【2015-10-27】 @海德沙龙 【产业故事】《汽车推销员之死》汽车销售是个很特别的业态，不仅商业模式独特，经销商的政治势力也很强大，以至能让美国各州通过成文法将这一商业模式固化了下来，不然，这种模式原本很可能只适合于汽车业发展的特定阶段，那么，在如今产业变迁大潮中，它是否会幸存下来？ @whigzhou: 1）汽车巨头年产量几百上千万，面向数亿消费者，厂商-消费者社会关系距离十分遥远（基于邓巴限制，这一距离至少四层），2）汽车购买是重大决策。——在传统零售模式下，同时满足这两个条件的产业，经销商的地位就会较强，我猜。 @闲中隐:房地产为什么这么需要中介呢 @whigzhou: 中介和经销商不同，二级房地产是供需两端皆为海量参与者的市场，此类市场若商品为无差异类型，会倾向于形成集中式交易中心，若为高差异类型，则形成中介模式 @whigzhou: 修正：同为高差异商品，若购买行为非重大决策，则形成超市/商场模式，若为重大决策，则形成中介模式  

Death of a car salesman 汽车推销员之死 日期：2015-8-22 译者：迈爸（@麦田的字留地） 校对：Ghost（@Ghostmarine） 来源：The Economist，http://www.economist.com/news/business/21661656-no-one-much-likes-car-dealers-changing-system-will-be-hard-death-car-salesman No one much likes car dealers. But changing the system will be hard 没人喜欢汽车经销商，但改变销售体系很难。 THE internet was supposed to do away with all sorts of middlemen. Yet house sales are mostly conducted by estate agents, and car sales are still finalised in cavernous showrooms that smell of tyres. Technology is diminishing the role of car dealers, however. 互联网会让各种中间商消失。然而，房屋销售大多是通过房地产中介进行的，汽车销售仍然在弥漫着轮胎味的空旷展厅完成。但是，技术正在削弱汽车经销商的作用。 Customers are using the internet for much of the process of choosing a new car, and are increasingly getting loans and insurance online rather than buying them from the dealer who sells them their car. Some carmakers are seeking ways to bypass dealers too. 顾客们开始在互联网上完成新车挑选过程的很大部分，并且越来越多地通过网络获得贷款、购买保险，而不在销售汽车的经销商那里掏腰包。一些汽车制造商也正在寻求绕过经销商的途径。 In the motor industry’s early days, a century ago, manufacturers tried selling their vehicles at the factory gate, in shops they owned themselves, by mail order and through travelling salesmen. But eventually they settled on a system of franchising, in which independent dealers mostly sell just one maker’s models. 在一个世纪以前，汽车工业的早期，生产商试图在工厂门口、在自己拥有的商店里、通过邮件订购，或者通过旅行推销员来销售汽车。但最终，生产商选择了特许经销体系，在这一体系中，独立的经销商大多只卖一家制造商的车型。 Now, almost all of the 90m motor vehicles sold worldwide each year cross dealers’ forecourts. In America, the second-largest car market, their total revenues reached $806 billion in 2014. China’s car market, the largest, has rapidly come to resemble the West’s, with all its faults . 今天，全世界每年卖出的9000万辆车中，绝大部分都要经过经销商之手。2014年美国，这个世界第二大汽车市场，汽车经销商的总收入达到了8060亿美元。最大的汽车市场，中国，已经迅速效仿了这一西方模式，连同它的全部毛病。 Surveys show that car buyers find the experience of visiting a dealer boring, confrontational and bureaucratic, notes Nick Gill of Capgemini, a consulting firm. No wonder they try to avoid them. Ten years ago Americans visited five dealers before making a purchase, according to McKinsey, another consulting outfit, but now they visit 1.6 on average. The trend is similar elsewhere in the world. Nick Gill of Capgemini咨询公司的调查显示，购车者发现造访经销商的经历无趣，富有对抗性，还充满官僚习气。难怪顾客总是试图避开经销商。而另一个咨询机构麦肯锡的调查表明，十年前美国人在购车前要转五个经销商，但现在他们平均访问1.6个。世界其他地方的趋势是相似的。 In many cases car buyers turn up having already decided which model and which options they require; and, having checked price-comparison websites, how much they will pay. Almost all cars these days have decent performance and handling, so test drives are less important than ever. 很多情况下，购车者已经决定了他们所需要的型号和选配，并且，通过价格对比网站，他们也知道需要支付多少钱。今天几乎所有的汽车，都有着不错的操控和性能，所以试驾相比以往显得不是那么重要了。 Styling and branding—things that can be assessed without visiting a dealer—figure more prominently in buyers’ minds. The role of traditional car salesmen, geared for the hard sell, is waning. 客户越来越看重风格和品牌，而这些信息不需要访问经销商即可获得。需要一张铁嘴的传统销售岗位，正在逐渐消逝。 What motorists do want, though, is someone to talk them through all the features that cars come with these days—entertainment systems, navigation services, automated parking and so on. Carmakers are beginning to respond. 然而，驾驶者真正想要的是，有人来告诉他们现在车上的所有功能，比如娱乐系统、导航服务、自动泊车等等。汽车制造商正开始做出反应。 Since 2013 BMW, taking Apple Stores as its model, has been installing “product geniuses” in some larger showrooms, to talk potential buyers through its cars’ features without pressing them to close a sale. Daimler Benz, another German premium carmaker, and even Kia, a mass-market South Korean firm, have begun similar initiatives. 自2013以来，宝马向苹果商店学习，在一些较大的展厅设置了“产品天才”，与潜在买家讨论其汽车的特性，而不是催着顾客买辆车。另一家德国高级汽车制造商戴姆勒奔驰，甚至还有面向大众市场的韩国起亚，也开始了类似的举措。 Apple’s softer sell, which stresses its products’ design and whizzy features, helps to persuade customers to pay premium prices. Its selling methods have also succeeded in training customers to accept that the list price is the final price. 苹果的软推销，强调其产品的设计和新奇特性，有助于说服客户支付溢价。这种销售方法还成功地使客户接受标价即是最终售价。 In contrast, the motor industry has spent more than a century training buyers to expect haggling, followed by discounts. Yet customers say having to argue about the price is one of the things that puts them off dealers. 相比之下，汽车工业已经花了一个多世纪使客户希望讨价还价，目的就是为了折扣。然而，顾客们说，不得不讨价还价是他们避开经销商的原因之一。 Some firms are offering them ways to avoid it. Costco, a discount retailer, sold 400,000 new and used cars in America last year, using its buying power to get good deals, doing the haggling on behalf of motorists. Lexus, Toyota’s premium brand, is experimenting with haggle-free pricing in a handful of its American dealerships. 一些公司正提供避免这一困扰的办法。折扣零售商Costco，去年在美国销售四十万辆新车和二手车，利用其购买力代客户讨价还价，取得了不错的业绩。丰田的高端品牌雷克萨斯，正在一些美国经销商那里尝试免议价策略。 Some dealers are experimenting with selling cars online, or opening temporary “pop-up” showrooms in shopping centres. Others are offering to bring cars to a potential buyer’s home or workplace for a test drive. 一些经销商开始尝试在网上卖车，或在购物中心开临时“弹出”展厅。还有的给潜在购买者提供在家里或工作地试驾的机会。 But the most controversial experiment is the one that Tesla, a maker of expensive electric cars, is trying: cutting out the dealers altogether and selling directly to motorists. Two decades ago Ford and General Motors tried to revive this idea from the industry’s early days, but they were deterred by resistant dealers and restrictive laws in some American states. 但最具争议性的尝试是特斯拉，这样一个高价电动汽车制造商，正在努力完全踢开经销商，直接向驾车者销售。二十年前，福特和通用汽车试图重现这个汽车工业早期的想法，但由于美国一些州的法律限制和经销商的阻挠而被迫放弃。 The legislation, enacted in the 1950s to protect dealers from onerous terms that carmakers were trying to impose on them, is now being used to put the brakes on Tesla. It has battled to open stores in several states where direct sales are banned or restricted. 这项立法，于20世纪50年代颁布，以防止汽车制造商强加给经销商繁重的条款，现在却被用来阻止特斯拉。在禁止或限制直销的几个州，特斯拉的开店之战已经开始。 And it is winning most of its fights. New Jersey and Maryland recently overturned bans, though the struggle continues in Arizona, Michigan, Texas, and West Virginia. 特斯拉赢得了大部分的战斗。新泽西和马里兰州最近推翻了禁令，但在亚利桑那，密歇根，德克萨斯，西弗吉尼亚的抗争还在继续。 In other countries, although carmakers face no legal hurdle to selling directly, they certainly would face resistance from their dealer networks. Nonetheless, Hyundai, Daimler Benz, BMW and Volvo have set up small experiments in Europe to sell cars through their company websites. 在其他国家，尽管汽车制造商们的直销模式没有面临法律障碍，但肯定会面临来自经销商网络的阻力。尽管如此，现代、戴姆勒奔驰、宝马和沃尔沃已经开始尝试在欧洲通过其公司网站销售汽车。 Customers can use the sites to configure their new cars and pay a deposit. Volvo sold all 1,900 of a special version of a sports-utility vehicle it offered online last year, and it now wants to get its entire line-up for sale online by 2016. 客户可以使用网站配置他们的新汽车，并支付定金。去年，沃尔沃的某款定制版SUV，1900辆全部在网上出售，现在公司希望到2016年时，能够在网上销售全系列产品。 Daimler is mulling an expansion of pilot schemes in Hamburg and Warsaw. GM’s premium Cadillac brand plans to open several test-drive centres and virtual dealerships across Europe. 戴姆勒正在考虑对华沙和汉堡的试点方案扩展。通用汽车公司的高端品牌凯迪拉克，计划在欧洲增设几个试驾中心和虚拟商店。 In all these cases except that of Tesla, the final stage of the transaction is handled offline, by a dealer. Even so, such selling methods strengthen customers’ relationships with carmakers, so they may steadily weaken the case for having dealers. 除了特斯拉，在其他这些案例中，交易的最后阶段还是由经销商处理的。即便如此，这样的销售方法也加强了客户与汽车制造商之间的关系，因此可能会持续削弱经销商的地位。 This trend is set to be reinforced anyway, since most new cars will soon come with built-in mobile-internet connections that, among other things, will stream data directly to the manufacturer. 无论如何，这一趋势将得到加强，比如，大多数新汽车将很快内建移动互联网连接，数据将直接流向制造商。 By offering motorists such things as remote diagnostics and automatic updates to the software installed in their cars, the makers will have a ready-made excuse to stay in touch. 通过向驾驶者提供远程诊断，自动更新安装在他们汽车上的软件，制造商将有一个现成的借口与消费者保持联系。 If carmakers did eventually cut out the middlemen, it could mean higher profits for them, lower prices for buyers, or both. Daron Gifford of Plante Moran, a consulting firm, notes that the potential savings could run from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars per car. Since mass-market carmakers’ margins are so slim, it could have a striking effect on their profitability. 如果汽车制造商最终绕过了中间商，则可能意味着给制造商更高的利润，给购买者更低的价格，或两者兼具。咨询机构Daron Gifford of Plante Moran指出，每辆车能节约几百到几千美元。由于大众消费市场汽车制造商的利润很薄，这可能对他们的盈利能力产生显著的影响。 Aside from the prospect of capturing the retail margin, and building direct links with buyers, carmakers’ shareholders have another reason to support the idea of eliminating dealers. That is because many manufacturers have got into the bad habit of overproducing, and of using dealers’ forecourts as dumping-grounds for their excess stock. 除了获得零售利润，与买家建立直接联系，汽车制造商的股东有另一个理由来支持消除经销商的想法。因为许多制造商已经养成了过度生产的坏习惯，并利用经销商来消化多余库存。 In the trade it is called “channel-stuffing”: manufacturers twist dealers’ arms to take on their surplus cars, with a combination of juicy discounts and the threat of holding back more sought-after models. If cars were sold directly by the maker, and production were constantly tailored to match sales, the industry’s fortunes could be transformed. 在贸易中，这种做法被称为“渠道充塞”：制造商诱以利润丰厚的折扣，结合限制畅销车型供应的威胁，迫使经销商接收他们过剩的汽车。如果汽车是由制造商直接销售，生产不断适应销售，行业际遇则有望改变。 Dealers, predictably, are desperate to remain the source of new cars even though they often make little or no money flogging them. In Britain, typically two-thirds of revenues but less than a quarter of profits come from that part of the business. 可以预见的是，经销商渴望保持新车的供应，即使他们从新车销售中很少或根本没有赚到钱。在英国，新车业务通常在销售收入中占三分之二，却只带来不到四分之一的利润。 However, selling new cars is the engine that drives the rest of their business—finance, insurance, warranties and other aftermarket products. Buyers often bring their cars back for repairs and servicing. 然而，新车销售却能够带动其他业务，金融、保险、担保，以及其他售后产品。买家通常还会回来进行维修和保养。 Trade-ins provide dealers with a stock of used cars, another important source of income. In America, such ancillaries helped dealers survive in the six years to 2011, when they were selling new cars at a loss. 而以旧抵新能够为经销商带来大量二手车，这是另一个重要的收入来源。在美国，从2006到2011年这六年中，当经销商亏本销售新车时，二手车帮助他们度过了难关。 Online firms are replicating these services and chipping away at dealers’ local monopolies. Websites such as Edmunds and TrueCar in America, Carwow in Britain and Mobile.de in Germany let buyers quickly gather quotes from multiple dealers. 在线企业同样提供这些服务，并正在打破经销商的地方垄断。如美国的Edmunds，TrueCar，英国的Carwow和德国的Mobile.de，能让买家快速收集来自多个经销商的报价。 Likewise, cheap insurance, finance and warranties are easy to find online. Motorists may get a better price for their old cars from a site like webuyanycar.com in Britain than by doing a trade-in with a dealer. 同样，便宜的保险，金融和担保服务，很容易从网上找到。英国的车主可以从一个叫webuyanycar.com网站为旧车找到更好的价格，远比去经销商那里以旧抵新划算。 But just as some tourists still like to buy package holidays, there may always be some motorists who prefer a one-stop-shop that provides everything, and some who prefer to buy face-to-face rather than over the internet. 但正如一些游客仍然喜欢让旅行社包办一切，总有人还是喜欢提供一切的一站式商店，还有人更喜欢面对面购物，而不是通过互联网。 America’s National Automobile Dealers’ Association puts forward two other reasons why motorists are better off with things the way they are. First, it argues, the competition among dealers to sell any given model helps to keep the retail profit margin low—and if carmakers captured the retail margin for themselves, there is no guarantee that any of it would be passed on to customers. 就为什么驾车者应该通过经销商购车，美国的全国汽车经销商协会提出了两条理由。首先，他们认为，经销商之间的竞争，使得销售任何车型的利润率都很低，如果汽车制造商自己获得这部分零售利润，将无法保证其中部分利润返还给客户。 Second, when a model has to be recalled because of a safety problem, dealers have an incentive to contact owners of that model promptly, since they usually get paid by the carmaker to correct the fault. 其次，当某个车型因为安全问题被召回时，由于制造商经常会向经销商支付维修纠偏的费用，经销商也更有动力及时联系该车型的拥有者。 In America especially, car dealers are a forceful lobby, and unlikely to remain silent if carmakers try cutting them out of the picture. But their grip on the industry is loosening. The all-purpose dealership, encompassing sales of new and used cars, finance, insurance, servicing and parts, once made sense. 尤其在美国，汽车经销商是一个强有力的游说团体，如果汽车制造商试图脱离他们，经销商们不可能保持沉默。但他们对行业的控制正在松动。囊括新车和二手车销售，集金融，保险，维修和配件于一身的全能经销商，已经大势不再。 Now this business model is being squeezed. If car buyers take to online buying in large numbers, it may not be long before a mass-market carmaker follows Tesla’s lead and tries to muscle aside the dealers. If customers are happy to buy direct from the manufacturer, lawmakers certainly should not stand in their way. 现在，这个商业模式正在被挤压。如果购买汽车的人大量在线购买，不消太久，在大众市场方面，制造商就会追随特斯拉的步伐，尝试边缘化经销商。如果顾客很乐意直接从制造商那里购买，立法者当然不应该妨碍他们。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Europe: When the Macro Overshadows the Micro 欧洲：当宏观现象掩盖微观动因时 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-8-14 译者：小瑛 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com.br/2015/08/europe-when-macro-overshadows-micro.html Christian Thimann currently works with the French investment bank AXA while also holding an academic position at the Paris School of Economics. However, from 2008 to 2013 he was Director General and Adviser to the President at the European Central Bank, which makes his views on the economics and politics of the euro crisis especially worth considering. 在巴黎经济学院担任教职的Christian Thimann目前正与法国投资银行安盛合作。他在2008至2013年间曾任欧洲中央银行行长顾问，这个经历使他对欧元危机的相关经济和政治观点变得尤为重要。 He lays out his perspective in "The Microeconomic Dimensions of the Eurozone Crisis and Why European Politics Cannot Solve Them," which appears in the Summer 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Like all JEP articles, it is freely available online courtesy of the American Economic Association. (Full disclosure: I've worked as Managing Editor of JEP since the first issue of the journal in 1987.) 他在《经济展望杂志》2015年夏季刊上发表的“欧元区危机的微观视角，及为什么欧洲政治无法解决危机”一文，详细阐述了他的观点。像所有《经济展望杂志》刊登的文章一样，美国经济学会将其免费放到网上供大家阅览。（好吧我承认：我从1987年《经济展望杂志》创刊号开始就担任责任编辑）。 On the economics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the problems have microeconomic roots, not just macroeconomic ones. Here are a couple of intriguing figures. Thimann points out that since the inception of the euro, some economies have consistently run trade surpluses, while others have consistently run trade deficits. This figure shows the cumulative trade surpluses and deficits over time. What's especially interesting to me is the relative steadiness of these lines: countries with trade surpluses tend to add surpluses every year, countries with deficits tend to add deficits every year. Thimann认为，欧元区经济问题的根源不止在宏观，也有微观层面的根源。以下是一些有趣的图表。Thimann指出，自从欧元诞生开始，某些经济体持续贸易顺差而另一些一直贸易逆差。下图展示了各国历年来的累计贸易顺差和逆差。让我特别感兴趣的是这些曲线的相对恒定性：贸易顺差国盈余每年都在增加，而逆差国赤字亦逐年增长。   Thimann argues that a driving factor behind these trade imbalances arises out of the interaction between wages and productivity. If wages in a country are growing a lot faster than productivity, then in effect, the cost of producing in that country is rising and it will be harder for that country to sell in international markets. If two countries share the same currency, so that exchange rate adjustments are not possible, then a country where wages are growing much faster than productivity will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with countries where wage growth is more closely aligned with productivity growth. Thimann points out that in the trade deficit countries, compensation soared well above productivity growth almost as soon as the euro was in place. Thimann认为，这些贸易不平衡是工资和生产率综合作用的结果。如果一国的工资增长速度高于生产率增速，则该国生产成本将上升，因此其产品在国际市场上的销路不会好。如果两国货币相同，无法使用汇率调节手段，那么工资增长快于生产率增长的国家竞争力就不如工资和生产率增长速度相对一致的国家。Thimann指出，在贸易逆差国，薪酬增长速度高于生产率增长速度的现象几乎是与欧元的启用同时发生的。   Why is Greece not shown among the countries here? Thimann writes in the note under the table: "Greece is not shown in the chart because, while the productivity increase is broadly comparable to that of Portugal, the wage growth was even steeper, rising by 2008 to 180 percent of the 1998 value, hence exceeding the scale of the countries shown; wages have declined by about 20 percent since the crisis to 160 percent." 为何上表中没有希腊？Thimann在表注中解释：“表中没有希腊是因为，如果说希腊的生产率增长还能大体与葡萄牙相比的话，那么其工资增长则过于迅速，从1998年到2008年增长了180%，远高于其他国家，乃至无法在同一张表中展示；从危机开始到现在工资已经下降了20%，至160%”。 Why did wages rise so quickly in the trade deficit countries? Some countries saw real estate bubbles or surges in government borrowing that pushed up wages in a way that productivity growth could not sustain. Public-sector wages took off: "Over the first ten years of the euro, public wages grew by 40 percent in the eurozone as a whole and by 30 percent in Germany. But public sector wages rose by 50 percent in France, 60 percent in Italy, 80 percent in Spain, 110 percent in Greece, and 120 percent in Ireland." 为何贸易逆差国的工资增长如此快？有些国家存在房地产泡沫，或过多依靠政府借贷而非生产力的持续增长推动工资增长。公共领域工资暴涨：“欧元启头十年，整个欧元区公共部门工资的平均增长水平是40%，其中德国为30%。而这一数字在法国，意大利，西班牙，希腊和爱尔兰分别是50%，60%，80%，110%和120%。” A common justification given for the rapid wage increases was that price levels in many of the trade deficit countries were rising, often at 6-7% per year, and so there was a perceived need for wages to keep up. But for the purposes of international trade and competitiveness, what matters is the wage--not the rise in local-country prices. 通常对工资迅速增长的辩护是，因为贸易逆差国家物价水平增长迅速，多为每年6%-7%，所以名义工资也要相应增加。但在讨论国际贸易和竞争力问题时，关注点是工资，而不是某国物价。 Thimann goes into some detail about how the trade deficit countries in the eurozone also tended to impose rules and regulations leading to higher wages and restrictions on business. My favorite story of the heavy hand of regulation in Greece is one that Megan Green told on her blog back in 2012, but I've been telling it ever since. It's about finding yourself in a combination bookstore/coffee shop in Athens which, because of regulations, is not allowed at that time to sell books or coffee. Green writes: Thimann还深入细节描述了一个现象：欧元区内贸易赤字国家更倾向于制定提高工资且限制商业的政策和法规。我最喜欢的关于希腊严苛政策的描述，来自Megan Green 2012年发表的一篇博客文章，我经常提起它。文章描述了作者在雅典一家书吧的经历，由于政府规定，这家书吧当时既不能卖书也不能卖咖啡。Green写到：

