【2016-09-14】 @海德沙龙: 《战争如何推动社会合作》 是什么让人类建立起了如今这样的复杂社会，让我们发展出如此高度的合作与组织能力，得以从事需要数十万人共同参与的大型活动？[[Peter Turchin]]在其新书《超级社会》中提出，众多人类共同体之间的竞争与冲突，特别是战争，是推动这一发展进程的基本动力。 ​​​​ @海德沙龙：乍一看，这似乎只是群选择理论的又一次复活，但Turchin的理论建立在全新的方法论基础之上，他将进化生物学的思想扩展运用于文化进化，为各种社会/文化指标给出了度量方法，并大量采用数量模型和统计工具，使得其理论在经验上变得可验证，由此，Turchin及其同道开创了一个自称为历史动力学的新学派。 @whigzhou: 说到群选择，早先我也曾被道金斯带进过坑里，五年前围观威尔逊帮和道金斯帮那场大争吵时重新思考了这个问题，见旧帖。 @whigzhou: 简单说，只要说清楚群体解决搭便车/损公肥私问题的组织/控制机制（因而回答了反对者的核心质疑），群选择是可以成立的，其余争论只是词汇之争  

《超级社会：人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评 Review of "Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth" 作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/ Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader. Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中，通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析，来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果，让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。 What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation. 什么是历史动力学？我能给出的最佳定义是：这是一种研究历史的科学方法，它试图通过量化的方法去检验，排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。 Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours. Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣：是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力，完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢？他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年，也就是超过260亿工时。 The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale. 下一个容易想到的问题就是，这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢，例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔，还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场，以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式，是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上的进步呢？ As an economist my bias is to see human actions in terms of self-interest, competition and conflict, where through the invisible hand the interaction of self-interested individuals can lead to productive outcomes. But like the fish who is blind to the vast ocean of water they live in, I realised I was blind to the ocean of cooperation that was the back-drop to my focus on self-interest and competition. 作为一个经济学家，我倾向于通过自利、竞争和冲突的视角来看待人类行为，在这些视角之下，自利个体之间能够通过“看不见的手”达致有效率的经济产出。但就像大海里一条对于自己所生存的广阔水域一无所知的鱼一样，我意识我对于合作行为这片广阔的大海实际上几乎一无所知，而这是我所关注的自利和竞争的基础。 In “Ultrasociety” Turchin provides a way to see and measure cooperation – to quantify its existence on a massive scale. Once you are able to see the great ocean of cooperation that dominates human society, it leads you to interesting and challenging lines of scientific inquiry. The puzzling question is then how a world dominated by ultra social human cooperation can also frequently succumb to large scale war and conflict? 在《超级社会》一书中，Turchin教授提供了一种看待并衡量合作的方式——在大尺度上将它的存在进行量化。当你能够看清合作这片统治着人类社会的汪洋大海，它就会将你的引向有趣而又富有挑战性的科学探索。之后的一个问题就是：为什么一个充盈着超大型社会合作的人类世界还会经常屈就于大规模的战争和冲突？ Turchin’s answer, and one of the big ideas in the book, is that war between social groups is the mechanism by which cooperative behaviour develops “within groups”. It is a fundamental evolutionary process happening between societies at a large scale. He elevates war as a selection mechanism for cooperation, and values it above many of the technological factors like domestication of plants and the advent of agriculture. Turchin对这个问题的答案，同时也是本书的主要观点之一，是认为社会群体之间的战争是合作行为在群体内部发展的机制。它是一种基础性进化过程，发生于在各社会之间的大尺度上。他提升了战争在历史进程中的地位，将其视为对合作行为的一种选择机制，并且将其价值置于许多技术性因素之上，例如植物的驯化和农业的出现。 Turchin debunks many standard stories that “explain” the path to civilisation and eliminates glaring inconsistencies in the archaeological record. The naive view that the invention of agriculture “…set the ball rolling, and the entire history of civilisation followed from that” is a satisfying common story. But it seems a stretch to claim that the small scale practice of seasonally collecting and planting seeds nearby small permanent settlements, leads directly to the large-scale institutions observed in ancient civilisations. Turchin推翻了许多自称能够“解释”通向文明路径的标准叙事，认为它们忽视了自身与显而易见的考古学事实之间的重大矛盾。有一种天真的观点认为，农业的发明“……让雪球滚动了起来，而整个文明的历史则随之展开”，这是一种令很多人满意的常见叙事。但是，认为小规模永久定居点附近季节性的收集和播种行为可以直接导致古代文明中所呈现的一些大规模社会制度，这似乎有点太过牵强了。 The “agricultural snowball” story is also hampered by the fact that early agricultural societies had “a markedly negative effect on human health” as the poorer nutrition compared to hunter gatherers lead to smaller stature, higher sickness and the spread of pathogens through the high density settlements. Yet agriculture did spread and ultimately outcompeted nomadic hunter-gather societies. 早期的农业社会“对人类的健康水平产生了显著的负面影响”这一事实也削弱了“农业的雪球”这一叙事的说服力，相比于狩猎-采集社会，农业社会更差的营养水平导致了更小的体形，更多疾病，以及高密度的聚居区内病原体的传播。尽管如此，农业社会的确在之后得到了扩张并最终超过了游动性的狩猎-采集社会。 I have long been hesitant about “just so” explanations of social institutions based on historic physical and technological conditions that turn simple correlations into plausible causal mechanisms. Turchin provides the evidence that although all early large scale civilisations had agriculture, it was not the agriculture alone that directly caused large scale civilisation. 这种对于社会制度“原来如此”解释【编注：『原来如此故事』又称特例假设（ad hoc hypothesis），是一种为某一解释设置无法或难以验证的特殊条件，从而消除或降低该解释之可证伪性的做法。】，立足于物质和技术方面的历史条件，把简单的相关性当成了煞有其事的因果关系，我因此而一直对此抱有怀疑态度。Turchin教授提供了证据以显示虽然所有早期的大型文明都拥有农业，但并不是农业这一单一因素直接导致了大型文明的出现。 I felt foolish to have not recognised the array of “just so” stories in the study of history before Turchin pointed them out. In my field of economics, the existence of money is still explained in the textbooks as arising automatically once someone in human prehistory realised that some kind of currency made commerce easier than trying to directly trade a quarter of a cow for three baskets of vegetables. 对于没能在Turchin教授指出之前认出这些“原来如此”故事，我感到自己有点傻。在我所研究的经济学领域中，货币的存在仍然在教科书中被解释为在史前时代的某个时刻有当人意识到某种形式的通货比直接使用四分之一头牛去交换三筐蔬菜变得更加容易的时候自动产生的。 Yet many alternative social arrangements also solve the physical problem of a “double coincidence of wants”. We need look no further than current tribal societies that do not have or desire money despite their specialisation into many roles. They have instead resolved their double coincidence of wants dilemma through various other rituals, hierarchies, and institutions. 然而，许多其他的社会安排也同样解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这个实际问题。我们只需要看看一些现存的部落社会，虽然这些社会中已经出现了众多专业化的分工角色，但他们至今既没有货币，也看不出对货币有任何需求。取而代之的是，这些部落社会通过多种仪式，层级结构和社会制度的安排解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这一困境。 Turchin, through his cliodynamics research agenda, aims to rid the historical study of civilisation from these “just so” explanations. In the aim of scientific progress this research agenda uses quantifiable historical data to pit multi-level selection theory and its various components against many others, and in doing so eliminate bad theories and open up new avenues of inquiry. Most chapters of the books contain references to this emerging field of research which themselves are intriguing and enlightening. Turchin教授希望通过他的历史动力学使文明史的研究摆脱这些“原来如此”解释。为了推进研究的科学化进程，他的研究里使用了可量化的历史数据让多层次选择理论以及它的不同组成部分与众多其它的理论进行竞争，通过这种做法排除那些较差的理论并为之后的研究打开新方向。书中的大多数章节都包含了对这一蓬勃发展的研究领域的描述，而这本身已经足够有趣和富有启发性了。 Turchin argues that human societies, tribes, and groups, did not simply take a linear path from small hunter-gatherers tribes to large-scale civilisations. It was the competition through conquest and war between societies that lead to those with more effective weaponry and military organisations arising from greater internal cooperation, to survive at the expense of others. Turchin认为，人类社会，部落和群体并不是简单地通过一条线性的道路从小规模的狩猎-采集部落发展为大型文明的。不同社会之间在相互征服和战争中所展开的竞争，使得那些通过更好的内部合作发展出了更高效的武器和军事组织的社会生存了下来，而代价则是其对手的消亡。 The following excerpt summarises: 以下引文对此作了总结： “Here’s how I think these peaceful, stable societies came about. As war created large states, empires, and nation-states, societies evolved measures to suppress internal conflict and violence. Reduced internal violence is the obverse of increased cooperation. “我认为这些和平而稳定的社会是以这样的方式诞生的。随着战争创造出大型的城邦，帝国和民族国家，社会也演化出了一些压制自身内部的冲突和暴力的机制。内部暴力行为减少的另一面是更多的内部合作。 “Surprising as it may seem, the trend towards greater peace was already noticeable during the Ancient and Medieval historical eras, long before the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Of course, wars between empires dwarfed intertribal conflicts in scale. Huge armies fought increasingly bloody battles, and the numbers of casualties mounted. “也许看起来让人吃惊，但向更加和平的状态演化的趋势，实际上在古代和中世纪这些历史时期中就已经显而易见了，这要远远早于18世纪的启蒙运动。当然，帝国之间的战争在规模上让部落间冲突相形见绌。大型军队间战争的血腥程度持续上升，而战争中的伤亡人数也随之水涨船高。 “But the key point is that these wars moved away from imperial centers, towards the frontiers. More and more people—those living far from frontiers where battles were fought—never experienced conflict, and could enjoy relative prosperity. “但关键在于这些战争不再发生于帝国的中心区域，而被移到了前线。越来越多的人——那些生活在远离战争发生的前线地区的人——从来没有经历过冲突，他们享受到了相对的繁荣。 “There is no contradiction between larger armies and larger butcher’s bills from warfare, on the one hand, and on the other, a greater part of the population enjoying peace. What is important from the point of view of quality of life is not how many people, in total, are killed, but what the chances are that I (or you, or someone you care about) will be killed. In other words, the important statistic is the risk of violent death for each person.” “一方面，军队规模更大，战争的死亡人数更高，而另一方面，总人口中更大比例的人群却能够享受和平，这两点并不冲突。从生活质量的角度来看，重要的并不是总体上有多少人在战争中被杀死，而是作为社会中的个体，我（或者是你，或者是你所关心的人）有多大的可能被杀死。换句话说，对每个人而言，更重要的统计量是死于暴力的风险大小。” The power of this view is in the way the apparent contradiction of how war leads to peace becomes obvious once understood through an evolutionary lens. It changed my mental model of history from a series of inevitable linear events, to one of a branching tree of evolutionary paths, complete with many dead-ends of failed civilisations and their cultures, with many more merging and growing from conquest. 这一观点的强大之处在于，“战争是如何导向和平的？”这一看似矛盾的问题一旦通过进化的视角来理解，其中的逻辑就显而易见了。它将我理解历史的心智模型从一系列不可避免的线性事件的串联转变为一棵包含多种进化路径的分叉树，这棵树的许多分支都终结于失败的文明及其文化，但更多的分支则是通过征服合并在一起并继续成长的文明。 In short, I have shifted away from the popular but incorrect view of evolution as linear and subject only to environmental stresses rather than intra-species conflict. The left panel of the below image epitomises this popular confusion that I ignorantly held in the context of the study of history. 简而言之，我已经摒弃了那种流行却是错误的以线性视角看待文明演化的方式，该方式认为它仅仅受到外部环境的压力影响而不理会种群内部冲突的作用。下图左边的部分代表了之前的我出于无知而在历史研究中所采用的这种带有很强迷惑性的流行视角。 A more correct view of biological evolution is in the right panel, complete with mixing of genes and extinctions. It is more subtle and complex view, but provides a more useful story of the path of history, the dying out of civilisations and merging of cultures as a result of inter-group warfare. 而下图中右边的部分则代表了一种更加准确的看待生物进化的视角，进化是在众多基因的混合与消亡中完成的。这是一种更加精细也更加复杂的视角，但它提供了一种对历史路径更加有用的叙事，文明的消亡和文化的合并实际上是族群间战争的结果。 Even more interesting is that when there is little external warfare and competition, the successful groups find it difficult to curtail infighting amongst sub-groups within their society, and their lack of internal cooperation begins to make them vulnerable to attack from outsiders. In Turchin’s own words, from Chapter 2: 更有趣的是，当来自外部的战争和竞争压力较小时，那些成功的族群会发现控制自身内部小群体间的明争暗斗变得更困难了，而缺乏内部合作将会让这些曾经成功的族群在面对外来者的攻击时变得脆弱。用Turchin在书中第二章的话来说就是： “Here’s how war serves to weed out societies that “go bad.” When discipline, imposed by the need to survive conflict, gets relaxed, societies lose their ability to cooperate. A reactionary catchphrase of the 1970s used to go, “what this generation needs is a war,” a deplorable sentiment but one that in terms of cultural evolution might sometimes have a germ of cold logic. “战争是以这样的方式淘汰掉那些“衰朽腐败”的社会的。当因生存压力而施加的纪律开始变得松弛的时候，社会就失去了合作的能力。1970年代曾经有一句反动标语，“这代人需要经历一场战争，”虽然这句话里满是可悲的情绪，但从文明进化的角度上说，也许其中的确包含着一些冷冰冰的真知灼见。 At any rate, there is a pattern that we see recurring throughout history, when a successful empire expands its borders so far that it becomes the biggest kid on the block. When survival is no longer at stake, selfish elites and other special interest groups capture the political agenda. The spirit that “we are all in the same boat” disappears and is replaced by a “winner take all” mentality. As the elites enrich themselves, the rest of the population is increasingly impoverished. Rampant inequality of wealth further corrodes cooperation. 无论如何，我们都能看到历史中不断重演的一种模式，当一个成功的帝国将自己的疆域扩展得如此之广以至于它成了“街区里的孩子王”，当生存的压力已不再迫在眉睫，那些自私的精英和其它一些特定的利益集团就会夺取帝国的政治议程。“大家同处一条船”的精神消失了，取而代之的是“赢者通吃”的心态。随着精英们发家致富，其它人则持续地变得更加贫困。肆无忌惮的贫富不均进一步腐蚀了合作的基础。 