【2015-11-27】 @托派的李二锅 我大清是中国历史上少见的拿得出手的辉煌盛世，非要抱贼秃驴的大腿说明您大脑该上上油了。 @whigzhou: 所谓盛世不就是把专制推向极致，士大夫人格尊严降至最低嘛，电报出现之前，帝权没法比这更专横了 @whigzhou: 周亡之后，帝国盛世不少，开明时代也不少，但唯一称得上开明盛世的，只有两宋，当然，帝权爱好者最鄙视两宋了 @whigzhou: 推崇汉武、唐宗、朱和尚、满清、蒋氏民国的，都是帝权爱好者，自由爱好者喜欢的都是春秋、窦后、魏晋、两宋、北洋，简单粗暴的划分，但挺有效。  

Social mobility: why does private school give you such a leg up? 社会流动性：为什么私立学校能助你一臂之力？

作者：Matt Dickson @ 2015-8-18 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Conversation，https://theconversation.com/social-mobility-why-does-private-school-give-you-such-a-leg-up-45739 Ever since John Major declared his shock at the dominance of the privately educated throughout Britain’s “upper echelons of power”, there has been a brighter spotlight shone on the way top professions in society are dominated by a selective elite. 约翰·梅杰曾对私立学校毕业生在英国“权力梯次上层”的支配地位表示震惊，自此以后，优选精英如何占据社会顶层职业就受到越来越多的关注。 Addressing this problem has never been more important for UK social mobility. With the re-shaping of the economy towards services, it’s predicted that four out of five future jobs will be in these professions, making them key to the future of social mobility. 对于英国的社会流动性而言，处理这个问题的重要性前所未有。由于经济正在向服务业转型，预计未来有五分之四的工作岗位将来自这些顶层职业，因此它们就成为未来社会流动性的关键。 Alan Milburn’s 2012 report into fair access to the professions showed 43% of barristers, 54% of chief executives, 51% of top medics and 54% of leading journalists attended private schools. Nationally, only 7% of children attend private schools. Alan Milburn 2012年关于公平职业机会的报告显示，43%的高级律师、54%的行政总监、51%的高级医生以及54%的新闻行业领袖念过私立学校。而全国范围内，现在只有7%的儿童在私立学校读书。 Research from the UCL Institute of Education and the University of Cambridge found that in a raw comparison, graduates who had attended private schools were 32% more likely to gain a “high-status” job – defined as the “higher managerial, administrative or professional” occupations – than state-school graduates from similar family types. 伦敦大学学院教育研究所和剑桥大学的研究发现，以来自相似家庭类型的大学毕业生做粗略比较，曾念过私立学校的比只念过公立学校的毕业生，找到“高等”工作的可能性要高出32%。该项研究将“高等”工作界定为“管理上、行政上或专业性上较高的”职业。 Even when accounting for other factors that could be driving this difference – such as a person’s grades in school, the university they attended, the course and qualification they got, or their age and gender – people who went to private school were still 8% more likely to access a high-status job after leaving university. 有一些其它因素也可能促成这一差异，比如在校成绩、所念大学、所修课程和专业资格、以及年龄与性别等。但即使将这些因素全都考虑在内，念过私立学校的学生大学毕业后获得高等工作的可能性仍然要高出8%。 A new report from the Sutton Trust and upReach charities has taken the analysis a step further. The report found that six-months after finishing university, private school graduates in high-status jobs are earning £670 per year more than those from the state sector in the same high-status positions, even after taking into account any differences in age, gender, university attended and degree obtained. Three years later, this gap has grown such that a private-school graduate is on average earning £2,198 per year more than the comparable state-school graduate. Sutton Trust和upReach两家慈善机构新近发布的一份报告对此问题做了进一步的分析。报告发现，大学毕业6个月后，即使将年龄、性别、所念大学及所获学位的差异都考虑进去，从事高等工作的私立学校毕业生，年收入也比从事同样职业的国立学校毕业生多出670磅。三年之后这种差距拉得更大，相比于国立学校毕业生，私立学校毕业生平均每年收入要多2198磅。 Elite firms look for ‘soft skills’ 精英公司想要“软技能” What is it about private schooling that causes this to happen? When it comes to getting a job and progressing up pay scales, there are always other factors apart from grades that are difficult to measure, such as self-confidence, assertiveness, ambition, determination or communication skills. These may differ between the average private and state school students and may be driving the difference. 念私立学校有什么不同，以至于出现上述差异呢？在找工作和提高收入等级时，除了成绩之外，总还有一些其它难以衡量的影响因素，比如自信、坚定、抱负、决心或沟通能力等。私立和公立学校学生一般在这些方面可能有些不同，并可能因此导致了上述差异。 This is consistent with other research from the Sutton Trust which has found that applicants to high-status jobs from less-privileged backgrounds lack self-confidence. Recent research from the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (SMCP) looking at recruitment to elite law, accountancy and financial services firms also identified that the differences in the non-academic skills of graduates from different school types played a key role in explaining different access to jobs and career progression. 这与Sutton Trust的另一项研究发现是一致的：出身弱势群体的人在申请高等工作时更加缺乏自信。社会流动性与儿童贫困委员会近期对法律、会计和金融服务等精英公司的招聘进行了研究，他们同样发现，在解释找工作和职业发展机会上的差异时，来自不同类型学校的毕业生在非学术技能上的差异是一个关键因素。 These elite firms look to recruit and promote “talent”. Their definitions incorporate the sort of non-academic skills that are not lacking in private school students, but can be lacking even among the most academically able state-school students. 这些精英公司想要招聘和提拔的是“才干之士”。在他们对“才干之士”的定义中，包含了私立学校学生从不缺乏的那些非学术技能，而在这些方面，即便是学术上最为杰出的公立学校学生也可能存在不足。 Gap in grades remains stark 成绩差距依然显著 There are policies that can help break down these barriers. The first requirement is to close the gap in attainment between different types of school. IFS research comparing the pay of state and privately educated people across all professions, found a 12% pay gap, half of which can be explained by prior attainment and the university subsequently attended. So, much of the gap is down to what happens in school. 有一些政策可以打破上述壁垒。第一个必须要做的，就是缩小不同类型学校在学业成就上的差距。英国财政研究学会对公立和私立学校毕业生在各类行业的薪酬水平进行了比较研究，发现其间存在12%的差距，该差距有一半源于早前的学业成就及随后所念的大学。因此，差距的很大一部分来自于在校经历。 The SMCP research also supports previous work that suggests attending “elite” universities and the course studied is becoming more and more important for access to top professions and higher pay. If we look at the difference in A-level attainment in the sort of “facilitating” subjects (such as maths, sciences and languages) that are preferred by the elite institutions, there is a suggestion that the gap between state and private school is narrowing. 前引社会流动性和儿童贫困委员会的研究结果也支持早前的一项研究，后者认为，接受“精英”大学教育及所学课程对于进入顶层职业和获得更高报酬的重要性与日俱增。精英机构更为偏爱那些使得进一步学习变得容易的“促进性”科目（比如数学、科学和语言等），如果我们去看中学高级水平考试中这些科目上的成绩差异，似乎有迹象表明，公立和私立学校之间的差距正在缩小。 Among 18-year-olds in 2004, 7.8% of state-school students had A*-B in three or more of these A-level subjects, compared with 21.6% of private school students. By 2010 the gap had closed slightly, largely due to a dip in independent schools' performance, but the proportion of state-school students attaining the grades required to access elite universities remains constant. 2004年的全部18岁学生中，有7.8%的公立学校学生在三门以上的中学高级水平考试“促进性”科目中得到了B或以上成绩，与之相比，私立学校学生则有21.6%。到了2010年，这一差距已略为减小，主要是因为独立学校的表现有所下滑，但取得精英大学最低录取成绩的公立学校学生比例并没有变化。   Unsurprisingly then, there is little evidence that the gap in attendance at elite universities has changed over time for students from comparable family backgrounds who attend state and private schools. The proportion of children who go to elite universities from the highest income group (which it is assumed includes private school attendees) was approximately 28% in 2010-11, compared to 12% for the next highest income group. However, this 16 percentage point gap is all but eliminated when researchers take into account how students did at A-level. 因此毫不奇怪，现在也没有什么证据表明家庭背景近似的公立和私立学校毕业生之间的精英大学录取差距有什么变化。2010-11年，最高收入群体的子女（假定包括私立学校入读者）就读精英大学的比例约为28%，与之相比，次高收入群体则为12%。不过，一旦研究人员将学生们在高级水平考试中的表现也考虑进来，这个16个百分点的差距也几乎完全不存在了。 More mentoring, earlier 更多、更早的辅导 So, the big question is how to improve the A-level results of students from state schools. After examining what can help predict better performance at A-level for bright but less advantaged students, research from Oxford University has suggested a series of policies to help boost performance by bright but less advantaged students. 因此，最大问题是如何提高公立学校学生的高级水平考试成绩。牛津大学一项研究考察了哪些因素有助于预测那些聪明但出身弱势的学生在高级水平考试中取得好成绩，并提出了帮助这一类学生改善表现的一系列政策建议。 These range from access to high-quality pre-school, daily homework, encouraging reading for pleasure, and educationally enriching activities outside of school, to greater guidance regarding the choice of subjects at GCSE and A-level likely to pay the highest future dividends in university access and beyond. 其中包括接受高质量学前教育的机会、每天做家庭作业、鼓励出于兴趣的阅读、开展具有教育意义的课外活动，还包括在普通中学教育证书和高级水平考试中为学生的科目选择提供更多指导，以帮助学生选择那些在未来的大学经历及以后人生中回报最大的科目。 The need for greater guidance, advice and mentoring for state-school pupils is also endorsed by the Sutton Trust research into recruitment for the financial services sector. These policy recommendations are now being implemented in a project that began in 2014 in which four major banks – Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Lloyds – are providing “end-to-end” support to young people from state schools. They will get help to develop non-academic skills both at school and university and then receive mentoring while in the job. 公立学校学生需要更多的指导、建议和辅导，这一点也得到了Sutton Trust关于金融服务行业招聘的一项研究的支持。这些政策建议现已在一个始于2014年的项目中得到实施，四家大银行——巴克莱、德意志银行、汇丰以及劳埃德——通过该项目向公立学校的年轻人提供“从头到尾”的支持。这些年轻人在中学和大学时都能得到培养非学术技能方面的帮助，工作以后还能得到辅导。 These closer links between state schools and professions was also identified by Milburn, who suggested that work experience placements, internships and university sandwich-year courses can all be routes to improve the transition for state students from school, through university and into the “upper echelons” of British society. Milburn也发现了这种公立学校和职业之间的紧密联系，他建议通过工作经验职位、实习期以及带“三明治年”的大学课程【译注：英国大学一种学制，大学期间有一年为实习期，通常为第三年】等途径，来帮助公立学校学生更好地实现从中学到大学最后进入英国社会“梯次上层”的转化。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Plastic Bags Are Good for You 塑料袋是个好东西 作者：Katherine Mangu-Ward @ 2015-10 译者：混乱阈值 （@混乱阈值） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Reason，http://reason.com/archives/2015/09/01/plastic-bags-are-good-for-you/ What prohibitionists get wrong about one of modernity's greatest inventions 禁用主义者对现代最伟大发明之一的理解错在何处 Here is a list of things that are thicker than a typical plastic grocery bag: A strand of hair. A coat of paint.A human cornea. 以下所列物品都比普通的塑料购物袋要厚：一绺头发、一层涂漆、人类的眼角膜。 High-density polyethylene is a miracle of materials science. 高密度聚乙烯是材料科学的一项奇迹。 Despite weighing less than 5 grams, one bag can hold 17 pounds, well over 1,000 times its own weight. At about a penny apiece, the bags are cheap enough for stores to give away and sturdy enough to carry home two gallons of milk in the evening and still be up to the task of scooping Cujo's poop the next morning. 尽管自身不足5克，一个塑料袋却可以装载17磅的重物，这超过它自身重量足足1000多倍。塑料袋非常便宜，大约每个才一分钱，商店不介意免费发放；塑料袋也非常牢固，晚上装着两加仑牛奶回家后，第二天早上还能用来装宠物狗的粪便。 Yet almost as soon as grocers started offering their customers the choice of "paper or plastic?" these modern marvels became a whipping boy for environmentalists, politicians, and other well-intentioned, ill-informed busybodies. Plastic bags for retail purchases are banned or taxed in more than 200 municipalities and a dozen countries, from San Francisco to South Africa, Bellingham to Bangladesh. 然而几乎就在杂货商开始让顾客选择“纸袋还是塑料袋？”的时候，这些现代奇迹却开始沦为环保主义者、政客和其他出于善意却知之甚少的好管闲事者的替罪羊。从旧金山到南非，从贝灵汉到孟加拉国等超过200个市和十多个国家，禁用零售塑料购物袋，或对其征税。 Each region serves up its own custom blend of alarmist rhetoric; coastal areas blame the wispy totes for everything from asphyxiated sea turtles to melting glaciers, while inland banners decry the bags' role in urban landscape pollution and thoughtless consumerism. 每个地区都炮制出各自版本的危言耸听之词；海岸区域把从窒息而死的海龟到冰川融化的一切问题都怪在这纤弱袋子头上，而内陆地区的宣传则谴责塑料袋造成了城市污染和没心没肺的消费主义。 But a closer look at the facts and figures reveals shaky science and the uncritical repetition of improbable statistics tossed about to shore up the case for a mostly aesthetic, symbolic act of conservation. 然而如果你仔细审视事实和数据就会发现，上述做法在科学上牵强附会，对荒谬的统计数字不加鉴别、人云亦云。人们用它们来支撑的，差不多只是一种审美上的、符号化的环保行动。 How did one of the most efficient, resource-saving inventions of the 20th century become an environmentalist bugaboo? 那么，20世纪最具有效率、最节省资源的发明之一是如何成为环保人士眼中的妖孽的？ Research 研究 Before 1800, if you bought or traded for an object, you were pretty much on your own to get it home. People carried baskets for the little stuff and wheeled carts for the bigger items, often toting scraps of canvas or other durable fabric to wrap messier or more fragile goods, such as meat or pastries. This was back when the germ theory of disease was yet to be broadly accepted, and there were not yet Laundromats on every street corner. 在十九世纪之前，如果你购买或交换到一件物品，基本上需要靠自己把物品带回家。如果是小件物品，人们用篮子装，大件则用轮车载。人们还常常携带帆布或其它耐用织物来包裹较脏乱或较易碎的物品，比如肉或糕点。那时细菌致病的理论尚未被广泛认同，自助洗衣店也还没有遍及每一个街角。 In the early 19th century, paper became cheap enough that merchants started using it to package their wares, tying off the bundles with string—a huge leap for both convenience and sanitation. The paper bag was invented in the 1850s, but it wasn't until the 1870s that a factory girl named Margaret Knight cobbled together a machine that cut, folded, and glued flat-bottomed paper receptacles. 19世纪早期，因为纸价变得足够低，商人开始用纸张包装商品并用绳子捆绑——这在便捷和卫生方面都是一个巨大进步。纸袋发明于1850年代，但直到1870年代，才由一个叫Margaret Knight的女工拼装出了一台可以剪裁、折叠并粘合平底纸袋的机器。 While the brown paper bag seems like the height of humdrum to modern eyes, Knight's machine was kind of a big deal: She won a bitter intellectual property fight to receive one of the first patents ever awarded to a woman, and was eventually decorated by Queen Victoria for her efforts. Over time, the paper bag got cheaper and stronger and sprouted handles, but it remained essentially unchanged, comfortably dominating the stuff-schlepping market for the next 100 years. 那种棕色纸袋如今看起来平淡无奇，但当时Knight的机器在某种意义上却是一个了不得的发明：她赢得了一场艰苦的知识产权官司，成为最早获得专利的女性之一，并因此最终获维多利亚女王授勋。随着时间推移，纸袋变得更便宜，更坚固，并长出了手环，但本质未变，在随后的100年里轻松地主宰了物品携带市场。 Meanwhile, German chemist Hans von Pechmann was messing around with methane and ether in a lab in 1898 when he happened to notice a waxy precipitate called polymethylene. Unfortunately, no one could puzzle out what to do with the goo, so another 30 years would pass before DuPont chemists stumbled upon a similar compound, polyethylene. This time, the British figured out they could use it to insulate radar cables, which is where the substance served its war duty. 与此同时，1898年当德国化学家Hans von Pechmann在实验室中捣鼓甲烷和乙醚时，他碰巧注意到一种被称为聚亚甲基的蜡状凝结物。不幸的是，当时没人知道这种黏糊糊的东西能用来干什么。又过了30年，杜邦公司的化学家们偶然发现了一种相似的化合物：聚乙烯。这一次，英国人发现他们可以用聚乙烯来为雷达的电线做绝缘层，这就是聚乙烯在战时的功用。 In 1953, Karl Ziegler of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (later re-christened the Max Planck Institute, for obvious reasons) and Erhard Holzkamp invented high-density polyethylene (HDPE) and soon after figured out how to use it to make pipes. Ziegler even snagged a Nobel Prize for the invention in 1963. 1953年，“威廉皇帝研究所”（后因众所周知的原因改名为“马克斯·普朗克研究所”）的Karl Ziegler和Erhard Holzkamp发明了高密度聚乙烯（HDPE），并很快设法用该物质制造管子。Ziegler还因为这项发明获得了1963年的诺贝尔奖。 But GustafThulinSten is the real hero (or villain, depending on your point of view) of our tale. An employee of the Swedish company Celloplast, Sten was the person who had the inspiration to punch holes into the side of super-thin tubes of HDPE, thus creating the ubiquitous, filmy "T-shirt bags" we know and love (to ban) today. 然而，在塑料袋的传奇故事里，真正的英雄（或恶棍，取决于你怎么看）是Gustaf Thulin Sten。作为瑞典Celloplast公司的雇员，Sten想出了在HDPE超薄管的一侧打孔的主意，创造了今天我们所熟知并热爱（或希望禁止）的无处不在的薄膜般的“T恤袋”。 In a 1993 book that claims to reveal the "hidden life of groceries and other secrets of the supermarket," journalist Vince Staten pinpoints the moment that the global takeover of the plastic bag became inevitable: a 1985 gathering of the New Materials and Profits in Grocery Sacks and Coextrusions Conference at a Holiday Inn in Somerset, New Jersey, at which a representative from Chem Systems announced that plastic bags were 11.5 percent cheaper than paper. 在一本出版于1993年的书里，记者Vince Staten声称揭示了“杂货业的隐秘生活以及超市的其它秘密”。作者指出了塑料袋风靡世界的决定性时刻：1985年，在新泽西州Somerset的假日酒店，举行了一个叫做“杂货袋和压膜袋的新材料和利润大会”的活动。会上，来自Chem Systems的代表宣布塑料袋比纸袋要便宜11.5%。 Just like that, the world changed. Plastic bags were stocked in 10 percent of grocery stores in 1983, according to Plastics World magazine. By 1985 it was 75 percent. "Paper or plastic?" immediately became an everyday question, a punchline, and a source of angst. 就这样，整个世界都变了。根据《塑料世界》杂志的信息，1983年时10%的杂货店备有塑料袋，到了1985年这个数字上升到了75%。 “纸袋还是塑料袋？”立刻成为了日常问句，脍炙人口的妙语，以及忧虑之源。 Almost from the beginning, plastic bags were controversial. After several high-profile suffocation deaths of children, manufacturers worked together to create a public safety campaign, staving off regulation and reducing accidents. As grocers substituted plastic for paper to bolster their bottom lines, suburban shoppers, who preferred to line up flat-bottomed paper bags in the backs of their cars, complained, even as urban shoppers rejoiced at the ability to comfortably and reliably carry more than two bags at a time. 几乎从一开始，塑料袋就备受争议。在数起备受瞩目的儿童窒息死亡事件发生后，塑料袋生产商聚在一起搞了一个公众安全运动，以此来延缓对塑料袋的监管，并减少事故的发生。杂货商用塑料袋代替纸袋以节约成本后，尽管市区购物者因为从此可以舒适稳当地同时手提多个袋子而感到高兴，那些更喜欢在车后摆满平底纸袋的郊区购物者却对此有了怨言。 The booming environmental movement was initially flummoxed. Forest conservation was a big deal in the '80s, a point in favor of plastic. But fossil fuels were a no-no, so maybe paper was better? Both types of bags at the time were tough to recycle. The debate raged on, leaving eco-conscious shoppers unclear about the best course of action. 蓬勃兴起的环境运动最开始被搞懵了。森林保护在80年代是件大事，使用塑料袋在这方面能得分。但是耗用化石燃料也是要不得的，那么也许纸袋更好？这两种购物袋在当时都不容易回收利用。争论持续升温，让有环保意识的购物者搞不清楚到底哪种选择最好。 Reduce 减少使用 In 2010, Guinness World Records named plastic bags the most ubiquitous consumer item in the world. But peak bag may already be upon us. 2010年，吉尼斯世界纪录把塑料袋确认为世界上最普及的消费品。然而，塑料袋使用的最高峰也许已然临近。 In 2007, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to prohibit plastic bags, citing concerns about water pollution and waste disposal. Chicago, Austin, Portland, and nearly all of Hawaii soon followed suit, chiming in with complaints about wastefulness, climate change, and more. 2007年，出于对水污染和垃圾处理的担忧，旧金山成为了美国第一个禁用塑料袋的城市。随后芝加哥、奥斯丁、波特兰和几乎整个夏威夷都群起效仿，它们纷纷抱怨塑料袋导致浪费、气候变化和其它问题。 Chinese officials banned plastic bags two months before hosting the 2008 Olympics, for the same reason they banned high-emissions vehicles and daytime pajama-wearing-such unsightly displays didn't match up with the image the People's Republic wanted to present to the world. In China, they call the floating sacks "white pollution." South Africans refer to bags snagged in bushes as their "national flower." 中国官员在2008年奥运会举办前两个月禁止了塑料袋，理由与他们禁止高排放汽车以及白天穿睡衣相同——这些不雅景观与人民共和国想要展现给世界的形象不相符。在中国，人们把漂浮的塑料袋称为“白色污染”。南非人则将缠在灌木丛中的塑料袋称为他们的“国花”。 In Washington, D.C., concern about used plastic bags finding their way down storm drains, through the Anacostia River, and into the Chesapeake Bay was the primary justification for the capital city's 5-cent bag tax in 2010, under the slogan "Skip the Bag, Save the River." In 2006, the California Coastal Commission claimed that plastic bags make up 3.8 percent of beach litter, and a few years later the California Ocean Protection Council upped the ante to 8 percent of all coastal trash. Last year the Dallas City Council pinned 5 percent of the area's refuse on bags. 2010年，首都华盛顿特区对每个塑料袋征税5美分，口号是“救救河流，不用塑料袋”，主要的理论依据是废弃塑料袋会被冲进雨水道，通过阿纳卡斯提亚河进入切萨皮克海湾。