上帝的新牧场#1：平等的松动 辉格 2018年11月1日 阶层是大型社会中最为凸显的一个特征，^[1] 任何称得上文明的社会都存在阶层分化，有些人类学家甚至将它列为文明的定义性特征之一，^[2] 它如此普遍，盖因其乃支撑复杂社会的一个重要结构元素，均质而平等的状态只有在结构简单的小型社会中才能看到。 然而，阶层分化并非随群体规模扩大而水到渠成，其创生过程曾面临巨大阻力，人类在其历史的多数时期可能都生活在高度平等主义的社会中，并且出于合作互惠的需要而刻意维持群体内的平等状态，用人类学家迈克尔·古尔文（Michael Gurven）的话说，多数狩猎采集者都是强硬平等主义者（fierce egalitarians），会激烈抵制任何个体谋求特殊地位的企图。^[3] 只有当这种平等主义伦理被打破之后，阶层才得以浮现。

原始平等主义

狩猎采集者高度依赖于合作互惠，尤其强调食物分享，因为狩猎是一项收益极不稳定的高风险活动，即便一位好猎手也常连续几天甚至几周空手而归，只有通过肉食分享来集体分担这一风险，狩猎才成为一种可依靠的生计；同时，成功捕获一头大型猎物可带来数百甚至数千公斤肉食，个体家庭根本来不及吃（毕竟我们不像狮子那样可以一次吞下几十公斤肉然后一两周不吃东西），所以分享的机会成本很低。 根深蒂固的分享传统使得任何私人财富积累都难以发生，每当某人拥有超出其日常所需的物品时，就会面临强大的社会压力迫使他拿出来分享，不然就会招来嫉恨目光甚至公开羞辱，近乎强制性的分享也常表现为蹭讨（scrounging）或受容忍的偷窃（tolerated theft），匮乏者从宽裕者那里讨要甚至擅取东西被认为是理所当然的（所以偷窃一词其实并不恰当），在采猎群体中做田野调查的人类学家，常为如何保存给养而大伤脑筋，而对于没有如此切身体验的我们，回忆一下小学年代同学之间的讨要行为或许有些帮助。^[4] 原始平等主义还表现为对出众者的压制，自我夸耀是不受鼓励的，居高临下更是不可容忍，人们拒绝给予成功者任何优越感，当一位好猎手将一头大猎物带回营地时，人们一边享用分得的好肉，一边却用轻蔑之词贬低其成就，“这么坨皮包骨你也好意思叫它鹿？”，“也就够塞个牙缝的”，“早知道就这么点肉我才不会来帮你搬呢”，诸如此类。^[5] 因为分享和索取是理所当然的，哈扎人（Hadza）在向人索要食物后不会表达谢意，他们的语言中可能根本没有“感谢”一词，因为感激会给施予者带来某种优越感，而这是不可接受的，相反，他们会毫不脸红的贬低所得礼物的价值，就像贬低他人成就一样。^[6] 为了遏制优秀猎手的优越感，昆桑人（!Kung San）将每次成功狩猎的荣誉归于首先射中猎物的那支箭的主人，而非射出箭的猎手，而每位猎手都会在自己箭筒里放上五六位伙伴所制作的箭，每个人制作的箭都有独特风格可供辨认，箭主将赢得主持切割分配猎物的荣耀，虽然他并不会因此得到更大份额；实际上，昆桑人完全明白谁是群体中的真正好猎手，这在他们的择偶和择友偏好中都有体现，可见上述习俗并非出于对箭之神秘力量的迷信，而只是为了压制优越感。^[7] 考虑到人类的自利本能，采猎群体能够奉行如此严厉的平等主义，也是因为，首先，游动性生活使得他们原本就不可能积累多少私人财富，绝大多数采猎者每年都会数次搬迁营地，温暖地带的群体平均每年迁移8.5次，寒冷地带次数相对较少；^[8] 搬迁时，每位成年人最多负重15-18公斤（包括婴儿），^[9] 超出这一携带局限的财富积累，对游动者显然是没意义的。 其次，数十人规模的小群体不太需要领袖或权威人物，因为没有多少公共事务需要处理，即便有也很容易集体协商，因为若只算各家庭的家长的话，总共没几个人需要参与决策，熟人小社会的秩序也很容易通过互惠关系和声誉机制而自发维持，纠纷可依习俗自行解决，当恩怨果真闹到不可收拾，通常的出路也只是其中一方出走，加入其他群体或自成一群，由于邻近群体间经由婚姻和亲属纽带有着广泛联系，对于个人和家庭，变换群体不存在太大障碍，也随时都在发生。 采猎者普遍奉行平等主义，是出于合作互惠的强烈需求，非如此难以生存，而不是因为他们地位竞争没有兴趣，或缺乏利用个人优势支配他人的倾向，相反，这种倾向从来都很强烈，而且有着古老渊源，至少可追溯到我们的大猿（great ape）祖先，大型灵长类很少是平等主义的，雄性黑猩猩热衷于争当老大和排定啄序（pecking order），首领们更以暴虐霸道而著称。[10] 实际上，原始平等主义是由人们对群体内出众冒尖者的持续约束和压制而勉力维持的，那些优秀个体以其狩猎能力，或战斗力，或智慧，而给群体带来好处，因而得到更多尊重，其意见也更有分量，人们也乐意让他们在诸如战争，对外交往，营地搬迁等重大事务上扮演领袖角色，但同时他们也要求这些显要人物表现出格外的慷慨，谦逊和低调，对他们的傲慢和支配他人的倾向随时保持警惕，稍有越界便施以惩罚，包括嘲讽，社会孤立，放逐，甚至处决；人类学家克里斯托弗·博姆（Christopher Boehm）将这种关系称为“逆向支配等级制（Reverse Dominance Hierarchy）”，即，才能出众者被允许拥有较高地位，但群体其他人（至少成年男性）保留对其地位乃至命运的最终支配权。[11]

容忍卓越

事实上，并非所有狩猎采集社会都这么平等主义，两万多年前生活在东北欧苔原的格拉维特人（Gravettians）便有了明显的地位分化，^[12] 北美西北海岸印第安人贫富悬殊，不少富豪甚至蓄奴，^[13] 加州努米克人（Numic）发展出了私人财产权和货币经济，并形成巨大贫富差距，以随葬品价值计算的基尼系数常高达0.8-0.9，^[14] 大平原印第安人（Plains Indians）更建立了酋长和议事会等权力等级结构。^[15] 当上一节提到的促成平等主义的诸条件改变时，地位分化便出现了，打破平等主义的最初突破口，是对卓越的容忍，即容许一些社会成员因其能力、品行和成就而获得更多尊重，拥有更高权威，之所以愿意作出这一妥协，是因为人们需要一位（或几位）领袖，而这往往发生在集体行动的需要变得日益迫切之际。 一类集体行动是合作狩猎，哈扎人和昆桑人的狩猎都是分散行动，或单独，或两位猎手协作，因纽特人捕猎海豹时通常也单独行动，只有当猎物太大时才会喊人帮忙，缺乏合作狩猎可能是这些社会如此极端平等主义的一大原因，他们不需要领袖人物来谋划、协调和指挥大型集体狩猎。 但这并非普遍情形，有很多需要集体协作的捕猎形式，例如绝境驱赶、设陷围猎、兽群跟踪，还有捕鲸；鲸鱼显然不是一两个人能对付的，楚克奇半岛（Chukchi Peninsula）的亚洲爱斯基摩人（Asiatic Eskimos）的捕鲸团队通常由3-4条船组成，每条船上4-6位成年男性，外加几位少年学徒，每位团队成员的职责和地位预先都有明确规定，他们的群体规模因而也比一般的采猎游团大。^[16] 印尼隆巴塔岛（Lembata Island）的拉马勒拉人（Lamalerans）的捕鲸团队更大，每船8-14人，也经常几条船一起出动，每条船都有主人，成员全部来自船主所在的父系家族，不仅其职责地位有明确规定，捕猎成功后鲸肉如何分配也预先按习俗严格确定，很明显，这些船主和父系家族的家长将在群体中享有某种领袖地位，相应的，基于这种更为紧密的社会组织，拉马勒拉人的村庄规模高达两千多人，比邓巴数高出了一个数量级。^[17] 在末次冰期的欧亚大陆，绝境驱赶曾是许多群体的主流捕猎方式，绝境可以是天然的悬崖或山谷死胡同，也可以用石垒、砦栅、沟渠、火堆等设施在适宜地貌上人为构造；格拉维特人大幅推进了围猎技术，他们改进了投掷矛（throwing spear）和设陷技术，还发明了猎网，这是非常有用的围猎工具，它大大降低了围猎对地貌的要求。^[18] 猎网的发明可能得益于格拉维特人为缝制厚实衣物以应对严寒而发展的纤维处理、制绳和编织技术，所以并非巧合，他们也是带孔针的发明者，可能也是最早的编篮者；网猎技术的广泛采用也体现在猎物种类上，有些格拉维特遗址中，野兔、狐狸、鸟类等小型动物占了骨骼化石数的70%以上，这些小动物若没有猎网和弓箭是很难大量捕杀的（格拉维特人尚没有弓箭，那还要过几千年才出现），而用绊套索（snare）只能少量捕获。^[19] 另外，格拉维特人（特别是生活在东部苔原的群体）十分倚重猛犸象，而且善于跟踪成群迁徙的象群，这两点都对集体行动提出了很高要求，猛犸很难以传统的伏击方式捕杀，对遗骨的年龄统计也显示了它们要么是被天灾成群消灭的，要么是成群猎杀的，若是后者，无疑需要大规模集体行动。^[20] 或许正是因为其独特的狩猎方式，格拉维特人才有了显著的地位分化；重要的是，像格拉维特这种情况在前农业时代会比后来更普遍，冰期之后，大型动物大批消失，此后随着农牧业扩张，狩猎采集者逐渐被取代和吸纳，剩下的被排挤到少数边缘生态位，大型围猎的条件已不复存在，所以人类学家在现存采猎社会观察到的强硬平等主义，在以往（特别是高纬度地区）未必是主流。

