人类进化历程中的音乐 Music in Human Evolution 作者：Kevin Simler @ 2015-10-16 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 来源：Melting Asphalt，http://www.meltingasphalt.com/music-in-human-evolution/ I just finished the strangest, most disconcerting little book. It's called Why Do People Sing?: Music in Human Evolution by Joseph Jordania. 我刚刚读完了一本让人称奇，又极为令人不安的小书——Joseph Jordania的《为什么人们会唱歌？——人类进化历程中的音乐》。 If the title hasn't already piqued your interest, its thesis surely will. The thesis is wild, bold, and original, but makes an eerie amount of sense. If true, it would be a revolution — and I don't use the term lightly — in how we understand the evolution of music, cooperation, warfare, and even religion. 如果这个标题还不足以激起你的兴趣，那么书中的理论一定会让你兴味盎然。该书论点狂野大胆又富于原创，但却合乎情理到可怕的程度。如果成立，它将成为我们理解音乐，人类合作，战争甚至宗教之演化过程的一项革命性理论——我一般不轻易使用“革命性”这个词。 I have my reservations about Jordania's theory (and his book), but I'll save them for a later time. As Daniel Dennett once wrote about another remarkable theory: 对于Jordania的理论（以及这本书）我仍有一些保留意见，但我打算把它们留到以后再讨论。正如Daniel Dennett曾就另一项卓越理论所写道的：

I think first it is very important to understand [the] project, to see a little bit more about what the whole shape of it is, and delay the barrage of nitpicking objections and criticisms until we have seen what the edifice as a whole is. After all, on the face of it, [the project] is preposterous... [but] I take it very seriously. 我认为首要的任务是理解这项理论，多看看它的整体是什么样的，在我们完全看清整个理论大厦前，不要急着接二连三地提出那些挑剔的反对和批评。尽管该理论表面看来荒诞不经……但我会很认真地对待它。

These are exactly my feelings about Jordania's project. Seemingly preposterous, but worth taking very seriously. 对于Jordania的工作，我的感觉也正是如此。它看似荒谬，却值得我们非常认真地对待。 0.STYLIZED FACTS 0.典型事实 I'm going to share Jordania's theory with you, but first I want to present a set of "stylized facts" — curious, disparate, and nearly inexplicable phenomena that would seem to have little relation to each other. Then I'll present the theory that (uncannily) links them all together and explains everything. 下面我将与你分享Jordania的理论，但首先，我想向你呈现一组“典型事实”——这是一组奇怪的，完全不同的，而且几乎无法解释的现象，互相之间看起来也没什么联系。之后，我会展示这项能够（以一种不可思议的方式）将它们联系在一起并且解释这一切现象的理论。 OK, brace yourself. Here come the facts: 打起精神，做好准备。让我们来看看这些“典型事实”：

• When our ancestors [1] first moved from the forest to the savannah, we were not yet capable of making tools. But early hominid evolution tended away from a physiology that would have helped us hunt and/or defend ourselves from predators. Our canine teeth receded, we became slower and weaker, and we didn't develop tough skin (in fact the opposite).
• 当我们的祖先第一次从森林中迁徙到热带稀树草原时，人类还没有获得制造工具的能力。但从生理学上看，早期原始人类的进化却并不利于人们狩猎以及防御捕食者。人类的犬齿退化了，运动变得缓慢，身体也变得更弱，而且也没有进化出坚韧的皮肤（事实上恰恰相反）。
• Lion evolution and migration seems to have mirrored early hominid patterns, both spatiotemporally and (in some ways) behaviorally and morphologically. Lions, for example, are the only social species of cat.
• 狮子的进化以及迁徙模式看起来与早期人类恰好互为镜像，不论从时间和空间上，还是从（某些方面的）行为和形态上说都是如此。举个例子，狮子是唯一一种群居的猫科动物。
• Humans are the only ground-dwelling species that sings. There are over 4000 singing species — mostly birds, but also gibbons, dolphins, whales, and seals. But they all sing from water or the trees. When a bird lands on the ground, it invariably stops singing.
• 人类是唯一一种会唱歌的地栖动物。世界上有超过4000种会唱歌的物种——其中大多数都是鸟类，此外还包括长臂猿，海豚，鲸类和海豹。但是这些物种全都是在水中或者树上唱歌。不论哪种鸟类，一旦降落到陆地上，它都会停止歌唱。
• Of all singing creatures, humans are the only ones who use rhythm.
• 在所有会唱歌的生物中，人类是唯一会使用韵律的。
• When we sing, we almost always dance, even if it's just nodding along or tapping a foot. Both singing and dancing (whether together or separate) are group activities used across the world in tribal bonding rituals. Isolated ethnic groups have remarkably similar styles of song and dance.
• 当我们唱歌时，我们几乎也总会跳起舞来，即使这种“舞蹈”也许仅仅是随着歌声点头，或者用脚打着节拍。歌唱和舞蹈（不论是同时或是分开进行的）是在世界各地的部落情感强化仪式中广泛使用的集体活动。相互孤立的族群常有着非常相似的歌曲和舞蹈风格。
• Rhythmic chanting and dancing induce trance states.
• 有节律的吟唱和舞蹈会诱导人进入恍惚状态。
• Early hominids quite possibly ate their dead, and (some while later) definitely started burying them. The instinct to preserve a dead human body from mutilation, and then to dispose of it, is fairly universal. E.g. we strive to retrieve corpses even from a battlefield.
• 早期的原始人很有可能食用同类尸体，但（在晚些时候）肯定开始埋葬尸体了。保护尸体不被损毁，将尸体妥善处置，是一种相当普遍的人类本能。一个典型的例证是，人们即使在战场上也会努力将同伴的尸体取回。

I hope you are intrigued. Each of these facts is hard to explain even in isolation. So a theory that can unify and account for all of them will have to be either profound or crazy — or both. 我希望上述事实激发了你的好奇心。这些事实中的每一条即使是孤立地来看也很难解释。一个能对这些事实做出统一解释的理论要么很深刻，要么很疯狂——也许二者兼有。 At this point I'm going to present Jordania's theory as clearly and comprehensively as I can. I'll interpolate a bit and add my own explanatory flare, but the ideas come straight out of his book. 接下来我将尽可能清晰而全面地展示Jordania的理论。我会不时插入一些自己的解释性看法，但其中的观点则直接来自于他的著作。 1.HUNTERS OR SCAVENGERS? 1.猎人还是腐食者？ When human ancestors first descended from the trees and stepped out onto the grasslands, they faced two critical problems: acquiring food and defending themselves from predators. We'll discuss food acquisition in this section and defense in the next section, but as you'll see they're linked by a similar mechanism. 当人类祖先第一次从树上下来走进草原时，他们面临着两个至关重要的问题：获取食物以及防御捕食者的捕杀。我们会这一节里讨论食物的获取，之后在下一节里讨论防御问题。但正如你将看到的，这两个问题实际上是由一种类似的机制联系在一起的。 I hadn't thought deeply about these problems until I read Jordania's book. I always imagined, naively, that early humans had been "hunter-gatherers." While this is true of later humans, it's almost certainly not true of our earliest savannah-dwelling ancestors. Gathering? yes. But hunting, especially big-game hunting, was out of the question. As I mentioned, our earliest ancestors hadn't yet learned how to make or use tools beyond simple rocks and sticks, and we were fairly weak. 在读到Jordania的书之前，我从来没有深入地思考过这些问题。我总是天真地设想，早期人类是“狩猎-采集者”。虽然之后的人类的确如此，但对于最早生活在热带稀树草原上的人类祖先而言，这几乎是不可能的。他们会采集食物吗？是的。但是狩猎，尤其是大规模的群体狩猎，则是完全不现实的。我之前提到过，除了简单的石块和树枝以外，我们最早的祖先还没有学会如何制造和使用工具，而且人类的身体也相当弱。 Yet we certainly ate meat — the archaeological record is pretty clear on that. So there's a growing consensus that we were actually scavengers (or perhaps "scavenger-gatherers"). 但是当时的人类显然是吃肉的——在这方面有相当清楚的考古学证据。所以现在学术界有了一种越来越强的共识，认为早期人类实际上是食腐者（或者也可称为“食腐-采集者”）。 Now there are two types of scavenging, two strategies for "carcass acquisition": passive and confrontational. Passive scavenging occurs when the scavenger comes across an undefended carcass. If the carcass was the result of a natural (non-predatory) death, there will be plenty to eat, assuming the scavenger finds it before putrefaction sets in (about 48 hours). 食腐行为可以分为两类，分别对应着两种不同的获取尸体方式：被动式获取和对抗式获取。当食腐者发现一具无守卫的尸体时，我们称之为被动式食腐。如果尸体是自然死亡（而非被捕食）的结果，就会有大量可供食用的肉，前提是食腐者能在尸体腐烂之前找到它（这个时间窗口约为48小时）。 But even if the carcass was killed and eaten by a predator, there's going to be some meat left on the bone. And, just as important, inside the bone. Marrow was an excellent source of calories for our early ancestors, and we were in a unique position to access it, since we could use rocks as primitive tools to break the bones open. 但即使尸体被某个掠食者杀死并吃掉，骨头上也会剩下一些肉。而且同样重要的是，在骨头里面也有可供食用的东西。对于我们早期祖先而言，骨髓是一种优质的能量来源，而且人类在获取骨髓方面处于独特的优势地位，因为人类可以将石头作为一种原始工具将骨头砸开。 The archeological record shows bones that were repeatedly smashed with "hammering stones," as well as bones that had scrape-marks, indicating that we also used sharp stones to carve off some of the clingier meat. 考古学记录显示，有些骨头被反复地用“锤石”敲碎，而有些骨头上则有刮擦的痕迹，这表明人类同样会使用锋利的石头以切下一些粘在骨头上的肉。 Now, confrontational scavenging is where it gets interesting — and also more circumstantial. Confrontational scavenging, also known as power or aggressive scavenging, happens when an animal (or group of animals) comes across a carcass that's in the process of being eaten, whether by the original predator or another scavenger. In this case, a confrontation ensues, and to the victor go the spoils. 相对来说，对抗式的食腐行为则更有趣，虽然支持证据也更为间接。对抗式食腐也被称为力量式或侵略式食腐，它通常是指当一只（或一群）动物遭遇了一具正在被其他动物（可能是最初的捕食者，也可能是其它食腐者）食用的尸体。在这种情况下，对抗随之而来，而胜者则将获得战利品。 Whether our ancestors practiced confrontational scavenging is hard to determine, given the evidence available to us at this point, but it's not a crazy idea. It happens all the time in the (non-human) animal kingdom, as when a pack of hyenas scares a lion away from its kill. 通过当前所能获得的证据，我们很难确定人类祖先是否有过对抗式食腐行为，但这并不是一个疯狂的想法。在动物王国（不包括人类）中，对抗式的食腐行为时刻都在发生，例如一群鬣狗会将一头狮子从它杀死的猎物身边吓走。 2.DEFENSE FROM PREDATORS 2.防御捕食者的捕杀 Along with finding food, defense from predators is crucial to the survival of any species, and ours presents a puzzle. 除了寻找食物之外，防御捕食者的捕杀对于任何物种的生存而言都至关重要，而我们祖先在这方面则给我们留下了一个谜题。 We definitely had predators — lions, principally, but also other big cats (jaguars, leopards), as well as hyenas and maybe crocodiles. (Or more accurately, the ancestors of those species, since they've been evolving just as we have. Hyena-ancestors, for example, were much larger than their modern descendants.) 很明显，有些动物会捕杀人类——主要是狮子，但也包括其它的大型猫科动物（美洲虎，豹子等），此外，鬣狗，可能还有鳄鱼，也会将人类当作捕猎对象。（更准确地说，是这些动物的祖先，因为和人类一样，这些物种也一直在进化。举例来说，鬣狗的祖先就比它们生活在今天的后代要大得多。） Physically, early humans were quite weak — and getting weaker with each generation. As I mentioned earlier, our canines were receding and our skin was growing softer. And we were getting bigger, it's true, but not stronger. Our size developed in service of bipedalism, which made us both weaker and slower(!). 从身体上说，早期人类是很弱的——而且还在一代代地变得更弱。正如我之前所提到的，人类的犬齿在退化，而且皮肤也变得更加柔软。人类的体型在变得更大，这是事实，但并没有变得更强壮。人类的体型是为了适应两足行走而变得更大，但这却让人类的身体变得更弱，也变得更慢。 A chimpanzee, for instance, is roughly twice as strong as a modern human, and can run just as fast if not faster. In the general case, bipedalism results in slower sprinting speeds, even if it increases efficiency (allowing us to walk/run for longer stretches). 例如，黑猩猩身体的强壮程度大约是现代人的两倍，而且并不比人类跑得慢。总体上说，两足行走降低了人类短距离奔跑的速度，即使它的确提升了效率（这让我们能够行走/奔跑更长的距离）。 Across the animal kingdom there are various strategies for evading or defending against predators, known in the literature as antipredator adaptations. Each adaptation defends against one of the four stages of predation: detection, attack, capture, and consumption. 在整个动物王国中，存在许多不同的躲避或防御捕食者捕杀的策略，这些策略在文献中被称为反捕食者适应性。每一种适应性都是为了防御猎食过程中的四个阶段之一：侦查、攻击、捕捉和摄食。 To evade detection, for example, most species pursue a strategy of crypsis, aka hiding. To evade capture, species rely on speed, burrowing, climbing into trees, etc. And to evade consumption, species develop physical defenses like claws, fangs, horns, shells (or at least a tough hide), venom, etc. 例如，为了躲避捕食者的侦查，多数物种都会采用一种保护色策略，或者叫隐藏策略。而不同的物种会依靠速度、挖洞、爬树等不同方式来躲避捕食者的捕捉。为了逃避捕食者的摄食，各物种进化出了多种身体上的防御机制，例如利爪、尖牙、长角、贝壳（或至少是一个坚硬的藏身之所）、毒液等等。 But early humans weren't doing any of these things. Physiologically, we weren't getting stronger or faster, or developing sharper claws or teeth or tougher skin. Nor were we trying to hide. Habitual bipedalism has its benefits, but going unnoticed in the grass certainly isn't one of them. 但是早期人类却没有做到以上的任何一件事情。生理上，人类没有变得更强壮或更快速，也没有进化出尖利的爪牙或强韧的皮肤。人类也没有试图将自己隐藏起来。习惯于两足行走当然有它的好处，但是这却让人类无法在草丛里行走时不被发现。 In fact, we seem to have evolved to become more noticeable, more conspicuous. We grew taller, we sang and made noise (the only animal who sings from the ground), we painted our bodies, and we developed strong body odor. [2] 事实上，人类似乎进化得更加容易引起注意了。人类变得更高，唱歌并且发出噪音（人类是唯一一种会在地上唱歌的动物），在身体上绘上色彩，并且进化出了浓重的体味。[2] The strategy of being conspicuous is known as aposematism: apo (away from) + sematism (signalling) = counter-signalling. Aposematism is an antipredator adaptation which prevents an attack from happening in the first place, by making it easier for the predator to recognize you as unprofitable. 这种故意引起注意的策略通常被称作“警示信号”（aposematism）：这个词的词根apo-意为“远离”，-sematism则意为“信号”，合起来的意思就是“反向信号”。“警示信号”是一种能从根源上防止捕食者发动攻击的反捕食者适应性策略，它让捕食者很容易地意识到将你作为捕食对象是一件无利可图的事情。 Species who counter-signal (aposematically) abound in nature, but they all have something up their sleeves, so to speak. Being conspicuous is a viable strategy only when you're advertising an otherwise invisible weapon. Consider the following aposematic species from across the animal kingdom: 自然世界中有许多采取这类（有警示作用的）“反向信号”策略的物种，但是可以说所有这些物种都有自己的杀手锏。只有当你的行为实际上是为了突出某种看不见的武器时，故意引起注意才是一个有效的策略。让我们来看看动物王国中的这些采用“警示信号”策略的物种：

• skunks and zorillas
• 臭鼬和非洲臭鼬
• bees, wasps, hornets, and velvet ants
• 蜜蜂，黄蜂，大黄蜂和蚁蜂
• black widows and redback spiders
• 黑寡妇蜘蛛和红背蜘蛛
• poison dart frogs and fire salamanders
• 箭毒蛙和火蜥蜴
• all manner of snakes, e.g. the coral snake
• 各种各样的蛇，例如珊瑚蛇
• flamboyant cuttlefish
• 火焰乌贼

Each of these species has a powerful defensive weapon — often some kind of venom/poison, but also noxious odors. And most species advertise this with distinctive coloration (bright and high-contrast), but some use other signals. Rattlesnakes and bees use sound, for example, and many species, including zorillas, 'mark their territory' using scents. [3] 所有的这些物种都拥有各自强大的防御武器——通常是某种毒液或毒物，也有一些是有毒气体。而其中大多数物种都会通过独特的颜色（艳丽而对比度鲜明的）来给自己的武器打广告，但有些物种也会通过其它信号来达到这个目的。例如，响尾蛇和蜜蜂使用声音，而包括非洲臭鼬在内的许多物种则通过气味来“标识”自己的领地。 Aposematism (being conspicuous) doesn't help an organism in a single encounter with a predator; in fact it's a liability. But it helps with repeated encounters. When a predator gets sprayed by a skunk or stung by a bee, it quickly learns to avoid future encounters with all members of the species. 这种（故意引起注意的）“警示信号”策略无法孤立地在一次与捕食者的遭遇中帮助某一个体逃出生天；事实上，这反而是一种拖累。但是一旦与捕食者的遭遇频繁地重复发生，这种策略就能发挥作用。当某个捕食者被臭鼬放出的气体熏到或是被蜂刺蜇过之后，它会迅速地学会在以后尽量避免去碰这些不好惹的物种。 All of this raises a most important question: how did early humans manage to get away with aposematism? What defensive weapons did we have up our sleeves? 所有这些都引出了一个最为重要的问题：早期人类是如何做到通过“警示信号”让捕食者远离自己的？他们到底有什么能够用于防身的“杀手锏”？ The answer probably won't surprise you: we used stones. It's how we used them (section 4) that's so unusual. 答案大概不会让你感到吃惊：人类会使用石器。但不寻常的地方则在于人类使用石器的方式（我们会在第4节讨论这个话题）。 3.STONES 3.石器 Stones were the most fundamental weapon at our disposal — the only means we had of causing actual physical damage to another animal. 石器是人类能够支配的最基础的武器——也是人类唯一能够对其它动物造成物理伤害的方式。 When we first started living on the savannah, we hadn't yet developed the hand/eye coordination necessary to hunt with stones (or to make and use other tools for that purpose). But self-defense is a much simpler proposition, for a number of reasons. 当人类最初开始在稀树草原上生活时，我们祖先还没有进化出使用石器捕猎所必需的手眼协调能力（或者制造和使用其它工具以进行捕猎的能力）。但由于以下的一些原因，使用石器自卫则是一个简单得多的命题。 First, using stones to hunt requires a lot of force and a lot of dexterity. You need to hit a target that's moving away from you at high speed, and gravity is not on your side. But defense is different. Defense happens up close. It's much easier to bash a lion with a large rock when the lion is coming toward you. And bringing the rock down allows gravity to work for you rather than against you. 首先，使用石器捕猎要求很大的力量以及很高的敏捷度。你需要能够准确地打中一个快速离你而去的目标，而且重力也并不站在你这一边。但自我防御则完全不同。通常防御都发生在很近的距离内。当一头狮子向你跑来时，用一块大石头砸中它会变得容易很多。而且将石头从上往下砸的动作也能够让重力助你一臂之力，而不是相反。 Moreover, attack and defense are fundamentally asymmetrical. Like in a lawsuit, where the prosecution assumes the burden of proof, in a hunt the predator assumes the burden of actually killing its prey. But to succeed at defense, you don't need to kill your would-be predator — you only need to injure it. If a lion or other competitor gets injured while attacking a human, it will flee the scene, opting to lose a meal rather than risk its life by continuing to fight. 除此之外，进攻和防御从根本上说也是两种完全不对称的行为。就像在一场诉讼中，举证的责任是由原告承担的，在一场捕猎中，杀死猎物的重担完全落在了捕食者的肩上。但是要在防御中获胜，你并不需要杀死潜在的捕猎者——你只需要弄伤它就行了。如果一头狮子或者其它捕食者在攻击人的时候受到伤害，它通常会逃离现场，相比于冒着生命危险继续搏斗下去，捕食者显然更愿意选择少吃这一顿。 And finally, defense was easier for early humans because we helped each other. In most of these circumstances (while being attacked and during confrontational scavenging raids), we had group members by our sides, ready to throw their own stones if others in the group became incapacitated. 最后，对于早期人类而言，防御捕食者之所以变得更容易，还因为人类会互相帮助。在绝大多数情况下（当遇到捕食者的攻击，以及在对抗式食腐的遭遇战中），人类拥有众多一起战斗的同伴，如果同伴中有人丧失了行动能力，他们时刻都准备着掷出手中的石头以帮助他。 Cooperation was indeed our biggest advantage, and our early ancestors refined it, quite literally, to a high art. 事实上，协作才是人类所拥有的最大优势，而我们的祖先则将这个优势发扬光大，毫不夸张地说，他们将协作上升到了艺术的高度。 4.AUDIO-VISUAL INTIMIDATION DISPLAY 4.恐吓性视听展示 Here, finally, is the crux of Jordania's thesis. His claim is that early humans developed a unique defense he calls the Audio-Visual Intimidation Display: 到这里，我们终于触及了Jordania理论中最关键的部分。他的观点是，早期人类发展出了一种被他称作“恐吓性视听展示”的独特防御机制。

My suggestion is that our ancestors turned loud singing into a central element of their defence system against predators. They started using loud, rhythmic singing and shouting accompanied by vigorous, threatening body movements and object throwing to defend themselves from predators. [4] 我对此的看法是，人类祖先将大声歌唱的行为转化为了对抗捕食者的防御机制中的一个核心要素。他们使用大声而富有节律的歌唱和叫喊，伴以有力而富有威胁性的身体动作以及向对方投掷各种物品来防御捕食者的进攻。

Before we go any further, I'd like you to see the AVID in action. Amazingly, some 'primitive' ethnic groups have maintained an AVID-like tradition into modern times. The kailao war dance of the Wallisian people and the Samoan cibi are two examples, but the best-documented tradition is the haka of the New Zealand Māori. 在我们更进一步之前，我希望你能够看看“恐吓性视听展示”（AVID）这种行为是什么样子的。令人惊讶的是，一些“原始的”人类族群将此类传统保留到了现代。瓦利斯群岛原住民的kailao战舞和萨摩亚人的cibi战舞是其中的两个例子，而被记载得最全面的此类传统则是新西兰毛利人的haka战舞。 Wikipedia describes the haka as 维基百科对haka战舞的描述如下：

a traditional ancestral war cry, dance or challenge from the Māori people of New Zealand. It is a posture dance performed by a group, with vigorous movements and stamping of the feet with rhythmically shouted accompaniment.... 新西兰毛利人的一种继承自祖先的传统战争呼喊、舞蹈或挑战形式。这是一种由群体表演的姿势性舞蹈，伴之以有力的动作和脚步的冲踏以及有节奏的大声喊叫... Various actions are employed in the course of a performance, including facial contortions such as showing the whites of the eyes and the poking out of the tongue, and a wide variety of vigorous body actions such as slapping the hands against the body and stamping of the feet. As well as chanted words, a variety of cries and grunts are used. 整个表演过程中包含了多种行为，包括面部表情的扭曲——例如翻出眼白和伸出舌头，以及一系列有力的身体动作——例如用手掌拍击身体和脚步的冲踏。还有高声喊出的话语，一系列的呼喊和低沉的咕哝声都被用于其中。

For a demonstration we now turn to YouTube. Here's a video of a haka by the New Zealand army, showing just how visually and auditorily intimidating it could be: 现在让我们上YouTube来看看haka战舞的演示。下面是一段新西兰军队表演的haka战舞，这段视频充分显示了这种战舞在视觉和听觉上具有多么强的恐吓力量： https://youtu.be/-rDoV0EBu44 And here's a more traditional version: 下面这段视频则记录了一段更传统的haka战舞： https://youtu.be/BI851yJUQQw The point of the AVID (of which the haka is the best-known example) is: “恐吓性视听展示”（haka战舞是其中最富盛名的例子）的意义在于：

• To intimidate competitors with loud sounds. Shouting in unison is clearly the best way to do this, because the result is far louder than any sound an individual human can make. But clapping, slapping, stomping, and banging rocks together would have added nicely to the cacophony.
• 用响亮的声音来恐吓对手。同时发出喊声显然是最好的办法，因为这种喊声比单独的一个人所能发出的声音要响亮得多。而同时伴以击掌，拍击身体，跺脚以及敲击石头这些动作则能够恰如其分地为这种刺耳的声音添油加醋。
• To intimidate competitors visually. The synchronized movements, body paint, and bizarre gestures (including facial expressions) would confuse and intimidate even the fiercest competitors.
• 在视觉上恐吓对手。这些同步的动作，身体上的绘画，以及奇怪的姿势（包括面部的奇怪表情）能够迷惑和恐吓甚至是那些最强悍的对手。
• To project the image of a single, powerful organism. As Jordania puts it, "rhythmically well-organized group vocalizations [and movements] send a strong message to the predator about the unity and determination of the group." Although the group is composed of individual humans, during an AVID the group acts as if it were a single, multiheaded, many-armed creature. In some ways it's a fiction, but as far as the competitor is concerned, if the movements and actions are sufficiently coordinated, the group becomes a unitary beast for all intents and purposes.
• 为了呈现一个强大的单一有机体的形象。如同Jordania所说，“富有节奏的有序的集体发声（和动作）向捕食者传递着关于这个群体的团结和决心的强烈信息。”尽管群体是由单独的个人组成的，在“恐吓性视听展示”的过程中，这样一个群体所表现出的行为就好像它是一个有着多个脑袋和无数只手的单一生物个体。从某种角度看来，这是一种欺骗行为，但是对于这个群体的对手来说，如果这种动作和行为足够地协调，这个群体实际上就成为了一只整一的怪兽。

Remember, the AVID would have been used for confrontational scavenging as well as defense against predators — and would have included rocks as physical weapons to fall back on when the intimidation display wasn't perfectly effective as a non-contact defense. 记住，“恐吓性视听展示”除了会在防御捕食者的攻击时使用之外，也同样适用于对抗性食腐的场景——而这种恐吓性的展示行为毕竟只是一种非接触的防御行为，一旦它不能完美地发挥作用，人们还需要求助于石头这样的物理性武器。 5.BATTLE TRANCE 5.“战斗恍惚”状态 Jordania also suggests that humans evolved a specific state of consciousness — the battle trance — to go along with the Audio-Visual Intimidation Display. This state has several characteristics: Jordania还认为，伴随着“恐吓性视听展示”行为，人类进化出了一种被称为“战斗恍惚”的特殊意识状态。这种状态有如下的几个特征：

• Analgesia and aphobia — no pain and no fear.
• 痛感缺失和恐惧缺失——感受不到疼痛和恐惧。
• Neglect of individual survival instincts.
• 忽视了个体的生存本能。
• Loss of individual identity and acquisition of a collective identity.
• 失去个人身份意识并获得集体的身份意识。

Central to the battle trance is the notion of collective or group identity: “战斗恍惚”状态的核心是集体（或群体）认同的概念：

Like in a well-established combat unit, where in the heat of the battle one can sacrifice his own life to save a friend's life, human ancestors developed the feel of group identity. The feel of group identity is based on the total trust and dedication of each member of the group to the common interest. 在一个稳固的作战单位中，当战斗进行得如火如荼时，一个战士可以为了拯救伙伴的生命牺牲自己。同样的，人类祖先也进化出了一种类似的集体认同感。集体认同感建立在对集体中所有成员的完全信任和对于集体共同利益的奉献精神之上。 Group identity kicks in when there is a critical situation, a mortal danger for survival of the group or any of its members. In such moments, the noble principle of 'One for all, all for one' rules any individual self-preserving instinct, fear and pain. 在某个生死攸关的时刻，当整个集体或其中某个成员的生存处于危险之中，集体身份意识就会发挥作用。在这样的时刻，“我为人人，人人为我”这种高尚的原则会超越任何个体的自我保护本能、恐惧和疼痛，主导集体成员的行为。

This state of consciousness may have originally evolved for parents (especially mothers) to defend their children when threatened, but it was repurposed for group defense and confrontational scavenging. And in the process, we developed a new trigger for it: rhythmic chanting and synchronized body movements. 这种意识状态可能最初是从父母（尤其是母亲）在受到威胁时保护孩子的本能中进化出来的，但之后被用于集体防御和对抗性食腐行为中。而在这个过程中，人类发展出了一种新的触发这种状态的机制：有节奏的吟唱和同步化的肢体动作。