Beyond a certain point a formerly great empire becomes so dysfunctional that smaller, more cohesive neighbors begin tearing it apart. Eventually the capacity for cooperation declines to such a low level that barbarians can strike at the very heart of the empire without encountering significant resistance. 在超过一个临界点之后，一个曾经的伟大帝国就会变得机能失调，以至于它的那些更小但更具凝聚力的邻居们开始将它分裂。最终帝国内部的合作能力降到了一个太低的水平，以至于外来的野蛮人可以在几乎遇不上任何值得一提的抵抗的条件下直捣帝国的心脏。 But barbarians at the gate are not the real cause of imperial collapse. They are a consequence of the failure to sustain social cooperation. As the British historian Arnold Toynbee said, great civilisations are not murdered – they die by suicide.” 但那些“门口的野蛮人”并不是帝国崩溃的原因。他们的入侵只是帝国没能维持内部社会合作的结果。正如英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比所言，伟大的文明从来不会被谋杀——他们全都死于自杀。” I have explored this process of disintegration of groups into competing clans in small scale in experiments before. Yet I failed to see the link to the large scale selection processes occurring even at such large scales at the nation-state. The talk of sclerosis and the death of large scale cooperation made me recall the chart below on the growth of partisan policy in the US which shows the striking decline in cross-party cooperation on legislative changes. 我之前曾经用小规模实验的方式研究过族群瓦解为多个相互竞争的部落的情况。但我并没有意识到，即使在民族国家这么大的尺度上，也有类似的选择过程发生。书中关于社会固化和大规模合作的消亡的讨论，让我联想起了下面这幅关于美国党派政策演化的图中所显示出在立法变更上的党际合作水平的显著下降。 Each node in the visual is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949–2012, with Republicans in red and Democrats in blue. Edges are drawn between members who agree on legislative decisions more often than expected by chance, and the nodes are spaced out in a way so that those with more edges connecting them are closer together. The clustering therefore visualises who is cooperating with who in terms of developing legislation. 图中每个节点都代表美国在1949-2012年间的一位众议院议员，红色代表共和党人，而蓝色则代表民主党人。如果两位议员在立法决策上达成一致的频率高于由随机概率所预期的水平，那么他们所对应的节点之间就会被一条线连接，节点在图中的排列方式使得那些相互之间有更多连接的议员靠得更近。这样图中的聚类就从视觉上反映出了哪些议员在推进立法上相互合作。 Without the external threats to the nation as a whole after WWII, and later the Cold War, the ability to maintain a cohesive national whole in political terms appears to have broken down into partisan scrambling. No longer can we see a cooperative whole, but instead competing fairly arbitrary tribes of blues and reds. 在第二次世界大战和随后的冷战结束后，来自外部的对于美国作为一个整体的威胁都不复存在了，而从政治角度上看，似乎维系一个有凝聚力的国家整体的能力也随之分崩离析，取而代之的则是喋喋不休的党派纷争。在图中我们不再能看到一个富有合作性的整体，而是一些分别由红点和蓝点组成的武断分隔的竞争部落。 I was left in a state of deep reflection after reading the book. Many other big ideas are woven through it to make you reconsider the popular but overly simplistic stories we tell ourselves to explain historical events. From the long term Z-shaped arc of quantifiable violence in human civilisation, to the role of horses, long range weaponry and population size in the success of inter-group warfare, and finally to the rise of God-kings and oppressive hierarchies. 在读完这本书后，我陷入了深刻的反思。本书中还贯穿了许多其它重要想法，它们会让你重新思考我们在解释历史事件时所常用的那些流行但过分简化的叙事。从人类文明中以可量化方式衡量的暴力水平在长期中所呈现出的Z型曲线，到马、远程武器和人口规模在族群间战争中所发挥的作用，以及最后君神合一政体和统治阶级的崛起。 Even Turchin’s incidental detours explore rather significant questions, such as in Chapter 4 when he clarifies a point about culture in human societies with the off-handed comment “Incidentally, why do we have culture? ” 即使是Turchin教授在书中偶然从主线上岔出的一些分支也讨论了相当重要的问题，例如在第四章中澄清关于人类社会中文化的作用的一个观点时，他随性地评论道“顺便问一句，为什么人类会拥有文化？”。 The same lesson applies in economics. Firms in highly competitive markets constantly face threats to their existence, leading to a type of destructive creation that ensures that surviving firms are internally highly cohesive and cooperative; economically efficient. 同样的道理也适用于经济学领域。高度竞争市场中的企业经常会面临威胁到自身生存的问题，这导致了一种毁灭性的创造过程以保证最终生存下来的企业在内部都具有极强的凝聚力和合作能力，我们称之为经济效率。 Yet the process of competition is highly inefficient in economic terms as only very slightly different production facilities are duplicated by competitors. For me the trade-off is rather radical just to think about. That the gains to internal cohesion require a cost of an external threat or else large-scale groups will be undermined by the interests of sub-groups within them. 然而从经济角度上说，竞争本身是非常低效的，因为众多互相竞争的对手所复制的生产设备之间的差别其实非常小。对我来说，其中的利弊权衡已经是一个相当深刻的问题了。即获得内部凝聚力所带来的收益需要以面对外部威胁为代价，否则大规模的群体将会被内部众多小团体的利益慢慢腐蚀。 Like any books that cover grand ideas about human civilisation there are probably some finer details to squabble about. I certainly don’t have the expertise to do so. Instead I want to share some of the thoughts that occupied my mind after reading Ultrasociety. These thoughts and comments should sufficiently signal the compelling nature of the discussions and ideas of the book. 与任何涉及关于人类文明的宏大观点的著作一样，书中几乎肯定会有一些值得争论的细节。我显然不具备足够的专业水平来这么做。但我希望与各位分享在读完《超级社会》这本书之后一直占据我脑海的一些想法。这些想法和评论应该足够说明这部大作的引人入胜之处以及其中的一些主题。 First, if sustained group cooperation relies on external competition, is there value in creating fictitious interstellar enemies to sustain better global cooperation? I’m thinking here of the film The Village, where the elders invented an outside enemy to sustain internal peace. The idea of creating an enemy for solidarity is popular, and even gets a run in the economics comics. 首先，如果持续的群体合作依赖于外部竞争，那么创造一些假想中的外星敌人是否对于维持更好的全球合作具有价值呢？这让我想起了一部名为《神秘村》的电影，在这部电影中，老人们创造出了一个外部敌人来维持村子内部的和平。为了维持团结而创造出一个敌人的想法现在很流行，即使在一些经济学漫画中也能看到它的影子。 Or perhaps the major modern religions fulfil this type of role so well that they can’t be displaced[1]? And surely it is the moral thing to do to promote human cooperation on an even larger scale without actual conflict and violence, if that indeed is possible. 或者也许主要的现代宗教已经扮演了这一角色而因此变得无可取代[1]？ 毫无疑问，在不引发实际的冲突和暴力的前提下推进更大规模的人类合作在道德上是无可厚非的，如果这真的可能的话。 Second, and following directly on from the first, the use of the term morality is widely used with its common meaning as conforming to the cooperative norms of a group. Yet I can’t shake the nagging feeling that, like Darwin’s work on evolution, the idea that war with outsiders promotes peace is ripe to be corrupted for political gain because it can be so easily argued to be a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ position. 第二，紧跟第一点的思路，现在人们对于“道德”的惯常理解与维持社会的合作规范是一致的。然而我还是无法摆脱一种令人不安的感觉，正如达尔文在进化论上的贡献一样，认为与外来者的战争能够推进内部和平这一观点很容易被政治利益所利用，因为它很容易被说成是一种“自然的”或是“道德的”立场。 Third, how are these great feats of cooperation realised in practice? Is there a common recipe that can be adopted into 21st public policy? There is a brief mention of how tribes and groups ‘tag’ each other with signals of group membership as one way to create cooperation in the following passage from Chapter 10. 第三，这些宏大的合作是如何在实践中实现的？对于21世纪的公共政策而言，存在一种通用的实践模式吗？书中第十章的以下段落简要地提到了部落和群体是如何用“标签”来标识彼此群体身份的方式来创造合作的。 “An important evolutionary breakthrough was the capacity to tag cooperating groups with symbolic markers such as language and dialect, styles of clothing and ornamentation (including tattoos), and behavioral characteristics—for example, participation in collective rituals. Symbolically-tagged cooperative groups, or tribes and nations, allowed us to increase the scale of cooperation beyond the circle of people personally known to us. Of course, the downside of increasing cooperation within a tribe or a nation was greater intensity of conflict with other tribes and nations.” “一个进化上的重大突破就是人们通过诸如语言和方言，衣着和装饰（包括纹身）的风格，以及行为特征——举例来说，对于集体仪式的参与——这些符号化的标记来为与自己合作的群体贴上标签的能力。通过符号化标签来标记与自己合作的群体，或者部落和国家，让我们能够在熟人小圈子之外扩大合作的规模。当然，在部落或国家内部增进合作的负面效应是与其它部落和国家之间冲突强度的加剧。” But like many of the minor points in the book, this single paragraph opens, then closes, a massively interesting puzzle about how humans actually organise into tribes at all levels. While as outsiders we easily observe tags, or the signals and rituals of a cultural group, as insiders we often overlook the amount of resources devoted to these tagging rituals. 但与书中其它一些次要观点一样，书中的这个段落首先提出了一个重要而有趣的难题，也就是人类是如何在实际中被组织为各种层次的“部落”的，并在之后回答了这个问题。作为外人，我们很容易观察到一个文化群体的标签，或者信号和仪式，但作为群体内部的人，我们却通常会忽视投入到这些标记仪式上的大量资源。 The whole fashion industry is almost exclusively about signalling social status, religious, sporting, or gender loyalties. People don’t buy cars just for transport; otherwise there would be little demand for more than a few different models. 整个时尚产业的存在几乎就是为了标识人们的社会地位，宗教信仰，体育爱好或性别取向。人们买车的目的并不仅仅是为了交通，否则除了有限的几种不同车型之外，不会有多少对其它车型的需求。 Instead we buy into marketing messages about how purchasing different types of cars tag us with different traits in the minds of others. At a national sale with have flags, anthems, national colours, sports teams and more that promote a sense of belonging. 但实际上人们买车也是在购买一种营销符号——通过对不同车型的选择而为自己贴上标签——你开的车显示出你是什么样的人。而国家则通过国旗，国歌，国家的代表性颜色，各种体育项目的国家队以及诸如此类的东西来让人们产生认同感。 While I’ve always considered much of our conspicuous consumption to be wasteful, in the same way that the devotion of military resources often appears wasteful on the surface, a picture is emerging of the amazing gains from these types of tagging behaviours and rituals in terms of promoting high levels of cooperation. While not the direct focus of the book, I think more details on this part of the evolutionary view of cooperation and conflict would have been valuable. 虽然我之前一直认为大多数炫耀性消费都很浪费，正如我们投入在军事上的资源通常从表面上看来都很浪费一样，但一幅由这类“贴标签”的行为和仪式通过在更高层次上提升合作水平而带来巨大收益的图景正在我的脑海中浮现。虽然这并不是本书直接关注的内容，但我认为，就有关合作和冲突的进化观点的这一侧面挖掘更多细节将是非常有价值的。 Fourth, what role does the massive advance in long-range weaponry since the dawn of the nuclear age mean for inter-group warfare? Turchin explains vividly how technology that allows for killing enemy combatants from a distance was a recipe for success in most warfare; starting with our evolved physical ability to accurately throwing rocks and spears, to the invention of bows and arrows, to the use of horses to mobilise armies over great distances. In the age of intercontinental missiles, drones, and nuclear weapons, how does the function of long-range of weaponry play out when the whole world can be anyone’s target? 第四，自从核武时代以来，远程武器技术的巨大进步将在群体间战争中扮演怎样的角色？Turchin教授在书中生动地描述了为什么那些能够在远程杀死敌军战士的技术在大多数战争中都是制胜的法宝，从早期人类演化出的准确投掷石块和长矛的能力，到弓和箭的发明，到使用马匹来让军队获得远程的机动性。在这个洲际导弹，无人机和核武器的时代，当整个世界都可以成为任何人的打击目标，远程武器又将如何发挥其作用？ Fifth, if the cooperative effort required to wage large scale war is a major part of the causal story of the history of civilisation, how significant is the legacy of previous wars in the current economic landscape? I have in mind the major industries of modern society, such as passenger airlines arising from industrial investment in aerial warfare, and the digital age legacy of military investment in remote communications. 第五，如果合作的努力是为大规模战争服务的这一因果叙事的确占据了大部分的文明史，那么之前的战争所留下的遗产在当今经济版图中又有着怎样的重要性？我所能想到的现代社会的一些重要产业，例如客运航空业，就是从对空中战争的产业投资中崛起的，而当今的数码时代也起源于军工行业对远程通信技术的投资。 Most major industrial firms of the modern age were intricately involved as military suppliers or were privatised former military organisations. Many modern cities only exist because of the strategic benefits of their local military bases, while public major works such as highway and rail systems, ports and airports, were products of military strategy more than peaceful economic investment. 现代大多数主要工业企业都曾经以各种复杂的方式扮演过军队供应商的角色，或者本身就是由之前的军工组织私有化而来。许多现代城市存在的原因就是处于当地的军事基地所带来的战略性优势，而高速公路，铁路系统，港口和机场这类重大的基础设施则更多都是军事战略的产物，而非和平时期经济投资的产物。 And, surprisingly to me, the cooperative legacy of previous wars is not simply technological, but also institutional; from the organisational structures of firms, to the welfare state, to international treaties on money and trade. The employer-worker relationship looks a lot like the soldier-army relationship, requiring induction, uniforms, codes of conduct, and hierarchal rule. 让我感到意外的是，之前的战争所带来的合作遗产并不仅仅存在于技术方面，它同样存在于组织制度中，从现代公司的组织结构，到福利国家，到国际货币和贸易条约。雇主和工人的关系看起来很像军队与士兵的关系，两者都要求正式入职程序，统一制服，行为准则以及层级化管理。 Modern provisions of the welfare state, including housing, health services and cash payments, were often originally created for returned soldiers following wars. It is no leap to suggest that our international monetary system, and the various international organisations and treaties that accompany it, is the direct result of resolutions in the shadow of the WWII. And perhaps the apparent breakdown of the social equality nurtured by post-war institutions observed since the late 1970s in many western countries is merely there result of the absence of external threats which breed infighting and abuses of power. 当代福利国家提供的各种供应品，包括住房，医疗服务和现金支付，最初通常都是在战后提供给退役士兵的。当今的国际货币体系以及与之配套的各种国际组织和条约，都是在第二次世界大战的阴影之下所达成的一系列决议的直接后果，这并不是什么新鲜的观点。而也许从1970年代晚期开始，许多西方国家中由战后建立的机构所导致的社会平等局面的崩塌，也仅仅是因为外部威胁的缺失为它们提供了内部斗争和权力滥用的温床。 As you can see, “Ultrasociety” will leave you pondering many big questions you may never have thought to ask before. I certainly see the world differently now. And that, to me, is the sign of a profound and insightful work. 正如你所看到的，《超级社会》这本书将会让你去深思一些之前不曾想到过的大问题。在读完这本书后，我眼中的世界变得明显不同了。对我来说，这意味着我读到了一部意义深远而富有洞见的大作。 尾注： Turchin cites Ara Norenzayan’s book Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict when explaining the role of religion in large scale cooperation, and I recommend reading it as well. 在解释宗教在大规模合作中所扮演的角色时，Turchin引用了Ara Norenzayan的著作《大神：宗教是如何改变合作与冲突的》一书中的内容，我也推荐读者阅读这本书。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-08-22】 @海德沙龙: 《被遗忘的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀》 1979年底，由中国支持的毛主义政党津民盟（ZANU）和由苏联阵营支持的津人联（ZAPU）联手打败罗德西亚政权，和所有成功掌权的革命政党一样，津民盟上台之后随即将矛头指向津人联，展开了一场大屠杀，并于1987年将津人联吞并，30年后，屠夫们仍安然在位。  ​​​​ @whigzhou: 穆加贝到现在还没想明白，我做的这么干净利落——权也夺了，同志也洗了，土地都分了，白人全赶跑了，甚至连万恶的金钱也消灭干净了——为什么得奖的不是我？  

