含有〈政府〉标签的文章(26)

DARPA vs NASA

【2022-01-07】

听了个 podcast,嘉宾对比了 DARPA 和 NASA 的工作效率,非常有意思,

NASA 17000 多员工,每年200多亿美元预算,确实做了不少事情,可是自从近些年民营航天兴起之后,对比之下就很容易看出,NASA 的效率是很低的,以前只是没对比大家不知道,

最近送上去的 James Webb 望远镜,进度晚了14年,预算超支了19倍,可见一斑,

相比之下,DARPA 只有200多员工,年预算30多亿,在美国的国防预算里只能算是零花钱,而它的工作绩效可谓耀眼夺目,几十年来的各种重大技术突破里,你总是能看到 DARPA 的身影,

特别有意思的一点是,DARPA 曾主动向国会提出,别给我们这么多钱,这是我从未听说过的事情,可能没有任何其他政府机构会主动提出削减自己预算的,其中道理,说到后面你就明白了,

(下面是我听完之后的一些想法)

这一效率差异的原因在于,两者虽然都是(more...)

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【2022-01-07】 听了个 podcast,嘉宾对比了 DARPA 和 NASA 的工作效率,非常有意思, NASA 17000 多员工,每年200多亿美元预算,确实做了不少事情,可是自从近些年民营航天兴起之后,对比之下就很容易看出,NASA 的效率是很低的,以前只是没对比大家不知道, 最近送上去的 James Webb 望远镜,进度晚了14年,预算超支了19倍,可见一斑, 相比之下,DARPA 只有200多员工,年预算30多亿,在美国的国防预算里只能算是零花钱,而它的工作绩效可谓耀眼夺目,几十年来的各种重大技术突破里,你总是能看到 DARPA 的身影, 特别有意思的一点是,DARPA 曾主动向国会提出,别给我们这么多钱,这是我从未听说过的事情,可能没有任何其他政府机构会主动提出削减自己预算的,其中道理,说到后面你就明白了, (下面是我听完之后的一些想法) 这一效率差异的原因在于,两者虽然都是国营机构,但它们的使命设定,以及完成使命的方式,都十分不同, 首先,NASA会有一些有上级所赋予的明确使命,比如某年之前把人送上月球,把某种性能指标的望远镜送上轨道,或者更一般的指标,每年往轨道载运多少人和物资,诸如此类, 其次,NASA 还会自己动手设计为达成这些目标而需要的装备,设计执行完成使命的项目与行动,运营这些项目所用到的众多设施, 虽然它也会尽可能将更多的制造和研发任务分包给私人企业,或者通过招标采购获取,但仍然承担了大量企业的常规功能(研发,设计,制造,运营,管理),所以 NASA 就是一家典型的国企,而国企的低效率是众所周知的, 相比之下,DARPA 不会做所有这些事情,它其实是一群天使投资人,DARPA 员工的日常工作就是兜里揣着支票本,到处看别人在干啥,看到有意思有前途有价值的,就给他们撒钱,其重点当然是跟国防和安全有关的,但这种关系可以很远,也可以没什么关系,只要是*对美国好*就行,比如 DARPA 早在2010年就给 Mordena 撒了2500万美元,那时候还很少有人看好 mRNA 疫苗的前景,(疫苗怎么跟国防扯上关系了?不愁,只要因果链足够长,什么都能扯上关系,美军士兵不是也得防疫吗?美军还可能部署到疫区呢是吧?) DARPA 之所以效率高,就是因为它除了看项目撒钱之外不做具体的事情,就不需要养一堆人,正是在*管一堆人让他们持续高效工作*这一点上,国企是远远不如私企有效率的, 一旦养了一堆人,这堆人就成了一个利益集团,他们的头就成了对一帮兄弟饭碗负责的大哥,他会拼了命保住这堆饭碗,而且一有机会就会把团队扩大,因为团队越大,大哥的级别就越高, 私企也有这个问题,但私企有很强的预算约束和收益率反馈,国企就不同了,国会拨款委员会虽然也施加了一种约束和反馈,但远不如股东的直接和灵敏, 这也解释了为何 DARPA 没有国营机构中普遍的自我膨胀倾向,会主动要求削减预算,正是因为没养一堆人,其行动是高度个人化的,每个项目,撒出去的每笔钱,都直接对应一个具体的决策者,这笔钱撒的效果是好是坏,他完全没办法推卸责任,因为事情太单纯了,根本不存在其他工作环节可以成为他的失败借口,所以,他有充分的激励克制自己的撒钱手脚,看不到好项目就别动, 反之,你看看 James Webb 望远镜的事情,拖了十几年,预算翻了二十倍,你能把责任落到具体某个人吗?根本不可能,谁都可以找出一大堆借口,证明不是自己的错, 当然,NASA 可能采用 DARPA 模式吗?考虑到它向来的使命性质,不可能,政策制定者给它下了很具体的任务,有时间限制,为此需要的东西不可能通过撒钱在明确时限中培育出来, 问题是,凭什么要给 NASA 赋予那么明确的使命?五年内把人送上月球对美国真的那么重要? 成立 NASA 的初衷其实是让美国取得太空优势,而不是具体做出什么东西或完成什么任务,所以完全可以采用 DARPA 模式,前提是改变其使命性质,从具体任务改成开放式目标,这需要政策思维的根本转变, 而 DARPA 的使命性质一开始就是开发式的:让美国在与国防有关的技术领域保持优势, 这个问题还可以更一般化,国营机构为追求国家目标,可以不同的深度参与整个实现过程,从深到浅依次是: 1)弄清楚自己需要什么东西,然后自己组织人设计开发,自己建厂制造, 2)把制造外包出去, 3)只提出需求和规格要求,让竞争私企拿出设计方案来竞标, 4)未来是开放的,所以我不想说死我究竟想要什么,你们放开试,我看中的就撒钱, 考虑到国企注定的低效率,参与深度越浅越好, 美军的大部分装备需求是以第三种方式满足的,但这还不够,因为未来究竟需要什么没法知道,所以才有了 DARPA,其使命是在一个开放未来中尽可能保持优势, 【2022-01-07】 说到 DARPA,让我想起一件事情,Napoleon Chagnon 对 Yanomamo人的研究现在已经很出名了,他的田野研究前后持续了30多年,这是非常罕见的,这种人类学田野调查如果由大学资助的话,一般顶多也就是读一个博士学位的时间, 那他当年的资助是从哪儿来的呢?NIH,美国的又一个官方撒钱机构,NIH 的腰包可比 DARPA 鼓多了,年预算400亿,Chagnon 的资助具体说来自NIH的下属机构 NIMH,(见 Napoleon Chagnon (2013) Noble Savages), 问题是,一个以亲属关系为研究主题的人类学项目怎么能得到 NIH 的资助? 名头是:这是比较遗传学研究的一部分,旨在弄清各人类群体的遗传差异,以及这种差异的医学含义,而亚马逊土著显然是一个足够独特的群体,被挑出来也算合理, 我之前说了,只要因果链足够长,没什么是扯不上关系的,这就是个生动例子,可以说明: 1)美国官方撒钱机构的宗旨可以被解释到多远, 2)具体负责撒钱的决策者的自由裁量余地可以有多大, 当然,这种宽松度之所以可行,是以高廉洁水平为保障的,否则不难想象,钱全都撒进小舅子们兜里了,最起码也是被记者扒出一堆大粪,鸡飞狗跳,国会震怒,把你预算一刀砍了,
刑事诉讼组织

【2021-09-11】

67

@whigzhou: 据说这种公共品只有政府能提供 (Peter Clark 2000, p.67) ​​​​

@何不笑:私人众筹+赏金猎人?

@whigzhou: 跟赏金猎人两码事,是私人公益组织扮演追捕者和检察官的角色

@whigzhou: 虽然早就有了一些公诉机制,但晚至18世纪,英格兰绝大多数刑事案件的诉讼人还都是私人,这一状况直到维多利亚时代才改变

@whigzhou(more...)

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【2021-09-11】 67 @whigzhou: 据说这种公共品只有政府能提供 (Peter Clark 2000, p.67) ​​​​ @何不笑:私人众筹+赏金猎人? @whigzhou: 跟赏金猎人两码事,是私人公益组织扮演追捕者和检察官的角色 @whigzhou: 虽然早就有了一些公诉机制,但晚至18世纪,英格兰绝大多数刑事案件的诉讼人还都是私人,这一状况直到维多利亚时代才改变 @whigzhou: 这就意味着,若没有这样的公益组织,很多案件会因为没有当事人起诉而被忽略
扇出系数和控制强度

【2020-11-23】

@何不笑 明清时期央地正财政分化及正腐雇员数量/支出:
●图1::16、18世纪,朝廷以牺牲地方财政为代价,大大改善了国库状况。16世纪末至17世纪末约一个世纪,国库收入不断扩大,地方支出不断缩小。

●图2:18世纪初,清廷年入大约是16世纪末4-5倍,累计财政盈余达年度预算收入的1-2倍,清廷告别赤字转入“国库充盈”模式。

●图3、4:各地官+吏雇员总数变化情况。“但留给地方的无论是人力还是财力,似乎都不足以治理帝国。我的研究发现,无论是政府雇员总数,还是雇员/千人指标,均自16世纪末开始逐渐下滑。

“考虑到人口从17世纪初的一(more...)

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【2020-11-23】 @何不笑 明清时期央地正财政分化及正腐雇员数量/支出: ●图1::16、18世纪,朝廷以牺牲地方财政为代价,大大改善了国库状况。16世纪末至17世纪末约一个世纪,国库收入不断扩大,地方支出不断缩小。 ●图2:18世纪初,清廷年入大约是16世纪末4-5倍,累计财政盈余达年度预算收入的1-2倍,清廷告别赤字转入“国库充盈”模式。 ●图3、4:各地官+吏雇员总数变化情况。“但留给地方的无论是人力还是财力,似乎都不足以治理帝国。我的研究发现,无论是政府雇员总数,还是雇员/千人指标,均自16世纪末开始逐渐下滑。 “考虑到人口从17世纪初的一亿人增长到19世纪初的三亿多人,地方正腐的规模很难对地方进行有效治理,加之地方财政的减少,从17世纪末开始,地方上还不得不雇佣了更多的人员用于帝国后勤和通讯网络,因而教育和地方治安等地方公共服务不断减少。” ( By Ziang Liu (LSE) via.EHS 2020.09.10) @whigzhou: 地方政府萎缩是集泉帝国趋于成熟稳定之后的惯常表现,这也是它集权成功的表征之一 @whigzhou: 以县的数量为例,1)长波段看,从汉至清,人口规模增加7倍,县数略同,2)越是乱世,县越多,3)每个寿命较长的王朝,开国时县多,越成熟越少,大致从1500降至1200 @whigzhou: 同理,越是乱世,控制层级之间的扇出系数越小,因而同等规模下层级越多,因为越严密的控制需要越小的扇出系数 @whigzhou: 扇出系数和控制强度之间的关系在很多场合都可以观察到,比如军队,平时的扇出系数约为9,1个师9个团,1个团9个连,一上战场,扇出系数就降到3,否则很难指挥,再比如,1949-54年间,某政权的行政层级有六级:中央-大区-省-行署-县-乡镇,扇出系数小于10,稳定下来后去掉了大区和行署,扇出系数升至20-30 @whigzhou: 再如罗马帝国,从屋大维到图拉真,行省从13个增至33个,但罗马和各省之间并未插入新层级,因而扇出系数提高两倍,可是在所谓三世纪危机期间,提高控制强度的需求大增,于是有了戴克里先改革,47个行省拆小为104个,组织进12个dioceses,再归入4个大区,由4个皇帝每人管一个,扇出系数降回10以下 @windflower1874:地方政府萎缩不是正有利于民间自治力量崛起。宗族不就是南宋时被目中无人的中下层文人重新发明出来控制地方社会的工具。 @whigzhou: 宋以后地方的乡绅治理确实有很大发展,但这很难说是自治,缙绅的权威完全取决于他在科举/官僚阶梯上爬的多高,其自主性还不如奥斯曼的 millet @whigzhou: 绅权更像是皇权自上而下扎进地方的末梢神经,而不是自下而上长出来的自主机构 @whigzhou: 实际上科举制的最大妙处就在这里,一个开放的上升通道,吸引千万地方才俊营营其中,将其对地位的追求和对皇权的效忠捆绑在一起,退休后还充当免费的居委会大妈  
屁不敢放

【2017-01-06】

@whigzhou: 川普几条tweets的恐吓威胁,就足以让福特通用们屈膝匍匐,噤若寒蝉,屁不敢放,仅此一点,即可体会联邦政府的权力已膨胀到了何种程度。 ​​​​

@whigzhou: 众多自称爱自由的人看到这种场面居然还能喜欢川普,实在无语。

@夫子大师兄: 我现在也挺不喜欢川普,但之前联邦权力的膨胀跟他没关系吧。

@whigzhou: 对,没关系,他只是在毫无克制的用这根越来越粗壮的权力大棒痛殴私人企业

@whig(more...)

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【2017-01-06】 @whigzhou: 川普几条tweets的恐吓威胁,就足以让福特通用们屈膝匍匐,噤若寒蝉,屁不敢放,仅此一点,即可体会联邦政府的权力已膨胀到了何种程度。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 众多自称爱自由的人看到这种场面居然还能喜欢川普,实在无语。 @夫子大师兄: 我现在也挺不喜欢川普,但之前联邦权力的膨胀跟他没关系吧。 @whigzhou: 对,没关系,他只是在毫无克制的用这根越来越粗壮的权力大棒痛殴私人企业 @whigzhou: 很多人会从『讨厌川普』迅速跳到『投票给希拉里』甚至『喜欢希拉里』,我只能说他心智不健全 @whigzhou: 我对投川普票没什么意见,有N多理由可以做此选择,比如:1)更不喜欢希拉里,2)不了解川普,只知道他是共和党,3)川普虽讨厌,政策相对好一点,4)年纪大的或许靠谱点,5)索性烂个透反倒可能有转机……这些理由都不足以让我对他产生负面看法,但『喜欢川普』就是另一码事了 【2017-01-19】 @whigzhou: 既然川普不能容忍制造业外迁,他会容忍自动化吗?比如数十万卡车司机失业?上百万收银员呢?若要阻止,他会做什么?谷歌亚马逊uber 一家家恐吓过去?
差强人意

【2016-05-07】

@whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。

@whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事(more...)

