【2016-01-08】 @sonicblue3: 在你国舆论场共和党似乎通过小布什的两场战争就取得了永远的鹰派名声，这是民主党总统通过两次世界大战和韩战越战都做不到的 @whigzhou: 美国两党制，隔几代就阵营重组，无限往前刨根说民主党祖上也鹰过毫无意义 @whigzhou: 一楼一凤制下形成的两党格局，和比例代表制下的多党格局，虽然都叫“党”，性质完全不同，前者是被选举制度强行压合到一起的大杂烩，后者才是有着明确纲领的主义式政党，甚至可以是单议题或单族群政党，前者的进化逻辑是：找出有望获得简单多数的政策组合，而后者只须越过比例代表最低门槛即可存在。 @whigzhou: 正因此，当原有的某种组合已无望获得简单多数时，党派格局便发生裂变重组，这种重组可以是小幅度的，也可以非常彻底，比如60年代那次，所以，说何种倾向是哪个党的，这种说法只有最多在几代人之内才有意义。  

【2016-01-08】 @whigzhou: 无论你们怎么嘲笑二胖三胖的发型，还是不得不承认，他们的边缘策略玩的非常成功，把边界一点点往看似不可理喻的方向上推，这样当形势不利不得不退让时，只须从边缘往后撤一小步，大家就觉得他很乖了，至于贩毒绑架印假钞，就都是没人关心的小把戏了，趁列强正焦头烂额，而且民主党还在台上，赶紧推几把  

【2016-01-07】 @海德沙龙 《挑三拣四的刺头理应得到感激》 这篇短文讲了一个非常简单却常常得不到充分领会的道理：那些总是挑三拣四的刺头，其实是强利他主义者（strong altruism），而那些总是一团和气的旁人，在受惠于他们的同时，自己却可保持温和友善的形象，很有意思的观察 @tertio: 这个我早就知道啦，所以我从来就对过份挑剔的人心怀感激 @whigzhou: 同理，报复心很重（重到他付出的报复成本往往超出报复所带来个人收益）的人也是（事实上的）强利他主义者，而宽恕则常常具有负外部性 @whigzhou: 只有有望带来更高水平均衡的宽恕（这通常意味着换得对方在未来遵守规范），才是值得赞赏的，因为东郭先生养的毒蛇，不会只咬他自己  

