In praise of pushy parents 对挑剔家长的赞扬 作者：Daniel Hanna @ 2015-10-16 译者：尼克基得慢 （@尼克基得慢） 校对：Drunkplane（@ Drunkplane-zny） 来源：www.capx.co，http://www.capx.co/in-praise-of-pushy-parents/ There was a mother at one of my children’s previous schools, a loud American, who was deeply unpopular with the other mums, but not with me. Her offence, in the eyes of the other women, was to be forever complaining. The reading programme was out-of-date, she averred, the music lessons inadequate, the maths too easy. 在我孩子以前上的一所学校里有一位母亲，一个大嗓门的美国人，她非常不受其他母亲的待见，但是我不讨厌她。在其他女人眼里，她的过错是永不休止的抱怨。比如她认为阅读方案已经过时了，音乐课程还有欠缺，数学课程过于简单。 “She was whining about the new French teacher today,” one of the other mums might say. “她今天在抱怨新来的法语老师，”另一位母亲说。 “Great,” I’d reply. “As long as she’s doing it, the rest of us don’t need to worry”. “太棒了，” 我回答说。“只要她这样做，我们其他人就不用操心了”。 Some of the lady’s criticisms were misplaced, and no doubt the teachers found her a thundering nuisance; but she unquestionably kept them on their toes. Whether she intended it or not, her pushiness thus benefited all our children. 这位女士的一些批评搞错了对象，而且老师们无疑视她为一大麻烦；但是她也确实让老师们不敢松懈。不管她是有意还是无意，她的咄咄逼人让我们大家的孩子都受益了。 This is the point missed by Leftist opponents of more parental choice in education. As usual, they believe that they are acting in the interests of the poor and powerless; and, as usual, they are wrong. 这是反对家长干涉教育的左派们所忽略的观点。像往常一样，他们认为自己正在为穷人和无权势者行事，但他们还是一如既往的错了。 “Free schools are all very well if you’re articulate and middle-class,” say supporters of uniformity. “But what about those kids whose parents aren’t engaged? Are we just going to throw them on the scrap heap?” “如果你能言善辩又是中产阶级，免费学校当然是非常棒的，”一致性的支持者们说。“但是那些失业父母的孩子们怎么办？难道我们就要把他们丢进垃圾场吗？” Actually, that’s pretty much what happens under our present system. The GCSE results of our top state schools are twice as good as those of the bottom. Seventy-three percent of children in Kensington and Chelsea got at least five good passes this year; in Knowsley, that figure was 35 per cent. Ponder that extraordinary discrepancy. A system specifically designed to ensure equality of opportunity creates massive asymmetries of outcome. 这确实是我们现行体系下正在发生的事情。顶级公立学校的普通中等教育认证（GCSE）成绩要比底层学校好一倍。今年， Kensington和Chelsea的孩子中有73%至少得到五个优；而在Knowsley，这个数字只有35%。思考下这巨大的差异。一个专门为确保机会均等而设计的系统却造成了大量不对称的结果。 Now imagine you took away all the state control. Suppose that there were no regulation beyond the market. Consider, for example, what happens when you buy a pint of milk. The quality and price are not only assured, but they are pretty constant around the country. True, you might pay a fraction more in Kensington than in Knowsley, reflecting the higher ground rents in the Royal Borough; but the milk in Merseyside will be just as good. 现在想象下你将所有的国家管控都取消。假设市场没有管制。比如，思考下你要买一杯牛奶时会发生什么。价格和质量不仅有保证，而且在全国都很稳定。当然，由于皇家自治市【编注：指Kensington-Chelsea皇家自治市】更高的地租，你在Kensington要比在Knowsley 付的钱更多；但是在Merseyside的牛奶会是同样的品质。 How does this extraordinary equalisation come about, given that there are no equivalents of the Local Education Authorities regulating prices? It comes about through competition. Millions of consumers invigilate the system as no committee of regulators ever could. 鉴于当地并没有教育部门调控价格，这种特殊的均衡如何产生呢？这可以通过竞争来实现。数百万消费者会监督这个任何监管委员会都无能为力的系统。 And here’s the best bit. The system works as well for incompetent as for discerning consumers. I am the least qualified shopper you could imagine. I have no idea about ingredients, brands, prices or sell-by dates. I live in terror of being asked, as politicians sometimes are, how much a pint of milk costs. But, when I buy one, I can be pretty confident that I’m getting a fair deal. Why? Because more knowledgeable buyers have done my work for me. They have played the part of that pushy New Yorker whom I used to admire at the school gates. 下面是最棒的一点。这个系统适用于有分辨力的消费者，也适用于无此能力者。我是你能想象的最不合格的顾客。我对于原料、品牌、价格或者销售日期都没有概念。像政客们有时候所表现的那样，我害怕被问及一杯牛奶多少钱。但是，当我买东西时，我很确信我得到了公平的对待。为什么？因为更多有见识的买家已经替我做了工作。他们扮演了那个我喜欢的，挑剔的纽约人的角色。 Precisely the same dynamic would work in schools if it were allowed to. The sharp-elbowed bourgeois parents, seeking to drive up standards for their own progeny, would incidentally drive up standards for everyone else. They might not mean to, but they would. 若是被允许的话，同样的原理也肯定适用于学校。那些为了自己孩子而对学校高标准严要求的严厉的中产阶级父母也会顺便帮其他孩子抬高学校的水平。他们可能本意并非如此，但他们确实导致了这结果。 Daniel Hannan is a Conservative Member of the European Parliament and blogs at www.hannan.co.uk. Daniel Hannan 是欧洲议会的保守派成员，他的博客网址为www.hannan.co.uk。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

CapX Reviews: By the People CapX评论:《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》 作者：Fred Smith @ 2015-9-13 译者：Lai Shawn（@NiGuoNiGuoNi） 校对：王涵秋（@你们都是乡非） 来源：CAPX，http://www.capx.co/capx-reviews-by-the-people/ Charles Murray, in his new book, By the People: Rebuilding Liberty without Permission, argues that America’s constitutional checks on the growth of spending, taxation, and regulation have largely been undermined. The result, he fears, is an America moving rapidly toward the kinder, gentler tyranny Alexis de Tocqueville warned about. Murray focuses—wisely in my view—on the massive expansion of federal regulations as the vehicle hurtling us down that road. 查尔斯·穆瑞在他的新书《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》中说到，美国对政府支出、税收、管制的宪法审查机制已经被严重破坏。他担心，其结果是美国快速滑向托克维尔所警告的“温和专制”。穆瑞认为，巨幅扩张的联邦政府管制像失控的汽车一样带着我们冲向这条道路。 Murray documents how the regulatory state, by shifting legislative powers to the Executive, has given Congress the green light to pass broad laws that are little more than aspirational resolutions—for better workplace safety, improved public health, energy conservation, clean air, safe drugs and food, you name it—while leaving the writing of rules to achieve these goals to anonymous, off-stage executive bureaucrats. 穆瑞讲述了，通过将立法权转移到行政分支，管制型国家是如何为议会大开绿灯，让它得以通过那些宽泛的法律的，而这些法律充其量只是些一厢情愿的决心——诸如提高工作环境的安全性，改善公众卫生状况，节约能源，清洁空气，确保食品药品安全等等。同时，为实现这些目的而制订具体规则的工作，却被丢给了幕后不知名的行政官僚。 Given this hollowing out of the Constitution, and the cultural and political changes that drove it, Murray concludes that America is so far down the road to serfdom that the political process can no longer restore the Founders’ vision of an institutionally constrained federal government. A solution, if one exists, must rely on massive civil disobedience and a populist and moral critique of regulatory predation. Yet, is it prudent to fully dismiss “normal” political approaches? 基于上述的宪法“中空化”，以及导致这一点的文化和政治上的变化，穆瑞认为美国已经在“通向奴役之路”上走得太远，以至于已经无法依靠正常的政治途径来将美国恢复成建国者们心目中那个其权力受制度性限制的联邦政府。如果有解决方案，那只能是依靠大规模的公民不服从运动和民粹主义者，以及对政府无情管制的道德批判。然而，完全忽略“正常”政治途径是不是谨慎的做法呢？ Murray’s first section, “Coming to Terms with Where We Stand,” tells the story of how Progressives, chafing at the limited government institutions bequeathed by the Founders, gutted constraints on federal power and unleashed the technocratic Leviathan, staffed by civil servants trained in scientific management and protected from political interference by the independent agency system. This is an oft-cited and depressing history but one that Murray summarizes well. 穆瑞书中的第一部分“面对现实”讲述了进步派是如何破坏国父们留下的有限政府制度，破坏对联邦政府权力的限制，释放出那头专家治国主义权力巨兽，这头巨兽由受过科学管理训练的公务员组成，并且免受独立机构的政治干预。这是一段常被提起的沉痛历史，但是穆瑞总结的很好。 His second section, “Opening a New Front,” develops his civil disobedience proposal, including the creation of a new group, the Madison Fund, to manage and finance that work and take on some support functions, such as educational and public affairs efforts. The moral case for civil disobedience, he argues, stems from citizens’ growing alienation from a government they feel no longer represents them. A government that has lost our trust, he argues, has lost legitimacy, which justifies civil disobedience. 该书的第二部分“开辟新战线”进一步阐述了他的公民不服从运动倡议，包括建立一个叫麦迪逊基金的新组织，用于管理和资助不服从运动，并且通过教育和公共事务去支持这项运动。他认为，公民不服从的伦理基础在于公民和政府越来越疏远，并且感到政府已经不再能代表他们。一个政府如果失去了人民的信任，就失去了其合法性，公民不服从运动也就有了正当的理由。 Murray suggests the Madison Fund might also offer “insurance” against regulatory predation, much like malpractice insurance gives professionals some financial protection from the threat of lawsuits. However, the diversity and complexity of regulations makes estimating risks, and thus setting premiums, very difficult. In fact, insurance as an alternative to regulation was once explored for Superfund and largely abandoned for these reasons. Moreover, the criminalization of many regulatory violations casts doubt on the ability of such insurance to survive in a hostile regulatory environment. 穆瑞建议，麦迪逊基金应为那些对抗管制掠夺的行动提供“保险”，这跟职业过失保险很像，后者帮助专业人士规避因职业行为而遭受诉讼所带来的财务风险。然而，政府管制的多样性和复杂性，让预估风险以及设置保险费率非常困难。实际上，保险作为管制的替代已经被 “超级基金”尝试过，又因上述理由而被放弃。此外，由于很多违反管制的行为已经被犯罪化，令人怀疑这种保险是否能在充满敌意的管制环境下幸存。 Murray suggests that many regulations are unenforceable, because there are far more parties subject to regulations than there are enforcers. As with highway speed limits, he notes, most drivers will rarely be ticketed as long as they go with the flow. Therefore, if large numbers can be induced to violate any specific regulation, that regulation will become unenforceable. Perhaps, but while the “flow defense” often works, some communities, rather than ease regulatory enforcement, create “speed traps” and impose large fines. Fierce, random enforcement is another way of ensuring less costly enforcement of compliance and makes Murray’s campaign less viable. 穆瑞提出，很多管制是无法强制进行的，因为监管对象的数量远超执法者。比如高速公路限速，大多数司机只要跟着车流就极少被罚款。因此，如果很多人被诱导去违反特定的法规，这个法规就无法被执行了。虽然“淹没防卫法”有时会奏效，但是很多地方，不仅没有放松执法，反而发明了“超速陷阱”（高速公路上一段严格执法的区域）并施加巨额罚金。大力度的随机执法是另一种确保低执法成本的方法，这让穆瑞的方法看上去难以实现。 Still, Murray hopes that organized resistance to overregulation might push lawmakers and regulators to adopt less burdensome regulatory practices. His cautious optimism stems from Herbert Stein’s famous quote, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” And as Murray notes, America’s regulatory burden is already massive, citing the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s recent estimate of federal regulatory costs at around $1.8 trillion annually. This suggests a “stop” may be imminent. 然而，穆瑞希望对过度执法的有组织抵抗或许会促使立法者和监管者采用不那么苛刻的管制措施。他的谨慎乐观态度来自于赫伯特·斯坦的名句“不能永恒的事物终将会停下。”穆瑞注意到，美国的管管负担已十分巨大，来自竞争性企业研究所的一份报告显示，联邦管制每年带来1.8万亿美元的成本，因此过度管制必须立刻被制止。 Murray is also cautiously optimistic that faith in the Progressive vision is fading. Progressivism was first premised on the notion that government guidance could ensure uninterrupted progress. Advances in the social and administrative sciences would enable the best and the brightest to regulate markets in the public interest. Civil service reforms would prevent ineptitude and corruption. Independent regulatory agencies would prevent political cronyism. Murray argues that the experiences of the last century have not been kind to these beliefs, resulting in progressivism losing some of its former appeal. 穆瑞同时谨慎乐观地认为，进步派的愿景正在逐渐失去光芒。进步主义的基本假设是，政府的引导可以确保社会持续进步，社会科学和行政科学的发展可以让最善良最聪明的人处于公众利益而规制市场，公民服务改革可以防止不平等和腐败，独立监管机构可以防止政治裙带关系。穆瑞认为，过去一个世纪的经验并不能支持这些想法，这使得进步主义正在丧失它之前的吸引力。 I’m less sure, given the current popularity of progressive firebrands like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. And the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Board is an exemplar progressive agency—run by experts with no accountability to elected officials, with a staggering and ever-widening array of regulatory powers, and self-financing to boot! 鉴于诸如伊丽莎白·沃伦和伯尼·桑德斯这些进步主义煽动者目前的旺盛人气，我对此并不那么确定。最近成立的消费者金融保护理事会是个典型的进步主义组织——由专家组成，无须对选举产生的官员负责，拥有令人震惊的广泛权力，甚至可以财政上自给自足地运作。 Murray next turns to the question of which criteria should determine those regulations suitable for challenge. Given the radical tone of Murray’s book, one might have expected an endorsement of a broad frontal attack on the regulatory Leviathan. Yet surprisingly, Murray’s target list is fairly narrow. He sees the original flurry of regulations in the late 19^th century as largely warranted. He exempts Internal Revenue Service regulations, seeing taxes as a legitimate role of government. He appears to endorse regulations designed to address issues related to externalities and public goods. He also argues against challenging regulations that enjoy overwhelming popular support. These exemptions mean a less aggressive challenge to the regulatory state. 穆瑞接下来讨论的是选择挑战哪些法规的标准。鉴于穆瑞的激进口吻，读者可能会猜想他将对“管制巨兽”发起全面攻势。然而让人吃惊的是，穆瑞的目标名单非常短。他认为源自19世纪末期的很多法律是正当的。他放过了国家税务总局，认为税收是政府的合法职能。他似乎同意那些与外部性和公共品相关的管制法规。他同时还反对挑战一些受到广泛支持的管制。这些豁免意味着他对管制型国家的挑战不是很具进攻性。 Murray’s exclusion criteria appear to be influenced by the successful strategy of the Institute for Justice (IJ), which has carved out an important niche challenging regulations that meet Murray’s rather restrictive criteria. IJ selects regulations that many see as unjust, seeks out clients likely to be viewed sympathetically by the public, and manages media strategies to frame their cases as examples of noble Davids fighting brutal regulatory Goliaths. 穆瑞的豁免名单似乎受到了“司法协会”（IJ）的成功策略的影响——他们选择加以挑战的管制恰好符合穆瑞的谨慎标准，挑选那些看起来不公平的管制法规，找出一些有望被公众同情的客户，并通过影响舆论把自己塑造成像挑战残暴巨兽歌利亚的大卫一样高贵的勇士，这一策略让他们开拓出了一个重要的生态位。 Yet, the Institute for Justice is not alone in its use of litigation to challenge regulations. To a limited extent, the free market movement already has created a “Madison Fund.” Free market policy organizations—the Pacific Legal Foundation, Becket Fund, Center for Individual Rights, Goldwater Institute, my own organization, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others—are taking on other complex regulatory challenges, with varying degrees of success and popular support. Murray might have discussed these efforts in greater detail. 然而，司法协会并不是唯一一个通过诉讼去挑战法规的。虽然规模不大，自由市场运动已经成立了一个“麦迪逊基金”。自由市场政策组织——太平洋法律基金会，贝克特基金，个人权利中心，戈德华特研究所，我自己的组织——竞争性企业研究所，以及其他各种组织，正在对管制展开复杂的挑战行动，取得了不同程度的成功和大众支持。穆瑞会在书中详细讨论了这些努力。 Murray seems to believe that common sense provides adequate guidance for sorting out “good” from “bad” regulations and that Americans oppose many of the bad ones. Yet, recent debates over financial, health, and environmental regulations cast doubt on this. Many feel that America is overregulated, but support specific regulations—such as for example, the left’s support for more restrictive environmental and financial regulations and the right’s calls for tighter security and immigration restrictions. 穆瑞似乎认为，凭常识足以区分“好”的和“坏”的管制，并且美国人都反对坏的那些。然而，近期关于金融、卫生、环境相关法律的争论让人怀疑这一点。很多人认识到美国被管的太多了，但却支持特定的管制——比如左派支持严格的环保措施和金融管制，右派呼吁更严格的安全措施和移民限制。 Citing polling data, Murray finds reason for optimism in the fact that trust in government is declining and that businesses view regulations as increasingly burdensome. But that does not necessarily indicate support for a specific reform agenda. Congress, too, has lost the trust of the American people, yet more than 90 percent of all Members of Congress are routinely reelected. 通过引用调查数据，穆瑞找到了乐观的理由——对政府的信任在下降，并且企业认为管制带给他们的负担正日益加重。但是这未必说明一项特定改革议程获得了支持。虽然国会同样失去了美国人民的信任，然而仍有超过90%的国会议员照样如期连任。 Lacking widespread support, Murray’s massive civil disobedience proposal is unlikely to prove a viable strategy. America’s early history experienced such an attempt to fend off federal taxation—the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790s. It enjoyed considerable local support, but was nonetheless quickly suppressed. 因为缺乏广泛的支持，穆瑞的大规模民众不服从策略并不可行。在美国的早期历史上有过抵抗联邦政府征税的行为——比如1790年代的威士忌叛乱，尽管这场抗税运动得到了当地大量支持，但仍被讯速镇压了。 Murray argues that an expanded effort might change all this. His proposed new and well-funded Madison Fund would organize protests, help businesses and individuals targeted by regulation, insure vulnerable parties against regulatory abuse, and ultimately strip regulators of their “white hat” public image. It would help, but as noted, many free market organizations are already doing much of this. Moreover, would many businessmen want to directly confront their overseers? And even if they did, would the public see them sympathetically? 穆瑞认为更大规模的支持可能会改变这些情况。全新的，资金充沛的麦迪逊基金可以组织抗议活动，帮助监管所针对的企业和个人，确保弱势团体也可以对抗滥用的权力，最终剥下监管者的正义外衣。这可能会有用，但是正如我们注意到的，已经有很多自由市场组织在做这些了。此外，会有很多商人想要直面他们的监管者们吗？而且即使他们愿意，公众会同情他们吗？ Murray seeks to addresses these challenges by drawing an analogy with the role civil disobedience, such as lunch counter sit-ins, played in advancing the civil rights movement. But this analogy falls short. The civil rights movement enjoyed widespread media, intellectual, and public support, including by many economic interests. Yet, it still took decades and required both a state-by-state as well as a national approach to bear fruit. Regulatory reform lacks this broad intellectual support and needs greater organized business support than it has received. 穆瑞将这些挑战类比成公民不服从运动，比如在推动了民权运动进程的静坐抗议。但是这些类比并不成立，因为民权运动有广泛的媒体、知识界和公众支持，包括很多出于经济利益考虑的支持。尽管如此，运动的成果仍然是在一个个州以及全国通过各种途径努力了几十年才获得的。管制改革缺少如此广泛的知识界支持，也缺乏更大的有组织商业支持。 Murray’s third and final section, “A Propitious Moment,” suggests reasons why his proposals need not be quixotic. America’s continued diversity, he suggests, makes one-size-fits-all regulation less attractive to large segments of the population. Technological innovations have rendered largely obsolete regulatory interventions intended to address information asymmetries and allowed entrepreneurs to bypass regulatory roadblocks, creating consumer constituencies before the regulators notice. Uber is a great example of both achievements. 穆瑞书中的第三也是最后一部分“一场胜算很大的运动”论述了为何他认为他的建议不是空想。美国长期持续的多样性，使得大多数人不会喜欢一刀切的管制。科技创新让那些为矫正信息不对称而设立的管制变得过时，也可以让企业家绕过监管，在监管者注意到之前就得到消费者的支持。Uber就是一个证明这两点的很好例子。 Murray has identified the regulatory challenge facing America. But his proposed reform strategy needs to be better developed if it is to achieve success. In my view, he is too optimistic about public attitudes toward the regulatory estate and the prospects for changing them. For instance, he suggests the federal bureaucracy is increasingly demoralized. Perhaps in some cases, but individuals and businesses at the regulatory reform frontier still find regulators to be self-confident, well-prepared, and aggressive. 穆瑞指出了美国所面临的管制挑战。但是若要取得成功，他提出的改革策略还有待完善。在我看来，他对公众的态度以及改变公众态度的可能性太过乐观。举个例子，他认为联邦政府官僚正逐渐失去其道德光环。这也许在某些情况下是对的，但在管制改革前线作战的个人和企业仍发现监管者们非常自信，准备充分，并具有进攻性。 Moreover, while the future Madison Fund might launch dozens of cases, regulations continue to proliferate. Murray seems to hope that the creative marketing of these cases will increase public anger at regulatory overreach, but they may not, given that many regulatory agencies still enjoy widespread public support. In fact, such efforts could even backfire, as irate regulators place resisting firms in the agency’s crosshairs. 此外，就算将来的麦迪逊基金可能会同时着手处理几十个针对过度管制的案件，同时却仍有更多的管制会不断诞生。穆瑞似乎希望对这些案例的营销会加深公众对过度管制的愤怒，但是他们也许根本不会，因为很多监管机构依然得到广泛支持。事实上，这些努力可能反而会帮倒忙，因为愤怒的监管者会 “重点关照”那些反抗的企业。 There are other approaches to reform, including legislation, such as the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would require Congress to vote on all regulations with $100 million or more in estimated annual costs (a threshold I’d like to see drop over time). Congress could also explore a one-in-one-out requirement for new rules, such as one now being tried in Canada, or even the one-in-two-out policy tried in the United Kingdom. States might also establish state regulatory ombudsmen to argue against both existing and new state regulations and to challenge on behalf of the state costly and restrictive federal regulations—that is, states might create their own Madison Groups. 但是还有其他改革方式，包括立法，比如REINS法案，这个法案要求所有每年花费一亿美元以上的监管措施都需要国会投票（我希望看到这个阈值越来越低）。国会可以尝试“一进一出”（每批准一项管制必须废弃之前的另一项）措施，就像加拿大已经在尝试的那样，甚至英国的“一进两出”。同时各州也可以设立管制巡察员来对抗已经存在的州法和新条例，挑战联邦政府加于各州的昂贵而又严格的管制——也就是说，各州可以建立自己的麦迪逊组织。 Murray deals only briefly with the business community’s role in the regulatory reform struggle. He notes, as economist Joseph Schumpeter did long ago, that, in the political world, business has too often been passive, or slipped into cronyism. Murray discusses the many reasons for this passivity. Firms are vulnerable to political retaliation, media attacks, shareholder activism, and consumer boycotts. Yet, Schumpeter also noted that business has critical resources—personnel, information, marketing and communication skills—needed for political success. And, as Murray notes, factors such as the slowing of innovation and the need for greater flexibility to operate in a global economy may be persuading some in the business community that this is a fight they must join and win. To do so, they need to ally with free market policy groups. 穆瑞只用了寥寥几笔简短地阐述了商业团体在改革中的角色。就像经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特很久以前就说过的那样，他认为在政治领域，企业要么消极被动，要么掉入裙带关系的陷阱。穆瑞认为以下几点造成了他们的消极。企业在政治报复，媒体攻击，股东维权，以及消费者抵制面前非常脆弱。但是熊彼特也指出，企业拥有重要的资源——人力，信息，市场和交流手段——这些都和政治成功有密切联系。此外，穆瑞也认为创新的减速和全球市场对运营灵活性提出的更高要求，会迫使企业加入这场战斗。为了获胜，他们必须和推广自由市场政策的组织结盟。 There are mutual advantages to such an alliance. Free market policy organizations are less vulnerable to political pressures, more credible as spokespeople, and skilled at crafting and promoting the narratives needed to advance the moral and intellectual case for reform. Meanwhile, businesspeople possess the localized knowledge, resources, and real-world experience to convey the human costs of overregulation. Businesses also enjoy cooperative links with their customers, employees, suppliers, and investors—relationships that give them both an audience and the clout to advance powerful narratives. 这种联盟可以给双方都带来好处。推广自由市场政策的组织更能应对政治压力，作为面对公众的发言人更容易被信任，并且擅长制造更具道德优势和知识水平的宣传攻势。同时，企业家具有本土化的知识、资源、和实打实的经验来转移过度管制的人力成本。企业家也更喜欢和他们客户、雇员、供应商、投资者的合作关系，这些人既是他们宣传的听众，也是推行这些宣传的重要力量。 In democratic market economies, most policy changes result from alliances of economic and moral interests. And indeed, such “Bootlegger and Baptist” alliances have long been a standard strategy used by those seeking greater political control of the economy. The cooperative efforts of trial lawyers and environmentalists, of consumer advocates and labor unions, explain much of the growth in regulation over the last decades. Our challenge, developed by Murray so well, is to learn from their successes. 在奉行市场经济的民主国家中，大部分政策改变都来自于经济利益和道德诉求的结合。实际上，类似“走私犯和教徒”的联盟很长时间以来一直是寻求对经济的更强政治控制的标准途径。诉讼律师、环保主义者、消费者保护组织，以及工会之间的合作，很大程度上导致了近几十年来增加的各种管制。正如穆瑞也提到过的，我们的挑战，就是从他们的成功中汲取经验。 Murray’s enthusiasm for reform is commendable, but those excited by his audacious plan must hope that he will lead an effort to advance it further. Stimulating resistance to regulation is key, but more will be needed to actually roll back Leviathan. The Progressives were successful in crafting the regulatory path to their goals, marketing that policy and gaining the influence and popular support to make it the dominant reality. Murray’s and our challenge is to find an equally effective strategy for economic liberalization. And Murray is well placed to suggest those next steps, having laid the intellectual groundwork for welfare reform in the 1990s, with his classic book, Losing Ground. Could Murray’s latest book provide the foundation for a new Doer/Thinker alliance? Stay tuned. 穆瑞对于改革的热情是值得赞扬的，但是那些因他的大胆计划而激动不已的人必须寄希望于他能更加完善这项计划。激起对管制的抵抗是关键，但更重要的是把权力关回笼子。进步派成功地借助管制实现了他们的目的，并且通过推销他们的策略，争取影响力和公众支持来使这些管制难以撼动。穆瑞和我们的挑战，是找出一套同样有效的策略来实现经济自由。在他的经典著作《倒退》中，穆瑞恰当的指出了，这些步骤如何为1990年代的福利改革打下了智识基础。那么，穆瑞的新书会为新一轮的实践家和思想家结盟提供基础吗？敬请期待。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Nevada’s Voucher Breakout 内华达州的教育券突围 作者：WSJ @ 2015-9-01 译者：淡蓝 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：WSJ，http://www.wsj.com/articles/nevadas-voucher-breakout-1441150012 Unions and the ACLU fight universal statewide school choice. 工会正和美国公民自由联盟一起反对全州普适择校 The hullabaloo over Common Core is obscuring some major school choice flashpoints in the states. Consider Nevada, where the union for the public school status quo is suing to block revolutionary education savings accounts. 围绕“公共核心”的喧闹，盖住了各州主要的择校热点问题。看看内华达州，为公立学校现状发声的工会，正在通过起诉来到达封锁革命性的教育储蓄账户的目的。 Earlier this summer Nevada Republicans established universal education savings accounts (ESAs), which allow all parents who withdraw their kids from public schools to spend state funds on private school tuition, textbooks, tutoring fees and special services. Jeb Bush last month praised Nevada’s ESAs as a model for “total voucherization,” which is scaring the unions silly. 今年夏初，内华达州的共和党人建立了普适教育储蓄账户（ESAs)， 允许所有家长，在把孩子从公立学校退学之后，可以用州立基金来给孩子交私立学校的学费、书本费、家教费和特殊教育服务费。上个月，Jeb Bush称赞这是个"教育券全面化"的典范，这可把工会吓傻了。 Starting next year, parents who opt out of public schools can receive between 90% and 100% of the statewide average per-pupil allotment ($5,100 to $5,700) depending on their income. Unused funds can be rolled over for future expenses including college. According to the Friedman Foundation, ESAs will cover between 60% and 80% of the median tuition at private schools, many of which provide additional financial assistance. 自明年始，选择让自己的孩子退出公立学校的家长们，根据收入不同，可以拿到全州学生平均拨款的90%到100%（即5100 至5700美元）。未用完的资金可以结转为将来使用，包括上大学的费用。据Friedman基金会说，教育储蓄账户可以覆盖私立学校中位学费的60%到80%，且这种私立学校大多会提供额外的助学金。 Twenty-three states have enacted 48 private-school choice programs, but nearly all include income and eligibility caps. Four states other than Nevada—Arizona, Florida, Tennessee and Mississippi—offer ESAs that are limited to special needs or low-income students. 有23个州已经立法实施了48个私立学校择校方案，只是几近所有的方案都包含有收入和资格限制。与内华达州不同，有四个州——亚利桑那，佛罗里达，田纳西和密西西比——要求教育储蓄账户限用于特殊需求或低收入家庭学生。 Unions are desperate to prevent Nevada’s model from spreading. They argue that giving all parents these educational options will destroy public schools, but the real point is to break up the union monopoly. Universal ESAs give all low and middle-income students the ability to escape failing schools, while providing enough funding to seed alternatives. 为阻止内华达州模式的蔓延，工会已不顾一切。他们认为，赋予所有家长以教育选择，这对公立学校将是毁灭性的，但真正的要点是它会打破工会的垄断。在提供足够资金扶植替代选择的同时，普适教育储蓄账户会使所有低收入和中等收入家庭的学生有能力避开不合格的学校。 The American Civil Liberties Union last week took up the union water cannon. It argued in a lawsuit that ESAs violate the Nevada constitution’s ban on “public funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal” being used for a “sectarian purpose” and undermine “the public school system that the State is constitutionally required to support.” 美国公民自由联盟上周拿起了工会的水枪。在一起诉讼中，它辩称，教育储蓄账户违反了内华达州宪法禁止"任何种类或性质的公共基金，无论是州立、县立或市立"被用于"宗派目的"的规定，并从根本上破坏了"宪法规定州必须支持的公立学校系统"。 This is a legal Hail Mary. Dozens of state constitutions include these so-called Blaine amendments, which are a legacy of the anti-Catholic bigotry of the 19th century. Most state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark 2011 ruling, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, have interpreted these prohibitions narrowly. The High Court ruled that tax credits to nonprofits that fund private school scholarships aren’t government expenditures. 这真是个法律上的孤注一掷。数十个州的宪法包含有这类所谓的布莱恩修正案，这是19世纪反天主教偏执狂的一份遗产。在2011年亚利桑那州基督教学校学费组织诉Winn案中，绝大多数州法院和美国联邦最高法院在其具有里程碑意义的裁定中，都已狭义地解释过这些禁令。高等法院裁定，给予旨在资助私立学校奖学金的非营利组织的那些税收优惠，不属于政府支出。 Last year the Arizona Supreme Court upheld an appellate decision that ESAs are constitutional because they are “neutral in all respects toward religion” and direct “aid to a broad class of individuals without reference to religion.” What’s more, “the specified object of the ESA is the beneficiary families, not private or sectarian schools.” 去年，亚利桑那州最高法院维持了一项上诉判决，认为教育储蓄账户符合宪法，因为它们是"在各方面对于宗教均属中立"，并且“直接帮助了大量与宗教无关的个体"。更重要的是，"教育储蓄账户指定的对象是受益家庭，不是私人或者宗派学校"。 The Institute for Justice, which helped defend Arizona’s ESAs and craft Nevada’s, notes that it is “the independent decision-making by parents that severs any link between church and state.” ESAs give “parents a genuine choice as to how to spend the money.” If ESAs are unconstitutional, then so are state Medicaid reimbursements to religiously affiliated hospitals. 帮助保卫亚利桑那州教育储蓄账户并帮助精心构建内华达州教育储蓄账户的“正义协会"指出，教育储蓄账户是"家长们的独立决策，切断了所有政教关连"。它给了"家长们一个真正的选择机会来决定如何花这些钱"。如果教育储蓄账户是违宪的，那各州给宗教附属医院报销的国家医疗补助也同样是。 It’s both a shame and reflection of modern liberal politics that the ACLU is teaming up with the teachers union to squash educational freedom. 美国公民自由联盟与教师工会结盟，一起压制教育自由，这不仅是一种耻辱，也是对现代自由派政治面目的一个真实写照。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Imperial exams and human capital 科举考试与人力资本 作者：Stephen Hsu @ 2015-5-20 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Information Processing，http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2015/05/imperial-exams-and-human-capital.html The dangers of rent seeking and the educational signaling trap. Although the imperial examinations were probably g loaded (and hence supplied the bureaucracy with talented administrators for hundreds of years), it would have been better to examine candidates on useful knowledge, which every participant would then acquire to some degree. 寻租的危险和教育信号陷阱。尽管科举考试基于一般智力因素（因此几百年来为官僚机构输送了很多优秀的行政人员）【校注：G因素，或一般智力因素，心理学上指人类一切认知活动都依赖的智力因素】，但如果它考察的是候选者的实用知识，那会更好，这样每个候选者都可以对这种知识有所掌握。 See also Les Grandes Ecoles Chinoises and History Repeats. 另请参考我的博文：“中国大学”和“历史在重复”