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【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情,但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要,因为当时关税再高,和运费比还是很低,所以只要拆除壁垒,效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2)管制,随便翻翻经济史就知道,18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛,但给人的印象很不一样,我猜这是因为,早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行,而较少以行为管控的方式进行,大量限制法规,但较少执行官僚,所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见,究其因,当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3)19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少,但州政府和市政府管的可不少,看看产业史,哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的,那时候联邦政府站在自由一边,多数州政府站在另一边,联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒,由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了,铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场,州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了,只好偏向自由化,但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4)政府规模,从财政开支和雇员数量看,那时候的政府确实小得多,但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看,也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5)福利制度,这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点,那时候基本上没有福利制度,济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中,国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊,仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级,何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的,所以不要相信什么自由天国,也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  
[译文]美国需要一部新大宪章

The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State
监管型国家的法治

作者:John Cochrane @ 2015-6
译者:Ether(@大小眼不能飞)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy),陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy)
来源:John Cochrane’s blog,http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf

1.Introduction
1.引言

The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom.

美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意,而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济,但很少有人认识到,日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁,而这一点恐怕更加重要。

What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board?

银行敢对美联储叫板吗?券商对证券交易委员会(SEC)又敢怎样?医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部(HHS)或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗?一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢?医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗?我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗?

The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support.

这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵,国王之忧还在其次。但是,现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下,各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。

The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around.

过去800年,美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力,保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治,我们的民主脱胎于法治,而非相反。

This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now.

法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今,其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现;也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天,对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张,且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大,或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险,并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。

Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress.

没错,我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身:宽泛模糊的法律,政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。

Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course.

当然,利用法律和规章奖励支持者,惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。

Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger.

富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功,甚至可能延长了大萧条,但在政治上则取得了极大的成功,民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。

A label?
用什么标签好?

I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control.

我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。

Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money.

很多人称之为“社会主义”,但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里,私有企业是存在的,但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织,控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业,它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局,也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。

It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support (more...)

