【2021-12-18】 美国在70年代之前和之后的增长模式十分不同，Tyler Cowen 在 The Great Stagnation 里提出过这个问题，后来 Robert Gordon在《美国增长的起落》里有更详尽的描述， Cowen 指出的现象是清楚的，但他的分析不得要领，简单说，他认为原因是容易摘到的果子都已经摘掉了，新的增长点很难找，而他开出的药方是多多支持科研，指望从中冒出像汽车那样的足以掀起大消费浪潮的大创新， 问题是： 1）有没有迹象显示，自70年代以来，美国企业的创新活动减少了，或创新激励减弱了？依我看，众多线索都指向相反方向， 2）何以认为这种增长模式转变是个需要治疗的毛病，因而需要你来开药方？更具体的说，当你对一国经济表现做长时段比较时，GDP增长率是不是恰当指标？如果GDP增长率放缓是社会富裕化的自然结果，那又有什么可担心的？ 完全有可能，GDP这种特定的度量方法，会倾向于高估某些类型的福利改进，而低估另一些类型的福利改进，而后者在富裕社会的增长中占比更高，因而在同等福利改进速度下，富裕社会测量到的增长率更低， 早先我曾指出这种可能性，为解决这个问题，更早时我还提出过一个类似恩格尔系数的指标， 当年读完 Cowen 那本书时，我的思考大概就停在这个位置，今天突然又想起这个问题，发现，其实我能在理论上证明，前面提到的低估不仅是可能的，而且是必然的， 这里的关键是生产函数中的要素特性，以及这种特性导致的边际成本曲线形状，会随社会富裕化而向特定方向改变，这一改变将导致GDP增长率对福利改进的系统性低估， 生产要素的一个关键特性，是它的竞用性（rivalry），即，当它被用于一件产品的生产时，多大程度上还能被用于另一件产品的生产，比如，一磅面粉，若被用来制造某个面包，就不能被用来制造另一个面包或其他任何东西了，所以面包生产中的面粉是完全竞用的，再如GPS信号，被一辆车用了，丝毫不影响其他车用，所以是完全不竞用的， 但竞用性不是二值的，有些要素介于两者之间，比如道路对于通行者，当拥挤度很低时，完全不竞用，通行人数到达某个程度时，开始显得有点拥挤，竞用性便出现了，拥挤到一定程度，每加入一位通行者必须挤出另一位，就成了完全竞用， 一个池塘对于钓鱼者的情况与此类似， 各种要素中有形原材料都是完全竞用的，机器厂房等有形资产通常是高度竞用的，有些是完全竞用的，无形资产的竞用性通常较低，比如专利权和著作权，完全不竞用，组织结构是竞用的，但程度比有形资产低，商誉也是低竞用的，知识的竞用性则随默会度而异，越是难以言传的默会知识，竞用性越高，越是显性知识，竞用性越低， 再来看产品，生产一种产品所用到的要素组合中，可能包括竞用程度不同的要素，假如我们为其中每种要素赋一个从0到1的竞用性值，并按其在成本中所占比例加权求和，便得到一个介于0到1之间的指标，不妨称为该产品的生产要素竞用强度（R）， 这个指标的重要性在于，它在很大程度上决定了该产品的边际成本曲线的形状，竞用强度越高，曲线越平缓，即单位生产成本随规模提高而下降速度较慢，竞用强度越低，曲线越陡峭，单位生产成本随规模提高而急剧下降， 依我看，一个很明显，在统计上也很容易验证的事实是：当一个社会从贫穷向中等收入发展时，其福利改进主要表现为有形产品消费量的增加，对应的生产增量大多是高竞用强度的，而在那些已经富裕的社会，福利改进主要表现既有消费品质量提升以及无形消费品和服务的增加，对应的生产增额大多是低竞用强度的， 进而，若生产增量所涉及产品是高竞用强度的，在数量上将更多表现为“价格不变，数量增加，金额增加”，因而GDP增长，反之，若生产增量所涉及产品是低竞用强度的，在数量上将更多表现为“价格不变，质量提高，金额不变”，或“价格降低，数量提高，金额不变”，因而GDP不变， 这是因为，若一种产品的竞用强度很低，边际生产成本随规模急剧下降，厂商就会倾向于低价扩大市场的策略，因为多卖出一份产品带来的额外成本很少，有时甚至为0， 【2021-12-19】 @叶子疏: 马斯洛金字塔的上层难以以单纯价格衡量的意思？大概主要是信息革命的非物质产品，例如在线电影，视频电话和互动网站比起前代产品如剧场演出几乎是免费提供 @whigzhou: 对，但不止于此，许多有形商品的生产函数中，低竞用性要素的成本比重也大幅提高了 @whigzhou: 比如有一类提高来自组织/管理变革导致的默会知识显性化，而显性化降低了知识的竞用性，进而让边际成本的下降更陡峭 @whigzhou: 一个容易理解的例子是连锁快餐业，原本，经营一家餐馆所需知识都是默会的，大多存储在老板脑子里，麦当劳做的事情就是把这些知识显性化，变成几千页的操作与培训手册，而显性化的知识可以低成本大量复制 @whigzhou: 从更广泛的意义上说，机械化和自动化也是一种默会知识显性化的过程，比如，要让一台机器完成纺纱任务，你必须把纺纱过程的每个动作和给料步骤清晰描绘出来，经此描绘，知识即被显性化了  

【2021-08-12】 照目前这个势头，或许两三年内我们就会看到两位数通胀，和向银行注资不一样，从财政出去的钱会变成实际消费，参院GOP好像已经切换到*反正拦不住不如趁机给自己选区捞点好处*模式了， ​​​​  

【2015-06-01】 @格林黑风:辉总更喜欢大英帝国？可我觉得大英帝国治下的全球GDP增长率和财富增长率远低于大美帝国治下的时代啊。 穷国弱国的发展限制也是大美帝国时代更加宽松。 @whigzhou: 我看不能这么比，首先金本位时代和纸币时代增长很难通过GDP之类指标进行，更一般的说，GDP这种指标只适合于短期局部比较 @whigzhou: 其次，我更关注那些影响文化/制度有机体长期健康发展的因素，而不是阶段性增长速度之类的指标。 @whigzhou: 有关如何在大跨度上比较经济水平和评估发展速度，我曾提出过一种类似于恩格尔系数的思路：算算T1时刻的中等收入者需要花掉收入的多大比例才能过上与T0时刻中等收入者相当水平的生活 @whigzhou: 比较长期发展时，有一点值得注意：从长期看，币值似乎更多的锚定于必需品，这意味着，当发展主要体现为“非必需品的交易量增加”时，以货币度量的增长率会显得更低，这样，即便全要素生产率以恒定速率提高，GDP增长也会越来越慢 @whigzhou: 就是说，当增长主要体现为人们吃了更多食物、盖了更多房子、买了更多汽车时，在统计上常会表现为价格恒定、GDP提高，而当增长主要体现为人们享受了更多优质服务、去更多地方旅行、享受更方便的通信、玩了更多游戏时，在统计上更可能表现为价格降低、GDP不变 @Stimmung:那意味着旅行社、通信服务供应商、游戏制作发行etc. 的收入并没有增长，但却增加了供给。他们是在为人民服务吗？ @whigzhou: 对啊，不然怎么会有摩尔定律 @Stimmung: （接上）ceteris paribus, 技术进步使MC曲线下移，厂商相应增加供给，直到重新达到均衡。在此过程中真实收入增加 @whigzhou: 对，但是价格指数的加权方式会自动拉低那些价格下降快的产品的权重，因而低估这些产品带来的消费增长，至于GDP绝对值是否随此过程而提高或下降，还取决于其他因素，无法判定 @whigzhou: 其实我们最好换个角度来看这问题：能否找出一种价格指数，使得按该指数调整的GDP能够反映“真实”消费水平？我的回答是：不能。因为无论如何设计价格指数，都会扭曲“真实”消费，它要么无法反映成本下降带来的消费增加，要么不得不扭曲消费者对不同消费品的价值排序，后者同样是对“真实”的偏离。 @whigzhou: 也正因此，我提倡另一种比较方法 【2021-04-08】 终于看到有人表达了和我类似的看法，下面两段摘自Robert Gordon《美国增长的起落》第一章：

本书表明，有两个重要的原因足以解释为什么人均实际GDP大大低估了任意国家（特别是美国）在特殊世纪中所取得的生活水平的提高。第一，GDP遗漏了生活质量的很多方面，这些对人们十分重要。这种遗漏的产生源于GDP指标的设计而非其理论缺陷，因为GDP测度的是在市场中交易的商品和服务，并没有包括那些对人们非常重要的非市场活动的价值。第二，即使作为衡量市场活动的指标，GDP增长也会被系统地低估，因为用于将当前货币支出转换为经通胀调整的不变价值美元的价格指数会高估价格增长。这一部分我们将超越实际GDP的界限拓展生活水平的概念，下一节讨论价格指数偏误的来源，最后用相关例子进行总结，说明人类活动中容易被GDP遗漏…… ……因此，价格指数忽略了新产品的福利收益以及新产品进入市场初期价格降低的福利提高效应。此外，在测度已有商品的质量方面还存在“质量偏误”。在任意给定月份，大部分电视机的型号都与前一个月的相同，价格指数测度的是已有型号任意月份环比价格的变动。但是，这将忽视能够以较小价格变动提供更大屏幕或更高清晰度图像的新型号的不断引入。消费者成群地停止购买旧型号而转向新型号，但是价格指数并没有考虑到质量价格比的提高。汽车燃油效率和家电能源效率的提高，如室内空调机和烘干机等，是官方价格指数中特别显著的质量偏误来源。

【2020-12-17】 前两天读了伯南克的《大萧条》，是部论文集，写得很好，清楚明了，是我这外行在这一主题上读到过最有说服力的东西，留下的疑点也最少，总结几点我的理解： 1）大萧条的首要原因是一战结束后恢复金本位的过程导致的严重货币收缩， 2）战前也是金本位，即1870-1914之间的所谓古典金本位，并未导致像大萧条那样的收缩，那是因为英镑地位非常牢固，即公众和全球金融界对英镑的信心很强，而英格兰银行也知道大家对它信心很强，所以它实际上把黄金储备拉的非常低，同时各国银行也敢于大量以英镑代替黄金为储备，结果是，虽然是金本位，但黄金存量对货币供给实际上并未构成太大障碍， 3）另外，英格兰银行之所以把黄金储备压的那么低，是因为它是一家私人企业（不像美联储），有盈利动机，因而只要可能，就会尽量降低黄金储备，因为黄金储备是没有收益的，而持有其他资产多少有点收益， 4）一战后重建起来的金本位则大不一样，由于世人对英镑和大英不再那么有信心，所以尽管外币仍被部分用作储备，但各国央行的首选和主要储备变成了黄金，而且都执行了很高的最低准备率（比如美国的40%），于是黄金存量就成了瓶颈， 5）各国央行对国际间黄金流动做出的反应不对称，流出国为维持准备率而缩减基础货币，流入国却并不相应增加货币供给，而是听任其变成超额储备，于是加剧了货币收缩， 6）上述不对称所造成的收缩效应，在银行体系的安全性面临风吹草动时会突然加剧，因为出现麻烦的那些国家的央行为了稳固储备以增强公众对本币及本国银行体系的信心，会设法（比如通过提升利率）吸引黄金流入，而这种举动将迅速引发连锁反应，形成对黄金的争夺，这将构成一种急剧加速货币收缩的正反馈， 7）第6点和第2、3点其实有相通之处，正因为此时各国央行都已不再有昔日大英曾拥有的那种自信和他信，才不得不以这种方式来稳固信心， 8）大萧条实际上分两个相当不同的阶段，1929-31年的衰退，本来到31年已经有复苏迹象，但此时衰退变成金融危机，银行大批破产（或陷于流动性困境），导致大量中小企业完全借不到钱，继而破产或缩减产出， 9）从衰退变成银行危机的一个关键因素是，由于绝大多数借贷契约是不与通胀率挂钩的，因而通货紧缩产生了再分配效应，即，紧缩之后，价格下跌，债务人欠的钱变得更值钱了，需要用更多产出去偿还，结果很多就还不起了，于是（加上衰退本身的影响）大批违约，导致银行破产， 10）对于金本位的作用，一个很强的证据是国际比较：坚守金本位越严格、守得越久，萧条持续也越久，反之，越早退出金本位的国家，也越早开始复苏，各国大致分三批退出，英国31年，美国33年，法国36年，最早退出的那批实际上并未出现明显的第二阶段危机， 哦，忘了一点，是有关基础理论的：企业在银行眼中的信用是一种高度特化的资产，是基于大量（哈耶克所称）局部知识的，所以当一家银行破产时，其贷款客户无法转而从其他银行获得同等条件同等数量的贷款，因而银行大批破产会直接导致货币收缩（伯南克本人没用我的术语，但意思差不多） @felicia111:我自己觉得是股市和房地产泡沫的破灭，当时杠杆用到了极致，有多繁荣，就有多萧条。 @whigzhou: 这个说法伯南克讨论了并且排除了 @felicia111:1929年是全球经济危机，从货币角度看，金本位，限制了货币供应，货币供应少了，为什么物价没有下跌呢？为什么二十年代，在29年以前，同样金本位，却是极度繁荣？ @whigzhou: 1）直到1925-30年间各国才陆续完成金本位的重建，2）货币缩减到衰退也需要时间，3）价格跌了，而且跌幅很大 @利维坦B:美联储前主席说大萧条源于“恢复黄金平价”；经济学家弗里德曼说大萧条源于美联储放弃了自己的职责，放任银行破产，严重打击人们的信心。 该相信谁？ @whigzhou: 伯南克和弗里德曼的主要分歧就体现在原帖第6-7点 @whigzhou: 弗说，联储犯下大错，没有努力扩张货币压低利率，反而做了相反举动，伯说，没错，可那不是因为联储太笨，而是金本位的内在逻辑要求他不得不这么做，只要想坚守金本位，就不可能做得更好，压低利率只能让黄金流出，储备耗尽 @whigzhou: 换句话说，金本位下，实际上不存在最终贷款人，所以一旦市场信心开始动摇，所有人——包括央行——都被迫加入了对黄金的挤兑  

