含有〈市场〉标签的文章(70)

[译文]如何运用市场机制分发慈善品

Free Market Food Banks
自由市场中的救济食品发放中心

作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-03
译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢)
校对:龙泉(@ L_Stellar)
来源:http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/free-market-food-banks.html

Feeding America, the third largest non-profit in the United States, distributes billions of pounds of food every year. Most of the food comes from large firms like Kraft, ConAgra and Walmart that have a surplus of some item and scarce warehouse space. Feeding America coordinates the supply of surplus food with the demand from food banks across the U.S..

作为美国第三大非营利性机构,“喂饱美国”每年要分发数十亿磅食品。大多数食品来自像克拉夫特、康尼格拉和沃尔玛这样产品过剩且仓储不足的大型食品公司。“喂饱美国”可调节过剩食品供给和全美救济食品发放中心【以下简称“救济中心”】需求之间的关系。

Allocating food is not an easy problem. How do you decide who gets what while taking into account local needs, local tastes, what foods the bank has already, what abilities the banks have to store food on a particular day, transportation costs and so forth. Alex Teytelboym writing at The Week (more...)

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Free Market Food Banks 自由市场中的救济食品发放中心 作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-03 译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对:龙泉(@ L_Stellar) 来源:http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/free-market-food-banks.html Feeding America, the third largest non-profit in the United States, distributes billions of pounds of food every year. Most of the food comes from large firms like Kraft, ConAgra and Walmart that have a surplus of some item and scarce warehouse space. Feeding America coordinates the supply of surplus food with the demand from food banks across the U.S.. 作为美国第三大非营利性机构,“喂饱美国”每年要分发数十亿磅食品。大多数食品来自像克拉夫特、康尼格拉和沃尔玛这样产品过剩且仓储不足的大型食品公司。“喂饱美国”可调节过剩食品供给和全美救济食品发放中心【以下简称“救济中心”】需求之间的关系。 Allocating food is not an easy problem. How do you decide who gets what while taking into account local needs, local tastes, what foods the bank has already, what abilities the banks have to store food on a particular day, transportation costs and so forth. Alex Teytelboym writing at The Week points out: 分配食品不是一件容易的差事。在同时考虑当地需求、当地口味、救济中心已有食品、救济中心在特定日期储存食品的能力和运输成本等因素时,你如何决定什么人得到什么食物呢?Alex Teytelboym在《周报》上指出:
…Before 2005, Feeding America allocated food centrally, and according to its rather subjective perception of what food banks needed. Headquarters would call up the food banks in a priority order and offer them a truckload of food. Bizarrely, all food was treated more or less equally, irrespective of its nutritional content. A pound of chicken was the same as a pound of french fries. …在2005年之前,“喂饱美国”根据对救济中心需求颇为主观的感知来集中分配食物。总部会按优先顺序致电救济中心,并给他们提供一大卡车食物。离奇的是,不论营养成分如何,所有食品或多或少都被同等处理了。一磅鸡肉等同于一磅炸薯条。 If the food bank accepted the load, it paid the transportation costs and had the truck sent to them. If the food bank refused, Feeding America would judge this food bank as having lower need and push it down the priority list. Unsurprisingly, food banks went out of their way to avoid refusing food loads — even if they were already stocked with that particular food. 如果一家救济中心接受了配送,总部会付给运费让卡车把食品送给接受的中心。如果一家救济中心拒绝了,“喂饱美国”会视这家救济中心需求量较低,并把它从优先列表中除去。不出所料,所有的救济中心都特意避免拒绝食品配送——即使某类食物它们已经储存了很多。 This Soviet-style system was hugely inefficient. Some urban food banks had great access to local food donations and often ended up with a surplus of food. A lot of food rotted in places where it was not needed, while many shelves in other food banks stood empty. Feeding America simply knew too little about what their food banks needed on a given day. 这种苏联式的系统非常低效。一些城市的救济中心有很多当地的食品捐赠渠道,因此经常出现食品过剩。很多食品腐烂在不需要它们的地方,而别处救济中心的很多架子仍是空的。“喂饱美国”连某一天救济中心的需求都知之甚少。
In 2005, however, a group of Chicago academics, including economists, worked with Feeding America to redesign the system using market principles. Today Feeding America no longer sends trucks of potatoes to food banks in Idaho and a pound of chicken is no longer treated the same as a pound of french fries. 然而在2005年,一群包括经济学家在内的芝加哥学者用市场准则帮助“喂饱美国”重新设计了分配系统。今天的“喂饱美国”不会再给爱达荷州的救济中心送去一车土豆了,而且一磅鸡肉跟一磅炸薯条也不再同等对待。 Instead food banks bid on food deliveries and the market discovers the internal market-prices that clear the system. The auction system even allows negative prices so that food banks can be “paid” to pick up food that is not highly desired–this helps Feeding America keep both its donors and donees happy. 救济中心转而对食品运送进行竞拍,而且市场发现了理顺整个系统的内部市场价格。这个拍卖系统甚至允许负价格,以便于救济中心可以为取走需求量不大的食物而获得报酬——这帮助“喂饱美国”同时取悦捐赠者和受捐者。 Food banks are not bidding in dollars, however, but in a new, internal currency called shares. 然而救济中心并不用美元竞拍,而是用一种新的名叫“股份”的内部货币。
Every day, each food bank is allocated a pot of fiat currency called “shares.” Food banks in areas with bigger populations and more poverty receive larger numbers of shares. Twice a day, they can use their shares to bid online on any of the 30 to 40 truckloads of food that were donated directly to Feeding America. The winners of the auction pay for the truckloads with their shares. 每个救济中心每天都会分配到一壶名为“股份”的法定货币。人口和穷人较多地区的救济中心会收到数量较多的“股份”。他们隔天就可以用自己的“股份”在线竞拍30到40卡车食品中的任意一车,这些食品都是直接捐赠给“喂饱美国”的。赢得拍卖的一方要为那车食品支付其“股份”。 Then, all the shares spent on a particular day are reallocated back to food banks at midnight. That means that food banks that did not spend their shares on a particular day would end up with more shares and thus a greater ability to bid the next day. 然后,一天内花掉的所有“股份”都会在半夜重新分配给救济中心。这意味着这一天没有花掉股份的救济中心最后会有更多“股份”,并因此在来日有更大的竞标能力。 In this way, the system has built-in fairness: If a large food bank could afford to spend a fortune on a truck of frozen chicken, its shares would show up on the balance of smaller food banks the next day. Moreover, neighboring food banks can now team up to bid jointly to reduce their transport costs. 通过这种方式,系统拥有了内在的公平性:如果一家大型救济中心在一车冻鸡肉上花了大价钱,它的“股份”就会在来日出现在小型救济中心的股份账户上。而且,临近的救济中心现在可以组团共同竞标来降低运输费用。 Initially, there was plenty of resistance. As one food bank director told Canice Prendergast, an economist advising Feeding America, “I am a socialist. That’s why I run a food bank. I don’t believe in markets. I’m not saying I won’t listen, but I am against this.” 起初有很多阻力。正如一位救济中心的主管对Canice Prendergast——一位经济学家,“喂饱美国”的顾问——所说,“我是个社会学家。这是为何由我来运营一家救济中心的原因。我不相信市场。我不是说我不会听取你们的建议,但我反对这一举措。” But the Chicago economists managed to design a market that worked even for participants who did not believe in it. Within half a year of the auction system being introduced, 97 percent of food banks won at least one load, and the amount of food allocated from Feeding America’s headquarters rose by over 35 percent, to the delight of volunteers and donors. 但是这位芝加哥经济学家尽力设计了一个连不相信它的参与者都适用的市场【编注:此处疑似埋了Niels Bohr的马蹄铁梗】。在引入拍卖系统的半年内,97%的救济中心至少竞标成功过一车食品,而且从“喂饱美国”总部分配的食品总量增长了超过35%,这是志愿者和捐赠者喜闻乐见的。
Teytelboym’s very good, short account is working off a longer, more detailed paper by Canice Prendergast, The Allocation of Food to Food Banks. Teytelboym出色简短的描述都出自Canice Prendergast一篇更长更细致的论文,《救济中心的食品配给》。 Canice’s paper would be a great teaching tool in an intermediate or graduate micro economics class. Pair it with Hayek’s The Use of Knowledge in Society. Under the earlier centralized system, Feeding America didn’t know when a food bank was out of refrigerator space or which food banks had hot dogs but wanted hot dog buns and which the reverse–under the market system this information, which Hayek called “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” is used and as a result less food is wasted and the food is used to satisfy more urgent needs. Canice的论文会是一份很棒的中级或者高级微观经济学课程的教学材料。最好配上哈耶克的《知识在社会中的应用》一文。在早前的集中式系统中,“喂饱美国”并不知道某个救济中心何时冰箱没空间了,或者哪家救济中心有热狗却想要热狗面包而哪家正相反——在市场系统中,这类信息——哈耶克称为“有关特定时空情境的知识”——被利用起来,因此浪费的食物更少,食物用来满足更急切的需求。 The Feeding America auction system is also the best illustration that I know of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. “喂饱美国”的拍卖系统也是我所知的对福利经济学第二基本定理的最好诠释。 Even monetary economics comes into play. Feeding America created a new currency and thus had to deal with the problem of the aggregate money supply. How should the supply of shares be determined so that relative prices were free to change but the price level would remain relatively stable? How could the baby-sitting co-op problem be avoided? Scott Sumner will be disappointed to learn that they choose pound targeting rather than nominal-pound targeting but some of the key issues of monetary economics are present even in this simple economy. 甚至货币经济学派上了用场。“喂饱美国”创造了一种新货币并且因此必须处理总货币供应量的问题。应如何决定“股份”的供应量以使相关价格能够自由变动而价格水平保持相对稳定?如何避免保姆合作社问题?Scott Sumner将会失望地发现,救济中心选择了以紧盯镑重而不是名义镑重为政策指引【编注:此处疑似在调戏Sumner,后者提倡一种紧盯名义GDP的货币政策。】,但是货币经济学的一些关键问题出现在了这个甚为简单的经济体中。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]沙特输掉了石油价格战

沙特阿拉伯可能会在美国石油行业崩溃之前倒下
Saudi Arabia may go broke before the US oil industry buckles

作者:Ambrose Evans-Pritchard @ 2015-8-5
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:Tankman
来源:每日电讯报,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/11768136/Saudi-Arabia-may-go-broke-before-the-US-oil-industry-buckles.html

If the oil futures market is correct, Saudi Arabia will start running into trouble within two years. It will be in existential crisis by the end of the decade.

如果石油期货市场是对的,那么沙特阿拉伯将会在两年之内开始陷入麻烦。这个国家将会在这个十年的尾声时陷入一场生存危机。

The contract price of US crude oil for delivery in December 2020 is currently $62.05, implying a drastic change in the economic landscape for the Middle East and the petro-rentier states.

目前2020年12月交付的美国原油期货价格是每桶62.05美元,这个价格体现了中东地区和石油租利国家经济版图的一场剧变。

The Saudis took a huge gamble last November when they stopped supporting prices and opted instead to flood the market and drive out rivals, boosting their own output to 10.6m barrels a day (b/d) into the teeth of the downturn.

沙特人在去年11月【译注:本文作于2015年,此处指2014年11月】开始了一场豪赌,他们停止了对石油价格的支撑,转而选择在市场上倾销以挤出竞争对手,他们在市场急转直下的时候将自己的原油产量提升到了每日106万桶。

Bank of America says OPEC is now “effectively dissolved”. The cartel might as well shut down its offices in Vienna to save money.

美国银行认为OPEC目前“实际上已经解体了”。这个垄断联盟也许会关闭它在维也纳的办公室以节省资金。

01-Saudi-02-large_trans++qVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwfSVWeZ_vEN7c6bHu2jJnT8

If the aim was to choke the US shale industry, the Saudis have misjudged badly, just as they misjudged the growing shale threat at every stage for eight years. “It is becoming apparent that non-OPEC producers are not as responsive to low oil prices as had been thought, at least in the short-run,” said the Saudi central bank in its latest stability report.

如果这么做的目的是打击美国的页岩产业,那么沙特人就犯了个大错,就像他们在过去八年中的每个阶段都错判了成长中的页岩产业的威胁一样。“很显然那些非OPEC产油国对于低油价的反应并不像我们之前所设想的那样剧烈,至少在短期内是这样,”沙特央行在最近的稳定性报告中表示。

“The main impact has been to cut back on developmental drilling of new oil wells, rather than slowing the flow of oil from existing wells. This requires more patience,” it said.

这份报告称:“(这项政策)的主要影响是减少了新油井的开发钻探量,而并非降低现有油井的生产速度。这需要更多的耐心。”

One Saudi expert was blunter. “The policy hasn’t worked and it will never work,” he said.

一位沙特专家则更加直白。“这项政策显然没起作用,而且它也永远起不了作用,”他说。

By causing the oil price to crash, the Saudis and their Gulf allies have certainly killed off prospects for a raft of high-cost ventures in the Russian Arctic, the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters of the mid-Atlantic, and the Canadian tar sands.

通过让油价崩溃,沙特人和他们的海湾盟友们显然杀死了那些试图在俄罗斯北极地区,墨西哥湾,大西洋中部深海和加拿大油砂中提炼原油的昂贵冒险活动。

Consultants Wood Mackenzie say the major oil and gas companies have(more...)