Farewell to Confucianism: The Modernizing Effect of Dismantling China’s Imperial Examination System Ying Bai The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 这里是香港科技大学Ying Bai的论文“告别儒家：中国废除科举制度的现代化影响” Imperial China employed a civil examination system to select scholar bureaucrats as ruling elites. This institution dissuaded high-performing individuals from pursuing some modernization activities, such as establishing modern firms or studying overseas. This study uses prefecture-level panel data from 1896-1910 to compare the effects of the chance of passing the civil examination on modernization before and after the abolition of the examination system. 中华帝国采用科举考试制度筛选士大夫来作为统治精英。这一机制阻止了优秀的个人从事一些现代化的活动，如建立现代企业或者去海外学习。本研究使用了从1896年到1910年废科举前后的府级名册数据，来考察科举晋身机会对现代化的影响。 Its findings show that prefectures with higher quotas of successful candidates tended to establish more modern firms and send more students to Japan once the examination system was abolished. As higher quotas were assigned to prefectures that had an agricultural tax in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643) of more than 150,000 stones, I adopt a regression discontinuity design to generate an instrument to resolve the potential endogeneity, and find that the results remain robust. 研究结果表明，废科举之后，那些科举取士配额较多的府建立的现代企业更多，向日本派遣的留学生也更多。由于那些在明朝时期（1368-1643）缴纳农业税超过15万石的府拥有的取士配额更多，我采用断点回归方法生成了一种工具，以解决潜在的内生相关性问题，发现结果依然稳固。【校注：此为论文“摘要”】

From the paper: 论文内容摘录：

Rent seeking is costly to economic growth if “the ablest young people become rent seekers [rather] than producers” (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991: 529). Theoretical studies suggest that if a society specifies a higher payoff for rent seeking rather than productive activities, more talent would be allocated in unproductive directions (Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 1993). 对于经济增长来说，寻租行为代价非常昂贵——如果“最优秀的年轻人倾向于成为寻租者，而不是生产者” (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991: 529) 的话。理论研究表明，如果社会让寻租行为比生产行为获利更多的话，更多有才能的人将会被分配到不事生产的方向(Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 1993)。 This was the case in late Imperial China, when a large part of the ruling class – scholar bureaucrats – was selected on the basis of the imperial civil examination. The Chinese elites were provided with great incentives to invest in a traditional education and take the civil examination, and hence few incentives to study other “useful knowledge” (Kuznets 1965), such as Western science and technology.2 Thus the civil examination constituted an institutional obstacle to the rise of modern science and industry (Baumol 1990; Clark and Feenstra 2003; Huff 2003; Lin 1995). 这就是中华帝国晚期的情况，统治阶级的很大一部分——即士大夫们——以科举考试的形式选拔出来。中国的精英们具有极大的激励来投资于传统教育，并且参加科举考试，因此对于其他“实用知识”就不那么热情了(Kuznets 1965)，比如说西方科学技术。这样，科举考试就构成了现代科学技术发展的制度性障碍(Baumol 1990; Clark and Feenstra 2003; Huff 2003; Lin 1995)。 This paper identifies the negative incentive effect of the civil exam on modernization by exploring the impact of the system’s abolition in 1904-05. The main empirical difficulty is that the abolition was universal, with no regional variation in policy implementation. To better understand the modernizing effect of the system’s abolition, I employ a simple conceptual framework that incorporates two choices open to Chinese elites: to learn from the West and pursue some modernization activities or to invest in preparing for the civil examination. 本文通过探索1904-1905年间废除科举考试的影响，来鉴别科举考试对于现代化的负面激励效应。主要的实证困难在于这一废除举动是全国性的，没有政策实施上的地区差异。为了更好地理解废除科举体制对于现代化建设的影响，我采用了一个简单的概念框架，其中包括了中国精英们在当时的两个选项：向西方学习并实行一些现代化举动，或是为准备科举考试而增加投入。 In this model, the elites with a greater chance of passing the examination would be less likely to learn from the West; they would tend to pursue more modernization activities after its abolition. Accordingly, the regions with a higher chance of passing the exam should be those with a larger increase in modernization activities after the abolition, which makes it possible to employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method to identify the causal effect of abolishing the civil examination on modernization. 在这个模型中，那些更有可能通过科举考试的精英们将不太可能向西方学习；而废除科举后他们将倾向于更多进行现代化活动。于是，科举晋身机会更大的地区应当也是那些废除科举之后现代化活动更为活跃的地区，这就使得我可以采用双重差分（DID）方法来鉴别废除科举制对于现代化的因果效应。 I exploit the variation in the probability of passing the examination among prefectures – an administrative level between the provincial and county levels. To control the regional composition of successful candidates, the central government of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) allocated a quota of successful candidates to each prefecture. In terms of the chances of individual participants – measured by the ratio of quotas to population – there were great inequalities among the regions (Chang 1955). 我利用了不同府在科举通过率上的差异——“府”这一地方的管理层级介于省级和县级之间。为了控制中选者的地域构成，清王朝（1644-1911）把取士名额分配到府。以个人投考者的成功率衡量——以配额占总人口比率计——不同地区很不平均（Chang 1955）。 To measure the level of modernization activities in a region, I employ (1) the number of newly modern private firms (per million inhabitants) above a designated size that has equipping steam engine or electricity as a proxy for the adoption of Western technology and (2) the number of new Chinese students in Japan – the most import host country of Chinese overseas students (per million inhabitants) as a proxy of learning Western science. Though the two measures might capture other things, for instance entrepreneurship or human capital accumulation, the two activities are both intense in modern science and technology, and thus employed as the proxies of modernization. ... 为衡量某个地区的现代化活动水平，我采用了（1）新成立的、具有一定规模、并应用了蒸汽机或者电力的现代私企数量（每百万居民），来代表对于西方科技的应用情况；以及（2）（每百万居民中）新近去往日本的中国留学生数量（日本是中国海外留学生的最主要目的地），来代表对于西方科学的学习情况。虽然这两者可能都会捕捉到其他东西，比如企业家或者人力资本积累，但这两个活动在现代科学技术中都是非常剧烈的，所以可用于代表现代化进程……

From Credentialism and elite employment: 以下摘自我之前的博文“文凭主义与精英雇佣”：

Evaluators relied so intensely on “school” as a criterion of evaluation not because they believed that the content of elite curricula better prepared students for life in their firms – in fact, evaluators tended to believe that elite and, in particular, super-elite instruction was “too abstract,” “overly theoretical,” or even “useless” compared to the more “practical” and “relevant” training offered at “lesser” institutions – but rather due to the strong cultural meanings and character judgments evaluators attributed to admission and enrollment at an elite school. I discuss the meanings evaluators attributed to educational prestige in their order of prevalence among respondents. ... 评价者们过于依赖于把“学校”作为评估的标准，这不是因为他们相信精英教育的内容可以使学生更善于应对公司生活——事实上，评价者倾向于相信，与“更差”的机构所提供的更“实用”和“更有意义”的训练相比，精英教育、特别是超级精英教育“太抽象”、“过于理论化”、甚或是“根本没用”——而是因为评价者给精英学校的招生录取赋予了丰厚的文化内涵和个性判断。我将按照它们各自在受访者中的流行程度次序，来讨论评价者在教育声望上所赋予的意义……

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超越邓巴数#3：祖先的记忆 辉格 2015年9月21日 早期人类社会不仅都是小型熟人社会，而且其中成员都是亲缘相当近的亲属，通常由少则六七个多则二十几个扩展大家庭组成；因为规模太小，这样的群体不太可能是将通婚关系限于其内部的内婚群体，而只能实行外婚，实际上往往是从夫居的外婚父系群，即，男性成年后留在出生群体内，女性则嫁出去，加入丈夫所在群体。 之所以父系群更为普遍，同样是因为战争；首先，群体间冲突的一大动机和内容便是诱拐或掳掠对方女性，而诱拐掳掠的结果自然是从夫居。 其次，在两性分工中，战争从来都是男性的专属，因而男性之间的紧密合作对于群体的生存繁荣更为重要，而我们知道，在缺乏其他组织与制度手段的保障时，亲缘关系是促成和强化合作关系的首要因素，而父系群保证了群内男性有着足够近的亲缘。 然而，也正是因为战争所需要的群体内合作倚重于亲缘关系，对紧密合作的要求也就限制了群体规模；因为亲缘关系要转变成合作意愿，需要相应的识别手段，否则，即便一种基于亲缘的合作策略是有利的，也是无法实施的；而随着代际更替，亲缘渐疏，到一定程度之后亲缘关系就变得难以识别了。 对于某位男性来说，群体内其他男性的脸上并未写着“这是我的三重堂兄弟，和我有着1/64的亲缘”，他头脑里也不可能内置了一个基于汉密尔顿不等式（rB>C）的亲选择算法，实际的亲选择策略，只能借助各种现成可用的间接信号，以及对这些信号敏感的情感机制，来引出大致符合策略要求的合作行为。 传统社会常见的父系扩展家庭里，几位已婚兄弟连同妻儿共同生活于同一家户，他们的儿子们（一重堂兄弟）从小一起玩耍，常被同一位祖母照顾，听同一位祖父讲故事，就很容易发展出家人间的亲密感，这种情感将维持终身，此后，当他们自己有幸成为父亲和祖父时，这一亲情便能够在他们各自带领的扩展家庭之间建立起强有力的合作纽带。 考虑到远古人类的寿命限制，很少有人能活着成为曾祖父，所以最理想情况下，一个人丁兴旺的家族，八九位已成为祖父的堂兄弟，各自率领着三四个核心家庭，构成一个五级父系群，其中辈份最低者拥有共同高祖父，这是个人能够从常规生活经历中感知到的亲缘关系的极限，而这个父系群的在世人数恰好接近邓巴数，当然，多数父系群没这么兴旺，因而人数会更少。 事实上，人类学家也发现，生活在前定居社会的人们，对祖先的记忆多半只限于祖父一辈，再往前就是一片朦胧，往往连名字都说不出；所以，若要将父系群扩展到更大规模，而同时又保持足够紧密的合作，必须借助其他手段来分辨亲缘关系。 办法之一是强化对共同祖先的记忆，在没有文字的时代，这不是件轻松的任务；用图腾和族徽等视觉符号来标识共同祖先和氏族身份，或许是最普遍的解决方案；另一种常见做法是，将从群体共祖通往在世者的系谱编成歌谣或口诀，在各种仪式性场合反复念诵，从而时常唤起在场者的祖先记忆。 南太平洋的萨摩亚人在这件事上就表现的特别认真，每个氏族都有一套叙述系谱的口诀，叫法阿鲁派加（fa'alupega），在萨摩亚村庄处理公共事务的政治集会福努（fono）上，每当一位酋长（代表村里一个氏族）入场时，所有在场的其他酋长都要吟诵前者的法阿鲁派加，表示对其身世的认可，当集会临近结束时，这一吟诵仪式会再重复一遍。 实际上，从自己的本名开始向前追溯、罗列一串父系祖先名，是初民社会中十分流行的做法，在形成稳定的姓氏之前，这是在正式场合称呼人名的常见方式，罗列的长度视需要而定，推测起来，很可能一直罗列到所有在场者的共祖为止，或者到某位声誉卓著的先辈。 这种呼名方式在现代阿拉伯人中仍可见到，而在其他民族中，长串父祖名（patronyms）逐渐被姓氏所取代，但往往仍保留一个父名作为中间名，比如斯拉夫人和荷兰人；出于类似理由，许多民族的多数姓氏，是由父名固化而来，犹太人姓名中的“ben”、阿拉伯人的“ibn”、北欧人的“-son”、爱尔兰人的“Mac-”、诺曼人的“Fitz-”，皆源于此类实践。 东亚人更熟悉的强化记忆方式，是立牌位、建宗庙、修祠堂，还有各种祭祖仪式，类似的祖先崇拜与祭祀活动几乎存在于所有定居社会（后来有些社会缺失这些仪式，通常是因为被晚近发展起来的某种高级宗教排挤了）；这些仪式表面上的理由是告慰祖先灵魂，实际上却履行着记忆共同祖先，族内定期聚会以强化血缘纽带，最终巩固群体内合作关系的社会功能。 每个定居民族都有自己的创世神话和始祖传说，始祖常常还会兼任创世之神，在吟诵和记忆共同祖先的一次次努力中，这些始祖的名称、形象和故事被固定下来，随着世代更替而逐渐变得遥远而神秘，最终被神化，或者被附会到某个既已存在的神灵上；这些神话的用意，并非像后来的哲学家那样，试图为世界存在或人类起源给出一个可信解释，而只是强化血缘纽带的一种叙事方式。 然而，祖先记忆和氏族历史叙事，只能为合作提供一种动机，尽管很重要，但并不能解决群体扩大之后必定带来的内部冲突；当父系群规模超出邓巴数时，其中关系最远的青年已是三重或四重堂兄弟，亲缘系数（r）只有1/64或1/128，这么弱的亲缘，很难说服个人冒着牺牲重大利益的风险去和并无深交的远亲合作，只有在群体面临急迫的外部威胁，或者在多方混战中选择站在哪一边、与谁结盟这种场合，才能起些作用。 要组成紧密而足够和谐的大型群体，还需要其他手段，最早发展出的办法是强化父权；试想，当前述五级父系群扩展到六级时，总人数就超出了邓巴数，但是，假如其中各分支的家长有能力约束其成员的行为，压制其攻击和报复行动（这是群体内冲突的主要来源），那就有了一种突破邓巴限制的方法：现在，群体和谐只需要家长们之间达成紧密合作即可。 如图所示，若每位家长控制一个十几二十人的扩展家庭，并且二三十位家长（他们是三重以内堂兄弟）组成合作联盟，那么群体规模便可达到三四百，而同时，群内每个成员需要长期交往密切合作的熟人数量仍处于邓巴数之下。这样，当分属两个支系的年轻人发生冲突时，纠纷便可由双方家长出面解决，或提交家长会议裁断，并迫使当事人接受裁决结果。 同样，当群体面临外部威胁，或谋求与其他群体结盟，或准备对外发动攻击等公共事务而需要集体行动时，家长联盟将充当决策与执行机构；也可以这样理解：通过强化父权，家长们把家族树最下面一两层排除出了维持群体团结所需要的那个关键合作圈子，从而避开了邓巴限制。 人类学材料显示，上述模式广泛存在于前国家定居社会，而且它正是在定居之后才出现的；游动性的狩猎采集社会大多是平等主义的，没有高度压制性的父权，长辈也很少向晚辈施加强制性规范，而一旦定居下来（或者游动性减弱），父权便出现了，并且在近代化之前的整个文明史上都占据主导地位；当今世界，凡国家权力所不及的定居社会，像阿富汗、索马里、中东和非洲的部落地区，父权仍非常强大，并且是维持基层社会秩序的主要力量。 父权的常见表现有：对家庭财产的控制，并尽可能的延迟分家，控制子女婚姻，社区内的老人政治；因定居而发展出的财产权，是家长执行父权的强大工具，爱尔兰传统社会的家长，会将财产牢牢控制在手里，即便子女都已成家也不分割家产；一些非洲部族的家长更夸张，当家庭财富增长时，优先用于为自己娶更多妻子，生更多孩子，而不是资助成年子女结婚成家（因而多妻往往与强父权相联系）。 这种做法发展到极致时，老男人们几乎垄断了娶妻机会，在非洲班图语民族（例如西非的约鲁巴人和豪萨人，肯尼亚的康巴人）的许多部落中，父权高度发达，多妻制盛行，男性在熬到40岁前很难娶到妻子，而十岁出头的年轻女孩常常被嫁给五六十岁的老男人；贾瑞德·戴蒙德在检查了大量人类学材料后发现，此类现象广泛存在于传统农牧业定居社会中。 其中原理，我们从进化生物学的亲子冲突（parent-offspring conflict）理论的角度可以看得更清楚：尽管父母和子女很大程度上有着共同利益，但两者利益仍有重大区别，父母希望在各子女间恰当分配家庭资源，以便总体上获得最佳繁衍成效，而每个子女都希望更多资源分给自己这一支，所以不希望父亲生太多孩子。 强大的父权改变了亲子冲突中的力量对比，压制了子女需求中偏离父亲愿望的部分，而且宗族组织的发展又强化了这一父权优势：原本，父代的多子策略高度受限于本人寿命，当预期寿命不够长时，继续生育意义就不大了，因为失去父亲保护的孤儿很可能活不到成年，但有了宗族组织，孤儿就有望被亡父的兄弟、堂兄弟和叔伯收养，甚至得到族内救济制度的帮助（救济制度最初就是伴随宗族组织的发达而出现的）。 将亲子冲突理论稍作扩展，可以让我们更好的理解家长制和部落老人政治：个人在家族树上所居层次（俗称辈份）越高，其个体利益和群体利益的重合度就越高，因而长辈总是比晚辈更多的代表群体利益，他们之间若能达成紧密合作，便有望维持群体和谐，并获得集体行动能力，而同时，因为长辈间亲缘更近，长期熟识的几率也更高，因而紧密合作也更容易达成。 父权和家长联盟为扩大父系群提供了组织手段，不过，若仅限于此，群体规模的扩张将十分有限，因为家长联盟的规模本身受限于邓巴数（还要减去每个支系的规模），若要继续扩张，要么让每位家长控制更多成员，要么让家长联盟发展出多个层级，无论哪种安排，高层联盟中的每位成员都将代表一个比扩展家庭更大的支系。 问题是：谁来代表这个支系？假如寿命足够长，一位曾祖父便可代表四世同堂的大家族（比扩展家庭多出一级），但活的曾祖父太少了；一种解决方案是选举，事实上，部落民主制确实存在于一些古代社会；不过，更自然的安排是让长支拥有优先权（说它“自然”是因为其优先权是自动产生的，无须为此精心安排程序机制），比如周代的宗法制，让长支（大宗）对幼支（小宗）拥有某些支配权，并作为族长代表包含二者的上一级支系。 于是就产生了一个三级宗族结构，理论上，这样的安排可以无限制的迭代，从而产生任意规模的宗族，而同时，每一层级的合作圈都限于几十人规模，因而每位家长或族长需要与之保持长期紧密合作关系的人数，也都限于邓巴数之下。 但实际上，组织能力总是受限于交通、通信和信息处理能力等技术性限制，还有更致命的是，委托代理关系和逐级控制关系的不可靠性，随着层级增加，上层族长越来越无法代表下层支系的利益，也越来越难以对后者施加控制，经验表明，具有某种集体行动能力的多级宗族组织，规模上限大约几千，最多上万。 在古代中国，每当蛮族大规模入侵、中原动荡、王朝崩溃、帝国权力瓦解之际，宗族组织便兴旺起来，聚族自保历来是人们应对乱世的最自然反应，古典时代以来的第一轮宗族运动，便兴起于东晋衣冠南渡之时；如果说第一轮运动主要限于士族大家的话，南宋开始的第二轮运动则吸引了所有阶层的兴趣，家族成员无论贫富贵贱都被编入族谱。 和聚居村落的结构布局一样，宗族组织的紧密程度和集体行动能力同样显著相关于所处环境的安全性，华南农耕拓殖前线，或者国家权力因交通不便而难以覆盖的地方，宗族组织便趋于发达和紧密；人类学家林耀华描述的福建义序黄氏宗族，血缘纽带历二十多代六百多年而不断，到1930年代已发展到15个房支，每房又分若干支系，各有祠堂，从核心家庭到宗族，共达七个组织层级，总人口近万。 类似规模的宗族在华南比比皆是，在宗族之间时而发生的大型械斗中，双方常能组织起上千人的参战队伍，可见其规模之大，行动能力之强；华南许多宗族部分的从福建迁入江西，又从江西迁入湖南，但许多迁出支系与留在原地的支系之间仍能保持定期联系。 共同祖先记忆、父权、家长制、族长会议、大型宗族组织，这些由扩大父系群的种种努力所发展出的文化元素，不仅为定居社会的最初大型化创造了组织基础，也为此后的国家起源提供了部分制度准备，父权和族长权，是早期国家创建者所倚赖的诸多政治权力来源之一。 当然，父系结构的扩展只是社会大型化的多条线索之一，要建立起数十上百万人的大型社会，还有很长的路要走，还要等待其他许多方面的文化进化，在后面的文章里，我会继续追寻人类文明的这段旅程。 （本系列文章首发于“大象公会”，纸媒转载请先征得公会同意。）  

