【2023-08-13】 @whigzhou: 從遺傳史的角度看，北方和南方的關係大概是這樣： 北方因其地理/生態/作物條件，有能力產生大型政體和單一文化，構造出更深厚的社會階梯，因而提供了更強大的階層選擇壓力，並由此持續創造出精英群體和精英文化， 可是這些政體和等級結構沒有能力長久自我維繫，周期性瓦解，每次瓦解都造成大批精英南遷，南遷者因其遺傳和文化優勢而逐漸取代融合當地土著， 簡單説，北方是奶油製造機，不斷造出奶油，每隔幾百年，就會有一把奶油刀從天而降，把一大半奶油刮到南方，如此反復， 直到宋爲止的歷史大致如此（中間有個插曲，戰國時有几把奶油刀是向東刮的，把若干批精英刮到了高麗和日本） 明代開始情況有了變化，近兩千年奶油刮下來，南方在個體稟賦上已明顯超越北方，所以當北方的大型階梯又重建起來時，順著它往上爬的，南方人已經占了大多數，就是說，自那以來，南方不僅是奶油被刮去的地方，也是主要的產奶地了， 類似的二元關係在人類歷史上可能並不多見，我能想到的另一個可能例子是印度，印度也是北方（特別是恆河河谷）更能產生大型政體，南方小邦林立，恆河谷地也是當代印度最窮的地方，南方明顯比北方富裕，

【2022-02-20】 @yiqin_fu Kathryn Paige Harden 的书《The Genetic Lottery》总结了过去几十年关于基因和人类各种特征相关性的研究。不管是比较同异卵双胞胎、兄弟姐妹、所有人，最后算出来的这个遗传系数都比我想象中高很多（基因差异能解释形状差异的百分之几）。作者的其他几个结论是：1）系数解读要小心，因为也有社会因素。这个系数也会随着社会变化而变化；2）因果机制我们不知道；3）承认基因差别之后我们可以设计机制帮助大家（例如给近视的人戴眼镜）。 不过更大的问题仍然存在——绝大多数先天差异无法通过“戴个眼镜”这样的方案完全去掉；不同时代、不同社会奖励的技能在道德上是完全随机的。 我还特别想请教做道德哲学的朋友，有人在根据实证的这些研究重新思考 Rawls/Nozick/Friedman 的理论吗？任何一派都需要面对“遗传系数这么高”这件事？ 其他我印象深刻的结论是：4）遗传系数在一个人二十多岁的时候最高，因为基因和努力相互作用；5）很多非认知能力甚至比认知能力的系数还要高，例如受到挫折后坚持的意愿、对新鲜事物的好奇心（当然，这些概念都是实验室做游戏测量的，你可以说实验室的游戏和现实生活不一样）。 @whigzhou: 如果你没被PC滤网局限住信息视野的话，这些事情早该知道了，这本书并没什么新东西，只不过因为配上了左派政策主张，才通过了PC滤网，另外，道德哲学家也不需要通过修正罗尔斯才找到立足点，他们是在二战后的修正中丧生了立足点，斯宾塞及其维多利亚同道和进化事实共存的很好 @whigzhou: 与个体成就密切相关的那些特性，大多有着50-70%的遗传率，这一事实圈内早就人所共知了，圈外很多人不知道，对此很惊讶，甚至表现的难以置信，说明PC滤网确实很强大， 不过我发现更有意思的是，不少人听到50-70%这个数字后，庆幸自己至少还有机会改变剩下的那30-50%，其实这也是个大大的误解，而且这个误解更难消除，因为其背后的原理解释/理解起来更困难， 简单说，剩下的那30-50%，其实大部分来自三种随机因素： 1）测量误差：比如同一个被测对象，不同的测试者去测，测得的数字不同，其中定有误差，这种误差在心理学测量中比其他（比如生理）领域更严重， 2）指标设计偏差，也就是一个度量指标的设计，使得它无法完全准确的反映出它本来想要测量的那个东西，任何指标都存在这种问题，心理学指标当然更严重， 3）运气成分：所谓运气就是你无法干预控制的东西，换句话说，你啥也做不了， 这样你就理解了，为何 Robert Plomin 他们发现，所有他们考察过的个体成长中的共享环境条件（比如是否共享家庭，是否共享父母，是否共享学校，是否共享某种教育模式，是否共享某种财富水平……），都对解释个性差异的毫无贡献，就是说，是否纳入这些因素，丝毫不能改变个性差异中的未解释部分的比例， 通俗的说就是，试图通过改变这些因素来改进孩子的个性/智力发育，是徒劳的，（当然，这绝不是说做这些事情毫无意义，它们可能有其他效果，比如让孩子过的更开心，更有见识，更有教养，更有品味……这些都可以很有意义，但改变不了他们的个性和智力）， 当然，也别太绝望，并不是说个性/智力发育问题上你什么也不能做，那些测量的一个缺陷就是他们的采样对象基本上都是美国的普通正常家庭，所以自动排除了一些极端条件，而某些极端条件确实是会造成显著影响的， 比如某种水平以上的铅污染和营养不良显然会影响智力发育，幼儿期的严重虐待或许也会影响某些个性成分，营养不良和缺钙当然会影响身高…… 所以，父母们在孩子的生理/个性/智力发育上至少有一件事情可以做：帮他们避免那些恶性极端条件， @揶哼:如果平均值以下的环境有影响，那么远高于平均值的环境（比如前0.1%的家庭）是否也有提升呢？ @whigzhou: 1）恶性极端条件可远远不只是*均值以下*，2）正向极端条件没啥用，就好比你成吨成吨的喝奶补钙，也养不出姚明来 @windflower188026:那么智商中值回归咋解释 @whigzhou: 均值回归是运气因素的一种特定表现，可以这么理解：对均值的偏离不仅是某些贡献因子的独立作用，也是其特定组合的效果，而幸运组合可能会在有性繁殖过程中被打破，而人类是有性繁殖生物 @whigzhou: 今天闲着，不妨再展开一下均值回归这个问题， 假设智力有五个贡献因子，A-E，贡献率（r）分别为：A=3, B=1.2, C=5, D=0.5, E=1，意思是，其他条件相同时，拥有其中某个将提高智力 r 个基点（这里姑且不用管基点到底是啥意思）， 再假设这些因子都是可加的（additive），意思是每多一个就更好一点，但它们又不是线性可加的（linear additive），意思是，比如，单有A高3个基点，单有B高1.2个基点，但同时有(A+B)并不是高(3+1.2=4.2)个基点，而是比4.2更高或更低，如果更高，就说明A和B具有组合红利， 大大偏离均值的个体，往往具有特别幸运的组合（也就是其拥有的各贡献因子的总贡献中包含了更多组合红利），偏离越远，其组合的幸运度越高，因而在有性繁殖中因特定组合被打破而丧失的组合红利也越多，因而向均值回归的幅度也越大， 在现有方法中，对遗传率的计算是基于遗传关系和个体表现型之间的统计相关性，而不是基于对各贡献因子之微观机制的直接理解的，这就意味着，在统计上，组合红利无法从运气成分中被分离出来， 比如某甲的父亲拥有上述五个因子中的（A，C，E），母亲拥有（A，B，D），重组之后，甲拥有（A，C，D），而（A，C，E）恰好是个特别幸运的组合，可是在繁殖过程中被打破了，于是，即便智力由基因型完全决定，甲的智力值也无法由其父母的智力值充分解释（因为要充分解释需要了解各贡献因子的微观作用机制），而无法解释的那部分看起来好像就只是运气而已， @whigzhou: 补充一句：如果各贡献因子都是线性可加的，那么单一子女的智力也无法由父母智力充分解释，但假如这对夫妻生的足够多，那么子女的平均智力可以由他们两人的智力充分解释，但如果贡献因子不是线性可加的，那么哪怕生再多，子女平均智力也无法由父母智力充分解释

【2021-09-19】 近年来古DNA技术的发展弄清楚了很多以前不太可能弄清楚的事情，现代日本的种群遗传结构，大约由更新世的狩猎采集土著和此后的两波移民所塑造， 绳文时代（Jomon）只有土著，1000BC左右第一波移民，来自东北亚，开始了弥生时代（Yayoi），300AD左右第二波，来自中国，遗传成分大致和汉族相当，开始了古坟时代（Kofun），此后除了中原汉人成分比例有所上升之外，没有大变化， 参见：Ancient genomics reveals tripartite origins of Japanese populations  

【2021-09-13】 @tertio 查了一下智商和精神疾病之间的关系，结论貌似还比较模糊，跟精神疾病的种类有关。数据给人大致的感觉是，智商明显高于常人和明显低于常人者，患精神疾病的可能性会增加。与智商高相关的是抑郁症和焦虑症，与智商低相关的是精神分裂症。这种统计结论的例外当然也很多了，比如纳什就是精神分裂症患者。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 有些遗传变异提高了高智商的几率，同时也提高了某些神经系统疾病的几率，但这两种结果可能是互斥的，即，那些果然患上神经系统疾病的携带者，智商反而比常人低，而高智商者携带者没这病，那么该病与高智商之间统计上就不会相关，但不能说没关系，而是一种很强的共因关系 @whigzhou: 比如阿兹肯纳齐犹太人中的Tay-Sachs病

【2021-08-25】 Razib Khan 又一篇好文章，讲的是匈牙利人的奇特历史， 匈牙利语属于乌拉尔语系乌戈尔语族，该语族的另外两个群体是汉特人和曼西人，远在匈牙利平原几千公里之外的西伯利亚， 可奇怪的是，当今匈牙利人在遗传特征标记上和他们的西伯利亚表亲毫无关系，而和他们目前的东欧邻居几乎看不出区别， 一个群体怎么会在保持其语言的同时丢失了全部遗传特征？ 最近十几年古DNA测序技术发展神速，所以有人就从10世纪的马扎尔人墓葬中提取了DNA，发现其中上层精英的DNA确实有显著的东亚成分，而同地区的平民遗骸则没有， 所以当初侵入匈牙利平原的马扎尔人确实来自东方，问题是他们的遗传特征跑哪儿去了？ 一种解释是当初的征服者群体规模非常小，所以东方成分被稀释了，统计上看不出差异， 问题是，历史上许多案例证明，小规模征服群体很难保持其母语，特别是没有教育传统也没有成文经典的蛮族，比如侵入伊比利亚和北非的汪达尔人，语言上一丝痕迹也没留下， 所以，保留了其母语的马扎尔人当初必定是个大群体，而且女性比例得足够高，如果娶的都是当地女子，母语难免丢失，因为在没有教育系统的情况下，婴儿主要跟母亲学母语， Razib Khan 认为，这可能因为，自从马扎尔贵族皈依基督教后，匈牙利成了基督教世界的东方门户，而匈牙利平原又是东方入侵者的天然指向（因为它是欧亚草原带的西端），所以长期承受着军事上的重压，特别是在蒙古和奥斯曼的入侵中，其贵族阶层屡次被大比例消灭，最终从遗传统计上消失， 一般而论，武士贵族是高风险高回报的生态位，通常相对于平民都有着较大遗传优势，但也有不幸赌输了的，马扎尔贵族算是一例，  

@whigzhou: 最近的美国藤校申请舞弊案里据说不少好莱坞明星，这和我的预期有所出入，我原以为体育明星会更多，因为我一直觉得，和其他上层精英相比，体育明星在社会地位传承问题上处境比较尴尬，这是因为体育界的禀赋-报酬对应关系十分特殊，（据我粗略观察）报酬随禀赋提高而上升的曲线形状呈反L形，即大部分区段很低平，右侧末尾段突然上翘，意味着只有像乔丹这样的极小一撮成为富人，其他都是普通中产者，这一特点，使得体育明星很难指望下一代保持与自己相近的社会地位。 @whigzhou: 不妨对照智力精英来说明这一点，假设某菲尔茨奖得主，智商160，按均值回归法则，他儿子智商130左右的几率较大，这一智商水平在工程/科技/医生/律师之类行业混个高薪职位大概不难，故仍可保持较高社会地位，体育就大不一样了，假设乔丹禀赋指数160，儿子130，而130只能在业余球队里玩玩，不能靠它挣大钱，这样，在地位保持这件事情上，遗传贡献就小的可以忽略，只有财富能帮上点忙，可是财富能帮上的忙远不如基因，而且是很容易败掉的，不知有没有人专门研究过这问题，估计会很有意思。 【2019-03-25】 @pkuwd:如果说禀赋-报酬的对应性，演艺明星无疑比体育明星更差。体育禀赋是可遗传的，乔丹的儿子再差，混个校队拿个奖学金还是可以的，何况在美国本身就特别推崇体育的环境内。演艺明星能否成名偶然性太大，光有张好看的脸远远不够。 @whigzhou: 但是演艺界前辈提携的效果十分显著，体育靠硬本身，没法提携

【2017-10-14】 Richerson&Boyd模型的另一个相对外围的问题是，他们认为群体间遗传差异很小且对文化进化不构成什么影响，他们用来支持该判断的仅有证据来自跨文化收养研究，这是缺乏说服力的。 ​​​​ 确实，跨文化/跨种族被收养者（稍低程度上也包括二代以上移民）都能顺利习得当地文化并正常生活于其中，但这并不表明：1）当一个群体的成员被大部分或全部替换成另一个种族或文化不同的群体成员时，其原有文化仍可保持，2）当外部条件适宜时，任何群体都能采纳某种特定文化。 这里的要害是：一种文化结构（包括制度）得以产生和维持，可能取决于某些特定个人禀赋，拥有这些禀赋的个体在群体中的比例可能很低（比如1%），但不能没有，也不能低于某个下限（比如0.1%），假如这些禀赋的分布曲线只要向左移动一个标准差，该文化便难以为继。 假设群体A的这组禀赋比群体B高一个标准差，那么，即便来自群体B的移民都可顺利习得A的文化且正常生活于其中，可一旦群体A的人口被来自B的移民替换掉一半，原有文化即可能瓦解 容易想到的此类禀赋有：道德感，尽责性，实施惩罚的意愿，亲社会性，智力，延迟满足，自我克制…… 假如盎格鲁文化需要80%的群体成员具有亲社会性，70%中等以上延迟满足，60%中等以上尽责性，10%强惩罚意愿，1%120以上智商……任何几条的大幅改变可能都是颠覆性的 很明显，这组条件与少量移民顺利融入和正常生活的可能性完全不矛盾 比如，道德规范，一个社区中，可能只要60%的人具有中等以上道德感，规范即可产生，再加上5%的人有强道德感和强惩罚意愿，规范便可稳定持续，但只要分布曲线偏离一个标准差，局面完全不同 极端情形下（其实我觉得很可能），文化的某些重要方面可能仅仅由群体0.1%精英成员的禀赋所决定，此时分布曲线的轻微移动即可让这0.1%变得不合格 回复@慕容飞宇gg:嗯，但那是另一个问题，我正在论证的是：即便最完美融入条件下也不行//@慕容飞宇gg:外来移民不是随机或均匀发布，而是集中在某些区域形成移民小社区，而在这些区域内移民比例远高于宿主，所以一开始就不会被同化。  