【2015-09-28】 @whigzhou: 安倍经济学应该算是新凯恩斯主义迄今为止最理想的实验了吧，几年后看结果吧，呵呵 @whigzhou: 不过到时候他们肯定会找出各种说辞来证明实验条件还是很不理想～ @证券狂人_GOP: 安倍不是努力地给企业减税、减少财政赤字吗？日元如此巨大贬值cpi依旧疲软，说明日元在安倍上台前的确有高估，这些不是都在证明安倍在做正确的事啊？ @whigzhou: 减税是对的，市场开放也有一些，但安倍的核心武器是用大规模公共开支向系统灌入大量货币，依我看不会有什么好结果 @whigzhou: 宽松货币我完全同意，但通过政府灌钱达到宽松效果，有害无益，无奈结构改革效果太慢，政客都喜欢任期内可以见效的方法 @证券狂人_GOP:果然真是大规模开飞机撒钞票的话，应该会有通胀啊，可目前cpi依旧在0附近徘徊，好像有些奇怪啊？ @whigzhou: 因为它会挤出私人开支啊，只要银行和个人仍然是财务负责的，并且看不到这些公共开支提升收入的前景，灌进去的钱就不会变成消费，反而扭曲银行的正常信贷机制 @whigzhou: 大规模公共开支不光扭曲信贷，还扭曲实体经济的资源配置，抬高私人部门的要素成本，效果类似于4万亿对私人部门的挤压

个人禀赋可遗传性，社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择，择偶的同质化倾向，阶层内婚，阶级分化，族群禀赋差异化，地区经济分化，大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……，把[[Charles Murray]]，[[Garett Jones]]和[[Gregory Clark]]的工作合起来看，貌似就通了，有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变，越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters，在写作《自私的皮球》时，我基本上还是个制度主义者，虽然也相信文化重要，但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的，然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认，文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。 转变最初起于对南北欧的比较，北欧（包括英德）在制度上也有种种问题，但表现总是比南欧强很多，日耳曼/拉丁这条分界线实在太清晰了，怎么辩解否认都不可能，想来想去，一个直觉上的印象反而比种种“客观原因”更有说服力：南欧的政治家（和他们的民众一样）普遍没有责任感，没有政治担当，没有认错然后做个决断的能力，只会命苦怪别人，就这么简单。 看看希腊人在债务危机后的丑态，一门心思只想着赖账，从不想想自己有什么问题，和西班牙政府在历史上无数次赖账如出一辙，这种事情北欧人就做不出来，默克尔移民大放水这件事情虽然是做得很坏，但不得不承认她是有担当的，在非常清楚代价的情况下勇于承担责任的，这种事情你在南欧永远看不到。 我曾经认为夏威夷是个支持制度主义的鲜明案例，但后来发现，直到几十年前，欧裔和日裔加起来还占夏威夷人口多数。 然后我又看了一下波多黎各和英属洪都拉斯（包括伯利兹），很明显的制度主义反例。可以设想一下，其他条件不变，把波多黎各或洪都拉斯的70%人口全部换成日裔，会是什么样，要我说，答案很明显。 外部强加的制度当然可以造成很大差别，这个以前说过很多了，现在我想强调的是，对于某些文化，某些族群，外部再怎么强加制度，可能都不会达到很好的状态，当然，正面外部力量可以让它避免最坏的状态（比如变成朝鲜） 简单说，在所有拉丁社会中，波多黎各当然已经非常好了，再怎么说，因为有美国，它不会变成阿根廷，或委内瑞拉，或古巴，而我的意思是，它也不大会变成夏威夷，变成韩国，变成香港，论制度条件，英属/美属加勒比的条件再理想不过了，但并未冒出任何加勒比小龙。 再看以色列，不考虑文化/遗传因素的话，当初的条件真是恶劣到无以复加，建国者满脑子共产主义，沉重战争负担，重税，重管制，恶性通胀，啥坏事都摊上过，最后愣是给拗过来了。 转个两年前的旧帖，大意如此。

@whigzhou @ 2014-8-29 12:25 随着技术/文化/制度的丰满成熟，地理因素对社会间差异变得越来越无关，地理大发现以来，英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会，德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民，犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……，换句话说：更成熟的文化与制度更有能力控制和适应各种环境。

 

昨天和小聂吃饭，聊起自动驾驶、机器人、失业和福利制度这一连串问题，早先我在《机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗？》一文中曾谈论过这事情，后来在微博上也有过讨论，自那以来的几次交谈，让我又有了些新想法，整理一下。 （我觉得这事情还是用对话体更容易表达清楚） M：就像你在那篇文章里说的，随着机器智能与生产率提高、成本下降，到某个点之后，人类（或者可以更安全的说，大部分人类）的劳动在经济体系中将变得没有雇佣价值，那时候失业率岂不是会很高？ W：嗯，好像是这样。 M：这些失业者没有了收入，但手里仍然握着选票，所以到时候福利制度的大幅扩张就是不可避免的，对吧？ W：那倒不一定，失业者没有了工资收入，但可以有其他收入，只要他还拥有一些在当前经济体中租得出去的要素便可，或者更简单的说，只要他持有一份（比如）谷歌的股票便可。 M：可是我们没有理由认为，多数失业者恰好都持有足以维生的股权或其他资产，要点在于，劳动力要素是每个人生出来就自动拥有的，但其他资产则有很大偶然性，重要的是没有什么机制确保每个人自动带着它。 W：嗯，有道理，不过其实劳动力资本也不是人人自动带着的，比如很多类型的残疾人可能生来就不自动带着在市场上租得出去的人力资本，所以你的问题其实是：未来社会能够应付（比如）80%的残疾人比例吗？对此，历史经验确实无法告诉我们什么。 M：所以并不能排除这样的可能：半数以上的人失业且无产，因而大规模福利制度不可避免，对吧？ W：但我们还可以考虑另一种可能性。假设80%的人失业了，但这些失业者还拥有一些土地（先别管这土地是怎么来的），这些土地和他们的劳动力一样，在当时的经济体系中已经没有出租价值，那么，这些人能否在这块土地上重新建立起一个自己的经济体系（姑且称为系统B）呢？ 退一万步讲，即便他们采用18世纪的技术和生产模式，似乎也没有理由认为他们不能维持一个自足的经济体，尽管因为效率太低，系统B的产品在那个主流经济体（姑且称为系统A）中完全没有销路，但只要系统A的人不把阳光遮起来，系统B便可以存在，就像18世纪的世界（或者14世纪的美洲经济体）可以存在一样。 M：嗯，而且留在系统A里的人总会有一些慈善家，只要他们向系统B捐赠一些现代玩意，系统B的日子就会比18世纪的好得多。 问题是，为什么他们恰好有这块土地呢？ W：或许系统A的人会大发善心，向系统B捐赠一块土地，让他们自己玩去，毕竟，这么做的代价要比一套巨型福利制度低多了，而且，现在不是也有自然保护区吗，他们难道不想保留几个文化公园？ M：要是他们不发善心呢？这不仍是诉诸偶然性吗？和假设他们恰好拥有其他值钱要素有何不同？ W：但是考虑到国家边界的存在，就没那么偶然了。当系统A的自动化程度不断加深，逐渐排除人类劳动力时，被排除者并非均匀分布于各国，考虑到人力禀赋、资源禀赋和制度条件的巨大差异，总会有一些国家被完全排除出系统A，于是它们便组成了系统B。 M：所以世界经济体在未来将发生两极分化，最终变成两个孤立的体系？ W：看起来是这样，当然两个系统之间还是会有一些贸易，但贸易量微不足道，不具有系统性重要性，系统A基本上用不着系统B的任何资源，而系统B基本上买不起系统A的任何东西。 M：那留在系统A里的失业人口呢？不是仍然要福利制度养活？ W：好像也不一定，理论上，若没有福利制度，这些失业者的较优选择是移民到系统B，当然搬家也有成本，所以系统A为了避免福利制度造成的代价，可以为他们支付船票和安家费。 M：嗯……不过以我对现实政治的经验，搬家的恐怕不是他们。 W：对！留在系统A里的显然将是少数派，而且他们是最有能力迁移的。 M：嗯嗯，实际上系统A的运行大概不需要太大的地方，实在不行漂在公海上都可以。 W：对，所以他们未必需要拼选票，只要有处可逃就行。 M：这一点又如何保证？ W：依我看，只要仍然存在众多分立国家即可，那些坚持福利制度的国家，似乎更可能最终留在系统B里，所以千万别有全球统一政府。 M：就是说，就算美国再好，也不能只剩一个美国？ W：没错。  

Hive Mind 蜂巢思维 作者：Robin Hanson @ 2015-11-13 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：龟海海 来源：overcomingbias.com，http://www.overcomingbias.com/2015/11/statestupidity.html Some people like murder mystery novels. I much prefer intellectual mysteries like that in Garett Jones’ new book Hive Mind: How Your Nation’s IQ Matters So Much More Than Your Own: 有些人喜欢看谋杀悬疑小说，而我则更青睐那些智力悬疑类著作，例如Garett Jones的新书《蜂巢思维：为什么你们国家的整体智商水平甚至比你自己的智商还要重要》中所描述的：

Over a decade ago I began my research into how IQ matters for nations. I soon found that the strong link between average IQ and national productivity couldn't be explained with just the conventional finding that IQ predicts higher wages. IQ apparently mattered far more for nations than for individuals. 在十年前我开始研究智商对国家意味着什么。我很快就发现，国民的平均智商与国家生产率之间的强相关性，并不能以高智商预示着高薪资这一传统发现来解释。智商对国家的作用显然比对个人重要得多。 In my early work, I estimated that IQ mattered about six times more for nations than for individuals: your nation’s IQ mattered so much more than your own. That puzzle, that paradox of IQ, is what set me on my intellectual journey. … 在我早期的研究中，我曾经做过一个估测，智商对国家所发挥的作用要比对于个人所发挥的作用高大约6倍，也就是说：你所在国家的平均智商水平比你自己的智商水平要重要的多。这个谜题，或者叫“智商悖论”，让我踏上了这条智力探索的漫漫长路... I’ll lay out five major channels for how IQ can pay off more for nations than for you as an individual: 我将在下面列举五个方面的依据说明智商对国家的影响要远远超出对个人的影响： 1. High-scoring people tend to save more, and some of that savings stays in their home country. More savings mean more machines, more computers, more technology to work with, which helps make everyone in the nation more productive. 1. 高智商的人更会储蓄，而其中的部分储蓄将留在他们的母国。更多储蓄意味着更多的机器，更多电脑，更多可运用的技术，而这些都能帮助生活在这个国家的所有人变得更有效率。 2. High-scoring groups tend to be more cooperative. And cooperation is a key ingredient for building higher-quality governments and more productive businesses. 2. 高智商的群体倾向于更具合作性。而合作则是建设更高质量的政府和更高效企业的一个关键因素。 3. High-scoring groups are more likely to support market-oriented policies, a key to national prosperity. People who do well on standardized tests also tend to be better at remembering information, and informed voters are an important ingredient for good government. 3. 高智商的人群更倾向于支持亲市场政策，这是国家繁荣的关键。那些在标准智商测试中得分更高的人同样也在记忆信息方面拥有优势，而博闻多识的选民是构建良好政府的重要因素。 4. High-scoring groups will tend to be more successful at using highly productive team-based technology. With these “weakest link” technologies, one misstep can destroy the product’s value, so getting high-quality workers together is crucial. Think about computer chips, summer blockbuster films, cooperative mega-mergers. 4. 高智商的人群在使用那些高效的基于团队协作的技术上要做得更好。在这些“最弱一环”【编注：Weakest Link是BBC二台的一档竞赛游戏节目，参赛者需一环扣一环的连续正确解答问题，以最终赢得奖金，每一回合过后，参赛者互相投票选出该回合的“最弱一环”，当选者出局离场。】技术中，任何一步差错都可能会毁掉整个产品的价值，所以让高素质工人进行协作至关重要。想想那些电脑芯片，夏季震撼的电影大片，还有巨型公司的兼并，都是此类协作的产物。 5. The human tendency to conform, at least a little, creates a fifth channel that multiplies the effect of the other four: the imitation channel, the peer effect channel. Even a small tendency to conform, to act just a little bit like those around us, too try to fit in, tends to quietly shape our behavior. If you have cooperative, patient, well-informed neighbors, that probably makes you a bit more cooperative, patient, and well-informed. 5. 人类多少有一点顺从倾向，这创造出了能够放大上述四类作用的第五种效应：那就是模仿效应，或“伙伴效应”。即使是很小一点顺从倾向，也就是行动得更像我们身边的人一些，或者说试图适应身边的人，都很可能在潜移默化中塑造我们的行为。如果你拥有富于合作性，有耐心而且博闻多识的邻居，那么这可能也会让你也变得更有合作性，更耐心，也更博闻多识。 Of course, test scores don’t explain everything about the wealth of nations: I’m only claiming that IQ-type scores explain about half of everything across countries – and much less within a country.

