Why Dodd-Frank Is Already Failing 为何Dodd-Frank法案已经失败？ 作者：Paul G. Mahoney @2015-9-17 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 二校：龙泉（@L_Stellar） 来源：Library of Law and Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/09/17/why-dodd-frank-is-already-failing/ Five years after its enactment, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 remains controversial. Critics argue that the statute imposes disproportionately large compliance costs on small community banks, institutionalizes “too big to fail,” and drives up the cost of banking services to consumers. Comparing Dodd-Frank to past securities reforms, particularly those of the New Deal, shows that these three problems are related and are nearly inevitable features of post-crisis legislation. 自2010年执行起，五年了，《多德-弗兰克法案》仍饱受争议。批评者认为该法规对小型社区银行强加了不成比例的巨大合规成本， 将“大而不倒”制度化，同时抬高消费者享用银行服务的成本。将多德-弗兰克法案与过去的证券业改革——尤其是罗斯福新政中那些——相比较会发现，这三个问题是相互关联的，并且是后危机立法几乎不可避免的特征。 Every major financial reform in U.S. history was enacted in the aftermath of a substantial decline in equity prices. Each, in other words, was crafted during a time of public anger that politicians hoped to deflect from themselves to Wall Street. The congressional authors always compose a narrative of the stock market crash that blames unscrupulous financial intermediaries or public companies and insufficient regulation of the markets. 美国历史上每一次重大金融改革都是在股票价格大幅下跌后制定的。换句话说，每一次改革都是在群情激愤时精心制定，政治家们希望借此将公众愤怒的对象从自己转移到华尔街。国会的立法者总会借市场崩盘创造出一套说辞——指责金融中介机构、上市公司不道德的钻空行为和以往监管的不足。 Just as inevitably, proponents studiously avoid any suggestion that their own prior regulatory innovations had unintended consequences that contributed to the crash. Meanwhile, firms in the regulated industry concentrate on determining who the winners and losers may be under a new regulatory regime, so they can make sure they end up on the winning side. 必然地，支持法案的政客们刻意避免任何这样的看法：正是他们自己早先实施的监管革新，无意中促成了那次崩盘。同时，受监管的公司集中精力分辨出新监管体系下的赢家输家，以确保自己最终处在赢面。 This routine ensures that the primary losers from financial reform are investors and small, regulated firms. Costly new rules simultaneously serve the ends of Congress and the major financial institutions. They allow Congress to argue that it filled the regulatory gaps that it claims caused the crisis. Large firms can spread the new costs over a large number of transactions, giving them a structural advantage over their smaller and previously nimbler competitors. All firms will seek to pass on to their customers as many of the regulatory costs as possible. 这一惯常路数使得金融改革的主要输家必然是投资者和监管范围内的小型企业。成本高昂的新规定服务于国会和大金融机构的目标，这些规定让国会有资格宣称自己填补了其所宣称的那些监管空白。大公司则可以通过大量交易摊薄新增的成本，相比那些更小、曾经更灵活的竞争对手，这给了他们结构性优势。所有的公司都会尽可能的把监管成本转移给消费者。 All of this would be unfortunate but bearable if the new regulations generated benefits in excess of their costs. But that is unlikely with post-crisis legislation. The objective is to show the public that Congress is doing something and time is short. Congress knows relatively little about the details of market practices and so relies on the financial industry for information. 如果新规产生的收益大过成本，所有这些都还可忍受，尽管不算幸运。但是这对于后危机立法是不太可能的。立法的目的是为了向公众显示，国会有所作为而且行动迅速。他们对于市场行为的细节知之甚少，因此不得不依赖金融业者来获取信息。 The largest firms have skilled lobbyists and contacts with legislative staff. They argue, often successfully, that their ways of doing business are “best practices” and their competitors’ practices are shoddy or unfair. The process almost guarantees that the legislation will harm competition and therefore investors. Historically, that is precisely the pattern we observe, as demonstrated in my book Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails. 那些行业巨头都有熟练的游说人员，与立法者有着广泛联系。他们通常会成功地辩解，他们做生意的方式是“最佳实践”，而竞争者的做法是卑劣的、不公平的。这样的立法过程几乎确保了法律最后会有害于竞争，并进一步伤害投资者利益。从历史上来看，这正是我们观察到的模式，正如我在《白白浪费了一次危机：为何证券监管总是失败》一书中所展示的。 The New Deal securities reforms, often seen as the classic example of good regu lation, provide a cautionary tale. President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration argued that the 1920s were a time of widespread fraud and manipulation in the stock market, but there is scant factual basis for the claim. 罗斯福新政中的证券业改革常被视为良好管制的经典案例，其实是一则警示寓言。富兰克林·罗斯福总统和他的行政团队声称，1920年代的股市中充满了欺骗和操纵，但是这样的观点缺乏有力的事实依据。 As my book demonstrates, the best-documented cases of “fraud” were no such thing; the evidence proves mostly that Congress did not understand how securities markets operate. By going back and analyzing market reactions to earnings announcements, I also show that the markets did not view the disclosures they received as a result of mandates from the Securities and Exchange Commission as more informative than the stock exchange-mandated disclosures of the pre-SEC era. 正如我书中所说，记录最为详尽的“骗局”案例都是空穴来风；有关证据只是证明了国会并不了解证券市场如何运行。通过追溯和分析市场对盈利报告的反应，我还揭示了，市场不觉得，在SEC规制下，企业的信息披露比前SEC时代更有价值。 The 1920s were, on the other hand, a time of sharply increasing competition and innovation in the investment business. As a growing middle class looked for ways to invest its savings, a large industry of brokers, investment bankers, and investment managers developed to meet the demand. New entrants modernized the sales process, taking advantage of the rising number of households with telephones and radio sets. Like many creative new companies, they took business away from their more established competitors. 另一方面，1920年代是一个投资业务竞争和创新飞速发展的时期。由于成长中的中产阶级为其储蓄寻求投资的途径，一个由经纪人、理财顾问、投资银行家构成的大产业就发展起来满足这种需求。新入行者充分利用配有电话和老式收音机的家庭的不断增长，将销售过程现代化。正如许多有创新力的新公司那样，他们从老牌的竞争者手中抢过了生意。 The New Deal reforms put the brakes on this innovation and competition. At the urging of the old-line investment banks, the securities laws defined the new sales practices as misleading and forced the industry to return to the traditional syndicated method of public offerings at which the established investment banks excelled. The securities laws comprehensively regulated brokers, stock exchanges, and listed companies, subjecting small, regional businesses to costs they could not bear. 罗斯福新政改革遏止了这种创新和竞争。在传统投资银行的强烈要求下，证券法将新的销售模式认定为骗局，并强迫整个行业重返传统财团公开募股的方法，这正是老牌投资银行所擅长的。证券法全面管制经纪人、证券交易所和上市公司，使地方小型交易商背负它们不可能承受的成本。 The results were dramatic: 结果是触目惊心的：

• Industry concentration increased promptly and measurably. By my estimate, the New Deal securities laws increased the aggregate market share of the top five investment banks by 12 percent;
• 行业集中度快速、可见地提高。据我估计，罗斯福新政的证券法使得投资银行前五名市场占有率共提升12%。

• Smaller securities dealers based outside New York City began to exit the business despite having survived the worst phase of the Great Depression;
• 在纽约市以外的小型券商开始退出市场，尽管他们熬过了大萧条时最糟糕的时期。

• Regional stock exchanges began a terminal decline. Of the 41 exchanges in existence when the Securities Exchange Act went into effect in 1935, only 20 survived until 1938, despite the fact that many of them had survived the financial panic of 1907 and the recession of 1920-21;
• 地区性证券交易所走上穷途末路。在1935年，《证券交易法》开始实施时还存在41家证券交易所，到了1938年则只有20家交易所还存在，尽管这些交易所中大多数都成功走过了1907年的金融恐慌和1920～1921年的经济衰退。

• Regulators helped enforce anticompetitive practices such as fixed brokerage commissions that increased investors’ costs.
• 监管者推动了从业者的反竞争措施，比如执行增加投资者花费的固定佣金制。

Dodd-Frank, for its part, has a broader focus than the New Deal securities laws. It changes the regulatory framework for the entire financial system, including commercial banks, investment banks, investment managers, and insurance companies. 在这方面，多德-弗兰克法案的关注面要比罗斯福新政的证券法更宽广。它改变了整个金融系统的监管框架，包括商业银行、投资银行、投资经理人和保险公司。 Its counterproductive effects are therefore potentially even more far-reaching and costly to consumers. At the most basic level, it gives the federal banking regulators the authority to identify “systemically important” financial institutions. These are pre-cleared for a bailout during the next financial crisis. In return, they become in effect wards of the state, with regulators having broad discretion to oversee their business practices. 因此对消费者来说，它适得其反的影响有可能更加深远且代价巨大。从最基础的来说，它赋予了联邦银行监管人员鉴别何为系统重要性金融机构的权力。下一次金融危机要实行救援计划时，它们就会被预先判定无辜。作为交换，国家成了它们事实上的监护人，监管者对其商业行为有着广泛的自由裁量权。 Dodd-Frank also requires major changes to the over-the-counter derivatives market. Lawmakers argued that “opaque” and “risky” derivatives contributed substantially to the financial crisis. This is true only in the sense that anything that reduces the transaction costs of borrowing leads to more borrowing. 多德-弗兰克法案还要求场外衍生品市场做出重大改变。立法者认为“晦涩的”和“高风险的”衍生品实质上促进了金融危机。这种观点仅在如下意义上是正确的：任何降低借款交易费用的事情都会导致更多借贷行为。 The financial crisis was fundamentally a problem of financial institutions taking highly leveraged positions in mortgage-related assets. Derivatives are only one of many vehicles by which they did so. Leverage is the problem, not the specific contracts by which it is achieved. 这次金融危机从根本上说是金融机构用抵押资产贷款维持高杠杆化经营的问题。金融衍生品只是这些企业实现高杠杆化的众多工具之一。衍生品并不是金融危机背后的问题，高杠杆化才是。 Congress therefore devised a solution to a non-problem by requiring that many over-the-counter derivatives be centrally cleared, meaning there must be an institution (typically owned by other financial institutions) that guarantees each party’s performance to the other. These central clearinghouses are eligible for “systemically important” status and will be in line for bailouts during the next financial crisis as well. 国会因此给一个不存在的问题设计了解决办法，要求场外金融衍生品集中清算，这意味必须要有一个机构（通常由其他金融机构拥有）来保证各方对彼此履约。这些（场内）中央清算所有资格具备“系统重要性”，而且也将在下次金融危机时纳入救援计划。 There are plausible arguments that the 2007-2008 financial crisis was exacerbated by the unintended consequences of governmental policies, including interest-rate decisions by the Federal Reserve, housing policies administered by banking regulators, politically-driven risk weights within the risk-based system of capital requirements, and the tendency to bail out large institutions in financial distress. 有人不无理由的说，2007-2008年金融危机被政府政策的非意图后果加剧了，包括美联储的利率决议，银行监管部门的住房贷款政策，风险相关的资本要求中受政治影响扭曲的风险权重，还有在危机时救助大机构的倾向。 Dodd-Frank increases the likelihood that regulators’ missteps will be a significant contributor to the next financial crisis. But because governmental actors strongly resist admitting mistakes, it, too, will be blamed on “reckless” bankers, clearinghouses, insurance companies, or other financial intermediaries. 多德-弗兰克法案增加了因监管者过失导致下一次金融危机的可能性。但是因为政府机构总是死不认错，下次 危机也会被归咎于“不计后果的”银行家、清算所、保险公司、或者其他金融中介机构 。 And then the cycle will start again, with more regulations that will cause more unintended consequences for which Wall Street will be blamed. 然后这个循环又会开始，更多规定导致更多非意图后果。为此华尔街还会被指责。 Paul G. Mahoney is dean of the University of Virginia School of Law. 弗吉尼亚大学法学院院长 Paul G.Mahoney （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-12-05】 @朱世巍 日本政府将采取强力措施促进农地集约化经营：对放弃耕种的土地增税；对长期出租的土地减税 @朱世巍:日本所面临的最艰巨问题，1是宪法，2个人口，3是农业。安倍似乎是真心要解决这三大难题——果然不是一个混日子的首相 @李佳苏勒Iridium: 咱大大战后第一相打底儿，千古一相封顶。看能做到哪儿。 @熊也餐厅: 不搞凯恩斯主义更好我得写信提醒他老一下。 @whigzhou: 这条政策比他的凯恩斯主义更蠢～ @whigzhou: 安倍就是个强国家主义者，只不过恰好是右翼国家主义而已 @李佳苏勒Iridium: 在你球村，五分之一的人生活在一个极权政权之下，没有人是能够独善其身的，你不咬蛇并不会保证蛇不咬你。共产党用黑金炸美国政客，关起门来搞自由主义行吗？门能关上吗？埃及之恶不在压榨费拉，而在腐蚀罗马。先发制人好 @whigzhou: 这些跟他愚蠢的经济政策有啥关系？自削国力以先发制人？ @whigzhou: 要让日本恢复活力，有个（说起来）简单的办法：解除一切与土地和住房有关的用途管制、流通管制、租金管制，卖掉全部非军用国有土地，让房价降下来，等宅男宅女都住上大浩斯，就愿意生孩子了，补贴农业，保护耕地，惩罚弃耕，显然都与此背道而驰 @熊也餐厅:弃用雇佣终身制。弃日语讲英语。 @whigzhou: 终身雇佣、不肯破产之类是文化特性，政府管不了也不该管，但管制、补贴、财政政策是政府一手制订的  

