超越邓巴数#5：青春的躁动 辉格 2015年10月7日 当多个群体联合成为更大社会时，总是面临这样一个组织问题：如何将维持秩序和协调集体行动的权力集团的规模限制得足够小，以确保其紧密合作；在前面的文章里，我已介绍了几种方法：1）强化父权和宗族，以将权力限制在长辈手里，2）赋予长支与幼支以不平等地位，从而将权力集中在长支手里，3）通过婚姻关系的内聚化，形成上层姻亲联盟，并垄断权力。 后两种方法都意味着地位分化，然而，只有当权势能够跨代积累时，个体和支系间的权势差异才能固化成阶层，进而形成稳定牢固的权力集团；可继承的财产权恰好创造了这样的条件，但是，不同类型的财产权有着不同的积累特性，而后者限定了地位分化的可能性，从而将社会大型化引向不同方向。 早期农民的主要财产是土地和牲畜，在旧大陆的多数农业社会，种植和畜牧都以某种比例混合搭配；在跨代传承过程中，土地数量要恒定的多（尽管也会因土壤退化或河流改道等原因而变动），牲畜数量则波动很大，而且出于生产组织的考虑，人们在处置土地产权时，有着普遍的抗分割倾向，即便不得不分也会尽可能推迟，而畜群则很容易分割，事实上也总是一有机会就分割。 例如，蒙古游牧者的多妻家庭，每位妻子和她的孩子们拥有单独的帐幕和自己的畜群，构成独立家户，而约鲁巴宗族社区（规模常达数百人）的土地归宗族集体所有，核心家庭只拥有使用权，成员去世后就被收回重新分配，马里多贡人（[[Dogon]]）的多妻家庭则处于中间状态：土地由家庭集体所有，并由长妻带领诸妻共同耕种，而牲畜则由每位妻子分别拥有，类似情况在非洲农牧混业社会十分常见。 土地和牲畜的差异也体现在分割时机上，畜牧者往往在男孩成年时便分给他几头牲口，作为其建立自己畜群的启动资本，到他结婚时，再分走一群牲畜（否则就无法成家），所以，以畜牧为主业者，家产分割继承是随每个继承人结婚而逐次进行的，最后父母保留的那一份由幼子继承，相比之下，以种植为主业者，通常要等到大家长去世之后，或宗族裂变之际，才一次性分家，在采用长子继承制的社会，甚至在分家时，也只分牲畜（和其他动产）而不分土地。 由于畜产的固有分割倾向，很难跨代积累，每一代的财富差异很快被子女数量所抹平，这样，以牲畜为主要资产的社会就难以形成稳定的阶层分化，因而无法通过上述后两条途径实现大型化，结果，要么停留在碎片化状态（就像中亚游牧民在多数时候那样），要么必须找出其他途径，他们找到的方法之一，是年龄组（[[age set]]）。 年龄组是这样一种制度（本文介绍的是非洲的年龄组，南岛和美洲的年龄组性质有所不同）：所有男性按年龄和资质被分入依次相继的五六个组别，这些组大致可归为四个阶段：未成年、战士、长老、隐退者，其中战士和长老还常分为新晋和资深两组；各组在发型、服饰、文身、彩绘等身体装饰上有着显著区分，在社会分工中承担不同任务，有着各自的社会地位和相应的义务，遵循不同的社会规范。 每隔若干年（短则六七年，长则十几年），当长老们决定晋升一批新战士时，符合条件者便在经历一系列仪式和品质考验之后，升入上一组；对于个人，最关键的两个环节是经由成年礼而成为战士和从战士晋升为长老，前者意味着被共同体接纳为有用一员，而后者往往与结婚成家的权利联系在一起，并在公共事务决策中拥有发言权。 非洲成年礼的核心是割礼，其过程极为痛苦，远不像现代医学条件下的包皮环切术那么轻松，接受割礼的男孩，不仅不许挣扎、呻吟、眨眼、扭头，还要长时间忍受众人刻意营造的恐怖气氛：在仪式临近前几天，前辈们就不断渲染割礼有多痛苦难熬，施礼当天早晨，男孩被一桶冰水浇头，接着，父辈谆谆教诲割礼有多重要，母亲手执棍子随时准备在他表现出怯懦时给予痛打，兄弟们以几近辱骂呵斥的口吻大声质疑他能否经受住考验，姐妹们则在一旁紧张的走来走去，担心着兄弟的怯懦会影响自己未来嫁个好丈夫。割礼所留下的伤疤，往往要过三四个月才完全愈合。 也有些成年礼不是割礼，但同样痛苦，比如南苏丹努尔人（[[Nuer]]）的额部切割：顺着抬头纹的路线，从左耳到右耳，切出六道深入额骨的切口，切口之深，从遗骸头骨上都能看到。 年龄组普遍存在于非洲的农牧混业社会，从非亚语系的奥罗莫人（[[Oromo]]），到尼罗-撒哈拉语系的马赛人（[[Maasai]]），到尼日尔-刚果语系的祖鲁人（[[Zulu]]），横跨非洲三大语系，如此广泛的流行，表明它作为一种社会组织工具大概颇有成效，才会被众多民族所模仿，那么，它是如何起作用的呢？ 年龄组在实践中有很多变化，最重要的区别是对各组成员所施加的约束，强弱十分不同，处于光谱最弱一端的是努尔人，他们的年龄组最松散，大致是一种区分尊卑和声望的标志，功能上有点像军衔，其约束力限于社交和仪式性场合，比如节庆宴会上某人该坐在什么位置，或者两个陌生人相遇时，是该平等相待还是尊卑有别，它带给群体的组织功能是最弱的。 肯尼亚的马赛人则处于光谱另一端，男孩一旦晋升为战士，便离开所在家庭，和同组兄弟集中居住在村外的专属营地里，并开始接受资深战士的训练，担负起保卫社区的责任，包括巡视领地边界，寻找新牧场（特别是在旱季来临之前），击退盗牛团伙，对外发动盗牛突袭，猎杀领地内危及牲畜的食肉动物（主要是狮子——有人因此误以为猎杀狮子是成年礼的一部分，其实那只是新晋战士迅速建立声望的多种方法之一），等等。 年龄组对马赛男性施加的最重要约束是，战士不可以结婚，也被禁止与任何已接受割礼的女孩交往，只有在晋升为长老之后，才能回到原先的家族，并娶妻成家；由于两次新战士招募之间通常相隔15年，而接受成年礼的年龄下限大约14岁，所以，晋升长老时至少已经29岁，运气差的话已接近45岁（13岁时刚好错过一次招募，于是28岁成为战士，43岁熬成长老）。 这显然是一种严酷的老人统治，通过禁止年轻男性结婚，并赋予其最危险的任务，老人们降低了自己面临的资源竞争（包括性资源）；和普通的家长制和宗族老人政治不同的是，通过强化同龄合作，长老组将家长权威集体化了，因而可以更有效的压制年轻人的反抗，而同龄合作的强化，恰恰又得益于同组长老早年在战士组中长达十五年的共同居住和集体行动经历。 长期合作所建立的兄弟情谊可以达到这样的程度：同组伙伴（age mate）被认为应该分享任何东西，甚至是妻子，当伙伴来访时，主人会在晚上让出他的茅屋，让妻子和来访者自己决定是否一起过夜。 可是长老们如何压制晚辈的反抗呢？要知道，刚刚经历了成年礼的新战士，大多处于好斗而危险的青春期，正是制造骚乱和挑战权威最积极的叛逆阶段，青春期躁动带来的高犯罪率也是每个现代社会面临的一大麻烦，欧美的大量犯罪学研究都显示，在所有社会中，15-19岁总是暴力犯罪率最高的年龄段，而且远远高于其他年龄段。 【图1：美国青少年犯罪率，来源：http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/4/1/16】 按某些进化心理学理论，青春期躁动并非由性功能发育所附带的有害副产品，而是年轻男性为自己在即将进入的社会竞技场中争得有利地位的一种方式，暴涨的雄性激素只是执行这一心理功能的媒介；这种躁动就像把一群母鸡刚刚放到一起时所引发的频繁啄击一样，等到啄序确立下来，就相安无事了。 支持这一适应性解释的一个证据是，在地位高度平等、没有阶层分化的小型狩猎采集社会，比如卡拉哈里沙漠的桑人（San）游团中，青春期躁动的表现要轻微的多，因为既然没有明显地位差别，也就没啥好争的。 那么长老如何避免这一躁动伤及自己呢？答案就隐藏在躁动的性质之中，由于它是一种适应，躁动和所谓“叛逆”的指向并非随机，而是相当有策略的，简单说就是欺软怕硬，这一点从校园团伙和街头帮派中很容易观察到，许多挑衅和惹是生非只是为了测试对方是否好欺负，以便将自己的啄序排到他前面，只有当大量年轻人找不到比自己更软弱的欺负对象时，青春期躁动才会因绝望反扑而伤及当权者。 年龄组和成年礼的要点在于，通过一系列精心安排的震慑性仪式和清晰可见的晋升阶梯，明确告诉其成员：你目前处于啄序的哪个位置，而且不必着急，只要你活得足够久，总有一天会升到高位，同时，它并不试图压制年轻人的躁动，相反它还鼓励和嘉奖这一躁动，并将其引向群体外部，把他们的好斗和不满变成服务于群体利益的战斗力。 实际上，类似的机制普遍存在于各种需要人为排定啄序的组织机构中，大学里老生仪式性欺负新生，军队中老兵考验新兵，秘密会社的残酷入会仪式，监狱里对新来囚犯的虐待，往往都是极具羞辱性和压制性的，排定啄序的用意昭然若揭；极度夸张的闹洞房习俗，或许也是出于类似心理，因为结婚和成年一样，也是社会地位的一次重大晋升。 总结起来，年龄组制度的妙处在于，它同时解决了这些社会面临的几大组织问题： 1）通过深化年龄段之间的垂直不平等，从而在维持个体间和家族支系间平等的条件下，控制了当权集团的规模——这意味着同等规模的当权集团能够管理更大型的社会； 2）通过细分年龄组，并在各组间实行社会分工，从而将每类公共事务上所需要的紧密合作圈子规模限制在邓巴数之下； 3）通过另辟战士营地并建立军事化集体生活，将战士组升级成了真正的战争团队，为其成员日后成为当权长老时保持紧密合作创造了条件； 4）通过强化年龄段之间等级区分和长老权威，将冲突压力引向外部，由于晚辈在家长去世前无望分到大额家产，不得不在群体外部寻找机会，积极发动袭击，特别是盗牛袭击； 5）让年轻组别承担主要战争任务，使得死亡率分布像低年龄段偏移，从而降低每个晋升环节的竞争压力。 基于这些组织优势，许多非洲农牧混业社会建立起了部落和部落联盟一级的政治结构，人数可达数千和数万人，若辅以选举制从而组建更高层次联盟，更可达到数十上百万人的规模。 奥罗莫人于16至19世纪间在埃塞俄比亚建立的嘎达（Gadaa）体制或许展示了它的极限能力，这是个三级共同体，其最高层酋长会议（luba）由各支系选举产生，任期八年——也就是奥罗莫年龄组的间隔年数，在较低层次上，资深长老组直接实施集体统治；有意思的是，奥罗莫人每过八年招募新战士组时，都要发动一场对外战争，此类战争还专门有个名字叫butta，从1522年到1618年共发动了12场butta。 年龄组所带来的战斗力，从祖鲁王国的崛起中也可窥见一斑，祖鲁军队的基本作战单位Impi的前身便是战士组，受所在部落长老和酋长的支配，服务于部落利益，后来，得益于其前辈丁吉斯瓦约（[[Dingiswayo]]）在数十个部落组成的联盟中所建立的霸权，祖鲁王国的创建者沙卡（[[Shaka]]）在持续不断的征战中逐渐强化了对这些战士组的控制，最终通过打散部落编制而消除了其部落身份，成为直接服务于祖鲁国王的国家军队。 作为一种军事组织，年龄组的痕迹甚至在罗马军团中也可看到，罗马军团（早期）的步兵基本作战单位是一个四排阵列，每排由一个120人小队构成20×6的小矩阵，这四排由前至后分别由少年兵（velites）、青年兵（hastati）、壮年兵（principie）和老兵（triarii）组成；如此排阵的结果，无疑也是越年轻的士兵死亡率越高（少年兵或许是例外，他们虽然冲在最前面，但以投掷标枪为主，并不近身接战）。 或许并非巧合的是，罗马（至少在早期）也是实行民主选举的平等社会，而且，直到公元前1000年左右的青铜时代晚期，古拉丁人仍以畜牧为主业，以季节性移牧（[[transhumance]]）方式过着半定居生活。  

