【2015-09-26】 @海德沙龙 【历史钩沉】反法西斯胜利纪念年年有，揭露纳粹暴行的学术和文艺作品也层出不穷，可是另一个远比纳粹更邪恶的系统，却很少得到展示和审视，人们要么假装不记得，要么真的忘了，或者压根没听说过，幸好，还有一小撮历史学家没忘记，Conquest便是其中之一 追忆红色恐怖 http://t.cn/RySY5zn @whigzhou: 当前英美左风大盛，新工党和新民主党双双埋葬，自称社会主义者已不再是政治自杀，这一转向，有人说是金融危机的后果，但依我看，更可能是因为：1975年后出生的人已经成为投票主力，他们1990年时还不懂事，大多没被苏联崩溃前后的场面震惊过…… @whigzhou: 1990年后的全球自由化浪潮中，左派丧失底气，除了某些机构拿不到卢布了这个原因之外，主要还是意识形态全面破产，但有意思的是，这套意识形态在完全没添加什么新鲜玩意儿的情况下，却大有复兴之势，可见，和直观场面相比，道理在政治纷争中确实没多少用  

通往现代文明的两条路线 辉格 2015年9月11日 上个月有幸和阿姨谈了两次，成效颇丰，一开始我们花了点时间，快速核对了一下各自在一些要点上的看法，后面的交谈就比较轻松流畅、海阔天空了。 主要的收获在我这边，我现在比较明白阿姨的大致思路了，至于我，因为历来坚持以最直白易懂的方式说话，我想大概从来就是袒露无遗的。（通俗版：大伯总是光着膀子，阿姨则难得玉体袒裎。） 众多基本共识，和一些细节分歧，我就不细说了，因为这些异同旁观者容易理解，从记录文字和我以往文章中也不难找到。这里我想解释的，是我和阿姨最基本的分歧，这涉及到相当纵深的渊源脉络，所以旁观者恐怕不容易看清。 简单说，基本分歧是，对于西方文明走向其现代形态的两条路线——姑且称为封建路线和城邦路线（不过这两个名字可能造成误解，我后面还会说）——我们有着不同态度，阿姨（在不同语境中）同时推崇两者，而我对后者相当拒斥，即便有所接受也很勉强。 需要声明，这一二分叙事是我的个人看法，和阿姨的交谈让我在这问题上思路更清楚了，但这并不代表阿姨也持同样看法，他未必会认可这样的二分。 下面我以最简略的方式解释一下这两条路线究竟是什么，它们的历史渊源，以及各自在现代文明中留下的遗产；这个高度概括性的叙述难免会留下大量有待推敲的疑点和过度片面化之类的问题，我会在未来恰当时候作出更细致的说明。 【前传：农业带来的新冲突局面】 前农业社会也充满暴力冲突，但农业改变了冲突的方式，狩猎采集者相互攻击的目的主要是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，因为他们没什么东西可抢的，因而也没什么东西（除了人身）需要保卫，而农耕者有了可供劫掠的财产（牲畜、谷物和农具），这就完全改变了战争形态。 狩猎采集者之间的战争以伏击和偷袭为主，阵地战多半是仪式性的，伤亡很小；一旦被成功偷袭，占下风一方的主要策略是逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗，农耕者就不同了，他们逃跑就只能饿死，所以必须留下来设法捍卫家园。 这是国家诞生前夜的基本背景，然后，在如何保卫家园上，农耕者发展出了两种模式。 【城邦】 一种是城邦，它源自基于血缘/文化纽带而组成的农耕部落，这些部落在面临新的战争形态时，出于自我保卫的需要，转变成了比原有部落更紧密的共同体，同时继承了部落的两大特性：高度文化认同和平等主义，在外部冲突的压力之下，从中发展出了城邦民主制、公民责任和步兵传统。 其核心特征是高度重合的共同利益，以及由此带来的强凝聚力和集体行动能力，面对外来入侵者时，所有公民不仅都有自身利益需要捍卫，也有义务和同胞并肩捍卫城邦利益，每个公民都是平等战士，这一集体行动的责任，将狩猎者的仪式性阵地战转变成了希腊式步兵方阵。 （在有些案例中，城邦的基础可以由自由农民换成有组织的自由手工业者或小商人，但原理类似。） 城邦是现代公民社会和民主政治的原型。 【封建】 另一种是封建，它起源于武装劫掠团伙，而后者是农业所导致的分工的结果，狩猎者中，每位猎人同时也是战士，不存在分工，因为光靠打仗养不活自己（毕竟抓人吃远不如抓动物吃容易嘛），而农业创造了可供劫掠的财产，因而打仗成了一门可以独立谋生的手艺，于是一部分人从农耕者或狩猎者中分化出来，成为专以劫掠为生的职业武人。 这就给农耕者带来很大麻烦，必须寻求自保，一种方法是组织成自卫共同体，就是城邦，但并非所有农民都能成功创建这样的组织，做不到的那些，只能寻求庇护，与庇护者建立依附关系，交纳保护费，获得其免于劫掠的保证，并得到其帮助抵御其他劫掠者的服务。 寻求庇护者的途径，大致分两种：一种外来劫掠者，这就相当于接受其征服，另一种是本部落内分化出的职业武人（还有一种是像罗马崩溃后留在部落地区的残余军队这样特殊来源）；这种区别的意义主要在初始阶段，双方在种族、语言和文化上存在隔阂，但时间长了，其实没什么不同。 这是最底层的庇护关系，但武装团伙之间的竞争仍然存在，幸运的话，他们之间也可能建立联盟和依附关系，最终构成一个多层次的庇护网络。 假如这种多层庇护网络长期稳定下来，各方遵守效忠/庇护责任（这一责任在底层是一方交保护费，一方提供保护，在上层是一方履行军役，一方封授领地）就转变成封建契约，庇护网络变成了领地封授体系，领地和保护费权益变成了封建式财产权。 需要强调，这一发展不是必然的，在许多条件下，庇护关系可能始终稳定不下来，因而机会主义盛行，长期处于欺骗、背叛、压制和报复的循环之中；但足够幸运的是，封建体系至少在西欧稳定存续了很长时间。 封建制是普通法、普通法下的财产权和英格兰宪政的渊源。（注意是渊源，封建制本身不包括这些元素） 【民族国家：城邦的现代对应物】 民族国家是近代在大得多的规模上复制城邦的产物，不过，规模问题也让它在一些重要方面不同于城邦： 1）对于城邦，文化同质性和民族认同几乎是自动获得的，只是被外部威胁强化了一下，而近代民族国家的同质性和民族认同，则是由政府强力推行的结果，印刷术、公立教育和官僚系统等等现代技术与组织手段，使得这一民族再发明工作有可能完成； 2）城邦的共同利益和共同命运对个体是切实可见的，有说服力的，而民族国家的共同利益多半是虚幻遥远的，需要编造各种神话进行忽悠，有时还需要借助像挑动战争之类的卑劣手段来刻意制造共同命运，即便如此，其集体行动的有效性也远逊于城邦； 3）高出两三个数量级的人口规模，使得城邦的直接民主变得不可行，只能改成代议制；而代议制里的委托代理问题，实际上让权力落入了精英手中，国民虽有公民之名，无政治参与之实，城邦公民真正的现代对应物其实是民族国家的精英； 4）由于上述几点（还有更多），城邦的主要优势，全民动员能力（这可以让他能够召集起大量步兵），在一战之后其实已经逐渐丧失，能否复兴十分可疑； 【自由市场秩序：封建的现代对应物】 自由市场秩序是指，存在一个普通法体系，保障人身和财产权利，除此之外，政府不干预任何私人事务，简单说，其终极形态就是市场无政府，即，当司法系统能够自我维持时，政府就被取消或私有化了。 民族国家和城邦之间的对应关系是容易理解的，因为他们保留了许多外观上的相似性，自由市场秩序和封建之间的对应关系则不容易看出也较难解释清楚，因为它更迂回曲折，封建制为现代市场制度的起源提供了良好土壤，但两者本身十分不同，其间经历了一系列演变，而且依赖于许多因缘际会的巧合，后者远远不是前者的“必然产物”。 （我不打算在这里详述这一演变过程，从我的旧文章里可以找到一些粗略的叙述，比如：《王权削弱不是宪政发展的结果》，《封建主义和专制主义一样坏？》，《天堂不远，就在索马里》，《封建与宪政》） 不过，深入一点就会发现，在一些基本要点上，两者仍有着共性，最根本的共性是：它们都是高度私人化的——没有公法，只有私法，没有公权力，只有私权利，没有公民，只有个人，没有主权，只有法人，…… 当然，这里的“没有”都是针对其终极形态而言，实际上尚不存在接近完美的自由市场秩序，因而这些“没有”在特定社会都要打不同程度的折扣。 【概括性对比】 当然，两条路线之间也有不少非常重要的共同点，首先，两者都要求有一套社会契约，或者叫共同规范，据此而建立契约共同体，不同的是，民族国家的契约内容更多，是一种强共同体，对成员施加强义务，要求更多的价值认同和普遍伦理；其次，两者都为广大地域的众多人口提供了普遍司法保护，从而使得现代流动性社会和大规模市场成为可能。 为方便理解，我概括对比一下两条路线的要点（我用城邦和封建来命名两条路线，仅仅是基于渊源上的考虑，目标形态其实是它们各自的现代对应物）：

	城邦路线	封建路线
文化同质性要求	强	弱
民族认同/价值认同	强	弱
共同利益/共同命运	强	弱
社会契约	强	弱
公民义务	强	弱
公法领域	强	弱
主权地位	至高无上/明确/集中	受限/模糊/分散
政府规模	大	小
地方自治	弱	强
普选制	必须	不必
义务兵役	必须	不必/无
全民动员能力	强	弱
国民教育	必须	弱/无
福利主义倾向	强	弱
个人自由	受限	充分
对制度创新的开放性	低	高

  【站队理由】 作为个人主义者，我自然倾向于第二条路线，第一条为个人自由留下的空间太小，阿姨也承认，他在内心也是更喜欢第二种的，但现实条件不允许，只能退而求其次，主权民族国家已成为主导，用阿姨的话说，除非发生一次末日级的大变故，否则私人秩序已没有出头机会，对此判断，我能理解，但有保留，存疑。 确实，在一个险恶环境中（比如老欧洲），缺乏全民动员能力可能是致命的，大英在其全盛期，步兵数量也是少得可怜，对于维持其所主导的全球秩序完全不够，所以只能依靠外交手腕、借力打力，或者花钱雇佣，一旦民族国家纷纷崛起，秩序便难以为继。相比之下，普鲁士这个按城邦路线创建民族国家的典范，其崛起速度和动员能力则有目共睹。 （其实荷兰比大英更能代表封建路线，但因为荷兰过早退出历史舞台，没多少东西可说，而且荷兰的命运也说明了封建路线的脆弱性。） 历史上的情况确实如此，但更重要的是现在，所以关键问题是，美国究竟属于哪一类？假如美国是另一个普鲁士，那我们确实没得选了。 这问题很难回答，美国太特殊了，而这一特殊又是因为他太安全了，远离险恶旧世界，所以即便骨子里有不少城邦元素，也鲜有机会发育成普鲁士那样，并在行动上表现出来，偶尔爆发一下倒是能动员起一支上千万的军队，和吓死人的军工产能，但这种爆发注定是短暂的。 反过来也是，假如美国代表了市场秩序模式，也同样缺乏机会发育和表现出来，还是因为他太安全也太辽阔因而太容易自足了，没必要去建立一个帝国来维持他所需要的安全秩序，至少没必要为此付出大规模动员的代价。 但依我看，美国还是更接近后一种情况，当然我可能只是被愿望蒙蔽了判断力；但无论如何，我是不会为任何一个普鲁士站队的，即便和霍布斯状态或极权主义相比，普鲁士要好多了，但对我来说还是远远不够好。 这么说吧，假如人类贱到不得不靠普鲁士来拯救，那我对他们还有没有救这件事情就没多大兴趣了。 （随便记录一些交谈当时闪过的念头，不成条理，读着吃力的话还望见谅，要把这种大话题写流畅太吃力了）

How Liberals Funked It? 自由派是如何可耻遁匿的？ 作者：Robert Conquest @ 1999-7-30 译者：Yuncong Yang 校对：Marcel ZHANG（@马赫塞勒张），沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Hoover Institution，http://www.hoover.org/research/how-liberals-funked-it A liberal is, by definition, one whose aim is the furtherance of ever greater political liberty, freedom of thought, and social justice. A number of those who thought of themselves as, and were thought of as, liberals became apologists for Stalinist or similar regimes whose most notable characteristics were extreme terror, narrow dogmatism, social oppression, and economic failure. That is, they were all that the liberal tradition opposed. 按定义，一个“自由派”理应是以推进政治自由、思想自由与社会公正为其目标。但是，许多自认为且被大众认为是自由派的人，却成了斯大林主义及类似政权的辩护士。这类政权最昭著的特征是极度的恐怖，僵化的教条主义，社会压制，以及经济失败。显然，所有这些都是自由派最应当反对的东西。 How, and why, did a number of liberals explicitly, and a large swath of liberaldom implicitly, overcome this objection? How did this apparent paradox come to pass? Why in the 1930s and later do we find a sort of general infection of the atmosphere in which much of the intelligentsia moved? Even apart from those who became more or less addicted to communism, there was also a stratum that usually gave the Soviet Union and such regimes some moral advantage over the West. 那么，那些明确这么做的自由派，以及更多默认其做法的泛自由派人士，为何能够克服这种显而易见的自相矛盾？它们又是如何做到这一点的？为什么会出现一个如此明显的悖论？为什么自1930年代起，整个知识界都感染了这种气氛？即使不算那些多少痴迷于共产主义的人，知识界里还有一大批人乐于认为：与西方相比，苏联及类似政权具有某种道义优势。 First, of course, we should say that there were many liberals—and in general many on the left—who kept their principles unsullied and were often among the strongest opponents of the communist despotisms. Liberal is, indeed, a vague term. Many of us would take a “liberal” position on some issues, a “conservative” one on others—as most of the American or British people in fact do (an attitude shared by the present writer). 首先应当指出的是：许多自由派——以及一般而言，许多左派——还是保持着他们的原则未受玷污的。他们时常还属于共产暴政最坚决的反对者之列。“自由派”这个词的意义本身就是相当含糊的。大多数人都在一些问题上抱着“自由派”的看法，而在另一些问题上持“保守派”观点，多数英国人或美国人——含笔者在内——都是这样。 These two vaguely differentiated attitudes are the poles within the normal development, or balance, of a civic or consensual society. But all those with a reasonably critical intelligence, whether “conservative” or “liberal” on other issues, were hostile to the USSR. Those who supported it unreservedly were Communists; those who excused it may have thought of themselves as liberals, but to that extent they degraded the term. 在一个平衡发展的公民社会或协约社会（consensual society）里，出现“自由派”和“保守派”这样两种各居一极但分野并不明确的观点，是再正常不过的了。但是所有具有适当批判思维能力的人，不管他在其它问题上自认为是保守派还是自由派，都是对苏联怀有敌意的。明确表态支持苏联的人无疑是共产主义者，而那些对苏联抱有心怀体谅的人，或许自认为是自由派，但他们这么做时，正是在给“自由派”这个词抹黑。 The phenomenon we deal with here is what Orwell called “renegade liberalism.” He defined these renegade liberals with characteristic felicity, in the unused preface to Animal Farm, as those who hold that “democracy” can only be defended by discouraging or suppressing independent thought. 本文要讨论的，是被乔治·奥威尔称为“变节的自由主义”的现象。奥威尔在《动物庄园》的一篇未发表的序文中，以他标志性的精妙笔触，定义了这些变节的自由派：这些人认为保卫他们眼中的“民主”的唯一方式，就是阻止或压制独立思考。 His immediate concern was that “where the USSR and its policies are concerned one cannot expect intelligent criticism or even, in many cases, plain honesty from liberal writers and journalists who are under no direct pressure to falsify their opinions.” 当时，最令奥威尔感到担忧的现象是，“即使并未受到什么迫使他们说假话的直接压力，自由派作家或记者们在讨论苏联及其政策时，也难以指望他们表现出一点批判性智慧，许多时候他们甚至都不肯说句实话。” Elsewhere (in “The Prevention of Literature”), he comments, “When one sees highly educated men looking on indifferently at oppression and persecution, one wonders which to despise more, their cynicism or their shortsightedness.” And, he felt obliged to add, “it is the liberals who fear liberty and intellectuals who want to do dirt on the intellect.” 在另一篇文章（《对文学的阻碍》）中，奥威尔评论道：“当一个受过高等教育的人对他眼前的压制和迫害熟视无睹，我真不知道是更应当鄙视他的冷漠还是他的短视。”可能是觉得自己有义务说得更明白一些，他又写道：“害怕自由的恰恰是那些自由派，而抹黑智识的正是知识分子。” THE SLIPPERY CONCEPT OF EQUALITY 平等：一个难以捉摸的概念 We can trace the roots of this aberration a long way back. Even before the First World War, L. T. Hobhouse in his classic Liberalism had written, “liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid meaning.” “Equality” is a slippery word. In a general sense we may allow that genuine liberals—and others—are committed to a society of equal citizens. 自由派的这种错乱由来已久。在第一次世界大战前，L.T.霍布豪斯在其经典著作《自由主义》中已然写道：“如果不讲平等，那么自由只是个表面好听而含义令人作呕的名词。”“平等”是个不大好定义的词。往大里说，我们可以认为那些真诚的自由派——也算上其他自由派好了——希望建成一个由平等公民组成的社会。 The liberal state may have a legitimate role in redressing poverty, making health care available, and so forth, but after a point we find that the liberté and égalité that proved incompatible in the 1790s are still awkward companions. 一个秉承自由派理念的国家，或许可以合法地在消除贫困，普及医疗保健等方面发挥作用。可是当自由派理念进一步延伸到社会生活的其他方面时，我们将会发现，在法国大革命时曾被证明不能无限相容的“liberté”和“égalité”依然会起冲突。 And, as the liberal attitude became more and more concerned with the use of political power to promote equality, it tended to become less and less concerned with the liberty side; even domestically (in Thomas Sowell’s words), “the grand delusion of contemporary liberals is that they have both the right and the ability to move their fellow creatures around like blocks of wood—and that the end results will be no different than if people had voluntarily chosen the same actions.” 并且，当自由派们越来越重视使用政治权力来推进平等的时候，他们会渐渐倾向于无视他们理念里的“自由”部分，即使这自由是他们同胞的自由。用托马斯·索维尔的话讲：“当代自由派陷入了一个巨大的幻觉：他们觉得他们既有权利也有能力像搬动木材一样随意指挥他们的同胞们。而且在他们指挥下，最终结果就跟人们最初自发选择同样的行动没什么差别。” And when these liberals looked abroad they found a regime that claimed to have the same aims—and used the same, or much the same, vocabulary. If anything, from a skeptic’s point of view, the Communists overdid it (with the result that any country nowadays calling itself a People’s Republic or a Democratic Republic is known at once to be a ruthless dictatorship). 当这些自由派们放眼海外，他们看到了一个号称和他们追求同一个目标的政权——而且这个政权也说着和他们大体相同的一套话。不，从一个怀疑者的眼里看来，共产主义者甚至可以说是把自由派的理想做过了头（其结果是现在人们看到一个“某某人民共和国”或者“某某民主主义共和国”，就立刻知道那是个残忍无情的专制政权）。 ROTTEN LIBERALS—AND THE VAST KLEPTOCRACY 腐臭的自由派——及广泛的盗贼统治 Communists in fact despised liberals, even if not quite as much as they despised social-democrats. It was in his procommunist period that W. H. Auden wrote: 共产主义者们实际上是鄙视自由派的，当然可能没有他们鄙视社会民主党人来得那么厉害。W.H.奥登在他支持共产主义的那段时期写下过这样的诗句：

