Real Reform for Detroit’s Kids 为底特律孩子做真正的改革 作者：Steven Malanga @ 2015-05-05 译者：babyface_claire（@许你疯不许你傻） 校对：hkustliqi 来源：http://city-journal.org/html/real-reform-detroits-kids-14433.html It’s time to break up the city’s dysfunctional school system. 是时候打破这座城市功能失调的学校系统了。 Even as it tries to revive itself after emerging from bankruptcy, Detroit faces a new crisis: it had to shut down many of its schools this week because of a sickout by teachers. The Detroit Federation of Teachers engineered the stoppage to pressure the Michigan legislature to agree to a $715 million aid package—without which, Detroit schools could run out of money by June. 即使底特律在摆脱破产之后试图重整，它还是面临着新的危机：由于教师的托病旷工，本周许多学校被迫关闭。底特律教师联合会策划了这次罢工，以便向密歇根州议会施压让它同意一个7.15亿美元的援助项目——没有它，底特律的学校在六月就会破产。 Michigan governor Rick Snyder wants to tie the aid to reforms that would bring new leadership to the troubled system, but some legislators are skeptical—with good reason. Snyder’s plan represents the fifth major reform agenda in the last 30 years for the Detroit Public Schools, which have been plagued by lousy leadership, a reform-resistant union, and a shortage of resources. Instead of a new plan for an old system, it’s time for Snyder and Michigan’s legislators to try something new. 密歇根州长Rick Snyder想把这个援助项目与一项改革挂钩，这项改革将把新领导班子引入这个陷于困境的系统，但是一些议员对此持怀疑态度——而且有很好的理由。Snyder的计划是过去30年里底特律公立学校的第五大改革议程，而底特律公立学校一直被糟糕的领导，抵抗改革的工会和资源短缺所困扰。 是时候让Snyder和密歇根立法委员会尝试一些新的方法，而不只是用个新瓶装旧酒。 Detroit’s public schools began their decline in the 1970s, as middle class residents fled the city. Even as the educational challenges increased, however, the system’s bureaucracy grew and grew. The board of education gained a reputation for financial mismanagement, fostering the impression that Detroit’s schools were being operated as a jobs program for adults, rather than to educate kids. 随着中产阶级逃离底特律，这座城市的公立学校从1970年代就开始衰退。尽管教育挑战加剧，这个系统的官僚主义却日积月累。教育委员会得到了财务管理不善的名声，造成了一种底特律的学校是以给成年人提供就业计划而运作，而不是教育孩子的印象。 By the late 1980s, the system ran a $180 million deficit, with a high school dropout rate of 50 percent and daily absenteeism averaging almost 20 percent of all students. The state brought in new management to stabilize the school system’s budget. 到1980年代末，教育系统有着1.8亿美元的财政赤字，高中辍学率高达50%，平均每天的缺席人数几乎占所有学生的20%。州里曾引进新的管理办法来稳定学校系统的预算。 Education reforms followed. Some principals gained the freedom to select their own curriculum and staff. A bitter teachers’ strike undermined these reform efforts, shuttering schools for 26 days in September of 1992. As one school board member told the press: “[The strike] hit the reform effort upside the head like a two-by-four.” 教育改革随后也被实行了。有些校长获得了选择他们自己的课程和员工的自由。一次激烈的教师罢工破环了这些改革措施，使得学校在1992年9月不得已被关闭26天。一个学校董事会成员告诉媒体，“（这次罢工）给了改革努力当头一棒。” The school district continued to drift. Controversy erupted when the board mishandled $1.5 billion in borrowed money meant to renovate schools. In 1997, then-governor John Engler proposed dissolving the board of education and turning the system over to a new group appointed by Mayor Dennis Archer. 学区继续脱离正轨。由于学校董事会对借来用于修缮学校的15亿美元管理不当，争议再度触发。1997年，时任州长John Engler提议解散学校董事会，把这个机构变成由市长Dennis Archer掌管的一个新部门。 In September 1999, however, the teachers struck again, this time for nine days, in opposition to Archer’s reform proposals, which included a merit-pay system tied to classroom performance. Archer wound up dropping the idea. 然而，在1999年9月，教师再次罢工，这次为期9天，以此反对Archer的改革提议。罢工提议包括了一个与课堂表现相关联的绩效工资制度。Archer最终放弃了他的改革设想。 Five years later, with the system showing little progress in educating students, frustrated Detroit residents voted for yet another reform plan, this time giving management of the schools back to an elected school board. That decision proved disastrous; the district’s finances quickly deteriorated. 五年之后，随着该系统显示出在教育学生方面进展甚微，沮丧的底特律居民投票支持另一个改革计划，这次把管理学校的权力还给了一个选举产生的学校董事会。这一决定被证明是灾难性的，该地区的财政状况迅速恶化。 In September 2006, teachers went on strike yet again, this time over proposals to freeze pay and require greater health-care contributions. By 2009, the district faced a $259 million deficit, as the new board failed to cut costs to respond to a rapid enrollment decline. Governor Jennifer Granholm seized control of the Detroit school district in February 2009 and installed a financial manager to right the ship. 2006年9月，教师再次罢工，这次针对的是冻结薪水和要求更多的医保缴款。到2009年，由于新的学校董事会在入学率快速下降的同时却没能消减支出，该地区面临着一个2.59亿美元的财政赤字。在2009年2月，州长Jennifer Granholm控制了底特律的学区，并指定了一个财务经理来挽回局势。 An audit discovered hundreds of employees getting paid for no-show jobs and salaries allocated to dead people. Obama education secretary Arne Duncan called the district a “national disgrace.” The system’s graduation rate had plunged to 25 percent, and in 2009, its students registered the lowest scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress tests since the exams have been given. 一个审计员发现有上百员工通过不用出勤的工作获得报酬，甚至有工资分配给死人。奥巴马的教育部长Arne Duncan称这个学区为“国家的耻辱”。这个学校系统的毕业率跌至25%。在2009年，它的学生得到了自从国家教育进展评估测试开展以来的最低分。 The state of Michigan has maintained control since 2009, but progress has been halting, in part because of the school system’s institutional dysfunction. The recalcitrant teachers’ union has successfully resisted many reforms. And Detroit’s bankruptcy, which left the city short of resources, hasn’t helped. Residents keep fleeing the city, and students keep leaving the school system. Enrollment is down to just 49,000, from 168,000 in 2000. 自从2009年来，密歇根州政府一直控制着学校系统，但是进展已经停滞，部分是由于学校系统的制度障碍。顽固的教师工会已成功抵制许多改革。底特律的破产，致使城市资源短缺，对此无所助益。居民一直在逃离这座城市，学生一直在离开学校系统。入学人数从2000年的16万8千跌落至仅有4万9千。 Facing these challenges, Snyder recently appointed the respected former bankruptcy judge Steven Rhodes to try and right the system’s finances. But Rhodes isn’t an educator, and Detroit’s kids desperately need better schools. Snyder should recognize by now that they won’t get them from the sclerotic and inept public system. 面临这些挑战，Snyder最近任命备受尊敬的前破产法官Steven Rhodes尝试修正学校系统的财政状况。然而Rhodes并不是教育家，底特律的孩子迫切需要更好的学校。Snyder现在应该意识到, 这些孩子不会从僵化且无能的公共学校系统得到良好的教育。 There is another way. In recent years, dozens of charter schools have been established in Detroit, attracting tens of thousands of city students. In fact, charter schools now enroll more students in Detroit than the public school system does. Snyder should aim higher—toward the complete elimination of traditional public schools in favor of an all-charter model. 还有另一种途径。近年来，底特律建立了许多特许学校，吸引着成千上万的城市学生。事实上，在底特律，现在特许学校比公立学校系统招收的学生更多。Snyder应该追求更高的目标，支持用一个全特许学校模式来彻底取代传统的公立学校。 Too radical? Not for New Orleans, which took this path after Hurricane Katrina, transitioning from its 120-school public education system to one dominated by charter schools. To bring about the transformation, New Orleans turned to the Louisiana Recovery School District (RSD), a state body instituted to take over failing schools. 太过激进？对新奥尔良来说不是。在卡崔娜飓风之后，新奥尔良采取这种方式把120所公立学校系统转化为一个特许学校系统。为了完成这次转变，新奥尔良求助于路易斯安那州复苏学区（RSD） 这一接管失败学校的州立机构。 After Katrina, the RSD became the public school operator in New Orleans. By 2007, some 60 percent of the city’s kids were enrolled in charters. New Orleans phased out its last government schools in 2015, effectively completing the changeover to an all-choice system. Graduation rates and test scores have rallied impressively. And it’s all happened in a network of schools that educates nearly as many children as Detroit does. 在卡崔娜飓风之后，RSD成了新奥尔良公立学校的管理者。到2007年，大约60%的城市孩子进入了特许学校。在2015年，新奥尔良逐步淘汰了最后的公立学校，有效的完成了向一个完全自由择校系统的转换。毕业率和考试成绩的上涨令人印象深刻。这都是发生在一个教育着与底特律同样多孩子的教育网络内。 Not surprisingly, charter schools in Detroit have their opponents. In fact, some critics are using the latest crisis to undermine charters, proposing to limit their ability to expand. Michigan should be doing exactly the opposite—phasing out Detroit’s reform-impervious public school system, encouraging local groups and charter operators from around the country to open more schools, and giving all Detroit residents the opportunity to escape the toxic grip of the city’s disastrous educational system. 不足为奇的是，特许学校在底特律有他们的反对者。事实上，一些批评家利用最新的危机来削弱特许学校并提议限制他们的扩张。密歇根州应该做的恰恰相反，逐步淘汰底特律无力改革的公立学校系统，鼓励地方团体和来自全国各地的特许经营者开放更多的学校，给所有底特律居民机会逃避这个城市有毒的灾难性的教育系统。 Steven Malanga is the senior editor of City Journal, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and the author of Shakedown: The Continuing Conspiracy Against the American Taxpayer. Steven Malanga是城市期刊的高级编辑，曼哈顿研究院的高级研究员，著有《勒索:对美国纳税人的持续阴谋》。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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America’s Opportunity City 美国的机会之城 作者：Joel Kotkin, Tory Gattis @ 2014-夏 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：babyface_claire（@许你疯不许你傻） 来源：City Journal，http://city-journal.org/html/america%E2%80%99s-opportunity-city-13662.html Lots of new jobs and a low cost of living make Houston a middle-class magnet. 许多的新工作和低廉的生活成本使得休斯敦成为一个对中产阶级有着强大吸引力的城市。 David Wolff and David Hightower are driving down the partially completed Grand Parkway around Houston. The vast road, when completed, will add a third freeway loop around this booming, 600-square-mile Texas metropolis. David Wolff和David Hightower正驱车行驶在部分完工的环休斯敦花园大道上。完工之后，这条宽阔道路会成为围绕这座蓬勃发展的600平方英里德州大城市的高速公路第三环。 Urban aesthetes on the ocean coasts tend to have a low opinion of the flat Texas landscape—and of Houston, in particular, which they see as a little slice of Hades: a hot, humid, and featureless expanse of flood-prone grassland, punctuated only by drab office towers and suburban tract houses. 住在海岸城市的唯美主义者通常不喜欢平坦的德州地貌——尤其是休斯敦的地貌，他们将之视为一小片地狱：一片炎热潮湿且毫无特点的广阔区域，有洪水泛滥的草地，点缀着单调的办公大楼和郊区风格的大片房屋。 But Wolff and Hightower, major land developers on Houston’s outskirts for four decades, have a different outlook. “We may not have all the scenery of a place like California,” notes the 73-year-old Wolff, who is also part owner of the San Francisco Giants. “But growth makes up for a lot of imperfections.” 但是作为从业四十年的休斯敦郊区主要土地开发商，Wolff和Hightower有着不同的观点。“我们或许没有像加州那样的全部景色，”同时也是旧金山巨人队的共有者的73岁的Wolff提到。“但是经济增长弥补了许多不完美之处。” A host of newcomers—immigrants and transplants from around the United States—agree with that assessment. Its low cost of living and high rate of job growth have made Houston and its surrounding metro region attractive to young families. According to Pitney Bowes, Houston will enjoy the highest growth in new households of any major city between 2014 and 2017. 许多新来者——外国移民和美国本土移居者——都同意Wolff的评价。低生活成本和高职位增长率使休斯敦和周围城区对年轻家庭很有吸引力。据Pitney Bowes公司预测，2014年到2017年期间，休斯敦将会享有所有大城市中最高的新住户增长率。 A recent U.S. Council of Mayors study predicted that the American urban order will become increasingly Texan, with Houston and Dallas–Fort Worth both growing larger than Chicago by 2050. 最近一份美国市长委员会的研究预测，美国的城市秩序越来越德州化，休斯敦和达拉斯-沃思堡（Dallas–Fort Worth）的城市规模在2050年前都会超过芝加哥。 The Grand Parkway, Wolff points out, continues Houston’s pattern of outward development. The vast ExxonMobil campus being built in the far northern suburbs—and surrounded by its own master-planned community, Springwoods Village—will eventually be the nation’s second-largest office development, after Manhattan’s Freedom Tower. Houston is already home to numerous planned communities with bucolic-sounding names: Cinco Ranch, Bridgeland, Sienna Plantation, the Woodlands, and Sugar Land. Wolff 指出，花园大道延续了休斯敦的外向型发展模式。位于北部远郊正在修建的巨大的埃克森美孚校园最终将会成为仅次于曼哈顿自由塔的美国第二大办公楼, 周围环绕着埃克森美孚自己总体规划的社区，Springwoods Village。休斯敦已经拥有众多名字听起来田园风格的规划社区：Cinco Ranch, Bridgeland, Sienna Plantation, the Woodlands, 和Sugar Land。 “Open space is the most precious amenity,” says Wolff, a primary developer of the Energy Corridor, a Houston neighborhood boasting 22 million square feet of office space and housing the headquarters of such key energy firms as BP America, ConocoPhillips, and CITGO. “What we are creating here is a place where business can grow and people can afford to live. This is the key to Houston.” Indeed, the Houston model of development might be described as “opportunity urbanism.” “开放空间是最宝贵的生活设施”， 作为Energy Corridor——一个休斯敦社区，拥有2200万平方英尺办公空间并且容纳了诸多重要能源公司的总部，如BP美国、康菲和CITGO——主要开发商的Wolff 说道。“我们在这正在创造的是一个商业能发展、人们能有钱生活的地方。这是休斯敦的关键所在。”确实，休斯敦发展模式可以被描述为“都市化机会”。 Houston’s economic success over the past 20 years—and, more remarkably, since the Great Recession and the weak national recovery—rivals the performance of any large metropolitan region in the United States. For nearly a decade and a half, the city has been adding jobs at a furious pace—more than 600,000 since early 2000, and 263,000 since early 2008. 休斯敦过去20多年的经济成功——并且从大衰退和疲弱的全国性复苏以来越发明显——超过了美国任何其他大都市区的表现。在大约15年时间里，这座城市以极快的速度创造着工作机会——2000年初以来超过60万，2008年初以来为26.3万。 The greater New York City area, by contrast, has added just 103,000 jobs since 2008, and Los Angeles, Chicago, Phoenix, Atlanta, and Philadelphia remain well below their 2008 levels in total jobs. In fact, Los Angeles and Chicago, like Detroit, have fewer jobs today than they did at the turn of the millennium. 对比之下，规模更大的纽约都市区自2008年以来仅创造了10.3万份工作机会，而且洛杉矶、芝加哥、凤凰城、亚特兰大和费城的总工作机会远低于它们2008年的水平。事实上，正如底特律那样，洛杉矶和芝加哥现在拥有的工作机会已经少于世纪之交那时了。 And many of Houston’s jobs pay well. Using Praxis Strategy Group calculations that factor in the cost of living as well as salaries, Houston now has the highest standard of living of any large city in the U.S. and among the highest in the world. Indeed, the average cost-of-living-adjusted salary in Houston is about $75,000, compared with around $50,000 in New York and $46,000 in Los Angeles. 而且很多休斯敦的工作薪水颇高。根据实践战略集团（Praxis Strategy Group）的推算，同时考虑生活成本和薪资，休斯敦目前拥有全美所有大城市中最高的生活标准，而且也是全世界最高的城市之一。事实上，休斯敦按生活成本调整后的薪水是大约7.5万美元，相比之下纽约为约5万美元，洛杉矶为4.6万美元。 Personal household income has risen 20 percent since 2005 in Houston, compared with 14 percent in New York, 11 percent in Los Angeles, and less than 9 percent in Chicago. Former Federal Reserve economist Bill Gilmer notes that, except during the energy bust of the mid-1980s, Houston’s per-capita income growth has outpaced the nation’s since the late 1960s. 从2005年以来，休斯敦的个人家庭收入已经上涨20%，相比之下纽约为14%，洛杉矶为11%，芝加哥为不到9%。前美联储经济学家Bill Gilmer提到，自1960年代末以来，除1980年代中期能源业危机期间【编注：原油价格在1979年第二次石油危机期间升至顶峰，1982年开始下跌，1986年暴跌至1973年第一次能源危机前的水平，此后直到2005年之前始终未能回到历史最高点。】，休斯敦的人均收入增长已经超过了全美水平。 Not surprisingly, given Houston’s reputation as an oil town, much of the job growth in its metro region (known as Greater Houston) is tied to energy—particularly, to the technological revolution now reshaping that industry. Once widely derided as a “colony” of California- and New York–based companies, Houston has increasingly become the location of choice for American energy firms. 不出所料，考虑到休斯敦作为石油城的名声，这一都市区（被称为大休斯敦区）相当部分的工作机会增长跟能源有关——特别是跟正在重塑该行业的技术革命【编注：即页岩革命】有关。虽然曾被广泛嘲笑为总部设在加州和纽约的公司的“殖民地”，休斯敦已经越来越多的成为美国能源公司的总部所在地。 In 1960, for example, Houston was home to only one of the nation’s top energy firms; by 2013, it was home to 22 from the Fortune 500, more than all other cities combined—and that doesn’t include major non-headquarter locations for ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, and BP. This past spring, Occidental Petroleum, Los Angeles’s last major energy firm, announced plans to move to Houston’s Uptown district, near the famed Galleria. 例如在1960年，仅有一家美国顶级能源公司的总部设在休斯敦；截至2013年，22家世界五百强企业总部设在休斯敦，超过其他城市的总和——这还不包括作为埃克森美孚、壳牌、雪佛龙和BP的主要非总部所在地。今年春季，作为洛杉矶最后一个大能源公司，西方石油公司宣布了迁往休斯敦城郊区域的计划，靠近著名的Galleria商场。 Since 2001, the energy industry has been directly responsible for an increase of 67,000 jobs in Houston, and it now employs more than 240,000 people in the area. These jobs include many technical positions, one reason that the region now boasts the highest concentration of engineers outside Silicon Valley. 从2001年开始，休斯敦的能源产业已经直接产生了6.7万份工作的增长，现在该区域的能源行业已经雇佣了超过24万人。这些工作包含了许多技术岗位，一个原因就是这一区域的工程师密度现已成为硅谷之外最大的了。 Since 2001, Houston has seen a 24.1 percent growth in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) employment, compared with less than 5 percent growth in New York and San Francisco. The jobs should keep coming: Gilmer estimates that $25 billion to $40 billion in new petrochemical facilities is on its way to Greater Houston. 自从2001年以来，休斯敦在STEM（科学，技术，工程和数学）雇佣上经历了24.1%的增长，相比之下纽约和旧金山增长率不足5%。工作机会还会增长：Gilmer推测将有250亿到400亿美元的新建石化设施会在大休斯敦地区崛起。 “Oil and gas used to feel old, but that’s changing,” suggests Samina Farid, cofounder of Merrick Systems, a 25-year-old oil-services firm with 45 employees. “Younger people are coming into the business because they see opportunities to use new technologies that can really make a difference.” Farid’s firm is one of the thousands of smaller companies—including a group of new, tech-savvy start-ups—that serve the energy industry. “石油和天然气以前给人感觉很老气，但是它们正在改变，” Merrick Systems的联合创始人Samina Farid提到，Merrick Systems是一家拥有45名员工和25年历史的石油服务公司。“年轻人正加入能源行业，因为他们看见了应用能真正带来改变的新技术的机会。” Allison Lami Sawyer, the 29-year-old president of Rebellion Photonics, is part of a movement of younger professionals clustering in the area, many of them in the city’s inner ring. “I came here kicking and screaming,” said the British-educated Alabama native, whose nine-person company, mostly engineers and scientists, provides image-sensing equipment to firms such as Exxon. “But this was the place to be—it works well to be in the oil and gas capital of the world if that’s who you are selling to.” Allison Lami Sawyer，29岁的Rebellion Photonics总裁，是往该区域聚集的年轻专家中的一员，大部分年轻专家住在城市内环。“我当初很不情愿地来到这里，”这位受英式教育的亚拉巴马州土著说道，他的九人公司主要由工程师和科学家构成，为埃克森之类的公司提供图像传感设备。“但这是休斯敦以前的情况——如果你想在石油天然气的资本世界中兜售产品，休顿斯是理想之地。” Houston has embraced not only the energy industry’s white-collar professional jobs but also its well-paying blue-collar industrial positions. The city has seen a surge in mid-skills jobs (usually requiring a certificate or a two-year degree) in fields such as manufacturing, logistics, and construction, as well as energy. 休斯敦不仅拥有能源行业白领专家的工作机会，也拥有薪资不菲的蓝领产业工人职位。这座城市见证了诸如制造业、物流业、建筑业和能源业等领域内中等技能工作（通常要求一份执照或者两年的学位）的爆发性增长。 Many of these jobs pay more than $100,000 a year, and since 2007, according to calculations derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the Praxis Strategy Group’s Mark Schill, Houston led the 52 major metropolitan areas in creating them, at a rate of 6.6 percent annually. In contrast, these jobs have declined by more than 10 percent in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco, which have not been friendly to such industries. 很多这类工作的年薪超过十万美元，而且根据实践战略集团（Praxis Strategy Group）的Mark Schill对劳工统计局数据的分析，休斯敦从2007年起就以每年6.6%的中等技能工作增长率领跑52个大都市区。相比之下，纽约、洛杉矶、芝加哥和旧金山的此类工作已经减少了超过10%，这几个地区一直对这些行业不友好。 Trade is robust. The Port of Houston, connected with the Gulf of Mexico by the 50-mile Houston Ship Channel, is now the nation’s Number One export hub, feeding off the energy revolution and expanding economic exchange with Latin America. Mexico and Brazil are by far the port’s largest trading partners. 贸易正如火如荼。休斯敦港通过50英里的休斯敦航道与墨西哥湾相连，得益于能源革命和与拉美经济交流的扩大，现已成为美国的头号出口中心。墨西哥和巴西是目前休斯顿港的最大贸易伙伴。 Houston’s port business has grown almost fourfold since 2000—far faster than either New York’s or Los Angeles’s. Port officials estimate that the trade sector contributes $500 billion in economic activity and more than 1 million jobs to the state of Texas annually. 休斯敦的港口生意自2000年以来几乎已经增长四倍——远快于纽约和洛杉矶的港口。港口官员认为，港口贸易部门为经济活动贡献了5000亿美元的产值，而且每年为德州增加100万工作机会。 Houston is also home to the Texas Medical Center, the largest concentration of hospitals and research institutions in the world and, by itself, the metro region’s third-largest source of jobs—employing 106,000 people, including 20,000 physicians, scientists, and other professionals. 休斯敦也是德州医学中心（TMC）——世界上最大的医院和研究机构综合体的所在地，此中心也是该都市区第三大工作来源——雇佣了包括2万名医生、科学家和其他专家在内的10.6万人。 Fifty-two separate medical institutions are located on the campus, equal in size to Chicago’s Loop. It currently has over 28.3 million square feet of office space, more than the downtowns of both Houston and Los Angeles. By the end of 2014, TMC top officials predict, the area will be the nation’s seventh-largest business district. 52个单独的医疗机构位于与芝加哥环区同等规模的园区内。它目前拥有超过2830万平方英尺的办公空间，比休斯敦和洛杉矶的商业区都大。TMC的高级官员预测，这一区域将在2014年末成为美国第七大商业区。 Houston is neither the libertarian paradise imagined by many conservatives nor the antigovernment Wild West town conjured by liberals. The city is better understood as relentlessly pragmatic and pro-growth. 休斯敦既不是许多保守派想象中的自由意志主义者的天堂，也不是自由派臆想的反政府狂野西部城镇。这座城市更应被理解为是冰冷的实用主义的和促进经济增长的。 Bob Lanier, the legendary three-time Democratic mayor who steered the city’s recovery from the 1980s oil bust, when the metro region bled more than 220,000 jobs in just five years, epitomized this can-do spirit. Bob Lanier 是这种充满干劲精神的典型代表，当1980年代的休斯敦地区在短短五年内减少了超过22万份工作时，这位连任三届传奇般的民主党市长带领这座城市从石油业危机中恢复过来。 Lanier was more interested in building infrastructure and promoting growth than in regulation and redistribution. That focus remains strong today. “Houston is getting very comfortable with itself and what it is,” says retired Harris County judge Robert Eckels. “We are a place that has a big idea—supporting and growing through private industry, and that’s something everyone pretty much accepts.” Lanier更喜欢修建基础设施、促进经济增长，而不是推动立法、实行再分配。这种偏向现在仍然很强烈。“休斯敦对于自身现状很满意，”退休的Harris县法官Robert Eckels说道。“我们是一个有远大理想的地方——通过支持私营企业来实现自身发展，这是这里每个人都深以为然的道理。” Low taxes are part of that idea. Texas has no income tax, as Governor Rick Perry frequently points out to businesses in other states, and its average state and local tax burden is 11th-lowest in the nation. New York, New Jersey, and California, by contrast, impose the three highest state tax burdens in the nation. 低税也是这理念的一部分。正如德州州长Rick Perry经常给其他州的生意人所说的那样，德州没有所得税，而且它的平均州税和本地税负担是全美第11低的。相比之下，纽约、新泽西和加州是全美州税负担前三名。 