An Odd Couple: Did Economic Prosperity Lead to the Emergence of World Religions? 奇异的组合：经济繁荣导致世界宗教的兴起？ 作者：Tahereh Haji @ 2015-9-01 译者：李九喻( @李九喻) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The Evolution Institute，https://evolution-institute.org/article/an-odd-couple-did-economic-prosperity-lead-to-the-emergence-of-world-religions-2/ Nearly 2500 years ago, in three different areas of the world, the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the Easter Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley, conditions were ideal for the emergence of a number of religious traditions, ones which would shape the future of human life to this very day. This 200-year period is called the “Axial Age,” and these doctrines would later become the world’s major religions, including Buddhism, Daoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The history of this process is well documented, but a key question remains unanswered: why did these similar movements emerge simultaneously? 大约2500年前，在长江和黄河流域、地中海东部及恒河流域这三个世界不同地区，数个宗教传统的兴起遇到了理想的条件，它们将会塑造人类的未来生活，直至今日。这个长约200年的时间段被称为“轴心时代”，其间诞生的教义日后逐渐衍变成了世界上的主要宗教，包括佛教、道教、犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教。这段被详细记录的历史中有一个关键问题尚未探明：为什么相似的宗教运动会同时兴起？ Prior to the Axial Age, in hunter-gatherer societies, early chiefdoms and archaic states, religions were focused on rituals, sacrifices, and respecting taboos, practices that were believed to ensure prosperity. However, the new doctrines were extremely different. Now, “personal transcendence” was valued. “轴心时代”之前，在狩猎-采集社会中，在酋邦和原始国家里，宗教活动侧重于能够确保社会繁荣的仪式、献祭与图腾崇拜等实践。，然而，后来兴起的新教义与这些非常不同。如今，“个人超越”变得重要起来。 Human existence was believed to have a purpose, distinct from the material world, and it lay in a moral existence and control of one’s material desires through moderation, asceticism, and compassion. Central importance was placed on the idea that human beings have a soul that can survive the mortal world; only moderation of these material desires, asceticism, and moral behavior can guarantee the salvation of that soul in the afterlife. 人类的存在被认为具有目的，与物质世界有所不同，而这在于道德生活和通过节制、禁欲和怜悯而实现对自身物质欲望的控制。至关重要的是这样一种观念：人类拥有超越有朽世界的灵魂；只有对物质欲望的节制、禁欲和道德操守能够确保灵魂在死后得到救赎。 In a 2015 publication in Current Biology, researchers in the United States and France, led by Nicolas Baumard, compared the political and economic conditions at that time in order to determine what led to the Axial Age. The religious movements were too innovative to be accounted for through the emergence of large empires, which tended to have organized religions, but lacked the essential focus on asceticism and morality. 在《当代生物学》2015年所登的一篇文章中，以Nicholas Baumard为首来自美国和法国的研究者试图通过对比同时期的政治与经济情况来解释轴心时代出现的原因。当时的宗教运动高度创新，不能用大型帝国的出现来解释，后者趋向于形成有组织的宗教，但禁欲与道德操守却不是其本质重点。 Drawing on recent evidence from evolutionary psychology that suggested that affluence has a predictable effect on human motivation and reward systems, Baumard and colleagues hypothesized that increased affluence was the major factor in all three areas (the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the Easter Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley). They used energy capture as a marker of affluence. Quantitative studies had already shown that, at the time, there was a sharp increase in energy capture occurring in exactly those three areas. 进化心理学的近期研究表明，富足的社会对人类的刺激与奖励系统有着可预测的影响，受此启发，Baumard和同事们假设财富增长是上述地区（长江和黄河流域、地中海东部及恒河流域）的重点因素。他们用能量获取作为富足的标识。量化研究已经表明，正是上述三个区域，当时在能量获取方面均曾有过突然的增长。 The researchers tested this link by developing and comparing statistical models in which the likelihood of the emergence of a religion was dependent on a single factor. The models either used the level of affluence or political success as a factor. Their results confirmed that affluence markers provide very good indicators for the emergence of axial religions, whereas political success markers did not. 研究者通过开发和比较统若干计模型来测试上述联系，每一种模型均将宗教兴起的可能性设置为依赖于单一因素。模型使用的因素或者是经济富裕水平，或者是政治成功。研究结果证实，经济富裕标志为轴心宗教的出现提供了非常好的指标，而政治成功标志则没有。 History would agree with these results as well; religious historians have noted that Axial Age movements did not appear in the largest states at the time (eg. Assyria, Egypt, Persia), but in smaller prosperous polities such as Greek city-states, Mahajanapada, and the most developed of Chinese states. However, the authors noted that a number of questions remain. More data on affluence and political success, both in these societies and in other non-Eurasian empires, is needed to test the robustness of the conclusions and would strengthen the model. 历史也会同意以上结论；宗教历史学家已经指出，轴心时代运动并没有在当时最大的国家（如亚述、埃及、波斯）出现，而是在类似希腊城邦、印度列国和最发达的中国诸侯等较小的繁荣政体中兴起。然而，文章作者们认为一些问题仍旧存在。为检验结论的稳健性并且巩固模型，需要有更多这些社会和其他非亚欧帝国在经济富裕和政治成功方面的数据。 In addition, though the analysis presented here suggests a general set of conditions, which led to the emergence of these religions, the more specific mechanism remains unknown. Was it a new class of priests or scholars who now had the time and resources to develop more abstract religions? Did economic prosperity lead to an increase in literacy among the believers? Did affluence promote a more cosmopolitan society in which generosity, universality, and self-control were more attractive? The answers to these questions may well explain some of our most basic current beliefs, and shed light on our shared history. 此外，尽管这些分析展示了一组导致上述宗教涌现的一般条件，更具体的机制则尚不清楚。是由于出现了新的祭司阶级或者学者，有时间和资源来发展更为抽象的宗教？经济繁荣是否令更多信徒识字？经济繁荣是否促成了一个更加趋于世界主义的世界，其中慷慨、普世性与自控更具吸引力？这些问题的答案可能有助于更好解释我们当下一些最基本的信仰，并照亮我们的共同历史。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Myth of Free-Trade Britain 自由贸易英国的神话 作者：John V.C. Nye @ 2003-3-03 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Library of Economics and Liberty，http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Nyefreetrade.html In the two and a half centuries since Adam Smith first articulated the basic case for free trade, no event has been more significant than the British conversion to open markets in the nineteenth century. In the fable that is now conventional wisdom, nineteenth century Britain turned its back on protection and chose to open its markets to the world. 在亚当·斯密首次清晰阐述了自由贸易基本原理后的两个半世纪里，没有比十九世纪英国转为开放市场更为重要的事件了。在如今已成传统智慧的寓言里，十九世纪的英国放弃了市场保护政策，转而选择向世界开放其市场。 A reform-minded British leadership, preaching the new gospel of free trade pushed their European confreres to open up their own markets, eventually ushering in an age of expansive commerce the likes of which the world had never seen—a precursor of late twentieth century globalization that was in many ways more open than anything before or since. 富有改革思想的英国领导人鼓吹自由贸易的新福音，推动了欧洲同仁们开放市场，最终开启了全世界前所未见的商业扩张时代——这是二十世纪晚期全球化的发端，许多方面比此前此后任何时期都要更加开放。 Yet this story has one big flaw: it's inconsistent with the facts. 然而这个故事有个巨大的缺陷：与事实不符。 As the story is usually told, British free trade came in the 1840s after a bitter political struggle to repeal the Corn Laws—a name given to a series of agricultural tariffs and quotas designed to keep farm prices high. This was quickly followed by rapid and dramatic reductions in duties on hundreds of imports. By the 1850s, all but a handful of commodities were admitted to Britain free of all duties. 这故事常说，在寻求废除《谷物法》——一系列旨在维持农产品高价的农业关税和配额政策的总称——的艰苦政治斗争后，英国的自由贸易在1840年代来临了。紧接着便是几百种进口物关税的迅速急剧减少。到1850年代，除少数例外，几乎所有商品都获准完全免税进入英国。 Sounds good, until you look closely at what products remained subject to high duties: those handful of items were the most contentious and some of the most highly taxed items that historically had been at the core of the mercantile debate in British history. In previous centuries they formed a large and significant fraction of British trade. 这听起来很好，但待你看清关税仍然高启的产品到底是什么之后，就不会这么想了：那少数商品是英国历史上最具争议的，而且属于赋税负担最高的商品之列，它们一直都处于商业争论的核心。在那之前的几个世纪里，这些商品构成了英国贸易的重要部分。 Free trade should mean just that: free trade, with all goods admitted without duties, quotas, or restrictions. That was not British policy. They removed most tariffs but mostly on items in which they had a comparative advantage. In other words, they mostly removed tariffs on items for which Britain had little to fear in terms of competition or which were of trivial importance in overall trade. 自由贸易的内涵应该是：所有商品无关税、无限额、无限制的自由贸易。这可不是英国的政策。他们取消了大部分关税，但大部分都在他们有比较优势的产品上。换句话说，英国人主要取消了他们不惧任何竞争的产品的关税，或者在整体贸易中无足轻重的产品的关税。 Britain in the early 1800s had just passed through the Industrial Revolution and was the world's leading producer of cotton textiles and other industrial products. It took little courage to lower tariffs on British manufactures. It would be like Japan promoting free trade in the 1980s by arguing for lower tariffs on compact cars imported from America. Since Japan already made some of the world's best and most economical small cars, such a policy would have had very limited economic impact. Japan's lowering trade barriers in agriculture would have been substantially more important and would have run up against enormous political resistance. 十九世纪早期的英国刚经历工业革命，是棉纺织品和其他工业产品的世界领先生产者。降低英国制造品的关税并不需要多大勇气。这就像1980年代的日本，通过主张降低从美国进口的紧凑型汽车的关税来促进自由贸易。因为日本已经制造出世界上最好、最经济的小型汽车，这样的政策对经济的冲击非常有限。如果日本降低农业方面的贸易壁垒，其重要性会大大加强，也会遇到极大的政治阻力。 Nineteenth-century Britain had no comparative advantage in agricultural and foodstuffs. That is why the Corn Laws were initially so controversial. Consumers had a lot to gain from the state's permitting the import of grain, because the British were not the cheapest producers of grain, while British farmers had much to lose. Unfortunately, the British did little to modify the tariffs on other contentious items, goods which had made for the commercial equivalent of war. Of these goods, the most important and the most troublesome was wine. 十九世纪的英国在农业和食品上没有比较优势。这就是为何《谷物法》从一开始就备受争议。英国的消费者能从国家允许进口粮食中受益良多，因为英国人生产的粮食并不是最便宜的，而同时，英国农民则损失惨重。遗憾的是，英国人对其他有争议商品的关税少有改动，这些商品曾导致商战。在这些商品中，最重要且最棘手的就是葡萄酒。 But how important is wine? To answer that we need to go back to the 1600s. Britain in the mid-seventeenth century was a prodigious importer of wine, mostly French. 但是葡萄酒有多重要呢？回答这个问题我们要追溯到十七世纪。十七世纪中期的英国是葡萄酒的重要进口国，主要是法国葡萄酒。 So much so, in fact, that her trade balance was in the red, mostly because of trade with France and mostly because of French wine, spirits and a number of luxury goods. Attempts to limit these imports by restricting trade had mostly failed. Tariffs were levied but never so high as to reduce the imports drastically. But then came the wars. 如此这般，事实上，英国的贸易收支是呈赤字的，主要是源于跟法国的贸易，也就是法国葡萄酒、烈酒和诸多奢侈品导致的。通过限制贸易来减少这些商品进口的企图都失败了。关税一直在征收，但是从未高到能明显减少进口的程度。但是接着战争开始了。 Two major conflicts spanning a quarter century kept French wine—indeed, all French imports—out of the British market from 1689 to 1713. The Nine Years' War and the War of Spanish Succession led to hostilities between Britain and France and a complete breakdown in trade for this quarter century. 绵延1/4世纪的两场大型冲突让法国葡萄酒——实际上，所有的法国进口产品——在1689年到1713年间退出了英国市场。九年战争和西班牙王位继承战争导致了英法之间的敌对和长达1/4世纪的彻底贸易中断。 During this grape-challenged period, three interest groups derived enormous benefit from the embargo on France—the British brewing industry, British distillers (gin, etc.) and British interests in foreign producers of alcohol—most notably the shippers of Portuguese wine. Prior to the late 1600s, the British drank plenty of wine, mostly French, a little Spanish, but virtually nothing from Portugal. The wars of 1689-1713 gave the Portuguese allies the opportunity of ten lifetimes. 在这葡萄酒缺乏的时期，三个利益集团从对法禁运中获得巨额利益——英国发酵酒工业、英国蒸馏酒商（杜松子酒等）、外国酒商中的英国利益集团——最明显的就是葡萄牙葡萄酒的运货商。在十七世纪晚期之前，英国人饮葡萄酒颇多，大部分是法国进口的，加上一点西班牙进口的，但是几乎没有葡萄牙进口的。1689-1713年的战争让葡萄牙盟友获得了千载难逢的良机。 Beginning in 1703 a treaty was signed granting Portugal access to British markets for their wines—generally of a much lower quality than those of France, and often needing to be fortified with brandy or spirits in order to keep from going bad. The Methuen Treaty (as it was known) promised that Portuguese tariffs would always be at least a third lower than those of other nations, most especially France. 从1703年开始，一个允许葡萄牙人的葡萄酒进入英国市场的条约就签订了——这些葡萄酒质量普遍不及法国葡萄酒，并且经常需要添加白兰地或者烈酒来防止其变质。这个被称为《梅图恩条约》的协定，承诺葡萄牙人的关税会一直比其他国家低至少1/3，尤其是法国。 Of course, most of the Portuguese wine trade was dominated by British ships, merchants, and even vintners working in Iberia. The end of hostilities between Britain and France was seen as a grave threat to all these British interests, and vigorous lobbying by brewers, distillers, and the Anglo-Portuguese merchants stopped attempts to return to the period of open trade with the French. A bill to revive trade on prewar conditions between Britain and France was defeated in Parliament. 当然，大多数葡萄牙葡萄酒贸易都被英国船只、英国商人乃至在伊比利亚半岛的英国酿酒商所控制。英法之间敌对状态的结束被视为是对所有这些英国利益集团的巨大威胁，啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和英葡商人的大力游说阻止了重回英法开放贸易时代的企图。一项旨在恢复英法战前贸易状态的提案在议会被否决。 Even worse, tariffs were raised even higher throughout the eighteenth century. The result was that French exports of wine to Britain in the 1700s fell to less than 5% of the levels (measured by volume) that had prevailed in the 1600s. A twenty-fold decrease! The high taxes kept out all but the finest French products. 更糟的是，整个十八世纪的关税甚至更高了。结果就是十八世纪法国出口到英国的葡萄酒降到不足之前十七世纪水平的5%（以体积计）。减少了二十倍！高关税驱逐了所有法国产品，除了最好的那些。 Indeed, the French were kept out of the British market for most of the period of the Industrial Revolution, when the middle classes emerged and middle class tastes developed. Only the rich had access to the very finest clarets of Bordeaux. Cheap wine was simply not worth importing. And the British brewers, distillers, and merchant shippers never had it better. One historian has remarked that absent war and protection, the Gin Age1 might never have come into existence. 事实上，在工业革命的大多数时期，当中产阶级出现并且中产品味得到发展时，法国产品都是被挡在英国市场之外的。只有富人才能找到最好的波尔多红葡萄酒。便宜的葡萄酒根本不值得进口。英国啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和运货商从未提高这些劣质葡萄酒的品质。一位历史学家曾说，若没有战争和保护政策，杜松子酒时代（脚注1）可能根本就不会出现。 These assorted tariffs on wine and other consumables—which Adam Smith had condemned for their inefficiency in the eighteenth century—remained at the core of British protection in the nineteenth, when trade was supposedly made free. Though claiming to have moved to open markets, the British hung on to tariffs that were of long standing, and that moreover, prevented much progress from being made in bilateral treaty negotiations. France was not about to sign a bilateral commercial treaty if Britain was unwilling to compromise on wine and spirits. 十九世纪，在这个人们认为贸易已变得自由的时期，这一系列对葡萄酒和其他消费品的关税——亚当·斯密在十八世纪就谴责过其低效——仍然是英国保护政策的核心。虽然声称已转变为开放市场，英国人还是坚持长期存在的关税，而且此举还阻止了双边条约谈判的进展。如果英国在葡萄酒和烈酒上不愿意妥协，法国就不会签署双边商务协定。 Figure 1. Average Tariffs in the U.K. and France, 1820–1913 图1.英国和法国的平均关税，1820-1913 [From: A. Imlah, 1958 Economic Elements of the PaxBritannica, New York; and M. Levy-Leboyerand F. Bourguignon, 1985L'Economie Francaise au XIXesiecle,Paris.] [来源：A. Imlah，1958，“不列颠治世”中的经济元素，纽约；M. Levy-Leboyer和F. Bourguignon，1985，十九世纪的法国经济，巴黎] Britain preached the gospel of free trade and France was cast in the role of the sinner, but there was little truth in this stereotype. France did have more protected products than England did but the average level of French tariffs (measured as total value of duties divided by total value of imports, cf. Figure 1) was actuallylower than in Britain for three-quarters of the nineteenth century.2 In other words, tariffs had a smaller impact on French trade than British duties had on Britain's trade. 英国是自由贸易新福音的布道者，而法国则被铸为罪人的角色，但是这种刻板偏见里并没有多少事实。法国确实比英格兰有更多的受保护产品，但是法国关税的平均水平（以关税总值除以进口总值衡量，如图1）在十九世纪3/4的时间里实际上比英国要低（脚注2）。换句话说，关税对法国贸易的影响要比英国关税对于英国贸易的影响小。【编注：这一比较方法存在严重问题：它体现不出那些因税率过高乃至无利可图的贸易，或者被非关税壁垒禁止了的贸易，因而无法准确反映贸易自由度，比如在极端情况下，某国以零关税开放一项小规模贸易，同时禁止其他所有贸易，此时该指标为零，但贸易显然极度不自由，所以它必须结合其他指标才有意义。不过，它确实揭示了当时英国的关税率是非常高的。】 The French, while eschewing free trade, and openly rejecting the Anglo doctrine of open markets, actually succeeded in making their trade more liberal and more open than that of the more vocal British. The master of this was Napoleon III—Bonaparte's nephew—who throughout the 1850s promoted the most radical liberalizing reforms of the French economy, all the while insisting that France was only interested in moderate reform. 法国人虽然避开自由贸易并且公开拒绝英国人的开放市场学说，但是它实际上却成功使其贸易比鼓噪发声的英国人更加自由和开放。这过程的主导是拿破仑三世——波拿巴的侄子——他在整个1850年代都在推动对法国经济最激进的自由化改革，却一直坚称法国只对温和改革有兴趣。 Indeed, it was not British unilateral tariff reduction that moved the world to freer trade. Despite the belief that is still common today that British exhortation opened the doors to European free trade in the late 19th century, it was the 1860 Treaty of Commerce, promoted by the Napoleon III and concluded between Britain and France, that really ushered in the age of nineteenth century "globalization". British demands for unilateral tariff reduction usually fell on deaf ears. 事实上，并不是英国的单方面关税削减使得世界贸易更加自由。尽管认为十九世纪末英国的呼吁打开了欧洲自由贸易之门的观点现在仍很普遍，但其实是1860年《商贸条约》才真正开启了十九世纪的“全球化”时代，该条约由拿破仑三世推动，在英法之间缔结。英国提出的单方面降低关税要求通常无人理睬。 Doctrinaire free traders and economic theorists opposed the use of commercial treaties since they felt that unilateral reductions were the most efficient policies for all countries. While correct in the abstract, such claims did little to overcome political resistance to trade liberalization in most countries. On the other hand, unwillingness on the part of the British to lower wine tariffs killed early trade negotiations with both France and Spain. 教条主义的自由贸易者和经济理论家反对使用商业条约，因为他们认为单方面降低关税对所有国家来说都是最有效的政策。尽管理论上是正确的，但这种主张在大多数国家却很少能克服政治阻力，实现贸易自由。另一方面，部分英国人不情愿降低葡萄酒关税的态度已经早早地扼杀了该国与法国及西班牙的贸易协商。 When the British finally decided to moderate their wine tariffs, Britain and France successfully concluded a treaty in 1860 which dramatically changed the landscape of European commerce. Politicians throughout Europe—who had till then resisted all pressure to liberalize trade—suddenly became fearful of being left out of a trade pact that united the two great European powers. The result was that the other major European powers quickly signed bilateral treaties with Britain and France as well. 当英国最终决定将葡萄酒关税调整到适度水平时，英法才在1860年成功缔结了条约，这极大地改变了欧洲商业的形势。全欧洲的政治人物——不久前还抗拒贸易自由化的压力——突然开始担心被遗落在连接欧洲两大势力的贸易协定之外。结果就是，其他欧洲大国也迅速地与英法签署了双边条约。 Since these treaties were all Most Favored Nation treaties—whereby concessions to one party meant extending such concessions to all the others—not just France and Britain, but by 1870 nearly all of Europe including the German states, Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and so on were integrated into a highly open trading market. 由于这些条约都是最惠国待遇条约——给予一方特权就意味着要给所有相关方特权——所以不仅法国和英国，到1870年几乎全欧洲，包括日耳曼各邦、西班牙、俄罗斯、荷兰、丹麦和瑞典等，都被整合进了一个高度开放的贸易市场里。 In many ways, Europe was freer than today, partly because the gold standard made capital extremely mobile, and because limitations in border control made immigration and the free movement of labor easy in practice despite differing rules across the continent. 在很多方面，那时欧洲都比现在更加自由，部分原因是金本位让资本极具流动性，还有边境控制有限使得移民和劳工的自由活动实际上比较容易，尽管欧洲大陆有各种不同的规定。 What politicians do and say are often quite different. That hasn't changed. Indeed, though there is much talk about globalization and unfettered trade, there is no country in existence today whose policies come anywhere near the ideal of free trade. 政治人物的言行往往不相一致。这一点从未改变。确实，虽然现在有很多关于全球化和自由贸易的讨论，今天还没有哪个国家的政策在任何方面能接近自由贸易的理想状态。 Goods and services do flow vigorously throughout the globe, but most countries suffer from a mix of import duties and non-tariff barriers such as quotas, unnecessary inspection rules and a bewildering variety of regulations that make it impossible for any of us to benefit fully from the specialization possible in a truly open world economy. 虽然产品和服务在全球频繁流通，但是大多数国家都承受一系列的进口关税和非关税壁垒，比如配额、不必要的检查规则和诸多令人困惑的条例，这些让我们所有人都不可能从真正开放的世界经济可能带来的专业化中充分受益。 But more importantly, the example of Britain and France in the 1800s challenges us to rethink and reanalyze the relationship between trade policy and growth. The story of Britain and France shows how easy it is to be misled by the fables of conventional wisdom. The fact that Britain was not as free trade as it claimed doesn't make the case for protectionism. The British did lower their tariffs, and in the last third of the nineteenth century, Britain did fully liberalize trade and benefited from the change. 但更重要是，十九世纪英国和法国的例子能让我们重新思考和重新分析贸易政策和增长之间的关系。英法的故事说明了我们是多么容易被传统智慧的寓言所误导。英国并不像它所声称的那样贸易自由，但这一事实并不证明贸易保护主义有足够的理由。英国人确实降低了本国的关税，而且在十九世纪最后1/3的时间里完全实现了贸易自由化，并从中受益。 But the interesting and unexamined story is France. Nineteenth-century France doesn't fit our preconceptions. France was in fact, closer to the free trade ideal than the British for much of the century, and did in fact do well, raising the standard of living of the average worker from the 1850s onward. 但有关法国的有趣故事却经不起检验。十九世纪的法国并不符合我们的偏见。事实上，法国在十九世纪大部分时间都比英国更接近自由贸易的理想境界，而且确实做的不错，从1850年代起提高了普通工人的生活水平。 Footnotes 脚注 1.The Gin Age is often used to describe the early to middle years of the eighteenth century, when the consumption of hard liquor grew substantially, and the consumption of gin, especially among the poor, was seen to be a national problem. 1.“杜松子酒时代”经常被用来描述十八世纪早期到中期的时间，这段时期烈酒的消费量大增，而杜松子酒的消费，尤其是在穷人之中，被认为是全国性的问题。 2.Readers interested in a more technical discussion of the problem of tariff levels in the nineteenth century may consult Nye, 1991, "The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France," Journal of Economic History and S. Dakhlia and J.V.C. Nye, "Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income," working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114. 2.对十九世纪关税水平问题的更多技术细节感兴趣的读者可以查阅Nye于1991年在《经济史杂志》上发表的论文“自由贸易英国和堡垒法国的神话”和S. Dakhlia与 J.V.C. Nye的论文“‘不列颠治税’：十九世纪关税和英国国家收入”，获取论文的网址为http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114。 * John Nye is Associate Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. This piece is adapted from a book in progress to be released under the title, War, Wine, and Taxes. John Nye是华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校的经济学和历史学副教授。这篇文章摘编自《战争，葡萄酒和税收》，该书即将要出版。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The V.C.s of B.C. 公元前的风险投资 作者：Adam Davidson @ 2015-8-27 译者：淡蓝 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The New York Times Magazine，http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-vcs-of-bc.html One morning, just before dawn, an old man named Assur-idi loaded up two black donkeys. Their burden was 147 pounds of tin, along with 30 textiles, known as kutanum, that were of such rare value that a single garment cost as much as a slave. Assur-idi had spent his life’s savings on the items, because he knew that if he could convey them over the Taurus Mountains to Kanesh, 600 miles away, he could sell them for twice what he paid. 清晨，天刚蒙蒙亮，老汉Assur-idi给两头黑驴装上了货。货物有147磅锡，另有30件叫作kutanum的纺织品，kutanum异常稀有，一件衣物就相当于一个奴隶的价钱。这些货花光了Assur-idi 一生的积蓄，因为他知道，只要越过托罗斯山脉运到600英里外的卡内什，这些东西能卖出双倍的价钱。 At the city gate, Assur-idi ran into a younger acquaintance, Sharrum-Adad, who said he was heading on the same journey. He offered to take the older man’s donkeys with him and ship the profits back. The two struck a hurried agreement and wrote it up, though they forgot to record some details. Later, Sharrum-­Adad claimed he never knew how many textiles he had been given. Assur-idi spent the subsequent weeks sending increasingly panicked letters to his sons in Kanesh, demanding they track down Sharrum-Adad and claim his profits. 在城门口，Assur-idi遇到了个年轻的熟人Sharrum-Adad，说正好他也要去同样的地方。Sharrum-Adad主动提出可以带着老人的驴子们同行并把赚的钱带回来。于是俩人匆匆拟定了协议并写了下来，但他们忘记了记录一些细节。后来，Sharrum-­Adad声称，他当时并不清楚到底有多少件纺织品。在随后的几周里，日益恐慌的Assur-idi不断给他远在卡内什的儿子们写信，要求他们追踪Sharrum-Adad并收回应当属于他的利润。 These letters survive as part of a stunning, nearly miraculous window into ancient economics. In general, we know few details about economic life before roughly 1000 A.D. But during one 30-year period — between 1890 and 1860 B.C. — for one community in the town of Kanesh, we know a great deal. 这些保存下来的信件，为我们打开了深入了解古代经济的一扇窗，它令人惊叹、近乎奇迹一般。总体而言，我们对大约公元1000年之前的经济生活知之甚少。但是对这个近30年的时间段——公元前1890 到1860 之间——在卡内什镇的社会经济情形，我们却知之甚多。 Through a series of incredibly unlikely events, archaeologists have uncovered the comprehensive written archive of a few hundred traders who left their hometown Assur, in what is now Iraq, to set up importing businesses in Kanesh, which sat roughly at the center of present-day Turkey and functioned as the hub of a massive global trading system that stretched from Central Asia to Europe. 在一系列令人难以置信的考古发现中，考古学家们找到了周详的文书档案，里面记录了数百个离开家乡亚述（在今日伊拉克）的商人，在异乡卡内什做起了进口生意。当时的卡内什大致位于今日土耳其的中心，是从中亚延伸到欧洲的巨大全球贸易体系的中枢。 Kanesh’s traders sent letters back and forth with their business partners, carefully written on clay tablets and stored at home in special vaults. Tens of thousands of these records remain. One economist recently told me that he would love to have as much candid information about businesses today as we have about the dealings — and in particular, about the trading practices — of this 4,000-year-old community. 这些卡内什商人与贸易伙伴之间的来往信件，被小心仔细地写在泥板上，并储存在家里的地窖中。数以千记的这种记录因此得以保存。一位经济学家最近跟我说，要是他对当今的真实商业信息、特别是有关贸易的信息的了解，能有我们对这个距今4000年的社会的交易的了解一样多，那就好了。 Trade is central to every key economic issue we face. Whether the subject is inequality, financial instability or the future of work, it all comes down to a discussion of trade: trade of manufactured goods with China, trade of bonds with Europe, trade over the Internet or enabled by mobile apps. For decades, economists have sought to understand how trade works. Can we shape trade to achieve different outcomes, like a resurgence of manufacturing or a lessening of inequality? Or does trade operate according to fairly fixed rules, making it resistant to conscious planning? 贸易是我们所面临的所有重要经济问题的中心点。无论是不平等、金融不稳定、或是工作前景等问题，一切都可以归结到对贸易的讨论上：与中国的制造品贸易，与欧洲的债券交易，以及通过互联网或移动应用的交易。几十年来，经济学家尝试弄清贸易是如何运转的。能否通过塑造贸易来实现不同的结果，比如复苏制造业，或是减少不平等？还是说，贸易运转遵循着固定的规则，根本就抵制有意的计划？ Economists, creating models of trade, have faced a challenge, because their data have derived exclusively from the modern world. Are their models universal or merely reflections of our time? It’s a crucial question, because many in our country would like to change our trading system to protect American jobs and to improve working conditions here and abroad. The archives of Kanesh have proved to be the greatest single source of information about trade from an entirely premodern milieu. 创建贸易模型的经济学家们因仅能从现代世界里获得数据而面临着挑战。他们的模型是普适的抑或仅是我们这个时代的反映？这个问题很关键，因为我国的很多人想改变我们的贸易体制，以保护美国的就业或是改善国内国外的工作环境。卡内什档案被证实是有关发生于彻底的前现代环境中的贸易的最大单一信息来源。 In a beautifully detailed new book — ‘‘Ancient Kanesh,’’ written by a scholar of the archive, Mogens Trolle Larsen, to be published by Cambridge University Press later this year — we meet dozens of the traders of Kanesh and their relatives back home in Assur. Larsen has been able to construct family trees, detailing how siblings and cousins, parents and spouses, traded with one another and often worked against one another. We meet struggling businessmen, like Assur-idi, and brilliant entrepreneurs, like Shalim-Assur, who built a wealthy dynasty that lasted generations. 在一本精美详细的新书《古代卡内什》中，我们将遇到数十个返回亚述的卡内什商人和他们的亲戚。此书由研究该档案的学者 Mogens Trolle Larsen著述，今年晚些时候将由剑桥大学出版社出版。 从Larsen描绘出的家族中，可以看到兄弟姊妹和他们的表亲之间，父母和夫妻之间相互交易的细节，以及时常针锋相对的细节。我们遇到了奋争的商人，比如Assur-idi，和杰出的企业家，比如建立了延续数代的富裕世家的Shalim-Assur。 In 2003, while covering the war in Iraq, I traveled to many ancient archaeological sites; the huge burial mounds, the carvings celebrating kings as relatives to the gods, all gave the impression of a despotic land in which a tiny handful of aristocrats and priests enjoyed dictatorial control. But the Kanesh documents show that at least some citizens had enormous power over their own livelihoods, achieving wealth and power through their own entrepreneurial endeavors. 2003年，在报道伊拉克战争时，我走访了很多古代考古遗址；其中有巨大的坟岗，为礼赞作为神灵亲属的国王而做的雕刻，所有这些给人一种很深的印象：在这片专制的土地上，只有极少数贵族和祭司享受着独裁统治。但是卡内什的文件显示，至少有一些市民对他们自己的生计拥有巨大的支配力，并通过他们自己创业的努力获得了财富和实力。 The details of daily life are amazing, but another scholar, Gojko Barjamovic, of Harvard, realized that the archive also offered insight into something potentially more compelling. Many of the texts enumerate specific business details: the price of goods purchased and sold, the interest rate on debt, the costs of transporting goods and the various taxes in the many city-states that the donkey caravans passed on the long journey from Assur to Kanesh. Like most people who have studied Kanesh, Barjamovic is an Assyriologist, an expert in ancient languages and culture. Earlier this year, he joined some economists, as well as some other Assyriologists and archaeologists, on a team that analyzed Kanesh’s financial statistics. 日常生活的细节是令人惊叹的，不过另一位来自哈佛的学者，Gojko Barjamovic，意识到这些档案还提供了一些有可能更引人注目的东西。其中许多文本列举了具体的贸易细节：某一货物买进和卖出的价格，借债的利息，货物运输费用，以及驴队在亚述与卡内什之间长途跋涉中所经过的众多城邦的不同税费。像许多研究卡内什的人一样，Barjamovic是一个亚述学家，是古代语言和文化专家。今年早些时候，他加入了一支由经济学家、其他亚述学家和考古学家的组成的团队，对卡内什的金融统计数据进行分析。 The picture that emerged of economic life is staggeringly advanced. The traders of Kanesh used financial tools that were remarkably similar to checks, bonds and joint-stock companies. They had something like venture-capital firms that created diversified portfolios of risky trades. And they even had structured financial products: People would buy outstanding debt, sell it to others and use it as collateral to finance new businesses. The 30 years for which we have records appear to have been a time of remarkable financial innovation. 团队分析描绘出的经济生活画面先进得令人惊奇。卡内什的商人们使用的金融工具，与当今的支票、债券和股份公司十分相似。他们有些东西就像风险投资公司，创建了针对有风险贸易的多元化投资组合。他们甚至有结构性理财产品：人们会购买未偿债务，将其卖给他人或用于抵押以便为新业务融资。我们手里有记录的这30年表现为一个有着卓越的金融创新的时期。 It’s impossible not to see parallels with our own recent past. Over the 30 years covered by the archive, we see an economy built on trade in actual goods — silver, tin, textiles — transform into an economy built on financial speculation, fueling a bubble that then pops. After the financial collapse, there is a period of incessant lawsuits, as a central government in Assur desperately tries to come up with new regulations and ways of holding wrongdoers accountable (though there never seems to be agreement on who the wrongdoers are, exactly). The entire trading system enters a deep recession lasting more than a decade. The traders eventually adopt simpler, more stringent rules, and trade grows again. 与我们自己最近的过去相比，我们不可能看不到其中的相似之处。在档案记录的30年里，我们看到一个建立在实体货物上的经济——银、锡、纺织品——转变为一个建立在金融投机上的经济，这样的转变助长了泡沫，随后又突然破灭。金融崩溃后，一度曾充满了诉讼。亚述的中央政府不顾一切地试图拿出新的法规和办法，来迫使那些肇事者承担责任（虽然关于谁是真正的肇事者似乎从未有过一致意见）。整个贸易体系陷入了一个10年以上的严重衰退。商人们最终采取了更简单、更严格的规则，由此贸易再次增长。 In 1962 A.D., as our modern era of globalization was just beginning, the economist Jan Tinbergen — who would later share the first Nobel in economic science — noted something curious: Trade within and between countries followed a mathematical formula. He called it the Gravity Model, sort of an E=mc2 for global business. It comes with an imposing formula: Fij = G(Mi x Mj)/Dij. Which, simplified, means that trade between two markets will equal the size of the two markets multiplied together and then divided by their distance. (The model gets its name from its mathematical similarity to the equation in physics that describes gravitational pull.) 公元1962年，正当我们这个现代的全球化时代开始之际，经济学家Jan Tinbergen——后来的第一届诺贝尔经济学科学奖获得者之一——注意到一些令人好奇的事：国内贸易和国际贸易遵循一个数学公式。他称之为引力模型，有点像全球贸易的E=mc2。这是个气势宏伟的公式：Fij = G(Mi x Mj)/Dij。简单的说，就是两个市场之间的贸易等于两个市场规模相乘然后除以两个市场之间的距离。（该模型因与物理学中描述引力的公式数学上相似而得名） Since Tinbergen first published his finding, others have tested it on thousands of trade routes around the modern world, as well as on trade records going back a couple of centuries. In extreme cases (for example, trade between warring countries or during periods of sanction), the formula can fail to predict the volume of trade, but over all the model works extremely well. It’s a striking finding, suggesting that, for all the debate about trade agreements and currency rates, import duties and World Trade Organization disputes, trade tends to follow its own rules. 自Tinbergen 首次公布他的发现以来，很多人已在数以千计的环绕现代世界的贸易路径、以及几个世纪以来的贸易记录上对之进行了验证测试。在极端情况下（例如交战国之间或是制裁期间的贸易），这个公式在预测贸易量时可能失败。但总的来说，该模型运作十分出色。这是个令人震惊的发现，这表明，不管人们在有关贸易协定和货币汇率、进口关税和世贸组织争端等方面如何争论不休，贸易仍趋于遵循其自身的法则。 Economists were drawn to the Kanesh archive because it offered an unprecedented chance to see how well the Gravity Model applied in an economy entirely unlike our own. This was trade conducted via donkey, through a land of independent city-states whose legal and cultural systems were totally dissimilar to any we know. But still, the model held up: Ali Hortacsu, a University of Chicago economist on the Kanesh team, says that the trade figures between Assur and Kanesh matched the formula almost perfectly. ‘‘It was a very nice surprise,’’ he told me. 卡内什档案之所以吸引经济学家们，是因为它提供了一个前所未有的机会，来验证当引力模型应用到一种完全不同于现有情形的经济体时的契合程度。这种贸易借助驴进行，经过一片由独立城邦组成的地区，这些城邦的法律和文化体系与我们所知的一切均完全不同。只是，这样的贸易情况下该模型仍然屹立：Ali Hortacsu，卡内什团队的芝加哥大学经济学家，说亚述和卡内什之间的贸易数据，与上述公式匹配得近乎完美。“是个十分不错的惊喜。”他跟我说。 The Gravity Model may seem like bad news for people who want the economy to be fairer. I have spoken to countless activists and concerned friends who see global trade as a choice, something a specific set of politicians and businesses decided to impose on the rest of us, through all those confusing acronymic trade deals: GATT, Nafta and (probably, soon) the T.P.P. To me, though, the model suggests that these deals have less impact than either their boosters or their detractors imagine. 对那些想要更多经济公平的人们来说，引力模型可不像是啥好消息。我曾跟无数将全球贸易视为一种选择的活动家和关心公共事务的朋友们交谈过，他们认为全球贸易只是特定政治家或者企业决定通过一堆令人迷糊的首字母缩写贸易协定：GATT、Nafta 和（可能很快就签订的）T.P.P.而强加给其余人的。然而对我来说，这个模型表明：此类协定对于贸易的影响，比支持者或是批评者想象的都要少。 There is a natural tendency for different regions to trade at fairly predictable volumes. However much politicians might want to change those outcomes, they have only crude tools at their disposal: They can stop trade through blockades, slow it through tariffs or try to jump-start it with trade agreements. What they can’t do, at least not reliably, is shape it with precision to achieve their preferred outcomes. 不同地区之间以基本可以预测的总量发生贸易，这是一种自然趋势。无论政治家多么想要改变其结果，他们都只有一些很原始的工具可用：通过封锁停止贸易，通过海关放缓贸易，或是通过贸易协议助推贸易。他们无法做到的，或者至少无法确切做到的，是有目的的精确塑造贸易以达到他们期望的结果。 But despite trade’s intractability, we still have a lot of room to address the impact of trade on our economy. Trade with China and other nations may be all but inevitable, but growing wealth inequality and disproportionate pain (blue-collar workers losing their jobs, investors reaping a fortune) are not. There is much we can do within our borders to address the unequal impact of global trade. We can educate children for more competitive careers, train displaced workers for new industries or even directly compensate those who fail to benefit from global trade. 尽管贸易难以驾驭，我们仍然有巨大的空间来处理贸易对我们经济的影响。与中国或者其他国家的贸易可能不可避免，但可避免的是日益增加的财富不均和不成比例的痛苦（蓝领工人失业，投资者获得利益）。在国界以内解决全球贸易导致的不平等，我们可做的事太多了。我们可以教育自己的孩子，以利于其从事更具有竞争力的职业，培训下岗工人进入新产业，甚至可以直接赔偿那些在全球贸易中丧失利益的人们。 That, in fact, is what the people of Assur did, 4,000 years ago, as Barjamovic pointed out to me. Trade brought enormous wealth to a dozen or so families. But rather than hold all of it for themselves, the wealthy were made to redistribute a high percentage of their earnings through taxes and religious foundations that used the money for the public good. This way, the wealth created by trading with Kanesh made nearly everybody — at least every free citizen — better off. 就像Barjamovic向我指出的那样，这些其实就是亚述人在4000年前所做的。贸易给数十个家庭带来了巨大的财富。但富人们并未将所有的财富据为己有，通过交税和交纳用于公益的宗教基金，他们将自己所获财富中的很大比例进行了再分配。以这种方式，通过与卡内什进行贸易而创造的财富，几乎使每一个人——至少是每一个自由城民——都过得更好了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