【2016-08-21】 @whigzhou: 两宋之间温州一定发生了点什么……浙东学派，绍兴师爷，宁波帮商人，似乎都能从这张表里看出点苗头。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 这还是对各路解额施加了限制之后的情况，否则数字会更夸张。 @南洋首富: 二件事：1、永嘉学派大兴办学打下的基础。2、乾道二年特大水灾温州人死了一大半，空地吸引莆田泉州仙游移民，而闽南人热衷科举。永嘉学派的办学普及加上闽南移民带来的热衷科举文化，使温州进士大增。 @whigzhou: 受教受教～ @whigzhou: 贾志扬《宋代科举》//@Mr-Pudding:请问这是什么书？  

New documents allege Mugabe’s complicity in 1980s massacres 新文档指证穆加贝参与了80年代的一系列屠杀 作者：STUART DORAN @ 2015-05-18 译者：Tankman 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Dailymaverick,http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-05-18-new-documents-allege-mugabes-complicity-in-1980s-massacres/#.V0ShIfkrKwU Thousands of historical documents are becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and allege what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of Matabeleland's mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 导言：海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文档涉及多个领域，并指证了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并得以系统性实施的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的主要策划者。

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From January 1983, a campaign of terror was waged against the Ndebele people of western Zimbabwe, an outbreak of obscene violence that remains the darkest period in the country’s post-independence history, notwithstanding the bloody notoriety of the last decade-and-a-half. 自1983年一月，一场针对津巴布韦西部恩德贝勒人的恐怖运动被发起，这是一场不堪入目的暴行的开端，至今仍是这个国家独立后历史中最黑暗的时期。尽管该国近十五年来的历史之血腥也已臭名昭著。【译注：2000年该国政府启动了强制土改政策。】 But now, the new light is being shed on these days of horror. 但是现在，这些恐怖的岁月正被重新审视。 Thousands of historical documents that appear to expose the perpetrators are now becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and include, among others, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence assessments and raw intelligence garnered by spies recruited from within the Zimbabwean government. 海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文件似乎揭示了屠杀的真凶。这些文件涉及多个领域，包括但不限于：外交文书，情报评估和津巴布韦政府内部线人收集的原始情报。 These papers—augmented by the testimony of Zimbabwean witnesses finding courage in old age—appear to substantiate what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 一些津巴布韦目击者在晚年鼓起勇气做出的证言进一步增加了这些文档的分量。目前看来，这些文件证实了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并被系统实施的大屠杀的主要策划者。 The documents appear to show that the massacres were closely associated with an effort by Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party to eliminate opposition groups in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s independence. Zapu, a party led by nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, represented the main obstacle to that objective. Given that Zapu enjoyed overwhelming support among Ndebele, the Ndebele as a whole came to be seen as an impediment. In the words of Mugabe, the people of Matabeleland needed to be “re-educated”. 这些文件似乎表明，大屠杀和穆加贝的政党——津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线（简称津民盟）——在国家独立后试图消灭反对派的努力紧密相连。津巴布韦非洲人民联盟（简称津人联）是由对手、民族主义者加西亚·恩科莫领导的政党，是津民盟达到该目标的主要障碍。津人联在恩德贝勒人中拥有压倒性优势，故而恩德贝勒人整体被视作一种障碍。按照穆加贝自己的话说，马塔贝莱兰当地人需要被“再教育”。 The little that Mugabe has said since the 1980s on this taboo subject has been a mixture of obfuscation and denial. The closest he has come to admitting any form of official responsibility was at the death of Nkomo (1999), when he remarked that the early 1980s was a “moment of madness”—an ambivalent statement that perhaps reflected a fear of Ngozi (avenging spirits) more than anything else and one he has not repeated. More recently, he blamed the killings on armed bandits who were allegedly coordinated by Zapu (the original smokescreen) along with occasional indiscipline among soldiers of the army’s North Korean-trained 5 Brigade. 自1980年代以来，穆加贝甚少谈及这个禁忌话题。他对此事的稀少评论，其实是混淆和否认的混合物。他最接近于承认官方对屠杀负有任何责任的一次，是在恩科莫1999年过世时。当时他评论说，八十年代早期是个“疯狂时刻”——这个暧昧的表述也许反映了他对怨灵复仇的恐惧甚于其他任何事，而且此后他也再未提过。后来，他将杀戮的责任归咎于据称由津人联负责协调的武装土匪（这是最早释放的迷雾），以及军队第五旅士兵偶发的违纪行为，该旅是朝鲜训练出来的。 In the documents, his alleged co-conspirators tell a different story. In doing so, they controvert theories that Mugabe was poorly informed about the activities of errant subordinates. By March 1983, when news of the atrocities had leaked, prompting Western ambassadors and others to ask awkward questions, government ministers who were overseeing the operation quickly pointed to Mugabe, documents allege. 在文档中，穆加贝所称的阴谋分子讲述了一个不同的故事。他们否定了有关穆加贝对下属违纪行为知之甚少的说法。文档称，到1983年3月，暴行的消息已经走漏，促使西方大使们和其他人问起令人尴尬的问题，监督行动的政府部长们很快指向穆加贝。 Sydney Sekeramayi, the minister in Mugabe’s office with responsibility for Defence, was one. In a conversation with Cephas Msipa, one of the few remaining Zapu ministers of what had been a government of national unity, Sekeramayi, said that “not only was Mugabe fully aware of what was going on—what the 5th Brigade was doing was under Mugabe’s explicit orders.” Msipa later relayed this discussion to the Australian High Commission, which in turn reported it to headquarters in Canberra. 悉尼·塞克拉马伊，穆加贝内阁负责防务的部长，是其中之一。矶法·姆西帕是早先的联合政府中仍在位的少数几个津人联部长之一，在一次与他的对话中，塞克拉马伊说穆加贝“不仅完全知道事件的状况——而且第五旅的所为乃是基于穆加贝的明确命令。”之后姆西帕把这次讨论发送给澳大利亚高级专员公署，后者随即向堪培拉总部做了报告。 Msipa appears to be a credible witness in view of his amicable relationship with Mugabe. He had, for instance, shared a room with Mugabe for two years during their earlier career as teachers. Msipa had also welcomed Mugabe into his home when the latter returned from Ghana in 1960 and joined the struggle against white rule. 从和穆加贝的友好关系来看，姆西帕似乎应是可信的证人。例如，在两人早年一起当教师时，他和穆加贝做过两年室友。1960年，穆加贝从加纳回国加入反对白人统治的斗争时，姆西帕也欢迎他住在自己家。 Between 1980 and 1982, when tensions were rising between Zapu and Zanu, Msipa had served as a regular go-between and had spoken to Mugabe often. He continued to do so during the killings. Within Zapu, Msipa, a Shona-speaker, had consistently advocated amalgamation with Zanu, a line that had attracted the ire of Ndebele-speaking colleagues. 在1980年到1982年间，当津人联和津民盟关系紧张时，姆西帕常常作为一位中间人，频繁的和穆加贝对话。他在屠杀期间也继续这么做。在津人联中，姆西帕作为说绍纳语的一位，一贯支持和津民盟的合并，这一立场曾引起了很多说恩德贝勒语的同事的愤怒。 He was, therefore, considerably more sympathetic to Zanu and its leader than most in Zapu. And yet, after speaking to Sekeramayi and others in Zanu, he was convinced (as he told the Australians) that “the Prime Minister was right behind what had been happening in Matabeleland.” He added that he had never before had such a “crisis of my conscience” about remaining in government. 所以相比于大多数津人联成员，他明显更加同情津民盟及其领导人。然而，在和塞克拉马伊和一些津民盟成员对话之后，他确信（正如他告诉澳大利亚方面的那样）“站在马塔贝莱兰事件后面的正是总理。”他补充道：对于留在政府内任职，他以前从未有过现在这样严重的“良心挣扎”。 Sekeramayi was more circumspect in direct discussions with Western representatives, but nevertheless made clear that the massacres were no accident. The “army had had to act ‘hard’”, he told the British defence attaché, “but … the situation was now under control”. Later, Sekeramayi admitted to the British High Commissioner that “there had been atrocities”. 塞克拉马伊在直接和西方社会代表讨论此事时说话更为谨慎，但他还是很清楚地表明，大屠杀不是意外事件。“军队不得不采取‘酷烈’行动”，他告诉英国武官，“但是……现在形势已经得到了控制”。后来，塞克拉马伊向英国高级专员公署承认“曾有暴行发生”。 The documents also record that Msipa talked to other members of Zanu who revealed that the killings were not simply the whim of a small coterie, but the result of a formal and broad-based decision by the leadership of Zanu-PF. Eddison Zvobgo, a member of Zanu’s 20-member policy-making body, spoke of a “decision of the Central Committee that there had to be a ‘massacre’ of Ndebeles”. That statement squared precisely with 5 Brigade’s ethnocentric modus operandi. 文档也记录了姆西帕和其他津民联成员的谈话，那些成员揭露出屠杀绝不是一个小团伙的心血来潮，而是出自津民联领导层正式且广泛认同的决定。艾迪森·祖沃布戈，津民盟的二十人决策层之一，提到了一份“中央委员会的决定：必须要有一场针对恩德贝勒人的‘屠杀’”。这一说法和第五旅种族中心主义的作案手法完全吻合。 Mugabe’s heir apparent, the current First Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was a member of the Central Committee. But so, too, were others who have subsequently developed a reputation for moderation, not least because of their latter-day rivalry with Mnangagwa. Former Vice President Joice Mujuru heads that list. 穆加贝的指定继承人，现任第一副总统的埃默森·姆南加古瓦曾是中央委员会的一员。当然，后来展现出温和形象的许多其他人当时也在中央委员会中，他们之所以变温和，相当程度是因为他们此后需要与姆南加古瓦竞争。前副总统乔伊斯·穆朱鲁在这份名单上居首位。 The army commanders who directed the killings, many of whom still retain key positions in a security sector that underwrites the regime, are also shown in the documents to have been eager accomplices. Zvobgo commented that the first commander of 5 Brigade, Perence Shiri, had said the “politicians should leave it to us” with regard to “settling things in Matabeleland”. 文件也曝光了指导屠杀的部队司令官是积极的从犯，其中不少人仍然在强力部门身居高位，维持着这个政权的统治。祖沃布戈提到第五旅的司令官佩伦斯·希里曾说过，对于“搞定在马塔贝莱兰的事情”，“政治家们应该交给我们去做”。 Shiri is now the head of Zimbabwe’s air force. 希里目前是津巴布韦的空军司令。 Testimony from witnesses provides evidence that Shiri worked closely with many former members of Mugabe’s guerilla army, Zanla, notwithstanding a myth that 5 Brigade operated separately from the rest of the army. Those who assisted Shiri allegedly included the now chief of Zimbabwe’s defence forces, Constantine Chiwenga, who was this month awarded a doctorate in ethics by the University of KwaZulu–Natal. 证人证言提供证据说明：希里曾和许多穆加贝游击部队——津巴布韦民族解放军——的前成员密切共事，尽管仍有传言说第五旅是脱离全军单独行动的。那些据称曾协助希里的人包括现任津巴布韦国防部长康斯坦丁·奇温加。他在这个月被夸祖鲁－纳塔尔大学授予了伦理学博士学位。 During the killings, Shiri frequently consulted with Chiwenga, who was then using the nom de guerre Dominic Chinenge and was head of 1 Brigade based in Bulawayo. Chiwenga’s unit also provided a range of practical assistance, including logistical support for 5 Brigade and a base from which Shiri’s men operated when they made punitive raids on Bulawayo’s townships. 在屠杀期间，希里经常向奇温加请教，后者那时化名多米尼克·奇内格，是驻扎在布拉瓦约的第一旅的旅长。奇温加的部队也提供了各种实际支持，包括对第五旅的后勤支持，以及在希里士兵向布拉瓦约的城镇发动惩戒性打击时，为其提供基地。 The first six weeks of 5 Brigade’s attacks were massive in their intensity, but the documentary record shows that an order was given to curtail this phase after news of the massacres began to leak to the outside world. However, the killing did not end, but was instead scaled back and conducted in a more covert manner. 在第五旅袭击的头六周，攻击的烈度极大。但文档记录显示，当大屠杀的消息开始往外界泄露时，上面有命令要求进行收缩。然而，屠杀并没有终止，只是缩小了规模，采取了更秘密的形式。 Estimates of the death toll are frequently put at 20,000, a figure first mooted by Nkomo when the campaign was still underway. But on-the-ground surveys have been piecemeal and vast areas of Matabeleland remain under-researched. Fear and the death of many witnesses provide further challenges. 通常的估计认为死者有约两万人，这个数字最早是恩科莫提出来的，当时屠杀还在进行中。然而现场调查一直是零星散乱的，而且马塔贝莱兰很大部分区域仍未被调查。人们的恐惧，加之很多目击者死亡，也增加了调查难度。 A forensically-accurate number will never be possible, yet it seems possible that the standard estimate is too conservative. Oral testimony from Zimbabweans who were in key government positions during the 1980s disinters a host of killings that were previously unknown. Cumulatively, this testimony suggests that the breadth of the violence and the extent of official involvement could have been significantly underestimated. 一个法医学标准的精确数字也许永远不可能得到，然而通常的估计可能太过保守。1980年代在津巴布韦政府重要岗位任职的一批人的口头证言揭示了许多以前不为人知的杀戮事件。总的来说，这证言暗示暴力的程度和官方牵涉的程度可能被显著低估了。 Observers have always wondered how much of this was known to Western governments—and what they did about it. It is clear from the documents that they knew a great deal, even if some of the detail remained obscure. It is also clear that the polite questions asked by diplomats were—along with courageous representations by churchmen and their allies in Zimbabwe—pivotal to the government’s decision to reduce the violence. 观察家一直好奇于对此事西方社会的政府已经知晓多少？他们对此又做了什么？文档显示，他们无疑知道很多，即使细节仍不清楚。文档也很清楚的表明，外交官有礼节的质询，和教会人士及其津巴布韦盟友们的勇敢发声，这些是政府决定收敛暴行的关键。 Up to that point, there was no indication that the brutal force of the massacres would be curtailed. Nevertheless, Western governments did little once the massacres were brought down to a lower, but still savage, intensity. Perhaps as a sign that Western censure had its limits, the campaign in Matabeleland North continued during the remainder of 1983; 5 Brigade was redeployed further south in 1984. 