CapX Reviews: By the People CapX评论:《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》 作者：Fred Smith @ 2015-9-13 译者：Lai Shawn（@NiGuoNiGuoNi） 校对：王涵秋（@你们都是乡非） 来源：CAPX，http://www.capx.co/capx-reviews-by-the-people/ Charles Murray, in his new book, By the People: Rebuilding Liberty without Permission, argues that America’s constitutional checks on the growth of spending, taxation, and regulation have largely been undermined. The result, he fears, is an America moving rapidly toward the kinder, gentler tyranny Alexis de Tocqueville warned about. Murray focuses—wisely in my view—on the massive expansion of federal regulations as the vehicle hurtling us down that road. 查尔斯·穆瑞在他的新书《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》中说到，美国对政府支出、税收、管制的宪法审查机制已经被严重破坏。他担心，其结果是美国快速滑向托克维尔所警告的“温和专制”。穆瑞认为，巨幅扩张的联邦政府管制像失控的汽车一样带着我们冲向这条道路。 Murray documents how the regulatory state, by shifting legislative powers to the Executive, has given Congress the green light to pass broad laws that are little more than aspirational resolutions—for better workplace safety, improved public health, energy conservation, clean air, safe drugs and food, you name it—while leaving the writing of rules to achieve these goals to anonymous, off-stage executive bureaucrats. 穆瑞讲述了，通过将立法权转移到行政分支，管制型国家是如何为议会大开绿灯，让它得以通过那些宽泛的法律的，而这些法律充其量只是些一厢情愿的决心——诸如提高工作环境的安全性，改善公众卫生状况，节约能源，清洁空气，确保食品药品安全等等。同时，为实现这些目的而制订具体规则的工作，却被丢给了幕后不知名的行政官僚。 Given this hollowing out of the Constitution, and the cultural and political changes that drove it, Murray concludes that America is so far down the road to serfdom that the political process can no longer restore the Founders’ vision of an institutionally constrained federal government. A solution, if one exists, must rely on massive civil disobedience and a populist and moral critique of regulatory predation. Yet, is it prudent to fully dismiss “normal” political approaches? 基于上述的宪法“中空化”，以及导致这一点的文化和政治上的变化，穆瑞认为美国已经在“通向奴役之路”上走得太远，以至于已经无法依靠正常的政治途径来将美国恢复成建国者们心目中那个其权力受制度性限制的联邦政府。如果有解决方案，那只能是依靠大规模的公民不服从运动和民粹主义者，以及对政府无情管制的道德批判。然而，完全忽略“正常”政治途径是不是谨慎的做法呢？ Murray’s first section, “Coming to Terms with Where We Stand,” tells the story of how Progressives, chafing at the limited government institutions bequeathed by the Founders, gutted constraints on federal power and unleashed the technocratic Leviathan, staffed by civil servants trained in scientific management and protected from political interference by the independent agency system. This is an oft-cited and depressing history but one that Murray summarizes well. 穆瑞书中的第一部分“面对现实”讲述了进步派是如何破坏国父们留下的有限政府制度，破坏对联邦政府权力的限制，释放出那头专家治国主义权力巨兽，这头巨兽由受过科学管理训练的公务员组成，并且免受独立机构的政治干预。这是一段常被提起的沉痛历史，但是穆瑞总结的很好。 His second section, “Opening a New Front,” develops his civil disobedience proposal, including the creation of a new group, the Madison Fund, to manage and finance that work and take on some support functions, such as educational and public affairs efforts. The moral case for civil disobedience, he argues, stems from citizens’ growing alienation from a government they feel no longer represents them. A government that has lost our trust, he argues, has lost legitimacy, which justifies civil disobedience. 该书的第二部分“开辟新战线”进一步阐述了他的公民不服从运动倡议，包括建立一个叫麦迪逊基金的新组织，用于管理和资助不服从运动，并且通过教育和公共事务去支持这项运动。他认为，公民不服从的伦理基础在于公民和政府越来越疏远，并且感到政府已经不再能代表他们。一个政府如果失去了人民的信任，就失去了其合法性，公民不服从运动也就有了正当的理由。 Murray suggests the Madison Fund might also offer “insurance” against regulatory predation, much like malpractice insurance gives professionals some financial protection from the threat of lawsuits. However, the diversity and complexity of regulations makes estimating risks, and thus setting premiums, very difficult. In fact, insurance as an alternative to regulation was once explored for Superfund and largely abandoned for these reasons. Moreover, the criminalization of many regulatory violations casts doubt on the ability of such insurance to survive in a hostile regulatory environment. 穆瑞建议，麦迪逊基金应为那些对抗管制掠夺的行动提供“保险”，这跟职业过失保险很像，后者帮助专业人士规避因职业行为而遭受诉讼所带来的财务风险。然而，政府管制的多样性和复杂性，让预估风险以及设置保险费率非常困难。实际上，保险作为管制的替代已经被 “超级基金”尝试过，又因上述理由而被放弃。此外，由于很多违反管制的行为已经被犯罪化，令人怀疑这种保险是否能在充满敌意的管制环境下幸存。 Murray suggests that many regulations are unenforceable, because there are far more parties subject to regulations than there are enforcers. As with highway speed limits, he notes, most drivers will rarely be ticketed as long as they go with the flow. Therefore, if large numbers can be induced to violate any specific regulation, that regulation will become unenforceable. Perhaps, but while the “flow defense” often works, some communities, rather than ease regulatory enforcement, create “speed traps” and impose large fines. Fierce, random enforcement is another way of ensuring less costly enforcement of compliance and makes Murray’s campaign less viable. 穆瑞提出，很多管制是无法强制进行的，因为监管对象的数量远超执法者。比如高速公路限速，大多数司机只要跟着车流就极少被罚款。因此，如果很多人被诱导去违反特定的法规，这个法规就无法被执行了。虽然“淹没防卫法”有时会奏效，但是很多地方，不仅没有放松执法，反而发明了“超速陷阱”（高速公路上一段严格执法的区域）并施加巨额罚金。大力度的随机执法是另一种确保低执法成本的方法，这让穆瑞的方法看上去难以实现。 Still, Murray hopes that organized resistance to overregulation might push lawmakers and regulators to adopt less burdensome regulatory practices. His cautious optimism stems from Herbert Stein’s famous quote, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” And as Murray notes, America’s regulatory burden is already massive, citing the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s recent estimate of federal regulatory costs at around $1.8 trillion annually. This suggests a “stop” may be imminent. 然而，穆瑞希望对过度执法的有组织抵抗或许会促使立法者和监管者采用不那么苛刻的管制措施。他的谨慎乐观态度来自于赫伯特·斯坦的名句“不能永恒的事物终将会停下。”穆瑞注意到，美国的管管负担已十分巨大，来自竞争性企业研究所的一份报告显示，联邦管制每年带来1.8万亿美元的成本，因此过度管制必须立刻被制止。 Murray is also cautiously optimistic that faith in the Progressive vision is fading. Progressivism was first premised on the notion that government guidance could ensure uninterrupted progress. Advances in the social and administrative sciences would enable the best and the brightest to regulate markets in the public interest. Civil service reforms would prevent ineptitude and corruption. Independent regulatory agencies would prevent political cronyism. Murray argues that the experiences of the last century have not been kind to these beliefs, resulting in progressivism losing some of its former appeal. 穆瑞同时谨慎乐观地认为，进步派的愿景正在逐渐失去光芒。进步主义的基本假设是，政府的引导可以确保社会持续进步，社会科学和行政科学的发展可以让最善良最聪明的人处于公众利益而规制市场，公民服务改革可以防止不平等和腐败，独立监管机构可以防止政治裙带关系。穆瑞认为，过去一个世纪的经验并不能支持这些想法，这使得进步主义正在丧失它之前的吸引力。 I’m less sure, given the current popularity of progressive firebrands like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. And the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Board is an exemplar progressive agency—run by experts with no accountability to elected officials, with a staggering and ever-widening array of regulatory powers, and self-financing to boot! 鉴于诸如伊丽莎白·沃伦和伯尼·桑德斯这些进步主义煽动者目前的旺盛人气，我对此并不那么确定。最近成立的消费者金融保护理事会是个典型的进步主义组织——由专家组成，无须对选举产生的官员负责，拥有令人震惊的广泛权力，甚至可以财政上自给自足地运作。 Murray next turns to the question of which criteria should determine those regulations suitable for challenge. Given the radical tone of Murray’s book, one might have expected an endorsement of a broad frontal attack on the regulatory Leviathan. Yet surprisingly, Murray’s target list is fairly narrow. He sees the original flurry of regulations in the late 19^th century as largely warranted. He exempts Internal Revenue Service regulations, seeing taxes as a legitimate role of government. He appears to endorse regulations designed to address issues related to externalities and public goods. He also argues against challenging regulations that enjoy overwhelming popular support. These exemptions mean a less aggressive challenge to the regulatory state. 穆瑞接下来讨论的是选择挑战哪些法规的标准。鉴于穆瑞的激进口吻，读者可能会猜想他将对“管制巨兽”发起全面攻势。然而让人吃惊的是，穆瑞的目标名单非常短。他认为源自19世纪末期的很多法律是正当的。他放过了国家税务总局，认为税收是政府的合法职能。他似乎同意那些与外部性和公共品相关的管制法规。他同时还反对挑战一些受到广泛支持的管制。这些豁免意味着他对管制型国家的挑战不是很具进攻性。 Murray’s exclusion criteria appear to be influenced by the successful strategy of the Institute for Justice (IJ), which has carved out an important niche challenging regulations that meet Murray’s rather restrictive criteria. IJ selects regulations that many see as unjust, seeks out clients likely to be viewed sympathetically by the public, and manages media strategies to frame their cases as examples of noble Davids fighting brutal regulatory Goliaths. 穆瑞的豁免名单似乎受到了“司法协会”（IJ）的成功策略的影响——他们选择加以挑战的管制恰好符合穆瑞的谨慎标准，挑选那些看起来不公平的管制法规，找出一些有望被公众同情的客户，并通过影响舆论把自己塑造成像挑战残暴巨兽歌利亚的大卫一样高贵的勇士，这一策略让他们开拓出了一个重要的生态位。 Yet, the Institute for Justice is not alone in its use of litigation to challenge regulations. To a limited extent, the free market movement already has created a “Madison Fund.” Free market policy organizations—the Pacific Legal Foundation, Becket Fund, Center for Individual Rights, Goldwater Institute, my own organization, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others—are taking on other complex regulatory challenges, with varying degrees of success and popular support. Murray might have discussed these efforts in greater detail. 然而，司法协会并不是唯一一个通过诉讼去挑战法规的。虽然规模不大，自由市场运动已经成立了一个“麦迪逊基金”。自由市场政策组织——太平洋法律基金会，贝克特基金，个人权利中心，戈德华特研究所，我自己的组织——竞争性企业研究所，以及其他各种组织，正在对管制展开复杂的挑战行动，取得了不同程度的成功和大众支持。穆瑞会在书中详细讨论了这些努力。 Murray seems to believe that common sense provides adequate guidance for sorting out “good” from “bad” regulations and that Americans oppose many of the bad ones. Yet, recent debates over financial, health, and environmental regulations cast doubt on this. Many feel that America is overregulated, but support specific regulations—such as for example, the left’s support for more restrictive environmental and financial regulations and the right’s calls for tighter security and immigration restrictions. 穆瑞似乎认为，凭常识足以区分“好”的和“坏”的管制，并且美国人都反对坏的那些。然而，近期关于金融、卫生、环境相关法律的争论让人怀疑这一点。很多人认识到美国被管的太多了，但却支持特定的管制——比如左派支持严格的环保措施和金融管制，右派呼吁更严格的安全措施和移民限制。 Citing polling data, Murray finds reason for optimism in the fact that trust in government is declining and that businesses view regulations as increasingly burdensome. But that does not necessarily indicate support for a specific reform agenda. Congress, too, has lost the trust of the American people, yet more than 90 percent of all Members of Congress are routinely reelected. 通过引用调查数据，穆瑞找到了乐观的理由——对政府的信任在下降，并且企业认为管制带给他们的负担正日益加重。但是这未必说明一项特定改革议程获得了支持。虽然国会同样失去了美国人民的信任，然而仍有超过90%的国会议员照样如期连任。 Lacking widespread support, Murray’s massive civil disobedience proposal is unlikely to prove a viable strategy. America’s early history experienced such an attempt to fend off federal taxation—the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790s. It enjoyed considerable local support, but was nonetheless quickly suppressed. 因为缺乏广泛的支持，穆瑞的大规模民众不服从策略并不可行。在美国的早期历史上有过抵抗联邦政府征税的行为——比如1790年代的威士忌叛乱，尽管这场抗税运动得到了当地大量支持，但仍被讯速镇压了。 Murray argues that an expanded effort might change all this. His proposed new and well-funded Madison Fund would organize protests, help businesses and individuals targeted by regulation, insure vulnerable parties against regulatory abuse, and ultimately strip regulators of their “white hat” public image. It would help, but as noted, many free market organizations are already doing much of this. Moreover, would many businessmen want to directly confront their overseers? And even if they did, would the public see them sympathetically? 穆瑞认为更大规模的支持可能会改变这些情况。全新的，资金充沛的麦迪逊基金可以组织抗议活动，帮助监管所针对的企业和个人，确保弱势团体也可以对抗滥用的权力，最终剥下监管者的正义外衣。这可能会有用，但是正如我们注意到的，已经有很多自由市场组织在做这些了。此外，会有很多商人想要直面他们的监管者们吗？而且即使他们愿意，公众会同情他们吗？ Murray seeks to addresses these challenges by drawing an analogy with the role civil disobedience, such as lunch counter sit-ins, played in advancing the civil rights movement. But this analogy falls short. The civil rights movement enjoyed widespread media, intellectual, and public support, including by many economic interests. Yet, it still took decades and required both a state-by-state as well as a national approach to bear fruit. Regulatory reform lacks this broad intellectual support and needs greater organized business support than it has received. 穆瑞将这些挑战类比成公民不服从运动，比如在推动了民权运动进程的静坐抗议。但是这些类比并不成立，因为民权运动有广泛的媒体、知识界和公众支持，包括很多出于经济利益考虑的支持。尽管如此，运动的成果仍然是在一个个州以及全国通过各种途径努力了几十年才获得的。管制改革缺少如此广泛的知识界支持，也缺乏更大的有组织商业支持。 Murray’s third and final section, “A Propitious Moment,” suggests reasons why his proposals need not be quixotic. America’s continued diversity, he suggests, makes one-size-fits-all regulation less attractive to large segments of the population. Technological innovations have rendered largely obsolete regulatory interventions intended to address information asymmetries and allowed entrepreneurs to bypass regulatory roadblocks, creating consumer constituencies before the regulators notice. Uber is a great example of both achievements. 穆瑞书中的第三也是最后一部分“一场胜算很大的运动”论述了为何他认为他的建议不是空想。美国长期持续的多样性，使得大多数人不会喜欢一刀切的管制。科技创新让那些为矫正信息不对称而设立的管制变得过时，也可以让企业家绕过监管，在监管者注意到之前就得到消费者的支持。Uber就是一个证明这两点的很好例子。 Murray has identified the regulatory challenge facing America. But his proposed reform strategy needs to be better developed if it is to achieve success. In my view, he is too optimistic about public attitudes toward the regulatory estate and the prospects for changing them. For instance, he suggests the federal bureaucracy is increasingly demoralized. Perhaps in some cases, but individuals and businesses at the regulatory reform frontier still find regulators to be self-confident, well-prepared, and aggressive. 穆瑞指出了美国所面临的管制挑战。但是若要取得成功，他提出的改革策略还有待完善。在我看来，他对公众的态度以及改变公众态度的可能性太过乐观。举个例子，他认为联邦政府官僚正逐渐失去其道德光环。这也许在某些情况下是对的，但在管制改革前线作战的个人和企业仍发现监管者们非常自信，准备充分，并具有进攻性。 Moreover, while the future Madison Fund might launch dozens of cases, regulations continue to proliferate. Murray seems to hope that the creative marketing of these cases will increase public anger at regulatory overreach, but they may not, given that many regulatory agencies still enjoy widespread public support. In fact, such efforts could even backfire, as irate regulators place resisting firms in the agency’s crosshairs. 此外，就算将来的麦迪逊基金可能会同时着手处理几十个针对过度管制的案件，同时却仍有更多的管制会不断诞生。穆瑞似乎希望对这些案例的营销会加深公众对过度管制的愤怒，但是他们也许根本不会，因为很多监管机构依然得到广泛支持。事实上，这些努力可能反而会帮倒忙，因为愤怒的监管者会 “重点关照”那些反抗的企业。 There are other approaches to reform, including legislation, such as the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would require Congress to vote on all regulations with $100 million or more in estimated annual costs (a threshold I’d like to see drop over time). Congress could also explore a one-in-one-out requirement for new rules, such as one now being tried in Canada, or even the one-in-two-out policy tried in the United Kingdom. States might also establish state regulatory ombudsmen to argue against both existing and new state regulations and to challenge on behalf of the state costly and restrictive federal regulations—that is, states might create their own Madison Groups. 但是还有其他改革方式，包括立法，比如REINS法案，这个法案要求所有每年花费一亿美元以上的监管措施都需要国会投票（我希望看到这个阈值越来越低）。国会可以尝试“一进一出”（每批准一项管制必须废弃之前的另一项）措施，就像加拿大已经在尝试的那样，甚至英国的“一进两出”。同时各州也可以设立管制巡察员来对抗已经存在的州法和新条例，挑战联邦政府加于各州的昂贵而又严格的管制——也就是说，各州可以建立自己的麦迪逊组织。 Murray deals only briefly with the business community’s role in the regulatory reform struggle. He notes, as economist Joseph Schumpeter did long ago, that, in the political world, business has too often been passive, or slipped into cronyism. Murray discusses the many reasons for this passivity. Firms are vulnerable to political retaliation, media attacks, shareholder activism, and consumer boycotts. Yet, Schumpeter also noted that business has critical resources—personnel, information, marketing and communication skills—needed for political success. And, as Murray notes, factors such as the slowing of innovation and the need for greater flexibility to operate in a global economy may be persuading some in the business community that this is a fight they must join and win. To do so, they need to ally with free market policy groups. 穆瑞只用了寥寥几笔简短地阐述了商业团体在改革中的角色。就像经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特很久以前就说过的那样，他认为在政治领域，企业要么消极被动，要么掉入裙带关系的陷阱。穆瑞认为以下几点造成了他们的消极。企业在政治报复，媒体攻击，股东维权，以及消费者抵制面前非常脆弱。但是熊彼特也指出，企业拥有重要的资源——人力，信息，市场和交流手段——这些都和政治成功有密切联系。此外，穆瑞也认为创新的减速和全球市场对运营灵活性提出的更高要求，会迫使企业加入这场战斗。为了获胜，他们必须和推广自由市场政策的组织结盟。 There are mutual advantages to such an alliance. Free market policy organizations are less vulnerable to political pressures, more credible as spokespeople, and skilled at crafting and promoting the narratives needed to advance the moral and intellectual case for reform. Meanwhile, businesspeople possess the localized knowledge, resources, and real-world experience to convey the human costs of overregulation. Businesses also enjoy cooperative links with their customers, employees, suppliers, and investors—relationships that give them both an audience and the clout to advance powerful narratives. 