The friendly tax environment is one reason that Houston ranked as the most affordable city to do business in a recent survey of global metropolitan areas by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Partnership for New York City. It means a lot more money in their employees’ pockets, too. A family of three making $150,000 moving from New York City to Houston would save upward of $8,000 in taxes, an analysis conducted by the District of Columbia found. 最近由普华永道（PricewaterhouseCoopers）和纽约合伙人（the Partnership for New York City）发起的全球都市区调查中，休斯敦被评为最容易做生意的城市，其中一个原因就是友好的税收环境。这也意味着更多的钱落进雇员的口袋里。一份由哥伦比亚特区主持的分析报告发现，一个从纽约搬到休斯敦的收入15万美元的三口之家可以省下高达八千美元的税费。 An even bigger component of Houston’s growth, however, may be its planning regime, which allows development to follow the market instead of top-down government directives. The city and its unincorporated areas have no formal zoning, so land use is flexible and can readily meet demand. 然而，休斯敦的经济增长可能更多来自它的规划制度，遵从市场规律而不是自上而下的政府指令来促进发展。休斯敦和周围未并入地区没有正式的边界，所以土地使用很灵活而且能很好地迎合需求。 Getting building permits is simple and quick, with no arbitrary approval boards making development an interminable process. Neighborhoods can protect themselves with voluntary, opt-in deed restrictions or minimum lot sizes. Architect and developer Tim Cisneros credits the flexible planning system for the city’s burgeoning apartment and town-home development. 获得建筑许可简单迅速，没有专横的审批委员会使得土地开发变成没完没了的恼人流程。社区可以通过自愿的可选的限制性契约或者最小批量方法来保护自己。建筑师兼开发商Tim Cisneros将这座城市迅速崛起的公寓和联排住宅的开发归功于灵活的规划系统。 “There are a lot of people who come here for jobs but don’t want to live, at least not yet, in the Woodlands,” he notes. “We can respond to this demand fast because there’s no zoning, and approvals don’t take forever. You could not do this so fast in virtually any city in America. The lack of zoning allows us not only to do neat things—but do them quickly and for less money.” “有很多人为工作来到这里，但却不想住在伍德兰（Woodlands），至少现在还不想。”他提到。“我们可以迅速对这种要求做出回应，因为这里没有区域划分，审批也不会耗时太久。事实上，你在美国任何其他城市都不可能如此快速地获得审批。无区域划分让我们不仅做实事，而且做得迅速且省钱。” The flexible planning regime is also partly responsible for keeping Houston’s housing prices low compared with those of other major cities. On a square-foot basis, according to Knight Frank, a London-based real-estate consultancy, the same amount of money buys you almost seven times as much space in Houston as it does in San Francisco and more than four times as much as in New York. (See “Houston, New York Has a Problem,” Summer 2008.) Houston has built a new kind of “self-organizing” urban model, notes architect and author Lars Lerup, one that he calls “a creature of the market.” 相比其他大城市，灵活的规划制度也在某种程度上使得休斯敦房价较低。据位于伦敦的不动产咨询公司Knight Frank统计，以每平方英尺计，你花同样的钱在休斯敦能买的空间几乎七倍于旧金山，四倍于纽约。（参阅“休斯敦，纽约有一个问题”，2008年夏。）建筑师兼作者Lars Lerup表示，休斯敦已经建立起了一种新型的“自组织”城市模式，他称之为“市场的产物”。 Some cities—such as Los Angeles—grow as a progression of larger communities around a relatively small core. Others—such as New York and Chicago—form dependent communities surrounding a dynamic central core. Houston is different: it revolves around a patchwork of centers, such as the aforementioned Woodlands, home to some 40,000 residences and more than 50,000 jobs. 一些城市——比如洛杉矶——发展成一系列围绕相对较小中心的较大社区。其它城市——比如纽约和芝加哥——则形成了依赖并围绕唯一动态核心的社区。休斯敦与两者都不同：它是围绕着一系列中心的拼图，比如说之前提到的拥有4万居民和超过5万份工作的伍德兰（Woodlands）。 Other centers exist within the city limits, but Houston also retains a strong core that never imploded, as did those of so many American cities. The city turns the whole debate that dominates urban thinking today—whether to grow the suburbs or downtown—on its head. Rather than advocate one kind of housing, Houston prides itself on providing choices. 城市边界内还有着其他中心，但是休斯顿也保留了一个从未衰退的强大核心区，正如许多美国城市那样。这座城市让左右今日城市思维的整个辩论——是发展郊区还是中心商业区——变得易如反掌。休斯敦自豪于提供各种住房选择，而不是大力推进任何一种住宅形式。 In fact, as the city’s outer suburban ring has grown—last year attracting roughly 80 percent of all new home buyers—the downtown has also boomed. The city’s vibrant inner ring, notes demographer Wendell Cox, grew 3 percent during the last decade—four times the average in the top 15 metropolitan areas and more than Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. 事实上，随着城外的郊区不断发展——去年吸引了约80%的新房买家——城区也在繁荣向前。人口统计学家Wendell Cox提到，这座城市生机勃勃的内环在过去十年增长了3%【编注：大概是指人口增长。】——4倍于15个大都市区的平均水平，也高于芝加哥、洛杉矶、纽约和费城。 “Most cities would die for our in-fill,” says Jeff Taebel, director of Community and Environmental Planning at the Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC). No one would mistake downtown Houston for midtown Manhattan, true; but it represents 6 percent of the region’s jobs—a proportion 2.5 to 4.5 times greater than one finds, say, in downtown Los Angeles or Phoenix. Houston’s experience refutes the popular notion that urban density and central city development require heavy regulation. “大部分城市都会渴望我们这种重建”休斯敦-加尔维斯顿地区议会（HGAC）中的社区与环境规划主任Jeff Taebel说到。没人会把休斯敦市中心误认为曼哈顿中心区，前者确实不如后者繁华；但是休斯敦市中心贡献了整个区域6%的工作机会——这一比例是洛杉矶或费城市区的2.5-4.5倍。休斯敦的经验驳斥了城区密度和中心城区发展需要严厉管制的流行观念。 Houston’s housing-market flexibility has also benefited some of the city’s historically neglected areas. The once-depopulating Fifth Ward has seen a surge of new housing—much of it for middle-income African-Americans, attracted by the area’s long-standing black cultural vibe and close access to downtown as well as the Texas Medical Center. 休斯敦房地产市场的灵活性也有益于部分历史上被忽略的地区。曾经人口负增长的第五区现在新房激增——很多新房都是为中等收入的非裔美国人所有，他们被该区长久的黑人文化氛围和靠近市区与德州医疗中心的位置所吸引。 Rather than worry about gentrification, many locals support the change in fortunes. “In Houston, we don’t like the idea of keeping an image of poverty for our neighborhood,” explained Rev. Harvey Clemons, chairman of the Fifth Ward Community Redevelopment Corporation. “We welcome renewal.” 许多当地人都支持这种财富转变，而不是去担心衰败社区的中产化升级会排挤贫穷居民。“在休斯敦，我们不喜欢那种保持自己社区贫穷形象的想法，”第五区社区重建局的主席，牧师Harvey Clemons解释道， “我们欢迎事物更新。” By allowing and encouraging development in the inner ring and on the fringe, the city increases its attractiveness to younger people, who want to live close to the urban core, while also providing affordable suburban housing. “Houston thrives because it has someplace for young people to stay inside the city but also offers an alternative when they get older. Just because you grow up doesn’t mean you have to leave the region,” notes Gilmer, now head of the Institute for Regional Forecasting at the University of Houston. 通过允许、鼓励内环和外围的发展，这座城市提高了对于那些想住在市中心附近的年轻人的吸引力，同时也为提供了其他人负担得起的郊区住房。“休斯敦之所以繁荣发展是因为它既提供了年轻人在城里生活的地方，也提供了当他们变老时的去处。你变老了并不意味着你必须要离开这城市，”休斯敦大学的区域预测学会会长Gilmer说到。 Houston’s explosive economic growth has engendered another kind of boom: a human one. Between 2000 and 2013, Greater Houston’s population expanded by 35 percent. In contrast, New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago grew by 4 percent to 7 percent. 休斯敦经济的爆发式增长已经产生了另一种形式的迅速发展：人口的增长。2000年到2013年期间，大休斯敦地区的人口增加了35%。相比之下，纽约、洛杉矶、波士顿、费城和芝加哥仅增长了4-7%。 These figures reflect emerging migration patterns. Texas once sent large numbers of people to California and the East Coast, but now, considerable numbers of New Yorkers, San Franciscans, and Los Angelenos are picking up stakes and heading for Houston, Dallas, Austin, and San Antonio. 这些数字反映了正在浮现的移居模式。德州曾有很多人去往加州和东海岸，但是现在，相当数量的纽约人，旧金山人和洛杉矶人正带着财产向休斯敦、达拉斯、奥斯丁和圣安东尼奥进发。 As it grows, Houston’s ethnic demography is shifting. Two decades ago, Houston struggled to attract foreign-born immigrants, as did Texas generally. But since the 1990s, Texas’s immigration rates have surpassed the national average. 随着休斯敦的发展，它的少数种族人口也在转变。二十年前，休斯敦很难吸引到外国移民，整个德州也普遍如此。但是自从1990年代以来，德州的移民率已经超过全国平均值。 Over the past decade, Houston added 440,000 foreign-born residents, the second-most in the country, while New York, with more than three times the population, added 660,000. In a dramatic sign of changing trends, Houston attracted more than three times as many foreign-born immigrants as did Los Angeles, which is more than double its size. 在过去十年里，休斯敦增加了44万外国出生的居民，数量全国第二，而有着超过三倍人口的纽约增加了66万。这种变化趋势的重要信号就是，休斯敦吸引了超过洛杉矶三倍的外国移民，而洛杉矶的规模是休斯敦的两倍。 “This is the big deal for immigrants,” suggests HGAC’s Taebel. “We are a very attractive place for working-class people to settle.” The immigrant surge has turned what was once a conventional Southern city into a multiracial melting pot. “这对移民来说是件大事，” HGAC的Taebel表示。“我们是一个非常吸引工薪阶层人们前来定居的地方。”激增的移民已经把一座曾经保守的南方城市转变为多种族熔炉。 Indeed, a 2012 Rice University study claimed that Greater Houston is now the most ethnically diverse metro region in America, as measured by the balance between four major groups: African-American, white, Asian, and Hispanic. Hispanics alone constitute nearly half the core city’s population, while the Asian population has surged almost fourfold; whites constitute barely a quarter of the total. The entire Greater Houston metro region—roughly 6.3 million people—is now 60 percent nonwhite, up from 42 percent in 1990. 事实上， 2012年莱斯大学的一份研究声称，通过衡量四个主要族群之间的平衡：非裔美国人、白人、亚裔和拉丁裔，大休斯敦区现已成为美国种族多样性程度最高的都市区。仅拉丁裔就贡献了核心城区人口的近一半，同时亚裔人口激增了几乎四倍；白人仅占总人口的四分之一。整个大休斯敦都市区——大约630万人——在1990年有42%是非白人种族，如今增长到了60%。 Houston’s new diversity is not confined to one neighborhood or district. Suburban Sugarland is over 35 percent Asian and home to one of the nation’s largest and most elaborate Hindu temples. “This place is as diverse as California,” notes David Yi, a Korean-American energy trader who moved to the city from Los Angeles in 2013 and lives in the suburb of Katy, west of the central core. 休斯敦如今的种族多样性并不局限在一个社区或者区域。郊区的糖城超过35%都是亚裔，还拥有美国最大最精美的印度寺庙之一。“这地方跟加州一样多元化，”韩裔美国能源交易商David Yi提到，他于2013年从洛杉矶搬到休斯敦并住在中心区西侧的凯蒂城（Katy）郊区。 “But it is affordable, with good schools. Our kids, who are learning Spanish, can afford to stay and have a house, which is not the case in California.” Pearland, located 17 miles south of downtown, has also become a draw for upwardly mobile minorities and immigrants. “但是这边房子是能支付得起的，而且有着很好的学校。我们正学习西班牙语的孩子也有能力留在这里并买套房子，而加州情况就不一样了。”位于市中心以南17英里的梨城也成为了吸引向上流动的少数族裔和移民的地方。 “This is very different from Dallas, where I grew up, which was very segregated,” notes African-American entrepreneur Carla Lane, president of Lane Staffing, which works with energy, construction, and other local firms. “My daughter has a totally different experience—many of her friends are white, Hispanic, or Asian. Living out in Pearland, you can have that experience, and then you cross Highway 6 and you see people with big hats, boots, and straw in the mouth. That’s Houston to a tee.” “这里与我从小长大的达拉斯很不同，达拉斯是各自独立的，”非裔美国企业家、Lane Staffing公司主席Carla Lane说到，Lane Staffing与能源、建筑和其他当地公司都有合作。“我女儿有着完全不同的经历——她的很多朋友是白人、拉丁裔或者亚裔。在梨城生活，你会有这样的体验，当你越过6号高速公路，你会看到戴着大帽子、穿着大靴子、嘴上还有稻草的人们。这恰恰就是休斯敦。” Immigration is driving growth but also creating new challenges. Though skilled immigrants are beginning to flock to Houston, observes former state demographer Steven Murdock, Texas’s immigrants also include many lower-skilled workers, primarily because of the state’s proximity to Mexico. 移民促进了经济增长但是也带来了新的挑战。虽然如前联邦人口统计学家Steven Murdock观察的那样，技术移民正开始蜂拥向休斯敦，但是德州的移民里也包括很多低技能工作者，主要因为德州靠近墨西哥。 Leaders in the petrochemical and construction industries complain about looming shortages in the skilled trades. A dearth of plumbers and electricians is already affecting construction of new housing, offices, and industrial facilities, impinging on developers’ ability to expand, despite a thriving housing market. 石化和建筑行业的领导者抱怨即将到来的技术行业人才短缺。尽管房地产市场火爆，但管道工和电工的短缺已经影响了新房子、办公室和工业设施的建设，限制了开发商扩大生产的能力。 “We have all these jobs but not the people in the pipelines,” says Marshall Schott, associate vice chancellor at Lone Star community college. “Sure, we have need for more geologists and engineers; but by an order of magnitude, we need skilled workers such as welders and machinists. These jobs pay $80,000 a year, a lot better than being a barista at Starbucks.” “我们有这些工作机会却没有可用之人，”孤星社区大学的助理副校长Marshall Schott说。“我们确实需要更多地质学家和工程师；但是我们更需要十倍数量的技术工人，如焊工和机械工。这些工作年薪8万美元，比在星巴克当一个咖啡师要好多了。” To address these shortfalls, many companies have invested in workforce training programs, some in collaboration with local high schools as part of “cooperative education,” where students go to school part-time and work part-time. “This is a typically Houston solution—very pragmatic,” Mike Temple, director of the Gulf Coast Workforce Board, points out. “We are trying to tell kids that it’s not only what you know but also what you can do.” 为了解决这些短缺问题，许多公司已经投资了劳动力培训项目，一些与当地高校合作作为“共同教育”的一部分，这些项目的学生半工半读。“这是很典型的休斯敦式解决方法——很务实，”墨西哥湾沿岸劳动力委员会主管Mike Temple指出。“我们正尽力告诉孩子，你不仅要懂得知识，也要运用。” Enrollment at Houston’s largest community college, Lone Star, has exploded 58 percent, to 78,000 students, in just the past five years, and the college expects it to reach 100,000 students by 2018. 休斯敦最大社区大学，孤星社区大学的注册人数在过去5年暴涨了58%，达到了7.8万名学生，而且它预期2018年会达到10万名学生。 Often attacked for under-investing in education, Houston has actually shown encouraging educational progress. Many of the schools in the outer rings, often predominantly white and Asian, perform well in state performance rankings. Houston Independent School District, the largest district in Texas and seventh-largest in the country, has won the Broad Prize for urban education twice. 虽然常被批评对教育缺乏投资，但休斯敦事实上已经显示出了在鼓励教育上的进展。外环的很多以白人和亚裔为主的学校在联邦成就排名中表现不错。作为德州最大、全国第七大的学区，休斯敦独立学区已经两次赢得城区教育大奖了。 Houston has also been called “the Silicon Valley of education reform,” with several highly successful charter school networks such as KIPP, Harmony, and YES Prep setting up shop in the city. 休斯敦也被称为“教育改革的硅谷”，有一些十分成功的特许学校网络在城里了设立办事处，如KIPP、 Harmony和 YES Prep。 These schools and others within the Houston Independent School District will have much to do with Houston’s future success, which, in Murdock’s view, will come down to “how well minorities are going to do.” Murdock is optimistic, in part, because Houston’s minorities share the city’s basic culture of faith in hard work as a means of upward mobility. 这些学校和其他休斯敦独立学区内的学校跟休斯敦未来的成功息息相关，在Murdock看来，这也会影响到“少数族裔未来的表现”。在某种程度上，Murdock对此持乐观态度，因为休斯敦的少数族裔继承了这座城市的基本文化，相信向上层流动的方法就是努力工作。 According to Rice University’s Houston Area Survey, 85 percent of Houstonians—including 79 percent of blacks and 89 percent of Hispanics—agreed with the statement “if you work hard in this city, eventually you will succeed.” Nationwide, this sentiment is shared by only 60 percent of those surveyed. 根据莱斯大学的休斯敦地区调查，85%的休斯敦人——包括79%的黑人和89%的拉丁裔——同意“如果你在这座城市努力工作，最终你会成功”的说法。而全国范围内，这种观点只有60%的被调查者认同。 Not everyone is impressed by Houston’s growth and prospects. Critics dismiss the city’s development model as a disaster for the environment, quality of life, and civic culture. For the most part, they regard Houston as a cultural desert—a throwback to the sprawling postwar model of many American cities. “When one asks to see the social center of Houston,” scoffs architect Andrés Duany, “one is taken to the mall.” 休斯敦的发展和前景并没有让所有人都印象深刻。批评者将这座城市的发展模型斥为一场环境、生活质量和城市文化的灾难。多数情况下，他们都将休斯敦视为文化沙漠——倒退回了许多美国城市战后那种无计划模型。“当有人想要看休斯敦的社会中心，”建筑师Andrés Duany嘲弄道，“他就会被带去商场。” But such statements don’t reflect a city where opportunity urbanism is shaping an impressively vibrant cultural landscape. A 2012 survey by Economic Modeling Specialists International (EMSI) of the city’s creative economy found 146,000 jobs, generating an annual economic impact of $9.1 billion. 但是这些说法并不能反映这座城市的真实情况，注重机会的城市化正塑造一种其勃勃生机令人印象深刻的文化地貌。一份2012年由国际经济建模专家（EMSI）对城市创新经济的调查发现了14.6万份工作，每年产生了91亿美元的经济效益。 Houston is projected to have the largest gain in arts-related jobs by 2016 of any city in the study. Arts and culture expenditures totaled almost $1 billion per year in 2010, with total event attendance topping 16 million—numbers sure to grow, with almost 150,000 people per year moving into Greater Houston. 研究预测，到2016年休斯敦在艺术相关工作上的收益会超过所有被调研城市。2012年全年的艺术和文化支出总计约10亿美元，活动参与总人数以1600万高居榜首——随着每年大约15万人移居大休斯敦地区，这个数目肯定还会增加。 The city boasts permanent professional resident companies in all of the major performing arts, including opera, ballet, symphony, and theater, and its theater district has more seats than any rival in the country, except for New York’s. Houston’s 18 museums attract 8.7 million visitors a year. This is no cultural backwater. 这座城市在所有主要的表演艺术领域都涌现了大批常驻专业公司，包括歌剧、芭蕾、交响乐和戏剧，并且它的剧院区拥有的座位比除纽约外的任何城市都要多。休斯敦的18个博物馆每年吸引870万游客。这才不是文化的倒退。 With their higher real incomes and lower taxes, Houstonians dine out substantially more than residents of any other major American city—and they’ve got lots of options. “You used to go to New Orleans for food and music,” notes Chris Williams of Lucille’s, a cutting-edge Houston restaurant that serves sophisticated Southern food. “Now you go down the block.” 因为有更高的收入和更低的税费，休斯敦人外出用餐的次数明显多于其他任何美国城市的居民——而且他们有多样的选择。“你过去习惯去新奥尔良寻访美食和音乐，”Lucille’s餐厅的Chris Williams说到，Lucille’s是休斯敦一家提供精致南方食物的高端餐厅。 Taylor Francis, a 24-year-old advertising executive who moved recently from the Bay Area, points to restaurants like Underbelly, a popular Beard Prize–winning restaurant in the fashionable Montrose district. “My friends in the Bay Area rarely go out because it’s too expensive,” he said. “All their money goes to rent—but here, I can live in a roomy place and go out. There’s something attractive about that.” Taylor Francis是一位24岁的广告经理，刚从湾区搬到休斯敦，他指着类似Underbelly（一家很受欢迎的位于时髦的蒙特罗斯区的餐厅，曾获Beard奖）的餐厅说，“现在你只需走过街区就能找到美食。”他说：“我在湾区的朋友很少外出娱乐，因为太贵了。所有的钱都用来付房租了——但是在这里，我可以住在宽敞的地方，也可以外出娱乐。这点很吸引人。” Houston’s leaders hope to lure more young people like Francis away from coastal cities such as Portland, Boston, New York, and Los Angeles. The city is building one of the nation’s most extensive bike systems and constructing a $215 million park system along its long-disdained bayous. 休斯敦的领导人希望吸引更多的像Francis这样的年轻人远离像波特兰、波士顿、纽约和洛杉矶这样的沿海城市。这座城市正在打造全国最大规模之一的自行车系统，而且沿着长时间被鄙弃的长沼建设着价值2.15亿美元的停车系统。 Marcus Davis, who grew up in the hardscrabble Fifth Ward, says that growth is simply part of the Houstonian ethos. “This place is pure opportunity, including for African-Americans,” he said at his successful and usually crowded restaurant, the Breakfast Klub, just outside downtown. 在贫瘠的第五区长大的Marcus Davis说，追求增长已是休斯敦人精神特质的一部分。“这地方是真正的机会之城，即使对非裔美国人来说也是，”他在自己位于市中心外的餐厅Breakfast Klub里如是说，该餐厅很成功且常常人满为患。 Davis’s customer base includes young professionals and middle-class families. “This is a place where everyone wants to figure out how to do business. And since Houstonians like to do things over food, having a restaurant can be very lucrative.” Davis的顾客组成中包括年轻专家和中产之家。“这是一个人人都想搞清如何做生意的地方。因为休斯敦人喜欢做跟食品相关的事情，所以开家餐厅是十分有利可图的。” The growth-friendly attitude is what holds everything together in Houston, and it will be crucial whenever the next slowdown comes—when oil prices could drop, say, to below $100 a barrel. It remains to be seen whether a large influx of newcomers to Greater Houston from the ocean coasts will clamor, as they have elsewhere—notably, in Colorado—for a more controlled, high-regulation urban environment. 增长友好的态度将休斯敦的一切凝聚在一起，无论下次的增速减缓发生在何时，这态度至关重要——比如说，当油价降至低于100美元一桶时。从沿海城市移居到大休斯敦地区的大批新来者是否会像别的地方一样，特别是科罗拉多，引发对城市环境更多管控的呼吁？尚不得而知。 For now, though, most Houstonians see the city as a place that works—for minorities and immigrants, for suburbanites and city dwellers—and few want to fix what isn’t broken. “The key to Houston’s future is to keep thinking about how to be a greater city,” notes David Wolff as he passes a new set of towers off the Grand Parkway. “This road, it wouldn’t be built in many places. People might talk about these things, but in most places, they don’t get done. In Houston, we don’t just talk about the future—we’re building it.” 然而就现在而言，大多数休斯敦人都认为这城市运转正常——对于少数族裔和移民，对于郊区居民和城市居民来说都是如此——无人想去修复那未坏的东西。“休斯敦的未来关键在于要不断思考如何成为一座更伟大的城市，” 当David Wolff在花园大道上经过一幢幢新大楼时说道。“在许多地方，这条路根本不会建成。人们或许会谈论这些事情，但是大多数地方都不会真正实施。在休斯敦，我们不仅仅谈论未来——我们正在创造未来。” Joel Kotkin is a City Journal contributing editor and the R. C. Hobbs Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University. Tory Gattis writes the Houston Strategies blog, which covers topics including transit, economy, quality of life, city identity, and development and land-use regulations. Joel Kotkin是《城市杂志》的特约编辑，同时也是查普曼大学城市研究R. C. Hobbs研究员。Tory Gattis撰写了《休斯敦策略》博客，主题涵盖了运输、经济、生活质量、城市身份和发展与土地使用规则。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

