含有〈普通法〉标签的文章(6)

[译文]司法竞争如何带来自由

When Courts Compete for ‘Business,’ Liberty Wins
当法庭之间争夺“生意”时,自由就是赢家

作者:Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty

Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong.
那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的

Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it’s curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn’t that which produced liberty be up to preserving it?

考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果,很奇怪的是,现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢?

When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone’s objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an “invisible hand.” That’s how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek’s, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson).

当我说竞争产生自由时,我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了,就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的(和坏的)后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果(这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅)。

We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge(more...)

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When Courts Compete for 'Business,' Liberty Wins 当法庭之间争夺“生意”时,自由就是赢家 作者:Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong. 那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的 Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it's curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn't that which produced liberty be up to preserving it? 考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果,很奇怪的是,现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢? When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone's objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an "invisible hand." That's how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek's, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson). 当我说竞争产生自由时,我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了,就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的(和坏的)后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果(这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅)。 We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge unintentionally. It should give us hope for the future; if the libertarian movement is deficient, we need not assume that liberty has no chance. (I have more to say about liberty as an unintended consequence in the context of Magna Carta here.) 得知像自由那样美好的事物会非意图地产生,我们应该感到高兴。这会给我们的未来带来希望;如果自由意志主义运动是有缺陷的,我们却不必认为自由已经没有了机会。(关于自由在《大宪章》语境中是个意外产物,我还有更多的话要说,戳这里。) Many authors from the 18th century onward have written about the unintended good consequences of competition, i.e., the absence of central control. They emphasized that in the West the rivalries between church and state, between nobles or parliament and crown, and between nation-states yielded zones of liberty that endure to this day, however diminished in particular matters. 18世纪以来,许多作者已经描写过竞争(即中央控制的缺失)所带来的意外好处。他们强调,西方世界中教会和世俗国家的斗争,贵族或议会和王权的斗争,以及民族国家之间的斗争,产生了延续至今的自由空间,不管这一空间在一些特定方面衰减得有多么厉害。 Competition among legal institutions—courts and bodies of law—within overlapping jurisdictions played a large role in this centuries-long beneficent process. These of course are not examples of anarchism; on the contrary, states existed. But competitive overlapping legal regimes are an element of market anarchism. 管辖界限互相交错的司法制度——各法庭和各法体【编注:一个法体是指有着独特渊源和内在一致性的一组法律规则,比如衡平法、海事法、战争法分属不同法体。】——之间的竞争在这场持续数个世纪的有益历程中扮演了重要角色。这些当然不是无政府主义的例证,恰恰相反,国家是存在的。但是司法制度之间的交叉竞争是市场无政府主义的一个组成元素。 So where a state coexisted with a polycentric legal order, we may say, with Bryan Caplan, that there existed "less than the minimum" state, that is, something that fell short of the nightwatchman state favored by limited-government libertarians. 所以当一个国家存在一种多中心的法律秩序时,我们可以用Bryan Caplan的话来说,这里就存在着一种“比最小国家更弱一点”的国家,也就是说,比喜欢有限政府的自由意志主义者所期待的守夜人政府更弱一点的东西。 A good place to read about competition in law and dispute resolution is Todd J. Zywicki's highly accessible Northwestern University Law Review article "The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis." Todd J.Zywicki发表在Northwestern University Law Reviews上的文章“普通法中的效率兴衰史:一种供给侧分析”是一篇了解法律和争端解决机制中的竞争情形的深入浅出的文章。 An important feature that "influenced the common law's evolution," Zywicki writes, "was the competitive, or 'polycentric,' legal order in which the common law developed. During the era that the common law developed, there were multiple English courts with overlapping jurisdictions over most of the issues that comprise the common law. As a result, parties potentially could bring a particular lawsuit in a variety of different courts. In turn this created competition among these various courts for business." 一个“影响到了普通法进化的重要特征”,Zywicki写到:“是竞争性的,或者说是“多中心”的法律秩序,普通法就是在其中演化的。在普通法产生的时代,在构成普通法的绝大多数问题上都有很多管辖界限重叠的英格兰法庭(存在竞争)。结果就是当事人有可能从很多不同的法庭中选择一个来进行特定的诉讼。于是,这些法庭之间就产生了生意上的竞争。” The idea of courts competing for "business" sounds strange to modern ears, but it was commonplace before the 20th century. (The extent of private arbitration in international commerce is largely unappreciated.) 对于现代人来说,法庭在“生意”方面进行竞争这个想法听起来很怪,但是在二十世纪之前这是很常见的。(在这方面,私人仲裁在国际贸易中的普及程度并没有受到应有的注意)。 Zywicki's paper shows that the common law, which featured this competition, was efficient in the eyes of those who used its services. Monopoly is inefficient even (especially?) in matters of security, dispute resolution, and justice. Moreover, it's a mistake, as Hayek explains in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (volume 1)  to assume that government is the source of law. Zywicki的论文指出,有这种竞争特色的普通法在那些使用其服务的人们眼中是有效的。垄断性司法甚至(或者说尤其是?)在安全、调解纠纷和司法制裁方面都是效率低下的。此外,哈耶克在《法律、立法与自由》中指出,认为政府是法律源头的想法是极其错误的。 Moves away from competition and the common law, then, aren't adequately explained by shortcomings in its services to its consumers. Political ambition provides a more satisfactory explanation. (In the case of the criminal law, see this.) 因此,对司法竞争性与普通法传统的偏离,单从当事人所得服务有所欠缺这一角度是不能充分解释的。政治野心是一个更为令人满意的解释(至于刑法的情况,参见这里) Zywicki draws on the legal historian Harold Berman, who wrote, "Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems." Zywicki引用了法律史学家Harold Berman的话:“也许西方法律传统的最与众不同之处在于多样化的司法管辖权和多种法律体系在同一个共同体内部共存和竞争。” The legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller went further: "A possible objection to the view [of law] taken here is that it permits the existence of more than one legal system governing the same population. The answer is, of course, that such multiple systems do exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems." (Emphasis added.) 法哲学家Lon L.Fuller进一步指出:“对这种(法律)概念的一个可能的反对意见是,它允许多个司法体系管辖同一个人群。当然,对此的回答是:这样的重合体系确实存在,并且在历史上比一元化的(司法)体系更为常见”。 The limited-government libertarian who insists that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisiction is like the apocryphal aerodynamicist who calculated that a bumblebee couldn't possibly fly. One needed only to point out the window, saying, "Behold!" Likewise, the anarchist need only point to history. 有些相信有限政府的自由意志主义者坚持认为,市场无政府主义行不通,因为它缺乏能够实行最后裁决的垄断性法院。这就像假冒的空气动力学家计算得出大黄蜂根本无法飞起来一样。实际上我们只需要朝窗外指指说:“看呐!”。同样,无政府主义者只需要拿出历史事实。 Berman also wrote (quoted by Zywicki), "The same person might be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king's courts in another, his lord's courts in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court in a fifth, [and] a merchants' court in a sixth." This sounds as though the courts were not really competitive, but rather that the variety of courts constituted specialization and a division of labor. Berman又写道(引用自Zywicki):“同样的一个人可能在某种案子中服从于宗教法庭,在另外一种案子中则可能服从国王的法庭,也可能是其领主的法庭,又可能是庄园的法庭,城镇法庭,甚至是商人法庭。”听起来好像各个法庭并不存在真实的互相竞争关系,不同法庭之间存在专业区分和劳动分工。 But that inference would be wrong. To see this we may turn to a keen contemporaneous observer, Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations Smith notes that despite a de jure division of labor, courts in fact competed with one another, even to the point of entrepreneurially finding ways to lure cases from other courts. 但是这样的推断是错误的。为了了解这一点,我们可以求助于同时代的一位敏锐观察者,亚当·斯密。在《国富论》中,斯密提到,尽管从法理上来说,法庭之间存在劳动分工,但事实上他们是相互竞争的,竞争甚至到了多方钻营以从其他法庭中诱拐案件的程度。 Why do this? Because the courts obtained their revenues from fees paid by parties to cases. The more cases a court heard, the more money it earned, a state of affairs that Smith, no anarchist of course, approved of: "Public services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them." 为什么要这样做呢?因为法庭的经费来自案件各方所支付的费用。一个法庭开审的案件越多,那么得到的金钱就越多,斯密当然不是一位无政府主义者,但他赞成这样的一种状态:“公共服务办好才给予酬劳,并且按勤勉的程度决定酬额,这样才能办好。” Smith described the legal environment of his day: 斯密这样描述他那个时代的法律环境:
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. 英格兰各法院最初似乎主要仰赖于法院诉讼费。各法院都尽可能兜揽诉讼事件,那怕本来不是归自己管辖的案件,也乐于受理。例如,单为审理刑事案件而设的高等法院,居然接受民事案件,而以原告声称被告对他所行不义是犯了非法侵害罪或轻罪为受理的口实。 The court of king's bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognisance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognisance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king because the defendant would not pay him. 王室特别法院的设立,本来单是为了征收国王收入和强制人民偿清对于国王所欠债务的。但它后来居然受理关于一切其他契约债务的诉讼,原告陈诉的理由是,被告不偿还对他的债务,所以他不能偿还对国王的债务这个理由。 In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. 由于这种种的假托,结果许多案件,究竟归哪个法院审理,全由诉讼当事人选择,而各法院要想为自己方面多多招徕诉讼案件,也在审理上力求迅速公平。 The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for every sort of injustice. [Emphasis added.] 英格兰今日的法院制度,是值得赞赏的,但一探其究竟,恐怕在很大程度上须归因于往昔各法院法官的相互竞争,对一切不正当行为,各个力求在自己法院就法律许可的范围内给予最迅速最有效的救济这个事实。
Zywicki also quotes from Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence: Zywicki也引用了斯密在《法学讲稿》中的话:
Another thing which tended to support the liberty of the people and render the proceedings in the courts very exact, was the rivalship which arose betwixt them. 另一件倾向于支持人民的自由和使得法庭程序更为严谨的事务,是法庭之间的竞争关系。
It may be argued that the state provided a backdrop to the competitive legal order, such that a forum of last resort was always available. This argument loses its force, however, when one realizes, as Edward Stringham teaches, that private dispute-resolution procedures arose in matters where states abstained from involvement, such as the nascent stock markets. (For more on the weakness of the "shadow of the State" argument, see this.) 有人可能会认为,竞争性的法律秩序总有国家站在后面,因此终极的裁决平台总是存在。然而,就如Edward Stringham教导的那样:当国家放弃参与时,私人的纠纷解决程序才会出现,就像最初的股票市场那样。只要意识到这一点,上述论调就变得苍白无力。(关于“国家的影子”论调的弱点,详见这里)。 "In short," Zywicki sums up, "a market for law prevailed, with numerous court systems competing for market share in order to increase their fees. This competitive process generated rules that satisfied the demand of consumers (here litigants) for fairness, consistency, and reasonableness." “总而言之,”Zywicki总结道:“法律市场繁盛起来了,很多法庭系统为市场占有率和从中所获费用进行竞争。这一竞争过程产生了符合顾客(这里指诉讼当事人)对公平性、一致性和合理性的需求的规则。” Bumblebees fly and reasonably pro-freedom dispute resolution emerges without the state, no matter what a cloistered theoretician may think. 不论纸上谈兵的理论家们怎样思考,大黄蜂会飞,公道的、促进自由的纠纷解决方式无需国家也能产生。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]勿忘普通法

