿和托马斯·杰弗逊即是明证。更多的时候，这做法导致了灾难性的失败，弗吉尼亚的性侵犯和强奸率至少和北美其他地方一样高。 The Virginian Cavaliers had an obsession with liberty, but needless to say it was not exactly a sort of liberty of which the ACLU would approve. I once heard someone argue against libertarians like so: even if the government did not infringe on liberties, we would still be unfree for other reasons. If we had to work, we would be subject to the whim of bosses. If we were poor, we would not be “free” to purchase most of the things we want. In any case, we are “oppressed” by disease, famine, and many other things besides government that prevent us from implementing our ideal existence. 弗吉尼亚骑士党着迷于自由，但是不用说，这自由不完全等同于美国民权自由联盟（ACLU）所支持的那种自由。我曾听某人和自由意志主义者做如此争辩：即使政府不侵犯我们的自由，我们仍然会因为其他原因不自由。如果我们必须工作，我们就会被老板的兴之所至所限制。如果我们贫穷，我们就不可能“自由的”购买我们所需的大部分物品。在任何时候，我们都会被疾病、饥饿和其他很多政府之外的事情“压迫”，来阻止我们达到理想的状态。 The Virginians took this idea and ran with it – in the wrong direction. No, they said, we wouldn’t be free if we had to work, therefore we insist upon not working. No, we wouldn’t be free if we were limited by poverty, therefore we insist upon being extremely rich. Needless to say, this conception of freedom required first indentured servitude and later slavery to make it work, but the Virginians never claimed that the servants or slaves were free. 弗吉尼亚人采纳了这个主意，并且践行了它——在错误的方向上。不，他们说，如果我们必须工作，我们不可能自由，所以我们坚持不工作。不，如果我们被贫穷限制，我们不可能自由，所以我们坚持要极度的富有。无需多言，要实行这种自由观念，起先要求契约仆人的服侍，而后要求奴隶的劳动，但弗吉尼亚人从来没有宣称仆人或奴隶是自由的。 That wasn’t the point. Freedom, like wealth, was properly distributed according to rank; nobles had as much as they wanted, the middle-class enough to get by on, and everyone else none at all. And a Virginian noble would have gone to his grave insisting that a civilization without slavery could never have citizens who were truly free. 问题不在这里。自由，像财富一样，按照等级进行恰当分配；贵族想要多少就要多少，中间阶层也得到了足够的，而其他人则什么也没有。一个弗吉尼亚贵族可能至死都会坚持：没有奴隶制的文明，不可能有真正自由的公民。 C: The Quakers C：贵格会 Fischer warns against the temptation to think of the Quakers as normal modern people, but he has to warn us precisely because it’s so tempting. Where the Puritans seem like a dystopian caricature of virtue and the Cavaliers like a dystopian caricature of vice, the Quakers just seem ordinary. Yes, they’re kind of a religious cult, but they’re the kind of religious cult any of us might found if we were thrown back to the seventeenth century. Fischer警告我们小心那种想要把贵格会看作正常现代人的倾向，但是他之所以不得不警告我们，恰好就是因为这种想法是如此诱人。清教徒看上去像关于德行的敌托邦讽刺画，骑士党看起来像关于邪恶的敌托邦讽刺画，而贵格会则看起来刚好正常。是的，他们是一种教派，但是他们是那种我们中任何人如果穿越回17世纪都会成立的教派。 Instead they were founded by a weaver’s son named George Fox. He believed people were basically good and had an Inner Light that connected them directly to God without a need for priesthood, ritual, Bible study, or self-denial; mostly people just needed to listen to their consciences and be nice. Since everyone was equal before God, there was no point in holding up distinctions between lords and commoners: Quakers would just address everybody as “Friend”. 其实贵格会是被一个纺织工的儿子George Fox创立的。他相信，人基本上是善的，而且人心有内在的光亮，可以把人和上帝直接联系起来，不需要牧师、仪式、解经或者自我否定；大部分时候，人只需要听从他们良心的召唤，为人友善。因为每个人在神面前都是平等的，所以没有任何理由坚持领主和平民之间的分别：贵格会对每个人都以“朋友”称呼。 And since the Quakers were among the most persecuted sects at the time, they developed an insistence on tolerance and freedom of religion which (unlike the Puritans) they stuck to even when shifting fortunes put them on top. They believed in pacificism, equality of the sexes, racial harmony, and a bunch of other things which seem pretty hippy-ish even today let alone in 1650. 而且因为贵格会在当时是最受迫害的宗派，他们发展出了对宗教宽容和信仰自由的坚持，这点不像清教徒。他们甚至在自身有幸掌权时，仍然坚持这点。他们信仰和平主义、性别平等、种族和谐，以及其他很多即使在今天看来都很嬉皮士的观念，更遑论在1650年。 England’s top Quaker in the late 1600s was William Penn. Penn is universally known to Americans as “that guy Pennsylvania is named after” but actually was a larger-than-life 17th century superman. Born to the nobility, Penn distinguished himself early on as a military officer; he was known for beating legendary duelists in single combat and then sparing their lives with sermons about how murder was wrong. 17世纪晚期，英国最重要的贵格会信徒是William Penn。对大多数美国人而言，他只是因“宾夕法尼亚以其得名”而广为人知。但其实，他是17世纪的超凡人物。生于贵族之家，Penn早年担任军官，崭露头角；他因以下事迹而著名：在一对一决斗中击败传奇般的对手们，而后饶过其性命，并发表讲道，指出谋杀是错误的。 He gradually started having mystical visions, quit the military, and converted to Quakerism. Like many Quakers he was arrested for blasphemy; unlike many Quakers, they couldn’t make the conviction stick; in his trial he “conducted his defense so brilliantly that the jurors refused to convict him even when threatened with prison themselves, [and] the case became a landmark in the history of trial by jury.” 渐渐的，他开始经历神秘的异象，退出军旅，改宗成为贵格会信徒。就像很多贵格会信徒一样，他因渎神被逮捕；和许多贵格会信徒不同，审判者没能给他定罪；在审判中，他“如此精彩的辩护，以至于陪审团成员甚至在面对牢狱之灾威胁时，都不肯定他的罪，而且该案成为了陪审团审判历史上的里程碑。” When the state finally found a pretext on which to throw him in prison, he spent his incarceration composing “one of the noblest defenses of religious liberty ever written”, conducting a successful mail-based courtship with England’s most eligible noblewoman, and somehow gaining the personal friendship and admiration of King Charles II. 当政府终于找到借口将其投入监狱时，他在狱中创作了“有史以来，对宗教自由的最高贵辩护之一的文章”，以信件形式向英国最有贵族资格的女士成功求爱，而且不知何故得到了查理二世的个人友谊和敬佩。 Upon his release the King liked him so much that he gave him a large chunk of the Eastern United States on a flimsy pretext of repaying a family debt. Penn didn’t want to name his new territory Pennsylvania – he recommended just “Sylvania” – but everybody else overruled him and Pennyslvania it was. 获释之后，国王如此喜爱他，以至于把美国东部的一大片以偿还家庭债务的单薄借口划给了他。Penn不想把他的新领地命名为宾夕法尼亚——他推荐的命名仅仅是“夕法尼亚”——但是其他所有人否决了他的意见，宾夕法尼亚就这样得名。 The grant wasn’t quite the same as the modern state, but a chunk of land around the Delaware River Valley – what today we would call eastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, southern New Jersey, and bits of Maryland – centered on the obviously-named-by-Quakers city of Philadelphia. 授予Penn的这份领地和现在宾州的疆域并不完全一样，而是德拉维尔河谷周围的一大片土地——今天我们称为宾夕法尼亚东部、德拉维尔北部、新泽西南部，以及很小一部分马里兰州的地区——该地区的中心的费城，显然是由贵格会命名的【编注：Philadelphia一词希腊文本意为“兄弟情谊”】。 Penn decided his new territory would be a Quaker refuge – his exact wording was “a colony of Heaven [for] the children of the Light”. He mandated universal religious toleration, a total ban on military activity, and a government based on checks and balances that would “leave myself and successors no power of doing mischief, that the will of one man may not hinder the good of a whole country”. Penn决定把他的新领土变成贵格会的避难地——他的原话是“一个面向圣光之子们的天国殖民地”。他强制实施普遍的宗教宽容，完全禁止军事活动，基于分权和制衡的政府将“不会给我自己和继任者留下作恶的权力，个人的意志不会妨害整个国家的益处”。 His recruits – about 20,000 people in total – were Quakers from the north of England, many of them minor merchants and traders. They disproportionately included the Britons of Norse descent common in that region, who formed a separate stratum and had never really gotten along with the rest of the British population. They were joined by several German sects close enough to Quakers that they felt at home there; these became the ancestors of (among other groups) the Pennsylvania Dutch, Amish, and Mennonites. 他招募了总共大约两万人——他们是英格兰北部的贵格会信徒，很多是小商小贩。不成比例地，他们中很多是那个区域很常见的具有北欧血统的英国人，构成了不列颠的一个特殊阶层，并且从未和其他不列颠人真正融合在一起。几个和贵格会近似的德国宗派加入了他们，教义相似使得这些人在那里能找到家的感觉；这些人和其他一些团体成为了德裔宾州人、阿米绪人和门诺派的祖先。 INTERESTING QUAKER FACTS: 关于贵格会的有趣事实： 1. In 1690 a gang of pirates stole a ship in Philadelphia and went up and down the Delaware River stealing and plundering. The Quakers got in a heated (but brotherly) debate about whether it was morally permissible to use violence to stop them. When the government finally decided to take action, contrarian minister George Keith dissented and caused a major schism in the faith. 在1690年，一帮海盗在费城偷了一艘船，在德拉维尔河上四处偷盗劫掠。贵格会信徒们展开了一场激烈（但是兄弟般的）辩论，讨论用暴力阻止这帮海盗在道德上是否合理。当政府最终决定采取行动，持反对意见的牧师George Keith表示不同意，并引发了信仰上的一次重大分裂。 2. Fischer argues that the Quaker ban on military activity within their territory would have doomed them in most other American regions, but by extreme good luck the Indians in the Delaware Valley were almost as peaceful as the Quakers. As usual, at least some credit goes to William Penn, who taught himself Algonquin so he could negotiate with the Indians in their own language. Fischer认为贵格会在他们的领土上禁止军事活动，在全美大部分别的地区可能都会给他们带来悲惨的命运。然而非常幸运的是，德拉维尔谷地的印第安人几乎和贵格会会众一样和平。和通常一样，这至少部分功绩归于William Penn，他自学了Algonquin语，所以他可以用印第安人的母语与其谈判。 3. The Quakers’ marriage customs combined a surprisingly modern ideas of romance, with extreme bureaucracy. The wedding process itself had sixteen stages, including “ask parents”, “ask community women”, “ask community men”, “community women ask parents”, and “obtain a certificate of cleanliness”. William Penn’s marriage apparently had forty-six witnesses to testify to the good conduct and non-relatedness of both parties. 贵格会信徒的婚姻习俗结合了令人惊讶的现代浪漫创意和极端的官僚化。婚姻过程本身有十六个阶段，包括“问询父母”，“问询社区里的妇人”，“问询社区里的男人”，“社区里的妇人问询父母”，以及“获得一个清白认证”。William Penn的婚姻显然有46位证人，见证夫妻双方都德行良好，没有亲属关系。 4. Possibly related: 16% of Quaker women were unmarried by age 50, compared to only about 2% of Puritans. 可能相关的事实：16%的贵格会妇女到50岁时都没有结婚，清教徒中这一数字仅为2%。 5. Quakers promoted gender equality, including the (at the time scandalous) custom of allowing women to preach (condemned by the Puritans as the crime of “she-preaching”). 贵格会推行性别平等，包括允许妇女讲道（在那时算是丑闻，被清教徒谴责为“妇女讲道”罪） 6. But they were such prudes about sex that even the Puritansthought they went too far. Pennsylvania doctors had problems treating Quakers because they would “delicately describe everything from neck to waist as their ‘stomachs’, and anything from waist to feet as their ‘ankles'”. 但是他们对性十分的正经，甚至清教徒都认为他们在这方面走得太远。宾州医生在治疗贵格会会众时会遇到麻烦，因为他们“故意把所有从颈到腰的部位都称为‘肚子’，而任何从腰到脚的地方都称为‘脚踝’”。 7. Quaker parents Richard and Abigail Lippincott named their eight children, in order, “Remember”, “John”, “Restore”, “Freedom”, “Increase”, “Jacob”, “Preserve”, and “Israel”, so that their names combined formed a simple prayer. 贵格会的一对父母Richard和Abigail Lippincott把他们的八个孩子按顺序起名叫做，“记得”，“约翰”，“恢复”，“自由”，“增加”，“雅各”，“存留”，“以色列”，他们的名字合起来构成一个简单的祷词。 8. Quakers had surprisingly modern ideas about parenting, basically sheltering and spoiling their children at a time when everyone else was trying whip the Devil out of them. 贵格会在教养孩童方面有着令人惊讶的现代观点，在那个其他人都试图从孩子身上赶出魔鬼的时代，他们基本上是保护和宠爱孩子的。 9. “A Quaker preacher, traveling in the more complaisant colony of Maryland, came upon a party of young people who were dancing merrily together. He broke in upon them like an avenging angel, stopped the dance, and demanded to know if they considered Martin Luther to be a good man. The astonished youngsters answered in the affirmative. The Quaker evangelist then quoted Luther on the subject of dancing: ‘as many paces as the man takes in his dance, so many steps he takes toward Hell. This, the Quaker missionary gloated with a gleam of sadistic satisfaction, ‘spoiled their sport’.” “一个贵格会的传道人，在更殷勤有礼的马里兰殖民地旅行时，遇到了一群年轻人在欢快的跳舞。他如复仇天使般闯入其中，停止了舞会，要求众人考虑马丁·路德是否是个好人。被惊呆的年轻人给出了肯定的答案。这位贵格会传道人接着引用了路德关于跳舞的评论：‘一个人在舞蹈中跳多少步，就朝地狱走了多少步。’这个贵格会传道人带着一种施虐的快感吹嘘，‘毁掉了他们的活动’。” 10. William Penn wrote about thirty books defending liberty of conscience throughout his life. The Quaker obsession with the individual conscience as the work of God helped invent the modern idea of conscientious objection. 终其一生，William Penn写下了约三十本书，为良心自由辩护。贵格会着迷于把个人良心看作是上帝的造物，这促进了因良心拒绝服兵役这一现代观念的产生。 11. Quakers were heavily (and uniquely for their period) opposed to animal cruelty. When foreigners introduced bullbaiting into Philadelphia during the 1700s, the mayor bought a ticket supposedly as a spectator. When the event was about to begin, he leapt into the ring, personally set the bull free, and threatened to arrest anybody who stopped him. 贵格会会众十分强力的反对虐待动物（在他们的时代，这是很独特的）。当外地人在18世纪把猎犬咬牛游戏引入费城时，市长买了一张票，本应作为观众呆在现场。当活动快开始时，他跃入场地，自己把牛放走，并威胁逮捕任何阻止他的人。 12. On the other hand, they were also opposed to other sports for what seem like kind of random reasons. The town of Morley declared an anathema against foot races, saying that they were “unfruitful works of darkness”. 在另一方面，他们借着各种任意的理由，反对各种其他运动。Morley镇宣布取缔长跑，因为长跑是“黑暗徒劳的工作”。 13. The Pennsylvania Quakers became very prosperous merchants and traders. They also had a policy of loaning money at low- or zero- interest to other Quakers, which let them outcompete other, less religious businesspeople. 宾夕法尼亚的贵格会信徒成了非常兴旺的商人。他们也有着一项以低利率或零利率贷款给其他贵格会成员的政策，这使得贵格会会众比其他更少宗教化的人更有竞争优势。 14. They were among the first to replace the set of bows, grovels, nods, meaningful looks, and other British customs of acknowledging rank upon greeting with a single rank-neutral equivalent – the handshake. 把英国的等级化问候动作，如鞠躬、下拜、点头、注目礼等等，更换为不具有等级意味的握手礼，贵格会是首先实施这种变革的群体之一。 15. Pennsylvania was one of the first polities in the western world to abolish the death penalty. 宾夕法尼亚是在西方世界首先废除死刑的政治体之一。 16. The Quakers were lukewarm on education, believing that too much schooling obscured the natural Inner Light. Fischer declares it “typical of William Penn” that he wrote a book arguing against reading too much. 贵格会会众对教育有些冷淡，认为太多学校教育会掩蔽人内心自然的灵性之光。Fischer宣称这是“William Penn的典型做法”，他写了一本书来反对过多的阅读。 17. The Quakers not only instituted religious freedom, but made laws against mocking another person’s religion. 贵格会会众不仅仅制定了宗教自由制度，还颁布法律，禁止嘲笑他人的宗教。 