2006年，加州海岸委员会声称塑料袋在海滩垃圾中占3.8%，几年后加州海洋保护委员会把塑料袋在所有海滨垃圾的份额提高到8%。去年，达拉斯市议会认定辖区内垃圾的5％由塑料袋构成。 But the definitive American litter study—yep, such a thing exists—reports much lower figures. The 2009 Keep America Beautiful Survey, run by Steven Stein of Environmental Resources Planning, shows that all plastic bags, of which plastic retail bags are only a subset, are just 0.6 percent of visible litter nationwide. 然而关于美国垃圾的权威研究——没错，这种研究确实存在——发布的数字要低很多。2009年，由“环境资源规划”组织的Steven Stein发起的一项名为“保持美国的美”的调查显示，所有塑料袋加在一起仅占了全国可见垃圾的0.6%，而塑料购物袋只是塑料袋中的一小类。 And those California data? They come from the International Coastal Commission (ICC), which the California Coastal Commission notes relies on information "collected by volunteers on one day each year, and is not a scientific assessment." (This insight, and many others in this story, is derived from a study produced last year by Julian Morris and Brian Seasholes for Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes reason.) 那么加州的数据从何而来？它来自国际海岸委员会（ICC）。加州海岸委员会提到，该数字 “由志愿者每年花一天搜集，并非科学评估”。（这个见解，以及此文中很多其它见解，都来自去年由Julian Morris和Brian Seasholes为“理性基金会”所作的研究，该基金会是一家非营利组织，出版刊物Reason。） In D.C., a 2008 analysis prepared for the city's Department of the Environment by the Anacostia Watershed Society found that plastic bags were only the third-largest contributor to litter in the river, after food wrappers and bottles and cans. 在华盛顿特区，2008年一份由“阿纳卡斯提亚流域协会”为市环境部提供的分析报告发现，塑料袋只是河流垃圾的第三大来源，排在食物包装和瓶罐之后。 Stein's study did find plastic bags in storm drains, but again, they made up only about 1 percent of the total litter. Stein的研究确实在雨水道中发现了塑料袋，然而，塑料袋同样仅占垃圾总量的1%。 Some plastic bags do find their way into the sea, of course. And one of the other concerns cited for the banning and regulation of plastic grocery bags is the safety of marine wildlife. The Blue Ocean Society for Marine Conservation is just one organization among many that claim that more than 1 million birds and 100,000 marine mammals and sea turtles die each year from eating or getting entangled in plastic. 当然，有些塑料袋确实进入了海洋。人们禁用或管制塑料购物袋时的忧虑之一，就是海洋野生动物的安全。包括“蓝色大洋海洋保护协会”在内的很多组织声称，每年有超过一百万只鸟和十万以上的海洋哺乳动物以及海龟因为吞食塑料袋或被塑料袋缠绕而死，。 Morris and Seasholes reconstructed an elaborate game of statistical telephone to source this figure back to a study funded by the Canadian government that tracked loss of marine animals in Newfoundland as a result of incidental catch and entanglement in fishing gear from 1981 to 1984. Importantly, this three-decade-old study had nothing to do with plastic bags at all. 针对上述数字，Morris和Seasholes重建了一个复杂的统计学电话游戏【校注：电话游戏即由一个人小声跟下一个人说一句话，不断传递，最终得出荒谬结果】，将其来源追溯到一项由加拿大政府资助的研究。这项研究将纽芬兰的海洋动物减少归咎于1981年至1984年间的误捕和捕鱼装备的缠绕。重要的是，这项三十年前的研究完全和塑料袋无关。 Porpoises and sea turtles are undeniably charismatic megafauna—the pandas of the deep—and it's understandable that environmental groups would want to parade them around in a bid to drum up sympathy, almost certainly driven by the sincere belief that plastics put the beloved animals at grave risk. But in the end, there's little evidence that that's true. 不可否认，鼠海豚和海龟都是极具魅力的巨型海洋动物——它们就像深海中的熊猫——并且，环保团体几乎肯定是受真诚的信念所驱使，认定是塑料袋让这些可爱的动物陷入危险境地，并想拉着它们招摇过市以竭力争取同情，这是可以理解的。但归根到底，没有什么证据证明确有其事。 As David Santillo, a senior biologist with Greenpeace, told The Times of London, "It's very unlikely that many animals are killed by plastic bags. The evidence shows just the opposite. We are not going to solve the problem of waste by focusing on plastic bags. With larger mammals it's fishing gear that's the big problem. On a global basis plastic bags aren't an issue." 就像绿色和平组织的高级生物学家David Santillo对《泰晤士报》所说的那样，“许多动物被塑料袋害死是不太可能的。证据显示情况恰恰相反。如果我们把重点放在塑料袋上，垃圾废料问题是得不到解决的。对大型哺乳动物来说，捕鱼装备才是大问题。从全球范围来看，塑料袋并不是个问题。” Reuse 重复利用 But what about larger-scale impacts, such as climate change? Where do grocery bags stack up there? A 2011 study from the U.K.'s Environmental Agency attempted to quantify the emissions footprint both of plastic bags and of their substitutes. Holding the typical HDPE grocery bag up as the standard, researchers found that the common reusable non-woven polypropylene bag—the ubiquitous crinkly plastic tote, typically made with oil—had to be used at least 11 times to hold its own against an HDPE grocery bag. Cotton bags had to be used an amazing 131 times to do the same. 那么大范围的影响，比如气候变化，又如何呢？购物塑料袋与此有何关系？英国环境局在2011年做了一项研究，尝试量化使用塑料袋及其替代品的碳排放量。以普通的高密度聚乙烯（HDPE）购物袋作为比较基准，研究者发现，常见的可重复使用无纺聚丙烯袋——那种四处可见的起皱塑料袋，一般以石油作原料——至少需要重复使用11次才能在排放量上匹敌HDPE购物袋。要达到同样的水平，棉布袋则需重复使用惊人的131次。 In 2007, for a brief moment, the "It bag" wasn't a $30,000 Hermes Birkin, it was a cotton tote designed by Anya Hindmarch that read: "I'm NOT A Plastic bag." Celebrities from Ivanka Trump to Keira Knightly were snapped toting the sold-out satchels for glossies like Life&Style and Grazia. While we can never know for sure, it seems wildly unlikely that Ivanka Trump has carried 131 loads of groceries in her life, much less in that particular bag. 在2007年，“It bag”（“当季必备包包”）曾经一度不是价值三万美元的爱马仕铂金包，而是由Anya Hindmarch设计的一款棉布包，上面印着几个字：“我不是塑料袋。”从Ivanka Trump到Keira Knightly等社会名流都拎着这个销售一空的手提包，为诸如Life&Style和Grazia的精美杂志拍定型照。尽管我们永远没法肯定，但看起来Ivanka Trump一辈子曾提过131袋生活杂物的可能性相当小，更不用说用这种小提包了。 What's more, those U.K. Environmental Agency figures assume the HDPE bag is not being reused. Nor do they account for the energy and materials needed to regularly wash the reusable bags in hot soapy water. Other alternatives did perform somewhat better in the global-warming matchup, including paper bags (which would have to be reused three times to match the single-use HDPE bag's footprint) and another type of reusable bag made of low-density polyethylene (four times). 此外，上述英国环境局的数字是基于HDPE购物袋不会被重复使用的假设得出的，他们也没有把用热肥皂水定期清洗可重复使用购物袋时所需的能源和材料考虑在内。一些其它替代品确实在防止全球变暖方面中表现更好，包括纸袋（需要重复使用三次才能和一次性HDPE袋在碳排放量上相当）和另一种可重复使用的低密度聚乙烯袋（需要重复使用四次）。 About 65 percent of Americans report that they repurpose their grocery bags for garbage. By contrast, a survey by the marketing research firm Edelman Berland found that consumers reported forgetting their reusable bags on 40 percent of grocery trips and opted for plastic or paper instead. 大约有65%的美国人称他们会用使用过的购物袋装垃圾。与此形成对比的是，由市场研究公司Edelman Berland所做的一项调查发现，消费者称他们去购物时有40%的可能性忘记携带可重复使用的购物袋，最终需要用塑料袋或纸袋来代替。 Prior to the movement to ban plastic bags, many American homes had a nook, cranny, or drawer that functioned as a kind of grocery-sack clown car. It seemed that whatever the size of the container, an infinite number of bags could be stuffed inside. My family called it the bag o' bags. As in: "Katherine! This mold experiment has gone on long enough! Go get me a bag from the bag o' bags so that I can throw it away," or "Karina, you better remember to get a bag from the bag o' bags for that wet swimsuit, unless you want the books in your backpack to get wet." If we wound up with an unmanageable surplus, we could just drop the bags at the recycling centers that used to sit in the parking lots of most suburban grocery stores. 在禁用塑料袋运动之前，许多美国家庭都有个角落、缝隙或抽屉，用作放购物袋小丑车。不管那个地方大小如何，似乎总是可以不断地往里面塞袋子。我家称之为“袋之袋”。比如：“凯瑟琳！这东西都生霉很久了！从袋之袋里拿个袋子给我，我好把这玩意丢掉。”，或是“卡琳娜，你要不想把你背包里的书都弄湿，最好记得从袋之袋里拿个袋子来装湿泳衣。”。如果我们有太多用不掉的多余袋子，只要放到以前大多数郊区杂货店的停车场里都有的回收中心去就可以了。 Then there are the frequently unmeasured consumption consequences of the bans themselves. For example, in San Francisco, after the grocery/retail plastic bag ban went into effect in 2007, depriving customers of a source of free bags, sales of still legal, low-density polyethylene plastic bags shot up 400 percent. 禁令本身还有很多尚未搞清的消费后果。举个例子，旧金山对零售购物塑料袋的禁令在2007年生效后，消费者无法再获得免费购物袋了，结果仍旧合法的低密度聚乙烯塑料袋的销量飙升了400%。 Recycle 回收 "It takes 12 million barrels of oil to produce the 100 billion plastic bags that are thrown away in the U.S. every year." Versions of this claim show up everywhere from New York Times editorials to Save the Bay pamphlets. But the origins of the figures are murky and the dramatic tone is misleading. Even if the number is accurate, it is almost a literal drop in the bucket: Americans consume a total of about 19 million barrels of oil a day. “在美国，每年一千亿只废弃塑料袋需要耗费1200万桶原油来生产。”这类说法的不同版本出现在从《纽约时报》社论到《拯救海湾》宣传册的各种地方。然而这个数字的原始出处却是模糊不清的，而且其夸张口吻也有误导性。就算这个数字是准确的，这也几乎真正是九牛一毛：美国人每天消费大约1900万桶原油。 But as Morris and Seasholes point out, all that fretting about oil use "is surprising, not least because nearly all HDPE bags are produced from natural gas, not oil. Indeed, between 1981 and 2012, on average only 3.2% of polyethylene bags were made from oil. The reason is simple: it is far less expensive to produce ethylene, the feedstock for polyethylene, from natural gas (methane) than from oil." While the price of oil has recently declined, the assumption that plastic bags are made primarily from oil remains false. 然而就像Morris和Seasholes指出的那样，这种所有关于原油使用的焦虑“都是令人惊讶的，尤其是因为几乎所有的HDPE袋都是由天然气而非原油制造的。事实上正是这样，在1981年到2012年间，平均只有3.2％的聚乙烯袋由原油制造。原因很简单：用天然气（甲烷）生产乙烯这种制造聚乙烯的原材料要比用原油便宜得多。”尽管原油价格最近下降了，这种认为塑料袋主要由原油制造的想法依然是错误的。 In 2010, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Americans threw away 690,000 tons of HDPE bags. Of those, approximately 30,000 tons were recycled. That means a total of 660,000 tons were discarded, mostly into landfills (approximately 82 percent of non-recovered municipal solid waste goes to landfill; 18 percent is incinerated). That same year, Americans also chucked almost exactly the same amount of "reusable" polypropylene bags (680,000 tons), of which zero were recovered. In other words, those polypropylene reusable bags actually constituted a slightly higher proportion of all bags going to landfills. 根据美国环境保护局的说法，美国人在2010年丢弃了69万吨HDPE袋，其中大约3万吨被回收。这意味着总共有66万吨袋子被废弃，主要是被丢入垃圾填埋场（城市非再生固体废弃物中大约有82％进入垃圾填埋场；另外18%被焚烧）。同年，美国人还丢弃了几乎重量相当的“可重复使用”聚丙烯袋（68万吨），没有任何回收利用。换句话说，在流入垃圾填埋场的袋子里，可重复使用的聚丙烯袋占比事实上还要稍高一些。 In April, NPR's Planet Money reported on the economics of plastic recycling, and noted that while recycled plastic from bags and sacks was once a profitable industry, times have changed. The prices of oil and gas have fallen, which means it is cheaper to just make new bags rather than undertake the laborious process of recycling the old ones. As Tom Outerbridge, who runs a Brooklyn recycling center called Sims, explained, "We can't afford to put a lot of time and money into trying to recycle it" if no one's buying the final product. 今年四月，美国全国公共广播电台的“地球财富”节目报道了塑料回收中的经济学，并指出尽管从袋子中回收塑料以前是一项盈利的事，现在情况已经变了。原油和天然气的价格已经下降，意味着直接生产新的袋子要比通过复杂费力的程序对旧袋子回收利用更便宜。布鲁克林一个叫做Sims的回收中心的运营商Tom Outerbridge解释说，如果没人购买最终产品，“我们就无法在塑料袋回收上投入大量时间和金钱”。 Reject 拒绝 In March, The Washington Post reported on the surprising strength of the plastic bag industry in the face of regulatory onslaught. 今年三月，《华盛顿邮报》报道了塑料袋制造业在凶猛的管制面前所展现出来的惊人力量。 In 2008, officials in the deep blue city of Seattle voted to impose a 20-cent fee on both plastic and paper single- use bags. "There's a competitive side to seeing who can come up with the most progressive legislation," city councilman and former local Sierra Club leader Mike O'Brien told The New York Times. 在2008年，深蓝之城西雅图的官员们投票决定对塑料和纸质的一次性袋子收取每个20美分的费用。“这么做有攀比的一面，就是看看谁能搞出最进步主义的立法，”市议员、“塞拉聚乐部”【校注：美国环保组织】在当地的前领导者Mike O’Brien这样告诉《纽约时报》。 But industry rallied before the implementation date, spending $1.4 million on a citywide ballot measure to repeal the fee. The referendum campaign was a success; Seattle voters rejected the surcharge, which would have been the most punitive in the nation, in 2009. Still, three years later, Seattle became the fourth city in Washington State to approve an outright plastic- bag ban, along with a 5-cent fee on paper bags. 但业界在该法规实施之前团结了起来，投入140万美元举行了全市范围的投票表决活动来撤销该收费。这场公决运动成功了；西雅图人投票拒绝了这项本会在2009年成为全国之最的惩罚性额外收费。然而，三年后，西雅图还是成了华盛顿州第四个通过彻底禁用塑料袋的城市，同时还对纸袋征收5美分的费用。 In Dallas, a coalition of plastic bag manufacturers are challenging a 5-cent markup that the city has imposed on single-use bags. Hilex Poly (now Novolex), Superbag Operating, the Inteplast Group, and Advance Polybag argue that the fee is illegal under an obscure Dallas law that states: "A local government or other political subdivision may not adopt an ordinance, rule or regulation to: prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law; [or] assess a fee or deposit on the sale or use of a container or package." 在达拉斯，塑料袋生产商联盟正在挑战市政府对一次性袋子每个5美分的收费政策。Helix Ploy（即如今的Novolex），Superbag Operating，Inteplast Group和Advance Polybag这些公司认为收费是非法的，他们的依据是一条模糊的达拉斯的法律：“地方政府或其它政治分区不能实施条例、规则或规定来：出于控制固体废弃物的目的，不经州法律授权，禁止或限制容器或包装的贩卖或使用；（或）对贩卖或使用容器或包装进行收费或收取保证金。” In Georgia, the state Senate got a little meta, passing a ban on bag bans last session, which would have pre-emptively prevented restrictions. While the bill failed in the House, it may prove to be a model for other state pre-emptions around the country. 在佐治亚，州参议院的做法有点元规则的性质，在上个会期通过了一项对塑料袋禁令的禁令，该禁令将能预防性地阻止禁塑令。这个法案虽未能在州众院中通过，但可能在全国范围成为预防性立法的典型，被其它州效仿。 Ground Zero of the plastic wars, unsurprisingly, is California. Last year, Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown signed a statewide ban against plastic grocery bags that was scheduled to take effect this July 1. But the implementation has been stalled, thanks to 800,000 signatories to a petition circulated by the American Progressive Bag Alliance, a new group funded by plastics manufacturers. Voters will now have to ratify the ban on their 2016 ballots for it to go into effect. "This is a cynical ploy by out-of-state interests desperate to delay a ban already adopted in more than 100 communities across California," a spokesperson for Brown told the Associated Press. 不出所料，塑料袋之战的中心战场是加州。去年，民主党州长Jerry Brown签署了一项在全州禁止塑料杂货袋的法令，原计划在今年七月一日投入实施。然而由于塑料品生产商资助的一个新团体“美国进步派袋子联盟”发起的一项请愿获得了80万个签名支持，禁令未能如期实施。现在选民只有等到2016年进行投票批准，禁令才能实施。“这是州外利益集团耍的冷漠自私的手段，他们拼命要推迟这项已被全加州超过一百个社区采用的禁令”，Brown的发言人告诉美联社。 Of course, if there's some banning going on, you can always rely on Congress to muscle in on the action. Rep. James P. Moran (D–Va.) has repeatedly introduced a bill to create a national 5-cent tax on all disposable plastic or paper bags supplied by stores to customers. The bill typically dies quietly in committee, but perhaps Moran was hoping that, as Gandhi famously didn't say: "First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they attack you, then you win." 当然，哪里有禁令，哪里就会有国会伸手掺和进来。来自弗吉尼亚的民主党众议员James P. Moran已多次提出一项在全国范围内对所有由商店向顾客提供的一次性塑料袋或纸袋征收5美分税的法案。一如既往，法案在委员会无声无息地胎死腹中，但也许Moran希望的是，就像那句甘地没说过的名言：“一开始他们无视你，然后他们嘲笑你，接下去他们攻击你，再然后你就胜利了。” Regurgitate 反刍 【译注：regurgitate也有呕吐的意思，这里可能是一语双关：重复使用的袋子有时脏得令人作呕。】 As I write this, a load of reusable grocery bags is tumbling around in my dryer. In the course of researching this article, I got so thoroughly grossed out by the malevolent horror lurking in my pantry that I had to stop writing and start washing. 就在我写此文时，一堆可重复使用的杂货袋正在我的烘干机内翻滚。在对此文的内容进行调研时，我被潜伏在我的餐具室内的可怕的脏东西彻底恶心到了，不得不停止写作开始清洗。 I may love plastic bags, but I'm not immune to cultural and economic pressure, so when I remember to, I tote my reusable bags to the store like a good little yuppie. But this ostensibly modern act brings me back to conditions a little too reminiscent of the sub-hygienic reality faced by my great-great-grandmother, with her blood-and-crumb-covered reusable canvas wrapper. 我也许喜欢塑料袋，但我并不能对文化和经济压力免疫，因此我要是想得起来，就会像个善良的雅皮士一样带着可重复使用的袋子去商店购物。然而这个表面上现代的行为会把我带回到不太卫生的现实情境，非常容易让我想起我的曾曾祖母和她那满是血污和面包屑的可重复使用的帆布袋子。 If you're like most people, here's what you have probably done at least once: Put a leaky package of chicken in your cloth or plastic tote. Then go home, empty the bag, crumple it up, and toss it in the trunk of your car to fester. A week later, you go shopping again and throw some veggies you're planning to eat raw into the same bag. Cue diarrhea. 如果你和多数人一样，那么你肯定经历过下述事情：把一包汁水滴漏的鸡肉放进你的布袋或塑料包中。然后回家，拿出鸡肉，把袋子揉成一团扔进车的后备箱让其发霉发臭。一周后，你又去购物，把一些你准备生吃的蔬菜丢进同一只袋子。腹泻就是这么来的。 A 2011 survey published in the journal Food Protection Trends found coliform bacteria in fully half of the reusable shopping bags tested in a random survey of shoppers in Arizona and California. The same 2014 Edelman Berland study that found consumers frequently forgot their bags also unearthed the fact that only 18 percent of shoppers reported cleaning their bags "once a week or more." An article in the Journal of Infectious Diseases traced a 2010 outbreak of norovirus to nine members of an Oregon soccer team who had touched or eaten food stored in a contaminated reusable bag. 根据2011年一项发表在《食品保护趋势》杂志上的调查，在对亚利桑那和加州的购物者进行随机调查时，他们发现有足足半数的可重复使用购物袋中存在大肠型细菌。前面提到的2014年Edelman Berland那项发现消费者经常忘带购物袋的研究，还发现了这样一个事实：只有18%的购物者声称他们每周清洁购物袋“至少一次以上”。一篇登在《传染疾病杂志》上的文章发现，2010年诺如病毒爆发的起因是九名俄勒冈足球队员接触或食用了存放在被污染的可重复使用袋子中的食物。 Your cute reusable tote decorated with whimsical watercolors of eggplants may actually be causing those stomach cramps. 你肚子疼的罪魁祸首，事实上也许是你那装点着奇形怪状的茄子水印、可爱无比的可重复使用袋呢。 Reconsider 重新考量 Set your mind back to 1999, before our current wave of bag crackdowns, but well after the "plastic" answer to "paper or plastic?" began giving environmentalists the tremors. In that year's Oscar-winning American Beauty, an ambitious young filmmaker within the dull confines of suburbia captures an iconic image of a plastic sack—that product of banal late-capitalist excess—twirling artistically in the wind. 把思绪转回到1999年，那时还没有目前这波对塑料袋的打击取缔。但面对“纸袋还是塑料袋？”这一问题，回答“塑料袋”已经开始让环保主义者战栗。在那年获得奥斯卡奖的电影《美国丽人》中，一位雄心勃勃的年轻制片人在郊区生活的无聊框架内抓住了一幅具有象征意义的塑料袋的画面——晚期资本主义无聊纵欲的产品——在风中艺术地旋转。 "And this bag was just dancing with me," he says dreamily. "Like a little kid begging me to play with it. For 15 minutes. That's the day I realized that there was this entire life behind things, and this incredibly benevolent force that wanted me to know there was no reason to be afraid, ever." “这袋子只是在和我跳舞，”他梦幻般地说道。“像一个小孩恳求我和它玩耍。玩15分钟。那天，我意识到，在所有一切事物背后，有个完整的生命，而且有种不可思议的博爱的力量要我知道没有理由感到害怕，永远都没有。” Though it was meant as irony, there was an essential (if accidental) truth behind the speech. The technology behind plastic grocery bags is so useful it won a Nobel Prize. Employing an unimaginably small amount of base material, manufacturers can create tools of surprising strength and durability. Far from being the environmental threat activists make them out to be, plastic bags are not particularly to blame for clogged sewers, choked rivers, asphyxiated sea animals, or global warming. Instead, they are likely our best bet for carrying all of our junk in a responsible manner. 尽管本意是为了讽刺，这段话背后却有一种基本的（也许是凑巧的）真相。塑料购物袋背后的科技是如此有用，使其赢得了诺贝尔奖。利用一些用量小到无法想象的基本材料，制造者可以创造出具有惊人强度和耐用性的工具。与环保威胁论积极分子所描绘的形象大相径庭的是，实际上塑料袋并未导致下水道堵塞、河流填塞、海洋动物窒息或全球变暖。相反，如果我们要负责任装走垃圾，它们可能是最佳选择。 Don't believe the haters. Plastic bags are good for you. 别相信那些心怀怨恨的人。塑料袋是个好东西。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