Giving Genes Their Due, But Not More 正视基因的功劳，但不要过誉 作者：Erik Parens @ 2015-5-21 译者：Tankman 校对：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：quillette，http://quillette.com/2016/05/21/giving-genes-their-due-but-not-more/ A review of Behaving: What’s Genetic, What’s Not, and Why Should We Care?   by Kenneth B. Schaffner. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016), 304 pages. 对牛津大学出版社出版的Kenneth B. Schaffner的《行为：什么是遗传的，什么不是，以及我们为何要在意这些》的书评。 No one gets anxious about using genetics to help explain a medical disease like cancer or heart disease. But using genetics to help explain a normal behavior like aggression, or a psychiatric disorder like depression, can be an entirely different story. At first blush, this difference in response to using genetics to explain different features of the same animal seems odd. 没有人会担心用遗传学来帮助解释疾病，如癌症或心脏疾病。但是用遗传学来帮助解释普通的行为，例如攻击行为，或精神障碍，如抑郁，则是一个完全不同的故事。对于用遗传学来解释同一动物的不同特征却有不同的反应，乍一看这似乎很奇怪。 After all, it’s not as if medical geneticists, on the one hand, and behavioral and psychiatric geneticists, on the other, employ different research methods. The difference, of course, is that the behavioral and psychiatric geneticists investigate features of ourselves that we take to be central to our humanity: our ways of acting and being in the world. To use genetics to try to explain those features elicits the anxious question, is human behavior genetically determined? 毕竟，这并不是说医疗遗传学家与另—边的行为和精神遗传学家，采用的是不同的研究方法。所不同的当然是，行为和精神遗传学家研究我们自己的特征，我们认为这些特征是我们人性的核心：我们行动和存在于世界的方式。试图用遗传学解释这些特征引起了一个令人焦虑的问题，人的行为是不是遗传决定的？ Few people have been thinking about that question for as long, or with as much devotion to the scientific facts and philosophical subtleties, as the philosopher of science, Kenneth Schaffner. In his magisterial, wise, and succinct new book,Behaving, he disentangles its two separate but related components. The first, which he devotes the lion’s share of the book to illuminating, concerns reductionism: specifically, can behavior be reduced to genes? No, it can’t. 没几个人像科学哲学家Kenneth Schaffner这样，长期思考这一问题，并大量精力投入科学事实和深奥哲理。在他的权威，智慧，简洁的新书《行为》中，他理顺了行为的两个独立但相关的成分。第一，他用本书的大部分篇幅，做了关于还原论的阐释：具体而言，行为可以被简化为基因吗？不，不能。 But it can, at least in principle, be reduced to, or explained in terms of, a mind-bogglingly large number of variables — including genes — which interact over time. The second concerns determinism: even if genes alone don’t determine behavior, does the fact that behavior is determined mean that freedom is an illusion? No. But it does mean that we have to jettison the sort of freedom that children sometimes imagine — freedom untethered to our bodies and histories. 但它可以，至少在原则上，可以简化或被解释成，包括基因在内的一大堆变量，数量多到令人发狂，且这些变量一直交互作用。第二点则关于决定论：即使基因并不能单独决定行为，行为是被决定的这一事实是否意味着自由是一种错觉？不。但它确实意味着我们必须抛弃那种自由，即有时孩子们会想象的那种——不受我们的身体和历史羁绊的自由。 In the course of decreasing the anxiety associated with genetic determinism, Schaffner’s book also decreases the anxiety associated with the fantasy of “designer babies” — a fantasy which depends on the notion that just by “editing” genes we can produce any trait we want, from great athleticism to great intelligence. 在试图减少遗传决定论所带来的焦虑时，Schaffner的书也降低了与“设计婴儿”狂想有关的焦虑——这一狂想基于以下概念：仅通过“编辑”基因，我们便可以创造任何我们想要的特质，从强大的运动能力到极高的智力。 By dispelling this wildly simplistic notion, Schaffner’s book serves not only as an anxiety reducer — or “anxiolytic” — but also as a “mood stabilizer”: it helps stabilize the mania that can afflict those who envision the Human Genome Project as the key to the future of medicine. 通过打消这种疯狂简单化的概念，Schaffner的书不仅可充当一种焦虑缓和剂——或“抗焦虑药”——而且可充当一种“情绪稳定剂” ：它有助于稳定一种狂热，这狂热让那些把人类基因组计划当成开启医学未来的金钥匙的人备受折磨。 Schaffner provides a balanced account while never losing sight of what has been and will be achieved by using genetics to explain medical, behavioral, and psychiatric traits — especially if integrated with insights at myriad other levels of analysis, from the genetic and neuronal to the psychological and social. Schaffner提供了一个平衡的描述，他从未忽视在用遗传学解释医疗、行为和精神特质的方面，已经和将会实现的成就—— 特别展望了若把这些成就和遗传学、神经科学、心理、社会等诸多其他层面的分析相结合所能带来的前景。 A Judge and a Behavioral Geneticist Have a Conversation 一个法官和一个行为遗传学家的对话 Schaffner begins with three Socratic dialogues (minus any Socratic snarkyness or dead ends) that elegantly introduce the basic concepts and methods of behavioral genetics. They are worth rehearsing here. The dialogues feature a Behavioral Geneticist and a fictional Judge. Based on the breathless headlines she’s read over the years, the Judge anticipates that she will increasingly confront the results of behavioral genetics research in her courtroom. Schaffner以三个苏格拉底式对话开始。（没有任何苏格拉底的反讽或死结）这些对话优雅的介绍了行为遗传学的基本概念和方法。他们值得在此被回溯。这些对话的主角是一个行为遗传学家和一个虚构的法官。根据她多年来读到的那些令人喘不过气的头条新闻，法官预计，她将在她的法庭面对越来越多的行为遗传学研究结果。 This provides the Behavioral Geneticist with a pretext for explaining how such results can — and cannot — help explain human behavior, and how such results are — and are not — relevant to everyday understandings of behaviors like aggression, traits like performance on IQ tests, and disorders like ADHD. (Because there is no difference between the concepts and methods of behavioral genetics and psychiatric genetics, from here on out I will use “behavioral genetics” to include the use of genetics to illuminate behaviors and traits, whether or not they are associated with a psychiatric diagnosis.) 这为行为遗传学家提供了理由，来解释这些结果可以或者不可以帮助解释人类行为，以及这些结果和一些对行为，特质，或者疾病的日常理解怎样关联或不相关。例如攻击性人格的行为，智商测试的表现，以及多动症。（因为行为遗传学的概念和方法与精神病遗传学之间没有区别，在此我将使用“行为遗传学”，以包括遗传学在解释的行为和特征上的应用，无论其是否与精神病诊断相关。） Two radically different sorts of investigation are undertaken by behavioral geneticists, and the dialogues introduce a basic but crucial distinction between them. The first uses “classical” methods to demonstrate that genes help explain observed differences in human traits and behaviors, whereas the second uses “molecular” methods to determine which genes or genetic differences are generating those observed differences. 行为遗传学家进行了两种截然不同的调查，而对话介绍了它们之间基本但关键的一个区别。第一种是使用“经典”方法来阐明基因有助于解释人的特征和行为上可见的差异，而第二个则使用“分子层面”方法，以确定哪些基因或遗传差异产生了那些可见差异。 The distinction is important — the distance is enormous between being able to say that a trait “is genetic” and being able to say which gene variants are contributing to the emergence of that trait (much less being able to say how they are contributing). 这种区别很重要 ——能够说一个特征“是遗传的”，和能够说出哪些基因变异正在促成该性状的涌现，这之间有着巨大的鸿沟（更别提说出它们是如何促成的）。 The basic idea for the classical method has been around since the pioneering statistician and father of modern eugenics, Francis Galton, published “The History of Twins” in 1875 — long before anyone knew anything about DNA. In its simplest contemporary form, geneticists compare identical and fraternal twins on a trait of interest, whether heart disease, schizophrenia, or performance on IQ tests. 自统计学先驱和现代优生学之父Francis Galton以来，经典方法的基本思想就已经出现，Galton于1875年发表了《双胞胎的历史》，那时人们还不知道DNA。在当时最简单的形式中，遗传学家比较同卵和异卵双胞胎的目标性状，无论是心脏疾病，精神分裂症，或智商测试的表现。 The first premise of such investigations is that identical twins are nearly 100% genetically similar and fraternal twins share on average only 50% of their genetic material. The second premise is that identical twins and fraternal twins are raised in equally similar environments. 这种调查的第一个前提是同卵双胞胎遗传上近乎100％的相似，而异卵双胞胎则平均只有50％的遗传物质相似。第二个前提是，同卵双胞胎和异卵双胞胎在同样相似的环境被养大。 If one accepts those premises and observes that genetically identical twins are more similar with respect to some trait than fraternal twins, then one has reason to make the simple but profound inference that genetic factors help explain why the identical twins are more similar to each other than are the fraternal twins. 如果一个人接受这些前提并观察到同卵双胞胎的某些特质比异卵双胞胎更相似，那么他便有理由做出简单而深刻的推论，即遗传因素能够帮助解释为什么同卵双胞胎之间比异卵双胞胎更相似。 Over time, by deploying ever more sophisticated variations on that basic logic, behavioral geneticists have demonstrated that identical twins (whether raised together or apart) are not only more similar with respect to traits like height and weight and heart rate, but are also more similar with respect to traits like depression, schizophrenia, aggression, and intelligence. 随着时间的推移，在该基本逻辑的基础上增加更复杂的变量，行为遗传学家已证明同卵双胞胎（无论是一起或分开抚养）不仅在诸如身高、体重和心率等性状上更为相似，而且在诸如抑郁症，精神分裂症，攻击性行为和智力等性状上也更相似。 As Schaffner’s Behavioral Geneticist patiently explains to the Judge, such classical studies produce what are called “heritability estimates.” These are the numbers that are invoked when it is said that depression “is 40% genetic” or that intelligence “is 60% genetic.” 正如Schaffner的行为遗传学家耐心地给法官大人解释的，这样的经典研究产生了所谓的“遗传率估计”。当讨论到抑郁症“40 ％是遗传性的”，或智慧“60 ％是遗传性的”时，有数字可以列。 They are estimates of how much of the variation with respect to a given trait in a given population can be attributed to variation in genetic factors and how much can be attributed to variation in environmental factors. However, in a different environment the observed variation can be different, and thus so can the heritability estimates. 这些估计反映了：对于一个给定群体特定性状的差异，有多少可以归因于遗传因素的差异，多少可以归因于环境因素的差异。毕竟，在不同的环境中可观察到的差异可以是不同的，因此，这样就可以估计遗传率。 To say that heritability estimates can be different in different environments is not to say that heritability estimates tell us nothing! (Indeed, how our genes can affect the environments we choose is an area of behavioral genetic research.) 如果说，遗传率在不同的环境下可以是不同的，这并不意味着遗传率什么都没告诉我们！ （事实上​​，我们的基因如何影响我们为自己选择身处其中的环境，是行为遗传学研究的一个领域。） An old but ever-relevant example of how much heritability estimates can tell us comes from the 1960s, when behavioral geneticists used classical studies to discredit the then-popular idea that schizophrenia and autism were due solely to bad environments — in particular, to “refrigerator mothers.” 关于遗传率，有个老旧但十分相关的例子，来自1960年代。当时行为遗传学家采用经典的研究方法，以贬斥当时十分流行的观点：精神分裂症和自闭症纯粹由恶劣环境引发—— 尤其是“冰箱妈妈”。【译者注：让孩子感到缺乏母爱的妈妈。】 The good news is that these studies helped relieve already-devastated mothers of the burden and social stigma associated with believing that their mothering had caused the disease in their child. 好消息是，这些研究有助于缓解已经受创颇深的母亲们的负担和社会污名，这些负担和污名来自这样一种见解：这些妈妈的抚育方式导致了她们孩子的疾病。 The bad news is that the knowledge gleaned from those classical studies does not help diagnose or treat — much less prevent — a disorder like schizophrenia. To go from noticing that genetic differences were making a difference to knowing which genetic differences were making a difference, geneticists had to move from the classical twin methods to the modern “molecular” methods. 坏消息是，从经典研究中获取的知识并不能帮助诊断或治疗——更不用说预防——如精神分裂症之类的疾病。从注意到遗传差异，到知道哪个遗传差异导致某种不同，遗传学家必须从经典的双胞胎方法跨越到现代的“分子”方法。 The Genome: A “Molecular Crystal Ball”? 基因组：一个“分子层面的水晶球”？ This move only became possible in the second half of the 20th century, when researchers began to understand the molecular structure of genes and how to map and sequence human genomes. Indeed, the purpose of the Human Genome Project (HGP), which officially launched in 1990, was to map the genome and to specify the sequence of the base pairs, the As, Gs, Cs, and Ts, that are the building blocks of genes. 此举直到20世纪下半叶才成为可能，当时研究人员开始了解基因的分子结构，以及如何对人类基因组进行绘制和测序图谱。事实上，于1990年正式启动的人类基因组计划（HGP）的目的，便是绘制基因组，并指定基因的积木——碱基对AS、GS 、CS和TS的序列。 The fervent hope was that knowledge of those sequences would lead rather quickly and directly to understanding and treating human disease. In reflecting back on that time, the geneticists Linda and Edward McCabe speak ruefully of the dream that an individual’s genome would be like a “molecular crystal ball.” 人们热切希望有关这些序列的知识将相当快且相当直接的导致对人类疾病的理解和治疗。忆起那个时候，遗传学家Linda 和 Edward McCabe懊丧的谈起当时的梦想：一个人的基因组将会像一个“分子层面的水晶球”。（http://content.ucpress.edu/pages/10867/10867.ch01.pdf） This idea of identifying “genes for” diseases made intuitive sense. After all, one year before the official launch of the HGP, in 1989, Francis Collins — who would go on to direct the National Human Genome Research Institute and who now directs the entire NIH — did co-discover “the gene for” cystic fibrosis, which constituted a prime supporting case in point for the idea dubbed OGOD: One-Gene-One-Disease. 直觉上，确定“致病基因”的想法是有道理的。毕竟，正式启动人类基因组计划前一年，即1989年，Francis Collins ——美国国家人类基因组研究所后来的领袖，也是现在整个美国国家卫生研究院（NIH）的领袖——和他人共同发现了囊性纤维化的“致病基因” ，这构成了OGOD理念，即一个基因对应一种疾病（One-Gene-One-Disease）的主要支撑例证。 If a rare medical disorder like cystic fibrosis could be caused by one gene, then maybe common medical diseases like heart disease could, too. And if common medical diseases could be caused by single genes, then maybe the same was true for psychiatric disorders and behavioral traits. 若是像囊性纤维化这样一种罕见的医学疾病可以由一个基因引起，那么也许常见病，如心脏病，也可能如此。如果普通疾病可能由单个基因引起的，那么也许精神疾病和行为特征同样如此。 Sure enough, in the 1990s, articles in the scientific and lay presses announced discoveries of “genes for” everything from bipolar disorder to aggression. But as Schaffner’s Behavioral Geneticist tells the Judge, those findings (which sparked the Judge’s initial interest) could not be replicated. “Genes for” diseases like cystic fibrosis and Huntington’s and sTay Sach were exceptions to the rule. 诚然，在1990年代，科普界的文章宣布发现各种各样的“致病基因”，从躁郁症到攻击性人格，无所不包。但正如Schaffner的行为遗传学家告诉法官的，这些（引发了法官最初兴趣的）发现无法被复制。诸如如囊性纤维化、亨廷顿舞蹈症和Tay-Sachs 病的“致病基因”是这一规律的例外。 “Failures to replicate” reminded geneticists of the yawning gap between discovering that a trait “is genetic” and figuring out which genes help explain it. 这些研究“无法被复制”提醒遗传学家们，在发现一种特质“是遗传的” ，和搞清哪些基因有助于解释该特质之间的存在着巨大鸿沟。 Genetic Reductionism: A Panacea or a Boondoggle? 遗传学还原论：万灵药还是打水漂？ One of the fascinating features of Schaffner’s book is his commitment to telling the story of how he came to reform — not renounce — his own vision of reductionism. When he began his career in the 1970s, he resonated with the hardcore genetic reductionists, who dreamt that understanding the operation of genes would be a panacea: a cure for our ignorance with respect to how disease and behavior come into being. Schaffner这本书的一个令人赞叹的特点是，他坚持讲述他如何变革——而不是抛弃——自己对还原论的看法。当他的职业生涯在1970年代开始时，他和铁杆遗传还原论者很合得来，这些还原论者有一个梦想，即理解基因的操作将会是一个万灵药：在疾病和行为是如何产生的这个问题上，能治愈我们的无知。 But already at that time people who called themselves developmentalists (such as the much-discussed evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin) were challenging that dream, suggesting that, especially in the context of behavior, genetic reductionism was a boondoggle. 但在那时自称是发育展主义者的人士（如备受争议的进化生物学家Richard Lewontin）则挑战了这一梦想，他提出，基因还原论打了水漂，尤其是在行为问题上。 To understand how Schaffner arrived at a middle path, it helps to understand the developmentalists’ challenge. According to Schaffner, that challenge boils down to five core concepts, two of them helpful and three overstated. 了解Schaffner如何到达一条中间道路，有助于理解发育主义者的挑战。据Schaffner看，这一挑战可以归结为五大核心理念，当中有两个有用，有三个被夸大其辞了。 The first helpful one concerns “contextualism” — the idea that genes do not have inherent meaning, but only acquire meaning “in context with other genes, and in the environment that is cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic” (p. 95). 第一个有用的理念和“背景主义”相关——即基因不具有固有的意义，但仅“在其他基因的背景中，并且在细胞内环境，细胞外环境，和生物体外的环境中”获得了意义（第95页）。 The other helpful (or at least wholly unobjectionable) core concept is “nonpreformationism” — the developmentalists’ rejection of the very old idea that genes contain within them little copies of the traits with which they are associated. 另一个有用的（或至少是完全无法反驳的）核心理念是“非预成论”——即发育主义者拒绝了基因中含有与其相关的性状的微小副本这一古旧想法。 As for the overstated ones, they include the core concept of “parity” — the idea that genes have no more explanatory power than many other features of the organism and environment. Schaffner dismisses this as an exaggeration, at least insofar as it ignores the extent of our current understanding of the molecular structure and function of DNA. 而那些夸大的理念，包括“等价性”——即基因和生物体以及环境的许多其他特征相比，并没有更多的解释力。至少目前，Schaffner把这作为一种夸张来驳斥，因为它忽略了我们当下对DNA分子结构和功能的了解程度。 “Unpredictability,” their fourth core concept, is also exaggerated: genes can contribute to some predictions. As for the developmentalists’ fifth concept, “indivisibility,” Schaffner reminds us of the extent to which reductionism can make incremental progress in “dividing” behavior into analyzable components. 他们的第四个核心理念 “不可预测性”，也是夸张的：基因可以帮助做出一些预测。而对于发育主义的第五个理念， “不可分割性”，Schaffner提醒我们在把行为分割成可分析组件方面，还原论能够取得何种程度的渐进性进展。 To better illustrate his revised vision for reductionism, he introduces the humble roundworm, a wonderful organism for research purposes precisely because we have such highly detailed knowledge of its genes, neurons, neuronal connections and circuits, and of the typical behaviors it engages in during its short life. 为了更好地说明他的修正版还原论，他介绍了不起眼的蛔虫。对做研究来说，这个生物真是棒极了。我们对它的基因，神经元，神经连接和回路，及其短暂一生中的典型行为都有非常详细的知识。 In his characteristically even-handed way, Schaffner actually begins his account of worm behavior with one of those exceptional cases that can mesmerize journalists, pop psychologists, bioethicists, and others — a case where mutations in a single gene do indeed appear to be the necessary condition for a behavior: specifically, in this case, for determining whether a roundworm eats alone or in groups. In other words: one gene appears to determine the worm’s dining preference! 以其特有的不偏不倚的方式，Schaffner实际上用一个极好的例子开始阐释蛔虫的行为，这例子可以让记者，通俗心理学家，伦理学家和其他人着迷。那就是某个基因的变异看起来确实可以是一种行为改变的必要条件：具体来说，决定了一条蛔虫单独进食还是和群体一起进食。换句话说：看来是一个基因决定着该蠕虫的进食喜好！ But then the remainder of his discussion of the roundworm illuminates what’s wrong with the One-Gene-One-Behavior idea — and more generally, with the One-Gene-One-Disease (OGOD) idea. 但书中关于蠕虫的讨论的余下篇幅阐明了“一个基因一种行为”， 更宽泛的来说是“一个基因一种疾病”（One-Gene-One-Disease ，缩写为OGOD）这一理念的谬误之处，。 To show why the “gene for style of eating” example is an exception to the big rule of thumb that behaviors cannot be reduced to genes, much less to single genes, Schaffner introduces eight smaller “rules.” 为了解释为何“决定进食偏好的基因”只是“行为不能被还原为基因，更不能被还原为单个基因”这条更一般性的经验法则的一个例外，Schaffner 介绍了八条较小的“法则”。 These emphasize the interactions, occurring on multiple levels of analysis (from genes to neurons and nutrients), which change over time, and which shape and are shaped by the cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic environments. 这些法则强调了发生在多个分析层次上的交互作用，从基因到神经元和营养物，而且这些交互作用一直在变化，并且塑造着细胞内，细胞外和生物体外的环境，反过来又受到这些环境的影响。 For example, “social deprivation,” he patiently explains, can adversely affect even the development of worms. Those raised in isolation were slower to respond to taps on the plates that constitute their environments (the “tap withdrawal reflex”), were physically smaller, and had delayed development — and the delay was correlated with the altered expression of a gene coding for a protein involved in the tap response. 他耐心地解释道，例如“社交剥夺”，甚至对蠕虫的发育也会造成负面影响。那些在孤独中被培育的蠕虫对轻拍培养皿的反应更慢，而培养皿构成了它们的生存环境（轻拍回撤反射实验），而且它们身形更小，发育更迟缓。而这迟缓与一个基因表达上的改变相关，这一基因编码了一种与轻拍反射相关的蛋白质。 Schaffner quotes the researcher’s conclusion: “Experience … can alter both gene expression and the structure of the nervous system” (p. 92). Even in the roundworm, there is no “gene for” the tap response; instead, the tap response is the result of a complex network, including, at a minimum, genes, neurons, and environments. If we hope to explain behavior, then, according to Schaffner, we need a “network perspective.” Schaffner 引用研究者的结论：“经验……能够改变基因表达和神经系统结构”（第92页）。即使在蠕虫里，也没有负责轻拍反应的基因；反之，轻拍反应是一个复杂网络的结果，这一网络至少包括基因、神经元、和环境。如果我们希望解释行为，那么根据Schaffner 的观点，我们需要一个“网络视角”。 If this “network” type of genetic explanation holds for most behaviors, including even more complex organisms than worms and fruit flies, such as mice and humans, it raises barriers both to any simplistic type of genetic explanation, and the prospects of easily achievable medical and psychiatric pharmacological interventions into behaviors (ital. added, p. 95). 如果这个“网络”型遗传学解释能对大多数行为成立，包括比蠕虫和果蝇复杂得多的生物体，比如老鼠和人，它就使以下二者变得更困难：一，任何还原论版本的遗传学解释；二，发明出针对行为的，容易实现的医药或精神病学的药物干涉的希望。 In other words, to appreciate the leap from genes to worm behaviors should put us on notice that there will be even more “barriers” in going from genes to human behaviors, disorders, and diseases. The once-intuitively plausible idea of the genome as a molecular crystal ball has come to seem quaint. 换言之，理解从基因到蠕虫行为的思维跳跃，应该让我们注意到，从基因推及人的行为、失调和疾病，存在更多的困难。把基因组当分子层面的水晶球，这一曾是直觉上可行的的理念已经变得古旧。 It is essential to recognize, however, the difference between the notion that behaviors can be reduced to the operation of genes and the idea that behaviors can be reduced. The former notion, according to Schaffner, is wildly inaccurate, but the latter is not. The fact that we can’t achieve what he calls “sweeping reductions” of the sort first fantasized about at the start of the Human Genome Project does not mean that the enterprise of reductionism is a bust. 然而，有必要认识到，行为可以被还原为基因运作的结果，与行为可以被还原，这两种想法是不同的。在Schaffner看来，前者是非常不精确的，但是后者不是。在人类基因组开始时，人类开始沉迷于Schaffner的所谓“全面还原”的愿景，我们不能达成“全面还原”的愿景这一事实并不意味着还原论的雄心只是个泡影。 It means, among other things, that we need to accept the fact that, in complex systems, we should expect what he calls “patchy” or “partial” or “creeping” reductions. Genes can help to illuminate one “patch” of the huge field or network that would in theory constitute something like a complete explanation of a behavior. 而且这意味着，我们得接受一个事实：在复杂系统中，我们应该期待他所谓的打补丁的，或部分的，或是“小步推进”的还原。基因能帮助弄清这个网络或巨大场域的一个补丁，这在理论上构成了对一种行为的完整解释的一部分。 Finding a Path Forward to Understanding Human Behavior 发现通向理解人类行为的路径 Schaffner nimbly moves from worms to human beings. What geneticists have notbeen able to discover regarding human personalities should reassure, even gladden, skeptics. Schaffner 灵活地从蠕虫跳到人类。关于人格，遗传学家一直没能发现的部分，应该会安慰和甚至鼓舞怀疑论者。 At the turn of the century, some psychologists and geneticists hypothesized that there were three domains of personality temperament — novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward dependence; each linked to a distinct neurotransmitter — dopamine, serotonin, and epinephrine; and thus linked to “genes for” the production and regulation of one of those neurotransmitters. 在世纪之交，一些心理学家和遗传学家假设人类气质有三个方面——猎奇性，避害性，和趋奖性；每种都和不同的神经递质相关——多巴胺，血清素，和肾上腺素；因此也和产生及管理这些神经递质的基因相关。 The idea was that specific gene variants associated with the regulation of dopamine, for example, had significant effects on novelty seeking. Again, those initial results failed to replicate. Among the reasons for those failures was the mistaken assumption that single “candidate” genes would, independent of their interaction with other genes and environmental variables, have large effects on traits as complex as personality. 这种理念认为，与管理多巴胺有关的基因的特定变异，会对猎奇性有显著影响。再一次，这些最初的结果未能被重复。单个基因会独立于其他基因和环境变量而对诸如人格这样的复杂性状产生巨大影响，这一错误的假设，算是失败的原因之一。 Combine that mistaken assumption with the all-too-human appetite of scientists, university PR departments, and journal editors for big, exciting findings, and voila: a variety of subtle statistical errors crept in. 这个错误的假设，加上科学家们的野心（这也是人之常情），大学公关部门和追求巨大且令人振奋发现的期刊编辑，于是：一系列微妙的统计学谬误渗透了进来。 Even the study of the interaction of genetic and environmental variables in the early 2000s was plagued with replication problems, perhaps due to their depending on the idea of “candidate” genes with large effects. Since then, extraordinary advances in technologies designed to compare genome sequences, combined with powerful new statistical methods, make it increasingly possible to detect genetic variants associated with tiny effects. 即使在21世纪初，对遗传和环境变量相互作用的研究也被结果不能重复这一问题所困扰，也许是因为研究者依赖“候选”基因有强大影响这一理念。此后，旨在比较基因组序列的非凡的技术进步，结合功能强大的新统计方法，使得发现与微小影响相关的遗传变异变得越来越可能。 The new, emerging picture boils down to this: common complex traits are the result of hundreds or thousands of gene variants of small effect size, which often interact with other gene variants as well as a gigantic range of environmental variables. It remains to be seen how much of practical value will result from this. 正在浮现中的新图景可以归结为：常见的复杂性状是几百或几千种效果较小的基因变异所产生的效果，并且它们通常与其他基因变异以及为数众多的环境变量相互作用。这个途径能带来多少实际价值仍有待观察。 Moreover, as Schaffner observes, it may be that huge categories like “novelty seeking” and “harm avoidance” are just too vague or indistinct to establish pathways from genes to behaviors like these. Again, to know that personality “is genetic” is massively different from knowing which genes are at work, much less how they are contributing to a given trait. 此外，Schaffner 指出，这可能是因为诸如“猎奇性”和“避害性”的宽泛类别太过含糊不清，以至于无法建立从基因到此类行为的途径。再次，要知道个性“是遗传的”和知道哪个基因在起作用是非常不同的，更不用说它们是如何导致一个特定性状的。 While Schaffner’s account of personality genetics may dishearten aficionados of genetic explanations, his account of schizophrenia should gladden them. Schizophrenia, too, is a large and heterogeneous category, but researchers have made headway in characterizing that heterogeneity — in specifying the symptoms and subtypes of schizophrenia. It’s in the context of schizophrenia that Schaffner elaborates on his conception of successfully reductionist scientific explanations. 虽然Schaffner关于个性遗传学的阐释会让遗传学解释狂人气馁，他关于精神分裂症的论述应该鼓舞他们。精神分裂症，也同样是一个宽泛且异质的类别，但研究人员在描述其异质性——即详细描述其症状和亚型——上已取得了进展。在精神分裂症问题上，Schaffner成功阐述了他的还原论者科学解释的概念。 Such explanations, whether of schizophrenia or any other disorder or behavior, will have to be “interlevel”; in other words, they will need to draw on what is known at the level of ions, molecules, cells, cell-cell circuits, and organs — and will have to tell a story about how, over time, the factors at those different levels interact with each other and their environments. 这样的解释，无论是针对精神分裂症或任何其他病症或行为，将必须是“层次间的”；换言之，他们将需要利用在离子、分子、细胞、细胞间回路和器官等各层面的知识构建一个故事——且必须解释在不同层次上的各个因素如何一直互动并和环境相互作用。 In the case of schizophrenia, this includes genes implicated in the production and regulation of specialized nerve cells, specialized parts of those nerve cells, connections among those nerve cells, and, ultimately, brain wave patterns thought to be associated with the activation of those neuronal circuits and associated with at least some features of schizophrenia. 在精神分裂症的例子中，那将包括所有涉及下列事情的基因：特化神经细胞的生成和调控、这些神经细胞的特化部位、这些神经细胞之间的连接，以及最后，被认为是和这些神经回路相关联的脑波模式，这些脑波模式也被认为至少和神经分裂症的一些特征相关联。 Need one say that the model he describes is not anywhere close to complete? (Nor is the elaboration of this model, which has recently received high-profile attention.) Rather, it offers a “creeping” reduction — incremental progress in using the tools of genetics and neuroscience to understand one patch of the massively complex phenomenon we call schizophrenia. 可以说他描述的模型离完成还差十万八千里吗？（阐述这个模型让他最近引人瞩目。）然而，这提供了一个“小步推进”的还原论解释——即在利用遗传学和神经科学方面的渐进性进展，可用来理解我们称之为精神分裂的极为复杂现象的一个方面。 Clearly, this model shouldn’t inspire euphoric expectations of imminent cures. Again, to his credit, Schaffner is adamant in stating that, “DNA sequence per se increasingly seems impoverished as a biological explainer” (p. 197). And, again, this is not to say that DNA sequence is unimportant — it’s just not important in the simple ways we once imagined, which notably still linger in the imagination. 很显然，这种模式不该激发关于治愈方案立即诞生的欣快预期。令人佩服地，Schaffner 再次坚决指出， “ 单单用DNA序列本身去解释生物学现象，似乎越来越困窘” （第197页） 。并且再次，这不是说 DNA序列是不重要的——只是不像我们曾经想象得那样，以简单的方式而显出其重要性，很明显，这些简单方式仍徘徊在想象中。 A Grownup Conception of Freedom 一个成熟的“自由”概念 So, is human behavior genetically determined? Different from what a sweeping genetic reductionist would hope, we have seen that the answer is plainly no. But nor is human behavior not determined. On the contrary, Schaffner thinks that human behavior is determined — and that it admits of reductionist explanations. Does this mean freedom is an illusion? 所以，人类行为是遗传决定的吗？不同于全面遗传学简化论者所指望的，我们已经看到答案明显是否定的。但这也不是说人类行为不是决定的。相反，Schaffner 认为人类行为是决定的——这使得还原论者的解释成为可能。这意味着自由是幻觉吗？ No, it doesn’t, even if it does mean that we have to give up conceptions of freedom of the sort that best-selling authors like Sam Harris like to set up in order to knock down. Yes, we have to give up the idea of freedom as an extra-natural capacity or force that is somehow insulated from the impact of the natural and social forces at work in the world. 不，这没有，即使这意味着我们必须放弃畅销书作家如 Sam Harris 为了作品成功而设定的那种自由概念。是的，我们必须放弃这一理念：自由某种程度上是一种能绝缘于世上自然和社会力量影响的超自然能力。 But accepting that our behaviors are determined by natural and social forces that, at least in principle, admit of explanation does not mean that we have to give up the conception of freedom that mature adults should want, or that, as Daniel Dennett puts it, “is worth having.” 但是接受我们的行为是被自然和社会决定的，或者至少在原则上承认该解释，并不意味着我们必须放弃有关心智成熟的成人应该渴望的那种——或者如 Daniel Dennett所说的，“值得拥有的”——自由的概念。 To get at what such a conception of freedom is, Schaffner introduces philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s influential distinction between first- and second-order desires. Consider, for example, an alcoholic with insight into her alcoholism. She might have a second-order desire not to drink, while also having a first-order desire to drink. 为了说清楚如此的自由概念究竟是什么，Schaffner 介绍了哲学家Harry Frankfurt所说的第一阶渴望和第二阶渴望之间的显著区别。试想，一个酗酒者很清楚的认识到她的成瘾问题。她也许有种不喝酒的二阶渴望，但同时又有想喝酒的一阶渴望。 The person who cannot bring her first-and second-order desires into alignment lacks what warrants being called free will. If, on the other hand, she can get those first- and second-order desires into alignment, and if she can, as it were, desire what she wants to desire, we can say that she is free. 这个不能把一阶和二阶渴望协调好的人缺乏确保自由意志的能力。反之，如果她能协调好一阶和二阶渴望，并且如果某种程度上她能渴望她想渴望的，我们可以说她是自由的。 The behavioral geneticist and philosopher of psychiatry, Kenneth Kendler explains how human beings can, “through their decision-making capacity, intervene in causal pathways from genes to behavior.” Kendler’s first example is alcohol dependence. We know from classical behavioral genetics studies that alcoholism “is genetic” in the real but limited sense that the genes that children inherit from parents can put them at increased risk of becoming alcoholics. 行为遗传学家和精神病哲学家 Kenneth Kendler 解释了人类如何能“通过他们的决策能力，在从基因到行为的因果性路径上进行干涉。”Kendler的第一个例子是酒精依赖。从经典的行为遗传学研究我们知道，酗酒在真实但有限的意义上是“遗传性的”，即孩子从父母那里继承的基因能增加他们成为酗酒者的风险。 We also know, however, that children of alcoholics are also at increased “risk” of becoming teetotalers — practicing complete abstinence from alcohol; Donald Trump’s response to his father’s and brother’s alcoholism is a case in point. Kendler and Schaffner both want us to notice how a grownup conception of freedom retains a place both for genes and for choice. 但我们也知道，酗酒者的孩子成为滴酒不沾者——也就是实际上完全戒绝酒精——的可能性也增加了；川普对于其父兄酗酒的回应就是一个与此有关的例子。Kendler 和Schaffner都想让我们注意到一个成人的自由概念，如何能给基因和选择都留有余地。 In other words, human decisions can be an essential factor in the multilevel causal network that gives rise to our behaviors. If we notice that genes, neurons, hormones, neighborhoods, cultures, histories — and human desires and choices — can be among the determinants of human behavior, determinism should be less anxiety-producing. 另一方面，人类决策能够成为导致我们的行为的多层次因果网络中的一个关键因素。如果我们注意到，基因，神经元，荷尔蒙，邻里，文化，历史——还有人的渴望和选择——都能算作人类行为的影响因素，决定论就应该不那么让人焦虑。 In offering his view of the sort of freedom of choice that any grownup should want, he reminds us that scientific researchers choose which level of the causal network they will study. There is nothing wrong with having a preference for a given level of analysis, but there is something wrong with forgetting that a preferred level won’t be the only one needed to make headway in the sorts of reductions that can contribute to practically useful explanations. 在阐释他关于（任何成年人都应向往的那种）选择自由的观点时，他提醒我们不要忽略科学研究者选择何种层次的因果网络来研究。对某层次的分析有偏好完全没有错，但如果想要在那种能够产生有实际用处的解释的还原工作上取得进展，忘记你所偏爱的层次不是所需的唯一条件，则是不对的。 An Anxiolytic and a Mood Stabilizer 一种抗焦虑剂和情绪稳定剂 This brings us full circle to the growing anxiety swirling around the idea of “designer babies,” and more specifically to the idea that it will be possible to use “gene editing technologies” like CRISPR-Cas9 to engineer traits like intelligence. As we begin to appreciate that such traits involve hundreds or thousands of genes interacting with each other and with the cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic environments, then the less seriously we can take the notion that it will be possible to enhance such traits by making changes at the level of the gene. 这把我们带回到文章开头提到的那萦绕在“设计婴儿”这一概念周围的日益增长的焦虑，或者更确切地说，带回到对利用“基因编辑技术”（如CRISPR-Cas9）来对诸如智力之类的性状进行工程设计的焦虑。当我们开始注意到这些性状涉及数百个基因的互动，以及和细胞内、细胞间和生物体外环境的交互作用，那么我们就更不会认为在基因层面做改动来增强这些性状是可能的了。 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, understanding this complexity can help stabilize the mania precipitated by the Human Genome Project. Ever since its launch in 1990, we have heard ecstatic claims about the imminent arrival of medical diagnoses, treatments, and preventive interventions tailored to individual genomes. 而且，如早先提到的，理解这种复杂性可以帮助平息人类基因组计划带来的急躁冒进。早在该项目于90年代发起之际，我们已经听到欣喜若狂的宣告，即针对个人基因定制的疾病诊疗预防手段即将问世。 While it is absolutely crucial to appreciate the real and important strides in diagnosis and treatment linked to advances in understanding the genome, it is equally important to appreciate that, with few exceptions, knowledge at the level of the genome alone will likely not be able to produce as much clinically relevant information as was once promised. 当然，重视由对基因组的深入理解而带来的诊疗方面的真实且重要的进步是绝对关键的，但同样重要的是要明白，除了少数几个例外，仅靠基因组层面的知识产生相关的临床信息，很可能不如之前曾经承诺的那么多。 As we taxpayers begin to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the Human Genome Project’s offspring, The Precision Medicine Initiative, we should hold its leaders to their word when they say that they are getting the mania under control. Given how ardently some of the leaders of that initiative — not least Francis Collins — have been committed to a geneocentric approach, and given how mesmerizing and cheap gene-sequencing has become, it may take significant effort on their part to live up to their new promise of pursuing a more multilevel and, dare one say, balanced approach. Reading Schaffner’s book could strengthen their resolve to live up to that promise. 既然我们纳税人已开始把数亿美元投入人类基因组计划的续集，精准药物计划，当计划的领袖们说他们正在控制关于基因疗法的急躁冒进，我们应当让他们遵守承诺。考虑到一些项目领袖们是如此热忱，不光Francis Collins一人决心采用基因导向的方法，而且目前基因测序已变得如此便宜又吸引人，让这些领袖信守他们采用更加多层次的，当然也就是更平衡的方法的承诺也许需要更大的努力。读Schaffner的书可以加强他们实现这个承诺的决心。 Erik Parens is a senior research scholar at The Hastings Center, a bioethics research institute in Garrison, New York, and is the author of Shaping Our Selves: On Technology, Flourishing, and a Habit of Thinking. Erik Parens 是Hastings中心（一个坐落于纽约州Garrison的生物伦理研究机构）的一位高级学者，他著有《塑造自我：关于技术，繁荣，和思维的习惯》。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-07-04】 @whigzhou: 常有人说，人类个体间99.5%的DNA是相同的，所以我们在遗传上不会有太大差别，这么说的人对数字不太敏感，0.5%的单核苷酸差异意味着每200个碱基中就有一个是不同的，每个基因平均2000个碱基对，平均可能摊上10个差异，实际上没那么多，那是因为编码段受自然选择约束，变异率低于非编码段， @whigzhou: 但这一极简单计算即表明，不同个体的每个基因都*有机会*是不同的，只要他们各自的种系发生历史上所面临的选择压力不同，就很可能不同，而且每个基因可能有多个不同之处。 @whigzhou: 理解这一点的最佳类比是程序代码，把DNA想象成一个软件的源代码，其中98.5%是注释，剩下1.5%是有用编码，现在为它建立一亿个副本，拷贝时平均每200个字符随机出现一个拷贝错误，然后将无法正常工作的副本剔除，剩下能工作的副本会表现出多大功能差异？ @whigzhou: 没写过代码的同学可以考虑做菜，让使用同样主料的两道菜味道变得十分不同，需要在调料上有多大不同？从寡淡无味变成巨咸无比需要几克盐？从不辣变成超辣需要几克辣椒汁？制造难以忍受的麻味需要几克花椒汁？  