战争领袖

另一类集体行动是战争，战争比围猎更需要领袖，因为它带来的组织协调问题更严重，平等主义群体在战争中表现出的最大弱点就是缺乏战斗纪律和无法贯彻稍稍复杂的战术，例如战斗中一个常见问题是：战士们总是过早投掷武器，往往在刚刚到达有效射程的上限时便匆忙投掷，而不是等逼近到最佳距离时再投，这是因为在双方武器效力对等的条件下（在技术发展缓慢的前文明时代，这一条件通常都成立），到达最佳投掷位置也就意味着自己将暴露在对方的最佳杀伤范围内，克服这一弱点需要严格督战或事后严厉惩罚所确保的纪律，而在平等主义社会中，对个人的这种强制性是不可接受的。^[21] 所以平等主义群体很不擅长阵地战，而更多采用伏击和偷袭（特别是黎明偷袭）战术，这种偷袭往往是一次性打击，若偷袭得手，结果可能是一场大屠杀，反之则迅速逃离，没有多阶段战术，后者需要严密的策划、组织和指挥，并以纪律为执行保障，在无权威社会，这些组织条件都不存在。^[22] 当资源压力提升，领地排他性增强，领地竞争加剧时，战争频度和重要性便会提高，此时平等主义也将松动；大平原印第安人的权力结构便是出于战争需要，这些印第安部落极为好战，相互间冲突不断，多半起于盗马突袭和领地竞争，和东非畜牧部落之间的争斗十分相似；大平原战争升级的一个重要原因，是印第安人在16世纪从西班牙人那里引入了马匹，这极大提升了野牛捕猎效率，继而造成资源压力加大，而马匹也提高了其作战机动能力，后来又加上枪支，这一系列因素彻底改变了他们的社会政治结构，其中包括地位分化。^[23] 例如在基奥瓦（Kiowa）部落中，男性被分为四个等级，地位最高的是高级武士（Onde），比例不超过10%，部落的所有重大决定都由他们做出，其次是正在努力且有望成为Onde的新秀武士（Ondegupta），然后是普通男性，最底层是没有独立谋生能力的渣滓（Dapom），被武士们当作随意使唤的跟班。[24] 类似例子并不鲜见，澳洲土著也以好战闻名，激烈的领地竞争和掳掠女人的风气使得战争成为头号公共事务，对擅入领地的外人会毫不犹豫的武力相向；^[25] 与连绵冲突相应的，是对平等主义的偏离，虽然澳洲人没有酋长和部落结构，却有着独特的老人寡头专制（geronto­cracy），对年轻人实施高压，比如澳洲流行的极为严格的半偶群（moiety）和对偶婚制度，极大限制了年轻人的合法结婚对象，违反者会遭严厉惩罚；^[26] 背离平等主义的另一个表现是广泛且高程度的多妻，许多群体中40岁以上老人常拥有多至十几位妻子，几乎垄断了全部结婚机会，^[27] 这些压制性安排所需的规范执行力也为更多社会控制建立了基础。 更鲜明的例子是亚马逊丛林的雅诺马米人（Yanomami），极为凶悍好斗，其生活中充满暴力，迎接访客的通常是一排拉开的弓（就像安达曼人），争斗的主要动机也是领地和女人，他们以狩猎和园艺农业（horticulture）为生，定居于村庄，因而领地性更强，领地竞争更激烈，所有这些方面都和新几内亚高地部落很像，后者同样热衷于战争。 雅诺马米人很好的演示了战争是如何催生强势领袖的，他们的社会规模还很小，多数村庄只有数十人规模，由于缺乏多层政治结构，其领袖还只能算头人（headman），称不上酋长（chief），但是，有些雅诺马米头人却拥有了类似酋长的权威和权力，能指使他人做事，或强迫他人遵守他所认定的规则，必要时施加惩罚，这些在平等主义社会都是不可接受的。 这些强势头人之所以能这么做，是因为他们在维持群体的战争优势上起了关键作用，这首先体现在他们自身强健勇敢善战，更有能力带领同伴取胜，但更重要的是，他们有足够的威望和社会技能，能够在群体增长到较大规模时仍维持内部和谐而不分裂，我们知道，超出邓巴数规模的群体是很难维持和谐的，平等主义社会的规模通常只有三五十人，但雅诺马米的大村庄可达两三百人，在原始战争中，这样的规模优势是压倒性的。^[28] 值得注意的是，强势领袖的这两方面能力是相互强化的：一位勇敢善战的首领会给伙伴带来安全感，因而他们会更珍惜留在群体中的机会，并为此而克制纠纷，或在纠纷发生时更愿意服从首领的裁决，不再像以往那样以出走分裂来解决问题，这就加强了首领扩张群体规模的能力，而规模扩张继而又带来了更多安全感，如此循环。 二战后的文化人类学著作常把生活在小型简单社会的原住民描绘为和平主义者，现实远非如此，这些浪漫化描绘既有出于意识形态偏见而故意忽略不愉快事实的成分，也是时代错位所致，^[29] 这些群体的早期接触者记录的是一幅截然不同的面貌，从亚马逊丛林，波利尼西亚诸岛，安达曼群岛，到澳洲大陆，新几内亚高地，阿拉伯沙漠，广泛分布着好战多争的前部落社会（前部落意味着缺乏政治结构），在新几内亚低地，吕宋山区，台湾高地，缅甸高地，阿萨姆，还盛行着令人生畏的猎头风俗（headhunting）。^[30] 劳伦斯·基利（Lawrence H. Keeley）全面检查了有关前文明社会暴力与战争的人类学材料，发现90-95%的简单社会存在经常性战争活动，那些被记录为“很少或没有”战争活动的，通常是不久前被优势群体打败后逃避到边缘孤绝生态位的群体，比如被班图大扩张（Bantu expansion）^[31] 所排挤的桑人和姆布提俾格米人（Mbuti Pygmies），马来西亚塞芒人（Semang）和加拿大红铜因纽特人（Copper Iniut），战后人类学家所看到的相对和平景象，很大程度上也是欧洲殖民政府大力压制暴力活动的结果。^[32] 现代人类学家已没有机会直接观察霍布斯世界中的小社会，不过一些灾难幸存者在避难荒岛组成的临时小社会，提供了一种颇有参考价值的近似模拟，社会学家尼古拉斯·克里斯塔基斯（Nicholas Christakis）研究了1500-1900年间的众多海难，挑出其中20多个符合“灾后求生小社会”特征的案例（挑选标准是至少19位遇难者幸存并找到临时避难地，且至少生存了两个月，并且通过笔记、事后回忆或考古遗存等方式留下了足够多记录可供分析），他们的最终命运十分不同，有些陷于分歧和争吵，争抢资源，甚至相互残杀并吃掉对方，但也有一些团结互助，精诚合作，分工组织有序，并最终脱险，克里斯塔基斯发现，那些在灾后求生自救上表现最好的遇难群体有个共同特点：都拥有一位出色的领袖，并且群体内存在程度适中的地位分化。^[33] 可以想象，霍布斯世界的小群体时刻处于险境求生的状态，而考虑到战争与权威的关系，人类社会恐怕从很早起（或许自他们爬到食物链顶端以来）就已经不那么平等了，哈扎人和昆桑人的极端平等主义只是特例。

财产

打破平等主义的另一个因素是食物保存技术，存储的可能性提高了分享的机会成本，同时也降低了因狩猎失败而挨饿的风险，因而从两方面削弱了人们依靠互惠关系来抵御风险的需要；努米克人之所以摆脱集体互惠，变得高度个人主义，甚至有了货币经济，便是因为他们的主食（松子）容易保存，同时弓箭的引入也大幅提高了狩猎成功率，于是不再那么需要互惠安全网了。^[34] 存储与分享的替代关系，也可从约拉人（Yora）和施维阿尔人（Shiwiar）的对比中看出，这是亚马逊丛林中两个以狩猎兼园艺农业为生的群体，他们在各方面都很相似，但有个重要差别：约拉人分享全部肉食，大型猎物全村分配，小猎物（包括鱼）在近亲家庭间分享，而施维阿尔人从不分享小型猎物，即便像美洲貘这样的大猎物（每头几百磅）也仅在近亲家庭间分享，这是因为施维阿尔人掌握了肉类烟熏技术，并且拥有枪支和毒箭吹射器，更多捕猎中小型动物，成功率也更高，因而从两方面降低了挨饿风险。^[35] 保存技术使得财富积累成为可能，而决定财富积累上限的，则是游动性，对于那些每隔几周或一两个月就要搬迁营地的高游动性群体，携带能力便是上限，高纬度地区的采猎者通常每年只作几次季节性搬迁，因而可以囤积整个冬季或旱季的食物储备，还有不少游动群体采用中心辐射式漫游，每次短暂外游后又很快回到中心营地，长期延续的中心营地可以积累起一些建筑物和沟渠石垒等设施；冰期欧洲广泛利用洞穴的克罗马侬人（Cro-Magnon），在苔原以猛犸象骨构筑半地下房屋的格拉维特人，在北极以石块、鲸骨、木材和草皮建造半地下房屋的爱斯基摩人，积累物质财富的潜力都远高于低纬度采猎者。^[36] 随着工具制造技术的进步，不少季节性搬迁者借助运输工具提升携带上限，因纽特人的狗拉雪橇，^[37] 西伯利亚涅涅茨人（Nenets）和汉特人（Khanty）的驯鹿雪橇，^[38] 大平原夏延人（Cheyennes）的马拉草撬，^[39] 都可将上限提至数百公斤；汉特人的独木舟，和西北海岸萨利希人（Coast Salish）的木板小舟（plank canoe），更可载运数吨物资。^[40] 以捕鱼兼采猎为生的海岸萨利希人生动演示了游动性与财富积累之间的矛盾，以及人们如何努力克服它，他们每年在主营地和夏季捕鱼营地之间作季节性迁移，主营地的木板房屋十分宽敞讲究，夏季营地则小而简陋，有意思的是，其豪华大木屋的墙体和房顶木板都不用榫接结构，而是用绳子绑在梁柱上，搬迁时，所有木板都被卸下，用板舟载至夏季营地搭成简易棚屋，只有空荡荡的梁柱框架留在主营地。 得益于较低的游动性，板舟的载运能力，和长期使用的主营地，萨利希家庭可积累起相当多财富，包括生产设施与工具，房屋家具，服饰被褥，各种红铜器皿，承认私人财产权的习俗也让他们对一些捕鱼采猎地盘划分了私人权利，而且产权可沿男性家系继承，结果是，萨利希人中出现了鲜明的贫富分化，以及富人对财富的大肆炫耀；同时也须看到，游动性仍限制了其积累能力，所以大量财富都在夸富宴（potlatch）中被挥霍掉了。^[41] 私人财产权的出现从根本上动摇了原始平等主义的伦理基础，这种伦理要求个人将任何超出当前需要的东西都拿出来分享，这既让财富积累变得不可能，也消除了人们为长远收益而工作的激励，行为变得极为短视，只为眼前需求而努力，而人们之所以愿意遵循这样的规范，并非天生短视，只是为了留在平等主义所维持的那张互惠安全网中，一旦条件允许，个人就会打起自己的小算盘。