Remember the Common Law
勿忘普通法

作者:Jim Harper  @ 2016-4
译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
校对:小橘子
来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law

Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.”

优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论,这个理论说明了,在可见的经济活动之下,可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户,就要买一扇新的,所以人们很容易认为,通过促进生产和贸易,打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上,打破窗户使社会境况恶化了;财富被破坏了,而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。

A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly u(more...)

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Remember the Common Law 勿忘普通法 作者:Jim Harper  @ 2016-4 译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 校对:小橘子 来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” 优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论,这个理论说明了,在可见的经济活动之下,可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户,就要买一扇新的,所以人们很容易认为,通过促进生产和贸易,打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上,打破窗户使社会境况恶化了;财富被破坏了,而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。 A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly unseen. Legal doctrines such as property and contract emerged quietly from series of court decisions over decades and even centuries, so they often go unconsidered and unspoken. Many people may believe that legislation and regulation do most of the work of ordering society. 在法律领域,类似的情况也同样存在。立法与监管程序是显而易见的。大选会定期让民众注意到立法与行政机构,选举的与非选举的官员会通过媒体来阐述他们的举措。相比之下,普通法下的规则绝大部分是看不见的。有关财产与契约等范畴的法律原则,在数十年甚至数百年来的法庭判例中悄无声息地形成,因此往往既不为人留意,也未经言明。许多人可能会认为,规范社会的,主要是法典与规条。 Libertarians should remember the common law and generally prefer it. The common law process for making the rules of a free society has much to commend it. And where it falls down, it is more readily fixable than legislation and government regulation. 自由意志主义者应该谨记普通法,并将其置于优先地位。普通法体系在形成自由社会规则方面确有不少令人赞许之处。而且与成文法和行政规制体系相比,普通法在其失足跌倒之处也更便于调整修正。 American law students learn early that the common law is an important inheritance from England that differs from the civil-law tradition dominant on the European continent. In the common-law tradition, the basic rules that govern our interactions arise from years of experience over generations. Our forebears learned that justice is served and benefits accrue when people avoid violence, stick to their promises, and allocate things in an orderly way. 美国法学学生很早就认识到普通法体系是继承自英国的一项重要遗产,该法系与欧洲大陆盛行的民法传统大相径庭。在普通法传统下,基本法律规范由一代代人的长期经验积累而来。我们的祖先发现,当人们免于暴力,信守承诺,分配有序时,正义便得到伸张,福祉便得到增长。 The law of battery, contract law, and property law all emerged as common practice solidified into common law. It’s often called “judge-made” law, but at its best common law is “judge-found” law— that is, judges discover law in common practices that are deeply ingrained in society. 有关殴打的法律、契约法以及财产法,都是由惯例凝结固化而成的普通法。普通法常被称为“法官制造的”法律,但最恰当的说法应该是“法官发现的”法律——意思是说,法官们发掘出社会上根深蒂固的惯例中所蕴含的规则。 In contrast, the source of rules in civil-law countries is the code books issued by rulers and governments. Civil codes establish the rules governing contracts, trade, property, criminal law, and so on. The civil-law tradition extols the great law-givers—Solon, Hammurabi, Napoleon—who wrote down the law codes purporting to govern their societies. 对比之下,民法体系国家的规则来源是统治者与政府颁布的法律条文。有关契约、商业、财产、刑法等各方面的规则,均由民法法典确立。民法传统推崇伟大的立法者——梭伦、汉穆拉比、拿破仑——他们一手制订治理社会的法典。 But the founding of civil law is something of a myth. In the times when civil law originated, the bulk of most populations was illiterate. These citizens did not have copies of the civil codes that purported to govern them. The civil-law tradition relies on the fiction that certain powerful men produced laws—but they actually arose like common law from the time-worn habits and customs of their subjects. 然而,民法起源于一个神话。在民法最初形成的时候,大部分民众还是文盲,他们并没有读过那些用来管辖他们的民法法典。民法传统建基于强人立法的虚构故事——实际上它们和普通法一样,源自于古老的习惯与惯例。【编注:作者的意思大概是,有关强人立法的虚构故事为民法赋予了其被广泛接受所需的权威性。】 Part of the genius of the common law is its mix of adaptability and consistency. When new circumstances arise, common-law courts, urged on and educated by the parties to disputes, adapt existing rules in ways that they believe produce the most just and fair outcomes. 普通法的优越之处,部分表现在它在适应性和连贯性之间的平衡。当新的环境条件出现时,普通法的法庭在争讼各方的敦促与启发下,会灵活理解运用现有规则,以期达到一个他们都认为公正公平的结果。 They look for comparable cases in their own and other jurisdictions to learn what adaptation of existing law will produce the best results. Over time, new doctrines emerge and old ones may die out. But at any given time there is a stable rule-set people can use to organize their lives and business activities. 法庭将在本身与其他司法管辖区中查找可供比附的案例,以研究如何调整现有规则才能达致最佳的结果。随着时间的推移,新的法律原则形成,旧的则被淘汰。但在任何一个时间点上,人民生活经商都有一套相对稳定的规则可供遵循。 THE COMMON LAW OF PRIVACY 有关隐私的普通法 The field of privacy protection illustrates how common law develops. In 1890 a Harvard Law Review article entitled “The Right to Privacy” made the original argument that law should address privacy. Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, later to become a U.S. Supreme Court justice, catalogued the legal doctrines that might control certain abuses of private life arising from photography and mass circulation newspapers. They argued that the law should explicitly protect privacy. 普通法规则的发展演变,从保护隐私领域就可觅一斑。1890年,一篇刊载在《哈佛法学评论》上题为《隐私权》的文章首次提出,法律需要处理隐私问题。萨缪尔•沃伦与后来成为美国最高法院大法官的路易斯•布兰代斯,整理出了能够制止因拍照和大发行量报纸而引致侵犯私生活的法律原则。他们认为法律应明确保护隐私。 Over time, a new branch of common law was born. Courts across the country began to recognize privacy torts—legally recognized wrongs that give victims of privacy invasions the right to sue invaders. In 1960 eminent legal scholar William L. Prosser documented how privacy as a legal concept had come to constitute four distinct torts: intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of name or likeness. 随着时间推移,普通法的一个新分支出现了。全国的法庭都开始承认隐私侵权——从法律上确认侵犯隐私是错的,受害者可以控告侵权者。1960年,杰出的法律学者威廉•普罗萨总结了隐私权这一法律概念,并界定了四种不同的侵权类型:侵扰他人独处或私人领域;曝光令人困窘的私人信息;不当报道,以造成对个人的错误印象;盗用人名等个人标记。 The common law of privacy continues to develop and advance. In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized invasion of privacy as a tort in that state for the first time. The case was Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores. The defendant’s photo-developing shop failed to deliver two women their vacation photos, but an employee distributed a photo of the two showering together, spurring the court to adopt the “public disclosure” branch of the privacy torts. 有关隐私权的普通法不断地发展和推进。1998年,明尼苏达州最高法院首次裁定侵犯隐私在该州构成民事侵权行为。该案为“莱克诉沃尔玛”(Lake v. Wal-Mart)案。被告的照片冲印店未能交付两位女顾客度假时拍的照片,但被告的一名员工却对外散布了这两名女顾客一起淋浴的照片。法庭认为此举适用于隐私侵权分类中的“公开泄露私人信息”。 Like most law, the privacy torts work in the background, through the threat of lawsuits and not actual days in court or big damage awards. The rarity of lawsuits under the privacy torts may show how consistent these baseline privacy rules are with society’s general mores. Some would argue, of course, that they’re not strict enough and that debatable uses of information should produce successful privacy lawsuits more often. Legal evolution will decide who is right. 与大多数的其他法律一样,隐私侵权的法规在社会背景中默默运作,通过潜在的诉讼威胁,而不是大量的实际庭审或高额赔偿来发挥作用。有关隐私侵权的实际案件之少,可能正说明了保护隐私的法律规则与社会上普遍的道德观念高度一致。当然,可能有些人会认为这些法规不够严厉,信息的争议性使用应该产生更多的隐私案胜诉。孰是孰非,在法律演变中自有定夺。 Privacy law may be in tension with free speech and the First Amendment, so it’s not clear that the privacy torts are a permanent fixture in the common-law pantheon. On the other hand, privacy-law professors and others often use the phrase “privacy harm” in a tacit effort to impress into common language— and ultimately common law—that more offenses against privacy or data security should be recognized as legally actionable harms. It’s all part of a quiet but important debate about our privacy values and what may become our privacy laws. 