【2016-06-26】 @whigzhou: @sw小橘子 问我『制度决定下限，文化决定上限』这句话是不是我说的，我说这么格拉德维尔的话不像是我说的，不过这句话确实道出了一些真相，并且和我的社会进化理论相合，我的理论就是雪球模型，从人性到文化到基础政治结构到制度到可见的繁荣状况，每一外层的可能性皆受制于内层的性质与禀赋， @whigzhou: 所以从短期看，内层结构的性质限制着外层的可能性，而从长期看，特定性质的外层的持续存在，对内层也构成了选择压力，因而也改变着内层的性质，我将这一改变称为（广义的）鲍德温效应。 @whigzhou: 我也曾为这套理论找过一句格拉德维尔式的警句『英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会，德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民，犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……』，无奈还是不够短不够朗朗上口。 @whigzhou: 还要加上后半句『在长期经历不同制度之后，香港文化已不同于广州文化，东德人也已不同于西德人，北朝鲜人更不同于南朝鲜人』 @whigzhou: 有关个人认知能力和人格特质的研究很多，但针对族群比较的研究还很少，历时性的研究则更少，所以我们远未弄清那些特质（及相应的遗传基础）在支撑着宪政、法治、宽容、开放等文明的关键元素，但我们可以设想一下，某些重要特质的改变可能会引出何种结果。 @whigzhou: 不妨从一个分歧最小的特质开始，假如英国人的IQ分布拉低两个标准差，顶级科学家就消失了，再拉低一个标准差，整个科学社区就没了，这大概不会有疑问， @whigzhou: 再考虑经验开放性，假如一个民族的经验开放性的统计分布拉低两个标准差，该民族就不会有出色艺术家了，再拉低一个标准差，所有艺术活动都消失了，这一点不太确定，或许经验开放性不是很好的指标，但我很确信必定可以找到某项特质来评估这一点 @whigzhou: 再考虑法治，法治能够存续的前提是绝大多数人在绝大多数场合愿意自觉遵守规则，否则再强大的司法机器也没用，那么一个族群的尽责性分布拉低两个标准差结果会如何？情绪稳定性也拉低两个标准差呢？ @whigzhou: 道德感又如何？普通法的要义便是：凭良心和常识即可自行判断某一行为是否正当，在一个普遍缺乏道德感的群体，这样的体系能够存续吗？道德感无关于人格特质吗？ @沉默的马大爷: 智商拉低两个标准差，意味着有一半人是弱智，别说科学社区，整个社会都崩溃了。。大部分族群差异达不到这个量级，组内差异一般要高于组间差异 @whigzhou: 两个标准差是夸张了点，但绝非不现实，请看右表 http://t.cn/hByJ2N 不许随便说人弱智，人家要不高兴的 @whigzhou: 确实，消灭顶级科学家大概一个标准差就够了  