Evolution supplied powerful neurological mechanisms to make this feeling a positive experience. Going into group identity brings the most exhilarating feelings to every member of the group. Every member of the group feels bigger, feel stronger, and virtually feels immortal.... Group members in such an altered state of mind, when they share total trust with each other, emotionally believe that the group cannot be defeated. 进化为将这种感觉变成一种积极的体验提供了强大的神经机制。进入集体身份意识状态为集体中的所有成员带来了一种最为振奋的感觉。集体中的所有人都感觉到自己变得更大，更强，并且几乎感觉到自己是不朽的……在这意识状态中，集体成员分享着对彼此的完全信任，他们会在感情上相信这个集体是不可战胜的。 This unique altered state of mind is supported (and most likely caused) by the powerful neurological substances such as endorphins and oxytocin, which are momentarily released in the brain when a critical survival situations arises. As the neurological substances are released into the brain, feelings of pain and fear are blocked, and total trust and exhilaration of being part of a supernaturally strong unit becomes overwhelming. 这种特别的意识状态是由诸如脑内啡（endorphin）和催产素（oxytocin）这类强大的神经物质所支持的（而且非常可能是由它们引发的），当某种生死攸关的状况出现时，大脑中会暂时释放出这些物质。一旦它们被释放到大脑中，疼痛和恐惧的感觉就被阻断了，而成为某个超自然的强大整体的一部分所带来的完全信任和振奋感则变得不可阻挡。

Actual combat isn't as central to our lives in the 21st century, but the battle trance and feelings of collective identity still echo in many of our modern rituals of solidarity, which I wrote about last year, and they're particularly pronounced in religion/politics and team/spectator sports. 真实的战斗在我们21世纪的生活中已经变得不那么重要了，但正如我在去年曾写道过的，在许多现代的团体性仪式中，我们仍然可以找到“战斗恍惚”和集体身份意识状态的影子。在宗教性/政治性活动以及集体性/观赏性体育项目中，它们表现得尤其明显。 6.CANNIBALISM (AND BURIAL) OF THE DEAD 6.吃掉（并埋葬）同类的尸体 As if Jordania's theory didn't cover enough ground already, he has one last surprise in store for us. He claims that early humans practiced cannibalism of their dead as a key part of their comprehensive antipredator strategy. 即使到了这里，Jordania的理论似乎仍然意犹未尽，他还为我们准备了最后一个惊喜。他声称，早期人类吃掉自己同类尸体这种行为实际上是他们整体的防御捕食者捕杀策略中非常重要的一环。 If you recall from section 2, the goal of aposematism is to advertise that, as a piece of prey, you are decidedly unprofitable for the predator. If a predator can easily recognize you (and other members of your species), and remembers getting burned during past encounters, it will quickly learn to stop attacking you in the first place. 回想一下我们在第2节里所提到的，“警示信号”这种策略的目的是让捕食者确认将你作为食物是一件无利可图的事情。如果捕食者能够轻易地认出你（以及你同类的其它成员），并且记起在之前的教训，它就会迅速意识到从一开始就不应该向你发起攻击。 Given this strategy, it's very important not to let the lions (or any other predator) get away with killing and eating a human. The more our ancestors were able to reinforce the message that humans are not a (good) meal, the safer they would be across repeated encounters. This was especially important for early humans because, unlike an actually poisonous species, human meat is worth eating, if a predator can get away with it. 在这种策略之下，不要让狮子（或者其它的任何捕食者）成功地杀死并吃掉人类就变得非常重要。人类祖先们越是能够强化“人类不是好食物”这条信息，在与捕食者们不断的重复相遇中他们就会越安全。对于早期人类来说这一点尤其重要，因为人并不是一种有毒性的物种，如果捕食者能够成功地捕杀人类，人肉其实是很有食用价值的。 This implies a heavy selection pressure for the following behaviors among our ancestors: 这就意味着，自然选择在引导人类祖先做出如下一些行为方面施加了很重的压力：

• If a predator attacks during a confrontation, make sure it gets injured.
• 如果捕食者在对抗中发动了攻击，必须保证将它弄伤。
• If a predator manages to kill one of your fellow humans, don't let it eat. Retrieve the body of your fallen comrade or your whole tribe will be in danger.
• 如果捕食者成功地杀死了你的同类，不要让它吃掉尸体。将你死去同伴的尸体弄回来，否则你的整个部落都将处于危险之中。
• When a human dies naturally, make sure the corpse is properly disposed of. The corpse is a liability because a predator will associate even a scavenged meal (of human meat) with 'profitability'.
• 当一个人自然死亡，必须保证尸体被以一种适当的方式处理掉。人类尸体实际上会成为一种负担，因为即使是一顿腐肉（人肉）大餐也会让捕食者认为吃人肉是有利可图的。

None of this implies that our ancestors had to practice cannibalism of their dead. Any means of keeping human meat out of the mouths of predators would have been effective. But there's some evidence that suggests cannibalism (stone scrapings on human bones similar to the scrapings on the bones of other animals), and if calories were hard to come by, it might have been an ecological necessity. 上面的任何一点都不意味着人类的祖先必须吃掉同类的尸体。任何一种不让人肉落入捕食者口中的方法都是有效的。但是一些证据表明人类的确会吃掉同类的尸体（人骨上和其它动物的骨头上都有类似的的石器划痕），而且如果能量并不是那么容易获取，吃掉同类尸体可能也是一种生态上的必要做法。 CONCLUSION 结论 There's so much more to say about this theory, but I'll save most of it for another time. 关于Jordania的这个理论，可说的还有很多，但我会把它们留到以后。 I'd just like to end by showing how some our beliefs and behaviors take on new significance in light of Jordania's theory, especially those that relate to how we handle the bodies of our dead. 我只是希望通过展示Jordania的理论能够如何为人类的一些信仰和行为赋予新的意义来结束这篇文章，特别是那些与我们处理同类尸体的方式相关的部分。 Funerary traditions vary widely around the world, but all have one thing in common: disposal of the body. Mechanisms include burial, entombment, mummification, burial at sea, sky burial [5], and ritual cannibalism, and even more exotic mechanisms like hanging coffins or tree burial. 世界各地的葬礼传统差异非常大，但是所有这些传统都有一个共同的特征：将尸体处理掉。处理尸体的机制包括土葬、墓葬、干尸化、海葬、天葬以及食人仪式，甚至还存在一些更加奇异的机制，例如悬棺葬和树葬等。 The common reasons given for disposal practices are all public-health-related, but intentional burial is at least 225,000 years old. Of course our ancestors wouldn't want a corpse rotting in their camp, but there's quite a leap from disposal to burial. Why not just drag the corpse away from camp and expose it to the elements? 通常人们对于这些处理尸体方式的解释都与公共卫生相关，但是人类从至少22.5万年前就开始有意识地埋葬尸体了。我们的祖先们当然不会希望尸体在他们的营地中腐烂，但是从处理掉尸体到埋葬尸体是一个不小的飞跃。他们为什么不只是简单地把尸体拖到远离营地的地方然后让它自然腐烂呢？ Jordania's theory doesn't predict how exactly we should dispose of our dead, but it predicts that we should care an awful lot about it (i.e. that it should be something sacred), and that we should be especially concerned that the body doesn't fall into the wrong hands. In Paleolithic times, this ensured that our ancestors retrieved the bodies of their comrades when they were killed by predators. Jordania的理论并没有对人类应该如何处理尸体做出具体的预言，但是它预测了人类应该对处理尸体的方式给予高度重视（例如，它应该是一种神圣的仪式），而且人类需要特别注意不能让尸体落入那些它不应该落入的对象手里。在石器时代，这意味着我们祖先会将他们被杀死的同伴尸体从捕食者那里抢回来。 But you can see vestiges of this in historic times — e.g. in our concern for salvaging bodies of the war dead. Mutilating or otherwise desecrating the war dead is an ancient practice, a ghastly way for the victor to show utter dominance over the loser. 但在历史上的各个时期中，你都能看到这种做法的痕迹——例如在战争中人们对于寻回战死者尸体的关切。毁尸或是以其它方式亵渎敌方战死者的尸体是一种古老的传统，这是一种胜者用以展示对失败者的完全统治的可怕方式。 And finally, Jordania's theory helps explain the religious nature of our funerary practices. Burial has always been a quintessentially religious practice. For example, we date the earliest religious behavior in our ancestors by when they started burying their dead. But religions are fundamentally about the living — a set of beliefs and practices that relate to collective identity and tribal cohesion. 最后，Jordania的理论还能够帮助解释人类葬礼活动的宗教性。葬礼一直是一项典型的宗教活动。例如，我们总是将人类祖先最早的宗教行为追溯到他们开始埋葬同类尸体的时刻。但是宗教从本质上说是关于活着的人的——它是一系列与集体身份意识和部落凝聚力相关的信仰和实践。 Why do religions care about the disposal of corpses? This has always puzzled me. It's always seemed like such a mundane concern. When someone dies, that should be the end of what we care about, and removing the body should be no more sacred than taking out the trash. Chimpanzees, for instance, can perceive when another chimp passes away (and mourn), but they soon lose interest in the body. 为什么宗教会关注处理处理尸体的方式？我长久以来都被这个问题困扰着。因为对尸体的处理看起来总是更像一个世俗的问题。当一个人死去，我们对于他的关注也应该随之结束了，而将尸体处理掉这件事情并不应该比我们清除垃圾的行为更加神圣。例如，当同类死去时，黑猩猩会对此有所感知（并感到悲伤），但是它们会迅速失去对同类尸体的兴趣。 But if Jordania is right, it's no coincidence that death rituals are intimately bound up with collective identity, because they're two parts of the same system. 但如果Jordania是对的，那么与死亡相关的仪式会与集体身份意识天然地联系在一起就并不是巧合了，因为它们实际上是从属于同一个体系的两个部分。 ------------------------------------ Update 2015/10/16. For the record, I don't think Jordania's theory explains (or even tries to explain) the lyrical aspects of music — only rhythm. But it's the only plausible account I've read that explains how music may have helped us survive. There's always the mate-selection hypothesis, of course. 更新于2015年10月16日。郑重声明，我并不认为Jordania的理论解释了（甚至仅仅是试图解释）音乐的抒情部分——他的理论所解释的仅仅是音乐的韵律部分。但这是我所读到过的唯一能够合理地解释音乐是如何帮助人类生存下来的理论。当然，关于这方面的理论还有配偶选择假说。 Endnotes 尾注 [1] human ancestors. I'm going to write about "human ancestors" and "early humans" — or sometimes simply "us" — knowing that there are more precise terms to describe the different stages (and branches) of our evolutionary path. Please forgive me — I'm not particularly steeped in the distinctions, and I doubt many of my readers are either. [1] 人类祖先。在下面我将会经常使用“人类祖先”以及“早期人类”——有时也会仅仅使用“我们”这个代词——来指代人类进化道路上的不同阶段（以及分支），虽然我知道还有更加精确的术语来描述它，但请原谅我在这里没有使用它们，因为我并不觉得这些术语之间的差异有多么重要，而且我怀疑我的读者中许多人也和我有同感。 [2] singing, body painting, body odor. It's unclear whether early humans actually sang habitually, painted their bodies, or had B.O., but modern humans certainly do, and there's a case to be made for our ancestors as well. Red ochre is noted as far back as 100,000 years ago, but earlier humans could easily have used simpler preparations like blood or berries, which would have left no trace in the archeological record. [2] 歌唱，体绘，和体味。现在仍不清楚早期人类是否会习惯性地歌唱、在身体上绘画、或者有体味，但现代人身上显然的确存在这些特点，而对于我们祖先而言，也的确存在这方面的可能性。氧化铁作为一种红色颜料最早可以追溯到十万年前，但早期人类也许能够轻易地使用血液和浆果这些更简单的颜料，而这些则并不会在考古学记录上留下痕迹。 [3] aposematism. A particularly interesting example is stotting — when a gazelle springs into the air by lifting all four feet off the ground simultaneously. Stotting is an aposematic display because (1) it makes the gazelle more visible, but (2) it's an honest signal of unprofitability. By stotting, a gazelle signals to a potential predator, "I'm in peak physical condition. Don't both chasing me, because I can easily outrun you." [3] “警示信号”策略。这方面一个特别有趣的例子是“跳跑”——这指的是羚羊四蹄同时离地，将身体弹到空中。“跳跑”之所以是一种具有警示信号的策略，主要是因为（1）它让羚羊更容易被看见，（2）这是一种真实地表明向羚羊发动攻击无利可图的信号。通过“跳跑”的动作，羚羊向潜在的捕食者发出了这样一个信号，“我的身体状态正处在巅峰。不用费工夫来追我了，因为我可以轻易地跑赢你。” [4] Audio-Visual Intimidation Display. I'm taking a couple liberties here. For one, Jordania calls it an "intimidating" display, but I prefer the noun form. But more substantively, Jordania lumps our morphological changes (bipedalism, hair, etc.) into the AVID, whereas I'm presenting the AVID as just the behavioral part (rhythmic chanting and dancing). [4] “恐吓性视听展示”。在这里我有两处自由发挥的地方。其一是Jordania在表达“恐吓性”这个意思时实际上使用的是intimidating这个词，但是我觉得使用名词形式更好一些。而更具实质意义的一点区别则是，Jordania将人类的一些形态学变化（例如双足行走，毛发等）也归入了“恐吓性视听展示”的范畴，而我仅仅对“恐吓性视听展示”的行为部分（有节奏地喊叫和舞蹈）进行了说明。 [5] sky burial. Yes, during a sky burial we let another animal eat our corpses, but they are always scavenging birds (e.g. vultures), never a potential predator. See also Dakhma for the Zoroastrian tradition. [5] 天葬。在天葬仪式中人类的确让别的动物吃掉了同类的尸体，但是这类动物都是腐食性的鸟类（例如秃鹫），而从来不会是某种潜在的捕食者。关于这个问题，可参考Dakhma对于琐罗亚斯德教传统的论著。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Good News Is Unplanned 好事无须规划 作者：Ronald Bailey @ 2015-10-30 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/30/good-news-is-unplanned Incremental, bottom-up, trial-and-error innovation yields moral progress, superior technologies, and greater wealth. Top-down mandates from centralized authorities are more likely to produce ethical disasters, technological stagnation, and persistent poverty. "Bad news is man-made, top-down, purposed stuff, imposed on history," Matt Ridley writes in The Evolution of Everything. "Good news is accidental, unplanned, emergent stuff that gradually evolves." 缓慢增长的、自下而上的、试错式的创新，产生了道德的进步、先进的技术和更多的财富。来自中央权威、自上而下的命令，最容易造成道德灾难、技术停滞和持续贫穷。“坏事都是人为的、自上而下的、刻意设计、故意强加给历史的东西，” Matt Ridley在《万物之进化》中写道。“好事都是意外的、未经计划的、缓慢进化的偶然事件。” Ridley, a British journalist who has written extensively about science, economics, and technological progress, begins by explaining the fundamentals of biological evolution by natural selection: Biological complexity evolves through random mutation followed by non-random survival. Ridley then argues that the Darwinian process is a "special theory of evolution" that is embedded in a more "general theory of evolution that applies to much more than biology." Ridley是一位广泛涉猎科学、经济学和技术进步的英国记者，在本书开头就解释了生物经由自然选择而进化的基础：生物的复杂性来自随机变异和紧随其后的非随机的适者生存。然后Ridley提出，达尔文过程（Darwinian process）只是一个特殊的进化理论，它包含在一个不止适用于生物学的更一般的进化论之中。 Decentralized evolution by trial and error, Ridley argues, is the chief way improvements have emerged in all sorts of human endeavor, including "morality, the economy, culture, language, technology, cities, firms, education, history, law, government, God, money, and society." As the 18th-century Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson argued, these phenomena are the result of human action, but not of human design. By book's end, Ridley has adeptly dismantled all forms of creationism, divine and Progressive. Ridley认为，通过试错而实现的分散进化是人类各种事业实现进步的主要途径，包括“道德、经济、文化、语言、技术、城市、公司、教育、历史、法律、政府、上帝、金钱和社会。”如18世纪苏格兰哲学家Adam Ferguson所说，这些现象都是人类行为的结果，而不是人类设计的结果。到书的结尾，Ridley已手法娴熟地拆解了所有类型的创造论，无论是诉诸神灵的还是进步主义的版本。 Consider the evolution of culture. More and more, cultural anthropologists have come to accept the view that—to quote a recent paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences—"human cultural groups have all the key attributes of a Darwinian evolutionary system." As Ridley explains, "Our habits and our institutions, from language to cities, are constantly changing, and the mechanism of change turns out to be surprisingly Darwinian: it is gradual, undirected, mutational, inexorable, combinatorial, selective and in some vague sense progressive." 不妨考虑一下文化的进化。越来越多的文化人类学家已经接受“人类文化群体具有达尔文进化系统所有的关键特征”——这一表述引自《行为与脑科学》上最近的一篇论文。Ridley解释道，“从语言到城市，我们的习性和制度都在不断变化，而令人吃惊的是，这些变化的原理被证明是达尔文式的：它是渐进的，无预定方向的，突变的，无情的，组合的，选择性的，并且在某种意义上是进步的。” One example: the institution of marriage. As our hunter-gatherer ancestors evolved into herders and farmers, polygamy became more common, since some men could now accumulate the resources needed to support and defend more than one woman and their progeny. However, polygamy has a big downside: Male sexual competition produces lots of violence. While some 80 percent of the distinct cultures identified by anthropologists still sanction polygamy, monogamy is by far now the most common form of marriage. Why? 举个例子：婚姻制度。随着我们狩猎采集的祖先演变成牧民和农民，一夫多妻制变得更常见，因为此时一些男性已能够积累起足够的资源来养活、守护多位女性及其后代。然而，一夫多妻制有个重大缺陷：男性性竞争会产生诸多暴力。尽管在已被人类学家辨明的不同文化中，约80%仍然实行一夫多妻制，但是到现在，一夫一妻制已经成了最常见的婚姻形式。为什么？ The University of British Columbia anthropologist Joseph Henrich and his colleagues argue that societies that adopted normative monogamy increased their social solidarity and trust thus enhancing "the competitive success of the polities, nations and religions that adopted this cultural package." The upshot is that in the modern world, cultures where polygamy still thrives tend to be marginalized, poor, and violent. 英属哥伦比亚大学的人类学家Joseph Henrich和他同事们认为，接受标准一夫一妻制的社会提高了社会的团结和信任，因此增加了“接受一夫一妻制这一文化一揽子方案的政治组织、国家和宗教的竞争成功率。”最终结果就是在当今世界，一夫多妻制仍盛行的文化多是被边缘化的、贫穷的和充满暴力的。 Henrich and his colleagues also speculate that "the peculiar institutions of monogamous marriage may help explain why democratic ideals and notions of equality and human rights first emerged in the West." This egalitarian impulse, interestingly, may behind the evolving inclination toward including same-sex unions in the institution of marriage. Henrich和他同事们推断，“一夫一妻的婚姻制度也可能有助于解释为何民主的典范和平等与人权的概念首先出现在西方。”有趣的是，这种平等主义的冲动或许隐藏在这样一种进化倾向背后，即向包括同性结合的婚姻制度的进化。 What about the evolution of economics? Prior to the 18th century, top-down extraction of wealth by elites from hapless serfs and peasants was the nearly universal form of economic and political organization among settled societies. The result was persistent and pervasive poverty. 那么经济的进化呢？18世纪以前，精英阶层对于不幸的奴隶和农民自上而下的财富压榨几乎是所有稳定社会普遍的经济和政治组织形式。结果是持续和普遍的贫穷。 As the University of Groningen economist Angus Maddison has shown, economic growth proceeded at the stately pace of less than 0.1 percent per year in Western Europe for more than 18 centuries, rising in constant dollars from $425 per year in AD 1 to $1,200 in 1820. Towards the end of that period, a socioeconomic mutation—market liberalism—arose in Britain and the Netherlands. 正如格罗宁根（Groningen）大学经济学家Angus Maddison所展示的，在长达18个世纪的时间里，西欧的经济增长都稳定在每年0.1%以下，以不变价美元计，从公元元年的425美元涨到了1820年的1200美元。到了这段时期的末尾，一个社会经济的巨变———市场自由主义——在英国和荷兰出现了。 As it spread around the world, the mutation proved highly advantageous to the societies that accepted some degree of it, enabling them to prosper. This "great enrichment," as the University of Illinois at Chicago economist Deidre McCloskey calls it, boosted average incomes 10- to 20-fold in those countries where the mutation took hold. 随着它传遍全世界，这一突变被证明对于那些多少接受了它的社会非常有利，让他们变得繁荣。这次“财富大爆发”（伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校经济学家Deidre McCloskey语）使得发生突变的国家人均收入翻了10到20倍。 Ridley cites the economists Nick Hanauer and Eric Beinhocker, who assert that unfettered commerce is "best understood as an evolutionary system, constantly creating and trying out new solutions to problems in a similar way to how evolution works in nature. Some solutions are 'fitter' than others. The fittest survive and propagate. The unfit die." Ridley引用了经济学家Nick Hanauer 和 Eric Beinhocker的观点，他们认为最好将自由商业“理解为一个像自然进化那样不断创造、并发明出解决问题之新方法的系统。有些方法比其他方法更能“适应环境”。最适应环境的存活并增殖。不适应的就灭亡。” The consequence of competition is constant innovation, which the economist Joseph Schumpeter neatly summarized as "creative destruction." After accounting for the contributions of labor and capital, economist Robert Solow calculated that nearly 90 percent of the improvements in living standards are due to technological progress. 竞争的结果就是不断的创新，经济学家Joseph Schumpeter将其巧妙地总结为“创造性破坏”。在算上人力和资本的因素后，经济学家Robert Solow计算得出，生活水平的提高中约90%归功于技术进步。 How about technological evolution? "Biology and technology in the end boil down to systems of information...and both evolve by trial and error," writes Ridley. "Technology is in a sense a continuation of biological evolution—an imposition of informational order on a random world." 技术进化又是如何呢？“生物和技术归根结底都是一些信息系统……而且都通过试错来进化，”Ridley写道。“技术在某种意义上是生物进化的延续——一种随机世界中信息秩序的排列。” Every technology is built by recombining earlier technologies. Ridley makes the arresting but persuasive claim that, far more often than not, "scientific breakthroughs are the effect, not the cause, of technological change." In other words, technologists' tools are what enable basic researchers uncover nature's secrets. 每种技术都建立在对早前技术的重新组合之上。Ridley做出了吸引眼球但又有说服力的论断，认为多数情况下，“科学突破是技术变革的产物，而不是成因。”换言之，技术专家的工具使得基础研究人员解开自然的奥秘。 One modest example is the invention of the microscope in the 1590s by the Dutch spectacle maker Zacharias Jansen. Another is the automated gene sequencer introduced by Applied Biosystems in 1987, which ultimately made the discoveries of the Human Genome Project feasible. 一个客观的例子就是1590年代由荷兰镜片制造商Zacharias Jansen发明的显微镜。另一个例子是1987年由Applied Biosystems公司引进的自动基因测序机，最终使得人类基因组计划变得可行。 Ridley also suggests that scientific central planning, especially in the form of public funding of research, poses problems. In 2015, for example, the Institute for International Economics found that research and development in "the business sector had high social returns, and hence contributed to growth, but there was no evidence in this analysis of positive effects from government R&D." Ridley还认为，对科学的中央计划会制造问题，尤其是以公共财政资助研究这种形式。比如说，国际经济研究所在2015年发现，商业部门的研发“有着较高的社会回报，而且因此促进了经济增长，但是该项分析中没有证据表明政府研发存在积极影响。” It would be really surprising if government R&D did not help give birth to some technological breakthroughs—nuclear power and the Internet leap to mind. Still, a 2014 paper published in PLoS Medicine estimated that 85 percent of public research resources are wasted. 如果说政府研发对于一些技术突破——毫无帮助，这肯定会让人非常吃惊——有人会想到核能和互联网这样的例子。然而，一篇发表在2014年《PLoS Medicine》 杂志上的论文估计，有85%的公共研究资源是被浪费掉的。 What's more, a 2015 study in PLoS Biology alarmingly suggested that half of all preclinical research is irreproducible. Replication and cumulative knowledge production are cornerstones of the scientific progress. This means that in U.S. that about $28 billion in annual public biomedical research funding, arguably, is squandered. 更有甚者，发表于《 PLoS Biology》的一项研究惊人地表明，一半的前临床研究都是不可重复的。重复和可累计知识的生产是科学发展的基石。这意味着美国每年的公共生物医药研究资金中，约有280亿美元可认为被浪费了。 And then there is the evolution of government. States emerged from protection rackets in which a gang monopolizing violence demanded payment of goods and services—taxes—in exchange for promises to defend local farmers and artisans from predation by rival gangs. "Tudor monarchs and the Taliban are cut from exactly the same cloth," summarizes Ridley. 然后是政府的进化。国家脱胎于暴力垄断集团的保护网机制，他们承诺保护当地农民和工匠免受竞争团伙的侵害，作为交换他们要求受保护者支付货物或服务——即税收。“都铎王朝的国王和塔利班都是一个模子刻出来的，”Ridley总结道。 But two to three centuries ago, the fractured polities of Western Europe provided an open, speculative space where novel ideas about property rights, free trade, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and limits on government could mutate and grow. Where those bottom-up conceptual mutations took hold, technological innovation sped forward, incomes rose, and civil liberties were recognized. 但是两三个世纪以前，西欧支离破碎的政体结构为有关财产权、自由贸易、宗教自由、出版自由、限制政府等新思想提供了开放的探索空间，让这些创新理念得以变化和生长。哪里发生了这些自下而上的观念突变，哪里的技术创新就会加速，收入增长，公民自由得到承认。 Once established, liberal societies are veritable evolution machines that frenetically generate new mutations and swiftly recombine them to produce a vast array of new products, services, and social institutions that enable ever more people to flourish. So far liberal societies are outcompeting—in the sense of being richer and more appealing—those polities that are closer to the original protection rackets. 自由社会一旦建成，它就成了一架真正的进化机器，疯狂地产生新突变，并迅速将突变重新结合生产出一系列新产品、新服务和新机构，使得更多人获益。到目前为止，在变得更富裕和更吸引人这方面，自由社会完胜那些更接近最初保护网机制的政体。 “Perhaps," Ridley hopefully suggests, "the state is now evolving steadily towards benign and gentle virtue." He adds, "Perhaps not." In support of evolving benignity is the fact that the ratio of countries rated as free by Freedom House increased from 29 percent in 1973 to 47 percent in 2007. “或许，”Ridley满怀希望地认为，“国家正在向着善意和温良的美德稳步进化着。”他补充道，“也可能不是这样。”支持良性进化的一个事实是，被自由之家（Freedom House）评定为自由国家的比例已经由1973年的29%增长到2007年的47%。 Since then the spread of liberty has faltered. Ridley notes that "creationism in government shows no signs of fading." Communism and fascism are examples of man-made top-down creationism that produced plenty of bad-news history in the last century. 但自那之后，自由的传播已缓滞不前。Ridley提到“关于政府的创世论没有衰退的迹象。”共产主义和法西斯主义便是人为的自上而下的创世论，导致了上世纪的诸多历史惨剧。 Biological evolution has no end goals; those creatures that survive reproduce. Presumably the sorts of cultural, economic, technological, and governmental evolution described by Ridley also do not have end goals. What survives, replicates. It is not impossible that some future cultural mutation might arise and outcompete market liberalism. Yet as a constant novelty-generating dynamo, market liberalism has pretty good chance of staying ahead of mutations that tend in more authoritarian directions. 生物进化没有终极目标；存活的生物繁殖不息。也许Ridley所描述的各种文化、经济、技术和政府进化也都没有终极目标。得以存留的就不断复制。未来出现一些文化突变并胜过市场自由主义也不是不可能。然而作为一个持久的创新发动机，市场自由主义很可能继续领先于那些倾向于专制的突变体。 There is another way to think of the developments that are the result of human action, but not of human design. Human beings, through a long process of trial and error (mostly error), are slowly discovering our own given natures. We chance upon habits, institutions, moralities that increasingly incline our inborn predilections toward promoting human flourishing. 还有另一种方式来思考那些由人类的行为而不是人类的设计所导致的发展。经过长时间的试错过程（大部分是错误的），人类正在慢慢发现自己的天性。我们有幸恰好发现了一些习性、制度和德性，它们越来越倾向于推动我们的先天偏好向着促进人类繁荣的方向发展。 Flourishing does not mean sheer biological reproduction. After all, it is those societies in which the market liberalism mutation took hold earliest that have the lowest fertility rates. Flourishing means something like the pursuit and enjoyment of more meaningful lives. 繁荣并不意味着单纯的生物繁殖。毕竟，出生率最低的正是那些最早抓住市场自由主义这一变异的社会。繁荣意味着追求并享受更有意义的人生。 As Ridley concludes, "It is a fair bet that the twenty-first century will be dominated mostly by shocks of bad news, but will experience mostly invisible progress of good things. Incremental, inexorable, inevitable changes will bring us material and spiritual improvements that will make the lives of our grandchildren wealthier, healthier, happier, cleverer, kinder, freer, more peaceful, and more equal—almost entirely as a serendipitous by-product of cultural evolution." Ridley总结道，“很可能21世纪会被坏消息带来的震惊所笼罩，但是也会经历美好事物近乎无形的进步。”渐进的、不可阻挡的、无可避免的改变，会带给我们物质和精神的进步，使得我们孙辈的生活更富足、更健康、更幸福、更明智、更友善、更自由、更和平且更平等——这几乎全都是文化进化的偶然副产物。” Ronald Bailey is a science correspondent at Reason magazine and author of The End of Doom (July 2015). Ronald Bailey是《Reason》杂志的科学通讯记者，也是《末日终结》一书（2015年七月）的作者。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Link Between State Gun Laws and Fatal Shootings Not as Simple as It Seems 各州枪支法与致命枪击案的关系并不像看起来那样简单 作者：Thomas A. Firey @ 2015-10-11 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/11/about-that-national-journal-gun-chart America has resumed its long-running debate on gun control, following the terrible attack at Umpqua Community College in Roseburg, Oregon, last week and two more shootings Friday, at Northern Arizona University and Texas Southern University. This time around, perhaps nothing has gotten more play than this tablefrom a short column by National Journal graphic artist Libby Isenstein. 在上周俄勒冈州罗斯堡乌姆普夸社区大学的可怕袭击和本周五北亚利桑那大学及德克萨斯南方大学的两起枪击案之后，美国有关枪支管制的长期争论再次开启。这一次，可能没什么比《国家杂志》平面艺术家Libby Isenstein在一篇简短专栏文章里的这张表格更出风头的了。 The chart ranks the states by their rate of "gun-related deaths" and notes whether each state has gun-restricting laws like background checks and waiting periods, or laws that expand gun accessibility and use, like concealed-carry and stand-your-ground rights. The chart’s implication is clear: the more gun restrictions, the fewer horrible crimes. 这张表格将各州按“涉枪死亡”率排名，并且标注了每个州是否有诸如背景审查和等待期这样的枪支管制法律，或者像隐蔽携带和无须退让权【译注："stand-your-ground" law是一种支持强自卫权的法律，允许个人在合理的认为自己身体或生命面临威胁时，不经退让躲避即可使用致命武力实施自卫。】这种扩大枪支获取和使用的法律。这表格的含义很明显：枪支管制越严，恶性犯罪越少。 Isenstein’s chart has since been posted on countless blogs, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages, with the subtext (and often the explicit text) that if troglodyte gun-rights supporters could appreciate simple statistics, they’d stop impeding common-sense gun controls that would deter terrible crimes like the one in Roseburg. President Obama also made this point explicit last week in a statement about the Roseburg shooting: Isenstein的表格至今已经被无数的博客、推特和Facebook页面转载，潜台词（而且经常是明说）就是，如果赞成持枪权的老顽固们能够领会这简单的数据统计，他们就不会再阻止常识性的枪支管制，像罗斯堡那样的恶性犯罪就不会发生。奥巴马总统上周在关于罗斯堡枪击案的一份声明中也明确表达了这一观点。 States with the most gun laws tend to have the fewest gun deaths. So the notion that gun laws don’t work, or just will make it harder for law-abiding citizens [to obtain guns] and criminals will still get their guns, is not borne out by the evidence. 枪支管控法最多的州往往枪击致死的人数最少。所以认为枪支法不起作用，或者认为它们仅仅使守法公民[获得枪支]更加困难而犯罪分子将仍然得到枪支的看法，是没有证据支持的。 The president’s comment has since received some critical scrutiny  from The Washington Post's "Fact-Checker" Glenn Kessler. And UCLA law professor and Post contributor Eugene Volokh criticized the National Journal table in a recent post  on the lack of a statistical link between gun control and overall homicide rates. 总统的观点已经被《华盛顿邮报》“真相检查者”Glenn Kessler仔细推敲过了。加州大学洛杉矶分校法学教授、《华盛顿邮报》投稿人Eugene Volokh在最近一篇文章中批评《国家杂志》的上述表格缺乏枪支管制和整体谋杀率之间的统计学关联。 Yet the chart continues to bounce around the Internet and the media. Its currency reveals how readily people seize on statistics they don’t really understand but think—in this case, wrongly—support their opinions, claiming the intellectual high ground while dismissing opposing viewpoints as hopelessly  ignorant, biased, and dishonest. 然而这个表格在互联网和媒体上持续发酵。这一趋势反映了人们多么倾向于利用他们并不真正理解但（错误地）认为支持其观点的统计数据，来占领智识高地并将相反观点斥为无可救药的无知、偏颇和不诚实。 First, let’s be clear about what Isenstein’s chart does show: a connection between "gun-related deaths" and certain gun laws. A simple statistical test offers decent evidence of such a relationship. But there’s a problem with using that evidence to conclude that more gun restrictions will reduce the number of fatal shootings. To understand why, consider the following story. 首先，让我们来搞清Isenstein的表格真正表达的是什么：涉枪死亡人数和某些枪支管控法之间的关联。一个简单的统计测试就能提供这种关系的有力证明。但是用这种证据得出加强枪支管制就会减少致命枪击案的结论是有问题的。为了理解当中的原因，请思考下面这个故事。 Suppose there are two towns, Chevyville and Fordburg. Many years ago, General Motors (GM) built a factory in Chevyville and its residents, in loyalty to their town’s largest employer, now all drive Chevrolets. In Fordburg, however, local leaders were so angry with GM for not building the plant there that they passed an ordinance banning Chevrolets. 假设有两个名为Chevyville 和 Fordburg的小镇。很多年前，通用汽车在Chevyville建了一个工厂，该镇的居民都忠于镇上最大的雇主，全都开雪佛兰汽车。然而在Fordburg，当地的领导人因通用不在该镇建厂而愤怒地通过了一条禁止雪佛兰汽车的法令。 Recently, some Chevyvillians noticed that every fatal car crash in town involved a Chevrolet, whereas Fordburg hasn’t had a fatal Chevy crash in years. Those folks assembled a damning chart comparing Chevyville and Fordburg’s Chevrolet-related fatal crashes and began demanding that Chevyville adopt Fordburg’s Chevrolet controls. 最近，一些Chevyville居民注意到镇上每起致命的车祸都与雪佛兰相关，然而Fordburg很多年都没有致命的雪佛兰车祸。于是这些人制作了一份表格，证据确凿地比较Chevyville和Fordburg两镇与雪佛兰相关的致命车祸数，并开始要求Chevyville实行同Fordburg一样的雪佛兰汽车管制。 The Chevyvillians aren’t really upset about Chevrolet-related fatal crashes, but about fatal crashes in general. It’s quite possible that Chevy-free Fordburg has the same rate of fatal crashes as Chevyville, but Fordburg’s crashes involve Fords, Dodges, and Toyotas. That becomes obscured by Chevyvillians’ focus on Chevrolets. If Chevyville’s leaders, persuaded by the chart, were to ban Chevrolets, residents would likely continue suffering the same fatal crashes they do now, just with other car brands. Chevyville居民并不是为与雪佛兰相关的致命车祸感到难过，而是为所有致命车祸感到难过。没有雪佛兰的Fordburg很可能与Chevyville有相同的致命车祸率，只不过Fordburg的车祸涉及福特、道奇和丰田的车子。但这些事实都被Chevyville居民对雪佛兰的关注所掩盖了。如果Chevyville的领导听信表格而禁用雪佛兰汽车，居民们很可能仍然会面对跟现在同样的致命车祸，只不过换了别的汽车品牌而已。 Isenstein (and many others)) makes a similar analytical move as the Chevyvillians: she focuses on gun-related deaths rather than all violent deaths. Her table shows that, in states where it’s easier to buy and carry a gun, violent deaths are more likely to occur from guns—but that doesn’t mean the violent death rate is higher in those states. Isenstein（还有很多其他人）的分析跟Chevyville居民类似：她关注涉枪死亡人数而不是所有的暴力死亡人数。她的表格显示，更容易买到和携带枪支的州更可能发生枪支导致的暴力死亡——但是这并不意味着这些州的暴力死亡比例更高。 Statistical testing 统计检验 The question that lies at the heart of the gun control debate is whether gun restrictions reduce the incidence of murder and other violent crime. To help answer that, we can compare Isenstein’s state law data to murder and violent crime rates from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Uniform Crime Reports  (UCR). 枪支管制辩论的核心问题，在于限制枪支是否能减少谋杀和其他暴力犯罪的发生率。为了回答这一问题，我们可将Isenstein的各州法律统计数据与司法统计局统一犯罪报告（UCR）的谋杀和暴力犯罪率相比较。 I did this with UCR data from 2012 (newer data aren’t yet available), resulting in 14 total test results (Isenstein’s seven laws multiplied by the two types of crime). The statistical test, known as a Pearson’s r, returns a value between 1 (indicating perfect positive correlation), 0 (no correlation), and –1 (perfect negative correlation). I arranged the tests so that negative numbers would indicate a relationship between more gun control and less violent crime. 我比较了2012年的统一犯罪报告，得出了总共14项检验结果（Isenstein七个方面的法规状况乘以两种犯罪类型）。这种称为Pearson积矩相关系数的统计检验会得出一个在1（表示完全正相关）、0（没有关联）、和-1（完全负相关）之间的值。在我组织的这个测试里，负数表示更多枪支管控法和较少暴力犯罪之间存在联系。 The results: In half of the 14 tests, the resulting coefficients were positive numbers, meaning that Isenstein’s gun restrictions had no more than a coin-flip chance of yielding the results that gun control supporters expect. Moreover, in all 14 cases, the coefficients were tiny, with nine smaller than +/– 0.1. Those results should make us highly skeptical that the gun laws have any effect—positive or negative—on murder and violent crime. 结果：在14项检验中，有7项得到的系数是正值，说明Isenstein的枪支限制得到枪支管制支持者预期结果的几率不会比抛硬币更高。而且，在全部14项检验中，相关系数都很小，有9项小于+/-0.1。这些结果应让我们高度怀疑，枪支法规是否对谋杀和暴力犯罪有任何影响——无论是正面的还是负面的。 I then slightly altered her law data in light of some peculiar data choices she made. For instance, Isenstein assumed that gun control changes implemented in 2015 affected gun-related deaths in 2013. She also treated states with court-established stand-your-ground (SYG) rights the same as states with no SYG, and different from states with legislatively enacted SYG rights. I used gun law data for 2012 (to match the crime data) and coded legislature-enacted SYG and court-imposed SYG the same. 然后我针对她对数据的一些特殊选择，稍微调整了她的法律统计数据。例如，Isenstein假定枪支管制法规在2015年发生的变更影响了2013年的涉枪死亡人数。她还将法院支持不退让权的州等同于没有不退让权的州，并且与立法确立不退让权的州区别开来。我用了2012年的枪支法规统计（为了匹配犯罪数据），并且将立法实行不退让权和法院承认不退让权等同视之。 I then repeated the statistical tests and the results were much the same as before. This time, nine of the 14 tests yielded positive numbers, indicating a correlation opposite of what gun control advocates expect. (In case you’re wondering about universal background checks, which President Obama is now considering expanding through executive order, both the murder and violent crime coefficients were positive numbers.) And again, all of the coefficients were tiny, with nine smaller than +/-0.1. 然后我再次进行了该统计检验，而结果跟之前相差无几。这一次，14项检验中有9项得到正值，显示与枪支管制支持者所预期的相关性相反。（若你想了解奥巴马总统正考虑通过行政命令来扩大的普遍背景调查的检验结果，我可以告诉你，它与谋杀和暴力犯罪的相关系数都是正值。）所有的系数都还是很小，有9个小于+/-0.1。 Finally, mindful of the possibility that a combination of gun laws could produce a "compounding" effect that alters crime rates but is undetectable when the laws are considered separately, I created an overarching variable intended to distill all of Isenstein’s law data into a single "gun restrictive" measure for each state. For violent crime, the resulting coefficient was 0.093 (again, a positive number, contrary to gun control advocates’ expectation), while murder was –0.012 (a negative number, but extremely tiny even when compared to the other tiny coefficients). 最后，枪支法规组合在一起时可能会产生影响犯罪率的“复合”效应，但在个别考察枪支法规时该效应未必能够被发现。考虑到这种可能性，我创造了一个全局变量，旨在将Isenstein的所有法规统计数据浓缩成每州一个的枪支限制程度值。对于暴力犯罪，得到的系数是0.093（又是正值，与枪支管制支持者预期相反），而谋杀的系数是-0.012（负值，但即使与其他很小的系数相比都极小）。 The results weren’t all bad for gun control. I performed the same statistical tests on 2012 state suicide rates and found that five of the seven coefficients yielded negative numbers, which is what gun control supporters would expect. Two of the cases (handgun registry and open-carry) yielded coefficients as large as –0.267 and –0.254—still pretty small, but much bigger than the crime coefficients. 结果并不是都不利于枪支管制。我对2012年各州自杀率做了同样的统计检验，发现得到的七个系数中有五个都是枪支管制支持者所期望的负值。有两项检验（手枪登记和公开携带）得到的系数较大，分别是-0.267和-0.254——仍然非常小，但比犯罪的系数要大得多。 So maybe gun control does have a small, beneficial effect on suicide. And it’s worth noting that nearly two-thirds of gun deaths are suicides. But currently the argument over gun control isn’t driven by concerns about suicide, but about violent crime. 所以或许枪支管制对减少自杀有微弱的有利影响。值得一提的是，近三分之二的涉枪死亡是自杀。但是如今有关枪支管制的争论并不是因为担心自杀，而是暴力犯罪。 Correlation, causation, and complexity 相关性，因果关系和复杂性 As damning as all this might appear, it shouldn’t be interpreted as proof that gun control (or gun access for that matter) has no effect on violent crime. My analysis suffers two serious shortcomings, which also plague Isenstein and her re-posters. 虽然看起来证据确凿，但上述分析并不应该被视为枪支管制（或者说枪支获取）对暴力犯罪没有影响的证明。我的分析有两个严重的漏洞，Isenstein和她的转发者们也面对同样的问题。 The first is the old dictum that correlation does not prove causation. Assume for a moment that our tests yielded stronger correlation coefficients; we still wouldn’t know whether they indicate that laxer (or tighter) gun controls led to higher murder and violent crime rates, or if the higher crime rates led to laxer (or tighter) gun controls as a result of public demand for different gun laws. Or some other cause could produce both higher murder rates and changes in gun laws. 第一个问题正如那句古老格言所说，相关性并不能证明因果关系。暂时假设我们的检验得出了强相关性，我们仍旧不能确定它们是否就表明更宽松的（或更严格的）枪支管制导致了更高的谋杀和暴力犯罪率，抑或是更高的犯罪率改变了公众对各类枪支管制法规的需求，从而导致了更宽松的（或更严格的）枪支管制。又或者，有一些其他原因能够同时导致更高的犯罪率和枪支法规的改变。 Another problem is that many factors besides gun laws likely affect murder and violent crime rates (and suicides, for that matter—see  Kessler's and Volokh's columns for more on this). Controlling for those factors could reveal different relationships (or non-relationships) than what Isenstein's table and my analysis suggest. 另一个问题是，除了枪支法规外还有很多因素也可能影响谋杀和暴力犯罪率（自杀也同样适用——更多信息请查阅Kessler和 Volokh的专栏）。调控了这些因素后所揭示出的关联性（或者非关联性），也许与Isenstein的表格和我的分析所显示的关联性并不一样。 Advanced statistical methods may be able to overcome those problems, and plenty of trees have been felled to provide paper for such academic analysis of American gun laws. Problem is, there's hardly a consensus among researchers as to whether any causal relationship has been found. (For a sense of the literature, see this.) The United States is hardly alone in this. 高级统计方法或许能克服这些问题，而有关美国枪支法规的这类学术分析已经汗牛充栋了。问题在于研究者对于是否发现了因果关系很难达成一致。（想感受一下相关文献，请看这里。）并不是只有美国面对这一问题。 For instance, though gun control advocates are now lionizing Australia's 1996 National Firearms Agreement restricting the licensing and ownership of different weapons, there appears to be no consensus among researchers as to whether the policy has reduced Australian homicide rates. (There does appear to be consensus that it has reduced suicide rates, though some researchers reach different conclusions.) 例如，虽然枪支管制的倡导者如今将澳大利亚的1996年国家枪支协定奉为杰作，该协定限制各种武器的许可和持有，但是研究者对于该政策是否降低了澳大利亚的谋杀率似乎并未达成共识。（人们在该政策能降低自杀率这点上倒似乎达成了一致，尽管有些研究者得出了不同结论。） The difficulty with this research is that it's hard to compare outcomes in the real world to outcomes in a hypothetical world where different gun laws exist but everything else is the same. Hence researchers' use of advanced mathematics and statistics. The problem is, unless you have a Ph.D. in some statistical science and a good appreciation of the specific issues involved in gun research, you'll be hard pressed to understand the critical points of that research, let alone form a knowledgeable opinion about which analyses are most likely correct. 这项研究的难度在于很难将现实世界的结果与假想世界的结果相比较，在假想世界中除了枪支法规不同外，其他所有条件都一样。然后研究者使用高等数学和统计学进行分析。可问题是，除非你有统计学的博士学位，而且对于涉枪研究的具体问题有深入的认识，否则你很难理解这一研究的关键点，更不用说对哪个分析更可能正确发表真知灼见了。 That brings us to the derisive comments accompanying all those posts of Isenstein's table. We now know the snark is misplaced. So why is the gun control debate, and American politics in general, so rife with such nastiness? 现在我们再来看那些针对转发Isenstein表格的嘲讽评论帖子。我们现在知道这些尖刻评论是不对的。那为什么枪支管制的辩论，以至普遍的美国政治，都有如此之多的龌龊事？ Part of the reason, understandably, is the stakes: gun control and gun rights involve some of the most cherished human values, including public safety, self-preservation, defense of innocents, privacy, and property rights. Part of the reason is simple fear: many people believe their risk of being victimized by violence is increasing (though the  data show the opposite). 有部分原因，可以理解，是利益：枪支管制和持枪权利牵涉到了一些人们最珍视的价值，包括公众安全、自卫权、正当防卫权、隐私权和财产权。有部分原因是仅仅出于恐惧：很多人相信他们被暴力侵害的风险正在提高（虽然数据显示并非如此）。 And part of the reason is the trend in American politics over the last century: government has imposed itself so broadly that many issues are now winner-take-all, and people are desperate to avoid being on the losing side. 还有部分原因是美国在过去一个世纪里的政治潮流：政府管控范围如此之广，以致于很多事情都是赢家通吃，所以人们竭力避免站在输家那一边。 Those factors, along with the muddled complexity of gun research, should encourage more civil, open-minded, and respectful debate about gun laws, not to mention greater modesty about what policy can accomplish. Unfortunately, the opposite is happening. There's a lot of Red team/Blue team, "my side is smart and caring/your side is stupid and cruel" bile. 这些因素加上枪支研究的错综复杂，本应促使有关枪支法规的辩论更文明、更开放、更尊重他人，更不用说对于政策所能达到的效果应持有更谦虚的态度。不幸的是，现在的情况完全相反。到处都是红蓝对决，还有“我方聪明有爱心，你方愚蠢且残忍”的怒气。 Adding further fuel to this angry fire is the simple fact that people who dislike guns usually also dislike—and want to stick it to—people who like guns, and vice versa. And that's a serious threat to American society, too. 一个火上浇油的简单事实是，不喜欢枪的人通常也不喜欢爱枪的人，而且态度坚定，反之亦然。这对美国社会也是一个严重威胁。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Small business divided on the benefits of the EU 英国小企业对于欧盟的好处意见不一 时间：@ 2015-9-17 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Capx，http://www.capx.co/external/is-the-eu-good-for-small-businesses/ In a survey of its 6,300 members, the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) found that 47% would vote for the UK to remain part of the EU, 41% would vote to leave and 11% are undecided. Of those who want to remain inside the EU, 35% would like to see powers transferred back to the UK, while a further 21% would like to see more reforms, compared to just 26% who want the EU to stay as it is. 小企业联合会（FSB）针对其6300家成员企业的调查发现，其中47%会投票支持英国留在欧盟，41%会投票支持脱离，另有11%尚未拿定主意。希望留在欧盟的企业中，有35%盼望英国能收回更多的自主权，另有21%盼望看到更多改革，与此相比，希望欧盟维持现状的只有26%。 The survey also found that while 50.5% of small businesses agreed or strongly agreed that EU membership is beneficial for the UK economy, only 35% agreed or strongly agreed that it was beneficial for their business. In regional terms, London had the largest majority in favour of remaining in the EU – 55% to 34% – while the East Midlands had the largest majority for leaving – 49% to 38%. 该调查还发现，尽管有50.5%的小企业同意或强烈同意欧盟成员国身份有益于英国经济，但只有35%的小企业同意或强烈同意这一身份有益于它们自己的生意。分区域来说，伦敦企业赞同留在欧盟的比例最高——55%对34%——而东米德兰企业赞同脱离欧盟的比例最高——49%对38%。 In nearly all regions, undecided small businesses would be able to swing the majority either way. If the UK were to leave the EU, 43% of the FSB’s members would like to see the UK strengthen trade links with the rest of the world, while 29% would want to see individual trade agreements with the EU and its member states, and 22% would want the UK to remain part of the European Economic Area (as Norway is). 几乎在所有地区，尚未拿定主意的小企业的数量都足以改变多数派的归属。如果英国将要脱离欧盟，FSB成员企业中有43%希望看到英国加强与世界其他地区的贸易关系，有29%希望看到英国与欧盟及其成员国单独签订贸易协定，有22%希望英国继续留在欧洲经济区（如挪威那样）。 Separately, in The Times, columnist Simon Nixon cites Open Europe’s proposals to safeguard the rights of non-Eurozone states within the EU, concluding though that there is no easy way to meet the UK’s promise of ensuring fairness between those inside and outside the Eurozone. 此外，专栏作家Simon Nixon在《泰晤士报》上提到了智库“开放欧洲”的建议，后者旨在保障欧盟非欧元区国家的权利，不过他的结论也认为，英国想要确保欧元区内外之间公平的承诺，这并不容易做到。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