The Rehabilitationists 回归主义者 作者：Brian Beutler，《新共和》高级编辑 @ 2015-08-30 译者：@Ghostmarine 来源：《新共和》（The Republic） http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal How a small band of determined legal academics set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won. 一小撮坚定的法学家如何游说最高法院撤销新政，并如何距成功一步之遥。 In November 2013, a who’s who of America’s conservative legal establishment descended on the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., for an annual meeting of the Federalist Society, the most influential conservative legal organization in the country. Current presidential candidates Scott Walker and Ted Cruz each made appearances, ingratiating themselves with the influence peddlers in attendance. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was a featured speaker at the event’s black-tie-optional dinner. 2013年11月，美国保守派法律界名流纷纷降临华盛顿特区五月花酒店，参加全美最具影响力的保守派法学组织——联邦党人协会（Federalist Society）举办的年会。眼下正在争取总统获选人党内提名的斯科特·沃克和泰迪·克鲁兹也分别到场，搔首弄姿，试图赢得与会大佬们的垂青。最高法院大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯作为特邀演讲嘉宾出席年会的半正装宴会。 One of the biggest stars of the conference, however, was neither a Senate-confirmed official nor an elected politician, but a libertarian law professor at Georgetown named Randy Barnett. This wasn’t Barnett’s first turn as a Federalist Society eminence, but his reception that year was especially rapturous. 然而，年会上最耀眼的明星并非是由参议院批准的法官，也不是民选政客，而是一个来自乔治城、名叫兰迪·巴奈特的法学教授，是个自由意志主义者。巴奈特并非首次在联邦党人协会上出风头，但那年，他格外火。 “The younger people, the people in law school, they seem to be gravitating toward people like Randy,” said attendee Josh Blackman, an associate law professor at the South Texas College of Law and a close friend of Barnett’s. “When he gets off the stage he’s mobbed. ... There’s a crowd of people five or six feet deep surrounding him.” “年轻人，法学院的学生们，他们为兰迪这样的人所倾倒，”与会者、巴奈特的密友、南德克萨斯法学院副教授乔什·布莱克曼如是说。“他下台时，被围住了······围在他身边的人群足有五、六英尺那么厚。” Barnett had been invited to participate in a lunchtime debate against J. Harvie Wilkinson, a Reagan-appointed judge serving on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the topic of whether courts are too deferential to legislatures. The event was sold out. 巴奈特曾被邀请参加午餐辩论，对手是里根任命的第四巡回上诉法院法官J·哈维·威尔金森，讨论法院是否对立法机关过于顺从。那次活动的票卖得精光。 Thinking back on that day recently, Barnett marveled at his emergence as a celebrity. “One of the leaders of the Federalist Society—one of the senior staff—said clearly I had the room,” Barnett told me. “It wasn’t that I beat J. Harvie Wilkinson in a debate—who knows?—it’s just that the room was with me. The room would not have been with me ten years ago.” 回想起那天的情形，巴奈特依然为自己成为一个明星而惊讶不已。“联邦党人协会的一名领导，高管，再明白不过地告诉我，说那间屋子是我的，”巴奈特对我说。“不是说我在辩论中赢了J·哈维·威尔金森，那种场合哪有胜负可言，他是指那间房子里全是我的支持者。要在十年前，根本不会出现这种情况。” Back then, Barnett was one of a handful of academics on the fringes of conservative legal thought. Today, their views are taking hold within the mainstream of our politics. Barnett and his compatriots represent the vanguard of a lasting shift toward greater libertarian influence over our law schools and, increasingly, throughout our legal system. They’re building networks for students and young lawyers and laying the foundation for a more free-market cast of federal judges in the next presidential administration. Their goal is to fundamentally reshape the courts in ways that will have profound effects on society. 十年前，巴奈特只是保守派法学思想边缘的少数几名学者之一。而今天，他们的观点开始在我们主流政治视野中显山露水。在长久以来自由意志主义向法学院乃至整个法律体系逐渐扩大影响的过程中，巴奈特和他的同袍们扮演了急先锋的角色。他们为学生和年轻律师构建了一个网络，打造了更为壮大的拥护自由市场的联邦法官阵容，为下一届政府选拔法官奠定了基础。他们的目标是，用一种能够对社会产生深远影响的方式，彻底重塑法庭体系。 Barnett’s political philosophy took root when he was a child. His father was a conservative, and he became one, too. When he was a junior at Northwestern University, one of his professors introduced him to libertarianism, as distinct from the more staid Republicanism of his youth. While attending law school at Harvard, a classmate took him to New York to meet the famed but controversial theorist Murray Rothbard, an encounter that inspired his lifelong affiliation with the libertarian movement and its prominent institutions, like the Cato Institute. His lone professional detour outside that world was a four-year stint as a prosecutor in Illinois. After that, he obtained a fellowship at the University of Chicago under Richard Epstein, a giant of American law in the twentieth century and a patron saint of modern libertarian scholars. 巴奈特的政治哲学植根于儿提时代。父亲是个保守派，他也成了保守派。在西北大学读大三时，一位教授向他介绍了自由意志主义，这套理论显然与他青年时所信仰的更为古板的共和主义大相径庭。进入哈佛法学院后，一位同窗带他前往纽约，拜见名满天下谤亦随之的思想家罗斯巴德。这次邂逅促成了他终生卷入自由意志主义运动之中，并与加图研究所这样的运动重镇始终保持良好关系。巴奈特孤寂的职业生涯并非起步于学术界，他最初在伊利诺伊清贫地干了四年检察官。此后，二十世纪美国法学巨擘理查德·爱泼斯坦主持下的芝加哥大学为他提供了一份奖学金，要知道，爱泼斯坦可是现代自由意志主义学者的守护神。 Barnett’s career as an academic began far from the center of the action, however, at Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he became a professor in 1982. “It was a good school,” Barnett told me, “but one reason it was a bummer to teach there was no one had ever heard of it.” 然而，巴奈特的学术之旅可谓发轫于蛮荒，他于1982年在芝加哥肯特法学院获得教授职称。“那是所好学校，”巴奈特告诉我道，“但是在那教书令人困扰的是，没几个人听说过那座学校。” Eventually, Barnett clawed his way to Boston University, and then to Georgetown, where he joined the faculty in 2006. (“I love the situation here,” he said of his current digs. “I don’t need to be on the outs.”) But even as his career took off, his legal views remained decidedly anti-establishment. Barnett believes the Constitution exists to secure inalienable property and contract rights for individuals. This may sound like a bland and inconsequential opinion, but if widely adopted by our courts and political systems it would prohibit or call into question basic governmental protections—minimum wages, food-safety regulations, child-labor laws—that most of us take for granted. For nearly a century now, a legal counterculture has insisted that the whole New Deal project was a big, unconstitutional error, and Barnett is a big part of that movement today. 最终，巴奈特费尽九牛二虎之力，辗转波士顿大学，于2006年成为乔治城的教员。（“我喜欢这里的环境，”他谈及自己当前的教职。“再不用跟别人格格不入了。”）虽然职业生涯平步青云，他依然坚定地秉承反建制派的法学观点。巴奈特深信，宪法存在的意义是为了确保个人财产和订约权不被侵犯。这种观点似乎是一种陈词滥调，无关紧要。但，如果美国的法院和政治体系能够彻底吸纳这种观点，就会彻底禁绝基本的政府保护行为，至少也会对我们绝大部分人都视作理所当然的一些举措，例如最低工资、食品安全管制、禁止童工法等等，产生怀疑。近百年来，法律界的非主流观点一直声称，整个新政项目都是一个巨大的违宪错误，而今天，巴奈特正在该运动中扮演重要的角色。 The main object of this group’s obsession is the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. Joseph Lochner was the owner of a bakery in Utica, New York, at the turn of the last century, who sought relief from the Bakeshop Act, under which he was fined for allowing an employee to work more than 60 hours a week. He believed that the act’s workplace-safety rationale was in fact a government-sanctioned tool for the bakers union to attack nonunion bakeries like his own and that it deprived him and his employees of their right to enter into their own contracts. The Supreme Court narrowly agreed. Its 5–4 ruling struck down the law and, more importantly, provided the rationale justices would use to invalidate other legislation over the course of a generation. 这群人念念不忘的是1905年最高法院就洛克纳诉纽约州（Lochner v. New York）一案的判决。约瑟夫·洛克纳是纽约尤蒂卡一家面包坊的主人，上世纪之交，由于让员工一周工作超过六十小时，受到了《面包坊法》（Bakeshop Act）的处罚，他决定找法院说理。他认为，《面包坊法》所谓基于工作场所安全的理由，其实是面包师工会的一种得到政府批准的工具，用于整治像自己这样的非工会面包师，而且这种法律也侵犯了他和员工之间自由订立契约的权利。最高法院勉强认同了他的观点。判决结果5-4，推翻了《面包坊法》。更重要的是，此次判决提供了一种司法逻辑依据，本足以颠覆此后整整一代所修筑而成的法律体系。 For decades now, legal academics and elites have considered the early twentieth century one of the Supreme Court’s darkest eras. Lochner, it’s been viewed, belongs with Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 1857 decision holding that neither slaves nor freedmen were U.S. citizens, and Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 decision upholding racial segregation under the separate-but-equal doctrine, in a Malebolge of rejected rulings. 最近几十年来，法学学者和精英们都将二十世纪早期视为最高法院的黑历史阶段。洛克纳一案，与1857年裁定奴隶和已解放奴隶均不享有公民权的斯科特诉桑福德案（Dred Scott v. Sandford），以及1896年在“隔离但平等”的原则下实行种族隔离的普莱西诉弗格森案（Plessy v. Ferguson）一道，被视为奇葩判决的典型。 In 1936, after the Supreme Court struck down a New York minimum-wage law, one of a series of New Deal measures it ruled unconstitutional, a dejected Franklin D. Roosevelt complained to the press that the Court had created “a ‘no-man’s land’ where no government—state or federal—can function.” 1936年，最高法院宣布新政措施之一、纽约州最低工资法违宪，沮丧的富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福对媒体抱怨道，最高法院开辟了“一片‘真空地带’，无论是联邦政府还是州政府，在这里都无能为力。” A year later, after Roosevelt had been reelected overwhelmingly on a New Deal platform, the Supreme Court effectively repudiated Lochner when a 5–4 majority upheld Washington’s state minimum-wage law for women. “More than 25 years ago we set forth the applicable principle in these words, after referring to the cases where the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been broadly described,” the Court ruled. “But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses.” In addition to forming the basis of the modern American social contract, this decision was a hard-fought victory over fierce opposition to government regulation by employers and property owners. The enduring postwar political consensus about the proper role of government may have masked that opposition, but it was never completely vanquished. 一年后，随着罗斯福挟新政以绝对优势连任，最高法院以5-4的多数支持华盛顿州女性最低工资法，事实上推翻了洛克纳案先例。 “二十五年前，在大量援引了明显涉及宪法第十四修正案所保障的众多自由的案件后，我们以这样的字眼陈述了一条适用原则，”法庭裁定。“然而，我们需要认识到，像其他所有案件一样，在所引用的案例中，订立契约的自由是一种具有限制的权利，而非绝对权利。并不存在随心所欲行事的绝对自由，也不存在任意订立契约的绝对自由。”此判决除了奠定现代美国社会契约基础外，还艰难地战胜了雇主和业主对政府管制的强烈反对。虽然战后长期以来，关于政府恰当角色的政治共识掩盖了这种反对，但反对的声音从未彻底消失。 All libertarians want to fight federal regulations in Congress and the executive branch. But Barnett and his allies think courts should be empowered to throw regulations out even if political majorities support them. These Lochner revivalist professors have established beachheads at law schools across the country. In 2002, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh founded a blog, The Volokh Conspiracy, as a hub for libertarian ideas, including Lochner revisionism. Today, it has become the most prominent academic legal blog in the country and now publishes under the auspices of The Washington Post. It boasts nearly two dozen contributing professors and mainlines detailed and informed libertarian legal arguments to thousands of the nation’s top lawyers, law students, clerks, judges, and opinion-makers every day. 所有自由意志主义者都试图在国会和行政分支与联邦管制作斗争。然而，巴奈特和他的盟友认为，即使政治主流乐见管制，司法系统也应当有能力推翻管制。这些以复兴洛克纳案为己任的教授们已经在全美各地的法学院建立起滩头阵地。2002年，加州大学洛杉矶分校的法学教授尤金·沃洛克创建了一个名叫“沃洛克共谋”的博客，成为自由意志主义理念，的大本营，其中就包括洛克纳修正主义。今天，该网站已经成为美国最引人瞩目的法学博客，并在《华盛顿邮报》的资助下结集出版。网站声称，有二十多位教授参与博客内容撰写，网站涉及大量详尽而具体的自由意志主义法学热点，每天有数以千计的国内顶级律师、法学院学生、书记员、法官，以及意见领袖浏览。 The contributors to The Volokh Conspiracy teach at the University of Minnesota, Northwestern, Emory, Duke, and elsewhere. Several hold positions at George Mason University’s law school, which is famous for its conservative faculty and, in 36 short years, has rocketed to prominence as one of the 50 best law schools in the country. In 2011, GMU law professor and Volokh Conspiracy contributor David Bernstein published a book titled Rehabilitating Lochner, and that’s exactly what he, Barnett, and their contemporaries have been attempting to do. “沃洛克共谋”的撰稿人在明尼苏达大学、西北大学、埃莫里大学、杜克大学，以及其他地方任教。还有几人把持乔治梅森大学法学院教席，该大学最引人注目之处就是其保守派教员，以及在短短三十六年时间里，以火箭的速度攀升至全国法学院前五十强。2011年，乔治梅森大学法学教授、沃洛克共谋撰稿人大卫·伯恩斯坦出版了一本名为《回归洛克纳》的书，而这正是伯恩斯坦、巴奈特，以及他们的同袍们所一直努力加以实现的目标。 That project aims to extend the reach of their dissident school of thought beyond academia and into the workings of government. In 1991, two former members of the Reagan administration, Chip Mellor and Clint Bolick, founded the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public-interest law firm now based in Arlington, Virginia, with $350,000 a year in seed money from the oil and gas magnate Charles Koch. They’ve challenged state licensing laws on behalf of hair braiders, florists, and other tradespeople across the country, but have also undertaken loftier crusades, including a doomed effort to overturn the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires that contractors pay their employees competitive wages on government-funded projects. 自由意志主义运动旨在扩展这一思想异端学派的影响力，从学术界渗透入政府运作领域。1991年，曾在里根政府任职的奇普·梅勒和克林特·波力克创立了一家自由意志主义公共利益律师事务所——司法研究所，该机构目前位于弗吉尼亚阿灵顿市，每年由石油大亨查尔斯·科赫慷慨解囊三十五万美元作为种子基金。研究所已经代表全国的编辫工、花匠，以及其他生意人挑战了各州的特许经营法，同时他们还在进行一场更为深远的变革，其中包括彻底推翻《戴维斯—培根法》（Davis-Bacon Act），因为该法案要求在政府出资的项目上，承包商应向员工支付具有竞争力的工资，虽然这项努力前景不妙。 The Volokh Conspiracy, too, was designed not just as a place where law professors could talk with each other, but as a platform from which to broadcast libertarian ideas to a wider audience. Barnett joined the blog as a contributor in 2004. In its early days, its views could be read as a counterpoint to prevailing conservative legal thought. In the summer of 2005, for example, when the overwhelming majority of conservative elites were celebrating John Roberts’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Barnett interjected with a typically contrarian but in some ways fundamental caveat. “Who is John Roberts?” he asked in a Volokh Conspiracypost. “We know nothing about what he stands for.” 同样，沃洛克共谋也不仅仅是个供法学教授们谈天说地的所在，而是一个向更多听众传播自由意志主义理念的平台。2004年，巴奈特成为该博客的撰稿人。起先，该博客的观点更像是保守派同行们所奉行法学观点的对位旋律。例如，2005年夏，当绝大多数保守派精英为约翰·罗伯茨被任命为最高法院首席大法官而欢呼雀跃时，巴奈特以一种典型的鹤立鸡群的姿态，问了一个更为本质的问题，“约翰·罗伯茨是谁？”他在沃洛克共谋发帖写道。“我们对于他所持有的立场一无所知。” Few professors see their academic work reflected in the public realm, and fewer still after cutting so aggressively against the grain. In 2004, when Barnett argued his first and only case before the Supreme Court, Lochner was a distant specter, and libertarian influence over the law more generally was hard to detect. The case concerned two women, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, who used marijuana to treat their chronic medical conditions. Monson’s homegrown medical marijuana plants were seized and destroyed by federal agents pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. Barnett contended the law was an overbroad application of the Commerce Clause to regulate economic activity. He lost 6–3. The following year, the Rehnquist Court dealt libertarians another major blow when it ruled 5–4 in Kelo v. New London that the Connecticut city could use its eminent domain powers to condemn private property and hand it over to private developers. The plaintiffs in that case were represented by the Institute for Justice. 做研究的很少能看到自己的成果反映在公共领域中，如果他们还如此咄咄逼人地与主流观点相悖，可能性就更微乎其微了。2004年，当巴奈特为他第一个也是唯一一个案子在最高法院展开唇枪舌战时，洛克纳只是一个遥远的幽灵，自由意志主义对于整个法律体系的影响微乎其微。那起案子关乎两名女性，安吉尔·赖希和黛安·蒙森，她们利用大麻治疗自己的慢性病。联邦探员依据《管制药品法》（Controlled Substances Act），查抄并销毁了蒙森在自己家种植的药用大麻。巴奈特慷慨陈词，认为利用商业条款对经济活动进行管制实在过于宽泛。他以3-6输了官司。来年，伦奎斯特法庭给了自由意志主义者又一击重拳，在凯洛诉新伦敦市一案（Kelo v. New London）中以5-4裁定，这座康涅狄格小城可以行使土地征用权，征收私人地产，并将其转售给私人开发商。这起案子的原告凯洛就是由司法研究所代理。 To anyone who lived through Bush v. Gore it might seem strange that a judiciary as conservative as the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts would rule for the government so regularly. But the dominant strain of conservative legal thought for the last half-century has largely been shaped by the right’s backlash to the social revolution stemming from the 1960s and the Warren and Burger Courts’ use of the Constitution to further progressive ends like desegregation and access to abortion. For conservatives, the main villain of the last 50 years has been creeping liberal judicial activism and a willingness to overturn legislative action. Conservative legal scholars and jurists like Robert Bork held that judges should refrain from projecting personal or political values into their judicial opinions. This principle became a cornerstone of traditional conservative legal thought, but it effectively created a presumption that democratically enacted laws are constitutional. Such a restrained judicial philosophy makes it difficult for judges to void properly enacted laws like the Controlled Substances Act. 对于任何经历过布什诉戈尔案（Bush v. Gore）的人来说，看到伦奎斯特法庭和罗伯茨法庭这种如此保守的司法机构却这般频繁地做出有利于政府的判决，难免惊诧莫名。然而，源于1960年代的社会革命，再加上沃伦法庭和伯格法庭以宪法为武器，达到诸如废除种族歧视、堕胎合法化之类的进步主义目的，这一切导致过去五十年间右翼反弹，进而塑造了保守派法学思潮的主要观点。在保守派看来，过去五十年中，最大的敌人一直是如影随形的自由派司法能动主义，以及法院推翻立法行动的强烈意愿。类似罗伯特·伯克这样的保守派法学学者和法学家，坚持认为，法官应当努力克制，避免将自己的私人政治价值观投射进司法意见之中。这种原则构成了传统保守法学思想的基石。然而这种价值观实际会产生一个假定：凡经民主程序颁布的法律一定合宪。一旦法官需要酌情废止诸如《管制药品法》之类的法规时，这样一种克制的司法哲学，就会显得力不从心。 But it has been nearly 30 years since Chief Justice Warren E. Burger retired. For many younger conservatives, the Court’s cardinal sin isn’t Brown v. Board of Education or even Roe v. Wade. And Barnett and his allies have helped make many conservatives more comfortable with the idea of judicial activism. 然而，伯格首席大法官退休已近三十年。对很多年轻一代保守派而言，最高法院的头等大罪并非是布朗诉托皮卡教育局案（Brown v. Board of Education），甚至也不是罗诉韦德案（Roe v. Wade）。巴奈特和他的战友们已经帮助很多保守派对于司法能动主义更为习以为常。 With five offices around the country, a legal clinic training students at the University of Chicago Law School, and a staff of nearly 100, the Institute for Justice has become a proving ground for aspiring, ideologically committed lawyers. Every year, the group sends lawyers to law schools around the country to give presentations on public-interest law and recruit students into its ranks. “It’s certainly done with the intent to make sure that libertarian-minded law students know who we are and what we have to offer,” Clark Neily, a senior attorney at the Institute for Justice, said of the group’s outreach. Each summer, a couple dozen clerks join the group in its Beltway headquarters and state offices. From there, these young lawyers typically move on to more traditional clerkships at law firms and federal courts—one former Institute for Justice clerk worked for Chief Justice Roberts from 2008 to 2009—and when the Institute hires new staff attorneys, it often culls from the ranks of these same pupils. 司法研究所拥有员工近百人，全国设有五家办事处，在芝加哥大学法学院开设一间用于学生培训的法律诊所，是志向远大、笃定于意识形态的律师一试身手的理想所在。每年，研究所都会派遣律师前往全国各地的法学院，就涉及公共利益的法律进行演讲，同时招兵买马，扩充队伍。“这些举措显然融入了我们的目的，就是确保具有自由意志主义意识的法学院学生知道我们是谁，我们能提供什么，”谈及研究所正在努力扩大影响时，司法研究所高级律师克拉克·莱利评论道。每年夏天，研究所位于特区政治圈的总部和各州的办事处都会迎来几十名书记员。这些年轻律师通常会从这里起步，跻身律师事务所和联邦法院担任传统书记员——其中有位司法研究所的前书记员在2008年至2009年期间听候首席大法官罗伯茨的差遣——而一旦研究所需要聘用新律师时，就会从这些曾经的学生中精挑细选。 “Ten to 15 years ago, conservatives who were in positions of influence—educating young lawyers, or in a position to hire them to politically desirable positions—were unified by what you might call Borkian restraint, or knee-jerk deference,” Neily said. “What has really changed in the last four or five years is a real skepticism, particularly but not exclusively among young law students, toward this kind of acquiescence to whatever government does.” “十到十五年前，调教年轻律师、能够在政治职位上安插自己人的这些举足轻重的保守派，信奉的都是那种所谓的伯克（Bork）式克制理念，你也可以管那套哲学叫做‘下意识的顺从’，”莱利批评道。“过去四五年里真正的变化就是出现了一种真正的怀疑主义，主要体现在那些法学院青年学生中，他们会怀疑这种默认政府一切举动的做法。” In 2013, the Institute for Justice enjoyed one of its biggest successes to date. It prevailed in a federal appeals court on behalf of the Benedictine monks of St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana, who had sued for the right to sell handmade, inexpensive funeral caskets after the state Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors ordered them to desist. Like Lochner, the case represents a challenge to government health and safety rules. And like Lochner, it could theoretically become the basis for invalidating scores of unrelated business regulations. The Supreme Court declined to hear the state board’s appeal in that case, but different appeals courts have taken different views of this general dispute, which means the Supreme Court—now more conservative than it was a decade ago—may well step in to settle it at some point. 2013年，司法研究所迎来了迄今最大的胜利。研究所在联邦上诉法院帮路易斯安那圣约瑟夫修道院的一群本笃僧打赢了官司，推翻了州殡葬业委员会对僧侣们销售自己手工制作廉价棺材的禁令。和洛克纳案一样，这起案子是对政府健康和安全领域管制的挑战。同样，和洛克纳案一样，这起案子能够成为推翻众多其它商业管制的起点。最高法院拒绝听取州委员会就该案件的上诉意见，然而，不同的上诉法院对同类案件有着不同的理解，这或许意味着，有朝一日，相比十年前更加保守的最高法院将会置身其中，一举解决类似分歧。 Each success on behalf of an everyman struggling against the government serves the libertarian cause well, but these victories pale in comparison to the role that President Obama and the Affordable Care Act have played in convincing mainstream conservatives to give judicial activism a second look. 平凡个人与政府抗争所取得的每一个胜利，都令自由意志主义更加强大，然而在奥巴马总统和《平价医疗法案》面前，这些胜利显得黯然失色，迫使主流保守派不得不重新打量司法能动主义。 Barnett has been at the forefront of the fight against Obamacare, and the 2012 constitutional challenge to the law’s insurance-coverage mandate was largely his brainchild. He argued that requiring private citizens to purchase health insurance against their will exceeded Congress’s powers. A clearly conflicted Chief Justice Roberts ultimately bent over backwards to construe the law in a constitutional way, out of deference to the elected branches, enraging the entire right. If Barnett viewed Roberts as an enigma back in 2005, it’s clear to him now that he finds the chief justice’s approach to the law deeply wanting, and many conservatives agree with him. 巴奈特始终战斗在抵制奥巴马医改的最前线，2012年就《平价医疗法案》中的保险涵盖范围规定上诉最高法院进行宪法挑战，很大程度上就是出自他的思想成果。巴奈特声称，要求私人违背个人意愿，购买健康保险，属国会越权。最终，出于对民选分支的尊重，倍感分裂的首席大法官罗伯茨使出浑身解数，从宪法的角度为该法案再三辩解，令整个右翼暴怒。如果说，2005年，巴奈特还将罗伯茨视作一团迷雾，那么现在他已经看清了，首席大法官对于法律的理解完全不及格，而很多保守派对巴奈特的这一评论颇为激赏。 “Selecting judges with the judicial mindset of ‘judicial restraint’ and ‘deference’ to the majoritarian branches leads to the results we witnessed,” Barnett warned in another Volokh Conspiracy post this summer, after Roberts once again saved the health care law. To Barnett, the proper role for judges isn’t modest or deferential at all, and it’s time for Republicans to start promoting conservatives who will embrace a more activist approach on the bench. “If conservative Republicans want a different performance from the judiciary in the future,” Barnett argued, “they must vet their presidential candidates to see whether they understand this point.” “选一个信奉‘司法克制主义’，对政府、国会‘言听计从’的法官会带来什么后果，我们都已经见识过了，”罗伯茨再次拯救医保法案后，今年夏天，巴奈特在沃洛克共谋的另一篇帖子中敲响警钟。对巴奈特来说，想要当法官，就绝不能温良恭俭让，共和党现在就应该开始动员保守派，将一个更为积极的人推上最高法院。“如果保守派共和党希望将来在司法系统能够有所作为，”巴奈特大声疾呼，“就必须好好敲打敲打总统候选人，看看他们能不能搞清楚这个问题。” Barnett’s opposition to Obamacare made him a hero to the conservative legal establishment. It was for this reason that he was greeted with such enthusiasm at the Federalist Society meeting in Washington two years ago. And it’s what catapulted his ideas about the proper role of judges fully into the mainstream. 巴奈特对于奥巴马医保改革的反对让他在保守派法学界成为一名英雄。这正是两年前的华盛顿特区联邦党人协会的年会中，他受到如此狂热欢迎的原因所在。也正是由于这样的原因，他关于法官适当人选的看法才得以被主流所了解。 To dismiss the debate between libertarians and traditional conservatives over Lochner as an academic sideshow is to misunderstand the stakes. “A full-fledged return to Lochner would put a constitutional cloud over a whole host of laws that we all take for granted today,” said Sam Bagenstos, a liberal constitutional scholar at the University of Michigan who has argued cases before the Supreme Court. “Laws guaranteeing workers the right to join a union without being fired, and the right to earn a minimum wage and receive overtime if working more than 40 hours a week, laws protecting worker safety, and laws protecting workers and customers against discrimination based on race or other protected statuses, just for starters.” 如果简单认定，自由意志主义者和传统保守派关于洛克纳案的争论仅仅是一场无伤大雅的学术小插曲，那就彻底没认清问题的利害所在。“彻底回归洛克纳案，将在我们今天习以为常的整套法律体系上，罩起一片宪法乌云，”曾在最高法院交锋过的密歇根大学自由派宪法学者塞缪尔·巴根斯托斯认为。“保障工人加入工会而不被开除的法律、保证工人把最低工资挣到手、每周工作超过四十小时能拿到加班费的法律、保护工人安全的法律、防止工人和消费者受到种族歧视或者别的什么歧视的法律，统统完蛋，而这统统只是前菜。” I asked Barnett whether the social welfare laws on the books today would be permitted under his reading of the Constitution. “Probably not at the federal level,” he said. 我问过巴奈特，依照他于宪法的理解，今天这些关乎社会福利的成文法还能不能通过。“大概在联邦层面不可能，”他回答。 That’s why Barnett and his contemporaries prefer to root their arguments in specific injustices rather than categorical abstractions. Why shouldn’t bakers be allowed to work more than 60 hours a week, or individuals be allowed to remain uninsured? Why should the government be allowed to regulate out of existence my right to hail a driver or your right to rent a stranger’s house for a weekend? 这就是为什么巴奈特和他的同袍们更愿意将论点放在具体的不公正上，而不是推而广之，形成一套抽象的体系。为什么面包师就不能一周工作六十小时？为什么一个人就不能不买保险？我招个司机，你租个陌生人的房子过周末，政府有什么资格无事生非地对这些权利指手画脚？ Even if you believe these regulations are the result of collusion between government and industry cronies, that doesn’t mean they should be constitutionally prohibited, or even that they have no merit. Once courts are empowered to invalidate sordid government regulations, they are also on a slippery slope to tossing out standards that serve useful purposes—in part because some laws that appear unprincipled at a glance actually do important work. If an Airbnb customer and a hotel guest are each badly burned in preventable fires, the hotel guest is likely to have a great deal more recourse—and would have government regulation to thank. 就算你认为这种管制是政府及其行业亲信共谋的结果，也并不意味着这些管制就应该被彻底禁绝，也并不意味着这些管制就丝毫没有优点。一旦法院有权将这些肮脏的政府管制统统取消，就有可能引发雪崩，将某些发挥重要作用的标准也随之抛弃——部分原因就在于，某些大眼一看不符合原则的法律，却在现实中发挥中重要的作用。要是Airbnb和一个酒店的顾客都在一场本可避免的火灾中被严重烧伤，酒店的顾客很可能享有更多的追索权。这时他或许会对政府管制千恩万谢。 That’s not a persuasive rationale in Barnett’s mind. “You should have your own insurance,” he told me emphatically. “You should be insured. You should have health insurance, you should probably have life insurance, disability insurance. I insure myself.” (The irony of this position should be lost on no one—had Barnett’s Obamacare challenge succeeded, 16 million fewer people would have health insurance today.) 在巴奈特看来，这套说辞并没什么说服力。“你是该有自己的保险，”他断然告诉我，“你该有个保障。你该有套健康保险，你或许还该套生命保险、残疾保险。我就为自己投保。”（这种姿态的讽刺意味倒是路人皆知——要是巴奈特挑战奥巴马医保法案成功，有保险的人就会比今天少一千六百万。） The movement to rehabilitate Lochner now faces a crucial test: Can it endure after the spasms of resistance to the Obama presidency have quieted, or will it burn out along with them? When I put this question to Barnett, he demurred. “I didn’t really have a strategy to get us this far,” he said. 目前，回归洛克纳案运动面临一个非常严峻的挑战：随着奥巴马总统任期结束，对其政策抵抗的退潮，这项运动能否延续下去？还是会随之偃旗息鼓？当我向巴奈特抛出这个问题时，他不以为然。“我们能发展到今天这步，也并不是靠一套什么战略。”巴奈特说道。 Nevertheless, Barnett believes that he and his contemporaries have laid a solid foundation for turning back the legal clock to Lochner. “I don’t think it’s top-down,” Barnett said of the overall approach. “You don’t get Justice Whatever without having a huge bottom-up.” 然而无论如何，巴奈特坚信，他和他的同袍们已经打下了坚实的基础，为法律的钟摆回归洛克纳案创造了条件。“我不觉得这项运动是自上而下组织的，”论及运动的整体方式，巴奈特说道， “没有一个巨大的底层基础，什么法官你都提不起来。” That bottom-up effect has arguably had a big impact on the judiciary already. The 2010 Citizens United decision upended the government’s ability to limit campaign spending by corporations. In 2012, four conservative Supreme Court justices declared, in a dissenting opinion, that the entire Affordable Care Act should be vacated as an improper use of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. This was Lochner cloaked in fresh garb: The government can’t tell me how many hours I can work at a bakery; the government can’t tell me to buy insurance. Roberts salvaged the law, but on the basic point about compulsion, he agreed with Barnett, too. It wasn’t just four conservative justices who bought into a kind of Lochnerism. It was all five. 或许可以这么说，自底向上的效果已经对司法体系产生了影响。2010年，联合公民诉联邦选举委员会案的裁决推翻了政府对于企业竞选资金的限制。2012年，四位保守派大法官在反对意见中声称，《平价医疗法案》应当被彻底取消，因为这是国会滥用权力，干涉州际贸易。其实就是把洛克纳案这样陈年老酒装进了一个新瓶子：政府不能告诉我在面包坊工作几个小时；政府不能逼我买保险。虽然罗伯茨拯救了该项法律，但是对强制性的基本看法，他和巴奈特没什么不同。并不是只有四名保守派法官具有一定的洛克纳主义倾向。所有五名保守派法官全都持有类似观点。 Ultimately, the success of any bottom-up movement will depend as much on voters as on legal scholars and the activists they inform. The biggest setback for Lochnerians could be an establishment Republican like Jeb Bush winning the presidency and cannibalizing the grassroots right’s enthusiasm for taking apart the Obama-era administrative state. A Hillary Clinton presidency would put off a Lochner revival for another four or eight years, but it would keep the fires of opposition to big government raging in the meantime. Bush, by contrast, is an advocate of judicial restraint, and once he started appointing traditional conservatives to the bench, it would be difficult to stop him. But Barnett and the Lochnerians hope that the right’s antipathy toward Obama, the Affordable Care Act, and the Roberts Court’s interventions to salvage it will give a Republican president no choice but to move in a new direction. 从根本上来说，任何自底向上的运动要想取得成功，一方面的确需要法学学者的摇旗呐喊，另一方面，选民也发挥着同样重要的作用。洛克纳分子们所能遭遇的最大挫败就是像杰布·布什这样倾向于大政府的共和党人赢得总统大选，挪用草根右翼的热情，向奥巴马时代的行政举措开火。一旦希拉里·克林顿当政，洛克纳的回归大业将会延后那么四到八年，但同时，这也会为反对大政府的熊熊烈火上浇上几桶热油。而相反，如果像布什这样鼓吹司法克制主义的人当了总统，只要他开始提名传统保守主义者当法官，局面几乎铁定难以挽回。但是，巴奈特和洛克纳分子们希望，奥巴马、《平价医疗法案》，以及罗伯茨法庭对于法案的挽救，已经让右翼分子深恶痛绝，这将会让共和党总统别无选择，只能另辟蹊径。 Conservatives, Barnett said, “have to decide, ‘Well, why am I furious? What am I furious at? ... They put John Roberts on the court. I didn’t put him on the court. Bill Clinton didn’t put him on the court. George Bush put him on the court, and he was considered by the Ted Cruzes of this world as a superstar, and then look what he does. There’s something wrong with this picture.” 巴奈特说道，保守派“必须痛下决心了”，“好吧，我为什么愤怒？是什么让我愤怒？······他们把约翰·罗伯茨抬上了首席大法官的宝座。不是我让他当的法官，不是比尔·克林顿让他当的法官，是乔治·布什任命他当了法官，泰迪·克鲁兹那群人把他当天皇巨星一样崇拜，可是你看看他都干了些什么。这种事压根就不对。” The hope is that this anger propels a libertarian-minded president into office and inspires him to nominate less restrained judges. The next president will likely have the opportunity to appoint at least one, and possibly as many as four Supreme Court justices. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is now 82. Stephen Breyer is 77. Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia are both 79. If one of these justices retires under a Republican president, who then appoints a Lochnerian to fill the vacancy, it will change the Court profoundly. If more than one of them steps down, the Court will become unrecognizable. 洛克纳分子们所寄予厚望的就是，这种愤怒能够将一位具有自由意志主义思想的总统推进白宫，并启发他提名一些不那么束手束脚的大法官。下一任总统将至少有可能提名一位大法官，要是机缘巧合，说不定能提名四位大法官。鲁斯·巴德·金斯伯格今年82，斯蒂芬·布雷耶77，安东尼·肯尼迪、安东宁·斯卡利亚都是79。如果这些法官随便哪个在共和党总统任内退休，而总统又指定了一位洛克纳主义者填补空缺，这将能够彻底改变最高法院。如果他们中不止一位归隐，那最高法院将会彻底面目全非。 If that plan fails, Barnett’s cause will be set back years, and the project of pushing his ideas into the Republican mainstream will continue sub rosa. But Barnett has influential allies. 如果计划难遂人意，巴奈特的回归大业将会蛰伏数年，将其理念变成共和党主流的进程也还会继续秘密推进。然而，巴奈特确有几位说得上话的朋友。 In July, the conservative columnist George Will made a provocative new demand of the next Republican president: “Ask this of potential court nominees: Do you agree that Lochner correctly reflected the U.S. natural rights tradition and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments’ affirmation of unenumerated rights?” 七月，保守派专栏作家乔治·威尔大肆宣扬，要为下一任共和党总统设置一个新的标准：“问他会提名谁当大法官：你是否认同洛克纳案正确地反映出美国自然权利传统，是宪法第九、第十四修正案对于宪法未规定公民权利的肯定。” Thanks to the efforts to grow their ranks, there are a few suitable Supreme Court candidates already. In his column, Will identified one: Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett. In a footnote to a recent opinion, Willett celebrated the fact that “a wealth of contemporary legal scholarship is reexamining Lochner, its history and correctness as a matter of constitutional law.” 多亏洛克纳分子们不遗余力地壮大队伍，现在已经有了几位理想的最高法院大法官人选。威尔在他的专栏中就点到了这么一位：德克萨斯最高法院法官丹·威利特。在最近一份判决意见的脚注中，威利特不无欣慰地写到，“当今法学界已经对洛克纳案作出了再三审视，审视其历史和其在宪法学上的正确性。” As for Will’s proposed litmus test, a few Republican presidential candidates this cycle have passed it. Rand Paul has praised the Lochner decision explicitly multiple times, most recently at the Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit this January. “I’m not a judicial restraint guy,” he told an audience of avowed judicial activism foes. “I’m a judicial activist when it comes to Lochner. I’m a judicial activist when it comes to the New Deal.” 至于威尔提出的资格审查测试，本轮有些共和党候选人已经合格。兰德·保罗曾多次明确盛赞洛克纳案，在今年一月传统保护保守派政策峰会（Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit）上，他对听众中一位据称是司法能动主义的反对者说，“我不是司法克制主义者”，“谈到洛克纳案，谈到新政，我就是一个司法能动主义者。” In August, Rick Perry boasted on Twitter that he was “proud” to have nominated Willett to the Texas Supreme Court, calling the justice “a model of conservative jurisprudence.” Whether they know it or not, both politicians are already speaking a language Barnett and his libertarian contemporaries have successfully injected into the mainstream of conservative strategic thought. 八月份，里克·佩里在推特上自吹，提名威利特进入德克萨斯最高法院是他的“骄傲”，称这位法官是“保守派法学界的楷模。”无论他们是否意识到了，这两位政治家操持的政治话语，正是由巴奈特和他的自由意志主义战友们成功注入主流保守派政策思想的。 These are dark horse candidates, but any Republican president will face much more pressure than George W. Bush ever did to nominate the kind of judges Paul or Perry might. Another candidate, Scott Walker, is more of an enigma, but he’s an equally doctrinaire opponent of economic regulation and has a liaison to the pro-Lochner world in George Will’s wife, Mari, who is an adviser to his campaign. History shows it’s difficult to stop a determined president from shaping the courts to reflect a particular conception of law. “There was a whole series of hot-button issues that the Reagan administration decided were exceptionally important in articulating the right kind of judicial restraint,” Bagenstos explained. “Affirmative action was one. The exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment was another. ... So they had a whole hit list of legal principles that they thought were misguided, which got the Constitution wrong, and so they worked really hard to explain why the decisions they thought were wrong, were wrong. 他们都是黑马，但任何共和党总统在提名保罗或者佩里中意的那类法官时，都面临着远远大于乔治·W·布什所遇到的压力。另一位候选人斯科特·沃克更像是一团谜，但他同样在理论上反对经济管制，并且与洛克纳案阵营有着千丝万缕的联系，乔治·威尔的妻子毛伊正是他的竞选顾问。历史一再告诉我们，让一位心意已决的总统不要插手法律系统，以反映其所认同的某种特定法律理念，是非常困难的。“里根执政时期，曾经有一系列热点问题，被政府认为对于恰当地体现司法克制而言极为重要，”巴根斯托斯解释道。“平权运动是一个例子。第四条修正案下的证据排除法则是另一个例子······所以当局列了一个法律原则黑名单，把他们认为搞错的案子、和宪法起冲突的案子统统装进去，于是千辛万苦地解释为什么他们认为错误的案子是错误的。” “It influenced the way they looked at judges, and once they put those judges on the lower court they started to put that agenda into action,” he continued. “Sometimes the Supreme Court went along with the more aggressive lower-court judges, and sometimes they didn’t. But you had this dynamic that things liberals thought they had won in the Burger and Warren Courts were not secure and suddenly were being contested.” “这甚至还影响了政府对待法官的方式，一旦政府提名某些法官在下级法院任职，他们便开始行动起来。” 巴根斯托斯继续说到，“有时候最高法院会认同更为活跃的下级法院法官，有时则不会。但问题在这里，自由派原本以为在伯格法庭、沃伦法庭斩获的胜利果实，突然就变得岌岌可危起来，” This is a lesson every Democrat, and really every establishment-minded Republican, should relearn, because a president who adopted the same model, with the goal of rehabilitating Lochner, could erode the legal and administrative foundations of the past century in a matter of years. A rule change undertaken by Senate Democrats last Congress eliminated the filibuster for nominees to lower courts, and by the time the next president is sworn into office, three sitting Supreme Court justices will be over 80 years old. 历史为每一个民主党以及倾向于大政府思想的共和党拉响了警报，倘若一旦有位以里根为楷模，以回归洛克纳案为己任的总统上台，过去一百多年来构建的法律和行政基础几年以内就可能受到极大侵蚀。要知道，上届国会，民主党参议员们废除了本可用来抵御下级法院法官提名的阻挠议事规则，而等到下一位总统宣誓就职时，三位最高法院大法官将年过八十。 “The next Republican president will have a choice,” Bagenstos said. “I don’t know which way that choice is going to come out.” “下一任共和党总统将有机会做出选择，”巴根斯托斯说道，“我只是不清楚这一选择会朝向何方。” To Randy Barnett the choice is obvious. 对兰迪·巴奈特来说，答案明摆着。