当然，智力测试得分无法解释关于国家富裕程度的一切：我只是说智商类测试得分能够解释国家间大约一半的财富差异——而对一个国家内部的差异，它能解释的部分则要小得多。 The question of why IQ matters more for nations than individuals does indeed seem quite important, and quite puzzling, and Jones is to be praised for his readable and informative book calling it to our attention. And the five explanations Jones offers are indeed, as he claims, channels by which each of us benefits from the IQ of the people around us. 为什么智商对于国家的影响相比对个人的影响要大得多这个问题看来的确很重要，而且也着实是个谜，因此我认为本书作者Jones应该为他这部兼具可读性和信息量并让我们充分意识到这个问题的著作而获得称赞。如他所言，上面所提到的五种解释的确都是我们受益于自己身边人群智商的渠道。 However (you knew that was coming, right?), when we benefit from the IQ of people nearby who are within the scope of shared social institutions, then institution access prices can reflect these benefits. For example, employers can pay more for a smart employee who is not only more productive personally, but also raises the productivity of co-workers. Landlords can offer lower rents to people that other renters want to be near. Stores can offer discounts to customers that other customers like nearby when they are shopping. And clubs can offer discounts to entice memberships from those with which others like to associate. 然而（你知道我会这么说的，对吧？），当我们在共享社会机构的范围内从身边人群的智商中受益时，这些机构的准入价格便可体现这种益处的大小。例如，雇主可以为一名不仅自己生产率高，而且还能提升同事生产率的雇员发放更多的工资。土地主可以向其他租户都愿意靠近的那家租户收取更低的地租。商店可以向那些在购物时有很多人愿意接近的顾客提供折扣价格。而俱乐部也可以通过向那些其他人都愿意结交的人提供折扣来吸引他们成为自己的会员。 So simple economic theory leads us to expect that the benefits that smart people give to others nearby, within these shared priced-entry institutions, will be reflected in their incomes. 因此简单的经济理论便可让我们得出这样的预期，那些聪明人通过共享一个有偿准入的机构而带给身边人的好处，将最终反映在他们的收入上。 Specifically, people can plausibly pay more to live, club, shop, and work near and influenced by others who are more patient, cooperative, informed, and reliable. So these local benefits of smart associates do not plausibly explain the difference between how individual and national IQ correlate with income. 具体地说，人们完全可以花更多钱以换取生活在这些更有耐心，更富合作性，更博闻多识，也更可靠的人身边，在其附近购物，参与社团活动，并受其影响完全。所以这些聪明的被结交者们为身边人带来的局部收益，并不能合理地解释个人智商与收入的相关性为何不同于与国家平均智商与收入之间的相关性。【编注：意思是，假如高智商个体能够以本节所述方式将其带给身边人的利益（一种正外部性）内化为私人收入，这一相关性差别就不会存在。】 To explain this key difference (a factor of six!) we need big market or government failures. These could result if: 想要解释这一关键差异（第六个因素！），我们需要看看大市场或者政府的失败。下面几个原因可能导致这样的结果：

• Small social institutions such as firms, clubs, malls, and rental housing suffer some severe and as yet unidentified market failures which prevent them from favoring the smart.
• 诸如企业，俱乐部，超市和房屋租赁这类小型社会机构，可能会经历一些严重而又找不到原因的市场失灵，这阻止了它们对于聪明人的偏好。
• Benefits from the smart span such long social distances that they are not encompassed by shared social institutions with low enough transaction costs to allow deals to favor the smart. Maybe, for example, large metropolitan areas just can’t make effective deals on policies to favor attracting the smart, and pushing away the stupid.
• 聪明人所带来的好处，所发挥作用的社会跨度太大，以至于它们无法以足够低的交易成本被囊括进一个共同的社会机构中，从而让该机构能够做出偏爱聪明人的安排。举例来说，也许大都市地区的确无法就吸引聪明人并赶走蠢人的政策达成有效的安排。
• Governments with structures that fail to prevent the stupid and impatient from greatly influencing government policy. Such prevention might happen via restricting the franchise in democracies, by auctioning governance to a highest bidder, or via institutions like futarchy tied to long-term outcomes.

有组织构架的政府，可能也无法阻止那些愚蠢而缺乏耐心的人对其政策施加巨大影响【编注：此句原文语法不完整，姑作此解】。此类预防性措施的可能实现途径是，通过将治理权拍卖给出价最高者，来限制民主机制中的选举投票权，或者通过类似futarchy的制度【译注：futarchy是由经济学家Robin Hanson设想的一种制度，在其中，候选人只提出价值主张供选民选择，而采用何种政策来追求这些价值的问题，则交给一个预测市场（比如赌博市场或其他金融衍生品市场）来回答。】而将政策与长期后果捆绑在一起。 This third explanation seems by far the most plausible to me, especially via the government impatience channel. After all, while the stupid might be persuaded to see a benefit in adopting government institutions that give more influence to the smart, the impatient may just not see much benefit from their point of view in having a more patient government. 第三种解释在我看来是最合理的（且远比其他解释高明），特别是在政府治理缺乏耐心这方面。毕竟，即使那些愚蠢的人能被说服，看到让聪明人在政府机构中发挥更大影响力的好处，那些目光短浅的人却很可能无法看到拥有一个更加富有耐心的政府能为他们带来多少好处。 Adopting this as my tentative explanation, I must admit to now being more nervous about allowing more impatient and stupid immigrants, though as Bryan Caplan points out, that still allows for taking on billions of smart immigrants. 我必须承认，在把这作为我的一种尝试性解释的同时，我对于这个国家接纳更多没耐心且愚蠢的移民这一政策感到担忧，虽然如Bryan Caplan所指出，该政策让我们拥有了接纳数十亿聪明移民的机会。 But even if I’m now mildly more reluctant to take on certain kinds of immigrants, I’ll blame that mainly on our poor governance institutions, which give too much weight to the stupid and the impatient. 不过，尽管现在我对接纳某些特定类型的移民变得更不情愿了，我还是会将这主要归咎于我们糟糕的治理机构，是它们把过大的权重放给了那些愚蠢而不耐心的移民。 P.S. I’m aware that Jones has a formal model wherein a certain kind of nation-IQ correlation is larger than a certain kind of individual-IQ correlation. 补充：我知道Jones有一个正规模型，在这个模型中，某种特定的国家财富与智商之间的相关性要大于个人财富与智商之间的相关性。 The model has two industries, one where reliability matters greatly, and one where it matters much less, and two kinds of workers, a set of identical and very reliable workers and another set of less reliable workers who vary in their reliability. 该模型假设有两种产业，可靠性在其中的一种产业中非常重要，而在另一种产业中则不那么重要，同时还假设有两类工人，其中一类工人有着相同水平的高可靠性，而另一类工人的可靠性水平较低且参差不齐。 Only the identical very reliable workers work in the industry where reliability matters a lot, but some of these workers also work in the industry where reliability matters less, and within that second industry, there is only a weak correlation between reliability and wages. But if we compare nations that differ in the value of the high identical reliability among the workers in the industry where reliability matters, we’ll see that national income varies greatly with this reliability parameter. 在可靠性很重要的产业中工作的，都是那些拥有同等高度可靠的工人，而同样也有一些拥有相同水平的高可靠性工人在另一个对可靠性要求不那么高的产业里工作，在这第二个产业中，工人的可靠性和工资水平之间仅仅有很弱的相关性。但如果我们在国与国之间比较那些在对可靠性要求较高的产业中工作的拥有同等高可靠性工人的价值，那么可靠性这个参数会导致的差异就大得多了。 Yes this is a valid formal model, but it seems fragile and I doubt it robustly generalizes well to more complex situations; I just don’t think it works as a robust account of why national IQ matters more than individual IQ for wages. 的确，这是一个有效的正规模型，但它看起来很脆弱，而且我对该模型能否被稳健地推广到一些更加复杂的情境中去也表示怀疑；原因是我不认为它能够作为一个稳健的解释来说明为什么国家的智商水平对工资的影响要大于个人的智商水平。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Europe: When the Macro Overshadows the Micro 欧洲：当宏观现象掩盖微观动因时 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-8-14 译者：小瑛 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com.br/2015/08/europe-when-macro-overshadows-micro.html Christian Thimann currently works with the French investment bank AXA while also holding an academic position at the Paris School of Economics. However, from 2008 to 2013 he was Director General and Adviser to the President at the European Central Bank, which makes his views on the economics and politics of the euro crisis especially worth considering. 在巴黎经济学院担任教职的Christian Thimann目前正与法国投资银行安盛合作。他在2008至2013年间曾任欧洲中央银行行长顾问，这个经历使他对欧元危机的相关经济和政治观点变得尤为重要。 He lays out his perspective in "The Microeconomic Dimensions of the Eurozone Crisis and Why European Politics Cannot Solve Them," which appears in the Summer 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Like all JEP articles, it is freely available online courtesy of the American Economic Association. (Full disclosure: I've worked as Managing Editor of JEP since the first issue of the journal in 1987.) 他在《经济展望杂志》2015年夏季刊上发表的“欧元区危机的微观视角，及为什么欧洲政治无法解决危机”一文，详细阐述了他的观点。像所有《经济展望杂志》刊登的文章一样，美国经济学会将其免费放到网上供大家阅览。（好吧我承认：我从1987年《经济展望杂志》创刊号开始就担任责任编辑）。 On the economics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the problems have microeconomic roots, not just macroeconomic ones. Here are a couple of intriguing figures. Thimann points out that since the inception of the euro, some economies have consistently run trade surpluses, while others have consistently run trade deficits. This figure shows the cumulative trade surpluses and deficits over time. What's especially interesting to me is the relative steadiness of these lines: countries with trade surpluses tend to add surpluses every year, countries with deficits tend to add deficits every year. Thimann认为，欧元区经济问题的根源不止在宏观，也有微观层面的根源。以下是一些有趣的图表。Thimann指出，自从欧元诞生开始，某些经济体持续贸易顺差而另一些一直贸易逆差。下图展示了各国历年来的累计贸易顺差和逆差。让我特别感兴趣的是这些曲线的相对恒定性：贸易顺差国盈余每年都在增加，而逆差国赤字亦逐年增长。   Thimann argues that a driving factor behind these trade imbalances arises out of the interaction between wages and productivity. If wages in a country are growing a lot faster than productivity, then in effect, the cost of producing in that country is rising and it will be harder for that country to sell in international markets. If two countries share the same currency, so that exchange rate adjustments are not possible, then a country where wages are growing much faster than productivity will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with countries where wage growth is more closely aligned with productivity growth. Thimann points out that in the trade deficit countries, compensation soared well above productivity growth almost as soon as the euro was in place. Thimann认为，这些贸易不平衡是工资和生产率综合作用的结果。如果一国的工资增长速度高于生产率增速，则该国生产成本将上升，因此其产品在国际市场上的销路不会好。如果两国货币相同，无法使用汇率调节手段，那么工资增长快于生产率增长的国家竞争力就不如工资和生产率增长速度相对一致的国家。Thimann指出，在贸易逆差国，薪酬增长速度高于生产率增长速度的现象几乎是与欧元的启用同时发生的。   Why is Greece not shown among the countries here? Thimann writes in the note under the table: "Greece is not shown in the chart because, while the productivity increase is broadly comparable to that of Portugal, the wage growth was even steeper, rising by 2008 to 180 percent of the 1998 value, hence exceeding the scale of the countries shown; wages have declined by about 20 percent since the crisis to 160 percent." 为何上表中没有希腊？Thimann在表注中解释：“表中没有希腊是因为，如果说希腊的生产率增长还能大体与葡萄牙相比的话，那么其工资增长则过于迅速，从1998年到2008年增长了180%，远高于其他国家，乃至无法在同一张表中展示；从危机开始到现在工资已经下降了20%，至160%”。 Why did wages rise so quickly in the trade deficit countries? Some countries saw real estate bubbles or surges in government borrowing that pushed up wages in a way that productivity growth could not sustain. Public-sector wages took off: "Over the first ten years of the euro, public wages grew by 40 percent in the eurozone as a whole and by 30 percent in Germany. But public sector wages rose by 50 percent in France, 60 percent in Italy, 80 percent in Spain, 110 percent in Greece, and 120 percent in Ireland." 为何贸易逆差国的工资增长如此快？有些国家存在房地产泡沫，或过多依靠政府借贷而非生产力的持续增长推动工资增长。公共领域工资暴涨：“欧元启头十年，整个欧元区公共部门工资的平均增长水平是40%，其中德国为30%。而这一数字在法国，意大利，西班牙，希腊和爱尔兰分别是50%，60%，80%，110%和120%。” A common justification given for the rapid wage increases was that price levels in many of the trade deficit countries were rising, often at 6-7% per year, and so there was a perceived need for wages to keep up. But for the purposes of international trade and competitiveness, what matters is the wage--not the rise in local-country prices. 通常对工资迅速增长的辩护是，因为贸易逆差国家物价水平增长迅速，多为每年6%-7%，所以名义工资也要相应增加。但在讨论国际贸易和竞争力问题时，关注点是工资，而不是某国物价。 Thimann goes into some detail about how the trade deficit countries in the eurozone also tended to impose rules and regulations leading to higher wages and restrictions on business. My favorite story of the heavy hand of regulation in Greece is one that Megan Green told on her blog back in 2012, but I've been telling it ever since. It's about finding yourself in a combination bookstore/coffee shop in Athens which, because of regulations, is not allowed at that time to sell books or coffee. Green writes: Thimann还深入细节描述了一个现象：欧元区内贸易赤字国家更倾向于制定提高工资且限制商业的政策和法规。我最喜欢的关于希腊严苛政策的描述，来自Megan Green 2012年发表的一篇博客文章，我经常提起它。文章描述了作者在雅典一家书吧的经历，由于政府规定，这家书吧当时既不能卖书也不能卖咖啡。Green写到：

