Free-Market Environmentalism 自由市场环保主义 作者：Richard L. Stroup 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 来源：EconLib， http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FreeMarketEnvironmentalism.html Free-market environmentalism emphasizes markets as a solution to environmental problems. Proponents argue that free markets can be more successful than government—and have been more successful historically—in solving many environmental problems. 自由市场环保主义强调将市场作为环境问题的解决办法。这一观念的倡议者认为，在解决许多环境问题方面，自由市场能够做得比政府更成功——历史上也一直更为成功。 This interest in free-market environmentalism is somewhat ironic because environmental problems have often been seen as a form of market failure (see PUBLIC GOODS and EXTERNALITIES). In the traditional view, many environmental problems are caused by decision makers who reduce their costs by polluting those who are downwind or downstream; other environmental problems are caused by private decision makers’ inability to produce “public goods” (such as preservation of wild species) because no one has to pay to get the benefits of this preservation. 对自由市场环保主义的关注多少有点反讽，因为环保问题一向都被看作是一种市场失灵的体现（见词条“公共物品”和“外部性”）。传统观点认为，许多环境问题之产生，是由于决策者会通过污染处于下风向或下游的人们来减少自身的成本；其他环境问题之产生，则是由于私人决策者无力生产“公共物品”（如野生物种保护），因为人们无需支付价格就能获得此种保护所带来的收益。 While these problems can be quite real, growing evidence indicates that governments often fail to control pollution or to provide public goods at reasonable cost. Furthermore, the private sector is often more responsive than government to environmental demands. This evidence, which is supported by much economic theory, has led to a reconsideration of the traditional view. 尽管这类问题相当实际，但是越来越多的证据表明，政府常常无法以合理的价格控制污染或提供公共物品。此外，私营部门通常比政府更能响应环保需求。此类证据得到了许多经济理论的支持，现已引导人们重新考量传统观点。 The failures of centralized government control in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union awakened further interest in free-market environmentalism in the early 1990s. As glasnost lifted the veil of secrecy, press reports identified large areas where brown haze hung in the air, people’s eyes routinely burned from chemical fumes, and drivers had to use headlights in the middle of the day. 在1990年代早期，东欧和苏联中央集权政府的控制失败进一步唤醒了人们对自由市场环保主义的关注。随着“公开性”政策拉开遮掩的帷幕，新闻媒体报道了在被黄色雾霾覆盖的大片地区中人们的眼睛经常因化学烟雾而刺痛，以及司机们大白天都需要开车灯。 In 1990 the Wall Street Journal quoted a claim by Hungarian doctors that 10 percent of the deaths in Hungary might be directly related to pollution. The New York Times reported that parts of the town of Merseburg, East Germany, were “permanently covered by a white chemical dust, and a sour smell fills people’s nostrils.” 《华尔街日报》在1990年曾引用过一些匈牙利医生的说法，即匈牙利10%的死亡与污染直接相关。《纽约时报》报道说，在东德梅泽堡，市镇的部分地区“常年覆盖着一层白色化学粉尘，一股股恶臭扑鼻而来。” For markets to work in the environmental field, as in any other, rights to each important resource must be clearly defined, easily defended against invasion, and divestible (transferable) by owners on terms agreeable to buyer and seller. 要让市场在环保领域发挥作用，跟在其他领域一样，对于重要资源的权利归属必须得到清晰界定（defined），对于侵犯行为能够轻松防卫（defended），并且权利所有人应当能基于买卖双方均能接受的条款而剥离（divestible）（或转让）之。 Well-functioning markets, in short, require “3-D” PROPERTY RIGHTS. When the first two are present—clear definition and easy DEFENSE of one’s rights—no one is forced to accept pollution beyond the standard acceptable to the community. Local standards differ because people with similar preferences and those seeking similar opportunities often cluster together. 简而言之，运转良好的市场要求存在这种“3D”财产权。一旦具备前面两条（某人的权利界定清晰并易于防卫），就没有任何人会被迫接受超过所在社群接受标准的污染。各地标准会有所不同，因为具有相同偏好的人和追寻相同机遇的人通常会聚集在一起。 Parts of Montana, for example, where the key economic activity is ranching, are “range country.” In those areas, anyone who does not want the neighbors’ cattle disturbing his or her garden has the duty to fence the garden to keep the cattle out. On the really large ranches of range country, that solution is far cheaper than fencing all the range on the ranch. But much of the state is not range country. There, the property right standards are different: It is the duty of the cattle owner to keep livestock fenced in. People in the two areas have different priorities based on goals that differ between the communities. 比如，在蒙大拿州的部分地区，关键的经济活动是牧场经营，可以说是“牧乡”。在这类地区，任何人如果不希望邻居的牧群打扰他或她的园子，自己就有义务修建花园栅栏，把牧群拦在外边。在牧乡的大型牧场上，这种解决办法远比给牧地上所有牧场都装上栅栏要来得便宜。但蒙大拿州许多其它地区并不是牧乡。在这些地方，财产权的标准就有所不同：牧群所有者有义务将牲畜用栅栏围住。不同地区的人们考虑的优先次序不同，根源在于不同社群拥有不同的目标。 Similarly, the “acceptable noise” standard in a vibrant neighborhood of the inner city with many young people might differ from that of a dignified neighborhood populated mainly by well-to-do retirees. “Noise pollution” in one community might be acceptable in another, because a standard that limits one limits all in the community. Those who sometimes enjoy loud music at home may be willing to accept some of it from others. 类似地，内城区年轻人很多的那些小区活力十足，这些地方的“可容忍噪音”标准可能就会不同于居民主要为生活优裕的退休人员的高端小区。某个社群的“噪音污染”在另外一个社群可能是可接受的，因为限制单个人的标准应当对于社群内的所有人都适用。偶尔喜欢在家里听听吵闹音乐的那些人很可能也愿意接受别人家里不时放放这种音乐。 Each individual has a right against invasion of himself and his property, and the courts will defend that right, but the standard that defines an unacceptable invasion can vary from one community to another. And finally, when the third characteristic of property rights—divestibility—is present, each owner has an incentive to be a good steward: preservation of the owner’s wealth (the value of his or her property) depends on good stewardship. 每个个体都有权反对对他本人及其财产的侵犯，且法院会捍卫这种权利。但在不同社群之间，如何界定不可容忍之侵犯的标准是可以不同的。最后，当财产权具备第三个特征（即可剥离性）时，每个所有者就都有做好管理人的激励：良好的管理才能维护业主的财富（财产的价值）。 Environmental problems stem from the absence or incompleteness of these characteristics of property rights. When rights to resources are defined and easily defended against invasion, all individuals or CORPORATIONS, whether potential polluters or potential victims, have an incentive to avoid pollution problems. When air or water pollution damages a privately owned asset, the owner whose wealth is threatened will gain by seeing—in court if necessary—that the threat is abated. 环境问题的根源在于财产权不具备或部分缺失上述特性。如果资源的权属界定清晰，对于侵权能够轻松防卫，那么所有个体或公司，不管他们是潜在污染者还是潜在受害者，就都具有激励去避免污染。当空气污染或水污染损害到私人所有的资产时，财富受到威胁的所有者通过确保威胁得以解除（必要时通过法院）就能获利。 In England and Scotland, for example, unlike in the United States, the right to fish for sport and commerce is a privately owned, transferable right. This means that owners of fishing rights can obtain damages and injunctions against polluters of streams. Owners of these rights vigorously defend them, even though the owners are often small anglers’ clubs with modest means. 比如，英格兰和苏格兰就与美国不同，以运动和商业为目的的钓鱼活动是私有的、可转让的权利。这就意味着钓鱼权的所有者能够从河流污染者那里获得赔偿或是用禁令禁止污染河流的行为。这些权利的所有者会积极地捍卫权利，尽管他们通常都只是些小型垂钓俱乐部，财产并不太多。 Fishers clearly gain, but there is a cost to them also. In 2005, for example, INTERNET advertisements offered fishing in the chalk streams of the River Anton, Hampshire, at 50 pounds British per day, or about $90 U.S. On the River Avon in Wiltshire, the price per day was 150 pounds, or $270. Valuable fishing rights encouraged their owners to form an association prepared to go to court when polluters violate their fishing rights. Such suits were successful well before Earth Day in 1970, and before pollution control became part of public policy. 钓鱼的人显然会得利，但他们也需承担成本。比如，2005年，网上广告说到汉普郡一条白垩河（安东河）上钓鱼每天需50英镑，合90美元；而在维尔特郡的埃文河上，价格更是高达每天150英镑，合270美元。价值高昂的钓鱼权促使其所有者组成联盟，一旦污染者损害他们的钓鱼权，就时刻准备走上法庭。早在1970年“世界地球日”诞生之前很久，早在污染控制进入公共政策之前很久，这类诉讼就已经很成功了。 Once rights against pollution are established by precedent, as these were many years ago, going to court is seldom necessary. Potential plaintiffs who recognize they are likely to lose do not want to add court costs to their losses. 一旦反对污染的权利经由先例得以确立，就像上述权利多年以前实现的那样，以后就很少有必要上法庭了。如果潜在的原告察觉到他们很可能会输掉官司，他们就不会愿意再往自己的损失上添一份诉讼开销。 Thus, LIABILITY for pollution is a powerful motivator when a factory or other potentially polluting asset is privately owned. The case of the Love Canal, a notorious waste dump, illustrates this point. As long as Hooker Chemical Company owned the Love Canal waste site, it was designed, maintained, and operated (in the late 1940s and 1950s) in a way that met even the Environmental Protection Agency standards of 1980. The corporation wanted to avoid any damaging leaks, for which it would have to pay. 因此，当工厂或其它有可能造成污染的资产为私人所有时，对造成的污染需付的责任就是一个强大的激励因素。发生在“爱河”这一臭名远扬的废料堆上的事件很好地表明了这一点。在胡克化学公司拥有“爱河”填埋场期间，它的设计、维持和运转（从1940年代晚期至1950年代）始终都做得很好，甚至能够满足美国环保署1980年的标准。公司希望能够避免任何有害泄露，要不然它就得出钱。 Only when the waste site was taken over by local government—under threat of eminent domain, for the cost of one dollar, and in spite of warnings by Hooker about the chemicals—was the site mistreated in ways that led to chemical leakage. The government decision makers lacked personal or corporate liability for their decisions. 只有在填埋场被当地政府接管（在政府威胁实施土地征用的情况下，胡克公司以一美元价格转让，并且当时它还就化学品提出过警告）以后，场地才遭到滥用，最后导致了化学泄露。政府决策者不需为他们的决定承担个体或公司责任。 They built a school on part of the site, removed part of the protective clay cap to use as fill dirt for another school site, and sold off the remaining part of the Love Canal site to a developer without warning him of the dangers as Hooker had warned them. The local government also punched holes in the impermeable clay walls to build water lines and a highway. This allowed the toxic wastes to escape when rainwater, no longer kept out by the partially removed clay cap, washed them through the gaps created in the walls. 他们在填埋场的部分地面上建了一所学校；移除了部分起保护作用的黏土盖层，用到另一学校工地去做填土；把“爱河”填埋场的剩余部分卖给了开发商，却没有像胡克公司那样附上危险警告。当地政府还在不渗水的黏土墙上开挖孔洞，用于建设水管和公路。由于黏土盖层部分被拆，挡不住雨水，结果有毒废弃物就被雨水从墙上的破洞里冲刷了出来。 The school district owning the land had a laudable but narrow goal: it wanted to provide EDUCATION cheaply for district children. Government decision makers are seldom held accountable for broader social goals in the way that private owners are by liability rules and potential PROFITS. Of course, anyone, including private parties, can make mistakes, but the decision maker whose private wealth is on the line tends to be more circumspect. The liability that holds private decision makers accountable is largely missing in the public sector. 拥有这片土地的学区所抱持的目标虽然值得称赞，但却过于狭隘：它就想为学区的孩子们提供便宜的教育。政府决策者几乎从来不会因更广泛的社会目标而遭到问责，这一点与私人所有者不同，后者需受责任原则和潜在利益的限制。当然，任何人都可能犯错，包括私方在内。但是，当决策者需要用个人财富来承担风险时，他会更加慎重。与对私人决策者问责的情况不同，在公共部门中，问责要求总体上是缺失的。 Nor does the government sector have the long-range view that property rights provide, which leads to protection of resources for the future. As long as the third D, divestibility, is present, property rights provide long-term incentives for maximizing the value of property. If I mine my land and impair its future PRODUCTIVITY or its groundwater, the reduction in the land’s value reduces my current wealth. 政府部门也不具备财产权所带来的长远视野，而这种视野会鼓励资源保护，以备未来之需。只要财产权具备第三个“D”即“可剥离性”，财产权就能提供将财物价值最大化的长期激励。如果我在我的土地上进行开采，破坏了它未来的生产率或其地下水，那么土地价值的减少就会导致我当前的财富的减少。 That is because land’s current worth equals the PRESENT VALUE of all future services. Fewer services or greater costs in the future mean lower value now. In fact, on the day an appraiser or potential buyer can first see that there will be problems in the future, my wealth declines. The reverse also is true: any new way to produce more value—preserving scenic value as I log my land, for example, to attract paying recreationists—is capitalized into the asset’s present value. 这是因为，土地的当前价值等于所有未来得益的折现值。未来得益减少或成本增加就意味着当前价值变低。事实上，只要有一个估价人或潜在买家首先看出未来会出问题，从这时起，我的财富就减少了。这话反过来也成立：任何能够产出更多价值的新办法（比如伐木时注意保护地面的观赏价值以吸引付费消遣的客人）都可以折算为资产的现值。 Because the owner’s wealth depends on good stewardship, even a shortsighted owner has the incentive to act as if he or she cares about the future usefulness of the resource. This is true even if an asset is owned by a corporation. Corporate officers may be concerned mainly about the short term, but as financial economists such as Harvard Business School’s Michael C. Jensen have noted, even they have to care about the future. If current actions are known to cause future problems, or if a current INVESTMENT promises future benefits, the stock price rises or falls to reflect the change. Corporate officers are informed by (and are judged by) these stock price changes. 财产所有者的财富取决于良好的管理，因此，即便是目光短浅的所有者也有动力表现出关心资源未来价值的样子。即便资产由公司所有，情况也是如此。公司管理者更多关心的可能是短期，但是正如哈佛商学院的Michael C. Jensen等金融经济学家所指出的那样，即便是这些人，也不得不着眼长远。如果人们知道当前行为在未来有可能引起麻烦，或者他们知道当前投资有望在未来获利，那么这种变化就会在股票价格的涨落上体现出来。公司管理人能够通过这种股票价格变化来获得信息，他们的工作成效也能由此得以判断。 This ability and incentive to engage in farsighted behavior is lacking in the political sector. Consider the example of Seattle’s Ravenna Park. At the turn of the twentieth century it was a privately owned park that contained magnificent Douglas firs. A husband and wife, Mr. and Mrs. W. W. Beck, had developed it into a family recreation area that, in good weather, brought in thousands of people a day. 政府部门缺乏行长远之事的能力和动力。这方面可以看看西雅图拉文纳公园的例子。20世纪初，这一公园属于私人所有，里面长有华贵的花旗松。W. W. Beck夫妇将公园打理成了一个家庭休闲场所，天气好的时候每天能吸引数千人来玩。 Concern that a future owner might not take proper care of it, however, caused the local government to “preserve” this beautiful place. The owners did not want to part with it, but the city initiated condemnation proceedings and bought the park. 然而，当地政府担心下一位所有者不会用心打理公园，因此要“保护”该公园。尽管公园所有者不愿意，但该市启动了征用程序，最终买下了公园。 But since they had no personal property or income at stake, local officials allowed the park to deteriorate. In fact, the tall trees began to disappear soon after the city bought it in 1911. A group of concerned citizens brought the theft of the trees to officials’ attention, but the logging continued. 然而，由于当地官员并不需要担心私人财产或收入受损，公园状况在他们的管理下日益恶化。事实上，在市政府于1911年买下之后，公园里面的高大树木很快就开始消失。一群热心市民还曾将偷树贼逮捕送官，但砍伐并没有停止。 Gradually, the park became unattractive. By 1972 it was an ugly, dangerous hangout for drug users. The Becks, operating privately at no cost to taxpayers, but supported instead by user fees, had done a far better job of managing the park they had created. 日复一日，这个公园不再有吸引力了。到1972年，它已经变成了一个丑陋危险的地方，只有吸毒者出没。Beck夫妇的私人经营没有花费纳税人一分钱，但他们能够得到使用者付费。在管理他们创造出来的这一公园方面，他们的成绩可漂亮多了。 Could parks, even national parks like Grand Canyon or Yellowstone, be run privately, by individuals, clubs, or firms, in the way the Becks ran Ravenna Park? Would park users suffer if they had to support the parks they used through fees rather than taxes? 公园、甚至是像大峡谷这样的国家公园是否能够以Beck夫妇经营拉夫纳公园的方式，由私人（包括个体、俱乐部或公司）来经营呢？如果公园使用者需要通过付费而非纳税的方式来维持他们所用的公园，他们因此就受损了吗？ Donald Leal and Holly Fretwell studied national parks and compared certain of them with state parks nearby. The latter had similar characteristics but, unlike the national parks, were supported in large part by user fees. Donald Leal和Holly Fretwell对国家公园进行了研究，并将其中部分与临近的州立公园进行了比较。州立公园与国家公园在许多地方都很相似，但有一个区别：它们大部分都通过使用者付费来维持。 The comparisons were interesting. Leal and Fretwell noted, in 1997, that sixteen state park systems earned at least half their operating funds from fees. The push for greater revenue led park managers to provide better services, and more people were served. 比较结果非常有意思。Leal和Fretwell在1997年提到，有16个州立公园体系通过收费赚取到了一半以上的运营经费。为了获得更大收益，公园管理者愿意提供更好服务，公园也迎来了更多的游客。 For example, in contrast to nearby national parks with similar natural features, Texas state parks offered trail runs, fun runs, “owl prowls,” alligator watching, wildlife safaris, and even a longhorn cattle drive. Costs in the state parks were also lower. Park users seem happy to pay more at the parks when they enjoy more and better services. 比如，与附近自然景观相似的国家公园相比，德克萨斯的州立公园向游客开放山路跑、乐跑、“寻找猫头鹰”、鳄鱼观赏、野生动物游猎，甚至包括长角牛骑行等活动。州立公园的支出也更低一些。如果能够享受到更多更好的服务，逛公园的人似乎很乐意花更多钱。 Private individuals and groups have preserved wildlife habitats and scenic lands in thousands of places in the United States. The 2003 Land Trust Alliance Census Tables list 1,537 local, state, and regional land trusts serving this purpose. Many other state and local groups have similar projects as a sideline, and national groups such as The Nature Conservancy and the Audubon Society have hundreds more. 私人和私人团体已经在美国数千个地方对野生动物栖息地和风景胜地进行了保护。土地信托联盟2003年的普查表中列有1537个地方性、全州性以及地区性的土地信托在从事这一事业。还有许多其他全州性或地方性的团体业余举办类似项目，而全国性团体如“大自然保护协会”和“奥杜邦协会”则有数百个此类项目。 None of these is owned by the government. Using the market, such groups do not have to convince the majority that their project is desirable, nor do they have to fight the majority in choosing how to manage the site. The result, as the federal government’s Council on ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY has reported, is an enormous and healthy diversity of approaches. 这些团体全都不归政府所有。由于它们利用的是市场，它们在其项目值得与否的问题上不用去说服多数人。同样，在选择如何管理保护地的问题上，它们也无需和多数人争执。结果，照联邦政府环境质量委员会报告的说法，我们在保护方法上具备了极为丰富且极为有益的多样性。 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the government is still involved, even in the case of privately donated and privately owned trust lands. Most of these private conservation choices benefit from tax advantages, as conservers gain charitable deductions from taxable income. Tax law, therefore, influences what sorts of donations qualify; it also increases the total amounts by rewarding all qualifying choices by tax reductions. 不过，有一个重要之处值得注意，那就是这里仍然会牵涉到政府，即便是那些私人捐赠或私人所有的信托土地也是如此。绝大多数选择进行私人环保的经营者都会获得税赋优惠，因为保护者的应税收入能够获得慈善事业减免。因此，税法会影响到哪种捐赠符合条件。它也能通过税赋减免来奖赏所有符合条件的选择，从而增加此类捐赠总量。 Who gains from the increased conservation? Most often it is first and foremost the nearby landowners. When donors of trust lands retain adjacent property, they benefit from the existence of the trust lands to a degree greater than other citizens more distant. Open space usually raises the value of nearby lands. 谁会从环保增进中获益？绝大多数时候，首先是临近地区的土地所有者。如果信托土地的捐赠者保留有临近地产，他们就会从信托土地的存在中获益，且这种获益程度会高于离该信托土地相对更远的市民。开阔的空间通常都能增加附近土地的价值。 Further, when many polluters and those who receive the pollution are involved, how can property rights force accountability? The nearest receivers may be hurt the most, and may be able to sue polluters—but not always. Consider an extreme case: the potential GLOBAL WARMING impact of carbon dioxide produced by the burning of wood or fossil fuels. If climate change results, the effects are worldwide. 更进一步说，如果涉及到的污染者和受污者人数众多，财产权又如何能推动问责呢？离得最近的受污染者可能受损最大，也可能有能力起诉污染者，但情况并非总是如此。这里可以考虑一个极端例子，即燃烧木头或化石燃料所产生的二氧化碳可能造成的全球变暖影响。如果气候变化发生，其影响将会遍及全球。 Nearly everyone uses the ENERGY from such fuels, and if the threat of global warming from a buildup of carbon dioxide turns out to be as serious as some claim, then those harmed by global warming will be hard-pressed to assert their property rights against all the energy producers or users of the world. The same is true for those exposed to pollutants produced by autos and industries in the Los Angeles air basin. Private, enforceable, and tradable property rights can work wonders, but they are not a cure-all. 如果二氧化碳增加所导致的全球变暖最后确实像某些人所宣称的那么严重，由于几乎所有人都使用此类燃料所产生的能源，全球变暖的受害者就要针对全世界的能源生产者或使用者主张其财产权利，而这会相当艰难。同理，洛杉矶空气盆地中受到汽车和工业污染物影响的人也很难主张其权利。私人所有的、可强制生效的、可交易的财产权能发挥妙用，但并非万灵药。 Still, even the lack of property rights today does not mean that a useful property rights solution is forever impossible. Property rights tend to evolve as technology, preferences, and prices provide added incentives and new technical options. Early in American history, property rights in cattle seemed impossible to establish and enforce on the Great Plains. But the growing value of such rights led to the use of mounted cowboys to protect herds and, eventually, barbed wire to fence the range. 不过，即便目前缺失相关的财产权，也并不意味着可行的财产权解决方案永远不可能出现。财产权常常会跟着技术、偏好和价格所导致的激励和新技术的增加而发生演变。在美国早期历史上，大平原上似乎根本不可能建立和实施对牛群的财产权。但随着这一权利的价值增加，人们开始利用牛仔骑士保护畜群，最终还用上了带刺铁丝网来围护牧场。 As economists Terry Anderson and Peter J. Hill have shown, the plains lost their status as commons and were privatized. Advances in technology may yet allow the establishment of enforceable rights to schools of whales in the oceans, migratory birds in the air, and—who knows?—even the presence of an atmosphere that clearly does not promote damaging climate change. Such is the hope of free-market environmentalism. 经济学家Terry Anderson和Peter J. Hill已经表明，草原由此失去了公地地位，被私有化了。随着技术的进步，将来某个时候，对于海中的鲸群、空中的候鸟，甚至是（天知道呢）对于一种明显不会造成有害气候变化的气体的存在，我们都可能建立起一种可以强制生效的权利。这正是自由市场环保主义的愿景。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-05-03】 @whigzhou: 乃国医疗管制，简单说就是，1）穷尽一切办法阻止患者掏出的钱落到真正帮助患者的人手里，尽最大可能的让它落进各类中间人——药监局、卫生局、招标办、医院院长、采购科、医药代表……——的腰包；2）穷尽一切办法阻止好医院/好医生赚钱、建立声誉、扩张壮大，从而将病人最大可能的留给骗子和老军医。 @whigzhou: 所以，莆田系和百度当然是管制的受益者。 @whigzhou: 有关医疗广告，转一篇七年前的旧文  