When Courts Compete for 'Business,' Liberty Wins 当法庭之间争夺“生意”时，自由就是赢家 作者：Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong. 那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的 Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it's curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn't that which produced liberty be up to preserving it? 考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果，很奇怪的是，现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢？ When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone's objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an "invisible hand." That's how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek's, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson). 当我说竞争产生自由时，我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了，就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的（和坏的）后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果（这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅）。 We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge unintentionally. It should give us hope for the future; if the libertarian movement is deficient, we need not assume that liberty has no chance. (I have more to say about liberty as an unintended consequence in the context of Magna Carta here.) 得知像自由那样美好的事物会非意图地产生，我们应该感到高兴。这会给我们的未来带来希望；如果自由意志主义运动是有缺陷的，我们却不必认为自由已经没有了机会。（关于自由在《大宪章》语境中是个意外产物，我还有更多的话要说，戳这里。） Many authors from the 18th century onward have written about the unintended good consequences of competition, i.e., the absence of central control. They emphasized that in the West the rivalries between church and state, between nobles or parliament and crown, and between nation-states yielded zones of liberty that endure to this day, however diminished in particular matters. 18世纪以来，许多作者已经描写过竞争（即中央控制的缺失）所带来的意外好处。他们强调，西方世界中教会和世俗国家的斗争，贵族或议会和王权的斗争，以及民族国家之间的斗争，产生了延续至今的自由空间，不管这一空间在一些特定方面衰减得有多么厉害。 Competition among legal institutions—courts and bodies of law—within overlapping jurisdictions played a large role in this centuries-long beneficent process. These of course are not examples of anarchism; on the contrary, states existed. But competitive overlapping legal regimes are an element of market anarchism. 管辖界限互相交错的司法制度——各法庭和各法体【编注：一个法体是指有着独特渊源和内在一致性的一组法律规则，比如衡平法、海事法、战争法分属不同法体。】——之间的竞争在这场持续数个世纪的有益历程中扮演了重要角色。这些当然不是无政府主义的例证，恰恰相反，国家是存在的。但是司法制度之间的交叉竞争是市场无政府主义的一个组成元素。 So where a state coexisted with a polycentric legal order, we may say, with Bryan Caplan, that there existed "less than the minimum" state, that is, something that fell short of the nightwatchman state favored by limited-government libertarians. 所以当一个国家存在一种多中心的法律秩序时，我们可以用Bryan Caplan的话来说，这里就存在着一种“比最小国家更弱一点”的国家，也就是说，比喜欢有限政府的自由意志主义者所期待的守夜人政府更弱一点的东西。 A good place to read about competition in law and dispute resolution is Todd J. Zywicki's highly accessible Northwestern University Law Review article "The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis." Todd J.Zywicki发表在Northwestern University Law Reviews上的文章“普通法中的效率兴衰史：一种供给侧分析”是一篇了解法律和争端解决机制中的竞争情形的深入浅出的文章。 An important feature that "influenced the common law's evolution," Zywicki writes, "was the competitive, or 'polycentric,' legal order in which the common law developed. During the era that the common law developed, there were multiple English courts with overlapping jurisdictions over most of the issues that comprise the common law. As a result, parties potentially could bring a particular lawsuit in a variety of different courts. In turn this created competition among these various courts for business." 一个“影响到了普通法进化的重要特征”，Zywicki写到：“是竞争性的，或者说是“多中心”的法律秩序，普通法就是在其中演化的。在普通法产生的时代，在构成普通法的绝大多数问题上都有很多管辖界限重叠的英格兰法庭（存在竞争）。结果就是当事人有可能从很多不同的法庭中选择一个来进行特定的诉讼。于是，这些法庭之间就产生了生意上的竞争。” The idea of courts competing for "business" sounds strange to modern ears, but it was commonplace before the 20th century. (The extent of private arbitration in international commerce is largely unappreciated.) 对于现代人来说，法庭在“生意”方面进行竞争这个想法听起来很怪，但是在二十世纪之前这是很常见的。（在这方面，私人仲裁在国际贸易中的普及程度并没有受到应有的注意）。 Zywicki's paper shows that the common law, which featured this competition, was efficient in the eyes of those who used its services. Monopoly is inefficient even (especially?) in matters of security, dispute resolution, and justice. Moreover, it's a mistake, as Hayek explains in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (volume 1)  to assume that government is the source of law. Zywicki的论文指出，有这种竞争特色的普通法在那些使用其服务的人们眼中是有效的。垄断性司法甚至（或者说尤其是？）在安全、调解纠纷和司法制裁方面都是效率低下的。此外，哈耶克在《法律、立法与自由》中指出，认为政府是法律源头的想法是极其错误的。 Moves away from competition and the common law, then, aren't adequately explained by shortcomings in its services to its consumers. Political ambition provides a more satisfactory explanation. (In the case of the criminal law, see this.) 因此，对司法竞争性与普通法传统的偏离，单从当事人所得服务有所欠缺这一角度是不能充分解释的。政治野心是一个更为令人满意的解释（至于刑法的情况，参见这里） Zywicki draws on the legal historian Harold Berman, who wrote, "Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems." Zywicki引用了法律史学家Harold Berman的话：“也许西方法律传统的最与众不同之处在于多样化的司法管辖权和多种法律体系在同一个共同体内部共存和竞争。” The legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller went further: "A possible objection to the view [of law] taken here is that it permits the existence of more than one legal system governing the same population. The answer is, of course, that such multiple systems do exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems." (Emphasis added.) 法哲学家Lon L.Fuller进一步指出：“对这种（法律）概念的一个可能的反对意见是，它允许多个司法体系管辖同一个人群。当然，对此的回答是：这样的重合体系确实存在，并且在历史上比一元化的（司法）体系更为常见”。 The limited-government libertarian who insists that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisiction is like the apocryphal aerodynamicist who calculated that a bumblebee couldn't possibly fly. One needed only to point out the window, saying, "Behold!" Likewise, the anarchist need only point to history. 有些相信有限政府的自由意志主义者坚持认为，市场无政府主义行不通，因为它缺乏能够实行最后裁决的垄断性法院。这就像假冒的空气动力学家计算得出大黄蜂根本无法飞起来一样。实际上我们只需要朝窗外指指说：“看呐！”。同样，无政府主义者只需要拿出历史事实。 Berman also wrote (quoted by Zywicki), "The same person might be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king's courts in another, his lord's courts in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court in a fifth, [and] a merchants' court in a sixth." This sounds as though the courts were not really competitive, but rather that the variety of courts constituted specialization and a division of labor. Berman又写道（引用自Zywicki）：“同样的一个人可能在某种案子中服从于宗教法庭，在另外一种案子中则可能服从国王的法庭，也可能是其领主的法庭，又可能是庄园的法庭，城镇法庭，甚至是商人法庭。”听起来好像各个法庭并不存在真实的互相竞争关系，不同法庭之间存在专业区分和劳动分工。 But that inference would be wrong. To see this we may turn to a keen contemporaneous observer, Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations Smith notes that despite a de jure division of labor, courts in fact competed with one another, even to the point of entrepreneurially finding ways to lure cases from other courts. 但是这样的推断是错误的。为了了解这一点，我们可以求助于同时代的一位敏锐观察者，亚当·斯密。在《国富论》中，斯密提到，尽管从法理上来说，法庭之间存在劳动分工，但事实上他们是相互竞争的，竞争甚至到了多方钻营以从其他法庭中诱拐案件的程度。 Why do this? Because the courts obtained their revenues from fees paid by parties to cases. The more cases a court heard, the more money it earned, a state of affairs that Smith, no anarchist of course, approved of: "Public services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them." 为什么要这样做呢？因为法庭的经费来自案件各方所支付的费用。一个法庭开审的案件越多，那么得到的金钱就越多，斯密当然不是一位无政府主义者，但他赞成这样的一种状态：“公共服务办好才给予酬劳，并且按勤勉的程度决定酬额，这样才能办好。” Smith described the legal environment of his day: 斯密这样描述他那个时代的法律环境：

The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. 英格兰各法院最初似乎主要仰赖于法院诉讼费。各法院都尽可能兜揽诉讼事件，那怕本来不是归自己管辖的案件，也乐于受理。例如，单为审理刑事案件而设的高等法院，居然接受民事案件，而以原告声称被告对他所行不义是犯了非法侵害罪或轻罪为受理的口实。 The court of king's bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognisance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognisance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king because the defendant would not pay him. 王室特别法院的设立，本来单是为了征收国王收入和强制人民偿清对于国王所欠债务的。但它后来居然受理关于一切其他契约债务的诉讼，原告陈诉的理由是，被告不偿还对他的债务，所以他不能偿还对国王的债务这个理由。 In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. 由于这种种的假托，结果许多案件，究竟归哪个法院审理，全由诉讼当事人选择，而各法院要想为自己方面多多招徕诉讼案件，也在审理上力求迅速公平。 The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for every sort of injustice. [Emphasis added.] 英格兰今日的法院制度，是值得赞赏的，但一探其究竟，恐怕在很大程度上须归因于往昔各法院法官的相互竞争，对一切不正当行为，各个力求在自己法院就法律许可的范围内给予最迅速最有效的救济这个事实。

Zywicki also quotes from Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence: Zywicki也引用了斯密在《法学讲稿》中的话：

Another thing which tended to support the liberty of the people and render the proceedings in the courts very exact, was the rivalship which arose betwixt them. 另一件倾向于支持人民的自由和使得法庭程序更为严谨的事务，是法庭之间的竞争关系。

It may be argued that the state provided a backdrop to the competitive legal order, such that a forum of last resort was always available. This argument loses its force, however, when one realizes, as Edward Stringham teaches, that private dispute-resolution procedures arose in matters where states abstained from involvement, such as the nascent stock markets. (For more on the weakness of the "shadow of the State" argument, see this.) 有人可能会认为，竞争性的法律秩序总有国家站在后面，因此终极的裁决平台总是存在。然而，就如Edward Stringham教导的那样：当国家放弃参与时，私人的纠纷解决程序才会出现，就像最初的股票市场那样。只要意识到这一点，上述论调就变得苍白无力。（关于“国家的影子”论调的弱点，详见这里）。 "In short," Zywicki sums up, "a market for law prevailed, with numerous court systems competing for market share in order to increase their fees. This competitive process generated rules that satisfied the demand of consumers (here litigants) for fairness, consistency, and reasonableness." “总而言之，”Zywicki总结道：“法律市场繁盛起来了，很多法庭系统为市场占有率和从中所获费用进行竞争。这一竞争过程产生了符合顾客（这里指诉讼当事人）对公平性、一致性和合理性的需求的规则。” Bumblebees fly and reasonably pro-freedom dispute resolution emerges without the state, no matter what a cloistered theoretician may think. 不论纸上谈兵的理论家们怎样思考，大黄蜂会飞，公道的、促进自由的纠纷解决方式无需国家也能产生。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Schizophrenia: No Smoking Gun 精神分裂症：缺乏“冒烟”的确凿证据 作者：Scott Alexander @ 2016-01-11 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Slate Star Codex，http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/01/11/schizophrenia-no-smoking-gun/ [Note: despite how some people are spinning this, tobacco is still really really bad and you should not smoke it] 【请注意：尽管许多人言之凿凿，但烟草真的真的还是很不好，不应该抽烟。】 I. Schizophrenics smoke. A lot. Depending on the study, about 60-80% of schizophrenics smoke, compared to only about 20% of the general population. And they spend on average about 27% (!) of their income on cigarettes. Even allowing that schizophrenics don’t make much income, that’s a lot of money. Sure, schizophrenics are often poor and undereducated and have other risk factors for smoking – but even after you control for this, the effect is still pretty strong. 精神分裂症患者抽烟，而且很多。根据某项研究，大约60%至80%的精神分裂症患者会抽烟，与之相比，总人口中只有约20%。而且，他们在烟草上的花费大约占到其收入的27%（！）。即便考虑到精神分裂症患者收入不高，这也是一大笔钱。无疑，精神分裂症患者通常都很穷、受教育程度不高，并且还有其他导致其吸烟的风险因素，但即便把所有这些都加以控制，精神分裂症与抽烟之间的统计关系还是很强。 Various people have come up with various explanations. Cognitively-minded people say that schizophrenics smoke as a maladaptive coping strategy for the anxiety caused by their condition. Pharmacologically-minded people say that schizophrenics smoke because smoking accelerates the metabolism of antipsychotic drugs and so makes their side effects go away faster. Pragmatically-minded people say that schizophrenics smoke because they’re stuck in institutions with nothing to do all day. No points for guessing what the Freudians say. 许多人已经为此提出过许多各种解释。关注认知的人说，精神分裂症患者抽烟，是对该疾病所致焦虑的不良应对策略。关注药理的人会说，他们抽烟是因为抽烟会加快抗精神病药物的代谢，从而能够促使其副作用更快消失。更为务实的人会说，他们抽烟是因为他们被困在了整日无所事事的社会福利机构里面。猜测弗洛伊德主义者的说法就没必要了。 But all these theories have problems. Sure, schizophrenics are often institutionalized, but even the ones at home smoke a lot. Sure, some schizophrenics are often on antipsychotics, but even the ones who aren’t on meds smoke a lot. Sure, schizophrenics are anxious, but we don’t see people with Generalized Anxiety Disorder having 80% smoking rates. 但所有这些理论都存在问题。毫无疑问，精神分裂症患者通常都被社会福利机构收容，但即便是那些散居在家的也抽很多烟。毫无疑问，有些精神分裂症患者经常服用抗精神病药，但即便是那些不服药的也抽很多烟。毫无疑问，精神分裂症患者很焦虑，但我们并没有在患有广泛性焦虑障碍的人群中看到80%的吸烟率。 As usual, I’m more biologically-minded, so I find it interesting that some of the genes that most commonly turn up as linked to schizophrenia – especially CHRNA3, CHRNA5, and CHRNA7 – are in nicotine receptors. Indeed, some of them are also the genes identified as risk factors for smoking. 我素来更倾向从生物学方面考虑，所以我发现了一个有趣之处，那就是部分最经常被与精神分裂症联系在一起的基因，特别是CHRNA3、CHRNA5和CHRNA7，都能在尼古丁受体上找到。 Further, there’s a lot of evidence that schizophrenic people actually feel better and have fewer symptoms when they’re smoking. Further, schizophrenics tend to gravitate toward cigarettes with higher nicotine content, and smoke them in ways that maximize nicotine absorption. 实际上，部分此类基因同时也被确认为影响吸烟的风险因素。此外，大量证据表明，精神分裂症患者在吸烟时确实会更加舒坦、更少症状。此外，精神分裂症患者一般会较喜欢尼古丁含量更高的烟草，而且吸烟时会设法尽量吸收更多的尼古丁。 It seems like part of the problem with schizophrenia is that the brain’s nicotine system isn’t working well. Smoking supplements nicotine and makes the system run smoother, so schizophrenics feel better when they smoke and continue to do so. This is the widely accepted self-medication hypothesis. 精神分裂症的问题似乎部分在于患者大脑的尼古丁系统运转不良。吸烟能够补充尼古丁，从而让这一系统运转更加顺畅，所以精神分裂症患者在吸烟时会感觉更加良好，并且乐此不疲。这就是受到广泛认同的“自发用药假说”。 I like this because it’s a really elegant example of…I don’t know what you’d call it…memetic evolution? Nobody knew that nicotine helped schizophrenia, nobody told the schizophrenics that, but they sort of naturally gravitated to an effective treatment for their condition by going in the direction of things that make them feel better, even going so far as to unknowingly gravitate toward cigarette brands with more nicotine. 我喜欢这一假说，因为它真是模因进化（我不知道你们如何称呼它）的一个极好例证。原先并没人知道尼古丁有助于缓解精神分裂症，没人这么告诉患者，但他们通过追随让他们感觉良好的事物，可以说是自然地找到了有效的治疗方法，甚至不自觉地偏爱尼古丁含量更高的烟草品牌。 They did all of this before psychiatry had any idea why they were doing it, and in the face of constant protests that it was stupid and useless. This should be a warning to anyone who’s too quick to tell patients that their coping strategies are maladaptive. 早在精神病学对其做法之缘由有任何了解之前，他们就已经在这么做了，尽管当时人们一直批评这种做法既愚蠢又无用。有些人会过于仓促地认为患者的应对策略调整不佳，上述事实应当能让这些人引以为戒。 But there’s a much more important question here: does smoking cause schizophrenia? How about prevent it? 但此处还有一个更为重要的问题：吸烟会导致精神分裂症吗？又会不会防止精神分裂症呢？ II. First, the causation argument. Gurillo et al do a meta-analysis and conclude that “daily tobacco use is associated with increased risk of psychosis and an earlier age of onset of psychotic illness. The possibility of a causal link between tobacco use and psychosis merits further examination”. That is, schizophrenics are already smoking much more at the moment their schizophrenia starts. This suggests that maybe smoking is helping to cause the schizophrenia? 首先来看因果论证。Gurillo等人做了一个荟萃分析，得出结论认为：“每日使用烟草与精神病风险的增加和精神疾病发病年龄的提早均有关。烟草使用和精神病之间存在因果关系的可能性还需要进一步研究。”也就是说，精神分裂症患者在初次发病时就已经在大量抽烟了。这是否意味着吸烟有可能增加患精神分裂症的风险？ All nice and well, except for a few things. First, this study ignores the possibility that the genes that cause schizophrenia might also cause increased smoking, even though we have some evidence that this is true (actually, it doesn’t ignore this, it mentions it, but uses it as a reason why a schizophrenia-smoking link is more plausible). 听上去很好，就是有一点点问题。首先，该研究忽略了一种可能性，即导致精神分裂症的基因可能也会导致烟瘾增加，而我们在这方面有一些证据。（实际上该研究并没有忽略这种可能性，而是有所提及，但只是把它作为精神分裂症与吸烟有关联这一说法更可信的理由）。 Second, we know that people who will later develop schizophrenia are seen as kind of odd even before they come down with the disease, and it’s possible that they’re already in some unusual brain state that smoking helps relieve. Third, this study is not controlled – meaning that we’re totally helpless before factors like “people destined to later develop schizophrenia are often poor, and poor people smoke more”. 第二，我们知道，有些后来得了精神分裂症的人早在得病之前就看起来似乎有点奇怪，可能那时候他们的大脑就已经处于某种不正常状态，而吸烟能帮助缓解这种状况。第三，该项研究没有进行对照控制，也就是说如果把某些因素考虑进去，比如“后来注定会得精神分裂症的人通常很穷，而穷人通常抽烟更多”等，我们就无力回答。 And fourth, another study shows exactly the opposite. 还有，第四，另一项研究有完全相反的发现。 Zammit et al (thanks to @allfeelsallthetime for the tip) looks at 50,000 teenage Swedish conscripts, then follows them throughout their lives to see which ones do or don’t get schizophrenia. They find that without adjusting for confounders, smokers are more likely to get schizophrenia. Zammit等人（感谢网友@allfeesallthetime提示）选取了50000个应征入伍的瑞典青少年，然后终身追踪他们，观察哪些会得精神分裂症，哪些不会。他们发现，如果不就混杂因子【编注：混杂因子是指同时导致A与B两个因子，从而使得A与B表现出相关性的因子。】作出调整，吸烟者便看起来更可能得精神分裂症。 But when you do adjust for confounders, smokers are less likely to get schizophrenia, (hazard ratio 0.8, p = 0.003) and heavy smokers are much less likely to get schizophrenia (hazard ratio 0.5)! A dose-dependent relationship was found between smoking and protection from schizophrenia. This is really interesting. 但如果你就混杂因子作了调整，吸烟者得精神分裂症的可能性相对就会较低（风险比为0.8，p=0.003），而重度嗜烟者患精神分裂症的可能性相对而言非常低（风险比为0.5）！在吸烟与避免精神分裂症之间居然找出了这种与剂量相关的关系，真是非常有意思。 Why do we find such different results from these two studies? The only explanation I can think of is that the second study controls for various factors including cannabis use, personality variables, IQ, past psychiatric diagnoses, and place of upbringing (thanks @su3su2u1 for the tip) and the first study controls for zilch. 为什么两项研究会得出如此不同的结论？我能想到的唯一解释就是，第二项研究对照控制了许多不同因素，包括吸食大麻、个性差异、智商、既往精神病诊断史、成长地点等（感谢网友@su3su2u1提示），而第一项研究没做任何控制。 In fact, we find that the second study’s uncontrolled numbers are not that different from the first study’s uncontrolled numbers, and that the only difference is that the second study then went on to control for confounders and get the opposite result. Controlling for more things is not always better, but controlling for a few things that previous studies and common sense suggest are very relevant is pretty superior to just leaving the data entirely unprocessed. Advantage very much second study. 实际上，我们发现第二项研究中未进行控制的因子数目跟第一项研究中未进行控制的因子数目没有多大出入，两者唯一的差别就是第二项研究进一步控制了混杂因子，然后就得出了相反的结论。控制的因子并不总是越多越好，但对此前研究和基本常识都认为，对非常相关的一些事项进行控制，比对数据完全不加任何处理的做法要好得多。第二项研究因而拥有压倒优势。 III. Unlike certain people on Facebook, I fucking hate science. Let me explain why. 跟Facebook上的某些人不同，我真他妈讨厌科学。让我来解释解释。 The first study here, Gurillo et al, was published ten years after the second study. Since it is a meta-analysis, it included the second study in it. The authors of the first study definitely read the second study. They just didn’t care. 此处提到的Gurillo等人所做的第一项研究，发表于第二项研究完成后的10年之后。由于它是一个荟萃分析，所以它的对象包括了第二项研究。该研究的作者们必定读过第二项研究。他们只是毫不在乎。 Nowhere in the first study does it say “By the way, we read this other study that got the opposite results from us, let’s try to figure out why, oh, it was because they controlled for things and we didn’t, maybe that should call our findings into question.” 第一项研究从未在任何地方说过：“此外，我们读到了另外一项研究，其结论与我们的正相对立；我们来看看原因是什么，哦，原来是因为他们对一些事项进行了控制而我们没有，这也许会对我们的发现构成质疑。” You know what they did do? They listed the second study as finding that smoking increased schizophrenia risk, because the rules of their meta-analysis said they would only take uncontrolled data, and so they did. You can read this entire study, which cites the second study no fewer than six times, without hearing at all about the fact that the second study got the opposite result using likely better methodology. 你知道他们实际干了什么吗？他们将第二项研究列为吸烟增加精神分裂症患病风险的发现之一，因为他们做荟萃分析的一项原则是只采用未控制的数据，他们也真是这么做的。你们可以读读其全文，它引用第二项研究不下六次，但在任何地方你都看不到它提及第二项研究利用可能更好的方法得出了完全相反的结论这一事实。 Then they go on to conclude that: 然后，他们在结论中说：

Cigarette smoking might be a hitherto neglected modifiable risk factor for psychosis, but confounding and reverse causality are possible. Notwithstanding, in view of the clear benefits of smoking cessation programs in this population, every effort should be made to implement change in smoking habits in this group of patients. 吸烟可能是引发精神病的可改造风险因素之一，这一点迄今为止一直为人所忽略。但是，混杂偏差和反向因果关系也有可能存在。尽管如此，考虑到在这一人群中实施戒烟计划的明显好处，我们应该全面努力，促使这一病患群体改变吸烟习惯。

Clear benefits! Every effort! Aaaaaaah! 明显好处！全面努力！啊哈哈哈哈！ I mean, I know where they (and the Lancet editors, who write a glowing comment backing them up) are coming from. Smoking is bad because lung cancer, COPD, etc. But now we have these things called e-cigarettes! They deliver nicotine without tobacco! As far as anyone knows they carry vastly less risk of cancer, COPD, etc. If nicotine actually prevents schizophrenia rather than causing it, that is the sort of thing we should really want to know. And instead we’re just getting this “We should make schizophrenia patients stop smoking, because smoking is bad”. 我说，我知道他们（以及《柳叶刀》的编辑们，他们写了篇热情洋溢的评论支持前者）的出发点在哪儿。吸烟不好，因为会导致肺癌、慢性阻塞性肺炎等等。但我们现在已经有了所谓的电子烟！它们无需烟草就能提供尼古丁。如果尼古丁确实会预防而不是导致精神分裂症，这种事应该是我们确实想要明白知晓的。但是，我们听到的却是这样一些话：“我们应该让精神分裂症患者停止抽烟，因为抽烟不好。” Look. I am not going to come out and say that there’s great evidence that nicotine decreases schizophrenia risk. There’s one study, which other studies contradict. I happen to think that the one study looks better than its competitors, but that’s my opinion and I have nowhere near the evidence I would need to feel really strongly about this. 注意，我不是跳出来说有很强的证据表明尼古丁有助于减少精神分裂症患病风险。有一项研究这么说，还有许多研究跟它有抵触。我只是凑巧觉得，这项研究似乎比其他研究做得更好，当然这只是我的个人看法，要说我对这一想法的信念有多强烈，那根本还缺乏必要的证据支持。 But I feel like we are very far from the point where we know enough to be pushing people at risk of schizophrenia away from nicotine, and light-years away from the point where we can use phrases like “clear benefits”. 但是，我也认为，要说我们已经具备了足够的知识，以催促有精神分裂症患病风险的人远离尼古丁，那我们现在还差得远；要说使用“明显好处”一类的说法，那我们还差着很多光年。 Possibly I am an idiot and missing something very important. But if this is true, I wish the authors of the new study, and the editors of The Lancet, would have acknowledged the existence of the conflicting study and patiently explained to their readership, many of whom are idiots like myself, “Here’s a study that looks better than ours that seems to contradict our results, but here’s why our study is nevertheless far more believable.” That’s all I ask. 也许我是个笨蛋，忽略了一些非常重要的事情。但如果真是如此，我就希望上述新研究的作者们，以及《柳叶刀》的编辑们，能够承认与他们有相互冲突的研究存在，并能耐心地向读者们解释，因为许多读者跟我一样是笨蛋。“有项研究看起来比我们做得好，结论与我们的相反，但我们的研究仍然更可信，理由如下。”这才是我希望看到的。 No matter how much of an idiot I am, I can’t possibly imagine how that wouldn’t be a straight-out gain. 不管我有多么傻，我也根本无法想象，这么做怎么会不是一件彻头彻尾的好事。 PS: Cigarette smoking definitely decreases your risk of Parkinson’s Disease. Parkinson’s is similar to schizophrenia in that both involve dopamine. But schizophrenia involves too much dopamine and Parkinson’s too little, so the analogy could go either direction. 附：吸烟绝对会减少你患帕金森症的风险。帕金森症跟精神分裂症有些类似，两者都涉及到多巴胺。只是，精神分裂症是多巴胺过多，而帕金森症则是过少，所以该类比可以指向两个方向。【译注：即吸烟可能会减低，也可能会增加精神分裂症的风险。】 PPS: Tobacco smoking is definitely still bad! Nothing in here at all suggests that tobacco smoking has the slightest chance of not being a terrible decision! 又附：吸烟仍然绝对有害！本文没有任何地方说吸烟有可能不是个糟糕的决定，没门。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