An interview with Josiah Ober, author of The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece 《古典希腊的崛起与衰落》作者Josiah Ober访谈 作者：Debra Liese @ 2015-5-13 译者：尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对：Pyro，小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源：Princeton University Press网址，http://blog.press.princeton.edu/2015/05/13/an-interview-with-josiah-ober-author-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-classical-greece/ The period considered classical Greece (roughly the 4th through 5th century BC) had a profound effect on Western civilization, forming the foundations of politics and philosophy, as well as artistic and scientific thought. Why did Greece experience such economic and cultural growth—and why was it limited to this 200-year period? Josiah Ober, Professor of Political Science and Classics at Stanford University and author of The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, took the time to explain the reasons behind Greece’s flourishing, and what its economic rise and political fall can tell us about our own world. 古典希腊时期（大约公元前4-5世纪）对于西方文明有着深远的影响，构建了其政治、哲学和艺术科学思想的基础。为何希腊经历了这样的经济增长和文化进步——而又为何仅限于这200年？斯坦福大学政治学和古典学教授、《古典希腊的崛起与衰落》一书作者Josiah Ober解释了希腊繁荣背后的原因，以及其经济崛起和政治衰落给我们现代世界的启示。 What was the rise of classical Greece and when and why did it happen? 什么是古典希腊的崛起？它于何时因何而发生？ JO: Basically, sustained economic growth lead to the rise of Ancient Greek civilization. JO：基本上，是持续的经济增长导致了古希腊文明的崛起。 At the Early Iron Age nadir, in ca. 1000 BCE, the Greek world was sparsely populated and consumption rates hovered near subsistence. Some 650 years later, in the age of Aristotle, the population of the Greek world had increased at least twenty-fold. During that same period, per capita consumption probably doubled. 在早期铁器时代的最低谷，约公元前1000年，希腊世界人烟稀少，消费水平徘徊在生存线附近。到了约650年之后的亚里士多德时代，希腊世界的人口已经增长了至少20倍，人均消费大约翻了一倍。 That rate of growth is far short of modern rates, but it equals the growth rate of the two standout societies of early modern Europe: Holland and England in the 16^th to 18^th centuries. Historians had long thought that the Greek world was impoverished and its economy overall static –which of course made Greek culture (art, philosophy, drama, and so on) seem that much more “miraculous.” 那时的增长速度远低于现代，但是已经相当于现代欧洲早期的两个杰出社会——16到18世纪荷兰和英格兰。历史学家曾在很长时间里以为希腊世界相当贫困，其经济总体上停滞不前，这当然让希腊文化（艺术、哲学、戏剧等）看起来更加“不可思议”。 But, thanks to the recent availability and quantification of a huge mass of data, drawn from both documentary and archaeological sources, we can now trace the amazing growth of the Greek economy, both in its extent (how many people, how much urbanization, and so on), and in terms of per capita consumption (how well people lived). 但是，多亏了近来文献和考古提供的大量量化数据，我们现在可以追溯希腊经济的惊人增长，不论是在规模方面（人口数量，城市化程度等等）还是人均消费方面（人民生活水平）。 So the rise of the Greek world was predicated on sustained economic growth, but why did the Greek economy grow so robustly for so long? 所以希腊世界的崛起立基于持续的经济增长之上，但是为什么希腊经济能保持强劲增长如此之久？ JO: In the 12th century BCE, the palace-centered civilization of Bronze Age Greece collapsed, utterly destroying political and social hierarchies. Surviving Greeks lived in tiny communities, where no one was rich or very powerful. JO：在公元前12世纪，以宫殿为中心的希腊青铜时代文明崩溃，彻底摧毁了社会和政治的等级制度。幸存的希腊人生活在小社区之内，没有人特别富裕或特别强大。 As Greece slowly recovered, some communities rejected attempts by local elites to install themselves as rulers. Instead, ordinary men established fair rules (fair, that is, for themselves) and governed themselves collectively, as political equals. Women and slaves were, of course, a very different story. 随着希腊慢慢复元，一些社区拒绝让当地精英自立为统治者。相反，普通男性们建立起公平的规则（公平仅限于他们男性自己），并在相互间政治平等的基础上实行集体自我治理。当然，女人和奴隶又是另一回事了。 But because these emerging citizen-centered states often out-competed elite-dominated rivals, militarily and economically, citizenship proved to be adaptive. Because participatory citizenship was not scalable, Greek states stayed small as they became increasingly democratic. 但是，因为这些以公民为中心的新兴城邦通常在军事和经济上胜过由精英统治的竞争对手，所以它证明了公民制度是很有适应性的。由于直接参与式的公民制度无法规模化，希腊城邦在日益民主化的同时仍保持着较小的规模。 Under conditions of increasingly fair rules, individuals and states rationally invested in human capital, leading to increased specialization and exchange. The spread of fair rules and a shared culture across an expanding Greek world of independent city-states drove down transaction costs. Meanwhile competition encouraged continuous institutional and technological innovation. 在规则日趋公平的条件下，个人和城邦均愿意对人力资本进行理性投资，从而促进了专业化和交易。在由独立城邦组成的不断扩张的希腊世界中，公平规则的传播和共同文化的建立，降低了交易成本。同时，竞争鼓励了制度和技术的持续创新。 The result was 700+ years of world-class efflorescence, marked by exceptional demographic and per capita growth, and by immensely influential ideas, literature, art, and science. But, unlike the more familiar story of ancient empires, no one was in running the show: Greece remained a decentralized ecology of small states. 其结果就是超过700年的世界级繁华盛世，史无前例的人口和人均（收入）增长，以及影响巨大的思想、文学、艺术和科学，是这一时期的标志。但是，与我们更熟悉的那些古代帝国的故事不一样的是，这齣大剧无人主导：希腊仍然是个分散的小国生态。 So what about the fall? 那衰落又是怎么回事？ JO: There are two “falls”–one political and one economic. The economic fall is the decline of the Greek economy from its very high level in the age of Aristotle to a “premodern Greek normal”of low population and near-subsistence consumption levels with the disintegration of the Roman empire. That low normal had pertained before the rise of the city-state ecology. After the fall, it persisted until the 20^th century. JO：衰落体现在两个方面：一个是政治上，一个是经济上。经济上的衰落是指希腊经济从亚里士多德时代的高水平，随着罗马帝国解体而下降到“前现代希腊标准”——低人口和徘徊在生存线的消费水平。那种低标准还是属于城邦生态兴起之前的。在衰落之后，这种状态一直持续到20世纪。 But we also need to explain an earlier political fall. Why, just when the ancient Greek economy was nearing its peak, were Philip II andAlexander (“the Great”) ofMacedon able to conquer the Greek world? And then there is another puzzle: Why were so many Greek city-states able to maintain independence and flourishing economies in the face of Macedonian hegemony? 但是我们还需要解释一下更早的政治衰落。当古希腊经济接近巅峰时，为什么马其顿的菲利普二世和亚历山大大帝能够征服希腊世界？随之而来的是另一个疑问：为什么这么多的希腊城邦在面对马其顿霸权时能够保持独立和经济繁荣？ The city-states were overtaken by the Macedonians in part because human-capital investments created a class of skilled and mobile experts in state finance and military organization. Hired Greek experts provided Philip and Alexander with the technical skills they needed to build a world-class army. 马其顿人夺取这些城邦的部分原因，是前述人力资本投资创造出了一个富有流动性的专业阶层，他们精通城邦财政和军队组织。通过雇佣这些希腊专家，菲利普和亚历山大大帝得到了他们创建世界级军队所急需的技术。 But meanwhile, deep investments by city-states in infrastructure and training made fortified cities expensive to besiege. As a result, after the Macedonian conquest, royal taxes on Greek cities were negotiated rather than simply imposed. That ensured enough independence for the Greek cities to sustain economic growth until the Roman conquest. 但与此同时，城邦在基础设施和训练上的大力投入，也使得攻占这些坚固设防的城邦代价高昂。因此，在征服了希腊城邦之后，马其顿人并不是单方面强加，而是通过谈判来确定希腊城邦的皇家税。这确保了希腊城邦的独立性，维持了其经济增长，直至被罗马人征服。 What does the economic rise and political fall of classical Greece have to tell us about our own world? 古典希腊的经济崛起和政治衰落对我们现代世界有何启示？ JO: The new data allows us to test the robustness of contemporary theories of political and economic development. In the classical Greek world, political development was a primary driver of economic growth; democracy appears to be a cause rather than simply an effect of prosperity. JO：新的数据让我们可以检验当代政治和经济发展理论的可靠性。在古典希腊时代，政治发展是经济发展的原始驱动力；民主看来是繁荣的原因而不只是结果。 The steep rise and long duration of the city-state ecology offers a challenge to neo-Hobbesian centralization theories of state formation, which hold that advanced economic and political development requires the consolidation of centralized state power. The comparatively low rate of ancient Greek income inequality, along with the high rate of economic growth, suggests that the negative correlation of sustained growth with extreme inequality, observed in some recent societies, is not a unique product of modernity. 这种城邦生态的迅速兴起和经久不衰，对关于国家构建的新霍布斯主义的中央集权化理论提出了挑战，该理论认为先进的经济和政治发展，需要中心化的国家权力的巩固。古希腊相对程度较低的收入不均和高速的经济增长并存，表明了在一些现代社会观察到的持续增长和极端不均等之间的负相关并不是现代化的独特产物。 Finally, the history of the ancient Greek world can be read as a cautionary tale about the unanticipated consequences of growth and human capital investment: It reveals how innovative institutions and technologies, originally developed in the open-access, fair-rules context of democratic states, can be borrowed by ambitious autocrats and redeployed to further their own, non-democratic purposes. 最后，古希腊世界的历史可以被解读为关于增长和人力资本投资的意外结果的警世寓言：它揭示了最初起源于对外开放，规则公平的民主政体的制度和技术创新，是如何被有野心的独裁者借用，并应用于推动他们自己的非民主目标的。 How did you get interested in the topic of rise and fall –was it just a matter of “Edward Gibbon envy”? 你是怎么对崛起与衰落这个主题感兴趣的？仅仅是由于“嫉妒Edward Gibbon”？ 【译注：Edward Gibbon是《罗马帝国衰亡史》的作者】 JO: Gibbon is amazing, as a prose stylist and historian. But the origin of my project actually goes back to a quip by a senior colleague at the very beginning of my career: “The puzzle is not why the Greek world fell, it is why it lasted more than 20 minutes.”Twenty-five years ago (and fifteen years after my colleague’s quip), the historical sociologist W.G. Runcimanclaimed that classical Greece was “doomed to extinction”because the Greek city-states were, “without exception, far too democratic.” JO：Gibbon作为一个散文家和历史学家非常优秀。但是我课题的起源要追溯到我职业生涯刚开始时一个资深同事的玩笑话：“费解的不是为何希腊世界会衰落，而是它竟然撑过了20分钟。”25年前（我同事那句玩笑话的15年后），历史社会学家W.G. Runciman声称古典希腊“注定要灭亡”，因为希腊城邦“无一例外，都过于民主。” True enough: the classical Greek world eventually went extinct. But then, so did all other ancient societies, democratic or otherwise. The Greek city-state culture lasted for the better part of a millennium; much longer than most ancient empires. I’ve long felt that I owed my colleague a solution to his puzzle. This book is an attempt to pay that debt. 确实，古典希腊最终灭亡了。但是其他所有古代社会，无论是否民主，也都灭亡了。希腊城邦文化持续了好几百年，比大多数古代帝国都要更长。我一直感觉我欠那个同事一个答案，我想用这本书试试。 Josiah Oberis the Mitsotakis Professor of Political Science and Classics at Stanford University. His books include Democracy and Knowledge, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens, The Athenian Revolution, and Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens(all Princeton). He lives in Palo Alto, California. Josiah Ober是斯坦福大学政治学和古典学Mitsotakis讲席教授。他的著作包括《民主与知识》，《民主雅典的政治异议》，《雅典的革命》，《民主雅典的群众和精英》（均由普林斯顿大学出版社出版）。他现居于加利福尼亚州的帕罗奥多市。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#4：婚姻粘结剂 辉格 2015年9月29日 通过组织宗族和强化父权而扩展父系继嗣群，终究会因亲缘渐疏和协调成本剧增而遭遇极限，西非约鲁巴宗族社区和华南众多单姓村显示了，其规模最多比狩猎采集游团高出一两个数量级（几百到几千人），若要组织起更大型社会，便需要借助各种社会粘结剂，将多个父系群联合成单一政治结构，而婚姻是最古老也最常见的粘结剂。 婚姻的粘结作用，在前定居社会便已存在，列维－斯特劳斯发现，相邻的若干继嗣群之间建立固定通婚关系，以交表婚之类的形式相互交换女性，是初民社会的普遍做法；持久通婚维系了群体间血缘纽带，促进语言上的融合，共享文化元素，让双方更容易结盟共同对抗其他群体，即便发生冲突也比较容易协商停战，所有这些，都有助于它们建立更高一级的政治共同体。 此类固定结对通婚关系广泛存在于澳洲土著和北美印第安人中，其最显著特点是，它是群体本位而非个体本位的，缺乏定居者所熟悉的从个体出发的各种亲属称谓，有关亲属关系的词汇，所指称的都是按继嗣群（或曰氏族，常由图腾标识）、性别和辈份三个维度所划分出的一个组别，婚姻必须发生在两个特定组别之间。（值得留意的是：这种模式常被错误的称为“群婚制”，实际上，其中每桩婚姻都发生在男女个体之间，并非群婚。） 典型的做法是，两个父系群结对通婚，澳洲西北阿纳姆地的雍古人（[[Yolngu]]），20个氏族分为两个被人类学家称为半偶族（[[moiety]]）的组，每个半偶族的女性只能嫁到另一个半偶族；这确保了夫妻双方的血缘不会比一级表亲更近；周人姬姓与姜姓的持续频繁通婚，或许也是此类安排的延续；不那么系统化的交表婚则更为普遍，几乎见于所有古代社会。 以此为基础，还发展出了更复杂的结对安排，比如西澳的马图苏利纳人（[[Martuthunira]]）采用一种双代交替的半偶族模式，运作机制如下图所示： 【图一】 每个半偶群的奇数辈和偶数辈又分成两个组，一个半偶群的奇数辈，只能和对方的奇数辈婚配。这样就把婚姻限制在了同辈之间，避免了娶到姨母或外甥女的可能性。这同时也起到了拉远夫妻血缘的效果，因为交表兄妹的亲缘系数比舅甥或姨甥小了一半；周人宗法制中的昭穆轮替标记法，或许也有类似用意。 为将更多单系继嗣群拉进固定通婚关系，从而扩大内婚群的规模，有些族群还采用了一种单向循环通婚圈，例如缅甸山区从事游耕的克钦人（Kachin）和苏门答腊种植水稻为生的巴塔克人（[[Batak]]），由三到六个父系群组成循环圈：A群男性从B群娶妻，B从C娶，C从A娶；这种安排不仅进一步拉远了夫妻血缘，也提升了内婚群的遗传多样性。 结对通婚关系促进群体间合作的效果十分显著，雍古人活动范围内的各种自然物——土地、河流、鱼种、山岩等等——都被赋予了和某一半偶族相同的名称，这显然是两组群体就共同领地内自然资源分配所达成的一种协调，而这一成就是在完全缺乏高级政治结构的条件下达成的。 也正是借助循环通婚圈，克钦人才可能在文化和种族成分极为复杂横断山区建立多种族复合社区，在埃德蒙·利奇（[[Edmund Leach]]）调查的一个500人社区（帕朗）中，六种语言并存，仍可维持大致和平，对外关系中还表现出了相当团结性。 然而正如澳洲土著的经验所显示，固定通婚关系本身并不能带来高级政治结构，而充其量只能产生一个文化共同体，即有着粗略地理边界、较强血缘纽带、具有一定文化同质性的血缘/文化群（[[ethnic group]]），澳洲人始终缺乏游团以上的部落结构，因而澳洲也是唯一一个英国殖民者未能与当地土著达成土地协议的殖民地，因为找不到适当的谈判和签约对手。 若要借助婚姻粘结剂建立更大社会，还需要父系群本身的升级改造（如我在上一篇所述），以及群内的等级分化和政治权力崛起，这一点，我们需要从群体角度转到个体角度才能看清。 在一个缺乏人身与财产权普遍保护，离开熟人小群体便毫无安全可言的霍布斯世界，姻亲关系对个人利益极为重要；当你在群体之外寻求合作与帮助时，它常常也是唯一的来源；当你为狩猎、作战，或采集某些重要材料（比如石料或盐），或从事交易，或战败逃亡，而需要穿越相邻群体的地盘时，若在该群体中无人为你提供担保和庇护，是极其危险的；所以，在霍布斯世界，陌生群体间的商品交易普遍采用“沉默交易”的方式，以避免近距离接触。 姻亲是个人将其互惠合作网络延伸至群体之外的主要途径，重要的是，它带来的一些合作关系是群内合作所无法替代的，包括：拓宽安全活动范围和信息来源，饥荒时的求助对象，发生群内冲突时的临时避难所，交易对象，和第三方建立合作或交易关系的中间人或担保人，等等。 马林诺夫斯基在其名著《西太平洋的航行者》中描述的特罗布里恩岛民的库拉圈交易是个很好的例子，分布在方圆数百英里海域的数十个岛屿的居民中，存在一个奇特的双向礼物流动圈，该圈每一环由来自不同群体的一对成员结成，在专门为此而举行的聚会上，双方隆重交换礼物——臂镯和项圈，用于仪式性场合上佩戴——，两种礼物总是朝相对方向流动，有数千人卷入这一交换活动。 乍看起来，库拉交换纯属仪式，毫无实用价值，其实不然，正是这种仪式性交换，为结成库拉对的两个人创造了定期拜访对方社区、参与其聚会和双方友好交往的机会，在库拉交换中拜访对方的人，都会随船携带一些实用商品用于交易，与我们主题有关的要点是：一个人库拉伙伴通常都是他的姻亲。 看上面的介绍，你可能会觉得这些群体和睦友好，实际上并非如此，库拉关系只是让群体间交往能够发生（否则根本无法和平接触），但平时关系仍然充满敌意和恐惧，远远谈不上友好；为了克服恐惧、确保自己不受对方伤害，拜访者在整个交易旅程中会施行大量巫术，一位土著对人类学家如此描述其即将拜访的库拉伙伴：

多布人没我们这么好；他们凶恶，他们是食人族！我们来多布时，十分害怕。他们会杀死我们。但看到我们吐出施过法术的姜汁，他们的头脑改变了。他们放下矛枪，友善的招待我们。

当拜访船队接近对方岛屿时，他们反复念诵类似这样的咒语：

尔之凶恶消失，消失，噢，多布男人！ 尔之矛枪消失，消失，噢，多布男人！ 尔之战争油彩消失，消失，噢，多布男人！ ……

另一个故事则说明了在这种恐惧氛围中，拥有库拉伙伴的价值：一个叫Kaypoyla男人，航行中搁浅于一个陌生岛屿，同伴全部被杀死吃掉，他被留作下一顿美餐，夜晚侥幸逃出，流落至另一岛上，次日醒来发现自己被一群人围着，幸运的是，其中一位是他的库拉伙伴，于是被送回了家。 在特罗布里恩，一位酋长的地位很大程度上体现在众多妻子（常多达十几个）带给他的庞大姻亲网络上，通过与妻子兄弟的互惠交换，常积累起显示其权势的巨大甘薯库存，姻亲网络也让他在库拉圈中地位显赫，普通人一般只有几位库拉伙伴，而酋长则有上百位；人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔（[[Timothy Earle]]）也发现，在部落向酋邦的发展过程中，酋长们建立其权势地位的手段之一，便是通过精心安排婚姻来建立姻亲网络。 对于社会结构来说，重要的是，姻亲关系的上述作用，被宗族组织和父权成倍放大了，并且反过来强化了后两者；若没有紧密的宗族关系，一位男性从一桩婚姻中得到的姻亲就十分有限，岳父加上妻子的兄弟，但宗族的存在使得婚姻不仅是一对男女的联合，也是两个家族的联合，随着繁复婚姻仪式的逐步推进，双方众多成员的关系全面重组，并在此后的周期性节庆聚宴上得到反复强化，这也是为何在具有宗族组织的社会中，婚姻和生育仪式发展得那么繁杂隆重。 类似的，假如没有强父权，男性从婚姻中得到的姻亲数量，便主要取决于妻子数量，而在高度平等主义的前定居社会，多妻较少见，而且妻子数较平均（但也有例外，比如澳洲，但那里的高多妻率同样伴随着强父权和老人政治），但父权改变了姻亲性质，在控制了子女婚姻之后，长辈取代结婚者本人而成为姻亲关系的主导者，这样一来，一位男性能够主动建立并从中获益的姻亲关系，便大大增加了。 宗族和父权不仅拓展了个人发展姻亲的潜力，而且拉大了个体之间和家族支系之间社会地位的不均等；在游团一级的小型简单社会中，尽管个体境遇和生活成就也有着巨大差异，但这差异主要表现为后代数量，很少能积累起可以传给后代的资源，而现在，由于宗族使得姻亲关系成为两个家族的广泛结合，因而这一关系网成了家族支系的集体资产，而同时，由长辈安排子女婚姻，使得这一资产具有了可遗传性，这就好比现代家族企业在晚辈接班时，长辈会把整个商业关系网络连同有形资产一起传给他。 借助长辈所积累的资源，成功者的后辈从人生起步时便取得了竞争优势，这便构成了一种正反馈，使得父系群中发达的支系愈加发达，最终在群体内形成地位分化；这一分化也将自动克服我在上一篇中指出的父系群扩张所面临的一个障碍：当家长联盟向更高层次发展时，由于共祖已不在世，由谁来代表更高级支系？很明显，拥有压倒性权势的支系家长更有机会成为族长。 当若干相邻群体皆发生地位分化之后，权势家庭之间便倾向于相互通婚，并逐渐形成一个上层姻亲网络；这个圈子将带给其成员众多优势：从事甚至垄断跨群体的长距离贸易，在冲突中获得权势姻亲的襄助，影响联盟关系使其有利于自己；经过代代相袭，权势强弱不再只是个人境遇的差别，而成了固有地位，权势者逐渐成为固化成一个贵族阶层。 和族长联盟一样，权势姻亲联盟也可将若干群体连结为一个政治共同体，但效果更好；由于血缘随代际更替而逐渐疏远，单系群不可避免处于持续的分支裂变之中，成吉思汗的儿子们还能紧密合作，孙子辈就开始分裂，但还勉强能召集起忽里勒台，到第四代就形同陌路了；相反，姻亲关系则可以每代刷新，保持亲缘距离不变。 阿兹特克的事例很好的演示了，姻亲联盟在维系一个大型共同体时是如何起作用的；阿兹特克由数百个城邦组成，其中三个强势城邦联合成为霸主，垄断城邦间贸易，并向各邦索取贡赋，国王一般与友邦王室通婚，并通常将其正妻所生嫡女嫁给友邦王族或本邦高级贵族，而将庶女嫁给较低级贵族或有权势的家族首领，类似的，贵族在本邦同侪中通婚，也将庶女嫁给有权势平民，或战功卓著的武士，相比之下，下层平民的婚姻则限于所居住社区，每个社区由若干家族构成内婚群。 这样，在社会结构的每个层次上，国王或贵族通过正妻和嫡子女的婚姻而构建了一个维持该层次统治阶层的横向姻亲联盟，而通过庶妻和庶子女的婚姻则构建了一个纵向姻亲网络，将其合作关系和控制力向下延伸，如此便搭建起一个组织紧密的多层次政治结构，其中每个层次上的姻亲网络有着不同的覆盖范围，因而其合作圈规模皆可限于邓巴数之下。 类似景象在前现代欧洲也可看到，王室在全欧洲联姻，贵族在整个王国通婚，而普通人的婚嫁对象则很少越出邻近几个镇区；得益于阶层分化，婚姻为多层社会同时提供了横向和纵向的粘结纽带，然而，高级政治结构在创造出文明社会之前，许多功能仍有待开发，也还需要其他粘结剂，我会在后面的文章里逐一考察。  