宗族

动摇上述伦理基础的另一个趋势，是宗族的兴起，宗族也是一种互惠安全网，亲属间相互接济，过继收养孤儿，在纠纷对抗中相互支持，相互承担复仇义务以保障人身安全，^[42] 等等；但族内互惠和熟人间一般互惠（generalized reciprocity）有着根本不同，它会随亲缘关系远近而区别对待，更贴近亲选择（kin selection）这一生物学法则，而一旦亲疏有别的交往原则流行起来，就会破坏一般互惠原则，类似于裙带主义（cronyism）对公共规范的破坏。 而且宗族组织有着制造不平等的内在倾向，表现在三个方面： 1）同一群体内各族的繁衍效率总会出现差异，其中一些变得更大，而一旦一般互惠原则被破坏，相互间竞争乃至冲突时，规模大的那些便有了天然优势，因而可能压服对方，将其置于从属地位，当竞争日益激烈，各宗族便努力扩大规模，这也是为何父系宗族发达的地区往往更重男轻女，更多选择性溺杀女婴（以及当代的选择性堕胎），因为高度对抗性局面中，男性成员将更有价值；^[43] 2）同样原理也适用于同一宗族的不同支系之间，香火旺盛俊杰辈出的支系，可能将欠旺支系置于从属地位； 3）宗族为领袖人物的诞生创造了更好的组织基础，因为长辈和家长天然的在族内拥有更多权威和影响力，实际上正是他们对这些能力的运用才建立和维持了宗族，假如一位足够长寿、辈份足够高的大家长恰好又是位杰出人物，便很可能脱颖而出成为领袖，同时，由于族内辈份越高亲缘越近，长辈们有很好的机会建立类似长老议事会的政治机构，获得在群体中执行规范和决定集体行动所需的强制力。 正是最后一点赋予了宗族组织在集体行动上的优势（反过来也可以说，宗族的兴起正是对集体行动的需要变得日益迫切的一种反应），这一优势将让强宗大族获得群体中的支配地位，如此一来，其他群体成员要么甘居从属地位，要么分裂出去，结果，原本较为松散而流动的各相邻群体将重组为若干单系群（unilineal group）。 相比传统游团，这些聚族而居的群体组织更紧密，更具排他性，以往像哈扎人那样在游团间随意跳槽的自由将不复存在，而这种自由曾是原始平等主义的重要基础，它使得群体很难强制其成员，强势人物也无法随意指使他人，互惠关系中若出现任何不对等的苗头，感觉被压制受委屈的一方便可出走另立门户，可是宗族化重组之后，这一选择越来越不可行了，无论跳槽还是另立门户，都会自陷于大族林立格局中的散户或弱势小族地位。 然而上述转变过程不会平滑顺畅，大族支配地位确立之前，必有一番激烈争斗，即便在此之后，各支系仍将就族内支配地位展开永不停息的争夺，一个有趣的例子可让我们对此类争夺的早期形式管窥一斑。 马楠布人（Manambu）是新几内亚东北沿岸低地的美拉尼西亚部落，其社会骨架由一个三级父系宗族构成，包含16个二级支系，政治首领从宗族长老中产生；各支系为谋取支配地位而激烈竞争，原本，竞争可通过财富积累和对外发动猎头袭击而展开，可是马楠布人太穷，哪个支系都积累不起可观财富，而猎头袭击则已被殖民政府禁止，于是竞争焦点便落在了人口与名分上。 那些人丁兴旺的支系自然会借此取得些优势，但这还不够，他们还要证明自己向来就是强枝大宗，所以祖上历代才俊辈出，为做到这一点，他们争相篡改谱系以便将那些在部落神话中留下大名的祖先说成是出自自己这一支，由于神话（连同谱系）都是口述的，因而篡改并非不可能，需要的是杰出的记忆力、口才和声势，常为名分而斗嘴的人需要记住上千个祖先名字及相应的事迹与关系。 当然，竞相篡改谱系难免会引发支系间的争议，实际上，这一名分之争在马楠布人中会以非常正式而隆重的方式进行，不妨称为仪式性斗嘴：双方各派出一组辩论者，面对面排成两列，各将一只独木舟倒扣在面前用作战鼓，女人们则在一旁舞蹈助威，一些其他支系的人也会在场围观。 斗嘴过程中，辩者每表达一个论点便将一片树叶扔在地上，每位被提及的祖先则由一根木签或一支箭代表；因为没有仲裁者，许多斗嘴不了了之，但也有些决出了胜负，一方被说的哑口无言只好认输，放弃对争议中的名号和相应巫术的权利，这通常意味着需要给孩子改名，因为马楠布人喜欢用这些名号为孩子取名。^[44] 这一习俗看似奇特，但类似的与家族血统相关的名分之争在有着宗族组织的社会中其实相当普遍，时常会闹到杀人甚至打仗的地步，萨摩亚族长们在名为福努（fono）的政治集会上会逐一吟诵每位到场族长的法阿鲁派加（fa’alupega），即记录其高贵身世的一套口诀，其中包含各种头衔及其来历，每位族长到达会场时，其他在场族长都要吟诵新到者的法阿鲁派加，然后新到者吟诵对方的，会议结束时该仪式又重复一遍，可见他们多么看重宗谱和名分。^[45]

几点概述

我们大致可以相信，在一段相当漫长的时期，当人类还生活在缺乏紧密组织的小型采猎游团中时，社会规范是相当平等主义的，但我们无法确定这究竟从何时开始，毕竟，大猿社会是完全谈不上平等的。 同样无法确定的是，像战后人类学文献所描绘的昆桑人和哈扎人那样的极端平等主义在历史上有多普遍，有许多理由令人怀疑这两个群体的代表性，比如： 1）在政府权力覆盖到那里之前，昆桑人和邻近群体之间的关系并不那么和平，因而其社会也可能并不那么平等；^[46] 2）桑人和哈扎人都是孤立孑遗的古老分支，前者和其他人类已经分开至少二三十万年了，后者也已分离七万多年，从它们的情况推出普遍结论是很危险的；^[47] 3）这两个群体都缺乏大型围猎或其他集体行动，没有食物保存技术和运输工具，也没有长期营地，而历史上许多采猎群体显然并非如此。 无论原始平等主义在早期采猎者中有多普遍和极端，如我在前文所试图阐明的，它看来并不是一种十分鲁棒（robust）的均衡，当某些条件出现时，平等就很容易松动，考虑到人类在历史上所面临条件的多样性，包括生态差异和时代差异，狩猎模式和安全压力的不同，即便简单社会中，平等主义的程度也会千差万别。 大约从旧石器晚期（Upper Paleolithic）起，一系列生态与技术条件开始导向一个不可逆的过程，伴随着定居倾向的日益增强和社会复杂度提升，等级分明的社会阶层开始涌现，这是朝向大型社会的组织进化过程的重要一环，也将是下一章的主题。

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注释：（其中所引文献详见〈参考文献〉） ^[1] 我在本书中将不对阶层（stratum）和阶级（class）作严格区分，而一律使用前一个术语来涵盖其他学者用这两个术语所表达的意思。 ^[2] Bruce G. Trigger (2003) 《理解早期文明》，第3章。 ^[3] Nancy Howell (2010) Life Histories of the Dobe !Kung, p.193. ^[4] Frank Marlowe (2010) The Hadza, ch.9; Nancy Howell (2010) ch.8. ^[5] Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus (2012) The Creation of Inequality, ch.2. ^[6] Frank Marlowe (2010) p.250. ^[7] Nancy Howell (2010) ch.8; Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus (2012) ch.2. ^[8] Frank Marlowe (2010) p.35,41,263. ^[9] Kristen J. Gremillion, “Central Place Foraging and Food Production on the Cumberland Plateau, Eastern Kentucky” in Douglas J. Kennett & Bruce Winterhalder (2006.ed) Behavioral Ecology and the Transition to Agriculture, pp.53-54. [10] Frans de Waal (2007) 《黑猩猩的政治》。 [11] Christopher Boehm (2001) Hierarchy in the Forest, ch.1,2,4. ^[12] Brian Fagan (2010) Cro-Magnon, ch.9. ^[13] Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus (2012) ch.5. ^[14] Robert L. Bettinger (2015) Orderly Anarchy, ch.4,6,8. ^[15] George B. Grinnell (2008) The Cheyenne Indians, ch.6. ^[16] Igor Krupnik & Marcia Levenson (1989) Arctic Adaptations, pp.44-49. ^[17] Lee Cronk & Beth L. Leech (2012) Meeting at Grand Central, pp.141-143; NHK (1992) 人間は何を食べてきたか, S03E01. ^[18] Brian Fagan (2010) ch.10. ^[19] Sarunas Milisauskas (2011.ed) European Prehistory, pp.80-91. ^[20] Olga Soffer & N. D. Praslov (1993.ed) From Kostenki to Clovis, ch.4. ^[21] Lawrence H. Keeley (1996) War Before Civilization, ch.3. ^[22] Azar Gat (2006) War in Human Civilization, ch.6; Lawrence H. Keeley (1996) ch.3. ^[23] Jason Hook (1985) The American Plains Indians; George B. Grinnell (1915) The Fighting Cheyennes. [24] David D. Friedman, Peter T. Leeson & David Skarbek (2019) Legal Systems Very Different From Ours, ch.13. ^[25] Azar Gat (2006) ch.2. ^[26] Monty Minyjun Hale (2012) Kurlumarniny, ch.6; Wikipedia: Moity. ^[27] C.W.M. Hart & al. (1987) The Tiwi of North Australia, ch.2; Wikipedia: Tiwi people. ^[28] Napoleon Chagnon (2013) Noble Savages, ch.1,3,8,9,12,13. ^[29] Napoleon Chagnon (2013) ch.1. ^[30] 关于猎头风俗，参见：Wikipeida: headhunting; Albert Jenks (1905) The Bontoc Igorot, ch.6; Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus (2012) ch.6,7,8,10. ^[31] Wikipedia: Bantu expansion; David Reich (2018) Who We Are and How We Got Here, ch.9. ^[32] Lawrence H. Keeley (1996) ch.2. ^[33] Nicholas A. Christakis (2019) Blueprint, ch.2. ^[34] Robert L. Bettinger (2015) Orderly Anarchy, ch.3,4,8,9. ^[35] Lawrence S. Sugiyama & Richard Chacon, “Effects of Illness and Injury on Foraging among the Yora and Shiwiar,” in Lee Cronk et al.(eds.) Adaptation and Human Behavior (2000), pp.374-375. ^[36] Brian Fagan (2010) ch.7; Sarunas Milisauskas (2011) pp.87-89; Molly Lee & Gregory A. Reinhardt (2003) Eskimo Architecture. ^[37] Molly Lee & Gregory A. Reinhardt (2003) p.5; Igor Krupnik & Marcia Levenson (1989) p.51,244. ^[38] Robert McGhee (2005) The Last Imaginary Place, pp.59-60; Peter D. Jordan (2014) Technology as Human Social Tradition, ch.3. ^[39] George B. Grinnell (2008) pp.68-69. ^[40] Peter D. Jordan (2014) ch.3,4. ^[41] Peter D. Jordan (2014) ch.4. ^[42] 有关复仇作为一种共同安全机制的逻辑，见辉格（2017）第II部分第7章。 ^[43] Wikipeida: Infanticide, Sex-selective abortion; Siobhan M. Mattison et al., “Offspring sex preferences among patrilineal and matrilineal Mosuo in Southwest China revealed by differences in parity progression,” in R Soc Open Sci. 2016 Sep; 3(9): 160526. ^[44] Simon J. Harrison (2006) Stealing People’s Names, ch.6-8. ^[45] Derek Freeman (1983) 《玛格丽特·米德与萨摩亚》，第8章。 ^[46] Lawrence H. Keeley (1996) p.29. ^[47] David Reich (2018) ch.9.

