含有〈法律〉标签的文章(149)

[译文]宪法回归主义者在行动

The Rehabilitationists
回归主义者

作者:Brian Beutler,《新共和》高级编辑 @ 2015-08-30
译者:@Ghostmarine
来源:《新共和》(The Republic) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal

How a small band of determined legal academics set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won.

一小撮坚定的法学家如何游说最高法院撤销新政,并如何距成功一步之遥。

In November 2013, a who’s who of America’s conservative legal establishment descended on the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., for an annual meeting of the Federalist Society, the most influential conservative legal organization in the country. Current presidential candidates Scott Walker and Ted Cruz each made appearances, ingratiating themselves with the influence peddlers in attendance. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was a featured speaker at the event’s black-tie-optional dinner.

2013年11月,美国保守派法律界名流纷纷降临华盛顿特区五月花酒店,参加全美最具影响力的保守派法学组织——联邦党人协会(Federalist Society)举办的年会。眼下正在争取总统获选人党内提名的斯科特·沃克和泰迪·克鲁兹也分别到场,搔首弄姿,试图赢得与会大佬们的垂青。最高法院大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯作为特邀演讲嘉宾出席年会的半正装宴会。

One of the biggest stars of the conference, however, was neither a Senate-confirmed official nor an elected politician, but a libertarian law professor at Georgetown named Randy Barnett. This wasn’t Barnett’s first turn as a Federalist Society eminence, but his recept(more...)