社会是如何学会数到10的 How societies learn to count to 10 作者：Michael Erard @ 2015-9-25 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 来源：AAAS，http://news.sciencemag.org/brain-behavior/2015/09/how-societies-learn-count-10 In some traditional cultures, counting is as easy as one, two, three—because it stops there: Their languages have no words for higher numerals, and instead simply use varieties of words like “many.” But over time some societies acquired higher numbers, as the major languages spoken on the planet today must have done long ago. 在一些传统文化中，计数这件事就像数1，2，3这么简单——因为在这些文化中，计数到3就到头了。他们的语言中没有相应的词语来表示更大的数字，而只是简单地使用各种类似“很多”这样的词语。但随着时间的推移，一些社会获得了使用更大数字的能力，就像今天世界上的主要语言必然在很早之前就已经做到的一样。 Now, a new study of an Australian language family reveals how languages add, and sometimes lose, higher numbers—and how some languages lasted for thousands of years without them. 日前，一项关于澳洲语系的最新研究揭示了语言是如何获得（在某些时候也会丢失）更大数字的，以及一些语言是如何在没有这些更大数字的状态下延续了数千年的。 For some cultures, big numbers just don’t make sense. Take the shepherd who knows that he has the right number of sheep not by counting them one by one but by grasping the gestalt of his flock. That may sound strange to people from other cultures, says Patience Epps, a linguist at the University of Texas, Austin. 对于某些文化而言，大数字并没有什么意义。例如，牧羊人并不是通过逐一数羊来判断羊群数目是否是正确的，而是通过掌握其羊群的完型（gestalt）来做到这一点。对于来自其他文化的人们而言，这听起来可能很奇怪，来自德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校的语言学家Patience Epps说。 Indeed, she says she’s often asked by incredulous Americans how people with few numerals know, for instance, how many children they have. When she asks this of the Amazonian tribe she works with, “they look at me like it’s a weird question. They list the names, they count on their fingers, but they don’t go around with a quantity in their heads,” she says. 她还表示，自己的确经常被充满怀疑精神的美国人问起诸如此类的问题：那些只能使用有限几个数字的人是怎么知道他们有几个孩子的？当她向和她一起工作的亚马逊部落民问起这个问题时，“他们盯着我看，似乎这对他们来说是个很奇怪的问题。他们会列举孩子们的名字，用手指数孩子的个数，但在他们脑海里并不存在一个具体的数字，”她说道。 But once a society becomes complex enough to require more abstract counting, higher numerals are needed. Amazonian languages add numerals when groups that don’t know or trust each other begin trading goods and need to track exchanges more closely, Epps says. Something like this must have happened in familiar languages many millennia ago. 可一旦某个社会变得足够复杂，要求更多的抽象计数时，就需要更大数字了。当并不互相了解或信任的群体开始交易物品，并且需要更加密切地跟踪这些交易时，亚马逊原住民的语言中就加入了新的数字，Epps表示。在我们所熟悉的语言中，数千年前也一定发生过类似的事情。 Looking at how languages with only a few numerals add or lose them could provide insight into how humans build numeral systems. But uncovering these patterns of cultural evolution required data from many related languages with small numeral systems over a long period of time. 通过研究那些只有有限几个数字的语言是如何添加或者丢失数字的，我们可以洞悉人类是如何构建数字系统的。但想要揭示这些文化演化的模式，我们还需要来自多种互相关联的具有小型数字体系的语言的长期数据。 Enter the Pama-Nyungan language family, which once extended across most of Australia. It contains about 300 languages that are currently spoken by about 25,000 people, though in the past they may have numbered as many as 2 million. Most of these languages have numeral systems that stop at five. 现在让我们走进Pama-Nyungan语系，该语系曾一度扩张到了澳洲的大部分地区。它包含了大约300种不同的语言，当前大约还有25000人在使用这些语言，而在过去，使用这些语言的人数或许曾达到200万之多。这个语系中大部分语言的计数系统都没有比5更大的数字。 Yale University historical linguist Claire Bowern collected current and historical data about these languages, many of which are no longer spoken. Together with undergraduate researcher Kevin Zhou, she reconstructed how numerals in the language family evolved over about 6500 years, borrowing a method from evolutionary biology to explore how the Pama-Nyungan languages were related to each other and also how they changed over time. 耶鲁大学历史语言学家Claire Bowern收集了有关这些语言的当前和历史数据，而其中的大部分语言在今天已不再有人使用了。她和本科生研究者Kevin Zhou一起，还原了过去大约6500年里数字在该语系中的演化过程，借用一种进化生物学的方法探索了Pama-Nyungan语系中的各种语言是如何关联在一起的，以及如何随时间演变的。 The researchers plugged their data into a computer model, which then generated the most likely family tree for all the languages’ numeral systems. Then they tracked how those systems added or lost numerals within the tree. 两位研究者将他们获得的数据导入一个计算机模型中，该模型为所有这些语言的计数系统生成一棵可能性最大的“家族树”。之后，研究者们会追踪在这棵“家族树”中的这些计数系统是如何加入或是丢失数字的。 The upper limits of these Australian numeral systems most often varied between three, four, and five, the team reports this month in the Proceedings of the Royal Society B. Over time, even small numeral systems sometimes lost a numeral or two, but they mainly gained numerals—yet not by plodding up the number line, one numeral after another. 该研究团队在本月的《英国皇家学会学报B刊》上发表的研究结果显示，在这些澳洲计数系统中，数字的上界通常在3，4和5之间变化。随着时间的推移，即使是很小的计数系统有时也会丢失一个或者两个数字，但大多数情况下它们都会获得更多的数字——而这并不是通过沿着数轴缓慢地一个个增加数字来完成的。 Surprisingly, they tended to acquire numerals in bunches, leaping from five numerals to 10 or 20, for example. The numeral five was often the tipping point—once a system reached five, it was likely to add more numerals, up to 20. As a result, numeral systems with five as an upper limit are rare in Pama-Nyungan languages. 令人吃惊的是，这些系统倾向于一次性获得多个数字，例如从5个数字直接跳跃到10个或20个。数字5通常会成为引爆点——一旦一个计数系统达到了5，它就很有可能会加入更多的数字，直到20。而结果就是在Pama-Nyungan语系的语言中，很少有语言的计数系统的上界是5。 “This is surprising, given the predominance of fingers and toes as things to count,” Bowern notes. Adding or losing the numeral four was the most frequent change. (The words for “four” were most often composed out of words for “two,” not by creating or borrowing a new word that means “four,” showing how the numeral systems evolved.) “这个现象让人感到意外，尤其是考虑到手指和脚趾作为计数工具的主导地位，”Bowern评论道。而加入或是丢失数字4则是这些系统中最频繁发生的变化。（在这些语言中，表示“4”的词通常都是由表示“2”的词合成的，而不是来自创造或借用一个意为“4”的新词语，这也展现了这些数字系统的演化方式。） Bowern thinks that numerals were added in clusters for practical reasons: If you need to count above five, you probably need to go higher than seven or eight as well. And she speculates that perhaps a cognitive shift occurs at about five. “Once you generalize beyond five or so, it becomes easier to generalize to an infinite system.” Bowern认为数字以集群的方式被加入语言中是出于一些实际的原因：如果你需要数到5以上，那么你很可能也同样需要数到7或者8以上。同时她推测，一个认知上的变化会在5这个数值附近发生。“一旦你形成了超过5左右的数字概念，那么形成一个无限计数系统就变得更容易了。” “This is the kind of historical linguistics using computational methods that gives me a lot of confidence,” said Brian Joseph, a historical linguist at Ohio State University, Columbus, adding that “there are a lot of nonlinguists who apply this methodology to data that they don’t seem to control or understand.” “这些采用计算分析方法的历史语言学研究给了我很多信心，”来自位于哥伦布市的俄亥俄州立大学历史语言学家Brian Joseph说道。他还表示“有很多并非语言学家的研究者将这种方法应用在了一些看起来超出他们的掌控或理解的数据上。” “These conclusions seem sound to me,” agrees Russell Gray of the University of Auckland in New Zealand and director of the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History in Jena, Germany, “and remind us that cultural evolution doesn't always proceed incrementally.” “这些结论在我看来很合理，”新西兰奥克兰大学的Russell Gray对这项研究结果表示赞同，他同时还担任位于德国耶拿的马克斯·普朗克人类历史科学研究所的主任，“这也提醒我们，文化的演化并不总是以逐一递增的方式进行的。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Valorization of Envy 赋予嫉妒以价值 作者：Jason Brennan @ 2015-8-22 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Bleeding Heart Libertarians，http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2015/08/the-valorization-of-envy/ Robert Nozick, among others, wondered to what degree left-wing conceptions of social justice are mere attempts to valorize envy. (Extreme left-wing views in the US, in particular, tend to concentrated among privileged upper-middle class liberal arts grads in the 2% who are angry with the 1%.) As an example of an envious rant, check out this remarkable essay at Counterpunch, “The Economic Inequality of Academia”., by Richard Goldin.  An excerpt: 罗伯特·诺齐克，还有其他一些人，都曾想知道，左翼的社会正义概念在多大程度上仅仅是尝试给嫉妒定价。（尤其是美国的极左翼观念，其往往集中出现在来自优越的中产阶级上层、身处收入顶层2%的文科毕业生中，他们对那1%愤怒有加。）嫉妒的咆哮之例证，请看网站Counterpunch的这篇神奇文章：“学术界的经济不平等”，文章作者是Richard Goldin。以下是两段摘录：

Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. No objective standard of measurement exists to financially quantify, and differentiate, these approaches or their contributions. Yet a vast and enduring economic hierarchy has emerged grounded in the supposed intrinsic hierarchy between the two. This financial hierarchy is not a dispassionate reflection of an objective reality; it is a strategic effect of the mechanisms underlying class formation and preservation. “通往知识的道路通常都由出版和教学的相互作用而铺成。世上并不存在什么客观的测量标准，能为这两种方法或它们的贡献做财务上的量化和区分。但是，在两者之间被公众认受的内在等级区分之上，产生出了一个庞大且持久存在的经济等级制度。这种财务等级制度不是对客观现实的一种公正反映，它是塑造和维护阶层的社会机制的策略效应。” The primacy of publishing, and the attendant allocation of resources, is utilized not merely to perpetuate two different economic classes, but also to create two different kinds of people. This creation allows the hierarchy of privilege to function as though it represents objective value differences both in terms of the work produced and the individuals who produce it. “出版第一及伴随而来的资源分配，不仅仅被用来维持两个不同的经济阶层，而且被用来创造不同的两个人群。这种创造令特权等级制的运转好像是体现了一种客观的价值差异，当中既包括劳动成果之间的价值差异，也包括提供劳动的个体之间的价值差异。”

Some comments on the essay: 对此文我有几点评论： 1.Like many essays in this genre, it has its facts wrong. It claims that the majority of faculty are adjuncts, but that is just false. As Phil Magness documents here, at normal four-year, not-for-profit universities and colleges, the majority of faculty are tenure-track. Even when we include for-profit and community colleges, which rely disproportionately on adjunct labor, the majority of faculty in the US are not adjuncts. (See this post, too.) 1.跟诸多此类文章一样，这篇文章也有事实错误。它声称教员中多数都是兼职人员，这绝对是错的。Phil Magness已证明，在一般的四年制非营利性大学和学院中，多数教员是终身轨。即使将极为依赖兼职劳动力的营利性院校和社区学院都包括进来，美国的大学教员中多数也不是兼职。 Also, contrary to what everyone keeps saying, the number of tenure-track faculty slots has been increasing over the past 40 years. Here’s a chart with US Dept of Ed data, again from Magness: 并且，跟大家历来的说法相反，终身轨教职【译注：终身轨，美国大学一种教职序列，只有进入终身轨的教员方有可能转正为终身教授，因此又称预备终身】空缺数过去40年间一直在增加。下图还是来自Magness，数据采自联邦教育部： It’s bizarre that the madjunct crowd keeps repeating obviously false claims, such as that they make minimum wage. Can’t they make their point without lying? I suspect the issue here is that many of these people are postmodernists, and for postmodernists, the concepts of “truth” or “facts” are just attempts to wield power over others. Or perhaps Dr. Goldin is being funded by the Koch brothers as part of a neoliberal assault to undermine the credibility of academia. “疯狂兼职人”群体总是在重复明显错误的主张，比如声称自己赚的是最低工资。这真是奇特。他们在立论时就不能不撒谎吗？我怀疑此处的问题是，这些人中有许多都是后现代主义者，而对于后现代主义者，“真理”或“事实”这种概念都只是对他人行使权力的企图。或者，也许Goldin博士是得了科赫兄弟【译注：美国富豪，积极参与政治，资助传统基金会和加图研究所等保守派和自由意志主义智库，常被左派攻击为右派幕后黑手】的资助，正为一场旨在摧毁学术界公信力的新自由主义攻势出力。 2.The essay claims that the academic 1% do as well as they do because the burdens of teaching are shifted onto poorly paid adjuncts. But the rather obvious problem with this claim is that the places where the academic 1% reside are not the places that use lots of adjuncts. The top researchers end up in places like Princeton, Harvard, MIT, and Penn. These schools do not make heavy use of adjunct faculty. (Insofar as they do use them, many of their adjuncts are professionals with full-time jobs, who teach extra clinical classes in their law and business schools.) For Goldin’s argument to succeed, he’d have to show us that the reason the academic 1% do so well is because their employers somehow exploit the adjuncts working at other universities and colleges. 2.文章声称学术界的1%们之所以能有今天这样的表现，是因为教学负担被转移到了收入平平的兼职教员头上。但是这一断言的一个特别明显的问题是，学术界那1%所在的地方，就不是大量使用兼职人员的地方。顶级的研究人员都流向了如普林斯顿、哈佛、麻省理工、宾大等地方，而这些学校并没有大量使用兼职教员。（即使确实为它们所用的兼职人员，其中也有许多是拥有全职工作的专业人士，他们只在法学院和商学院里额外讲授实操课程。）Goldin的论证要成立，他就必须向我们证明，学术界的1%之所以能有今天的优异表现，是因为他们的雇主以某种方式剥削了其他大学和学院里的兼职工作人员。 I’m an academic 1-percenter, but it’s not because adjuncts do all my teaching for me. We do have a two-tier system, it’s true. In our system, the majority of faculty are extremely well paid tenure-track professors with high research expectations and low teaching loads; the minority are very well paid permanent teaching faculty with higher teaching loads. (According to this website, Goldin makes $30.5K a year, which is only a tiny fraction of what we pay our non-tenure track teaching faculty. Indeed, we pay our non-tenure-track faculty better than Cal State Long Beach pays their tenure-track faculty.) We use few adjuncts. 我就是学术界1%中的一个，但这不是因为兼职教员承担了我所有的教学事务。我们这里确实有一个双轨制，这是真的。在我们的这一制度下，教员的多数都是终身轨教授，报酬非常高，研究前景非常好，教学任务很轻；少数人则是长期职位（permanent）的教学教员，报酬很高，教学任务较重。（根据这个网站，Goldin每年能赚3.5万美元，只是我们这里的非终身轨教学教员报酬的一个零头。事实上，我们付给非终身轨教员的报酬比加州州立长滩分校【译注：即吐槽对象Richard Goldin任职的学校】付给其终身轨教员的还要高。）我们极少使用兼职教员。 I’m not making bank because Georgetown exploits adjuncts.  Martin Gilens isn’t making bank because Princeton exploits adjuncts. R. Edward Freeman doesn’t make bank because Darden exploits adjuncts. Rather, the exploited adjuncts are getting exploited elsewhere, at community colleges, small liberal arts colleges, third tier/low output “research” universities, and the for-profit colleges. 我不是因为乔治敦大学剥削兼职教员而发财。Martin Gilens不是因为普林斯顿大学剥削兼职教员而发财。R. Edward Freeman不是因为达顿商学院剥削兼职教员而发财。其实，被剥削的兼职教员是在别的地方被剥削的，比如社区学院、小型的文理学院、第三档或者低产出的“研究型”大学以及营利性学院。 3.Goldin has some interesting points about whether research is overvalued and teaching undervalued. But we should keep in mind the economics of the situation. Good teachers are a dime a dozen. It’s easy to find people who can teach low-level undergraduate courses well. It’s easy to teach these classes well, and many people can do it. The supply of good teachers is very high. But good researchers are rare. Most faculty cannot consistently publish in high-level venues. The supply of good researchers is low. (It’s easy to publish in obscure third and four-tier journals and presses, but difficult to publish in prestigious top-tier journals and presses.) Even if universities valued teaching and research equally, we’d expect the star researchers to be paid more than the star teachers, because star teachers are easy to come by. 3.关于研究是否估值过高而教学是否估值过低，Goldin提出了一些有趣的论点。但我们要牢记这种情形里的经济学道理。好的教师四处都有，我们很容易找到能把低水平的本科课程讲得很好的教师。这些课也容易教得好，很多人都可以做到。优秀教师的供给是很充足的。但优秀研究者则很少见。多数教员不能稳定地在高水平场合发表成果。优秀研究员的供给是不足的。（在不知名的三、四流杂志或出版社发表成果很容易，但在极富盛名的一流杂志和出版社就难了。）即使大学同等重视教学和研究，我们也会预期明星研究员所得的报酬比明星教师要多，因为明星教师得之不难。 I realize that as a Counterpunch author, it’s unlikely Goldin has ever seen an economics textbook. But I’d invite him to go to Cal State Long Beach’s library, check out Mankiw’s undergrad econ textbook, turn to pages 6-7, and read about the diamond-water paradox. Goldin是Counterpunch网站的作者，我估计他很可能从未看过任何经济学教材。但我很乐意邀请他去趟加州州立长滩分校的图书馆，借本曼昆的经济学本科教材，翻到第6-7页，读读钻石和水的悖论【译注：即价值悖论，水对人的生存极为重要，但市场价值远比无甚大用的钻石低】。 4.Consider this quotation: 4.思考一下文中这样一段话：

It is teachers dedicated to a challenging education who engage in the task of reworking and concretizing theories to make them relevant to students. It is in the classroom where the dialogue between theory and politics takes place; and it is the classroom which sends forth generations of students who can perceive, and possibly undermine, the rationalities of power. “从事理论修订和具体化这一任务，使之能被学生理解的，是那些献身于具挑战性的教育事业的教师；理论与政治之间的对话，是在课堂上进行的；一代又一代能够理解权力合理性，并且可能还会将之摧毁的学生，也是从课堂上走出来的。” Paths to knowledge are often forged through the interplay of publications and teaching. “通往知识的道路通常都由成果发表和教学的相互作用而铺成。” What should we make of this? Is coming up with general relativity less of an achievement than teaching it to undergrads secondhand? Is writing A Theory of Justice less of an achievement than teaching it to undergrads secondhand? Is writing the stuff that gets into the textbooks less of an achievement than teaching the textbook to undergrads? 我们该怎么去理解这段话？提出广义相对论的成就不如把它二手教给本科生？写出《正义论》的成就不如把它二手教给本科生？写出那些进入了教科书的东西，其成就不如向本科生讲授教科书？

Also, after reading Academically Adrift, it’s not clear to me that college teaching is undervalued. It might instead be overvalued. 而且，在读了《学术漂泊》以后，我都不太确定大学教学是否确实被低估了。它甚至有可能被高估了。 5.Goldin, like many writing in this genre, claims that academia is a lottery. This view is problematic. First, if it were a lottery, we’d expect that the type of people being hired as tenure-track at Harvard would have average credentials, but, on the contrary, the top schools tend to hire people with the best publication records. Second, the way the madjunct crowd reacts to their failure to secure good jobs doesn’t match how people react when they lose lotteries. My Uncle Freddy like to play the lottery from time to time. When he lost, he didn’t act surprised, claim that the system is unfair, and demand redistribution from the winners to the losers. Rather, he expected to lose, threw out his losing tickets, and kept living his life. If madjunct crowd sincerely believed that academia is a lottery, they would not act surprised or indignant that they lost and would move on with their lives. 5.跟许多写作此类文章的人一样，Goldin宣称学术界就是大抽奖。这种观点是有问题的。首先，如果确实是抽奖，我们就可以预期哈佛所聘用的终身轨人员将会是些成就处于平均水平的人，但是正好相反，顶尖学校都更倾向于聘用著述丰厚的人。第二，“疯狂兼职人”群体在没能保住自己的好工作时，其反应与人们抽奖落空后的反应并不相同。我的叔叔Freddy时不时就去抽奖。抽不中他也不觉得稀奇，不会说这个制度不公平，也不会要求中了奖的人把奖品拿出来和抽不中的瓜分，他只会丢了没中奖的彩票，生活照旧。如果“疯狂兼职人”群体真心觉得学术界就是抽奖，那他们就不会为自己的失败而感到惊讶或愤怒，只会继续自己的生活。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Dodd-Frank Is Already Failing 为何Dodd-Frank法案已经失败？ 作者：Paul G. Mahoney @2015-9-17 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 二校：龙泉（@L_Stellar） 来源：Library of Law and Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/09/17/why-dodd-frank-is-already-failing/ Five years after its enactment, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 remains controversial. Critics argue that the statute imposes disproportionately large compliance costs on small community banks, institutionalizes “too big to fail,” and drives up the cost of banking services to consumers. Comparing Dodd-Frank to past securities reforms, particularly those of the New Deal, shows that these three problems are related and are nearly inevitable features of post-crisis legislation. 自2010年执行起，五年了，《多德-弗兰克法案》仍饱受争议。批评者认为该法规对小型社区银行强加了不成比例的巨大合规成本， 将“大而不倒”制度化，同时抬高消费者享用银行服务的成本。将多德-弗兰克法案与过去的证券业改革——尤其是罗斯福新政中那些——相比较会发现，这三个问题是相互关联的，并且是后危机立法几乎不可避免的特征。 Every major financial reform in U.S. history was enacted in the aftermath of a substantial decline in equity prices. Each, in other words, was crafted during a time of public anger that politicians hoped to deflect from themselves to Wall Street. The congressional authors always compose a narrative of the stock market crash that blames unscrupulous financial intermediaries or public companies and insufficient regulation of the markets. 美国历史上每一次重大金融改革都是在股票价格大幅下跌后制定的。换句话说，每一次改革都是在群情激愤时精心制定，政治家们希望借此将公众愤怒的对象从自己转移到华尔街。国会的立法者总会借市场崩盘创造出一套说辞——指责金融中介机构、上市公司不道德的钻空行为和以往监管的不足。 Just as inevitably, proponents studiously avoid any suggestion that their own prior regulatory innovations had unintended consequences that contributed to the crash. Meanwhile, firms in the regulated industry concentrate on determining who the winners and losers may be under a new regulatory regime, so they can make sure they end up on the winning side. 必然地，支持法案的政客们刻意避免任何这样的看法：正是他们自己早先实施的监管革新，无意中促成了那次崩盘。同时，受监管的公司集中精力分辨出新监管体系下的赢家输家，以确保自己最终处在赢面。 This routine ensures that the primary losers from financial reform are investors and small, regulated firms. Costly new rules simultaneously serve the ends of Congress and the major financial institutions. They allow Congress to argue that it filled the regulatory gaps that it claims caused the crisis. Large firms can spread the new costs over a large number of transactions, giving them a structural advantage over their smaller and previously nimbler competitors. All firms will seek to pass on to their customers as many of the regulatory costs as possible. 这一惯常路数使得金融改革的主要输家必然是投资者和监管范围内的小型企业。成本高昂的新规定服务于国会和大金融机构的目标，这些规定让国会有资格宣称自己填补了其所宣称的那些监管空白。大公司则可以通过大量交易摊薄新增的成本，相比那些更小、曾经更灵活的竞争对手，这给了他们结构性优势。所有的公司都会尽可能的把监管成本转移给消费者。 All of this would be unfortunate but bearable if the new regulations generated benefits in excess of their costs. But that is unlikely with post-crisis legislation. The objective is to show the public that Congress is doing something and time is short. Congress knows relatively little about the details of market practices and so relies on the financial industry for information. 如果新规产生的收益大过成本，所有这些都还可忍受，尽管不算幸运。但是这对于后危机立法是不太可能的。立法的目的是为了向公众显示，国会有所作为而且行动迅速。他们对于市场行为的细节知之甚少，因此不得不依赖金融业者来获取信息。 The largest firms have skilled lobbyists and contacts with legislative staff. They argue, often successfully, that their ways of doing business are “best practices” and their competitors’ practices are shoddy or unfair. The process almost guarantees that the legislation will harm competition and therefore investors. Historically, that is precisely the pattern we observe, as demonstrated in my book Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails. 那些行业巨头都有熟练的游说人员，与立法者有着广泛联系。他们通常会成功地辩解，他们做生意的方式是“最佳实践”，而竞争者的做法是卑劣的、不公平的。这样的立法过程几乎确保了法律最后会有害于竞争，并进一步伤害投资者利益。从历史上来看，这正是我们观察到的模式，正如我在《白白浪费了一次危机：为何证券监管总是失败》一书中所展示的。 The New Deal securities reforms, often seen as the classic example of good regu lation, provide a cautionary tale. President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration argued that the 1920s were a time of widespread fraud and manipulation in the stock market, but there is scant factual basis for the claim. 罗斯福新政中的证券业改革常被视为良好管制的经典案例，其实是一则警示寓言。富兰克林·罗斯福总统和他的行政团队声称，1920年代的股市中充满了欺骗和操纵，但是这样的观点缺乏有力的事实依据。 As my book demonstrates, the best-documented cases of “fraud” were no such thing; the evidence proves mostly that Congress did not understand how securities markets operate. By going back and analyzing market reactions to earnings announcements, I also show that the markets did not view the disclosures they received as a result of mandates from the Securities and Exchange Commission as more informative than the stock exchange-mandated disclosures of the pre-SEC era. 正如我书中所说，记录最为详尽的“骗局”案例都是空穴来风；有关证据只是证明了国会并不了解证券市场如何运行。通过追溯和分析市场对盈利报告的反应，我还揭示了，市场不觉得，在SEC规制下，企业的信息披露比前SEC时代更有价值。 The 1920s were, on the other hand, a time of sharply increasing competition and innovation in the investment business. As a growing middle class looked for ways to invest its savings, a large industry of brokers, investment bankers, and investment managers developed to meet the demand. New entrants modernized the sales process, taking advantage of the rising number of households with telephones and radio sets. Like many creative new companies, they took business away from their more established competitors. 另一方面，1920年代是一个投资业务竞争和创新飞速发展的时期。由于成长中的中产阶级为其储蓄寻求投资的途径，一个由经纪人、理财顾问、投资银行家构成的大产业就发展起来满足这种需求。新入行者充分利用配有电话和老式收音机的家庭的不断增长，将销售过程现代化。正如许多有创新力的新公司那样，他们从老牌的竞争者手中抢过了生意。 The New Deal reforms put the brakes on this innovation and competition. At the urging of the old-line investment banks, the securities laws defined the new sales practices as misleading and forced the industry to return to the traditional syndicated method of public offerings at which the established investment banks excelled. The securities laws comprehensively regulated brokers, stock exchanges, and listed companies, subjecting small, regional businesses to costs they could not bear. 罗斯福新政改革遏止了这种创新和竞争。在传统投资银行的强烈要求下，证券法将新的销售模式认定为骗局，并强迫整个行业重返传统财团公开募股的方法，这正是老牌投资银行所擅长的。证券法全面管制经纪人、证券交易所和上市公司，使地方小型交易商背负它们不可能承受的成本。 The results were dramatic: 结果是触目惊心的：

• Industry concentration increased promptly and measurably. By my estimate, the New Deal securities laws increased the aggregate market share of the top five investment banks by 12 percent;
• 行业集中度快速、可见地提高。据我估计，罗斯福新政的证券法使得投资银行前五名市场占有率共提升12%。

• Smaller securities dealers based outside New York City began to exit the business despite having survived the worst phase of the Great Depression;
• 在纽约市以外的小型券商开始退出市场，尽管他们熬过了大萧条时最糟糕的时期。

• Regional stock exchanges began a terminal decline. Of the 41 exchanges in existence when the Securities Exchange Act went into effect in 1935, only 20 survived until 1938, despite the fact that many of them had survived the financial panic of 1907 and the recession of 1920-21;
• 地区性证券交易所走上穷途末路。在1935年，《证券交易法》开始实施时还存在41家证券交易所，到了1938年则只有20家交易所还存在，尽管这些交易所中大多数都成功走过了1907年的金融恐慌和1920～1921年的经济衰退。

• Regulators helped enforce anticompetitive practices such as fixed brokerage commissions that increased investors’ costs.
• 监管者推动了从业者的反竞争措施，比如执行增加投资者花费的固定佣金制。