Europe: When the Macro Overshadows the Micro 欧洲：当宏观现象掩盖微观动因时 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-8-14 译者：小瑛 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com.br/2015/08/europe-when-macro-overshadows-micro.html Christian Thimann currently works with the French investment bank AXA while also holding an academic position at the Paris School of Economics. However, from 2008 to 2013 he was Director General and Adviser to the President at the European Central Bank, which makes his views on the economics and politics of the euro crisis especially worth considering. 在巴黎经济学院担任教职的Christian Thimann目前正与法国投资银行安盛合作。他在2008至2013年间曾任欧洲中央银行行长顾问，这个经历使他对欧元危机的相关经济和政治观点变得尤为重要。 He lays out his perspective in "The Microeconomic Dimensions of the Eurozone Crisis and Why European Politics Cannot Solve Them," which appears in the Summer 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Like all JEP articles, it is freely available online courtesy of the American Economic Association. (Full disclosure: I've worked as Managing Editor of JEP since the first issue of the journal in 1987.) 他在《经济展望杂志》2015年夏季刊上发表的“欧元区危机的微观视角，及为什么欧洲政治无法解决危机”一文，详细阐述了他的观点。像所有《经济展望杂志》刊登的文章一样，美国经济学会将其免费放到网上供大家阅览。（好吧我承认：我从1987年《经济展望杂志》创刊号开始就担任责任编辑）。 On the economics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the problems have microeconomic roots, not just macroeconomic ones. Here are a couple of intriguing figures. Thimann points out that since the inception of the euro, some economies have consistently run trade surpluses, while others have consistently run trade deficits. This figure shows the cumulative trade surpluses and deficits over time. What's especially interesting to me is the relative steadiness of these lines: countries with trade surpluses tend to add surpluses every year, countries with deficits tend to add deficits every year. Thimann认为，欧元区经济问题的根源不止在宏观，也有微观层面的根源。以下是一些有趣的图表。Thimann指出，自从欧元诞生开始，某些经济体持续贸易顺差而另一些一直贸易逆差。下图展示了各国历年来的累计贸易顺差和逆差。让我特别感兴趣的是这些曲线的相对恒定性：贸易顺差国盈余每年都在增加，而逆差国赤字亦逐年增长。   Thimann argues that a driving factor behind these trade imbalances arises out of the interaction between wages and productivity. If wages in a country are growing a lot faster than productivity, then in effect, the cost of producing in that country is rising and it will be harder for that country to sell in international markets. If two countries share the same currency, so that exchange rate adjustments are not possible, then a country where wages are growing much faster than productivity will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with countries where wage growth is more closely aligned with productivity growth. Thimann points out that in the trade deficit countries, compensation soared well above productivity growth almost as soon as the euro was in place. Thimann认为，这些贸易不平衡是工资和生产率综合作用的结果。如果一国的工资增长速度高于生产率增速，则该国生产成本将上升，因此其产品在国际市场上的销路不会好。如果两国货币相同，无法使用汇率调节手段，那么工资增长快于生产率增长的国家竞争力就不如工资和生产率增长速度相对一致的国家。Thimann指出，在贸易逆差国，薪酬增长速度高于生产率增长速度的现象几乎是与欧元的启用同时发生的。   Why is Greece not shown among the countries here? Thimann writes in the note under the table: "Greece is not shown in the chart because, while the productivity increase is broadly comparable to that of Portugal, the wage growth was even steeper, rising by 2008 to 180 percent of the 1998 value, hence exceeding the scale of the countries shown; wages have declined by about 20 percent since the crisis to 160 percent." 为何上表中没有希腊？Thimann在表注中解释：“表中没有希腊是因为，如果说希腊的生产率增长还能大体与葡萄牙相比的话，那么其工资增长则过于迅速，从1998年到2008年增长了180%，远高于其他国家，乃至无法在同一张表中展示；从危机开始到现在工资已经下降了20%，至160%”。 Why did wages rise so quickly in the trade deficit countries? Some countries saw real estate bubbles or surges in government borrowing that pushed up wages in a way that productivity growth could not sustain. Public-sector wages took off: "Over the first ten years of the euro, public wages grew by 40 percent in the eurozone as a whole and by 30 percent in Germany. But public sector wages rose by 50 percent in France, 60 percent in Italy, 80 percent in Spain, 110 percent in Greece, and 120 percent in Ireland." 为何贸易逆差国的工资增长如此快？有些国家存在房地产泡沫，或过多依靠政府借贷而非生产力的持续增长推动工资增长。公共领域工资暴涨：“欧元启头十年，整个欧元区公共部门工资的平均增长水平是40%，其中德国为30%。而这一数字在法国，意大利，西班牙，希腊和爱尔兰分别是50%，60%，80%，110%和120%。” A common justification given for the rapid wage increases was that price levels in many of the trade deficit countries were rising, often at 6-7% per year, and so there was a perceived need for wages to keep up. But for the purposes of international trade and competitiveness, what matters is the wage--not the rise in local-country prices. 通常对工资迅速增长的辩护是，因为贸易逆差国家物价水平增长迅速，多为每年6%-7%，所以名义工资也要相应增加。但在讨论国际贸易和竞争力问题时，关注点是工资，而不是某国物价。 Thimann goes into some detail about how the trade deficit countries in the eurozone also tended to impose rules and regulations leading to higher wages and restrictions on business. My favorite story of the heavy hand of regulation in Greece is one that Megan Green told on her blog back in 2012, but I've been telling it ever since. It's about finding yourself in a combination bookstore/coffee shop in Athens which, because of regulations, is not allowed at that time to sell books or coffee. Green writes: Thimann还深入细节描述了一个现象：欧元区内贸易赤字国家更倾向于制定提高工资且限制商业的政策和法规。我最喜欢的关于希腊严苛政策的描述，来自Megan Green 2012年发表的一篇博客文章，我经常提起它。文章描述了作者在雅典一家书吧的经历，由于政府规定，这家书吧当时既不能卖书也不能卖咖啡。Green写到：

This is best encapsulated in an anecdote from my visit to Athens. A friend and I met up at a new bookstore and café in the centre of town, which has only been open for a month. The establishment is in the center of an area filled with bars, and the owner decided the neighborhood could use a place for people to convene and talk without having to drink alcohol and listen to loud music. 我在雅典的趣闻能充分说明这一点。我和一个朋友约在市中心一家开业仅一月的书吧见面。这一区周围都是酒吧，店主认为在这里开一间为需要小憩聊天但又不想喝酒精饮料听喧闹音乐的人们服务的店铺是个好主意。 After we sat down, we asked the waitress for a coffee. She thanked us for our order and immediately turned and walked out the front door. My friend explained that the owner of the bookstore/café couldn’t get a license to provide coffee. She had tried to just buy a coffee machine and give the coffee away for free, thinking that lingering patrons would boost book sales. 我们落座后向服务员点了咖啡。她对我们的光顾表示感谢后，立刻转身走出前门。我朋友解释说，店主无法取得出售咖啡的营业执照。她尝试买了一个咖啡机向客人免费提供咖啡，这样吸引客人光顾也能促进图书销售。 However, giving away coffee was illegal as well. Instead, the owner had to strike a deal with a bar across the street, whereby they make the coffee and the waitress spends all day shuttling between the bar and the bookstore/café. My friend also explained to me that books could not be purchased at the bookstore, as it was after 18h and it is illegal to sell books in Greece beyond that hour. I was in a bookstore/café that could neither sell books nor make coffee. 然而，免费提供咖啡也是非法的。店主只能请街对面的酒吧帮忙制作咖啡，而店员要终日往返于书吧和酒吧之间。我朋友还解释说，不能在店里买书，因为18点以后出售图书在希腊是违法的。我光顾的是一家既不能卖书也不能制作咖啡的书吧。

One story like this is a comedy. An economy in which stories like this are commonplace--and which is locked into a free-trade zone with countries sharing a common currency, is a tragedy waiting to happen. 仅仅一则这样的故事还只是趣闻，可是当一个经济体满是此类故事时，灾难随时都可能发生，更何况这个经济体还处于同周边国家共用同一种货币的自由贸易区内。 On the politics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the euro, the European Central Bank, and all the European-wide negotations over debt overshadowing these other issues. Normally, when a democratic country has miserable economic performance with high unemployment and slow growth, a common response is for its citizens to demand some policy changes from their politicians. 就欧元区的政治，Thimann认为，欧元、欧洲央行和有关债务问题的所有全欧层面的谈判掩盖了其他问题。一般情况下，当一个民主国家经济萧条，失业率高且经济增长缓慢时，民众通常会要求政治家修改政策。 But in the euro-zone, when a country has a miserable economic performance, the politicians of that country tell the citizens that it's not their fault. It's all the fault of the Euro-crats in Brussels, or Germans pulling strings behind the scenes, or the ECB. The politicians tell the voters that self-examination unnecessary and even counterproductive, because they to unite against the malign outsiders. 但在欧元区内，当国家经济不振时，政府会向民众辩解这不是他们的错，罪魁祸首是布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员，或是在背后操纵的德国，或是欧洲央行。政客们会告诉选民，自省没有必要甚至起反作用，因为他们要联合起来抵抗外敌。 Here are some concluding thoughts from Thimann: 下面是Thimann的一些结论性观点：

At the core of the economic crisis in the eurozone is the problem of unemployment in several countries. Roughly 18.2 million people are unemployed in early 2015. In about half the eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is below 10 percent, and in Germany it is actually below 5 percent (Eurostat data, February 2015), but in France, 10.7 percent of the labor force are unemployed; in Italy, 12.7 percent; in Portugal, 14.1 percent; in Spain, 23.2 percent; and in Greece, 26.0 percent. ... 欧元区经济危机的核心是一些国家的失业问题。2015年初大约有1820万失业人口。半数欧元国家的失业率在10%以下，德国甚至低于5%（欧盟统计局，2015年2月），但法国有10.7%的劳动人口没有工作，意大利12.7%；葡萄牙14.1%；西班牙23.2%；希腊26%…… It is legitimate to speak about this as a problem for the eurozone in the sense that economic policies in a single currency area are truly a matter of common concern, and also because high unemployment interferes with the smooth functioning of the eurozone, challenging its economic and political cohesion. But it is not accurate to attribute responsibility for the problem, or the solution, to the eurozone as a whole, to European institutions, or to other countries. 我们有理由将此视为一个欧元区问题，因为单一货币区内的经济政策是各国都关注的问题，同时高失业率妨碍欧元区正常运作，挑战其政治和经济凝聚力。但将问题的责任或解决方法归咎于欧元区整体、欧盟机构或其他国家，都是不准确的。 Jobs fail to be created in a number of these countries not because of a “lack of demand” as often claimed, but mainly because wage costs are high relative to productivity, social insurance and tax burdens are heavy, and the business environment is excessively burdensome. All of this should be viewed not in absolute terms,but in relative terms, compared with other economies in Europe and countries around the world where labor costs and productivity are more advantageous, and the business environment is friendlier. 许多国家未能有效创造就业，并不像通常认为的那样是由于“缺乏需求”，主要是因为相对于其生产率水平，工资过高，社会福利和税负过重，商业环境极其不友好。所有这些因素都不能绝对地看，而应相对地看，要和生产成本与生产率更有优势、商业环境更友善的欧洲和全球其他国家放在一起比较研究。 “Europe” is not an all-powerful actor in the field of national economic policies, but only a potentially useful facilitator. Only the country concerned is the legitimate and able party to improve its own economic functioning in line with its social preferences and economic setup. This is why European politics cannot solve the microeconomic dimensions of the eurozone crisis. Within individual countries, it is the governments, administrative authorities, social partners, and all other economic stakeholders that are the legitimate actors in the field of economic and social policies.... “欧洲”在国家层面的经济政策制定上并不是一个有力的参与者，仅有潜在的催化剂作用。只有各相关国家自己才有合法性也有能力依照自身社会偏好和经济结构，设法提高经济运行状况。这就是为什么欧洲政治无法解决欧元区危机微观因素的原因所在。在每一个国家中，经济和社会政策领域中真正有效的参与者是该国的政府，行政机构，社会伙伴和其他经济利益相关者…… For the eurozone countries, their economic and unemployment problems are not primarily a question about some countries versus other countries within the monetary union, but about finding their place in an open global economy—that is, about competing and cooperating successfully with advanced, emerging, and developing economies across the globe. 对欧元区国家，经济和失业问题主要不是货币同盟中国家间的问题，而是能否在开放的全球经济中找到自己的立足点，即成功与全球众多发达、新兴或发展中经济体展开经济合作的问题。 An inward-looking European debate on the distribution of the relative adjustment burden for structural reforms would dramatically overlook the much broader challenges of integration into the global economy. ... It may be more glamorous to focus on European monetary policy, the “European architecture,” or the “bigger macro picture.” But the real issue of—and solution to—the crisis in the eurozone lies in the mostly microeconomic trenches of national economic, social, and structural policies. 关于结构改革带来的重担如何在各国间分配这种纯欧洲内部的争论，会令人极度忽视融入世界经济的挑战……讨论欧洲货币政策，“欧洲铸造者”或“更宏观的图景”等可能显得高大上。但欧元区危机的症结和解决方法所在，主要是国家层面的经济、社会和结构政策的微观经济壕沟。

I think Thimann may understate the fundamental macroeconomic problems that are being created by the presence of the euro (as I've discussed here and here, for example). But he seems to me quite correct to emphasize that many European countries badly need structural, regulatory, and microeconomic adjustments. Moreover, politicians and voters in many of these countries would much rather assail the rest of Europe about international negotiations involving public debt and the euro, rather than face their domestic political issues. 我认为Thimann明白使用欧元带来的基本宏观问题（比如，我在http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2014/02/will-we-look-back-on-euro-as-mistake.html和http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2013/08/a-euro-narrative.html讨论过的）。然而，他所强调的很多欧洲国家急需结构、法规和微观经济调整，在我看来也是合理的。此外，在许多此类国家中，政治家和选民更愿意攻击其他欧洲国家在公共债务和欧元问题国际谈判中的立场，而不是面对本国的政治问题。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State 监管型国家的法治 作者：John Cochrane @ 2015-6 译者：Ether（@大小眼不能飞） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy） 来源：John Cochrane's blog，http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf 1.Introduction 1.引言 The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom. 美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意，而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济，但很少有人认识到，日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁，而这一点恐怕更加重要。 What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board? 银行敢对美联储叫板吗？券商对证券交易委员会（SEC）又敢怎样？医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部（HHS）或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗？一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢？医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗？我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗？ The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support. 这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵，国王之忧还在其次。但是，现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下，各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。 The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around. 过去800年，美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力，保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治，我们的民主脱胎于法治，而非相反。 This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now. 法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今，其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现；也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天，对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张，且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大，或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险，并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。 Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress. 没错，我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身：宽泛模糊的法律，政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。 Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course. 当然，利用法律和规章奖励支持者，惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。 Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger. 富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功，甚至可能延长了大萧条，但在政治上则取得了极大的成功，民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。 A label? 用什么标签好？ I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control. 我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。 Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money. 很多人称之为“社会主义”，但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里，私有企业是存在的，但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织，控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业，它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局，也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。 It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support their regulators politically. But Stigler’s regulators and business golf together and drink together, and the balance power is strongly in the hands of the businesses. “Capture” doesn't see billion-dollar criminal cases and settlements. And “capture” does not describe how national political forces use regulatory power to extract political support. 这也不是“捕获”。乔治·斯蒂格勒描述过受管制的企业“捕获”其监管者的过程，企业借监管之手排除竞争。斯蒂格勒所研究的受管制企业一定会在政治上支持其监管者。但是在斯蒂格勒的叙述中，监管者和商人一起打高尔夫一起喝酒，制衡的权力牢牢地掌握在企业手中。“捕获”中见不着上十亿美元的刑事案件及和解协议。“捕获”也不能描述国家政治力量如何利用监管权力攫取政治支持。 It’s not really “crony capitalism.” That term has a bit more of the needed political flavor than “capture.” Yes, there is a revolving door, connections by which businesses get regulators to do them favors. But what’s missing in both “capture” and “cronyism” is the opposite flow of power, the Devil’s bargain aspect of it from the point of view of the regulated business or individual, the silencing of political opposition by threat of regulation. 这也不是真正的“裙带资本主义”。这个词相比“捕获”多了一份应有的政治意味。的确，这里面有一扇旋转门，企业通过这种关系让监管者们施以援手。但无论“捕获”还是“裙带主义”都没能体现逆向的权力作用。对受管制的企业和个人来说，这是一笔与魔鬼的交易，是通过监管的威胁对政治反对的压制。 We’re headed for an economic system in which many industries have a handful of large, cartelized businesses— think 6 big banks, 5 big health insurance companies, 4 big energy companies, and so on. Sure, they are protected from competition. But the price of protection is that the businesses support the regulator and administration politically, and does their bidding. If the government wants them to hire, or build factory in unprofitable place, they do it. The benefit of cooperation is a good living and a quiet life. The cost of stepping out of line is personal and business ruin, meted out frequently. That’s neither capture nor cronyism. 我们正在迈入这样一种经济体制：很多行业只有少数几家大型的、卡特尔化的企业——比如6家银行、5家健康保险公司、4家能源公司等等。的确，他们受到保护，免于竞争，但保护的代价是企业政治上支持其监管者和行政机关，并听命于它们。如果政府想要他们雇工或者在无法盈利的地方建厂，他们就会照做。合作的好处是日子好过、生活太平。越界的成本就是个人和企业的毁灭，这种惩罚频繁出现。这既不是捕获也不是裙带主义。 “Bureaucratic tyranny,” a phrase that George Nash quotes Herbert Hoover as using is a contender. “官僚暴政”——这个乔治·纳什引自赫伯特·胡佛的短语倒是值得考虑。 Charles Murray, writing recently on the status of the regulatory state notes many of these issues. He totals 4,450 distinct federal crimes— just the law, not including regulations with criminal penalties, or the vastly greater number with civil penalties. He adds up the 175,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the vagueness of the enabling legislation — Congress only decrees that rules are “generally fair and equitable,” “just and reasonable,” prohibits “unfair methods of competition” or “excessive profits.” He notes the absence of judicial rights in administrative courts. He notes the wide scope of regulation and the comparatively tiny — but ruinous to those charged — enforcement: 最近，查尔斯·墨里在论述监管型国家的现状时关注了诸多类似议题。他一共数出了4,450条联邦刑事罪名。这还仅仅是法律规定，不包括附有刑事惩罚的行政规章或者数量更大的附有民事惩罚的规章。他核查了一共175,000页的《美国联邦法规汇编》，以及含糊不清的授权立法条款。国会仅要求规章条款“原则上公平、公正”、“公正、合理”，禁止“不公平竞争”或者“过分利得”。他指出，行政法庭上司法权利缺失。他还指出，规章管辖范围广泛，执法却相对不足，但执法的结果对被控诉者却是毁灭性的： the “Occupational Safety and Health Administration has authority over more than eight million workplaces. But it can call upon only one inspector for about every 3,700 of those workplaces. The Environmental Protection Agency has authority ... over every piece of property in the nation. It conducted about 18,000 inspections in 2013—a tiny number in proportion to its mandate. “职业安全与健康管理局有权管辖超过八百万个工作场所，但是每3,700个工作场所只能均摊到一个巡视员。环境保护署有权管辖美国每一处资产。2013年，它一共进行了18,000次检查，仅是其管辖范围中极小的一部分。” Murray advocates civil disobedience with insurance for the few zebras who get caught by the regulators. 墨里提倡每个公民都购买保险以弥补万一被监管者抓到所带来的损失，同时对管制采取不予合作的态度。 But by and large Murray deplores merely the silliness of and economic inefficiency of the regulatory state. This misses, I think, the greatest danger, that to our political freedom. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect. 但总体而言，墨里憎恶的只是监管型国家的愚蠢和经济不效率。我认为这漏掉了最大的危险，那就是对政治自由的危害。仅仅是想到有可能被环保署拜访这一点，就有显著的噤声效果。 And it also misses, I think, an explanation for how we got here. Regulators and politicians aren’t nitwits. The libertarian argument that regulation is so dumb — which it surely is — misses the point that it is enacted by really smart people. The fact that the regulatory state is an ideal tool for the entrenchment of political power was surely not missed by its architects. 我认为他还漏掉了一点：我们是怎么走到这一步的。监管者和政客都不是傻子。自由意志主义者关于监管很愚蠢的观点，尽管正确，但没有看到一点：这些法律法规也是非常聪明的人制定的。监管型国家的建造者肯定对其是保有政治权力的最佳工具这一点心知肚明。 Likewise, Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen make a good casethat most of the economic rationale for regulation has disappeared along with information. Uber stars are far more effective than the Taxi Commission. But the demand for protection and the desire to trade economic protection for political support will remain unchanged. “Protect the consumer” is as much a distracting argument in the Uber vs. Taxi debate as it was when the medieval guilds advanced it. 同样，亚历克斯·塔巴洛克和泰勒·考恩很好地证明了，大多数赞成监管的经济学原理已经随着充分的信息而消失。优步的星级评定远比出租车委员会有效，但是对监管保护的需求以及用经济上的保护来换取政治上的支持仍然不会改变。在优步和出租车之争中，“保护消费者”不过是个掩人耳目的论点，和中世纪行会利用它时一样。 Rule of Law: the Devil in the Details 法治：细节里的魔鬼 “Rule of law” and “regulation” are dangerous Big Vague Words. The rule of law is so morally powerful that the worst tyrants go through the motions. Stalin bothered with show trials. Putin put Pussy Riot on trial, and then they were “legally” convicted of and jailed for the crime of ”hooliganism.” Even Henry the Eighth had trials before chopping heads. Is this not rule of law? “法治”和“监管”是危险的模糊大词。法治在道德上如此有力，以至于最坏的暴君也要应付一下。斯大林费力搞出走秀似的审判。普京审判暴动小猫【译注：俄罗斯女性主义朋克乐队，经常在各大景点举办有关俄罗斯政治生活的行为艺术表演，都未经政府批准】，然后“依法”宣判“流氓罪”罪名成立并判入狱。甚至亨利八世把那么多人头砍下了之前也经过了审判。这难道不是法治吗？ No, of course, but it’s worth reminding ourselves why not as we think about bureaucracies. 当然不是，但在我们思考官僚体系的时候，值得提醒一下自己，为什么它们不是。 “Rule of law” ultimately is a set of restrictions to keep the state from using its awesome power of coercion to force your political support. If you oppose Castro, you go to prison. If you opposed Herbert Hoover, could you still run a business? Sure. If you oppose President Obama, or the future President Hilary Clinton can you do so? If you oppose the polices of one of their regulatory agencies, now powers unto themselves, or speak out against the leaders of those agencies, can you do so? If you support candidates with unpopular positions, can you still get the regulatory approvals you need? It’s not so clear. That is our danger. “法治”说到底是一系列对国家的限制，防止国家动用可怕的强制权力强迫你的政治支持。如果你反对卡斯特罗，你会被关进监狱。如果你反对赫伯特·胡佛，你还可以经营一家公司吗？当然可以。如果你反对奥巴马总统或者未来的希拉里·克林顿总统呢？如果你反对他们手下某个现已有权有势的监管机构的政策，或是公开反对他们的领导呢，你还可以继续经营公司吗？如果你支持立场不受欢迎的候选人，你还能获得经营公司所需的行政审批吗？答案并不清楚。这就是我们所面临的危险。 “Rule of law” is not just about the existence of written laws, and the superficial mechanics of trials, judges, lawyers, ad sentences. Rule of law lies deep in the details of how those institutions work. Do you have the right to counsel, the right to question witnesses, the right to discovery, the right to appeal, and so forth. Like laws, what matters about regulation, both in its economic efficiency and in its insulation from politics, is not its presence but its character and operation. “法治”不仅仅是成文法和形式上的审判、法官、律师和判决等机制。法治根植于这些制度如何运作的细节中。你是否有权利获得律师辩护、质证、证据开示、上诉，等等。和法律一样，不管是从经济效率还是政治独立性上来说，监管的要害不在于它的存在，而在于它的特点和操作。 Regulators write rules too. They fine you, close down your business, send you to jail, or merely harass you with endless requests, based on apparently written rules. We need criteria to think about whether “rule of law” applies to this regulatory process. Here are some suggestions. 监管者也制定规则。他们依据成文法开罚单、关闭你的公司、送你入监，或者就不停地提要求骚扰你。我们需要一些标准来思考“法治”一词是否适用于这套监管程序。以下是一些建议：

Rule vs. Discretion? 规则vs自由裁量？ Simple/precise or vague/complex? 简单／准确，还是模糊／复杂？ Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? 可知的规则vs溯及既往？ Permission or rule book? 批准，还是规则手册 Plain text or fixers? 直白文本，还是掮客？ Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? 普通执法还是专断执法？ Right to discovery and challenge decisions. 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。 Right to appeal. 上诉权。 Insulation from political process. 与政治活动隔离。 Speed vs. delay？ 快捷还是拖延？ Consultation, consent of the governed. 被治理人的意见和合意。  

• Rule vs. Discretion?
• 规则vs自由裁量？

This is really a central distinction. Does the regulation, in operation, function as a clear rule? Or is it simply an excuse for the regulator to impose his or her will on the regulated firm or person? Sometimes discretion is explicit. Sometimes discretion comes in the application of a rule book thousands of pages long with multiple contradictory and vague rules. 这是一个核心区别。在操作中规章是不是作为明确的规则发挥作用？还是规章仅是监管者对被监管公司和个人施加自身意志的借口？有时候自由裁量是很明确的，有时候自由裁量则来自对上千页且存在大量冲突、模糊规则的规章手册的运用。

• Simple/precise or vague/complex?
• 简单／准确还是模糊／复杂？

Regulations can be simple and precise — even if silly. “Any structure must be set back six feet from the property line” is simple and precise. Or the regulation can be long, vague and complex. “The firm shall not engage in abusive practices.” 规章可以简单、准确，即使其很愚蠢。例如“所有建筑必须在界址线后6英尺”，这就很简单、准确。规章也可以很长、模糊且复杂，比如“公司不允许从事违规行为”。 Many regulations go on for hundreds of pages. Long, vague, and complex is a central ingredient which gives the appearance of rules but amounts to discretion. 很多规章长达数百页。冗长、模糊、复杂是让规则成为自由裁量，只具有规则的表象的核心因素。

• Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions?
• 可知的规则vs溯及既往？

Is the rule book knowable ex ante? Or is it, in application, simply a device for ex-post prosecutions. Insider trading rules are, at present, a good example of the latter. The definition of “insider” varies over time, and there is really little hope for a firm to read a coherent rule book to know what is and is not allowed. Much better to stay on good terms with the regulator. 规则事先可知吗？还是其实只是一种溯及既往的工具。内幕交易规则就是后一种情况的很好例子。“内幕”的定义随时间而变，公司几乎不可能从一本融贯的规则手册中知道什么是允许的，什么不被允许。与其如此，还远不如和监管者搞好关系。