到那时为止，没有迹象表明当时大屠杀的野蛮暴力会终止。但是一旦大屠杀的烈度变低，即使其仍然残酷，西方社会的政府却没什么作为了。在1983年剩下的时间，北马塔贝莱兰省的战争一直在持续，这仿佛代表了西方抗议的局限性；第五旅在1984年被重新部署到更南部。 It is a fact that the Western response to violence toward black countrymen in the 1980s was a pale shadow of the reaction to his attack on white farmers in 2000. Many Ndebele remain bitter about this inconsistency. While historians debate the dimensions of Zanu’s violence, for Western policy-makers and the domestic constituencies that are meant to hold them to account there's a need to reflect again on the price of inconsistency in the developing world. Aside from the human cost, Western advocacy of democracy and international justice will continue to be viewed with skepticism while such glaring contradictions remain. 事实上，西方对2000年时穆加贝袭击白人农场主做出了强烈反应，与之相比，他们在1980年代针对黑人村民所遭受暴行的反应要小得多。许多恩德贝勒人仍对这种前后不一心怀怨愤。当历史学家争辩津民盟暴力的程度时，西方的政策制定者和想让他们承担责任的国内选民则需要再次反思这种在发展中国家采取双重标准的代价。如果这么显眼的自相矛盾继续存在，除了生命成本外，西方对民主和国际正义的支持也会继续被人怀疑。 At the same time, an inordinate focus on the international dimensions of the Matabeleland massacres is to miss the point. Mugabe has instinctively sought to racialise and internationalise internal controversies of which he is the principal author or to invoke the spectre of neo-colonialism in the hope of support from fellow African leaders. 同时，对马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的关注过多聚焦于国际视角，这没有切中要害。出于本能，穆加贝常把主要由他引起的国内争端国际化和种族化，或者试图召唤新殖民主义的幽灵，希望借此获得非洲领袖们的支持。 Zimbabwe’s Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko recently made the claim that the Matabeleland massacres were “conspiracy of the West” and that Mugabe had nothing to do with them. Yet the new documentary material appears to underline once more that post-independence Zimbabwe’s greatest crimes and deepest wounds lie squarely at the feet of Mugabe and Zanu-PF. 津巴布韦的第二副总统费列克佐拉·姆波科最近声明：马塔贝莱兰大屠杀是“西方的阴谋”，穆加贝和此事没有任何干系。然而新的文档材料似乎再次昭示穆加贝和津民盟－爱国阵线应该为津巴布韦独立后最大的罪行和最深的创伤负责。 The documents appear to show that the killings were an internal affair, neither provoked nor sustained by outsiders, and that the atrocities were driven from the top by Zanu-PF in pursuit of specific political objectives. 现在看来，文档揭示了屠杀是个内政事件，并非由外部力量发起或支持，而且是津民盟－爱国阵线的领袖为了达到特定政治目的而发动。 Viewed across a period of several years and hundreds of files, the documents appear to provide evidence that—far from being a “moment of madness” in which supporters of rival parties went at each other— the massacres were but one component of a sustained and strategic effort to remove all political opposition within five years of independence, as Zanu leaders were determined to secure a “victory” against non-existent opposition in elections scheduled for 1985, after which there would be a “mandate” from the people to impose a one-party state. 经几年时间把数百份文件放在一起审阅，文档似乎证明了大屠杀绝对不是所谓的对立政党支持者相互攻击的“疯狂时刻”。津民盟领袖决意要压制尚未出现的反对，确保在计划于1985年举行的大选中“取得胜利”，以便之后顺应“人民的选择”施行一党专制，因此，大屠杀只是独立后五年内消灭一切政治反对派的持续行为和战略努力中的一环。 Dr Stuart Doran is an independent historian and author of a forthcoming book based on the new documentary material—Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, Zanu and the quest for supremacy, 1960–87. 【作者】斯图加特·道朗博士是一位独立历史学家，基于新的文档材料，他所著的《国度，权柄，荣耀：穆加贝，津民盟和对权力巅峰的追求，1960-87》一书即将问世。 Photo: A file picture dated 25 March 2005 shows Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe gesturing during a ZANU-PF rally near the town of Mbaira south of Harare, Zimbabwe. EPA/STR 【图注】一份摄于2005年3月25日的档案照片显示，在哈拉雷以南的玛巴拉镇，津巴布韦总统罗伯特·穆加贝在津巴布韦非洲民族联盟－爱国阵线（ZANU-PF）的集会上振臂高呼。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-07-27】 狄宇宙在《古代中国与其强邻》中提出的观点很有意思，列出的事实很明显，但之前好像没见过讨论， 1）秦赵燕三国在战国后期对北方非华夏的游牧或畜牧民族发动了大型征伐，将控制线向北推进了数百公里， 2）秦赵燕的长城远非农耕与草原的生态边界，而是大幅远离这条边界，深入草原，特别是赵长城， 3）所以长城并非防御性策略的结果，而是扩张政策的结果， 4）秦统一后延续了这一扩张政策，但随后局面发生了逆转， 5）秦汉之际和汉前期是一个华夏大幅退缩的阶段， 6）武帝发动的大型战争是对此退缩的反弹，其对非华夏区的征伐规模此后任何华夏政权再也没达到过。 说几点我的看法： 1）统一集权帝国抵御游牧入侵的能力不如割据状态，原因之一是因为他不敢把重兵放在远离权力中心的边境上，蒙恬是第一个例子， 2）统一集权帝国对进攻性政策的意愿也弱于割据的边缘国，因为和亲纳贡政策对它来说相对成本更低，而边地的相对价值也更低， 3）汉武的成就看来是个特例，这一特例之所以出现，有两个较明显的原因：A）帝国历史不长，人口压力尚轻，因而可动员资源较多，B）伴随大型帝国的和平化时间较短，战士禀赋尚未大幅削弱， 4）唐帝国勉强维持了那么久而没被冲垮，是因为它的集权程度不太高，后期近乎于割据状态， 5）明帝国看起来是个反例，可能的解释是：A）小冰期游牧势力大幅退缩，B）迁都北京+大运河部分解决了（1）所提到的难题 @黄章晋ster: 处于割据对立时，很容易形成普鲁士林立的情形，一旦统一为一个中央集权帝国，大约百年后就进入无人知兵、柔弱不武的军力下滑通道。 @whigzhou: 对 @黄章晋ster:一个超大帝国保持稳定，只能依靠一个庞大的具有相同信仰的文官和精英建立统一认同才能做到，而这个组织系统和它的价值观必然是排斥职业军人的。这样的帝国几亿人和几千万并无区别。但在一个军事贵族集团统治的农业社会，有五百万人就足够对付铁木真了。 @whigzhou: 贵帝国的历史就是一个不断打压尚武文化的历史，到最后军户甚至都变成贱籍了  

We know less about the ancient world than we think we do 我们对古代世界的认识，比我们以为的要少 作者：James Hannam @ 2015-1-9 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Tankman 来源：Quodlibeta，http://bedejournal.blogspot.jp/2015/01/we-know-less-about-ancient-world-than.html On 15 June 763BC, a near total eclipse of the sun was visible over a swathe of the Near East. As luck would have it, the event was noted in the official list of Assyrian high officials. This record provides the earliest absolute and uncontroversial date in ancient history. Using lists of kings and the chronicles of events, historians have counted the years back from this date to construct the chronology of ancient history. 公元前763年的6月15日，在近东的大片地区都能看到一次近似日全食。幸运的是，这一事件被记录在了亚述国高官的官方系年表【译注：即名年官表，亚述以一年一任的“名年官”之姓名纪年，记录当年发生的重大事件】中。这一文献为我们提供了古代历史上最早的无争议的绝对日期。历史学家们利用历代国王名表和大事记，从这一日期开始倒排年代，已经构造出古代史的编年次序。 Radiocarbon analysis (which measures the decay of carbon 14, an unstable isotope) and the predicable styles of pottery found in digs both provide corroborating evidence. Dating the layers of archaeological remains from the artefacts found within them is called stratigraphy and can yield quite precise results. The vast amount of pot shards that has been unearthed allows archaeologists to use statistical methods to screen out random noise and anomalous samples that have found their way into the wrong strata. 放射性碳分析（该方法测量的是碳-14这种不稳定同位素的衰变）和出土陶器可确认的风格，均提供了佐证。从出土的人工制品来测定这些制品所在的考古遗迹各地层的年代，这叫做考古地层学，由此得出的结论相当准确。大量发掘出的陶器碎片，使得考古学家能够利用统计方法排除那些混入错误地层的随机噪声和异常样本。 Of course, pottery and radiocarbon methods need to be calibrated to produce absolute dates. This has been done using samples of wood whose age can be determined by matching patterns of tree rings, a technique called dendrochronology. We can count back sequences of tree rings from the present day, all the way to 2000BC. By carbon dating the oldest samples of wood, we can tie the tree ring record to the results from carbon 14 decay. 当然，陶器和放射性碳方法也需要经过校正，才能得出确切日期。我们现在通过木头样本来做校正，这些木头的年龄可以通过与树木样本的年轮模式进行对照来确定，这种技术叫做树轮年代学。我们现在可以从今天倒推树木年轮的序列，一直推到公元前2000年。通过对最早的木头样本进行碳年代测定，我们就可以将树木的年轮档案和碳-14的衰变结果结合起来。 By 1990, all these clues had yielded a multi-dimensional jigsaw which fitted together to almost everyone’s satisfaction. There were a few heretics like Peter James, who suggested in his book Centuries of Darkness that the conventional chronology included two hundred additional years around 1000BC. Thus remains that were conventionally dated to 1050BC actually occurred in 850BC. Although James’s book is an excellent read, it fails to convince. 到1990年为止，上述所有线索加起来构成了一个多维度的拼图，相互吻合，几乎能让所有人满意。当然也有一些异端，如Peter James曾在其著作《黑暗数世纪》中提出，传统的编年学在公元前1000年前后额外多出了200年。因此传统上定为公元前1050年的遗迹实际上产生于公元前850年。尽管James的书是一本优秀读物，但并不能让人信服。 Nonetheless, it has now turned out that the conventional chronology was not as secure as everybody else thought. While James was convinced ancient history was two centuries too long, new evidence has begun to pile up in the opposite direction: it now looks like the conventional chronology is up to 150 years too short. To put it another way, a cataclysm that everyone thought occurred in 1500BC actually happened before 1620BC. The event in question was the massive eruption of the island of Thera in the Aegean Sea. 尽管如此，现已发现，传统的编年学确实不如大家曾认为的那样可靠。James坚信古代史多出了200年，但新积累的证据却逐渐偏向另一个方向。如今看来，传统的编年学似乎短了多达150年。换句话说，过去人人都以为发生于公元前1500年的一次灾变实际发生于公元前1620年以前。这里所说的事件就是爱琴海锡拉岛的一次大规模火山爆发。 Conventional chronology dated the end of Minoan age in Crete to 1450BC. Archaeologists assumed that the Thera eruption (on the modern island of Santorini) and its resulting tsunami had destroyed the Minoan fleet leaving them vulnerable to raiders from the mainland. Certainly, the havoc wrought by the volcano can clearly be seen across the Eastern Mediterranean. When Thera exploded, it blasted 60 cubic kilometres of rock into the atmosphere which settled over Asia Minor. 传统编年学将克里特岛米诺斯文明的终结时间定在公元前1450年。考古学家猜测，锡拉岛的火山爆发（发生于今天的圣托里尼岛上）及其导致的海啸摧毁了米诺斯的舰队，使之难以抵挡来自大陆的入侵者。当然，由这次火山爆发导致的破坏在整个东地中海地区都清晰可见。锡拉爆发时，曾将60立方千米的岩石冲入空中，落在小亚细亚。 The resulting layer of ash and pumice is used to date the sites where it is observed. And the eruption had other effects. Sulphur dioxide released by the volcano spread across the northern hemisphere and fell to earth as acid rain, or more significantly as acid snow. At the poles, not all of that snow has yet melted and, from the 1990s, it provides a new strand of evidence to date the eruption. 由此产生的火山灰和浮石组成的地层，被用来确定地层中遗址的年代。这次火山爆发还有其他影响。火山中释放出来的二氧化硫席卷北半球，以酸雨或更厉害时以酸雪的形式降落地面。在极地地区，这些雪至今都还没有完全融化。从1990年代开始，这些降雪就为测定该次火山爆发的年代提供了一条新的证据链。 Ice cores, drilled from the icecap of central Greenland, record the depth of each annual snowfall. The ice holds within it information on the constitution of the atmosphere going back tens of thousands of years. Like tree rings, each layer can be counted so as to give an absolute rather than relative date. 从格陵兰岛中部的冰盖中钻孔取出的冰芯，记录着每年降雪的深度。这些冰中包含有过去数万年间大气成分的信息。跟年轮一样，每一层冰都可以数出来，因此能给出绝对年代，而非相对年代。 Big volcanic eruptions show up as spikes in the sulphur-content of the annual fall of snow: Krakatau in 1886; Tombura in 1815; Vesuvius in AD79. Despite the presence of literate civilisations in Egypt, the Levant and Babylon, no written record of the Thera eruption exists, but the ice cores should overcome that deficiency and provide an absolute date for the cataclysm. 大型火山爆发就表现为年度降雪中硫含量的突然增加。如1886年喀拉喀托火山爆发，1815年坦博拉火山爆发，以及公元79年维苏威火山爆发。尽管当时埃及、黎凡特和巴比伦都已产生能够书写文字的文明，但锡拉岛火山爆发并没有成文记录留存下来。不过，冰芯应该能够克服这一不足，为我们提供此次灾难的确切年代。 Actually, the fact that the Thera event went unrecorded is less surprising than it seems. Mankind has been remarkably unobservant of enormous volcanic eruptions. An event in 1257AD, less than 800 years ago, is indelibly imprinted into both the Greenland and Antarctic ice cores. It was greater in size even than Tombora and thus the largest eruption in the last ten thousand years. But remarkably, no one knows where it happened. Only in 2012 has Mt Rinjani in Indonesia emerged as a likely candidate. Another big eruption, as recent as 1809, remains unidentified. 实际上，锡拉事件没有留下成文记录并没有初看上去那么异常。人类对于大型火山爆发历来特别粗心。在不到800年前，公元1257年发生了一次火山爆发，确凿无疑地体现于格陵兰岛和南极的冰芯中。它在规模上甚至比坦博拉爆发还大，因此是过去一万年间最大的火山爆发。但是，引人注目地是，没人知道它发生于何地。直到2012年，印度尼西亚的林加尼火山才得以成为备选答案。另外一次大型火山爆发，晚至1809年，至今身份不明。 By 2000, the Greenland ice cores had revealed that Thera could not have happened when everyone thought it had. The most likely anomaly in the ice dated from 1640BC, but this turned out to be from a volcano in Alaska. At the same time, carbon dating an olive tree buried in the Aegean eruption yielded a date of around 1620BC. Sulphur traces in the ice have been found that correspond to this date, although they are not as strong as might be expected. 到2000年时，格陵兰岛的冰芯已经揭示，锡拉火山爆发不可能发生于此前人们所设想的年代。冰层中最有可能的一次异常发生于公元前1640年，但这源于阿拉斯加的一座火山。同时，通过对在此次爱琴海火山爆发中被掩埋的一颗橄榄树进行碳年代测定，得出的年代大概是公元前1620年。冰层中也发现了与这一年代吻合的硫磺痕迹，只是不如预期的那么强烈。 Now, the dendrochronologists have piled in. The Thera eruption would have caused unusually cold weather which stunted plant growth across the globe. Evidence from bristlecone pines in the western United States, oak trees in Ireland and Swedish pines all point to a cold snap in 1627BC. This is consistent with what we’d expect from a big volcano blowing its top in the Mediterranean. Evidence from the Antarctic ice cores should be in shortly, but for a northern hemisphere volcano, this is unlikely to be conclusive. 现在，树轮年代学家挤进来了。锡拉火山爆发应该会导致不同寻常的寒冷天气，从而会妨碍全球范围内树木的生长。美国西部的狐尾松、爱尔兰的橡树和瑞典的松树所提供的证据，都表明公元前1672年出现了一次突然的寒冷期。这与我们对地中海地区一次大型火山爆发的预期后果相吻合。来自南极地区冰芯的证据应该很快就会出现，但这对一场发生于北半球的火山爆发而言，恐怕并不具有结论性。 The lack of a definitive date for the Thera disaster is frustrating, but we can now be reasonably sure it occurred 120 years earlier than thought. The implications of this for ancient history are immense. The chronology of the New Kingdom of Egypt was thought to be rock solid. Finding that they need to find room for a dozen more decades has been too disconcerting for Egyptologists to tackle so far. There is a good chance that the extra years belong in a period after the well-documented New Kingdom called the Third Intermediate Period. 找不到锡拉岛灾难发生的确切年代，这令人沮丧。不过，我们现在可以合理地确信，它的发生，比原先所设想的要早120年。