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The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State 监管型国家的法治 作者:John Cochrane @ 2015-6 译者:Ether(@大小眼不能飞) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy),陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy) 来源:John Cochrane's blog,http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf 1.Introduction 1.引言 The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom. 美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意,而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济,但很少有人认识到,日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁,而这一点恐怕更加重要。 What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board? 银行敢对美联储叫板吗?券商对证券交易委员会(SEC)又敢怎样?医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部(HHS)或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗?一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢?医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗?我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗? The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support. 这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵,国王之忧还在其次。但是,现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下,各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。 The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around. 过去800年,美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力,保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治,我们的民主脱胎于法治,而非相反。 This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now. 法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今,其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现;也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天,对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张,且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大,或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险,并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。 Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress. 没错,我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身:宽泛模糊的法律,政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。 Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course. 当然,利用法律和规章奖励支持者,惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。 Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger. 富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功,甚至可能延长了大萧条,但在政治上则取得了极大的成功,民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。 A label? 用什么标签好? I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control. 我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。 Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money. 很多人称之为“社会主义”,但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里,私有企业是存在的,但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织,控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业,它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局,也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。 It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support their regulators politically. But Stigler’s regulators and business golf together and drink together, and the balance power is strongly in the hands of the businesses. “Capture” doesn't see billion-dollar criminal cases and settlements. And “capture” does not describe how national political forces use regulatory power to extract political support. 这也不是“捕获”。乔治·斯蒂格勒描述过受管制的企业“捕获”其监管者的过程,企业借监管之手排除竞争。斯蒂格勒所研究的受管制企业一定会在政治上支持其监管者。但是在斯蒂格勒的叙述中,监管者和商人一起打高尔夫一起喝酒,制衡的权力牢牢地掌握在企业手中。“捕获”中见不着上十亿美元的刑事案件及和解协议。“捕获”也不能描述国家政治力量如何利用监管权力攫取政治支持。 It’s not really “crony capitalism.” That term has a bit more of the needed political flavor than “capture.” Yes, there is a revolving door, connections by which businesses get regulators to do them favors. But what’s missing in both “capture” and “cronyism” is the opposite flow of power, the Devil’s bargain aspect of it from the point of view of the regulated business or individual, the silencing of political opposition by threat of regulation. 这也不是真正的“裙带资本主义”。这个词相比“捕获”多了一份应有的政治意味。的确,这里面有一扇旋转门,企业通过这种关系让监管者们施以援手。但无论“捕获”还是“裙带主义”都没能体现逆向的权力作用。对受管制的企业和个人来说,这是一笔与魔鬼的交易,是通过监管的威胁对政治反对的压制。 We’re headed for an economic system in which many industries have a handful of large, cartelized businesses— think 6 big banks, 5 big health insurance companies, 4 big energy companies, and so on. Sure, they are protected from competition. But the price of protection is that the businesses support the regulator and administration politically, and does their bidding. If the government wants them to hire, or build factory in unprofitable place, they do it. The benefit of cooperation is a good living and a quiet life. The cost of stepping out of line is personal and business ruin, meted out frequently. That’s neither capture nor cronyism. 我们正在迈入这样一种经济体制:很多行业只有少数几家大型的、卡特尔化的企业——比如6家银行、5家健康保险公司、4家能源公司等等。的确,他们受到保护,免于竞争,但保护的代价是企业政治上支持其监管者和行政机关,并听命于它们。如果政府想要他们雇工或者在无法盈利的地方建厂,他们就会照做。合作的好处是日子好过、生活太平。越界的成本就是个人和企业的毁灭,这种惩罚频繁出现。这既不是捕获也不是裙带主义。 “Bureaucratic tyranny,” a phrase that George Nash quotes Herbert Hoover as using is a contender. “官僚暴政”——这个乔治·纳什引自赫伯特·胡佛的短语倒是值得考虑。 Charles Murray, writing recently on the status of the regulatory state notes many of these issues. He totals 4,450 distinct federal crimes— just the law, not including regulations with criminal penalties, or the vastly greater number with civil penalties. He adds up the 175,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the vagueness of the enabling legislation — Congress only decrees that rules are “generally fair and equitable,” “just and reasonable,” prohibits “unfair methods of competition” or “excessive profits.” He notes the absence of judicial rights in administrative courts. He notes the wide scope of regulation and the comparatively tiny — but ruinous to those charged — enforcement: 最近,查尔斯·墨里在论述监管型国家的现状时关注了诸多类似议题。他一共数出了4,450条联邦刑事罪名。这还仅仅是法律规定,不包括附有刑事惩罚的行政规章或者数量更大的附有民事惩罚的规章。他核查了一共175,000页的《美国联邦法规汇编》,以及含糊不清的授权立法条款。国会仅要求规章条款“原则上公平、公正”、“公正、合理”,禁止“不公平竞争”或者“过分利得”。他指出,行政法庭上司法权利缺失。他还指出,规章管辖范围广泛,执法却相对不足,但执法的结果对被控诉者却是毁灭性的: the “Occupational Safety and Health Administration has authority over more than eight million workplaces. But it can call upon only one inspector for about every 3,700 of those workplaces. The Environmental Protection Agency has authority ... over every piece of property in the nation. It conducted about 18,000 inspections in 2013—a tiny number in proportion to its mandate. “职业安全与健康管理局有权管辖超过八百万个工作场所,但是每3,700个工作场所只能均摊到一个巡视员。环境保护署有权管辖美国每一处资产。2013年,它一共进行了18,000次检查,仅是其管辖范围中极小的一部分。” Murray advocates civil disobedience with insurance for the few zebras who get caught by the regulators. 墨里提倡每个公民都购买保险以弥补万一被监管者抓到所带来的损失,同时对管制采取不予合作的态度。 But by and large Murray deplores merely the silliness of and economic inefficiency of the regulatory state. This misses, I think, the greatest danger, that to our political freedom. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect. 但总体而言,墨里憎恶的只是监管型国家的愚蠢和经济不效率。我认为这漏掉了最大的危险,那就是对政治自由的危害。仅仅是想到有可能被环保署拜访这一点,就有显著的噤声效果。 And it also misses, I think, an explanation for how we got here. Regulators and politicians aren’t nitwits. The libertarian argument that regulation is so dumb — which it surely is — misses the point that it is enacted by really smart people. The fact that the regulatory state is an ideal tool for the entrenchment of political power was surely not missed by its architects. 我认为他还漏掉了一点:我们是怎么走到这一步的。监管者和政客都不是傻子。自由意志主义者关于监管很愚蠢的观点,尽管正确,但没有看到一点:这些法律法规也是非常聪明的人制定的。监管型国家的建造者肯定对其是保有政治权力的最佳工具这一点心知肚明。 Likewise, Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen make a good casethat most of the economic rationale for regulation has disappeared along with information. Uber stars are far more effective than the Taxi Commission. But the demand for protection and the desire to trade economic protection for political support will remain unchanged. “Protect the consumer” is as much a distracting argument in the Uber vs. Taxi debate as it was when the medieval guilds advanced it. 同样,亚历克斯·塔巴洛克和泰勒·考恩很好地证明了,大多数赞成监管的经济学原理已经随着充分的信息而消失。优步的星级评定远比出租车委员会有效,但是对监管保护的需求以及用经济上的保护来换取政治上的支持仍然不会改变。在优步和出租车之争中,“保护消费者”不过是个掩人耳目的论点,和中世纪行会利用它时一样。 Rule of Law: the Devil in the Details 法治:细节里的魔鬼 “Rule of law” and “regulation” are dangerous Big Vague Words. The rule of law is so morally powerful that the worst tyrants go through the motions. Stalin bothered with show trials. Putin put Pussy Riot on trial, and then they were “legally” convicted of and jailed for the crime of ”hooliganism.” Even Henry the Eighth had trials before chopping heads. Is this not rule of law? “法治”和“监管”是危险的模糊大词。法治在道德上如此有力,以至于最坏的暴君也要应付一下。斯大林费力搞出走秀似的审判。普京审判暴动小猫【译注:俄罗斯女性主义朋克乐队,经常在各大景点举办有关俄罗斯政治生活的行为艺术表演,都未经政府批准】,然后“依法”宣判“流氓罪”罪名成立并判入狱。甚至亨利八世把那么多人头砍下了之前也经过了审判。这难道不是法治吗? No, of course, but it’s worth reminding ourselves why not as we think about bureaucracies. 当然不是,但在我们思考官僚体系的时候,值得提醒一下自己,为什么它们不是。 “Rule of law” ultimately is a set of restrictions to keep the state from using its awesome power of coercion to force your political support. If you oppose Castro, you go to prison. If you opposed Herbert Hoover, could you still run a business? Sure. If you oppose President Obama, or the future President Hilary Clinton can you do so? If you oppose the polices of one of their regulatory agencies, now powers unto themselves, or speak out against the leaders of those agencies, can you do so? If you support candidates with unpopular positions, can you still get the regulatory approvals you need? It’s not so clear. That is our danger. “法治”说到底是一系列对国家的限制,防止国家动用可怕的强制权力强迫你的政治支持。如果你反对卡斯特罗,你会被关进监狱。如果你反对赫伯特·胡佛,你还可以经营一家公司吗?当然可以。如果你反对奥巴马总统或者未来的希拉里·克林顿总统呢?如果你反对他们手下某个现已有权有势的监管机构的政策,或是公开反对他们的领导呢,你还可以继续经营公司吗?如果你支持立场不受欢迎的候选人,你还能获得经营公司所需的行政审批吗?答案并不清楚。这就是我们所面临的危险。 “Rule of law” is not just about the existence of written laws, and the superficial mechanics of trials, judges, lawyers, ad sentences. Rule of law lies deep in the details of how those institutions work. Do you have the right to counsel, the right to question witnesses, the right to discovery, the right to appeal, and so forth. Like laws, what matters about regulation, both in its economic efficiency and in its insulation from politics, is not its presence but its character and operation. “法治”不仅仅是成文法和形式上的审判、法官、律师和判决等机制。法治根植于这些制度如何运作的细节中。你是否有权利获得律师辩护、质证、证据开示、上诉,等等。和法律一样,不管是从经济效率还是政治独立性上来说,监管的要害不在于它的存在,而在于它的特点和操作。 Regulators write rules too. They fine you, close down your business, send you to jail, or merely harass you with endless requests, based on apparently written rules. We need criteria to think about whether “rule of law” applies to this regulatory process. Here are some suggestions. 监管者也制定规则。他们依据成文法开罚单、关闭你的公司、送你入监,或者就不停地提要求骚扰你。我们需要一些标准来思考“法治”一词是否适用于这套监管程序。以下是一些建议:
Rule vs. Discretion? 规则vs自由裁量? Simple/precise or vague/complex? 简单/准确,还是模糊/复杂? Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? 可知的规则vs溯及既往? Permission or rule book? 批准,还是规则手册 Plain text or fixers? 直白文本,还是掮客? Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? 普通执法还是专断执法? Right to discovery and challenge decisions. 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。 Right to appeal. 上诉权。 Insulation from political process. 与政治活动隔离。 Speed vs. delay? 快捷还是拖延? Consultation, consent of the governed. 被治理人的意见和合意。  
  • Rule vs. Discretion?
  • 规则vs自由裁量?
This is really a central distinction. Does the regulation, in operation, function as a clear rule? Or is it simply an excuse for the regulator to impose his or her will on the regulated firm or person? Sometimes discretion is explicit. Sometimes discretion comes in the application of a rule book thousands of pages long with multiple contradictory and vague rules. 这是一个核心区别。在操作中规章是不是作为明确的规则发挥作用?还是规章仅是监管者对被监管公司和个人施加自身意志的借口?有时候自由裁量是很明确的,有时候自由裁量则来自对上千页且存在大量冲突、模糊规则的规章手册的运用。
  • Simple/precise or vague/complex?
  • 简单/准确还是模糊/复杂?
Regulations can be simple and precise — even if silly. “Any structure must be set back six feet from the property line” is simple and precise. Or the regulation can be long, vague and complex. “The firm shall not engage in abusive practices.” 规章可以简单、准确,即使其很愚蠢。例如“所有建筑必须在界址线后6英尺”,这就很简单、准确。规章也可以很长、模糊且复杂,比如“公司不允许从事违规行为”。 Many regulations go on for hundreds of pages. Long, vague, and complex is a central ingredient which gives the appearance of rules but amounts to discretion. 很多规章长达数百页。冗长、模糊、复杂是让规则成为自由裁量,只具有规则的表象的核心因素。
  • Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions?
  • 可知的规则vs溯及既往?
Is the rule book knowable ex ante? Or is it, in application, simply a device for ex-post prosecutions. Insider trading rules are, at present, a good example of the latter. The definition of “insider” varies over time, and there is really little hope for a firm to read a coherent rule book to know what is and is not allowed. Much better to stay on good terms with the regulator. 规则事先可知吗?还是其实只是一种溯及既往的工具。内幕交易规则就是后一种情况的很好例子。“内幕”的定义随时间而变,公司几乎不可能从一本融贯的规则手册中知道什么是允许的,什么不被允许。与其如此,还远不如和监管者搞好关系。
  • Permission or rule book?
  • 批准还是规则手册?
In one kind of regulation, there is a rule book. If you follow the rule book, you’re ok. You go ahead and do what you want to do. In much regulation, however, you have to ask for permission from the regulator, and that permission includes a lot of discretion. Environmental review is a good example. 有一种监管,依据就是一本规则手册。只要你遵循上面的规则就没事,你可以做其他任何你想做的。但是有很多监管,你需要征得监管者的批准,而批准则包括了很多自由裁量。环境审评就是一个好例证。
  • Plain text or fixers?
  • 通俗文本还是掮客?
Can a normal person read the plain text of the rule, and understand what action is allowed or not? Or is the rule so complex that specialists are required to understand the rule, and the regulatory agency’s current interpretation of the rule? In particular, are specialists with internal agency contacts necessary, or specialists who used to work at the agency? 一个普通人是否能够阅读规则的文本并理解何种行为被允许,何种不被允许?还是规则太复杂,想要理解规则需要专家,需要依靠监管机构对规则的最新阐释?特别是,是不是需要一个拥有监管机构内部关系的专家或者是前工作人员? As a private pilot, I often bristle at the FAA’s mindless bureaucracy and the plain silliness of much of their regulation. But to their credit, there is a strong culture that the plain text of the rule counts, and each pilot should read the rules and know what they mean. That is a system much harder to misuse. Financial, banking, environmental, health care, and housing regulation stand on the opposite end of the spectrum. 作为一个私人飞行员,我经常恼怒于联邦航空管理局的无脑官僚做派和很多愚蠢的规章。但是有一点不得不承认,他们那里盛行一种文化,就是保持规则文本的通俗易懂,每一位飞行员都应该能读懂规则。在这种体制下,监管者滥用规则的难度就会加大。但金融、银行、环境、医疗保健、住房的规章却完全处于光谱的相反一端。
  • Enforced commonly or arbitrarily?
  • 普通执法还是专断执法?
Regulations that are seldom enforced, but then used occasionally to impose enormous penalties are clearly more open to political abuse. If Americans commit three felonies a dayin “conspiracy,” internet use, endangered species, wetlands, or employment and immigration regulations (just to start), but one in a hundred thousand is ever prosecuted, just who gets prosecuted is obviously ripe for abuse. 很少执行但偶尔用来施加重罚的规章显然更易被滥用。如果美国人每天都在有关“合谋”、互联网使用、濒危物种、湿地或雇佣和移民等等规章(远远还没数完)下犯下三项重罪,但是只有十万分之一的机率被起诉,那么挑谁来起诉这件事显然就成了滥权的温床。
  • Right to discovery, see evidence, and challenge decisions.
  • 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。
Do you have the right to know how a regulatory agency decided your case? Step by step, what assumptions, calculations, or interpretations did it use? Often not, and even in high profile cases. 你是否有权知道监管机构是如何裁决你的案子的?每一步,他们用了什么假设、如何计算或者解释?通常你无权知道,即使是要案。 For example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverageof Met Life’s “systemic” designation reports 比如,《华尔街日报》关于大都会人寿保险公司被划定为具有“系统性风险”的报道写道: The feds ...still refuse to say exactly which [threats] make MetLife a systemic risk or what specific changes the company could make to avoid presenting such a risk. “联邦政府……依然拒绝说明是什么(威胁)使得大都会保险公司具有系统性风险或者公司可以通过何种具体的改变来避免出现这种风险。” and continues ...MetLife says that…the government’s decision is based on mere speculation and “undisclosed evidentiary material.” 接着又提到: “大都会保险公司表示……政府的裁决是基于纯粹臆测以及‘未公开的证明材料’。” Since the case is still being decided, the point here is not the correctness or not of these charges. But the charges are a clear example of the kind of regulation that can go wrong (In fact, the miracle of the MetLife case is that the company had the chutzpah to sue. They are taking a big bet that FSOC doesn’t believe in revenge.) 因为案件尚无定论,这里的重点并非这些指控正确与否,而是这些指控作为一个清楚的例证,表明监管可以变味。(事实上,大都会保险公司一案的奇迹在于公司竟然敢起诉监管机构。他们在金融稳定监督委员不会报复上面押了好大一注。)
  • Right to appeal.
  • 上诉权。
And not just to the same agency that makes the decision! In law, the right to appeal is central. In regulation, the right to appeal is often only to appeal to the same agency that made the decision. The Chevron doctrine severely limits your ability to appeal regulatory decisions (and the regulations themselves) to any outside entity. As an example, continuing the above MetLife coverage, 这里说的不仅仅是向作出裁决的机构提出上诉!法律上,上诉权是核心。在监管中,上诉权通常只是向作出行政裁决的同一机构提出上诉。“雪佛龙原则”严重地限制了你向机构外其他实体对监管裁决(和监管本身)提起上诉的能力。作为例子,我们接着看关于大都会保险公司一案的报道。 The ... stability council “lacks any separation in its legislative, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.” That combined with MetLife’s inability to see the full record on which the decision was based made it “impossible” to get a fair hearing. 金融稳定监督委员会“缺乏立法、调查、起诉和司法各职能的分立”。加上大都会无法看到裁决依据的完整记录,这使得他们“不可能”得到一个公平的听证。 As in law, secret evidence, secret decisions, secret testimony; and legislature, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled in to one are classic ingredients for subverting rule of law. And, eventually, for using the machinery of law to silence political opposition. 和在法律领域一样,秘密证据、秘密裁决、秘密证词以及立法、起诉、判决、陪审和执行不加区分都是破坏法治的典型元素。最终,它们都是为了利用法律机器来压制政治反对。
  • Insulation from political process.
  • 与政治活动隔离。
There are many structures in place to try to ensure the “independence” of independent agencies. There is also a tension that we live in a democracy, so independent agencies can’t be too independent if they have great discretionary power. 目前有很多架构想要确保独立机构的“独立”。但在民主国家,这也带来一个内在的压力。独立机构如果有很大的裁量权,那就不可能太独立。 These important structures try to limit explicit party politics’ use of the regulatory state. They are less successful at limiting the bureaucracy’s use of its regulatory power to prop up its own separate fiefdom. They are also less successful at limiting unwitting political cooperation. When vast majorities of the bureaucracy belong to one political party, when government employee unions funnel unwitting contributions to candidates of that party, and when strong ideological currents link decisions across agencies, explicit cooperation is less necessary. 这些重要的架构都是为了限制政党政治对监管型国家的公开利用,但它们在限制官僚机构利用监管权力强化自己的独立王国上则不那么成功。在限制无意的政治合作上也不成功。当机构的绝大部分人属于一个政党时,当政府雇员工会无意中资助那个政党的候选人时,当强烈的意识形态动向将各部门的裁决关联起来时,公开的合作就没那么必要了。 And, though it was ever thus, the enormous expansion of the size, power, and discretion of the regulatory state makes the insulation structures more important, just as they are falling apart. 即使这样,监管型国家的规模、权力和自由裁量权的扩张也使得隔离架构更加重要,而这些架构却正在分崩离析。
  • Speed vs. delay.
  • 快捷还是拖延。