• Permission or rule book?
• 批准还是规则手册？

In one kind of regulation, there is a rule book. If you follow the rule book, you’re ok. You go ahead and do what you want to do. In much regulation, however, you have to ask for permission from the regulator, and that permission includes a lot of discretion. Environmental review is a good example. 有一种监管，依据就是一本规则手册。只要你遵循上面的规则就没事，你可以做其他任何你想做的。但是有很多监管，你需要征得监管者的批准，而批准则包括了很多自由裁量。环境审评就是一个好例证。

• Plain text or fixers?
• 通俗文本还是掮客？

Can a normal person read the plain text of the rule, and understand what action is allowed or not? Or is the rule so complex that specialists are required to understand the rule, and the regulatory agency’s current interpretation of the rule? In particular, are specialists with internal agency contacts necessary, or specialists who used to work at the agency? 一个普通人是否能够阅读规则的文本并理解何种行为被允许，何种不被允许？还是规则太复杂，想要理解规则需要专家，需要依靠监管机构对规则的最新阐释？特别是，是不是需要一个拥有监管机构内部关系的专家或者是前工作人员？ As a private pilot, I often bristle at the FAA’s mindless bureaucracy and the plain silliness of much of their regulation. But to their credit, there is a strong culture that the plain text of the rule counts, and each pilot should read the rules and know what they mean. That is a system much harder to misuse. Financial, banking, environmental, health care, and housing regulation stand on the opposite end of the spectrum. 作为一个私人飞行员，我经常恼怒于联邦航空管理局的无脑官僚做派和很多愚蠢的规章。但是有一点不得不承认，他们那里盛行一种文化，就是保持规则文本的通俗易懂，每一位飞行员都应该能读懂规则。在这种体制下，监管者滥用规则的难度就会加大。但金融、银行、环境、医疗保健、住房的规章却完全处于光谱的相反一端。

• Enforced commonly or arbitrarily?
• 普通执法还是专断执法？

Regulations that are seldom enforced, but then used occasionally to impose enormous penalties are clearly more open to political abuse. If Americans commit three felonies a dayin “conspiracy,” internet use, endangered species, wetlands, or employment and immigration regulations (just to start), but one in a hundred thousand is ever prosecuted, just who gets prosecuted is obviously ripe for abuse. 很少执行但偶尔用来施加重罚的规章显然更易被滥用。如果美国人每天都在有关“合谋”、互联网使用、濒危物种、湿地或雇佣和移民等等规章（远远还没数完）下犯下三项重罪，但是只有十万分之一的机率被起诉，那么挑谁来起诉这件事显然就成了滥权的温床。

• Right to discovery, see evidence, and challenge decisions.
• 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。

Do you have the right to know how a regulatory agency decided your case? Step by step, what assumptions, calculations, or interpretations did it use? Often not, and even in high profile cases. 你是否有权知道监管机构是如何裁决你的案子的？每一步，他们用了什么假设、如何计算或者解释？通常你无权知道，即使是要案。 For example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverageof Met Life’s “systemic” designation reports 比如，《华尔街日报》关于大都会人寿保险公司被划定为具有“系统性风险”的报道写道： The feds ...still refuse to say exactly which [threats] make MetLife a systemic risk or what specific changes the company could make to avoid presenting such a risk. “联邦政府……依然拒绝说明是什么（威胁）使得大都会保险公司具有系统性风险或者公司可以通过何种具体的改变来避免出现这种风险。” and continues ...MetLife says that…the government’s decision is based on mere speculation and “undisclosed evidentiary material.” 接着又提到： “大都会保险公司表示……政府的裁决是基于纯粹臆测以及‘未公开的证明材料’。” Since the case is still being decided, the point here is not the correctness or not of these charges. But the charges are a clear example of the kind of regulation that can go wrong (In fact, the miracle of the MetLife case is that the company had the chutzpah to sue. They are taking a big bet that FSOC doesn’t believe in revenge.) 因为案件尚无定论，这里的重点并非这些指控正确与否，而是这些指控作为一个清楚的例证，表明监管可以变味。（事实上，大都会保险公司一案的奇迹在于公司竟然敢起诉监管机构。他们在金融稳定监督委员不会报复上面押了好大一注。）

• Right to appeal.
• 上诉权。

And not just to the same agency that makes the decision! In law, the right to appeal is central. In regulation, the right to appeal is often only to appeal to the same agency that made the decision. The Chevron doctrine severely limits your ability to appeal regulatory decisions (and the regulations themselves) to any outside entity. As an example, continuing the above MetLife coverage, 这里说的不仅仅是向作出裁决的机构提出上诉！法律上，上诉权是核心。在监管中，上诉权通常只是向作出行政裁决的同一机构提出上诉。“雪佛龙原则”严重地限制了你向机构外其他实体对监管裁决（和监管本身）提起上诉的能力。作为例子，我们接着看关于大都会保险公司一案的报道。 The ... stability council “lacks any separation in its legislative, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.” That combined with MetLife’s inability to see the full record on which the decision was based made it “impossible” to get a fair hearing. 金融稳定监督委员会“缺乏立法、调查、起诉和司法各职能的分立”。加上大都会无法看到裁决依据的完整记录，这使得他们“不可能”得到一个公平的听证。 As in law, secret evidence, secret decisions, secret testimony; and legislature, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled in to one are classic ingredients for subverting rule of law. And, eventually, for using the machinery of law to silence political opposition. 和在法律领域一样，秘密证据、秘密裁决、秘密证词以及立法、起诉、判决、陪审和执行不加区分都是破坏法治的典型元素。最终，它们都是为了利用法律机器来压制政治反对。

• Insulation from political process.
• 与政治活动隔离。

There are many structures in place to try to ensure the “independence” of independent agencies. There is also a tension that we live in a democracy, so independent agencies can’t be too independent if they have great discretionary power. 目前有很多架构想要确保独立机构的“独立”。但在民主国家，这也带来一个内在的压力。独立机构如果有很大的裁量权，那就不可能太独立。 These important structures try to limit explicit party politics’ use of the regulatory state. They are less successful at limiting the bureaucracy’s use of its regulatory power to prop up its own separate fiefdom. They are also less successful at limiting unwitting political cooperation. When vast majorities of the bureaucracy belong to one political party, when government employee unions funnel unwitting contributions to candidates of that party, and when strong ideological currents link decisions across agencies, explicit cooperation is less necessary. 这些重要的架构都是为了限制政党政治对监管型国家的公开利用，但它们在限制官僚机构利用监管权力强化自己的独立王国上则不那么成功。在限制无意的政治合作上也不成功。当机构的绝大部分人属于一个政党时，当政府雇员工会无意中资助那个政党的候选人时，当强烈的意识形态动向将各部门的裁决关联起来时，公开的合作就没那么必要了。 And, though it was ever thus, the enormous expansion of the size, power, and discretion of the regulatory state makes the insulation structures more important, just as they are falling apart. 即使这样，监管型国家的规模、权力和自由裁量权的扩张也使得隔离架构更加重要，而这些架构却正在分崩离析。

• Speed vs. delay.
• 快捷还是拖延。

The regulatory process can take years, and a canny regulator need not explicitly rule against a political foe. Delay is enough. Lois Lerner herself didn’t deny applications. She just endlessly delayed them. The FDA similarly sits on applications, sometimes for decades. 监管流程可以耗费数年。一个狡猾的监管者并不需要作出明显不利于政治对手的裁决，拖延就够了。洛伊丝·勒纳【编注：勒纳是美国国税局处理税务豁免申请的部门负责人，从2010年起，该部门被发现对涉及保守派特别是茶党人士及捐赠对象的豁免申请施加额外苛刻的审查，2013年的国会调查确认了这些滥权行为的存在，国税局官方也予以承认，并导致勒纳先被停职，后来辞职。】本人并不拒绝任何申请，她只是无限地拖延。类似地，食品药品监督局也拖延审核申请，有时一拖就是几十年。 A central element of a new Magna Carta for regulatory agencies should be a right to speedy decision. If a decision is not rendered in say, 6 months, it is approved. 一部针对监管机构的新大宪章的核心元素，就应该是速决的权利。如果一项裁决，比如说6个月内未作出，就相当于得到批准。