Troubling Signs of Minimum Wage Damage in Los Angeles 洛杉矶最低工资带来的破坏令人不安 作者：Adam Ozimek @ 2015-8-18 译者：带菜刀的诗人（@带菜刀的诗人_） 一校：迈爸（@麦田的字留地） 来源：Moody’s Analytics，https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/datapoints/256050/Troubling-Signs-of-Minimum-Wage-Damage-in-Los-Angeles/ The recent spate of local minimum wage hikes around the country is generating a lot of new data for economists to study, but so far I’ve been hesitant to focus on case studies. 最近，遍及全国的一大波地方最低工资上涨浪潮，为经济学家的研究带来的了大量新鲜数据，但是到目前为止我仍在犹豫是否要将注意力集中于个案研究。 There are a lot of reasons to be cautious in looking for minimum wage impacts on a city-by-city basis: it is easy to cherry pick, employment data at local levels can be volatile, growth rates rather than levels may be affected, and areas with stronger than average economies may be raising minimum wages. 我们有许多理由对按城市考察最低工资的影响保持谨慎：这很容易因选择性取样而造成确认偏差，地方层面的就业数据可能不够稳定，受影响的可能是增长率而不是绝对水平，并且高于平均经济水平的区域更可能提高最低工资水平。 In addition, disagreement in the literature on minimum wages illustrates that different comparisons or controls can easily give different answers. However, as I’ve been watching the data, one case is becoming too stark to ignore: Los Angeles. 另外，学术文献中关于最低工资水平的争议表明，不同的比较方式或变量控制很容易得出不同结果。然而，就我一直在观察的数据而言，有一个例子过于惹眼以至于无法被忽略：洛杉矶。 In September, 2014, Los Angeles City approved hike to the minimum wage for hotel workers of $15.37. The wage went into effect in July, 2015, for hotels with 300 or more rooms, and will go into effect July, 2016 for 150-plus-room hotels. 2014年9月，洛杉矶市通过了将酒店工人最低工资水平上调到15.37美元的决议。对于客房数量超过300间的酒店，新的工资条例将在2015年7月生效，而数量超过150间客房的酒店则在2016年7月执行该法。 Given the delay in the wage hike, it is not obvious that employment would be affected already. But BLS data on the accommodations industry (NAICS 721) for Los Angeles county is starting to look like serious impacts are occurring already. 考虑到工资水平上调时间上的延迟，并不能马上就看到它给就业率带来的影响。但是根据劳工统计局（BLS）关于洛杉矶住宿行业（北美工业分类系统 721）的数据，严重的影响看来已然出现。 【图1】洛杉矶酒店业开始出现失业情况 The decline in year-to-year growth rates starts to show up in October, 2014, when growth falls below 2% for the first time in more than two years. Then in January, 2015, employment starts to actually shrink, and by June it is down 4.8% year over year. Zooming out, it’s clear that job losses of this magnitude in Los Angeles are not seen outside of recessions. 年度增长速度在2014年10月开始出现下滑，增速首次连续超过两年低于2%。2015年1月，就业率实际上开始萎缩，到6月同比下降4.8%。而当我们放眼全局，很明显，洛杉矶这种程度的职位流失在只有在衰退中才能看到。 【图2】洛杉矶酒店业出现衰退迹象 The BLS does not report seasonally adjusted data, but I did the adjustment using the same procedure they use and found accommodations have fallen by around 1,000 jobs so far this year. 劳工局并不会每个季度都发布调整后的数据，但是我使用跟他们一样的程序得出了自己的调整数据，并且发现到今年为止，住宿行业已经失去了约1000个工作岗位。 There are, of course, a lot of reasons for caution here. Data from the more exhaustive QCEW survey suggests the decline in job growth in accommodations is overstated in the data I use here through the end of 2014. Unfortunately, QCEW data is only available through December, 2014. 当然，我们有许多理由慎于判断。来自劳工局的就业与工资水平季度统计（QCEW）中的更详实数据表明，我使用的2014年住宿行业就业增长率的下降被高估了。不幸的是，可供使用的QCEW数据只到2014年12月。 This means that some of the job losses may be revised away in the future. However, the declines through June are large enough that is seems very likely that real employment declines are occurring. 这意味着被我计入的一些职位流失在将来可能会被更正过来。然而，整个6月的就业率下降已经足够大了，以至于看起来似乎很有可能真正的就业率下降正在发生。 Another reason to be cautious is that the employment effects are showing up after the hike passed but before it takes effect. Businesses are forward looking so this is not impossible, but the magnitude of the declines before the wage hike takes effect are somewhat surprising especially for the service sector. Finally, the hotel minimum wage hike is only affecting the City of Los Angeles, and this data is for the larger county of Los Angeles. 另一个警惕的理由是，就业效应是在上调最低工资的法案通过之后但是生效之前显现出来的。但是，在上调工资生效之前就业率下降的程度有点让人吃惊，特别是服务部门。然而商业具有前瞻性，所以这也不是没有可能。最终，上调酒店最低工资的浪潮仅仅波及洛杉矶市，这项数据覆盖了范围更大的洛杉矶县。 Reason for concern 关注的理由 Overall, the caveats here are significant, and despite the stark and significant decline in employment, the data should be considered just very suggestive at this point. However, it does represent one more reason to be concerned about the forthcoming minimum wage hike that will be affecting all Los Angeles County workers in all industries. 总的说来，不详预兆是足够明显的，但尽管就业出现了明显且重大的下降，目前的数据仍应被视为只是推测性的。然而，它的确呈现了另一个理由，让我们关切即将到来的最低工资提升是否会影响到洛杉矶县所有工人。 The service sector, and hotels in particular, should be less responsive to minimum wage hikes than many other lower wage employers. Tourism industries should be less price elastic than tradeables like manufacturing, and hotels don’t have a lot of alternatives, which makes transitioning the building to some less-labor-intensive use less likely. 服务部门，特别是酒店，应该比许多其他较低工资水平雇主对这次工资上调的反应更小。旅游业应该比生产贸易货物的制造业表现出更低的价格弹性，并且酒店没有很多替代选择，这使得酒店建筑物不太可能转换成一些低劳动密度的用途上。 Hotels, in other words, should have been more safe. Instead, they seem to be taking a big hit. While what we are seeing in Los Angeles so far is nowhere near conclusive, it should worry those who have been less concerned about big minimum wage hikes. 换而言之，酒店行业原本应该是比较安全的。但是，看来他们即将遭受重创。就目前我们在洛杉矶所看到的景象还远不稳定，应该担忧的倒是那些对最低工资水平大幅上调仍缺乏关注的人们。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Fifty years of twin studies 双胞胎研究五十年 作者：Stephen Hsu @ 2015-5-21 译者：demo 来源：Information Processing，http://infoproc.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/fifty-years-of-twin-studies.html The most interesting aspect of these results is that for many traits there is no detectable non-additivity. That is, gene-gene interactions seem to be insignificant, and a simple linear genetic architecture is consistent with the results. 以下结果中最有意思的一点在于，很多人类的复杂性状都没有检测出非可加性（非线性）。也就是说，基因和基因之间的作用似乎微不足道，而一个简单的线性遗传结构就可以解释这些结果。

Meta-analysis of the heritability of human traits based on fifty years of twin studies Nature Genetics (2015) doi:10.1038/ng.3285 基于五十年双胞胎研究的人类表型遗传率的整合分析 《自然遗传学》（2015年） Despite a century of research on complex traits in humans, the relative importance and specific nature of the influences of genes and environment on human traits remain controversial. 尽管关于人类复杂性状的研究已进行了一个世纪，但基因和环境对人类表型的作用孰轻孰重，以及它们的具体性质如何，都还存在争议。 We report a meta-analysis of twin correlations and reported variance components for 17,804 traits from 2,748 publications including 14,558,903 partly dependent twin pairs, virtually all published twin studies of complex traits. Estimates of heritability cluster strongly within functional domains, and across all traits the reported heritability is 49%. 我们在此发表一项关于双胞胎相关性的整合分析，涵盖几乎所有已发表的双胞胎复杂性状研究，包括2748篇论文中研究的14,558,903对（部分重复研究）双胞胎、其所得出的17,804项表型的方差分量。估算出的遗传率在功能群内呈现群集分布，对于全部性状来说，报告的遗传率为49%。 For a majority (69%) of traits, the observed twin correlations are consistent with a simple and parsimonious model where twin resemblance is solely due to additive genetic variation. The data are inconsistent with substantial influences from shared environment or non-additive genetic variation. 对于多数（69％）性状，观察到的双胞胎相关性可以用一个简单到吝啬的模型解释；在这个模型中，双胞胎的相似之处完全归结于可加的遗传差异。这些数据不支持共同的环境因素或者非可加的遗传差异对于复杂性状有显著影响。 This study provides the most comprehensive analysis of the causes of individual differences in human traits thus far and will guide future gene-mapping efforts. 这项研究提供了目前最为全面的一份关于人类性状的个体差异分析，对以后的基因定位研究具有指导意义。

See also Additivity and complex traits in mice: 另见（作者早先的博文）《小鼠的复杂性状与可加性》：

You may have noticed that I am gradually collecting copious evidence for (approximate) additivity. Far too many scientists and quasi-scientists are infected by the epistasis or epigenetics meme, which is appealing to those who "revel in complexity" and would like to believe that biology is too complex to succumb to equations. ("How can it be? But what about the marvelous incomprehensible beautiful sacred complexity of Nature? But But But ...") 你可能已经注意到，我逐渐在搜集（近似于）可加性的丰富证据。有太多科学家和民科染上了流行的遗传上位或者表观遗传的观念；这些观念对于那些“为复杂而陶醉”、相信生物学太过复杂不可能用简单方程来表达的人非常有吸引力。（他们会说“怎么可能呢？可是自然中那些美妙不可方物、神圣不可侵犯的复杂性呢？可是这个可是那个呢？”） I sometimes explain things this way: There is a deep evolutionary reason behind additivity: nonlinear mechanisms are fragile and often "break" due to DNA recombination in sexual reproduction. Effects which are only controlled by a single locus are more robustly passed on to offspring. ... 我有时候会这样解释： 遗传的可加性背后有很深的进化上的原因：非线性的机制过于脆弱，常常会在有性生殖DNA重组中“断开”。而仅由单个位点控制的性状则更易于被传给后代。 Many people confuse the following statements: "The brain is complex and nonlinear and many genes interact in its construction and operation." "Differences in brain performance between two individuals of the same species must be due to nonlinear (non-additive) effects of genes." The first statement is true, but the second does not appear to be true across a range of species and quantitative traits. 很多人会把下面的两个陈述混淆： “大脑是复杂且非线性的，有很多基因在它的构成和功能中相互作用。” “同一物种的不同个体之间大脑性能的差异一定是由于非线性（非可加性）的基因作用。” 第一个说法是正确的，但第二个在很多物种和可量化的性状中似乎都不成立。