这种联盟可以给双方都带来好处。推广自由市场政策的组织更能应对政治压力，作为面对公众的发言人更容易被信任，并且擅长制造更具道德优势和知识水平的宣传攻势。同时，企业家具有本土化的知识、资源、和实打实的经验来转移过度管制的人力成本。企业家也更喜欢和他们客户、雇员、供应商、投资者的合作关系，这些人既是他们宣传的听众，也是推行这些宣传的重要力量。 In democratic market economies, most policy changes result from alliances of economic and moral interests. And indeed, such “Bootlegger and Baptist” alliances have long been a standard strategy used by those seeking greater political control of the economy. The cooperative efforts of trial lawyers and environmentalists, of consumer advocates and labor unions, explain much of the growth in regulation over the last decades. Our challenge, developed by Murray so well, is to learn from their successes. 在奉行市场经济的民主国家中，大部分政策改变都来自于经济利益和道德诉求的结合。实际上，类似“走私犯和教徒”的联盟很长时间以来一直是寻求对经济的更强政治控制的标准途径。诉讼律师、环保主义者、消费者保护组织，以及工会之间的合作，很大程度上导致了近几十年来增加的各种管制。正如穆瑞也提到过的，我们的挑战，就是从他们的成功中汲取经验。 Murray’s enthusiasm for reform is commendable, but those excited by his audacious plan must hope that he will lead an effort to advance it further. Stimulating resistance to regulation is key, but more will be needed to actually roll back Leviathan. The Progressives were successful in crafting the regulatory path to their goals, marketing that policy and gaining the influence and popular support to make it the dominant reality. Murray’s and our challenge is to find an equally effective strategy for economic liberalization. And Murray is well placed to suggest those next steps, having laid the intellectual groundwork for welfare reform in the 1990s, with his classic book, Losing Ground. Could Murray’s latest book provide the foundation for a new Doer/Thinker alliance? Stay tuned. 穆瑞对于改革的热情是值得赞扬的，但是那些因他的大胆计划而激动不已的人必须寄希望于他能更加完善这项计划。激起对管制的抵抗是关键，但更重要的是把权力关回笼子。进步派成功地借助管制实现了他们的目的，并且通过推销他们的策略，争取影响力和公众支持来使这些管制难以撼动。穆瑞和我们的挑战，是找出一套同样有效的策略来实现经济自由。在他的经典著作《倒退》中，穆瑞恰当的指出了，这些步骤如何为1990年代的福利改革打下了智识基础。那么，穆瑞的新书会为新一轮的实践家和思想家结盟提供基础吗？敬请期待。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Minimum-Wage Muddle 最低工资之惑 作者：David Brooks @ 2015-7-24 译者：乘风（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：迈爸（@麦田的字留地），小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The New York Times，http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/opinion/david-brooks-the-minimum-wage-muddle.html Once upon a time there was a near consensus among economists that raising the minimum wage was a bad idea. The market is really good at setting prices on things, whether it is apples or labor. If you raise the price on a worker, employers will hire fewer and you’ll end up hurting the people you meant to help. 从前，经济学家们几乎普遍一致地认为提高最低工资是个馊主意。市场着实善于为各种东西定价，无论是苹果还是劳动力。假如你提高工人的价格，雇主就会减少招聘，最终你会伤害你本想要帮助的人。 Then in 1993 the economists David Card and Alan Krueger looked at fast-food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and found that raising the minimum wage gave people more income without hurting employment. A series of studies in Britain buttressed these findings. 然后经济学家David Card和Alan Krueger在1993年考察了新泽西州和宾夕法尼亚州的快餐店之后，发现最低工资的提高增加了人们的收入，同时并未减少就业职位。英国的一系列研究也支持这一发现。 Today, raising the minimum wage is the central piece of the progressive economic agenda. President Obama and Hillary Clinton champion it. Cities and states across the country have been moving to raise minimum wages to as high as $15 an hour —including New York State just this week. 当前，提高最低工资是进步派经济议程的核心内容。奥巴马总统和希拉里·克林顿都拥护它。全国各地的许多州和城市纷纷把最低工资提到高达每小时15美元——纽约州本周就这么干了。 Some of my Democratic friends are arguing that forcing businesses to raise their minimum wage will not only help low-wage workers; it will actually boost profits, because companies will better retain workers. Some economists have reported that there is no longer any evidence that raising wages will cost jobs. 我的一些民主党朋友争辩说，强迫企业提高最低工资不仅能帮助低薪工人，而且实际上还会增加企业利润，因为公司将能够更好地留住工人。一些经济学家还提出，现在已经没有证据表明提高工资会造成职位减少。 Unfortunately, that last claim is inaccurate. There are in fact many studies on each side of the issue. David Neumark of the University of California, Irvine and William Wascher of the Federal Reserve have done their own studies and point to dozens of others showing significant job losses. 遗憾地是，最后这一断言并不准确。实际上，这个问题的研究结果正反两方都有很多。加州大学尔湾分校的David Neumark和美联储的William Wascher也对此做了研究，并举出了其他数十项研究，表明（提高最低工资会带来）严重的岗位流失。 Recently, Michael Wither and Jeffrey Clemens of the University of California, San Diego looked at data from the 2007 federal minimum-wage hike and found that it reduced the national employment-to-population ratio by 0.7 percentage points (which is actually a lot), and led to a six percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a low-wage worker would have a job. 最近，加州大学圣迭戈分校的Michael Wither 和Jeffrey Clemens检视了2007年联邦最低工资上涨的数据，发现这一上涨使得全国适龄劳动人口就业率下降了0.7个百分点（这一下降幅度其实已经很大了），并使得低薪工人找到工作的可能性下降了6个百分点。 Because low-wage workers get less work experience under a higher minimum-wage regime, they are less likely to transition to higher-wage jobs down the road. Wither and Clemens found that two years later, workers’chances of making $1,500 a month was reduced by five percentage points. 在一个最低工资较高的体制下，低薪工人得到的工作经验较少，于是他们未来就更加难以转型以求得薪资较高的职位。Wither 和Clemens发现，两年以后，工人们月薪达到1500美元的机会下降了5个百分点。 Many economists have pointed out that as a poverty-fighting measure the minimum wage is horribly targeted. A 2010 study by Joseph Sabia and Richard Burkhauser found that only 11.3 percent of workers who would benefit from raising the wage to $9.50 an hour would come from poor households. An earlier study by Sabia found that single mothers’employment dropped 6 percent for every 10 percent increase in the minimum wage. 很多经济学家已经指出，作为一项扶贫措施，最低工资简直是南辕北辙。Joseph Sabia和Richard Burkhauser于2010年所做的一项研究发现，最低工资提升至时薪9.5美元时，受益者中只有11.3%来自贫困家庭。Sabia更早的一项研究则发现，最低工资每提升10%，单身母亲的就业率就下降6%。 A study by Thomas MaCurdy of Stanford built on the fact that there are as many individuals in high-income families making the minimum wage (teenagers) as in low-income families. 斯坦福大学Thomas MaCurdy的一项研究基于这样一个事实：就赚取最低工资而言，来自高收入家庭的个体（青少年）和来自低收入家庭的一样多。 MaCurdy found that the costs of raising the wage are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Minimum-wage workers often work at places that disproportionately serve people down the income scale. So raising the minimum wage is like a regressive consumption tax paid for by the poor to subsidize the wages of workers who are often middle class. MaCurdy还发现，提高工资带来的成本，会以加价的形式转嫁到消费者头上。由于拿最低工资的工人其服务对象大都处于收入底层，所以提高最低工资就像是征收了一种按收入递减的消费税，由穷人来补贴那些时常来自中产阶级的工人的工资。 What we have, in sum, is a very complicated situation. If we do raise the minimum wage a lot of people will clearly benefit and a lot of people will clearly be hurt. The most objective and broadest bits of evidence provoke ambivalence. 总之，我们面对的是一个非常复杂的情况。如果我们提高最低工资，很多人明显会受益，也有很多人明显会受损。最广泛且客观的证据引致了相互矛盾的观点。 One survey of economists by the University of Chicago found that 59 percent believed that a rise to $9 an hour would make it “noticeably harder”for poor people to find work. But a slight majority also thought the hike would be worthwhile for those in jobs. 芝加哥大学所做的一份针对经济学家的调查显示，59%的经济学家相信最低工资提高到时薪9美元会使穷人找工作“显著变难”。不过，也有微弱多数认为最低工资上涨对那些已经有工作的人是有利的。 A study by the Congressional Budget Office found that a hike to $10.10 might lift 900,000 out of poverty but cost roughly 500,000 jobs. 国会预算办公室的一项研究发现，时薪上涨到10.10美元可能会使90万人脱贫，但代价是牺牲大约50万个工作岗位。 My own guess is the economists will never be able to give us a dispositive answer about who is hurt or helped. Economists have their biases and reality is too granular. It depends on what region a worker is in, whether a particular job can be easily done by a machine, what the mind-set of his or her employer is. 我自己的猜测是，经济学家永远不可能给我们一个最终定论，告诉我们谁受损谁受益。经济学家有其偏见，而现实则纷繁复杂。结果取决于工人的工作所在地，其工作是否容易被机器取代，其雇主的思想观念如何。 The best reasonable guess is that a gradual hike in high-cost cities like Seattle or New York will probably not produce massive dislocation. But raising the wage to $15 in rural New York will cause large disruptions and job losses. 最合理的猜测是，在西雅图或纽约等物价高昂的城市，最低工资的逐步提高不太可能会造成严重混乱。但在纽约的乡下地区将时薪提高至15美元，则会导致巨大的破坏和岗位流失。 The key intellectual upshot is that, despite what some people want you to believe, the laws of economic gravity have not been suspended. You can’t impose costs on some without trade-offs for others. You can’t intervene in the market without unintended consequences. 关键的知识要点是，不管别人想要你相信什么，经济学的牛顿定律并没有失效。你在这边厢强加成本，就得在那边厢做出交换，你不能指望干涉市场而不产生意料之外的后果。 And here’s a haunting fact that seems to make sense: Raising the minimum wage will produce winners among job holders from all backgrounds, but it will disproportionately punish those with the lowest skills, who are least likely to be able to justify higher employment costs. 一个挥之不去的事实看来很说明问题：提高最低工资的赢家会包括来自所有不同背景的受雇劳动力，但它所损害的，更多的是劳动技能最低的人群，他们最缺乏能力去证明，自己值得拿更高的工资。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Dodd-Frank's Nasty Double Whammy 多德-弗兰克法案的双重恶果 作者：Phil Gramm @ 2015-7-23 译者：林翠     校对：小册子 来源：Wall Street Journal‎， http://www.wsj.com/articles/dodd-franks-nasty-double-whammy-1437692851 【译注：多德-弗兰克法案，全称《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法》（Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act），2010年颁行的金融监管改革法案，是国会对2008年金融危机的主要立法反应。】 Five years after the passage of the Dodd-Frank financial law, the causes and effects of the failed economic recovery are apparent throughout the banking system. The Federal Reserve’s monetary easing has inflated bank reserves, but lending has barely increased. Today banks maintain an extraordinary $29 of reserves for every dollar they are required to hold. In the first quarter of 2015 banks actually deposited more money in the Fed ($65.1 billion) than they lent ($52.5 billion). 回顾多德-弗兰克金融法生效后的这五年，银行系统清楚展现了经济复苏失败的前因后果。美联储的宽松货币政策使银行储备愈加膨胀，贷款总量却几乎没有增加。银行机构目前在美联储的实际存款是法定要求的29倍。2015年第一季度，银行机构向美联储总存款651亿美元，比总贷款525亿美元还多。 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 1,341 commercial banks have disappeared since 2010. Remarkably, only two new banks have been chartered. By comparison, in the quarter century before the financial crisis, roughly 2,500 new banks were chartered. Even during the Great Depression of the 1930s, an average of 19 new banks a year were chartered. 联邦存款保险公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.）的数据显示，2010年至今已经有1341家商业银行消失。同时，只有两家新银行获得牌照。相比之下，在金融危机前的二十五年，大约涌现了2500家新银行。即使在20世纪30年代的大萧条时期，平均每年也有19家新银行获牌。 A Mercatus Center survey found that while community banks have hired 50% more compliance officers to deal with Dodd-Frank, overall industry employment has increased only 5% and remains below precrisis levels. Industrial, consumer and mortgage finance continue to flee the banking system, as the American Bankers Association reported this week that the law’s regulatory burden has led almost half of banks to reduce offerings of financial products and services. 莫卡斯特中心（Mercatus Center ）的一项调查发现，尽管为应对多德-弗兰克法案，小型社区银行雇用的合规事务员比原先多了50%，整个行业的就业人数仅增加5%，仍然低于金融危机前的水平。产业金融、消费金融、抵押融资持续流出银行系统，据美国银行家协会（American Bankers Association）本周发布的报告，该法案造成的监管负担导致近半数银行削减了金融产品和服务。 New financial-services technology, such as online and mobile payment systems, has continued to blossom, but almost exclusively outside the banking system. The massive resources of, and talent in, banks have been sidetracked, rather than being employed to make loans and boost the economy. 新的金融服务技术，如在线和移动支付系统，继续而且只在银行系统之外繁荣发展。而银行受法案拖累，却未能充分利用其巨大的资源与人才来提供融资和促进经济增长。 Worst of all, Dodd-Frank has empowered regulators to set rules on their own, rather than implement requirements set by Congress. This has undermined a vital condition necessary to put money and America back to work—legal and regulatory certainty. 最糟糕的是，多德-弗兰克法案抛弃了监管机构应执行国会所设定标准的惯例，转而授权监管机构自行制订规则。这种做法损害了保证金融活动乃至整个美国运作良好的重要条件——法律和监管的确定性。 It is true that a certain amount of regulatory flexibility is necessary in many laws. But in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and most subsequent banking law before Dodd-Frank, the powers Congress granted to regulators were fairly limited and generally implemented by bipartisan commissions. 对许多法律来说，一定的监管灵活度必不可少。但是，在多德-弗兰克法案之前的1934年证券交易法，以及随后的大部分银行法律中，国会授予监管机构的权力相当有限，且一般由两党共同控制的委员会来执行。 Major decisions were debated and voted on in the clear light of day. Precedents and formal rules were knowable by the regulated. And regulators generally had to be responsive to Congress, which controlled agency appropriations. These checks and balances, while imperfect, did promote general consistency and predictability in federal regulatory policy. 种种制衡机制——重大决策经过冷静的辩论和投票表决；监管所依据的先例和成文法可供被监管者查阅；监管机构需要对掌控预算拨款的国会负责——尽管未必完善，却仍有效促进了联邦监管政策总体上的一致性和可预见性。 This process has been undermined. For example, Dodd-Frank’s Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is not run by a bipartisan commission. And the CFPB’s funding is automatic, virtually eliminating any real ability for elected officials to check its policies. Consistency and predictability are being replaced by uncertainty and fear. 但这套程序正在遭受侵蚀。例如，根据多德-弗兰克法案设立的消费者金融保障局（Consumer Financial Protection Bureau）并非由一个两党共同控制的委员会运作。再有，消费者金融保障局每年的拨款都是自动获得的，这令民选官员事实上无法监督其政策制订。原先政策总体的一致性和可预见性正在被迷茫和恐慌所代替。 Over the years the Federal Trade Commission and the courts defined what constituted “unfair and deceptive” financial practices. Dodd-Frank added the word “abusive” without defining it. The result: The CFPB can now ban services and products offered by financial institutions even though they are not unfair or deceptive by long-standing precedent. 多年以来，美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）和法院负责界定何谓“不公平与欺诈性”的金融行为。多德-弗兰克法案却不加定义地写入了“滥用（abusive）”一词。由此，金融机构提供的特定产品或服务，即使在传统上并不属于不公平与欺诈性的范畴，消费者金融保护局仍有权予以禁止。 Regulators in the Dodd-Frank era impose restrictions on financial institutions never contemplated by Congress, and they push international regulations on insurance companies and money-market funds that Congress never authorized. The law’s Financial Stability Oversight Council meets in private and is made up exclusively of the sitting president’s appointed allies. 多德-弗兰克法案之后，监管当局可以绕开国会审查授权程序，直接推行对金融机构的限制，以及对保险公司和货币市场基金的跨国监管。法案设立了金融稳定监督委员会（Financial Stability Oversight Council），其成员个个都是在任总统指定的盟友，会议均闭门进行。 Dodd-Frank does not say what makes a financial institution systemically important and thus subject to stringent regulation. The council does. Banks so designated have regulators embedded in their executive offices to monitor and advise, eerily reminiscent of the old political officers who were placed in every Soviet factory and military unit. 法案也没有说明，什么情况下，一家金融机构会被认为具有系统重要性，因而需要接受严格监管。委员会说了算。被认定符合这种条件的银行，监管官员被安插进其管理部门，现场监督指导工作，令人回想起当年政治干部充斥于苏联工厂和军队的怪异景象。 Dodd-Frank’s Volcker rule prohibits proprietary trading by banks. And yet, despite years of delay and hundreds of pages of new rules, no one knows what the rule requires—not even Paul Volcker. 多德-弗兰克法案的沃尔克规则（Volcker rule）禁止了银行的自营交易。然而，经过数年反复商讨，出台新规千百页，始终没人说得清楚这个规则到底提出了什么要求，就算沃尔克本人也做不到。 Then there is the “living will,” a plan that banks deemed to be systemically important must submit to the Fed and the FDIC on how they would be liquidated if they fail. The Fed and the FDIC have almost total discretion in deciding whether the plan is acceptable and therefore whether to institute a variety of penalties, including the divestiture of assets. 再有就是“生前遗嘱（living will）”——重要的银行必须向美联储和联邦存款保险公司预先递交清算计划，以备破产之需。美联储和联邦存款保险公司几近拥有完全的自由裁量权，判断该计划是否可接受，由此决定是否制定包括资产剥离在内的处罚措施。 Large banking firms must undergo stress tests to see if they could survive market turmoil. But what does the stress test test? No one knows. The Fed’s vice chairman, Stanley Fischer, said in a speech last month that giving banks a clear road map for compliance might make it “easier to game the test.” Compliance is indeed easier when you know what the law requires, but isn’t that the whole point of the rule of law? 法案规定，大型银行必须接受压力测试，以检验处于市场动荡时的存活能力。但压力测试测试些什么呢？没人知道。上个月，美联储副主席斯坦利·费希尔（Stanley Fischer）在演讲中说，为银行遵从法规提供清晰的路线图可能令银行“更容易通过压力测试”。只要法律明确，遵守规定确实更容易，可这不正是法治的基本要求吗？ To limit abuse by the rulers, ancient Rome wrote down the law and permitted citizens to read it. Under Dodd-Frank, regulatory authority is now so broad and so vague that this practice is no longer followed in America. The rules are now whatever regulators say they are. 昔日古罗马为限制滥权，法律可供公民传抄诵读。今天的美国不再这么做了，在多德-弗兰克法案的卵翼下，监管机构的权力范围极为广泛，边界极为模糊。规则已经变成监管者随心所欲的工具。 Most criticism of Dodd-Frank focuses on its massive regulatory burden, but its most costly and dangerous effects are the uncertainty and arbitrary power it has created by the destruction of the rule of law. This shackles economic growth but more important, it imperils our freedom. 大多数针对多德-弗兰克法案的批评，着眼于其沉重的监管负担。实际上，代价最高昂，危害也最大的影响，是它徒增不确定性，并通过破坏法治而创设了专断权力。这项法案不仅束缚经济发展，更危及到自由的原则。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Rent Control in Stockholm 斯德哥尔摩的租房管制