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沙特阿拉伯可能会在美国石油行业崩溃之前倒下 Saudi Arabia may go broke before the US oil industry buckles 作者:Ambrose Evans-Pritchard @ 2015-8-5 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:Tankman 来源:每日电讯报,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/11768136/Saudi-Arabia-may-go-broke-before-the-US-oil-industry-buckles.html If the oil futures market is correct, Saudi Arabia will start running into trouble within two years. It will be in existential crisis by the end of the decade. 如果石油期货市场是对的,那么沙特阿拉伯将会在两年之内开始陷入麻烦。这个国家将会在这个十年的尾声时陷入一场生存危机。 The contract price of US crude oil for delivery in December 2020 is currently $62.05, implying a drastic change in the economic landscape for the Middle East and the petro-rentier states. 目前2020年12月交付的美国原油期货价格是每桶62.05美元,这个价格体现了中东地区和石油租利国家经济版图的一场剧变。 The Saudis took a huge gamble last November when they stopped supporting prices and opted instead to flood the market and drive out rivals, boosting their own output to 10.6m barrels a day (b/d) into the teeth of the downturn. 沙特人在去年11月【译注:本文作于2015年,此处指2014年11月】开始了一场豪赌,他们停止了对石油价格的支撑,转而选择在市场上倾销以挤出竞争对手,他们在市场急转直下的时候将自己的原油产量提升到了每日106万桶。 Bank of America says OPEC is now "effectively dissolved". The cartel might as well shut down its offices in Vienna to save money. 美国银行认为OPEC目前“实际上已经解体了”。这个垄断联盟也许会关闭它在维也纳的办公室以节省资金。 01-Saudi-02-large_trans++qVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwfSVWeZ_vEN7c6bHu2jJnT8 If the aim was to choke the US shale industry, the Saudis have misjudged badly, just as they misjudged the growing shale threat at every stage for eight years. "It is becoming apparent that non-OPEC producers are not as responsive to low oil prices as had been thought, at least in the short-run," said the Saudi central bank in its latest stability report. 如果这么做的目的是打击美国的页岩产业,那么沙特人就犯了个大错,就像他们在过去八年中的每个阶段都错判了成长中的页岩产业的威胁一样。“很显然那些非OPEC产油国对于低油价的反应并不像我们之前所设想的那样剧烈,至少在短期内是这样,”沙特央行在最近的稳定性报告中表示。 "The main impact has been to cut back on developmental drilling of new oil wells, rather than slowing the flow of oil from existing wells. This requires more patience," it said. 这份报告称:“(这项政策)的主要影响是减少了新油井的开发钻探量,而并非降低现有油井的生产速度。这需要更多的耐心。” One Saudi expert was blunter. "The policy hasn't worked and it will never work," he said. 一位沙特专家则更加直白。“这项政策显然没起作用,而且它也永远起不了作用,”他说。 By causing the oil price to crash, the Saudis and their Gulf allies have certainly killed off prospects for a raft of high-cost ventures in the Russian Arctic, the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters of the mid-Atlantic, and the Canadian tar sands. 通过让油价崩溃,沙特人和他们的海湾盟友们显然杀死了那些试图在俄罗斯北极地区,墨西哥湾,大西洋中部深海和加拿大油砂中提炼原油的昂贵冒险活动。 Consultants Wood Mackenzie say the major oil and gas companies have shelved 46 large projects, deferring $200bn of investments. 咨询公司Wood Machenzie表示,大型油气公司们已经将46个大型项目束之高阁,这推迟了大约2000亿美元的投资支出。 The problem for the Saudis is that US shale frackers are not high-cost. They are mostly mid-cost, and as I reported from the CERAWeek energy forum in Houston, experts at IHS think shale companies may be able to shave those costs by 45pc this year - and not only by switching tactically to high-yielding wells. 沙特人所面临的问题是,美国的页岩油气生产商们的成本并不高。正如我在休斯顿举办的CERAWeek能源论坛上所报告的,这些公司中的大多数成本都处于适中的水平,IHS公司的专家们认为这些页岩油气公司也许能在今年将这些成本削减45个百分点——而这并不仅是靠战术性地转向那些高产的油井来做到的。 Advanced pad drilling techniques allow frackers to launch five or ten wells in different directions from the same site. Smart drill-bits with computer chips can seek out cracks in the rock. New dissolvable plugs promise to save $300,000 a well. "We've driven down drilling costs by 50pc, and we can see another 30pc ahead," said John Hess, head of the Hess Corporation. 先进的井台批量钻探技术让页岩油业者能在同一处钻探点打出5口或10口不同方向的油井。植入了计算机芯片的智能钻探装置能够自动发现岩层中的裂缝。最新的可溶解油栓技术有望为每口油井节省30万美元的成本。“我们已经将钻探成本降低了百分之五十,而且我们认为目前的成本还有百分之三十的下降空间,”Hess集团总裁John Hess表示。 It was the same story from Scott Sheffield, head of Pioneer Natural Resources. "We have just drilled an 18,000 ft well in 16 days in the Permian Basin. Last year it took 30 days," he said. 先锋自然资源公司总裁Scott Sheffield也持相同看法。“我们最近在16天内在二叠纪盆地钻出了一口深达一万八千英尺的油井。而在去年,这样的工程还需要花上30天,”他说。 The North American rig-count has dropped to 664 from 1,608 in October but output still rose to a 43-year high of 9.6m b/d June. It has only just begun to roll over. "The freight train of North American tight oil has kept on coming," said Rex Tillerson, head of Exxon Mobil. 北美工作中的钻机数量从去年十月的1608台下降到了目前的664台,但原油产量却在今年六月升至43年来的最高水平——每日960万桶。而这仅仅只是个开始。“运送北美页岩油的货运火车正源源不断地开来,”埃克森美孚公司总裁Rex Tillerson表示。 01-Saudi-03-large_trans++mRnaWIkzDVpCKltYOKrpmR1NfXqjyxAjf9-9h2iOWsQ He said the resilience of the sister industry of shale gas should be a cautionary warning to those reading too much into the rig-count. Gas prices have collapsed from $8 to $2.78 since 2009, and the number of gas rigs has dropped 1,200 to 209. Yet output has risen by 30pc over that period. 他说,页岩气作为姊妹行业其适应能力应该引起那些过多关注钻机数量的人们的深切警醒。天然气价格已经从2009年的8美元暴跌至目前的2.78美元,而工作中的天然气钻机数量则从当时的1200台降至了目前的209台。但产量却在同一时期上升了超过三十个百分点。 Until now, shale drillers have been cushioned by hedging contracts. The stress test will come over coming months as these expire. But even if scores of over-leveraged wild-catters go bankrupt as funding dries up, it will not do OPEC any good. 直到目前,页岩钻探者们一直受到了对冲合约的保护。而未来的几个月中,随着这些合约到期,真正的压力测试将会到来。但即便这些过度使用杠杆的风险弄潮儿最终因为资金枯竭而破产,OPEC也无法从中得到任何好处。 The wells will still be there. The technology and infrastructure will still be there. Stronger companies will mop up on the cheap, taking over the operations. Once oil climbs back to $60 or even $55 - since the threshold keeps falling - they will crank up production almost instantly. 油井仍然在那里。技术和基础设施也仍然在那里。更加强大的公司将会廉价扫货,并接管他们的生意。一旦油价重新回到每桶60美元甚至55美元——这个阈值正在持续降低——他们将会立即重新启动钻机开始生产。 OPEC now faces a permanent headwind. Each rise in price will be capped by a surge in US output. The only constraint is the scale of US reserves that can be extracted at mid-cost, and these may be bigger than originally supposed, not to mention the parallel possibilities in Argentina and Australia, or the possibility for "clean fracking" in China as plasma pulse technology cuts water needs. OPEC目前面临着一个挥之不去的困境。每一波油价上涨就会被一波美国原油产量的激增抵消。对此的唯一限制是全美能够以适中成本开采的原油总储量,而这个数字则很可能比人们之前设想的要大,更不用提在阿根廷和澳大利亚的那些类似的可供开采储量,还有中国未来因等离子脉冲技术降低了对水量的需求,实现“清洁开采”的可能性。 Mr Sheffield said the Permian Basin in Texas could alone produce 5-6m b/d in the long-term, more than Saudi Arabia's giant Ghawar field, the biggest in the world. Sheffield先生表示,单单是德州的二叠纪盆地在长期内的日产出量就能达到500到600万桶,而这个数字比目前世界上最大的石油产区——沙特阿拉伯的大Ghawar油田的产出还要大。 Saudi Arabia is effectively beached. It relies on oil for 90pc of its budget revenues. There is no other industry to speak of, a full fifty years after the oil bonanza began. 沙特阿拉伯这艘大船实际上已经搁浅了。这个国家预算收入中的90%都依赖石油。而在经历了整整50年的石油大繁荣之后,它并没有发展出任何其它值得一提的产业。 01-Saudi-04-large_trans++qVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwfSVWeZ_vEN7c6bHu2jJnT8 Citizens pay no tax on income, interest, or stock dividends. Subsidized petrol costs twelve cents a litre at the pump. Electricity is given away for 1.3 cents a kilowatt-hour. Spending on patronage exploded after the Arab Spring as the kingdom sought to smother dissent. 该国的国民不需要为他们的收入,利息或者股利交税。在加油站可以用每升12美分的补贴价格购买汽油。每千瓦时的电价仅仅是1.3美分。在“阿拉伯之春”开始之后,由于王室试图平息民间的不满情绪,该国用于收买支持的开支也迅速地增长。 The International Monetary Fund estimates that the budget deficit will reach 20pc of GDP this year, or roughly $140bn. The 'fiscal break-even price' is $106. 据国际货币基金组织估计,沙特的财政赤字将在今年占到GDP的20%,也就是大约1400亿美元。而让该国的财政收支达到均衡的油价水平是每桶106美元。 Far from retrenching, King Salman is spraying money around, giving away $32bn in a coronation bonus for all workers and pensioners. 而当今沙特国王萨勒曼却完全没有想要缩减开支的意思,反而四处撒钱,单单是在一次加冕礼上,他就为全国的所有工人和退休者发放了320亿美元的奖金。 He has launched a costly war against the Houthis in Yemen and is engaged in a massive military build-up - entirely reliant on imported weapons - that will propel Saudi Arabia to fifth place in the world defence ranking. 此外,他还对也门的胡塞武装发动了一场代价高昂的战争,并且大肆扩张军备——沙特的军备完全依赖从外国进口武器——这会使沙特的军费开支排到全球第5位。 The Saudi royal family is leading the Sunni cause against a resurgent Iran, battling for dominance in a bitter struggle between Sunni and Shia across the Middle East. "Right now, the Saudis have only one thing on their mind and that is the Iranians. They have a very serious problem. Iranian proxies are running Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon," said Jim Woolsey, the former head of the US Central Intelligence Agency. 沙特王室还需要肩负领导逊尼派对抗东山再起的伊朗的重任,为争夺霸权,整个中东地区的逊尼派和什叶派之间展开了艰苦的斗争。“现在沙特人满脑子都只想着一件事情,那就是来自伊朗人的威胁。他们面临着一个非常严峻的问题,伊朗的代理人目前正控制着也门,叙利亚,伊拉克和黎巴嫩,”美国中央情报局前任局长吉姆·伍尔西表示。 01-Saudi-05-large_trans++qVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwfSVWeZ_vEN7c6bHu2jJnT8 Money began to leak out of Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring, with net capital outflows reaching 8pc of GDP annually even before the oil price crash. The country has since been burning through its foreign reserves at a vertiginous pace. 在“阿拉伯之春”发生后,资本开始流出沙特阿拉伯,即使在油价崩溃之前,每年资本净流出也占到了GDP的8%。从那时开始,该国的外汇储备就以惊人地速度直线下降。 The reserves peaked at $737bn in August of 2014. They dropped to $672 in May. At current prices they are falling by at least $12bn a month. 沙特的外汇储备在2014年8月达到峰值7370亿美元。而到今年5月,这个数字下降到了6720亿美元。以目前的汇率计算,沙特的外汇储备每月至少会下降120亿美元。【编注:2016年4月 已降至5720亿美元01-Saudi-06-large_trans++ySkuuxUK4LTxT1WX70dVCRfLU-xOUtCF4wrCYXn1-hA Khalid Alsweilem, a former official at the Saudi central bank and now at Harvard University, said the fiscal deficit must be covered almost dollar for dollar by drawing down reserves. 沙特央行的一位前任官员Khalid Alsweilem(目前在哈佛大学担任研究员)表示,沙特政府财政赤字中的几乎每一美元都需要以外汇储备的同等下降为代价来弥补。 The Saudi buffer is not particularly large given the country's fixed exchange system. Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi all have three times greater reserves per capita. "We are much more vulnerable. That is why we are the fourth rated sovereign in the Gulf at AA-. We cannot afford to lose our cushion over the next two years," he said. 在该国的固定汇率体系之下,留给沙特人的缓冲余地并不是很大。科威特,卡塔尔和阿布扎比所拥有的人均外汇储备是沙特的三倍。“我们相对而言要脆弱得多。这就是为何我们的主权债评级在海湾地区只排第四,评级水平也仅是AA-。在未来两年中,我们承受不起失去外汇储备缓冲的后果,”他说。 Standard & Poor's lowered its outlook to "negative" in February. "We view Saudi Arabia's economy as undiversified and vulnerable to a steep and sustained decline in oil prices," it said. 标普在今年二月将沙特主权债务的评级展望降为“负面”。“我们认为在油价持续急剧下降的过程中,沙特阿拉伯的经济没有多元化,并且十分脆弱,”标普在他们的报告中表示。 Mr Alsweilem wrote in a Harvard report that Saudi Arabia would have an extra trillion of assets by now if it had adopted the Norwegian model of a sovereign wealth fund to recyle the money instead of treating it as a piggy bank for the finance ministry. The report has caused storm in Riyadh. Alsweilem先生在哈佛大学的一份报告中写道,如果沙特之前采用挪威的主权财富基金模式让外汇储备循环投资,而不是像他们所做的那样仅仅把它当作财政部的一头现金奶牛,目前沙特阿拉伯的资产也许会多出1万亿美元。这份报告在沙特首都利雅得引发了风暴。 "We were lucky before because the oil price recovered in time. But we can't count on that again," he said. “上一次我们很幸运,因为油价适时地恢复了。但是这次我们不能再次指望同样的事情会,”他说。 OPEC have left matters too late, though perhaps there is little they could have done to combat the advances of American technology. OPEC做出反应时已经太晚了,虽然即使早一些意识到问题,他们也做不了太多事情来对抗美国的技术进步。 In hindsight, it was a strategic error to hold prices so high, for so long, allowing shale frackers - and the solar industry - to come of age. The genie cannot be put back in the bottle. 事后看来,让油价在如此长的时间维持在这么高的位置实际上是一个战略性错误,这样那些页岩油气的勘探者们——还有太阳能产业——就能够成长壮大。一旦被放出来,你就无法再将精灵放回瓶子里了。 The Saudis are now trapped. Even if they could do a deal with Russia and orchestrate a cut in output to boost prices - far from clear - they might merely gain a few more years of high income at the cost of bringing forward more shale production later on. 沙特人如今陷入了困境。即使他们能与俄罗斯达成一致共同减产以支撑油价——虽然这样的愿景目前看来一点也不清晰——这也仅仅能让他们享受多几年的高收入,而这样做的代价却是在未来面临更多的页岩油产出的竞争。 Yet on the current course their reserves may be down to $200bn by the end of 2018. The markets will react long before this, seeing the writing on the wall. Capital flight will accelerate. 而如果当前的趋势维持下去,沙特的外汇储备将在2018年底前降至2000亿美元以下。一旦前景明白无误了,市场会在它成为现实前就早早做出反应。资本外流将会加速。 The government can slash investment spending for a while - as it did in the mid-1980s - but in the end it must face draconian austerity. It cannot afford to prop up Egypt and maintain an exorbitant political patronage machine across the Sunni world. 沙特政府可以在一段时间内削减资本开支——就像它在1980年代中期所做的那样——但最终它将面临严峻的紧缩。沙特将无法负担起支撑埃及政权并在逊尼派穆斯林世界里维持一台昂贵的资助机器的开支。 Social spending is the glue that holds together a medieval Wahhabi regime at a time of fermenting unrest among the Shia minority of the Eastern Province, pin-prick terrorist attacks from ISIS, and blowback from the invasion of Yemen. 庞大的社会开支是将一个仍然处在中世纪状态的瓦哈比政权维系在一起的粘合剂,这个政权正面临着东部省份的什叶少数派中正在发酵的动荡,ISIS时而发动的针刺般的恐怖袭击,还有入侵也门所带来的反作用力。 Diplomatic spending is what underpins the Saudi sphere of influence in a Middle East suffering its own version of Europe's Thirty Year War, and still reeling from the after-shocks of a crushed democratic revolt. 庞大的外交开支则是维系沙特在中东地区影响力的基础,而目前中东地区正在经历着类似欧洲“三十年战争”般的苦难,同时还在蹒跚地试图爬出镇压民主反抗运动带来的余震。 We may yet find that the US oil industry has greater staying power than the rickety political edifice behind OPEC. 我们也许会发现,虽然同样处在低谷中,但相比OPEC身后的那座虚弱的政治大厦,美国的石油行业其实拥有着更强的生命力。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