【2015-11-03】 @海德沙龙 《宗教自由的丧钟已经敲响？》三年前，丹佛市一位糕点师拒绝为一对同性恋人制作婚礼蛋糕，这对恋人随后向科罗拉多州政府投诉，州政府民权委员会文化专员随即裁定糕点师歧视同性恋，勒令其更改店铺规定，并从此之后须为同性婚礼制作蛋糕，否则将面临罚款， 糕点师不服并开始了多年诉讼…… @whigzhou: [[The Good Wife]]里看到过这个故事，原来是真事，荒谬至此。 @whigzhou: 在这个玻璃心时代，直男基督徒是唯一可以摁住头随便冒犯的群体，也是活该，谁叫他们没长颗玻璃心呢～ @whigzhou: 最近听到的另一个案子荒谬程度雷同，华盛顿州一家药店基于宗教理由拒绝出售堕胎药，结果被法院勒令改正，官司打到第九巡回法院，输了 http://t.cn/RUJjMVf @whigzhou: 看来很多人没有意识到这个案子与一般区别对待消费者案子的不同之处：此案所涉及服务直接与店主信仰抵触，这不是饭店拒绝同性恋就餐，或服装店拒绝卖衣服给同性恋 @whigzhou: 更贴切的类比：一位基督徒开了家打字店，有人来打一份伊斯兰经文，里面充斥着对基督教的诋毁之词，他有权拒绝这笔生意吗？ @whigzhou: 或者你开了家印刷厂，有人要印一万份宗教宣传小册子，其中内容与你的宗教信仰直接抵触，你可以拒绝这笔生意吗？ @sonicblue3: 药店的公共属性是要高一些。不过要是不接受明的暗的政府补贴的话，那我觉得老板想卖啥不想卖啥也无所谓 @Stimmung: 这就是为什么政府补贴不该存在，政府一补贴你，你就归政府管了// @whigzhou: 而且暗的补贴也算，连拒绝都拒绝不掉～  

【2015-10-30】 最近听到不少诸如“别让孩子学中文或读中文材料以免受其毒害”之类的，我看有点反应过度了，说几点看法： 1）中文（即汉语官话之书面语）不是很好的语言，特别是在表达精确而复杂的结构性内容时， 2）但这不好不是该语言的“本性”决定的，而是因为它缺乏被高密度大强度的运用于此类精确表达的历史， 3）认为学某种语言就会被该语言所特有的思维模式所困住，这种想法过于语言决定论了， 4）有些人确实会被语言困住，但那是因为他们自己足够蠢，或信息条件足够闭塞， 5）语言没什么固有不变的本性，使用者总是在不断改造它，当某种表达需求足够强烈、频繁而普遍时，新成分就会被创造出来， 6）就认知能力发展而言，拼音化和非拼音化书面语各有好处，有机会各学一门挺好， 7）但不学也没什么大不了的，因为发展符号认知能力的其他机会很多，错过一种也无所谓， 8）当代中文材料里垃圾居多，这没错， 9）但因此而认为孩子学中文时接触这些材料会把脑子学坏，是没有道理的过度恐慌， 10）许多孩子确实被教坏了，比如学到很多坏的思考方法，习得很多坏的文化， 11）但这不是因为接触了太多垃圾，而是因为没机会读到好东西， 12）希望将孩子隔离在垃圾之外，这既无必要，也做不到，哪里都有很多垃圾，英文世界也是， 13）重要的是要让他有机会接触好东西，品味都是靠多吃练出来的。  

【2015-10-29】 @海德沙龙 《欧元危机背后的微观病灶》在有关欧元危机的报道和评论中，货币政策、财政赤字、物价、失业率等宏观因素总是处于议论焦点，微观层面却很少得到关注，经济学家Christian Thimann在比较了各欧元国过去15年贸易差额后发现：顺差国顺差恒增，逆差国逆差同样恒增，这只能从微观方面理解 @whigzhou: 分隔顺差区和逆差区的界线真是太眼熟了～ @whigzhou: 日耳曼vs非日耳曼，新教vs天主教/东正教，文化禀赋真是千年难改啊 @whigzhou: 个人责任vs命苦赖别人，重诺守信vs说话当放屁，遵守规则愿赌服输vs习惯性耍赖……

【2015-10-27】 @whigzhou: 昨天参加了一个初中同学会，除少数几位，都是我30年没见过的同学，我把大部分时间都花在使劲逐一辨认上了，直到散会这任务也还没完成，这是我有生以来最真切而密集的体验到长期记忆如何被逐渐唤起，人脸似乎在其中履行了主要的索引功能，往往在凝视一张面孔几分钟之后，一些往日情景突然就浮了出来。 @whigzhou: 回想起不少有意思的情景：1）我们班2/3以上同学是农村的，老师也有不少是农村的，学校有农忙假，不过每年只有一次，但因为当时还流行双季稻和冬小麦，所以每年有两次农忙，春天那次没有假期，结果，那一周教室里常常只剩下不到一半学生，还经常有父母跑到教室里把孩子喊回家干活； @whigzhou: 2）有个女同学突然变得很忧郁，常暗自哭泣，后来就没来上学了，一打听，说是嫁人了，家里穷，是换亲；另一个女生比我高一级，也换亲了，但她没服从，因为太喜欢读书，而且成绩年纪第一，结果逃到亲戚家躲起来了，后来上了中专好像 @whigzhou: 3）许多同学最终被我认出来，是因为曾经和我同桌，我的同桌比谁都多，因为入学排座位是按身高，我在第二排，后来不断有同学要求往前换，我却巴不得往后靠，而且我在老师眼里属于“眼不见为净”那种，所以换座提议总是得到批准，于是最后我就在末排了，结果就有了许多前同桌。 @二逼青年批话多:换亲是类似于童养媳？ @whigzhou: 不是，童养媳是“答应嫁过来为条件的收养”，换亲是双方各自将女儿嫁给对方的儿子，这是两个都备不起彩礼的穷家庭的解决方案 @whigzhou: 4）说起同桌，我们小学的排桌政策是尽可能男女混桌，据说用意是利用男女生之间的敌意来建立相互监督和制约机制，而到初中，排桌政策就换成了尽可能同性同桌，无论好坏，这两个政策倒确实有着坚实的发育心理学基础，青春期、男女生之间从敌意/对抗到吸引的转变，好像就是从初一开始； @whigzhou: 5）我们镇人口两千多，我们中学还服务周边农村两万多人，但那时农村入学率低不少，所以农村学生比例大约在2/3，回想起来，当时在学生中间，城镇对农村是一条最明显的社会界线，不过我好像天生就对此类社会界线缺乏敏感，我的玩伴以农村孩子居多，似乎还因此被排斥在城镇孩子的玩圈之外， @whigzhou: 不过我当时对此懵然不觉，回想起来好像真是这样，昨天吃饭时分桌是自发的，但城乡界线依然清晰，而我不知不觉就坐在了农村那桌上，我对社会交往中的一些隐秘规范和模式太迟钝了，往往事后很久才察觉到，这一定造成了许多沟通无效，让我听不出别人的某句话在暗示什么  

And There Shall be an Über for Everything … Including Goats 无处不Uber，山羊亦如是 作者：Michelle Martin @ 2015-8-26 译者：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：张三（@老子毫无动静地坐着像一段呆木头），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：花花公子，http://www.playboy.com/articles/uber-goats-rental Tammy Dunakin sits in a lawn chair in the shade of her R-pod camper trailer watching her brush-removal team at work. Her crew of 60 is spaced haphazardly across a weedy hillside that rises to meet Highway 99 in downtown Seattle. 在露营车旁边的阴凉地里放一把草坪躺椅，Tammy Dunakin悠闲地坐在上面，看着她正在工作的灌木清除队。她的60位伙计地散布在一片杂草丛生的山坡上。山坡向上延伸，同西雅图市中心的99号公路相接。 At least half of the workers are napping or resting in the shade. The others are wandering about or snacking. It’s typical for this crew. They’re goats. 然而，此时至少有一半的伙计在树荫下打瞌睡或休息，其他的不是在闲逛就是在吃零食。但这其实是这个团队的常态。因为——他们毕竟是山羊啊：） People walking by are surprised and delighted. They ask questions and snap photos through the fence. They stop. They look. They linger. 路过的人们都露出了惊讶和兴奋的表情。隔着栅栏，他们问这问那，又忙着拍照。他们停下来，围观，久久不愿离去。 “Seriously? This is pretty awesome,” one man says to Dunakin before continuing on his way. “不是逗我吧？这可真酷毙了。”一个路人停下脚步对Dunakin说。 “Goats out of context,” says Dunakin, the owner of Rent-a-Ruminant, which is based on nearby Vashon Island. “It grabs people’s attention. People absolutely love goats. Everyone—and I mean every single person who sees them—leaves with a smile on their face. It makes them happy. It makes my day.” “想不到是山羊吧，呵呵。”Dunakin说道，她是“租个反刍动物回家”公司的老板，公司位于附近的瓦雄岛（Vashon Island）。“这成功地抓住了人们的眼球，人们超爱山羊的。所有人——我是说每一个看到这些山羊的人——离开时都会面带笑容。这带给他们快乐，也让我非常开心。” When Dunakin started her clients were private landowners. Eleven years later, goats are in high demand and getting more popular all the time. Now she also has requests from planned communities, transportation departments and even police departments for clearing shrubbery in high-crime areas. Dunakin刚开始这门营生时，顾客都是私有土地主。11年过去了，山羊越来越受欢迎，需求旺盛。现在Dunakin也会收到来自规划型社区、交通部门的订单，甚至警察局也会请她去清理罪案多发地区的灌木丛。 In March, Amazon Home Services launched with goats as a top offering. “My email exploded,” says Dunakin. “I got hundreds of requests. No one was expecting that kind of response.” 三月份，亚马逊推出“家庭服务”主页的时候高榜热推了“山羊”服务。“我的邮箱都被挤爆了！” Dunakin说，“我收到数以百计的订单，真没想到市场反应竟然这么热烈。” This is Uber, but with goats, and more proof that thanks to technology meeting ingenuity meeting demand, there will soon be an “Uber” for everything. 这其实就是山羊除草服务的Uber模式。越来越多的事例表明，有赖科技，创意和需求的结合，用不了多久，什么东西都可以来“Uber”一把。 Dunakin’s herd has grown to 115 working goats, and she now has more than enough work to keep them all busy from April to October. Livestock-loving entrepreneurs are stepping up to fill the growing demand. Dunakin has trained and licensed 10 others through her affiliate license program, and she plans to franchise in 2016. More than 50 grazing providers across the United States and Canada can be found here. Dunakin的羊群已经增加到了115头，而且已经有足够的活儿让它们从四月一直忙到十月。网站“Livestock-loving”上的企业家们正纷纷加入进来，去满足不断增长的需求。通过其“成员认证计划”，Dunakin已经培训了十家公司并给它们颁发了证书，而且她打算在2016年开始进行特许经营。美国和加拿大已有50多家提供吃草服务的商家。 Goats are browsers as opposed to grazers. Unlike cows, which mostly stick to munching grass, goats prefer a variety of plants. They’ll eat thorny Himalayan blackberries, stinging nettles, ivy – it’s a long list. Goats are the high school boys of the animal kingdom. 山羊是食草动物里的“扫货客”。同基本只吃草的牛不同，山羊喜欢的植物多种多样。它们能吃带刺的喜马拉雅黑莓、叶子上长满刺人蜇毛的荨麻、常青藤——这份菜单长着呢。山羊是动物王国里的高中男生。 They like to climb. They traverse steep slopes with ease. Their digestion destroys some weed seeds such as blackberry seeds, and they fertilize the soil as they go. They also help to keep fire danger low. 它们还喜欢攀爬，陡峭的山坡也能轻松越过。它们的消化系统能破坏掉诸如黑莓等植物的种子，而且它们会沿路给土地“施肥”。它们还能降低火灾的风险。 If they are deployed at the right time of year and contained—not always an easy task—using livestock such as goats is arguably one of the best, greenest ways to remove pesky weeds and unwanted vegetation. And best of all, you don’t have to own a goat to reap the benefits—you can rent. 在一年中的适当时候将畜群“分派”出去，而且让它们安分守己，有时并不是件容易的事。但如果做到了，那用像山羊这样的牲畜来清除讨厌的杂草和不想要的植被，可以说是最好、最绿色环保的方式了。而且最棒的是，眼下你不用实际拥有一头山羊就能享有这些好处——你可以租了。 It’s not a solution for everyone. I received an estimate through Amazon Home Services for a tenth-of-an-acre parcel. At $650 it seemed a bit steep for a mow. I get it, though. The goats have to be transported to the property, the wrangler stays with them the entire time, and she has to set up electric fencing to keep the goats out of the garden beds and any plants that are toxic to them. 这一解决方案也并不是能适用于每个人。之前我通过亚马逊家庭服务网站收到了一份为十分之一英亩土地提供除草服务的估价，是650美刀，作为割草服务，这个要价似乎贵了点。但我也可以理解，毕竟山羊们得先被运到这里，然后牧羊人得同它们一直呆在一起，她还必须拉起一个电栅栏以便把山羊同花坛和对它们有毒的植物分开。 I’ll stick with a push mower, but goats make a lot of sense for people with some combination of steep slopes, gnarly weeds, significant acreage, restoration goals or a desire to do good for the planet. 我还是会选择手推式剪草机。不过对于那些拥有大片土地，土地上有陡峭山坡和粗硬扭结杂草，希望恢复土地的肥力，或者想保护环境的人来说，山羊还是很不错的选择。 Mark Stranahan has all but the steep slopes. He hired Dunakin’s goats in June to come out to his land on Vashon Island for the second year in a row. 除了没有陡坡，Mark Stranahan 在瓦雄岛的土地符合以上所有条件。他六月时请Dunakin的羊来给他的土地除草，而这已是连续第二年了。 “What goats eat, it’s incredible. I had a huge nasty thicket of blackberry bramble with branches an inch thick, and they ate it all. It’s amazing what they can accomplish in terms of clearing,” says Stranahan, who is an architect and consultant who has been living in Ann Arbor, Mich., for part of the year. “山羊这吃货可真是让人难以置信。我有一大片讨厌的茂密黑莓林，枝丫都有一英寸粗，可山羊把它们都吃光了！说到清理，它们的能力简直令人惊异。”Stranahan说道。Stranahan是一位建筑师和顾问，每年都有部分时间生活在密西根州的安娜堡（Ann Arbor, Mich.）。 Last year the goats worked his four acres of meadows and alder forests for nine days, and this year they cleared the weeds in a week. How did they shave three days off? More experience? Better pay? Cloud-based solutions? Actually, the land starts to recover, and it becomes easier to maintain. 去年，山羊群在他四英亩的牧场和桤树林里足足干了九天，而今年在一周之内就搞定了。它们是怎么省下三天时间的呢？更有经验了？薪水更多了？还是用了云计算？事实上，只是土地开始恢复了而已，这让保养工作变得容易了。 “It’s nice to wander out with a hot cup of coffee and see the goats,” Stranahan says. “端着一杯热咖啡到地里散步，看看羊，真是一种享受。”Stranahan 说。 Not so entertaining is when the goats get out. Set free, they will eat gardens and ornamental plants (and get sick goat bellies or worse), and they will clamber up onto anything they can, including the roof of your car or home. This is why hiring is the best way to go. 可当山羊跑出去时，可就没有这么惬意了。要是放任不管，山羊们会吃掉花园和装饰植物（这会让他们拉肚子，甚至更糟），它们能爬就爬，包括你的车顶和房顶。所以租用（而不是自己养）是最好的方式。 “I lived with a couple of goats in a previous era on a previous hippie farm,” Stranahan said. “They are damned difficult roommates. The clickety-clack of little goat hooves on your Alfa Romeo will piss you right off.” “早年在一个嬉皮士农场，我曾同几只羊一起生活过，” Stranahan 说，“它们真是超级难处的室友。小羊蹄子在你的阿尔法·罗密欧牌爱车上的踢踏声，能把你当场气疯。” Stranahan likes a good goat-based solution because, well, it’s cool. Stranahan喜欢一个不错的“羊方案”，嗯，因为这很酷。 “Local vegan food is cool, roller-derby is cool, and goats are cool,” he said. “当地的纯素食很酷，轮滑阻拦赛（roller derby）很酷，还有山羊也很酷。”他说。 Having them quickly graze off weed populations every few seasons is an excellent way to encourage re-vegetation and restoration of natural plant succession. And it’s more fun. People don’t come visiting with a picnic if you’re spraying pesticides. 让山羊们每隔几个季节就来啃食田间杂草，是促进植被恢复和自然植物更替的好办法，而且也更有乐趣。要是你喷洒除草剂的话，人们是不会来野餐的。 Russ Ayers might agree. He’s the landscape manager of the 2,200-acre Issaquah Highlands, a master-planned community in the foothills of the Cascade Mountain Range. He has hired goats to come eat weeds on about 18 acres of the steepest, toughest terrain—land where the community tried using human crews before discovering it was just too rough and risky. Goats have been coming for five years. They are born to take on steep hillsides where weed-eaters wear out and where men grow weary and get injured. Russ Ayers大概也会同意的。他管理着2200英亩的伊瑟阔高地（Issaquah Highlands），这是卡斯克德山脉（Cascade Mountain Range）脚下一片精心规划的社区。Russ Ayers已经雇山羊来为其中最陡峭、最艰难的18英亩土地清除杂草。之前社区是用人力来完成这项工作的，但发现那样太艰难，风险太高了。山羊们已经连续过来五年了。它们天生就是爬陡坡的好手——那些地方会让除草机报废，让人累坏，而且容易受伤。 “They do a great job,” Ayers says. “它们干得很棒。”Ayers 说。 When they’re done, the fire fuel load is virtually zero. They chomp it down and fertilize the fields and by early fall the grass is green and about six inches tall. The goats cost a quarter of what a human crew costs. 山羊们清理完后，土地上的可燃物基本就没有了。它们嚼完那些可燃物，还给土地施肥。等到了早秋时节，绿草就有6英寸高了。雇佣山羊的费用只有雇佣工人的四分之一。 To accomplish the same tasks, a human crew would need to cut, bag, haul, dump and fertilize—each step with a cost and carbon footprint that the goats obliterate in the game of who’s greener. 要完成同样的工作，一个工人需要先修剪，再打包拖走，然后倒掉，最后再施肥——每一步都有成本并产生碳排放。山羊可不会产生碳排放，在绿化环保的比拼里稳操胜券。 if you’re in the market for a goat rental, Dunakin has a few tips. Find an outfit that stays with the goats, unless you want to end up on the news. If the animals escape, a speedy response is essential. Check the company’s rating with the Better Business Bureau as well as reviews from previous clients and on sites such as Angie’s List. Make sure they are insured and that they provide water and shelter for the animals. 如果你正打算从市场上挑选山羊租赁服务，Dunakin有几条建议给你。为山羊配齐整套控制装备【译注：大概是指前面提到的控制山羊活动范围的电网之类设施】，除非你想上新闻。如果动物们逃跑了，快速反应是必须的。从非盈利点评组织Better Business Bureau那里查看该公司的评级，同时从以前的客户那里或类似Angie’s List这样的网站上了解该公司的服务水平。确保他们是买了保险的，并会为动物们提供饮水和栖身之所。 If restoration of native vegetation is your goal, An Peischel, a small ruminant extension specialist at Tennessee State University, suggests making sure the herd you hire has experience with your particular types of vegetation. There is a lot of science around what goats can do, naturally, and factors such as time of year, elevation and even sex of the goats can make a difference in what the goats will eat when. With the right timing, goats can eradicate certain weeds and promote native plants. 田纳西州立大学的小型反刍动物推广专家An Peischel建议，如果你的目标是想恢复当地植被，那你要搞清楚你所雇佣的畜群是否对你想处理的特定植物有经验。关于山羊天生可以做什么有许多科学研究，诸如季节、海拔甚至性别等因素，都会对山羊什么时候吃些什么产生影响。选对了时间，山羊就可以清除特定的杂草，促进当地植被的生长。 Dunakin’s adorable employees have perennial appeal. She and her goats have been highlighted in The Wall Street Journal, Newsweek and “The Colbert Report,” among other places, but Dunakin says she has at least one more goal. “I know that when I get on ‘Ellen,’ I have arrived.” Sigh. We hope Playboy will do for now. Dunakin可爱的伙计们一年到头都那么受欢迎。她和她的山羊们已经在包括《华尔街日报》、《新闻周刊》和“科尔伯特报告”节目在内的许多媒体中被重点报道过了。但Dunakin说她至少还有一个目标：“要是有朝一日能上艾伦秀，那就圆满了。”哎，其实此刻上《花花公子》也不赖啊，我希望。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Beginning of the End of Religious Freedom 宗教自由终结的开始 作者：David Harsanyi @ 2015-8-21 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Reason，http://reason.com/archives/2015/08/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-religious-fr Compelling bakers to bake cakes part of a broader drive to limit faith-based decisions by private businesses. 强迫糕点师制作蛋糕是限制私营企业基于信仰作决策的广泛攻势的一部分 Just in case you need a refresher: Back in 2012, a baker in the Denver suburb of Lakewood was asked by a gay couple to make them a wedding cake—two years before gay marriage was even legalized in Colorado. The owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, declined to participate in Charlie Craig and David Mullins' celebration because such an event conflicted with his Christian faith. 也许你需要重温一下：2012年，在丹佛市郊的莱克伍德，一对同性恋人要求一名糕点师为他们制作一个婚礼蛋糕——那是科罗拉多州同姓婚姻合法化之前两年的事了。“杰作蛋糕”的店主，Jack Phillip，拒绝让自己参与进Charlie Craig和David Mullins的婚礼，因为这与他的基督教信仰相冲突。 Here are a few things Phillips didn't do: He didn't query consumers about their sexual preferences. He didn't bar same-sex couples from purchasing a cake at a place of public accommodation. He didn't ask consumers traveling in same-sex pairs to leave his shop. He didn't hang a "No Gays Allowed" sign in his window. Phillips没有做以下这些事情：他没有查问顾客的性取向。他没有禁止同性伴侣在公共场所购买蛋糕。他没有要求出双入对的同性客人离开他的店铺。他也没有在窗户上挂“同性恋勿入”的牌子。 What he could never have known when he first opened his shop was that celebrating gay marriages would be a precondition for making a living. And when you consider that there are at least a few dozen other bakeries within a short drive from Masterpiece Cakeshop that could have accommodated the couple's celebratory pastry needs, why would he? 他刚开店的时候绝对想不到，为同性婚姻服务会成为谋生的前提条件。你想想，“杰作蛋糕”周边极短车程以内就有至少好几十家其它烘焙店，它们原本都能帮这对恋人制作婚礼蛋糕，这让他怎么想得到呢？ Yet instead of exhibiting a basic level of tolerance (or dignity), two priggish bullies decided to call the authorities when Phillips refused to bake them a cake. And the cultural commissars at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission soon ruled that he had discriminated against the couple. 然而，在Phillips拒绝为他们制作蛋糕之后，这两位自命道德高尚的霸道人物，没有表现出起码的宽容（或体面），而是决定报告政府。科罗拉多民权委员会的文化专员很快就裁定Phillips歧视了这对同性恋。 The shop was not only ordered to alter store policy and start baking cakes for gay weddings—or else face debilitating fines, a consequence often reported on by the media—but also forced to provide comprehensive staff training, ensure compliance and then file quarterly obedience reports with the government for two years. In these reports, Phillips has to describe exactly which remedial measures the shop has taken to conform and document the reasons any other patrons were denied service. 这家店不但被勒令店铺更改规定，从今往后要为同性婚礼制作蛋糕——否则就要面临惩罚性罚款，媒体对此后果多有报道——而且还被强制要求开展全面的员工培训、保证遵守规定并在两年内每季度定期向政府提交合规报告。Phillips在报告中必须具体描述店里为了合规都采取了何种整改措施，并要记录店里拒绝为任何其他主顾提供服务的原因。 So, you know, I'm sure this is exactly how Thomas Jefferson imagined America would turn out when he was writing the Declaration of Independence. 所以，你知道的，我确信托马斯·杰弗逊写《独立宣言》时就料到美国未来会变成这样。 Phillips appealed the decision, and a three-panel Colorado Court of Appeals unanimously decided that Masterpiece Cakeshop's policy against creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples was a "discriminatory and unfair practice," further ruling that the shop must continue to answer to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission or else be run out of business. Phillips对这一判决提出了上诉，结果由三人组成的科罗拉多上诉法院一致裁定“杰作蛋糕”拒绝为同性伴侣制作婚礼蛋糕的方针乃是“歧视性的不公正行为”，同时判决该店必须继续听从科罗拉多民权委员会的要求，否则就要停止营业。 Incredibly, the court acknowledged in its decision that it would have looked at the First Amendment arguments more closely had the gay couple ordered a cake with some explicit messaging that advocated gay marriage. In other words, the Colorado Court of Appeals believes that the threshold for denying religious liberty is the presence of advocacy. The court has effectively tasked itself with determining for you when religion should matter. 令人难以置信的是，法院在其判决中承认，假如当事的同性伴侣在订购蛋糕时明确传递了提倡同性婚姻的信息，那么法院会更为仔细地考虑宪法第一修正案。换句话说，科罗拉多上诉法院认为，否定宗教自由的门槛乃是公开提倡。法院因此实质上为自己赋予了一项任务：替你决定什么时候宗教是要紧的。 If nothing else, it's comforting to know that Colorado can force an orthodox Muslim butcher to make sausages for a polyamorous, bisexual bachelor/bachelorette party, as long as no one asks the butcher to outwardly promote swine and free love. 别的不论，以下事实实在让我们感到安慰：科罗拉多可以强迫正统的穆斯林屠户为开放多偶、双性恋的单身派对制作猪肉肠，只要没人要求这位屠户公开推广猪和自由性爱。 In any event, I'm sure there will be an appeal. But seeing as most Americans are fine with gay marriage and simultaneously put off by unpleasant (though deceptive, in this case) words such as "discrimination" and "prejudice," the courts—nearly always driven by the vagaries of public opinion—will find a way to force all to comply. 无论如何，我确信还会有场上诉。但看到多数美国人都觉得同性婚姻没什么大不了，同时又容易因“歧视”和“偏见”等令人不快（尽管在本案中这一不快是有欺骗性的）的词汇引发反感，几乎总是被反复莫测的公共意见所左右的法院总会找到办法来令所有人顺从。 This will go for any other businesses even tangentially related to weddings, such as food catering, music and so on. And the crusade will accelerate until the legal lynch mob gets to religious institutions. No doubt advocates will work backward to come up with a great legal rationalization for all of it. 这甚至还会延伸到只与婚礼擦边的行业，比如酒席承办、音乐伴奏等等。这场讨伐运动还会愈演愈烈，直到那些利用法律行私刑的暴民们一路杀到宗教组织那里。毫无疑问，支持者们会事后努力，为所有这一切进行法律上的合理化。 All of this is not to say that in American life, the minority should never be compelled to surrender to some form of majoritarianism, judicial force or government. In this case, though, the minority does not have the ability to compromise without abandoning its faith. The other side refuses to compromise precisely because of this reality. And courts and commissions around the country are willing to destroy businesses—businesses that sometimes took a large part of a lifetime to build—by ignoring one of the most vital functions of the First Amendment. 以上所论当然不是说，在美国人的生活中，少数派永远不应该被迫向某种形式的多数主义、司法机关和政府让步。只不过，在眼前的这一案例中，少数派没有能力在遵从自己信仰的条件下达成妥协。而另一方之所以拒绝妥协，恰恰就是因为这一现实。而全国各地的法院和委员会无视第一修正案的最关键功能之一，愿意去摧毁企业——有时还是某些人花了大半辈子才建立起来的企业。 The position of these businesspeople, unlike Southern racists decades ago, in no way undermines the newfound right of gay Americans to marry, nor does it inhibit them from enjoying freedom or finding happiness. In this case, only one side is attempting to legislate morality. 与几十年前南方的种族主义者不同，这些生意人的立场完全不会破坏美国同性恋者新近得以确立的结婚权利，也不会阻止他们享受自由和追求幸福。在本案中，只有一方试图将道德问题法律化。 If you admit—and many rational people do, even those who quarrel with the reasoning behind religious obstinacy—that millions of Christians hold some form of a genuine, long-standing religious conviction that prohibits them from celebrating gay marriages but you still support state coercion against them, then you might as well just concede that religious freedom isn't compatible with your conception of a contemporary society. 如果你承认——许多理性的人都会承认，即便是那些反对固执宗教思维的人——数以百万计的基督徒持有某种真诚的、存在已久的宗教信念，使得他们不可能去庆祝同性婚姻，但你还是支持国家对他们采取强制措施，那你就不如直接承认宗教自由与你所理解的现代社会不相容。 Whereas at one time the state wouldn't substantially burden religious exercise and would use the least restrictive means to further "compelling interests," the state today is inclined to substantially burden a Christian by the mere fact that someone's feelings are hurt. 从前，国家并不会实质性地增加宗教活动的义务，并以最不具有限制性的方式推动“重大迫切利益”。然而现在，国家已倾向于实质性地加重基督徒的义务，只是因为有人的感情受到了伤害。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Coddling of the American Mind 美国精神的娇惯 作者：GREG LUKIANOFF，JONATHAN HAIDT @ 2015-9 译者：Horace Rae（@sheldon_rae） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Atlantic，http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ In the name of emotional well-being, college students are increasingly demanding protection from words and ideas they don’t like. Here’s why that’s disastrous for education—and mental health. 以情感安康为名，大学生如今愈发强烈地要求保护自己，不愿听到他们不喜欢的言语和思想。下文解释了为什么这一趋势无论对教育还是心理健康都是灾难性的。 Something strange is happening at America’s colleges and universities. A movement is arising, undirected and driven largely by students, to scrub campuses clean of words, ideas, and subjects that might cause discomfort or give offense. Last December, Jeannie Suk wrote in an online article for The New Yorker about law students asking her fellow professors at Harvard not to teach rape law—or, in one case, even use the word violate (as in “that violates the law”) lest it cause students distress. 当今美国高校中存在一个奇怪的现象。一场运动正在蓬勃发展，它不受引导，主要由学生推动，目的是把可能造成冒犯或引起不适的言语、思想和议题从校园中清除出去。去年12月，Jeannie Suk在《纽约客》一篇在线文章中写到，有法学院的学生要求她在哈佛的同僚停止讲授强奸法——有一次，甚至要求他们停止使用“violate”一词（比如在“that violates the law”中）【译注：该词兼有“违反”、“侵犯”、“亵渎”与“强奸”之义】以免引起学生不适。 In February, Laura Kipnis, a professor at Northwestern University, wrote an essay in The Chronicle of Higher Education describing a new campus politics of sexual paranoia—and was then subjected to a long investigation after students who were offended by the article and by a tweet she’d sent filed Title IX complaints against her. 今年二月，西北大学教授Laura Kipnis在《高等教育纪事报》上发表了一篇文章，讲述高校里新出现的一种性妄想政治，有学生因为被这篇文章以及她发布的一条推特所冒犯，对其提出基于“第九条”的控诉【译注：指《联邦教育法修正案》第九条，禁止教育领域性别歧视】，她因此遭受了漫长的调查。 In June, a professor protecting himself with a pseudonym wrote an essay for Vox describing how gingerly he now has to teach. “I’m a Liberal Professor, and My Liberal Students Terrify Me,” the headline said. A number of popular comedians, including Chris Rock, have stopped performing on college campuses (see Caitlin Flanagan’s article in this month’s issue). Jerry Seinfeld and Bill Maher have publicly condemned the oversensitivity of college students, saying too many of them can’t take a joke. 今年六月，一位使用化名以保护自己的教授为Vox写了一篇文章，描述他现在在教学中需要多么小心翼翼，文章的标题是：“我是一名自由派教授，我被我的自由派学生吓坏了”。包括Chris Rock在内的许多当红谐星，已经不在大学校园演出了（详情见Caitlin Flanagan在本月杂志上的文章）。 Jerry Seinfeld和Bill Maher已公开批评大学生的过度敏感，说他们中太多人连一个玩笑也开不起了。 Two terms have risen quickly from obscurity into common campus parlance.Microaggressions are small actions or word choices that seem on their face to have no malicious intent but that are thought of as a kind of violence nonetheless. For example, by some campus guidelines, it is a microaggression to ask an Asian American or Latino American “Where were you born?,” because this implies that he or she is not a real American. 有两个晦涩的术语已经变成了校园里的日常用语。“微冒犯”（microaggression）表示表面本无恶意但仍被认为具有侵犯性的小举动或用语选择。举个例子，某些校园规则规定，询问亚裔或拉丁裔美国人“你出生在哪里？”就是一种“微冒犯”，因为这一提问暗示了这个人不是真正的美国人。 Trigger warnings are alerts that professors are expected to issue if something in a course might cause a strong emotional response. For example, some students have called for warnings that Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart describes racial violence and that F. Scott Fitzgerald’sThe Great Gatsby portrays misogyny and physical abuse, so that students who have been previously victimized by racism or domestic violence can choose to avoid these works, which they believe might “trigger” a recurrence of past trauma. “刺激警告”是上课时教授们在讲授易触发强烈情绪波动的内容前被认为应该发出的警告。举个例子，有些学生要求教授预先警告Chinua Achebe的《瓦解》包含有种族暴力内容，F. Scott Fitzgerald的《了不起的盖茨比》描绘了厌女症和肢体暴力。他们认为这些著作可能会“刺激”过往的心灵创伤，因此之前遭受过种族主义和家庭暴力伤害的学生就可以选择跳过这些著作。 Some recent campus actions border on the surreal. In April, at Brandeis University, the Asian American student association sought to raise awareness of microaggressions against Asians through an installation on the steps of an academic hall. The installation gave examples of microaggressions such as “Aren’t you supposed to be good at math?” and “I’m colorblind! I don’t see race.” But a backlash arose among other Asian American students, who felt that the display itself was a microaggression. The association removed the installation, and its president wrote an e-mail to the entire student body apologizing to anyone who was “triggered or hurt by the content of the microaggressions.” 一些近期的校园现象近乎荒诞。今年四月，为了引起对针对亚裔的“微冒犯”的重视，布兰迪斯大学亚裔美国学生联合会在一个学术报告厅的台阶上做了一个展示，内容是“微冒犯”的例子，比如“你们不是应该非常擅长数学吗？”和“我是色盲！我分辨不出种族。”但是另一些亚裔美国学生则提出强烈反对，他们认为这个展示本身就是一种“微冒犯”。后来联合会撤除了这些展品，会长向全体学生发了一封电子邮件，向所有“被‘微冒犯’伤害或刺激”的人道歉。