这对于古代史意义重大。埃及新王国时期的编年次序曾被认为如磐石一般确切。自从埃及学家发现他们需要找出空隙来摆放这多出来的100多年，就一直仓皇不安、无从下手。很有可能，多出来的这些岁月属于文献详实的新王国以后的一段时期，即“第三中间期”。 For historians of Babylonia, the crisis has been less existential. Absolute dates for the second half of the second millennium are based on ancient observations of the planet Venus. We know from modern calculations that a particular configuration of Venus recorded during the eighth year of the reign of a certain King Ammisaduqa must have occurred in 1702BC, 1646BC, 1582BC or 1550BC. 对于研究巴比伦王国的历史学家而言，危机尚没有那么严重。（公元前）第二个千年下半叶的确切年代，是根据古代对金星的观测记录推出来的。基于现代的推算，我们知道，文献记载中某个叫做Ammisaduqa的国王治下第8年出现的某种特定的金星形态，必定发生于以下年代之一：公元前1702年，前1646年，前1582年或前1550年。 Other events in Babylonian history, such as the reign of King Hammurabi (famous for his law code) and the sack of Babylon by the Hittites are arranged around whichever absolute date is most convenient. That some of these possible Venusian dates differ by 120 years, about the same length of time that the Thera eruption has been moved back, is highly suggestive to say the least. 巴比伦历史上的其他事件，如汉谟拉比国王（以其法典而闻名）的统治和赫梯人对巴比伦的洗劫，均参照上述确切年份中最合用的那个来排列。上述几个备选的金星日期中存在相隔120年的情况，大体上与锡拉火山爆发时间被推后的时长间隔相等，这至少可说是非常意味深长。 So, where does all this leave biblical chronology? That remains very unclear. But the redating of Thera shows that we know a lot less about when things happened in the ancient world than we thought we did. 于是，所有这些对圣经编年学而言意味着什么？这一点尚不清楚。但对锡拉火山爆发的重新追溯表明，对于古代世界中的事情何时发生，我们的认识比自认为的，要少得多。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Most Misunderstood Libertarian 最为人所误解的自由意志主义者 作者:Alberto Mingardi @ 2015-9-28 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:Library of Law & Liberty,http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/the-most-misunderstood-libertarian/ To the surprise of many, scholarship on Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) has flourished in the last few years. A towering figure in Victorian Britain, Spencer was all but forgotten after his death. His works, which taken together form a “Synthetic Philosophy,” seemed alien to 20th century academics in an age of meticulous specialization. Also his commitment to individual liberty and (seriously) limited government has not been too common in the discipline that he helped establish, sociology. Talcott Parsons famously called him a victim of the very God he adored: evolution. 关于赫伯特·斯宾塞(1820-1903)的学术研究过去几年活跃了起来,这让许多人感到惊讶｡斯宾塞是英国维多利亚时代的一位杰出人物,死后却几乎被人遗忘｡他的各种著作构成一个“综合哲学”整体,与20世纪专业细分的学术界格格不入｡并且,他对个体自由和(极度的)有限政府的信奉,在他所帮助建立的社会学学科中历来并不十分流行｡塔儿科特·帕森斯曾出了名地把他称为他所推崇的那个上帝——进化——的牺牲品｡ Toward the end of the 20th century, however, interest in Spencer began to revive. In 1974, J.D.Y. Peel published Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist and Robert Nisbet dealt at length with Spencer in his 1980 History of the Idea of Progress. In Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick adapted his “tale of the slave” on taxation and democracy from Spencer’s 1884 The Man versus the State. In 1982, the journal History of Political Thought published contributions on Spencer from John Gray, William Miller, Jeffrey Paul, and Hillel Steiner that remain a landmark. 不过,到20世纪快要结束时,人们又重新燃起对斯宾塞的兴趣｡1974年,J. D. Y. Peel出版了《赫伯特·斯宾塞:一位社会学家的进化》;1980年,Robert Nisbet在其《进步观念史》中对斯宾塞进行了长篇讨论｡在《无政府､国家与乌托邦》(1974)中,罗伯特·诺齐克讨论税收和民主问题时所用的“奴隶的故事”源自于斯宾塞1884年的著作《人与国家》｡1982年,《政治思想史》杂志刊登了John Gray､William Miller､Jeffrey Paul和Hillel Steiner等人论斯宾塞的多篇文章,至今仍有里程碑意义｡ New monographs and studies were later published, and today a number of scholars in different disciplines (history of political thought, sociology, anthropology) can be counted among the Spencer connoisseurs. But few of them have come from the classical liberal camp. (The most notable exception is George H. Smith.) 其后关于斯宾塞的新专著和新研究时有出现｡时至今日,分处不同领域(政治思想史､社会学､人类学)的许多学者可以被视为斯宾塞行家｡但其中几乎无人来自古典自由主义阵营｡(George H. Smith是最著名的例外｡) Spencer may be routinely included among the forerunners of modern libertarianism but it is rather uncommon to find a contemporary individualist thinker deliberately appealing to his insights. Take F.A. Hayek: Long ago, John Gray pointed out that Hayek and Spencer share the “same aspiration of embedding the defense of liberty in a broad evolutionary framework,” but Hayek himself appeared to have been largely unaware of this affinity. More recently, Gray wrote that Hayek told him he never read Spencer. 斯宾塞或许会被习惯性地列为现代自由意志主义的先驱之一,但要在当代个人主义思想家中找到一个刻意诉诸斯宾塞见解的人,这可并非易事｡以F. A. 哈耶克为例:John Gray早已指出哈耶克和斯宾塞都具有“同一种抱负,那就是把对自由的辩护牢固树立于一种广义的进化论框架中”,但哈耶克本人似乎基本上没有意识到这种共鸣｡最近,Gray写道,哈耶克曾告诉他说自己从没读过斯宾塞｡ The paradox of one of the fiercest libertarians ever to be ignored by libertarians emerges vividly from Herbert Spencer: Legacies, edited by Mark Francis and Michael Taylor. Interestingly, the two editors have published extensively on Spencer in the past, but their interpretations of him do not overlap. 史上最为狂热的自由意志主义者之一却被自由意志主义者们所忽略,这一乖谬在由Mark Francis和Michael Taylor主编的《赫伯特·斯宾塞:遗产》一书中表现得极为生动｡有趣的是,两位主编过去都已就斯宾塞发表过大量文章,不过他们各自对斯宾塞的解读并不相同｡ Francis, as he attempts to rescue Spencer’s philosophy from oblivion, in his Introduction calls The Man Versus the State and also Social Statics (1851) “popular works” that, “while they were liberal and progressive, . . . were not scientific or philosophical.” Taylor, in contrast, deals at length with Social Statics—as Stephen Tomlinson does in his chapter in this volume. Francis尝试将斯宾塞的哲学从被人遗忘的状态中拯救出来,并在他为该书所写的“导论”中将《人与国家》和《社会静力学》(1851)称为“流行作品”,“尽管是自由主义､进步主义的……并不具备科学性或哲学性”｡与之相反,Taylor则对《社会静力学》进行了长篇讨论——同书中由Stephen Tomlinson所写的一个章节也是如此｡ Spencer’s legacy is plural, as the title of this collection suggests, and may have come to us mediated by subsequent developments in different fields. The plural nature of the “legacies” is stressed throughout, and has multiple dimensions: disciplinary, political, and even geographical given the “migration” of Spencerian theories all over the world. 正如这一文集的复数形式的标题所暗示的那样,斯宾塞的遗产是多重的｡而且这些遗产可能是通过多个不同领域的后续发展传递给我们的｡对“legacies”复数性质的强调贯穿本书首尾,并具有多个不同维度:学科维度､政治维度､甚至还有地理维度(因为斯宾塞的理论曾在全世界“迁移”)｡ Sometimes, however, by looking far away you disregard what you have nearby. Bernard Lightman, for example, focuses his essay “Spencer’s British Disciples” on Beatrice Potter Webb and Grant Allen, quickly dismissing Auberon Herbert as a not very influential British disciple of Spencer. 不过,有些时候,由于过于关注远方,你会忽视眼前事物｡比如,Bernard Lightman在他的文章“斯宾塞的英国门徒”中,主要聚焦于Beatrice Potter Webb和Grant Allen,却急匆匆地略过了Auberon Herbert,视其为斯宾塞的一位影响不大的英国门徒｡ There might be a problem here: the influence the disciples themselves had may have to be disentangled from the thinking of the disciples qua disciples. Lightman presents in fascinating and plentiful detail the most interesting paths of Webb and Allen, who both turned socialist to the disappointment of the master. 这里可能有个问题:这些门徒自身所具有的影响力,可能必须和身为门徒的他们的思想区分开来｡Lightman以引人入胜和细节丰富的方式为我们介绍了Webb和Allen所走过的最为有趣的道路｡他们俩都转变成了社会主义者,令其师父大失所望｡ It would be hard to overemphasize the emotional nature of the relationship between Webb and Herbert Spencer. He was a family friend and a confidant of Laurencina Potter, Beatrice Potter Webb’s mother. A solitary man, Spencer bestowed unlimited affection on his dear friends’ kids. Webb和赫伯特·斯宾塞之间的情感再怎么强调都不为过｡斯宾塞是Webb一家的世交,是Beatrice Potter Webb的母亲Laurencina Potter的知己｡未曾娶妻的斯宾塞将无限的情感倾注于他这位密友的孩子身上｡【编注:Beatrice Potter Webb是著名经济学家,伦敦经济学院和费边社的核心成员,这两个机构也是20世纪初英国社会主义运动的主要推动者｡】 Young Beatrice grew up thinking that he was her best ally and the only adult truly interested in her intellectual development. Spencer, as Webb later wrote, pressed her “to become a scientific worker” and to a certain extent he became a model, for the “continuous concentrated effort in carrying out, with an heroic disregard of material prosperity and physical comfort, a task which he believed would further human progress.” 小Beatrice在成长过程中一直把斯宾塞当成最好的伙伴,认为他是唯一真正对她的智识进步感兴趣的成年人｡如Webb后来所写的那样,是斯宾塞敦促她“成为一个科学工作者”,而他在某种程度上已然是一个典范,因为,“为了实施一项他认为能够推动人类进步的事业,他能持续集中地努力,为此奋而不顾物质财富和生理舒适｡” In her 1926 memoir My Apprenticeship, Webb described at length the old friend, in a portrait very familiar to modern readers. She saw in him “the mental deformity which results from the extraordinary development of the intellectual faculties joined with the very imperfect development of the sympathetic and emotional qualities.” 在其1926年的回忆录《我的学徒生涯》中,Webb花大量笔墨描绘了这位老朋友,其形象现代读者非常熟悉｡她在他身上看到“一种精神上的畸形,它是智识能力非凡发达与同情和情感极度不完善两相结合的产物｡” Webb’s Spencer is a human being obsessed with rationality and purpose who paid the price on the affective side. Though Webb is not stingy of kind words or affectionate recollections, it is hard not to speculate that her portrait of Spencer evokes magnificently all she disliked in unregulated capitalism: a purported organizational efficiency with little humanity to spare for those who are needy. Webb眼中的斯宾塞是个痴迷于理性和目的,并为此在情感方面付出相应代价的人｡尽管Webb并不吝啬写出赞誉之词或深情回忆,我们仍很难不这样推测:她对斯宾塞的描绘极好地再现了她对毫无限制的资本主义——一种对匮乏者冷酷无情的所谓的组织化效率——的所有憎恶｡ It is indeed true that Spencer was the one who, as Lightman writes, “originally taught” Beatrice Webb “to value the scientific method and to think about social issues from a scientific perspective.” One wonders, however, exactly how much of Spencer’s insights she kept in her later thinking. 毫无疑问,如Lightman所写的那样,正是斯宾塞“最初教导”Beatrice Webb去“重视科学方法,并从一种科学的视角来考虑社会问题”｡不过,人们不禁会怀疑,在她后来的看法中到底保留有多少斯宾塞的观点｡ As for Auberon Herbert, certainly a less grand figure, he was an advocate of a libertarianism “that verged on anarchism,” in Taylor’s words. Reading Spencer was for him a truly life-changing experience. It made him lose “faith in the great machine” of politics and convinced him to become an apostle of freedom. Herbert’s libertarian anarchism is one of the “legacies” Michael Taylor examines in his essay. 至于Auberon Herbert,相较而言当然没那么出名｡用Taylor的话说,他鼓吹的是一种“接近于无政府主义”的自由意志主义｡阅读斯宾塞对他来说确实是真正改变人生的一种体验,让他丧失了对于政治“这台大机器的信念”,并说服他成为了一位传播自由的使徒｡Herbert的自由意志论无政府主义是Michael Taylor在其文章中检视的多重“遗产”中的一种｡ He approaches Spencer as a historian of political thought. The Taylor chapter, on the one hand, presents Social Statics as a text that inspired multiple legacies, including the work of Henry George (who resented the fact that Spencer wanted the 1892 revised edition of this 1851 work to leave out the original chapter on land) and Piotr Kropotkin. Taylor以一种政治思想史家的方式讨论斯宾塞｡他所写作的那一章,一方面将《社会静力学》呈现为一份激发了多重遗产的文本,其中包括Henry George(斯宾塞要求《社会静力学》1892年修订版删除1851年原版中论土地一章,George对这一做法感到非常不满)和Piotr Kropotkin的著作｡【编注:Henry George是乔治主义改革运动的创始人,该运动最初主张以单一土地税代替其他所有税种,以便削弱地租收益而提高其他创造性活动的激励,但后来一些追随者将其改造成了土地国有化再分配主张｡】 Taylor stresses how Spencer goes for voluntary and spontaneous arrangements, not necessarily for institutional settings based on the price system. But this won’t sound particularly controversial or new to libertarians, who, despite the caricature often made of them, understand that not everything in life is tradable at a money price. Their point is more subtle (and Spencerian): that is, top-down government intrusions may retard or altogether stop the spontaneous evolution (or adaptation to new circumstances) of human societies. Taylor强调了斯宾塞支持自愿和自发的安排,而不一定支持基于价格体系的制度设置的做法｡但这对于自由意志主义者来说,并不会特别富于争议或新颖,因为尽管他们经常在这一点上遭到夸张嘲弄,但他们知道并非生命中的每样事物都可以用某种货币价格进行交换｡他们的观点更精致(也更斯宾塞式):即,从上至下的政府干预可能会妨碍或完全阻止人类社会的自发进化(或对新环境的适应)｡ On the other hand, Taylor puts in context Spencer’s later, famous polemics against an intrusive state. The articles included in The Man Versus the State were by and large a reaction to the “drift to the left” of William Gladstone’s 1880 government. Taylor emphasizes that “although Liberals were always suspicious of an overextended sphere of state action, the prevalent attitude was one of wariness of government overreach rather than an outright opposition to a positive role for the state.” 在另一方面,Taylor又结合语境分析了斯宾塞晚年反对干预性国家的著名论战文章｡收在《人与国家》一书中的文章大体上都是针对1880年威廉·格莱斯顿政府“左倾转向”而发的反对｡Taylor强调说:“尽管自由派历来对都国家行动范围的过度扩张心怀疑虑,但当时的流行观点只是对政府的过度扩张保持警惕,并不直接反对国家扮演积极角色｡” In other words, Spencer belonged to a minority of truly committed minimal government types that was never hegemonic in the intellectual realm, let alone in the pragmatic world of politicians. Fair enough, though the younger Spencer certainly saw himself as surrounded by writers with ideas rather close to his, particularly after the abolition of the Corn Laws. 换句话说,斯宾塞属于真正信奉最小政府的少数派,这种人在知识界从未成为主流,更不用说在政客们所处的实务世界｡这说得很对,不过,青年斯宾塞当然认为自己周围有许多作家持有近似于己的观点,特别是在《谷物法》废除以后｡ But the opposite is also true. Many critics have used against Spencer the same argument they later employed against Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom: namely, that pointing to the slippery slope of state interventionism was ridiculous given that government was pursuing just limited (particularly in Spencer’s times) and benevolent interventions. In the 1870s, government spending was less than 10 percent of the British GDP—but increased rapidly in the new century. 