【2016-04-13】 @海德沙龙 《被踢出局的气候学家》 Judith Curry的故事清晰的展示了，气候学术圈不容异己的氛围已恶化到了何种程度，尽管Curry远算不上暖化怀疑派，而且在同行评审期刊上发表过大量论文，但仅仅因为对未来暖化速度的主流估算值有所怀疑，就被戴上了“伪科学”的帽子 @whigzhou: 暖球党之所以如此疯狂，盖因暖球问题是他们迄今找到的唯一一个（在他们看来）无法通过基于分立产权的市场化方案解决的外部性问题（或曰公地悲剧），用他们的话说，地球只有一个，无法为它创建分立产权，唯一可能的救星是政府，而且必须是个普世主义的父爱政府，这么好的题材怎能轻易放弃？ @whigzhou: 其他像土壤空气的化学污染这种外部性问题，由于外部性都是作用于局部的，或至少是有梯度分布的，因而总能通过恰当的产权安排来解决，甚至野生动物也可以将种群产权赋予部落来内化激励，但二氧化碳排放均匀分散于整个大气层，激励确实很难由产权来内化  

【2016-02-26】 @海德沙龙 《仅有慷慨满足不了器官移植需求》 人体各器官的设计寿命看来有着不小差异，当然这差异也可能只是现代生活方式所带来，于是随着移植技术的成熟和寿命不断延长，对器官的需求日益强烈，与此同时，供给却大为滞后，而原因在于，当前伦理/法律体系下，需求无法转变成对器官提供者的激励 …… @海德沙龙: 在本文作者看来，尽管现金激励或更开放的自由交易确实为当前伦理体系所不容，但许多非现金的激励安排是完全可行且在伦理上也容易被公众接受的。 @whigzhou: 我2009年在《器官移植的伦理困境》中也讨论的这个问题，后来还提出了一个具体的措施。 @whigzhou: 其中的伦理问题，我后来又有了些新看法，现在我觉得，对人体器官交易近乎本能的道德反感，是有其道理的，原理和我们对杀人游戏的道德抵制类似，因为现实世界的信息条件不完备的，对于一件被出售的器官，人们很难判定它是否来自凶杀盗取，而后一种情况实在太可怕，共同体值得为杜绝它而走得远一点。 @whigzhou: 这一想法转变发生于4年前有关杀人游戏的讨论，依我看，我们禁止在大街上玩追杀游戏的理由，是因为这种游戏很难和真正的追杀区分开来，若要容忍它，那就相当于放弃了协助自卫的权利，而后者对我们太重要，不能放弃 @whigzhou: 去年对一桩醉奸案的讨论中，也表达了类似看法 @whigzhou: 更一般而言，社会规范都是在特定信息条件下产生的，所以当信息条件已大幅改变时，很多古老法则便不再适宜，可是许多规范过于古老乃至已内化为我们的本能道德口味，一时难以割弃，但是通过为它们披上温情外衣，其实也可绕过。 @whigzhou: 从信息条件出发考虑，大街追杀不可容忍，但是人为构造了较完备信息条件的角斗场拼死格杀，好像就没啥不可以  