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The Rehabilitationists 回归主义者 作者:Brian Beutler,《新共和》高级编辑 @ 2015-08-30 译者:@Ghostmarine 来源:《新共和》(The Republic) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal How a small band of determined legal academics set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won. 一小撮坚定的法学家如何游说最高法院撤销新政,并如何距成功一步之遥。 In November 2013, a who’s who of America’s conservative legal establishment descended on the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., for an annual meeting of the Federalist Society, the most influential conservative legal organization in the country. Current presidential candidates Scott Walker and Ted Cruz each made appearances, ingratiating themselves with the influence peddlers in attendance. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was a featured speaker at the event’s black-tie-optional dinner. 2013年11月,美国保守派法律界名流纷纷降临华盛顿特区五月花酒店,参加全美最具影响力的保守派法学组织——联邦党人协会(Federalist Society)举办的年会。眼下正在争取总统获选人党内提名的斯科特·沃克和泰迪·克鲁兹也分别到场,搔首弄姿,试图赢得与会大佬们的垂青。最高法院大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯作为特邀演讲嘉宾出席年会的半正装宴会。 One of the biggest stars of the conference, however, was neither a Senate-confirmed official nor an elected politician, but a libertarian law professor at Georgetown named Randy Barnett. This wasn’t Barnett’s first turn as a Federalist Society eminence, but his reception that year was especially rapturous. 然而,年会上最耀眼的明星并非是由参议院批准的法官,也不是民选政客,而是一个来自乔治城、名叫兰迪·巴奈特的法学教授,是个自由意志主义者。巴奈特并非首次在联邦党人协会上出风头,但那年,他格外火。 “The younger people, the people in law school, they seem to be gravitating toward people like Randy,” said attendee Josh Blackman, an associate law professor at the South Texas College of Law and a close friend of Barnett’s. “When he gets off the stage he’s mobbed. ... There’s a crowd of people five or six feet deep surrounding him.” “年轻人,法学院的学生们,他们为兰迪这样的人所倾倒,”与会者、巴奈特的密友、南德克萨斯法学院副教授乔什·布莱克曼如是说。“他下台时,被围住了······围在他身边的人群足有五、六英尺那么厚。” Barnett had been invited to participate in a lunchtime debate against J. Harvie Wilkinson, a Reagan-appointed judge serving on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the topic of whether courts are too deferential to legislatures. The event was sold out. 巴奈特曾被邀请参加午餐辩论,对手是里根任命的第四巡回上诉法院法官J·哈维·威尔金森,讨论法院是否对立法机关过于顺从。那次活动的票卖得精光。 Thinking back on that day recently, Barnett marveled at his emergence as a celebrity. “One of the leaders of the Federalist Society—one of the senior staff—said clearly I had the room,” Barnett told me. “It wasn’t that I beat J. Harvie Wilkinson in a debate—who knows?—it’s just that the room was with me. The room would not have been with me ten years ago.” 回想起那天的情形,巴奈特依然为自己成为一个明星而惊讶不已。“联邦党人协会的一名领导,高管,再明白不过地告诉我,说那间屋子是我的,”巴奈特对我说。“不是说我在辩论中赢了J·哈维·威尔金森,那种场合哪有胜负可言,他是指那间房子里全是我的支持者。要在十年前,根本不会出现这种情况。” Back then, Barnett was one of a handful of academics on the fringes of conservative legal thought. Today, their views are taking hold within the mainstream of our politics. Barnett and his compatriots represent the vanguard of a lasting shift toward greater libertarian influence over our law schools and, increasingly, throughout our legal system. They’re building networks for students and young lawyers and laying the foundation for a more free-market cast of federal judges in the next presidential administration. Their goal is to fundamentally reshape the courts in ways that will have profound effects on society. 十年前,巴奈特只是保守派法学思想边缘的少数几名学者之一。而今天,他们的观点开始在我们主流政治视野中显山露水。在长久以来自由意志主义向法学院乃至整个法律体系逐渐扩大影响的过程中,巴奈特和他的同袍们扮演了急先锋的角色。他们为学生和年轻律师构建了一个网络,打造了更为壮大的拥护自由市场的联邦法官阵容,为下一届政府选拔法官奠定了基础。他们的目标是,用一种能够对社会产生深远影响的方式,彻底重塑法庭体系。 Barnett’s political philosophy took root when he was a child. His father was a conservative, and he became one, too. When he was a junior at Northwestern University, one of his professors introduced him to libertarianism, as distinct from the more staid Republicanism of his youth. While attending law school at Harvard, a classmate took him to New York to meet the famed but controversial theorist Murray Rothbard, an encounter that inspired his lifelong affiliation with the libertarian movement and its prominent institutions, like the Cato Institute. His lone professional detour outside that world was a four-year stint as a prosecutor in Illinois. After that, he obtained a fellowship at the University of Chicago under Richard Epstein, a giant of American law in the twentieth century and a patron saint of modern libertarian scholars. 巴奈特的政治哲学植根于儿提时代。父亲是个保守派,他也成了保守派。在西北大学读大三时,一位教授向他介绍了自由意志主义,这套理论显然与他青年时所信仰的更为古板的共和主义大相径庭。进入哈佛法学院后,一位同窗带他前往纽约,拜见名满天下谤亦随之的思想家罗斯巴德。这次邂逅促成了他终生卷入自由意志主义运动之中,并与加图研究所这样的运动重镇始终保持良好关系。巴奈特孤寂的职业生涯并非起步于学术界,他最初在伊利诺伊清贫地干了四年检察官。此后,二十世纪美国法学巨擘理查德·爱泼斯坦主持下的芝加哥大学为他提供了一份奖学金,要知道,爱泼斯坦可是现代自由意志主义学者的守护神。 Barnett’s career as an academic began far from the center of the action, however, at Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he became a professor in 1982. “It was a good school,” Barnett told me, “but one reason it was a bummer to teach there was no one had ever heard of it.” 然而,巴奈特的学术之旅可谓发轫于蛮荒,他于1982年在芝加哥肯特法学院获得教授职称。“那是所好学校,”巴奈特告诉我道,“但是在那教书令人困扰的是,没几个人听说过那座学校。” Eventually, Barnett clawed his way to Boston University, and then to Georgetown, where he joined the faculty in 2006. (“I love the situation here,” he said of his current digs. “I don’t need to be on the outs.”) But even as his career took off, his legal views remained decidedly anti-establishment. Barnett believes the Constitution exists to secure inalienable property and contract rights for individuals. This may sound like a bland and inconsequential opinion, but if widely adopted by our courts and political systems it would prohibit or call into question basic governmental protections—minimum wages, food-safety regulations, child-labor laws—that most of us take for granted. For nearly a century now, a legal counterculture has insisted that the whole New Deal project was a big, unconstitutional error, and Barnett is a big part of that movement today. 最终,巴奈特费尽九牛二虎之力,辗转波士顿大学,于2006年成为乔治城的教员。(“我喜欢这里的环境,”他谈及自己当前的教职。“再不用跟别人格格不入了。”)虽然职业生涯平步青云,他依然坚定地秉承反建制派的法学观点。巴奈特深信,宪法存在的意义是为了确保个人财产和订约权不被侵犯。这种观点似乎是一种陈词滥调,无关紧要。但,如果美国的法院和政治体系能够彻底吸纳这种观点,就会彻底禁绝基本的政府保护行为,至少也会对我们绝大部分人都视作理所当然的一些举措,例如最低工资、食品安全管制、禁止童工法等等,产生怀疑。近百年来,法律界的非主流观点一直声称,整个新政项目都是一个巨大的违宪错误,而今天,巴奈特正在该运动中扮演重要的角色。 The main object of this group’s obsession is the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. Joseph Lochner was the owner of a bakery in Utica, New York, at the turn of the last century, who sought relief from the Bakeshop Act, under which he was fined for allowing an employee to work more than 60 hours a week. He believed that the act’s workplace-safety rationale was in fact a government-sanctioned tool for the bakers union to attack nonunion bakeries like his own and that it deprived him and his employees of their right to enter into their own contracts. The Supreme Court narrowly agreed. Its 5–4 ruling struck down the law and, more importantly, provided the rationale justices would use to invalidate other legislation over the course of a generation. 这群人念念不忘的是1905年最高法院就洛克纳诉纽约州(Lochner v. New York)一案的判决。约瑟夫·洛克纳是纽约尤蒂卡一家面包坊的主人,上世纪之交,由于让员工一周工作超过六十小时,受到了《面包坊法》(Bakeshop Act)的处罚,他决定找法院说理。他认为,《面包坊法》所谓基于工作场所安全的理由,其实是面包师工会的一种得到政府批准的工具,用于整治像自己这样的非工会面包师,而且这种法律也侵犯了他和员工之间自由订立契约的权利。最高法院勉强认同了他的观点。判决结果5-4,推翻了《面包坊法》。更重要的是,此次判决提供了一种司法逻辑依据,本足以颠覆此后整整一代所修筑而成的法律体系。 For decades now, legal academics and elites have considered the early twentieth century one of the Supreme Court’s darkest eras. Lochner, it’s been viewed, belongs with Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 1857 decision holding that neither slaves nor freedmen were U.S. citizens, and Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 decision upholding racial segregation under the separate-but-equal doctrine, in a Malebolge of rejected rulings. 最近几十年来,法学学者和精英们都将二十世纪早期视为最高法院的黑历史阶段。洛克纳一案,与1857年裁定奴隶和已解放奴隶均不享有公民权的斯科特诉桑福德案(Dred Scott v. Sandford),以及1896年在“隔离但平等”的原则下实行种族隔离的普莱西诉弗格森案(Plessy v. Ferguson)一道,被视为奇葩判决的典型。 In 1936, after the Supreme Court struck down a New York minimum-wage law, one of a series of New Deal measures it ruled unconstitutional, a dejected Franklin D. Roosevelt complained to the press that the Court had created “a ‘no-man’s land’ where no government—state or federal—can function.” 1936年,最高法院宣布新政措施之一、纽约州最低工资法违宪,沮丧的富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福对媒体抱怨道,最高法院开辟了“一片‘真空地带’,无论是联邦政府还是州政府,在这里都无能为力。” A year later, after Roosevelt had been reelected overwhelmingly on a New Deal platform, the Supreme Court effectively repudiated Lochner when a 5–4 majority upheld Washington’s state minimum-wage law for women. “More than 25 years ago we set forth the applicable principle in these words, after referring to the cases where the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been broadly described,” the Court ruled. “But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses.” In addition to forming the basis of the modern American social contract, this decision was a hard-fought victory over fierce opposition to government regulation by employers and property owners. The enduring postwar political consensus about the proper role of government may have masked that opposition, but it was never completely vanquished. 一年后,随着罗斯福挟新政以绝对优势连任,最高法院以5-4的多数支持华盛顿州女性最低工资法,事实上推翻了洛克纳案先例。 “二十五年前,在大量援引了明显涉及宪法第十四修正案所保障的众多自由的案件后,我们以这样的字眼陈述了一条适用原则,”法庭裁定。“然而,我们需要认识到,像其他所有案件一样,在所引用的案例中,订立契约的自由是一种具有限制的权利,而非绝对权利。并不存在随心所欲行事的绝对自由,也不存在任意订立契约的绝对自由。”此判决除了奠定现代美国社会契约基础外,还艰难地战胜了雇主和业主对政府管制的强烈反对。虽然战后长期以来,关于政府恰当角色的政治共识掩盖了这种反对,但反对的声音从未彻底消失。 All libertarians want to fight federal regulations in Congress and the executive branch. But Barnett and his allies think courts should be empowered to throw regulations out even if political majorities support them. These Lochner revivalist professors have established beachheads at law schools across the country. In 2002, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh founded a blog, The Volokh Conspiracy, as a hub for libertarian ideas, including Lochner revisionism. Today, it has become the most prominent academic legal blog in the country and now publishes under the auspices of The Washington Post. It boasts nearly two dozen contributing professors and mainlines detailed and informed libertarian legal arguments to thousands of the nation’s top lawyers, law students, clerks, judges, and opinion-makers every day. 所有自由意志主义者都试图在国会和行政分支与联邦管制作斗争。然而,巴奈特和他的盟友认为,即使政治主流乐见管制,司法系统也应当有能力推翻管制。这些以复兴洛克纳案为己任的教授们已经在全美各地的法学院建立起滩头阵地。2002年,加州大学洛杉矶分校的法学教授尤金·沃洛克创建了一个名叫“沃洛克共谋”的博客,成为自由意志主义理念,的大本营,其中就包括洛克纳修正主义。今天,该网站已经成为美国最引人瞩目的法学博客,并在《华盛顿邮报》的资助下结集出版。网站声称,有二十多位教授参与博客内容撰写,网站涉及大量详尽而具体的自由意志主义法学热点,每天有数以千计的国内顶级律师、法学院学生、书记员、法官,以及意见领袖浏览。 The contributors to The Volokh Conspiracy teach at the University of Minnesota, Northwestern, Emory, Duke, and elsewhere. Several hold positions at George Mason University’s law school, which is famous for its conservative faculty and, in 36 short years, has rocketed to prominence as one of the 50 best law schools in the country. In 2011, GMU law professor and Volokh Conspiracy contributor David Bernstein published a book titled Rehabilitating Lochner, and that’s exactly what he, Barnett, and their contemporaries have been attempting to do. “沃洛克共谋”的撰稿人在明尼苏达大学、西北大学、埃莫里大学、杜克大学,以及其他地方任教。还有几人把持乔治梅森大学法学院教席,该大学最引人注目之处就是其保守派教员,以及在短短三十六年时间里,以火箭的速度攀升至全国法学院前五十强。2011年,乔治梅森大学法学教授、沃洛克共谋撰稿人大卫·伯恩斯坦出版了一本名为《回归洛克纳》的书,而这正是伯恩斯坦、巴奈特,以及他们的同袍们所一直努力加以实现的目标。 That project aims to extend the reach of their dissident school of thought beyond academia and into the workings of government. In 1991, two former members of the Reagan administration, Chip Mellor and Clint Bolick, founded the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public-interest law firm now based in Arlington, Virginia, with $350,000 a year in seed money from the oil and gas magnate Charles Koch. They’ve challenged state licensing laws on behalf of hair braiders, florists, and other tradespeople across the country, but have also undertaken loftier crusades, including a doomed effort to overturn the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires that contractors pay their employees competitive wages on government-funded projects. 自由意志主义运动旨在扩展这一思想异端学派的影响力,从学术界渗透入政府运作领域。1991年,曾在里根政府任职的奇普·梅勒和克林特·波力克创立了一家自由意志主义公共利益律师事务所——司法研究所,该机构目前位于弗吉尼亚阿灵顿市,每年由石油大亨查尔斯·科赫慷慨解囊三十五万美元作为种子基金。研究所已经代表全国的编辫工、花匠,以及其他生意人挑战了各州的特许经营法,同时他们还在进行一场更为深远的变革,其中包括彻底推翻《戴维斯—培根法》(Davis-Bacon Act),因为该法案要求在政府出资的项目上,承包商应向员工支付具有竞争力的工资,虽然这项努力前景不妙。 The Volokh Conspiracy, too, was designed not just as a place where law professors could talk with each other, but as a platform from which to broadcast libertarian ideas to a wider audience. Barnett joined the blog as a contributor in 2004. In its early days, its views could be read as a counterpoint to prevailing conservative legal thought. In the summer of 2005, for example, when the overwhelming majority of conservative elites were celebrating John Roberts’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Barnett interjected with a typically contrarian but in some ways fundamental caveat. “Who is John Roberts?” he asked in a Volokh Conspiracypost. “We know nothing about what he stands for.” 同样,沃洛克共谋也不仅仅是个供法学教授们谈天说地的所在,而是一个向更多听众传播自由意志主义理念的平台。2004年,巴奈特成为该博客的撰稿人。起先,该博客的观点更像是保守派同行们所奉行法学观点的对位旋律。例如,2005年夏,当绝大多数保守派精英为约翰·罗伯茨被任命为最高法院首席大法官而欢呼雀跃时,巴奈特以一种典型的鹤立鸡群的姿态,问了一个更为本质的问题,“约翰·罗伯茨是谁?”他在沃洛克共谋发帖写道。“我们对于他所持有的立场一无所知。” Few professors see their academic work reflected in the public realm, and fewer still after cutting so aggressively against the grain. In 2004, when Barnett argued his first and only case before the Supreme Court, Lochner was a distant specter, and libertarian influence over the law more generally was hard to detect. The case concerned two women, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, who used marijuana to treat their chronic medical conditions. Monson’s homegrown medical marijuana plants were seized and destroyed by federal agents pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. Barnett contended the law was an overbroad application of the Commerce Clause to regulate economic activity. He lost 6–3. The following year, the Rehnquist Court dealt libertarians another major blow when it ruled 5–4 in Kelo v. New London that the Connecticut city could use its eminent domain powers to condemn private property and hand it over to private developers. The plaintiffs in that case were represented by the Institute for Justice. 做研究的很少能看到自己的成果反映在公共领域中,如果他们还如此咄咄逼人地与主流观点相悖,可能性就更微乎其微了。2004年,当巴奈特为他第一个也是唯一一个案子在最高法院展开唇枪舌战时,洛克纳只是一个遥远的幽灵,自由意志主义对于整个法律体系的影响微乎其微。那起案子关乎两名女性,安吉尔·赖希和黛安·蒙森,她们利用大麻治疗自己的慢性病。联邦探员依据《管制药品法》(Controlled Substances Act),查抄并销毁了蒙森在自己家种植的药用大麻。巴奈特慷慨陈词,认为利用商业条款对经济活动进行管制实在过于宽泛。他以3-6输了官司。来年,伦奎斯特法庭给了自由意志主义者又一击重拳,在凯洛诉新伦敦市一案(Kelo v. New London)中以5-4裁定,这座康涅狄格小城可以行使土地征用权,征收私人地产,并将其转售给私人开发商。这起案子的原告凯洛就是由司法研究所代理。 To anyone who lived through Bush v. Gore it might seem strange that a judiciary as conservative as the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts would rule for the government so regularly. But the dominant strain of conservative legal thought for the last half-century has largely been shaped by the right’s backlash to the social revolution stemming from the 1960s and the Warren and Burger Courts’ use of the Constitution to further progressive ends like desegregation and access to abortion. For conservatives, the main villain of the last 50 years has been creeping liberal judicial activism and a willingness to overturn legislative action. Conservative legal scholars and jurists like Robert Bork held that judges should refrain from projecting personal or political values into their judicial opinions. This principle became a cornerstone of traditional conservative legal thought, but it effectively created a presumption that democratically enacted laws are constitutional. Such a restrained judicial philosophy makes it difficult for judges to void properly enacted laws like the Controlled Substances Act. 对于任何经历过布什诉戈尔案(Bush v. Gore)的人来说,看到伦奎斯特法庭和罗伯茨法庭这种如此保守的司法机构却这般频繁地做出有利于政府的判决,难免惊诧莫名。然而,源于1960年代的社会革命,再加上沃伦法庭和伯格法庭以宪法为武器,达到诸如废除种族歧视、堕胎合法化之类的进步主义目的,这一切导致过去五十年间右翼反弹,进而塑造了保守派法学思潮的主要观点。在保守派看来,过去五十年中,最大的敌人一直是如影随形的自由派司法能动主义,以及法院推翻立法行动的强烈意愿。类似罗伯特·伯克这样的保守派法学学者和法学家,坚持认为,法官应当努力克制,避免将自己的私人政治价值观投射进司法意见之中。这种原则构成了传统保守法学思想的基石。然而这种价值观实际会产生一个假定:凡经民主程序颁布的法律一定合宪。一旦法官需要酌情废止诸如《管制药品法》之类的法规时,这样一种克制的司法哲学,就会显得力不从心。 But it has been nearly 30 years since Chief Justice Warren E. Burger retired. For many younger conservatives, the Court’s cardinal sin isn’t Brown v. Board of Education or even Roe v. Wade. And Barnett and his allies have helped make many conservatives more comfortable with the idea of judicial activism. 然而,伯格首席大法官退休已近三十年。对很多年轻一代保守派而言,最高法院的头等大罪并非是布朗诉托皮卡教育局案(Brown v. Board of Education),甚至也不是罗诉韦德案(Roe v. Wade)。巴奈特和他的战友们已经帮助很多保守派对于司法能动主义更为习以为常。 With five offices around the country, a legal clinic training students at the University of Chicago Law School, and a staff of nearly 100, the Institute for Justice has become a proving ground for aspiring, ideologically committed lawyers. Every year, the group sends lawyers to law schools around the country to give presentations on public-interest law and recruit students into its ranks. “It’s certainly done with the intent to make sure that libertarian-minded law students know who we are and what we have to offer,” Clark Neily, a senior attorney at the Institute for Justice, said of the group’s outreach. Each summer, a couple dozen clerks join the group in its Beltway headquarters and state offices. From there, these young lawyers typically move on to more traditional clerkships at law firms and federal courts—one former Institute for Justice clerk worked for Chief Justice Roberts from 2008 to 2009—and when the Institute hires new staff attorneys, it often culls from the ranks of these same pupils. 司法研究所拥有员工近百人,全国设有五家办事处,在芝加哥大学法学院开设一间用于学生培训的法律诊所,是志向远大、笃定于意识形态的律师一试身手的理想所在。每年,研究所都会派遣律师前往全国各地的法学院,就涉及公共利益的法律进行演讲,同时招兵买马,扩充队伍。“这些举措显然融入了我们的目的,就是确保具有自由意志主义意识的法学院学生知道我们是谁,我们能提供什么,”谈及研究所正在努力扩大影响时,司法研究所高级律师克拉克·莱利评论道。每年夏天,研究所位于特区政治圈的总部和各州的办事处都会迎来几十名书记员。这些年轻律师通常会从这里起步,跻身律师事务所和联邦法院担任传统书记员——其中有位司法研究所的前书记员在2008年至2009年期间听候首席大法官罗伯茨的差遣——而一旦研究所需要聘用新律师时,就会从这些曾经的学生中精挑细选。 “Ten to 15 years ago, conservatives who were in positions of influence—educating young lawyers, or in a position to hire them to politically desirable positions—were unified by what you might call Borkian restraint, or knee-jerk deference,” Neily said. “What has really changed in the last four or five years is a real skepticism, particularly but not exclusively among young law students, toward this kind of acquiescence to whatever government does.” “十到十五年前,调教年轻律师、能够在政治职位上安插自己人的这些举足轻重的保守派,信奉的都是那种所谓的伯克(Bork)式克制理念,你也可以管那套哲学叫做‘下意识的顺从’,”莱利批评道。“过去四五年里真正的变化就是出现了一种真正的怀疑主义,主要体现在那些法学院青年学生中,他们会怀疑这种默认政府一切举动的做法。” In 2013, the Institute for Justice enjoyed one of its biggest successes to date. It prevailed in a federal appeals court on behalf of the Benedictine monks of St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana, who had sued for the right to sell handmade, inexpensive funeral caskets after the state Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors ordered them to desist. Like Lochner, the case represents a challenge to government health and safety rules. And like Lochner, it could theoretically become the basis for invalidating scores of unrelated business regulations. The Supreme Court declined to hear the state board’s appeal in that case, but different appeals courts have taken different views of this general dispute, which means the Supreme Court—now more conservative than it was a decade ago—may well step in to settle it at some point. 2013年,司法研究所迎来了迄今最大的胜利。研究所在联邦上诉法院帮路易斯安那圣约瑟夫修道院的一群本笃僧打赢了官司,推翻了州殡葬业委员会对僧侣们销售自己手工制作廉价棺材的禁令。和洛克纳案一样,这起案子是对政府健康和安全领域管制的挑战。同样,和洛克纳案一样,这起案子能够成为推翻众多其它商业管制的起点。最高法院拒绝听取州委员会就该案件的上诉意见,然而,不同的上诉法院对同类案件有着不同的理解,这或许意味着,有朝一日,相比十年前更加保守的最高法院将会置身其中,一举解决类似分歧。 Each success on behalf of an everyman struggling against the government serves the libertarian cause well, but these victories pale in comparison to the role that President Obama and the Affordable Care Act have played in convincing mainstream conservatives to give judicial activism a second look. 平凡个人与政府抗争所取得的每一个胜利,都令自由意志主义更加强大,然而在奥巴马总统和《平价医疗法案》面前,这些胜利显得黯然失色,迫使主流保守派不得不重新打量司法能动主义。 Barnett has been at the forefront of the fight against Obamacare, and the 2012 constitutional challenge to the law’s insurance-coverage mandate was largely his brainchild. He argued that requiring private citizens to purchase health insurance against their will exceeded Congress’s powers. A clearly conflicted Chief Justice Roberts ultimately bent over backwards to construe the law in a constitutional way, out of deference to the elected branches, enraging the entire right. If Barnett viewed Roberts as an enigma back in 2005, it’s clear to him now that he finds the chief justice’s approach to the law deeply wanting, and many conservatives agree with him. 巴奈特始终战斗在抵制奥巴马医改的最前线,2012年就《平价医疗法案》中的保险涵盖范围规定上诉最高法院进行宪法挑战,很大程度上就是出自他的思想成果。巴奈特声称,要求私人违背个人意愿,购买健康保险,属国会越权。最终,出于对民选分支的尊重,倍感分裂的首席大法官罗伯茨使出浑身解数,从宪法的角度为该法案再三辩解,令整个右翼暴怒。如果说,2005年,巴奈特还将罗伯茨视作一团迷雾,那么现在他已经看清了,首席大法官对于法律的理解完全不及格,而很多保守派对巴奈特的这一评论颇为激赏。 “Selecting judges with the judicial mindset of ‘judicial restraint’ and ‘deference’ to the majoritarian branches leads to the results we witnessed,” Barnett warned in another Volokh Conspiracy post this summer, after Roberts once again saved the health care law. To Barnett, the proper role for judges isn’t modest or deferential at all, and it’s time for Republicans to start promoting conservatives who will embrace a more activist approach on the bench. “If conservative Republicans want a different performance from the judiciary in the future,” Barnett argued, “they must vet their presidential candidates to see whether they understand this point.” “选一个信奉‘司法克制主义’,对政府、国会‘言听计从’的法官会带来什么后果,我们都已经见识过了,”罗伯茨再次拯救医保法案后,今年夏天,巴奈特在沃洛克共谋的另一篇帖子中敲响警钟。对巴奈特来说,想要当法官,就绝不能温良恭俭让,共和党现在就应该开始动员保守派,将一个更为积极的人推上最高法院。“如果保守派共和党希望将来在司法系统能够有所作为,”巴奈特大声疾呼,“就必须好好敲打敲打总统候选人,看看他们能不能搞清楚这个问题。” Barnett’s opposition to Obamacare made him a hero to the conservative legal establishment. It was for this reason that he was greeted with such enthusiasm at the Federalist Society meeting in Washington two years ago. And it’s what catapulted his ideas about the proper role of judges fully into the mainstream. 巴奈特对于奥巴马医保改革的反对让他在保守派法学界成为一名英雄。这正是两年前的华盛顿特区联邦党人协会的年会中,他受到如此狂热欢迎的原因所在。也正是由于这样的原因,他关于法官适当人选的看法才得以被主流所了解。 To dismiss the debate between libertarians and traditional conservatives over Lochner as an academic sideshow is to misunderstand the stakes. “A full-fledged return to Lochner would put a constitutional cloud over a whole host of laws that we all take for granted today,” said Sam Bagenstos, a liberal constitutional scholar at the University of Michigan who has argued cases before the Supreme Court. “Laws guaranteeing workers the right to join a union without being fired, and the right to earn a minimum wage and receive overtime if working more than 40 hours a week, laws protecting worker safety, and laws protecting workers and customers against discrimination based on race or other protected statuses, just for starters.” 如果简单认定,自由意志主义者和传统保守派关于洛克纳案的争论仅仅是一场无伤大雅的学术小插曲,那就彻底没认清问题的利害所在。“彻底回归洛克纳案,将在我们今天习以为常的整套法律体系上,罩起一片宪法乌云,”曾在最高法院交锋过的密歇根大学自由派宪法学者塞缪尔·巴根斯托斯认为。“保障工人加入工会而不被开除的法律、保证工人把最低工资挣到手、每周工作超过四十小时能拿到加班费的法律、保护工人安全的法律、防止工人和消费者受到种族歧视或者别的什么歧视的法律,统统完蛋,而这统统只是前菜。” I asked Barnett whether the social welfare laws on the books today would be permitted under his reading of the Constitution. “Probably not at the federal level,” he said. 我问过巴奈特,依照他于宪法的理解,今天这些关乎社会福利的成文法还能不能通过。“大概在联邦层面不可能,”他回答。 That’s why Barnett and his contemporaries prefer to root their arguments in specific injustices rather than categorical abstractions. Why shouldn’t bakers be allowed to work more than 60 hours a week, or individuals be allowed to remain uninsured? Why should the government be allowed to regulate out of existence my right to hail a driver or your right to rent a stranger’s house for a weekend? 这就是为什么巴奈特和他的同袍们更愿意将论点放在具体的不公正上,而不是推而广之,形成一套抽象的体系。为什么面包师就不能一周工作六十小时?为什么一个人就不能不买保险?我招个司机,你租个陌生人的房子过周末,政府有什么资格无事生非地对这些权利指手画脚? Even if you believe these regulations are the result of collusion between government and industry cronies, that doesn’t mean they should be constitutionally prohibited, or even that they have no merit. Once courts are empowered to invalidate sordid government regulations, they are also on a slippery slope to tossing out standards that serve useful purposes—in part because some laws that appear unprincipled at a glance actually do important work. If an Airbnb customer and a hotel guest are each badly burned in preventable fires, the hotel guest is likely to have a great deal more recourse—and would have government regulation to thank. 就算你认为这种管制是政府及其行业亲信共谋的结果,也并不意味着这些管制就应该被彻底禁绝,也并不意味着这些管制就丝毫没有优点。一旦法院有权将这些肮脏的政府管制统统取消,就有可能引发雪崩,将某些发挥重要作用的标准也随之抛弃——部分原因就在于,某些大眼一看不符合原则的法律,却在现实中发挥中重要的作用。要是Airbnb和一个酒店的顾客都在一场本可避免的火灾中被严重烧伤,酒店的顾客很可能享有更多的追索权。这时他或许会对政府管制千恩万谢。 That’s not a persuasive rationale in Barnett’s mind. “You should have your own insurance,” he told me emphatically. “You should be insured. You should have health insurance, you should probably have life insurance, disability insurance. I insure myself.” (The irony of this position should be lost on no one—had Barnett’s Obamacare challenge succeeded, 16 million fewer people would have health insurance today.) 在巴奈特看来,这套说辞并没什么说服力。“你是该有自己的保险,”他断然告诉我,“你该有个保障。你该有套健康保险,你或许还该套生命保险、残疾保险。我就为自己投保。”(这种姿态的讽刺意味倒是路人皆知——要是巴奈特挑战奥巴马医保法案成功,有保险的人就会比今天少一千六百万。) The movement to rehabilitate Lochner now faces a crucial test: Can it endure after the spasms of resistance to the Obama presidency have quieted, or will it burn out along with them? When I put this question to Barnett, he demurred. “I didn’t really have a strategy to get us this far,” he said. 目前,回归洛克纳案运动面临一个非常严峻的挑战:随着奥巴马总统任期结束,对其政策抵抗的退潮,这项运动能否延续下去?还是会随之偃旗息鼓?当我向巴奈特抛出这个问题时,他不以为然。“我们能发展到今天这步,也并不是靠一套什么战略。”巴奈特说道。 Nevertheless, Barnett believes that he and his contemporaries have laid a solid foundation for turning back the legal clock to Lochner. “I don’t think it’s top-down,” Barnett said of the overall approach. “You don’t get Justice Whatever without having a huge bottom-up.” 然而无论如何,巴奈特坚信,他和他的同袍们已经打下了坚实的基础,为法律的钟摆回归洛克纳案创造了条件。“我不觉得这项运动是自上而下组织的,”论及运动的整体方式,巴奈特说道, “没有一个巨大的底层基础,什么法官你都提不起来。” That bottom-up effect has arguably had a big impact on the judiciary already. The 2010 Citizens United decision upended the government’s ability to limit campaign spending by corporations. In 2012, four conservative Supreme Court justices declared, in a dissenting opinion, that the entire Affordable Care Act should be vacated as an improper use of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. This was Lochner cloaked in fresh garb: The government can’t tell me how many hours I can work at a bakery; the government can’t tell me to buy insurance. Roberts salvaged the law, but on the basic point about compulsion, he agreed with Barnett, too. It wasn’t just four conservative justices who bought into a kind of Lochnerism. It was all five. 或许可以这么说,自底向上的效果已经对司法体系产生了影响。2010年,联合公民诉联邦选举委员会案的裁决推翻了政府对于企业竞选资金的限制。2012年,四位保守派大法官在反对意见中声称,《平价医疗法案》应当被彻底取消,因为这是国会滥用权力,干涉州际贸易。其实就是把洛克纳案这样陈年老酒装进了一个新瓶子:政府不能告诉我在面包坊工作几个小时;政府不能逼我买保险。虽然罗伯茨拯救了该项法律,但是对强制性的基本看法,他和巴奈特没什么不同。并不是只有四名保守派法官具有一定的洛克纳主义倾向。所有五名保守派法官全都持有类似观点。 Ultimately, the success of any bottom-up movement will depend as much on voters as on legal scholars and the activists they inform. The biggest setback for Lochnerians could be an establishment Republican like Jeb Bush winning the presidency and cannibalizing the grassroots right’s enthusiasm for taking apart the Obama-era administrative state. A Hillary Clinton presidency would put off a Lochner revival for another four or eight years, but it would keep the fires of opposition to big government raging in the meantime. Bush, by contrast, is an advocate of judicial restraint, and once he started appointing traditional conservatives to the bench, it would be difficult to stop him. But Barnett and the Lochnerians hope that the right’s antipathy toward Obama, the Affordable Care Act, and the Roberts Court’s interventions to salvage it will give a Republican president no choice but to move in a new direction. 从根本上来说,任何自底向上的运动要想取得成功,一方面的确需要法学学者的摇旗呐喊,另一方面,选民也发挥着同样重要的作用。洛克纳分子们所能遭遇的最大挫败就是像杰布·布什这样倾向于大政府的共和党人赢得总统大选,挪用草根右翼的热情,向奥巴马时代的行政举措开火。一旦希拉里·克林顿当政,洛克纳的回归大业将会延后那么四到八年,但同时,这也会为反对大政府的熊熊烈火上浇上几桶热油。而相反,如果像布什这样鼓吹司法克制主义的人当了总统,只要他开始提名传统保守主义者当法官,局面几乎铁定难以挽回。但是,巴奈特和洛克纳分子们希望,奥巴马、《平价医疗法案》,以及罗伯茨法庭对于法案的挽救,已经让右翼分子深恶痛绝,这将会让共和党总统别无选择,只能另辟蹊径。 Conservatives, Barnett said, “have to decide, ‘Well, why am I furious? What am I furious at? ... They put John Roberts on the court. I didn’t put him on the court. Bill Clinton didn’t put him on the court. George Bush put him on the court, and he was considered by the Ted Cruzes of this world as a superstar, and then look what he does. There’s something wrong with this picture.” 巴奈特说道,保守派“必须痛下决心了”,“好吧,我为什么愤怒?是什么让我愤怒?······他们把约翰·罗伯茨抬上了首席大法官的宝座。不是我让他当的法官,不是比尔·克林顿让他当的法官,是乔治·布什任命他当了法官,泰迪·克鲁兹那群人把他当天皇巨星一样崇拜,可是你看看他都干了些什么。这种事压根就不对。” The hope is that this anger propels a libertarian-minded president into office and inspires him to nominate less restrained judges. The next president will likely have the opportunity to appoint at least one, and possibly as many as four Supreme Court justices. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is now 82. Stephen Breyer is 77. Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia are both 79. If one of these justices retires under a Republican president, who then appoints a Lochnerian to fill the vacancy, it will change the Court profoundly. If more than one of them steps down, the Court will become unrecognizable. 洛克纳分子们所寄予厚望的就是,这种愤怒能够将一位具有自由意志主义思想的总统推进白宫,并启发他提名一些不那么束手束脚的大法官。下一任总统将至少有可能提名一位大法官,要是机缘巧合,说不定能提名四位大法官。鲁斯·巴德·金斯伯格今年82,斯蒂芬·布雷耶77,安东尼·肯尼迪、安东宁·斯卡利亚都是79。如果这些法官随便哪个在共和党总统任内退休,而总统又指定了一位洛克纳主义者填补空缺,这将能够彻底改变最高法院。如果他们中不止一位归隐,那最高法院将会彻底面目全非。 If that plan fails, Barnett’s cause will be set back years, and the project of pushing his ideas into the Republican mainstream will continue sub rosa. But Barnett has influential allies. 如果计划难遂人意,巴奈特的回归大业将会蛰伏数年,将其理念变成共和党主流的进程也还会继续秘密推进。然而,巴奈特确有几位说得上话的朋友。 In July, the conservative columnist George Will made a provocative new demand of the next Republican president: “Ask this of potential court nominees: Do you agree that Lochner correctly reflected the U.S. natural rights tradition and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments’ affirmation of unenumerated rights?” 七月,保守派专栏作家乔治·威尔大肆宣扬,要为下一任共和党总统设置一个新的标准:“问他会提名谁当大法官:你是否认同洛克纳案正确地反映出美国自然权利传统,是宪法第九、第十四修正案对于宪法未规定公民权利的肯定。” Thanks to the efforts to grow their ranks, there are a few suitable Supreme Court candidates already. In his column, Will identified one: Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett. In a footnote to a recent opinion, Willett celebrated the fact that “a wealth of contemporary legal scholarship is reexamining Lochner, its history and correctness as a matter of constitutional law.” 多亏洛克纳分子们不遗余力地壮大队伍,现在已经有了几位理想的最高法院大法官人选。威尔在他的专栏中就点到了这么一位:德克萨斯最高法院法官丹·威利特。在最近一份判决意见的脚注中,威利特不无欣慰地写到,“当今法学界已经对洛克纳案作出了再三审视,审视其历史和其在宪法学上的正确性。” As for Will’s proposed litmus test, a few Republican presidential candidates this cycle have passed it. Rand Paul has praised the Lochner decision explicitly multiple times, most recently at the Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit this January. “I’m not a judicial restraint guy,” he told an audience of avowed judicial activism foes. “I’m a judicial activist when it comes to Lochner. I’m a judicial activist when it comes to the New Deal.” 至于威尔提出的资格审查测试,本轮有些共和党候选人已经合格。兰德·保罗曾多次明确盛赞洛克纳案,在今年一月传统保护保守派政策峰会(Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit)上,他对听众中一位据称是司法能动主义的反对者说,“我不是司法克制主义者”,“谈到洛克纳案,谈到新政,我就是一个司法能动主义者。” In August, Rick Perry boasted on Twitter that he was “proud” to have nominated Willett to the Texas Supreme Court, calling the justice “a model of conservative jurisprudence.” Whether they know it or not, both politicians are already speaking a language Barnett and his libertarian contemporaries have successfully injected into the mainstream of conservative strategic thought. 八月份,里克·佩里在推特上自吹,提名威利特进入德克萨斯最高法院是他的“骄傲”,称这位法官是“保守派法学界的楷模。”无论他们是否意识到了,这两位政治家操持的政治话语,正是由巴奈特和他的自由意志主义战友们成功注入主流保守派政策思想的。 These are dark horse candidates, but any Republican president will face much more pressure than George W. Bush ever did to nominate the kind of judges Paul or Perry might. Another candidate, Scott Walker, is more of an enigma, but he’s an equally doctrinaire opponent of economic regulation and has a liaison to the pro-Lochner world in George Will’s wife, Mari, who is an adviser to his campaign. History shows it’s difficult to stop a determined president from shaping the courts to reflect a particular conception of law. “There was a whole series of hot-button issues that the Reagan administration decided were exceptionally important in articulating the right kind of judicial restraint,” Bagenstos explained. “Affirmative action was one. The exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment was another. ... So they had a whole hit list of legal principles that they thought were misguided, which got the Constitution wrong, and so they worked really hard to explain why the decisions they thought were wrong, were wrong. 他们都是黑马,但任何共和党总统在提名保罗或者佩里中意的那类法官时,都面临着远远大于乔治·W·布什所遇到的压力。另一位候选人斯科特·沃克更像是一团谜,但他同样在理论上反对经济管制,并且与洛克纳案阵营有着千丝万缕的联系,乔治·威尔的妻子毛伊正是他的竞选顾问。历史一再告诉我们,让一位心意已决的总统不要插手法律系统,以反映其所认同的某种特定法律理念,是非常困难的。“里根执政时期,曾经有一系列热点问题,被政府认为对于恰当地体现司法克制而言极为重要,”巴根斯托斯解释道。“平权运动是一个例子。第四条修正案下的证据排除法则是另一个例子······所以当局列了一个法律原则黑名单,把他们认为搞错的案子、和宪法起冲突的案子统统装进去,于是千辛万苦地解释为什么他们认为错误的案子是错误的。” “It influenced the way they looked at judges, and once they put those judges on the lower court they started to put that agenda into action,” he continued. “Sometimes the Supreme Court went along with the more aggressive lower-court judges, and sometimes they didn’t. But you had this dynamic that things liberals thought they had won in the Burger and Warren Courts were not secure and suddenly were being contested.” “这甚至还影响了政府对待法官的方式,一旦政府提名某些法官在下级法院任职,他们便开始行动起来。” 巴根斯托斯继续说到,“有时候最高法院会认同更为活跃的下级法院法官,有时则不会。但问题在这里,自由派原本以为在伯格法庭、沃伦法庭斩获的胜利果实,突然就变得岌岌可危起来,” This is a lesson every Democrat, and really every establishment-minded Republican, should relearn, because a president who adopted the same model, with the goal of rehabilitating Lochner, could erode the legal and administrative foundations of the past century in a matter of years. A rule change undertaken by Senate Democrats last Congress eliminated the filibuster for nominees to lower courts, and by the time the next president is sworn into office, three sitting Supreme Court justices will be over 80 years old. 历史为每一个民主党以及倾向于大政府思想的共和党拉响了警报,倘若一旦有位以里根为楷模,以回归洛克纳案为己任的总统上台,过去一百多年来构建的法律和行政基础几年以内就可能受到极大侵蚀。要知道,上届国会,民主党参议员们废除了本可用来抵御下级法院法官提名的阻挠议事规则,而等到下一位总统宣誓就职时,三位最高法院大法官将年过八十。 “The next Republican president will have a choice,” Bagenstos said. “I don’t know which way that choice is going to come out.” “下一任共和党总统将有机会做出选择,”巴根斯托斯说道,“我只是不清楚这一选择会朝向何方。” To Randy Barnett the choice is obvious. 对兰迪·巴奈特来说,答案明摆着。
[译文]宗教自由的丧钟已经敲响?