大空头

【2016-06-01】

@whigzhou: 看过《大空头》:虽然下了点功夫,但还是错的离谱,Margin Call仍是有关金融题材唯一好电影 ★★★

1)市场上永远不缺看空、唱空、做空者,更有无数泡沫论、危机论、末日论者,

2)对房产泡沫和次贷风险的警告早就存在了,绝非一小撮火眼金睛的怪人聪明人的离经叛道之辞,

3)看空和做空是完全不同的两码事,后者需要对崩盘时间的准确判断,危机晚几个月爆发,跳楼的可能就是你了,

4)所以这根本不是一小撮聪明人/头脑清醒者与其他所有傻瓜/混蛋/疯子之间互搏的问题,果若如此,就不会有金融市场了,

5)次贷危机的始作俑者就是政府,放贷机构当然是非常起劲且不负责任的放出了大量劣质房贷,但他们敢这么做就是因为(more...)

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【2016-06-01】 @whigzhou: 看过《大空头》:虽然下了点功夫,但还是错的离谱,Margin Call仍是有关金融题材唯一好电影 ★★★ 1)市场上永远不缺看空、唱空、做空者,更有无数泡沫论、危机论、末日论者, 2)对房产泡沫和次贷风险的警告早就存在了,绝非一小撮火眼金睛的怪人聪明人的离经叛道之辞, 3)看空和做空是完全不同的两码事,后者需要对崩盘时间的准确判断,危机晚几个月爆发,跳楼的可能就是你了, 4)所以这根本不是一小撮聪明人/头脑清醒者与其他所有傻瓜/混蛋/疯子之间互搏的问题,果若如此,就不会有金融市场了, 5)次贷危机的始作俑者就是政府,放贷机构当然是非常起劲且不负责任的放出了大量劣质房贷,但他们敢这么做就是因为知道两房这两个冤大头会大量买入次贷,而两房之所以会做冤大头是因为他们需要满足92年住房法案的要求,而且知道出了问题政府不会撒手不管,说白了他们就是准国企, 6)当然让次贷危机扩大成金融危机的责任,金融业是逃不掉的,主要是债券结构的特性,让次贷的毒性蔓延到了整个系统中,它造成的结构与反馈机制上的复杂性,使得风险影响变得很难计算和重估,一出事就造成恐慌, 7)参与其中的金融企业根本没有逃脱损失,这一点是媒体和好莱坞睁眼说瞎话最多的地方,The Big Short里虚构的那种神奇大逃脱根本不可能实现, 8)虽然一开始来势凶猛,但事后看来这次金融危机根本无法跟大萧条相提并论,从对实体经济的影响看,这种级别的危机很平常,10年左右总会来一次,资本主义末日之类说法完全胡扯, 9)美联储的应对很好,国会和奥巴马的应对(Dodd-Frank法案以及针对金融业的一系列疯狂打压)很糟糕,否则后来的复苏会更快更高, @Limlne: 那些神棍博中几次就以为自己是股神了,殊不知坏表一天也会有两次指对时间的,退潮了才能发觉自己是在裸游 。一直看空者也如此,他们预测到3次衰退中的5次 @whigzhou: 呵呵就是 @Veidt:被骂得最多的不是金融企业的股东逃脱损失,而是金融企业的高管作为代理人不仅没有因为不负责任的冒险受到惩罚,反而在危机发生后还拿到了高额奖金。其实金融业的一个大问题也在于从合伙制大规模转向股份制后的委托代理问题, @whigzhou: 没错,所以我说的不是“骂得最多”而是“睁眼说瞎话最多” @Veidt:财政部在前期的应对也很好,因为美国的信贷创造主要是由商业银行体系之外的投行和其他影子银行创造的,商业银行创造的信贷量不到整个体系的三分之一,所以影子银行体系如果得不到救助,信贷真空对实体经济造成的损失会非常可怕,但美联储对影子 @whigzhou: 没错,所以我说的是“奥巴马”不是“行政分支” @Veidt:另外说这种级别的危机十年左右总会来一次有点低估它了,这次危机之所以没有一直蔓延下去造成更大规模的恐慌和萧条原因还是在于财政部和联储吸取了历次危机尤其是大萧条的教训,在早期通过有力的担保救助切断了危机蔓延的链条… @whigzhou: 没错,但要假设把知识状态退回80年前的话危机也不会发生了 @wangyi_sswy:还有就是评级机构在这里的非常负面的作用。我亲身参与了很多次贷结构化证券的交易,很多同事认为,我们最终赚的,其实是评级机构的钱,以及大家对评级机构的盲目相信 @whigzhou: 1)评级机构是金融业的一部分,2)评级机构的责任主要在链条的后半部分,即让次贷危机放大为金融危机的部分 @wangyi_sswy:两房其实是不买次级债的,他们只会买优质的债(当然这里面包括了次级打包后,打包出来的优质债,这又和评级机构有关 @whigzhou: 两房买了很多次贷,见Fannie Mae一份季报 http://t.cn/R54IypM 第5页表格  
[译文]那些本可避免的痛苦

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of Kidney Donors
政府补贴捐肾者的成本效益分析

作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-25
译者:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha)
校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:Marginal Revolution,http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/a-cost-bene%EF%AC%81t-analysis-of-government-compensation-of-kidney-donors.html

The latest issue of the American Journal of Transplantation has an excellent and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of paying kidney donors by Held, McCormick, Ojo, and Roberts.

最新一期【(more...)

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A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of Kidney Donors 政府补贴捐肾者的成本效益分析 作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-25 译者:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha) 校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:Marginal Revolution,http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/a-cost-bene%EF%AC%81t-analysis-of-government-compensation-of-kidney-donors.html The latest issue of the American Journal of Transplantation has an excellent and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of paying kidney donors by Held, McCormick, Ojo, and Roberts. 最新一期【译注:即2015年第十期】的《美国移植杂志》刊登了一篇由Held, McCormick, Ojo, 与 Roberts合著的文章,出色且全面地描述了关于支付捐肾者报酬的成本效益分析。 Earlier, Becker and Elias estimated that a payment of $15,000 per living donor would be sufficient to eliminate the US waiting list. The authors adopt a larger figure of $45,000 for living donors and $10,000 for deceased donors and find that even at these rates paying donors generates benefits far in excess of costs. 早些时候,Becker与 Elias就估算过,如果向每位活体捐赠者支付15,000美元,就会有足够的捐赠者来满足全美的肾脏移植需求。上述论文的作者们在分析中采用了更高的补贴数额,给予活体捐献者45,000美元,遗体捐献者10,000美元。结果显示,即使以这样的高价格补贴捐献者,其产生的效益也远超过成本。 In particular, a program of government compensation of kidney donors would provide the following benefits (quoting from the article): 具体而言,政府补贴捐肾者的计划将会带来下列好处(摘自该文章):
  • Transplant kidneys would be readily available to all patients who had a medical need for them, which would prevent 5000 to 10 000 premature deaths each year and significantly reduce the suffering of 100 000 more receiving dialysis.
  • 所有有医疗需求的患者都能够顺利地获得肾脏移植,每年将会挽救5,000至10,000例早逝患者,并为超过100,000名依赖透析的患者极大地减缓病痛。
  • This would be particularly beneficial to patients who are poor and African American because they are considerably overrepresented on the transplant waiting list. Indeed, it would be a boon to poor kidney recipients because it would enable them to reap the great benefits of transplantation at very little expense to themselves.
  • 穷人和非裔病患将尤其从中受益,因为他们在移植等候名单中明显占据了多数。对于贫苦的肾脏移植接受者来说,这的确是一件好事,因为这将使得他们能以非常低的价格享受到肾脏移植的巨大好处。
  • Because transplant candidates would no longer have to spend almost 5 years receiving dialysis while waiting for a transplant kidney, they would be younger and healthier when they receive their transplant, increasing the chances of a successful transplantation.
  • 因为移植接受者将不必再依赖透析等待近5年,他们接受移植的时候也会更加年轻与健康,移植的成功率将会得到提高。
  • With a large number of transplant kidneys available, it would be much easier to ensure the medical compatibility of donors and recipients, which would increase the success rate of transplantation.
  • 由于有大量的肾脏可供移植,捐献者与受移植者在医学上的相容性会更容易得到保障,这也会提高移植的成功率。
  • Taxpayers would save about $12 billion each year. Dialysis is not only an inferior therapy for end-stage renal disease (ESRD), it is also almost 4 times as expensive per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained as a transplant.
  • 纳锐人将因此每年节省大约120亿美元。对末期肾衰竭(ESRD)患者来说,肾透析不仅是一种次等的治疗方法,而且延长每个经质量调整寿命年(QALY)的花费,几乎是肾移植的四倍。【译注:QALY是一种经调整的期望寿命,其计算方式是将实际年数乘上该健康状态下的效用价值。如果在效用价值为5的健康状态持续3年,QALY就等于1.5,相当于保持1.5年的完美健康状态。】
(编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

达尔萨斯

【2016-05-23】

1)达尔萨斯主义者(Darthusian)和古典自由主义者的根本区别在于:不许诺一个共同富裕普遍康乐的前景,并认为那注定是个虚假的许诺,

2)尽管我们相信(也乐意称颂)自由市场可以最大限度的拓展合作共赢的领域,也承认(统计上)自由社会的最穷困阶层也比非自由社会的普通人状况更好,但不会否认自由竞争终究会有失败者,自由化甚至可能在绝对水平上恶化一些人的处境,

3)马尔萨斯法则为这一判断提供了兜底保证,尽管不是唯一理由,

4)达尔文的启示在于,这完全不是(more...)

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【2016-05-23】 1)达尔萨斯主义者(Darthusian)和古典自由主义者的根本区别在于:不许诺一个共同富裕普遍康乐的前景,并认为那注定是个虚假的许诺, 2)尽管我们相信(也乐意称颂)自由市场可以最大限度的拓展合作共赢的领域,也承认(统计上)自由社会的最穷困阶层也比非自由社会的普通人状况更好,但不会否认自由竞争终究会有失败者,自由化甚至可能在绝对水平上恶化一些人的处境, 3)马尔萨斯法则为这一判断提供了兜底保证,尽管不是唯一理由, 4)达尔文的启示在于,这完全不是坏事,而是文明进步的动力,试图消除它的努力将摧毁文明赖以繁荣的基础, 5)只有认清这一点才能将自由主义建立在真实而牢靠的基础上,而虚假承诺终究会被现实所揭穿, 6)这也是为何许诺共同康乐的强共同体难以长久维系,除非它能通过周期性重组摆脱一部分成员, 7)或者像罗马那样有着永无止境的拓殖边疆让他得以向其贫穷公民许诺美好前程, 8)对达尔萨斯主义者,自由的伦理基础不是帕累托效率,而是契约合意:我们同意这样的竞争规则,无论结果是谁赢——通俗的说,就是愿赌服输,  
急杀太监了

【2016-05-13】

@海德沙龙 《自由市场环保主义》 环境问题向来都被视为市场失灵的一种表现,许多经济学家也认为,市场本身无法处理像环境污染这样的“外部性”问题,良好环境是一种“公共品”,只能由政府提供(以管制或庇古税的方式),可实际上,无论是理论还是经验都告诉我们,自由市场能够处理环境问题

@whigzhou: 福利经济学作为一种思考问题的方式是有益的,像外部性、公共品、帕累托最优等概念,对不同税种之经济性质的分析,等等,但许多自以为是的福利经济学家总(more...)