This is best encapsulated in an anecdote from my visit to Athens. A friend and I met up at a new bookstore and café in the centre of town, which has only been open for a month. The establishment is in the center of an area filled with bars, and the owner decided the neighborhood could use a place for people to convene and talk without having to drink alcohol and listen to loud music. 我在雅典的趣闻能充分说明这一点。我和一个朋友约在市中心一家开业仅一月的书吧见面。这一区周围都是酒吧，店主认为在这里开一间为需要小憩聊天但又不想喝酒精饮料听喧闹音乐的人们服务的店铺是个好主意。 After we sat down, we asked the waitress for a coffee. She thanked us for our order and immediately turned and walked out the front door. My friend explained that the owner of the bookstore/café couldn’t get a license to provide coffee. She had tried to just buy a coffee machine and give the coffee away for free, thinking that lingering patrons would boost book sales. 我们落座后向服务员点了咖啡。她对我们的光顾表示感谢后，立刻转身走出前门。我朋友解释说，店主无法取得出售咖啡的营业执照。她尝试买了一个咖啡机向客人免费提供咖啡，这样吸引客人光顾也能促进图书销售。 However, giving away coffee was illegal as well. Instead, the owner had to strike a deal with a bar across the street, whereby they make the coffee and the waitress spends all day shuttling between the bar and the bookstore/café. My friend also explained to me that books could not be purchased at the bookstore, as it was after 18h and it is illegal to sell books in Greece beyond that hour. I was in a bookstore/café that could neither sell books nor make coffee. 然而，免费提供咖啡也是非法的。店主只能请街对面的酒吧帮忙制作咖啡，而店员要终日往返于书吧和酒吧之间。我朋友还解释说，不能在店里买书，因为18点以后出售图书在希腊是违法的。我光顾的是一家既不能卖书也不能制作咖啡的书吧。

One story like this is a comedy. An economy in which stories like this are commonplace--and which is locked into a free-trade zone with countries sharing a common currency, is a tragedy waiting to happen. 仅仅一则这样的故事还只是趣闻，可是当一个经济体满是此类故事时，灾难随时都可能发生，更何况这个经济体还处于同周边国家共用同一种货币的自由贸易区内。 On the politics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the euro, the European Central Bank, and all the European-wide negotations over debt overshadowing these other issues. Normally, when a democratic country has miserable economic performance with high unemployment and slow growth, a common response is for its citizens to demand some policy changes from their politicians. 就欧元区的政治，Thimann认为，欧元、欧洲央行和有关债务问题的所有全欧层面的谈判掩盖了其他问题。一般情况下，当一个民主国家经济萧条，失业率高且经济增长缓慢时，民众通常会要求政治家修改政策。 But in the euro-zone, when a country has a miserable economic performance, the politicians of that country tell the citizens that it's not their fault. It's all the fault of the Euro-crats in Brussels, or Germans pulling strings behind the scenes, or the ECB. The politicians tell the voters that self-examination unnecessary and even counterproductive, because they to unite against the malign outsiders. 但在欧元区内，当国家经济不振时，政府会向民众辩解这不是他们的错，罪魁祸首是布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员，或是在背后操纵的德国，或是欧洲央行。政客们会告诉选民，自省没有必要甚至起反作用，因为他们要联合起来抵抗外敌。 Here are some concluding thoughts from Thimann: 下面是Thimann的一些结论性观点：

At the core of the economic crisis in the eurozone is the problem of unemployment in several countries. Roughly 18.2 million people are unemployed in early 2015. In about half the eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is below 10 percent, and in Germany it is actually below 5 percent (Eurostat data, February 2015), but in France, 10.7 percent of the labor force are unemployed; in Italy, 12.7 percent; in Portugal, 14.1 percent; in Spain, 23.2 percent; and in Greece, 26.0 percent. ... 欧元区经济危机的核心是一些国家的失业问题。2015年初大约有1820万失业人口。半数欧元国家的失业率在10%以下，德国甚至低于5%（欧盟统计局，2015年2月），但法国有10.7%的劳动人口没有工作，意大利12.7%；葡萄牙14.1%；西班牙23.2%；希腊26%…… It is legitimate to speak about this as a problem for the eurozone in the sense that economic policies in a single currency area are truly a matter of common concern, and also because high unemployment interferes with the smooth functioning of the eurozone, challenging its economic and political cohesion. But it is not accurate to attribute responsibility for the problem, or the solution, to the eurozone as a whole, to European institutions, or to other countries. 我们有理由将此视为一个欧元区问题，因为单一货币区内的经济政策是各国都关注的问题，同时高失业率妨碍欧元区正常运作，挑战其政治和经济凝聚力。但将问题的责任或解决方法归咎于欧元区整体、欧盟机构或其他国家，都是不准确的。 Jobs fail to be created in a number of these countries not because of a “lack of demand” as often claimed, but mainly because wage costs are high relative to productivity, social insurance and tax burdens are heavy, and the business environment is excessively burdensome. All of this should be viewed not in absolute terms,but in relative terms, compared with other economies in Europe and countries around the world where labor costs and productivity are more advantageous, and the business environment is friendlier. 许多国家未能有效创造就业，并不像通常认为的那样是由于“缺乏需求”，主要是因为相对于其生产率水平，工资过高，社会福利和税负过重，商业环境极其不友好。所有这些因素都不能绝对地看，而应相对地看，要和生产成本与生产率更有优势、商业环境更友善的欧洲和全球其他国家放在一起比较研究。 “Europe” is not an all-powerful actor in the field of national economic policies, but only a potentially useful facilitator. Only the country concerned is the legitimate and able party to improve its own economic functioning in line with its social preferences and economic setup. This is why European politics cannot solve the microeconomic dimensions of the eurozone crisis. Within individual countries, it is the governments, administrative authorities, social partners, and all other economic stakeholders that are the legitimate actors in the field of economic and social policies.... “欧洲”在国家层面的经济政策制定上并不是一个有力的参与者，仅有潜在的催化剂作用。只有各相关国家自己才有合法性也有能力依照自身社会偏好和经济结构，设法提高经济运行状况。这就是为什么欧洲政治无法解决欧元区危机微观因素的原因所在。在每一个国家中，经济和社会政策领域中真正有效的参与者是该国的政府，行政机构，社会伙伴和其他经济利益相关者…… For the eurozone countries, their economic and unemployment problems are not primarily a question about some countries versus other countries within the monetary union, but about finding their place in an open global economy—that is, about competing and cooperating successfully with advanced, emerging, and developing economies across the globe. 对欧元区国家，经济和失业问题主要不是货币同盟中国家间的问题，而是能否在开放的全球经济中找到自己的立足点，即成功与全球众多发达、新兴或发展中经济体展开经济合作的问题。 An inward-looking European debate on the distribution of the relative adjustment burden for structural reforms would dramatically overlook the much broader challenges of integration into the global economy. ... It may be more glamorous to focus on European monetary policy, the “European architecture,” or the “bigger macro picture.” But the real issue of—and solution to—the crisis in the eurozone lies in the mostly microeconomic trenches of national economic, social, and structural policies. 关于结构改革带来的重担如何在各国间分配这种纯欧洲内部的争论，会令人极度忽视融入世界经济的挑战……讨论欧洲货币政策，“欧洲铸造者”或“更宏观的图景”等可能显得高大上。但欧元区危机的症结和解决方法所在，主要是国家层面的经济、社会和结构政策的微观经济壕沟。