隐私法也许与言论自由和宪法第一修正案有一定的矛盾,因此隐私侵权能否成为普通法神殿的永久基石之一,并未有定论。而在另一方面,隐私法领域的教授与其他学者经常引用“隐私伤害”来试图与普通用语挂钩——最终与普通法挂钩——并试图将更多侵害隐私或信息安全的行为纳入可采取法律行动的伤害行为。 这些争论虽然悄然进行,但对于我们确立有关隐私的价值观,以及确立针对隐私的法律,都非常重要。 But people don’t often ask how common law torts, property rights, and contracts protect privacy. They ask: “What will Congress and our state legislatures do?” Legislation and regulation get most of the attention. 但人们并不会经常过问,隐私权如何得到普通法的侵权法、财产法,以及契约法的保护。他们会问:“国会和我们的州立法机构会怎么做?”。引人注目的是立法与规制。 The top-down process that established federal privacy regulation of health information illustrates some differences between understated common-law development and cacophonous civil-law-style rule-writing. 有关健康信息隐私的联邦管制规则,是通过一个由上至下的程序确立的,从中可以看出低调的普通法发展与喧闹的民法式规则制定之间的某些区别。 In 1996 Congress revamped the rules around health insurance. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) also addressed health privacy, but it didn’t set new privacy rules. Instead, Congress instructed the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make recommendations about the privacy of individually identifiable health information. It told HHS to go ahead and write privacy regulations based on those recommendations if Congress did not act. 1996年,国会对有关医疗保险的法规进行修订。《健康保险隐私及责任法案》(HIPAA)也涉及健康隐私,但其并未对隐私做出新规定。相反,国会要求卫生及公共服务部(HHS)部长就个人可辨识医疗信息的隐私提供建议,并指示HHS,如果国会没有采取相应行动,该部可根据这些建议撰写隐私相关规定。 When HHS reported back to Congress, it downplayed many safeguards for privacy that already existed. These included medical ethics, explicit and implied contract rights, malpractice claims, and state privacy torts— non regulatory privacy protections that got only a few cryptic lines buried deep in the report. In addition to largely ignoring them, HHS advocated eliminating some of them. 此后,当HHS向国会汇报时,对已有的隐私保护措施予以淡化处理,这些措施包括医疗道德,明确及隐含的契约权利,针对专业失当的索赔,以及各州的隐私侵权法——即非行政的隐私保护,仅在报告的某个角落以寥寥数行隐晦提及。HHS不仅对其几近无视,甚至建议将它们当中的一部分予以剔除。 Today, with the HIPAA privacy regulations in place, people seeking health care sign a lot of forms and see a lot of notices discussing health privacy—but it’s not at all clear that their privacy is well protected. The HIPAA rules preserved and helped solidify behind the- scenes information-sharing practices in the health care industry that may or may not serve consumers and society well. Every year, it seems, there is less and less of a free market in health care to test for and discover consumers’ true interests in health privacy and every other dimension of health care. The common law of health privacy is widely ignored. 如今,由于HIPAA的隐私条文已付诸实施,人们接受医疗保健服务需要签署大量表格,阅读大量讨论健康隐私的告示,但他们的隐私是否得到很好的保障,却根本不清楚。医疗行业幕后的信息共享机制未必能很好地满足消费者和社会整体的要求,而HIPAA的条文则保护了这一机制,并使之更加稳固。年复一年,自由的医疗保健市场似乎正在日益萎缩,我们难以探知与发掘消费者在健康隐私乃至医疗保障其他方面的真正利益之所在。健康隐私方面的普通法原则被普遍忽略了。 INDUCTIVE COMMON LAW VS. DEDUCTIVE REGULATION 归纳式的普通法与推论式的立法 Common law is inductive. Building on experience in case after real-world case, common- law courts accrete knowledge about the rule-set that best serves society. Because rule development occurs with reference to real life cases, it takes advantage of local knowledge about the precise disputes that occur. This allows better approximation of what the truly just rules will be for most cases. 普通法是归纳性的。在众多真实案例的经验基础上,普通法法庭在不断积累认知,寻求最适合社会的法则。由于规则在参照真实案例的过程中发展,其优势是能够利用实际发生的真切争议中所包含的局部知识。在绝大多数情况下,这种方式都能达致较为接近公平法则的效果。【编注:此处作者援引的是哈耶克在1948年的论文《社会中的知识利用》中阐述的思想,哈耶克认为,中央计划者或理性建构者的根本困难在于,无法收集和利用作出正确决定所需的分散的局部知识。】 Hayek emphasized the value of local knowledge in economic decision making. He also emphasized the distinction between common law and top-down legislation in his three-volume work Law, Legislation and Liberty. The Italian lawyer Bruno Leoni is another great thinker in this area. His book Freedom and the Law extolled the virtue of English common law compared to Roman jus civile. The two systems have very different ways of developing rules. Common-law systems hew closer to common justice. 哈耶克强调过局部知识对于经济决策的重要价值,也在他的三卷本著作《法律、立法与自由》中强调了普通法与由上至下立法的区别。意大利律师布鲁诺•莱奥尼在这一领域也颇有研究,他在其著作《自由与法律》中赞扬了英式普通法较之罗马市民法的优点。两套体系在发展法规方面大相径庭,普通法更倾向于追求常理上的正义。 Legislation and regulation more often produce rank re-ordering of rights and liabilities because legislation is deductive. At a single point in time, based on all the knowledge it has drawn together at that moment, a legislature establishes the rule-set that it believes to make the most sense. This is often what it perceives as pleasing the most— or the most important—constituencies. That imperative to please constituencies means that the information legislatures codify often comes from well-organized interests with substantial resources. Special- interest pleading is a hallmark of legislation and regulation. 由于立法是演绎性的,因此权利与义务的轻重经常通过订立法律与规章来编排。在某个给定的时点上,立法机关基于当时所知,建立一整套它认为最合理的法规。这又被认为是在迎合最多数或者最重要的选民。迎合选民,意味着立法机关为之编写法规的诉求,经常会来自于掌握重要资源的有组织团体。因而,制定法律与规章带有满足特殊利益诉求的印记。 Judges in common law courts have fewer of the perverse incentives that legislators and regulators do, particularly when judges are appointed for life terms. A tenured judge gets professional acclaim from developing a reputation for fairness, from clearing dockets, and from suffering few reversals in higher courts. Judges generally don’t anticipate growing their courts’ budgets, getting post-service perks, or being re-installed in office due to the outcomes in their cases, as legislators and regulators often do. Legislation and regulation are systematically subject to a kind of intellectual corruption in which self interest diverges from the public interest. 与立法者和监管者相比,普通法法庭的法官带有的不当动机较少,尤其当法官职位是终身制的时候。为赢得专业上的赞誉,一个终身制的法官需要建立断案公正的名声,避免案件积压,以及减少其裁定被高一级法院推翻的案件。与立法者和监管者不同,法官一般来说并不需要担心他们的判决会对法庭的收入,个人离任津贴,或者恢复职位造成影响。而立法与监管机构则由于自身利益与公众利益有所偏离,容易系统性的滋生智识上的腐败。 WRITING THE RIGHT RULES 编写正确的规则 Rules produced by the deductions of legislators and regulators don’t always fail, of course, and they aren’t always wrong. But it is better to arrive at just rules through a long, society-wide deliberation than through a legislative debate. To illustrate this subtle point, consider the rules that govern the liability of interactive computer services like YouTube, Yelp, craigslist, and Facebook. 当然,立法者与监管者通过推导演绎编写的规则并非必然失败,也并非总是错的。但为了得到公正的规则,经由全社会参与的长期讨论始终还是比经由立法辩论为好。为了体现这当中的微妙之处,让我们来研究规管诸如YouTube、Yelp、Craigslist和Facebook等电脑互动服务供应商之责任的规则。 In the mid-1990s courts were considering whether interactive online services would be considered publishers of the information people uploaded and posted to them. If they were publishers, websites might be liable for defamation and other causes of action because of the material users contributed to them. Had this rule taken hold, operators of online services would probably have allowed only tightly controlled and monitored interactions among users. The rollicking, interactive Internet we know today would have been sharply curtailed. 1990年代中期,法庭在研究在线互动服务是否应该被视为其用户张贴上载信息的发布人。如果是的话,这些网站可能将会因为其用户所提供的信息,而负上诽谤及其他法律责任。如果确立了这一规则,在线服务运营商就很可能会对用户间的交流进行严密的控制与监视,我们今天所见到的生动活泼、积极互动的互联网必将大打折扣。 In response to this concern, Congress passed legislation saying that interactive computer services are not publishers or speakers of any information others provide using their services. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is one of the most important protections for online speech in the United States. 出于这一顾虑,国会通过法案表明,电脑互动服务供应商并非其用户上载信息的发布人或发言人。《通信规范法案》(CDA)第230条,便是美国网上言论最重要的保障之一。 