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According to the most-basic tenets of psychology, helping people with anxiety disorders avoid the things they fear is misguided. 按照最基本的心理学原则，帮助焦虑症患者逃避他们所惧怕的事物是完全错误的。

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This new climate is slowly being institutionalized, and is affecting what can be said in the classroom, even as a basis for discussion. During the 2014–15 school year, for instance, the deans and department chairs at the 10 University of California system schools were presented by administrators at faculty leader-training sessions with examples of microaggressions. The list of offensive statements included: “America is the land of opportunity” and “I believe the most qualified person should get the job.” 这种新的风气正在渐渐制度化，而且正在影响课堂上可以讲授的内容，甚至成为讨论问题的基础。例如在2014-15学年间，行政官员在教职员领导培训课程上为加州大学系统10所院校的院长和系主任们介绍了“微冒犯”的例子。冒犯性语言的清单包括：“美国是充满机会的国度”和“我相信这份工作应该给最有资格的人”。 The press has typically described these developments as a resurgence of political correctness. That’s partly right, although there are important differences between what’s happening now and what happened in the 1980s and ’90s. That movement sought to restrict speech (specifically hate speech aimed at marginalized groups), but it also challenged the literary, philosophical, and historical canon, seeking to widen it by including more-diverse perspectives. 媒体通常将这种变化描述为政治正确的复兴。这种说法部分正确，尽管现在发生的事情和上世纪八、九十年代发生的事情存在着重大差异。过去的运动试图限制言论（尤其是针对边缘群体的仇恨言论），但是它们也挑战文学、哲学和历史各方面的正统，试图通过容纳更加多元的视角来对之加以拓展。 The current movement is largely about emotional well-being. More than the last, it presumes an extraordinary fragility of the collegiate psyche, and therefore elevates the goal of protecting students from psychological harm. The ultimate aim, it seems, is to turn campuses into “safe spaces” where young adults are shielded from words and ideas that make some uncomfortable. 当下的运动则主要关注情感安康。不仅如此，它假定大学生的心理脆弱不堪，因此提升了保护学生免受心理伤害这一目标的重要性。这场运动的终极目标，似乎是要屏蔽一切让学生不舒服的言语和观点，把大学校园变成一个“安全场所”。 And more than the last, this movement seeks to punish anyone who interferes with that aim, even accidentally. You might call this impulse vindictive protectiveness. It is creating a culture in which everyone must think twice before speaking up, lest they face charges of insensitivity, aggression, or worse. 再进一步，这场运动试图让每一个妨碍这一目标的人受到惩罚，无心而为也不可原谅。你可以把这种冲动的念头称作“报复性保护”，它正在创造一种文化，在这种文化下，每一个人都必须三思而后言，以免被人指控麻木不仁、有攻击性，甚至更糟糕的罪名。 We have been studying this development for a while now, with rising alarm. (Greg Lukianoff is a constitutional lawyer and the president and CEO of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, which defends free speech and academic freedom on campus, and has advocated for students and faculty involved in many of the incidents this article describes; Jonathan Haidt is a social psychologist who studies the American culture wars. The stories of how we each came to this subject can be read here.) 我们研究这场运动已有一段时间了，情况越来越吓人。（Greg Lukianoff是一名宪法律师学者，也是个人教育权利基金会的主席兼CEO。该基金会致力于捍卫校园中的言论自由和学术自由，并且曾声援那些卷入本文所描述诸多事件的学生和教师；Jonathan Haidt是一位社会心理学家，他研究美国的文化战争。关于我们各自都是如何开始研究这个课题的，请见这里http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/greg-lukianoffs-story/399359/） The dangers that these trends pose to scholarship and to the quality of American universities are significant; we could write a whole essay detailing them. But in this essay we focus on a different question: What are the effects of this new protectiveness on the students themselves? Does it benefit the people it is supposed to help? 这种趋势对学术研究和美国大学教育的质量构成了严重威胁；我们可以写一整篇论文来详细论述。但是本文关注的是另一个问题：这种娇呵严护对学生自身有什么影响？它是否能帮助到它本打算帮助的人？ What exactly are students learning when they spend four years or more in a community that polices unintentional slights, places warning labels on works of classic literature, and in many other ways conveys the sense that words can be forms of violence that require strict control by campus authorities, who are expected to act as both protectors and prosecutors? 对无意的怠慢加以管制，给经典文学作品贴上警示标签，以其它种种方式传达这么一层意思：言词可能构成暴力，需要受到既被视作保护者又被视作检举人的校方的严格控制——学生花了四年甚至更多时间生活在这样的社区之中，究竟会学到什么呢？ There’s a saying common in education circles: Don’t teach students what to think; teach them how to think. The idea goes back at least as far as Socrates. Today, what we call the Socratic method is a way of teaching that fosters critical thinking, in part by encouraging students to question their own unexamined beliefs, as well as the received wisdom of those around them. Such questioning sometimes leads to discomfort, and even to anger, on the way to understanding. “不要教学生思考什么，要教给他们如何思考。”这句话在教育圈内广为人知。这一理念最早起码可追溯至苏格拉底。现在，我们把鼓励批判性思考的教育方法——部分通过鼓励学生质疑自己未经检验的信念以及从周遭等所接收到的知识——称作“苏格拉底法”。在通往理解的道路上，这些质疑可能带来不适，甚至引起愤怒。 But vindictive protectiveness teaches students to think in a very different way. It prepares them poorly for professional life, which often demands intellectual engagement with people and ideas one might find uncongenial or wrong. The harm may be more immediate, too. 但是报复性保护则教育学生以一种完全不同的方式思考。它无法给学生的职业生涯提供多少帮助，因为在职场我们往往需要与我们不认同甚至认为是完全错误的观点和人进行智识交锋。报复性保护也会带来更直接的伤害。 A campus culture devoted to policing speech and punishing speakers is likely to engender patterns of thought that are surprisingly similar to those long identified by cognitive behavioral therapists as causes of depression and anxiety. The new protectiveness may be teaching students to think pathologically. 致力于管制言论和惩罚发声者的校园文化容易导致一种思维方式，它与早已被认知行为治疗师们确认为焦虑症和抑郁症病因的那种思维方式惊人相似。新的保护可能会令学生陷入病态思维。 How Did We Get Here? 何以到了这一步？ It’s difficult to know exactly why vindictive protectiveness has burst forth so powerfully in the past few years. The phenomenon may be related to recent changes in the interpretation of federal antidiscrimination statutes (about which more later). But the answer probably involves generational shifts as well. Childhood itself has changed greatly during the past generation. Many Baby Boomers and Gen Xers can remember riding their bicycles around their hometowns, unchaperoned by adults, by the time they were 8 or 9 years old. In the hours after school, kids were expected to occupy themselves, getting into minor scrapes and learning from their experiences. 想要弄清为什么过去几年报复性保护如此猖獗并不容易。这一现象可能与最近对联邦反歧视法条的解释变化有关（以下稍后再详论这一点），但是答案也可能涉及代际差异，如今的孩童时代和上一代很不一样了。许多“婴儿潮一代”和“X一代”【译注：约指1965-1975年间生人】还有在家乡骑自行车四处兜风的记忆，当时他们只有八九岁，没有父母陪伴在旁。放学后，孩子们应该自己玩自己的，受些小挫折并从经验中吸取教训。 But “free range” childhood became less common in the 1980s. The surge in crime from the ’60s through the early ’90s made Baby Boomer parents more protective than their own parents had been. Stories of abducted children appeared more frequently in the news, and in 1984, images of them began showing up on milk cartons. In response, many parents pulled in the reins and worked harder to keep their children safe. 但是在1980年代，“放养”的童年越来越少了。1960年代到1990年代初的罪案攀升，使得婴儿潮时期出生的父母们比他们自己的父母更加护犊心切。拐卖儿童的事情越来越常见，在1984年，被拐卖儿童的照片都开始出现在牛奶盒上了。因此，许多家长勒紧了缰绳，努力保证自己孩子的安全。 The flight to safety also happened at school. Dangerous play structures were removed from playgrounds; peanut butter was banned from student lunches. After the 1999 Columbine massacre in Colorado, many schools cracked down on bullying, implementing “zero tolerance” policies. In a variety of ways, children born after 1980—the Millennials—got a consistent message from adults: life is dangerous, but adults will do everything in their power to protect you from harm, not just from strangers but from one another as well. 学校也加强了对安全的重视。操场上的危险游乐设施被拆除；学生午餐中禁用花生黄油。自从1999年科罗拉多州科伦拜恩大屠杀之后，许多学校严厉惩处欺凌事件，实行“零容忍”政策。生于1980年之后的一代——即“千禧一代”——以不同方式从大人们那里得到了一致的信息：生活危机满布，但大人们会竭尽所能保护你们免受伤害，既要防范陌生人，也要防范你们同伴。 These same children grew up in a culture that was (and still is) becoming more politically polarized. Republicans and Democrats have never particularly liked each other, but survey data going back to the 1970s show that on average, their mutual dislike used to be surprisingly mild. 同是这一批孩子，成长在一个政治上日益两极分化的文化中（这一两极化今天仍在继续）。共和党人和民主党人从来都互无好感，但是回溯到1970年代的调查数据显示，两党相互厌恶的程度总体来看也曾出奇地温和。 Negative feelings have grown steadily stronger, however, particularly since the early 2000s. Political scientists call this process “affective partisan polarization,” and it is a very serious problem for any democracy. As each side increasingly demonizes the other, compromise becomes more difficult. A recent study shows that implicit or unconscious biases are now at least as strong across political parties as they are across races. 此后，负面情绪就一直在稳步扩张，在进入新世纪后尤其严重。政治学家称这种现象为“情绪性党派两极化”。这对任何一个民主政体都是很严重的问题。鉴于一方一直在妖魔化另一方，达成共识就越来越困难。近来有研究显示，党派之间隐形和无意识的偏见，丝毫不逊色于种族之间的偏见。 So it’s not hard to imagine why students arriving on campus today might be more desirous of protection and more hostile toward ideological opponents than in generations past. This hostility, and the self-righteousness fueled by strong partisan emotions, can be expected to add force to any moral crusade. A principle of moral psychology is that “morality binds and blinds.” Part of what we do when we make moral judgments is express allegiance to a team. But that can interfere with our ability to think critically. Acknowledging that the other side’s viewpoint has any merit is risky—your teammates may see you as a traitor. 所以，我们不难想象为什么现在的学生比上几代人更加渴望受保护，对意识形态对立方有更强烈的敌意。这种敌意和由强烈党派感情激发的自命正直感，可想而知就是各种道德讨伐的助推器。道德心理学的一条原则是：“道德约束人，也让人盲目。”我们在作出道德判断的时候，同时也表达了对一个群体的忠诚。但是这可能会影响我们进行批判性思考的能力。承认对手的观点具有任何的合理性，风险都很大——队友们可能会把你当成叛徒。 Social media makes it extraordinarily easy to join crusades, express solidarity and outrage, and shun traitors. Facebook was founded in 2004, and since 2006 it has allowed children as young as 13 to join. This means that the first wave of students who spent all their teen years using Facebook reached college in 2011, and graduated from college only this year. 社交媒体使得加入道德讨伐易如反掌，也让表达团结与愤怒和排斥叛徒变得更加容易。Facebook成立于2004年，从2007年开始，它就允许低至13岁的孩子加入。这意味着第一批从青少年时期起就一直在用Facebook的孩子在2011年进入大学，今年才大学毕业。 These first true “social-media natives” may be different from members of previous generations in how they go about sharing their moral judgments and supporting one another in moral campaigns and conflicts. We find much to like about these trends; young people today are engaged with one another, with news stories, and with prosocial endeavors to a greater degree than when the dominant technology was television. But social media has also fundamentally shifted the balance of power in relationships between students and faculty; the latter increasingly fear what students might do to their reputations and careers by stirring up online mobs against them. 第一批真正的“社交媒体原生族”与此前几代人的不同之处，在于他们如何分享道德判断，在道德运动与道德冲突中如何彼此支持。这种趋势有其可喜之处：当今的年轻人与其他人在互相联系，分享新鲜事，与以电视为主导技术的时期相比，对社会交往更为投入。但是社交媒体也从根本上打破了学生和教师之间的权力平衡：后者越来越害怕学生会在网上煽动暴民打击自己，从而损害自己的名声和职业前途。 We do not mean to imply simple causation, but rates of mental illness in young adults have been rising, both on campus and off, in recent decades. Some portion of the increase is surely due to better diagnosis and greater willingness to seek help, but most experts seem to agree that some portion of the trend is real. 我们并不打算暗示一种简单的因果关系，但是近几十年来，不管在校内还是校外，青年人患心理疾病的比例都在上升。比例的提高，一定有部分是源于更高的诊断水平和更强的求诊意愿，但是大部分专家似乎都同意，这一统计趋势至少有部分是反映了患病率的真实上升。 Nearly all of the campus mental-health directors surveyed in 2013 by the American College Counseling Association reported that the number of students with severe psychological problems was rising at their schools. The rate of emotional distress reported by students themselves is also high, and rising. 2013年，所有接受美国高校咨询联合会调查的校园心理健康指导员都报告说，自己学校患有严重精神疾病的学生数目在上升。学生自己报告的情绪焦虑比率也很高，而且还在上升。 In a 2014 survey by the American College Health Association, 54 percent of college students surveyed said that they had “felt overwhelming anxiety” in the past 12 months, up from 49 percent in the same survey just five years earlier. Students seem to be reporting more emotional crises; many seem fragile, and this has surely changed the way university faculty and administrators interact with them. The question is whether some of those changes might be doing more harm than good. 2014年，美国高校健康联合会的一个调查显示，54%的大学生表示在过去12个月中“感受到了高度焦虑”，五年前同一调查的结果是49%。学生们报告的情绪危机似乎越来越多；许多人非常脆弱，这当然也改变了高校教师和行政人员与他们互动的方式。问题就是，是否其中有些改变可能弊大于利？ The Thinking Cure 思维治疗 For millennia, philosophers have understood that we don’t see life as it is; we see a version distorted by our hopes, fears, and other attachments. The Buddha said, “Our life is the creation of our mind.” Marcus Aurelius said, “Life itself is but what you deem it.” The quest for wisdom in many traditions begins with this insight. Early Buddhists and the Stoics, for example, developed practices for reducing attachments, thinking more clearly, and finding release from the emotional torments of normal mental life. 几千年来，哲学家们都已经认识到，我们看到的不是生活的本来面目：我们看到的是被我们的期望、恐惧以及其他情感所扭曲的一个版本。佛说：“我们的生活是我们心智的创造物。”马可·奥勒留说：“生活就是我们认为的样子。”在许多文化传统中，对智慧的追求就始于这种观点。例如，早期佛教徒和斯多葛主义者就有通过实践训练去抑制情感，理清思维，以及从日常精神生活的情绪折磨中寻求解脱。 Cognitive behavioral therapy is a modern embodiment of this ancient wisdom. It is the most extensively studied nonpharmaceutical treatment of mental illness, and is used widely to treat depression, anxiety disorders, eating disorders, and addiction. It can even be of help to schizophrenics. No other form of psychotherapy has been shown to work for a broader range of problems. 认知行为治疗是这种古老智慧的现代体现。它是精神疾病非药物疗法中被研究的最多的一种。它被广泛应用于治疗抑郁、焦虑症、进食障碍以及药物成瘾，甚至被用于帮助治疗精神分裂。据我们目前所知，没有其它任何心理治疗方法能治疗更多的疾病。 Studies have generally found that it is as effective as antidepressant drugs (such as Prozac) in the treatment of anxiety and depression. The therapy is relatively quick and easy to learn; after a few months of training, many patients can do it on their own. Unlike drugs, cognitive behavioral therapy keeps working long after treatment is stopped, because it teaches thinking skills that people can continue to use. 研究普遍表明它治疗焦虑和抑郁的功效与抗抑郁药物（比如百忧解）不相上下。这种疗法相对容易学，掌握快，只需几个月的训练，许多患者就可以自行运用了。与药物不同，认知行为疗法在疗程结束后仍长期有效，因为它教给患者的思维方法还能继续使用。 The goal is to minimize distorted thinking and see the world more accurately. You start by learning the names of the dozen or so most common cognitive distortions (such as overgeneralizing, discounting positives, and emotional reasoning; see the list at the bottom of this article). Each time you notice yourself falling prey to one of them, you name it, describe the facts of the situation, consider alternative interpretations, and then choose an interpretation of events more in line with those facts. 认知行为治疗的目标是尽量令患者减少思想扭曲，从而能更精确地观察世界。开始时，你需要学习最常见的十几种认知扭曲的名目（比如以偏概全、低估正面信息，以及情绪化推理等；完整列表见文章末尾）。每当你发现自己陷入了其中某种扭曲状况，先对号入座，描述真实状况，思考其他的解释方式，接下来选择与事实较一致的解释。 Your emotions follow your new interpretation. In time, this process becomes automatic. When people improve their mental hygiene in this way—when they free themselves from the repetitive irrational thoughts that had previously filled so much of their consciousness—they become less depressed, anxious, and angry. 新的解释会引导你的情绪。经过一段时间训练之后，这一处理程序会变得很自动。如果以这种方式改善自己的精神健康状况，人们会将自己从原本充斥于意识中的重复性非理性思想中解脱出来，他们的抑郁、焦虑和愤怒都会随之得到缓解。 The parallel to formal education is clear: cognitive behavioral therapy teaches good critical-thinking skills, the sort that educators have striven for so long to impart. By almost any definition, critical thinking requires grounding one’s beliefs in evidence rather than in emotion or desire, and learning how to search for and evaluate evidence that might contradict one’s initial hypothesis. But does campus life today foster critical thinking? Or does it coax students to think in more-distorted ways? 这种疗法与正规教育有着不言而喻的相似之处。认知行为疗法教授良好的批判思维方法，而这正是教育者们长久以来努力要传授的。不论怎么说，批判思维都需要把信念建立在证据而非情感或欲望之上，并且需要人们学习如何寻找可能与自己最初假设相抵触的证据，并加以评判。但是，当今的大学教育鼓励批判思维吗？还是这种教育方式在诱使学生以更扭曲的方式思考？ Let’s look at recent trends in higher education in light of the distortions that cognitive behavioral therapy identifies. We will draw the names and descriptions of these distortions from David D. Burns’s popular book Feeling Good, as well as from the second edition of Treatment Plans and Interventions for Depression and Anxiety Disorders, by Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland, and Lata K. McGinn. 让我们按照认知行为疗法界定的各种扭曲来审视近期高等教育中出现的新趋势。我们所使用的思维扭曲的名称和描述，取自David D. Burns广受欢迎的著作《感觉良好》和 Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland和Lata K. McGinn的著作《抑郁症和焦虑症的治疗计划及干预措施》（第二版）。 Higher Education’s Embrace of “Emotional Reasoning” 高等教育欣然接受“情绪化推理” Burns defines emotional reasoning as assuming “that your negative emotions necessarily reflect the way things really are: ‘I feel it, therefore it must be true.’ ” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define it as letting “your feelings guide your interpretation of reality.” But, of course, subjective feelings are not always trustworthy guides; unrestrained, they can cause people to lash out at others who have done nothing wrong. Therapy often involves talking yourself down from the idea that each of your emotional responses represents something true or important. Burns将“情绪化推理”定义为：预先假定“你的负面情绪一定反映了事实：‘我感觉是这样，所以事情一定是这样’”。 Leahy、Holland和McGinn将其定义为任凭“你的情绪引导你对现实的解释”。但是，主观感受当然并不一定可靠；如果不受抑制，它可能令人们无端指责完全无辜的人。治疗方案通常包括劝自己放弃这种想法：你的每一个情绪反应都代表了重要的或真实的事情。 Emotional reasoning dominates many campus debates and discussions. A claim that someone’s words are “offensive” is not just an expression of one’s own subjective feeling of offendedness. It is, rather, a public charge that the speaker has done something objectively wrong. It is a demand that the speaker apologize or be punished by some authority for committing an offense. 情绪化推理主导了许多校园讨论和辩论。宣称某人的用词“有冒犯性”并不只是表达对于冒犯的主观感受，而是公开指责此人犯了客观错误。这是一种要求，要求说话人道歉，或者要求有关当局惩罚他，因为他犯下了罪行。 There have always been some people who believe they have a right not to be offended. Yet throughout American history—from the Victorian era to the free-speech activism of the 1960s and ’70s—radicals have pushed boundaries and mocked prevailing sensibilities. Sometime in the 1980s, however, college campuses began to focus on preventing offensive speech, especially speech that might be hurtful to women or minority groups. The sentiment underpinning this goal was laudable, but it quickly produced some absurd results. 总有些人相信自己拥有不被冒犯的权利。不过，纵观美国历史——从维多利亚时代到1960和70年代的言论自由运动——激进分子一次次拓展边界，蔑视当时盛行的敏感情绪。然而，在1980年代的某个时候，大学校园开始注重管制冒犯性言论，尤其是可能会对女性或少数族裔造成伤害的言论。这一目标所基于的情操值得赞扬，但是它很快就催生了一些荒诞的后果。