How big is the average penis? 丁丁的平均尺寸 作者：David Shultz @ 2015-3-15 翻译：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Science，http://news.sciencemag.org/biology/2015/03/how-big-average-penis “I was in the pool!” George Costanza’s distress at the “shrinkage” of his penis after exiting a cold pool was hilarious in the 1994 Seinfeld episode, but for many men concern over the length and girth of their reproductive organ is no laughing matter. Now, a new study could assuage such worries with what may be the most accurate penis-size measurements to date. “那是因为我刚从冰冷的池子里出来！”在1994年播出的一集《宋飞传》里，可怜的男主角George Costanza在被朋友嘲笑萎缩的丁丁后，懊恼地大叫。这一幕成了《宋飞传》经典的搞笑桥段，但对许多男士来说，生殖器的长短粗细可不是闹着玩的。现在，有一份最新研究也许能平抚男士们的担忧。这份研究里的丁丁尺寸测量数据也许是迄今为止最为精确的。 Many earlier studies relied on self-reporting, which doesn’t always yield reliable results. “People tend to overestimate themselves,” says David Veale, a psychiatrist at the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. So when Veale and his team set out to settle the score on penile proportions, they decided to compile data from clinicians who followed a standardized measuring procedure. 在此之前，许多研究都依赖自行报告的数据，结果往往并不可靠。“人们倾向于高估自己。”David Veale说。Veale是英国国民保健属（NHS）-南伦敦及莫兹利信托基金的精神病学家。所以当Veale和他的团队着手评估阴茎尺寸时，他们决定采用来自临床医生的数据，因为医生们会遵照一个标准的测量程序。 Published today in the British Journal of Urology International, their new study synthesizes data from 17 previous academic papers that included measurements from a total of 15,521 men from around the world. The data enabled the researchers to calculate averages and model the estimated distribution of penile dimensions across humanity. 他们今天发表在《英国国际泌尿学杂志》上的研究报告综合了之前17份学术论文的成果，包括对全世界15521名男士的测量数据。这些数据让研究人员得以计算出阴茎大小的平均值，并对人类阴茎尺寸的大致分布建立模型。 “It still just strikes me how many men have questions and insecurities and concerns about their own penis size. We actually do need good data on it,” says Debra Herbenick, a behavioral scientist at Indiana University, Bloomington, who was not involved in the study. Debra Herbenick说，“如此多的人对自己的阴茎大小抱有疑问、不安全感和关切，这让我颇为惊奇。我们真是需要一份靠谱的数据。”Herbenick是印第安纳大学伯明顿分校的行为科学家，并未参与这份研究。 According to the team’s analysis, the average flaccid, pendulous penis is 9.16 cm (3.61 inches) in length; the average erect penis is 13.12 cm (5.16 inches) long. The corresponding girth measurements are 9.31 cm (3.66 inches) for a flaccid penis and 11.66 cm (4.59 inches) for an erect one. 根据Veale团队的分析，阴茎松弛下垂时平均长9.16cm（3.61英寸），勃起时长13.12cm（5.16英寸）；相应的，阴茎松弛时的平均周长为9.31cm（3.66英寸），勃起时的周长为11.66cm（4.59英寸）。 A graph of the size distribution shows that outliers are rare. A 16-cm (6.3-inch) erect penis falls into the 95th percentile: Out of 100 men, only five would have a penis larger than 16 cm. Conversely, an erect penis measuring 10 cm (3.94 inches) falls into the 5th percentile: Only five out of 100 men would have a penis smaller than 10 cm. 从尺寸分布图上我们可以看到异常值是很少的。一根勃起时16cm（6.3英寸）长的阴茎已处在第95个百分位处：100个男人中，只有5位的阴茎勃起长度大于16cm。相反，一根勃起时10cm（3.94英寸）长的阴茎位于第5个百分位：100个男人中只有5位的阴茎勃起长度小于10cm。 Gentlemen, if you’re eager to see how you measure up, you’ll need to follow the same measurement procedure used in the study. All length measurements were made from the pubic bone to the tip of the glans on the top side of the penis. Any fat covering the pubic bone was compressed before measurement, and any additional length provided by foreskin was not counted. Circumference was measured at the base of the penis or around the middle of the shaft, as the two sites were deemed equivalent. 先生们，如果你很想知道自己“长方几何”，那你就需要依照研究中采用的测量方法去测量。长度均从耻骨测起，到阴茎上方的龟头顶端。覆盖耻骨的脂肪在测量前应被压平，包皮延伸的长度都概不作数。周长则是测量阴茎根部或中部，一般两者的数值相等。 The researchers concluded that there was no strong evidence to link penis size to other physical features such as height, body mass index, or even shoe size. Yes, it seems that the only definite conclusion that can be drawn about a fellow with big socks is that he probably has big feet. 研究者们得出结论：并没有有力证据表明，阴茎的大小同诸如身高、体重指数或脚的大小等其他体征相关。是的，对于一个穿大号袜子的哥们，你唯一能确定的似乎只是他有双大脚。【译注：西方有“脚大鸟大” 之说。】 Likewise, the study found no significant correlation between genital dimensions and race or ethnicity, although Veale points out that their study was not designed to probe such associations, because much of the data used were from studies of Caucasian men. 同样，该研究也没有发现生殖器的大小同种族或民族有何显著联系。不过Veals也指出，他们的研究并不是为揭示此种联系而设计的，因为他们采用的大量数据都是来自针对白人的研究。 It’s easy to laugh at poor George Costanza for his shrunken manhood, but some reports suggest that only about 55% of men are satisfied with their penis size. Some seek potentially dangerous surgical solutions to a problem that, according to Veale, is often only in their head. Men “seem to have a very distorted picture of what [size] other men are, and what they believe they should be,” Veale says. 嘲笑可怜的George Costanza那泄了气的命根固然轻松，可一些报告显示只有55%的男性满意自己的丁丁尺寸。一些男人求助于有潜在风险的外科手术来解决“问题”，而这一“问题”——依Veals之见——只不过是他们臆想出来的罢了。男人们“似乎对其他男人的尺寸、自己该有的尺寸，有非常扭曲的看法。”Veals说道。 Pornography, in which male performers are often selected for their extremely large genitalia, may be partly to blame. Similarly, Herbenick points to the myriad spam e-mails that assert that 17.78 cm (7 inches) is average for an erection, when in reality such a member would place its owner in about the 98th percentile. It’s best to just ignore those ads in any case, Veale says. “There are no effective lotions or potions or pills.” 也许色情作品难辞其咎，那里面的男演员通常都是经过挑选的，生殖器尺寸大得惊人。Herbenick指出，那些宣称17.78cm（7英寸）才是勃起丁丁平均长度的垃圾邮件也是满天飞的祸害，而实际上17.78cm已位于第98个百分位了。Veale 说，无视这些广告就好了，“没有什么神油和猛药，统统不管用。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