But CDA section 230 is often talked about as an “immunity” Congress gave to online service providers, a carve-out from general liability rules, put in place to advance a certain public policy goal. The perception of CDA section 230 as a special-interest favor means that other interests are on relatively strong footing when they come to Congress seeking to overturn it. Today, CDA section 230 is under attack from groups who would like to see it reversed. The rule against liability for online service providers would be stronger if courts had arrived at a rule of “no liability” based in considerations of natural justice. 但CDA第230条经常被认为有异于一般的责任条款,是国会旨在推动某一特定的公共政策,而赋予网络服务运营商的“豁免权”。该条款给人以一种照顾特殊利益的印象,这意味着当其他利益的代表寻求在国会推翻这一条款的时候,将会有较强的理据。如今,一些持反对立场的团体正在挑战该条款。如果在线服务供应商的“免责”是经由法庭考虑自然正义原则之后确立的话, 该规则就将会有较强的说服力。 When the rules that organize our society are temporal products of legislation, they may always be “in play” for a legislative reversal. Online service providers must always remain vigilant in Washington, D.C., for attempts to undercut their special “immunity.” The rules that govern online liability were established quickly, which is good, but they are less settled than they otherwise would be, and there is one more reason for private businesses to maintain a stable of lobbyists and lawyers in Washington. 如果规制社会的规则是因应时势的立法产物,那么这些规则就处于一种随时可能被立法推翻的状态之下。在线服务供应商就必须在华盛顿特区保持高度警觉,以防有人破坏他们的特殊“豁免权”。迅速订立规制网上责任的规则是好事,但这些规则的认受性本来可以更高一些,而且这也为私营企业在华盛顿豢养着一班说客和律师提供了多一个理由。 There is no guarantee, of course, that the common-law rule would be the same right now as what CDA section 230 produced. The common-law process might still be searching for the right rule. Common-law development would probably find, though, that online service providers are not liable for the acts of others. 当然,普通法体系下订立的规则,未必就和CDA第230条的内容一样。在普通法程序下,我们可能仍在寻找恰当的规则,当然,普通法体系很可能会认为在线服务供应商无需为他人的行为负责。 FAR FROM PERFECT, BUT BETTER IN PRACTICE 虽远未完美,但在实践中占优 This is no argument that common-law courts are perfect. They are not. It takes a very long time for just rules to be found out and settled on through common-law development. Elected judges often have incentives to please powerful constituencies. The class-action mechanism is prone to abuse and often used to reward plaintiffs’ lawyers. Punitive damages are too often a source of windfalls to lucky plaintiffs. The rules about who pays for litigation may be changed to improve the delivery of justice in the courts. 没有人会认为普通法法庭运作得很完美。并非如此。在普通法体系下,确立公平规则,并得到认受,需要很长的时间;选举产生的法官常有动机去迎合强大的利益团体;集体诉讼机制容易被滥用,而且常常有利于原告的律师;幸运的原告经常从惩罚性赔偿中大捞一票;为了正义能更好地在法庭上体现,诉讼费用的分担规则可能需要进行修改。 But these challenges are more correctable than the dynamics in legislation and regulation. Public choice economics teaches that actors in all these rule-making processes will pursue their own self-interest, but the interests of legislators and regulators are likely to diverge from justice more often than the interests of judges. 但这些难题,要比立法与规制过程中的纠葛易于解决。公共选择经济学指出,在规则制定的过程中,相关各方会追求自身的最大利益,但与法官比起来,立法者与监管者的利益很可能更容易与社会公义有分歧。 There is a fair argument that legislation and government regulation create certainty, which may make it worthwhile to accept their many costs. This is particularly acute in the area of high tech, where the application of common law may be unclear. 一种意见认为,明文立法与政府规章带来了确定性,因此随之而来的众多代价也就变得可以接受。这不是没有道理,特别在普通法的适用性并不明确的高科技领域,这显得尤其突出。 But regulation produces certainty in theory better than it does in practice. Witness the recent “BitLicense” fiasco in New York State. When Bitcoin, a digital currency, first captured public attention a few years ago, New York superintendent of financial services Ben Lawsky saw it as an opportunity to make his mark in a hot new area. He proposed an ill-defined “BitLicense” that would require registration of Bitcoin businesses in New York. During the rule-making process, his office declined to release “research and analysis” backing the necessity of a BitLicense, in violation of New York’s Freedom of Information Law. 成文法规理论上能带来确定性,但在实践中却未必。近来“比特登记证”(BitLicense)在纽约州的惨败便是一例。当电子货币比特币在几年前引起公众关注的时候,纽约金融服务主管本•洛斯基将其视为他在这个炙手可热的新领域留名的机会。他提议推出含混不清的“比特登记证”条例,要求纽约的比特币业务进行注册登记。在条例制定过程中,他的部门不惜违反纽约的《信息自由法》,拒绝提供与证明“比特登记证”之必要性相关的“研究与分析”。 The final “BitLicense” was a hodgepodge of regulations like the ones that burden the mainstream financial services sector. They were an ill fit with this emerging technology and a hindrance to innovation because they drove up the cost of starting new businesses. They didn’t acknowledge the technology’s inherent capability to provide consumer protections that surpass existing financial services. Shortly after the “BitLicense” was finalized, Lawsky stepped down from his post to establish a financial regulation consultancy. 和那些为主流金融服务增加负担的规章一样,最终出台的“比特登记证”条例是个大杂烩。这些条例完全不适应这一新兴技术,并且因提高创业成本而妨碍了创新。它们无视新技术内在的保护消费者的能力,这种保护超越了现有的金融服务。“比特登记证”条例推出不久,洛斯基就下台创立了一家金融监管咨询公司。 Today, it is anyone’s guess whether and how the New York Department of Financial Services will amend or enforce the technology- specific regulation that Lawsky produced. The “BitLicense” did not create certainty about the rules of the road for Bitcoin businesses in New York, and it did not create an upwelling of Bitcoin business activity in New York. America’s financial capital appears to be ceding ground on financial innovation to London, in the birthplace of common law. 今天,大家都在猜测纽约的金融服务管理局是否会修订或者执行洛斯基留下来的这一针对特定科技的条例,以及具体如何修订或执行。“比特登记证”并没有为比特币业务在纽约的发展之路带来确定性,也没有令比特币业务在纽约蓬勃发展。美国的金融之都在金融创新方面似乎正在让位于伦敦,普通法的发源地。 Common-law rules foster innovation because they allow anyone with a new idea or process to experiment with it, subject only to background rules, such as “stick to your promises” and “do no harm.” There are no forms to fill out or licensing fees. There is no oversight body that must examine how an innovation fits into pre-existing regulation. “Permissionless innovation” does mean some more risk to consumers and society, but our experience with high tech shows just how great the reward is when behavior is controlled with light-touch, simple, fair common-law rules. 普通法规则有利于创新,因为它允许人们去试验新主意和新方法,只要遵守诸如“履行承诺”、“避免伤害”等基本规则即可。不需要填表格,不需要付牌照费,也没有监管部门去检验一项创新在现行规章下如何自处。“免许可创新”的确意味着消费者和社会将面对较高的风险,但经验已经告诉我们,当我们的行为处于简单、公平的普通法规则的规制之下时,高科技将会给我们带来多么巨大的回报。 The United States and England today live under a dual system. In many areas, they continue to enjoy the benefits of the common law. But legislatures increasingly insert themselves, making temporal judgments that rejigger the rules that people and businesses must live by. In many fields, people look to legislation and regulation first, rather than examining how time-honored rules can be adapted to solve new problems. 现今的美国与英格兰生活在一个双重体系之下。在很多方面,她们继续享受着普通法的益处。但立法机关正不断强化自己的作用,用世俗的判断来改变日常生活与商业活动所需遵守的规则。在很多领域,人们首先寄望于立法与规管,而不是去审视自古以来的规则可以如何调适,以解决新生的问题。 Legislatures and regulatory agencies have a lot of smart people working in them. They universally believe they are pursuing the best interests of their jurisdictions. But the system they work in has perverse incentives, and they have little of the knowledge that common-law processes gather and pass down through the ages. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” wrote jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his 1881 book, The Common Law. 立法机关与监管部门当中不乏能人,他们普遍认为他们在为其辖区的最大利益而努力。但他们所供职的体系有着不当的激励,并且他们对普通法体系经年累月累积传承下来的知识知之甚少。法学家小奥利佛•温德尔•霍姆斯在他1881年所著的《普通法》一书中写道,“法律的生命从不在于逻辑,而在于经验,” The common law is an important part of structuring and ordering a free and prosperous society. It is preferable to legislation and government regulation. Even when we confront new problems, we lovers of liberty should remember the common law. 构建与规范一个自由繁荣的社会,普通法体系乃重要一环,它比成文的法律与政府规章更为可取。即便遭遇新的挑战,热爱自由的我们也不应该忘记普通法。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

