【2016-09-09】 @海德沙龙  《一场轰轰烈烈的反娼妓战争》 无论从哪个方面都很难论证禁娼的合理性，在性交易合法化的地方（比如澳洲），它并未带来风气败坏和道德沦丧，相反，禁娼总是恶化妓女的处境，将其推入黑帮之手，所以禁娼法已逐渐失去支持，然而在过去十几年，禁娼运动又戴着一副新面具卷土重来…… @whigzhou: 宗教保守派和进步主义者在这件事情上结成了奇特的联盟，这是宗教保守派的一个污点，和他们在禁酒和禁毒问题上的污点类似，这不禁让人感慨，基督徒什么时候又堕落到需要国家强制力来执行他们的教规了？ @whigzhou: 相比之下，有些教派（比如阿米绪人）就从不诉求于国家强制，他们对自己的德行更有信心，也更值得得尊敬  

【2016-09-08】 @海德沙龙: 《为何影视业拿了这么多税务补贴？ ​​​​》 好莱坞无论如何都算不上贫困户或弱势群体，但奇特的是，美国各州争相为影视制片商提供税务补贴，以说服他们在本州拍摄外景，相互攀比之下，补贴额越来越高，据说这可以提升当地旅游业，可实际上并没有任何经验证据支持这一点，那么这事情究竟为何会发生呢？ @whigzhou: 说明一个小道理：长了脚的资产／生意很难征到税 @海德沙龙: 嗯，我们一篇旧译文《农作物类型如何影响制度进化》中有个概念叫『可收夺性（appropriability）』，说的也是这个道理 @whigzhou: 嗯嗯，James Scott写了一整本书《逃避统治的艺术》讲的全是这个道理～  

The Lottery 彩票 作者:Gregory Cochran @ 2015-04-22 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen) 来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/the-lottery/ Lotteries can be useful natural experiments; we can use them to test the accuracy of standard sociological theories, in which rich people buy their kids extra smarts, bigger brains, better health, etc. 彩票可以视为一种有用的自然实验。我们可以用它们来检测标准社会学理论的准确度。这些理论认为，富人能给他们的孩子买到额外的智慧、更大的大脑和更健康的身体，等等。 David Cesarini, who I met at that Chicago meeting, has looked at the effect of winning the lottery in Sweden. He found that the “effects of parental wealth on infant health, drug consumption, scholastic performance and cognitive and non-cognitive skills can be bounded to a tight interval around zero.” 在芝加哥那次会议上我遇到了David Cesarini。他研究了在瑞典中彩票的影响。他发现，“父母的财富对婴儿健康、药品消费、学业表现，以及认知和非认知技能的影响，仅在一个几乎为零的小区间内。” As I once mentioned, there was an important land lottery in Georgia in 1832. The winners received an 160-acre farm. But by 1880, their descendants were no more literate, their occupational status no higher. The families in the top 2/3rds of income managed to hang on to some of their windfall, but lower-income families did not. 我曾经提到过，1832年在佐治亚州有过一次重要的土地抽彩。中奖者们得到了160英亩的农场。但是到1880年，（和未中奖者相比），他们后代的教育水平并不更高，他们的职业地位也不更好。收入在前2/3的家庭设法保住了他们的一些意外之财，而低收入的家庭则没能如此。 This remind of a story by Gerald Kersh, “Whatever Happened to Corporal Cuckoo?” – About a medieval soldier who stumbled into immortality. Someone asks him (in 1945) – why hadn’t he saved his pay?  With compound interest, yaddaa yadda. 这让我想起Gerald Kersh写的一个故事，“Cuckoo下士怎么了？”——讲的是一个无意间获得了永生的中世纪士兵的故事。有人问他（在1945年），为什么不把工资存下来呢？有复利，等等等等。 “Why didn’t I save my pay? Because I’m what I am, you mug! Hell, once upon a time, if I’d stayed away from cards, I could’ve bought Manhattan Island for less than what I lost to a Dutchman called Bruncker drawing ace-high for English guineas!  Save my pay! If it wasn’t one thing it was another. I lay off liquor. Okay. So if it’s not liquor, it’s a woman. I lay off women. Okay. Then it’s cards or dice. I always meant to save my pay; but I never had it in me to save my pay!  Doctor Paré’s stuff fixed me–and when I say it fixed me, I mean, it fixed me, just like I was, and am, and always will be. ” “为什么我没有存下工资? 因为我就是我，你个傻瓜！见鬼，曾几何时，如果我离开了牌局，把和人玩‘A大’赌几尼时输给那个叫Bruncker的荷兰佬的钱省下来，那可是买下曼哈顿岛还有余。存钱！不是这事就是那事。我戒掉了酒。好吧，如果不是酒，那便是女人。我戒掉了女人。好吧，接着就是牌或者骰子。我总是想要存钱，但是我从来就不是存工资的人! Paré医生的药治好了我——当我说它治好了我，我的意思是，它装配好了我，就像我过去，现在，永远都是的那样。” Low leverage of wealth on your children’s traits is something that exists in a particular society, with a particular kind of technology. Back in medieval times, a windfall could have kept your kids alive in a famine, and that certainly had a long-term positive effect on their cognitive skills.  Dead men take no tests. The most effective medical interventions today are cheap – everyone in Sweden and the US already has them – but there are places where those interventions are not universally available. Some families in Mozambique can afford artemisin, some can’t – this must make a difference. 财富对儿童性格的低影响存在于拥有特定技术的特定社会。回到中世纪时代，一笔意外之财可以让你的小孩在饥荒中存活，这必然就会对他们的认知技能有长期的正面影响。死人不能参加测试。当今最有效的医疗干预措施是便宜的——在瑞典和美国人人都已经拥有了——然而还有些地方，这些干预并不是普遍可得的。莫桑比克的一些家庭可以负担得起青蒿素『译注：一种有效的抗疟疾药物』，另一些则负担不起——这肯定会有重大影响。 Suppose we had a method of dramatically improving a kid’s genetic potential for intelligence and success, one that cost five million dollars a pop: then wealth could influence the next generation in ways that it can’t today. In other words, Cesarani’s conclusions are correct for Sweden-now (but not for Sweden in 1700), probably correct for the US today, but maybe not true tomorrow. 假设我们有一种特效药可以显著提高孩子在智力和成就方面的遗传潜力，五百万美元一针；那么财富将可以以现在不能的方式影响下一代。换句话说，Cesarani的结论对今天的瑞典来说是正确的（但不是1700年的瑞典），可能对今天的美国也是对的，但未来却不一定正确。 It is not just wealth that has a small effect on your kid’s potential: playing Mozart doesn’t help either. Other than locking away the ball-peen hammers, it’s hard to think of any known approach that does have much effect – although we don’t know everything, and maybe there are undiscovered effective approaches (other than genetic engineering). For example, iodine supplements have a good effect in areas that are iodine-deficient. We now know (since 2014) that bromine is an essential trace element – maybe people in some parts of the world would benefit from bromine supplementation. 不仅仅是财富对小孩的潜能影响甚微：练习莫扎特也没有什么帮助。除了锁起圆头锤【编注：意思大概是可以防止孩子把自己的脑袋敲破】，很难想象任何已知的方法会有很大的影响——虽然我们不知道所有的事情，或许有未被发现的有效方法（除基因工程以外）。比如，碘补充剂对碘缺乏地区有很好的效果。现在（2014年之后）我们知道，溴也是一种必要的微量元素——或许在这个世界的一些地方人们会受益于溴补充。 What about the social interventions that people are advocating, like Pre-K?  Since shared family effects (family environment surely matters more than some external social program) are small by adulthood, I think they’re unlikely to have any lasting effect.  We might also note that the track record isn’t exactly encouraging. If there was a known and feasible way of boosting academic performance, you’d think that those teachers in Atlanta would have tried it. Sure beats prison. 人们提倡的社会干预怎么样呢，比如学前教育？由于共享家庭的影响（家庭环境肯定比一些外部社会项目更重要）到成年时已经很小，我认为他们不太可能会有持久的影响。我们可能也已注意到这方面的跟踪研究并不那么令人鼓舞。如果有一个已知且可行的方法来提高学习成绩，我想那些亚特兰大的教师们大概已经试过了。当然，肯定比监狱强多了。 Maybe there’s an effective approach using fmri and biofeedback – wouldn’t hurt to take a look.  But even if it did work, it might simply boost everyone equally, and obviously nobody gives a shit about that. 或许有一个有效的方法使用功能性磁共振成像（fmri）和生物反馈——看一看无妨。但是即便可以，它可能只是平等的提高每个人，但显然没有人在乎这一点。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

好莱坞的误导历史 Hollywood’s misleading history 作者:Peter J. Wallison @ 2016-2-29 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:Tankman 来源:American Enterprise Institute,http://www.aei.org/publication/hollywoods-misleading-history/ The film called The Big Short differs in a significant way from the book of the same name on which it is based, and this difference reveals how the film-makers made it more politically charged in order to blame Wall Street for the financial crisis. 《大空头》这部电影与其同名报告文学在历史叙事上有着很明显的不同，而且这一差异揭示了电影制作者是如何使这部影片更充满政治意味，从而把金融危机归咎于华尔街。 In the book, the Wall Street experts who were approached to bet against the housing market almost all refused. 在那本书中，几乎所有被问及是否做空房产市场的华尔街专家们都给出了否定答案。 This showed something that was true, and for that reason interesting: that even people on Wall Street, always on the lookout for a money-making opportunity, could not believe the housing market was in any danger of collapse. In the film, this was demonstrated by the skepticism of the FrontPoint group that was initially approached as investors, as well as the eagerness of the financial firms such as Goldman Sachs and others to take the other side of the bet against the housing market. 这显示了一些有趣的事实，那就是，即使是成天盯着捞钱机会的华尔街精英也无法相信（当时的）房市会有任何崩溃的风险。而在电影中，这被演绎成投资者FrontPoint集团的怀疑立场，以及像高盛集团那样的金融机构们对于做多房地产市场的渴望。 In the book, the tension in the narrative was created when the book’s protagonists — the first people to bet against the housing market — had persuaded their investors to place bets against the housing market many months before the coming failures actually became evident. As a result, in the book their financial backers became impatient. The predictions of a collapse did not happen fast enough, and they sought to withdraw their funds. Some of this impatience was present in the film, but the context was changed. 在书中，整个故事的紧张之处体现在主人公——作为第一个开始做空房地产市场的人——在金融海啸变成现实之前很多个月，就说服了他们的投资者来做空房市。结果，他们的财务支持者们变得不耐烦了，预言中的崩塌没有足够快的发生，于是他们计划撤资。电影中部分展现了这一不耐烦的情节，然而其情境却被改写了。 In the film, the collapse actually occurred, but the there was no movement in the market prices of the privately-issued mortgage-backed securities or the credit default swaps that were used to bet against them. This was attributed in the film to a conspiracy among the big banks on Wall Street: they somehow kept the market from moving against them while they sold off their holdings to less informed buyers. 在影片中，房产市场的崩溃如期发生了，但是私下发行的MBS（住房抵押贷款证券）和用来做空他们的CDS（信用违约掉期）的市场价格并没有变化。这在影片中被归结于华尔街上大银行的共谋：他们以某种方式稳定住了市场，直到把自己持有的资产卖给那些知情较少的买家。 It should be obvious that a conspiracy like this is impossible. There are too many buyers and sellers in the financial markets for something like the price of mortgage-backed securities or credit defaults swaps to be rigged. In reality, as soon as an index of housing defaults began to signal danger, investors fled the market. 显然像这样的阴谋是不可能成功的。在金融市场像CDS和MBS这类金融工具所涉及到的买家和卖家实在是太多了，以至于其价格很难被操纵。事实上，一旦房贷违约的指数开始发出危险信号，投资者马上就逃离了这个市场。 If the film had simply followed the book, it would have been a tale about how some very smart and gutsy traders outwitted Wall Street and faced down investors who had lost faith in them to win big in the end. It could have been an uplifting story that would have shone an unflattering light on the supposedly smart guys on Wall Street. 如果该影片只是简单地遵循同名报告文学的叙事，那将只会是一个某些既聪明绝顶又胆大包天的交易员以其聪明才智胜过华尔街，以及让那些对他们失去信心的投资者羞愧万分，从而在最后赢得巨额回报的故事。这或许会成为一个真实报道华尔街上的聪明伙计的励志故事。 But that was not enough for Hollywood. In Hollywood’s telling, the bad guys had to be villains, not just dumb. So the film-makers concocted a plot in which Wall Street successfully kept the market from moving against them in order to save themselves. 但这对好莱坞来说可远远不够。在好莱坞的通常叙事中，坏家伙们必须是十足的恶棍，而不是随便冒出来的草包。所以电影制作人们编造了一个情节：为了拯救自身，华尔街成功阻止了不利于自身的市场运动。 In reality, of course, Wall Street was not saved. Many of the major firms got into serious trouble when the housing bubble collapsed. Several failed and others suffered major losses. 当然，实际上华尔街并没有被拯救。房产泡沫崩溃时很多主要金融机构陷入了严重的困境。有一些破产了，剩下的也遭受到了极其严重的损失。 The lesson here is to approach Hollywood’s versions of real life events with caution. They can be good entertainment, but badly misleading history. 这里的教训是要对好莱坞版本的现实事件保持警惕。他们可以是很好的娱乐，但同时可能会严重的误导历史。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