Because you saw but were not indignant The invasion of the great malignant Cambridge ulcer That army intellectual Of every kind of liberal, Smarmy with friendship but of all There are none falser. 你看到了那恶心的剑桥脓疮， 看到了它入侵我们的国度， 却并不感到愤怒。 那支诸种自由派知识分子组成的侵略军， 表演着种种虚假的好意， 实际上，没人比他们更加虚伪卑鄙

“Rotten liberalism” was, of course, the conventional charge made by the Soviet Communists against those insufficiently ruthless in the repression of enemies of the people. 当然，“腐臭的自由主义者”这个词也是苏维埃共产主义者创造出来的。他们时常拿这个词来鄙视那些在镇压人民的敌人方面做得不够狠辣到位的家伙们。 Moreover, Lenin’s own interest in the overthrow of the existing order was so intense that he did not spread his progressivism into any other fields and had nothing but contempt for modern art, free love, unorthodox medicine, and all the other paraphernalia. Communist artistic principles—socialist realism and so forth—remained overtly hostile to all the modernisms dear to many liberal hearts. 此外，列宁本人是如此醉心于推翻现有秩序，以致他只有在这一方面才表现出了那么一点进步派倾向，而与此同时彻底无视了其他领域。对于现代艺术、自由恋爱、非传统医学，以及其它种种现代事物，列宁的态度只有鄙视。共产主义艺术的准则——社会主义现实主义等等——始终全面敌视各种形式的现代艺术，而这些现代艺术正是许多自由派们全心珍爱着的。 The Communists’ attitude to homosexuality, at least after its criminalization in the USSR in 1935, was contrary to an important component of the liberal worldview—but Moscow did not lose the allegiance even of homosexuals such as Guy Burgess. The Soviets suppressed and maligned all the psychological views, Freudian and other, dear to Western intellectuals. And Stalin’s extreme anti-Semitism in the post–World War II years ran against anything describable as liberal. 共产主义者对同性恋的态度，至少是在1935年苏联将同性恋入刑之后，是与自由派世界观的一个重要方面相抵触的。但即使是盖伊·伯吉斯【译注：英国情报人员和外交官，著名苏联间谍】这样的同性恋者，也从未放弃过对莫斯科的忠诚。苏联压制和批判所有那些西方知识分子视若珍宝的心理学学说——弗洛伊德主义等等。战后斯大林表现出的露骨的极端反犹倾向，更是和一切能被称为自由主义的思想相对立的。 But, some liberals felt, at least the Stalinists were not capitalists, not motivated by greed, which, taken as the defining quality of the economic system in the West, was thus the most detested of all vices for certain liberals. These were, in general, those who gained their income (and were highly competitive with rivals for it) in academic or media spheres, that is, money derived from, but not directly dependent on, “capitalism.” 但是，一些自由派们还是认为，至少斯大林主义者不是利欲熏心的资本家，而后者在一些自由派看来，是整个西方经济制度的根本特质，因此是所有罪恶中最可鄙弃的罪恶。抱有这样看法的人，通常都是从学术界或媒体业挣得收入（而且是通过与其对手的高强度竞争而挣得），这些钱自然也派生于 “资本主义”，虽然并不直接依靠于它。 Greed, it might be argued, is not as bad as mass murder. But in any case greed was equally prevalent in the mass murder societies. Corruption of every possible type has flourished in all the communist countries. It is not only that the USSR, for example, became a vast kleptocracy but also that even the supposedly pristine early revolutionaries were anything but immune. 或许有人会说，贪欲再怎么也没有大规模屠杀那么坏呀？可事实上，在那些发生大屠杀的国家里，贪欲和西方社会一样盛行。在所有共产主义国家里，一切人类社会中可能发生的腐败活动都大行其道。不仅苏联很快变成了一个巨大的盗贼统治国家，那些据说品行高洁的早期革命家们也都绝非纯洁无瑕。 In fact, with few exceptions the victorious Bolsheviks lived comfortably through the deprivations of the postrevolutionary period. Milovan Djilas, then a Yugoslav communist leader, was shocked at how his victorious partisans, on entering Belgrade, seized villas, cars, women, and so on. The same was noted of the Sandinistas when they entered Managua. 事实上，在革命后的匮乏时期里，得胜的布尔什维克领袖几无例外都过着优裕生活。米洛凡·吉拉斯，当年的南斯拉夫共产党领导人，震惊地看到他的同志们获胜进入贝尔格莱德后个个都开始霸占别墅、汽车和女人了。尼加拉瓜的桑地诺武装分子们打进马那瓜后的表现也一模一样。 THE SWING IN LEFTISH OPINION 左派观点的转变 The phenomenon of renegade liberalism arose in the early days of the Soviet regime. Lincoln Steffens, the fearless journalist exposer of American corruption, famously said of the USSR, “I have seen the future and it works.” He had seen nothing and that future didn’t work. 在苏维埃政权的幼年时期，变节的自由主义现象已经出现了。林肯·斯蒂芬斯，那位无畏的揭露美国种种腐败现象的名记者，曾说过一句关于苏联的名言：“我看到了它的未来，它行得通。”当然，实际上他啥也没看到，而那个未来也没行通。 But until the 1930s the Sovietophiles were a minority among liberals. It is in 1933 that we see a real swing in leftish opinion. The terror-famine early that year, in which millions died, had been widely and accurately reported in much of the Western press. 但直到2ij如此醉心于推翻现有秩序写下过这样的诗句191919119130年代，亲苏分子还只占自由派中的一小部分。西方左派对苏联态度的真正转变发生在1933年。在那年初，恐怖的乌克兰大饥荒——数百万人丧生——在西方得到了广泛且准确的报道。 But the Soviet government simply denied that any famine had taken place. President Kalinin, speaking of “political cheats who offer to help the starving Ukraine,” commented that, “only the most decadent classes are capable of producing such cynical elements.” 苏联政府则矢口否认曾发生过任何饥荒。最高苏维埃主席加里宁在谈到那些“号称要帮助饥饿的乌克兰的政治骗子”时说道：“只有那些最最卑劣的家伙才能编出这种犬儒主义的谎言。” The Soviet story was supported—as we now know for disreputable reasons—by reporters such as Walter Duranty. Thus two versions were available to the American liberals. But it was Duranty who received the Pulitzer Prize—for “dispassionate, interpretive reporting of the news from Russia.” 一些像沃尔特·杜兰蒂之类的记者支持了苏联方面的说法——我们今天知道，这些支持背后有着不可见人的理由。这样，在美国自由派的面前就出现了两种迥然相异的说法。但是最后得到普利策奖的是杜兰蒂——为他“就俄国消息作出的冷静的，解读性的报道”。 The announcement of the prize added that Duranty’s dispatches were “marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity,” being “excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.” 普利策评奖委员会的颁奖通稿里继续写道，杜兰蒂的报道表现了“学术性，洞察力，中立性，优秀的判断力，而且格外清晰明了”，这些报道是“最佳外国新闻报道的杰出典范”。 The Nation, citing him in its annual “honor roll,” described his as “the most enlightening, dispassionate and readable dispatches from a great nation in the making which appeared in any newspaper in the world.” 《国家》杂志在它一年一度的“荣誉榜”里列入了杜兰蒂的名字，说他的报道是“最富启示的公允冷静报道，可读性极佳。来自一个正浮现于全世界所有报章之上的，正在创建中的伟大国家”。 A banquet was given at the Waldorf Astoria in 1933 to celebrate the recognition of the USSR by the United States. A list of names was read, each politely applauded by the guests until Walter Duranty’s was reached; then, Alexander Woollcott wrote in the New Yorker, “the only really prolonged pandemonium was evoked. . . . Indeed, one got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty.” 1933年，在纽约华尔道夫饭店举办了一场盛大宴会，旨在庆祝美国对苏联的承认。会上宣读了一串名字，每个名字都得到了人们礼貌性的掌声。接着杜兰蒂的名字出现了，亚历山大·沃尔科特在《纽约客》上写道：“（杜兰蒂的名字）激发了当晚唯一一次长时间的狂热喧腾……的确，当晚来宾都感觉到，仿佛美国出现了一次鉴别力大爆发，同时承认了苏联和杜兰蒂。” This scene in the Waldorf was clearly a full-dress appearance of the liberal establishment. And all this was before Stalin and his Comintern had given up their overt hostility to social democrats and liberals and moved over to a popular front. 华尔道夫饭店的景象，无疑象征着美国自由派当权集团的正式亮相。而所有这些，都是在斯大林和他的第三国际全面放弃对社会民主主义者及自由派的公开敌视态度、转而采取一种更受欢迎的面貌之前发生的。 THE ACADEMIC FRONDE 学术界的投石党人 From the start, it was not only the occasional corrupt journalist such as Walter Duranty but also a veritable Fronde of academics who were at least equally responsible for mediating the Soviet phenomena for the Western liberal intelligentsia. It would be to present all the horrors of expert academe. 打一开始，在西方自由派知识界面前为苏联洗地的，就不只是杜兰蒂等几个腐败记者。一伙名副其实的学术界投石党人至少要和杜兰蒂之流负相等的责任。从中将揭示出整个专业学界最恶心的事。 Most notorious, of course, were the deans of Western social science, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who went to Russia, saw the system, and produced what purported to be a learned tome on the subject—Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?—which in its second edition, at the height of the terror, dropped the question mark. 最臭名昭著的，当然是当时西方社会科学界掌门人西德尼·韦伯和贝亚特丽斯·韦伯夫妇。他们前往苏联，看到了苏联体制，然后写出了号称苏联问题权威著作的《苏联共产主义：一种新的文明？》——此书再版时，书名里的那个问号被删掉了，而此时正值苏联政治恐怖的高峰。 Their massive exercise in drivel was largely based on believing Soviet official documents. They were, in effect, taken in above all by Potemkin paperwork—of elections, trade unions, cooperatives, statistics, all the documents of the phantom USSR. 韦伯夫妇之所以表现出如此惊人的愚蠢和幼稚，很大程度上归因于他们对苏联官方文件的盲信。实际上，他们被眼前的波将金式虚假资料彻底蒙骗了。这些资料里描述了选举，工会，合作社，包含各种统计数据，向韦伯夫妇呈现了一个完全虚假的苏联。 Many others followed, such as Harold Laski, professor of political science at the London School of Economics and at one point chairman of the Labour Party. When Sir Bernard Pares, the West’s leading “Russianist,” arrived in Russia, his previous anti-Soviet feelings evaporated. 很多人趋步韦伯夫妇之后尘，比如伦敦经济学院的政治学教授哈罗德·拉斯基，他后来曾任工党主席。西方世界的首席“俄国通”伯纳德·帕雷斯爵士一踏上俄国国土，他之前的反苏倾向立刻烟消云散了。 As his son admiringly put it, he “had not left the Moscow railway station before his mind was flooded with the realization that the Bolsheviks were, after all, Russia.” He, Laski, the Webbs, and others all pronounced the show trials genuine exercises in truth and legality. 就像后来他儿子满怀着敬慕之心写下的那样，他“在踏出莫斯科火车站之前就已得出结论，布尔什维克就是俄国”。帕雷斯，拉斯基，韦伯夫妇和许多其他人都认为，他们看到的那些审判秀都是真正基于真相与合法性的实践。 These were, indeed, individuals. The academic world, though liberal in a general way, was not as yet a scene of organized error on the communist regime. That came later and in particular in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 以上说到的这些多是个人行为，当时的学术界，虽然总的来说是偏自由派的，还并没有在共产政权问题上表现出后来那种几乎是有组织的错误倾向。那要等到以后，特别是要在二十世纪的最后1/4才会大行其道呢。 THE POTEMKIN PHENOMENON 波将金现象 The Potemkin phenomenon proper—the presentation of faked appearances of prosperity or social triumphs—was, of course, widespread in all the communist countries. Anyone who ever visited the Exhibition of Economic Achievements in Moscow will know the score. Similarly, when Vice President Henry Wallace, on a flight from America to China, was for a few days in the midst of the frightful Kolyma labor camps, the guard towers and barbed wires were torn down, the miserable prisoners replaced by strong and healthy NKVD men, and so on. 波将金现象——伪造出虚假的繁荣或社会成就用于展示——当然在所有共产主义国家中都广泛存在。随便哪个看过莫斯科的经济成就展的人都知道那是怎么回事。与此相似，当美国副总统亨利·华莱士自美国飞往中国时，他曾在那恐怖的科雷马劳改营中待过几天。在华莱士停留期间，所有的守卫塔和铁丝网都拆掉了。可怜的囚犯们被换成了身强力壮的内务人民委员部人员。诸如此类。 Many such stories could be told. Yet the most extraordinary are those representing the Soviet penal system as humane and progressive. The facts about the Gulag were already available in a number of firsthand accounts. But, entirely for deceiving the Western liberals, the Stalinists maintained some “model prisons”—in particular one at Bolshevo where J. L. Gillin, a former president of the American Sociological Society, noted that: 这样的故事还有很多，其中最为卓异的，无疑是那些把苏联刑罚系统包装为“人道”和“进步”的体制。当时，已经有一些有关古拉格实情的第一手记述出现了。然而，斯大林主义者们为了蒙骗西方自由派，特意设置了一些“模范监狱”。比如设在波尔谢夫的模范监狱。曾任美国社会学学会主席的J.L.季林在访问波尔谢夫监狱后写道：

In accordance with the spirit of the Revolution the terms current in capitalist penology are discarded. There are no “crimes”; there are “wrongs.” . . . There is no “punishment,” only “measures of social defence.” 根据革命精神，资本主义刑罚学说里的词语都被抛弃了。不再有“犯罪”了，只有“错误”……再也没有“惩罚”，有的只是“社会防卫措施”。