军令如丝

【2016-04-22】

@whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时,我常常为其(操作主义意义上的)精确性所折服,与其他系统中常见的(看不出操作性含义的)泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照,这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础,每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示,再往前追究,这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系,

@whigzhou: 和其他文书相比,军令应该是最讲究(操作意义上的)明确性的——你,和谁谁谁一起,(more...)

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【2016-04-22】 @whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时,我常常为其(操作主义意义上的)精确性所折服,与其他系统中常见的(看不出操作性含义的)泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照,这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础,每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示,再往前追究,这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系, @whigzhou: 和其他文书相比,军令应该是最讲究(操作意义上的)明确性的——你,和谁谁谁一起,带上这个那个,于某月某日几点前,到达某地。——读令状的感觉就像这样。史家也曾指出,在亨利二世之前,司法令状和其他令状并没有明确区别,依我看,他们都有着军令的背景。  
[微言]封建与宪政

【2014-08-27】

@吴昊老是重名很无奈 我觉得阿姨少数有点学术味道的也就这篇:http://t.cn/RPDoFrY

@whigzhou: 这让我想到他一个毛病:过度拔高封建制:“个人主义、私有财产和市场体系与英格兰习惯法互为表里。所谓“现代社会核心特征”,其实就是英格兰封建自由的本来面目。大宪章到维多利亚时代,英国社会没有发生实质变化”

@whigzhou: 封建制是宪政和市场制度的最佳孕育土壤,但不能混淆土壤和它所孕育的东西, 再肥沃的牛粪也是牛粪,不是从中长出的那朵鲜花。

@whigzhou: 封建制本身要是真这么好,那大陆岂不是比英格兰更好?封建制在法德保持得更完整而纯粹,阿姨与此相关的另一个毛病是将普通法和习惯法混为一谈,日耳曼世界都有习惯法,但唯有英格兰发展出了普通法,而后者正是王权对抗封建体系的结果,而不是封建制的一部分

@whigzhou: 在#罗斯巴德批判#12里,我曾对封建制做过一个评价 (more...)