On the genetic architecture of intelligence and other quantitative traits (p.16): （作者早先的学术论文）《智力及其他可量化表型的遗传结构》（第16页）：

... The preceding discussion is not intended to convey an overly simplistic view of genetics or systems biology. Complex nonlinear genetic systems certainly exist and are realized in every organism. However, quantitative differences between individuals within a species may be largely due to independent linear effects of specific genetic variants. 前面讨论的用意并非要给遗传学或者系统生物学一个过于简化的看法。复杂、非线性的遗传系统肯定存在，而且在任何有机体中都有实现。然而，一个物种中不同个体间的定量差异，在很大程度上可能取决于某些基因差异的独立线性效果。 As noted, linear effects are the most readily evolvable in response to selection, whereas nonlinear gadgets are more likely to be fragile to small changes. (Evolutionary adaptations requiring significant changes to nonlinear gadgets are improbable and therefore require exponentially more time than simple adjustment of frequencies of alleles of linear effect.) 上面说过，线性作用在自然选择中最容易进化出来，而非线性的小把戏则更可能被很小的变化破坏。（非线性机制作出大量改变而得到的进化适应不太可能出现，因此相比于仅需要简单调整基因频率的线性机制来说，它们需要更多时间。） One might say that, to first approximation, Biology = linear combinations of nonlinear gadgets, and most of the variation between individuals is in the (linear) way gadgets are combined, rather than in the realization of different gadgets in different individuals. 有人可能会说，做个简单的近似，生物学等于非线性机制的线性组合，而且大部分个体间差异是来自各种机制被（线性）组合的方式，而不是这些机制本身在个体间的差异。 Linear models work well in practice, allowing, for example, SNP-based prediction of quantitative traits (milk yield, fat and protein content, productive life, etc.) in dairy cattle. ... 线性的模型在实践中有广泛用途，比方说用奶牛的单核酸多态性（SNP）来预测可量化的表型（产奶量、奶制品的脂肪和蛋白含量、生产时限等等）。…

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

苍白无力的欧洲普世主义 Europe’s Bloodless Universalism 作者：Theodore Dalrymple @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：Library of Law and Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/19/europes-bloodless-universalism/ By now the story of Omar Ismail Mostefai, the first of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks to be named, is depressingly familiar. One could almost have written his biography before knowing anything about him. A petty criminal of Algerian parentage from what all the world now calls the banlieue, he was sustained largely by the social security system, an erstwhile fan of rap music, and a votary of what might be called the continuation of criminality by other means, which is to say Islamism and the grandiose purpose in life that it gives to its adherents. For feeble minds, the extremity of the consequences for self and others serves as some kind of guarantee that their cause is just. 到今天，巴黎袭击事件中第一个确定姓名的案犯Omar Ismail Mostefai的故事已经家喻户晓了。即使对他完全不了解，人们也能凭猜测为他写出一本传记。一个小混混，有着阿尔及利亚血统，成长于今天被世人称为“暴力街区”的市郊，主要依靠社保体系生活，曾经是饶舌音乐的爱好者，热诚地致力于伊斯兰教和它给予信徒们的宏伟人生目标——或者，从另一种意义上也可以说，是持续犯罪。对那些意志薄弱的人来说，最终将自己和他人带向死亡，也有着某种正当理由。 Nor was the connection to Molenbeek, a neighborhood in Brussels where at least three of the terrorists lived, much of a surprise to anyone. Brussels—the “capital of Europe,” be it remembered—is slightly more than a quarter Muslim, and nearly 100 percent of Molenbeek’s residents are Muslims of North African background. When a few years ago I was shown around the place, my acquaintances told me it was virtually extraterritorial as far as the Belgian state was concerned—apart from the collection of social security, of course. 而他与莫伦贝克区（至少三名参与巴黎恐袭的恐怖分子都来自这里）之间的联系也丝毫不会让人感到惊奇。布鲁塞尔——人们记忆中的“欧洲之都”——的穆斯林人口占比略高于四分之一，而几乎所有的莫伦贝克区居民都是北非裔穆斯林。几年前一些熟人带着我在那里参观的时候，他们告诉我，对比利时政府来说，这个区域几乎就是“免受司法管辖的治外之地”——当然，除了它还享受着这个国家的社保体系之外。 All the women wore headscarves, and the young men dressed like American rap music fans. The police rarely entered and were far more concerned not to offend Muslim sensibilities—for example, by not being seen to eat during Ramadan—than to find or capture the miscreants who made the area so dangerously crime-ridden. Businesses there (so my guides told me) paid no taxes but were not investigated for evasion by the tax authorities: it was the tax authorities who did the evading. 那里所有的女人都戴着头巾，而年轻男人都穿得像是美国饶舌音乐的狂热粉丝。警察很少进入这个区域，相比追踪和抓捕那些将这里变成一个犯罪猖獗之地的恶棍，他们更关心的是千万不要触碰到穆斯林的敏感之处——例如，不要在斋月期间被穆斯林看到在白天吃东西。在那里做各种生意（我的导游告诉我）都不交税，而且也不会受到税务局的调查：相反，税务局只要一听这个地方就会躲得远远的。 Everyone knew Islamist preaching and plotting were rife in Molenbeek, but nothing was done to stop it, in order to keep the tense and fragile peace going as long as possible. Sympathy for terrorism was the norm—or, it would be more correct to say, that no one dared publicly voice opposition to it. 所有人都知道，莫伦贝克区伊斯兰极端分子的宣传策划工作十分猖獗，却没有任何加以阻止的努力，而这只是为了将现有的脆弱和平状态维持得尽量久一些。对恐怖主义的同情成为常态——或者更准确的说，没有谁敢于公开反对。 If my informants were right, this was the perfect place for psychopaths with an illusion of purpose to flourish and make plans undisturbed by the authorities, while being supported by the welfare state. Events since have demonstrated that they did not exaggerate (as, to my regret, I rather suspected at the time that they did, for alarm is so often disproportionate to the reality that gives rise to it). 如果告诉我这些的人是对的，那么对于那些抱有疯狂幻想并且希望在不受当局干扰的状态下筹划自己行动的疯子们而言，这里就是人间天堂，与此同时，他们还能够享受福利国家的支持。之后发生的事件已经证明了他们并没有夸大其词（而令我后悔的是，当时他们提醒我时，我也对他们的看法表示怀疑，相比警告成真后人们所面对的残酷现实，之前的警告声总是显得微不足道）。 Recall that the terrorists who were disarmed on the train from Amsterdam to Paris in August came from Molenbeek, as did the man who killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. More volunteers to fight for ISIS have come from Molenbeek than anywhere else in Europe. 回想一下，今年8月那帮在阿姆斯特丹开往巴黎的火车上被人们提前发现并解除了武装的恐怖分子就来自于莫伦贝克区，而那个2014年在布鲁塞尔的犹太人博物馆里杀害了4个人的凶手也同样来自那里。莫伦贝克区为ISIS提供了比全欧洲任何其它地方都要多的志愿战士。 The Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel, has now virtually admitted that the area was extraterritorial to Belgium, and out of all control. The time had come “to focus more on repression,” he said. But whether the determination or sufficient political unity necessary to carry it out will last is doubtful. Repression requires discrimination; we live in a regime in which murderers may come and go, but social security goes on forever. 现在，比利时首相米歇尔实际上已经承认该区域已成比利时的“治外之地”，并且已经完全失去了控制。他说，现在应该“把更多的注意力集中在压制上”。但这种决心是否能得以坚持，或者，为实现这一目标所必须的足够的政治团结能够得以坚持，是值得怀疑的。压制就意味着区别对待，但在我们如今生活的这个社会制度下，杀人犯来来去去，而社会保障则永不中断。 Do we have the stomach to tar many people with the same brush? That we now know that terrorists among the Syrian refugees have entered Europe, which was precisely the objection of those opposed to accepting them (who were vilified by immigration-liberals for their moral obtuseness or nastiness, and have been proven right, which is even more unforgivable), now raises the disturbing question: How many innocent people should Europe accept for one suicide bomber? 但我们要不要一竿子打倒一船人呢？现在我们已经知道，有些恐怖分子藏在叙利亚难民队伍里混入了欧洲，这正是之前那些反对接纳叙利亚难民入欧的人们所提出的拒绝理由（为了诋毁他们，那些移民自由派们给他们扣上了“道德迟钝”或“道德败坏”之类的帽子，但最终事实证明他们的担忧是对的，这就让我们所犯下的错误变得更加不可原谅），而现状又给我们提出了一个令人困扰的问题：为了一个自杀式炸弹袭击者欧洲要接纳多少无辜的难民？ A striking thing about the immigration debate before the massacres of November 13 was the almost complete absence of references, at least by the “respectable” politicians, to the national interest of the various countries. The debate was couched in Kantian moral terms. Sweden, for example, which has no imperative to take refugees other than moral grandiosity and its desire to feel itself virtuous, has had a hard enough time integrating the immigrants it has already taken; their entry has made that country one with nearly the highest crime rate in Western Europe. Current family re-unification laws in Europe mean that the numbers any country agrees to take will soon be expanded. 11月13日的巴黎大屠杀发生之前，在有关移民政策的辩论中令人吃惊的一点是，几乎完全没有人——至少那些“令人尊敬的”政客们中没有人——提及各国的国家利益。这场辩论是以一种康德式道德辩论的方式进行的。举例来说，除了道德上华而不实的崇高感以及让自己觉得高尚之外，瑞典并没有任何必要去接收难民，整合已接收的难民也让其已经历了一段非常困难的时期；这些难民进入之后，几乎把瑞典变成了整个西欧犯罪率最高的国家。而当前欧洲有关家庭重聚的法律则意味着，很快每个国家都将同意接收数量更多的难民。 There is a real moral dilemma, of course. Recently in Bodrum, on the Aegean coast of Turkey, I was approached by a family of four Syrian refugees begging for alms. The father of the family showed me his Syrian passport (precisely of the kind so easily forged by the terrorists), but all I could see was his wife and two small children who were obviously bereft of support and who would obviously suffer without charity. That day, 22 refugees were reported drowned as they tried to reach Turkey by boat, an occurrence so regular that it was not reported in the Western press. No one undertakes such a journey lightly: only safety or an egocentric thirst for “martyrdom” could impel him. 显然，这里有个道德困境。最近在土耳其爱琴海沿岸城市博德鲁姆，一个叙利亚难民的四口之家走近我，希望我能施舍给他们些什么。这家的父亲给我看了他的叙利亚护照（正是那种恐怖分子非常容易伪造的护照），但我所看到的只是他妻子和两个年幼的孩子所表现出的无助，如果得不到施舍，他们显然会吃很多苦。在同一天，当地新闻报道了22名难民在乘船试图前往土耳其的途中溺水身亡的消息，而由于这类事情发生得如此频繁，西方媒体甚至都没有报道这条消息。没有人会轻易选择踏上这样一段旅途：只有对安全的强烈渴求或是个人主义的“殉道”热望才能让人踏上这条路。 Europe has nothing equivalent to national interest, and if it did, it would have no way of acting on it. A kind of bloodless universalism has rushed in to fill the vacuum, whose consequences are now visible to all. The first thing President Hollande tried to do after the attacks was close the borders; he now talks (understandably, of course) of national security. He talks also of defeating ISIS militarily, but France, along with all of the other European countries, has run down its armed forces in the name of the social security that paid for at least some of the terrorists. 欧洲没有国家利益之类的东西，即使有，也不存在以之为名做些什么的政治途径。于是一种苍白无力的普世主义便趁虚而入填补了这一空白，其后果已经呈现在了每个人面前。巴黎恐怖袭击发生后，奥朗德总统试图做的第一件事就是关闭边境；他现在开始谈论国家安全了（当然，这可以理解）。他同样开始谈论军事打击ISIS，然而法国和其它的欧洲国家一样，已经以社保资金不足为由削减了自己武装力量，而这些钱中至少有一部分落入了恐怖分子的口袋。 Just because Europe’s weakness is clear doesn’t mean that our heads are clear. Three days after the attacks, the most influential newspaper in Britain (and in certain ways the best), the liberal-Left Guardian, ran 40 small photos of some the victims, with the headline, “Killed in the Pitiless Name of Terrorism.” 虽然欧洲的弱点已展露无遗，但这并不意味着我们的脑子就清醒了。在巴黎恐怖袭击发生仅仅三天之后，英国最具影响力的报纸（从某些角度说也是最好的）——左翼自由派的《卫报》，刊登了40张遇害者的小幅照片，而使用的标题则是“以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而遭杀害”。 They were not killed in the pitiless name of terrorism, of course. They were killed in the pitiless name of Islam—not the only possible interpretation if Islam, no doubt, but still in its name. In the cowardice of this headline was the encapsulated all the weakness of Europe, a real encouragement to the terrorists. 当然,他们并非以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而被杀死。他们是以冷酷无情的伊斯兰之名而被杀死——是的，这不是解读伊斯兰的唯一方式，但这些杀戮仍是以伊斯兰之名而行。《卫报》标题中所表现出的懦弱是今天欧洲所有弱点的集中体现，而这对恐怖分子们来说则是一种实实在在的激励。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

In praise of pushy parents 对挑剔家长的赞扬 作者：Daniel Hanna @ 2015-10-16 译者：尼克基得慢 （@尼克基得慢） 校对：Drunkplane（@ Drunkplane-zny） 来源：www.capx.co，http://www.capx.co/in-praise-of-pushy-parents/ There was a mother at one of my children’s previous schools, a loud American, who was deeply unpopular with the other mums, but not with me. Her offence, in the eyes of the other women, was to be forever complaining. The reading programme was out-of-date, she averred, the music lessons inadequate, the maths too easy. 在我孩子以前上的一所学校里有一位母亲，一个大嗓门的美国人，她非常不受其他母亲的待见，但是我不讨厌她。在其他女人眼里，她的过错是永不休止的抱怨。比如她认为阅读方案已经过时了，音乐课程还有欠缺，数学课程过于简单。 “She was whining about the new French teacher today,” one of the other mums might say. “她今天在抱怨新来的法语老师，”另一位母亲说。 “Great,” I’d reply. “As long as she’s doing it, the rest of us don’t need to worry”. “太棒了，” 我回答说。“只要她这样做，我们其他人就不用操心了”。 Some of the lady’s criticisms were misplaced, and no doubt the teachers found her a thundering nuisance; but she unquestionably kept them on their toes. Whether she intended it or not, her pushiness thus benefited all our children. 这位女士的一些批评搞错了对象，而且老师们无疑视她为一大麻烦；但是她也确实让老师们不敢松懈。不管她是有意还是无意，她的咄咄逼人让我们大家的孩子都受益了。 This is the point missed by Leftist opponents of more parental choice in education. As usual, they believe that they are acting in the interests of the poor and powerless; and, as usual, they are wrong. 这是反对家长干涉教育的左派们所忽略的观点。像往常一样，他们认为自己正在为穷人和无权势者行事，但他们还是一如既往的错了。 “Free schools are all very well if you’re articulate and middle-class,” say supporters of uniformity. “But what about those kids whose parents aren’t engaged? Are we just going to throw them on the scrap heap?” “如果你能言善辩又是中产阶级，免费学校当然是非常棒的，”一致性的支持者们说。“但是那些失业父母的孩子们怎么办？难道我们就要把他们丢进垃圾场吗？” Actually, that’s pretty much what happens under our present system. The GCSE results of our top state schools are twice as good as those of the bottom. Seventy-three percent of children in Kensington and Chelsea got at least five good passes this year; in Knowsley, that figure was 35 per cent. Ponder that extraordinary discrepancy. A system specifically designed to ensure equality of opportunity creates massive asymmetries of outcome. 这确实是我们现行体系下正在发生的事情。顶级公立学校的普通中等教育认证（GCSE）成绩要比底层学校好一倍。今年， Kensington和Chelsea的孩子中有73%至少得到五个优；而在Knowsley，这个数字只有35%。思考下这巨大的差异。一个专门为确保机会均等而设计的系统却造成了大量不对称的结果。 Now imagine you took away all the state control. Suppose that there were no regulation beyond the market. Consider, for example, what happens when you buy a pint of milk. The quality and price are not only assured, but they are pretty constant around the country. True, you might pay a fraction more in Kensington than in Knowsley, reflecting the higher ground rents in the Royal Borough; but the milk in Merseyside will be just as good. 现在想象下你将所有的国家管控都取消。假设市场没有管制。比如，思考下你要买一杯牛奶时会发生什么。价格和质量不仅有保证，而且在全国都很稳定。当然，由于皇家自治市【编注：指Kensington-Chelsea皇家自治市】更高的地租，你在Kensington要比在Knowsley 付的钱更多；但是在Merseyside的牛奶会是同样的品质。 How does this extraordinary equalisation come about, given that there are no equivalents of the Local Education Authorities regulating prices? It comes about through competition. Millions of consumers invigilate the system as no committee of regulators ever could. 鉴于当地并没有教育部门调控价格，这种特殊的均衡如何产生呢？这可以通过竞争来实现。数百万消费者会监督这个任何监管委员会都无能为力的系统。 And here’s the best bit. The system works as well for incompetent as for discerning consumers. I am the least qualified shopper you could imagine. I have no idea about ingredients, brands, prices or sell-by dates. I live in terror of being asked, as politicians sometimes are, how much a pint of milk costs. But, when I buy one, I can be pretty confident that I’m getting a fair deal. Why? Because more knowledgeable buyers have done my work for me. They have played the part of that pushy New Yorker whom I used to admire at the school gates. 下面是最棒的一点。这个系统适用于有分辨力的消费者，也适用于无此能力者。我是你能想象的最不合格的顾客。我对于原料、品牌、价格或者销售日期都没有概念。像政客们有时候所表现的那样，我害怕被问及一杯牛奶多少钱。但是，当我买东西时，我很确信我得到了公平的对待。为什么？因为更多有见识的买家已经替我做了工作。他们扮演了那个我喜欢的，挑剔的纽约人的角色。 Precisely the same dynamic would work in schools if it were allowed to. The sharp-elbowed bourgeois parents, seeking to drive up standards for their own progeny, would incidentally drive up standards for everyone else. They might not mean to, but they would. 若是被允许的话，同样的原理也肯定适用于学校。那些为了自己孩子而对学校高标准严要求的严厉的中产阶级父母也会顺便帮其他孩子抬高学校的水平。他们可能本意并非如此，但他们确实导致了这结果。 Daniel Hannan is a Conservative Member of the European Parliament and blogs at www.hannan.co.uk. Daniel Hannan 是欧洲议会的保守派成员，他的博客网址为www.hannan.co.uk。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