I think Thimann may understate the fundamental macroeconomic problems that are being created by the presence of the euro (as I've discussed here and here, for example). But he seems to me quite correct to emphasize that many European countries badly need structural, regulatory, and microeconomic adjustments. Moreover, politicians and voters in many of these countries would much rather assail the rest of Europe about international negotiations involving public debt and the euro, rather than face their domestic political issues. 我认为Thimann明白使用欧元带来的基本宏观问题（比如，我在http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2014/02/will-we-look-back-on-euro-as-mistake.html和http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2013/08/a-euro-narrative.html讨论过的）。然而，他所强调的很多欧洲国家急需结构、法规和微观经济调整，在我看来也是合理的。此外，在许多此类国家中，政治家和选民更愿意攻击其他欧洲国家在公共债务和欧元问题国际谈判中的立场，而不是面对本国的政治问题。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Middle-Class Squeeze 夹缝中的中产阶级 编辑：Jennifer Erickson @ 2014-9-24 译者：松旭斋天胜（@松旭斋天胜） 校对：安德（@ HuZhenbo）、带菜刀的诗人（@带菜刀的诗人） 制图：amen（@治愈系历史） 来源：美国进步中心（Center for American Progress），https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MiddeClassSqueeze-INTRO.pdf A Picture of Stagnant Incomes, Rising Costs, and What We Can Do to Strengthen America’s Middle Class 面对收入停滞、生活费高涨的局面，怎么做才能巩固中产阶级 【插图】 America's middle class is being squeezed by stagnant—and in many cases declining—incomes and rising costs. 美国的中产阶级正被停滞甚至往往是减少的收入和高涨的生活费压得喘不过气。 Why the middle-class squeeze matters 为何需要关注中产阶级重压 The American middle class is in trouble. 美国中产阶级有麻烦了。 The middle-class share of national income has fallen, middle-class wages are stagnant, and the middle class in the United States is no longer the world’s wealthiest. 美国中产阶级收入在国民收入中占比减少，薪资停滞，他们已不再是世界上最富有的中产。 But income is only one side of the story. The cost of being in the middle class—and of maintaining a middle-class standard of living—is rising fast too. For fundamental needs such as child care and health care, costs have risen dramatically over the past few decades, taking up larger shares of family budgets. The reality is that the middle class is being squeezed. 但收入只是问题的一方面。做一个中产阶级、并维持中产阶级生活品质的成本，正在飞涨。过去几十年中，儿童保育和医疗保障等基本生活需求的费用迅速飙升，在家庭预算中比重增大。现实告诉我们，中产阶级正被压得喘不过气来。 As this report will show, for a married couple with two children, the costs of key elements of middle-class security—child care, higher education, health care, housing, and retirement—rose by more than $10,000 in the 12 years from 2000 to 2012, at a time when this family’s income was stagnant. 正如本报告随后将展示的那样，对于一对育有两个子女的夫妇而言，从2000年到2012年的12年间，界定中产阶级的那些关键元素的花费，即儿童保育、高等教育、医疗保障、住房和退休保障的成本，上涨了10000美元，而与此同时，家庭收入却停滞不前。 As sharp as this squeeze can be, the pain does not stop at one family, or even at millions of families. Because of the critical role that middle-class consumers play in creating aggregate demand, the American economy is in trouble when the American middle class is in trouble. And the long-term health of the U.S. economy is at risk if financially squeezed families cannot afford—and smart public policies do not support—developing the next generation of America’s workforce. It is this workforce that will lead the United States in an increasingly open and competitive global economy. 如此严峻的挤迫并不止于一个家庭，或者甚至是百万个家庭。因为中产阶级消费者在创造总需求中扮演着关键角色，当中产阶级出问题，美国经济也随之陷入麻烦。进一步来说，如果经济承受重压的家庭无法负担培养美国下一代劳动力的费用，公共政策也不提供适时的辅助，那么美国经济的长期发展也将处于危险之中。毕竟，未来是由这一代劳动力在更加开放、竞争也更激烈的全球经济体系中领导美国。 This report provides a snapshot of the American middle class and those struggling to become a part of it. It focuses on six key pillars that can help define security for households: jobs, early childhood programs, higher education, health care, housing, and retirement. Each chapter is both descriptive and prescriptive—detailing both how the middle class is doing and what policies can help it do better. 本报告提供了美国中产阶级和正为之而奋斗的人们的一幅速写。它将重点放在对家庭保障起决定作用的六根重要支柱上：就业、儿童保育、高等教育、医疗保障、住房和退休保障。每一部分都在描述现象之余提供建议，不仅详细阐述中产阶级目前的状况，也详尽分析怎样的政策可帮其改善现状。 Defining the middle class 定义中产阶级 Statistically, when we talk about the middle class, we generally mean the middle three quintiles of American households by income—those making between the 20th and 80th percentiles of the income distribution. In reality, however, being middle class in America is at its core about economic security. 统计学上，当我们讨论中产阶级时，一般是指全美收入水平处于中间60%的家庭，即落在20%到80%区间内的家庭。但实际上，美国中产阶级的核心在于家庭经济保障能力。 As Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA) wrote in the 2011 report “Saving the American Dream,” “Most of us don’t expect to be rich or famous, but we do expect a living wage and good American benefits for a hard day’s work.” 正如参议员Tom Harkin（民主党，爱荷华州）在其2011年题为《挽救美国梦》的报告中写道：“我们中的大部分不求成为富翁或是出名，但我们都希望每日的辛勤工作可以换来足以负担生活开支的工资和良好的社会福利保障。” At the Center for American Progress, our work has focused on the importance of both strengthening and growing America’s middle class. So while the middle three quintiles will always be just that, it is our goal to ensure that as many Americans as possible have the cornerstones of the American Dream, including access to education, health care, housing, and the ability to retire. 在美国进步中心（Center for American Progress），我们致力于巩固和发展美国的中产阶级。因此，虽然统计学角度的中产只是那60%的人群，但我们志在让尽可能多的美国人拥有美国梦的基本条件，包括受教育的机会、医疗、住房和养老保障。 So even as this report measures what has been happening to the middle class, we articulate our hopes for all Americans. To be clear, having more than 46 million Americans in poverty is both contrary to our national character and to our economic aspirations. So too is having millions of young people unemployed and underemployed and 11 million aspiring Americans living in the country without legal status. 因此，即便这篇报告的主体是美国中产阶级，我们却是怀着对所有美国人的希望而发声。更直白地说，让4600万人陷入贫困不仅不符合我们的民族特质，也不符合我们的经济发展志向。我们同样关注那几百万失业或半失业的年轻人，以及1100万拥有抱负却没有合法身份的美国人。 Having more workers in good jobs—who have access to good education; affordable child care, health care, and housing; and the ability to retire with dignity—is our clear objective. The closer we get to this reality, the better it will be for all of our families and the sustainable growth of our economy. 我们的目标很明确：让劳动者适得其所，拥有受教育的机会，有能力支付儿童保育、医疗保障和住房的费用，最终有保障、有尊严地退休。我们离实现这个目标越近，对所有家庭以及经济的可持续发展就越有利。 What’s more, we know that areas with larger middle classes and less inequality also have more economic mobility. And opportunity is what America is about: 97 percent of Americans believe that every person should have an equal opportunity to get ahead in life. We all have an interest in a strong and growing middle class. 另外，我们已经知道，一个地区中产阶级越多、贫富差距越小，该地区的经济流动性就越高。美国最珍视的是机会：97%的美国人相信每个人都应当有平等的机会获得成功。更强大且持续增长的中产阶级，是我们共同的目标。 Squeeze part I: A snapshot of incomes 重压之第一部分：收入概况 When we think about the golden age of the American middle class, we often think of the decades following World War II. To be sure, the mid-20th century legislated unequal treatment and therefore limited opportunities for many Americans, but even with that marked and deep-rooted inequality, the economic statistics from that period tell a story of growing wealth and security for America’s middle class. 提到美国中产阶级的黄金时代，人们通常会想到二战后的几十年。诚然，20世纪中期的立法并不平等，也限制了许多美国人的机会，但即使在如此显著且根深蒂固的不平等之下，那一时期的经济数据仍表明当时美国的中产阶级财富增长，且拥有家庭保障。From 1948 to 1973, America experienced a period in which growing compensation tracked growing worker productivity: A worker in 1973 was almost twice as productive as a worker in 1948 and earned nearly twice as much. This golden age built the middle class as prosperity was increasingly shared. The economy grew by an average of 3.9 percent from 1948 to 1973, and the bottom 90 percent of families reaped 68 percent of the gains. 1948年到1973年间的美国，见证了劳动报酬与生产率齐头并进的时期：1973年劳动者的生产率几乎是1948年劳动者的两倍，且收入也几乎是其两倍。这一普遍繁荣的黄金时期造就了当时的中产阶级。从1948年到1973年，经济总量平均每年增长3.9%，金字塔底部的90%家庭获得了总收入的68%。 However, around 1973, American productivity growth slowed, increasing about half as quickly between 1973 and the early 1990s as it had during the previous 25 years. Furthermore, compensation started to decouple from productivity, growing about one-third as quickly as before. 然而，到了1973年左右，美国的生产率增速放缓，1973年到1990年代早期的增速只有之前25年的一半。此外，劳动报酬开始落后于生产率，增长速率则只有之前的三分之一。 【插图】 As the 1990s tech boom progressed and the economy heated up, productivity accelerated again: Productivity growth from 1991 to 2012 averaged 2.2 percent per year, yet compensation growth only averaged 1 percent per year. A worker today is almost 60 percent more productive than a worker in 1991 but has seen only half of that productivity growth translate into higher compensation. And the vast majority of this wage growth took place toward the end of the 1990s tech boom, as real wages and benefits jumped about 16 percent between 1995 and 2001. 因九十年代科技业繁荣和经济升温，劳动生产率再次加速：1991年到2012年间，生产率年平均增幅为2.2%，而劳动报酬增幅却仅为每年1%。现在的工人几乎比1991年高效60%，但仅有一半的生产率增长转化为了劳动报酬。并且，大部分薪资增长发生在九十年代科技业繁荣的末期——1995年到2001年，扣除通胀影响的实际薪资增长了约16%。【编注：此处存在一个误解（或误导），劳动生产率的提高未必反映工人的“生产效率”有任何提高，而完全可能仅由要素组合变化或该组合中非劳动要素的改进所带来，比如某项生产中，一台原本产能为每天5件的机器换成了产能每天10件的机器，同时其操作方法完全不变，此时工人的禀赋和表现皆无任何变化，但劳动生产率大幅提高了。】 Real compensation growth has slowed further since the start of the 21st century. What’s worse, health insurance premiums over this period ate into even modest compensation gains. Therefore, many Americans saw stagnant or declining take-home pay even as productivity continued to rise. 实际的劳动报酬增长速率从21世纪伊始便继续放缓。更严重的是，医疗保险费用在此期间将仅有的一点劳动报酬增长也侵吞殆尽。正因为如此，许多美国人发现虽然生产率持续提高，劳动者实际领回家的钱一直没变，甚至还有减少。 In other words, American workers have been squeezed for decades when it comes to take-home pay, even before 2007 and the Great Recession. The financial crisis and the Great Recession itself then took a catastrophic toll on millions of Americans, as unemployment skyrocketed and trillions of dollars in household wealth vanished. And while the economy has picked up since bottoming out in 2009, and private-sector job growth began to bounce back in 2010, the gains from this postcrash period have been strikingly unequal. Ninety-five percent of all income gains since the start of the recovery have accrued to the top 1 percent of U.S. households. 换言之，2007年和经济大衰退之前，美国劳动者数十年来真正拿到手里的钱已经一直在减少。随后的金融危机和经济大衰退又给了美国人一记重击，失业率急速增长，数以万亿美元的家庭财富蒸发。虽然2009年经济触底后开始恢复，2010年私营企业就业率反弹，但经济危机后的收入分配却极其不平等。危机后的几年，新增收益的95%都聚集在前1%的家庭中。 The trends in rising inequality are also striking when measured by wealth. Among the top 20 percent of families by net worth, average wealth increased by 120 percent between 1983 and 2010, while the middle 20 percent of families only saw their wealth increase by 13 percent, and the bottom fifth of families, on average, saw debt exceed assets—in other words, negative net worth. 按财富计，不平等的上升趋势也同样惊人。资产净值前20%的家庭在1983年到2010年间平均财富增长为120%，中间20%的家庭只增长了13%，最下层20%家庭的平均负债超过了资产，即资产净值为负。 Families of color have fallen further behind white families in building wealth: A survey that tracked white and African American families between 1984 and 2009 found that the wealth gap between them nearly tripled, from $85,000 to $236,500. Homeowners in the bottom quintile of wealth lost an astounding 94 percent of their wealth between 2007 and 2010. 有色人种家庭在创造财富上愈发逊于白人家庭：一项跟踪调查显示，从1984年到2009年，白人家庭和非洲裔家庭的财富差距扩大了将近三倍，从85000美元变为236500美元。财富排名最末20%的家庭在2007年到2010年间，失去了高达94%的财富。

The importance of the middle class to economic growth 中产阶级对经济增长的重要性 Rising inequality is not simply a question of distribution; it also poses real questions for how our economy operates. The increasing resources available to the wealthiest Americans have created demand for such luxuries as private jets—which creates jobs building those jets—but the declining purchasing power of middle-class Americans means that there is less demand for goods and services more broadly in the economy. 不平等加剧不只是个分配问题，它也是为经济运转方式带来了问题。最富有美国人的财富持续增长催生了私人飞机等奢侈品需求，当然，这创造了更多飞机制造业的职位，但是中产阶级购买力下降意味着商品和服务的总需求减少了。 A recent analysis showed that giving $1 to a low-income household produces three times as much consumption as giving $1 to a high-income household. And it is certainly true that increasing the concentration of wealth means more jobs managing finances and fewer jobs making the goods that middle-class consumers once bought in numbers that drove much of our economic growth. 近期的一项分析显示，低收入家庭收入每增加1美元所产生的消费是高收入家庭的三倍。财富集中意味着更多的理财业务职位【编注：这一断言并无道理，财富集中可能增加也可能减少理财职位，要看集中的结果是增加还是减少了财富规模达到需要理财的程度的人数】，和更少的制造业职位，这些工作曾为所制造的产品曾被中产阶级消费者大量购买，而正是这些消费极大地推动了经济增长。 CAP outlined the economic importance of a strong and growing middle class—and the concerns for our economy from growing inequality—in a 2012 report, “The American Middle Class, Income Inequality, and the Strength of the Economy.” The report details the importance of the middle class to human capital, stable demand, entrepreneurship, and support for institutions. 美国进步中心曾在2012年一份题为《美国中产阶级、收入不均及经济实力》的报告中概述了强大且持续增长的中产阶级对于经济的重要性，也说明了扩大的贫富差距对经济造成的问题。该份报告详尽分析了中产阶级对人力资本、稳定的需求、创业的重要性，以及对现行社会制度的支持。【编注：此处institutions含义不明，可能是指制度，也可能是指组织机构】