沙特阿拉伯可能会在美国石油行业崩溃之前倒下 Saudi Arabia may go broke before the US oil industry buckles 作者：Ambrose Evans-Pritchard @ 2015-8-5 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：Tankman 来源：每日电讯报，http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/11768136/Saudi-Arabia-may-go-broke-before-the-US-oil-industry-buckles.html If the oil futures market is correct, Saudi Arabia will start running into trouble within two years. It will be in existential crisis by the end of the decade. 如果石油期货市场是对的，那么沙特阿拉伯将会在两年之内开始陷入麻烦。这个国家将会在这个十年的尾声时陷入一场生存危机。 The contract price of US crude oil for delivery in December 2020 is currently $62.05, implying a drastic change in the economic landscape for the Middle East and the petro-rentier states. 目前2020年12月交付的美国原油期货价格是每桶62.05美元，这个价格体现了中东地区和石油租利国家经济版图的一场剧变。 The Saudis took a huge gamble last November when they stopped supporting prices and opted instead to flood the market and drive out rivals, boosting their own output to 10.6m barrels a day (b/d) into the teeth of the downturn. 沙特人在去年11月【译注：本文作于2015年，此处指2014年11月】开始了一场豪赌，他们停止了对石油价格的支撑，转而选择在市场上倾销以挤出竞争对手，他们在市场急转直下的时候将自己的原油产量提升到了每日106万桶。 Bank of America says OPEC is now "effectively dissolved". The cartel might as well shut down its offices in Vienna to save money. 美国银行认为OPEC目前“实际上已经解体了”。这个垄断联盟也许会关闭它在维也纳的办公室以节省资金。 If the aim was to choke the US shale industry, the Saudis have misjudged badly, just as they misjudged the growing shale threat at every stage for eight years. "It is becoming apparent that non-OPEC producers are not as responsive to low oil prices as had been thought, at least in the short-run," said the Saudi central bank in its latest stability report. 如果这么做的目的是打击美国的页岩产业，那么沙特人就犯了个大错，就像他们在过去八年中的每个阶段都错判了成长中的页岩产业的威胁一样。“很显然那些非OPEC产油国对于低油价的反应并不像我们之前所设想的那样剧烈，至少在短期内是这样，”沙特央行在最近的稳定性报告中表示。 "The main impact has been to cut back on developmental drilling of new oil wells, rather than slowing the flow of oil from existing wells. This requires more patience," it said. 这份报告称：“（这项政策）的主要影响是减少了新油井的开发钻探量，而并非降低现有油井的生产速度。这需要更多的耐心。” One Saudi expert was blunter. "The policy hasn't worked and it will never work," he said. 一位沙特专家则更加直白。“这项政策显然没起作用，而且它也永远起不了作用，”他说。 By causing the oil price to crash, the Saudis and their Gulf allies have certainly killed off prospects for a raft of high-cost ventures in the Russian Arctic, the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters of the mid-Atlantic, and the Canadian tar sands. 通过让油价崩溃，沙特人和他们的海湾盟友们显然杀死了那些试图在俄罗斯北极地区，墨西哥湾，大西洋中部深海和加拿大油砂中提炼原油的昂贵冒险活动。 Consultants Wood Mackenzie say the major oil and gas companies have shelved 46 large projects, deferring $200bn of investments. 咨询公司Wood Machenzie表示，大型油气公司们已经将46个大型项目束之高阁，这推迟了大约2000亿美元的投资支出。 The problem for the Saudis is that US shale frackers are not high-cost. They are mostly mid-cost, and as I reported from the CERAWeek energy forum in Houston, experts at IHS think shale companies may be able to shave those costs by 45pc this year - and not only by switching tactically to high-yielding wells. 沙特人所面临的问题是，美国的页岩油气生产商们的成本并不高。正如我在休斯顿举办的CERAWeek能源论坛上所报告的，这些公司中的大多数成本都处于适中的水平，IHS公司的专家们认为这些页岩油气公司也许能在今年将这些成本削减45个百分点——而这并不仅是靠战术性地转向那些高产的油井来做到的。 Advanced pad drilling techniques allow frackers to launch five or ten wells in different directions from the same site. Smart drill-bits with computer chips can seek out cracks in the rock. New dissolvable plugs promise to save $300,000 a well. "We've driven down drilling costs by 50pc, and we can see another 30pc ahead," said John Hess, head of the Hess Corporation. 先进的井台批量钻探技术让页岩油业者能在同一处钻探点打出5口或10口不同方向的油井。植入了计算机芯片的智能钻探装置能够自动发现岩层中的裂缝。最新的可溶解油栓技术有望为每口油井节省30万美元的成本。“我们已经将钻探成本降低了百分之五十，而且我们认为目前的成本还有百分之三十的下降空间，”Hess集团总裁John Hess表示。 It was the same story from Scott Sheffield, head of Pioneer Natural Resources. "We have just drilled an 18,000 ft well in 16 days in the Permian Basin. Last year it took 30 days," he said. 先锋自然资源公司总裁Scott Sheffield也持相同看法。“我们最近在16天内在二叠纪盆地钻出了一口深达一万八千英尺的油井。而在去年，这样的工程还需要花上30天，”他说。 The North American rig-count has dropped to 664 from 1,608 in October but output still rose to a 43-year high of 9.6m b/d June. It has only just begun to roll over. "The freight train of North American tight oil has kept on coming," said Rex Tillerson, head of Exxon Mobil. 北美工作中的钻机数量从去年十月的1608台下降到了目前的664台，但原油产量却在今年六月升至43年来的最高水平——每日960万桶。而这仅仅只是个开始。“运送北美页岩油的货运火车正源源不断地开来，”埃克森美孚公司总裁Rex Tillerson表示。 He said the resilience of the sister industry of shale gas should be a cautionary warning to those reading too much into the rig-count. Gas prices have collapsed from $8 to $2.78 since 2009, and the number of gas rigs has dropped 1,200 to 209. Yet output has risen by 30pc over that period. 他说，页岩气作为姊妹行业其适应能力应该引起那些过多关注钻机数量的人们的深切警醒。天然气价格已经从2009年的8美元暴跌至目前的2.78美元，而工作中的天然气钻机数量则从当时的1200台降至了目前的209台。但产量却在同一时期上升了超过三十个百分点。 Until now, shale drillers have been cushioned by hedging contracts. The stress test will come over coming months as these expire. But even if scores of over-leveraged wild-catters go bankrupt as funding dries up, it will not do OPEC any good. 直到目前，页岩钻探者们一直受到了对冲合约的保护。而未来的几个月中，随着这些合约到期，真正的压力测试将会到来。但即便这些过度使用杠杆的风险弄潮儿最终因为资金枯竭而破产，OPEC也无法从中得到任何好处。 The wells will still be there. The technology and infrastructure will still be there. Stronger companies will mop up on the cheap, taking over the operations. Once oil climbs back to $60 or even $55 - since the threshold keeps falling - they will crank up production almost instantly. 油井仍然在那里。技术和基础设施也仍然在那里。更加强大的公司将会廉价扫货，并接管他们的生意。一旦油价重新回到每桶60美元甚至55美元——这个阈值正在持续降低——他们将会立即重新启动钻机开始生产。 OPEC now faces a permanent headwind. Each rise in price will be capped by a surge in US output. The only constraint is the scale of US reserves that can be extracted at mid-cost, and these may be bigger than originally supposed, not to mention the parallel possibilities in Argentina and Australia, or the possibility for "clean fracking" in China as plasma pulse technology cuts water needs. OPEC目前面临着一个挥之不去的困境。每一波油价上涨就会被一波美国原油产量的激增抵消。对此的唯一限制是全美能够以适中成本开采的原油总储量，而这个数字则很可能比人们之前设想的要大，更不用提在阿根廷和澳大利亚的那些类似的可供开采储量，还有中国未来因等离子脉冲技术降低了对水量的需求，实现“清洁开采”的可能性。 Mr Sheffield said the Permian Basin in Texas could alone produce 5-6m b/d in the long-term, more than Saudi Arabia's giant Ghawar field, the biggest in the world. Sheffield先生表示，单单是德州的二叠纪盆地在长期内的日产出量就能达到500到600万桶，而这个数字比目前世界上最大的石油产区——沙特阿拉伯的大Ghawar油田的产出还要大。 Saudi Arabia is effectively beached. It relies on oil for 90pc of its budget revenues. There is no other industry to speak of, a full fifty years after the oil bonanza began. 沙特阿拉伯这艘大船实际上已经搁浅了。这个国家预算收入中的90%都依赖石油。而在经历了整整50年的石油大繁荣之后，它并没有发展出任何其它值得一提的产业。 Citizens pay no tax on income, interest, or stock dividends. Subsidized petrol costs twelve cents a litre at the pump. Electricity is given away for 1.3 cents a kilowatt-hour. Spending on patronage exploded after the Arab Spring as the kingdom sought to smother dissent. 该国的国民不需要为他们的收入，利息或者股利交税。在加油站可以用每升12美分的补贴价格购买汽油。每千瓦时的电价仅仅是1.3美分。在“阿拉伯之春”开始之后，由于王室试图平息民间的不满情绪，该国用于收买支持的开支也迅速地增长。 The International Monetary Fund estimates that the budget deficit will reach 20pc of GDP this year, or roughly $140bn. The 'fiscal break-even price' is $106. 据国际货币基金组织估计，沙特的财政赤字将在今年占到GDP的20%，也就是大约1400亿美元。而让该国的财政收支达到均衡的油价水平是每桶106美元。 Far from retrenching, King Salman is spraying money around, giving away $32bn in a coronation bonus for all workers and pensioners. 而当今沙特国王萨勒曼却完全没有想要缩减开支的意思，反而四处撒钱，单单是在一次加冕礼上，他就为全国的所有工人和退休者发放了320亿美元的奖金。 He has launched a costly war against the Houthis in Yemen and is engaged in a massive military build-up - entirely reliant on imported weapons - that will propel Saudi Arabia to fifth place in the world defence ranking. 此外，他还对也门的胡塞武装发动了一场代价高昂的战争，并且大肆扩张军备——沙特的军备完全依赖从外国进口武器——这会使沙特的军费开支排到全球第5位。 The Saudi royal family is leading the Sunni cause against a resurgent Iran, battling for dominance in a bitter struggle between Sunni and Shia across the Middle East. "Right now, the Saudis have only one thing on their mind and that is the Iranians. They have a very serious problem. Iranian proxies are running Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon," said Jim Woolsey, the former head of the US Central Intelligence Agency. 沙特王室还需要肩负领导逊尼派对抗东山再起的伊朗的重任，为争夺霸权，整个中东地区的逊尼派和什叶派之间展开了艰苦的斗争。“现在沙特人满脑子都只想着一件事情，那就是来自伊朗人的威胁。他们面临着一个非常严峻的问题，伊朗的代理人目前正控制着也门，叙利亚，伊拉克和黎巴嫩，”美国中央情报局前任局长吉姆·伍尔西表示。 Money began to leak out of Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring, with net capital outflows reaching 8pc of GDP annually even before the oil price crash. The country has since been burning through its foreign reserves at a vertiginous pace. 在“阿拉伯之春”发生后，资本开始流出沙特阿拉伯，即使在油价崩溃之前，每年资本净流出也占到了GDP的8%。从那时开始，该国的外汇储备就以惊人地速度直线下降。 The reserves peaked at $737bn in August of 2014. They dropped to $672 in May. At current prices they are falling by at least $12bn a month. 沙特的外汇储备在2014年8月达到峰值7370亿美元。而到今年5月，这个数字下降到了6720亿美元。以目前的汇率计算，沙特的外汇储备每月至少会下降120亿美元。【编注：2016年4月 已降至5720亿美元】 Khalid Alsweilem, a former official at the Saudi central bank and now at Harvard University, said the fiscal deficit must be covered almost dollar for dollar by drawing down reserves. 沙特央行的一位前任官员Khalid Alsweilem（目前在哈佛大学担任研究员）表示，沙特政府财政赤字中的几乎每一美元都需要以外汇储备的同等下降为代价来弥补。 The Saudi buffer is not particularly large given the country's fixed exchange system. Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi all have three times greater reserves per capita. "We are much more vulnerable. That is why we are the fourth rated sovereign in the Gulf at AA-. We cannot afford to lose our cushion over the next two years," he said. 在该国的固定汇率体系之下，留给沙特人的缓冲余地并不是很大。科威特，卡塔尔和阿布扎比所拥有的人均外汇储备是沙特的三倍。“我们相对而言要脆弱得多。这就是为何我们的主权债评级在海湾地区只排第四，评级水平也仅是AA-。在未来两年中，我们承受不起失去外汇储备缓冲的后果，”他说。 Standard & Poor's lowered its outlook to "negative" in February. "We view Saudi Arabia's economy as undiversified and vulnerable to a steep and sustained decline in oil prices," it said. 标普在今年二月将沙特主权债务的评级展望降为“负面”。“我们认为在油价持续急剧下降的过程中，沙特阿拉伯的经济没有多元化，并且十分脆弱，”标普在他们的报告中表示。 Mr Alsweilem wrote in a Harvard report that Saudi Arabia would have an extra trillion of assets by now if it had adopted the Norwegian model of a sovereign wealth fund to recyle the money instead of treating it as a piggy bank for the finance ministry. The report has caused storm in Riyadh. Alsweilem先生在哈佛大学的一份报告中写道，如果沙特之前采用挪威的主权财富基金模式让外汇储备循环投资，而不是像他们所做的那样仅仅把它当作财政部的一头现金奶牛，目前沙特阿拉伯的资产也许会多出1万亿美元。这份报告在沙特首都利雅得引发了风暴。 "We were lucky before because the oil price recovered in time. But we can't count on that again," he said. “上一次我们很幸运，因为油价适时地恢复了。但是这次我们不能再次指望同样的事情会，”他说。 OPEC have left matters too late, though perhaps there is little they could have done to combat the advances of American technology. OPEC做出反应时已经太晚了，虽然即使早一些意识到问题，他们也做不了太多事情来对抗美国的技术进步。 In hindsight, it was a strategic error to hold prices so high, for so long, allowing shale frackers - and the solar industry - to come of age. The genie cannot be put back in the bottle. 事后看来，让油价在如此长的时间维持在这么高的位置实际上是一个战略性错误，这样那些页岩油气的勘探者们——还有太阳能产业——就能够成长壮大。一旦被放出来，你就无法再将精灵放回瓶子里了。 The Saudis are now trapped. Even if they could do a deal with Russia and orchestrate a cut in output to boost prices - far from clear - they might merely gain a few more years of high income at the cost of bringing forward more shale production later on. 沙特人如今陷入了困境。即使他们能与俄罗斯达成一致共同减产以支撑油价——虽然这样的愿景目前看来一点也不清晰——这也仅仅能让他们享受多几年的高收入，而这样做的代价却是在未来面临更多的页岩油产出的竞争。 Yet on the current course their reserves may be down to $200bn by the end of 2018. The markets will react long before this, seeing the writing on the wall. Capital flight will accelerate. 而如果当前的趋势维持下去，沙特的外汇储备将在2018年底前降至2000亿美元以下。一旦前景明白无误了，市场会在它成为现实前就早早做出反应。资本外流将会加速。 The government can slash investment spending for a while - as it did in the mid-1980s - but in the end it must face draconian austerity. It cannot afford to prop up Egypt and maintain an exorbitant political patronage machine across the Sunni world. 沙特政府可以在一段时间内削减资本开支——就像它在1980年代中期所做的那样——但最终它将面临严峻的紧缩。沙特将无法负担起支撑埃及政权并在逊尼派穆斯林世界里维持一台昂贵的资助机器的开支。 Social spending is the glue that holds together a medieval Wahhabi regime at a time of fermenting unrest among the Shia minority of the Eastern Province, pin-prick terrorist attacks from ISIS, and blowback from the invasion of Yemen. 庞大的社会开支是将一个仍然处在中世纪状态的瓦哈比政权维系在一起的粘合剂，这个政权正面临着东部省份的什叶少数派中正在发酵的动荡，ISIS时而发动的针刺般的恐怖袭击，还有入侵也门所带来的反作用力。 Diplomatic spending is what underpins the Saudi sphere of influence in a Middle East suffering its own version of Europe's Thirty Year War, and still reeling from the after-shocks of a crushed democratic revolt. 庞大的外交开支则是维系沙特在中东地区影响力的基础，而目前中东地区正在经历着类似欧洲“三十年战争”般的苦难，同时还在蹒跚地试图爬出镇压民主反抗运动带来的余震。 We may yet find that the US oil industry has greater staying power than the rickety political edifice behind OPEC. 我们也许会发现，虽然同样处在低谷中，但相比OPEC身后的那座虚弱的政治大厦，美国的石油行业其实拥有着更强的生命力。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

It may be baby talk, but ‘parentese’ is an infant’s pathway to learning the language, international study shows 跨国研究表明：“妈妈语”虽然萌萌哒，但却是婴儿学习语言的必经之路 作者：Joel Schwarz @ 1997-7-31 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：UWToday 网址： http://www.washington.edu/news/1997/07/31/it-may-be-baby-talk-but-parentese-is-an-infants-pathway-to-learning-the-language-international-study-shows/ Parentese, the exaggerated, drawn-out form of speech that people use to communicate with babies, apparently is universal and plays a vital role in helping infants to analyze and absorb the phonetic elements of their parents’ language. An international study shows that infants are so good at analyzing this speech that by the age of 20 weeks they are beginning to produce the three vowel sounds common to all human languages — “ee,” “ah” and “uu.” 妈妈语，指的是人们在和幼儿交流时使用的那种夸张、拖长的说话方式。它似乎是普天下皆有的现象，而且在帮助婴儿分析和掌握父母语言的语音要素方面发挥着关键作用。一项跨国研究表明，婴儿分析这种说话方式的能力极高，以至于他们在20周那么大时就开始发出所有人类语言都共有的三个元音，即ee，ah和uu。 “Parentese has a melody to it. And inside this melody is a tutorial for the baby that contains exceptionally well-formed versions of the building blocks of language,” explains Patricia Kuhl, a University of Washington neuroscientist. Kuhl recently headed a team of nine researchers from the United States, Russia and Sweden investigating how infants master the complex task of acquiring speech. Their findings are being published in tomorrow’s issue (Aug. 1) of the journal Science. “妈妈语具有内在的韵律。对幼儿的辅导就藏在这一韵律之中，其内容包括了语言基本材料的极为成熟的形式”，华盛顿大学神经系统科学家Patricia Kuhl如此解释道。Kuhl近来带领一个9人团队对婴儿如何得以完成学会说话这种复杂任务进行了研究，研究者分别来自美国、俄罗斯和瑞典。他们的发现将于明天（8月1日）发表于《科学》杂志上。【编注：注意本文发表于1997年。】 The new study examined differences in how American, Russian and Swedish mothers speak to their infants and to other adults. The study shows that parentese is characterized by over- articulation that exaggerates the sounds contained in words. Mothers in the study were, in effect, sounding out “super-vowels” to help their infants learn the phonetic elements of language, says Kuhl, who is the chair of speech and hearing sciences and the William P. and Ruth Gerberding professor at the UW. 这项新研究考察了美国、俄罗斯和瑞典的妈妈们在和她们的婴儿说话时跟她们和其他成人说话时的区别。研究表明，妈妈语的特征是夸张发音，对词语中的音素进行夸张。Kuhl说，实际上，被研究的妈妈们都会发出“超级元音”来帮助她们的孩子学习语言中的语音要素。Kuhl在华盛顿大学担任言语及听觉学院主席，同时还是该校的“盖博丁夫妇”讲席教授。 “In normal, everyday speech adults generally race along at a very fast pace,” Kuhl says. “But we know it is easier to understand a speaker when they stretch out sounds. That’s why we tend to speak more slowly and carefully to increase understanding when we teach in the classroom or talk to strangers. We also do this unconsciously with babies, giving them an improved verbal signal they can capitalize on by slowing down and over articulating.” “在正常的日常交谈中，成年人一般都会以非常快的速度放连珠炮”，Kuhl说。“但我们知道，如果说话者拉长声音，就更容易被人听懂。这就是为什么我们在进行课堂教学或和陌生人说话时会把话说得更慢更仔细，这是为了增进理解。面对幼儿时，我们也会下意识地这么做。通过放慢语速、夸张发音，我们向幼儿提供了一种改良过的语言信号，以便他们利用。” The mothers in the study were not aware of what they were doing, she says, and so parentese was produced unconsciously and automatically. “When women across three different cultures, speaking three different languages, show the same pattern when speaking to their infants, biology is telling us something about it’s necessity and value to their babies. It’s our job to figure out why they do it and what it’s good for,” Kuhl adds. 她还说，被研究的妈妈们对于自己的作为并没有自觉意识，因此妈妈语是无意识、不经意产生的。“来自三种不同文化、使用三种不同语言的妇女在和她们的婴儿交谈时都呈现出同一种模式，这是生物学在向我们透露某些东西，关乎其必要性及其对幼儿的价值。我们的任务就是要搞清她们为什么要这么做以及这么做的好处”，Kuhl补充说。 To explore differences in the way people communicate with infants and adults, 10 women from each of the three countries were first recorded talking for 20 minutes to their infants, ranging in age from two to five months. Then they were recorded in conversation with an adult. 为了查明人们与婴儿及他们与成人交流时的区别，研究者首先对分别来自上述三国的各10位妇女与其婴儿的交谈进行了20分钟的录音，婴儿年龄从2至5个月不等。然后又录制了她们与某一成人的谈话。 In both cases, the mothers were told to talk naturally and were given a small list of target words containing the three common vowel sounds and asked to include them in the conversations.. The selected English words were “bead” for the “ee” sound, “pot” for “ah” and “boot” for “uu.” Similar common words were selected in Russian and Swedish. The three languages were chosen because they represent substantially different vowel systems occurring in human languages: Russian has five vowels, English has nine vowels and Swedish has16. 在两种情形中，妈妈们都被要求进行自然交谈，并拿到了一份简短的目标词汇表，这些词汇都包含有常见的三种元音。妈妈们被要求在对话中使用到这些词汇。被选中的英文单词包括bead（含元音ee），pot（含元音ah）和boot（含元音uu）。俄语和瑞典语中也选的是类似的常见词汇。之所以选这三种语言，是因为它们代表着人类语言中存在本质区别的不同元音体系：俄语有5个元音，英语有9个，而瑞典语有16个。 The more than 2,300 recorded target words spoken by the subjects were then isolated and acoustically analyzed by spectrograph. This analysis showed speech directed at infants had more extreme or stretched out vowel sounds than speech with an adult. This was true among all 30 mothers across the three languages, says Kuhl. 然后，研究者把研究对象说过且被录制的2300多个目标词汇单独提取出来，并用声谱仪对之进行声学分析。分析表明，跟对成人说的话相比，对婴儿说的话中包含有更过分或更为拖长的元音发音。Kuhl说，使用三种语言的30位母亲全都如此。 The use of parentese seems to benefit infants in three ways, she believes. It makes the sounds of vowels more distinct from one another, and it produces expanded vowel sounds not produced in ordinary adult conversations. This exaggerated speech allows mothers to produce a greater variety of vowel pronunciations without overlapping other vowels. Kuhl相信，使用妈妈语似乎会从三种途径有利于婴儿。它能使元音发音彼此之间区分得更为清楚，同时能发出成人们在日常对话中不会发出的拖长元音。这种夸张的说话方式能让妈妈们发出更为多样化的元音读法，且不与其它元音重叠。 To speak, an infant must be able to reproduce the appropriate features of individual phonetic elements using a tiny vocal tract which is about only one-quarter the size and lacks the same frequency range of an adult’s. The exaggeration of parentese helps the infant separate sounds into contrasting categories and helps the baby distinguish between different categories, she believes. 婴儿的小声道在大小上只有成人的大约四分之一，缺乏成人所具备的那种频率范围。为了说话，婴儿必须要用这种声道来再现每个语音要素的恰当特征。Kuhl相信，妈妈语的夸张发音能帮助婴儿将声音分为对比鲜明的类别，并帮助他们区分不同类别。 “What infants are doing with this information is not memorization. Their minds are not working like a tape recorder,” says Kuhl. “Because their mouths and vocal tracts can’t form the same sounds as adults, they have to transform adult sounds to frequencies they can use. So they must be analyzing speech.” “针对这些信息，婴儿们做的并不是熟记。他们的心智并不像是录音机那样运转”，Kuhl说。“因为他们的小嘴和小声道无法发出成人那样的声音，他们必须将成人的发音转化为他们能够使用的频率。因此，他们必定分析发声。” Babies’ brains, like their bodies, need to be nourished, she says, and parentese provides them with “essential nuggets” of information about language that their lightning fast brains analyze and absorb. 她说，幼儿的大脑跟他们的身体一样需要滋养，而妈妈语则为他们提供了语言信息的“基本材料”，以便他们能用其闪电般快速运转的大脑进行分析和吸收。 The use of parentese seems to be universal, she says, and parents don’t have to worry about learning it when they take a newborn home from the hospital. 她说，使用妈妈语似乎是普天下共有的现象，父母们把新生儿从医院抱回家后并不需要担心如何学会妈妈语。 “Moms, dads, caretakers, younger siblings and even college students who were handed a baby in the classroom have been observed speaking parentese. Talking that way seems to be a natural communications mode we all use. That means parents don’t have to work hard at this. Just by talking and communicating with their infants they are playing a vital role without being aware of it,” Kuhl says. “人们已经发现，妈妈、爸爸、保姆、小哥哥小姐姐都会说妈妈语，甚至是在课堂上被塞给了一个小宝宝的大学生也是如此。以这种方式说话似乎是我们所使用的一种自然的交流模式。这就是说，父母们无需在这方面用功。只要和他们的婴儿说话交流，他们就在不自觉的扮演一个关键的角色”，Kuhl说。 Collaborating researchers in the study come from the Early Intervention Institute in St. Petersburg, Russia, and Stockholm University in Sweden. The research was funded by grants from the National Institutes of Health, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. 参与本研究的合作研究者分别来自俄罗斯圣彼得堡的早期介入研究所和瑞典斯德哥尔摩大学。研究得到了美国国立卫生研究院、加拿大社会科学与人文研究委员会及瑞典银行三百年基金会的基金资助。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Remember the Common Law 勿忘普通法 作者：Jim Harper  @ 2016-4 译者：小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 校对：小橘子 来源：Cato Institute，http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” 优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论，这个理论说明了，在可见的经济活动之下，可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户，就要买一扇新的，所以人们很容易认为，通过促进生产和贸易，打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上，打破窗户使社会境况恶化了；财富被破坏了，而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。 A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly unseen. Legal doctrines such as property and contract emerged quietly from series of court decisions over decades and even centuries, so they often go unconsidered and unspoken. Many people may believe that legislation and regulation do most of the work of ordering society. 在法律领域，类似的情况也同样存在。立法与监管程序是显而易见的。大选会定期让民众注意到立法与行政机构，选举的与非选举的官员会通过媒体来阐述他们的举措。相比之下，普通法下的规则绝大部分是看不见的。有关财产与契约等范畴的法律原则，在数十年甚至数百年来的法庭判例中悄无声息地形成，因此往往既不为人留意，也未经言明。许多人可能会认为，规范社会的，主要是法典与规条。 