Such a thing 种族这回事 作者：Gregory Cochran @ 2016-4-19 译者：Tankman 校对：龙泉 来源：https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2016/04/19/such-a-thing/ “there’s no such thing as race” is a standard sentence in the United States and Europe. Conventional wisdom, and like so much conventional wisdom, false. “没有种族这回事”在欧美,这是老生常谈｡传统观点,甚至如此传统的观点,是错误的｡ Of course there is. 种族,当然是存在的｡ First you need to define your terms. I would suggest that any population – a group whose members have mated within that group, almost entirely, for some time – and has experienced strong-enough natural selection to change significantly in some trait that we give a shit about can usefully be considered a race. Or a ‘goklu’, where goklu has exactly the same operational meaning as race, without having yet acquired any toxic associations. 首先,你得需要为你的术语给出定义｡我的建议是:任何人群,群内成员交配繁衍(有时几乎只在群内交配),并且经历了足够强度的自然选择因而显著改变了一些被我们所在意的重要性状,那么方便起见,这样的群体便可称作一个种族｡或者叫它“格克鲁”【译注:作者生造词】也行,在此处,格克鲁有着和种族完全一样的操作性意义,但尚未像后者那样获得毒性｡ Low levels of inward gene flow allow selection to change the frequencies of alleles, so mating within the group is important. Usually this endogamy is a natural consequence of geography (not much gene flow across the Atlantic before Columbus) but sometimes it has been caused by social rules, as in the case of the Ashkenazi Jews or the Hindu castes. 低水平的外来基因流入,让自然选择得以改变等位基因的频率,因此交配限于群内这一点是重要的｡通常这种内婚是地理分割的自然结果(如哥伦布之前,大西洋两岸并未发生很多基因转移),但有时社会规则也会导致内婚,如阿什肯納茲犹太人和印度种姓制度｡ Low inward gene flow: in order for significant differences in the neutral genome to accumulate, there must have been < 1 immigrant per generation for tens of of thousands of years or more. That has happened sometimes, and not just with Neanderthals: sub-Saharan Africans and Eurasians were that separate until fairly recently, and have that kind of differences in their neutral genomes. For that matter, Bushmen and Bantu were genetically distinct for an even longer period. So it takes only a little gene flow to stop drift in its tracks. 低水平的外来基因流入:为了累积中性基因组的显著差异,在数万年甚至更长时间内,每代的外来迁入率必须小于1%【编注:依下文内容可知,此处原文漏了百分号】｡这种情况时有发生,而且不止在尼安德特人身上:撒哈拉以南的非洲人和欧亚人种间的隔离状态,直到相当晚近时才结束｡而他们的中性基因组也有这种差别｡同样的,布希曼人和班图人在更长的时间内,在遗传学上有显著不同｡所以,只需要一小点基因转移,就能让遗传漂变改变轨迹｡ Selection can be a lot stronger, and it takes more gene flow to scotch it. You could have effective selection for IQ among the Ashkenazi Jews even in the presence of as much as 0.5% inward gene flow per generation from the general European population. 2% would have been too much, though. 选择压力的作用则可强大得多,需要更多的基因流入才能抵消｡即使目前经历了每代0.5%的来自欧洲人口的外来基因流入,你仍可以在阿什肯納茲犹太人中观察到针对智商的让人印象深刻的选择压力｡不过,也许2%的外来基因流入会抵消选择压力的效果｡ A long period of genetic isolation does not automatically generate differences in any particular trait: but it does show that there has been an extended opportunity for selection to operate effectively and generate population differences. 长期的遗传隔离不能自动产生任何特有性状上的不同:但是它的确显示了选择压力更起作用,并导致种群差异｡ So when we see differences, how old are they? and how can we tell? Plausible selection pressures could generates one-std trait differences in as little as a thousand years, and in some cases, like the Ashkenazim, it likely has. In other cases it may have operated over tens of thousands of years, even as much as quarter of a million years (Bushmen/Pygmies versus other humans). 所以,当我们看到差异时,如何得知这些差异发生多久了?某些情况下,在短短一千年里,合理的选择压力可以产生一个标准差的性状差异,阿什肯納茲犹太人很可能就是这样｡其他情况下可能要花上几万年甚至长达二三十万年(比如布须曼人/俾格米人相对于其他人类的差异)｡ If the trait in question is characteristic of a geographically extended population, you might suspect that selection had operated over a long time. But since we now know that there have been many population expansions and replacements, you might be wrong. Ancient DNA may be a better guide. 如果讨论的性状属于一个在地理上广泛分布的人群,你一定会怀疑自然选择已经作用了很长时间｡但是既然我们现在知道很多人口扩张和替代现象,你的猜测可能是错的｡古代DNA可能是更好的线索｡ So sometimes the explanation for the differences between two populations may go back deep into the Ice Age, but it might also have happened since the birth of agriculture, or even since the fall of Rome. 所以有时解释两个种群间的差异,可能要回溯到冰河时代,但它也可能发生在农业起源之后,甚至是罗马灭亡之后｡ Suppose you have a one-std difference in some trait between two populations? What can we say about the genetic architecture? Well, sometime it boils down to the presence or absence of a single allele. Other times it is caused by a shift in the frequencies of a number of alleles that each have a small effect on the trait. 假如在两个种群间,一些性状存在一个标准差的差距,在遗传构成方面,我们有何结论?有时,这归结于某个等位基因的存在或缺失｡也有时,这是因为多个等位基因的频率漂变,每个(对)等位基因对性状均有一些影响｡ African-Americans average about 1-std lower in white count. That’s all due to the Duffy allele. All else equal, northern Europeans are a couple of centimeters taller than southern Europeans: that is caused by frequency differences in hundreds of alleles affecting height, a shift that on the whole has increased the frequency of plus variants. 非裔美国人平均比美国白人矮一个标准差｡这完全归因于Duffy等位基因｡其他条件相同时,北欧人比南欧人高一两厘米:这是因为数百个影响身高的等位基因的频率差异,某个漂变作用于这些等位基因上,增加了正向变异的频数｡ So what to say to someone that asks about the ‘race gene’? First, you tell her that she’s an idiot. The complex of shovel-shaped incisors, thick hair, small breasts, more eccrine sweat glands, and a different shape to the hangy-down part of the ear, fixed in northeast Asia, is indeed caused by a single allele, an EDAR variant that is essentially nonexistent in Europe or Africa. On the other hand, Pygmy height, or the lack of it, is influenced by a number of alleles. 所以如果有人问道“人种基因”的问题,该怎么回答呢?首先,你告诉她她是个白痴｡铲形门齿,浓密头发,小乳房,小汗腺发达,以及耳垂的不同形状,这些集中于东北亚人种的组合性状,实际上是由同一个等位基因带来的,一个不存在于欧非人种中的EDAR变异｡另一方面,俾格米人的身高,或者说身高很低,则反映了大量等位基因的影响｡ But the genetic architecture isn’t all that important: it’s the differences that matter. Pygmies are really short – that’s what matters. 但是遗传结构并不一定都那么重要:重要的是性状差异｡比如俾格米人真的很矮,这才是要紧的｡ Along those lines, Lewontin and other bullshit artists have tried to argue that genetic statistics are such that human groups can’t really be different. Most genetic variation in humans is within-group, rather than between-group: so fucking what? the same is true for dogs: am I supposed to think that pit bulls and Chihuahuas and border collies are ‘really the same’? 类似的,列万廷或者其他喷子一直试图争辩,遗传统计学反映了人类族群并非真的不同｡人类的大多数遗传学变异出现在族群内,而非族群之间:那又如何?对狗来说也一样啊:难道我就应该认为斗牛犬和吉娃娃和边境牧羊犬“真的是一样的”吗? Having more plus variants in the alleles that affect a particular quantitative trait doesn’t show up in these genetic statistics (like Fst) at all. Neither would a big frequency difference in a single allele that had a big effect, like EDAR. 这些遗传统计学差异(例如Fst,【译注:费雪统计量,衡量种群间基因差异程度】)完全不能反映影响了特定性状的数据对应的等位基因含有更多正向变异｡也不能反映某一有显著影响的单个等位基因在频数上的巨大差异,例如EDAR｡ People are mostly about as different as they seem to be. There are exceptions, cases where an environmental insult makes a fair amount of difference. This is particularly the case with height, where nutritional status can easily create a 1-std difference. But height is influenced by genetics, too, and the shortest people (the Pygmies) are short for genetic reasons, not because they’re starving. 一般来说,人群间的差异看上去有多大,他们的基因差异就有多大｡环境冲击是一个例外,它也可以导致相当多的差异｡尤其是身高,营养环境可以造成一个标准差的差异｡但基因也可以影响身高｡最矮的人群(俾格米人)长得矮就是因为基因而非饥饿｡ What about the magic immunity of the brain to natural selection? That’s nonsense, of course. We know, for sure, that different goklus have different distributions of personality traits – because they act significantly differently with 24 hours of birth. All the psychometric results indicate that goklus vary in intelligence too [perhaps 3 stds from highest to lowest] probably largely because of differences in the frequency of many alleles with small effects. 关于自然选择,难道大脑就能神奇的免于其影响吗?这当然是胡扯｡我们确定知道,不同种族在人格特质上有不同的分布——出生24小时之后,人们的行为就明显不同｡所有智商测试结果都表明不同种族在智商上也有差异(最低水平与最高水平间约有三个标准差),这可能归因于众多影响智商的等位基因在频率上的差别｡ （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Strangled by Roots 根之牵绊 作者：Steven Pinker @ 2007-8-6 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：New Republic，http://www.newrepublic.com/article/77729/strangled-roots The genealogy craze in America. 美国的家谱热。 New technologies often have unforeseeable consequences. Michael Faraday could not have anticipated the rise of the electric guitar and its effects on our culture, nor did the inventors of the laser realize they had laid the ground for a thriving industry of tattoo removal. And it is safe to say that Watson and Crick could not have foreseen a day when an analysis of Oprah Winfrey's DNA would tell her that she was descended from the Kpelle people of the Liberian rainforest. "I feel empowered by this," she said upon hearing the news, overcoming her disappointment that her ancestors were not Zulu warriors. 新科技通常会带来一些意料之外的后果。迈克尔·法拉第不可能会预料到电吉他的兴起及其对我们文化的影响，激光的发明者也不会想到他们会为纹身消除业的繁荣打下基础。可以肯定地说，沃森和克里克【译注：DNA双螺旋结构的发现者。】不可能预见到会有这么一天：对奥普拉·温弗里【译注：美国脱口秀女王。】做个DNA分析，就能告诉她，她是利比里亚热带雨林中的Kpelle人的后代。“我感觉因此而充满力量”，听到这个消息后，她如是说，克服了此前因祖先不是祖鲁战士而产生的失望感。 A fascination with ancestry has long been part of the human condition, from the "begat's" of the Bible to the Roots miniseries and the restoration of Ellis Island. But with the advent of the Internet and genomic technology, genealogy has entered a new age. The past year has served up a series of high-profile revelations. 对家世的痴迷长久以来就是人类状态的一部分，从《圣经》中的“某某生某某”到电视连续剧《根》，再到埃利斯岛的重建【译注：埃利斯岛为纽约一小岛，曾长期用作移民检查站】，皆是其表现。但随着互联网和基因组技术的到来，家系学已经迈入了新的时代。去年就涌现了一系列热度很高的现象。 The news that Barack Obama's ancestors owned slaves was a bit more surprising than the news that Strom Thurmond's did, but it was more surprising still to be told that among the Thurmond family's slaves were the ancestors of Al Sharpton. 比起Strom Thurmond【译注：前美国参议员，支持种族隔离政策】的祖先曾经蓄奴这一消息来说，巴拉克·奥巴马的祖先也曾蓄奴更令人惊讶，但尤为令人惊讶的是，我们得知，Thurmond家族的奴隶中包括有Al Sharpton的祖先。 And Henry Louis Gates Jr., the host of the fascinating PBS series African American Lives, which explored the family trees of six prominent African Americans, was astounded to learn that half of his own ancestry was European, including Irish kinsmen on his father's side and two Jewish women on his mother's. PBS有个非常好看的系列栏目《非裔美国人的生活》，曾探寻过六位杰出非裔美国人的家族树，其主持人Henry Louis Gates Jr.惊讶地发现，他的祖先中有一半是欧洲人，父系这边有爱尔兰亲戚，而母系那边则有两位犹太女性。 Few of us can expect that a search for ancestors will bring us an inheritance, a title, or a coat of arms: the rewards of genealogy are mostly psychological. As Winfrey put it, "Knowing your family history is knowing your worth." The sentiment, though, is dubious--not just on moral grounds but on biological ones. 极少有人会期待通过追寻祖先而获得一份遗产、一个头衔或者一枚盾徽。家谱学的回报主要在于心理方面。正如Winfrey所说的那样，“认识自己的家族史就是认识自己的价值。”然而，这种心理感情很难站住脚——不仅仅从道德层面看是如此，从生物层面看也是如此。 A closer look at the human drive to know one's family tree uncovers a number of tensions between our intuitions of kinship and the facts of kinship. Some of those facts show that the findings of the new genealogy should not have been surprising at all. And others, tacitly appreciated for millennia, have recently been neglected to our peril. 更加仔细地分析一下人类认识自己家族树的冲动，我们就能得知，在我们对于亲缘关系的直觉与事实上的亲缘关系之间存在诸多张力。其中部分事实表明，新家谱学的发现根本不应当令人感到惊奇。而历经千年被人心照不宣地领会的另一些事实，其最近遭遇的忽视则会陷我们于危险之中。 For all its fascination, kinship is a surprisingly neglected topic in the behavioral sciences. A Martian reading a textbook in psychology would get no inkling that human beings treated their relatives any differently from strangers. Many social scientists have gone so far as to claim that kinship is a social construction with no connection to biology. 尽管人们对它痴迷如狂，但令人惊讶的是，亲缘关系在行为科学中一直是个不受关注的题目。如果有个火星人来读读我们的心理学教科书，关于人类对待自己的亲属与对待陌生人会有何不同，他完全不会得到任何线索。许多社会科学家走得如此之远，乃至宣称亲缘关系是一种社会建构，与生物学没有任何关系。 But assuming the creationists are wrong and humans are products of evolution, it would be surprising if our species entirely escaped the powerful forces that shape organisms' behavior toward their kin. Genetics and evolutionary theory predict that the biology of kinship should have biased our thoughts and emotions about relatives in several ways. 但是，假设创世主义者是错的，人类是进化的产物，那么，要说我们这个物种彻底逃脱了那一塑造了有机体对待自己亲属的行为的强大力量，那会很让人意外的。遗传学和进化理论预言，亲缘关系的生物学应当会通过多种方式使得我们对亲属的想法和情感发生偏移。 The first is the simple fact that blood relatives are likely to share genes. To the extent that minds are shaped by genomes, relatives are likely to be of like minds. Close relatives, whether raised together or apart, have been found to be correlated in intelligence, personality, tastes, and vices. The discovery of an ancestor is thus felt to reflect on the descendant, who may feel he has an explanation for the kind of person he is, and who can claim to have a dose of the ancestor's praiseworthy traits. 首先就有一个简单的事实：血亲之间很可能共享基因。就心智由基因组塑造而言，亲属有可能具有相似的心智。我们已经发现，近亲属，无论是一起还是分开成长，会在智力、个性、品味和缺点方面相互关联。因此对祖先的观察，似乎就会反映在其后裔身上，其子孙可能会觉得他找到了他成为某种类型人物的理由，并且也可声称自己具有其祖先身上部分值得赞扬的特征。 A promotional spot for Coca-Cola in African American Lives juxtaposes footage of African Americans with images of traditional Africans and says, "She has her great-great-great-grandmother's eye for adornment. He is fit and agile, like his forefathers." 《非裔美国人的生活》插播过一个可口可乐的促销广告，里面把非裔美国人的镜头和传统非洲人的画面放在一块，说“她和她的曾曾曾祖母对装扮的品味一致。他健壮灵敏，跟他的祖先一样。” The similarities among blood relatives mean that they are likely to share values, and shared values can lead to easy solidarity because of what ecologists call mutualism and economists call positive externalities. A pair of associates with the same interests can benefit each other just by being selfish--always the most painless route to altruism. If two roommates have similar tastes in music, each will benefit the other every time she brings home a new CD, and each has a reason to value the other's well-being. To identify a blood relative, then, is to identify a potential soul mate. Adoptees who track down their biological parents and siblings often report an instant solidarity as they quickly discover shared quirks and passions. 血亲之间的相似性意味着他们有可能共享价值观，而共享价值观使得相互团结更为容易，原因则在于生态学家所说的“互惠共生”和经济学家所称的“正外部性”。一对伙伴，如果利益相同，那么只需做到行为自利就能有益于彼此——而这总是实现利他的最不费力的办法。如果两位室友音乐品味相同，那么任何时候其中任何一位带回一张新CD，都会使另外一位受益，并且每个人都有理由珍视另外一个人的福祉。因此，确定血亲就是确定一位潜在的灵魂伴侣。被收养的人在搜寻到自己的生父生母和兄弟姐妹后，通常会提到一种立即出现的休戚与共之感，因为他们很快就会发觉彼此的癖好和喜爱相似。 A more direct tug of shared genes on family emotions comes from the phenomenon that biologists call inclusive fitness, kin selection, and nepotistic altruism. The overlap of genes among relatives does more than make them similar; it alters the dynamics of natural selection. Over evolutionary time, any gene that predisposed a person to be nice to a relative would have had some chance of helping out a copy of itself inside that relative, and the gene would have been favored by natural selection and entrenched in the genome (as long as the average benefit to the relative, discounted by the probability that the gene is shared, exceeds the average cost to the favor-doer). 共享基因对家族情感的更直接作用来自生物学家所称的“内含适应性”、“亲缘选择”和“亲缘利他”现象。亲属之间基因的重叠不仅仅使得他们相似，而且改变了自然选择的动力机制。在进化过程中，任何基因，如果它会使得一个人倾向于善待亲属，它就有可能帮助到那个亲属身上该基因的复制品，于是这个基因就会受到自然选择的偏爱，使自己在基因组中盘踞下来（只要该亲属的平均得益乘以两人共享该基因的概率后仍高于施以援手者的平均成本）。 A sharing of genes at the genetic level sets the evolutionary stage for feelings of solidarity and affection at the emotional level, and that in turn shapes much of human life. In traditional societies, genetic relatives are more likely to live together, work together, protect each other, and adopt each other's orphaned children, and are less likely to attack, feud with, and kill each other. Even in modern societies, which tend to weaken ties of kinship, studies have shown that the more closely two people are genetically related, the more inclined they are to come to each other's aid, especially in life-or-death situations. 遗传层面上共享基因，为情感层面上的团结感和偏爱感设定了进化平台，而这些情感现象又进一步塑造了人类生活的很大一部分。在传统社会中，血亲更有可能生活、工作在一起，保护彼此，收养彼此的孤儿，相互之间发生攻击、仇争、杀害的可能性更小。即便是在倾向于削弱亲缘关系的现代社会，也有研究表明，两个人在遗传上的关系更为接近，他们就更有可能帮助彼此，特别是在生死存亡之际。 Solidarity between pairs of relatives is further amplified by the fact that they have other relatives in common. My brother and I are close not just because each of us has copies of genes in the other, but because we share a mother, a father, a sister, and nieces and nephews, so our genetic interests are yoked together. 一对亲属之间的团结还会进一步被他们共同拥有其他亲戚这一事实放大。我和我哥哥亲近，这不仅仅是因为我们身上具有彼此部分基因的复制品，而且因为我们共同拥有一个母亲、一个父亲、一个妹妹，还有其他侄子侄女，所以我们的遗传利益是套在一起的。 This triangular altruism also explains why non-blood relatives can feel various degrees of affinity--most dramatically in the case of a husband and wife, whose long-term genetic interests are fused in their children, and to a lesser extent in the case of stepsiblings and in-laws, as long as they are not in zero-sum competition for the common relative's affections or resources. 这种三角利他也能解释为何非血亲也能感受到不同程度的亲和——特别突出表现在夫妻关系这一例子中，其长期遗传利益融于他们的子女身上，相对不那么明显的例子则是继亲和姻亲，只要他们并非处于一种争夺共有亲戚的喜爱或资源的零和竞争之中。 But now comes a crucial bit of arithmetic. In sexually reproducing species, every organism has two parents, and every organism makes up half the parentage of each of its offspring. The result is that as people are separated by more generations, they are related to an exponentially greater number of people, and their genetic relatedness to any of them plummets, also exponentially. 但现在要来点关键性的算术了。在有性繁殖生物中，每一个有机体都有一对父母，且每一个有机体都构成其任一后代之父母中的一半。结果就是，人们之间的代际隔离越远，他们之间存在亲属关系的人口数量以指数方式增加，而与其中任何一个的遗传相关性也以指数方式减少。 Going upward, you have two parents, with whom you share half your genes apiece; four grandparents, with whom you share one-quarter; eight great-grandparents; sixteen great-great-grandparents; and so on. Going downward, if you and your descendants have two children apiece, then you'll have four grandchildren, eight great-grandchildren, and so on. And going sideways, you share half your genes with your sibling, one-eighth with each of your first cousins, one-thirty-second with each of your second cousins, and so on. 向上，你有一对父母，你与之各自分享一半基因；4个祖父母，你与之分享1/4；8个曾祖父母；16个曾曾祖父母；如此等等。向下，如果你和你的后代各自都生两个小孩，你就会有4个孙儿女，8个曾孙儿女，如此等等。向两边，你和你的兄弟姐妹分享一半基因，与每个第一代堂表亲分享1/8基因，与每个第二代堂表亲分享1/32，如此等等。 Exponential functions quickly explode to unimaginable magnitudes or peter out to infinitesimal ones, and the inability of our intuition to keep track of them leads to many paradoxes of kinship. In an old Smothers Brothers routine, Tommy explained why the population explosion is a myth. We have two parents, he noted, and four grandparents, eight great-grandparents, sixteen great-great-grandparents, and so on. The further back you go, the more ancestors you have. So, he concluded, "The population isn't growing--it's tapering off!" 指数函数很快就会使量级得到不可想象的爆发，或者使之快速减少为无限之小，我们的直觉将无力掌握，而这会引发关于亲缘关系的许多悖论。在“斯马瑟兄弟”的一个保留老节目中，Tommy解释了为啥人口爆炸只是一个神话。他说，我们有一对父母，4个祖父母，8个曾祖父母，16个曾曾祖父母，如此等等。越往回数，你的祖先就越多。所以，他的结论是，“人口并没有增加，而是在逐渐减少！” Like many of their jokes, this one depends on a subtle truth. If you assume twenty-five years per generation, you can calculate that you had around three billion ancestors at the time of the signing of the Magna Carta, one hundred billion during the Norman invasion, two quintillion at the fall of the Roman Empire, and around 1,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 at the birth of Jesus. Needless to say, the Earth did not contain a fraction of that many people in those eras. 跟他们讲的许多笑话一样，这个笑话底下也有一个微妙的真理。如果假定25年为一代，你就能算出，在《大宪章》签署的时候，你的祖先大概有30亿个，在诺曼征服的时候大概有1000亿，而在罗马帝国灭亡时大概有2万亿，而在耶稣诞生时有大概有1,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000个。不用说，在那些年代，地球人口还达不到这些数量中的一小部分。 The paradox is resolved by the realization that our ancestors must have married their cousins of various distances and removes, so that vast numbers of the slots in one's family tree are filled by the same individuals. Imagine, in an extreme case, that your parents were first cousins. Then two of your great-grandparents on your mother's side would also be your great-grandparents on your father's side--you would have six great-grandparents instead of eight. 解决这一悖论，需要我们认识到，我们的祖先必定与其各类远房表亲结了婚，使得某人的家庭树上的许多空位是由同一人占据的。想象一个极端的例子，假定你的父母是第一代堂表亲。那么你在你母亲那边的两位曾祖同时也会是你在你父亲这边的曾祖——你的曾祖将是6个而非8个。 Genealogists call this "pedigree collapse": the necessity that as you trace your family tree backward, it will fan out for a number of generations until it begins to encompass most of the people in the available population, whereupon it falls back on itself, coinciding with the original growth of that population. The rate of collapse depends on the size of the pool of potential mates and the average rate and closeness of cousin marriages. 家谱学家称之为“谱系崩塌”，即存在一种必然：随着你向前追溯家庭树，它在数代人之间将呈扇形展开，直到它开始包括整个可及群体的绝大部分，这时它就不再展开，只与那一群体的增长保持一致。崩塌的速度取决于潜在配偶的可用规模以及堂表亲结婚的平均比例和亲缘度。 