18. In the late 1600s as many as 70% of upper-class Quakers owned slaves, but Pennsylvania essentially invented modern abolitionism. Although their colonial masters in England forbade them from banning slavery outright, they applied immense social pressure and by the mid 1700s less than 10% of the wealthy had African slaves. As soon as the American Revolution started, forbidding slavery was one of independent Pennsylvania’s first actions. 在17世纪晚期，多达70%的上层贵格会人士拥有奴隶，但是宾夕法尼亚的确发明了现代废奴主义。虽然他们在英国的殖民地宗主们不准他们公然废除奴隶制，但是他们施加了巨大的社会压力，到18世纪中叶，少于10%的富裕阶层拥有黑奴。美国革命一开始，废奴就成为了宾州独立后的第一批举措之一。 Pennsylvania was very successful for a while; it had some of the richest farmland in the colonies, and the Quakers were exceptional merchants and traders; so much so that they were forgiven their military non-intervention during the Revolution because of their role keeping the American economy afloat in the face of British sanctions. 宾夕法尼亚曾非常成功；它拥有殖民地当中最肥沃的农地，贵格会会众是出色的商人；这些优势如此之大，以至于独立战争期间，他们的军事不干涉态度得到了原谅，因为面临英国的制裁，他们起到了支撑美国经济的作用。 But by 1750, the Quakers were kind of on their way out; by 1750, they were a demographic minority in Pennsylvania, and by 1773 they were a minority in its legislature as well. In 1750 Quakerism was the third-largest religion in the US; by 1820 it was the ninth-largest, and by 1981 it was the sixty-sixth largest. 但是到1750年代，贵格会信徒日渐式微；到1750年，他们变成了宾州人口上的少数派，到1773年，他们又变成了宾州立法机构中的少数。在1750年，贵格主义是美国的第三大宗教；到1820年，变成了第九大，到1981年，变成了第六十六大。 What happened? The Quakers basically tolerated themselves out of existence. They were so welcoming to religious minorities and immigrants that all these groups took up shop in Pennsylvania and ended its status as a uniquely Quaker society. At the same time, the Quakers themselves became more “fanatical” and many dropped out of politics believing it to be too worldly a concern for them; this was obviously fatal to their political domination. 发生了什么呢？贵格会信徒基本上是因宽容而使得他们自己逐步消逝。他们如此欢迎少数教派和移民，这些人占据了宾州，结束了宾州贵格会一统天下的状态。同时，贵格会自身变得更具属灵热忱，许多人从政治领域退出，他们认为该领域对于他们而言属于过于世俗的关怀；这对于他们的政治影响力显然是致命的。 The most famous Pennsylvanian statesman of the Revolutionary era, Benjamin Franklin, was not a Quaker at all but a first-generation immigrant from New England. Finally, Quakerism was naturally extra-susceptible to that thing where Christian denominations become indistinguishable from liberal modernity and fade into the secular background. 独立战争时期最著名的宾州政治家是本杰明·富兰克林。他完全不是贵格会信徒，而是来自新英格兰的第一代移民。最后，贵格主义自然而然地特别易于受这一趋势影响：即基督教派日渐变得和自由主义现代性难以区分，从而渐渐融于世俗背景中去。 But Fischer argues that Quakerism continued to shape Pennsylvania long after it had stopped being officially in charge, in much the same way that Englishmen themselves have contributed disproportionately to American institutions even though they are now a numerical minority. The Pennsylvanian leadership on abolitionism, penal reform, the death penalty, and so on all happened after the colony was officially no longer Quaker-dominated. 但是Fischer争辩说，在退出官方主导地位后，贵格主义的影响在宾州持续了很长一段时间，正如英国裔本身对美国的制度有着不成比例的巨大贡献那样，即使他们现在是数量上的少数派。宾州在废奴、刑罚改革、死刑等等方面的领袖地位全部出现在该殖民地官方不再被贵格会掌控之后。 And it’s hard not to see Quaker influence on the ideas of the modern US – which was after all founded in Philadelphia. In the middle of the Puritans demanding strict obedience to their dystopian hive society and the Cavaliers demanding everybody bow down to a transplanted nobility, the Pennsylvanians – who became the thought leaders of the Mid-Atlantic region including to a limited degree New York City – were pretty normal and had a good opportunity to serve as power-brokers and middlemen between the North and South. Although there are seeds of traditionally American ideas in every region, the Quakers really stand out in terms of freedom of religion, freedom of thought, checks and balances, and the idea of universal equality. 而且，很难忽略贵格会对现代美国理念上的影响——不管如何，现代美国创建于费城。清教徒严格要求服从他们的敌托邦集体主义社会，骑士党人要求每个人都在移植的贵族制度中鞠躬，介于两者之间，宾夕法尼亚人——作为中大西洋地区，一定程度上也包括纽约市的思想领袖——则相当正常，并且有很好的机会作为南方和北方的中间人和权力经纪人。虽然在每个区域都有美国传统观念的种子，贵格会在宗教自由、思想自由、分权制衡和普世平等理念上真的表现很突出。 It occurs to me that William Penn might be literally the single most successful person in history. He started out as a minor noble following a religious sect that everybody despised and managed to export its principles to Pennsylvania where they flourished and multiplied. Pennsylvania then managed to export its principles to the United States, and the United States exported them to the world. I’m not sure how much of the suspiciously Quaker character of modern society is a direct result of William Penn, but he was in one heck of a right place at one heck of a right time 我突然想到，William Penn也许真的是史上最成功的个人。一开始，作为一个小贵族，他皈依了一个人人蔑视的宗派，他尽力把该宗派的原则输出到了宾夕法尼亚，让其发扬光大。宾夕法尼亚则尽力把它的原则输出到美国，而美国则将之输出到全世界。我不确定现代社会的贵格会特征有多大可能是William Penn的直接成果，但他的确是一个在非常正确的时间，出现在非常正确的地点的人。 D: The Borderers D: 边民们 The Borderers are usually called “the Scots-Irish”, but Fischer dislikes the term because they are neither Scots (as we usually think of Scots) nor Irish (as we usually think of Irish). Instead, they’re a bunch of people who lived on (both sides of) the Scottish-English border in the late 1600s. 边民们经常被叫做“苏格兰-爱尔兰人”，但是Fischer不喜欢这个称谓，因为他们既不是如我们通常想象的苏格兰人，也不是如我们通常想象的爱尔兰人。相反，他们是一群17世纪晚期生活在苏格兰-英格兰边界两侧的人。 None of this makes sense without realizing that the Scottish-English border was terrible. Every couple of years the King of England would invade Scotland or vice versa; “from the year 1040 to 1745, every English monarch but three suffered a Scottish invasion, or became an invader in his turn”. These “invasions” generally involved burning down all the border towns and killing a bunch of people there. 如果没有意识到苏格兰-英格兰边境曾极其可怕，事情就说不通。每隔几年，英格兰的国王就会侵略苏格兰，或者反之；“从1040年到1745年，除了三个君主之外，每个英格兰君主都遭遇过苏格兰的入侵，或者反之变成了入侵者”；这些“入侵”总的来说，就是烧毁所有边境城镇，杀死那地区的一大批人。 Eventually the two sides started getting pissed with each other and would also torture-murder all of the enemy’s citizens they could get their hands on, ie any who were close enough to the border to reach before the enemy could send in their armies. As if this weren’t bad enough, outlaws quickly learned they could plunder one side of the border, then escape to the other before anyone brought them to justice, so the whole area basically became one giant cesspool of robbery and murder. 最终，双方都被激怒了，开始虐杀所有落入手中的对方平民，也就是任何住的离边境足够近、在敌方军队赶来前就能实施侵害的人。好像嫌这还不够糟，法外匪徒很快学到他们可以在边境一侧抢掠，而后在被绳之以法前，逃到另一边去。所以整个地区基本上是充满抢劫谋杀的血腥地狱。 In response to these pressures, the border people militarized and stayed feudal long past the point where the rest of the island had started modernizing. Life consisted of farming the lands of whichever brutal warlord had the top hand today, followed by being called to fight for him on short notice, followed by a grisly death. The border people dealt with it as best they could, and developed a culture marked by extreme levels of clannishness, xenophobia, drunkenness, stubbornness, and violence. 面对这些压力，边民武装了起来，在大不列颠岛的其他地方已经开始现代化之后很久，他们还保持着封建制度。生活由以下部分构成：耕种土地，这些土地属于当时军阀混战的胜利者，服从突然而至的上战场的征召，面对悲惨的死亡。边民在此条件下，竭力挣扎求活，发展出一种以极端小集团、排外、酗酒、倔强和暴力为特征的文化。 By the end of the 1600s, the Scottish and English royal bloodlines had intermingled and the two countries were drifting closer and closer to Union. The English kings finally got some breathing room and noticed – holy frick, everything about the border is terrible. 到1600年代末，苏格兰和英格兰的皇族变得血脉相连，两个国家开始接近并组成联邦【编注：1603年苏格兰国王詹姆斯六世继承英格兰王位，成为英格兰的詹姆斯一世】。此后的英格兰国王们终于缓过气来，并且发现——天哪，边境的一切都很可怕。 They decided to make the region economically productive, which meant “squeeze every cent out of the poor Borderers, in the hopes of either getting lots of money from them or else forcing them to go elsewhere and become somebody else’s problem”. Sometimes absentee landlords would just evict everyone who lived in an entire region, en masse, replacing them with people they expected to be easier to control. 他们决定让这个地区在经济产出上有效，这意味着“从贫穷边民身上榨出每一分钱，目的是要么从边民那里得到很多收入，要么强迫他们搬到别处，变成他人的麻烦。”有时候，外居的领主会直接把整个区域的居民驱逐，代之以他们预期会更好控制的人。 Many of the Borderers fled to Ulster in Ireland, which England was working on colonizing as a Protestant bulwark against the Irish Catholics, and where the Crown welcomed violent warlike people as a useful addition to their Irish-Catholic-fighting project. But Ulster had some of the same problems as the Border, and also the Ulsterites started worrying that the Borderer cure was worse than the Irish Catholic disease. So the Borderers started getting kicked out of Ulster too, one thing led to another, and eventually 250,000 of these people ended up in America. 许多边民逃到爱尔兰的阿尔斯特，英国人当时正要在此地殖民，将之变成新教针对爱尔兰天主教的堡垒。所以皇室欢迎暴力好战的人，用于补充他们和爱尔兰天主教的斗争工程。但是阿尔斯特也有一些和边境地区相同的麻烦，而阿尔斯特人也开始担忧，边民作为一种解药，也许比爱尔兰天主教这一疾病更糟。所以边民又开始被驱逐出阿尔斯特，事情接踵而至，最终边民中有25万人移居美国。 250,000 people is a lot of Borderers. By contrast, the great Puritan emigration wave was only 20,000 or so people; even the mighty colony of Virginia only had about 50,000 original settlers. So these people showed up on the door of the American colonies, and the American colonies collectively took one look at them and said “nope”. 25万人可是很大一批。对比之下，清教徒移民大潮只有2万人左右；即使是弗吉尼亚巨大的殖民地，也只有5万初始殖民者。所以当这些人出现在北美殖民地的大门口，各个殖民地一齐打量了他们一下，然后说“不”。 Except, of course, the Quakers. The Quakers talked among themselves and decided that these people were also Children Of God, and so they should demonstrate Brotherly Love by taking them in. They tried that for a couple of years, and then they questioned their life choices and also said “nope”, and they told the Borderers that Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley were actually kind of full right now but there was lots of unoccupied land in WesternPennsylvania, and the Appalachian Mountains were very pretty at this time of year, so why didn’t they head out that way as fast as it was physically possible to go? 当然，贵格会会众例外。贵格会内部进行了讨论，认定这些人也是上帝的孩子，所以他们应该彰显兄弟之爱，接纳边民们。他们尝试了几年，然后他们对自己的选择产生了疑问，也转向了说“不”。他们告诉边民，费城和德拉威尔河谷现在其实已经很满了，但是西宾夕法尼亚有很多无主之地，而阿巴拉契亚山脉在这个季节也很好，为什么不向那些方向尽快开拓，趁着自然条件还允许？ At the time, the Appalachians were kind of the booby prize of American colonization: hard to farm, hard to travel through, and exposed to hostile Indians. The Borderers fell in love with them. They came from a pretty marginal and unproductive territory themselves, and the Appalachians were far away from everybody and full of fun Indians to fight. 在那时，阿巴拉契亚的群山对北美殖民者来说，是分给最后一名的奖品：很难耕种，很难通行，暴露于充满敌意的印第安人面前。边民却爱上了它们。他们本就来自贫瘠的边缘化的故土，而阿巴拉契亚群山远离所有人，充满了与印第安人战斗的乐趣。 Soon the Appalachian strategy became the accepted response to Borderer immigration and was taken up from Pennsylvania in the north to the Carolinas in the South (a few New Englanders hit on a similar idea and sent their own Borderers to colonize the mountains of New Hampshire). 很快，阿巴拉契亚策略成为了对移入边民的既定策略，北到宾夕法尼亚，南到卡罗莱纳的殖民地都加以采纳（几个新英格兰殖民地也想出了相似的办法，把他们自己的边民打发到新罕布什尔的群山去殖民）。 So the Borderers all went to Appalachia and established their own little rural clans there and nothing at all went wrong except for the entire rest of American history. 所以边民们都去了阿巴拉契亚，建立了他们自己的小群农村宗族，一切都相安无事，除了整个美国历史被大大影响。 INTERESTING BORDERER FACTS: 关于边民的有趣事实： 1. Colonial opinion on the Borderers differed within a very narrow range: one Pennsylvanian writer called them “the scum of two nations”, another Anglican clergyman called them “the scum of the universe”. 对边民，殖民地人们的看法相去不远：一个宾夕法尼亚作家把他们叫做“两个国家之间的渣滓”，另一个国教会牧师把他们叫做“宇宙的渣滓”。 2. Some Borderers tried to come to America as indentured servants, but after Virginian planters got some experience with Borderers they refused to accept any more. 一些边民试图以契约仆人身份来美国，但是在弗吉尼亚种植园主得到了一些关于边民的教训后，他们不再接收边民。 3. The Borderers were mostly Presbyterians, and their arrival en massestarted a race among the established American denominations to convert them. This was mostly unsuccessful; Anglican preacher Charles Woodmason, an important source for information about the early Borderers, said that during his missionary activity the Borderers “disrupted his service, rioted while he preached, started a pack of dogs fighting outside the church, loosed his horse, stole his church key, refused him food and shelter, and gave two barrels of whiskey to his congregation before a service of communion”. 边民们大部分是长老会信徒，他们的成群到达开启了一场其他既有美国宗派转化他们的竞赛。基本上，这是不成功的；国教会传道人 Charles Woodmason是研究早期边民的重要资料来源。他说在他的传道活动期间，边民“打断他的侍奉，在其讲道时作乱，在教会外面斗狗，放了他的马，偷了他的教堂钥匙，拒绝给他食物和住宿，在一次擘饼聚会时，给他的会众两桶威士忌。 4. Borderer town-naming policy was very different from the Biblical names of the Puritans or the Ye Olde English names of the Virginians. Early Borderer settlements include – just to stick to the creek-related ones – Lousy Creek, Naked Creek, Shitbritches Creek, Cuckold’s Creek, Bloodrun Creek, Pinchgut Creek, Whipping Creek, and Hangover Creek. There were also Whiskey Springs, Hell’s Half Acre, Scream Ridge, Scuffle town, and Grab town. The overall aesthetic honestly sounds a bit Orcish. 边民的集镇命名规则非常不同于清教徒的圣经命名法，或者弗吉尼亚人的仿古英文命名法。早期边民殖民点中和溪流有关的名字有——糟糕溪，裸露溪，烂裤衩溪，戴绿帽溪，流血溪，吃不饱溪，鞭打溪，以及宿醉溪。当然，也有威士忌泉，地狱半英亩，尖叫岭，混战镇，揪住镇。总体审美的确听来有些野蛮。 5. One of the first Borderer leaders was John Houston. On the ship over to America, the crew tried to steal some of his possessions; Houston retaliated by leading a mutiny of the passengers, stealing the ship, and sailing it to America himself. He settled in West Virginia; one of his descendants was famous Texan Sam Houston. 第一代边民的领袖之一是约翰·休斯顿。在来美国的船上，船员试图偷窃他的财产；作为报复，他领导乘客发动事变，劫持了船，自己航行到美国。他在西弗吉尼亚安顿下来，后代之一，就是著名的德州佬山姆·休斯顿。 