How small is the world, really? 世界何其小，真的吗？ 作者:Duncan Watts @ 2016-02-10 译者:龟海海 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:七分钟阅读,https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/how-small-is-the-world-really-736fa21808ba Last week’s finding by a team of data scientists at Facebook that everyone in the social network is connected by an average of 3.5 “intermediaries” has renewed interest in the longstanding “Six Degrees of Separation” hypothesis: that everyone in the world is connected by some short chain of acquaintances. 上周，一个脸书数据分析专家小组发现，社交网络中的每个人都可经由平均3.5个“媒介好友”而联系起来，这一发现刷新了之前长期流行的“六度分隔”理论，即世上任何两人皆可通过某条较短的熟人链条连接起来。 Not surprisingly, the attention has focused on the plausible assertion that online social networks like Facebook have made the world smaller: that whatused to be six degrees is now almost half that. But really what it has revealed is how little we understand this intriguing phenomenon and what it might mean for our world. 无出意外，人们的注意力被吸引到了一个看似可能的判断上：像脸书这样的社交网络让世界变得更小：以前的六度现在一半就足够。但它真正揭示的是，对此令人神迷的现象和它对我们世界的意义何在，我们的理解何等浅薄。 This “small world” hypothesis, as it is known in sociology, has been percolating in popular culture for a long time. Almost a century ago the Hungarian poet Frigyes Karinthy wrote a short story called “Chain Links” in which he claimed he could reach anyone in the world, whether a Nobel Prize winner or a worker in a Ford auto factory, through a series of no more than five intermediaries. 在社会学领域内，大家都已了解，这个“小小世界”假说久已渗透进我们的文化之中。早在一个世纪前，匈牙利诗人Frigyes Karinthy就写了一则题为“链接”的小故事，文中他声称可以通过一系列不超过5个的“媒介”，联络到世界上任何人，无论是诺奖得主，或是一名福特工厂的工人。 Subsequently, writers like Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell have periodically reinvigorated the idea with their own colorful characters and fantastical speculations about who really runs the world. 此后，像Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell等等作家时不时的通过他们自己书中丰富的人物重塑了这一假说，并天马行空的猜测究竟是谁在真正掌控这个世界。 But arguably no one has had more impact on the question of how small the world is than Stanley Milgram, a Harvard psychologist who in the 1960s conducted an ingenious experiment to test it (Milgram is even more famous for another experiment of his, on obedience to authority, but that’s for another day). 但是，毋庸置疑，没有人对此“小小世界”问题的影响超过1960年代任教于哈佛大学的心理学家史丹利·米尔格拉姆，他进行了一个原创试验来测试此理论（米尔格拉姆其实有另一个更加有名的试验，“权力服从研究”，这个我们改天再谈）。 In brief, Milgram chose a single person, an acquaintance of his who was a stockbroker living in Sharon Mass, just outside of Boston, to be the “target” of the experiment. In addition he chose roughly 300 others — 100 from Boston itself and the other 200 from Omaha Nebraska, which Milgram figured was about as far away from Boston, socially and geographically, as one could get within the US. 简言之，米尔格拉姆选择他的一位朋友作为其实验的“靶标”，他是一位股票经纪人，住在波士顿城外的Sharon Mass。另外，他还另外选择了约300名实验对象——其中100名来自波士顿，其他200名来自内布拉斯加的奥马哈市，米尔格拉姆认为，就美国境内而言，奥马哈无论在社会关系上还是在地理上，都距离波士顿足够远。 Milgram then sent these 300 subjects special packets containing a good deal of information about the target — his name, address, occupation, etc. — and also instructions that they were to try to get the packet to him. But there was a catch: they could only send the packet to him if they knew him personally, meaning on a first-name basis. 随后，米尔格拉姆为这300名实验对象送出了特殊的包裹，其中包涵他这名股票经纪人（靶标）的许多信息——他的名字，地址，职业，等等——以及一些让他们试着将包裹寄给他的提示。但是，这儿有个坑：他们只能在个人直接认识他的情况下才能寄出包裹。 In the overwhelmingly likely event that that they did not, they were instead to send to someone they did know on a first name basis and who was closer to the target than they were themselves. These new participants would then get the same packet with the same instructions, and the process would repeat until — hopefully — some of the packets reached the target. 而实际上，在绝大部分情况下，他们不满足这一条件，所以只能将包裹寄给某位他们直接认识并且和靶标的关系距离更近一层的人。而这个收到包裹的新参与者，得到的是同样的包裹和提示，这一过程会一直持续循环下去，直到——幸运的话——有些包裹能顺利到达“靶标”。 Milgram’s question then was: for successfully delivered packets, how long would the chains be? Curiously, before he ran the experiment Milgram asked lots of people to guess the answer. Many assumed it wasn’t possible while others figured it would take hundreds of steps. So when Milgram found that not only did 64 packets, roughly one fifth of the initial sample, reached the target, but that the average length of the successful chains was just 6, he knew it would surprise many people. 米尔格拉姆接下来的问题是：如果包裹递送成功，那么这些链条有多长呢？有趣的是，在米尔格拉姆进行此实验之前就让很多人猜过答案。一些人表示根本不可能送达目标，另一些则认为至少得通过成百上千个步骤。所以，当米尔格拉姆得知不仅64个包裹（占初始样本的五分之一）到达了靶标，而且这些成功链条的平均长度仅仅为6。他知道这会让许多人咋舌。 In many ways, it still does. Although the phrase “Six Degrees of Separation” has become a cliché, when pressed many people still find it difficult to imagine how they could really reach anyone — not just someone like them or someone near to them, but anyone at all in the whole world — in something like six steps. 从许多方面看，这仍然令人惊奇。虽说“六度分隔”已经成了陈词滥调，但这一结果发布之后，许多人仍难以相信自己仅仅只需六步即可链接到世界上的任何人——不仅是自己一个圈子的人，或是周边的人，而是整个世界的任何人。 Understandably then, the Facebook result also attracted some resistance: “Facebook is an unrepresentative sample of the population;” “Facebook friends aren’t real friends” and so on. But although these critiques may have merit, they miss the point. In reality, the 3.5 number is simply incomparable to Milgram’s 6 for three reasons. 所以不难理解，脸书的研究结果发布后吸引了许多反对声音：“脸书是个不具代表性的人口样本；”“脸书的朋友并非真朋友”等等。虽说这些批评也许有可取之处，但是他们没抓住要点。实际上，这个3.5不能和米尔格拉姆的“六度”直接对比，理由有三： First, the number 3.5 counts intermediaries not degrees of separation. If I am “one degree” from someone I know them directly; there are zero intermediaries between me and them. Likewise, there is one intermediary between me and my “two degree” neighbors, and so on. 首先，3.5这个数字计算的是“媒介”的数量，而不是分隔度数。如果我是某人的“一度”友邻，我就直接认识此人；我和他们间没有“媒介”。类似的，我和我的“二度”友邻之间存在一个“媒介”，以此类推。 In general, therefore, an average of 3.5 intermediaries corresponds to 4.5 degrees of separation, which is almost exactly what Facebook itself found when it performed a similar exercise a few years ago. Conversely, Milgram’s six degrees result corresponds to five intermediaries, which is actually the number he reported in his original paper with Jeffery Travers. So already the difference is one less than it appears. 因此，平均3.5个“媒介”对应的是“4.5度分隔”，这和几年前脸书自己通过类似实验得出的发现几乎相同。反之，米尔格拉姆的“六度”所对应的是5个“媒介”——其实他和Jeffery Travers发表的文章中所用的正是这个数字。所以上述差异比表面看起来就已经少了1 。 Second, though, Milgram’s experiment was a subtly but importantly different test than the one run by Facebook. Whereas the latter measured the length of the shortest possible path between two people — by exhaustively searching every link in the underlying Facebook graph — the former is simply the shortest path that ordinary people could find given very limited information about the underlying social network. 第二，虽然米尔格拉姆的试验很巧妙，但是，和脸书做的这个测试有重要差异。后者度量的是两个人之间的最短可能路径的长度——通过穷举搜索脸书关系图上的每条链接，而前者则是普通人基于其所掌握的极为有限的社会关系信息而能够找到的路径长度。 There are, in other words, two versions of the small-world hypothesis — the “topological” version, which refers only to underlying network structure, and the “algorithmic” version, which refers to the ability of people to search this underlying structure. 换言之，其实“小世界假说”有两个版本：“拓扑版”，它度量的是社会关系网络结构，和“算法版”，它度量的则是人们在此网络中进行搜索的能力。 From these definitions, it follows that algorithmic (search) paths cannot be shorter than topological paths and are almost certainly longer. Saying that the world has gotten smaller because the shortest topological path length is 4.5 not 6 therefore makes no sense — because the equivalent number would have been smaller in Milgram’s day as well. 从这些定义得出，“算法版”（搜索）路径不可能短于“拓扑版”。仅仅因为最短拓扑路径的长度是4.5而非6就说世界变小了，这么说毫无意义——因为米尔格拉姆时代的相应数字同样小于6。 Finally, the number 6 is also in some respects too small. As has been pointed out many times since Milgram’s experiment, only about 20% of the letters made it to their target. More importantly, these letters were almost certainly on shorter paths than the ones that didn’t make it, meaning that estimates of path length that don’t take into account the missing data are almost certainly biased downwards. 最后，从某些角度看，数字6也太小了。因为自从米尔格拉姆试验后就被很多人指出，仅有20%的信封送到了靶标。更重要的是，这些信所通过的途径几乎肯定短于那些没有到达靶标的，这就意味着那些投递失败的长链条在估算链条长度时没有被计算在内，这肯定会造成向下偏差。 Fortunately it is possible to correct for this bias using standard statistical methods. In a 2009 paper my colleagues and I performed exactly this analysis both on Milgram’s original data and also on our data from a similar — but much larger — experiment that we had conducted ourselves in 2003. 有幸的是，我们可以通过标准的统计算法来更正这一偏差。在2009年的一篇论文中我和我的同事们对米尔格拉姆的原始数据和我们自己在2003年做的一个大得多的类似试验的数据进行了恰如上面所述的分析。 Remarkably we found that after the correction, both experiments yielded similar results: the median shortest path was 7, meaning that 50% of chains should complete in 7 or fewer steps while the other 50% would be longer. Many people find this result surprising because it seems so clear that the world has gotten smaller in the last 50 years. 我们惊喜的发现，在矫正了数据后，两个试验得出相似的结果：最短链条的中位值是7，即50%的链条会7步或少于7步时完成，而另外50%则会更长。许多人觉得这个结果不思议，因为过去50年世界变得更小了这个事实看起来如此明白无误。 Yet this apparent stability is exactly what one would predict from my early theoretical work with Steven Strogatz back in the late 1990’s. In a nutshell what we showed is that it is easy to turn a “large” world into a “small” one, just by adding a small fraction of random, long-range links, reminiscent of Mark Granovetter’s famous “weak ties.” 但这一明显的稳定性正是我和Steven Strogatz在1990年代后期的理论研究中预见到的。简言之，我们要证明的是，只需要在“大”世界中加入一小部分随机的“长范围”链接，就可以把世界变“小”，这让人联想起马克·格兰诺维特著名的“弱关系”理论。 The flip side of our result, however, is that once the world has already gotten small — as it was already by the 1960's — it is extremely hard to make it smaller. Obviously Facebook did not exist in 2003 so possibly since then something has indeed changed. But I suspect that the difference will be small. 实际上，这一结果反过来说就是，一旦世界变小之后——其实它在60年代已经变小了——想要把它变得更小就极为困难。很明显，脸书2003年并不存在，所以有可能某些东西真的已经改变了。但是我估计这个变化是微小的。 Why does any of this matter? There are three reasons. First, the two versions of the small-world hypothesis — topological and algorithmic — are relevant to different social processes. The spread of a sexually transmitted disease along networks of sexual relations, for example, does not require that participants have any awareness of the disease, or intention to spread it; thus for an individual to be at risk of acquiring an infection, he or she need only be connected in the topological sense to existing infectives. 何以见得这些差异是要紧的呢？理由有三：第一，两个版本的“小世界假说”——拓扑版和算法版——关乎不同的社会过程。例如，就像性病通过两性关系而传播，这并不需要参与者意识到疾病的存在或者拥有传播它的意图，而仅需要他或她在拓扑上链接到既有的感染者即可。 On the contrary, individuals attempting to “network” — in order to locate some resources like a new job or a service provider — must actively traverse chains of referrals, and thus must be connected in the algorithmic sense. Depending on the application of interest, therefore, either the topological or algorithmic distance between individuals may be more relevant — or possibly both together. 相反，若是个人想要“建立链接”寻找资源，比如找工作，寻找服务商，则必须积极的遍历中间人链条，因而必须在算法上建立链接。所以，根据实际应用中的关注重点，有些情况下个体之间的拓扑距离更切题，有时则算法距离更切题，或者两者同时切题。 Second, whereas the topological hypothesis has been shown to apply essentially universally, to networks of all kinds, the algorithmic hypothesis is largely (although not exclusively) concerned with social networks in which human agents make decisions about how to direct messages. 第二，拓扑版小世界假说已经表明普遍适用于所有类型的网络结构，而算法版假说则大致上量（虽然不完全）适用于社交网络，在这些网络中，人类主体就如何引导信息流向做出决定。 And third, whereas the topological version is supported by an overwhelming volume of empirical evidence — hundreds of studies, if not thousands — have found that nodes in even the very largest known networks are connected by short paths, the practical difficulty of running “small-world” experiments of the sort that Milgram conducted in the 1960s has meant that much less is known about the algorithmic version. 第三，鉴于“拓扑版”得到了压倒性数量的经验证据——来自数百甚至数千项研究——支持这些证据表明，即使在最大的关系网中，节点之间也可通过较短路径相连接，进行像米尔格拉姆在1960年代所做的那种“小世界效应”试验的实际困难意味着，我们对“算法版”的情况其实所知不多。 On this last point, for example, our 2009 analysis also found evidence that some of the longer paths could be much longer than the median, adding weight to the skeptics’ claims that in spite of the small-world phenomenon, some people remain socially isolated. 有关最后这一点，（例如）我们2009年的分析同样发现了证据表明，一些长路径可以远远长于中位值，这为那些怀疑者的主张提供了依据：即使存在小世界现象，总有些人在社会关系上是保持孤立的。 Given the importance of social networks in determining life outcomes, it would be extremely interesting and useful to understand better who these people are and why they are isolated. Is it something to do with their underlying networks or is it that their search strategies are somehow less effective? 考虑到社会关系网在决定生活质量上的重要性，研究并理解这些孤立者是谁，为何变得孤立，将是件极为有趣且有用的事情。这跟他们的下层关系网有关？【编注：此处underlying networks应是指亲戚、邻里等个人被预先给定的被动关系，相对于个人主动寻求建立的社会关系】还是他们的搜索策略不够有效？ Could it be, as my coauthors and I speculated many years ago, some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the perception of social isolation discourages one from searching one’s network, and that the resulting lack of success reinforces the original perception of isolation? 有没有可能，正如多年前我和我的共同作者所推测的那样，是某种自我实现的预言？即，对社会孤立的感知，使得个人不愿意搜索自己的关系网，由此导致的关系建立失败进而强化了对孤立的最初感知？ Answering these questions would require new experiments that are only now just becoming possible. But the answers would not only be of academic interest — they could also potentially help many people access currently inaccessible reserves of “social capital” thereby improving their lives. Far from being settled, the small-world problem still has much to teach us about the world, and ourselves. 要回答这些问题需要更新的试验，而此类实验直到最近才变得可行。但是，这些问题的答案不仅仅是满足学术兴趣——它们同样可能帮助很多人得以访问目前对他们来说还不可触及的“社会资本”储备，从而来改善他们的生活。 小世界问题还远未解决，在未来，它仍将为我们带来有关这个世界以及我们自身的诸多教益。 Duncan Watts is a principal researcher at Microsoft and author of Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (WW Norton, 2003). 邓肯·J·瓦茨是微软首席研究员和《六度分隔理论》作者 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

No Matter Who Wins at the Oscars, Taxpayers Lose on Film Subsidies 不管奥斯卡花落谁家，纳税人在电影补贴上都是输 作者:Jared Meyer @ 2016-02-26 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:Reason ,http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/26/no-matter-who-wins-at-the-oscars-taxpaye Big screen and small get big benefits at taxpayer expense. 纳税人埋单，荧屏业大获其利 Sunday night brings the 89th Academy Awards, and many are wondering what film will take home the Oscar for Best Picture. No matter what film wins, one group of people should be thanked during the acceptance speech—taxpayers. 本周日将举办第89届奥斯卡金像奖，许多人都在猜测最佳影片将会花落谁家。但不管哪部影片得奖，获奖感言里都应该感谢一个群体：纳税人。 Film is a heavily subsidized industry, and the majority of states have tax incentive programs that lower the cost of production. These tax credits are determined by production costs, not profits, and many credits are transferrable or refundable. When a film’s tax liabilities are below its allotted refundable credits, taxpayers end up directly paying film companies the difference. 电影行业得到的补贴极大，大部分州都设置有税收激励计划，以降低制片成本。这类税收抵免额度由制片成本而非影片收益决定，而且其中许多都可以转移或补差【译注：指如果抵免额高于应税额，纳税人不但不用纳税，还能倒拿差额】。如果一部影片的应税额低于它所得的可补差抵免额，那就相当于纳税人直接向电影公司支付差额。 The Big Short, one of this year’s nominees, cost $28 million to produce and was filmed in California, Nevada, and Louisiana. All three states have film tax credit programs, but Louisiana’s 40 percent partially-transferable credit is the largest. The film's producers made a movie about Wall Street greed, but they clearly had no problem making taxpayers pay for their production costs. 今年获提名的影片《大空头》制作成本为2800万，在加利福尼亚、内华达和路易斯安那三地拍摄。三个州都有电影业税收抵免计划，不过，路易斯安那的40%部分可转移税收抵免仍属其中翘楚。制片人拍摄了一部讲述华尔街之贪婪的电影，但在让纳税人为其制片成本埋单的时候，他们显然心安理得。 New York’s fully-refundable 30 percent film tax credit is the most generous in the nation, with an annual limit of $420 million. Brooklyn and Bridge of Spies, two of this year’s nominees, were filmed in New York, and their budgets were $12 million and $40 million, respectively. 要论慷慨，全国之最当数纽约的30%全额可补差电影业税收抵免，每年最高限额是4.2亿。本年度有两部提名电影在纽约拍摄，《布鲁克林》和《间谍之桥》，费用分别达到1200万和4000万。 States are starting to realize that the economic benefits of film tax credits are pure fantasy, like some movie plots. In 2012, 40 states offered tax incentives, at a total cost of $1.4 billion, but since then some states have decided that maintaining roads, funding schools, staffing police departments, and letting residents keep more income are better uses of funds. Since last year’s Oscars, Alaska, Michigan, and Illinois all ended their film tax credit programs. (See my testimony for the Alaska Senate on the false promise of film tax credits here). 许多州已经开始意识到，电影业税收抵免的经济利好效应就跟某些电影情节一样纯属空想。2012年，有40个州提供此类税收激励，总共耗费14亿。但自此以后，一些州已经决定，维护公路、资助学校、充实警力以及让居民手中存留更多收入才是对资金的更好使用。上届奥斯卡以来，阿拉斯加、密歇根和伊利诺伊等州都已经终止了电影业税收抵免计划。（可参考我在阿拉斯加州议会上就电影业税收抵免之虚假承诺所做的证言） In contrast, California tripled its non-refundable film tax credit budget to $330 million in an effort to lure more film production back to Hollywood. 加利福尼亚则反其道行之，为吸引更多影片返回好莱坞制作，该州已经将其用于不可补差电影业税收抵免的预算增加了三倍，达到3.3亿。 It is not only Oscar-nominated movies that receive sweetheart tax deals. Television shows, including HBO’s VEEP and Netflix’s House of Cards, are two examples. 获得这种甜蜜的减税待遇的并不是只有奥斯卡提名影片。电视剧也是如此，HBO的《副总统》和Netflix的《纸牌屋》就是其中两个例子。 When Maryland did not increase its fully-refundable film tax incentive program in 2014, Netflix executives went all Frank Underwood on former governor Martin O’Malley and threatened to leave the state. Political pressure, including a Kevin Spacey visit to Annapolis, convinced Maryland to raid other funds in order to double its film tax credit budget to $15 million. This does not include the $4 million in annual lost revenue from sales tax exemptions for film production companies. 2014年，在马里兰州尚未在其全额可补差电影业税收激励计划上增加力度之际，Netflix的总监们就在前任州长Martin O’Malley面前扮演“弗兰克·安德伍德”（译注：《纸牌屋》主角，马基雅维利式政客），并且威胁要撤离该州。凯文·史派西（译注：安德伍德的扮演者）到访安纳波利斯，在诸如此类的政治压力之下，马里兰州将其电影业税收抵免预算增加一倍，达到1500万，为此砍掉了许多其他方面的资金。这还没把电影制片公司所享受的营业税免征额包含在内，每年因此少征的税收可是有400万。 Even though film tax credits are often sold as a way to help small producers, 98 percent of Maryland’s film tax credit budget over the last three years has been taken up by House of Cards and VEEP. The increased tourism argument that film tax credit proponents constantly use clearly does not apply for two shows that are set in Washington, D.C. Similarly, no one thinks of Louisiana while they are watching The Big Short. 尽管电影业税收抵免经常顶着帮助小制片公司的名头做游说，但在过去三年中，马里兰州98%的电影税收抵免款都进了《纸牌屋》和《副总统》的兜里。电影业税收抵免的鼓吹者们经常使用的抵免带动旅游业的论证，显然在这里也并不适用，因为两部剧的背景都设定在华盛顿特区。同样，在观看《大空头》时，根本没人会想起路易斯安那州。 Maryland’s handouts were still not enough to convince HBO executives to keep filming VEEP in Maryland. VEEP’s production moved to California after the state offered the show a $6.5 million tax credit. 即便如此，马里兰州的馈赠仍然不足以说服HBO的总监们继续在该州拍摄《副总统》。该片将搬到加利福利亚制作，因为加州将为该剧提供650万的税收抵免。 The Maryland Department of Legislative Services found that the state’s film tax incentive program only returns 6 cents for every dollar spent. While this return is particularly poor, the best return in any state is still less than 30 cents on the dollar. 马里兰州立法服务部发现，该州的电影业税收激励计划每花掉1美元，只能收回6美分。这么低的回报当然很极端，但各州回报表现最好的也仍然不到每美元30美分。 Jobs in the film industry are highly skilled and mobile, which means they do not create lasting economic benefits. If another state rolls out an even more generous tax credit, film production can simply pack up and leave for another soundstage. States that decide to shower the film industry with taxpayer funds are in a race to the bottom, as no credit is high enough to satisfy Hollywood executives. 电影行业所提供的工作都是技术岗位，且流动性很高，这就意味着该行业并不能创造持久的经济效益。如果另外一个州推出了更为慷慨的税收抵免计划，电影制片商只需要打个包，就能换个摄影棚。各州如果决心花纳税人的钱来馈赠电影行业，它们就是加入了一场竞相逐底的比赛，因为抵免额度无论多高都无法满足好莱坞的总监们。 Maryland’s experience of losing film productions and wasting taxpayer dollars on its program is not unique. Every independent study of film tax credits have found that the programs come nowhere close to paying for themselves. But this reality has not stopped proponents from making fanciful predictions. The Maryland Film Industry Coalition—a group dedicated to promoting the film industry—claims that each dollar in tax credits leads to $1.03 in tax revenue. 马里兰州遭制片公司抛弃、在补贴计划上浪费纳税人税金的上述经历并不罕见。所有关于电影业税收减免的独立研究都已发现，各种补贴计划均远远无法实现收支平衡。但这一事实并没能阻止其鼓吹者提出各种白日梦般的预测。“马里兰州电影行业联盟”——一个旨在促进电影行业发展的组织——宣称，税收抵免每花1美元都能带来1.03美元的税收。 The Tax Foundation’s Joseph Henchman points out that if these fanciful projections were taken seriously, the United States could pay off its national debt by simply giving the film industry $1 trillion. “税务基金会”的Joseph Henchman指出，如果我们拿这种白日梦似的测算当真，那么美国只需要给电影行业派送1万亿，就能偿清它的全部国债了。 One study that was funded by the Motion Picture Association of American assumes that every dollar in tax credits creates $17.75 in economic activity, which leads to $1.88 in new tax revenue for the state. These claims are less realistic than the science-fiction films the credits support. 由“美国电影协会”赞助实施的一项研究提出，税收抵免每花掉1美元，就能创造出17.75美元的经济活动，而这又会为所在州形成1.88美元的新税收收入。这类说法比那些获得税收抵免补贴的科幻电影还要不切实际一些。 Film tax credit programs do not pay for themselves. They do not create long-term jobs, nor do they have tourism benefits. All film tax incentives do is provide opportunities for politicians to rub elbows with movie stars. 电影业税收抵免计划无法实现收支平衡。他们无法创造长期岗位，也不会带来旅游收益。电影业税收激励所能做的，无非是给政客们提供了和电影明星亲密往来的机会。 With the hundreds of millions of dollars that taxpayers gift the film industry each year, perhaps it is time for the Academy Awards to create an Oscar for Best Tax Break. If nothing else, taxpayers at least deserve a shout-out during Sunday’s award ceremony. 纳税人每年都向电影行业派送数亿美元的礼包，也许金像奖是时候设立一个“奥斯卡最佳减税奖”了。如果啥都没有，那么纳税人至少也应出现在周日颁奖典礼的致谢词中。 Jared Meyer is a fellow at Economics21 at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. You can follow him on Twitter here. Jared Meyer是曼哈顿政策研究所Economics21分部的研究员。你可以到这里关注他的Twitter账号。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