This is best encapsulated in an anecdote from my visit to Athens. A friend and I met up at a new bookstore and café in the centre of town, which has only been open for a month. The establishment is in the center of an area filled with bars, and the owner decided the neighborhood could use a place for people to convene and talk without having to drink alcohol and listen to loud music. 我在雅典的趣闻能充分说明这一点。我和一个朋友约在市中心一家开业仅一月的书吧见面。这一区周围都是酒吧，店主认为在这里开一间为需要小憩聊天但又不想喝酒精饮料听喧闹音乐的人们服务的店铺是个好主意。 After we sat down, we asked the waitress for a coffee. She thanked us for our order and immediately turned and walked out the front door. My friend explained that the owner of the bookstore/café couldn’t get a license to provide coffee. She had tried to just buy a coffee machine and give the coffee away for free, thinking that lingering patrons would boost book sales. 我们落座后向服务员点了咖啡。她对我们的光顾表示感谢后，立刻转身走出前门。我朋友解释说，店主无法取得出售咖啡的营业执照。她尝试买了一个咖啡机向客人免费提供咖啡，这样吸引客人光顾也能促进图书销售。 However, giving away coffee was illegal as well. Instead, the owner had to strike a deal with a bar across the street, whereby they make the coffee and the waitress spends all day shuttling between the bar and the bookstore/café. My friend also explained to me that books could not be purchased at the bookstore, as it was after 18h and it is illegal to sell books in Greece beyond that hour. I was in a bookstore/café that could neither sell books nor make coffee. 然而，免费提供咖啡也是非法的。店主只能请街对面的酒吧帮忙制作咖啡，而店员要终日往返于书吧和酒吧之间。我朋友还解释说，不能在店里买书，因为18点以后出售图书在希腊是违法的。我光顾的是一家既不能卖书也不能制作咖啡的书吧。

One story like this is a comedy. An economy in which stories like this are commonplace--and which is locked into a free-trade zone with countries sharing a common currency, is a tragedy waiting to happen. 仅仅一则这样的故事还只是趣闻，可是当一个经济体满是此类故事时，灾难随时都可能发生，更何况这个经济体还处于同周边国家共用同一种货币的自由贸易区内。 On the politics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the euro, the European Central Bank, and all the European-wide negotations over debt overshadowing these other issues. Normally, when a democratic country has miserable economic performance with high unemployment and slow growth, a common response is for its citizens to demand some policy changes from their politicians. 就欧元区的政治，Thimann认为，欧元、欧洲央行和有关债务问题的所有全欧层面的谈判掩盖了其他问题。一般情况下，当一个民主国家经济萧条，失业率高且经济增长缓慢时，民众通常会要求政治家修改政策。 But in the euro-zone, when a country has a miserable economic performance, the politicians of that country tell the citizens that it's not their fault. It's all the fault of the Euro-crats in Brussels, or Germans pulling strings behind the scenes, or the ECB. The politicians tell the voters that self-examination unnecessary and even counterproductive, because they to unite against the malign outsiders. 但在欧元区内，当国家经济不振时，政府会向民众辩解这不是他们的错，罪魁祸首是布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员，或是在背后操纵的德国，或是欧洲央行。政客们会告诉选民，自省没有必要甚至起反作用，因为他们要联合起来抵抗外敌。 Here are some concluding thoughts from Thimann: 下面是Thimann的一些结论性观点：

At the core of the economic crisis in the eurozone is the problem of unemployment in several countries. Roughly 18.2 million people are unemployed in early 2015. In about half the eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is below 10 percent, and in Germany it is actually below 5 percent (Eurostat data, February 2015), but in France, 10.7 percent of the labor force are unemployed; in Italy, 12.7 percent; in Portugal, 14.1 percent; in Spain, 23.2 percent; and in Greece, 26.0 percent. ... 欧元区经济危机的核心是一些国家的失业问题。2015年初大约有1820万失业人口。半数欧元国家的失业率在10%以下，德国甚至低于5%（欧盟统计局，2015年2月），但法国有10.7%的劳动人口没有工作，意大利12.7%；葡萄牙14.1%；西班牙23.2%；希腊26%…… It is legitimate to speak about this as a problem for the eurozone in the sense that economic policies in a single currency area are truly a matter of common concern, and also because high unemployment interferes with the smooth functioning of the eurozone, challenging its economic and political cohesion. But it is not accurate to attribute responsibility for the problem, or the solution, to the eurozone as a whole, to European institutions, or to other countries. 我们有理由将此视为一个欧元区问题，因为单一货币区内的经济政策是各国都关注的问题，同时高失业率妨碍欧元区正常运作，挑战其政治和经济凝聚力。但将问题的责任或解决方法归咎于欧元区整体、欧盟机构或其他国家，都是不准确的。 Jobs fail to be created in a number of these countries not because of a “lack of demand” as often claimed, but mainly because wage costs are high relative to productivity, social insurance and tax burdens are heavy, and the business environment is excessively burdensome. All of this should be viewed not in absolute terms,but in relative terms, compared with other economies in Europe and countries around the world where labor costs and productivity are more advantageous, and the business environment is friendlier. 许多国家未能有效创造就业，并不像通常认为的那样是由于“缺乏需求”，主要是因为相对于其生产率水平，工资过高，社会福利和税负过重，商业环境极其不友好。所有这些因素都不能绝对地看，而应相对地看，要和生产成本与生产率更有优势、商业环境更友善的欧洲和全球其他国家放在一起比较研究。 “Europe” is not an all-powerful actor in the field of national economic policies, but only a potentially useful facilitator. Only the country concerned is the legitimate and able party to improve its own economic functioning in line with its social preferences and economic setup. This is why European politics cannot solve the microeconomic dimensions of the eurozone crisis. Within individual countries, it is the governments, administrative authorities, social partners, and all other economic stakeholders that are the legitimate actors in the field of economic and social policies.... “欧洲”在国家层面的经济政策制定上并不是一个有力的参与者，仅有潜在的催化剂作用。只有各相关国家自己才有合法性也有能力依照自身社会偏好和经济结构，设法提高经济运行状况。这就是为什么欧洲政治无法解决欧元区危机微观因素的原因所在。在每一个国家中，经济和社会政策领域中真正有效的参与者是该国的政府，行政机构，社会伙伴和其他经济利益相关者…… For the eurozone countries, their economic and unemployment problems are not primarily a question about some countries versus other countries within the monetary union, but about finding their place in an open global economy—that is, about competing and cooperating successfully with advanced, emerging, and developing economies across the globe. 对欧元区国家，经济和失业问题主要不是货币同盟中国家间的问题，而是能否在开放的全球经济中找到自己的立足点，即成功与全球众多发达、新兴或发展中经济体展开经济合作的问题。 An inward-looking European debate on the distribution of the relative adjustment burden for structural reforms would dramatically overlook the much broader challenges of integration into the global economy. ... It may be more glamorous to focus on European monetary policy, the “European architecture,” or the “bigger macro picture.” But the real issue of—and solution to—the crisis in the eurozone lies in the mostly microeconomic trenches of national economic, social, and structural policies. 关于结构改革带来的重担如何在各国间分配这种纯欧洲内部的争论，会令人极度忽视融入世界经济的挑战……讨论欧洲货币政策，“欧洲铸造者”或“更宏观的图景”等可能显得高大上。但欧元区危机的症结和解决方法所在，主要是国家层面的经济、社会和结构政策的微观经济壕沟。

I think Thimann may understate the fundamental macroeconomic problems that are being created by the presence of the euro (as I've discussed here and here, for example). But he seems to me quite correct to emphasize that many European countries badly need structural, regulatory, and microeconomic adjustments. Moreover, politicians and voters in many of these countries would much rather assail the rest of Europe about international negotiations involving public debt and the euro, rather than face their domestic political issues. 我认为Thimann明白使用欧元带来的基本宏观问题（比如，我在http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2014/02/will-we-look-back-on-euro-as-mistake.html和http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2013/08/a-euro-narrative.html讨论过的）。然而，他所强调的很多欧洲国家急需结构、法规和微观经济调整，在我看来也是合理的。此外，在许多此类国家中，政治家和选民更愿意攻击其他欧洲国家在公共债务和欧元问题国际谈判中的立场，而不是面对本国的政治问题。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State 监管型国家的法治 作者：John Cochrane @ 2015-6 译者：Ether（@大小眼不能飞） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy） 来源：John Cochrane's blog，http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf 1.Introduction 1.引言 The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom. 美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意，而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济，但很少有人认识到，日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁，而这一点恐怕更加重要。 What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board? 银行敢对美联储叫板吗？券商对证券交易委员会（SEC）又敢怎样？医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部（HHS）或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗？一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢？医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗？我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗？ The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support. 这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵，国王之忧还在其次。但是，现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下，各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。 The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around. 过去800年，美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力，保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治，我们的民主脱胎于法治，而非相反。 This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now. 法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今，其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现；也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天，对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张，且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大，或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险，并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。 Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress. 没错，我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身：宽泛模糊的法律，政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。 Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course. 当然，利用法律和规章奖励支持者，惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。 Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger. 富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功，甚至可能延长了大萧条，但在政治上则取得了极大的成功，民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。 A label? 用什么标签好？ I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control. 我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。 Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money. 很多人称之为“社会主义”，但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里，私有企业是存在的，但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织，控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业，它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局，也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。 It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support their regulators politically. But Stigler’s regulators and business golf together and drink together, and the balance power is strongly in the hands of the businesses. “Capture” doesn't see billion-dollar criminal cases and settlements. And “capture” does not describe how national political forces use regulatory power to extract political support. 这也不是“捕获”。乔治·斯蒂格勒描述过受管制的企业“捕获”其监管者的过程，企业借监管之手排除竞争。斯蒂格勒所研究的受管制企业一定会在政治上支持其监管者。但是在斯蒂格勒的叙述中，监管者和商人一起打高尔夫一起喝酒，制衡的权力牢牢地掌握在企业手中。“捕获”中见不着上十亿美元的刑事案件及和解协议。“捕获”也不能描述国家政治力量如何利用监管权力攫取政治支持。 It’s not really “crony capitalism.” That term has a bit more of the needed political flavor than “capture.” Yes, there is a revolving door, connections by which businesses get regulators to do them favors. But what’s missing in both “capture” and “cronyism” is the opposite flow of power, the Devil’s bargain aspect of it from the point of view of the regulated business or individual, the silencing of political opposition by threat of regulation. 这也不是真正的“裙带资本主义”。这个词相比“捕获”多了一份应有的政治意味。的确，这里面有一扇旋转门，企业通过这种关系让监管者们施以援手。但无论“捕获”还是“裙带主义”都没能体现逆向的权力作用。对受管制的企业和个人来说，这是一笔与魔鬼的交易，是通过监管的威胁对政治反对的压制。 We’re headed for an economic system in which many industries have a handful of large, cartelized businesses— think 6 big banks, 5 big health insurance companies, 4 big energy companies, and so on. Sure, they are protected from competition. But the price of protection is that the businesses support the regulator and administration politically, and does their bidding. If the government wants them to hire, or build factory in unprofitable place, they do it. The benefit of cooperation is a good living and a quiet life. The cost of stepping out of line is personal and business ruin, meted out frequently. That’s neither capture nor cronyism. 我们正在迈入这样一种经济体制：很多行业只有少数几家大型的、卡特尔化的企业——比如6家银行、5家健康保险公司、4家能源公司等等。的确，他们受到保护，免于竞争，但保护的代价是企业政治上支持其监管者和行政机关，并听命于它们。如果政府想要他们雇工或者在无法盈利的地方建厂，他们就会照做。合作的好处是日子好过、生活太平。越界的成本就是个人和企业的毁灭，这种惩罚频繁出现。这既不是捕获也不是裙带主义。 “Bureaucratic tyranny,” a phrase that George Nash quotes Herbert Hoover as using is a contender. “官僚暴政”——这个乔治·纳什引自赫伯特·胡佛的短语倒是值得考虑。 Charles Murray, writing recently on the status of the regulatory state notes many of these issues. He totals 4,450 distinct federal crimes— just the law, not including regulations with criminal penalties, or the vastly greater number with civil penalties. He adds up the 175,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the vagueness of the enabling legislation — Congress only decrees that rules are “generally fair and equitable,” “just and reasonable,” prohibits “unfair methods of competition” or “excessive profits.” He notes the absence of judicial rights in administrative courts. He notes the wide scope of regulation and the comparatively tiny — but ruinous to those charged — enforcement: 最近，查尔斯·墨里在论述监管型国家的现状时关注了诸多类似议题。他一共数出了4,450条联邦刑事罪名。这还仅仅是法律规定，不包括附有刑事惩罚的行政规章或者数量更大的附有民事惩罚的规章。他核查了一共175,000页的《美国联邦法规汇编》，以及含糊不清的授权立法条款。国会仅要求规章条款“原则上公平、公正”、“公正、合理”，禁止“不公平竞争”或者“过分利得”。他指出，行政法庭上司法权利缺失。他还指出，规章管辖范围广泛，执法却相对不足，但执法的结果对被控诉者却是毁灭性的： the “Occupational Safety and Health Administration has authority over more than eight million workplaces. But it can call upon only one inspector for about every 3,700 of those workplaces. The Environmental Protection Agency has authority ... over every piece of property in the nation. It conducted about 18,000 inspections in 2013—a tiny number in proportion to its mandate. “职业安全与健康管理局有权管辖超过八百万个工作场所，但是每3,700个工作场所只能均摊到一个巡视员。环境保护署有权管辖美国每一处资产。2013年，它一共进行了18,000次检查，仅是其管辖范围中极小的一部分。” Murray advocates civil disobedience with insurance for the few zebras who get caught by the regulators. 墨里提倡每个公民都购买保险以弥补万一被监管者抓到所带来的损失，同时对管制采取不予合作的态度。 But by and large Murray deplores merely the silliness of and economic inefficiency of the regulatory state. This misses, I think, the greatest danger, that to our political freedom. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect. 但总体而言，墨里憎恶的只是监管型国家的愚蠢和经济不效率。我认为这漏掉了最大的危险，那就是对政治自由的危害。仅仅是想到有可能被环保署拜访这一点，就有显著的噤声效果。 And it also misses, I think, an explanation for how we got here. Regulators and politicians aren’t nitwits. The libertarian argument that regulation is so dumb — which it surely is — misses the point that it is enacted by really smart people. The fact that the regulatory state is an ideal tool for the entrenchment of political power was surely not missed by its architects. 我认为他还漏掉了一点：我们是怎么走到这一步的。监管者和政客都不是傻子。自由意志主义者关于监管很愚蠢的观点，尽管正确，但没有看到一点：这些法律法规也是非常聪明的人制定的。监管型国家的建造者肯定对其是保有政治权力的最佳工具这一点心知肚明。 Likewise, Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen make a good casethat most of the economic rationale for regulation has disappeared along with information. Uber stars are far more effective than the Taxi Commission. But the demand for protection and the desire to trade economic protection for political support will remain unchanged. “Protect the consumer” is as much a distracting argument in the Uber vs. Taxi debate as it was when the medieval guilds advanced it. 同样，亚历克斯·塔巴洛克和泰勒·考恩很好地证明了，大多数赞成监管的经济学原理已经随着充分的信息而消失。优步的星级评定远比出租车委员会有效，但是对监管保护的需求以及用经济上的保护来换取政治上的支持仍然不会改变。在优步和出租车之争中，“保护消费者”不过是个掩人耳目的论点，和中世纪行会利用它时一样。 Rule of Law: the Devil in the Details 法治：细节里的魔鬼 “Rule of law” and “regulation” are dangerous Big Vague Words. The rule of law is so morally powerful that the worst tyrants go through the motions. Stalin bothered with show trials. Putin put Pussy Riot on trial, and then they were “legally” convicted of and jailed for the crime of ”hooliganism.” Even Henry the Eighth had trials before chopping heads. Is this not rule of law? “法治”和“监管”是危险的模糊大词。法治在道德上如此有力，以至于最坏的暴君也要应付一下。斯大林费力搞出走秀似的审判。普京审判暴动小猫【译注：俄罗斯女性主义朋克乐队，经常在各大景点举办有关俄罗斯政治生活的行为艺术表演，都未经政府批准】，然后“依法”宣判“流氓罪”罪名成立并判入狱。甚至亨利八世把那么多人头砍下了之前也经过了审判。这难道不是法治吗？ No, of course, but it’s worth reminding ourselves why not as we think about bureaucracies. 当然不是，但在我们思考官僚体系的时候，值得提醒一下自己，为什么它们不是。 “Rule of law” ultimately is a set of restrictions to keep the state from using its awesome power of coercion to force your political support. If you oppose Castro, you go to prison. If you opposed Herbert Hoover, could you still run a business? Sure. If you oppose President Obama, or the future President Hilary Clinton can you do so? If you oppose the polices of one of their regulatory agencies, now powers unto themselves, or speak out against the leaders of those agencies, can you do so? If you support candidates with unpopular positions, can you still get the regulatory approvals you need? It’s not so clear. That is our danger. “法治”说到底是一系列对国家的限制，防止国家动用可怕的强制权力强迫你的政治支持。如果你反对卡斯特罗，你会被关进监狱。如果你反对赫伯特·胡佛，你还可以经营一家公司吗？当然可以。如果你反对奥巴马总统或者未来的希拉里·克林顿总统呢？如果你反对他们手下某个现已有权有势的监管机构的政策，或是公开反对他们的领导呢，你还可以继续经营公司吗？如果你支持立场不受欢迎的候选人，你还能获得经营公司所需的行政审批吗？答案并不清楚。这就是我们所面临的危险。 “Rule of law” is not just about the existence of written laws, and the superficial mechanics of trials, judges, lawyers, ad sentences. Rule of law lies deep in the details of how those institutions work. Do you have the right to counsel, the right to question witnesses, the right to discovery, the right to appeal, and so forth. Like laws, what matters about regulation, both in its economic efficiency and in its insulation from politics, is not its presence but its character and operation. “法治”不仅仅是成文法和形式上的审判、法官、律师和判决等机制。法治根植于这些制度如何运作的细节中。你是否有权利获得律师辩护、质证、证据开示、上诉，等等。和法律一样，不管是从经济效率还是政治独立性上来说，监管的要害不在于它的存在，而在于它的特点和操作。 Regulators write rules too. They fine you, close down your business, send you to jail, or merely harass you with endless requests, based on apparently written rules. We need criteria to think about whether “rule of law” applies to this regulatory process. Here are some suggestions. 监管者也制定规则。他们依据成文法开罚单、关闭你的公司、送你入监，或者就不停地提要求骚扰你。我们需要一些标准来思考“法治”一词是否适用于这套监管程序。以下是一些建议：