6. Traditional Borderer prayer: “Lord, grant that I may always be right, for thou knowest I am hard to turn.” 传统的边民祷词：“上帝，让我一直都走对路吧，因为你最清楚，我是难以回转的。” 7. “The back country folk bragged that one interior county of North Carolina had so little ‘larnin’ that the only literate inhabitant was elected ‘county reader'” “荒野的乡民吹嘘北卡的一个内陆郡是如此的缺乏‘蚊化’，以至于唯一识字的定居者被选为“‘郡阅读员’”。 8. The Borderer accent contained English, Scottish, and Irish elements, and is (uncoincidentally) very similar to the typical “country western singer” accent of today. 边民的口音包括了英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰元素，而且并非巧合，它和今天的“乡村西部歌手”腔调十分相似。 9. The Borderers were famous for family feuds in England, including the Johnson clan’s habit of “adorning their houses with the flayed skins of their enemies the Maxwells in a blood feud that continued for many generations”. The great family feuds of the United States, like the Hatfield-McCoy feud, are a direct descendent of this tradition. 边民在英格兰以家族世仇闻名，包括Johnson宗族的习惯：“在持续多代的血腥世仇中，用他们的敌人，Maxwells家族身上剥下来的皮装饰自己的房子”。在美国，大型的家族世仇，比如Hatfield家族与McCoy家族的世仇，则直接继承自这种传统。 10. Within-clan marriage was a popular Borderer tradition both in England and Appalachia; “in the Cumbrian parish of Hawkshead, for example, both the bride and the groom bore the same last names in 25 percent of all marriages from 1568 to 1704”. This led to the modern stereotype of Appalachians as inbred and incestuous. 在英格兰和阿巴拉契亚，宗族内婚都是边民流行的传统；“例如在Hawkshead的Cumbrian教区，从1568年到1704年，25%的新郎和新娘都有着相同的姓。”这导致了现代对阿巴拉契亚山民的刻板印象：近亲繁殖和内婚盛行。 11. The Borderers were extremely patriarchal and anti-women’s-rights to a degree that appalled even the people of the 1700s. 边民极端家长制，反对女权，其极端程度甚至吓坏了十八世纪的人们。 12. “In the year 1767, [Anglican priest] Charles Woodmason calculated that 94 percent of backcountry brides whom he had married in the past year were pregnant on their wedding day” “在1767年，国教会牧师Charles Woodmason统计，上一年度他主持结婚的乡下新娘中有94%在婚礼之日已经怀孕了。” 13. Although the Borderers started off Presbyterian, they were in constant religious churn and their territories were full of revivals, camp meetings, born-again evangelicalism, and itinerant preachers. Eventually most of them ended up as what we now call Southern Baptist. 虽然边民本来信长老会，但他们持续处于信仰流失中，而他们的领地上则充满了复兴、营会、重生福音主义和巡回布道者。最终，他们中大部分变成了我们现在所称的南方浸信会信徒。 14. Borderer folk beliefs: “If an old woman has only one tooth, she is a witch”, “If you are awake at eleven, you will see witches”, “The howling of dogs shows the presence of witches”, “If your shoestring comes untied, witches are after you”, “If a warm current of air is felt, witches are passing”. Also, “wet a rag in your enemy’s blood, put it behind a rock in the chimney, and when it rots your enemy will die”; apparently it was not a coincidence they were thinking about witches so much. 边民相信：“如果一个老妇人只有一颗牙，她就是个女巫”，“如果你在11点醒来，你会看到女巫”，“嚎叫的狗显示了女巫的存在”，“如果你的鞋带松了，女巫在跟着你”，“如果空气中有一股暖流，女巫正在经过”。而且，“用抹布沾湿敌人的血，把它放在烟囱里的一块石头后面，当它烂掉，你的敌人就会死了”；显然，他们如此多的考虑女巫，不是巧合。 15. Borderer medical beliefs: “A cure for homesickness is to sew a good charge of gunpowder on the inside of ths shirt near the neck”. That’ll cure homesickness, all right. 边民的医疗观念：“治疗思乡的方子是在衬衫靠近脖子的部位缝上大量火药”。好吧，这会治好乡愁。 16. More Borderer medical beliefs: “For fever, cut a black chicken open while alive and bind it to the bottom of your foot”, “Eating the brain of a screech owl is the only dependable remedy for headache”, “For rheumatism, apply split frogs to the feet”, “To reduce a swollen leg, split a live cat and apply while still warm”, “Bite the head off the first butterfly you see and you will get a new dress”, “Open the cow’s mouth and throw a live toad-frog down her throat. This will cure her of hollow-horn”. Also, blacksmiths protected themselves from witches by occasionally throwing live puppies into their furnaces. 边民的其他医疗观念：“如果发烧，活活剖开一只黑鸡，把它绑在你的脚底”，“吃掉尖叫猫头鹰的脑子是唯一可靠的治头痛药方”，“对风湿病，在脚上绑上撕开的青蛙”，“为了给腿消肿，劈开一只活猫，趁还温热敷上”，“把你见到的第一只蝴蝶的头拽掉，你会得到一件新裙子”，“把奶牛的嘴打开，扔一只活的癞蛤蟆到它喉咙里。这会治好它的空角病”。而且，铁匠们为了避免女巫的危害，会时不时把活着的小狗扔进他们的炉子里。 17. Rates of public schooling in the backcountry settled by the Borderers were “the lowest in British North America” and sometimes involved rituals like “barring out”, where the children would physically keep the teacher out of the school until he gave in and granted the students the day off. 边民乡村的公共学校入学率是“北美英国殖民地”中最低的，而且有些时候会发生“封门”的仪式，即孩子们会用身体阻挡教师进入学校，除非他让步并给学生们当天放假。 18. “Appalachia’s idea of a moderate drinker was the mountain man who limited himself to a single quart [of whiskey] at a sitting, explaining that more ‘might fly to my head’. Other beverages were regarded with contempt.” “阿巴拉契亚关于适度饮酒的理念是，一个山民会克制自己一次只喝一夸脱以下的威士忌，解释是喝更多‘也许会让我的脑袋发晕’。其他饮品则是被轻视的。” 19. A traditional backcountry sport was “rough and tumble”, a no-holds-barred form of wrestling where gouging out your opponent’s eyes was considered perfectly acceptable and in fact sound strategy. In 1772 Virginia had to pass a law against “gouging, plucking, or putting out an eye”, but this was the Cavalier-dominated legislature all the way on the east coast and nobody in the backcountry paid them any attention. Other traditional backcountry sports were sharpshooting and hunting. 一项传统的乡下运动是“混战”，一种无规则限制的摔角，在运动中挖掉对手的眼睛被认为是完全可以接受，且实际上非常有效的策略。在1772年弗吉尼亚被迫通过一项法律反对“抠，挖，挤出眼球”，但这是骑士党主导的法律，只在东海岸有效，在阿巴拉契亚的山民根本不理会。另一项传统的乡下运动则是射击和打猎。 20. The American custom of shooting guns into the air to celebrate holidays is 100% Borderer in origin. 美国向天鸣枪庆祝节日的传统100%来自于山民。 21. The justice system of the backcountry was heavy on lynching, originally a race-neutral practice and named after western Virginian settler William Lynch. 山民地区的法律体系非常依赖于私刑审判，这种做法（原本并无种族倾向）即以西弗吉尼亚殖民者William Lynch得名。【编注：lynch一词在内战后常常特指美国南方白人种族主义者针对黑人的私刑。】 22. Scottish Presbyterians used to wear red cloth around their neck to symbolize their religion; other Englishmen nicknamed them “rednecks”. This maybe the origin of the popular slur against Americans of Borderer descent, although many other etiologies have been proposed. “Cracker” as a slur is attested as early as 1766 by a colonist who says the term describes backcountry men who are great boasters; other proposed etymologies like slaves talking about “whip-crackers” seem to be spurious. 苏格兰长老会教徒曾在脖子周遭围上红布来象征他们的宗教；其他英国人昵称其为“红脖”。这也许是这一对美国边民后裔的流行贬称的起源，虽然有很多其他的语源学解释也被提出过。“大话精”则是另一个贬称，验证发现，早在1766年一个殖民者曾以该词表示边民们中的吹牛者；其他语源学解释包括奴隶们谈到的“挥鞭子的人”，看来是谬误的。 This is not to paint the Borderers as universally poor and dumb – like every group, they had an elite, and some of their elite went on to become some of America’s most important historical figures. Andrew Jackson became the first Borderer president, behaving exactly as you would expect the first Borderer president to behave, and he was followed by almost a dozen others. Borderers have also been overrepresented in America’s great military leaders, from Ulysses Grant through Teddy Roosevelt (3/4 Borderer despite his Dutch surname) to George Patton to John McCain. 并不是说边民普遍贫穷愚笨——如同每个群体一样，他们也有精英，有些精英成了美国史上最重要的历史人物之一。Andrew Jackson成为第一任边民总统，其作为和你预期的第一任边民总统会做的一样，他之后又有十多个边民总统。边民在美国伟大军事领袖中的比例也高得过分，从尤利西斯·格兰特到泰迪·罗斯福（3/4的边民血统，虽然他有个荷兰裔姓氏），再到乔治·巴顿，再到约翰·麦凯恩。 The Borderers really liked America – unsurprising given where they came from – and started identifying as American earlier and more fiercely than any of the other settlers who had come before. Unsurprisingly, they strongly supported the Revolution – Patrick Henry (“Give me liberty or give me death!”) was a Borderer. They also also played a disproportionate role in westward expansion. 边民真的很爱美国——考虑到他们来自何处，这不奇怪——而且他们产生美国人的自我认同比其他在他们之前到的殖民者更早，程度更强烈。并不奇怪的是，他们强烈支持独立革命——Patrick Henry(“不自由，宁毋死！”）是个边民。他们也在西进运动中发挥了不成比例的重要作用。 After the Revolution, America made an almost literal 180 degree turn and the “backcountry” became the “frontier”. It was the Borderers who were happiest going off into the wilderness and fighting Indians, and most of the famous frontiersmen like Davy Crockett were of their number. This was a big part of the reason the Wild West was so wild compared to, say, Minnesota (also a frontier inhabited by lots of Indians, but settled by Northerners and Germans) and why it inherited seemingly Gaelic traditions like cattle rustling. 革命后，美国实际上是180度转向，“内地”变成了“边疆”。对于深入荒野，和印第安人战斗，边民是最开心的，大部分著名的边疆拓荒者如Davy Crockett即是其中一员。很大程度上，这就是为什么狂野西部是如此狂野，相比于比如说明尼苏达（也是个有很多印第安人定居的边疆地带，但是由北方人和德国裔开拓殖民），这也解释了为何西部有套小牛的传统，这疑似是苏格兰盖尔人的传统。 Their conception of liberty has also survived and shaped modern American politics: it seems essentially to be the modern libertarian/Republican version of freedom from government interference, especially if phrased as “get the hell off my land”, and especially especially if phrased that way through clenched teeth while pointing a shotgun at the offending party. 他们的自由观念也存留下来并塑造了美国的政治：它看起来基本上是现代自由意志主义者/共和党版本的免于政府干涉的自由，特别是“滚出我的土地”这句话，尤其是这话以咬牙切齿的腔调说出，伴着指向入侵者的霰弹枪的时候。 III. This is all interesting as history and doubly interesting as anthropology, but what relevance does it have for later American history and the present day? 这些从历史学上来说，很有意思，从人类学角度来说，更有意思。但是这些和美国之后的历史以及今天又什么关系吗？ One of my reasons reading this book was to see whether the link between Americans’ political opinions and a bunch of their other cultural/religious/social traits (a “Blue Tribe” and “Red Tribe”) was related to the immigration patterns it describes. I’m leaning towards “probably”, but there’s a lot of work to be done in explaining how the split among these four cultures led to a split among two cultures in the modern day, and with little help from the book itself I am going to have to resort to total unfounded speculation. 我读这本书的理由之一，是想看看美国政治观点和一系列文化/宗教/社会特质（“红部落”和“蓝部落”）是否和该书描述的移民模式相关。我倾向“很可能”这一结论，但是还需要大量的工作来解释这四种文化之分裂是如何导致今日的两种文化之分裂，而且接下来我将要不依赖这本书的帮助，诉诸未经验证的大胆猜想。 But the simplest explanation – that the Puritans and Quakers merged into one group (“progressives”, “Blue Tribe”, “educated coastal elites”) and the Virginians and Borderers into another (“conservatives”, “Red Tribe”, “rednecks”) – has a lot going for it. 然而最简单的解释有很大的说服力——清教徒和贵格会融合成了一个团体（“进步派”，“蓝部落”，“受过教育的东西岸精英”），而弗吉尼亚人和边民则汇聚成另一个（“保守派”，“红部落”，“红脖子”）。 Many conservatives I read like to push the theory that modern progressivism is descended from the utopian Protestant experiments of early America – Puritanism and Quakerism – and that the civil war represents “Massachusetts’ conquest of America”. I always found this lacking in rigor: Puritanism and Quakerism are sufficiently different that positing a combination of them probably needs more intellectual work than just gesturing at “you know, that Puritan/Quaker thing”. 我所读到的很多保守派喜欢这一理论：现代进步主义来自于早期乌托邦式的新教实验——清教主义和贵格主义——而内战则代表“‘马萨诸塞’”征服了美国”。我总是发现这个说法缺乏严谨：清教主义和贵格主义有很大的不同，把他们合并起来很可能需要更多的智力工作，而不是仅仅陈述“你知道的，清教徒/贵格会的那套”。 But the idea of a Puritan New England and a Quaker-(ish) Pennsylvania gradually blending together into a generic “North” seems plausible, especially given the high levels of interbreeding between the two (some of our more progressive Presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, were literally half-Puritan and half-Quaker). 但是一个清教徒的新英格兰和一个贵格会的宾夕法尼亚逐渐融合在一起，被统称为“北方”，这一说法似乎有道理，尤其是考虑到两个群体之间很高的通婚率（我们一些更偏进步派的总统，包括亚伯拉罕·林肯，实际上是半清教徒半贵格会血统）。 Such a merge would combine the Puritan emphasis on moral reform, education, and a well-ordered society with the Quaker doctrine of niceness, tolerance, religious pluralism, individual conscience, and the Inner Light. It seems kind of unfair to just mix-and-match the most modern elements of each and declare that this proves they caused modernity, but there’s no reason that couldn’t have happened. 这种融合把清教徒对道德改革、教育和有序社会的强调，以及贵格会友善、容忍、宗教多元、个人良心和内在灵性之光的教义结合了起来。把两个宗派最现代化的元素混合对应起来，然后宣称这证明了他们导致了现代性，这似乎有点不公平，但是没有理由否定，这可能发生。 The idea of Cavaliers and Borderers combining to form modern conservativism is buoyed by modern conservativism’s obvious Border influences, but complicated by its lack of much that is recognizably Cavalier – the Republican Party is hardly marked by its support for a hereditary aristocracy of gentlemen. 骑士党和边民结合形成了现代保守主义这一看法，被现代保守主义明显受边民影响所支持。但更复杂的是，它缺乏可以被辨认为骑士党文化的成分——共和党在支持绅士们的世袭贵族政治方面并不突出。 Here I have to admit that I don’t know as much about Southern history as I’d like. In particular, how were places like Alabama, Mississippi, et cetera settled? Most sources I can find suggest they were set up along the Virginia model of plantation-owning aristocrats, but if that’s true how did the modern populations come to so embody Fischer’s description of Borderers? In particular, why are they so Southern Baptist and not very Anglican? 这里我不得不承认，我所知的南方历史，并不如我渴望的那么多。特别是，像阿拉巴马，密西西比这些地方是如何被开发的？我所找到的大部分资料都暗示，他们是按照弗吉尼亚那种拥有种植园的贵族模式发展，但是如果这是真的，为何现代这片土地上的人口和Fischer描述的边民如此相似？特别是，为什么他们如此倾向于南方浸信会，而不是国教会？ And what happened to all of those indentured servants the Cavaliers brought over after slavery put them out of business? What happened to that whole culture after the Civil War destroyed the plantation system? My guess is going to be that the indentured servants and the Borderer population mixed pretty thoroughly, and that this stratum was hanging around providing a majority of the white bodies in the South while the plantation owners were hogging the limelight – but I just don’t know. 而所有那些骑士党带来的契约仆人在被奴隶取代而不再做仆人后，又经历了什么？在内战毁灭了南方种植园系统后，整个文化经历了什么？我的猜想是契约仆人和边民人口深度融合，而这个阶层蔓延开来，构成了南方白人的主体，而与此同时种植园主们则吸引了太多关注——但是我就是不知道。 