The regulatory process can take years, and a canny regulator need not explicitly rule against a political foe. Delay is enough. Lois Lerner herself didn’t deny applications. She just endlessly delayed them. The FDA similarly sits on applications, sometimes for decades. 监管流程可以耗费数年。一个狡猾的监管者并不需要作出明显不利于政治对手的裁决,拖延就够了。洛伊丝·勒纳【编注:勒纳是美国国税局处理税务豁免申请的部门负责人,从2010年起,该部门被发现对涉及保守派特别是茶党人士及捐赠对象的豁免申请施加额外苛刻的审查,2013年的国会调查确认了这些滥权行为的存在,国税局官方也予以承认,并导致勒纳先被停职,后来辞职。】本人并不拒绝任何申请,她只是无限地拖延。类似地,食品药品监督局也拖延审核申请,有时一拖就是几十年。 A central element of a new Magna Carta for regulatory agencies should be a right to speedy decision. If a decision is not rendered in say, 6 months, it is approved. 一部针对监管机构的新大宪章的核心元素,就应该是速决的权利。如果一项裁决,比如说6个月内未作出,就相当于得到批准。
  • Consultation, consent of the governed.
  • 被治理人的意见及合意。
The process by which rules are written needs to be reformed. Congress writes empowering legislation, usually vague and expansive. The agencies undertake their own process for rule writing. They usually invite comment from interested parties, but are typically free to ignore it when they wish. We are as supplicants before the King, asking for his benevolent treatment. 规则制定的流程需要改革。国会制定的授权法律通常模糊、宽泛。机构根据各自的流程制定规则。它们常常会邀请利益相关方提出意见,但当他们不愿意接受这些意见时,通常可以直接无视它们。我们就像国王面前的恳请者,乞求他的仁慈。 And that was before the current transformation. As exemplified by the EPA’s decision to brand carbon dioxide a pollutant (coverage here), to extend the definition of “navigable waters” to pretty much every puddle, HHS’ many reinterpretations of the ACA, and the Education Department’s “Dear Colleague” letters, even the barely-constrained rule-making process now proceeds beyond its previous mild legal and consultative constraints. 这还是发生在如今的转变之前的事。从环境保护局宣布二氧化碳为污染物(见报道),将“可通行水域”的范围延伸到几乎所有的池塘,到卫生与公共服务部数次重新解释患者保护与平价医疗法案,以及教育部的“致同僚的一封信”,都是例证。现在,即使原本就不怎么受约束的规则制定过程也突破了本已有限的法律和征求意见方面的约束。 A structure with more formal representation, and more formal rights to draft the rules that govern us, is more in keeping with the parliamentary lessons of the Rule of Law tradition. 在起草治理我们的规则方面,一个有着更为正式的代议机制和更为正式的权利的制度结构,将更加符合法治传统下的议会经验。 2.A Tour 2.浏览 Do we really have reason to be afraid? Let’s take a tour. 我们真的有理由害怕吗?我们来浏览一下。 These cases are drawn mostly from media coverage, which allows me a quick and current high- level tour. Each case, and many more that are unreported, and a serious investigation to the structure of our massive regulatory state, could easily be drawn out to book length. 以下案例大多来自媒体报道,让我得以对当前情况做一次鸟瞰式的快速浏览。每一起案件和更多没有报道的案件以及对大型监管型国家架构的严肃检视,都可以轻而易举地写成一本书。 My point is not so much a current scandal. My case is that the structure that has emerged is ripe for the Faustian political bargain to emerge, that the trend of using regulation to quash political freedom is in place and will only increase. 我的意图不是要讲一件当下的丑闻。我是认为,现已出现的架构很容易导致浮士德式政治交易的出现,使用监管来压制政治自由的趋势已经形成而且只会不断加强。 As we tour our current regulatory state of affairs, then, think of how well the current regime represents “rule of law,” how well it respects your freedom to speak, your freedom to object, your freedom to oppose the regulator and regulatory regime. Think how insulated it is against the strong temptations of our increasingly polarized, winner-take-all, partisan political system to use regulatory power as a means of enshrining political power. 当我们检视当前监管型国家的事务时,想一想现有体制体现了多少“法治”,它在多大程度上尊重了你的言论自由、反对自由和反对监管者及监管型政权的自由,想一想它与两极分化日益严重、赢家通吃、政党体系动用监管权力来固化政治权力的强烈冲动隔离得怎么样。 Banks 银行 Start with finance. Finance is, of course, where the money is. 从金融业开始。金融,顾名思义,是钱之所在。 The Dodd-Frank act is 2,300 pages of legislation, in which “systemic” is never defined, making a “systemic” designation nearly impossible to fight. The act has given rise to tens of thousands of pages of subsidiary regulation, much still to be written. The Volker rule alone — do not fund proprietary trading with insured deposits — runs now to nearly 1,000 pages. To call this Talmudic is to insult the clarity and concision of the Talmud. 《多德-弗兰克法案》有2,300页长,但里面并未定义何为“系统性的”。这就使得监管者对企业具有“系统性风险”的划定几乎无法反驳。法案也带来了上万页的附加规章,需要接着撰写的还有很多。单是沃尔克规则——禁止用参加存款保险的存款进行自营交易­­——现在就已经快1,000页了。以“塔木德式”来称呼它,是对塔木德之清晰、简洁的亵渎。【编注:塔木德是犹太教的一套口传律法,由拉比传承,记录该教的传统习俗和行为规范。】 The result is immense discretion, both by accident and by design. There is no way one can just read the regulations and know which activities are allowed. Each big bank now has dozens to hundreds of regulators permanently embedded at that bank. The regulators must give their ok on every major decision of the banks. 结果就是巨大的自由裁量权,既有意外也有蓄意。仅仅阅读这些规章绝无可能知道什么活动是被允许的。每家大银行现在都被永久性地安插了几十至几百个监管者。银行的每一项重大决定都必须得到监管者的批准。 The “stress tests” are a good case in point. Seeing, I suspect, the futility of much Dodd-Frank regulation, and with the apparent success of the Spring 2009 stress tests in the rear view mirror, such tests have become a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory efforts. But what worked once does not necessarily work again if carved in stone. “压力测试”是一个好例子。我怀疑是看到了众多多德-弗兰克规章的无效,同时,回顾过去又有2009年春天压力测试的成功,这些使得压力测试成了美联储加强监管的柱基。但是成功一次不代表常规化后次次都能成功。 In “stress tests,” Federal Reserve staff make up various scenarios, and apply their own computer models and the banks’ computer models to see how the banks fare. However, the Fed does not announce a set scenario ahead of time. They Fed staffers make up new scenarios each time. They understand that if banks know ahead of time what the scenario is and the standards are, then the clever MBAs at the banks will make sure the banks all pass. And billions of dollars hang on the results of this game. “压力测试”中,美联储职员制造不同的情境,然后应用联储自己的电脑模型和银行的模型来看银行如何反应。但是联储不会提前公布一组情境都有什么,美联储职员每次都制造一组新的情境。他们知道如果银行事先知道情境及标准,银行里那些聪明的MBA们就有办法保证银行通过测试。而数十亿美元系于这场游戏的结果。 Now, the Fed staffers playing this game, at least those that I have talked to, are honest and a- political. For now. But how long can that last? How long can the Fed resist the temptation to punish banks who have stepped out of line with a stress test designed to exploit their weakness? Is it any wonder that few big banks are speaking out against the whole regime? They understand that being an “enemy” is not the way to win approvals. 现在,参与这个游戏的联储职员,至少那些和我说过话的,都是诚实且无涉政治的。目前是这样,但这能维持多久呢?联储能够抵御诱惑多久,而不去惩罚那些在专门设计来利用银行弱点的压力测试中行为出格的银行?鲜有大银行敢于直言反对整个体系,这很奇怪吗?他们明白,成为“敌人”并不是获得审批的办法。 And the stress-test staff are getting handsome offers already to come work for the banks, to help the banks to pass the Fed’s stress tests. Ben Bernanke himself is now working for Citadel. 参与设计压力测试的联储职员现已从银行获得了待遇不菲的工作邀请,来帮助银行通过测试。本·伯南克自己现在就为城堡投资集团工作。 If this sounds like the cozy world of “capture,” however, remember the litany of criminal prosecutions and multibillion-dollar settlements. These are instigated by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, with much closer ties to the Administration, but they revolve around violations of securities regulations. Is it a coincidence that S&P, who embarrassed the Administration by downgrading U.S. debt, faced a $1.4 billion dollar settlement for ratings shenanigans, while Moody’s, which gave the same ratings, did not? Pay up, shut up, and stay out of trouble is the order of the day. 如果这听起来像是一个“捕获”的温馨世界,那请记住刑事诉讼和数十亿美元的和解下的哀鸣。这些都是由与行政分支关系更紧密的司法部长和司法部发起的,涉及的则是违反证券法规的行为。降低美国债务评级而让行政分支蒙羞的标准普尔因评级欺诈而面临14亿美元的和解,但给出同样评级的穆迪却没有受罚。这难道是巧合?破财消灾、闭上嘴、远离是非,是当今市场的生存之道。 The Wall Street Journal nicely characterized today’s Wall Street, quotingJohn J. Mack, Morgan Stanley's ex-chairman “Your No.1 client is the government,” which embeds “About 50 full-time government regulators.” 《华尔街日报》引述摩根士丹利前主席约翰·马克的话,漂亮地描述了今天华尔街的特点,他说:“你的头号客户是政府”,它安插了“大约50个全职监管者。” CFPB 消费者金融保护局 Another example: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice charged Ally Bank with discrimination in auto lending, and extracted a nearly $100 million settlement. Ally provides money to auto lenders. Lenders negotiate interest rates. Nobody is allowed to collect data on borrowers’ race. So Justice ran statistical analysis on last names and zip codes — Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding — to decide that minorities are being charge more than they should, essentially encoding ethnic jokes into law. 另一个例子:美国消费者金融保护局和司法部指控Ally银行在汽车贷款中歧视,并获取了一份价值约一亿美元的和解。Ally向汽车贷款放贷人提供资金。放贷人协商利率。不允许任何人收集借贷人的种族信息。所以司法部就通过贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法统计分析借贷人的姓和邮编作出裁决,认为少数族裔被收取了过高的费用——这等于是将种族笑话秘密地写入了法律。 Why did Ally pay? Sure, they might survive in court. But nobody wants to be branded a racist. And DOJ and CFPB have many more cards up their sleeves. CFPB now can disapprove any retail financial arrangement it deems “abusive,” and put Ally out of business. Ally为什么答应和解呢?当然,他们可能在法庭上获胜。但没人愿意被称作种族主义者。此外,司法部和消费者金融保护局袖子里还藏着很多牌。消费者金融保护局现在可以否决一切它们认为“滥用”的零售金融合约,它们可以让Ally破产。 Note in this case, there was no charge or evidence of discriminatory practice or intent. The case was purely that DOJ and CFPB didn’t like the statistics of the outcome. 注意,此案中并无歧视行为或意图的指控或证据。一切只因为司法部和消费者金融保护局不喜欢最后的数据统计分布。 More importantly, was this a knowable regulation, or a bill of attainder? Did CFPB and Justice make available the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding program on their website, and tell financial institutions “please download the BISG program, make sure you run loans through it, and that they come out with the right statistics?” Obviously not. This was an unknowable regulation. Ally had no way to make sure it was lending to the right last names. 更重要的是,这究竟是一条可知的规章,还是褫夺公民权的法案?消费者金融保护局和司法部有没有在网站公布贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法,并告诉金融机构“请下载该程序,根据它发放贷款并确保最终数据统计分布正确”?显然没有。这是一个不可知的法规。Ally无法保证它们把钱贷给了正确的姓氏。 Ominously, in Wall Street Journal coverage, 《华尔街日报》的报道带来了不详的预兆: Larger settlements may be on the horizon. J.P. Morgan...warned in a recent filing that it is discussing the issue of possible “statistical disparities” in auto lending with Justice. With more than $50 billion in auto loans on Morgan’s balance sheet at the end of last year, real or imaginary disparities wouldn’t have to be that large to generate a fat settlement. “更大的和解可能就在眼前。JP摩根……在最近提交的一份公告中警示投资者,它正在与司法部讨论汽车贷款中可能存在的‘统计偏差’问题。根据公司去年底资产负债表上超过500亿美元的汽车贷款,真实或者想象的偏差不必过大,也会产生巨额和解。” While the Obamacare (King v. Burwell) and gay marriage decisions soaked up the airtime in the summer of 2015, the Court’s upholdingof statistical discrimination and disparate impact stands as the greatest affront to liberty. Without even alleging discriminatory intent, without following any established procedure, the Justice Department can chew numbers as it feels, and based on statistical analysis brand you a racist and drag you to court. 尽管奥巴马医改案(金诉布维尔案)和同性恋婚姻判决占据了2015年整个夏天的聚光灯,但联邦最高法院对数据统计分布所体现的歧视和差别影响的认可才是对自由最严重的侵犯。甚至无需指称歧视意图,无需遵循任何现有程序,司法部就可以随意咀嚼数字,根据统计分析为你打上种族歧视者的标签,把你拖上法庭。 SEC 美国证券交易委员会 The SEC’s regulation of insider trading is a fine example of discretion run amok. There is no legal definition of insider trading. Other than corporate insiders (who have legal fiduciary responsibilities not to trade on information) there is little economic rationale for this witch hunt. The game is characterized by big suits with big settlements and novel theories. 证券交易委员会对内幕交易的监管是自由裁量权失控的一个很好例证。法律上没有内幕交易的定义。除去企业内部人(他们有法律上的受托人责任,不利用信息进行交易)之外,这种猎巫式的监管没有多少经济依据。这场游戏的特点是大案件、高额和解和新颖的理论。 And thus, big discretion. The SEC can ruin anyone it wants to. If you’re running a hedge fund and the SEC accuses you of insider trading, it grabs your computers and shuts down your business. Sure, 5 years from now you might win in court, but your customers left and the fund shut down the day they took the computers away. And appeal is only to the SEC itself. 于是,这带来了广泛的自由裁量权。证券交易委员会可以摧毁想要摧毁的任何人。如果你经营一家对冲基金,而证券交易委员会指控你内幕交易,它会带走公司的电脑,关闭你的公司。当然,5年后你可能赢下官司,但是客户全都离开了,基金公司也在取走电脑的那天关了。而且你就算上诉也只能上诉到证券交易委员会。 Robosigning 自动签名 During the financial crisis, many banks didn’t fill out all the forms correctly when foreclosing on houses. The charge was entirely about process — there was no charge that anyone was evicted who was paying his or her mortgages. From the Federal Reserve’s own press releaseswe learn that the Fed found them guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices.” 金融危机期间,许多银行取消房屋抵押赎回权时没有正确填写所有表格。这项指控纯粹只和流程有关,没有任何关于仍在还按揭的房主被驱逐的指控。从美联储自己的官方新闻通报中我们知道,美联储认为银行因“不安全、不合理的程序和操作”而犯有过错。 The Fed was acting in conjunction with a comprehensive settlement agreed in principle between the five banking organizations, the state Attorneys General, and the Department of Justice ... The Settlement Agreement requires these organizations to provide $25 billion in payments and other designated types of monetary assistance and remediation to residential mortgage borrowers. 在一项五家银行机构、各州检察长和司法部……之间达成的、内容广泛的原则性和解中,美联储也参与了联合行动。和解协议要求银行赔付给民宅按揭借贷者总额为250亿美元的款项和其他指定的资金支持和救助。 The Fed, a supposedly non-political independent agency devoted to bank safety and monetary policy, acted with the Administration, to transfer $25 billion dollars from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers (not the victims of robosigning, other borrowers) and “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” 美联储——一家理应政治中性、独立,致力于银行安全和实施货币政策的机构——和行政分支一起将250亿美元从银行股东那里转移给按揭借贷者(他们还不是自动签名的受害者)和“非营利性住房咨询机构”。 It’s a small example, but a concrete one. 这是一个小例子,但很实在。 Regulation in general is transitioning from widespread application of rules to sporadic but very large enforcement actions, frequently involving threat of criminal prosecution and ending in large settlements. Documenting this trend, the Wall Street Journalnoted the spread of Department of Justice Attorneys to regulatory agencies. For example, the EPA “described a strategy of pursuing larger, more complicated enforcement cases, albeit fewer in number.” 总体上看,监管正由规则的广泛适用转向不定期的大型执法活动,还经常伴随着刑事诉讼的威胁,并以大额和解而终结。在记录这一趋势时,《华尔街日报》注意到很多司法部律师转到了其他监管机构。比如,环境保护署“描绘了一个策略,就是追求更大、更复杂的执法案件,哪怕案件数量更少”。 Similarly,Larry Parkinson, another former federal prosecutor who runs FERC’s [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] investigations, described it as an outgrowth of shifting resources to more serious matters—like market manipulation—and away from more traditional violations. In 2008, for example, a majority of the agency’s penalties were against firms that violated requirements that natural-gas shippers maintain title to the gas. 类似地,拉里·帕金森,另一位前联邦检察官,现负责联邦能源监管委员会的调查,将此说成是资源从传统违法行为转移到更严重问题的结果,如市场操控。比如,2008年,该委员会的大部分处罚是针对那些违反天然气航运商必须保有天然气所有权这一规定的公司。 “Market Manipulation” is of course a lot more nebulous and discretionary than natural-gas title checks. “市场操控”当然比天然气所有权检查更加模糊、有更多自由裁量权。 The ACA, AKA Obamacare 患者保护与平价医疗法案,即奥巴马医改法案 The ACA is 2,700 pages, and the subsidiary regulation is so convoluted that there is an active debate on the page count of its actual regulations. Justice Scalia invoked the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment as protection against actually reading it. 奥巴马医改法案长达2,700页,配套法规也相当复杂,以至于其到底有多少页还存在争议。斯卡利亚大法官援引第八修正案——不得施加残酷和非常惩罚——来保护自己不去读它。 The Heritage foundation counted 1,327 waivers. Clearly, someone needing a discretionary waiver shouldn’t be a big critic of HHS or the law. 美国传统基金会统计到了1,327份弃权声明。显然,有人需要自主弃权,这不应算是对卫生与公共服务部或者这项法案的严厉批评。 The cartelization of health insurance and health care under the ACA is almost a textbook case of corporatism. The big hospitals doctors, and insurers get a protected small cartel. In return for political support for the ACA, HHS, state exchanges, and so on. And, the ACA itself being an intensely partisan question, that support already leaks into major party politics. 奥巴马医改法案下健康保险和医疗卫生服务的卡特尔化是社团主义的教科书式案例。大医院、医生和保险公司获得了一个受保护的小卡特尔。作为回报,他们从政治上支持医改法案、卫生与公共服务部及州立医疗保险交易所等等。由于医改法案本身已经成为了一个很严重的党派问题,对法案的支持也卷入到了政党政治中。 Writing on the consolidation of health insurance into two or three big companies, the Wall Street Journal quotesAetna CEO Mark Bertolini that the federal regulators “happen to be, for most of us now, our largest customer,” adding 《华尔街日报》在关于健康保险公司整合为两到三家大公司的报道中,引用了安泰保险首席执行官马克·伯特利尼的话说,联邦监管机构“对我们大多数人而言,现在恰好是我们最大的客户”。他又补充道: “So there is a relationship you need to figure out there if you’re going to have a sustained positive relationship with your biggest customer. And we can all take our own political point of view of whether it’s right or wrong, but in the end-analysis, they’re paying us a lot of money and they have a right to give us some insight into how they think we should run our business.” “所以如果你想要和最大的客户有一个长久积极的关系,就需要认清这个关系。关于对错,我们都可以有自己的政治观点,但是最终来看,他们支付我们很大一笔钱,他们有权利给我们一些见解,告诉我们该如何经营。” The Journal opined that “such domestication is part of ObamaCare’s goal of political control,” echoing my fear. 《华尔街日报》评论道,“这种驯服是奥巴马医改法案政治控制意图的一部分”,这呼应了我的忧惧。 United Healthwanted to join the California exchange Covered California. Many areas of California have only one or two insurers now, so competition and choice are clearly needed. But participation in the exchange needs prior regulatory approval, and United Health was denied. Why? The LA Times wrote 联合健康保险想要加入加州健康保险交易所——医保加州。加州很多地方现在只有一两家保险公司,所以显然是很需要竞争和更多选择余地的。但是参加交易所需要事先得到审批,联合健康保险被否决了。为什么?《洛杉矶时报》写到: Peter Lee, executive director of Covered California, said established insurers shouldn't be free to come in right away. Those insurers, he said, should not be allowed to undercut rivals who stepped up at the start and made significant investments to sign up 1.2 million Californians during the first open enrollment. “彼得·李,医保加州的执行董事,表示老牌保险公司不应该立刻自由进入市场。他说那些保险公司不应该被允许以更低地成本与那些在第一次公开登记时就进场,并为签下120万加州人作出巨大投资的对手竞争。” and quoting Lee further, 李还说, We think the health plans that helped make California a national model should not be in essence undercut by plans that sat on the sidelines. “我们认为帮助加州成为全国模范的保险计划不应该被那些坐在一边看热闹的计划比下去。” You can’t ask for a clearer example of a regulator, using discretionary power to cartelize his industry, protect incumbent profits, and punish a business for failure to support political objectives. He said nothing about United Health’s ability to serve California customers, or to abide by any regulation. 没有什么是比这个更明显的监管者的例子了,利用自由裁量权将他管辖的行业卡特尔化,保护既得利益,惩罚没能支持其政治目标的公司。李一点没提联合健康保险服务加州消费者的能力或者其遵守了所有的法规。 Again in California, reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Daughters of Charity Health system wanted to sell six insolvent hospitals to Prime, which agreed to take on their debt and a $300 million pension liabilities. Under state law, Attorney General Kamala Harris must approve nonprofit hospital sales or acquisitions, with only a vague guideline that such transactions must be “in the public interest.” But only four of Prime’s 15 California hospitals are unionized, so the Service Employees International Union was against the merger. Ms. Harris torpedoed the merger, despite a positive report form her own staff. 还是在加州,据《华尔街日报》报道,仁爱女儿连锁医院想要将六所破产的医院卖给基本医疗。后者同意接受破产医院的债务和3亿美元的养老金负债。根据州法律,非营利医院的收购或出售须得到州检察长卡马拉·哈里斯批准,而指导其审批的只有一条模糊原则,就是这一交易必须“符合公共利益”。但是基本医疗在加州的15家医院只有4家参加了工会,所以服务业员工国际工会就起来反对这一并购。哈里斯女士阻止了这次并购,尽管她自己的手下出具了对并购持正面评价的报告。 Was the event a political cave to unions, as represented by the Journal? Perhaps; perhaps not. What matters here is that it certainly could be, as the Attorney General has enormous discretionary power to approve or disapprove hospital mergers. Hospitals are well advised to stay on her good side. 这一事件是不是如《华尔街日报》报道的那样,是对工会的政治屈服呢?也许是,也许不是。这里真正重要的是,完全有可能如此,因为检察长有很大的自由裁量权批准或否决医院并购。医院得到的建议是乖乖站在检察长一边。 