Rule vs. Discretion? 规则vs自由裁量？ Simple/precise or vague/complex? 简单／准确，还是模糊／复杂？ Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? 可知的规则vs溯及既往？ Permission or rule book? 批准，还是规则手册 Plain text or fixers? 直白文本，还是掮客？ Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? 普通执法还是专断执法？ Right to discovery and challenge decisions. 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。 Right to appeal. 上诉权。 Insulation from political process. 与政治活动隔离。 Speed vs. delay？ 快捷还是拖延？ Consultation, consent of the governed. 被治理人的意见和合意。  

• Rule vs. Discretion?
• 规则vs自由裁量？

This is really a central distinction. Does the regulation, in operation, function as a clear rule? Or is it simply an excuse for the regulator to impose his or her will on the regulated firm or person? Sometimes discretion is explicit. Sometimes discretion comes in the application of a rule book thousands of pages long with multiple contradictory and vague rules. 这是一个核心区别。在操作中规章是不是作为明确的规则发挥作用？还是规章仅是监管者对被监管公司和个人施加自身意志的借口？有时候自由裁量是很明确的，有时候自由裁量则来自对上千页且存在大量冲突、模糊规则的规章手册的运用。

• Simple/precise or vague/complex?
• 简单／准确还是模糊／复杂？

Regulations can be simple and precise — even if silly. “Any structure must be set back six feet from the property line” is simple and precise. Or the regulation can be long, vague and complex. “The firm shall not engage in abusive practices.” 规章可以简单、准确，即使其很愚蠢。例如“所有建筑必须在界址线后6英尺”，这就很简单、准确。规章也可以很长、模糊且复杂，比如“公司不允许从事违规行为”。 Many regulations go on for hundreds of pages. Long, vague, and complex is a central ingredient which gives the appearance of rules but amounts to discretion. 很多规章长达数百页。冗长、模糊、复杂是让规则成为自由裁量，只具有规则的表象的核心因素。

• Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions?
• 可知的规则vs溯及既往？

Is the rule book knowable ex ante? Or is it, in application, simply a device for ex-post prosecutions. Insider trading rules are, at present, a good example of the latter. The definition of “insider” varies over time, and there is really little hope for a firm to read a coherent rule book to know what is and is not allowed. Much better to stay on good terms with the regulator. 规则事先可知吗？还是其实只是一种溯及既往的工具。内幕交易规则就是后一种情况的很好例子。“内幕”的定义随时间而变，公司几乎不可能从一本融贯的规则手册中知道什么是允许的，什么不被允许。与其如此，还远不如和监管者搞好关系。

• Permission or rule book?
• 批准还是规则手册？

In one kind of regulation, there is a rule book. If you follow the rule book, you’re ok. You go ahead and do what you want to do. In much regulation, however, you have to ask for permission from the regulator, and that permission includes a lot of discretion. Environmental review is a good example. 有一种监管，依据就是一本规则手册。只要你遵循上面的规则就没事，你可以做其他任何你想做的。但是有很多监管，你需要征得监管者的批准，而批准则包括了很多自由裁量。环境审评就是一个好例证。

• Plain text or fixers?
• 通俗文本还是掮客？

Can a normal person read the plain text of the rule, and understand what action is allowed or not? Or is the rule so complex that specialists are required to understand the rule, and the regulatory agency’s current interpretation of the rule? In particular, are specialists with internal agency contacts necessary, or specialists who used to work at the agency? 一个普通人是否能够阅读规则的文本并理解何种行为被允许，何种不被允许？还是规则太复杂，想要理解规则需要专家，需要依靠监管机构对规则的最新阐释？特别是，是不是需要一个拥有监管机构内部关系的专家或者是前工作人员？ As a private pilot, I often bristle at the FAA’s mindless bureaucracy and the plain silliness of much of their regulation. But to their credit, there is a strong culture that the plain text of the rule counts, and each pilot should read the rules and know what they mean. That is a system much harder to misuse. Financial, banking, environmental, health care, and housing regulation stand on the opposite end of the spectrum. 作为一个私人飞行员，我经常恼怒于联邦航空管理局的无脑官僚做派和很多愚蠢的规章。但是有一点不得不承认，他们那里盛行一种文化，就是保持规则文本的通俗易懂，每一位飞行员都应该能读懂规则。在这种体制下，监管者滥用规则的难度就会加大。但金融、银行、环境、医疗保健、住房的规章却完全处于光谱的相反一端。

• Enforced commonly or arbitrarily?
• 普通执法还是专断执法？

Regulations that are seldom enforced, but then used occasionally to impose enormous penalties are clearly more open to political abuse. If Americans commit three felonies a dayin “conspiracy,” internet use, endangered species, wetlands, or employment and immigration regulations (just to start), but one in a hundred thousand is ever prosecuted, just who gets prosecuted is obviously ripe for abuse. 很少执行但偶尔用来施加重罚的规章显然更易被滥用。如果美国人每天都在有关“合谋”、互联网使用、濒危物种、湿地或雇佣和移民等等规章（远远还没数完）下犯下三项重罪，但是只有十万分之一的机率被起诉，那么挑谁来起诉这件事显然就成了滥权的温床。

• Right to discovery, see evidence, and challenge decisions.
• 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。

Do you have the right to know how a regulatory agency decided your case? Step by step, what assumptions, calculations, or interpretations did it use? Often not, and even in high profile cases. 你是否有权知道监管机构是如何裁决你的案子的？每一步，他们用了什么假设、如何计算或者解释？通常你无权知道，即使是要案。 For example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverageof Met Life’s “systemic” designation reports 比如，《华尔街日报》关于大都会人寿保险公司被划定为具有“系统性风险”的报道写道： The feds ...still refuse to say exactly which [threats] make MetLife a systemic risk or what specific changes the company could make to avoid presenting such a risk. “联邦政府……依然拒绝说明是什么（威胁）使得大都会保险公司具有系统性风险或者公司可以通过何种具体的改变来避免出现这种风险。” and continues ...MetLife says that…the government’s decision is based on mere speculation and “undisclosed evidentiary material.” 接着又提到： “大都会保险公司表示……政府的裁决是基于纯粹臆测以及‘未公开的证明材料’。” Since the case is still being decided, the point here is not the correctness or not of these charges. But the charges are a clear example of the kind of regulation that can go wrong (In fact, the miracle of the MetLife case is that the company had the chutzpah to sue. They are taking a big bet that FSOC doesn’t believe in revenge.) 因为案件尚无定论，这里的重点并非这些指控正确与否，而是这些指控作为一个清楚的例证，表明监管可以变味。（事实上，大都会保险公司一案的奇迹在于公司竟然敢起诉监管机构。他们在金融稳定监督委员不会报复上面押了好大一注。）

• Right to appeal.
• 上诉权。

And not just to the same agency that makes the decision! In law, the right to appeal is central. In regulation, the right to appeal is often only to appeal to the same agency that made the decision. The Chevron doctrine severely limits your ability to appeal regulatory decisions (and the regulations themselves) to any outside entity. As an example, continuing the above MetLife coverage, 这里说的不仅仅是向作出裁决的机构提出上诉！法律上，上诉权是核心。在监管中，上诉权通常只是向作出行政裁决的同一机构提出上诉。“雪佛龙原则”严重地限制了你向机构外其他实体对监管裁决（和监管本身）提起上诉的能力。作为例子，我们接着看关于大都会保险公司一案的报道。 The ... stability council “lacks any separation in its legislative, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.” That combined with MetLife’s inability to see the full record on which the decision was based made it “impossible” to get a fair hearing. 金融稳定监督委员会“缺乏立法、调查、起诉和司法各职能的分立”。加上大都会无法看到裁决依据的完整记录，这使得他们“不可能”得到一个公平的听证。 As in law, secret evidence, secret decisions, secret testimony; and legislature, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled in to one are classic ingredients for subverting rule of law. And, eventually, for using the machinery of law to silence political opposition. 和在法律领域一样，秘密证据、秘密裁决、秘密证词以及立法、起诉、判决、陪审和执行不加区分都是破坏法治的典型元素。最终，它们都是为了利用法律机器来压制政治反对。

• Insulation from political process.
• 与政治活动隔离。

There are many structures in place to try to ensure the “independence” of independent agencies. There is also a tension that we live in a democracy, so independent agencies can’t be too independent if they have great discretionary power. 目前有很多架构想要确保独立机构的“独立”。但在民主国家，这也带来一个内在的压力。独立机构如果有很大的裁量权，那就不可能太独立。 These important structures try to limit explicit party politics’ use of the regulatory state. They are less successful at limiting the bureaucracy’s use of its regulatory power to prop up its own separate fiefdom. They are also less successful at limiting unwitting political cooperation. When vast majorities of the bureaucracy belong to one political party, when government employee unions funnel unwitting contributions to candidates of that party, and when strong ideological currents link decisions across agencies, explicit cooperation is less necessary. 这些重要的架构都是为了限制政党政治对监管型国家的公开利用，但它们在限制官僚机构利用监管权力强化自己的独立王国上则不那么成功。在限制无意的政治合作上也不成功。当机构的绝大部分人属于一个政党时，当政府雇员工会无意中资助那个政党的候选人时，当强烈的意识形态动向将各部门的裁决关联起来时，公开的合作就没那么必要了。 And, though it was ever thus, the enormous expansion of the size, power, and discretion of the regulatory state makes the insulation structures more important, just as they are falling apart. 即使这样，监管型国家的规模、权力和自由裁量权的扩张也使得隔离架构更加重要，而这些架构却正在分崩离析。

• Speed vs. delay.
• 快捷还是拖延。

The regulatory process can take years, and a canny regulator need not explicitly rule against a political foe. Delay is enough. Lois Lerner herself didn’t deny applications. She just endlessly delayed them. The FDA similarly sits on applications, sometimes for decades. 监管流程可以耗费数年。一个狡猾的监管者并不需要作出明显不利于政治对手的裁决，拖延就够了。洛伊丝·勒纳【编注：勒纳是美国国税局处理税务豁免申请的部门负责人，从2010年起，该部门被发现对涉及保守派特别是茶党人士及捐赠对象的豁免申请施加额外苛刻的审查，2013年的国会调查确认了这些滥权行为的存在，国税局官方也予以承认，并导致勒纳先被停职，后来辞职。】本人并不拒绝任何申请，她只是无限地拖延。类似地，食品药品监督局也拖延审核申请，有时一拖就是几十年。 A central element of a new Magna Carta for regulatory agencies should be a right to speedy decision. If a decision is not rendered in say, 6 months, it is approved. 一部针对监管机构的新大宪章的核心元素，就应该是速决的权利。如果一项裁决，比如说6个月内未作出，就相当于得到批准。