《超级社会：人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评 Review of "Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth" 作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/ Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader. Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中，通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析，来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果，让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。 What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation. 什么是历史动力学？我能给出的最佳定义是：这是一种研究历史的科学方法，它试图通过量化的方法去检验，排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。 Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours. Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣：是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力，完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢？他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年，也就是超过260亿工时。 The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale. 下一个容易想到的问题就是，这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢，例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔，还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场，以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式，是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上的进步呢？ As an economist my bias is to see human actions in terms of self-interest, competition and conflict, where through the invisible hand the interaction of self-interested individuals can lead to productive outcomes. But like the fish who is blind to the vast ocean of water they live in, I realised I was blind to the ocean of cooperation that was the back-drop to my focus on self-interest and competition. 作为一个经济学家，我倾向于通过自利、竞争和冲突的视角来看待人类行为，在这些视角之下，自利个体之间能够通过“看不见的手”达致有效率的经济产出。但就像大海里一条对于自己所生存的广阔水域一无所知的鱼一样，我意识我对于合作行为这片广阔的大海实际上几乎一无所知，而这是我所关注的自利和竞争的基础。 In “Ultrasociety” Turchin provides a way to see and measure cooperation – to quantify its existence on a massive scale. Once you are able to see the great ocean of cooperation that dominates human society, it leads you to interesting and challenging lines of scientific inquiry. The puzzling question is then how a world dominated by ultra social human cooperation can also frequently succumb to large scale war and conflict? 在《超级社会》一书中，Turchin教授提供了一种看待并衡量合作的方式——在大尺度上将它的存在进行量化。当你能够看清合作这片统治着人类社会的汪洋大海，它就会将你的引向有趣而又富有挑战性的科学探索。之后的一个问题就是：为什么一个充盈着超大型社会合作的人类世界还会经常屈就于大规模的战争和冲突？ Turchin’s answer, and one of the big ideas in the book, is that war between social groups is the mechanism by which cooperative behaviour develops “within groups”. It is a fundamental evolutionary process happening between societies at a large scale. He elevates war as a selection mechanism for cooperation, and values it above many of the technological factors like domestication of plants and the advent of agriculture. Turchin对这个问题的答案，同时也是本书的主要观点之一，是认为社会群体之间的战争是合作行为在群体内部发展的机制。它是一种基础性进化过程，发生于在各社会之间的大尺度上。他提升了战争在历史进程中的地位，将其视为对合作行为的一种选择机制，并且将其价值置于许多技术性因素之上，例如植物的驯化和农业的出现。 Turchin debunks many standard stories that “explain” the path to civilisation and eliminates glaring inconsistencies in the archaeological record. The naive view that the invention of agriculture “…set the ball rolling, and the entire history of civilisation followed from that” is a satisfying common story. But it seems a stretch to claim that the small scale practice of seasonally collecting and planting seeds nearby small permanent settlements, leads directly to the large-scale institutions observed in ancient civilisations. Turchin推翻了许多自称能够“解释”通向文明路径的标准叙事，认为它们忽视了自身与显而易见的考古学事实之间的重大矛盾。有一种天真的观点认为，农业的发明“……让雪球滚动了起来，而整个文明的历史则随之展开”，这是一种令很多人满意的常见叙事。但是，认为小规模永久定居点附近季节性的收集和播种行为可以直接导致古代文明中所呈现的一些大规模社会制度，这似乎有点太过牵强了。 The “agricultural snowball” story is also hampered by the fact that early agricultural societies had “a markedly negative effect on human health” as the poorer nutrition compared to hunter gatherers lead to smaller stature, higher sickness and the spread of pathogens through the high density settlements. Yet agriculture did spread and ultimately outcompeted nomadic hunter-gather societies. 早期的农业社会“对人类的健康水平产生了显著的负面影响”这一事实也削弱了“农业的雪球”这一叙事的说服力，相比于狩猎-采集社会，农业社会更差的营养水平导致了更小的体形，更多疾病，以及高密度的聚居区内病原体的传播。尽管如此，农业社会的确在之后得到了扩张并最终超过了游动性的狩猎-采集社会。 I have long been hesitant about “just so” explanations of social institutions based on historic physical and technological conditions that turn simple correlations into plausible causal mechanisms. Turchin provides the evidence that although all early large scale civilisations had agriculture, it was not the agriculture alone that directly caused large scale civilisation. 这种对于社会制度“原来如此”解释【编注：『原来如此故事』又称特例假设（ad hoc hypothesis），是一种为某一解释设置无法或难以验证的特殊条件，从而消除或降低该解释之可证伪性的做法。】，立足于物质和技术方面的历史条件，把简单的相关性当成了煞有其事的因果关系，我因此而一直对此抱有怀疑态度。Turchin教授提供了证据以显示虽然所有早期的大型文明都拥有农业，但并不是农业这一单一因素直接导致了大型文明的出现。 I felt foolish to have not recognised the array of “just so” stories in the study of history before Turchin pointed them out. In my field of economics, the existence of money is still explained in the textbooks as arising automatically once someone in human prehistory realised that some kind of currency made commerce easier than trying to directly trade a quarter of a cow for three baskets of vegetables. 对于没能在Turchin教授指出之前认出这些“原来如此”故事，我感到自己有点傻。在我所研究的经济学领域中，货币的存在仍然在教科书中被解释为在史前时代的某个时刻有当人意识到某种形式的通货比直接使用四分之一头牛去交换三筐蔬菜变得更加容易的时候自动产生的。 Yet many alternative social arrangements also solve the physical problem of a “double coincidence of wants”. We need look no further than current tribal societies that do not have or desire money despite their specialisation into many roles. They have instead resolved their double coincidence of wants dilemma through various other rituals, hierarchies, and institutions. 然而，许多其他的社会安排也同样解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这个实际问题。我们只需要看看一些现存的部落社会，虽然这些社会中已经出现了众多专业化的分工角色，但他们至今既没有货币，也看不出对货币有任何需求。取而代之的是，这些部落社会通过多种仪式，层级结构和社会制度的安排解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这一困境。 Turchin, through his cliodynamics research agenda, aims to rid the historical study of civilisation from these “just so” explanations. In the aim of scientific progress this research agenda uses quantifiable historical data to pit multi-level selection theory and its various components against many others, and in doing so eliminate bad theories and open up new avenues of inquiry. Most chapters of the books contain references to this emerging field of research which themselves are intriguing and enlightening. Turchin教授希望通过他的历史动力学使文明史的研究摆脱这些“原来如此”解释。为了推进研究的科学化进程，他的研究里使用了可量化的历史数据让多层次选择理论以及它的不同组成部分与众多其它的理论进行竞争，通过这种做法排除那些较差的理论并为之后的研究打开新方向。书中的大多数章节都包含了对这一蓬勃发展的研究领域的描述，而这本身已经足够有趣和富有启发性了。 Turchin argues that human societies, tribes, and groups, did not simply take a linear path from small hunter-gatherers tribes to large-scale civilisations. It was the competition through conquest and war between societies that lead to those with more effective weaponry and military organisations arising from greater internal cooperation, to survive at the expense of others. Turchin认为，人类社会，部落和群体并不是简单地通过一条线性的道路从小规模的狩猎-采集部落发展为大型文明的。不同社会之间在相互征服和战争中所展开的竞争，使得那些通过更好的内部合作发展出了更高效的武器和军事组织的社会生存了下来，而代价则是其对手的消亡。 The following excerpt summarises: 以下引文对此作了总结： “Here’s how I think these peaceful, stable societies came about. As war created large states, empires, and nation-states, societies evolved measures to suppress internal conflict and violence. Reduced internal violence is the obverse of increased cooperation. “我认为这些和平而稳定的社会是以这样的方式诞生的。随着战争创造出大型的城邦，帝国和民族国家，社会也演化出了一些压制自身内部的冲突和暴力的机制。内部暴力行为减少的另一面是更多的内部合作。 “Surprising as it may seem, the trend towards greater peace was already noticeable during the Ancient and Medieval historical eras, long before the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Of course, wars between empires dwarfed intertribal conflicts in scale. Huge armies fought increasingly bloody battles, and the numbers of casualties mounted. “也许看起来让人吃惊，但向更加和平的状态演化的趋势，实际上在古代和中世纪这些历史时期中就已经显而易见了，这要远远早于18世纪的启蒙运动。当然，帝国之间的战争在规模上让部落间冲突相形见绌。大型军队间战争的血腥程度持续上升，而战争中的伤亡人数也随之水涨船高。 “But the key point is that these wars moved away from imperial centers, towards the frontiers. More and more people—those living far from frontiers where battles were fought—never experienced conflict, and could enjoy relative prosperity. “但关键在于这些战争不再发生于帝国的中心区域，而被移到了前线。越来越多的人——那些生活在远离战争发生的前线地区的人——从来没有经历过冲突，他们享受到了相对的繁荣。 “There is no contradiction between larger armies and larger butcher’s bills from warfare, on the one hand, and on the other, a greater part of the population enjoying peace. What is important from the point of view of quality of life is not how many people, in total, are killed, but what the chances are that I (or you, or someone you care about) will be killed. In other words, the important statistic is the risk of violent death for each person.” “一方面，军队规模更大，战争的死亡人数更高，而另一方面，总人口中更大比例的人群却能够享受和平，这两点并不冲突。从生活质量的角度来看，重要的并不是总体上有多少人在战争中被杀死，而是作为社会中的个体，我（或者是你，或者是你所关心的人）有多大的可能被杀死。换句话说，对每个人而言，更重要的统计量是死于暴力的风险大小。” The power of this view is in the way the apparent contradiction of how war leads to peace becomes obvious once understood through an evolutionary lens. It changed my mental model of history from a series of inevitable linear events, to one of a branching tree of evolutionary paths, complete with many dead-ends of failed civilisations and their cultures, with many more merging and growing from conquest. 这一观点的强大之处在于，“战争是如何导向和平的？”这一看似矛盾的问题一旦通过进化的视角来理解，其中的逻辑就显而易见了。它将我理解历史的心智模型从一系列不可避免的线性事件的串联转变为一棵包含多种进化路径的分叉树，这棵树的许多分支都终结于失败的文明及其文化，但更多的分支则是通过征服合并在一起并继续成长的文明。 In short, I have shifted away from the popular but incorrect view of evolution as linear and subject only to environmental stresses rather than intra-species conflict. The left panel of the below image epitomises this popular confusion that I ignorantly held in the context of the study of history. 简而言之，我已经摒弃了那种流行却是错误的以线性视角看待文明演化的方式，该方式认为它仅仅受到外部环境的压力影响而不理会种群内部冲突的作用。下图左边的部分代表了之前的我出于无知而在历史研究中所采用的这种带有很强迷惑性的流行视角。 A more correct view of biological evolution is in the right panel, complete with mixing of genes and extinctions. It is more subtle and complex view, but provides a more useful story of the path of history, the dying out of civilisations and merging of cultures as a result of inter-group warfare. 而下图中右边的部分则代表了一种更加准确的看待生物进化的视角，进化是在众多基因的混合与消亡中完成的。这是一种更加精细也更加复杂的视角，但它提供了一种对历史路径更加有用的叙事，文明的消亡和文化的合并实际上是族群间战争的结果。 Even more interesting is that when there is little external warfare and competition, the successful groups find it difficult to curtail infighting amongst sub-groups within their society, and their lack of internal cooperation begins to make them vulnerable to attack from outsiders. In Turchin’s own words, from Chapter 2: 更有趣的是，当来自外部的战争和竞争压力较小时，那些成功的族群会发现控制自身内部小群体间的明争暗斗变得更困难了，而缺乏内部合作将会让这些曾经成功的族群在面对外来者的攻击时变得脆弱。用Turchin在书中第二章的话来说就是： “Here’s how war serves to weed out societies that “go bad.” When discipline, imposed by the need to survive conflict, gets relaxed, societies lose their ability to cooperate. A reactionary catchphrase of the 1970s used to go, “what this generation needs is a war,” a deplorable sentiment but one that in terms of cultural evolution might sometimes have a germ of cold logic. “战争是以这样的方式淘汰掉那些“衰朽腐败”的社会的。当因生存压力而施加的纪律开始变得松弛的时候，社会就失去了合作的能力。1970年代曾经有一句反动标语，“这代人需要经历一场战争，”虽然这句话里满是可悲的情绪，但从文明进化的角度上说，也许其中的确包含着一些冷冰冰的真知灼见。 At any rate, there is a pattern that we see recurring throughout history, when a successful empire expands its borders so far that it becomes the biggest kid on the block. When survival is no longer at stake, selfish elites and other special interest groups capture the political agenda. The spirit that “we are all in the same boat” disappears and is replaced by a “winner take all” mentality. As the elites enrich themselves, the rest of the population is increasingly impoverished. Rampant inequality of wealth further corrodes cooperation. 无论如何，我们都能看到历史中不断重演的一种模式，当一个成功的帝国将自己的疆域扩展得如此之广以至于它成了“街区里的孩子王”，当生存的压力已不再迫在眉睫，那些自私的精英和其它一些特定的利益集团就会夺取帝国的政治议程。“大家同处一条船”的精神消失了，取而代之的是“赢者通吃”的心态。随着精英们发家致富，其它人则持续地变得更加贫困。肆无忌惮的贫富不均进一步腐蚀了合作的基础。 Beyond a certain point a formerly great empire becomes so dysfunctional that smaller, more cohesive neighbors begin tearing it apart. Eventually the capacity for cooperation declines to such a low level that barbarians can strike at the very heart of the empire without encountering significant resistance. 在超过一个临界点之后，一个曾经的伟大帝国就会变得机能失调，以至于它的那些更小但更具凝聚力的邻居们开始将它分裂。最终帝国内部的合作能力降到了一个太低的水平，以至于外来的野蛮人可以在几乎遇不上任何值得一提的抵抗的条件下直捣帝国的心脏。 But barbarians at the gate are not the real cause of imperial collapse. They are a consequence of the failure to sustain social cooperation. As the British historian Arnold Toynbee said, great civilisations are not murdered – they die by suicide.” 但那些“门口的野蛮人”并不是帝国崩溃的原因。他们的入侵只是帝国没能维持内部社会合作的结果。正如英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比所言，伟大的文明从来不会被谋杀——他们全都死于自杀。” I have explored this process of disintegration of groups into competing clans in small scale in experiments before. Yet I failed to see the link to the large scale selection processes occurring even at such large scales at the nation-state. The talk of sclerosis and the death of large scale cooperation made me recall the chart below on the growth of partisan policy in the US which shows the striking decline in cross-party cooperation on legislative changes. 我之前曾经用小规模实验的方式研究过族群瓦解为多个相互竞争的部落的情况。但我并没有意识到，即使在民族国家这么大的尺度上，也有类似的选择过程发生。书中关于社会固化和大规模合作的消亡的讨论，让我联想起了下面这幅关于美国党派政策演化的图中所显示出在立法变更上的党际合作水平的显著下降。 Each node in the visual is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949–2012, with Republicans in red and Democrats in blue. Edges are drawn between members who agree on legislative decisions more often than expected by chance, and the nodes are spaced out in a way so that those with more edges connecting them are closer together. The clustering therefore visualises who is cooperating with who in terms of developing legislation. 图中每个节点都代表美国在1949-2012年间的一位众议院议员，红色代表共和党人，而蓝色则代表民主党人。如果两位议员在立法决策上达成一致的频率高于由随机概率所预期的水平，那么他们所对应的节点之间就会被一条线连接，节点在图中的排列方式使得那些相互之间有更多连接的议员靠得更近。这样图中的聚类就从视觉上反映出了哪些议员在推进立法上相互合作。 Without the external threats to the nation as a whole after WWII, and later the Cold War, the ability to maintain a cohesive national whole in political terms appears to have broken down into partisan scrambling. No longer can we see a cooperative whole, but instead competing fairly arbitrary tribes of blues and reds. 在第二次世界大战和随后的冷战结束后，来自外部的对于美国作为一个整体的威胁都不复存在了，而从政治角度上看，似乎维系一个有凝聚力的国家整体的能力也随之分崩离析，取而代之的则是喋喋不休的党派纷争。在图中我们不再能看到一个富有合作性的整体，而是一些分别由红点和蓝点组成的武断分隔的竞争部落。 I was left in a state of deep reflection after reading the book. Many other big ideas are woven through it to make you reconsider the popular but overly simplistic stories we tell ourselves to explain historical events. From the long term Z-shaped arc of quantifiable violence in human civilisation, to the role of horses, long range weaponry and population size in the success of inter-group warfare, and finally to the rise of God-kings and oppressive hierarchies. 在读完这本书后，我陷入了深刻的反思。本书中还贯穿了许多其它重要想法，它们会让你重新思考我们在解释历史事件时所常用的那些流行但过分简化的叙事。从人类文明中以可量化方式衡量的暴力水平在长期中所呈现出的Z型曲线，到马、远程武器和人口规模在族群间战争中所发挥的作用，以及最后君神合一政体和统治阶级的崛起。 Even Turchin’s incidental detours explore rather significant questions, such as in Chapter 4 when he clarifies a point about culture in human societies with the off-handed comment “Incidentally, why do we have culture? ” 即使是Turchin教授在书中偶然从主线上岔出的一些分支也讨论了相当重要的问题，例如在第四章中澄清关于人类社会中文化的作用的一个观点时，他随性地评论道“顺便问一句，为什么人类会拥有文化？”。 The same lesson applies in economics. Firms in highly competitive markets constantly face threats to their existence, leading to a type of destructive creation that ensures that surviving firms are internally highly cohesive and cooperative; economically efficient. 同样的道理也适用于经济学领域。高度竞争市场中的企业经常会面临威胁到自身生存的问题，这导致了一种毁灭性的创造过程以保证最终生存下来的企业在内部都具有极强的凝聚力和合作能力，我们称之为经济效率。 Yet the process of competition is highly inefficient in economic terms as only very slightly different production facilities are duplicated by competitors. For me the trade-off is rather radical just to think about. That the gains to internal cohesion require a cost of an external threat or else large-scale groups will be undermined by the interests of sub-groups within them. 然而从经济角度上说，竞争本身是非常低效的，因为众多互相竞争的对手所复制的生产设备之间的差别其实非常小。对我来说，其中的利弊权衡已经是一个相当深刻的问题了。即获得内部凝聚力所带来的收益需要以面对外部威胁为代价，否则大规模的群体将会被内部众多小团体的利益慢慢腐蚀。 Like any books that cover grand ideas about human civilisation there are probably some finer details to squabble about. I certainly don’t have the expertise to do so. Instead I want to share some of the thoughts that occupied my mind after reading Ultrasociety. These thoughts and comments should sufficiently signal the compelling nature of the discussions and ideas of the book. 与任何涉及关于人类文明的宏大观点的著作一样，书中几乎肯定会有一些值得争论的细节。我显然不具备足够的专业水平来这么做。但我希望与各位分享在读完《超级社会》这本书之后一直占据我脑海的一些想法。这些想法和评论应该足够说明这部大作的引人入胜之处以及其中的一些主题。 First, if sustained group cooperation relies on external competition, is there value in creating fictitious interstellar enemies to sustain better global cooperation? I’m thinking here of the film The Village, where the elders invented an outside enemy to sustain internal peace. The idea of creating an enemy for solidarity is popular, and even gets a run in the economics comics. 首先，如果持续的群体合作依赖于外部竞争，那么创造一些假想中的外星敌人是否对于维持更好的全球合作具有价值呢？这让我想起了一部名为《神秘村》的电影，在这部电影中，老人们创造出了一个外部敌人来维持村子内部的和平。为了维持团结而创造出一个敌人的想法现在很流行，即使在一些经济学漫画中也能看到它的影子。 Or perhaps the major modern religions fulfil this type of role so well that they can’t be displaced[1]? And surely it is the moral thing to do to promote human cooperation on an even larger scale without actual conflict and violence, if that indeed is possible. 或者也许主要的现代宗教已经扮演了这一角色而因此变得无可取代[1]？ 毫无疑问，在不引发实际的冲突和暴力的前提下推进更大规模的人类合作在道德上是无可厚非的，如果这真的可能的话。 Second, and following directly on from the first, the use of the term morality is widely used with its common meaning as conforming to the cooperative norms of a group. Yet I can’t shake the nagging feeling that, like Darwin’s work on evolution, the idea that war with outsiders promotes peace is ripe to be corrupted for political gain because it can be so easily argued to be a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ position. 第二，紧跟第一点的思路，现在人们对于“道德”的惯常理解与维持社会的合作规范是一致的。然而我还是无法摆脱一种令人不安的感觉，正如达尔文在进化论上的贡献一样，认为与外来者的战争能够推进内部和平这一观点很容易被政治利益所利用，因为它很容易被说成是一种“自然的”或是“道德的”立场。 Third, how are these great feats of cooperation realised in practice? Is there a common recipe that can be adopted into 21st public policy? There is a brief mention of how tribes and groups ‘tag’ each other with signals of group membership as one way to create cooperation in the following passage from Chapter 10. 第三，这些宏大的合作是如何在实践中实现的？对于21世纪的公共政策而言，存在一种通用的实践模式吗？书中第十章的以下段落简要地提到了部落和群体是如何用“标签”来标识彼此群体身份的方式来创造合作的。 “An important evolutionary breakthrough was the capacity to tag cooperating groups with symbolic markers such as language and dialect, styles of clothing and ornamentation (including tattoos), and behavioral characteristics—for example, participation in collective rituals. Symbolically-tagged cooperative groups, or tribes and nations, allowed us to increase the scale of cooperation beyond the circle of people personally known to us. Of course, the downside of increasing cooperation within a tribe or a nation was greater intensity of conflict with other tribes and nations.” “一个进化上的重大突破就是人们通过诸如语言和方言，衣着和装饰（包括纹身）的风格，以及行为特征——举例来说，对于集体仪式的参与——这些符号化的标记来为与自己合作的群体贴上标签的能力。通过符号化标签来标记与自己合作的群体，或者部落和国家，让我们能够在熟人小圈子之外扩大合作的规模。当然，在部落或国家内部增进合作的负面效应是与其它部落和国家之间冲突强度的加剧。” But like many of the minor points in the book, this single paragraph opens, then closes, a massively interesting puzzle about how humans actually organise into tribes at all levels. While as outsiders we easily observe tags, or the signals and rituals of a cultural group, as insiders we often overlook the amount of resources devoted to these tagging rituals. 但与书中其它一些次要观点一样，书中的这个段落首先提出了一个重要而有趣的难题，也就是人类是如何在实际中被组织为各种层次的“部落”的，并在之后回答了这个问题。作为外人，我们很容易观察到一个文化群体的标签，或者信号和仪式，但作为群体内部的人，我们却通常会忽视投入到这些标记仪式上的大量资源。 The whole fashion industry is almost exclusively about signalling social status, religious, sporting, or gender loyalties. People don’t buy cars just for transport; otherwise there would be little demand for more than a few different models. 整个时尚产业的存在几乎就是为了标识人们的社会地位，宗教信仰，体育爱好或性别取向。人们买车的目的并不仅仅是为了交通，否则除了有限的几种不同车型之外，不会有多少对其它车型的需求。 Instead we buy into marketing messages about how purchasing different types of cars tag us with different traits in the minds of others. At a national sale with have flags, anthems, national colours, sports teams and more that promote a sense of belonging. 但实际上人们买车也是在购买一种营销符号——通过对不同车型的选择而为自己贴上标签——你开的车显示出你是什么样的人。而国家则通过国旗，国歌，国家的代表性颜色，各种体育项目的国家队以及诸如此类的东西来让人们产生认同感。 While I’ve always considered much of our conspicuous consumption to be wasteful, in the same way that the devotion of military resources often appears wasteful on the surface, a picture is emerging of the amazing gains from these types of tagging behaviours and rituals in terms of promoting high levels of cooperation. While not the direct focus of the book, I think more details on this part of the evolutionary view of cooperation and conflict would have been valuable. 虽然我之前一直认为大多数炫耀性消费都很浪费，正如我们投入在军事上的资源通常从表面上看来都很浪费一样，但一幅由这类“贴标签”的行为和仪式通过在更高层次上提升合作水平而带来巨大收益的图景正在我的脑海中浮现。虽然这并不是本书直接关注的内容，但我认为，就有关合作和冲突的进化观点的这一侧面挖掘更多细节将是非常有价值的。 Fourth, what role does the massive advance in long-range weaponry since the dawn of the nuclear age mean for inter-group warfare? Turchin explains vividly how technology that allows for killing enemy combatants from a distance was a recipe for success in most warfare; starting with our evolved physical ability to accurately throwing rocks and spears, to the invention of bows and arrows, to the use of horses to mobilise armies over great distances. In the age of intercontinental missiles, drones, and nuclear weapons, how does the function of long-range of weaponry play out when the whole world can be anyone’s target? 第四，自从核武时代以来，远程武器技术的巨大进步将在群体间战争中扮演怎样的角色？Turchin教授在书中生动地描述了为什么那些能够在远程杀死敌军战士的技术在大多数战争中都是制胜的法宝，从早期人类演化出的准确投掷石块和长矛的能力，到弓和箭的发明，到使用马匹来让军队获得远程的机动性。在这个洲际导弹，无人机和核武器的时代，当整个世界都可以成为任何人的打击目标，远程武器又将如何发挥其作用？ Fifth, if the cooperative effort required to wage large scale war is a major part of the causal story of the history of civilisation, how significant is the legacy of previous wars in the current economic landscape? I have in mind the major industries of modern society, such as passenger airlines arising from industrial investment in aerial warfare, and the digital age legacy of military investment in remote communications. 第五，如果合作的努力是为大规模战争服务的这一因果叙事的确占据了大部分的文明史，那么之前的战争所留下的遗产在当今经济版图中又有着怎样的重要性？我所能想到的现代社会的一些重要产业，例如客运航空业，就是从对空中战争的产业投资中崛起的，而当今的数码时代也起源于军工行业对远程通信技术的投资。 Most major industrial firms of the modern age were intricately involved as military suppliers or were privatised former military organisations. Many modern cities only exist because of the strategic benefits of their local military bases, while public major works such as highway and rail systems, ports and airports, were products of military strategy more than peaceful economic investment. 现代大多数主要工业企业都曾经以各种复杂的方式扮演过军队供应商的角色，或者本身就是由之前的军工组织私有化而来。许多现代城市存在的原因就是处于当地的军事基地所带来的战略性优势，而高速公路，铁路系统，港口和机场这类重大的基础设施则更多都是军事战略的产物，而非和平时期经济投资的产物。 And, surprisingly to me, the cooperative legacy of previous wars is not simply technological, but also institutional; from the organisational structures of firms, to the welfare state, to international treaties on money and trade. The employer-worker relationship looks a lot like the soldier-army relationship, requiring induction, uniforms, codes of conduct, and hierarchal rule. 让我感到意外的是，之前的战争所带来的合作遗产并不仅仅存在于技术方面，它同样存在于组织制度中，从现代公司的组织结构，到福利国家，到国际货币和贸易条约。雇主和工人的关系看起来很像军队与士兵的关系，两者都要求正式入职程序，统一制服，行为准则以及层级化管理。 Modern provisions of the welfare state, including housing, health services and cash payments, were often originally created for returned soldiers following wars. It is no leap to suggest that our international monetary system, and the various international organisations and treaties that accompany it, is the direct result of resolutions in the shadow of the WWII. And perhaps the apparent breakdown of the social equality nurtured by post-war institutions observed since the late 1970s in many western countries is merely there result of the absence of external threats which breed infighting and abuses of power. 当代福利国家提供的各种供应品，包括住房，医疗服务和现金支付，最初通常都是在战后提供给退役士兵的。当今的国际货币体系以及与之配套的各种国际组织和条约，都是在第二次世界大战的阴影之下所达成的一系列决议的直接后果，这并不是什么新鲜的观点。而也许从1970年代晚期开始，许多西方国家中由战后建立的机构所导致的社会平等局面的崩塌，也仅仅是因为外部威胁的缺失为它们提供了内部斗争和权力滥用的温床。 As you can see, “Ultrasociety” will leave you pondering many big questions you may never have thought to ask before. I certainly see the world differently now. And that, to me, is the sign of a profound and insightful work. 正如你所看到的，《超级社会》这本书将会让你去深思一些之前不曾想到过的大问题。在读完这本书后，我眼中的世界变得明显不同了。对我来说，这意味着我读到了一部意义深远而富有洞见的大作。 尾注： Turchin cites Ara Norenzayan’s book Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict when explaining the role of religion in large scale cooperation, and I recommend reading it as well. 在解释宗教在大规模合作中所扮演的角色时，Turchin引用了Ara Norenzayan的著作《大神：宗教是如何改变合作与冲突的》一书中的内容，我也推荐读者阅读这本书。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Free Market Food Banks 自由市场中的救济食品发放中心 作者：Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-03 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：龙泉（@ L_Stellar） 来源：http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/free-market-food-banks.html Feeding America, the third largest non-profit in the United States, distributes billions of pounds of food every year. Most of the food comes from large firms like Kraft, ConAgra and Walmart that have a surplus of some item and scarce warehouse space. Feeding America coordinates the supply of surplus food with the demand from food banks across the U.S.. 作为美国第三大非营利性机构，“喂饱美国”每年要分发数十亿磅食品。大多数食品来自像克拉夫特、康尼格拉和沃尔玛这样产品过剩且仓储不足的大型食品公司。“喂饱美国”可调节过剩食品供给和全美救济食品发放中心【以下简称“救济中心”】需求之间的关系。 Allocating food is not an easy problem. How do you decide who gets what while taking into account local needs, local tastes, what foods the bank has already, what abilities the banks have to store food on a particular day, transportation costs and so forth. Alex Teytelboym writing at The Week points out: 分配食品不是一件容易的差事。在同时考虑当地需求、当地口味、救济中心已有食品、救济中心在特定日期储存食品的能力和运输成本等因素时，你如何决定什么人得到什么食物呢？Alex Teytelboym在《周报》上指出：