CapX Reviews: By the People CapX评论:《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》 作者：Fred Smith @ 2015-9-13 译者：Lai Shawn（@NiGuoNiGuoNi） 校对：王涵秋（@你们都是乡非） 来源：CAPX，http://www.capx.co/capx-reviews-by-the-people/ Charles Murray, in his new book, By the People: Rebuilding Liberty without Permission, argues that America’s constitutional checks on the growth of spending, taxation, and regulation have largely been undermined. The result, he fears, is an America moving rapidly toward the kinder, gentler tyranny Alexis de Tocqueville warned about. Murray focuses—wisely in my view—on the massive expansion of federal regulations as the vehicle hurtling us down that road. 查尔斯·穆瑞在他的新书《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》中说到，美国对政府支出、税收、管制的宪法审查机制已经被严重破坏。他担心，其结果是美国快速滑向托克维尔所警告的“温和专制”。穆瑞认为，巨幅扩张的联邦政府管制像失控的汽车一样带着我们冲向这条道路。 Murray documents how the regulatory state, by shifting legislative powers to the Executive, has given Congress the green light to pass broad laws that are little more than aspirational resolutions—for better workplace safety, improved public health, energy conservation, clean air, safe drugs and food, you name it—while leaving the writing of rules to achieve these goals to anonymous, off-stage executive bureaucrats. 穆瑞讲述了，通过将立法权转移到行政分支，管制型国家是如何为议会大开绿灯，让它得以通过那些宽泛的法律的，而这些法律充其量只是些一厢情愿的决心——诸如提高工作环境的安全性，改善公众卫生状况，节约能源，清洁空气，确保食品药品安全等等。同时，为实现这些目的而制订具体规则的工作，却被丢给了幕后不知名的行政官僚。 Given this hollowing out of the Constitution, and the cultural and political changes that drove it, Murray concludes that America is so far down the road to serfdom that the political process can no longer restore the Founders’ vision of an institutionally constrained federal government. A solution, if one exists, must rely on massive civil disobedience and a populist and moral critique of regulatory predation. Yet, is it prudent to fully dismiss “normal” political approaches? 基于上述的宪法“中空化”，以及导致这一点的文化和政治上的变化，穆瑞认为美国已经在“通向奴役之路”上走得太远，以至于已经无法依靠正常的政治途径来将美国恢复成建国者们心目中那个其权力受制度性限制的联邦政府。如果有解决方案，那只能是依靠大规模的公民不服从运动和民粹主义者，以及对政府无情管制的道德批判。然而，完全忽略“正常”政治途径是不是谨慎的做法呢？ Murray’s first section, “Coming to Terms with Where We Stand,” tells the story of how Progressives, chafing at the limited government institutions bequeathed by the Founders, gutted constraints on federal power and unleashed the technocratic Leviathan, staffed by civil servants trained in scientific management and protected from political interference by the independent agency system. This is an oft-cited and depressing history but one that Murray summarizes well. 穆瑞书中的第一部分“面对现实”讲述了进步派是如何破坏国父们留下的有限政府制度，破坏对联邦政府权力的限制，释放出那头专家治国主义权力巨兽，这头巨兽由受过科学管理训练的公务员组成，并且免受独立机构的政治干预。这是一段常被提起的沉痛历史，但是穆瑞总结的很好。 His second section, “Opening a New Front,” develops his civil disobedience proposal, including the creation of a new group, the Madison Fund, to manage and finance that work and take on some support functions, such as educational and public affairs efforts. The moral case for civil disobedience, he argues, stems from citizens’ growing alienation from a government they feel no longer represents them. A government that has lost our trust, he argues, has lost legitimacy, which justifies civil disobedience. 该书的第二部分“开辟新战线”进一步阐述了他的公民不服从运动倡议，包括建立一个叫麦迪逊基金的新组织，用于管理和资助不服从运动，并且通过教育和公共事务去支持这项运动。他认为，公民不服从的伦理基础在于公民和政府越来越疏远，并且感到政府已经不再能代表他们。一个政府如果失去了人民的信任，就失去了其合法性，公民不服从运动也就有了正当的理由。 Murray suggests the Madison Fund might also offer “insurance” against regulatory predation, much like malpractice insurance gives professionals some financial protection from the threat of lawsuits. However, the diversity and complexity of regulations makes estimating risks, and thus setting premiums, very difficult. In fact, insurance as an alternative to regulation was once explored for Superfund and largely abandoned for these reasons. Moreover, the criminalization of many regulatory violations casts doubt on the ability of such insurance to survive in a hostile regulatory environment. 穆瑞建议，麦迪逊基金应为那些对抗管制掠夺的行动提供“保险”，这跟职业过失保险很像，后者帮助专业人士规避因职业行为而遭受诉讼所带来的财务风险。然而，政府管制的多样性和复杂性，让预估风险以及设置保险费率非常困难。实际上，保险作为管制的替代已经被 “超级基金”尝试过，又因上述理由而被放弃。此外，由于很多违反管制的行为已经被犯罪化，令人怀疑这种保险是否能在充满敌意的管制环境下幸存。 Murray suggests that many regulations are unenforceable, because there are far more parties subject to regulations than there are enforcers. As with highway speed limits, he notes, most drivers will rarely be ticketed as long as they go with the flow. Therefore, if large numbers can be induced to violate any specific regulation, that regulation will become unenforceable. Perhaps, but while the “flow defense” often works, some communities, rather than ease regulatory enforcement, create “speed traps” and impose large fines. Fierce, random enforcement is another way of ensuring less costly enforcement of compliance and makes Murray’s campaign less viable. 穆瑞提出，很多管制是无法强制进行的，因为监管对象的数量远超执法者。比如高速公路限速，大多数司机只要跟着车流就极少被罚款。因此，如果很多人被诱导去违反特定的法规，这个法规就无法被执行了。虽然“淹没防卫法”有时会奏效，但是很多地方，不仅没有放松执法，反而发明了“超速陷阱”（高速公路上一段严格执法的区域）并施加巨额罚金。大力度的随机执法是另一种确保低执法成本的方法，这让穆瑞的方法看上去难以实现。 Still, Murray hopes that organized resistance to overregulation might push lawmakers and regulators to adopt less burdensome regulatory practices. His cautious optimism stems from Herbert Stein’s famous quote, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” And as Murray notes, America’s regulatory burden is already massive, citing the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s recent estimate of federal regulatory costs at around $1.8 trillion annually. This suggests a “stop” may be imminent. 然而，穆瑞希望对过度执法的有组织抵抗或许会促使立法者和监管者采用不那么苛刻的管制措施。他的谨慎乐观态度来自于赫伯特·斯坦的名句“不能永恒的事物终将会停下。”穆瑞注意到，美国的管管负担已十分巨大，来自竞争性企业研究所的一份报告显示，联邦管制每年带来1.8万亿美元的成本，因此过度管制必须立刻被制止。 Murray is also cautiously optimistic that faith in the Progressive vision is fading. Progressivism was first premised on the notion that government guidance could ensure uninterrupted progress. Advances in the social and administrative sciences would enable the best and the brightest to regulate markets in the public interest. Civil service reforms would prevent ineptitude and corruption. Independent regulatory agencies would prevent political cronyism. Murray argues that the experiences of the last century have not been kind to these beliefs, resulting in progressivism losing some of its former appeal. 穆瑞同时谨慎乐观地认为，进步派的愿景正在逐渐失去光芒。进步主义的基本假设是，政府的引导可以确保社会持续进步，社会科学和行政科学的发展可以让最善良最聪明的人处于公众利益而规制市场，公民服务改革可以防止不平等和腐败，独立监管机构可以防止政治裙带关系。穆瑞认为，过去一个世纪的经验并不能支持这些想法，这使得进步主义正在丧失它之前的吸引力。 I’m less sure, given the current popularity of progressive firebrands like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. And the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Board is an exemplar progressive agency—run by experts with no accountability to elected officials, with a staggering and ever-widening array of regulatory powers, and self-financing to boot! 鉴于诸如伊丽莎白·沃伦和伯尼·桑德斯这些进步主义煽动者目前的旺盛人气，我对此并不那么确定。最近成立的消费者金融保护理事会是个典型的进步主义组织——由专家组成，无须对选举产生的官员负责，拥有令人震惊的广泛权力，甚至可以财政上自给自足地运作。 Murray next turns to the question of which criteria should determine those regulations suitable for challenge. Given the radical tone of Murray’s book, one might have expected an endorsement of a broad frontal attack on the regulatory Leviathan. Yet surprisingly, Murray’s target list is fairly narrow. He sees the original flurry of regulations in the late 19^th century as largely warranted. He exempts Internal Revenue Service regulations, seeing taxes as a legitimate role of government. He appears to endorse regulations designed to address issues related to externalities and public goods. He also argues against challenging regulations that enjoy overwhelming popular support. These exemptions mean a less aggressive challenge to the regulatory state. 穆瑞接下来讨论的是选择挑战哪些法规的标准。鉴于穆瑞的激进口吻，读者可能会猜想他将对“管制巨兽”发起全面攻势。然而让人吃惊的是，穆瑞的目标名单非常短。他认为源自19世纪末期的很多法律是正当的。他放过了国家税务总局，认为税收是政府的合法职能。他似乎同意那些与外部性和公共品相关的管制法规。他同时还反对挑战一些受到广泛支持的管制。这些豁免意味着他对管制型国家的挑战不是很具进攻性。 Murray’s exclusion criteria appear to be influenced by the successful strategy of the Institute for Justice (IJ), which has carved out an important niche challenging regulations that meet Murray’s rather restrictive criteria. IJ selects regulations that many see as unjust, seeks out clients likely to be viewed sympathetically by the public, and manages media strategies to frame their cases as examples of noble Davids fighting brutal regulatory Goliaths. 穆瑞的豁免名单似乎受到了“司法协会”（IJ）的成功策略的影响——他们选择加以挑战的管制恰好符合穆瑞的谨慎标准，挑选那些看起来不公平的管制法规，找出一些有望被公众同情的客户，并通过影响舆论把自己塑造成像挑战残暴巨兽歌利亚的大卫一样高贵的勇士，这一策略让他们开拓出了一个重要的生态位。 Yet, the Institute for Justice is not alone in its use of litigation to challenge regulations. To a limited extent, the free market movement already has created a “Madison Fund.” Free market policy organizations—the Pacific Legal Foundation, Becket Fund, Center for Individual Rights, Goldwater Institute, my own organization, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others—are taking on other complex regulatory challenges, with varying degrees of success and popular support. Murray might have discussed these efforts in greater detail. 然而，司法协会并不是唯一一个通过诉讼去挑战法规的。虽然规模不大，自由市场运动已经成立了一个“麦迪逊基金”。自由市场政策组织——太平洋法律基金会，贝克特基金，个人权利中心，戈德华特研究所，我自己的组织——竞争性企业研究所，以及其他各种组织，正在对管制展开复杂的挑战行动，取得了不同程度的成功和大众支持。穆瑞会在书中详细讨论了这些努力。 Murray seems to believe that common sense provides adequate guidance for sorting out “good” from “bad” regulations and that Americans oppose many of the bad ones. Yet, recent debates over financial, health, and environmental regulations cast doubt on this. Many feel that America is overregulated, but support specific regulations—such as for example, the left’s support for more restrictive environmental and financial regulations and the right’s calls for tighter security and immigration restrictions. 穆瑞似乎认为，凭常识足以区分“好”的和“坏”的管制，并且美国人都反对坏的那些。然而，近期关于金融、卫生、环境相关法律的争论让人怀疑这一点。很多人认识到美国被管的太多了，但却支持特定的管制——比如左派支持严格的环保措施和金融管制，右派呼吁更严格的安全措施和移民限制。 Citing polling data, Murray finds reason for optimism in the fact that trust in government is declining and that businesses view regulations as increasingly burdensome. But that does not necessarily indicate support for a specific reform agenda. Congress, too, has lost the trust of the American people, yet more than 90 percent of all Members of Congress are routinely reelected. 通过引用调查数据，穆瑞找到了乐观的理由——对政府的信任在下降，并且企业认为管制带给他们的负担正日益加重。但是这未必说明一项特定改革议程获得了支持。虽然国会同样失去了美国人民的信任，然而仍有超过90%的国会议员照样如期连任。 Lacking widespread support, Murray’s massive civil disobedience proposal is unlikely to prove a viable strategy. America’s early history experienced such an attempt to fend off federal taxation—the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790s. It enjoyed considerable local support, but was nonetheless quickly suppressed. 因为缺乏广泛的支持，穆瑞的大规模民众不服从策略并不可行。在美国的早期历史上有过抵抗联邦政府征税的行为——比如1790年代的威士忌叛乱，尽管这场抗税运动得到了当地大量支持，但仍被讯速镇压了。 Murray argues that an expanded effort might change all this. His proposed new and well-funded Madison Fund would organize protests, help businesses and individuals targeted by regulation, insure vulnerable parties against regulatory abuse, and ultimately strip regulators of their “white hat” public image. It would help, but as noted, many free market organizations are already doing much of this. Moreover, would many businessmen want to directly confront their overseers? And even if they did, would the public see them sympathetically? 穆瑞认为更大规模的支持可能会改变这些情况。全新的，资金充沛的麦迪逊基金可以组织抗议活动，帮助监管所针对的企业和个人，确保弱势团体也可以对抗滥用的权力，最终剥下监管者的正义外衣。这可能会有用，但是正如我们注意到的，已经有很多自由市场组织在做这些了。此外，会有很多商人想要直面他们的监管者们吗？而且即使他们愿意，公众会同情他们吗？ Murray seeks to addresses these challenges by drawing an analogy with the role civil disobedience, such as lunch counter sit-ins, played in advancing the civil rights movement. But this analogy falls short. The civil rights movement enjoyed widespread media, intellectual, and public support, including by many economic interests. Yet, it still took decades and required both a state-by-state as well as a national approach to bear fruit. Regulatory reform lacks this broad intellectual support and needs greater organized business support than it has received. 穆瑞将这些挑战类比成公民不服从运动，比如在推动了民权运动进程的静坐抗议。但是这些类比并不成立，因为民权运动有广泛的媒体、知识界和公众支持，包括很多出于经济利益考虑的支持。尽管如此，运动的成果仍然是在一个个州以及全国通过各种途径努力了几十年才获得的。管制改革缺少如此广泛的知识界支持，也缺乏更大的有组织商业支持。 Murray’s third and final section, “A Propitious Moment,” suggests reasons why his proposals need not be quixotic. America’s continued diversity, he suggests, makes one-size-fits-all regulation less attractive to large segments of the population. Technological innovations have rendered largely obsolete regulatory interventions intended to address information asymmetries and allowed entrepreneurs to bypass regulatory roadblocks, creating consumer constituencies before the regulators notice. Uber is a great example of both achievements. 穆瑞书中的第三也是最后一部分“一场胜算很大的运动”论述了为何他认为他的建议不是空想。美国长期持续的多样性，使得大多数人不会喜欢一刀切的管制。科技创新让那些为矫正信息不对称而设立的管制变得过时，也可以让企业家绕过监管，在监管者注意到之前就得到消费者的支持。Uber就是一个证明这两点的很好例子。 Murray has identified the regulatory challenge facing America. But his proposed reform strategy needs to be better developed if it is to achieve success. In my view, he is too optimistic about public attitudes toward the regulatory estate and the prospects for changing them. For instance, he suggests the federal bureaucracy is increasingly demoralized. Perhaps in some cases, but individuals and businesses at the regulatory reform frontier still find regulators to be self-confident, well-prepared, and aggressive. 穆瑞指出了美国所面临的管制挑战。但是若要取得成功，他提出的改革策略还有待完善。在我看来，他对公众的态度以及改变公众态度的可能性太过乐观。举个例子，他认为联邦政府官僚正逐渐失去其道德光环。这也许在某些情况下是对的，但在管制改革前线作战的个人和企业仍发现监管者们非常自信，准备充分，并具有进攻性。 Moreover, while the future Madison Fund might launch dozens of cases, regulations continue to proliferate. Murray seems to hope that the creative marketing of these cases will increase public anger at regulatory overreach, but they may not, given that many regulatory agencies still enjoy widespread public support. In fact, such efforts could even backfire, as irate regulators place resisting firms in the agency’s crosshairs. 此外，就算将来的麦迪逊基金可能会同时着手处理几十个针对过度管制的案件，同时却仍有更多的管制会不断诞生。穆瑞似乎希望对这些案例的营销会加深公众对过度管制的愤怒，但是他们也许根本不会，因为很多监管机构依然得到广泛支持。事实上，这些努力可能反而会帮倒忙，因为愤怒的监管者会 “重点关照”那些反抗的企业。 There are other approaches to reform, including legislation, such as the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would require Congress to vote on all regulations with $100 million or more in estimated annual costs (a threshold I’d like to see drop over time). Congress could also explore a one-in-one-out requirement for new rules, such as one now being tried in Canada, or even the one-in-two-out policy tried in the United Kingdom. States might also establish state regulatory ombudsmen to argue against both existing and new state regulations and to challenge on behalf of the state costly and restrictive federal regulations—that is, states might create their own Madison Groups. 但是还有其他改革方式，包括立法，比如REINS法案，这个法案要求所有每年花费一亿美元以上的监管措施都需要国会投票（我希望看到这个阈值越来越低）。国会可以尝试“一进一出”（每批准一项管制必须废弃之前的另一项）措施，就像加拿大已经在尝试的那样，甚至英国的“一进两出”。同时各州也可以设立管制巡察员来对抗已经存在的州法和新条例，挑战联邦政府加于各州的昂贵而又严格的管制——也就是说，各州可以建立自己的麦迪逊组织。 Murray deals only briefly with the business community’s role in the regulatory reform struggle. He notes, as economist Joseph Schumpeter did long ago, that, in the political world, business has too often been passive, or slipped into cronyism. Murray discusses the many reasons for this passivity. Firms are vulnerable to political retaliation, media attacks, shareholder activism, and consumer boycotts. Yet, Schumpeter also noted that business has critical resources—personnel, information, marketing and communication skills—needed for political success. And, as Murray notes, factors such as the slowing of innovation and the need for greater flexibility to operate in a global economy may be persuading some in the business community that this is a fight they must join and win. To do so, they need to ally with free market policy groups. 穆瑞只用了寥寥几笔简短地阐述了商业团体在改革中的角色。就像经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特很久以前就说过的那样，他认为在政治领域，企业要么消极被动，要么掉入裙带关系的陷阱。穆瑞认为以下几点造成了他们的消极。企业在政治报复，媒体攻击，股东维权，以及消费者抵制面前非常脆弱。但是熊彼特也指出，企业拥有重要的资源——人力，信息，市场和交流手段——这些都和政治成功有密切联系。此外，穆瑞也认为创新的减速和全球市场对运营灵活性提出的更高要求，会迫使企业加入这场战斗。为了获胜，他们必须和推广自由市场政策的组织结盟。 There are mutual advantages to such an alliance. Free market policy organizations are less vulnerable to political pressures, more credible as spokespeople, and skilled at crafting and promoting the narratives needed to advance the moral and intellectual case for reform. Meanwhile, businesspeople possess the localized knowledge, resources, and real-world experience to convey the human costs of overregulation. Businesses also enjoy cooperative links with their customers, employees, suppliers, and investors—relationships that give them both an audience and the clout to advance powerful narratives. 这种联盟可以给双方都带来好处。推广自由市场政策的组织更能应对政治压力，作为面对公众的发言人更容易被信任，并且擅长制造更具道德优势和知识水平的宣传攻势。同时，企业家具有本土化的知识、资源、和实打实的经验来转移过度管制的人力成本。企业家也更喜欢和他们客户、雇员、供应商、投资者的合作关系，这些人既是他们宣传的听众，也是推行这些宣传的重要力量。 In democratic market economies, most policy changes result from alliances of economic and moral interests. And indeed, such “Bootlegger and Baptist” alliances have long been a standard strategy used by those seeking greater political control of the economy. The cooperative efforts of trial lawyers and environmentalists, of consumer advocates and labor unions, explain much of the growth in regulation over the last decades. Our challenge, developed by Murray so well, is to learn from their successes. 在奉行市场经济的民主国家中，大部分政策改变都来自于经济利益和道德诉求的结合。实际上，类似“走私犯和教徒”的联盟很长时间以来一直是寻求对经济的更强政治控制的标准途径。诉讼律师、环保主义者、消费者保护组织，以及工会之间的合作，很大程度上导致了近几十年来增加的各种管制。正如穆瑞也提到过的，我们的挑战，就是从他们的成功中汲取经验。 Murray’s enthusiasm for reform is commendable, but those excited by his audacious plan must hope that he will lead an effort to advance it further. Stimulating resistance to regulation is key, but more will be needed to actually roll back Leviathan. The Progressives were successful in crafting the regulatory path to their goals, marketing that policy and gaining the influence and popular support to make it the dominant reality. Murray’s and our challenge is to find an equally effective strategy for economic liberalization. And Murray is well placed to suggest those next steps, having laid the intellectual groundwork for welfare reform in the 1990s, with his classic book, Losing Ground. Could Murray’s latest book provide the foundation for a new Doer/Thinker alliance? Stay tuned. 穆瑞对于改革的热情是值得赞扬的，但是那些因他的大胆计划而激动不已的人必须寄希望于他能更加完善这项计划。激起对管制的抵抗是关键，但更重要的是把权力关回笼子。进步派成功地借助管制实现了他们的目的，并且通过推销他们的策略，争取影响力和公众支持来使这些管制难以撼动。穆瑞和我们的挑战，是找出一套同样有效的策略来实现经济自由。在他的经典著作《倒退》中，穆瑞恰当的指出了，这些步骤如何为1990年代的福利改革打下了智识基础。那么，穆瑞的新书会为新一轮的实践家和思想家结盟提供基础吗？敬请期待。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#6：武人的兴起 辉格 2015年10月20日 农业出现之前，所有适龄男性都是战士，但没人将打仗作为谋生之道，因为战争或暴力攻击虽可能带来各种利益——战利品、个人声誉、女人、消灭资源竞争对手，等等——，却无法为个人提供经常性收入或可靠生活保障，所以当时并不存在一个职业武人阶层，社会分工充其量只是在性别与年龄段之间发生。 但农业改变了这一状况，畜群和粮食成了可供持续劫掠的资源，有望为劫掠者提供持久生活来源，从而使得战争成为一种有可能赖以为生的职业；可以说，农耕和畜牧创造了一种新的生态位，吸引一些人逐渐将生计建立在此之上；对于有着长久狩猎历史的人类，这一生态位并不太陌生，农牧群体的生活资料只是另一种猎物而已。 不过，该生态位起初并不十分诱人，因为人类毕竟是最可怕的动物，几万年前便已占据了食物链顶端，从他们口中夺食太危险了，而且人类有着强烈的复仇倾向，被攻击、特别是亲友被杀之后，无论是个人情感还是社会规范，都要求人们实施报复，实际上，血仇循环也是传统小型社会之间暴力冲突的头号起因。 但劫掠机会的持续存在，激励着一代代劫掠和反劫掠者不断开发新的战争技术和组织方法，同时，凭借地位分化和财富积累所带来的比较优势，最终将战争变成了一种可持续的生计模式；首先是武器的发展，早先的武器十分简陋，而且制作材料都是分布广泛、容易获得的石料、竹木、骨料、皮革和贝壳，尽管有些材料（比如黑曜石）需要从远处交换而来，但价格也相当便宜，所以每个人都有能力为自己制作和装备与别人质量效力相当的武器。 据人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔（[[Timothy Earle]]）介绍，丹麦日德兰半岛的新石器时代晚期古日耳曼遗存中，最常见的武器是一种石制匕首，数量极多，几乎每个墓葬和房屋遗址中都有几把，当地农民在犁地时还经常翻到；然而在进入青铜时代早期之后，主要武器变成了青铜剑，它们仅见于小部分墓葬，而且这些墓葬的位置、形式和随葬内容，皆与其他墓葬有着显著区别。 【图1】北欧新石器时代的燧石匕首 更有意思的是，这些铜剑多数安装的是朴素剑柄，且剑刃上可观察到较多砍削所留下的痕迹，但有少数安装了采用失蜡工艺铸造的豪华剑柄，且较少使用痕迹；很明显，拥有青铜剑的武士已有别于普通人，而豪华剑的主人则是地位显赫的权势人物；这一变化的原因不难理解：制造石匕首的燧石材料唾手可得，而青铜剑所需材料则是从数百公里外的南方经由长途贸易而来，其制造工艺也并非人人都能掌握。 【图2】北欧青铜时代早期的青铜剑，有些装有豪华剑柄 我们不妨从投资者或企业家的角度来考虑，武器和战争技术的发展是如何改变战争形态的：武器成本的提高，使得战争从一个重人力轻资产行业向重资产方向转变，让富裕者拥有了额外优势，他们的财力不仅让自己获得更强大的武器，还可以保障材料来源和武器制造能力，为那些贫穷但又渴望获取战利品的人提供装备，换取他们听从自己指挥，展开协调行动，从而组织起一支效忠于自己的队伍。 由于首领拥有分配战利品的权力，让他有了足够的激励采用更多重资产的战争手段，投资建造更为昂贵的战争器具，组织更大规模的劫掠行动；早期维京人在欧洲海岸河口发动的袭击都规模不大，通常只有几十条小船、一两百人，参与者地位也较平等，行动很少受头领节制，但随着易受攻击的沿岸村镇纷纷开始设防，成功袭击所需队伍日益庞大，船只也变得更大更昂贵，到十世纪时，袭击队伍常达到上百条船、数千人的规模。 【图5】维京海盗船 夏威夷群岛各酋邦的大酋长们建造的战船丝毫不逊色于维京海盗船，它基于波利尼西亚传统独木舟改造而成，将平衡浮木换成了第二独木船体，并添加了三角帆；1779年Kaleiopuu大酋长出迎库克船长的船队旗舰上，装载了20位桨手和40位战士，另一位大酋长Peleioholani拥有的一艘战舰，据说可装载160位战士，这样的大型战争装备，显然不是普通家庭所能负担，而传统独木舟却是每个家庭都有能力制造的。 【图6-7】波利尼西亚传统独木舟，有些带三角帆 【图3】夏威夷群岛的双体独木战船 【图4】1779年Kaleiopuu大酋长出迎库克船长的船队 盔甲、马匹、马具和战车同样昂贵，实际上，和早期农业社会的多数创新一样，这些新技术都是战争向重资产方向发展的结果，直到变得足够普及和廉价之后，才被用于容器和农具等和平用途；这些创新离不开有组织私人武装的崛起，试想，假如战争仍像前农业社会那样，以分散自发无组织的方式进行，战利品谁拿到归谁，那就没人会愿意在重资产型的新技术上进行高风险投资。 对战争从事者来说，财力优势也体现在风险抵御能力上，和农业生产相比，劫掠的机会来得更随机，成败也更难预料，万一身亡家人也可能失去依靠，由富裕者出面组织，便提供了一种保险机制，平时由首领保障食宿，作战时提供武器装备，战死后还可抚恤家人，这对于那些缺少资源的穷人非常有吸引力，这一风险差异，和当代自由职业者与受薪雇员之间的差异一样。 农业社会的制度结构恰好创造了对此类机会的旺盛需求，基于经营效率上的考虑，土地财产常有着抗分割倾向，因而较多采用长子继承制，得不到土地的幼子们的一条常见出路，便是投靠一位首领，成为职业武士，首领族内的穷亲戚、孤儿、还不起债的债务人、有特殊技能却无处施展者，都可能选择这条出路。 如此一来，这些权势人物便逐渐将具备战争所需技能的各种人才聚集在其身边，包括战士，武器和车船工匠，厨师伙夫，水手马夫，学者谋士，采购关键物资的行商，还有兼任历史学家、宣传部长和情报收集者的说书艺人和吟游诗人，通过为他们提供食宿、赞助和庇护，在战争中共同行动，分享战利品和保护费，首领与其追随者之间便建立起了一种稳固的恩主-门客关系（[[patronage]]）。 这是早期农业社会从部落向酋邦发展的关键一步，它开启了社会进化的一个全新阶段，社会结构与秩序不再仅仅通过自发协调而产生，权势人物开始主动创建组织，实施集中式控制，这一转折，类似于管理学家钱德勒（[[Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.]]）所指出的现代规模化企业取代传统个体商人的过程，企业这只“看得见的手”在局部代替市场配置资源、组织生产、协调供应链，将这些战争团队的首领称为第一批钱德勒式企业家，也并不过分。 门客制广泛存在于各大文明的黎明期，在酋邦形态的社会中，统治阶层由一群通过宗族或姻亲纽带联合起来的恩主（酋长）组成，其中权势最显赫而取得霸主地位的大恩主便是酋邦首领；北欧萨迦史诗传颂的英雄，荷马史诗中的英雄和所谓国王（[[basileus]]）们，都是拥有众多门客的大恩主，随从或侍卫亲兵组成了其军队，相互间征战不休，争夺霸主地位。 恩主-门客关系也是早期罗马的重要社会纽带和基础政治结构，罗马城创建者罗穆鲁斯本人便是位大恩主，早先的恩主（patronus）后来成了罗马王国的贵族（[[patricius]]），他们同时也是元老（[[senator]]）的来源；在王国早期，称呼元老的词是patres，意思是父亲或族长，与“恩主”和“贵族”同源，与此同时，那些追随效忠恩主的门客（pietas），变成了罗马的平民阶层（[[plebeian]]），这一词义演变揭示了从部落到酋邦的发展过程：权势家族通过收容大批门客而变成政治组织，其族长作为恩主而成为该组织的首领，这些首领继而联合成为罗马国家。 历史学家阿扎尔·加特（[[Azar Gat]]）在对照分析了希腊罗马文献后发现，类似的演变也发生在凯尔特和日耳曼社会，在波利比乌斯（[[Polybius]]）所描绘的公元前二世纪北意大利凯尔特人社会中，已经有了拥有大批门客的显赫恩主，但此时这些大人物与其随从之间的关系仍较为平等，每日聚宴畅饮，同吃同住，分享战利品和奢侈品，早期称呼门客随从的词汇也多与“朋友”同源，大人物只是众多战士和战争首领中最富有、最成功、最声誉卓著的那些，社会结构也仍由亲属关系所主导。 然而一个多世纪后，凯撒在《高卢战记》中描绘情况已迥然不同，门客们对恩主唯命是从，且已转变为常年作战的职业武士，最显赫恩主的私人武装扩张到上万人规模，居住在新近兴起的城镇里，恩主们俨然已成为高高在上的贵族统治阶层，早先的部落平等主义已不复存在。 基于门客制的新型组织一方面充分利用传统的宗族结构和姻亲网络，同时又大加改造；首领们突出强调自己所在家系，并将其直系祖先加以神化，强加给其他支系和氏族，成为社区共同祀奉的神祗，希腊诸神连同其谱系便如此被创造了出来，夏威夷酋长们甚至阻止平民记诵家谱，结果平民往往只记得祖父辈是谁，罗马的门客则常以收养的名义被并入恩主的氏族，采用其姓氏，收养传统在罗马贵族中一直盛行到帝国时代。 恩主们在网罗门客时，也突破了宗族结构和部落边界，在选择与谁合作的问题上，亲缘关系退居其次，专业素养、忠诚勇武、个人友情成为更优先的考虑，更直接的物质报酬和利益算计取代传统互惠关系而成为主要激励来源，亲属义务则被效忠盟誓等契约性义务所取代，战友情谊代替血缘亲情，基于职位的权力代替家长和长老权威……所有这些改变，都是走向专业化所必需，类似于家族企业在去家族化过程中所经历的变化。 这些武装组织最初是为了对外发动劫掠，获取战利品，可一旦建立，便成为一股改变社会政治结构的力量；那些频遭劫掠却无力自保的群体，可能会向劫掠者定期缴纳贡赋以换取安宁，或者向其他同类组织纳贡以寻求庇护；同时，存在此类组织的群体，会因其对外劫掠行动而惹来报复，而报复通常会无差别的落在整个群体头上，这样，即便那些并未依附于武装首领的社会成员，也不得不与之建立关系，以免躺枪。 此时事情可能朝两个方向发展，假如部落长老们的影响力足够强大，便可将这些武装组织置于自己的控制之下，建立起某种军事民主制，相反，假如武装首领更强大，便可能篡夺原本由长老会议所拥有的部落政治权力而成为僭主，全面接管部落的公共事务，而其门客就成了他的统治团队。 重要的是，那些在竞争中胜出的武装组织，必定是有能力慑服了周边若干群体因而得以从中勒索贡赋的组织，所以他们基于纳贡与庇护关系而建立的政治结构，必定是跨部落的，结果便是酋邦的建立；尽管此前也存在跨部落联盟，但联盟是一种类似于商会的松散组织，而酋邦则是真正的企业，它将推动社会以更紧密的方式走向大型化。 武装首领一旦建立起酋邦，便可凭借姻亲网络进一步强化对各部落的控制，常见做法是从各部落娶妻，并将女儿嫁给各酋长，正如祖鲁王国诞生前的情况；假如首领实力足够强大，还可将其宗族近亲安插进各部落，在夏威夷酋邦中，部落酋长都是大酋长的父系近亲，亲缘通常不远于一级堂兄弟，更低级的社区酋长则是大酋长的亲兵随从，他们都直接听从其指挥，平时照管农务、组织人力修缮灌溉系统，定期收缴贡赋，必要时有义务参与大酋长的作战行动。 在夏威夷的案例中，一个层级化的官僚系统已呼之欲出，随着武装组织之间的竞争推动武器和组织技术持续改进，酋邦的统治范围和控制能力日益扩展，由此所开启的组织和制度发展进程，将最终导致国家的诞生。 门客制所创造的武装组织，也留下了一种不可逆的遗产，在此后历史上，每当国家崩溃、社会失序之际，凡已经历过这一阶段的社会，都不会再退回到部落状态，而会在各种类似恩主-门客关系的模式下实现政治权力重组，并重建地方秩序，罗马衰亡后西欧封建体系的兴起，汉帝国崩溃后士族门阀收纳部曲荫客、拥家兵而自保的做法，皆属此类。  

【2015-11-19】 @whigzhou: 我会疼爱她，保护她，决不让她受一点点伤害。——这些话我们常听到，小清新尤其爱听，但觉得这些话温暖动听的人，多半不知道那意味着什么，否则就不会有那么多无原则的反战分子了，没准备好去战斗的人，有什么资格说要保护家人免受伤害呢？所以并非谈论爱就没意义，而是他们不明白那在行动上意味着什么 @whigzhou: 假如你足够真诚，而不只是说说空话，就能闻到这几句话背后的血腥味，在一个霍布斯世界，要想确保家人免受伤害，你就必须（1）杀死某些不可理喻的邻居，或（2）用雷霆般的打击将其摄服，或（3）把他们控制起来，或（4）教会他们文明行事——这些方法一个比一个困难，你的实力决定了你可能作何选择。 @whigzhou: 美国条约体系（北约/澳新美/美日/美韩……）之外的国际社会，就是个霍布斯世界，至于联合国，那只是个笑话  

多年前我曾就中医发表过一些观点，今天不小心又提起这个话题，刚好这几年又有些新体会，再整理补充一下： 1）中医这个词的含义不太清楚，按较狭窄的用法，它是指一套理论体系（诸如阴阳五行、五脏六腑、气血经络、寒热干湿、温凉甘苦……），以及被组织在这套体系之内的各种治疗方法，而按较宽泛的用法，则囊括了所有存在于汉文化中的非现代医疗； 2）对于那套理论体系，我的态度是完全唾弃； 3）对于被归在中医名下的各种治疗方法，我的态度和对待其他前科学的朴素经验一样，持高度怀疑的态度； 4）但我不会像有些反中医者那样，做出一个强判断：它们都是无用的或错误的； 5）我相信，这些疗法中，有不少大概是有点用的； 6）然而，现代医疗的发展，大幅改变了利用这些可能用处的机会成本和得失比，依我看，改变的程度已达到：其中没有什么是值得考虑到，我甚至认为，作为医疗消费者，认真考虑这些可能用处，会显得很愚蠢； 7）考虑到中医界普遍拒绝按现代医学标准去审查旧疗法，对这些疗法持总体负面评价（即所谓一棍子打死），是完全合理的，在我看来，今天一位医生宣称自己是中医，或推崇中医，仅这一点，足以让他变得不值得信任； 8）但是这一评价方式不适用于过去，在现代医疗普及之前，一位相信传统疗法的医生，也完全可能是明智的、理性的、具有批判性头脑的，甚至具有一些朴素科学态度的，据我了解，许多被归为中医的医生，其实对那些理论说辞没什么兴趣，他们只是相信一些特定疗法，而且也愿意随经验而调整自己的信念； 9）我相信（虽然没什么经验依据），在近代以前，或多或少有点用处的中医疗法，很可能比现在多不少，但随着现代医疗的普及，幸存下来的中医疗法中，有用的比例降低了，剩下的基本上都是没用的；理由是， 10）在科学方法出现之前，对传统知识的筛选机制是基于个体经验和口碑传播的，这一选择机制有个特点：因果链容易从随机个体经验中得到识别的那些事情上，知识改进和积累更可能发生，而在因果链不容易识别的那些地方，便是迷信的温床； 11）在现代医疗普及的过程中，大众对待新旧疗法的态度上，上述筛选机制仍会起作用，因而，传统疗法中那些被用于因果链较明显的病症上因而很可能有点用的疗法，反而更容易被现代疗法所淘汰，结果，剩下的都是安慰剂，因果关系越是难以看清，对安慰剂的需求就越大，这大概就是当代中医的情况，在现代医疗的排挤下，它已经转变成了一个比以往远更纯粹的安慰剂产业。  