Dodd-Frank, for its part, has a broader focus than the New Deal securities laws. It changes the regulatory framework for the entire financial system, including commercial banks, investment banks, investment managers, and insurance companies. 在这方面，多德-弗兰克法案的关注面要比罗斯福新政的证券法更宽广。它改变了整个金融系统的监管框架，包括商业银行、投资银行、投资经理人和保险公司。 Its counterproductive effects are therefore potentially even more far-reaching and costly to consumers. At the most basic level, it gives the federal banking regulators the authority to identify “systemically important” financial institutions. These are pre-cleared for a bailout during the next financial crisis. In return, they become in effect wards of the state, with regulators having broad discretion to oversee their business practices. 因此对消费者来说，它适得其反的影响有可能更加深远且代价巨大。从最基础的来说，它赋予了联邦银行监管人员鉴别何为系统重要性金融机构的权力。下一次金融危机要实行救援计划时，它们就会被预先判定无辜。作为交换，国家成了它们事实上的监护人，监管者对其商业行为有着广泛的自由裁量权。 Dodd-Frank also requires major changes to the over-the-counter derivatives market. Lawmakers argued that “opaque” and “risky” derivatives contributed substantially to the financial crisis. This is true only in the sense that anything that reduces the transaction costs of borrowing leads to more borrowing. 多德-弗兰克法案还要求场外衍生品市场做出重大改变。立法者认为“晦涩的”和“高风险的”衍生品实质上促进了金融危机。这种观点仅在如下意义上是正确的：任何降低借款交易费用的事情都会导致更多借贷行为。 The financial crisis was fundamentally a problem of financial institutions taking highly leveraged positions in mortgage-related assets. Derivatives are only one of many vehicles by which they did so. Leverage is the problem, not the specific contracts by which it is achieved. 这次金融危机从根本上说是金融机构用抵押资产贷款维持高杠杆化经营的问题。金融衍生品只是这些企业实现高杠杆化的众多工具之一。衍生品并不是金融危机背后的问题，高杠杆化才是。 Congress therefore devised a solution to a non-problem by requiring that many over-the-counter derivatives be centrally cleared, meaning there must be an institution (typically owned by other financial institutions) that guarantees each party’s performance to the other. These central clearinghouses are eligible for “systemically important” status and will be in line for bailouts during the next financial crisis as well. 国会因此给一个不存在的问题设计了解决办法，要求场外金融衍生品集中清算，这意味必须要有一个机构（通常由其他金融机构拥有）来保证各方对彼此履约。这些（场内）中央清算所有资格具备“系统重要性”，而且也将在下次金融危机时纳入救援计划。 There are plausible arguments that the 2007-2008 financial crisis was exacerbated by the unintended consequences of governmental policies, including interest-rate decisions by the Federal Reserve, housing policies administered by banking regulators, politically-driven risk weights within the risk-based system of capital requirements, and the tendency to bail out large institutions in financial distress. 有人不无理由的说，2007-2008年金融危机被政府政策的非意图后果加剧了，包括美联储的利率决议，银行监管部门的住房贷款政策，风险相关的资本要求中受政治影响扭曲的风险权重，还有在危机时救助大机构的倾向。 Dodd-Frank increases the likelihood that regulators’ missteps will be a significant contributor to the next financial crisis. But because governmental actors strongly resist admitting mistakes, it, too, will be blamed on “reckless” bankers, clearinghouses, insurance companies, or other financial intermediaries. 多德-弗兰克法案增加了因监管者过失导致下一次金融危机的可能性。但是因为政府机构总是死不认错，下次 危机也会被归咎于“不计后果的”银行家、清算所、保险公司、或者其他金融中介机构 。 And then the cycle will start again, with more regulations that will cause more unintended consequences for which Wall Street will be blamed. 然后这个循环又会开始，更多规定导致更多非意图后果。为此华尔街还会被指责。 Paul G. Mahoney is dean of the University of Virginia School of Law. 弗吉尼亚大学法学院院长 Paul G.Mahoney （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Rehabilitationists 回归主义者 作者：Brian Beutler，《新共和》高级编辑 @ 2015-08-30 译者：@Ghostmarine 来源：《新共和》（The Republic） http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal How a small band of determined legal academics set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won. 一小撮坚定的法学家如何游说最高法院撤销新政，并如何距成功一步之遥。 In November 2013, a who’s who of America’s conservative legal establishment descended on the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., for an annual meeting of the Federalist Society, the most influential conservative legal organization in the country. Current presidential candidates Scott Walker and Ted Cruz each made appearances, ingratiating themselves with the influence peddlers in attendance. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was a featured speaker at the event’s black-tie-optional dinner. 2013年11月，美国保守派法律界名流纷纷降临华盛顿特区五月花酒店，参加全美最具影响力的保守派法学组织——联邦党人协会（Federalist Society）举办的年会。眼下正在争取总统获选人党内提名的斯科特·沃克和泰迪·克鲁兹也分别到场，搔首弄姿，试图赢得与会大佬们的垂青。最高法院大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯作为特邀演讲嘉宾出席年会的半正装宴会。 One of the biggest stars of the conference, however, was neither a Senate-confirmed official nor an elected politician, but a libertarian law professor at Georgetown named Randy Barnett. This wasn’t Barnett’s first turn as a Federalist Society eminence, but his reception that year was especially rapturous. 然而，年会上最耀眼的明星并非是由参议院批准的法官，也不是民选政客，而是一个来自乔治城、名叫兰迪·巴奈特的法学教授，是个自由意志主义者。巴奈特并非首次在联邦党人协会上出风头，但那年，他格外火。 “The younger people, the people in law school, they seem to be gravitating toward people like Randy,” said attendee Josh Blackman, an associate law professor at the South Texas College of Law and a close friend of Barnett’s. “When he gets off the stage he’s mobbed. ... There’s a crowd of people five or six feet deep surrounding him.” “年轻人，法学院的学生们，他们为兰迪这样的人所倾倒，”与会者、巴奈特的密友、南德克萨斯法学院副教授乔什·布莱克曼如是说。“他下台时，被围住了······围在他身边的人群足有五、六英尺那么厚。” Barnett had been invited to participate in a lunchtime debate against J. Harvie Wilkinson, a Reagan-appointed judge serving on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the topic of whether courts are too deferential to legislatures. The event was sold out. 巴奈特曾被邀请参加午餐辩论，对手是里根任命的第四巡回上诉法院法官J·哈维·威尔金森，讨论法院是否对立法机关过于顺从。那次活动的票卖得精光。 Thinking back on that day recently, Barnett marveled at his emergence as a celebrity. “One of the leaders of the Federalist Society—one of the senior staff—said clearly I had the room,” Barnett told me. “It wasn’t that I beat J. Harvie Wilkinson in a debate—who knows?—it’s just that the room was with me. The room would not have been with me ten years ago.” 回想起那天的情形，巴奈特依然为自己成为一个明星而惊讶不已。“联邦党人协会的一名领导，高管，再明白不过地告诉我，说那间屋子是我的，”巴奈特对我说。“不是说我在辩论中赢了J·哈维·威尔金森，那种场合哪有胜负可言，他是指那间房子里全是我的支持者。要在十年前，根本不会出现这种情况。” Back then, Barnett was one of a handful of academics on the fringes of conservative legal thought. Today, their views are taking hold within the mainstream of our politics. Barnett and his compatriots represent the vanguard of a lasting shift toward greater libertarian influence over our law schools and, increasingly, throughout our legal system. They’re building networks for students and young lawyers and laying the foundation for a more free-market cast of federal judges in the next presidential administration. Their goal is to fundamentally reshape the courts in ways that will have profound effects on society. 十年前，巴奈特只是保守派法学思想边缘的少数几名学者之一。而今天，他们的观点开始在我们主流政治视野中显山露水。在长久以来自由意志主义向法学院乃至整个法律体系逐渐扩大影响的过程中，巴奈特和他的同袍们扮演了急先锋的角色。他们为学生和年轻律师构建了一个网络，打造了更为壮大的拥护自由市场的联邦法官阵容，为下一届政府选拔法官奠定了基础。他们的目标是，用一种能够对社会产生深远影响的方式，彻底重塑法庭体系。 Barnett’s political philosophy took root when he was a child. His father was a conservative, and he became one, too. When he was a junior at Northwestern University, one of his professors introduced him to libertarianism, as distinct from the more staid Republicanism of his youth. While attending law school at Harvard, a classmate took him to New York to meet the famed but controversial theorist Murray Rothbard, an encounter that inspired his lifelong affiliation with the libertarian movement and its prominent institutions, like the Cato Institute. His lone professional detour outside that world was a four-year stint as a prosecutor in Illinois. After that, he obtained a fellowship at the University of Chicago under Richard Epstein, a giant of American law in the twentieth century and a patron saint of modern libertarian scholars. 巴奈特的政治哲学植根于儿提时代。父亲是个保守派，他也成了保守派。在西北大学读大三时，一位教授向他介绍了自由意志主义，这套理论显然与他青年时所信仰的更为古板的共和主义大相径庭。进入哈佛法学院后，一位同窗带他前往纽约，拜见名满天下谤亦随之的思想家罗斯巴德。这次邂逅促成了他终生卷入自由意志主义运动之中，并与加图研究所这样的运动重镇始终保持良好关系。巴奈特孤寂的职业生涯并非起步于学术界，他最初在伊利诺伊清贫地干了四年检察官。此后，二十世纪美国法学巨擘理查德·爱泼斯坦主持下的芝加哥大学为他提供了一份奖学金，要知道，爱泼斯坦可是现代自由意志主义学者的守护神。 Barnett’s career as an academic began far from the center of the action, however, at Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he became a professor in 1982. “It was a good school,” Barnett told me, “but one reason it was a bummer to teach there was no one had ever heard of it.” 然而，巴奈特的学术之旅可谓发轫于蛮荒，他于1982年在芝加哥肯特法学院获得教授职称。“那是所好学校，”巴奈特告诉我道，“但是在那教书令人困扰的是，没几个人听说过那座学校。” Eventually, Barnett clawed his way to Boston University, and then to Georgetown, where he joined the faculty in 2006. (“I love the situation here,” he said of his current digs. “I don’t need to be on the outs.”) But even as his career took off, his legal views remained decidedly anti-establishment. Barnett believes the Constitution exists to secure inalienable property and contract rights for individuals. This may sound like a bland and inconsequential opinion, but if widely adopted by our courts and political systems it would prohibit or call into question basic governmental protections—minimum wages, food-safety regulations, child-labor laws—that most of us take for granted. For nearly a century now, a legal counterculture has insisted that the whole New Deal project was a big, unconstitutional error, and Barnett is a big part of that movement today. 最终，巴奈特费尽九牛二虎之力，辗转波士顿大学，于2006年成为乔治城的教员。（“我喜欢这里的环境，”他谈及自己当前的教职。“再不用跟别人格格不入了。”）虽然职业生涯平步青云，他依然坚定地秉承反建制派的法学观点。巴奈特深信，宪法存在的意义是为了确保个人财产和订约权不被侵犯。这种观点似乎是一种陈词滥调，无关紧要。但，如果美国的法院和政治体系能够彻底吸纳这种观点，就会彻底禁绝基本的政府保护行为，至少也会对我们绝大部分人都视作理所当然的一些举措，例如最低工资、食品安全管制、禁止童工法等等，产生怀疑。近百年来，法律界的非主流观点一直声称，整个新政项目都是一个巨大的违宪错误，而今天，巴奈特正在该运动中扮演重要的角色。 The main object of this group’s obsession is the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. Joseph Lochner was the owner of a bakery in Utica, New York, at the turn of the last century, who sought relief from the Bakeshop Act, under which he was fined for allowing an employee to work more than 60 hours a week. He believed that the act’s workplace-safety rationale was in fact a government-sanctioned tool for the bakers union to attack nonunion bakeries like his own and that it deprived him and his employees of their right to enter into their own contracts. The Supreme Court narrowly agreed. Its 5–4 ruling struck down the law and, more importantly, provided the rationale justices would use to invalidate other legislation over the course of a generation. 这群人念念不忘的是1905年最高法院就洛克纳诉纽约州（Lochner v. New York）一案的判决。约瑟夫·洛克纳是纽约尤蒂卡一家面包坊的主人，上世纪之交，由于让员工一周工作超过六十小时，受到了《面包坊法》（Bakeshop Act）的处罚，他决定找法院说理。他认为，《面包坊法》所谓基于工作场所安全的理由，其实是面包师工会的一种得到政府批准的工具，用于整治像自己这样的非工会面包师，而且这种法律也侵犯了他和员工之间自由订立契约的权利。最高法院勉强认同了他的观点。判决结果5-4，推翻了《面包坊法》。更重要的是，此次判决提供了一种司法逻辑依据，本足以颠覆此后整整一代所修筑而成的法律体系。 For decades now, legal academics and elites have considered the early twentieth century one of the Supreme Court’s darkest eras. Lochner, it’s been viewed, belongs with Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 1857 decision holding that neither slaves nor freedmen were U.S. citizens, and Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 decision upholding racial segregation under the separate-but-equal doctrine, in a Malebolge of rejected rulings. 最近几十年来，法学学者和精英们都将二十世纪早期视为最高法院的黑历史阶段。洛克纳一案，与1857年裁定奴隶和已解放奴隶均不享有公民权的斯科特诉桑福德案（Dred Scott v. Sandford），以及1896年在“隔离但平等”的原则下实行种族隔离的普莱西诉弗格森案（Plessy v. Ferguson）一道，被视为奇葩判决的典型。 In 1936, after the Supreme Court struck down a New York minimum-wage law, one of a series of New Deal measures it ruled unconstitutional, a dejected Franklin D. Roosevelt complained to the press that the Court had created “a ‘no-man’s land’ where no government—state or federal—can function.” 1936年，最高法院宣布新政措施之一、纽约州最低工资法违宪，沮丧的富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福对媒体抱怨道，最高法院开辟了“一片‘真空地带’，无论是联邦政府还是州政府，在这里都无能为力。” A year later, after Roosevelt had been reelected overwhelmingly on a New Deal platform, the Supreme Court effectively repudiated Lochner when a 5–4 majority upheld Washington’s state minimum-wage law for women. “More than 25 years ago we set forth the applicable principle in these words, after referring to the cases where the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been broadly described,” the Court ruled. “But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses.” In addition to forming the basis of the modern American social contract, this decision was a hard-fought victory over fierce opposition to government regulation by employers and property owners. The enduring postwar political consensus about the proper role of government may have masked that opposition, but it was never completely vanquished. 一年后，随着罗斯福挟新政以绝对优势连任，最高法院以5-4的多数支持华盛顿州女性最低工资法，事实上推翻了洛克纳案先例。 “二十五年前，在大量援引了明显涉及宪法第十四修正案所保障的众多自由的案件后，我们以这样的字眼陈述了一条适用原则，”法庭裁定。“然而，我们需要认识到，像其他所有案件一样，在所引用的案例中，订立契约的自由是一种具有限制的权利，而非绝对权利。并不存在随心所欲行事的绝对自由，也不存在任意订立契约的绝对自由。”此判决除了奠定现代美国社会契约基础外，还艰难地战胜了雇主和业主对政府管制的强烈反对。虽然战后长期以来，关于政府恰当角色的政治共识掩盖了这种反对，但反对的声音从未彻底消失。 All libertarians want to fight federal regulations in Congress and the executive branch. But Barnett and his allies think courts should be empowered to throw regulations out even if political majorities support them. These Lochner revivalist professors have established beachheads at law schools across the country. In 2002, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh founded a blog, The Volokh Conspiracy, as a hub for libertarian ideas, including Lochner revisionism. Today, it has become the most prominent academic legal blog in the country and now publishes under the auspices of The Washington Post. It boasts nearly two dozen contributing professors and mainlines detailed and informed libertarian legal arguments to thousands of the nation’s top lawyers, law students, clerks, judges, and opinion-makers every day. 所有自由意志主义者都试图在国会和行政分支与联邦管制作斗争。然而，巴奈特和他的盟友认为，即使政治主流乐见管制，司法系统也应当有能力推翻管制。这些以复兴洛克纳案为己任的教授们已经在全美各地的法学院建立起滩头阵地。2002年，加州大学洛杉矶分校的法学教授尤金·沃洛克创建了一个名叫“沃洛克共谋”的博客，成为自由意志主义理念，的大本营，其中就包括洛克纳修正主义。今天，该网站已经成为美国最引人瞩目的法学博客，并在《华盛顿邮报》的资助下结集出版。网站声称，有二十多位教授参与博客内容撰写，网站涉及大量详尽而具体的自由意志主义法学热点，每天有数以千计的国内顶级律师、法学院学生、书记员、法官，以及意见领袖浏览。 The contributors to The Volokh Conspiracy teach at the University of Minnesota, Northwestern, Emory, Duke, and elsewhere. Several hold positions at George Mason University’s law school, which is famous for its conservative faculty and, in 36 short years, has rocketed to prominence as one of the 50 best law schools in the country. In 2011, GMU law professor and Volokh Conspiracy contributor David Bernstein published a book titled Rehabilitating Lochner, and that’s exactly what he, Barnett, and their contemporaries have been attempting to do. “沃洛克共谋”的撰稿人在明尼苏达大学、西北大学、埃莫里大学、杜克大学，以及其他地方任教。还有几人把持乔治梅森大学法学院教席，该大学最引人注目之处就是其保守派教员，以及在短短三十六年时间里，以火箭的速度攀升至全国法学院前五十强。2011年，乔治梅森大学法学教授、沃洛克共谋撰稿人大卫·伯恩斯坦出版了一本名为《回归洛克纳》的书，而这正是伯恩斯坦、巴奈特，以及他们的同袍们所一直努力加以实现的目标。 That project aims to extend the reach of their dissident school of thought beyond academia and into the workings of government. In 1991, two former members of the Reagan administration, Chip Mellor and Clint Bolick, founded the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public-interest law firm now based in Arlington, Virginia, with $350,000 a year in seed money from the oil and gas magnate Charles Koch. They’ve challenged state licensing laws on behalf of hair braiders, florists, and other tradespeople across the country, but have also undertaken loftier crusades, including a doomed effort to overturn the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires that contractors pay their employees competitive wages on government-funded projects. 自由意志主义运动旨在扩展这一思想异端学派的影响力，从学术界渗透入政府运作领域。1991年，曾在里根政府任职的奇普·梅勒和克林特·波力克创立了一家自由意志主义公共利益律师事务所——司法研究所，该机构目前位于弗吉尼亚阿灵顿市，每年由石油大亨查尔斯·科赫慷慨解囊三十五万美元作为种子基金。研究所已经代表全国的编辫工、花匠，以及其他生意人挑战了各州的特许经营法，同时他们还在进行一场更为深远的变革，其中包括彻底推翻《戴维斯—培根法》（Davis-Bacon Act），因为该法案要求在政府出资的项目上，承包商应向员工支付具有竞争力的工资，虽然这项努力前景不妙。 The Volokh Conspiracy, too, was designed not just as a place where law professors could talk with each other, but as a platform from which to broadcast libertarian ideas to a wider audience. Barnett joined the blog as a contributor in 2004. In its early days, its views could be read as a counterpoint to prevailing conservative legal thought. In the summer of 2005, for example, when the overwhelming majority of conservative elites were celebrating John Roberts’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Barnett interjected with a typically contrarian but in some ways fundamental caveat. “Who is John Roberts?” he asked in a Volokh Conspiracypost. “We know nothing about what he stands for.” 同样，沃洛克共谋也不仅仅是个供法学教授们谈天说地的所在，而是一个向更多听众传播自由意志主义理念的平台。2004年，巴奈特成为该博客的撰稿人。起先，该博客的观点更像是保守派同行们所奉行法学观点的对位旋律。例如，2005年夏，当绝大多数保守派精英为约翰·罗伯茨被任命为最高法院首席大法官而欢呼雀跃时，巴奈特以一种典型的鹤立鸡群的姿态，问了一个更为本质的问题，“约翰·罗伯茨是谁？”他在沃洛克共谋发帖写道。“我们对于他所持有的立场一无所知。” Few professors see their academic work reflected in the public realm, and fewer still after cutting so aggressively against the grain. In 2004, when Barnett argued his first and only case before the Supreme Court, Lochner was a distant specter, and libertarian influence over the law more generally was hard to detect. The case concerned two women, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, who used marijuana to treat their chronic medical conditions. Monson’s homegrown medical marijuana plants were seized and destroyed by federal agents pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. Barnett contended the law was an overbroad application of the Commerce Clause to regulate economic activity. He lost 6–3. The following year, the Rehnquist Court dealt libertarians another major blow when it ruled 5–4 in Kelo v. New London that the Connecticut city could use its eminent domain powers to condemn private property and hand it over to private developers. The plaintiffs in that case were represented by the Institute for Justice. 做研究的很少能看到自己的成果反映在公共领域中，如果他们还如此咄咄逼人地与主流观点相悖，可能性就更微乎其微了。2004年，当巴奈特为他第一个也是唯一一个案子在最高法院展开唇枪舌战时，洛克纳只是一个遥远的幽灵，自由意志主义对于整个法律体系的影响微乎其微。那起案子关乎两名女性，安吉尔·赖希和黛安·蒙森，她们利用大麻治疗自己的慢性病。联邦探员依据《管制药品法》（Controlled Substances Act），查抄并销毁了蒙森在自己家种植的药用大麻。巴奈特慷慨陈词，认为利用商业条款对经济活动进行管制实在过于宽泛。他以3-6输了官司。来年，伦奎斯特法庭给了自由意志主义者又一击重拳，在凯洛诉新伦敦市一案（Kelo v. New London）中以5-4裁定，这座康涅狄格小城可以行使土地征用权，征收私人地产，并将其转售给私人开发商。这起案子的原告凯洛就是由司法研究所代理。 To anyone who lived through Bush v. Gore it might seem strange that a judiciary as conservative as the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts would rule for the government so regularly. But the dominant strain of conservative legal thought for the last half-century has largely been shaped by the right’s backlash to the social revolution stemming from the 1960s and the Warren and Burger Courts’ use of the Constitution to further progressive ends like desegregation and access to abortion. For conservatives, the main villain of the last 50 years has been creeping liberal judicial activism and a willingness to overturn legislative action. Conservative legal scholars and jurists like Robert Bork held that judges should refrain from projecting personal or political values into their judicial opinions. This principle became a cornerstone of traditional conservative legal thought, but it effectively created a presumption that democratically enacted laws are constitutional. Such a restrained judicial philosophy makes it difficult for judges to void properly enacted laws like the Controlled Substances Act. 对于任何经历过布什诉戈尔案（Bush v. Gore）的人来说，看到伦奎斯特法庭和罗伯茨法庭这种如此保守的司法机构却这般频繁地做出有利于政府的判决，难免惊诧莫名。然而，源于1960年代的社会革命，再加上沃伦法庭和伯格法庭以宪法为武器，达到诸如废除种族歧视、堕胎合法化之类的进步主义目的，这一切导致过去五十年间右翼反弹，进而塑造了保守派法学思潮的主要观点。在保守派看来，过去五十年中，最大的敌人一直是如影随形的自由派司法能动主义，以及法院推翻立法行动的强烈意愿。类似罗伯特·伯克这样的保守派法学学者和法学家，坚持认为，法官应当努力克制，避免将自己的私人政治价值观投射进司法意见之中。这种原则构成了传统保守法学思想的基石。然而这种价值观实际会产生一个假定：凡经民主程序颁布的法律一定合宪。一旦法官需要酌情废止诸如《管制药品法》之类的法规时，这样一种克制的司法哲学，就会显得力不从心。 But it has been nearly 30 years since Chief Justice Warren E. Burger retired. For many younger conservatives, the Court’s cardinal sin isn’t Brown v. Board of Education or even Roe v. Wade. And Barnett and his allies have helped make many conservatives more comfortable with the idea of judicial activism. 然而，伯格首席大法官退休已近三十年。对很多年轻一代保守派而言，最高法院的头等大罪并非是布朗诉托皮卡教育局案（Brown v. Board of Education），甚至也不是罗诉韦德案（Roe v. Wade）。巴奈特和他的战友们已经帮助很多保守派对于司法能动主义更为习以为常。 With five offices around the country, a legal clinic training students at the University of Chicago Law School, and a staff of nearly 100, the Institute for Justice has become a proving ground for aspiring, ideologically committed lawyers. Every year, the group sends lawyers to law schools around the country to give presentations on public-interest law and recruit students into its ranks. “It’s certainly done with the intent to make sure that libertarian-minded law students know who we are and what we have to offer,” Clark Neily, a senior attorney at the Institute for Justice, said of the group’s outreach. Each summer, a couple dozen clerks join the group in its Beltway headquarters and state offices. From there, these young lawyers typically move on to more traditional clerkships at law firms and federal courts—one former Institute for Justice clerk worked for Chief Justice Roberts from 2008 to 2009—and when the Institute hires new staff attorneys, it often culls from the ranks of these same pupils. 司法研究所拥有员工近百人，全国设有五家办事处，在芝加哥大学法学院开设一间用于学生培训的法律诊所，是志向远大、笃定于意识形态的律师一试身手的理想所在。每年，研究所都会派遣律师前往全国各地的法学院，就涉及公共利益的法律进行演讲，同时招兵买马，扩充队伍。“这些举措显然融入了我们的目的，就是确保具有自由意志主义意识的法学院学生知道我们是谁，我们能提供什么，”谈及研究所正在努力扩大影响时，司法研究所高级律师克拉克·莱利评论道。每年夏天，研究所位于特区政治圈的总部和各州的办事处都会迎来几十名书记员。这些年轻律师通常会从这里起步，跻身律师事务所和联邦法院担任传统书记员——其中有位司法研究所的前书记员在2008年至2009年期间听候首席大法官罗伯茨的差遣——而一旦研究所需要聘用新律师时，就会从这些曾经的学生中精挑细选。 “Ten to 15 years ago, conservatives who were in positions of influence—educating young lawyers, or in a position to hire them to politically desirable positions—were unified by what you might call Borkian restraint, or knee-jerk deference,” Neily said. “What has really changed in the last four or five years is a real skepticism, particularly but not exclusively among young law students, toward this kind of acquiescence to whatever government does.” “十到十五年前，调教年轻律师、能够在政治职位上安插自己人的这些举足轻重的保守派，信奉的都是那种所谓的伯克（Bork）式克制理念，你也可以管那套哲学叫做‘下意识的顺从’，”莱利批评道。“过去四五年里真正的变化就是出现了一种真正的怀疑主义，主要体现在那些法学院青年学生中，他们会怀疑这种默认政府一切举动的做法。” In 2013, the Institute for Justice enjoyed one of its biggest successes to date. It prevailed in a federal appeals court on behalf of the Benedictine monks of St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana, who had sued for the right to sell handmade, inexpensive funeral caskets after the state Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors ordered them to desist. Like Lochner, the case represents a challenge to government health and safety rules. And like Lochner, it could theoretically become the basis for invalidating scores of unrelated business regulations. The Supreme Court declined to hear the state board’s appeal in that case, but different appeals courts have taken different views of this general dispute, which means the Supreme Court—now more conservative than it was a decade ago—may well step in to settle it at some point. 2013年，司法研究所迎来了迄今最大的胜利。研究所在联邦上诉法院帮路易斯安那圣约瑟夫修道院的一群本笃僧打赢了官司，推翻了州殡葬业委员会对僧侣们销售自己手工制作廉价棺材的禁令。和洛克纳案一样，这起案子是对政府健康和安全领域管制的挑战。同样，和洛克纳案一样，这起案子能够成为推翻众多其它商业管制的起点。最高法院拒绝听取州委员会就该案件的上诉意见，然而，不同的上诉法院对同类案件有着不同的理解，这或许意味着，有朝一日，相比十年前更加保守的最高法院将会置身其中，一举解决类似分歧。 Each success on behalf of an everyman struggling against the government serves the libertarian cause well, but these victories pale in comparison to the role that President Obama and the Affordable Care Act have played in convincing mainstream conservatives to give judicial activism a second look. 平凡个人与政府抗争所取得的每一个胜利，都令自由意志主义更加强大，然而在奥巴马总统和《平价医疗法案》面前，这些胜利显得黯然失色，迫使主流保守派不得不重新打量司法能动主义。 Barnett has been at the forefront of the fight against Obamacare, and the 2012 constitutional challenge to the law’s insurance-coverage mandate was largely his brainchild. He argued that requiring private citizens to purchase health insurance against their will exceeded Congress’s powers. A clearly conflicted Chief Justice Roberts ultimately bent over backwards to construe the law in a constitutional way, out of deference to the elected branches, enraging the entire right. If Barnett viewed Roberts as an enigma back in 2005, it’s clear to him now that he finds the chief justice’s approach to the law deeply wanting, and many conservatives agree with him. 巴奈特始终战斗在抵制奥巴马医改的最前线，2012年就《平价医疗法案》中的保险涵盖范围规定上诉最高法院进行宪法挑战，很大程度上就是出自他的思想成果。巴奈特声称，要求私人违背个人意愿，购买健康保险，属国会越权。最终，出于对民选分支的尊重，倍感分裂的首席大法官罗伯茨使出浑身解数，从宪法的角度为该法案再三辩解，令整个右翼暴怒。如果说，2005年，巴奈特还将罗伯茨视作一团迷雾，那么现在他已经看清了，首席大法官对于法律的理解完全不及格，而很多保守派对巴奈特的这一评论颇为激赏。 “Selecting judges with the judicial mindset of ‘judicial restraint’ and ‘deference’ to the majoritarian branches leads to the results we witnessed,” Barnett warned in another Volokh Conspiracy post this summer, after Roberts once again saved the health care law. To Barnett, the proper role for judges isn’t modest or deferential at all, and it’s time for Republicans to start promoting conservatives who will embrace a more activist approach on the bench. “If conservative Republicans want a different performance from the judiciary in the future,” Barnett argued, “they must vet their presidential candidates to see whether they understand this point.” “选一个信奉‘司法克制主义’，对政府、国会‘言听计从’的法官会带来什么后果，我们都已经见识过了，”罗伯茨再次拯救医保法案后，今年夏天，巴奈特在沃洛克共谋的另一篇帖子中敲响警钟。对巴奈特来说，想要当法官，就绝不能温良恭俭让，共和党现在就应该开始动员保守派，将一个更为积极的人推上最高法院。“如果保守派共和党希望将来在司法系统能够有所作为，”巴奈特大声疾呼，“就必须好好敲打敲打总统候选人，看看他们能不能搞清楚这个问题。” Barnett’s opposition to Obamacare made him a hero to the conservative legal establishment. It was for this reason that he was greeted with such enthusiasm at the Federalist Society meeting in Washington two years ago. And it’s what catapulted his ideas about the proper role of judges fully into the mainstream. 巴奈特对于奥巴马医保改革的反对让他在保守派法学界成为一名英雄。这正是两年前的华盛顿特区联邦党人协会的年会中，他受到如此狂热欢迎的原因所在。也正是由于这样的原因，他关于法官适当人选的看法才得以被主流所了解。 To dismiss the debate between libertarians and traditional conservatives over Lochner as an academic sideshow is to misunderstand the stakes. “A full-fledged return to Lochner would put a constitutional cloud over a whole host of laws that we all take for granted today,” said Sam Bagenstos, a liberal constitutional scholar at the University of Michigan who has argued cases before the Supreme Court. “Laws guaranteeing workers the right to join a union without being fired, and the right to earn a minimum wage and receive overtime if working more than 40 hours a week, laws protecting worker safety, and laws protecting workers and customers against discrimination based on race or other protected statuses, just for starters.” 如果简单认定，自由意志主义者和传统保守派关于洛克纳案的争论仅仅是一场无伤大雅的学术小插曲，那就彻底没认清问题的利害所在。“彻底回归洛克纳案，将在我们今天习以为常的整套法律体系上，罩起一片宪法乌云，”曾在最高法院交锋过的密歇根大学自由派宪法学者塞缪尔·巴根斯托斯认为。“保障工人加入工会而不被开除的法律、保证工人把最低工资挣到手、每周工作超过四十小时能拿到加班费的法律、保护工人安全的法律、防止工人和消费者受到种族歧视或者别的什么歧视的法律，统统完蛋，而这统统只是前菜。” I asked Barnett whether the social welfare laws on the books today would be permitted under his reading of the Constitution. “Probably not at the federal level,” he said. 我问过巴奈特，依照他于宪法的理解，今天这些关乎社会福利的成文法还能不能通过。“大概在联邦层面不可能，”他回答。 That’s why Barnett and his contemporaries prefer to root their arguments in specific injustices rather than categorical abstractions. Why shouldn’t bakers be allowed to work more than 60 hours a week, or individuals be allowed to remain uninsured? Why should the government be allowed to regulate out of existence my right to hail a driver or your right to rent a stranger’s house for a weekend? 这就是为什么巴奈特和他的同袍们更愿意将论点放在具体的不公正上，而不是推而广之，形成一套抽象的体系。为什么面包师就不能一周工作六十小时？为什么一个人就不能不买保险？我招个司机，你租个陌生人的房子过周末，政府有什么资格无事生非地对这些权利指手画脚？ Even if you believe these regulations are the result of collusion between government and industry cronies, that doesn’t mean they should be constitutionally prohibited, or even that they have no merit. Once courts are empowered to invalidate sordid government regulations, they are also on a slippery slope to tossing out standards that serve useful purposes—in part because some laws that appear unprincipled at a glance actually do important work. If an Airbnb customer and a hotel guest are each badly burned in preventable fires, the hotel guest is likely to have a great deal more recourse—and would have government regulation to thank. 就算你认为这种管制是政府及其行业亲信共谋的结果，也并不意味着这些管制就应该被彻底禁绝，也并不意味着这些管制就丝毫没有优点。一旦法院有权将这些肮脏的政府管制统统取消，就有可能引发雪崩，将某些发挥重要作用的标准也随之抛弃——部分原因就在于，某些大眼一看不符合原则的法律，却在现实中发挥中重要的作用。要是Airbnb和一个酒店的顾客都在一场本可避免的火灾中被严重烧伤，酒店的顾客很可能享有更多的追索权。这时他或许会对政府管制千恩万谢。 That’s not a persuasive rationale in Barnett’s mind. “You should have your own insurance,” he told me emphatically. “You should be insured. You should have health insurance, you should probably have life insurance, disability insurance. I insure myself.” (The irony of this position should be lost on no one—had Barnett’s Obamacare challenge succeeded, 16 million fewer people would have health insurance today.) 在巴奈特看来，这套说辞并没什么说服力。“你是该有自己的保险，”他断然告诉我，“你该有个保障。你该有套健康保险，你或许还该套生命保险、残疾保险。我就为自己投保。”（这种姿态的讽刺意味倒是路人皆知——要是巴奈特挑战奥巴马医保法案成功，有保险的人就会比今天少一千六百万。） The movement to rehabilitate Lochner now faces a crucial test: Can it endure after the spasms of resistance to the Obama presidency have quieted, or will it burn out along with them? When I put this question to Barnett, he demurred. “I didn’t really have a strategy to get us this far,” he said. 目前，回归洛克纳案运动面临一个非常严峻的挑战：随着奥巴马总统任期结束，对其政策抵抗的退潮，这项运动能否延续下去？还是会随之偃旗息鼓？当我向巴奈特抛出这个问题时，他不以为然。“我们能发展到今天这步，也并不是靠一套什么战略。”巴奈特说道。 Nevertheless, Barnett believes that he and his contemporaries have laid a solid foundation for turning back the legal clock to Lochner. “I don’t think it’s top-down,” Barnett said of the overall approach. “You don’t get Justice Whatever without having a huge bottom-up.” 然而无论如何，巴奈特坚信，他和他的同袍们已经打下了坚实的基础，为法律的钟摆回归洛克纳案创造了条件。“我不觉得这项运动是自上而下组织的，”论及运动的整体方式，巴奈特说道， “没有一个巨大的底层基础，什么法官你都提不起来。” That bottom-up effect has arguably had a big impact on the judiciary already. The 2010 Citizens United decision upended the government’s ability to limit campaign spending by corporations. In 2012, four conservative Supreme Court justices declared, in a dissenting opinion, that the entire Affordable Care Act should be vacated as an improper use of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. This was Lochner cloaked in fresh garb: The government can’t tell me how many hours I can work at a bakery; the government can’t tell me to buy insurance. Roberts salvaged the law, but on the basic point about compulsion, he agreed with Barnett, too. It wasn’t just four conservative justices who bought into a kind of Lochnerism. It was all five. 或许可以这么说，自底向上的效果已经对司法体系产生了影响。2010年，联合公民诉联邦选举委员会案的裁决推翻了政府对于企业竞选资金的限制。2012年，四位保守派大法官在反对意见中声称，《平价医疗法案》应当被彻底取消，因为这是国会滥用权力，干涉州际贸易。其实就是把洛克纳案这样陈年老酒装进了一个新瓶子：政府不能告诉我在面包坊工作几个小时；政府不能逼我买保险。虽然罗伯茨拯救了该项法律，但是对强制性的基本看法，他和巴奈特没什么不同。并不是只有四名保守派法官具有一定的洛克纳主义倾向。所有五名保守派法官全都持有类似观点。 Ultimately, the success of any bottom-up movement will depend as much on voters as on legal scholars and the activists they inform. The biggest setback for Lochnerians could be an establishment Republican like Jeb Bush winning the presidency and cannibalizing the grassroots right’s enthusiasm for taking apart the Obama-era administrative state. A Hillary Clinton presidency would put off a Lochner revival for another four or eight years, but it would keep the fires of opposition to big government raging in the meantime. Bush, by contrast, is an advocate of judicial restraint, and once he started appointing traditional conservatives to the bench, it would be difficult to stop him. But Barnett and the Lochnerians hope that the right’s antipathy toward Obama, the Affordable Care Act, and the Roberts Court’s interventions to salvage it will give a Republican president no choice but to move in a new direction. 从根本上来说，任何自底向上的运动要想取得成功，一方面的确需要法学学者的摇旗呐喊，另一方面，选民也发挥着同样重要的作用。洛克纳分子们所能遭遇的最大挫败就是像杰布·布什这样倾向于大政府的共和党人赢得总统大选，挪用草根右翼的热情，向奥巴马时代的行政举措开火。一旦希拉里·克林顿当政，洛克纳的回归大业将会延后那么四到八年，但同时，这也会为反对大政府的熊熊烈火上浇上几桶热油。而相反，如果像布什这样鼓吹司法克制主义的人当了总统，只要他开始提名传统保守主义者当法官，局面几乎铁定难以挽回。但是，巴奈特和洛克纳分子们希望，奥巴马、《平价医疗法案》，以及罗伯茨法庭对于法案的挽救，已经让右翼分子深恶痛绝，这将会让共和党总统别无选择，只能另辟蹊径。 Conservatives, Barnett said, “have to decide, ‘Well, why am I furious? What am I furious at? ... They put John Roberts on the court. I didn’t put him on the court. Bill Clinton didn’t put him on the court. George Bush put him on the court, and he was considered by the Ted Cruzes of this world as a superstar, and then look what he does. There’s something wrong with this picture.” 巴奈特说道，保守派“必须痛下决心了”，“好吧，我为什么愤怒？是什么让我愤怒？······他们把约翰·罗伯茨抬上了首席大法官的宝座。不是我让他当的法官，不是比尔·克林顿让他当的法官，是乔治·布什任命他当了法官，泰迪·克鲁兹那群人把他当天皇巨星一样崇拜，可是你看看他都干了些什么。这种事压根就不对。” The hope is that this anger propels a libertarian-minded president into office and inspires him to nominate less restrained judges. The next president will likely have the opportunity to appoint at least one, and possibly as many as four Supreme Court justices. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is now 82. Stephen Breyer is 77. Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia are both 79. If one of these justices retires under a Republican president, who then appoints a Lochnerian to fill the vacancy, it will change the Court profoundly. If more than one of them steps down, the Court will become unrecognizable. 洛克纳分子们所寄予厚望的就是，这种愤怒能够将一位具有自由意志主义思想的总统推进白宫，并启发他提名一些不那么束手束脚的大法官。下一任总统将至少有可能提名一位大法官，要是机缘巧合，说不定能提名四位大法官。鲁斯·巴德·金斯伯格今年82，斯蒂芬·布雷耶77，安东尼·肯尼迪、安东宁·斯卡利亚都是79。如果这些法官随便哪个在共和党总统任内退休，而总统又指定了一位洛克纳主义者填补空缺，这将能够彻底改变最高法院。如果他们中不止一位归隐，那最高法院将会彻底面目全非。 If that plan fails, Barnett’s cause will be set back years, and the project of pushing his ideas into the Republican mainstream will continue sub rosa. But Barnett has influential allies. 如果计划难遂人意，巴奈特的回归大业将会蛰伏数年，将其理念变成共和党主流的进程也还会继续秘密推进。然而，巴奈特确有几位说得上话的朋友。 In July, the conservative columnist George Will made a provocative new demand of the next Republican president: “Ask this of potential court nominees: Do you agree that Lochner correctly reflected the U.S. natural rights tradition and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments’ affirmation of unenumerated rights?” 七月，保守派专栏作家乔治·威尔大肆宣扬，要为下一任共和党总统设置一个新的标准：“问他会提名谁当大法官：你是否认同洛克纳案正确地反映出美国自然权利传统，是宪法第九、第十四修正案对于宪法未规定公民权利的肯定。” Thanks to the efforts to grow their ranks, there are a few suitable Supreme Court candidates already. In his column, Will identified one: Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett. In a footnote to a recent opinion, Willett celebrated the fact that “a wealth of contemporary legal scholarship is reexamining Lochner, its history and correctness as a matter of constitutional law.” 多亏洛克纳分子们不遗余力地壮大队伍，现在已经有了几位理想的最高法院大法官人选。威尔在他的专栏中就点到了这么一位：德克萨斯最高法院法官丹·威利特。在最近一份判决意见的脚注中，威利特不无欣慰地写到，“当今法学界已经对洛克纳案作出了再三审视，审视其历史和其在宪法学上的正确性。” As for Will’s proposed litmus test, a few Republican presidential candidates this cycle have passed it. Rand Paul has praised the Lochner decision explicitly multiple times, most recently at the Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit this January. “I’m not a judicial restraint guy,” he told an audience of avowed judicial activism foes. “I’m a judicial activist when it comes to Lochner. I’m a judicial activist when it comes to the New Deal.” 至于威尔提出的资格审查测试，本轮有些共和党候选人已经合格。兰德·保罗曾多次明确盛赞洛克纳案，在今年一月传统保护保守派政策峰会（Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit）上，他对听众中一位据称是司法能动主义的反对者说，“我不是司法克制主义者”，“谈到洛克纳案，谈到新政，我就是一个司法能动主义者。” In August, Rick Perry boasted on Twitter that he was “proud” to have nominated Willett to the Texas Supreme Court, calling the justice “a model of conservative jurisprudence.” Whether they know it or not, both politicians are already speaking a language Barnett and his libertarian contemporaries have successfully injected into the mainstream of conservative strategic thought. 八月份，里克·佩里在推特上自吹，提名威利特进入德克萨斯最高法院是他的“骄傲”，称这位法官是“保守派法学界的楷模。”无论他们是否意识到了，这两位政治家操持的政治话语，正是由巴奈特和他的自由意志主义战友们成功注入主流保守派政策思想的。 These are dark horse candidates, but any Republican president will face much more pressure than George W. Bush ever did to nominate the kind of judges Paul or Perry might. Another candidate, Scott Walker, is more of an enigma, but he’s an equally doctrinaire opponent of economic regulation and has a liaison to the pro-Lochner world in George Will’s wife, Mari, who is an adviser to his campaign. History shows it’s difficult to stop a determined president from shaping the courts to reflect a particular conception of law. “There was a whole series of hot-button issues that the Reagan administration decided were exceptionally important in articulating the right kind of judicial restraint,” Bagenstos explained. “Affirmative action was one. The exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment was another. ... So they had a whole hit list of legal principles that they thought were misguided, which got the Constitution wrong, and so they worked really hard to explain why the decisions they thought were wrong, were wrong. 他们都是黑马，但任何共和党总统在提名保罗或者佩里中意的那类法官时，都面临着远远大于乔治·W·布什所遇到的压力。另一位候选人斯科特·沃克更像是一团谜，但他同样在理论上反对经济管制，并且与洛克纳案阵营有着千丝万缕的联系，乔治·威尔的妻子毛伊正是他的竞选顾问。历史一再告诉我们，让一位心意已决的总统不要插手法律系统，以反映其所认同的某种特定法律理念，是非常困难的。“里根执政时期，曾经有一系列热点问题，被政府认为对于恰当地体现司法克制而言极为重要，”巴根斯托斯解释道。“平权运动是一个例子。第四条修正案下的证据排除法则是另一个例子······所以当局列了一个法律原则黑名单，把他们认为搞错的案子、和宪法起冲突的案子统统装进去，于是千辛万苦地解释为什么他们认为错误的案子是错误的。” “It influenced the way they looked at judges, and once they put those judges on the lower court they started to put that agenda into action,” he continued. “Sometimes the Supreme Court went along with the more aggressive lower-court judges, and sometimes they didn’t. But you had this dynamic that things liberals thought they had won in the Burger and Warren Courts were not secure and suddenly were being contested.” “这甚至还影响了政府对待法官的方式，一旦政府提名某些法官在下级法院任职，他们便开始行动起来。” 巴根斯托斯继续说到，“有时候最高法院会认同更为活跃的下级法院法官，有时则不会。但问题在这里，自由派原本以为在伯格法庭、沃伦法庭斩获的胜利果实，突然就变得岌岌可危起来，” This is a lesson every Democrat, and really every establishment-minded Republican, should relearn, because a president who adopted the same model, with the goal of rehabilitating Lochner, could erode the legal and administrative foundations of the past century in a matter of years. A rule change undertaken by Senate Democrats last Congress eliminated the filibuster for nominees to lower courts, and by the time the next president is sworn into office, three sitting Supreme Court justices will be over 80 years old. 历史为每一个民主党以及倾向于大政府思想的共和党拉响了警报，倘若一旦有位以里根为楷模，以回归洛克纳案为己任的总统上台，过去一百多年来构建的法律和行政基础几年以内就可能受到极大侵蚀。要知道，上届国会，民主党参议员们废除了本可用来抵御下级法院法官提名的阻挠议事规则，而等到下一位总统宣誓就职时，三位最高法院大法官将年过八十。 “The next Republican president will have a choice,” Bagenstos said. “I don’t know which way that choice is going to come out.” “下一任共和党总统将有机会做出选择，”巴根斯托斯说道，“我只是不清楚这一选择会朝向何方。” To Randy Barnett the choice is obvious. 对兰迪·巴奈特来说，答案明摆着。