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【2016-05-13】 @海德沙龙 《自由市场环保主义》 环境问题向来都被视为市场失灵的一种表现,许多经济学家也认为,市场本身无法处理像环境污染这样的“外部性”问题,良好环境是一种“公共品”,只能由政府提供(以管制或庇古税的方式),可实际上,无论是理论还是经验都告诉我们,自由市场能够处理环境问题 @whigzhou: 福利经济学作为一种思考问题的方式是有益的,像外部性、公共品、帕累托最优等概念,对不同税种之经济性质的分析,等等,但许多自以为是的福利经济学家总是得出一些可笑的结论,然后就被现实打耳光,比如他们总是认为收益未能内化的产品不可能由私人企业提供,或至少是供给不足的,需要政府补贴, @whigzhou: 可是谷歌服务的收益内化了百分之多少呢?开源社区呢?维基呢?所有这些产业需要多少政府补贴才算够? @whigzhou: 还有,在书呆子福利经济学家看来,像基础研究这种不能带来短期利益即便带来了也不是一家独享的事情,私人企业是不可能去做的,事实上呢?贝尔实验室,IBM实验室,1960年代由石油企业引领的地质学革命,耳光piapia的~ @whigzhou: 更好笑的是,当私人企业在诸如此类看不到眼前利益的事情上表现过于热情时,另一批经济学家又会跳出来大叫:泡沫!泡沫!急杀太监了~  
差强人意

【2016-05-07】

@whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。

@whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事(more...)

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【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情,但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要,因为当时关税再高,和运费比还是很低,所以只要拆除壁垒,效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2)管制,随便翻翻经济史就知道,18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛,但给人的印象很不一样,我猜这是因为,早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行,而较少以行为管控的方式进行,大量限制法规,但较少执行官僚,所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见,究其因,当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3)19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少,但州政府和市政府管的可不少,看看产业史,哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的,那时候联邦政府站在自由一边,多数州政府站在另一边,联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒,由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了,铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场,州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了,只好偏向自由化,但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4)政府规模,从财政开支和雇员数量看,那时候的政府确实小得多,但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看,也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5)福利制度,这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点,那时候基本上没有福利制度,济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中,国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊,仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级,何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的,所以不要相信什么自由天国,也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  
穷尽一切办法

【2016-05-03】

@whigzhou: 乃国医疗管制,简单说就是,1)穷尽一切办法阻止患者掏出的钱落到真正帮助患者的人手里,尽最大可能的让它落进各类中间人——药监局、卫生局、招标办、医院院长、采购科、医药代表……——的腰包;2)穷尽一切办法阻止好医院/好医生赚钱、建立声誉、扩张壮大,从而将病人最大可能的留给骗子和老军医。

@whigzhou: 所以,莆田系和百度当然是管制的受益者。

@whigzhou: 有关医疗广告,转(more...)

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【2016-05-03】 @whigzhou: 乃国医疗管制,简单说就是,1)穷尽一切办法阻止患者掏出的钱落到真正帮助患者的人手里,尽最大可能的让它落进各类中间人——药监局、卫生局、招标办、医院院长、采购科、医药代表……——的腰包;2)穷尽一切办法阻止好医院/好医生赚钱、建立声誉、扩张壮大,从而将病人最大可能的留给骗子和老军医。 @whigzhou: 所以,莆田系和百度当然是管制的受益者。 @whigzhou: 有关医疗广告,转一篇七年前的旧文  
唯一可能的救星

【2016-04-13】

@海德沙龙 《被踢出局的气候学家》 Judith Curry的故事清晰的展示了,气候学术圈不容异己的氛围已恶化到了何种程度,尽管Curry远算不上暖化怀疑派,而且在同行评审期刊上发表过大量论文,但仅仅因为对未来暖化速度的主流估算值有所怀疑,就被戴上了“伪科学”的帽子

@whigzhou: 暖球党之所以如此疯狂,盖因暖球问题是他们迄今找到的唯一一个(在他们看来)无法通过基于分立产权的市场化方案解决的外部性问题(more...)

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【2016-04-13】 @海德沙龙 《被踢出局的气候学家》 Judith Curry的故事清晰的展示了,气候学术圈不容异己的氛围已恶化到了何种程度,尽管Curry远算不上暖化怀疑派,而且在同行评审期刊上发表过大量论文,但仅仅因为对未来暖化速度的主流估算值有所怀疑,就被戴上了“伪科学”的帽子 @whigzhou: 暖球党之所以如此疯狂,盖因暖球问题是他们迄今找到的唯一一个(在他们看来)无法通过基于分立产权的市场化方案解决的外部性问题(或曰公地悲剧),用他们的话说,地球只有一个,无法为它创建分立产权,唯一可能的救星是政府,而且必须是个普世主义的父爱政府,这么好的题材怎能轻易放弃? @whigzhou: 其他像土壤空气的化学污染这种外部性问题,由于外部性都是作用于局部的,或至少是有梯度分布的,因而总能通过恰当的产权安排来解决,甚至野生动物也可以将种群产权赋予部落来内化激励,但二氧化碳排放均匀分散于整个大气层,激励确实很难由产权来内化  
杀人取肾

【2016-02-26】

@海德沙龙 《仅有慷慨满足不了器官移植需求》 人体各器官的设计寿命看来有着不小差异,当然这差异也可能只是现代生活方式所带来,于是随着移植技术的成熟和寿命不断延长,对器官的需求日益强烈,与此同时,供给却大为滞后,而原因在于,当前伦理/法律体系下,需求无法转变成对器官提供者的激励 ……

@海德沙龙: 在本文作者看来,尽管现金激励或更开放的自由交易确实为当前伦理体系所不容,但许多非现金的激励安排是完全可行且在伦理上也容易被公众接受的。

@whigzhou: 我2009年在《器官移植的伦理困境》中也讨论的这个问题,后来还提出了一个具体的措施

@whigzhou: 其中的伦理问题,我后来又有了些新看法,现在我觉得,对人体器官交易近乎本能的道德反感,是有其道理的,原理和(more...)

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【2016-02-26】 @海德沙龙 《仅有慷慨满足不了器官移植需求》 人体各器官的设计寿命看来有着不小差异,当然这差异也可能只是现代生活方式所带来,于是随着移植技术的成熟和寿命不断延长,对器官的需求日益强烈,与此同时,供给却大为滞后,而原因在于,当前伦理/法律体系下,需求无法转变成对器官提供者的激励 …… @海德沙龙: 在本文作者看来,尽管现金激励或更开放的自由交易确实为当前伦理体系所不容,但许多非现金的激励安排是完全可行且在伦理上也容易被公众接受的。 @whigzhou: 我2009年在《器官移植的伦理困境》中也讨论的这个问题,后来还提出了一个具体的措施。 @whigzhou: 其中的伦理问题,我后来又有了些新看法,现在我觉得,对人体器官交易近乎本能的道德反感,是有其道理的,原理和我们对杀人游戏的道德抵制类似,因为现实世界的信息条件不完备的,对于一件被出售的器官,人们很难判定它是否来自凶杀盗取,而后一种情况实在太可怕,共同体值得为杜绝它而走得远一点。 @whigzhou: 这一想法转变发生于4年前有关杀人游戏的讨论,依我看,我们禁止在大街上玩追杀游戏的理由,是因为这种游戏很难和真正的追杀区分开来,若要容忍它,那就相当于放弃了协助自卫的权利,而后者对我们太重要,不能放弃 @whigzhou: 去年对一桩醉奸案的讨论中,也表达了类似看法 @whigzhou: 更一般而言,社会规范都是在特定信息条件下产生的,所以当信息条件已大幅改变时,很多古老法则便不再适宜,可是许多规范过于古老乃至已内化为我们的本能道德口味,一时难以割弃,但是通过为它们披上温情外衣,其实也可绕过。 @whigzhou: 从信息条件出发考虑,大街追杀不可容忍,但是人为构造了较完备信息条件的角斗场拼死格杀,好像就没啥不可以  
粪肥市场与城市卫生

【2015-12-10】

@baidu冷兵器吧 依靠以自豪感为目的的历史教育和许多义和团知识分子们,总是强调老欧洲粪便垃圾满地污水横流,街道如何狭窄等等,以此制造一种印象——虽然近现代我们是不行了,可是我们祖宗可比西方祖宗阔的多啦,不用去学什么鸟西方!但,中国真能嘲笑古代欧洲脏乱差吗? http://t.cn/RUsEyYH 中国能嘲笑古代欧洲脏乱差吗?

@战争史研究WHS:汉长安城至北周时“水皆咸卤,不甚宜人”,这个水指的是地下水。八百年间城市粪尿渗入地表,(more...)

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【2015-12-10】 @baidu冷兵器吧 依靠以自豪感为目的的历史教育和许多义和团知识分子们,总是强调老欧洲粪便垃圾满地污水横流,街道如何狭窄等等,以此制造一种印象——虽然近现代我们是不行了,可是我们祖宗可比西方祖宗阔的多啦,不用去学什么鸟西方!但,中国真能嘲笑古代欧洲脏乱差吗? http://t.cn/RUsEyYH 中国能嘲笑古代欧洲脏乱差吗? @战争史研究WHS:汉长安城至北周时“水皆咸卤,不甚宜人”,这个水指的是地下水。八百年间城市粪尿渗入地表,影响地下水质。所以隋朝才放弃汉长安城,在其南边营建大兴城 @whigzhou: 对佛山、汉口等商业城市和都城做个比较研究可能会有点意思,我毫无根据的猜,当行会在城市管理中起较大作用时,卫生条件会更好 @whigzhou: 另外,城市面积越大,屎尿处理越难,因为古代运输条件下,屎尿的市场价格随距离递减得极快,当有效供应半径内农民对屎尿的需求量超出城市生产量时,屎尿收购价格便是正的,无需额外激励,城镇和小城市大概可以满足这一条件,而上百万人的大都市就不好说了。 @whigzhou: 所以,同等人口规模下,居住密度越高,屎尿处理越容易,这可能和一般人都直觉相反  
经销商地位

【2015-10-27】

@海德沙龙 【产业故事】《汽车推销员之死》汽车销售是个很特别的业态,不仅商业模式独特,经销商的政治势力也很强大,以至能让美国各州通过成文法将这一商业模式固化了下来,不然,这种模式原本很可能只适合于汽车业发展的特定阶段,那么,在如今产业变迁大潮中,它是否会幸存下来?

@whigzhou: 1)汽车巨头年产量几百上千万,面向数亿消费者,厂商-消费者社会关系距离十分遥远(基于邓巴限制,这一距离至少四层),2)汽车购买是重大决策。——在传统零(more...)

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【2015-10-27】 @海德沙龙 【产业故事】《汽车推销员之死》汽车销售是个很特别的业态,不仅商业模式独特,经销商的政治势力也很强大,以至能让美国各州通过成文法将这一商业模式固化了下来,不然,这种模式原本很可能只适合于汽车业发展的特定阶段,那么,在如今产业变迁大潮中,它是否会幸存下来? @whigzhou: 1)汽车巨头年产量几百上千万,面向数亿消费者,厂商-消费者社会关系距离十分遥远(基于邓巴限制,这一距离至少四层),2)汽车购买是重大决策。——在传统零售模式下,同时满足这两个条件的产业,经销商的地位就会较强,我猜。 @闲中隐:房地产为什么这么需要中介呢 @whigzhou: 中介和经销商不同,二级房地产是供需两端皆为海量参与者的市场,此类市场若商品为无差异类型,会倾向于形成集中式交易中心,若为高差异类型,则形成中介模式 @whigzhou: 修正:同为高差异商品,若购买行为非重大决策,则形成超市/商场模式,若为重大决策,则形成中介模式  
[译文]自由市场环保主义

Free-Market Environmentalism
自由市场环保主义

作者:Richard L. Stroup
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:EconLib, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FreeMarketEnvironmentalism.html

Free-market environmentalism emphasizes markets as a solution to environmental problems. Proponents argue that free markets can be more successful than government—and have been more successful historically—in solving many environmental problems.

自由市场环保主义强调将市场作为环境问题的解决办法。这一观念的倡议者认为,在解决许多环境问题方面,自由市场能够做得比政府更成功——历史上也一直更为成功。

This interest in free-market environmentalism is somewhat ironic because environmental problems have often been seen as a form of market failure (see PUBLIC GOODS and EXTERNALITIES). In the traditional view, many environmental problems are caused by decision makers who reduce their costs by polluting those who are downwind or downstream; other environmental problems are caused by private decision makers’ inability to produce “public goods” (such as preservation of wild species) because no one has to pay to get the benefits of this preservation.

对自由市场环保主义的关注多少有点反讽,因为环保问题一向都被看作是一种市场失灵的体现(见词条“公共物品”和“外部性”)。传统观点认为,许多环境问题之产生,是由于决策者会通过污染处于下风向或下游的人们来减少自身的成本;其他环境问题之产生,则是由于私人决策者无力生产“公共物品”(如野生物种保护),因为人们无需支付价格就能获得此种保护所带来的收益。

While these problems can be quite real, growing evidence indicates that governments often fail to control pollution or to provide public goods at reasonable cost. Furthermore, the private sector is often more responsive than government to environmental demands. This evidence, which is supported by much economic theory, has led to a reconsideration of the traditional view.

尽管这类问题相当实际,但是越来越多的证据表明,政府常常无法以合理的价格控制污染或提供公共(more...)