权力积木#2：信息与控制 辉格 2015年12月3日 一个广域国家的统治者面临各种技术难题，比如在前文已讨论过的领地安全问题中，为了对入侵和叛乱做出及时反应，他不仅需要机动优势，还需要以5-10倍于行军的速度传送情报，而即便如此，当疆域非常广阔时，也必须在多个据点驻扎军队，而不能集中于一点；行政系统也是如此，为实现有效治理，广袤领地须划分成若干单元，分别派驻官吏。 更一般而言，当统治团队膨胀到一定程度时，由于它本身也受制于邓巴局限，因而只能建立层级组织，假设按每个上级单元控制20个下级单元（1：20已经是非常扁平的结构，只能实现较弱的控制，有关这一点我以后会展开讨论），那么，从一两百人的熟人小社会到数千万人的帝国，就至少需要四个层级。 然而，一旦建立层级组织，就会面临所有委托-代理关系中都存在的激励和控制难题，瞒上欺下，职权滥用，目标偏离，推诿责任，沟通不畅，协调失灵，以及最危险的背叛和分离；最高权力者总会想出各种办法来克服这些障碍，那些或多或少管用的办法就被延用下来，构成了我们在历史中所见到的种种政体结构、制度安排和组织工具。 防止叛乱的一种方法是多线控制，将维持下级单元运行所需职能加以分割，交给不同人掌管，并通过不同的层级系统加以控制，使得其中每个都无法单独行动，从而剥夺下级单元的独立性；例如，由将领掌握军队指挥权，由行政系统负责粮草供给，这样，叛军很快会因失去粮草而陷入瘫痪。 另一种方法是阻止上下级官员之间发展私人效忠关系，缩短任期、频繁调动、任职回避、把奖励和提拔权限保留在高层，都是出于这一目的；另外，在重臣身边安插耳目，派出巡回监察官，维持多个独立情报来源，要求同级官员分头汇报情况以便核查真伪虚实，都是常见的做法。 强化控制的终极手段，是直接发号施令，让官员忙于执行频繁下达的任务而无暇追求自己的目标，甚至让他们看不清系统的整体运营机制因而无法打自己的小算盘；爱德华·科克（[[Edward Coke]]）有句名言：（大意）“每天起床都要等着别人告诉他今天要做什么的人，肯定是农奴。”当控制强化到极致时，臣僚便成了君主的奴仆。 当然，这些做法都是有代价的，多线控制削弱了下级单元的独立应变能力，面对突发危机时，协调障碍可能是致命的；在古代的组织条件下，消除个人效忠也会削弱军队的战斗力，这一点在历史上已屡屡得到证明，较近的例子是，湘军的战斗力很大程度上依靠曾国藩等人所建立的个人效忠网络，北洋新军相对于绿营清军的一大优势也是个人效忠。 然而，更重要的是，所有这些方法都有一个共同前提：高速通信；多线控制下，军队和粮草都可囤在前线基地，但指令必须由上层发出，平时被刻意隔离的几套体系，离开中央指挥就难以协调行动；同样，有效的监视、巡察、考核、奖惩，也都依赖于快速高效的情报传递，直接遥控指挥更需要近乎于实时的通信能力；正因此，所有帝国都建立了效率远远超出同时代民用水平的通信系统。 自从定居之后，便有了入侵警报机制，发现盗贼时，人们以鸣锣呼喊等方式通知邻居，循声追捕（[[hue and cry]]）是中世纪英格兰社区对付盗贼的惯常方法，只要盗贼还没离开视线，所有目击者都有义务追呼，hue的拉丁词源可能是hutesium（号角），和铜锣一样，号角也是用于警报的通信工具。 当部落扩大到多个村寨时，功率更大的鼓就被用于远程警报，流行于百越民族的铜鼓，可将信号传出几公里乃至十几公里，经接力传递更可达上百公里，由于铜鼓的覆盖范围大，也被长老和酋长们用于召集民众，因而成为权威和共同体凝聚力的象征，类似于欧洲市镇的钟楼；钟鼓楼也是古代中国行政城市的标准配置，其象征意义毋庸置疑。 非洲人将鼓的通信功能发挥到了极致，通常，鼓只能通过节奏变化编码少量信息，带宽十分有限，但西非人凭借可调音高的沙漏状皮带鼓创造了一种能够传递丰富信息的鼓语（[[talking drum]]），用音调变化模拟语音流，效果类似于闭着嘴用鼻音说汉语。 因为班图语和汉语一样也是声调语言（[[tonal language]]），这样的模拟确实可行，当然，去掉元辅音丢失了大量信息，听者很难猜到在说什么，特别是失去当面对话中的手势体态环境等辅助信息之后，为此，鼓语者会附加大量冗余来帮助听者还原：重复、排比、修饰，把单词拉长成句子，插入固定形式的惯用短语来提示上下文，等等，长度加长到所模拟语音的五六倍。 鼓语不仅被用于在村庄之间传讯，也被大量用于私人生活，召唤家人回家，通知有客来访，谈情说爱，或只是闲聊，在20世纪上半叶鼓语还盛行时，人人都有一个鼓语名；不过，自发形成的鼓语毕竟不够精确，难以满足军事和行政需要，阿散蒂（[[Ashanti]]）和约鲁巴（[[Yoruba]]）的城邦君主们会供养一批世袭的专业鼓语者，并将短语和句型加以精确化，用于传递情报和指令。 18世纪初建立的阿散蒂帝国（[[Ashanti Empire]]），曾是下撒哈拉非洲最强盛的国家，在19世纪与英国的四次战争中表现出强大战斗力，多次挫败英军，而构成其战斗力的一大法宝，正是鼓语通信系统所带来的机动优势和指挥效率，在前电报时代，这大概是最高效的军事通信手段，它不仅传输速度快，带宽也不比电报低，而且是无线的。 欧亚帝国更流行的通信系统是烽燧链和邮驿网，烽燧传讯的速度较快，汉代边地烽燧的间距约1-3公里，假设每个烽燧的响应时间是5分钟，那么信息每小时可以走12-36公里，每天三五百公里；但烽燧的带宽太小，调节烟柱数量和火把离合也只能编码几个比特。 邮驿则是高带宽的，但速度比烽燧慢，罗马帝国的普通驿传速度是每天60-80公里，和唐代的每天160里差不多，紧急情况下，若不断更换最好的马，且不惜将马累死，可以达到每天两三百公里，公元前9年提比略（[[Tiberius]]）便是以这种方式在一昼夜内狂奔300公里，赶往日耳曼前线见他临死的弟弟德鲁苏斯（[[Nero Claudius Drusus]]）。 在古代，既高速又高带宽的远程通信工具是信鸽，可负重75克（相当于20张A4纸或0.6平米缣帛或0.14平米羊皮纸），以80公里时速一天内将消息传至千里之外；但信鸽也有其缺陷，首先是不可靠，它们经常被敌人打下来，其次，它是定点且单向的，因为信鸽通信利用的是其归巢本能，而每只信鸽只认一个巢；不过，对于最高权力者，第二个缺陷同时也是优点，它限制了属下的通信对象，防止他们用信鸽与敌人或相互间密谋串通。 通信在大型组织运营和控制上的关键作用，从教皇格列高利一世（Pope [[Gregory I the Great]]）的成就中可窥见一斑，格列高利是罗马教会事实上的缔造者，在他之前，教会是个十分松散的组织，教皇作为罗马主教也只是诸主教中最显要的一位，格列高利将它改造成了严密的层级化组织，他那非凡的组织管理活动有个著名特点：大量写信，在14年任期中，仅留存下来的信件就有854封。 通过与下属之间非常频密的信件往来，他对远在西西里、北非、不列颠的下属的工作进展了如指掌，事无巨细的作出指示，并在任务执行过程中不断给予协助和干预；为处理大量信件，他还组建了一个专门的文书团队。 格列高利能这么做，也得益于教会在读写上的优势，当时统治西欧的蛮族领主和贵族大多是文盲，因而这一优势尤为突出，国王们能够得到的文书服务也大多来自教士，结果，集权化之后的罗马教会不仅在各国拥有巨大权力，也成了近千年中唯一一个影响覆盖整个西欧的权力中心，到中世纪后期当贵族也开始掌握文字时，教廷的地位已难以撼动。 通信手段在帝权专制的发展中也扮演了重要角色，中国历史上那些权力欲特别强的帝王，总是努力绕开常规行政系统，直接从下层获取情报，武则天就特别喜欢让人向她告密，朱元璋更将密疏言事制度化了，不过，他们把告密权放得太宽，反倒容易被信息所淹没。 康熙做得更聪明，他把密折专奏的机会限于少数亲信和60多位省级大员（这里我们又看到了邓巴数），从而首度建立起了真正有效的直达皇帝的专属情报系统，康熙还在要地安插亲信作为另一套情报来源，曹雪芹祖上三代所担任的江宁织造，就兼负着为皇帝收罗江南情报的职责；雍正更将密折制度变成了主要施政工具，通过朱批奏折与臣僚直接对话成了常规，留存的朱批奏折共41600本，批语1000多万字，合每天批9本两三千字。 这一系列做法，将集权专制推向了前电报时代的极限，从{{孔飞力}}（[[Philip A. Kuhn]]）在《叫魂》中所描绘的一个案例可以看出，当皇帝对某件事情产生兴趣时，其干预可以细致和深入到何种程度，比如对一个乞丐的审讯中，刑讯逼供的尺度该怎么把握，如此程度的直接干预和全程遥控，自然离不开高效率的通信系统，在处理叫魂案的那半年里，奏批往来的频密程度，可从孔氏所援引的部分批语中得到一个直观印象。 这些通信系统成本极为高昂，汉代西北边境的居延都尉府（县级军事辖区）沿额济纳河构建的一条270公里烽燧链上，有270座烽燧，敦煌的塞垣烽燧链密度近似，长约100公里，近100座烽燧，每座烽燧少则三五名，多则十几名守卒，为管理数百座烽燧并为其供应粮草，还须建立一个四级官僚结构和三级仓储系统，人员配置近2000，而当时居延县总共才8000户人家。 邮驿网比烽燧链庞大得多，东汉修建的褒斜道，全程258里（107公里）设置了大小64个中继站（所谓邮亭驿置）；假设每县有50公里驿路，每2-3公里一个小型中继站，10-20公里一个大型服务区，就需要数百人为它服务；明清两代，全国8万多公里驿路，2000个驿（服务区），14000个铺（中继站），每驿60-70匹马，总计十几万驿卒铺兵和同等数量的马匹。 维持这样的系统需要雄厚的财政和劳役资源，在古代帝国的常设行政系统中，它占了很大比例，清代一个县级政府的书吏衙役加起来不过一两百人，和驿卒铺兵数量相当，加上马匹，后者财政负担更大，所以万历年间{{张居正}}大举裁撤精简行政官僚机构时，邮驿系统是他的裁撤重点。 道路和邮驿系统一旦建立起来，便成为帝国权力的一大支柱，并且为帝国统一提供了一种向心力，使得它容易被接管，却很难被割裂，因为这些道路网络的拓扑结构有着强烈的首都中心倾向，将其中一个局部分出来，功效便大打折扣，罗马大道（[[Roman Roads]]）被刻意设计成笔直的形状，常不顾地形条件而强行取直，甚至在翻越山岭时也直上直下，这样的道路系统有利于大跨度的战略机动和长途通信，但削弱了连接区域内城镇和局部中心的价值，因为后者的分布通常由河流山脉等自然地貌所决定。 电报的出现戏剧性的改变了通信方式，传统邮驿系统在不到一代人中即遭废弃，它从根本上改变了权力结构；南北战争首度见证了这场革命，凭借4000多英里电报线路，林肯成为首位能够直接向战地指挥官发号施令的总统，在战争部的电报室里实现了对战争近乎实时的遥控。 1879年的祖鲁战争（[[Zulu war]]）是个有趣的对照，这场冲突很大程度上是英国派往南非不久的高级专员亨利·弗里尔（[[Henry Frere]]）刚愎自用，背着其殖民部上司擅自行事的结果，在殖民部长希克斯·比奇（[[Hicks Beach]]）看来，当时弗里尔若用电报而非信件与伦敦沟通，战争完全可以避免；可惜的是，就在战争结束后不到一个月，来自亚丁（[[Aden]]）的东线海底电缆刚刚通到德班（[[Durban]]），而通往专员驻地开普敦（[[Cape Town]]）的西线海底电缆在十年后才铺通。 电报对权力结构的冲击也改变了几大帝国的命运，奥斯曼帝国（[[Ottoman Empire]]）热情拥抱这项新技术，1839年，摩尔斯的测试成功后一年多，首部电报机即已出现在伊斯坦布尔，1855年，克里米亚战争（[[Crimean War]]）尚未结束，通往欧洲的线路便已开通，到1869年，急速扩张中的帝国电报网已拥有25137公里线路。 起初，电报强化了帝国对遥远行省的控制，但因为电报线铺设成本远远低于邮驿系统，只须一路竖杆子，且完全不受地形之碍，地方政权也很容易建立起自己的通信网，同时民用电报也迅速发展并推动了新闻业繁荣，结果导致地方离心倾向和民族主义的兴起。 类似的故事也在东方上演，庚子事变后的{{东南互保}}这种前所未有的事情之所以会发生，正是因为各地督抚已能相互通电，而此事的牵头者恰恰是当时控制电报局的{{盛宣怀}}，更有意思的是，盛宣怀在1911年担任邮传大臣后，试图将各省自建的铁路和电报网收归国有，以便由中央集中控制，由此引发的{{保路运动}}导致了满清帝国的最终崩溃。  

未来的历史学家可能会将刚刚过去的这一年视为美利坚治世（[[Pax Americana]]）的终点，不过就我个人而言，这是幸福的一年。 祝各位新年快乐～

【2015-12-18】 @海德沙龙 《猪肉产业的政治游戏》 直到二战前，美国人吃的猪肉远远多于牛肉，更多于其他肉类，然而从上世纪初开始，猪肉地位一路下滑，到50年代被牛肉超过，70年代起，出于红肉恐惧，许多消费者又转向禽鱼肉，于是从1985年起，猪肉界发起了一场猪肉保卫战，其口号是：猪肉是另一种白肉 @海德沙龙：1985年，国会通过了猪肉复兴法案，据此农业部牵头组织了全国猪肉委员会（NPB），负责向消费者推广猪肉，次年起，它每年投入数百万美元，大力宣传“猪肉是另一种白肉”，然而诡异的是，到2011年，这一口号已经被放弃，而同时农业部官方资料也不承认猪肉是白肉，但这笔每年数百万的费用却仍在照常支付。 @海德沙龙:本文介绍了这件事情里的政治勾当，从中我们可以从一个侧面窥见美国政治的某些运作机制 @whigzhou: 养猪户联合起来，组成行会，向其缴费，委托其推进共同利益，这原本是再平常不过的商业行为，但政府一掺和，性质就变了，入会和缴费都变成了强制性的，而且行会独此一家没得选，结果当然是腐败和权力滥用，以及自由的丧失 @whigzhou: 工会和劳工法的关系也是如此，若仅仅是自愿组织，工会就没什么不好，但那些亲工会的劳工法把它变成了特权垄断组织，只要人数超过某个比例，工会与雇主的议价结果就对非工会成员也有了强制力，于是雇主和非工会成员便丧失了契约自由，同时工会也变得极端腐败 @whigzhou: 全国猪肉委员会实际上体现了联邦政府干预产业和经济的典型模式，和美联储如出一辙，就是在一个私人行会的基础上，通过专项立法将其置于行政部门控制之下，取得其决策机构成员的部分任命权，同时赋予其垄断地位，结果就变成了一个特权垄断性质的半官方组织。 @whigzhou: 此类机构在日常事务上仍是自治的，并且通常也还代表行业利益，前提是必须听政府的话，配合其政策 @whigzhou: 但是因为有了垄断地位，它所代表的行业利益基本上只是行业巨头的利益，虽然在自愿组织的行会中，主导权通常也掌握在行业巨头手里，但小厂商有退出权，可以用脚投票，而只要有竞争，就坏不到哪儿去，对小厂商的压制也很有限，但有了特权垄断，小厂商就惨了  