…Before 2005, Feeding America allocated food centrally, and according to its rather subjective perception of what food banks needed. Headquarters would call up the food banks in a priority order and offer them a truckload of food. Bizarrely, all food was treated more or less equally, irrespective of its nutritional content. A pound of chicken was the same as a pound of french fries. …在2005年之前，“喂饱美国”根据对救济中心需求颇为主观的感知来集中分配食物。总部会按优先顺序致电救济中心，并给他们提供一大卡车食物。离奇的是，不论营养成分如何，所有食品或多或少都被同等处理了。一磅鸡肉等同于一磅炸薯条。 If the food bank accepted the load, it paid the transportation costs and had the truck sent to them. If the food bank refused, Feeding America would judge this food bank as having lower need and push it down the priority list. Unsurprisingly, food banks went out of their way to avoid refusing food loads — even if they were already stocked with that particular food. 如果一家救济中心接受了配送，总部会付给运费让卡车把食品送给接受的中心。如果一家救济中心拒绝了，“喂饱美国”会视这家救济中心需求量较低，并把它从优先列表中除去。不出所料，所有的救济中心都特意避免拒绝食品配送——即使某类食物它们已经储存了很多。 This Soviet-style system was hugely inefficient. Some urban food banks had great access to local food donations and often ended up with a surplus of food. A lot of food rotted in places where it was not needed, while many shelves in other food banks stood empty. Feeding America simply knew too little about what their food banks needed on a given day. 这种苏联式的系统非常低效。一些城市的救济中心有很多当地的食品捐赠渠道，因此经常出现食品过剩。很多食品腐烂在不需要它们的地方，而别处救济中心的很多架子仍是空的。“喂饱美国”连某一天救济中心的需求都知之甚少。

In 2005, however, a group of Chicago academics, including economists, worked with Feeding America to redesign the system using market principles. Today Feeding America no longer sends trucks of potatoes to food banks in Idaho and a pound of chicken is no longer treated the same as a pound of french fries. 然而在2005年，一群包括经济学家在内的芝加哥学者用市场准则帮助“喂饱美国”重新设计了分配系统。今天的“喂饱美国”不会再给爱达荷州的救济中心送去一车土豆了，而且一磅鸡肉跟一磅炸薯条也不再同等对待。 Instead food banks bid on food deliveries and the market discovers the internal market-prices that clear the system. The auction system even allows negative prices so that food banks can be “paid” to pick up food that is not highly desired–this helps Feeding America keep both its donors and donees happy. 救济中心转而对食品运送进行竞拍，而且市场发现了理顺整个系统的内部市场价格。这个拍卖系统甚至允许负价格，以便于救济中心可以为取走需求量不大的食物而获得报酬——这帮助“喂饱美国”同时取悦捐赠者和受捐者。 Food banks are not bidding in dollars, however, but in a new, internal currency called shares. 然而救济中心并不用美元竞拍，而是用一种新的名叫“股份”的内部货币。

Every day, each food bank is allocated a pot of fiat currency called “shares.” Food banks in areas with bigger populations and more poverty receive larger numbers of shares. Twice a day, they can use their shares to bid online on any of the 30 to 40 truckloads of food that were donated directly to Feeding America. The winners of the auction pay for the truckloads with their shares. 每个救济中心每天都会分配到一壶名为“股份”的法定货币。人口和穷人较多地区的救济中心会收到数量较多的“股份”。他们隔天就可以用自己的“股份”在线竞拍30到40卡车食品中的任意一车，这些食品都是直接捐赠给“喂饱美国”的。赢得拍卖的一方要为那车食品支付其“股份”。 Then, all the shares spent on a particular day are reallocated back to food banks at midnight. That means that food banks that did not spend their shares on a particular day would end up with more shares and thus a greater ability to bid the next day. 然后，一天内花掉的所有“股份”都会在半夜重新分配给救济中心。这意味着这一天没有花掉股份的救济中心最后会有更多“股份”，并因此在来日有更大的竞标能力。 In this way, the system has built-in fairness: If a large food bank could afford to spend a fortune on a truck of frozen chicken, its shares would show up on the balance of smaller food banks the next day. Moreover, neighboring food banks can now team up to bid jointly to reduce their transport costs. 通过这种方式，系统拥有了内在的公平性：如果一家大型救济中心在一车冻鸡肉上花了大价钱，它的“股份”就会在来日出现在小型救济中心的股份账户上。而且，临近的救济中心现在可以组团共同竞标来降低运输费用。 Initially, there was plenty of resistance. As one food bank director told Canice Prendergast, an economist advising Feeding America, “I am a socialist. That’s why I run a food bank. I don’t believe in markets. I’m not saying I won’t listen, but I am against this.” 起初有很多阻力。正如一位救济中心的主管对Canice Prendergast——一位经济学家，“喂饱美国”的顾问——所说，“我是个社会学家。这是为何由我来运营一家救济中心的原因。我不相信市场。我不是说我不会听取你们的建议，但我反对这一举措。” But the Chicago economists managed to design a market that worked even for participants who did not believe in it. Within half a year of the auction system being introduced, 97 percent of food banks won at least one load, and the amount of food allocated from Feeding America’s headquarters rose by over 35 percent, to the delight of volunteers and donors. 但是这位芝加哥经济学家尽力设计了一个连不相信它的参与者都适用的市场【编注：此处疑似埋了Niels Bohr的马蹄铁梗】。在引入拍卖系统的半年内，97%的救济中心至少竞标成功过一车食品，而且从“喂饱美国”总部分配的食品总量增长了超过35%，这是志愿者和捐赠者喜闻乐见的。