• Consultation, consent of the governed.
• 被治理人的意见及合意。

The process by which rules are written needs to be reformed. Congress writes empowering legislation, usually vague and expansive. The agencies undertake their own process for rule writing. They usually invite comment from interested parties, but are typically free to ignore it when they wish. We are as supplicants before the King, asking for his benevolent treatment. 规则制定的流程需要改革。国会制定的授权法律通常模糊、宽泛。机构根据各自的流程制定规则。它们常常会邀请利益相关方提出意见，但当他们不愿意接受这些意见时，通常可以直接无视它们。我们就像国王面前的恳请者，乞求他的仁慈。 And that was before the current transformation. As exemplified by the EPA’s decision to brand carbon dioxide a pollutant (coverage here), to extend the definition of “navigable waters” to pretty much every puddle, HHS’ many reinterpretations of the ACA, and the Education Department’s “Dear Colleague” letters, even the barely-constrained rule-making process now proceeds beyond its previous mild legal and consultative constraints. 这还是发生在如今的转变之前的事。从环境保护局宣布二氧化碳为污染物（见报道），将“可通行水域”的范围延伸到几乎所有的池塘，到卫生与公共服务部数次重新解释患者保护与平价医疗法案，以及教育部的“致同僚的一封信”，都是例证。现在，即使原本就不怎么受约束的规则制定过程也突破了本已有限的法律和征求意见方面的约束。 A structure with more formal representation, and more formal rights to draft the rules that govern us, is more in keeping with the parliamentary lessons of the Rule of Law tradition. 在起草治理我们的规则方面，一个有着更为正式的代议机制和更为正式的权利的制度结构，将更加符合法治传统下的议会经验。 2.A Tour 2.浏览 Do we really have reason to be afraid? Let’s take a tour. 我们真的有理由害怕吗？我们来浏览一下。 These cases are drawn mostly from media coverage, which allows me a quick and current high- level tour. Each case, and many more that are unreported, and a serious investigation to the structure of our massive regulatory state, could easily be drawn out to book length. 以下案例大多来自媒体报道，让我得以对当前情况做一次鸟瞰式的快速浏览。每一起案件和更多没有报道的案件以及对大型监管型国家架构的严肃检视，都可以轻而易举地写成一本书。 My point is not so much a current scandal. My case is that the structure that has emerged is ripe for the Faustian political bargain to emerge, that the trend of using regulation to quash political freedom is in place and will only increase. 我的意图不是要讲一件当下的丑闻。我是认为，现已出现的架构很容易导致浮士德式政治交易的出现，使用监管来压制政治自由的趋势已经形成而且只会不断加强。 As we tour our current regulatory state of affairs, then, think of how well the current regime represents “rule of law,” how well it respects your freedom to speak, your freedom to object, your freedom to oppose the regulator and regulatory regime. Think how insulated it is against the strong temptations of our increasingly polarized, winner-take-all, partisan political system to use regulatory power as a means of enshrining political power. 当我们检视当前监管型国家的事务时，想一想现有体制体现了多少“法治”，它在多大程度上尊重了你的言论自由、反对自由和反对监管者及监管型政权的自由，想一想它与两极分化日益严重、赢家通吃、政党体系动用监管权力来固化政治权力的强烈冲动隔离得怎么样。 Banks 银行 Start with finance. Finance is, of course, where the money is. 从金融业开始。金融，顾名思义，是钱之所在。 The Dodd-Frank act is 2,300 pages of legislation, in which “systemic” is never defined, making a “systemic” designation nearly impossible to fight. The act has given rise to tens of thousands of pages of subsidiary regulation, much still to be written. The Volker rule alone — do not fund proprietary trading with insured deposits — runs now to nearly 1,000 pages. To call this Talmudic is to insult the clarity and concision of the Talmud. 《多德-弗兰克法案》有2,300页长，但里面并未定义何为“系统性的”。这就使得监管者对企业具有“系统性风险”的划定几乎无法反驳。法案也带来了上万页的附加规章，需要接着撰写的还有很多。单是沃尔克规则——禁止用参加存款保险的存款进行自营交易­­——现在就已经快1,000页了。以“塔木德式”来称呼它，是对塔木德之清晰、简洁的亵渎。【编注：塔木德是犹太教的一套口传律法，由拉比传承，记录该教的传统习俗和行为规范。】 The result is immense discretion, both by accident and by design. There is no way one can just read the regulations and know which activities are allowed. Each big bank now has dozens to hundreds of regulators permanently embedded at that bank. The regulators must give their ok on every major decision of the banks. 结果就是巨大的自由裁量权，既有意外也有蓄意。仅仅阅读这些规章绝无可能知道什么活动是被允许的。每家大银行现在都被永久性地安插了几十至几百个监管者。银行的每一项重大决定都必须得到监管者的批准。 The “stress tests” are a good case in point. Seeing, I suspect, the futility of much Dodd-Frank regulation, and with the apparent success of the Spring 2009 stress tests in the rear view mirror, such tests have become a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory efforts. But what worked once does not necessarily work again if carved in stone. “压力测试”是一个好例子。我怀疑是看到了众多多德-弗兰克规章的无效，同时，回顾过去又有2009年春天压力测试的成功，这些使得压力测试成了美联储加强监管的柱基。但是成功一次不代表常规化后次次都能成功。 In “stress tests,” Federal Reserve staff make up various scenarios, and apply their own computer models and the banks’ computer models to see how the banks fare. However, the Fed does not announce a set scenario ahead of time. They Fed staffers make up new scenarios each time. They understand that if banks know ahead of time what the scenario is and the standards are, then the clever MBAs at the banks will make sure the banks all pass. And billions of dollars hang on the results of this game. “压力测试”中，美联储职员制造不同的情境，然后应用联储自己的电脑模型和银行的模型来看银行如何反应。但是联储不会提前公布一组情境都有什么，美联储职员每次都制造一组新的情境。他们知道如果银行事先知道情境及标准，银行里那些聪明的MBA们就有办法保证银行通过测试。而数十亿美元系于这场游戏的结果。 Now, the Fed staffers playing this game, at least those that I have talked to, are honest and a- political. For now. But how long can that last? How long can the Fed resist the temptation to punish banks who have stepped out of line with a stress test designed to exploit their weakness? Is it any wonder that few big banks are speaking out against the whole regime? They understand that being an “enemy” is not the way to win approvals. 现在，参与这个游戏的联储职员，至少那些和我说过话的，都是诚实且无涉政治的。目前是这样，但这能维持多久呢？联储能够抵御诱惑多久，而不去惩罚那些在专门设计来利用银行弱点的压力测试中行为出格的银行？鲜有大银行敢于直言反对整个体系，这很奇怪吗？他们明白，成为“敌人”并不是获得审批的办法。 And the stress-test staff are getting handsome offers already to come work for the banks, to help the banks to pass the Fed’s stress tests. Ben Bernanke himself is now working for Citadel. 参与设计压力测试的联储职员现已从银行获得了待遇不菲的工作邀请，来帮助银行通过测试。本·伯南克自己现在就为城堡投资集团工作。 If this sounds like the cozy world of “capture,” however, remember the litany of criminal prosecutions and multibillion-dollar settlements. These are instigated by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, with much closer ties to the Administration, but they revolve around violations of securities regulations. Is it a coincidence that S&P, who embarrassed the Administration by downgrading U.S. debt, faced a $1.4 billion dollar settlement for ratings shenanigans, while Moody’s, which gave the same ratings, did not? Pay up, shut up, and stay out of trouble is the order of the day. 如果这听起来像是一个“捕获”的温馨世界，那请记住刑事诉讼和数十亿美元的和解下的哀鸣。这些都是由与行政分支关系更紧密的司法部长和司法部发起的，涉及的则是违反证券法规的行为。降低美国债务评级而让行政分支蒙羞的标准普尔因评级欺诈而面临14亿美元的和解，但给出同样评级的穆迪却没有受罚。这难道是巧合？破财消灾、闭上嘴、远离是非，是当今市场的生存之道。 The Wall Street Journal nicely characterized today’s Wall Street, quotingJohn J. Mack, Morgan Stanley's ex-chairman “Your No.1 client is the government,” which embeds “About 50 full-time government regulators.” 《华尔街日报》引述摩根士丹利前主席约翰·马克的话，漂亮地描述了今天华尔街的特点，他说：“你的头号客户是政府”，它安插了“大约50个全职监管者。” CFPB 消费者金融保护局 Another example: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice charged Ally Bank with discrimination in auto lending, and extracted a nearly $100 million settlement. Ally provides money to auto lenders. Lenders negotiate interest rates. Nobody is allowed to collect data on borrowers’ race. So Justice ran statistical analysis on last names and zip codes — Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding — to decide that minorities are being charge more than they should, essentially encoding ethnic jokes into law. 另一个例子：美国消费者金融保护局和司法部指控Ally银行在汽车贷款中歧视，并获取了一份价值约一亿美元的和解。Ally向汽车贷款放贷人提供资金。放贷人协商利率。不允许任何人收集借贷人的种族信息。所以司法部就通过贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法统计分析借贷人的姓和邮编作出裁决，认为少数族裔被收取了过高的费用——这等于是将种族笑话秘密地写入了法律。 Why did Ally pay? Sure, they might survive in court. But nobody wants to be branded a racist. And DOJ and CFPB have many more cards up their sleeves. CFPB now can disapprove any retail financial arrangement it deems “abusive,” and put Ally out of business. Ally为什么答应和解呢？当然，他们可能在法庭上获胜。但没人愿意被称作种族主义者。此外，司法部和消费者金融保护局袖子里还藏着很多牌。消费者金融保护局现在可以否决一切它们认为“滥用”的零售金融合约，它们可以让Ally破产。 Note in this case, there was no charge or evidence of discriminatory practice or intent. The case was purely that DOJ and CFPB didn’t like the statistics of the outcome. 注意，此案中并无歧视行为或意图的指控或证据。一切只因为司法部和消费者金融保护局不喜欢最后的数据统计分布。 More importantly, was this a knowable regulation, or a bill of attainder? Did CFPB and Justice make available the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding program on their website, and tell financial institutions “please download the BISG program, make sure you run loans through it, and that they come out with the right statistics?” Obviously not. This was an unknowable regulation. Ally had no way to make sure it was lending to the right last names. 更重要的是，这究竟是一条可知的规章，还是褫夺公民权的法案？消费者金融保护局和司法部有没有在网站公布贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法，并告诉金融机构“请下载该程序，根据它发放贷款并确保最终数据统计分布正确”？显然没有。这是一个不可知的法规。Ally无法保证它们把钱贷给了正确的姓氏。 Ominously, in Wall Street Journal coverage, 《华尔街日报》的报道带来了不详的预兆： Larger settlements may be on the horizon. J.P. Morgan...warned in a recent filing that it is discussing the issue of possible “statistical disparities” in auto lending with Justice. With more than $50 billion in auto loans on Morgan’s balance sheet at the end of last year, real or imaginary disparities wouldn’t have to be that large to generate a fat settlement. “更大的和解可能就在眼前。JP摩根……在最近提交的一份公告中警示投资者，它正在与司法部讨论汽车贷款中可能存在的‘统计偏差’问题。根据公司去年底资产负债表上超过500亿美元的汽车贷款，真实或者想象的偏差不必过大，也会产生巨额和解。” While the Obamacare (King v. Burwell) and gay marriage decisions soaked up the airtime in the summer of 2015, the Court’s upholdingof statistical discrimination and disparate impact stands as the greatest affront to liberty. Without even alleging discriminatory intent, without following any established procedure, the Justice Department can chew numbers as it feels, and based on statistical analysis brand you a racist and drag you to court. 尽管奥巴马医改案（金诉布维尔案）和同性恋婚姻判决占据了2015年整个夏天的聚光灯，但联邦最高法院对数据统计分布所体现的歧视和差别影响的认可才是对自由最严重的侵犯。甚至无需指称歧视意图，无需遵循任何现有程序，司法部就可以随意咀嚼数字，根据统计分析为你打上种族歧视者的标签，把你拖上法庭。 SEC 美国证券交易委员会 The SEC’s regulation of insider trading is a fine example of discretion run amok. There is no legal definition of insider trading. Other than corporate insiders (who have legal fiduciary responsibilities not to trade on information) there is little economic rationale for this witch hunt. The game is characterized by big suits with big settlements and novel theories. 证券交易委员会对内幕交易的监管是自由裁量权失控的一个很好例证。法律上没有内幕交易的定义。除去企业内部人（他们有法律上的受托人责任，不利用信息进行交易）之外，这种猎巫式的监管没有多少经济依据。这场游戏的特点是大案件、高额和解和新颖的理论。 And thus, big discretion. The SEC can ruin anyone it wants to. If you’re running a hedge fund and the SEC accuses you of insider trading, it grabs your computers and shuts down your business. Sure, 5 years from now you might win in court, but your customers left and the fund shut down the day they took the computers away. And appeal is only to the SEC itself. 于是，这带来了广泛的自由裁量权。证券交易委员会可以摧毁想要摧毁的任何人。如果你经营一家对冲基金，而证券交易委员会指控你内幕交易，它会带走公司的电脑，关闭你的公司。当然，5年后你可能赢下官司，但是客户全都离开了，基金公司也在取走电脑的那天关了。而且你就算上诉也只能上诉到证券交易委员会。 Robosigning 自动签名 During the financial crisis, many banks didn’t fill out all the forms correctly when foreclosing on houses. The charge was entirely about process — there was no charge that anyone was evicted who was paying his or her mortgages. From the Federal Reserve’s own press releaseswe learn that the Fed found them guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices.” 金融危机期间，许多银行取消房屋抵押赎回权时没有正确填写所有表格。这项指控纯粹只和流程有关，没有任何关于仍在还按揭的房主被驱逐的指控。从美联储自己的官方新闻通报中我们知道，美联储认为银行因“不安全、不合理的程序和操作”而犯有过错。 The Fed was acting in conjunction with a comprehensive settlement agreed in principle between the five banking organizations, the state Attorneys General, and the Department of Justice ... The Settlement Agreement requires these organizations to provide $25 billion in payments and other designated types of monetary assistance and remediation to residential mortgage borrowers. 在一项五家银行机构、各州检察长和司法部……之间达成的、内容广泛的原则性和解中，美联储也参与了联合行动。和解协议要求银行赔付给民宅按揭借贷者总额为250亿美元的款项和其他指定的资金支持和救助。 The Fed, a supposedly non-political independent agency devoted to bank safety and monetary policy, acted with the Administration, to transfer $25 billion dollars from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers (not the victims of robosigning, other borrowers) and “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” 美联储——一家理应政治中性、独立，致力于银行安全和实施货币政策的机构——和行政分支一起将250亿美元从银行股东那里转移给按揭借贷者（他们还不是自动签名的受害者）和“非营利性住房咨询机构”。 It’s a small example, but a concrete one. 这是一个小例子，但很实在。 Regulation in general is transitioning from widespread application of rules to sporadic but very large enforcement actions, frequently involving threat of criminal prosecution and ending in large settlements. Documenting this trend, the Wall Street Journalnoted the spread of Department of Justice Attorneys to regulatory agencies. For example, the EPA “described a strategy of pursuing larger, more complicated enforcement cases, albeit fewer in number.” 总体上看，监管正由规则的广泛适用转向不定期的大型执法活动，还经常伴随着刑事诉讼的威胁，并以大额和解而终结。在记录这一趋势时，《华尔街日报》注意到很多司法部律师转到了其他监管机构。比如，环境保护署“描绘了一个策略，就是追求更大、更复杂的执法案件，哪怕案件数量更少”。 Similarly,Larry Parkinson, another former federal prosecutor who runs FERC’s [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] investigations, described it as an outgrowth of shifting resources to more serious matters—like market manipulation—and away from more traditional violations. In 2008, for example, a majority of the agency’s penalties were against firms that violated requirements that natural-gas shippers maintain title to the gas. 类似地，拉里·帕金森，另一位前联邦检察官，现负责联邦能源监管委员会的调查，将此说成是资源从传统违法行为转移到更严重问题的结果，如市场操控。比如，2008年，该委员会的大部分处罚是针对那些违反天然气航运商必须保有天然气所有权这一规定的公司。 “Market Manipulation” is of course a lot more nebulous and discretionary than natural-gas title checks. “市场操控”当然比天然气所有权检查更加模糊、有更多自由裁量权。 The ACA, AKA Obamacare 患者保护与平价医疗法案，即奥巴马医改法案 The ACA is 2,700 pages, and the subsidiary regulation is so convoluted that there is an active debate on the page count of its actual regulations. Justice Scalia invoked the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment as protection against actually reading it. 奥巴马医改法案长达2,700页，配套法规也相当复杂，以至于其到底有多少页还存在争议。斯卡利亚大法官援引第八修正案——不得施加残酷和非常惩罚——来保护自己不去读它。 The Heritage foundation counted 1,327 waivers. Clearly, someone needing a discretionary waiver shouldn’t be a big critic of HHS or the law. 美国传统基金会统计到了1,327份弃权声明。显然，有人需要自主弃权，这不应算是对卫生与公共服务部或者这项法案的严厉批评。 The cartelization of health insurance and health care under the ACA is almost a textbook case of corporatism. The big hospitals doctors, and insurers get a protected small cartel. In return for political support for the ACA, HHS, state exchanges, and so on. And, the ACA itself being an intensely partisan question, that support already leaks into major party politics. 奥巴马医改法案下健康保险和医疗卫生服务的卡特尔化是社团主义的教科书式案例。大医院、医生和保险公司获得了一个受保护的小卡特尔。作为回报，他们从政治上支持医改法案、卫生与公共服务部及州立医疗保险交易所等等。由于医改法案本身已经成为了一个很严重的党派问题，对法案的支持也卷入到了政党政治中。 Writing on the consolidation of health insurance into two or three big companies, the Wall Street Journal quotesAetna CEO Mark Bertolini that the federal regulators “happen to be, for most of us now, our largest customer,” adding 《华尔街日报》在关于健康保险公司整合为两到三家大公司的报道中，引用了安泰保险首席执行官马克·伯特利尼的话说，联邦监管机构“对我们大多数人而言，现在恰好是我们最大的客户”。他又补充道： “So there is a relationship you need to figure out there if you’re going to have a sustained positive relationship with your biggest customer. And we can all take our own political point of view of whether it’s right or wrong, but in the end-analysis, they’re paying us a lot of money and they have a right to give us some insight into how they think we should run our business.” “所以如果你想要和最大的客户有一个长久积极的关系，就需要认清这个关系。关于对错，我们都可以有自己的政治观点，但是最终来看，他们支付我们很大一笔钱，他们有权利给我们一些见解，告诉我们该如何经营。” The Journal opined that “such domestication is part of ObamaCare’s goal of political control,” echoing my fear. 《华尔街日报》评论道，“这种驯服是奥巴马医改法案政治控制意图的一部分”，这呼应了我的忧惧。 United Healthwanted to join the California exchange Covered California. Many areas of California have only one or two insurers now, so competition and choice are clearly needed. But participation in the exchange needs prior regulatory approval, and United Health was denied. Why? The LA Times wrote 联合健康保险想要加入加州健康保险交易所——医保加州。加州很多地方现在只有一两家保险公司，所以显然是很需要竞争和更多选择余地的。但是参加交易所需要事先得到审批，联合健康保险被否决了。为什么？《洛杉矶时报》写到： Peter Lee, executive director of Covered California, said established insurers shouldn't be free to come in right away. Those insurers, he said, should not be allowed to undercut rivals who stepped up at the start and made significant investments to sign up 1.2 million Californians during the first open enrollment. “彼得·李，医保加州的执行董事，表示老牌保险公司不应该立刻自由进入市场。他说那些保险公司不应该被允许以更低地成本与那些在第一次公开登记时就进场，并为签下120万加州人作出巨大投资的对手竞争。” and quoting Lee further, 李还说， We think the health plans that helped make California a national model should not be in essence undercut by plans that sat on the sidelines. “我们认为帮助加州成为全国模范的保险计划不应该被那些坐在一边看热闹的计划比下去。” You can’t ask for a clearer example of a regulator, using discretionary power to cartelize his industry, protect incumbent profits, and punish a business for failure to support political objectives. He said nothing about United Health’s ability to serve California customers, or to abide by any regulation. 没有什么是比这个更明显的监管者的例子了，利用自由裁量权将他管辖的行业卡特尔化，保护既得利益，惩罚没能支持其政治目标的公司。李一点没提联合健康保险服务加州消费者的能力或者其遵守了所有的法规。 Again in California, reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Daughters of Charity Health system wanted to sell six insolvent hospitals to Prime, which agreed to take on their debt and a $300 million pension liabilities. Under state law, Attorney General Kamala Harris must approve nonprofit hospital sales or acquisitions, with only a vague guideline that such transactions must be “in the public interest.” But only four of Prime’s 15 California hospitals are unionized, so the Service Employees International Union was against the merger. Ms. Harris torpedoed the merger, despite a positive report form her own staff. 还是在加州，据《华尔街日报》报道，仁爱女儿连锁医院想要将六所破产的医院卖给基本医疗。后者同意接受破产医院的债务和3亿美元的养老金负债。根据州法律，非营利医院的收购或出售须得到州检察长卡马拉·哈里斯批准，而指导其审批的只有一条模糊原则，就是这一交易必须“符合公共利益”。但是基本医疗在加州的15家医院只有4家参加了工会，所以服务业员工国际工会就起来反对这一并购。哈里斯女士阻止了这次并购，尽管她自己的手下出具了对并购持正面评价的报告。 Was the event a political cave to unions, as represented by the Journal? Perhaps; perhaps not. What matters here is that it certainly could be, as the Attorney General has enormous discretionary power to approve or disapprove hospital mergers. Hospitals are well advised to stay on her good side. 这一事件是不是如《华尔街日报》报道的那样，是对工会的政治屈服呢？也许是，也许不是。这里真正重要的是，完全有可能如此，因为检察长有很大的自由裁量权批准或否决医院并购。医院得到的建议是乖乖站在检察长一边。 FDA 食品药品监督管理局 Henry Miller at Hoover tells the sad tale of the Aquadvantage salmon, submitted for review in 1996 and still under review20: 胡佛研究所的亨利·米勒说了关于AquAdvantage转基因鲑鱼的悲伤故事，这一品种1996年提交评审，到现在还在评审： ...Consider what they [FDA] have inflicted on a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon, which differs from its wild cohorts only by reaching maturity about 40 percent faster, as the result of the addition to its genome of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon... “……想一想食品药品监督管理局（FDA）对这一转基因大西洋鲑鱼都做了什么。