A quick argument that I’m not totally making all of this up: 以下的简易论证并非纯属编造： This is a map of voting patterns by county in the 2012 Presidential election. The blue areas in the South carefully track the so-called “black belt” of majority African-American areas. The ones in the Midwest are mostly big cities. Aside from those, the only people who vote Democrat are New England (very solidly!) and the Delaware Valley region of Pennsylvania. 这是2012年总统大选在郡层面的投票模式的地图。蓝色区域在南方精确地分布在大量非裔美国人聚居的所谓“黑带”上。在中西部的蓝色基本上是大城市。除了这些，选民主党的人只有新英格兰人（支持度很高！）和宾州德拉威尔河谷地区。 In fact, you can easily see the distinction between the Delaware Valley settled by Quakers in the east, and the backcountry area settled by Borderers in the west. Even the book’s footnote about how a few Borderers settled in the mountains of New Hampshire is associated with a few spots of red in the mountains of New Hampshire ruining an otherwise near-perfect Democratic sweep of the north. 事实上，你能一眼看出，贵格会开拓的东部德拉威尔河谷和边民开拓的西部区域之间的区别。即便是书中脚注提到的少量边民移居新罕布尔州群山也能对应图中新罕布尔州群山中的几个红点，如果不是这几个红点，民主党在北方就拥有了完美的全胜。 One anomaly in this story is a kind of linear distribution of blue across southern Michigan, too big to be explained solely by the blacks of Detroit. But a quick look at Wikipedia’s History of Michigan finds: 这个故事中的一个异常就是在南密歇根存在一种线性分布的蓝色，面积太大，不能仅用底特律的黑人来解释。但是快速浏览维基百科上密歇根的历史条目就会发现： In the 1820s and 1830s migrants from New England began moving to what is now Michigan in large numbers (though there was a trickle of New England settlers who arrived before this date). These were “Yankee” settlers, that is to say they were descended from the English Puritans who settled New England during the colonial era….Due to the prevalence of New Englanders and New England transplants from upstate New York, Michigan was very culturally contiguous with early New England culture for much of its early history…The amount with which the New England Yankee population predominated made Michigan unique among frontier states in the antebellum period. Due to this heritage Michigan was on the forefront of the antislavery crusade and reforms during the 1840s and 1850s. 在1820年代到1830年代，来自新英格兰的移民大量移居到今日的密歇根（虽然有少量新英格兰开拓者在之前就移居此地）。这些是“扬基”开拓者，这意味着他们是在殖民地时期住在新英格兰的英国清教徒的后裔……因为新英格兰人众多，以及从纽约上州移入的新英格兰人，在它早期历史的相当长时间，密歇根在文化上和早期新英格兰文化很相近……新英格兰扬基人口的庞大数量使得密歇根在内战前时期边疆州当中与众不同。因为这种传统，密歇根站在1840年代和1850年代的废奴十字军和改革的前列。 Alhough I can’t find proof of this specifically, I know that Michigan was settled from the south up, and I suspect that these New England settlers concentrated in the southern regions and that the north was settled by a more diverse group of whites who lacked the New England connection. 虽然我不能发现专门的证据，我知道密歇根是从南方被开拓的，我怀疑新英格兰开拓者集中于南部区域，而北部则被更多元的白人群体开拓，这些人缺乏和新英格兰地区的联系。 Here’s something else cool. We can’t track Borderers directly because there’s no “Borderer” or “Scots-Irish” option on the US census. But Albion’s Seed points out that the Borderers were uniquely likely to identify as just “American” and deliberately forgot their past ancestry as fast as they could. 还有更有趣的发现。我们不能直接跟踪边民，因为在美国人口普查中没有“边民”或者“苏格兰人-爱尔兰人”的选项。但是《阿尔比安的种子》一书指出，边民特别倾向于自我认同为“美国人”，并故意尽快忘记自己过去的先祖。 Meanwhile, when the census asks an ethnicity question about where your ancestors came from, every year some people will stubbornly ignore the point of the question and put down “America” (no, this does not track the distribution of Native American population). Here’s a map of so-called “unhyphenated Americans”, taken from this site: 同时，当普查问及关于你先祖来自何处的族裔问题时，每年都有一些人顽固的忽略这一问题的目的，而填上“美国”（不，这并不能代表印第安人的分布）。下面是所谓的“纯粹的美国人”的地图，来自这个网站。 We see a strong focus on the Appalachian Mountains, especially West Virginia, Tennesee, and Kentucky, bleeding into the rest of the South. Aside from west Pennsylvania, this is very close to where we would expect to find the Borderers. Could these be the same groups? 我们看到了该人群在阿巴拉契亚山脉区域有很高的密度，尤其是西弗吉尼亚，田纳西，和肯塔基，延伸到南方其他地区。除了西宾夕法尼亚之外，这和我们预期能发现边民的地区非常接近。这些可能是相同的人群吗？ Meanwhile, here is a map of where Obama underperformed the usual Democratic vote worst in 2008: 同时，这里还有奥巴马在08年民主党选举中表现最差的地区的一张地图： These maps are small and lossy, and surely unhyphenatedness is not an exact proxy for Border ancestry – but they are nevertheless intriguing. You may also be interested in the Washington Post’s correlation between distribution of unhyphenated Americans and Trump voters, or the Atlantic’s article on Trump and Borderers. 这些地图也许小且模糊，而且纯种美国人认同也不是边民先祖的精确表征——但是它们仍然十分吸引人。你也许会对《华盛顿邮报》在纯种美国人分布和川普支持者之间相关性的报道感兴趣，还有《大西洋月刊》关于川普和边民的文章。 If I’m going to map these cultural affiliations to ancestry, do I have to walk back on my previous theory that they are related to class? Maybe I should. But I also think we can posit complicated interactions between these ideas. Consider for example the interaction between race and class; a black person with a white-sounding name, who speaks with a white-sounding accent, and who adopts white culture (eg listens to classical music, wears business suits) is far more likely to seem upper-class than a black person with a black-sounding name, a black accent, and black cultural preferences; a white person who seems black in some way (listens to hip-hop, wears baggy clothes) is more likely to seem lower-class. This doesn’t mean race and class are exactly the same thing, but it does mean that some races get stereotyped as upper-class and others as lower-class, and that people’s racial identifiers may change based on where they are in the class structure. 如果我把这些文化偏好对应到祖先谱系，我是否也不得不回到我之前的理论上，即这些和阶层有关？也许我应该这么做。但是我也认为我们应该注意这些看法之间的交互作用。比如考虑一下种族和阶层的交互关系；一个黑人带着一个白人式的名字，带白人口音，适应了白人文化（比如听古典音乐，穿西装），则比取黑人名、带黑人口音、偏好黑人文化的黑人更可能是上等阶级；一个某方面像黑人的白人（听嘻哈，穿松垮的衣服）则更可能属于底层。这并不是说种族和阶层完全是一码事，但是这说明一些族群给人的固定印象是上层，另一些是底层，而基于人们在阶层结构中位置，人们的和种族相关的特征可能会变化。 I think something similar is probably going on with these forms of ancestry. The education system is probably dominated by descendents of New Englanders and Pennsylvanians; they had an opportunity to influence the culture of academia and the educated classes more generally, they took it, and now anybody of any background who makes it into that world is going to be socialized according to their rules. Likewise, people in poorer and more rural environments will be surrounded by people of Borderer ancestry and acculturated by Borderer cultural products and end up a little more like that group. As a result, ethnic markers have turned into and merged with class markers in complicated ways. 我认为族裔血统的构成中，很可能发生了相似的事情。教育系统很可能被新英格兰人和宾夕法尼亚人把持，他们更有机会普遍地影响学术界的文化和受教育阶层，他们把握了这个机会，现在任何背景的人，要进入他们的世界，都会按照他们的规则被社会化。相似的，更穷和更乡村化的人，被边民的先祖和边民文化的产物包围，最终变得有点像这个群体。结果，族裔标志以种种复杂的方式转化成了阶层标志并与之融合。 Indeed, some kind of acculturation process has to have been going on, since most of the people in these areas today are not the descendents of the original settlers. But such a process seems very likely. Just to take an example, most of the Jews I know (including my own family) came into the country via New York, live somewhere on the coast, and have very Blue Tribe values. But Southern Jews believed in the Confederacy as strongly as any Virginian – see for example Judah Benjamin. And Barry Goldwater, a half-Jew raised in Arizona, invented the modern version of conservativism that seems closest to some Borderer beliefs. 的确，某种同化过程一定发生过，因为这些地区今天的大部分人并不是初代开拓者的后代。但是这样一个过程很可能发生。仅举一个例子，大部分我所认识的犹太人（包括我自己的家庭），从纽约来到这个国家，生活在靠海岸的某处，拥有蓝色的价值观。但是南方犹太人曾和任何弗吉尼亚人一样，相信南部邦联——可以参考Judah Benjamin的例子。而且Barry Goldwater，一个长在亚利桑那的半血犹太人，发明了现代版本的保守主义，其观点看起来最接近一些边民信仰。 All of this is very speculative, with some obvious flaws. What do we make of other countries like Britain or Germany with superficially similar splits but very different histories? Why should Puritans lose their religion and sexual prudery, but keep their interest in moralistic reform? There are whole heaps of questions like these. 所有这些都是很大胆的假设，带有一些明显的缺陷。对于英国或者德国，这些国家表面上有类似的分裂，但是有很不同的历史，我们如何来解释呢？为什么清教徒失去了他们的宗教和在性上的规矩，但是仍然在道德改革上保持兴趣？还有一大堆类似的问题。 But look. Before I had any idea about any of this, I wrote that American society seems divided into two strata, one of which is marked by emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, academic/financial jobs, and Democratic party affiliation, and furthermore that this group was centered in the North. 但是看看，在我有这些想法之前，我就曾写道美国社会看来被分裂成两层，其中之一有以下特征：重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容，很低的未成年怀孕率，学术和财经工作，以及支持民主党，而且这个群体以北方为中心。 Meanwhile, now I learn that the North was settled by two groups that when combined have emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, an academic and mercantile history, and were the heartland of the historical Whigs and Republicans who preceded the modern Democratic Party. 同时，我现在知道了北方曾被两个团体所开拓，两个群体结合起来，拥有以下特征：重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容，很低的未成年怀孕率 ，具有学术和商业历史，而且是历史上辉格党和共和党（后来的地位被现代的民主党取代）的核心地域。 And I wrote about another stratum centered in the South marked by poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high teenage pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, country western music, and support for the Republican Party. And now I learn that the South was settled by a group noted even in the 1700s for its poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high premarital pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, accent exactly like the modern country western accent, and support for the Democratic-Republicans who preceded the modern Republican Party. 我还写到过另一个集中于南方的阶层，它以教育贫乏，枪文化，暴力文化，排外，高未成年人怀孕率，军国主义，爱国主义，西部乡村音乐，和支持共和党为特征。现在我知道，开拓南方的群体，在18世纪就以教育的贫乏， 枪文化，暴力文化，排外，高未成年人怀孕率，尚武精神，爱国主义，接近现代西部乡村的口音，以及支持民主-共和党为特征（后来地位被现代的共和党取代）。 If this is true, I think it paints a very pessimistic world-view. The “iceberg model” of culture argues that apart from the surface cultural features we all recognize like language, clothing, and food, there are deeper levels of culture that determine the features and institutions of a people: whether they are progressive or traditional, peaceful or warlike, mercantile or self-contained. 如果这是真的，我认为这给出了一个非常悲观的世界图景。文化的“冰山模型”认为，撇开我们都能识别的文化表面特征，例如语言、衣着、和食物，存在更深层次的文化，它们决定了上述特征和人们的制度：决定他们是进步的还是传统的，和平的还是好战的，爱经商的还是自给自足的。 We grudgingly acknowledge these features when we admit that maybe making the Middle East exactly like America in every way is more of a long-term project than something that will happen as soon as we kick out the latest dictator and get treated as liberators. Part of us may still want to believe that pure reason is the universal solvent, that those Afghans will come around once they realize that being a secular liberal democracy is obviously great. 当我们承认也许让中东在每一方面都变成和美国一样是一个长期过程，而不是如我们把最近的独裁者赶下台，像解放者般被接待那么快，我们就是在勉强承认这些文化特征的存在。我们中的部分人还想相信纯粹理性是普遍适用的答案，只要阿富汗人意识到一个世俗化的自由主义的民主制度明显很棒，他们就会觉醒。 But we keep having deep culture shoved in our face again and again, and we don’t know how to get rid of it. This has led to reasonable speculation that some aspects of it might even be genetic – something which would explain a lot, though not its ability to acculturate recent arrivals. 但是我们已经一而再地被深层文化打脸，我们不知道如何摆脱它。这导致了合理的猜想，深层文化的某方面可能是遗传性的——这可以解释很多事情，虽然这个因素不能解释其同化最近的新来者的能力。 This is a hard pill to swallow even when we’re talking about Afghanistan. But it becomes doubly unpleasant when we think about it in the sense of our neighbors and fellow citizens in a modern democracy. What, after all, is the point? A democracy made up of 49% extremely liberal Americans and 51% fundamentalist Taliban Afghans would be something very different from the democratic ideal; even if occasionally a super-charismatic American candidate could win over enough marginal Afghans to take power, there’s none of the give-and-take, none of the competition within the marketplace of ideas, that makes democracy so attractive. Just two groups competing to dominate one another, with the fact that the competition is peaceful being at best a consolation prize. 即便我们讨论的是阿富汗，这也是一枚难以下咽的药丸。但如果我们从现代民主制中我们的邻舍和公民同胞的角度来考虑这个问题时，难受程度又要翻倍。这到底有什么意义？一个由49%的极端自由派的美国人和51%的基本教义派的阿富汗塔利班组成的民主制恐怕和民主典范非常不同；即使有时，一个很有人格魅力的美国候选人能赢得足够的阿富汗人摇摆票，获得权力，这里也没有讨价还价，没有思想市场的竞争，而正是这些因素才使得民主制如此有吸引力。只剩两个团体相互竞争来统治对方，事实上，如果竞争是和平的，就已经是谢天谢地了。 If America is best explained as a Puritan-Quaker culture locked in a death-match with a Cavalier-Borderer culture, with all of the appeals to freedom and equality and order and justice being just so many epiphenomena – well, I’m not sure what to do with that information. 如果美国可以很好地被解释成一种清教徒-贵格会文化，和一种骑士党-边民文化锁在一起的拼死对决，并且所有对自由，平等，秩序，正义的呼求仅是众多附带现象——那么我不确定该如何处理这个信息。 Push it under the rug? Say “Well, my culture is better, so I intend to do as good a job dominating yours as possible?” Agree that We Are Very Different Yet In The End All The Same And So Must Seek Common Ground? Start researching genetic engineering? Maybe secede? 把它藏在桌布下？说“好，我的文化更好，所以我打算竭尽全力做做好事，来统治你？”同意我们是非常不同的，但最终我们会变得一样，所以我们必须寻求共同立场？开始研究基因工程？也许独立分裂？ I’m not a Trump fan much more than I’m an Osama bin Laden fan; if somehow Osama ended up being elected President, should I start thinking “Maybe that time we made a country that was 49% people like me and 51% members of the Taliban –maybe that was a bad idea“. 我不是个川普粉，就像我不是奥萨马·本·拉登粉丝一样；如果不知何故，本·拉登当选了总统，我应该开始思考“也许那时候我们由49%的像我这样的人和51%的塔利班组成了一个国家——也许这是一个坏主意”。 I don’t know. But I highly recommend Albion’s Seed as an entertaining and enlightening work of historical scholarship which will be absolutely delightful if you don’t fret too much over all of the existential questions it raises. 我不知道。但是我高度推荐《阿尔比安的种子》这本富有娱乐性和启发性的历史学著作。如果你没有过多地被它引起的实在性问题吓到，读它绝对会是非常愉悦的。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-11-22】 @爱贝睿学堂 #用心父母#孩子犯错，到底该不该惩罚他呢？惩罚他觉得孩子还小，可是如果不惩罚的话，他又怎么能学好？这可真是左右为难，怎么办呢？ @赵昱鲲 节目中介绍了三个步骤来培养孩子责任心，你和孩子实践过了么？[兔子]O网页链接 ​​​​ @赵昱鲲:#用心父母# 我反对任何形式的惩罚，而是让孩子承担自然后果，这样他才能有真正的责任心，不至于到将来被社会惩罚。 @whigzhou: 为何你要拒绝成为自然的一部分呢？ @whigzhou: 1）比如儿子叫我婊子， 我给他一个耳光，这个后果好像挺『自然』的，他在外面这么做也会吃耳光 @whigzhou: 2）我不认为父母的责任仅限于充当孩子成长的自然环境，有些事情无法经由平滑的学习路径习得，在无辅导学习过程中，可能1/4的学习者死掉了，比如辨别毒蘑菇， @whigzhou: 3）有些错误行为没有直接可感知的负面反馈，除了人为施加的惩罚，比如从欺骗和背约中获利 @赵昱鲲:辉总没有听这个节目吧？[哈哈] 我在里面提到了，孩子打了你，你也可以打回去，这就是自然后果的一部分。我说的惩罚是没有因果关系的惩罚 @whigzhou: 嗯嗯没听，只看了微博帖 @赵昱鲲: @whigzhou 这是文字版的一部分。在微博上讨论育儿，其实很费劲，因为育儿是一件很复杂的事情，孩子的年龄、父母的性格、家庭的社会经济地位、外界环节的影响等等，都得考虑进去，什么都说，就什么都没法说，最后就只能讲大道理了。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 照这么说，我们只是对什么叫『惩罚』有不同看法，依我看，惩罚当然是基于受罚者对因果关系之认识的，否则不构成激励反馈，只能叫『光火』或『暴跳』，如此改变词义是要安抚玻璃心？呵呵 @赵昱鲲:另外，有些惩罚时间拉得太长，我就见过家长在从幼儿园接孩子回家时说，回去看我怎么收拾你，那其实孩子不太会明白晚上受的惩罚与白天干的坏事之间的联系的。 @whigzhou: 嗯回路要短，所以以前老人兜里都揣着糖果～  

HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION A Conversation with Joseph Henrich  文化如何推动人类进化：与Joseph Henrich对话 时间:@ 2012-09-04 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution.  导言：我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信，我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。 JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia. 约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家，同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学（UBC）文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。 [JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I've been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it's so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it. 约瑟夫·亨里奇：过去几年，我反复追问自己的一个主要问题，大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指，观念在代际间不断积累，从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西，下一代人又添加一点点东西，如此接力，直到最后得出的工具无比复杂，以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。 This was a really important line in human evolution, and we've begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information. 这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索，我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点，这种观点认为，人脑增大的真正动力就是，文化信息以这种方式不断累积，由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息，存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the things that culture creates—like tools. Compared to chimpanzees, we have high levels of manual dexterity. We're good at throwing objects. We can thread a needle. There are  aspects of our brain that seem to be consistent with that as being an innate ability, but tools and artifacts (the kinds of things that one finds useful to throw or finds useful to manipulate) are themselves products of cultural evolution. 随着时间推移，两个系统开始相互作用。在人类进化的过程中，最重要的选择压力正是文化所生成的事物，比如工具。与黑猩猩相比，我们的手要灵巧得多，比如我们善于抛掷东西，我们能够穿针引线。我们大脑的某些方面与此高度协调，使得这种能力看上去似乎与生俱来，但工具和人工制品——那种我们觉得扔出去有用或操作起来有用的东西——本身则是文化进化的产物。 Another example here is fire and cooking. Richard Wrangham, for example, has argued that fire and cooking have been important selection pressures, but what often gets overlooked in understanding fire and cooking is that they're culturally transmitted—we're terrible at making fires actually. We have no innate fire-making ability. But once you got this idea for cooking and making fires to be culturally transmitted, then it created a whole new selection pressure that made our stomachs smaller, our teeth smaller, our gapes or holdings of our mouth smaller, it altered the length of our intestines. It had a whole bunch of downstream effects. 另外一个例子就是用火和烹饪。Richard Wrangham就提出，用火和烹饪一直都是非常重要的选择压力。但在看待用火和烹饪的问题上，经常容易忽略的一点是，它们实际是通过文化进行传递的——人类原本是不怎么会生火的。我们不具备生火的先天能力。但一旦烹饪和生火的观念通过文化得以传递，就创造出一种全新的选择压力，使我们的胃容量变小、牙齿变小、嘴能张开的幅度变小，一口能吃下的东西也变少，而且我们肠道的长度也发生改变。这就带来了一系列的下游效应。 Another area that we've worked on is social status. Early work on human status just took humans to have a kind of status that stems from non-human status. Chimps, other primates, have dominant status. The assumption for a long time was that status in humans was just a kind of human version of this dominant status, but if you apply this gene-culture co-evolutionary thinking, the idea that culture is one of the major selection pressures in human evolution, you come up with this idea that there might be a second kind of status. We call this status prestige. 我们研究的另一个领域是社会地位。有关人类社会地位的早期研究只是简单地假定，人类的地位有其非人类时期的根源。黑猩猩和其他灵长类社群中都有拥有宰制地位的个体。长期以来，人们假定，人类的地位属性只不过是动物群体中的宰制地位的人类版本。但如果运用这种“基因和文化协同进化”的观念，也就是说把文化作为人类进化中的一种主要选择压力，你就会意识到或许存在另外一种类型的地位。我们称其为“威望地位”。 This is the kind of status you get from being particularly knowledgeable or skilled in an area, and the reason it's a kind of status is because once animals, humans in this case, can learn from each other, they can possess resources. 当你在某个领域的知识特别丰富或技能特别熟练时，你就能得到这种地位。这之所以能成为一种地位，是因为一旦动物（此处就是人）能够彼此学习，它们自身便可拥有资源【编注：此句较绕口，意思是相互学习的可能性，使得个体所拥有的知识成为一种对他人也有价值的人力资源】。 You have information resources that can be tapped, and then you want to isolate the members of your group who are most likely to have a lot of this resources, meaning a lot of the knowledge or information that could be useful to you in the future. This causes you to focus on those individuals, differentially attend to them, preferentially listen to them and give them deference in exchange for knowledge that you get back, for copying opportunities in the future. 如果存在可资利用的信息资源，那你就会想把你所属团体之中最有可能拥有大量此类资源的人单独区分出来，这是一大堆你将来有可能用得上的知识或信息。这会促使你关注这些人，特别地留意他们，更乐于倾听他们的意见，敬重他们，以此作为从他们那里获得知识、在未来运用这些知识的回报。

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From this we've argued that humans have two separate kinds of status, dominance and prestige, and these have quite different ethologies. Dominance [ethology] is about physical posture, of size (large expanded chest the way you'd see in apes). Subordinates in dominance hierarchies are afraid. They back away. They look away, where as prestige hierarchies are quite the opposite. 基于此，我们认为人类存在两种不同类型的地位，分别是宰制和威望，分别对应着不同的动物行为学。宰制（行为学）核心在于身体块头的展示（你能在猿类身上看到的那种大块胸肌）。在宰制等级中，处于从属地位的个体会感到害怕。他们会退缩。他们不会正视上级，而在威望等级中情况则正好相反。 You're attracted to prestigious individuals. You want to be near them. You want to look at them, watch them, listen to them, and interact with them. We've done a bunch of experimental work here at UBC and shown that that pattern is consistent, and it leads to more imitation. There may be even specific hormonal profiles with the two kinds of status. 你会被有威望的个体所吸引。你渴望亲近他们。你渴望看着他们，观察他们，倾听他们，与他们交往。在UBC（不列颠哥伦比亚大学），我们已经就此做过一连串实验，证明了这种模式总是存在，而且会引发更多的模仿。这两种不同的地位可能还对应着各自不同的激素配置。 I've also been trying to think broadly, and some of the big questions are, exactly when did this body of cumulative cultural evolution get started? Lately I've been pursuing the idea that it may have started early: at the origins of the genus, 1.8 million years ago when Homo habilis or Homo erectus first begins to emerge in Africa. 此外，我也一直在试图思考一些更为宏大的问题，比如，这一累积性的文化进化体到底是从什么时候开始的？最近，我一直致力于澄清一个想法，那就是它可能开始得很早：很可能在人属出现时就开始了，也就是180万年前能人或直立人最早出现于非洲的时候。 Typically, people thinking about human evolution have approached this as a two-part puzzle, as if there was a long period of genetic evolution until either 10,000 years ago or 40,000 years ago, depending on who you're reading, and then only after that did culture matter, and often little or no consideration given to a long period of interaction between genes and culture. 通常，研究人类进化的人在处理这一问题时，会把它看作是一个“两部分谜题”，就好像从一开始直到距今1万或4万年以前（具体时间取决于你正在阅读谁的研究），曾经存在过一个长时段的基因进化，自此以后，文化才开始发挥作用。他们很少或根本不会考虑基因和文化之间曾长期相互作用这种情形。 Of course, the evidence available in the Paleolithic record is pretty sparse, so another possibility is that it emerged about 800,000 years ago. One theoretical reason to think that that might be an important time to emerge is that there's theoretical models that show that culture, our ability to learn from others, is an adaptation to fluctuating environments. If you look at the paleo-climatic record, you can see that the environment starts to fluctuate a lot starting about 900,000 years ago and going to about six or five hundred thousand years ago. 当然，我们能得到的旧石器时代证据相当少。因此，另一种可能性是，这一文化进化体开始于大约80万年前。这个时间点之所以成为一个重要的起源时间选项，一个理论依据在于，已经有理论模型表明，文化——即我们从他人身上学习的能力——是我们对持续的环境变动的一种适应。翻一翻古气候记录就会发现，环境大概在距今90万年前的时候开始剧烈变动，直到距今60或50万年前才消停。 This would have created a selection pressure for lots of cultural learning for lots of focusing on other members of your group, and taking advantage of that cumulative body of non-genetic knowledge. 这有可能创造出一种选择压力，催生了更多的文化学习，促使人更多关注团体中的其他成员，也促使人们更多地利用那种累积性的非基因的知识体。

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Another signature of cultural learning is regional differentiation and material culture, and you see that by about 400,000 years ago. So, you could have a kind of late emergence at 400,000 years ago. A middle guess would be 800,000 years ago based on the climate, and then the early guess would be, say, the origin of genus, 1.8 million years ago. 文化学习的另外一个鲜明特征是地区分化和物质文化，这一点在大约40万年前可以看到。所以还有一种说法，认为这一文化进化体始于40万年前。这一时间比较晚，持中的猜测则是基于气候的80万年前起源说，更早的猜测则是人属出现的时候，即180万年前。 Along these same lines, I've been trying to figure out what the ancestral ape would have looked like. We know that humans share a common ancestry with chimpanzees about five or six million years ago with chimpanzees and bonobos, and the question is, what kind of ape was that? 沿着同样的思考线索，我还一直试图弄清祖猿长成什么样子。我们知道，大概500万或600万年前，人类和黑猩猩、倭黑猩猩拥有共同的祖先，问题是，这是种什么样的猿？ One possibility, and the typical assumption, is that the ape was more like a chimpanzee or a bonobo. But there's another possibility that it was a different kind of ape that we don't have in the modern world: a communal breeding ape that lives in family units rather than the kind of fission fusion you might see in chimpanzees, and that actually chimpanzees and bonobos took a separate turn, and that lineage eventually went to humans spurred off a whole bunch of different kinds of apes. In the Pliocene, we see lots of different kinds of apes in terms of different species of Australopithecus. 其中一种可能是，这种祖猿更像黑猩猩或倭黑猩猩，这也是通常的假设。但还有另外一种可能性，它们可能是一种当今世界已经不存在的完全不同的猿：一种以家庭为单位、合作繁殖的猿，而不是黑猩猩那种裂变融合群体【译注：指群体的规模和成员不断变动】，而且黑猩猩和倭黑猩猩实际上是往另外一个不同方向上演变了，而最终进化出人类的那一谱系则进化成为一系列不同种类的猿。在上新世，我们可以看到大量不同种类的猿，他们都是南猿的不同种。 I'm just beginning to get into that, and I haven't gotten very far, but I do have this strong sense that we now have evidence to suggest that humans were communal breeders, so that we lived in family groups maybe somewhat similar to the way gorillas live in family groups, and that this is a much better environment for the evolution of capacities for culture than typical in the chimpanzee model, because for cultural learning to really take off, you need more than one model. 我才刚刚开始研究这一问题，成果还不多，但我强烈地感觉到，我们现在已经有证据说人类曾是合作繁殖的，因此我们是生活于家庭群体之中的，某种程度上就像大猩猩现在的那种家庭群体生活一样。相比黑猩猩的那种模式，这一模式为文化能力进化提供的环境要好得多，因为文化学习要真正实现飞跃，必须得有多种模式。 You want a number of individuals in your social environment to be trying out different techniques—say different techniques for getting nuts or for finding food or for tracking animals. Then you need to pay attention to them so you can take advantage of the variation between them. If there's one member of your group who's doing it a little bit better, you preferentially learn from them, and then the next generation gets the best technique from the previous generation. 这需要你所在的社会环境中拥有许多个体去尝试各不相同的技术，比如说取出果仁或找到食物或追踪猎物的不同技术。然后你就需要细心关注他们，以便能充分利用他们彼此之间的差异变化。如果群体之中有一个成员比其他成员做得稍微好一点点，你就更乐于向他们学习，于是下一代就能从上一代学到最好的技术。 Other things I've been thinking about along these lines are just trying to think through all the different adaptations that would have resulted from this gene culture interaction. One thing that's been noted by a number of people is that humans are strangely good at long distance running. We seem to have long distance running adaptations. 沿着这条线索，我还在考虑其他一些问题，那就是基于这种基因与文化的相互作用，到底我们会出现哪些不同的适应性变化。其中许多人已经注意到的一点是，人类特别善于长距离奔跑，这一点相当令人诧异。我们身上似乎出现了长距离奔跑的适应性变化。 Our feet have a particular anatomy. We have sweat glands and we can run really far. Hunter-gatherers can chase down game by just running the antelope down until it collapses. We run marathons. We seem generally attracted to running, and the question is, how did we become such long distance runners? 我们的脚具有一种独特的生理构造。我们拥有汗腺，可以跑得很远。狩猎采集者要追捕羚羊的话，只需要追着它跑，直到猎物筋疲力尽自己倒下。我们能跑马拉松。我们似乎全都对跑步感兴趣。问题是，我们是如何变得这样善于长跑的呢？ We don't see this in other kinds of animals. We think if it was an obvious adaptation, we'd see it recurring through nature, but only humans have it. The secret is that humans who don't know how to track animals, can't run them down, so you need to have a large body of tracking knowledge that allows you to interpret spoors and identify individual animals and track animals over long distances when you can't see the animal, and without that body of knowledge, we're not very good at running game down. 在其他动物身上，我们看不到这一点。我们认为，如果这是一种简单的适应，那我们就应该能在自然界中看到它重复出现，但这一现象只有人类身上有。这里的隐秘在于，如果有的人类不知道如何追踪猎物，那他就不可能尾随追捕，所以你需要拥有一大套的追踪知识，以便你能在看不到猎物的时候分析足迹，能正确辨识猎物个体并能长距离追踪到它。如果没有这一知识体系，我们是不善于把猎物追倒的。 There's an interaction between genes and culture. First you have to get the culturally transmitted knowledge about animal behavior and tracking and spoor knowledge and the ability to identify individuals, which is something you need to practice, and only after that can you begin to take advantage of long distance running techniques and being able to run animals down. 在基因与文化之间存在着相互作用。首先你需要拥有那套关于动物行为和追踪的知识、足迹知识和辨识猎物个体的能力，而这是通过文化传递的，是一种需要练习的东西，只有这样，你才能用上长跑技巧，才能把猎物追倒。 That's a potential source for figuring out the origins of capacities for culture, because to the degree that we have information about the anatomy of feet, we can use that to figure out when it started. The same idea follows from cooking and fire. Since we know that those are culturally transmitted now, when we begin to see evidence that that affected our anatomy, that gives us clues to the origins of our capacities for culture. 要弄清人类文化能力的起源，这是一个可以思考的方向，因为凭借对人类足部构造的了解，我们可以弄清文化进化开始的时间。同样的思路也可以用在烹饪和用火问题上。因为我们现已知道烹饪和用火都是通过文化传递的，因此，如果我们能够找到它们影响身体构造的证据，就有了探究我们的文化能力之起源的线索。