然而,反对斯宾塞的也大有人在｡许多批评者在反对斯宾塞时已经用到了他们后来用于反对哈耶克《通往奴役之路》的同一论证:即,认为国家干预主义会急剧膨胀恶化是可笑的,因为政府所追求的只是有限的(在斯宾塞的时代尤其如此)､善意的干预｡在1870年代,政府支出还不到英国GDP的10%——尽管在接下来的新世纪里增长迅速｡ One of the many take-aways of this book is that Spencer was a far more complex thinker than those who only know him as a diabolical “social Darwinist” may believe. Its essays might, for example, open the eyes of those who still have in mind the Herbert Spencer largely manufactured in the 1940s by Richard Hofstadter in a book that made history as a beautifully written and yet quite misleading tirade. 本书的诸多简便结论之一是,作为一位思想家,斯宾塞非常复杂,远超那些只知他是个凶恶的“社会达尔文主义者”的人心中所想｡比如,有些人心目中的斯宾塞仍是由理查德·霍夫斯塔特写于1940年代的一本书(该书将历史编成一份整齐漂亮但却颇为误人子弟的长篇檄文)所塑造【译注:指《美国思想中的社会达尔文主义》一书】,而本书所收论文可以让这些人大开眼界｡ Taylor explains that Spencer never thought that “social existence involved an unrelenting struggle for survival in which the richest were the most successful and the poor should go to the wall.” He quotes Thomas Leonard’s important study on the Hofstadterian myth. Taylor引用Thomas Leonard对“霍夫斯塔特迷思”的重要研究解释说,斯宾塞从未认为“社会存在中包含一种永不休止的生存斗争,在这场斗争中,最富裕的人就是最成功的,而最贫穷的人就应该碰壁失败｡” Jonathan H. Turner explains Spencer’s view of evolution as a process of continuous differentiation, which entailed at the same time more interdependence among the parts of the “social organism” and the need for a flexible regulation that allows for ever further differentiation and specialization. The pace of civilization, so to say, is limited by the extent of the division of labor. Jonathan H. Turner将斯宾塞的进化观解释为一种持续分化的进程,而这就意味着“社会有机体”各个部分之间更大程度的相互依赖,而同时也要求实施弹性管理,以允许更进一步的分化和特化｡可以说文明的步伐是受限于劳动分工水平｡ Francis, who like his co-editor cites the Leonard monograph, also makes clear Spencer’s commitment to pacifism: “Spencerians believed that imperial conquest might have been a natural phenomenon when employed by ancient states, but was an archaic activity in modern times” and a most immoral one. The thread running through all of Spencer’s works is the idea that society progresses toward the minimization of violence, which had been needed at earlier stages of civilization. Francis跟共同主编Taylor一样引用了Leonard的论文,也明确指出了斯宾塞对和平主义的信奉:“斯宾塞主义者相信,当帝国征服发生于古代国家手中时,它们也许是种自然现象,但在现时代,它就是一种过时的活动”,同时也是最不道德的活动之一｡贯穿斯宾塞所有著作的一条主线就是这样一种观念:暴力在文明的最初阶段是需要的,但社会进步的方向就是暴力的最小化｡ This book may convey a sense of Spencer’s true understanding of complexity. In the last pages of Social Statics, which revolves around the idea of betterment and progress, he explains that “the institutions of any given age exhibit the compromise made by these contending moral forces at the signing of their last truce.” His magnificent The Study of Sociology (1873) would be a relevant work for those interested in the proper role of the social sciences and their limits, if only they read it. 本书可能向我们传达了一些斯宾塞对于复杂性的真正理解｡在《社会静力学》的最后部分,斯宾塞讨论的是改良与进步｡他解释说,“任何给定时代的制度都呈现出妥协,这些妥协是彼此竞争的道德力量在签订最终停战协定时所达成的｡”对于那些对社会科学的恰当角色及其局限所在感兴趣的人来说,斯宾塞的皇皇巨著《群学肆言》(1873)很值得关注,当然前提是你能读一读｡ Turner’s essay, possibly the most thorough in this collection, claims Spencer’s centrality in the development of sociology. Turner is sure that Spencer was “a theorist, not in the often sloppy and vague social theory sense, but in the hard-science view of theory as a series of abstract laws that explain the operation of some portion of the universe.” Unfortunately, he writes, though “many of his ideas have endured,  . . . most people do not know that they come from Spencer, so ingrained is the avoidance of anything Spencerian.” Turner的文章可能是这本文集中最为深入的,它认为斯宾塞在社会学的发展过程中占据中心位置｡Turner认定斯宾塞是“一位理论家,这里所说的理论不是社会理论意义上的那种很马虎或含糊的理论,而是表现为一系列抽象规则､能够解释宇宙某一部分之运转的那种硬科学意义上的理论｡”不幸的是,他写道,尽管“他的许多观点延续不朽……绝大多数人并不知道它们来自斯宾塞｡对任何斯宾塞主义的东西都避而不谈的做法是如此顽固｡” Turner signals, for example, that Spencer had a very perceptive and thorough vision of power and the dynamics of the mobilization of coercive resources, which also anticipates the analysis of political elites by Vilfredo Pareto (not by chance, an avid reader of Spencer’s). 比如,Turner表明,斯宾塞对于权力和强制性资源的动员过程持有一种认知透彻､细察入微的理解,这也早于维弗雷多·帕累托对于政治精英的分析(帕累托是斯宾塞的热心读者,这并非偶然)｡ Spencer’s dichotomy of militant and industrial societies is not the naive teleology many assumed. “Militant societies are always centralized because they must deal with conflict and war, whereas” industrial societies “are not centralized and allow individuals and corporate units considerable freedom of activity.” Nations may go in one direction or another, depending on many factors. 斯宾塞对于军事社会和工业社会的二分并不是许多人所理解的那种幼稚的目的论｡“军事社会总是中央集权的,因为它们必须应付冲突和战争”,而工业社会“并不中央集权,并允许个体和团体拥有可观的行动自由｡”国家可能走向完全不同的方向,这取决于许多不同因素｡ Spencer learnt it the hard way. His alleged “drift to conservatism,” or the fact that the tone of his articles and political pamphlets got drier, is due to his understanding of developments in England, which he considered revealed a resurgence of the militant spirit. 斯宾塞是历经艰难困苦才得出这一观点的｡他那被指为“保守主义转向”的转变,以及他的文章和政论日益冷峻这一事实,源自他对于英国内部变化的理解｡他认为这种变化表明了军事精神的复活｡ If I had any quibble about this impressive collection, it would be that the propensity to consider The Man Versus the State as “just” a political pamphlet causes the contributors to overlook that this is perhaps the first work whose arguments are truly centered around the notion of unintended consequences. All in all, though, Herbert Spencer: Legacies may foster a better understanding of this seminal thinker and raise yet more interest in his underappreciated writings. 如果说我对这本令人印象深刻的文集还有什么挑剔的话,那就是作者们将《人与国家》仅仅视作一本政论册子的倾向导致他们忽视了一点:它可能是第一本真正集中围绕“非意图后果”这一概念进行论证的书籍｡总而言之,《赫伯特·斯宾塞:遗产》可能增进我们对这位重要思想家的更好理解,同时进一步增加人们对于他的那些明珠蒙尘之作的更大兴趣｡ （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-05-22】 @whigzhou: 大英帝国犯下的最大错误是让听任普鲁士统一德国，结果在一战时只好派自己的陆军上场，而不能像以前那样，只要花钱雇一批德国人打另一批德国人就行了。#后见之明 @whigzhou: 大英走的是弱共同体路线，这条路线有利于自由、繁荣和个人主义，以及为一个族群/文化高度混杂的社会建立普遍秩序，弱点是动员能力不足，难以像强共同体路线的德国那样建立庞大陆军，只能倚重于重资产轻人力的海军，拼钱不拼人头，靠金钱、外交和战略性封锁勉力维持平衡。 @whigzhou: 但这就要求他必须阻止欧洲后院出现任何过于强大的民族国家，强大到能够建立一支他无法扶持装备几个盟友即可轻易打败的陆军  

【2016-05-17】 @黄章晋ster 你很难说，猫主席发动史无前例时，到底是因为有运动群众的偏好，还是不得已才如此。我们也可以这样说，秦始皇当年不能像东德苏联一样把所有人都纳入专政机关的监督视线之内，不是他不想这么做，而是他没有足够的社会财富可以做到这一点。 °城市化率与清洗模式的选择 http://t.cn/RqDaFh2 @whigzhou: 另一组数字也值得注意，1911年时俄罗斯帝国人口1.67亿，扣掉波兰部分大概1.55亿，此后经历各种杀戮，和1932-33大饥荒，到1936年斯大林开始大清洗时，苏联人口仍不足1.6亿，对比猫国，1948-1966年间，人口约增长50%。 @Liittma是我:说明了什么？ @whigzhou: 说明那段时间苏联的马尔萨斯弹簧压的更低，因而剩余率更高，能够供养更庞大的专政机器 @whigzhou: 实际上，苏联的强行集体化和工业化过程，（无论是否故意）就是通过系统性的消灭部分农业人口，提高剩余率，从而供养更多非农人口，这方面猫国的力度远远不及 @whigzhou: 1932-33年的饥饿疗法直接消灭了乌克兰1/5的农民，在马尔萨斯极限边缘，农民主要是吃饭的嘴而不是创造余粮的工具 @黄章晋ster: 如果主席一直活到现在，中国的城市化率大概会跌到10%以下。 @whigzhou: 于是城市果真就被农村包围了～ @黄章晋ster:哈萨克斯坦和乌克兰官方的说法是，大饥荒消灭了他们近三分之一的人口。 @whigzhou: 嗯嗯，那可能还计入了几百万非直接饿死的受害者  

【2016-05-08】 @whigzhou: 现代邮政兴起之前，收信方付费是西欧私人通信中的普遍做法，有趣的是，这一惯例也是上流社会在他们和其他人之间建立无形屏障的一种手段，如果你不够有钱，就不敢混进他们的社交圈，因为连收信都收不起，在19世纪初的荷兰，一封信的收件费大约7stuivers（1[[stuiver]]=1/20盾），差不多是中下阶层一顿饭钱。 @whigzhou: 所以，若发信人预付了邮费，等于是在告诉收信人：我知道你没钱，所以替你把邮费付了。而假如收信人自认为是圈内peer，便会将此视为严重羞辱，所以当荷兰国家邮政最初推行邮票制度时，遭到很多人抵制。  

【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始，libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任，许多追随者也人云亦云，他们的用意很好，但说法是错的，实际上，即便西方世界中最自由的部分，（除了少数袖珍国之外）距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远，只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点：1）自由贸易，古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒，而关税始终很高，各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多，关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情，但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要，因为当时关税再高，和运费比还是很低，所以只要拆除壁垒，效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2）管制，随便翻翻经济史就知道，18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛，但给人的印象很不一样，我猜这是因为，早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行，而较少以行为管控的方式进行，大量限制法规，但较少执行官僚，所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见，究其因，当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3）19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少，但州政府和市政府管的可不少，看看产业史，哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的，那时候联邦政府站在自由一边，多数州政府站在另一边，联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒，由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了，铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场，州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了，只好偏向自由化，但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4）政府规模，从财政开支和雇员数量看，那时候的政府确实小得多，但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看，也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5）福利制度，这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点，那时候基本上没有福利制度，济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中，国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊，仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级，何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的，所以不要相信什么自由天国，也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  

Lenin’s Ghost: How Did Marxist Professors Create a New Wave of Political Leaders? 列宁的幽灵：马克思主义学者是如何培养出新一拨政治领袖的？ 作者：Mihail Neamtu @ 2016-1-12 译者：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Law & Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/01/22/lenins-ghost-how-did-marxist-professors-create-a-new-wave-of-political-leaders/ Europe has by no means recovered from its crisis. The new wave of migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has worsened the economic forecast. The economies of the Eurozone, with a collective growth rate of under 1.5 percent in 2015, are almost stagnant. Gone are the days of the German economic miracle. Nowadays, nearly 4.5 million young persons under 25 are unemployed in the EU-28 — a staggering figure, to which Chancellor Merkel just added an extra million refugees. Particularly in the Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is at very high levels: 47.9 percent in Greece, 47.7 percent in Spain and 39.8 percent in Italy. 欧洲还远未从危机中恢复过来，来自非洲、亚洲和中东的新一波移民令经济预测更加悲观。欧元区的经济发展几近停滞，其2015年整体增长率不足1.5%。德国创造经济奇迹的时期早已远去，如今欧盟28国25岁以下年轻人的失业人数接近4500万，令人瞠目结舌，而德国总理默克尔还刚刚再往上面增加了100万难民。年轻人的失业率在地中海沿岸国家尤其居高不下：希腊为47.9%，西班牙为47.7%，意大利则为39.8%。 Confronted with this bleak picture, politicians, journalists, religious leaders, and public intellectuals all search for an explanation. Why is the European dream failing so many young people? How long will the economic recovery last? Will the EU be able to cope with another massive crash of the financial international system? 面对这般凄惨景况，政治家、记者、宗教领袖以及公共知识分子都在寻找个中原因。为什么欧洲梦会让如此多的年轻人无法企及？经济复苏还能维持多久？欧盟有没有能力应对另一次国际金融系统崩溃的巨大冲击？ While experts ponder such questions, legions of university students face the grim, day-to-day reality. Still in their thirties, they cannot leave their parents’ homes. It would be hard to find university graduates from Thessalonica or Malaga with bank savings or with enough funds to allow them to establish a family of their own. Many rely directly on social benefits, while switching from one low-paid job to another. In the public square, the notion of individual responsibility has become unfashionable. Angry crowds demonstrating in Athens, Madrid, or Bucharest call for ever new governmental solutions. 专家们在思考这些问题，而众多大学生则日复一复地面对残酷现实。他们已经三十多岁，但仍未能脱离父母独立生活。在萨洛尼卡和马拉加的大学毕业生当中，极少人有存款或其他财务来源足以让他们组建自己的家庭。他们当中很多人不停地辗转于不同的低薪工作，转工期间仅能依靠社会救济过活。“个人责任”的观念在社会上不再那么时髦了，雅典、马德里和布加勒斯特都有愤怒的群众游行示威，要求政府提供更新的解决方案。 In this atmosphere, both far Right parties and far Left political platforms have been mounting radical proposals. Populism is on the rise, in the form of nationalism, or revolutionary Marxism, or in some cases a strange mix of the two—as can be seen in the “Red-Brown-White” coalition that constitutes Vladimir Putin’s motley political base. Odd as it may seem, the two extremes can, as with the far-Left Syriza and the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a new Rightwing party, march together shoulder to shoulder. 在这种氛围下，无论极右政党还是极左政治联盟都不停地提出激进的建议。民粹主义正在升温，表现形式有民族主义，有宣扬革命的马克思主义，也有两者的奇特组合——例如普京混杂政权基础中的“红-棕-白”政治联盟【译注：在俄罗斯的政治语境中，红色代表社会主义和共产主义，棕色代表极端民族主义，白色代表君主政体】。虽然看起来很古怪，但是位处两个对立极端的势力（正如希腊的激进左翼联盟(Syriza)和新右翼政党独立希腊人(ANEL)那样）却可以并肩前行。 The present essay will examine the Left side of the ledger to see what intellectual and cultural forces account for the resurgence of Left radicalism in various European countries. My claim is that old-school Marxists in Western academia have managed to produce a new class of revolutionary politicians, who are currently challenging the foundations of the Western capitalist order. 本文将研究政治光谱中的左翼，以寻找极左激进思潮在欧洲各国重新抬头背后的思想与文化推力。我的看法是，西方学术界中老派的马克思主义者已经培养出了新一批的革命政客，而这些政客正在对西方资本主义秩序的根基提出挑战。 