【2021-12-06】 一份更大规模的研究确认了早先我说起过的一个观察：两性在权利和机会上越平等，职业选择的性别差异就越强烈，并与刻板印象越接近， 图中纵轴为女性权利指数，横轴的指标较复杂，是 0.5 x（男生梦想职业与刻板印象相符并且与其父亲职业相似的比例+女生梦想职业与刻板印象相符并且与其母亲职业相似的比例） 来源：Sex Differences in Adolescents’ Occupational Aspirations: Variations Across Time and Place

The Misogynist Origins of American Labor Law 美国劳动法的仇女起源 作者:Jeffrey Tucker @ 2016-02-17 译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 来源:FEE,https://fee.org/articles/government-s-war-on-women-1900-1920/ Many now credit government for past progress in gender equality, mostly because of late 20th-century legislation that appeared to benefit women in the workplace. This is a distorted view. Few know that government at all levels actually sought to prevent that progress. 如今许多人把过去在性别平等上的进步归功于政府，主要是因为二十世纪后期的立法看似让职业女性受益。然而这个观点与现实不符。鲜为人知的是，各个层级的政府都曾企图阻挠这种进步。 A century ago, just as markets were attracting women to professional life, government regulation in the United States specifically targeted women to restrict their professional choices. The regulations were designed to drive them out of offices and factories and back into their homes — for their own good and the good of their families, their communities, and the future of the race. 一个世纪前，正当市场吸引女性进入职场之际，美国的政府管制刻意将女性作为目标人群，限制她们的职业选择。这些管制措施的目的是把女性从办公室和工厂驱赶回家中——为了女性和她们家庭、社区，以及民族的未来。 The new controls — the first round of a century of interventions in the free labor market — were designed to curb the sweeping changes in economics and demographics that were taking place due to material advances in the last quarter of the 19th century. The regulations limited women’s choices so they would stop making what elites considered the wrong decisions. 这些新的控制措施——是整整一个世纪对自由劳动力市场的干涉浪潮的第一波——意在阻止由于十九世纪最后二十五年物质进步所带来的经济和人口统计上的巨大变化。管制措施限制了女性的选择，这样她们就无法做出当时社会精英眼中的“错误”决定。 The real story, which is only beginning to emerge within the academic literature, is striking. It upends prevailing narratives about the relationship between government and women’s rights. Many cornerstones of the early welfare and regulatory state were designed to hobble women’s personal liberty and economic advancement. They were not progressive but reactionary, an attempt to turn back the clock. Women’s Work Is Not New 女性工作不是什么新鲜事 It was the freedom and opportunity realized in the latter period of the 19th century that changed everything for women workers, opening up new lines of employment. The growth of industrial capitalism meant that women could leave the farm and move to the city. They could choose to leave home without having married — and even stay in the workforce as married women. They enjoyed more choice in education and professional life than ever before. New clerical jobs, unknown a century earlier, were everywhere to be had. Women’s wages were rising quickly, by an impressive 16 percent from 1890 through 1920. Nor were women working at “exploitative” wages. A Rand corporation study of wage differentials discovered an interesting fact: women’s wages relative to men’s were higher in 1920 than they were in 1980. 新的文书类工作在那之前一个世纪还不存在，而此时已经到处都是。从1890年至1920年女性的工资快速上升，涨幅高达16%。女性的工资并非是“剥削性”的。兰德公司一项关于工资差异的研究揭示了一个有趣的事实：1920年女性工资相对于男性工资的比率要高于1980年。 The Law Intervenes 法律介入 And yet, these were also the years in which we first saw government intervention in the labor market, much of it specifically targeting women. As historian Thomas Leonard argues in his spectacular book Illiberal Reformers (2016), an entire generation of intellectuals and politicians panicked about what this could mean for the future of humanity. 然而，在那些年政府首次开始介入劳动力市场，明确针对的目标主要是女性。正如历史学家Thomas Leonard在其力作《非自由的改革者（Illiberal Reformers）》中指出的，整整一代的知识分子和政治家恐慌于女性工资上升会给人类未来带来的影响。 Society must control reproduction and therefore what women do with their lives. So said the prevailing ideology of the age. We couldn’t have a situation in which markets enticed women to leave the control of their families and move to the city. 社会必须控制生育，因而也就必须控制女性的人生。那个时代盛行的意识形态如是说。市场引诱女性离开家庭的控制搬迁到城市，这种情况让人无法接受。 Though they are called Progressives, the reformers’ rhetoric had more in common with the “family values” movement of the 1970s and ‘80s — with pseudoscientific race paranoia playing the role that religion would later play. In many ways, they were the ultimate conservatives, attempting to roll back the tide of history made possible by the advance of the capitalist economy. 尽管他们被称为进步主义者，这些改革者的话语倒跟1970和80年代的“家庭价值观”运动有更多共同点——也包括日后宗教也运用的伪科学种族妄想狂那一套。在许多方面，这些人是终极的保守主义者，他们企图使资本经济的进步带来的历史浪潮倒流。 They were incredibly successful. Over a 10-year period between 1909 and 1919, 40 states restricted the number of hours that women employees could work. Fifteen states passed new minimum wage laws to limit entry-level jobs. Most states created stipends for single-parent families, specifically to incentivize women to reject commercial life, return to protected domesticity, and stop competing with men for wages. 他们大获全胜。1909年至1919年的十年间，40个州限制了女性雇员可以工作的小时数。15个州通过了新的最低工资法来限制初级工作职位。大多数州制定了对单职工家庭的津贴，特意激励女性抵制商业生活回归被保护的家庭生活，同时不再与男人在职场上竞争。 Such laws were completely new in American history (and in almost all of modern history) because they intervened so fundamentally in the right of workers and employers to make any sort of contract. The Progressive agenda involved government deeply in issues that directly affected people’s ability to provide for themselves. It also created unprecedented impositions on both employees and their employers. Such laws would have been inconceivable even 50 years earlier. 这些法律在美国历史上（同时也在几乎整个现代历史上）没有先例。原因在于它们如此根本性地介入了工人和雇主订立任意契约的权利。在一些直接影响人们自给自足能力的议题上，进步主义的议程和政府关联极深。同时进步主义创立了前所未有的税项，同时向雇主和雇员征收。这样的法律即使在五十年前也是不可想象的。 How did all this happen so fast, and why? 政府的干预如何迅速实施？为何能得逞？ The Inferiority of Women 女性的劣势 Richard T. Ely, the hugely influential founder of the American Economic Association and the godfather of progressive economics, explained the issue clearly, laying the groundwork for the laws that followed. His 1894 book Socialism and Social Reform expressed a panic about women’s entry into the workforce: Richard T. Ely 是美国经济协会极具影响力的创建者，也是进步主义经济学的教父。他曾清楚地阐述了这个问题，为之后产生的法律打下了基石。他在1894年发表的著作《社会主义与社会改革》中对女性加入劳动力大军表达了恐慌：

Restrictions should be thrown about the employment of married women, and their employment for a considerable period before and after child-birth should be prohibited under any circumstances. There should also be a restriction of the work-day, as in England, for children and young persons under eighteen, and for women. Such a limitation having beneficial effect upon the health of the community…. Night work should be prohibited for women and persons under eighteen years of age and, in particular, all work injurious to the female organism should be forbidden to women. 应该限制雇用已婚女性，在任何情形下，都应该禁止雇用处于分娩期前后的女性，禁止雇用期应该相当长。我们应该仿效英格兰，限制儿童、十八岁以下的年轻人和女性的工作时长。这种限制利于社会健康发展。……应该禁止女性和不满十八岁者上夜班，尤其应该禁止女性从事那些损害女性生理机体的工作。