Libertarians should remember the common law and generally prefer it. The common law process for making the rules of a free society has much to commend it. And where it falls down, it is more readily fixable than legislation and government regulation. 自由意志主义者应该谨记普通法，并将其置于优先地位。普通法体系在形成自由社会规则方面确有不少令人赞许之处。而且与成文法和行政规制体系相比，普通法在其失足跌倒之处也更便于调整修正。 American law students learn early that the common law is an important inheritance from England that differs from the civil-law tradition dominant on the European continent. In the common-law tradition, the basic rules that govern our interactions arise from years of experience over generations. Our forebears learned that justice is served and benefits accrue when people avoid violence, stick to their promises, and allocate things in an orderly way. 美国法学学生很早就认识到普通法体系是继承自英国的一项重要遗产，该法系与欧洲大陆盛行的民法传统大相径庭。在普通法传统下，基本法律规范由一代代人的长期经验积累而来。我们的祖先发现，当人们免于暴力，信守承诺，分配有序时，正义便得到伸张，福祉便得到增长。 The law of battery, contract law, and property law all emerged as common practice solidified into common law. It’s often called “judge-made” law, but at its best common law is “judge-found” law— that is, judges discover law in common practices that are deeply ingrained in society. 有关殴打的法律、契约法以及财产法，都是由惯例凝结固化而成的普通法。普通法常被称为“法官制造的”法律，但最恰当的说法应该是“法官发现的”法律——意思是说，法官们发掘出社会上根深蒂固的惯例中所蕴含的规则。 In contrast, the source of rules in civil-law countries is the code books issued by rulers and governments. Civil codes establish the rules governing contracts, trade, property, criminal law, and so on. The civil-law tradition extols the great law-givers—Solon, Hammurabi, Napoleon—who wrote down the law codes purporting to govern their societies. 对比之下，民法体系国家的规则来源是统治者与政府颁布的法律条文。有关契约、商业、财产、刑法等各方面的规则，均由民法法典确立。民法传统推崇伟大的立法者——梭伦、汉穆拉比、拿破仑——他们一手制订治理社会的法典。 But the founding of civil law is something of a myth. In the times when civil law originated, the bulk of most populations was illiterate. These citizens did not have copies of the civil codes that purported to govern them. The civil-law tradition relies on the fiction that certain powerful men produced laws—but they actually arose like common law from the time-worn habits and customs of their subjects. 然而，民法起源于一个神话。在民法最初形成的时候，大部分民众还是文盲，他们并没有读过那些用来管辖他们的民法法典。民法传统建基于强人立法的虚构故事——实际上它们和普通法一样，源自于古老的习惯与惯例。【编注：作者的意思大概是，有关强人立法的虚构故事为民法赋予了其被广泛接受所需的权威性。】 Part of the genius of the common law is its mix of adaptability and consistency. When new circumstances arise, common-law courts, urged on and educated by the parties to disputes, adapt existing rules in ways that they believe produce the most just and fair outcomes. 普通法的优越之处，部分表现在它在适应性和连贯性之间的平衡。当新的环境条件出现时，普通法的法庭在争讼各方的敦促与启发下，会灵活理解运用现有规则，以期达到一个他们都认为公正公平的结果。 They look for comparable cases in their own and other jurisdictions to learn what adaptation of existing law will produce the best results. Over time, new doctrines emerge and old ones may die out. But at any given time there is a stable rule-set people can use to organize their lives and business activities. 法庭将在本身与其他司法管辖区中查找可供比附的案例，以研究如何调整现有规则才能达致最佳的结果。随着时间的推移，新的法律原则形成，旧的则被淘汰。但在任何一个时间点上，人民生活经商都有一套相对稳定的规则可供遵循。 THE COMMON LAW OF PRIVACY 有关隐私的普通法 The field of privacy protection illustrates how common law develops. In 1890 a Harvard Law Review article entitled “The Right to Privacy” made the original argument that law should address privacy. Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, later to become a U.S. Supreme Court justice, catalogued the legal doctrines that might control certain abuses of private life arising from photography and mass circulation newspapers. They argued that the law should explicitly protect privacy. 普通法规则的发展演变，从保护隐私领域就可觅一斑。1890年，一篇刊载在《哈佛法学评论》上题为《隐私权》的文章首次提出，法律需要处理隐私问题。萨缪尔•沃伦与后来成为美国最高法院大法官的路易斯•布兰代斯，整理出了能够制止因拍照和大发行量报纸而引致侵犯私生活的法律原则。他们认为法律应明确保护隐私。 Over time, a new branch of common law was born. Courts across the country began to recognize privacy torts—legally recognized wrongs that give victims of privacy invasions the right to sue invaders. In 1960 eminent legal scholar William L. Prosser documented how privacy as a legal concept had come to constitute four distinct torts: intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of name or likeness. 随着时间推移，普通法的一个新分支出现了。全国的法庭都开始承认隐私侵权——从法律上确认侵犯隐私是错的，受害者可以控告侵权者。1960年，杰出的法律学者威廉•普罗萨总结了隐私权这一法律概念，并界定了四种不同的侵权类型：侵扰他人独处或私人领域；曝光令人困窘的私人信息；不当报道，以造成对个人的错误印象；盗用人名等个人标记。 The common law of privacy continues to develop and advance. In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized invasion of privacy as a tort in that state for the first time. The case was Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores. The defendant’s photo-developing shop failed to deliver two women their vacation photos, but an employee distributed a photo of the two showering together, spurring the court to adopt the “public disclosure” branch of the privacy torts. 有关隐私权的普通法不断地发展和推进。1998年，明尼苏达州最高法院首次裁定侵犯隐私在该州构成民事侵权行为。该案为“莱克诉沃尔玛”（Lake v. Wal-Mart）案。被告的照片冲印店未能交付两位女顾客度假时拍的照片，但被告的一名员工却对外散布了这两名女顾客一起淋浴的照片。法庭认为此举适用于隐私侵权分类中的“公开泄露私人信息”。 Like most law, the privacy torts work in the background, through the threat of lawsuits and not actual days in court or big damage awards. The rarity of lawsuits under the privacy torts may show how consistent these baseline privacy rules are with society’s general mores. Some would argue, of course, that they’re not strict enough and that debatable uses of information should produce successful privacy lawsuits more often. Legal evolution will decide who is right. 与大多数的其他法律一样，隐私侵权的法规在社会背景中默默运作，通过潜在的诉讼威胁，而不是大量的实际庭审或高额赔偿来发挥作用。有关隐私侵权的实际案件之少，可能正说明了保护隐私的法律规则与社会上普遍的道德观念高度一致。当然，可能有些人会认为这些法规不够严厉，信息的争议性使用应该产生更多的隐私案胜诉。孰是孰非，在法律演变中自有定夺。 Privacy law may be in tension with free speech and the First Amendment, so it’s not clear that the privacy torts are a permanent fixture in the common-law pantheon. On the other hand, privacy-law professors and others often use the phrase “privacy harm” in a tacit effort to impress into common language— and ultimately common law—that more offenses against privacy or data security should be recognized as legally actionable harms. It’s all part of a quiet but important debate about our privacy values and what may become our privacy laws. 隐私法也许与言论自由和宪法第一修正案有一定的矛盾，因此隐私侵权能否成为普通法神殿的永久基石之一，并未有定论。而在另一方面，隐私法领域的教授与其他学者经常引用“隐私伤害”来试图与普通用语挂钩——最终与普通法挂钩——并试图将更多侵害隐私或信息安全的行为纳入可采取法律行动的伤害行为。 这些争论虽然悄然进行，但对于我们确立有关隐私的价值观，以及确立针对隐私的法律，都非常重要。 But people don’t often ask how common law torts, property rights, and contracts protect privacy. They ask: “What will Congress and our state legislatures do?” Legislation and regulation get most of the attention. 但人们并不会经常过问，隐私权如何得到普通法的侵权法、财产法，以及契约法的保护。他们会问：“国会和我们的州立法机构会怎么做？”。引人注目的是立法与规制。 The top-down process that established federal privacy regulation of health information illustrates some differences between understated common-law development and cacophonous civil-law-style rule-writing. 有关健康信息隐私的联邦管制规则，是通过一个由上至下的程序确立的，从中可以看出低调的普通法发展与喧闹的民法式规则制定之间的某些区别。 In 1996 Congress revamped the rules around health insurance. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) also addressed health privacy, but it didn’t set new privacy rules. Instead, Congress instructed the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make recommendations about the privacy of individually identifiable health information. It told HHS to go ahead and write privacy regulations based on those recommendations if Congress did not act. 1996年，国会对有关医疗保险的法规进行修订。《健康保险隐私及责任法案》（HIPAA）也涉及健康隐私，但其并未对隐私做出新规定。相反，国会要求卫生及公共服务部（HHS）部长就个人可辨识医疗信息的隐私提供建议，并指示HHS，如果国会没有采取相应行动，该部可根据这些建议撰写隐私相关规定。 When HHS reported back to Congress, it downplayed many safeguards for privacy that already existed. These included medical ethics, explicit and implied contract rights, malpractice claims, and state privacy torts— non regulatory privacy protections that got only a few cryptic lines buried deep in the report. In addition to largely ignoring them, HHS advocated eliminating some of them. 此后，当HHS向国会汇报时，对已有的隐私保护措施予以淡化处理，这些措施包括医疗道德，明确及隐含的契约权利，针对专业失当的索赔，以及各州的隐私侵权法——即非行政的隐私保护，仅在报告的某个角落以寥寥数行隐晦提及。HHS不仅对其几近无视，甚至建议将它们当中的一部分予以剔除。 Today, with the HIPAA privacy regulations in place, people seeking health care sign a lot of forms and see a lot of notices discussing health privacy—but it’s not at all clear that their privacy is well protected. The HIPAA rules preserved and helped solidify behind the- scenes information-sharing practices in the health care industry that may or may not serve consumers and society well. Every year, it seems, there is less and less of a free market in health care to test for and discover consumers’ true interests in health privacy and every other dimension of health care. The common law of health privacy is widely ignored. 如今，由于HIPAA的隐私条文已付诸实施，人们接受医疗保健服务需要签署大量表格，阅读大量讨论健康隐私的告示，但他们的隐私是否得到很好的保障，却根本不清楚。医疗行业幕后的信息共享机制未必能很好地满足消费者和社会整体的要求，而HIPAA的条文则保护了这一机制，并使之更加稳固。年复一年，自由的医疗保健市场似乎正在日益萎缩，我们难以探知与发掘消费者在健康隐私乃至医疗保障其他方面的真正利益之所在。健康隐私方面的普通法原则被普遍忽略了。 INDUCTIVE COMMON LAW VS. DEDUCTIVE REGULATION 归纳式的普通法与推论式的立法 Common law is inductive. Building on experience in case after real-world case, common- law courts accrete knowledge about the rule-set that best serves society. Because rule development occurs with reference to real life cases, it takes advantage of local knowledge about the precise disputes that occur. This allows better approximation of what the truly just rules will be for most cases. 普通法是归纳性的。在众多真实案例的经验基础上，普通法法庭在不断积累认知，寻求最适合社会的法则。由于规则在参照真实案例的过程中发展，其优势是能够利用实际发生的真切争议中所包含的局部知识。在绝大多数情况下，这种方式都能达致较为接近公平法则的效果。【编注：此处作者援引的是哈耶克在1948年的论文《社会中的知识利用》中阐述的思想，哈耶克认为，中央计划者或理性建构者的根本困难在于，无法收集和利用作出正确决定所需的分散的局部知识。】 Hayek emphasized the value of local knowledge in economic decision making. He also emphasized the distinction between common law and top-down legislation in his three-volume work Law, Legislation and Liberty. The Italian lawyer Bruno Leoni is another great thinker in this area. His book Freedom and the Law extolled the virtue of English common law compared to Roman jus civile. The two systems have very different ways of developing rules. Common-law systems hew closer to common justice. 哈耶克强调过局部知识对于经济决策的重要价值，也在他的三卷本著作《法律、立法与自由》中强调了普通法与由上至下立法的区别。意大利律师布鲁诺•莱奥尼在这一领域也颇有研究，他在其著作《自由与法律》中赞扬了英式普通法较之罗马市民法的优点。两套体系在发展法规方面大相径庭，普通法更倾向于追求常理上的正义。 Legislation and regulation more often produce rank re-ordering of rights and liabilities because legislation is deductive. At a single point in time, based on all the knowledge it has drawn together at that moment, a legislature establishes the rule-set that it believes to make the most sense. This is often what it perceives as pleasing the most— or the most important—constituencies. That imperative to please constituencies means that the information legislatures codify often comes from well-organized interests with substantial resources. Special- interest pleading is a hallmark of legislation and regulation. 由于立法是演绎性的，因此权利与义务的轻重经常通过订立法律与规章来编排。在某个给定的时点上，立法机关基于当时所知，建立一整套它认为最合理的法规。这又被认为是在迎合最多数或者最重要的选民。迎合选民，意味着立法机关为之编写法规的诉求，经常会来自于掌握重要资源的有组织团体。因而，制定法律与规章带有满足特殊利益诉求的印记。 Judges in common law courts have fewer of the perverse incentives that legislators and regulators do, particularly when judges are appointed for life terms. A tenured judge gets professional acclaim from developing a reputation for fairness, from clearing dockets, and from suffering few reversals in higher courts. Judges generally don’t anticipate growing their courts’ budgets, getting post-service perks, or being re-installed in office due to the outcomes in their cases, as legislators and regulators often do. Legislation and regulation are systematically subject to a kind of intellectual corruption in which self interest diverges from the public interest. 与立法者和监管者相比，普通法法庭的法官带有的不当动机较少，尤其当法官职位是终身制的时候。为赢得专业上的赞誉，一个终身制的法官需要建立断案公正的名声，避免案件积压，以及减少其裁定被高一级法院推翻的案件。与立法者和监管者不同，法官一般来说并不需要担心他们的判决会对法庭的收入，个人离任津贴，或者恢复职位造成影响。而立法与监管机构则由于自身利益与公众利益有所偏离，容易系统性的滋生智识上的腐败。 WRITING THE RIGHT RULES 编写正确的规则 Rules produced by the deductions of legislators and regulators don’t always fail, of course, and they aren’t always wrong. But it is better to arrive at just rules through a long, society-wide deliberation than through a legislative debate. To illustrate this subtle point, consider the rules that govern the liability of interactive computer services like YouTube, Yelp, craigslist, and Facebook. 当然，立法者与监管者通过推导演绎编写的规则并非必然失败，也并非总是错的。但为了得到公正的规则，经由全社会参与的长期讨论始终还是比经由立法辩论为好。为了体现这当中的微妙之处，让我们来研究规管诸如YouTube、Yelp、Craigslist和Facebook等电脑互动服务供应商之责任的规则。 In the mid-1990s courts were considering whether interactive online services would be considered publishers of the information people uploaded and posted to them. If they were publishers, websites might be liable for defamation and other causes of action because of the material users contributed to them. Had this rule taken hold, operators of online services would probably have allowed only tightly controlled and monitored interactions among users. The rollicking, interactive Internet we know today would have been sharply curtailed. 1990年代中期，法庭在研究在线互动服务是否应该被视为其用户张贴上载信息的发布人。如果是的话，这些网站可能将会因为其用户所提供的信息，而负上诽谤及其他法律责任。如果确立了这一规则，在线服务运营商就很可能会对用户间的交流进行严密的控制与监视，我们今天所见到的生动活泼、积极互动的互联网必将大打折扣。 In response to this concern, Congress passed legislation saying that interactive computer services are not publishers or speakers of any information others provide using their services. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is one of the most important protections for online speech in the United States. 出于这一顾虑，国会通过法案表明，电脑互动服务供应商并非其用户上载信息的发布人或发言人。《通信规范法案》（CDA）第230条，便是美国网上言论最重要的保障之一。 But CDA section 230 is often talked about as an “immunity” Congress gave to online service providers, a carve-out from general liability rules, put in place to advance a certain public policy goal. The perception of CDA section 230 as a special-interest favor means that other interests are on relatively strong footing when they come to Congress seeking to overturn it. Today, CDA section 230 is under attack from groups who would like to see it reversed. The rule against liability for online service providers would be stronger if courts had arrived at a rule of “no liability” based in considerations of natural justice. 但CDA第230条经常被认为有异于一般的责任条款，是国会旨在推动某一特定的公共政策，而赋予网络服务运营商的“豁免权”。该条款给人以一种照顾特殊利益的印象，这意味着当其他利益的代表寻求在国会推翻这一条款的时候，将会有较强的理据。如今，一些持反对立场的团体正在挑战该条款。如果在线服务供应商的“免责”是经由法庭考虑自然正义原则之后确立的话， 该规则就将会有较强的说服力。 When the rules that organize our society are temporal products of legislation, they may always be “in play” for a legislative reversal. Online service providers must always remain vigilant in Washington, D.C., for attempts to undercut their special “immunity.” The rules that govern online liability were established quickly, which is good, but they are less settled than they otherwise would be, and there is one more reason for private businesses to maintain a stable of lobbyists and lawyers in Washington. 如果规制社会的规则是因应时势的立法产物，那么这些规则就处于一种随时可能被立法推翻的状态之下。在线服务供应商就必须在华盛顿特区保持高度警觉，以防有人破坏他们的特殊“豁免权”。迅速订立规制网上责任的规则是好事，但这些规则的认受性本来可以更高一些，而且这也为私营企业在华盛顿豢养着一班说客和律师提供了多一个理由。 There is no guarantee, of course, that the common-law rule would be the same right now as what CDA section 230 produced. The common-law process might still be searching for the right rule. Common-law development would probably find, though, that online service providers are not liable for the acts of others. 当然，普通法体系下订立的规则，未必就和CDA第230条的内容一样。在普通法程序下，我们可能仍在寻找恰当的规则，当然，普通法体系很可能会认为在线服务供应商无需为他人的行为负责。 FAR FROM PERFECT, BUT BETTER IN PRACTICE 虽远未完美，但在实践中占优 This is no argument that common-law courts are perfect. They are not. It takes a very long time for just rules to be found out and settled on through common-law development. Elected judges often have incentives to please powerful constituencies. The class-action mechanism is prone to abuse and often used to reward plaintiffs’ lawyers. Punitive damages are too often a source of windfalls to lucky plaintiffs. The rules about who pays for litigation may be changed to improve the delivery of justice in the courts. 没有人会认为普通法法庭运作得很完美。并非如此。在普通法体系下，确立公平规则，并得到认受，需要很长的时间；选举产生的法官常有动机去迎合强大的利益团体；集体诉讼机制容易被滥用，而且常常有利于原告的律师；幸运的原告经常从惩罚性赔偿中大捞一票；为了正义能更好地在法庭上体现，诉讼费用的分担规则可能需要进行修改。 But these challenges are more correctable than the dynamics in legislation and regulation. Public choice economics teaches that actors in all these rule-making processes will pursue their own self-interest, but the interests of legislators and regulators are likely to diverge from justice more often than the interests of judges. 但这些难题，要比立法与规制过程中的纠葛易于解决。公共选择经济学指出，在规则制定的过程中，相关各方会追求自身的最大利益，但与法官比起来，立法者与监管者的利益很可能更容易与社会公义有分歧。 There is a fair argument that legislation and government regulation create certainty, which may make it worthwhile to accept their many costs. This is particularly acute in the area of high tech, where the application of common law may be unclear. 一种意见认为，明文立法与政府规章带来了确定性，因此随之而来的众多代价也就变得可以接受。这不是没有道理，特别在普通法的适用性并不明确的高科技领域，这显得尤其突出。 But regulation produces certainty in theory better than it does in practice. Witness the recent “BitLicense” fiasco in New York State. When Bitcoin, a digital currency, first captured public attention a few years ago, New York superintendent of financial services Ben Lawsky saw it as an opportunity to make his mark in a hot new area. He proposed an ill-defined “BitLicense” that would require registration of Bitcoin businesses in New York. During the rule-making process, his office declined to release “research and analysis” backing the necessity of a BitLicense, in violation of New York’s Freedom of Information Law. 成文法规理论上能带来确定性，但在实践中却未必。近来“比特登记证”（BitLicense）在纽约州的惨败便是一例。当电子货币比特币在几年前引起公众关注的时候，纽约金融服务主管本•洛斯基将其视为他在这个炙手可热的新领域留名的机会。他提议推出含混不清的“比特登记证”条例，要求纽约的比特币业务进行注册登记。在条例制定过程中，他的部门不惜违反纽约的《信息自由法》，拒绝提供与证明“比特登记证”之必要性相关的“研究与分析”。 The final “BitLicense” was a hodgepodge of regulations like the ones that burden the mainstream financial services sector. They were an ill fit with this emerging technology and a hindrance to innovation because they drove up the cost of starting new businesses. They didn’t acknowledge the technology’s inherent capability to provide consumer protections that surpass existing financial services. Shortly after the “BitLicense” was finalized, Lawsky stepped down from his post to establish a financial regulation consultancy. 和那些为主流金融服务增加负担的规章一样，最终出台的“比特登记证”条例是个大杂烩。这些条例完全不适应这一新兴技术，并且因提高创业成本而妨碍了创新。它们无视新技术内在的保护消费者的能力，这种保护超越了现有的金融服务。“比特登记证”条例推出不久，洛斯基就下台创立了一家金融监管咨询公司。 Today, it is anyone’s guess whether and how the New York Department of Financial Services will amend or enforce the technology- specific regulation that Lawsky produced. The “BitLicense” did not create certainty about the rules of the road for Bitcoin businesses in New York, and it did not create an upwelling of Bitcoin business activity in New York. America’s financial capital appears to be ceding ground on financial innovation to London, in the birthplace of common law. 今天，大家都在猜测纽约的金融服务管理局是否会修订或者执行洛斯基留下来的这一针对特定科技的条例，以及具体如何修订或执行。“比特登记证”并没有为比特币业务在纽约的发展之路带来确定性，也没有令比特币业务在纽约蓬勃发展。美国的金融之都在金融创新方面似乎正在让位于伦敦，普通法的发源地。 Common-law rules foster innovation because they allow anyone with a new idea or process to experiment with it, subject only to background rules, such as “stick to your promises” and “do no harm.” There are no forms to fill out or licensing fees. There is no oversight body that must examine how an innovation fits into pre-existing regulation. “Permissionless innovation” does mean some more risk to consumers and society, but our experience with high tech shows just how great the reward is when behavior is controlled with light-touch, simple, fair common-law rules. 普通法规则有利于创新，因为它允许人们去试验新主意和新方法，只要遵守诸如“履行承诺”、“避免伤害”等基本规则即可。不需要填表格，不需要付牌照费，也没有监管部门去检验一项创新在现行规章下如何自处。“免许可创新”的确意味着消费者和社会将面对较高的风险，但经验已经告诉我们，当我们的行为处于简单、公平的普通法规则的规制之下时，高科技将会给我们带来多么巨大的回报。 The United States and England today live under a dual system. In many areas, they continue to enjoy the benefits of the common law. But legislatures increasingly insert themselves, making temporal judgments that rejigger the rules that people and businesses must live by. In many fields, people look to legislation and regulation first, rather than examining how time-honored rules can be adapted to solve new problems. 现今的美国与英格兰生活在一个双重体系之下。在很多方面，她们继续享受着普通法的益处。但立法机关正不断强化自己的作用，用世俗的判断来改变日常生活与商业活动所需遵守的规则。在很多领域，人们首先寄望于立法与规管，而不是去审视自古以来的规则可以如何调适，以解决新生的问题。 Legislatures and regulatory agencies have a lot of smart people working in them. They universally believe they are pursuing the best interests of their jurisdictions. But the system they work in has perverse incentives, and they have little of the knowledge that common-law processes gather and pass down through the ages. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” wrote jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his 1881 book, The Common Law. 立法机关与监管部门当中不乏能人，他们普遍认为他们在为其辖区的最大利益而努力。但他们所供职的体系有着不当的激励，并且他们对普通法体系经年累月累积传承下来的知识知之甚少。法学家小奥利佛•温德尔•霍姆斯在他1881年所著的《普通法》一书中写道，“法律的生命从不在于逻辑，而在于经验，” The common law is an important part of structuring and ordering a free and prosperous society. It is preferable to legislation and government regulation. Even when we confront new problems, we lovers of liberty should remember the common law. 构建与规范一个自由繁荣的社会，普通法体系乃重要一环，它比成文的法律与政府规章更为可取。即便遭遇新的挑战，热爱自由的我们也不应该忘记普通法。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