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Most recently I've been also thinking about the evolution of societal complexity. This is the emergence of complex societies that happens after the origins of agriculture, when societies begin to get big and complex and you have lots of interactions among strangers, large-scale cooperation, market exchange, militaries, division of labor, substantial division of labor. We have a sense of the sequence of events, but we don't have good process descriptions of how it was. What are the causal processes that bring these things about? 最近，我还在思考社会复杂性的进化问题。这里说的是农业起源之后复杂社会的出现，社会开始变大、变复杂，在其中你能看到陌生人之间的大量互动、大范围的合作、市场交换、军队、劳动分工、深度劳动分工。我们对这些事件的发生次序有所了解，但对于它们到底是如何发生的，我们还没能形成一个很好的过程描叙。引发这些事件的因果过程到底是什么样的？ One of the ideas I've been pursuing is that after the origins of agriculture, there was an intense period that continues today of intergroup competition, which favors groups who have social norms and institutions that can more effectively expand the group while maintaining internal harmony, leading to the benefits of exchange, of the ability to maintain markets, of division of labor and of higher levels of cooperation. Then you get intense competition amongst the early farming groups, and this is going to favor those groups who have the abilities to expand. 我一直在思考的一个想法是，在农业出现之后，曾有过一个群体之间激烈竞争的时期，一直持续到现在。这种竞争使得拥有社会规范和制度、从而能够更有效地在扩张的同时维持内部和谐的一类群体脱颖而出，进而凸显出了交易、维持市场的能力、劳动分工和更高水平的合作所能带来的好处。早期农耕群体之间存在激烈竞争，那些拥有扩张能力的群体在这种竞争中更占优势。 You need to be precise about what you mean by these cultural traits and norms. I've worked in a couple of different areas on this, and one is religion. We just got a big grant to study the cultural evolution of religion with the idea being that the religions of modern societies are quite different than the religions we see in hunter gatherers and small scale societies, because they've been shaped by this process over millennia, and specifically they've been shaped in ways that galvanize cooperation in larger groups and sustained cooperation amongst non relatives. 在谈及文化特征和规范时，需要精确界定它们表达的意思。我在许多不同领域中都研究过这一问题，其中一个领域就是宗教。我们刚刚拿到一大笔资金，来研究宗教的文化进化，主要的观点就是，现代社会的宗教与狩猎采集群体和小规模社会中的宗教大不相同，因为它们已经被这一进程不断塑造了几千年，特别是，它们已经被塑造得能够有助于大规模群体中的合作，以及非亲属之间的持续合作。 The emergence of high-moralizing gods is an important example of this. In small-scale hunter-gatherer religions, the gods are typically whimsical. They're amoral. They're not concerned with your sexual behavior or your social behavior. Often you'll make bargains with them, but as we begin to move to the religions in more complex societies, we find that the gods are increasingly moralizing. They're concerned about exactly the kinds of things that are going to be a problem for running a large-scale society, like how you treat other members of your religious group or your ethnic group. 这方面的一个重要例子就是具有高度道德教化意义的神的出现。在小规模狩猎采集群体的宗教中，神通常都是反复无常的。它们是非道德的。它们并不关心你的性行为或社会行为。通常你会跟它们讨价还价。但在更为复杂的社会中，我们发现神会变得越来越具有道德教化意义。它们所关注的，恰好就是会对大规模社会运行构成麻烦的那一类事情，比如你如何对待同一宗教团体或本种族中的其他成员。 Experiments run at UBC and elsewhere have shown that when you remind atheists, it doesn't matter, but if you remind believers of their god, believers cheat less, and they're more pro social or fair in exchange tasks, and the kinds of exchange tasks that they're more pro social in are the ones with anonymous others, or strangers. UBC和其他一些地方所做的实验都表明，如果你提醒无神论者注意自己的言行，基本没有什么效果，但如果你提醒有神论者，并抬出他们的神，他们就会更少说谎，在参与交易时也会表现得更亲社会或更公平，而且他们在其中表现得更亲社会的这类交易，其对象都是匿名人士或陌生人。 These are the kinds of things you need to make a market run to have a successful division of labor. We've been pursuing that hypothesis and, in fact, we've just sent a number of psychologists and anthropologists to the field, and we'll be doing more of that in the coming years to do these kinds of experiments in a diverse range of societies, seeing if the moralizing gods of a variety of religions create these same kinds of effects. 这恰好是维持市场运转、成功维系劳动分工所需要的特征。我们近来一直在研究这个假说，事实上，我们不久前刚派出了一批心理学家和人类学家就此去做田野研究，未来几年还会加大力度，在大量不同社会群体中去做这类实验，以检验不同宗教中的教化性神是否都能造成以上同样的效果。

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We also think that ritual plays a role in this in that rituals seem to be sets of practices engineered by cultural evolution to be effective at transmitting belief and transmitting faith. By attending a ritual, you elevate the degree of belief in the high-moralizing gods or the priests of the religion by the ritual practice. If you break down rituals common in many religions, they put the words in the mouths of a prestigious member of the group, someone everyone respects. That makes it more likely to transmit and be believed. 我们还认为，仪式在文化进化中发挥了作用。仪式似乎是文化进化所创造出来的一整套行为，有助于信念和信仰的传递。通过参与仪式，你就能通过仪式行为提高对高度教化性的神或传教者的信仰程度。如果你分析一下在许多宗教中都能找到的仪式行为就会发现，它们会借群体中某个威望很高、大家都尊重的人物之口来宣之于众。这会令其更易传播、更可能被相信。 People also engage in what we call credibility-enhancing displays [during rituals]. These are costly things. It might be an animal sacrifice or the giving of a large sum of money or some kind of painful initiation rite like circumcision, which one would only engage in if one actually believed in it. It's a demonstration of true belief, which then makes the observers more likely to acquire the belief. （在仪式过程中，）人们也会参与我们称为“提升可信度”的行为。这是一种代价颇高的事情。可能是以动物献祭，或者捐出大笔钱财，或者是某种痛苦的加入仪式，比如割礼，这些事都是只有真正的信徒才会参与的，是真信仰的展示，并能增加旁观者接受这些信仰的可能性。 Speaking in unison, large congregations saying the same thing, this all taps our capacity for conformist transmission; the fact that we weight what everybody believes in deciding in what we believe. 齐声说话，大规模集会倾诉同样的内容，这些都是在利用人们实现从众传递的潜力——也就是说我们在选择自己要相信什么的时候会考虑其他人都相信些什么。 These seem to want to tap our cultural transmission abilities to deepen the faith, and one of the interesting kind of ways that this has developed is that high-moralizing gods will often require rituals of this kind, and then by forcing people to routinely do the rituals, they then guarantee that the next generation acquires a deepened faith in the god, and then the whole thing perpetuates itself. It creates a self-perpetuating cycle. 这就像是要利用文化传递能力来加深信仰，它发展出来的有趣方式之一是，高度教化性的神通常都要求执行这类仪式，通过强迫人们经常性地履行仪式，就能保证下一代人对神能够拥有更深一层的信仰，然后整套体系就能实现永续。它创造出了一个自我存续的循环。 We think religions are just one element, one way in which culture has figured out ways to expand the sphere of cooperation and allow markets to form and people to exchange and to maintain the substantial division of labor. 我们认为，文化已经发展出了许多方式来扩大合作领域、允许市场形成、促进人们之间的交易，并维持明确的劳动分工，而宗教只是其中之一。 One of the interesting things about the division of labor is that you're not going to specialize in a particular trade—maybe you make steel plows—unless you know that there are other people who are specializing in other kinds of trades which you need—say food or say materials for making housing, and you have to be confident that you can trade with them or exchange with them and get the other things you need. 关于劳动分工，有一点非常有趣：你要选择专门从事某一特定行业，比如打造铁犁具，这需要一个前提，那就是你得知道有人专门从事你对之有需求的其他一些行业，比如食品或建材，而且你需要确信，自己能与他们进行贸易或交换，能够得到你需要的其他东西。 There's a lot of risk in developing specialization because you have to be confident that there's a market there that you can engage with. Whereas if you're a generalist and you do a little bit of farming, a little bit of manufacturing, then you're much less reliant on the market. 发展专业分工有很大的风险，因为你必须确信存在一个你能够利用的市场。如果你是个多面手，能做一点农活，再从事一些制造，那么你对这个市场的依赖度就大幅降低。 Markets require a great deal of trust and a great deal of cooperation to work. Sometimes you get the impression from economics that markets are for self-interested individuals. They're actually the opposite. Self-interested individuals don't specialize, and they don't take it [to market], because there's all this trust and fairness that are required to make markets run with impersonal others. 市场的运转需要很高的信任和大量的合作。你会从经济学得知，市场是由自利的个体组成的。实际上正好相反。自利的个体没法专业化，不能形成市场，因为要使市场在素昧平生的陌路人之间运作，那需要非常高的信任和公平。

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In developing this line of thought, one of the things you need to be clear about is what you mean by culture and culture evolution. Culture is one of those terms that has lots of different meanings, and people have used it lots of different ways. In the intellectual tradition that I'm building on, culture is information stored in people's heads that gets there by some kind of social learning—so imitation, teaching, any kind of observational learning. 沿着这条思路想问题时，你需要清晰界定的事物之一就是文化和文化进化的含义。文化是那种带有很多不同含义的词汇，人们已经在用不同方式使用它。在我所背靠的智识传统中，文化指的是人们通过某种形式的社会化学习——如模仿、教育或任何形式的观察学习——而获得并储存在自己头脑中的信息。 We tend to think of cultural transmission, or at least many people think of cultural transmission as relying on language, but that's in part because in our culture, especially among academics, there tends to be a lot of talking, but in lots of small-scale societies, it's quite clear that there is a ton of cultural transmission that is just strictly by observational learning. 我们，或至少很多人，都倾向于认为文化传递是依赖语言的，但造成这种理解的部分原因在于，在我们的文化里，特别是在学术界，人们倾向于进行大量的语言交流，但是在众多小型社群中，很明显大量的文化传递纯粹是依靠观察学习来实现的。 If you're trying to make a tool, you're mostly watching the physical movements of the hands and the strategies taken. You might get tips that are transmitted verbally as you go along. In building a house, you're looking at how the house is built together, again with verbal comments as supplements to getting a sense for how the house goes together. 如果你想学习制造工具，就得主要观察手部的物理运动，以及其中的技巧。在这个过程中你可能会获得一些口头传达的指点。如果要学建房子，你要观察房子到底是怎么建造起来的，当然也会得到一些口头评论，帮助你理解房子到底如何拼起来。 If you're copying how to shoot an arrow, you're watching body position and bow position and aiming, and you're not listening to a lot of exposition on it, although clearly the verbal part of the transmission helps. We think and there's experimental evidence that show you can transmit lots of stuff without using any words. 如果你是在学习射箭，你观察的是身体的姿势、弓箭的位置及如何瞄准，你不会去听一大堆阐释，虽然很明显这种传达的口头部分也是有帮助的。我们认为，而且也有很多实验证据表明，无需使用任何词语，也能传达很多信息。 This is information stored in people's brains, and when we look at other animals, we find that the evolutionary models of culture make really good predictions about culture in fish. Fish will learn food foraging preferences from each other, and non-human primates can learn from each other, but what we don't see amongst other animals is cumulative cultural evolution. The case in which the cultural transmission is high enough fidelity that you can learn one thing from one generation, and that begins to accumulate in subsequent generations. 这是储存在人脑中的信息，当我们观察其他动物的时候，我们发现文化的进化模型能够很好地预测鱼类的文化。鱼类能够相互学习觅食偏好，人类之外的灵长类也能相互学习，但我们在其他动物身上看不到累积性的文化进化。也就是那种能从一代人身上学会某样事物，然后在接下来的数代人中间开始逐步累积的足够准确的文化传递。 One possible exception to that is bird song. Bird songs accumulate in such that birds from large continents have more complex songs than birds from islands. It turns out humans from smaller islands have less complex material culture than humans from larger islands, at least until recently, until communication was opened up. One of the interesting lines of research that's come out of this recognition is the importance of population size and the interconnectedness for technology. 此处有一个可能的例外，那就是鸟鸣。鸟类的鸣叫方式能够累积，以至于大陆鸟类的鸣叫方式要比海岛鸟类的更复杂。我们还发现，直到不久之前，也就是直到交流开放之前，在物质文化的复杂程度方面，来自小型海岛的人群不如来自更大型海岛的人群。源于这一认知的有趣研究领域之一，就是人口规模和互联程度对科技的重要影响。