One liberal visitor, Jerzy Gliksman, a progressive member of the Warsaw City Council, was thus deceived but later experienced the real Soviet penal behavior—described in his striking memoirs of the Gulag. 一位自由派访问者乔治·格利克斯曼当时是华沙市议会的一位进步派成员，他也上了当。不过后来他亲身体验了真正的苏联刑罚，并在回忆录中记下了自己令人发指的古拉格体验。 As Hans Magnus Enzensberger writes of Havana two generations later, there were delegates living “in the hotels for foreigners who had no idea that the energy and water supply in the working quarters had broken down during the afternoon, that bread was rationed, and that the population had to stand for two hours in line for a slice of pizza; meanwhile the tourists in their hotel rooms were arguing about Lukacs.” 就像汉斯·马格努斯·恩森斯伯格在几十年后描写的哈瓦那一样，很多访问者住在“外国人专用的旅馆里。这些外国佬根本不知道当天下午工人居住区曾经断水断电，不知道面包是按配给定额发放的，不知道他们在旅馆房间里争论有关卢卡奇的问题时，群众们在外面为领一块比萨饼要排两个小时的队。” Even the actual optic nerves of Western viewers seem to have become distorted, with falsehood coming from both outside and inside. As Malcolm Muggeridge noted: 在内外夹攻的假话冲击之下，这些西方访客的视神经似乎都被扭曲了。正如马尔科姆·穆格里奇写到的：

There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU with tears of gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest clergymen who walked reverently through anti-God museums and reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists who watched delightedly tanks rattle across the Red Square and bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town planning specialists who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered: “If only we had something like this in England!” The almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university-educated tourists astonished even Soviet officals used to handling foreign visitors. “望见国家政治保卫总局总部的宏伟大厦时，一些真诚主张人道屠宰牲口的活动家流下了感激的热泪；听完苏联的无产阶级专政是如何必要的说教后，一些真诚主张比例代表制的活动家热切地表示着同感；真诚的教士们满怀敬意的走在反上帝主题博物馆里，翻阅着宣扬无神论的著作；真诚的和平主义者们高兴地观看开过红场的坦克和遮天蔽日的轰炸机；真诚的城市设计专家们站在拥挤失修的居民楼外，嘴里嘟囔着：‘我们英国要是也有这个就好了！’这些几乎都受过高等教育的访客们表现的这种令人难以置信的轻信，甚至把那些专职糊弄外国来客的苏联官员都惊呆了。”

GOGHDZE IS A FINE MAN 贡加泽是个好人 It was not only the facts about communist regimes that received such treatment but even Stalinist personalities. The French progressive novelist Romain Rolland described secret police chief Genrikh Yagoda (later shot) as sensitive and intellectual. Harold Laski had a long discussion with Vyshinsky, faker of show trials, whom he found “a man whose passion was law reform. . . . He was doing what an ideal Minister of Justice would do if we had such a person in Great Britain.” 受到这种对待的不止是共产主义政权的方方面面，还包括斯大林主义者的品格。法国进步小说家罗曼·罗兰把秘密警察头子亨利希·亚戈达（后被枪毙）描述为一个敏感聪慧的人。哈罗德·拉斯基在和维辛斯基——一系列审判秀的策划者和执行者——长谈之后，觉得他是“一个全心投入法律改革事业的人……如果他生在英国，他做的就是一个理想的司法大臣所做的事。” Vice President Henry Wallace later described Beria’s terror henchman in the Soviet Far East, Goghdze, as “a very fine man, very efficient, gentle and understanding with people.” Owen Lattimore saw I. F. Nikishov, the head of the most murderous camp system in the Gulag, as having “a trained and sensitive interest in art and music and also a deep sense of civic responsibility.” 在亨利·华莱士副总统口中，贝利亚在远东的忠实走狗贡加泽是“一个非常好的人，效率很高，待人温和，善于理解他人。”欧文·拉铁摩尔认为I.F.尼基绍夫——他管辖的集中营系统即使在古拉格中也是最凶残致命的一个——拥有“在音乐和艺术上训练有素且趣味敏锐，同时对于公民责任的深刻认知”。 H. G. Wells arrived in Moscow in 1934 full of hostility to communism and to Stalin. An interview changed that. Stalin, it is true, “looked past me rather than at me” but “not evasively.” He asked Wells’s permission to smoke his pipe and in this and other ways soon allayed Wells’s hostility. H.G.威尔斯在1934年满怀着对共产主义和斯大林的敌意来到了莫斯科。和斯大林的一次会面完全改变了他的态度。斯大林，当真的，“把目光投向了我的身后而不是看着我”，但“并不是为了躲开我。”在点燃烟斗前，斯大林特意征得了客人的同意。这样那样的小姿态很快就把威尔斯的敌意消解于无形了：

I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest, and to these qualities it is, and nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia. I had thought before I saw him that he might be where he was because men were afraid of him but I realize that he owes his position to the fact that no one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him. “我从没见过一个更加直率、公正且诚实的人。正是由于他的这些品质，而非什么神秘或卑劣的因素，他才能得到他在今日俄国的伟大且无争议的统治地位。在见到他之前，我曾认为他是由于别人对他的恐惧才得到今天的地位的。我现在才明白，他的地位正是来源于这一事实：没有人害怕他，相反所有人都信赖他。”

Even Franklin Roosevelt—deceived indeed by Harold Ickes—was charmed by Stalin into speaking of his being above all “getatable”: the great British Russianist Ronald Hingley commented that “ungetatability” was one of Stalin’s central characteristics. 即使富兰克林·罗斯福——其实他是被哈罗德·伊克斯骗了——也被斯大林的魅力打动，以致他评论斯大林首先是个“易于亲近的人”：伟大的俄国通，英国人罗纳德·辛格利对此评论说，“不易亲近”正是斯大林性格的核心特征之一。 Among the most egregious of what I hope I may be excused as calling the Kremlin creepers was a number of those who would have been called liberal Christians. One might have expected a certain alienation from communism by any of them that had read Lenin’s virulent condemnation of all religion but particularly of sophisticated religion. The active persecution of religion in the communist countries might, you would also think, have also had an effect. 在所有那些“克里姆林宫的小爬虫”——希望大家原谅我使用这个词——中，最令人震惊不解的，就是那些曾被称作自由派基督徒的家伙。一般人都会认为：宗教人士只要读过列宁对宗教，特别是繁琐神学的那些恶毒攻击，总会对共产主义有所疏远。共产主义国家对于宗教的现实迫害也应该会加深这种排斥。 But to take only one example—the World Council of Churches Central Committee’s meeting in 1973 passed a resolution deploring oppression in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the United States, and elsewhere. An attempt by a Swedish clergyman to add the communist countries was defeated ninety-one to three, with twenty-six abstentions. 但让我举一个例子吧：世界基督教协进会在1973年的中央委员会上通过了一项决议，谴责中东、非洲、拉丁美洲、美国和其他一些地方对宗教的压迫。会上一位瑞典教士试图把共产主义国家加入谴责范围，对这一提案的投票结果是：三票赞成，九十一票反对，二十六票弃权。

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We might say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. 或许可以这么说：正如胆固醇有两种，自由派也有两种：好的和坏的。

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Here again, the commitment has often been so strong that it is hard to imagine that complete conversion to communism has not taken place. A Communist once told me his method. First you explain to a Christian sympathizer that communism is compatible with Christianity. That accomplished, you explain that Christianity is not compatible with communism. 在这里我们也看到，他们对共产主义的支持是如此强烈，以致人们很难想象他们居然还没有完全改宗共产主义。一位共产主义者曾经跟我说过他的妙法：首先，对一个同情共产主义的基督徒解释共产主义与基督教义可以相容，完成这一步之后，你再向他解释基督教义和共产主义不能相容就行了。 BUT WHY? 为什么？ I started by advancing a general reason, or context, for these phenomena. I argued that they arose from an excessive regard for equality as against liberty. That is, people thought they saw a system, superior to our own, in which the abhorrent profit motive had been eliminated (in a sense so it had, but there are other ways of robbing the population). It was rather as if they would rejoice to find that a slum landlord had been replaced by a gangster extortionist. 在本文开始时，我试图为这些现象提出一个总体原因或情境。我提出：这种现象出现的根源是过分注重平等而不惜放弃自由。也就是说：这些人认为他们看到了一种比我们的体制更优越的体制，这种体制消灭了追逐利润这一可怕动机（一定意义上它确实做到了，当然与此同时，搜刮民脂民膏的办法还多得很呢）。事实上，他们更像是乐于看到一个黑帮勒索者取代一个贫民窟房东。 But even this is hardly enough to explain how the mind of the liberal intelligentsia became so much a subject of deception and self-deception. We must inquire further. 但是就算这一原因也不足以解释，为什么自由派知识分子的心智沦落至此，以至让他们成为如此程度的欺骗和自欺的牺牲品。还有必要向更深处找寻原因。 That is so even when we consider the attraction of anything “noncapitalist”—even when we consider domestic resentment against “conservatives” on home soil—for, as Macaulay writes of British politicians in the eighteenth century, “it is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original principles.” 即使我们考虑到任何“非资本主义”事物对自由派的吸引力，即使我们考虑自由派对本国“保守派”的忿恨——正如麦考莱在论述18世纪英国政治家时写下的：“政党总是把它的最初之敌而非最初宗旨记得更牢”——，也无法解释这种现象。 But pas d’ennemi à gauche—the idea that the far left, even if wrong in some respects, when it came down to essentials was against the real enemy, the right—cannot sustain the procommunist liberal case. “敌人永远在右”——也就是说，极左即使某些方面是错的，本质上也还是在反对真正的敌人，也就是右派——即便这句格言也不能解释为什么会有亲共产主义自由派这一现象。 For not all on the far left were covered: Trotskyites, the POUM in Spain, Anarchists. If we ask why this did not affect some “liberal” minds, it seems that in the first two cases, at least, the Stalinist version (that these were not “left” at all but secret agencies of Hitler) had some distractive effect. 因为并非所有极左翼都得到自由派的亲近，托派、西班牙的马克思主义统一工人党（POUM）或无政府主义者都无此幸运。为什么这些组织没有打动自由派的心呢？看来，至少托派和POUM可能受害于斯大林主义者的宣传，后者坚持这些组织都不是真左派，而是希特勒的特务。 Then again, the Trotskyites lacked the huge propaganda funding available to Stalinists everywhere, though the pervasiveness of a notion has traditionally not been the key point for critical minds. Where issues of fact were in question, the anti-Stalinist left was not only truer but also far more plausible. 另外，托派没有斯大林主义者那么多的宣传资金，尽管对于具有批判性头脑的人来讲，一种思想的传播力度不该影响它的说服力。实际上，当涉及事实问题时，那些反斯大林左派的说法不仅更加真实，还更有说服力。 We can list, in addition to utopianism and parochial partisanship, a number of other characteristics to be found, if not in all, than in many of the Stalinophiles (and Mao-ophiles, Castrophiles, and Ho-ophiles): in some cases vanity, in others pleasure at adulation, in others yet an adolescent romanticism about “revolution” as such. 除了乌托邦情结和狭隘的党派偏见外，在很多斯大林粉（还有毛粉，卡斯特罗粉，胡志明粉等等）身上通常都可以找到一些其他特性：一些人的共同点是求名的欲望；另一些人的共同点是爱听奉承话；而其他一些人的共同点是有一种对“革命”的青春浪漫主义。 Nor should mere boredom be omitted, as Simone de Beauvoir once confessed, which may remind us of the attitudes of a certain type of French intellectual, different, but not all that different, from his American or British counterparts, as given by Herbert Luthy in the early 1960s. 当然，单纯的无聊也是个不能不提的因素，正如西蒙·德·波伏娃曾经坦白过的那样，这或许能使我们想起赫伯特·卢蒂曾于1960年代初描述过的那类法国知识分子的态度，这种态度与他们的英美同行有所不同，但其实也相去不远：

For ten years the French intellectuals have discussed the big issues of the day so to speak in front of the looking-glass,in search less of facts and knowledge than of an attitude befitting their traditional role—of the “correct pose.” “十年来，法国知识分子们一直在镜子前讨论着所谓的‘当前重大问题’，他们的讨论与其说是为了寻求真相或知识，不如说是为了找到一种适合他们传统角色的态度——所谓的‘正确姿态’。”

THE HEROES OF THE ARGUMENT 论争中的英雄们 Nevertheless, it might be argued that the true heroes of the long argument were not so much the committed anticommunist conservatives (who were, of course, right, and fully deserve the verdict in their favor as against the procommunist liberals) as those within the liberal intelligentsia who not only were not deceived but also fought for the truth over years of slander and discouragement. 尽管如此，我们依然可以说：在这场漫长的论争中，真正的英雄与其说是那些坚定反共的保守派，不如说是那些虽身在自由派阵营却不仅不受蒙蔽，还常年冒着中伤和挫折而努力寻求真相的自由派们。当然，反共的保守派是正确的，他们在与亲共自由派论争中做出的功绩也完全值得肯定。 We might in fact say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. The difficulty is, or has been, that good liberalism implies a good deal of mental self-control. 实际上，我们可以说，正如胆固醇有两种，自由派也有两种，一种好，一种坏。如今的困难在于——或者说一直如此——好的自由主义必然要求强大的精神自律。 AND NOWADAYS? 今天呢？ Kenneth Minogue, the Anglo-Australian political scientist, has observed that “as radicals have lost plausible utopias of one kind or another—from the Soviet Union to Cuba—they have become more ferociously intolerant of the society in which they live.” 英裔澳大利亚政治学家肯尼思·米诺格观察到，“当激进派失去一个又一个曾经具有说服力的乌托邦——从苏联到古巴——时，他们对自己身处其中的这个社会变得越来越不宽容了。” There are plenty of up-to-date insane absurdities, such as John Le Carré writing (in a letter to the Washington Post) that capitalism was today killing many more than communism ever had; such as Nigel Nicolson in Britain saying that Solzhenitsyn had betrayed his country just as Anthony Blunt had his. 时至今日，疯狂的荒谬论调依然层出不穷。比如约翰·勒卡雷投书《华盛顿邮报》，声称今天资本主义正在杀死的人数比共产主义曾经杀掉的还要多的多；比如英国的奈杰尔·尼科尔森声称，索尔仁尼琴正像安东尼·勃朗特【校注：英国艺术史家、苏联间谍】一样，无非是个叛国者。 And in academe we still find noisy cliques working to lower the Soviet death roll, to prove the West as the villain of the Cold War, and to call for “dispassionate” study of Stalin and Mao. 在学术界，我们也可以发现一些吵闹的小集团努力降低苏联时期的死亡数字，以便证明西方才是冷战中的那个恶棍，并呼吁对斯大林和毛泽东进行“公允不偏”的研究。 Such notions are, of course, not confined to campuses. We now get an allegedly historical film series sponsored by Ted Turner, which, with some concessions to reality, in effect tilts the balance against the West, Stalin offset by McCarthy, Castro better than Kennedy. 这种思潮当然不只存在于大学校园之内。现在出现了泰德·透纳赞助的一些所谓历史影集。虽然在一定程度上承认事实，这些影集事实上在把天平翘向反西方的那一侧。在这些影片中，麦卡锡主义被拿来抵销斯大林的罪恶，而卡斯特罗被塑造成了一个比肯尼迪更好的人。 A WORD TO YOUNG LIBERALS 对年轻自由派们的赠言 Can one offer any advice to the current generation of liberals? Well, one can advise them not to let passions provoked by the internal politics of their homelands go too far. Rhetoric of party faction is part of democratic life, but do not project it into your assessment of alien regimes and mentalities and do not accept accounts of these cultures provided by partisan sources without a critical assessment (a point that applies, indeed, to the acceptance of supposed facts in any field in which strong emotions prevail). 我们能对现今一代的自由派提出什么建言吗？当然，我们可以建议他们控制头脑里被本国政治斗争挑起的激情。党派话语是民主政治生活的一部分，但不要让这些话语影响了你对外国政权或思想的评价。此外，不要照单全收有党派偏见的来源所提供的各种关于外国文化的材料（这一点还适用于接受各种可能受到强烈感情因素影响的领域的材料）。 As to the academics criticized above, it seems that nothing is to be done. They are committed to their misconceptions. One can only urge their younger colleagues (even if hardly able to speak out frankly in an atmosphere of academic persecution, denial of tenure, and so on) that they should work at least at thinking independently, while biding their time. 至于上文中批判到的那些学者们，看起来无可救药了。他们虔诚于自己的错误信念。我们只能呼吁他们的年轻同事们（当然，在目前的大学空气里充斥着学术迫害，否决终身教职等等威胁，要直率说出自己的想法并不容易），至少努力做到独立思考，等着属于他们的时代到来。 Above all, as Granville Hicks, himself temporarily deceived, put it: “It is no defence whatever for an intellectual to say that he was duped, since that is what, as an intellectual, he should never allow to happen to him.” 毕竟，正如自己也曾一度受到蒙骗的格兰维尔·希克斯所说的：“知识分子是不能用一句‘我上当了’来为自己辩护的。因为一个知识分子有不受蒙骗的义务。” Excerpted and adapted from the New Criterion, February 1999, from an essay entitled “Liberals and Totalitarianism.” 摘编改写自《新标准》(The New Criterion)1999年2月号刊登的《自由派与极权主义》一文。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-09-06】 @whigzhou: 智能手机年代，可以想象这些广告的号召力有多大 //FW 难民，在德国得到“All Inkluisve”的特殊客人 O网页链接 作者小语，以国际援助组织一名员工的身份，细数她在难民营内部一些鲜为人知的感触与见闻。 @whigzhou: 欧洲最坏的结果是缓慢而均匀的绿化，这样的话，等土著醒悟过来就晚了，票数不够了，要挽回只能靠硬打了，相对不坏的结果是，其中一国迅速沦陷，然后炸锅逆天了，可是我真心不愿看到这是德国啊。 @梳皇斗饮口味刁:德国人认死理，不如英国佬转变快 @whigzhou: 是，所以一旦翻转过来，又会从另一个方向上变得非常可怕 @whigzhou: 欧洲政治精英圈高度封闭，而该圈的意识形态又一边倒，大众的相反诉求在上层根本找不到出路，结果最后只能诉诸民粹主义，看不到平缓扭转的可能性 @whigzhou: 法国选民把右派一次次选上去，结果却发现他们跟左派差不多一路货 @研二公知苗:政治精英封闭是因为比例代表加政党名单制吗？ @whigzhou: 我觉得跟教育和学校体制关系更大，公立的基础教育，官办的大学体系，都有着强烈的封闭化倾向，比如按德国的体制，孩子从小学高年级开始，就被分入技术/职业轨道和学术/精英轨道了，进前一条轨道的，就一辈子老老实实听精英的好了 @whigzhou: 详情可参考 http://t.cn/RPKxQAC 每个孩子读完四年小学后，经学校甄别后被分入三条轨道：Hauptschule：老老实实学手艺做工人吧，Realschule：老老实实做个白领吧，Gymnasium：恭喜，你是未来精英。 @Kameeldoring:你该去法国成立政党。 @whigzhou: 拯救人类这事儿不归我管，我看看热闹就行了 @Kameeldoring:欧洲人自己都不管自己了，或许以后会爆发各种极端主义，或者改革福利、移民政策吧。 @whigzhou: 改革福利怎么可能，民粹主义者一般都热爱福利，无论左右，Trump也不例外