I’m an Oregon rancher. Here’s what you don’t understand about the Bundy standoff. 俄勒冈农场主来信：谈谈“邦迪对峙”中你所不知道的一些事情 作者： Keith Nantz @ 2016-1-8 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Tankman 来源：The Washington Post， https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/01/08/im-an-oregon-rancher-heres-what-you-dont-understand-about-the-bundy-standoff/ The Obama administration has pushed our livelihood to the brink. 奥巴马政府把我们的生计推到了崩溃边缘。 This week, the Ammon Bundy-led seizure of a federal wildlife refuge thrust Oregon’s ranchers into the spotlight. While I don’t agree with the occupiers’ tactics, I sympathize with their position. Being a rancher was always challenging. And it has become increasingly difficult under the Obama administration. 本周，由阿蒙·邦迪领导的一场占领某联邦野生动物保护站的行动将俄勒冈的牧场主们推到了聚光灯下。尽管我并不赞同占领者的策略，但我同情他们的立场。牧场主历来难当，在奥巴马政府治下更是日益艰辛。 I grew up in a ranching community in northeast Oregon. Even as a kid, I knew I wanted to be a rancher. After eight years as a firefighter, I’d saved enough to start my own business. I wanted to work on the land, raising delicious, wholesome beef for our growing population. 我自幼在俄勒冈东北部的一个放牧社区长大。还在孩提时代，我就知道自己想要做个牧场主。当了八年消防员之后，我攒够了钱，启动了自己的生意。我渴望在土地上劳作，为我们日益增长的人口生产出美味可口的健康牛肉。 For almost a decade, I’ve done just that. Most days, I’m up before the sun rises. I spend my mornings tending to my horses, dogs and livestock. In the winter, when it’s bitter cold, I’m outside with my cattle, making sure their water isn’t frozen and that they’re properly fed. In the summer, I often work 15-hour days, cultivating my crops and tending to the animals. In the afternoons, I’m in my office, reaching out to customers and handling the ranch’s business side. Over the course of a given day, I act as a vet, a mechanic, an agronomist and accountant. 有大约整整十年，我就在做这个事情。大多数日子，我会在天亮之前起床。整个早上都要去照料我的马匹、狗和牲畜。冬天的严寒时节，我也需要和牛群呆在外边，确保它们的饮水不会结冰，进食不会出错。夏天，我通常每天工作15小时，种植庄稼、照料动物。下午则呆在办公室里联络顾客、处理农场的经营事务。每天的不同时候，我需要扮演兽医、技工、农艺师和会计等不同角色。 I love the work, but it’s grueling. As a rancher, I’m always one bad year away from financial disaster. Every purchase I make — from new cows ($2,000 each) to a new piece of equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars — is a major investment. And my ranch operates on very slim margins, so I have to be savvy to make ends meet. 我热爱这份工作，但确实很累。作为一个牧场主，我离出现财务悲剧永远只有一个糟糕年份的距离。每购进一样东西——不管是新的奶牛（每头2000元）还是价值数十万的新设备——都是一次重要投资。我的农场盈利微薄，所以我必须精打细算、量入为出。 Money isn’t the only challenge. Raising cattle requires a lot of land, much more than most ranchers can afford to own outright. I lease about a third of the space I use from private owners. But most ranchers aren’t so lucky. The federal government controls a huge amount of land in the west (more than 50 percent in some states, like Oregon), and many ranchers must lease that space to create a sustainable operation. 钱并不是唯一的麻烦。养牛需要大片土地，多数牧场主做不到全部使用自有土地。我所用的土地中，约有三分之一是从其他私人业主手中租用的。但多数牧场主没有我这种好运。在西部，联邦政府控制着巨量土地（在一些州，如俄勒冈，联邦政府土地占有量超过50%），许多牧场主必须从其手中租用，以支撑牧场持续运转。 Utilizing federal land requires ranchers to follow an unfair, complicated and constantly evolving set of rules. For example, a federal government agency might decide that it wants to limit the number of days a rancher can graze their cattle to protect a certain endangered plant or animal species, or they might unilaterally decide that ranchers can’t use as much water as they need because of a fight over water rights. Or they might take over land that once belonged to the state or private individuals, imposing an entirely new set of restrictions. 使用联邦土地要求牧场主遵从一系列不甚公平、复杂且持续多变的规则。比如，某联邦机构可能会决定限制牧场主放牧牛群的时间，以保护某种濒危植物或动物；或者，他们也可能单方面要求牧场主不能足量地使用淡水，因为在水权问题上有争执。或者，他们也可能接管原属于州政府或私人的土地，强加一套全新的规制。 I saw this play out firsthand when the federal government considered listing the sage grouse, a chicken-like bird, as endangered. That regulation would have shrunk the amount of land where ranchers could graze cattle, putting many out of business and decimating the industry. 我曾亲眼目睹上述现象上演，起因是联邦政府考虑将艾草榛鸡——一种外形像鸡的鸟——列为濒危物种。一旦政府作出这一规定，牧场主用于放牧牛群的土地面积就将大为缩减，许多牧场会因此倒闭，整个行业也会大受伤害。 To avoid this, ranchers like myself and local officials spent months meeting with federal officials looking for compromise. We ultimately found middle ground. But we already have an enormous workload in our daily lives. The pressure of having to drop everything to lobby against a rule (which happens more often than you’d think) is a tremendous burden. 为避免发生这种事情，像我这样的牧场主及地方官员费时数月之久去和联邦官员会谈，寻找折中方案。最后，我们找到了中间立场。但我们的日常经营本来就有庞大的工作量，要我们放下手头一切事情去游说政府放弃某条规则（此类事情的发生频率比你想象的要高），这种压力对我们而言是极大的负担。 Most of the time, those regulations are written by people with no agriculture experience, and little understanding of what it takes to produce our nation’s food. The agencies that control these lands can add burdensome regulations at any time. Often, they will begin aggressively enforcing them before ranchers have a chance to adjust. 大多数时候，制定此类规定的人没有任何农业经验，也对生产全国食物需要付出什么缺乏任何了解。控制土地的各类机构任何时候都可以添加各种累赘麻烦的规定。通常，在牧场主们有机会为此做任何调整之前，他们就已经咄咄逼人地强制执行开了。 This forces us to either find new grazing land, reduce the size of our herd or sell out completely. In rural communities, this can have a catastrophic effect on the local economy and environment. Ranching is a billion-dollar industry in Oregon. 这就迫使我们要么找到新的放牧用地，要么削减牧群规模，要么彻底卖光牲畜。对于农村社群而言，这就有可能对地方经济和环境造成灾难性影响。在俄勒冈，放牧是一门价值十多亿的生意。 Overall, agriculture accounts for 15 percent of the state’s economic activity and 12 percent of the state’s employment. The income of a local farm generates double the money for the local economy as a supermarket’s income in the same area, according to the London-based New Economics Foundation. 总体而言，农业在全州经济活动中占到15%，在全州就业中占到12%。根据位于伦敦的“新经济学基金会”估计，就对俄勒冈地方经济的货币贡献而言，一个地方农场的收入是同一地区一个超市收入的两倍。 The siege on our industry has only increased under the Obama administration. Officials are effectively regulating us out of business by enforcing a string of unprecedented environmental restrictions. In Malhuer county (next to Harney county, where the current standoff is taking place), the Obama administration is considering a measure that will turn 2.5 million acres of federal land into a “national monument,” a move that would severely restrict grazing. These restrictions would cause a huge economic downturn for those communities. 对我们这一行业的围攻在奥巴马当政期间有增无减。官员们通过实施一系列前所未见的环境管制，事实上正把我们规制得走向歇业。在马卢尔郡（临近此次对峙所在地哈尼郡），奥巴马政府正考虑采取一项举措，将250万英亩联邦土地变成“国家保护区”。此举将会极大地限制放牧。这类管制将会使此类社群面临巨大的经济衰退。 These decisions are being made by people who are four to five generations removed from food production. The rule-makers don’t quite understand our industry, and are being spurred on by extreme environmentalist groups asking for unreasonable policy changes. 这类决策的制定者祖上四代或五代人之前就已经远离食物生产。规定制定者并不很了解我们这一行业，并且受到了要求进行不合理的政策变革的极端环保主义团体的鼓动唆使。 It’s not that I don’t care what the environmental community wants. In every part of my business, I try to find a balance between economics, mother nature and our culture. I know that if we don’t treat our land properly, we will go out of business by our own hands. It is of utmost importance for us to be true conservationists if we want to continue producing the most nutritious and safest protein in the world. 并不是说我不关心环保团体的要求。在我的生意的方方面面，我都努力寻求在经济、大自然母亲和我们的文化之间达成平衡。我知道，如果我们不善待自己的土地，我们就会在自己手上歇业完蛋。如果我们期望持续地生产出世界上最营养、最安全的蛋白质，那么最重要的一点就是要做一个真正的自然资源保护主义者。 But all too often, I’m not given the autonomy to do so. I’m given rules, not a conversation about how ranchers and government officials and environmentalists might be able to work together. That’s an approach that fails everyone. 但反复发生的事情是，我并没有得到自决权去这么做。他们给我定规则，而不是和我就农场主、政府官员和环保主义者如何可能共同合作进行对话。这种办法令所有人都失望透顶。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

When Bigots Become Reformers  当顽固派变成改革者 作者：Damon Root @ 2006-05 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Whig Zhou（@whigzhou） 来源：Reason，https://reason.com/archives/2006/05/01/when-bigots-become-reformers/ The Progressive Era’s shameful record on race. 进步时代在种族问题上的黑记录 The Progressive Era and Race: Reform and Reaction, 1900-1977, by David W. Southern, Wheeling, W.V.: Harlan Davidson, 240 pages, $15.95 《进步时代与种族问题：改革与反动，1900-1977》，作者 David W. Southern THE PROGRESSIVE movement swept America from roughly the early 1890s through the early 1920s, producing a broad popular consensus that government should be the primary agent of social change. 大概从1890年代早期开始，直到1920年代早期，进步主义运动席卷美国，催生了一个广泛的民众共识，即政府应当是推动社会变化的首要主体。 To that end, legions of idealistic young crusaders, operating at the local, state, and federal levels, seized and wielded sweeping new powers and enacted a mountain of new legislation, including minimum wage and maximum hour laws, antitrust statutes, restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol, appropriations for hundreds of miles of roads and highways, assistance to new immigrants and the poor, women's suffrage, and electoral reform, among much else. 为实现那一目的，一大批年轻的理想主义斗士活跃在地方、各州直至联邦政府层面，掌握并运用手中势不可挡的权力，制定了成堆的新法律，涉及最低工资和最长工时法、反托拉斯法、酒精出售与消费限制、对数百英里道路与高速路的征用、对新移民及穷人的补助、妇女投票权和选举改革，等等。 Today many on the liberal left would like to revive that movement and its aura of social justice. Journalist Bill Moyers, speaking at a conference sponsored by the left-wing Campaign for America's Future, described Progressivism as "one of the country's great traditions." Progressives, he told the crowd, "exalted and extended the original American Revolution. They spelled out new terms of partnership between the people and their rulers. And they kindled a flame that lit some of the most prosperous decades in modern history." 今天，许多自由左派人士希望复兴这一运动以及它带来的社会正义氛围。在一场由左翼团体“美国的未来运动”举办的会议上，记者Bill Moyers称进步主义是“美国的伟大传统之一”。他向与会者说，进步派“提升并拓展了原本的美国革命。他们阐明了人民与统治者之间合作关系的新条件。他们所点燃的火焰，照亮了现代历史上最为繁荣昌盛的年代之一。” Yet the Progressive Era was also a time of vicious, state-sponsored racism. In fact, from the standpoint of African-American history, the Progressive Era qualifies as arguably the single worst period since Emancipation. The wholesale disfranchisement of Southern black voters occurred during these years, as did the rise and triumph of Jim Crow. 然而，进步时代也是一个种族主义得到国家支持、极为严重的时代。事实上，从非裔美国人历史的角度来看，进步时代可以说是自黑奴解放以来最为黑暗的一段时间。南方黑人选民的公民权遭到大规模剥夺，就发生于这段时间，Jim Crow法【译注：指南方各州通过的在公共设施使用上实行种族隔离的法律】也是在此期间出现并流行。 Furthermore, as the Westminster College historian David W. Southern notes in his recent book, The Progressive Era and Race: Reform and Reaction, 1900-1917, the very worst of it-disfranchisement, segregation, race baiting, lynching-"went hand-in-hand with the most advanced forms of southern progressivism." Racism was the norm, not the exception, among the very crusaders romanticized by today's activist left. 另外，正如威斯敏斯特学院的历史学家Daivd W. Southern在其新书《进步时代与种族问题：改革与反动，1900-1917》中所提到的那样，其中最糟糕的情形——剥夺选举权、种族隔离、种族羞辱和对黑人实施私刑——“与南方进步运动的最先进活动是携手并进的。”正是在那些被今天的左派活动家浪漫化的斗士中，种族主义是种常态，而非例外。 At the heart of Southern's flawed but useful study is a deceptively simple question: How did reformers infused with lofty ideals embrace such abominable bigotry? His answer begins with the race-based pseudoscience that dominated educated opinion at the turn of the 20th century. Southern的研究不无瑕疵，但非常有用，其核心是一个看似简单的问题：那些心中充满崇高理念的改革者们怎么会有这样恶劣的偏执言行？他的回答始于一种以种族为基础的伪科学，这种伪科学在19和20世纪之交时曾在知识人的观念中占据主导地位。 "At college," Southern notes, "budding progressives not only read exposés of capitalistic barons and attacks on laissez-faire economics by muckraking journalists, they also read racist tracts that drew on the latest anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, eugenics, and medical science." “学院里头，”Southern提到，“崭露头角的进步派不仅阅读调查记者所写的揭批资本主义大亨、攻击自由放任经济学的东西，他们也阅读那些征引最新的人类学、生物学、心理学、社会学、优生学和医学研究的种族主义小册子。” Popular titles included Charles Carroll's The Negro a Beast (1900) and R.W. Shufeldt's The Negro, a Menace to American Civilization (1907). One bestseller, Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race (1916), discussed the concept of "race suicide," the theory that inferior races were outbreeding their betters. 当时流行的作品包括Charles Carroll的《黑人是野兽》（1900）和R. W. Shufeldt的《黑人对美国文明的威胁》（1907）。Madison Grant所写的畅销书，《伟大种族的消逝》，讨论了“种族自杀”这一概念，该理论认为卑贱种族已然比优等种族繁殖得更快。 President Theodore Roosevelt was one of many Progressives captivated by this notion: He opposed voting rights for African-American men, which were guaranteed by the 15th amendment, on the grounds that the black race was still in its adolescence. 西奥多·罗斯福总统就是诸多被这一概念俘获的进步人士之一。他反对非裔美国男性获得由宪法第15修正案保障的投票权，理由就是黑人种族尚未成年。 Such thinking, which emphasized "expert" opinion and advocated sweeping governmental power, fit perfectly within the Progressive worldview, which favored a large, active government that engaged in technocratic, paternalistic planning. As for reconciling white supremacy with egalitarian democracy, keep in mind that when a racist Progressive championed "the working man," "the common man," or "the people," he typically prefixed the silent adjective white. 这类理论强调“专家”观点，主张扩大政府权力，与进步主义的世界观严丝合缝，后者就欣赏大而有为、实施专家治理和家长式计划的政府。至于在白人至上与民主平等之间如何调和，你只要记住，当一个种族主义的进步派拥护“劳动群体”、“普通人”或“人民”时，他总是会加上一个不说出声的形容词前缀，“白人”。 For a good illustration, consider Carter Glass of Virginia. Glass was a Progressive state and U.S. senator and, as chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, one of the major architects of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. He was also an enthusiastic supporter of his state's massive effort to disfranchise black voters. 这里有个很好的例证，就是弗吉尼亚州的Carter Glass。Glass是个进步派，既是州参议员也是国会参议员，他曾任国会银行与货币委员会主席，是1913年《联邦储备法》的主要缔造者之一。他也是弗吉尼亚州大规模剥夺黑人选民公民权行动的热情支持者。 "Discrimination! Why that is exactly what we propose," he declared to one journalist. "To remove every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white electorate." “歧视！为什么这恰恰就是我们所提倡的，”他对某记者宣称，“为了合法地移除每一个可以甩掉的黑人投票人，避免极大地削弱白人选民的数量优势。” Then there was political scientist John R. Commons, an adviser to the Progressive Wisconsin governor and senator Robert M. LaFollette and a member of Theodore Roosevelt's Immigration Commission. Commons, the author of Races and Immigrants in America (1907), criticized immigration on both protectionist grounds (he believed immigrants depressed wages and weakened labor unions) and racist ones (he wrote that the so-called tropical races were "indolent and fickle"). 然后还有政治科学家John R. Commons，他曾是威斯康辛州进步派州长和参议员Robert M. LaFollette的顾问，还曾是西奥多·罗斯福的“移民委员会”成员。Commons著有《美国的种族与移民》（1907），同时从贸易保护主义立场（他相信移民压低了工资、削弱了工会）和种族主义立场（他写道，所谓的热带种族都“懒惰而善变”）出发批评外来移民。 Woodrow Wilson, whose Progressive presidential legacy includes the Federal Reserve System, a federal loan program for farmers, and an eight-hour workday for railroad employees, segregated the federal bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. "I have recently spent several days in Washington," the black leader Booker T. Washington wrote during Wilson's first term, "and I have never seen the colored people so discouraged and bitter as they are at the present time." 伍德罗·威尔逊，这位进步派总统的遗产包括联邦储备体系、一项针对农民的联邦贷款计划和铁路工人八小时工作日制度，对华盛顿的联邦机构实施了种族隔离。“最近我在华盛顿呆了几天”，黑人领袖Booker T. Washington在威尔逊的第一个任期写道，“我从没见过有色人种像今天这样气馁心酸。” Perhaps the most notorious figure of the era was Benjamin "Pitchfork" Tillman, a leading Southern Progressive and inveterate white supremacist. As senator from South Carolina from 1895 to 1918, Tillman stumped for "Free Silver," the economic panacea of the agrarian populist (and future secretary of state) William Jennings Bryan, whom Tillman repeatedly supported for president. 或许这一时代最为臭名昭著的人物应数“干草叉”Benjamin Tillman，南方进步派领袖，同时也是冥顽不灵的白人至上主义者。Tillman从1895年至1918年一直是南卡罗来纳州的参议员，一直为William Jennings Bryan这位土地民粹主义者（后曾出任国务卿）的经济万灵药——“自由银币”——而奔走鼓呼，并反复支持后者出任总统。 "Pitchfork" Tillman favored such Progressive staples as antitrust laws, railroad regulations, and public education, but felt the latter was fit only for whites. "When you educate a negro," he brayed, "you educate a candidate for the penitentiary or spoil a good field hand." “干草叉”Tillman对反托拉斯法、铁路管制、公共教育等进步主义产品均表支持，但他觉得公共教育这种东西只适用于白人。“你要是教育黑人”，他干嚎道，“那就相当于为监狱教育出一个后备分子，或说是糟蹋了一个农活好手。” Nor did African Americans always fare better among those radicals situated entirely to the left of the Progressives. Socialist Party leader Eugene V. Debs, though personally sympathetic to blacks, declared during his 1912 campaign for the presidency, "We have nothing special to offer the Negro." 在完全处于进步派最左端的激进分子面前，非裔美国人也并不总是能讨得了好。美国社会党领袖Eugene V. Debs尽管私底下同情黑人，但在1912年总统竞选活动中仍宣称：“我们不能向黑人提供什么特殊对待”。 Other leading radicals offered even less. Writing in the Socialist Democratic Herald, Victor Berger, the leader of the party's right wing, declared that "there can be no doubt that the negroes and mulattoes constitute a lower race-that the Caucasian and even the Mongolian have the start on them in civilization by many years." 其他激进分子领袖愿意付出的甚至比这还少。社会党右翼领袖Victor Berger在为社会主义刊物《民主先驱报》所写文章中宣称，“毫无疑问，黑人和黑白混血是一个低等种族，白人甚至蒙古人都在文明程度上领先他们许多年。” The celebrated left-wing novelist Jack London, covering the 1908 heavyweight title bout between black challenger Jack Johnson and white boxing champ Tommy Burns, filled his New York Herald story with lurid ethnic caricatures and incessant race baiting. "Though he was a committed socialist," observed Jack Johnson biographer Geoffrey C. Ward, London's "solidarity with the working class did not extend to black people." 著名左翼小说家杰克·伦敦曾报道过黑人挑战者Jack Johnson和白人拳击冠军Tommy Burns于1908年进行的重量级拳王争霸赛，在为《纽约先驱报》采编的故事中，他用尽了各种夸张的族裔讽刺和层出不穷的种族羞辱。“尽管伦敦是个坚定的社会主义者，”Jack Johnson的传记作家Geoffrey C. Ward说道，但他“并没有将其与劳动阶级的团结延伸到黑人身上。” As Southern thoroughly documents, these examples just begin to scratch the surface. Progressivism was infested with the most repugnant strains of racism. But was there something more, something inherent in Progressivism itself that facilitated the era's harsh treatment of blacks? 正如Southern的详尽描绘所示，以上例证只是浮光掠影。种种令人心生厌恶的种族主义性质在进步主义之中泛滥成灾。但是，这一时代对于黑人的残酷态度，是否出于进步主义本身所具有的某种内在特质？ According to Southern, who repeatedly maintains that racism derailed "the great promise" of Progressivism, the answer is no. "The ideas of race and color were powerful, controlling elements in progressive social and political thinking," he argues. "And this fixation on race explains how democratic reform and racism went hand-in-hand." Southern的回答是“并非如此”。他反复强调，种族主义偏离了进步主义的“伟大愿景”。“种族观念和肤色观念强大无比，控制了进步主义的社会与政治思想元素，”他论证道，“而这种对于种族的关注，解释了为何民主改革会与种族主义并驾齐驱。” That is surely correct, but is it the whole story? As the legal scholar Richard Epstein has noted, "the sad but simple truth is that the Jim Crow resegregation of America depended on a conception of constitutional law that gave property rights short shrift, and showed broad deference to state action under the police power." 这当然是对的，但这就是事情的全部面目吗？正如法学家Richard Epstein所说，“真相虽然可悲，但很简单：美国的Jim Crow种族隔离法案奠基于一种宪法理念，这种理念漠视财产权，并对国家依据治安权实施的行动表现出最大程度的顺从。” Progressivism itself, in other words, granted the state vast new authority to manage all walks of American life while at the same time weakening traditional checks on government power, including property rights and liberty of contract. Such a mixture was ripe for the racist abuse that occurred. 换句话说，进步主义本身就把广泛的新权限赋予国家，使之能够管理美国人生活的方方面面，同时又削弱了传统上对于政府权力的各种制衡，包括财产权和契约自由。这种组合对于所发生的种族主义虐待而言，正是水到渠成。 Take the Supreme Court's notorious decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), a case that has rightly come to symbolize the South's Jim Crow regime. In Plessy, the Court considered a Louisiana statute forbidding railroads from selling first-class tickets to blacks, a clear violation of economic liberty. 以最高法院在“普莱西诉弗格森案”（1896）中臭名昭著的判决为例，这个案子自此已经恰如其分地成为南方种族隔离体制的象征。在普莱西案中，最高法细致考察了路易斯安那州一条禁止铁路公司将头等票卖给黑人的法令——这是一条明显违反经济自由的法令。 In its 7-1 ruling, the Court upheld segregation in public accommodations so long as "separate but equal" facilities were provided for each race, setting off an orgy of legislation throughout the old Confederacy. South Carolina, for example, segregated trains two years after Plessy.Streetcars followed in 1905, train depots and restaurants in 1906, textile plants in 1915-16, circuses in 1917, pool halls in 1924, and beaches in 1934. 在其7-1的判决中，最高法院认可在公共设施中实施种族隔离，只需每个种族都获得“隔离但平等”的设施。这一判决在整个过去的南部邦联地区引爆了一轮立法高潮。比如，普莱西案两年后，南卡罗来纳州就在火车上实行了种族隔离。1905年是有轨电车，1906年是火车站和餐厅，1915-1916是纺织厂，1917年是马戏团，1924年是台球厅，1934年则是海滩。 No doubt many of those businesses would have excluded or mistreated black customers whatever the law. But in a market free from Jim Crow regulations, other businesses would have welcomed blacks, or at least black dollars, forcing racist enterprises to bear the full cost of excluding or mistreating all those potential paying customers. (This was one of the chief reasons the segregationists pushed for those laws in the first place.) 毫无疑问，不管法律如何规定，许多上述企业还是会排斥或歧视黑人顾客。但是，如果某个市场没有受到种族隔离法规的限制，其他企业就可能欢迎黑人，或至少是黑人身上的美金，那些排斥或歧视此类潜在付费顾客的种族主义企业就会被迫承受由此产生的全部成本。（这就是隔离主义者一开始推动此类立法的最主要原因之一。） The state, in the eloquent words of the historian C. Vann Woodward, granted "free rein and the majesty of the law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have been curbed, blunted, or deflected." 用历史学家C. Vann Woodward文辞华美的话来说，各州把“完全的自由和法律的庄严认可”赋予了“大规模的侵害行为，而这本来是可以有所限制、有所缓和或有所修正的。” Furthermore, this tangled web of regulations, ordinances, codes, and controls was spun during the heyday of Progressivism, precisely when such official actions were least likely to receive any meaningful scrutiny. Southern, despite his otherwise close attention to the many permutations of race and racism, fails to recognize this major defect in the Progressive worldview. 另外，这一团由各种规章、条例、法令和控制组成的乱麻是在进步主义的鼎盛时期编织出来的，而当时恰恰就是这种官方行为最不可能受到任何有意义的细致审查的时候。尽管Southern在其他地方考察种族和种族主义的各种不同组合时细致绵密，在这里却没有注意到进步主义世界观的这一巨大缺陷。 A similar failure handicaps his treatment of one of the era's rare victories for African Americans. In Buchanan v. Warley(1917), the Supreme Court unanimously overturned a Louisville ordinance segregating residential housing blocks by race. The case involved a voluntary contract between a white seller and a black buyer for a housing lot located in a majority-white neighborhood. Under the law, the new black owner could not live on the property he had just purchased. Southern还有一个不足之处，导致他未能很好地处理非裔美国人在这一时期所取得的罕见胜利之一。