这种鲑鱼与其它野生同类唯一不同的是比它们快40%达到成熟期，因为它的基因组中添加了帝王鲑的生长荷尔蒙基因……” It took FDA more than a decade just to decide how they would regulate the AquAdvantage salmon. Characteristically, they decided on the most onerous pathway, regulating the new construct in genetically engineered animals as though it were a veterinary drug, similar to a flea medicine or pain reliever. After several years of deliberation, regulators concluded as early as 2012 that the AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon has no detectable differences and that it “is as safe as food from conventional Atlantic salmon.” ... FDA用了超过十年时间来决定要怎样监管这种鲑鱼。跟往常一样，他们决定通过最繁复的路径来监管转基因动物体内的新构造，就像把它当作兽药，类似跳蚤药或者镇痛药那样对待。经过数年的研究，监管者早在2012年就得出结论认为这种鲑鱼没有可探知的差异，它“和大西洋传统鲑鱼一样安全”。 When the FDA completed its Environmental Assessment in April 2012 and was ready to publish it—the last necessary hurdle before approving the salmon for marketing—the White House mysteriously intervened. The review process vanished from sight until December of that year, when the FDA was finally permitted to publish the EA (the unsurprising verdict: “no significant impact”), which should then have gone out for a brief period of public comment prior to approval. 就在2012年4月FDA完成环境评价准备公布结果时——这也是最后一道挡在鲑鱼上市前的障碍——白宫却神秘地干涉了进来。审批过程从公众视野中消失了。直到那年12月，FDA才最终被批准公布环境评价，结果并不出人意料——“没有显著影响”。这之后理应是短暂的公开征求意见阶段，然后就是正式批准。 The reason for the delay in the FDA’s publishing the needed Environmental Assessment was exposed by science writer Jon Entine. He related that the White House interference “came after discussions [in the spring of 2012] between Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ office and officials linked to Valerie Jarrett at the Executive Office [of the President], who were debating the political implications of approving the [genetically modified] salmon. Genetically modified plants and animals are controversial among the president’s political base, which was thought critical to his reelection efforts during a low point in the president’s popularity.” 科学作家乔恩•昂蒂纳揭露了FDA推迟公布环境评价的原因。他谈到，白宫的干涉“发生于2012年春天卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳·西贝利厄斯的部长办公室和总统办公室瓦莱丽·贾勒相关的官员进行的一场讨论之后。这些官员的辩论围绕着批准转基因鲑鱼的政治影响。在总统的政治大本营，转基因植物和动物是有争议的话题。这一话题被认为在总统的支持率处于低点的时候对总统的再次当选至关重要。” Needless to say, 20 years of delay makes a project pretty unprofitable. 不用说，20年的拖延让转基因鲑鱼项目变得几乎无利可图。 This is a good example, because the FDA regulations prescribe a precise science-based process for evaluating a food. There are time limits for rendering decisions, which the FDA ignores. But strong political forces don’t like GM foods, science be damned. 这是一个绝佳的例子，因为FDA的法规规定了评价食品的一套基于科学的精确程序。作出裁决是有时限的，但被FDA忽略了。当强大的政治力量不喜欢转基因食品时，科学就屁也不是了。 EPA 环境保护署 A clean environment is important. Pollution is a clear externality. We can also regard it as a Nash equilibrium. Each competitor in an industry is happy to pay the extra money to produce cleanly if all his or her competitors do so. 清洁环境很重要。污染显然是一个外部性。我们也可以把它看作一个纳什均衡。如果竞争对手也这么做，行业里的每一个竞争对手都愿意花额外的钱清洁地生产。 But the modern EPA violates just about every one of my suggested bullet points for preserving rule of law in the regulatory bureaucracy, and is ripe for political misuse. Discretion vs. rules, the potential for endless delay, the need for ex-ante permission, and a politicized and partisan bureaucracy are just the beginning. 但是现代的环境保护署违背了我为在监管型官僚机构下维护法治所提出的几乎每一条建议，政治滥用就在眼前。自由裁量权而非规则、无限拖延的可能、事前批准的要求、政治化和党派化的官僚机构，这些都还只是开始。 In the Pebble Mine controversy, EPA issued a preemptive veto of a project before a request for review was submitted, and was found colluding with mining opponents. Note, I’m not opining on whether the mine was a good or bad idea. Merely that the process in view is clearly one that could be misused for political purposes, and that mine owners already must know not to speak ill of the EPA or administration with such sway over the EPA. 在佩柏金矿争议中，环境保护署在项目审批申请递交前就发出了事先否决，并且被发现和开采的反对方相勾结。请注意，我并不是在就开矿是好是坏发表意见。我要说的仅仅是，这个程序明显可以因政治目的而遭到利用，而矿主一定已经知道不要说环境保护署以及可以对其施加影响的其他机构的坏话。 The Keystone pipeline stands as the example par excellence of regulatory delay and politicization. Perhaps next to the EPA’s decision to take on carbon as a pollutant. Keystone石油管线是监管拖延和政治化的绝佳例证。可能仅次于环境保护署决定将二氧化碳列为污染物。 Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project. 如今，任何因其他理由——比如遮住了视野——而反对一个项目的人，都可以利用环境评估来加以阻止。在任何商业项目中，拖延跟否决一样有效。 The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed “crucifying” some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying: 环境保护署第六区主管阿尔·阿曼达里兹的小故事很有启发性。他建议把一些大的石油公司“钉死在十字架上”，以儆效尤。录音显示，他说： The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years. “罗马人曾经征服地中海地区的小村庄。他们进入某个土耳其小镇，将最先看到的五个人钉死在十字架上。然后整个镇子在接下来的几年都会很好管理。 ...we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly. ……我们确实有一些很有效的执法工具。如此，顺服便唾手可得，而且程度很高，来得很快，非常快。 According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases. 故事里，阿曼达里兹关闭了Range Resources，首批水力压裂公司之一。Range予以了回击，最终一位联邦法官作出了有利于Range的判决。但是一个通过杀鸡儆猴、明显增加企业合规成本来运作的机构，当然易于根据政治考量而选择 “钉死”哪些儆猴之鸡。 Internet 网络 The Internet is the central disruptive technology of our time. So far it has been “permissionless” — unlike just about every other activity in the contemporary United States, you do not need prior approval of a regulator to put up a website. 网络是这个时代核心的颠覆性科技。截至目前，它还是“无需审批”的。不像当代美国的其他任何活动，你不需要事前审批就能上线一个网站。 Pressure grew under the reasonable-sounding banner of “net neutrality,” though what was at stake was the right of some businesses to pay extra for faster delivery. “Net neutrality” meant outlawing business class. The FCC, a supposedly independent agency, studied the issue and found no reason to regulate the internet. 但是，在听似合理的“网络中立性”旗帜下，压力与日俱增，虽然这里受到危及的是一些公司通过额外付费来获得更快传输的权利。“网络中立性”意味着宣布通过额外付费取得一定特权不合法。联邦通信委员会（FCC）——一个本该中立的机构，研究了这个议题，然后发现没有理由监管网络。 One fine day in November 2014, FCC commissioner Tom Wheeler must have found horse head in bed. Well, more specifically a surprise public announcement from President Obama that “blindsided officials at the FCC” per WSJ coverage. 2014年11月某个美好的日子，FCC主席汤姆·惠勒一定在床上发现了一个血淋淋的马头【译注：电影《教父》梗】，更准确地说是奥巴马总统惊人的公开言论。据《华尔街日报》报道，奥巴马提到了“FCC那些钻进死胡同的官员”。 The result is not just “net neutrality” but to apply full telecommunications regulation circa 1935. In particular, this includes Title II rate regulation, in which the FCC has full power to determine what rates are “reasonable.” 奥巴马的言论带来的结果不仅仅是“网络中立性”，而是FCC将动用其约于1935年获得的全面电信监管权力。尤其是，这其中包括有关费用管制的第二条款。据此，FCC可以全权决定什么样的费用是“合理”的。 The FCC announces it will “forbear” to use that power. Along with its right, under the regulation, to impose content restrictions — yes, to tell you what to put on your website — and the “fairness doctrine.” But forebearance is discretionary. So, a company thinking of investing money in fiber-optic lines had better invest in good relations with the FCC and the Administration that apparently drives its decisions. FCC宣布他们会“克制”使用该权力，以及在该监管下实施内容限制（是的，就是告诉你网站放什么内容）和“公平原则”的权力。但是克制也是有裁量的。所以，一家打算投资光纤电缆的公司最好多多投资于它和FCC以及能够影响其裁决的行政分支的关系。 The “independence” of regulatory agencies is one of the key structures impeding widespread use of regulatory power to induce political support. The WSJ coverage of the politics behind the decision describes well how specific businesses’ access to the White House drove the result. On the commission, the 3-2 vote with 2 republicans issuing withering dissents speaks of the partisan nature of this regulation. 监管机构的“独立”是阻止广泛使用监管权力争取政治支持的关键架构之一。《华尔街日报》关于裁决背后的政治勾当的报道，很好地描述了特定公司通往白宫的门道是如何推动结果的。通信委员会3:2的投票结果，以及2名共和党挖苦式地发表少数意见，正说明了这一监管的党派政治本质。 Alas, the internet is all moving to Washington. Uber hired, straight from the Administration, well known tech wizard, David Pflouffe. Given Uber’s troubles with labor law — a California court recently ruling that its contractors are employees — and taxi regulation throughout the U.S., investing in politics is good business for Uber. 可叹的是，网络公司都向华盛顿涌来。优步直接从政府雇佣了著名的科技巫师大卫·普罗夫。鉴于优步面临的劳动法方面的麻烦（一家加州法庭最近裁定它旗下的合约司机是正式雇员）和在全美出租车法规面前遭遇的麻烦，投资于政治对它来说是一笔好生意。 Campaign finance 竞选筹款 Campaign finance law and regulation is all about restricting freedom of speech and altering who wins elections. So one should not be surprised about its political use to restrict freedom of speech and alter who wins elections. 竞选筹款的法律法规就是关于限制言论自由和改变胜选人的。所以对于它被政治性的用来限制言论自由和改变胜选人也不应感到意外。 Still, the recent trend is more troubling than usual. 但尽管如此，最近的趋势仍比往常更加令人不安。 Lois Lerner, director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Unit, famously derailed applications for nonprofit status from conservative groups, ahead of the 2012 Presidential election. Her main tactic was endless delay. All you need is for the election to pass. 洛伊丝·勒纳，联邦税务局免税机构部主管，在2012年总统大选前阻挠保守派团体获得非盈利性资格的申请【编注：被认定为非盈利性机构意味着其所获得的捐赠可以让捐赠者享受相应的税务豁免，按机构性质不同，豁免的可能是应税收入，也可能是应缴税额。】，并因此出名。她的主要战术就是无限期拖延。她需要的只是等到大选过去。 Scott Walker’s troubles are similarly renown. Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm filed “John Doe” probes against conservative issue advocacy groups, “blanketed conservatives with subpoenas, raided their homes and put the targets under a gag order” that they could not even reveal the fact of the investigation. It came to light, and is now in the courts, but not until well after the election. Walker won anyway, but might not have. 斯科特·沃克的麻烦也差不多出名。密尔沃基地区检察官约翰·奇瑟姆发起了一项针对保守议题倡导组织的“无名氏”调查。“给保守派人士发法庭传票来妨碍他们，突然查抄他们的家，为目标人士申请禁口令”，使得他们甚至无法揭露这些调查存在的事实。整件事直到选举之后很久才曝光，目前正在庭审阶段。不管怎样，沃克最后还是赢了，但完全可能因此而输掉。 The Administration has been pushing since 2010 to force nonprofits to disclose all donors, as campaigns must disclose contributors. It sounds innocuous: “Disclosures?” Who can be against that? Shouldn’t “big money” contributing to politics be public information? 政府自2010年以来一直在推动强令非营利组织公开捐款人，就像竞选必须公开捐助人一样。这听起来很无害。“公开”？谁敢反对？难道捐助政治的“大钱”不应该成为公开信息吗？ Not when the vast power of the regulatory state can come down on whomever it wants to. Tyrannies always start by making lists. Nixon at least had to compile his own enemies list. 当监管型国家的权力触角可以伸到它希望的任何人时，就不应该了。暴政都是从列名单开始的。尼克松至少还需要自己动手编列一份政敌名单。 Snowden 斯诺登 The Snowden affair taught us some important lessons about our government. The NSA collected phone call “metadata.” Well, it’s just who called who and not the content of phone calls (unless you call abroad), you may say. 斯诺登事件教给我们一些关于我们政府的重要教训。国家安全局收集电话“元数据”。你也许会说，只是谁打给谁，又不是电话的内容（除非打到国外）。 But even metadata is revealing. Suppose you called three cancer doctors, alcoholics anonymous, and two divorce lawyers. And you want to run for the senate. That kind of information is political dynamite. 但即使是元数据信息量也很大。假设你打给了三个癌症医生，匿名戒酒会和两个离婚律师。你还想要竞选参议员。这些信息在政治上就是爆炸性的。 The NSA has the content, not just metadata, of any emails that go abroad. The NSA likely has many Hilary Clinton’s missing emails. And Jeb Bushes’. Unless neither has ever written an email that rises to the embarrassment level of Mitt Romney’s 47% remark, the information to sink either campaign is likely sitting on NSA computers. 国安局掌握着发往国外的任何邮件的内容，不仅仅是元数据。国安局里很可能有很多希拉里·克林顿的失踪邮件。以及杰布·布什的。除非两人写过的邮件没有一封能达到罗姆尼47%言论【译注：罗姆尼2012年曾经在私下场合表示，有47%的选民无论如何都会选奥巴马，他们相信政府对他们有责任、有义务。罗姆尼表示自己不需要去担心这些人】的尴尬程度，否则击沉任意一个候选人的信息就在国安局的电脑里。 That information would never leak out, you say? Snowden proves the opposite. Any piece of information on a government computer is one Snowden, one Lois Lerner, or one Chinese hacker away from a twitter feed. 你说什么？信息永远不会泄露？斯诺登证明了信息会泄露。政府电脑里的任何信息离推特信息都只有一个斯诺登、一个洛伊丝·勒纳或者一个中国黑客的距离。 John Oliver’s Snowden interview contained an interesting revelation. The internet is an amazing thing. What do Americans do with it? They send around pictures of their private parts. And NSA employees regularly pass the pictures around to great hilarity. 约翰·奥利弗对斯诺登的采访披露了一个有意思的情节。网络是个奇妙的东西。美国人用它来干什么呢？他们到处发送自己私处的照片。而国安局职员经常传阅这些照片来取乐。 E-Verify 电子查证 As part of most immigration deals we are likely to see strong enforcement of the right of employees to work via e-verify. Every single human being who wishes to work in the United States must ask for the ex-ante permission the Federal Government. 作为绝大多数移民政策的一部分，我们可能会看到，借助电子查证，有关雇员工作权的法规得到了强有力实施。每个想在美国工作的人都必须征得联邦政府的事先准许。 Leave aside here the obvious question how the same government that runs the Obamacare website, and, as I write, has had all visa applications to the U.S. shut down for two weeks due to hardware failures, will manage this. Let’s focus on the political implications. 一个运营着奥巴马医改网站的政府，一个因为硬件故障关闭所有签证申请达两周的政府，如何能够管理电子查证？这里先别管这个明显的问题，我们把焦点集中到政治影响上吧。 This power will naturally expand. First, people without proper immigration documents. But once in place, why only enforce immigration laws? Already there are a long list of laws governing who can work and when and where. People must have the right licenses, the right background checks, union memberships and so on. Are you guilty in the latest SEC which hunt? E-verify can really make sure you never work in finance again, not so much as a bank teller. Or that a conviction for violating the endangered species act keeps you out of the work force. 这一权力会自然延伸。首先是没有正当移民文件的人。但是电子查证一旦到位，为什么只用来执行移民法呢？已经有一长串的法律管理着谁可以工作以及什么时候在哪儿工作。人们必须要有正确的执照、正确的背景审查、工会会员身份等等。在证券交易委员会最近的一次政治迫害中你有罪吗？电子查证可以确保你再也不能从事金融业，即使是银行柜员也不行。或者一项威胁濒危物种的行为的定罪，也可以把你隔离在劳动力市场之外。 Every tyranny controls its citizens by controlling their right to work. Do we really want every American who wants employment to have to ask for the ex-ante permission of the Federal Government of Edward Snowden and Lois Lerner? 任何暴政都通过控制公民的工作权来控制公民。我们真的希望每个想要工作的人都必需事先征得一个由爱德华·斯诺登和洛伊丝·勒纳组成的联邦政府的许可吗？ Transactions 交易 We have lost the right to transact privately in the terror and drug wars. The right to political dissent requires the ability to speak freely and privately; the right to earn a living despite political opposition; and the right to transact in private. All three are vanishing. 我们已经在反恐和禁毒战争中失去了私下交易的权利。政治异见的权利要求人们能够自由和私密地表达的可能性，政治反对者仍能谋生的权利，以及私下交易的权利。这三种权利都在消失。 You may have reveled in the ending of Stephen King’s Shawshank Redemption, in which the hero takes cash out of banks and heads to Mexico. Under today’s banking laws, that could no longer happen. 你也许很喜欢史蒂夫·金的《肖申克的救赎》的结尾，男主角从银行取出钱，前往墨西哥。在今天的银行法律下，这一幕再也不会发生了。 As a recent political example, Dennis Hastert was recently indictedf or violating the spirit of the $10,000 limit on bank withdrawals, by withdrawing amounts just shy of the limit. Hastert wanted the money, apparently, to pay blackmail to someone with an embarrassing personal secret. 最近的一个政治例子是，丹尼斯·哈斯特尔特最近因违背银行取款不超过10,000美元的宗旨而受到起诉。他取出的额度恰好略低于限额。原来，哈斯特尔特需要钱去支付某人利用其尴尬的私人秘密所进行的勒索。 Hastert is retired. But should aspiring politicians really have no privacy in their personal transactions? 哈斯特尔特退休了。但是有抱负的政客在私人交易中就真的没有任何隐私吗？ Education 教育 As Daniel Henninger put it: 正如丹尼尔·海宁格所说： ...historians of the new system will cite the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights’ 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter on sexual harassment as the watershed event. “新系统下的历史学家会将教育部民权办公室2011年关于性骚扰的致同僚信作为分水岭事件。” This letter—not even a formal regulation—forced creation of quasi-judicial systems of sexual-abuse surveillance on every campus in America. The universities complied for fear of lawsuits from enforcers at the Departments of Education and Justice. 这封信，甚至都不是一个正式的法规，但其强制建立了一个准司法体系，监视美国每一个校园的性侵害。大学都遵守这一要求，因为怕惹上教育部和司法部的官司。 The Justice Department’s Special Litigation Section and Housing and Civil Enforcement Section have forced numerous settlements from police departments, school districts, jails and housing agencies. Whatever the merits, the locals know the price of resisting Justice is too high. 司法部的特殊诉讼处及住房和民事执法处已经强制和解了好几起来自警察局、学区、监狱和住房机构的案件。不管是不是在法律上站得住脚，当地人知道抵抗司法部的成本太高。 National Review’s coverageof Laura Kipinis’ travails is a good example of the political use of this regulation. Professor Kipinis “wrote a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education arguing that college campuses are in a state of ‘sexual paranoia.’” She quickly became the subject of a “Title IX inquisition,” documented in her essayby that name. Though eventually cleared, the point is the use of regulatory power to silence speech. 《国家评论》对劳拉·吉普尼斯的痛苦经历的报道是这项监管被政治利用的一个好例子。吉普尼斯教授“在《高等教育纪事报》上写了一篇专栏，表示大学校园正处于一种‘性受迫害妄想狂’的状态”。她很快成为了“第九条调查”的对象，她在一篇文章里用的就是这个词。尽管最终洗清了嫌疑，重点是利用监管权力压制了言论。 3.A Magna Carta for the Regulatory State 3.为监管型国家寻求一部大宪章 The power of the regulatory state has increased steadily. And it lacks many of the checks and balances that give us some “rule of law” in the legal system. (A system which has its own troubles.) The clear danger we face is the use of regulation for political control. Each industry gets carved up into a few compliant oligopolies. And the threat of severe penalties, with little of the standard rule-of-law recourse, keeps people and businesses in line and supporting the political organization or party that controls the agencies. 监管型国家的权力已持续增长。它缺少了很多在法律体系（该体系也面临着自己的麻烦）里给我们带来一些“法治”的制衡。我们面对的最明显的危险，就是利用监管实现政治控制。每个行业都若干顺服的寡头所瓜分。严厉处罚的威胁，以及法治援助标准的缺失，让个人和公司对控制着监管机构的政治组织或政党既保持服从，又提供支持。 We’re not there yet. The Koch Brothers are not on the EPA “crucifixion” list, an investigation of every plant they own, or probes by the DOJ, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, and so on and so on. They could be. The Hoover institution retains its tax-exempt status despite writings such as this one. A free media still exists, and I can read all my horror stories in the morning Wall Street Journal, and the free (for now) internet. 我们还没到那一步。科赫兄弟公司还不在环境保护署的“钉死”名单上，他们旗下的工厂没有被逐一调查，也没有被司法部、国家劳动关系委员会、公平就业机会委员会、职业安全与健康管理局等等调查。但他们可能成为调查对象。胡佛研究所仍保有免税资格，尽管发表了类似于这篇文章的东西。自由媒体依然存在，每天早上我仍可在《华尔街日报》上读到各种恐怖故事。互联网（目前）也还是自由的。 But we are getting there. What stops it from happening? A tree ripe for picking will be picked. 但是我们正滑向那里。什么能够阻止它发生呢？一颗易于采摘的树最终会被采摘的。 The easy answers are too easy. “Get rid of regulations” is true, but simplistic like “get rid of laws.” What we learned in the 800 years since Magna Carta is that the character of law, and the detailed structures of its operation that matter. Law is good, as it protects citizens from arbitrary power. 简单的回答过于简单了。“取消监管”是真的，但和“取消法律”一样太过简化。大宪章以来的800年，我们学到的一样东西就是法律的特征以及它运作的详细架构很重要。法律是好的，因为它保护公民免于专断的权力。 It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one. 是时候为监管型国家起草一部大宪章了。规章需要按照我之前列的几点来制定。人们需要有挑战监管者的权利：证据开示权、对判决提出异议的权利、上诉权。是的，这就意味着制衡的场所在法庭。人人都恨律师，除了自己需要一个的时候。 People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor. 人们需要速决的权利。一个针对规章的“人身保护令”会起作用：如果任何裁决未在6个月内作出，则自动视为有利于你。 A return to economic growth depends on reforming the regulatory state. But the deeper and perhaps more important preservation of our political freedom depends on it even more. 经济的重新增长依赖于改革监管型国家，但从更深层或许也更重要的意义上说，我们政治自由的存续甚至更加依赖于这一改革。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-10-21】 @熊也餐厅:我有些搞不懂，这么多年香港的经济自由程度一直排全世界第一但是我真心不觉得是这样。 @whigzhou: 我觉得差不多啊，你感觉哪里不对呢？ @whigzhou: 其实城邦与大国不太好比，香港在许多方面占了特殊便宜：自由港，无军队，只有一级政府，夕阳产业容易移出因而工会很难维持……所以得分高是可以预料的 @whigzhou: 香港也没几个农民，而农民是许多国家阻挠自由贸易的重要势力和吃政府补贴的大头 @熊也餐厅:香港马路上整天有食品署的查询，警察也驱赶小贩。在我大袋鼠国从来没有看到过。 @whigzhou: 具体情况我不了解，但驱赶小贩未必是自由的扣分项，要看理由是什么，如果警察是应附近居民或商铺的扰民投诉而行动，就可能是在保护既有权利，如果警察是自作主张或依行政法条行事，才算负分 @whigzhou: 从居住密集度看，香港小贩引起扰民投诉的可能性显然比澳洲大 @熊也餐厅:[哈哈] 說實話我在我大袋鼠國就沒有見到過有什麼小販。down town 有時有賣鞋帶的其實就是乞丐 @whigzhou: 香港地铁是界限明确的私人空间，所以除非小贩已经长期占领其中某块特定地盘，驱赶是没问题的  