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【2014-08-27】 @吴昊老是重名很无奈 我觉得阿姨少数有点学术味道的也就这篇:http://t.cn/RPDoFrY @whigzhou: 这让我想到他一个毛病:过度拔高封建制:“个人主义、私有财产和市场体系与英格兰习惯法互为表里。所谓“现代社会核心特征”,其实就是英格兰封建自由的本来面目。大宪章到维多利亚时代,英国社会没有发生实质变化” @whigzhou: 封建制是宪政和市场制度的最佳孕育土壤,但不能混淆土壤和它所孕育的东西, 再肥沃的牛粪也是牛粪,不是从中长出的那朵鲜花。 @whigzhou: 封建制本身要是真这么好,那大陆岂不是比英格兰更好?封建制在法德保持得更完整而纯粹,阿姨与此相关的另一个毛病是将普通法和习惯法混为一谈,日耳曼世界都有习惯法,但唯有英格兰发展出了普通法,而后者正是王权对抗封建体系的结果,而不是封建制的一部分 @whigzhou: 在#罗斯巴德批判#12里,我曾对封建制做过一个评价 http://t.cn/zWdhu83 //@whigzhou:封建制本身要是真这么好,那大陆岂不是比英格兰更好?封建制在法德保持得更完整而纯粹,阿姨与此相关的另一个毛病是将普通法和习惯法混为一谈,日耳曼世界都有习惯法,但唯有英格兰发展出了普通法,而后者正是王权 @吴昊老是重名很无奈:习惯法和普通法原来不一样的啊 @whigzhou: 当然,对普通法和习惯法的关系,以及王权在普通法发展中的作用,我在#罗斯巴德批判#23里有过评论 http://t.cn/zlPnHdI @whigzhou: 普通法在英格兰是伴随王权扩张而发展起来的,可以说普通法的发展就是国王伸张其王权的过程,它把日耳曼习惯法和封建契约义务转变成了近代意义上的法律,让契约义务超越双方关系而变成一般性权利,从而逐渐脱离封建依附关系,它也为这些权利提供了一个普遍司法保障,而不再依赖于对等制约和自我救济 @whigzhou: 从大宪章到维多利亚,发生了太多“实质性变化”,普通法从雏形到成熟,国会的常设化,下院对预算的控制,财产权逐渐摆脱封建关系而获得流动性,人身依附关系的解除,行会垄断权的瓦解,王权的持续扩张,封建义务逐渐被现代权利体系替代…… @whigzhou: 假如“从大宪章到维多利亚”包括了维多利亚时代,那“实质性变化”就更多了,正是从维多利亚开始,人头票选制兴起,贵族和上院权力被逐渐削夺…… @沃里克伯爵陈毓秀:辉总,王权的提高同样可以视为封建体制的一部分啊,他起到了制衡贵族的作用。毕竟英国宪制的重点不是某一阶级彻底压倒另一方,而是各方势力的平衡。 @whigzhou: 对照德国即可看出这一扩张的结果不是封建制一部分了,贵族未被消灭,但不再是领主,行政和司法转入王权,封建契约变成宪政制衡 @whigzhou: 在封建制中,对王权的制约基于封建契约,而在君主宪政中,对王权的制约基于宪法(大宪章是其早期代表),这是根本区别之一 @whigzhou: 实际上封建制中所有权利都基于契约,是两两关系,英格兰所发生的关键变化是,经由普通法的发展,由特定契约关系所规定的权利转变成了一般法律规则之下的普遍权利 @沃里克伯爵陈毓秀 封建契约与宪法的不同,是否是因为前者是领主间的封建关系,而宪法则带有人民主权的色彩? @whigzhou: 跟人民主权好像没关系。比如男爵B依其与国王K的契约领有土地E,只要他履行了契约义务(比如打仗时应召或出骑士或出钱,嫁大女儿时交税),K就不能没收E,这是契约保障…… @whigzhou: 但B不能把土地转让给别人C,因为C和K没有契约关系,也不能按自己意愿选择继承人,继承须领主同意,而且要重新誓约和交税,同样,你自行开垦一块无主荒地,是不受保护的,这种所有权是人格化的,不是现代产权,缺乏流动性,而在现代普通法中,产权脱离了这些人格化关系而受一般规则保护 @whigzhou: 人身权利也是如此,在封建制,个人不是自动获得人身保护,要获得保护,他要么处于某种契约关系中,要么受庇于某个拥有特许状(因而与国王有契约关系)的城市,一般性的人身保护是普通法和宪政发展的结果 @黄油的桐谷华:像是右边这个说法就是眉毛胡子一把抓了,这些特征可以原封不动的去描述罗马法系乃至近东的古代王国,但这些法律体系没一以发展出近代社会。 @whigzhou: 这里谈论的是普通法和习惯法的区别,它和罗马法的区别我在其他地方说过很多,简言之,规则来源不同,程序不同 @whigzhou: 这两点不同使得罗马法在限制权力和界定/保护权利上的表现远不如普通法 @whigzhou: 甲:和其他灵长类相比,人类过上了定居生活,建立了分工体系,发展了食物生产系统(或者叫农业),离开这些,就不会有高度发达的文明。乙:你这完全是眉毛胡子一把抓,你说的这些特性,蚂蚁全都有。 @祈罔见:用于布道和用于满足好奇心的文本不大可能一致,阿姨对事实和考据的轻视在之前文章中自述过很多次了。其实未必是不知,效库克,康梁故智,六经注我,托古改制而已 @whigzhou: 呵呵,不知想布给谁听,听众必须聪明到足以认同光荣革命前的英国传统,笨到可以无视事实,人数又多到足以推动改制,这个…… @whigzhou: 那我看还不如去拍另一部《冰与火之歌》来得省事 @tertio:上次有人建议阿姨写虚构历史小说 @whigzhou: 好主意 @孤胆鹰雄芯 辉总,就是这一系列微博讲的内容,什么封建,王权,契约,普通法,习惯法,宪政,及这些历史有没有书籍啊,表示没基础,看辉总的微博也捉急啊。 @whigzhou: 做了个豆列:历史.宪政史 http://t.cn/RhPV4Ch 涉及中世纪、封建制、英格兰、普通法、宪政史,可参考。其中一些翻译质量较差,自己留意 【2014-09-04】 @whigzhou: 认为英国宪政在大宪章时代便已成型的人,恐怕没有理解都铎和斯图亚特两朝历史的制度意义,这是宪政发展的关键期,实际上,都铎朝的英格兰正在向专制和政教合一的方向发展,假如亨利八世寿命更长些,或者他儿子更健壮些,或者他女儿们都是国教徒,且嫁给国教徒并生下了国教徒,后面的历史就很不一样了 @whigzhou: 亨利八世获得了建立专制的多项有利条件:1)经百年战争和玫瑰战争,大贵族大部分被消灭,2)摆脱了罗马教廷这个竞争权威;3)成功清洗了作为平行权力体系的教会;4)有了印刷机这个缔造民族国家的强大工具……只可惜后来王室的宗教问题始终没解决,先有血腥玛丽的折腾,后又迎来天主教的斯图亚特家族 @whigzhou: 正是在解决国王个人信仰和国教不一致问题、外来的斯图亚特王室与贵族互不信任问题的过程中,政教分离和宗教宽容的原则才确立起来,对王权的限制也逐渐巩固和制度化 @特兰西瓦尼亚大公陈毓秀:英国宪政应该在兰开斯特王朝第一次成熟,亨利四世成为第一个由议会推举的君主,不过后来的约克王朝和都铎王朝都是对传统宪政的反动。 @whigzhou: 我不这么认为,我理解的宪政包括更多原则,其中许多到斯图亚特才确立
罗斯巴德批判#23:天堂不远,就在索马里

(续)#第23章#

上篇我提到,罗氏在本章总算开始稍稍具体的说明,他的无政府主义是如何可能的,而在之前他只是在痛陈国家之恶,那就让我们来看看罗氏心目中的无政府理想社会是什么样的吧。

首先,罗氏引用法哲学家朗·富勒的观点,认为法律无须由政府制订,而可以从人际互动中自发的产生(p.238):

这当然没错,也正是我一直在强调的观点,历史上,习惯法无疑先于国家而出现,即便在国家出现之后,其权力所不及的地方(比如传统中国的乡村社区),习惯法也普遍存在并起着极为重要的作用,而在当今一些无政府地区,习惯法仍是当地唯一正在起作用的法律。

问题是,这些习惯法是否足以维系一个今天这样的市场社会?或者将条件降低一些:在无政府条件下,导致这些习惯法的机制是否能够发展出足以维持当今市场社会所需要的法律元素?在罗氏眼里,这似乎不在话下,他认为这些元素都是不依靠政府的存在而出现的(p.237):

部落习惯法是前国家制度,当然不依赖政府,可是,罗氏将习惯法视为自然法的来源,本身是件非常奇怪的事情,首先,习惯法是因循的结果,而罗氏自然法是理性发现和推导的结果,两者经常是抵触的,对此他早在第三章里明确表达过,把这段文字再摘录一遍吧(p.60):

其次,习惯法是特定博弈背景下达成的协调均衡的产物,因而很自然的随各社会博弈背景不同而各异,事实也是如此,各社会习俗千差万别,而罗氏自然法是“绝对的、不变的、普适的”,两者怎么能等同?按罗氏理论,习惯法根本不配被当作自然法,相反,恰恰是需要被“革命性”的清除的东西,仅仅是为了证明无政府状态下也可以有自然法,他就不惜自打耳光的把它拉进来,是自己记性差还是欺负读者记性差?

好吧,这点暂且搁置,可是罗氏居然认为普通法的出现也不依靠政府,那就完全是胡说八道了,普通法在英格兰就是伴随着王权扩张而发展起来的,可以说普通法的发展就是国王伸张其王权的过程,它把日耳曼习惯法和封建契约义务转变成了近代意义上的法(more...)