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I began this investigation by looking at a case study in Tasmania. Tasmania's an island off the coast of Southern Victoria in Australia and the archeological record is really interesting in Tasmania. Up until about 10,000 years ago, 12,000 years ago, the archeology of Tasmania looks the same as Australia. It seems to be moving along together. It's getting a bit more complex over time, and then suddenly after 10,000 years ago, it takes a downturn. It becomes less complex. 调查开始之初，我回顾了一个关于塔斯马尼亚岛的案例研究。塔斯马尼亚岛是澳大利亚的维多利亚州南部海洋上的一个岛屿，这里的考古记录非常有趣。直到约1万年前，和1.2万年前，塔斯马尼亚岛的考古记录看起来都跟澳洲大陆是一样的。两者似乎是齐头并进的，随着时间推移而变得日渐复杂。但在距今1万年以后，突然它就衰退了，变得没有澳洲大陆复杂了。 The ability to make fire is probably lost. Bone tools are lost. Fishing is lost. Boats are probably lost. Meanwhile, things move along just fine back on the continent, so there's this kind of divergence, and one thing nice about this experiment is that there's good reason to believe that peoples were genetically the same. 生火的能力可能丢失了。骨制工具丢失了。不会打渔了。船可能也没有了。与此同时，大陆上的事物则照常发展，所以就出现了这种分化。这一案例特别好的一点在于，我们有很好的理由相信两地的人群原本拥有相同的基因。 You start out with two genetically well-intermixed peoples. Tasmania's actually connected to mainland Australia so it's just a peninsula. Then about 10,000 years ago, the environment changes, it gets warmer and the Bass Strait floods, so this cuts off Tasmania from the rest of Australia, and it's at that point that they begin to have this technological downturn. 最开始两个群体在基因方面是相互混杂的。塔斯马尼亚最早是跟澳大利亚本土连在一起的，因此只是个半岛。大约在距今1万年前，气候发生了变化，越来越暖，于是巴斯海峡形成了，把塔斯马尼亚岛和澳大利亚其余部分分隔开来。也就是在这时，他们开始出现这种技术上的倒退。 You can show that this is the kind of thing you'd expect if societies are like brains in the sense that they store information as a group and that when someone learns, they're learning from the most successful member, and that information is being passed from different communities, and the larger the population, the more different minds you have working on the problem. 假如把各个社会群体比作不同人的大脑，就可以说发生上述这种事情毫不奇怪。因为社会群体以集体的方式储存信息，如果某人要学习，他就会向最成功的成员学习，而且这种信息会在不同社群之间传播，人口规模越大，你在处理问题时所能依靠的不同头脑就更多。 If your number of minds working on the problem gets small enough, you can actually begin to lose information. There's a steady state level of information that depends on the size of your population and the interconnectedness. It also depends on the innovativeness of your individuals, but that has a relatively small effect compared to the effect of being well interconnected and having a large population. 如果处理问题时能够依靠的头脑数目少到一定程度，你实际上会开始丢失信息。信息的稳态水平依赖于人口规模和互联程度。它也依赖于个体的创造性，但后一方面的影响相对而言比较小，良好的互联水平和大量的人口更加重要。 There have been a number of tests of this recently, the best of which is this study by Rob Boyd and Michelle Kline in which they took the fishing technologies of different Oceanic islands from the time when Europeans first arrived, and they looked at how the population size of the island relates to the tool complexity, and larger islands had much bigger and more complex fishing technologies, and you can even show an effective contact. Some of the islands were in more or less contact with each other, and when you include that, you get the size effect, but you also get a contact effect, and the prediction is that if you're more in contact, you have fancier tools, and that seems to hold up. 在这方面，最近已经有了很多测试，其中最好的当属Rob Boyd和Michelle Kline所做的研究。他们研究了自欧洲人初次抵达以后大洋洲不同岛屿上的捕鱼技术，考察了岛上人口规模如何影响渔具的复杂度，结果发现更大的岛屿拥有更大型、更复杂的捕鱼技术。有效接触也会发挥作用。其中某些岛屿跟其他岛屿之间存在或多或少的接触，如果把这个考虑在内，就既能发现规模效应，又能发现接触效应，理论上的预测是，更多的接触就意味着更好的渔具，这似乎也得到了验证。 If you follow this idea a little bit further, then it does give you a sense that rates of innovation should continue to increase, especially with the emergence of communication technologies, because these allow ideas to flow very rapidly from place to place. 如果你顺着这一想法再进一小步，它就会促使你产生一种想法，那就是创新的速度应该还会继续提高，特别是在通信技术出现以后，因为这使得观念从一地到另一地的流动速度变得非常快。 An important thing to remember is that there's always an incentive to hide your information. As an individual inventor or company, you're best off if everybody else shares their ideas but you don't share your ideas because then you get to keep your good ideas, and nobody else gets exposed to them, and you get to use their good ideas, so you get to do more recombination. 这里要记住的重要一点是，对于你自己知道的信息，你总是有动力进行隐瞒。对于个体发明家或单个公司而言，如果其他所有人都分享他们的想法，而你不分享你的想法，那你就是最受益的。因为这种情况下你能保守自己的好想法，别人没法知道，而你却能使用他们的好想法，这样你就能尝试更多的组合。 Embedded in this whole information-sharing thing is a constant cooperative dilemma in which individuals have to be willing to share for the good of the group. They don't have to explicitly know it's for the good of the group, but the idea that a norm of information sharing is a really good norm to have because it helps everybody do better because we share more ideas, get more recombination of ideas. 信息分享本身就存在合作困境，这种情形是一致存在的。为了集体的利益，个体要有分享的意愿。他们不需要明确地知道这是为了集体的利益，但他们需要建立一个观念，即认为有一个信息分享的规范是件好事，因为这能帮助所有人过得更好，因为我们分享的观念越多，我们得到的观念组合就越多。

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I've done a lot of work on marriage systems with the evolution of monogamy. We have a sort of human nature that pushes us towards polygyny whenever there are sufficient resources. Eighty-five percent of human societies have allowed men to have more than one wife, and very few societies have adopted polyandry which would be the flip side of this, and then there's actually a number of societies that allowed both, but they tended to be polygynous because, assuming you have enough resources, the men are going to be more interested in having more wives than the wives are interested in having more husbands, and the husbands aren't inclined to be second husbands as much as the women are willing to be second wives. 我在婚姻体制方面下了很多功夫，研究过一夫一妻制的进化。我们有某种天性，促使我们在资源充分的前提下追求一夫多妻。85%的人类社会曾允许男人拥有一个以上妻子，极少有社会采用过这一制度的对立面，即一妻多夫制。有些社会实际上两者都允许，但最终更可能出现一夫多妻，因为假定有充足的资源，男人会对拥有更多妻子更感兴趣，女人对于拥有更多丈夫就没那么感兴趣，而且丈夫们并不太愿意成为别人的二号丈夫，而女人在做别人的二号妻子方面意愿相对更强。 But in the modern world, of course, monogamy is normative, and people who have too many wives are thought poorly of by the larger society. The question is, how did this ever get in place? And of course, it traces back through Europe. 但是在现代社会，当然一夫一妻制是规范性的，而且那些拥有很多妻子的人会被更大社群当中的人瞧不起。问题是，到底怎么会变成这样的？当然，这要从欧洲往上追溯。 One of the things that distinguished Europe from the rest of the world was something called the European Marriage Pattern, and part of that was normative monogamy, the idea that taking a second wife was wrong as long as you still had the first wife, and this actually traces back to Rome and eventually to Athens. Athens legislates the first rules about monogamous marriage just before the Classical period. 欧洲区别于世界其他地方的一个要点就是欧洲婚姻模式，规范性一夫一妻制就是其中之一。认为只要你的第一个妻子还在，娶第二个妻子就是错误的，这种观念实际上可以追溯到古罗马，甚至古雅典。在古典时代开始之前，雅典人就正式奠定了一夫一妻制的最初规则。 This was an example of a case where people are ready to moralize it, and I like to view it as the evolution of this marriage system of monogamy. It's peculiar. It doesn't fit with what we know about human nature, but it does seem to have societal level benefits. It reduces male-male competition. 人们会把一些东西道德化，婚姻制度就是例证之一，而且我倾向于从一夫一妻制婚姻体制的进化这个角度来考虑。这是很特别的。它跟我们对人性的认知相左，但确实具有社会层面的好处。它能减少男性之间的竞争。 We think there's evidence to say it reduces crime, reduces substance abuse, and it also engages males in ways that cause them to discount the future less and engage in productive activities rather than taking a lot of risks which include crime and other things. Depending on what your value systems are, if you think freedom is really important, then you might be for polygyny, but if you want to trade freedom off against other social ills like high crime, then you might favor the laws that prohibit polygamy. 我们认为，有证据表明这一制度可以减少犯罪，减少毒品滥用，而且它还能吸引男性更多地重视未来，更多地参与生产性活动，而不是到处冒险，制造犯罪及其他事端。这取决于你的价值观体系，如果你认为自由非常重要，那么你可能会支持一夫多妻，但如果你愿意为了减少社会麻烦（如高犯罪率）而牺牲一些自由，那么你可能就会支持立法禁止多偶制。 When I talk about success and un-success, I don't mean anything moralizing. I'm talking about the cultural evolutionary processes that favor the spread of one idea over another. If I talk about normative monogamy as being successful, I mean that it spread, and in this case the idea is that it spread despite the fact that it's contrary to some aspects of human nature. It does harness our pair bonding in some aspects, so it's a complex story there, but it creates societal level benefits. 我所说的成功或不成功，并不具有任何道德意味。我要表达的只是，在文化进化的过程中，某个理念的传播压倒了另外一个理念。当我说规范性一夫一妻制成功了的时候，我的意思只是它传播开了，而且在这个例子中，尽管它与人性某些方面相抵触，但仍然得以传播开来。它确实在某些方面约束了我们的结成配偶的行为，所以这个故事很复杂，但它带来了社会层面的好处。 Societies that have this are better able to maintain a harmonious population, increase trade and exchange, and have economic growth more than societies that allow polygamy, especially if you have a society with widely varying amounts of wealth, especially among males. Then you're going to have a situation that would normally promote high levels of polygyny. 实行一夫一妻制的社会更能维持人与人之间的和谐，增加贸易和交易，实现更快的经济增长，而允许多偶制的社会在这些方面就要差一些，特别是如果这一社会里财富差异非常大时（尤其是在男性之间）。如果存在上述情形，通常都会加剧一夫多妻的程度。 The absolute levels of wealth difference of, say, between Bill Gates and Donald Trump and the billionaires of the world, and the men at the bottom end of the spectrum is much larger than it's ever been in human history, and that includes kings and emperors and things like that in terms of total control of absolute wealth. 比如说，一边是比尔·盖茨、唐纳德·特朗普以及世上的亿万富翁，另一边则是处于财富分配末端的众多人口，财富差异绝对水平远远超过人类历史上的任何时候，而且这还把历史上那些国王、帝王等人物都考虑了在内，他们可是绝对财富的全权控制者。 Males will be males in the sense that they'll try to obtain extra matings, but the billionaires are completely curbed in terms of what they would do if they could do what emperors have done throughout the ages. They have harems and stuff like that. Norms of modern society prevent that. 男性作为男性，就会力图拥有更多的配偶，但现在的亿万富翁在这一点上却受到了完全的约束；本来如果他们可以这么做，他们会这么做的，历史上的所有帝王都不例外。他们会形成后宫体制，或类似的体制，但现代社会的道德规范阻止了他们。 Otherwise, there would be massive male-male competition, and even to get into the mating and marriage market you would have to have a high level of wealth if we were to let nature take it's course as it did in the earliest empires. It depends on what your views are about freedom versus societal level benefits. 否则的话，如果我们像早期帝国那样，让天性不加阻碍地发展，那将会出现大规模的男性竞争，甚至是仅仅想进入配偶和婚姻市场，你就得拥有很多的财富。这取决于你如何看待自由和社会层面利益之间的取舍。

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Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 我的研究课题之一就是要说服人们相信，人们应该停止在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们希望将所有这些事情整个当作生物进化看待。 We want to distinguish genetic evolution and cultural evolution, and then at some point we may have epigenetic evolution, and there are other kinds of inheritance systems. 我们要区分基因进化和文化进化，在某些情况下我们可能还发生了表观进化，此外还有其他种类的继承机制。 It's going to be a little bit more of a complex story. Culture is part of our biology. We now have the neuroscience to say that culture's in our brain, so if you compare people from different societies, they have different brains. Culture is deep in our biology. 接下来的故事更加复杂一点。文化是我们生物属性的一部分。现在，神经科学告诉我们，文化存在于我们的大脑中，所以如果你把来自不同社会的人进行比较，会发现他们拥有不同的大脑。文化深嵌于我们的生物属性之中。 We have people with different cultural backgrounds that have different hormonal reactions as well as having different brains on the MRI scan. So culture is just part of our biology, and we shouldn't take this dualistic view that there's this realm of ideas that somehow are separate from this realm of biology, and you're either talking about the realm of ideas or the realm of biology. 我们看到，来自不同文化背景的人会有不同的激素反应，而且在核磁共振扫描上显示的大脑也不一样。所以文化只是我们生物属性的一部分，我们不应该采取一种二元区分的观点，认为存在一个观念领域，和一个生物领域，两者截然分开，只能分别谈论。 Cognition and our ability to think are all interwoven, and we're a cultural species, which means one of our genetic programs is to be able to acquire ideas, beliefs and values and weave them into our brain such that they then affect our biology. A good example of this is the placebos. 认知和思考能力是相互交织的，我们就是一个文化物种，这就是说我们的基因程序之一就是使我们获得观念、信念和价值观并将它们编入我们的大脑，我们的生物属性也因而受到影响。 Placebos are something that depend on your cultural beliefs. If you believe that something will work, then when you take it, like you take an aspirin or you take a placebo for an aspirin, it initiates the same pathways as the chemically active substance. 这方面的一个恰当例子就是安慰剂。安慰剂的作用取决于你的文化信念。如果你相信某物会起作用，那在你服用它之后，比如把安慰剂当作阿司匹林来服用，那么安慰剂就会像阿司匹林那样开启同样的路径。 Placebos are chemically inert but biologically active, and it's completely dependent on your cultural beliefs. If you don't believe that cures come in pills, then taking a placebo aspirin does not have any effect on you. That's a case where it shows the ability of a cultural belief to activate biological processes, and then it's something we know a little bit about. 从化学角度来说，安慰剂是不会起效的，但从生物学上来说，它能起到跟阿司匹林一样的作用，这完全取决于你的文化信念。如果你不相信药能治病，那么服用阿司匹林安慰剂就不会对你产生任何效果。这是表明文化信念能够激发生物过程的一个案例，我们对此稍微有所了解。