Why Boston's Sports Fans Rejected the Olympics Boondoggle—and L.A. Said Bring It On 为什么波士顿的体育迷拒绝承办劳民伤财的奥运会——而洛杉矶却说我来办 作者: Garrett Quinn @ 2015-9-15 译者: Who视之(@Who适之) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源: Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/09/15/why-bostons-sports-fans-rejected-the-oly The long, sad history of overspending on the international games. 国际性赛事超支的心酸历史 As the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) submits the city of Los Angeles as the country’s official nominee to host the 2024 Summer Games, sports fans in Boston are whooping it up like they did after the Red Sox finally won another World Series. 当美国奥委会正式提名洛杉矶代表美国申办2024年夏季奥运会，波士顿的体育迷欢呼雀跃，好似红袜队又拿下了一场世界系列赛。【译注：美国棒球联盟和全国棒球联盟优胜者之间的年度比赛】 And with good reason. Earlier this year, the USOC had picked Boston to represent America in the Olympics-host sweepstakes. Then the sports-mad fans of the Red Sox, the Bruins, the Celtics, and the Patriots told city fathers—especially Mayor Martin J. Walsh—to pound sand when it came to hosting the Olympic Games with tax dollars. 他们这么高兴是有道理的。今年早些时候，美国奥委会挑选波士顿代表美国参加奥运会主办城市的赌赛。那些红袜队、棕熊队、凯尔特人队和爱国者队的死忠们告诉市府大员们——特别是市长Martin J. Walsh——若是用纳税人的钱来办奥运会，就要把这主意掐死。 How Boston’s rabid sports fans rejected the Olympics—and how chumps in Los Angeles enthusiastically stepped up to potential bankruptcy—is a tale worth understanding, especially the next time your city or state tries selling voters on a new stadium or venue for billionaire sports team owners. 为啥波士顿的狂热体育迷拒绝奥运会，而洛杉矶的呆逼们兴高采烈地踏上潜在的破产之旅，这事值得弄弄明白，特别是下次你的城市或州政府为身家亿万的球队老板们着想，试图向选民们兜售新的体育场馆时。 The Summer Games routinely use billions of taxpayer dollars to throw the equivalent of a three-week-long international party that ends with a trashed house and a financial hangover that lasts for years. Montreal hosted the games in 1976 and built a stadium that was called the Big O. ­­Since it took fully 30 years to pay off the municipal debt that underwrote the Games, locals dubbed it "the Big Owe." 夏奥会一贯会花费纳税人几十上百亿美元，举办为期三周的国际大趴，结局是一地垃圾和延续若干年的财务宿醉症。蒙特利尔1976年承办了夏奥会，建了一座叫Big O的体育场。由于用了整整30年才还清为承办奥运会而发行的市政债，当地居民给这个体育场起了个“Big Owe”的外号【译注：Owe是欠账的意思】。 As sports economist Andrew Zimbalist has noted, the Summer Games might generate $6 billion in total revenue, half of which goes to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) while costing the host city $20 billion (London) or even $40 billion (Beijing). And don’t think that any new stadiums or infrastructure will have much of an economic afterlife. Indeed, the main achievement of the 2004 Athens games was to create modern ruins to match the ancient ones that actually draw tourists to Greece. 体育经济学家Andrew Zimbalist注意到，夏奥会可能产生了60亿美元的总收入，其中一半归国际奥委会，而主办城市会花费200亿美元（伦敦），甚至400亿美元（北京）。不要以为那些新的运动场馆和基础设施在会后能有什么经济效益。实际上，2004年雅典奥运会的主要成就，就是兴建了一批现代废墟来配合真正吸引游客到希腊去的古代废墟。 On top of all that the Olympics have an established reputation for bringing graft, a draconian security state, and horrific traffic and business disruption everywhere they go. "The important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win, but to participate," declared the creator of the modern Games, the Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, who obviously wasn’t stuck paying any of the bills. 不仅如此，奥林匹克运动已经建立起这样一个名声：它走到哪，哪就会有贪腐、苛刻的安保，以及严重的交通和商务混乱。现代奥林匹克创始人，法国人顾拜旦宣称：“奥运会重在参与而不是取胜。”这人显然不管付账。 Earlier this year, Boston seemed up for the challenge and was selected to be the city that the USOC would put forward to host the 2024 Games. To its slim credit, the IOC had reformed some of its practices after a stunning show of disinterest from western democracies in hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics (an even bigger money-loser than the Summer Games). The reforms, known as Agenda 2020, are designed to make hosting the games less financially burdensome and will be applied for the first time during the bidding for the 2024 Summer Olympics. 今年早间，波士顿看着像要去挑战一下，被美国奥委会选为竞办2024奥运会的城市。得承认，在西方民主国家对举办2022年冬奥会（这是个比夏奥会更能亏钱的玩意）显示了令人震惊的冷淡之后，国际奥委会对其做法进行了一些改革。这些改革称为“2020议程”，将在竞办2024年夏奥会时实施，目的是让承办奥运会的经济负担不至于过分沉重。 After Boston’s bid was initially approved by the USOC, more and more details of the financing started dripping out and the city’s enthusiasm went softer than one of Tom Brady’s footballs. While it’s true that the people of Boston are diehard, always-annoying sports fans you want to punch in the neck, they are not suckers and have a long, proud history of telling team owners and elected official to take a hike when it comes to paying for sports venues. 波士顿的竞办申请被美国奥委会批准后，越来越多的融资细节开始泄露，市民的热情变得比Tom Brady【译注：美式橄榄球四分卫】的某个传球还弱。虽然波士顿人是死硬的、让人讨厌的、欠揍的体育迷，但这些人一点不蠢；如果球队老板和民选官员想让纳税人掏钱建体育场馆，波士顿人对这种想法的回答有着长久的光荣传统：您哪凉快哪呆着去。 In the 1990s the Patriot and Red Sox sought to build waterfront stadiums on the South Boston Waterfront as part of project dubbed the MegaPlex. The plan only required a tiny commitment from taxpayers but it was still too much to placate the dialed-in citizens of Boston. The plan eventually died when late Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino turned against it. 1990年代，爱国者队和红袜队想在波士顿南部滨水地带兴建滨水体育场，作为名为MegaPlex项目的一部分。这个计划只需要纳税人一点微小的承诺，但仍然不能安抚那些打电话反对的市民。该计划在已故市长Thomas M. Menino转而反对后夭折。 Now, the once vacant area is home to a booming innovation district and soaring residential towers. When the Bruins and Celtics replaced the rat infested Boston Garden with a new building in 1995, it was build with private money after much public handwringing. 现如今，那片原先的空地上建起了生机勃勃的创新产业园区和高高的住宅楼。棕熊队和凯尔特人队在1995年把鼠患猖獗的波士顿花园重建，在公众表示很大关注之后，花的是私人老板的钱。 In 2015, a rag-tag group of activists and young professionals organized against the 2024 bid in an extremely effective manner that put pressure on elected officials to stop the games and created a climate of intense negativity around Boston’s Olympic bid. It was a remarkable display of activism. It pitted the city’s captains of industry against a group of activists with little more than pennies to rub together and smartphones. 2015年，一群由活动分子和年轻的专业人士组成的草根组织了一次非常有效的反申奥活动，使民选官员受到阻止赛会的压力，并为波士顿的申办活动创造了极为负面的气氛。这群除了几块钱和智能手机外啥都没有的活动分子，得以和波士顿的行业大佬们叫阵。 The group pushing the bid had their hands tied by various USOC decrees and limitations. They couldn’t respond quickly and effectively to their opponents and they committed all sorts of unforced errors that stoked the anti-Olympics sentiment: Property owners were caught off guard about venue locations, residents were not contacted before the plan was devised, and community stakeholders were only included in the process when it was all but too late. 支持申办的团体受到美国奥委会各种条例和限制的约束。他们未能及时有效地回应反对者，犯下很多本可避免的失误，使得反奥运情绪如火上浇油：业主们被场馆选址弄得猝不及防，居民们在规划设计之前没有得到通知，而利益相关的社区成员直到时机已过才被纳入进程中去。 The bid’s biggest public supporter, Mayor Martin J. Walsh, was often forced to publicly chastise the USOC and bid organizers for not releasing information in a timely or transparent manner. For many, the announcement that former Governor Deval Patrick was being paid $7,500 a day as a consultant on the project was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 申办活动最大的公共部门支持者，市长Martin Walsh，经常被迫公开批评美国奥委会和申办组织者没有及时透明地公开信息。对很多人来说，前任州长Deval Patrick每天可以得到7500美元的项目顾问费这一消息，是压断骆驼的最后一根稻草。 Opinion poll after opinion poll showed the public just did not trust the organizers to be honest about how much it would all cost locals. Boston’s bid conformed to the reforms outlined in the IOC’s reform agenda but the final sticking point was something that is still Olympic policy: Host cities must take a binding pledge that puts taxpayers on the hook for any cost overruns. 一个接一个的民意调查显示，公众就是不相信组织者对当地人需付总价的估算。波士顿的申办符合国际奥委会做出的改革，但最后胶着点仍然是奥林匹克的这个态度：主办城市必须做出有法律约束的保证，让纳税人为任何成本超支付账。 It wasn’t just Boston-area residents who soured. Elected officials across Massachusetts like Governor Charlie Baker and House Speaker Robert DeLeo balked at the idea of being on the hook and said publicly that they would not sign a taxpayer guarantee for the Olympics. Period. The USOC grew tired of the local reluctance and eventually pulled the bid on July 29, after Walsh said he would not sign a taxpayer guarantee at a hastily called city hall press conference carried live on all local TV stations. 不仅仅是波士顿地区的居民对此不开心，马萨诸塞州各处的民选官员，比如州长Charlie Baker和众议院议长Robert DeLeo，都对做出这种承诺迟疑不决，公开说他们不会为奥运会签署纳税人的担保，这事没得谈。在一场面向所有当地电视台直播的匆忙召集的市府新闻发布会上，Walsh说他不会签署纳税人的保证，美国奥委会受不了波士顿的勉强，最后在7月29日撤回了竞办。 Meanwhile, all the way across the continent, a two-time Olympic host city waited in the wings to pick up the torch as soon as Boston threw it down: Los Angeles. 与此同时，横跨美国大陆的另一边，一个曾经两次举办奥运会、伺机而动的城市在波士顿放弃申办后，马上接棒了。洛杉矶来了。 The City of Angels hosted the Summer Games in 1932 and in 1984. Memories of those latter games are especially warm and fuzzy for Angelenos. In many ways, the ’84 Games were the coming-out party for L.A., a city that had grown rich in post-war America while never quite being taken seriously in America, much less the rest of the world. To this day and despite the city’s standing as the second-largest metropolis in the country, it nurses a cultural inferiority complex bigger than the budget of a Hollywood blockbuster. 天使之城在1932和1984举办过夏奥会。后一次的奥运会对洛杉矶人来说尤其感觉温馨可人。在很多方面，1984年奥运会是洛杉矶的成年派对，这座城市在战后美国富裕了起来，却一直没有被美国人认真对待过，更不要说在全世界了。直到今天，尽管洛杉矶是美国第二大城市，它的文化自卑情结比一场好莱坞大片的预算还要大。 In 1984, the tremendous performances of Carl Lewis, Mary Lou Retton, and both the men’s and women’s swim teams—along with a boycott by the Soviet Union, East Germany, and other Eastern bloc countries—resulted in the U.S. winning more than three times as many medals as any other country. More important to the current debate, the games were supervised by Peter Uberroth, who insisted on using existing facilities whenever possible, exercised ultra-rare but effective financial discipline, and leaned hard on local philanthropies to kick in lots of free money. The result was what is still widely hailed as "the most successful games ever," at least from a public accountant’s point of view. 1984年，美国的Carl Lewis，Mary Lou Retton，男女游泳队发挥卓越，加上苏联和东欧国家的抵制，美国得到的奖牌数比第二名的三倍还多。对于当前争议而言，更重要的是，这次运动会由Peter Uberroth主管，他坚持尽量使用现有设施，表现出少有但有效的财务纪律性，依靠当地的慈善力量，省下很多钱。结果是这届奥运会被称为“最成功的奥运会”，至少从会计角度看是这样。 In the ‘80s, L.A. and California were booming. Things are different this time around. The recession was not kind to Los Angeles and the city continues to amass debt, lose jobs, struggle to provide basic services, and hang on to its middle class. California in general is struggling to pay its bills, too, while keeping the lights on. 在80年代，洛杉矶和加州欣欣向荣，可这次情况不同了。经济衰退对洛杉矶毫不客气，该市一直在堆积债务，流失就业机会，忙于提供基本服务，求助于中产阶级。加州基本上也是在让灯亮着的同时挣扎着付清账单。 Yet this time around, the Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to support Mayor Eric Garcetti’s pursuit of the Games even though it means putting the city’s taxpayers on the line for any kind of cost overruns. And the state government has a history of coming to the city’s rescue. During their pursuit of the 2016 games, the California legislature set aside $250 million in state funds to help Los Angeles’s bid (it lost out to Rio de Janeiro). California Gov. Jerry Brown has not officially committed to financially backing the games but that did not stop bid organizers in Los Angeles from saying he was on board anyway. 可是这一次，洛杉矶市议会投票一致支持市长Eric Garcetti申办奥运会，尽管这意味着纳税人要为任何成本超支买单。该州政府有搭救市府的传统。在申办2016运动会时，加州议会拨出2.5亿美元州资金来帮助洛杉矶申办（最后不敌里约热内卢）。加州州长没有正式承诺在财务上支持运动会，但这并未阻止洛杉矶的申办者宣称州长和他们站在一起。 The rosy-colored view of the games is not limited to the California political elite. Sports columnists such like Bill Plaschke of the Los Angeles Times tend to be uncritical boosters of Southern California and are enthusiastically on board. In Boston, there was almost uniform opposition to the games in the press and the reception from the sports media was more vicious than the drunks in the Fenway Park bleachers when the Yankees are in town. Even the limited polling on the games shows Los Angeles actually wants the games. Over 81 percent of respondents in a recent poll sponsored by the USOC said they backed the games. 对奥运会玫瑰色的展望并未局限于加州的政治精英，体育专栏作家们，如《洛杉矶时报》的Bill Plaschke，都是南加州不加批评的支持者，对申办全心支持。在波士顿，报界几乎一致反对奥运会，体育媒体的反应，比纽约扬基队来叫阵时，Fenway公园露天看台上醉鬼的骂声更加邪恶。有限的民意测验显示，洛杉矶人确实想申办奥运会。在最近一个美国奥委会组织的调查中，超过81%的受访者说他们支持。 So it seems that Los Angeles and its residents appear far more willing to mortgage their future to host a three-week party in 2024 for the world’s elite than Boston was. Come 2017, when the IOC will announce the winning city from applicants that include Paris, Toronto, Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome, Hollywood may well be breaking ground on yet another boulevard of broken dreams. That is, if Los Angeles is selected to host the game for a third time. 看来洛杉矶和它的居民比波士顿更加愿意把他们的未来抵押在2024年为世界精英们举办一次为时三周的国际派对。2017年奥委会将宣布巴黎、多伦多、布达佩斯特、汉堡、罗马这些申办城市中的胜者。如果洛杉矶第三次获选举办奥运会，好莱坞很可能要为另一条碎梦大道破土动工。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

‘Please Stop Helping Us’ “请不要再帮助我们” 作者：Thomas Sowell @ 2014-6-08 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：National Review，http://www.nationalreview.com/article/382135/please-stop-helping-us-thomas-sowell A new book brilliantly explains how policies designed to help blacks end up harming them. 有本新书极为出色地解释了，旨在帮助黑人的政策如何最终反而伤害了他们。 Back in the heyday of the British Empire, a man from one of the colonies addressed a London audience. “Please do not do any more good in my country,” he said. “We have suffered too much already from all the good that you have done.” 在不列颠帝国的鼎盛时期，一位殖民地来客曾在伦敦发表演说。“请不要再到我的国家去做好事了。”他说，“你们之前做的所有那些好事，已经令我们受尽折磨。” That is essentially the message of an outstanding new book by Jason Riley about blacks in America. Its title is Please Stop Helping Us. Its theme is that many policies designed to help blacks are in fact harmful, sometimes devastatingly so. These counterproductive policies range from minimum-wage laws to “affirmative action” quotas. 这实质上就是Jason Riley关于美国黑人的最新杰作所要传达的信息，书名叫做《请不要再帮助我们》。该书的主题是，诸多旨在帮助黑人的政策实际上反而有害，有时甚至是毁灭性的伤害。从最低工资法到“平权行动”配额，在在都能见到这种事与愿违的政策。 This book untangles the controversies, the confusions, and the irresponsible rhetoric in which issues involving minimum-wage laws are usually discussed. As someone who has followed minimum-wage controversies for decades, I must say that I have never seen the subject explained more clearly or more convincingly. 这本书理清了人们讨论最低工资法相关事务时经常遭遇的争议、困惑和不负责任的华丽辞藻。作为一个数十年来一直在跟踪最低工资争议的人，我也必须承认，此前还没有见过任何人曾将这一问题解释得如此清楚、如此令人信服。 Black teenage-unemployment rates ranging from 20 to 50 percent have been so common over the past 60 years that many people are unaware that this was not true before there were minimum-wage laws, or even during years when inflation rendered minimum-wage laws ineffective, as in the late 1940s. 过去60年间，黑人青少年失业率一直徘徊在20%到50%之间。许多人对此已习以为常，以至于都没有留意到：在最低工资法出现之前，情况并非如此，哪怕是在通胀对最低工资法的效用有所抵消的年份，如1940年代末，情况也非如此。 Pricing young people out of work deprives them not only of income but also of work experience, which can be even more valuable. Pricing young people out of legal work, when illegal work is always available, is just asking for trouble. So is having large numbers of idle young males hanging out together on the streets. 为年轻人定价过高，以至令他们失去工作，这种政策不仅剥夺了他们的收入，而且也剥夺了他们的工作经验，而后者价值甚至可能更高。为年轻人定价过高，以至于他们失去合法的工作机会，但又总是可以找到非法工作，这种政策就是自讨苦吃。让大量无所事事的男青年成群结队在街上游荡，也是自讨苦吃。 When it comes to affirmative action, Jason Riley asks the key question: “Do racial preferences work? What is the track record?” Like many other well-meaning and nice-sounding policies, affirmative action cannot survive factual scrutiny. 对于平权行动，Jason Riley提出了如下关键问题：“种族优惠是否行之有效？往绩如何？”跟许多其它好心好意且悦耳动听的政策一样，平权行动经不起事实检验。 Some individuals may get jobs they would not get otherwise, but many black students who are quite capable of getting a good college education are admitted, under racial quotas, to institutions whose pace alone is enough to make it unlikely that they will graduate. （有了平权行动，）某些人也许确实会得到他们本来得不到的工作。但许多黑人学生本来完全有能力得到良好的大学教育，却在种族配额制下被一些不适宜的学校录取，而单是这些学校的教学进度就足以使得他们无望毕业。 Studies that show how many artificial failures are created by affirmative-action admissions policies are summarized in Please Stop Helping Us, in language much easier to understand than in the original studies. 已有许多研究表明，平权行动的录取政策人为制造了许多失败，《请不要再帮助我们》用十分易懂的语言综述了相关研究。 There are many ponderous academic studies of blacks, if you have a few months in which to read them, but there is nothing to match Jason Riley’s book as a primer that will quickly bring you up to speed on the complicated subject of race in a week, or perhaps over a weekend. 如果你愿意花上几个月去读的话，研究黑人的冗长学术著作有很多。不过作为入门读物，Jason Riley的这本书无可匹敌。只要一周，甚至只要一个周末，它就能迅速让你跟上有关种族这一复杂课题的最新研究。 As an experienced journalist, rather than an academic, Riley knows how to use plain English to get to the point. He also has the integrity to give it to you straight, instead of in the jargon and euphemisms too often found in discussions of race. The result is a book that provides more knowledge and insight in a couple of hundred pages than are usually found in books twice that length. Riley是位经验丰富的记者，而不是学者，因此他知道如何用简单易懂的语言表达论点。而且他很诚实，立论坦率直接，不会使用那些在种族问题讨论中常见的行话切口和委婉表达。得益于此，他这本两三百页的书所提供的知识和见解，比一般厚度两倍于它的书还要多。 Unlike academics who just tell facts, Riley knows which facts are telling. 与只知道说明事实的学者不同，Riely知道哪些事实能说明问题。 For example, in response to claims that blacks don’t do well academically because the schools use an approach geared to white students, he points out that blacks from foreign, non-English-speaking countries do better in American schools than black, English-speaking American students. 比如，有人宣称，黑人学业成绩不好是因为学校使用的是适合白人学生的教学方法。针对这种论断，Riley就指出，在美国的学校里，母语非英语的外国黑人比说英语的美国黑人学生表现更优。 Asian students do better than whites in schools supposedly geared to whites. In all three of New York City’s three academically elite public high schools — Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, and Brooklyn Tech — there are more than twice as many Asian students as white students. 在据称特别适合白人的学校里，亚裔学生比白人学生表现更好。纽约市的全部三所学业优异的公立高中——史岱文森高中、布朗士科学高中、布鲁克林技术高中，在校亚裔学生数量是白人学生的两倍以上。 So much for the theory that non-whites can’t do well in schools supposedly geared to whites. 在据称特别适合白人的学校里，不是白人就无法表现良好，这种论调可以休矣。 On issue after issue, Please Stop Helping Us cites facts to destroy propaganda and puncture inflated rhetoric. It is impossible to do justice to the wide range of racial issues — from crime to family disintegration — explored in this book. Pick up a copy and open pages at random to see how the author annihilates nonsense. 针对一个个议题，《请不要再帮助我们》挨个引用事实来推翻那些宣传口号、戳穿那些言过其实的花言巧语。此处不可能一一点到该书所论述的各类种族议题，它们跨度甚大，从犯罪到家庭解体都有。捡起一本，随便翻几页，看看作者是如何灭掉那些胡说八道的吧。 His brief comments pack a lot of punch. For example, “Having a black man in the Oval Office is less important than having one in the home.” 他的简洁评论常常一针见血。比如这句，“白宫椭圆办公室里坐着个黑人，可不如家里坐着个黑人那么重要。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