作者：Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-7-24 译者：Marcel ZHANG（@马赫塞勒张）   校对：史祥莆（@史祥莆） 来源：Marginal Revolution， http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/07/rent-control.html Here’s an interesting letter from “Stockholm” to Seattle: 这儿有封“斯德哥尔摩”写给西雅图的信，很有意思：

Dear Seattle, 亲爱的西雅图： I am writing to you because I heard that you are looking at rent control. 听说你正在着手租房管制，特此来信。 Seattle, you need to ask your citizens this: How would citizens like it if they walked into a rental agency and the agent told them to register and come back in 10 years? 西雅图，你该问问你的市民们：如果他们走进一个租房中介却被告知十年后再来登记，他们将作何感受？ I’m not joking. The image above is a scan of a booklet sent to a rental applicant by Stockholm City Council’s rental housing service. See those numbers on the map? That’s the waiting time for an apartment in years. Yes, years. Look at the inner city – people are waiting for 10-20 years to get a rental apartment, and around 7-8 years in my suburbs. (Red keys = new apartments, green keys = existing apartments). 我可没开玩笑啊。上图是一张斯德哥尔摩市议会派发给租房申请人的宣传册扫描件。看见地图上那些数字了吗？那是租一间公寓所需等待的年数，没错，是年数。看看市中心，人们需要等上个一二十年才能租到一间公寓，而在郊区也要七八年的时间。（图中红钥匙指新公寓，绿钥匙指现有公寓。） Stockholm City Council now has an official housing queue, where 1 day waiting = 1 point. To get an apartment you need both money for the rent and enough points to be the first in line. Recently an apartment in inner Stockholm became available. In just 5 days, 2000 people had applied for the apartment. The person who got the apartment had been waiting in the official housing queue since 1989! 斯德哥尔摩市政府目前有个官方住房队列，在这个队列中耗上一天就赚得一个“租房点”。为了租到一间公寓，你既要准备好租金，还要赚足“租房点”才能熬到队伍前头。最近有处位于斯德哥尔摩市中心的公寓开放租赁了。仅在5天之内，有多达2000人前来申请。最终租到这间房的那个人，可是早在1989年就已经在官方住房队列里候着了！