If the reference to the “female organism” sounds strange, remember that this generation of intellectuals believed in eugenics — using state force to plan the emergence of the model race — and hence saw women mainly as propagators of the race, not human individuals with the right to choose. 如果书中所谓的“女性生理机体”听着别扭，请记住那一代知识分子相信优生学——即使用国家的力量来制定生产模范种族的计划，因此他们将女性主要看成生育者，而非拥有选择权利的个人。 For anyone who believed that government had a responsibility to plan human production (and most intellectuals at the time did believe this), the role of women was critical. They couldn’t be allowed to do what they wanted, go where they wanted, or make lives for themselves. This was the normal thought pattern for the generation that gave the United States unprecedented legal restrictions on the labor market. 对于任何相信政府有责任对人类生育做规划的人（当时大多数知识分子确实相信）来说，女性的角色至关重要。女性不能被允许做自己想做的事，去她们想去的地方，或过她们自己想要的生活。这就是当时一代人通常的思维模式，而正是这种思维模式让美国政府对劳动力市场进行前所未有的法律限制。 The Supreme Court Weighs In 最高法院的介入 Consider the Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which considered state legislation on maximum working hours and decided in favor of the state. Oregon was hardly unusual; it was typical of the 20 states that had already passed such laws directed at women’s freedom to choose employment. From the text of Colorado’s law passed in 1903: “No woman” shall “work or labor for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day … where such labor, work, or occupation by its nature, requires the woman to stand or be upon her feet.” 看一下Muller诉俄勒冈州这个最高法院案例，最高法院认可对最大工作小时数的州立法，并做了对州政府有利的判决。俄勒冈州并非特别，它只是已经通过此类针对女性选择工作自由的法律的二十个州的典型。在1903年通过的科罗拉多州的法律这样写道：“没有女性”应该“在一天的24小时中进行8小时以上的工作或劳动……这里指的是需要女性站立完成的工作、劳动或职业。” The decision in Muller v. Oregon, then, ratified such laws all over the country. Today, this case is widely considered the foundation of progressive labor law. What’s not well known is that the brief that settled the case was a remarkable piece of pseudoscience that argued for the inferiority of women and hence their need for special protections from the demands of commercial enterprise. That brief was filed by future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis. 于是，最高法院对Muller诉俄勒冈州案的判决正式批准了全国范围内此类法律。今天，该诉讼被普遍认为是进步主义劳动法的基础。而不为人所周知的是，终结该诉讼的那份简报是一篇令人称奇的伪科学文章，该简报论述了女性的劣势，认为女性需要特殊的保护使她们免受商业公司侵害。这份简报正是后来成为最高法院法官的Louis Brandeis提交的。 The Weird and Awful “Brandeis Brief” 奇怪又糟糕的“Brandeis简报” The “Brandeis Brief” argued that the law had to stop the massive influx of women into the workplace because women have “special susceptibility to fatigue and disease,” because female blood has more water in it than men’s blood. Their blood composition also accounts for why women have less focus, energy, and strength generally, according to the brief. “Brandeis简报”认为法律必须制止大量女性流入劳动力大军，因为女性“特别容易疲劳和生病”，原因是与男性相比，女性血液中含有更高比例的水分。按照这份简报的说法，女性的血液成分比例也解释了为何女性通常在注意力、精力和体力上逊于男性。。 “Physicians are agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in the powers of persistent attention and application.” “医生们认同女性在一切和耐力有关的方面从根本上弱于男性的观点：这些方面包括肌肉力量，神经系统的能量，持续保持注意力和坚持的能力。” Moreover, “In strength as well as in rapidity and precision of movement women are inferior to men. This is not a conclusion that has ever been contested.” 此外，“不仅在力量上，在速度和动作的精确度上，女性都劣于男性。这一结论从未受到过质疑。” Long hours are “more disastrous to the health of women than to men,” the brief explained. Government therefore needed to regulate work hours for the “health, safety, morals, and general welfare of women.” 长时间工作“对女性健康的损害要大于对男性，”该简报这样解释道。因此政府需要为了“女性的健康、安全、道德，以及生活幸福”对工作时长进行管制。 Restrictions on work hours were therefore essential. “It is of great hygienic importance on account of the more delicate physical organization of woman,” the brief said, “and will contribute much toward the better care of children and the maintenance of a regular family life.” 因此限制工作时间就至关重要。“考虑到女性生理组织更脆弱，（限制工作时间长度）在卫生上具有重大意义”，该简报这样写道，“这对关爱儿童和维持正常家庭生活都非常有益。” This brief is also notable for being the first to combine science, however bogus, and public policy in an appeal to the Supreme Court. 这份简报另一个闻名于世的原因，是它首次在向最高法院的上诉中将科学——尽管是冒牌货——与公共政策结合在一起。 Florence Kelley’s Dream of Nonworking Women Florence Kelley的女性不工作梦想 One might suspect that the entire effort was a male-driven one to stop female progress, but that’s not the case. A leader in the campaign for such labor interventions was writer and activist Florence Kelley. Modern progressives celebrate her activism for maximum work hours, the 10-hour workday, minimum wages, and children’s rights. Indeed, she is considered a great hero by the sanitized version of history that progressives tell each other. 现在可能有人会怀疑这整个事情都是男性驱使的，意在阻止女性进步，但事实并非如此。支持政府介入劳动力市场的运动的一位领导者Florence Kelley是一名作家兼激进分子。现代进步主义者颂扬了她在最大工作时长、十小时工作制、最低工资和儿童权益上的激进主义。没错，在进步主义者相互传颂的历史洁本中，她是一位伟大的英雄。 Before we cheer her accomplishments, however, we should look at Kelley’s driving motivation. Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, she explained that she wanted a minimum wage as a wage floor to stop manufacturing plants and retail outlets from employing women for less than they could otherwise employ men. 但在为她的成就欢呼之前，我们应该看看Kelley的动机。在发表于《美国社会学杂志》的文章上，她解释道，她支持最低工资标准是因为最低工资相当于工资门槛，可以不让工厂和零售商店以低于男性工资的标准雇佣女性。 Retail stores, she wrote, tend to “minimize the employment of men, substituting them for women, girls, and boys, employed largely at less than living wages.” It was precisely such competition from women and children that Kelley intended to stop, so that men could earn higher wages and women could return to traditional roles. 她写道，零售商店倾向于“将雇佣的男性数量最小化，取而代之的是以低于基本生活工资的薪酬雇佣女性，女孩和男孩。”Kelley希望制止的正是这些来自于女性和儿童的就业竞争，这样男性就可以赚更多工资，而女性则可以回归她们的传统角色。 In her book Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905), Kelley said that long working hours had to be ended for women because commercial life was introducing “vice” into communities (“vice” for this generation was the preferred euphemism for every manner of sexual sin). Worse, women were choosing commercial life over home “on their own initiative.” 在出版于1905年的《一些通过立法获得的伦理好处》一书中，Kelley认为女性长时间工作必须被阻止，因为商业化生活正在将“恶习”带入社区（那一代人更喜欢用“恶习”这一委婉说法来指代任何与性相关的罪孽 ）。而更糟的是，女性在商业化生活和家庭二者间选择了前者，完全是“自己主动的”。 Kelley considered it necessary to restrict women’s rights for their own “health and morality,” she said, and also to boost men’s wages so women would stay home under the care of their mothers, fathers, suitors, and husbands. Kelley认为有必要为了女性的“健康和道德”限制女性权利。在书中她写道，限制女性权利也是为了推动男性工资的增长，从而使得女性可以留在家中受她们的父母、求婚者和丈夫们的照顾。 Moreover, to make such work illegal would make “righteous living” more practical for women. If they stopped being rewarded in wages, they would return to domestic life. Kelley even regretted the invention of electricity because it allowed women to work late at factories, when they should be at home reading to children by firelight. 此外，将女性长时间工作定为非法会使得“正直的生活”对女性来说更为实际可行。如果女性不再受工资回报的奖励，她们就会回归家庭生活。Kelley甚至还为电的发明感到遗憾，因为是电让女性可以夜晚在工厂工作，而此时她们本应在家中的炉火旁给孩子们讲故事。 In Kelley’s view, the ideal role of women with children is not to enter commercial life at all: “Family life in the home is sapped in its foundation when mothers of young children work for wages.” It’s an opinion with which some may still sympathize, but should such an opinion be imposed on working families by coercive legislation? For this paragon of progressive social reform, it was clear that lawmakers had to force women back into the home. 在Kelley看来，女性面对孩子的理想角色是完全不进入商业化生活：“当小孩的母亲们为工资工作时，家庭生活的基础被削弱了。”现在有些人依然支持这样的观点，但这样的观点应该通过强制性立法被强加于双职工家庭吗？按照这种进步主义社会改革的范式，立法者必须强迫女性回家。 Florence Kelley and the movement she represented sought to disemploy women and get everyone back to a premodern form of domestic living. She wanted not more rights for women but fewer. The workplace was properly for men, who were to get paid high wages sufficient for the whole family. That was the basis for her support of a range of legislation to drive women out of the workforce and put an end to the new range of options available to them, options that many women were happy to choose. Florence Kelley与她代表的运动，追求的是女性不被雇佣以及所有人都回归现代之前的家庭生活。她要的不是女性拥有更多权利，而是更少。工作场所适合男性，因为他们在那里能获得高薪酬，足够养活全家人。就是基于这样的理念，她支持通过广泛的立法将女性从工作场所驱逐出去，使女性不再有一系列新的选项——很多女性乐于选择的选项。 Fear the Women of East Prussia 对东普鲁士女性的恐惧 All this scholarship and activism is one thing, but what about the popular press? 这些学术研究和激进主义是一回事，那大众传媒又怎么样呢？ Professor Edward A. Ross, author of Sin and Society, spoke out in the New York Times on May 3, 1908. In an article titled “The Price Woman Pays to Industrial Progress,” Ross warned that America’s “fine feminine form” was endangered by commercial society. Edward A. Ross教授是《罪与社会》一书的作者。他在1908年3月3日纽约时报上一篇题为《女性为产业进步所付出的代价》文章中警告了“精致的女性气质”正在被商业化社会所危害。 If women were permitted to work, an evolutionary selection process would govern their reproduction to the detriment of the human race. The graceful women who would otherwise bear beautiful children would be pushed out of the gene pool and replaced by “squat, splay-footed, wide-backed, flat-breasted, broad-faced, short-necked — a type that lacks every grace that we associate with women.” 如果允许女性工作，进化选择过程会主宰她们的生育，危害人类。本来会生养漂亮孩子的优雅女性会被挤出基因池，取而代之的将是“矮胖、八字脚、宽背、平胸、脸蛋平庸、脖子短的女性——这种类型的女性在任何方面都不能让我们把女性优雅与之相联系。” Ross’s example: “the women of East Prussia,” who “bear a child in the morning” and “are out in the field in the afternoon.” Ross举的例子是“东普鲁士女人”，她们“在早晨刚生完孩子”，“下午就下地”。 The professor explained that women who had worked in factories would not make suitable bearers of children. “Think of the discouraging situation of the young man who after he has been married two or three years finds he has a wife who at the age of 28 or 30 has collapsed, become a miserable invalid, suffering aches and pains all the time.” Why, she might find herself “unable to keep the home attractive.” And all of this “because of just a few extra dollars added to the profits of the employer or a few extra dollars saved to the consumer.” 该教授解释说，在工厂工作的女性不会是合适的生养者。“试想一下这样令人沮丧的情况：一个年轻男人在和他妻子结婚两三年后发现她在28或30岁的年纪垮掉了，终日一身病痛。”这样的妻子可能会发现自己“无法把家里弄得漂亮”。而这一切“仅仅是为了让雇主多赚几美元，或是让消费者多省几美元”。 Because of the dangerous combination of employment and natural selection, Ross contended, the government had to extend a hand to help these women by limiting working hours and establishing a high bar to enter the workforce: minimum wages. 由于雇佣劳动和自然选择的危险结合，Ross主张政府必须通过限制工作时长，并对进入劳动力市场设置高门槛——即最低工资——向女性伸出援手。 Only through such enlightened interventions could government save women from the workplace, so that they could return to the maternal duties of rearing “girls who have the qualities of fineness — grace and charm.” 政府只有通过这样高明的干预才能将女性从工作场所中拯救出来，这样女性才能回归母亲的角色，抚养“具有优雅和美丽这些优秀特质的女孩”。 Is This Satire? 讽刺否？ If this reads like satire, sadly it is not. Nor were such views unusual in a generation of ruling-class intellectuals, politicians, and activists that embraced eugenics and rejected capitalism as too random, too chaotic, too liberating. Their plan was to reestablish and entrench by law the family and marital structure they believed in, which absolutely precluded a generation of women making individual choices over their own lives. Every trend panicked the eugenic generation. They fretted about the falling birth rate among those who should be reproducing and the rising birth rate among those who shouldn’t be. They worried about morals, about competition, about health, about culture. Most of all, they regretted the change that a dynamic economy was bringing about. 所有的时代趋向都让相信优生学的一代人恐慌。他们担心本应生养的群体的生育率在下降，而那些本不应生育的群体的生育率却在上升。他们忧虑于道德、竞争、健康和文化。所有问题中他们最担心的是充满活力的经济即将带来的改变。 Thus, from 1900 through 1920, a period that set the stage for a century of interventions in the labor market, hundreds of laws stifling women were passed in every state and at the federal level, too. None dared call it misogyny, but this is real history, however rarely it is told. 因此，1900至1920年间，政府为干预劳动力市场打好了舞台，这种干预持续了一个世纪。数以百计窒息女性的法律在所有州以及联邦层面上通过。没人敢称之为厌女，但这是真实的历史，尽管很少被说起。 Feminists against Regulation 对抗管控的女权主义 Laws that disemployed thousands of women nationwide led to vast protests. The Equal Opportunity League, an early feminist organization in New York, lobbied the state legislature to repeal the bans on work. And it received quite the press coverage. 使全国范围内成千上万的女性失去工作的法律导致了大范围的抗议。机会平等联盟是一个位于纽约的早期女权组织，它游说州立法机构废除对女性工作的禁令，得到了相当多的媒体报道。 “So-called ‘welfare’ legislation is not asked for or wanted by real working women,” the league said. “These ‘welfare’ bills are drafted by self-styled social uplifters who assert that working women do not know enough to protect themselves.” “所谓的“福利”立法不是真正在工作的女性要求或内心想要的，”该联盟如是说。“这些“福利”法案由自封的社会提升者起草，他们认为工作的女性不知如何保护自己。” “Are women people? Women are no longer the wards of the State and a law that is unconstitutional for a man voter is equally unconstitutional for a woman voter.” “女性也是人吧？女性不再是州政府的被监护人，对男性投票人来说违宪的法律对女性投票人来说一样违宪。” “Working at night is not more injurious than working in the daytime,” the league argued. “Many women prefer to work at night because the wage is higher, opportunities for advancement greater, and women with children can enjoy being with their child after school hours in the day time.” “在晚上工作不比在白天工作更有害”，该联盟这样认为。“许多女性喜欢在晚上工作是因为工资更高，升职的机会更大，而且有孩子的女性可以在白天孩子放学后和孩子在一起。” In fact, the phrase “equal pay for equal work” was not created to mandate higher wages for women. It was a league slogan invoked to argue against laws that made it “a crime to employ women even five minutes after the eight-hour day.” The phrase emerged as a preferred slogan to protest in favor of free markets, not against them. 事实上，“同工同酬”这一警句的出现并非为了强制提高女性工资。它是联盟的一句口号，用来反对那些认定“8小时工作时间之外即使多雇佣女性5分钟也是犯罪”的法律。这一广受欢迎警句的是作为亲市场而非反对自由市场的口号而提出的。 The Equal Opportunity League also passionately opposed the minimum wage law. Such laws, it argued, “while purporting to be for [women’s] benefit, would really be a serious handicap to them in competing with men workers for desirable positions.” 平等机会联盟也积极地反对最低工资法。联盟认为这样的法律“尽管本意是为了照顾（女性）利益，实质上却让女性在与男性工人竞争好职位时受到严重妨碍”。 In short, the conclusion of the League is that these proposed bills and laws, ostensibly intended to protect and shield the woman worker, will, if permitted to stand, unquestionably work her industrial ruin and throw her back into the slough of drudgery out of which she is just emerging after centuries of painful, laborious effort to better her condition. ("Women’s Work Limited by Law," New York Times, January 18, 1920) 简单来说，联盟的结论是这些提议中的法案和法律表面上意在保护女性工人，实际上一旦通过则毫无疑问会毁坏女性的职业生涯，将女性赶回家务重活的泥沼。而女性在经历数个世纪痛苦艰难的努力后才刚刚脱离这一泥沼而改善了自己的状况。（《女性的工作被法律所限》，《纽约时报》1920年1月18日。） Restriction Becomes Liberation? 限制变成了解放？ The fairy tale version of history says that during the 20th century, government freed women to become newly empowered in the workplace. The reality is exactly the opposite. Just as the market was granting women more choices, government swept in to limit them in the name of health, purity, family values, and social uplift. Such laws and regulations are still around today, though they have been recharacterized in a completely different way. As Orwell might say, somewhere along the way, restriction became liberation. 历史的童话版本说，在20世纪政府给予了女性自由，让女性在工作场所拥有了权利。真相恰好相反。市场给予女性更多的选择，而政府却插手进来以健康、纯洁、家庭价值观和社会地位提升等名义限制女性的选择。这类法律和法规在今天仍然存在，虽然它们以完全不同的方式被重新描绘。正如奥威尔所说，在通往动物庄园路途中，不知从何处起，限制变成了解放。 (Author’s note: I’m grateful to Thomas Leonard’s Illiberal Reformers for providing the footnotes I followed to write this piece. Also, much more rethinking of Progressive Era politics and its impact on the family is discussed in Steven Horwitz’s Hayek’s Modern Family, newly published by Palgrave.) （作者附言：非常感激Thomas Leonard的《非自由的改革者》，循着该书提供的脚注，我写下了此文。另外，对进步时代的政治及其对家庭之影响的更多再思考，在Steven Horwitz所著的由Palgrave最新出版的《哈耶克的现代家庭》一书中有更多讨论。） （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Lottery 彩票 作者:Gregory Cochran @ 2015-04-22 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen) 来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/the-lottery/ Lotteries can be useful natural experiments; we can use them to test the accuracy of standard sociological theories, in which rich people buy their kids extra smarts, bigger brains, better health, etc. 彩票可以视为一种有用的自然实验。我们可以用它们来检测标准社会学理论的准确度。这些理论认为，富人能给他们的孩子买到额外的智慧、更大的大脑和更健康的身体，等等。 David Cesarini, who I met at that Chicago meeting, has looked at the effect of winning the lottery in Sweden. He found that the “effects of parental wealth on infant health, drug consumption, scholastic performance and cognitive and non-cognitive skills can be bounded to a tight interval around zero.” 在芝加哥那次会议上我遇到了David Cesarini。他研究了在瑞典中彩票的影响。他发现，“父母的财富对婴儿健康、药品消费、学业表现，以及认知和非认知技能的影响，仅在一个几乎为零的小区间内。” As I once mentioned, there was an important land lottery in Georgia in 1832. The winners received an 160-acre farm. But by 1880, their descendants were no more literate, their occupational status no higher. The families in the top 2/3rds of income managed to hang on to some of their windfall, but lower-income families did not. 我曾经提到过，1832年在佐治亚州有过一次重要的土地抽彩。中奖者们得到了160英亩的农场。但是到1880年，（和未中奖者相比），他们后代的教育水平并不更高，他们的职业地位也不更好。收入在前2/3的家庭设法保住了他们的一些意外之财，而低收入的家庭则没能如此。 This remind of a story by Gerald Kersh, “Whatever Happened to Corporal Cuckoo?” – About a medieval soldier who stumbled into immortality. Someone asks him (in 1945) – why hadn’t he saved his pay?  With compound interest, yaddaa yadda. 这让我想起Gerald Kersh写的一个故事，“Cuckoo下士怎么了？”——讲的是一个无意间获得了永生的中世纪士兵的故事。有人问他（在1945年），为什么不把工资存下来呢？有复利，等等等等。 “Why didn’t I save my pay? Because I’m what I am, you mug! Hell, once upon a time, if I’d stayed away from cards, I could’ve bought Manhattan Island for less than what I lost to a Dutchman called Bruncker drawing ace-high for English guineas!  Save my pay! If it wasn’t one thing it was another. I lay off liquor. Okay. So if it’s not liquor, it’s a woman. I lay off women. Okay. Then it’s cards or dice. I always meant to save my pay; but I never had it in me to save my pay!  Doctor Paré’s stuff fixed me–and when I say it fixed me, I mean, it fixed me, just like I was, and am, and always will be. ” “为什么我没有存下工资? 因为我就是我，你个傻瓜！见鬼，曾几何时，如果我离开了牌局，把和人玩‘A大’赌几尼时输给那个叫Bruncker的荷兰佬的钱省下来，那可是买下曼哈顿岛还有余。存钱！不是这事就是那事。我戒掉了酒。好吧，如果不是酒，那便是女人。我戒掉了女人。好吧，接着就是牌或者骰子。我总是想要存钱，但是我从来就不是存工资的人! Paré医生的药治好了我——当我说它治好了我，我的意思是，它装配好了我，就像我过去，现在，永远都是的那样。” Low leverage of wealth on your children’s traits is something that exists in a particular society, with a particular kind of technology. Back in medieval times, a windfall could have kept your kids alive in a famine, and that certainly had a long-term positive effect on their cognitive skills.  Dead men take no tests. The most effective medical interventions today are cheap – everyone in Sweden and the US already has them – but there are places where those interventions are not universally available. Some families in Mozambique can afford artemisin, some can’t – this must make a difference. 财富对儿童性格的低影响存在于拥有特定技术的特定社会。回到中世纪时代，一笔意外之财可以让你的小孩在饥荒中存活，这必然就会对他们的认知技能有长期的正面影响。死人不能参加测试。当今最有效的医疗干预措施是便宜的——在瑞典和美国人人都已经拥有了——然而还有些地方，这些干预并不是普遍可得的。莫桑比克的一些家庭可以负担得起青蒿素『译注：一种有效的抗疟疾药物』，另一些则负担不起——这肯定会有重大影响。 Suppose we had a method of dramatically improving a kid’s genetic potential for intelligence and success, one that cost five million dollars a pop: then wealth could influence the next generation in ways that it can’t today. In other words, Cesarani’s conclusions are correct for Sweden-now (but not for Sweden in 1700), probably correct for the US today, but maybe not true tomorrow. 假设我们有一种特效药可以显著提高孩子在智力和成就方面的遗传潜力，五百万美元一针；那么财富将可以以现在不能的方式影响下一代。换句话说，Cesarani的结论对今天的瑞典来说是正确的（但不是1700年的瑞典），可能对今天的美国也是对的，但未来却不一定正确。 It is not just wealth that has a small effect on your kid’s potential: playing Mozart doesn’t help either. Other than locking away the ball-peen hammers, it’s hard to think of any known approach that does have much effect – although we don’t know everything, and maybe there are undiscovered effective approaches (other than genetic engineering). For example, iodine supplements have a good effect in areas that are iodine-deficient. We now know (since 2014) that bromine is an essential trace element – maybe people in some parts of the world would benefit from bromine supplementation. 不仅仅是财富对小孩的潜能影响甚微：练习莫扎特也没有什么帮助。除了锁起圆头锤【编注：意思大概是可以防止孩子把自己的脑袋敲破】，很难想象任何已知的方法会有很大的影响——虽然我们不知道所有的事情，或许有未被发现的有效方法（除基因工程以外）。比如，碘补充剂对碘缺乏地区有很好的效果。现在（2014年之后）我们知道，溴也是一种必要的微量元素——或许在这个世界的一些地方人们会受益于溴补充。 What about the social interventions that people are advocating, like Pre-K?  Since shared family effects (family environment surely matters more than some external social program) are small by adulthood, I think they’re unlikely to have any lasting effect.  We might also note that the track record isn’t exactly encouraging. If there was a known and feasible way of boosting academic performance, you’d think that those teachers in Atlanta would have tried it. Sure beats prison. 人们提倡的社会干预怎么样呢，比如学前教育？由于共享家庭的影响（家庭环境肯定比一些外部社会项目更重要）到成年时已经很小，我认为他们不太可能会有持久的影响。我们可能也已注意到这方面的跟踪研究并不那么令人鼓舞。如果有一个已知且可行的方法来提高学习成绩，我想那些亚特兰大的教师们大概已经试过了。当然，肯定比监狱强多了。 Maybe there’s an effective approach using fmri and biofeedback – wouldn’t hurt to take a look.  But even if it did work, it might simply boost everyone equally, and obviously nobody gives a shit about that. 或许有一个有效的方法使用功能性磁共振成像（fmri）和生物反馈——看一看无妨。但是即便可以，它可能只是平等的提高每个人，但显然没有人在乎这一点。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-08-14】 @whigzhou: 只有将竞争在性别间完全隔离，才可能让男女运动员拿到数量大致相同的奖牌，同理，必须实行某种（有形或无形的）种族隔离制度，才可能让各种族在职业竞技场上获得大致相同的报酬和晋升机会，现在你们大概明白平权法的精髓所在了吧？ @去了哪儿的人: 不知道为吗没有这样的言论——某族人居然一块金牌都没，种族歧视啊，领这种奖是一种侮辱。 @whigzhou: 更奇怪的是竟然没有人主张将赛事分成17个性别举行，可能是因为最近黄金太贵～  