• Consultation, consent of the governed.
• 被治理人的意见及合意。

The process by which rules are written needs to be reformed. Congress writes empowering legislation, usually vague and expansive. The agencies undertake their own process for rule writing. They usually invite comment from interested parties, but are typically free to ignore it when they wish. We are as supplicants before the King, asking for his benevolent treatment. 规则制定的流程需要改革。国会制定的授权法律通常模糊、宽泛。机构根据各自的流程制定规则。它们常常会邀请利益相关方提出意见，但当他们不愿意接受这些意见时，通常可以直接无视它们。我们就像国王面前的恳请者，乞求他的仁慈。 And that was before the current transformation. As exemplified by the EPA’s decision to brand carbon dioxide a pollutant (coverage here), to extend the definition of “navigable waters” to pretty much every puddle, HHS’ many reinterpretations of the ACA, and the Education Department’s “Dear Colleague” letters, even the barely-constrained rule-making process now proceeds beyond its previous mild legal and consultative constraints. 这还是发生在如今的转变之前的事。从环境保护局宣布二氧化碳为污染物（见报道），将“可通行水域”的范围延伸到几乎所有的池塘，到卫生与公共服务部数次重新解释患者保护与平价医疗法案，以及教育部的“致同僚的一封信”，都是例证。现在，即使原本就不怎么受约束的规则制定过程也突破了本已有限的法律和征求意见方面的约束。 A structure with more formal representation, and more formal rights to draft the rules that govern us, is more in keeping with the parliamentary lessons of the Rule of Law tradition. 在起草治理我们的规则方面，一个有着更为正式的代议机制和更为正式的权利的制度结构，将更加符合法治传统下的议会经验。 2.A Tour 2.浏览 Do we really have reason to be afraid? Let’s take a tour. 我们真的有理由害怕吗？我们来浏览一下。 These cases are drawn mostly from media coverage, which allows me a quick and current high- level tour. Each case, and many more that are unreported, and a serious investigation to the structure of our massive regulatory state, could easily be drawn out to book length. 以下案例大多来自媒体报道，让我得以对当前情况做一次鸟瞰式的快速浏览。每一起案件和更多没有报道的案件以及对大型监管型国家架构的严肃检视，都可以轻而易举地写成一本书。 My point is not so much a current scandal. My case is that the structure that has emerged is ripe for the Faustian political bargain to emerge, that the trend of using regulation to quash political freedom is in place and will only increase. 我的意图不是要讲一件当下的丑闻。我是认为，现已出现的架构很容易导致浮士德式政治交易的出现，使用监管来压制政治自由的趋势已经形成而且只会不断加强。 As we tour our current regulatory state of affairs, then, think of how well the current regime represents “rule of law,” how well it respects your freedom to speak, your freedom to object, your freedom to oppose the regulator and regulatory regime. Think how insulated it is against the strong temptations of our increasingly polarized, winner-take-all, partisan political system to use regulatory power as a means of enshrining political power. 当我们检视当前监管型国家的事务时，想一想现有体制体现了多少“法治”，它在多大程度上尊重了你的言论自由、反对自由和反对监管者及监管型政权的自由，想一想它与两极分化日益严重、赢家通吃、政党体系动用监管权力来固化政治权力的强烈冲动隔离得怎么样。 Banks 银行 Start with finance. Finance is, of course, where the money is. 从金融业开始。金融，顾名思义，是钱之所在。 The Dodd-Frank act is 2,300 pages of legislation, in which “systemic” is never defined, making a “systemic” designation nearly impossible to fight. The act has given rise to tens of thousands of pages of subsidiary regulation, much still to be written. The Volker rule alone — do not fund proprietary trading with insured deposits — runs now to nearly 1,000 pages. To call this Talmudic is to insult the clarity and concision of the Talmud. 《多德-弗兰克法案》有2,300页长，但里面并未定义何为“系统性的”。这就使得监管者对企业具有“系统性风险”的划定几乎无法反驳。法案也带来了上万页的附加规章，需要接着撰写的还有很多。单是沃尔克规则——禁止用参加存款保险的存款进行自营交易­­——现在就已经快1,000页了。以“塔木德式”来称呼它，是对塔木德之清晰、简洁的亵渎。【编注：塔木德是犹太教的一套口传律法，由拉比传承，记录该教的传统习俗和行为规范。】 The result is immense discretion, both by accident and by design. There is no way one can just read the regulations and know which activities are allowed. Each big bank now has dozens to hundreds of regulators permanently embedded at that bank. The regulators must give their ok on every major decision of the banks. 结果就是巨大的自由裁量权，既有意外也有蓄意。仅仅阅读这些规章绝无可能知道什么活动是被允许的。每家大银行现在都被永久性地安插了几十至几百个监管者。银行的每一项重大决定都必须得到监管者的批准。 The “stress tests” are a good case in point. Seeing, I suspect, the futility of much Dodd-Frank regulation, and with the apparent success of the Spring 2009 stress tests in the rear view mirror, such tests have become a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory efforts. But what worked once does not necessarily work again if carved in stone. “压力测试”是一个好例子。我怀疑是看到了众多多德-弗兰克规章的无效，同时，回顾过去又有2009年春天压力测试的成功，这些使得压力测试成了美联储加强监管的柱基。但是成功一次不代表常规化后次次都能成功。 In “stress tests,” Federal Reserve staff make up various scenarios, and apply their own computer models and the banks’ computer models to see how the banks fare. However, the Fed does not announce a set scenario ahead of time. They Fed staffers make up new scenarios each time. They understand that if banks know ahead of time what the scenario is and the standards are, then the clever MBAs at the banks will make sure the banks all pass. And billions of dollars hang on the results of this game. “压力测试”中，美联储职员制造不同的情境，然后应用联储自己的电脑模型和银行的模型来看银行如何反应。但是联储不会提前公布一组情境都有什么，美联储职员每次都制造一组新的情境。他们知道如果银行事先知道情境及标准，银行里那些聪明的MBA们就有办法保证银行通过测试。而数十亿美元系于这场游戏的结果。 Now, the Fed staffers playing this game, at least those that I have talked to, are honest and a- political. For now. But how long can that last? How long can the Fed resist the temptation to punish banks who have stepped out of line with a stress test designed to exploit their weakness? Is it any wonder that few big banks are speaking out against the whole regime? They understand that being an “enemy” is not the way to win approvals. 现在，参与这个游戏的联储职员，至少那些和我说过话的，都是诚实且无涉政治的。目前是这样，但这能维持多久呢？联储能够抵御诱惑多久，而不去惩罚那些在专门设计来利用银行弱点的压力测试中行为出格的银行？鲜有大银行敢于直言反对整个体系，这很奇怪吗？他们明白，成为“敌人”并不是获得审批的办法。 And the stress-test staff are getting handsome offers already to come work for the banks, to help the banks to pass the Fed’s stress tests. Ben Bernanke himself is now working for Citadel. 参与设计压力测试的联储职员现已从银行获得了待遇不菲的工作邀请，来帮助银行通过测试。本·伯南克自己现在就为城堡投资集团工作。 If this sounds like the cozy world of “capture,” however, remember the litany of criminal prosecutions and multibillion-dollar settlements. These are instigated by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, with much closer ties to the Administration, but they revolve around violations of securities regulations. Is it a coincidence that S&P, who embarrassed the Administration by downgrading U.S. debt, faced a $1.4 billion dollar settlement for ratings shenanigans, while Moody’s, which gave the same ratings, did not? Pay up, shut up, and stay out of trouble is the order of the day. 如果这听起来像是一个“捕获”的温馨世界，那请记住刑事诉讼和数十亿美元的和解下的哀鸣。这些都是由与行政分支关系更紧密的司法部长和司法部发起的，涉及的则是违反证券法规的行为。降低美国债务评级而让行政分支蒙羞的标准普尔因评级欺诈而面临14亿美元的和解，但给出同样评级的穆迪却没有受罚。这难道是巧合？破财消灾、闭上嘴、远离是非，是当今市场的生存之道。 The Wall Street Journal nicely characterized today’s Wall Street, quotingJohn J. Mack, Morgan Stanley's ex-chairman “Your No.1 client is the government,” which embeds “About 50 full-time government regulators.” 《华尔街日报》引述摩根士丹利前主席约翰·马克的话，漂亮地描述了今天华尔街的特点，他说：“你的头号客户是政府”，它安插了“大约50个全职监管者。” CFPB 消费者金融保护局 Another example: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice charged Ally Bank with discrimination in auto lending, and extracted a nearly $100 million settlement. Ally provides money to auto lenders. Lenders negotiate interest rates. Nobody is allowed to collect data on borrowers’ race. So Justice ran statistical analysis on last names and zip codes — Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding — to decide that minorities are being charge more than they should, essentially encoding ethnic jokes into law. 另一个例子：美国消费者金融保护局和司法部指控Ally银行在汽车贷款中歧视，并获取了一份价值约一亿美元的和解。Ally向汽车贷款放贷人提供资金。放贷人协商利率。不允许任何人收集借贷人的种族信息。所以司法部就通过贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法统计分析借贷人的姓和邮编作出裁决，认为少数族裔被收取了过高的费用——这等于是将种族笑话秘密地写入了法律。 Why did Ally pay? Sure, they might survive in court. But nobody wants to be branded a racist. And DOJ and CFPB have many more cards up their sleeves. CFPB now can disapprove any retail financial arrangement it deems “abusive,” and put Ally out of business. Ally为什么答应和解呢？当然，他们可能在法庭上获胜。但没人愿意被称作种族主义者。此外，司法部和消费者金融保护局袖子里还藏着很多牌。消费者金融保护局现在可以否决一切它们认为“滥用”的零售金融合约，它们可以让Ally破产。 Note in this case, there was no charge or evidence of discriminatory practice or intent. The case was purely that DOJ and CFPB didn’t like the statistics of the outcome. 注意，此案中并无歧视行为或意图的指控或证据。一切只因为司法部和消费者金融保护局不喜欢最后的数据统计分布。 More importantly, was this a knowable regulation, or a bill of attainder? Did CFPB and Justice make available the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding program on their website, and tell financial institutions “please download the BISG program, make sure you run loans through it, and that they come out with the right statistics?” Obviously not. This was an unknowable regulation. Ally had no way to make sure it was lending to the right last names. 更重要的是，这究竟是一条可知的规章，还是褫夺公民权的法案？消费者金融保护局和司法部有没有在网站公布贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法，并告诉金融机构“请下载该程序，根据它发放贷款并确保最终数据统计分布正确”？显然没有。这是一个不可知的法规。Ally无法保证它们把钱贷给了正确的姓氏。 Ominously, in Wall Street Journal coverage, 《华尔街日报》的报道带来了不详的预兆： Larger settlements may be on the horizon. J.P. Morgan...warned in a recent filing that it is discussing the issue of possible “statistical disparities” in auto lending with Justice. With more than $50 billion in auto loans on Morgan’s balance sheet at the end of last year, real or imaginary disparities wouldn’t have to be that large to generate a fat settlement. “更大的和解可能就在眼前。JP摩根……在最近提交的一份公告中警示投资者，它正在与司法部讨论汽车贷款中可能存在的‘统计偏差’问题。根据公司去年底资产负债表上超过500亿美元的汽车贷款，真实或者想象的偏差不必过大，也会产生巨额和解。” While the Obamacare (King v. Burwell) and gay marriage decisions soaked up the airtime in the summer of 2015, the Court’s upholdingof statistical discrimination and disparate impact stands as the greatest affront to liberty. Without even alleging discriminatory intent, without following any established procedure, the Justice Department can chew numbers as it feels, and based on statistical analysis brand you a racist and drag you to court. 尽管奥巴马医改案（金诉布维尔案）和同性恋婚姻判决占据了2015年整个夏天的聚光灯，但联邦最高法院对数据统计分布所体现的歧视和差别影响的认可才是对自由最严重的侵犯。甚至无需指称歧视意图，无需遵循任何现有程序，司法部就可以随意咀嚼数字，根据统计分析为你打上种族歧视者的标签，把你拖上法庭。 SEC 美国证券交易委员会 The SEC’s regulation of insider trading is a fine example of discretion run amok. There is no legal definition of insider trading. Other than corporate insiders (who have legal fiduciary responsibilities not to trade on information) there is little economic rationale for this witch hunt. The game is characterized by big suits with big settlements and novel theories. 证券交易委员会对内幕交易的监管是自由裁量权失控的一个很好例证。法律上没有内幕交易的定义。除去企业内部人（他们有法律上的受托人责任，不利用信息进行交易）之外，这种猎巫式的监管没有多少经济依据。这场游戏的特点是大案件、高额和解和新颖的理论。 And thus, big discretion. The SEC can ruin anyone it wants to. If you’re running a hedge fund and the SEC accuses you of insider trading, it grabs your computers and shuts down your business. Sure, 5 years from now you might win in court, but your customers left and the fund shut down the day they took the computers away. And appeal is only to the SEC itself. 于是，这带来了广泛的自由裁量权。证券交易委员会可以摧毁想要摧毁的任何人。如果你经营一家对冲基金，而证券交易委员会指控你内幕交易，它会带走公司的电脑，关闭你的公司。当然，5年后你可能赢下官司，但是客户全都离开了，基金公司也在取走电脑的那天关了。而且你就算上诉也只能上诉到证券交易委员会。 Robosigning 自动签名 During the financial crisis, many banks didn’t fill out all the forms correctly when foreclosing on houses. The charge was entirely about process — there was no charge that anyone was evicted who was paying his or her mortgages. From the Federal Reserve’s own press releaseswe learn that the Fed found them guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices.” 金融危机期间，许多银行取消房屋抵押赎回权时没有正确填写所有表格。这项指控纯粹只和流程有关，没有任何关于仍在还按揭的房主被驱逐的指控。从美联储自己的官方新闻通报中我们知道，美联储认为银行因“不安全、不合理的程序和操作”而犯有过错。 The Fed was acting in conjunction with a comprehensive settlement agreed in principle between the five banking organizations, the state Attorneys General, and the Department of Justice ... The Settlement Agreement requires these organizations to provide $25 billion in payments and other designated types of monetary assistance and remediation to residential mortgage borrowers. 在一项五家银行机构、各州检察长和司法部……之间达成的、内容广泛的原则性和解中，美联储也参与了联合行动。和解协议要求银行赔付给民宅按揭借贷者总额为250亿美元的款项和其他指定的资金支持和救助。 The Fed, a supposedly non-political independent agency devoted to bank safety and monetary policy, acted with the Administration, to transfer $25 billion dollars from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers (not the victims of robosigning, other borrowers) and “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” 美联储——一家理应政治中性、独立，致力于银行安全和实施货币政策的机构——和行政分支一起将250亿美元从银行股东那里转移给按揭借贷者（他们还不是自动签名的受害者）和“非营利性住房咨询机构”。 It’s a small example, but a concrete one. 这是一个小例子，但很实在。 Regulation in general is transitioning from widespread application of rules to sporadic but very large enforcement actions, frequently involving threat of criminal prosecution and ending in large settlements. Documenting this trend, the Wall Street Journalnoted the spread of Department of Justice Attorneys to regulatory agencies. For example, the EPA “described a strategy of pursuing larger, more complicated enforcement cases, albeit fewer in number.” 总体上看，监管正由规则的广泛适用转向不定期的大型执法活动，还经常伴随着刑事诉讼的威胁，并以大额和解而终结。在记录这一趋势时，《华尔街日报》注意到很多司法部律师转到了其他监管机构。比如，环境保护署“描绘了一个策略，就是追求更大、更复杂的执法案件，哪怕案件数量更少”。 Similarly,Larry Parkinson, another former federal prosecutor who runs FERC’s [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] investigations, described it as an outgrowth of shifting resources to more serious matters—like market manipulation—and away from more traditional violations. In 2008, for example, a majority of the agency’s penalties were against firms that violated requirements that natural-gas shippers maintain title to the gas. 类似地，拉里·帕金森，另一位前联邦检察官，现负责联邦能源监管委员会的调查，将此说成是资源从传统违法行为转移到更严重问题的结果，如市场操控。比如，2008年，该委员会的大部分处罚是针对那些违反天然气航运商必须保有天然气所有权这一规定的公司。 “Market Manipulation” is of course a lot more nebulous and discretionary than natural-gas title checks. “市场操控”当然比天然气所有权检查更加模糊、有更多自由裁量权。 The ACA, AKA Obamacare 患者保护与平价医疗法案，即奥巴马医改法案 The ACA is 2,700 pages, and the subsidiary regulation is so convoluted that there is an active debate on the page count of its actual regulations. Justice Scalia invoked the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment as protection against actually reading it. 奥巴马医改法案长达2,700页，配套法规也相当复杂，以至于其到底有多少页还存在争议。斯卡利亚大法官援引第八修正案——不得施加残酷和非常惩罚——来保护自己不去读它。 The Heritage foundation counted 1,327 waivers. Clearly, someone needing a discretionary waiver shouldn’t be a big critic of HHS or the law. 美国传统基金会统计到了1,327份弃权声明。显然，有人需要自主弃权，这不应算是对卫生与公共服务部或者这项法案的严厉批评。 The cartelization of health insurance and health care under the ACA is almost a textbook case of corporatism. The big hospitals doctors, and insurers get a protected small cartel. In return for political support for the ACA, HHS, state exchanges, and so on. And, the ACA itself being an intensely partisan question, that support already leaks into major party politics. 奥巴马医改法案下健康保险和医疗卫生服务的卡特尔化是社团主义的教科书式案例。大医院、医生和保险公司获得了一个受保护的小卡特尔。作为回报，他们从政治上支持医改法案、卫生与公共服务部及州立医疗保险交易所等等。由于医改法案本身已经成为了一个很严重的党派问题，对法案的支持也卷入到了政党政治中。 Writing on the consolidation of health insurance into two or three big companies, the Wall Street Journal quotesAetna CEO Mark Bertolini that the federal regulators “happen to be, for most of us now, our largest customer,” adding 《华尔街日报》在关于健康保险公司整合为两到三家大公司的报道中，引用了安泰保险首席执行官马克·伯特利尼的话说，联邦监管机构“对我们大多数人而言，现在恰好是我们最大的客户”。他又补充道： “So there is a relationship you need to figure out there if you’re going to have a sustained positive relationship with your biggest customer. And we can all take our own political point of view of whether it’s right or wrong, but in the end-analysis, they’re paying us a lot of money and they have a right to give us some insight into how they think we should run our business.” “所以如果你想要和最大的客户有一个长久积极的关系，就需要认清这个关系。关于对错，我们都可以有自己的政治观点，但是最终来看，他们支付我们很大一笔钱，他们有权利给我们一些见解，告诉我们该如何经营。” The Journal opined that “such domestication is part of ObamaCare’s goal of political control,” echoing my fear. 《华尔街日报》评论道，“这种驯服是奥巴马医改法案政治控制意图的一部分”，这呼应了我的忧惧。 United Healthwanted to join the California exchange Covered California. Many areas of California have only one or two insurers now, so competition and choice are clearly needed. But participation in the exchange needs prior regulatory approval, and United Health was denied. Why? The LA Times wrote 联合健康保险想要加入加州健康保险交易所——医保加州。加州很多地方现在只有一两家保险公司，所以显然是很需要竞争和更多选择余地的。但是参加交易所需要事先得到审批，联合健康保险被否决了。为什么？《洛杉矶时报》写到： Peter Lee, executive director of Covered California, said established insurers shouldn't be free to come in right away. Those insurers, he said, should not be allowed to undercut rivals who stepped up at the start and made significant investments to sign up 1.2 million Californians during the first open enrollment. “彼得·李，医保加州的执行董事，表示老牌保险公司不应该立刻自由进入市场。他说那些保险公司不应该被允许以更低地成本与那些在第一次公开登记时就进场，并为签下120万加州人作出巨大投资的对手竞争。” and quoting Lee further, 李还说， We think the health plans that helped make California a national model should not be in essence undercut by plans that sat on the sidelines. “我们认为帮助加州成为全国模范的保险计划不应该被那些坐在一边看热闹的计划比下去。” You can’t ask for a clearer example of a regulator, using discretionary power to cartelize his industry, protect incumbent profits, and punish a business for failure to support political objectives. He said nothing about United Health’s ability to serve California customers, or to abide by any regulation. 没有什么是比这个更明显的监管者的例子了，利用自由裁量权将他管辖的行业卡特尔化，保护既得利益，惩罚没能支持其政治目标的公司。李一点没提联合健康保险服务加州消费者的能力或者其遵守了所有的法规。 Again in California, reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Daughters of Charity Health system wanted to sell six insolvent hospitals to Prime, which agreed to take on their debt and a $300 million pension liabilities. Under state law, Attorney General Kamala Harris must approve nonprofit hospital sales or acquisitions, with only a vague guideline that such transactions must be “in the public interest.” But only four of Prime’s 15 California hospitals are unionized, so the Service Employees International Union was against the merger. Ms. Harris torpedoed the merger, despite a positive report form her own staff. 还是在加州，据《华尔街日报》报道，仁爱女儿连锁医院想要将六所破产的医院卖给基本医疗。后者同意接受破产医院的债务和3亿美元的养老金负债。根据州法律，非营利医院的收购或出售须得到州检察长卡马拉·哈里斯批准，而指导其审批的只有一条模糊原则，就是这一交易必须“符合公共利益”。但是基本医疗在加州的15家医院只有4家参加了工会，所以服务业员工国际工会就起来反对这一并购。哈里斯女士阻止了这次并购，尽管她自己的手下出具了对并购持正面评价的报告。 Was the event a political cave to unions, as represented by the Journal? Perhaps; perhaps not. What matters here is that it certainly could be, as the Attorney General has enormous discretionary power to approve or disapprove hospital mergers. Hospitals are well advised to stay on her good side. 这一事件是不是如《华尔街日报》报道的那样，是对工会的政治屈服呢？也许是，也许不是。这里真正重要的是，完全有可能如此，因为检察长有很大的自由裁量权批准或否决医院并购。医院得到的建议是乖乖站在检察长一边。 FDA 食品药品监督管理局 Henry Miller at Hoover tells the sad tale of the Aquadvantage salmon, submitted for review in 1996 and still under review20: 胡佛研究所的亨利·米勒说了关于AquAdvantage转基因鲑鱼的悲伤故事，这一品种1996年提交评审，到现在还在评审： ...Consider what they [FDA] have inflicted on a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon, which differs from its wild cohorts only by reaching maturity about 40 percent faster, as the result of the addition to its genome of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon... “……想一想食品药品监督管理局（FDA）对这一转基因大西洋鲑鱼都做了什么。这种鲑鱼与其它野生同类唯一不同的是比它们快40%达到成熟期，因为它的基因组中添加了帝王鲑的生长荷尔蒙基因……” It took FDA more than a decade just to decide how they would regulate the AquAdvantage salmon. Characteristically, they decided on the most onerous pathway, regulating the new construct in genetically engineered animals as though it were a veterinary drug, similar to a flea medicine or pain reliever. After several years of deliberation, regulators concluded as early as 2012 that the AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon has no detectable differences and that it “is as safe as food from conventional Atlantic salmon.” ... FDA用了超过十年时间来决定要怎样监管这种鲑鱼。跟往常一样，他们决定通过最繁复的路径来监管转基因动物体内的新构造，就像把它当作兽药，类似跳蚤药或者镇痛药那样对待。经过数年的研究，监管者早在2012年就得出结论认为这种鲑鱼没有可探知的差异，它“和大西洋传统鲑鱼一样安全”。 When the FDA completed its Environmental Assessment in April 2012 and was ready to publish it—the last necessary hurdle before approving the salmon for marketing—the White House mysteriously intervened. The review process vanished from sight until December of that year, when the FDA was finally permitted to publish the EA (the unsurprising verdict: “no significant impact”), which should then have gone out for a brief period of public comment prior to approval. 就在2012年4月FDA完成环境评价准备公布结果时——这也是最后一道挡在鲑鱼上市前的障碍——白宫却神秘地干涉了进来。审批过程从公众视野中消失了。直到那年12月，FDA才最终被批准公布环境评价，结果并不出人意料——“没有显著影响”。这之后理应是短暂的公开征求意见阶段，然后就是正式批准。 The reason for the delay in the FDA’s publishing the needed Environmental Assessment was exposed by science writer Jon Entine. He related that the White House interference “came after discussions [in the spring of 2012] between Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ office and officials linked to Valerie Jarrett at the Executive Office [of the President], who were debating the political implications of approving the [genetically modified] salmon. Genetically modified plants and animals are controversial among the president’s political base, which was thought critical to his reelection efforts during a low point in the president’s popularity.” 科学作家乔恩•昂蒂纳揭露了FDA推迟公布环境评价的原因。他谈到，白宫的干涉“发生于2012年春天卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳·西贝利厄斯的部长办公室和总统办公室瓦莱丽·贾勒相关的官员进行的一场讨论之后。这些官员的辩论围绕着批准转基因鲑鱼的政治影响。在总统的政治大本营，转基因植物和动物是有争议的话题。这一话题被认为在总统的支持率处于低点的时候对总统的再次当选至关重要。” Needless to say, 20 years of delay makes a project pretty unprofitable. 不用说，20年的拖延让转基因鲑鱼项目变得几乎无利可图。 This is a good example, because the FDA regulations prescribe a precise science-based process for evaluating a food. There are time limits for rendering decisions, which the FDA ignores. But strong political forces don’t like GM foods, science be damned. 这是一个绝佳的例子，因为FDA的法规规定了评价食品的一套基于科学的精确程序。作出裁决是有时限的，但被FDA忽略了。当强大的政治力量不喜欢转基因食品时，科学就屁也不是了。 EPA 环境保护署 A clean environment is important. Pollution is a clear externality. We can also regard it as a Nash equilibrium. Each competitor in an industry is happy to pay the extra money to produce cleanly if all his or her competitors do so. 清洁环境很重要。污染显然是一个外部性。我们也可以把它看作一个纳什均衡。如果竞争对手也这么做，行业里的每一个竞争对手都愿意花额外的钱清洁地生产。 But the modern EPA violates just about every one of my suggested bullet points for preserving rule of law in the regulatory bureaucracy, and is ripe for political misuse. Discretion vs. rules, the potential for endless delay, the need for ex-ante permission, and a politicized and partisan bureaucracy are just the beginning. 但是现代的环境保护署违背了我为在监管型官僚机构下维护法治所提出的几乎每一条建议，政治滥用就在眼前。自由裁量权而非规则、无限拖延的可能、事前批准的要求、政治化和党派化的官僚机构，这些都还只是开始。 In the Pebble Mine controversy, EPA issued a preemptive veto of a project before a request for review was submitted, and was found colluding with mining opponents. Note, I’m not opining on whether the mine was a good or bad idea. Merely that the process in view is clearly one that could be misused for political purposes, and that mine owners already must know not to speak ill of the EPA or administration with such sway over the EPA. 在佩柏金矿争议中，环境保护署在项目审批申请递交前就发出了事先否决，并且被发现和开采的反对方相勾结。请注意，我并不是在就开矿是好是坏发表意见。我要说的仅仅是，这个程序明显可以因政治目的而遭到利用，而矿主一定已经知道不要说环境保护署以及可以对其施加影响的其他机构的坏话。 The Keystone pipeline stands as the example par excellence of regulatory delay and politicization. Perhaps next to the EPA’s decision to take on carbon as a pollutant. Keystone石油管线是监管拖延和政治化的绝佳例证。可能仅次于环境保护署决定将二氧化碳列为污染物。 Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project. 如今，任何因其他理由——比如遮住了视野——而反对一个项目的人，都可以利用环境评估来加以阻止。在任何商业项目中，拖延跟否决一样有效。 The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed “crucifying” some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying: 环境保护署第六区主管阿尔·阿曼达里兹的小故事很有启发性。他建议把一些大的石油公司“钉死在十字架上”，以儆效尤。录音显示，他说： The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years. “罗马人曾经征服地中海地区的小村庄。他们进入某个土耳其小镇，将最先看到的五个人钉死在十字架上。然后整个镇子在接下来的几年都会很好管理。 ...we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly. ……我们确实有一些很有效的执法工具。如此，顺服便唾手可得，而且程度很高，来得很快，非常快。 According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases. 故事里，阿曼达里兹关闭了Range Resources，首批水力压裂公司之一。Range予以了回击，最终一位联邦法官作出了有利于Range的判决。但是一个通过杀鸡儆猴、明显增加企业合规成本来运作的机构，当然易于根据政治考量而选择 “钉死”哪些儆猴之鸡。 Internet 网络 The Internet is the central disruptive technology of our time. So far it has been “permissionless” — unlike just about every other activity in the contemporary United States, you do not need prior approval of a regulator to put up a website. 网络是这个时代核心的颠覆性科技。截至目前，它还是“无需审批”的。不像当代美国的其他任何活动，你不需要事前审批就能上线一个网站。 Pressure grew under the reasonable-sounding banner of “net neutrality,” though what was at stake was the right of some businesses to pay extra for faster delivery. “Net neutrality” meant outlawing business class. The FCC, a supposedly independent agency, studied the issue and found no reason to regulate the internet. 但是，在听似合理的“网络中立性”旗帜下，压力与日俱增，虽然这里受到危及的是一些公司通过额外付费来获得更快传输的权利。“网络中立性”意味着宣布通过额外付费取得一定特权不合法。联邦通信委员会（FCC）——一个本该中立的机构，研究了这个议题，然后发现没有理由监管网络。 One fine day in November 2014, FCC commissioner Tom Wheeler must have found horse head in bed. Well, more specifically a surprise public announcement from President Obama that “blindsided officials at the FCC” per WSJ coverage. 2014年11月某个美好的日子，FCC主席汤姆·惠勒一定在床上发现了一个血淋淋的马头【译注：电影《教父》梗】，更准确地说是奥巴马总统惊人的公开言论。据《华尔街日报》报道，奥巴马提到了“FCC那些钻进死胡同的官员”。 The result is not just “net neutrality” but to apply full telecommunications regulation circa 1935. In particular, this includes Title II rate regulation, in which the FCC has full power to determine what rates are “reasonable.” 奥巴马的言论带来的结果不仅仅是“网络中立性”，而是FCC将动用其约于1935年获得的全面电信监管权力。尤其是，这其中包括有关费用管制的第二条款。据此，FCC可以全权决定什么样的费用是“合理”的。 The FCC announces it will “forbear” to use that power. Along with its right, under the regulation, to impose content restrictions — yes, to tell you what to put on your website — and the “fairness doctrine.” But forebearance is discretionary. So, a company thinking of investing money in fiber-optic lines had better invest in good relations with the FCC and the Administration that apparently drives its decisions. FCC宣布他们会“克制”使用该权力，以及在该监管下实施内容限制（是的，就是告诉你网站放什么内容）和“公平原则”的权力。但是克制也是有裁量的。所以，一家打算投资光纤电缆的公司最好多多投资于它和FCC以及能够影响其裁决的行政分支的关系。 The “independence” of regulatory agencies is one of the key structures impeding widespread use of regulatory power to induce political support. The WSJ coverage of the politics behind the decision describes well how specific businesses’ access to the White House drove the result. On the commission, the 3-2 vote with 2 republicans issuing withering dissents speaks of the partisan nature of this regulation. 监管机构的“独立”是阻止广泛使用监管权力争取政治支持的关键架构之一。《华尔街日报》关于裁决背后的政治勾当的报道，很好地描述了特定公司通往白宫的门道是如何推动结果的。通信委员会3:2的投票结果，以及2名共和党挖苦式地发表少数意见，正说明了这一监管的党派政治本质。 Alas, the internet is all moving to Washington. Uber hired, straight from the Administration, well known tech wizard, David Pflouffe. Given Uber’s troubles with labor law — a California court recently ruling that its contractors are employees — and taxi regulation throughout the U.S., investing in politics is good business for Uber. 可叹的是，网络公司都向华盛顿涌来。优步直接从政府雇佣了著名的科技巫师大卫·普罗夫。鉴于优步面临的劳动法方面的麻烦（一家加州法庭最近裁定它旗下的合约司机是正式雇员）和在全美出租车法规面前遭遇的麻烦，投资于政治对它来说是一笔好生意。 Campaign finance 竞选筹款 Campaign finance law and regulation is all about restricting freedom of speech and altering who wins elections. So one should not be surprised about its political use to restrict freedom of speech and alter who wins elections. 竞选筹款的法律法规就是关于限制言论自由和改变胜选人的。所以对于它被政治性的用来限制言论自由和改变胜选人也不应感到意外。 Still, the recent trend is more troubling than usual. 但尽管如此，最近的趋势仍比往常更加令人不安。 Lois Lerner, director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Unit, famously derailed applications for nonprofit status from conservative groups, ahead of the 2012 Presidential election. Her main tactic was endless delay. All you need is for the election to pass. 洛伊丝·勒纳，联邦税务局免税机构部主管，在2012年总统大选前阻挠保守派团体获得非盈利性资格的申请【编注：被认定为非盈利性机构意味着其所获得的捐赠可以让捐赠者享受相应的税务豁免，按机构性质不同，豁免的可能是应税收入，也可能是应缴税额。】，并因此出名。她的主要战术就是无限期拖延。她需要的只是等到大选过去。 Scott Walker’s troubles are similarly renown. Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm filed “John Doe” probes against conservative issue advocacy groups, “blanketed conservatives with subpoenas, raided their homes and put the targets under a gag order” that they could not even reveal the fact of the investigation. It came to light, and is now in the courts, but not until well after the election. Walker won anyway, but might not have. 斯科特·沃克的麻烦也差不多出名。密尔沃基地区检察官约翰·奇瑟姆发起了一项针对保守议题倡导组织的“无名氏”调查。“给保守派人士发法庭传票来妨碍他们，突然查抄他们的家，为目标人士申请禁口令”，使得他们甚至无法揭露这些调查存在的事实。整件事直到选举之后很久才曝光，目前正在庭审阶段。不管怎样，沃克最后还是赢了，但完全可能因此而输掉。 The Administration has been pushing since 2010 to force nonprofits to disclose all donors, as campaigns must disclose contributors. It sounds innocuous: “Disclosures?” Who can be against that? Shouldn’t “big money” contributing to politics be public information? 政府自2010年以来一直在推动强令非营利组织公开捐款人，就像竞选必须公开捐助人一样。这听起来很无害。“公开”？谁敢反对？难道捐助政治的“大钱”不应该成为公开信息吗？ Not when the vast power of the regulatory state can come down on whomever it wants to. Tyrannies always start by making lists. Nixon at least had to compile his own enemies list. 当监管型国家的权力触角可以伸到它希望的任何人时，就不应该了。暴政都是从列名单开始的。尼克松至少还需要自己动手编列一份政敌名单。 Snowden 斯诺登 The Snowden affair taught us some important lessons about our government. The NSA collected phone call “metadata.” Well, it’s just who called who and not the content of phone calls (unless you call abroad), you may say. 斯诺登事件教给我们一些关于我们政府的重要教训。国家安全局收集电话“元数据”。你也许会说，只是谁打给谁，又不是电话的内容（除非打到国外）。 But even metadata is revealing. Suppose you called three cancer doctors, alcoholics anonymous, and two divorce lawyers. And you want to run for the senate. That kind of information is political dynamite. 但即使是元数据信息量也很大。假设你打给了三个癌症医生，匿名戒酒会和两个离婚律师。你还想要竞选参议员。这些信息在政治上就是爆炸性的。 The NSA has the content, not just metadata, of any emails that go abroad. The NSA likely has many Hilary Clinton’s missing emails. And Jeb Bushes’. Unless neither has ever written an email that rises to the embarrassment level of Mitt Romney’s 47% remark, the information to sink either campaign is likely sitting on NSA computers. 国安局掌握着发往国外的任何邮件的内容，不仅仅是元数据。国安局里很可能有很多希拉里·克林顿的失踪邮件。以及杰布·布什的。除非两人写过的邮件没有一封能达到罗姆尼47%言论【译注：罗姆尼2012年曾经在私下场合表示，有47%的选民无论如何都会选奥巴马，他们相信政府对他们有责任、有义务。罗姆尼表示自己不需要去担心这些人】的尴尬程度，否则击沉任意一个候选人的信息就在国安局的电脑里。 That information would never leak out, you say? Snowden proves the opposite. Any piece of information on a government computer is one Snowden, one Lois Lerner, or one Chinese hacker away from a twitter feed. 你说什么？信息永远不会泄露？斯诺登证明了信息会泄露。政府电脑里的任何信息离推特信息都只有一个斯诺登、一个洛伊丝·勒纳或者一个中国黑客的距离。 John Oliver’s Snowden interview contained an interesting revelation. The internet is an amazing thing. What do Americans do with it? They send around pictures of their private parts. And NSA employees regularly pass the pictures around to great hilarity. 约翰·奥利弗对斯诺登的采访披露了一个有意思的情节。网络是个奇妙的东西。美国人用它来干什么呢？他们到处发送自己私处的照片。而国安局职员经常传阅这些照片来取乐。 E-Verify 电子查证 As part of most immigration deals we are likely to see strong enforcement of the right of employees to work via e-verify. Every single human being who wishes to work in the United States must ask for the ex-ante permission the Federal Government. 作为绝大多数移民政策的一部分，我们可能会看到，借助电子查证，有关雇员工作权的法规得到了强有力实施。每个想在美国工作的人都必须征得联邦政府的事先准许。 Leave aside here the obvious question how the same government that runs the Obamacare website, and, as I write, has had all visa applications to the U.S. shut down for two weeks due to hardware failures, will manage this. Let’s focus on the political implications. 一个运营着奥巴马医改网站的政府，一个因为硬件故障关闭所有签证申请达两周的政府，如何能够管理电子查证？这里先别管这个明显的问题，我们把焦点集中到政治影响上吧。 This power will naturally expand. First, people without proper immigration documents. But once in place, why only enforce immigration laws? Already there are a long list of laws governing who can work and when and where. People must have the right licenses, the right background checks, union memberships and so on. Are you guilty in the latest SEC which hunt? E-verify can really make sure you never work in finance again, not so much as a bank teller. Or that a conviction for violating the endangered species act keeps you out of the work force. 这一权力会自然延伸。首先是没有正当移民文件的人。但是电子查证一旦到位，为什么只用来执行移民法呢？已经有一长串的法律管理着谁可以工作以及什么时候在哪儿工作。人们必须要有正确的执照、正确的背景审查、工会会员身份等等。在证券交易委员会最近的一次政治迫害中你有罪吗？电子查证可以确保你再也不能从事金融业，即使是银行柜员也不行。或者一项威胁濒危物种的行为的定罪，也可以把你隔离在劳动力市场之外。 Every tyranny controls its citizens by controlling their right to work. Do we really want every American who wants employment to have to ask for the ex-ante permission of the Federal Government of Edward Snowden and Lois Lerner? 任何暴政都通过控制公民的工作权来控制公民。我们真的希望每个想要工作的人都必需事先征得一个由爱德华·斯诺登和洛伊丝·勒纳组成的联邦政府的许可吗？ Transactions 交易 We have lost the right to transact privately in the terror and drug wars. The right to political dissent requires the ability to speak freely and privately; the right to earn a living despite political opposition; and the right to transact in private. All three are vanishing. 我们已经在反恐和禁毒战争中失去了私下交易的权利。政治异见的权利要求人们能够自由和私密地表达的可能性，政治反对者仍能谋生的权利，以及私下交易的权利。这三种权利都在消失。 You may have reveled in the ending of Stephen King’s Shawshank Redemption, in which the hero takes cash out of banks and heads to Mexico. Under today’s banking laws, that could no longer happen. 你也许很喜欢史蒂夫·金的《肖申克的救赎》的结尾，男主角从银行取出钱，前往墨西哥。在今天的银行法律下，这一幕再也不会发生了。 As a recent political example, Dennis Hastert was recently indictedf or violating the spirit of the $10,000 limit on bank withdrawals, by withdrawing amounts just shy of the limit. Hastert wanted the money, apparently, to pay blackmail to someone with an embarrassing personal secret. 最近的一个政治例子是，丹尼斯·哈斯特尔特最近因违背银行取款不超过10,000美元的宗旨而受到起诉。他取出的额度恰好略低于限额。原来，哈斯特尔特需要钱去支付某人利用其尴尬的私人秘密所进行的勒索。 Hastert is retired. But should aspiring politicians really have no privacy in their personal transactions? 哈斯特尔特退休了。但是有抱负的政客在私人交易中就真的没有任何隐私吗？ Education 教育 As Daniel Henninger put it: 正如丹尼尔·海宁格所说： ...historians of the new system will cite the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights’ 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter on sexual harassment as the watershed event. “新系统下的历史学家会将教育部民权办公室2011年关于性骚扰的致同僚信作为分水岭事件。” This letter—not even a formal regulation—forced creation of quasi-judicial systems of sexual-abuse surveillance on every campus in America. The universities complied for fear of lawsuits from enforcers at the Departments of Education and Justice. 这封信，甚至都不是一个正式的法规，但其强制建立了一个准司法体系，监视美国每一个校园的性侵害。大学都遵守这一要求，因为怕惹上教育部和司法部的官司。 The Justice Department’s Special Litigation Section and Housing and Civil Enforcement Section have forced numerous settlements from police departments, school districts, jails and housing agencies. Whatever the merits, the locals know the price of resisting Justice is too high. 司法部的特殊诉讼处及住房和民事执法处已经强制和解了好几起来自警察局、学区、监狱和住房机构的案件。不管是不是在法律上站得住脚，当地人知道抵抗司法部的成本太高。 National Review’s coverageof Laura Kipinis’ travails is a good example of the political use of this regulation. Professor Kipinis “wrote a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education arguing that college campuses are in a state of ‘sexual paranoia.’” She quickly became the subject of a “Title IX inquisition,” documented in her essayby that name. Though eventually cleared, the point is the use of regulatory power to silence speech. 《国家评论》对劳拉·吉普尼斯的痛苦经历的报道是这项监管被政治利用的一个好例子。吉普尼斯教授“在《高等教育纪事报》上写了一篇专栏，表示大学校园正处于一种‘性受迫害妄想狂’的状态”。她很快成为了“第九条调查”的对象，她在一篇文章里用的就是这个词。尽管最终洗清了嫌疑，重点是利用监管权力压制了言论。 3.A Magna Carta for the Regulatory State 3.为监管型国家寻求一部大宪章 The power of the regulatory state has increased steadily. And it lacks many of the checks and balances that give us some “rule of law” in the legal system. (A system which has its own troubles.) The clear danger we face is the use of regulation for political control. Each industry gets carved up into a few compliant oligopolies. And the threat of severe penalties, with little of the standard rule-of-law recourse, keeps people and businesses in line and supporting the political organization or party that controls the agencies. 监管型国家的权力已持续增长。它缺少了很多在法律体系（该体系也面临着自己的麻烦）里给我们带来一些“法治”的制衡。我们面对的最明显的危险，就是利用监管实现政治控制。每个行业都若干顺服的寡头所瓜分。严厉处罚的威胁，以及法治援助标准的缺失，让个人和公司对控制着监管机构的政治组织或政党既保持服从，又提供支持。 We’re not there yet. The Koch Brothers are not on the EPA “crucifixion” list, an investigation of every plant they own, or probes by the DOJ, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, and so on and so on. They could be. The Hoover institution retains its tax-exempt status despite writings such as this one. A free media still exists, and I can read all my horror stories in the morning Wall Street Journal, and the free (for now) internet. 我们还没到那一步。科赫兄弟公司还不在环境保护署的“钉死”名单上，他们旗下的工厂没有被逐一调查，也没有被司法部、国家劳动关系委员会、公平就业机会委员会、职业安全与健康管理局等等调查。但他们可能成为调查对象。胡佛研究所仍保有免税资格，尽管发表了类似于这篇文章的东西。自由媒体依然存在，每天早上我仍可在《华尔街日报》上读到各种恐怖故事。互联网（目前）也还是自由的。 But we are getting there. What stops it from happening? A tree ripe for picking will be picked. 但是我们正滑向那里。什么能够阻止它发生呢？一颗易于采摘的树最终会被采摘的。 The easy answers are too easy. “Get rid of regulations” is true, but simplistic like “get rid of laws.” What we learned in the 800 years since Magna Carta is that the character of law, and the detailed structures of its operation that matter. Law is good, as it protects citizens from arbitrary power. 简单的回答过于简单了。“取消监管”是真的，但和“取消法律”一样太过简化。大宪章以来的800年，我们学到的一样东西就是法律的特征以及它运作的详细架构很重要。法律是好的，因为它保护公民免于专断的权力。 It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one. 是时候为监管型国家起草一部大宪章了。规章需要按照我之前列的几点来制定。人们需要有挑战监管者的权利：证据开示权、对判决提出异议的权利、上诉权。是的，这就意味着制衡的场所在法庭。人人都恨律师，除了自己需要一个的时候。 People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor. 人们需要速决的权利。一个针对规章的“人身保护令”会起作用：如果任何裁决未在6个月内作出，则自动视为有利于你。 A return to economic growth depends on reforming the regulatory state. But the deeper and perhaps more important preservation of our political freedom depends on it even more. 经济的重新增长依赖于改革监管型国家，但从更深层或许也更重要的意义上说，我们政治自由的存续甚至更加依赖于这一改革。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-10-21】 @熊也餐厅:我有些搞不懂，这么多年香港的经济自由程度一直排全世界第一但是我真心不觉得是这样。 @whigzhou: 我觉得差不多啊，你感觉哪里不对呢？ @whigzhou: 其实城邦与大国不太好比，香港在许多方面占了特殊便宜：自由港，无军队，只有一级政府，夕阳产业容易移出因而工会很难维持……所以得分高是可以预料的 @whigzhou: 香港也没几个农民，而农民是许多国家阻挠自由贸易的重要势力和吃政府补贴的大头 @熊也餐厅:香港马路上整天有食品署的查询，警察也驱赶小贩。在我大袋鼠国从来没有看到过。 @whigzhou: 具体情况我不了解，但驱赶小贩未必是自由的扣分项，要看理由是什么，如果警察是应附近居民或商铺的扰民投诉而行动，就可能是在保护既有权利，如果警察是自作主张或依行政法条行事，才算负分 @whigzhou: 从居住密集度看，香港小贩引起扰民投诉的可能性显然比澳洲大 @熊也餐厅:[哈哈] 說實話我在我大袋鼠國就沒有見到過有什麼小販。down town 有時有賣鞋帶的其實就是乞丐 @whigzhou: 香港地铁是界限明确的私人空间，所以除非小贩已经长期占领其中某块特定地盘，驱赶是没问题的  