恐怖主义土壤肥沃，众多落后国家制度建设鲜有成就，甚至沦为失败国家，社会失序，这些问题其实有着一个共同的背景：西方文化和价值观对这些国家的精英或潜在精英失去了吸引力，或者，即便仍有吸引力，以往那个以西方价值为灯塔的、并且可供这些落后国家精英分子或有志青年向上爬升的社会阶梯，已经断裂了。 这一情景与维多利亚时代形成鲜明对比，那时所有已经接触西方的传统社会，无不仰慕西方文化，这些社会中禀赋优秀、志向高远、不安现状的青年，都清楚的知道，通往西方价值的阶梯在哪里，可以如何通过自身努力而一级级爬升，从而获得个人成就。 在晚清最后三十年，有点志向的青年都知道，学英语、接受西式教育、在铁路局、电报局、工厂等西式产业谋得一份差事、留学，都是令人艳羡的社会晋身之途，按西方模式创办现代企业、组织自治社区，甚至改革政治制度，这些成就可以为个人带来新的荣耀，赢得西方式的尊严和体面，甚至被女王封爵。 这就像之前科举阶梯，即便对不识字的人也是一目了然。 即便禀赋较差、地位较低的青年，无望获得这样的成就，也同样会受这一价值阶梯的影响，因为他身边总会有一些成功者、高地位者，他们的一举一动都在告诉他：什么才是更值得追求的价值，如何行事才显得更体面；这就好比，尽管科举体系仅仅容纳了社会极小部分成员（最多几十万），但其价值吸引力却影响了所有人的观念和行为。 上述价值阶梯之所以那么清晰可见，是因为西方元素的现场存在，其优势亲眼可见，不容否认，并且对个人可以伸手触及，而不像如今许多落后国家，可以在电视和互联网上看到，却遥不可及。 优势文化的现场存在所带来的价值引导作用，被社会学家称为橱窗效应，研究发现，晚清大量商业和政治制度创新，比如新式企业、商业行会、慈善机构的组织模式，都是橱窗效应的表现，许多都是照抄香港同类。 可是现如今，西方橱窗里只剩下商品和娱乐，制度元素都不见了。 这部价值阶梯的断裂，始于上世纪六十年代，西方从殖民地和保护国全面撤离；与此同时，一战后西方左派知识分子在文化上的自我否定运动，也在六七十年代达到高峰；九十年代，这一趋势因苏联崩溃而有所回潮，但很快又重新掀起，特别是在08年之后。 这一撤离之所以导致阶梯断裂，是因为，价值阶梯要起作用，必须和权力结构相对应，否则即便还有大批传教士、慈善组织、教师、人类学家、考古学家在现场，橱窗效应也会大大削弱，因为在价值吸引和文化仿效方面，多数人尤其是处于这一发展阶段的人，都是很势利很低俗的，谁发财谁有权势，就仰慕和效仿谁，村里首富开奔驰，就觉得奔驰是天下最好的车，当地土豪军阀以砍头剁手展示权力，大家就都觉得这才是赢得尊严和体面的可行方式，无论外人觉得金三胖多丑陋，在朝鲜那都是时尚先锋。 细说起来话就太长…… 总之，只要西方不在文化和价值观重建其自信心，本文开头所提到的那些问题，就不会有出路，更糟糕的是，西方世界本身也会因此而继续颓废下去，那才是真正的悲剧。  

当前中东乱局，看来只有大强度——二战以来的最大强度——干预才足以解决，但以我对美国干预方式的观感，恐怕既不会有好效果，也难以长期坚持。 美式干预的固有缺陷，让他在越南、阿富汗、伊拉克一次次陷入泥潭。 所谓美式干预，简单说有这样几个要点：

1. 推翻坏政权；
2. 扶持政治伦理上可接受的、战略上愿意配合的友好政权；
3. 干预费用由美国买单，包括大把军事和经济援助；
4. 好不容易扶持起来的友好政权，为了让它维持下去，不得不很大限度上容忍其违反规则和协议的鸡贼小动作（比如巴基斯坦、埃及和海外各国）；
5. 尊重主权（否则伊拉克早就该一拆三了）；

这一模式的问题是：

1. 推翻旧政权容易，但扶持新政权困难，往往很脆弱，依赖性很强，结果美军被长期拖在那里，越卷越深，无法脱身；
2. 军费开支膨胀乃至失控，加上伤亡数积累，过不了几年就丧失国内支持；
3. 有些问题不破坏主权根本解决不了，比如南斯拉夫。

越战以来，这个模式只在格林纳达和巴拿马这种情况单纯的迷你国家才成功过，在阿富汗和伊拉克都失败的很惨，但看不出有改弦更张的迹象。 美国人执着于这种模式，原因有几个：

1. 殖民地历史和独立建国经历，使得美国人有着根深蒂固的反殖民反帝倾向，远离旧大陆的和平环境又造成了孤立主义倾向，所以总是希望外科手术式的尽快解决问题，不愿将干预经常化和长期化；
2. 反殖民反帝倾向也导致他们特别愿意尊重主权和领土完整；
3. 战后对德国日本的占领和改造异常成功，这可能让他们对该模式抱有过度信心。

有关干预和秩序重建的困难，有各种分析，很多也都言之成理，可问题是，为何当年大英帝国以规模小得多的军队、少得多的军费、薄弱得多的财政基础，却能在那么广阔的世界维持相当水平的秩序？ 不妨看看一下英式干预有何不同：

1. 尽量不更换旧政权，这一点很重要，因为一个政权既然能够建立并自我维持，必定已经找到了足够的存在基础和可行的组织方式，而这些是很难从头建立的；
2. 向既有政权施加规范，不遵守就狠狠打，打到肉痛，但别推翻；
3. 抓住既有政权最心疼的利益要害（俗话叫捏住卵子）；
4. 干预费用主要由当地承担（有人可能会说落后国家怎么承担得起发达国家标准的军费开支？错了，秩序可以带来巨额红利，没有秩序，伊拉克石油可能一桶都运不出波斯湾，马关条约带来的FDI和工业增长，远远足以抵偿赔款额）；
5. 别拿主权太当回事，从伦理上说，非契约性国家的主权根本不值得尊重，扶谁灭谁，全看哪个对建立秩序有利，等到他们宪政发育成熟，转变成契约性国家，再尊重不迟；

很明显，这一模式是很帝国主义的，有人会说，当前政治环境下不可能，确实，不过部分的往这方向靠拢还是可能的，比如：

1. 南斯拉夫和塞尔维亚的主权就没尊重，不是也挺好？伊拉克为啥不能拆？
2. 第一次海湾战争的军费就摊了，后来的没摊，是因为美国让埃米尔们感觉太安全了，不像之前被萨达姆吓尿了裤子，要改变这一点，必须将干预经常化，也就是让他们时不时尿一次裤子；
3. 为此，就需要建立地区性的条约体系，类似冷战期间的东盟，实际上第一次海湾战争是建立此类体系千载难逢的良机，当时就该乘他们裤子未干把条约义务施加上去；
4. 有了条约体系，像卡塔尔给哈马斯一箱箱拎钱这种事情，一旦发现就得狠狠打；
5. 利比亚在阿拉伯之春前其实有望成为一个英式干预的案例，可惜半途而废；
6. 在中东这样的乱局中，出现危机的政权从来不少，美国应该抓住每次这样的机会，迫使危机中的政权接受条约义务，便可为后续干预提供合法性；

我对“该怎么办”这种问题向来兴趣不大，说这些，主要是为了回答这样一种可能的质疑：你的政治哲学究竟有何操作性含义？在现实政治问题上究竟对应何种做法？确实，这是一个合理质疑，所以，为了表明自己说的不是空话，就需要给出一个操作性的演示，但也仅仅是个演示（比方说，可以如此这般），并不打算仔细展开。

Walmart Is Changing Its Labor Model: How Many Workers Will Lose Their Jobs? 沃尔玛正在改变其劳工模式：有多少工人会因此而失业？ 作者：Tim Worstall @ 2015-9-06 译者：黑色枪骑兵（@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：福布斯，http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/09/06/walmart-is-changing-its-labor-model-how-many-workers-will-lose-their-jobs/ Walmart is quite significantly changing its labor model. Moving from a near hire any live body and let them get on with it one to something where people are well trained, well paid and presumably of rather higher productivity. 沃尔玛正在对其劳工模式进行大刀阔斧的改革。从之前的“几乎是个活人就愿意雇佣，并让他们一直干下去”逐步转变为“让员工接受更好的培训，拿到更高的薪水，以期带来更高的生产率”。 This is what many have been crying out for the company to do for years of course: move to something closer to the Costco model than the one that Walmart has traditionally pursued. 当然，许多人一直就迫切呼吁沃尔玛采取这些行动：从沃尔玛的传统模式转向更类似于Costco的模式。 However, as some like me have been pointing out all along there is a flip side to that change in models. Which is that the end aim is of course to employ fewer of those more productive people at those higher wages. 然而，一些人，比如我，自始至终认为这一模式改变存在负面影响。这种改革的最终目的，是以更高的工资雇佣数量更少但是生产率更高的员工。 The point being that if one can raise productivity levels by more than the increase in cost then of course profits will rise: that being the end goal for all shareholder owned companies. 这个观点的核心在于：如果提升的生产率超过所增的花费，收益就会提升——这是所有股份制公司的终极目标。 The interesting question is going to be how many people either lose or don’t get jobs as a result of this strategic change: and I’ll suggest a method by which we can calculate this a little later. 那么一个有趣的问题就来了：有多少人会由于这种战略性转变而失去或者得不到工作呢？稍后我会推荐一个计算这个数值的方法。 There’s two prongs to Walmart’s new approach. The first is to take a leaf from Henry Ford’s book with that $5 a day thing: 沃尔玛的新方案包括两部分。第一部分是照着亨利·福特的“每天五美元”画葫芦：

One motive is better public relations at a time when inequality is a hot-button political issue. But bottom-line calculations also play a role. 当分配不均成为一个热点政治话题的时候，更好的公共关系就成了动机之一。但实际利益计算也发挥了作用。 Employee turnover costs money—by industry estimates as much as $5,000 per front-line worker, or 20% to 30% of an entry-level salary. 员工的流动替换是要花钱的——按业内估计，每位一线工人的流动所费多达5000美元，也就是入门级薪水的20%到30%。 Standard turnover in retail is 50% in the first six months. If Wal-Mart can reduce this churn, persuading people to stay at least 12 to 18 months, it will save “tens of millions of dollars a year,” according to Ms. Oliver. 零售业员工在工作头六个月内的流动率通常是50%。如果沃尔玛能减少这种流动，劝说员工至少工作12到18个月，照Ms. Oliver 的估计，“每年能省下数千万美元”。

As I explained way back here, Henry Ford’s $5 a day was not what most people think it was. It was most certainly not, as all too many would have it, so that the newly richer workers could all buy a Model T. 我老早之前就已说过，亨利·福特的“每天五美元”并不是大多数人想象的那个样子。这么做的目的，根本就不是许多人所理解的那样，要让那些新富工人都能买T型轿车。 That would have been a great way to lose lots of money. A company cannot pay its own workers more, then see profits rise as they spend that cash on the company’s products. 想大把亏钱的人才会那么干。一个公司不能向他的员工支付更多薪水，并期待员工会把钱花到自家公司的产品上，然后公司利润会增加。 This is trying to raise yourself by your bootlaces. It also wasn’t about trying to create a vibrant midle class. What it was about was reducing the job churn on the assembly line. 这相当于是要拎着自己的靴带把自己提起来。这么做，也不是为了塑造一个有活力的中产阶级。它要做的，只是减少装配线上的人员流动。 Ford was getting through 50,000 workers a year in order to have 13,000 working on the line at any one time. That had vast recruitment and training costs. 福特每年雇佣50000名工人，以保证生产线上时刻都有13000名工人工作。这需要庞大的招募和训练费用。 So, that’s what Walmart is doing here. Let’s see if we can reduce those costs by having less churn. 所以，这就是沃尔玛现在要做的事。让我们看看减少人员流动能否减少这些花费。 That, in turn, means perhaps not bottom fishing in the labor market but improving pay relative to others so that people will stick around a little longer. 这反过来意味着，也许不再从劳动市场底层招人，而是比别家支付更高的工资，以期员工能待得更久。 This could well be a good move too but only time will tell. 这可能是一招好棋，但是效果只能交给时间检验了。 There’s also a second prong to the new strategy: 这项计划还有另一部分。

Front-line employees—cashiers, cart pushers and sales associates—will now spend their first months at the company in a supervised on-the-job training program. 现在，一线员工，比如收银员、手推车整理员和销售助理，入职后的头几个月会在公司接受有人指导的在职训练计划。 In the past, they sat through a few days of orientation and safety drills, many of them focused on compliance with environmental and health regulations. 过去，他们会耐着性子接受几天新人指导和安全训练，这些训练大多数集中在遵守环境条例和卫生条例上。 The only real job training happened in the store—knowledge passed on by more experienced employees. 在店里接受的唯一真正的工作培训是由更有经验的员工传授的知识。

There’s two sides to this. One is the obvious point that if you’re expecting your workers to stick around longer then you’re also going to be willing to invest in them rather more. 这件事是有两面性的。一方面很明显，那就是如果你预期你的雇员会待得更久，那么同样，你也将会更加乐于在他们身上投资。 Because you’ll be able to amortise your investment in them over that longer period that they’re working for you. 因为你在他们身上的投资会随着他们为你工作时间的增长而分期收回。 And there’s the more obvious point of that end goal: better trained workers will be, ceteris paribus, more productive. And thus we can see that Walmart is trying to move from one labor model to another: 另一个更为明显的作用就是终极目标的实现：训练更好的员工，让他们在相同条件下生产率更高。因此我们能明白沃尔玛正在推进劳工模式的转变：

Economists who study retail distinguish between “low-road” and “high-road” employers. One group keeps labor costs down, the other invests more in workers and reaps the benefits in higher productivity. Cost-conscious Wal-Mart is trying to move toward the high road. 研究零售的经济学家区分“低端”和“高端”雇主。前者压底劳工成本，后者会给员工更多的投资，然后通过更高的生产率获益。注重节约成本的沃尔玛正在向“高端”的方向靠拢。

This is all entirely traditional labor economics by the way, there’s nothing mysterious about any of it. However, there is a sting in the tail here. 顺便说一下，这全部都是传统劳动经济学的内容，没什么神秘的。然而，这里有一个令人始料未及的缺陷。 For well over a decade now I’ve been pointing out that yes, sure, Costco pays its workers very much better than Walmart does. But it also uses, per unit of sales, about half the labor that Walmart does. 十多年来，我一直在说，是的，没错，Costco支付给员工的薪水比沃尔玛要多很多。但是达成单位销量时，它用的劳动力大约是沃尔玛的一半。 Thus the shouting that Walmart can and should pay its workers like Costco does comes with that sting in that tail: for moving to the same pay structure would entail at least attempting to move to the same productivity levels. 因此“沃尔玛能够且应该像Costco一样支付工资”这种呼吁就有个意料之外的缺陷：因为采取相同的工资结构就意味着至少需要尝试把生产率拉到相同的水平。 Meaning that Walmart would employ about half the number of people per unit of sales than it currently does. 这就意味着，将来沃尔玛单位销量的雇工数量将只有目前数量的一半。 And now we’re seeing that Walmart is taking at least baby steps to that higher road labor model. And the interesting thing is going to be, well, is the prediction about employment levels going to come true too? 现在我们正目睹沃尔玛在向着“高端”劳工模式蹒跚学步。值得关注的事情将是，关于雇佣水平的预期真的会实现吗？ Just in a little more detail. Productivity is the amount of work (really, the amount of value added) that we get from one hour of labor. Raising productivity thus means getting more value added from one hour of labor. 再说得详细一点。生产率是劳动力每小时的工作量（实际上，是增加的价值量）。那么提高生产率就意味着从单位劳动量里得到更多的增加值。 And if sales are static that then obviously also means using less labor per unit of sales. 如果销售不变，那么这就明显意味着用更少的劳动力达成单位销量。 Thus raising productivity is the very same thing as saying that less labor is going to be used. This still holds even if sales or output rise: there’s still less labor going to be used than there would have been at the earlier, lower, level of labor productivity. 那么提高生产率就等同于使用更少的劳动力。销量或者产出上升的时候，这一点依然成立：需要用到的劳动力比之前劳动生产率水平更低的时候更少。 And the way to test it is pretty simple, because we can find the numbers we need to measure labor productivity in the Walmart accounts. 验证的方式很简单，因为我们能从沃尔玛的账目中找到所需的用来衡量劳动生产率的数字。 We know the number employed in the US….some 1.4 million….and we know what sales are in the US…$288 billion….so labor productivity is $205,000 and change per worker. 我们知道沃尔玛在美国的雇员数量，大约一百四十万，我们也知道它在美国境内的销售额，2880亿美元，所以劳动生产率是大约是每个员工205000美元多一点。 That’s actually sales not value added but that still gives us what we want, a number to compare over time (Costco’s sales per employee are about double this). 这个数据事实上是销售额而不是增加值，但是我们还是能从中得到我们想要的，即可以进行跨时段对比的数据。（Costco的每位雇员销售额大约是这个数字的两倍） As labor productivity rises as a result of more training and lower churn from the pay rises then we would expect to see this number rise. 当劳动生产率随着培训增加以及工资提升导致的流动率降低而增长时，我们可以预期上述数字会增加。 More sales per employee. And then we will also be able to calculate how many jobs have been lost to this rise in productivity. 每个员工将对应更多的销售量。然后我们就能计算出有多少工作岗位会由于生产率的上升而减少。 For, say, that sales rise to $250k per employee. We can then calculate how many employees would have been needed if productivity was still the old, lower, number. 因为，假设人均销量上升至25万美元。我们可以计算，如果生产率还是之前的老的、比较低的数值，那将需要多少雇员。 The number of jobs lost will therefore be the difference between the number actually employed and the number who would have been without the productivity gain. 工作岗位的流失量就是实际雇佣员工数和生产率增加之前本该雇佣的人数的差额。 Yes, obviously, we would need to discount this for the general inflation rate. 当然，我们要给这个数字打个折，因为存在通胀因素。 My prediction is that productivity will indeed rise at Walmart in the coming years. And also that sales per employee will rise, meaning that the number employed will fall. 我的预期是，沃尔玛的生产率确实会在未来几年逐步上升，人均销售额也会提升，这就意味着被雇佣的人数会减少。 Not fall necessarily from the current absolute level, but fall relative to where it would have been absent the productivity increase. 这种减少不是说其绝对值一定会低于当前水平，而是说它会相对地低于生产率没有增加时本该达到的水平。 Anyone want to bet against that prediction? 有人想跟我赌赌这个预测吗？ （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Nevada’s Voucher Breakout 内华达州的教育券突围 作者：WSJ @ 2015-9-01 译者：淡蓝 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：WSJ，http://www.wsj.com/articles/nevadas-voucher-breakout-1441150012 Unions and the ACLU fight universal statewide school choice. 工会正和美国公民自由联盟一起反对全州普适择校 The hullabaloo over Common Core is obscuring some major school choice flashpoints in the states. Consider Nevada, where the union for the public school status quo is suing to block revolutionary education savings accounts. 围绕“公共核心”的喧闹，盖住了各州主要的择校热点问题。看看内华达州，为公立学校现状发声的工会，正在通过起诉来到达封锁革命性的教育储蓄账户的目的。 Earlier this summer Nevada Republicans established universal education savings accounts (ESAs), which allow all parents who withdraw their kids from public schools to spend state funds on private school tuition, textbooks, tutoring fees and special services. Jeb Bush last month praised Nevada’s ESAs as a model for “total voucherization,” which is scaring the unions silly. 今年夏初，内华达州的共和党人建立了普适教育储蓄账户（ESAs)， 允许所有家长，在把孩子从公立学校退学之后，可以用州立基金来给孩子交私立学校的学费、书本费、家教费和特殊教育服务费。上个月，Jeb Bush称赞这是个"教育券全面化"的典范，这可把工会吓傻了。 Starting next year, parents who opt out of public schools can receive between 90% and 100% of the statewide average per-pupil allotment ($5,100 to $5,700) depending on their income. Unused funds can be rolled over for future expenses including college. According to the Friedman Foundation, ESAs will cover between 60% and 80% of the median tuition at private schools, many of which provide additional financial assistance. 自明年始，选择让自己的孩子退出公立学校的家长们，根据收入不同，可以拿到全州学生平均拨款的90%到100%（即5100 至5700美元）。未用完的资金可以结转为将来使用，包括上大学的费用。据Friedman基金会说，教育储蓄账户可以覆盖私立学校中位学费的60%到80%，且这种私立学校大多会提供额外的助学金。 Twenty-three states have enacted 48 private-school choice programs, but nearly all include income and eligibility caps. Four states other than Nevada—Arizona, Florida, Tennessee and Mississippi—offer ESAs that are limited to special needs or low-income students. 有23个州已经立法实施了48个私立学校择校方案，只是几近所有的方案都包含有收入和资格限制。与内华达州不同，有四个州——亚利桑那，佛罗里达，田纳西和密西西比——要求教育储蓄账户限用于特殊需求或低收入家庭学生。 Unions are desperate to prevent Nevada’s model from spreading. They argue that giving all parents these educational options will destroy public schools, but the real point is to break up the union monopoly. Universal ESAs give all low and middle-income students the ability to escape failing schools, while providing enough funding to seed alternatives. 为阻止内华达州模式的蔓延，工会已不顾一切。他们认为，赋予所有家长以教育选择，这对公立学校将是毁灭性的，但真正的要点是它会打破工会的垄断。在提供足够资金扶植替代选择的同时，普适教育储蓄账户会使所有低收入和中等收入家庭的学生有能力避开不合格的学校。 The American Civil Liberties Union last week took up the union water cannon. It argued in a lawsuit that ESAs violate the Nevada constitution’s ban on “public funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal” being used for a “sectarian purpose” and undermine “the public school system that the State is constitutionally required to support.” 美国公民自由联盟上周拿起了工会的水枪。在一起诉讼中，它辩称，教育储蓄账户违反了内华达州宪法禁止"任何种类或性质的公共基金，无论是州立、县立或市立"被用于"宗派目的"的规定，并从根本上破坏了"宪法规定州必须支持的公立学校系统"。 This is a legal Hail Mary. Dozens of state constitutions include these so-called Blaine amendments, which are a legacy of the anti-Catholic bigotry of the 19th century. Most state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark 2011 ruling, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, have interpreted these prohibitions narrowly. The High Court ruled that tax credits to nonprofits that fund private school scholarships aren’t government expenditures. 这真是个法律上的孤注一掷。数十个州的宪法包含有这类所谓的布莱恩修正案，这是19世纪反天主教偏执狂的一份遗产。在2011年亚利桑那州基督教学校学费组织诉Winn案中，绝大多数州法院和美国联邦最高法院在其具有里程碑意义的裁定中，都已狭义地解释过这些禁令。高等法院裁定，给予旨在资助私立学校奖学金的非营利组织的那些税收优惠，不属于政府支出。 Last year the Arizona Supreme Court upheld an appellate decision that ESAs are constitutional because they are “neutral in all respects toward religion” and direct “aid to a broad class of individuals without reference to religion.” What’s more, “the specified object of the ESA is the beneficiary families, not private or sectarian schools.” 去年，亚利桑那州最高法院维持了一项上诉判决，认为教育储蓄账户符合宪法，因为它们是"在各方面对于宗教均属中立"，并且“直接帮助了大量与宗教无关的个体"。更重要的是，"教育储蓄账户指定的对象是受益家庭，不是私人或者宗派学校"。 The Institute for Justice, which helped defend Arizona’s ESAs and craft Nevada’s, notes that it is “the independent decision-making by parents that severs any link between church and state.” ESAs give “parents a genuine choice as to how to spend the money.” If ESAs are unconstitutional, then so are state Medicaid reimbursements to religiously affiliated hospitals. 帮助保卫亚利桑那州教育储蓄账户并帮助精心构建内华达州教育储蓄账户的“正义协会"指出，教育储蓄账户是"家长们的独立决策，切断了所有政教关连"。它给了"家长们一个真正的选择机会来决定如何花这些钱"。如果教育储蓄账户是违宪的，那各州给宗教附属医院报销的国家医疗补助也同样是。 It’s both a shame and reflection of modern liberal politics that the ACLU is teaming up with the teachers union to squash educational freedom. 美国公民自由联盟与教师工会结盟，一起压制教育自由，这不仅是一种耻辱，也是对现代自由派政治面目的一个真实写照。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Imperial exams and human capital 科举考试与人力资本 作者：Stephen Hsu @ 2015-5-20 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Information Processing，http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2015/05/imperial-exams-and-human-capital.html The dangers of rent seeking and the educational signaling trap. Although the imperial examinations were probably g loaded (and hence supplied the bureaucracy with talented administrators for hundreds of years), it would have been better to examine candidates on useful knowledge, which every participant would then acquire to some degree. 寻租的危险和教育信号陷阱。尽管科举考试基于一般智力因素（因此几百年来为官僚机构输送了很多优秀的行政人员）【校注：G因素，或一般智力因素，心理学上指人类一切认知活动都依赖的智力因素】，但如果它考察的是候选者的实用知识，那会更好，这样每个候选者都可以对这种知识有所掌握。 See also Les Grandes Ecoles Chinoises and History Repeats. 另请参考我的博文：“中国大学”和“历史在重复”