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What are we doing to our students if we encourage them to develop extra-thin skin just before they leave the cocoon of adult protection? 如果我们鼓励学生在离开成年人的保护茧之前长出一副超级薄弱的外壳，我们究竟是在做什么？

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Among the most famous early examples was the so-called water-buffalo incident at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1993, the university charged an Israeli-born student with racial harassment after he yelled “Shut up, you water buffalo!” to a crowd of black sorority women that was making noise at night outside his dorm-room window. 此类事件最出名的早期案例有发生在宾夕法尼亚大学的所谓“水牛事件”。1993年，该校指控一名生于以色列的学生有种族骚扰罪行，因为他对一些晚上在他宿舍窗外吵闹的黑人女生联谊会成员喊道：“闭嘴，你们这群水牛！” Many scholars and pundits at the time could not see how the termwater buffalo (a rough translation of a Hebrew insult for a thoughtless or rowdy person) was a racial slur against African Americans, and as a result, the case became international news. 当时，许多学者和专家都不理解“水牛”这个词是如何构成对非洲裔美国人的种族诽谤的（实际上，水牛是对希伯来语一个辱骂词汇的粗糙翻译，指不顾旁人或吵闹不堪的人），所以，这件事一时成了国际新闻。 Claims of a right not to be offended have continued to arise since then, and universities have continued to privilege them. In a particularly egregious 2008 case, for instance, Indiana University–Purdue University at Indianapolis found a white student guilty of racial harassment for reading a book titled Notre Dame vs. the Klan. The book honored student opposition to the Ku Klux Klan when it marched on Notre Dame in 1924. Nonetheless, the picture of a Klan rally on the book’s cover offended at least one of the student’s co-workers (he was a janitor as well as a student), and that was enough for a guilty finding by the university’s Affirmative Action Office. 从那时起，对“不被冒犯的权利”的要求开始不断增长，各大学也不断加以纵容。比如，发生在2008年的一个影响极其恶劣的案件中，印第安纳大学与普渡大学印第安纳波利斯联合分校认定一名学生干犯种族骚扰罪行，因为他阅读了一本名叫《圣母大学vs.三K党》的书。这本书纪念了1924年三K党进军圣母大学时反抗他们的学生。虽然如此，该书封面上的三K党集会照片至少冒犯了该学生的一名同事（后者也是学生，同时还是一名楼管）。该大学的反歧视办公室认为这种行为足以构成种族骚扰。 These examples may seem extreme, but the reasoning behind them has become more commonplace on campus in recent years. Last year, at the University of St. Thomas, in Minnesota, an event called Hump Day, which would have allowed people to pet a camel, was abruptly canceled. Students had created a Facebook group where they protested the event for animal cruelty, for being a waste of money, and for being insensitive to people from the Middle East. The inspiration for the camel had almost certainly come from a popular TV commercial in which a camel saunters around an office on a Wednesday, celebrating “hump day”; it was devoid of any reference to Middle Eastern peoples. Nevertheless, the group organizing the event announced on its Facebook page that the event would be canceled because the “program [was] dividing people and would make for an uncomfortable and possibly unsafe environment.” 这些例子也许看起来比较极端，但它们背后的逻辑在大学中近年来越来越常见。去年在明尼苏达州的圣托马斯大学，一个叫驼峰日的活动——意在让人们有机会抚摸一下骆驼——被紧急取消。学生们创建了一个Facebook群组抗议这个活动，理由是虐待动物，浪费金钱，并且不顾及中东学生的感受。该活动的灵感几乎可以肯定是来自一个很受欢迎的电视广告：在某个周三，一只骆驼绕着办公室悠闲散步，庆祝“驼峰日”；它完全和中东人没有关系。尽管如此，活动组织者还是在他们的Facebook主页宣布取消活动，因为“这个活动会造成隔阂，并且可能造成使人不适甚至不安全的环境”。 Because there is a broad ban in academic circles on “blaming the victim,” it is generally considered unacceptable to question the reasonableness (let alone the sincerity) of someone’s emotional state, particularly if those emotions are linked to one’s group identity. The thin argument “I’m offended” becomes an unbeatable trump card. This leads to what Jonathan Rauch, a contributing editor at this magazine, calls the “offendedness sweepstakes,” in which opposing parties use claims of offense as cudgels. In the process, the bar for what we consider unacceptable speech is lowered further and further. 正因为学术圈广泛禁止“批评受害者”，所以质疑一个人的情感状态是否合理基本上不可接受（讨论是否真实就更不用说了），尤其是当情感与群体归属有关的时候。一句单薄的“我被冒犯了”，已成了无往不胜的杀手锏。这就导致了本杂志特约编辑Jonathan Rauch所称的“受辱竞赛”现象：双方都以声称遭到冒犯为武器。在这个过程中，界定“不可接受言论”的门槛越来越低。 Since 2013, new pressure from the federal government has reinforced this trend. Federal antidiscrimination statutes regulate on-campus harassment and unequal treatment based on sex, race, religion, and national origin. Until recently, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights acknowledged that speech must be “objectively offensive” before it could be deemed actionable as sexual harassment—it would have to pass the “reasonable person” test. To be prohibited, the office wrote in 2003, allegedly harassing speech would have to go “beyond the mere expression of views, words, symbols or thoughts that some person finds offensive.” 从2013年起，来自联邦政府的压力更为这种趋势推波助澜。联邦反歧视法对校园中基于性别、种族、宗教和民族的冒犯和不平等对待进行规制。直到不久前，教育部民权署仍规定只有“客观上具有冒犯性”的言论才能被认定为可提起诉讼的性骚扰——它必须通过“公允人”测试【译注：是一种程序机制，用于判别一个明事理的、情感和价值取向适度的、且处于中立地位的社会典型成员，在有关情境中将会持何种看法，最常见的公允人测试是陪审团裁决】。2003年，民权署写道，被指为骚扰的言论必须“不仅仅只是令某些人感到冒犯的观点、言语、符号或思想的表达”，才需要禁止。 But in 2013, the Departments of Justice and Education greatly broadened the definition of sexual harassment to include verbal conduct that is simply “unwelcome.” Out of fear of federal investigations, universities are now applying that standard—defining unwelcome speech as harassment—not just to sex, but to race, religion, and veteran status as well. Everyone is supposed to rely upon his or her own subjective feelings to decide whether a comment by a professor or a fellow student is unwelcome, and therefore grounds for a harassment claim. Emotional reasoning is now accepted as evidence. 但是在2013年，司法部和教育部把性骚扰的范围大大扩展，将仅仅“令人反感”的言语也包括了进去。由于害怕联邦政府的调查，现在各大学正将这种标准——把令人反感的言论定性为骚扰——从性领域扩展应用到种族、宗教，以及兵役状况方面。所有人都应该以自己的主观感受为依据来判定教授或同学的评论是否令人反感，并以此作为控告骚扰的依据。情绪化推理现已被当做证据来看待了。 If our universities are teaching students that their emotions can be used effectively as weapons—or at least as evidence in administrative proceedings—then they are teaching students to nurture a kind of hypersensitivity that will lead them into countless drawn-out conflicts in college and beyond. Schools may be training students in thinking styles that will damage their careers and friendships, along with their mental health. 如果我们的大学在教导学生，他们的感情可以作为有力的武器——至少可以作为证据用于行政诉讼之中——那么，大学就是在培养学生的过度敏感，这会导致学生们陷入无休无止的冲突之中，无论是在校期间还是毕业之后。学校教授学生的思维方式，可能会毁掉他们的职业生涯、友谊，以及精神健康。 Fortune-Telling and Trigger Warnings “悲观预测”与“刺激警告” Burns defines fortune-telling as “anticipat[ing] that things will turn out badly” and feeling “convinced that your prediction is an already-established fact.” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define it as “predict[ing] the future negatively” or seeing potential danger in an everyday situation. The recent spread of demands for trigger warnings on reading assignments with provocative content is an example of fortune-telling. Burns把“悲观预测”定义为“预料事情会变糟”而且“确信自己的预测已是既成事实”。Leahy、Holland和McGinn将其定义为“对未来做出负面预测”或者从日常事件中看到潜在风险。近期，对具有刺激性内容的阅读材料发出“刺激警告”的要求正在增加，这正是“悲观预测”的实例。 The idea that words (or smells or any sensory input) can trigger searing memories of past trauma—and intense fear that it may be repeated—has been around at least since World War I, when psychiatrists began treating soldiers for what is now called post-traumatic stress disorder. 文字（或是气味或者任何一种感官输入）会使人回忆起往昔的伤痛，还会引起对这种伤痛再次出现的强烈恐惧，这种观点最早至少可追溯到第一次世界大战时期。当时，精神科医生们开始为士兵们治疗我们现在称之为“创伤后应激障碍”的疾病。 But explicit trigger warnings are believed to have originated much more recently, on message boards in the early days of the Internet. Trigger warnings became particularly prevalent in self-help and feminist forums, where they allowed readers who had suffered from traumatic events like sexual assault to avoid graphic content that might trigger flashbacks or panic attacks. 但人们相信，明确的刺激警告是近期才出现的，最早是在早期互联网的留言板上。刺激警告在自救论坛和女权论坛上广泛流行，这些论坛允许遭受过创伤（比如性侵犯）的读者避开可能引起创伤再现或恐慌发作的图片内容。 Search-engine trends indicate that the phrase broke into mainstream use online around 2011, spiked in 2014, and reached an all-time high in 2015. The use of trigger warnings on campus appears to have followed a similar trajectory; seemingly overnight, students at universities across the country have begun demanding that their professors issue warnings before covering material that might evoke a negative emotional response. 搜索引擎的热词统计显示，在网络上这一术语于2011年进入主流用语，2014年使用量激增，2015年的搜索量达到历史最高。“刺激警告”一词在校园里的使用情况也遵循着同一发展轨迹，仿佛一夜之间，全国的大学生们都开始要求教授在讲授可能引起负面情绪反应的内容前发出警告。 In 2013, a task force composed of administrators, students, recent alumni, and one faculty member at Oberlin College, in Ohio, released an online resource guide for faculty (subsequently retracted in the face of faculty pushback) that included a list of topics warranting trigger warnings. These topics included classism and privilege, among many others. The task force recommended that materials that might trigger negative reactions among students be avoided altogether unless they “contribute directly” to course goals, and suggested that works that were “too important to avoid” be made optional. 2013年，俄亥俄州奥柏林学院一个由行政人员、学生、近期毕业的校友和一名教员组成的特别工作组在网上发表了一份在线资料指南（之后因教职员工反对而撤回），罗列了应当提出“刺激警告”的题材，包括阶级歧视论和特权论，及许多其他内容。这个工作组建议全面剔除可能引起学生负面反应的内容，除非这些内容对课程目标“有直接作用”。工作组还建议将“不可不读”的书目调整成选读内容。 It’s hard to imagine how novels illustrating classism and privilege could provoke or reactivate the kind of terror that is typically implicated in PTSD. Rather, trigger warnings are sometimes demanded for a long list of ideas and attitudes that some students find politically offensive, in the name of preventing other students from being harmed. This is an example of what psychologists call “motivated reasoning”—we spontaneously generate arguments for conclusions we want to support. 那些“创伤后应激障碍”通常所牵涉的恐慌，很难想象会被描绘阶级歧视论和特权论的小说唤起或重新激发出来。确切地说，只有在某些学生眼中有政治冒犯色彩的一系列观念和言论才需要刺激警告，名为避免其他同学受伤害。这就是心理学家所称的“动机性推理”的实例：我们不由自主地为我们想要支持的结论制造论据。 Once you find something hateful, it is easy to argue that exposure to the hateful thing could traumatize some other people. You believe that you know how others will react, and that their reaction could be devastating. Preventing that devastation becomes a moral obligation for the whole community. Books for which students have called publicly for trigger warnings within the past couple of years include Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (at Rutgers, for “suicidal inclinations”) and Ovid’s Metamorphoses (at Columbia, for sexual assault). 如果你觉得某些东西令你憎恨，就很容易认为其他人与它们接触会受到创伤。你认为你知道别人会作何反应：他们可能会崩溃。避免这种情感崩溃成了整个社会的道德责任。最近几年，学生们公开要求提供刺激警告的著作包括弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫的《达洛维夫人》（在罗格斯大学，因“自杀倾向”）和奥维德的《变形记》（在哥伦比亚大学，因“性侵犯”）。 Jeannie Suk’s New Yorker essay described the difficulties of teaching rape law in the age of trigger warnings. Some students, she wrote, have pressured their professors to avoid teaching the subject in order to protect themselves and their classmates from potential distress. Suk compares this to trying to teach “a medical student who is training to be a surgeon but who fears that he’ll become distressed if he sees or handles blood.” Jeannie Suk在《纽约客》发表的文章讲述了在刺激警告盛行的时代讲授强奸法有多么困难。她写道，有些学生向教授施压，不许教授讲授这一课程，以免自己和同学们可能会承受精神痛苦。Suk将这种境况比作试图教“将要成为外科医生但害怕自己晕血的医学生”。 However, there is a deeper problem with trigger warnings. According to the most-basic tenets of psychology, the very idea of helping people with anxiety disorders avoid the things they fear is misguided. A person who is trapped in an elevator during a power outage may panic and think she is going to die. That frightening experience can change neural connections in her amygdala, leading to an elevator phobia. If you want this woman to retain her fear for life, you should help her avoid elevators. 然而，刺激警告还会带来更深层的问题，根据最基本的心理学原则，帮助焦虑症患者逃避他们所惧怕的事物是完全错误的。停电时被困在电梯里的人可能会慌了手脚，以为自己快要死了。这种可怕的经历会改变这个人大脑杏仁核中神经元的反应，导致电梯恐惧症。如果你想让这个女人在余生中保持恐惧，你就应该帮助她远离电梯。 But if you want to help her return to normalcy, you should take your cues from Ivan Pavlov and guide her through a process known as exposure therapy. You might start by asking the woman to merely look at an elevator from a distance—standing in a building lobby, perhaps—until her apprehension begins to subside. If nothing bad happens while she’s standing in the lobby—if the fear is not “reinforced”—then she will begin to learn a new association: elevators are not dangerous. (This reduction in fear during exposure is called habituation.) Then, on subsequent days, you might ask her to get closer, and on later days to push the call button, and eventually to step in and go up one floor. This is how the amygdala can get rewired again to associate a previously feared situation with safety or normalcy. 但是，如果你想让她回归正常，你就应该采用巴甫洛夫的方法，为她进行“暴露治疗”。开始时，你可以让这个女人远观电梯——比如站在大堂里——直到她的不安平复下来。如果站在大堂没有大碍，她的恐惧没有“加强”，她就会开始建立一个新的认识：电梯并不危险。（这种在接触过程中的恐惧消退叫做“习惯化”）。接下来几天，你可以要求她靠近电梯，再之后几天按下电梯按钮，最后走进电梯，上一层楼。这样，杏仁核就会将之前害怕的境况重新与安全和正常联系起来。 Students who call for trigger warnings may be correct that some of their peers are harboring memories of trauma that could be reactivated by course readings. But they are wrong to try to prevent such reactivations. Students with PTSD should of course get treatment, but they should not try to avoid normal life, with its many opportunities for habituation. 要求刺激警告的学生在这一点上可能是正确的：他们的某些同学可能还有创伤记忆，这些记忆可能被阅读材料重新唤起。但是他们要避免唤起这些记忆，却是错误的。患有创伤后应激障碍的学生理应得到治疗，但他们不应该试图回避正常生活，这样他们就错失了许多适应的机会。 Classroom discussions are safe places to be exposed to incidental reminders of trauma (such as the word violate). A discussion of violence is unlikely to be followed by actual violence, so it is a good way to help students change the associations that are causing them discomfort. And they’d better get their habituation done in college, because the world beyond college will be far less willing to accommodate requests for trigger warnings and opt-outs. 课堂讨论是偶然接触易于引发创伤回忆的事物（比如词语“强奸”）的安全环境。针对暴力的讨论不大可能伴随真实的暴力，所以这种讨论是帮助学生改变引发不适联想的一剂良方。并且，学生们最好在大学中完成适应过程，因为校园外的世界可不那么愿意满足学生对刺激警告的要求，或者让他们选择半路退出。 The expansive use of trigger warnings may also foster unhealthy mental habits in the vastly larger group of students who do not suffer from PTSD or other anxiety disorders. People acquire their fears not just from their own past experiences, but from social learning as well. If everyone around you acts as though something is dangerous—elevators, certain neighborhoods, novels depicting racism—then you are at risk of acquiring that fear too. 对于更多没有患创伤后应激障碍或其他焦虑症的学生来说，刺激警告的大范围应用也会滋长他们不健康的心理习惯。人们的恐惧，不仅仅来自于自己的经验，也来自于从社会学习。如果你身边的所有人都表现得像是害怕某种东西——电梯、某一片区域、描述种族主义的小说——你也有可能对此产生恐惧。 The psychiatrist Sarah Roff pointed this out last year in an online article for The Chronicle of Higher Education. “One of my biggest concerns about trigger warnings,” Roff wrote, “is that they will apply not just to those who have experienced trauma, but to all students, creating an atmosphere in which they are encouraged to believe that there is something dangerous or damaging about discussing difficult aspects of our history.” 精神医生Sarah Roff在《高等教育纪事报》的一篇在线文章中指出了这一点。Roff写道：“我对刺激警告最大的担忧在于，它不仅会影响受过创伤的学生，它还会影响所有学生。它创造了一种氛围，令学生相信讨论历史的阴暗面很危险，会造成伤害。”

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The new climate is slowly being institutionalized, and is affecting what can be said in the classroom, even as a basis for discussion or debate. 这种新的风气正在渐渐制度化，而且正在影响课堂上可以讨论的内容，甚至成为讨论的基础。