But the fact that our ancestors never covered the surface of the Earth ten deep shows that medium-distant-cousin marriages must have been the rule rather than the exception over most of human history. This chronic incest, by the way, did not turn our ancestors into the cast of Deliverance. The degree of relatedness, and hence the risk that a harmful recessive gene will meet a copy of itself in a child, falls off a cliff as you move from siblings to first cousins to more distant cousins. 但我们的祖先从未将整个地球表面满满铺上十层这一事实表明，中等亲缘度的堂表亲间婚姻必定曾是人类历史绝大部分时期中的常态而非例外。顺便要说，这种惯常性乱伦并未将我们的祖先变成电影《生死狂澜》中的角色【译注：电影中的四个角色在广袤平和的大自然面前将人性中最丑陋的一面赤裸裸地暴露了出来】。随着通婚对象从兄弟姐妹到第一代堂表亲到更远距离的堂表亲，亲缘程度急剧下降，从而有害的隐形基因能在孩子身上碰到其复制品的风险也随之下降。 The same arithmetic that makes an individual's pedigree collapse onto itself also makes everyone's pedigree collapse into everyone else's. We are all related--not just in the obvious sense that we are all descended from the same population of the first humans, but also because everyone's ancestors mated with everyone else's at many points since that dawn of humanity. There aren't enough ancestors to go around for everyone to have a family tree of his or her own. 使得某个人的谱系崩塌的算术，同样也会使得其他每个人的谱系崩塌到别人的谱系上。我们都是亲戚——这不仅仅是因为，在很显白的意义上，我们都源自于同一初民种群，而且是因为，自人类出现以来的许多不同时点上，每个人的祖先都曾与另一个人的祖先结成配偶。世上就不存在那么多祖先，不足以让每个人都拥有只属于他/她自己的家族树。 So it is a mathematical necessity, not a surprise, that genealogy will turn up strange bedfellows. George W. Bush is a distant cousin of his electoral opponents Al Gore and John Kerry (as well as of Richard Nixon, Ernest Hemingway, Queen Elizabeth, and, through her, every European monarch). Gore, for his part, is a descendant of Charlemagne, and Kerry is a descendant of Mary, Queen of Scots--and presumably also (thanks to his recently-discovered-to-be-Jewish paternal grandfather) of rabbis, cantors, and medieval moneylenders. 所以家谱学会发现许多令人奇怪的关系，这是一种数学必然，而非意外。乔治·W·布什是其竞选对手阿尔·戈尔和约翰·克里（此外还有理查德·尼克松、欧内斯特·海明威、伊丽莎白女王，以及通过女王延伸到每一位欧洲君主）的远房堂表亲。而戈尔自己，则是查理曼大帝的后代，克里则是苏格兰玛丽女王的后代——同时可能还是犹太拉比、唱诗班领唱人和中世纪放债人的后代（因为我们新近发现他的祖先是犹太人）。 This brings up another corollary of the mathematics of kinship: a single mating between people from two ethnic groups results in all their descendants being related to both groups in perpetuity. So even occasional couplings across racial and ethnic lines can entangle family trees, explaining why humans, that peripatetic and sexually omnivorous species, are genetically fairly homogeneous, despite our worldwide distribution. 这就引出了亲缘关系数学的一个必然推论：两个种族群体之间的某一次联姻，就会导致他们的所有后代都永远与两个群体均有亲戚关系。所以，即使跨人种和跨种族边界的配对只是偶然出现，也能将各自的家族树缠到一块，从而能够解释，为什么人类这种四处迁徙、性开放的物种尽管遍布全球，但在基因上则大体上是同质的。 The genealogical ties connecting American presidents and European royalty are not a sign of some vast transatlantic ruling caste. Every noteworthy person is related to other noteworthy people (together, of course, with countless not-so-noteworthy people). One genealogist with too much time on his hands showed that the late Senator Alan Cranston was related to Emily Dickinson, George Plimpton, Margaret Mead, the actress Julie Harris, the Dow family of chemical fame, and Queen Geraldine of Albania. 美国总统与欧洲皇室之间的家谱关系并不表明存在某种庞大的跨大西洋统治阶级。每个名人都跟其他名人有亲戚关系（当然，也都跟无数的非名人有亲戚关系）。某位时间特别充裕的家谱学家曾表明，已故参议员Alan Cranston跟艾米丽·迪金森、George Plimpton、玛格丽特·米德、女演员Julie Harris、化学领域极富盛名的陶氏家族、阿尔巴尼亚的Geraldine王后都有亲戚关系。 Another discovered that Tom Hanks, the star of The Da Vinci Code, has blood ties with many of the historical figures mentioned in the film, including William the Conqueror, Shakespeare, and Henry VIII. Also recently revealed is the fact that Paris Hilton is related to fellow celebrity jailbirds Zsa Zsa Gabor and G. Gordon Liddy. Finding kinship ties among famous people is shooting ducks in a barrel. 另一个则发现，电影《达芬奇密码》的主演汤姆·汉克斯跟影片中提及的许多历史人物都有血缘联系，包括征服者威廉、莎士比亚、亨利八世等。另外，最近有人发现了另一个事实，帕里斯·希尔顿跟另外两位明星囚犯Zsa Zsa Gabor和G. Gordon Liddy有亲戚关系。在名人之间寻找亲缘关系就像是在橡木桶里面射鸭子一样容易。 And before you brag about the talent or courage you share with some illustrious kinsman, remember that the exponential mathematics of relatedness successively halves the number of genes shared by relatives with every link separating them. You share only 3 percent of your genes with your second cousin, and the same proportion with your great-great-great-grandmother. 在夸耀自己分享有某个著名族人的天赋或勇气之前，你最好能记住，亲戚之间每隔开一层关系，亲缘关系数学上的指数关系就会将他们的共有基因数量减半一次。你与你的第二堂表亲只共享3%的基因，跟你的曾曾曾祖母也是如此。 It is important to remember that psychological traits are nowhere near completely heritable in the first place, so the chances that you got your eye for adornment from that ancestor in the gorgeous dashiki are rather small. Do not expect genetically inspired largesse from the rich relative uncovered by your genealogy service, either. A gift from a second cousin would have to result in a thirty-two-fold increase in the number of your surviving descendants compared to his for a desire to bestow it upon you to have evolved. 记住这一条很重要：首先，心理特征是很难完全继承的，因此你得到你那穿着黑人花褂子的祖先所拥有的那种对于装扮的眼光，这样的几率相当小。也不要奢望通过家谱搜寻服务找到的那些富裕亲戚会因为受遗传关系激励而对你慷慨解囊。要使你的一位隔代表亲产生出馈赠于你的欲望，那将要求，送与你的礼物会让你增加的存活后代数目32倍于同一礼物用在他自己身上的效果。 The relentless decimation of resources (both genetic and financial) across generations is the rationale behind the feudal practice of primogeniture, in which all the family estate was bequeathed to the eldest son. And it is why in modern times family fortunes can dissipate so quickly--"three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves," as Nicholas Murray Butler put it. 资源（无论是遗传的还是财务的）在代际之间的持续分解正是长子继承制这种封建做法的背后道理所在，通过长子继承制，家族的财产被遗留给最年长的儿子。这也是为何现代家庭的财产会消散得如此之快——正如Nicholas Murray Butler所说，“富不过三代”。 The geometric decay of relatedness also takes some of the fun out of two of the main tools used by genetic-ancestry services: the analysis of mitochondrial DNA (which is passed from mother to daughter) and of Y-chromosomes (which are passed from father to son). Since they trace ancestry only through the all-female or all-male branch of your family tree, they can identify only one tendril, which diminishes exponentially the further back you go. 亲缘关系的几何衰减也会使得基因血统搜寻服务主要采用的两大工具——即线粒体DNA（从母亲传递给女儿）分析和Y染色体（从父亲传递给儿子）分析——不再那么好玩。因为这两种工具在你的家族树上搜寻血统时，要么是沿纯母系进行，要么是沿纯父系进行，因此它们找到的只是其中一脉，且会随着往回追溯以指数方式削减。 Winfrey's mitochondrial DNA does not show that she is a Kpelle, but rather that she is one-sixty-fourth (or perhaps even 1/128th or 1/256th) Kpelle. Many African Americans who seek their paternal ancestor, and therefore a sense of their African roots, via Y-chromosome analysis discover to their dismay that this root lies in Germany or Scotland. Winfrey的线粒体DNA并没能说明她是Kpelle人，而只能说明她是1/64（或者甚至可能是1/128或1/256）个Kpelle人。许多非裔美国人通过Y染色体分析来寻找他们的父系祖先，从而想获得一种寻根非洲的感觉，但却失望地发现这一根脉位于德国或苏格兰。 If family ties are so biologically tenuous, why does kinship loom so large in the human psyche? One reason is that our intuitions about kinship evolved when we lived in villages and bands whose small size and limited mobility ensured that most marriages were between closer cousins, and hence the genetic overlap between relatives was close enough to be biologically significant. Today we project these feelings of affinity onto relatives who are far more distant--indeed, arbitrarily distant, thanks to the wonders of Internet and DNA genealogy. 如果家族纽带在生物学上如此单薄，为什么亲缘关系会如此巍然地耸立于人类心灵之中？一个原因在于，我们对于亲缘关系的直觉已在村庄和游团生活阶段得以进化，那种群体规模很小且流动性受限，使得多数婚姻都发生于较亲近的表亲之间，从而使得亲戚之间的基因重叠足够稠密，因而在生物学上很显著。今天，我们将这类亲密感投射到与我们血缘距离远得多的亲戚身上——实际上，由于神奇的互联网和DNA家系分析，这种距离可以无限远。 But the other reason is that our sense of kinship is triggered not by relatedness itself, but by the perception of relatedness. After all, when we encounter a possible relative, we generally do not demand a cheek swab and analyze its DNA. Instead we rely on cues that in the evolutionary past tended to correlate with relatedness. 但另一个原因在于，我们的亲缘感并不由亲缘关系本身引发，而是由对亲缘关系的感知引发。别忘了，如果我们碰到一个可能的亲戚，我们通常并不会要求做一个口腔拭子采集【编注：即用棉签刮擦口腔内膜，这是采集个人DNA样本的常用简易方法】并分析其DNA。相反，我们依赖的是在过去的进化过程中指向亲缘关系的线索。 Recent experiments by Debra Lieberman, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides have shown that two kinds of life experience are crucial in triggering family feelings toward siblings (such as doing them favors and being willing to donate a kidney to them). One consists of observing the sibling being cared for by one's mother when it was an infant. The other is having grown up in the same household as the sibling. Debra Lieberman, John Tooby和Leda Cosmides最近所做的实验已经表明，在引发对于兄弟姐妹的家庭感情方面（比如给他们帮忙或者愿意捐赠一个肾给他们之类），有两类生活经历非常关键。一是观察到兄弟姐妹在婴儿时期被自己的母亲照顾。二是与该兄弟姐妹共同成长于同一个家庭。 That is why children adopted at birth can be emotionally close to their parents and siblings despite the lack of genetic overlap: the early close association sets off everyone's kinship detectors, a kind of benign illusion. And because these experiences also trigger repugnance at the thought of having sex with the relative, incest avoidance is not perfectly correlated with biological relatedness. 这就是为何出生时即被收养的儿童，尽管在基因上不存在重叠，但仍能与其父母及兄弟姐妹情感上很亲近的原因所在：早期的亲密关系触发了人们的亲缘关系探测器，这是一种良性的幻觉。并且由于这种经历也同样会引发对于与亲戚发生性关系的念头的恶心感，因此乱伦回避并不与生物亲缘关系完全对应。 Unrelated children who are brought up together (like nursery-mates in kibbutzim) tend to shun each other as sexual partners in adulthood, as if they were siblings. And children who meet a parent or sibling for the first time in adulthood can find him or her sexually attractive, as the novelist Kathryn Harrison recounted in The Kiss, her memoir of a four-year affair with her father. 没有亲缘关系的儿童，如果一起长大（如以色列集体农场中的托儿所同伴），长大后在选择性伴侣时也倾向于避开彼此，好像他们就是兄弟姐妹一样。而假如孩子们长大后才第一次看到父母或兄弟姐妹时，也可能觉得他或她具有性吸引力，这一点小说作家Kathryn Harrison在《罪之吻》这本关于她与其父4年私通经历的回忆录中有所叙述。 When it comes to individual people, then, kinship is in the mind of the beholder. That creates an opening through which manipulators can flood people's kinship sense with cues that mimic the signals of biological relatedness. This kind of mind control is a strong temptation to anyone who wants to foster cohesion among people who are not closely related. 论到个体，那么亲缘关系便取决于观察者的心思。这就为操控者使用模拟生物性亲属信号的线索来淹没冲击人们的亲属感提供了机会。这类精神控制，对于任何想要在并非近缘亲戚的人们之间塑造团结的人来说，是种巨大的诱惑。 Contrary to a shibboleth of the American right, family values do not uphold religion and country; they subvert them. An extended family is a rival coalition to any other group, held together not by an ideology or social contract or common purpose but by brute genetic relatedness. And it is a coalition with an unfair advantage: relatives care for one another more than comrades do. 与美国右派的某一陈腐观念相左，家庭价值观并不支撑宗教和国家；相反，它们起的是破坏作用。一个大家庭，通过直接的遗传相关性而非意识形态或社会契约或共同目标联合在一起，作为一种联合体，就是任何其他团体的竞争者。并且这种联合体具有一种难以平衡的优势：亲戚比同志更加关心彼此。 Religions and political movements thus have to undermine family loyalties. Marxist collectivization and Moonie programming are obvious recent examples, but millennia before them Jesus momentously declared, "A man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me." 因此，宗教和政治运动必须破坏家庭忠诚。马克思主义的集体化和文鲜明统一教的计划都是近期的显例，但数千年前耶稣就郑重宣布过：“人的仇敌，就是自己家里的人。爱父母过于爱我的，不配作我的门徒；爱儿女过于爱我的，不配作我的门徒。” Successful coalitions often try to co-opt family feelings by tricking the brain into perceiving the coalition as kin. Though the most potent technique--forcing people to grow up in a single household--is impractical, other kinds of kinship illusion have repeatedly been invented. 成功的联合体通常会尝试吸纳家庭感，方法是哄骗大脑将这种联合体认知为家族。尽管最为有效的技术——即强迫人们在单一家庭中长大——不具备可操作性，但其他许多种类的家族幻觉已被反复发明。 The anthropologist Alan Fiske notes that communal meals are one of the most common bonding rituals the world over, partly because they simulate family experiences, partly because people believe that you are what you eat, and so if you eat the same stuff you are the same stuff. 人类学家Alan Fiske提到，共餐是世界范围内最为常见的团结仪式之一，部分是因为它们能够模拟家庭经历，部分是因为人们相信“你是你所食”，所以如果你们吃的是同样的东西，那么你们就是同样的东西。 Many tribes and coalitions (such as the Mafia) cut their fingers and rub them together to allow their blood to mingle, hence the expression "blood brothers." People also disfigure their bodies--by scarring, tattooing, piercing, hairstyling, and circumcision and other forms of genital mutilation--as if to make the group look like a separate race or species, biologically distinct from other human groups. 许多部落和联合体（如黑手党）的成员会切破手指、相互摩擦以使血液混合，从而产生“歃血兄弟”这种表述。人们也会损毁自己的身体——如制造伤疤、纹身、穿刺、装扮发型、割包皮及以其他形式损毁生殖器，似乎以此来使得该群体看似一个单独的种族或物种，与其他人群具有生物学上的差别。 Language provides another way to co-opt the warm and fuzzy feelings people have toward their relatives. One common trick is the use of kinship metaphors: brethren, brotherhood, fraternity, sisterhood, sorority, the fatherland, the mother country, the family of man, and so on. 对于人们对其亲戚所具有的这种温暖而朦胧的感情，语言提供了另一种吸纳方式。常见的一种花招是使用亲戚暗喻：同胞、手足、兄弟会、姐妹感情、姐妹会、祖国、母国、人类大家庭等等。 These tactics are provably effective: experiments have shown that people are more convinced by a political speech if the speaker engages them with the language of kinship. Myths and ideologies are also commonly put to use. People are told that they are descended from a patriarch or a primeval couple, or that they are connected to a natal land, or that they came into being in the same act of creation, or that they are related to the same totemic animal. 这些策略经证明是有效的：实验已经表明，如果政治演说的演讲者用亲缘关系的语言来吸引听众，人们就会更为信服。神话和意识形态也经常被采用。人们被告知，他们都源自同一个族长或同一对原始夫妻，或者他们都与同一个出生地相联系，或者他们之存在是源于同一个创世行为，或者他们与同一个图腾动物相关。 In large part, the institutions of modernity depend on a dissolution of family ties. It is hard to run an effective organization if you cannot fire the knucklehead brother-in-law forced on you by your wife's family, nor can civil society function if the instruments of government are treated as the spoils of the most powerful local clan. 很大程度上，现代性的制度依赖于家庭纽带的瓦解。如果你没法开除由你老婆的娘家塞给你的笨蛋小舅子，那你就没法有效运营一个组织，或者，如果政府的诸多手段都被视为某个地方强势氏族的战利品，那么政治社会就没法运转。 Public safety is more effectively guaranteed by a disinterested police and court system than by a threat that your male relatives will avenge your murder, and national defense above all depends on the willingness of citizens to neglect the bonds of kinship. 比起血仇威胁（即你的男性亲戚会报复杀害你的凶手）来，一个无私的警察和法院体制能更为有效地保证公共安全，而国防则尤其依赖于公民们忽略亲缘关系纽带的意愿。 In The Godfather: Part II, Sonny Corleone upbraids Michael for his sympathy with the men who enlisted after Pearl Harbor: "They're saps because they risk their lives for strangers. Your country ain't your blood. Remember that." 在《教父2》中，麦克同情珍珠港事件爆发后从军的某人，杉尼·科里昂因而对其加以斥责。“他们都是蠢货，因为他们用自己的生命去冒险，为的却是些陌生人。你的国家不是你的血。记住这个。” In the struggle between society and family, the exponential mathematics of kinship ordinarily works to the advantage of society. As time passes or groups get larger, family trees intertwine, dynasties dissipate, and nepotistic emotions get diluted. 在社会与家庭的厮打中，亲缘关系的指数衰减特性通常有利于社会。随着时间推移或群体扩大，家族树之间会相互缠扰，世家会烟消云散，而裙带感情会逐渐稀释。 But families can defend themselves with a potent tactic: they can graft the twig tips of the family tree together by cousin marriage. If you force your daughter to marry her first cousin, then your son-in-law is your nephew, her father-in-law is your brother, your parents' estate will be worth twice as much per grandchild, and the couple will never have to bicker about which side of the family to visit on holidays. 但家庭可以用一种强大的策略来捍卫自身：他们能够通过堂表亲婚姻来嫁接家族树上的小小树梢。如果你强迫你的女儿嫁给她的第一代堂表亲，那么你的女婿就是你的侄子，她的公公就是你的兄弟，且你父母相对于每个孙子而言的财产价值会翻倍，且这对夫妇永远无需为了假日应该回哪方家里而斗嘴。 For these reasons, clans and dynasties in many cultures encourage first-or second-cousin marriage, tolerating the slightly elevated risk of genetic disease. Not only does cousin marriage amplify the average degree of relatedness among members of the clan, but it enmeshes them in a network of triangular relationships, with kinsmen valuing each other because of their many mutual kin as well as their own relatedness. 出于这些理由，许多文化中的氏族和世家会鼓励第一代或第二代堂表亲婚姻，并容忍遗传病风险的些许提高。堂表亲婚姻不但会放大氏族成员之间的平均亲缘程度，而且还会将氏族成员网罗进一个三角亲戚关系的网络之中，其中的同族会因为他们之间的众多共同亲戚及自己的亲缘关系而彼此关心。 As a result, the extended family, clan, or tribe can emerge as a powerfully cohesive bloc--and one with little common cause with other families, clans, or tribes in the larger polity that comprises them. The anthropologist Nancy Thornhill has shown that the prohibitions against incestuous marriages in most societies are not public-health measures aimed at reducing birth defects but the society's way of fighting back against extended families. 结果，大型的家族、氏族或部落有可能以一种强大的凝聚集团的形式出现——与它们所属的更大政治体中的其他家族、氏族或部落没有什么共同目标。人类学家Nancy Thornhill已经向我们展示，绝大部分社会中的血亲结婚禁令并不是旨在减少生育缺陷的公共健康措施，而是用以压制大型家族的一种方式。 In January 2003, during the buildup to the war in Iraq, the journalist and blogger Steven Sailer published an article in The American Conservative in which he warned readers about a feature of that country that had been ignored in the ongoing debate. As in many traditional Middle Eastern societies, Iraqis tend to marry their cousins. About half of all marriages are consanguineous (including that of Saddam Hussein, who filled many government positions with his relatives from Tikrit). 2003年1月，在为伊拉克战争造势时期，新闻记者和博客作者Steven Sailer在《美国保守派》杂志上发表了一篇文章，提醒读者注意在当时的社会讨论中遭到忽视的一个伊拉克的特征。跟许多传统的中东社会一样，伊拉克人倾向于和堂表亲结婚。大约半数婚姻属于血亲结婚（包括萨达姆·侯赛因的婚姻，他在许多政府职位上塞进了他那些来自提克里特市的亲戚）。 The connection between Iraqis' strong family ties and their tribalism, corruption, and lack of commitment to an overarching nation had long been noted by those familiar with the country. In 1931, King Faisal described his subjects as "devoid of any patriotic idea … connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil; prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever." Sailer presciently suggested that Iraqi family structure and its mismatch with the sensibilities of civil society would frustrate any attempt at democratic nation-building. 熟悉这个国家的人久已注意到，在伊拉克人的强大家庭纽带与他们的部落意识、腐败及他们对涵盖一切的国家缺乏忠诚等现象之间存在关联。1931年，费萨尔国王【译注：即费萨尔一世，哈希姆家族成员，1921-1933年间任伊拉克国王】称其臣民“缺乏任何爱国观念……彼此之间没有共同纽带，响应邪恶；倾向无政府，永远准备着起来反对任何政府。”Sailer预见性地指出，伊拉克的家庭结构及其与公民社会情感不相匹配的现状，将会挫败任何构建民主国家的企图。 Outside a small family circle, the links of kinship are biologically trifling, vulnerable to manipulation, and inimical to modernity. For all that, the almost mystical bond that we feel with those whom we perceive as kin continues to be a potent force in human affairs. It is no small irony that in an age in which technology allows us to indulge these emotions as never before, our political culture systematically misunderstands them. 在小家庭圈子以外，亲缘关系的联系在生物学上极为微弱，易于被操控，并与现代性相抵触。尽管如此，我们对那些我们认为是亲戚的人的感情几乎是一种神秘主义的亲和，它将继续是人类事务中的一种强大力量。在技术已经允许我们旷古未有地纵情于这类感情的时代，我们的政治文化却系统性地对它们存有误会，这真是个相当大的反讽。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Your Ancestors, Your Fate 你的祖先，你的命运 作者：Gregory Clark @ 2014-2-21 翻译：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：The New York Times，http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/your-fate-thank-your-ancestors/?_r=0 Inequality of income and wealth has risen in America since the 1970s, yet a large-scale research study recently found that social mobility hadn’t changed much during that time. How can that be? 美国社会的收入和财富不平等自1970年代就一直在攀升，然而近期一项大规模调查研究发现，社会的流动性在这段时间内并没有发生大的变化。怎么回事呢？ The study, by researchers at Harvard and Berkeley, tells only part of the story. It may be true that mobility hasn’t slowed — but, more to the point, mobility has always been slow. 这项由哈佛和伯克利大学进行的研究其实只讲述了整个故事的一个方面。是的，流动性也许并没有变得更低，但更关键的是，流动性一直就很低。 When you look across centuries, and at social status broadly measured — not just income and wealth, but also occupation, education and longevity — social mobility is much slower than many of us believe, or want to believe. This is true in Sweden, a social welfare state; England, where industrial capitalism was born; the United States, one of the most heterogeneous societies in history; and India, a fairly new democracy hobbled by the legacy of caste. 当你的目光扫过几个世纪，从更广义的度量标准审视社会地位这个概念——不仅仅是收入和财富，还包括职业、教育水平和寿命——你会发现社会流动性比我们许多人相信的，或希望的要低得多。在许多国家，比如瑞典（一个社会福利国家）、英国（工业资本主义诞生之地）、美国（历史上多样性最丰富的社会之一）、印度（一个受种姓制度拖累的年轻的民主国家），情况皆是如此。 Capitalism has not led to pervasive, rapid mobility. Nor have democratization, mass public education, the decline of nepotism, redistributive taxation, the emancipation of women, or even, as in China, socialist revolution. 资本主义并没有导致广泛的、快速的社会流动。民主化同样没有，大众教育、裙带主义的衰退、以重新分配财富为目的的税收、妇女解放、甚至社会主义改革（比如中国），这些全都没有导致广泛的、快速的社会流动。 To a striking extent, your overall life chances can be predicted not just from your parents’ status but also from your great-great-great-grandparents’. The recent study suggests that 10 percent of variation in income can be predicted based on your parents’ earnings. In contrast, my colleagues and I estimate that 50 to 60 percent of variation in overall status is determined by your lineage. 你整体的人生际遇不仅仅能从你父母的社会地位，也能从你的曾-曾-曾祖父母的社会地位预测出来，准确程度足以令人吃惊。最新的研究表明，收入差异【编注：即偏离基准值的幅度】中，10%可以从你父母的收入得到预测。而我的同事和我估计，就广义的社会地位来讲，其差异幅度的50-60%都由你的血统决定了。 