Farewell to Confucianism: The Modernizing Effect of Dismantling China’s Imperial Examination System Ying Bai The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 这里是香港科技大学Ying Bai的论文“告别儒家：中国废除科举制度的现代化影响” Imperial China employed a civil examination system to select scholar bureaucrats as ruling elites. This institution dissuaded high-performing individuals from pursuing some modernization activities, such as establishing modern firms or studying overseas. This study uses prefecture-level panel data from 1896-1910 to compare the effects of the chance of passing the civil examination on modernization before and after the abolition of the examination system. 中华帝国采用科举考试制度筛选士大夫来作为统治精英。这一机制阻止了优秀的个人从事一些现代化的活动，如建立现代企业或者去海外学习。本研究使用了从1896年到1910年废科举前后的府级名册数据，来考察科举晋身机会对现代化的影响。 Its findings show that prefectures with higher quotas of successful candidates tended to establish more modern firms and send more students to Japan once the examination system was abolished. As higher quotas were assigned to prefectures that had an agricultural tax in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643) of more than 150,000 stones, I adopt a regression discontinuity design to generate an instrument to resolve the potential endogeneity, and find that the results remain robust. 研究结果表明，废科举之后，那些科举取士配额较多的府建立的现代企业更多，向日本派遣的留学生也更多。由于那些在明朝时期（1368-1643）缴纳农业税超过15万石的府拥有的取士配额更多，我采用断点回归方法生成了一种工具，以解决潜在的内生相关性问题，发现结果依然稳固。【校注：此为论文“摘要”】

From the paper: 论文内容摘录：

Rent seeking is costly to economic growth if “the ablest young people become rent seekers [rather] than producers” (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991: 529). Theoretical studies suggest that if a society specifies a higher payoff for rent seeking rather than productive activities, more talent would be allocated in unproductive directions (Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 1993). 对于经济增长来说，寻租行为代价非常昂贵——如果“最优秀的年轻人倾向于成为寻租者，而不是生产者” (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991: 529) 的话。理论研究表明，如果社会让寻租行为比生产行为获利更多的话，更多有才能的人将会被分配到不事生产的方向(Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 1993)。 This was the case in late Imperial China, when a large part of the ruling class – scholar bureaucrats – was selected on the basis of the imperial civil examination. The Chinese elites were provided with great incentives to invest in a traditional education and take the civil examination, and hence few incentives to study other “useful knowledge” (Kuznets 1965), such as Western science and technology.2 Thus the civil examination constituted an institutional obstacle to the rise of modern science and industry (Baumol 1990; Clark and Feenstra 2003; Huff 2003; Lin 1995). 这就是中华帝国晚期的情况，统治阶级的很大一部分——即士大夫们——以科举考试的形式选拔出来。中国的精英们具有极大的激励来投资于传统教育，并且参加科举考试，因此对于其他“实用知识”就不那么热情了(Kuznets 1965)，比如说西方科学技术。这样，科举考试就构成了现代科学技术发展的制度性障碍(Baumol 1990; Clark and Feenstra 2003; Huff 2003; Lin 1995)。 This paper identifies the negative incentive effect of the civil exam on modernization by exploring the impact of the system’s abolition in 1904-05. The main empirical difficulty is that the abolition was universal, with no regional variation in policy implementation. To better understand the modernizing effect of the system’s abolition, I employ a simple conceptual framework that incorporates two choices open to Chinese elites: to learn from the West and pursue some modernization activities or to invest in preparing for the civil examination. 本文通过探索1904-1905年间废除科举考试的影响，来鉴别科举考试对于现代化的负面激励效应。主要的实证困难在于这一废除举动是全国性的，没有政策实施上的地区差异。为了更好地理解废除科举体制对于现代化建设的影响，我采用了一个简单的概念框架，其中包括了中国精英们在当时的两个选项：向西方学习并实行一些现代化举动，或是为准备科举考试而增加投入。 In this model, the elites with a greater chance of passing the examination would be less likely to learn from the West; they would tend to pursue more modernization activities after its abolition. Accordingly, the regions with a higher chance of passing the exam should be those with a larger increase in modernization activities after the abolition, which makes it possible to employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method to identify the causal effect of abolishing the civil examination on modernization. 在这个模型中，那些更有可能通过科举考试的精英们将不太可能向西方学习；而废除科举后他们将倾向于更多进行现代化活动。于是，科举晋身机会更大的地区应当也是那些废除科举之后现代化活动更为活跃的地区，这就使得我可以采用双重差分（DID）方法来鉴别废除科举制对于现代化的因果效应。 I exploit the variation in the probability of passing the examination among prefectures – an administrative level between the provincial and county levels. To control the regional composition of successful candidates, the central government of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) allocated a quota of successful candidates to each prefecture. In terms of the chances of individual participants – measured by the ratio of quotas to population – there were great inequalities among the regions (Chang 1955). 我利用了不同府在科举通过率上的差异——“府”这一地方的管理层级介于省级和县级之间。为了控制中选者的地域构成，清王朝（1644-1911）把取士名额分配到府。以个人投考者的成功率衡量——以配额占总人口比率计——不同地区很不平均（Chang 1955）。 To measure the level of modernization activities in a region, I employ (1) the number of newly modern private firms (per million inhabitants) above a designated size that has equipping steam engine or electricity as a proxy for the adoption of Western technology and (2) the number of new Chinese students in Japan – the most import host country of Chinese overseas students (per million inhabitants) as a proxy of learning Western science. Though the two measures might capture other things, for instance entrepreneurship or human capital accumulation, the two activities are both intense in modern science and technology, and thus employed as the proxies of modernization. ... 为衡量某个地区的现代化活动水平，我采用了（1）新成立的、具有一定规模、并应用了蒸汽机或者电力的现代私企数量（每百万居民），来代表对于西方科技的应用情况；以及（2）（每百万居民中）新近去往日本的中国留学生数量（日本是中国海外留学生的最主要目的地），来代表对于西方科学的学习情况。虽然这两者可能都会捕捉到其他东西，比如企业家或者人力资本积累，但这两个活动在现代科学技术中都是非常剧烈的，所以可用于代表现代化进程……

From Credentialism and elite employment: 以下摘自我之前的博文“文凭主义与精英雇佣”：

Evaluators relied so intensely on “school” as a criterion of evaluation not because they believed that the content of elite curricula better prepared students for life in their firms – in fact, evaluators tended to believe that elite and, in particular, super-elite instruction was “too abstract,” “overly theoretical,” or even “useless” compared to the more “practical” and “relevant” training offered at “lesser” institutions – but rather due to the strong cultural meanings and character judgments evaluators attributed to admission and enrollment at an elite school. I discuss the meanings evaluators attributed to educational prestige in their order of prevalence among respondents. ... 评价者们过于依赖于把“学校”作为评估的标准，这不是因为他们相信精英教育的内容可以使学生更善于应对公司生活——事实上，评价者倾向于相信，与“更差”的机构所提供的更“实用”和“更有意义”的训练相比，精英教育、特别是超级精英教育“太抽象”、“过于理论化”、甚或是“根本没用”——而是因为评价者给精英学校的招生录取赋予了丰厚的文化内涵和个性判断。我将按照它们各自在受访者中的流行程度次序，来讨论评价者在教育声望上所赋予的意义……