【2015-10-21】 @研二公知苗 想请教一下大家，关于国家对经济的干预程度，有没有比经济自由度指数更加直观的指标？ @whigzhou: 商业新闻中提到政府的新闻的比例，这个指标现在应该已经有条件获得了 @whigzhou: 其他许多直观指标也有价值，但都不够全面，比如首都规模，只适用于美国澳洲巴西等另建新都的国家，财政供养人口不能充分反映管制繁苛度，受贿普遍度则有很大文化差异且很难控制 @whigzhou: 不过这个也有缺陷，比如朝鲜就用不上，因为朝鲜没有商业新闻:( @研二公知苗: 像是阿根廷的梅内姆，为了减少私有化的压政治压力，增加了社会福利开支，这就使得梅内姆政府开支占GDP比重甚至比经济改革之前还高。 @whigzhou: 嗯，从北欧经验看，比起特权/管制/干预，高税收/高政府开支对经济的干扰其实要小很多 @研二公知苗:那请教辉格老师，华尔街日报的经济自由度指数作为一个综合指标怎么样？有一点缺陷是，这个指标覆盖的年份太少了。 @whigzhou: 我觉得挺好的，类似指标里可能是最好的，不过离我的期望还是有很大距离，主要问题是缺乏前瞻性  

超越邓巴数#2：扩张的动力 辉格 2015年9月14日 自从人类过上定居生活之后，便开始组织起规模越来越大的社会，这一趋势如此普遍的存在于各大文明中，以至给人一种印象：社会向大型化发展似乎是不可避免的；实际上并非如此，正如我在上一篇文章里所提到的，在定居之前的漫长历史（至少占整个智人历史的19/20）中，人类社会的规模始终处于邓巴数限制之下。 社会的大型化趋势不仅表现在不同群体间结成的政治实体日益扩张和复杂化——从几十人的游团，几百上千人的部落，几万人的酋邦，到数十上百万人的王国——，也表现在生活在同一定居点的单一社区的规模越来越庞大。 在大约一万年前，文明的黎明时分，文明摇篮新月沃地诞生了第一批有着永久性建筑的城市，据认为是史上最古老城市的杰里科（[[Jericho]]），拥有一两千居民；从大约六千年前开始，另一个文明摇篮乌克兰出现了一批拥有一万多居民的更大城市，其中包括印欧人祖先所建立的塔连基（[[Talianki]]）。 约一千年后，青铜时代的苏美尔人在两河地区建立的一系列城邦，人口更达到了四五万；到铁器时代，出现了新巴比伦这样人口过十万的大城市，随后数百年，欧亚多个文明中心进入了被哲学家卡尔·雅斯培（[[Karl Jaspers]]）称为“轴心时代”（[[Axial Age]]）的繁荣期，地中海世界、印度和中国都涌现了一批和巴比伦规模相当的城市。 城市的下一轮扩张伴随着地域辽阔的帝国的崛起，从迦太基、亚历山大到罗马，这些都市的规模和繁荣背后，是整个帝国的疆域和权力，而作为首个人口过百万的城市，罗马的规模为此后所有古代城市设定了上限（罗马的后继者，比如长安和巴格达，规模可能略大于罗马，但差距不明显），直到工业革命之后，这一上限才被伦敦所超越。 那么，是何种力量在推动社会规模——无论是政治实体还是聚居社区——不断扩大？考虑到这一扩张趋势普遍存在于各大洲相互孤立的文明中心，它显然不是偶然的；定居生活究竟带来了什么新情况，使得社会大型化成为不可避免的趋势？ 答案或许是战争。 前定居社会同样充斥着暴力冲突和有组织的群体间攻击（也就是战争），而且按冲突频率和死亡率算，其暴力程度远远超出后来的文明社会，大约1/5到1/3的男性死于暴力，游团一级小型血缘群体之间的关系，非常接近霍布斯所描绘的“自然状态”，很少有经常性的政治安排能够抑制群体间冲突。 这一背景提示了，或许定居化本身就改善了相邻群体间抑制冲突的前景，有关合作博弈的研究表明，博弈双方对持久交往的预期，将增进合作意愿，预期中的交往关系越长久，合作意愿越强，假如双方都认为这是最后一次交往，或者交往关系将在某个明确时间终结，那么背叛就成为最优选择——尽管与都选择合作相比，这给双方都带来更坏的结果。 一项案例研究很好的演示了这一原理，在一战的西线战场，当战争进入僵持状态时，前沿阵地上长期对峙的双方士兵之间，逐渐达成了一种默契：每天只在固定时间例行公事式的向对方射击，其余时间可以大胆走出战壕；在协约国军方高层察觉这一情况后，为打破这种默契，迫使前线军队积极行动，采取的措施是定期调防，以避免形成长久交往预期。 可以想象，相邻关系变动不居的游动性社会（无论是游猎、游耕还是游牧），很难建立牢固的信任与合作关系，定居者却相对容易做到；这种群体间合作关系，不仅帮助他们抑制相互间的冲突，还可以联合对付外来攻击者，或对其他群体发动攻击；这种关系一旦稳定下来，便在游团之上形成了部落或部落联盟一级的政治实体。 不过，这里并不存在一条截然分明的界线，因为首先，游动群体的游动程度是不同的，其次，游动路线并不是随机的，这两方面都和群体赖以生存的资源分布状况有关，当若干群体游动程度较小，或漫游路线较固定，或围绕某些关键资源而频繁持久发生关系时，他们之间就或多或少存在稳定的相邻关系，并据此而发展出一些合作性安排。 比如卡拉哈里沙漠的狩猎采集者桑人（!Kung），每当枯水期来临，相邻的十几个游团会聚拢到少数几个尚有水可取的天然水井附近，而平时他们则依靠各自巡游范围内的水源，这样的安排能够和平达成，离不开这些游团相对稳定的漫游范围和相邻关系；类似的情况，在干湿变化剧烈的热带草原畜牧者，和冬季草场高度稀缺的温带游牧者那里，也可看到。 然而，和稳定相邻关系比起来，定居农业带来的另一个变化，其影响要深远的多，那就是战争形态的改变；在前农业时代，战争的主要目的是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，以便为自己谋得更好的生存空间，当然还包括掳掠女性，抢劫则不在考虑之列，因为没什么东西可抢的，同样，对于被攻击者，除了生命之外，没有什么需要捍卫的。 与此相应，那时的主要战斗形式是伏击和偷袭，阵地战也有，但多半是仪式性的，就像集体约架，伤亡很小（这一点常误导早期观察者，让他们误以为前文明社会是相当和平的）；在伏击和偷袭战斗中，形势不利的一方会毫不犹豫的选择逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗；在非定居者的价值观中，逃跑无损于战士声誉，相反，死守或不利条件下坚持进攻，被认为是愚蠢的。 正是在这一点上，定居农业带来了根本性的改变，农耕者的生计全赖于庄稼、牲畜和存粮，逃跑很可能意味着饿死，所以在面临攻击时，不得不留下来捍卫家园。 可是这样一来，攻防双方的地位就变得十分不对称：进攻者可以从容选择进攻时机和攻击对象，形势不利可以随时撤逃，因而风险较小，而一旦得手，收益却极大，而防守者不知袭击何时发生，又不能逃跑，输了失去全部，赢了却也得不到什么，而假如对方来自游动群体，连报复的机会都很难找到；这样的成本收益对比，无疑会激励出大量针对定居者的攻击。 想象一下早期农民的处境，身处一个毫无安全感的霍布斯世界，周围还有许多非定居群体，而农业生产模式所必须依赖的存量财产，正为自己引来越来越多的敌人，随着这样的局面日益明朗，如何保卫家园便成为生死攸关的头等大事。 和此后的所有定点防卫者一样，农民首先作出的反应是修筑防御工事，并采取紧密聚居模式，形成设防村寨，这样，在面临攻击时，全村男性便可迅速集结，组织抵抗。 从考古记录可以看出，最初的农业定居点都是设防的；杰里科遗址围有一道六百米长的石墙，墙外挖了壕沟；多见于黎凡特的一种村落结构，比如安纳托利亚的加泰土丘（[[Çatalhöyük]]），由一群砖石房屋相互紧贴组成一个蜂窝状结构，没有侧面的门窗，也没有街道，只能靠梯子由天窗出入；门窗狭小也是上古农村住宅的普遍特征，吕宋山区伊富高人的房门狭小到必须侧身才能出入。 新月沃地还有许多村落是在山壁上凿出来的；乌克兰发现的几个五六千年前的万人大城，包括涅伯利夫卡（[[Nebelivka]]）、多布罗沃迪（[[Dobrovody]]）和之前提到的塔连基，都是设防城市；科罗拉多著名的印第安农业村寨梅萨维德（[[Mesa Verde]]），修建在一整块巨大石崖下面，这块向外伸出的巨石像一个罩子，保护了村庄的三个方向；在西北欧，许多新石器时代村庄都坐落于湖泊或沼泽中间，通过可开关的桥廊与外界相通；在没有山崖河湾江心洲等有利地势可依凭的地方，城墙与壕沟便是标准配置。 实际上，设防城镇并非像过去许多人认为的那样，是文明较成熟、政治结构较发达之后的才出现的，而是从一开始就伴随着定居农业，非如此就他们无法生存下来，这一点，我们从相当晚近的历史中仍可看出端倪；在农业帝国的广阔疆域中，越是靠近农耕拓殖前线，因而面临越多来自原住民的威胁，也越难指望国家力量保护的群体，就越倾向于紧密聚居并严密设防。 比如汉族农民的拓殖前锋客家人，建造了极重防御的大型围楼，还有带围墙壕沟的棋盘式致密村寨（所谓九井十八巷），有些还在四角设有碉堡；相反，在帝国核心腹地江南，农村民居是高度分散的，通常十几户人家沿河道散列成一长串（所谓宅基），房屋的封闭性也很弱，毫无防御能力；所以讽刺的是，山水派文人所描绘的那种三两农家零星散布，鸡犬相闻炊烟相望而互不相扰的安宁和谐场面，只有在帝国权力的卵翼之下才见得到。 然而，修筑防御工事带来了非常高昂的成本，是传统小型群体无力负担的，而且定点防卫所必需的阵地对抗，也对人数提出了很高要求；因为和伏击或偷袭战不同，阵地防御的有效性，常依赖于组织严密的密集阵列；假如阵列深度为四层（这相当于典型希腊步兵方阵的一半），那么，一个150人的小型群体，其全部成年男性也最多只能排成一个宽度不足五米的阵列，即便是防御最小型的村庄，即便该村庄在多个方向上有着天然屏障，这样的规模也是远远不够的。 所以，一旦就地防卫成为一种经常性的需要，超越邓巴数限制而组织更大型社会，就成了定居者攸关生死存亡的迫切任务；而一旦其中一部分群体这么做了，就会引发一系列连锁反应，迫使其他群体也走向大型化，并且越来越大；因为首先，当你周围的其他群体提升了防御能力之后，保持原状的群体就成了攻击者的优选对象。 其次，也更要命的是，在一个霍布斯世界里，不存在好人与恶棍之分，每个防御者也是潜在的攻击者，出于防卫需要而建立的新型组织，同样可以用于攻击，那些未能组织起来的群体，随时可能沦为听任宰割的羔羊，这样，最终幸存下来并扩张壮大的，是那些成功实现了大型化组织的群体。 幸运的是，在最初的定居者中，至少有一部分找到了有效的组织方法，帮助他们克服了相对于游动者的攻防劣势，否则，定居农业这种生活方式就无法维系下去，也就不会有此后的文明历史了，那么，他们是怎么做到的？  

【2015-10-18】 @研二公知苗 保守主义定义本来就很难嘛，有人将其定义为一种特定的意识形态，出现于法国大革命之后，以柏克为始祖，这基本就是你姨采纳的说法。但是根据另一种的“情境化定义”，认为保守主义就是一种在相似情境下反复出现的普遍性的思潮。 @whigzhou: 其实我更喜欢心理学家的定义，保守性是一组伦理/政治方面的心理特质，这组特质的聚合度很高，拥有这组特质的人很大可能成为保守派，但具有保守特质的人，在不同的社会/思想经历下，生成了不同的政治/伦理主张，进而，这些人在特定的社会/历史情境中，聚合为特定的保守主义，相互间完全可能对立。 @whigzhou: 沿这条脉络可以把问题看得更清楚，甚至可以预测一个人在特定认知环境下会形成何种政治倾向，以及，基于人口统计学数据而推测，特定社会条件下，会出现何种政治潮流 @熊也餐厅:是不是要保守的内容和价值观不一样，才形成不同的立场？ @whigzhou: 对，保守派必定是维护某种既有秩序的，但具体维护的是哪个秩序，每个保守派有可以不同选择 @whigzhou: 所以和保守派对立的，其实是激进派（或叛逆派），从心理机制上看，最根本区别可能是，前者重原则，后则重计算 @whigzhou: 复古派（比如新儒家和塔利班）不是保守派，相反，往往是激进派，因为他们要复的那个古，只是一套理想，根本不是一种现实中存在秩序或传统 @PlusKing2022:那么复封建主义呢 @whigzhou: 都铎朝的封建主义是保守派，腓特烈大帝所面对的封建主义也是保守派，今天的就不是  

【2015-10-16】 @海德沙龙 本文摘选自作者一部有关桑（布须曼）人神话传说的专著，其中谈论了桑人神话中的一种叙事方式，即如何通过图形或符号传达意义，对我们理解语言的演化和早期图形文字的起源都有所启发，类似现象在其他文化中也都可以看到，但桑人提供了一个更原始朴素的例子 °桑人神话的叙事方式 @whigzhou: 我推荐此文是因为它呼应了我有关语言的一个看法：言语无法也不必包含意义，它只是一个刺激序列，用于在听者头脑里唤起相应的观念。 @whigzhou: 由此引出两个推论：1）言语的信息量和被交流观念的信息量没有直接对应关系；2）有效交流所需要的最小言语单位是不可确定的，可能只是一个音节，也可能是一段长篇大论 @whigzhou: 这一观点若运用在短语这一层次（表现为所谓典故），相信多数人都会同意，但其实在基础词汇这一层次，和多个句子组成的大段落这样的层次，同样成立  