FDA 食品药品监督管理局 Henry Miller at Hoover tells the sad tale of the Aquadvantage salmon, submitted for review in 1996 and still under review20: 胡佛研究所的亨利·米勒说了关于AquAdvantage转基因鲑鱼的悲伤故事,这一品种1996年提交评审,到现在还在评审: ...Consider what they [FDA] have inflicted on a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon, which differs from its wild cohorts only by reaching maturity about 40 percent faster, as the result of the addition to its genome of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon... “……想一想食品药品监督管理局(FDA)对这一转基因大西洋鲑鱼都做了什么。这种鲑鱼与其它野生同类唯一不同的是比它们快40%达到成熟期,因为它的基因组中添加了帝王鲑的生长荷尔蒙基因……” It took FDA more than a decade just to decide how they would regulate the AquAdvantage salmon. Characteristically, they decided on the most onerous pathway, regulating the new construct in genetically engineered animals as though it were a veterinary drug, similar to a flea medicine or pain reliever. After several years of deliberation, regulators concluded as early as 2012 that the AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon has no detectable differences and that it “is as safe as food from conventional Atlantic salmon.” ... FDA用了超过十年时间来决定要怎样监管这种鲑鱼。跟往常一样,他们决定通过最繁复的路径来监管转基因动物体内的新构造,就像把它当作兽药,类似跳蚤药或者镇痛药那样对待。经过数年的研究,监管者早在2012年就得出结论认为这种鲑鱼没有可探知的差异,它“和大西洋传统鲑鱼一样安全”。 When the FDA completed its Environmental Assessment in April 2012 and was ready to publish it—the last necessary hurdle before approving the salmon for marketing—the White House mysteriously intervened. The review process vanished from sight until December of that year, when the FDA was finally permitted to publish the EA (the unsurprising verdict: “no significant impact”), which should then have gone out for a brief period of public comment prior to approval. 就在2012年4月FDA完成环境评价准备公布结果时——这也是最后一道挡在鲑鱼上市前的障碍——白宫却神秘地干涉了进来。审批过程从公众视野中消失了。直到那年12月,FDA才最终被批准公布环境评价,结果并不出人意料——“没有显著影响”。这之后理应是短暂的公开征求意见阶段,然后就是正式批准。 The reason for the delay in the FDA’s publishing the needed Environmental Assessment was exposed by science writer Jon Entine. He related that the White House interference “came after discussions [in the spring of 2012] between Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ office and officials linked to Valerie Jarrett at the Executive Office [of the President], who were debating the political implications of approving the [genetically modified] salmon. Genetically modified plants and animals are controversial among the president’s political base, which was thought critical to his reelection efforts during a low point in the president’s popularity.” 科学作家乔恩•昂蒂纳揭露了FDA推迟公布环境评价的原因。他谈到,白宫的干涉“发生于2012年春天卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳·西贝利厄斯的部长办公室和总统办公室瓦莱丽·贾勒相关的官员进行的一场讨论之后。这些官员的辩论围绕着批准转基因鲑鱼的政治影响。在总统的政治大本营,转基因植物和动物是有争议的话题。这一话题被认为在总统的支持率处于低点的时候对总统的再次当选至关重要。” Needless to say, 20 years of delay makes a project pretty unprofitable. 不用说,20年的拖延让转基因鲑鱼项目变得几乎无利可图。 This is a good example, because the FDA regulations prescribe a precise science-based process for evaluating a food. There are time limits for rendering decisions, which the FDA ignores. But strong political forces don’t like GM foods, science be damned. 这是一个绝佳的例子,因为FDA的法规规定了评价食品的一套基于科学的精确程序。作出裁决是有时限的,但被FDA忽略了。当强大的政治力量不喜欢转基因食品时,科学就屁也不是了。 EPA 环境保护署 A clean environment is important. Pollution is a clear externality. We can also regard it as a Nash equilibrium. Each competitor in an industry is happy to pay the extra money to produce cleanly if all his or her competitors do so. 清洁环境很重要。污染显然是一个外部性。我们也可以把它看作一个纳什均衡。如果竞争对手也这么做,行业里的每一个竞争对手都愿意花额外的钱清洁地生产。 But the modern EPA violates just about every one of my suggested bullet points for preserving rule of law in the regulatory bureaucracy, and is ripe for political misuse. Discretion vs. rules, the potential for endless delay, the need for ex-ante permission, and a politicized and partisan bureaucracy are just the beginning. 但是现代的环境保护署违背了我为在监管型官僚机构下维护法治所提出的几乎每一条建议,政治滥用就在眼前。自由裁量权而非规则、无限拖延的可能、事前批准的要求、政治化和党派化的官僚机构,这些都还只是开始。 In the Pebble Mine controversy, EPA issued a preemptive veto of a project before a request for review was submitted, and was found colluding with mining opponents. Note, I’m not opining on whether the mine was a good or bad idea. Merely that the process in view is clearly one that could be misused for political purposes, and that mine owners already must know not to speak ill of the EPA or administration with such sway over the EPA. 在佩柏金矿争议中,环境保护署在项目审批申请递交前就发出了事先否决,并且被发现和开采的反对方相勾结。请注意,我并不是在就开矿是好是坏发表意见。我要说的仅仅是,这个程序明显可以因政治目的而遭到利用,而矿主一定已经知道不要说环境保护署以及可以对其施加影响的其他机构的坏话。 The Keystone pipeline stands as the example par excellence of regulatory delay and politicization. Perhaps next to the EPA’s decision to take on carbon as a pollutant. Keystone石油管线是监管拖延和政治化的绝佳例证。可能仅次于环境保护署决定将二氧化碳列为污染物。 Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project. 如今,任何因其他理由——比如遮住了视野——而反对一个项目的人,都可以利用环境评估来加以阻止。在任何商业项目中,拖延跟否决一样有效。 The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed “crucifying” some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying: 环境保护署第六区主管阿尔·阿曼达里兹的小故事很有启发性。他建议把一些大的石油公司“钉死在十字架上”,以儆效尤。录音显示,他说: The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years. “罗马人曾经征服地中海地区的小村庄。他们进入某个土耳其小镇,将最先看到的五个人钉死在十字架上。然后整个镇子在接下来的几年都会很好管理。 ...we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly. ……我们确实有一些很有效的执法工具。如此,顺服便唾手可得,而且程度很高,来得很快,非常快。 According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases. 故事里,阿曼达里兹关闭了Range Resources,首批水力压裂公司之一。Range予以了回击,最终一位联邦法官作出了有利于Range的判决。但是一个通过杀鸡儆猴、明显增加企业合规成本来运作的机构,当然易于根据政治考量而选择 “钉死”哪些儆猴之鸡。 Internet 网络 The Internet is the central disruptive technology of our time. So far it has been “permissionless” — unlike just about every other activity in the contemporary United States, you do not need prior approval of a regulator to put up a website. 网络是这个时代核心的颠覆性科技。截至目前,它还是“无需审批”的。不像当代美国的其他任何活动,你不需要事前审批就能上线一个网站。 Pressure grew under the reasonable-sounding banner of “net neutrality,” though what was at stake was the right of some businesses to pay extra for faster delivery. “Net neutrality” meant outlawing business class. The FCC, a supposedly independent agency, studied the issue and found no reason to regulate the internet. 但是,在听似合理的“网络中立性”旗帜下,压力与日俱增,虽然这里受到危及的是一些公司通过额外付费来获得更快传输的权利。“网络中立性”意味着宣布通过额外付费取得一定特权不合法。联邦通信委员会(FCC)——一个本该中立的机构,研究了这个议题,然后发现没有理由监管网络。 One fine day in November 2014, FCC commissioner Tom Wheeler must have found horse head in bed. Well, more specifically a surprise public announcement from President Obama that “blindsided officials at the FCC” per WSJ coverage. 2014年11月某个美好的日子,FCC主席汤姆·惠勒一定在床上发现了一个血淋淋的马头【译注:电影《教父》梗】,更准确地说是奥巴马总统惊人的公开言论。据《华尔街日报》报道,奥巴马提到了“FCC那些钻进死胡同的官员”。 The result is not just “net neutrality” but to apply full telecommunications regulation circa 1935. In particular, this includes Title II rate regulation, in which the FCC has full power to determine what rates are “reasonable.” 奥巴马的言论带来的结果不仅仅是“网络中立性”,而是FCC将动用其约于1935年获得的全面电信监管权力。尤其是,这其中包括有关费用管制的第二条款。据此,FCC可以全权决定什么样的费用是“合理”的。 The FCC announces it will “forbear” to use that power. Along with its right, under the regulation, to impose content restrictions — yes, to tell you what to put on your website — and the “fairness doctrine.” But forebearance is discretionary. So, a company thinking of investing money in fiber-optic lines had better invest in good relations with the FCC and the Administration that apparently drives its decisions. FCC宣布他们会“克制”使用该权力,以及在该监管下实施内容限制(是的,就是告诉你网站放什么内容)和“公平原则”的权力。但是克制也是有裁量的。所以,一家打算投资光纤电缆的公司最好多多投资于它和FCC以及能够影响其裁决的行政分支的关系。 The “independence” of regulatory agencies is one of the key structures impeding widespread use of regulatory power to induce political support. The WSJ coverage of the politics behind the decision describes well how specific businesses’ access to the White House drove the result. On the commission, the 3-2 vote with 2 republicans issuing withering dissents speaks of the partisan nature of this regulation. 监管机构的“独立”是阻止广泛使用监管权力争取政治支持的关键架构之一。《华尔街日报》关于裁决背后的政治勾当的报道,很好地描述了特定公司通往白宫的门道是如何推动结果的。通信委员会3:2的投票结果,以及2名共和党挖苦式地发表少数意见,正说明了这一监管的党派政治本质。 Alas, the internet is all moving to Washington. Uber hired, straight from the Administration, well known tech wizard, David Pflouffe. Given Uber’s troubles with labor law — a California court recently ruling that its contractors are employees — and taxi regulation throughout the U.S., investing in politics is good business for Uber. 可叹的是,网络公司都向华盛顿涌来。优步直接从政府雇佣了著名的科技巫师大卫·普罗夫。鉴于优步面临的劳动法方面的麻烦(一家加州法庭最近裁定它旗下的合约司机是正式雇员)和在全美出租车法规面前遭遇的麻烦,投资于政治对它来说是一笔好生意。 Campaign finance 竞选筹款 Campaign finance law and regulation is all about restricting freedom of speech and altering who wins elections. So one should not be surprised about its political use to restrict freedom of speech and alter who wins elections. 竞选筹款的法律法规就是关于限制言论自由和改变胜选人的。所以对于它被政治性的用来限制言论自由和改变胜选人也不应感到意外。 Still, the recent trend is more troubling than usual. 但尽管如此,最近的趋势仍比往常更加令人不安。 Lois Lerner, director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Unit, famously derailed applications for nonprofit status from conservative groups, ahead of the 2012 Presidential election. Her main tactic was endless delay. All you need is for the election to pass. 洛伊丝·勒纳,联邦税务局免税机构部主管,在2012年总统大选前阻挠保守派团体获得非盈利性资格的申请【编注:被认定为非盈利性机构意味着其所获得的捐赠可以让捐赠者享受相应的税务豁免,按机构性质不同,豁免的可能是应税收入,也可能是应缴税额。】,并因此出名。她的主要战术就是无限期拖延。她需要的只是等到大选过去。 Scott Walker’s troubles are similarly renown. Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm filed “John Doe” probes against conservative issue advocacy groups, “blanketed conservatives with subpoenas, raided their homes and put the targets under a gag order” that they could not even reveal the fact of the investigation. It came to light, and is now in the courts, but not until well after the election. Walker won anyway, but might not have. 斯科特·沃克的麻烦也差不多出名。密尔沃基地区检察官约翰·奇瑟姆发起了一项针对保守议题倡导组织的“无名氏”调查。“给保守派人士发法庭传票来妨碍他们,突然查抄他们的家,为目标人士申请禁口令”,使得他们甚至无法揭露这些调查存在的事实。整件事直到选举之后很久才曝光,目前正在庭审阶段。不管怎样,沃克最后还是赢了,但完全可能因此而输掉。 The Administration has been pushing since 2010 to force nonprofits to disclose all donors, as campaigns must disclose contributors. It sounds innocuous: “Disclosures?” Who can be against that? Shouldn’t “big money” contributing to politics be public information? 政府自2010年以来一直在推动强令非营利组织公开捐款人,就像竞选必须公开捐助人一样。这听起来很无害。“公开”?谁敢反对?难道捐助政治的“大钱”不应该成为公开信息吗? Not when the vast power of the regulatory state can come down on whomever it wants to. Tyrannies always start by making lists. Nixon at least had to compile his own enemies list. 当监管型国家的权力触角可以伸到它希望的任何人时,就不应该了。暴政都是从列名单开始的。尼克松至少还需要自己动手编列一份政敌名单。 Snowden 斯诺登 The Snowden affair taught us some important lessons about our government. The NSA collected phone call “metadata.” Well, it’s just who called who and not the content of phone calls (unless you call abroad), you may say. 斯诺登事件教给我们一些关于我们政府的重要教训。国家安全局收集电话“元数据”。你也许会说,只是谁打给谁,又不是电话的内容(除非打到国外)。 But even metadata is revealing. Suppose you called three cancer doctors, alcoholics anonymous, and two divorce lawyers. And you want to run for the senate. That kind of information is political dynamite. 但即使是元数据信息量也很大。假设你打给了三个癌症医生,匿名戒酒会和两个离婚律师。你还想要竞选参议员。这些信息在政治上就是爆炸性的。 The NSA has the content, not just metadata, of any emails that go abroad. The NSA likely has many Hilary Clinton’s missing emails. And Jeb Bushes’. Unless neither has ever written an email that rises to the embarrassment level of Mitt Romney’s 47% remark, the information to sink either campaign is likely sitting on NSA computers. 国安局掌握着发往国外的任何邮件的内容,不仅仅是元数据。国安局里很可能有很多希拉里·克林顿的失踪邮件。以及杰布·布什的。除非两人写过的邮件没有一封能达到罗姆尼47%言论【译注:罗姆尼2012年曾经在私下场合表示,有47%的选民无论如何都会选奥巴马,他们相信政府对他们有责任、有义务。罗姆尼表示自己不需要去担心这些人】的尴尬程度,否则击沉任意一个候选人的信息就在国安局的电脑里。 That information would never leak out, you say? Snowden proves the opposite. Any piece of information on a government computer is one Snowden, one Lois Lerner, or one Chinese hacker away from a twitter feed. 你说什么?信息永远不会泄露?斯诺登证明了信息会泄露。政府电脑里的任何信息离推特信息都只有一个斯诺登、一个洛伊丝·勒纳或者一个中国黑客的距离。 John Oliver’s Snowden interview contained an interesting revelation. The internet is an amazing thing. What do Americans do with it? They send around pictures of their private parts. And NSA employees regularly pass the pictures around to great hilarity. 约翰·奥利弗对斯诺登的采访披露了一个有意思的情节。网络是个奇妙的东西。美国人用它来干什么呢?他们到处发送自己私处的照片。而国安局职员经常传阅这些照片来取乐。 E-Verify 电子查证 As part of most immigration deals we are likely to see strong enforcement of the right of employees to work via e-verify. Every single human being who wishes to work in the United States must ask for the ex-ante permission the Federal Government. 作为绝大多数移民政策的一部分,我们可能会看到,借助电子查证,有关雇员工作权的法规得到了强有力实施。每个想在美国工作的人都必须征得联邦政府的事先准许。 Leave aside here the obvious question how the same government that runs the Obamacare website, and, as I write, has had all visa applications to the U.S. shut down for two weeks due to hardware failures, will manage this. Let’s focus on the political implications. 一个运营着奥巴马医改网站的政府,一个因为硬件故障关闭所有签证申请达两周的政府,如何能够管理电子查证?这里先别管这个明显的问题,我们把焦点集中到政治影响上吧。 This power will naturally expand. First, people without proper immigration documents. But once in place, why only enforce immigration laws? Already there are a long list of laws governing who can work and when and where. People must have the right licenses, the right background checks, union memberships and so on. Are you guilty in the latest SEC which hunt? E-verify can really make sure you never work in finance again, not so much as a bank teller. Or that a conviction for violating the endangered species act keeps you out of the work force. 这一权力会自然延伸。首先是没有正当移民文件的人。但是电子查证一旦到位,为什么只用来执行移民法呢?已经有一长串的法律管理着谁可以工作以及什么时候在哪儿工作。人们必须要有正确的执照、正确的背景审查、工会会员身份等等。在证券交易委员会最近的一次政治迫害中你有罪吗?电子查证可以确保你再也不能从事金融业,即使是银行柜员也不行。或者一项威胁濒危物种的行为的定罪,也可以把你隔离在劳动力市场之外。 Every tyranny controls its citizens by controlling their right to work. Do we really want every American who wants employment to have to ask for the ex-ante permission of the Federal Government of Edward Snowden and Lois Lerner? 任何暴政都通过控制公民的工作权来控制公民。我们真的希望每个想要工作的人都必需事先征得一个由爱德华·斯诺登和洛伊丝·勒纳组成的联邦政府的许可吗? Transactions 交易 We have lost the right to transact privately in the terror and drug wars. The right to political dissent requires the ability to speak freely and privately; the right to earn a living despite political opposition; and the right to transact in private. All three are vanishing. 我们已经在反恐和禁毒战争中失去了私下交易的权利。政治异见的权利要求人们能够自由和私密地表达的可能性,政治反对者仍能谋生的权利,以及私下交易的权利。这三种权利都在消失。 You may have reveled in the ending of Stephen King’s Shawshank Redemption, in which the hero takes cash out of banks and heads to Mexico. Under today’s banking laws, that could no longer happen. 你也许很喜欢史蒂夫·金的《肖申克的救赎》的结尾,男主角从银行取出钱,前往墨西哥。在今天的银行法律下,这一幕再也不会发生了。 As a recent political example, Dennis Hastert was recently indictedf or violating the spirit of the $10,000 limit on bank withdrawals, by withdrawing amounts just shy of the limit. Hastert wanted the money, apparently, to pay blackmail to someone with an embarrassing personal secret. 最近的一个政治例子是,丹尼斯·哈斯特尔特最近因违背银行取款不超过10,000美元的宗旨而受到起诉。他取出的额度恰好略低于限额。原来,哈斯特尔特需要钱去支付某人利用其尴尬的私人秘密所进行的勒索。 Hastert is retired. But should aspiring politicians really have no privacy in their personal transactions? 哈斯特尔特退休了。但是有抱负的政客在私人交易中就真的没有任何隐私吗? Education 教育 As Daniel Henninger put it: 正如丹尼尔·海宁格所说: ...historians of the new system will cite the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights’ 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter on sexual harassment as the watershed event. “新系统下的历史学家会将教育部民权办公室2011年关于性骚扰的致同僚信作为分水岭事件。” This letter—not even a formal regulation—forced creation of quasi-judicial systems of sexual-abuse surveillance on every campus in America. The universities complied for fear of lawsuits from enforcers at the Departments of Education and Justice. 这封信,甚至都不是一个正式的法规,但其强制建立了一个准司法体系,监视美国每一个校园的性侵害。大学都遵守这一要求,因为怕惹上教育部和司法部的官司。 The Justice Department’s Special Litigation Section and Housing and Civil Enforcement Section have forced numerous settlements from police departments, school districts, jails and housing agencies. Whatever the merits, the locals know the price of resisting Justice is too high. 司法部的特殊诉讼处及住房和民事执法处已经强制和解了好几起来自警察局、学区、监狱和住房机构的案件。不管是不是在法律上站得住脚,当地人知道抵抗司法部的成本太高。 National Review’s coverageof Laura Kipinis’ travails is a good example of the political use of this regulation. Professor Kipinis “wrote a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education arguing that college campuses are in a state of ‘sexual paranoia.’” She quickly became the subject of a “Title IX inquisition,” documented in her essayby that name. Though eventually cleared, the point is the use of regulatory power to silence speech. 《国家评论》对劳拉·吉普尼斯的痛苦经历的报道是这项监管被政治利用的一个好例子。吉普尼斯教授“在《高等教育纪事报》上写了一篇专栏,表示大学校园正处于一种‘性受迫害妄想狂’的状态”。她很快成为了“第九条调查”的对象,她在一篇文章里用的就是这个词。尽管最终洗清了嫌疑,重点是利用监管权力压制了言论。 3.A Magna Carta for the Regulatory State 3.为监管型国家寻求一部大宪章 The power of the regulatory state has increased steadily. And it lacks many of the checks and balances that give us some “rule of law” in the legal system. (A system which has its own troubles.) The clear danger we face is the use of regulation for political control. Each industry gets carved up into a few compliant oligopolies. And the threat of severe penalties, with little of the standard rule-of-law recourse, keeps people and businesses in line and supporting the political organization or party that controls the agencies. 监管型国家的权力已持续增长。它缺少了很多在法律体系(该体系也面临着自己的麻烦)里给我们带来一些“法治”的制衡。我们面对的最明显的危险,就是利用监管实现政治控制。每个行业都若干顺服的寡头所瓜分。严厉处罚的威胁,以及法治援助标准的缺失,让个人和公司对控制着监管机构的政治组织或政党既保持服从,又提供支持。 We’re not there yet. The Koch Brothers are not on the EPA “crucifixion” list, an investigation of every plant they own, or probes by the DOJ, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, and so on and so on. They could be. The Hoover institution retains its tax-exempt status despite writings such as this one. A free media still exists, and I can read all my horror stories in the morning Wall Street Journal, and the free (for now) internet. 我们还没到那一步。科赫兄弟公司还不在环境保护署的“钉死”名单上,他们旗下的工厂没有被逐一调查,也没有被司法部、国家劳动关系委员会、公平就业机会委员会、职业安全与健康管理局等等调查。但他们可能成为调查对象。胡佛研究所仍保有免税资格,尽管发表了类似于这篇文章的东西。自由媒体依然存在,每天早上我仍可在《华尔街日报》上读到各种恐怖故事。互联网(目前)也还是自由的。 But we are getting there. What stops it from happening? A tree ripe for picking will be picked. 但是我们正滑向那里。什么能够阻止它发生呢?一颗易于采摘的树最终会被采摘的。 The easy answers are too easy. “Get rid of regulations” is true, but simplistic like “get rid of laws.” What we learned in the 800 years since Magna Carta is that the character of law, and the detailed structures of its operation that matter. Law is good, as it protects citizens from arbitrary power. 简单的回答过于简单了。“取消监管”是真的,但和“取消法律”一样太过简化。大宪章以来的800年,我们学到的一样东西就是法律的特征以及它运作的详细架构很重要。法律是好的,因为它保护公民免于专断的权力。 It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one. 是时候为监管型国家起草一部大宪章了。规章需要按照我之前列的几点来制定。人们需要有挑战监管者的权利:证据开示权、对判决提出异议的权利、上诉权。是的,这就意味着制衡的场所在法庭。人人都恨律师,除了自己需要一个的时候。 People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor. 人们需要速决的权利。一个针对规章的“人身保护令”会起作用:如果任何裁决未在6个月内作出,则自动视为有利于你。 A return to economic growth depends on reforming the regulatory state. But the deeper and perhaps more important preservation of our political freedom depends on it even more. 经济的重新增长依赖于改革监管型国家,但从更深层或许也更重要的意义上说,我们政治自由的存续甚至更加依赖于这一改革。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