Squeeze part II: A snapshot of rising costs 重压之第二部分：成本上升情况速览 While real incomes have been stagnant or declining in recent years, the other side of the story is the increase in the costs of various items that define a middle-class standard of living. Not only have families’ costs for things from higher education to health care increased rapidly relative to overall consumer inflation, but these costs are also consuming a growing share of family budgets, leaving less and less room for discretionary spending and saving. 近年来实际收入停滞甚至减少的同时，定义中产阶级生活标准的各元素成本却在增长。在家庭支出中，高等教育和医疗保障等项的支出不仅相对消费者物价指数急速增长，它们在家庭预算中比重也在扩大，给自由消费和存款留下的空间越来越少。 When looking at the changes in consumer price indices for core elements of middle-class security, it is painfully easy to see the squeeze in action; prices for many cornerstones of middle-class security have risen dramatically at the same time that real incomes have fallen. 令人心痛的是，在一份与中产阶级经济保障能力相关元素的价格指数变动图表中，可以非常直观地看到压力的存在。对中产阶级经济保障能力至关重要的各项物价飙升，但与此同时，实际收入却在减少。 【插图】 As stark as the data appear when comparing stagnant or falling incomes to rising prices, they are even worse than the Consumer Price Index above might suggest. 虽然停滞或减少的收入和飞升的物价在数据上已十分明显，但实际情况比上图中消费者物价指数所显示的更糟糕。 Let’s consider what has happened to the finances of a typical middle-class family since 2000. 让我们来看看对于一个普通中产阶级家庭来说，2000年以来都有哪些变化。 The median family saw its income fall by 8 percent between 2000 and 2012. Even when we look at just married couples with two children—a type of family that tends to have higher incomes—median income was virtually frozen between 2000 and 2012. 处于中间的家庭在2000到2012年间收入降低了8%。即便我们只把目光放在通常有更高收入的育有两个子女的夫妇上，处于中间的家庭收入在2000到2012年间也仅是持平。 At the same time, this type of family also faced a severe middle-class squeeze as the costs of key elements of security rose dramatically, including child care costs—which grew by 37 percent—and health care costs—both employee premiums and out-of-pocket costs—which grew by 85 percent. 与此同时，这一类家庭也面临着巨大压力：中产保障关键元素的价格急剧升高，儿童保育费用上涨了37%，医疗保障（包括就业医保和自费医疗）费用上涨了85%。 In fact, investing in the basic pillars of middle-class security—child care, housing, and health care, as well as setting aside modest savings for retirement and college—cost an alarming $10,600 more in 2012 than it did in 2000. 事实上，2000到2012年，花费在中产保障关键元素（儿童保育、住房、医疗保障以及为退休和大学存款）上的费用上涨了令人震惊的10,600美元。 Put another way, in 12 years, this household’s income was stagnant—rising by less than 1 percent—while basic pillars of middle-class security rose by more than 30 percent. As the cost of basic elements of middle-class security rose, the money available for everything else—from groceries to clothing to emergency savings—fell by $5,500. 换句话说，12年间，家庭收入没变，或仅提高不到1%，而花费在中产保障上的钱却多了30%。随着各项基本元素的成本上涨，留给其他花销的钱——比如食品杂货、衣服和应急存款等，减少了5500美元。 And while for the purposes of this example we have assumed this household kept retirement savings constant, data about worryingly low savings confirm that for millions of families, their retirement funds are bearing much of the pain of the squeeze. 然而，虽然我们在上述例子中假定该家庭每年留给退休保障的钱维持不变，但令人担忧的低储蓄数据却表明，对于数以百万计的家庭而言，退休保障承受着大部分压力。 【插图】 注：因四舍五入，数据可能略有偏差。2000年至2012年数据根据现有最准确数据估算。详见本系列报告的方法论部分。 来源：见系列报告的方法论部分。 The data paint a clear picture: The middle class is being squeezed. So it should come as no surprise that in a 2014 Pew Research Center survey, 57 percent of Americans responded that they think their incomes are falling behind the growing cost of living, up from 47 percent in 2006. In fact, the percentage of Americans who identify themselves as middle class has fallen to 44 percent, down from 53 percent in 2008. 数据清晰地描绘出这样的图景：中产阶级正受到重压。2014年皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）的一项调查显示，57%的美国人认为他们的收入赶不上生活成本的增长速度，而2006年如此认为的人只占47%。这样的结果在意料之中。事实上，认为自己属于中产阶级的美国人由2008年的53%降低到了如今的44%。 Policies to alleviate the squeeze 减轻重压的政策 Understanding that middle-class families are clearly squeezed—with adverse effects on our entire economy—we must craft policies to alleviate the squeeze. This requires two things: growing incomes and containing costs. 既然已经了解了中产阶级面临的困难和它将对我们整个经济带来的负面影响，我们必须设计出合理的政策减轻他们的压力。这包括两方面：增加收入和限制支出。 Jobs 就业 Given that the majority of middle-class families derive their incomes from jobs—as opposed to investments—improving our lackluster jobs picture is the first task to address the middle-class squeeze. To do this, we need to invest in a dynamic economy powered by skilled workers who operate in an environment that lets them and their businesses compete at home and abroad. 鉴于大部分中产阶级收入来源于就业而非投资，减轻压力的第一步便是改善就业环境。我们需要构建一个由技术劳动者支撑的、充满活力的经济环境，让劳动者和企业无论是在本国还是在国际上都具有竞争力。 Doing so will require myriad policies outlined in depth in CAP’s long-term growth strategy, 300 Million Engines of Growth: A Middle-Out Plan for Jobs, Business, and a Growing Economy. Five areas that would directly help the jobs and income pictures in the shorter term include policies to: 为此，美国进步中心在题为《促进增长的三亿个发动机：中产阶级辐射计划，就业、企业和繁荣经济》的长期发展战略中列举了多项政策。

• Boost aggregate demand, including through extending federal unemployment insurance; raising the federal minimum wage to $10.10 per hour; strengthening the Earned Income Tax Credit by expanding it for workers without children and lowering the eligibility age from 25 to 21; and making long-term investments in our economic growth that will also pay dividends now in the form of expanding high-quality early childhood education and infrastructure
• 刺激总需求：延长联邦失业保险；将联邦最低工资提高为每小时10美元；将劳动所得税扣抵制度的适用对象扩大到无子女劳动者和25岁以下、21岁以上的劳动者，以加强其效力；通过开办高质量早教机构、建设基础设施造福当下，促进经济增长
• Foster inclusive capitalism that will see more gains shared with workers, including through expanding tax incentives that transfer ownership or at least a share of profits from capital ownership to employees; offering grants to regional inclusive capitalism centers; stopping policies that inhibit the growth of sharing programs; and promoting existing best practices through an Office of Inclusive Capitalism
• 促成包容性资本主义，与劳动者分享更多收益：给将所有权转让给劳动者或将不少于一股的资本收益赠予劳动者的公司以税收优惠；为包容性地区资本中心提供补助；停止妨碍分享项目发展的政策；通过设立包容性资本办公室鼓励促进目前的最佳实践
• Ensure basic workplace protections to maximize workforce participation, including through developing a federal paid family and medical leave program to ensure working families have access to wage replacement when they need it most, via the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, or the FAMILY Act, as well as establishing a national paid sick days standard via the Healthy Families Act
• 确保基本工作场所保护以最大化劳动者参与：通过家庭与医疗保险假期法案（简称FAMILY法案），由联邦建立家庭与医疗假期资助项目来确保在劳动者家庭在最需要时可获取工资替代【编注：此处工资替代似乎是指让雇员选择以医疗保障代替部分工资报酬】；通过健康家庭法案创立全国性带薪病假标准
• Strengthen unions, including by modernizing the union election process; ensuring that all workers, regardless of their occupation or location, have the right to join a union if they so desire; better protecting workers who choose to unionize by making the right to join a union a civil right; and establishing more meaningful penalties and remedies for workers who are fired or discriminated against for exercising their right to organize
• 强化工会：推进工会选举制度现代化；确保任何职业、处于任何地点的劳动者都有权自愿加入工会；最好促使加入工会的权利成为一项基本民权以更好地保护选择加入工会的劳动者；为因行使工会组织权利而遭解雇或歧视的劳动者提供更多有意义的处罚或矫正措施
• Improve education and workforce-development programs, including a dramatic expansion of apprenticeship programs in high-growth sectors, by creating a $1,000 federal tax credit for each apprentice hired; establishing competitive grants to support promising apprenticeship partnerships in new high-wage, high-growth occupations; improving apprenticeship marketing to businesses; leveraging the federal workforce and federal contracting to support apprenticeships; and improving the portability of apprenticeships by offering grants for employers to come together to write national guideline standards for apprenticeships in key high-growth occupations
• 改善教育和劳动力发展项目：在高增长行业设立1000美元/位的联邦抵税额，以大幅扩展这些行业的学徒项目；创立竞争性补助金以支持前景好的新兴高报酬、高发展职业的学徒合伙项目；努力将学徒推销给企业；促使联邦劳动者和联邦合同支持学徒；给协同编写有关学徒的全国性指导标准的新兴行业雇主提供补助金，以促进学徒项目的可移植性

Early childhood programs 儿童保育项目 High-quality early childhood programs—including both child care and preschool programs—are critical for workers with young children who hope to remain in the workforce. Research shows that these programs are also critical educational investments in the children themselves. 高质量的儿童保育项目——包括儿童照料和学前教育——对育有子女且想继续工作的劳动者十分重要。调查表明，这些项目也是对儿童自身非常重要的教育投资。 So with two generations relying on the existence and affordability of high-quality programs, it is critical to address the high cost of child care, which rose dramatically from 2000 to 2012. To do so, we recommend policies that would: 这样，两代人都将仰赖可负担的高质量教育资源，所以关键是要解决儿童保育的高成本问题，如我们所见，这项成本在2000到2012年间急剧增长。为此，我们推荐以下政策：

• Provide high-quality preschool to all 3- and 4-year-olds through a partnership between the federal and state governments
• 通过联邦和州政府合作，向3至4岁儿童提供高质量学前教育
• Expand and reform the child care subsidy system, which is currently insufficient to reach even a majority of low-income working parents, let alone those struggling to stay in the middle class, by both providing additional resources to help families access high-quality child care and ensuring that child care assistance declines gradually as parents earn more money, rather than cutting off abruptly
• 扩大和改革儿童保育补贴制度。目前连大部分低收入劳动者父母都无法受惠于该项目，更别提中产阶级了。通过提供额外资源以帮助家庭获得高质量儿童保育的机会，使儿童保育援助随着父母收入增加逐渐减少，而非突然被取消
• Reform the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit by making it refundable and raising the amount that can be claimed to cover more of the actual cost of child care
• 改革受抚养人抵税额政策，使其变为可退税部分，同时提高征税额度，用于补贴儿童保育的实际开支
• Expand Early Head Start-Child Care Partnerships building on the initial investment already made and reaching additional children
• 扩大早期启蒙幼儿资助合作计划，在原有投资的基础上，让更多儿童受益

Higher education 高等教育 Increases in higher-education costs are a huge part of the middle-class squeeze. These costs affect what parents can do to help their children pay for college and what students can bear in terms of debt as they enter an uncertain job market. 高等教育费用增长是造成中产阶级压力的一大原因。这项费用影响着父母为子女支付大学学费的能力和学生本身在工作未定情况下的负债能力。 What’s more, the real and perceived costs of higher-education affect who applies for and who goes to college—representing a real constraint on economic mobility, which carries a cost for individuals and for the economy. To help alleviate the middle-class squeeze in higher education, we propose policies that would: 进一步而言，大学的实际学费和感知成本影响着学生是否申请、是否入学的问题。这极大地限制着经济流动性，从而让个体和经济付出代价。为减轻高等教育给中产阶级带来的压力，我们提出以下政策建议：

• Promote consumer choice by establishing a student-record system that can be used to create improved consumer-choice tools that highlight outcomes such as graduation rates and labor-market outcomes, and by creating a federal accountability system with institutions placed in broad categories, rather than rankings, which indicate their performance across key metrics
• 优化消费者选择：建立学生档案系统，提供毕业率、就业信息等资料；设立联邦审核系统，将大学按照在各关键指标的表现分成大类，而非提供综合排名
• Restore public investment in higher education, including through increasing funding for the Pell Grant program to help low- and lower-middle-income students; creating a competitive federal grant program to support public institutions—matched with state funds—to support state policies that promote on-time completion and that significantly lower the cost of postsecondary education
• 振兴公共教育投资：增加佩尔助学金项目（Pell Grant program）的经费，用以帮助低收入和中低收入学生；设立有竞争性的联邦补助金项目，用以支持公立机构；设立相对应的州补助金项目，用以支持按时结业的和显著降低高等教育费用的州级政策
• Innovate to bring down costs and improve quality through increasing support for the First in the World Fund; using experimental site authority to give institutions flexibility from existing federal requirements in exchange for a commitment to implement innovative programs that reduce costs for students; creating an alternative to accreditation where institutions could choose to focus exclusively on improving the learning outcomes of their students; and increasing investment in research and development.
• 通过创新来降低费用并提高教育质量：加强对“世界第一”基金（First in the World Fund）的支持；通过使用实验性场地增加教育机构的灵活性，设立帮助学生减轻学费的创新项目；设立全新的评价机制，让教育机构能够转而更专注于学生的学习成果；增加对科研和发展项目的投资

Health care 医疗保障 Access to affordable health care is critical for all American households, and the rising costs of health care in recent decades have kept a basic underpinning of middle-class security out of reach for too many. 对于每个美国家庭来说，获得平价医疗保障至关重要。然而，保障中产阶级的基础医疗支出近几十年来出现的增长让太多家庭负担不起。 While the Affordable Care Act, or ACA, has already made a difference for millions of Americans—from the ability of children under age 26 to remain on their parents’ health insurance plans to a prohibition on exclusion from coverage based on pre-existing conditions—more needs to be done to bend the cost curve and to ensure that people have access to high-quality coverage. A single health event should not wipe out a person’s savings. To help lower costs, we therefore propose policies to: 虽然平价医疗法案（Affordable Care Act，ACA）已经改变了几百万美国人的生活——该项法案允许未满26岁的子女留在父母的医保方案中，并禁止保险公司因投保前已存在病情而设立不保事项——要进一步扭转费用增长、让人们获得平价医疗的机会，能做的还有更多。疾病或意外不应当把人们的存款消耗殆尽。为了降低费用，我们提出以下政策：

• Accelerate the use of alternatives to fee-for-service payment to reduce costs and improve care coordination, with Medicare leading the way by encouraging private payers to participate in alternative payment methods, especially bundled payments
• 促进按服务计酬模式以外的替代收费方式的使用；降低成本、改善医疗分配；由医疗保险制度牵头，鼓励独立付款人使用其他付费方式，尤其是捆绑付费
• Leverage insurance exchanges to improve access to lower-cost, high-quality insurance products, including through state marketplace officials using their broad authority to exclude low-value plans and reward plans that offer more value to consumers
• 利用保险交易市场，使人们有机会购买低价高质量的保险产品；州市场监管人员运用他们的权威排除价值低的产品，奖励能给消费者提供更高价值的产品
• Increase transparency to allow consumers to choose high-quality, lower-cost providers and services via the Department of Health Human Services, ensuring that the ACA’s requirement to provide cost-sharing information is implemented in a consumer-friendly way. Congress should also modify the ACA’s cost-sharing disclosure requirements so that the plan’s quoted costs for episodes of care are guaranteed
• 增加透明度：消费者可以通过卫生及公共服务部（Department of Health Human Services）选择性价比更高的医保公司，保证ACA法案中对成本信息公开的要求得到落实；国会也应当修改法案中对成本信息公开的要求，使每项保险的报价得以固定
• Reform restrictive state scope-of-practice laws to maximize use of nonphysician providers, with the federal government providing bonus payments to states that meet scope-of-practice standards delineated by the Institute of Medicine
• 改革各州的限制性适用范围法律，以最大化对非医师保险供应商的使用；联邦政府给符合美国医学研究所（Institute of Medicine）有关适用范围规定的州提供奖金
• Address cost shifting to employees by encouraging employers to share health care savings with employees via more transparency, with employers providing annual notices about how much the employer expects to pay, on average, for health care benefits per employee, as well as how much the employer expects the employee will spend, on average, for health care during the upcoming year
• 保证员工知悉费用变化：鼓励雇主更透明地向员工分享医疗保障存款信息；雇主每年定期通知员工每年平均应缴医疗保障费用，及雇主对员工来年医疗消费平均预估值