The Beginning of the End of Religious Freedom
宗教自由终结的开始

作者:David Harsanyi @ 2015-8-21
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:Reason,http://reason.com/archives/2015/08/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-religious-fr

Compelling bakers to bake cakes part of a broader drive to limit faith-based decisions by private businesses.
强迫糕点师制作蛋糕是限制私营企业基于信仰作决策的广泛攻势的一部分

Just in case you need a refresher: Back in 2012, a baker in the Denver suburb of Lakewood was asked by a gay couple to make them a(more...)

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The Beginning of the End of Religious Freedom 宗教自由终结的开始 作者:David Harsanyi @ 2015-8-21 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:Reason,http://reason.com/archives/2015/08/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-religious-fr Compelling bakers to bake cakes part of a broader drive to limit faith-based decisions by private businesses. 强迫糕点师制作蛋糕是限制私营企业基于信仰作决策的广泛攻势的一部分 Just in case you need a refresher: Back in 2012, a baker in the Denver suburb of Lakewood was asked by a gay couple to make them a wedding cake—two years before gay marriage was even legalized in Colorado. The owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, declined to participate in Charlie Craig and David Mullins' celebration because such an event conflicted with his Christian faith. 也许你需要重温一下:2012年,在丹佛市郊的莱克伍德,一对同性恋人要求一名糕点师为他们制作一个婚礼蛋糕——那是科罗拉多州同姓婚姻合法化之前两年的事了。“杰作蛋糕”的店主,Jack Phillip,拒绝让自己参与进Charlie Craig和David Mullins的婚礼,因为这与他的基督教信仰相冲突。 Here are a few things Phillips didn't do: He didn't query consumers about their sexual preferences. He didn't bar same-sex couples from purchasing a cake at a place of public accommodation. He didn't ask consumers traveling in same-sex pairs to leave his shop. He didn't hang a "No Gays Allowed" sign in his window. Phillips没有做以下这些事情:他没有查问顾客的性取向。他没有禁止同性伴侣在公共场所购买蛋糕。他没有要求出双入对的同性客人离开他的店铺。他也没有在窗户上挂“同性恋勿入”的牌子。 What he could never have known when he first opened his shop was that celebrating gay marriages would be a precondition for making a living. And when you consider that there are at least a few dozen other bakeries within a short drive from Masterpiece Cakeshop that could have accommodated the couple's celebratory pastry needs, why would he? 他刚开店的时候绝对想不到,为同性婚姻服务会成为谋生的前提条件。你想想,“杰作蛋糕”周边极短车程以内就有至少好几十家其它烘焙店,它们原本都能帮这对恋人制作婚礼蛋糕,这让他怎么想得到呢? Yet instead of exhibiting a basic level of tolerance (or dignity), two priggish bullies decided to call the authorities when Phillips refused to bake them a cake. And the cultural commissars at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission soon ruled that he had discriminated against the couple. 然而,在Phillips拒绝为他们制作蛋糕之后,这两位自命道德高尚的霸道人物,没有表现出起码的宽容(或体面),而是决定报告政府。科罗拉多民权委员会的文化专员很快就裁定Phillips歧视了这对同性恋。 The shop was not only ordered to alter store policy and start baking cakes for gay weddings—or else face debilitating fines, a consequence often reported on by the media—but also forced to provide comprehensive staff training, ensure compliance and then file quarterly obedience reports with the government for two years. In these reports, Phillips has to describe exactly which remedial measures the shop has taken to conform and document the reasons any other patrons were denied service. 这家店不但被勒令店铺更改规定,从今往后要为同性婚礼制作蛋糕——否则就要面临惩罚性罚款,媒体对此后果多有报道——而且还被强制要求开展全面的员工培训、保证遵守规定并在两年内每季度定期向政府提交合规报告。Phillips在报告中必须具体描述店里为了合规都采取了何种整改措施,并要记录店里拒绝为任何其他主顾提供服务的原因。 So, you know, I'm sure this is exactly how Thomas Jefferson imagined America would turn out when he was writing the Declaration of Independence. 所以,你知道的,我确信托马斯·杰弗逊写《独立宣言》时就料到美国未来会变成这样。 Phillips appealed the decision, and a three-panel Colorado Court of Appeals unanimously decided that Masterpiece Cakeshop's policy against creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples was a "discriminatory and unfair practice," further ruling that the shop must continue to answer to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission or else be run out of business. Phillips对这一判决提出了上诉,结果由三人组成的科罗拉多上诉法院一致裁定“杰作蛋糕”拒绝为同性伴侣制作婚礼蛋糕的方针乃是“歧视性的不公正行为”,同时判决该店必须继续听从科罗拉多民权委员会的要求,否则就要停止营业。 Incredibly, the court acknowledged in its decision that it would have looked at the First Amendment arguments more closely had the gay couple ordered a cake with some explicit messaging that advocated gay marriage. In other words, the Colorado Court of Appeals believes that the threshold for denying religious liberty is the presence of advocacy. The court has effectively tasked itself with determining for you when religion should matter. 令人难以置信的是,法院在其判决中承认,假如当事的同性伴侣在订购蛋糕时明确传递了提倡同性婚姻的信息,那么法院会更为仔细地考虑宪法第一修正案。换句话说,科罗拉多上诉法院认为,否定宗教自由的门槛乃是公开提倡。法院因此实质上为自己赋予了一项任务:替你决定什么时候宗教是要紧的。 If nothing else, it's comforting to know that Colorado can force an orthodox Muslim butcher to make sausages for a polyamorous, bisexual bachelor/bachelorette party, as long as no one asks the butcher to outwardly promote swine and free love. 别的不论,以下事实实在让我们感到安慰:科罗拉多可以强迫正统的穆斯林屠户为开放多偶、双性恋的单身派对制作猪肉肠,只要没人要求这位屠户公开推广猪和自由性爱。 In any event, I'm sure there will be an appeal. But seeing as most Americans are fine with gay marriage and simultaneously put off by unpleasant (though deceptive, in this case) words such as "discrimination" and "prejudice," the courts—nearly always driven by the vagaries of public opinion—will find a way to force all to comply. 无论如何,我确信还会有场上诉。但看到多数美国人都觉得同性婚姻没什么大不了,同时又容易因“歧视”和“偏见”等令人不快(尽管在本案中这一不快是有欺骗性的)的词汇引发反感,几乎总是被反复莫测的公共意见所左右的法院总会找到办法来令所有人顺从。 This will go for any other businesses even tangentially related to weddings, such as food catering, music and so on. And the crusade will accelerate until the legal lynch mob gets to religious institutions. No doubt advocates will work backward to come up with a great legal rationalization for all of it. 这甚至还会延伸到只与婚礼擦边的行业,比如酒席承办、音乐伴奏等等。这场讨伐运动还会愈演愈烈,直到那些利用法律行私刑的暴民们一路杀到宗教组织那里。毫无疑问,支持者们会事后努力,为所有这一切进行法律上的合理化。 All of this is not to say that in American life, the minority should never be compelled to surrender to some form of majoritarianism, judicial force or government. In this case, though, the minority does not have the ability to compromise without abandoning its faith. The other side refuses to compromise precisely because of this reality. And courts and commissions around the country are willing to destroy businesses—businesses that sometimes took a large part of a lifetime to build—by ignoring one of the most vital functions of the First Amendment. 以上所论当然不是说,在美国人的生活中,少数派永远不应该被迫向某种形式的多数主义、司法机关和政府让步。只不过,在眼前的这一案例中,少数派没有能力在遵从自己信仰的条件下达成妥协。而另一方之所以拒绝妥协,恰恰就是因为这一现实。而全国各地的法院和委员会无视第一修正案的最关键功能之一,愿意去摧毁企业——有时还是某些人花了大半辈子才建立起来的企业。 The position of these businesspeople, unlike Southern racists decades ago, in no way undermines the newfound right of gay Americans to marry, nor does it inhibit them from enjoying freedom or finding happiness. In this case, only one side is attempting to legislate morality. 与几十年前南方的种族主义者不同,这些生意人的立场完全不会破坏美国同性恋者新近得以确立的结婚权利,也不会阻止他们享受自由和追求幸福。在本案中,只有一方试图将道德问题法律化。 If you admit—and many rational people do, even those who quarrel with the reasoning behind religious obstinacy—that millions of Christians hold some form of a genuine, long-standing religious conviction that prohibits them from celebrating gay marriages but you still support state coercion against them, then you might as well just concede that religious freedom isn't compatible with your conception of a contemporary society. 如果你承认——许多理性的人都会承认,即便是那些反对固执宗教思维的人——数以百万计的基督徒持有某种真诚的、存在已久的宗教信念,使得他们不可能去庆祝同性婚姻,但你还是支持国家对他们采取强制措施,那你就不如直接承认宗教自由与你所理解的现代社会不相容。 Whereas at one time the state wouldn't substantially burden religious exercise and would use the least restrictive means to further "compelling interests," the state today is inclined to substantially burden a Christian by the mere fact that someone's feelings are hurt. 从前,国家并不会实质性地增加宗教活动的义务,并以最不具有限制性的方式推动“重大迫切利益”。然而现在,国家已倾向于实质性地加重基督徒的义务,只是因为有人的感情受到了伤害。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]美国需要一部新大宪章

The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State
监管型国家的法治

作者:John Cochrane @ 2015-6
译者:Ether(@大小眼不能飞)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy),陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy)
来源:John Cochrane’s blog,http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf

1.Introduction
1.引言

The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom.

美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意,而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济,但很少有人认识到,日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁,而这一点恐怕更加重要。

What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board?

银行敢对美联储叫板吗?券商对证券交易委员会(SEC)又敢怎样?医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部(HHS)或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗?一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢?医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗?我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗?

The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support.

这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵,国王之忧还在其次。但是,现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下,各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。

The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around.

过去800年,美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力,保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治,我们的民主脱胎于法治,而非相反。

This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now.

法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今,其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现;也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天,对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张,且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大,或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险,并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。

Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress.

没错,我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身:宽泛模糊的法律,政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。

Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course.

当然,利用法律和规章奖励支持者,惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。

Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger.

富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功,甚至可能延长了大萧条,但在政治上则取得了极大的成功,民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。

A label?
用什么标签好?

I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control.

我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。

Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money.

很多人称之为“社会主义”,但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里,私有企业是存在的,但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织,控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业,它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局,也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。

It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support (more...)