公共品、政府与私人机构

【2015-07-29】

@阿尔及利亚苏丹陈毓秀 请问,有木有消防以及公安部门市场化成功的例子?@whigzhou

@whigzhou: 美国很多啊,地方消防服务很多是市场化的,治安服务也是,另外早先许多司法服务也部分市场化,比如从私人从法院拿到逮捕令可以自己去抓人,企业从法院拿到授权也可以组织自己的治安队,近年来一些监狱也市场化了,实际上美国州以下的地方政府机构很大程度上有私人企业的性质,早期更明显。

@whigzhou: 美国地方政府的概念和中国的完全不同(more...)

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【2015-07-29】 @阿尔及利亚苏丹陈毓秀 请问,有木有消防以及公安部门市场化成功的例子?@whigzhou @whigzhou: 美国很多啊,地方消防服务很多是市场化的,治安服务也是,另外早先许多司法服务也部分市场化,比如从私人从法院拿到逮捕令可以自己去抓人,企业从法院拿到授权也可以组织自己的治安队,近年来一些监狱也市场化了,实际上美国州以下的地方政府机构很大程度上有私人企业的性质,早期更明显。 @whigzhou: 美国地方政府的概念和中国的完全不同,很不像“政府”,每个机构因事而设,互不隶属/统辖,且服务范围交错重叠,财政来源也五花八门,相比中国地方政府,更像私人机构,系统性的介绍可参考Ostrom夫妇写的《美国地方政府》 @暂时只看书不旅行了-zny: 那趋势呢?是越来越像“政府”了,还是相反? @whigzhou: 据Ostrom介绍(见第三章第三节),二战后的大趋势是越来越像官僚政府,造成这一变化的主要力量是联邦资助和福利项目 @whigzhou: Edward Peter Stringham新书Private Governance,po主可能有兴趣  
周史札记#16:县之起源

1)县本意为“悬”,这点没有异议;

2)将该词义置于封建制背景中,就很好理解:县起初就是“悬于君权而待封之地”,即被临时置于君权管辖之下,可资未来分封的土地;

3)同为君权所控制的土地,县不同于君主之私人采邑,后者已纳入王室之私人财政系统,用于供养王家,而前者被置于国家行政系统,用于行政目的;

4)此类土地的来源,不外乎:新征服而尚未分封的土地,从绝嗣或因重罪而被灭宗的附庸那里收回的封地,攻灭他国(比如楚灭陈)所获领地,从他国夺取的城邑;

5)春秋中期以降,诸侯间战争蜂起,(more...)