Teytelboym’s very good, short account is working off a longer, more detailed paper by Canice Prendergast, The Allocation of Food to Food Banks. Teytelboym出色简短的描述都出自Canice Prendergast一篇更长更细致的论文，《救济中心的食品配给》。 Canice’s paper would be a great teaching tool in an intermediate or graduate micro economics class. Pair it with Hayek’s The Use of Knowledge in Society. Under the earlier centralized system, Feeding America didn’t know when a food bank was out of refrigerator space or which food banks had hot dogs but wanted hot dog buns and which the reverse–under the market system this information, which Hayek called “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” is used and as a result less food is wasted and the food is used to satisfy more urgent needs. Canice的论文会是一份很棒的中级或者高级微观经济学课程的教学材料。最好配上哈耶克的《知识在社会中的应用》一文。在早前的集中式系统中，“喂饱美国”并不知道某个救济中心何时冰箱没空间了，或者哪家救济中心有热狗却想要热狗面包而哪家正相反——在市场系统中，这类信息——哈耶克称为“有关特定时空情境的知识”——被利用起来，因此浪费的食物更少，食物用来满足更急切的需求。 The Feeding America auction system is also the best illustration that I know of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. “喂饱美国”的拍卖系统也是我所知的对福利经济学第二基本定理的最好诠释。 Even monetary economics comes into play. Feeding America created a new currency and thus had to deal with the problem of the aggregate money supply. How should the supply of shares be determined so that relative prices were free to change but the price level would remain relatively stable? How could the baby-sitting co-op problem be avoided? Scott Sumner will be disappointed to learn that they choose pound targeting rather than nominal-pound targeting but some of the key issues of monetary economics are present even in this simple economy. 甚至货币经济学派上了用场。“喂饱美国”创造了一种新货币并且因此必须处理总货币供应量的问题。应如何决定“股份”的供应量以使相关价格能够自由变动而价格水平保持相对稳定？如何避免保姆合作社问题？Scott Sumner将会失望地发现，救济中心选择了以紧盯镑重而不是名义镑重为政策指引【编注：此处疑似在调戏Sumner，后者提倡一种紧盯名义GDP的货币政策。】，但是货币经济学的一些关键问题出现在了这个甚为简单的经济体中。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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The War on Sex Trafficking Is the New War on Drugs 反性贩运战争就是新的禁毒战争 作者:Elizabeth Nolan Brown @ 2015-11 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/09/30/the-war-on-sex-trafficking-is And the results will be just as disastrous, for "perpetrators" and "victims" alike. 它将走向同样悲惨的结局，对“犯罪者”和“受害者”均是如此。 "Sex Trafficking of Americans: The Girls Next Door." "Sex-trafficking sweep nets arrests near Phoenix truck stops." "Man becomes 1st jailed under new human trafficking law." “性贩运美国人：邻家女孩。” “凤凰城卡车停靠站附近扫网式逮捕性贩运。” “性贩运新法实施后首人收监。” Conduct a Google news search for the word trafficking in 2015 and you'll find pages of stories about the commercial sex trade, in which hundreds of thousands of U.S. women and children are supposedly trapped by coercion or force. 2015年，在Google上用trafficking一词做新闻搜索，你将找到大量关于商业化性交易故事的页面，据称，成千上万的美国妇女儿童正陷于强制或暴力之困。 A few decades prior, a survey of "trafficking" headlines would have yielded much different results. Back then, newspapers recounted tales of "contemporary Al Capones trafficking illegal drugs to the smallest villages and towns in our heartland," and of organized "motorcycle gangs" trafficking LSD and hashish. 几十年前，如果对包含“trafficking”一词的头条新闻做一番考察，结果会大不相同。那时候，报纸上详细讲述的是“当代的阿尔·卡彭【译注：Al Capone，上世纪二、三十年代芝加哥黑手党头目】们已将非法毒品贩卖至我们心脏地带的小村小镇”，以及有组织的“摩托党”贩卖LSD和印度大麻。 "Many young black men in the ghetto see the drug trade as the Gold Rush of the 1980s," the Philadelphia Inquirer told readers in 1988. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) warned of a "nationwide phenomenon" of drug lords abducting young people to force them into the drug trade. Crack kingpins were rumored to target runaways, beating them if they didn't make drug sales quotas. 1988年，《费城问询报》对读者说：“众多贫民区黑人青年将毒品交易视为1980年代的淘金热。”全国失踪与受剥削儿童中心（NCMEC）曾发出警告称，毒枭们绑架年轻人并强迫他们加入毒品交易是一种“全国性现象”。当时还有传言称，可卡因头目会瞄准离家出走者，如果他们没能售出足额毒品就会殴打他们。 Such articles offered a breathless sense that the drug trade was booming, irresistible to criminals, and in desperate need of child foot soldiers. Lawmakers touted harsher penalties for drug offenses. The war on drugs raged. New task forces were created. Civilians were trained how to "spot" drug traffickers in the wild, and students instructed how to rat out drug-using parents. Politicians spoke of a drug "epidemic" overtaking America, its urgency obviously grounds for anything we could throw its way. 此类文章令人窒息，让人觉得毒品交易兴旺繁荣，能令犯罪分子利欲熏心，且对儿童兵的需求极为迫切。立法者们兜售各种针对毒品犯罪的更严厉惩罚。禁毒战争风起云涌。新的特遣部队成立了。平民受到训练，学习如何在野外“认出”毒品贩子；学生得到指导，学习如何告发吸毒的父母。政客们都在谈论一场正在袭击美国的毒品“传染”，其严峻性使得我们能够采纳的任何阻止措施均有不言而喻的理由。 We know now how that all worked out. 我们如今已知道这些事情的结局如何。 The tactics employed to "get tough" on drugs ended up entangling millions in the criminal justice system, sanctioning increasingly intrusive and violent policing practices, worsening tensions between law enforcement and marginalized communities, and degrading the constitutional rights of all Americans. 为“严打”毒品而采取的种种策略，结果使得数百万人受困于刑事司法系统，鼓励了日益扰民而有害的政策措施，恶化了执法机构与边缘社群之间的紧张关系，并且损害了全体美国人的宪法权利。 Yet even as the drug war's failures and costs become more apparent, the Land of the Free is enthusiastically repeating the same mistakes when it comes to sex trafficking. This new "epidemic" inspires the same panicked rhetoric and punitive policies the war on drugs did—often for activity that's every bit as victimless. 但尽管是禁毒战争的失败和代价日益昭然，当遇到性贩运问题时，美国这片自由之地仍旧在满腔热情地重复同样的错误。如同禁毒战争中曾经发生的那样，新的“传染病”鼓动了同样的恐慌修辞，激发了同样的惩罚政策——通常针对的都是从头到尾找不到受害者的行为。 Forcing others into sex or any sort of labor is abhorrent, and it deserves to be treated like the serious violation it is. But the activity now targeted under anti-trafficking efforts includes everything from offering or soliciting paid sex, to living with a sex worker, to running a classified advertising website. 强迫他人进行性交易或任何种类的劳动都很令人痛恨，理应和其他严重侵害一样得到处理。但目前的反贩运行动的目标所指，则包括了从提供或招揽有偿性行为，到与性工作者同居，再到运营一家分类广告网站等所有一切活动。 What's more, these new laws aren't organic responses by legislators in the face of an uptick in human trafficking activity or inadequate current statutes. They are in large part the result of a decades-long anti-prostitution crusade from Christian "abolitionists" and anti-sex feminists, pushed along by officials who know a good political opportunity when they see it and by media that never met a moral panic they didn't like. 此外，这些新法规并不是立法者在遭遇人口贩运行为增加或现行法律不足问题之后的自然回应。它们大部分都是基督教“废奴主义者”和反性女权主义者数十年来的反卖淫斗争的结果，其推手包括从中看到了良好政治机遇的官员，以及只要有道德恐慌就会来劲的媒体。 The fire is fueled by federal money, which sends police departments and activist groups into a grant-grubbing frenzy. The anti-trafficking movement is "just one big federal grant program," Michael Hudson, a scholar with the conservative Hudson Institute, told the Las Vegas Review-Journal. "Everybody is more worried about where they're going to get their next grant" than helping victims, Hudson said. 联邦资金则是火上添油，它将各个警局和行动组织都卷入了一场争取拨款的狂潮。保守派智库哈德逊研究所的学者Michael Hudson对《拉斯维加斯评论杂志》说，反贩运行动“只是一个大型联邦拨款项目”。他说：“大家更关心的是到哪里去找下一份拨款”，而不是帮助受害者。 Because of the visceral feelings that the issue of paid sex has always provoked, it's easy for overstatements and false statistics to go unchallenged, winning repetition in congressional hearings and the press. Yet despite all the dire proclamations, there's little evidence of anything approaching an "epidemic" of sexual slavery. 由于有偿性交易通常总能唤起一些本能的道德感，因此，过分夸大和错误统计总是容易避开质疑，得以反复出现在国会听证会和新闻媒体上。然而，尽管存在各种可怕的宣告，并没有什么证据表明性奴役这一“传染病”正在发生。 THE NUMBERS DON'T ADD UP 经不起推敲的数字 From 2000 to 2002, the State Department claimed that 50,000 people were trafficked into the U.S. each year for forced sex or labor. By 2003, the agency reduced this estimate to 18,000–20,000, further reducing it to 14,500–17,500 in subsequent reports. That's a 71 percent decrease in just five years, though officials offered no explanation as to how they arrived at these numbers or what accounted for the drastic change. These days, federal agencies tend to stick to the vague "thousands" when discussing numbers of incoming victims. 自2000年至2002年，国务院宣称，每年有5万人被贩运到美国从事强迫性行为或强迫劳动。到2003年，该机构将这一估计缩小到18000到20000人，在后续的报告中又进一步缩小为14500到17500人。五年间降低了71%，尽管官方没有给出解释说明他们是如何得出这些数字以及为何变化如此之大。现在，在讨论入境受害者数量时，联邦机构更愿意坚持使用模糊的“数千”一词。 Globally, some 600,000 to 800,000 people are trafficked across international borders each year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates. But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2006 described this figure as "questionable" due to "methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies," including the rather astonishing fact that "the U.S. government's estimate was developed by one person who did not document all his work." And even if he had, there would still be good reasons to doubt the quality of the data, which were compiled from a range of nonprofits, governments, and international organizations, all of which use different definitions of "trafficking." 全球来看，据国土安全部（DHS）估计，每年约有60至80万人遭到跨国界贩运。但政府问责办公室（GAO）2006年曾说，这一数字是“有问题的”，原因在于“方法论缺陷、数据缺失以及数值矛盾”，其中还包括一个令人乍舌的事实——“美国政府的这项估计是由一个人完成的，而且他并没有对其所有工作存档”。即便他存档了，我们也有很好的理由怀疑数据的质量，因为它们收集自各种各样的非营利组织、政府机构和国际组织，运用的“贩运”定义各不相同。 Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post's "Fact Checker" columnist, began digging into government-promulgated sex-slavery numbers last spring and discovered just how dubious many of them are. "Because sex trafficking is considered horrific, politicians appear willing to cite the flimsiest and most poorly researched statistics—and the media is content to treat the claims as solid facts," Kessler concluded in June. 《华盛顿邮报》的“事实核查者”专栏作家Glenn Kessler去年春开始钻研政府发布的性奴役数字，发现大量数字无比可疑。六月份，Kessler总结到：“由于性贩运被认为是骇人听闻的，所以政治家们似乎都愿意引用一些最经不起推敲、研究质量最糟糕的统计数字——而媒体则很乐意将这些断言当做确凿事实。” For instance, Rep. Joyce Beatty (D–Ohio) declared in a May statement that "in the U.S., some 300,000 children are at risk each year for commercial sexual exploitation." Rep. Ann Wagner (R–Mo.) made a similar statement that month at a congressional hearing, claiming the statistic came from the Department of Justice (DOJ). The New York Times has also attributed this number to the DOJ, while Fox News raised the number to 400,000 and sourced it to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 比如，众议员Joyce Beatty（民主党—俄亥俄）在五月份的一份声明中宣称，“在美国，每年约有30万儿童遭遇商业化性剥削的威胁。”同月，众议员Ann Wagner（民主党—密苏里）在一场国会听证会上做出了类似声明，宣称统计数据来自司法部（DOJ）。《纽约时报》也将这一数字溯源于司法部，而《福克斯新闻》则将数字提升到40万，并将来源定为卫生部（HHS）。 But not only are these not DOJ or HHS figures, they're based on 1990s data published in a non-peer-reviewed paper that the primary researcher, Richard Estes, no longer endorses. The authors of that study came up with their number by speculating that certain situations—i.e., living in public housing, being a runaway, having foreign parents—place minors at risk of potential exploitation by sex traffickers. They then simply counted up the number of kids in those situations. To make a bad measure worse, anyone who fell into more than one category was counted multiple times. 然而，它们不仅不是司法部或卫生部提供的数字，而是基于一个1990年代发表于一篇未经同行评议的论文中的数据，而且其主要研究者Richard Estes现在都不再支持这一数据。完成该研究的几位作者如此推测：某些特定情形——如居住于廉租房、离家出走或父母为外国人等——会使未成年人面临被性贩子剥削的潜在风险，并由此来得出他们的数字。然后，他们就简单地把所有遭遇这类情形的孩子数量进行了一下加总。使这一糟糕估算变得更加糟糕的是，每个同时属于多种情形类别的人都被多次计算了。 "PLEASE DO NOT CITE THESE NUMBERS," wrote Michelle Stransky and David Finkelhor of the respected Crimes Against Children Research Center in 2008. "The reality is that we do not currently know how many juveniles are involved in prostitution. Scientifically credible estimates do not exist." Michelle Stransky和David Finkelhor在2008年曾写道：“请不要引用这些数字”，两人均是广受尊敬的“针对儿童犯罪研究中心”成员。“现实情况是，我们目前并不知道有多少青少年卷入了卖淫业。科学上可信的估算尚不存在。” A lengthy 2013 report on child sex trafficking from the Justice Department concluded that "no reliable national estimate exists of the incidence or prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking of minors in the United States." 司法部2013年的一份关于儿童性贩运的长篇报告得出结论：“关于美国境内涉及未成年人的商业化性剥削和性贩运的发生频率或普遍程度，尚没有可靠的全国性估算。” Common sense should preclude believing the 300,000 number in the first place. If even a third of those "at risk" youth were peddled for sex in a given year, we'd be looking at nearly 110,000 victims. And since advocates often claim that victims are forced to have sex with 10, 20, or 30 clients a day, that would be—using the lowest number—1.1 million commercial child rapes in America each day. Even if we assume that child rapists are typically repeat customers, averaging one assault per week, that would still mean nearly 8 million Americans have a robust and ongoing child rape habit, in addition to the alleged millions who pay for sex with adults. 本来，从一开始，常识就应该能够阻止人们相信30万这个数字。即便这些“有风险”的少年人某年只有三分之一遭遇性贩运，我们看到的就会是11万受害者。又由于鼓吹者们通常宣称受害者被迫每天接客10、20、30人，那就是说，美国每天发生——用最小值计算——110万起商业性的强奸儿童案。即便我们假定儿童强奸犯都是典型的回头客，平均每周犯案一次，那也将意味着有近800万美国人拥有强烈且持久的儿童强奸嗜好，此外据称还有数百万美国人与成人发生过有偿性行为。 Common sense should also immediately cast doubt on another frequently cited statistic: that the average age at which females become victims of sex trafficking is 13. "If you think about it for half a minute, this statistic makes little sense," wrote Kessler. "After all, if it is the 'average,' then for all those who entered trafficking at age 16 or 17, there have to be nearly equivalent numbers who entered at age 9 or 10. But no one seriously believes that." 本来，常识还应该能够迅速令人对另一个经常被引用的统计数据起疑：女性成为性贩运受害者的平均年龄是13岁。“只要你花半分钟时间想想，这个数据就完全说不通”，Kessler写到，“要知道，如果它确实是‘平均数’，那么对应于所有那些16或17岁时遭遇贩运的人，必须得有几乎同等数量的人在9或10岁时就有此遭遇。没人会真诚的相信这一点。” Still, the obvious implausibility of the statistic—and its routine debunking—hasn't stopped it from reaching the upper echelons of public discourse. Kessler's own Washington Post ran it uncritically in 2014. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D–Minn.) made the claim on the Senate floor this year, citing the FBI. 这种数据明显不可信，且反复遭到驳斥，然而，这仍然无法阻止它们进入公共讨论的顶层。Kessler所在的《华盛顿邮报》本身就在2014年不加鉴别地登载过这一数据。今年，参议员Amy Klobuchar（民主党—明尼苏达）在参议院也做出同样的断言，引用的是FBI。 The DHS also asserts that "the average age a child is trafficked into the commercial sex trade is between 11 and 14 years old," sourcing it to the DOJ and the government's NCMEC. Yet none of these federal agencies take responsibility for this stat. 同样，卫生部也声称“儿童被贩运进入商业化性交易的平均年龄在11至14岁之间”，并称其来源为司法部和政府的全国失踪与受剥削儿童中心。然而，上述联邦机构中没有一个表示为这一数据负责。 When Kessler followed the facts down the rabbit hole, the original source in all cases was...the self-disowned Estes paper, in which interviews with 107 teens doing street-based prostitution in the 1990s determined that their average age of entry into the business was 13. 当Kessler追问事实，一直钻进“兔子洞”【译注：《爱丽丝漫游奇境记》典故】之后，才发现所有这些证词的最初来源都是……Estes那篇已被作者本人否定的论文；在该文中，针对1990年代107位从事站街卖淫活动的青少年的访谈就确定了他们的平均入行年龄为13岁。 "So one government agency appears to cite two other government entities—but in the end the source of the data is the same discredited and out-of-date academic paper," wrote Kessler. "It would be amusing if it were not so sad." “所以，看似是一个政府机构引用另外两个政府部门——但最终的数据来源则是同一篇已遭否定的过时学术论文，”Kessler写到，“真是令人啼笑皆非。” Author and former sex worker Maggie McNeill has traced other uses of the age-13 figure back to a similarly narrow and unrepresentative study, this one looking at underage streetwalkers in 1982 San Francisco ("Victimization of Street Prostitutes" by M.H. Silbert and A.M. Pines). Among these interview subjects from three decades ago, the average age of their first noncommercial sexual experience was 13. The average age of entry into prostitution was 16, and the report made no mention of sex trafficking at all. 从前曾为性工作者的作家Maggie McNeill也追踪考察了其它对于13岁这个数据的用法，发现它源自一个同样狭隘且不具代表性的研究。该项研究考察的是旧金山1982年的未成年街头妓女（M. H. Silbert和A. M. Pines的《街头卖淫的牺牲》）。在这些三十年前的受访者中，第一次非商业的性经历平均发生于13岁时。进入卖淫业的平均年龄是16岁，并且这篇报告压根没有提及性贩运。 Surveys of adults working in the U.S. sex trade have yielded much higher average starting ages. A 2014 Urban Institute study involving 38 sex workers found that only four began before age 15, 10 started between the ages of 15 and 17, another four started in their 30s, and the remaining 20 began sex work between the ages of 18 and 29. A 2011 study, this one from Arizona State University, found that of more than 400 women arrested for prostitution in Phoenix, the average age of entry was about 25. 针对美国成年性交易从业者的研究得出的首次从业年龄要高得多。城市研究所2014年一项涉及38位性工作者的研究发现，只有4个入行年龄小于15岁，有10个开始于15至17岁，另有4个是30岁后才开始的，剩下的20个是在18至29岁之间开始从事性工作。另一项亚利桑拿州立大学2011年所做的研究发现，在凤凰城因卖淫被捕的400多名妇女中，平均入行年龄约为25岁。 "Regardless of whether the number is 300,000 or 30,000, something must be done to protect these children at risk of exploitation and trafficking," said Moira Bagley Smith, a spokeswoman for Rep. Wagner, when Kessler challenged the figure. But it's exactly this kind of thinking that inflicts real-world policy damage. 当Kessler对前述数据提出质疑时，众议员Wagner的发言人Moria Bagley Smith说：“不管数字是30万还是3万，我们必须采取适当措施来保护这些处于被剥削和被贩运风险中的儿童。”但正是这种思维方式导致了真实世界的政策代价。 Whether there are 30,000 or 300,000 crime victims makes a great deal of difference in terms of fashioning an appropriate response, as does the context of the victims' circumstances. Separating the mythology of sex trafficking from the facts is crucial for addressing problems as they exist, not problems as we might want, fear, or imagine them to be. 在设计恰当的应对办法时，犯罪受害者是3万还是30万，区别很大，正如受害人的环境背景影响很大一样。将有关性贩运的神话和事实加以区分，对于处理现实存在的问题——而非我们想要、惧怕或者想象中的问题——至关重要。 WILLFUL HYPERBOLE 恣意夸张 A 2010 study from Rutgers University professors James Finckenauer and Ko-lin Chin took an in-depth look at Chinese women working in America's illicit massage parlors, which are routinely denounced by politicians as hotbeds of sexual slavery. 罗格斯大学James Finckenauer和Ko-lin Chin教授2010年的一项研究深入考察了在美国非法按摩院中工作的中国妇女；此类按摩院经常被政客们指斥为性奴役的温床。 Indeed, Finckenauer noted that 93 percent of the women he interviewed would be considered sex trafficking victims under common legal definitions, which include any person who arrives in a foreign country for sex work regardless of whether force or coercion is involved. 事实上，Finckenauer指出，在他所访谈的妇女中，有93%会被通行的法律定义界定为性贩运受害者，因为这一定义包括了进入异国从事性工作的任何人，不管其中有没有涉及暴力或强制。 Yet not one of the 149 Chinese women interviewed said she was sold into prostitution, and only one reported being forced or coerced into it. "There is more diversity among the parties involved in prostitution than is commonly supposed, and to portray them all in the same way as victims is an oversimplification," the researchers concluded. 但受访的149位中国妇女中，没有一位说自己是被卖为妓女的，且只有一位报告说自己是被殴打或强制沦为妓女的。两位研究者的结论是：“卖淫业涉及的各方参与者比通常所认为的具有更多的差异性，以同一种方式将他们作为受害者来描绘，这是一种过分简化。” Under federal law and most state laws, anyone under 18 who is engaged in prostitution is considered a sex trafficking victim. But study after study has found most youths in the sex trade do not have "pimps." And if they are forced or coerced into the work, it's often at the hands of a family member or romantic partner, not some child-snatching stranger. 在联邦法律和绝大多数州法之下，18岁以下从事卖淫业的任何人都被视为性贩运受害者。但一项又一项研究都发现，性行业中的绝大多数少年人都没有“皮条”。如果他们是被强制或胁迫进入这一行的，那么施暴者通常是某个家庭成员或情人，而非绑架儿童的陌生人。 Pimps themselves claim to steer clear of underage sex workers. In interviews with 73 people who had been incarcerated for crimes such as promoting, profiting from, or compelling prostitution, the Urban Institute found that most tried to avoid business relationships with teens (though these respondents, along with the police officers Urban interviewed, also claimed it was common for teenagers to lie about their ages). 皮条客自己也宣称，他们会避开未成年性工作者。城市研究所曾对73个因助推卖淫、获利于卖淫或强迫卖淫等类罪行而入狱的罪犯进行访谈，发现其中绝大多数都避免和青少年建立业务关系（当然这些受访者和城市研究所访问的警官们也都提到，青少年谎报年龄的情况很常见）。 "I was determined to stay away from the younger bitches; 16 gets you 20," said one respondent. "Bitch better have a felony charge and stretch marks to mess with me," said another. "I know she is grown and been to jail." 某受访者说：“远离低龄婊子，这一点我很坚决；16岁能给你带来20年牢。”另一个则说：“要跟我搞，那些婊子最好能身背重罪、长妊娠纹”，“这样我就知道她是成人，坐过牢”。 "This particular business ain't about pimps going to high school and recruiting a girl," said a third. "Government don't understand how this game original come about. Girl run away from home, look older than what she is. They think pimps are going out and enticing them." 另有一个则说：“这个特殊行当，不是说皮条客去高中招募少女”，“政府没搞明白这个游戏是怎么来的。这帮女孩自己跑出家门，打扮得比实际成熟。政府觉得是皮条客们四处出动、诱拐少女。” By any estimation, teen runaways make up a major proportion of underage individuals in prostitution, forced or otherwise. Runaways are especially likely to engage in what sociologists call "survival sex"—exchanging sex not for a set fee, but for food and a place to crash. 无论采取何种方式估计，离家出走的青少年都是从事卖淫的未成年人（无论被迫与否）的主要部分。离家出走者特别容易加入社会学家所称的“生存卖淫”——并不是为了固定的价格而出卖肉体，而是为了食物或过夜之处。 Sixty-eight percent of minors engaged in street-based prostitution in New York City say they've sought help from youth services organizations, according to Kate D'Adamo of the Sex Workers Project. "New York City funds roughly 200 beds for a population of 4,000 unaccompanied, homeless youth," D'Adamo told TechCrunch. "When all the beds are full, it is street economies like the sex trade which they turn to in order to provide basic needs. If we want to identify the most vulnerable, all we have to do is provide support when someone stands up and says 'I need a place to sleep tonight.'" 据“性工作者计划”的Kate D'Adamo所说，在纽约市从事站街卖淫的未成年人中，有68%自称曾向青年服务组织寻求帮助。D'Adamo向科技博客TechCrunch说：“纽约市向4000名孤独无家的年轻人资助提供了约200个床位”，“如果床位满了，为了满足基本需求，这些人就会求助于街头经济如性交易。如果我们想要找出最容易受害的人，我们只要做到一条：有人站起来说‘我今晚需要找个地方睡’的时候，我们能提供些帮助。” Instead, we fund police task forces to monitor Internet ads for weeks in search of suspect code words or tattoos. We pass laws mandating more prison time for pimps. We set up elaborate sting operations for both sex workers and their customers. 然而，我们却在资助警察特遣队持续数周对网络广告进行监视，搜寻可疑的暗号或纹身。我们立法要求延长皮条客坐牢年限。我们精心设计种种针对性工作者及其顾客的诱捕行动。 We hang "Are you being trafficked?" signs at strip clubs and highway rest stops, and train airport staff on how they can spot the signs of sex trafficking. We act as if sex traffickers are organized, jet-setting, diabolical, and legion. We are chasing our own mythology, to the detriment of actual results. 我们在脱衣舞酒吧和高速公路停车区悬挂“你是否遭到贩运？”的标牌，向机场工作人员提供如何发现性贩运迹象的培训。我们采取种种行为，好像性贩子们组织严密、生活奢华、暴虐残忍且数量众多一样。我们所追捕的，只是我们自己编的神话，真正的结果则是有害的。 A look at human trafficking investigations in the U.S. makes this clear. In July 2015, for instance, Homeland Security, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and other Arizona state agencies conducted a joint "human trafficking enforcement operation" that involved randomly stopping commercial trucks as well as running the license plates of passersby. 看看美国的人口贩运调查就清楚了。比如，国土安全部、亚利桑那州公共安全部及其它州政府机构于2015年7月共同实施了一项“人口贩运执法行动”，措施是随机拦截商用货车并检查过路者的牌照。 The 30-agent, nine-hour stunt resulted in 28 stops, the checking of 5,576 license plates...and zero arrests for human trafficking. Police did arrest one woman for prostitution, however, and are continuing to investigate another who said she worked in "adult entertainment." 这场由30名执法官持续9小时的噱头行动拦截车辆28次，检查牌照5576次……而因贩运人口被捕的人数为零。不过，确实有一名女性因卖淫而被警察逮捕，另一名自称从事“成人娱乐”的妇女也将继续接受调查。 Last April, the FBI released its first crime data on state-based trafficking investigations. In the 13 states reporting for last year, law enforcement looked into a total of 14 human trafficking incidents, ultimately making a grand total of four arrests. 去年四月，FBI首次发布了各州贩运调查的犯罪数据。在去年提交报告的13个州中，执法者总共调查了14起人口贩运案件，最终共计拘捕4人。 Between 2008 and 2010, federally funded task forces investigated 2,515 suspected incidents of human trafficking, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. An "investigation" was defined as "any effort in which the task force spent at least one hour investigating" the incident. Of these cases, only 6 percent led to arrests. 根据司法统计局数据，在2008至2010年间，得到联邦资金资助的特遣部队共调查了2515起涉嫌人口贩运的案件。其中“调查”的定义是，“特遣部队至少花了一个小时来努力调查”某案件。在这些案子中，只有6%以拘捕结束。 From 2007 to fall 2008, federal dollars funded 38 sex-trafficking task forces, of which 15 found no confirmed victims or suspects, 14 reported between one and four cases, and nine reported more than five. Of the total 1,229 suspected incidents that year, sex cops found just 14 underage victims. 自2007年至2008年秋，联邦为38个性贩运特遣部队提供了资金，其中的15个没有发现任何经确认的受害者或嫌疑人，有14个报告了1至4起案子，9个所报案件在5个以上。在当年共计1229件涉嫌案件中，性警察们只找出了14名未成年受害人。 "Given the obstacles to locating victims in black markets" some disparity between estimated numbers and confirmed cases should be expected, wrote the sociologist Ronald Weitzer in a 2011 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology paper. But "a huge disparity between the two should at least raise questions about the alleged scale of victimization." 2011年，社会学家Ronald Weitzer在《刑法与犯罪学杂志》上的一篇论文中写道：“考虑到在黑市中找受害者要面临种种障碍”，估算数字和确证案件之前存在一定差别，这是可以预料的。但是，“两者之间的巨大悬殊至少应该引发人们的疑惑，反思此前宣称的受害者规模。” UNNECESSARY LEGISLATION 毫无必要的立法 Of all the myths and misinformation about sex trafficking in America, the most pernicious may be that our current laws are insufficient. Pushing his new Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, which passed last May, Sen. John Cornyn (R–Texas) declared that it would "provide law enforcement with the tools" to hold human traffickers accountable. 在关于美国性贩运的种种迷思和误报中，最有害的可能是，宣称现行法律不完善。参议员John Cornyn（共和党—德州）在推动其《贩运受害者正义法案》这一新法（已于今年五月通过）时曾宣称，该法案将“为执法机构提供了工具”，使他们能将人贩子绳之以法。 Another co-sponsor, Sen. Mark Kirk (R–Ill.), said the bill "gives police and prosecutors the tools they need to go after sex traffickers." Such statements—and there are plenty more—imply that we currently lack tough anti-trafficking laws. Yet for at least 15 years, federal policy makers and agencies have been continually strengthening these laws and increasing funding for their enforcement. 另一名联署人，参议员Mark Kirk（共和党—伊利诺伊），则称该法案“向警察和检察官们提供了追捕性贩子所必须的工具”。这些说法——还有很多——暗示，我们原先缺乏严厉的反贩运法规。然后，至少在过去15年间，联邦政策制定者和联邦机构一直在持续强化此类法律，并不断增加其执法资金。 Things really got going with the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000, though before this federal agents could bring human trafficking charges under various statutes, including the Mann Act (passed in 1910 to prohibit transporting a minor across state lines for the purposes of engaging in prostitution), the Tariff Act (passed in 1930 to ban importing goods made with forced or indentured labor), and various laws related to peonage, indentured servitude, and slavery. 这事在2000年就已经真正启动，当年通过了《贩运受害者保护法案》（TVPA）；即便在此之前，联邦机构也能通过各种不同法令对人口贩运提起控告，包括《曼恩法案》（1910年通过，禁止州际之间运送未成年人为娼）、《关税法案》（1930年通过，禁止进口由强迫劳工或契约奴工制造的产品）及其它各种与劳动偿债制、契约奴工制和奴隶制有关的法律。 But the TVPA, signed by President Bill Clinton in the waning days of his presidency, specifically established as federal crimes "forced labor," "sex trafficking," and "unlawful conduct with respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking." It also created a national Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and gave the feds authority to seize traffickers' assets. 但是，由比尔·克林顿总统在其任期的没落时期所签署的《贩运受害者保护法案》，明确将“强迫劳动”、“性贩运”和“事涉各类文件的助推贩运的非法行为”确定为联邦犯罪。它还创设了一个全国性的“监测和打击人口贩运办公室”，并授权联邦政府官员可没收人贩子的财产。 The TVPA's 2003 reauthorization gave law enforcement the ability to use wiretapping to investigate sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation, increased the minimum and maximum sentencing requirements for a variety of sex offenses, and instituted a "two strikes, you're out" rule requiring mandatory life imprisonment upon a second sex offense involving a minor, "unless the sentence of death is imposed." 《贩运受害者保护法案》的2003年再授权法案赋予执法机构以监听调查性贩运和儿童性剥削的能力，提高了一系列性侵犯的最低和最高刑罚要求，并建立了一条“两次就出局”的规则，要求对涉及未成年人的性侵犯再犯实施刚性的终身监禁，“除非已经处以死刑”。 The 2005 reauthorization added human trafficking to crimes that can trigger the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law, expanded asset forfeiture possibilities, and directed the CIA to study "the interrelationship between trafficking in persons and terrorism." It also increased funding for the prosecution of "persons who engage in the purchase of commercial sex acts." 2005年的再授权法案将人口贩运添加到了可以触发联邦《反欺诈与腐败组织》（RICO）法的罪行之列，扩大了财产没收的可能性，并命令CIA研究“人口贩运与恐怖主义之间的相互关系”。它还为起诉“参与购买商业化性行为的人”增加了资金。 In 2008, legislators enhanced criminal penalties for human trafficking and expanded what qualifies to include several new areas, including anyone who "obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of" anti-trafficking laws. It specified that in minor sex trafficking cases, "The Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years." And it significantly increased federal funding—doubling some appropriations and more than tripling others—for anti-trafficking efforts at home and abroad. The 2013 reauthorization increased federal involvement with state and local anti-trafficking efforts. 2008年，立法者提高了人口贩运的刑事惩罚，并扩大了限定条件，使之包含了几个新的领域，包括任何“阻扰、试图阻扰或以任何方式干扰或阻止”反贩运法规“实施”的人。它明确，在未成年性贩运案件中，“政府无需证明被告人知道该人未满18岁。”并且显著增加了国内外反贩运斗争的联邦资金——部分拨款是此前的两倍、其它则是此前的三倍以上。2013年的再授权法案增加了联邦在各州和各地方反贩运斗争中的参与度。 This year's Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act made soliciting paid sex from a minor a form of federal sex trafficking; established a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund into which anyone convicted of trafficking must pay $5,000; and lowered the evidentiary standard for proving trafficking charges. 今年的《贩运受害者正义法案》把引诱未成年人从事有偿性交易确定为联邦性贩运的一种形式；建立了一个“国内贩运受害者基金”，每个被定罪的人贩子都必须向其缴纳5000美元；并降低了证明贩运指控的证据标准。 The act also established that websites and publishers—from classified ad sites such as Craigslist to social media services such as Twitter and Reddit—may be charged with sex trafficking if any victim is found to have advertised there. And it created a "HERO corps" of military veterans who will work with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents to fight cybercrime, including "digital intellectual property theft" and "hidden marketplaces." 这一法案还明确，网站和出版商——从分类广告网站如Craigslist到社交媒体服务如Twitter和Reddit——一旦被发现有曾登过任何受害者的广告，则有可能面临性贩运指控。它还组建了一队由退伍老兵组成的“英雄警察”，与移民和海关执法局官员合作打击网络犯罪，包括“数字知识产权盗窃”和“隐蔽市场”。 Sen. Cornyn called it a "first step." 参议员Cornyn把这称为“第一步”。 The State Department's 2014 Trafficking in Persons report states explicitly that our current penalties for human trafficking "are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious offenses." Penalties for forced labor, involuntary servitude, or peonage range from five to 20 years without aggravating factors; possible life imprisonment with them. Sex traffickers can receive up to life imprisonment, and are required to serve at least 10 years in prison if the victim is under 17 and 15 years if the victim is under 14. Victims may also independently file a civil cause of action; something 117 have done since 2003, with a 75 percent success rate. 国务院2014年《人口贩运》报告明确说明，我们对于人口贩运的现行惩罚“足够严厉，与为其它严重罪行规定的惩罚相当。”在没有加刑因素的情况下，对于强迫劳动、非自愿劳役或劳役偿债的惩罚是5到20年；如果有加刑因素，可判终身监禁。性贩子最高可获终身监禁；如果受害者小于17岁，要求至少狱中服刑10年；如果受害者小于14岁，则是15年。受害者还可以独立提起民事诉讼；自2003年以来已有大概117起，其中75%成功。 In addition to federal anti-trafficking laws, states have been adopting a flurry of their own measures. In 2014 alone, 31 states passed new laws concerning human trafficking. Since the start of 2015, at least 22 states have done so. 在联邦反贩运法律之外，各州本身也一直在采用大量措施。仅2014年就有31个州通过了涉及人口贩运的新法律。2015年开年以来，已有至少22个州这么做了。 Echoing the policy choices of the drug war, one common trend in these laws has been harsher sentences for trafficking offenses, including new mandatory minimums. In Florida, helping a minor engage in prostitution in any way now comes with mandatory life imprisonment. In Louisiana, labor trafficking of a minor comes with a five-year mandatory minimum, and sex trafficking of a minor 15 years. In New Jersey, soliciting a minor for paid sex comes with a minimum $15,000 fine. Some states have also started adding "aggravating" factors that trigger higher penalties, such as the offense taking place within a certain distance of a school or group home. 如同禁毒战争中的政策选择一样，上述法律中的一个普遍趋势是，对贩运罪行采取更为严厉的刑罚，包括制定新的刚性最低刑期。在弗罗里达州，以任何方式协助未成年人进入卖淫业如今都将面临刚性终身监禁。在路易斯安那州，贩运未成年劳动力将面临最少5年的刚性刑期，而性贩运未成年人则是15年。在新泽西州，引诱未成年人进行有偿性交易将面临最低15000美元的罚款。有些州还开始增加能够触发更高刑罚的“加刑”因素，包括侵害发生于离学校或集体宿舍一定距离以内。 Another trend is adding trafficking-related offenses to those that get perps on sex-offender registries. Last January, Arkansas passed a bill requiring anyone convicted of trafficking in persons or "patronizing a victim of human trafficking" to register as a sex offender. Increasing criminal penalties on patrons, or "johns," has been hot in state legislatures, too. 另一个趋势是，将与贩运有关的犯罪行为归为需要对罪犯进行性犯罪者登记之列。去年一月，阿肯色州通过一项法案，要求一旦被定罪为贩运人口或“光顾人口贩运受害者”，就必须登记为性犯罪者。对顾客即“嫖客”加重刑事惩罚也一直是各州立法的热点。 In 21 states, "sex trafficking laws have been amended or originally enacted with the intent to decisively reach the action of buyers of sex," according to the anti-trafficking nonprofit Shared Hope International. In 2014, Michigan changed soliciting someone under 18 for sex from a misdemeanor to a felony sex offense. Florida recently stipulated that people found guilty of soliciting prostitution (from someone of any age) must do 100 hours of community service and attend "john school," where they will be educated on "the negative effects of prostitution and human trafficking." 