The fortunes of high-status families inexorably fall, and those of low-status families rise, toward the average — what social scientists call “regression to the mean” — but the process can take 10 to 15 generations (300 to 450 years), much longer than most social scientists have estimated in the past. 高门注定跌落，而寒门势必崛起，两者向均值趋同——即社会学家所谓的“均值回归”——这个过程会发生，但需要10至15代人的时间（300至450年），比过去大多数社会学家估计的都要长得多。 We came to these conclusions after examining reams of data on surnames, a surprisingly strong indicator of social status, in eight countries — Chile, China, England, India, Japan, South Korea, Sweden and the United States — going back centuries. Across all of them, rare or distinctive surnames associated with elite families many generations ago are still disproportionately represented among today’s elites. 让人始料未及的是，姓氏是社会地位的一个有力指标，我们对其相关数据做了海量的分析，最终得到上述结论。这些数据来自八个国家：智利、中国、英国、印度、日本、韩国、瑞典和美国，并向上追溯了数个世纪。在所有国家中，来自精英家族的罕见或特别的姓氏在许多代之后在精英阶层的名单中仍占有很高比例。 Does this imply that individuals have no control over their life outcomes? No. In modern meritocratic societies, success still depends on individual effort. Our findings suggest, however, that the compulsion to strive, the talent to prosper and the ability to overcome failure are strongly inherited. 这是不是意味着个人对自己的命运毫无掌控之力？不。在现代精英统治的社会里，成功依然依赖个人奋斗。我们的发现只是表明，出人头地的欲望、发家致富的天赋和战胜失败的能力都有很大一部分来自遗传。 We can’t know for certain what the mechanism of that inheritance is, though we know that genetics plays a surprisingly strong role. Alternative explanations that are in vogue — cultural traits, family economic resources, social networks — don’t hold up to scrutiny. 我们无法确切知晓这种遗传的机制是什么，但是我们知道基因在此出人意料地扮演了一个重要角色。其他流行的解释——文化特质、家庭经济资源、人脉——则经不起推敲。 Because our findings run against the intuition that modernity, and in particular capitalism, has eroded the impact of ancestry on a person’s life chances, I need to explain how we arrived at them. 因为我们的发现与这样一种直觉相悖，那就是：现代化，尤其是资本主义，已经弱化了血统对一个人生活际遇的影响。所以我有必要解释下我们是怎么得到这些发现的。 Let’s start with Sweden, which — like Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway — is one of the world’s most equal societies in terms of income. To our surprise, we found that social mobility in Sweden today was no greater than in Britain or the United States today — or even Sweden in the 18th century. 让我们从瑞典开始。同丹麦、芬兰、冰岛和挪威一样，瑞典是世界上收入最平等的国家之一。让我们吃惊的是，我们发现当今瑞典的社会流动性并不比当今英国或是美国更高，甚至也不高于18世纪的瑞典。 Sweden still has a nobility. Those nobles no longer hold de facto political power, but their family records are stored by the Riddarhuset (House of Nobility), a society created in 1626. We estimate that about 56,000 Swedes hold rare surnames associated with the three historic tiers of nobles. (Variations on the names of the unfortunate Rosencrantz and Guildenstern of “Hamlet” are on the list.) 瑞典仍然存在贵族。这些贵族不再享有实际的政治权力，但他们的家族记录则被贵族院（Riddarhuset）——这一创立于1626年的机构存档。据我们估计，大约有56,000位瑞典人的姓氏同历史上的三阶贵族有联系。【译注：瑞典的贵族分为三个等级，领主（lord）、骑士（knight）和士绅（esquire）。】（比如《哈姆雷特》一剧中两个不幸人物的姓氏Rosencrantz和Guildenstern就在其中。） Another elite group are Swedes whose ancestors — a rising educated class of clerics, scholars, merchants — Latinized their surnames in the 17th and 18th centuries (like the father of the botanist Carolus Linnaeus). Adopting elite names was limited by law in Sweden in 1901, so a vast majority of people holding them are descended from prominent families. 另一个精英群体的先辈则是崛起的教士、学者或商人，他们受过教育并于17世纪到18世纪之间把自己的姓氏拉丁化，比如植物学家林奈（Carolus Linnaeus）的父亲。1901年瑞典立法限制采用精英姓氏的行为，所以今天拥有这些姓氏的人大多出身于名门望族。 Given the egalitarian nature of Swedish society, one would expect that people with these elite surnames should be no better off than other Swedes. That isn’t so. In a sample of six Stockholm-area municipalities in 2008, rich and poor, we found that the average taxable income of people with noble names was 44 percent higher than that of people with the common surname Andersson. Those with Latinized names had average taxable incomes 27 percent higher than those named Andersson. 考虑到瑞典社会的平等主义性质，可以预计拥有这些精英姓氏的人不会比其他瑞典人要混得好。事实并非如此。2008年我們所做的一項研究对斯德哥尔摩地区六个贫富不一的自治市进行了取样，研究发现拥有贵族姓氏的人，其应税所得（taxable income）要比拥有Andersson这一普通姓氏的人高44%。那些拥有拉丁化名字的人，其平均应税所得要比Andersson们高27%。 Surnames of titled nobles (counts and barons) are represented in the register of the Swedish Bar Association at six times the rate they occur in the general population (three times the rate, for untitled-noble and Latinized surnames). The same goes for Swedish doctors. 有封号贵族（伯爵或男爵）的姓氏出现在瑞典律师协会登记名单中的比例是他们在全体国民中比例的六倍（对无封号贵族以及拉丁化姓氏，则是3倍）。在瑞典的医生群体当中，情况也是如此。 Among those who completed master’s theses at Uppsala University from 2000 to 2012, Swedes with elite surnames were overrepresented by 60 to 80 percent compared with those with the common surname prefixes Lund- and Berg-. 2000年至2012年，在乌普萨拉大学完成硕士论文的学生中，拥有精英姓氏的瑞典学生的代表率要比有着普通姓名前缀Lund-、Berg-的学生高60%到80%。【译注：文中多次用到“代表率”这个指标，是指被考察群体在某特征人群中的占比除以其在全国人口中的占比，若得数远大于1，则是过度代表（overrepresented），若得数小于1，则是代表不足（underrepresented）。】 Over centuries, there is movement toward the mean, but it is slow. In three of the Royal Academies of Sweden, half of the members from 1740 to 1769 held one of the elite surnames in our sample; by 2010, only 4 percent did — but these surnames were held by just 0.7 percent of all Swedes, so they were still strongly overrepresented. In short, nearly 100 years of social democratic policies in Sweden, while creating a very egalitarian society, have failed to accelerate social mobility. 数世纪以来，均值回归化的趋势一直存在，但速度缓慢。在三所瑞典皇家学院，我们调查的样本人群中有一半在1740年至1769年间拥有一个精英姓氏；到2010年，这个比例仅为4%——但是全体瑞典人中只有0.7%的人拥有这些精英姓氏，所以精英姓氏的高代表率仍显得非常突出。简而言之，瑞典近100年的社会民主化政策虽然创造了一个平等主义的社会，却没能加速社会流动性。 What if we go back even further in time — to medieval England? 如果我们在时间上回溯得更远——到中世纪的英格兰，又会怎样呢？ We estimate that one-tenth of all surnames in contemporary England can be traced to the occupation of a medieval ancestor — names like Smith (the most common surname in the United States, England and Australia), Baker, Butler, Carter, Chamberlain, Cook, Shepherd, Stewart and Wright. Tax records suggest that most surnames became heritable by 1300. 我们估计十分之一的当今英格兰姓氏可以同其中世纪的祖先的职业联系起来——比如Smith（美国、英格兰和澳大利亚最常见的姓氏）、Baker、Butler、Carter、Chamberlain、Cook、Shepherd、Stewart and Wright。【译注：从Smith到Wright，这些姓氏分别对应着铁匠、烤面包师、管家、马车司机、封建领主的大管家、厨师、牧羊人、事务官、修船工。】税赋记录显示，大多数姓氏从1300年前后开始变成了可继承姓氏。 We compared the frequency of these common surnames in the population as a whole against elite groups, as drawn from several sources, including membership rolls at Oxford and Cambridge, dating as far back as 1170, and probate records from 1384 onward. 我们对比了人群中这些普通姓氏和精英姓氏出现的频率，数据来源有几个，包括最早追溯至1170年的牛津与剑桥录取名单，和1384年以来的遗嘱记录。 We found that late medieval England was no less mobile than modern England — contrary to the common assumption of a static feudal order. It took just seven generations for the successful descendants of illiterate village artisans of 1300 to be incorporated fully into the educated elite of 1500 — that is, the frequency of their names in the Oxbridge rolls reached the level around where it is today. By 1620, according to probate records, people with names like Butcher and Baker had nearly as much wealth as people with high-status surnames like Rochester and Radcliffe. 我们发现，中世纪晚期英格兰的社会流动性不比现代英国差——这和静止的封建秩序这一通常印象恰恰相反。公元1300年一个目不识丁的村夫的后代仅仅需要7代便可在1500年成为彻头彻尾的受过良好教育的精英分子——也就是说，他们的姓氏出现在牛津剑桥录取名单上的频率已经和今天差不多了。到1620年，根据遗嘱记录，有着像Butcher和Baker这样平民姓氏的人已经和有着诸如Rochester 和Radcliffe这种高贵姓氏的人一样富有了。 Take Chaucer. A commoner by birth — his name probably comes from the French word for shoemaker — he became a courtier, a diplomat and a member of Parliament, and his great-great-grandson was even briefly considered heir to the throne during the reign of Richard III. 比如著名的英国诗人乔叟（Chaucer），他出生在一个平凡的家庭——他的姓氏可能来自法语，意思是鞋匠——却成为了朝臣、外交家和国会议员。他的曾-曾孙甚至在理查三世时期被短暂地视作王位的继承人。 Of course, mobility, in medieval times as now, worked both ways. Just as Chaucer’s progeny prospered, other previously well-off families declined. The medieval noble surname Cholmondeley was, by the 19th century, held by a good number of farm laborers. 当然，不管是在中世纪还是当代，社会流动性都是双向的。当乔叟的后代们飞黄腾达时，其他曾经辉煌的家族也在衰落。中世纪时的贵族姓氏Cholmondeley到了19世纪，已为许多农民拥有。 In any generation, happy accidents (including extraordinary talent) will produce new high-status families. It is impossible to predict which particular families are likely to experience such boosts. What is predictable is what the path to elite status will look like, and the path back to the mean. Both happen at a very slow pace. 在任何时代，天上掉下的馅饼（包括超凡的天才）都可以成就新的上层家族。预测具体哪些家庭会碰上这样的运气是不可能的。可以预测的是通向精英阶层的道路和重回平民阶级的道路。两个方向的流动都非常缓慢。 For all the creative destruction unleashed by capitalism, the industrial revolution did not accelerate mobility. Looking at 181 rare surnames held by the wealthiest 15 percent of English and Welsh people in the mid-19th century — to be clear, these were not the same elite surnames as in the medieval era — we found that people with these surnames who died between 1999 and 2012 were more than three times as wealthy as the average person. 虽然资本主义带来了种种创造性破坏，但工业革命并没有加速社会流动。举例来说，19世纪中期英格兰和威尔士最富有的15%的人当中，有181个贵族姓氏（当然，这些姓氏与中世纪的精英姓氏已有不同），我们发现，在1999年到2012年间死亡的拥有这些姓氏的人士的财富是普通人的三倍还多。 If your surname is rare, and someone with that surname attended Oxford or Cambridge around 1800, your odds of being enrolled at those universities are nearly four times greater than the average person. This slowness of mobility has persisted despite a vast expansion in public financing for secondary and university education, and the adoption of much more open and meritocratic admissions at both schools. 如果你的姓氏很少见，而且拥有你的姓氏的人在1800年进入了牛津或剑桥，那么你被这两所大学录取的几率就比普通人高三倍。尽管对中学和大学教育的公共开支大幅增加，而且两所大学的录取条件也已变得更加公开、更加以实力为考量，但社会流动缓慢状况仍在继续。 What about America, the self-proclaimed land of opportunity? 那么美国，这个自诩“机会的国度”，其情况又如何呢? We selected a sampling of high- and low-status American surnames. The elite ones were held by descendants of Ivy League alumni who graduated by 1850, exceptionally wealthy people with rare surnames in 1923-24 (when public inspection of income-tax payments was legal) and Ashkenazi Jews. The low-status names were associated with black Americans whose ancestors most likely arrived as slaves, and the descendants of French colonists in North America before 1763. 我们挑选了一些代表社会上层和下层的姓氏作为样本。上层姓氏的拥有者们一部分是1850年毕业的常青藤校友的后代，他们是绝对的富人，在1923-24年拥有少见的姓氏（那时对个人所得税支付情况进行公开检查仍是合法的），另一部分则是阿什肯纳兹犹太人。下层姓氏的拥有者则是美国黑人和1763年前在北美的法国殖民者的后裔，前者的祖先大多以奴隶的身份来到美国。 We chose only surnames closely correlated with these subgroups — for example, Rabinowitz for American Jews, and Washington for black Americans. 我们只选择与上述背景紧密相关的姓氏——比如，Rabinowitz代表了美国犹太人，而Washington则是典型的美国黑人。 We used two indicators of social status: the American Medical Association’s directory of physicians and registries of licensed attorneys, along with their dates of registration, in 25 states, covering 74 percent of the population. 我们采纳了两个衡量社会地位的指标：美国医学协会的内科医生名录和执业律师注册名单，以及注册时间，调查覆盖25个州，涵盖了此类人口的74%。 In the early to mid-20th century we found the expected regression toward the mean for all of these groups, except for Jews and blacks — which reflects the reality of quotas that had barred Jews from many elite schools, and of racial segregation, which was not fully outlawed until the 1960s. 我们发现，在20世纪初期至中叶，所有这些群体都如预想那样出现了均值回归的情形，只有犹太人和黑人除外——这反应了当时的现实状况：一是配额制限制了犹太人进入许多精英学校的机会，二是种族隔离，直到1960年代种族隔离才被全面视作非法。 Starting in the 1970s, Jews began, over all, a decline in social status, while blacks began a corresponding rise, at least as measured by the doctors’ directory. But both trends are very slow. At the current rate, for example, it will be 300 years before Ashkenazi Jews cease to be overrepresented among American doctors, and even 200 years from now the descendants of enslaved African-Americans will still be underrepresented. 从1970年代起，整体而言犹太人的社会地位开始下降，而黑人的社会地位则相应地开始上升，至少医生名录反映出的状况如此。但这两种趋势都十分缓慢。比方说，按现在的速度，得过300年后，阿什肯纳兹犹太人在美国医生群体中的过度代表情形才会消失，甚至200年后，曾为奴隶的非洲裔美国人的后代在医生群体中仍将存在代表不足的情形。 Family names tell you, for better or worse, a lot: The average life span of an American with the typically Jewish surname Katz is 80.2 years, compared with 64.6 years for those with the surname Begay (or Begaye), which is strongly associated with Native Americans. Heberts, whites of New France descent, live on average three years less than Dohertys, whites of Irish descent. 不管是好是坏，姓氏总是包含有大量信息：拥有典型的犹太姓氏Katz的美国人，其平均寿命是80.2岁，与此相对的则是拥有Begay（或是Begaye）这一与美洲土著紧密相关的姓氏的人，他们平均寿命只有64.6岁。新法兰西殖民地的白人后代比爱尔兰白人后代平均少活3年，前者的典型姓名是Hebert，而后者往往姓Doherty。 But to be clear, we found no evidence that certain racial groups innately did better than others. Very high-status groups in America include Ashkenazi Jews, Egyptian Copts, Iranian Muslims, Indian Hindus and Christians, and West Africans. The descendants of French Canadian settlers don’t suffer racial discrimination, but their upward mobility, like that of blacks, has been slow. 不过要澄清的是，我们发现并没有证据显示某些种族天生就比其他种族过得好。在美国拥有非常高社会地位的族群包括阿什肯纳兹犹太人、埃及科普特人、伊朗穆斯林、来自印度的印度教徒和基督徒，以及西非移民。法裔加拿大移民的后裔并没有种族歧视的烦恼，但同黑人一样，他们向社会上层的流动一直很缓慢。 Chen (a common Chinese surname) is of higher status than Churchill. Appiah (a Ghanaian surname) is higher than Olson (or Olsen), a common white surname of average status. Very little information about status can be surmised by the most common American surnames — the top five are Smith, Johnson, Williams, Brown and Jones, which all originated in England — because they are held by a mix of whites and blacks. 姓Chen（常见的华裔姓氏）的比姓Churchill的社会地位高。姓Appiah（常见加纳姓氏）的比姓Olson（或Olsen）的社会地位高，后者是常见的普通白人的姓氏。从美国最常见的姓氏中很难得出关于社会地位的信息（前五位的姓氏是Smith、Johnson、Williams、Brown和Jones，他们都源自英格兰），因为这些人中有白人也有黑人。 Our findings were replicated in Chile, India, Japan, South Korea and, surprisingly, China, which stands out as a demonstration of the resilience of status — even after a Communist revolution nearly unparalleled in its ferocity, class hatred and mass displacement. 我们的发现在智利、印度、日本、韩国和中国都得到了印证。在中国的惊人发现向我们清晰地展示了社会地位的难以撼动，即便是在一场共产主义革命之后（其残暴程度、阶级仇恨的强度和人口迁移规模前所未有），情形仍是如此。 Hundreds of thousands of relatively prosperous mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan with the Nationalists in the late 1940s. Under Communist agrarian reform, as much as 43 percent of all land was seized and redistributed. The Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 saw purges of scholars and other former elites and “class enemies.” 1940年代末期，数百万大陆居民随国民党逃到台湾，他们都是相对富裕的中国人。中共的土地革命夺取了43%的土地并将其重新分配。1966年至1976年的文化大革命对学者、其他前社会精英分子以及“阶级敌人”进行了大清洗。 In China, there are only about 4,000 surnames; the 100 most common are held by nearly 85 percent of the population. Yet we were able to identify 13 rare surnames that were exceptionally overrepresented among successful candidates in imperial examinations in the 19th century. Remarkably, holders of these 13 surnames are disproportionately found now among professors and students at elite universities, government officials, and heads of corporate boards. Social mobility in the Communist era has accelerated, but by very little. Mao failed. 在中国，总共只有大约4,000种姓氏，其中最常见的100个占了85%的人口。不过我们仍选出了13种罕见姓氏，拥有这些姓氏的人在19世纪的科举考试成功者中的过度代表情形十分突出。在今天，这13个姓氏的拥有者在教授、名牌大学的学生、政府官员和公司高管中的占比也较高。在共产主义的时代，中国的社会流动性曾得到提升，但十分微弱。毛泽东的努力失败了。 These findings may surprise two groups that are often politically opposed: those who believe that certain “cultures” are higher-achieving than others and those who attribute success to family resources and social networks. 这些发现可能会让两种人吃惊，而这两种人通常在政见上互相对立：一是那些相信某些“文化”能比其他文化取得更大成就的人，二是那些将成功归因为家族资源和社会关系的人。 Culture is a nebulous category and it can’t explain the constant regression of family status — from the top and the bottom. High-status social groups in America are astonishingly diverse. There are representatives from nearly every major religious and ethnic group in the world — except for the group that led to the argument for culture as the foundation of social success: white European Protestants. Muslims are low-status in much of India and Europe, but Iranian Muslims are among the most elite of all groups in America. 文化这个范畴太过含糊不清，并不能解释家族地位的均值回归——不管是从高处回归还是从低处回归。美国上层社会群体是非常多元化的，这一点相当令人吃惊。在这些拥有较高社会地位的人中，你可以找到全世界几乎所有主要宗教和种族的代表——但没有来自欧洲的白人新教徒，这一群体往往被拿来佐证文化是取得社会成功的基础。穆斯林在印度和欧洲的大部分地区都处在社会底层，但是伊朗穆斯林却是美国最精英的群体之一。 Family resources and social networks are not irrelevant. Evidence has been found that programs from early childhood education to socioeconomic and racial classroom integration can yield lasting benefits for poor children. But the potential of such programs to alter the overall rate of social mobility in any major way is low. The societies that invest the most in helping disadvantaged children, like the Nordic countries, have produced absolute, commendable benefits for these children, but they have not changed their relative social position. 家族资源和人脉并不是无关的。有证据显示，从早期的儿童教育到社会经济和种族的一体化教育，这样的项目能够为贫穷家庭的孩子带来持续的好处。但是此类项目提高社会流动性的潜力都是很低的。那些煞费苦心帮助条件不利儿童的社会，比如北欧的国家，已经取得了明显的、可圈可点的益处，但都没能改变这些儿童的相对社会地位。 The notion of genetic transmission of “social competence” — some mysterious mix of drive and ability — may unsettle us. But studies of adoption, in some ways the most dramatic of social interventions, support this view. “社会竞争力”——某种神秘的内驱力和能力的混合体——能够通过基因遗传，这一想法也许会让我们感到不安。但是对领养（在某些方面这可谓是最激烈的社会干预行为了）的研究却支持这一观点。 A number of studies of adopted children in the United States and Nordic countries show convincingly that their life chances are more strongly predicted from their biological parents than their adoptive families. In America, for example, the I.Q. of adopted children correlates with their adoptive parents’ when they are young, but the correlation is close to zero by adulthood. There is a low correlation between the incomes and educational attainment of adopted children and those of their adoptive parents. 对美国和北欧被领养小孩的一些调查研究极有说服力地表明，从这些小孩的生物学父母——而非他们的养父母身上——的情况更能预测出他们的生活境遇。比如在美国，被领养小孩的智商在他们还小时同他们的养父母相关，但是当他们成年了，这种相关性就接近于0了。被领养孩子的收入和受教育程度同他们养父母的相关性不大。 These studies, along with studies of correlations across various types of siblings (identical twins, fraternal twins, half siblings) suggest that genetics is the main carrier of social status. 上述研究，加上对不同类型的兄弟姐妹（同卵双胞胎、异卵双胞胎、同母异父或同父异母）之间相关性的研究，都表明基因是决定社会地位的主要因素。 If we are right that nature predominates over nurture, and explains the low rate of social mobility, is that inherently a tragedy? It depends on your point of view. 如果真是大自然主导了出人头地的机会，并且是低社会流动性的罪魁祸首，那岂不是说，从根本上而言，这就是一个悲剧？这要看你怎么想。 The idea that low-status ancestors might keep someone down many generations later runs against most people’s notions of fairness. But at the same time, the large investments made by the super-elite in their kids — like those of the Manhattan hedge-funders who spend a fortune on preschool — are of no avail in preventing long-run downward mobility. 来自社会底层的祖先会让某人在时隔许多代以后仍然处在社会底层，这样的观点与大多数人对公平的理解相抵触。但同时，上层精英对孩子们的大量投资——比如对学前教育一掷千金的曼哈顿对冲基金经理们——并不能阻止子孙们在长久的时间跨度中社会地位的衰落。 Our findings do suggest that intermarriage among people of different strata will raise mobility over time. India, we found, has exceptionally low mobility in part because religion and caste have barred intermarriage. As long as mating is assortative — partners are of similar social status, regardless of ethnic, national or religious background — social mobility will remain low. 我们的发现确实表明不同社会地位的人通婚会在长期内增加社会流动性。我们发现印度的社会流动性异常之低，部分原因便是宗教和种姓制度阻碍了这种通婚。只要婚姻奉行“非同类不婚”原则——拥有相似的社会地位，不管其种族、国籍或是宗教背景如何——社会流动性就会一直处在低水平。 As the political theorist John Rawls suggested in his landmark work “A Theory of Justice” (1971), innate differences in talent and drive mean that, to create a fair society, the disadvantages of low social status should be limited. We are not suggesting that the fact of slow mobility means that policies to lift up the lives of the disadvantaged are for naught — quite the opposite. Sweden is, for the less well off, a better place to live than the United States, and that is a good thing. And opportunities for people to flourish to the best of their abilities are essential. 政治理论家罗尔斯在他里程碑式著作《正义论》（1971年）中提出，才干和内驱力的先天差异意味着，要创造一个公平的社会，卑微出身带来的不利需要予以限制。我们不是暗示社会流动性低这一事实意味着那些帮助处于不利地位的人的政策就是徒劳的——恰恰相反。瑞典，对生活并不宽裕的人来说，是个比美国更好的选择，而这是好事。让人们有机会最大限度地发挥他们的能力是至关重要的。 Large-scale, rapid social mobility is impossible to legislate. What governments can do is ameliorate the effects of life’s inherent unfairness. Where we will fall within the social spectrum is largely fated at birth. Given that fact, we have to decide how much reward, or punishment, should be attached to what is ultimately fickle and arbitrary, the lottery of your lineage. 大范围的、快速的社会流动是无法通过立法来实现的。政府能做的是削弱先天不公平所带来的后果。我们会处在阶层光谱的哪个位置，基本上在我们出生时就已经决定了。基于这一事实，我们必须决定的是，由“族谱彩票”这一终归是无情而武断的因素所决定的赏罚额该有多大。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