（上图红字：近两千人仅为一间房而苦苦守候！） In addition to Soviet-level shortages, the letter writer discusses a number of other effects of rent controls in Stockholm including rental units converted to condominiums and a division of renters into original recipients who are guaranteed low rates and who thus never move and the newly arrived who have to sublet at higher rates or share crowded space. All of these, of course, are classic consequences of rent controls. 除了这种“苏联式短缺”之外，上述致函者还讨论了斯德哥尔摩的租房管制所造成的其他影响，包括：出租单元被转变成了公寓楼，还有将租客们分成先来的原始租客和后到的转租客这一效果，前者因为有着安享低房租的保证，因而绝不会自动搬走，而后者却不得不以更高的租价从这些二房东那里转租，或是选择与他们合租而忍受拥挤。上述一切，自然都是租房管制所造成的典型后果。 Addendum: More details on Sweden’s rent-setting system can be found here, statistics (in Swedish) on rental availability in Stockhom are here and a useful analysis of the Swedish housing crisis with more details on various policies (e.g. new construction is exempt for 15 years but there isn’t nearly enough) is here. 附录：欲了解有关瑞典的租金厘定体系的更多细节，请点击这里，有关斯德哥尔摩可租房屋的统计数据（瑞典语）请点击这里，一份关于瑞典住房危机的有用分析，其中含有有关诸多政策的细节（比如：新修建筑获免税已有15年，而建筑却仍供不应求【编注：此句意思不确定，exempt不知所指为何：exempt from what?】）请点击这里。 Jenkins wrote a comprehensive review of the literature on rent controls in 2009 that echoed what Navarro said in 1985 “the economics profession has reached a rare consensus: Rent control creates many more problems than it solves.” Jenkins在2009年写过一篇有关租房管制的文献综述，与Navarro早在1985年时所言不谋而合：“经济学界难得达成了一个共识：租房管制无异于饮鸩止渴。” Hat tip to Bjorn and Niclas who confirmed to me the situation in Stockholm and to Peter for the original link. 特别感谢Bjorn和Niclas，他们向我证实了斯德哥尔摩的实际情况；另外也要感谢Peter，是他为我提供了原始链接。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Are Aussie housing regulations the dumbest rules on Earth? 澳洲的房屋管制是否是世界上最愚蠢的规定？ 作者：Scott Sumner @ 2015-6-7 译者：混乱阈值 （@混乱阈值） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子）沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：TheMoneyIllusion， http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=29551 Commenter Colin Docherty sent me an article on the Reserve Bank of Australia’s counterproductive attempt to hold down house prices with tight money: 评论员Colin Docherty发给我一篇关于澳大利亚储备银行试图用紧缩银根这种适得其反的手段来抑制房价的文章：【译注：作者收到的文章地址http://www.afr.com/real-estate/residential/housing-bubble-compels-rba-to-hold-rates-at-225pc-20150407-1mfyvh】

The Reserve Bank of Australia’s surprise decision to defer its widely anticipated April rate cut for at least another month might have been influenced by the increasingly pricey housing market, which it regards as posing a real “dilemma”. 外界普遍预期澳大利亚储备银行将在四月份降息，但其却出人意料地决定将降息往后推迟至少一个月。此举可能是受了房价日趋上扬的影响。在储备银行看来，房价的不断上涨让他们陷入了真正的“两难处境”。 According to UBS, in March the ratio of Australian dwelling prices-to-disposable household incomes equalled – and is presently surpassing – the previous record of 5.3 times set back in September 2003. And they predict it will climb further. 根据瑞士联合银行（UBS）给出的数据，三月份澳洲的住房价格与可支配家庭收入比已经追平——并且正在赶超——2003年9月创下的5.3倍的纪录。而且上升势头可能还会持续。

As a result, Aussie inflation is now sliding far below the 2.5% target, and unemployment has been climbing. This is the same policy the Fed tried in 1929. This is the same policy the Riksbank tried in 2010.  Do central bankers ever learn? 结果，澳洲目前通胀率远低于2.5%的目标，而失业率则一直在攀升。同样的经济政策，美联储（Fed）在1929年就用过了，瑞典中央银行（Riksbank）在2010年也用过了。中央银行的银行家们就不会吸取教训吗？ Back in 2009 I ridiculed the idea of bubbles by pointing out that while all the English speaking countries had seen huge house price surges in the early 2000s, only the US and Ireland saw a crash.  Australian prices were particularly robust. But despite the bubblemongers being wrong about these countries, they continued to insist it was all a bubble. 2009年时我就嘲笑过那些认为房市存在泡沫的观点，那时我指出，尽管在本世纪头几年所有英语国家的房价都迅猛上涨，但只有美国和爱尔兰的房市出现了崩盘。而澳大利亚的房价尤其坚挺。尽管那些泡沫论贩子对这些国家的房市判断出错，他们依然坚持房地产市场全是泡沫。 OK, I can sort of understand how people could make that mistake in 2009. But now, six years later, Australian house prices are still up at the same lofty levels.  Is the term “bubble” now so elastic that it can fit a house price boom that’s occupied virtually the entire 21st century? 好吧，人们在2009年犯错还算情有可原。然而六年后的今天，澳大利亚的房价依然处在同样的高位。如果整个21世纪至今几乎一直在延续的房价上涨还能叫做是“泡沫”，那“泡沫”这个词的弹性也太大了吧？ How about if prices are still high in 2020—will it still be a bubble?  How about 2030?  How about 2050? Of course the bubblemongers will refuse to answer these questions because like soothsayers they always want an “out” if their predictions fail.  They always want to be able to say; “You just wait and see.” 如果房价在2020年依旧很高，还是泡沫吗？2030年呢？2050年呢？当然这些泡沫论贩子会拒绝回答这些问题，因为他们就像算命先生那样，总能为自己失败的预言找到托词。他们永远会说：“你等着瞧好了。” And how about those people who said Bitcoin was a bubble at $25?  I’m will to buy coins from you guys at twice the price you said was a bubble back then. 那么那些在比特币价值25美元的时候说出现了泡沫的人怎么样了？我愿意用当初你们说是泡沫的价格的两倍跟你们购买比特币。 I still haven’t gotten to the dumbest policy on Earth.  Australia is the size of the continental US, with a population smaller than Texas.  Like Texans, Aussies should be able to afford comfortable single-family homes.  But in the right column of the article linked to above, I see links for these articles: 目前为止我还没说到地球上最愚蠢的政策呢。澳大利亚的国土面积和美国本土一样大，人口比德克萨斯州还少。和德州人一样，澳洲人应该能够买得起舒适的独户住宅。然而就在前面提到的文章的右边栏上，我看到了以下这些文章的链接：

• Australia becoming a nation of landlords
• 澳大利亚成了地主的国家
• http://www.afr.com/real-estate/residential/australia-becoming-a-nation-of-landlords-20150605-ghhjpi
• Melbourne developer experiments with micro-apartments, sliding walls
• 墨尔本的房屋开发商尝试建造带滑动墙的微型公寓
• http://www.afr.com/real-estate/residential/sliding-walls-tiny-apartments-and-how-to-solve-the-housing-shortage-20150605-ghgfmz

I can visualize microapartments in Hong Kong, but Australia? Are the zoning regulators there sadists?  What would cause an otherwise sensible country to have such insane housing rules that Sydney would end up with some of the highest land prices on Earth? 我能想象香港的微型公寓，但在澳洲建造微型公寓？澳洲土地规划者是施虐狂吗？是什么让这个本来理智的国家有如此疯狂的房屋规定，以致于悉尼要跻身世界上地价最贵的城市之一？ Milton Friedman said: 米尔顿·弗里德曼说过：

If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in 5 years there’d be a shortage of sand. 如果你让联邦政府负责管理撒哈拉沙漠，五年之内沙子就会短缺。