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(续)#第23章# 上篇我提到,罗氏在本章总算开始稍稍具体的说明,他的无政府主义是如何可能的,而在之前他只是在痛陈国家之恶,那就让我们来看看罗氏心目中的无政府理想社会是什么样的吧。 首先,罗氏引用法哲学家朗·富勒的观点,认为法律无须由政府制订,而可以从人际互动中自发的产生(p.238): 这当然没错,也正是我一直在强调的观点,历史上,习惯法无疑先于国家而出现,即便在国家出现之后,其权力所不及的地方(比如传统中国的乡村社区),习惯法也普遍存在并起着极为重要的作用,而在当今一些无政府地区,习惯法仍是当地唯一正在起作用的法律。 问题是,这些习惯法是否足以维系一个今天这样的市场社会?或者将条件降低一些:在无政府条件下,导致这些习惯法的机制是否能够发展出足以维持当今市场社会所需要的法律元素?在罗氏眼里,这似乎不在话下,他认为这些元素都是不依靠政府的存在而出现的(p.237): 部落习惯法是前国家制度,当然不依赖政府,可是,罗氏将习惯法视为自然法的来源,本身是件非常奇怪的事情,首先,习惯法是因循的结果,而罗氏自然法是理性发现和推导的结果,两者经常是抵触的,对此他早在第三章里明确表达过,把这段文字再摘录一遍吧(p.60): 其次,习惯法是特定博弈背景下达成的协调均衡的产物,因而很自然的随各社会博弈背景不同而各异,事实也是如此,各社会习俗千差万别,而罗氏自然法是“绝对的、不变的、普适的”,两者怎么能等同?按罗氏理论,习惯法根本不配被当作自然法,相反,恰恰是需要被“革命性”的清除的东西,仅仅是为了证明无政府状态下也可以有自然法,他就不惜自打耳光的把它拉进来,是自己记性差还是欺负读者记性差? 好吧,这点暂且搁置,可是罗氏居然认为普通法的出现也不依靠政府,那就完全是胡说八道了,普通法在英格兰就是伴随着王权扩张而发展起来的,可以说普通法的发展就是国王伸张其王权的过程,它把日耳曼习惯法和封建契约义务转变成了近代意义上的法律,让契约义务超越双方关系而变成一般性权利,从而逐渐脱离封建依附关系,它也为这些权利提供了一个普遍的司法保障,而不再依赖于对等制约和自我救济。 作为一种全新司法程序机制的普通法,纯粹是由王权所创造的,每项诉讼都由王室令状所启动,所谓令状就是一个命令,最初它不是用来启动诉讼的,而是直接就是一个实施救济的指令,诸如“某某郡长:某甲向我告状说某乙侵占了他合法拥有的土地,请责令某乙将该土地归还某甲。钦此”,后来才演变为一个司法程序的启动器:“某某郡长:某甲向我告状说某乙侵占了他合法保有的土地,请责令某乙将该土地归还某甲,若他拒绝这么做,将他带到我的法官前面,让你从当地挑选的12位守法绅士宣誓画押验明该土地究竟由谁合法保有。钦此” 显然,王权在这里起了关键作用,他为诉讼规定了一个明确的程序,保证它可以对特定纠纷输出一个确切裁决,并确保裁决得到执行;理论上,普通法的这个程序机制可以在完全没有实体法的情况下有效工作,比如将12位绅士替换成一个抛硬币的机器,抛出正面就判原告胜诉,实际上古老的神裁法就类似于抛硬币。 但光靠抛硬币总是难以服人,所以在实践过程中普通法逐渐引入实体规则,最初的巡回法官完全是被动的,只是拿着令状死板执行就行了,除令状规定之外,无须对陪审团做任何指导,陪审团直接输出结果就是,只是当司法活动趋于专业化之后,才开始引入举证、交叉质证、法庭辩论等等新的程序环节,而一旦开始举证、质证和辩论,实体规则也就开始形成,这样,需要陪审团来抛硬币的环节,就越来越被限定了。 这里可以看出普通法与大陆成文法的一个关键区别:普通法的方式可以让王权在不制订任何实体规则的情况下推行一套有效的程序机制来处理大量纠纷,而成文法典则需要事先针对各种可能纠纷制订全面详尽的实体规则,后者对立法者的理性能力提出了极高的要求,因而赞同成文法的前提便是假定立法者具有完美的理性。 正因为它在最初可以不包括实体规则,因而普通法可以在借助王权推行法律秩序的同时不与既有的习俗和传统发生冲突,传统的习惯法规则可以在这套程序机制运行的过程中被引入进来:先是陪审团将其对习俗(或封建契约)的理解运用到裁决中,然后由双方律师在辩论中作为先例来援引,再经由司法经验积累由法官陈述为法律规则并用以指导陪审团,最终由法学家在法律著作中加以阐明。 所以,普通法确实有能力容纳习俗和习惯法,但说它不需要政府,则大错特错了。 再来看商人法,商人法确实更多自发成分,而且理论上也可以不依靠政府而存在,但实际上商人法在历史上和目前所起的作用,与政府关系颇为密切;首先,垄断性行会在商人法的发展上起了关键作用,而行会的垄断地位离开政府是难以维系的,其次,既已确立的商人法不断被吸收进官方法律,后者让它获得了普适性。 假如离开这两条,商人法的适用范围将大受约束,很可能仅仅停留于一个个封闭性商人组织的内部规范,这种规范当然也很有用,但仅靠它是否足以为高度流动性的大规模市场活动提供足够的规范保障,是可疑的,至少其历史并未证明这一点。 最后,我们还要问问:罗氏理想中的无政府社会到底是什么样的?他始终只字未提,不过总算用一个例子提示了一下(p.237): 古爱尔兰是罗氏举出的唯一实例,用来说明他的无政府理想何以可能,可是这个例子实在让人失望,它除了能证明没有政府也可能有习惯法之外,丝毫没有说明这个社会(即便只是与同时代的其他社会相比)有何可取之处,更无法对我们今天所能期待的社会制度有所提示。 罗氏所说的那一千年,爱尔兰称得上是处于无政府状态,这不是说那里没有政府,恰好相反,那里政府太多了,但没有一个是成功的,这种长期混乱状态,是一种双边失败的结果:一方面凯尔特土著始终建立不起足够统一强大的国家,而同时外部入侵者(先是维京人,后是诺曼人)的征服和统治始终不太成功。 【爱尔兰民族主义者编造为他们的古代历史编造了许多美妙神话,把它描绘成黄金时代,我猜,作为小白的罗斯巴德大概也受了这些神话的误导,这个猜测基于如下线索:罗氏为其提及古爱尔兰的那段文字所给出的文献来源,是Joseph R. Peden发表在自由意志主义期刊[[The Libertarian Forum]]上的一篇文章,这位Peden是该期刊的发行人,而罗氏是它的编辑,就是说,该期刊就是这哥俩玩的老鼠会】 在罗氏所指那段历史的初期,爱尔兰正处于从部落社会向早期国家过渡的状态,许多对立的酋邦竞争领地和权力,但每个都很弱小,对内尚未有能力制订法律,对外不足以抗衡入侵者,所以只能满足于现有的习惯法,可是部落或酋邦拥有习惯法不是什么值得特别夸耀的事情,稍稍成熟一些的部落社会或多或少都有习惯法。 当然,爱尔兰的习惯法(即[[Brehon Laws]])相对成熟一些,但看起来并不比日耳曼部落的习惯法和当代索马里部落社会的[[Xeer]]系统成熟多少,一大区别是它有文字记录,这是因为基督教传入爱尔兰较早,因而培养了一批识字者。 这套习惯法也没有什么值得羡慕的地方,Brehon系统的主要内容,是对侵害行为规定了一套赔偿标准,这套标准之所以特别繁杂庞大(这一点让它看起来好像很“发达”),是因为古爱尔兰是个高度等级化社会,等级和身份鸿沟十分森严,分的也非常细,这一点倒是与印度很像,因为每种身份的赔偿金定价都不同,所以标准就很繁杂。 施行这套习惯法的这个社会就更不值得羡慕了,经济和社会结构都十分原始,定居程度也还很低,游牧和游耕是主流生产模式,房屋是非洲常见的那种圆形小茅屋;更重要的是,习惯法只能处理一些私人纠纷,根本没有带来和平,古爱尔兰始终处于战乱状态,不是跟入侵者打,就是一群小国王相互混战。 如果罗氏梦寐以求的自由主义无政府社会就是这种,那就不必费心寻找了,索马里就有。
普通法原则的绝佳注脚:《资本的秘密》读后

(按:在继续讨论林权和地权问题之前,提供一点我关于所有权的思想背景,另一篇已经贴过:<钓鱼的故事:所有权的另一种解读>)Hernando de Soto

普通法原则的绝佳注脚——《资本的秘密》读后
辉格
2007年12月26日

清晰的财产权是自由市场的基础,这已经是老生常谈了。但是产权如何得以明晰?经济学家好像不大关心,大概他们认为这是法学家的事情。

德·索托(Hernando de Soto)认为,清晰的产权要求法律在认定权利时,遵循全局一致的原则,否则权利的相关交易人将被迫为每一次交易而陷入纷繁多样的地方性规则的迷宫,如此带来的巨大交易费用将产权的流动性局限在熟人圈子中,因而极大限制了产权潜在价值的发现。

为了更好的理解问题所在,还是让我们回到问题的起点:究竟什么是产权?怎么样的产权才算是清晰的?