We have, for example, the British Labor Party’s new leader Jeremy Corbyn, an anti-NATO politician and welfare devotee. He has called for a friendlier approach to Putin’s Russia. (In accord with the above-noted trend, this puts him in line with Rightwing populists in his country, of the UKIP Party, and Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France.) 例如，英国工党的新党魁科尔宾就是一个反北约的政客，也是福利主义的狂热信徒。他还呼吁以友善的态度对待普京治下的俄罗斯（在前文所述的趋势之下，科尔宾凭着他的这一主张，与英国独立党的右翼民粹主义者，以及法国民族阵线的马琳•勒庞，成为同道中人）。 In Spain, there has emerged Podemos, a Leftwing movement that ran candidates for the general elections under the motto Libertad, igualdad, y fraternidad, and that late last year won 20.65 percent of the national vote, vaulting to the position of third largest political organization in the country.A 37-year-old political science professor named Pablo Manuel Iglesias Turrión is the leader of Podemos, which means “We Can”—an echo of Barack Obama’s “Yes, We Can.” 而西班牙则冒出了一个叫“我们可以”的左翼团体，他们派出代表以“自由、平等、博爱”的口号参加大选，并在去年年底赢得全国20.65%的选票，一跃成为全国第三大政治组织。“我们可以”的领袖，是一个名叫伊格莱西亚斯的37岁政治学教授。“我们可以”这个名字，呼应了奥巴马的竞选口号“是的，我们可以”。 Iglesias, an admirer of the Bolshevik Revolution, was a member of the Spanish Communist Party until 1999. In 2014, Comrade Iglesias was elected to the European Parliament as a member of his new party. Its growth in the last election came after it gathered in representatives of Izquierda Anticapitalista, an organization that includes some Trotskyites and Gramscians. (Sample press release from that group: “Toward a Democratic Disruption and an End to Austerity”). 伊格莱西亚斯对布尔什维克革命心怀敬佩，他自己在1999年之前也是西班牙共产党员。2014年，伊格莱西亚斯同志以其新政党【译注：即“我们可以”】成员的身份，成为欧洲议会的议员。在去年的大选中冒升之前，“我们可以”吸收了政治组织“左翼反资本主义”的代表，而该组织网罗的是一些托派和葛兰西学派的人。（该组织对外发表的范文之一：“迈向民主之崩溃与紧缩政策之终结”。） Podemos takes pride in presenting youthful faces to the Spanish electorate, and advocates of liberation theology (in the person of Teresa Forcades, “the radical Catalan nun on a mission,” as London’s Guardian newspaper called her). In the land of Don Quixote, Pope Francis’ sympathy for the Bolivarian economic model did make a lasting impression. “我们可以”让年轻人更多地参与政治，让他们成为解放神学倡导者（例如被伦敦《卫报》称之为“肩负使命的加泰罗尼亚激进修女”的特蕾莎•福加德斯），并以此为傲。在这片诞生了堂吉诃德的土地上，教宗方济各对玻利维亚经济模式的同情的确令人经久不忘。 In fact among former leaders of Podemos, one counts Juan Carlos Monedero, an advisor to the late Hugo Chávez. Incidentally, Hugo Chávez and his successor in Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, have sponsored Spain’s Leftwing parties and associations in the same explicit manner that President Putin has channeled Russian rubles toward his political puppets from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 实际上，“我们可以”的前领袖之一胡安•卡洛斯•莫内德罗就在委内瑞拉总统查韦斯执政后期担任其顾问。顺便说一句，查韦斯和他的继任人尼古拉斯•马杜罗都毫不掩饰地为西班牙左翼的政党和组织提供资助，与普京总统向他在乌克兰、摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚的傀儡政权输送卢布同出一辙。 The European Left, in short, is very much alive and kicking. From Britain, Greece, and Spain to the Die Linke party in Germany, the heirs of Marx show a remarkable efflorescence, resembling the Greek mythological Hydra endowed with multiple serpentine heads, despite its one and only reptilian body. We may ask ourselves who the future Heracles will be, slaying the beast with the humor of Winston Churchill and the manly determination of Mrs. Thatcher… 简而言之，欧洲的左翼势力仍生机勃勃。从英国、希腊、西班牙，到德国的左翼党，马克思的继承人向世人展现了他们的欣欣向荣，一如希腊神话中的九头蛇，尽管只有一副羸弱的身躯，却生出许多个蛇头。我们也许可以问问自己，谁将成为未来的赫拉克勒斯，以丘吉尔的幽默和撒切尔夫人的铁腕，手刃这头怪兽。 Why are the ghosts of Marxism haunting the political life of Europe? Mainly because neither the structural evils of communist ideology nor its perpetrators in the former Soviet bloc have  experienced a proper Nurnberg-style scrutiny. After the Second World War, the dismantling of the Nazi network in Germany created the proper context for the carrying out of the Marshall Plan. 为何马克思主义在欧洲政坛阴魂不散？这主要是因为，无论是共产主义意识形态在体制上的恶性，还是前苏维埃统治集团中的恶徒，都没有经历过一场纽伦堡审判式的彻底清算。二战之后，纳粹主义机体在德国土崩瓦解，为实行马歇尔计划提供了适当条件。 After 1989, the EU’s expansion toward former Socialist republics did not require a similar political lustration. To this day, most of the societal and economic disasters produced by the communist experiment remain largely unknown to the general public from the Western European countries, particularly those not yet born at the time of the 1989 revolutions or who were young at the time 1989年之后，欧盟向前社会主义国家扩张，却并没有要求在政治体制上进行类似的清理。时至今日，共产主义实验在社会制度和经济上所造成的重大灾难，大多仍不为西欧普通民众所知，尤其是那些在1989年还没出生——或当时还很年轻——的民众。 It was widely expected that these revolutions would put Leftist academics, or at least most of them, out of business. Their voices were certainly muted for a time, but that time has expired. Rejecting the notion of public penance, old Marxist professors have resumed their project, and carried on with their negation of historical facts. By spinning their simplistic understanding of the relationship between labor and capital, Marxist ideologues in the North-Atlantic hemisphere have hatched a new generation—one that seeks, and in many cases finds, electoral validation. 人们曾普遍预期，在经历了那些革命之后，就算不是全部，起码绝大部分的左翼学者不会再有市场。他们的确销声匿迹了一段时间，然而这段时间已经过去了。那些老派马克思主义学者又开始重操旧业，他们仍然拒绝接受公开忏悔的理念，继续否定历史事实。基于对劳动力与资本两者间关系的粗浅理解，北大西洋区的马克思主义追随者们牵强附会地虚构编造，孵化出了新一代——他们寻求通过参选得到承认，有好些已经获得成功。 Just as the young Barack Obama absorbed Frank Marshall Davis’ worldview in the 1970s, so too have European elites imbibed the vapors of the Maoist philosopher Alain Badiou in Paris, the late historian Eric Hobsbawm in London, cultural critic Slavoj Žižek in Ljubljana, or the Hungarian writer G.M. Tamás in Budapest. Such Marxist professors are responsible, indeed, for the birth of a new generation of historically ignorant opinion-makers in Europe. 和巴拉克•奥巴马年轻时吸收了1970年代弗兰克•马歇尔•戴维斯的世界观一样，欧洲精英阶层也受到了马克思主义学者影响，当中有巴黎的毛主义哲学家阿兰•巴迪欧，伦敦的当代历史学家艾瑞克•霍布斯鮑姆，卢布尔雅那的文化评论家斯拉沃热•齐泽克，以及布达佩斯的匈牙利作家贾斯伯•米克罗斯•塔马斯。欧洲出现了对历史愚昧无知的新一代意见领袖，这些马克思主义学者对此难辞其咎。 The economic crisis of late 2008 proved to be a good moment for high-brow academics and social justice street activists. They came together with the dream of rekindling the May 1968 movement against the bourgeois, middle-class establishment in France. Alienated youth flooded social media with Marxist jingles about American imperialism, the existence of banks and mortgages, the privatization of state assets, and the hierarchical structures of traditional family (depicted as sexist and homophobic). 2008年末爆发的经济危机，成了撮合高高在上的学术界和追求社会公义的街头行动家的大好时机。他们梦想着重燃法国1968年5月反资产阶级风暴之火，走到了一起。离群索居的年轻人在社交媒体大肆张贴马克思主义的宣传短曲，攻击美帝国主义，反对银行与抵押贷款、国有资产私有化以及传统家庭等级制度（认为这是性别歧视和恐同的表现）。 Day and night during—and since—the Great Recession, on television and radio programs, at public rallies, and throughout academic colloquia, utopians recycle the mantras of “equality,” “identity politics,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination.” At times, the fresh young European Marxists may speak more eloquently than the worn-out Bernie Sanders does in the Democratic Party’s primaries. However, this lyrical exaltation of Marxism brings nothing new in terms of understanding economic cycles or the way out of poverty. 自2008年经济大衰退开始，不切实际的空想家们无论在电视和电台节目、公众集会，还是学术界的研讨会上，都日以继夜地把“平等”“身份政治”“偏见”和“ 歧视”等概念像咒语一样翻来覆去地念诵。有时候，年轻的欧洲马克思主义者说起话来，比疲惫的桑德斯在民主党党内初选的演说还要滔滔不绝。然而，无论听起来多么激动人心，马克思主义仍然不能为研究经济规律和摆脱贫穷带来任何新东西。 Podemos and Syriza won their respective elections by vaguely promising the voters another future—a distant reality in which decisions about individual happiness would be made through a Rousseau-styled “collective deliberation.” How would poverty be eliminated? Through cooperatives, we are told, which would be less profit-driven than the “neoliberal enterprises” but which would benefit from a state-controlled redistribution of wealth. “我们可以”和激进左翼联盟通过含糊其辞地承诺选民“另一个”未来，赢得了西班牙和希腊的大选。而在这个遥远的未来中，有关个人幸福的问题则需要通过卢梭式的“集体研究”来决定。该怎样消灭贫穷呢？据说可以通过合作社，因为合作社不像“新自由主义企业”那样唯利是图，还可以从国家控制下的财富再分配中获益。 The call to ideological warfare from Podemos (be it in the form of political correctness, student strikes, militias on campuses, or voluntary sit-ins) flirts with the image of a cosmic deliverance from the “hegemonic powers” of capitalism. The relationship between the individual and the crowd is construed erotically. Comrade Iglesias’ speeches set the stage for a quasi-spiritual, if not mystical, interpretation of the revolutionary endeavor. “我们可以”所宣扬的意识形态斗争（无论是以讲求政治正确、学生罢课、校园民兵组织，还是自愿静坐的形式）引发了全球摆脱资本主义霸权这一遐想。个人与集体的关系被描绘得很诱人。伊格莱西亚斯同志的演讲令人容易对革命行动产生类似宗教般的，甚至神秘的理解。 The Leftist revolutionaries accuse “the agents of laissez-faire capitalism” of having created a new class of underpaid employees. They depict students, workers, and trade unionists as innocent victims of a vast conspiracy set up by the owners of multinational companies. In response to the selfish individualism of the Right, the new Marxists celebrate the collectivist frenzy of anti-bourgeois demonstrators. By singing the litany of “fairness,” they forget the importance of moral virtue, human character, and individual responsibility. They avoid addressing the psychological dimension of behavioral traits such as laziness, low-esteem, or procrastination. 左翼革命家们谴责“自由放任的资本主义代理人”制造了新的受剥削阶层，他们认为跨国公司股东之间互相勾结，而学生、工人、工会会员则是这一巨大阴谋的无辜受害者。针对右翼利己的个人主义，新马克思主义者为反资产阶级示威者的集体主义狂热唱赞歌。在喋喋不休地歌颂“公正”的时候，他们忘却了道德伦理、人类本性与个人责任的重要性，而且对诸如懒惰、缺乏自尊和拖延等行为特征的心理因素避而不谈。 Professor Claude Karnoouh (who taught Marxist sociology at a prominent university in the central Romanian region of Transylvania) argues that free markets produce social disasters by destroying neighborhoods and towns. He nowhere takes into account the creative nature of capitalist disruptions, so powerfully defended by Joseph Schumpeter and strikingly visible in the recent replacement of old postal offices by email (or in the mass-production of electronic tablets and the rapid decline of desktop computers). 在位于罗马尼亚中部特兰西瓦尼亚地区某知名大学教授马克思主义社会学的克劳德•卡努教授认为，自由市场摧毁了社区和小城镇，制造了社会灾难。但他完全没有考虑到资本主义式破坏的创造性本质，而这一点已经得到了约瑟夫•熊彼特强有力的论证，并且在近年来电子邮件取代传统邮局（或者平板电脑盛行和桌面电脑式微）的范例中得到清晰的体现。 The Marxist revolutionaries of 21st century Europe ignore the subtle contrivances of human motivation and organizational behavior, which typically make people leave behind the poor conditions of their ancestors, acquire new skills, and transcend the national barriers in search for a better life. 那些针对人类动机和组织行为的微妙设置，能够驱使人们挣脱先辈的困境，学习新的技能，超越国家壁垒，以求改善生活，而二十一世纪欧洲的马克思主义革命家忽略了这一点。 Also based on false assumptions is Podemos’ rhetoric against corruption. It underestimates the welfare state’s role in diminishing individual freedom and economic opportunity for young Spaniards and young people everywhere. In search of the heroic proletariat, Professor Iglesias is still obsessed with the class struggle and the victory of workers through larger trade unions and more frequent strikes. He ignores that every individual is paid for the skills, and for the needs, that he or she brings to the marketplace. “我们可以”针对贪污腐败的激烈言辞，也建基于错误假设之上，他们低估了福利制度对西班牙乃至世界各地的年轻人的个体自由和经济发展的抑制作用。怀着对英雄无产阶级的向往，伊格莱西亚斯教授仍然沉迷于阶级斗争，渴望工人阶级通过更大规模的工会和更频繁的示威来获得胜利。每个人的薪水都是由其在市场上展现出来的技能和对这种技能的需求决定的，但他完全无视这一点。 The leaders of Podemos and Syriza are blind to the differences between an Anglo American approach to economic competition (as a cure to favoritism) and a South American (but of course not uniquely South American) support for state monopoly. Rampant corruption stems not only from the ills of human nature (“the greed of the Wall Street party,” as Iglesias puts it). Corruption is the result of poor institutional arrangements: volatile property rights, overregulation, laws preventing the free association of individuals, rigged contracts pushed by central governments, as well as high taxes for small businesses. It is corruption that kills the natural instinct for entrepreneurship, individual freedom, personal growth, and economic development. 英语美洲鼓励经济竞争（以避免偏袒徇私），南美洲（当然也不仅限于南美洲）支持国家垄断，但“我们可以”和激进左翼联盟的领袖对两者间的差异却视而不见。猖獗的贪污腐败行为不仅仅源于人性中之恶（伊格莱西亚斯谓之为“华尔街派对中的贪婪”），也源于糟糕的制度安排：产权缺乏保障、过度监管、法律限制自由结社、中央政府非法操纵合同，以及对小企业高额征税。正是贪污腐败扼杀了与生俱来的创业精神、个体自由、个人成长与经济发展。 Speaking of poverty and wealth, the Jacobins haven’t managed to create a single socialist success story. No one in contemporary Cuba, Laos, or North Korea goes to “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, and criticize after dinner.” Except for the privileged nomenklatura and the party apparatchiks, ordinary people from socialist countries have never experienced the coexistence of these leisurely activities. 说到贫穷与财富，雅各宾派并没能创造出社会主义的成功案例，一个都没有。在当代的古巴、老挝或者朝鲜，都没有人能够“上午打猎，下午捕鱼，晚上喂牛，晚饭后搞批判”【编注：语出马克思《德意志意识形态》（1845）第9页】。除了拥有特权的某些阶层和党员，社会主义国家的平民百姓从未过上这种悠闲生活。 Why should we believe that Syriza or Podemos will unchain millions of unemployed people through the shameless rescue of Lenin? In recent times, countries run by radical socialist governments have made no significant contribution to the flourishing of scientific research or to the groundbreaking technological innovations which have spread across the world. 