Generosity won’t fix our shortage of organs for transplants 慷慨解决不了可移植器官的短缺 作者：Tyler Cowen @ 2015-12-28 译者：龟海海 校对：小册子（＠昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Washington Post，http://www.aei.org/publication/generosity-wont-fix-our-shortage-of-organs-for-transplants/ Each week, In Theory takes on a big idea in the news and explores it from a range of perspectives. This week we’re talking about government compensation for organ donors.  《华盛顿邮报》的“理论”栏目每周都会从新闻中选取一个大胆话题，从不同角度进行探索。本周我们的主题是政府对器官捐献者的补偿。 Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. She is the editor of “When Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney Donors.” Sally Satel 是美国企业研究所常驻学者和耶鲁大学医学院的精神病学讲师，也是《当利他主义不够时：补偿捐肾者的理由》一书的主编。 My interest in the national organ shortage began one steamy afternoon in August 2004. That day, my doctor told me my kidneys were failing. As a physician myself, I knew immediately that I would need to find a replacement organ or else face a shortened life tethered to a dialysis machine. My search was rocky at first, but finally I did get a kidney from a casual friend — now a very dear one. 我对国内器官匮乏的关注始于2004年八月一个闷热的下午。那天我的医生告诉我，我的肾快要不行了。作为一名内科医生，我立刻知道我需要找到替换的器官，否则我将命不长久，而且余生都要栓着透析机。 At the time of my search, there were about 60,000 people on the national waiting list maintained by the United Network for Organ Sharing. Today, a decade later, there are roughly 101,000. Meanwhile, donation rates from both living and deceased donors are effectively flat. The death toll is 12 people per day — individuals who could not survive the years-long wait for an organ. 根据我当时搜索的结果，美国器官共享网络的全国等待名单上大约有6万人。十年过去了，如今上面大约有10万1千人。与此同时，活体和死亡捐献率都走势平平。结果就是每天有12人由于多年得不到新器官而死亡。 Clearly, our current organ transplant policy is a qualified failure. And it is because our current system, by law, mandates altruism as the sole legitimate motive for organ donation. We need to give more healthy young and middle-age people a reason to become living donors. 显而易见，我们现今的器官移植政策是十足的失败。那是因为按照法律，利他主义是器官移植唯一的合法动机。我们需要给健康的年轻人和中年人足够的理由来让他们加入活体器官捐献者的行列。 Tragically, altruism is not enough. The yield from public awareness campaigns, the organ procurement teams that meet with families of the recently deceased and the reimbursement for donors’ expenses has leveled off. Moving to an opt-out system, under which we would harvest people’s organs at death unless they had earlier indicated they didn’t wish to donate them, can do only so much — relatively few people die in ways that leave their organs suitable for transplantation. 不幸的是，利他主义并不够。公众宣传活动，器官采集团队造访最近有亲人去世的家庭，为捐助者报销费用，这些措施的效果已趋于耗竭。即使在捐献者死去时默认可以采集器官（除非他们早先曾表明不愿意捐献），成效也不会太好——大多数人的死亡方式决定了他们的器官不适合移植。 So, to save lives, let’s test incentives. A model reimbursement plan would look like this: Donors would not receive a lump sum of cash; instead, a governmental entity or a designated charity would offer them in-kind rewards, such as a contribution to the donor’s retirement fund; an income tax credit or a tuition voucher; lifetime health insurance; a contribution to a charity of the donor’s choice; or loan forgiveness. 所以，为了救人，我们可以试试激励机制。一个理想的补偿计划应该是这样的：捐献者不会收到一笔现金，但政府部门或者指定的慈善机构会为他们提供非现金奖励，例如：向捐献者的退休基金供款，所得税抵免或者学费代金劵，终生健康保险，向捐献者指定的慈善机构捐款，或者债务豁免。 Meanwhile, the law can impose a waiting period of at least six months before people donate, ensuring that they don’t act impulsively and that they offer fully informed consent. Prospective compensated donors would be carefully screened for physical and emotional health, as all donors are now. These arrangements would filter out financially desperate individuals who might otherwise rush to donate for a large sum of instant cash and later regret it. 与此同时，法律可以规定捐献者在捐献前有至少六个月的冷静期，以确保他们不是冲动行事，而是经过周详考虑才决定同意。和现在所有捐献者一样，有偿捐献者也需要经过仔细筛选以保证身心健康。这些措施可以把那些急着等钱用的人过滤掉，他们会为了那笔钱而冲去捐献，但事后追悔莫及。 The donors’ kidneys would be distributed to people on the waiting list, according to the rules now in place. (People who wanted to donate a kidney to a specific person — say, a father to a son — would still be able to, alongside this system.) Finally, all rewarded donors would be guaranteed follow-up medical care for any complications, which is not ensured now. 根据现行规则，捐出来的肾将分配给那份等待名单上的人。（如果有人想把肾捐献给指定的人，例如，父亲捐给儿子，也同时可以做到。）最后，所有有偿捐献者都将得到术后并发症的跟踪治疗，这个规定是现在没有的。 The good news is that the general notion of incentivizing donations is gaining traction. A 2009 poll of the membership of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons revealed that 80 percent supported or were neutral toward the provision of tax credits for donors. In 2014, the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons published the results of a workshop in which the societies expressed approval of testing third-party, in-kind incentives. A few weeks ago, the American Medical Association passed a resolution in favor of testing the effect of incentives on living and deceased donation. (A reward for deceased donation could take the form of a funeral subsidy or a contribution to the estate of the deceased.) 好消息是，为捐献提供激励的观念正日益赢得关注。2009年一项针对美国器官移植外科医生协会的调查显示，80％的协会成员对向捐助者提供税收抵免持赞成或中立态度。2014年，美国器官移植协会（AST）和美国器官移植外科医生协会公布了他们一个研讨会的结果，在该研讨会上，两个协会对试行来自第三方的非现金奖励表示支持。几周前，全美医疗协会（AMA）通过决议，支持测试为活体和死后器官捐献提供激励的效果。（死后捐赠的奖励，可以葬礼补贴或并入死者遗产的方式实现。） The objections I heard years ago seem to be wearing thin. Take the objection that rewarding donors “commodifies the body.” We already commodify the body, speaking strictly, every time there is a transplant: The doctors get paid to manipulate the body. So does the hospital and the agency that obtains and transports the organ. Why would we now object to enriching the donor — the sole individual in this entire scenario who gives the precious item in question and assumes all the risk? 多年前我所听到的反对声音，如今似乎越来越少了。例如，有人反对说奖励捐献者是“人体商品化”。其实，严格来说我们早就将人体商品化了，每一次移植手术，医生们都是拿着薪水在操纵着人体。那些获得和运输器官的医院和中介机构亦是如此。那我们现在为什么要反对给捐献者报酬呢？在整件事里面，捐献者才是唯一一个提供宝贵器官和承担所有风险的人。 At the heart of the “commodification” claim is really the concern that donors will not be treated with dignity. But dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions in their own best interest, protect their health and express gratitude for their sacrifice. Material gain, per se, is not inconsistent with this. The true indignity is to stand by smugly while thousands of people die each year for want of an organ. 诟病“人体商品化”，其核心实际是担心捐献者得不到有尊严的对待。但我们尊重他们有为自己做出最有利决定的能力，保证他们的健康，对他们的牺牲表示感激，这些就保证了尊严。物质上的获益，实质上与此并不矛盾。真正不光彩的，是眼见每年数以千计的人在等待器官中死去，却还站在一旁洋洋自得。 Some worry that that rewarded donation will attract only low-income people. This is possible, though only a trial project can provide the answer. But even if this turns out to be the case, why doubt the capacity of low-income people to make decisions in their own interest? From the standpoint of the recipient, it is low-income individuals who stand to benefit the most, as they are disproportionately represented among those waiting for a kidney. 有人担心奖励捐献只会吸引低收入人群。这是有可能的，但只有通过试验计划才可以得到答案。但即便事实就是如此，我们又为什么要去怀疑低收入人群基于自身利益作决定的能力呢？从器官接收者的角度看，受益最大的正是低收入人群，因为他们在等待新肾的名单上比例偏高。 Yet regardless of who ends up donating, any plan must ensure that donors’ decisions are thoroughly informed, their health is protected and they are amply rewarded. As the organ waiting list grows, the need to test incentives becomes stronger and stronger. 然而，无论谁来捐献，任何一个计划都必须确保捐献者在做决定前得到充分的信息，他们将得到健康保障和足够的奖励。由于器官等待名单日益增长，试行“激励计划”也变得越来越迫切。 We need to liberate patients from the tyranny of “the gift.” It’s glorious when you are the recipient, as I know better than most, but the penalty for being unlucky should not be premature death. Hollow moralizing from critics in the face of so much needless suffering must be replaced by sensitive and pragmatic policy. 我们需要将病患从“礼物”观念的思想束缚中解放出来。能得到器官捐赠当然非常美好，对此我比绝大多数的人都深有体会，但运气不好的病人也不应该就这样英年早逝。在如此众多不必要的痛苦折磨面前，批评者空洞的道德说教，必须被通情达理且切实可行的政策所取代。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Market for Human Hair 人发市场 作者：Alex Mayyasi @ 2015-12-02 译者：Horace Rae 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Priceonomics，http://priceonomics.com/the-market-for-human-hair/ The Venkateswara Temple in Tirumala, India, had a problem. 印度Tirumala的Venkateswara寺有了个麻烦。 Thirty to forty million pilgrims visit the temple each year, and in a gesture of humility and sacrifice, 10% to 25% of them, men and women both, have their heads shaven. Every day, the Venkateswara Temple staff fills giant vats with human hair, and for a long time, its staff burned thousands of pounds of hair—a noxious process that produces toxic gases like ammonia and was eventually banned by the Indian government in the 1990s. 每年有三千到四千万名朝圣者造访这间寺院。为了表示谦恭与牺牲，他们中10%－25%的人会剪掉自己的头发，其中男女皆有。每天，Venkateswara寺的工作人员要把头发塞进大桶里。很长一段时间，工作人员会把上万磅头发烧掉，这一行为十分有害，会产生氨气等有毒气体。1990年代，这种行为最终被印度政府禁止。 By then, however, they had discovered a new way to get rid of the hair: sell it for millions. 不过，那时候他们已经找到了一种解决头发问题的新方法：把它们卖掉，大赚一笔。 When fashion companies make wigs—and when stylists tape or weave hair extensions into customers’ hair in salons—they want to use real human hair. To get it, they rely on places like the Venkateswara Temple, which sells its hair in annual auctions. In 2014, fashion companies bid almost $12 million for what temple employees call “black gold.” 时装公司生产假发时，或者发廊的造型师给顾客接假发时，都想使用真正的人发。为了获得人发，他们依赖类似Venkateswara寺这样的地方。Venkateswara寺会在年度拍卖中出售头发。2014年，时装公司出价将近1200万美元，购买这种被寺院员工叫做“黑金”的东西。 The Tirumala Temple auction is part of a multi-billion dollar market for human hair—a global endeavor that includes collecting long locks to make fashionable hairpieces and its more industrial counterpart of turning hair into fertilizers, stuffing for clothes, and even amino acids used in pizza dough. Tirumala的寺院拍卖只是数十亿美元规模的人发市场的一部分。这一全球性行当包括收集长发以制作时髦假发，还包括更加工业化的部分：把头发制成化肥、衣服填充物，甚至做成披萨面团制作中用到的氨基酸。 Nearly everyone has hair they discard without a thought. Yet it can also be one of the world’s most precious resources, and businesses can’t get enough of it. 几乎所有人都会想也不想地扔掉头发。但是，同时，它也能成为世界上最宝贵的资源，许多公司对头发的需求总是多多益善。 From Tirumala to the Salon 从Tirumala到发廊 A quality wig made of human hair sells for thousands of dollars in the United States, and hair extensions made of real hair can sell for several hundred or thousand dollars. But it takes a lot of work to turn the hair of Venkateswara pilgrims into a luxury product. 在美国，一顶使用人发制作的优质假发可以卖到数千美元，人发制作的接发材料也可以卖到数百甚至上千美元。但是，要把Venkateswara朝圣者们的头发变成昂贵的商品，有很多事情需要做。 When companies buy hair from the temple for as much as $700 per pound, it contains sweat, blood, and lice. The temple warehouses reek from mildew and fungus. Investigative journalist Scott Carney visited Tirumala and called the hair a “foul-smelling heap.” As 600 barbers each shave a head every 5 minutes, they leave bloody scalps and hair balls littering the floor. 当厂商以每磅700美元的价格从寺院买来头发时，头发中还有汗水、血块和虱子。寺院的仓库散发着霉味。调查记者Scott Carney造访Tirumala时，把那里的头发形容为“一大堆恶臭”。大约600名理发师，每位理发师每隔5分钟剃光一个头，血淋淋的头皮和发球就会杂乱地铺在地上。 It takes someone in the industry to recognize why the hair is so valuable. Only long women’s hair is sold at auction—the temple sells men’s hair at a pittance for industrial uses—and since many pilgrims come from humble, rural towns, they have not used shampoos or styled and treated their hair in ways that damage it. 只有业内人士才能认识到为什么头发如此宝贵。只有女性的长发能在拍卖中出售——而男性头发则被寺院低价出售，用作工业用途。因为许多朝圣者来自偏远贫穷的村庄，他们没有用过洗发水，也没有做过发型，而且他们对付头发的方式对它造成过损伤。 To transform the best (longest) hair from trash into treasure, teams of workers untangle the hair, sort it by length, pick out lice and other particles, wash and dry it, and dye it a variety of colors. Companies then either ship the hair out to salons where stylists will sew, tape, or bond the extensions into customers’ hair, or sew the hair into wigs. 为让最优质（最长）的头发变废为宝，需要许多工人团队把头发理顺，按长度分类，把虱子和其他东西挑出来，之后把头发洗净并干燥，然后把它们染成不同的颜色。厂商要么把这些头发送到发廊，发廊的造型师会把头发编织、粘贴或者嫁接在顾客的头发上；要么把它们编织成假发。 The process is incredibly labor intensive. “To make a high-end wig,” says Mo Hefnawy of Lori’s Wigsite, one of many retailers of wigs made by Indian and Chinese manufacturers, “someone sat there with a needle and sewed a few hairs at a time. It takes 3 or 4 days.” 这一过程需要大量劳动力。中国或印度所产假发的众多经销商之一，Lori’s Wigsite的Mo Hefnawy说：“为了生产出一顶优质假发，需要有人坐着，用缝针一次编织几根头发。这一过程需要3天到4天。” Retailers like Lori’s Wigsite sell wigs made of fake, synthetic hair, and they cost $250 where a human hair wig would cost $1,500. But synthetic wigs don’t last as long, can’t be styled, and look and feel less natural. Most people want wigs made of real hair, Hefnawy says, but Lori’s sells more synthetic wigs than human hair wigs because they are more affordable. 类似Lori’s Wigsite这样的经销商也出售人工合成毛发制作的假发，这种假发的价格是250美元，但是真发制成的假发要1500美元。但是合成假发很快就会损坏，也不能做造型，看起来摸起来也没有那么自然。Hefnawy说，大部分人都想要真发制成的假发，但是Lori’s出售的合成假发比人发假发多，因为前者更加便宜。 The majority of Lori’s customers suffer hair loss from chemotherapy or conditions like alopecia. A minority are religious women who buy wigs as an alternative to modestly hiding their hair, and some older men and women buy wigs to cover thinning hair. Lori’s 的顾客大多是因化疗或脱发症而脱发的人，一小部分女性宗教信徒购买假发是为了隐藏起自己的头发以示谦恭，还有一些老年人购买假发来遮盖自己日益稀薄的头发。 For the moment, though, hair extensions are increasingly popular among young women who want to quickly change their hairstyle or buy the long, thick hair celebrated in shampoo commercials. Among other celebrities, Victoria Beckham, Beyonce, and Kylie Jenner of Kardashian fame are known for wearing extensions. 但是现在，一些年轻女性想要迅速改变发型，或是想要洗发水广告中那样的浓密飘逸的长发，所以接发在她们中间非常流行。明星中间，像Victoria Beckham， Beyonce以及Kardashian家的Kylie Jenner，都因接发而闻名。 Prices have increased with popularity. In several burglaries of hair salons, thieves ignored cash registers and went straight for hair extensions worth tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. 随着接发流行开来，其价格也水涨船高。在一些针对发廊的盗窃案中，窃贼们对收款机视而不见，径直去寻找接发用的假发，其价值常高达数万甚至数十万美元。 When nonprofits like Locks of Love ask people to donate their hair (to make hairpieces for children suffering from hair loss), they are not asking because long hair is hard to find. The human hair market is well established, and anyone can go online and instantly order hair by the pound. 当“一缕关爱”（Locks of Love）这样的非营利性组织号召人们捐出头发（用来给脱发的孩子制作假发）时，不是因为长发难以得到。人发市场已经相当成熟，所有人都可以上网，即刻预订头发，按磅计价。 Locks of Love asks for donations because hair is so expensive that many patients can’t afford thousand dollar wigs. “一缕关爱”号召人们捐头发，是因为头发过于昂贵，许多患者买不起价值数千美元的假发。 The Secret Life of Hair 头发的隐秘故事 The market for human hair has always been a mechanism for getting hair from people in poor areas to those who need or want it in wealthier ones. 人发市场向来是个从贫穷地区的人手中获取头发，然后把头发卖给富裕地区有需要的人的机制。 History is full of examples of human hair being treated as a valuable commodity. Archeologists have discovered human hair wigs held together with resin and beeswax in Ancient Egyptian tombs. Upper class men in 18th century Europe wore long periwigs made of human or horse hair, and thieves commonly worked in teams to steal and resell them. An observer of an annual “hair harvest” in a poor Italian village in the 19th century described seeing girls “sheared, one after the other, like sheep.” Their hair went to Parisian markets that sold 200,000 pounds of human hair each year. 历史上，人发成为昂贵商品的例子俯拾皆是。考古学家们已经在古埃及的墓穴中发现了用树脂和蜂蜡粘合的人发假发。十八世纪，欧洲上流社会的男性会佩戴人发或是马鬃制作的假发。当时的盗贼常常会组团盗窃、转卖假发。十九世纪，在一个贫穷的意大利村庄，有人曾见证了一年一次“头发收割”，他写道，自己看见女孩们“一个接一个地剃头，就像剪羊毛一样”。她们的头发会被出售到巴黎市场，那里每年有20万磅人发售出。 The difference today is that the market has changed with globalization. Hair does not move from provincial Europe to capital cities; it moves from poor countries to wealthy ones. The vast majority of hair and hair products come from India and China and are sold in the United States and Europe. 与过去相比，现在的不同是，人发市场已经因全球化而改变。头发不再从欧洲的乡下被运往首都，而是从贫穷国家运往富裕国家。绝大多数头发与发制品来自印度和中国，并被出售到美国和欧洲。 In the hair industry, no one bothers to equally celebrate each and every person’s hair. For them, hair is a product, and the way they talk about hair reflects economic and social realities—and made us squirm. 在人发产业中，没人会费心去平等的称颂每个人的头发。对他们来说，头发就是物品，他们谈论头发的方式反映了经济和社会的现实——且令我们不安。 “Indian hair is best,” retailers and manufacturers told us without hesitation. They cite the strength of Indian hair and how plentiful it is thanks to places like the Venkateswara Temple. But its most valuable attribute is that it closely resembles caucasian hair. “Oriental hair is used,” one industry expert bluntly added, “because there is a lot of it.” “印度人的头发最好，”经销商和生产厂家毫不犹豫地告诉我们。他们谈论印度头发的强韧度，以及拜Venkateswara寺这种地方所赐的巨大供应量。但是它最具价值的因素是它和白人头发的相似性。“我们使用东方人的头发，”行内专家坦白道，“因为东方人的头发供应量很大。” Hair flows from poor countries to rich countries, but when a woman with blond hair is willing to sell her hair, the market pays incredibly well. Destitute Russian women regularly sell their blond hair for fifty to several hundred dollars. Mo Hefnawy says he knows a young woman whom wig makers flew out from Indiana and paid $1,500 for her hair, which they made into an $8,000 wig. 头发从贫穷国家流入富裕国家，但是当金发女人愿意卖出她的头发，市场给出的价格特别慷慨。贫穷的俄罗斯女人定期卖掉自己的金发，能卖到五十美元甚至上百美元。Mo Hefnawy说他认识一个年轻女人，假发制造商为了她的头发从印第安纳州远道飞来，付给她1500美元，用她的头发制作的假发售价8000美元。 Africa also bucks global trends: despite the prevalence of poverty in many countries, Africa is an importer of hair. Elaborate wigs may no longer separate royalty from commoners, but hair has not lost its political and economic relevance. 非洲则逆全球趋势而行。尽管非洲的大部分国家都十分贫穷，但非洲是头发进口地。精致的假发可能不再能区分王室与平民，但是头发还没有丧失其政治和经济意义。 Projects like My Nappy Roots and Good Hair have explored the efforts that black people, especially women, go through to style their hair, and in particularly the time and expense of straightening their curly hair—often with the help of hair extensions. Responding to this question of why “women adopt a concept of ‘beauty’ that is not based on the natural characteristics of their hair,” Al Sharpton says in Good Hair, “We wear our economic oppression on our heads." 诸如 My Nappy Roots和Good Hair之类的项目发现，黑人，尤其是女性，会费尽心力给头发做造型，尤其是他们会费时费财地去把他们的卷发拉直——这一过程经常需要接发。在回答“为什么女性不把她们与生俱来的头发特征当作美的标准”这一问题时，Al Sharpto在Good Hair中说：“我们头上戴的是经济压迫。” As a result, hair extensions and products are popular among African Americans and wealthy Africans, but hair traders have little interest in black hair. 因此，接发和假发产品在非裔美国人和富裕的非洲人之间非常流行，但是，头发经销商对黑人头发的兴趣有限。 Collecting Hair at Scale 规模化采集 If you ask people in the industry where they get human hair, they talk about temples in China and India like the Venkateswara Temple. 如果你询问业内人士他们的原料来自何处，他们会谈到中国和印度的寺庙，比如Venkateswara寺。 It’s no surprise they do; collecting hair from pilgrims is an elegant solution to manufacturers’ need for human hair. Shaving one’s head is a traditional, voluntary practice that avoids the exploitive undertones of desperate women selling their hair. Most pilgrims don’t know that the temple sells their hair. But we have not seen reports of religious leaders pocketing millions. The temple administrators have used the proceeds on gold wall panelling for the temple, but they say they primarily spend the money on charitable endeavors like feeding the needy and running hospitals. 这么做并不令人惊讶；从信徒那里收集头发是满足生产厂家头发需求的完美方案。剃发是一种有历史渊源而且自愿的行为，这就避免了走投无路的女性忍痛卖发的剥削寓意。大部分朝圣者不知道寺院卖掉了他们的头发。尽管如此，我们并未听说寺院管理者因此腰缠万贯。他们用这笔钱给寺院的墙板镀金，但他们声称这笔钱优先用于慈善用途，比如施粥行善或资助医院。 Yet only a minority of hair comes from temples. In India, a regional Minister for Textiles and Commerce told The Guardian, “all the Indian temples together contribute only 20 out of every 100 locks of premium hair sold abroad.” The Minister added, “Where the rest comes from, we have no idea.” Retailers and wholesale providers we spoke to voiced similar uncertainty. 但是只有一小部分头发来自寺庙。在印度，某地方的纺织和商业部部长告诉《卫报》，“印度所有寺庙出售的头发只占出口优质头发的20%。”他补充道：“剩下的头发是哪里来的，我们就不知道了。”与我们交谈过的零售商以及批发商同样语焉不详。 We do know that collecting hair is a large, decentralized undertaking that employs tens of thousands of people in India alone. Barber shops and salons collect and sell hair—both long hair sold to fashion companies and short hair sold cheaply to be used as stuffing, fertilizer, or, once broken down into component chemicals, in industrial uses ranging from food to pharmaceuticals. Waste pickers scrounge hair from trash and dumpsters. Hair traders visit villages—in a slum outside Chennai, a bell announces a trader’s arrival—to buy hair with either cash or trinkets and hair accessories. 我们知道，收集头发是一个巨大的去中心化产业，仅在印度就有数万人参与。理发店和发廊收集并出售头发，长发卖给时装公司，短发则被低价出售，用来制作填充物、化肥，或者被分解成化学物质，制作从食物到药品制剂的各种产品。垃圾分拣员在垃圾堆中寻找头发。头发收购人们寻访村庄——在Chennai周边的一个贫民区，铃声宣告着他们的到来——用现金或是小装饰品以及发饰购买头发。 The traders may buy hair that women have collected from combs and brushes, or the scenes may resemble the shearing of 19th century Italian villagers. No one can say exactly how often, but hair is not always sold willingly. Press has reported on husbands who receive $10 for their wives’ hair. One Indian woman told The Guardian, “I was held down by a gang of men who hacked at my hair… the police don't care, they will do nothing to protect women.” In Russia, prison wardens have admitted to forcibly cutting female inmates’ hair in order to sell it. 收购人买到的头发可能是妇女们从梳子或是刷子上收集来的，也有可能出现像十九世纪意大利村庄中一样的剃发场景。没人知道剃发的准确频率，但是，出售头发并不总是自愿的。媒体曾经报道过丈夫出售妻子的头发获得十美元报酬的事情。一个印度女人告诉《卫报》：“我被一群男人按倒在地，他们抢走了我的头发……警察漠不关心，他们不做任何保护妇女的事。”在俄罗斯，有狱卒承认曾经强迫女性犯人剃发，然后卖掉。 Whether it’s people scrounging hair from dumpsters or men forcing women to give up their hair, the hair business can be a dirty one. 不论是在垃圾桶里搜捡头发，还是男性强迫女性出售头发，头发行业有时十分肮脏。