【2016-03-07】 @Ent_evo 一个理科生对三八劳动妇女节的杂感 http://t.cn/Rw3aI8T @Ent_evo: 转眼一年了，好像也没有什么变化 @whigzhou: “为“男性掌控资源”这一现状公开辩护的人，通常绕来绕去总会绕到生物属性上面……这恐怕并不是最重要的理由，但这应该是唯一还能拿出来说说而不被骂成狗的理由了”——为什么需要辩护？若一种现状并非强制或权利缺失的结果，它就不需要辩护 @whigzhou: 或者说，选择自由就是充分的辩护理由 @whigzhou: 比如一种简单的可能情形，被认为“掌控着资源”（其实这种说法很可疑，姑且接受）的那些职业圈，充满尔虞我诈穷凶极恶的好斗氛围，多数女性不喜欢进入，那你们有什么好操心的？ @whigzhou: “掌控着资源”这种说法之可疑，可以考虑这样一种可能情形：某女要求某男必须挣来很多钱才肯嫁给他，嫁了后用这些钱养大五个儿子，并教导、鼓励、帮助这五个儿子个个又挣来大钱，那么究竟是谁在“掌控着资源”？ @能年驼背母猴子的长颈鹿:然而资源的获取是由男性决定的 @whigzhou: 上海丈母娘好像不同意这说法 @whigzhou: 认为女性职业选择比男性更受限是传统农业社会的特点，是又一个流行谬见，实际上，传统社会规范对两性之社会角色所施加的约束同样严格，两性中哪一个职业选择更宽，随分工结构而异，许多社会的女性职业选择（或经济活动类型）比男性更丰富，比如西非和东南亚，出入本地市场做小生意的，大部分是女性。 @whigzhou: 在铁路之前早期工业时代，欧美工厂大部分雇工是婚前年轻女性，当时的工厂销售半径小，其规模无法提供大批常年全日制职位，多数雇工职位是季节性或高度波动性的，因而作为家庭收入支柱的成年男性不会轻易转去工厂，能够雇到的，大多是在婚前为自己攒点嫁妆的年轻女孩。 @whigzhou: 直到有了铁路电报之后，出现众多面向全国性市场的规模化连续生产工厂，能够提供大量全日制职位，成年男性才大批成为工厂雇工，等到他们成了雇工市场主力之后，便开始组织工会，用劳工法和最低工资法努力将女性驱赶出雇工市场 @whigzhou: 西非约鲁巴人是典型的父权社会，但其贸易活动几乎完全由女性包办