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The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State 监管型国家的法治 作者:John Cochrane @ 2015-6 译者:Ether(@大小眼不能飞) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy),陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy) 来源:John Cochrane's blog,http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf 1.Introduction 1.引言 The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom. 美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意,而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济,但很少有人认识到,日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁,而这一点恐怕更加重要。 What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board? 银行敢对美联储叫板吗?券商对证券交易委员会(SEC)又敢怎样?医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部(HHS)或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗?一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢?医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗?我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗? The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support. 这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵,国王之忧还在其次。但是,现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下,各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。 The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around. 过去800年,美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力,保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治,我们的民主脱胎于法治,而非相反。 This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now. 法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今,其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现;也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天,对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张,且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大,或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险,并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。 Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress. 没错,我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身:宽泛模糊的法律,政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。 Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course. 当然,利用法律和规章奖励支持者,惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。 Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger. 富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功,甚至可能延长了大萧条,但在政治上则取得了极大的成功,民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。 A label? 用什么标签好? I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control. 我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。 Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money. 很多人称之为“社会主义”,但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里,私有企业是存在的,但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织,控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业,它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局,也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。 It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support their regulators politically. But Stigler’s regulators and business golf together and drink together, and the balance power is strongly in the hands of the businesses. “Capture” doesn't see billion-dollar criminal cases and settlements. And “capture” does not describe how national political forces use regulatory power to extract political support. 这也不是“捕获”。乔治·斯蒂格勒描述过受管制的企业“捕获”其监管者的过程,企业借监管之手排除竞争。斯蒂格勒所研究的受管制企业一定会在政治上支持其监管者。但是在斯蒂格勒的叙述中,监管者和商人一起打高尔夫一起喝酒,制衡的权力牢牢地掌握在企业手中。“捕获”中见不着上十亿美元的刑事案件及和解协议。“捕获”也不能描述国家政治力量如何利用监管权力攫取政治支持。 It’s not really “crony capitalism.” That term has a bit more of the needed political flavor than “capture.” Yes, there is a revolving door, connections by which businesses get regulators to do them favors. But what’s missing in both “capture” and “cronyism” is the opposite flow of power, the Devil’s bargain aspect of it from the point of view of the regulated business or individual, the silencing of political opposition by threat of regulation. 这也不是真正的“裙带资本主义”。这个词相比“捕获”多了一份应有的政治意味。的确,这里面有一扇旋转门,企业通过这种关系让监管者们施以援手。但无论“捕获”还是“裙带主义”都没能体现逆向的权力作用。对受管制的企业和个人来说,这是一笔与魔鬼的交易,是通过监管的威胁对政治反对的压制。 We’re headed for an economic system in which many industries have a handful of large, cartelized businesses— think 6 big banks, 5 big health insurance companies, 4 big energy companies, and so on. Sure, they are protected from competition. But the price of protection is that the businesses support the regulator and administration politically, and does their bidding. If the government wants them to hire, or build factory in unprofitable place, they do it. The benefit of cooperation is a good living and a quiet life. The cost of stepping out of line is personal and business ruin, meted out frequently. That’s neither capture nor cronyism. 我们正在迈入这样一种经济体制:很多行业只有少数几家大型的、卡特尔化的企业——比如6家银行、5家健康保险公司、4家能源公司等等。的确,他们受到保护,免于竞争,但保护的代价是企业政治上支持其监管者和行政机关,并听命于它们。如果政府想要他们雇工或者在无法盈利的地方建厂,他们就会照做。合作的好处是日子好过、生活太平。越界的成本就是个人和企业的毁灭,这种惩罚频繁出现。这既不是捕获也不是裙带主义。 “Bureaucratic tyranny,” a phrase that George Nash quotes Herbert Hoover as using is a contender. “官僚暴政”——这个乔治·纳什引自赫伯特·胡佛的短语倒是值得考虑。 Charles Murray, writing recently on the status of the regulatory state notes many of these issues. He totals 4,450 distinct federal crimes— just the law, not including regulations with criminal penalties, or the vastly greater number with civil penalties. He adds up the 175,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the vagueness of the enabling legislation — Congress only decrees that rules are “generally fair and equitable,” “just and reasonable,” prohibits “unfair methods of competition” or “excessive profits.” He notes the absence of judicial rights in administrative courts. He notes the wide scope of regulation and the comparatively tiny — but ruinous to those charged — enforcement: 最近,查尔斯·墨里在论述监管型国家的现状时关注了诸多类似议题。他一共数出了4,450条联邦刑事罪名。这还仅仅是法律规定,不包括附有刑事惩罚的行政规章或者数量更大的附有民事惩罚的规章。他核查了一共175,000页的《美国联邦法规汇编》,以及含糊不清的授权立法条款。国会仅要求规章条款“原则上公平、公正”、“公正、合理”,禁止“不公平竞争”或者“过分利得”。他指出,行政法庭上司法权利缺失。他还指出,规章管辖范围广泛,执法却相对不足,但执法的结果对被控诉者却是毁灭性的: the “Occupational Safety and Health Administration has authority over more than eight million workplaces. But it can call upon only one inspector for about every 3,700 of those workplaces. The Environmental Protection Agency has authority ... over every piece of property in the nation. It conducted about 18,000 inspections in 2013—a tiny number in proportion to its mandate. “职业安全与健康管理局有权管辖超过八百万个工作场所,但是每3,700个工作场所只能均摊到一个巡视员。环境保护署有权管辖美国每一处资产。2013年,它一共进行了18,000次检查,仅是其管辖范围中极小的一部分。” Murray advocates civil disobedience with insurance for the few zebras who get caught by the regulators. 墨里提倡每个公民都购买保险以弥补万一被监管者抓到所带来的损失,同时对管制采取不予合作的态度。 But by and large Murray deplores merely the silliness of and economic inefficiency of the regulatory state. This misses, I think, the greatest danger, that to our political freedom. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect. 但总体而言,墨里憎恶的只是监管型国家的愚蠢和经济不效率。我认为这漏掉了最大的危险,那就是对政治自由的危害。仅仅是想到有可能被环保署拜访这一点,就有显著的噤声效果。 And it also misses, I think, an explanation for how we got here. Regulators and politicians aren’t nitwits. The libertarian argument that regulation is so dumb — which it surely is — misses the point that it is enacted by really smart people. The fact that the regulatory state is an ideal tool for the entrenchment of political power was surely not missed by its architects. 我认为他还漏掉了一点:我们是怎么走到这一步的。监管者和政客都不是傻子。自由意志主义者关于监管很愚蠢的观点,尽管正确,但没有看到一点:这些法律法规也是非常聪明的人制定的。监管型国家的建造者肯定对其是保有政治权力的最佳工具这一点心知肚明。 Likewise, Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen make a good casethat most of the economic rationale for regulation has disappeared along with information. Uber stars are far more effective than the Taxi Commission. But the demand for protection and the desire to trade economic protection for political support will remain unchanged. “Protect the consumer” is as much a distracting argument in the Uber vs. Taxi debate as it was when the medieval guilds advanced it. 同样,亚历克斯·塔巴洛克和泰勒·考恩很好地证明了,大多数赞成监管的经济学原理已经随着充分的信息而消失。优步的星级评定远比出租车委员会有效,但是对监管保护的需求以及用经济上的保护来换取政治上的支持仍然不会改变。在优步和出租车之争中,“保护消费者”不过是个掩人耳目的论点,和中世纪行会利用它时一样。 Rule of Law: the Devil in the Details 法治:细节里的魔鬼 “Rule of law” and “regulation” are dangerous Big Vague Words. The rule of law is so morally powerful that the worst tyrants go through the motions. Stalin bothered with show trials. Putin put Pussy Riot on trial, and then they were “legally” convicted of and jailed for the crime of ”hooliganism.” Even Henry the Eighth had trials before chopping heads. Is this not rule of law? “法治”和“监管”是危险的模糊大词。法治在道德上如此有力,以至于最坏的暴君也要应付一下。斯大林费力搞出走秀似的审判。普京审判暴动小猫【译注:俄罗斯女性主义朋克乐队,经常在各大景点举办有关俄罗斯政治生活的行为艺术表演,都未经政府批准】,然后“依法”宣判“流氓罪”罪名成立并判入狱。甚至亨利八世把那么多人头砍下了之前也经过了审判。这难道不是法治吗? No, of course, but it’s worth reminding ourselves why not as we think about bureaucracies. 当然不是,但在我们思考官僚体系的时候,值得提醒一下自己,为什么它们不是。 “Rule of law” ultimately is a set of restrictions to keep the state from using its awesome power of coercion to force your political support. If you oppose Castro, you go to prison. If you opposed Herbert Hoover, could you still run a business? Sure. If you oppose President Obama, or the future President Hilary Clinton can you do so? If you oppose the polices of one of their regulatory agencies, now powers unto themselves, or speak out against the leaders of those agencies, can you do so? If you support candidates with unpopular positions, can you still get the regulatory approvals you need? It’s not so clear. That is our danger. “法治”说到底是一系列对国家的限制,防止国家动用可怕的强制权力强迫你的政治支持。如果你反对卡斯特罗,你会被关进监狱。如果你反对赫伯特·胡佛,你还可以经营一家公司吗?当然可以。如果你反对奥巴马总统或者未来的希拉里·克林顿总统呢?如果你反对他们手下某个现已有权有势的监管机构的政策,或是公开反对他们的领导呢,你还可以继续经营公司吗?如果你支持立场不受欢迎的候选人,你还能获得经营公司所需的行政审批吗?答案并不清楚。这就是我们所面临的危险。 “Rule of law” is not just about the existence of written laws, and the superficial mechanics of trials, judges, lawyers, ad sentences. Rule of law lies deep in the details of how those institutions work. Do you have the right to counsel, the right to question witnesses, the right to discovery, the right to appeal, and so forth. Like laws, what matters about regulation, both in its economic efficiency and in its insulation from politics, is not its presence but its character and operation. “法治”不仅仅是成文法和形式上的审判、法官、律师和判决等机制。法治根植于这些制度如何运作的细节中。你是否有权利获得律师辩护、质证、证据开示、上诉,等等。和法律一样,不管是从经济效率还是政治独立性上来说,监管的要害不在于它的存在,而在于它的特点和操作。 Regulators write rules too. They fine you, close down your business, send you to jail, or merely harass you with endless requests, based on apparently written rules. We need criteria to think about whether “rule of law” applies to this regulatory process. Here are some suggestions. 监管者也制定规则。他们依据成文法开罚单、关闭你的公司、送你入监,或者就不停地提要求骚扰你。我们需要一些标准来思考“法治”一词是否适用于这套监管程序。以下是一些建议:
Rule vs. Discretion? 规则vs自由裁量? Simple/precise or vague/complex? 简单/准确,还是模糊/复杂? Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? 可知的规则vs溯及既往? Permission or rule book? 批准,还是规则手册 Plain text or fixers? 直白文本,还是掮客? Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? 普通执法还是专断执法? Right to discovery and challenge decisions. 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。 Right to appeal. 上诉权。 Insulation from political process. 与政治活动隔离。 Speed vs. delay? 快捷还是拖延? Consultation, consent of the governed. 被治理人的意见和合意。  
  • Rule vs. Discretion?
  • 规则vs自由裁量?
This is really a central distinction. Does the regulation, in operation, function as a clear rule? Or is it simply an excuse for the regulator to impose his or her will on the regulated firm or person? Sometimes discretion is explicit. Sometimes discretion comes in the application of a rule book thousands of pages long with multiple contradictory and vague rules. 这是一个核心区别。在操作中规章是不是作为明确的规则发挥作用?还是规章仅是监管者对被监管公司和个人施加自身意志的借口?有时候自由裁量是很明确的,有时候自由裁量则来自对上千页且存在大量冲突、模糊规则的规章手册的运用。
  • Simple/precise or vague/complex?
  • 简单/准确还是模糊/复杂?
Regulations can be simple and precise — even if silly. “Any structure must be set back six feet from the property line” is simple and precise. Or the regulation can be long, vague and complex. “The firm shall not engage in abusive practices.” 规章可以简单、准确,即使其很愚蠢。例如“所有建筑必须在界址线后6英尺”,这就很简单、准确。规章也可以很长、模糊且复杂,比如“公司不允许从事违规行为”。 Many regulations go on for hundreds of pages. Long, vague, and complex is a central ingredient which gives the appearance of rules but amounts to discretion. 很多规章长达数百页。冗长、模糊、复杂是让规则成为自由裁量,只具有规则的表象的核心因素。
  • Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions?
  • 可知的规则vs溯及既往?
Is the rule book knowable ex ante? Or is it, in application, simply a device for ex-post prosecutions. Insider trading rules are, at present, a good example of the latter. The definition of “insider” varies over time, and there is really little hope for a firm to read a coherent rule book to know what is and is not allowed. Much better to stay on good terms with the regulator. 规则事先可知吗?还是其实只是一种溯及既往的工具。内幕交易规则就是后一种情况的很好例子。“内幕”的定义随时间而变,公司几乎不可能从一本融贯的规则手册中知道什么是允许的,什么不被允许。与其如此,还远不如和监管者搞好关系。
  • Permission or rule book?
  • 批准还是规则手册?
In one kind of regulation, there is a rule book. If you follow the rule book, you’re ok. You go ahead and do what you want to do. In much regulation, however, you have to ask for permission from the regulator, and that permission includes a lot of discretion. Environmental review is a good example. 有一种监管,依据就是一本规则手册。只要你遵循上面的规则就没事,你可以做其他任何你想做的。但是有很多监管,你需要征得监管者的批准,而批准则包括了很多自由裁量。环境审评就是一个好例证。
  • Plain text or fixers?
  • 通俗文本还是掮客?
Can a normal person read the plain text of the rule, and understand what action is allowed or not? Or is the rule so complex that specialists are required to understand the rule, and the regulatory agency’s current interpretation of the rule? In particular, are specialists with internal agency contacts necessary, or specialists who used to work at the agency? 一个普通人是否能够阅读规则的文本并理解何种行为被允许,何种不被允许?还是规则太复杂,想要理解规则需要专家,需要依靠监管机构对规则的最新阐释?特别是,是不是需要一个拥有监管机构内部关系的专家或者是前工作人员? As a private pilot, I often bristle at the FAA’s mindless bureaucracy and the plain silliness of much of their regulation. But to their credit, there is a strong culture that the plain text of the rule counts, and each pilot should read the rules and know what they mean. That is a system much harder to misuse. Financial, banking, environmental, health care, and housing regulation stand on the opposite end of the spectrum. 作为一个私人飞行员,我经常恼怒于联邦航空管理局的无脑官僚做派和很多愚蠢的规章。但是有一点不得不承认,他们那里盛行一种文化,就是保持规则文本的通俗易懂,每一位飞行员都应该能读懂规则。在这种体制下,监管者滥用规则的难度就会加大。但金融、银行、环境、医疗保健、住房的规章却完全处于光谱的相反一端。
  • Enforced commonly or arbitrarily?
  • 普通执法还是专断执法?
Regulations that are seldom enforced, but then used occasionally to impose enormous penalties are clearly more open to political abuse. If Americans commit three felonies a dayin “conspiracy,” internet use, endangered species, wetlands, or employment and immigration regulations (just to start), but one in a hundred thousand is ever prosecuted, just who gets prosecuted is obviously ripe for abuse. 很少执行但偶尔用来施加重罚的规章显然更易被滥用。如果美国人每天都在有关“合谋”、互联网使用、濒危物种、湿地或雇佣和移民等等规章(远远还没数完)下犯下三项重罪,但是只有十万分之一的机率被起诉,那么挑谁来起诉这件事显然就成了滥权的温床。
  • Right to discovery, see evidence, and challenge decisions.
  • 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。
Do you have the right to know how a regulatory agency decided your case? Step by step, what assumptions, calculations, or interpretations did it use? Often not, and even in high profile cases. 你是否有权知道监管机构是如何裁决你的案子的?每一步,他们用了什么假设、如何计算或者解释?通常你无权知道,即使是要案。 For example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverageof Met Life’s “systemic” designation reports 比如,《华尔街日报》关于大都会人寿保险公司被划定为具有“系统性风险”的报道写道: The feds ...still refuse to say exactly which [threats] make MetLife a systemic risk or what specific changes the company could make to avoid presenting such a risk. “联邦政府……依然拒绝说明是什么(威胁)使得大都会保险公司具有系统性风险或者公司可以通过何种具体的改变来避免出现这种风险。” and continues ...MetLife says that…the government’s decision is based on mere speculation and “undisclosed evidentiary material.” 接着又提到: “大都会保险公司表示……政府的裁决是基于纯粹臆测以及‘未公开的证明材料’。” Since the case is still being decided, the point here is not the correctness or not of these charges. But the charges are a clear example of the kind of regulation that can go wrong (In fact, the miracle of the MetLife case is that the company had the chutzpah to sue. They are taking a big bet that FSOC doesn’t believe in revenge.) 因为案件尚无定论,这里的重点并非这些指控正确与否,而是这些指控作为一个清楚的例证,表明监管可以变味。(事实上,大都会保险公司一案的奇迹在于公司竟然敢起诉监管机构。他们在金融稳定监督委员不会报复上面押了好大一注。)
  • Right to appeal.
  • 上诉权。
And not just to the same agency that makes the decision! In law, the right to appeal is central. In regulation, the right to appeal is often only to appeal to the same agency that made the decision. The Chevron doctrine severely limits your ability to appeal regulatory decisions (and the regulations themselves) to any outside entity. As an example, continuing the above MetLife coverage, 这里说的不仅仅是向作出裁决的机构提出上诉!法律上,上诉权是核心。在监管中,上诉权通常只是向作出行政裁决的同一机构提出上诉。“雪佛龙原则”严重地限制了你向机构外其他实体对监管裁决(和监管本身)提起上诉的能力。作为例子,我们接着看关于大都会保险公司一案的报道。 The ... stability council “lacks any separation in its legislative, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.” That combined with MetLife’s inability to see the full record on which the decision was based made it “impossible” to get a fair hearing. 金融稳定监督委员会“缺乏立法、调查、起诉和司法各职能的分立”。加上大都会无法看到裁决依据的完整记录,这使得他们“不可能”得到一个公平的听证。 As in law, secret evidence, secret decisions, secret testimony; and legislature, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled in to one are classic ingredients for subverting rule of law. And, eventually, for using the machinery of law to silence political opposition. 和在法律领域一样,秘密证据、秘密裁决、秘密证词以及立法、起诉、判决、陪审和执行不加区分都是破坏法治的典型元素。最终,它们都是为了利用法律机器来压制政治反对。
  • Insulation from political process.
  • 与政治活动隔离。
There are many structures in place to try to ensure the “independence” of independent agencies. There is also a tension that we live in a democracy, so independent agencies can’t be too independent if they have great discretionary power. 目前有很多架构想要确保独立机构的“独立”。但在民主国家,这也带来一个内在的压力。独立机构如果有很大的裁量权,那就不可能太独立。 These important structures try to limit explicit party politics’ use of the regulatory state. They are less successful at limiting the bureaucracy’s use of its regulatory power to prop up its own separate fiefdom. They are also less successful at limiting unwitting political cooperation. When vast majorities of the bureaucracy belong to one political party, when government employee unions funnel unwitting contributions to candidates of that party, and when strong ideological currents link decisions across agencies, explicit cooperation is less necessary. 这些重要的架构都是为了限制政党政治对监管型国家的公开利用,但它们在限制官僚机构利用监管权力强化自己的独立王国上则不那么成功。在限制无意的政治合作上也不成功。当机构的绝大部分人属于一个政党时,当政府雇员工会无意中资助那个政党的候选人时,当强烈的意识形态动向将各部门的裁决关联起来时,公开的合作就没那么必要了。 And, though it was ever thus, the enormous expansion of the size, power, and discretion of the regulatory state makes the insulation structures more important, just as they are falling apart. 即使这样,监管型国家的规模、权力和自由裁量权的扩张也使得隔离架构更加重要,而这些架构却正在分崩离析。
  • Speed vs. delay.
  • 快捷还是拖延。