Troubling Signs of Minimum Wage Damage in Los Angeles 洛杉矶最低工资带来的破坏令人不安 作者：Adam Ozimek @ 2015-8-18 译者：带菜刀的诗人（@带菜刀的诗人_） 一校：迈爸（@麦田的字留地） 来源：Moody’s Analytics，https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/datapoints/256050/Troubling-Signs-of-Minimum-Wage-Damage-in-Los-Angeles/ The recent spate of local minimum wage hikes around the country is generating a lot of new data for economists to study, but so far I’ve been hesitant to focus on case studies. 最近，遍及全国的一大波地方最低工资上涨浪潮，为经济学家的研究带来的了大量新鲜数据，但是到目前为止我仍在犹豫是否要将注意力集中于个案研究。 There are a lot of reasons to be cautious in looking for minimum wage impacts on a city-by-city basis: it is easy to cherry pick, employment data at local levels can be volatile, growth rates rather than levels may be affected, and areas with stronger than average economies may be raising minimum wages. 我们有许多理由对按城市考察最低工资的影响保持谨慎：这很容易因选择性取样而造成确认偏差，地方层面的就业数据可能不够稳定，受影响的可能是增长率而不是绝对水平，并且高于平均经济水平的区域更可能提高最低工资水平。 In addition, disagreement in the literature on minimum wages illustrates that different comparisons or controls can easily give different answers. However, as I’ve been watching the data, one case is becoming too stark to ignore: Los Angeles. 另外，学术文献中关于最低工资水平的争议表明，不同的比较方式或变量控制很容易得出不同结果。然而，就我一直在观察的数据而言，有一个例子过于惹眼以至于无法被忽略：洛杉矶。 In September, 2014, Los Angeles City approved hike to the minimum wage for hotel workers of $15.37. The wage went into effect in July, 2015, for hotels with 300 or more rooms, and will go into effect July, 2016 for 150-plus-room hotels. 2014年9月，洛杉矶市通过了将酒店工人最低工资水平上调到15.37美元的决议。对于客房数量超过300间的酒店，新的工资条例将在2015年7月生效，而数量超过150间客房的酒店则在2016年7月执行该法。 Given the delay in the wage hike, it is not obvious that employment would be affected already. But BLS data on the accommodations industry (NAICS 721) for Los Angeles county is starting to look like serious impacts are occurring already. 考虑到工资水平上调时间上的延迟，并不能马上就看到它给就业率带来的影响。但是根据劳工统计局（BLS）关于洛杉矶住宿行业（北美工业分类系统 721）的数据，严重的影响看来已然出现。 【图1】洛杉矶酒店业开始出现失业情况 The decline in year-to-year growth rates starts to show up in October, 2014, when growth falls below 2% for the first time in more than two years. Then in January, 2015, employment starts to actually shrink, and by June it is down 4.8% year over year. Zooming out, it’s clear that job losses of this magnitude in Los Angeles are not seen outside of recessions. 年度增长速度在2014年10月开始出现下滑，增速首次连续超过两年低于2%。2015年1月，就业率实际上开始萎缩，到6月同比下降4.8%。而当我们放眼全局，很明显，洛杉矶这种程度的职位流失在只有在衰退中才能看到。 【图2】洛杉矶酒店业出现衰退迹象 The BLS does not report seasonally adjusted data, but I did the adjustment using the same procedure they use and found accommodations have fallen by around 1,000 jobs so far this year. 劳工局并不会每个季度都发布调整后的数据，但是我使用跟他们一样的程序得出了自己的调整数据，并且发现到今年为止，住宿行业已经失去了约1000个工作岗位。 There are, of course, a lot of reasons for caution here. Data from the more exhaustive QCEW survey suggests the decline in job growth in accommodations is overstated in the data I use here through the end of 2014. Unfortunately, QCEW data is only available through December, 2014. 当然，我们有许多理由慎于判断。来自劳工局的就业与工资水平季度统计（QCEW）中的更详实数据表明，我使用的2014年住宿行业就业增长率的下降被高估了。不幸的是，可供使用的QCEW数据只到2014年12月。 This means that some of the job losses may be revised away in the future. However, the declines through June are large enough that is seems very likely that real employment declines are occurring. 这意味着被我计入的一些职位流失在将来可能会被更正过来。然而，整个6月的就业率下降已经足够大了，以至于看起来似乎很有可能真正的就业率下降正在发生。 Another reason to be cautious is that the employment effects are showing up after the hike passed but before it takes effect. Businesses are forward looking so this is not impossible, but the magnitude of the declines before the wage hike takes effect are somewhat surprising especially for the service sector. Finally, the hotel minimum wage hike is only affecting the City of Los Angeles, and this data is for the larger county of Los Angeles. 另一个警惕的理由是，就业效应是在上调最低工资的法案通过之后但是生效之前显现出来的。但是，在上调工资生效之前就业率下降的程度有点让人吃惊，特别是服务部门。然而商业具有前瞻性，所以这也不是没有可能。最终，上调酒店最低工资的浪潮仅仅波及洛杉矶市，这项数据覆盖了范围更大的洛杉矶县。 Reason for concern 关注的理由 Overall, the caveats here are significant, and despite the stark and significant decline in employment, the data should be considered just very suggestive at this point. However, it does represent one more reason to be concerned about the forthcoming minimum wage hike that will be affecting all Los Angeles County workers in all industries. 总的说来，不详预兆是足够明显的，但尽管就业出现了明显且重大的下降，目前的数据仍应被视为只是推测性的。然而，它的确呈现了另一个理由，让我们关切即将到来的最低工资提升是否会影响到洛杉矶县所有工人。 The service sector, and hotels in particular, should be less responsive to minimum wage hikes than many other lower wage employers. Tourism industries should be less price elastic than tradeables like manufacturing, and hotels don’t have a lot of alternatives, which makes transitioning the building to some less-labor-intensive use less likely. 服务部门，特别是酒店，应该比许多其他较低工资水平雇主对这次工资上调的反应更小。旅游业应该比生产贸易货物的制造业表现出更低的价格弹性，并且酒店没有很多替代选择，这使得酒店建筑物不太可能转换成一些低劳动密度的用途上。 Hotels, in other words, should have been more safe. Instead, they seem to be taking a big hit. While what we are seeing in Los Angeles so far is nowhere near conclusive, it should worry those who have been less concerned about big minimum wage hikes. 换而言之，酒店行业原本应该是比较安全的。但是，看来他们即将遭受重创。就目前我们在洛杉矶所看到的景象还远不稳定，应该担忧的倒是那些对最低工资水平大幅上调仍缺乏关注的人们。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Fifty years of twin studies 双胞胎研究五十年 作者：Stephen Hsu @ 2015-5-21 译者：demo 来源：Information Processing，http://infoproc.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/fifty-years-of-twin-studies.html The most interesting aspect of these results is that for many traits there is no detectable non-additivity. That is, gene-gene interactions seem to be insignificant, and a simple linear genetic architecture is consistent with the results. 以下结果中最有意思的一点在于，很多人类的复杂性状都没有检测出非可加性（非线性）。也就是说，基因和基因之间的作用似乎微不足道，而一个简单的线性遗传结构就可以解释这些结果。

Meta-analysis of the heritability of human traits based on fifty years of twin studies Nature Genetics (2015) doi:10.1038/ng.3285 基于五十年双胞胎研究的人类表型遗传率的整合分析 《自然遗传学》（2015年） Despite a century of research on complex traits in humans, the relative importance and specific nature of the influences of genes and environment on human traits remain controversial. 尽管关于人类复杂性状的研究已进行了一个世纪，但基因和环境对人类表型的作用孰轻孰重，以及它们的具体性质如何，都还存在争议。 We report a meta-analysis of twin correlations and reported variance components for 17,804 traits from 2,748 publications including 14,558,903 partly dependent twin pairs, virtually all published twin studies of complex traits. Estimates of heritability cluster strongly within functional domains, and across all traits the reported heritability is 49%. 我们在此发表一项关于双胞胎相关性的整合分析，涵盖几乎所有已发表的双胞胎复杂性状研究，包括2748篇论文中研究的14,558,903对（部分重复研究）双胞胎、其所得出的17,804项表型的方差分量。估算出的遗传率在功能群内呈现群集分布，对于全部性状来说，报告的遗传率为49%。 For a majority (69%) of traits, the observed twin correlations are consistent with a simple and parsimonious model where twin resemblance is solely due to additive genetic variation. The data are inconsistent with substantial influences from shared environment or non-additive genetic variation. 对于多数（69％）性状，观察到的双胞胎相关性可以用一个简单到吝啬的模型解释；在这个模型中，双胞胎的相似之处完全归结于可加的遗传差异。这些数据不支持共同的环境因素或者非可加的遗传差异对于复杂性状有显著影响。 This study provides the most comprehensive analysis of the causes of individual differences in human traits thus far and will guide future gene-mapping efforts. 这项研究提供了目前最为全面的一份关于人类性状的个体差异分析，对以后的基因定位研究具有指导意义。

See also Additivity and complex traits in mice: 另见（作者早先的博文）《小鼠的复杂性状与可加性》：

You may have noticed that I am gradually collecting copious evidence for (approximate) additivity. Far too many scientists and quasi-scientists are infected by the epistasis or epigenetics meme, which is appealing to those who "revel in complexity" and would like to believe that biology is too complex to succumb to equations. ("How can it be? But what about the marvelous incomprehensible beautiful sacred complexity of Nature? But But But ...") 你可能已经注意到，我逐渐在搜集（近似于）可加性的丰富证据。有太多科学家和民科染上了流行的遗传上位或者表观遗传的观念；这些观念对于那些“为复杂而陶醉”、相信生物学太过复杂不可能用简单方程来表达的人非常有吸引力。（他们会说“怎么可能呢？可是自然中那些美妙不可方物、神圣不可侵犯的复杂性呢？可是这个可是那个呢？”） I sometimes explain things this way: There is a deep evolutionary reason behind additivity: nonlinear mechanisms are fragile and often "break" due to DNA recombination in sexual reproduction. Effects which are only controlled by a single locus are more robustly passed on to offspring. ... 我有时候会这样解释： 遗传的可加性背后有很深的进化上的原因：非线性的机制过于脆弱，常常会在有性生殖DNA重组中“断开”。而仅由单个位点控制的性状则更易于被传给后代。 Many people confuse the following statements: "The brain is complex and nonlinear and many genes interact in its construction and operation." "Differences in brain performance between two individuals of the same species must be due to nonlinear (non-additive) effects of genes." The first statement is true, but the second does not appear to be true across a range of species and quantitative traits. 很多人会把下面的两个陈述混淆： “大脑是复杂且非线性的，有很多基因在它的构成和功能中相互作用。” “同一物种的不同个体之间大脑性能的差异一定是由于非线性（非可加性）的基因作用。” 第一个说法是正确的，但第二个在很多物种和可量化的性状中似乎都不成立。

On the genetic architecture of intelligence and other quantitative traits (p.16): （作者早先的学术论文）《智力及其他可量化表型的遗传结构》（第16页）：

... The preceding discussion is not intended to convey an overly simplistic view of genetics or systems biology. Complex nonlinear genetic systems certainly exist and are realized in every organism. However, quantitative differences between individuals within a species may be largely due to independent linear effects of specific genetic variants. 前面讨论的用意并非要给遗传学或者系统生物学一个过于简化的看法。复杂、非线性的遗传系统肯定存在，而且在任何有机体中都有实现。然而，一个物种中不同个体间的定量差异，在很大程度上可能取决于某些基因差异的独立线性效果。 As noted, linear effects are the most readily evolvable in response to selection, whereas nonlinear gadgets are more likely to be fragile to small changes. (Evolutionary adaptations requiring significant changes to nonlinear gadgets are improbable and therefore require exponentially more time than simple adjustment of frequencies of alleles of linear effect.) 上面说过，线性作用在自然选择中最容易进化出来，而非线性的小把戏则更可能被很小的变化破坏。（非线性机制作出大量改变而得到的进化适应不太可能出现，因此相比于仅需要简单调整基因频率的线性机制来说，它们需要更多时间。） One might say that, to first approximation, Biology = linear combinations of nonlinear gadgets, and most of the variation between individuals is in the (linear) way gadgets are combined, rather than in the realization of different gadgets in different individuals. 有人可能会说，做个简单的近似，生物学等于非线性机制的线性组合，而且大部分个体间差异是来自各种机制被（线性）组合的方式，而不是这些机制本身在个体间的差异。 Linear models work well in practice, allowing, for example, SNP-based prediction of quantitative traits (milk yield, fat and protein content, productive life, etc.) in dairy cattle. ... 线性的模型在实践中有广泛用途，比方说用奶牛的单核酸多态性（SNP）来预测可量化的表型（产奶量、奶制品的脂肪和蛋白含量、生产时限等等）。…