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Free-Market Environmentalism 自由市场环保主义 作者:Richard L. Stroup 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:EconLib, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FreeMarketEnvironmentalism.html Free-market environmentalism emphasizes markets as a solution to environmental problems. Proponents argue that free markets can be more successful than government—and have been more successful historically—in solving many environmental problems. 自由市场环保主义强调将市场作为环境问题的解决办法。这一观念的倡议者认为,在解决许多环境问题方面,自由市场能够做得比政府更成功——历史上也一直更为成功。 This interest in free-market environmentalism is somewhat ironic because environmental problems have often been seen as a form of market failure (see PUBLIC GOODS and EXTERNALITIES). In the traditional view, many environmental problems are caused by decision makers who reduce their costs by polluting those who are downwind or downstream; other environmental problems are caused by private decision makers’ inability to produce “public goods” (such as preservation of wild species) because no one has to pay to get the benefits of this preservation. 对自由市场环保主义的关注多少有点反讽,因为环保问题一向都被看作是一种市场失灵的体现(见词条“公共物品”和“外部性”)。传统观点认为,许多环境问题之产生,是由于决策者会通过污染处于下风向或下游的人们来减少自身的成本;其他环境问题之产生,则是由于私人决策者无力生产“公共物品”(如野生物种保护),因为人们无需支付价格就能获得此种保护所带来的收益。 While these problems can be quite real, growing evidence indicates that governments often fail to control pollution or to provide public goods at reasonable cost. Furthermore, the private sector is often more responsive than government to environmental demands. This evidence, which is supported by much economic theory, has led to a reconsideration of the traditional view. 尽管这类问题相当实际,但是越来越多的证据表明,政府常常无法以合理的价格控制污染或提供公共物品。此外,私营部门通常比政府更能响应环保需求。此类证据得到了许多经济理论的支持,现已引导人们重新考量传统观点。 The failures of centralized government control in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union awakened further interest in free-market environmentalism in the early 1990s. As glasnost lifted the veil of secrecy, press reports identified large areas where brown haze hung in the air, people’s eyes routinely burned from chemical fumes, and drivers had to use headlights in the middle of the day. 在1990年代早期,东欧和苏联中央集权政府的控制失败进一步唤醒了人们对自由市场环保主义的关注。随着“公开性”政策拉开遮掩的帷幕,新闻媒体报道了在被黄色雾霾覆盖的大片地区中人们的眼睛经常因化学烟雾而刺痛,以及司机们大白天都需要开车灯。 In 1990 the Wall Street Journal quoted a claim by Hungarian doctors that 10 percent of the deaths in Hungary might be directly related to pollution. The New York Times reported that parts of the town of Merseburg, East Germany, were “permanently covered by a white chemical dust, and a sour smell fills people’s nostrils.” 《华尔街日报》在1990年曾引用过一些匈牙利医生的说法,即匈牙利10%的死亡与污染直接相关。《纽约时报》报道说,在东德梅泽堡,市镇的部分地区“常年覆盖着一层白色化学粉尘,一股股恶臭扑鼻而来。” For markets to work in the environmental field, as in any other, rights to each important resource must be clearly defined, easily defended against invasion, and divestible (transferable) by owners on terms agreeable to buyer and seller. 要让市场在环保领域发挥作用,跟在其他领域一样,对于重要资源的权利归属必须得到清晰界定(defined),对于侵犯行为能够轻松防卫(defended),并且权利所有人应当能基于买卖双方均能接受的条款而剥离(divestible)(或转让)之。 Well-functioning markets, in short, require “3-D” PROPERTY RIGHTS. When the first two are present—clear definition and easy DEFENSE of one’s rights—no one is forced to accept pollution beyond the standard acceptable to the community. Local standards differ because people with similar preferences and those seeking similar opportunities often cluster together. 简而言之,运转良好的市场要求存在这种“3D”财产权。一旦具备前面两条(某人的权利界定清晰并易于防卫),就没有任何人会被迫接受超过所在社群接受标准的污染。各地标准会有所不同,因为具有相同偏好的人和追寻相同机遇的人通常会聚集在一起。 Parts of Montana, for example, where the key economic activity is ranching, are “range country.” In those areas, anyone who does not want the neighbors’ cattle disturbing his or her garden has the duty to fence the garden to keep the cattle out. On the really large ranches of range country, that solution is far cheaper than fencing all the range on the ranch. But much of the state is not range country. There, the property right standards are different: It is the duty of the cattle owner to keep livestock fenced in. People in the two areas have different priorities based on goals that differ between the communities. 比如,在蒙大拿州的部分地区,关键的经济活动是牧场经营,可以说是“牧乡”。在这类地区,任何人如果不希望邻居的牧群打扰他或她的园子,自己就有义务修建花园栅栏,把牧群拦在外边。在牧乡的大型牧场上,这种解决办法远比给牧地上所有牧场都装上栅栏要来得便宜。但蒙大拿州许多其它地区并不是牧乡。在这些地方,财产权的标准就有所不同:牧群所有者有义务将牲畜用栅栏围住。不同地区的人们考虑的优先次序不同,根源在于不同社群拥有不同的目标。 Similarly, the “acceptable noise” standard in a vibrant neighborhood of the inner city with many young people might differ from that of a dignified neighborhood populated mainly by well-to-do retirees. “Noise pollution” in one community might be acceptable in another, because a standard that limits one limits all in the community. Those who sometimes enjoy loud music at home may be willing to accept some of it from others. 类似地,内城区年轻人很多的那些小区活力十足,这些地方的“可容忍噪音”标准可能就会不同于居民主要为生活优裕的退休人员的高端小区。某个社群的“噪音污染”在另外一个社群可能是可接受的,因为限制单个人的标准应当对于社群内的所有人都适用。偶尔喜欢在家里听听吵闹音乐的那些人很可能也愿意接受别人家里不时放放这种音乐。 Each individual has a right against invasion of himself and his property, and the courts will defend that right, but the standard that defines an unacceptable invasion can vary from one community to another. And finally, when the third characteristic of property rights—divestibility—is present, each owner has an incentive to be a good steward: preservation of the owner’s wealth (the value of his or her property) depends on good stewardship. 每个个体都有权反对对他本人及其财产的侵犯,且法院会捍卫这种权利。但在不同社群之间,如何界定不可容忍之侵犯的标准是可以不同的。最后,当财产权具备第三个特征(即可剥离性)时,每个所有者就都有做好管理人的激励:良好的管理才能维护业主的财富(财产的价值)。 Environmental problems stem from the absence or incompleteness of these characteristics of property rights. When rights to resources are defined and easily defended against invasion, all individuals or CORPORATIONS, whether potential polluters or potential victims, have an incentive to avoid pollution problems. When air or water pollution damages a privately owned asset, the owner whose wealth is threatened will gain by seeing—in court if necessary—that the threat is abated. 环境问题的根源在于财产权不具备或部分缺失上述特性。如果资源的权属界定清晰,对于侵权能够轻松防卫,那么所有个体或公司,不管他们是潜在污染者还是潜在受害者,就都具有激励去避免污染。当空气污染或水污染损害到私人所有的资产时,财富受到威胁的所有者通过确保威胁得以解除(必要时通过法院)就能获利。 In England and Scotland, for example, unlike in the United States, the right to fish for sport and commerce is a privately owned, transferable right. This means that owners of fishing rights can obtain damages and injunctions against polluters of streams. Owners of these rights vigorously defend them, even though the owners are often small anglers’ clubs with modest means. 比如,英格兰和苏格兰就与美国不同,以运动和商业为目的的钓鱼活动是私有的、可转让的权利。这就意味着钓鱼权的所有者能够从河流污染者那里获得赔偿或是用禁令禁止污染河流的行为。这些权利的所有者会积极地捍卫权利,尽管他们通常都只是些小型垂钓俱乐部,财产并不太多。 Fishers clearly gain, but there is a cost to them also. In 2005, for example, INTERNET advertisements offered fishing in the chalk streams of the River Anton, Hampshire, at 50 pounds British per day, or about $90 U.S. On the River Avon in Wiltshire, the price per day was 150 pounds, or $270. Valuable fishing rights encouraged their owners to form an association prepared to go to court when polluters violate their fishing rights. Such suits were successful well before Earth Day in 1970, and before pollution control became part of public policy. 钓鱼的人显然会得利,但他们也需承担成本。比如,2005年,网上广告说到汉普郡一条白垩河(安东河)上钓鱼每天需50英镑,合90美元;而在维尔特郡的埃文河上,价格更是高达每天150英镑,合270美元。价值高昂的钓鱼权促使其所有者组成联盟,一旦污染者损害他们的钓鱼权,就时刻准备走上法庭。早在1970年“世界地球日”诞生之前很久,早在污染控制进入公共政策之前很久,这类诉讼就已经很成功了。 Once rights against pollution are established by precedent, as these were many years ago, going to court is seldom necessary. Potential plaintiffs who recognize they are likely to lose do not want to add court costs to their losses. 一旦反对污染的权利经由先例得以确立,就像上述权利多年以前实现的那样,以后就很少有必要上法庭了。如果潜在的原告察觉到他们很可能会输掉官司,他们就不会愿意再往自己的损失上添一份诉讼开销。 Thus, LIABILITY for pollution is a powerful motivator when a factory or other potentially polluting asset is privately owned. The case of the Love Canal, a notorious waste dump, illustrates this point. As long as Hooker Chemical Company owned the Love Canal waste site, it was designed, maintained, and operated (in the late 1940s and 1950s) in a way that met even the Environmental Protection Agency standards of 1980. The corporation wanted to avoid any damaging leaks, for which it would have to pay. 因此,当工厂或其它有可能造成污染的资产为私人所有时,对造成的污染需付的责任就是一个强大的激励因素。发生在“爱河”这一臭名远扬的废料堆上的事件很好地表明了这一点。在胡克化学公司拥有“爱河”填埋场期间,它的设计、维持和运转(从1940年代晚期至1950年代)始终都做得很好,甚至能够满足美国环保署1980年的标准。公司希望能够避免任何有害泄露,要不然它就得出钱。 Only when the waste site was taken over by local government—under threat of eminent domain, for the cost of one dollar, and in spite of warnings by Hooker about the chemicals—was the site mistreated in ways that led to chemical leakage. The government decision makers lacked personal or corporate liability for their decisions. 只有在填埋场被当地政府接管(在政府威胁实施土地征用的情况下,胡克公司以一美元价格转让,并且当时它还就化学品提出过警告)以后,场地才遭到滥用,最后导致了化学泄露。政府决策者不需为他们的决定承担个体或公司责任。 They built a school on part of the site, removed part of the protective clay cap to use as fill dirt for another school site, and sold off the remaining part of the Love Canal site to a developer without warning him of the dangers as Hooker had warned them. The local government also punched holes in the impermeable clay walls to build water lines and a highway. This allowed the toxic wastes to escape when rainwater, no longer kept out by the partially removed clay cap, washed them through the gaps created in the walls. 他们在填埋场的部分地面上建了一所学校;移除了部分起保护作用的黏土盖层,用到另一学校工地去做填土;把“爱河”填埋场的剩余部分卖给了开发商,却没有像胡克公司那样附上危险警告。当地政府还在不渗水的黏土墙上开挖孔洞,用于建设水管和公路。由于黏土盖层部分被拆,挡不住雨水,结果有毒废弃物就被雨水从墙上的破洞里冲刷了出来。 The school district owning the land had a laudable but narrow goal: it wanted to provide EDUCATION cheaply for district children. Government decision makers are seldom held accountable for broader social goals in the way that private owners are by liability rules and potential PROFITS. Of course, anyone, including private parties, can make mistakes, but the decision maker whose private wealth is on the line tends to be more circumspect. The liability that holds private decision makers accountable is largely missing in the public sector. 