个人禀赋可遗传性，社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择，择偶的同质化倾向，阶层内婚，阶级分化，族群禀赋差异化，地区经济分化，大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……，把[[Charles Murray]]，[[Garett Jones]]和[[Gregory Clark]]的工作合起来看，貌似就通了，有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变，越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters，在写作《自私的皮球》时，我基本上还是个制度主义者，虽然也相信文化重要，但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的，然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认，文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。 转变最初起于对南北欧的比较，北欧（包括英德）在制度上也有种种问题，但表现总是比南欧强很多，日耳曼/拉丁这条分界线实在太清晰了，怎么辩解否认都不可能，想来想去，一个直觉上的印象反而比种种“客观原因”更有说服力：南欧的政治家（和他们的民众一样）普遍没有责任感，没有政治担当，没有认错然后做个决断的能力，只会命苦怪别人，就这么简单。 看看希腊人在债务危机后的丑态，一门心思只想着赖账，从不想想自己有什么问题，和西班牙政府在历史上无数次赖账如出一辙，这种事情北欧人就做不出来，默克尔移民大放水这件事情虽然是做得很坏，但不得不承认她是有担当的，在非常清楚代价的情况下勇于承担责任的，这种事情你在南欧永远看不到。 我曾经认为夏威夷是个支持制度主义的鲜明案例，但后来发现，直到几十年前，欧裔和日裔加起来还占夏威夷人口多数。 然后我又看了一下波多黎各和英属洪都拉斯（包括伯利兹），很明显的制度主义反例。可以设想一下，其他条件不变，把波多黎各或洪都拉斯的70%人口全部换成日裔，会是什么样，要我说，答案很明显。 外部强加的制度当然可以造成很大差别，这个以前说过很多了，现在我想强调的是，对于某些文化，某些族群，外部再怎么强加制度，可能都不会达到很好的状态，当然，正面外部力量可以让它避免最坏的状态（比如变成朝鲜） 简单说，在所有拉丁社会中，波多黎各当然已经非常好了，再怎么说，因为有美国，它不会变成阿根廷，或委内瑞拉，或古巴，而我的意思是，它也不大会变成夏威夷，变成韩国，变成香港，论制度条件，英属/美属加勒比的条件再理想不过了，但并未冒出任何加勒比小龙。 再看以色列，不考虑文化/遗传因素的话，当初的条件真是恶劣到无以复加，建国者满脑子共产主义，沉重战争负担，重税，重管制，恶性通胀，啥坏事都摊上过，最后愣是给拗过来了。 转个两年前的旧帖，大意如此。