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One of the large research projects that I run in an effort to understand human sociality is called The Root of Human Sociality Project. In the mid '90s I was working in the Peruvian Amazon and I was working with a group called the Machiguenga. Traditionally, the Machiguenga lived in single-family units scattered throughout the forest. I had been exposed through my advisor, Rob Boyd, at the time to something called the Ultimatum Game, and the Ultimatum Game seemed to provide evidence that humans were innately inclined to punish unfairness. 为了理解人类社会，我正在做的大型研究项目中包括一个“人类社会性探源项目”。上世纪90年代中期我在秘鲁的亚马逊地区工作，跟一个叫做Machiguenga的群体一起。传统上，该群体的人们以独户家庭为单位分散居住在森林里。通过我的导师Rob Boyd，我那时知道了一个叫做“最后通牒博弈”的东西，而这个博弈似乎能够证明人类天性倾向于对不公加以惩罚。 In the Ultimatum Game, two players are allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer a portion of this $100 to the second player who can either accept or reject. If the second player accepts, they get the amount of the money, and the first player gets the remainder. If they reject, both players get zero. 在“最后通牒博弈”中，两个参与者会拿到一笔钱，比如100块。参与者A可以开价，将100块中的一部分给予参与者B，后者既可以接受，也可以拒绝。如果参与者B接受，他就能拿走提议数目的钱，剩下的归参与者A。如果他拒绝，那两个参与者都拿不到钱。 Just to give you an example, suppose the money is $100, and the first player offers $10 out of the $100 to the second player. If the second player accepts, he gets the $10 and the first player gets $90. If he rejects, both players go home with zero. If you place yourself in the shoes of the second player, then you should be inclined to accept any amount of money if you just care about making money. 举个例子，假设总数为100块，参与者A开价将100块中的10块给参与者B。如果B接受，他就得10块，而A得90块。如果他拒绝，两人都只能空手而归。如果你站在参与者B的角度想问题，如果你只关心赚钱与否，那你就应该接受任何开价。 Now, if he offers you zero, you have the choice between zero and zero, so it's ambiguous what you should do. But assuming it's a positive amount, so $10, you should accept the $10, go home with $10 and let the other guy go home with $90. 如果A提出不给你钱，那无论如何选择，你都只能空手而归，在这种情况下你应该如何选择就是不确定的。但是，假定A提议分给你一个正数，比如10块，那你就应该接受这10块钱，拿着10块钱回家，让另外那个家伙拿90块回家。 But in experiments with undergraduates, Western undergraduates, going back to 1982, behavioral economists find that students give about half, sometimes a little bit less than half, and people are inclined to reject offers below about 30 percent. 但在实验中，在1982年针对大学生——西方大学生——的实验中，行为经济学家发现，学生们会开价给一半，有时候是略少于一半，一旦开价低于30%，人们就倾向于拒绝接受了。 Subsequent work with non-student adults in the West show that it's an even a stronger result. The older you get, even if you have more wealth and more income, you're especially inclined to only offer half, and you'll reject offers below 40 percent. 针对非学生的西方成人的后续研究显示出了比这更强的结果。随着年龄增长，不管你多么有钱收入多高，你都会特别倾向于只拿出一半钱来分享，而且你会拒绝任何低于40%的开价。 In 1995, it had been done in a number of different countries, and it seemed to be robust. I was thinking that the Machiguenga would be a good test of this, because if they also showed this willingness to reject and to make equal offers, it would really demonstrate the innateness of this finding, because they don't have any higher level institutions, and it would be hard to make a kind of cultural argument that they were bringing something into the experiment that was causing this behavior. 到1995年，研究者已在许多不同国家做过同一实验，这一关系都很明显。我当时想，拿Machiguenga人做个测试会相当好，因为如果他们也显示出拒绝的意愿和平等分享的意愿，那就真的能证明这一发现确属天性，因为这个群体中并没有任何高层次的制度，因此我们很难提出一种文化论证，说他们在参加实验时带入了某些（文化方面的）东西，影响了他们的行为。 I went and I did it in 1995 and 1996 there, and what I found amongst the Machiguenga was that they were completely unwilling to reject, and they thought it was silly. Why would anyone ever reject? They would almost explain the subgame perfect equilibrium, the solution that the economists use, back to me by saying, "Well, why would anybody ever reject? You lose money then." And they made low offers, the modal offer was 15 percent instead of 50, and the mean comes out to be about 25 percent. 我1995年和1996年去那里做了实验，而我从Machiguenga人那里得到的结论是，他们绝不愿意拒绝，而且他们觉得拒绝是愚蠢的做法。为什么有人会拒绝？而且他们几乎都能跟我解释经济学家使用的那个解，即子博弈完美均衡：“为什么会有人拒绝呢？拒绝了你就会损失钱啊。”而且他们还会给出很低额度的开价，开价的众数是15%而非50%，而平均值则是大约25%。 Rob Boyd then was my advisor, and we went to the MacArthur Foundation for some funding, and they funded us, and we were able to put together a team of anthropologists. We brought them to UCLA. We had some economists there, including Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles, and Herb Gintis, and we taught them some game theory. Rob Boyd那时候是我导师，我们跑去麦克阿瑟基金会要资助，他们资助了我们。我们由此得以组建了一个人类学家团队，把他们带到加州大学洛杉矶分校。我们在那还有一批经济学家，包括Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles和Herb Gintis，我们就教了他们一些博弈论。 There was large discussion about methods, about whether we could actually pull this off, and then over the next two summers these field anthropologists went to the field and conducted the ultimatum game as well as a few other games—not systemically across the societies— but it gave us insight that we would then later use, and what we found is that societies vary dramatically, from societies that would never reject, to societies that would even reject offers above 50 percent, and we found that mean offers ranged across societies from about 25 percent to even over 50 percent. We had some of what we called hyper fair societies. The highest was 57 percent in Lamalera, Indonesia. 当时就方法论有很多争论，还争论到了我们到底能否做成这事。但接下来的两个夏季，我们的田野人类学家就到了实地，实施了“最后通牒博弈”和其他一些博弈（并没有在不同社群中系统性实施），这给我们提供了一些见解，后来都能够用上。我们发现的是，社群与社群之间差别极大，有些社群绝不会选择拒绝任何开价，而有些社群甚至连高于50%的开价都会拒绝。而且我们发现，不同社群的平均开价从25%到高于50%不等。有些社群我们称为“极度公平”社会。其中最高的是印度尼西亚的Lamalera人，（开价）高达57%。 We found we were able to explain a lot of the variation in these offers with two variables. One was the degree of market integration. More market-integrated societies offered more, and less market integrated societies offered less. But also, there seemed to be other institutions, institutions of cooperative hunting seemed to influence offers. Societies with more cooperative institutions offered more, and these were independent effects. 我们发现，我们可以用两个变量解释开价方面的很大一部分差异。其中一个变量是市场整合的程度。市场整合度越高的社群开价越高，整合度越低的社群开价越低。不过似乎也还有其他的机制，比如合作狩猎的机制似乎也会影响开价。合作机制越多的社群开价越高，而且两者是独立发挥作用的。 This then led to a subsequent project where we measured market integration much more carefully along with a large number of other variables, including wealth, income, education, community size, and also religion. We did the Ultimatum Game along with two other experiments. The two other experiments were the Dictator Game (the Dictator Game is like the Ultimatum Game except the second player doesn't have the option to reject) and the Third Party Punishment Game. 这又引出了我们后来的项目，我们更加细致地测量了市场整合度，以及很多其他变量，包括财富、收入、教育、社区规模，还有宗教。除“最后通牒博弈”之外，我们还一同做了另外两个实验。一个是“独裁者博弈”（跟“最后通牒博弈”类似，只是参与者B没有拒绝的选项），另一个是“第三方惩罚博弈”。 In the Third Party Punishment Game, there are three players and the first two players play a Dictator Game. They're allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer any portion of the $100 to the second player, player B. Now, player B in this game can't do anything, and they just get whatever they're offered. But there is a third player, player C, and player C is given half the amount that A and B are dividing up, and he can use some of his money (20 percent of it actually) to pay to take money away from A at three times the rate. If he's given $50, he can use $10 of it to take $30 away from player A. Suppose player A gives only $10 to player B and keeps $90 for himself, then player B will go home with $10. Now, player C can pay $10, so he goes home with $40 instead of $50 in order to take $30 away from player A. Player A would go home with $60 instead of $90, because he got punished. Player B goes home with $10, and player C goes home with $40 instead of $50 because he chose to punish. 在“第三方惩罚博弈”中有三个参与者，头两个进行“独裁者博弈”。他们会得到一笔钱，比方说100块。然后参与者A可以提议将100块中的任意数目分给第二个参与者，参与者B。在这个游戏中，参与者B不能做任何事，A给他多少，他就只能得到多少。但是还有第三个参与者，参与者C。参与者C手里有相当于A和B所分数额一半的钱，他可以拿出其中的一部分（20%）去抵消掉参与者A手中的一部分钱，而且能1抵3。比如，C手里有50块，他就能花掉其中的10块去抵消掉参与者A手中的30块。假设参与者A只分了10块给B参与者，自己留下了90块，那么参与者B就得10块。但因为参与者C拿出了10块钱，那他拿回家的就是40块而非50块，又因为参与者A手中钱被抵消掉了30块。A拿回家的就是60块而非90块，因为他遭到了惩罚。参与者B拿回家10块，参与者C拿回家40块而非50块，因为他选择进行惩罚。 This gives us two different measures of willingness to punish strangers, ephemeral interactions—people that you don't know and won't see again. In the experiment, one is rejection in the Ultimatum Game, and then this Third Party Punishment measure, and it gives us three measures of fairness in this kind of transaction. 对于我们惩罚陌生人和一次性交往（那些你不认识并且以后也不会再见到的人）的意愿，这就提供了两种测量办法。在试验中，一种测量是看“最终通牒博弈”中的拒绝选项，另一个则是看“第三方惩罚”。并且，它还给我们提供了此类交易中关于公平的三种测量方式。 It gives us offers in all three games and what we found there is that market integration again predicts higher offers in all three games, and size of the community predicts willingness to punish and this fits with a lot of theoretical work, suggesting that if you have small communities, you don't need punishment. You don't need costly punishment. You need some kind of sanctioning system to keep people in line, but you're probably not going to do it with single individuals punishing. You have some other mechanism. It could be some kind of reputational mechanism like if they don't cooperate in this situation, then you won't interact with them in some other situation. It's a withdrawal of interaction rather than direct punishment. There's a number of different ways to create norm systems that operate like that. 在三种博弈中都有出价，而且我们再次发现，在三种博弈中，市场整合度能够预测出价的高低，社区的规模能够预测惩罚的意愿，而且这跟许多理论研究成果相吻合；这意味着，如果社区规模足够小，根本不需要惩罚。根本不需要代价高昂的惩罚。你需要建立某种处罚机制，以便人人都能守规矩，但你可能无需对个体施加单独的惩罚。你还有其他一些机制。可能是某种声誉机制，比方说如果他们在这种情况下不能够合作，那碰到其他情况你就不会与他们互动。这是取消交往，而不是直接惩罚。有许多办法可以创造出按照这个模式运行的规范制度。 In a big society punishment can be most effective because reputational mechanisms can be weak. If you're in a big society and you encounter somebody, you probably don't have friends in common through which you could pass reputational information for which punishment could be generated. You might want to punish them right on the spot or someone who observes the interaction might want to punish them right on the spot or call the authorities or whatever, which is also costly. 在大型社群中，惩罚可能是最有效的，因为声誉机制的效力可能很微弱。如果你在一个大型社群中与某人打交道，你和他之间可能并没有共同的朋友，那你就没法传递声誉信息，也就无从构成惩罚。你可能希望当场惩罚他，或者你们打交道时的某个旁观者可能想要当场惩罚他，或者诉诸权威，这样的代价都是很高的。

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This creates a puzzle because typically people think of small-scale kinds of societies, where you study hunter-gatherers and horticultural scattered across the globe (ranging from New Guinea to Siberia to Africa) as being very pro social and cooperative. This is true, but the thing is those are based on local norms for cooperation with kin and local interactions in certain kinds of circumstances. 这就给我们制造了一个谜题。因为通常人们认为，小规模的社区——比如当你研究的是散布全球各地的狩猎采集者群体（从新几内亚到西伯利亚到非洲）——都是非常亲社会的、非常具有合作精神的。事实的确如此，但问题是这只是基于地方性的与亲族合作的的规范，以及在特定情形下的地方性交往规范。 Hunter-gatherers are famous for being great at food sharing, but these norms don't extend beyond food sharing. They certainly don't extend to ephemeral or strangers, and to make a large-scale society run you have to shift from investing in your local kin groups and your enduring relationships to being willing to pay to be fair to a stranger. 狩猎采集者在食物分享上的慷慨是出了名的，但这些规范并不会延伸到食物分享以外。它们绝对不会延伸到一次性交往或陌生人身上。要维持一个大型社会运转，你必须要转型，从投资于你的本地亲族群体和长久关系，转变为愿意为了公平对待陌生人而付出代价。 This is something that is subtle, and what people have trouble grasping is that if you're going to be fair to a stranger, then you're taking money away from your family. In the case of these dictator games, in order to give 50 percent to this other unknown person, it meant you were going home with less money, and that meant your family was going to have less money, and your kids would have less money. To observe modern institutions, to not hire your brother-in-law when you get a fancy job or you get elected to an office is to hurt your family. Your brother-in-law doesn't have a job now. He has to have whatever other job he has, a less good job. 这种情形非常微妙。人们不容易理解的是，如果你想要公平对待陌生人，那就会让你家里的钱变少。在上述独裁者博弈中，如果你要拿出50%的钱给另外一个陌生人，那就意味着你拿回家里的钱会变少，也就是你家的钱会变少，你孩子的钱会变少。要遵守现代的制度，比如在你得到一个好工作或被选为官员以后不要雇佣自己的小舅子，这就会对自己家庭造成伤害。你的小舅子现在没有工作。他必须自己去找其他工作，一个没那么好的工作。 A commitment to something like anti-nepotism norms is something that runs against our evolutionary inclinations and our inclinations to help kin and to invest in long-term close relationships, but it's crucial for making a large-scale society run. Corruption, things like hiring your brother-in-law and feathering the nest of your close friends and relatives is what really tears down and makes complex societies not work very well. In this sense, the norms of modern societies that make modern societies run now are at odds with at least some of our evolved instincts. 服膺于像反裙带关系这种规范，这是与我们的进化偏好相悖的，与我们帮助亲族、投资于长期亲密关系的偏好相悖，但它对大型社群的运转则至关重要。腐败，比如雇佣自己的小舅子、为自己的好友和亲属谋私利这种事，才真正会撕裂复杂社会，并令其不能良好运转。在这个意义上，令现代社会得以运转的现代社会规范是与我们进化形成的至少一部分本能相违背的。 Lately we've been focused on the effects of religion. One of the things I didn't mention from the experimental games project is that in addition to market integration in the second project, we found independently that adherence to a world religion matters. People from world religions were willing to give more to the other person in the experiment, the anonymous stranger. 近来我们研究的焦点是宗教的作用。关于我们的博弈实验项目，有一件事我还没有提到，那就是在第二个项目中，除了市场整合度之外，我们还独立地发现，人们对世界宗教的信仰也有关系。在实验中，信仰世界宗教的人会愿意分更多钱给另外一个人，另外一个匿名的陌生人。 We've been using these experiments in the context of behavioral games. There's since been a number of additional papers coming out of economics showing the relationship between market integrations using measures like distance from market and people's willingness to build impartial institutions. Part of this is your willingness to acquire a norm of impartial roles; that we have a set of rules that governs this system. 我们还将这些实验应用到了行为博弈的情境中去。自那以后至今，经济学领域已经又发表了很多论文，证明市场整合度（用与市场的距离之类方式测量）与人们建构公平制度之意愿之间的关系。内容之一包括，你习得一套关于公平角色的规范的意愿，也就是我们有一套规则来管理这个体系。 Sometimes historians or political scientists call it the rule of law. We have an impartial set of rules that we're going to follow, and those rules apply independently of the identities and our emotional reactions towards the participants. 有时候，历史学家或政治科学家会把它叫做法治。我们有一套需要遵守的公平规则，而且不管我们的身份如何，不管我们对其他参与者的感情态度如何，这套规则都适用。 One of the things we find with the relationship between norms and these risk-managing institutions is that when you have risk managing institutions these impartial norms can spread. Otherwise, people are strongly biased towards maintaining these local relationships. If you want the rule of law to spread or to be maintained, you need conditions in which you're managing risk. 关于规范和这类风险管理机制之间的关系，我们有一个发现是，如果你拥有风险管理机制，那么这种公平规范就能得以传播。否则，人们会强烈偏向于固守他们的地方性关系。如果你希望法治得到传播或维持，那就需要一个有风险管控的环境。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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