The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers 专制强权的回归 作者：Azar Gat @ 2007-07-01 译者：sheperdmt（@-3co） 校对：Kyo(@tfny.kyo)，沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Foreign Affairs，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2007-07-01/return-authoritarian-great-powers THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY “历史终结”论的终结 【译注：《历史的终结》是美国学者弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）1989年发表的一篇文章，后又于1992年扩写成书。福山认为自由民主制是人类社会演化的终点。】 Today's global liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam -- and it is the lesser of the two challenges. Although the proponents of radical Islam find liberal democracy repugnant, and the movement is often described as the new fascist threat, the societies from which it arises are generally poor and stagnant. 当今全球自由民主秩序面临两大挑战。第一个是伊斯兰极端主义——它的威胁程度相对较小。尽管伊斯兰极端主义的支持者对自由民主制恨之入骨，而且经常有人将这一运动描绘为新法西斯式的威胁，但其生根发芽的社会大多穷困潦倒、停滞不前。 They represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world. It is mainly the potential use of weapons of mass destruction -- particularly by nonstate actors -- that makes militant Islam a menace. 它们既不代表通往现代社会的另一条可行道路，也无法对发达国家形成明显的军事威胁。对它们可能会使用大规模杀伤性武器的担忧——尤其是在非国家行动者手中——才让伊斯兰武装算得上一个威胁。 The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback. 第二个也是更为显著的挑战，来自崛起中的非民主强权：西方世界的冷战老对手，中国与俄罗斯，它们正处于专制资本主义，而非共产主义政权统治之下。直到1945年以前，专制资本主义强权国家曾在国际体系中占据主导地位，但自那以后便销声匿迹。今天，它们似乎已准备好东山再起。 Capitalism's ascendancy appears to be deeply entrenched, but the current predominance of democracy could be far less secure. Capitalism has expanded relentlessly since early modernity, its lower-priced goods and superior economic power eroding and transforming all other socioeconomic regimes, a process most memorably described by Karl Marx in The Communist Manifesto. 资本主义的优势看来牢不可破，而民主制度目前所拥有的主导地位，却远不如前者那样安枕无忧。从现代早期开始，资本主义便所向披靡，其廉价商品和优势经济力量腐蚀并改变了其他一切社会经济制度，对此过程，马克思在《共产党宣言》里有过最令人难忘的记述。 Contrary to Marx's expectations, capitalism had the same effect on communism, eventually "burying" it without the proverbial shot being fired. 然而与马克思的期望截然相反，资本主义对共产主义产生了同样的作用，最终“不费一枪一炮”便将后者“埋葬”了。【译注：英语世界流传赫鲁晓夫的一句名言：“我们将不费一枪一炮将你们埋葬。”（We will bury you without firing a shot.）然而这句话的真实来源存疑】 The triumph of the market, precipitating and reinforced by the industrial-technological revolution, led to the rise of the middle class, intensive urbanization, the spread of education, the emergence of mass society, and ever greater affluence. 市场的胜利加速并强化了工业技术革命，也反过来从中得到力量，带来了中产阶级崛起、急剧的城镇化、教育普及、大众社会兴起，以及前所未有的富裕。 In the post-Cold War era (just as in the nineteenth century and the 1950s and 1960s), it is widely believed that liberal democracy naturally emerged from these developments, a view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama. 在后冷战时代（正如19世纪及1950、1960年代一样），人们普遍认同自由民主制是上述发展的自然结果，这一观点最著名的支持者是弗朗西斯·福山。 Today, more than half of the world's states have elected governments, and close to half have sufficiently entrenched liberal rights to be considered fully free. 如今，世界上有超过一半的国家拥有民选政府，还有接近一半的国家拥有牢固的自由权利，因而足以被视为充分自由的。 But the reasons for the triumph of democracy, especially over its nondemocratic capitalist rivals of the two world wars, Germany and Japan, were more contingent than is usually assumed. 但民主究竟是如何获胜的，尤其是如何在两次世界大战中获胜，如何战胜了非民主的资本主义对手德国和日本，其原因要比普遍认为的更具偶然性。 Authoritarian capitalist states, today exemplified by China and Russia, may represent a viable alternative path to modernity, which in turn suggests that there is nothing inevitable about liberal democracy's ultimate victory -- or future dominance. 今天，以中国和俄罗斯为代表的专制资本主义国家，或许提供了另一条通往现代社会的可行路径，而这反过来说明，自由民主制的最终胜利，或者说未来的主导地位，并非必然之事。 CHRONICLE OF A DEFEAT NOT FORETOLD 实录：无人预见的胜利 The liberal democratic camp defeated its authoritarian, fascist, and communist rivals alike in all of the three major great-power struggles of the twentieth century -- the two world wars and the Cold War. In trying to determine exactly what accounted for this decisive outcome, it is tempting to trace it to the special traits and intrinsic advantages of liberal democracy. 在20世纪的三次主要强权争锋——两次世界大战和冷战——中，自由民主阵营将其对手——专制主义、法西斯主义和共产主义——逐一击败。要确定究竟是哪些因素导致了这一决定性结局，我们很难不从自由民主制的诸多特点和内在优势开始追溯。 One possible advantage is democracies' international conduct. Perhaps they more than compensate for carrying a lighter stick abroad with a greater ability to elicit international cooperation through the bonds and discipline of the global market system. 民主国家的优势之一可能来自其国际表现。或许，借助全球市场体系中建立的种种纽带及互律准则，它们获得了引导国际合作的强大力量，足以补偿了其海外军事力量上的劣势。【译注：原文carrying a lighter stick语出老罗斯福的巨棒外交：“温言在口，大棒在手。”其中大棒指代军事实力。】 This explanation is probably correct for the Cold War, when a greatly expanded global economy was dominated by the democratic powers, but it does not apply to the two world wars. Nor is it true that liberal democracies succeed because they always cling together. 这一解释似乎适用于冷战，正是在冷战期间，民主强国主导了大幅扩张的全球经济；但它没法解释两次大战。另一种解释也难以成立：自由民主国家的成功源于它们之间的紧密团结。 Again, this was true, at least as a contributing factor, during the Cold War, when the democratic capitalist camp kept its unity, whereas growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and China pulled the communist bloc apart. 同样，后一解释适用于冷战，至少这是影响因素之一，因为在冷战期间，资本主义民主阵营始终团结一致，而共产主义联盟却因中苏之间日渐增长的敌意而破裂。 During World War I, however, the ideological divide between the two sides was much less clear. The Anglo-French alliance was far from preordained; it was above all a function of balance-of-power calculations rather than liberal cooperation. At the close of the nineteenth century, power politics had brought the United Kingdom and France, bitterly antagonistic countries, to the brink of war and prompted the United Kingdom to actively seek an alliance with Germany. 然而反观一战，战争双方的意识形态分歧却模糊得多。英法协约的签署远非注定；它首先是基于对力量均衡的算计而得出的权宜之计，而非出于共同自由理念所达成的合作。19世纪末，强权政治曾将敌意颇深的英法两国带到战争边缘，致使英国积极寻求与德国结盟。 Liberal Italy's break from the Triple Alliance and joining of the Entente, despite its rivalry with France, was a function of the Anglo-French alliance, as Italy's peninsular location made it hazardous for the country to be on a side opposed to the leading maritime power of the time, the United Kingdom. 自由主义的意大利退出三国同盟，不顾与法国的敌对关系转投协约国阵营，乃是英法结盟的结果。因为意大利身处半岛，与当时的海上第一强国英国抗衡有害无益。 Similarly, during World War II, France was quickly defeated and taken out of the Allies' side (which was to include nondemocratic Soviet Russia), whereas the right-wing totalitarian powers fought on the same side. 类似的，二战中法国迅速战败，就此脱离同盟国（之后非民主国家苏联加入），反倒是右翼极权主义强权全在同一战壕之内。 Studies of democracies' alliance behavior suggest that democratic regimes show no greater tendency to stick together than other types of regimes. Nor did the totalitarian capitalist regimes lose World War II because their democratic opponents held a moral high ground that inspired greater exertion from their people, as the historian Richard Overy and others have claimed. 对民主国家结盟行为的研究显示，民主政体并不比其他类型的政体更倾向团结合作。极权资本主义政权在二战中失败，也不是历史学家理查德·奥弗里（Richard Overy）等人所说的那样，是因为民主国家占据了道德高地，因而能在其人民中间鼓舞动员起更多力量。 During the 1930s and early 1940s, fascism and Nazism were exciting new ideologies that generated massive popular enthusiasm, whereas democracy stood on the ideological defensive, appearing old and dispirited. If anything, the fascist regimes proved more inspiring in wartime than their democratic adversaries, and the battlefield performance of their militaries is widely judged to have been superior. 在20世纪30和40年代早期，法西斯和纳粹思想都是激动人心的新型意识形态，激起了大范围的民众热情，而民主国家则在意识形态上处于守势，面目苍老毫无生气。两者差别恰恰是，法西斯政权在战时比它们的民主敌人更能鼓舞人心，其军队的战场表现也被公认为更加优秀。 Liberal democracy's supposedly inherent economic advantage is also far less clear than is often assumed. All of the belligerents in the twentieth century's great struggles proved highly effective in producing for war. During World War I, semiautocratic Germany committed its resources as effectively as its democratic rivals did. 人们认为自由民主制天生具有经济优势，其实这一点远不如想象中明显。20世纪的几次对抗已经证明，所有交战国都有极强的军事生产能力。一战期间，半独裁的德国可以与其民主对手同样有效地调配资源。 After early victories in World War II, Nazi Germany's economic mobilization and military production proved lax during the critical years 1940-42. Well positioned at the time to fundamentally alter the global balance of power by destroying the Soviet Union and straddling all of continental Europe, Germany failed because its armed forces were meagerly supplied for the task. 在取得最初胜利之后，纳粹德国却在至关紧要的1940至1942年间，经历了经济动员和军事生产上的松懈。当德国已做好准备消灭苏联，彻底打破世界均势、横扫欧洲大陆之际，却因部队供给不足而遭致失败。 The reasons for this deficiency remain a matter of historical debate, but one of the problems was the existence of competing centers of authority in the Nazi system, in which Hitler's "divide and rule" tactics and party functionaries' jealous guarding of their assigned domains had a chaotic effect. 虽然供给短缺的原因至今仍是历史争论的主题，但一个已知的问题是，纳粹党内存在相互争权夺利的多个权力中心。希特勒的“分而治之”策略，以及党务官员对各自职权领地的精心守护，都加剧了其内部混乱。 Furthermore, from the fall of France in June 1940 to the German setback before Moscow in December 1941, there was a widespread feeling in Germany that the war had practically been won. All the same, from 1942 onward (by which time it was too late), Germany greatly intensified its economic mobilization and caught up with and even surpassed the liberal democracies in terms of the share of GDP devoted to the war (although its production volume remained much lower than that of the massive U.S. economy). Likewise, levels of economic mobilization in imperial Japan and the Soviet Union exceeded those of the United States and the United Kingdom thanks to ruthless efforts. 另外，从1940年6月法国沦陷，到1941年12月德军受阻于莫斯科期间，德国全国上下充溢着战争实际已经胜利的情绪。尽管如此，从1942年开始（为时已晚），德国大幅加强了自己的经济动员能力，在军费占GDP的比例上追赶甚至超越了各民主国家（尽管与规模庞大的美国经济相比，其产量仍然十分低下）。相似的情形也发生在日本帝国和苏联，经过残酷努力，两国经济动员水平超越了美国和英国。 Only during the Cold War did the Soviet command economy exhibit deepening structural weaknesses -- weaknesses that were directly responsible for the Soviet Union's downfall. The Soviet system had successfully generated the early and intermediate stages of industrialization (albeit at a frightful human cost) and excelled at the regimentalized techniques of mass production during World War II. 只有在冷战期间，苏联的指令经济体系才显现出不断加深的结构性缺陷——这类缺陷是苏联覆灭的直接原因。苏维埃体系成功到达了工业化的早期和中期阶段（尽管为此付出了可怕的人员代价），并在二战期间出色实现了整编有方的大规模生产。 It also kept abreast militarily during the Cold War. But because of the system's rigidity and lack of incentives, it proved ill equipped to cope with the advanced stages of development and the demands of the information age and globalization. 即使在冷战期间，它的军事建设也并不曾落后。但因为它僵硬死板、缺乏激励，在高级的发展阶段，以及信息时代和全球化的要求面前，这一体系装备不良，无力应对。 There is no reason, however, to suppose that the totalitarian capitalist regimes of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan would have proved inferior economically to the democracies had they survived. The inefficiencies that favoritism and unaccountability typically create in such regimes might have been offset by higher levels of social discipline. 但我们也没有证据认为，如果纳粹德国和日本帝国的极权资本主义政权延续至今，它们的经济实力会逊于民主国家。这样的政权往往徇私泛滥，缺乏监察问责，造成效率低下，但这可以被更高水平的社会纪律所抵消。 Because of their more efficient capitalist economies, the right-wing totalitarian powers could have constituted a more viable challenge to the liberal democracies than the Soviet Union did; Nazi Germany was judged to be such a challenge by the Allied powers before and during World War II. The liberal democracies did not possess an inherent advantage over Germany in terms of economic and technological development, as they did in relation to their other great-power rivals. 由于接纳了更为有效的资本主义经济，比起苏联，这些右翼极权主义强权有可能对自由民主国家构成更有力的挑战；二战结束之前，同盟国就曾如此看待纳粹德国。自由民主制相比其他强权，在经济和技术发展上体现出的内在优势，与德国相比却并不存在。 So why did the democracies win the great struggles of the twentieth century? The reasons are different for each type of adversary. They defeated their nondemocratic capitalist adversaries, Germany and Japan, in war because Germany and Japan were medium-sized countries with limited resource bases and they came up against the far superior -- but hardly preordained -- economic and military coalition of the democratic powers and Russia or the Soviet Union. 那么，究竟是什么原因，使得民主国家在20世纪的三场对抗中都取得了胜利呢？对不同类型的对手，答案不尽相同。战胜同样实行资本主义、但无民主的德国和日本，是因为这两个国家领土面积中等，资源基础有限，却要面对各民主强国及俄国（或苏联）结成的经济和军事联盟，其实力远超前者——尽管这次结盟只是机缘巧合。 The defeat of communism, however, had much more to do with structural factors. The capitalist camp -- which after 1945 expanded to include most of the developed world -- possessed much greater economic power than the communist bloc, and the inherent inefficiency of the communist economies prevented them from fully exploiting their vast resources and catching up to the West. 共产主义的失败则更多出于结构性因素。1945年后，资本主义阵营囊括了几乎所有发达国家，它们比起共产主义阵营拥有强大得多的经济实力，而共产主义经济固有的低效也妨碍了它们充分利用其丰富的资源，拖累了它们追赶西方的步伐。 Together, the Soviet Union and China were larger and thus had the potential to be more powerful than the democratic capitalist camp. Ultimately, they failed because their economic systems limited them, whereas the nondemocratic capitalist powers, Germany and Japan, were defeated because they were too small. Contingency played a decisive role in tipping the balance against the nondemocratic capitalist powers and in favor of the democracies. 苏联和中国加起来面积更大，因而其实力确有潜力超越资本主义民主阵营。中苏最终失败于其经济体系对自身的制约，而德日作为实行资本主义的非民主强权，却因为领土面积太小失败。在打破力量平衡，使天平向民主国家一边倾斜的过程中，偶然因素起了决定性的作用。 AMERICAN EXCEPTION 美国例外论 The most decisive element of contingency was the United States. After all, it was little more than a chance of history that the scion of Anglo-Saxon liberalism would sprout on the other side of the Atlantic, institutionalize its heritage with independence, expand across one of the most habitable and thinly populated territories in the world, feed off of massive immigration from Europe, and so create on a continental scale what was -- and still is -- by far the world's largest concentration of economic and military might. 最具决定性的偶然因素就是美国。盎格鲁-撒克逊自由主义的后裔在大西洋彼岸生根发芽，取得独立，并将自由主义的遗产加以制度化，在地球上最为宜居、同时人烟最稀的土地上纵横扩张，接纳来自欧洲的庞大移民，并在大陆级的规模上，集合起曾经是、现在仍然是全世界最强的经济和军事力量——这一切几乎全是出于历史的巧合。 A liberal regime and other structural traits had a lot to do with the United States' economic success, and even with its size, because of its attractiveness to immigrants. But the United States would scarcely have achieved such greatness had it not been located in a particularly advantageous and vast ecological-geographic niche, as the counterexamples of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand demonstrate. 美国经济的成功，应在很大程度上归功于其自由政体，以及其他结构性特点；甚至美国的规模也与此有关，因为自由主义能吸引大量移民。然而，如果不是位居这块生态和地理条件都极其优越、丰富的土地，美国不太可能取得如今的成就，加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰就是反例。 And location, of course, although crucial, was but one necessary condition among many for bringing about the giant and, indeed, United States as the paramount political fact of the twentieth century. Contingency was at least as responsible as liberalism for the United States' emergence in the New World and, hence, for its later ability to rescue the Old World. 地理位置确实十分关键，但造就美国这个巨人，造就这个20世纪最为重要的政治实体，所需的必要条件不可胜数，位置不过是其中之一。对于美国在新世界的崛起，以及后来出手挽救旧世界的过程，偶然因素发挥的作用至少并不少于自由主义。 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States' power consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. If any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. 整个20世纪，美国国力始终领先于世界，实力超过全球第二、三位的总和，因此全球均势的天平不可避免地滑向华盛顿所支持的那一边。如果要为民主阵营略占上风找一个原因，那首先是因为美国的加入，而非民主制度有什么内在优势。 In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the twentieth century. This is a sobering thought that is often overlooked in studies of the spread of democracy in the twentieth century, and it makes the world today appear much more contingent and tenuous than linear theories of development suggest. 事实上，如果没有美国，自由民主阵营很可能输掉20世纪的三次对抗。这个观点发人深省，却常常被有关20世纪民主扩张的研究所忽略。也正因此，和那些线性发展理论所设想的情况相比，今日世界之存在更像是巧合的产物，也更为脆弱。 If it were not for the U.S. factor, the judgment of later generations on liberal democracy would probably have echoed the negative verdict on democracy's performance, issued by the fourth-century-BC Greeks, in the wake of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. 如果没有美国这个因素，后世大概会给自由民主制以负面评价，就像公元前4世纪的希腊人评价败于斯巴达的雅典民主时一样。 THE NEW SECOND WORLD 新第二世界 But the audit of war is, of course, not the only one that societies -- democratic and nondemocratic -- undergo. One must ask how the totalitarian capitalist powers would have developed had they not been defeated by war. Would they, with time and further development, have shed their former identity and embraced liberal democracy, as the former communist regimes of eastern Europe eventually did? 然而对于各社会，无论民主与否，战争都不是唯一的考验。我们应该问一句：如果没有战败，这些极权资本主义国家将如何发展。是否，经过足够的时间和进一步的发展，它们会改头换面，接受自由民主，走上东欧各个前共产主义政权最终选择的道路吗？ Was the capitalist industrial state of imperial Germany before World War I ultimately moving toward increasing parliamentary control and democratization? Or would it have developed into an authoritarian oligarchic regime, dominated by an alliance between the officialdom, the armed forces, and industry, as imperial Japan did (in spite of the latter's liberal interlude in the 1920s)? 一战前的资本主义工业国家德意志帝国，会逐渐加强议会监察制度，继而走向民主吗？还是会像日本帝国一样，受官僚、军队和工业联合把控，变成一个专制主义的寡头政体（即便日本1920年代出现过短暂的自由期）？ Liberalization seems even more doubtful in the case of Nazi Germany had it survived, let alone triumphed. Because all these major historical experiments were cut short by war, the answers to these questions remain a matter of speculation. But perhaps the peacetime record of other authoritarian capitalist regimes since 1945 can offer a clue. 假如纳粹德国幸存了下来，其自由化（相比德意志帝国）的可能性则更渺茫，更别说假如它当初得胜了。战争切断了这些大型历史实验的进程，这些回答永远只能是想象。不过，还有一些专制资本主义国家延续到了1945年之后，它们在和平年代的表现可以提供一条线索。 Studies that cover this period show that democracies generally outdo other systems economically. Authoritarian capitalist regimes are at least as successful -- if not more so -- in the early stages of development, but they tend to democratize after crossing a certain threshold of economic and social development. This seems to have been a recurring pattern in East Asia, southern Europe, and Latin America. 关于这段时期的研究显示，民主政体的经济发展总体而言优于其它制度。在发展的早期阶段，专制资本主义国家也取得了至少不逊于民主国家的成就，但当经济和社会发展越过了某一特定水平，它们就有民主化的趋势。这一模式似乎在东亚、南欧及拉丁美洲反复出现过。 The attempt to draw conclusions about development patterns from these findings, however, may be misleading, because the sample set itself may be polluted. Since 1945, the enormous gravitational pull exerted by the United States and the liberal hegemony has bent patterns of development worldwide. 然而，试图从上述现象中得出任何有关发展模式的结论，可能会误入歧途，因为样本集合本身可能已被污染。自1945年起，美国及自由主义全球霸权所发挥的强大引力，已然影响了世界各国的发展轨迹。 Because the totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war, and these countries were subsequently threatened by Soviet power, they lent themselves to a sweeping restructuring and democratization. 极权资本主义的德日两国被战争击垮，接着又受到苏联霸权威胁，因而走上了彻底的重构和民主化之路。 Consequently, smaller countries that chose capitalism over communism had no rival political and economic model to emulate and no powerful international players to turn to other than the liberal democratic camp. These small and medium-sized countries' eventual democratization probably had as much to do with the overwhelming influence of the Western liberal hegemony as with internal processes. 结果，同属资本主义而非共产主义阵营的小国，没有其他对立的政经体制可以效仿，除了自由民主制，他们在国际舞台上也找不到可以投靠的其它选手。这些中小型国家最终走向民主化，内在发展恐怕只占一半的原因，另有一半则应是西方自由霸权的压倒性影响。 Presently, Singapore is the only example of a country with a truly developed economy that still maintains a semiauthoritarian regime, and even it is likely to change under the influence of the liberal order within which it operates. But are Singapore-like great powers that prove resistant to the influence of this order possible? 当前，经济真正发达同时仍保留半专制主义政权的例子，只有新加坡一个，但即使是新加坡，也可能因为受到它运行于其中的自由秩序之影响而发生改变。但是，有可能存在一种能够对抗该秩序之影响的新加坡式强权大国吗？ The question is made relevant by the recent emergence of nondemocratic giants, above all formerly communist and booming authoritarian capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. 这个问题的意义随着近来非民主大国的兴起愈发明显。突出代表就是放弃共产主义，正在专制资本主义的统治下繁荣发展的中国。同样，俄国也从后共产时代的自由主义之中回归，并且随着经济实力的增长，显现出越来越多的专制主义特征。 Some believe that these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence, and outside influence. Alternatively, they may have enough weight to create a new nondemocratic but economically advanced Second World. They could establish a powerful authoritarian capitalist order that allies political elites, industrialists, and the military; that is nationalist in orientation; and that participates in the global economy on its own terms, as imperial Germany and imperial Japan did. 有人认为，经过内部发展、财富增长及外部影响的共同作用，此类国家可能最终接纳自由民主。或者，它们也可能有足够的实力，创造一个新的第二世界，不实行民主，却有高度发达的经济。它们可以集结政治精英、工业家和军队，建立一个强大的专制资本主义秩序；以民族主义为发展方向；并与帝国主义的德国、日本一样，按照他们自己设定的规则参与全球经济。 It is widely contended that economic and social development creates pressures for democratization that an authoritarian state structure cannot contain. There is also the view that "closed societies" may be able to excel in mass manufacturing but not in the advanced stages of the information economy. The jury on these issues is still out, because the data set is incomplete. 