Well the Australian government was put in charge of land use in a country the size of the Sahara, and now they have microapartments. 好吧，人们让澳洲政府负责管理面积相当于撒哈拉沙漠的土地使用，于是现在就有了微型公寓。 I’m begging regulators there to make me look like a fool.  Pop that nonexistent housing bubble by changing the fundamentals.  Give landowners the freedom to build, like they have in Germany.  Please, make me look like a fool. 我倒是希望澳洲的监管者们能让我看起来像个笨蛋。通过改变经济基本因素来戳破那根本不存在的房市泡沫吧。像德国那样给予土地所有者建造房屋的自由吧。拜托了，让我看起来像个笨蛋吧。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Canada Cuts Down On Red Tape. Could It Work In The U.S.? 加拿大精简繁规缛章，美国行吗？ 作者：Uri Berliner @2015-7-25 译者：@苏格底柏德図         校对：晓舸 (@ShawXG) 来源：NPR 网址：http://www.npr.org/2015/05/26/409671996/canada-cuts-down-on-red-tape-could-it-work-in-the-u-s Canada says it's the first country with a law that eliminates one regulation for every new measure that's adopted. The One-for-One Rule is designed to ease the burden on businesses. 加拿大宣称自己是世界上第一个采纳“一换一”规则的国家，这项法律规则要求：每出台一项新的监管措施，必须相应的排除一条旧的。此项规则旨在减轻企业的负担。 RENEE MONTAGNE, HOST:   In Canada, the government has figured out a surefire way to slash red tape with a law that eliminates one regulation for every new one that's created. The One-For-One Rule was adopted last month in a nice Canadian way, without political warfare. NPR's Uri Berliner reports. 主持人，蕾妮·蒙塔：在加拿大，政府想出了一种削减繁杂监管规章的可靠办法，为每项新出台的监管措施削减掉一项旧的。上个月，“一换一”规则以一种加拿大人特有的优雅方式而被采纳，没有引发政治纷争。 URI BERLINER, BYLINE: The story starts in 2001 in Canada's beautiful west coast province of British Columbia. Laura Jones lives there, in Vancouver. She's with the Canadian Federation of Independent Business. And she says back then, the economy of British Columbia was a mess, partly because there were so many time-consuming regulations. And she says some of them were pretty dumb. 文章署名，乌利·贝陵尔：这事情始于加拿大美丽的西海岸，不列颠哥伦比亚省。劳拉·琼斯（Laura Jones）住在该省的温哥华市，就职于加拿大独立商业联盟（Canadian Federation of Independent Business）。她说，回想之前，不列颠哥伦比亚省的经济状况十分混乱，部分原因是有许多浪费时间的监管制度上。她认为其中一些监管实在愚蠢。 LAURA JONES: Forest companies were told what size nails they had to use the build a bridge. Restaurants were told what size televisions they could have in their establishments. Kids even were affected. They were being told they needed two permits to show a tadpole in their classroom at show and tell. 劳拉·琼斯：林业公司必须使用规定型号的钉子来造桥。旅店必须在店内摆设规定型号的电视机。甚至连孩子也难逃影响，他们必须先取得两项许可，才能在教室里上展示讲解课的时候向同学展示蝌蚪。 BERLINER: So the incoming administration in British Columbia said enough is enough. For every new rule that becomes law, two existing ones would have to go. And Laura Jones says it's worked. In British Columbia, regulation has been reduced by 40 percent. She says small business has benefited. 乌利·贝陵尔：所以不列颠哥伦比亚省新上任的政府决定，真是够了，不能再这么下去了。凡是新出台法律规则，都要相应的减少两条现有规则。劳拉·琼斯说这个办法效果非常好。不列颠哥伦比亚省现在已经有40%的监管项目被取消。她表示该省的小企业已因此而受益。 JONES: And there's been very little to no outcry about cutting into rules that are important to protect human health, safety and the environment. 劳拉·琼斯：然而在削减关乎人类健康、安全和环境的监管条目的事情上，总是会引来强烈抗议。 BERLINER: Eventually, British Columbia dialed it back to one for one, and that became the model for the entire country. For two years, one for one has been a federal policy, part of a broader attack on red tape. To give the effort credibility, the savings from eliminating regulations couldn't just be assumed. They had to be quantified. Tony Clement is a cabinet minister with Canada's ruling Conservative Party. 乌利·贝陵尔：最终，政府退而求其次，从“一换二”退至“一换一”规则，后者成了整个加拿大的榜样。经过两年之后，“一换一”已经成了一项联邦政策，这是对抗政府繁杂监管的一个重要力量。为了赋予这项规则以可信度，通过削减监管项目而节省花费这件事不能仅仅只是一个假设，它们必须得到量化。托尼·克莱门托是现执政加拿大的保守党内阁大臣。 TONY CLEMENT: We're trying to measure and benchmark our success. And in that way, it's a serious exercise, not just a - you know, a jingoistic political exercise. 托尼·克莱门托：我们正在尝试度量和评测我们所取得的成功。那是一种非常认真严肃的行动，而不是那种以势压人的政治运动。 BERLINER: Clement says small businesses are logging less time on paperwork - a reduction of hundreds of thousands of hours so far. Nineteen federal regulations have been eliminated, but the law won't allow cuts to protections for health, safety and the environment. That took any ideological edge off the act. When Canada's House of Commons voted to make the policy an actual law, the bill passed overwhelmingly. 乌利·贝陵尔：克莱门托说，小企业浪费在文书上的时间减少了——迄今已减少了上万小时。19条联邦监管规章已经被取消，但同时法律又规定不允许削减有关保护健康、安全和环境的监管。这条规定缓解了所有意识形态上的冲突。加拿大下院对是否将“一换一”规则写入法律进行了投票，结果以压倒性多数获得通过。 I saw that the vote was 245 to one. 我看到投票结果是245比1. CLEMENT: Yes, the Green Party was a bit skeptical. 托尼·克莱门托：是的，绿党对这项措施还是有点疑虑。 BERLINER: So even the socialists backed it? 乌利·贝陵尔：所以甚至社会主义者们也同意了这项政策？ CLEMENT: They did indeed. Yeah. In fact, we're having a tussle with them as we move towards our election as to who is a better spokesperson for small business in Canada. 托尼·克莱门托：是的，确实。实际上，在临近选举前，我们跟他们就谁才是加拿大中小企业的更好代言人还有过一些争吵。 BERLINER: Here in the States, there is, of course, plenty of policy debate about the right level of regulation. Business groups say compliance with regulation cost the U.S. economy $2 trillion a year. Environmental, consumer and labor groups say these are mostly vital protections, and they often push for more of them. Laura Jones says that's a debate the public largely ignores. 乌利·贝陵尔：在美国，有很多关于政府监管强度是否合适的政治争论。工商业团体认为监管制度使得美国经济每年付出2万亿美金的代价。环境组织，消费者组织和劳工组织则表示这些监管中的大部分非常重要，他们还经常强烈要求出台更多的监管制度。劳拉·琼斯说，公众在很大程度上忽视了这些争论。 JONES: And that's what we're trying to change in Canada. And I think Canada, in this area, is ironically going to be a very good model for the U.S. 劳拉·琼斯：而在加拿大，这正是我们设法改变的状况。而我觉得，在这个领域，加拿大会颇具讽刺意味地成为美国的一个好榜样。 PAUL LIGHT: I think there's a reason why we've never used it, which is that it's a most impossible to implement without offending Congress. 保罗·莱特：我认为有一个原因导致了我们一直没有采纳“一换一”这样的规则，那就是这么做无疑会触怒国会。 BERLINER: That's Paul Light. He's a professor of public service at NYU, and he's been watching efforts to pare back bureaucracy since the 1980s. He says regulations don't get created without a legitimate reason. They reflect the desires of elected leaders. 乌利·贝陵尔：这位是保罗·莱特（Paul Light）。他是纽约大学公共服务专业的教授，他从1980年代就开始密切关注精简官僚机构的问题。他说，监管制度不会没正当理由就被制定出来。这些监管反映了民选领导人的欲望。 LIGHT: I get the pressure from business - and small businesses, in particular - to reduce red tape. 保罗·莱特：我感受到了来自企业，尤其是中小企业的，希望削减政府监管条目的压力。 BERLINER: But he says there's a better way to do it. Instead of a one-for-one swap, write smarter and more careful regulations. Uri Berliner, NPR News. 乌利·贝陵尔：但是他表示还有一个更好的办法，不一定要“一换一”，我们可以制订更精巧和审慎的监管条文。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-08-06】 @海德沙龙 自去年奥巴马开始发起提高最低工资的运动以来，康涅狄格率先响应，立法要求最低时薪两年内提高至$10.10，此后一些城市也迅速跟进，其中以加州城市最为积极，目前流行的口号是15美元，西雅图也于去年6月通过了法案，本文介绍了最低工资法的一种荒唐后果 http://t.cn/RLYmuRB @whigzhou: 最低工资法是常见干预措施中最恶劣的一种（我本来想用恶毒/卑劣/无耻等道德意味更明确的词汇，不过想想还是算了，总不能完全排除愚蠢的可能），它把最脆弱无助但又愿意通过自身努力改善生活的人残忍的驱逐出了劳动市场。正因其荒谬和恶劣程度，它也是观察公共政策氛围已恶化到何种程度的一个风向标。 @whigzhou: 对于无知起哄者，最低工资法是表达其伪善的最廉价方式，其主张无异于宣称，为改变穷人命运，你无须任何努力，只要改改数字就行，就像以为只要在脸书上点点赞就能帮助非洲难民，而这种廉价良心安慰法，正是某些政客最乐意兜售的 @whigzhou: 对于某些精明政客，借助最低工资法将最弱势群体驱逐出劳动市场，也为其继续兜售福利主义政策创造了需求，这一手法类似于秃蚣当年在农村发动割命时，通过破坏刻意农民的生计基础、制造仇恨，来为自己创造“群众基础”和炮灰来源 @lion_kittyyyyy:最低工资在美国历史上第一次出现就是为了挤出劳动力的。1911年在马塞诸塞州，妇女的收入在每周5刀-7刀，低于当时的最低生活标准。于是，最低工资倡议者H. LaRue Brown写道：“我们付出社会最宝贵的财富…（劳动）毁掉了那些本该成为高效的美国公民的女孩的身体。” @lion_kittyyyyy:1912年，马塞诸塞州通过了全国第一个最低工资法案，仅针对妇女与18岁以下儿童。