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Decline of Witch Trials in Europe 欧洲猎巫审判的衰落 作者：James Hannam @ 2007 译者：Yuncong Yang 校对：慕白 来源：作者个人网站，http://jameshannam.com/witchtrial.htm Preliminary considerations 绪论 Alice Molland was sent to the gallows at Exeter in 1684 and became the last witch to be executed in England. Scotland closed its account with Janet Horne in 1722 while trials wound down across Europe. However, it would not be until 1782 that the last witch to be legally executed met her fate at Glarus in Switzerland. 1684年，艾丽丝·莫兰在埃克塞特被处以绞刑，她是最后一个在英格兰被处决的女巫。 1722年，珍妮特·霍恩成为苏格兰最后一个被处决的女巫，此时，全欧洲的猎巫审判案件已经在减少，不过要等到1782年，全欧最后一个经法律程序被判死刑的女巫才在瑞士的格拉鲁斯被处决。 But by the late 17th century witch trials were already reasonably rare occurrences even in the same localities where, in the earlier part of that century, the greatest hunts had taken place. The crime itself was extinguished in France by royal edict in 1682, repealed in England in 1736 and abolished in Poland as late as 1776. 但是到17世纪晚期时，在那些之前猎巫运动最盛行的地区，猎巫审判已经是相当罕见的事情了。法国于1682年就通过王室敕令废除了巫术罪。英格兰取消巫术罪是在1736年，而直到1776年波兰才废除这一罪名。 However, the decline in trials and hunts did not necessarily presage a corresponding decline in the belief in witches just as their start did not correspond to any increase. Belief is a notoriously hard thing to measure, but almost all societies appear to have some tradition of witches and fear of magic has been nearly universal. The questions about witches in early modern Europe are not so much why people believed in them at that time and place, but why that belief manifested itself into the hunts and executions. 然而，正如猎巫审判和猎巫运动的兴起并不代表人们比以前更加相信巫术及巫师的存在一样，它的衰落也并不一定代表人们变得更不相信巫术及巫师的存在了。众所周知，信仰是非常难以度量的，而几乎所有社会里都存在着某种巫师传统，人们对魔法的恐惧也是处处有之。要研究近代早期欧洲的巫师这一题目，重要的问题不是为什么彼时彼地的人们相信有巫师存在，而是为什么彼时人们的这种信念导致了猎巫运动及对巫师的大规模处决。 The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the reasons that trials for the crime of witchcraft, from being relatively common before 1650, had, across Europe, become a rarity fifty years later and had died out altogether within another century. This rapid decline and then extinction is at least as puzzling as the widespread appearance of the phenomena in the first place at the end of the fifteenth century. 本文的宗旨是探讨这一问题：为什么在1650年前相当普遍的对施行巫术者的审判50年后就变得颇为罕见，而到了18世纪晚期就彻底绝迹了？猎巫审判在这一时期的急剧衰落与它在十五世纪末的急剧盛行一样令人费解。 Witch trials only became common during the Renaissance and the fiercest hunts took place in the 1620s and 1630s in German speaking areas. Contrary to popular belief, they were not a phenomenon of the Middle Ages. Although magical belief and practice were just as common during this earlier period, they did not often lead to trials, let alone executions. 猎巫审判要到文艺复兴时期才开始普遍出现，而最最激烈的猎巫高潮出现在十七世纪二三十年代的德语地区。与普遍的认知相反，猎巫运动不是中世纪的事情。在中世纪，人们对魔法的信仰和使用与猎巫运动时期一样普遍，但那时很少有巫师被送上法庭，更别说被处决了。 Until recently popular views of this subject were confused both by the agendas of rationalists who wanted to find examples of superstition and by neo-pagans seeking their own foundation myth. 直到最近，对猎巫运动的流行观点都相当混乱。其原因在于，一方面，理性主义者们希望找到迷信带来恶果的实例，另一方面，新异教的信徒们希望在历史中找到他们教义的根基。 The “Burning Times”, when, according to the most extreme polemicists, nine million women lost their lives after dreadful torture, has become an essential part of neo-paganism’s self identity. They also had Margaret Murray to assure them that witches really were the survivors of the old religion that neo-pagans were continuing in the present day [NOTE]. “大火刑时代”已经成为了新异教主义自我身份认同的核心部分。据一些最极端的论者说，这一时期有九百万女性在承受酷刑后被杀。除此之外，玛格丽特·穆雷断言巫师们是古老宗教的孑遗，而今天的新异教正是继承了这些古老宗教。 Murray’s thesis of the existence of a pre-Christian fertility cult remains influential outside the academy but, despite seeming to have gained some support from Carlo Ginzberg’s work on the benandanti who do appear to have had some of the attributes of a religious cult, it is dismissed by noted modern authority Robin Briggs as having “just enough marginal plausibility to be hard to refute completely, yet is almost wholly wrong.” [NOTE]. 穆雷认为，猎巫时代存在着一种源于前基督教时期的生殖崇拜。这一观点至今在学术圈外仍然颇有影响。尽管卡洛·金斯堡对于“善之行者”（benandanti）的研究结论（“善之行者”的身上确实存在某种宗教崇拜的特征）似乎部分支持穆雷的观点，现代的权威学者罗宾·布里格斯依然对穆雷的观点嗤之以鼻，在他眼里，穆雷的学说“只有刚好够使它难以被彻底驳斥的那么一点点说服力，但基本上是完全错误的。” This reassessment of the myth of the Burning Times has even reached neo-paganism’s own scholarship [NOTE] which is challenging the idea that the validity of their religion depends on its antiquity. Meanwhile, estimates of the total number of executions over three centuries has shrunk to about 60,000 or so [NOTE] which is of a similar order of magnitude to what the Jacobins managed in just three years of terror during the French Revolution. 即使新异教主义自己的学者们也开始重新审视“大火刑时代”，他们开始挑战这一令其信仰能够合理的建基于古代传统的观念了。同时，现今对猎巫运动在三个世纪内处决人数的估计已经下降到约六万人，这一处决规模和法国大革命时雅各宾派在三年恐怖时期内做到的不相上下。 There is very little agreement about the reasons for the end of witch trials and the scholars have tended each to be an advocate for their own ideas based on the study of particular localities rather than trying a more synoptic approach to bring some order to the myriad of available suggestions. It is not even clear whether we are looking for some new causes that helped end witch trials or simply the absence of whatever it was that had started them in the first place. 对于猎巫审判结束的原因，学术界没有什么统一意见。很多学者仅仅是在努力研究某一地区的情况，并以此支持他们自己的观点，而不是尝试进行综合研究以给各种可能假说梳理出头绪。我们甚至都不知道在研究中应该寻找什么。是某些新生因素结束了猎巫审判，还是某些在过去推动了猎巫审判的因素已经不复存在？ So, if we could identify the conditions that brought about the trials, the subsequent decline might simply be explained by their later disappearance. An example of this would be the religious confusion and violence of the Reformation that had largely worked itself out after the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century. 如此说来，如果我们能够找到最初猎巫审判产生时的种种条件，那么猎巫审判后来的衰落或许就可以归因于这些初始条件的不复存在。举例来说：宗教改革带来了宗教观点的混乱和大量暴力冲突，而这种混乱状况在十七世纪中叶威斯特伐利亚条约后大为缓解。 It has also been widely noticed that hunts tended to take place in areas and periods where central control had largely broken down or during interregnums between regimes. For example, the activities of Matthew Hopkins took place in the chaos of the English Civil War, the Great Hunt in Scotland in 1661 when English justices were replaced, and even the Salem of 1692 outbreak occurred in a temporary vacuum of authority. When control was restored, goes this theory, the witch hunts largely ceased. 很多人也都注意到，若一个地区中央统治秩序崩坏或正处于改朝换代时期，猎巫审判就比较易于在此地盛行。举例而言：马修·霍普金斯活跃于英国内战的混乱时期；1661年苏格兰的大规模猎巫运动发生时，当地的英格兰法官正遭到大规模替换；甚至1692年的萨勒姆大审判也是发生在当地短暂处于权力真空的时期。如这一理论预言的，在以上地区一旦秩序得到恢复，猎巫审判就大大减少了。 On the other hand, the original causes might long since have been removed without their effects likewise disappearing so that the decline of witch trials will be brought about by entirely different means. Examples frequently cited are the rise of secular rationalism or social trends that led to the discounting of devilry. It has been suggested that witchcraft simply became too old hat for the intelligentsia of the early Enlightenment to countenance and that they were wont to sneer at such outdated nonsense so as to reassure themselves of their own intellectual superiority. 另一方面，也有很多猎巫运动的初始动因早早消失，但其效力并未消失，在这种情况下，导致猎巫审判衰落的就应该是其他因素。经常被引用的例子是世俗理性主义的兴起，或社会潮流导致魔鬼信仰的自然衰落。一些人认为在启蒙运动早期的知识精英眼里，巫术罪太老套了，不值得他们支持；相反这些精英乐于鄙视这些过时的无稽之谈，从而获得智力上的优越感。 A good deal of recent work has concentrated on the social reasons for witchcraft accusations and has looked for the causes of both their rise and fall at a local level. For instance, Alan MacFarlane and Keith Thomas set out a complex web of interactions between vulnerable single women and other villagers motivated by guilt [NOTE]. They suggested that the full implementation of the Poor Laws sufficiently alleviated the situation so that the accusations ceased. While their careful research of depositions suggests they have accurately portrayed the mechanism by which social tensions manifested themselves, I do not think that they have explained why, at that particular place and time, it should be through witchcraft accusations. 许多近期的研究工作着重研究巫术罪指控背后的社会因素，并通过对局部地区的研究来寻找巫术罪指控增加和减少的原因。麦克法兰和基斯·托马斯的研究描述了一些村子中弱势单身女性与其他村民之间基于罪恶感而展开的错综复杂的互动。他们认为济贫法的全面贯彻实施大大缓解了此类困境，因而减少了巫术罪指控。尽管他们对各种证词的细致研究表明，他们确实精确地描述了当时社会矛盾的表现方式，我认为他们并没有解答“为何彼时彼地这些矛盾偏偏以巫术罪指控的形式表现出来”这一关键问题。 The era of the witch trials was one of great change and disruption but we must not forget that it was bracketed by the disastrous fourteenth century and the enormous social upheavals of enclosure and the industrial revolution. Any social explanation for witch hunts has to be specific enough to differentiate between the early modern period and those on each side of it, while also being general enough to apply to much of Europe over two centuries. 猎巫审判时代确实是一个剧烈变迁、社会失序的时代。但是不应忘记，这个时代之前是灾难不断的十四世纪，而后面则跟着圈地运动和工业革命这样的重大社会变迁。若要从社会角度解读猎巫运动的兴衰，这种解读必须足够具体，否则难以把近代早期和它前后的时期区分开来。同时这种解读又要有足够的一般性，能被应用来解释二百余年间的大半个欧洲发生的诸多相关事件。 The commonalties of witch beliefs are greater enough to make having lots of different social explanations for different environments unconvincing. For this reason I will be looking for general reasons for the decline that can be applied across Europe rather than seeking an individual cause for each locale. 当时的诸种巫术信仰存在非常之多的共同点，因此在解释猎巫运动的兴衰时，试图为不同地区不同环境的猎巫现象找出许多不同社会原因的思路是缺乏说服力的。所以，我要找到一般性原因来解释整个欧洲范围内的情况，而不是为每个不同的地方发生的事情找出一个特定的解释。 By a witch, I mean someone who is believed to have received magical power by some form of diabolical means. The diabolical source of this power is important because the mentality of most Christian intellectuals allowed only the devil as a source of supernatural power, except of course from God, and it led witchcraft to be viewed in much the same way as heresy. 在本文中，巫师一词指的是那些被认为通过某种与恶魔有关的方式得到了魔法力量的人。这种超自然力量的根源是魔鬼，这一点非常重要，因为除了上帝之外，魔鬼是唯一一个被当时的基督教知识分子接受的超自然力来源。也正是这一点使得巫术在很大程度上被当作一种异端行为来处理。 The connection between diabolism and magic is found in the documents of the Christian elite including, most famously, the Malleus Malificium (1486) of Kramer and Sprenger, but has an older provenance. The straightforward dichotomy between God and the devil was already present in late antiquity with the labelling of all pagan gods as demons but once they had been seen off, the church took a more sceptical attitude. Belief in magic was considered to be a sin but consequently actually practising it was nothing more than delusion. 魔法和魔鬼之间的联系载于许多当时基督教知识精英的著作中，最有名的是克拉默和斯普伦格著的《巫师之锤》一书。但这一观念的来源比这些著作更为古老。在古典时代晚期，上帝-魔鬼的简单二分法就已经出现了，当时基督教会把所有异端神祗都目为魔鬼。但击败异教信仰后，基督教会却转而采取一种更具怀疑色彩的立场。信仰魔法被认为是一种罪，但施行魔术不过是一种幻术而已。 This attitude is very much an intellectual one and reflects the continuing rejection of most forms of supernatural belief by theologians even when witchcraft was accepted. That is to say that rather than believing in the innate potency of ritual magic or in nature spirits, they insisted that God and the devil were the only possible agencies for magical or miraculous power. 这种态度很大程度上是基于智识的，它反映着自古以来神学家们对绝大多数超自然信仰的否定，即使后来巫术的存在被接受了，神学家们的态度也依然如此。也就是说：神学家们坚持认为上帝和魔鬼是仅有的能够施行魔法或奇迹力量的存在，而不承认各种仪式魔术或自然精灵本身具有某种能力。 This was not just a question of theology but also arose from the Aristotelian paradigm of natural science that had no room for spirits, magic or other such phenomena. We should note, however, that the word ‘magic’ was also used in medieval works like the Speculum Astronomiae of St Albertus Magnus to describe certain legitimate natural practices. 这种态度不仅是一个神学问题，它也来源于亚里士多德的自然哲学范式。在这一范式中没有精灵、魔法或其他类似现象的存在空间。然而我们也应注意到，一些中世纪著作也使用“魔法”一词来描述某些合法的、并非超自然的行为，例如圣阿尔伯特·马格努斯的《天文之镜》一书。 Later, the hermetic systems that became popular during the Renaissance did allow for spirits and angels to be summoned so consequently their practitioners were always vulnerable to accusations of devilry. This ambiguity about what was and was not acceptable remained a feature of intellectual debate throughout the Middle Ages and Early Modern period with both sides using magic to make their own polemical points. In the late seventeenth century we find Joseph Glanvill and Henry More, representing learned science and theology, defending the belief in witchcraft against occultist and radical sectarian John Webster [NOTE]. Webster is keen to deny diabolic involvement in great part because he does not want his own ‘natural magic’ to be confused with witchcraft while Glanville and More are defending the mechanistic new philosophy which, like Aristotelianism, insists all magic must be supernatural - and that can only mean God or the devil. 晚些时候，文艺复兴期间广为流传的赫尔墨斯派哲学系统允许信者召唤天使和精灵，这就使得其信众更容易被指控为魔鬼信者。在中世纪及近代早期，知识界一直在就何种形态的超自然存在可以接受展开辩论。辩论双方都会使用“魔法”一词来阐述论点。在十七世纪后期我们可以看到约瑟夫·格兰维尔和亨利·摩尔代表神学和科学阵营肯定巫术的存在，与神秘主义者兼激进的宗派主义者约翰·韦伯斯特辩论。韦伯斯特努力否定巫术中的魔鬼因素，因为他不希望他的“自然魔法”和巫术扯上关系。而格兰维尔和摩尔捍卫的是新的机械论哲学，这种哲学和亚里士多德派一样，认为魔法一定是超自然的，因而只可能来源于上帝或魔鬼。 At a popular level, beliefs about the supernatural were far more varied and indeed, one of the only commonalties appears to be that they did not involve the devil, at least without prompting from educated interrogators. MacFarlane mentions that the devil hardly figured at all in the depositions to the Essex assizes and in other English cases, he makes few appearances even in confessions [NOTE]. Elsewhere, especially in confessions under torture, diabolic themes are much more prevalent. This seems likely to have been due to the use of torture, together with leading questions, causing the defendants to start echoing the more learned views of their prosecutors. 在大众中，对超自然力的信仰更加五花八门，诸种信仰仅有的一个重要共同点似乎就是，它们都与魔鬼无关，起码在没有遭到博学的审判者追问时是这样。麦克法兰提到：在埃塞克斯郡巡回法院及其它英格兰案件的证言中几乎没有人提起魔鬼，即使在罪人的供词中魔鬼都没怎么露面。在其他地方，特别是那些刑讯之下获得的供词里，魔鬼的主题则明显得多。这种现象看起来应归因于刑讯和诱供。在这二者的共同作用下，被告人们开始重复指控者嘴里的高深说法了。 Restrictions in space make a discussion of how witch trials started impossible here, but it seems likely that a key factor was the overlaying of the elite mentality of diabolism and its associated perversions onto the pre-existing magical beliefs and social tensions among the people. This had happened before with the heretics of the Middle Ages when much of what was believed about them came from ancient authorities rather than their actual activities. It was the combination of learned thought with real factors on the ground (as there really were heretics and people claiming magical powers) that turned deadly. 材料来源的空间限制使得我们难以讨论猎巫审判是如何起源的，但看起来一个重要因素是精英阶层和普通民众的合力。精英们对超自然力来源的“魔鬼说”理论把魔鬼帽子扣在了很多已有的超自然信仰身上，而民众之间的矛盾需要一个发泄的出口。类似的现象在此前也曾发生在中世纪的异端们身上，人们对他们的许多认识并非源于异端们本身的行动，而是来自古老的权威观点。当知识阶层的思想和底层存在的现实因素（因为社会上确有异端，也有号称拥有魔法能力的人）结合起来，其效果是致命的。 Many, but by no means all, so-called witches seem to have been healers, wise women and cunning men who previously would have been of no interest to the higher clergy or secular legal authorities. If they were brought before any authority it would tend to be the local church court that would prescribe some penance like walking around the parish wearing sackcloth. 许多——但绝非全部——所谓的巫师似乎是一些治疗师。在猎巫运动之前，教会高层或者世俗法律体系对这些聪慧的女性或头脑灵活的男性是没有什么兴趣的。如果真可能有什么权威机构想审判他们，那十有八九是当地的教会法庭，判处的刑罚也就是一些类似穿着麻衣绕教区走一周的赎罪行为。 The village healers indulged in a wide variety of ritual magic, healing or mediation with spirits but they had little or no idea of any theory attached to these actions. In other words, to the lower orders, magic was a question of practice while to the elite it was something that required explanation with the devil usually the only explanation available. 当时这些乡村治疗师使用很多仪式魔法，用于治疗，或者让活人与死去的人对话，但是他们头脑里并没有什么关于这些做法的理论。换句话说，对于下层社会，问题的关键是怎么使用魔法。而对上层社会，问题的关键是如何解释魔法，通常魔鬼是唯一的备选答案。 The topography of the decline in trials and executions strongly suggests there were two distinct phases. The first phase, which takes place from the first half of the seventeenth century, is a large falling of in the number of accusations and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of capital convictions obtained. Thomas states that the large majority of executions in England had already taken place by 1620 [NOTE] and in Spain the Basque hunt marks the end of large scale prosecutions. Appeals heard by the Parlement of Paris after about 1610 show a large reduction in the number of capital sentences that were confirmed and after about 1630 an equally precipitous drop in the number of cases heard (even though all witchcraft cases at this time were subject to automatic appeal to Paris) [NOTE]. 猎巫审判及处决的减少并不是平均的，其分布表明猎巫审判的衰落经历了两个不同的阶段。第一阶段自十七世纪中叶开始，其标志是巫术罪起诉数大大减少，及与之相应的死刑判决比例下降。托马斯的研究表明，英格兰的绝大多数巫师处决都发生在1620年前，在西班牙，巴斯克大猎巫标志着大规模巫术罪起诉时期的终结。1610年后，巴黎高等法院的上诉记录显示，在巫术罪案件中死刑判决比例大幅下降。到1630年后，巫术罪案件的数量也出现了同样的大幅下降（尽管在此时期，所有下级法院审理的巫术罪案件都会自动上诉到巴黎高等法院）。 The pattern is repeatedly seen in almost all localities although the time scales are often different. The last hunt in Scotland took place 1661 – 2, large-scale scares continued to claim many lives in parts of Germany through the 1630s but became much rarer thereafter. This is not the end of the prosecution of witches - that continued even with sporadic outbursts of panic - but it is rather the normalisation of the crime as it fades into the background of early modern life. 同样的变化模式出现在欧洲几乎所有地区，尽管时间先后常常不同。苏格兰的最后一次大规模猎巫是在1661-1662年间。1630年代，德国部分地区还时有大规模的猎巫运动，很多人因此丧命，但在那之后就很罕见了。当然，这并不代表对巫师的审判已经消失。审判依然在进行——而且还有间歇性的恐慌带来的小高潮，但这更应解释为这种罪行的常态化。巫术罪行已不是社会关注的焦点，它正在渐渐隐入近代早期社会生活的背景之中。 The second phase is the complete cessation or abolition of prosecutions for witchcraft and this tends to take place in the eighteenth century. It can either take the form of a gradual petering out; some form of legislative act such as Louis XIV’s decree extinguishing the crime after a poisoning plot panic; or the English Act of Parliament abolishing it in 1736 [NOTE]. Often, it had become impossible to secure a conviction before the crime itself was removed from the statute book. 第二阶段是各国彻底停止起诉（或取消）巫术罪的时期，发生在十八世纪。这一阶段，各国停止猎巫的方式各有不同。有的国家逐渐停止了对巫术罪的起诉审理，有些国家采取某些立法措施取消了巫术罪，如路易十四在一次投毒阴谋引起的恐慌后颁布敕令取消了巫术罪，英国国会在1736年通过法案取消了巫术罪。即使在巫术罪被正式从刑法里取消之前，想要说服法庭判决被告巫术罪罪名成立已经很难了。 It seems extremely likely that in looking for causes we must treat these two phases as separate events to be handled individually and that consequently we will not find any single reason for the end of witch trials. 由此看来，在寻找猎巫审判衰落原因时，我们应把这两个阶段分开来看。这也就意味着，猎巫审判的消失不是任一因素单独作用的结果。 Explaining the decline of witch trials and executions 对猎巫审判及处决减少的解释 Under Roman law, to achieve a capital conviction required a full proof consisting of material evidence, witnesses of good standing or a free confession. Torture could be used to extract a confession if sufficient partial proofs had been accumulated but the defendant had to repeat themselves after they recovered and then again in court. Even if they later retracted their confession they were not supposed to be put to the question again [NOTE]. 在罗马法下，要判处死刑需要一条完整的证据链，支持证据链的可以是物证、合格的人证或被告自由自愿提供的证词。如果已经有足够的间接证据指向嫌疑人，则可以使用刑讯取得供诉，但犯人在养好伤后必须再次重复他们在刑讯下作出的供诉，此后还要当庭再重复一次。即使犯人后来撤回了自己在刑讯下作出的供词，他们也不应就同一问题再受到讯问了。 English common law forbade the use of torture in criminal cases altogether unless with the permission of the privy council (effectively meaning only for treason) but had similar systems of evidences and proofs of witchcraft as codified by William Perkins [NOTE]. 英格兰普通法在刑事案件中严格禁止刑讯，仅有的例外是由枢密院审判的案件（通常都是叛国案）。然而，根据威廉·珀金斯的案例汇编，在巫术罪案件中，英格兰有着一套和罗马法相似的取证和证明方式。【编注：威廉·珀金斯是16世纪英格兰著名教士和神学家，清教运动先驱，著述颇丰，曾编有一部三卷本的信仰审判案例集】 In the case of witches, material evidence was usually lacking, as the village healers did not go in for the kind of occult paraphernalia that characterised higher magic. It is also hard to see how the social interactions thought to lead to the initial accusation by Thomas and Briggs could give rise to witnesses able to say they had caught the witch casting a spell red handed, let alone flying through the air. 在审判巫师时，一般都没有物证，一般的乡村治疗师是不会去搞那些高等魔法式的繁琐神秘学仪式的。托马斯和布里格斯认为社会互动可能导致巫术罪指控的出现，但这些通常没法让一个证人到法庭上作证宣称他抓到了一个正在施法术的巫师，更别说亲眼看到巫师在空中飞翔了。 That said, when a witness was produced before the dubious English judge Sir John Powell, declaring that the defendant had been seen travelling on her broomstick, his lordship is said to have dryly remarked that there was no law against flying (sadly the provenance of the story is doubtful [NOTE]). In short, to get a capital conviction if the proper procedures were followed was extremely difficult. 话虽如此，当一个证人被带到对巫术问题持怀疑态度的英格兰法官约翰·鲍威尔爵士面前时，他宣称看到了被告骑着扫帚飞行，据说，鲍威尔爵士不动声色地答道，没有哪条法律禁止人飞行。（可惜这个故事的来源可疑，未可尽信。）总而言之，如果遵循正当的法律程序，受指控者被判处死刑罪名成立是非常困难的。 That is not to say that one could not be punished in other ways where the proof was deficient and the grounds of suspicion that could lead to the application of torture were considerably wider. Simply having a bad local reputation could land someone in a lot of official trouble. This was due to an important reform in the legal system in the late Middle Ages when the accusatio was gradually replaced with the inquisitio. To modern ears this immediately summons up images of the Inquisition although it was secular rather than clerical courts and certainly not papal inquisitors that were responsible for the vast majority of fatal witch trials. 当然， 这并不是说在证据不全且使用刑讯的条件颇为宽松时，被疑为巫师的人无法以别的方式受到惩罚。仅仅是在当地名声不好就可以给人带来很多麻烦了。这种情况的原因是中世纪晚期的一项重要司法改革，在案件审理中控诉制逐渐被纠问制所取代。听在现代人的耳朵里，“纠问制”会让人立即想起宗教裁判所。但这里的裁判官是世俗职务而非宗教职务，在绝大多数巫师被处决的庭审中，作出裁决的也不是宗教裁判官。 When before the Inquisition, a confession and willingness to do penance was always supposed to be sufficient to avoid the death penalty for a first offence while no such leeway existed in most secular courts [NOTE]. Instead, iniquisitio was a method of legal proceedings used in all courts outside England which dropped the dependence on an accuser to bring a complaint. The accuser (who could be punished himself if the defendant was acquitted) was replaced by an inquirer whose role was slowly taken over by professional magistrates. 在宗教裁判所里，初犯的嫌疑人通过忏悔和表达赎罪意愿通常就可以逃过死刑。但在大多数世俗法庭里，是没有这等出路的。在英格兰之外的所有国家，纠问制是被法庭普遍采用的司法程序，这种程序中，不需要一个起诉人来提起诉讼。起诉人（若被告被判无罪则可能受到反坐）被换成了讯问人，讯问人又逐渐被职业地方法官代替了。 This inquirer was expected to investigate matters brought to their attention or the subject of rumour, and was equipped with various powers to enable them to do so. Once they had a case it was presented before a court for consideration and sentence. Provided the procedures were followed and the magistrate was fair and competent, this was a huge improvement over the system of personal accusation and trial by ordeal that preceded it. 讯问人的工作是调查那些引起他们注意的事或流言的源头，并被赋予种种权力以便履行他们的职责。如果他们有足够的理由，相关案件就会提交给法院供审理判刑。如果能够遵守程序，并且地方法官公正且能胜任，这一改革相对于过去的个人起诉及神判法而言将是一个巨大进步。 But it is clear that during the great hunts the rules were not followed. Torture was liberally applied and the atmosphere was one of siege where it was felt the circumstances demanded extreme action. It is interesting to note that the Matthew Hopkins episode, where pseudo-torture such as sleep deprivation and ‘pricking’ was used, was the closest example to a full-scale continental witch hunt that occurred in England. 但是很明显，在大规模猎巫运动期间，司法程序并未得到遵守。刑讯逼供是家常便饭，而且当人们认为事态严重到需要采取极端行动时，全社会的气氛就好像被围在孤城里一样，什么极端行为都不在话下。很有意思的是，在英格兰发生的最像欧陆大规模猎巫的事件就是马修·霍普金斯主导的猎巫运动。在这场运动中使用的大多是一些“类刑讯”手段，比如睡眠剥夺和使用穿刺法鉴别巫师（https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pricking）. The most prolific hunters tended to be lay magistrates and middle ranking clerics of some education while in the higher and appeal courts such as at Paris the conviction rate was much lower, mainly because the sense of panic was absent, torture kept to the statutory limits and evidence examined with a cooler eye [NOTE]. The actual abolition of torture took place too late in most jurisdictions to have had a significant effect on reducing convictions of witches [NOTE]. 