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

苍白无力的欧洲普世主义 Europe’s Bloodless Universalism 作者：Theodore Dalrymple @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：Library of Law and Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/19/europes-bloodless-universalism/ By now the story of Omar Ismail Mostefai, the first of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks to be named, is depressingly familiar. One could almost have written his biography before knowing anything about him. A petty criminal of Algerian parentage from what all the world now calls the banlieue, he was sustained largely by the social security system, an erstwhile fan of rap music, and a votary of what might be called the continuation of criminality by other means, which is to say Islamism and the grandiose purpose in life that it gives to its adherents. For feeble minds, the extremity of the consequences for self and others serves as some kind of guarantee that their cause is just. 到今天，巴黎袭击事件中第一个确定姓名的案犯Omar Ismail Mostefai的故事已经家喻户晓了。即使对他完全不了解，人们也能凭猜测为他写出一本传记。一个小混混，有着阿尔及利亚血统，成长于今天被世人称为“暴力街区”的市郊，主要依靠社保体系生活，曾经是饶舌音乐的爱好者，热诚地致力于伊斯兰教和它给予信徒们的宏伟人生目标——或者，从另一种意义上也可以说，是持续犯罪。对那些意志薄弱的人来说，最终将自己和他人带向死亡，也有着某种正当理由。 Nor was the connection to Molenbeek, a neighborhood in Brussels where at least three of the terrorists lived, much of a surprise to anyone. Brussels—the “capital of Europe,” be it remembered—is slightly more than a quarter Muslim, and nearly 100 percent of Molenbeek’s residents are Muslims of North African background. When a few years ago I was shown around the place, my acquaintances told me it was virtually extraterritorial as far as the Belgian state was concerned—apart from the collection of social security, of course. 而他与莫伦贝克区（至少三名参与巴黎恐袭的恐怖分子都来自这里）之间的联系也丝毫不会让人感到惊奇。布鲁塞尔——人们记忆中的“欧洲之都”——的穆斯林人口占比略高于四分之一，而几乎所有的莫伦贝克区居民都是北非裔穆斯林。几年前一些熟人带着我在那里参观的时候，他们告诉我，对比利时政府来说，这个区域几乎就是“免受司法管辖的治外之地”——当然，除了它还享受着这个国家的社保体系之外。 All the women wore headscarves, and the young men dressed like American rap music fans. The police rarely entered and were far more concerned not to offend Muslim sensibilities—for example, by not being seen to eat during Ramadan—than to find or capture the miscreants who made the area so dangerously crime-ridden. Businesses there (so my guides told me) paid no taxes but were not investigated for evasion by the tax authorities: it was the tax authorities who did the evading. 那里所有的女人都戴着头巾，而年轻男人都穿得像是美国饶舌音乐的狂热粉丝。警察很少进入这个区域，相比追踪和抓捕那些将这里变成一个犯罪猖獗之地的恶棍，他们更关心的是千万不要触碰到穆斯林的敏感之处——例如，不要在斋月期间被穆斯林看到在白天吃东西。在那里做各种生意（我的导游告诉我）都不交税，而且也不会受到税务局的调查：相反，税务局只要一听这个地方就会躲得远远的。 Everyone knew Islamist preaching and plotting were rife in Molenbeek, but nothing was done to stop it, in order to keep the tense and fragile peace going as long as possible. Sympathy for terrorism was the norm—or, it would be more correct to say, that no one dared publicly voice opposition to it. 所有人都知道，莫伦贝克区伊斯兰极端分子的宣传策划工作十分猖獗，却没有任何加以阻止的努力，而这只是为了将现有的脆弱和平状态维持得尽量久一些。对恐怖主义的同情成为常态——或者更准确的说，没有谁敢于公开反对。 If my informants were right, this was the perfect place for psychopaths with an illusion of purpose to flourish and make plans undisturbed by the authorities, while being supported by the welfare state. Events since have demonstrated that they did not exaggerate (as, to my regret, I rather suspected at the time that they did, for alarm is so often disproportionate to the reality that gives rise to it). 如果告诉我这些的人是对的，那么对于那些抱有疯狂幻想并且希望在不受当局干扰的状态下筹划自己行动的疯子们而言，这里就是人间天堂，与此同时，他们还能够享受福利国家的支持。之后发生的事件已经证明了他们并没有夸大其词（而令我后悔的是，当时他们提醒我时，我也对他们的看法表示怀疑，相比警告成真后人们所面对的残酷现实，之前的警告声总是显得微不足道）。 Recall that the terrorists who were disarmed on the train from Amsterdam to Paris in August came from Molenbeek, as did the man who killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. More volunteers to fight for ISIS have come from Molenbeek than anywhere else in Europe. 回想一下，今年8月那帮在阿姆斯特丹开往巴黎的火车上被人们提前发现并解除了武装的恐怖分子就来自于莫伦贝克区，而那个2014年在布鲁塞尔的犹太人博物馆里杀害了4个人的凶手也同样来自那里。莫伦贝克区为ISIS提供了比全欧洲任何其它地方都要多的志愿战士。 The Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel, has now virtually admitted that the area was extraterritorial to Belgium, and out of all control. The time had come “to focus more on repression,” he said. But whether the determination or sufficient political unity necessary to carry it out will last is doubtful. Repression requires discrimination; we live in a regime in which murderers may come and go, but social security goes on forever. 现在，比利时首相米歇尔实际上已经承认该区域已成比利时的“治外之地”，并且已经完全失去了控制。他说，现在应该“把更多的注意力集中在压制上”。但这种决心是否能得以坚持，或者，为实现这一目标所必须的足够的政治团结能够得以坚持，是值得怀疑的。压制就意味着区别对待，但在我们如今生活的这个社会制度下，杀人犯来来去去，而社会保障则永不中断。 Do we have the stomach to tar many people with the same brush? That we now know that terrorists among the Syrian refugees have entered Europe, which was precisely the objection of those opposed to accepting them (who were vilified by immigration-liberals for their moral obtuseness or nastiness, and have been proven right, which is even more unforgivable), now raises the disturbing question: How many innocent people should Europe accept for one suicide bomber? 但我们要不要一竿子打倒一船人呢？现在我们已经知道，有些恐怖分子藏在叙利亚难民队伍里混入了欧洲，这正是之前那些反对接纳叙利亚难民入欧的人们所提出的拒绝理由（为了诋毁他们，那些移民自由派们给他们扣上了“道德迟钝”或“道德败坏”之类的帽子，但最终事实证明他们的担忧是对的，这就让我们所犯下的错误变得更加不可原谅），而现状又给我们提出了一个令人困扰的问题：为了一个自杀式炸弹袭击者欧洲要接纳多少无辜的难民？ A striking thing about the immigration debate before the massacres of November 13 was the almost complete absence of references, at least by the “respectable” politicians, to the national interest of the various countries. The debate was couched in Kantian moral terms. Sweden, for example, which has no imperative to take refugees other than moral grandiosity and its desire to feel itself virtuous, has had a hard enough time integrating the immigrants it has already taken; their entry has made that country one with nearly the highest crime rate in Western Europe. Current family re-unification laws in Europe mean that the numbers any country agrees to take will soon be expanded. 11月13日的巴黎大屠杀发生之前，在有关移民政策的辩论中令人吃惊的一点是，几乎完全没有人——至少那些“令人尊敬的”政客们中没有人——提及各国的国家利益。这场辩论是以一种康德式道德辩论的方式进行的。举例来说，除了道德上华而不实的崇高感以及让自己觉得高尚之外，瑞典并没有任何必要去接收难民，整合已接收的难民也让其已经历了一段非常困难的时期；这些难民进入之后，几乎把瑞典变成了整个西欧犯罪率最高的国家。而当前欧洲有关家庭重聚的法律则意味着，很快每个国家都将同意接收数量更多的难民。 There is a real moral dilemma, of course. Recently in Bodrum, on the Aegean coast of Turkey, I was approached by a family of four Syrian refugees begging for alms. The father of the family showed me his Syrian passport (precisely of the kind so easily forged by the terrorists), but all I could see was his wife and two small children who were obviously bereft of support and who would obviously suffer without charity. That day, 22 refugees were reported drowned as they tried to reach Turkey by boat, an occurrence so regular that it was not reported in the Western press. No one undertakes such a journey lightly: only safety or an egocentric thirst for “martyrdom” could impel him. 显然，这里有个道德困境。最近在土耳其爱琴海沿岸城市博德鲁姆，一个叙利亚难民的四口之家走近我，希望我能施舍给他们些什么。这家的父亲给我看了他的叙利亚护照（正是那种恐怖分子非常容易伪造的护照），但我所看到的只是他妻子和两个年幼的孩子所表现出的无助，如果得不到施舍，他们显然会吃很多苦。在同一天，当地新闻报道了22名难民在乘船试图前往土耳其的途中溺水身亡的消息，而由于这类事情发生得如此频繁，西方媒体甚至都没有报道这条消息。没有人会轻易选择踏上这样一段旅途：只有对安全的强烈渴求或是个人主义的“殉道”热望才能让人踏上这条路。 Europe has nothing equivalent to national interest, and if it did, it would have no way of acting on it. A kind of bloodless universalism has rushed in to fill the vacuum, whose consequences are now visible to all. The first thing President Hollande tried to do after the attacks was close the borders; he now talks (understandably, of course) of national security. He talks also of defeating ISIS militarily, but France, along with all of the other European countries, has run down its armed forces in the name of the social security that paid for at least some of the terrorists. 欧洲没有国家利益之类的东西，即使有，也不存在以之为名做些什么的政治途径。于是一种苍白无力的普世主义便趁虚而入填补了这一空白，其后果已经呈现在了每个人面前。巴黎恐怖袭击发生后，奥朗德总统试图做的第一件事就是关闭边境；他现在开始谈论国家安全了（当然，这可以理解）。他同样开始谈论军事打击ISIS，然而法国和其它的欧洲国家一样，已经以社保资金不足为由削减了自己武装力量，而这些钱中至少有一部分落入了恐怖分子的口袋。 Just because Europe’s weakness is clear doesn’t mean that our heads are clear. Three days after the attacks, the most influential newspaper in Britain (and in certain ways the best), the liberal-Left Guardian, ran 40 small photos of some the victims, with the headline, “Killed in the Pitiless Name of Terrorism.” 虽然欧洲的弱点已展露无遗，但这并不意味着我们的脑子就清醒了。在巴黎恐怖袭击发生仅仅三天之后，英国最具影响力的报纸（从某些角度说也是最好的）——左翼自由派的《卫报》，刊登了40张遇害者的小幅照片，而使用的标题则是“以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而遭杀害”。 They were not killed in the pitiless name of terrorism, of course. They were killed in the pitiless name of Islam—not the only possible interpretation if Islam, no doubt, but still in its name. In the cowardice of this headline was the encapsulated all the weakness of Europe, a real encouragement to the terrorists. 当然,他们并非以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而被杀死。他们是以冷酷无情的伊斯兰之名而被杀死——是的，这不是解读伊斯兰的唯一方式，但这些杀戮仍是以伊斯兰之名而行。《卫报》标题中所表现出的懦弱是今天欧洲所有弱点的集中体现，而这对恐怖分子们来说则是一种实实在在的激励。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

In praise of pushy parents 对挑剔家长的赞扬 作者：Daniel Hanna @ 2015-10-16 译者：尼克基得慢 （@尼克基得慢） 校对：Drunkplane（@ Drunkplane-zny） 来源：www.capx.co，http://www.capx.co/in-praise-of-pushy-parents/ There was a mother at one of my children’s previous schools, a loud American, who was deeply unpopular with the other mums, but not with me. Her offence, in the eyes of the other women, was to be forever complaining. The reading programme was out-of-date, she averred, the music lessons inadequate, the maths too easy. 在我孩子以前上的一所学校里有一位母亲，一个大嗓门的美国人，她非常不受其他母亲的待见，但是我不讨厌她。在其他女人眼里，她的过错是永不休止的抱怨。比如她认为阅读方案已经过时了，音乐课程还有欠缺，数学课程过于简单。 “She was whining about the new French teacher today,” one of the other mums might say. “她今天在抱怨新来的法语老师，”另一位母亲说。 “Great,” I’d reply. “As long as she’s doing it, the rest of us don’t need to worry”. “太棒了，” 我回答说。“只要她这样做，我们其他人就不用操心了”。 Some of the lady’s criticisms were misplaced, and no doubt the teachers found her a thundering nuisance; but she unquestionably kept them on their toes. Whether she intended it or not, her pushiness thus benefited all our children. 这位女士的一些批评搞错了对象，而且老师们无疑视她为一大麻烦；但是她也确实让老师们不敢松懈。不管她是有意还是无意，她的咄咄逼人让我们大家的孩子都受益了。 This is the point missed by Leftist opponents of more parental choice in education. As usual, they believe that they are acting in the interests of the poor and powerless; and, as usual, they are wrong. 这是反对家长干涉教育的左派们所忽略的观点。像往常一样，他们认为自己正在为穷人和无权势者行事，但他们还是一如既往的错了。 “Free schools are all very well if you’re articulate and middle-class,” say supporters of uniformity. “But what about those kids whose parents aren’t engaged? Are we just going to throw them on the scrap heap?” “如果你能言善辩又是中产阶级，免费学校当然是非常棒的，”一致性的支持者们说。“但是那些失业父母的孩子们怎么办？难道我们就要把他们丢进垃圾场吗？” Actually, that’s pretty much what happens under our present system. The GCSE results of our top state schools are twice as good as those of the bottom. Seventy-three percent of children in Kensington and Chelsea got at least five good passes this year; in Knowsley, that figure was 35 per cent. Ponder that extraordinary discrepancy. A system specifically designed to ensure equality of opportunity creates massive asymmetries of outcome. 这确实是我们现行体系下正在发生的事情。顶级公立学校的普通中等教育认证（GCSE）成绩要比底层学校好一倍。今年， Kensington和Chelsea的孩子中有73%至少得到五个优；而在Knowsley，这个数字只有35%。思考下这巨大的差异。一个专门为确保机会均等而设计的系统却造成了大量不对称的结果。 Now imagine you took away all the state control. Suppose that there were no regulation beyond the market. Consider, for example, what happens when you buy a pint of milk. The quality and price are not only assured, but they are pretty constant around the country. True, you might pay a fraction more in Kensington than in Knowsley, reflecting the higher ground rents in the Royal Borough; but the milk in Merseyside will be just as good. 现在想象下你将所有的国家管控都取消。假设市场没有管制。比如，思考下你要买一杯牛奶时会发生什么。价格和质量不仅有保证，而且在全国都很稳定。当然，由于皇家自治市【编注：指Kensington-Chelsea皇家自治市】更高的地租，你在Kensington要比在Knowsley 付的钱更多；但是在Merseyside的牛奶会是同样的品质。 How does this extraordinary equalisation come about, given that there are no equivalents of the Local Education Authorities regulating prices? It comes about through competition. Millions of consumers invigilate the system as no committee of regulators ever could. 鉴于当地并没有教育部门调控价格，这种特殊的均衡如何产生呢？这可以通过竞争来实现。数百万消费者会监督这个任何监管委员会都无能为力的系统。 And here’s the best bit. The system works as well for incompetent as for discerning consumers. I am the least qualified shopper you could imagine. I have no idea about ingredients, brands, prices or sell-by dates. I live in terror of being asked, as politicians sometimes are, how much a pint of milk costs. But, when I buy one, I can be pretty confident that I’m getting a fair deal. Why? Because more knowledgeable buyers have done my work for me. They have played the part of that pushy New Yorker whom I used to admire at the school gates. 下面是最棒的一点。这个系统适用于有分辨力的消费者，也适用于无此能力者。我是你能想象的最不合格的顾客。我对于原料、品牌、价格或者销售日期都没有概念。像政客们有时候所表现的那样，我害怕被问及一杯牛奶多少钱。但是，当我买东西时，我很确信我得到了公平的对待。为什么？因为更多有见识的买家已经替我做了工作。他们扮演了那个我喜欢的，挑剔的纽约人的角色。 Precisely the same dynamic would work in schools if it were allowed to. The sharp-elbowed bourgeois parents, seeking to drive up standards for their own progeny, would incidentally drive up standards for everyone else. They might not mean to, but they would. 若是被允许的话，同样的原理也肯定适用于学校。那些为了自己孩子而对学校高标准严要求的严厉的中产阶级父母也会顺便帮其他孩子抬高学校的水平。他们可能本意并非如此，但他们确实导致了这结果。 Daniel Hannan is a Conservative Member of the European Parliament and blogs at www.hannan.co.uk. Daniel Hannan 是欧洲议会的保守派成员，他的博客网址为www.hannan.co.uk。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Boston's Sports Fans Rejected the Olympics Boondoggle—and L.A. Said Bring It On 为什么波士顿的体育迷拒绝承办劳民伤财的奥运会——而洛杉矶却说我来办 作者: Garrett Quinn @ 2015-9-15 译者: Who视之(@Who适之) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源: Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/09/15/why-bostons-sports-fans-rejected-the-oly The long, sad history of overspending on the international games. 国际性赛事超支的心酸历史 As the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) submits the city of Los Angeles as the country’s official nominee to host the 2024 Summer Games, sports fans in Boston are whooping it up like they did after the Red Sox finally won another World Series. 当美国奥委会正式提名洛杉矶代表美国申办2024年夏季奥运会，波士顿的体育迷欢呼雀跃，好似红袜队又拿下了一场世界系列赛。【译注：美国棒球联盟和全国棒球联盟优胜者之间的年度比赛】 And with good reason. Earlier this year, the USOC had picked Boston to represent America in the Olympics-host sweepstakes. Then the sports-mad fans of the Red Sox, the Bruins, the Celtics, and the Patriots told city fathers—especially Mayor Martin J. Walsh—to pound sand when it came to hosting the Olympic Games with tax dollars. 他们这么高兴是有道理的。今年早些时候，美国奥委会挑选波士顿代表美国参加奥运会主办城市的赌赛。那些红袜队、棕熊队、凯尔特人队和爱国者队的死忠们告诉市府大员们——特别是市长Martin J. Walsh——若是用纳税人的钱来办奥运会，就要把这主意掐死。 How Boston’s rabid sports fans rejected the Olympics—and how chumps in Los Angeles enthusiastically stepped up to potential bankruptcy—is a tale worth understanding, especially the next time your city or state tries selling voters on a new stadium or venue for billionaire sports team owners. 为啥波士顿的狂热体育迷拒绝奥运会，而洛杉矶的呆逼们兴高采烈地踏上潜在的破产之旅，这事值得弄弄明白，特别是下次你的城市或州政府为身家亿万的球队老板们着想，试图向选民们兜售新的体育场馆时。 The Summer Games routinely use billions of taxpayer dollars to throw the equivalent of a three-week-long international party that ends with a trashed house and a financial hangover that lasts for years. Montreal hosted the games in 1976 and built a stadium that was called the Big O. ­­Since it took fully 30 years to pay off the municipal debt that underwrote the Games, locals dubbed it "the Big Owe." 夏奥会一贯会花费纳税人几十上百亿美元，举办为期三周的国际大趴，结局是一地垃圾和延续若干年的财务宿醉症。蒙特利尔1976年承办了夏奥会，建了一座叫Big O的体育场。由于用了整整30年才还清为承办奥运会而发行的市政债，当地居民给这个体育场起了个“Big Owe”的外号【译注：Owe是欠账的意思】。 As sports economist Andrew Zimbalist has noted, the Summer Games might generate $6 billion in total revenue, half of which goes to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) while costing the host city $20 billion (London) or even $40 billion (Beijing). And don’t think that any new stadiums or infrastructure will have much of an economic afterlife. Indeed, the main achievement of the 2004 Athens games was to create modern ruins to match the ancient ones that actually draw tourists to Greece. 体育经济学家Andrew Zimbalist注意到，夏奥会可能产生了60亿美元的总收入，其中一半归国际奥委会，而主办城市会花费200亿美元（伦敦），甚至400亿美元（北京）。不要以为那些新的运动场馆和基础设施在会后能有什么经济效益。实际上，2004年雅典奥运会的主要成就，就是兴建了一批现代废墟来配合真正吸引游客到希腊去的古代废墟。 On top of all that the Olympics have an established reputation for bringing graft, a draconian security state, and horrific traffic and business disruption everywhere they go. "The important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win, but to participate," declared the creator of the modern Games, the Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, who obviously wasn’t stuck paying any of the bills. 不仅如此，奥林匹克运动已经建立起这样一个名声：它走到哪，哪就会有贪腐、苛刻的安保，以及严重的交通和商务混乱。现代奥林匹克创始人，法国人顾拜旦宣称：“奥运会重在参与而不是取胜。”这人显然不管付账。 Earlier this year, Boston seemed up for the challenge and was selected to be the city that the USOC would put forward to host the 2024 Games. To its slim credit, the IOC had reformed some of its practices after a stunning show of disinterest from western democracies in hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics (an even bigger money-loser than the Summer Games). The reforms, known as Agenda 2020, are designed to make hosting the games less financially burdensome and will be applied for the first time during the bidding for the 2024 Summer Olympics. 今年早间，波士顿看着像要去挑战一下，被美国奥委会选为竞办2024奥运会的城市。得承认，在西方民主国家对举办2022年冬奥会（这是个比夏奥会更能亏钱的玩意）显示了令人震惊的冷淡之后，国际奥委会对其做法进行了一些改革。这些改革称为“2020议程”，将在竞办2024年夏奥会时实施，目的是让承办奥运会的经济负担不至于过分沉重。 After Boston’s bid was initially approved by the USOC, more and more details of the financing started dripping out and the city’s enthusiasm went softer than one of Tom Brady’s footballs. While it’s true that the people of Boston are diehard, always-annoying sports fans you want to punch in the neck, they are not suckers and have a long, proud history of telling team owners and elected official to take a hike when it comes to paying for sports venues. 波士顿的竞办申请被美国奥委会批准后，越来越多的融资细节开始泄露，市民的热情变得比Tom Brady【译注：美式橄榄球四分卫】的某个传球还弱。虽然波士顿人是死硬的、让人讨厌的、欠揍的体育迷，但这些人一点不蠢；如果球队老板和民选官员想让纳税人掏钱建体育场馆，波士顿人对这种想法的回答有着长久的光荣传统：您哪凉快哪呆着去。 In the 1990s the Patriot and Red Sox sought to build waterfront stadiums on the South Boston Waterfront as part of project dubbed the MegaPlex. The plan only required a tiny commitment from taxpayers but it was still too much to placate the dialed-in citizens of Boston. The plan eventually died when late Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino turned against it. 1990年代，爱国者队和红袜队想在波士顿南部滨水地带兴建滨水体育场，作为名为MegaPlex项目的一部分。这个计划只需要纳税人一点微小的承诺，但仍然不能安抚那些打电话反对的市民。该计划在已故市长Thomas M. Menino转而反对后夭折。 Now, the once vacant area is home to a booming innovation district and soaring residential towers. When the Bruins and Celtics replaced the rat infested Boston Garden with a new building in 1995, it was build with private money after much public handwringing. 现如今，那片原先的空地上建起了生机勃勃的创新产业园区和高高的住宅楼。棕熊队和凯尔特人队在1995年把鼠患猖獗的波士顿花园重建，在公众表示很大关注之后，花的是私人老板的钱。 In 2015, a rag-tag group of activists and young professionals organized against the 2024 bid in an extremely effective manner that put pressure on elected officials to stop the games and created a climate of intense negativity around Boston’s Olympic bid. It was a remarkable display of activism. It pitted the city’s captains of industry against a group of activists with little more than pennies to rub together and smartphones. 2015年，一群由活动分子和年轻的专业人士组成的草根组织了一次非常有效的反申奥活动，使民选官员受到阻止赛会的压力，并为波士顿的申办活动创造了极为负面的气氛。这群除了几块钱和智能手机外啥都没有的活动分子，得以和波士顿的行业大佬们叫阵。 The group pushing the bid had their hands tied by various USOC decrees and limitations. They couldn’t respond quickly and effectively to their opponents and they committed all sorts of unforced errors that stoked the anti-Olympics sentiment: Property owners were caught off guard about venue locations, residents were not contacted before the plan was devised, and community stakeholders were only included in the process when it was all but too late. 支持申办的团体受到美国奥委会各种条例和限制的约束。他们未能及时有效地回应反对者，犯下很多本可避免的失误，使得反奥运情绪如火上浇油：业主们被场馆选址弄得猝不及防，居民们在规划设计之前没有得到通知，而利益相关的社区成员直到时机已过才被纳入进程中去。 The bid’s biggest public supporter, Mayor Martin J. Walsh, was often forced to publicly chastise the USOC and bid organizers for not releasing information in a timely or transparent manner. For many, the announcement that former Governor Deval Patrick was being paid $7,500 a day as a consultant on the project was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 申办活动最大的公共部门支持者，市长Martin Walsh，经常被迫公开批评美国奥委会和申办组织者没有及时透明地公开信息。对很多人来说，前任州长Deval Patrick每天可以得到7500美元的项目顾问费这一消息，是压断骆驼的最后一根稻草。 Opinion poll after opinion poll showed the public just did not trust the organizers to be honest about how much it would all cost locals. Boston’s bid conformed to the reforms outlined in the IOC’s reform agenda but the final sticking point was something that is still Olympic policy: Host cities must take a binding pledge that puts taxpayers on the hook for any cost overruns. 一个接一个的民意调查显示，公众就是不相信组织者对当地人需付总价的估算。波士顿的申办符合国际奥委会做出的改革，但最后胶着点仍然是奥林匹克的这个态度：主办城市必须做出有法律约束的保证，让纳税人为任何成本超支付账。 It wasn’t just Boston-area residents who soured. Elected officials across Massachusetts like Governor Charlie Baker and House Speaker Robert DeLeo balked at the idea of being on the hook and said publicly that they would not sign a taxpayer guarantee for the Olympics. Period. The USOC grew tired of the local reluctance and eventually pulled the bid on July 29, after Walsh said he would not sign a taxpayer guarantee at a hastily called city hall press conference carried live on all local TV stations. 不仅仅是波士顿地区的居民对此不开心，马萨诸塞州各处的民选官员，比如州长Charlie Baker和众议院议长Robert DeLeo，都对做出这种承诺迟疑不决，公开说他们不会为奥运会签署纳税人的担保，这事没得谈。在一场面向所有当地电视台直播的匆忙召集的市府新闻发布会上，Walsh说他不会签署纳税人的保证，美国奥委会受不了波士顿的勉强，最后在7月29日撤回了竞办。 Meanwhile, all the way across the continent, a two-time Olympic host city waited in the wings to pick up the torch as soon as Boston threw it down: Los Angeles. 与此同时，横跨美国大陆的另一边，一个曾经两次举办奥运会、伺机而动的城市在波士顿放弃申办后，马上接棒了。洛杉矶来了。 The City of Angels hosted the Summer Games in 1932 and in 1984. Memories of those latter games are especially warm and fuzzy for Angelenos. In many ways, the ’84 Games were the coming-out party for L.A., a city that had grown rich in post-war America while never quite being taken seriously in America, much less the rest of the world. To this day and despite the city’s standing as the second-largest metropolis in the country, it nurses a cultural inferiority complex bigger than the budget of a Hollywood blockbuster. 天使之城在1932和1984举办过夏奥会。后一次的奥运会对洛杉矶人来说尤其感觉温馨可人。在很多方面，1984年奥运会是洛杉矶的成年派对，这座城市在战后美国富裕了起来，却一直没有被美国人认真对待过，更不要说在全世界了。直到今天，尽管洛杉矶是美国第二大城市，它的文化自卑情结比一场好莱坞大片的预算还要大。 In 1984, the tremendous performances of Carl Lewis, Mary Lou Retton, and both the men’s and women’s swim teams—along with a boycott by the Soviet Union, East Germany, and other Eastern bloc countries—resulted in the U.S. winning more than three times as many medals as any other country. More important to the current debate, the games were supervised by Peter Uberroth, who insisted on using existing facilities whenever possible, exercised ultra-rare but effective financial discipline, and leaned hard on local philanthropies to kick in lots of free money. The result was what is still widely hailed as "the most successful games ever," at least from a public accountant’s point of view. 1984年，美国的Carl Lewis，Mary Lou Retton，男女游泳队发挥卓越，加上苏联和东欧国家的抵制，美国得到的奖牌数比第二名的三倍还多。对于当前争议而言，更重要的是，这次运动会由Peter Uberroth主管，他坚持尽量使用现有设施，表现出少有但有效的财务纪律性，依靠当地的慈善力量，省下很多钱。结果是这届奥运会被称为“最成功的奥运会”，至少从会计角度看是这样。 In the ‘80s, L.A. and California were booming. Things are different this time around. The recession was not kind to Los Angeles and the city continues to amass debt, lose jobs, struggle to provide basic services, and hang on to its middle class. California in general is struggling to pay its bills, too, while keeping the lights on. 在80年代，洛杉矶和加州欣欣向荣，可这次情况不同了。经济衰退对洛杉矶毫不客气，该市一直在堆积债务，流失就业机会，忙于提供基本服务，求助于中产阶级。加州基本上也是在让灯亮着的同时挣扎着付清账单。 Yet this time around, the Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to support Mayor Eric Garcetti’s pursuit of the Games even though it means putting the city’s taxpayers on the line for any kind of cost overruns. And the state government has a history of coming to the city’s rescue. During their pursuit of the 2016 games, the California legislature set aside $250 million in state funds to help Los Angeles’s bid (it lost out to Rio de Janeiro). California Gov. Jerry Brown has not officially committed to financially backing the games but that did not stop bid organizers in Los Angeles from saying he was on board anyway. 可是这一次，洛杉矶市议会投票一致支持市长Eric Garcetti申办奥运会，尽管这意味着纳税人要为任何成本超支买单。该州政府有搭救市府的传统。在申办2016运动会时，加州议会拨出2.5亿美元州资金来帮助洛杉矶申办（最后不敌里约热内卢）。加州州长没有正式承诺在财务上支持运动会，但这并未阻止洛杉矶的申办者宣称州长和他们站在一起。 The rosy-colored view of the games is not limited to the California political elite. Sports columnists such like Bill Plaschke of the Los Angeles Times tend to be uncritical boosters of Southern California and are enthusiastically on board. In Boston, there was almost uniform opposition to the games in the press and the reception from the sports media was more vicious than the drunks in the Fenway Park bleachers when the Yankees are in town. Even the limited polling on the games shows Los Angeles actually wants the games. Over 81 percent of respondents in a recent poll sponsored by the USOC said they backed the games. 对奥运会玫瑰色的展望并未局限于加州的政治精英，体育专栏作家们，如《洛杉矶时报》的Bill Plaschke，都是南加州不加批评的支持者，对申办全心支持。在波士顿，报界几乎一致反对奥运会，体育媒体的反应，比纽约扬基队来叫阵时，Fenway公园露天看台上醉鬼的骂声更加邪恶。有限的民意测验显示，洛杉矶人确实想申办奥运会。在最近一个美国奥委会组织的调查中，超过81%的受访者说他们支持。 So it seems that Los Angeles and its residents appear far more willing to mortgage their future to host a three-week party in 2024 for the world’s elite than Boston was. Come 2017, when the IOC will announce the winning city from applicants that include Paris, Toronto, Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome, Hollywood may well be breaking ground on yet another boulevard of broken dreams. That is, if Los Angeles is selected to host the game for a third time. 看来洛杉矶和它的居民比波士顿更加愿意把他们的未来抵押在2024年为世界精英们举办一次为时三周的国际派对。2017年奥委会将宣布巴黎、多伦多、布达佩斯特、汉堡、罗马这些申办城市中的胜者。如果洛杉矶第三次获选举办奥运会，好莱坞很可能要为另一条碎梦大道破土动工。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