权力积木#1：距离与速度 辉格 2015年11月21日 国家最初源自若干相邻酋邦中的最强者所建立的霸权，而这些酋邦则由专业武装组织发展而来；霸权当然首先来自压倒性的武力优势：霸主能够轻易击败势力范围内的任何对手，并且所有各方都十分确信这一点，因而甘愿向它纳贡称臣，也愿意在自身遭受威胁时向它求助，卷入纠纷时接受其仲裁，发生争霸挑战时站在它那一边。 然而，武力是起落消长多变的，仅凭一时之战斗力而维持的霸权难以长久，要将围绕霸权所建立的多边关系常规化和制度化，需要更多权力要素；要理解这些要素如何起源，以及它们在支撑国家权力中所履行的基础性功能，我们最好从多方博弈的角度出发，考虑其中的利害权衡。 通常，霸主最需要担心的是这样几种情况：1）在属邦遭受攻击时不能及时提供援助，丧失安全感的属邦可能转而投靠其他霸主，2）当一个属邦反叛并攻击其他属邦时，若不能及时加以制止，便可能引发连锁反应，3）当足够多属邦联合协调行动发动叛乱时，霸主的武力优势被联合力量所压过。 无论何种情况，当事方对霸主行动速度的预期都是关键所在，若遭受攻击的弱小属邦预期得不到及时救援，便可能放弃抵抗而选择投降，若邻近敌邦预期能在援兵到达之前得手并及时撤离，便更可能发动攻击，若潜在叛乱者预期自己有能力在霸主赶来镇压之前连克多个属邦并吸引到足够多追随者，便更可能发动叛乱，而当叛乱实际发生时，那些骑墙观望的属邦，若预期霸主无力及时平定叛乱，便更可能加入叛军行列，特别是当他们原本就心怀不满，或与反叛者关系亲密，或早有争霸野心时。 所以，对于维持霸权，仅有强大战斗力是不够的，还要有机动性，能够将兵力及时投送到需要的地方，速度要比对手快；设想这样一种简化的情形：霸主甲位于属邦乙的南方60英里，敌邦丙由北向南进攻乙，位于乙之北60英里的边境哨所得到敌情后向甲和乙汇报，假如所有人的行动速度都是每天10英里，那么丙就会早于甲的援军至少6天到达乙地，假如乙预期撑不过6天，就可能早早选择投降。 但是，假如报信者每天能跑60英里，而甲的行军速度是2倍于敌军的每天20英里，加上一天的集结时间，援军仍可与敌军同时到达，换句话说，上述情境中，只要通信速度6倍于敌军行军速度，己方行军速度2倍于敌方，霸主便能有效保护属邦，若机动优势降至1.5倍，也只需要属邦能抵抗一天，或者，即便机动优势只有1.2倍，霸主也完全来得及在敌军得手撤离之前追上它并实施报复，而及时报复能力是对潜在侵犯者的有力威慑。 这虽然是简化虚构，但离现实并不太远，古代军队的行军速度很慢，晴天陆地行军速度一般不超过每天10英里，雨天则几乎走不动，而无论是青铜时代的城邦霸主，还是铁器时代的大型帝国，机动优势都构成了其霸权的核心要素。 公元前15世纪的埃及战神图特摩斯三世（[[Thutmose III]]）在其成名之战米吉多战役（[[Battle of Megiddo]]）中，在9天内将2万大军投送到250英里之外的加沙，将近3倍于常规速度；从波斯、马其顿到罗马，这些辉煌帝国的一大共同点是：都有能力以2到3倍于对手的速度大规模投送兵力，同时以5至10倍于常规行军的速度传递消息。 古代行军速度慢，不是因为人跑的慢，相反，人类特别擅长超长距离奔跑，大概只有袋鼠、鸵鸟和羚羊等少数动物能与人媲美，长跑也是早期人类狩猎技能的关键，我们的脊柱、骨盆、腿骨、颈部肌肉、脚趾、足弓和汗腺，都已为适应长跑而大幅改造，运动生理学家发现，对于长距离奔跑，两足方式比四足方式更加高效节能，尽管后者能达到更高的瞬间速度。 卡拉哈里的桑族猎人经常在40度高温下连续三四小时奔跑三四十公里直至将猎物累垮，美国西南部的派尤特（[[Paiute]]）印第安人逐猎叉角羚时，澳洲土著追逐大袋鼠时，也采用类似方法；当距离超出100公里时，人的速度便可超过马；居住在墨西哥高原奇瓦瓦州的美洲土著塔拉乌马拉人（[[Tarahumara]]）很好的展示了人类的超长跑能力，在他们的一项传统赛跑活动中，参赛者可以在崎岖山路上两天内奔跑300多公里。 拖慢行军速度的，是后勤补给负担，这一负担因国家起源过程中战争形态的改变而大幅加重，原因有三个：首先，大型政治实体的出现成倍拉大了作战距离，在前国家的群体间战争中，作战者通常可以当天往返，无须携带补给品，在酋邦时代，相邻酋邦之间相距几十公里，军队也最多离家一两天，但广域国家的军队常常需要到数百上千公里外作战，短则几周，长则数月，必须随身携带大量消耗性补给品。 其次，军队的大型化使得就地补给变得不可靠，对于数十上百人的小股部队，只要拥有武力优势，沿路打劫村落便可获得补给，但数千上万人的大部队就很难依靠这种方式，而攻取拥有大量存粮的设防城镇则会大幅拖慢行程，并为任务带来不确定性，所以，尽管古代军队很大程度上利用就地补给（说难听点就是一路抢过去），但在两个可靠补给点之间，不得不携带足够粮草。 据估算，长途行军者粮食补给的最低需求约为每人每天1.5公斤谷物，若穿越水源不足的干旱地区，还需另加2.5公斤水，按携带15天粮食（这是罗马军团的标准配置）和3天饮水算，单兵负重便达30公斤，这还没算上武器装备；因为要在外吃饭过夜，还须携带燃料、灶具、铺盖和帐篷；如此负重之下，奔跑就只能改成行走。 以古代行军效率最高的罗马军团为例，其常规行军模式是，单兵负重20-30公斤，步伐每分钟120步，每步75厘米，每天可走5-6小时（夏天长一些），合计30公里左右；当然，若放弃辎重、不考虑补给，一两天内的短途轻装奔袭可以快得多，然而对于陆地长途行军，每天30公里构成了古代军队机动性的极限，那些强大帝国的优势便在于，它们能够最大程度上接近这一极限。 构成机动障碍的第三个原因是军队的重型化，从青铜时代开始，战争就始终在向重资产方向发展，随着新型武器不断出现，装备也变得越来越重，仍以罗马军团为例，罗马方盾（[[Scutum]]）重达10公斤，重标枪（[[pilum]]）每支3-5公斤，每人配备1-2支，一套锁子甲（[[lorica hamata]]）约16公斤，鳞片甲（[[lorica segmentata]]）9公斤，这样，仅单兵基本装备就占满了20-30公斤的行军负重，其他补给品只能另想办法。 对后勤构成更大压力的是消耗性材料和重型装置，由于投射型武器日益增多，且发射功率越来越大，它们使用的耗材也大幅增加；传统猎人和部落战士虽然也使用弓箭，但通常只携带很少几支箭，重量在30克左右，但在大型阵地战出现后，连续密集齐射成为一种火力压制和近身接战之前的主要杀伤手段，弓箭手在一次战斗中常携带50-100支箭，后勤储备更数倍于此，而随着弩机的使用，箭也增大变重了，出土的秦代青铜弩箭重达100多克。 另一种单兵投射武器是投石索（[[sling]]），用于抛掷鹅卵石，每颗重几百克，投掷者背囊里的几十颗弹丸将为他带来近十公斤负重；从手持式轻弩，脚踏式和腰张式重弩，重型{{床弩}}，到能够发射几十公斤重箭或石块的大型扭力绞盘投射机（[[ballista]]），投射装置和它们所抛掷的耗材都越来越重，所有这些装备和材料，都无法指望由单兵背负。 解决这一运输难题的最初办法是使用驼畜，主要是驴，后来还有骆驼，驴的问题是负重太小，走的也太慢，一头负重50公斤的驴每天能走25公里，但它每天需要消耗3公斤粮草，所以当行程超出15天时，有效负载就接近零了，而且它驼不了太重的东西，所以只适合于轻装队伍短程行军。 有了轮子后，牵畜逐渐取代了驼畜，牵引力最强的是公牛，据色诺芬（[[Xenophon]]）记载，希腊军队中一辆单牛二轮车可以拉650公斤货物，相当于13头驴，而16头公牛合力更可牵引一部6吨多重的攻城塔车；但牛的问题是速度太慢，只能以2英里时速每天走5小时，而且牛的食量很大，约为马的5倍，这就进一步减少了有效负载。 所以大部分古代军队（除了最强大的那些）行军速度难以突破每天10英里的主要原因，就是被辎重牛车拖了后腿，要突破这个瓶颈，必须用马代替牛，据计算，5匹马牵引的四轮马车，负载相当于两头公牛，而速度可提高至每小时4英里，每天走8小时，且食量只相当于一头公牛，这样，辎重车队的速度便可超过步兵。 马的问题是昂贵，特别是在那些缺乏草场的地方，中世纪西欧流行多圃轮作制，草场较充裕，但据一份中世纪后期的价格资料，一头公牛13先令，牵引马10-20先令，按同等牵引力算，马价约3倍于牛价，骑乘马则更贵，约为牵引马的5-10倍；根据公元前17世纪赫梯帝国的一份文献，公牛价7.5谢克尔（[[shekel]]），牵引马10谢克尔，比价与中世纪欧洲相仿。 长途征战的大军对役畜的需求非常大，罗马军团的每个8人小队（[[contubernium]]）共享一个帐篷、一套灶具（包括一个石磨）和一头骡子，外加专门的后勤辎重队伍所需；菲利普二世（[[Philip II of Macedon]]）在改革马其顿军队的后勤系统时，通过清理闲杂人员（家属、仆人、妓女等），并提高单兵负重，将一支5万人军队的役畜削减了6千多头，可见总数之庞大。 因为数量太多价格太贵，只有那些财力最雄厚的军队才能配备足够多马车从而消除牛车瓶颈；同时，为了尽可能避免用牛车，并节约马匹，铁器时代两位著名军事改革家马略（[[Gaius Marius]]）和菲利普二世都十分强调提高单兵负重，而且不约而同的将标准设定在30公斤左右，这差不多就是现代化步兵的标准负重，拿破仑战争期间英军步兵负重80磅，登陆诺曼底的美军步兵是82磅；将负重向单兵转移到倾向表明，机动瓶颈不在士兵行走速度，而是后勤辎重车队。 提高机动性也需要在组织训练和强化纪律上下功夫，像罗马军团那样每天数小时负重30公斤齐步行军，需要严格的训练，每天迅速及时安营和拔营，也需要完备的组织，参加过集体旅游的人都可以想象到，一群乌合之众，哪怕只有数十人，要让他们一致行动起来，有多么困难和耗时，要让五千人的军团趁天黑之前在两小时内井井有条的完成扎营、设岗、侦查、补充燃料和饮用水……，需要很强的纪律性。 克服后勤障碍的另一个手段，是利用水路便利进行快速投送，在火车出现之前，水上运输比陆地快得多，而且负载越大水路优势越明显，波斯帝国动辄在几千公里的跨度上投送数十万大军，便是充分利用了地中海的便利，能够运载如此大军的船队也非常庞大，需要雄厚实力才能供养。 然而，对于一个疆域辽阔的大型帝国，要将其军事控制覆盖境内每个角落，并且对任何要害地点皆可以接近极限的速度投送武力，终极手段是修建高速公路网，这一点只有罗马做到了，在罗马之前，各大帝国也致力于架桥修路等交通基础设施，但通常只限于开路、平整和压实等初级措施，保证道路勉强可用，但远远达不到全天候全速通行。 在公元前312年第二次萨莫奈战争（[[Second Samnite War]]）后的数百年间，罗马共修筑了40万公里道路，其中8万公里是精心铺设的硬化路面，有着土基、灰砂和石块三层铺设，以及路肩和排水系统，沿路设有大量路标、哨所、驿站和旅店，旅行者每隔20多英里便可找到休息和补给点地方，还有为通信兵换马的马栈。 正是这一高速公路网，确保了罗马军队可以在任何条件下以极限速度调往帝国任一角落，它构成了帝国权力的一大支柱，其所带来的陆地机动能力，直到美国南北战争期间才被火车所超越，同时，罗马大道也被商人和平民旅行者所利用，它将帝国疆域内的众多小社会连接成了一个大社会。  