The regulatory process can take years, and a canny regulator need not explicitly rule against a political foe. Delay is enough. Lois Lerner herself didn’t deny applications. She just endlessly delayed them. The FDA similarly sits on applications, sometimes for decades. 监管流程可以耗费数年。一个狡猾的监管者并不需要作出明显不利于政治对手的裁决,拖延就够了。洛伊丝·勒纳【编注:勒纳是美国国税局处理税务豁免申请的部门负责人,从2010年起,该部门被发现对涉及保守派特别是茶党人士及捐赠对象的豁免申请施加额外苛刻的审查,2013年的国会调查确认了这些滥权行为的存在,国税局官方也予以承认,并导致勒纳先被停职,后来辞职。】本人并不拒绝任何申请,她只是无限地拖延。类似地,食品药品监督局也拖延审核申请,有时一拖就是几十年。 A central element of a new Magna Carta for regulatory agencies should be a right to speedy decision. If a decision is not rendered in say, 6 months, it is approved. 一部针对监管机构的新大宪章的核心元素,就应该是速决的权利。如果一项裁决,比如说6个月内未作出,就相当于得到批准。
  • Consultation, consent of the governed.
  • 被治理人的意见及合意。
The process by which rules are written needs to be reformed. Congress writes empowering legislation, usually vague and expansive. The agencies undertake their own process for rule writing. They usually invite comment from interested parties, but are typically free to ignore it when they wish. We are as supplicants before the King, asking for his benevolent treatment. 规则制定的流程需要改革。国会制定的授权法律通常模糊、宽泛。机构根据各自的流程制定规则。它们常常会邀请利益相关方提出意见,但当他们不愿意接受这些意见时,通常可以直接无视它们。我们就像国王面前的恳请者,乞求他的仁慈。 And that was before the current transformation. As exemplified by the EPA’s decision to brand carbon dioxide a pollutant (coverage here), to extend the definition of “navigable waters” to pretty much every puddle, HHS’ many reinterpretations of the ACA, and the Education Department’s “Dear Colleague” letters, even the barely-constrained rule-making process now proceeds beyond its previous mild legal and consultative constraints. 这还是发生在如今的转变之前的事。从环境保护局宣布二氧化碳为污染物(见报道),将“可通行水域”的范围延伸到几乎所有的池塘,到卫生与公共服务部数次重新解释患者保护与平价医疗法案,以及教育部的“致同僚的一封信”,都是例证。现在,即使原本就不怎么受约束的规则制定过程也突破了本已有限的法律和征求意见方面的约束。 A structure with more formal representation, and more formal rights to draft the rules that govern us, is more in keeping with the parliamentary lessons of the Rule of Law tradition. 在起草治理我们的规则方面,一个有着更为正式的代议机制和更为正式的权利的制度结构,将更加符合法治传统下的议会经验。 2.A Tour 2.浏览 Do we really have reason to be afraid? Let’s take a tour. 我们真的有理由害怕吗?我们来浏览一下。 These cases are drawn mostly from media coverage, which allows me a quick and current high- level tour. Each case, and many more that are unreported, and a serious investigation to the structure of our massive regulatory state, could easily be drawn out to book length. 以下案例大多来自媒体报道,让我得以对当前情况做一次鸟瞰式的快速浏览。每一起案件和更多没有报道的案件以及对大型监管型国家架构的严肃检视,都可以轻而易举地写成一本书。 My point is not so much a current scandal. My case is that the structure that has emerged is ripe for the Faustian political bargain to emerge, that the trend of using regulation to quash political freedom is in place and will only increase. 我的意图不是要讲一件当下的丑闻。我是认为,现已出现的架构很容易导致浮士德式政治交易的出现,使用监管来压制政治自由的趋势已经形成而且只会不断加强。 As we tour our current regulatory state of affairs, then, think of how well the current regime represents “rule of law,” how well it respects your freedom to speak, your freedom to object, your freedom to oppose the regulator and regulatory regime. Think how insulated it is against the strong temptations of our increasingly polarized, winner-take-all, partisan political system to use regulatory power as a means of enshrining political power. 当我们检视当前监管型国家的事务时,想一想现有体制体现了多少“法治”,它在多大程度上尊重了你的言论自由、反对自由和反对监管者及监管型政权的自由,想一想它与两极分化日益严重、赢家通吃、政党体系动用监管权力来固化政治权力的强烈冲动隔离得怎么样。 Banks 银行 Start with finance. Finance is, of course, where the money is. 从金融业开始。金融,顾名思义,是钱之所在。 The Dodd-Frank act is 2,300 pages of legislation, in which “systemic” is never defined, making a “systemic” designation nearly impossible to fight. The act has given rise to tens of thousands of pages of subsidiary regulation, much still to be written. The Volker rule alone — do not fund proprietary trading with insured deposits — runs now to nearly 1,000 pages. To call this Talmudic is to insult the clarity and concision of the Talmud. 《多德-弗兰克法案》有2,300页长,但里面并未定义何为“系统性的”。这就使得监管者对企业具有“系统性风险”的划定几乎无法反驳。法案也带来了上万页的附加规章,需要接着撰写的还有很多。单是沃尔克规则——禁止用参加存款保险的存款进行自营交易­­——现在就已经快1,000页了。以“塔木德式”来称呼它,是对塔木德之清晰、简洁的亵渎。【编注:塔木德是犹太教的一套口传律法,由拉比传承,记录该教的传统习俗和行为规范。】 The result is immense discretion, both by accident and by design. There is no way one can just read the regulations and know which activities are allowed. Each big bank now has dozens to hundreds of regulators permanently embedded at that bank. The regulators must give their ok on every major decision of the banks. 结果就是巨大的自由裁量权,既有意外也有蓄意。仅仅阅读这些规章绝无可能知道什么活动是被允许的。每家大银行现在都被永久性地安插了几十至几百个监管者。银行的每一项重大决定都必须得到监管者的批准。 The “stress tests” are a good case in point. Seeing, I suspect, the futility of much Dodd-Frank regulation, and with the apparent success of the Spring 2009 stress tests in the rear view mirror, such tests have become a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory efforts. But what worked once does not necessarily work again if carved in stone. “压力测试”是一个好例子。我怀疑是看到了众多多德-弗兰克规章的无效,同时,回顾过去又有2009年春天压力测试的成功,这些使得压力测试成了美联储加强监管的柱基。但是成功一次不代表常规化后次次都能成功。 In “stress tests,” Federal Reserve staff make up various scenarios, and apply their own computer models and the banks’ computer models to see how the banks fare. However, the Fed does not announce a set scenario ahead of time. They Fed staffers make up new scenarios each time. They understand that if banks know ahead of time what the scenario is and the standards are, then the clever MBAs at the banks will make sure the banks all pass. And billions of dollars hang on the results of this game. “压力测试”中,美联储职员制造不同的情境,然后应用联储自己的电脑模型和银行的模型来看银行如何反应。但是联储不会提前公布一组情境都有什么,美联储职员每次都制造一组新的情境。他们知道如果银行事先知道情境及标准,银行里那些聪明的MBA们就有办法保证银行通过测试。而数十亿美元系于这场游戏的结果。 Now, the Fed staffers playing this game, at least those that I have talked to, are honest and a- political. For now. But how long can that last? How long can the Fed resist the temptation to punish banks who have stepped out of line with a stress test designed to exploit their weakness? Is it any wonder that few big banks are speaking out against the whole regime? They understand that being an “enemy” is not the way to win approvals. 现在,参与这个游戏的联储职员,至少那些和我说过话的,都是诚实且无涉政治的。目前是这样,但这能维持多久呢?联储能够抵御诱惑多久,而不去惩罚那些在专门设计来利用银行弱点的压力测试中行为出格的银行?鲜有大银行敢于直言反对整个体系,这很奇怪吗?他们明白,成为“敌人”并不是获得审批的办法。 And the stress-test staff are getting handsome offers already to come work for the banks, to help the banks to pass the Fed’s stress tests. Ben Bernanke himself is now working for Citadel. 参与设计压力测试的联储职员现已从银行获得了待遇不菲的工作邀请,来帮助银行通过测试。本·伯南克自己现在就为城堡投资集团工作。 If this sounds like the cozy world of “capture,” however, remember the litany of criminal prosecutions and multibillion-dollar settlements. These are instigated by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, with much closer ties to the Administration, but they revolve around violations of securities regulations. Is it a coincidence that S&P, who embarrassed the Administration by downgrading U.S. debt, faced a $1.4 billion dollar settlement for ratings shenanigans, while Moody’s, which gave the same ratings, did not? Pay up, shut up, and stay out of trouble is the order of the day. 如果这听起来像是一个“捕获”的温馨世界,那请记住刑事诉讼和数十亿美元的和解下的哀鸣。这些都是由与行政分支关系更紧密的司法部长和司法部发起的,涉及的则是违反证券法规的行为。降低美国债务评级而让行政分支蒙羞的标准普尔因评级欺诈而面临14亿美元的和解,但给出同样评级的穆迪却没有受罚。这难道是巧合?破财消灾、闭上嘴、远离是非,是当今市场的生存之道。 The Wall Street Journal nicely characterized today’s Wall Street, quotingJohn J. Mack, Morgan Stanley's ex-chairman “Your No.1 client is the government,” which embeds “About 50 full-time government regulators.” 《华尔街日报》引述摩根士丹利前主席约翰·马克的话,漂亮地描述了今天华尔街的特点,他说:“你的头号客户是政府”,它安插了“大约50个全职监管者。” CFPB 消费者金融保护局 Another example: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice charged Ally Bank with discrimination in auto lending, and extracted a nearly $100 million settlement. Ally provides money to auto lenders. Lenders negotiate interest rates. Nobody is allowed to collect data on borrowers’ race. So Justice ran statistical analysis on last names and zip codes — Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding — to decide that minorities are being charge more than they should, essentially encoding ethnic jokes into law. 另一个例子:美国消费者金融保护局和司法部指控Ally银行在汽车贷款中歧视,并获取了一份价值约一亿美元的和解。Ally向汽车贷款放贷人提供资金。放贷人协商利率。不允许任何人收集借贷人的种族信息。所以司法部就通过贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法统计分析借贷人的姓和邮编作出裁决,认为少数族裔被收取了过高的费用——这等于是将种族笑话秘密地写入了法律。 Why did Ally pay? Sure, they might survive in court. But nobody wants to be branded a racist. And DOJ and CFPB have many more cards up their sleeves. CFPB now can disapprove any retail financial arrangement it deems “abusive,” and put Ally out of business. Ally为什么答应和解呢?当然,他们可能在法庭上获胜。但没人愿意被称作种族主义者。此外,司法部和消费者金融保护局袖子里还藏着很多牌。消费者金融保护局现在可以否决一切它们认为“滥用”的零售金融合约,它们可以让Ally破产。 Note in this case, there was no charge or evidence of discriminatory practice or intent. The case was purely that DOJ and CFPB didn’t like the statistics of the outcome. 注意,此案中并无歧视行为或意图的指控或证据。一切只因为司法部和消费者金融保护局不喜欢最后的数据统计分布。 More importantly, was this a knowable regulation, or a bill of attainder? Did CFPB and Justice make available the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding program on their website, and tell financial institutions “please download the BISG program, make sure you run loans through it, and that they come out with the right statistics?” Obviously not. This was an unknowable regulation. Ally had no way to make sure it was lending to the right last names. 更重要的是,这究竟是一条可知的规章,还是褫夺公民权的法案?消费者金融保护局和司法部有没有在网站公布贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法,并告诉金融机构“请下载该程序,根据它发放贷款并确保最终数据统计分布正确”?显然没有。这是一个不可知的法规。Ally无法保证它们把钱贷给了正确的姓氏。 Ominously, in Wall Street Journal coverage, 《华尔街日报》的报道带来了不详的预兆: Larger settlements may be on the horizon. J.P. Morgan...warned in a recent filing that it is discussing the issue of possible “statistical disparities” in auto lending with Justice. With more than $50 billion in auto loans on Morgan’s balance sheet at the end of last year, real or imaginary disparities wouldn’t have to be that large to generate a fat settlement. “更大的和解可能就在眼前。JP摩根……在最近提交的一份公告中警示投资者,它正在与司法部讨论汽车贷款中可能存在的‘统计偏差’问题。根据公司去年底资产负债表上超过500亿美元的汽车贷款,真实或者想象的偏差不必过大,也会产生巨额和解。” While the Obamacare (King v. Burwell) and gay marriage decisions soaked up the airtime in the summer of 2015, the Court’s upholdingof statistical discrimination and disparate impact stands as the greatest affront to liberty. Without even alleging discriminatory intent, without following any established procedure, the Justice Department can chew numbers as it feels, and based on statistical analysis brand you a racist and drag you to court. 尽管奥巴马医改案(金诉布维尔案)和同性恋婚姻判决占据了2015年整个夏天的聚光灯,但联邦最高法院对数据统计分布所体现的歧视和差别影响的认可才是对自由最严重的侵犯。甚至无需指称歧视意图,无需遵循任何现有程序,司法部就可以随意咀嚼数字,根据统计分析为你打上种族歧视者的标签,把你拖上法庭。 SEC 美国证券交易委员会 The SEC’s regulation of insider trading is a fine example of discretion run amok. There is no legal definition of insider trading. Other than corporate insiders (who have legal fiduciary responsibilities not to trade on information) there is little economic rationale for this witch hunt. The game is characterized by big suits with big settlements and novel theories. 证券交易委员会对内幕交易的监管是自由裁量权失控的一个很好例证。法律上没有内幕交易的定义。除去企业内部人(他们有法律上的受托人责任,不利用信息进行交易)之外,这种猎巫式的监管没有多少经济依据。这场游戏的特点是大案件、高额和解和新颖的理论。 And thus, big discretion. The SEC can ruin anyone it wants to. If you’re running a hedge fund and the SEC accuses you of insider trading, it grabs your computers and shuts down your business. Sure, 5 years from now you might win in court, but your customers left and the fund shut down the day they took the computers away. And appeal is only to the SEC itself. 于是,这带来了广泛的自由裁量权。证券交易委员会可以摧毁想要摧毁的任何人。如果你经营一家对冲基金,而证券交易委员会指控你内幕交易,它会带走公司的电脑,关闭你的公司。当然,5年后你可能赢下官司,但是客户全都离开了,基金公司也在取走电脑的那天关了。而且你就算上诉也只能上诉到证券交易委员会。 Robosigning 自动签名 During the financial crisis, many banks didn’t fill out all the forms correctly when foreclosing on houses. The charge was entirely about process — there was no charge that anyone was evicted who was paying his or her mortgages. From the Federal Reserve’s own press releaseswe learn that the Fed found them guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices.” 金融危机期间,许多银行取消房屋抵押赎回权时没有正确填写所有表格。这项指控纯粹只和流程有关,没有任何关于仍在还按揭的房主被驱逐的指控。从美联储自己的官方新闻通报中我们知道,美联储认为银行因“不安全、不合理的程序和操作”而犯有过错。 The Fed was acting in conjunction with a comprehensive settlement agreed in principle between the five banking organizations, the state Attorneys General, and the Department of Justice ... The Settlement Agreement requires these organizations to provide $25 billion in payments and other designated types of monetary assistance and remediation to residential mortgage borrowers. 在一项五家银行机构、各州检察长和司法部……之间达成的、内容广泛的原则性和解中,美联储也参与了联合行动。和解协议要求银行赔付给民宅按揭借贷者总额为250亿美元的款项和其他指定的资金支持和救助。 The Fed, a supposedly non-political independent agency devoted to bank safety and monetary policy, acted with the Administration, to transfer $25 billion dollars from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers (not the victims of robosigning, other borrowers) and “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” 美联储——一家理应政治中性、独立,致力于银行安全和实施货币政策的机构——和行政分支一起将250亿美元从银行股东那里转移给按揭借贷者(他们还不是自动签名的受害者)和“非营利性住房咨询机构”。 It’s a small example, but a concrete one. 这是一个小例子,但很实在。 Regulation in general is transitioning from widespread application of rules to sporadic but very large enforcement actions, frequently involving threat of criminal prosecution and ending in large settlements. Documenting this trend, the Wall Street Journalnoted the spread of Department of Justice Attorneys to regulatory agencies. For example, the EPA “described a strategy of pursuing larger, more complicated enforcement cases, albeit fewer in number.” 总体上看,监管正由规则的广泛适用转向不定期的大型执法活动,还经常伴随着刑事诉讼的威胁,并以大额和解而终结。在记录这一趋势时,《华尔街日报》注意到很多司法部律师转到了其他监管机构。比如,环境保护署“描绘了一个策略,就是追求更大、更复杂的执法案件,哪怕案件数量更少”。 Similarly,Larry Parkinson, another former federal prosecutor who runs FERC’s [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] investigations, described it as an outgrowth of shifting resources to more serious matters—like market manipulation—and away from more traditional violations. In 2008, for example, a majority of the agency’s penalties were against firms that violated requirements that natural-gas shippers maintain title to the gas. 类似地,拉里·帕金森,另一位前联邦检察官,现负责联邦能源监管委员会的调查,将此说成是资源从传统违法行为转移到更严重问题的结果,如市场操控。比如,2008年,该委员会的大部分处罚是针对那些违反天然气航运商必须保有天然气所有权这一规定的公司。 “Market Manipulation” is of course a lot more nebulous and discretionary than natural-gas title checks. “市场操控”当然比天然气所有权检查更加模糊、有更多自由裁量权。 The ACA, AKA Obamacare 患者保护与平价医疗法案,即奥巴马医改法案 The ACA is 2,700 pages, and the subsidiary regulation is so convoluted that there is an active debate on the page count of its actual regulations. Justice Scalia invoked the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment as protection against actually reading it. 奥巴马医改法案长达2,700页,配套法规也相当复杂,以至于其到底有多少页还存在争议。斯卡利亚大法官援引第八修正案——不得施加残酷和非常惩罚——来保护自己不去读它。 The Heritage foundation counted 1,327 waivers. Clearly, someone needing a discretionary waiver shouldn’t be a big critic of HHS or the law. 美国传统基金会统计到了1,327份弃权声明。显然,有人需要自主弃权,这不应算是对卫生与公共服务部或者这项法案的严厉批评。 The cartelization of health insurance and health care under the ACA is almost a textbook case of corporatism. The big hospitals doctors, and insurers get a protected small cartel. In return for political support for the ACA, HHS, state exchanges, and so on. And, the ACA itself being an intensely partisan question, that support already leaks into major party politics. 奥巴马医改法案下健康保险和医疗卫生服务的卡特尔化是社团主义的教科书式案例。大医院、医生和保险公司获得了一个受保护的小卡特尔。作为回报,他们从政治上支持医改法案、卫生与公共服务部及州立医疗保险交易所等等。由于医改法案本身已经成为了一个很严重的党派问题,对法案的支持也卷入到了政党政治中。 Writing on the consolidation of health insurance into two or three big companies, the Wall Street Journal quotesAetna CEO Mark Bertolini that the federal regulators “happen to be, for most of us now, our largest customer,” adding 《华尔街日报》在关于健康保险公司整合为两到三家大公司的报道中,引用了安泰保险首席执行官马克·伯特利尼的话说,联邦监管机构“对我们大多数人而言,现在恰好是我们最大的客户”。他又补充道: “So there is a relationship you need to figure out there if you’re going to have a sustained positive relationship with your biggest customer. And we can all take our own political point of view of whether it’s right or wrong, but in the end-analysis, they’re paying us a lot of money and they have a right to give us some insight into how they think we should run our business.” “所以如果你想要和最大的客户有一个长久积极的关系,就需要认清这个关系。关于对错,我们都可以有自己的政治观点,但是最终来看,他们支付我们很大一笔钱,他们有权利给我们一些见解,告诉我们该如何经营。” The Journal opined that “such domestication is part of ObamaCare’s goal of political control,” echoing my fear. 《华尔街日报》评论道,“这种驯服是奥巴马医改法案政治控制意图的一部分”,这呼应了我的忧惧。 United Healthwanted to join the California exchange Covered California. Many areas of California have only one or two insurers now, so competition and choice are clearly needed. But participation in the exchange needs prior regulatory approval, and United Health was denied. Why? The LA Times wrote 联合健康保险想要加入加州健康保险交易所——医保加州。加州很多地方现在只有一两家保险公司,所以显然是很需要竞争和更多选择余地的。但是参加交易所需要事先得到审批,联合健康保险被否决了。为什么?《洛杉矶时报》写到: Peter Lee, executive director of Covered California, said established insurers shouldn't be free to come in right away. Those insurers, he said, should not be allowed to undercut rivals who stepped up at the start and made significant investments to sign up 1.2 million Californians during the first open enrollment. “彼得·李,医保加州的执行董事,表示老牌保险公司不应该立刻自由进入市场。他说那些保险公司不应该被允许以更低地成本与那些在第一次公开登记时就进场,并为签下120万加州人作出巨大投资的对手竞争。” and quoting Lee further, 李还说, We think the health plans that helped make California a national model should not be in essence undercut by plans that sat on the sidelines. “我们认为帮助加州成为全国模范的保险计划不应该被那些坐在一边看热闹的计划比下去。” You can’t ask for a clearer example of a regulator, using discretionary power to cartelize his industry, protect incumbent profits, and punish a business for failure to support political objectives. He said nothing about United Health’s ability to serve California customers, or to abide by any regulation. 没有什么是比这个更明显的监管者的例子了,利用自由裁量权将他管辖的行业卡特尔化,保护既得利益,惩罚没能支持其政治目标的公司。李一点没提联合健康保险服务加州消费者的能力或者其遵守了所有的法规。 Again in California, reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Daughters of Charity Health system wanted to sell six insolvent hospitals to Prime, which agreed to take on their debt and a $300 million pension liabilities. Under state law, Attorney General Kamala Harris must approve nonprofit hospital sales or acquisitions, with only a vague guideline that such transactions must be “in the public interest.” But only four of Prime’s 15 California hospitals are unionized, so the Service Employees International Union was against the merger. Ms. Harris torpedoed the merger, despite a positive report form her own staff. 还是在加州,据《华尔街日报》报道,仁爱女儿连锁医院想要将六所破产的医院卖给基本医疗。后者同意接受破产医院的债务和3亿美元的养老金负债。根据州法律,非营利医院的收购或出售须得到州检察长卡马拉·哈里斯批准,而指导其审批的只有一条模糊原则,就是这一交易必须“符合公共利益”。但是基本医疗在加州的15家医院只有4家参加了工会,所以服务业员工国际工会就起来反对这一并购。哈里斯女士阻止了这次并购,尽管她自己的手下出具了对并购持正面评价的报告。 Was the event a political cave to unions, as represented by the Journal? Perhaps; perhaps not. What matters here is that it certainly could be, as the Attorney General has enormous discretionary power to approve or disapprove hospital mergers. Hospitals are well advised to stay on her good side. 这一事件是不是如《华尔街日报》报道的那样,是对工会的政治屈服呢?也许是,也许不是。这里真正重要的是,完全有可能如此,因为检察长有很大的自由裁量权批准或否决医院并购。医院得到的建议是乖乖站在检察长一边。 