普遍认为，经济和社会发展不断创造趋向民主化的压力，会使专制国家的结构无法承受。还有观点认为，“封闭社会”可能擅长大规模生产，却会在信息经济的高级阶段落到下风。上述问题悬而未决，因为数据资料尚不完整。 Imperial and Nazi Germany stood at the forefront of the advanced scientific and manufacturing economies of their times, but some would argue that their success no longer applies because the information economy is much more diversified. Nondemocratic Singapore has a highly successful information economy, but Singapore is a city-state, not a big country. 德意志帝国和纳粹德国在它们的时代，先进科学和制造业经济都处于世界前列，但有人会说它们的成功无法复制，因为信息经济的细化程度深入得多。新加坡这个非民主国家有十分成功的信息经济，但它只是一座城邦，而非一个大国。 It will take a long time before China reaches the stage when the possibility of an authoritarian state with an advanced capitalist economy can be tested. All that can be said at the moment is that there is nothing in the historical record to suggest that a transition to democracy by today's authoritarian capitalist powers is inevitable, whereas there is a great deal to suggest that such powers have far greater economic and military potential than their communist predecessors did. 先进的资本主义经济能否在专制国家实现，只有等中国的发展到达那一阶段才能得知，而这还要很久。当下只能得出这样的结论：历史记载并未表明今天的专制资本主义大国必然会转向民主，倒是有足够证据说明这些大国有着远超其共产主义前辈的经济和军事潜力。 China and Russia represent a return of economically successful authoritarian capitalist powers, which have been absent since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, but they are much larger than the latter two countries ever were. Although Germany was only a medium-sized country uncomfortably squeezed at the center of Europe, it twice nearly broke out of its confines to become a true world power on account of its economic and military might. 1945年德日战败，经济上成功的专制资本主义一度消失过。现在，中俄两国代表了这股力量的回归，并有远超前两者的国家规模。尽管德国只是蜷缩在欧洲中心的一个中等国家，它却因其经济和军事力量之故，有两次几近于突破约束，成为真正的世界大国。 In 1941, Japan was still behind the leading great powers in terms of economic development, but its growth rate since 1913 had been the highest in the world. Ultimately, however, both Germany and Japan were too small -- in terms of population, resources, and potential -- to take on the United States. Present-day China, on the other hand, is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is experiencing spectacular economic growth. 1941年，日本的经济发展水平仍落后于领先强国，但它1913年以来的增长率一直保持世界第一。然而最终，无论从人口、资源还是潜力来说，德国和日本都太小了，无法与美国抗衡。与之相比，从人口上来说，现在的中国是国际舞台上最重量级的选手，正在经历惊人的经济增长。 By shifting from communism to capitalism, China has switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. As China rapidly narrows the economic gap with the developed world, the possibility looms that it will become a true authoritarian superpower. 经过从共产主义向资本主义的转变，中国形成了一种远更高效的专制主义。随着中国快速缩小着自己与发达国家间的经济差距，一个真正的超级专制大国也就离我们越来越近。 Even in its current bastions in the West, the liberal political and economic consensus is vulnerable to unforeseen developments, such as a crushing economic crisis that could disrupt the global trading system or a resurgence of ethnic strife in a Europe increasingly troubled by immigration and ethnic minorities. 即使在其当下的西方堡垒之内，自由主义的政治和经济共识在难以预见的发展面前也颇为脆弱，比如可能扰乱全球贸易体系的惨重经济危机，或随着移民不断涌入，少数族裔问题日渐突出，最终种族冲突在欧洲复兴。 Were the West to be hit by such upheavals, support for liberal democracy in Asia, Latin America, and Africa -- where adherence to that model is more recent, incomplete, and insecure -- could be shaken. A successful nondemocratic Second World could then be regarded by many as an attractive alternative to liberal democracy. 假如西方遭此剧变，亚洲、拉美和非洲各地的自由民主拥趸就会动摇（这些地区接受自由民主的时间十分晚近，也不够完备，因而更不稳固）。到那时，一个不实行民主然而经济上成功的第二世界，就会对许多国家形成诱惑，成为自由民主制之外的另一种选择。 MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 给民主一个安全世界 Although the rise of authoritarian capitalist great powers would not necessarily lead to a nondemocratic hegemony or a war, it might imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union's collapse will be short-lived and that a universal "democratic peace" is still far off. 专制资本主义超级大国的崛起，并不必然会催生一个非民主国家的世界霸权，也不一定导致战争；然而，这可能暗示着，自由民主制自苏联解体以来所享有的那种近乎完全的支配地位，可能不会长久，而全球范围内的“民主和平”仍将遥不可及。 The new authoritarian capitalist powers could become as deeply integrated into the world economy as imperial Germany and imperial Japan were and not choose to pursue autarky, as Nazi Germany and the communist bloc did. A great-power China may also be less revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were (although Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, is more likely to tend toward revisionism). 新的专制资本主义强国可能与德意志帝国、日本帝国一样，与世界经济紧密结为一体，而不会像纳粹德国和共产主义阵营那样追求自给自足。一个既已崛起的强大中国，可能不会像领土受限的德日一样奉行修正主义（但仍未从帝国失落的眩晕中恢复的俄国，更有可能向修正主义迈进）。 Still, Beijing, Moscow, and their future followers might well be on antagonistic terms with the democratic countries, with all the potential for suspicion, insecurity, and conflict that this entails -- while holding considerably more power than any of the democracies' past rivals ever did. 但是，北京、莫斯科以及它们未来的追随者极有可能站在民主国家的对立面，因此包含着发生猜忌、不安全和冲突的全部可能，同时它们还拥有民主阵营以往任何对手都不曾拥有过的强大实力。 So does the greater power potential of authoritarian capitalism mean that the transformation of the former communist great powers may ultimately prove to have been a negative development for global democracy? It is too early to tell. Economically, the liberalization of the former communist countries has given the global economy a tremendous boost, and there may be more in store. 那么，专制资本主义会成为更大强权的可能性，是否意味着那些前共产主义大国的转型最终将对全球民主产生负面作用？现在下结论还为时尚早。从经济上来说，前共产主义国家的自由化已极大地推动了全球经济，更不用说这一助力尚未充分释放。 But the possibility of a move toward protectionism by them in the future also needs to be taken into account -- and assiduously avoided. It was, after all, the prospect of growing protectionism in the world economy at the turn of the twentieth century and the protectionist bent of the 1930s that helped radicalize the nondemocratic capitalist powers of the time and precipitate both world wars. 但是，这些国家未来转向保护主义的可能性也应加以考虑，并且小心避免。毕竟，正是由于20世纪初对于世界经济中保护主义会不断增长的预期，以及1930年代的保护主义倾向，才使得当时的非民主资本主义强权趋向激进，并催生了两次世界大战。 On the positive side for the democracies, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire stripped Moscow of about half the resources it commanded during the Cold War, with eastern Europe absorbed by a greatly expanded democratic Europe. This is perhaps the most significant change in the global balance of power since the forced postwar democratic reorientation of Germany and Japan under U.S. tutelage. 从对民主国家有利的一面来看，，苏联及其帝国的解体使莫斯科失去了冷战中拥有的一半资源，东欧被规模大幅扩张的民主欧洲吸收同化。这大概是自德日两国受美国监管，强制进行战后民主转型以来，全球均势最为重要的变化。 Moreover, China may still eventually democratize, and Russia could reverse its drift away from democracy. If China and Russia do not become democratic, it will be critical that India remain so, both because of its vital role in balancing China and because of the model that it represents for other developing countries. 此外，中国最终仍有可能选择民主化道路，而俄国也可能会从偏离民主的轨道上修正回来。如果中俄最终没有转向民主，印度保持民主就显得意义重大，不仅因为印度扮演着平衡中国的重要角色，也因为他对其他发展中国家起着示范作用。 But the most important factor remains the United States. For all the criticism leveled against it, the United States -- and its alliance with Europe -- stands as the single most important hope for the future of liberal democracy. Despite its problems and weaknesses, the United States still commands a global position of strength and is likely to retain it even as the authoritarian capitalist powers grow. 然而，最重要的因素依旧是美国。面对一切针对美国的公开指责，美国及其与欧洲的结盟关系，仍然是自由民主在未来至为关键的希望。尽管存在诸多问题和弱点，美国仍然具有全球实力，即使专制资本主义强权发展壮大，美国仍不会轻易失去这一地位。 Not only are its GDP and productivity growth rate the highest in the developed world, but as an immigrant country with about one-fourth the population density of both the European Union and China and one-tenth of that of Japan and India, the United States still has considerable potential to grow -- both economically and in terms of population -- whereas those others are all experiencing aging and, ultimately, shrinking populations. 美国不仅有发达国家中最高的GDP和生产力增速，同时，作为一个移民国家，其人口密度仅为欧盟和中国的四分之一，日本和印度的十分之一，因此美国仍有相当可观的发展潜能——无论是就经济还是人口而言——相反，其他国家都在遭受老龄化的困扰，并且最终将面临人口缩减的问题。 China's economic growth rate is among the highest in the world, and given the country's huge population and still low levels of development, such growth harbors the most radical potential for change in global power relations. But even if China's superior growth rate persists and its GDP surpasses that of the United States by the 2020s, as is often forecast, China will still have just over one-third of the United States' wealth per capita and, hence, considerably less economic and military power. 中国的经济增长率居于世界前列，加上巨大的人口数量和目前较低的发展水平，这样的增长率之下潜藏着改变全球力量对比的巨大潜能。不过，即便中国能够保持如此高速的增长，能像普遍预测的那样，实现2020年之前GDP超越美国的目标，其人均财富也刚刚企及美国的三分之一，因此经济和军事实力仍旧相对较弱。 Closing that far more challenging gap with the developed world would take several more decades. Furthermore, GDP alone is known to be a poor measure of a country's power, and evoking it to celebrate China's ascendency is highly misleading. As it was during the twentieth century, the U.S. factor remains the greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the periphery of the international system. 弥补这个差距的任务极其艰巨，赶上发达国家还需花费好几十年。另外，众所周知，单独考察GDP不足以全面衡量一国国力，仅凭这一项来赞颂中国的支配地位十分具有误导性。如同20世纪的情形一样，要使自由民主制免于陷入守势，免于落得国际体系中脆弱的边缘位置，美国的存在仍是最大的保障。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The return of Authoritarian Capitalists 专制资本主义的归来 作者：Azar Gat @ 2007-6-14 译者：史祥莆（@史祥莆）    校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：The New York Times，http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/opinion/14iht-edgat.1.6137311.html Today's global liberal democratic order faces a significant challenge from the rise of nondemocratic great powers - the West's old Cold War rivals, China and Russia, now operating under "authoritarian capitalist" rather than Communist regimes. 今天，全球自由民主秩序面临着来自非民主强权崛起的巨大挑战——冷战中西方的老对手，中国和俄罗斯，如今处于专制资本主义而非共产主义政权控制之下。 The category is not new - authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. 专制资本主义国家并不是一个新类别——它们在1945年之前的国际体系中一直扮演着领导角色。 But they have been largely absent since then. The liberal democratic camp defeated its authoritarian, Fascist and Communist rivals alike in all of the three major great-power struggles of the 20th century - the two world wars and the Cold War. 但是在那之后他们就基本上消失了。自由民主阵营在20世纪的三次强权争锋（两次世界大战加上冷战）中战胜了其专制主义、法西斯主义和共产主义对手。 It is tempting to trace this outcome to the special traits and intrinsic advantages of liberal democracy. But the reasons for the liberal democracies' victories were different for each type of adversary. 人们很容易将这一结果追溯到自由民主的特性和内在优势。然而面对不同的对手，自由民主胜利的原因也是不同的。 The Soviet Union failed because its economic systems limited it. But the nondemocratic capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were defeated in war fundamentally because they were medium-sized countries with limited resource bases. 苏联是因为其经济体系的局限而失败的。但非民主资本主义强国德国和日本，却根本上是因为其屈居中等的国家面积和有限的资源而在战争中被打败。 Thus contingency, not inherent advantages of liberal democracy, played a decisive role in tipping the balance against the non-democratic capitalist powers and in favor of the democracies. 所以，在与非民主资本主义强国的对抗中起着打破平衡的决定性作用，从而使天平偏向民主一方的，是偶然因素而不是固有优势。 The most decisive element of contingency was the United States. 最关键的偶然因素是美国。 Because of its continental size, no less than its democratic-capitalist system, the power of the United States consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined throughout the 20th century, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. 因为美国有着与一个大陆相当的面积和民主资本主义体系，在整个20世纪，美国的力量总是比紧随其后最大的两个国家加起来还要大。这决定性地使全球力量平衡偏向了华盛顿所在的那一边。 So if any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the 20th century. 所以，如果说有什么因素给了自由民主优势，那么美国的存在高于一切内在优势。事实上，如果没有美国的存在，自由民主很可能已经在20世纪的大搏斗中失败。 This is a sobering thought that is often overlooked in studies of the spread of democracy in the 20th century, and it makes the world today appear much more contingent and tenuous than linear theories of development suggest. 这一发人深省的想法，在有关20世纪民主传播的研究中往往被忽视，并且它使得当今世界显得比线性发展理论所设想的更加偶然与脆弱。 This is especially true in light of the recent emergence of nondemocratic powers, above all booming, authoritarian, capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its post-Communist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. 这一观点在观察最近出现的非民主强国时尤其正确，其中最突出的是繁荣而又专制的资本主义中国。俄罗斯也正在从后共产主义的自由主义退出，并且在经济实力增强的同时表现出越来越多的专制特征。 Some believe these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence and outside influence. 一些人相信这些国家可以通过内部发展、财富的增加，以及外部影响的共同作用而最终成为自由民主国家。 Alternatively, they may have enough weight to create a new non-democratic but economically advanced Second World. They could establish a powerful authoritarian-capitalist order that allies political elites, industrialists and the military; that is nationalist in orientation; and that participates in the global economy on its own terms, as imperial Germany and imperial Japan did. 或者，他们可能有足够的实力来创造一个非民主却有着发达经济的新第二世界。他们可能建立一个联合了政治精英、企业家和军队的强大专制资本主义秩序；这将是民族主义取向的，他们会以自己的方式参与国际经济，就像曾经的德意志帝国和日本帝国那样。 By shifting from Communist command economy to capitalism, China and Russia have switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. Although the rise of these authoritarian capitalist great powers would not necessarily lead to a non-democratic hegemony or war, it might imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union's collapse will be short-lived and that a universal "democratic peace" is still far off. 通过从共产主义指令经济转向资本主义，中国和俄罗斯转向了一种远更高效的专制主义。尽管这些专制资本主义大国的崛起，未必会导致非民主霸权或者战争，但它可能意味着，苏联解体之后那种自由民主几乎完全主宰世界的局面是短暂的，而普遍的“民主和平”仍然遥远。 Beijing and Moscow and their future followers might well become antagonists of the democratic countries - with all the potential for insecurity and conflict that this entails- while holding considerably more power than any of the democracies' past rivals ever did by virtue of being both large and capitalist. 北京、莫斯科和他们未来的追随者可能成为民主国家的对手——连同它必定携带的潜在冲突和不安全因素——他们有着比民主国家以往对手更强的实力，这一实力既来自其国家规模，也来自其资本主义性质。 The most important counterweight remains the United States. For all the criticism leveled against it, the United States and its alliance with Europe stands as the single most important hope for the future of liberal democracy. 最重要的砝码依然是美国。尽管遭受种种批评，美国和它的欧洲盟友仍是未来自由民主无可替代的最重要希望。 As it was during the 20th century, the United States remains the greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the periphery of the international system. 正如在20世纪那样，美国仍是确保自由民主免于屈居守势并沦落至国际体系边缘脆弱地位的最大保障。 Azar Gat is professor of national security at Tel Aviv University and the author of "War in Human Civilization." A longer version of this article appears in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs. Azar Gat是特拉维夫大学国家安全教授，《人类文明进程中的战争》的作者。本文的更长版本刊载于7/8 月的《外交事务》（Foreign Affairs）杂志。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Climate and Elite Opinion 气候问题与精英观点 作者：David Friedman @ 2014-12-12 译者：小聂 校对：乘风（@你在何地-sxy） 陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy) 来源：Ideas，http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/climate-and-elite-opinion.html I have spent a good deal of time observing and participating in arguments about global warming. One striking point that I have not seen discussed is the sharp divergence between elite opinion and mass opinion. 我曾花大量时间关注和参与有关全球变暖的讨论。有一个惊人却从未被讨论过的现象是，在此话题上精英和大众的观点存在着巨大分歧。 Elite opinion, the New York Times, official statements by various scientific organizations and the like, views global warming as a dire threat, one that requires drastic and immediate action to prevent. Mass opinion, not only in the U.S. but, according to at least one poll I saw, world wide, puts it very far down in the list of what people are concerned about, perhaps tenth or twentieth. 《纽约时报》和各类科研机构发布的官方声明，或诸如此类的精英观点，认为全球变暖是个紧迫威胁，需要立刻采取有力措施加以避免。大众的观点，不仅仅在美国，在全球范围内，该问题在人们的关切事项中排位都特别靠后，大概在十几到二十几名，至少我看到过的一份全球调研是这么显示的。 This pattern is reflected in the online discussions, where people concerned about warming mostly base their arguments on some version of "everyone who is anyone agrees with me." Their picture of the situation, pretty clearly, is one in which the truth is perfectly clear and it is only uneducated fundamentalists or people in the pay of the oil companies who can disagree. 这种情况也反映在网络讨论中，在那里，全球变暖担忧者常见的说法，都是类似于“众所周知——‘众’的意思是同意我的任何人”的论证。很显然，他们眼中的图景是：真相一清二楚，且只有无知的原教旨主义者或领酬于石油公司的人才会有不同看法。 My reasons for questioning part of that picture, not the fact of warming due to human actions but the likely consequences, I have discussed in past posts here. 我部分质疑该图景的原因，不是对人类活动造成了变暖这一事实有异议，而是质疑关于变暖可能后果的看法。我曾在过去的博客文章里解释了质疑的原因。 My general skepticism of elite opinion comes from many past disagreements with it, most notably on political and economic issues. My point here, however, is not about whether the elite view is right or wrong but about the relation between the elite view and the mass view in different countries. 我对于精英观点的普遍怀疑来自于过去和他们的数次争论，尤其是在政治和经济议题上的分歧。尽管如此，我在这里想说的并不是精英观点正确与否，而是他们在不同国家里和大众观点之间的关系。 Among western developed countries, Australia appears least supportive of action against warming, Germany most, the U.S. in between. Germany has been involved in a very high profile effort to push down its output of CO2. The current Australian government, so far as I can make out, has mostly rejected calls for anything along similar lines. In the U.S., the President is strongly in favor of climate action, the Congress reluctant to support it, with the result that the administration has been trying to implement its views by regulatory action instead of legislation. 在西方发达国家中，澳大利亚最不支持对抗全球变暖的行动，德国反之，美国处于他们之间。德国一直大张旗鼓的想要降低二氧化碳排放量。而据我所知，现任澳大利亚政府拒绝了大部分对类似活动的倡议。在美国，总统是行动派，国会却不情不愿，结果就是，行政当局一直试图通过管制措施而非立法过程来践行其观点。 After a summer in Australia many years ago, I concluded two things about the country. One was that it had a larger variety of flavored potato chips than anywhere else in the world, including all the British versions and all the U.S. versions. 多年以前，在澳大利亚度过了一个夏天之后，我对这个国家做了两点总结。第一点是，相比世界其他地方，这里的薯片口味最多，包括了所有英国和美国的口味。 The second, possibly related, was that Australia had a full range of social classes built almost entirely out of an originally working class population. One implication, consistent with at least casual observation, is that Australians have less respect for their betters, their social superiors, their elite, than any other population on the globe. 第二且可能相关的一点是，澳大利亚层次丰满的整套社会阶层，几乎全部源自同一个本是工人阶级的群体。一个至少与初步观察相吻合的推断是，对他们中的佼佼者、上层阶级、或是精英们，澳大利亚人相比于世界上的其他人群更少景仰。 Germany, I think, represents the opposite pattern. The U.S. is somewhere in between. Unlike European countries, the U.S. never had a system with well defined social classes, the sort of system where there was a close correlation between how much money someone had, how much education he had, and how he spoke. 在我看来，德国代表了相反的模式。美国处于他们之间。不像欧洲国家，美国从未有过一个界限分明的社会阶层系统，即那种人们的财富水平、受教育程度以及说话方式之间有着紧密相关性的阶级系统。 One result is that Americans are less inclined to see all political issues as my class vs your class than Europeans (I must confess that my view of Europeans is heavily weighted towards Great Britain, as the only European country whose language I am fluent in). Another, I think, is that Americans have less respect for their elite. 这使得美国人比欧洲人更不倾向于把所有政治议题看作是阶级斗争（我必须承认我对欧洲人的看法更多是基于我对英国人的看法，因为这是唯一我能熟练运用其语言的欧洲国家）。此外，在我看来，美国人更少迷信精英。 If I am correct—I am far from expert in the various societies and may be misinterpreting them—there is a pattern. Countries where the elite is more influential are more likely to take costly actions aimed at reducing global warming. 假设我是对的——我远非熟知各类社会的专家，而且很有可能对他们抱有错误的认知——那么，确实存在这样一种固有模式：那些精英更具影响力的国家，更可能采取高成本的举措来阻止全球暖化。 At a final tangent, I recently came across an online post, based in part on another post by a blogger I think very highly of, which nicely stated one of my reservations about arguments for the current elite view of warming. 最后，离一下题，我最近看到了一篇博客文章，其内容部分基于一位我高度认可的作者。这篇文章很好地阐述了我对有关当前全球变暖的精英观点的一个保留意见。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-08-11】 @黄章晋ster:因为他们俩大致属于同一个生态位。 @tertio：右边这个判断错得太离谱了吧，这等于说安兰德与哈耶克一个生态位 @whigzhou: 教官说的是事实，虽然我对这一事实何以出现也是大惑不解。刚花了十几分钟想了想，这似乎揭示了有关政治生态、政治光谱，以及政治倾向如何结晶成派系的某些一般模式 @whigzhou: 为说明这情况，我需要先做一点预备性论证。对个人而言，从哲学基础，到主义（或者叫政治信条，表现为一组标签），再到具体的政治主张，可以形成一个连贯而自洽的体系，但从群体表现看，事情不是按这个逻辑发生的，光谱、主义、派系，可以在这三个层次的任意一个上汇聚结晶，结果就是若干团乱麻。 @whigzhou: 因为绝大多数人不会将自己的反思深入到哲学层次，所以，除了一小撮有哲学兴趣的人之间，结晶通常发生在后两个层次上 @whigzhou: 至于后两个层次哪个优先，取决于特定制度环境下，表达机会和参与机会之前的相对关系，假如表达机会很多，参与机会很少，则结晶倾向于在第二个层次（即主义层次）上发生，反之，若参与机会相对较多，则结晶更多发生在第三层次（即主张层次）上 @whigzhou: 注意：我说的参与机会并不直接对应结铛或投票的机会，而是更一般的指，以自身行动改变政治进程的可能性，比如同样是票决制或代议制，越是下层的地方性事务，个人参与就越大，而在联邦层面，大部分以为自己在参与的人，其实不过是在表达 @whigzhou: 问题是，第二个层次上的共同点，虽然在站队（更贴切说是虚拟站队）时最具号召力，却往往是最肤浅也最没用的，举个较纯粹的例子，罗斯巴德和大卫·弗里德曼常被一起归为Libertarian和市场无镇腹主义，但这两位无论在哲学基础上，还是现实主张上，可以说毫无共同之处（除了都用英语写作之外） 。 @whigzhou: 草，对付关键词屏蔽花了二十分钟，本来还想多说几句，太麻烦，算了～