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In an article published last year by Inside Higher Ed, seven humanities professors wrote that the trigger-warning movement was “already having a chilling effect on [their] teaching and pedagogy.” They reported their colleagues’ receiving “phone calls from deans and other administrators investigating student complaints that they have included ‘triggering’ material in their courses, with or without warnings.” 去年，在《高等教育内部观察》的一篇文章中，七位人文学科教授写道，刺激警告运动“已经严重影响（他们的）教学。”他们说，他们的同事“接到院长和其他行政人员的电话，调查学生对他们的投诉：他们在有警告或无警告的情况下，在课程中包含了‘刺激性’内容。” A trigger warning, they wrote, “serves as a guarantee that students will not experience unexpected discomfort and implies that if they do, a contract has been broken.” When students come to expect trigger warnings for any material that makes them uncomfortable, the easiest way for faculty to stay out of trouble is to avoid material that might upset the most sensitive student in the class. 他们写道，一个刺激警告“保证学生不会遭受意外的不适，并且暗示如果这种情况出现了，教师们就违反了契约。”如果学生们要求在所有引起不适的材料前提供刺激警告，教师们避免麻烦的最佳方式，就是剔除有可能会冒犯班级中最敏感学生的材料。 Magnification, Labeling, and Microaggressions 夸大、贴标签和微冒犯 Burns defines magnification as “exaggerat[ing] the importance of things,” and Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define labeling as “assign[ing] global negative traits to yourself and others.” The recent collegiate trend of uncovering allegedly racist, sexist, classist, or otherwise discriminatory microaggressions doesn’tincidentally teach students to focus on small or accidental slights. Its purpose is to get students to focus on them and then relabel the people who have made such remarks as aggressors. Burns把“夸大”定义为“夸张描述事物的重要性”，Leahy、 Holland和McGinn把“贴标签”定义为“把自己或其他人归类于某些负面特征。”近期，大学中有越来越多的个案揭发所谓种族主义、性别歧视、阶级歧视，或者其他歧视性的微冒犯。这种趋势并不是就着事件引导学生们去关注细微或无意识的怠慢。它的目的就是让学生们关注这些东西，然后给说这些话的人贴上侵犯者的标签。 The term microaggression originated in the 1970s and referred to subtle, often unconscious racist affronts. The definition has expanded in recent years to include anything that can be perceived as discriminatory on virtually any basis. For example, in 2013, a student group at UCLA staged a sit-in during a class taught by Val Rust, an education professor. The group read a letter aloud expressing their concerns about the campus’s hostility toward students of color. Although Rust was not explicitly named, the group quite clearly criticized his teaching as microaggressive. In the course of correcting his students’ grammar and spelling, Rust had noted that a student had wrongly capitalized the first letter of the word indigenous. Lowercasing the capital I was an insult to the student and her ideology, the group claimed. “微冒犯”一词产生于1970年代，意指微妙的、通常属于无意识的种族冒犯。近些年，其定义已经扩展到包含几乎任何语境下所有被认为具有歧视性的言论和行为。举个例子，2013年加州大学洛杉矶分校的一个学生团体旁听了教育学教授Val Rust讲授的一节课。这个团体大声宣读了一封信，表示对校园里针对有色人种学生的敌意深感忧虑。尽管没有直接点Rust的名，这个团体显然是在批评他的教学有“微冒犯性”。在纠正学生的语法和拼写的过程中，Rust注意到一个学生错误地把“indigenous”（土著的）的首字母大写了。这个团体宣称，把首字母“i”小写侮辱了这名学生和她的意识形态。 Even joking about microaggressions can be seen as an aggression, warranting punishment. Last fall, Omar Mahmood, a student at the University of Michigan, wrote a satirical column for a conservative student publication, The Michigan Review, poking fun at what he saw as a campus tendency to perceive microaggressions in just about anything. Mahmood was also employed at the campus newspaper, The Michigan Daily. The Daily’s editors said that the way Mahmood had “satirically mocked the experiences of fellow Daily contributors and minority communities on campus … created a conflict of interest.” 就算是拿微冒犯开玩笑也会被视为冒犯，并带来惩罚。去年夏天，密歇根大学的学生Omar Mahmood为一份保守派学生刊物《密歇根评论》写了一篇讽刺性的专栏文章，讽刺他看到的当下大学中把一切都视作微冒犯的趋势。Omar Mahmood也供职于校报《密歇根日报》。《密歇根日报》的编辑说Mahmood“讽刺本杂志撰稿人和校园中少数族裔的经历”的方式“制造了利益冲突”。 The Daily terminated Mahmood after he described the incident to two Web sites, The College Fix and The Daily Caller. A group of women later vandalized Mahmood’s doorway with eggs, hot dogs, gum, and notes with messages such as “Everyone hates you, you violent prick.” When speech comes to be seen as a form of violence, vindictive protectiveness can justify a hostile, and perhaps even violent, response. 在Mahmood向两家网站——The College Fix和The Daily Caller——讲述了这一事件之后，《密歇根日报》解雇了他。后来，一帮女人在Mahmood家门口用鸡蛋、热狗、口香糖和写有诸如“所有的人都恨你，你这个暴徒”之类文字的便条大搞破坏。当言论被视作一种暴力时，报复性保护就为恶意报复，甚至暴力行为赋予了正当性。 In March, the student government at Ithaca College, in upstate New York, went so far as to propose the creation of an anonymous microaggression-reporting system. Student sponsors envisioned some form of disciplinary action against “oppressors” engaged in belittling speech. One of the sponsors of the program said that while “not … every instance will require trial or some kind of harsh punishment,” she wanted the program to be “record-keeping but with impact.” 今年三月，纽约州北部地区的伊萨卡学院，学生会甚至提议建立匿名的微冒犯举报机制。提议的学生设想出一套针对发表歧视性言论的“压迫者”的纪律性惩罚。该项目的一位提议者说，虽然“并不是每一个案例都需要审讯或者某种严酷惩罚”，但是她希望这个项目能“留下记录，产生影响”。 Surely people make subtle or thinly veiled racist or sexist remarks on college campuses, and it is right for students to raise questions and initiate discussions about such cases. But the increased focus on microaggressions coupled with the endorsement of emotional reasoning is a formula for a constant state of outrage, even toward well-meaning speakers trying to engage in genuine discussion. 当然了，人们的确会在大学校园发表委婉的或是稍稍遮掩的种族歧视和性别歧视言论，学生们质疑这种状况并发起讨论也是正确的。但是对微冒犯的关注持续增长加上对情绪化推理的支持，结果就是持续性的愤怒，这种愤怒甚至会针对真心想要讨论问题的善意说话者。 What are we doing to our students if we encourage them to develop extra-thin skin in the years just before they leave the cocoon of adult protection and enter the workforce? Would they not be better prepared to flourish if we taught them to question their own emotional reactions, and to give people the benefit of the doubt? 如果我们鼓励学生在离开成年人的保护茧、踏入工作岗位之前长出一副超级薄弱的外壳，我们究竟是在做什么？如果我们教会他们质疑自己的情绪化反应、不要妄下定论，他们难道不是会表现得更好吗？ Teaching Students to Catastrophize and Have Zero Tolerance 教导学生小题大做、零容忍。 Burns defines catastrophizing as a kind of magnification that turns “commonplace negative events into nightmarish monsters.” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn define it as believing “that what has happened or will happen” is “so awful and unbearable that you won’t be able to stand it.” Requests for trigger warnings involve catastrophizing, but this way of thinking colors other areas of campus thought as well. Burns把“小题大做”定义为“把寻常的负面事物当做梦魇般的妖魔鬼怪”的夸大行为。Leahy、Holland和McGinn把它定义为相信“已发生或将发生之事糟糕得让人难以忍受，乃至你经受不住”。对刺激警告的需求中包含着小题大做的成分，但是这种思考方式也干扰了大学中的其他思想。 Catastrophizing rhetoric about physical danger is employed by campus administrators more commonly than you might think—sometimes, it seems, with cynical ends in mind. For instance, last year administrators at Bergen Community College, in New Jersey, suspended Francis Schmidt, a professor, after he posted a picture of his daughter on his Google+ account. The photo showed her in a yoga pose, wearing a T-shirt that read I will take what is mine with fire & blood, a quote from the HBO show Game of Thrones. 在大学管理者中，描述人身伤害时“小题大做”的情况要比你想象得普遍——有时候看起来像是抱着愤世嫉俗的目的一样。举个例子，新泽西州卑尔根社区学院的教授Francis Schmidt去年在他的Google+账号上发布了一张他女儿的照片之后，被该学院的管理者停职了。照片中，他女儿正做着瑜伽动作，T恤衫上写着“我要用血与火来赢回属于我的一切”，这句话引自HBO的电视剧《权利的游戏》。 Schmidt had filed a grievance against the school about two months earlier after being passed over for a sabbatical. The quote was interpreted as a threat by a campus administrator, who received a notification after Schmidt posted the picture; it had been sent, automatically, to a whole group of contacts. According to Schmidt, a Bergen security official present at a subsequent meeting between administrators and Schmidt thought the word fire could refer to AK-47s. 两个月之前，因为停教休假的请求被拒绝，Schmidt曾向学校表达过不满。在Schmid发布那张照片之后，照片被自动发送给了一组联系人。一位大学管理者得到了推送消息，然后把那张照片解读成了威胁信息。据Schmidt所说，在随后管理者与Schmidt会面时，一位出席的安全官员认为“火”也可能是暗指AK-47。 Then there is the eight-year legal saga at Valdosta State University, in Georgia, where a student was expelled for protesting the construction of a parking garage by posting an allegedly “threatening” collage on Facebook. The collage described the proposed structure as a “memorial” parking garage—a joke referring to a claim by the university president that the garage would be part of his legacy. The president interpreted the collage as a threat against his life. 然后还有佐治亚州瓦尔多斯塔州立大学长达八年的传奇官司。该大学开除了一名学生，因为他为了抗议一个室内停车场的修建，在Facebbok上发表了一幅据称有“威胁性”的拼贴画。那幅画把这个规划中的设施称为“纪念性”停车场。这是个玩笑，影射的是大学校长曾经说过的：这座停车场将会成为他为学校留下的遗产。这位校长将该拼贴画理解为死亡恐吓。 It should be no surprise that students are exhibiting similar sensitivity. At the University of Central Florida in 2013, for example, Hyung-il Jung, an accounting instructor, was suspended after a student reported that Jung had made a threatening comment during a review session. Jung explained to the Orlando Sentinel that the material he was reviewing was difficult, and he’d noticed the pained look on students’ faces, so he made a joke. “It looks like you guys are being slowly suffocated by these questions,” he recalled saying. “Am I on a killing spree or what?” 学生们表现出类似的敏感也就不足为奇了。举个例子，中佛罗里达大学的会计学讲师Hyung-il Jung在2013年被学校停职，因为学生举报他在一节复习课中表达了威胁性言论。Jung向《奥兰多哨兵报》解释说，他在辅导的材料很难，他还注意到了学生们脸上痛苦的表情，所以他开了一个玩笑。他回忆他当时曾说：“你们好像快要被这些问题憋死在这里了呢”，“我这不是在玩杀人游戏吗？” After the student reported Jung’s comment, a group of nearly 20 others e-mailed the UCF administration explaining that the comment had clearly been made in jest. Nevertheless, UCF suspended Jung from all university duties and demanded that he obtain written certification from a mental-health professional that he was “not a threat to [himself] or to the university community” before he would be allowed to return to campus. 在学生举报了Jung的言论之后，有差不多二十个人给中佛罗里达大学的管理部门发电子邮件，解释说那些明显只是玩笑话。尽管如此，中佛罗里达大学还是暂停了Jung的一切学校职务，并且要求他要在获得了来自精神健康专家的书面认可，证明他“对自己和学校成员都不构成威胁”之后，才能回学校上班。 All of these actions teach a common lesson: smart people do, in fact, overreact to innocuous speech, make mountains out of molehills, and seek punishment for anyone whose words make anyone else feel uncomfortable. 这些事情给了我们同一个教训：聪明人真的会对无伤大雅的言辞反应过度，小题大做，然后要求惩罚所有说过让任何一个人不舒服的话的人。 Mental Filtering and Disinvitation Season “思维过滤”和“撤邀时节” As Burns defines it, mental filtering is “pick[ing] out a negative detail in any situation and dwell[ing] on it exclusively, thus perceiving that the whole situation is negative.” Leahy, Holland, and McGinn refer to this as “negative filtering,” which they define as “focus[ing] almost exclusively on the negatives and seldom notic[ing] the positives.” When applied to campus life, mental filtering allows for simpleminded demonization. 按照Burns的定义，“思维过滤”是“从事件中筛选出负面细节，然后只抓住负面细节不放，因而认为整件事都是负面的。”Leahy、Holland和McGinn把它命名为“负面信息过滤”，他们把它定义为“只关注负面，很少留意正面。”把这一概念应用到大学校园，思维过滤使得不加考虑地妖魔化他人成为可能。 Students and faculty members in large numbers modeled this cognitive distortion during 2014’s “disinvitation season.” That’s the time of year—usually early spring—when commencement speakers are announced and when students and professors demand that some of those speakers be disinvited because of things they have said or done. According to data compiled by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, since 2000, at least 240 campaigns have been launched at U.S. universities to prevent public figures from appearing at campus events; most of them have occurred since 2009. 2014年的“撤邀时节”中，大量学生和教职员示范了这种认知扭曲。那是每年宣布毕业典礼演讲人的时间——通常是早春，由于某些演讲者做过的事和说过的话，学生们和教授们要求撤回对他们的邀请。根据个人教育权利基金会整理的数据，自2000年起，美国大学中至少发起了240场抵制公众人物出席大学活动的运动，其中大部分都发生在2009年以后。 Consider two of the most prominent disinvitation targets of 2014: former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, Christine Lagarde. Rice was the first black female secretary of state; Lagarde was the first woman to become finance minister of a G8 country and the first female head of the IMF. Both speakers could have been seen as highly successful role models for female students, and Rice for minority students as well. But the critics, in effect, discounted any possibility of something positive coming from those speeches. 让我们仔细想想2014年被要求撤回邀请的最知名的两个人：前国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯和国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁克里斯蒂娜·拉加德。赖斯是首位黑人女国务卿；拉加德是G8国家首位女财长，也是IMF首位女掌门人。这两个人都应该被视作女性学生的杰出榜样才是，赖斯还是少数族裔的榜样。但是，批评者们实际上认为这两人的演讲不可能有什么积极意义。 Members of an academic community should of course be free to raise questions about Rice’s role in the Iraq War or to look skeptically at the IMF’s policies. But should dislike of part of a person’s record disqualify her altogether from sharing her perspectives? 学者们自然可以自由地质疑赖斯在伊拉克战争中的角色，或者用怀疑的眼光审视IMF的政策，但是一个人的某一部分经历令人生厌就意味着这个人没有资格分享她的见解吗？ If campus culture conveys the idea that visitors must be pure, with résumés that never offend generally left-leaning campus sensibilities, then higher education will have taken a further step toward intellectual homogeneity and the creation of an environment in which students rarely encounter diverse viewpoints. And universities will have reinforced the belief that it’s okay to filter out the positive. If students graduate believing that they can learn nothing from people they dislike or from those with whom they disagree, we will have done them a great intellectual disservice. 如果大学文化传递的信息是“来访者必须纯洁无暇，其简历完全不曾伤害总体左倾的校园感情”，那么，高等教育就向智力同质化又迈进一步，并且为学生创造了一个遇不到多元化观点的环境。大学也将对“过滤掉积极方面是可以的”这一信念加以巩固。如果学生们毕业的时候相信他们从自己讨厌或反对的人那里学不到任何东西，我们就对他们的智力造成了很大伤害。 What Can We Do Now? 我们现在能做些什么？ Attempts to shield students from words, ideas, and people that might cause them emotional discomfort are bad for the students. They are bad for the workplace, which will be mired in unending litigation if student expectations of safety are carried forward. And they are bad for American democracy, which is already paralyzed by worsening partisanship. When the ideas, values, and speech of the other side are seen not just as wrong but as willfully aggressive toward innocent victims, it is hard to imagine the kind of mutual respect, negotiation, and compromise that are needed to make politics a positive-sum game. 这种试图把学生和可能令他们感情上不舒服的言语、思想和人物隔离开来的做法，贻害无穷。这种努力对职场无益，如果学生还对安全抱着同样的期望，他们在工作场所会陷入没完没了的官司。这对美国的民主也是有害的，这种民主本来就已经被日益恶化的党派纷争破坏得千疮百孔了。当对手的思想、价值观和言论不仅仅被看做是错误观点，而且被看做是对无辜受害人的蓄意伤害，很难想象我们还能找到令政治成为正和博弈的那种相互尊重、友好协商和相互妥协。 Rather than trying to protect students from words and ideas that they will inevitably encounter, colleges should do all they can to equip students to thrive in a world full of words and ideas that they cannot control. One of the great truths taught by Buddhism (and Stoicism, Hinduism, and many other traditions) is that you can never achieve happiness by making the world conform to your desires. But you can master your desires and habits of thought. This, of course, is the goal of cognitive behavioral therapy. With this in mind, here are some steps that might help reverse the tide of bad thinking on campus. 与其帮助学生避免接触他们必然遇到的言词和观点，大学更应该尽力武装学生，让他们在这个言论不受他们控制的世界里茁壮成长。佛教（以及斯多葛学派、印度教和许多其他传统思想）教给我们的真理之一就是，通过让世界顺应你的要求来获得快乐是永远不可能的。但是你可以掌控自己的思维习惯和欲望。当然了，这就是认知行为疗法的目标。意识到这一点以后，以下是一些可能帮助大学逆转不良思维的步骤。 The biggest single step in the right direction does not involve faculty or university administrators, but rather the federal government, which should release universities from their fear of unreasonable investigation and sanctions by the Department of Education. Congress should define peer-on-peer harassment according to the Supreme Court’s definition in the 1999 case Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. The Davis standard holds that a single comment or thoughtless remark by a student does not equal harassment; harassment requires a pattern of objectively offensive behavior by one student that interferes with another student’s access to education. Establishing the Davis standard would help eliminate universities’ impulse to police their students’ speech so carefully. 迈向正路最重要的一步，需要的不是教职员或者学校管理者，而是联邦政府。政府应该让大学免受教育部不合理的调查和处罚。国会应该按照1999年最高法院在Davis诉门罗郡教育委员会一案中的定义来确定“朋辈间骚扰”的定义。“Davis标准”认定学生所作的一句个别评论或者一句无心话语并不构成骚扰；只有干扰他人正常受教育而且蓄意冒犯别人的惯常行为方式才能构成骚扰。贯彻“Davis标准”，可以避免激发大学严厉管制学生言论。 Universities themselves should try to raise consciousness about the need to balance freedom of speech with the need to make all students feel welcome. Talking openly about such conflicting but important values is just the sort of challenging exercise that any diverse but tolerant community must learn to do. Restrictive speech codes should be abandoned. 大学本身应该深化认识，提醒大家在保证言论自由和保证每个学生都舒服之间需要取得平衡。公开谈论这种具有冲突性却又至关重要的价值，是每个多元而宽容的社会必须学会的挑战。限制性的言论准则应该被废除。 Universities should also officially and strongly discourage trigger warnings. They should endorse the American Association of University Professors’ report on these warnings, which notes, “The presumption that students need to be protected rather than challenged in a classroom is at once infantilizing and anti-intellectual.” 大学也必须从官方立场正式且严厉的阻止刺激警告的蔓延。大学应该赞同美国大学教授联合会关于刺激警告的报告，这份报告写道，“认为学生在课堂中应该受到保护，而不是面对挑战的想法，是把学生当小孩的行为，同时也是反智的”。 Professors should be free to use trigger warnings if they choose to do so, but by explicitly discouraging the practice, universities would help fortify the faculty against student requests for such warnings. 如果出于自愿，教授们应该有使用刺激警告的自由，但是，通过明确地反对刺激警告，大学也能帮助教授拒绝学生的此类要求。 Finally, universities should rethink the skills and values they most want to impart to their incoming students. At present, many freshman-orientation programs try to raise student sensitivity to a nearly impossible level. Teaching students to avoid giving unintentional offense is a worthy goal, especially when the students come from many different cultural backgrounds. 最后，大学应该重新思考他们最想教给学生什么样的技能和价值观。目前，许多面向新生的活动试图把学生的敏感性提升到一个不合理的高度。教导学生避免不小心冒犯别人很有意义，尤其是当学生来自各种不同文化背景的时候。 But students should also be taught how to live in a world full of potential offenses. Why not teach incoming students how to practice cognitive behavioral therapy? Given high and rising rates of mental illness, this simple step would be among the most humane and supportive things a university could do. The cost and time commitment could be kept low: a few group training sessions could be supplemented by Web sites or apps. But the outcome could pay dividends in many ways. 但是学生也应该得到教导，懂得如何生活在一个到处都有潜在冒犯的世界里。为什么不教导学生如何实施认知行为疗法呢？鉴于精神疾病的比率居高不下且仍在上升，把认知行为疗法教给学生就是大学能做的最人道、最有意义的事情了。时间和成本付出都可以很低：只需要几次集体培训课，剩下的就可以靠网站和手机应用来辅助完成，但是学生得到的回报是多方面的。 For example, a shared vocabulary about reasoning, common distortions, and the appropriate use of evidence to draw conclusions would facilitate critical thinking and real debate. It would also tone down the perpetual state of outrage that seems to engulf some colleges these days, allowing students’ minds to open more widely to new ideas and new people. A greater commitment to formal, public debate on campus—and to the assembly of a more politically diverse faculty—would further serve that goal. 例如，建立一套共用的术语，用来描述推理、常见认知扭曲和适当使用证据以引出结论的方法，将会促进批判思维和真正的辩论。这也能缓和近来似乎在大学不断蔓延的愤怒情绪，让学生更容易接受新思想和新人物。在校园内更多地致力于正式、公开的讨论，致力于汇集政见更为多元的教师，会进一步推动这一目标的实现。 Thomas Jefferson, upon founding the University of Virginia, said: 托马斯·杰斐逊在创办弗吉尼亚大学时说：

This institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it. 这一机构的根基在于不受限制的思想自由。因为在这里，我们跟随真理，不惧它把我们带到哪里；也无须忍受任何错误，只要允许理智与之自由对抗。