FDA 食品药品监督管理局 Henry Miller at Hoover tells the sad tale of the Aquadvantage salmon, submitted for review in 1996 and still under review20: 胡佛研究所的亨利·米勒说了关于AquAdvantage转基因鲑鱼的悲伤故事,这一品种1996年提交评审,到现在还在评审: ...Consider what they [FDA] have inflicted on a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon, which differs from its wild cohorts only by reaching maturity about 40 percent faster, as the result of the addition to its genome of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon... “……想一想食品药品监督管理局(FDA)对这一转基因大西洋鲑鱼都做了什么。这种鲑鱼与其它野生同类唯一不同的是比它们快40%达到成熟期,因为它的基因组中添加了帝王鲑的生长荷尔蒙基因……” It took FDA more than a decade just to decide how they would regulate the AquAdvantage salmon. Characteristically, they decided on the most onerous pathway, regulating the new construct in genetically engineered animals as though it were a veterinary drug, similar to a flea medicine or pain reliever. After several years of deliberation, regulators concluded as early as 2012 that the AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon has no detectable differences and that it “is as safe as food from conventional Atlantic salmon.” ... FDA用了超过十年时间来决定要怎样监管这种鲑鱼。跟往常一样,他们决定通过最繁复的路径来监管转基因动物体内的新构造,就像把它当作兽药,类似跳蚤药或者镇痛药那样对待。经过数年的研究,监管者早在2012年就得出结论认为这种鲑鱼没有可探知的差异,它“和大西洋传统鲑鱼一样安全”。 When the FDA completed its Environmental Assessment in April 2012 and was ready to publish it—the last necessary hurdle before approving the salmon for marketing—the White House mysteriously intervened. The review process vanished from sight until December of that year, when the FDA was finally permitted to publish the EA (the unsurprising verdict: “no significant impact”), which should then have gone out for a brief period of public comment prior to approval. 就在2012年4月FDA完成环境评价准备公布结果时——这也是最后一道挡在鲑鱼上市前的障碍——白宫却神秘地干涉了进来。审批过程从公众视野中消失了。直到那年12月,FDA才最终被批准公布环境评价,结果并不出人意料——“没有显著影响”。这之后理应是短暂的公开征求意见阶段,然后就是正式批准。 The reason for the delay in the FDA’s publishing the needed Environmental Assessment was exposed by science writer Jon Entine. He related that the White House interference “came after discussions [in the spring of 2012] between Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ office and officials linked to Valerie Jarrett at the Executive Office [of the President], who were debating the political implications of approving the [genetically modified] salmon. Genetically modified plants and animals are controversial among the president’s political base, which was thought critical to his reelection efforts during a low point in the president’s popularity.” 科学作家乔恩•昂蒂纳揭露了FDA推迟公布环境评价的原因。他谈到,白宫的干涉“发生于2012年春天卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳·西贝利厄斯的部长办公室和总统办公室瓦莱丽·贾勒相关的官员进行的一场讨论之后。这些官员的辩论围绕着批准转基因鲑鱼的政治影响。在总统的政治大本营,转基因植物和动物是有争议的话题。这一话题被认为在总统的支持率处于低点的时候对总统的再次当选至关重要。” Needless to say, 20 years of delay makes a project pretty unprofitable. 不用说,20年的拖延让转基因鲑鱼项目变得几乎无利可图。 This is a good example, because the FDA regulations prescribe a precise science-based process for evaluating a food. There are time limits for rendering decisions, which the FDA ignores. But strong political forces don’t like GM foods, science be damned. 这是一个绝佳的例子,因为FDA的法规规定了评价食品的一套基于科学的精确程序。作出裁决是有时限的,但被FDA忽略了。当强大的政治力量不喜欢转基因食品时,科学就屁也不是了。 EPA 环境保护署 A clean environment is important. Pollution is a clear externality. We can also regard it as a Nash equilibrium. Each competitor in an industry is happy to pay the extra money to produce cleanly if all his or her competitors do so. 清洁环境很重要。污染显然是一个外部性。我们也可以把它看作一个纳什均衡。如果竞争对手也这么做,行业里的每一个竞争对手都愿意花额外的钱清洁地生产。 But the modern EPA violates just about every one of my suggested bullet points for preserving rule of law in the regulatory bureaucracy, and is ripe for political misuse. Discretion vs. rules, the potential for endless delay, the need for ex-ante permission, and a politicized and partisan bureaucracy are just the beginning. 但是现代的环境保护署违背了我为在监管型官僚机构下维护法治所提出的几乎每一条建议,政治滥用就在眼前。自由裁量权而非规则、无限拖延的可能、事前批准的要求、政治化和党派化的官僚机构,这些都还只是开始。 In the Pebble Mine controversy, EPA issued a preemptive veto of a project before a request for review was submitted, and was found colluding with mining opponents. Note, I’m not opining on whether the mine was a good or bad idea. Merely that the process in view is clearly one that could be misused for political purposes, and that mine owners already must know not to speak ill of the EPA or administration with such sway over the EPA. 在佩柏金矿争议中,环境保护署在项目审批申请递交前就发出了事先否决,并且被发现和开采的反对方相勾结。请注意,我并不是在就开矿是好是坏发表意见。我要说的仅仅是,这个程序明显可以因政治目的而遭到利用,而矿主一定已经知道不要说环境保护署以及可以对其施加影响的其他机构的坏话。 The Keystone pipeline stands as the example par excellence of regulatory delay and politicization. Perhaps next to the EPA’s decision to take on carbon as a pollutant. Keystone石油管线是监管拖延和政治化的绝佳例证。可能仅次于环境保护署决定将二氧化碳列为污染物。 Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project. 如今,任何因其他理由——比如遮住了视野——而反对一个项目的人,都可以利用环境评估来加以阻止。在任何商业项目中,拖延跟否决一样有效。 The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed “crucifying” some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying: 环境保护署第六区主管阿尔·阿曼达里兹的小故事很有启发性。他建议把一些大的石油公司“钉死在十字架上”,以儆效尤。录音显示,他说: The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years. “罗马人曾经征服地中海地区的小村庄。他们进入某个土耳其小镇,将最先看到的五个人钉死在十字架上。然后整个镇子在接下来的几年都会很好管理。 ...we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly. ……我们确实有一些很有效的执法工具。如此,顺服便唾手可得,而且程度很高,来得很快,非常快。 According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases. 故事里,阿曼达里兹关闭了Range Resources,首批水力压裂公司之一。Range予以了回击,最终一位联邦法官作出了有利于Range的判决。但是一个通过杀鸡儆猴、明显增加企业合规成本来运作的机构,当然易于根据政治考量而选择 “钉死”哪些儆猴之鸡。 Internet 网络 The Internet is the central disruptive technology of our time. So far it has been “permissionless” — unlike just about every other activity in the contemporary United States, you do not need prior approval of a regulator to put up a website. 网络是这个时代核心的颠覆性科技。截至目前,它还是“无需审批”的。不像当代美国的其他任何活动,你不需要事前审批就能上线一个网站。 Pressure grew under the reasonable-sounding banner of “net neutrality,” though what was at stake was the right of some businesses to pay extra for faster delivery. “Net neutrality” meant outlawing business class. The FCC, a supposedly independent agency, studied the issue and found no reason to regulate the internet. 但是,在听似合理的“网络中立性”旗帜下,压力与日俱增,虽然这里受到危及的是一些公司通过额外付费来获得更快传输的权利。“网络中立性”意味着宣布通过额外付费取得一定特权不合法。联邦通信委员会(FCC)——一个本该中立的机构,研究了这个议题,然后发现没有理由监管网络。 One fine day in November 2014, FCC commissioner Tom Wheeler must have found horse head in bed. Well, more specifically a surprise public announcement from President Obama that “blindsided officials at the FCC” per WSJ coverage. 2014年11月某个美好的日子,FCC主席汤姆·惠勒一定在床上发现了一个血淋淋的马头【译注:电影《教父》梗】,更准确地说是奥巴马总统惊人的公开言论。据《华尔街日报》报道,奥巴马提到了“FCC那些钻进死胡同的官员”。 The result is not just “net neutrality” but to apply full telecommunications regulation circa 1935. In particular, this includes Title II rate regulation, in which the FCC has full power to determine what rates are “reasonable.” 奥巴马的言论带来的结果不仅仅是“网络中立性”,而是FCC将动用其约于1935年获得的全面电信监管权力。尤其是,这其中包括有关费用管制的第二条款。据此,FCC可以全权决定什么样的费用是“合理”的。 The FCC announces it will “forbear” to use that power. Along with its right, under the regulation, to impose content restrictions — yes, to tell you what to put on your website — and the “fairness doctrine.” But forebearance is discretionary. So, a company thinking of investing money in fiber-optic lines had better invest in good relations with the FCC and the Administration that apparently drives its decisions. FCC宣布他们会“克制”使用该权力,以及在该监管下实施内容限制(是的,就是告诉你网站放什么内容)和“公平原则”的权力。但是克制也是有裁量的。所以,一家打算投资光纤电缆的公司最好多多投资于它和FCC以及能够影响其裁决的行政分支的关系。 The “independence” of regulatory agencies is one of the key structures impeding widespread use of regulatory power to induce political support. The WSJ coverage of the politics behind the decision describes well how specific businesses’ access to the White House drove the result. On the commission, the 3-2 vote with 2 republicans issuing withering dissents speaks of the partisan nature of this regulation. 监管机构的“独立”是阻止广泛使用监管权力争取政治支持的关键架构之一。《华尔街日报》关于裁决背后的政治勾当的报道,很好地描述了特定公司通往白宫的门道是如何推动结果的。通信委员会3:2的投票结果,以及2名共和党挖苦式地发表少数意见,正说明了这一监管的党派政治本质。 Alas, the internet is all moving to Washington. Uber hired, straight from the Administration, well known tech wizard, David Pflouffe. Given Uber’s troubles with labor law — a California court recently ruling that its contractors are employees — and taxi regulation throughout the U.S., investing in politics is good business for Uber. 可叹的是,网络公司都向华盛顿涌来。优步直接从政府雇佣了著名的科技巫师大卫·普罗夫。鉴于优步面临的劳动法方面的麻烦(一家加州法庭最近裁定它旗下的合约司机是正式雇员)和在全美出租车法规面前遭遇的麻烦,投资于政治对它来说是一笔好生意。 Campaign finance 竞选筹款 Campaign finance law and regulation is all about restricting freedom of speech and altering who wins elections. So one should not be surprised about its political use to restrict freedom of speech and alter who wins elections. 竞选筹款的法律法规就是关于限制言论自由和改变胜选人的。所以对于它被政治性的用来限制言论自由和改变胜选人也不应感到意外。 Still, the recent trend is more troubling than usual. 但尽管如此,最近的趋势仍比往常更加令人不安。 Lois Lerner, director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Unit, famously derailed applications for nonprofit status from conservative groups, ahead of the 2012 Presidential election. Her main tactic was endless delay. All you need is for the election to pass. 洛伊丝·勒纳,联邦税务局免税机构部主管,在2012年总统大选前阻挠保守派团体获得非盈利性资格的申请【编注:被认定为非盈利性机构意味着其所获得的捐赠可以让捐赠者享受相应的税务豁免,按机构性质不同,豁免的可能是应税收入,也可能是应缴税额。】,并因此出名。她的主要战术就是无限期拖延。她需要的只是等到大选过去。 Scott Walker’s troubles are similarly renown. Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm filed “John Doe” probes against conservative issue advocacy groups, “blanketed conservatives with subpoenas, raided their homes and put the targets under a gag order” that they could not even reveal the fact of the investigation. It came to light, and is now in the courts, but not until well after the election. Walker won anyway, but might not have. 斯科特·沃克的麻烦也差不多出名。密尔沃基地区检察官约翰·奇瑟姆发起了一项针对保守议题倡导组织的“无名氏”调查。“给保守派人士发法庭传票来妨碍他们,突然查抄他们的家,为目标人士申请禁口令”,使得他们甚至无法揭露这些调查存在的事实。整件事直到选举之后很久才曝光,目前正在庭审阶段。不管怎样,沃克最后还是赢了,但完全可能因此而输掉。 The Administration has been pushing since 2010 to force nonprofits to disclose all donors, as campaigns must disclose contributors. It sounds innocuous: “Disclosures?” Who can be against that? Shouldn’t “big money” contributing to politics be public information? 政府自2010年以来一直在推动强令非营利组织公开捐款人,就像竞选必须公开捐助人一样。这听起来很无害。“公开”?谁敢反对?难道捐助政治的“大钱”不应该成为公开信息吗? Not when the vast power of the regulatory state can come down on whomever it wants to. Tyrannies always start by making lists. Nixon at least had to compile his own enemies list. 当监管型国家的权力触角可以伸到它希望的任何人时,就不应该了。暴政都是从列名单开始的。尼克松至少还需要自己动手编列一份政敌名单。 Snowden 斯诺登 The Snowden affair taught us some important lessons about our government. The NSA collected phone call “metadata.” Well, it’s just who called who and not the content of phone calls (unless you call abroad), you may say. 斯诺登事件教给我们一些关于我们政府的重要教训。国家安全局收集电话“元数据”。你也许会说,只是谁打给谁,又不是电话的内容(除非打到国外)。 But even metadata is revealing. Suppose you called three cancer doctors, alcoholics anonymous, and two divorce lawyers. And you want to run for the senate. That kind of information is political dynamite. 但即使是元数据信息量也很大。假设你打给了三个癌症医生,匿名戒酒会和两个离婚律师。你还想要竞选参议员。这些信息在政治上就是爆炸性的。 The NSA has the content, not just metadata, of any emails that go abroad. The NSA likely has many Hilary Clinton’s missing emails. And Jeb Bushes’. Unless neither has ever written an email that rises to the embarrassment level of Mitt Romney’s 47% remark, the information to sink either campaign is likely sitting on NSA computers. 国安局掌握着发往国外的任何邮件的内容,不仅仅是元数据。国安局里很可能有很多希拉里·克林顿的失踪邮件。以及杰布·布什的。除非两人写过的邮件没有一封能达到罗姆尼47%言论【译注:罗姆尼2012年曾经在私下场合表示,有47%的选民无论如何都会选奥巴马,他们相信政府对他们有责任、有义务。罗姆尼表示自己不需要去担心这些人】的尴尬程度,否则击沉任意一个候选人的信息就在国安局的电脑里。 That information would never leak out, you say? Snowden proves the opposite. Any piece of information on a government computer is one Snowden, one Lois Lerner, or one Chinese hacker away from a twitter feed. 你说什么?信息永远不会泄露?斯诺登证明了信息会泄露。政府电脑里的任何信息离推特信息都只有一个斯诺登、一个洛伊丝·勒纳或者一个中国黑客的距离。 John Oliver’s Snowden interview contained an interesting revelation. The internet is an amazing thing. What do Americans do with it? They send around pictures of their private parts. And NSA employees regularly pass the pictures around to great hilarity. 约翰·奥利弗对斯诺登的采访披露了一个有意思的情节。网络是个奇妙的东西。美国人用它来干什么呢?他们到处发送自己私处的照片。而国安局职员经常传阅这些照片来取乐。 E-Verify 电子查证 As part of most immigration deals we are likely to see strong enforcement of the right of employees to work via e-verify. Every single human being who wishes to work in the United States must ask for the ex-ante permission the Federal Government. 作为绝大多数移民政策的一部分,我们可能会看到,借助电子查证,有关雇员工作权的法规得到了强有力实施。每个想在美国工作的人都必须征得联邦政府的事先准许。 Leave aside here the obvious question how the same government that runs the Obamacare website, and, as I write, has had all visa applications to the U.S. shut down for two weeks due to hardware failures, will manage this. Let’s focus on the political implications. 一个运营着奥巴马医改网站的政府,一个因为硬件故障关闭所有签证申请达两周的政府,如何能够管理电子查证?这里先别管这个明显的问题,我们把焦点集中到政治影响上吧。 This power will naturally expand. First, people without proper immigration documents. But once in place, why only enforce immigration laws? Already there are a long list of laws governing who can work and when and where. People must have the right licenses, the right background checks, union memberships and so on. Are you guilty in the latest SEC which hunt? E-verify can really make sure you never work in finance again, not so much as a bank teller. Or that a conviction for violating the endangered species act keeps you out of the work force. 这一权力会自然延伸。首先是没有正当移民文件的人。但是电子查证一旦到位,为什么只用来执行移民法呢?已经有一长串的法律管理着谁可以工作以及什么时候在哪儿工作。人们必须要有正确的执照、正确的背景审查、工会会员身份等等。在证券交易委员会最近的一次政治迫害中你有罪吗?电子查证可以确保你再也不能从事金融业,即使是银行柜员也不行。或者一项威胁濒危物种的行为的定罪,也可以把你隔离在劳动力市场之外。 Every tyranny controls its citizens by controlling their right to work. Do we really want every American who wants employment to have to ask for the ex-ante permission of the Federal Government of Edward Snowden and Lois Lerner? 任何暴政都通过控制公民的工作权来控制公民。我们真的希望每个想要工作的人都必需事先征得一个由爱德华·斯诺登和洛伊丝·勒纳组成的联邦政府的许可吗? Transactions 交易 We have lost the right to transact privately in the terror and drug wars. The right to political dissent requires the ability to speak freely and privately; the right to earn a living despite political opposition; and the right to transact in private. All three are vanishing. 我们已经在反恐和禁毒战争中失去了私下交易的权利。政治异见的权利要求人们能够自由和私密地表达的可能性,政治反对者仍能谋生的权利,以及私下交易的权利。这三种权利都在消失。 You may have reveled in the ending of Stephen King’s Shawshank Redemption, in which the hero takes cash out of banks and heads to Mexico. Under today’s banking laws, that could no longer happen. 你也许很喜欢史蒂夫·金的《肖申克的救赎》的结尾,男主角从银行取出钱,前往墨西哥。在今天的银行法律下,这一幕再也不会发生了。 As a recent political example, Dennis Hastert was recently indictedf or violating the spirit of the $10,000 limit on bank withdrawals, by withdrawing amounts just shy of the limit. Hastert wanted the money, apparently, to pay blackmail to someone with an embarrassing personal secret. 最近的一个政治例子是,丹尼斯·哈斯特尔特最近因违背银行取款不超过10,000美元的宗旨而受到起诉。他取出的额度恰好略低于限额。原来,哈斯特尔特需要钱去支付某人利用其尴尬的私人秘密所进行的勒索。 Hastert is retired. But should aspiring politicians really have no privacy in their personal transactions? 哈斯特尔特退休了。但是有抱负的政客在私人交易中就真的没有任何隐私吗? Education 教育 As Daniel Henninger put it: 正如丹尼尔·海宁格所说: ...historians of the new system will cite the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights’ 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter on sexual harassment as the watershed event. “新系统下的历史学家会将教育部民权办公室2011年关于性骚扰的致同僚信作为分水岭事件。” This letter—not even a formal regulation—forced creation of quasi-judicial systems of sexual-abuse surveillance on every campus in America. The universities complied for fear of lawsuits from enforcers at the Departments of Education and Justice. 这封信,甚至都不是一个正式的法规,但其强制建立了一个准司法体系,监视美国每一个校园的性侵害。大学都遵守这一要求,因为怕惹上教育部和司法部的官司。 The Justice Department’s Special Litigation Section and Housing and Civil Enforcement Section have forced numerous settlements from police departments, school districts, jails and housing agencies. Whatever the merits, the locals know the price of resisting Justice is too high. 司法部的特殊诉讼处及住房和民事执法处已经强制和解了好几起来自警察局、学区、监狱和住房机构的案件。不管是不是在法律上站得住脚,当地人知道抵抗司法部的成本太高。 National Review’s coverageof Laura Kipinis’ travails is a good example of the political use of this regulation. Professor Kipinis “wrote a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education arguing that college campuses are in a state of ‘sexual paranoia.’” She quickly became the subject of a “Title IX inquisition,” documented in her essayby that name. Though eventually cleared, the point is the use of regulatory power to silence speech. 《国家评论》对劳拉·吉普尼斯的痛苦经历的报道是这项监管被政治利用的一个好例子。吉普尼斯教授“在《高等教育纪事报》上写了一篇专栏,表示大学校园正处于一种‘性受迫害妄想狂’的状态”。她很快成为了“第九条调查”的对象,她在一篇文章里用的就是这个词。尽管最终洗清了嫌疑,重点是利用监管权力压制了言论。 3.A Magna Carta for the Regulatory State 3.为监管型国家寻求一部大宪章 The power of the regulatory state has increased steadily. And it lacks many of the checks and balances that give us some “rule of law” in the legal system. (A system which has its own troubles.) The clear danger we face is the use of regulation for political control. Each industry gets carved up into a few compliant oligopolies. And the threat of severe penalties, with little of the standard rule-of-law recourse, keeps people and businesses in line and supporting the political organization or party that controls the agencies. 监管型国家的权力已持续增长。它缺少了很多在法律体系(该体系也面临着自己的麻烦)里给我们带来一些“法治”的制衡。我们面对的最明显的危险,就是利用监管实现政治控制。每个行业都若干顺服的寡头所瓜分。严厉处罚的威胁,以及法治援助标准的缺失,让个人和公司对控制着监管机构的政治组织或政党既保持服从,又提供支持。 We’re not there yet. The Koch Brothers are not on the EPA “crucifixion” list, an investigation of every plant they own, or probes by the DOJ, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, and so on and so on. They could be. The Hoover institution retains its tax-exempt status despite writings such as this one. A free media still exists, and I can read all my horror stories in the morning Wall Street Journal, and the free (for now) internet. 我们还没到那一步。科赫兄弟公司还不在环境保护署的“钉死”名单上,他们旗下的工厂没有被逐一调查,也没有被司法部、国家劳动关系委员会、公平就业机会委员会、职业安全与健康管理局等等调查。但他们可能成为调查对象。胡佛研究所仍保有免税资格,尽管发表了类似于这篇文章的东西。自由媒体依然存在,每天早上我仍可在《华尔街日报》上读到各种恐怖故事。互联网(目前)也还是自由的。 But we are getting there. What stops it from happening? A tree ripe for picking will be picked. 但是我们正滑向那里。什么能够阻止它发生呢?一颗易于采摘的树最终会被采摘的。 The easy answers are too easy. “Get rid of regulations” is true, but simplistic like “get rid of laws.” What we learned in the 800 years since Magna Carta is that the character of law, and the detailed structures of its operation that matter. Law is good, as it protects citizens from arbitrary power. 简单的回答过于简单了。“取消监管”是真的,但和“取消法律”一样太过简化。大宪章以来的800年,我们学到的一样东西就是法律的特征以及它运作的详细架构很重要。法律是好的,因为它保护公民免于专断的权力。 It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one. 是时候为监管型国家起草一部大宪章了。规章需要按照我之前列的几点来制定。人们需要有挑战监管者的权利:证据开示权、对判决提出异议的权利、上诉权。是的,这就意味着制衡的场所在法庭。人人都恨律师,除了自己需要一个的时候。 People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor. 人们需要速决的权利。一个针对规章的“人身保护令”会起作用:如果任何裁决未在6个月内作出,则自动视为有利于你。 A return to economic growth depends on reforming the regulatory state. But the deeper and perhaps more important preservation of our political freedom depends on it even more. 经济的重新增长依赖于改革监管型国家,但从更深层或许也更重要的意义上说,我们政治自由的存续甚至更加依赖于这一改革。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