Jeb Bush’s Beltway Climb 杰布·布什的华府攀登路 作者：社论 @2015-7-24 译者：王涵秋    校对：Animu (@丹哲生) 来源：华尔街日报 网址：http://www.wsj.com/articles/jeb-bushs-beltway-climb-1437693373 He proposes reforms that are good, bad and ugly. 他提出的改革之中，有好的，有坏的，还有不堪入目的 As Florida Governor, Jeb Bush conquered what he called “Mount Tallahassee,” and now that he’s running for President he is proposing to do the same to “Mount Washington.” On Monday he offered some initial ideas on how to do it, and some are better than others. 作为佛罗里达州州长，杰布·布什已经成功登上了他所称的“塔拉哈西之巅”；既已开始竞选总统，他还要登上“华盛顿之巅”。本周一，他已就如何开展竞选提出了一些初步想法，其中某些胜过另一些。 The good news is that he wants to start by reducing the size of the bureaucratic Everest. “You can have a fast-expanding economy or you can have a fast expanding government, but you can’t have both,” he said in a speech at Florida State University. 好消息是，他打算从裁减巨如珠峰的官僚机构入手。在佛罗里达州州立大学的一次演讲中他说道：“你要么有个迅速扩张的经济，要么有个迅速扩张的政府，但你不可能两者兼得。” His best idea would freeze the federal workforce and then reduce it by 10% over four years through attrition. In particular he proposes a “three-out, one-in” rule—one new hire for every three who leave. 杰布·布什最好的主意是，冻结现有的联邦政府雇员规模，并于之后四年内逐渐削减10%的雇员数量。特别是，他提出了“三出一进”则——每三人离职才可招募一位新员工。 According to the White House budget office historical tables, that would shrink federal civilian employment by some 210,000 from the 2.114 million full-time equivalent (FTE) positions in the executive branch in 2015. As recently as 2008 there were 1.875 million FTEs. 根据白宫预算办公室以往的数据可知，杰布·布什的政策，将使2015年行政部门中的联邦非军事雇员数量，从目前的211.4万人（按全职工时折算）缩减约21万人。晚至2008年，该数字还仅为曾为187.5万FTEs。【译注：FTE，full-time equivalent，一种人力资源统计指标，意为按全职工时折算后的雇员人数，假如全职工时为8小时，那么每天工作2小时兼职雇员，便计为0.25个FTE。】 For skeptics who doubt this is possible, Mr. Bush pointed to his record in Florida, where the state workforce fell by 11% over his eight years despite a rising state population. He can also point to Journal contributor and NYU scholar Paul Light, who has described the “inefficiency and bloat” of more than 10,000 senior executives “who occupy more than 60 layers of management just at the top” of the Washington organization chart. Ten percent may be shooting too low. 面对那些怀疑这是否可能做到的质疑者，他拿出了自己在佛州的记录，在其执政的8年内，尽管人口增长，该州雇员仍缩减了11%。他还援引了杂志撰稿人、纽约大学学者Paul Light的论点，后者将1万多资深行政官员的低效与臃肿形容为“这些人占据了管理部门的60层，层层积压在华盛顿组织结构图的上端”。或许砍去10%只嫌太少。 Mr. Bush also wants a line-item veto along the lines Wisconsin Republican Paul Ryan has proposed. This is a hardy perennial, but it would at the margin enhance the power of a President who wants to control spending (unlike the current one). 布什先生还提倡一种类似威斯康星州共和党人保罗·瑞安（Paul Ryan）提出的部分否决权【译注：美国总统只有完全认可或完全否决某一立法的权力。最近一次鲜有例外发生在克林顿任上，但仅过了两年，最高法院便裁定部分否决权违宪。】这是个屡屡被提出的经年老话题了，不过它确可在边际上增强一位有意控制支出的总统的权力（而非像在任这位）。 “If we reform how government works,” Mr. Bush said, “and build capacity for people to achieve earned success by our very nature we’ll all become conservatives because the demands on government will subside.” “如果我们能改革政府的工作方式，”布什先生说，“为人民创造一个靠自己双手劳动赢得成功的环境，那么我们会统统成为保守派，因为我们将不再有求于政府。” Mr. Bush’s other ideas are more populist gimmicks than genuine reforms. Take his pitch to dock the pay of Senators and Congressmen when they don’t show up for votes. We’d be happier if a couple hundred of them didn’t show up at all. But in any case Mr. Bush couldn’t do this without Congress’s consent, and he’d need their votes to get more important things done. Americans can always throw the bums out during elections. 至于布什先生的其他想法，与其说真正的改革，倒像是亲民的噱头。比如呼吁在参议员和众议员不出席投票时扣他们工资的提案。其实要是有几百位议员不出席投票，我们会更开心。但无论如何，布什先生不可能未经国会同意就这么做，他需要他们的选票来完成更重要的事情。而且在选举期间，美国人总是可以把那些尸位素餐的人给拉下马。 Even worse is Mr. Bush’s call for a six-year ban on lobbying for former members of the House and Senate, as well as expanding the definition of lobbyist so more people come under its restrictions. This buys into the liberal narrative that the problem in Washington is too many lobbyists. 更糟糕的是，布什先生提出的对卸任国会议员施加在6年内禁止游说的禁令，并且扩大说客的定义，使得更多人被该禁令所约束。如此便投合了自由派的说法，即华盛顿的问题是说客太多。 Businesses have no choice but to lobby a government that can cripple them with a single new regulation. The First Amendment also gives all Americans the right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 生意人游说政府实属情非得已，毕竟政府只需一条新管制法规即可让他们遭殃。而且第一宪法修正案也给予了所有美国公民“就其委屈苦衷向政府请愿申诉”的权利。 The real problem is the opportunities for corruption and special dealing that a too-large government provides. Every new regulation or twist of the tax code is an opening for some powerful Member to assist the powerful. But the solution is to reduce the size and scope of the regulatory state and to reform the tax code. Mr. Bush says he plans to propose both regulatory and tax reforms, and those will do more to reduce the influence of lobbyists than will restrictions on lobbyists that will be evaded in any case. 真正的问题在于一个过于庞大的政府创造了腐败及特殊对待的机会。每次新设管制、每次税法繁琐化，都为一些权势人物去支援另一些权势人物创造了新契机。但解决办法是减少政府管制的规模和范围，并改革税法。布什先生说他计划提出管制和税收两方面兼有的改革，比起用禁令规限说客，这些改革才更能缩减他们的影响，而禁令总是会被绕过。 One other benefit of a government that tries to do fewer things with fewer people: It might be able to launch a website without crashing. 一个致力于雇更少人、做更少事的政府，将带来的另一个好处：它或许有能力建成一个不会崩溃的网站了。【编注：这句似乎在嘲讽联邦政府专为奥巴马医保建立的网站，该网站花了大价钱，却故障频频。】 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-08-06】 @海德沙龙 自去年奥巴马开始发起提高最低工资的运动以来，康涅狄格率先响应，立法要求最低时薪两年内提高至$10.10，此后一些城市也迅速跟进，其中以加州城市最为积极，目前流行的口号是15美元，西雅图也于去年6月通过了法案，本文介绍了最低工资法的一种荒唐后果 http://t.cn/RLYmuRB @whigzhou: 最低工资法是常见干预措施中最恶劣的一种（我本来想用恶毒/卑劣/无耻等道德意味更明确的词汇，不过想想还是算了，总不能完全排除愚蠢的可能），它把最脆弱无助但又愿意通过自身努力改善生活的人残忍的驱逐出了劳动市场。正因其荒谬和恶劣程度，它也是观察公共政策氛围已恶化到何种程度的一个风向标。 @whigzhou: 对于无知起哄者，最低工资法是表达其伪善的最廉价方式，其主张无异于宣称，为改变穷人命运，你无须任何努力，只要改改数字就行，就像以为只要在脸书上点点赞就能帮助非洲难民，而这种廉价良心安慰法，正是某些政客最乐意兜售的 @whigzhou: 对于某些精明政客，借助最低工资法将最弱势群体驱逐出劳动市场，也为其继续兜售福利主义政策创造了需求，这一手法类似于秃蚣当年在农村发动割命时，通过破坏刻意农民的生计基础、制造仇恨，来为自己创造“群众基础”和炮灰来源 @lion_kittyyyyy:最低工资在美国历史上第一次出现就是为了挤出劳动力的。1911年在马塞诸塞州，妇女的收入在每周5刀-7刀，低于当时的最低生活标准。于是，最低工资倡议者H. LaRue Brown写道：“我们付出社会最宝贵的财富…（劳动）毁掉了那些本该成为高效的美国公民的女孩的身体。” @lion_kittyyyyy:1912年，马塞诸塞州通过了全国第一个最低工资法案，仅针对妇女与18岁以下儿童。