据反贩运非营利组织“国际共同希望”称，在21个州中，“对性贩运法律的修订或全新颁布，意在决定性地打击性服务买家的行为。”2014年，密歇根州将引诱未满18岁者发生性关系由轻罪改为性侵犯重罪。弗罗里达州最近规定，犯有招妓罪（无论对象是何年龄）的人都必须做满100小时社区服务，并参加“嫖客学校”，在里面接受有关“卖淫和人口贩运的负面影响”的教育。 Expanding police/prosecutorial power to fight and profit from trafficking is also common. At least 21 states now allow police to use wiretapping in trafficking investigations. And many states allow asset forfeiture for those convicted of sex trafficking or prostitution. For instance, in Colorado, "every building or part of a building including the ground upon which it is situated and all fixtures and contents thereof, every vehicle, and any real property" are up for grabs if they've been used in conjunction with prostitution of any kind. 扩大警察和检察官打击贩运并从中获利的权力，这种做法也很常见。至少有21个州现已允许警察在贩运调查中使用监听手段。此外，许多州允许对获得性贩运或卖淫定罪的人实施财产没收。比如，在科罗拉多州，“每栋建筑或建筑的任一部分，包括建筑所在的土地，以及此建筑内的所有固定装置和内容物品，每辆车和所有不动产”都可以被拿走，只要它们曾被用于任何形式的卖淫活动。 The final category of popular new state laws seems predominantly concerned with "raising awareness," be it via classes for hotel employees, programs in school curricula, or signs posted in strip clubs. Dozens of states now require certain entities—from adult-entertainment businesses and job-placement firms to hospitals, rest stops, and airports—to post the National Human Trafficking Hotline number, or face penalties. In Georgia, failure to do so can result in fines of between $500 and $5,000. 各州流行的最后一类新法似乎主要注重“提高觉悟”，可能是通过为宾馆雇员开培训班，在学校课程中设置有关课程，或在脱衣舞夜总会悬挂标牌等。如今已有几十个州要求某些机构——从成人娱乐行业和职业介绍所到医院、停车场和机场——张贴“全国人口贩运热线”电话，否则就会被罚款。在佐治亚州，没做到这一点可能面临500至5000美元的罚款。 Federal agencies are also in the trafficking publicity game. In July 2015, the DHS announced the expansion of "awareness efforts to major airports, truck stops, and motorist gas stations across the country," where it will fund messages describing "the signs of human trafficking" on signs, video monitors, and shopping bags. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission conducted more than 250 human trafficking "outreach events" in 2013 alone. 联邦机构也参加了这一对人口贩运进行曝光的游戏。2015年7月，卫生部宣布要“在全国的主要机场、货车停车区和机动车加油站扩大提高觉悟的工作”，它将提供资金，在这些地方的标牌、显示器和购物袋上发布信息，内容则是“关于人口贩运的标志”。就业机会平等委员会仅2013年就举办了250多场人口贩运“宣讲活动”。 REFRAMING PROSTITUTION 重新界定卖淫 If there's no empirical evidence that domestic human trafficking is increasing, and the State Department says we already have adequate laws to go after traffickers, then what's driving this current legislative frenzy? 如果没有经验证据表明国内人口贩运在增加，且国务院说过我们已有足够法律来追捕人贩子，那么究竟是什么东西在驱动当下的这场立法狂潮？ One factor is opposition to prostitution, even between consenting adults. Since the 1990s, a coalition of Christian and radical feminist activists has been working to redefine all prostitution as sex trafficking. While the Clinton administration was unsympathetic to their efforts, they found a friend in President George W. Bush. 其中一个因素是对卖淫（即便是成人之间的自愿卖淫）的反对。自1990年代以来，由基督徒和激进女权主义者结成的联盟一直在努力，试图将所有卖淫都重新界定为性贩运。克林顿政府对这一活动并不热心，但他们在小布什总统那里找到了知音。 In a 2002 National Security Presidential Directive, the White House stated that prostitution was "inherently harmful and dehumanizing." Hence the administration's new rule: Non-governmental organizations receiving federal funds to fight human trafficking (or AIDS) must explicitly oppose prostitution. 在2002年的一份国土安全总统指令中，白宫宣布卖淫“本质上有害且令人丧失人性”。于是有了该届政府的新规则：接受联邦资金从事反人口贩运（或反艾滋病）事业的非政府组织必须明确反对卖淫。 "Prostitution is not the oldest profession, but the oldest form of oppression," a State Department publication from 2004 reads. The agency stated that "the vast majority of women in prostitution don't want to be there," that "few activities are as brutal and damaging to people as prostitution," and that "prostitution leaves women and children physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually devastated," with damage that "can never be undone." “卖淫并非最古老的职业，而是最古老的压迫形式”，国务院2004年的一份出版物如是说。该机构称，“从事卖淫的绝大部分女性都不愿意如此”，且“没有什么行为比卖淫更残忍、对人更具损害性”，以及“卖淫让妇女和儿童在生理上、心理上、情感上以及精神上受到摧残”，其伤害“永不可能恢复”。 "Since the early 2000s, anti-prostitution policies at the federal level have translated into increasingly aggressive state and local-level policing of sex workers and their customers," wrote Kari Lerum, Kiesha McCurtis, Penelope Saunders, and Stephanie Wahab in a 2012 article for Anti-Trafficking Review. Kari Lerum、Kiesha McCurtis、Penelope Saunders和Stephanie Wahab 2012年发表于《反贩运评论》上的一篇文章写道：“自21世纪初以来，联邦层面的反卖淫政策已经转变为州层面和地方层面针对性工作者及其顾客的日益严厉的整顿。” This conflation of trafficking and prostitution "has allowed for federal dollars to be used locally for anti-prostitution purposes," the authors noted. "Anti-trafficking raids, such as Operation Cross Country held annually since 2006, have resulted in the arrest of many sex workers nationwide using federal anti-trafficking dollars." 上述几位作者提到，这种对人口贩运和卖淫的归并处理，“已使得各地方将联邦资金用在了反卖淫这一目的上”，“反贩运搜查，比如自2006年以来每年进行的‘横越美国行动’，花费了联邦反贩运资金，结果只是全国范围内众多性工作者被捕。” The goal of Operation Cross Country, according to the FBI's website, is "to recover victims of child sex trafficking." In 2014, more than a dozen cities took part. Knoxville, Tennessee, to cite one participant, uncovered zero underage victims of sex trafficking, but it did arrest eight women for prostitution, four women for promoting prostitution, two women for human trafficking, and four men for solicitation. 根据FBI网站，“横越美国行动”的目标，是“找回儿童性贩运的受害者”。2014年有十几个城市参加了这一行动。只举一个参与城市为例，田纳西州的Knoxville，没有找到一个未成年的性贩运受害者，但确实因卖淫逮捕了8名妇女，因协助卖淫逮捕了2名妇女，因贩卖人口逮捕了2名妇女，因引诱卖淫逮捕了4名男子。 In Newark, New Jersey, one 14-year-old victim was identified and 45 people were arrested for prostitution or pimping. Richmond, Virginia, found no child victims but charged 26 people with prostitution and two with pimping. In Atlanta, dozens were arrested for prostitution, loitering, soliciting, and drug possession. 在新泽西州的Newark，确认了一名14岁的受害者，有45人因卖淫或拉皮条而被逮捕。在弗吉尼亚州的Richmond，没有找到一个受害儿童，不过有26人因卖淫、2人因拉皮条遭到控告。在亚特兰大，数十人因卖淫、街头游荡、招嫖及持有毒品而被捕。 Phoenix officials announced the most victims recovered: five minors and 42 adults. But dig beyond the press release and you'll see the adult "victims" included women willingly working in prostitution. Officers posing as clients answered these women's online ads and then apprehended them. 凤凰城的警官所宣布的受害者解救数目最大：5个未成年、42个成人。但往新闻发布之外再挖一挖，你会发现所谓成人“受害者”中包括了自愿卖淫的妇女。警官们假装顾客，回应这些妇女的线上广告，然后再逮捕她们。 One 20-year-old "victim" had her arm broken by the cops when she tried to flee. A 16-year-old victim was booked on prostitution charges when she refused to let officers contact her parents. After failing to secure emergency shelter for two adult victims who had no money and no identification, police returned them to the motel where they'd been apprehended "so they could try and arrange funds to get back" home. 某位20岁的“受害者”在试图逃跑时还被警察把手臂给扭断了。当一位16岁的受害者拒绝让警官联系其父母时，她被登记为受到卖淫指控。在为两名成年受害人寻找临时住所失败之后，由于两人既无钱财也无身份证明，警察又把她们送回了逮捕她们的同一家汽车旅馆，“这样她们能试着筹集回家的钱”。 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A MORAL CRUSADE 道德圣战的制度化 In a 2012 paper published in Politics & Society, Ronald Weitzer suggested that the 1990s anti-prostitution crusade has become fully "institutionalized" in the 21st century. "Institutionalization by the state may be limited or extensive—ranging from consultation with activists, inclusion of leaders in the policy process, material support for crusade organizations, official endorsement of crusade ideology, resource mobilization, and the creation of legislation and new agencies to address the problem," Weitzer wrote. Sound familiar? 在一篇2012年发表于《政治与社会》杂志的论文中，Ronald Weitzer认为，1990年代的反卖淫斗争在21世纪已经完全“制度化”了。他写道：“州层面的制度化既可能是有限性质的，也可能是全面彻底的——其内容包括征求活跃分子意见、将其领导人纳入政策过程、向斗争组织提供物质支持、为其斗争意识形态提供官方背书、资源动员、为处理这个问题而创设法律和新的机构等。”听着是不是很熟悉？ "Some moral crusades are so successful that they see their ideology fully incorporated in government policy and vigorous efforts by state agencies to combat the problem on their own," he noted. In other words, "the movement's central goals become a project of the government." 他还提到，“某些道德圣战如此成功，以至于它们的结果是，州立机构已经将这一斗争的意识形态完全纳入了政府政策和强力措施，自己扛起了与此问题作战的任务。”换句话说，“这一任务的核心目标已经变成了一项政府规划。” It's hard to think of a better representative of this institutionalization than the Polaris Project, one of America's biggest anti-trafficking groups. Founded by a man who now runs the website Everyday Feminism and a woman who now works for the federal government, Polaris has drafted multi-pronged model legislation for the taking. Compare Polaris' recommendations with state trafficking laws, and you'll find near verbatim language in some, and shared assumptions and goals in almost all. 很难想到还有什么例子能比“北极星项目”更好代表这种制度化了。它是美国最大的反贩运团体之一，其创立者为一男一女，前者目前运营着一家叫做“每日女权主义”的网站，后者现为联邦政府工作。“北极星”已经起草了多管齐下的示范法案，供人参考。拿“北极星”的建议与州反贩运法做个比较，你就能发现部分句子几乎一字不差，而且绝大部分辞句有着共同的预设前提和目标。 How did Polaris gain such influence? One way is through state "report cards." Advertised as a measure of states' commitment to fighting human trafficking, it's basically a measure of how closely their laws hew to the Polaris policy wishlist. Among the must-haves: a law requiring the display of the national human trafficking hotline number, which Polaris runs with funding from Health and Human Services. States that fail to enact all of the Polaris-endorsed policies wind up with bad grades, which the organization then publicizes extensively. “北极星”这么大的影响力是怎么来的？其中一个途径是通过发布各州“成绩单”。据宣传，这是对各州投身反人口贩运斗争努力程度的一种测量，但基本上测量的是各州法律在多大程度上遵守“北极星”的政策意愿清单。必要部分中有一条：立法要求张贴全国人口贩运热线电话，而这个热线是由“北极星”用来自卫生部的资金运营的。有些州没能将“北极星”支持的政策全部立为法律，最终得分就很差劲，并被该组织广为宣传。 Another driver of state trafficking policies is the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), a nonpartisan organization that drafts model state legislation in a variety of areas. In 2010, ULC was asked by the American Bar Association to prepare a plan for tackling human trafficking. The result was drafted in collaboration with Polaris, Shared Hope International, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the U.S. State Department, then approved by the bar association in 2013. 各州制定此类贩运政策的另一个推动力来自“统一法律委员会”（ULC），这是一个致力于在诸多领域起草示范性州法的无党派组织。2010年，美国律师协会请统一法律委员起草一个规划，以应对人口贩运问题。最终成果是由统一法律委员会与“北极星”、“国际共同希望”、“全国首席检察官联合会”以及美国国务院共同起草的，并于2013年获得律师协会认可。 In the first half of 2015, two states enacted laws based on ULC's model legislation and four others introduced them. Four states enacted ULC-based trafficking laws in 2014 with 10 more attempting to. 2015年上半年，已有2个州根据统一法律委员会的示范法案制定法律，另有4个州已发起提议。2014年有4个州颁布了以统一法律委员会为参考基础的贩运法规，另有10个州还在为此努力。 Among the model legislation's main tenets are court-ordered forfeiture of real and personal property for traffickers, providing "immunity to minors who are human trafficking victims and commit prostitution or nonviolent offenses," and imposing "felony-level punishment when the defendant offers anything of value to engage in commercial sexual activity." 该示范立法的核心原则之一是由法院下令对人贩子的不动产和个人财产实施没收，并“为本身为人口贩运受害者，同时犯有卖淫罪或非暴力罪行的未成年人”提供“豁免”，以及“当被告提供了任何有价值物品以进行商业化性行为时”，对其加以“重罪水平的惩罚”。 That last bit is part of what's known as the "end-demand" strategy, or the "Nordic model," which focuses heavier penalties on sex buyers than sex sellers. Popularized by Nordic feminists, it's since become the law of the land in Canada and is rapidly influencing American policy, with many religious-based anti-trafficking groups also adopting its rallying cry. As a result, cities and states around the country have begun increasing penalties for prostitution clients and rebranding them as sexual predators. In Seattle, for instance, the crime of "patronizing a prostitute" was recently rechristened "sexual exploitation." 这最后一点是所谓“终结需求”策略的体现之一，该策略又称“北欧模式”，注重对性服务买家而非卖家施加重罚。最早由北欧女权主义者普及，该策略在加拿大成为当地法律，并正在加速影响美国政策，许多从宗教角度反贩运的团体也在采用这一战斗口号。结果是，全国境内的诸多城市和州政府都已开始加大对嫖客的惩罚力度，并将他们改称为色情魔。比如，在西雅图，“光顾妓女”罪最近已被改名为“性剥削”。 The theory behind "end demand" is that if only we arrest enough patrons or make the punishments for them severe enough, people will stop trying to purchase sex. Voila! No more prostitution, no more sex trafficking. If that sounds familiar, perhaps you're old enough to remember the '80s, when a similar approach was supposed to bring down the drug trade. “终结需求”策略背后的理论是，只有逮捕足够多的顾客或对他们施加足够严厉的惩罚，人们才会停止去买春。瞧！卖淫不再有，性贩运也不再有。如果你对此听着耳熟，可能是因为你足够年长，还记得80年代的事，当时曾用过类似的办法，认为它能打倒毒品交易。 "Ending the demand for drugs is how, in the end, we will win," President Ronald Reagan declared in 1988. Indeed, it was how we were already winning: "The tide of the battle has turned, and we're beginning to win the crusade for a drug-free America," Reagan claimed. 罗纳德·里根总统1988年宣布：“终结毒品需求将是我们最终取得胜利的办法。”不，它是当时正取得的节节胜利的缘由所在，里根声称：“战争的风向已经变了，我们已经开始赢得这场斗争，走向一个无毒美国。” In reality, the number of illicit drug users in America has only risen since then, despite the billions of dollars spent and hundreds of thousands of people locked away. In 1990, for instance, 7.1 percent of Americans had used some sort of illegal drug in the past month, according to the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. By 2002 it had risen to 8.3 percent, and by 2013 to 9.4 percent. 事实上，从那时候至今，美国人中的非法毒品使用者数量只增不降，尽管我们花费了数十亿美元，关押了数十万人。比如，根据国家毒品滥用家庭调查，1990年有7.1%的美国人在过去一个月曾服用某种非法毒品。而到2002年，这一数字已经上升到8.3%，到2013年则升到了9.4%。 The utter failure to "end demand" for drugs hasn't dented optimism that we can accomplish the trick with prostitution. During the "National Day of John Arrests" each year, police pose as sex workers online and then arrest would-be clients. Each year, hundreds of men are booked in these stings and charged with offenses ranging from public indecency and solicitation to pimping and sex trafficking. If these anti-trafficking efforts sound a lot like old vice policing, that's because the tactics, and results, are nearly identical. 针对毒品的“终结需求”策略的彻底失败，并没能减少那种认为我们能够在卖淫问题上实现这一计策的乐观主义。在每年的“全国抓嫖日”期间，警察在网上假扮性工作者，然后逮捕企图嫖娼的客户。每年都有好几百男人落入这种圈套，然后被控犯罪，罪名从公共场合猥亵、招嫖到拉皮条、性贩运不等。如果这类反贩运做法听起来特别像是以前那种腐化警察，那是因为两者在策略和结果上都接近于雷同。 In a study released last year by Shared Hope International and Arizona State University, researchers examined end-demand efforts in four metro areas over a four-month period. Between 50 and 60 percent of these efforts involved police decoys pretending to be teens, and no actual victims. A typical tactic is for police to post an ad pretending to be a young adult sex worker, and once a man agrees to meet, the "girl" indicates that she's actually only 16 or 17. 在国际共同希望和亚利桑那州立大学于2014年发布的一项研究中，研究者们考察了四个大都市区的终结需求式措施，历时四个月。其中有50-60%涉及警察设套假扮青少年，没有实际的受害者。一个惯常策略是由警察登一个广告，假扮年轻的成年性工作者，要是有男人同意见面，该“女孩”再表明她实际只有16或17岁。 Shared Hope is candid about the fact that most of the men soliciting sex here are not pedophiles and not necessarily seeking out someone underage. But "distinguishing between demand for commercial sex acts with an adult and demand for commercial sex acts with a minor is often an artificial construct," its report asserted. 共同希望坦白承认一个事实，即此中招嫖的绝大部分男人并非恋童癖，也并不一定是在寻觅未成年人。但上述报告断言，“对两种需求加以区分，一边是与成人进行商业化性行为的需求，一边是与未成年人进行商业化性行为的需求，这种做法通常只是一种人为建构”。 So to save the children, we need to prosecute men who have no demonstrated interest in children, because in the future they may seek sex with adults who could actually turn out to be old-looking teens—got that? 因此，为了拯救孩子，我们需要起诉那些还没有表露出他们对儿童有兴趣的人，因为将来他们可能会与一些成人发生性关系，而后者可能只是看起来比较成熟的青少年而已——能看懂这种逻辑不？ "One shortcoming of the reverse sting approach is that no live victims are rescued from trafficking," Shared Hope admitted. "But it does take intended perpetrators of child sex trafficking off the Internet and off the streets." 共同希望承认：“这种反向设局策略的一个缺陷是，没能救出陷于贩运之中的真正受害者”。“但它确实能将具有儿童性贩运犯罪意图的人从网上和街上移除。” Bipartisan Paranoia 双党妄想症 A federal war on prostitution doesn't play well with large segments of Americans. Fighting human trafficking, on the other hand, is a feel-good cause. At a 2012 Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) speech, President Barack Obama insisted that we must call human trafficking "by its true name—modern slavery." And what kind of monster would be against ending slavery? Which brings us to another factor driving all this trafficking action: It makes politicians look good. 美国人中的很大部分对一场针对卖淫的联邦战争并不感冒。但是，打击人口贩运，则是一项令人观感良好的事业。在巴拉克·奥巴马总统于2012年“克林顿全球倡议”（CGI）会议上发表的一场演说中，他强调我们必须“按照其真实名称”来称呼人口贩运——“现代奴隶制”。你要是竟然反对结束奴隶制的斗争，你将是何等邪恶？这就给我们带来了驱动以上种种反贩运行动的另一个因素：它能让政客们很好看。 At a time when Republicans and Democrats can barely agree on anything, human trafficking bills have attracted huge bipartisan support. Here is an area where enterprising legislators can attach their names to something likely to pass. And if it doesn't pass, for whatever reason, it's ripe for demagoguery: "My opponent voted against a bill to fight modern slavery!" Tough-on-crime policies, particularly tough-on-drugs policies, used this tactic for decades, until mass incarceration finally lost its luster. 在这个共和党和民主党几乎不能在任何事情上取得一致的时代，人口贩运法案获得了极大的两党共同支持。这是一个法案还有可能获得通过的领域，有进取心的立法者们有可能将其名字附加在这些法案上。如果它没能通过，无论出于任何原因，它都很适合用于煽动群众。“我的对手投票反对了打击现代奴隶制的法案！”严打犯罪的政策，特别是严打毒品的政策，曾经将这个策略用了数十年，直到大规模收监办法最后黯然收场。 Undoubtedly, many lawmakers do legitimately want to help trafficking victims and hold bad guys accountable; political point-scoring is just a happy side effect. But a less happy side effect is a slew of bad laws, violated rights, and squandered money. The federal government has given away scores of millions in grant dollars for this quixotic crusade. 毫无疑问，确实有许多立法者真正地想要帮助贩运受害者，想要将坏人绳之以法；政治上得分只是一个喜闻乐见的副作用。但是还有个不那么喜闻乐见的副作用，即一连串的糟糕法律、受侵犯的权利和金钱浪费。为了这场唐吉可德式的十字军圣战，联邦政府已经拨出了成千上百万美元的款项。 The resources spent on prostitution stings and public awareness campaigns are resources diverted from mundane but more effective strategies for helping at-risk youth, such as adding more beds at emergency shelters. The State Department's latest Trafficking in Persons report notes that "shelter and housing for all trafficking victims, especially male and labor trafficking victims, continue to be insufficient." Advocates routinely say the biggest barrier to escape for many trafficking victims is simply a lack of places to go. 用于钓鱼抓嫖和提高公共觉悟活动的资源，转移自那些在帮助面临危险的青少年方面看起来单调平凡但也更为有效的策略，比如在应急收容所添加更多床位。国务院最新的《人口贩运》报告指出：“对于所有贩运受害者，特别是男性受害者和劳力贩运受害者，收容住所持续不足。”提倡者反复说过，对于许多贩运受害者而言，逃跑的最大障碍很简单，就是无处可去。 "Studies focused on New York City consistently report that homeless youth often trade sex for a place to stay each night because of the absence of available shelter beds," noted the Urban Institute in a report last year. "These figures are even more striking for LGBTQ youth...According to a survey of nearly 1,000 homeless youth in New York City, young men were three times more likely than young women to have traded sex for a place to stay, and LGBTQ youth were seven times more likely than heterosexual youth to have done so. Transgender youth in New York City have been found eight times more likely than non-transgender youth to trade sex for a safe place to stay." “聚焦于纽约市的研究一致表明，无家可归的青少年通常每晚都会以性关系换取住所，因为可用的收容床位不足。” 城市研究所去年发布的一份报告如此写道。“对于LGBTQ青少年群体来说，这个数字更为惊人……根据一份对纽约市近1000名无家可归青少年的调查，少男为找到住所而出卖性关系的可能性要比少女高出3倍，而LGBTQ青少年做这种事的可能性又要比异性恋青少年高出7倍。研究发现，纽约市的变性青少年为了安全住所而出卖性关系的可能性比非变性青少年要高8倍。” What's more, many of the policies in place to fight trafficking actively work against their own stated mission. The criminalization of prostitution keeps sex workers from reporting abuse and keeps clients from coming forward if they suspect someone is being trafficked. Victims themselves are afraid to go to police for fear they'll be arrested for prostitution—and indeed, they often are. 此外，已经实施的、用于打击贩运的许多政策明显对它们意图实现的使命产生了负面作用。卖淫入罪妨碍了性工作者报告所受虐待，并妨碍了怀疑某人遭到贩运的嫖客挺身而出。受害者本人也不敢去找警察，因为担心因卖淫被捕——他们确实经常因此被捕。 In 2012, 579 minors were reported to the federal government as having been arrested for prostitution and commercialized vice. Prosecutors say they need this as a "bargaining chip" to make the victims testify against their perpetrators. We're just using state violence and the threat of incarceration against children in order to save them! 2012年，在联邦政府收到的报告中，有579名未成年人因卖淫和商业化卖春而遭逮捕。检察官称，他们需要这么做，这是种“议价筹码”，能促使受害者出来为其作案者的罪行作证。为了拯救孩子们，我们正在使用国家暴力和收监威胁来对付他们！ Another misguided government target is the classified advertising website Backpage, home to many an "escort" ad. Lawmakers accuse the site of "profiting off of child exploitation," even though only a miniscule percentage of Backpage ads—which anyone can put up—are posted by traffickers rather than adult sex workers. 政府的另一个误导性靶子是分类广告网站Backpage，那是许多“应召”广告的老巢。立法者们指责该网站“从对儿童的剥削中牟利”，尽管网站上只有极小部分广告——任何人都可以发布——是由人贩子而非成人性工作者所发布的。 Both legislators and anti-trafficking groups have long been intent on shutting the site down. Yet "street-based sex workers, across studies, face much higher rates of violence than indoor sex workers," says Serpent Libertine, a Sex Workers Outreach Project (SWOP)-Chicago board member. "It's hard to understand how eliminating a low-barrier way to work indoors would promote safety." 立法者和反贩运团体一直以来都想要关闭这个网站。不过，Serpent Libertine却说：“不同研究都表明，站街的性工作者比室内性工作者遭受暴力的可能性大得多”，Libertine是“扩大对性工作者服务项目”（SWOP）芝加哥分支的董事会成员。“通过清除低门槛的室内工作途径，如何能够增进妓女安全呢，这委实难以理解。” Vera Lamarr, also with SWOP-Chicago, pointed out that Backpage cooperates with law enforcement in the U.S. more than many other sites do. "It's hard to understand the desire to take down a website that voluntarily supports efforts against trafficking and willingly cooperates with law enforcement," Lamarr says. "If Backpage closes, their user base could easily migrate to a less cooperative site" or be forced back out on the streets, where traffickers don't leave digital records. 同在SWOP工作的Vera Lamarr指出，Backpage与美国执法机构的合作比其它许多网站都要多。“很难理解为什么要关闭一个主动支持反贩运事业并愿意与执法机构合作的网站”，Lamarr说。“如果Backpage关掉，那他们的用户群可能会轻松地转移到另一个不那么合作的网站去”，或者被迫重新回去站街，街上的人贩子可不会留下什么数字信息记录。 But at least we're getting the really bad guys, right? That's also up for debate. Peruse trafficking arrest records and you'll find many folks like Amber Batt, an Alaska woman who faces 10 to 25 years in federal prison (plus a lifetime on the sex-offender registry) for running an escort service featuring adult women who freely elected to work there. 但至少我们正在抓那些真正的坏蛋，对吧？这一点也有待讨论。细检反贩运逮捕记录，你会找到许多人，比如Amber Batt，她是一位经营应召服务的阿拉斯加妇女，推销的是自愿选择在那里工作的成年妇女，她因此需要在联邦监狱服刑10至25年（再加上终身登记为性犯罪者）。 Or Julie Haner, a 19-year-old Oregon sex worker who was charged with trafficking after taking her 17-year-old friend with her to meet clients. Or Aimee Hart, 42, who served seven months in prison and faces 15 years on the sex-offender registry for driving her adult friend to a prostitution job. Or Hortencia Medeles-Arguello, a 71-year-old Houston bar owner arrested as the leader of a "sex trafficking conspiracy" because she allowed prostitution upstairs. 又如Julie Haner，她是俄勒冈一位19岁性工作者，因带着她17岁的朋友一起见客而被控贩运罪。又如Aimee Hart，42岁，因开车送其成年朋友去卖淫，已在监狱服刑7个月，并将持续15年被登记为性犯罪者。又如Hortencia Medeles-Aguello，休斯顿一位71岁的酒吧店主，因在其楼上容留卖淫，她被当作“性贩运团伙”的头目而遭逮捕。 There's Trenton McLemore, 29, who faces federal sex trafficking charges for "facilitating" the sex work of his 16-year-old girlfriend by purchasing the girl a cellphone and sometimes texting clients for her. He faces a mandatory minimum of 10 years and possible life in prison, thanks to a joint effort of Irving, Texas, police; Homeland Security; and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 还有Trenton McLemore，29岁，他因给他16岁的女友买了一个手机，有时还帮她给客户发短信，被认为“协助”其从事性工作，面临联邦性贩运指控。在德克萨斯Irving市警察、国土安全部、美国移民和海关执法局的共同努力下，他要面对的刚性最短刑期为10年，最高可能为终身监禁。 And Alfonso Kee Peterson, 28, arrested in July for telling a 17-year-old on Facebook that he could help her earn a lot of money from prostitution. The "teen" turned out to be a police decoy. Despite the absence of any real victim or any activity beyond speech, Peterson was charged with one felony count of human trafficking of a minor, one felony count of pandering, and one felony count of attempted pimping; he faces up to 12 years in prison. This important sting apparently warranted the work of several local police departments, the California Highway Patrol, and the FBI. 还有Alfonso Kee Peterson，28岁。因在Facebook上告诉一个17岁女孩他可以帮她通过卖淫赚一大笔，他于今年7月被捕。结果这个“青少年”是个警察诱饵。尽管没有任何真正的受害人，除言论之外也没有任何行动，Peterson仍被控三项重罪罪名，分别是性贩运未成年人、唆使作恶和试图拉皮条；他最高面临12年监禁。这个重要圈套显然让当地几个地方警局、加州公路巡警和FBI的共同工作看起来有了正当理由。 Even if we grant that some of this activity is unsavory, is it really the sort of behavior that warrants lengthy prison sentences and attention from federal agents? Since when is what adults—or even teenagers—willingly do with their genitalia a matter of homeland security? Is this really what President Obama had in mind at the CGI conference when he compared anti-trafficking laws to the Emancipation Proclamation? 即便我们承认上述某些行为确实令人讨厌，它们是否真的属于那种应该处于长期监禁惩罚、需要联邦机构来调查的行为？成年人——或者甚至包括青少年——愿意如何利用他们的生殖器这个问题，从什么时候开始已经成为国土安全事务了？这真的是奥巴马总统在“克林顿全球倡议”会上将反贩运法律和《解放黑奴宣言》作比较时心中所想吗？ "To be sure, linking trafficking and slavery could, in theory, surface important similarities between political economies of chattel slavery (largely) of the past, and modern-day trafficking," the American University law professor Janie Chuang wrote in a paper published in the American Journal of International Law last year. 去年，美利坚大学法学教授Janie Chuang在《美国国际法杂志》上发表了一篇文章，其中写道：“诚然，将贩运和奴隶制联系起来，在理论上可以使（大致上）发生于过去的传统奴隶制和现代贩运之间在政治经济结构上的重要相似点浮出水面。” "Drawing out such nuanced comparisons is not, however, the current trajectory of slavery creep. Instead, this version promotes an understanding of trafficking as a problem created and sustained by individual deviant actors, and thus best addressed through aggressive crime control measures." “但是，描绘这种微妙的对照并不是奴隶制恐慌的当下方向。相反，目前的恐慌助推了一种看法，认为贩运是由变态的个体行动者导致和维持的问题，因此最好用严厉的犯罪控制措施来处理。” For a fraction of the money spent on these measures, state governments or private foundations could fund more beds at emergency shelters. The resources that churches, charities, and radical feminists use trying to convince people that all sex workers are victims (and their clients predators) could go toward helping that minority of sex workers who do feel trapped in prostitution with job placement or getting an education. 只需拿出用于上述措施中的资金的一部分，州政府或私人基金就能为应急收容所提供更多床位。教会、慈善组织和激进女权主义者花了大量资源试图告诉人们，所有性工作者都是受害者（且他们的所有顾客都是侵害者），而这些钱本可以用于帮助性工作者中真正觉得自己受困于卖淫的少数人，帮她们介绍工作或接受教育。 For the vast majority of vulnerable sex workers, the greatest barriers to exit aren't ankle-cuffs, isolation, and shadowy kidnappers with guns, but a lack of money, transportation, identification, or other practical things. Is helping with this stuff not sexy enough? 对于绝大多数容易受到伤害的性工作者来说，离开这一行的最大障碍并非脚链、隔离或如影随形的持枪劫持者，而是没有钱、交通工具、身份证明和其它实用之物。在这些事务方面提供帮助是不是不够性感？ As it stands, many of those "rescued" by police or abolitionist groups find that their self-appointed saviors can't actually offer them housing, food, a job, or anything else of urgent value in starting a life outside the sex trade. Awareness doesn't pay the bills. 事实上，许多被警察和废奴主义团体所“营救”出来的人发现，她们面对的这些自命救世主实际上不能给她们提供住所、食物、工作或任何其它在性交易之外重新开始生活时紧迫需要之物。觉悟并不能用来支付账单。 Kamylla's story typifies this rescue paradox. A Texas mother who had fallen on hard times after an injury ended her construction career, she started working in prostitution last year. One day, producers from the A&E television series 8 Minutes contacted her, having seen her ad on Backpage. Kamylla的故事代表了这种拯救悖论的典型。Kamylla是一位德克萨斯母亲，她的建筑事业因一场事故而被迫终结，生活陷入困境，去年开始从事卖淫业。某天，因为在Backpage上看到了她的广告，A&E电视台的《八分钟》系列节目联系了她。 Though 8 Minutes was marketed as a reality show where a rogue pastor found and "saved" sex trafficking victims in real time, Kamylla and others (who were selling sexual services willingly, even if their situation wasn't optimal) actually talked with producers several times beforehand. The show promised to help with her overdue rent and finding a job, she says. After filming, they gave her $150 and told her they'd be in touch soon about further assistance. 这档节目是以真人秀的形式播出的，一位流氓牧师在其中发现并及时“拯救”了性贩卖受害者。但事实上，Kamylla和其他几个人（尽管她们的境况并不理想，但均为自愿出售性服务）事前已经多次与制片人交谈过。她说，这个节目答应会帮她解决房租逾期问题，并为她找个工作。拍摄之后，电视台给了她150美元，告诉她他们很快就会与她联系，商量后续援助问题。 They never called. When Kamylla followed up, the producers referred her to the same unhelpful social services she'd already tried on her own. Eventually Kamylla returned to Backpage, posting an ad using the same phone number that the producers had used to contact her. The first call she received was from an undercover cop, who arranged to meet her and another sex worker at a motel. Once the women agreed to oral sex for money, "he opened the door and nine police officers came inside the room," she says. Both women were taken to jail and booked on prostitution charges. 他们再没有给Kamylla打过电话。她去追究，制片方就让她去找她自己已经试过、但并不管用的社会服务机构。最终，Kamylla回到了Backpage，所登广告上使用的电话号码正是制片方曾拿来联络她的那个。她接到的第一个电话来自一个卧底警察，后者约她和另外一个性工作者在一家汽车旅馆见面。两个女人才答应收钱给他做口交，“他就把门打开了，一下进来9个警官”，她说。两人均被关进监狱，并以被控卖淫而被登记在案。 In a world with no gray areas—one where traffickers are always evil predators and victims always utterly helpless, where sex workers are never ambivalently engaged with their work, and the bright line between teendom and adulthood is always apparent and meaningful—in this world, the raid-and-rescue model of addressing sex trafficking may make some sense. You don't give a girl chained to a bed a condom and call it a day. 在一个没有灰色地带的世界里——里面的人贩子总是邪恶的侵害者，受害者总是彻底无助，性工作者从事其工作从未进退两难，青少年和成年之间的明确界限总是清楚明晰——在这样的世界中，处理性贩运问题时采用“搜捕拯救”模式可能还有道理。你不会丢个避孕套给一个被锁在床上的女孩，然后收工回家。 But in the world as it exists, sometimes a 17-year-old runaway chooses prostitution because it's better than living in an abusive foster home. Sometimes a sex worker gives all her money to a man because she loves him or thinks she needs him, or that he needs her. Sometimes a struggling mother doesn't love the sex trade, but finds it the best option to feed her kids. 但在现实存在的世界中，有时候，17岁的离家出走者会选择卖淫，因为这比生活于一个残暴虐待的寄养家庭要好。有时候性工作者会把她所有的钱财全部交给一个男人，因为她爱他，或者觉得她需要他或他需要她。有时候，一个苦苦挣扎的母亲并不喜欢性交易，但她觉得这是养活她孩子的最好办法。 Sometimes an immigrant would rather give hand jobs to strangers than face whatever drove her to leave her own country. Harm reduction strategies like handing out condoms in popular prostitution areas, offering STD tests, or even just facilitating online advertising (rather than street work) could prove lifesaving to these women. 有时候，某个移民宁愿给陌生人手交，也不愿意面对那些驱使她离开自己祖国的事情。降低危害的种种策略，比如在卖淫盛行地区分发避孕套，提供性传播疾病检查，甚至仅仅只是促进网上广告（而非站街工作），对这些女人来说，都可能是活命之举。 Yet when it comes to the way we talk about commercial sex, you have to be a victim or a predator. We've created a narrative with no room for nuance. We traffic not in facts but in melodrama. In TV broadcasts, campus panels, and congressional hearings, the most lurid and sensational stories are held up as representative. Legislators assure us that their intent is noble and pure. 但在我们讨论商业化性行为的方式里头，你必须要么是受害者，要么是侵害者。我们所创造出来的是一种没有给微妙差别留下任何空间的叙事。我们不是在事实中、而是在传奇剧中穿梭。在电视节目上、在校园会议上、在国会听证上，被拿出来作为代表的都是那些最为耸人听闻、最具轰动效应的故事。立法者向我们保证，他们的意图高贵而纯洁。 But remember: Tough-on-drugs legislation was never crafted or advertised as a means to send poor people to prison for life over a few grams of weed. It was a way to crack down on drug kingpins, violent gang leaders, evil crack fiends, and all those who would lure innocent children into addiction, doom, and death. 但是，请记住：立法严打毒品，从来就不是为了仅因几克大麻就把穷人终身关进监狱，这类法律并不是为此制定的，也没人这样宣称。它是为了镇压大毒枭、暴力团伙头目、邪恶的可卡因成瘾者和所有那些会引诱无辜少年毒品成瘾、遭遇厄运、走向死亡的人。 Yet in mandating more police attention for drug crimes, giving law enforcement new technological tools and military gear with which to fight it, and adding ever-stricter prison sentences and punishments for drug offenders, we unleashed a corrupt, authoritarian, biased, and fiscally untenable mess on American cities without any success in decreasing drug rates or the violence and danger surrounding an activity that human beings stubbornly refuse to give up. 但是，通过责令警方更加注意毒品犯罪，通过赋予执法机构新的技术工具和军需用品以打击毒品犯罪，通过前所未有地提高毒品犯罪分子的刑期和惩罚，我们在美国各城市释放出了一种腐败、专断、偏执并且在财政上无法维持的糟糕局面，却没能取得任何成功，无论是在减少毒品用量方面，还是在减少围绕这一人们坚决拒绝抛弃的活动而产生的暴力和危险方面。 Unless we can learn the lessons of our past failed crusades, the war on sex trafficking could result in every bit as much misery as its panicky predecessors. Here's hoping it won't take us another four decades to realize that this prohibition doesn't work either. 除非我们能从过去失败的圣战中吸取教训，反性贩运的战争就有可能以一种完全一模一样的结局收尾，其可悲之处与其恐慌前例会是一样的。只希望我们不会又一次再花40年才能意识到，这种禁令同样行不通。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-09-06】 @whigzhou: Airbnb的模式不知会不会复制到餐饮业，自己做菜的，忙乎两小时十分钟就吃完了感觉很亏，多做一人份的边际成本很小，还可以顺便聊聊天，甚至交些朋友，不过有个问题，其中相当大一部分可能很快会凝固成固定饭搭子，如果比例太高，那在商业上就难以成立了。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 当然，在缺乏人际信任的某国，怎么都不成立，即便有也会最终蜕变为共雇阿姨，而且据说这条路也堵死了，外卖网都禁止无门店商家入驻。 @MrsRobinson:伦敦颇有一些这样经营的“餐厅”，在自己家做饭，邮件通知、定位，再口碑传。我去过的人多的20多个客人，少的六七个，一人付四五十镑  