Seattle sees fallout from $15 minimum wage, as other cities follow suit 西雅图见识了15美元最低工资法的后果，其他城市亦步亦趋 作者：Dan Springer @ 2015-07-22 译者：史祥莆（@史祥莆） 校对：Marcel Zhang（@马赫塞勒张） 来源：FoxNews.com，http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/07/22/seattle-sees-fallout-from-15-minimum-wage-as-other-cities-follow-suit/ Seattle’s $15 minimum wage law is supposed to lift workers out of poverty and move them off public assistance. But there may be a hitch in the plan. 西雅图的15美元最低工资法，照理说是为了帮助就业者摆脱贫穷并脱离公共救济体系，但是这个计划可能存在纰漏。 Evidence is surfacing that some workers are asking their bosses for fewer hours as their wages rise – in a bid to keep overall income down so they don’t lose public subsidies for things like food, child care and rent. 有证据表明，一些员工在工资提升的同时，正在向他们的雇主要求更短的工作时间——以求压低总收入，这样他们才不会失去食品、育儿和租房方面的公共补贴。 Full Life Care, a home nursing nonprofit, told KIRO-TV in Seattle that several workers want to work less. 一家名为“终身照料”（Full Life Care）的非盈利家庭护理机构告诉西雅图的KIRO-TV电视台，他们的一些员工希望减少工作量。 “If they cut down their hours to stay on those subsidies because the $15 per hour minimum wage didn’t actually help get them out of poverty, all you’ve done is put a burden on the business and given false hope to a lot of people,” said Jason Rantz, host of the Jason Rantz show on 97.3 KIRO-FM. “如果他们因为每小时15美元的最低工资并不能真正帮他们摆脱贫穷而减少他们的工时以保持补贴，那么这一切不过是给企业增加了负担并给了很多人虚假希望，” KIRO-FM 97.3广播节目Jason Rantz show的主持人Jason Rantz如是说。 The twist is just one apparent side effect of the controversial -- yet trendsetting -- minimum wage law in Seattle, which is being copied in several other cities despite concerns over prices rising and businesses struggling to keep up. 这一麻烦只是时下颇为时髦却饱受争议的西雅图最低工资法的明显副作用之一，而该法案正在被其他若干城市复制，尽管有着种种对价格上涨和经营困难的忧虑。 The notion that employees are intentionally working less to preserve their welfare has been a hot topic on talk radio. While the claims are difficult to track, state stats indeed suggest few are moving off welfare programs under the new wage. 员工故意减少工作量以保持其福利的观点一直是电台节目上的热点话题。虽然这些见解很难被追踪核实，但州政府的统计数据确实表明几乎没有人在新工资政策下脱离福利计划。 Despite a booming economy throughout western Washington, the state’s welfare caseload has dropped very little since the higher wage phase began in Seattle in April. In March 130,851 people were enrolled in the Basic Food program. In April, the caseload dropped to 130,376. 尽管整个华盛顿州西部的经济处于繁荣之中，但西雅图的高薪规定自四月生效以来，州政府的待处理福利申请案数量却几乎没有下降。三月份，有130851人被纳入基本食品计划（Basic Food program）之中，这一数字在四月仅仅降低到了130376。 At the same time, prices appear to be going up on just about everything. 与此同时，似乎所有东西的价格都开始上涨。 Some restaurants have tacked on a 15 percent surcharge to cover the higher wages. And some managers are no longer encouraging customers to tip, leading to a redistribution of income. Workers in the back of the kitchen, such as dishwashers and cooks, are getting paid more, but servers who rely on tips are seeing a pay cut. 一些餐馆开始附加15%的额外费用以便补偿更高工资带来的成本。一些管理者不再鼓励顾客支付小费，这导致了一种收入再分配。在后厨工作的员工，例如洗碗工和厨师，将会有更多收入，但依赖小费的服务员的工资将会减少。 Some long-time Seattle restaurants have closed altogether, though none of the owners publicly blamed the minimum wage law. 一些长期经营的西雅图餐馆纷纷关门，尽管这些店主中没有一个将此公开归咎于最低工资法。 “It’s what happens when the government imposes a restriction on the labor market that normally wouldn’t be there, and marginal businesses get hit the hardest, and usually those are small, neighborhood businesses,” said Paul Guppy, of the Washington Policy Center. “当政府给劳动力市场施加正常情况下不应有的限制时，就会发生这种状况，处于边际上的企业受打击最沉重，而通常它们是些小型的社区企业，” 华盛顿政策中心（Washington Policy Center）的Paul Guppy如是说。 Seattle was followed by San Francisco and Los Angeles in passing a $15 minimum wage law. The wage is being phased in over several years to give businesses time to adjust. The current minimum wage in Seattle is $11. In San Francisco, it’s $12.25. 继西雅图之后，旧金山和洛杉矶也出台了15美元最低工资法。法案留出了几年的过渡期以便企业有时间作出调整适应。目前西雅图的最低工资是11美元，旧金山则是12.25美元。 And it is spreading. Beyond the city of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors this week also approved a $15 minimum wage. 这种做法正在蔓延。不仅仅是洛杉矶市，洛杉矶县管理委员会（Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors）本周也通过了15美元最低工资法。 New York state could be next, with the state Wage Board on Wednesday backing a $15 wage for fast-food workers, something Gov.Andrew Cuomo has supported. 纽约州可能是下一个，和州长Andrew Cuomo一样，州工资委员会（Wage Board）周三也支持了针对快餐业工人的15美元最低工资标准。 Already, though, there are unintended consequences in other cities. 尽管这已经在其他城市造成了意想不到的后果。 Comix Experience, a small book store in downtown San Francisco, has begun selling graphic novel club subscriptions in order to meet payroll. The owner, Brian Hibbs, admits members are not getting all that much for their $25 per month dues, but their “donation” is keeping him in business. 旧金山城区的小书店Comix Experience已开始对图画小说俱乐部收取会费以便应付工资开销。店主Brian Hibbs承认，会员们得到的好处不值每月25美元的会费，但是他们的“赞助”让他能把生意维持下去。 “I was looking at potentially having to close the store down and then how would I make my living?” Hibbs asked. “我想可能要不得不关掉这家店了，那么接下来我将如何谋生呢？” Hibbs问道。 To date, he’s sold 228 subscriptions. He says he needs 334 to reach his goal of the $80,000 income required to cover higher labor costs. He doesn’t blame San Francisco voters for approving the $15 minimum wage, but he doesn’t think they had all the information needed to make a good decision. 迄今为止，他招徕到了228个会员。他说他需要334个才能达到80000美元的收入目标，以补偿抬高了的劳动成本。他并不责备旧金山选民赞成15美元最低工资法，但他并不认为拥有做出良好决策所需要充分信息。 【作者背景】 *Dan Springer joined Fox News Channel (FNC) in August 2001 as a Seattle-based correspondent. *Dan Springer于2001年8月作为驻西雅图通讯记者加入了福克斯新闻频道(Fox News Channel). （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Gun Sales Boomed In June 六月，枪支销售因何大热 作者：Frank Miniter @ 2015-7-25 译者：Eartha（@王小贰_Eartha） 校对：晓舸（@ShawXG） 来源：Forbes，http://www.forbes.com/sites/frankminiter/2015/07/17/why-gun-sales-boomed-in-june/ Guns are not perishable items. Kept in good repair a firearm lasts generations. So how is it that gun sales continue to set records when more than 100 million American gun owners already have over 300 million guns? 枪支不是易腐商品，照料的好，可以保用数代。那么，为何当超过1亿多美国枪主已拥有3亿多支枪时，枪支销售量仍然屡创新高呢？ Last month, for example, was the busiest June for gun sales ever. The National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF), the trade association for firearms manufacturers, says gun dealers completed 886,825 background checks in June 2015. 就近的说，上个月是史上枪支销售最火爆的六月。美国全国射击运动基金会（National Shooting Sports Foundation ，NSSF），一个由军火生产商组成的贸易协会，宣称2015年6月枪支销售商们完成了886,825例（对购买枪支者的）背景调查。【译注：此类背景调查所依据的是1993年通过的布雷迪手枪暴力防治法（Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act）设立的背景调查制度，该法案禁止出售枪支给受限人群。】 The NSSF follows the FBI-administered National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) closely. Each time someone wants to buy a gun from a licensed dealer their name must be called into the FBI’s NICS database (or, in some cases, a state-operated database) to check if that person is barred from possessing a gun. NSSF严格遵守由FBI管理的全国即时犯罪背景调查系统（National Instant Criminal Background Check System，NICS）的有关规定。每当有人想从特许枪支销售商那里购买枪支，其姓名必须被输进FBI的NICS数据库（或者，在某些情况下，由州运营的数据库），以检查此人是否被限制拥有枪支。 The NSSF said the number of NICS checks last June was “the highest” on record “for the 17-year-old [NICS] system.” It was an increase of 10.1 percent over June 2014. NSSF表示，上个月是NICS系统建立17年以来背景调查次数最多的六月，比去年同期增加了10.1%。 Now, some news reports say this jump in sales is all about gun owners’ fears about more gun control coming in the wake of the horrific attack on parishioners on June 17 at a church in Charleston, South Carolina. The thing is this can’t be the whole story because in May 2015 some 918,707 background checks were called into the FBI’s database, making it the second-highest May ever. 现在，一些新闻报道认为，此次枪支销量突增全是因为，6月17日发生在南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿一座教堂中针对教徒的严重枪击事件，导致持枪者们担心政府会进一步加强枪支管控。但这并不是全部的理由，因为在2015年的五月，FBI的数据库进行了918,707次背景调查，这是有史以来次数第二多的五月。

Rifles stand on a rack at Article 2 Gun Store in Lombard, Illinois. U.S. (Photographer: Tim Boyle/Bloomberg) 美国伊利诺伊州Lombard镇的“Article 2”枪店内陈列的来复枪。【译注：Article 2即宪法第二修正案：纪律严明的民兵是保障自由州的安全所必需的，因此人民持有和携带武器的权利不得侵犯。】（摄影：Tim Boyle/Bloomberg）

For a deeper explanation I contacted Jim Curcuruto, director, industry research & analysis for the NSSF. He said, “Background checks were up over 19 percent in South Carolina, as compared to the previous June, but that one state isn’t enough to make the NICS checks jump 10 percent nationally. So, after making a lot of calls, we found that some of the bump was related to sales and other deals at retail chains. Some percentage of the rise in sales was definitely related to fear of more gun control. There are also typically spikes in sales regionally after something occurs that prompts people to look for ways to protect their own lives. But there has also been a steady rise in gun sales for some time. So there were multiple factors involved.” 为了获得更深入的解释，我联系到了NSSF行业研究分析主管Jim Curcuruto。他说：“南卡罗来纳州的背景调查数量相比于去年六月增加超过19%，但是一个州的情况变化并不足以导致全国范围的NICS背景调查数量突增10%。所以，在打了很多电话进行调查之后，我们发现，数量突增一部分与连锁零售店的交易量有关，一部分也确实出于对强化枪支管控的担忧。如果在某个地区发生了一些事件，人们由此意识到需要采取行动来保卫自己的生命，当地的枪支销售量也通常会突然增加。但是，枪支销量的稳定上升也有一段时间了。所以，全国调查数量的突增涉及到很多因素。” Of course, we’re talking about NICS checks here, not actual gun sales. Just because someone undergoes a background check doesn’t mean they necessarily purchased a gun; also, someone could buy multiple guns after a single background check. This is why NICS is seen only as an indicator of the volume of gun sales. 当然，我们在此讨论的只是NICS的背景调查数目，而非真实的枪支销售量。并不是说一个人接受了背景调查之后就一定买了一把枪；同样，一个人可以买很多把枪而只需进行一次背景调查。正因此，NICS只能被视为判断枪支销量的指标之一。 Now, I started by asking why gun sales continue to set records when more than 100 million American gun owners already have over 300 million guns? This probably had a lot of gun aficionados asking, “What, the average gun owner only has three guns?” 现在回到本文开头提出的问题，“为什么当1亿多的美国枪主已拥有3亿多支枪时，枪支销量仍屡创新高？”。恐怕有很多枪支爱好者要问了，“什么？每位枪主才三支枪？” Guns, you see, are heirlooms, works of art, and practical tools used for sport, self-defense and hunting. As works of art or tools—or both—guns have a specific purposes. Hunters will have a specific gun or guns for big game, for upland birds, for waterfowl and so on. 你瞧，枪支是传家宝、艺术品，还是用于体育、自卫和狩猎的实用工具。不论是作为艺术品还是实用工具，抑或两者兼具，枪支都有着特定的用途。猎人们用不同种类的枪分别对付丛林里的大家伙、陆鸟或是水鸟。 Those who are into the shooting sports will find their collection expanding as they mature and try new sports. Those looking for self-defense guns will try new carry guns and more as technology and design adds options. As for collectors, well, by definition they just can’t get enough. So it’s actually not all that helpful to compare the number of guns in private hands to the number of gun owners. 当射击爱好者们变得老练起来，并开始尝试新项目，他们的枪支储备也随之而不断扩充。想买把枪防身的人则会不停地尝试新款配枪，而技术与设计的发展也为他们提供了更多的选择。至于收藏者，看这称呼就知道他们永远都不会满足。所以，将私人拥有的枪支数量和持枪者的数量进行比较并没有什么意义。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

第十三章   规章条例常常是麻烦的起点 如前面所说，财产权是法律给行为所划定的边界，类似的，管制也是一种行为边界，规定你不可以做什么；差别在于：财产权篱笆的钥匙，分散的握在每份财产的主人手里，而管制篱笆的钥匙，则集中的握在作为立法者的政府手里。 这一区别有着巨大的经济含义，比如，人们都讨厌噪音，假如法律赋予居民阻止邻居制造噪音的权利，那么，你要在家开个重金属晚会，就只须征得邻居们的同意，但假如政府法令规定任何人不得在居民区制造多少分贝以上的噪音，要合法的开晚会，你就只能去发动一场立法运动了。 问题是，同一种行为，在不同场合下，给不同的行为人带来的收益，给不同的旁人带来的影响和主观伤害，都大不相同，你的邻居可能对噪音十分敏感，也可能不太在意，或者恰好也喜欢重金属，而这个晚会，可能对你难以割舍，也可能很容易换个地方去开，等等。 所有这些都是高度分散的、无法被集中处理的私人知识或局部知识[1]，在分立的私人产权制度下，这些知识将体现在议价和交易过程中：假如你很在意而邻居不太在意，几句道歉或一份小礼物或许就能换得谅解，假如邻居很在意而你无所谓，或许就放弃或换个地方了，假如你们都很在意，或许你会付一笔钱给他。 然而，在管制制度下，所有这些差异和信息都被无视了，结果，大量原本通过私人间议价和妥协可以做的事情，都被不分青红皂白一律禁止了，人们因此而丧失了这些事情所能带来的全部福利，而这一福利原本足以补偿受影响者的损失还有余（否则就不会达成妥协和交易）。 因管制而丧失的福利绝非微不足道，价格管制让无数时间、精力和才智浪费在排队、变相加价和搜寻中，脱离现实的严苛标准把许多商品的价格抬高到穷人难以承受，被FDA所禁止的药物和医疗方法，更剥夺了许多人冒一些副作用风险而挽救生命的机会。 由于掌握立法权的政客既可博取保护消费者的名声，又无须承担管制的代价，因而总是倾向于将管制标准定的越来越高；同时，每项管制都对应着新的行政职能、编制、预算和权力，因而行政官僚也总是乐意维持和增加管制项目。 由于管制大规模压制了通过自愿交易增进福利的机会，它总是面临着潜在众多交易者突破其限制的努力，这便给其执行者带来了大量寻租机会，已成为腐蚀行政机关和司法系统的主要力量，也消磨着公众对政府和法律的信心。 ---------------------- [1]弗里德里希·哈耶克在“社会中的知识使用”（1945）一文中提出了分散知识（dispersed knowledge）的概念，并分析了市场价格机制如何处理它们，以及为何只有价格机制能够处理它们，这也是哈耶克据以反对计划经济的核心论点。