我们为什么要相信，“我们可以”和激进左翼联盟搬出列宁的那一套，就能解救数以百万计的失业人口呢？在近代社会，科学研究百花齐放，科技创新突破惠及全球，但激进社会主义政权领导的国家从未对此做出过任何重大贡献。 Neither Communist China nor authoritarian Russia can boast impressive advances in the field of medical science. Such achievements still crown the healthcare systems of the free world. From its very first political application in real time and real history, Marxist ideology has been a painful failure of astonishing proportions. 无论是共产主义中国，还是威权主义俄国，都没能在医学研究领域取得引以为豪的突破进展。那些令人瞩目的成就，仍然出自自由国度的医疗系统。从其历史上第一次付诸政治实践开始，马克思主义意识形态带来的从来都是极其惨痛的失败。 What about the scientific claims made by Karl Marx (1818–1883)? As Dr. Paul Aligică from George Mason University once put it, Marxist economists currently employ epistemic tools that resemble the phlogiston theory used by the 17th century physicists. Das Kapital can explain the wealth and the poverty of nations with the same measure of clarity that Johann Joachim Becher’s (1635–1682) alchemist views of combustion help us understand a Ferrari engine. 那么马克思在科学方面的论断又是否有过什么贡献呢？正如乔治梅森大学的保罗•阿里吉卡博士曾经说的那样，马克思主义经济学家如今使用的认知工具，类似于17世纪物理学家使用的燃素理论。用《资本论》来解释国家的财富和贫穷，和以约翰•约钦姆•贝歇尔（1635-1682年）炼金术的燃烧理论来研究法拉利引擎，效度不相伯仲。 A century and half since the Communist Manifesto was published, the entire scientific scaffolding of Marxism has fallen to pieces. Marx got it all wrong when he spoke about the future developments of the Western society. As a reductionist theory, Marxism today cannot account for the economic transformation of the West. 自《共产党宣言》发表一个半世纪以来，马克思主义的整个科学理论框架已经分崩离析，支离破碎。马克思对西方社会的未来展望，无一应验。作为一种还原主义理论，如今马克思主义完全无法解释西方国家的经济转型。 Let us compare the income and lifestyle of a 19th century worker from a steel factory in Manchester, England with the monthly salary and the spare time enjoyed by a Google employee at the dawn of the third millennium. Would a ship worker from Gdansk in the early 1980s have dreamt of possessing a satellite home television or a mobile phone in his pocket? What is, then, left of all Marxist “prophecies”? 我们不妨将19世纪英国曼彻斯特钢铁厂工人的月薪和生活方式，和21世纪初谷歌员工的月薪与闲暇时间进行对比。1980年代初格但斯克的船坞工人能想象家里装上卫星电视，兜里揣着手机吗？那马克思主义的“预言”还剩下些什么？ Since Marxist doctrine has no scientific grounding, it would seem to follow that its popularity ought to be examined from the perspective of rhetoric, theology, or literary studies. Decades ago, Robert C. Tucker convincingly argued that myth is a central category in the writings of the young Marx. 马克思主义学说没有科学基础，因此要分析它为何盛行，似乎应该从修辞艺术、宗教信仰和文学研究角度入手。数十年前，罗伯特•塔克就已经很有力地论述过，神话是马克思年轻时写作的中心主题。 From time immemorial, people cherished the eschatological promise of a savior (rebranded by Marx as “the proletariat” and by Stalin under the name of “the Party leader”). Since Marxism is neither a serious economic theory nor a rigorous social science, we would understand it better as the secular religion of modernity, which uses a redemptive language for the alienated masses. 自古以来，人们就对承诺拯救万民于水火的救世主心怀向往（马克思将其包装为“无产阶级”，而斯大林则称其为“党的领袖”）。鉴于马克思主义既不是严肃的经济理论，也不是严谨的社会科学，因此要更好地理解这一理论，我们应该将其视作追求现代性的世俗宗教，它运用救赎的语言来面对异化了的普罗大众。 Alain Besançon identified the presence of Gnostic themes in the Marxist narrative of class warfare, while the University of Chicago’s Mircea Eliade has shown the extent to which the historicist myth of a classless society projects the image of a Golden Age into modern times. 阿兰•贝桑松指出，马克思主义对于阶级斗争的叙述中包含了诺斯替派的主张，而芝加哥大学的米尔恰•伊利亚德则指出，消除社会阶级乃历史必然这一迷思，其实很大程度上只是一厢情愿地将希腊的黄金时代投射到现代社会之中。 Traditional societies had foundational stories about charismatic, heroic individuals who fought against an evil enemy and promised a radical, not an incremental, improvement of the human condition. Marxists revolutionaries have taken up this apocalyptic imagery. The new small “c” catholic church is the international socialist movement, which brings to the afflicted world a message of a redeemed humanity. 传统社会总流传着一些英雄故事，这些英雄魅力非凡，勇于对抗恶势力，他们许诺的不是渐进的改良，而是一夜之间改善人们的生活现状。马克思主义革命家宣扬的就是这种末日天启般的景象。这一新的全人类的教会就是国际社会主义运动，他们宣称，要为这个受尽磨难的世界带来人性救赎的福音。 Prime Minister Tsipras (known as the Greek “Che Guevara”) said that “the communist regime . . . at least had humanity at the center of their thinking.” Young and radical politicians such as he do not feel the need to explain the criminal deeds of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 被称为“希腊的切•格瓦拉”的希腊总理齐普拉斯说，“共产主义政权……起码以人道主义作为核心考量。”像他那样年轻激进的政客们，似乎从不觉得有必要解释1917年布尔什维克革命所犯下的罪行。 Instead of looking at the horrors of the Gulag, the leaders of Syriza and Podemos offer their audience the same toxic and yet mesmerizing incantations that make people forget about the Ukrainian Holodomor or about the Stalinist labor camps of Perm, Volga Canal, and Pitești (the latter experiment being described by Vladimir Tismăneanu in his 2014 book on The Devil in History). 激进左翼联盟和“我们可以”的领袖们也无视古拉格的丑陋和残酷，他们拿催眠咒语来荼毒信众，让他们忘记乌克兰大饥荒，忘记设在彼尔姆、伏尔加运河与皮特什蒂的斯大林式劳改营（弗拉迪米尔•蒂斯马尼努在他2014年出版的《历史中的魔鬼》中对皮特什蒂的实验项目也有所描述）。 When a freely elected leader of a European nation can say that “humanity” was “at the center” of the communist experiment, we must pause and ask ourselves: How can Europe regain the vast amount of moral clarity it has lost since the 1989-1991 period? Will perhaps the foe of the former evil empire make a Reaganite comeback to help Europe find its way? Might we believe that a future President of the United States will call out the new Jacobins? May we hope that future leaders of democratic parties will stop indulging in a shameless nostalgia for Marx and Lenin? 连一个欧洲国家自由选举产生的领导人，都能说出“人道主义”处于共产主义实践的“核心位置”这样的话来，我们必须停下来问问自己：欧洲如何能重新厘清自1989-1991年巨变以来就已经变得模糊的道德观念？过往邪恶帝国的敌人会不会以一个里根式的王者归来，帮助欧洲重回正轨？我们会不会相信美国未来的总统会请新雅各宾派重出江湖？我们可不可以希望未来民主政党的领导人不要再不知廉耻地缅怀马克思和列宁？ It is a matter of historical record that, like the victims of the Shoah, the prisoners of communism underwent unimaginable physical degradation and psychological torture. Who will educate the Prime Minister of Greece and tell him of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s long-lasting witness? Who will enlighten Pablo Iglesias Turrión about the black mass which, in the name of humanity, the KGB proxies organized at Pitești Prison during the late 1950s? Students of theology living under communism were forced to denounce God, to mock Christ, and to blaspheme the name of the Virgin Mary under the burden of extreme beatings and despicable sufferings. 就如同电影《浩劫》中的受害人那样，共产主义的囚徒经受了无法想象的身体摧残和心理折磨，这是铁一般的历史事实。难道没有人教育一下希腊总理，告诉他索尔仁尼琴长期以来所目睹的那些惨况？难道没有人告诉伊格莱西亚斯，1950年代末克格勃特工以人道主义的名义在皮特什蒂监狱组织的黑色弥撒是什么？生活在共产主义国家的神学学生，在酷刑的胁迫之下，要被迫批判上帝，嘲笑耶稣基督，亵渎中伤圣母玛利亚。 Such was the “love” for “humanity” that millions of people witnessed during the 20th century. Such are the untruths that vote-seeking, parliament-leading Marxist revolutionaries want to pour into the minds of ordinary men and women, who may begin their adult life by searching for a better job, but might end their pursuit of happiness by embracing an obsolete and evil ideology. 这些就是数以百万计的民众在20世纪所亲眼目睹的“人道主义”之“爱”，这些也是唯选票是图的马克思主义革命家们想对普通民众灌输的颠倒黑白的谎言。人们原本不过是想在成年后找一份好点的工作，但却可能只因向一种过时而邪恶的意识形态张开怀抱，而令追求幸福的梦想彻底破灭。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-04-22】 @whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时，我常常为其（操作主义意义上的）精确性所折服，与其他系统中常见的（看不出操作性含义的）泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照，这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础，每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示，再往前追究，这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系， @whigzhou: 和其他文书相比，军令应该是最讲究（操作意义上的）明确性的——你，和谁谁谁一起，带上这个那个，于某月某日几点前，到达某地。——读令状的感觉就像这样。史家也曾指出，在亨利二世之前，司法令状和其他令状并没有明确区别，依我看，他们都有着军令的背景。  

权力积木#3：马尔萨斯弹簧 辉格 2015年12月21日 考古学家在判断一个社会的文明程度时，常依据这样一些线索：显著的社会地位分化，宏大工程，复杂的文字系统，精致的工艺品，以及职业分工的迹象；所有这些线索都指向一个共同点：部分社会成员脱离了生存必需品的生产，从而能够专注于其他技艺的发展，保存和积累起复杂的知识系统。 确实，文明发展的主线，便是知识系统的不断积累和膨胀，若将它比做基因组，那么各种可见的文明创造物便是表现型，正如道金斯所言，身体易朽，基因永生；但假如没有一个脱离食物生产的专业群体，知识积累便极为缓慢，并不断被遗忘和讹变所侵蚀，恰如我们在前文明社会的朴陋文化中所看到的情况。 部分成员脱离食物生产，意味着食物（以及其他生存必需品，下同）的劳动生产率超出了仅仅满足食物生产者自己生存繁衍所需的水平，超出的部分常被人类学家称为“剩余”（注：并非马克思所说的那种剩余）；一个社会剩余率越高，用于支撑其文明活动的资源便越多，文明就越繁荣，这是显而易见的。 然而，在“剩余从何而来”这个问题上，却有着一种流传极为广泛的深刻误解：认为技术进步提高了劳动生产率，即单位劳动生产了更多食物，从而带来剩余；可是正如马尔萨斯所指出，技术进步确实可在短期内提高劳动生产率，但人口增长很快又会将劳动生产率拉下来，结果只是增加了人口，这一过程只须几代或十几代人即可完成。 所以，除非技术进步连续涌现，或永远存在可供拓垦的新土地，从长期看技术进步不会提高剩余率；实际上，在定居农业之前，人类也取得过许多技术进步，标枪、弓箭、石器、掘棒、渔网、陷阱，火的控制，还有团队合作与狩猎计谋，这些进步帮助人类散布全球，占据了广阔生态位，但并未带来经常性的剩余和积累，因而也没有发展出文明。 如今，越来越多的经济史家相信，工业革命之前，人类和其它动物一样，长期处于马尔萨斯陷阱（毋宁说是常态）之中，证明这一点的最佳证据是工资铁律（[[Iron Law of Wages]]）：非技术工作的工资始终徘徊在生存线附近；可是，文明毕竟诞生了，那么，究竟是什么带来了剩余？很明显，必定存在某种力量，阻止人口增长到耗尽全部剩余的程度。 有两种力量起了这样的作用：国家权力和私人财产权；原理如下图所示： 【图1】马尔萨斯弹簧 随着人口增长，投入于单位土地的劳动增加，但新增产出却不断降低，在没有赋税（或租金）的条件下，会一直降到仅够新增人口勉强维生，此时人口便达到自然极限（Pa），但有了赋税，食物产出被拿走一部分，所以人口增长会在边际产出率降至最低生存需求加赋税的水平时提前停下来，此时人口为Pb，而由于B点的边际产出率高于A点，因而剩余率也更高（即Sb>Sa）。 上述原理可归结为这样几条：当人口接近极限水平时，1）无论出于什么原因，减少人口将提高剩余率，从而提高脱离食物生产的人口比例，因而使文明更加繁荣，同时也让受益于赋税和租金的群体要么更庞大，要么更富裕；2）通过改变分配结构，赋税和财产权会压低人口，3）若统治者有能力压低人口，他可能更容易获取赋税。 形象的说，文明就像一块巨型浮石，压在人口弹簧之上，它在压低人口总量的同时，也获得了更大弹力来支撑其体量。 认识到这一点，可以帮助我们更好的理解人类历史，消除一些陈腐谬见，比如许多人将人口增长视为社会繁荣的指标，或者认为，除非有灾难性事件发生，文明总是趋向于进步，相对的，战乱、瘟疫和饥荒总是降低文明水平；然而，有着大量历史事实与这些传统见解相抵触，而且，一旦我们采取马尔萨斯的视角，许多貌似“反常”甚至不可思议的事情，就变得顺理成章了。 考虑到脱离食物生产的人多数生活在城市，而且除了早期城邦，城市居民绝大多数不是农民，因而城市化率是衡量文明繁荣程度的很好指标；许多传统农业社会在开始现代化进程之前，城市化率都不足10%，你可能会认为这是农业社会的常态，但实际上，当人口压力没到最高程度时，农业社会的城市化率完全可以达到15-25%。 据经济史家赵冈统计，（按两千人以上标准）战国时期城市化率达15.9%，南宋更高达22%，汉唐介于两者之间；以物质丰富度和文化多样性衡量，两宋也是中国古代文明的巅峰期，此后，随着人口压力渐增，城市化率一路下滑，到近代前夕已降至不足7%，据施坚雅测算，清代繁荣程度最高的江南，城市化率也只有7.8%。【注1】 【图2】中国若干历史时期的城市化率 城市衰微也体现在顶级都市的规模缩减上，明清最大城市不过80万人口，而唐长安、北宋开封、苏州，南宋临安，人口都过百万，宋代还有一大批人口数十万的大城市，其中武昌、泉州、建康等都市若放在清代皆可与京城比肩；人口压力和城市退化的关系，从华北城市的衰弱中也可见一斑，由于华北平原开发历史更久，人口更早饱和，那些著名的古代中原大城在中古之后再也没有复兴过。 同样的情况也出现在江户时代的日本，在德川幕府结束战国时代之后，日本进入了长期和平阶段，人口持续增长，起初带来了城市繁荣，据斋藤修（Osamu Saito）和高岛正德（Masanori Takashima）测算，（按万人标准）城市化率从1600年的6%上升到1721年的12.6%，但随着人口逼近极限，人口压力渐增，城市开始萎缩，到1874年明治初期，城市化率已跌到10%。 德川家于1615年攻克大阪，发布一国一城令，弭平全境，到1721年重新落入马尔萨斯陷阱，满清于1681年平定三藩，到1796年爆发白莲教之乱，被许多史家视为人口压力开始起作用的标志，这两个长度极为接近的周期，或许并非巧合，和历史上典型中原王朝的人口恢复周期大抵一致。 【图3】日本江户时代的人口与农业产出 【图4】日本江户时代的人口密度与城市化率 人口压力的增长也伴随着众多文明元素的消逝，当我们追溯各种器物、技术、工艺、文学和艺术形式，乃至思想观念、组织模式和制度元素的古代渊源时，常会发现，那些能够找到的渊源，多数出现在宋代，还有一部分在南北朝，更早的，就要到先秦去找了，并非巧合的是，这些历史时期都是人口压力相对松弛的阶段。 宋代的产业生态很像工业革命前夕的英格兰，其核心特征是广泛采用非人力能源和劳动节省型机械，水力作坊遍地开花，包括大型水力纺车；然而到清代，王祯《农书》中所描绘的农业和工业机械几乎消失殆尽，铁鎝锄头代替了耕牛，推磨的水力换成了人力；明清江南纺织业尽管规模庞大，但黄宗智的研究发现，纺织工作绝大部分以家庭副业的形式完成，宋代那种集中使用水动力设备的规模化工场作坊已不复存在。 人口压力和城市繁荣之间的关系，从相反的方向可以看得更清楚，14世纪中后期的黑死病，消灭了欧洲1/3到1/2的人口，并且此后黑死病反复流行，长期抑制了西欧的人口增长；然而正是从那时起，欧洲的城市化率开始快速持续上升，（按五千人标准）从1300年的9.5%升至1400年的12.5%，这明显早于文艺复兴和地理大发现，更远远早于工业革命。 在2007年发表的《增长的三驾马车：瘟疫、战争和城市化》这篇论文中，经济学家Nico Voigtlander和Hans-Joachim Voth指出，正是黑死病加上连绵不绝的战争，让欧洲长时期内大幅远离马尔萨斯极限，才促成了数个世纪的城市扩张和经济繁荣，并为此后的工业革命创造了条件。 黑死病提高城市化率，并非因为它消灭了更多农村人口，恰相反，正如历史学家麦克尼尔所指出，古代城市的极高人口密度和恶劣卫生条件，令其在瘟疫中的死亡率远高于农村，这一点在欧洲尤为突出，因为不存在粪肥市场，欧洲城市的卫生条件远比中国城市差；但是，由于瘟疫大幅提高了工资率，在恩格尔定律作用下，对城市所生产的非农业产品需求大增，带来更多城市就业机会，不断吸引大批农民进入城市，这反过来又提高了瘟疫带来的死亡率。 在极限水平附近，降低人口将提高剩余率，从而让国家更容易征收税赋，供养一个更大规模的政府，这一原理为我们理解国家权力的基础提供了两个启示：首先，和传统的国家起源理论相反，国家的征税潜力和财政基础并非基于技术进步所带来的剩余，而只需要足够的暴力手段和组织能力，通过食物产出再分配压低人口水平，提高剩余率，便可获得可持续的税赋基础。 其次，尽管古代政府规模远不如现代政府那么大，但也并非都像晚期帝国的政府那么小，实际上，在人口压力还没那么大的古典时代，政府规模明显比后来的更大，相对于其人口水平，秦汉的行政系统不仅数量更多，专业化程度更高，组织更严密，对社会的控制也更深入和细致，这从简牍材料中可以得到一个直观印象。 施坚雅的研究发现，从西汉到清代，尽管人口增长了六倍，有效疆域扩大了一倍多（西汉整个南方基本上处于未开发状态），但基层行政单元并未增加，汉初1580个县，清初1510个；更有意思的是，越是战乱、分裂的人口低谷期，县反而越多，南北朝晚期只有四千万人口，却供养着2300个县政府，还有三个中央政府；同理，每个王朝初建之际，县的数量通常也处于峰值水平的1500多，随着王朝稳固，人口恢复，便逐渐下降到1200上下。 当人口压力特别巨大，以至难以征税以维持政府时，统治者甚至可能刻意压低人口；阿兹特克晚期的人口密度达到每平方公里200多，其中宜耕地区更高达500多，远高于其他早期文明，时常为饥荒所困，这一状况催生了一种独特的战争形态，这些战争并非起因于冲突或纠纷，也不是为了劫掠勒索或征服扩张，其主要目的就是尽可能多的获取俘虏，杀死并吃掉，武士的战功和晋升条件皆以捕获俘虏数量为依据。 在阿兹特克诸城邦中拥有霸主地位的三巨头，特诺奇蒂特兰、特斯科科和特拉科潘，几乎持续不断的对其他城邦发动战争，起初这些战争是为了建立纳贡和贸易关系，但后来，常规战争已满足不了对俘虏越来越大的需求，为此，城邦之间时常安排一场“花式战争”（[[xochiyaoyotl]]），在约定的时间和地点开战。 此类战争并不带来任何政治后果，也不改变外交关系，唯一的功能就是消灭部分人口并获取肉食；在阿兹特克，被用作人牲的俘虏数量非常庞大，一些重大仪式上，首先被献祭然后被吃掉的人牲，可多达8万，而一个普通城邦的人口也就几万，对于这些蛋白质高度匮乏的群体，大规模屠杀俘虏既是人口控制手段，也是重要的蛋白质来源。 印加帝国的人口密度虽没有阿兹特克那么高，宜耕区每平方公里超过120人，但安第斯高原的土地十分贫瘠，因而人口压力也很高，经济学家Louis Baudin将其称为马尔萨斯定律的绝佳案例；不过，印加人的解决方案不是杀了吃，而是计划生育和强制迁徙。 印加帝国在每个行省设有国营手工作坊，名为“太阳神处女院”，每隔一两年，行省官员便从所辖社区中挑选出一批少女，称为“选妇（aqllakuna）”，名义上，她们是印加王的候选嫔妃，实际上，其中少数被用作献祭人牲，还有少数被分配给功绩卓著的武士或贵族作为配偶，但绝大多数被终身幽禁在作坊内，纺织和酿酒，不得结婚生育，若被发现怀孕立即处死；选妇数量很庞大，规模较大的处女院可容纳数百人，而处女院在考古遗址中占有相当比例，这一制度明显有着控制生育率、压低人口的用意。 缓解人口压力的另一个办法是大规模迁移，人口过密地区的村社，被强行整体迁移到数百上千公里之外人口较稀的地区；强制迁移也是印加帝国的重要统治手段，通过彻底打散和重组原有的族群分布，传统的族群合作纽带被破坏，政治控制变得更容易，那些较为忠诚的族群被迁往边境要地，并以免税或分配大量他族女性作为补偿，不够驯服的族群则被迁入腹地，置于陌生邻居的监视之下。 印加与阿兹特克的高强度人口压力和极端人口控制手段，或许和它们的土地制度有关，这些社会始终没有形成私人土地财产权，土地皆由社区集体所有，这样，抵抗人口压力以免剩余被其耗尽的力量，就只剩下国家权力了。   ---------------------- 注1：赵冈对宋代城市化率的估算在各家中偏高，但并非最高，斯波义信估算的上限为30%，而最低估算数（柳平生与葛金芳）是13-14%，但同时，赵冈对清代城市化率的估算同样偏高，按施坚雅的较保守数据，1843年的城市化率仅为5.1%，所以，无论取高估数还是低估数，清盛期城市化率都只有南宋鼎盛期的约1/3。