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1)县本意为“悬”,这点没有异议; 2)将该词义置于封建制背景中,就很好理解:县起初就是“悬于君权而待封之地”,即被临时置于君权管辖之下,可资未来分封的土地; 3)同为君权所控制的土地,县不同于君主之私人采邑,后者已纳入王室之私人财政系统,用于供养王家,而前者被置于国家行政系统,用于行政目的; 4)此类土地的来源,不外乎:新征服而尚未分封的土地,从绝嗣或因重罪而被灭宗的附庸那里收回的封地,攻灭他国(比如楚灭陈)所获领地,从他国夺取的城邑; 5)春秋中期以降,诸侯间战争蜂起,同时诸侯向周边旷野和土著区扩张,县之来源剧增; 6)诸侯为扩张君权,倾向于将县长期留置于君权之手,导致县的数量增长; 7)留于君手的县,被用作配合君权施政和作战的激励工具,奖赏给卿大夫作为其临时采邑; 8)作为临时采邑转交给卿大夫的县,期限随君主意志、君权与卿权对比而异,或随时收回,或一世而止,或世袭几代,但在未经正式分封之前,君主至少在名义上通常也在实际上保留着收回与转交之权利; 9)那些在扩张君权上最为成功的诸侯,最终将县变成了由凭君主意志任免的官僚管理的君主直辖行政单元。  
周史札记#13:为何外官总是被内官取代

帝国的政制史有个一贯倾向,外官不断被内官取代,几代之后,原先的内官逐渐变成外官,然后又被新的内官取代:宰相取代三公,尚书令取代宰相,中书令(原为内史令)取代尚书令,平章事/侍中取代中书令,然后中书令和平章事们又变成宰相,接着被内阁大学士取代,康熙时大学士又被上书房行走取代,最后又被军机处取代。

地方官也存在类似倾向,常任地方官总是被中央派出的巡察官取代,久而久之,巡察官又变成了新的常任官:太守被刺史取代,刺史被节度使取代,节度使被知州取代,知州又被行中书省取代,行中书省先是改成布政司,然后被巡抚取代。

这些取代外官的内官,最初都是皇帝管家、秘书、仆从性质的近侍亲信,级别很低,起初只是一种伸张帝权的临时安排,是皇帝执行其意志的工具,长期化之后就(more...)

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帝国的政制史有个一贯倾向,外官不断被内官取代,几代之后,原先的内官逐渐变成外官,然后又被新的内官取代:宰相取代三公,尚书令取代宰相,中书令(原为内史令)取代尚书令,平章事/侍中取代中书令,然后中书令和平章事们又变成宰相,接着被内阁大学士取代,康熙时大学士又被上书房行走取代,最后又被军机处取代。 地方官也存在类似倾向,常任地方官总是被中央派出的巡察官取代,久而久之,巡察官又变成了新的常任官:太守被刺史取代,刺史被节度使取代,节度使被知州取代,知州又被行中书省取代,行中书省先是改成布政司,然后被巡抚取代。 这些取代外官的内官,最初都是皇帝管家、秘书、仆从性质的近侍亲信,级别很低,起初只是一种伸张帝权的临时安排,是皇帝执行其意志的工具,长期化之后就变成了新职位。 这是帝权专制不断强化的表现,这大概没有疑问,问题是,为何皇帝不直接通过任免外官来推行其政策、实现其意志?好像没什么东西妨碍他这么做。 这个问题,从上一篇对代际更替与制度化关系的分析中可以找到答案:启用内官而不是直接任免外官,是皇帝实现个人意志与保持制度连续性之间达成的平衡。 因为外官在存在多年、经历几次代际更替之后,已经制度化,有了一套自己的工作模式、专业技能和职业伦理,若要让它继续正常运行,就不能随意打破这些规范。 这样,皇帝在推行自己意志时,就会受各种羁绊,而皇帝自己通常不是其中专家,不清楚其中运行机制,也就很难将其引向自己希望的方向,就像Yes Minister里那位新任部长,陷入官僚机器的重重迷雾之中,处处陷阱,不天天踩屎就不错了,根本无力驾驭它。 所以,假如皇帝通过任免外官推行自己政策,要么陷进坑里出不来,要么只能强力打破官僚机器,但那样后果可能太严重,稳妥的办法是,让官僚机器继续运行,不过度捣腾,小心碰坏,同时启用内官,另起一套炉灶,而如何使用这些内官,用他们能做些什么,则是皇帝得心应手的事情,因为这些人本来就天天在他身边听他使唤。  
[饭文]允许飞机上打电话会是场噩梦吗?

允许飞机上打电话会是场噩梦吗?
辉格
2014年1月22日

去年12月,美国联邦通讯委员会(FCC)就一份拟议中允许乘客在商业航班上使用手机的提案征询公众意见,很快收到了四百多份意见函,几乎异口同声的对提议表达了反对意见,然而有意思的是,这些反对者所提出的理由,绝大多数是嫌打电话的声音太吵,而不是担心手机会影响飞行安全。

有关飞机上使用通信设备是否存在安全隐患的争议,从手机诞生之日起就一直在持续,相关研究也做了很多,不过,我在这里想关注的倒是另一些细节,这些细节或许可以让我们从一个侧面看清管制当局是如何行事的,而公众对管制政策的(more...)

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允许飞机上打电话会是场噩梦吗? 辉格 2014年1月22日 去年12月,美国联邦通讯委员会(FCC)就一份拟议中允许乘客在商业航班上使用手机的提案征询公众意见,很快收到了四百多份意见函,几乎异口同声的对提议表达了反对意见,然而有意思的是,这些反对者所提出的理由,绝大多数是嫌打电话的声音太吵,而不是担心手机会影响飞行安全。 有关飞机上使用通信设备是否存在安全隐患的争议,从手机诞生之日起就一直在持续,相关研究也做了很多,不过,我在这里想关注的倒是另一些细节,这些细节或许可以让我们从一个侧面看清管制当局是如何行事的,而公众对管制政策的态度又是如何形成的。 首先,和通常认为的不一样,FCC禁止乘客在飞机上使用手机的正式理由并不是安全隐患,而是担心高空飞行中的手机会扰乱地面基站的工作,所以该禁令也适用于气球,尽管气球上未必有什么可以被干扰的电子设备;实际上,FCC大概也只能使用这样的理由,因为航空安全毕竟不归它管。 可是,真正管航空安全的联邦航空管理局(FAA)从未禁止在飞机上使用任何电子设备,只是说航空公司要确保这些设备不会干扰飞机的导航与通讯系统;这样问题就来了:既然禁用手机不是出于安全考虑,而且即便有这样的考虑也不是FCC颁布禁令的理由,那么FCC何必要为解除禁令而征询乘客意见?从乘客那里听到什么才会让它撤回解除禁令的提案? 显然不是乘客对电话喧闹的担忧和抱怨,因为帮助乘客避免喧闹无疑不是FCC的职责,也不是任何管制部门禁止飞机上用手机的理由;看起来更合理的解释是:FCC当初下达禁令确实是出于安全担忧,以干扰基站为借口只是在掩饰其越权管辖的事实,而二十多年来的大量研究并未找到安全隐患的证据,FCC也觉得维持禁令已没有必要,但它又不想为自己必须做的决策——无论是维持还是解除禁令——承担政治责任,于是就用征询公众意见的方式推卸责任。 再看公众方面,那些给FCC写信的人,恐怕不至于认为,FCC当初下达禁令是为了防止飞机上的喧闹,可是他们却仍然异口同声的以此为由要求FCC维持禁令,假如这些人具有代表性,那就意味着:人们会仅仅因为某项政策看起来符合他们的偏好而支持它,而不管该政策是否合理或正当。 而且,正如我们在其他政策议题中所见到的,他们在这么做时,常常会混淆几个十分不同的问题:某种行为是否讨厌?是否需要加以限制?这种限制是否有必要以政府禁令的方式实行?这样的禁令在道德上是否正当?当这些问题以恰当的方式提出时,人们的反应会更讲道理一些,但政策鼓吹者们却往往故意将它们混淆以便夹带私货。 长途旅行中,周围充斥电话噪音,或许是件讨厌的事情,但限制打电话也会带来许多不便,甚至耽误一些紧急要事,两相权衡,究竟该不该限制,并非那么一目了然,比如同样是长途旅行的火车和大巴上,好像就没多少人主张要限制打电话。 即便一项行为需要加以限制,也未必要诉诸禁令和法规,实际上,许多像图书馆、电影院、高级餐厅这样需要安静的场所,依靠习俗、羞愧感和众人的鄙视目光,或许再加上一些文字提示,通常都可以将喧闹控制在人们可以接受的水平。 即便习俗和道德未能有效的限制这种讨厌行为,而必须明文规定,这种规定也未必需要政府和司法机构来制订,而完全可以由场所的主人制订,而飞机恰恰有着的明确主人:航空公司,假如多数乘客果真希望在飞机上打电话的行为受到限制,那就可以相信,至少会有一部分航空公司会努力满足这种普遍需求,并以自己有能力确保旅途安静为卖点招揽乘客,如此一来,该不该限制打电话,便是一个可以由消费者用钞票投票解决的问题。 公众对特定现象的厌恶,总是被利用来为种种管制禁令提供所谓“民意基础”,殊不知,每条禁令都在剥夺着他们的自由,而原本,通过服务商与消费者双方的自愿选择,他们完全可以在保有自由的同时,避免或至少躲开他们所讨厌的东西。
[饭文]从底特律看城市治理

从底特律看城市治理
辉格
2013年8月6日

底特律市政府宣布破产(这是美国历史上最大规模的地方政府破产案)的消息,又引来世人对这个城市日渐衰败的命运的关注,这一命运似乎在半个世纪前那场暴乱中便早已注定,破产案只是其持续衰弱过程中的又一个里程碑。

城市的生死兴衰并不少见,有些是国家强行实施的低效率开发建设的结果,比如苏联解体后西伯利亚许多城市变成废墟,这是对资源无效配置的纠正,更多的则是因为地理经济学上的变化,比如河流改道、矿产枯竭、产业变迁等等,导致一些城市丧失原有地理或资源优势。

然而,底特律的衰败却是另一种完全不同的情况,它完美例证了一(more...)

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4654
从底特律看城市治理 辉格 2013年8月6日 底特律市政府宣布破产(这是美国历史上最大规模的地方政府破产案)的消息,又引来世人对这个城市日渐衰败的命运的关注,这一命运似乎在半个世纪前那场暴乱中便早已注定,破产案只是其持续衰弱过程中的又一个里程碑。 城市的生死兴衰并不少见,有些是国家强行实施的低效率开发建设的结果,比如苏联解体后西伯利亚许多城市变成废墟,这是对资源无效配置的纠正,更多的则是因为地理经济学上的变化,比如河流改道、矿产枯竭、产业变迁等等,导致一些城市丧失原有地理或资源优势。 然而,底特律的衰败却是另一种完全不同的情况,它完美例证了一种城市治理的失败;总有些人将底特律的命运归咎于美国汽车制造业的变迁,但实际上美国整个制造业都在变迁,也有许多城市曾高度依赖制造业,但没有一个大城市曾经历底特律式的完败:160万白人逃离,人口流失60%,失业率、贫困率和犯罪率等负面指标皆居美国大城市首位,大批地产价值降至零。 这一案例或许可以对我们观察城市制度有所启发;从长期看(不需要很长),一个城市无论对于居民、企业还是游客的吸引力,都将影响土地价值;而因为地方政府不像国家,没有一条国境线可以阻止人口和资本流动,因而这种关系更为紧密,其制度和政策的好坏,都将直接体现在地价上。 这样,一个城市的各种居民中,土地主的利益是与城市长期发展前景最为一致的,因为他们拥有的,是所有生产要素中唯一无法移动的,因而其利益被迫与城市命运绑在了一起;所以理想情况下,城市的制度安排和政策制定,应由这些人主导,因为所有其他人都比他们更可能拥有与城市发展冲突的利益,也更可能持机会主义态度。 但现实政治中选票是按人头分配的,因而选出的政府未必能将城市长期前景放在很高的优先级上考虑,而这种利益不一致的程度,将高度相关于在该城市拥有不动产的人在选民中所占的比例,假如这一比例低到微不足道,不足以形成政治上的制衡力量,那么选出的政府很可能不惜牺牲土地价值而为特殊利益群体谋求短期利益。 不难看出,大城市比小城市更容易出现这种情况,因为大城市人口流动性更高,中心城区的居住密度也更高,同时也能吸引更多尚没有能力买房的年轻人和新移民,因而有更多的人租住公寓而不是购买房产,这样房产主在选民中的比例就可能很低,相比之下,一个小城市的选民可能大部分都是房产主。 在大城市,即便房产主之间也会因人数多且分散,而面临搭便车和组织障碍的问题,因而难以形成有效的政治力量;一旦他们丧失政策影响力,城市当局就会推出各种压榨其利益而取悦其他选民的政策,诸如房租管制,禁止驱逐房客,征收日益沉重的房产税去补贴各种福利开支,还有对土地用途的种种管制,等等。 其中福利政策影响尤为深远,因为它为被补贴者提供了一个留在这个城市的额外理由,而假如没有这个理由,他们原本会因为在这里缺乏经济机会或生活成本过高而搬到更适合他们的地方,现在福利补贴吸引和帮助他们留了下来,并且手握选票。 通常情况下,用脚投票多少会对上述过程有所制约,如果政府做得太过分,不堪重压的中产阶级就大批搬往郊区和小城市,税基削弱,财政出麻烦,于是政策会有所收敛;但在底特律,上述过程以非常极端的方式发生,67年的暴乱在短时间内吓走了大批房产主,而且这个阶层的流失此后几十年一直在持续。 留下和新来的人口中,越来越大的比例,是那些不拥有当地不动产、多半靠福利生活的人,他们没有理由关心城市发展前途,他们在城市经济系统中的作用不是生产性的,而是寄生性的,但同时,由于他们在选民中占了多数且比例不断提高,因而长期主导了城市政治。 这种寄生性在它的最终破产结局中可以看得很清楚:其无力偿还的债务中,大部分是公务员的养老和医保开支,实际上,公务员的薪酬和福利开支此前已经占到市政收入的76%,而同时,虽然底特律拥有美国大城市中最高的财产税率,但将近一半的房产主已拒绝为他们的房产缴纳财产税。  
[微言]盐为何被专卖

【2013-02-28】

@楠哥哥过日子 求问学习贸易或者经济的同学,有一个很普通的问题,我却不太明白的是,为何国家要进行盐专卖呢,为何国家要垄断盐呢,甚至从古至今毫无断绝。

@Lil_Lian_卖萌迪:@whigzhou 请问下辉总 你怎么看

@whigzhou: 这种产地局限而易控制、消费量大、弹性低的产品,容易被政府选为渔利之源,以间接税或专卖的方式,类似的还有矿产品和茶叶

@whigzhou: 烟草本来只符合后(more...)