拥有这片土地的学区所抱持的目标虽然值得称赞,但却过于狭隘:它就想为学区的孩子们提供便宜的教育。政府决策者几乎从来不会因更广泛的社会目标而遭到问责,这一点与私人所有者不同,后者需受责任原则和潜在利益的限制。当然,任何人都可能犯错,包括私方在内。但是,当决策者需要用个人财富来承担风险时,他会更加慎重。与对私人决策者问责的情况不同,在公共部门中,问责要求总体上是缺失的。 Nor does the government sector have the long-range view that property rights provide, which leads to protection of resources for the future. As long as the third D, divestibility, is present, property rights provide long-term incentives for maximizing the value of property. If I mine my land and impair its future PRODUCTIVITY or its groundwater, the reduction in the land’s value reduces my current wealth. 政府部门也不具备财产权所带来的长远视野,而这种视野会鼓励资源保护,以备未来之需。只要财产权具备第三个“D”即“可剥离性”,财产权就能提供将财物价值最大化的长期激励。如果我在我的土地上进行开采,破坏了它未来的生产率或其地下水,那么土地价值的减少就会导致我当前的财富的减少。 That is because land’s current worth equals the PRESENT VALUE of all future services. Fewer services or greater costs in the future mean lower value now. In fact, on the day an appraiser or potential buyer can first see that there will be problems in the future, my wealth declines. The reverse also is true: any new way to produce more value—preserving scenic value as I log my land, for example, to attract paying recreationists—is capitalized into the asset’s present value. 这是因为,土地的当前价值等于所有未来得益的折现值。未来得益减少或成本增加就意味着当前价值变低。事实上,只要有一个估价人或潜在买家首先看出未来会出问题,从这时起,我的财富就减少了。这话反过来也成立:任何能够产出更多价值的新办法(比如伐木时注意保护地面的观赏价值以吸引付费消遣的客人)都可以折算为资产的现值。 Because the owner’s wealth depends on good stewardship, even a shortsighted owner has the incentive to act as if he or she cares about the future usefulness of the resource. This is true even if an asset is owned by a corporation. Corporate officers may be concerned mainly about the short term, but as financial economists such as Harvard Business School’s Michael C. Jensen have noted, even they have to care about the future. If current actions are known to cause future problems, or if a current INVESTMENT promises future benefits, the stock price rises or falls to reflect the change. Corporate officers are informed by (and are judged by) these stock price changes. 财产所有者的财富取决于良好的管理,因此,即便是目光短浅的所有者也有动力表现出关心资源未来价值的样子。即便资产由公司所有,情况也是如此。公司管理者更多关心的可能是短期,但是正如哈佛商学院的Michael C. Jensen等金融经济学家所指出的那样,即便是这些人,也不得不着眼长远。如果人们知道当前行为在未来有可能引起麻烦,或者他们知道当前投资有望在未来获利,那么这种变化就会在股票价格的涨落上体现出来。公司管理人能够通过这种股票价格变化来获得信息,他们的工作成效也能由此得以判断。 This ability and incentive to engage in farsighted behavior is lacking in the political sector. Consider the example of Seattle’s Ravenna Park. At the turn of the twentieth century it was a privately owned park that contained magnificent Douglas firs. A husband and wife, Mr. and Mrs. W. W. Beck, had developed it into a family recreation area that, in good weather, brought in thousands of people a day. 政府部门缺乏行长远之事的能力和动力。这方面可以看看西雅图拉文纳公园的例子。20世纪初,这一公园属于私人所有,里面长有华贵的花旗松。W. W. Beck夫妇将公园打理成了一个家庭休闲场所,天气好的时候每天能吸引数千人来玩。 Concern that a future owner might not take proper care of it, however, caused the local government to “preserve” this beautiful place. The owners did not want to part with it, but the city initiated condemnation proceedings and bought the park. 然而,当地政府担心下一位所有者不会用心打理公园,因此要“保护”该公园。尽管公园所有者不愿意,但该市启动了征用程序,最终买下了公园。 But since they had no personal property or income at stake, local officials allowed the park to deteriorate. In fact, the tall trees began to disappear soon after the city bought it in 1911. A group of concerned citizens brought the theft of the trees to officials’ attention, but the logging continued. 然而,由于当地官员并不需要担心私人财产或收入受损,公园状况在他们的管理下日益恶化。事实上,在市政府于1911年买下之后,公园里面的高大树木很快就开始消失。一群热心市民还曾将偷树贼逮捕送官,但砍伐并没有停止。 Gradually, the park became unattractive. By 1972 it was an ugly, dangerous hangout for drug users. The Becks, operating privately at no cost to taxpayers, but supported instead by user fees, had done a far better job of managing the park they had created. 日复一日,这个公园不再有吸引力了。到1972年,它已经变成了一个丑陋危险的地方,只有吸毒者出没。Beck夫妇的私人经营没有花费纳税人一分钱,但他们能够得到使用者付费。在管理他们创造出来的这一公园方面,他们的成绩可漂亮多了。 Could parks, even national parks like Grand Canyon or Yellowstone, be run privately, by individuals, clubs, or firms, in the way the Becks ran Ravenna Park? Would park users suffer if they had to support the parks they used through fees rather than taxes? 公园、甚至是像大峡谷这样的国家公园是否能够以Beck夫妇经营拉夫纳公园的方式,由私人(包括个体、俱乐部或公司)来经营呢?如果公园使用者需要通过付费而非纳税的方式来维持他们所用的公园,他们因此就受损了吗? Donald Leal and Holly Fretwell studied national parks and compared certain of them with state parks nearby. The latter had similar characteristics but, unlike the national parks, were supported in large part by user fees. Donald Leal和Holly Fretwell对国家公园进行了研究,并将其中部分与临近的州立公园进行了比较。州立公园与国家公园在许多地方都很相似,但有一个区别:它们大部分都通过使用者付费来维持。 The comparisons were interesting. Leal and Fretwell noted, in 1997, that sixteen state park systems earned at least half their operating funds from fees. The push for greater revenue led park managers to provide better services, and more people were served. 比较结果非常有意思。Leal和Fretwell在1997年提到,有16个州立公园体系通过收费赚取到了一半以上的运营经费。为了获得更大收益,公园管理者愿意提供更好服务,公园也迎来了更多的游客。 For example, in contrast to nearby national parks with similar natural features, Texas state parks offered trail runs, fun runs, “owl prowls,” alligator watching, wildlife safaris, and even a longhorn cattle drive. Costs in the state parks were also lower. Park users seem happy to pay more at the parks when they enjoy more and better services. 比如,与附近自然景观相似的国家公园相比,德克萨斯的州立公园向游客开放山路跑、乐跑、“寻找猫头鹰”、鳄鱼观赏、野生动物游猎,甚至包括长角牛骑行等活动。州立公园的支出也更低一些。如果能够享受到更多更好的服务,逛公园的人似乎很乐意花更多钱。 Private individuals and groups have preserved wildlife habitats and scenic lands in thousands of places in the United States. The 2003 Land Trust Alliance Census Tables list 1,537 local, state, and regional land trusts serving this purpose. Many other state and local groups have similar projects as a sideline, and national groups such as The Nature Conservancy and the Audubon Society have hundreds more. 私人和私人团体已经在美国数千个地方对野生动物栖息地和风景胜地进行了保护。土地信托联盟2003年的普查表中列有1537个地方性、全州性以及地区性的土地信托在从事这一事业。还有许多其他全州性或地方性的团体业余举办类似项目,而全国性团体如“大自然保护协会”和“奥杜邦协会”则有数百个此类项目。 None of these is owned by the government. Using the market, such groups do not have to convince the majority that their project is desirable, nor do they have to fight the majority in choosing how to manage the site. The result, as the federal government’s Council on ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY has reported, is an enormous and healthy diversity of approaches. 这些团体全都不归政府所有。由于它们利用的是市场,它们在其项目值得与否的问题上不用去说服多数人。同样,在选择如何管理保护地的问题上,它们也无需和多数人争执。结果,照联邦政府环境质量委员会报告的说法,我们在保护方法上具备了极为丰富且极为有益的多样性。 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the government is still involved, even in the case of privately donated and privately owned trust lands. Most of these private conservation choices benefit from tax advantages, as conservers gain charitable deductions from taxable income. Tax law, therefore, influences what sorts of donations qualify; it also increases the total amounts by rewarding all qualifying choices by tax reductions. 不过,有一个重要之处值得注意,那就是这里仍然会牵涉到政府,即便是那些私人捐赠或私人所有的信托土地也是如此。绝大多数选择进行私人环保的经营者都会获得税赋优惠,因为保护者的应税收入能够获得慈善事业减免。因此,税法会影响到哪种捐赠符合条件。它也能通过税赋减免来奖赏所有符合条件的选择,从而增加此类捐赠总量。 Who gains from the increased conservation? Most often it is first and foremost the nearby landowners. When donors of trust lands retain adjacent property, they benefit from the existence of the trust lands to a degree greater than other citizens more distant. Open space usually raises the value of nearby lands. 谁会从环保增进中获益?绝大多数时候,首先是临近地区的土地所有者。如果信托土地的捐赠者保留有临近地产,他们就会从信托土地的存在中获益,且这种获益程度会高于离该信托土地相对更远的市民。开阔的空间通常都能增加附近土地的价值。 Further, when many polluters and those who receive the pollution are involved, how can property rights force accountability? The nearest receivers may be hurt the most, and may be able to sue polluters—but not always. Consider an extreme case: the potential GLOBAL WARMING impact of carbon dioxide produced by the burning of wood or fossil fuels. If climate change results, the effects are worldwide. 更进一步说,如果涉及到的污染者和受污者人数众多,财产权又如何能推动问责呢?离得最近的受污染者可能受损最大,也可能有能力起诉污染者,但情况并非总是如此。这里可以考虑一个极端例子,即燃烧木头或化石燃料所产生的二氧化碳可能造成的全球变暖影响。如果气候变化发生,其影响将会遍及全球。 Nearly everyone uses the ENERGY from such fuels, and if the threat of global warming from a buildup of carbon dioxide turns out to be as serious as some claim, then those harmed by global warming will be hard-pressed to assert their property rights against all the energy producers or users of the world. The same is true for those exposed to pollutants produced by autos and industries in the Los Angeles air basin. Private, enforceable, and tradable property rights can work wonders, but they are not a cure-all. 如果二氧化碳增加所导致的全球变暖最后确实像某些人所宣称的那么严重,由于几乎所有人都使用此类燃料所产生的能源,全球变暖的受害者就要针对全世界的能源生产者或使用者主张其财产权利,而这会相当艰难。同理,洛杉矶空气盆地中受到汽车和工业污染物影响的人也很难主张其权利。私人所有的、可强制生效的、可交易的财产权能发挥妙用,但并非万灵药。 Still, even the lack of property rights today does not mean that a useful property rights solution is forever impossible. Property rights tend to evolve as technology, preferences, and prices provide added incentives and new technical options. Early in American history, property rights in cattle seemed impossible to establish and enforce on the Great Plains. But the growing value of such rights led to the use of mounted cowboys to protect herds and, eventually, barbed wire to fence the range. 不过,即便目前缺失相关的财产权,也并不意味着可行的财产权解决方案永远不可能出现。财产权常常会跟着技术、偏好和价格所导致的激励和新技术的增加而发生演变。在美国早期历史上,大平原上似乎根本不可能建立和实施对牛群的财产权。但随着这一权利的价值增加,人们开始利用牛仔骑士保护畜群,最终还用上了带刺铁丝网来围护牧场。 As economists Terry Anderson and Peter J. Hill have shown, the plains lost their status as commons and were privatized. Advances in technology may yet allow the establishment of enforceable rights to schools of whales in the oceans, migratory birds in the air, and—who knows?—even the presence of an atmosphere that clearly does not promote damaging climate change. Such is the hope of free-market environmentalism. 经济学家Terry Anderson和Peter J. Hill已经表明,草原由此失去了公地地位,被私有化了。随着技术的进步,将来某个时候,对于海中的鲸群、空中的候鸟,甚至是(天知道呢)对于一种明显不会造成有害气候变化的气体的存在,我们都可能建立起一种可以强制生效的权利。这正是自由市场环保主义的愿景。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]仅靠慷慨满足不了器官需求