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So far, the hair industry has not had its ethically-sourced moment. 到目前为止，人发行业还没有遭遇其道德溯源时刻。 American customers are typically unconcerned about the origins of extensions, the founder of a hair extensions trade group told the New York Times, other than to ask if they are hygienic. For retailers and manufacturers, the demand for hair makes it a financial necessity not to ask too many questions. 一位假发销售公司的创始人告诉《纽约时报》，美国顾客很少关心假发的来源，他们只在乎假发是不是卫生。对于零售商和制造商来说，在假发需求的驱使下，为了赚钱，最好还是不要问太多问题。 "The hair business is unlike any other," the owner of an Indian hair-exporting business told journalist Scott Carney. "In any other business, buying a commodity is easy; it's the selling it to retailers that is difficult. Here it's all reversed. It's simple to sell hair, just difficult to buy it." “人发产业跟其他产业都有所不同，”某印度头发出口企业的业主告诉记者Scott Carney说，“在其他行业中，商品买进很容易，将它卖给零售商就很难。但人发行业是颠倒过来的。头发卖出去很容易，买进来很难。” Better synthetic hair is coming. As China and India’s economic growth has reduced poverty, hair donors have been harder to find, which has increased prices and pushed companies to research alternatives. In the last 5 years, Mo Hefnawy of Lori’s Wigsite tells us, progress has been made on making synthetic wigs thicker and more heat-resistant. “I’d give it a few more years and they will have it,” he says. 更好的合成头发即将面世。随着中国和印度经济的增长，贫困有所减少，卖头发的人已经比以前更难找到了，这抬高了价格，促使企业研究替代方案。Lori’ Wigsite的Mo Hefnawy告诉我们，过去5年，在制造更浓密、更耐热的合成假发方面已有所进步。他说，“我想再过几年，他们会成功的。” Until then, though, a resource everyone has growing on the top of their head will remain a secretively lucrative commodity. 不过，在此之前，这种每个人头顶上都在生长的资源，仍将是一种鲜为人知的厚利商品。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-12-10】 @baidu冷兵器吧 依靠以自豪感为目的的历史教育和许多义和团知识分子们，总是强调老欧洲粪便垃圾满地污水横流，街道如何狭窄等等，以此制造一种印象——虽然近现代我们是不行了，可是我们祖宗可比西方祖宗阔的多啦，不用去学什么鸟西方！但，中国真能嘲笑古代欧洲脏乱差吗？ http://t.cn/RUsEyYH 中国能嘲笑古代欧洲脏乱差吗？ @战争史研究WHS:汉长安城至北周时“水皆咸卤,不甚宜人”，这个水指的是地下水。八百年间城市粪尿渗入地表，影响地下水质。所以隋朝才放弃汉长安城，在其南边营建大兴城 @whigzhou: 对佛山、汉口等商业城市和都城做个比较研究可能会有点意思，我毫无根据的猜，当行会在城市管理中起较大作用时，卫生条件会更好 @whigzhou: 另外，城市面积越大，屎尿处理越难，因为古代运输条件下，屎尿的市场价格随距离递减得极快，当有效供应半径内农民对屎尿的需求量超出城市生产量时，屎尿收购价格便是正的，无需额外激励，城镇和小城市大概可以满足这一条件，而上百万人的大都市就不好说了。 @whigzhou: 所以，同等人口规模下，居住密度越高，屎尿处理越容易，这可能和一般人都直觉相反  

The Myth of Free-Trade Britain 自由贸易英国的神话 作者：John V.C. Nye @ 2003-3-03 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Library of Economics and Liberty，http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Nyefreetrade.html In the two and a half centuries since Adam Smith first articulated the basic case for free trade, no event has been more significant than the British conversion to open markets in the nineteenth century. In the fable that is now conventional wisdom, nineteenth century Britain turned its back on protection and chose to open its markets to the world. 在亚当·斯密首次清晰阐述了自由贸易基本原理后的两个半世纪里，没有比十九世纪英国转为开放市场更为重要的事件了。在如今已成传统智慧的寓言里，十九世纪的英国放弃了市场保护政策，转而选择向世界开放其市场。 A reform-minded British leadership, preaching the new gospel of free trade pushed their European confreres to open up their own markets, eventually ushering in an age of expansive commerce the likes of which the world had never seen—a precursor of late twentieth century globalization that was in many ways more open than anything before or since. 富有改革思想的英国领导人鼓吹自由贸易的新福音，推动了欧洲同仁们开放市场，最终开启了全世界前所未见的商业扩张时代——这是二十世纪晚期全球化的发端，许多方面比此前此后任何时期都要更加开放。 Yet this story has one big flaw: it's inconsistent with the facts. 然而这个故事有个巨大的缺陷：与事实不符。 As the story is usually told, British free trade came in the 1840s after a bitter political struggle to repeal the Corn Laws—a name given to a series of agricultural tariffs and quotas designed to keep farm prices high. This was quickly followed by rapid and dramatic reductions in duties on hundreds of imports. By the 1850s, all but a handful of commodities were admitted to Britain free of all duties. 这故事常说，在寻求废除《谷物法》——一系列旨在维持农产品高价的农业关税和配额政策的总称——的艰苦政治斗争后，英国的自由贸易在1840年代来临了。紧接着便是几百种进口物关税的迅速急剧减少。到1850年代，除少数例外，几乎所有商品都获准完全免税进入英国。 Sounds good, until you look closely at what products remained subject to high duties: those handful of items were the most contentious and some of the most highly taxed items that historically had been at the core of the mercantile debate in British history. In previous centuries they formed a large and significant fraction of British trade. 这听起来很好，但待你看清关税仍然高启的产品到底是什么之后，就不会这么想了：那少数商品是英国历史上最具争议的，而且属于赋税负担最高的商品之列，它们一直都处于商业争论的核心。在那之前的几个世纪里，这些商品构成了英国贸易的重要部分。 Free trade should mean just that: free trade, with all goods admitted without duties, quotas, or restrictions. That was not British policy. They removed most tariffs but mostly on items in which they had a comparative advantage. In other words, they mostly removed tariffs on items for which Britain had little to fear in terms of competition or which were of trivial importance in overall trade. 自由贸易的内涵应该是：所有商品无关税、无限额、无限制的自由贸易。这可不是英国的政策。他们取消了大部分关税，但大部分都在他们有比较优势的产品上。换句话说，英国人主要取消了他们不惧任何竞争的产品的关税，或者在整体贸易中无足轻重的产品的关税。 Britain in the early 1800s had just passed through the Industrial Revolution and was the world's leading producer of cotton textiles and other industrial products. It took little courage to lower tariffs on British manufactures. It would be like Japan promoting free trade in the 1980s by arguing for lower tariffs on compact cars imported from America. Since Japan already made some of the world's best and most economical small cars, such a policy would have had very limited economic impact. Japan's lowering trade barriers in agriculture would have been substantially more important and would have run up against enormous political resistance. 十九世纪早期的英国刚经历工业革命，是棉纺织品和其他工业产品的世界领先生产者。降低英国制造品的关税并不需要多大勇气。这就像1980年代的日本，通过主张降低从美国进口的紧凑型汽车的关税来促进自由贸易。因为日本已经制造出世界上最好、最经济的小型汽车，这样的政策对经济的冲击非常有限。如果日本降低农业方面的贸易壁垒，其重要性会大大加强，也会遇到极大的政治阻力。 Nineteenth-century Britain had no comparative advantage in agricultural and foodstuffs. That is why the Corn Laws were initially so controversial. Consumers had a lot to gain from the state's permitting the import of grain, because the British were not the cheapest producers of grain, while British farmers had much to lose. Unfortunately, the British did little to modify the tariffs on other contentious items, goods which had made for the commercial equivalent of war. Of these goods, the most important and the most troublesome was wine. 十九世纪的英国在农业和食品上没有比较优势。这就是为何《谷物法》从一开始就备受争议。英国的消费者能从国家允许进口粮食中受益良多，因为英国人生产的粮食并不是最便宜的，而同时，英国农民则损失惨重。遗憾的是，英国人对其他有争议商品的关税少有改动，这些商品曾导致商战。在这些商品中，最重要且最棘手的就是葡萄酒。 But how important is wine? To answer that we need to go back to the 1600s. Britain in the mid-seventeenth century was a prodigious importer of wine, mostly French. 但是葡萄酒有多重要呢？回答这个问题我们要追溯到十七世纪。十七世纪中期的英国是葡萄酒的重要进口国，主要是法国葡萄酒。 So much so, in fact, that her trade balance was in the red, mostly because of trade with France and mostly because of French wine, spirits and a number of luxury goods. Attempts to limit these imports by restricting trade had mostly failed. Tariffs were levied but never so high as to reduce the imports drastically. But then came the wars. 如此这般，事实上，英国的贸易收支是呈赤字的，主要是源于跟法国的贸易，也就是法国葡萄酒、烈酒和诸多奢侈品导致的。通过限制贸易来减少这些商品进口的企图都失败了。关税一直在征收，但是从未高到能明显减少进口的程度。但是接着战争开始了。 Two major conflicts spanning a quarter century kept French wine—indeed, all French imports—out of the British market from 1689 to 1713. The Nine Years' War and the War of Spanish Succession led to hostilities between Britain and France and a complete breakdown in trade for this quarter century. 绵延1/4世纪的两场大型冲突让法国葡萄酒——实际上，所有的法国进口产品——在1689年到1713年间退出了英国市场。九年战争和西班牙王位继承战争导致了英法之间的敌对和长达1/4世纪的彻底贸易中断。 During this grape-challenged period, three interest groups derived enormous benefit from the embargo on France—the British brewing industry, British distillers (gin, etc.) and British interests in foreign producers of alcohol—most notably the shippers of Portuguese wine. Prior to the late 1600s, the British drank plenty of wine, mostly French, a little Spanish, but virtually nothing from Portugal. The wars of 1689-1713 gave the Portuguese allies the opportunity of ten lifetimes. 在这葡萄酒缺乏的时期，三个利益集团从对法禁运中获得巨额利益——英国发酵酒工业、英国蒸馏酒商（杜松子酒等）、外国酒商中的英国利益集团——最明显的就是葡萄牙葡萄酒的运货商。在十七世纪晚期之前，英国人饮葡萄酒颇多，大部分是法国进口的，加上一点西班牙进口的，但是几乎没有葡萄牙进口的。1689-1713年的战争让葡萄牙盟友获得了千载难逢的良机。 Beginning in 1703 a treaty was signed granting Portugal access to British markets for their wines—generally of a much lower quality than those of France, and often needing to be fortified with brandy or spirits in order to keep from going bad. The Methuen Treaty (as it was known) promised that Portuguese tariffs would always be at least a third lower than those of other nations, most especially France. 从1703年开始，一个允许葡萄牙人的葡萄酒进入英国市场的条约就签订了——这些葡萄酒质量普遍不及法国葡萄酒，并且经常需要添加白兰地或者烈酒来防止其变质。这个被称为《梅图恩条约》的协定，承诺葡萄牙人的关税会一直比其他国家低至少1/3，尤其是法国。 Of course, most of the Portuguese wine trade was dominated by British ships, merchants, and even vintners working in Iberia. The end of hostilities between Britain and France was seen as a grave threat to all these British interests, and vigorous lobbying by brewers, distillers, and the Anglo-Portuguese merchants stopped attempts to return to the period of open trade with the French. A bill to revive trade on prewar conditions between Britain and France was defeated in Parliament. 当然，大多数葡萄牙葡萄酒贸易都被英国船只、英国商人乃至在伊比利亚半岛的英国酿酒商所控制。英法之间敌对状态的结束被视为是对所有这些英国利益集团的巨大威胁，啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和英葡商人的大力游说阻止了重回英法开放贸易时代的企图。一项旨在恢复英法战前贸易状态的提案在议会被否决。 Even worse, tariffs were raised even higher throughout the eighteenth century. The result was that French exports of wine to Britain in the 1700s fell to less than 5% of the levels (measured by volume) that had prevailed in the 1600s. A twenty-fold decrease! The high taxes kept out all but the finest French products. 更糟的是，整个十八世纪的关税甚至更高了。结果就是十八世纪法国出口到英国的葡萄酒降到不足之前十七世纪水平的5%（以体积计）。减少了二十倍！高关税驱逐了所有法国产品，除了最好的那些。 Indeed, the French were kept out of the British market for most of the period of the Industrial Revolution, when the middle classes emerged and middle class tastes developed. Only the rich had access to the very finest clarets of Bordeaux. Cheap wine was simply not worth importing. And the British brewers, distillers, and merchant shippers never had it better. One historian has remarked that absent war and protection, the Gin Age1 might never have come into existence. 事实上，在工业革命的大多数时期，当中产阶级出现并且中产品味得到发展时，法国产品都是被挡在英国市场之外的。只有富人才能找到最好的波尔多红葡萄酒。便宜的葡萄酒根本不值得进口。英国啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和运货商从未提高这些劣质葡萄酒的品质。一位历史学家曾说，若没有战争和保护政策，杜松子酒时代（脚注1）可能根本就不会出现。 These assorted tariffs on wine and other consumables—which Adam Smith had condemned for their inefficiency in the eighteenth century—remained at the core of British protection in the nineteenth, when trade was supposedly made free. Though claiming to have moved to open markets, the British hung on to tariffs that were of long standing, and that moreover, prevented much progress from being made in bilateral treaty negotiations. France was not about to sign a bilateral commercial treaty if Britain was unwilling to compromise on wine and spirits. 十九世纪，在这个人们认为贸易已变得自由的时期，这一系列对葡萄酒和其他消费品的关税——亚当·斯密在十八世纪就谴责过其低效——仍然是英国保护政策的核心。虽然声称已转变为开放市场，英国人还是坚持长期存在的关税，而且此举还阻止了双边条约谈判的进展。如果英国在葡萄酒和烈酒上不愿意妥协，法国就不会签署双边商务协定。 Figure 1. Average Tariffs in the U.K. and France, 1820–1913 图1.英国和法国的平均关税，1820-1913 [From: A. Imlah, 1958 Economic Elements of the PaxBritannica, New York; and M. Levy-Leboyerand F. Bourguignon, 1985L'Economie Francaise au XIXesiecle,Paris.] [来源：A. Imlah，1958，“不列颠治世”中的经济元素，纽约；M. Levy-Leboyer和F. Bourguignon，1985，十九世纪的法国经济，巴黎] Britain preached the gospel of free trade and France was cast in the role of the sinner, but there was little truth in this stereotype. France did have more protected products than England did but the average level of French tariffs (measured as total value of duties divided by total value of imports, cf. Figure 1) was actuallylower than in Britain for three-quarters of the nineteenth century.2 In other words, tariffs had a smaller impact on French trade than British duties had on Britain's trade. 英国是自由贸易新福音的布道者，而法国则被铸为罪人的角色，但是这种刻板偏见里并没有多少事实。法国确实比英格兰有更多的受保护产品，但是法国关税的平均水平（以关税总值除以进口总值衡量，如图1）在十九世纪3/4的时间里实际上比英国要低（脚注2）。换句话说，关税对法国贸易的影响要比英国关税对于英国贸易的影响小。【编注：这一比较方法存在严重问题：它体现不出那些因税率过高乃至无利可图的贸易，或者被非关税壁垒禁止了的贸易，因而无法准确反映贸易自由度，比如在极端情况下，某国以零关税开放一项小规模贸易，同时禁止其他所有贸易，此时该指标为零，但贸易显然极度不自由，所以它必须结合其他指标才有意义。不过，它确实揭示了当时英国的关税率是非常高的。】 The French, while eschewing free trade, and openly rejecting the Anglo doctrine of open markets, actually succeeded in making their trade more liberal and more open than that of the more vocal British. The master of this was Napoleon III—Bonaparte's nephew—who throughout the 1850s promoted the most radical liberalizing reforms of the French economy, all the while insisting that France was only interested in moderate reform. 法国人虽然避开自由贸易并且公开拒绝英国人的开放市场学说，但是它实际上却成功使其贸易比鼓噪发声的英国人更加自由和开放。这过程的主导是拿破仑三世——波拿巴的侄子——他在整个1850年代都在推动对法国经济最激进的自由化改革，却一直坚称法国只对温和改革有兴趣。 Indeed, it was not British unilateral tariff reduction that moved the world to freer trade. Despite the belief that is still common today that British exhortation opened the doors to European free trade in the late 19th century, it was the 1860 Treaty of Commerce, promoted by the Napoleon III and concluded between Britain and France, that really ushered in the age of nineteenth century "globalization". British demands for unilateral tariff reduction usually fell on deaf ears. 事实上，并不是英国的单方面关税削减使得世界贸易更加自由。尽管认为十九世纪末英国的呼吁打开了欧洲自由贸易之门的观点现在仍很普遍，但其实是1860年《商贸条约》才真正开启了十九世纪的“全球化”时代，该条约由拿破仑三世推动，在英法之间缔结。英国提出的单方面降低关税要求通常无人理睬。 Doctrinaire free traders and economic theorists opposed the use of commercial treaties since they felt that unilateral reductions were the most efficient policies for all countries. While correct in the abstract, such claims did little to overcome political resistance to trade liberalization in most countries. On the other hand, unwillingness on the part of the British to lower wine tariffs killed early trade negotiations with both France and Spain. 教条主义的自由贸易者和经济理论家反对使用商业条约，因为他们认为单方面降低关税对所有国家来说都是最有效的政策。尽管理论上是正确的，但这种主张在大多数国家却很少能克服政治阻力，实现贸易自由。另一方面，部分英国人不情愿降低葡萄酒关税的态度已经早早地扼杀了该国与法国及西班牙的贸易协商。 When the British finally decided to moderate their wine tariffs, Britain and France successfully concluded a treaty in 1860 which dramatically changed the landscape of European commerce. Politicians throughout Europe—who had till then resisted all pressure to liberalize trade—suddenly became fearful of being left out of a trade pact that united the two great European powers. The result was that the other major European powers quickly signed bilateral treaties with Britain and France as well. 当英国最终决定将葡萄酒关税调整到适度水平时，英法才在1860年成功缔结了条约，这极大地改变了欧洲商业的形势。全欧洲的政治人物——不久前还抗拒贸易自由化的压力——突然开始担心被遗落在连接欧洲两大势力的贸易协定之外。结果就是，其他欧洲大国也迅速地与英法签署了双边条约。 Since these treaties were all Most Favored Nation treaties—whereby concessions to one party meant extending such concessions to all the others—not just France and Britain, but by 1870 nearly all of Europe including the German states, Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and so on were integrated into a highly open trading market. 由于这些条约都是最惠国待遇条约——给予一方特权就意味着要给所有相关方特权——所以不仅法国和英国，到1870年几乎全欧洲，包括日耳曼各邦、西班牙、俄罗斯、荷兰、丹麦和瑞典等，都被整合进了一个高度开放的贸易市场里。 In many ways, Europe was freer than today, partly because the gold standard made capital extremely mobile, and because limitations in border control made immigration and the free movement of labor easy in practice despite differing rules across the continent. 在很多方面，那时欧洲都比现在更加自由，部分原因是金本位让资本极具流动性，还有边境控制有限使得移民和劳工的自由活动实际上比较容易，尽管欧洲大陆有各种不同的规定。 What politicians do and say are often quite different. That hasn't changed. Indeed, though there is much talk about globalization and unfettered trade, there is no country in existence today whose policies come anywhere near the ideal of free trade. 政治人物的言行往往不相一致。这一点从未改变。确实，虽然现在有很多关于全球化和自由贸易的讨论，今天还没有哪个国家的政策在任何方面能接近自由贸易的理想状态。 Goods and services do flow vigorously throughout the globe, but most countries suffer from a mix of import duties and non-tariff barriers such as quotas, unnecessary inspection rules and a bewildering variety of regulations that make it impossible for any of us to benefit fully from the specialization possible in a truly open world economy. 虽然产品和服务在全球频繁流通，但是大多数国家都承受一系列的进口关税和非关税壁垒，比如配额、不必要的检查规则和诸多令人困惑的条例，这些让我们所有人都不可能从真正开放的世界经济可能带来的专业化中充分受益。 But more importantly, the example of Britain and France in the 1800s challenges us to rethink and reanalyze the relationship between trade policy and growth. The story of Britain and France shows how easy it is to be misled by the fables of conventional wisdom. The fact that Britain was not as free trade as it claimed doesn't make the case for protectionism. The British did lower their tariffs, and in the last third of the nineteenth century, Britain did fully liberalize trade and benefited from the change. 但更重要是，十九世纪英国和法国的例子能让我们重新思考和重新分析贸易政策和增长之间的关系。英法的故事说明了我们是多么容易被传统智慧的寓言所误导。英国并不像它所声称的那样贸易自由，但这一事实并不证明贸易保护主义有足够的理由。英国人确实降低了本国的关税，而且在十九世纪最后1/3的时间里完全实现了贸易自由化，并从中受益。 But the interesting and unexamined story is France. Nineteenth-century France doesn't fit our preconceptions. France was in fact, closer to the free trade ideal than the British for much of the century, and did in fact do well, raising the standard of living of the average worker from the 1850s onward. 但有关法国的有趣故事却经不起检验。十九世纪的法国并不符合我们的偏见。事实上，法国在十九世纪大部分时间都比英国更接近自由贸易的理想境界，而且确实做的不错，从1850年代起提高了普通工人的生活水平。 Footnotes 脚注 1.The Gin Age is often used to describe the early to middle years of the eighteenth century, when the consumption of hard liquor grew substantially, and the consumption of gin, especially among the poor, was seen to be a national problem. 1.“杜松子酒时代”经常被用来描述十八世纪早期到中期的时间，这段时期烈酒的消费量大增，而杜松子酒的消费，尤其是在穷人之中，被认为是全国性的问题。 2.Readers interested in a more technical discussion of the problem of tariff levels in the nineteenth century may consult Nye, 1991, "The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France," Journal of Economic History and S. Dakhlia and J.V.C. Nye, "Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income," working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114. 2.对十九世纪关税水平问题的更多技术细节感兴趣的读者可以查阅Nye于1991年在《经济史杂志》上发表的论文“自由贸易英国和堡垒法国的神话”和S. Dakhlia与 J.V.C. Nye的论文“‘不列颠治税’：十九世纪关税和英国国家收入”，获取论文的网址为http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114。 * John Nye is Associate Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. This piece is adapted from a book in progress to be released under the title, War, Wine, and Taxes. John Nye是华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校的经济学和历史学副教授。这篇文章摘编自《战争，葡萄酒和税收》，该书即将要出版。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