【2015-10-21】 @研二公知苗 想请教一下大家，关于国家对经济的干预程度，有没有比经济自由度指数更加直观的指标？ @whigzhou: 商业新闻中提到政府的新闻的比例，这个指标现在应该已经有条件获得了 @whigzhou: 其他许多直观指标也有价值，但都不够全面，比如首都规模，只适用于美国澳洲巴西等另建新都的国家，财政供养人口不能充分反映管制繁苛度，受贿普遍度则有很大文化差异且很难控制 @whigzhou: 不过这个也有缺陷，比如朝鲜就用不上，因为朝鲜没有商业新闻:( @研二公知苗: 像是阿根廷的梅内姆，为了减少私有化的压政治压力，增加了社会福利开支，这就使得梅内姆政府开支占GDP比重甚至比经济改革之前还高。 @whigzhou: 嗯，从北欧经验看，比起特权/管制/干预，高税收/高政府开支对经济的干扰其实要小很多 @研二公知苗:那请教辉格老师，华尔街日报的经济自由度指数作为一个综合指标怎么样？有一点缺陷是，这个指标覆盖的年份太少了。 @whigzhou: 我觉得挺好的，类似指标里可能是最好的，不过离我的期望还是有很大距离，主要问题是缺乏前瞻性  

Illinois' Population And AGI Continue To Plummet Under Democratic Legislature 在民主党州议会治下，伊利诺伊州人口和总收入直线下跌 作者：Rex Sinquefield @ 2015-08-07 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Forbes，http://www.forbes.com/sites/rexsinquefield/2015/08/07/illinois-population-and-agi-continue-to-plummet-under-democratic-legislature/ 【插图文字说明】Illinois residents and businesses are still suffering from the 67 percent state income tax hike former Governor Quinn enacted in 2011. 伊利诺伊州居民和企业仍在遭受前任州长Pat Quinn 2011签署的所得税提升67%法令所导致的痛苦。 The sweet smell of success won’t waft through Deerfield, Illinois, much longer. Mondelez International, maker of beloved cookie brands Chips Ahoy and Oreo, recently announced plans to lay off 600 workers at its Illinois headquarters. Plus, Mondelez is shutting down nine manufacturing lines on Chicago’s South Side and spending $130 million to install new lines in Salinas, Mexico. 成功的甜蜜气息不会在伊利诺伊州的迪尔菲尔德上空继续飘荡太久。旗下拥有深受喜爱的饼干品牌Chips Ahoy和Oreo 的Mondelez International公司最近宣布将从其伊州总部裁员600人。另外，Mondelez还会关闭位于芝加哥南区的9条生产线，并将花费约一亿三千万美元在墨西哥的Salinas市配置新生产线。 This, of course, is just the latest in a long line of blows dealt to Illinois. Thanks to years of unwise fiscal decisions and short-sighted tax increases, people (and their incomes) leave the state in droves. 这当然只是伊利诺伊州所受一长串打击中的最新一条而已。由于不明智的财政决策和短视的增税持续多年，人们（和他们的收入）成群结队地离开该州。 Where are all these disenchanted Illinoisans going? Well . . . anywhere except Illinois. Taxpayer-migration data released by the Internal Revenue Service on July 31 shows that for the first time in recorded IRS history (stretching back to 1990), Illinois lost residents to every other state in the Midwest. 这些希望破灭的伊州人民去哪了呢？嗯……任何地方，除了伊利诺伊。美国国税局于7月31日发布的纳税人迁移数据表明，自该局有记录以来（早至1990年），首次出现所有中西部州均接纳了伊利诺伊州流失居民的现象。 Such is the legacy left by former Governor Pat Quinn, who in 2011 enacted a 67 percent hike in Illinois’ state income tax. This historic tax hike hit hard, causing harm to working families, small businesses, and entrepreneurs alike. Illinois voters were so disappointed by their state’s decline that, last November, they ousted the Democrat governor in favor of business-savvy, reform-minded Bruce Rauner. 这就是前任州长Pat Quinn的遗产，他于2011年签署法令，将伊利诺伊州的州所得税拉高了67%。这一历史性的加税打击沉重，对工薪家庭、小企业和企业家们都带来了伤害。伊州选民对该州如此衰微非常不满，于是去年11月他们将原民主党州长赶下台，选出了精于商业、具有改革思维的Bruce Rauner。 Understanding what a mess Illinois is in, Rauner quickly proposed a series of strong reforms aimed at solving the state’s massive unfunded-pension problem as well as curbing union power. He also advocated for policy reform that would help manufacturers, in particular, including lawsuit reform, workers’ compensation reform, and a freeze on property taxes. Bruce Rauner完全明白伊州陷入了怎样的混乱，他迅速提出了一系列针对养老金亏空问题和遏制工会力量的强力改革措施。他同时也提倡那些有利于制造商的政策改革，特别是诉讼改革、工人薪酬改革和财产税冻结。 Unfortunately and rather unsurprisingly, Governor Rauner is facing pushback from dyed-in-the-wool Democrats in the Illinois General Assembly (particularly Senate President John Cullerton and House Speaker Mike Madigan). Legislative leadership’s wrong-headed handling of the state’s economy is driving Illinoisans away. 不幸但并不令人惊讶的是，Rauner州长面临着伊利诺伊州议会中铁杆民主党人的反抗（特别是州参院议长John Cullerton和州众院议长Mike Madigan）。立法机构领导人在州经济事务上的执迷不悟正在驱走该州民众。 In 2011 alone, Illinois lost 24,000 taxpayers and their 26,000 documented dependents, for a net loss of 50,000 people. These former Land of Lincoln residents took their adjusted gross incomes with them, of course – the AGI loss for the state of Illinois was $2.5 billion in 2011 alone. (That’s a $600 million increase from 2010, when Illinois saw $1.9 billion in net AGI leave.) 仅2011年一年内，伊利诺伊州就失去了24000位纳税人和他们的26000位登记家属，净损失达到了五万人口。这些前“林肯之乡”的居民当然还把他们的“调整后总收入”一并带走——伊州总收入2011年单年就损失了25亿美元。（这一损失比2010年增加了6亿美元，当年的总收入流失是19亿美元）。 Significantly, people and incomes aren’t just going to the typical low-tax paradises, like Florida and Texas. They’re also going to every other state in the Midwest. And the House and Senate Democrats who refuse to call a vote on Rauner’s bills have offered nothing in the way of viable alternative plans. 值得注意的是，人民和他们的收入并不仅仅是流向了那些典型的低税天堂，像佛罗里达和得克萨斯，他们也去向了中西部的其他各州。州众院和参院的民主党人拒绝为州长Rauner的提案提起表决，而他们自己却拿不出任何可行的替代方案。 The problem is perhaps most pronounced in Chicago, where Mayor Rahm Emanuel seeks solutions for the enormous hole in the city budget. There are many reasons for this budget debacle – unfunded pension liabilities and an increased minimum wage among them – but one of the biggest factors is the erosion of the Cook County tax base. 芝加哥的问题可能最为明显，该市市长Rahm Emanuel正在想办法解决市预算的巨额缺口。这一预算灾难有很多原因——其中包括拨付不足的养老金负债和最低工资的上涨——但一个最大的因素是Cook县税基的缩水。 The out-migration of taxpayers during 2011 will cost Chicago more than $9 billion in taxable income over the next ten years, according to the recently released IRS data. During 2011 (again, the first year of Illinois’ 67 percent income-tax hike), Cook County lost nearly 28,000 more people than it gained; along with these residents went more than $900 million in net AGI for the year, with $700 million leaving the state entirely. At the time of writing, each and every Chicago household is on the line for more than $63,000 in local-government debt. 根据最近披露的美国国税局数据，2011年纳税人的外流将会使得芝加哥市在未来十年内流失超过90亿美元的应税收入。在2011年（又是伊利诺伊州所得税提升67%的第一年），Cook县净流失人口约达28000人之多，这些居民所带走的当年总收入数值超过9亿美元，其中有7亿美元彻底流出伊州。在本文写作时，每一个芝加哥家庭平均都背负着超过63000美元的地方政府债务。 To break it down even further: Even before cookie giant Mondelez International decided to pull up stakes, Illinois was losing 40 manufacturing jobs every single day. In the first half of 2015 (January through June), Illinois suffered a net loss of 7,300 factory jobs – while neighboring Indiana is up 7,600 factory jobs, and Michigan is up 12,800 jobs. 更深入地讲，甚至在饼干巨头Mondelez International决定打包走人之前，伊利诺伊州每天都会损失40个制造业工作岗位。在2015年上半年（1-6月），伊州损失了至少7300个工厂岗位——而邻居印第安纳州增长了7300个，密歇根州增长了12800个。 Illinois legislators should feel a moral imperative to keep factory jobs in the Land of Lincoln, considering how many families depend on this work. The time is far past due for the General Assembly to make smart decisions that keep jobs, families, and incomes in Illinois.  If they do not, one Illinoisans should think back on the fiercely competitive boxing match between Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier, which prompted Howard Cosell to call out, “Down goes Frazier! Down goes Frazier!” 考虑到太多家庭依赖于此，伊利诺伊州的立法者们应该怀有一种道德上的紧迫感，来把制造业工作留在“林肯之乡”。州议会早就应该做出一些聪明的决定，将工作、家庭和收入留在本州之内。如果他们不这么干，一个伊利诺伊人应该回想一下拳王阿里和弗雷泽的激烈拳击比赛，Howard Cosell曾在那场比赛中高呼“打倒弗雷泽！打倒弗雷泽！”【译注：作者似乎记错了，所提及的比赛似应为弗雷泽vs福尔曼。在此次比赛中，福尔曼多次击倒弗雷泽，著名解说员Cosell连续高呼打倒弗雷泽。】 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

German success is surprisingly recent 德国的就业奇迹其实很晚才出现 作者: Scott Sumner @ 2014­-4-­22 译者:bear     校对：小册子 来源:Economics Liberty, http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2014/04/german_success.html Many people assume that Germany has long been an economic success story. It was certainly successful back in the 1950s and 1960s. But as recently as 2004 it was widely viewed as the "sick man of Europe" despite all those sleek BMWs and Mercedes they churn out each year. 许多人认为德国经济长期以来都很成功。在上世纪五十年代和六十年代，它的确是成功的。但近至2004年，德国还被广泛认为是“欧洲病人”，尽管它每年都大量产出豪华的宝马和奔驰。 The normally reliable Matt Yglesias falls into the trap of (implicitly) assuming long term German success in a piece on youth unemployment. Yglesias tries to explain the low rate of youth unemployment by pointing to their system of technical training for students that are not college bound. That certainly seems like a fine system, but it's been around for decades, and thus can hardly explain the amazing post-2004 German jobs miracle. Why do I use the term 'miracle'? Consider:

1. Germany was hit roughly as hard by the 2008-09 recession as the US.
2. Unlike the US, the German working age population is not growing.

连通常比较靠谱的Matthew Yglesias【译注：著名博客作家，擅长写经济和政治话题】也掉进了这个圈套，他在一篇描写年轻人失业问题的文章里（隐含地）预设了德国长期成功这一前提。Yglesias试图将（德国）年轻人的低失业率归功于不以升读大学为目标的学生技术培训系统。这个系统看上去当然很好，但它已经运作了几十年了，因此很难用它来解释2004年以后德国令人惊讶的就业奇迹。为什么我用“奇迹”这词？ 试想：

1. 德国在2008-09年的经济衰退中受到的沉重打击和美国大致相当。
2. 不同于美国，德国就业适龄人口并没有增长。

Put those two together and you'd expect very little German job creation in recent years. And yet German employment has risen by 6% over the past 6 years, whereas American employment has declined, despite a RGDP recovery that is far more brisk than the eurozone, indeed faster than in Germany. That's pretty amazing. 考虑到这两点，你会预期近年来德国的新增职位会很少。但德国的雇佣人数在过去六年已经提升了6%，而美国的雇佣数则在下降，尽管美国实际GDP的复苏比欧元区快得多——确实比德国快。这是非常令人惊奇的。 I sometimes wonder how progressive readers would filter Yglesias's message. The type that thinks that if a program works in Sweden it would certainly work over here. The ones that Paul Krugman insists are "reality based" in their thinking. German job training seems good, and Obama has recommended some programs for America. The highly inegalitarian German high school system might make American progressives squirm, but Yglesias reassures them that this approach would be hard to implement in a country that lacks the tight cooperation between companies, unions and local governments. 我有时会怀疑进步主义读者是怎样看待Yglesias的看法的。这类人认为如果一套方案在瑞典奏效，那它在别处也会，Paul Krugman坚定地认为这些人是“基于事实”来思考的。德国的职业培训看上去做得不错，奥巴马也已经建议在美国施行一些类似的方案。德国那种高度分化、区别对待的高中教育系统可能会让美国进步主义者不舒服，但Yglesias向他们担保，德国的做法在公司、工会和地方政府缺乏紧密合作的国家很难实施。 Of course none of this has anything to do with explaining how Germany went from being the sick man of Europe to its shining star, all in a period of 10 years. Here's the German unemployment rate since 1960. Notice that Germany had 8% unemployment as far back as the mid-1980s, during the Reagan boom in America. Things had been getting worse for decades, and the 1980s figures suggest that the problem wasn't just German reunification. 当然这些都无法解释德国是怎样在十年间从欧洲病人转变成璀璨明星的。下图显示的是德国自1960年以来的失业率。在里根振兴美国的八十年代中期，德国的失业率为8%。数十年来每况愈下，而八十年代的数据说明，这个问题并非仅仅是两德统一导致的。 So what's the real explanation for the German success? That's pretty obvious; the Hartz reforms of 2003 sharply reduced the incentive to not work, and sharply increased the incentive to take low wage jobs. As a result, today Germany has lots of very low wage jobs of the type that would be illegal in France or California. (Germany has no minimum wage.) Here is the Guardian: 那德国成功的真正原因是什么呢？显然是因为：2003年的哈茨改革方案急剧减低了鼓励人们不工作的诱因，同时急剧增加了接受低薪工作的激励。【译注：哈茨方案是德国政府于2002-2005年逐步推行的，针对失业人口调整救济内容、培训和促进再就业的社会改革方案，共有哈茨一号到哈茨四号四个方案。其中哈茨四号凶残地削减了失业者的福利。】结果今天德国有大量非常低薪的工作，低到在法国或加州会被视为违法的程度（德国没有最低工资法）。下面是《卫报》的报道：

Exactly 10 years ago today, Germany's labour market was subjected to the first of the so-called Hartz IV reforms. Brought about by the smooth centre-left chancellor Gerhard Schröder, it was a watershed moment that changed the way the German government deals with poverty. 正好是十年前的今天，德国的劳动市场施行了所谓哈茨四段改革的第一阶段。改革由作风温和、中间偏左的德国总理施罗德推行，这是德国政府处理贫困问题的政策分水岭。 The changes were riddled with the kind of Anglicisms that German officialdom likes to deploy for any modernisation. In the past decade, unemployed Germans have been bewildered with a kaleidoscope of new "Denglish" terms, from "Jobcenter" to "Personal Service Agentur" to "Mini-Job" to "BridgeSystem". But the measures recommended by the Hartz commission - named after its chairman, former Volkswagen executive Peter Hartz - boiled to down to this: the bundling of unemployment benefits and social welfare benefits into one neat package. 这些变化充满了英国范儿——德国官僚总喜欢为现代化搞点花样。在过去十年里，德国的失业者们被五花八门的新德式英语名词搞得晕头转向，从“就业中心”（"Jobcenter"）到“个人服务中介”（"Personal Service Agentur"）到“迷你工作”（"Mini-Job"）到“桥接系统”（"BridgeSystem"）。但这些由哈茨委员会推荐的措施——以该委员会主席、前大众汽车公司执行官Peter Hartz命名——可归结为：把失业津贴和社会福利捆绑到一个简洁的方案中。 The immediate effect was to leave those living on benefits worse off (as of 2013, the standard rate for a single person is €382 a month, plus the cost of "adequate housing" and healthcare). But the new element that brought the most profound change was the contract, drawn up between the "jobseeker" and the "Jobcenter", which defined what each party promised to do to get the jobseeker back on somebody's payroll. This was coupled with "sanctions" - in other words, benefit cuts - if the jobseeker failed to keep up his or her side of the bargain. With those two measures, Germany came to accept the modern interpretation of the word "incentive" in the job market: the doctrine that poor people will only work if they are they are not given money. 该措施的直接效果是令那些靠社会保障过活的人生活水平恶化（到2013年，个人的标准社会保障是每月382欧元，再加上“适宜居所”和医保的补贴）。但带来最深远影响的是待业者和“就业中心”之间的合同，这份合同订明了为让当事人能回到工作岗位上，双方承诺履行的义务。当一个待业者没有履行承诺的时候是有惩罚措施的——也就是减少福利。凭着这两项措施，德国开始接受“激励”在劳动市场上的现代解释：穷人拿不到钱才会去工作的学说。 There are myriad debates about the net results or benefits of the Hartz reforms. Unemployment, both long-term and short-term, has certainly dropped considerably in Germany since 1 January 2003, but critics say that's only because most jobless people are forced to accept the next job they can find - and often they end up in one so low-paid and part-time that they were still dependent on some sort of state welfare anyway. Then again, the flexibility that allows employers - especially major industrial companies - to take on and lay off part-time shift workers depending on the state of the export market has certainly helped Germany to ride out the global economic crisis in the past three years. 关于哈茨改革方案的最终结果或效益有着无数争论。自从2003年1月1日以来，德国的长期和短期失业率肯定都显著下降了，但批评者说这仅仅是因为失业者被迫接受他们所能找到的下一份工作，这往往是一份低薪的兼职工作，因此他们多少还是要靠政府救济。但是需要再次强调的是，这使得雇主——尤其是大型的实业公司——可以根据出口市场的状况灵活地雇佣或解雇兼职轮班职工。这肯定对德国安然度过过去三年的经济危机有帮助。 But what is hard to overlook is that the Hartz reforms have had two social effects. First, they have helped to accelerate inequality in Germany. According to an April 2012 OECD report, "Germany is the only [EU] country that has seen an increase in labour earnings inequality from the mid 1990s to the end 2000s driven by increasing inequality in the bottom half of the distribution." The report goes on to point to "a set of reforms in 2003 meant to increase the flexibility of the labour market" which help to explain the "wage moderation". 但是哈茨方案的两个社会影响也很难被忽视。首先，方案加速了德国的收入不均。根据一份经合组织（OECD）在2012年4月发布的报告，“从1990年代中期到2000年代末，德国是欧洲唯一一个劳动收入不均在扩大的国家，这是由社会下半层的收入不均等加剧导致的。”这份报告继续指出，“2003年的一系列改革旨在令劳动市场的灵活性增加”，这部分解释了“工资停滞”。

So the one major success story among developed countries has achieved its success by doing essentially the exact opposite of what progressives want. Germany has no minimum wage, reduced its incentives to live off welfare, and has a level of wage inequality that is increasing even faster than in the US. It's no wonder that progressives prefer to focus on things like "vocational training programs," which were just as common during the 30-year period of steadily rising German unemployment. 所以，这一发达国家中最重大的成功故事之一，恰恰是通过和进步主义的愿望完全相反的方式做到的。德国没有最低工资法，降低了靠福利过活的激励，而且工资不均等的扩大比美国还快。进步主义者倾向于关注“职业培训计划”这类事一点也不让人奇怪，尽管这个计划在德国失业率稳定上升的30年间也一样存在。 And yet Paul Krugman can say the following without blushing: 然而，Paul Krugman还是可以脸不红心不跳地说这样的话：

Just to be clear: Yes, you can find examples where *some* liberals got off on a hobbyhorse of one kind or another, or where the liberal conventional wisdom turned out wrong. But you don't see the kind of lockstep rejection of evidence that we see over and over again on the right. Where is the liberal equivalent of the near-uniform conservative rejection of climate science, or the refusal to admit that Obamacare is in fact reaching a lot of previously uninsured Americans? 要说清楚的是：是的，你可以找到一些自由派这样那样老调重弹的例子，或是自由派的传统看法被证明是错误的例子。但你不会看到我们全体一致地否定右派不断强调的那些证据。哪里有自由派做过保守派那样几乎统一地反对气象科学的这种事，或是他们拒绝承认奥巴马医改事实上帮助了很多原本没有医保的美国人的这种事？

Here's an example for Krugman. Much of the progressive movement seems entranced by a pied piper from France who thinks inequality can be reduced almost costlessly, and that even France needs to be much more socialist. Meanwhile they almost totally ignore a highly successful social market economy. The biggest economy in Europe. What would Al Gore call German labor market policy success? An inconvenient truth? 现在我就给了Krugman一个这样的例子。似乎很多进步主义运动都是受来自法国的彩衣魔笛手 (Pied Piper)【译注：彩衣魔笛手源自于一个德国民间故事，他的笛声带有魔力，可以诱使孩子们跟着他走。】鼓动，认为不均等的改善几乎没有成本，认为连法国都需要变得更加社会主义。与此同时，他们几乎完全无视一个政府积极干预的社会市场经济的高度成功案例。那可是欧洲最大的经济体。Al Gore会怎么看待德国劳动市场政策的成功呢？一个讨厌的真相？ （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

通往现代文明的两条路线 辉格 2015年9月11日 上个月有幸和阿姨谈了两次，成效颇丰，一开始我们花了点时间，快速核对了一下各自在一些要点上的看法，后面的交谈就比较轻松流畅、海阔天空了。 主要的收获在我这边，我现在比较明白阿姨的大致思路了，至于我，因为历来坚持以最直白易懂的方式说话，我想大概从来就是袒露无遗的。（通俗版：大伯总是光着膀子，阿姨则难得玉体袒裎。） 众多基本共识，和一些细节分歧，我就不细说了，因为这些异同旁观者容易理解，从记录文字和我以往文章中也不难找到。这里我想解释的，是我和阿姨最基本的分歧，这涉及到相当纵深的渊源脉络，所以旁观者恐怕不容易看清。 简单说，基本分歧是，对于西方文明走向其现代形态的两条路线——姑且称为封建路线和城邦路线（不过这两个名字可能造成误解，我后面还会说）——我们有着不同态度，阿姨（在不同语境中）同时推崇两者，而我对后者相当拒斥，即便有所接受也很勉强。 需要声明，这一二分叙事是我的个人看法，和阿姨的交谈让我在这问题上思路更清楚了，但这并不代表阿姨也持同样看法，他未必会认可这样的二分。 下面我以最简略的方式解释一下这两条路线究竟是什么，它们的历史渊源，以及各自在现代文明中留下的遗产；这个高度概括性的叙述难免会留下大量有待推敲的疑点和过度片面化之类的问题，我会在未来恰当时候作出更细致的说明。 【前传：农业带来的新冲突局面】 前农业社会也充满暴力冲突，但农业改变了冲突的方式，狩猎采集者相互攻击的目的主要是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，因为他们没什么东西可抢的，因而也没什么东西（除了人身）需要保卫，而农耕者有了可供劫掠的财产（牲畜、谷物和农具），这就完全改变了战争形态。 狩猎采集者之间的战争以伏击和偷袭为主，阵地战多半是仪式性的，伤亡很小；一旦被成功偷袭，占下风一方的主要策略是逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗，农耕者就不同了，他们逃跑就只能饿死，所以必须留下来设法捍卫家园。 这是国家诞生前夜的基本背景，然后，在如何保卫家园上，农耕者发展出了两种模式。 【城邦】 一种是城邦，它源自基于血缘/文化纽带而组成的农耕部落，这些部落在面临新的战争形态时，出于自我保卫的需要，转变成了比原有部落更紧密的共同体，同时继承了部落的两大特性：高度文化认同和平等主义，在外部冲突的压力之下，从中发展出了城邦民主制、公民责任和步兵传统。 其核心特征是高度重合的共同利益，以及由此带来的强凝聚力和集体行动能力，面对外来入侵者时，所有公民不仅都有自身利益需要捍卫，也有义务和同胞并肩捍卫城邦利益，每个公民都是平等战士，这一集体行动的责任，将狩猎者的仪式性阵地战转变成了希腊式步兵方阵。 （在有些案例中，城邦的基础可以由自由农民换成有组织的自由手工业者或小商人，但原理类似。） 城邦是现代公民社会和民主政治的原型。 【封建】 另一种是封建，它起源于武装劫掠团伙，而后者是农业所导致的分工的结果，狩猎者中，每位猎人同时也是战士，不存在分工，因为光靠打仗养不活自己（毕竟抓人吃远不如抓动物吃容易嘛），而农业创造了可供劫掠的财产，因而打仗成了一门可以独立谋生的手艺，于是一部分人从农耕者或狩猎者中分化出来，成为专以劫掠为生的职业武人。 这就给农耕者带来很大麻烦，必须寻求自保，一种方法是组织成自卫共同体，就是城邦，但并非所有农民都能成功创建这样的组织，做不到的那些，只能寻求庇护，与庇护者建立依附关系，交纳保护费，获得其免于劫掠的保证，并得到其帮助抵御其他劫掠者的服务。 寻求庇护者的途径，大致分两种：一种外来劫掠者，这就相当于接受其征服，另一种是本部落内分化出的职业武人（还有一种是像罗马崩溃后留在部落地区的残余军队这样特殊来源）；这种区别的意义主要在初始阶段，双方在种族、语言和文化上存在隔阂，但时间长了，其实没什么不同。 这是最底层的庇护关系，但武装团伙之间的竞争仍然存在，幸运的话，他们之间也可能建立联盟和依附关系，最终构成一个多层次的庇护网络。 假如这种多层庇护网络长期稳定下来，各方遵守效忠/庇护责任（这一责任在底层是一方交保护费，一方提供保护，在上层是一方履行军役，一方封授领地）就转变成封建契约，庇护网络变成了领地封授体系，领地和保护费权益变成了封建式财产权。 需要强调，这一发展不是必然的，在许多条件下，庇护关系可能始终稳定不下来，因而机会主义盛行，长期处于欺骗、背叛、压制和报复的循环之中；但足够幸运的是，封建体系至少在西欧稳定存续了很长时间。 封建制是普通法、普通法下的财产权和英格兰宪政的渊源。（注意是渊源，封建制本身不包括这些元素） 【民族国家：城邦的现代对应物】 民族国家是近代在大得多的规模上复制城邦的产物，不过，规模问题也让它在一些重要方面不同于城邦： 1）对于城邦，文化同质性和民族认同几乎是自动获得的，只是被外部威胁强化了一下，而近代民族国家的同质性和民族认同，则是由政府强力推行的结果，印刷术、公立教育和官僚系统等等现代技术与组织手段，使得这一民族再发明工作有可能完成； 2）城邦的共同利益和共同命运对个体是切实可见的，有说服力的，而民族国家的共同利益多半是虚幻遥远的，需要编造各种神话进行忽悠，有时还需要借助像挑动战争之类的卑劣手段来刻意制造共同命运，即便如此，其集体行动的有效性也远逊于城邦； 3）高出两三个数量级的人口规模，使得城邦的直接民主变得不可行，只能改成代议制；而代议制里的委托代理问题，实际上让权力落入了精英手中，国民虽有公民之名，无政治参与之实，城邦公民真正的现代对应物其实是民族国家的精英； 4）由于上述几点（还有更多），城邦的主要优势，全民动员能力（这可以让他能够召集起大量步兵），在一战之后其实已经逐渐丧失，能否复兴十分可疑； 【自由市场秩序：封建的现代对应物】 自由市场秩序是指，存在一个普通法体系，保障人身和财产权利，除此之外，政府不干预任何私人事务，简单说，其终极形态就是市场无政府，即，当司法系统能够自我维持时，政府就被取消或私有化了。 民族国家和城邦之间的对应关系是容易理解的，因为他们保留了许多外观上的相似性，自由市场秩序和封建之间的对应关系则不容易看出也较难解释清楚，因为它更迂回曲折，封建制为现代市场制度的起源提供了良好土壤，但两者本身十分不同，其间经历了一系列演变，而且依赖于许多因缘际会的巧合，后者远远不是前者的“必然产物”。 （我不打算在这里详述这一演变过程，从我的旧文章里可以找到一些粗略的叙述，比如：《王权削弱不是宪政发展的结果》，《封建主义和专制主义一样坏？》，《天堂不远，就在索马里》，《封建与宪政》） 不过，深入一点就会发现，在一些基本要点上，两者仍有着共性，最根本的共性是：它们都是高度私人化的——没有公法，只有私法，没有公权力，只有私权利，没有公民，只有个人，没有主权，只有法人，…… 当然，这里的“没有”都是针对其终极形态而言，实际上尚不存在接近完美的自由市场秩序，因而这些“没有”在特定社会都要打不同程度的折扣。 【概括性对比】 当然，两条路线之间也有不少非常重要的共同点，首先，两者都要求有一套社会契约，或者叫共同规范，据此而建立契约共同体，不同的是，民族国家的契约内容更多，是一种强共同体，对成员施加强义务，要求更多的价值认同和普遍伦理；其次，两者都为广大地域的众多人口提供了普遍司法保护，从而使得现代流动性社会和大规模市场成为可能。 为方便理解，我概括对比一下两条路线的要点（我用城邦和封建来命名两条路线，仅仅是基于渊源上的考虑，目标形态其实是它们各自的现代对应物）：