@whigzhou @ 2014-8-29 12:25 随着技术/文化/制度的丰满成熟，地理因素对社会间差异变得越来越无关，地理大发现以来，英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会，德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民，犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……，换句话说：更成熟的文化与制度更有能力控制和适应各种环境。

 

Fifty years of twin studies 双胞胎研究五十年 作者：Stephen Hsu @ 2015-5-21 译者：demo 来源：Information Processing，http://infoproc.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/fifty-years-of-twin-studies.html The most interesting aspect of these results is that for many traits there is no detectable non-additivity. That is, gene-gene interactions seem to be insignificant, and a simple linear genetic architecture is consistent with the results. 以下结果中最有意思的一点在于，很多人类的复杂性状都没有检测出非可加性（非线性）。也就是说，基因和基因之间的作用似乎微不足道，而一个简单的线性遗传结构就可以解释这些结果。

Meta-analysis of the heritability of human traits based on fifty years of twin studies Nature Genetics (2015) doi:10.1038/ng.3285 基于五十年双胞胎研究的人类表型遗传率的整合分析 《自然遗传学》（2015年） Despite a century of research on complex traits in humans, the relative importance and specific nature of the influences of genes and environment on human traits remain controversial. 尽管关于人类复杂性状的研究已进行了一个世纪，但基因和环境对人类表型的作用孰轻孰重，以及它们的具体性质如何，都还存在争议。 We report a meta-analysis of twin correlations and reported variance components for 17,804 traits from 2,748 publications including 14,558,903 partly dependent twin pairs, virtually all published twin studies of complex traits. Estimates of heritability cluster strongly within functional domains, and across all traits the reported heritability is 49%. 我们在此发表一项关于双胞胎相关性的整合分析，涵盖几乎所有已发表的双胞胎复杂性状研究，包括2748篇论文中研究的14,558,903对（部分重复研究）双胞胎、其所得出的17,804项表型的方差分量。估算出的遗传率在功能群内呈现群集分布，对于全部性状来说，报告的遗传率为49%。 For a majority (69%) of traits, the observed twin correlations are consistent with a simple and parsimonious model where twin resemblance is solely due to additive genetic variation. The data are inconsistent with substantial influences from shared environment or non-additive genetic variation. 对于多数（69％）性状，观察到的双胞胎相关性可以用一个简单到吝啬的模型解释；在这个模型中，双胞胎的相似之处完全归结于可加的遗传差异。这些数据不支持共同的环境因素或者非可加的遗传差异对于复杂性状有显著影响。 This study provides the most comprehensive analysis of the causes of individual differences in human traits thus far and will guide future gene-mapping efforts. 这项研究提供了目前最为全面的一份关于人类性状的个体差异分析，对以后的基因定位研究具有指导意义。

See also Additivity and complex traits in mice: 另见（作者早先的博文）《小鼠的复杂性状与可加性》：

You may have noticed that I am gradually collecting copious evidence for (approximate) additivity. Far too many scientists and quasi-scientists are infected by the epistasis or epigenetics meme, which is appealing to those who "revel in complexity" and would like to believe that biology is too complex to succumb to equations. ("How can it be? But what about the marvelous incomprehensible beautiful sacred complexity of Nature? But But But ...") 你可能已经注意到，我逐渐在搜集（近似于）可加性的丰富证据。有太多科学家和民科染上了流行的遗传上位或者表观遗传的观念；这些观念对于那些“为复杂而陶醉”、相信生物学太过复杂不可能用简单方程来表达的人非常有吸引力。（他们会说“怎么可能呢？可是自然中那些美妙不可方物、神圣不可侵犯的复杂性呢？可是这个可是那个呢？”） I sometimes explain things this way: There is a deep evolutionary reason behind additivity: nonlinear mechanisms are fragile and often "break" due to DNA recombination in sexual reproduction. Effects which are only controlled by a single locus are more robustly passed on to offspring. ... 我有时候会这样解释： 遗传的可加性背后有很深的进化上的原因：非线性的机制过于脆弱，常常会在有性生殖DNA重组中“断开”。而仅由单个位点控制的性状则更易于被传给后代。 Many people confuse the following statements: "The brain is complex and nonlinear and many genes interact in its construction and operation." "Differences in brain performance between two individuals of the same species must be due to nonlinear (non-additive) effects of genes." The first statement is true, but the second does not appear to be true across a range of species and quantitative traits. 很多人会把下面的两个陈述混淆： “大脑是复杂且非线性的，有很多基因在它的构成和功能中相互作用。” “同一物种的不同个体之间大脑性能的差异一定是由于非线性（非可加性）的基因作用。” 第一个说法是正确的，但第二个在很多物种和可量化的性状中似乎都不成立。

On the genetic architecture of intelligence and other quantitative traits (p.16): （作者早先的学术论文）《智力及其他可量化表型的遗传结构》（第16页）：

... The preceding discussion is not intended to convey an overly simplistic view of genetics or systems biology. Complex nonlinear genetic systems certainly exist and are realized in every organism. However, quantitative differences between individuals within a species may be largely due to independent linear effects of specific genetic variants. 前面讨论的用意并非要给遗传学或者系统生物学一个过于简化的看法。复杂、非线性的遗传系统肯定存在，而且在任何有机体中都有实现。然而，一个物种中不同个体间的定量差异，在很大程度上可能取决于某些基因差异的独立线性效果。 As noted, linear effects are the most readily evolvable in response to selection, whereas nonlinear gadgets are more likely to be fragile to small changes. (Evolutionary adaptations requiring significant changes to nonlinear gadgets are improbable and therefore require exponentially more time than simple adjustment of frequencies of alleles of linear effect.) 上面说过，线性作用在自然选择中最容易进化出来，而非线性的小把戏则更可能被很小的变化破坏。（非线性机制作出大量改变而得到的进化适应不太可能出现，因此相比于仅需要简单调整基因频率的线性机制来说，它们需要更多时间。） One might say that, to first approximation, Biology = linear combinations of nonlinear gadgets, and most of the variation between individuals is in the (linear) way gadgets are combined, rather than in the realization of different gadgets in different individuals. 有人可能会说，做个简单的近似，生物学等于非线性机制的线性组合，而且大部分个体间差异是来自各种机制被（线性）组合的方式，而不是这些机制本身在个体间的差异。 Linear models work well in practice, allowing, for example, SNP-based prediction of quantitative traits (milk yield, fat and protein content, productive life, etc.) in dairy cattle. ... 线性的模型在实践中有广泛用途，比方说用奶牛的单核酸多态性（SNP）来预测可量化的表型（产奶量、奶制品的脂肪和蛋白含量、生产时限等等）。…

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——