The Economic Inequality in Academia 学术界的经济不平等 作者：Richard Goldin @ 2015-8-13 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Who视之 来源：Counterpunch，http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/08/13/progressives-and-the-economic-inequality-in-academia/ In focusing on the wealthy as the singular source of economic inequality, progressive politics obscures the machineries of privilege which function at all levels of society. Individuals are trapped within these mechanisms; their lives lessened in ways that are far more damaging than the actions of the “one per cent.” 进步派政治活动聚焦于有钱人，将之作为经济不平等的唯一源头，从而未能看到在社会各个层面均在发挥作用的特权机制。个体受困于这类机制；他们的生活被削弱，其作用方式远比“1%们”【译注：指占人口总数1%的顶层富人】的行为更为有害。 Economic hierarchies are maintained not by brute force, but by strategies which rationalize the privilege of a few and the struggle of many. Within a multitude of economic contexts, structures of inequality are arduously perpetuated, even by those who consistently profess a belief in economic justice. Progressives need to analyze these contradictions and to expose the strategies which are utilized to justify hierarchy. 经济等级制的维系，并不依靠赤裸暴力，它依靠的是将少数人的特权和多数人的挣扎加以合理化的策略。在众多经济情境中，人们，哪怕是那些一贯声称自己信奉经济正义的人，都在竭力维持不平等的结构。进步派人士需要分析这类矛盾现象，并将那些用于为等级制辩护的策略公之于众。 Academia provides an excellent laboratory for this kind of analysis. Within academia, the contradictions between words and practices are particularly stark. Publicly, Professors often denounce the structures of privilege constructed by the top one per cent in this country. Privately, the small, tenured professorial class perpetuates a system through which it acquires disproportionate resources while condemning the majority of university faculty – non tenure-track adjuncts – to often live in near poverty. 学术界为进行这种分析提供了一个绝佳的实验室。言行不一在学术界特别突出。在公开场合，教授们经常谴责由我国顶层1%们构建的特权结构。但在私下里，人数很少的终身教授阶层维持着一个体系，并利用这一体系更多地获取资源，同时迫使大多数的大学教员——非终身教职轨道的受雇教员——经常处于近乎贫困的状态。【译注：美国大学的教师职位晋升分两条轨道，一条通往终身教授，俗称终身规（tenure-track），另一条是受雇教员，处于普通雇员地位，合同期较短，收入也较低。】 While there are clear economic incentives for university administrators to pay the majority of adjuncts severely depressed wages,the financial disparity between tenured/tenure-track Professors and non tenure-track adjuncts (often denoted as Instructors or Lecturers) is not solely an effect of administrative policies. Administrators and the professorial class are complicit in the maintenance of this economic hierarchy and each provides a certain degree of cover for the other. 对于大多数受雇教员，学校管理方出于明显的经济动机，只会支付极低的工资。但是，终身或终身轨教授与非终身轨的受雇教员（常被称为教员或讲师）之间所存在的财务差距，不仅仅是校方管理政策的结果。在维系这种经济等级制方面，校方和教授阶层狼狈为奸，彼此都为对方提供一些掩护。 When pressed on the disparity between their words and their practices, tenured faculty can point to university administrators as the real culprits of adjunct impoverishment. In return, administrators’ harsh financial calculations are softened and obscured by professorial rationalizations which interpret structural hierarchy as merit-based. 当终身教授的言行不一致遭到追问时，他们会将学校管理方指认为受雇教员遭遇贫困的真正祸首。而作为回报，教授们会对结构性的等级差异进行合理化，将之解释为基于品质的差异，于是管理方苛刻的财务算计便得到了柔化和遮掩。 The reinforcement of professorial class privilege begins with the hiring process for the few available tenure-track jobs. Excellence in teaching, without academic publications, will rarely qualify an applicant for a university level tenure-track position. Publishing without any evidence of teaching ability is far more acceptable. However, the current proliferation of graduate students with Ph.Ds., many with publications in top journals, has transformed the work of faculty hiring committees into something of a lottery. 教授阶层特权的强化, 始于数量不多的终身轨空缺岗位的招聘过程。对于一个大学终身轨职位，即使申请者教学特别出色，但只要没有学术出版物，那就不太可能合格。有出版物，但丝毫看不出能够教书的，相较而言明显更受欢迎。不过，由于现下拥有博士学位的毕业生数量激增，而且其中许多在顶尖期刊上发表过文章，教员招聘委员会的工作已经变成了一种抽奖。 Most Lecturers understand that “one’s position in the academic academy hierarchy is largely an accident of birth” and even some tenured faculty admit that their tenured colleagues “got lucky.” The result of this “luck of the draw” is financial security for the chosen few, and financial desperation for the non-tenure track adjuncts – a class that comprises almost seventy per cent of college and university faculties. 多数讲师明白，“一个人在学术研究机构的等级体系中的地位，很大程度上是一种因缘造化”，甚至连一些终身教员也承认他们的终身职同事“运气好”。这种“抽签撞运”的结果，就是被选中的少数人得到了财务保障，而非终身轨的受雇教员则财务窘迫，而后者几乎要占学院及大学教职员工的70%。 The primacy of publishing does not originate solely with the professorial class, but in its hands it has been re-purposed into a tool of class formation and preservation. Members of the faculty hiring committees evaluate new hires with the same criteria by which they were awarded their positions and which constitute their continued financial accumulation. This self-replication is then denoted as “merit;” a designation that separates new hires into two distinct groups while reassuring tenured faculty of their own superior worth. 发表（论文）至上，这并非全然源自教授阶层，但在他们手中，它已然改头换面成为了一种塑造和维护阶层的工具。教员招聘委员会的成员们，拿着他们过去曾据之以获得职位的、让他们得以持续积累财富的同一标准来评价新雇员。然后又把这种自我复制称为“品质”，用这种称呼把新雇员分成两个不同群体，并确保终身教员自己拥有高贵身价。 Even though the hiring process is, at best, a conjecture, once the separation between tenure-track Professor and Lecturer has taken place, the newly hired are fully constructed to align with their new class status. Lecturers are often considered to be hourly employees and their salaries are contingent on the number of courses taught. This compels them to teach as many courses as possible, though the vast majority are limited by course availability to being part-time. Financial survival often remains elusive, and many adjuncts are forced to go on public assistance and food stamps. 尽管招聘过程只能靠猜，可一旦终身轨教授和讲师的分野出现，新雇员就完全被框定了，只能去跟自己的新阶层身份对齐。讲师经常被视为钟点工，薪水因授课门数而异。这就迫使他们尽量多开几门课，然而绝大部分人还是因为可开课程门数受限而只能非全日工作。他们在财务上常陷于窘境，难以自保，许多受雇教员被迫寻求公共救济和食品券。 Tenure-track Professors, however, are often given as minimal teaching loads as possible and are eligible for paid time off from teaching in order to further their research. This disproportionate allocation of resources is designed to move tenure-track Assistant Professors smoothly along the path to tenured Associate and Full Professor. Each new title brings with it an increase in financial reward. A tenured Professor who is teaching far fewer courses and has far fewer students than a Lecturer might still earn five times the salary. 另一方面，学校却尽可能少地将教学任务压给终身轨教授。他们还有资格获得带薪休假，方便他们开展研究。设计这种不成比例的资源分配，是为了顺利推动终身轨助理教授沿着轨道转变为终身副教授和正教授。每一个新的头衔都附带着财务报酬的增加。一个终身教授，即使授课门数和所带学生都远远少于讲师，其薪水却仍是后者的五倍。 There is no significant financial path upwards for Lecturers. According to a recent survey report by the Coalition on the Academic Workforce (CAW) part-time faculty “experienced little in the way of a career ladder” measured as “higher wages after several years of work.” At the university level, continued excellence in teaching virtually never qualifies a Lecturer for a tenure-track position. But heavy teaching loads limit the ability of Lecturers to engage in the continued research and writing required for such positions. If a Lecturer takes time off for research, they receive no pay for that semester. The CAW notes that the professional commitment and support for part-time faculty is “dismal.” 讲师没有什么明显的的财务上升路径。根据学术劳动力联盟（CAW）近日的一份调查报告，“以工作几年以后工资上升”来衡量，非全日教员“极少经历过职业晋升阶梯”。在大学里，教学上长期出色对一名讲师有资格获得终身教职几乎毫无助益。沉重的教学负担还限制了讲师持续从事研究和写作以满足此类职位要求的能力。假如讲师在某个学期休假去做研究，他们就拿不到该学期的报酬。CAW指出，对非全日教员的职业承诺和职业支持“令人沮丧”。 However, simply increasing resources for Lecturers leaves the fundamental pivot point of the academic hierarchy untouched. The economic stratification within academia is built upon the disproportionate financial rewards given to those who publish articles or books in acceptable academic journals (or with acceptable publishers) over those who teach. Though this structure of incentives and rewards is universal within academia, the strongly disparate financial valuation given to publishing remains unquestioned. 不过，如果只是向讲师们增加资源，那就没有触及学术等级制的根本支点。学术界的经济阶层分化建立于一种不成比例的财务报酬之上，那些在合格的学术期刊（或合格出版社）发表文章或出书的人拿得太多，相比之下教书的人拿得过少。尽管这种激励和报酬结构在学术界极为普遍，但是，发表研究所得到财务估值高的极不相称，这一点无人质疑。 In many of the more theoretical fields of academia, such as political theory, publications are highly self-referential. Observations and arguments are not derived from, nor are they intended to mirror, the complex, multi-faceted contemporary political world. Instead publications refer to other publications in debates about the field’s own abstract conceptual structures. 在许多理论性较强的学术领域，比如政治理论，论文是高度自我引用的。其中的观察和论证既不源自于、也不是为了反映复杂多面的当代政治世界。相反，论文之间相互引证来引证去，只不过是就该领域自己的抽象概念框架之内辩论不休。 It is teachers dedicated to a challenging education who engage in the task of reworking and concretizing theories to make them relevant to students. It is in the classroom where the dialogue between theory and politics takes place; and it is the classroom which sends forth generations of students who can perceive, and possibly undermine, the rationalities of power. 正是那些献身于挑战性教育工作的教师，忙于将理论再加工和具体化，使之变得与学生（的现实关切）相干。正是在课堂上，理论与现实政治之间的对话方才得以发生；也正是从课堂里，送出一代又一代的学生，他们能够领会——还可能消解——权力合理性。 Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. No objective standard of measurement exists to financially quantify, and differentiate, these approaches or their contributions. Yet a vast and enduring economic hierarchy has emerged grounded in the supposed intrinsic hierarchy between the two. This financial hierarchy is not a dispassionate reflection of an objective reality; it is a strategic effect of the mechanisms underlying class formation and preservation. 通往知识的道路通常都由发表研究和课堂教学的相互作用而铺就。不存在什么客观的测量标准，能对这两条途径或它们的贡献做财务上的量化和区分。但是，两者之间的内在等级区分却已被假定，在这上面还生出一个巨大且持久存在的经济等级制。这种财务等级制不是对客观现实的一种公正反映；它是塑造和维护阶层的底层机制的策略效应。 The primacy of publishing, and the attendant allocation of resources, is utilized not merely to perpetuate two different economic classes, but also to create two different kinds of people. This creation allows the hierarchy of privilege to function as though it represents objective value differences both in terms of the work produced and the individuals who produce it. 发表至上及伴随而来的资源分配，不仅被用来维持两种不同的经济阶层，而且被用来创造两种不同的人。这种创造令特权等级制的运转好像是体现了一种客观的价值差异，既包括产品之间的价值差异，也包括制造产品的个体之间的价值差异。 In any economic hierarchy, once those at the bottom are positioned as “lesser,” all sorts of harms become permissible. Since the financial disparities in academia do not mirror any objective universal value differences in work or aptitude, the hierarchy between adjuncts and Professors needs to be maintained and reinforced by persistent invocations of professorial privilege. 在任何经济等级制中，一旦身处底层的人被定位为“次等”，那么各种伤害就都得到了许可。由于学术界的财务不平等并不反映任何工作或天资方面的客观的普世价值差异，因此受雇教员与教授之间的等级制就需要持续动用教授特权来加以维持和强化。 Even some tenured faculty are critical of the constant assertion of “prerogatives,” and the “arrogance, and fear of being lumped together with the Untouchable Other.” Tenured faculty become experts at delineating “who really counts as part of [the] professional community and who doesn’t.” 甚至一些终身教员都对频繁的“特权”主张以及“傲慢，害怕被人把自己与‘不可触碰的他者’归为一类”等持批评态度。终身教员在准确划分“谁真正属于专业共同体的一部分，谁不属于”方面都成了行家里手。 These protections of class difference require, and cultivate, a disdain for the processes of education, and construct teaching as a burden to be endured. The professorial class strategically utilizes this construction as though it represents an underlying reality – an exercise in class maintenance which punishes both adjuncts and students. 这类对阶层差异的保护，依靠并促进了对课堂教学的蔑视，并将教学塑造成了一种不得不忍受的负担。教授阶层有策略地利用了上述塑造，使之仿佛是对基本现实的反映——这是一种维护阶层的做法，它既损害了受雇教员，也损害了学生。 One of the few options currently available to adjuncts to improve their financial situation is a faculty union. But unions comprised of both tenured and adjunct faculty will never question the mechanisms which underlie the academic hierarchy. Instead, they will ask adjuncts to join in fights for general increases in faculty salaries which disproportionately benefit those who already earn the most. The trade-off for adjuncts is an incremental raise in pay in return for a reinforcement of the structures and relations which perpetuate their impoverishment. 受雇教员要改善其财务状况，当前只有不多的几个可用选项，其中之一就是教员工会。但是，由终身教员和兼职教员共同组成的工会永远不会质疑支撑学术等级制的上述机制。他们只会要求受雇教员参与普遍提高教员薪水的斗争，而这对那些已然挣得最多的人更为有利。这里发生的交换是，兼职人员报酬少量增加，但代价是进一步强化了那些延续他们的贫困状态的结构和关系。 The academic hierarchy will not be altered by resorting to arguments about fairness, equality or basic human decency. Unions composed solely of adjuncts must fight for far greater increases in adjunct salaries as part of a larger struggle to dismantle the entire professorial apparatus of privilege. All progressives should join in this effort. 诉诸公平、平等或人类的基本体面等论证，无助于改变学术界的等级制。纯粹由受雇教员组成的工会必须为这些教员薪水的更大幅度增长而斗争，并将之作为拆除整个教授特权体系的大型斗争的一部分。所有的进步派都应加入这一活动。 The gap between professorial words and actions exemplify the kinds of rationalizations which perpetuate exploitation at all economic levels. The power of the most wealthy in this country will not be impeded if their strategies can be simultaneously decried and emulated. Progressive politics must expose and disrupt these processes, wherever they occur. In this sense, the professorial class should be appearing frequently on progressive media. They have a lot to explain. 教授们的言行差异是在各个经济层面上帮助维持剥削的合理化策略的一个例证。如果这个国家的最富者们的策略在被人谴责的同时还会被人效仿，那么他们的权力将无可阻挡。进步派的政治活动必须揭露并破坏这些方法，不管它们发生在哪儿。在此意义上，教授阶层应当经常上上进步派的媒体。他们有很多事需要解释。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Shocking data on wealth inequality 哗众取宠的财富不平等数据 作者：Scott Sumner @ 2015-5-18 译者：Veidt       校对：小聂 来源：Library of Economics and Liberty，http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2015/05/shocking_new_da.html Imagine living in a country where the top 30% of the population had roughly 25 times as much wealth per person as the bottom 30% of the population. That seems pretty unequal, doesn't it? 设想一下，你生活在这样一个国家，其中最富有的30%人口的个人财富大约是最贫穷的30%的人口的25倍。看起来挺不平等的，不是吗？ Now suppose the same statistics applied, but every person at any given age had exactly the same wealth. All 18 year olds had the same wealth as other members of their cohort, as did all 60 year olds. But 18 year olds had much less wealth than 60 year olds. 现在假设同样的统计结果，并且所有年龄相同的人拥有的财富也相同。所有18岁的人和他们的同龄人拥有一样多的财富，所有60岁的人也都拥有相同的财富。但是18岁的人所拥有的财富相比60岁的人则少得多。 Now how would you feel about the data? Does that sort of society seem highly unequal? Not to me, indeed in a sense there'd be no inequality at all; each person would experience the exact same wealth trajectory over the course of their life. 现在你对该数据又会做何感想呢？这样的社会看起来是高度不平等的吗？我不这么认为，实际上从某种意义上说，这里完全不存在任何不平等，每个人在他的整个生命历程中的财富轨迹都是完全相同的。 Of course we don't live in that sort of society, there are large differences in wealth at any given age. But even if we did have that sort of equality, the aggregate wealth data would look shockingly unequal. 当然，我们并不生活在这样的社会里，在任何年龄的人群中都均在巨大的贫富差距。但是即使在相同年龄的人群中财富分配是均等的，合计起来的财富数据还是会呈现出惊人的不平等。 Here's some Census data for the US, showing that the median person in the over 55 age group holds about 25 times as much wealth as in the 18 to 35 group: 下图中是一些来自美国人口普查的数据，其中显示年龄超过55岁人群的财富中位数是年龄在18到35岁之间人群的财富中位数的大约25倍。 So could we solve this measurement problem by getting wealth inequality data for each age cohort? Not even close, because wealth is a poor measure of economic well-being. 那么我们是否可以通过对各个年龄段的人口分别计算财富的不平等程度来解决这个测量方法上的问题呢？还差得远，因为财富并不是一个衡量经济福利的好指标。 Suppose you had two people who each earned $100,000/year in wage income. Over the course of their life they both eventually spent all of their wealth on consumption goods. Both ended up with an identical level of total consumption, in present value terms. But one person spent all his money as it was earned, and then relied on Social Security, while the other saved 1/2 of his wage income, spending much more in his later years. 假设有两个人每年都获得十万美元的工资收入，在他们的一生中，他们也都最终将所有的财富用于消费。从现值的意义上说，两个人一生的总消费水平是相同的。但是其中一个人在赚到钱之后马上就把钱花掉了，之后依赖社保；另一个人则在获得工资收入后将其中的一半用于储蓄，将更多的钱用于晚年的消费。 By age 65 the thrifty guy might have several million dollars in wealth, while the other guy had almost nothing, even though (by assumption) they were equally well off in economic terms, they simply had different preferences as to when to spend their money. 在65岁时，那个懂得储蓄的人大概会拥有数百万美元的财富，而另一位则几乎没有任何财富，从经济意义上说，他们享受到的福利是相同的，区别只是他们在何时花掉赚来的钱这一点上有着不同的偏好。 I was recently at a NGDP conference in West Virginia, and noticed this in the local paper's advice column: 我最近在西弗吉尼亚参加一次关于名义GDP（NGDP）的会议，在当地报纸的建议栏目里，我注意到了如下对话：