We believe that this is still—and will always be—the best attitude for American universities. Faculty, administrators, students, and the federal government all have a role to play in restoring universities to their historic mission. 我们相信这依旧是——并将一直是——对待美国大学的最佳态度。教师、行政人员，学生，以及联邦政府都有责任让大学回到完成其历史使命的轨道上。 Common Cognitive Distortions 常见的认知扭曲 A partial list from Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland, and Lata K. McGinn’sTreatment Plans and Interventions for Depression and Anxiety Disorders (2012) 这是来自Robert L. Leahy, Stephen J. F. Holland和Lata K. McGinn的《抑郁症和焦虑症的治疗计划及干预措施》（2012年）的一份部分清单。 1.Mind reading.You assume that you know what people think without having sufficient evidence of their thoughts. “He thinks I’m a loser.” 1.读心术。不需要足够的证据，你就认定自己知道别人想的是什么。“他认为我逊毙了。” 2.Fortune-telling.You predict the future negatively: things will get worse, or there is danger ahead. “I’ll fail that exam,” or “I won’t get the job.” 2.悲观预测。你对未来的预测是消极的：事情会越来越糟糕，或者前方危机四伏。“我考试要不及格了”，或者“我得不到这份工作”。 3.Catastrophizing.You believe that what has happened or will happen will be so awful and unbearable that you won’t be able to stand it. “It would be terrible if I failed.” 3.小题大做。你相信将发生或已发生的事情会糟糕得让人难以忍受。“如果我失败了就太糟糕了。” 4.Labeling.You assign global negative traits to yourself and others. “I’m undesirable,” or “He’s a rotten person.” 4.贴标签。你把自己或其他人归类于某些负面特征。“我不受欢迎”或者“他是个堕落的人。” 5.Discounting positives.You claim that the positive things you or others do are trivial. “That’s what wives are supposed to do—so it doesn’t count when she’s nice to me,” or “Those successes were easy, so they don’t matter.” 5.低估正面信息。你声称自己或者其他人做的有意义的事微不足道。“老婆就应该那个样子——所以她对我好不值一提。”或者“这些成功很容易取得，所以算不上什么成就。” 6.Negative filtering.You focus almost exclusively on the negatives and seldom notice the positives. “Look at all of the people who don’t like me.” 6.负面过滤。你几乎只关注负面信息，很少留意正面信息。“看看那些不喜欢我的人吧。” 7.Overgeneralizing.You perceive a global pattern of negatives on the basis of a single incident. “This generally happens to me. I seem to fail at a lot of things.” 7.以偏概全。你通过一件事就认定整体性的负面模式。“这种事总是发生在我身上。好像我有好多事都干不成。” 8.Dichotomous thinking.You view events or people in all-or-nothing terms. “I get rejected by everyone,” or “It was a complete waste of time.” 8.二元思维。你以非此即彼的方式审视人和事。“我被所有人拒绝”或“这完全是浪费时间”。 9.Blaming.You focus on the other person as the source of your negative feelings, and you refuse to take responsibility for changing yourself. “She’s to blame for the way I feel now,” or “My parents caused all my problems.” 9.迁怒于人。你把其他人当作自己负面情绪的来源，不愿意承担改变自己的责任。“我现在感觉这么糟全都是她的错”或“我所有的问题都是我父母造成的”。 10.What if?You keep asking a series of questions about “what if” something happens, and you fail to be satisfied with any of the answers. “Yeah, but what if I get anxious?,” or “What if I can’t catch my breath?” 10.杞人忧天。你一直问“如果某事发生了怎么办？”，并且对所有答案都不满意。“对，但是如果我变得焦虑怎么办？”或者“如果我喘不过气怎么办？” 11.Emotional reasoning.You let your feelings guide your interpretation of reality. “I feel depressed; therefore, my marriage is not working out.” 11.情绪化推理。你让情感引导你去解读现实。“我很沮丧，所以我的婚姻要完蛋了。” 12.Inability to disconfirm.You reject any evidence or arguments that might contradict your negative thoughts. For example, when you have the thought I’m unlovable,you reject as irrelevant any evidence that people like you. Consequently, your thought cannot be refuted. “That’s not the real issue. There are deeper problems. There are other factors.” 12.无法证伪。你拒绝任何和你的消极想法相抵触的证据或观点。举个例子，你认为“没人喜欢我”，你认为证明别人喜欢你的所有证据都毫不相干。所以，你的思想无法被驳斥。“事情不是这样的。肯定有更深层次的问题，还有其他因素。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Economic Inequality in Academia 学术界的经济不平等 作者：Richard Goldin @ 2015-8-13 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Who视之 来源：Counterpunch，http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/08/13/progressives-and-the-economic-inequality-in-academia/ In focusing on the wealthy as the singular source of economic inequality, progressive politics obscures the machineries of privilege which function at all levels of society. Individuals are trapped within these mechanisms; their lives lessened in ways that are far more damaging than the actions of the “one per cent.” 进步派政治活动聚焦于有钱人，将之作为经济不平等的唯一源头，从而未能看到在社会各个层面均在发挥作用的特权机制。个体受困于这类机制；他们的生活被削弱，其作用方式远比“1%们”【译注：指占人口总数1%的顶层富人】的行为更为有害。 Economic hierarchies are maintained not by brute force, but by strategies which rationalize the privilege of a few and the struggle of many. Within a multitude of economic contexts, structures of inequality are arduously perpetuated, even by those who consistently profess a belief in economic justice. Progressives need to analyze these contradictions and to expose the strategies which are utilized to justify hierarchy. 经济等级制的维系，并不依靠赤裸暴力，它依靠的是将少数人的特权和多数人的挣扎加以合理化的策略。在众多经济情境中，人们，哪怕是那些一贯声称自己信奉经济正义的人，都在竭力维持不平等的结构。进步派人士需要分析这类矛盾现象，并将那些用于为等级制辩护的策略公之于众。 Academia provides an excellent laboratory for this kind of analysis. Within academia, the contradictions between words and practices are particularly stark. Publicly, Professors often denounce the structures of privilege constructed by the top one per cent in this country. Privately, the small, tenured professorial class perpetuates a system through which it acquires disproportionate resources while condemning the majority of university faculty – non tenure-track adjuncts – to often live in near poverty. 学术界为进行这种分析提供了一个绝佳的实验室。言行不一在学术界特别突出。在公开场合，教授们经常谴责由我国顶层1%们构建的特权结构。但在私下里，人数很少的终身教授阶层维持着一个体系，并利用这一体系更多地获取资源，同时迫使大多数的大学教员——非终身教职轨道的受雇教员——经常处于近乎贫困的状态。【译注：美国大学的教师职位晋升分两条轨道，一条通往终身教授，俗称终身规（tenure-track），另一条是受雇教员，处于普通雇员地位，合同期较短，收入也较低。】 While there are clear economic incentives for university administrators to pay the majority of adjuncts severely depressed wages,the financial disparity between tenured/tenure-track Professors and non tenure-track adjuncts (often denoted as Instructors or Lecturers) is not solely an effect of administrative policies. Administrators and the professorial class are complicit in the maintenance of this economic hierarchy and each provides a certain degree of cover for the other. 对于大多数受雇教员，学校管理方出于明显的经济动机，只会支付极低的工资。但是，终身或终身轨教授与非终身轨的受雇教员（常被称为教员或讲师）之间所存在的财务差距，不仅仅是校方管理政策的结果。在维系这种经济等级制方面，校方和教授阶层狼狈为奸，彼此都为对方提供一些掩护。 When pressed on the disparity between their words and their practices, tenured faculty can point to university administrators as the real culprits of adjunct impoverishment. In return, administrators’ harsh financial calculations are softened and obscured by professorial rationalizations which interpret structural hierarchy as merit-based. 当终身教授的言行不一致遭到追问时，他们会将学校管理方指认为受雇教员遭遇贫困的真正祸首。而作为回报，教授们会对结构性的等级差异进行合理化，将之解释为基于品质的差异，于是管理方苛刻的财务算计便得到了柔化和遮掩。 The reinforcement of professorial class privilege begins with the hiring process for the few available tenure-track jobs. Excellence in teaching, without academic publications, will rarely qualify an applicant for a university level tenure-track position. Publishing without any evidence of teaching ability is far more acceptable. However, the current proliferation of graduate students with Ph.Ds., many with publications in top journals, has transformed the work of faculty hiring committees into something of a lottery. 教授阶层特权的强化, 始于数量不多的终身轨空缺岗位的招聘过程。对于一个大学终身轨职位，即使申请者教学特别出色，但只要没有学术出版物，那就不太可能合格。有出版物，但丝毫看不出能够教书的，相较而言明显更受欢迎。不过，由于现下拥有博士学位的毕业生数量激增，而且其中许多在顶尖期刊上发表过文章，教员招聘委员会的工作已经变成了一种抽奖。 Most Lecturers understand that “one’s position in the academic academy hierarchy is largely an accident of birth” and even some tenured faculty admit that their tenured colleagues “got lucky.” The result of this “luck of the draw” is financial security for the chosen few, and financial desperation for the non-tenure track adjuncts – a class that comprises almost seventy per cent of college and university faculties. 多数讲师明白，“一个人在学术研究机构的等级体系中的地位，很大程度上是一种因缘造化”，甚至连一些终身教员也承认他们的终身职同事“运气好”。这种“抽签撞运”的结果，就是被选中的少数人得到了财务保障，而非终身轨的受雇教员则财务窘迫，而后者几乎要占学院及大学教职员工的70%。 The primacy of publishing does not originate solely with the professorial class, but in its hands it has been re-purposed into a tool of class formation and preservation. Members of the faculty hiring committees evaluate new hires with the same criteria by which they were awarded their positions and which constitute their continued financial accumulation. This self-replication is then denoted as “merit;” a designation that separates new hires into two distinct groups while reassuring tenured faculty of their own superior worth. 发表（论文）至上，这并非全然源自教授阶层，但在他们手中，它已然改头换面成为了一种塑造和维护阶层的工具。教员招聘委员会的成员们，拿着他们过去曾据之以获得职位的、让他们得以持续积累财富的同一标准来评价新雇员。然后又把这种自我复制称为“品质”，用这种称呼把新雇员分成两个不同群体，并确保终身教员自己拥有高贵身价。 Even though the hiring process is, at best, a conjecture, once the separation between tenure-track Professor and Lecturer has taken place, the newly hired are fully constructed to align with their new class status. Lecturers are often considered to be hourly employees and their salaries are contingent on the number of courses taught. This compels them to teach as many courses as possible, though the vast majority are limited by course availability to being part-time. Financial survival often remains elusive, and many adjuncts are forced to go on public assistance and food stamps. 尽管招聘过程只能靠猜，可一旦终身轨教授和讲师的分野出现，新雇员就完全被框定了，只能去跟自己的新阶层身份对齐。讲师经常被视为钟点工，薪水因授课门数而异。这就迫使他们尽量多开几门课，然而绝大部分人还是因为可开课程门数受限而只能非全日工作。他们在财务上常陷于窘境，难以自保，许多受雇教员被迫寻求公共救济和食品券。 Tenure-track Professors, however, are often given as minimal teaching loads as possible and are eligible for paid time off from teaching in order to further their research. This disproportionate allocation of resources is designed to move tenure-track Assistant Professors smoothly along the path to tenured Associate and Full Professor. Each new title brings with it an increase in financial reward. A tenured Professor who is teaching far fewer courses and has far fewer students than a Lecturer might still earn five times the salary. 另一方面，学校却尽可能少地将教学任务压给终身轨教授。他们还有资格获得带薪休假，方便他们开展研究。设计这种不成比例的资源分配，是为了顺利推动终身轨助理教授沿着轨道转变为终身副教授和正教授。每一个新的头衔都附带着财务报酬的增加。一个终身教授，即使授课门数和所带学生都远远少于讲师，其薪水却仍是后者的五倍。 There is no significant financial path upwards for Lecturers. According to a recent survey report by the Coalition on the Academic Workforce (CAW) part-time faculty “experienced little in the way of a career ladder” measured as “higher wages after several years of work.” At the university level, continued excellence in teaching virtually never qualifies a Lecturer for a tenure-track position. But heavy teaching loads limit the ability of Lecturers to engage in the continued research and writing required for such positions. If a Lecturer takes time off for research, they receive no pay for that semester. The CAW notes that the professional commitment and support for part-time faculty is “dismal.” 讲师没有什么明显的的财务上升路径。根据学术劳动力联盟（CAW）近日的一份调查报告，“以工作几年以后工资上升”来衡量，非全日教员“极少经历过职业晋升阶梯”。在大学里，教学上长期出色对一名讲师有资格获得终身教职几乎毫无助益。沉重的教学负担还限制了讲师持续从事研究和写作以满足此类职位要求的能力。假如讲师在某个学期休假去做研究，他们就拿不到该学期的报酬。CAW指出，对非全日教员的职业承诺和职业支持“令人沮丧”。 However, simply increasing resources for Lecturers leaves the fundamental pivot point of the academic hierarchy untouched. The economic stratification within academia is built upon the disproportionate financial rewards given to those who publish articles or books in acceptable academic journals (or with acceptable publishers) over those who teach. Though this structure of incentives and rewards is universal within academia, the strongly disparate financial valuation given to publishing remains unquestioned. 不过，如果只是向讲师们增加资源，那就没有触及学术等级制的根本支点。学术界的经济阶层分化建立于一种不成比例的财务报酬之上，那些在合格的学术期刊（或合格出版社）发表文章或出书的人拿得太多，相比之下教书的人拿得过少。尽管这种激励和报酬结构在学术界极为普遍，但是，发表研究所得到财务估值高的极不相称，这一点无人质疑。 In many of the more theoretical fields of academia, such as political theory, publications are highly self-referential. Observations and arguments are not derived from, nor are they intended to mirror, the complex, multi-faceted contemporary political world. Instead publications refer to other publications in debates about the field’s own abstract conceptual structures. 在许多理论性较强的学术领域，比如政治理论，论文是高度自我引用的。其中的观察和论证既不源自于、也不是为了反映复杂多面的当代政治世界。相反，论文之间相互引证来引证去，只不过是就该领域自己的抽象概念框架之内辩论不休。 It is teachers dedicated to a challenging education who engage in the task of reworking and concretizing theories to make them relevant to students. It is in the classroom where the dialogue between theory and politics takes place; and it is the classroom which sends forth generations of students who can perceive, and possibly undermine, the rationalities of power. 正是那些献身于挑战性教育工作的教师，忙于将理论再加工和具体化，使之变得与学生（的现实关切）相干。正是在课堂上，理论与现实政治之间的对话方才得以发生；也正是从课堂里，送出一代又一代的学生，他们能够领会——还可能消解——权力合理性。 Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. No objective standard of measurement exists to financially quantify, and differentiate, these approaches or their contributions. Yet a vast and enduring economic hierarchy has emerged grounded in the supposed intrinsic hierarchy between the two. This financial hierarchy is not a dispassionate reflection of an objective reality; it is a strategic effect of the mechanisms underlying class formation and preservation. 通往知识的道路通常都由发表研究和课堂教学的相互作用而铺就。不存在什么客观的测量标准，能对这两条途径或它们的贡献做财务上的量化和区分。但是，两者之间的内在等级区分却已被假定，在这上面还生出一个巨大且持久存在的经济等级制。这种财务等级制不是对客观现实的一种公正反映；它是塑造和维护阶层的底层机制的策略效应。 The primacy of publishing, and the attendant allocation of resources, is utilized not merely to perpetuate two different economic classes, but also to create two different kinds of people. This creation allows the hierarchy of privilege to function as though it represents objective value differences both in terms of the work produced and the individuals who produce it. 发表至上及伴随而来的资源分配，不仅被用来维持两种不同的经济阶层，而且被用来创造两种不同的人。这种创造令特权等级制的运转好像是体现了一种客观的价值差异，既包括产品之间的价值差异，也包括制造产品的个体之间的价值差异。 In any economic hierarchy, once those at the bottom are positioned as “lesser,” all sorts of harms become permissible. Since the financial disparities in academia do not mirror any objective universal value differences in work or aptitude, the hierarchy between adjuncts and Professors needs to be maintained and reinforced by persistent invocations of professorial privilege. 在任何经济等级制中，一旦身处底层的人被定位为“次等”，那么各种伤害就都得到了许可。由于学术界的财务不平等并不反映任何工作或天资方面的客观的普世价值差异，因此受雇教员与教授之间的等级制就需要持续动用教授特权来加以维持和强化。 Even some tenured faculty are critical of the constant assertion of “prerogatives,” and the “arrogance, and fear of being lumped together with the Untouchable Other.” Tenured faculty become experts at delineating “who really counts as part of [the] professional community and who doesn’t.” 甚至一些终身教员都对频繁的“特权”主张以及“傲慢，害怕被人把自己与‘不可触碰的他者’归为一类”等持批评态度。终身教员在准确划分“谁真正属于专业共同体的一部分，谁不属于”方面都成了行家里手。 These protections of class difference require, and cultivate, a disdain for the processes of education, and construct teaching as a burden to be endured. The professorial class strategically utilizes this construction as though it represents an underlying reality – an exercise in class maintenance which punishes both adjuncts and students. 这类对阶层差异的保护，依靠并促进了对课堂教学的蔑视，并将教学塑造成了一种不得不忍受的负担。教授阶层有策略地利用了上述塑造，使之仿佛是对基本现实的反映——这是一种维护阶层的做法，它既损害了受雇教员，也损害了学生。 One of the few options currently available to adjuncts to improve their financial situation is a faculty union. But unions comprised of both tenured and adjunct faculty will never question the mechanisms which underlie the academic hierarchy. Instead, they will ask adjuncts to join in fights for general increases in faculty salaries which disproportionately benefit those who already earn the most. The trade-off for adjuncts is an incremental raise in pay in return for a reinforcement of the structures and relations which perpetuate their impoverishment. 受雇教员要改善其财务状况，当前只有不多的几个可用选项，其中之一就是教员工会。但是，由终身教员和兼职教员共同组成的工会永远不会质疑支撑学术等级制的上述机制。他们只会要求受雇教员参与普遍提高教员薪水的斗争，而这对那些已然挣得最多的人更为有利。这里发生的交换是，兼职人员报酬少量增加，但代价是进一步强化了那些延续他们的贫困状态的结构和关系。 The academic hierarchy will not be altered by resorting to arguments about fairness, equality or basic human decency. Unions composed solely of adjuncts must fight for far greater increases in adjunct salaries as part of a larger struggle to dismantle the entire professorial apparatus of privilege. All progressives should join in this effort. 诉诸公平、平等或人类的基本体面等论证，无助于改变学术界的等级制。纯粹由受雇教员组成的工会必须为这些教员薪水的更大幅度增长而斗争，并将之作为拆除整个教授特权体系的大型斗争的一部分。所有的进步派都应加入这一活动。 The gap between professorial words and actions exemplify the kinds of rationalizations which perpetuate exploitation at all economic levels. The power of the most wealthy in this country will not be impeded if their strategies can be simultaneously decried and emulated. Progressive politics must expose and disrupt these processes, wherever they occur. In this sense, the professorial class should be appearing frequently on progressive media. They have a lot to explain. 教授们的言行差异是在各个经济层面上帮助维持剥削的合理化策略的一个例证。如果这个国家的最富者们的策略在被人谴责的同时还会被人效仿，那么他们的权力将无可阻挡。进步派的政治活动必须揭露并破坏这些方法，不管它们发生在哪儿。在此意义上，教授阶层应当经常上上进步派的媒体。他们有很多事需要解释。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#3：祖先的记忆 辉格 2015年9月21日 早期人类社会不仅都是小型熟人社会，而且其中成员都是亲缘相当近的亲属，通常由少则六七个多则二十几个扩展大家庭组成；因为规模太小，这样的群体不太可能是将通婚关系限于其内部的内婚群体，而只能实行外婚，实际上往往是从夫居的外婚父系群，即，男性成年后留在出生群体内，女性则嫁出去，加入丈夫所在群体。 之所以父系群更为普遍，同样是因为战争；首先，群体间冲突的一大动机和内容便是诱拐或掳掠对方女性，而诱拐掳掠的结果自然是从夫居。 其次，在两性分工中，战争从来都是男性的专属，因而男性之间的紧密合作对于群体的生存繁荣更为重要，而我们知道，在缺乏其他组织与制度手段的保障时，亲缘关系是促成和强化合作关系的首要因素，而父系群保证了群内男性有着足够近的亲缘。 然而，也正是因为战争所需要的群体内合作倚重于亲缘关系，对紧密合作的要求也就限制了群体规模；因为亲缘关系要转变成合作意愿，需要相应的识别手段，否则，即便一种基于亲缘的合作策略是有利的，也是无法实施的；而随着代际更替，亲缘渐疏，到一定程度之后亲缘关系就变得难以识别了。 对于某位男性来说，群体内其他男性的脸上并未写着“这是我的三重堂兄弟，和我有着1/64的亲缘”，他头脑里也不可能内置了一个基于汉密尔顿不等式（rB>C）的亲选择算法，实际的亲选择策略，只能借助各种现成可用的间接信号，以及对这些信号敏感的情感机制，来引出大致符合策略要求的合作行为。 传统社会常见的父系扩展家庭里，几位已婚兄弟连同妻儿共同生活于同一家户，他们的儿子们（一重堂兄弟）从小一起玩耍，常被同一位祖母照顾，听同一位祖父讲故事，就很容易发展出家人间的亲密感，这种情感将维持终身，此后，当他们自己有幸成为父亲和祖父时，这一亲情便能够在他们各自带领的扩展家庭之间建立起强有力的合作纽带。 考虑到远古人类的寿命限制，很少有人能活着成为曾祖父，所以最理想情况下，一个人丁兴旺的家族，八九位已成为祖父的堂兄弟，各自率领着三四个核心家庭，构成一个五级父系群，其中辈份最低者拥有共同高祖父，这是个人能够从常规生活经历中感知到的亲缘关系的极限，而这个父系群的在世人数恰好接近邓巴数，当然，多数父系群没这么兴旺，因而人数会更少。 事实上，人类学家也发现，生活在前定居社会的人们，对祖先的记忆多半只限于祖父一辈，再往前就是一片朦胧，往往连名字都说不出；所以，若要将父系群扩展到更大规模，而同时又保持足够紧密的合作，必须借助其他手段来分辨亲缘关系。 办法之一是强化对共同祖先的记忆，在没有文字的时代，这不是件轻松的任务；用图腾和族徽等视觉符号来标识共同祖先和氏族身份，或许是最普遍的解决方案；另一种常见做法是，将从群体共祖通往在世者的系谱编成歌谣或口诀，在各种仪式性场合反复念诵，从而时常唤起在场者的祖先记忆。 南太平洋的萨摩亚人在这件事上就表现的特别认真，每个氏族都有一套叙述系谱的口诀，叫法阿鲁派加（fa'alupega），在萨摩亚村庄处理公共事务的政治集会福努（fono）上，每当一位酋长（代表村里一个氏族）入场时，所有在场的其他酋长都要吟诵前者的法阿鲁派加，表示对其身世的认可，当集会临近结束时，这一吟诵仪式会再重复一遍。 实际上，从自己的本名开始向前追溯、罗列一串父系祖先名，是初民社会中十分流行的做法，在形成稳定的姓氏之前，这是在正式场合称呼人名的常见方式，罗列的长度视需要而定，推测起来，很可能一直罗列到所有在场者的共祖为止，或者到某位声誉卓著的先辈。 这种呼名方式在现代阿拉伯人中仍可见到，而在其他民族中，长串父祖名（patronyms）逐渐被姓氏所取代，但往往仍保留一个父名作为中间名，比如斯拉夫人和荷兰人；出于类似理由，许多民族的多数姓氏，是由父名固化而来，犹太人姓名中的“ben”、阿拉伯人的“ibn”、北欧人的“-son”、爱尔兰人的“Mac-”、诺曼人的“Fitz-”，皆源于此类实践。 东亚人更熟悉的强化记忆方式，是立牌位、建宗庙、修祠堂，还有各种祭祖仪式，类似的祖先崇拜与祭祀活动几乎存在于所有定居社会（后来有些社会缺失这些仪式，通常是因为被晚近发展起来的某种高级宗教排挤了）；这些仪式表面上的理由是告慰祖先灵魂，实际上却履行着记忆共同祖先，族内定期聚会以强化血缘纽带，最终巩固群体内合作关系的社会功能。 每个定居民族都有自己的创世神话和始祖传说，始祖常常还会兼任创世之神，在吟诵和记忆共同祖先的一次次努力中，这些始祖的名称、形象和故事被固定下来，随着世代更替而逐渐变得遥远而神秘，最终被神化，或者被附会到某个既已存在的神灵上；这些神话的用意，并非像后来的哲学家那样，试图为世界存在或人类起源给出一个可信解释，而只是强化血缘纽带的一种叙事方式。 然而，祖先记忆和氏族历史叙事，只能为合作提供一种动机，尽管很重要，但并不能解决群体扩大之后必定带来的内部冲突；当父系群规模超出邓巴数时，其中关系最远的青年已是三重或四重堂兄弟，亲缘系数（r）只有1/64或1/128，这么弱的亲缘，很难说服个人冒着牺牲重大利益的风险去和并无深交的远亲合作，只有在群体面临急迫的外部威胁，或者在多方混战中选择站在哪一边、与谁结盟这种场合，才能起些作用。 要组成紧密而足够和谐的大型群体，还需要其他手段，最早发展出的办法是强化父权；试想，当前述五级父系群扩展到六级时，总人数就超出了邓巴数，但是，假如其中各分支的家长有能力约束其成员的行为，压制其攻击和报复行动（这是群体内冲突的主要来源），那就有了一种突破邓巴限制的方法：现在，群体和谐只需要家长们之间达成紧密合作即可。 如图所示，若每位家长控制一个十几二十人的扩展家庭，并且二三十位家长（他们是三重以内堂兄弟）组成合作联盟，那么群体规模便可达到三四百，而同时，群内每个成员需要长期交往密切合作的熟人数量仍处于邓巴数之下。这样，当分属两个支系的年轻人发生冲突时，纠纷便可由双方家长出面解决，或提交家长会议裁断，并迫使当事人接受裁决结果。 同样，当群体面临外部威胁，或谋求与其他群体结盟，或准备对外发动攻击等公共事务而需要集体行动时，家长联盟将充当决策与执行机构；也可以这样理解：通过强化父权，家长们把家族树最下面一两层排除出了维持群体团结所需要的那个关键合作圈子，从而避开了邓巴限制。 人类学材料显示，上述模式广泛存在于前国家定居社会，而且它正是在定居之后才出现的；游动性的狩猎采集社会大多是平等主义的，没有高度压制性的父权，长辈也很少向晚辈施加强制性规范，而一旦定居下来（或者游动性减弱），父权便出现了，并且在近代化之前的整个文明史上都占据主导地位；当今世界，凡国家权力所不及的定居社会，像阿富汗、索马里、中东和非洲的部落地区，父权仍非常强大，并且是维持基层社会秩序的主要力量。 父权的常见表现有：对家庭财产的控制，并尽可能的延迟分家，控制子女婚姻，社区内的老人政治；因定居而发展出的财产权，是家长执行父权的强大工具，爱尔兰传统社会的家长，会将财产牢牢控制在手里，即便子女都已成家也不分割家产；一些非洲部族的家长更夸张，当家庭财富增长时，优先用于为自己娶更多妻子，生更多孩子，而不是资助成年子女结婚成家（因而多妻往往与强父权相联系）。 这种做法发展到极致时，老男人们几乎垄断了娶妻机会，在非洲班图语民族（例如西非的约鲁巴人和豪萨人，肯尼亚的康巴人）的许多部落中，父权高度发达，多妻制盛行，男性在熬到40岁前很难娶到妻子，而十岁出头的年轻女孩常常被嫁给五六十岁的老男人；贾瑞德·戴蒙德在检查了大量人类学材料后发现，此类现象广泛存在于传统农牧业定居社会中。 其中原理，我们从进化生物学的亲子冲突（parent-offspring conflict）理论的角度可以看得更清楚：尽管父母和子女很大程度上有着共同利益，但两者利益仍有重大区别，父母希望在各子女间恰当分配家庭资源，以便总体上获得最佳繁衍成效，而每个子女都希望更多资源分给自己这一支，所以不希望父亲生太多孩子。 强大的父权改变了亲子冲突中的力量对比，压制了子女需求中偏离父亲愿望的部分，而且宗族组织的发展又强化了这一父权优势：原本，父代的多子策略高度受限于本人寿命，当预期寿命不够长时，继续生育意义就不大了，因为失去父亲保护的孤儿很可能活不到成年，但有了宗族组织，孤儿就有望被亡父的兄弟、堂兄弟和叔伯收养，甚至得到族内救济制度的帮助（救济制度最初就是伴随宗族组织的发达而出现的）。 将亲子冲突理论稍作扩展，可以让我们更好的理解家长制和部落老人政治：个人在家族树上所居层次（俗称辈份）越高，其个体利益和群体利益的重合度就越高，因而长辈总是比晚辈更多的代表群体利益，他们之间若能达成紧密合作，便有望维持群体和谐，并获得集体行动能力，而同时，因为长辈间亲缘更近，长期熟识的几率也更高，因而紧密合作也更容易达成。 父权和家长联盟为扩大父系群提供了组织手段，不过，若仅限于此，群体规模的扩张将十分有限，因为家长联盟的规模本身受限于邓巴数（还要减去每个支系的规模），若要继续扩张，要么让每位家长控制更多成员，要么让家长联盟发展出多个层级，无论哪种安排，高层联盟中的每位成员都将代表一个比扩展家庭更大的支系。 问题是：谁来代表这个支系？假如寿命足够长，一位曾祖父便可代表四世同堂的大家族（比扩展家庭多出一级），但活的曾祖父太少了；一种解决方案是选举，事实上，部落民主制确实存在于一些古代社会；不过，更自然的安排是让长支拥有优先权（说它“自然”是因为其优先权是自动产生的，无须为此精心安排程序机制），比如周代的宗法制，让长支（大宗）对幼支（小宗）拥有某些支配权，并作为族长代表包含二者的上一级支系。 于是就产生了一个三级宗族结构，理论上，这样的安排可以无限制的迭代，从而产生任意规模的宗族，而同时，每一层级的合作圈都限于几十人规模，因而每位家长或族长需要与之保持长期紧密合作关系的人数，也都限于邓巴数之下。 但实际上，组织能力总是受限于交通、通信和信息处理能力等技术性限制，还有更致命的是，委托代理关系和逐级控制关系的不可靠性，随着层级增加，上层族长越来越无法代表下层支系的利益，也越来越难以对后者施加控制，经验表明，具有某种集体行动能力的多级宗族组织，规模上限大约几千，最多上万。 在古代中国，每当蛮族大规模入侵、中原动荡、王朝崩溃、帝国权力瓦解之际，宗族组织便兴旺起来，聚族自保历来是人们应对乱世的最自然反应，古典时代以来的第一轮宗族运动，便兴起于东晋衣冠南渡之时；如果说第一轮运动主要限于士族大家的话，南宋开始的第二轮运动则吸引了所有阶层的兴趣，家族成员无论贫富贵贱都被编入族谱。 和聚居村落的结构布局一样，宗族组织的紧密程度和集体行动能力同样显著相关于所处环境的安全性，华南农耕拓殖前线，或者国家权力因交通不便而难以覆盖的地方，宗族组织便趋于发达和紧密；人类学家林耀华描述的福建义序黄氏宗族，血缘纽带历二十多代六百多年而不断，到1930年代已发展到15个房支，每房又分若干支系，各有祠堂，从核心家庭到宗族，共达七个组织层级，总人口近万。 类似规模的宗族在华南比比皆是，在宗族之间时而发生的大型械斗中，双方常能组织起上千人的参战队伍，可见其规模之大，行动能力之强；华南许多宗族部分的从福建迁入江西，又从江西迁入湖南，但许多迁出支系与留在原地的支系之间仍能保持定期联系。 共同祖先记忆、父权、家长制、族长会议、大型宗族组织，这些由扩大父系群的种种努力所发展出的文化元素，不仅为定居社会的最初大型化创造了组织基础，也为此后的国家起源提供了部分制度准备，父权和族长权，是早期国家创建者所倚赖的诸多政治权力来源之一。 当然，父系结构的扩展只是社会大型化的多条线索之一，要建立起数十上百万人的大型社会，还有很长的路要走，还要等待其他许多方面的文化进化，在后面的文章里，我会继续追寻人类文明的这段旅程。 （本系列文章首发于“大象公会”，纸媒转载请先征得公会同意。）