And There Shall be an Über for Everything … Including Goats 无处不Uber，山羊亦如是 作者：Michelle Martin @ 2015-8-26 译者：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 校对：张三（@老子毫无动静地坐着像一段呆木头），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：花花公子，http://www.playboy.com/articles/uber-goats-rental Tammy Dunakin sits in a lawn chair in the shade of her R-pod camper trailer watching her brush-removal team at work. Her crew of 60 is spaced haphazardly across a weedy hillside that rises to meet Highway 99 in downtown Seattle. 在露营车旁边的阴凉地里放一把草坪躺椅，Tammy Dunakin悠闲地坐在上面，看着她正在工作的灌木清除队。她的60位伙计地散布在一片杂草丛生的山坡上。山坡向上延伸，同西雅图市中心的99号公路相接。 At least half of the workers are napping or resting in the shade. The others are wandering about or snacking. It’s typical for this crew. They’re goats. 然而，此时至少有一半的伙计在树荫下打瞌睡或休息，其他的不是在闲逛就是在吃零食。但这其实是这个团队的常态。因为——他们毕竟是山羊啊：） People walking by are surprised and delighted. They ask questions and snap photos through the fence. They stop. They look. They linger. 路过的人们都露出了惊讶和兴奋的表情。隔着栅栏，他们问这问那，又忙着拍照。他们停下来，围观，久久不愿离去。 “Seriously? This is pretty awesome,” one man says to Dunakin before continuing on his way. “不是逗我吧？这可真酷毙了。”一个路人停下脚步对Dunakin说。 “Goats out of context,” says Dunakin, the owner of Rent-a-Ruminant, which is based on nearby Vashon Island. “It grabs people’s attention. People absolutely love goats. Everyone—and I mean every single person who sees them—leaves with a smile on their face. It makes them happy. It makes my day.” “想不到是山羊吧，呵呵。”Dunakin说道，她是“租个反刍动物回家”公司的老板，公司位于附近的瓦雄岛（Vashon Island）。“这成功地抓住了人们的眼球，人们超爱山羊的。所有人——我是说每一个看到这些山羊的人——离开时都会面带笑容。这带给他们快乐，也让我非常开心。” When Dunakin started her clients were private landowners. Eleven years later, goats are in high demand and getting more popular all the time. Now she also has requests from planned communities, transportation departments and even police departments for clearing shrubbery in high-crime areas. Dunakin刚开始这门营生时，顾客都是私有土地主。11年过去了，山羊越来越受欢迎，需求旺盛。现在Dunakin也会收到来自规划型社区、交通部门的订单，甚至警察局也会请她去清理罪案多发地区的灌木丛。 In March, Amazon Home Services launched with goats as a top offering. “My email exploded,” says Dunakin. “I got hundreds of requests. No one was expecting that kind of response.” 三月份，亚马逊推出“家庭服务”主页的时候高榜热推了“山羊”服务。“我的邮箱都被挤爆了！” Dunakin说，“我收到数以百计的订单，真没想到市场反应竟然这么热烈。” This is Uber, but with goats, and more proof that thanks to technology meeting ingenuity meeting demand, there will soon be an “Uber” for everything. 这其实就是山羊除草服务的Uber模式。越来越多的事例表明，有赖科技，创意和需求的结合，用不了多久，什么东西都可以来“Uber”一把。 Dunakin’s herd has grown to 115 working goats, and she now has more than enough work to keep them all busy from April to October. Livestock-loving entrepreneurs are stepping up to fill the growing demand. Dunakin has trained and licensed 10 others through her affiliate license program, and she plans to franchise in 2016. More than 50 grazing providers across the United States and Canada can be found here. Dunakin的羊群已经增加到了115头，而且已经有足够的活儿让它们从四月一直忙到十月。网站“Livestock-loving”上的企业家们正纷纷加入进来，去满足不断增长的需求。通过其“成员认证计划”，Dunakin已经培训了十家公司并给它们颁发了证书，而且她打算在2016年开始进行特许经营。美国和加拿大已有50多家提供吃草服务的商家。 Goats are browsers as opposed to grazers. Unlike cows, which mostly stick to munching grass, goats prefer a variety of plants. They’ll eat thorny Himalayan blackberries, stinging nettles, ivy – it’s a long list. Goats are the high school boys of the animal kingdom. 山羊是食草动物里的“扫货客”。同基本只吃草的牛不同，山羊喜欢的植物多种多样。它们能吃带刺的喜马拉雅黑莓、叶子上长满刺人蜇毛的荨麻、常青藤——这份菜单长着呢。山羊是动物王国里的高中男生。 They like to climb. They traverse steep slopes with ease. Their digestion destroys some weed seeds such as blackberry seeds, and they fertilize the soil as they go. They also help to keep fire danger low. 它们还喜欢攀爬，陡峭的山坡也能轻松越过。它们的消化系统能破坏掉诸如黑莓等植物的种子，而且它们会沿路给土地“施肥”。它们还能降低火灾的风险。 If they are deployed at the right time of year and contained—not always an easy task—using livestock such as goats is arguably one of the best, greenest ways to remove pesky weeds and unwanted vegetation. And best of all, you don’t have to own a goat to reap the benefits—you can rent. 在一年中的适当时候将畜群“分派”出去，而且让它们安分守己，有时并不是件容易的事。但如果做到了，那用像山羊这样的牲畜来清除讨厌的杂草和不想要的植被，可以说是最好、最绿色环保的方式了。而且最棒的是，眼下你不用实际拥有一头山羊就能享有这些好处——你可以租了。 It’s not a solution for everyone. I received an estimate through Amazon Home Services for a tenth-of-an-acre parcel. At $650 it seemed a bit steep for a mow. I get it, though. The goats have to be transported to the property, the wrangler stays with them the entire time, and she has to set up electric fencing to keep the goats out of the garden beds and any plants that are toxic to them. 这一解决方案也并不是能适用于每个人。之前我通过亚马逊家庭服务网站收到了一份为十分之一英亩土地提供除草服务的估价，是650美刀，作为割草服务，这个要价似乎贵了点。但我也可以理解，毕竟山羊们得先被运到这里，然后牧羊人得同它们一直呆在一起，她还必须拉起一个电栅栏以便把山羊同花坛和对它们有毒的植物分开。 I’ll stick with a push mower, but goats make a lot of sense for people with some combination of steep slopes, gnarly weeds, significant acreage, restoration goals or a desire to do good for the planet. 我还是会选择手推式剪草机。不过对于那些拥有大片土地，土地上有陡峭山坡和粗硬扭结杂草，希望恢复土地的肥力，或者想保护环境的人来说，山羊还是很不错的选择。 Mark Stranahan has all but the steep slopes. He hired Dunakin’s goats in June to come out to his land on Vashon Island for the second year in a row. 除了没有陡坡，Mark Stranahan 在瓦雄岛的土地符合以上所有条件。他六月时请Dunakin的羊来给他的土地除草，而这已是连续第二年了。 “What goats eat, it’s incredible. I had a huge nasty thicket of blackberry bramble with branches an inch thick, and they ate it all. It’s amazing what they can accomplish in terms of clearing,” says Stranahan, who is an architect and consultant who has been living in Ann Arbor, Mich., for part of the year. “山羊这吃货可真是让人难以置信。我有一大片讨厌的茂密黑莓林，枝丫都有一英寸粗，可山羊把它们都吃光了！说到清理，它们的能力简直令人惊异。”Stranahan说道。Stranahan是一位建筑师和顾问，每年都有部分时间生活在密西根州的安娜堡（Ann Arbor, Mich.）。 Last year the goats worked his four acres of meadows and alder forests for nine days, and this year they cleared the weeds in a week. How did they shave three days off? More experience? Better pay? Cloud-based solutions? Actually, the land starts to recover, and it becomes easier to maintain. 去年，山羊群在他四英亩的牧场和桤树林里足足干了九天，而今年在一周之内就搞定了。它们是怎么省下三天时间的呢？更有经验了？薪水更多了？还是用了云计算？事实上，只是土地开始恢复了而已，这让保养工作变得容易了。 “It’s nice to wander out with a hot cup of coffee and see the goats,” Stranahan says. “端着一杯热咖啡到地里散步，看看羊，真是一种享受。”Stranahan 说。 Not so entertaining is when the goats get out. Set free, they will eat gardens and ornamental plants (and get sick goat bellies or worse), and they will clamber up onto anything they can, including the roof of your car or home. This is why hiring is the best way to go. 可当山羊跑出去时，可就没有这么惬意了。要是放任不管，山羊们会吃掉花园和装饰植物（这会让他们拉肚子，甚至更糟），它们能爬就爬，包括你的车顶和房顶。所以租用（而不是自己养）是最好的方式。 “I lived with a couple of goats in a previous era on a previous hippie farm,” Stranahan said. “They are damned difficult roommates. The clickety-clack of little goat hooves on your Alfa Romeo will piss you right off.” “早年在一个嬉皮士农场，我曾同几只羊一起生活过，” Stranahan 说，“它们真是超级难处的室友。小羊蹄子在你的阿尔法·罗密欧牌爱车上的踢踏声，能把你当场气疯。” Stranahan likes a good goat-based solution because, well, it’s cool. Stranahan喜欢一个不错的“羊方案”，嗯，因为这很酷。 “Local vegan food is cool, roller-derby is cool, and goats are cool,” he said. “当地的纯素食很酷，轮滑阻拦赛（roller derby）很酷，还有山羊也很酷。”他说。 Having them quickly graze off weed populations every few seasons is an excellent way to encourage re-vegetation and restoration of natural plant succession. And it’s more fun. People don’t come visiting with a picnic if you’re spraying pesticides. 让山羊们每隔几个季节就来啃食田间杂草，是促进植被恢复和自然植物更替的好办法，而且也更有乐趣。要是你喷洒除草剂的话，人们是不会来野餐的。 Russ Ayers might agree. He’s the landscape manager of the 2,200-acre Issaquah Highlands, a master-planned community in the foothills of the Cascade Mountain Range. He has hired goats to come eat weeds on about 18 acres of the steepest, toughest terrain—land where the community tried using human crews before discovering it was just too rough and risky. Goats have been coming for five years. They are born to take on steep hillsides where weed-eaters wear out and where men grow weary and get injured. Russ Ayers大概也会同意的。他管理着2200英亩的伊瑟阔高地（Issaquah Highlands），这是卡斯克德山脉（Cascade Mountain Range）脚下一片精心规划的社区。Russ Ayers已经雇山羊来为其中最陡峭、最艰难的18英亩土地清除杂草。之前社区是用人力来完成这项工作的，但发现那样太艰难，风险太高了。山羊们已经连续过来五年了。它们天生就是爬陡坡的好手——那些地方会让除草机报废，让人累坏，而且容易受伤。 “They do a great job,” Ayers says. “它们干得很棒。”Ayers 说。 When they’re done, the fire fuel load is virtually zero. They chomp it down and fertilize the fields and by early fall the grass is green and about six inches tall. The goats cost a quarter of what a human crew costs. 山羊们清理完后，土地上的可燃物基本就没有了。它们嚼完那些可燃物，还给土地施肥。等到了早秋时节，绿草就有6英寸高了。雇佣山羊的费用只有雇佣工人的四分之一。 To accomplish the same tasks, a human crew would need to cut, bag, haul, dump and fertilize—each step with a cost and carbon footprint that the goats obliterate in the game of who’s greener. 要完成同样的工作，一个工人需要先修剪，再打包拖走，然后倒掉，最后再施肥——每一步都有成本并产生碳排放。山羊可不会产生碳排放，在绿化环保的比拼里稳操胜券。 if you’re in the market for a goat rental, Dunakin has a few tips. Find an outfit that stays with the goats, unless you want to end up on the news. If the animals escape, a speedy response is essential. Check the company’s rating with the Better Business Bureau as well as reviews from previous clients and on sites such as Angie’s List. Make sure they are insured and that they provide water and shelter for the animals. 如果你正打算从市场上挑选山羊租赁服务，Dunakin有几条建议给你。为山羊配齐整套控制装备【译注：大概是指前面提到的控制山羊活动范围的电网之类设施】，除非你想上新闻。如果动物们逃跑了，快速反应是必须的。从非盈利点评组织Better Business Bureau那里查看该公司的评级，同时从以前的客户那里或类似Angie’s List这样的网站上了解该公司的服务水平。确保他们是买了保险的，并会为动物们提供饮水和栖身之所。 If restoration of native vegetation is your goal, An Peischel, a small ruminant extension specialist at Tennessee State University, suggests making sure the herd you hire has experience with your particular types of vegetation. There is a lot of science around what goats can do, naturally, and factors such as time of year, elevation and even sex of the goats can make a difference in what the goats will eat when. With the right timing, goats can eradicate certain weeds and promote native plants. 田纳西州立大学的小型反刍动物推广专家An Peischel建议，如果你的目标是想恢复当地植被，那你要搞清楚你所雇佣的畜群是否对你想处理的特定植物有经验。关于山羊天生可以做什么有许多科学研究，诸如季节、海拔甚至性别等因素，都会对山羊什么时候吃些什么产生影响。选对了时间，山羊就可以清除特定的杂草，促进当地植被的生长。 Dunakin’s adorable employees have perennial appeal. She and her goats have been highlighted in The Wall Street Journal, Newsweek and “The Colbert Report,” among other places, but Dunakin says she has at least one more goal. “I know that when I get on ‘Ellen,’ I have arrived.” Sigh. We hope Playboy will do for now. Dunakin可爱的伙计们一年到头都那么受欢迎。她和她的山羊们已经在包括《华尔街日报》、《新闻周刊》和“科尔伯特报告”节目在内的许多媒体中被重点报道过了。但Dunakin说她至少还有一个目标：“要是有朝一日能上艾伦秀，那就圆满了。”哎，其实此刻上《花花公子》也不赖啊，我希望。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-10-27】 @海德沙龙 【产业故事】《汽车推销员之死》汽车销售是个很特别的业态，不仅商业模式独特，经销商的政治势力也很强大，以至能让美国各州通过成文法将这一商业模式固化了下来，不然，这种模式原本很可能只适合于汽车业发展的特定阶段，那么，在如今产业变迁大潮中，它是否会幸存下来？ @whigzhou: 1）汽车巨头年产量几百上千万，面向数亿消费者，厂商-消费者社会关系距离十分遥远（基于邓巴限制，这一距离至少四层），2）汽车购买是重大决策。——在传统零售模式下，同时满足这两个条件的产业，经销商的地位就会较强，我猜。 @闲中隐:房地产为什么这么需要中介呢 @whigzhou: 中介和经销商不同，二级房地产是供需两端皆为海量参与者的市场，此类市场若商品为无差异类型，会倾向于形成集中式交易中心，若为高差异类型，则形成中介模式 @whigzhou: 修正：同为高差异商品，若购买行为非重大决策，则形成超市/商场模式，若为重大决策，则形成中介模式  