Dear Dave, My wife and I have just started getting on track with our money. We have $2,000 in savings, and the only debt we have is our house and two cars. I work in the oil and gas industry and make about $180,000 a year, but things are pretty volatile right now. We're upside down on both vehicles, and we owe $39,000 on one and about $48,000 on the other. Under the circumstances, should we go ahead and build a fully funded emergency fund or work on paying off the cars? Kendall 亲爱的Dave，我和妻子才刚刚开始赚钱。我们有两千美元的储蓄，仅有的债务是我们的房贷和两辆车的车贷。我在油气行业工作，每年的收入大约有18万美元，但现在形势很不稳定。为了买这两辆车我们已经把钱都花光了，在其中一辆车上我们欠了39,000美元，另一辆车则欠了48,000美元。在这种情况下，我们是应该把赚来的钱用于设立一个充足的应急基金呢，还是用来偿还两辆汽车的欠款呢？Kendall Dear Kendall, Are you kidding me? Sell the cars, dude! You need to go to Kelly Blue Book's website right now, and find out what your cars are really worth. Then, put them on the market as a private sale. You'll get thousands more selling them that way than you will at a dealership. You'll have to talk to a local credit union or bank for a small loan to cover the difference, plus a little bit more so you guys can get a couple of little beaters to drive for a while. 亲爱的Kendall， 你不是在跟我开玩笑吧？赶快把车都卖了吧，我的朋友！ 你现在要做的是去Kelly蓝皮书的网站查一下你的车到底值多少钱，然后以私人销售的名义把它们挂到汽车交易市场上。以这种方式出售，你得到的钱会比你通过汽车经纪商出售多几千美元。你还需要去找一家本地信用合作社或者银行谈谈，借一笔小额贷款来弥补差额，并让你们能够买两辆小“甲壳虫”暂时开一段时间。【译注：此处beaters疑为beatles之讹。】

I'm going to go out on a limb and guess there aren't very many similar letters in China. Like the advice columnist "Dave", I have a temperament that makes it easy to save. But as a libertarian I favor allowing people like Kendall to spend their money when and how they wish. 这里我想斗胆猜测一下，中国应该不会有太多类似的读者来信。和上面那位建议专栏的作者Dave一样，我在性格上倾向于储蓄。但是作为一名自由意志主义者，我倾向于允许Kendall这样的人按自己的意愿去决定何时、如何花自己的钱。 The only qualification is that I think people should be forced to save enough to cover the things that society would otherwise have to pay (basic retirement, medical, etc.) 我认为唯一合理的限制是，假如因为人们因自己的储蓄不足，而需要整个社会来付出代价时，强制性储蓄才是必须的（例如基本的退休工资，医疗保障等）。 If we believe that people should be free to choose when to spend their wealth, we will end up with far more wealth inequality than if we try to force everyone to consume the "right amount" of each year's income. But I don't see how that sort of wealth inequality could be considered a problem. 如果我们相信人们拥有选择何时花掉自己所拥有财富的自由，那么相比强制所有人都花掉每年收入中“正确比例”的钱，最终的财富不平等程度会高得多。但我完全不觉得这种原因导致的财富不平等会是个问题。 Inevitably some will misconstrue what I am saying here. Just to be clear, even accounting for all the factors I mentioned (age, saving preferences, etc) there is still lots more inequality due to big differences in lifetime earnings (or inherited wealth.) So this post is not trying to suggest that inequality is not a problem. 难免有人会误解我的意思，所以我要澄清一下，即便考虑了上面提到的所有这些因素（年龄、储蓄偏好等）之后，由人们生命周期中巨大的收入差异（或是财产继承上的差异）所造成的不平等仍然是巨大的。这篇文章并不是想说不平等不是个问题。 Rather I'm suggesting that if inequality is a problem, we would not be able to know that from the wealth inequality data that is presented in the media. And that's because even if wealth inequality were not a problem at all, the actual inequality of wealth would look shocking large, with 100 to 1 disparities easily accounted for by nothing more than differences in age and saving propensities. 实际上我更想表达的是，假如不平等的确是一个问题，我们并不能从媒体上出现的那些有关财富不平等的数据里得知这一点。因为即使在那些财富不平等根本不算个问题的情况下，实际数据上的财富不平等程度看起来也会很惊人，仅仅是年龄和储蓄偏好上的一些差异就能轻易地造成100比1这样的差距。 The only data that truly gets at the inequality question is consumption inequality, which is very rarely discussed in the media. 对于不平等问题，唯一切中要害的数据，其实是消费的不平等，但有关后者却极少在媒体上被讨论。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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