	城邦路线	封建路线
文化同质性要求	强	弱
民族认同/价值认同	强	弱
共同利益/共同命运	强	弱
社会契约	强	弱
公民义务	强	弱
公法领域	强	弱
主权地位	至高无上/明确/集中	受限/模糊/分散
政府规模	大	小
地方自治	弱	强
普选制	必须	不必
义务兵役	必须	不必/无
全民动员能力	强	弱
国民教育	必须	弱/无
福利主义倾向	强	弱
个人自由	受限	充分
对制度创新的开放性	低	高

  【站队理由】 作为个人主义者，我自然倾向于第二条路线，第一条为个人自由留下的空间太小，阿姨也承认，他在内心也是更喜欢第二种的，但现实条件不允许，只能退而求其次，主权民族国家已成为主导，用阿姨的话说，除非发生一次末日级的大变故，否则私人秩序已没有出头机会，对此判断，我能理解，但有保留，存疑。 确实，在一个险恶环境中（比如老欧洲），缺乏全民动员能力可能是致命的，大英在其全盛期，步兵数量也是少得可怜，对于维持其所主导的全球秩序完全不够，所以只能依靠外交手腕、借力打力，或者花钱雇佣，一旦民族国家纷纷崛起，秩序便难以为继。相比之下，普鲁士这个按城邦路线创建民族国家的典范，其崛起速度和动员能力则有目共睹。 （其实荷兰比大英更能代表封建路线，但因为荷兰过早退出历史舞台，没多少东西可说，而且荷兰的命运也说明了封建路线的脆弱性。） 历史上的情况确实如此，但更重要的是现在，所以关键问题是，美国究竟属于哪一类？假如美国是另一个普鲁士，那我们确实没得选了。 这问题很难回答，美国太特殊了，而这一特殊又是因为他太安全了，远离险恶旧世界，所以即便骨子里有不少城邦元素，也鲜有机会发育成普鲁士那样，并在行动上表现出来，偶尔爆发一下倒是能动员起一支上千万的军队，和吓死人的军工产能，但这种爆发注定是短暂的。 反过来也是，假如美国代表了市场秩序模式，也同样缺乏机会发育和表现出来，还是因为他太安全也太辽阔因而太容易自足了，没必要去建立一个帝国来维持他所需要的安全秩序，至少没必要为此付出大规模动员的代价。 但依我看，美国还是更接近后一种情况，当然我可能只是被愿望蒙蔽了判断力；但无论如何，我是不会为任何一个普鲁士站队的，即便和霍布斯状态或极权主义相比，普鲁士要好多了，但对我来说还是远远不够好。 这么说吧，假如人类贱到不得不靠普鲁士来拯救，那我对他们还有没有救这件事情就没多大兴趣了。 （随便记录一些交谈当时闪过的念头，不成条理，读着吃力的话还望见谅，要把这种大话题写流畅太吃力了）