财产权是权利的一种,其区(more...)

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(按:在继续讨论林权和地权问题之前,提供一点我关于所有权的思想背景,另一篇已经贴过:<钓鱼的故事:所有权的另一种解读>)Hernando de Soto 普通法原则的绝佳注脚——《资本的秘密》读后 辉格 2007年12月26日 清晰的财产权是自由市场的基础,这已经是老生常谈了。但是产权如何得以明晰?经济学家好像不大关心,大概他们认为这是法学家的事情。 德·索托(Hernando de Soto)认为,清晰的产权要求法律在认定权利时,遵循全局一致的原则,否则权利的相关交易人将被迫为每一次交易而陷入纷繁多样的地方性规则的迷宫,如此带来的巨大交易费用将产权的流动性局限在熟人圈子中,因而极大限制了产权潜在价值的发现。 为了更好的理解问题所在,还是让我们回到问题的起点:究竟什么是产权?怎么样的产权才算是清晰的? 财产权是权利的一种,其区别于其他权利的关键特征是可交易性,或称为流动性,即通过交易从一人向另一人转移的可能性。 权利非常古老。动物会用尿液和体味来划定各自的领地并懂得相互尊重;丈夫可以合法的排除妻子与他人的性接触;父母可以支配未成年孩子的行为甚至他们的婚姻;儿子有望继承父亲的地位和权力;师傅有权要求徒弟给他干活。 这些古老权利的共同特征是:它们都是依赖于身份的,其背后的法则是:“我是XX,我在这里,所以我有权XXX”。 基于身份的权利是难以转移和让渡的,权利对身份的依赖越严重,权利就越难以转让,或者说流动性越差,离现代意义上的财产权也就越远。 封建时代的大部分权利都严重依赖于身份,尤其是关于不动产的权利。一位诺曼男爵在国王的地产核查官要求其出示土地所有权凭证时,从墙上取下一把生锈的剑,答到:我的父亲当初拿着这把剑跟随老威廉从诺曼底来到这里,现在你问我凭什么拥有这块土地,这就是凭证。 很清楚,那时候的人们知道如何捍卫自己的权利,但这种权利显然不同于现代财产权。试想,如果面对地产核查官的是一位移居而来、用金钱向那位男爵换取了那块土地的农民,他很可能就没那么幸运。 在现代法治建立之前,人们为了捍卫自己的不动产权利,必须亲自居住在土地上面,随时应付对权利的各种挑战,用剑、锄头和猎枪来自卫。那时候,很少有商业性的土地转让,因为其结果得不到承认和保护,不动产转移只能随身份转变而进行——封赠、婚姻、过继、死亡、绝嗣等等。 像今天这样凭一纸契约、一张股票,你就能买卖远在芝加哥的大宗货物和纽约的跨国公司权益,这在古代是无法想像的,那时候,你必须亲临现场,亲身捍卫你的权利,离开土地很可能意味着丧失权利。这一点在诺曼时代英法长期战争中表现的十分明显,诺曼贵族(包括国王)大多在诺曼底和英格兰都拥有封地,这迫使他们必须频繁地在海峡两岸来回奔波,不如此就随时可能失去土地。 独立于身份的、摆脱了地方性惯例和人际关系的复杂性、因而无须主人现场亲身维护的、可自由交易的财产权是晚近出现的事物,它是法律现代化进程——或者用德·索托可能会更喜欢的名词:“资本主义革命”——的结果。 一些政治学家指出,现代化过程在早期表现为王权的扩张,从中世纪封建私权网络中建立起现代民族国家的所谓“主权”。从司法角度看,这也是全国性司法体系取代封建个人契约关系和地方习惯法的过程,在此过程中,封建契约或者被打破,或者失去了原本的身份依附特征,不动产交易的有效性被确认,现代财产权制度随着一次次交易转手得到确认而逐渐浮现,最终新兴商业新贵的权势、地位和他们带来的新规则逐渐压倒和改造了旧规则,绝大部分土地最终被卷入新的财产权规则体系下。 在德·索托看来,这一过程中的关键问题是要把各种地方性规则和不成文习俗纳入全局一致的、成文的规则体系中。他指出,在成功解决了这一问题的西欧和北美国家,资本主义得到了发展,而其他地区没能解决这个问题。而我则宁愿将这一反差看作两种法律传统面对规则体系的冲突所作出的不同反应。 查士丁尼或韩非子的信徒们,基于他们对法律本质的理解,将自然而然地把建立统一规则体系的任务,解读为将上帝之法推行或恩赐到迄今王化尚未推及的蛮荒之地;德·索托指出,凡是循此方式试图将一套规则强加于保有各自传统的地方的努力,结果不是规则和秩序的扩展,而是将大部分社会活动置于非法状态,将大部分经济“地下化”,将权利状态变得暧昧不明和不可预期。 接着,德·索托描述了美国所走过的不同道路,得益于开放而善于妥协的政治传统,和从英国继承的司法传统,美国人在每一次面临全局性规则与地方传统和自发规则发生冲突时,总能找到一种妥协方案,既尊重地方的实际权利状态,又能将其纳入全局规则体系,从占地法,优先权法,矿权法,到宅地法,见证了这段历史。 如果我们追溯这一政治和司法传统,不难发现,这正是普通法传统的精神所在,具体表现为以下三个方面: 1)在程序法上谋求统一,在实体法上尊重现状 早在征服者威廉进行“末日审判”土地普查时,就体现了尊重权利现状的精神,诺曼征服在财产权上并非一次彻底推倒重来的革命,除了战争中被杀的原上层贵族的封地被诺曼贵族继承之外,在郡、庄园、市镇等层面上的地方权利得到承认和保护。 亨利二世之前的几代诺曼国王,时常发出一些直接干预权利分配的令状(我称之为“实体性令状”),但他们逐渐意识到,让自己卷入具体的产权纠纷并不明智,于是到亨利二世朝,处理土地产权纠纷的令状就演变成诸如:“某甲诉称某乙侵占其某某土地,现责成该郡守将某乙带到我的法官跟前,令其停止侵占,除非他能找到N位当地骑士来证明……”,很明显,令状的作用由干预权利分配变成了规定并发起诉讼程序。 当初英格兰巡回法官们坐马车巡视全国时,虽然也怀抱建立罗马式秩序的理想,但他们缺少罗马皇帝的铁腕,事实让他们意识到试图消灭地方传统是徒劳无益的,有了这一认识,有了妥协,人类最伟大的法律传统由此诞生,地方的传统和实体性规则得到尊重,地方性规则所导致的权利状态得到承认。 2)陪审制 陪审制是使上述普通法原则得以实现的绝佳制度基础,来自国王的法官确保诉讼按统一的司法程序进行,而把诉讼的实体部分交给来自当地的陪审团。今天,陪审团的功能是证据判别和事实认定,而早期陪审团的功能更多,有时作为提供事实证据的证人,有时则作为乡绅向法官阐释当地习俗和规则(作用类似于现代的专业证人)。 在美国的土地实际占有人捍卫其权利时,陪审制曾发挥了巨大作用。法官常常会听到这样的宣称:“在这里,你别想找到一个会反对我主张的陪审员!”。用德·索托的话来说,陪审团正是那些听得懂狗叫的人,因为他们每天都在闻着那些圈定领地的尿液的气味。 3)举证责任上的保守原则 从亨利二世开始设计的一系列格式令状体现了一个原则:改变现状者负有全部举证责任。我称之为保守原则。这对维持权利状态的稳定性十分关键。比如,某甲在一块土地上耕种并盖房居住多年,他人若要主张与此相冲突的权利,就必须证明他先前曾获得此权利,并且(这很关键):他在过去若干年有效行使了这一权利,或者至少通过诉讼在不断主张这些权利。