【2016-09-06】 @whigzhou: 好像很少有人提到这个事实：基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家里，有6个在阿拉伯半岛，仅仅是regression to mean吗？不太像  

【2016-09-04】 该微博因被多人举报，根据《微博社区管理规定》，已被删除。 @whigzhou: 这也太牵强附会了，巴西走进口替代封闭经济，高关税培育国内制造业，最后被外债拖死，贵汁走三来一补外向型，贸易盈余多到撑，这个差别怎么强调都不过分，被原po直接无视 @whigzhou: 拉美和东亚滑向不同模式也事出有因，其中之一是劳动力禀赋差异，拉美平均智商比东亚低不止一个标准差，卖劳力没比较优势 @轻舟知寒:卖劳力为什么需要智商高？ @whigzhou: 1）熟练工也是劳力，白领也是劳力，码农也是劳力，2）再劳动密集，也需要工头、班组长、工段长、技工、会计、业务员……3）就算最偏体力的行当，智商高的也比智商低的挣钱多，4）去开个工厂就知道了 @whigzhou: 5）如果劳动力禀赋足够好，那么一个从最初的低端卖劳力产业逐渐升级/丰满的过程便更可能发生 @mianmumohu:这么一说对党国又多了一份信心。 @whigzhou: 对啊，智商高的民族建设古拉格的能力也强，拉美非洲独裁者根本建不成古拉格～  