Excavating meaning from the complex myths of southern Africa’s San people 挖掘南非桑人复杂神话传说的意义 作者：David Lewis-Williams @ 2015-8-20 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：The Conversation，http://theconversation.com/excavating-meaning-from-the-complex-myths-of-southern-africas-san-people-45451 The San are the oldest inhabitants of southern Africa, where they have lived for millennia. The term San is commonly used to refer to a diverse group of hunter-gatherers living in the region who share historical and linguistic connections. They were also called Bushmen, but this term is considered derogatory and is no longer used. 作为南部非洲最早的居民，桑人已经在这片土地上生活了数千年。“桑人”这个概念通常被用来指代多个在这片区域生活的、在历史和语言上存在关联的狩猎采集群体。历史上他们也曾经被称为“布希曼人”，但这个词通常被认为具有贬义，现在已经不再使用了。 David Lewis-Williams has spent 53 years studying the San people, publishing his first article in 1962. His 20th book on the San – Myth and Meaning: San-Bushman Folklore in Global Context – has just been published (see extract below). 学者David Lewis-Williams已经花了53年研究桑人，1962年他发表了自己关于桑人的第一篇文章，而上个月他刚刚出版了自己第20部有关桑人的著作——《神话与内涵——全球背景下的桑-布希曼民间传说》（见下文的节选）。 Lewis-Williams believes that the future of the San is uncertain. South Africa began passing laws in the 1960s to take over large sections of the traditional hunting lands of the Kalahari San for game and nature reserves. Lewis-Williams认为，桑人的未来存在诸多不确定性。自1960年代开始，南非就通过一系列法律大片侵占生活在卡拉哈里沙漠的桑人世代狩猎及用于自然保育的土地。 Although the South African government is now much more helpful, the San people hardly have any land on which to hunt and gather. Lewis-Williams says they face a battle to hang onto customs in the face of modernization. The small number that remain stick to their beliefs and traditions. 虽然当前南非政府在帮助桑人方面做了比之前更多的努力，但是对桑人来说，目前已经几乎没有多少土地能够供他们狩猎和采集了。Lewis-Williams认为桑人正面临着一场在现代化挑战下维持他们传统生存方式的战斗。这一小群人仍然在努力坚守着他们的信仰和传统。 In his latest book, Lewis-Williams excavates meaning from the complex mythological stories of the San-Bushmen to create a larger theory of how myth is used in culture. He says the myths are not detailed in the paintings, but that the paintings and the myths derive from the same set of religious beliefs. 在他最新的著作中，Lewis-Williams试图从盘根错节的桑-布希曼民间传说中挖掘出一些内涵，以建立一个更大的理论框架来解释神话传说是如何在文化中发挥作用的。他认为，这些神话传说并未在桑人的岩壁画得到具体表现，相反，桑人的壁画和神话传说是同一组宗教信仰中衍生出来的。 Lewis-Williams explores the connection between myths and rock paintings in the Drakensberg. The paintings on the walls were not pictures of myths but actually important words or phrases – what he called small but valuable “nuggets”– about San life. Lewis-Williams研究了南非德拉肯斯堡的桑人神话传说和岩壁画之间的关系。这些岩壁上的图案并不是用来详细呈现神话传说的内容的，而是一些有关桑人生活的重要词语和短语——他把它们叫做“珍贵的小金块”。 Extract from Myth and Meaning: San-Bushman Folklore in Global Context 下文节选自David Lewis-Williams的新作《神话与内涵——全球背景下的桑-布希曼民间传说》 One of the results of my own work has been that apparently simple texts such as the Song of the Broken String are studded with far-reaching words and concepts that are unintelligible to, and therefore easily missed by, modern readers. 我之前的一项研究成果表明，一些表面看来简单的文本（例如《残章之歌》【编注：该书是南非作家Stephen Watson的一部诗集，基于人类学家Dorothea Bleek对布希曼口述传统的直白记录，以诗歌形式演绎而成。】）中实际上包含了一些意义深远的词语和概念，现代读者很容易错过它们，因为这些词语和概念看起来很可能有些莫名其妙。 These “nuggets”, as I call them, encapsulate meanings that bring San lore and myth to life. Specific narratives are seldom pan-San, but, as we shall see, nuggets frequently are. 在这些被我称为“小金块”的东西之中，包含了许多能帮助我们在今天再现桑人神话传说的内涵。具体的叙事在不同的桑人群落中各有不同，但我们可以看到，这些小金块在各桑人群落中反复出现。 Nuggets should not be confused with the cross-cultural narrative motifs that, for instance, the folklorist Sigrid Schmidt used in her valuable catalogue of Khoesan folklore. 我们不能把这些桑人“小金块”与其它的一些跨文化叙事主题混淆在一起，就像民俗学者Sigrid Schmidt在她宝贵的科伊桑语系民间传说目录中所做的那样。 Nor are nuggets equivalents of Claude Levi-Strauss’ “mythemes” that, in his formulation, frequently comprise a subject and a predicate. Rather, nuggets are single words denoting, for example, items of material culture that have rich associations, or parts of the natural environment with cryptic connotations. 这些桑人“小金块”同样也并不等同于列维-斯特劳斯（Claude Levi-Strauss）提出的“神话主题”的概念，在他的定义里，“神话主题”通常都包含一个主语和一个谓语。而这些“小金块”则是单个的词汇，表现诸如物质文化中的物品等拥有丰富关联的条目，或者一些具有神秘内涵的自然环境内容。 They may also be idiomatic turns of phrase that are opaque to outsiders, or ellipses that hearers would have been expected to complete from their own knowledge. Although diverse, nuggets are important because they invoke reticulations of fundamental beliefs and associations that may not be explicitly expressed in the text. 它们也可能是一些外人无法理解的当地人惯用的短语，或者是一些期待听众通过自己的理解将内容补全的省略号。虽然很零散，但是这些“小金块”仍然很重要，因为它们能够启发出一系列并没有在文本中显式表达出来的基础信仰和联系的网络。 As a narrative proceeds, they add up to a powerful, all-embracing cognitive and affective context. They provide a counterpoint to the manifest plot of a tale, enriching its harmonies and resonances. 随着对一个神话故事叙述的不断深入，这些“小金块”逐步拼接成了一个强大而包容一切的认知和情感上下文。它们为一个神话传说的显性表达提供了一种衬托对位旋律，让故事本身获得了更强的和声与共振。 The manifest meaning, or “lesson”, of a narrative (if we assume one can be discerned) should be seen within this, for Westerners, allusive and often elusive context. My use of the concept of nuggets explores, in part, the same territory as the notion of “key symbols”. 一种叙述所要表达的意义（或曰“训”）只有通过这个在西方人看来充满暗喻而又难以捉摸的上下文中才能看出来。我在使用“小金块”这个概念时所表达的含义实际上和使用“关键符号”这个表述时在某种程度上是相同的。 Although broader than key symbols, the notion of nuggets does imply a summarising or synthesising function. In Sherry Ortner’s words, they “relate the respondent to the grounds of the system as a whole”. Respondents seldom analyse nuggets or key symbols, but they have absorbed their referents in the course of daily life. 虽然“小金块”这个词的含义比“关键符号”要更为宽泛，但其中也同样隐含了某些总结或者合成的功能。用Sherry Ortner的话来说，它们“在受众与该体系的背景这个整体之间建立了联系”。受众很少会去分析这些“小金块”或者“关键符号”，但他们已经通过日常生活中的各种经历了解了它们所指代的内容。 Indeed, nuggets are part of the “taken-for-granted” aspects of myth. Often indigenous narrators ignore the most important contexts and elements of a myth as being so obvious that they cannot imagine that their auditors do not think in terms of them. They themselves seldom, if ever, articulate them. 实际上，这些“小金块”是神话传说中的那些被人们认为“理所当然”的部分。通常来说，原住民讲述者们都会忽略掉一个神话传说中最重要的那些上下文和元素，因为这些内容实在太过于明显，他们无法想象自己的听众无法自己联想出这些部分。所以他们很少，甚至从不讲述这些内容。 In ancient Greece, for instance, writers and speakers rarely retold myths in detail. They more commonly merely referred to an incident or character in a myth on the assumption that their readers or hearers would know the full narrative. 举例来说，在古希腊，作家和演说家都很少详细地重述神话传说。他们通常仅仅提及一个神话传说中的某个事件或者某个角色，并假设自己的读者或听众都知道完整的故事。 Similarly with the San, we must constantly remember that in traditional circumstances the hearers were already familiar with the whole tale. They would mentally fill in “missing” episodes or details as the narrator progressed. 对于桑人也是这样，我们必须时刻记住，在传统的环境中，听众通常已经非常熟悉完整的神话故事了。随着叙述者的讲述不断深入，他们自己会脑补上那些叙述中缺失的篇章和细节。 It was therefore not necessary for narrators to spell out every incident in the tales that they were performing. It was not even necessary that a tale be told through to its end: everyone knew how it ended. The taken-for-granted factor was high. 因此叙述者们并没有必要说出他们正在讲述的故事中的每一个事件的细节，他们甚至不需要把一个故事从头讲到尾，因为所有人都知道它的结局如何。在整个故事中，那些“理所当然”的部分占了很高的比例。 Within an encompassing intellectual universe like this, a small part, a nugget, can readily stand for a vast, unarticulated whole. Indeed, synecdoche is intrinsic to a San speaker’s recounting and manipulation of narratives. 处于这样的一个知识环境的包围中，一个“小金块”这样的小片段能够很容易地代表一个巨大的、未被完整表达出来的整体。事实上，对于一个桑人讲述者而言，提喻是叙述中的一种固有手法。 In Chapter 7 I argue that this principle applies, in modified form, to San imagemaking as well. An appreciation of nuggets soon destroys the illusion of simplicity in myth and art. 在本书的第7章中，我认为这一原则如果稍加改动，也同样适用于桑人的岩画创作。通过对于这些“小金块”的深入了解，我们很快地破除了认为桑人的神话和艺术体系都很简单这一错觉。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Health Check: the science of ‘hangry’, or why some people get grumpy when they’re hungry 健康检查：“饿怒症”科学，或为什么有些人饿了以后会暴躁 作者：Amanda Salis @ 2015-7-20 译者：黎安林 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The Conversation，https://theconversation.com/health-check-the-science-of-hangry-or-why-some-people-get-grumpy-when-theyre-hungry-37229 There are many reasons why some people get very grumpy when they haven’t eaten for a while. 有些人一段时间没吃东西就变得非常暴躁，这有很多原因。 Have you ever snapped angrily at someone when you were hungry? Or has someone snapped angrily at you when they were hungry? If so, you’ve experienced “hangry” (an amalgam of hungry and angry) – the phenomenon whereby some people get grumpy and short-tempered when they’re overdue for a feed. 你曾在饥肠辘辘时愤怒地呵斥过某人吗？或者，你曾被某人在饥饿时愤怒地呵斥过吗？如果有，你就体验过“饿怒症”（一种饥饿和愤怒的混合体）——即有些人过了吃饭时间没吃东西就会变得暴躁易怒的现象。 But where does hanger come from? And why is it that only some people seem to get hangry? The answer lies in some of the processes that happen inside your body when it needs food. 但是饿怒来自哪里？为什么只是一部分人会饿怒？答案就在你身体需要食物时发生在体内的过程中。 The physiology of hanger 饿怒的生理学 The carbohydrates, proteins and fats in everything you eat are digested into simple sugars (such as glucose), amino acids and free fatty acids. These nutrients pass into your bloodstream from where they are distributed to your organs and tissues and used for energy. 你吃的所有食物中的碳水化合物、蛋白质和脂肪，都被消化成单糖（如葡萄糖）、氨基酸和游离脂肪酸。这些营养物质首先进入你的血液，然后从哪里被分配到你的器官和组织，并用作能量来源。 As time passes after your last meal, the amount of these nutrients circulating in your bloodstream starts to drop. If your blood-glucose levels fall far enough, your brain will perceive it as a life-threatening situation. You see, unlike most other organs and tissues in your body which can use a variety of nutrients to keep functioning, your brain is critically dependent on glucose to do its job. 在你上一次饭后，随着时间流逝，这些在你的血液中循环的营养物质的量开始下降。如果你的血糖水平过低，你的大脑就会把它理解为危及生命的情况。你知道，不像你体内的大多数其他器官和组织，它们可以使用种类繁多的营养物质来保持运转，你的大脑却严重依赖葡萄糖来完成其工作。 You’ve probably already noticed this dependence your brain has on glucose; simple things can become difficult when you’re hungry and your blood glucose levels drop. You may find it hard to concentrate, for instance, or you may make silly mistakes. Or you might have noticed that your words become muddled or slurred. 你可能已经注意到了这种大脑对葡萄糖的依赖；当你饿了，身体的血糖水平下降，简单的事情也会变得困难。比如，你会感到注意力难以集中，或者可能犯一些低级的错误。或者你可能已经注意到，你说话变得混乱而含糊不清。 Another thing that can become more difficult when you’re hungry is behaving within socially acceptable norms, such as not snapping at people. So while you may be able to conjure up enough brain power to avoid being grumpy with important colleagues, you may let your guard down and inadvertently snap at the people you are most relaxed with or care most about, such as partners and friends. Sound familiar? 当你饿了，可能变得更加困难的另一件事情是行为举止符合社会可接受的规范，比如不呵斥人。虽然你可能唤起足够脑力来避免和重要同事相处时出现暴躁，但是在对待如伴侣、朋友等最令人放松或者最在乎的人时，你可能放松警惕，无意识地呵斥他们。是不是听起来很熟悉？ Another bodily response 另一种身体反应 Besides a drop in blood-glucose concentrations, another reason people can become hangry is the glucose counter-regulatory response. Let me explain. 除了血糖浓度的下降，另一个让人饿怒的原因是葡萄糖反馈调节反应。让我解释一下。 When blood-glucose levels drop to a certain threshold, your brain sends instructions to several organs in your body to synthesise and release hormones that increase the amount of glucose in your bloodstream. 当血糖水平下降到一定阈值，大脑会向你身体的几个器官发出指令来合成和释放特定激素，以增加血液中的葡萄糖含量。 The four main glucose counter-regulatory hormones are: growth hormone from the pituitary gland situated deep in the brain; glucagon from the pancreas; and adrenaline, which is sometimes called epinephrine, and cortisol, which are both from the adrenal glands. These latter two glucose counter-regulatory hormones are stress hormones that are released into your bloodstream in all sorts of stressful situations, not just when you experience the physical stress of low blood-glucose levels. 四种主要的葡萄糖反馈调节激素是：位于大脑深处的脑垂体释放的生长激素；胰腺产生的胰高血糖素；肾上腺素和皮质醇，它们都是从肾上腺产生的。后两个葡萄糖反馈调节激素是在各种紧张的情况下（不只是在遭受低血糖水平的生理压力时）释放到血液中的应激激素。 In fact, adrenaline is one of the major hormones released into your bloodstream with the “fight or flight” response to a sudden scare, such as when you see, hear or even think something that threatens your safety. Just as you might easily shout out in anger at someone during the “fight or flight” response, the flood of adrenaline you get during the glucose counter-regulatory response can promote a similar response. 事实上，肾上腺素是当你遭受突然的惊吓，如看到、听到甚至想到有什么东西威胁你的安全，从而作出“战斗或逃跑”反应时，被释放到血液中的主要激素之一。正如你可能很容易在“战斗或逃跑”应激场景中对某人愤怒地咆哮，你在葡萄糖反馈调节反应中产生的大量肾上腺素也可能促发类似的反应。 Nature and nurture 先天和后天 Another reason hunger is linked to anger is that both are controlled by common genes. The product of one such gene is neuropeptide Y, a natural brain chemical released into the brain when you are hungry. It stimulates voracious feeding behaviours by acting on a variety of receptors in the brain, including one called the Y1 receptor. 饥饿与愤怒有关的另一个原因是，两者都被共同的基因所控制。其中一个基因的产物是神经肽Y，这是当你饿了时释放给大脑的脑内天然化学物质。它通过作用于大脑中多种受体，其中一个叫Y1受体，来刺激贪婪的取食行为。 Besides acting in the brain to control hunger, neuropeptide Y and the Y1 receptor also regulate anger or aggression. In keeping with this, people with high levels of neuropeptide Y in their cerebrospinal fluid also tend to show high levels of impulse aggression. 神经肽Y和Y1受体除了作用于大脑以控制饥饿感之外，还能调节愤怒或攻击性。与此一致，当人的脑脊液中神经肽Y水平高时，往往表现出高水平的攻击冲动。 As you can see, there are several pathways that can make you prone to anger when you’re hungry. Hanger is undoubtedly a survival mechanism that has served humans and other animals well. Think about it like this: if hungry organisms stood back and graciously let others eat before them, their species could die out. 正如你所看到的，当你饿了时，有几个途径可以使你易怒。饿怒无疑是作用于人类和其他动物的一种生存机制。这样想想看：如果饿了的生物靠后站，慷慨地让别人在他们头前吃东西，他们的物种将消亡。 While many physical factors contribute to hanger, psychosocial factors also have a role. Culture influences whether you express verbal aggression directly or indirectly, for instance. 虽然有许多物理因素能导致饿怒，社会心理因素也有一定作用。例如，文化能够影响你是直接还是间接地表达言语攻击。 And as we are all different across all of these factors, it’s little wonder there are differences in how angry people seem to get when they’re hungry. 并且，由于人们在所有这些因素上都有所不同，很自然地，当他们饥饿时，他们愤怒的程度也有所不同。 Dealing with hanger 克服饿怒 The easiest way to handle hanger is to eat something before you get too hungry. While you may hanker for quick-fix foods, such as chocolate and potato chips, when you’re in the throes of hanger, junk foods generally induce large rises in blood-glucose levels that come crashing down fast. 应对饿怒的最简单方法是在你太饿之前吃东西。当你在饿怒中挣扎时，你可能会想吃些速战速决的食物，如巧克力和薯片，垃圾食品普遍能促使血糖水平大幅提升，但下降得也非常快。 Ultimately, they may leave you feeling hangrier. So think nutrient-rich, natural foods that help satisfy hunger for as long as possible, without excess kilojoules. 最终，他们可能会让你感到更加饿怒。因此，还是考虑食用营养丰富的天然食品，它们可以尽可能久地给你充饥，且没有多余的能量。 Eating as soon as you are hungry may not always be possible. This may be the case during long shifts at work, for instance, or through religious fasts such as Ramadan, or during weight-loss diets that involve severe energy restriction (such as intermittent fasting diets). All of these should only be done if your doctor has given you the all-clear. 你未必总是能够一饿就立即吃东西。比如，这可能是由工作中的轮班时间很长导致的，或者由宗教斋戒如斋月导致，或正处于严格限制热量的减肥节食（如间歇性禁食减肥）过程中。所有这些只应在医生给了你全面清晰指导后再做。 In these cases, it can help to remember that, with time, your glucose counter-regulatory response will kick in and your blood-glucose levels will stabilise. Also, when you go without food, your body starts breaking down its own fat stores for energy, some of which are converted by your body into ketones, a product of fat metabolism. Ketones are thought to help keep your hunger under control because your brain can use ketones in place of glucose for fuel. 在所有这些情况下，记住以下这一点都是有用的：随着时间推移，你的葡萄糖反馈调节反应会开启，你的血糖水平将趋于稳定。此外，当你没有进食时，你的身体开始分解自己的脂肪储存来提供能量，其中一些将被你的身体转换成酮——脂肪代谢的一种产物。酮被认为有助于控制饥饿，因为你的大脑可以使用酮代替葡萄糖作为能量。 A final – and very civilised – way of handling hanger is to suggest that difficult situations be dealt with after food, not before! 最后一个——并且很文明——的饿怒处理方式是，建议你在进食后再处理复杂的事情，而不是在此之前！ （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-10-13】 @海德沙龙 本文是Peter Turchin报告他实践旧石器食谱后个人体验的系列博文中最后一篇，此时他转变食谱已有27个月，不过本文大部分篇幅是在介绍人类学家Richard Wrangham有关烹饪与人类进化之关系的著作Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human，这是本非常好的书 °旧石器食谱与火 @whigzhou: Catching Fire很好，在我今年读过的书里排前五，他还教会我用榔头敲牛排。 @whigzhou: 能量均衡等式是生计模式的核心，但以往的研究往往只按食材计算能量，而Richard Wrangham提醒我们，加工方式非常重要，是否加工及如何加工，对于从给定食材中所获取净能量的影响可达30-40% @whigzhou: 其实房屋、炉火和衣服等因素也都应纳入能量均衡式，在温带，冬天若没有保温效果良好的房屋和衣服，代谢水平要高出很多，它们对马尔萨斯极限位置的影响也很大，不过从我读到的文献看，这些因素都还没得到足够关注  