成果最为卓著的猎巫者通常都是未受训练的地方法官和受过一点教育的中层牧师，而在较高等的法院和上诉法院里（如巴黎高等法院）判决率明显低得多。主要原因是在这些法院里没有恐慌气氛，对刑讯的法律限制遵守的较好，法官检视证据的态度也较为冷静。在多数地区，取消刑讯对于减少巫师判决率没有什么影响，因为这一改变来得太晚了。 Neither was it the case that most senior judges denied the very possibility of witchcraft for if they had it is hard to see how they could have countenanced any executions at all. Rather, they were removed from the panic on the ground so they could take a more objective and professional stance. 高等法院的判决率较低并不是因为高等法官们本身就不相信巫术，如果他们真的不信巫术，那他们大可以一个巫师都不判。真正的原因是他们没有受到底层的恐慌气氛感染，因而可以在一个较为客观和职业的立场上审理案件。 It was not just lawyers who could become more lenient as they became more expert in their subjects. In Geneva, when the devil’s mark became an accepted form of evidence, the city’s surgeons were delegated to carry out the examination. However, no doubt as a result of having seen a huge range of moles, growths and boils on patients of unimpeachable character, they simply refused to be drawn as to whether a particular lump was of diabolic or purely natural origin. This made a capital prosecution almost impossible and only one witch was executed after 1625 [NOTE]. 都说律师随着对自身所从事领域了解得越多就会变得越宽容，其实不止律师，很多职业都是这样。在日内瓦，当“恶魔的印记”被认定为可接受的证据时，法院授权本地的外科医生检验被告身上有无恶魔的印记。然而，无疑是由于他们平日见多了那些人品端正无瑕的病人们身上的痣、增生和烫伤，医生们拒绝对某一肿块是恶魔的印记还是自然原因所致做出判断。其结果就是想根据恶魔的印记判处死刑基本上成了不可能的任务。1625年之后，日内瓦只有一个巫师被处决。 So the reduction of witch trials from epidemic to endemic proportions requires little else than the assertion of central control over convictions to ensure the legal forms were being adhered to and that local courts could not execute people without sufficient evidence. This central control could be achieved either through allowing appeals to higher courts (or even making them mandatory) or else by ensuring the proper training and oversight of local magistrates. In particular, the strict controls over the use of torture had to be reinstated, notwithstanding the status of witchcraft as a crimen exceptum (an exceptional crime) in most states, and confessions achieved through torture treated with the necessary scepticism. 由此看来，要把猎巫审判由传染性变为地方性不需要什么高深手段，只要有一个中央权威来控制地方法院，确保他们遵守法律程序，不在证据不足的情况下处决犯人就可以了。这种中央控制可以通过设置上诉程序（或像法国一样规定巫术罪案件自动上诉）来达到，也可以通过确保地方法官受过合适的训练且有合理的监督来达到。尤为重要的是要严格控制刑讯，而不是像很多地方一样把巫术罪看作一种“例外犯罪”而放松刑讯控制。法官对由刑讯得来的供词应有足够的怀疑态度。 In either case, this was extremely difficult during times of political upheaval, which explains the prevalence of hunts in the areas of the Holy Roman Empire most affected by the fragmentation of control up to the Thirty Years War and the same situation in France during the Wars of Religion. Although war itself distracted from witch trials as they were no longer the most pressing concern, the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity engendered by possible conflict could increase them. 不管采用哪种方法，建立此类中央控制在政治混乱时期都非常困难。这解释了猎巫为何在三十年战争期间中央权威破坏最为严重的神圣罗马帝国领地最为盛行，同样的情况也发生在宗教战争期间的法国。尽管作为新的麻烦来源，战争从猎巫那边吸引走了世人的一些注意力，但它带来的不确定感和不安全感也会使得人们对猎巫更加狂热。 At first sight, the abuse of judicial process was not so prevalent in England and a crack down on the use of torture can hardly explain anything in a jurisdiction in which torture was not used. The reasons for the hotspots of witch prosecutions in Essex and Lancashire also remain a mystery now that the theory of proxy persecutions of religious minorities has been called into question. 乍一看，在英格兰司法程序的滥用并不是那么厉害，对刑讯逼供的打击也很难解释在一个不允许刑讯逼供的地区出现的猎巫减少。在英格兰的猎巫高发区埃塞克斯和兰开夏，猎巫运动的起因依然是一个谜。目前有人已开始怀疑，这些地区的猎巫审判只是个幌子，实际上针对的是少数教派。 It is ironic that English witch trials faded at much the time that a king who was personally interested in them came to the throne. The North Berwick trials and his publication of Demonologie (1597) suggest that when he became James I of England, he would have been as concerned in his new realm as he was in his old. Perhaps the events surrounding the state opening of Parliament in 1605 focused his mind on more concrete threats to the royal person. The constant danger from Spain that was present during the rule of Elizabeth, as well as fears about the succession, might well have contributed to an atmosphere that encouraged trials. The ascension of James solved the later problem as well as closing off Scotland as a bridgehead for foreign invaders. 颇为讽刺的是，英格兰猎巫运动的衰落居然主要是在一位个人热衷于猎巫的国王在位期间发生的。由北贝斯维克发生的一系列审判以及詹姆斯一世本人于1597年出版的著作《恶魔学》来看，在他当了英王之后可能仍然和在苏格兰时一样热衷于猎巫。也许1605年国会开会前后的一系列事件所表现出的对国王本人的威胁吸引走了他的注意力。自伊丽莎白一世在位期间就长期存在的来自西班牙的威胁，以及对女王继位者问题的恐慌，都可能在伊丽莎白时期导致了一种鼓励猎巫的不安气氛。詹姆斯一世的继位解决了继承者问题，而且也使得苏格兰再不能成为入侵者的桥头堡了。 While the lack of judicial torture in England made witch prosecutions more difficult, the use of juries of laymen probably had the opposite effect. Whereas in the higher continental courts, the entire trial process, including reaching a verdict, was in the hands of professionals, in England a conviction had to be obtained through a jury of commoners (although they were landowners and burghers) who were often more credulous than the judge. The judge did have a considerable ability to influence the juror and, as he was a professional travelling around the circuit, could considerably reduce the number of convictions. 虽说在英格兰因为没有刑讯，要以巫术罪定罪较为困难，但由非专业人士组成的陪审团参与审理可能产生了相反的效果。在大陆上的高等法院里，整个审理程序包括定罪在内都是由专业人士来掌握的。而在英格兰，定罪工作是由一个一般民众（虽然通常都是地主或体面市民）组成的陪审团来做的。这些人比法官要轻信得多。不过法官对陪审团有相当大的影响力，而且当时的法官又是在辖区内巡回审理案件的专业法官，因此可以有效减少定罪的数量。 In the mid-seventeenth century guides like Robert Filmer’s An Advertisement to the Jurymen of England Touching Witches (1653) and reprints of Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witches (1584) were used as guides to the evidence that took a much more sceptical line than Perkins’ effort. But the jury could also reach a verdict of guilty no matter what directions came from the bench as happened during the last successful prosecution in England in 1712 [NOTE]. 在十七世纪中期，陪审员们使用断案指南来帮助他们衡量证据。常用的断案指南包括罗伯特·菲尔莫的《英格兰巫师案件陪审员须知》（1653）和雷吉纳德·斯科特的《发现女巫》（1584）的重印版。这些书对证据的怀疑态度比起珀金斯的著作来要强得多了。但是陪审员们也有权无视法官的指引而作出有罪裁定，在1712年英格兰最后一次成功定罪的猎巫审判中就出现了这种情况。 Rationalism and the final end of the witch trials 理性主义和猎巫审判的终结 By 1700, witch trials had become rare things across much of Europe although they remained reasonably common in Poland until 1725 [NOTE]. When they did occur, they excited a good deal of interest and usually ended with the liberty of the witch. The position of even the lower judiciary was now that maleficia was extremely hard to prove and it was not acceptable to accept lower standards of evidence simply because the crime was so serious. 到了1700年，在欧洲的大部分地区猎巫审判已经很少见了——尽管在波兰猎巫审判要到1725年才变得稀少。这一时期的猎巫审判一旦举行总能吸引众人的兴趣，而结果通常都是巫师嫌疑人被无罪开释。即使较低层的法院都开始认为要证明巫术诅咒是非常困难的事了，不能因为此类犯罪性质严重就采用较低的证据审查标准。 But from time to time, for one reason or another, a conviction was achieved and the statutory punishment was usually death. There were ways around this, such as the judge in England’s last case personally and successfully petitioning for a royal pardon for the accused in 1712 but even ten years after that the Scots executed Janet Horne [NOTE]. 然而间或还是会因为种种原因判决一个两个的巫师，而法律规定的刑罚一般都是死刑。当然即使判了死刑也不是没有办法，比如在1712年英格兰那最后一次成功定罪的巫师案判决后，法官通过个人的努力从王室拿到了特赦令。但在十年之后，苏格兰人还是处决了珍妮特·霍恩。 Positivist historians have long looked upon the end of witch trials as victory for rationalism over superstition. Michael de Montaigne’s scepticism about reports of witchcraft and the veracity of confessions in his essay On the Lame （1588） is a popular example of Renaissance humanism. 一直以来，实证主义历史学家把猎巫审判的终结看作是理性主义对迷信取得的胜利。米歇尔·德·蒙田在他的散文《论跛子》中表现出的对巫术及巫师供词的怀疑态度，是文艺复兴时期人文主义思想的一个著名例子。 However, closer examination of the rationalists has frequently found them to be something of a disappointment for their champions who do not share their mentality. Learned sceptics are often advocates of a mystical or hermetic point of view and are seeking to defend magic from the taint of diabolism rather than claiming that it is impossible. 然而，对理性主义者进行的仔细观察，时常会让他们的支持者们失望，因为这些理性主义者们想的和他们的现代支持者不是一回事。当时学者们之所以对巫术表现怀疑态度，时常是因为他们要推销自己的神秘主义或赫尔墨斯派观点。他们希望从魔法身上揭去魔鬼的污名，而不是认为魔法根本不存在。 The best known sixteenth century critic of witch trials, Johann Weyer, was a pupil of the great neo-Platonist magician Cornelius Agrippa as well as being a radical Protestant. In his De praestigiis daemonum (1583), Weyer was completely orthodox in his belief in devils and his condemnation of almost any kind of magical practice, but just did not think it was the kind of thing that old ladies got up to. 十六世纪最有名的猎巫审判批评者约翰·韦尔是伟大的新柏拉图主义魔法师科尔奈利乌斯·阿格里帕的学生，他也是一位激进的新教徒。在他的《论恶魔幻觉》（1583）一书中，韦尔表现出的相信魔鬼存在和谴责各种魔法实践的观点完全是正统派的。他只是认为，他说的魔法和老太太们做的那些不是一回事。 His English contemporary, Reginald Scot appears at first sight to be more conducive to the views of modern sceptics, but on closer examination his thought also turns out to be almost entirely a function of his Puritan theology [NOTE]. A century later John Webster had a remarkably similar outlook as he too is a sectarian and defender of alchemy. 与他同时代的英国人雷吉纳德·斯科特乍看起来好像更倾向于近代怀疑主义观点，但仔细审视就会发现，斯科特的观点完全是他清教信仰的衍生品。比他晚一个世纪的约翰·韦伯斯特看起来和他异常相似，而韦伯斯特也是一个宗派主义者和炼金术的捍卫者。 The argument was between, on one side Aristotelians and their heirs, the mechanical philosophers, and on the other neo-Platonists and hermetists. As we have seen, it was usually the former, with what we might call the more scientific attitude, who defended belief in witchcraft. This causes a serious problem for traditional explanations for the end of witch trials as there is almost nobody whose particular bundle of motivations and beliefs are entirely comfortable to positivist sensibilities. 论争的一方是亚里士多德派及他们的继承者，机械主义哲学家们，另一方则是新柏拉图主义者和赫尔墨斯派。正如我们前面看到的，通常总是前一派人——也就是我们可能会觉得态度更科学的那一派——相信巫术的存在并努力为之辩护。对女巫审判终结的传统解释在这一点上遇上了难题，因为在这场论争中没有任何一位参与者的信念和动机完全合乎现代实证主义者的口味。 There certainly is a rise in scepticism as Glanville and More (who was a mechanistic Platonist and thus demonstrates the impossibility of fitting anyone’s beliefs into a neat box) are both keen to combat it but, as far as the positivist is concerned, it is not always the right people being sceptics. 当时对巫术持怀疑态度者确实有所增加，以至于格兰维尔和摩尔要努力与之斗争（摩尔是个机械主义派的柏拉图主义者，这又一次证明了想把人的信仰套进方便的模式里是不可能的）。但是困扰实证主义者的是：持怀疑主义的不总是合适的人。 Likewise, Cotton Mather manages to receive both excretion and exoneration for his conduct in the Salem witch trials and later his work on smallpox immunisation. Even a bona fide freethinker like Thomas Hobbes thought that it was justified to convict someone of witchcraft if they had knowingly tried to carry out maleficia even if they were incapable of it [NOTE]. 与之类似，科顿·马瑟既因他在萨勒姆审判中的作为被人痛诋，又因他推广天花疫苗的功劳为人称颂。即使一个托马斯·霍布斯这样十足真金的自由思考者也认为：如果有人有意试图施加诅咒，那尽管他实际上没有巫术能力，判他个巫术罪也是正当的。 The pamphlet wars give us some idea of the motivations of both sides of the argument. Defenders of the belief in witches, such as Sir Thomas Browne in Religio Medici (1634), seemed more worried about atheists than the devil. 当年的小册子论战可以让我们对论战双方的动机略作管窥。为相信巫师存在者辩护的人似乎更担心否定巫师会让无神论者——而非魔鬼——得势。此类思维的例子可参见托马斯·布朗尼爵士的《一个医生的宗教观》（1634）一书。 Similarly, in Saducismus Triumphantus (1681), Glanvill did not appear to be so much concerned about witchcraft being a serious threat to life and limb, especially after his careful investigations revealed rather feeble examples, but instead that a denial of the witch was a big step towards the denial of all religion. 格兰维尔在他的著作《巫师及鬼怪的完整直接证据》（1681）中也表达了类似的意思。他仔细调查了他书中举出的那些巫术例子之后，发现它们都不太经得起推敲，在书中他并不认为巫术对人的生命或肢体能够造成什么实质威胁，更使他担心的是对巫师及巫术的否定可能导致对所有宗教的全面否定。 Even a hundred years later John Wesley had much the same concerns saying “giving up witchcraft is in effect giving up the bible” [NOTE]. Clearly the intention of these writers is not the same as earlier demonologists like Jean Bodin. 甚至在一百年之后，约翰·韦斯利也表达出了相同的担忧。他写道：“否认巫术实质上就是否认《圣经》。”很明显，这些作者支持巫术存在的目的与早期的恶魔学者如让·博丹等人大相径庭。 So, while Cotton Mather’s The Wonders of the Invisible World (1693) fits the bill as a the work of old fashioned cleric, seeing devils under the bed, convinced there is a vast diabolical conspiracy that justifies desperate retaliatory measures, many of the learned defenders had a much narrower interest. 所以，虽然科顿·马瑟的《不可见世界中的奇观》一书的确够得上老派教士著作的标准——书中他认为魔鬼就在我们身边、坚信存在一个魔鬼策划的大规模阴谋且人们应以极端手段对抗这一阴谋，但很多颇有学识的巫术捍卫者所感兴趣的领域则要窄得多。 Ultimately it was these learned men, who simply did not care about old women and their muttered curses, who had to be won around for the prosecutions to stop altogether. What eventually defeated the likes of More and Glanville was the same thing that has invalidated so many of the last ditch defences conducted in the name of religion. 归根结底，要结束猎巫指控和审判，反猎巫派必须把这些饱学者争取过来。而这些人并不关心村中的某个老妇是不是女巫，或她们口中咕哝的诅咒是否灵验。最终击败摩尔和格兰维尔及其同道的，此前也曾扫清过无数以宗教之名誓死捍卫某种信念的人。 There are always a few people who become fixated on a piece of doctrine and insist that the world will be imperilled by giving it up. This happened over the movement of the earth and is happening today over women priests. 历史上不论何时总有一些人执着于某些教条，并宣称如果放弃这些教条世界就会大难临头。围绕着地球是否在转动发生过类似的论争，而今天我们还可以在关于女性牧师问题的讨论中找到这些人的影子。 But once the dogma has in fact been dropped de facto despite the protestations of its defenders, it usually becomes clear that the terrible consequences of which they warned have not come to pass and a new generation has no concerns about amending the writ to conform with practice. 但是，尽管这些人誓死捍卫旧教条，一旦这些旧教条的死亡成为事实，人们就会发现捍卫者们拿来吓唬人的那些严重后果一样都没发生。这种情况下，新一代人就不惮于修改教条来使之适应新的现实了。 Essentially, most people were able to see that the church could sail serenely on despite the loss of an occasional doctrine and that its problems were rather more fundamental than just a matter of believing in witches. 最重要的是，大多数人都能够看到：虽然教会失去了某个教条，但它依旧安然无恙，而教会面临的问题也比巫术问题要深层的多。 While the contention of some scholars that there was a wholesale withdrawal of the elite from popular culture seems to me to be thrown into doubt by the enormous unifying effect of the English bible, it is true that certain beliefs can drop out of ‘high’ culture – especially when they become associated with vulgarity or lack of sophistication. In late seventeenth century England this happened to nearly all magical ideas as the New Philosophy became the in-thing. 虽然英文版《圣经》表现出的巨大文化统合力已使得某些学者声称的“精英阶层大规模退出大众文化圈”这一结论遭到质疑，但不可否认，有些时候一些信念确实会逐渐从“高等”文化的范畴里被排斥出去——尤其是当人们开始认为这些信念太过鄙俗或太过粗浅的时候。在十七世纪晚期的英格兰，这种现象导致了几乎所有与魔法相关的思想被思想界扫地出门，因为这一时期新哲学才是最时髦的。 While actually understanding the scientific results of Boyle or Newton was beyond most people, anyone could attack the superstitions of peasants and thus reassure themselves of their membership of the intelligentsia. Just as the learned ideas about the devil were absorbed by the middling classes who then put them into practice by hunting witches, so the New Philosophy, percolating into the middle class consciousness, helped instil them with scepticism. 虽然大多数人都很难准确理解牛顿或者玻义耳的科学发现，随便什么人都可以通过攻击农民的迷信而获得“自己是个知识分子”的自信。正如之前大众接受了学者们关于魔鬼的理论而置身于猎巫运动，新哲学也渐渐被大众接受，在他们的头脑里种下了怀疑主义的种子。 Even those who were willing to accept the existence of witches in principle did not feel they could countenance any specific examples. As Joseph Addison wrote in the Spectator in 1711 “I believe in general that there is and has been such a thing as witchcraft; but at the same time can give credit to no particular instance of it” [NOTE]. 即使那些愿意在理论上接受巫术存在的人也开始变得难以支持某个特定的巫术案例了。比如约瑟夫·艾迪逊在1711年的《观察家》中写到：“在一般意义上，我相信过去和现在都存在巫术，但与此同时我难以相信任何巫术案例。” To actually abolish the crime required more than the belief that proof was difficult to obtain. The twin pillars of witchcraft were maleficia and the pact with the devil - both aspects needed to be dealt with. Witchcraft had to be thought impossible (in the case of maleficia) and irrelevant (in the case of the pact with the devil). 要废除巫术罪名，只让人们相信其证据难以获得是不够的。巫术罪的两大要件是诅咒行为和与魔鬼所定的契约，必须把这两点都打倒才能废除巫术罪。人们必须认识到，巫术罪是不可能的（打倒诅咒行为）并且和魔鬼并无相干（打倒魔鬼契约）。 Belief in magic was largely absent from the elite long before the existence of the devil himself was being denied although he was becoming a spiritual being whose abilities were far more limited than they had been in the past. He could not really do anything miraculous but only foster illusions in the gullible. Eventually, his power became merely the ability to tempt Christians into sin by mental suggestion and so his threat was but a moral challenge. 在人们开始否定魔鬼的存在以前，知识阶层早已不信魔法存在了。而且现在魔鬼虽然还没被彻底打倒，但它已经成了一种精神性的存在，它的威能已经大不如前，目前它已经无法展示任何奇迹，它能做到的只是用幻觉蛊惑那些容易上当的人了。最终，魔鬼的能力只剩了以精神暗示诱惑基督徒犯下罪孽这一项，这样他对人们的威胁也就只停留在道德层面，而与法律无涉了。 It is also possible that the near complete lack of any solid evidence for devil worship finally began to make itself felt and that consequently fears of a fifth column in the midst of society faded but they would reappear from time to time, most recently in Orkney and Rochdale in the 1991. 另一个可能是，人们终于发现了他们对恶魔信仰的恐惧其实没有任何现实证据，因此，对社会中可能存在一个魔鬼势力第五纵队的恐惧也就消退了。当然，类似的恐惧日后还是会不时爆发出来，最近的例子就是1991年在奥克尼和罗什戴尔发生的“从魔鬼崇拜的家庭中解救儿童”的丑闻。【编注：参见维基词条Orkney child abuse scandal】 Neutering Satan and turning him into a more transcendent figure is often ascribed to Protestantism although Luther himself claims he suffered many physical encounters with the devil who threw excrement at him. Whatever the causes, the devil faded from view and this turned the question of what to do about his alleged disciples into a purely religious matter. 把撒旦无力化并使他成为一个更加虚幻的存在一事时常被记到新教的账上——虽然马丁路德本人宣称撒旦曾多次与他相遇并扔大便攻击他。不管原因为何，魔鬼从人们眼中消失了。这样，如何处理那些被指控是魔鬼信徒的人就变成了一个宗教性的问题，而与社会安全无关了。 The process was a drawn out one that should perhaps be studied in parallel with the decline of heresy and blasphemy as a crime against the state. This slowly faded as the eighteenth century wore on although there were isolated prosecutions, such as the La Barre case of 1766 in France made famous by Voltaire [NOTE]. （巫术罪的消失）这一过程相当漫长，或许较好的办法是把它与“异端诽谤危害国家罪”的消失一同研究。虽然仍有零星的异端指控（如因伏尔泰而大大出名的拉·巴尔案），异端罪在十八世纪已经慢慢淡出了人们的视野。 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there might simply have been a change in the jurisdiction for witch trials from secular to ecclesiastical courts but during the seventeenth century heresy had gradually ceased to be seen as a crime deserving temporal punishment and the church courts could no longer expect the secular arm to carry out their orders. 在十五至十六世纪，巫术罪的管辖权可能确由世俗法院转到了宗教法庭。但到了十七世纪，异端信仰已经渐渐不再被人视作一种需要神罚的罪行了。与此同时，宗教法庭也渐渐不能指望世俗法院执行它的判决了。 Even in countries which retained strong church courts, most especially Spain and Portugal, sentences became lighter as the eighteenth century progressed with a return to the medieval idea of penance and reconciliation rather than punishment. The stalemate that had ended the wars between Catholics and Protestants, coupled with the fostering of national over religious identity, meant the ideals of tolerance expressed as early as Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) were finally implemented. 即使在那些仍保留了相对强势宗教法庭的国家如西班牙和葡萄牙，进入十八世纪后对异端罪行的定罪也逐渐变轻了。以忏悔和赎罪代替刑罚的中世纪思想逐渐回归。天主教徒和新教徒长年战争结束后，两派进入了对峙局面，再加上人们的头脑中国家意识也开始取代宗教意识而成为主要的身份认同，这似乎意味着早在1516年托马斯·莫尔在《乌托邦》中写到的宗教宽容理想终于得以实现。 This is not to say that atheism or devil worship were socially acceptable, but rather that if a man or woman minded their own business and kept their views quiet, nobody would hunt them down. Essentially ones private religion became a private matter and, as long as one did not cause a public disturbance, the public sphere had little interest. 当然，这并不意味着无神论或恶魔信仰得到了社会的承认。只是如果一个人自扫门前雪，不把自己的宗教主张到处宣扬，那么不管他相信什么，都不会有人来猎捕他了。基本上，个人的宗教信仰终于被社会认可为个人事务了。而只要一个人不制造公共事端，那么公众方面对他的个人事务是没有什么兴趣的。 Conclusion 结论 Witchcraft is an imaginary crime. It has, as Robin Briggs says, a hole in the middle which demonologists were able to fill with their speculations [NOTE]. They were then able to persuade others, including the actual accused, of the veracity of these ideas. 巫术罪是一种想象出来的犯罪。正如罗宾·布里格斯所说：它的中心有个空洞，正方便那些魔鬼学者把他们的臆测填进去。这样，魔鬼学者就可以说服旁人——甚至包含被控为巫师的人——认同他们的观点。 As Briggs says, after Alasdair MacIntyre, a rational thought is one that coheres with the thoughts around it and, to the mentality of the demonologists and enough of those around them, their writings made perfect sense. We do not need to call them superstitious charlatans to say that they were wrong. 布里格斯说的好：阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔把“合理的想法”定义为“与周围人的想法一致的想法”。按这一定义，对那些魔鬼学者及他们身边足够多的人们来说，他们的著述是非常合理的。我们可以說他们是錯的，但没有必要称他们为迷信的骗子。 A defendant, accused of a non-existent crime, should expect that any effective legal process will find them not guilty and in witch trials this is eventually what happened. It remained possible that someone could (and perhaps should) be convicted if, believing they have the power, they bewitched a person who then conveniently started to ail, but this will be a very rare case. 一个被控犯了不存在的罪行的被告人应该期待一个合理的司法系统还他清白，就猎巫审判而言，最终情形也确实如此。如果一个真心相信自己能施巫术的人对别人施了巫术，而受术者正巧就病倒了，因此给施术者定一个巫术罪是完全可能的。但这种案子即使有，也应该非常稀少。 Renaissance magicians never won their argument with the demonologists as they were both swept aside by the intellectual changes of the seventeenth century. The devil found himself relegated to the role assigned for him by Milton in Paradise Lost (1667) as a tempter who must rely on God to effect any real change. Milton also gives us an idea of the penetration of the New Philosophy, although he hardly approves of it, with his running joke about the configuration of the solar system and Raphael’s admonition of Adam for being too curious about the heavens. 文艺复兴时代的魔术师们从未在与魔鬼学者的辩论中获胜，因为他们一起被十七世纪的知识界剧变甩下了辩论台。魔鬼被贬到弥尔顿在《失乐园》中给他安排的位置上去了，他现在是一个教唆者，他只有依靠上帝的力量才能导致实质性的改变。弥尔顿也通过他时常提到的笑话（例如“太阳系的构成”和“拉斐尔警告亚当不要对天堂太过好奇”）让我们了解了当时正破土而出的新哲学，虽然弥尔顿本人并不认同这新哲学。 To the New Philosophers, the rhetorical purpose of a defence of witchcraft was completely different to that of the earlier demonologists, which shows how attitudes had already changed. Perhaps the decline of the trials taking place without the world being overwhelmed by devilry had made the issue seem less urgent. 一篇为巫术罪的辩护词对新一代的哲学家们而言的修辞意义与它在早期恶魔学者眼中的修辞意义截然不同，这一点就证明了知识界的态度已然改变了。也许在猎巫审判越来越少的时代里，世界依然如常运转而并未充斥着魔鬼的术法这一事实，就使得魔鬼问题变得不那么迫切了。 On the same note, once it became clear that most people were already sceptical about witches and this had not led to a collapse of the Christian religion, intellectuals had no further use for witchcraft except for English Tories who wanted to do a bit of Whig baiting. As moral and religious matters were assigned more to the private than the public sphere, a pact with the devil ceased to be a crime against the state and maleficia ceased to be anything at all. 同样，一旦大多数人都已对巫师的存在产生怀疑而基督宗教也并未崩塌，对知识分子们而言巫术问题就没用了。只有英格兰的托利党人还会拿巫术问题来钓一钓辉格党人。当道德和宗教逐渐由社会事务变成私人事务，与魔鬼定约也就不再是危害国家的犯罪，而诅咒也就不再被人当作一回事了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-11-14】 @朱海就 “恐怖主义”与“资本主义”互为敌人：前段时间看到有文章说秘鲁政府通过产权改革、推动市场化，成功地消除了反政府武组织“光辉道路”的威胁。确实，如能通过商业改变自己命运，那总比搞恐怖强。恐怖组织在资本主义文明之光未照耀到的地方更容易出现，而恐怕分子可能更多的是寄生虫。 @高贤林l:德索托强调：正如1980年代和1990年代的秘鲁所证明的（就是他的《另一条道路》打败了“光辉道路”），只有合理的经济授权和对企业家精神的鼓励才是根治全球恐怖主义顽疾的良药。 @朱萧木: 天天为生计和发财梦打拼，谁搞恐怖袭击 @whigzhou: 德索托的书很好，但光辉道路的溃败不需要用他的理由来解释 @whigzhou: 苏联解体后全球倒了无数马列毛党，但发生藤森式改革的地方没几个 @whigzhou: 贫穷能提供恐怖分子，但造不出恐怖主义，假如战后美国托管中东全部油田，收入转交听话的地方政府，今天就不会有这些烂事了 @战争史研究WHS: 伊朗的巴列维国王和利比亚的伊德里斯国王都表示这条路走不通。 @whigzhou: 根本没走过，美国从来没形成过这样的政治意愿 @whigzhou: 假如你家附近来了群整天喊打喊杀的邻居，又不肯坐下来跟你谈，你的选择：1）控制其行为——成本可能很高，难度可能超出你能力，2）削弱其加害能力，定期打断他的腿，让他爬不进你家篱笆——可能相对容易做到，3）等死——容易倒是容易，就看你愿不愿意。 @PlusKing2022:假设美国不是70年代至今对瓦哈比教派的扩张睁只眼闭只眼，事态也不致于如此。穆斯林几十年，在某些地区是几百年的世俗化进程完全逆转了 @whigzhou: 与其叫瓦哈比派不如叫石油土豪金派，没被文明驯服的人就不能让他有钱，就好比我家猫没学会收好自己爪子，我就只能把它们都剪了～