刑讯与战俘

【2015-07-03】

@whigzhou: 发表了文章 刑讯逼供与刑求情报的差别 《纽时》:参院周二投票禁止刑讯逼供,将采取措施确保政府不再利用水刑一类的审问技巧。参议员们以78票对21票的结果通过了国防授权议案的一项修正案,据此,包括军方在内的任何政府机构将只能使用《陆军战地手册》所载的审问技巧。

@sonicblue_nju2: 战俘这个推理不行。战俘总归会持有一些你不知道的话将来会对你方造成损害的情报,越高级的知道越多。不能把隐瞒这类情报当作犯罪。

@whigzhou: 区分关键是威胁的直接、显明和急迫,这与自力救济的前提类似,何种条件下我可以拔枪击毙对我构成威胁的攻击者?(more...)

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【2015-07-03】 @whigzhou: 发表了文章 刑讯逼供与刑求情报的差别 《纽时》:参院周二投票禁止刑讯逼供,将采取措施确保政府不再利用水刑一类的审问技巧。参议员们以78票对21票的结果通过了国防授权议案的一项修正案,据此,包括军方在内的任何政府机构将只能使用《陆军战地手册》所载的审问技巧。 @sonicblue_nju2: 战俘这个推理不行。战俘总归会持有一些你不知道的话将来会对你方造成损害的情报,越高级的知道越多。不能把隐瞒这类情报当作犯罪。 @whigzhou: 区分关键是威胁的直接、显明和急迫,这与自力救济的前提类似,何种条件下我可以拔枪击毙对我构成威胁的攻击者? @whigzhou: 我们不能以一条规则在语言表述上的模糊,否认这条规则的有效性,不然的话,没多少法律规则有资格保存下来,表述模糊性对大陆法才是问题,在普通法程序机制下不是问题 @whigzhou: 在有关淫秽品的诉讼历史上,不断有人要求法官/法学家对淫秽给出一个精确定义,也确实有不少人接招尝试了,但没有一个定义找不到直觉上的反例,最后一位大法官说:(大意)我给不出精确定义,但你拿给我看我就说得出算不算淫秽。我觉得这位法官抓住了语言学的一个要点。 @sentimental-fog:抓到了敌方的高级将领,由于他掌握的许多情报都会对我方造成持续的伤害,所以我们一直对他用刑? @whigzhou: 有关战俘,我举的例子是定时炸弹,不是情报,后者是针对恐怖分子的例子,对前者采用更严格的标准,是因为这么做可以保护被对方俘虏的我方战士 @whigzhou: 正是基于后一种考虑,我们订立了《日内瓦公约》,而恐怖分子没有加入公约,故我们针对他们的行动不受其约束 @whigzhou: 按《日内瓦公约》,被俘者必须报出国籍、姓名、番号,供对方确认其隶属于立约国军队,才能享受其保护,恐怖分子显然做不到这一点 @Ghostmarine: ……但是,请注意,实际上,刑讯逼供出错的概率相当高。曾经有个人被怀疑是恐怖分子,关在关塔那摩很多年,严刑拷问,最后才发现是当局搞错了。这或许正是法律上严禁刑讯逼供的道理:根本没那么管用。 @whigzhou: 嗯,这是个经验问题,争议各方可以在法庭上举证说服法官/陪审团 @rjxghg:善待俘虏与平民的条款与某些日内瓦公约条款(例如禁止达姆弹)不同,后者只是双方的约定,一方违约另一方可以报复。前者不是约定而是某种具有绝对效力的条款。若说只有订约国才有义务遵循,那内战叛军怎么办? @whigzhou: 日内瓦公约只是约束我们行动的规范之一,我们还受其他伦理规范约束,但标准不同 @whigzhou: 若报复有效,且这是保护我方共同体成员的最有利方案,那当然要报复,实际上我们可能选择不报复,那是因为:1)对方政权根本不在乎平民伤亡,2)这不是最佳方案,3)有其他选择时,共同体成员不喜欢这么做 @whigzhou: 法外之人不受保护,但我们也不会任意虐待他们,这不是因为我们承认他们拥有自然权利,而是因为需要顾及本共同体成员的感受,其原理和反对虐待动物一样  
偷听来的羞辱可以要求赔偿吗?

【2015-06-26】

@勿怪幸 2013年,维吉尼亚州一男子在接受结肠镜检查时偷偷打开了手机的录音。在他被麻醉后,麻醉师和GI医生嘲笑他怕打针,胆小,笨,阴茎上有一个红斑,是“梅毒或结核”等。于是将俩医生告了。周二陪审团判赔偿他50万美元,20万为医疗失职,5万为梅毒的羞辱,5万为结核羞辱,20万为惩罚。http://weibo.com/1878363622/CoiP2EaKS

@whigzhou: 我不同意这个判决,两位医生的言论属于密室交谈,麻醉状态也(more...)

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【2015-06-26】 @勿怪幸 2013年,维吉尼亚州一男子在接受结肠镜检查时偷偷打开了手机的录音。在他被麻醉后,麻醉师和GI医生嘲笑他怕打针,胆小,笨,阴茎上有一个红斑,是“梅毒或结核”等。于是将俩医生告了。周二陪审团判赔偿他50万美元,20万为医疗失职,5万为梅毒的羞辱,5万为结核羞辱,20万为惩罚。http://weibo.com/1878363622/CoiP2EaKS @whigzhou: 我不同意这个判决,两位医生的言论属于密室交谈,麻醉状态也排除了“当面羞辱”这一要件,而改变该言论之伦理性质的,正是原告故意打开手机这一行动,其责任不应由被告承担 @慕容飞宇gg:很难说是密室交谈,这是工作场所。不算公共场所,但也不是私人空间。不管怎么说,病人本人是有访问权的。当然,病人是否有权偷录,另当别论。不过,病人被麻醉这一场景特殊,可能法官认为以往的判例不适用了。 @whigzhou: 要点是,两位医生是否可以合理的假定这些话不会被病人听到,因而不会对他造成伤害 @whigzhou: 伤害是侵权的要件,而合理的预见到伤害可能性,是侵权责任的要件  
巫术与侵权

【2015-06-12】

@whigzhou: 假设某一社会的成员普遍相信“针扎布偶”这种巫术确实可以加害于人,现在某甲对某乙施行了这一巫术,且证据确凿,而你是被大英帝国派去那里的法官,你完全不信此类巫术的效力,那么,当乙诉甲侵权时,你是否会裁定甲侵犯了乙?或者,你是否认为乙的诉讼理由可以成立,因而至少可以立案?

 

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【2015-06-12】 @whigzhou: 假设某一社会的成员普遍相信“针扎布偶”这种巫术确实可以加害于人,现在某甲对某乙施行了这一巫术,且证据确凿,而你是被大英帝国派去那里的法官,你完全不信此类巫术的效力,那么,当乙诉甲侵权时,你是否会裁定甲侵犯了乙?或者,你是否认为乙的诉讼理由可以成立,因而至少可以立案?  
[微言]同性婚姻、契约及其它

【2015-05-23】

@我讲旧常识: 同性婚姻是否 “合法” 的问题也就两种思路。认为婚姻仅是法律事件,同性婚姻并没有对异性恋产生暴力/经济危害,没有什么理由不合法。如果你认为 “婚姻” 不仅是法律契约,而是宗教传统,那么唯一自洽的结论也就是根据政教分离原则法律没资格规定婚姻。

@whigzhou: 前半句不同意

@whigzhou: 假如婚姻契约的内容都是双方个别议定的,那是没什么好争,但婚姻契约是一种典型的俗成契约(conventional contract),其条款涵盖的责任非常广泛,而这些条款通常不是个别议定的,而是俗成的、默会的,这样,司法系统便需要辨明一项特定的关系是(more...)

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【2015-05-23】 @我讲旧常识: 同性婚姻是否 “合法” 的问题也就两种思路。认为婚姻仅是法律事件,同性婚姻并没有对异性恋产生暴力/经济危害,没有什么理由不合法。如果你认为 “婚姻” 不仅是法律契约,而是宗教传统,那么唯一自洽的结论也就是根据政教分离原则法律没资格规定婚姻。 @whigzhou: 前半句不同意 @whigzhou: 假如婚姻契约的内容都是双方个别议定的,那是没什么好争,但婚姻契约是一种典型的俗成契约(conventional contract),其条款涵盖的责任非常广泛,而这些条款通常不是个别议定的,而是俗成的、默会的,这样,司法系统便需要辨明一项特定的关系是否应被归入此类契约而加以保护。 @我讲旧常识: 俗成契约不是契约,就是习俗。 @whigzhou: 听上去你对习俗与法律之间关系的看法和我的很不一样,你似乎认为两者是相互替代的:只要法律把规则讲清楚了,便无须再问习俗是什么,而我认为:法律是对习俗的澄清和肯定,并赋予其强制性,法律永远(经由司法过程)追随着习俗而演变,并非在替代它 @我讲旧常识: 抱歉,此微博已被删除。查看帮助:O网页链接 @whigzhou: 这件事,在我看来即是“习俗首先演变,然后法律(在滞后相当长时间之后)跟着改变”的一个例子,具体而言,习俗已不再将性义务列为婚姻契约的默认条款,而司法系统在这一变化发生了很久之后,加以澄清和确认。 @我讲旧常识: 我的意思是:法律的语·言·和习俗的语·言·不同。一切习俗中 “默会” 的在法律上都必须明确,如果这种 “明确化” 导致了荒谬的结论,就只·能·说·明·习·俗·本·身·是·坏·的。 @whigzhou: 嗯,这样我们的分歧就小多了,问题是这里似乎没有什么荒谬的地方 @whigzhou: 这就好比,习俗已经对收养关系规定了一些义务,其中得到司法系统肯定的部分变成了收养法,然后某一天,某甲宣布与某乙建立收养关系,并主张这一关系得到法律保护,但别人反对说:某乙明明是成年人啊,收养契约不该适用于成年人之间,我看不出这里有什么荒谬的 @我讲旧常识: 衡量习俗本身是否荒谬,就只能以习俗之外的标准。同性婚姻既然不在暴力/经济上歧视异性恋,影响也就只是审美观感上的。如果仅因审美就能判定其不合法,那么同样的逻辑《小苹果》的作者早该拉出去毙了。我觉得这已经荒谬了 @whigzhou: 看来起,这一荒谬观感似乎混淆了反对同性关系和反对同性婚姻 @whigzhou: 再好比:若一对同性恋人宣称他们之间的同居关系是一种雇佣关系,理应按雇佣法得到保护,于是一群人站出来反对,这算荒谬吗? @人格显示器:如果他们是雇佣关系,那是应该受到雇佣法的保护呀 @whigzhou: 嗯,但如果他们进一步主张一条一般性原则:同性恋人的同居关系都应被默认的视为一种雇佣关系,呢?  
[微言]民权法和歧视

【2014-09-23】

@段宇宏 《从FBI与马丁·路德·金的点滴说起》:上篇——马丁·路德·金与FBI恩怨;中篇——美帝图森破图样;下篇——有幸福也有悲剧的结局。不是介绍美国黑人民权运动史,而是围绕金与FBI的话题澄清诸多庞杂的背景:FBI为个么调查金、金的私德丑闻如何看待、FBI局长胡佛为什么忧虑、金的事业哪些值得肯定和否定

@whigzhou: 好文,不过依我看民权运动无论从哪方面看都算不上什么进步,它就像泼进法律系统的一瓶硫酸,其腐蚀作用至今仍在继续

@阿卜杜拉法耶 辉格老师能把这个观点说的详细一些么

@whigzhou: 1)民权运动向法律体系塞进了一条无法(more...)

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【2014-09-23】 @段宇宏 《从FBI与马丁·路德·金的点滴说起》:上篇——马丁·路德·金与FBI恩怨;中篇——美帝图森破图样;下篇——有幸福也有悲剧的结局。不是介绍美国黑人民权运动史,而是围绕金与FBI的话题澄清诸多庞杂的背景:FBI为个么调查金、金的私德丑闻如何看待、FBI局长胡佛为什么忧虑、金的事业哪些值得肯定和否定 @whigzhou: 好文,不过依我看民权运动无论从哪方面看都算不上什么进步,它就像泼进法律系统的一瓶硫酸,其腐蚀作用至今仍在继续 @阿卜杜拉法耶 辉格老师能把这个观点说的详细一些么 @whigzhou: 1)民权运动向法律体系塞进了一条无法自洽的原则,造成连绵不绝的混乱,2)它对人性提出了不可能满足的高要求,从而腐蚀了正义感 @whigzhou: 在第一点上,民权法很像反垄断法,造成一种“你怎么做都可能错”的局面,第二点则像灵魂审判,提出了一个既不现实也不合理的道德标准,文化/族群歧视是人类在复杂社会中得以存身处事的基本手段,根本不可能消除,也没有理由要求人们消除。 @whigzhou: 宣称自己不歧视的人,要么没有认真反思过这个问题,仍处于懵懂状态,要么不诚实 @whigzhou: 当然,表现得好像不歧视,则是另一码事,那可能处于交往礼节的考虑,避免冒犯和冲突,这当然是值得赞赏的,但民权法恰恰是要在这一点上鼓励各方撕破脸皮 @whigzhou: “不歧视”这句话反过来说就是“毫无偏爱”,你不歧视任何文化的意思就是你不偏爱任何文化,也不对任何族群(比其他族群)有更多好感 @whigzhou: 你不能既认为“法语最最好听”,同时又否认“德语比法语难听”,当然你可以避免把后一句话说出口,只是出于礼貌 @图卢兹伯爵陈毓秀:辉总,我兹词歧视,但从定义上讲歧视的反面或许不应该是无所偏爱,因为在日常语境里歧视有很明显的贬义色彩,而偏爱既可以用于褒义,也可以是贬义,乃至中立。 @whigzhou: 我不太关心一个词是褒义还是贬义,只要指称对象差不多,换用无妨,我看不出歧视和偏爱所指称的行为集有什么差别 @whigzhou: 同一类行为,不应该因为被两个褒贬色彩不同的词所指称,而得到不同的道德评价,对吧? @whigzhou: 当然,可以想象,有人会认为“歧视”和“偏爱”所指称的行为集不同,比如歧视是蕴含了负面评价的,而偏爱则可以不涉及任何负面评价,但平权法中“歧视”一词显然不必蕴含负面评价,比如雇主在其他信息相同时,总是不雇佣黑人而雇佣白人,并不能由此推定其对黑人有负面评价。 @whigzhou: 他完全可能只是认为:其他信息相同时,我选择雇佣白人,得到一个好雇员的机会更大,这并不排除同时他相信,这些黑人应聘者也很优秀,相信A比B更优秀,并不排除同时相信B也很优秀 @whigzhou: 就是说,在平权法中,只要你在实际选择中表现出了对某群体的偏爱,你就被认为歧视了其他群体,符合我对歧视一词的解读  
[微言]神裁与决斗

【2014-09-06】

@whigzhou: 写了《The Bontoc Igorot》的读书笔记 “几种神裁法,其中唾液测试是我见过最有希望得到科学支持的古代测谎法,鸡胆测试则好像只是为已经决定的裁..” http://t.cn/Rhb8tMV

@陈乃章:比武审判应该是最令人信服的。

@whigzhou: 何以见得?决斗和各种神裁一样,都不追求实质正义,起初只是一种了断冲突的方式,用来将伤害限制在直接冲突的个人之间,避免个人冲突(more...)

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【2014-09-06】 @whigzhou: 写了《The Bontoc Igorot》的读书笔记 “几种神裁法,其中唾液测试是我见过最有希望得到科学支持的古代测谎法,鸡胆测试则好像只是为已经决定的裁..” http://t.cn/Rhb8tMV @陈乃章:比武审判应该是最令人信服的。 @whigzhou: 何以见得?决斗和各种神裁一样,都不追求实质正义,起初只是一种了断冲突的方式,用来将伤害限制在直接冲突的个人之间,避免个人冲突发展为血仇循环,决斗的最好结果是一死一完,最坏结果是两死,更多是一死一伤,制度成本比神裁高,看不出有什么优点 @whigzhou: 从激励机制看,决斗事先赋予善斗者以优势,会鼓励他们更轻易侵犯他人,而各种神裁法的设计都旨在消除此类激励  
[微言]成文规则

【2014-07-28】

@somebody: 抱歉,此微博已被作者删除。查看帮助:http://t.cn/zWSudZc

@段宇宏:很多人光看书名容易施予太多“中国特色”溢美之词,如“高瞻远瞩”,“宏图伟业”……其实美国制宪会议一是对建国前十年“纠左”,二是就像十几个小家庭要凑一起过日子,各家派几个会计算细账,很琐碎很计较很庸俗,没有建立强大国家和人间天堂的宏伟蓝图。

@whigzhou: 对

@whigzhou: 其实任何成文规则在实际裁决中被援引几次之前,谁都不知道那到底是什么

@whigzho(more...)

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【2014-07-28】 @somebody: 抱歉,此微博已被作者删除。查看帮助:http://t.cn/zWSudZc @段宇宏:很多人光看书名容易施予太多“中国特色”溢美之词,如“高瞻远瞩”,“宏图伟业”……其实美国制宪会议一是对建国前十年“纠左”,二是就像十几个小家庭要凑一起过日子,各家派几个会计算细账,很琐碎很计较很庸俗,没有建立强大国家和人间天堂的宏伟蓝图。 @whigzhou: 对 @whigzhou: 其实任何成文规则在实际裁决中被援引几次之前,谁都不知道那到底是什么 @whigzhou: 比如,若从字面看,权利法案中最重要的是第九修正案,这是个兜底条款,确认了美国人到那时为止已经拥有的所有权利,后来各种政府管制和立法限制(除非另有修正案支持)其实都可以用这条来挑战,但实际上很少被用到 @whigzhou: 按第九修正案的字面“本意”,美国人到那时为止有权做的事情,除非另有修正案加以限制,都永远继续有权去做,所以,为持枪权辩护根本不需要援引第二修正案,也就省得为“民兵”的含义而争论,只须证明美国人在1791年之前拥有持枪权即可。 @姚斯道:但第二与第九修正案的生效时间为同一日,其可视作在原有权利上以法律文本来加以定义与约束, @whigzhou: A2肯定性的列举了一项权利,A9说肯定性列举不能被理解为对未列举权利的否定,剩下的你自己推导 @whigzhou: 当然,我并不认为A9在实际宪法规范中对应着这样一条规则,所以我说成文规则的现实含义不能从字面看 @姚斯道:另外辉总的观点这也无法解释在赫勒一案中拥枪派甚至搬出威廉布拉克斯通的著作和17世纪新教徒的书籍作为参考文献来论证而没有直接引用第九修正案作为论据 @whigzhou: 我的观点好像不排除辩护者援引任何东西  
[微言]植物孕妇的丈夫

【2014-01-15】

@货币大叔 伦理题:美德州女子,昏迷入院,脑死亡,仅靠生命支持设备维持。其腹中孕20周胎儿。女子曾与丈夫预定如若病重不做无谓治疗,故丈夫希望医院取消妻子的支持设备。医院不允,依据是德州法律不允许孕妇自决是否接受医疗。怎么看?@fufuji97 @whigzhou @布尔费墨 @李子暘 @BigChubbyCat @粤鞅 @加西亚三世

@whigzhou: 首先要认定一个医学事实:胎儿有多大希望健康生下来?和一个法律事实:在德州,20周的胎儿是否具有主体资格?如果这两个问题的回答都是肯定的,(more...)

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【2014-01-15】 @货币大叔 伦理题:美德州女子,昏迷入院,脑死亡,仅靠生命支持设备维持。其腹中孕20周胎儿。女子曾与丈夫预定如若病重不做无谓治疗,故丈夫希望医院取消妻子的支持设备。医院不允,依据是德州法律不允许孕妇自决是否接受医疗。怎么看?@fufuji97 @whigzhou @布尔费墨 @李子暘 @BigChubbyCat @粤鞅 @加西亚三世 @whigzhou: 首先要认定一个医学事实:胎儿有多大希望健康生下来?和一个法律事实:在德州,20周的胎儿是否具有主体资格?如果这两个问题的回答都是肯定的,那么胎儿的父亲就有责任让胎儿维持生命并获得生下来的机会。 @whigzhou: 假如这一责任成立,那么该责任大概不应被允许通过破产来摆脱 @whigzhou: 当然,他可能无力承担这个责任,也得不到别人的资助,那问题就转变为:在自己的行为导致一个胎儿产生之前,他是否有责任确保自己有能力承担未来的抚养责任? @whigzhou: 如果有,那么接下去的问题是:像“因为胎儿母亲变成植物人而产生无力负担的抚养费用”这样的风险,是不是事先可以合理预期到并有成本合理的手段(比如购买保险)加以防范? @看这片云:对于死人生孩子这个事情从伦理上怎么看呢?美国是认为脑死亡就是死了 @whigzhou: 我倒不觉得“死人生孩子”本身构成了什么伦理困难,假如技术条件允许试管婴儿直接在机器子宫里发育成熟,好像也没什么伦理上的困难 @fufuji97:哈耶克在《知名的自负》里特点提到过这个问题,他认为这种事情就属于在磨合中道德准则,我的理解是,这时候政府不要立法,而是把这种暂时性的规则,交给法院,由法官结合实际情况作出裁决 @whigzhou: 这是上一层的原则,我想原po的意思就是假如你处于法官或陪审团的位置,会如何思考  
市场、丛林和社会议价

经过一番批改,@灰鸽子银水 的作业总算变得清楚一些,可以讨论下去了。

原来他说的议价(原话是“你给我多少钱?”)是指“社会议价”,意思是:在结果尚未明朗的政治进程中,利益相关的各方施展各种手段,去影响该进程的走向,以图让该进程最终得出一个有利于自己的结果。(当然,从“你给我多少钱?”这句话,是很难猜到这层意思的)

社会议价是民主主义者爱用的概念,他们认为,让利益相关方都参与到政治进程中,既体现了民主原则,也可将社会冲突纳入到既有的秩序框架中得以释放,而不至于积累爆发为社会动荡和革命,最终结果即便不是各方满意,也至少比较容易服气。

确实,和秩序崩溃、革命和战争相比,要好得多,问题是,与一个良好的法治社会相比,这样的评价标准太低了,社会议价的手段各种各样,拉选票、打广告、造谣诽谤、游行静坐、堵门封路、扔燃烧瓶、(流行于法国的)软禁雇主、破坏试验田、破坏油井……其中许多毫无正当性和公正性可言,唯一可以安慰的,是其中涉及的罪恶与暴力都是零星小规模的,作为革命和战争的替代品(假如能够替代的话),相对要好一点,如此而已。

而真正可以带来公正性的社会议价机制,只有司法程序,正如我在一个帖子里曾经总结过的,它具备了我们可以期待于一种社会议价机制的全部制度功能:

(more...)