Illinois' Population And AGI Continue To Plummet Under Democratic Legislature 在民主党州议会治下，伊利诺伊州人口和总收入直线下跌 作者：Rex Sinquefield @ 2015-08-07 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Forbes，http://www.forbes.com/sites/rexsinquefield/2015/08/07/illinois-population-and-agi-continue-to-plummet-under-democratic-legislature/ 【插图文字说明】Illinois residents and businesses are still suffering from the 67 percent state income tax hike former Governor Quinn enacted in 2011. 伊利诺伊州居民和企业仍在遭受前任州长Pat Quinn 2011签署的所得税提升67%法令所导致的痛苦。 The sweet smell of success won’t waft through Deerfield, Illinois, much longer. Mondelez International, maker of beloved cookie brands Chips Ahoy and Oreo, recently announced plans to lay off 600 workers at its Illinois headquarters. Plus, Mondelez is shutting down nine manufacturing lines on Chicago’s South Side and spending $130 million to install new lines in Salinas, Mexico. 成功的甜蜜气息不会在伊利诺伊州的迪尔菲尔德上空继续飘荡太久。旗下拥有深受喜爱的饼干品牌Chips Ahoy和Oreo 的Mondelez International公司最近宣布将从其伊州总部裁员600人。另外，Mondelez还会关闭位于芝加哥南区的9条生产线，并将花费约一亿三千万美元在墨西哥的Salinas市配置新生产线。 This, of course, is just the latest in a long line of blows dealt to Illinois. Thanks to years of unwise fiscal decisions and short-sighted tax increases, people (and their incomes) leave the state in droves. 这当然只是伊利诺伊州所受一长串打击中的最新一条而已。由于不明智的财政决策和短视的增税持续多年，人们（和他们的收入）成群结队地离开该州。 Where are all these disenchanted Illinoisans going? Well . . . anywhere except Illinois. Taxpayer-migration data released by the Internal Revenue Service on July 31 shows that for the first time in recorded IRS history (stretching back to 1990), Illinois lost residents to every other state in the Midwest. 这些希望破灭的伊州人民去哪了呢？嗯……任何地方，除了伊利诺伊。美国国税局于7月31日发布的纳税人迁移数据表明，自该局有记录以来（早至1990年），首次出现所有中西部州均接纳了伊利诺伊州流失居民的现象。 Such is the legacy left by former Governor Pat Quinn, who in 2011 enacted a 67 percent hike in Illinois’ state income tax. This historic tax hike hit hard, causing harm to working families, small businesses, and entrepreneurs alike. Illinois voters were so disappointed by their state’s decline that, last November, they ousted the Democrat governor in favor of business-savvy, reform-minded Bruce Rauner. 这就是前任州长Pat Quinn的遗产，他于2011年签署法令，将伊利诺伊州的州所得税拉高了67%。这一历史性的加税打击沉重，对工薪家庭、小企业和企业家们都带来了伤害。伊州选民对该州如此衰微非常不满，于是去年11月他们将原民主党州长赶下台，选出了精于商业、具有改革思维的Bruce Rauner。 Understanding what a mess Illinois is in, Rauner quickly proposed a series of strong reforms aimed at solving the state’s massive unfunded-pension problem as well as curbing union power. He also advocated for policy reform that would help manufacturers, in particular, including lawsuit reform, workers’ compensation reform, and a freeze on property taxes. Bruce Rauner完全明白伊州陷入了怎样的混乱，他迅速提出了一系列针对养老金亏空问题和遏制工会力量的强力改革措施。他同时也提倡那些有利于制造商的政策改革，特别是诉讼改革、工人薪酬改革和财产税冻结。 Unfortunately and rather unsurprisingly, Governor Rauner is facing pushback from dyed-in-the-wool Democrats in the Illinois General Assembly (particularly Senate President John Cullerton and House Speaker Mike Madigan). Legislative leadership’s wrong-headed handling of the state’s economy is driving Illinoisans away. 不幸但并不令人惊讶的是，Rauner州长面临着伊利诺伊州议会中铁杆民主党人的反抗（特别是州参院议长John Cullerton和州众院议长Mike Madigan）。立法机构领导人在州经济事务上的执迷不悟正在驱走该州民众。 In 2011 alone, Illinois lost 24,000 taxpayers and their 26,000 documented dependents, for a net loss of 50,000 people. These former Land of Lincoln residents took their adjusted gross incomes with them, of course – the AGI loss for the state of Illinois was $2.5 billion in 2011 alone. (That’s a $600 million increase from 2010, when Illinois saw $1.9 billion in net AGI leave.) 仅2011年一年内，伊利诺伊州就失去了24000位纳税人和他们的26000位登记家属，净损失达到了五万人口。这些前“林肯之乡”的居民当然还把他们的“调整后总收入”一并带走——伊州总收入2011年单年就损失了25亿美元。（这一损失比2010年增加了6亿美元，当年的总收入流失是19亿美元）。 Significantly, people and incomes aren’t just going to the typical low-tax paradises, like Florida and Texas. They’re also going to every other state in the Midwest. And the House and Senate Democrats who refuse to call a vote on Rauner’s bills have offered nothing in the way of viable alternative plans. 值得注意的是，人民和他们的收入并不仅仅是流向了那些典型的低税天堂，像佛罗里达和得克萨斯，他们也去向了中西部的其他各州。州众院和参院的民主党人拒绝为州长Rauner的提案提起表决，而他们自己却拿不出任何可行的替代方案。 The problem is perhaps most pronounced in Chicago, where Mayor Rahm Emanuel seeks solutions for the enormous hole in the city budget. There are many reasons for this budget debacle – unfunded pension liabilities and an increased minimum wage among them – but one of the biggest factors is the erosion of the Cook County tax base. 芝加哥的问题可能最为明显，该市市长Rahm Emanuel正在想办法解决市预算的巨额缺口。这一预算灾难有很多原因——其中包括拨付不足的养老金负债和最低工资的上涨——但一个最大的因素是Cook县税基的缩水。 The out-migration of taxpayers during 2011 will cost Chicago more than $9 billion in taxable income over the next ten years, according to the recently released IRS data. During 2011 (again, the first year of Illinois’ 67 percent income-tax hike), Cook County lost nearly 28,000 more people than it gained; along with these residents went more than $900 million in net AGI for the year, with $700 million leaving the state entirely. At the time of writing, each and every Chicago household is on the line for more than $63,000 in local-government debt. 根据最近披露的美国国税局数据，2011年纳税人的外流将会使得芝加哥市在未来十年内流失超过90亿美元的应税收入。在2011年（又是伊利诺伊州所得税提升67%的第一年），Cook县净流失人口约达28000人之多，这些居民所带走的当年总收入数值超过9亿美元，其中有7亿美元彻底流出伊州。在本文写作时，每一个芝加哥家庭平均都背负着超过63000美元的地方政府债务。 To break it down even further: Even before cookie giant Mondelez International decided to pull up stakes, Illinois was losing 40 manufacturing jobs every single day. In the first half of 2015 (January through June), Illinois suffered a net loss of 7,300 factory jobs – while neighboring Indiana is up 7,600 factory jobs, and Michigan is up 12,800 jobs. 更深入地讲，甚至在饼干巨头Mondelez International决定打包走人之前，伊利诺伊州每天都会损失40个制造业工作岗位。在2015年上半年（1-6月），伊州损失了至少7300个工厂岗位——而邻居印第安纳州增长了7300个，密歇根州增长了12800个。 Illinois legislators should feel a moral imperative to keep factory jobs in the Land of Lincoln, considering how many families depend on this work. The time is far past due for the General Assembly to make smart decisions that keep jobs, families, and incomes in Illinois.  If they do not, one Illinoisans should think back on the fiercely competitive boxing match between Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier, which prompted Howard Cosell to call out, “Down goes Frazier! Down goes Frazier!” 考虑到太多家庭依赖于此，伊利诺伊州的立法者们应该怀有一种道德上的紧迫感，来把制造业工作留在“林肯之乡”。州议会早就应该做出一些聪明的决定，将工作、家庭和收入留在本州之内。如果他们不这么干，一个伊利诺伊人应该回想一下拳王阿里和弗雷泽的激烈拳击比赛，Howard Cosell曾在那场比赛中高呼“打倒弗雷泽！打倒弗雷泽！”【译注：作者似乎记错了，所提及的比赛似应为弗雷泽vs福尔曼。在此次比赛中，福尔曼多次击倒弗雷泽，著名解说员Cosell连续高呼打倒弗雷泽。】 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#1：规模局限的含义 辉格 2015年9月8日 人类学家罗宾·邓巴（[[Robin Dunbar]]）提出过一个著名理论，大意是说，每个人与之维持持久关系的熟人，数量最多不超过200，通常只有100多；所谓熟人，不仅是指你认识这个人（对此常存在误解），更是指你记住了和他的交往历史，以及他和你认识的其他人之间的关系；这一数量限制，后来被称为邓巴数（[[Dunbar's number]]）。 在邓巴看来，造成这一限制的，是人类认知能力的局限：尽管一百多看起来不是很大的数字，但两两关系的数量却可以非常庞大，而且随着人数增长，关系数量将指数式的膨胀，所以尽管我们的大脑已经比黑猩猩大了三四倍，也很难处理更庞大的关系网络和交往历史了；况且，社会关系只是我们面临的诸多认知任务之一，虽然对人类来说它是非常重要的一类。 受制于这样的认知局限，人类不得不以两种截然不同的方式对待他人：对熟知者，我们会把他当作有血有肉的特殊个体对待，会关注他的喜好和秉性，揣摩他的动机和意图，并以此决定如何与他交往和相处；相反，对半生不熟者或陌生人，我们会简单的做类型化处理：归类、贴标签，凭借刻板印象迅速决定如何相待。 用计算主义的话说，人类认知系统中处理社会关系的模块，有着两套相互独立的算法，用于处理熟识关系的那套，会为每个交往对象单独建模，据此预测其行为，而另一套则只对每种关系类型建模，具体运用时，将个体对象作类型识别后套入其中一个模型，便得出判断。 果若如此，我们就容易理解某些社会心理现象了：比如许多人持有种族偏见，但这种偏见常常并不妨碍他拥有该种族的朋友；再如，当一个人进入文化迥异的陌生社会，起初往往会遭遇刻板化的对待，但时间长了，那些和他建立起熟识关系的人，就会改变态度。 这两种交往模式，在我们的称谓方式中也留下了鲜明痕迹；对于和自己较亲密的人，我们会以名字相称，连名带姓就显得见外，只称姓就更疏远；因为名字是标识个体的，而姓氏则是标识家族、宗族或更大世系群的；昵称则是更亲密的称谓，因为正式名字是给所有需要的人用的，所以最亲密的关系中需要换用另一个特殊称谓，才能将两种关系区分开来。 类似的，当我们使用比较客气的称谓时（客气的意思是刻意强调与对方的社会距离），就会选择一些标签式称谓（相对于个体式称谓），这些标签用于标识对方的社会身份，比如职业、职务、爵位、军衔等等。（这里存在一些微妙情形，当既要表示客气或尊敬，又要表示亲密时，会组合使用标签和个体名字，比如杰克叔叔，小波老师，泰迪上校，等等。） 进而，（特别是在第三人称场合）当我们想要表达对他人的轻蔑，或强调自己和他的差异，并以此强调自己和他根本不是同类人，也不屑于将他当作特定个体对待时，便会倾向于选择类别称谓，常见的类别涉及种族、民族、地域、阶层、宗教、政治派别和亚文化群体，还有身体残疾特征。 当然，对交往模式的这种二分法可能过于简化了，一个多层次渐变模型或许更接近现实，单独建模和刻板化处理这两种评估和判断方法，会以不同比例混合使用，因而对个人而言，其关系网将按交往密切程度而构成一组由亲及疏的同心圆结构，其中最内圈大概只有小几十人。 邓巴数理论对我们理解人类社会很有帮助，人类学家早已注意到，传统乡村社会大多是小型熟人社会，游动性的狩猎采集群体更是无一例外，定居文明出现之前，不存在比熟人社会更大的社会结构，而邓巴告诉我们，这不是偶然现象，而是人类认知局限所造成的结果。 邓巴对社会化灵长类的群体规模和脑容量的统计研究，支持了基于认知能力的解释，他发现，这些群体的规模和它们的大脑新皮层容量之间，存在着显著的相关性，从新皮层的尺寸可以粗略推测群体规模，而脑科学告诉我们，新皮层确实和社会化行为、表情处理和语言能力等社会性动物特有的认知能力有密切关系。 熟人社会的特点是，其内部秩序主要靠熟人之间的合作与信任来维持，这是一种在人际交往中自发建立并自我维持的秩序，不依赖于中心执行机构（比如司法系统）；这些人之所以相互熟识并生活在一起，通常是因为血缘和姻亲关系为合作互惠创造了前提；而记忆交往历史和两两关系之所以重要，是因为这些记忆在上述合作互惠关系的建立和维持中扮演了关键角色。 政治学家罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德（[[Robert Axelrod]]）的理论研究发现，在重复性合作博弈中，达成互惠合作从而避免囚徒困境的可能性，与此类社会关系记忆有着密切关系，这些记忆能够帮助个体区别对待不同交往对象，如此才可能发展出各种复杂的合作策略，让自己既乐于合作（从而最大可能的获取合作收益），又尽可能的避免受骗吃亏。 所以，当一个熟人社会人口接近或超出邓巴数限制，因而社会关系记忆的负担超出个体认知能力局限时，确保社会和谐的合作互惠规范便难以为继，于是该社会就会发生分裂；这一理论预测，得到了人类学调查的印证，一个特别完美的当代案例，是北美的胡特尔人（[[Hutterites]]）社区。 胡特尔人是新教再洗礼派的一支，他们离群索居，拒斥现代生活，并在最大程度上实现了自我治理；每个社区由若干扩展家庭组成，人数在60-140人之间，过着部落公社式的生活；由于生育率非常高，每过十几二十年，当人口接近上限时，就会安排一次分家，拆成两个社区。类似的情况，在再洗礼派的另一个分支阿米绪人（[[Amish]]）中也可观察到。 狩猎采集社会的典型组织单位——游团——的规模一般不足百人，比如非洲西南部卡拉哈里沙漠的桑人（[[San people|San]]），每个游团大约20-60人，邻近农耕区的游团则较大，100-150人；从事游耕农业的半定居社会，规模也只是略大，比如缅甸克钦邦山区的一个500人游耕群落，共有9个村寨，其中最大的也只有31个家户100多人。 即便是完全定居且人口密集的农耕社会，若缺乏较发达的政治结构，其规模也接近或略高于邓巴数，这种情况在交通不便的山区尤为普遍，比如菲律宾吕宋山区从事灌溉农业并建造了辉煌梯田的伊戈罗特人（[[Igorots]]），其村寨规模常有一两千人，粗看是个大社会，但其实里面分成了十几个相互独立、互不统辖、自行其是的单元（叫ato），其规模恰好接近邓巴数。 游牧社会的情况则比较多样和多变，因为游牧者的社会结构高度依赖于他们和邻近农耕定居者的关系，以及这些农耕社会本身的结构特征；通常，当远离农耕区，或者邻近的农耕者也缺乏大型社会时，游牧者的社会结构便与狩猎采集者相似，随人口增长而不断分支裂变，从而将规模限制在邓巴数之下。 比如地处草原腹地的哈萨克和北部蒙古，一个典型的牧团规模大约五六帐，最多十几帐（一帐相当于一个家户），由于过冬草场相对稀缺，冬季会有几十帐聚在一起；在资源贫瘠、人口稀疏的牧区，比如阿拉伯和北非的沙漠贝都因人，牧团规模更可小至两三帐。 只有当他们频繁接触较大规模的农耕定居社会，与之发展出勒索、贡奉、庇护、军事雇佣等关系，并因大额贡奉的分配和劫掠行动的协调等问题而引发内部冲突时，才会发展出更大更复杂的社会结构。 而在某些特殊地理条件下，游牧者即便与农耕社会长期频密接触，也难以发展出大型社会，比如青海河湟地区的羌人，其牧区被崇山峻岭分割成一条条难以相互通行的山谷，因而其社会结构也和在类似皱褶地带从事农业的族群一样，长期处于碎片化状态。 如此看来，我们不无理由将小型熟人社会视为人类社会结构的“自然状态”，在人类漫长历史的绝大部分时期，它都是唯一可能的形态，更大更复杂的社会是十分晚近的发展；然而，人类毕竟还是建立起了大型复杂社会，现代都市社会的规模，已超出邓巴数五个数量级，像大公司这样的机构，常拥有数十万成员，却仍可协调一致的行动，持续追求特定目标。 既然人类能够做到这一点，必定是找到了某些特别的办法，创造出了与之相应的文化和制度元素，从而帮助他们克服了邓巴数所揭示的认知局限，那么，他们是怎么做到的？在此过程中他们创造了什么？还有更基本的问题：社会最初为何会向大型化方向发展？是何种力量在推动着社会变得越来越大？在后续文章里，我将顺着这些疑问，继续追寻人类社会的发展历史。 （本系列文章首发于“大象公会”，纸媒转载请先征得公会同意。）

【2015-10-09】 @海德沙龙 今年7月，路易斯安那发生影院枪击案之后，市场研究公司C4对影院常客做了一次调查，结果很有意思，3/4受访者认为，影院仍是非常安全的地方，85%受访者说，枪击案不会改变他们的观影习惯，但同时，35%受访者认为，影院应在前厅配备武装保安和金属探测器…… °你愿意为安全而多付两块钱吗？ @海德沙龙: 这个35%和前面两个数字（3/4和85%）显然难以协调起来，不过，紧接着另一个数字很快回答了可能的疑惑：当被问及是否愿意为额外的安全措施而多付3美元门票时，只有13%的受访者说愿意。 @whigzhou: 这个案例很典型，它提醒我们在解读各种意愿表达时需要警惕的地方 @whigzhou: 隐瞒成本是问卷调查以及其他意见表达机制的常见陷阱，在不考虑成本的条件下，最琐碎的意愿、最不关切的事情，也会被无限放大，这些扭曲的意愿表达，继而被权责不对称的票决机制变成政策