【2016-08-24】 @whigzhou: 当前各国（特别是欧日）央行往系统里拼命灌钱、毫无节制抬高杠杆的劲头实在有点疯狂了吧，照这么买下去，流通中的企业债全进央行了，日本央行甚至直接买股票，到明年大企业都变国企了，想想不久前他们还在痛责私人银行家头脑发热，事实证明，论无视风险制造泡沫的胆量，有谁比得过政府呢？ ​​​​  

【2016-07-19】 @隐藏的火星人:我就想问辉总，兼顾后果和公平的最好的策略是什么，对待绿化 @whigzhou: 宪法容许范围内可做的很多，比如停止穆斯林移民，犯罪移民驱逐出境（像瑞士），取缔国内赞助恐怖主义的组织，禁止国内政治组织接受伊斯兰主义组织或政权（比如沙特政府）的捐款，在公职人员中展开忠诚调查（即麦卡锡行动） @whigzhou: 从佛罗里达Boca Raton伊斯兰中心 ([[ICBR]])的例子可看出有多少早该做事情没做，ICBR与恐怖组织的关系确凿无疑，毫不掩饰，十几年来屡屡被联邦政府抓包和定罪，却始终活得好好的，不久前还被棕榈滩县选为投票点，直到本次惨案发生遭大量抗议后才换地方 http://t.cn/RtzHREz @whigzhou: 类似例子比比皆是，几乎是常态 【2016-08-24】 @whigzhou: 终于有动作了  

【2016-08-22】 @海德沙龙: 《被遗忘的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀》 1979年底，由中国支持的毛主义政党津民盟（ZANU）和由苏联阵营支持的津人联（ZAPU）联手打败罗德西亚政权，和所有成功掌权的革命政党一样，津民盟上台之后随即将矛头指向津人联，展开了一场大屠杀，并于1987年将津人联吞并，30年后，屠夫们仍安然在位。  ​​​​ @whigzhou: 穆加贝到现在还没想明白，我做的这么干净利落——权也夺了，同志也洗了，土地都分了，白人全赶跑了，甚至连万恶的金钱也消灭干净了——为什么得奖的不是我？