Housing 住房 Having an affordable place to call home is out of reach for far too many families, putting the most basic piece of middle-class security in doubt. New mortgages are at their lowest level in 17 years, millions of Americans still owe more than their homes are worth, and half of all renters spend more than 30 percent of their income on housing. 对于太多家庭来说，想以平实的价格换来一处能被称作“家”的地方太难了。这极大地威胁了中产阶级经济保障能力。新的住房贷款起码要17年才能还清，上百万的美国人负债比他们的房产价值还高，一半的租客起码将收入的30%用在房租上。 The federal government has a huge role to play in steering the country out of the housing crisis and building a stronger and more equitable housing-finance system. To do so, we suggest policies that would: 联邦政府在引导国家走出住房危机，以及建立一个更强大、更公平的住房财政系统上，可发挥巨大作用。为此，我们提出以下政策：

• Require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to support a healthier and more equitable housing market by increasing access to and affordability of mortgages, providing struggling borrowers with better loan modifications that include principal reductions, and capitalizing the National Housing Trust Fund and Capital Magnet Fund
• 要求联邦国民按揭贷款协会（Fannie Mae，又称房利美）和联邦住房抵押贷款公司（Freddie Mac，又称房地美）扶持更公正的住房市场：增加住户取得住房贷款的机会；给有困难的贷款人提供包括房贷本金减免的优惠调整；资本化国家住房信托基金（National Housing Trust Fund）和磁性资本基金（Capital Magnet Fund）
• Reform the housing-finance system to realign incentives, enable broader access to affordable and sustainable mortgages, and support the creation of more affordable rental housing
• 改革住房财政系统：调整优惠政策，使人们有更多机会获取费用更低、更持久的住房贷款；建造更多廉租房
• Track cash investor activity in the single-family rental market and monitor its potential impact on tenants, rents, neighborhoods, and homeownership opportunities
• 跟踪单一家庭租房市场中现金投资人的活动：监测此类投资对住户、房租、社区和获得房屋所有权机会的潜在影响

Retirement 退休保障 Among the top concerns of middle-class Americans is whether they will be able to afford to retire. Unfortunately for many, saving for retirement has become much more difficult in recent decades as families have struggled to find money to save and as the workplace-retirement-plan environment has fundamentally changed. 美国中产阶级的一大担忧是退休保障问题。很不幸的是，对于许多人来说，最近几十年为退休而存款已变得越来越难：家庭很难存下什么钱，在职退休储蓄计划的大环境也发生了根本性的改变。 As incomes have stagnated and as employers have shifted away from pensions to 401(k)-style plans, employees have been forced to shoulder far more risk and to invest what little they can set aside in savings vehicles that are often designed to take advantage of their lack of investment experience. With approximately half of all American households in danger of having insufficient savings for retirement, we propose policies that would: 随着收入停滞，雇主停止提供类似401(k)的退休金计划，职工不得不自己承担风险，向原本就利用他们投资经验缺乏的理财产品投资。几近一半的美国家庭都面临着退休金不足的危险。我们提出以下建议：

• Encourage the adoption of hybrid retirement plans such as CAP’s Safe, Accessible, Flexible, and Efficient, or SAFE, Retirement Plan at both the state and national levels
• 鼓励混合型退休金计划：例如美国进步中心提出的“安全、方便、灵活、高效”或简称SAFE的联邦和州级退休金计划
• Increase access to existing alternative savings options such as the low-cost Thrift Savings Plan which—by allowing all workers the ability to join—would not only give many a chance to save through a workplace plan but also would provide them with access to one of the best 401(k) plans available
• 增加其他退休存款计划的曝光度：例如低费用的互助存款计划（Thrift Savings Plan）。允许所有劳动者加入该计划后，它不仅能给许多人提供工作地退休计划账户，还提供最好的401(k)计划之一
• Require 401(k) and IRA plans to be more transparent about fees and investment practices through the adoption of a retirement label on all qualified plan options that informs consumers about the high risks of fees and lets them know how the fees in a given plan compare with fees in other plans of the same type
• 要求401(k)计划和个人退休金账户（IRA）缴费、投资更加透明。为告知消费者缴费风险，以及本计划与其他同类计划费用对比的计划添加标识。
• Make tax incentives for saving simpler and fairer by replacing the complex web of tax deductions that disproportionately benefit the wealthy with a Universal Savings Credit that would turn all existing deductions into a single, streamlined credit, as well as by potentially introducing a progressive match for low-income savers’ contributions
• 给更简单、公平的计划提供税收优惠。用通用存款抵税额替代复杂且更利于有钱人的抵税机制。为低收入存款者提供更先进的计划匹配方式

Conclusion 结论 To have a strong and growing economy, we need a strong and growing middle class. The longer the middle-class squeeze continues unabated, the more these trends will continue to affect both families across the country and our economic prospects as a nation. 只有强大且持续增长的中产阶级才能造就强大且持续增长的经济。中产阶级承受重压的时间越长，对全国的家庭和经济形势影响就越大。 We know what policies would help reverse the middle-class squeeze. Now, we just need to act. 我们已经知道怎样的政策能够减轻中产阶级的压力。现在，只待行动。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

No Economic Mess in Texas 德州经济安然无恙 作者：WSJ @ 2015-7-22 译者：赵鲲 校对：晓舸 (@ShawXG) 来源：《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journay），http://www.wsj.com/articles/no-economic-mess-in-texas-1437433836 Oil prices collapse but the Lone Star State keeps creating jobs. 油价崩溃并未阻止孤星州持续创造就业机会

A funny thing has happened to the economic miracle in Texas that liberals predicted would go bust along with oil prices. America’s foremost state job creator of the past decade continues to produce opportunity and employment.

有趣的是，虽然自由派一直在预测“德州奇迹”将随油价崩溃而破产，但这个过去十年美国创造就业最多的州仍在持续创造着就业和经济机遇。

Last week’s “beige book” release from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas shows that despite the struggling oil and gas industry, the Texas economy is still enjoying moderate growth. Since prices in the oil patch began sliding a year ago, pundits on the political left have been waiting for evidence to declare the Texas model a failure. They’re still waiting.

上周达拉斯联邦储备银行发布的褐皮书显示，虽然石油和天然气行业举步维艰，德州经济却仍然在以温和的速度增长。自从去年油价开始暴跌以来，那些左翼评论员们就一直在等待着能证实“德州模式”失败的证据出现。但直到现在，他们仍然没有等到。

Last month the federal Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that in 2014 the Texas economy grew by a sizzling 5.2%, second fastest in the country after North Dakota’s 6.3% and more than twice the U.S. average. That followed 5.5% growth in 2013 and 6.2% in 2012. And 2014 was the year oil prices fell to $53 a barrel in December from more than $107 in June. The Texas rig count in May was down 58% from a year ago.

上月联邦经济分析局发布的报告显示，德州经济在2014年度表现良好，增长率达到5.2%，在全美仅次于北达科他州6.2%排名第二，超过全美平均水平的两倍。在之前的2013和2012年度，德州的增长率分别为5.5%和6.2%。值得一提的是，油价已从2014年6月的每桶超过107美元跌至了12月的每桶53美元。而今年5月德州运转中的钻机数量相比一年前下降了58%。

Liberal Governors, tired of looking bad next to Texas, may have hoped to catch a break as the full impact of cheap oil hit the Lone Star State in 2015. And Texas is creating jobs more slowly this year—1.1% growth through May versus 3.6% in the same period last year. Lower-paying positions in hospitality have substituted for higher-paying energy jobs.

受够了被德州比得很难看的自由派州长们，也许希望当低油价的影响在2015年全面冲击“孤星州”时，他们能够缓口气。德州今年创造就业的速度的确在放缓——整个5月工作岗位仅仅增长了1.1%，而去年同期这个数字则是3.6%。低工资的酒店服务业岗位填补了高工资的能源行业岗位消失所带来的空缺。

But the overall economic resilience is a far cry from the Texas recessions that followed previous oil busts. Unemployment in the state, 4.3% in May, was still well below the national average of 5.5% that month.

但是相比之前的几次油价暴跌之后德州所经历的经济衰退，这次油价下跌中经济的整体韧性已经强得多了。德州在5月的失业率是4.3%，这个数字仍要比全美 5.5% 的平均水平低了不少。

Some credit goes to the foresight of energy companies that made themselves less vulnerable with better balance sheets. In a report specifically focused on the energy capital of Houston, the Dallas Fed notes recent improvement in job growth and says that “refining, petrochemicals and service industries are managing to offset oil-producer woes.” Statewide, education and health services employment has also been strong.

一些有远见的能源企业提前储备了资金，他们通过改善资产负债表使自己变得更健壮。在一份特别关注能源之都休斯顿的报告中，达拉斯联储提到了最近就业增长的改善，该报告指出，“炼油，石化和服务业的增长基本抵消了原油开采行业下滑所带来的问题。”在全州范围内，教育和医疗产业的就业势头也同样强劲。

Meanwhile in Austin, which has little exposure to the energy industry, business other than government is booming. May job growth surged at an annual rate of 6.6%, including “a significant increase in high-paying scientific and technical services jobs.” Texas is now America’s top technology exporter, surpassing long-time leader California.

同时在与能源行业几乎没有什么联系的奥斯汀，政府服务之外的经济正在蓬勃发展。奥斯汀5月的就业增长率飙升到了年化6.6%的水平，其中还包括“高收入的科技服务领域内就业机会的显著增长。”德州现已成为了全美第一大的技术输出州，超越了长期以来一直领先的加州。

Imagine how the economy of Washington, D.C. would suffer and how high the local unemployment rate would soar if government spending fell by half in less than a year. But Texas is mainly in the business of wealth creation, not redistribution.

设想一下，如果政府开支在一年之内缩减一半，华盛顿特区的经济将会遭受多大的打击，当地的失业率又将会飙升到什么样的水平。但是德州经济主要依赖的是财富创造，而不是财富再分配。

The Texas strategy of avoiding burdensome taxation and regulation has attracted a variety of businesses across many industries that have diversified the state economy. Texas still has no personal or corporate income tax. New Gov. Greg Abbott has been annoying the left even more by taking a hatchet to business franchise and property levies. He recently signed into law tax cuts amounting to $4 billion over two years despite the reduced flow of revenue due to falling oil production. This is the opposite of the tax-raising strategy pursued by Illinois, Connecticut, Maryland and New York when revenues decline.

德州尽可能减少繁重的税收和管制的经济策略吸引了横跨多个行业的多种类型的企业，这让德州经济变得更加多元化。德州至今仍然没有个人和公司所得税。新任州长Greg Abbott进一步削减了特许经营权税和财产税，这一举措让左派感到更加气恼。虽然政府收入因为油价的下跌已经在减少，但他最近还是签署了一项在两年内减税40亿美元的计划。这与伊利诺伊，康涅狄格，马里兰和纽约等州在收入下降时采取的加税措施完全背道而驰。

The Texas Governor was in New York urging more businesses to consider moving south and west. And while service businesses of many types are currently growing in Texas, don’t expect energy and related manufacturing to stay down forever. Mr. Abbott says that “we are on the cusp of once again transforming the energy world” with new Gulf Coast terminals for exporting liquefied natural gas.

这位德州州长曾在纽约呼吁更多的企业考虑搬到地处西南部的德州。各种类型的服务业企业正在德州茁壮成长，同时也不要以为能源以及与之相关的制造业会一直处于低迷状态。Abott先生表示，随着用于出口液化天然气的新终端在墨西哥湾沿岸建成投产，“我们再一次站在了改变能源世界的前沿”。

Economic dependence on commodity prices can be a boom and bust proposition, as Canada’s Alberta province and Australia are experiencing. But the resilience in Texas is proving again that limiting government is an economic growth strategy for all seasons.