Generosity won’t fix our shortage of organs for transplants
慷慨解决不了可移植器官的短缺

作者:Tyler Cowen @ 2015-12-28
译者:龟海海
校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:The Washington Posthttp://www.aei.org/publication/generosity-wont-fix-our-shortage-of-organs-for-transplants/

Each week, In Theory takes on a big idea in the news and explores it from a range of perspectives. This week we’re talking about government compensation for organ donors. 
《华盛顿邮报》的“理论”栏目每周都会从新闻中选取一个大胆话题,从不同角度进行探索。本周我们的主题是政府对器官捐献者的补偿。

Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. She is the editor of “ 标签: |

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Generosity won’t fix our shortage of organs for transplants 慷慨解决不了可移植器官的短缺 作者:Tyler Cowen @ 2015-12-28 译者:龟海海 校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:The Washington Posthttp://www.aei.org/publication/generosity-wont-fix-our-shortage-of-organs-for-transplants/ Each week, In Theory takes on a big idea in the news and explores it from a range of perspectives. This week we’re talking about government compensation for organ donors.  《华盛顿邮报》的“理论”栏目每周都会从新闻中选取一个大胆话题,从不同角度进行探索。本周我们的主题是政府对器官捐献者的补偿。 Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. She is the editor of “When Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney Donors.” Sally Satel 是美国企业研究所常驻学者和耶鲁大学医学院的精神病学讲师,也是《当利他主义不够时:补偿捐肾者的理由》一书的主编。 My interest in the national organ shortage began one steamy afternoon in August 2004. That day, my doctor told me my kidneys were failing. As a physician myself, I knew immediately that I would need to find a replacement organ or else face a shortened life tethered to a dialysis machine. My search was rocky at first, but finally I did get a kidney from a casual friend — now a very dear one. 我对国内器官匮乏的关注始于2004年八月一个闷热的下午。那天我的医生告诉我,我的肾快要不行了。作为一名内科医生,我立刻知道我需要找到替换的器官,否则我将命不长久,而且余生都要栓着透析机。 At the time of my search, there were about 60,000 people on the national waiting list maintained by the United Network for Organ Sharing. Today, a decade later, there are roughly 101,000. Meanwhile, donation rates from both living and deceased donors are effectively flat. The death toll is 12 people per day — individuals who could not survive the years-long wait for an organ. 根据我当时搜索的结果,美国器官共享网络的全国等待名单上大约有6万人。十年过去了,如今上面大约有10万1千人。与此同时,活体和死亡捐献率都走势平平。结果就是每天有12人由于多年得不到新器官而死亡。 Clearly, our current organ transplant policy is a qualified failure. And it is because our current system, by law, mandates altruism as the sole legitimate motive for organ donation. We need to give more healthy young and middle-age people a reason to become living donors. 显而易见,我们现今的器官移植政策是十足的失败。那是因为按照法律,利他主义是器官移植唯一的合法动机。我们需要给健康的年轻人和中年人足够的理由来让他们加入活体器官捐献者的行列。 Tragically, altruism is not enough. The yield from public awareness campaigns, the organ procurement teams that meet with families of the recently deceased and the reimbursement for donors’ expenses has leveled off. Moving to an opt-out system, under which we would harvest people’s organs at death unless they had earlier indicated they didn’t wish to donate them, can do only so much — relatively few people die in ways that leave their organs suitable for transplantation. 不幸的是,利他主义并不够。公众宣传活动,器官采集团队造访最近有亲人去世的家庭,为捐助者报销费用,这些措施的效果已趋于耗竭。即使在捐献者死去时默认可以采集器官(除非他们早先曾表明不愿意捐献),成效也不会太好——大多数人的死亡方式决定了他们的器官不适合移植。 So, to save lives, let’s test incentives. A model reimbursement plan would look like this: Donors would not receive a lump sum of cash; instead, a governmental entity or a designated charity would offer them in-kind rewards, such as a contribution to the donor’s retirement fund; an income tax credit or a tuition voucher; lifetime health insurance; a contribution to a charity of the donor’s choice; or loan forgiveness. 所以,为了救人,我们可以试试激励机制。一个理想的补偿计划应该是这样的:捐献者不会收到一笔现金,但政府部门或者指定的慈善机构会为他们提供非现金奖励,例如:向捐献者的退休基金供款,所得税抵免或者学费代金劵,终生健康保险,向捐献者指定的慈善机构捐款,或者债务豁免。 Meanwhile, the law can impose a waiting period of at least six months before people donate, ensuring that they don’t act impulsively and that they offer fully informed consent. Prospective compensated donors would be carefully screened for physical and emotional health, as all donors are now. These arrangements would filter out financially desperate individuals who might otherwise rush to donate for a large sum of instant cash and later regret it. 与此同时,法律可以规定捐献者在捐献前有至少六个月的冷静期,以确保他们不是冲动行事,而是经过周详考虑才决定同意。和现在所有捐献者一样,有偿捐献者也需要经过仔细筛选以保证身心健康。这些措施可以把那些急着等钱用的人过滤掉,他们会为了那笔钱而冲去捐献,但事后追悔莫及。 The donors’ kidneys would be distributed to people on the waiting list, according to the rules now in place. (People who wanted to donate a kidney to a specific person — say, a father to a son — would still be able to, alongside this system.) Finally, all rewarded donors would be guaranteed follow-up medical care for any complications, which is not ensured now. 根据现行规则,捐出来的肾将分配给那份等待名单上的人。(如果有人想把肾捐献给指定的人,例如,父亲捐给儿子,也同时可以做到。)最后,所有有偿捐献者都将得到术后并发症的跟踪治疗,这个规定是现在没有的。 The good news is that the general notion of incentivizing donations is gaining traction. A 2009 poll of the membership of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons revealed that 80 percent supported or were neutral toward the provision of tax credits for donors. In 2014, the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons published the results of a workshop in which the societies expressed approval of testing third-party, in-kind incentives. A few weeks ago, the American Medical Association passed a resolution in favor of testing the effect of incentives on living and deceased donation. (A reward for deceased donation could take the form of a funeral subsidy or a contribution to the estate of the deceased.) 好消息是,为捐献提供激励的观念正日益赢得关注。2009年一项针对美国器官移植外科医生协会的调查显示,80%的协会成员对向捐助者提供税收抵免持赞成或中立态度。2014年,美国器官移植协会(AST)和美国器官移植外科医生协会公布了他们一个研讨会的结果,在该研讨会上,两个协会对试行来自第三方的非现金奖励表示支持。几周前,全美医疗协会(AMA)通过决议,支持测试为活体和死后器官捐献提供激励的效果。(死后捐赠的奖励,可以葬礼补贴或并入死者遗产的方式实现。) The objections I heard years ago seem to be wearing thin. Take the objection that rewarding donors “commodifies the body.” We already commodify the body, speaking strictly, every time there is a transplant: The doctors get paid to manipulate the body. So does the hospital and the agency that obtains and transports the organ. Why would we now object to enriching the donor — the sole individual in this entire scenario who gives the precious item in question and assumes all the risk? 多年前我所听到的反对声音,如今似乎越来越少了。例如,有人反对说奖励捐献者是“人体商品化”。其实,严格来说我们早就将人体商品化了,每一次移植手术,医生们都是拿着薪水在操纵着人体。那些获得和运输器官的医院和中介机构亦是如此。那我们现在为什么要反对给捐献者报酬呢?在整件事里面,捐献者才是唯一一个提供宝贵器官和承担所有风险的人。 At the heart of the “commodification” claim is really the concern that donors will not be treated with dignity. But dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions in their own best interest, protect their health and express gratitude for their sacrifice. Material gain, per se, is not inconsistent with this. The true indignity is to stand by smugly while thousands of people die each year for want of an organ. 诟病“人体商品化”,其核心实际是担心捐献者得不到有尊严的对待。但我们尊重他们有为自己做出最有利决定的能力,保证他们的健康,对他们的牺牲表示感激,这些就保证了尊严。物质上的获益,实质上与此并不矛盾。真正不光彩的,是眼见每年数以千计的人在等待器官中死去,却还站在一旁洋洋自得。 Some worry that that rewarded donation will attract only low-income people. This is possible, though only a trial project can provide the answer. But even if this turns out to be the case, why doubt the capacity of low-income people to make decisions in their own interest? From the standpoint of the recipient, it is low-income individuals who stand to benefit the most, as they are disproportionately represented among those waiting for a kidney. 有人担心奖励捐献只会吸引低收入人群。这是有可能的,但只有通过试验计划才可以得到答案。但即便事实就是如此,我们又为什么要去怀疑低收入人群基于自身利益作决定的能力呢?从器官接收者的角度看,受益最大的正是低收入人群,因为他们在等待新肾的名单上比例偏高。 Yet regardless of who ends up donating, any plan must ensure that donors’ decisions are thoroughly informed, their health is protected and they are amply rewarded. As the organ waiting list grows, the need to test incentives becomes stronger and stronger. 然而,无论谁来捐献,任何一个计划都必须确保捐献者在做决定前得到充分的信息,他们将得到健康保障和足够的奖励。由于器官等待名单日益增长,试行“激励计划”也变得越来越迫切。 We need to liberate patients from the tyranny of “the gift.” It’s glorious when you are the recipient, as I know better than most, but the penalty for being unlucky should not be premature death. Hollow moralizing from critics in the face of so much needless suffering must be replaced by sensitive and pragmatic policy. 我们需要将病患从“礼物”观念的思想束缚中解放出来。能得到器官捐赠当然非常美好,对此我比绝大多数的人都深有体会,但运气不好的病人也不应该就这样英年早逝。在如此众多不必要的痛苦折磨面前,批评者空洞的道德说教,必须被通情达理且切实可行的政策所取代。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]人发市场欣欣向荣

The Market for Human Hair
人发市场

作者:Alex Mayyasi @ 2015-12-02
译者:Horace Rae
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Priceonomics,http://priceonomics.com/the-market-for-human-hair/

The Venkateswara Temple in Tirumala, India, had a problem.

印度Tirumala的Venkateswara寺有了个麻烦。

Thirty to forty million pilgrims visit the temple each year, and in a gesture of humility and sacrifice, 10% to 25% of them, men and women both, have their heads shaven. Every day, the Venkateswara Temple staff fills giant vats with human hair, and for a long time, its staff burned thousands of pounds of hair—a noxious process that produces toxic gases like ammonia and was eventually banned by the Indian government in the 1990s.

每年有三千到四千万名朝圣者造访这间寺院。为了表示谦恭与牺牲,他们中10%-25%的人会剪掉自己的头发,其中男女皆有。每天,Venkateswara寺的工作人员要把头发塞进大桶里。很长一段时间,工作人员会把上万磅头发烧掉,这一行为十分有害,会产生氨气等有毒气体。1990年代,这种行为最终被印度政府禁止。

By then, however, they had discovered a new way to get rid of the hair: sell it for millions.

不过,那时候他们已经找到了一种解决头发问题的新方法:把它们卖掉,大赚一笔。

When fashion companies make wigs—and when stylists tape or weave hair extensions into customers’ hair in salons—they want to use real human hair. To get it, they rely on places like the Venkateswara Temple, which sells its hair in annual auctions. In 2014, fashion companies bid almost $12 million for what temple employees call “black gold.”

时装公司生产假发时,或者发廊的造型师给顾客接假发时,都想使用真正的人发。为了获得人发,他们依赖类似Venkateswara寺这样的地方。Venkateswara寺会在年度拍卖中出售头发。2014年,时装公司出价将近1200万美元,购买这种被寺院员工叫做“黑金”的东西。

The Tirumala Temple auction is part of a multi-billion dollar market for human hair—a global endeavor that includes collecting long locks to make fashionable hairpieces and its more industrial counterpart of turning hair into fertilizers, stuffing for clothes, and even amino acids used in pizza dough.

Tirumala的寺院拍卖只是数十亿美元规模的人发市场的一部分。这一全球性行当包括收集长发以制作时髦假发,还包括更加工业化的部分:把头发制成化肥、衣服填充物,甚至做成披萨面团制作中用到的氨基酸。

Nearly everyone has hair they discard without a thought. Yet it can also be one of the world’s most precious resources, and businesses can’t get enough of it.

几乎所有人都会想也不想地扔掉头发。但是,同时,它也能成为世界上最宝贵的资源,许多公司对头发的需求总是多多益善。

From Tirumala to the Salon
从Tirumala到发廊

A quality wig made of human hair sells for thousands of dollars in the United States, and hair extensions made of real hair can sell for several hundred or thousand dollars. But it takes a lot of work to turn the hair of Venkateswara pilgrims into a luxury product.

在美国,一顶使用人发制作的优质假发可以卖到数千美元,人发制作的接发材料也可以卖到数百甚至上千美元。但是,要把Venkateswara朝圣者们的头发变成昂贵的商品,有很多事情需要做。

When companies buy hair from the temple for as much as $700 per pound, it contains sweat, blood, and lice. The temple warehouses reek from mildew and fungus. Investigative journalist Scott Carney visited Tirumala and called the hair a “foul-smelling heap.” As 600 barbers each shave a head every 5 minutes, they le(more...)