【2015-07-31】 @大象公会 【真问真答】为什么欧洲国家相比之下面积小、数量多？ @whigzhou: 远点说，罗马在条顿堡战役后放弃征服日耳曼尼亚，因而没能消灭日耳曼语，近点说，有我大英坚持不懈的阻挠大陆出现单一强权。 @凌山伯:条顿战役让罗马人停止东扩我懂 但是请问大英阻扰大陆出现单一强权怎么讲？ @whigzhou: 腓力二世的西班牙，黄金时代的荷兰，拿破仑的法国，哈布斯堡的奥匈，统一后的德国，这些欧洲霸权的最有力竞争者，不都是大英的打击对象嘛  

The Secret Republicans of Silicon Valley 硅谷的深柜共和党人 作者：Rebecca Nelson @ 2015-4-8 翻译：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 校对：乘风（@你在何地-sxy），小橘子（@sw小橘子） 来源：《国家杂志》（National Journal），http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/gop-silicon-valley-20150408/ In an industry where only liberal ideas are "allowed," many libertarians and conservatives keep their political views secret. 在一个只“容许”自由派理念的产业，许多自由意志主义者和保守派都对他们自己的政治观点秘而不宣。 Deep in Silicon Valley, where the free market reigns and the exchange of ideas is celebrated, a subset of tech workers are hiding their true selves. Working as programmers and software engineers, they don't want the stigma that comes with revealing who they really are. 在自由市场占统治地位、观念交流之风盛行的硅谷深处，一小撮科技从业者却把真实的自己隐藏了起来。这些程序员和软件工程师不愿因为展现真我而成为众矢之的。 They're the tech company employees, startup founders, and CEOs who vote for and donate to Republican candidates, bucking the Bay Area's liberal supremacy. Fearing the repercussions of associating with a much-maligned minority, they keep their political views fiercely hidden. 他们是向共和党候选人投票和捐赠的科技公司雇员、创业者和CEO们，默默抵抗着自由派在湾区至高无上的统治地位。人们担心与受到排挤中伤的少数派来往，会产生不良影响，因此他们把自己的政治观点深深地隐藏起来。 "It's a liberal echo chamber," Garrett Johnson, a co-founder of Lincoln Labs, which was started in 2013 to connect the right-of-center outsiders in Silicon Valley, told National Journal. "People have been convinced that Silicon Valley is reflexively liberal or progressive. And so their response is to conform." “这里是个自由派回音室，”Lincoln Labs联合创始人Garrett Johnson告诉《国家杂志（National Journal）》。Lincoln Labs创建于2013年，用来联络硅谷里处于政治右翼的局外人。“人们已经对硅谷的自由派思想和进步主义不假思索。他们的反应是一致顺从。” Silicon Valley has long been a bastion of liberalism. Since George H.W. Bush won Napa County in 1988, Republican presidential nominees have lost every county in the Bay Area. In 2012, President Obama won 84 percent of the vote in San Francisco to Mitt Romney's 13 percent and raised more for his reelection campaign from Bay Area donors than from those in New York or Hollywood. Political donations specifically from tech workers follow that trend: Google employees collectively gave $720,000 to Obama in 2012, versus $25,000 for Romney. Crowdpac, a nonpartisan political analytics firm, found that between 1979 and 2012, tech companies have overwhelmingly favored liberal candidates. 长久以来硅谷就是自由派的堡垒。自从老布什在1988年竞选中拿下加州纳帕郡以来，共和党总统候选人在湾区任何一个郡都没有赢过。2012年奥巴马总统在旧金山以84%的得票率战胜罗姆尼，后者只获得13%的选票。他从湾区筹集的连任竞选资金比从纽约或者好莱坞筹集来的都要多。科技业从业者的政治献金特别体现了这种趋势：2012年Google员工共捐给奥巴马72万美元，而只给了罗姆尼2万5千美元。无党派的政治分析公司Crowdpac发现，1979至2012年间，科技公司压倒性地倾向于自由派候选人。 Rather than ruffle feathers—or worse—Republicans who work there often just keep quiet. Rich Tafel, who coaches tech companies in politics and policy, understands the dynamic. The founder of the gay group Log Cabin Republicans, he's had many Republicans in Silicon Valley confide to him their true political views. 在硅谷工作的共和党人通常只是保持安静。他们不会触怒旁人，更别提做点别的什么了。在政治和政策方面给科技公司提供指导的Rich Tafel深知其中奥妙。Tafel是同性恋团体Log Cabin Republicans的创始人，已有许多硅谷共和党人向他吐露他们的真实政见。 "You just learn how to operate, if you will, in the closet as a Republican," Tafel told National Journal. "You keep your viewpoints to yourself." “这么说吧，作为共和党人，你就得学着做一个‘深柜’，”Tafel告诉《国家杂志》，“把你自己的政治观点埋藏在心里。” One startup CEO who has worked in Silicon Valley for more than a decade says that while it's popular to talk politics in the workplace, the underlying assumption is that everyone has similar views. 一个已在硅谷工作十多年的创业公司CEO说，尽管在工作场合谈论政治很流行，但背景假设是每个人的观点都相似。 The CEO, who generally votes Republican and donates to GOP candidates—he spoke on background to conceal his right-leaning views—said that in 2012, "you wouldn't want to say you're voting for Romney in the election." At the same time, openly expressing one's support for Obama was "incredibly common." 这位通常给共和党投票，给共和党候选人捐款的CEO——为了隐藏他的右倾观点他不愿透露自己的姓名——2012年时说：“你不会愿意告诉别人你投票给了罗姆尼。”与此同时，公开表示对奥马巴的支持则是“不可思议的普遍”。 His opposition to raising the minimum wage is just one area where he diverges with most of his colleagues. "If you say something like, 'We need a higher minimum wage,' you don't get critiqued," he said. But he would never reveal his more conservative outlook on the matter. 他对提高最低工资的反对只是他与多数同事发生分歧的一个例子。“如果你说‘我们需要更高的最低工资’之类的话，你就不会被批判。”他说。但他绝不会透露自己对此较保守的观点。 "They can't fathom that somebody disagrees with them," he said. "And I disagree with them. So I'm not going to open up that box." “他们无法理解有人会与他们意见相左，”他说，“而我就是不同意他们，所以我不会哪壶不开提哪壶。” Closeted Republicans aren't just a phenomenon in the tech industry. In Hollywood, where acclaimed movie stars and directors throw lavish fundraisers for Democrats and unabashedly support liberal causes, Republicans are a rare breed. Friends of Abe, a GOP support group of sorts, caters to A-list conservatives in the entertainment industry. Only a handful of its members have made their affiliation known, and its roster is kept secret out of fears of a blacklisting reminiscent of the McCarthy era. 深柜共和党人现象并非只出现在科技产业中。在好莱坞，知名影星和导演为民主党人举行慷慨的募捐筹款，不加掩饰地支持自由派事业，而共和党人则是凤毛麟角。亚伯之友（Friends of Abe），可以算是共和党的支持团体，为娱乐界最一流的保守派人士提供服务。这个团体只有少数成员公开了自己的会员身份。出于对类似麦卡锡时代黑名单的恐惧，会员名单也秘而不宣。 For some right-leaning techies, the GOP brand itself is a liability. The startup CEO stressed that there are "a number of ideas that conservatives have that I totally disagree with," such as opposition to same-sex marriage, and he abhors the thought of being lumped in with Republicans who deny climate change or evolution. 对一些右倾的科技界人士来说，共和党这个标签本身就是一种负担。那位创业公司的CEO强调“保守派的许多观点我完全不同意”，比如反对同性婚姻。他也厌恶与那些否认气候变化或进化论的共和党人为伍。 "Republicans are regarded as assholes," he said. "And I wouldn't want to be associated with assholes." “共和党人被认为是混蛋，”他说，“而我不愿和混蛋扯上关系。” Another Republican who founded a small San Francisco-based startup told National Journal that he's worried potential partners and investors would be turned off by his libertarian views. Recently, it seems like all of his peers in Silicon Valley have been outspoken about their opposition to the thwarted religious liberty law in Indiana, he said. He thinks business owners should be allowed to decide whom they serve, and if they discriminate against gays, people can choose not to patronize their business. He won't discuss that view, though, or debate his left-leaning colleagues on Facebook or Twitter. 另一位在旧金山创建了一家小型企业的共和党人告诉《国家杂志》，他担心他的自由意志主义观点会让他失去潜在的合作者和投资人。他说，就在不久前，似乎他所有在硅谷的同行都公开表达了看法，抗议印第安纳州未能通过宗教信仰自由法案。他认为企业主应被允许由自己决定为谁服务。如果这些企业主歧视同性恋者，人们可以选择不去惠顾他们的生意。然而他不会去讨论这个观点，也不会在Facebook或Twitter上与他的左派同事辩论。 "If I were to speak out about something like that, maybe one of these companies wants to buy my company one day and the CEO is like, 'Oh, I remember this guy saying all this stuff about this thing that I really disagree with.' And that obviously could have negative effects," he said. "Getting your point across isn't worth it." “如果我毫无保留地谈这样的事，也许有一天当一家公司要收购我的公司时，那家公司的CEO说‘哦，我记得那个家伙就此事说了很多看法，而我完全不同意他的这些看法’，那么显而易见这可能带来负面影响”，他说，“不值得为了说清楚自己的观点而冒这样的险。” The consequences for being outed for conservative views can be dire. In a highly public controversy last year, newly-hired Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich, who is registered as an independent in California, stepped down after critics attacked his 2008 donation to support Proposition 8, the anti-same-sex marriage law in California. Eich, who declined to comment for this story, faced an internal uprising from within the Mozilla community, as well as boycotts from other tech companies, and quit after just two weeks on the job. 因为保守观点而被排挤的后果可能很可怕。去年就有一场喧嚣的争论。Mozilla公司新上任的CEO Brendan Eich是一位在加州注册的无党派人士，他因为在2008年捐款支持加州反同性婚姻法的8号提案而受到评论家的攻击，随后就辞职了。拒绝对此事作出评论的Eich承受了来自公司内部的激烈反对以及其它科技公司的抵制，仅仅在上任两周后便辞职了。 Though Eich's was an extreme case, some Republicans in Silicon Valley fear that if they go public, they'll face subtler, less direct repercussions. The CEO who spoke on background keeps his conservative-leaning views to himself, he said, because he doesn't want to risk people not liking him, which could hurt his job in imperceptible ways. As a leader, he needs to be able to inspire people to join and thrive in his company. If he's "contrarian," he said, he can't build the necessary camaraderie to succeed. 尽管Eich这件事是一个极端案例，但一些硅谷的共和党人害怕一旦将观点公之于众，会面对较隐蔽的不那么直接的反对。据那位不愿透露姓名的CEO说，他隐藏自己保守倾向的观点是因为他不愿冒险。一旦人们不喜欢自己，自己的工作可能以不易察觉的方式受到损害。作为一个领导者，他需要具备鼓舞人们加入自己的公司并蓬勃发展的能力。如果他是一个“同大家背道而驰的人”，他说，他就无法建立成功所必需的同僚之情。 Matthew Del Carlo, the former president of the San Francisco Young Republicans and the COO of the California Young Republican Federation, said that transparent Republicans can have a much harder time finding work in the Bay Area. "I've had people tell me, 'If I found out that this person's a Republican, their resume's off the list.'" 旧金山年轻共和党人组织（San Francisco Young Republicans）的前主席，加州年轻共和党人联盟（California Young Republican Federation）的首席运营官Matthew Del Carlo说，公开身份的共和党人在湾区找工作要难得多。“有人告诉我：‘如果我发现这人是共和党人，他的简历会直接被排除。’” Prominent Republicans do openly work in Silicon Valley, and not all of them feel stigmatized for their political views. Billionaire Paypal founder Peter Thiel is a high-profile GOP supporter who has made considerable donations to presidential contender Ted Cruz's 2012 Senate run and former congressman Ron Paul's 2012 presidential super PAC. And Sarah Pompei, who handled Romney's regional press in 2012 and now serves as Hewlett-Packard's director of corporate communications, told National Journal she's never felt denigrated for her conservative views. 确实也有知名共和党人会在硅谷公开活动，他们中并非所有人都觉得自己因为政治观点而受到指责。Paypal创始人亿万富翁Peter Thiel是位高调的共和党支持者。他捐赠了数量可观的献金支持总统席位竞争者Ted Cruz的2012年参议员竞选，以及前众议员Ron Paul的2012年总统竞选超级政治行动委员会（super PAC）。2012年为罗姆尼处理地区报道事务的Sarah Pompei目前是惠普公司的企业传播主管，她告诉《国家杂志》，她从未感觉因持有保守派观点而受到抨击。 Both Pompei and Thiel, who declined to comment for this story, prove success in the tech industry is possible for Republicans who are open about their political leanings. But they wield more power and cachet than the average start-up employee. Pompei和Thiel拒绝评论此事。他们都证明公开表明自己政治倾向的共和党人在科技产业中获得成功是可能的。当然，他们较之一般的创业公司员工拥有更多的权力和威信。 "There's fearless people out there that don't care, but those tend to be people that are in a better position financially. They're secure in their job," Del Carlo said. Those with more to lose, he said, often find it easier to keep quiet. “有些胆子大的人对此无所谓，但那些人往往拥有比较好的经济地位。他们在工作上有了保障。”Del Carlo说。他说那些顾虑多的人常常觉得还是保持沉默为妙。 Still, Thiel's attention-getting fundraising for GOP candidates and libertarian causes, along with other high-profile Republicans in the tech sector, show that the climate in Silicon Valley is—albeit incrementally—becoming more politically inclusive. Lincoln Labs, the group dedicated to connecting right-of-center techies in the Bay Area, has been a big part of that effort. Earlier this year, its annual conference, Reboot, brought libertarians and conservatives from Silicon Valley to Washington to hear Sens. Ted Cruz and Rand Paul speak on deregulation, net neutrality, and other tech-industry priorities. 尽管如此，Thiel为共和党候选人以及自由意志主义事业进行的引人注目的募捐，以及其他一些科技界的高调共和党人，都显示了硅谷的政治气候正在——尽管是渐进式地——变得更包容。致力于联合湾区右翼科技从业者的团体Lincoln Labs在推动这种政治气候变化的过程中贡献良多。今年早些时间，团体年会Reboot将硅谷的自由主义意志者和保守派聚集到华盛顿，聆听参议员Ted Cruz和Rand Paul就解除管制、网络中立以及其它一些科技产业重要事宜发表的讲话。 Throughout the year, the organization holds meetups and hackathons to build a "sense of community, so that people don't feel like they are isolated," Johnson said. He and Lincoln Labs' other co-founders, Aaron Ginn and Chris Abrams, want to empower a true exchange of ideas within the tech community, without ostracizing any one view. 该组织全年举行聚会和编程马拉松，以此建立一种“社区感，让人不会觉得被孤立。”Johnson说。他和Lincoln Labs的另外两位共同创立者Aaron Ginn和Chris Abrams想在科技行业内促成真正的意见交流，而不排斥任何一种观点。 "Silicon Valley purports to be a place where the best ideas win," Johnson said. "If we are going to encourage diversity, let's not just stop with gender and ethnicity. How about ideological perspective?" “硅谷据说是个最佳观念取胜的地方，”Johnson说，“如果我们要鼓励多样化，那就不能仅限于性别和种族方面。在意识形态上也试试怎么样？” Conservatives and libertarians in Silicon Valley like Johnson are pioneering a new kind of Republican. With a distinctly libertarian flavor, they align with the party on the principles of liberty and limited government, but don't necessarily lean right on—or care much about—social issues. 像Johnson这样的硅谷保守派和自由意志主义者正在开创一种新型的共和党人形象。他们带有鲜明的自由意志主义倾向，在自由原则和小政府原则上与共和党一致，但他们不一定在社会问题上持右倾观点——他们未必关心这些问题。 The entrepreneurs and techies of the Bay Area, said Tafel, are "very aligned to what could be a Republican party." They just need to come out. 湾区的企业家和科技工作者“几乎快要组成一个共和党团体了”，Tafel说。他们只是需要出柜。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-07-21】 @西瓜大丸子汤 人类不怕暴政，不怕大战，怕就怕政治秩序的丧失，导致的他人即地狱的混乱。德国在30年战争中丧失1/3人口，中国每次改朝换代要失去一半人口，直接死于战火的并不多，大部分都是饿死，病死的。生产一被破坏，普通人就变成两脚羊了。 @西瓜大丸子汤: 中国要是再来一次天下大乱，中央政府失灵，到下一次政治权威重建，死掉几亿人不成问题。王林这样的神棍在搞个独立王国做皇帝都是有可能的。 @whigzhou: 尽瞎扯，现代通信/交通/市场条件下，大规模饿死人还真不容易，得有一个强大政府阻止民众自救并阻断外部援助 @whigzhou: 过去几十年，“中央政府失灵”这种事还少了？哪次导致大饥荒了？拿古代生套现代，不动脑子～ @西瓜大丸子汤: 当年读《南明史》，开始讲述饥荒人吃人，真是比恐怖片恐怖一百倍的世界。你往哪逃？你在别人眼里不过是食物而已，所有人，包括亲人。后面逐步讲政治秩序的崩溃，所有人开始相互混战。明末大概 @whigzhou: 古代动荡死人确实多，但王朝更迭期的账面人口波动体现的主要是户籍统计和税收职能的削弱 @西瓜大丸子汤: 过去几十年，除了非洲一些国家，分裂有之，中央政府失灵的事没发生过。那些非洲国家，无不生灵涂炭，2011索马里就饿死了至少十万人，这是政府失灵的典范 @whigzhou: 苏联南斯拉夫中央都没了还不算中央政府失灵啊～ @西瓜大丸子汤: 南斯拉夫不是打起来了，死人无算。俄国核心政府并没有消失，换了个旗号而已，和明末那种崩溃完全不同。饶是如此，俄国人均寿命还低于80年代，死亡率上升，二十年来少生多死了两千万人 @whigzhou: 1）所以南斯拉夫人口被消灭了多少？2）和明末那种崩溃完全不同——对啊，这不正是我的重点？ @西瓜大丸子汤: 饶是如此，俄国人均寿命还低于80年代，死亡率上升，二十年来少生多死了两千万人。 @whigzhou: 3）俄罗斯生育率/人口下降是七八十年代开始的长期趋势的延续，80年代堕胎数就超过生育数了 @whigzhou: 4）俄罗斯人均寿命的短期下降是事实，这是因为市场开放酒可以随便喝了，跟政治/社会动荡扯不上边 @卷心菜计划:失灵的程度有不同，还有失灵的国家有不同，俄罗斯彻底失灵和中国彻底失灵后果是数量级的差别 @whigzhou: 你又用水晶球看过啦～ @西瓜大丸子汤: 明清人口，这个是《中国人口史》的结论，不是看帐面人口，从各种经济数据推算的 @whigzhou: “明末近两亿，康熙八千万”这数字哪里来的？对万历人口的最高估计（1.97亿）来自葛剑雄/曹树基一派，他们对康熙谷值的估计是1.23亿，你不能峰值取最高，谷值取最低，然后说“人口被消灭大半”吧？ @whigzhou: 手头没有《中国人口史》，1.23亿是曹树基在《中国移民史》第六卷里提出的数字，该卷对万历峰值的估计是1.8亿，差额更小 @whigzhou: 葛/曹的数字是各派中峰谷差额偏大的，按何炳棣的估计，差额要小得多（虽然他没明确给出谷值估计，但他认为峰谷差额在清初小几十年内就弥补上了 @劉光舟:复旦的《中国人口史》对明清易代死亡人数的估计是4000多万，特意查了下 @whigzhou: 谢谢～这个差额数字比97年版的《中国移民史》少了近1/3，说明复旦派后来也把谷值估算上调了 @局外人c的空间: 我以前有个猜测：苏联崩溃以后，没有发生大规模流血冲突，大量的人口死亡，乃因它预先分裂的缘故，假如没有苏联的提前解体，这样一个疆域和民族众多的国家， @whigzhou: 对。可是就算满清解体这么不顺利，北洋时期也没死多少人啊，加起来不及49后一次镇鸭和清洗，更没法跟60饥荒相提并论 @细雨润石:这种回避主题纠缠数字的手法，倒是跟毛左分子纠缠“三年自然灾害”饿死了多少人、日本右翼分子纠缠南京大屠杀屠杀了多少人如出一辙。 @whigzhou: 嗯毛左最认真了所以他们输了～  