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经过一番批改,@灰鸽子银水 的作业总算变得清楚一些,可以讨论下去了。 原来他说的议价(原话是“你给我多少钱?”)是指“社会议价”,意思是:在结果尚未明朗的政治进程中,利益相关的各方施展各种手段,去影响该进程的走向,以图让该进程最终得出一个有利于自己的结果。(当然,从“你给我多少钱?”这句话,是很难猜到这层意思的) 社会议价是民主主义者爱用的概念,他们认为,让利益相关方都参与到政治进程中,既体现了民主原则,也可将社会冲突纳入到既有的秩序框架中得以释放,而不至于积累爆发为社会动荡和革命,最终结果即便不是各方满意,也至少比较容易服气。 确实,和秩序崩溃、革命和战争相比,要好得多,问题是,与一个良好的法治社会相比,这样的评价标准太低了,社会议价的手段各种各样,拉选票、打广告、造谣诽谤、游行静坐、堵门封路、扔燃烧瓶、(流行于法国的)软禁雇主、破坏试验田、破坏油井……其中许多毫无正当性和公正性可言,唯一可以安慰的,是其中涉及的罪恶与暴力都是零星小规模的,作为革命和战争的替代品(假如能够替代的话),相对要好一点,如此而已。 而真正可以带来公正性的社会议价机制,只有司法程序,正如我在一个帖子里曾经总结过的,它具备了我们可以期待于一种社会议价机制的全部制度功能:
司法程序提供了:具体而直接的利益关切与诉求者、对立的证据呈现、对等的抗辩与质证、中立的倾听者、独立于政治派系的裁决者、基于众多分散案例的试错和反馈、渐进的惯例形成、修正和废弃,而在……政治过程中,这些元素要么不存在、要么缺乏程序规范
当然,有人可能不同意我这种“司法主义”,而偏爱欧洲式的社会议价,可是,无论我们赞同何种社会议价方式,至少需要承认一点:不是什么事情都可以放到社会议价过程中去解决的,有些既已划定的边界、既已明确的权利,不能随便被拿去议价,即便有人吵着要这么做也不行,否则就没完没了,没有权利保障可言了。 所以我举了炒菜的例子,在家炒菜是早已确立的权利,尽管这么做确实提高了邻居遭受火灾的风险,但因为我有权利这么做,所以他只能承受这样的风险。 不过看来灰鸽子误解了这个例子的意思,那我就说得更清楚一些吧。 当我们谈论“讨价还价”时,可能涉及三种情况: 1)市场议价:此时交易标的物的权利归属明确,且议价双方共同认可,需要商量的只是价格,比如我去菜场买西瓜,我和摊主都同意现在这个西瓜是属于他的,而需要付钱的是我; 2)丛林议价:权利归属不明确,或权利归属原本明确,但其中一方无视该权利,议价结果由双方实力对比和偏好决定,与权利状态无关,比如绑匪与被绑者家属的议价; 3)社会议价:旨在通过议价过程,从权利不明确状态中得出一个明确的权利归属结论;(按我的观点,唯一公正的社会议价机制就是司法程序,不过,为了讨论继续,可以把其他机制也包括在内) 所以,社会议价只能运用于权利不明确状态,如果权利本来已经明确,你还提出议价,那就是无视既有权利,转变成丛林议价(俗话叫耍流氓)了。 那么,转基因争议是怎么回事?考虑到转基因争议涉及好几个不同问题,首先要明确你谈论的是哪一个,起初灰鸽子的核电站类比让我以为他说的是消费者的安全担忧,不过后来他说,如果脑筋正常的话应该理解他指的其实是有机农场经营者所面临的损失。 可是,经营者担忧自己的生意因为其他竞争者的进入而受损,并不是阻止他人进入这个行业的正当理由,至少在行会权利早已瓦解的当代是如此,这和开餐馆的道理完全一样,怕别人抢了你家餐馆的生意,不是阻止别人开餐馆的正当理由,这件事不能拿来进行社会议价,你硬要堵在人家店门口,跟人讨价还价,说咱们算算你该赔我多少钱我才能答应你开店,这当然是流氓做法,这种议价只能叫做丛林议价。  
[微言]连体人

【2013-11-22】

@绿狗网 关于“连体婴”的若干思考:一、身份证该登记谁的?二、如果两人争着使用左手,这时谁侵犯了谁的合法权利?三、坐公交、地铁,要刷几次卡?四、二人分持有两国国籍,哥哥出国,弟弟跟着去,算违法行为么?五、连体婴这一群体,是否会改变自助餐业的行业格局? @whigzhou @鹦鹉史航 @王小山

@whigzhou: 1)两个意志,两个ID;

@whigzhou: 2)我不太了解连体婴儿的肢体运动控制机制,如果像你说的是竞争性的,那么手就(more...)

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【2013-11-22】 @绿狗网 关于“连体婴”的若干思考:一、身份证该登记谁的?二、如果两人争着使用左手,这时谁侵犯了谁的合法权利?三、坐公交、地铁,要刷几次卡?四、二人分持有两国国籍,哥哥出国,弟弟跟着去,算违法行为么?五、连体婴这一群体,是否会改变自助餐业的行业格局? @whigzhou @鹦鹉史航 @王小山 @whigzhou: 1)两个意志,两个ID; @whigzhou: 2)我不太了解连体婴儿的肢体运动控制机制,如果像你说的是竞争性的,那么手就是他们的共有物,他们最好达成某种协议来分配使用机会,也就是明确权利,否则就不可避免的陷入公地悲剧,这种情况下没有权利被侵犯,因为不存在落实到个体的权利; @whigzhou: 3)服务提供商说了算,如果我是服务商,免票; @whigzhou: 4)首先要问这个国家的边境控制是否合法,如果合法,那么你说的行为是否合法就视该法律如何规定而定,不过在我看来,目前没有任何国家的边境控制是合法的; @whigzhou: 5)不会,这个群体这么小,改变不了什么;  
[饭文]转基因标注争议中的法律经济学

(按:抱歉最近写作状态不好,很没条理,好像没说清楚,以后有机会再说一遍)

转基因标注争议中的法律经济学
辉格
2013年11月19日

近来,政策当局的一些动作似乎表明,其对待转基因粮食的政策已有所松动,这一迹象,也让转基因这个多年来争吵不休的话题再度热了起来;从农业技术的角度看,像中国这样还不怎么富裕的人口大国,转基因农业成为主流恐怕是无法避免的,非转基因食品将越来越成为只有少数人才负担得起的奢侈品。

这样,未来的争议焦点,将转向看待转基因的两种截然相反的价值观如何在一个社会共存的问题,而反转阵营的诉求重点,大概也会从封锁围堵转向监管和标注方面,要求政府强化监管,并主张转基因食品制造(more...)

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4701
(按:抱歉最近写作状态不好,很没条理,好像没说清楚,以后有机会再说一遍) 转基因标注争议中的法律经济学 辉格 2013年11月19日 近来,政策当局的一些动作似乎表明,其对待转基因粮食的政策已有所松动,这一迹象,也让转基因这个多年来争吵不休的话题再度热了起来;从农业技术的角度看,像中国这样还不怎么富裕的人口大国,转基因农业成为主流恐怕是无法避免的,非转基因食品将越来越成为只有少数人才负担得起的奢侈品。 这样,未来的争议焦点,将转向看待转基因的两种截然相反的价值观如何在一个社会共存的问题,而反转阵营的诉求重点,大概也会从封锁围堵转向监管和标注方面,要求政府强化监管,并主张转基因食品制造商有法律责任做出明确标注。 一种反对向企业施加法定标注责任的意见认为,如何对商品特性进行标注,应由企业自主决定,无论是否标注,那都是企业与消费者之间的自由交易,政府和法律不应横加干涉;确实,企业自主性和自由交易理应得到保护,问题是,一桩交易的内容究竟是什么,并不总是随交易的发生而自动明确的,往往需要法律来加以澄清,假如交易内容无法确定,一旦双方发生纠纷而寻求司法救济时,就没人能知道该怎么办,法律对交易的保护也就沦为一句空话。 通常,商家会通过招牌、价目表、菜单、广告、商品包装等手段,告诉消费者他卖的是什么,以及相应的交易条件,若是重要买卖,双方还会议定更多细节,甚至签个书面协议;但所有这些都无法保证对交易内容作出完备而精确的描述,因为首先,对任何东西进行完备精确描述都是不可能的,那意味需要对整个世界进行精确描述,而这是我们的认识能力和信息手段所无法满足的,其次,我们用来描述交易内容的自然语言本身就十分模糊并充满了歧义,再次,即便我们有这样的能力,也不可能在每笔交易中都进行完备描述,因为那么做成本太高,与交易所带来的好处相比,不值得付出,所以实际的内容描述往往非常简略。 不过好在我们已经有了一些办法来应付这一信息不完备问题;首先,人们通常不需要那么精确的描述交易内容,双方在认定内容与描述是否相符时,会有一定的宽容度,比如,饭店顾客大概不会接受一份缺了鸡丁或花生的菜被称作宫保鸡丁,也不会接受直径小于两毫米的鸡肉也算鸡丁而不是肉末,但通常可以容忍里面有或没有大葱,因为有了这样的宽容度,双方对交易内容的认定不必完全一致,只要分歧没有大到引发纠纷的程度即可。 其次,存在于习俗之中的隐含约定,可以补足交易内容描述的不完备性,人们对自然语言中每个词汇的共同理解,便是这样一种习俗,语义和其它习俗一样,都是长期协调博弈过程所达成的均衡;无须明确说明,我们都知道鸡丁大概有多大,一份宫保鸡丁大概有哪些配料,同样,无须明确约定,我们都可以合理的认为,一份宫保鸡丁里不应该出现一条老鼠尾巴,其制作过程也不应添入厨师的几毫升唾液,即便那是经过高温消毒并在医学上是完全无害的。 但习俗并不总是能解决问题,尽管它是社会协调的产物,但对它的理解毕竟是主观的,高度依赖于个人的母语、文化和教育背景,而隐含约定的内容随文化和亚文化的不同而不同,在现代流动性大社会中,交易双方常拥有十分不同的文化背景,因而对交易与合约内容产生歧义和纠纷就在所难免,正因此,许多交易分歧才需要在法庭上解决。 合同法便是用来处理此类分歧的,它需要回答两个问题:在特定交易中,存在哪些理应得到遵循的习俗,这些习俗为此类交易规定了哪些隐含约定(或者叫默示条款);具体到转基因议题上,有待回答的问题就是:消费者是否可以合理的认为,在没有明确标注(或以其他方式告知)的情况下,市售食品中不会含有转基因成分? 换句话说,不应含有转基因成分,是不是食品零售交易的一项隐含约定?假如转基因是个存在已久的古老现象,那么法官的任务就只是识别是否存在相应的习俗,但实际上转基因是个新问题,很可能还没来得及形成习俗,或者几种相互竞争的习俗正在形成之中,此时法官便有了创造新规则的机会,那么,他该如何选择呢? 按法律经济学的观点,他应该遵循社会成本最小化原则,所以,假如对转基因食品进行标注的总成本低于那些忌讳转基因食品者在没有标注的情况下为识别是否转基因而付出的总代价,就应该支持法定标注责任,否则,就应让忌讳者自行负担识别成本。 实际情况如何,需要争议双方用统计数据来举证,不过,很容易想到几个影响上述两项成本的因素:转基因技术应用越广泛,跟踪转基因成分加工销售链条的难度就越大,需要标注的场合也越多,标注总成本就越高;对转基因的忌讳越普遍,识别需求就越多,忌讳者对转基因的心理抵触越强烈,识别的准确性和苛刻程度就越高,后两项都将提高识别成本;非转基因食品标注越普遍越鲜明,忌讳者的识别成本越低。 信奉自然法原则的人大概会说,法律这等神圣庄严的事情,怎么能让如此赤裸裸的功利主义算计来决定,而对于主观价值论者,这些算计中所不得不采用的客观价值标准(通常是以市场价格和货币金额来衡量)则更难以令人接受。 然而,正如波斯纳和大卫·弗里德曼等法律经济学家所指出,无论是在习俗和习惯法的自发形成中,还是在法官和陪审团对规则的权衡中,实际上通常都遵循着这样的原则,只不过多数时候人们并没有明确的意识到这一点。 法律是用来说服众人的,因而当它试图在模糊地带为行为划出边界时,必须遵循某种客观价值标准,而只有在边界既已划定之后,个人才得以在属于自己的边界之内遵循自己的主观价值而自由行事,也只有在此时,主观价值论才有了其用武之地。  
[微言]转基因与标注责任

【2013-11-13】

@whigzhou: 转基因食物要不要标注,不只关系到它是否在医学上有害,心理上的感受同样重要,道理类似于非清真食品是否需要标注,答案可由法律经济学给出:假如一个社会忌讳转基因食物的人居多,转基因食物的零售交易频率远低于非转基因食品,那就应该标注,否则就无需标注,这样,社会将更接近卡尔多-希克斯最优

@whigzhou: 类似的,一个穆斯林占多数的社会,需要标注的是非清真食品,而在穆斯林占少数的社会,则应将标注/甄别负担转移穆斯林自己,由他们自行负担标注清真食品的成本

@吴昊老是重名很无奈:感觉穆斯林人数比较好判定,完全不吃非清真的边界也很清楚。但是吃不吃转基因的意愿好像偏模糊,比如食用油采用了转基因的大豆压榨的,可能很多人能接受。但是直接的转基因大米,同样的人可能就接受不了。而且是否标注是不是只能靠立法者人为创制一种权利?

@whigzhou: 这种模糊性在法律问题中其实无处不在,司法系统(more...)

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【2013-11-13】 @whigzhou: 转基因食物要不要标注,不只关系到它是否在医学上有害,心理上的感受同样重要,道理类似于非清真食品是否需要标注,答案可由法律经济学给出:假如一个社会忌讳转基因食物的人居多,转基因食物的零售交易频率远低于非转基因食品,那就应该标注,否则就无需标注,这样,社会将更接近卡尔多-希克斯最优 @whigzhou: 类似的,一个穆斯林占多数的社会,需要标注的是非清真食品,而在穆斯林占少数的社会,则应将标注/甄别负担转移穆斯林自己,由他们自行负担标注清真食品的成本 @吴昊老是重名很无奈:感觉穆斯林人数比较好判定,完全不吃非清真的边界也很清楚。但是吃不吃转基因的意愿好像偏模糊,比如食用油采用了转基因的大豆压榨的,可能很多人能接受。但是直接的转基因大米,同样的人可能就接受不了。而且是否标注是不是只能靠立法者人为创制一种权利? @whigzhou: 这种模糊性在法律问题中其实无处不在,司法系统有能力对付,不需要立法 @吴昊老是重名很无奈:请问辉总,对于这种食品安全方面的立法方法也适用那种各地分别由陪审团裁定的判例法? @whigzhou: 对,我赞同司法途径,不赞成立法和行政途径,判断需要由陪审团来做,但各方可以援引第三方机构的调查报告或者专家意见作为证据,用来说服陪审团 @whigzhou: 重要的是,立法机构在处理这种模糊性上没有任何优势,议员们既不是专家,也不是上帝,同样需要依靠第三方意见,而与陪审团和法官相比,他们更容易受利益团体和政治偏见的影响 @whigzhou: 司法途径的好处还在于,法官可以向陪审团指示或解释:需要他们判断的是什么,以及其中的法理逻辑,比如这里的法律经济学道理 @zcx7792:但实施起来应该很困难吧,这样的经济学分析的数据来源应该是什么?基于民调? @whigzhou: 调查是一种,陪审团也可能依据直接的个人经验做判断 @吴昊老是重名很无奈:那理论上是否可以取消立法机构而达成法律系统完善运转呢?也就是说立法机构(一般是议会吧)是否在法律系统中具有某些判例法系统不 @whigzhou: 嗯,我赞成取消国会的普通立法权限,但可以保留其行政立法权限,即下院就“政府可以收多少税、怎么花”立法,上院对“政府可以做什么事”立法 @吴昊老是重名很无奈:哇,知识不够了,分不清什么叫“行政的”,什么不是……对于“政府能做什么事”一般习惯上是由宪法规定? @whigzhou: 很简单啊,所谓行政就是国王的行为,宪法只能做一般性限制,而为了有效限制王权,国会需要在某些事情上保留决定权,因而需要特别立法,比如是否允许国王与别国开战…… @黄章晋ster:通常的情形是,穆斯林数量较少的社会(如中国),清真餐厅或食品会标注『清真』,非清真则不会标注。在穆斯林占为主的社会,人们实际上并不特别在意餐厅或食品是否绝对清真,对食品是否清真特别认真在意,似乎是中国独有的现象 @whigzhou: 嗯,类比的前提是穆斯林都很介意这个,否则类比就无效了 @whigzhou: 判断是否“真的介意”,可以看两点,1)是否很多人会因为事后发现买到的食品不够清真而索赔或起诉卖家,2)其他条件相仿时,穆斯林是否愿意为确保食物清真而支付更高代价;实际情况我不了解,谢教官指出 @胡子v5:把转基因视同宗教禁忌,把反转视同宗教行为。别说,还真是越来越象这么回事了。不过正因如此,更不能强制标注了。 @whigzhou: 为什么? @whigzhou: 好吧,那就再做个更纯粹的思想实验吧。假设,经特定加工之后,食用狗屎在医学上是完全无害的,而且将狗屎作为辅料掺入食品还能带来某些特殊风味,那么,假如某饭馆在不预先告知食客的情况下出售掺了狗屎的食品,你认为是否正当? @whigzhou: 不介意吃到狗屎的人可能会说,让介意的人去负担标注成本吧,问题是,他恰好不幸生活在一个普遍介意是否吃到狗屎的世界 @whigzhou: 该思想实验中的狗屎可以替换成精液、月经血、包皮环切术切下来的皮、抽脂术抽出来的脂肪…… @whigzhou: 当火星人发现地球访客居然禁忌这些完全无害的食物时,大概也会觉得不可理喻吧——你们居然要求我们标注! @国王的耳朵11:转基因心理上的感受是媒体宣传出来的,没听说有人对杂交水稻心理上有障碍。 @whigzhou: 一种心理感受不会因为是“媒体宣传出来的”,就丧失得到保护的理由,宗教禁忌不也是巫师、教会和传教士宣传出来的吗? @胡子v5:楼主的“思想实验”恰恰应证了老美反对强标的一个理由:防止恶意丑化。狗屎、经血、包皮…以楼主的想像力,恐怕还有更多更恶心的类比 @whigzhou: 如果丑化已经成为普遍事实,转基因食品在多数人心目中形同经血,对它的心理厌恶已经很强烈,加以回避已经成为他们宗教禁忌般的习俗,那就有理由得到保护 @whigzhou: 注意这里的“如果……已经”,我并不认为这些事实在当前中国社会已经成立,我给出了一个判断原则,但并未作出判断 @whigzhou: 在法律局面尚未明朗之际,假如你不希望转基因食品被要求标注,办法之一是推动尽可能多的人去吃它,这样,主张强制标注者未来在法庭上就难以证明:转基因已成为普遍禁忌 @胡子v5:回到反转宗教化的问题。首先,科学问题不能宗教化,这是理性的底线 @whigzhou: 1)何以认为“转基因食品是否应该标注”是一个科学问题?科学问题里包括“应该”这种词汇吗?2)理性的底线是你的底线吧?你凭什么可以要求别人按你的理性底线生活?他们不可以不受打扰的过自己的非理性生活? @久四:不如推广更多的农民种它更实际,对农民有利的转基因作物更容易在市场上推广,到时候都是转基因,你不吃也得吃了。就像北京的空气,都污染成这样了,还不是照样吸。 @whigzhou: 嗯,之二