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4887
【2013-02-28】 @楠哥哥过日子 求问学习贸易或者经济的同学,有一个很普通的问题,我却不太明白的是,为何国家要进行盐专卖呢,为何国家要垄断盐呢,甚至从古至今毫无断绝。 @Lil_Lian_卖萌迪:@whigzhou 请问下辉总 你怎么看 @whigzhou: 这种产地局限而易控制、消费量大、弹性低的产品,容易被政府选为渔利之源,以间接税或专卖的方式,类似的还有矿产品和茶叶 @whigzhou: 烟草本来只符合后两个条件,但卷烟这种形式让它也满足了第一个条件,与烟丝和雪茄相比,卷烟的经济规模大的多,因而厂商少,容易控制,结果也沦为专卖品  
[饭文]反腐败需要根本性制度变革

反腐败需要根本性制度变革
辉格
2013年1月25日

二十多年来,反腐败早已成了大小官员的口头禅,党政体系也横七竖八叠床架屋的设立了一个又一个反腐机构,但腐败却从未因此而减少,反而愈演愈烈,无孔不入;其实这样的结果当在意料之中,当前的腐败是系统性的,有着广泛而坚实的制度基础,不改变这一基础,而仅仅针对腐败行为和个人,如扬汤止沸,自然不可得。

对腐败的制度基础,已有无数评论从各个侧面作出分析,较浅显的,是权力缺乏外部监督,实际上所有反腐政策,都是在同一个权力集团和利益共同体内,赋予一部分成员以新的权力,去监督约束另一部分成员,结果只是改变了腐败机会的分配而已,况且该集体所有成员都是腐败体制的受益者,(more...)

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4460
反腐败需要根本性制度变革 辉格 2013年1月25日 二十多年来,反腐败早已成了大小官员的口头禅,党政体系也横七竖八叠床架屋的设立了一个又一个反腐机构,但腐败却从未因此而减少,反而愈演愈烈,无孔不入;其实这样的结果当在意料之中,当前的腐败是系统性的,有着广泛而坚实的制度基础,不改变这一基础,而仅仅针对腐败行为和个人,如扬汤止沸,自然不可得。 对腐败的制度基础,已有无数评论从各个侧面作出分析,较浅显的,是权力缺乏外部监督,实际上所有反腐政策,都是在同一个权力集团和利益共同体内,赋予一部分成员以新的权力,去监督约束另一部分成员,结果只是改变了腐败机会的分配而已,况且该集体所有成员都是腐败体制的受益者,如何能指望从制度上消除腐败根源。 基于此认识,有了舆论监督的呼声,舆论监督确实挖出了许多腐败,互联网更壮大了其声势,但和政府机构反腐一样,舆论虽拉倒了无数贪官,却没有减少腐败,因为它丝毫没有削弱体制创造腐败的能力,充其量只是让贪腐行为变得更谨慎、更隐秘、更迂回巧妙,只是在帮助贪官改进技术水平。 深一层的观察,认识到腐败是政府权力泛滥的结果,通过控制大量关键资源,掌握大规模开发项目和大型工程,支配大量财富的再分配,对市场活动、企业经营和个人生活设立种种管制壁垒,让权力罗网深入了社会生活的每个毛孔,从而赋予了决策和执行者大量寻租机会。 一些较为乐观的评论者曾指出,在权力对资源的掌控和管制壁垒既已存在的前提下,有腐败比没腐败好,从单一事件看,确实如此,贪官拿了钱至少让市场交易得以发生,让企业继续经营下去,只是被额外抽了一笔租金,而铁面无私照章办事的官员若严格执行管制法规,则完全关闭了市场大门。 但这一观察忽略了腐败的长期激励效果:寻租甜头被屡屡品尝之后,会激励官员设立更多壁垒,想尽办法制订种种束缚企业和公民手脚的规章条例,况且,在扒粪记者和舆论监督的鼓吹推动之下,在西方国家管制先例的示范之下,他们在这么做时,从来不缺少冠冕堂皇的理由。 也就是说,腐败作为市场润滑剂,只是在短期起润滑作用,在长期却创造了越来越多的摩擦阻力;而且这种润滑剂极为昂贵,昂贵首先是因为垄断,需要疏通的衙门往往是独此一家别无分店,特别是对业务限于本地的中小企业,根本没有绕开的可能。 其次是因为寻租交易的地下性质,使承诺缺乏约束力,任何承诺都是临时的、个人的和双边的,这自然会导致高度机会主义倾向,模糊的个人承诺随时可能反悔,假如缺乏反制手段,便可能面临无限制敲诈,每任新官都要重新买通,来自上面的每项新政策,也都可以成为重新索价的理由。 地下性质的另一个后果是高昂的交易费用,在没有公开市场的情况下,仅仅搭上线就要付出很高代价,要完成议价,要找到确保安全的机制,更是难上加难,大量费用被花在中间人、相互试探摸底、迂回伪装掩饰和风险控制上面。 而且这一过程往往非常肮脏和卑劣,充满了屈辱感、卑污感和罪恶感,给当事者带来沉重的人格和道德代价,为诚实正直自尊者所不齿,这就造成了一个逆向淘汰的局面,败坏了社会习俗和道德规范,使得有利于市场发展的价值和伦理体系久久难以出现。 权力泛滥创造了腐败温床,因而正如许多观察者所指出的,解决之道在于如何“将权力关进笼子”,这意味着需要某种制衡结构和宪法机制,制度化的阻止权力进入它不该进入的私人领域,当它错误的进入时,需要有一种常规机制来加以矫正,然而,在现有体制下,很难指望出现这样的变化。 实际上,导致腐败的这套资源控制和行为管制系统,同时也是一套内部组织和激励系统,它构成了当前体制赖以存在的核心;由于缺乏现代职业文官阶层所发展出的专业伦理和价值体系的支撑,体制维持官员的忠诚、凝聚力和组织效力所依靠的,主要是物质利益和传统的恩荫效忠模式。 考虑到正统价值体系的过时、政体合法性上的缺陷、官场的腐化堕落,如今做官大概不会给人带来多少荣誉和成就感,特别是开放以后成长起来的新生代,在人格、声誉、价值观方面,做官的收益恐怕都是负的,那么,让他们仍大批涌往公务员考场的动力,就只剩下物质利益了。 关键是,这些利益不能按正式公开透明的规则来分发,那就起不到组织工具的作用了,而必须分山头派系,按资历、势力和荫庇关系来分配,才能在权力阶梯的上下级之间建立个人荫庇和效忠关系,恩主为确保手下兄弟的效忠,必须保留随时收回的机会,而为了确保这种予取予夺的能力,必须让利益处于灰色状态,抓住你的污点把柄。 同时,为在同僚竞争中自我保护,也必须相互有把柄可抓,而相互抓把柄的努力,最终发展成了这样一条让各方满意的规范:确保每个人身上都不干净;只有断绝了金盆洗手退出赛场的后路,才能约束成员遵守组织内的游戏规则,防止他们背叛组织;这样一个通过无数利益纽带,将数千万人卷入其中、无法逃脱的体系,靠局部的小修小补,是难以改变的。  
[微言]债务与法治

【2012-12-31】

@高利明 [地方政府债务放大的可能后果]法治与债权是一枚硬币的两面。地方因债权而引入法治、因债权的滚转放大、法治随之加强,随之中央与地方的关系发生调整。“发债是地方法治之路,也是中国法治发育之路。”http://t.cn/zjQZQcd 附一下陈总@陈如是说 的骥尾 @傅蔚冈 @学经济家 @whigzhou

@whigzhou: 一厢情愿。并没有这样的确切关系,历史上相反的情况多得是,欠犹太人一屁股债再把他们杀掉或驱逐,(more...)

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4815
【2012-12-31】 @高利明 [地方政府债务放大的可能后果]法治与债权是一枚硬币的两面。地方因债权而引入法治、因债权的滚转放大、法治随之加强,随之中央与地方的关系发生调整。“发债是地方法治之路,也是中国法治发育之路。”http://t.cn/zjQZQcd 附一下陈总@陈如是说 的骥尾 @傅蔚冈 @学经济家 @whigzhou @whigzhou: 一厢情愿。并没有这样的确切关系,历史上相反的情况多得是,欠犹太人一屁股债再把他们杀掉或驱逐,类似的事情发生过很多次,欧洲大小君主破产赖债的也不在少数,只有抢不动的时候(也就是权力已经受到某些制约时),债权才能对政府的具体行为构成进一步制约 @whigzhou: 你连公然没收都无力抵制的时候,赖点债算个屁 @whigzhou: 另外,高总此文的立论过度建立在“地方竞争”的理论基础上,这假定了地方政府是个连贯一致的利益主体,实际上该假定仅在很弱的意义上才成立,而且现在比过去更弱了,这与邓后的官员激励机制变化有关,我最近一篇文章中对此作了说明,过几天会贴出  
[饭文]让免费午餐回归慈善事业

让免费午餐回归慈善事业
辉格
2012年11月29日

免费午餐项目从最初广受赞扬到如今四面楚歌的转变,生动的演示了,政府的不恰当介入,会如何毁掉一项善良美好的事业;向贫困地区的小学生提供免费午餐,原本是一个很好的慈善创意,它不仅可以让受助的孩子吃饱肚子,还能吸引他们留在学校,而不至于沦为流浪儿童。

最近毕节惨案也恰好提醒我们,在极度贫困的地区,由于父母普遍外出打工,这样的流浪是很可能发生的,那五个孩子若每天能在学校吃到一顿饱饭热饭,很可能就不会逃学离家出走了;流浪不仅给儿童本身带来痛苦和危险,也是在培养未来的反社会(more...)

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4247
让免费午餐回归慈善事业 辉格 2012年11月29日 免费午餐项目从最初广受赞扬到如今四面楚歌的转变,生动的演示了,政府的不恰当介入,会如何毁掉一项善良美好的事业;向贫困地区的小学生提供免费午餐,原本是一个很好的慈善创意,它不仅可以让受助的孩子吃饱肚子,还能吸引他们留在学校,而不至于沦为流浪儿童。 最近毕节惨案也恰好提醒我们,在极度贫困的地区,由于父母普遍外出打工,这样的流浪是很可能发生的,那五个孩子若每天能在学校吃到一顿饱饭热饭,很可能就不会逃学离家出走了;流浪不仅给儿童本身带来痛苦和危险,也是在培养未来的反社会者和犯罪者,所以果若有慈善组织能实现这一想法,那将是功德无量的。 但这事不能让政府来做,因为政府不是慈善组织,不具备适合于慈善事业的制度基础、组织条件和激励结构,更不具备从事慈善活动的伦理资格,因为它所拥有的钱和其它资源都不是自愿捐献的,而是凭借国家暴力向纳税人征收得来的,因而政府的介入让自愿捐助变成了强制再分配,丧失了慈善的根本特性,也剥夺了捐助者和受助者本可从中获得的价值满足和道德慰籍。 从效率上看,政府也完全不适合承担这项任务,向上千万贫困学生提供午餐是一项极为庞大复杂而且充满了风险的活动,涉及到饮食习惯、民族和宗教习俗、贫困程度和营养缺乏特征、供应条件、食品安全隐患等等,而所有这些因素在每个地区都大为不同,民间慈善组织会派出大量志愿者现场考察,听取受助者的需求,并在自己的预算约束内选择最适合的方案,事后他们还要向捐款人报告资助效果。 但由中央政府统一拨款经由国有教育行政体系分配落实的方式就完全不同了,缺乏一个现场体验、需求表达和方案对比权衡的过程,也很难顾及上述种种差异,只能用一些武断草率的简单做法;这个组织体系是为其他职能而设计的,无论组织和成员个人都没有理由拥有慈善动机,只是被赋予了一个额外任务,而对其执行结果的唯一约束标准就是有没有把上面拨下来的钱花了出去,并且有合格的供货合同和报销凭证。 如此得到的结果就难免是物非所值并埋下安全隐患,据报道,凤凰县的学生午餐供货合同上除了价格居然没有对食品规格和份量的任何描述,这看起来很荒唐,但仔细想想,假如教育局真要仔细规定午餐的规格和份量,他有什么标准可以依据?他有能力对各相关因素做出充分考虑吗?能够为其中隐藏的风险而承担责任吗? 当然,设计一份恰当的学生午餐,并找到可靠的供应商,对慈善组织也很不容易,但好在民间慈善组织有很多,其活动是分散和多样化的,假如制度和政策足够开放,慈善产业也将是一个高度竞争性的市场,各组织会探索尝试不同的方案,其成效会得到公众和媒体的评价,效果卓著者会得到更多资助,会被其他组织仿效,和其他产业一样,市场机制将成为大范围搜索和筛选最优方案的途径。 比起公务员考试,慈善事业的志愿性质显然更可能筛选出那些拥有慈善动机的人,而且长期从事慈善活动的志愿者群体会形成自己的职业伦理和专业价值观,交流和积累专业经验,这些宝贵资源是那些被动的接受了一项额外任务的行政机构所不可能拥有的。 160亿拨款听上去是个大数字,但和潜在的私人捐助意愿相比并不算大,实际上,有许多随时愿意捐出上亿善款的国内外亿万富豪,正在为找不到合适的项目而发愁,而多数情况下,找不到是因为制度和政策的限制,特别是对私人开办学校和医院的限制,在现行体制下,他们只有掏钱的份,而没有机会按自己的意愿设计和管理慈善项目,自行选择执行者并评估其成效,这当然会抑制他们的慈善热情,也让数百万贫困儿童继续陷于凄惨无助的境地。