The Human Breast Milk Market 母乳市场 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-08-24 译者：陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/08/the-human-breast-milk-market.html The market for human breast milk starts with demand from hospitals for pre-term infants. The American Academy of Pediatrics writes: 母乳市场起源于医院早产儿对母乳的需求。美国儿科学会写道：

The potent benefits of human milk are such that all preterm infants should receive human milk. ... Mother’s own milk, fresh or frozen, should be the primary diet, and it should be fortified appropriately for the infant born weighing less than 1.5 kg. If mother’s own milk is unavailable despite significant lactation support, pasteurized donor milk should be used. “母乳具有诸多益处，所有早产儿都应当接受母乳喂养。……母亲自身的乳汁，无论新鲜的还是冷冻的，都应该是婴儿的主要食物，而且对于出生时体重低于1.5千克的婴儿，应该在其饮用的母乳中适当添加营养成分。如果在相当程度的泌乳帮助之后，母亲仍无法给婴儿提供母乳，那么就应当使用他人捐献的经过巴氏杀菌法消毒的母乳。”

The demand then continues with a belief that human milk might have properties that are useful to adults as well. Some biomedical companies are involved in research, and there is apparently a subculture of bodybuilders who believe that consuming human milk helps them build muscle. 有些人相信，母乳的某些特性可能对成年人同样有益，这使得对母乳的需求进一步扩大。一些生物医药企业参与了对母乳的研究，同时，在健美圈有种亚文化，认为母乳有助于增强肌肉。 What are the sources of supply to meet this demand? One source is donations that happen through the 19 locations of the Human Milk Banking Association of North America, as well as other donor organizations. But there are also for-profit companies emerging like Prolacta Bioscience and International Milk Bank which buy breast-milk, screen and test it, sometimes add additional nutrients, and then sells it to hospitals. There are also websites that facilitate buying and selling breast-milk. 有哪些供给源来满足这些需求呢？来源之一是北美母乳银行协会19个驻地以及其他一些捐赠机构所得到的捐赠。但现在也出现了一些新兴的营利性公司，如“Prolacta生科”和“国际母乳银行”，他们收购母乳，在进行筛选、测试（有时还会添加一些额外的营养成分）后出售给医院。此外，还有一些方便母乳买卖的网站。 This market is one where prices are fairly clear: the for-profit companies typically offer moms $1.50- $2 per ounce for breast milk, and end up selling it to hospitals for roughly $4 per ounce. Quantities are less clear, although for a rough sense, the nonprofit Human Milk Banking Association of North America dispensed 3.1 million ounces of breast milk in 2013, while a single for-profit firm, Prolacta, plans to process 3.4 million ounces this year. 这是个价格相当透明的市场：那些营利性企业通常为每盎司母乳向妈妈们支付1.50-2美元，最后以大约每盎司4美元的价格出售给医院。但市场上母乳的数量就没那么透明了，不过从以下数据中可以得到一个大致的概念，非营利组织北美母乳银行协会在2013年配发了310万盎司母乳，然而，今年仅Prolacta一家营利性企业就计划处理340万盎司。 Any product that involves a mixture of donated and paid-for elements is going to be a source for controversy, and when the product involves fluids from the human body, the controversy is going to ramp up one more level. Here are some of the issues: 任何同时涉及捐赠和有偿元素的产品都会引来争议，而且，当产品包含来自人体的液体时，争议便会再上一个层次。相关问题包括： Many people have a gut-level reaction that human breast milk for neonatal children is the sort of product that should be run on the basis of donations. But two concerns arise here, as enunciated by Julie P. Smith in "Market, breastfeeding and trade in mother's milk," which appears earlier this year in the International Breastfeeding Journal (10:9). 许多人都有一种直觉反应，他们认为提供给新生儿的母乳应当是一种基于捐赠的产品。但正如Julie P. Smith在今年早些时候发表于《国际母乳喂养期刊》（10:9）上的文章《母乳的市场、喂养和交易》所表明的，这会带来两个问题。 As Smith writes: "Human milk is being bought and sold.Commodifying and marketing human milk and breastfeeding risk reinforcing social and gender economic inequities. Yet there are potential benefits for breastfeeding, and some of the world’s poorest women might profit. How can we improve on the present situation where everyone except the woman who donates her milk benefits?" There are a number of ideas to unpack here. Smith写道：“人们买卖母乳。将母乳和母乳喂养商品化、市场化，存在加剧社会不平等和性别间经济不平等的风险。然而，母乳喂养有潜在的益处，而且一些世界上最贫困的妇女也可能因此获益。现状是，除了捐赠母乳的女性外，人人都会受益，我们如何才能改善这种状况？”这里面有一些观点可供探讨。 First, a substantially expanded supply of breast-milk would improve the health prospects of pre-term infants. Donated breast-milk doesn't seem able to fill the need. 首先，母乳供给的大量增加将提升早产儿的预期健康水平。捐赠的母乳数量似乎供不应求。 Second, it's not clear why mothers should be expected to pump, save and donate breast milk for free, when the rest of the health care system is getting paid. In some practical sense, the social choice may come to paying the health care system to address the sicknesses that infants experience from a lack of breast milk, or paying mothers for breast milk. 第二，你很难解释清楚，为何在医疗保健系统的其余参与者都能得到报酬的情况下，母亲们却要挤出乳汁保存起并进行捐赠，而这一切都是无偿的。从实践意义上说，社会选择可能是：要么向医疗保健系统付钱，以解决婴儿因缺乏母乳而导致的疾病，要么向提供母乳的母亲们付钱。 Third, there are real issues here involving social inequalities. Earlier this year in Detroit, a company called Medolac announced a plan to purchase breast milk. It received a hostile open letter with a number of signatories, starting with the head of the Black Mothers' Breastfeeding Association. The letter read, in part: 第三，这里涉及了社会不平等这个大问题。今年早些时候，在底特律，一家名为Medolac的公司宣布了一项收购母乳的计划。它收到了一封联名反对的公开信，牵头者是黑人母亲母乳喂养协会负责人。信中提到：

[W]e are writing to you in the spirit of open dialogue about your company’s recent attempts to recruit African-American and low-income women in Detroit to sell their breast milk to your company, Medolac Laboratories. We are troubled by your targeting of African-American mothers, and your focus on Detroit in particular. We are concerned that this initiative has neither thoroughly factored in the historical context of milk sharing nor the complex social and economic challenges facing Detroit families. ... Around the country, African-American women face unique economic hardships, and this is no less true in our city. In addition, African American women have been impacted traumatically by historical commodification of our bodies. Given the economic incentives, we are deeply concerned that women will be coerced into diverting milk that they would otherwise feed their own babies. “我们本着公开对话的精神写这封信，谈谈贵公司近期的计划，你们在底特律招募非洲裔美国女性和低收入女性，让其出售母乳给贵公司——Medolac实验室。你们把目标对准非洲裔美国母亲，并且专注于底特律地区，这些让我们倍感困扰。我们担心这一举措既没有全面考虑母乳共享的历史背景，也没有考虑到底特律家庭所面临的复杂的社会和经济挑战。……全国非洲裔美国女性都面临着巨大的经济困难，我们这座城市中的情形也是如此。此外，历史上对我们非洲裔美国女性身体的商品化，已经让我们遭受过巨大的创伤。我们对女性将出于经济利益而被强迫出售本将用来喂养自己孩子的母乳深感担忧。”

Medolac withdrew its proposal. Without getting into the language of the letter ("commodification" and "coercion" are not being used in the sense of an economics class), the basic public health question remains: Given the very substantial health benefits of breast milk for infants, can it make sense to offer mothers a financial incentive to sell their breast milk? Especially knowing that this incentive will have greater weight for mothers in lower income groups? Medolac收回了计划。不去深究这封信的措辞（“商品化”和“强迫”不是在经济学课堂里的意义上使用的），也还有基本的公共卫生问题：鉴于母乳对婴儿健康所起到的至关重要的作用，向母亲们提供金钱上的激励，让她们出售母乳是否合理呢？尤其是当知道这些激励将会对较低收入群体的母亲们产生更大的影响时，其合理性又如何呢？ Fourth, the economic choices involves in breastfeeding are inevitably intertangled with other choices that face nursing mothers. Julie Smith points out that there are a variety of incentives to encourage early weaning of infants, like the promotion of infant formula and baby food products, combined with laws and rules affecting how quickly new mothers will re-enter the workforce. Reconsidering these incentives in a broader context, with an eye to encouraging breastfeeding in all contexts, could potentially lead both to more breastfeeding and to greater supplies of donated breast milk. Smith writes; 第四，母乳喂养中的经济选择不可避免地与摆在哺乳期母亲们面前的其他选择复杂地交织在一起。Julie Smith指出，有多种不同因素鼓励母亲们给婴儿提早断奶，例如婴儿配方奶粉和婴儿食品的广告，同时，还有影响产后母亲重回劳动力市场的法律法规。在更全面的背景下反思这些激励，同时着眼于全面鼓励母乳喂养，这可能会在带来母乳喂养增加的同时，也带来母乳捐献供给的增加。Smith写道：

‘The market’ fails to protect breastfeeding, because market prices give the wrong signals. An economic approach to the problem of premature weaning from optimal breastfeeding may help prioritise global maternity protection as the foundation for sustainable development of human capital and labour productivity. It would remove fiscal subsidies for breast milk substitutes, tax their sale to recoup health system costs, and penalise their free supply, promotion and distribution. By removing widespread incentives for premature weaning, the resources would be available for the world to invest more in breastfeeding. “在保护母乳喂养问题上市场失灵是因为市场价格给出了错误的信号。解决过早断奶与最优母乳喂养时间这一问题的经济学方法可能有助于优先考虑全球母道保护，将它作为人力资本及劳动生产力可持续发展的基础。这一方法将消除对母乳替代品的财政补贴，对其征收消费税以补贴医疗系统的成本，并对免费供应、促销和分发母乳替代品的行为进行处罚。通过消除普遍的过早断奶的激励因素，全社会的资源将被更多地用在母乳喂养投资上。”

Finally, in an internet-based economy that excels at connecting decentralized suppliers and buyers, there is no chance that the paid market for breast milk is going away. At least some of the market--say, the demand from body-builders--is likely to remain shadowy. But for neonatal infants and research purposes, it is useful for the bulk of the breast-milk market to come out of the shadows so that it can be subject to basic regulations, assuring that the breast milk isn't adulterated by cow's milk, microbes, or worse. 最后，在一个以互联网为基础的经济体系中——它特别善于将分散的供应商和买家联系起来——购买母乳的市场不可能会消失。至少一部分市场很可能仍会处于灰色地带，比如来自健美者的需求。然而对新生儿和研究而言，让母乳市场的主体走出阴影是有益的，这样它就能受到基本的监管，以确保母乳中不被掺入牛奶、微生物或者其他更不该加入的物质。 If you'd like another example of the potential for economic markets in bodily fluids, I discuss the arguments concerning how to increase the supply of blood in "Volunteers for Blood, Paying for Plasma" (May 16, 2014). A proposal for using the recently dead as a source of blood donations is here. 如果你想了解有关体液的潜在经济市场的另一个例子，我在《无偿献血，有偿使用血浆》（2014年5月16日）一文中对如何增加血液供应的各种观点做了讨论。一个关于采用新近死亡者的血液作为捐献来源的提议在此：http://www.realclearscience.com/blog/2015/07/a_simple_solution_to_end_blood_shortages.html。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

     

Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story 拯救非洲犀牛：一个关于市场成功的故事

作者：Michael 't Sas-Rolfes @ 2011-8-19 编辑：Laura Huggins 译者：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 校对：带菜刀的诗人（@带菜刀的诗人_），林翠（@cwlinnil） 来源：Property and Environment Research Center，http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/Saving%20African%20Rhinos%20final.pdf 【译注：现存犀牛分五种：白犀牛，黑犀牛，苏门答腊犀牛，印度犀牛，爪哇犀牛。本文的白犀牛主要是指白犀牛的亚种南方白犀牛。】 In 1900, the southern white rhinoceros was the most endangered of the world's five rhinoceros species. Less than 20 rhinos remained in a single reserve  in South Africa. By 2010, white rhino numbers had climbed to more than 20,000, making it the most common rhino species on the planet. 在1900年，南方白犀牛曾是世界上五个犀牛物种中最濒危的一种。不到20头犀牛生活在仅存于南非的一个保护区里。到2010年，白犀牛数量攀升至20000头以上，成了这个星球上最常见的犀牛物种。 While southern white rhino numbers rose, populations of the other rhino species declined. This included the African black rhino and three Asian species. Why did the white rhino thrive whereas the others did not? In short, South Africa and a few other African countries adopted policies that created the right incentives for rhino conservation. 当南方白犀牛的数量增加时，其它犀牛物种（包括非洲黑犀牛以及三种亚洲犀牛）的数量却减少了。为什么白犀牛种群繁衍壮大了，而其它犀牛种群没有？简而言之，南非和其它几个非洲国家采用的政策，对犀牛保护产生了正确的激励效果。 BACKGROUND 背景 The white rhino, once plentiful in southern Africa, was all but hunted to extinction in the nineteenth century. As Dutch and English settlers colonized the region, they killed rhinos for meat and sport. 白犀牛曾经大量存在于非洲南部，然而在19世纪被捕猎至几近灭绝。荷兰和英国殖民者在此地区建立起殖民地，他们为取食和娱乐而捕杀犀牛。 By the early twentieth century, only a small population survived  in what is now the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in South Africa. Initially a royal hunting area for  the Zulu Kingdom, the park was officially protected in 1895. Its population of white rhinos slowly recovered and by the mid-twentieth century had reached the park’s full ecological carrying capacity. 至20世纪早期，只有少量白犀牛还幸存于如今成为南非Hluhluwe-Umfolozi公园的地区。这个公园最初是祖鲁王国的皇家狩猎区，在1895年正式成为保护区。保护区内的白犀牛数量渐渐回升，并在20世纪中期达到了公园生态承载能力的极限。 At that time, the Natal Parks Board decided to take bold action to expand the white rhino population by capturing and relocating animals to new areas. Breeding groups of white rhinos were moved to other state-owned parks, such as Kruger National Park, and also to private game ranches and zoos. This program, known as Operation Rhino, successfully re-established many new breeding groups throughout southern Africa. 就在那时，纳塔尔公园董事会决定采取大胆行动，通过捕获动物并将其迁移至新地区来扩张白犀牛的种群规模。白犀牛繁殖群被迁移到了其它诸如克鲁格国家公园这样的国有公园、私人狩猎牧场和动物园。这个以“犀牛行动”闻名的迁移项目成功地在整个非洲南部重建了许多新的犀牛繁殖群。 By 1960, the white rhino population had grown to 840. The next decade saw increased interest in private game ranching, and in 1968 the first legal white rhino trophy hunt took place. 到1960年，白犀牛数量已增加到了840头。在接下去的十年中，人们对私人狩猎牧场的兴趣不断增加，并在1968年出现了首个合法的白犀牛战利品狩猎。【编注：战利品狩猎是指参与者以获取猎物留作纪念品为主要目的的狩猎活动，与之相对照的另一种商业性狩猎是运动狩猎（sports hunting）】 The Natal Parks Board continued to supply live white rhinos to private landowners for a nominal fee on a first-come, first-served basis. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that there was a problem with this system. A long waiting list of private owners was eager to acquire rhinos for trophy hunting, but they showed little interest in breeding them. This led conservationists to question whether the private sector could actually be entrusted with rhino conservation. On closer examination, however, it appeared the problem was a matter of fixing the incentive structure. 纳塔尔公园董事会继续对私人土地所有者提供活白犀牛，先到先得，只收取象征性费用。到1980年代中期，这项制度的一个问题已显露了出来。有一长串私人地主渴望获得白犀牛来开展战利品狩猎，但他们对养殖白犀牛兴趣寥寥。这使得动物保护主义者质疑私人机构是否能真正被委以保护犀牛的重任。然而，在对情况仔细审视后，人们发现问题关键是要调整激励结构。 PRIVATIZING RHINOS 犀牛的私有化 Before 1991, all wildlife in South Africa was treated by law as res nullius or un-owned property. To reap the benefits of ownership from a wild animal, it had to be killed, captured, or domesticated. This created an incentive to harvest, not protect, valuable wild species— meaning that even if a game rancher paid for a rhino, the rancher could not claim compensation if the rhino left his property or was killed by a poacher. 1991年以前，南非所有的野生动物都被法律当作无主财产（res nullius）对待。对野生动物拥有所有权的好处，就只有通过猎杀、捕获或驯养来获得。这激励了捕猎而非保护珍稀野生物种——意味着即使一个狩猎农场主为一头犀牛付了钱，一旦犀牛离开农场主的所有地或被偷猎者捕杀，农场主将无法索要补偿。 The Natal Parks Board thought that providing rhinos for a low fee—an effective subsidy— would encourage private owners to be good stewards of rhinos. However, a closer look at rhino prices—both for buying and for hunting— suggests that this view was mistaken. 纳塔尔公园董事会曾经认为，提供犀牛时收取较低费用——相当于补贴——将鼓励私有业主对犀牛妥善照料。然而，在仔细考察犀牛价格——包括购买犀牛的价格和捕猎犀牛的价格——后，人们发现这种观点有误。 In 1982, the Natal Parks Board list price for a live white rhino was 1,000 South African rands (R). That same year, the average trophy price was R6,000. Any private landowner receiving a live rhino had a very strong incentive to sell it as a trophy as quickly as possible to pocket  a 600 percent profit. The alternative was allowing it to roam on his property where there was a risk of losing it to a poacher or neighbor. 1982年时，纳塔尔公园董事会对一头活白犀牛的明码标价是1,000南非兰特。而同年一头犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价是6,000兰特。任何得到活犀牛的私人地主都有非常强烈的动机将犀牛作为狩猎战利品尽快卖掉，以便将六倍之利收入囊中。不然，私人地主只能让犀牛在土地上闲逛，犀牛有落入偷猎者或邻居之手的风险。

THINKING CREATIVELY Rhino poaching is driven by economic forces. If we really want to save the rhino, we must understand how those forces work and look at examples of success stories to see what we can learn from them. 创造性思维 偷猎犀牛的行为受经济力量驱使。如果我们真想拯救犀牛，我们就必须了解经济力量是如何起作用的，并看看我们能从那些成功案例中学到什么。

For the next three years, as the waiting list for white rhinos grew, the Natal Parks Board tripled its list prices, but demand continued to outstrip the rate of supply. In 1985, a private rancher offered a few rhinos up for auction, prompting the Natal Parks Board to do the same. 接下去三年里，白犀牛的申请名单不断增加，纳塔尔公园董事会将价格升至三倍，然而白犀牛依然供不应求。1985年，一位私人农场主拍卖了几头犀牛，这促使纳塔尔公园董事会也将白犀牛进行拍卖。 In 1986, the board auctioned six rhinos, which sold for an average price of just above R10,000—more than double the list price. Encouraged by this success, the board increasingly embraced the auction system over the next three years, during which time the market price soared to an average of almost R49,000 by 1989. 1986年董事会拍卖了六头犀牛，均价刚刚超过10000兰特——高于标价的两倍。受此鼓励，董事会在此后三年中越来越多地进行犀牛拍卖，而在此期间犀牛的平均市场价格飙升到了1989年的接近49000兰特。 During this same period, the average price for a rhino trophy also rose, but peaked in 1989 at just under R92,000 before pulling back to R80,000 in 1990. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between list prices, auction prices, and trophy prices between 1982 and 1990. 同时期，犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价也在上升，但在1989年达到了顶峰，价格为略低于每头92000兰特，并在1990年回落到了80000兰特。图1为1982年至1990年间标价、拍得价和战利品价之间的关系。 From 1990 onward, list prices were abandoned and rhinos were mostly auctioned, as the Natal Parks Board realized the benefits of market pricing. By this time the gap between the price of a live rhino and a trophy had narrowed such that the trophy price was only about 60 percent higher than the live price—a more realistic mark-up. 自1990年起，随着纳塔尔公园董事会意识到市场定价带来的益处，标价被废除，绝大部分犀牛被拍卖。此时活犀牛与战利品犀牛的价格差距已经缩小，一头战利品价格只比一头活犀牛价格高了百分之六十——一个现实得多的溢价。 Also during this period, the South African Law Commission addressed the issue of ownership of valuable game animals. Recognizing the problems associated with the res nullius maxim, the commission drafted a new piece of legislation: the theft of game act of 1991. This policy allowed for private ownership of any wild animal that could be identified according to certain criteria such as a brand or ear tag. 还是在这一时期，南非法律委员会着手处理有关珍稀狩猎动物所有权的问题。委员会意识到，这些问题涉及无主财产准则，便起草了一项新的立法：《1991年猎物偷盗法案》。按照这项政策，任何野生动物的私人所有权可以根据确切的判别标准来识别，比如烙印或耳牌。 The combined effect of market pricing through auctions and the creation of stronger property rights over rhinos changed the incentives of private ranchers. It now made sense to breed rhinos rather than shoot them as soon as they were received. 通过拍卖实现的市场定价机制，创造对犀牛更牢固的财产权，这二者的共同作用，改变了对私人农场主的激励。养殖犀牛而非一得到犀牛就射杀终于成了明智的做法。 Interestingly, the private market also benefited state agencies such as the Natal Parks Board, which gained from the increased income from rhino sales. From a mere few thousand rands in the early 1980s (the rand/US dollar rate was one to one at this time), the annual market value of live rhino sales grew to R64.5 million (uS$7.8 million) by 2008. 有趣的是，私人市场也使国有机构（比如纳塔尔公园董事会）获益，因为他们通过出售犀牛而获得的收入增加了。出售活犀牛的年市值从1980年代早期的几千兰特（当时兰特对美元汇率为1:1）增长到了2008年的6450万兰特（合780万美元）。 BLACK AND WHITE 黑与白 Not only did the white rhino market grow in value, but white rhino populations also flourished. Figure 2 shows trends in white rhino numbers from 1960 until 2007. Contrast those numbers with the black rhino, which mostly lived in African countries with weak or absent wildlife market institutions such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. In 1960, about 100,000 black rhinos roamed across Africa, but by the early 1990s poachers had reduced their numbers to less than 2,500. 白犀牛不仅市值增长，种群也繁荣了起来。图2展示了从1960年到2007年的白犀牛数量变化趋势。与之形成鲜明对比的是黑犀牛，主要生活在诸如肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚和赞比亚这些野生动物市场制度薄弱或缺失的非洲国家。1960年时大约有10万头黑犀牛分布在非洲，但到1990年代早期，偷猎者使黑犀牛的数量下降到了不足2500头。

RHINO HORN USES There are two major markets for rhino horn. Throughout Asia, rhino horn has been used for thousands of years for both ornamental and medicinal purposes. Ailments that rhino body parts supposedly cure include skin disease, bone disorders, and fever. The second market for rhino horn is the dagger trade in the Middle Eastern nation of Yemen where carved rhino horns are used as handles for ceremonial daggers called jambiyas. 犀牛角的用途 犀牛角有两个主要市场。在整个亚洲，犀牛角被用作装饰和药材已有上千年的历史。人们认为犀牛的身体部位可以用来治疗皮肤病、骨骼疾病和发热等病症。中东国家也门的匕首生意是犀牛角的第二个市场，在那里，经过雕刻的犀牛角被用作一种称作jambiyas的仪式性匕首的手柄。

Rhino poaching is driven by the demand for rhino horn of  both species, which is used for ornamental and medicinal purposes in Asia. Since the mid-1970s, international trade in rhino horn has been subject to a ban under CITES, the United Nations Convention on international trade in Endangered Species. After the CITES ban came into effect, prices for rhino horn soared on black markets and have continued rising ever since. 对两种犀牛牛角的需求驱使了偷猎犀牛的行为。犀牛角在亚洲用于装饰和药材。从1970年代中期开始，根据CITES，即关于濒危物种国际贸易的联合国公约，犀牛角的国际贸易被禁止。自公约生效起，黑市上的犀牛角价格一路飙升。

ABOUT CITES CITES was formed in the mid-1970s as an international treaty to protect wild species threatened by trade. All member countries (more than 175) agree to regulate the trade in species across their borders in one of two ways. Species are either listed on Appendix 1, under which no trade is allowed, or Appendix 2, under which trade is allowed under a permit system only. About 800 species are listed on Appendix 1 and 32,500 on Appendix 2. CITES employs only a single officer to oversee global enforcement of the treaty. 关于CITES 作为一项保护被贸易所威胁的野生物种的国际公约，CITES形成于1970年代中期。所有成员国（超过175个）约定以两种方式之一对通过其边境的物种贸易进行管制。被列入公约附录1的物种被禁止贸易，被列入公约附录2的物种只能在许可证制度下进行贸易。大约有800个物种被列入附录1，而有32500个物种被列入附录2。 CITES只雇佣了一名官员来监督公约在全球的实施情况。

By the mid-1990s, rhino poaching had declined to sustainable levels and many conservationists assumed that the CITES ban had solved the problem. Rhino poaching, however, has re-emerged as a serious problem since 2008. 到1990年代中期，偷猎犀牛的行为已减少到了可持续水平，许多动保主义者认为CITES的禁令起了作用。然而自2008年起偷猎犀牛行为再次成为一个严重问题。 A more plausible reason for the temporary respite in poaching pressure is that all the “easy pickings” were gone. Unprotected wild rhino populations are rare to non-existent in modern Africa. The only surviving African rhinos remain either in countries with strong wildlife market institutions (such as South Africa and Namibia) or in intensively protected zones. 对此前偷猎压力暂时缓解的一个更可信的解释是，所有“易得手猎物”都消失了。在现代非洲，不受保护的野生动物数量非常稀少甚至不复存在。幸存的非洲犀牛只存在于那些有强大野生动物市场制度的国家（比如南非和纳米比亚），或在受严密保护的地区。 South Africa and Namibia have replicated the successful approach to white rhino conservation with black rhinos, currently protecting 75 percent of the world’s black rhino population and 96 percent of the white rhino population. After receiving CITES approval in 2004, both countries have even introduced limited black rhino trophy hunting. 南非和纳米比亚在黑犀牛上复制了保护白犀牛的成功方法，目前保护了世界上百分之七十五的黑犀牛和百分之九十六的白犀牛。在2004年得到CITES的批准后，两国甚至都引进了有限的黑犀牛战利品狩猎活动。 CROSSROADS 十字路口 Despite clear evidence that strong property rights and market incentives constitute the most sensible model for rhino conservation in Africa, many international conservationists and policymakers do not recognize this. Through institutions such as CITES, they continue to pursue a command-and-control approach that depends on regulations or bans to restrict wildlife use. This approach now threatens to undermine the success achieved thus far, as the extraordinarily high black market price for rhino horn has fuelled a new poaching drive. 尽管有清楚的证据表明，强有力的财产权和市场激励在非洲构建了最合理的犀牛保护模式，很多国际保护主义者和政策制定者对此依然不予认可。通过诸如CITES这样的机构，他们一直追求一种“命令加控制”的方法，依靠监管和禁令来限制对野生动物的使用。随着犀牛角异乎寻常的黑市高价促成了新的偷猎驱动力,这种方法如今威胁到了到目前为止已经取得的成功。 Before the recent upsurge in poaching, Asian nationals attempted to gain legitimate access to rhino horn by posing as trophy hunters. In response, South Africa’s government tightened controls over the hunting industry as well as the sale and use of live rhinos and rhino horn. Unfortunately, these restrictions only seemed to precipitate the current poaching crisis. The demand for rhino horn is significant and persistent enough to be very rewarding to criminals who are willing to supply it. 在最近的偷猎高潮之前，一些亚洲人试图作为战利品猎人而合法获取犀牛角。作为应对，南非政府加紧了对狩猎业以及贩卖和使用活犀牛和犀牛角的控制。不幸的是，这些限制看来仅仅加剧了当下的偷猎危机。对犀牛角的需求足够庞大而持久，这使那些愿意提供犀牛角的罪犯获利颇丰。

THREE RHINO MYTHS 有关犀牛的三个传说

• Rhino horn is used as an aphrodisiac in Asia. Rhino horn is used as an ingredient in traditional Chinese medicine to treat serious illnesses involving high fevers and toxicity. In Vietnam, it is sought as a cancer remedy.

• 犀牛角在亚洲被用作一种壮阳药。犀牛角作为一种传统中药成分，用来治疗伴有高烧和中毒症状的严重疾病。在越南，人们认为犀牛角可以治愈癌症。

• Rhino poaching is driven by greed and evil people. Rhino poaching is driven by the high price for rhino horn, which is caused by an artificial supply restriction from the ban in the face of persistent demand, creating perverse incentives.