Human genetic diversity: Lewontin’s fallacy 人类遗传多样性之列万廷的谬误 作者：A.W.F. Edwards 翻译：小聂（@PuppetMaster） 校对：辉格（@whigzhou） 来源：Edwards, A. W. F. (2003). "Human genetic diversity: Lewontin's fallacy". BioEssays 25 (8): 798–801. Summary In popular articles that play down the genetical differences among human populations, it is often stated that about 85% of the total genetical variation is due to individual differences within populations and only 15% to differences between populations or ethnic groups. It has therefore been proposed that the division of Homo sapiens into these groups is not justified by the genetic data. This conclusion, due to R.C. Lewontin in 1972, is unwarranted because the argument ignores the fact that most of the information that distinguishes populations is hidden in the correlation structure of the data and not simply in the variation of the individual factors. The underlying logic, which was discussed in the early years of the last century, is here discussed using a simple genetical example. 概要 在那些淡化人类种群遗传差异的流行文章里面，一个常见的说法是：85%的遗传差异来自于种群内的个体间差异，而只有15%是来自于种群或种族间差异。因此，有人认为依靠遗传数据而将智人划分为不同群体，是不合理的。R.C.列万廷在1972年作出的该论断是缺乏根据的，原因在于：用于区分种群的大部分信息隐藏在遗传数据的相关性结构里，而不简简单单体现在单个因子的差异上。这背后的逻辑，在上世纪初就已被讨论，在这里用一个简单的遗传学范例来加以说明。 “When a large number of individuals [of any kind of organism] are measured in respect of physical dimensions, weight, colour, density, etc., it is possible to describe with some accuracy the population of which our experience may be regarded as a sample. By this means it may be possible to distinguish it from other populations differing in their genetic origin, or in environmental circumstances. Thus local races may be very different as populations, although individuals may overlap in all characters; . . .” R.A. Fisher (1925). “在测量「任何一种有机体的」大量个体的物理属性——重量，颜色，密度等——的时候，我们可以以特定的精确度来对该有机体的种群加以描述，虽然在经验上，他们可能只是样本而已。用这种方式，我们有可能把他们和其他种群在遗传起源上，甚至是在环境条件上，加以区分。这样一来，地区亚种之间在种群层面上可以有巨大的差别，尽管个体之间有可能高度重合……”R.A.菲舍尔（1925）。 “It is clear that our perception of relatively large differences between human races and subgroups, as compared to the variation within these groups, is indeed a biased perception and that, based on randomly chosen genetic differences, human races and populations are remarkably similar to each other, with the largest part by far of human variation being accounted for by the differences between individuals. Human racial classification is of no social value and is positively destructive of social and human relations. Since such racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance either, no justification can be offered for its continuance”. R.C. Lewontin (1972). “很明显，我们对于人类种群或是亚种之间差异大于群内个体差异的理解，是一种偏见。并且，基于随机选定的遗传差异来看，人类种族和种群之间具有显著的相似性，迄今为止人类间差异的最大部分都源于个体差异。种族分类不仅没有社会价值，而且对人和社会的关系有着强烈的破坏性。既然现在看来这样的种族分类毫无遗传学和分类学根据，将其持续下去也是毫无必要的了。”R.C.列万廷（1972）。 “The study of genetic variations in Homo sapiens shows that there is more genetic variation within populations than between populations. This means that two random individuals from any one group are almost as different as any two random individuals from the entire world. Although it may be easy to observe distinct external differences between groups of people, it is more difficult to distinguish such groups genetically, since most genetic variation is found within all groups.” Nature (2001). “对于智人遗传差异的研究表明种群内差异大于种群间差异。这意味着从同一族群中随机挑选的两个个体之间的差异几乎等同于世界上任何两个随机个体间的差异。尽管我们可以观测到族群间分明的外部特征区别，对他们在遗传上加以区分却困难得多，因为大部分遗传差异存在于所有的族群之内。”《自然》（2001）。 Introduction 导言 In popular articles that play down the genetical differences among human populations it is often stated, usually without any reference, that about 85% of the total genetical variation is due to individual differences within populations and only 15% to differences between populations or ethnic groups. It has therefore been suggested that the division of Homo sapiens into these groups is not justified by the genetic data. People the world over are much more similar genetically than appearances might suggest. 淡化人类种群间遗传差异的流行文章里，一个常见的未加引用的说法是：85%的遗传差异源于种群内的个体间差异，而只有15%的差异来自于种群或是种族。因此以这些种群为智人分类是不被遗传数据支持的。世界各地的人们在遗传上的相似性远大于外表所显示出的那样。 Thus an article in New Scientist reported that in 1972 Richard Lewontin of Harvard University “found that nearly 85 per cent of humanity’s genetic diversity occurs among individuals within a single population.”“In other words, two individuals are different because they are individuals, not because they belong to different races.” In 2001, the Human Genome edition of Nature came with a compact disc containing a similar statement, quoted above. 正如《新科学家》的一篇文章所报道的，哈佛大学的理查德•列万廷在1972年“发现近85%的人类遗传差异产生于种群内的个体之间”、“换句话说，个体之所以不同是因为他们是不同的个体，而不是因为他们属于不同的种族。”2001年，《自然：人类基因组特刊》附带的压缩光盘内也包含类似的引述。 Such statements seem all to trace back to a 1972 paper by Lewontin in the annual review Evolutionary Biology. Lewontin analysed data from 17 polymorphic loci, including the major blood-groups, and 7 ‘races’ (Caucasian, African, Mongoloid, S. Asian Aborigines, Amerinds, Oceanians, Australian Aborigines). The gene frequencies were given for the 7 races but not for the individual populations comprising them, although the final analysis did quote the within-population variability. 类似的陈述貌似都出自列万廷在1972年《进化生物学》年度综述中发表的一篇文章。列万廷分析了出自17个多态基因位点（包括主要的血型）和7个“种族”（高加索人，非洲人，蒙古人，南亚原住民，美洲印第安人，大洋洲人，以及澳洲原住民）的数据。尽管最终的分析引述了种群内多样性，对于基因频率，文章只给出了7个种族的数据，而没有给出组成这些种族的种群数据。 “The results are quite remarkable. The mean proportion of the total species diversity that is contained within populations is 85.4%.... Less than 15% of all human genetic diversity is accounted for by differences between human groups! Moreover, the difference between populations within a race accounts for an additional 8.3%, so that only 6.3% is accounted for by racial classification.” “结果很显著。在种群内包含的总物种多样性的比例平均可以达到85.4%……而只有不到15%的人类遗传多样性能被种群差异所解释！不仅如此，同一种族内部种群的差异在这里占8.3%，所以只有6.3%的差异能归结于种族划分。” Lewontin concluded “Since . . . racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance . . ., no justification can be offered for its continuance” (full quotation given above). 列万廷结论道：“既然如此……种族划分现在看来毫无遗传学或是分类学依据……延续它看来是毫无必要的”（上文已有完整引用）。 Lewontin included similar remarks in his 1974 book The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change “The taxonomic division of the human species into races places a completely disproportionate emphasis on a very small fraction of the total of human diversity. That scientists as well as nonscientists nevertheless continue to emphasize these genetically minor differences and find new ‘scientific’ justifications for doing so is an indication of the power of socioeconomically based ideology over the supposed objectivity of knowledge.” 在他1974年的书《进化改进的遗传学基础》种，列万廷加入了类似的评论。“将人类划分为种族的分类学方法将不成比例的注意力集中在人类总体多样性的零头上。科学家和大众对这种零星遗传差异的重视和坚持，甚至发现新的‘科学’证据来支持这种做法，显示出社会经济学意识形态的力量超越了本该是客观的知识。” The fallacy 谬误 These conclusions are based on the old statistical fallacy of analysing data on the assumption that it contains no information beyond that revealed on a locus-by-locus analysis, and then drawing conclusions solely on the results of such an analysis. The ‘taxonomic significance’ of genetic data in fact often arises from correlations amongst the different loci, for it is these that may contain the information which enables a stable classification to be uncovered. 之所以有以上定论，主要是出于一个陈旧的统计谬误，即认为除了基于单个位点的分析结论之外，数据不包含任何其它信息，并且只考虑基于这个假设的分析和它衍生出的结论。而所谓的“有分类学意义”的遗传数据实际上源自不同位点之间的相关关系，正是这些相关关系中可能包含的信息驱动了对于分类的发掘。 Cavalli-Sforza and Piazza coined the word ‘treeness’ to describe the extent to which a tree-like structure was hidden amongst the correlations in gene-frequency data. Lewontin’s superficial analysis ignores this aspect of the structure of the data and leads inevitably to the conclusion that the data do not possess such structure. The argument is circular. A contrasting analysis to Lewontin’s, using very similar data, was presented by Cavalli-Sforza and Edwards at the 1963 International Congress of Genetics. Making no prior assumptions about the form of the tree, they derived a convincing evolutionary tree for the 15 populations that they studied. Lewontin, though he participated in the Congress, did not refer to this analysis. Cavalli-Sforza和 Piazza创造了“树性”这一词汇，用于描述一个树形结构在基因频率数据的相关关系中的隐匿程度。列万廷的肤浅分析无视了数据在这方面的特性，于是不可避免的得出结论认为该树形结构不存在。这是个循环论证。Cavalli-Sforza和Edwards于1963年的世界遗传大会发表了与之对应的对比分析，并使用了类似的数据。在不对树形做任何先验假设的情况下，他们在研究的15个种群中得出了一个令人信服的进化树结构。列万廷虽然参加了此次会议，但却没有提到这个分析。 The statistical problem has been understood at least since the discussions surrounding Pearson’s ‘coefficient of racial likeness’ in the 1920s. It is mentioned in all editions of Fisher’s Statistical Methods for Research Workers from 1925 (quoted above). A useful review is that by Gower in a 1972 conference volume The Assessment of Population Affinities in Man. As he pointed out, “...the human mind distinguishes between different groups because there are correlated characters within the postulated groups.” 早在围绕皮尔森在1920年代提出的“种族相似性的协同因素”的讨论中，人们就已经理解了相关的统计原理了。在菲舍尔所作的《给研究员的统计方法》的所有版本中，该原理都有被提及（本文开头亦有引用）。高尔于1972年在“人类种群亲缘关系评估”的会议出版物中提出了一个有用的评论，他指出：“……人类心智将人划分为不同的组别，原因在于在这些组别内存在具有相关性的特性。” The original discussions involved anthropometric data, but the fallacy may equally be exposed using modern genetic terminology. Consider two haploid populations each of size n. In population 1 the frequency of a gene, say ‘+’ as opposed to ‘-’, at a single diallelic locus is p and in population 2 it is q, where p + q = 1. (The symmetry is deliberate.) Each population manifests simple binomial variability, and the overall variability is augmented by the difference in the means. 原初的讨论涉及一些人体测量学数据，但是我们用现代遗传学术语也同样可以揭示这个谬误。考虑两个个体数量各为n的单倍体种群。在种群1中某基因在一个单独位点为“+”而不是“-”的频率为p，在种群2中该频率为q，且p + q = 1。（这种对称性是有意设定的。）各种群的多样性为简单二项式分布，且总体多样性由于两个种群间平均值的差异而得到加强。 The natural way to analyse this variability is the analysis of variance, from which it will be found that the ratio of the within-population sum of squares to the total sum of squares is simply 4pq. Taking p = 0.3 and q = 0.7, this ratio is 0.84; 84% of the variability is within-population, corresponding closely to Lewontin’s figure. The probability of misclassifying an individual based on his gene is p, in this case 0.3. The genes at a single locus are hardly informative about the population to which their bearer belongs. 很自然的，我们用方差分析来评估多样性，从中可以得出种群内平方和与总体平方和之比为4pq【译注：对于任一种群，种群方差为npq，种群平方和为n²pq；总和平方和为1/4•n²(p+q)² = 1/4•n²；(n²pq)/( 1/4•n²)=4pq】。如 p = 0.3 而 q = 0.7，该比率为0.84，即84%的多样性来自于种群内，正好对应列万廷的结果。基于该基因对个体的分类误差率为p，即0.3。单个位点的基因几乎不包含关于该基因携带者属于哪个种群的任何信息。 Now suppose there are k similar loci, all with gene frequency p in population 1 and q in population 2. The ratio of the within-to-total variability is still 84% at each locus. The total number of ‘+’ genes in an individual will be binomial with mean kp in population 1 and kq in population 2, with variance kpq in both cases. Continuing with the former gene frequencies and taking k = 100 loci (say), the mean numbers are 30 and 70 respectively, with variances 21 and thus standard deviations of 4.58. With a difference between the means of 40 and a common standard deviation of less than 4.6, there is virtually no overlap between the distributions, and the probability of misclassification is infinitesimal, simply on the basis of counting the number of ‘+’ genes. Fig. 1 shows how the probability falls off for up to 20 loci. 现在假设共有k个相似位点，都在种群1中和种群2中分别具有p和q的基因频率。在每个单个位点上，种群内多样性与总体多样性之比仍是84%。在每个个体上为“+”的基因数将呈二项式分布，其均值在种群1中为kp，在种群2中为kq，方差在两个种群中同为kpq。继续之前关于基因频率的假设【译注：即p = 0.3，q = 0.7】，设k = 100 个位点，则在两个种群中均值各为30和70，方差为21，因此标准差为4.58。在均值相差40的情况下，共同的标准差还不到4.6，因此这两个分布几乎没有任何重叠部分，所以基于“+”基因出现个数所作分类的误差可能性是无限小。图1显示了该分类误差率随位点数增加而下降的曲线，至20个位点。 Figure 1. Graph showing how the probability of misclassification falls off as the number of gene loci increases, for the first example given in the text. The proportion of the variability within groups remains at 84% as in Lewontin’s data, but the probability of misclassification rapidly becomes negligible. 图1. 该图显示分类误差率随基因位点数增加而下降的曲线，用于文本中第一个例证。组内多样性占比依旧为列万廷数据揭示的84%，但分类误差率迅速下降至可以忽略的程度。【图表横轴：基因位点数；图表纵轴：分类误差率】 One way of looking at this result is to appreciate that the total number of ‘+’ genes is like the first principal component in a principal component analysis (Box 1). For this component the between-population sum of squares is very much greater than the within-population sum of squares. For the other components the reverse will hold, so that overall the between-population sum of squares is only a small proportion (in this example 16%) of the total. But this must not beguile one into thinking that the two populations are not separable, which they clearly are. 一种领会该结果的方式是将“+”基因的总数看成主成分分析法中的第一主成分（见框文1【编注：是对主成分分析（Principal components analysis，PCA）方法的介绍，译略，有兴趣可查看原文，或参见维基词条“主成分分析”】）。对于该成分，种群间平方和远大于种群内平方和。对于其他成分则反之，以至于对所有成分来说种群间平方和仅占总体平方和的一小部分（在这个例子里面为16%）。但这个结果不能诱使我们认为两个种群是不可分的，而实际上他们是清晰可分的。 Each additional locus contributes equally to the within-population and between-population sums of squares, whose proportions therefore remain unchanged but, at the same time, it contributes information about classification which is cumulative over loci because their gene frequencies are correlated. 每一个增加的位点都同样的增加种群内和种群间的平方和，导致它们之间的比率不变。但同时，关于分类的信息也增加了，而且这种增加在位点数量上是具有累加性的，因为位点之间的基因频率是相关的。 Classification 分类 It might be supposed, though it would be wrong, that this example is prejudiced by the assumptions that membership of the two populations is known in advance and that, at each locus, it is the same population that has the higher frequency of the ‘+’ gene. In fact the only advantage of the latter simplifying assumption was that it made it obvious that the total number of ‘+’ genes is the best discriminant between the two populations. 人们或可认为——虽然这么想是错的——这是个不太好的例子，因为假设了个体在两个种群的归属事先已知，并且在每个位点都是同一种群拥有较高的获得“+”的基因频率。实际上，后一个简化假设的唯一优势在于使得“+”基因的总数成为种群的明显最优判准。 To dispel these concerns, consider the same example but with ‘+’ and ‘-’ interchanged at each locus with probability 1⁄2, and suppose that there is no prior information as to which population each individual belongs. Clearly, the total number of ‘+’ genes an individual contains is no longer a discriminant, for the expected number is now the same in each group. A cluster analysis will be necessary in order to uncover the groups, and a convenient criterion is again based on the analysis of variance as in the method introduced by Edwards and Cavalli-Sforza. Here the preferred division into two clusters maximises the between-clusters sum of squares or, what is the same thing, minimises the sum of the within-clusters sums of squares. 为解除这些疑虑，设想同样的例子，但“+”和“-”在各个位点以1/2的概率互换，且没有关于个体归属的任何先验信息。显然，个体所拥有的“+”基因总数不能再作为判准，因为该数目的期望值在两组里面是一样的。在这种情况下需要用聚类分析来处理分组，且一个便利的分组条件仍然是基于方差分析的，其方法由Edwards和Cavalli-Sforza提供。这里对于聚类的优先分割会最大化聚类间平方和，或者说是最小化聚类内平方和，在这里是一样的意思。 As pointed out by these authors, it is extremely easy to compute these sums for binary data, for all the information is contained in the half-matrix of pairwise distances between the individuals, and at each locus this distance is simply 0 for a match and 1 for a mismatch of the genes. Since interchanging ‘+’ and ‘-’ makes no difference to the numbers of matches and mismatches, it is clear that the random changes introduced above are irrelevant. 正如这两位作者指出的那样，在二值数据里是很容易计算出这些平方和的，因为所有信息都可以体现为一个成对个体间的距离半矩阵。在每个位点上，配对时距离为0，不配对为1。既然互换“+”和“-”对于配对关系没有影响，那么显然以上引入的随机变化是无关的。 Continuing the symmetrical example, the probability of a match is p² + q² if the two individuals are from the same population and 2pq if they are from different populations. With k loci, therefore, the distance between two individuals from the same population will be binomial with mean k(p² + q²) and variance k(p² + q²)(1 – p² – q²) and if from different populations binomial with mean 2kpq and variance 2kpq(1 – 2pq). These variances are, of course, the same. 继续这个对称性例子，对于来自同一种群的两个个体来说，单一位点配对的机率为p² + q²；若来自不同种群，则为2pq。因此，对于k个位点，同一种群两个个体间距离呈二项式分布，均值为k(p² + q²)，方差为k(p² + q²)(1 – p² – q²)；若来自不同种群，则均值为2kpq，方差为2kpq(1 – 2pq)。这两个方差显然是一样的【译注：p + q = 1 à p² + q² = 1 – 2pq】。 Taking p = 0.3, q = 0.7 and k = 100 as before, the means are 58 and 42 respectively, a difference of 16, the variances are 24.36 and the standard deviations both 4.936. The means are thus more than 3 standard deviations apart (3.2415). The entries of the half-matrix of pairwise distances will therefore divide into two groups with very little overlap, and it will be possible to identify the two clusters with a risk of misclassification which tends to zero as the number of loci increases. 像之前一样，取p = 0.3, q = 0.7 和 k = 100，则均值分别为58和42，相差16。方差为24.36，即两组的标准差都为4.936。这样一来两组均值之间则有超出3个标准差的距离。因此，这个成对个体距离半矩阵中的数值就可以被分成几乎没有重叠的两组，这样就有可能以较小的分类误差来识别两个聚类，且该分类误差率随位点数目增加逐渐趋向于0。 By analogy with the above example, it is likely that a count of the four DNA base frequencies in homologous tracts of a genome would prove quite a powerful statistical discriminant for classifying people into population groups. 同理可知，对于基因组同源区域的四个DNA碱基频率进行计数，这种方法很可能被证明是一个十分有效的进行种群分类的统计判准。 Conclusion 结论 There is nothing wrong with Lewontin’s statistical analysis of variation, only with the belief that it is relevant to classification. It is not true that “racial classification is . . . of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance”. It is not true, as Nature claimed, that “two random individuals from any one group are almost as different as any two random individuals from the entire world”, and it is not true, as the New Scientist claimed, that “two individuals are different because they are individuals, not because they belong to different races” and that “you can’t predict someone’s race by their genes”. Such statements might only be true if all the characters studied were independent, which they are not. 列万廷对于多样性的统计分析本身没错，错的是认为该分析与分类有关。那种认为“人种分类……毫无遗传学和分类学依据”的想法是错误的。类似《自然》杂志所声明的“两个来源于任何组别的个体之间的差异和两个来源于世界上任何地方的个体之间的差异几乎一样大”的想法是错误的。类似《新科学家》声明的“两个个体有区别是因为他们是两个个体，而不是因为他们从属于不同的种族”和“你无法通过基因来判断某人的种族”的想法也是错误的。这类声明唯有在所有被研究的特性都是独立分布的时候才成立，可它们并不是独立分布的。 Lewontin used his analysis of variation to mount an unjustified assault on classification, which he deplored for social reasons. It was he who wrote “Indeed the whole history of the problem of genetic variation is a vivid illustration of the role that deeply embedded ideological assumptions play in determining scientific ‘truth’ and the direction of scientific inquiry”. 列万廷利用他对于多样性的分析对人种分类发起了一场毫无根据的攻击，认为人种分类是社会因素造成的悲剧。正是他写道：“的确，遗传多样性问题的整个研究历史生动的向我们展示了深埋的意识形态假设是如何决定科学的‘真相’和科学探索的方向。” In a 1970 article Race and intelligence he had earlier written “I shall try, in this article, to display Professor Jensen’s argument, to show how the structure of his argument is designed to make his point and to reveal what appear to be deeply embedded assumptions derived from a particular world view, leading him to erroneous conclusions.” 更早之前在一篇发表于1972年的题为“种族与智能”的文章里他写道：“我会努力在本文向你展示詹森教授的论据，以及他如何构筑这些论据以说明他的论点的，并向你揭示那些深埋的假设是如何来自于一种特别的世界观，最终导致他得出一个错误的结论。” A proper analysis of human data reveals a substantial amount of information about genetic differences. What use, if any, one makes of it is quite another matter. But it is a dangerous mistake to premise the moral equality of human beings on biological similarity because dissimilarity, once revealed, then becomes an argument for moral inequality. One is reminded of Fisher’s remark in Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference “that the best causes tend to attract to their support the worst arguments, which seems to be equally true in the intellectual and in the moral sense.” 对于人类数据的恰当分析揭示了有关遗传差异的大量信息。如何利用这些信息则是另外一回事。但将生物学上的相似性当作人类在道德上平等的前提是一个危险的错误，因为差异一旦被发现，就会被视作道德不平等的论据。我们应当铭记菲舍尔在《统计方法与科学推断》中的话：“最好的主张常常会吸引最差的理由，而这理由在智力上和道德上都一样不靠谱。” Epilogue 后记 This article could, and perhaps should, have been written soon after 1974. Since then many advances have been made in both gene technology and statistical computing that have facilitated the study of population differences from genetic data. The magisterial book of Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza took the human story up to 1994, and since then many studies have amply confirmed the validity of the approach. 这篇文章本可以——且应该——在1974年之后不久就写完。自那时起，基因技术和统计计算方面取得了诸多进展，为研究遗传数据中的种群差异提供了很大帮助。Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi和Piazza的权威著作将人类的故事带到了1994年，从那时起，众多研究广泛的证实了他们的方法。 Very recent studies have treated individuals in the same way that Cavalli-Sforza and Edwards treated populations in 1963, namely by subjecting their genetic information to a cluster analysis thus revealing genetic affinities that have unsurprising geographic, linguistic and cultural parallels. As the authors of the most extensive of these comment, “it was only in the accumulation of small allele-frequency differences across many loci that population structure was identified.” 一些晚近的研究用Cavalli-Sforza和Edwards处理种群的方法对待个体，即，将聚类分析运用到个体遗传信息的分析上，由此所揭示出的地理、语言、以及文化上的遗传亲缘性，并不出乎意料。正如在这些课题上之中涉猎最为广泛的作者所言：“只有当众多微小位点上等位基因的差异逐渐累积，种群结构才得以显现。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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