依赖大宗商品价格的经济体是可能面临繁荣-衰退循环，这正是加拿大阿尔伯塔省和澳大利亚所正在经历的。但德州经济所表现出来的韧性，则又一次证明了，限制政府规模是一种在各种经济环境下都能促进增长的策略。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

How much the young suffer 年轻人受了多少苦 作者：C.W. @ 2015-7-17 译者：史祥莆（@史祥莆） 校对：Marcel Zhang 来源：Economists，http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/housing-britain BRITONS are obsessed with home-ownership; but it is getting less and less common. 英国人迷恋房屋所有权，但这种情形越来越不普遍。 BRITONS are obsessed with home-ownership; but it is getting less and less common. A new note from Neal Hudson of Savills, an estate agent, points out that "the share of households owning their home peaked in 2003 at 71% [...] and has been in decline since." But the crucial point, as Mr Hudson goes on to explain, is that things look rather different when splitting up the data by age group. 英国人迷恋房屋所有权，但这种情形越来越不普遍。一份来自房地产中介Neal Hudson of Savills的记录表明：“拥有房屋所有权的比例在2003年达到最高点71%，并在此后下降。” Hudson先生继续解释，但关键点在于，当按照年龄层划分人群之后，情况就完全不同了。 The chart uses data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders and shows Britain's home-ownership by age. Even seasoned watchers of Britain's housing market are surprised by how dramatic it is. 这张使用了来自抵押贷款委员会（Council of Mortgage Lenders）的数据的图表显示了不同年龄段英国人的房屋所有率。即使是资深的英国房地产观察者，也吃惊于它所呈现出的戏剧性。 The pathetic rates of home-ownership among young people in Britain may be down to the country's crazy property prices, particularly in London where lots of young people live. (The economic problems associated with London's housing market are explained in this week's issue). 英国年轻人可悲的房屋拥有状况可能是疯狂的房价导致的，尤其是众多年轻人居住的伦敦。（与伦敦房产市场相关的经济问题在本周的刊物上有所解释）。 And other factors, not related to prices, may be at play. More young Britons are spending a long time at university, driving up the age they get their first job. And younger generations are more likely to move around to find work than the old; renting gives them the flexibility to do this. 此外，其他非价格因素可能也在发挥着作用。更多的英国年轻人在大学度过更长时光，抬高了他们初次工作的年龄。另外年轻一代相比年长者更容易四处迁徙寻找工作，而租房为他们提供了这么做所需要的灵活性。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-07-07】 @whigzhou: 读过《大停滞?》 ★★ “这是Cowen作品里最差的一本，这家伙的经济学功力这回算是彻底暴露了，对消费和金融的理解都一塌糊涂，我看他还是谈文化更有趣一些。” http://t.cn/RA1Wck8 @慕容飞宇gg:那么 大停滞 这个主要论断你赞同吗？ @whigzhou: 不同意。我也看到一种停滞前景，但和他说的完全不是一码事，我看到的是：随着整个生产体系的进化，很可能越来越多人的人力资源在其中变得毫无价值，当这部分人的比例高到某个程度时，经济将不可避免陷于停滞 @whigzhou: 我不知道这个临界点何时到来，过去几年美国的劳动市场参与率在持续下降，或许部分体现了这一趋势，但我不确定其中多少可归因于制度（比如社会福利和最低工资），但从理论上说，即便消除所有制度障碍，越来越多人退出劳动市场也是完全可能的 @whigzhou: 有人认为教育制度的改进可以解决这问题，我不同意，教育最多能延缓这一过程，因为受制于人类硬件局限，教育的边际效果在不断下降，到某个程度之后，无论再追加多少教育也不可能把某些人的人力资源变得有市场价值了 @理客墙: ....你说的这现象早有文献研究到死了，Cowen还专门写了另一本书说这事。但这和停滞有什么必然联系？ @whigzhou: 理论上没有必然联系，我在《机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗？》里也说了，退出劳动市场的人，并非不可能靠非劳动要素报酬继续维持其消费能力 @whigzhou: 但从经验上看，当大部分人口退出劳动市场，要指望出现一种恰好分散均匀到足以维持消费繁荣的要素分配格局，依我看是不太可能的，我也看不出通过何种演变途径能达到这样的分配格局 @whigzhou: 传统低端劳动要素有一个自然特性：每个健康人都天然拥有，而且谁都不比谁多多少，因而当此类要素的市场价值高于零时，经济体自动实现了某种分配结构 @慕容飞宇gg:从消费的角度来说，衣食住行已经很久没有提高了，未来呢？ @whigzhou: Cowen看待消费的方式整个歪了，要拧过来很费劲，我就简单说几句，1）“很久没有明显提高”这个说法经不起仔细检查；2）假如每人多买三辆车，每天多吃三倍肉，倒是很符合Cowen的增长观，可是人们要的增长真是这种吗？ @whigzhou: 3）当某个层次某些类别的消费大致满足之后，人们就开始更多关注其他方面，开辟新的消费天地，而不会在原有消费组合上一味追求数量扩张；4）考虑到成本结构上的变化，旧消费组合的精致化、新消费领域的扩张/改善，其程度可能无法充分体现在GDP中，但只要这些改变正是消费者所要的，那又有什么不好？ @whigzhou: 举个稍稍极端的例子，假如延长寿命的边际成本越来越高，达到这样的程度：一个人需要把医疗开支从其收入的20%提高到80%才能以让他再多活一年，按Cowen的标准，活101岁和100岁显然不算明显著改善，但人家就愿意这么做，你着啥急？ @鸥先生-:辉格老师最在意那些数据？ @whigzhou: 比较消费质量和长期生活水平的话，我提倡一种扩展的恩格尔系数，比较创新和投资活跃程度的话，最简单指标是Top100名单的更新频率 @whigzhou: 不过，若不是为了讨论方便而需要一种客观指标的话，我个人其实更注重直觉观感：新鲜好玩的东西是否还在不断冒出来？学术界是否还在不断产生富有启迪的新思想？企业家是否仍有机会创造激动人心的新事业？总之，只要文明继续繁荣下去的可能性不被扼杀，我就很满意了～  

第十七章   不一样的泡沫 在古代，经济的大幅波动通常与战争、天灾、瘟疫等外部事件联系在一起，但自从近代大规模市场体系出现之后，人们发现，即便没有显著的外部冲击，经济自己也常会在景气与萧条之间反复震荡，并且震荡的过程常表现出许多十分相似的特征。 由于经济波动[1]会带来大规模的失业、破产、资产价格暴跌和币值动荡，扰乱人们的生活，因而历来是经济学家关注的焦点，对导致波动的原因和周期发展机理的不同解释，也是构成了区分不同学派的主要分水岭。 马克思认为，经济危机是市场制度的内在缺陷所致，这个缺陷就是资本有机构成不断提高，所谓有机构成，是指收入分配中资本要素相对于劳动和土地要素所取得的报酬，随着资本积累，这个比例不断提高，导致劳动者贫困化，缺乏足够的购买力消费所产出的产品，结果整个经济体总需求不足，不得不通过周期性危机来消灭过剩的产能和资本。 凯恩斯也将危机归因于总需求不足，但提出的微观原理不同，根本的原因是货币幻觉[2]和过度储蓄倾向，前者导致价格刚性，特别是工资刚性，后者导致市场利率无法平衡储蓄率与投资率，这两者最终导致失业和产出过剩，因而他主张，由政府通过积极的财政开支和某种程度的通货膨胀政策来矫正这一倾向。 奥地利学派的哈耶克和米塞斯，则将商业周期归咎于信用系统的内在扩张倾向，它使得银行创造出过多的信用货币，导致投资过热和资产价格泡沫[3]，而由于信息传导上的滞后，这些错误投资未能被价格机制及时纠正，最终由危机来消除；同时他们也强调，政府的错误货币政策常常引发或加剧这一波动。 弗里德曼同样将波动主要归因于货币系统，但他并不认为货币系统本身具有内在的紧缩或扩张倾向，而是错误的货币制度或政策会随机的导致通货紧缩或膨胀，因而他同时担忧紧缩和膨胀，并且否认任何主动的货币政策可以无害的消除自然波动，政府唯一需要做的只是稳定货币量，同时他也相信，假如政府肯放手，私人银行系统能够自己想出办法做到这一点。 在诸多学派里，熊彼特是少有的以乐观态度看待波动的学者，他认为周期主要是由创新浪潮推动的，由于对创新前景看法的共识形成和传播存在时滞，而创新模式的扩张、对旧模式下产能的替代和对旧企业盈利基础的打击，都需要时间，因而其对利率和产品与资产价格的影响，在创新扩张的各阶段都十分不同，从而形成周期，他将这一过程称为创造性毁灭，并视其为经济得以发展、产业结构得以进化的方式，就像生态系统那样。[4] 直到现在，宏观经济学仍处于一片混战之中，没有任何学派获得学界公认，这在本次危机中鸡同鸭讲意见纷纭的场面中即可看出，要全面理解这样一个庞大的复杂系统确实太困难了，不过，得益于大萧条以来众多学者的苦心研究，大量的制度和政策实验，以及金融业本身的发展和创新，我们至少对经济系统的某些机制已经有了更好的理解，同时，指出许多流行看法的错谬比提出解释要容易的多。 和上一章一样，由于经济波动主题过于宏大，本章宁可收窄范围，把注意力主要集中在各种泡沫现象和国际货币失衡这两个话题上。 ---------------------- [1]经济波动（economic fluctuation）常被早期经济学家称为商业周期（business cycle），但前一个词未必暗示波动的周期性，有些学者拒绝承认存在周期性。 [2]货币幻觉（money illusion）是凯恩斯在其《货币幻觉》（1928）一书里提出的概念，指人们普遍具有对名义价格而非实际价格作出反应的本能倾向（名义与实际价格因通货膨胀而存在差异）。 [3]乔治主义（Georgism）创始人亨利·乔治（Henry George）也将波动归咎于资产泡沫，但他认为首恶是地产泡沫。 [4]我个人比较亲睐弗里德曼和熊彼特的理论，这两者是兼容的，只要稳定了货币，波动既无法消除，也无须担忧；熊彼特是长期游离于经济学主流之外的独行侠，但我从他的思想里获益良多，在本书许多地方你都可以看到他给我留下的痕迹。  

第五部分  宏观经济  

商品价格的高涨是金银增加的必然结果，但这种高涨并非紧随金银而来，而是需要一段时间，直到货币在全国流通并让所有人都感觉到其影响；刚开始看不出什么变化，逐渐的，先是一种，接着是另一种，物价逐渐上涨，直至全部商品价格与新的货币量形成合适比例为止，只有在货币增加到物价上涨之间的空档中，金银增加才对提高生产劲头有利。

——大卫·休谟，“论货币”，1742

人类在恐惧与兴奋之间摇摆的天性让我们陷于经济困境，没有任何经济模式能够抑制这种情况的出现却不带来严重的后果。监管是人们所谓能有效解决当前危机的方案，但它在历史上从未能够消除过危机。

——艾伦·格林斯潘，《金融时报》专栏，2008

  有些事情，可以从对个体的微观判断简单推知对群体的总和效果，比如，一个人每天多吃几块肥肉，就容易长胖，假如每人都多吃肥肉，总的肥胖水平就会提高，这是显而易见的；但在另一些事情上，从微观判断是得不出宏观结论的，比如，一个人捡到一百万美元，他就变得更富有了，假如每个人同时捡到一百万美元，整个社会的富裕水平会提高吗？ 后一类情况意味着，某些经济现象从观察个体行为是无法得到理解的，就像观察个别空气分子的运动无法获得对飓风的理解一样，必须在另一个层次上观察和分析，那便是所谓宏观经济学正在做的事情。 从系统学的角度看，驱动一个系统的总体运动和变化的诸因素中，具有可叠加和可积累性效果的那些因素，将占据主导地位，而假如它们能被某种正反馈机制所放大，那么这种主导优势更将是压倒性的。 正反馈对于一个系统是破坏性的，系统能够稳定的存在，要么在其边界上存在某种负反馈机制，要么会通过某些爆破方式周期性的释放其能量，而这些边界和爆破点将构成系统的总体面貌和波动特征；理解经济系统的关键，便在于找出这些反馈机制及其工作原理。 一个正反馈因素是分工，分工提高效率、增加产出，而更高的产量将支撑更精细的分工（因为在较低的产量下，将某些工序分离出来是规模不经济的），于是进一步提高效率、增加产出；但每个正反馈必定对应一个负反馈，分工越细，交易和组织成本越高，效率越低，最终分工细化将停止在成本收益相抵的那个水平上。 类似的，合作（包括交易）关系中也有正反馈效应：合作会增进信任，信任会带来更多合作，另一方面，过度的信任会增加欺骗的机会和收益，同时，过于密切的合作关系会将合作引入那些过于复杂或不确定性太多因而不易履行承诺的事情上，从而既破坏信任，也减少合作。 人口也是如此，每生下一个孩子，就为未来增加了一个能生孩子的人，但随着人口增加，为生产足够食物不得不开垦更贫瘠的土地，而随着单位土地上投入更多劳动，边际产出不断下降，直至新增产量无法供养新增人口。 信用和流动性是另一个例子，信用创造流动性，流动性抬高资产价值，而更高的资产价值带来更好的信用，但流动性过度泛滥会提高系统风险水平，最终通过或大或小、局部或全局的爆破来释放。 乐观与悲观的正反馈机制是一种“信念的自我实现”[1]，这是由信念和行为相互加强的二元正反馈：我相信股市要涨，大手买入，我表弟听说我在买，也相信要涨，就跟着买，然后越来越多的人相信股市要涨，也跟着买，结果股市就真的涨了；银行挤兑也是如此：有谣言说某银行要破产，最初听到的几十个人跑去提款，别人看到好多人同时在提款，感觉不妙，跟着提，于是银行真的破产了。 ---------------------- [1]也叫“自我应验预言”（self-fulfilling prophecy）。