The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers 专制强权的回归 作者：Azar Gat @ 2007-07-01 译者：sheperdmt（@-3co） 校对：Kyo(@tfny.kyo)，沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Foreign Affairs，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2007-07-01/return-authoritarian-great-powers THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY “历史终结”论的终结 【译注：《历史的终结》是美国学者弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）1989年发表的一篇文章，后又于1992年扩写成书。福山认为自由民主制是人类社会演化的终点。】 Today's global liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam -- and it is the lesser of the two challenges. Although the proponents of radical Islam find liberal democracy repugnant, and the movement is often described as the new fascist threat, the societies from which it arises are generally poor and stagnant. 当今全球自由民主秩序面临两大挑战。第一个是伊斯兰极端主义——它的威胁程度相对较小。尽管伊斯兰极端主义的支持者对自由民主制恨之入骨，而且经常有人将这一运动描绘为新法西斯式的威胁，但其生根发芽的社会大多穷困潦倒、停滞不前。 They represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world. It is mainly the potential use of weapons of mass destruction -- particularly by nonstate actors -- that makes militant Islam a menace. 它们既不代表通往现代社会的另一条可行道路，也无法对发达国家形成明显的军事威胁。对它们可能会使用大规模杀伤性武器的担忧——尤其是在非国家行动者手中——才让伊斯兰武装算得上一个威胁。 The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback. 第二个也是更为显著的挑战，来自崛起中的非民主强权：西方世界的冷战老对手，中国与俄罗斯，它们正处于专制资本主义，而非共产主义政权统治之下。直到1945年以前，专制资本主义强权国家曾在国际体系中占据主导地位，但自那以后便销声匿迹。今天，它们似乎已准备好东山再起。 Capitalism's ascendancy appears to be deeply entrenched, but the current predominance of democracy could be far less secure. Capitalism has expanded relentlessly since early modernity, its lower-priced goods and superior economic power eroding and transforming all other socioeconomic regimes, a process most memorably described by Karl Marx in The Communist Manifesto. 资本主义的优势看来牢不可破，而民主制度目前所拥有的主导地位，却远不如前者那样安枕无忧。从现代早期开始，资本主义便所向披靡，其廉价商品和优势经济力量腐蚀并改变了其他一切社会经济制度，对此过程，马克思在《共产党宣言》里有过最令人难忘的记述。 Contrary to Marx's expectations, capitalism had the same effect on communism, eventually "burying" it without the proverbial shot being fired. 然而与马克思的期望截然相反，资本主义对共产主义产生了同样的作用，最终“不费一枪一炮”便将后者“埋葬”了。【译注：英语世界流传赫鲁晓夫的一句名言：“我们将不费一枪一炮将你们埋葬。”（We will bury you without firing a shot.）然而这句话的真实来源存疑】 The triumph of the market, precipitating and reinforced by the industrial-technological revolution, led to the rise of the middle class, intensive urbanization, the spread of education, the emergence of mass society, and ever greater affluence. 市场的胜利加速并强化了工业技术革命，也反过来从中得到力量，带来了中产阶级崛起、急剧的城镇化、教育普及、大众社会兴起，以及前所未有的富裕。 In the post-Cold War era (just as in the nineteenth century and the 1950s and 1960s), it is widely believed that liberal democracy naturally emerged from these developments, a view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama. 在后冷战时代（正如19世纪及1950、1960年代一样），人们普遍认同自由民主制是上述发展的自然结果，这一观点最著名的支持者是弗朗西斯·福山。 Today, more than half of the world's states have elected governments, and close to half have sufficiently entrenched liberal rights to be considered fully free. 如今，世界上有超过一半的国家拥有民选政府，还有接近一半的国家拥有牢固的自由权利，因而足以被视为充分自由的。 But the reasons for the triumph of democracy, especially over its nondemocratic capitalist rivals of the two world wars, Germany and Japan, were more contingent than is usually assumed. 但民主究竟是如何获胜的，尤其是如何在两次世界大战中获胜，如何战胜了非民主的资本主义对手德国和日本，其原因要比普遍认为的更具偶然性。 Authoritarian capitalist states, today exemplified by China and Russia, may represent a viable alternative path to modernity, which in turn suggests that there is nothing inevitable about liberal democracy's ultimate victory -- or future dominance. 今天，以中国和俄罗斯为代表的专制资本主义国家，或许提供了另一条通往现代社会的可行路径，而这反过来说明，自由民主制的最终胜利，或者说未来的主导地位，并非必然之事。 CHRONICLE OF A DEFEAT NOT FORETOLD 实录：无人预见的胜利 The liberal democratic camp defeated its authoritarian, fascist, and communist rivals alike in all of the three major great-power struggles of the twentieth century -- the two world wars and the Cold War. In trying to determine exactly what accounted for this decisive outcome, it is tempting to trace it to the special traits and intrinsic advantages of liberal democracy. 在20世纪的三次主要强权争锋——两次世界大战和冷战——中，自由民主阵营将其对手——专制主义、法西斯主义和共产主义——逐一击败。要确定究竟是哪些因素导致了这一决定性结局，我们很难不从自由民主制的诸多特点和内在优势开始追溯。 One possible advantage is democracies' international conduct. Perhaps they more than compensate for carrying a lighter stick abroad with a greater ability to elicit international cooperation through the bonds and discipline of the global market system. 民主国家的优势之一可能来自其国际表现。或许，借助全球市场体系中建立的种种纽带及互律准则，它们获得了引导国际合作的强大力量，足以补偿了其海外军事力量上的劣势。【译注：原文carrying a lighter stick语出老罗斯福的巨棒外交：“温言在口，大棒在手。”其中大棒指代军事实力。】 This explanation is probably correct for the Cold War, when a greatly expanded global economy was dominated by the democratic powers, but it does not apply to the two world wars. Nor is it true that liberal democracies succeed because they always cling together. 这一解释似乎适用于冷战，正是在冷战期间，民主强国主导了大幅扩张的全球经济；但它没法解释两次大战。另一种解释也难以成立：自由民主国家的成功源于它们之间的紧密团结。 Again, this was true, at least as a contributing factor, during the Cold War, when the democratic capitalist camp kept its unity, whereas growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and China pulled the communist bloc apart. 同样，后一解释适用于冷战，至少这是影响因素之一，因为在冷战期间，资本主义民主阵营始终团结一致，而共产主义联盟却因中苏之间日渐增长的敌意而破裂。 During World War I, however, the ideological divide between the two sides was much less clear. The Anglo-French alliance was far from preordained; it was above all a function of balance-of-power calculations rather than liberal cooperation. At the close of the nineteenth century, power politics had brought the United Kingdom and France, bitterly antagonistic countries, to the brink of war and prompted the United Kingdom to actively seek an alliance with Germany. 然而反观一战，战争双方的意识形态分歧却模糊得多。英法协约的签署远非注定；它首先是基于对力量均衡的算计而得出的权宜之计，而非出于共同自由理念所达成的合作。19世纪末，强权政治曾将敌意颇深的英法两国带到战争边缘，致使英国积极寻求与德国结盟。 Liberal Italy's break from the Triple Alliance and joining of the Entente, despite its rivalry with France, was a function of the Anglo-French alliance, as Italy's peninsular location made it hazardous for the country to be on a side opposed to the leading maritime power of the time, the United Kingdom. 自由主义的意大利退出三国同盟，不顾与法国的敌对关系转投协约国阵营，乃是英法结盟的结果。因为意大利身处半岛，与当时的海上第一强国英国抗衡有害无益。 Similarly, during World War II, France was quickly defeated and taken out of the Allies' side (which was to include nondemocratic Soviet Russia), whereas the right-wing totalitarian powers fought on the same side. 类似的，二战中法国迅速战败，就此脱离同盟国（之后非民主国家苏联加入），反倒是右翼极权主义强权全在同一战壕之内。 Studies of democracies' alliance behavior suggest that democratic regimes show no greater tendency to stick together than other types of regimes. Nor did the totalitarian capitalist regimes lose World War II because their democratic opponents held a moral high ground that inspired greater exertion from their people, as the historian Richard Overy and others have claimed. 对民主国家结盟行为的研究显示，民主政体并不比其他类型的政体更倾向团结合作。极权资本主义政权在二战中失败，也不是历史学家理查德·奥弗里（Richard Overy）等人所说的那样，是因为民主国家占据了道德高地，因而能在其人民中间鼓舞动员起更多力量。 During the 1930s and early 1940s, fascism and Nazism were exciting new ideologies that generated massive popular enthusiasm, whereas democracy stood on the ideological defensive, appearing old and dispirited. If anything, the fascist regimes proved more inspiring in wartime than their democratic adversaries, and the battlefield performance of their militaries is widely judged to have been superior. 在20世纪30和40年代早期，法西斯和纳粹思想都是激动人心的新型意识形态，激起了大范围的民众热情，而民主国家则在意识形态上处于守势，面目苍老毫无生气。两者差别恰恰是，法西斯政权在战时比它们的民主敌人更能鼓舞人心，其军队的战场表现也被公认为更加优秀。 Liberal democracy's supposedly inherent economic advantage is also far less clear than is often assumed. All of the belligerents in the twentieth century's great struggles proved highly effective in producing for war. During World War I, semiautocratic Germany committed its resources as effectively as its democratic rivals did. 人们认为自由民主制天生具有经济优势，其实这一点远不如想象中明显。20世纪的几次对抗已经证明，所有交战国都有极强的军事生产能力。一战期间，半独裁的德国可以与其民主对手同样有效地调配资源。 After early victories in World War II, Nazi Germany's economic mobilization and military production proved lax during the critical years 1940-42. Well positioned at the time to fundamentally alter the global balance of power by destroying the Soviet Union and straddling all of continental Europe, Germany failed because its armed forces were meagerly supplied for the task. 在取得最初胜利之后，纳粹德国却在至关紧要的1940至1942年间，经历了经济动员和军事生产上的松懈。当德国已做好准备消灭苏联，彻底打破世界均势、横扫欧洲大陆之际，却因部队供给不足而遭致失败。 The reasons for this deficiency remain a matter of historical debate, but one of the problems was the existence of competing centers of authority in the Nazi system, in which Hitler's "divide and rule" tactics and party functionaries' jealous guarding of their assigned domains had a chaotic effect. 虽然供给短缺的原因至今仍是历史争论的主题，但一个已知的问题是，纳粹党内存在相互争权夺利的多个权力中心。希特勒的“分而治之”策略，以及党务官员对各自职权领地的精心守护，都加剧了其内部混乱。 Furthermore, from the fall of France in June 1940 to the German setback before Moscow in December 1941, there was a widespread feeling in Germany that the war had practically been won. All the same, from 1942 onward (by which time it was too late), Germany greatly intensified its economic mobilization and caught up with and even surpassed the liberal democracies in terms of the share of GDP devoted to the war (although its production volume remained much lower than that of the massive U.S. economy). Likewise, levels of economic mobilization in imperial Japan and the Soviet Union exceeded those of the United States and the United Kingdom thanks to ruthless efforts. 另外，从1940年6月法国沦陷，到1941年12月德军受阻于莫斯科期间，德国全国上下充溢着战争实际已经胜利的情绪。尽管如此，从1942年开始（为时已晚），德国大幅加强了自己的经济动员能力，在军费占GDP的比例上追赶甚至超越了各民主国家（尽管与规模庞大的美国经济相比，其产量仍然十分低下）。相似的情形也发生在日本帝国和苏联，经过残酷努力，两国经济动员水平超越了美国和英国。 Only during the Cold War did the Soviet command economy exhibit deepening structural weaknesses -- weaknesses that were directly responsible for the Soviet Union's downfall. The Soviet system had successfully generated the early and intermediate stages of industrialization (albeit at a frightful human cost) and excelled at the regimentalized techniques of mass production during World War II. 只有在冷战期间，苏联的指令经济体系才显现出不断加深的结构性缺陷——这类缺陷是苏联覆灭的直接原因。苏维埃体系成功到达了工业化的早期和中期阶段（尽管为此付出了可怕的人员代价），并在二战期间出色实现了整编有方的大规模生产。 It also kept abreast militarily during the Cold War. But because of the system's rigidity and lack of incentives, it proved ill equipped to cope with the advanced stages of development and the demands of the information age and globalization. 即使在冷战期间，它的军事建设也并不曾落后。但因为它僵硬死板、缺乏激励，在高级的发展阶段，以及信息时代和全球化的要求面前，这一体系装备不良，无力应对。 There is no reason, however, to suppose that the totalitarian capitalist regimes of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan would have proved inferior economically to the democracies had they survived. The inefficiencies that favoritism and unaccountability typically create in such regimes might have been offset by higher levels of social discipline. 但我们也没有证据认为，如果纳粹德国和日本帝国的极权资本主义政权延续至今，它们的经济实力会逊于民主国家。这样的政权往往徇私泛滥，缺乏监察问责，造成效率低下，但这可以被更高水平的社会纪律所抵消。 Because of their more efficient capitalist economies, the right-wing totalitarian powers could have constituted a more viable challenge to the liberal democracies than the Soviet Union did; Nazi Germany was judged to be such a challenge by the Allied powers before and during World War II. The liberal democracies did not possess an inherent advantage over Germany in terms of economic and technological development, as they did in relation to their other great-power rivals. 由于接纳了更为有效的资本主义经济，比起苏联，这些右翼极权主义强权有可能对自由民主国家构成更有力的挑战；二战结束之前，同盟国就曾如此看待纳粹德国。自由民主制相比其他强权，在经济和技术发展上体现出的内在优势，与德国相比却并不存在。 So why did the democracies win the great struggles of the twentieth century? The reasons are different for each type of adversary. They defeated their nondemocratic capitalist adversaries, Germany and Japan, in war because Germany and Japan were medium-sized countries with limited resource bases and they came up against the far superior -- but hardly preordained -- economic and military coalition of the democratic powers and Russia or the Soviet Union. 那么，究竟是什么原因，使得民主国家在20世纪的三场对抗中都取得了胜利呢？对不同类型的对手，答案不尽相同。战胜同样实行资本主义、但无民主的德国和日本，是因为这两个国家领土面积中等，资源基础有限，却要面对各民主强国及俄国（或苏联）结成的经济和军事联盟，其实力远超前者——尽管这次结盟只是机缘巧合。 The defeat of communism, however, had much more to do with structural factors. The capitalist camp -- which after 1945 expanded to include most of the developed world -- possessed much greater economic power than the communist bloc, and the inherent inefficiency of the communist economies prevented them from fully exploiting their vast resources and catching up to the West. 共产主义的失败则更多出于结构性因素。1945年后，资本主义阵营囊括了几乎所有发达国家，它们比起共产主义阵营拥有强大得多的经济实力，而共产主义经济固有的低效也妨碍了它们充分利用其丰富的资源，拖累了它们追赶西方的步伐。 Together, the Soviet Union and China were larger and thus had the potential to be more powerful than the democratic capitalist camp. Ultimately, they failed because their economic systems limited them, whereas the nondemocratic capitalist powers, Germany and Japan, were defeated because they were too small. Contingency played a decisive role in tipping the balance against the nondemocratic capitalist powers and in favor of the democracies. 苏联和中国加起来面积更大，因而其实力确有潜力超越资本主义民主阵营。中苏最终失败于其经济体系对自身的制约，而德日作为实行资本主义的非民主强权，却因为领土面积太小失败。在打破力量平衡，使天平向民主国家一边倾斜的过程中，偶然因素起了决定性的作用。 AMERICAN EXCEPTION 美国例外论 The most decisive element of contingency was the United States. After all, it was little more than a chance of history that the scion of Anglo-Saxon liberalism would sprout on the other side of the Atlantic, institutionalize its heritage with independence, expand across one of the most habitable and thinly populated territories in the world, feed off of massive immigration from Europe, and so create on a continental scale what was -- and still is -- by far the world's largest concentration of economic and military might. 最具决定性的偶然因素就是美国。盎格鲁-撒克逊自由主义的后裔在大西洋彼岸生根发芽，取得独立，并将自由主义的遗产加以制度化，在地球上最为宜居、同时人烟最稀的土地上纵横扩张，接纳来自欧洲的庞大移民，并在大陆级的规模上，集合起曾经是、现在仍然是全世界最强的经济和军事力量——这一切几乎全是出于历史的巧合。 A liberal regime and other structural traits had a lot to do with the United States' economic success, and even with its size, because of its attractiveness to immigrants. But the United States would scarcely have achieved such greatness had it not been located in a particularly advantageous and vast ecological-geographic niche, as the counterexamples of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand demonstrate. 美国经济的成功，应在很大程度上归功于其自由政体，以及其他结构性特点；甚至美国的规模也与此有关，因为自由主义能吸引大量移民。然而，如果不是位居这块生态和地理条件都极其优越、丰富的土地，美国不太可能取得如今的成就，加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰就是反例。 And location, of course, although crucial, was but one necessary condition among many for bringing about the giant and, indeed, United States as the paramount political fact of the twentieth century. Contingency was at least as responsible as liberalism for the United States' emergence in the New World and, hence, for its later ability to rescue the Old World. 地理位置确实十分关键，但造就美国这个巨人，造就这个20世纪最为重要的政治实体，所需的必要条件不可胜数，位置不过是其中之一。对于美国在新世界的崛起，以及后来出手挽救旧世界的过程，偶然因素发挥的作用至少并不少于自由主义。 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States' power consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. If any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. 整个20世纪，美国国力始终领先于世界，实力超过全球第二、三位的总和，因此全球均势的天平不可避免地滑向华盛顿所支持的那一边。如果要为民主阵营略占上风找一个原因，那首先是因为美国的加入，而非民主制度有什么内在优势。 In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the twentieth century. This is a sobering thought that is often overlooked in studies of the spread of democracy in the twentieth century, and it makes the world today appear much more contingent and tenuous than linear theories of development suggest. 事实上，如果没有美国，自由民主阵营很可能输掉20世纪的三次对抗。这个观点发人深省，却常常被有关20世纪民主扩张的研究所忽略。也正因此，和那些线性发展理论所设想的情况相比，今日世界之存在更像是巧合的产物，也更为脆弱。 If it were not for the U.S. factor, the judgment of later generations on liberal democracy would probably have echoed the negative verdict on democracy's performance, issued by the fourth-century-BC Greeks, in the wake of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. 如果没有美国这个因素，后世大概会给自由民主制以负面评价，就像公元前4世纪的希腊人评价败于斯巴达的雅典民主时一样。 THE NEW SECOND WORLD 新第二世界 But the audit of war is, of course, not the only one that societies -- democratic and nondemocratic -- undergo. One must ask how the totalitarian capitalist powers would have developed had they not been defeated by war. Would they, with time and further development, have shed their former identity and embraced liberal democracy, as the former communist regimes of eastern Europe eventually did? 然而对于各社会，无论民主与否，战争都不是唯一的考验。我们应该问一句：如果没有战败，这些极权资本主义国家将如何发展。是否，经过足够的时间和进一步的发展，它们会改头换面，接受自由民主，走上东欧各个前共产主义政权最终选择的道路吗？ Was the capitalist industrial state of imperial Germany before World War I ultimately moving toward increasing parliamentary control and democratization? Or would it have developed into an authoritarian oligarchic regime, dominated by an alliance between the officialdom, the armed forces, and industry, as imperial Japan did (in spite of the latter's liberal interlude in the 1920s)? 一战前的资本主义工业国家德意志帝国，会逐渐加强议会监察制度，继而走向民主吗？还是会像日本帝国一样，受官僚、军队和工业联合把控，变成一个专制主义的寡头政体（即便日本1920年代出现过短暂的自由期）？ Liberalization seems even more doubtful in the case of Nazi Germany had it survived, let alone triumphed. Because all these major historical experiments were cut short by war, the answers to these questions remain a matter of speculation. But perhaps the peacetime record of other authoritarian capitalist regimes since 1945 can offer a clue. 假如纳粹德国幸存了下来，其自由化（相比德意志帝国）的可能性则更渺茫，更别说假如它当初得胜了。战争切断了这些大型历史实验的进程，这些回答永远只能是想象。不过，还有一些专制资本主义国家延续到了1945年之后，它们在和平年代的表现可以提供一条线索。 Studies that cover this period show that democracies generally outdo other systems economically. Authoritarian capitalist regimes are at least as successful -- if not more so -- in the early stages of development, but they tend to democratize after crossing a certain threshold of economic and social development. This seems to have been a recurring pattern in East Asia, southern Europe, and Latin America. 关于这段时期的研究显示，民主政体的经济发展总体而言优于其它制度。在发展的早期阶段，专制资本主义国家也取得了至少不逊于民主国家的成就，但当经济和社会发展越过了某一特定水平，它们就有民主化的趋势。这一模式似乎在东亚、南欧及拉丁美洲反复出现过。 The attempt to draw conclusions about development patterns from these findings, however, may be misleading, because the sample set itself may be polluted. Since 1945, the enormous gravitational pull exerted by the United States and the liberal hegemony has bent patterns of development worldwide. 然而，试图从上述现象中得出任何有关发展模式的结论，可能会误入歧途，因为样本集合本身可能已被污染。自1945年起，美国及自由主义全球霸权所发挥的强大引力，已然影响了世界各国的发展轨迹。 Because the totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war, and these countries were subsequently threatened by Soviet power, they lent themselves to a sweeping restructuring and democratization. 极权资本主义的德日两国被战争击垮，接着又受到苏联霸权威胁，因而走上了彻底的重构和民主化之路。 Consequently, smaller countries that chose capitalism over communism had no rival political and economic model to emulate and no powerful international players to turn to other than the liberal democratic camp. These small and medium-sized countries' eventual democratization probably had as much to do with the overwhelming influence of the Western liberal hegemony as with internal processes. 结果，同属资本主义而非共产主义阵营的小国，没有其他对立的政经体制可以效仿，除了自由民主制，他们在国际舞台上也找不到可以投靠的其它选手。这些中小型国家最终走向民主化，内在发展恐怕只占一半的原因，另有一半则应是西方自由霸权的压倒性影响。 Presently, Singapore is the only example of a country with a truly developed economy that still maintains a semiauthoritarian regime, and even it is likely to change under the influence of the liberal order within which it operates. But are Singapore-like great powers that prove resistant to the influence of this order possible? 当前，经济真正发达同时仍保留半专制主义政权的例子，只有新加坡一个，但即使是新加坡，也可能因为受到它运行于其中的自由秩序之影响而发生改变。但是，有可能存在一种能够对抗该秩序之影响的新加坡式强权大国吗？ The question is made relevant by the recent emergence of nondemocratic giants, above all formerly communist and booming authoritarian capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. 这个问题的意义随着近来非民主大国的兴起愈发明显。突出代表就是放弃共产主义，正在专制资本主义的统治下繁荣发展的中国。同样，俄国也从后共产时代的自由主义之中回归，并且随着经济实力的增长，显现出越来越多的专制主义特征。 Some believe that these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence, and outside influence. Alternatively, they may have enough weight to create a new nondemocratic but economically advanced Second World. They could establish a powerful authoritarian capitalist order that allies political elites, industrialists, and the military; that is nationalist in orientation; and that participates in the global economy on its own terms, as imperial Germany and imperial Japan did. 有人认为，经过内部发展、财富增长及外部影响的共同作用，此类国家可能最终接纳自由民主。或者，它们也可能有足够的实力，创造一个新的第二世界，不实行民主，却有高度发达的经济。它们可以集结政治精英、工业家和军队，建立一个强大的专制资本主义秩序；以民族主义为发展方向；并与帝国主义的德国、日本一样，按照他们自己设定的规则参与全球经济。 It is widely contended that economic and social development creates pressures for democratization that an authoritarian state structure cannot contain. There is also the view that "closed societies" may be able to excel in mass manufacturing but not in the advanced stages of the information economy. The jury on these issues is still out, because the data set is incomplete. 普遍认为，经济和社会发展不断创造趋向民主化的压力，会使专制国家的结构无法承受。还有观点认为，“封闭社会”可能擅长大规模生产，却会在信息经济的高级阶段落到下风。上述问题悬而未决，因为数据资料尚不完整。 Imperial and Nazi Germany stood at the forefront of the advanced scientific and manufacturing economies of their times, but some would argue that their success no longer applies because the information economy is much more diversified. Nondemocratic Singapore has a highly successful information economy, but Singapore is a city-state, not a big country. 德意志帝国和纳粹德国在它们的时代，先进科学和制造业经济都处于世界前列，但有人会说它们的成功无法复制，因为信息经济的细化程度深入得多。新加坡这个非民主国家有十分成功的信息经济，但它只是一座城邦，而非一个大国。 It will take a long time before China reaches the stage when the possibility of an authoritarian state with an advanced capitalist economy can be tested. All that can be said at the moment is that there is nothing in the historical record to suggest that a transition to democracy by today's authoritarian capitalist powers is inevitable, whereas there is a great deal to suggest that such powers have far greater economic and military potential than their communist predecessors did. 先进的资本主义经济能否在专制国家实现，只有等中国的发展到达那一阶段才能得知，而这还要很久。当下只能得出这样的结论：历史记载并未表明今天的专制资本主义大国必然会转向民主，倒是有足够证据说明这些大国有着远超其共产主义前辈的经济和军事潜力。 China and Russia represent a return of economically successful authoritarian capitalist powers, which have been absent since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, but they are much larger than the latter two countries ever were. Although Germany was only a medium-sized country uncomfortably squeezed at the center of Europe, it twice nearly broke out of its confines to become a true world power on account of its economic and military might. 1945年德日战败，经济上成功的专制资本主义一度消失过。现在，中俄两国代表了这股力量的回归，并有远超前两者的国家规模。尽管德国只是蜷缩在欧洲中心的一个中等国家，它却因其经济和军事力量之故，有两次几近于突破约束，成为真正的世界大国。 In 1941, Japan was still behind the leading great powers in terms of economic development, but its growth rate since 1913 had been the highest in the world. Ultimately, however, both Germany and Japan were too small -- in terms of population, resources, and potential -- to take on the United States. Present-day China, on the other hand, is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is experiencing spectacular economic growth. 1941年，日本的经济发展水平仍落后于领先强国，但它1913年以来的增长率一直保持世界第一。然而最终，无论从人口、资源还是潜力来说，德国和日本都太小了，无法与美国抗衡。与之相比，从人口上来说，现在的中国是国际舞台上最重量级的选手，正在经历惊人的经济增长。 By shifting from communism to capitalism, China has switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. As China rapidly narrows the economic gap with the developed world, the possibility looms that it will become a true authoritarian superpower. 经过从共产主义向资本主义的转变，中国形成了一种远更高效的专制主义。随着中国快速缩小着自己与发达国家间的经济差距，一个真正的超级专制大国也就离我们越来越近。 Even in its current bastions in the West, the liberal political and economic consensus is vulnerable to unforeseen developments, such as a crushing economic crisis that could disrupt the global trading system or a resurgence of ethnic strife in a Europe increasingly troubled by immigration and ethnic minorities. 即使在其当下的西方堡垒之内，自由主义的政治和经济共识在难以预见的发展面前也颇为脆弱，比如可能扰乱全球贸易体系的惨重经济危机，或随着移民不断涌入，少数族裔问题日渐突出，最终种族冲突在欧洲复兴。 Were the West to be hit by such upheavals, support for liberal democracy in Asia, Latin America, and Africa -- where adherence to that model is more recent, incomplete, and insecure -- could be shaken. A successful nondemocratic Second World could then be regarded by many as an attractive alternative to liberal democracy. 假如西方遭此剧变，亚洲、拉美和非洲各地的自由民主拥趸就会动摇（这些地区接受自由民主的时间十分晚近，也不够完备，因而更不稳固）。到那时，一个不实行民主然而经济上成功的第二世界，就会对许多国家形成诱惑，成为自由民主制之外的另一种选择。 MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 给民主一个安全世界 Although the rise of authoritarian capitalist great powers would not necessarily lead to a nondemocratic hegemony or a war, it might imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union's collapse will be short-lived and that a universal "democratic peace" is still far off. 专制资本主义超级大国的崛起，并不必然会催生一个非民主国家的世界霸权，也不一定导致战争；然而，这可能暗示着，自由民主制自苏联解体以来所享有的那种近乎完全的支配地位，可能不会长久，而全球范围内的“民主和平”仍将遥不可及。 The new authoritarian capitalist powers could become as deeply integrated into the world economy as imperial Germany and imperial Japan were and not choose to pursue autarky, as Nazi Germany and the communist bloc did. A great-power China may also be less revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were (although Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, is more likely to tend toward revisionism). 新的专制资本主义强国可能与德意志帝国、日本帝国一样，与世界经济紧密结为一体，而不会像纳粹德国和共产主义阵营那样追求自给自足。一个既已崛起的强大中国，可能不会像领土受限的德日一样奉行修正主义（但仍未从帝国失落的眩晕中恢复的俄国，更有可能向修正主义迈进）。 Still, Beijing, Moscow, and their future followers might well be on antagonistic terms with the democratic countries, with all the potential for suspicion, insecurity, and conflict that this entails -- while holding considerably more power than any of the democracies' past rivals ever did. 但是，北京、莫斯科以及它们未来的追随者极有可能站在民主国家的对立面，因此包含着发生猜忌、不安全和冲突的全部可能，同时它们还拥有民主阵营以往任何对手都不曾拥有过的强大实力。 So does the greater power potential of authoritarian capitalism mean that the transformation of the former communist great powers may ultimately prove to have been a negative development for global democracy? It is too early to tell. Economically, the liberalization of the former communist countries has given the global economy a tremendous boost, and there may be more in store. 那么，专制资本主义会成为更大强权的可能性，是否意味着那些前共产主义大国的转型最终将对全球民主产生负面作用？现在下结论还为时尚早。从经济上来说，前共产主义国家的自由化已极大地推动了全球经济，更不用说这一助力尚未充分释放。 But the possibility of a move toward protectionism by them in the future also needs to be taken into account -- and assiduously avoided. It was, after all, the prospect of growing protectionism in the world economy at the turn of the twentieth century and the protectionist bent of the 1930s that helped radicalize the nondemocratic capitalist powers of the time and precipitate both world wars. 但是，这些国家未来转向保护主义的可能性也应加以考虑，并且小心避免。毕竟，正是由于20世纪初对于世界经济中保护主义会不断增长的预期，以及1930年代的保护主义倾向，才使得当时的非民主资本主义强权趋向激进，并催生了两次世界大战。 On the positive side for the democracies, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire stripped Moscow of about half the resources it commanded during the Cold War, with eastern Europe absorbed by a greatly expanded democratic Europe. This is perhaps the most significant change in the global balance of power since the forced postwar democratic reorientation of Germany and Japan under U.S. tutelage. 从对民主国家有利的一面来看，，苏联及其帝国的解体使莫斯科失去了冷战中拥有的一半资源，东欧被规模大幅扩张的民主欧洲吸收同化。这大概是自德日两国受美国监管，强制进行战后民主转型以来，全球均势最为重要的变化。 Moreover, China may still eventually democratize, and Russia could reverse its drift away from democracy. If China and Russia do not become democratic, it will be critical that India remain so, both because of its vital role in balancing China and because of the model that it represents for other developing countries. 此外，中国最终仍有可能选择民主化道路，而俄国也可能会从偏离民主的轨道上修正回来。如果中俄最终没有转向民主，印度保持民主就显得意义重大，不仅因为印度扮演着平衡中国的重要角色，也因为他对其他发展中国家起着示范作用。 But the most important factor remains the United States. For all the criticism leveled against it, the United States -- and its alliance with Europe -- stands as the single most important hope for the future of liberal democracy. Despite its problems and weaknesses, the United States still commands a global position of strength and is likely to retain it even as the authoritarian capitalist powers grow. 然而，最重要的因素依旧是美国。面对一切针对美国的公开指责，美国及其与欧洲的结盟关系，仍然是自由民主在未来至为关键的希望。尽管存在诸多问题和弱点，美国仍然具有全球实力，即使专制资本主义强权发展壮大，美国仍不会轻易失去这一地位。 Not only are its GDP and productivity growth rate the highest in the developed world, but as an immigrant country with about one-fourth the population density of both the European Union and China and one-tenth of that of Japan and India, the United States still has considerable potential to grow -- both economically and in terms of population -- whereas those others are all experiencing aging and, ultimately, shrinking populations. 美国不仅有发达国家中最高的GDP和生产力增速，同时，作为一个移民国家，其人口密度仅为欧盟和中国的四分之一，日本和印度的十分之一，因此美国仍有相当可观的发展潜能——无论是就经济还是人口而言——相反，其他国家都在遭受老龄化的困扰，并且最终将面临人口缩减的问题。 China's economic growth rate is among the highest in the world, and given the country's huge population and still low levels of development, such growth harbors the most radical potential for change in global power relations. But even if China's superior growth rate persists and its GDP surpasses that of the United States by the 2020s, as is often forecast, China will still have just over one-third of the United States' wealth per capita and, hence, considerably less economic and military power. 中国的经济增长率居于世界前列，加上巨大的人口数量和目前较低的发展水平，这样的增长率之下潜藏着改变全球力量对比的巨大潜能。不过，即便中国能够保持如此高速的增长，能像普遍预测的那样，实现2020年之前GDP超越美国的目标，其人均财富也刚刚企及美国的三分之一，因此经济和军事实力仍旧相对较弱。 Closing that far more challenging gap with the developed world would take several more decades. Furthermore, GDP alone is known to be a poor measure of a country's power, and evoking it to celebrate China's ascendency is highly misleading. As it was during the twentieth century, the U.S. factor remains the greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the periphery of the international system. 弥补这个差距的任务极其艰巨，赶上发达国家还需花费好几十年。另外，众所周知，单独考察GDP不足以全面衡量一国国力，仅凭这一项来赞颂中国的支配地位十分具有误导性。如同20世纪的情形一样，要使自由民主制免于陷入守势，免于落得国际体系中脆弱的边缘位置，美国的存在仍是最大的保障。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The return of Authoritarian Capitalists 专制资本主义的归来 作者：Azar Gat @ 2007-6-14 译者：史祥莆（@史祥莆）    校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：The New York Times，http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/opinion/14iht-edgat.1.6137311.html Today's global liberal democratic order faces a significant challenge from the rise of nondemocratic great powers - the West's old Cold War rivals, China and Russia, now operating under "authoritarian capitalist" rather than Communist regimes. 今天，全球自由民主秩序面临着来自非民主强权崛起的巨大挑战——冷战中西方的老对手，中国和俄罗斯，如今处于专制资本主义而非共产主义政权控制之下。 The category is not new - authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. 专制资本主义国家并不是一个新类别——它们在1945年之前的国际体系中一直扮演着领导角色。 But they have been largely absent since then. The liberal democratic camp defeated its authoritarian, Fascist and Communist rivals alike in all of the three major great-power struggles of the 20th century - the two world wars and the Cold War. 但是在那之后他们就基本上消失了。自由民主阵营在20世纪的三次强权争锋（两次世界大战加上冷战）中战胜了其专制主义、法西斯主义和共产主义对手。 It is tempting to trace this outcome to the special traits and intrinsic advantages of liberal democracy. But the reasons for the liberal democracies' victories were different for each type of adversary. 人们很容易将这一结果追溯到自由民主的特性和内在优势。然而面对不同的对手，自由民主胜利的原因也是不同的。 The Soviet Union failed because its economic systems limited it. But the nondemocratic capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were defeated in war fundamentally because they were medium-sized countries with limited resource bases. 苏联是因为其经济体系的局限而失败的。但非民主资本主义强国德国和日本，却根本上是因为其屈居中等的国家面积和有限的资源而在战争中被打败。 Thus contingency, not inherent advantages of liberal democracy, played a decisive role in tipping the balance against the non-democratic capitalist powers and in favor of the democracies. 所以，在与非民主资本主义强国的对抗中起着打破平衡的决定性作用，从而使天平偏向民主一方的，是偶然因素而不是固有优势。 The most decisive element of contingency was the United States. 最关键的偶然因素是美国。 Because of its continental size, no less than its democratic-capitalist system, the power of the United States consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined throughout the 20th century, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. 因为美国有着与一个大陆相当的面积和民主资本主义体系，在整个20世纪，美国的力量总是比紧随其后最大的两个国家加起来还要大。这决定性地使全球力量平衡偏向了华盛顿所在的那一边。 So if any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the 20th century. 所以，如果说有什么因素给了自由民主优势，那么美国的存在高于一切内在优势。事实上，如果没有美国的存在，自由民主很可能已经在20世纪的大搏斗中失败。 This is a sobering thought that is often overlooked in studies of the spread of democracy in the 20th century, and it makes the world today appear much more contingent and tenuous than linear theories of development suggest. 这一发人深省的想法，在有关20世纪民主传播的研究中往往被忽视，并且它使得当今世界显得比线性发展理论所设想的更加偶然与脆弱。 This is especially true in light of the recent emergence of nondemocratic powers, above all booming, authoritarian, capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its post-Communist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. 这一观点在观察最近出现的非民主强国时尤其正确，其中最突出的是繁荣而又专制的资本主义中国。俄罗斯也正在从后共产主义的自由主义退出，并且在经济实力增强的同时表现出越来越多的专制特征。 Some believe these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence and outside influence. 一些人相信这些国家可以通过内部发展、财富的增加，以及外部影响的共同作用而最终成为自由民主国家。 Alternatively, they may have enough weight to create a new non-democratic but economically advanced Second World. They could establish a powerful authoritarian-capitalist order that allies political elites, industrialists and the military; that is nationalist in orientation; and that participates in the global economy on its own terms, as imperial Germany and imperial Japan did. 或者，他们可能有足够的实力来创造一个非民主却有着发达经济的新第二世界。他们可能建立一个联合了政治精英、企业家和军队的强大专制资本主义秩序；这将是民族主义取向的，他们会以自己的方式参与国际经济，就像曾经的德意志帝国和日本帝国那样。 By shifting from Communist command economy to capitalism, China and Russia have switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. Although the rise of these authoritarian capitalist great powers would not necessarily lead to a non-democratic hegemony or war, it might imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union's collapse will be short-lived and that a universal "democratic peace" is still far off. 通过从共产主义指令经济转向资本主义，中国和俄罗斯转向了一种远更高效的专制主义。尽管这些专制资本主义大国的崛起，未必会导致非民主霸权或者战争，但它可能意味着，苏联解体之后那种自由民主几乎完全主宰世界的局面是短暂的，而普遍的“民主和平”仍然遥远。 Beijing and Moscow and their future followers might well become antagonists of the democratic countries - with all the potential for insecurity and conflict that this entails- while holding considerably more power than any of the democracies' past rivals ever did by virtue of being both large and capitalist. 北京、莫斯科和他们未来的追随者可能成为民主国家的对手——连同它必定携带的潜在冲突和不安全因素——他们有着比民主国家以往对手更强的实力，这一实力既来自其国家规模，也来自其资本主义性质。 The most important counterweight remains the United States. For all the criticism leveled against it, the United States and its alliance with Europe stands as the single most important hope for the future of liberal democracy. 最重要的砝码依然是美国。尽管遭受种种批评，美国和它的欧洲盟友仍是未来自由民主无可替代的最重要希望。 As it was during the 20th century, the United States remains the greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the periphery of the international system. 正如在20世纪那样，美国仍是确保自由民主免于屈居守势并沦落至国际体系边缘脆弱地位的最大保障。 Azar Gat is professor of national security at Tel Aviv University and the author of "War in Human Civilization." A longer version of this article appears in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs. Azar Gat是特拉维夫大学国家安全教授，《人类文明进程中的战争》的作者。本文的更长版本刊载于7/8 月的《外交事务》（Foreign Affairs）杂志。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Dodd-Frank's Nasty Double Whammy 多德-弗兰克法案的双重恶果 作者：Phil Gramm @ 2015-7-23 译者：林翠     校对：小册子 来源：Wall Street Journal‎， http://www.wsj.com/articles/dodd-franks-nasty-double-whammy-1437692851 【译注：多德-弗兰克法案，全称《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法》（Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act），2010年颁行的金融监管改革法案，是国会对2008年金融危机的主要立法反应。】 Five years after the passage of the Dodd-Frank financial law, the causes and effects of the failed economic recovery are apparent throughout the banking system. The Federal Reserve’s monetary easing has inflated bank reserves, but lending has barely increased. Today banks maintain an extraordinary $29 of reserves for every dollar they are required to hold. In the first quarter of 2015 banks actually deposited more money in the Fed ($65.1 billion) than they lent ($52.5 billion). 回顾多德-弗兰克金融法生效后的这五年，银行系统清楚展现了经济复苏失败的前因后果。美联储的宽松货币政策使银行储备愈加膨胀，贷款总量却几乎没有增加。银行机构目前在美联储的实际存款是法定要求的29倍。2015年第一季度，银行机构向美联储总存款651亿美元，比总贷款525亿美元还多。 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 1,341 commercial banks have disappeared since 2010. Remarkably, only two new banks have been chartered. By comparison, in the quarter century before the financial crisis, roughly 2,500 new banks were chartered. Even during the Great Depression of the 1930s, an average of 19 new banks a year were chartered. 联邦存款保险公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.）的数据显示，2010年至今已经有1341家商业银行消失。同时，只有两家新银行获得牌照。相比之下，在金融危机前的二十五年，大约涌现了2500家新银行。即使在20世纪30年代的大萧条时期，平均每年也有19家新银行获牌。 A Mercatus Center survey found that while community banks have hired 50% more compliance officers to deal with Dodd-Frank, overall industry employment has increased only 5% and remains below precrisis levels. Industrial, consumer and mortgage finance continue to flee the banking system, as the American Bankers Association reported this week that the law’s regulatory burden has led almost half of banks to reduce offerings of financial products and services. 莫卡斯特中心（Mercatus Center ）的一项调查发现，尽管为应对多德-弗兰克法案，小型社区银行雇用的合规事务员比原先多了50%，整个行业的就业人数仅增加5%，仍然低于金融危机前的水平。产业金融、消费金融、抵押融资持续流出银行系统，据美国银行家协会（American Bankers Association）本周发布的报告，该法案造成的监管负担导致近半数银行削减了金融产品和服务。 New financial-services technology, such as online and mobile payment systems, has continued to blossom, but almost exclusively outside the banking system. The massive resources of, and talent in, banks have been sidetracked, rather than being employed to make loans and boost the economy. 新的金融服务技术，如在线和移动支付系统，继续而且只在银行系统之外繁荣发展。而银行受法案拖累，却未能充分利用其巨大的资源与人才来提供融资和促进经济增长。 Worst of all, Dodd-Frank has empowered regulators to set rules on their own, rather than implement requirements set by Congress. This has undermined a vital condition necessary to put money and America back to work—legal and regulatory certainty. 最糟糕的是，多德-弗兰克法案抛弃了监管机构应执行国会所设定标准的惯例，转而授权监管机构自行制订规则。这种做法损害了保证金融活动乃至整个美国运作良好的重要条件——法律和监管的确定性。 It is true that a certain amount of regulatory flexibility is necessary in many laws. But in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and most subsequent banking law before Dodd-Frank, the powers Congress granted to regulators were fairly limited and generally implemented by bipartisan commissions. 对许多法律来说，一定的监管灵活度必不可少。但是，在多德-弗兰克法案之前的1934年证券交易法，以及随后的大部分银行法律中，国会授予监管机构的权力相当有限，且一般由两党共同控制的委员会来执行。 Major decisions were debated and voted on in the clear light of day. Precedents and formal rules were knowable by the regulated. And regulators generally had to be responsive to Congress, which controlled agency appropriations. These checks and balances, while imperfect, did promote general consistency and predictability in federal regulatory policy. 种种制衡机制——重大决策经过冷静的辩论和投票表决；监管所依据的先例和成文法可供被监管者查阅；监管机构需要对掌控预算拨款的国会负责——尽管未必完善，却仍有效促进了联邦监管政策总体上的一致性和可预见性。 This process has been undermined. For example, Dodd-Frank’s Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is not run by a bipartisan commission. And the CFPB’s funding is automatic, virtually eliminating any real ability for elected officials to check its policies. Consistency and predictability are being replaced by uncertainty and fear. 但这套程序正在遭受侵蚀。例如，根据多德-弗兰克法案设立的消费者金融保障局（Consumer Financial Protection Bureau）并非由一个两党共同控制的委员会运作。再有，消费者金融保障局每年的拨款都是自动获得的，这令民选官员事实上无法监督其政策制订。原先政策总体的一致性和可预见性正在被迷茫和恐慌所代替。 Over the years the Federal Trade Commission and the courts defined what constituted “unfair and deceptive” financial practices. Dodd-Frank added the word “abusive” without defining it. The result: The CFPB can now ban services and products offered by financial institutions even though they are not unfair or deceptive by long-standing precedent. 多年以来，美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）和法院负责界定何谓“不公平与欺诈性”的金融行为。多德-弗兰克法案却不加定义地写入了“滥用（abusive）”一词。由此，金融机构提供的特定产品或服务，即使在传统上并不属于不公平与欺诈性的范畴，消费者金融保护局仍有权予以禁止。 Regulators in the Dodd-Frank era impose restrictions on financial institutions never contemplated by Congress, and they push international regulations on insurance companies and money-market funds that Congress never authorized. The law’s Financial Stability Oversight Council meets in private and is made up exclusively of the sitting president’s appointed allies. 多德-弗兰克法案之后，监管当局可以绕开国会审查授权程序，直接推行对金融机构的限制，以及对保险公司和货币市场基金的跨国监管。法案设立了金融稳定监督委员会（Financial Stability Oversight Council），其成员个个都是在任总统指定的盟友，会议均闭门进行。 Dodd-Frank does not say what makes a financial institution systemically important and thus subject to stringent regulation. The council does. Banks so designated have regulators embedded in their executive offices to monitor and advise, eerily reminiscent of the old political officers who were placed in every Soviet factory and military unit. 法案也没有说明，什么情况下，一家金融机构会被认为具有系统重要性，因而需要接受严格监管。委员会说了算。被认定符合这种条件的银行，监管官员被安插进其管理部门，现场监督指导工作，令人回想起当年政治干部充斥于苏联工厂和军队的怪异景象。 Dodd-Frank’s Volcker rule prohibits proprietary trading by banks. And yet, despite years of delay and hundreds of pages of new rules, no one knows what the rule requires—not even Paul Volcker. 多德-弗兰克法案的沃尔克规则（Volcker rule）禁止了银行的自营交易。然而，经过数年反复商讨，出台新规千百页，始终没人说得清楚这个规则到底提出了什么要求，就算沃尔克本人也做不到。 Then there is the “living will,” a plan that banks deemed to be systemically important must submit to the Fed and the FDIC on how they would be liquidated if they fail. The Fed and the FDIC have almost total discretion in deciding whether the plan is acceptable and therefore whether to institute a variety of penalties, including the divestiture of assets. 再有就是“生前遗嘱（living will）”——重要的银行必须向美联储和联邦存款保险公司预先递交清算计划，以备破产之需。美联储和联邦存款保险公司几近拥有完全的自由裁量权，判断该计划是否可接受，由此决定是否制定包括资产剥离在内的处罚措施。 Large banking firms must undergo stress tests to see if they could survive market turmoil. But what does the stress test test? No one knows. The Fed’s vice chairman, Stanley Fischer, said in a speech last month that giving banks a clear road map for compliance might make it “easier to game the test.” Compliance is indeed easier when you know what the law requires, but isn’t that the whole point of the rule of law? 法案规定，大型银行必须接受压力测试，以检验处于市场动荡时的存活能力。但压力测试测试些什么呢？没人知道。上个月，美联储副主席斯坦利·费希尔（Stanley Fischer）在演讲中说，为银行遵从法规提供清晰的路线图可能令银行“更容易通过压力测试”。只要法律明确，遵守规定确实更容易，可这不正是法治的基本要求吗？ To limit abuse by the rulers, ancient Rome wrote down the law and permitted citizens to read it. Under Dodd-Frank, regulatory authority is now so broad and so vague that this practice is no longer followed in America. The rules are now whatever regulators say they are. 昔日古罗马为限制滥权，法律可供公民传抄诵读。今天的美国不再这么做了，在多德-弗兰克法案的卵翼下，监管机构的权力范围极为广泛，边界极为模糊。规则已经变成监管者随心所欲的工具。 Most criticism of Dodd-Frank focuses on its massive regulatory burden, but its most costly and dangerous effects are the uncertainty and arbitrary power it has created by the destruction of the rule of law. This shackles economic growth but more important, it imperils our freedom. 大多数针对多德-弗兰克法案的批评，着眼于其沉重的监管负担。实际上，代价最高昂，危害也最大的影响，是它徒增不确定性，并通过破坏法治而创设了专断权力。这项法案不仅束缚经济发展，更危及到自由的原则。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——