【2015-07-17】 @whigzhou: 当一个议题被政治纷争笼罩时，我就不会相信什么“科学界主流意见”，这些意见几十年后再看估计扯蛋居多，判断这种局面出现的几个线索：1）向来谨慎的科学家突然变得信誓旦旦起来，2）专业跟议题距离很远的科学家突然大批掺和进来，3）动辄几百上千联名公开信，4）动机论阴谋论开始盛行…… @你国人民感情伤害专家: 说人碳暖球呢。 @whigzhou: 很多，从塞维利亚信条，种族差异，人碳暖球，智力测量，同性教育…… @慕容飞宇gg: 社会心理学界左得一塌糊涂，那些同性父母对儿童没有影响的结论根本不足为信。看他们对相反结论签名抗议的闹剧也就知道了 @whigzhou: 我看的不多，让我纳闷的是，同性家庭历史才多长？他们有机会大致正常养孩子的历史才多长？观察养育效果的合理周期是多长？这么快就有结论了还信誓旦旦？  

【2015-07-16】 @大象公会 【猎头者，霍布斯的诅咒】胆小慎点 | 只为猎取人头而杀人，曾是广泛存在于从美洲、南太平洋、东南亚到华南地区的习俗，各地对猎头的理由和动机解释完全不同，是什么原因让这些地区变成了人人恐惧的高危地带。作者：@whigzhou @人格显示器: 问题在于反复的博弈为何没有带来和平？ @whigzhou: 在局部（小共同体或联盟内部）和短时期内带来过和平，但都不太长久。均衡被打破的常见原因有：1）寿命太短，均衡常依赖于大人物之间的个人信任，也因一个大人物的死亡而打破；2）饥荒等灾难导致的绝望之举；3）一方力量增长打破均势…… @whigzhou: 4）但最根本也最难以遏制的因素是：资源竞争的激烈程度，使得每个群体内部的失败者 不得不向外寻求出路，铤而走险，非洲的年龄组制度便是一例，这些部落财产和女性资源被年长男性完全霸占，每一代男性都要等到30多岁，叔叔们死的差不多了，才有机会娶到老婆，等不了的，只能到外面找。 @whigzhou: 所谓年龄组，就是由部落内同龄男性组成的战斗/劫掠团队，经过成人仪式考验后组成，对外发动攻击，抢牲口抢女人，杀戮驱逐竞争者 @whigzhou: 这种模式在澳洲北部Tiwi人中发展到极端，部落内资源被老男人垄断，男性在40岁之前基本上无望在部落内部娶妻，问题上熬到这个年龄之前很可能死了，你说他们怎么可能不铤而走险搏一下？ @香港的谭叔: 唉。去看看理性乐观派。辉总这篇文章说过头了 @whigzhou: 《理性乐观派》我恐怕比任何人读的都仔细，书很好，但我不得不说里德利在这个问题上犯了错误，详见我的两篇评论：文化发动机：市场交易vs互惠交易 ，国家起源：定居农业vs商业 @whigzhou: 总结一下：1）前国家社会的交易以互惠式为主，而互惠交易的特点是区分熟人/陌生人，朋友/敌人，规范之在熟人/朋友间发展，对待其他人可以毫无规则和底线，且毫无道德包袱，2）前国家社会也有少量非互惠式的市场交易，但从事这些贸易的人同时也是武装团伙，当抢劫更有利时，他们不会犹豫。 @香港的谭叔: 辉总其实也应该了解一下有贸易和没有贸带来的分別。不是我说的。是理性乐观派这书的主旨。把国家政府当成秩序的主要来源有很多问题错误 @whigzhou: 我完全同意，除国家之外，秩序还可以有很多重要来源，自发秩序也是我常挂在嘴边的词，但我不得不承认：这些秩序在前国家时代确实未能带来和平 @whigzhou: 作为有着无政府理想的人，这事实让我很遗憾，但我不能假装看不见。假如我们想象一个平行世界，国家晚出现几千年，假以时日，私人组织或许能够找到更好的均衡，但事实上，国家抢得了先机，抢到了作为大型社会秩序独家供应商的地位，并且排挤和压制了与之竞争的其他潜在供应商， 很遗憾～ @tertio:如果邓巴数大一个或几个数量级，情况也许不同 @whigzhou: 或许寿命长几倍更管用。历史上最接近于成功的私人组织是日耳曼封建制，典型的封建系统其实是个私人组织，一切都是私权，但后来的历史表明，其结构性缺陷使它无法为一个流动性大社会提供秩序，而宪政/法治的发展是王权扩张和国家化的结果 @黄章晋ster: 我在想，如果有个超大但却是连续而破碎的群岛，而且物产不均，或许可以出现这种的演化。 @whigzhou: 嗯，再给波利尼西亚一千年～ @只配叫猪:王朝就是私人组织啊 @whigzhou: 国家/私人不是这么分的，只要符合如下条件的实体，就是国家（无论该实体是不是个人）：它所执行的规范要求由它垄断暴力，即，除非经它许可或授权，任何人不得对他人使用武力 @whigzhou: 一个不主张不谋求这一垄断地位的秩序供应商（比如保险公司或者非排他性仲裁者），就是私人组织而非国家 @人格显示器:所谓的公权，不过是把个人的所有权分成股份给予更多人，本质上还是私有制的。 @whigzhou: 区别在制度性垄断（所谓制度性，是指其所执行的规范规定了自己的垄断地位），如果这个保险公司不主张垄断地位，就是私人性质的 @whigzhou: 详细分析见我对诺齐克的评论 @格林黑风: 辉总，美版无间道里一个黑社会boss 说我是此地老大，我没说可以打谁，谁就不能被打。这黑社会不能算国家吧？ @whigzhou: 如果他把认真执行这一条，那他就是想成为国家，如果他大致上做到了，那他就是国家了，被称为黑社会的，都是离成功太远的那些