‘Please Stop Helping Us’ “请不要再帮助我们” 作者：Thomas Sowell @ 2014-6-08 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：National Review，http://www.nationalreview.com/article/382135/please-stop-helping-us-thomas-sowell A new book brilliantly explains how policies designed to help blacks end up harming them. 有本新书极为出色地解释了，旨在帮助黑人的政策如何最终反而伤害了他们。 Back in the heyday of the British Empire, a man from one of the colonies addressed a London audience. “Please do not do any more good in my country,” he said. “We have suffered too much already from all the good that you have done.” 在不列颠帝国的鼎盛时期，一位殖民地来客曾在伦敦发表演说。“请不要再到我的国家去做好事了。”他说，“你们之前做的所有那些好事，已经令我们受尽折磨。” That is essentially the message of an outstanding new book by Jason Riley about blacks in America. Its title is Please Stop Helping Us. Its theme is that many policies designed to help blacks are in fact harmful, sometimes devastatingly so. These counterproductive policies range from minimum-wage laws to “affirmative action” quotas. 这实质上就是Jason Riley关于美国黑人的最新杰作所要传达的信息，书名叫做《请不要再帮助我们》。该书的主题是，诸多旨在帮助黑人的政策实际上反而有害，有时甚至是毁灭性的伤害。从最低工资法到“平权行动”配额，在在都能见到这种事与愿违的政策。 This book untangles the controversies, the confusions, and the irresponsible rhetoric in which issues involving minimum-wage laws are usually discussed. As someone who has followed minimum-wage controversies for decades, I must say that I have never seen the subject explained more clearly or more convincingly. 这本书理清了人们讨论最低工资法相关事务时经常遭遇的争议、困惑和不负责任的华丽辞藻。作为一个数十年来一直在跟踪最低工资争议的人，我也必须承认，此前还没有见过任何人曾将这一问题解释得如此清楚、如此令人信服。 Black teenage-unemployment rates ranging from 20 to 50 percent have been so common over the past 60 years that many people are unaware that this was not true before there were minimum-wage laws, or even during years when inflation rendered minimum-wage laws ineffective, as in the late 1940s. 过去60年间，黑人青少年失业率一直徘徊在20%到50%之间。许多人对此已习以为常，以至于都没有留意到：在最低工资法出现之前，情况并非如此，哪怕是在通胀对最低工资法的效用有所抵消的年份，如1940年代末，情况也非如此。 Pricing young people out of work deprives them not only of income but also of work experience, which can be even more valuable. Pricing young people out of legal work, when illegal work is always available, is just asking for trouble. So is having large numbers of idle young males hanging out together on the streets. 为年轻人定价过高，以至令他们失去工作，这种政策不仅剥夺了他们的收入，而且也剥夺了他们的工作经验，而后者价值甚至可能更高。为年轻人定价过高，以至于他们失去合法的工作机会，但又总是可以找到非法工作，这种政策就是自讨苦吃。让大量无所事事的男青年成群结队在街上游荡，也是自讨苦吃。 When it comes to affirmative action, Jason Riley asks the key question: “Do racial preferences work? What is the track record?” Like many other well-meaning and nice-sounding policies, affirmative action cannot survive factual scrutiny. 对于平权行动，Jason Riley提出了如下关键问题：“种族优惠是否行之有效？往绩如何？”跟许多其它好心好意且悦耳动听的政策一样，平权行动经不起事实检验。 Some individuals may get jobs they would not get otherwise, but many black students who are quite capable of getting a good college education are admitted, under racial quotas, to institutions whose pace alone is enough to make it unlikely that they will graduate. （有了平权行动，）某些人也许确实会得到他们本来得不到的工作。但许多黑人学生本来完全有能力得到良好的大学教育，却在种族配额制下被一些不适宜的学校录取，而单是这些学校的教学进度就足以使得他们无望毕业。 Studies that show how many artificial failures are created by affirmative-action admissions policies are summarized in Please Stop Helping Us, in language much easier to understand than in the original studies. 已有许多研究表明，平权行动的录取政策人为制造了许多失败，《请不要再帮助我们》用十分易懂的语言综述了相关研究。 There are many ponderous academic studies of blacks, if you have a few months in which to read them, but there is nothing to match Jason Riley’s book as a primer that will quickly bring you up to speed on the complicated subject of race in a week, or perhaps over a weekend. 如果你愿意花上几个月去读的话，研究黑人的冗长学术著作有很多。不过作为入门读物，Jason Riley的这本书无可匹敌。只要一周，甚至只要一个周末，它就能迅速让你跟上有关种族这一复杂课题的最新研究。 As an experienced journalist, rather than an academic, Riley knows how to use plain English to get to the point. He also has the integrity to give it to you straight, instead of in the jargon and euphemisms too often found in discussions of race. The result is a book that provides more knowledge and insight in a couple of hundred pages than are usually found in books twice that length. Riley是位经验丰富的记者，而不是学者，因此他知道如何用简单易懂的语言表达论点。而且他很诚实，立论坦率直接，不会使用那些在种族问题讨论中常见的行话切口和委婉表达。得益于此，他这本两三百页的书所提供的知识和见解，比一般厚度两倍于它的书还要多。 Unlike academics who just tell facts, Riley knows which facts are telling. 与只知道说明事实的学者不同，Riely知道哪些事实能说明问题。 For example, in response to claims that blacks don’t do well academically because the schools use an approach geared to white students, he points out that blacks from foreign, non-English-speaking countries do better in American schools than black, English-speaking American students. 比如，有人宣称，黑人学业成绩不好是因为学校使用的是适合白人学生的教学方法。针对这种论断，Riley就指出，在美国的学校里，母语非英语的外国黑人比说英语的美国黑人学生表现更优。 Asian students do better than whites in schools supposedly geared to whites. In all three of New York City’s three academically elite public high schools — Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, and Brooklyn Tech — there are more than twice as many Asian students as white students. 在据称特别适合白人的学校里，亚裔学生比白人学生表现更好。纽约市的全部三所学业优异的公立高中——史岱文森高中、布朗士科学高中、布鲁克林技术高中，在校亚裔学生数量是白人学生的两倍以上。 So much for the theory that non-whites can’t do well in schools supposedly geared to whites. 在据称特别适合白人的学校里，不是白人就无法表现良好，这种论调可以休矣。 On issue after issue, Please Stop Helping Us cites facts to destroy propaganda and puncture inflated rhetoric. It is impossible to do justice to the wide range of racial issues — from crime to family disintegration — explored in this book. Pick up a copy and open pages at random to see how the author annihilates nonsense. 针对一个个议题，《请不要再帮助我们》挨个引用事实来推翻那些宣传口号、戳穿那些言过其实的花言巧语。此处不可能一一点到该书所论述的各类种族议题，它们跨度甚大，从犯罪到家庭解体都有。捡起一本，随便翻几页，看看作者是如何灭掉那些胡说八道的吧。 His brief comments pack a lot of punch. For example, “Having a black man in the Oval Office is less important than having one in the home.” 他的简洁评论常常一针见血。比如这句，“白宫椭圆办公室里坐着个黑人，可不如家里坐着个黑人那么重要。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Human genetic diversity: Lewontin’s fallacy 人类遗传多样性之列万廷的谬误 作者：A.W.F. Edwards 翻译：小聂（@PuppetMaster） 校对：辉格（@whigzhou） 来源：Edwards, A. W. F. (2003). "Human genetic diversity: Lewontin's fallacy". BioEssays 25 (8): 798–801. Summary In popular articles that play down the genetical differences among human populations, it is often stated that about 85% of the total genetical variation is due to individual differences within populations and only 15% to differences between populations or ethnic groups. It has therefore been proposed that the division of Homo sapiens into these groups is not justified by the genetic data. This conclusion, due to R.C. Lewontin in 1972, is unwarranted because the argument ignores the fact that most of the information that distinguishes populations is hidden in the correlation structure of the data and not simply in the variation of the individual factors. The underlying logic, which was discussed in the early years of the last century, is here discussed using a simple genetical example. 概要 在那些淡化人类种群遗传差异的流行文章里面，一个常见的说法是：85%的遗传差异来自于种群内的个体间差异，而只有15%是来自于种群或种族间差异。因此，有人认为依靠遗传数据而将智人划分为不同群体，是不合理的。R.C.列万廷在1972年作出的该论断是缺乏根据的，原因在于：用于区分种群的大部分信息隐藏在遗传数据的相关性结构里，而不简简单单体现在单个因子的差异上。这背后的逻辑，在上世纪初就已被讨论，在这里用一个简单的遗传学范例来加以说明。 “When a large number of individuals [of any kind of organism] are measured in respect of physical dimensions, weight, colour, density, etc., it is possible to describe with some accuracy the population of which our experience may be regarded as a sample. By this means it may be possible to distinguish it from other populations differing in their genetic origin, or in environmental circumstances. Thus local races may be very different as populations, although individuals may overlap in all characters; . . .” R.A. Fisher (1925). “在测量「任何一种有机体的」大量个体的物理属性——重量，颜色，密度等——的时候，我们可以以特定的精确度来对该有机体的种群加以描述，虽然在经验上，他们可能只是样本而已。用这种方式，我们有可能把他们和其他种群在遗传起源上，甚至是在环境条件上，加以区分。这样一来，地区亚种之间在种群层面上可以有巨大的差别，尽管个体之间有可能高度重合……”R.A.菲舍尔（1925）。 “It is clear that our perception of relatively large differences between human races and subgroups, as compared to the variation within these groups, is indeed a biased perception and that, based on randomly chosen genetic differences, human races and populations are remarkably similar to each other, with the largest part by far of human variation being accounted for by the differences between individuals. Human racial classification is of no social value and is positively destructive of social and human relations. Since such racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance either, no justification can be offered for its continuance”. R.C. Lewontin (1972). “很明显，我们对于人类种群或是亚种之间差异大于群内个体差异的理解，是一种偏见。并且，基于随机选定的遗传差异来看，人类种族和种群之间具有显著的相似性，迄今为止人类间差异的最大部分都源于个体差异。种族分类不仅没有社会价值，而且对人和社会的关系有着强烈的破坏性。既然现在看来这样的种族分类毫无遗传学和分类学根据，将其持续下去也是毫无必要的了。”R.C.列万廷（1972）。 “The study of genetic variations in Homo sapiens shows that there is more genetic variation within populations than between populations. This means that two random individuals from any one group are almost as different as any two random individuals from the entire world. Although it may be easy to observe distinct external differences between groups of people, it is more difficult to distinguish such groups genetically, since most genetic variation is found within all groups.” Nature (2001). “对于智人遗传差异的研究表明种群内差异大于种群间差异。这意味着从同一族群中随机挑选的两个个体之间的差异几乎等同于世界上任何两个随机个体间的差异。尽管我们可以观测到族群间分明的外部特征区别，对他们在遗传上加以区分却困难得多，因为大部分遗传差异存在于所有的族群之内。”《自然》（2001）。 Introduction 导言 In popular articles that play down the genetical differences among human populations it is often stated, usually without any reference, that about 85% of the total genetical variation is due to individual differences within populations and only 15% to differences between populations or ethnic groups. It has therefore been suggested that the division of Homo sapiens into these groups is not justified by the genetic data. People the world over are much more similar genetically than appearances might suggest. 淡化人类种群间遗传差异的流行文章里，一个常见的未加引用的说法是：85%的遗传差异源于种群内的个体间差异，而只有15%的差异来自于种群或是种族。因此以这些种群为智人分类是不被遗传数据支持的。世界各地的人们在遗传上的相似性远大于外表所显示出的那样。 Thus an article in New Scientist reported that in 1972 Richard Lewontin of Harvard University “found that nearly 85 per cent of humanity’s genetic diversity occurs among individuals within a single population.”“In other words, two individuals are different because they are individuals, not because they belong to different races.” In 2001, the Human Genome edition of Nature came with a compact disc containing a similar statement, quoted above. 正如《新科学家》的一篇文章所报道的，哈佛大学的理查德•列万廷在1972年“发现近85%的人类遗传差异产生于种群内的个体之间”、“换句话说，个体之所以不同是因为他们是不同的个体，而不是因为他们属于不同的种族。”2001年，《自然：人类基因组特刊》附带的压缩光盘内也包含类似的引述。 Such statements seem all to trace back to a 1972 paper by Lewontin in the annual review Evolutionary Biology. Lewontin analysed data from 17 polymorphic loci, including the major blood-groups, and 7 ‘races’ (Caucasian, African, Mongoloid, S. Asian Aborigines, Amerinds, Oceanians, Australian Aborigines). The gene frequencies were given for the 7 races but not for the individual populations comprising them, although the final analysis did quote the within-population variability. 类似的陈述貌似都出自列万廷在1972年《进化生物学》年度综述中发表的一篇文章。列万廷分析了出自17个多态基因位点（包括主要的血型）和7个“种族”（高加索人，非洲人，蒙古人，南亚原住民，美洲印第安人，大洋洲人，以及澳洲原住民）的数据。尽管最终的分析引述了种群内多样性，对于基因频率，文章只给出了7个种族的数据，而没有给出组成这些种族的种群数据。 “The results are quite remarkable. The mean proportion of the total species diversity that is contained within populations is 85.4%.... Less than 15% of all human genetic diversity is accounted for by differences between human groups! Moreover, the difference between populations within a race accounts for an additional 8.3%, so that only 6.3% is accounted for by racial classification.” “结果很显著。在种群内包含的总物种多样性的比例平均可以达到85.4%……而只有不到15%的人类遗传多样性能被种群差异所解释！不仅如此，同一种族内部种群的差异在这里占8.3%，所以只有6.3%的差异能归结于种族划分。” Lewontin concluded “Since . . . racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance . . ., no justification can be offered for its continuance” (full quotation given above). 列万廷结论道：“既然如此……种族划分现在看来毫无遗传学或是分类学依据……延续它看来是毫无必要的”（上文已有完整引用）。 Lewontin included similar remarks in his 1974 book The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change “The taxonomic division of the human species into races places a completely disproportionate emphasis on a very small fraction of the total of human diversity. That scientists as well as nonscientists nevertheless continue to emphasize these genetically minor differences and find new ‘scientific’ justifications for doing so is an indication of the power of socioeconomically based ideology over the supposed objectivity of knowledge.” 在他1974年的书《进化改进的遗传学基础》种，列万廷加入了类似的评论。“将人类划分为种族的分类学方法将不成比例的注意力集中在人类总体多样性的零头上。科学家和大众对这种零星遗传差异的重视和坚持，甚至发现新的‘科学’证据来支持这种做法，显示出社会经济学意识形态的力量超越了本该是客观的知识。” The fallacy 谬误 These conclusions are based on the old statistical fallacy of analysing data on the assumption that it contains no information beyond that revealed on a locus-by-locus analysis, and then drawing conclusions solely on the results of such an analysis. The ‘taxonomic significance’ of genetic data in fact often arises from correlations amongst the different loci, for it is these that may contain the information which enables a stable classification to be uncovered. 之所以有以上定论，主要是出于一个陈旧的统计谬误，即认为除了基于单个位点的分析结论之外，数据不包含任何其它信息，并且只考虑基于这个假设的分析和它衍生出的结论。而所谓的“有分类学意义”的遗传数据实际上源自不同位点之间的相关关系，正是这些相关关系中可能包含的信息驱动了对于分类的发掘。 Cavalli-Sforza and Piazza coined the word ‘treeness’ to describe the extent to which a tree-like structure was hidden amongst the correlations in gene-frequency data. Lewontin’s superficial analysis ignores this aspect of the structure of the data and leads inevitably to the conclusion that the data do not possess such structure. The argument is circular. A contrasting analysis to Lewontin’s, using very similar data, was presented by Cavalli-Sforza and Edwards at the 1963 International Congress of Genetics. Making no prior assumptions about the form of the tree, they derived a convincing evolutionary tree for the 15 populations that they studied. Lewontin, though he participated in the Congress, did not refer to this analysis. Cavalli-Sforza和 Piazza创造了“树性”这一词汇，用于描述一个树形结构在基因频率数据的相关关系中的隐匿程度。列万廷的肤浅分析无视了数据在这方面的特性，于是不可避免的得出结论认为该树形结构不存在。这是个循环论证。Cavalli-Sforza和Edwards于1963年的世界遗传大会发表了与之对应的对比分析，并使用了类似的数据。在不对树形做任何先验假设的情况下，他们在研究的15个种群中得出了一个令人信服的进化树结构。列万廷虽然参加了此次会议，但却没有提到这个分析。 The statistical problem has been understood at least since the discussions surrounding Pearson’s ‘coefficient of racial likeness’ in the 1920s. It is mentioned in all editions of Fisher’s Statistical Methods for Research Workers from 1925 (quoted above). A useful review is that by Gower in a 1972 conference volume The Assessment of Population Affinities in Man. As he pointed out, “...the human mind distinguishes between different groups because there are correlated characters within the postulated groups.” 早在围绕皮尔森在1920年代提出的“种族相似性的协同因素”的讨论中，人们就已经理解了相关的统计原理了。在菲舍尔所作的《给研究员的统计方法》的所有版本中，该原理都有被提及（本文开头亦有引用）。高尔于1972年在“人类种群亲缘关系评估”的会议出版物中提出了一个有用的评论，他指出：“……人类心智将人划分为不同的组别，原因在于在这些组别内存在具有相关性的特性。” The original discussions involved anthropometric data, but the fallacy may equally be exposed using modern genetic terminology. Consider two haploid populations each of size n. In population 1 the frequency of a gene, say ‘+’ as opposed to ‘-’, at a single diallelic locus is p and in population 2 it is q, where p + q = 1. (The symmetry is deliberate.) Each population manifests simple binomial variability, and the overall variability is augmented by the difference in the means. 原初的讨论涉及一些人体测量学数据，但是我们用现代遗传学术语也同样可以揭示这个谬误。考虑两个个体数量各为n的单倍体种群。在种群1中某基因在一个单独位点为“+”而不是“-”的频率为p，在种群2中该频率为q，且p + q = 1。（这种对称性是有意设定的。）各种群的多样性为简单二项式分布，且总体多样性由于两个种群间平均值的差异而得到加强。 The natural way to analyse this variability is the analysis of variance, from which it will be found that the ratio of the within-population sum of squares to the total sum of squares is simply 4pq. Taking p = 0.3 and q = 0.7, this ratio is 0.84; 84% of the variability is within-population, corresponding closely to Lewontin’s figure. The probability of misclassifying an individual based on his gene is p, in this case 0.3. The genes at a single locus are hardly informative about the population to which their bearer belongs. 很自然的，我们用方差分析来评估多样性，从中可以得出种群内平方和与总体平方和之比为4pq【译注：对于任一种群，种群方差为npq，种群平方和为n²pq；总和平方和为1/4•n²(p+q)² = 1/4•n²；(n²pq)/( 1/4•n²)=4pq】。如 p = 0.3 而 q = 0.7，该比率为0.84，即84%的多样性来自于种群内，正好对应列万廷的结果。基于该基因对个体的分类误差率为p，即0.3。单个位点的基因几乎不包含关于该基因携带者属于哪个种群的任何信息。 Now suppose there are k similar loci, all with gene frequency p in population 1 and q in population 2. The ratio of the within-to-total variability is still 84% at each locus. The total number of ‘+’ genes in an individual will be binomial with mean kp in population 1 and kq in population 2, with variance kpq in both cases. Continuing with the former gene frequencies and taking k = 100 loci (say), the mean numbers are 30 and 70 respectively, with variances 21 and thus standard deviations of 4.58. With a difference between the means of 40 and a common standard deviation of less than 4.6, there is virtually no overlap between the distributions, and the probability of misclassification is infinitesimal, simply on the basis of counting the number of ‘+’ genes. Fig. 1 shows how the probability falls off for up to 20 loci. 现在假设共有k个相似位点，都在种群1中和种群2中分别具有p和q的基因频率。在每个单个位点上，种群内多样性与总体多样性之比仍是84%。在每个个体上为“+”的基因数将呈二项式分布，其均值在种群1中为kp，在种群2中为kq，方差在两个种群中同为kpq。继续之前关于基因频率的假设【译注：即p = 0.3，q = 0.7】，设k = 100 个位点，则在两个种群中均值各为30和70，方差为21，因此标准差为4.58。在均值相差40的情况下，共同的标准差还不到4.6，因此这两个分布几乎没有任何重叠部分，所以基于“+”基因出现个数所作分类的误差可能性是无限小。图1显示了该分类误差率随位点数增加而下降的曲线，至20个位点。 Figure 1. Graph showing how the probability of misclassification falls off as the number of gene loci increases, for the first example given in the text. The proportion of the variability within groups remains at 84% as in Lewontin’s data, but the probability of misclassification rapidly becomes negligible. 图1. 该图显示分类误差率随基因位点数增加而下降的曲线，用于文本中第一个例证。组内多样性占比依旧为列万廷数据揭示的84%，但分类误差率迅速下降至可以忽略的程度。【图表横轴：基因位点数；图表纵轴：分类误差率】 One way of looking at this result is to appreciate that the total number of ‘+’ genes is like the first principal component in a principal component analysis (Box 1). For this component the between-population sum of squares is very much greater than the within-population sum of squares. For the other components the reverse will hold, so that overall the between-population sum of squares is only a small proportion (in this example 16%) of the total. But this must not beguile one into thinking that the two populations are not separable, which they clearly are. 一种领会该结果的方式是将“+”基因的总数看成主成分分析法中的第一主成分（见框文1【编注：是对主成分分析（Principal components analysis，PCA）方法的介绍，译略，有兴趣可查看原文，或参见维基词条“主成分分析”】）。对于该成分，种群间平方和远大于种群内平方和。对于其他成分则反之，以至于对所有成分来说种群间平方和仅占总体平方和的一小部分（在这个例子里面为16%）。但这个结果不能诱使我们认为两个种群是不可分的，而实际上他们是清晰可分的。 Each additional locus contributes equally to the within-population and between-population sums of squares, whose proportions therefore remain unchanged but, at the same time, it contributes information about classification which is cumulative over loci because their gene frequencies are correlated. 每一个增加的位点都同样的增加种群内和种群间的平方和，导致它们之间的比率不变。但同时，关于分类的信息也增加了，而且这种增加在位点数量上是具有累加性的，因为位点之间的基因频率是相关的。 Classification 分类 It might be supposed, though it would be wrong, that this example is prejudiced by the assumptions that membership of the two populations is known in advance and that, at each locus, it is the same population that has the higher frequency of the ‘+’ gene. In fact the only advantage of the latter simplifying assumption was that it made it obvious that the total number of ‘+’ genes is the best discriminant between the two populations. 人们或可认为——虽然这么想是错的——这是个不太好的例子，因为假设了个体在两个种群的归属事先已知，并且在每个位点都是同一种群拥有较高的获得“+”的基因频率。实际上，后一个简化假设的唯一优势在于使得“+”基因的总数成为种群的明显最优判准。 To dispel these concerns, consider the same example but with ‘+’ and ‘-’ interchanged at each locus with probability 1⁄2, and suppose that there is no prior information as to which population each individual belongs. Clearly, the total number of ‘+’ genes an individual contains is no longer a discriminant, for the expected number is now the same in each group. A cluster analysis will be necessary in order to uncover the groups, and a convenient criterion is again based on the analysis of variance as in the method introduced by Edwards and Cavalli-Sforza. Here the preferred division into two clusters maximises the between-clusters sum of squares or, what is the same thing, minimises the sum of the within-clusters sums of squares. 为解除这些疑虑，设想同样的例子，但“+”和“-”在各个位点以1/2的概率互换，且没有关于个体归属的任何先验信息。显然，个体所拥有的“+”基因总数不能再作为判准，因为该数目的期望值在两组里面是一样的。在这种情况下需要用聚类分析来处理分组，且一个便利的分组条件仍然是基于方差分析的，其方法由Edwards和Cavalli-Sforza提供。这里对于聚类的优先分割会最大化聚类间平方和，或者说是最小化聚类内平方和，在这里是一样的意思。 As pointed out by these authors, it is extremely easy to compute these sums for binary data, for all the information is contained in the half-matrix of pairwise distances between the individuals, and at each locus this distance is simply 0 for a match and 1 for a mismatch of the genes. Since interchanging ‘+’ and ‘-’ makes no difference to the numbers of matches and mismatches, it is clear that the random changes introduced above are irrelevant. 正如这两位作者指出的那样，在二值数据里是很容易计算出这些平方和的，因为所有信息都可以体现为一个成对个体间的距离半矩阵。在每个位点上，配对时距离为0，不配对为1。既然互换“+”和“-”对于配对关系没有影响，那么显然以上引入的随机变化是无关的。 Continuing the symmetrical example, the probability of a match is p² + q² if the two individuals are from the same population and 2pq if they are from different populations. With k loci, therefore, the distance between two individuals from the same population will be binomial with mean k(p² + q²) and variance k(p² + q²)(1 – p² – q²) and if from different populations binomial with mean 2kpq and variance 2kpq(1 – 2pq). These variances are, of course, the same. 继续这个对称性例子，对于来自同一种群的两个个体来说，单一位点配对的机率为p² + q²；若来自不同种群，则为2pq。因此，对于k个位点，同一种群两个个体间距离呈二项式分布，均值为k(p² + q²)，方差为k(p² + q²)(1 – p² – q²)；若来自不同种群，则均值为2kpq，方差为2kpq(1 – 2pq)。这两个方差显然是一样的【译注：p + q = 1 à p² + q² = 1 – 2pq】。 Taking p = 0.3, q = 0.7 and k = 100 as before, the means are 58 and 42 respectively, a difference of 16, the variances are 24.36 and the standard deviations both 4.936. The means are thus more than 3 standard deviations apart (3.2415). The entries of the half-matrix of pairwise distances will therefore divide into two groups with very little overlap, and it will be possible to identify the two clusters with a risk of misclassification which tends to zero as the number of loci increases. 像之前一样，取p = 0.3, q = 0.7 和 k = 100，则均值分别为58和42，相差16。方差为24.36，即两组的标准差都为4.936。这样一来两组均值之间则有超出3个标准差的距离。因此，这个成对个体距离半矩阵中的数值就可以被分成几乎没有重叠的两组，这样就有可能以较小的分类误差来识别两个聚类，且该分类误差率随位点数目增加逐渐趋向于0。 By analogy with the above example, it is likely that a count of the four DNA base frequencies in homologous tracts of a genome would prove quite a powerful statistical discriminant for classifying people into population groups. 同理可知，对于基因组同源区域的四个DNA碱基频率进行计数，这种方法很可能被证明是一个十分有效的进行种群分类的统计判准。 Conclusion 结论 There is nothing wrong with Lewontin’s statistical analysis of variation, only with the belief that it is relevant to classification. It is not true that “racial classification is . . . of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance”. It is not true, as Nature claimed, that “two random individuals from any one group are almost as different as any two random individuals from the entire world”, and it is not true, as the New Scientist claimed, that “two individuals are different because they are individuals, not because they belong to different races” and that “you can’t predict someone’s race by their genes”. Such statements might only be true if all the characters studied were independent, which they are not. 列万廷对于多样性的统计分析本身没错，错的是认为该分析与分类有关。那种认为“人种分类……毫无遗传学和分类学依据”的想法是错误的。类似《自然》杂志所声明的“两个来源于任何组别的个体之间的差异和两个来源于世界上任何地方的个体之间的差异几乎一样大”的想法是错误的。类似《新科学家》声明的“两个个体有区别是因为他们是两个个体，而不是因为他们从属于不同的种族”和“你无法通过基因来判断某人的种族”的想法也是错误的。这类声明唯有在所有被研究的特性都是独立分布的时候才成立，可它们并不是独立分布的。 Lewontin used his analysis of variation to mount an unjustified assault on classification, which he deplored for social reasons. It was he who wrote “Indeed the whole history of the problem of genetic variation is a vivid illustration of the role that deeply embedded ideological assumptions play in determining scientific ‘truth’ and the direction of scientific inquiry”. 列万廷利用他对于多样性的分析对人种分类发起了一场毫无根据的攻击，认为人种分类是社会因素造成的悲剧。正是他写道：“的确，遗传多样性问题的整个研究历史生动的向我们展示了深埋的意识形态假设是如何决定科学的‘真相’和科学探索的方向。” In a 1970 article Race and intelligence he had earlier written “I shall try, in this article, to display Professor Jensen’s argument, to show how the structure of his argument is designed to make his point and to reveal what appear to be deeply embedded assumptions derived from a particular world view, leading him to erroneous conclusions.” 更早之前在一篇发表于1972年的题为“种族与智能”的文章里他写道：“我会努力在本文向你展示詹森教授的论据，以及他如何构筑这些论据以说明他的论点的，并向你揭示那些深埋的假设是如何来自于一种特别的世界观，最终导致他得出一个错误的结论。” A proper analysis of human data reveals a substantial amount of information about genetic differences. What use, if any, one makes of it is quite another matter. But it is a dangerous mistake to premise the moral equality of human beings on biological similarity because dissimilarity, once revealed, then becomes an argument for moral inequality. One is reminded of Fisher’s remark in Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference “that the best causes tend to attract to their support the worst arguments, which seems to be equally true in the intellectual and in the moral sense.” 对于人类数据的恰当分析揭示了有关遗传差异的大量信息。如何利用这些信息则是另外一回事。但将生物学上的相似性当作人类在道德上平等的前提是一个危险的错误，因为差异一旦被发现，就会被视作道德不平等的论据。我们应当铭记菲舍尔在《统计方法与科学推断》中的话：“最好的主张常常会吸引最差的理由，而这理由在智力上和道德上都一样不靠谱。” Epilogue 后记 This article could, and perhaps should, have been written soon after 1974. Since then many advances have been made in both gene technology and statistical computing that have facilitated the study of population differences from genetic data. The magisterial book of Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza took the human story up to 1994, and since then many studies have amply confirmed the validity of the approach. 这篇文章本可以——且应该——在1974年之后不久就写完。自那时起，基因技术和统计计算方面取得了诸多进展，为研究遗传数据中的种群差异提供了很大帮助。Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi和Piazza的权威著作将人类的故事带到了1994年，从那时起，众多研究广泛的证实了他们的方法。 Very recent studies have treated individuals in the same way that Cavalli-Sforza and Edwards treated populations in 1963, namely by subjecting their genetic information to a cluster analysis thus revealing genetic affinities that have unsurprising geographic, linguistic and cultural parallels. As the authors of the most extensive of these comment, “it was only in the accumulation of small allele-frequency differences across many loci that population structure was identified.” 一些晚近的研究用Cavalli-Sforza和Edwards处理种群的方法对待个体，即，将聚类分析运用到个体遗传信息的分析上，由此所揭示出的地理、语言、以及文化上的遗传亲缘性，并不出乎意料。正如在这些课题上之中涉猎最为广泛的作者所言：“只有当众多微小位点上等位基因的差异逐渐累积，种群结构才得以显现。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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