允许飞机上打电话会是场噩梦吗？ 辉格 2014年1月22日 去年12月，美国联邦通讯委员会（FCC）就一份拟议中允许乘客在商业航班上使用手机的提案征询公众意见，很快收到了四百多份意见函，几乎异口同声的对提议表达了反对意见，然而有意思的是，这些反对者所提出的理由，绝大多数是嫌打电话的声音太吵，而不是担心手机会影响飞行安全。 有关飞机上使用通信设备是否存在安全隐患的争议，从手机诞生之日起就一直在持续，相关研究也做了很多，不过，我在这里想关注的倒是另一些细节，这些细节或许可以让我们从一个侧面看清管制当局是如何行事的，而公众对管制政策的态度又是如何形成的。 首先，和通常认为的不一样，FCC禁止乘客在飞机上使用手机的正式理由并不是安全隐患，而是担心高空飞行中的手机会扰乱地面基站的工作，所以该禁令也适用于气球，尽管气球上未必有什么可以被干扰的电子设备；实际上，FCC大概也只能使用这样的理由，因为航空安全毕竟不归它管。 可是，真正管航空安全的联邦航空管理局（FAA）从未禁止在飞机上使用任何电子设备，只是说航空公司要确保这些设备不会干扰飞机的导航与通讯系统；这样问题就来了：既然禁用手机不是出于安全考虑，而且即便有这样的考虑也不是FCC颁布禁令的理由，那么FCC何必要为解除禁令而征询乘客意见？从乘客那里听到什么才会让它撤回解除禁令的提案？ 显然不是乘客对电话喧闹的担忧和抱怨，因为帮助乘客避免喧闹无疑不是FCC的职责，也不是任何管制部门禁止飞机上用手机的理由；看起来更合理的解释是：FCC当初下达禁令确实是出于安全担忧，以干扰基站为借口只是在掩饰其越权管辖的事实，而二十多年来的大量研究并未找到安全隐患的证据，FCC也觉得维持禁令已没有必要，但它又不想为自己必须做的决策——无论是维持还是解除禁令——承担政治责任，于是就用征询公众意见的方式推卸责任。 再看公众方面，那些给FCC写信的人，恐怕不至于认为，FCC当初下达禁令是为了防止飞机上的喧闹，可是他们却仍然异口同声的以此为由要求FCC维持禁令，假如这些人具有代表性，那就意味着：人们会仅仅因为某项政策看起来符合他们的偏好而支持它，而不管该政策是否合理或正当。 而且，正如我们在其他政策议题中所见到的，他们在这么做时，常常会混淆几个十分不同的问题：某种行为是否讨厌？是否需要加以限制？这种限制是否有必要以政府禁令的方式实行？这样的禁令在道德上是否正当？当这些问题以恰当的方式提出时，人们的反应会更讲道理一些，但政策鼓吹者们却往往故意将它们混淆以便夹带私货。 长途旅行中，周围充斥电话噪音，或许是件讨厌的事情，但限制打电话也会带来许多不便，甚至耽误一些紧急要事，两相权衡，究竟该不该限制，并非那么一目了然，比如同样是长途旅行的火车和大巴上，好像就没多少人主张要限制打电话。 即便一项行为需要加以限制，也未必要诉诸禁令和法规，实际上，许多像图书馆、电影院、高级餐厅这样需要安静的场所，依靠习俗、羞愧感和众人的鄙视目光，或许再加上一些文字提示，通常都可以将喧闹控制在人们可以接受的水平。 即便习俗和道德未能有效的限制这种讨厌行为，而必须明文规定，这种规定也未必需要政府和司法机构来制订，而完全可以由场所的主人制订，而飞机恰恰有着的明确主人：航空公司，假如多数乘客果真希望在飞机上打电话的行为受到限制，那就可以相信，至少会有一部分航空公司会努力满足这种普遍需求，并以自己有能力确保旅途安静为卖点招揽乘客，如此一来，该不该限制打电话，便是一个可以由消费者用钞票投票解决的问题。 公众对特定现象的厌恶，总是被利用来为种种管制禁令提供所谓“民意基础”，殊不知，每条禁令都在剥夺着他们的自由，而原本，通过服务商与消费者双方的自愿选择，他们完全可以在保有自由的同时，避免或至少躲开他们所讨厌的东西。

（命题口水文） SEC正在全力摧毁资本市场 辉格 2012年12月07日 SEC对五家会计事务所提起诉讼的举动，很可能将在美上市的中国企业陷于非法地位，导致其最终退市，并断绝中国企业未来进入美国市场的机会，这一驱逐行动只是过去三年SEC对美国资本市场的一连串瞒旰打击的最新一桩，看起来，该机构已铁了心，不置华尔街于死地，不将金融资本逐出美国，是不会罢休了。 从赋予SEC当前职责的监管法规的逻辑看，它对会计事务所的要求当然说的通：既然监管目的是保护美国投资者免受欺诈，那么向美国投资者出售证券的企业自然应遵守同样的规则，问题是这些监管法规本身是否合理？ 投资者当然需要得到保护，假如他们被欺诈了，可以从常规司法系统得到救济，构成犯罪的检察官可提起公诉，这些是事后救济，而在事先，他们可以得到会计师、审计师、分析师、评级机构和做空者的专业信息提供者的帮助，那么，SEC究竟在哪方面能够比他们做得更好？ 和证券投资一样，所有交易都潜伏着侵权和欺诈的风险，市场体制下的保护方案总是由司法系统的事后强制与市场机制提供的事先保护组合而成，假如政府权力在事先就介入交易，规定交易双方该怎么做，那么选择和创新的机会就很容易被扼杀，这是计划体制下的通行做法，而SEC监管模式正是计划思路的产物。 幸好，SEC并未将其权力发挥到极致，这是因为法规赋予了很大的自由裁量空间，而它的官员们也逐渐意识到，其实他们自己也弄不清楚到底该怎么做才能达到法规所设定的笼统的监管目标，面对日益庞大而复杂的金融系统，特别是90年代新一轮金融创新开始涌现之后，他们甚至没有能力对它形成一个起码的理解，讽刺的是，这种复杂性很大程度上正是日渐繁杂的监管法规所导致。 所以在90年代和本世纪初，SEC处于相对消极的状态，既然看不懂也不知该怎么做，而金融市场看上去又发展的不错，它也就乐得因循顺遂；从行政效能上看，可谓有失职守，对市场却是好事，假如一个衙门的存在本身就是个错误，那么它越是一丝不苟廉洁勤恳铁面无私，祸害就越大。 金融危机的爆发，特别是马多夫和斯坦福丑闻，给SEC打了鸡血，这个在其75年历史上从未证明自己的存在价值的机构，突然跳起来说：现在起我要好好干了；可是，究竟是什么让给了它信心，让它以为自己能完成保护投资者的使命？是它突然理解了它花了75年还没理解的金融系统吗？还是它终于找到了前任们所忽略的窍门？ 显然不可能，实际上马多夫和斯坦福的骗局很容易识破，SEC在事先也得到了很多警告，而且根本不需要特别的监管法规，按普通法即可处理，在无数导致投资者损失的案例上，SEC从未表现出先见之明和胜过私人机构的判断力，比如中概股的弄虚作假，都是被做空者揭露后SEC才跟进，可是既然只能事后矫正，那和常规司法系统有何差别？ SEC的无知和无能，从夏皮罗上台后紧锣密鼓的系列打击行动所采用的策略中也可看出端倪，这些行动大部分以和解方式收场，被调查企业认缴大额罚款，但无须承认自己有过错，这是一种非常恶劣的机会主义做法，监管者获得了工作业绩，企业花钱消灾，双方获益，但于市场规则的透明化却有百害而无一利，因为这种和解结果丝毫没能告诉市场参与者：怎么做才是对的，而这本应是规则执行过程最重要的结果。 实际上，市场纠纷中只有极小比例是通过正式的司法和执法程序而获得解决的，但司法程序对社会秩序又极端重要，因为它可以让规则透明化，告诉人们怎么做才是对的，但SEC的和解方式传达给市场参与者的信息却十分暧昧：天知道认罚企业有没有过错，只知道它撞在枪口上，倒了大霉了。  

有偿沉默怪象根源在发行制度 辉格 2012年9月25日 近日，《新世纪》周刊的一篇报道，将国内资本和新闻市场一个“公开的秘密”推上了舆论的台面，近年来新上市的企业，在IPO过程中，几无例外的会向各大媒体支付一笔“沉默费”，换取后者在该企业IPO审批过程中避免发表负面报道，据说这笔开支已成为发行费用的常规组成，价格也趋于透明，据说每家600万左右，从而“有偿沉默”产业的年规模已达10亿元级。 目前这一局面，据说是媒体与IPO企业双方早些年经历了一番争斗之后所达成的默契，之前更多见的是某些媒体用未发表的负面报道去勒索企业，尽管被抓住问题的企业处于被动挨打地位，但勒索也不是没有风险，所以最终各方达成默契、形成有偿沉默的行业惯例，才有了如今和平共处的互惠局面：媒体省下了扒粪成本，也避免了勒索嫌疑，企业则买到了一份保险。 对于投资者，这种均衡当然是非常糟糕的，媒体与企业的这种稳定合作关系，让他们失去了一个获取上市企业信息的很重要渠道；而对于媒体，这种做法当然违背了其通常所宣称的价值观和职业道德，是有损于声誉的，但从法律上看，这么做并没有什么过错，因为媒体虽以出售信息为业，却没有任何义务向其读者或公众提供特定信息。 相反，在言论自由的原则下，媒体拥有完全的自主权决定提供哪些信息，只要不构成造谣、诽谤、欺诈、辱骂、人身恐吓、隐私散布等言论侵权即可；有人说，这么做是在接受商业贿赂，可是，贿赂的前提是存在委托代理关系，代理人以违反委托责任为前提而收取的报酬才是贿赂，所以，只有记者编辑瞒着所在媒体私下收取沉默费，才构成商业贿赂，但目前的有偿沉默产业显然不是如此。 实际上，造成有偿沉默这一怪象的根本原因，在于目前的发行制度，为说明这一点，我们不妨先问两个问题：首先，为何几乎所有IPO企业都如此心虚，因而宁愿承担如此高额的沉默费？其次，假如这些企业果真有那么多可能被揭露的问题，为何他们只需要在IPO过程中支付这笔沉默费？难道上市之后那些问题就不是问题了？之前应披露而未披露的信息，若在上市之后再被揭发，难道就不必负责了？ 按理说，一家企业之所以被交易所和投资者所接受，是因为它承诺了已充分披露投资者所关切的那些信息，并且这些信息表明该企业是有投资价值的，因而，交易所的认可和投资者的信心，都建立在这些信息的真实和充分性，以及上市企业对之所作出的承诺之上，因为他们知道，这一承诺是具有法律效力的，若事后被证明未予履行，是可以追究承诺者责任的。 可现在我们看到的情况并非如此，上市企业唯一关切的，似乎只是顺利“过会”，只要过了这一关，就万事大吉高枕无忧了，为何会这样？他们显然很自信的认为，自己不足或不实披露的问题，在事后不会受到追究，这个信心来自哪里？很明显，来自司法救济的缺失，投资者对不足或不实披露行为的诉讼很难被受理，即便被受理了也很难指望得到公正判决和有效执行，当投资者很分散时，更缺乏集体诉讼制度让他们以合理的诉讼成本来索回损失，而这一切，都是用行政管制代替司法救济的结果。 那么，发行审批制度这一行政管制，是否真的保护了投资者呢？有偿沉默产业如此繁荣的事实已给出了答案：没有。首先，发审制度在纸面上将规范制订的过于严苛，乃至所有上市企业若细究起来，几乎没有一家能符合标准，否则他们为何要支付高额沉默费？其次，这些纸面规定显然未被严格执行，否则支付沉默费又有何用？ 看来，这些纸面规定所起到的作用只是告诫上市企业：不要让违规信息跑到台面上来，一旦跑上台面，我想睁只眼闭只眼也不行了，至于实际上还有多少不实或不足披露的情况，我可管不了；当然，严苛无比的纸面规定还有另一个作用：它赋予了审批官员极大的自由裁量权，既然细究起来没有一家能符合标准，那么扣下谁放过谁就完全由我说了算。 如此我们就要问：这么一个丝毫不能改善资本市场信息环境，仅仅为审批官员创造了寻租机会的发审制度，投资者要来又有何用？