• 人性的贪婪邪恶驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。面对持续的需求，贸易禁令制造了人为的供应限制，产生了不正当的激励，导致犀牛角的高价，驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。

• The medicinal demand for rhino horn is unscientific and therefore not legitimate. Use of rhino horns in Chinese medicine has cultural roots going back thousands of years and many of its adherents are unlikely to pay much attention to scientific arguments.

• 对犀牛角的药用需求缺乏科学根据，因此非法。犀牛角用作中药有数千年的文化根基，因此很多中医拥护者不太会关心有关的科学争论。

South Africa’s game ranchers are also willing to supply the market, and some have already experimented with ways to increase breeding and horn growth rates in a free-range farming environment. Rhino horn is made of keratin (similar to fingernails and hair) and can be periodically and humanely harvested from live rhinos at minimal cost (as little as $20 dollars to sedate an animal and cut off its horns). If the CITES ban was lifted, legal commercial rhino horn production from ranchers could outcompete most illegal harvesting by poachers. 南非的狩猎农场主也愿意向市场供应犀牛，而且一些农场主已经尝试了在放养的农场环境中增加犀牛繁殖和犀牛角生长率的方法。犀牛角由角蛋白（类似于指甲和头发）构成，能周期性地且人道地以最小代价从活犀牛上获得。（麻醉一头犀牛采割牛角的花费低至20美元。）假如CITES的禁令放开，来自农场主的合法商业犀牛角生产便可在竞争中击败绝大多数偷猎者非法获得的犀牛角。 Unfortunately, this pragmatic market solution does not appeal to key international conservationists, who insist that better enforcement and more political will are needed to solve the poaching crisis. Tragically, this may not be enough. 不幸的是，这种务实的市场解决方案对主要的国际保护主义者没有吸引力。他们坚持认为需要更好的执法和更多的政治意愿来解决偷猎危机。可悲的是，更好的执法和更多的政治意愿可能是不够的。 There are many other examples of failed bans, such as alcohol prohibition and the war on drugs, characterized by insufficient incentives to implement them successfully. The market-incentive success story of African rhino conservation may yet be undermined by a failure to recognize and learn from it. 已经有很多禁令失败的例子，比如禁酒和禁毒战争，就是因为没有充分的激励使这些禁令成功实施。市场激励在保护非洲犀牛上取得的成功，可能会由于人们未能认识激励机制并吸取经验而受挫。 MICHAEL 'T SAS-ROLFES is an environmental economist based in South Africa and a 2011 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow. 作者MICHAEL 'T SAS-ROLFES是位南非环境经济学家，2011年的 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗？ 辉格 2013年3月4日 近年来，随着信息技术变得日益强劲，它正在向产业链的各个角落迅速渗透，从设计、加工、物流，到办公、管理、供应链组织、市场交易、娱乐、社交，乃至研究部门，无孔不入，计算能力和自动化设施正在越来越多的工种和岗位上取代人力。 有人甚至认为，金融危机后的复苏过程中，就业率的回升明显滞后于消费、投资、资产价值和企业盈利等各大指标，原因之一便是企业在危机后的新一轮扩张中，更多的投资于自动化设施而非劳动力，包括制造业向美国的局部回归，也将是一次基于深度自动化的回归。 那么，机器真的会将大批劳动力挤出就业市场吗？对此，常见的乐观说法是，机器在一些岗位上取代人时，因为提高了生产率，将抬高总产出，从而在别处创造出新的就业机会；这没错，问题是，上述过程所创造的新就业机会是否足以弥补它所消灭的呢？ 没有任何经济学原理能够保证这一点，具体效果将视所在产业和整个经济体的要素结构而定，假如机器渗透发生在一个劳动密集型产业，而由其产出提高所带动的、以及因总收入提高而拉动的其他产业，若劳动密集程度远低于前者，那么总的效果便可能是降低了劳动需求，从而压低工资率或抬高失业率。 也就是说，伴随着结构变动的收入增长，未必惠及每个人，在新的生产函数所对应的要素结构中，某些要素的地位可能下降了，因而将得到更少的报酬；对此有人可能会说，这种情况下工人会降低工资要价，从而在较低的均衡位置上重新实现充分就业。 问题是，当机器变得足够廉价，乃至雇佣某人的交易和管理费用超出雇佣同等能力机器的成本时，即便工资降到零也没有雇主会雇佣他，这是完全可能的，比如今天的可乐罐装厂大概不会雇佣任何搬运工去替代自动传送带，即便工资为零。 或许有人会说，假如机器果真会让大批工人失业，那么这些失去劳动报酬的人很快就会饿死，于是就业市场又会在一个较低水平上实现均衡，但实际上当代社会不大会出现这种局面，首先，失业者未必是无产者，可能拥有其他要素，而这些要素在新的生产结构中仍得到了雇佣，其次，即便他们得不到任何要素报酬，也可能得到政府或慈善组织的援助而继续生存下去，并处于毫无指望的长期失业状态。 说明机器排挤效果的最有力案例，是马的命运，历史上，马曾被大量雇佣于农业和交通运输业，但在蒸汽机和铁路发明后，它们很快被排挤出内河与陆地干线运输，内燃机出现后，更被全面排挤出支线与城市运输、农耕和军事领域；这一过程生产率和总收入都有巨大提高，但并未为马创造出多少就业机会，休闲、竞技和博彩业雇佣的马匹或许增加了一些，但与消失的岗位相比，只是九牛一毛。（见Gregory Clark: A Farewell To Alms, p.12） 当然，马被排挤后并未抬高长期失业率，因为马的数量很快减少了，但被机器排挤的人类却更可能继续生存下去并生育同样多、甚至更多的后代，结果，人口中越来越大的部分将处于长期失业状态，这个比例将随机器能力提高和成本下降而扩大，并且没有什么原理显示它存在一个上限。 乐观者最后一根稻草是诉诸经验：工业革命以来机器渗透已持续了两百多年，每轮浪潮会造成阶段性失业，但此后更繁荣的经济总是创造了更多就业机会和更高的工资率，在机器化最为深入的美国，失业率并不高，而且多半都能用其他因素来解释。 迄今为止确实如此，但那可能只是因为我们尚未越过临界点，当生产模式所对应的要素结构中劳动还占很高比例，人所能完成的任务大部分还未能被机器有效率的替代，机器因推动增长而带来的岗位就可能弥补它所挤掉的，但假如这一比例翻转过来，当生产结构中的大部分岗位，人对机器都已丧失比较优势，情况就不同了。 临界点的位置，取决于人类与机器的能力对比，由于我们不能指望人类禀赋在可见未来会有所改变，而机器则在迅猛进步，因而只能相信：临界点迟早会被越过；或许我们正在逼近它，或者全球经济作为整体已经越过了它，只是大规模失业并未均匀分配，而更多的被留在了南欧和非洲？  

【2013-01-13】 @高利明 国家：合作的背书——巴泽尔《国家理论》读书笔记 “不同于诺斯,巴泽尔给出了资本主义兴盛的一个简单而有力的解释:‘第三方实施’的规模效应。 巴泽尔是有着惊人续航能力的思想家。在找到‘第三方执行’的金钥匙之后,巴泽... @局外人c的空间:高老师的力作！隆重推荐。我以为，高老师算是中国巴泽尔研究的至少是最高水准之一， @学经济家:先收藏 @whigzhou: 若高总对巴泽尔的介绍是准确的，那看上去他是剑走偏锋了，强调国家普遍保护在市场制度发展中的作用是对的，但以为它取代了自下而上的规范/价值体系，因而后者不再重要，就错了 @whigzhou: 有机会我会写篇文章，先简单说几点：1）人格化与非人格化（即高总的“长期关系”与“第三方实施”）的二分法过于简化，远不足以澄清市场与传统社会的根本差异，实际上这首先是一个策略与关系的抽象化和符号化的过程，从两两长期关系，到圈内长期关系，到身份/阶层分化，到亚文化的价值/伦理规范……再到社会主流价值/规范体系的形成，人格化程度逐级降低， @whigzhou: 2）其次，缺乏普遍保障的传统社会，也有市场，因为熟人圈可以相互重叠，所以只要形成专业圈子，经过几层中介，即可覆盖一个相当规模的市场，百来个相互熟识犹太人社团，可以经营很大规模的商业和金融业，并且都是基于个人声誉的； @whigzhou: 3）行会/协会等组织，可以大大扩展上述基于相互交叠的熟人圈的多层结构的覆盖范围，因为组织提供了一层抽象，用组织声誉代替个人声誉，一位墙上挂着某医学院毕业证的医生，有机会到一个陌生小镇开业， @whigzhou: 4）所以，从传统社会向市场演化的过程，那些从长期关系中发展出来的价值/规范不是消失了或被取代了，而是a)去人格化了，b)多面化了， @whigzhou: 5）国家的普遍保护（如果幸而存在的话）确实降低了市场制度对传统规范的依赖，但前者不可能离开后者而单独存在，因为需要有个东西来拉住它，以免其滑向专痔…… @whigzhou: 因为依其本性，国家总是走向集权化和大政府，永远需要有个东西拉住它，而市场制度至今得以苟延残喘，端赖一个自下而上的规范生成体系，巴泽尔（若如高总所介绍）的错误在于，以为这套价值/规范体系不再重要，其作用已被国家司法所取代，果若如此，我们看到的就是法国，而不是美国 @whigzhou: 5）这套自下而上的规范生成系统，相当程度上仍依赖于熟识和个人声誉，只是现代社会的熟识往往是单方面的，名人/大众构成了一个非对称的熟识关系， @whigzhou: 6）实际上，这种非对称熟识关系也存在于大公司与消费者之间，它用公司人格取代自然人格，得以在邓巴数限制之下，在大规模市场上实现声誉机制， @whigzhou: 7）即便有了司法普遍保障，现代市场的运行仍高度依赖信誉机制和私人规范，司法只是最终保障，只有极小部分纠纷求助于它， @whigzhou: 8）作为个人，若从每个侧面看，很大程度仍生活于熟人社会（至少单方面熟识），与传统的主要区别是，这些侧面分离了，关系的内聚度降低了，即：你的熟人的熟人很可能不是你的熟人 @whigzhou: 相反在传统社会，人际关系内聚度很高，你的同学通常也认识你的邻居/亲戚/客户，高内聚度的结果是，规范生活不同侧面的诸价值与规则，通常被捆绑在一起，成为一个无所不包、从头管到脚的伦理系统，这种规范体系过于僵硬，让社区趋于保守封闭，让社会失去了流动性， @吴昊老是重名很无奈:逗号，然后？辉总你这半天没下文了啊，哈哈…… @whigzhou: 想了想，要点好像说完了，更多细节以后再说 @高利明:答辉总http://t.cn/zjrnOke @whigzhou: 嗯，高总列了很多具体例子来展开和澄清原文的意思，这些例子很好，其实许多我也赞同，但我要强调的是，从熟人社会到由第三方执行的抽象规范的演变，是经过了许多中间状态的，并且这些中间结构在市场制度中仍起着基础性作用，并未“沦丧” @whigzhou: 也就是说，一个可持续的市场社会，不是由一个中央司法机构和一群无结构的个人组成的两层结构，而是由许多中间结构支撑起来的自下而上的多层结构 @whigzhou: 这些中间结构包括：社区/地方自治，行业组织，利益集团，专业阶层，大学/媒体/标准化组织等功能性机构/社团，亚文化群体，等等，所有这些中间结构，都有着与之相应的价值和伦理体系，在某个侧面起着社会规范的作用，假如这些都“沦丧”了，市场也没有了 @whigzhou: 其实，看待这些中间结构的态度，也构成了保守主义和Libertarian的一大区别 @whigzhou: 教会/教派组织也是重要的中间结构 @高利明:我更关心的是，不同国家不同地区间若要开展贸易，其合约背后的执行方未必完全一致，这些不一致，市场究竟是怎样协调的、并进而如何影响这些执行者的行为和力量的。 @whigzhou: 嗯，你强调的方面是重要的，我只是提醒一下也要重视另一方面 @whigzhou: 饭文：从同性恋纷争看文化宽容 http://t.cn/ap6o8n ……在每一个特定的场合中，现代人倾向于只袒露自己与该场景有关的那个侧面，而把其他方面包裹掩盖起来，同时，他们也懂得小心的不去触碰和揭露别人的那些场景无关部位，这是现代…… @whigzhou: 这篇旧文介绍了我的多面化理论，多面化是理解传统与现代之区别的关键，现代社会，你在工作、亲戚往来、娱乐活动、参与社区管理、社会活动等等方面，会分别有个熟人圈，互不重叠，你在每个圈子里遵循的是不同的规范，而且除血缘圈之外，每个都可以退出、另选，而在传统社会，所有这些都被绑在一起 @whigzhou: 这种多面性，最生动的表现在婚宴的桌席安排上，一个圈子一两桌，假设每圈熟识15人，邓巴数限制下，个人可同时进入十个圈子，可覆盖生活各个侧面 @whigzhou: 多面化转变是根本性的，它同时带来了文化宽容、个人自由和社会流动性，因为若这些圈子全都被捆绑重叠在一起，个人就很难重新选择，退出的成本极高（那将意味着短时间一次性重建所有关系），退出（更多是被逐出）意味着身败名裂，从此无依无靠 @whigzhou: 多面化的结果改变了社会关系网的拓扑结构，传统社区基于血缘和地域，高度封闭，多数关系限于内部，仅通过少数关键人物（政治领袖、小店主、铁匠、货郎等）与外部发生关系，而那些专门从事社区间流通/交易的人，又往往游离于本地社区之外，组成自己的特殊社区，比如犹太人 @whigzhou: 起社区连结作用的那些群体，由于多数社会关系游离在本社区之外，因而本社区的规范无法约束他们，因而被视为异类，甚至归入贱籍，这是古代社会存在本末良贱之分的根源所在 @whigzhou: 关于本末良贱，我在这篇微言的后记里也有讨论 http://t.cn/zjrr6dh @whigzhou: 邓巴数（或类似的认知局限），也为各行业可容纳的品牌数量和每个品牌覆盖产品种类设置了上限，为何牙膏和洗头膏被置于同一品牌下？因为分太细品牌太多消费者记不住，能合并就合并，但抹脸的不能跟刷马桶的合并，手机也不能跟鞋合并，认知距离太大，总的限制是：单个消费者能够辨识的品牌也就一百多个  

【2013-01-12】 @王志安 如果说在蔬菜定价方面存在所谓的“剥削”，不是中间商对农民存在盘剥，而是城里人借助制度的不平等对乡下人的压榨。许多人还把这种压榨看做是一种天经地义，他们把过去计划经济时代的不合理定价当做了“正常”。但其实，过去的那种“正常”并不正常。《中国的菜价被低估了》http://t.cn/zjBmQ71 @wenkino: @whigzhou 老师，和您以前有关蛛网效应和投资受限对农民收入影响比，觉着此文问题多多。首先，蔬菜价格并没有管制，应该说所谓绿色通道则给了农民特权而已，市民才是受害者 @whigzhou: 1）正文的主要观点可以成立，但按语中的指责没什么意思，坏的制度总是损害交易双方，说交易方谁害谁就转移矛盾了 @whigzhou: 2）蛛网波动是短期现象，与此文主题没多大关系 @whigzhou: 3）绿色通道剥夺了谁、补贴了谁，要看各环节的供给弹性和消费者的需求弹性，不可武断定论 @whigzhou: 4）妨碍城乡流动的制度屏障，确实损害了农民，也压低了农产品价格 @whigzhou: 5）土地用途管制的效果则不太清楚，既可能应妨碍集约化农业发展而抬高菜价，也可能因将更多城郊土地束缚于农业而降低菜价 @wenkino:菜价是否被低估了呢？ @whigzhou: 不存在低估的问题，低估的意思是你去囤蔬菜会有钱赚，从正文看，他的意思是未来菜价仍有很大上涨空间，这是他用词不当 @wenkino:制度屏障会减少供给，造成价格上涨，怎么可能压低农产品价格？ @whigzhou: 这里的屏障是指妨碍城乡人员流动的制度屏障，比如户籍制度，如果你在别处出售劳动的机会被限制了，那么，在未被限制领域出售劳动的机会成本便降低了 @wenkino:回复@whigzhou:嗯，现在蔬菜许多地方明显过剩了，大白菜烂到地里。不知是否与补贴有关？就像压低汇率搞出口，因为蔬菜并不会像粮食国家可以收购囤积。 @whigzhou: 没关系，只要补贴额不高于成本，烂在地里肯定是预期落空的结果，是生产决策失误 @whigzhou: 而且肯定是当季生产决策失误，因为烂在地里说明地头价不仅低于总成本，还低于采摘＋包装成本 @wenkino:看来辉格老师是反对户籍制度的。但户籍制度本是自治的形式，虽然现在问题多多，比如计划生育，高考都给捆绑在了一起。反户籍制度剥夺体制外市民税后福利，而不反体制内，明显是打土豪分田地思维 @whigzhou: 放屁，户籍制度是土蚣套在所有被征服者脖子上锁链，自个屁治 @wenkino:美国各个州有比中国更严厉的户籍制度与之相关福利 @whigzhou: 1）户籍制度的哪方面是由当地居民决定的、因而体现了自治原则？2）美国公民在各州获得居民身份的条件是什么？