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The Market for Human Hair 人发市场 作者:Alex Mayyasi @ 2015-12-02 译者:Horace Rae 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Priceonomics,http://priceonomics.com/the-market-for-human-hair/ The Venkateswara Temple in Tirumala, India, had a problem. 印度Tirumala的Venkateswara寺有了个麻烦。 Thirty to forty million pilgrims visit the temple each year, and in a gesture of humility and sacrifice, 10% to 25% of them, men and women both, have their heads shaven. Every day, the Venkateswara Temple staff fills giant vats with human hair, and for a long time, its staff burned thousands of pounds of hair—a noxious process that produces toxic gases like ammonia and was eventually banned by the Indian government in the 1990s. 每年有三千到四千万名朝圣者造访这间寺院。为了表示谦恭与牺牲,他们中10%-25%的人会剪掉自己的头发,其中男女皆有。每天,Venkateswara寺的工作人员要把头发塞进大桶里。很长一段时间,工作人员会把上万磅头发烧掉,这一行为十分有害,会产生氨气等有毒气体。1990年代,这种行为最终被印度政府禁止。 By then, however, they had discovered a new way to get rid of the hair: sell it for millions. 不过,那时候他们已经找到了一种解决头发问题的新方法:把它们卖掉,大赚一笔。 When fashion companies make wigs—and when stylists tape or weave hair extensions into customers’ hair in salons—they want to use real human hair. To get it, they rely on places like the Venkateswara Temple, which sells its hair in annual auctions. In 2014, fashion companies bid almost $12 million for what temple employees call “black gold.” 时装公司生产假发时,或者发廊的造型师给顾客接假发时,都想使用真正的人发。为了获得人发,他们依赖类似Venkateswara寺这样的地方。Venkateswara寺会在年度拍卖中出售头发。2014年,时装公司出价将近1200万美元,购买这种被寺院员工叫做“黑金”的东西。 The Tirumala Temple auction is part of a multi-billion dollar market for human hair—a global endeavor that includes collecting long locks to make fashionable hairpieces and its more industrial counterpart of turning hair into fertilizers, stuffing for clothes, and even amino acids used in pizza dough. Tirumala的寺院拍卖只是数十亿美元规模的人发市场的一部分。这一全球性行当包括收集长发以制作时髦假发,还包括更加工业化的部分:把头发制成化肥、衣服填充物,甚至做成披萨面团制作中用到的氨基酸。 Nearly everyone has hair they discard without a thought. Yet it can also be one of the world’s most precious resources, and businesses can’t get enough of it. 几乎所有人都会想也不想地扔掉头发。但是,同时,它也能成为世界上最宝贵的资源,许多公司对头发的需求总是多多益善。 From Tirumala to the Salon 从Tirumala到发廊 A quality wig made of human hair sells for thousands of dollars in the United States, and hair extensions made of real hair can sell for several hundred or thousand dollars. But it takes a lot of work to turn the hair of Venkateswara pilgrims into a luxury product. 在美国,一顶使用人发制作的优质假发可以卖到数千美元,人发制作的接发材料也可以卖到数百甚至上千美元。但是,要把Venkateswara朝圣者们的头发变成昂贵的商品,有很多事情需要做。 When companies buy hair from the temple for as much as $700 per pound, it contains sweat, blood, and lice. The temple warehouses reek from mildew and fungus. Investigative journalist Scott Carney visited Tirumala and called the hair a “foul-smelling heap.” As 600 barbers each shave a head every 5 minutes, they leave bloody scalps and hair balls littering the floor. 当厂商以每磅700美元的价格从寺院买来头发时,头发中还有汗水、血块和虱子。寺院的仓库散发着霉味。调查记者Scott Carney造访Tirumala时,把那里的头发形容为“一大堆恶臭”。大约600名理发师,每位理发师每隔5分钟剃光一个头,血淋淋的头皮和发球就会杂乱地铺在地上。 It takes someone in the industry to recognize why the hair is so valuable. Only long women’s hair is sold at auction—the temple sells men’s hair at a pittance for industrial uses—and since many pilgrims come from humble, rural towns, they have not used shampoos or styled and treated their hair in ways that damage it. 只有业内人士才能认识到为什么头发如此宝贵。只有女性的长发能在拍卖中出售——而男性头发则被寺院低价出售,用作工业用途。因为许多朝圣者来自偏远贫穷的村庄,他们没有用过洗发水,也没有做过发型,而且他们对付头发的方式对它造成过损伤。 To transform the best (longest) hair from trash into treasure, teams of workers untangle the hair, sort it by length, pick out lice and other particles, wash and dry it, and dye it a variety of colors. Companies then either ship the hair out to salons where stylists will sew, tape, or bond the extensions into customers’ hair, or sew the hair into wigs. 为让最优质(最长)的头发变废为宝,需要许多工人团队把头发理顺,按长度分类,把虱子和其他东西挑出来,之后把头发洗净并干燥,然后把它们染成不同的颜色。厂商要么把这些头发送到发廊,发廊的造型师会把头发编织、粘贴或者嫁接在顾客的头发上;要么把它们编织成假发。 The process is incredibly labor intensive. “To make a high-end wig,” says Mo Hefnawy of Lori’s Wigsite, one of many retailers of wigs made by Indian and Chinese manufacturers, “someone sat there with a needle and sewed a few hairs at a time. It takes 3 or 4 days.” 这一过程需要大量劳动力。中国或印度所产假发的众多经销商之一,Lori’s Wigsite的Mo Hefnawy说:“为了生产出一顶优质假发,需要有人坐着,用缝针一次编织几根头发。这一过程需要3天到4天。” Retailers like Lori’s Wigsite sell wigs made of fake, synthetic hair, and they cost $250 where a human hair wig would cost $1,500. But synthetic wigs don’t last as long, can’t be styled, and look and feel less natural. Most people want wigs made of real hair, Hefnawy says, but Lori’s sells more synthetic wigs than human hair wigs because they are more affordable. 类似Lori’s Wigsite这样的经销商也出售人工合成毛发制作的假发,这种假发的价格是250美元,但是真发制成的假发要1500美元。但是合成假发很快就会损坏,也不能做造型,看起来摸起来也没有那么自然。Hefnawy说,大部分人都想要真发制成的假发,但是Lori’s出售的合成假发比人发假发多,因为前者更加便宜。 The majority of Lori’s customers suffer hair loss from chemotherapy or conditions like alopecia. A minority are religious women who buy wigs as an alternative to modestly hiding their hair, and some older men and women buy wigs to cover thinning hair. Lori’s 的顾客大多是因化疗或脱发症而脱发的人,一小部分女性宗教信徒购买假发是为了隐藏起自己的头发以示谦恭,还有一些老年人购买假发来遮盖自己日益稀薄的头发。 For the moment, though, hair extensions are increasingly popular among young women who want to quickly change their hairstyle or buy the long, thick hair celebrated in shampoo commercials. Among other celebrities, Victoria Beckham, Beyonce, and Kylie Jenner of Kardashian fame are known for wearing extensions. 但是现在,一些年轻女性想要迅速改变发型,或是想要洗发水广告中那样的浓密飘逸的长发,所以接发在她们中间非常流行。明星中间,像Victoria Beckham, Beyonce以及Kardashian家的Kylie Jenner,都因接发而闻名。 Prices have increased with popularity. In several burglaries of hair salons, thieves ignored cash registers and went straight for hair extensions worth tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. 随着接发流行开来,其价格也水涨船高。在一些针对发廊的盗窃案中,窃贼们对收款机视而不见,径直去寻找接发用的假发,其价值常高达数万甚至数十万美元。 When nonprofits like Locks of Love ask people to donate their hair (to make hairpieces for children suffering from hair loss), they are not asking because long hair is hard to find. The human hair market is well established, and anyone can go online and instantly order hair by the pound. 当“一缕关爱”(Locks of Love)这样的非营利性组织号召人们捐出头发(用来给脱发的孩子制作假发)时,不是因为长发难以得到。人发市场已经相当成熟,所有人都可以上网,即刻预订头发,按磅计价。 Locks of Love asks for donations because hair is so expensive that many patients can’t afford thousand dollar wigs. “一缕关爱”号召人们捐头发,是因为头发过于昂贵,许多患者买不起价值数千美元的假发。 The Secret Life of Hair 头发的隐秘故事 The market for human hair has always been a mechanism for getting hair from people in poor areas to those who need or want it in wealthier ones. 人发市场向来是个从贫穷地区的人手中获取头发,然后把头发卖给富裕地区有需要的人的机制。 History is full of examples of human hair being treated as a valuable commodity. Archeologists have discovered human hair wigs held together with resin and beeswax in Ancient Egyptian tombs. Upper class men in 18th century Europe wore long periwigs made of human or horse hair, and thieves commonly worked in teams to steal and resell them. An observer of an annual “hair harvest” in a poor Italian village in the 19th century described seeing girls “sheared, one after the other, like sheep.” Their hair went to Parisian markets that sold 200,000 pounds of human hair each year. 历史上,人发成为昂贵商品的例子俯拾皆是。考古学家们已经在古埃及的墓穴中发现了用树脂和蜂蜡粘合的人发假发。十八世纪,欧洲上流社会的男性会佩戴人发或是马鬃制作的假发。当时的盗贼常常会组团盗窃、转卖假发。十九世纪,在一个贫穷的意大利村庄,有人曾见证了一年一次“头发收割”,他写道,自己看见女孩们“一个接一个地剃头,就像剪羊毛一样”。她们的头发会被出售到巴黎市场,那里每年有20万磅人发售出。 The difference today is that the market has changed with globalization. Hair does not move from provincial Europe to capital cities; it moves from poor countries to wealthy ones. The vast majority of hair and hair products come from India and China and are sold in the United States and Europe. 与过去相比,现在的不同是,人发市场已经因全球化而改变。头发不再从欧洲的乡下被运往首都,而是从贫穷国家运往富裕国家。绝大多数头发与发制品来自印度和中国,并被出售到美国和欧洲。 In the hair industry, no one bothers to equally celebrate each and every person’s hair. For them, hair is a product, and the way they talk about hair reflects economic and social realities—and made us squirm. 在人发产业中,没人会费心去平等的称颂每个人的头发。对他们来说,头发就是物品,他们谈论头发的方式反映了经济和社会的现实——且令我们不安。 “Indian hair is best,” retailers and manufacturers told us without hesitation. They cite the strength of Indian hair and how plentiful it is thanks to places like the Venkateswara Temple. But its most valuable attribute is that it closely resembles caucasian hair. “Oriental hair is used,” one industry expert bluntly added, “because there is a lot of it.” “印度人的头发最好,”经销商和生产厂家毫不犹豫地告诉我们。他们谈论印度头发的强韧度,以及拜Venkateswara寺这种地方所赐的巨大供应量。但是它最具价值的因素是它和白人头发的相似性。“我们使用东方人的头发,”行内专家坦白道,“因为东方人的头发供应量很大。” Hair flows from poor countries to rich countries, but when a woman with blond hair is willing to sell her hair, the market pays incredibly well. Destitute Russian women regularly sell their blond hair for fifty to several hundred dollars. Mo Hefnawy says he knows a young woman whom wig makers flew out from Indiana and paid $1,500 for her hair, which they made into an $8,000 wig. 头发从贫穷国家流入富裕国家,但是当金发女人愿意卖出她的头发,市场给出的价格特别慷慨。贫穷的俄罗斯女人定期卖掉自己的金发,能卖到五十美元甚至上百美元。Mo Hefnawy说他认识一个年轻女人,假发制造商为了她的头发从印第安纳州远道飞来,付给她1500美元,用她的头发制作的假发售价8000美元。 Africa also bucks global trends: despite the prevalence of poverty in many countries, Africa is an importer of hair. Elaborate wigs may no longer separate royalty from commoners, but hair has not lost its political and economic relevance. 非洲则逆全球趋势而行。尽管非洲的大部分国家都十分贫穷,但非洲是头发进口地。精致的假发可能不再能区分王室与平民,但是头发还没有丧失其政治和经济意义。 Projects like My Nappy Roots and Good Hair have explored the efforts that black people, especially women, go through to style their hair, and in particularly the time and expense of straightening their curly hair—often with the help of hair extensions. Responding to this question of why “women adopt a concept of ‘beauty’ that is not based on the natural characteristics of their hair,” Al Sharpton says in Good Hair, “We wear our economic oppression on our heads." 诸如 My Nappy RootsGood Hair之类的项目发现,黑人,尤其是女性,会费尽心力给头发做造型,尤其是他们会费时费财地去把他们的卷发拉直——这一过程经常需要接发。在回答“为什么女性不把她们与生俱来的头发特征当作美的标准”这一问题时,Al Sharpto在Good Hair中说:“我们头上戴的是经济压迫。” As a result, hair extensions and products are popular among African Americans and wealthy Africans, but hair traders have little interest in black hair. 因此,接发和假发产品在非裔美国人和富裕的非洲人之间非常流行,但是,头发经销商对黑人头发的兴趣有限。 Collecting Hair at Scale 规模化采集 If you ask people in the industry where they get human hair, they talk about temples in China and India like the Venkateswara Temple. 如果你询问业内人士他们的原料来自何处,他们会谈到中国和印度的寺庙,比如Venkateswara寺。 It’s no surprise they do; collecting hair from pilgrims is an elegant solution to manufacturers’ need for human hair. Shaving one’s head is a traditional, voluntary practice that avoids the exploitive undertones of desperate women selling their hair. Most pilgrims don’t know that the temple sells their hair. But we have not seen reports of religious leaders pocketing millions. The temple administrators have used the proceeds on gold wall panelling for the temple, but they say they primarily spend the money on charitable endeavors like feeding the needy and running hospitals. 这么做并不令人惊讶;从信徒那里收集头发是满足生产厂家头发需求的完美方案。剃发是一种有历史渊源而且自愿的行为,这就避免了走投无路的女性忍痛卖发的剥削寓意。大部分朝圣者不知道寺院卖掉了他们的头发。尽管如此,我们并未听说寺院管理者因此腰缠万贯。他们用这笔钱给寺院的墙板镀金,但他们声称这笔钱优先用于慈善用途,比如施粥行善或资助医院。 Yet only a minority of hair comes from temples. In India, a regional Minister for Textiles and Commerce told The Guardian, “all the Indian temples together contribute only 20 out of every 100 locks of premium hair sold abroad.” The Minister added, “Where the rest comes from, we have no idea.” Retailers and wholesale providers we spoke to voiced similar uncertainty. 但是只有一小部分头发来自寺庙。在印度,某地方的纺织和商业部部长告诉《卫报》,“印度所有寺庙出售的头发只占出口优质头发的20%。”他补充道:“剩下的头发是哪里来的,我们就不知道了。”与我们交谈过的零售商以及批发商同样语焉不详。 We do know that collecting hair is a large, decentralized undertaking that employs tens of thousands of people in India alone. Barber shops and salons collect and sell hair—both long hair sold to fashion companies and short hair sold cheaply to be used as stuffing, fertilizer, or, once broken down into component chemicals, in industrial uses ranging from food to pharmaceuticals. Waste pickers scrounge hair from trash and dumpsters. Hair traders visit villages—in a slum outside Chennai, a bell announces a trader’s arrival—to buy hair with either cash or trinkets and hair accessories. 我们知道,收集头发是一个巨大的去中心化产业,仅在印度就有数万人参与。理发店和发廊收集并出售头发,长发卖给时装公司,短发则被低价出售,用来制作填充物、化肥,或者被分解成化学物质,制作从食物到药品制剂的各种产品。垃圾分拣员在垃圾堆中寻找头发。头发收购人们寻访村庄——在Chennai周边的一个贫民区,铃声宣告着他们的到来——用现金或是小装饰品以及发饰购买头发。 The traders may buy hair that women have collected from combs and brushes, or the scenes may resemble the shearing of 19th century Italian villagers. No one can say exactly how often, but hair is not always sold willingly. Press has reported on husbands who receive $10 for their wives’ hair. One Indian woman told The Guardian, “I was held down by a gang of men who hacked at my hair… the police don't care, they will do nothing to protect women.” In Russia, prison wardens have admitted to forcibly cutting female inmates’ hair in order to sell it. 收购人买到的头发可能是妇女们从梳子或是刷子上收集来的,也有可能出现像十九世纪意大利村庄中一样的剃发场景。没人知道剃发的准确频率,但是,出售头发并不总是自愿的。媒体曾经报道过丈夫出售妻子的头发获得十美元报酬的事情。一个印度女人告诉《卫报》:“我被一群男人按倒在地,他们抢走了我的头发……警察漠不关心,他们不做任何保护妇女的事。”在俄罗斯,有狱卒承认曾经强迫女性犯人剃发,然后卖掉。 Whether it’s people scrounging hair from dumpsters or men forcing women to give up their hair, the hair business can be a dirty one. 不论是在垃圾桶里搜捡头发,还是男性强迫女性出售头发,头发行业有时十分肮脏。

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So far, the hair industry has not had its ethically-sourced moment. 到目前为止,人发行业还没有遭遇其道德溯源时刻。 American customers are typically unconcerned about the origins of extensions, the founder of a hair extensions trade group told the New York Times, other than to ask if they are hygienic. For retailers and manufacturers, the demand for hair makes it a financial necessity not to ask too many questions. 一位假发销售公司的创始人告诉《纽约时报》,美国顾客很少关心假发的来源,他们只在乎假发是不是卫生。对于零售商和制造商来说,在假发需求的驱使下,为了赚钱,最好还是不要问太多问题。 "The hair business is unlike any other," the owner of an Indian hair-exporting business told journalist Scott Carney. "In any other business, buying a commodity is easy; it's the selling it to retailers that is difficult. Here it's all reversed. It's simple to sell hair, just difficult to buy it." “人发产业跟其他产业都有所不同,”某印度头发出口企业的业主告诉记者Scott Carney说,“在其他行业中,商品买进很容易,将它卖给零售商就很难。但人发行业是颠倒过来的。头发卖出去很容易,买进来很难。” Better synthetic hair is coming. As China and India’s economic growth has reduced poverty, hair donors have been harder to find, which has increased prices and pushed companies to research alternatives. In the last 5 years, Mo Hefnawy of Lori’s Wigsite tells us, progress has been made on making synthetic wigs thicker and more heat-resistant. “I’d give it a few more years and they will have it,” he says. 更好的合成头发即将面世。随着中国和印度经济的增长,贫困有所减少,卖头发的人已经比以前更难找到了,这抬高了价格,促使企业研究替代方案。Lori’ Wigsite的Mo Hefnawy告诉我们,过去5年,在制造更浓密、更耐热的合成假发方面已有所进步。他说,“我想再过几年,他们会成功的。” Until then, though, a resource everyone has growing on the top of their head will remain a secretively lucrative commodity. 不过,在此之前,这种每个人头顶上都在生长的资源,仍将是一种鲜为人知的厚利商品。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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