在“布坎南诉沃利案”（1917）中，最高法院一致判决推翻路易斯维尔市依据种族来隔离居民住宅街区的法令。在该案中，黑人买方和白人卖方自由订立合同，购买一套位于以白人居民为主的街区的住宅。按照上述法律，这位黑人新房主不能在他刚刚购买的房产内居住。 Writing for the Court, Justice William Rufus Day held that "this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of color...is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law." 大法官William Rufus Day代表最高法院写道，“企图阻止涉案房产转让给有色人……这是对于宪法第十四修正案关于各州不经正当法律程序不得干涉财产权的基本法则的直接违反。” Yet Southern dismisses this rare and important victory as "hollow" and incorrectly asserts that it "was decided not on the grounds of human rights, but on those of white property rights." In fact, the judicial recognition of black rights stood at the very center of the decision. Justice Day's opinion clearly states that the Fourteenth Amendment "operate[s] to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against him solely because of color." 然而，Southern却称这一罕见且重要的胜利“意义不大”，并且错误地断言其“并非基于人权所作出的判决，而是基于白人的财产权。”事实上，法院对黑人权利的承认正处于上述判决的核心。大法官Day在其意见中清晰阐明，第十四修正案“的作用是，准予并授权有色人获得财产，不受各州仅仅因为其肤色而针对他的立法歧视。” Nor should Southern's characterization of this victory as "hollow" pass unchallenged. As the legal scholars David Bernstein and Ilya Somin have argued, the Buchanan ruling played a major though sadly underappreciated role in the burgeoning fight for civil rights. Southern对这一胜利“意义不大”的描述也不应该轻轻揭过。正如法学家David Bernstein和Ilya Somin论证到的，布坎南案判决在风生水起的公民权斗争中发挥了重要作用，很遗憾没有获得应得的承认。 "Buchanan could not force whites to live in the same neighborhood as blacks," Bernstein and Somin write, "but it did prevent cities from stifling black migration by creating de jure and inflexible boundaries for black neighborhoods, and may have prevented even more damaging legislation." It is well worth noting, they continue, that the South did not adopt South African-style apartheid at this time, despite widespread white support for such measures. “布坎南案无法强迫白人和黑人住到同一个街区去，”Bernstein和Somin写道，“但它对各市通过为黑人街区制造法定且固定的边界以限制黑人迁徙的做法发挥了阻止效果，并且可能阻止了其他伤害性更大的立法。”他们接着说，特别值得注意的是，美国南方当时并没有采取一种南非式的种族隔离，尽管当时白人普遍支持此类举措。 In addition, Buchanan was the first major Supreme Court victory for the four-year-old National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a huge boon for the organization that would go on to win the landmark Brown v. Board of Education (1954), overturning Plessy. W.E.B Du Bois, an NAACP founder and longtime editor of its newsletter, The Crisis, gave Buchanan credit for "the breaking of the backbone of segregation." 此外，布坎南案是当时成立仅4年的“全国有色人种协进会”在最高法院所取得的第一次重要胜利，这为该组织带来了极大的好处，此后它将赢得里程碑式的“布朗诉教育委员会案”（1954），从而推翻普莱西案。该组织的创始人之一、长期为会刊《危机》担任编辑的W. E. B. Du Bois赞扬布坎南案“打断了种族隔离制度的脊柱”。 Despite these significant shortcomings, The Progressive Era and Race deserves careful attention. The Progressive movement unleashed, aided, and abetted some of the most destructive forces in 20th-century America. The better we understand this history, the less likely we are to repeat it. 尽管存在这些重大缺陷，《进步时代与种族问题》仍值得细心阅读。进步运动解放、助推和煽动了在20世纪美国历史上最具破坏性的一些力量。我们对这段历史了解越多，重复犯错的可能性就越小。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Amish Effect: Unique cultural strengths help Plain Sect businesses thrive 阿米绪效应：独特的文化力量帮助该朴素教派获得商业繁荣 作者： Tim Stuhldreher  @ 2016-5-18 译者：babyface_claire（@许你疯不许你傻） 校对：hkustliqi 来源：LancasterOnline，http://lancasteronline.com/business/local_business/the-amish-effect-unique-culturalstrengths-help-plain-sect-businesses/article_ba60c8e4-e6dc-11e5-9cc7-73775e680585.html Amish scholar Don Kraybill calls it a riddle, or a paradox. 阿米绪学者Don Kraybill称之为一个迷，或者一个悖论。 How can the Amish be such successful entrepreneurs today, when they end their formal education at eighth grade and forswear so much of the paraphernalia of modern life? 在完成八年级后结束正式教育，并且放弃这么多与现代生活息息相关的用品，阿米绪人如何能在当今成为如此成功的企业家？ That they succeed is indisputable: The failure rate of Amish startups in the first five years is less than 10 percent, versus 65 percent for businesses in North America overall. 他们的成功是毋庸置疑的：阿米绪人创业企业在第一个五年内的失败率不到10%，而对于整个北美，这一失败率为65%。 Many Amish retailers cater to mainstream customers, and do so with sophistication. Kraybill likes to cite Emma’s Gourmet Popcorn, which pegs promotions to popular holidays and offers online ordering on a modern, well-designed website. 许多阿米绪零售商迎合主流客户，并且精于世故。Kraybill喜欢引用“艾玛的美食爆米花”为例，它经常利用受欢迎的节假日进行促销活动，并且提供了一个精心设计的入时网站供在线订购。 Bowls of the flavored treat were part of a buffet preceding a talk on Amish business that Kraybill gave recently at Elizabethtown College. Kraybill, who retired from teaching at Elizabethtown last year, remains an active scholar at the college’s Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietist Studies. Kraybill最近在伊丽莎白镇学院做了一个有关阿米绪商业的演讲，在演讲开始前的自助餐上，有着各式各样的风味小吃。Kraybill去年从伊丽莎白镇学院的教学岗位退休，但仍然是该学院青年中心的一位活跃学者，这个中心从事再洗礼派和虔信派研究。 2,000-plus Amish firms 2000多家阿米绪企业 Over the past few decades, Lancaster County’s Amish have undergone a “mini-Industrial Revolution,” Kraybill said. High land prices plus a population explosion limited farming opportunities for rising generations, fueling a turn to carpentry, small manufacturing and other enterprises. Kraybil说，在过去的几十年里，（宾夕法尼亚州）兰开斯特县的阿米绪人经历了一场“小型工业革命”。对年轻一代，高昂的土地价格加上人口爆炸限制了农业机会，推动了（从农业）向木工业、小型制造业和其他企业的转变。 Today, there are more than 2,000 Amish businesses in the Lancaster area, Kraybill said. Fewer than one-third of local Amish households still rely on farming as the primary source of income. 现今有超过2000多家阿米绪企业在兰开斯特地区，Kraybill说道。只有少于三分之一的当地阿米绪家庭仍然依靠农业作为主要收入来源。 Alan Dakey is president of the Bank of Bird-in-Hand. Its single branch sits at the corner of North Ronks Road and Route 340, and a majority of its clientele are Plain-sect members. Many of the bank’s customers farm but also operate nonfarm side businesses, Dakey said. Alan Dakey是手中鸟银行的主席。该银行的唯一分行座落在Ronks北路和340号公路的路口，并且大多数客户是朴素派教徒。Dakey说，许多银行的客户经营农场，同时也进行非农业方面的业务。 Remarkably, the bank has yet to record a single 30-day delinquency on a loan since its December 2013 opening — a tribute to its customers’ frugality and money-management capabilities. Amish aren’t opposed to borrowing per se, but “they want to use it constructively,” Dakey said. 值得注意的是，自从2013年12月开业以来，归功于其客户的节俭和理财能力，银行从未有过哪怕一个拖欠贷款达到30天的记录。阿米绪人并不反对借款本身，但“他们想积极地使用它，” Dakey如是说。 In his talk, Kraybill identified 12 factors he sees contributing to Amish business success. While some are integral to the culture, many, in principle, could be adopted by anyone. 在Kraybill的演讲中，他指出了他所认为的帮助阿米绪人创业成功的12个因素。虽然有一些与他们的文化融为一体，但也有许多在原则上是可以被任何人采纳的。 Here they are: 这些因素是： 1.Apprenticeship: Apprenticeship is a training system that mainstream society has largely abandoned, Kraybill said. But in Amish society, teens learn trades by working alongside their parents or other adults. Kraybill described once watching a 13-year-old fix a piece of hydraulic machinery. He had already spent years in his father’s shop and knew what he was doing. “That’s apprenticeship,” Kraybill said. 1.学徒制：学徒制是一个很大程度上已经被主流社会放弃了的训练体系，Kraybill说到。然而在阿米绪社会中，青少年从通过在他们父母或其他成年人旁边工作而学习手艺。Kraybill介绍了他曾经观察一个13岁少年在修理一台液压机械的部件。他已经花了数年时间在父亲的商店，并且知道自己在做什么。“这就是学徒制，” Kraybill说。 2.Limited education: Because Amish finish school with eighth grade, they can’t be drawn off into law, medicine or other professions that require extended formal education. The two basic Amish career tracks are farming and small business, so that’s where the best and brightest end up, bringing their ingenuity and drive with them. 2.有限的教育：由于阿米绪人八年级就结束学校教育，他们不能进入律师、医药或者其他需要更长时间正式教育的行业。阿米绪人的两种基本职业路线是农业和小型企业，这就是最优秀最聪明的人的出路，这些人具备智慧和进取心。 3.Work ethic: Amish are brought up in a culture that values hard work. It’s seen as integral to life, and children are brought up from an early age to pitch in to help their family and community. 3.职业道德：阿米绪人在一种重视努力工作的文化中长大。这种文化被视为生活中不可或缺的一部分，并且儿童从小要帮助他们的家庭和社区。 4.Smallness: “Bigness spoils everything,” Kraybill said an Amishman once told him. With many small companies instead of a few dominant ones, individual Amish have scope to express their entrepreneurial spirit. There’s little social distance between business owners and employees, and owners stay personally invested in their enterprises. 4.精简：“庞大宠坏了一切，”Kraybill说一个阿米绪人曾经这么告诉他。有许多小公司而不是少数几家大公司占据统治地位，阿米绪个人有机会展现他们的创业精神。企业主和员工之间的社交距离很短，业主们在他们自己的企业里保持投入。 5.Low overhead: Amish businesses don’t have air conditioning or luxurious offices. If the business has an office, Kraybill said he usually finds it empty, because the owner is out working on the shop floor. 5.低开销：阿米绪企业没有空调和奢华的办公室。Kraybill说，即便企业有办公室，他也经常发现办公室是空的，因为业主在车间工作。 6.Social capital: Information propagates rapidly through Amish communities’ social networks. Job seekers and companies with vacancies can put the word out and find each other easily. Transaction costs are low because everyone shares the same values and trust is high. 6.社会资本：信息通过阿米绪社区的社交网络传播得很迅速。求职者们和有职位空缺的公司可以让每个人都知道，并且很容易找到彼此。由于大家有着共同的价值观和高信任度，因此交易成本很低。 7.The paradox of technology: The Amish taboos on technology stimulate innovation and “hacking” as entrepreneurs find workarounds, Kraybill said. The culture distinguishes between using and owning technology — that’s why it’s OK for a business like Emma’s Gourmet Popcorn to contract with a website developer, or for Amish carpenters to journey to job sites in “Amish taxis” driven by their neighbors. 7.技术的悖论：在创业者寻找替代方法时，阿米绪人的技术禁忌刺激了创新和黑客精神，Kraybill说。这种文化把使用技术和拥有技术区别对待——那就是为什么像艾玛的美食爆米花这样的企业与网站开发人员签约是可行的，阿米绪木匠也可以乘坐由他们邻居的“阿米绪出租车”去工作地点。【编注：阿米绪人的教规不允许他们拥有手机、电脑和汽车等现代器物，但其中一些较开明的支派允许在工作中使用这些器物。】 8.Infrastructure:New Amish companies operate within a framework created by their fellow business people. They enjoy access to a well-established network of products and services tailored to the culture and its unique needs and restrictions. 8.基础设施：新的阿米绪公司在一个由他们的商人创建的框架里运行。他们享有一个为其文化以及该文化所赋予的独特需求和限制而量身定做的完善的网络产品和服务。 9.Regional markets: The tens of millions of people in the mid-Atlantic region comprise a “phenomenal external market” for the Amish, Kraybill said. There are more than 50 Amish markets between Annapolis and New York City, many catering to urban dwellers hungering for a taste of rural life. Ben Riehl, who owns a stand at the Markets at Shrewsbury in southern York County, said half of his Saturday customers drive up from Maryland, and he estimates they account for half his weekly sales. 9.区域性市场：Kraybill说，大西洋中部地区数以千万计的居民为阿米绪人提供了一个“规模惊人的外部市场”。在安纳波利斯（美国马里兰州首府）和纽约之间有超过50个阿米绪市场，许多是为了迎合城市居民对体验农村生活的渴望。Ben Riehl在南约克郡什鲁斯伯里的集市里拥有一个摊位【译注：什鲁斯伯里是宾夕法尼亚州的一个自治镇】，他说他周六的一半客人是从马里兰州开车赶来的，他估计这大概占了每周收入的一半。 10.Niche markets: Gourmet popcorn is a niche product. So are dried flower arrangements, carriage restoration, handmade furniture and horse-drawn farm machinery. Many Amish specialize in organic or free-range farming, Dakey said. Kraybill said he knows an Amish farmer who raises camels, having discovered camel milk commands a premium price. 10.细分市场：美食家爆米花是一个细分产品。同样，干花艺术、马车修整、手工家具和马车农业机械也是。许多阿米绪人专业从事有机或自由放养的农业，Dakey说。Kraybill说他知道一个阿米绪农民饲养骆驼，并且发现骆驼奶奇货可居。 11.Amish “branding”: For many Americans, the term “Amish” has strong positive associations: honesty, simplicity, old-fashioned virtue. Businesses can partake in those associations simply by being Amish. For Riehl, there's a big difference between overt image-building and the kind of trust that accrues when Amish business owners serve their customers with integrity: The latter “is a reputation that was earned, not a brand that was bought.” 11.阿米绪“品牌效应”：对许多美国人而言，“阿米绪”这个词有着很强的正面联想：诚实、朴素和传统的美德。企业仅仅需要是阿米绪的即可产生那些联想。对Riehl而言，赤裸裸的形象塑造和阿米绪企业主通过全心全意为客人服务而积累的那种信任之间有天壤之别，后者“是赢得的口碑，而不是可以买到的品牌”。 12.Payroll costs: Amish employees in Amish businesses are exempt from mainstream companies’ Social Security, health insurance and pension mandates. Though that keeps costs down, the impact is often exaggerated, Amish business owners say. They say they still have to pay into Amish Aid, the community’s mutual-aid fund, and they have responsibility for payroll taxes and benefits for non-Amish employees, so the difference isn’t all that great. 12.薪资成本：在阿米绪企业工作的阿米绪雇员被免除了主流公司的社会保障、医疗保险和退休津贴的要求。阿米绪企业主说，尽管那带来了成本下降，效果却经常被过分夸大。阿米绪企业主说他们仍然需要支付阿米绪援助金，社区互助基金，并且有责任为非阿米绪员工付工资税和福利津贴，因此差别并没有那么显著。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Giving Genes Their Due, But Not More 正视基因的功劳，但不要过誉 作者：Erik Parens @ 2015-5-21 译者：Tankman 校对：Drunkplane （@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：quillette，http://quillette.com/2016/05/21/giving-genes-their-due-but-not-more/ A review of Behaving: What’s Genetic, What’s Not, and Why Should We Care?   by Kenneth B. Schaffner. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016), 304 pages. 对牛津大学出版社出版的Kenneth B. Schaffner的《行为：什么是遗传的，什么不是，以及我们为何要在意这些》的书评。 No one gets anxious about using genetics to help explain a medical disease like cancer or heart disease. But using genetics to help explain a normal behavior like aggression, or a psychiatric disorder like depression, can be an entirely different story. At first blush, this difference in response to using genetics to explain different features of the same animal seems odd. 没有人会担心用遗传学来帮助解释疾病，如癌症或心脏疾病。但是用遗传学来帮助解释普通的行为，例如攻击行为，或精神障碍，如抑郁，则是一个完全不同的故事。对于用遗传学来解释同一动物的不同特征却有不同的反应，乍一看这似乎很奇怪。 After all, it’s not as if medical geneticists, on the one hand, and behavioral and psychiatric geneticists, on the other, employ different research methods. The difference, of course, is that the behavioral and psychiatric geneticists investigate features of ourselves that we take to be central to our humanity: our ways of acting and being in the world. To use genetics to try to explain those features elicits the anxious question, is human behavior genetically determined? 毕竟，这并不是说医疗遗传学家与另—边的行为和精神遗传学家，采用的是不同的研究方法。所不同的当然是，行为和精神遗传学家研究我们自己的特征，我们认为这些特征是我们人性的核心：我们行动和存在于世界的方式。试图用遗传学解释这些特征引起了一个令人焦虑的问题，人的行为是不是遗传决定的？ Few people have been thinking about that question for as long, or with as much devotion to the scientific facts and philosophical subtleties, as the philosopher of science, Kenneth Schaffner. In his magisterial, wise, and succinct new book,Behaving, he disentangles its two separate but related components. The first, which he devotes the lion’s share of the book to illuminating, concerns reductionism: specifically, can behavior be reduced to genes? No, it can’t. 没几个人像科学哲学家Kenneth Schaffner这样，长期思考这一问题，并大量精力投入科学事实和深奥哲理。在他的权威，智慧，简洁的新书《行为》中，他理顺了行为的两个独立但相关的成分。第一，他用本书的大部分篇幅，做了关于还原论的阐释：具体而言，行为可以被简化为基因吗？不，不能。 But it can, at least in principle, be reduced to, or explained in terms of, a mind-bogglingly large number of variables — including genes — which interact over time. The second concerns determinism: even if genes alone don’t determine behavior, does the fact that behavior is determined mean that freedom is an illusion? No. But it does mean that we have to jettison the sort of freedom that children sometimes imagine — freedom untethered to our bodies and histories. 但它可以，至少在原则上，可以简化或被解释成，包括基因在内的一大堆变量，数量多到令人发狂，且这些变量一直交互作用。第二点则关于决定论：即使基因并不能单独决定行为，行为是被决定的这一事实是否意味着自由是一种错觉？不。但它确实意味着我们必须抛弃那种自由，即有时孩子们会想象的那种——不受我们的身体和历史羁绊的自由。 In the course of decreasing the anxiety associated with genetic determinism, Schaffner’s book also decreases the anxiety associated with the fantasy of “designer babies” — a fantasy which depends on the notion that just by “editing” genes we can produce any trait we want, from great athleticism to great intelligence. 在试图减少遗传决定论所带来的焦虑时，Schaffner的书也降低了与“设计婴儿”狂想有关的焦虑——这一狂想基于以下概念：仅通过“编辑”基因，我们便可以创造任何我们想要的特质，从强大的运动能力到极高的智力。 By dispelling this wildly simplistic notion, Schaffner’s book serves not only as an anxiety reducer — or “anxiolytic” — but also as a “mood stabilizer”: it helps stabilize the mania that can afflict those who envision the Human Genome Project as the key to the future of medicine. 通过打消这种疯狂简单化的概念，Schaffner的书不仅可充当一种焦虑缓和剂——或“抗焦虑药”——而且可充当一种“情绪稳定剂” ：它有助于稳定一种狂热，这狂热让那些把人类基因组计划当成开启医学未来的金钥匙的人备受折磨。 Schaffner provides a balanced account while never losing sight of what has been and will be achieved by using genetics to explain medical, behavioral, and psychiatric traits — especially if integrated with insights at myriad other levels of analysis, from the genetic and neuronal to the psychological and social. Schaffner提供了一个平衡的描述，他从未忽视在用遗传学解释医疗、行为和精神特质的方面，已经和将会实现的成就—— 特别展望了若把这些成就和遗传学、神经科学、心理、社会等诸多其他层面的分析相结合所能带来的前景。 A Judge and a Behavioral Geneticist Have a Conversation 一个法官和一个行为遗传学家的对话 Schaffner begins with three Socratic dialogues (minus any Socratic snarkyness or dead ends) that elegantly introduce the basic concepts and methods of behavioral genetics. They are worth rehearsing here. The dialogues feature a Behavioral Geneticist and a fictional Judge. Based on the breathless headlines she’s read over the years, the Judge anticipates that she will increasingly confront the results of behavioral genetics research in her courtroom. Schaffner以三个苏格拉底式对话开始。（没有任何苏格拉底的反讽或死结）这些对话优雅的介绍了行为遗传学的基本概念和方法。他们值得在此被回溯。这些对话的主角是一个行为遗传学家和一个虚构的法官。根据她多年来读到的那些令人喘不过气的头条新闻，法官预计，她将在她的法庭面对越来越多的行为遗传学研究结果。 This provides the Behavioral Geneticist with a pretext for explaining how such results can — and cannot — help explain human behavior, and how such results are — and are not — relevant to everyday understandings of behaviors like aggression, traits like performance on IQ tests, and disorders like ADHD. (Because there is no difference between the concepts and methods of behavioral genetics and psychiatric genetics, from here on out I will use “behavioral genetics” to include the use of genetics to illuminate behaviors and traits, whether or not they are associated with a psychiatric diagnosis.) 这为行为遗传学家提供了理由，来解释这些结果可以或者不可以帮助解释人类行为，以及这些结果和一些对行为，特质，或者疾病的日常理解怎样关联或不相关。例如攻击性人格的行为，智商测试的表现，以及多动症。（因为行为遗传学的概念和方法与精神病遗传学之间没有区别，在此我将使用“行为遗传学”，以包括遗传学在解释的行为和特征上的应用，无论其是否与精神病诊断相关。） Two radically different sorts of investigation are undertaken by behavioral geneticists, and the dialogues introduce a basic but crucial distinction between them. The first uses “classical” methods to demonstrate that genes help explain observed differences in human traits and behaviors, whereas the second uses “molecular” methods to determine which genes or genetic differences are generating those observed differences. 行为遗传学家进行了两种截然不同的调查，而对话介绍了它们之间基本但关键的一个区别。第一种是使用“经典”方法来阐明基因有助于解释人的特征和行为上可见的差异，而第二个则使用“分子层面”方法，以确定哪些基因或遗传差异产生了那些可见差异。 The distinction is important — the distance is enormous between being able to say that a trait “is genetic” and being able to say which gene variants are contributing to the emergence of that trait (much less being able to say how they are contributing). 这种区别很重要 ——能够说一个特征“是遗传的”，和能够说出哪些基因变异正在促成该性状的涌现，这之间有着巨大的鸿沟（更别提说出它们是如何促成的）。 The basic idea for the classical method has been around since the pioneering statistician and father of modern eugenics, Francis Galton, published “The History of Twins” in 1875 — long before anyone knew anything about DNA. In its simplest contemporary form, geneticists compare identical and fraternal twins on a trait of interest, whether heart disease, schizophrenia, or performance on IQ tests. 自统计学先驱和现代优生学之父Francis Galton以来，经典方法的基本思想就已经出现，Galton于1875年发表了《双胞胎的历史》，那时人们还不知道DNA。在当时最简单的形式中，遗传学家比较同卵和异卵双胞胎的目标性状，无论是心脏疾病，精神分裂症，或智商测试的表现。 The first premise of such investigations is that identical twins are nearly 100% genetically similar and fraternal twins share on average only 50% of their genetic material. The second premise is that identical twins and fraternal twins are raised in equally similar environments. 这种调查的第一个前提是同卵双胞胎遗传上近乎100％的相似，而异卵双胞胎则平均只有50％的遗传物质相似。第二个前提是，同卵双胞胎和异卵双胞胎在同样相似的环境被养大。 If one accepts those premises and observes that genetically identical twins are more similar with respect to some trait than fraternal twins, then one has reason to make the simple but profound inference that genetic factors help explain why the identical twins are more similar to each other than are the fraternal twins. 如果一个人接受这些前提并观察到同卵双胞胎的某些特质比异卵双胞胎更相似，那么他便有理由做出简单而深刻的推论，即遗传因素能够帮助解释为什么同卵双胞胎之间比异卵双胞胎更相似。 Over time, by deploying ever more sophisticated variations on that basic logic, behavioral geneticists have demonstrated that identical twins (whether raised together or apart) are not only more similar with respect to traits like height and weight and heart rate, but are also more similar with respect to traits like depression, schizophrenia, aggression, and intelligence. 随着时间的推移，在该基本逻辑的基础上增加更复杂的变量，行为遗传学家已证明同卵双胞胎（无论是一起或分开抚养）不仅在诸如身高、体重和心率等性状上更为相似，而且在诸如抑郁症，精神分裂症，攻击性行为和智力等性状上也更相似。 As Schaffner’s Behavioral Geneticist patiently explains to the Judge, such classical studies produce what are called “heritability estimates.” These are the numbers that are invoked when it is said that depression “is 40% genetic” or that intelligence “is 60% genetic.” 正如Schaffner的行为遗传学家耐心地给法官大人解释的，这样的经典研究产生了所谓的“遗传率估计”。当讨论到抑郁症“40 ％是遗传性的”，或智慧“60 ％是遗传性的”时，有数字可以列。 They are estimates of how much of the variation with respect to a given trait in a given population can be attributed to variation in genetic factors and how much can be attributed to variation in environmental factors. However, in a different environment the observed variation can be different, and thus so can the heritability estimates. 这些估计反映了：对于一个给定群体特定性状的差异，有多少可以归因于遗传因素的差异，多少可以归因于环境因素的差异。毕竟，在不同的环境中可观察到的差异可以是不同的，因此，这样就可以估计遗传率。 To say that heritability estimates can be different in different environments is not to say that heritability estimates tell us nothing! (Indeed, how our genes can affect the environments we choose is an area of behavioral genetic research.) 如果说，遗传率在不同的环境下可以是不同的，这并不意味着遗传率什么都没告诉我们！ （事实上​​，我们的基因如何影响我们为自己选择身处其中的环境，是行为遗传学研究的一个领域。） An old but ever-relevant example of how much heritability estimates can tell us comes from the 1960s, when behavioral geneticists used classical studies to discredit the then-popular idea that schizophrenia and autism were due solely to bad environments — in particular, to “refrigerator mothers.” 关于遗传率，有个老旧但十分相关的例子，来自1960年代。当时行为遗传学家采用经典的研究方法，以贬斥当时十分流行的观点：精神分裂症和自闭症纯粹由恶劣环境引发—— 尤其是“冰箱妈妈”。【译者注：让孩子感到缺乏母爱的妈妈。】 The good news is that these studies helped relieve already-devastated mothers of the burden and social stigma associated with believing that their mothering had caused the disease in their child. 好消息是，这些研究有助于缓解已经受创颇深的母亲们的负担和社会污名，这些负担和污名来自这样一种见解：这些妈妈的抚育方式导致了她们孩子的疾病。 The bad news is that the knowledge gleaned from those classical studies does not help diagnose or treat — much less prevent — a disorder like schizophrenia. To go from noticing that genetic differences were making a difference to knowing which genetic differences were making a difference, geneticists had to move from the classical twin methods to the modern “molecular” methods. 坏消息是，从经典研究中获取的知识并不能帮助诊断或治疗——更不用说预防——如精神分裂症之类的疾病。从注意到遗传差异，到知道哪个遗传差异导致某种不同，遗传学家必须从经典的双胞胎方法跨越到现代的“分子”方法。 The Genome: A “Molecular Crystal Ball”? 基因组：一个“分子层面的水晶球”？ This move only became possible in the second half of the 20th century, when researchers began to understand the molecular structure of genes and how to map and sequence human genomes. Indeed, the purpose of the Human Genome Project (HGP), which officially launched in 1990, was to map the genome and to specify the sequence of the base pairs, the As, Gs, Cs, and Ts, that are the building blocks of genes. 此举直到20世纪下半叶才成为可能，当时研究人员开始了解基因的分子结构，以及如何对人类基因组进行绘制和测序图谱。事实上，于1990年正式启动的人类基因组计划（HGP）的目的，便是绘制基因组，并指定基因的积木——碱基对AS、GS 、CS和TS的序列。 The fervent hope was that knowledge of those sequences would lead rather quickly and directly to understanding and treating human disease. In reflecting back on that time, the geneticists Linda and Edward McCabe speak ruefully of the dream that an individual’s genome would be like a “molecular crystal ball.” 人们热切希望有关这些序列的知识将相当快且相当直接的导致对人类疾病的理解和治疗。忆起那个时候，遗传学家Linda 和 Edward McCabe懊丧的谈起当时的梦想：一个人的基因组将会像一个“分子层面的水晶球”。（http://content.ucpress.edu/pages/10867/10867.ch01.pdf） This idea of identifying “genes for” diseases made intuitive sense. After all, one year before the official launch of the HGP, in 1989, Francis Collins — who would go on to direct the National Human Genome Research Institute and who now directs the entire NIH — did co-discover “the gene for” cystic fibrosis, which constituted a prime supporting case in point for the idea dubbed OGOD: One-Gene-One-Disease. 直觉上，确定“致病基因”的想法是有道理的。毕竟，正式启动人类基因组计划前一年，即1989年，Francis Collins ——美国国家人类基因组研究所后来的领袖，也是现在整个美国国家卫生研究院（NIH）的领袖——和他人共同发现了囊性纤维化的“致病基因” ，这构成了OGOD理念，即一个基因对应一种疾病（One-Gene-One-Disease）的主要支撑例证。 If a rare medical disorder like cystic fibrosis could be caused by one gene, then maybe common medical diseases like heart disease could, too. And if common medical diseases could be caused by single genes, then maybe the same was true for psychiatric disorders and behavioral traits. 若是像囊性纤维化这样一种罕见的医学疾病可以由一个基因引起，那么也许常见病，如心脏病，也可能如此。如果普通疾病可能由单个基因引起的，那么也许精神疾病和行为特征同样如此。 Sure enough, in the 1990s, articles in the scientific and lay presses announced discoveries of “genes for” everything from bipolar disorder to aggression. But as Schaffner’s Behavioral Geneticist tells the Judge, those findings (which sparked the Judge’s initial interest) could not be replicated. “Genes for” diseases like cystic fibrosis and Huntington’s and sTay Sach were exceptions to the rule. 诚然，在1990年代，科普界的文章宣布发现各种各样的“致病基因”，从躁郁症到攻击性人格，无所不包。但正如Schaffner的行为遗传学家告诉法官的，这些（引发了法官最初兴趣的）发现无法被复制。诸如如囊性纤维化、亨廷顿舞蹈症和Tay-Sachs 病的“致病基因”是这一规律的例外。 “Failures to replicate” reminded geneticists of the yawning gap between discovering that a trait “is genetic” and figuring out which genes help explain it. 这些研究“无法被复制”提醒遗传学家们，在发现一种特质“是遗传的” ，和搞清哪些基因有助于解释该特质之间的存在着巨大鸿沟。 Genetic Reductionism: A Panacea or a Boondoggle? 遗传学还原论：万灵药还是打水漂？ One of the fascinating features of Schaffner’s book is his commitment to telling the story of how he came to reform — not renounce — his own vision of reductionism. When he began his career in the 1970s, he resonated with the hardcore genetic reductionists, who dreamt that understanding the operation of genes would be a panacea: a cure for our ignorance with respect to how disease and behavior come into being. Schaffner这本书的一个令人赞叹的特点是，他坚持讲述他如何变革——而不是抛弃——自己对还原论的看法。当他的职业生涯在1970年代开始时，他和铁杆遗传还原论者很合得来，这些还原论者有一个梦想，即理解基因的操作将会是一个万灵药：在疾病和行为是如何产生的这个问题上，能治愈我们的无知。 But already at that time people who called themselves developmentalists (such as the much-discussed evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin) were challenging that dream, suggesting that, especially in the context of behavior, genetic reductionism was a boondoggle. 但在那时自称是发育展主义者的人士（如备受争议的进化生物学家Richard Lewontin）则挑战了这一梦想，他提出，基因还原论打了水漂，尤其是在行为问题上。 To understand how Schaffner arrived at a middle path, it helps to understand the developmentalists’ challenge. According to Schaffner, that challenge boils down to five core concepts, two of them helpful and three overstated. 了解Schaffner如何到达一条中间道路，有助于理解发育主义者的挑战。据Schaffner看，这一挑战可以归结为五大核心理念，当中有两个有用，有三个被夸大其辞了。 The first helpful one concerns “contextualism” — the idea that genes do not have inherent meaning, but only acquire meaning “in context with other genes, and in the environment that is cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic” (p. 95). 第一个有用的理念和“背景主义”相关——即基因不具有固有的意义，但仅“在其他基因的背景中，并且在细胞内环境，细胞外环境，和生物体外的环境中”获得了意义（第95页）。 The other helpful (or at least wholly unobjectionable) core concept is “nonpreformationism” — the developmentalists’ rejection of the very old idea that genes contain within them little copies of the traits with which they are associated. 另一个有用的（或至少是完全无法反驳的）核心理念是“非预成论”——即发育主义者拒绝了基因中含有与其相关的性状的微小副本这一古旧想法。 As for the overstated ones, they include the core concept of “parity” — the idea that genes have no more explanatory power than many other features of the organism and environment. Schaffner dismisses this as an exaggeration, at least insofar as it ignores the extent of our current understanding of the molecular structure and function of DNA. 而那些夸大的理念，包括“等价性”——即基因和生物体以及环境的许多其他特征相比，并没有更多的解释力。至少目前，Schaffner把这作为一种夸张来驳斥，因为它忽略了我们当下对DNA分子结构和功能的了解程度。 “Unpredictability,” their fourth core concept, is also exaggerated: genes can contribute to some predictions. As for the developmentalists’ fifth concept, “indivisibility,” Schaffner reminds us of the extent to which reductionism can make incremental progress in “dividing” behavior into analyzable components. 他们的第四个核心理念 “不可预测性”，也是夸张的：基因可以帮助做出一些预测。而对于发育主义的第五个理念， “不可分割性”，Schaffner提醒我们在把行为分割成可分析组件方面，还原论能够取得何种程度的渐进性进展。 To better illustrate his revised vision for reductionism, he introduces the humble roundworm, a wonderful organism for research purposes precisely because we have such highly detailed knowledge of its genes, neurons, neuronal connections and circuits, and of the typical behaviors it engages in during its short life. 为了更好地说明他的修正版还原论，他介绍了不起眼的蛔虫。对做研究来说，这个生物真是棒极了。我们对它的基因，神经元，神经连接和回路，及其短暂一生中的典型行为都有非常详细的知识。 In his characteristically even-handed way, Schaffner actually begins his account of worm behavior with one of those exceptional cases that can mesmerize journalists, pop psychologists, bioethicists, and others — a case where mutations in a single gene do indeed appear to be the necessary condition for a behavior: specifically, in this case, for determining whether a roundworm eats alone or in groups. In other words: one gene appears to determine the worm’s dining preference! 以其特有的不偏不倚的方式，Schaffner实际上用一个极好的例子开始阐释蛔虫的行为，这例子可以让记者，通俗心理学家，伦理学家和其他人着迷。那就是某个基因的变异看起来确实可以是一种行为改变的必要条件：具体来说，决定了一条蛔虫单独进食还是和群体一起进食。换句话说：看来是一个基因决定着该蠕虫的进食喜好！ But then the remainder of his discussion of the roundworm illuminates what’s wrong with the One-Gene-One-Behavior idea — and more generally, with the One-Gene-One-Disease (OGOD) idea. 但书中关于蠕虫的讨论的余下篇幅阐明了“一个基因一种行为”， 更宽泛的来说是“一个基因一种疾病”（One-Gene-One-Disease ，缩写为OGOD）这一理念的谬误之处，。 To show why the “gene for style of eating” example is an exception to the big rule of thumb that behaviors cannot be reduced to genes, much less to single genes, Schaffner introduces eight smaller “rules.” 为了解释为何“决定进食偏好的基因”只是“行为不能被还原为基因，更不能被还原为单个基因”这条更一般性的经验法则的一个例外，Schaffner 介绍了八条较小的“法则”。 These emphasize the interactions, occurring on multiple levels of analysis (from genes to neurons and nutrients), which change over time, and which shape and are shaped by the cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic environments. 这些法则强调了发生在多个分析层次上的交互作用，从基因到神经元和营养物，而且这些交互作用一直在变化，并且塑造着细胞内，细胞外和生物体外的环境，反过来又受到这些环境的影响。 For example, “social deprivation,” he patiently explains, can adversely affect even the development of worms. Those raised in isolation were slower to respond to taps on the plates that constitute their environments (the “tap withdrawal reflex”), were physically smaller, and had delayed development — and the delay was correlated with the altered expression of a gene coding for a protein involved in the tap response. 他耐心地解释道，例如“社交剥夺”，甚至对蠕虫的发育也会造成负面影响。那些在孤独中被培育的蠕虫对轻拍培养皿的反应更慢，而培养皿构成了它们的生存环境（轻拍回撤反射实验），而且它们身形更小，发育更迟缓。而这迟缓与一个基因表达上的改变相关，这一基因编码了一种与轻拍反射相关的蛋白质。 Schaffner quotes the researcher’s conclusion: “Experience … can alter both gene expression and the structure of the nervous system” (p. 92). Even in the roundworm, there is no “gene for” the tap response; instead, the tap response is the result of a complex network, including, at a minimum, genes, neurons, and environments. If we hope to explain behavior, then, according to Schaffner, we need a “network perspective.” Schaffner 引用研究者的结论：“经验……能够改变基因表达和神经系统结构”（第92页）。即使在蠕虫里，也没有负责轻拍反应的基因；反之，轻拍反应是一个复杂网络的结果，这一网络至少包括基因、神经元、和环境。如果我们希望解释行为，那么根据Schaffner 的观点，我们需要一个“网络视角”。 If this “network” type of genetic explanation holds for most behaviors, including even more complex organisms than worms and fruit flies, such as mice and humans, it raises barriers both to any simplistic type of genetic explanation, and the prospects of easily achievable medical and psychiatric pharmacological interventions into behaviors (ital. added, p. 95). 如果这个“网络”型遗传学解释能对大多数行为成立，包括比蠕虫和果蝇复杂得多的生物体，比如老鼠和人，它就使以下二者变得更困难：一，任何还原论版本的遗传学解释；二，发明出针对行为的，容易实现的医药或精神病学的药物干涉的希望。 In other words, to appreciate the leap from genes to worm behaviors should put us on notice that there will be even more “barriers” in going from genes to human behaviors, disorders, and diseases. The once-intuitively plausible idea of the genome as a molecular crystal ball has come to seem quaint. 换言之，理解从基因到蠕虫行为的思维跳跃，应该让我们注意到，从基因推及人的行为、失调和疾病，存在更多的困难。把基因组当分子层面的水晶球，这一曾是直觉上可行的的理念已经变得古旧。 It is essential to recognize, however, the difference between the notion that behaviors can be reduced to the operation of genes and the idea that behaviors can be reduced. The former notion, according to Schaffner, is wildly inaccurate, but the latter is not. The fact that we can’t achieve what he calls “sweeping reductions” of the sort first fantasized about at the start of the Human Genome Project does not mean that the enterprise of reductionism is a bust. 然而，有必要认识到，行为可以被还原为基因运作的结果，与行为可以被还原，这两种想法是不同的。在Schaffner看来，前者是非常不精确的，但是后者不是。在人类基因组开始时，人类开始沉迷于Schaffner的所谓“全面还原”的愿景，我们不能达成“全面还原”的愿景这一事实并不意味着还原论的雄心只是个泡影。 It means, among other things, that we need to accept the fact that, in complex systems, we should expect what he calls “patchy” or “partial” or “creeping” reductions. Genes can help to illuminate one “patch” of the huge field or network that would in theory constitute something like a complete explanation of a behavior. 而且这意味着，我们得接受一个事实：在复杂系统中，我们应该期待他所谓的打补丁的，或部分的，或是“小步推进”的还原。基因能帮助弄清这个网络或巨大场域的一个补丁，这在理论上构成了对一种行为的完整解释的一部分。 Finding a Path Forward to Understanding Human Behavior 发现通向理解人类行为的路径 Schaffner nimbly moves from worms to human beings. What geneticists have notbeen able to discover regarding human personalities should reassure, even gladden, skeptics. Schaffner 灵活地从蠕虫跳到人类。关于人格，遗传学家一直没能发现的部分，应该会安慰和甚至鼓舞怀疑论者。 At the turn of the century, some psychologists and geneticists hypothesized that there were three domains of personality temperament — novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward dependence; each linked to a distinct neurotransmitter — dopamine, serotonin, and epinephrine; and thus linked to “genes for” the production and regulation of one of those neurotransmitters. 在世纪之交，一些心理学家和遗传学家假设人类气质有三个方面——猎奇性，避害性，和趋奖性；每种都和不同的神经递质相关——多巴胺，血清素，和肾上腺素；因此也和产生及管理这些神经递质的基因相关。 The idea was that specific gene variants associated with the regulation of dopamine, for example, had significant effects on novelty seeking. Again, those initial results failed to replicate. Among the reasons for those failures was the mistaken assumption that single “candidate” genes would, independent of their interaction with other genes and environmental variables, have large effects on traits as complex as personality. 这种理念认为，与管理多巴胺有关的基因的特定变异，会对猎奇性有显著影响。再一次，这些最初的结果未能被重复。单个基因会独立于其他基因和环境变量而对诸如人格这样的复杂性状产生巨大影响，这一错误的假设，算是失败的原因之一。 Combine that mistaken assumption with the all-too-human appetite of scientists, university PR departments, and journal editors for big, exciting findings, and voila: a variety of subtle statistical errors crept in. 这个错误的假设，加上科学家们的野心（这也是人之常情），大学公关部门和追求巨大且令人振奋发现的期刊编辑，于是：一系列微妙的统计学谬误渗透了进来。 Even the study of the interaction of genetic and environmental variables in the early 2000s was plagued with replication problems, perhaps due to their depending on the idea of “candidate” genes with large effects. Since then, extraordinary advances in technologies designed to compare genome sequences, combined with powerful new statistical methods, make it increasingly possible to detect genetic variants associated with tiny effects. 即使在21世纪初，对遗传和环境变量相互作用的研究也被结果不能重复这一问题所困扰，也许是因为研究者依赖“候选”基因有强大影响这一理念。此后，旨在比较基因组序列的非凡的技术进步，结合功能强大的新统计方法，使得发现与微小影响相关的遗传变异变得越来越可能。 The new, emerging picture boils down to this: common complex traits are the result of hundreds or thousands of gene variants of small effect size, which often interact with other gene variants as well as a gigantic range of environmental variables. It remains to be seen how much of practical value will result from this. 正在浮现中的新图景可以归结为：常见的复杂性状是几百或几千种效果较小的基因变异所产生的效果，并且它们通常与其他基因变异以及为数众多的环境变量相互作用。这个途径能带来多少实际价值仍有待观察。 Moreover, as Schaffner observes, it may be that huge categories like “novelty seeking” and “harm avoidance” are just too vague or indistinct to establish pathways from genes to behaviors like these. Again, to know that personality “is genetic” is massively different from knowing which genes are at work, much less how they are contributing to a given trait. 此外，Schaffner 指出，这可能是因为诸如“猎奇性”和“避害性”的宽泛类别太过含糊不清，以至于无法建立从基因到此类行为的途径。再次，要知道个性“是遗传的”和知道哪个基因在起作用是非常不同的，更不用说它们是如何导致一个特定性状的。 While Schaffner’s account of personality genetics may dishearten aficionados of genetic explanations, his account of schizophrenia should gladden them. Schizophrenia, too, is a large and heterogeneous category, but researchers have made headway in characterizing that heterogeneity — in specifying the symptoms and subtypes of schizophrenia. It’s in the context of schizophrenia that Schaffner elaborates on his conception of successfully reductionist scientific explanations. 虽然Schaffner关于个性遗传学的阐释会让遗传学解释狂人气馁，他关于精神分裂症的论述应该鼓舞他们。精神分裂症，也同样是一个宽泛且异质的类别，但研究人员在描述其异质性——即详细描述其症状和亚型——上已取得了进展。在精神分裂症问题上，Schaffner成功阐述了他的还原论者科学解释的概念。 Such explanations, whether of schizophrenia or any other disorder or behavior, will have to be “interlevel”; in other words, they will need to draw on what is known at the level of ions, molecules, cells, cell-cell circuits, and organs — and will have to tell a story about how, over time, the factors at those different levels interact with each other and their environments. 这样的解释，无论是针对精神分裂症或任何其他病症或行为，将必须是“层次间的”；换言之，他们将需要利用在离子、分子、细胞、细胞间回路和器官等各层面的知识构建一个故事——且必须解释在不同层次上的各个因素如何一直互动并和环境相互作用。 In the case of schizophrenia, this includes genes implicated in the production and regulation of specialized nerve cells, specialized parts of those nerve cells, connections among those nerve cells, and, ultimately, brain wave patterns thought to be associated with the activation of those neuronal circuits and associated with at least some features of schizophrenia. 在精神分裂症的例子中，那将包括所有涉及下列事情的基因：特化神经细胞的生成和调控、这些神经细胞的特化部位、这些神经细胞之间的连接，以及最后，被认为是和这些神经回路相关联的脑波模式，这些脑波模式也被认为至少和神经分裂症的一些特征相关联。 Need one say that the model he describes is not anywhere close to complete? (Nor is the elaboration of this model, which has recently received high-profile attention.) Rather, it offers a “creeping” reduction — incremental progress in using the tools of genetics and neuroscience to understand one patch of the massively complex phenomenon we call schizophrenia. 可以说他描述的模型离完成还差十万八千里吗？（阐述这个模型让他最近引人瞩目。）然而，这提供了一个“小步推进”的还原论解释——即在利用遗传学和神经科学方面的渐进性进展，可用来理解我们称之为精神分裂的极为复杂现象的一个方面。 Clearly, this model shouldn’t inspire euphoric expectations of imminent cures. Again, to his credit, Schaffner is adamant in stating that, “DNA sequence per se increasingly seems impoverished as a biological explainer” (p. 197). And, again, this is not to say that DNA sequence is unimportant — it’s just not important in the simple ways we once imagined, which notably still linger in the imagination. 很显然，这种模式不该激发关于治愈方案立即诞生的欣快预期。令人佩服地，Schaffner 再次坚决指出， “ 单单用DNA序列本身去解释生物学现象，似乎越来越困窘” （第197页） 。并且再次，这不是说 DNA序列是不重要的——只是不像我们曾经想象得那样，以简单的方式而显出其重要性，很明显，这些简单方式仍徘徊在想象中。 A Grownup Conception of Freedom 一个成熟的“自由”概念 So, is human behavior genetically determined? Different from what a sweeping genetic reductionist would hope, we have seen that the answer is plainly no. But nor is human behavior not determined. On the contrary, Schaffner thinks that human behavior is determined — and that it admits of reductionist explanations. Does this mean freedom is an illusion? 所以，人类行为是遗传决定的吗？不同于全面遗传学简化论者所指望的，我们已经看到答案明显是否定的。但这也不是说人类行为不是决定的。相反，Schaffner 认为人类行为是决定的——这使得还原论者的解释成为可能。这意味着自由是幻觉吗？ No, it doesn’t, even if it does mean that we have to give up conceptions of freedom of the sort that best-selling authors like Sam Harris like to set up in order to knock down. Yes, we have to give up the idea of freedom as an extra-natural capacity or force that is somehow insulated from the impact of the natural and social forces at work in the world. 不，这没有，即使这意味着我们必须放弃畅销书作家如 Sam Harris 为了作品成功而设定的那种自由概念。是的，我们必须放弃这一理念：自由某种程度上是一种能绝缘于世上自然和社会力量影响的超自然能力。 But accepting that our behaviors are determined by natural and social forces that, at least in principle, admit of explanation does not mean that we have to give up the conception of freedom that mature adults should want, or that, as Daniel Dennett puts it, “is worth having.” 但是接受我们的行为是被自然和社会决定的，或者至少在原则上承认该解释，并不意味着我们必须放弃有关心智成熟的成人应该渴望的那种——或者如 Daniel Dennett所说的，“值得拥有的”——自由的概念。 To get at what such a conception of freedom is, Schaffner introduces philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s influential distinction between first- and second-order desires. Consider, for example, an alcoholic with insight into her alcoholism. She might have a second-order desire not to drink, while also having a first-order desire to drink. 为了说清楚如此的自由概念究竟是什么，Schaffner 介绍了哲学家Harry Frankfurt所说的第一阶渴望和第二阶渴望之间的显著区别。试想，一个酗酒者很清楚的认识到她的成瘾问题。她也许有种不喝酒的二阶渴望，但同时又有想喝酒的一阶渴望。 The person who cannot bring her first-and second-order desires into alignment lacks what warrants being called free will. If, on the other hand, she can get those first- and second-order desires into alignment, and if she can, as it were, desire what she wants to desire, we can say that she is free. 这个不能把一阶和二阶渴望协调好的人缺乏确保自由意志的能力。反之，如果她能协调好一阶和二阶渴望，并且如果某种程度上她能渴望她想渴望的，我们可以说她是自由的。 The behavioral geneticist and philosopher of psychiatry, Kenneth Kendler explains how human beings can, “through their decision-making capacity, intervene in causal pathways from genes to behavior.” Kendler’s first example is alcohol dependence. We know from classical behavioral genetics studies that alcoholism “is genetic” in the real but limited sense that the genes that children inherit from parents can put them at increased risk of becoming alcoholics. 行为遗传学家和精神病哲学家 Kenneth Kendler 解释了人类如何能“通过他们的决策能力，在从基因到行为的因果性路径上进行干涉。”Kendler的第一个例子是酒精依赖。从经典的行为遗传学研究我们知道，酗酒在真实但有限的意义上是“遗传性的”，即孩子从父母那里继承的基因能增加他们成为酗酒者的风险。 We also know, however, that children of alcoholics are also at increased “risk” of becoming teetotalers — practicing complete abstinence from alcohol; Donald Trump’s response to his father’s and brother’s alcoholism is a case in point. Kendler and Schaffner both want us to notice how a grownup conception of freedom retains a place both for genes and for choice. 但我们也知道，酗酒者的孩子成为滴酒不沾者——也就是实际上完全戒绝酒精——的可能性也增加了；川普对于其父兄酗酒的回应就是一个与此有关的例子。Kendler 和Schaffner都想让我们注意到一个成人的自由概念，如何能给基因和选择都留有余地。 In other words, human decisions can be an essential factor in the multilevel causal network that gives rise to our behaviors. If we notice that genes, neurons, hormones, neighborhoods, cultures, histories — and human desires and choices — can be among the determinants of human behavior, determinism should be less anxiety-producing. 另一方面，人类决策能够成为导致我们的行为的多层次因果网络中的一个关键因素。如果我们注意到，基因，神经元，荷尔蒙，邻里，文化，历史——还有人的渴望和选择——都能算作人类行为的影响因素，决定论就应该不那么让人焦虑。 In offering his view of the sort of freedom of choice that any grownup should want, he reminds us that scientific researchers choose which level of the causal network they will study. There is nothing wrong with having a preference for a given level of analysis, but there is something wrong with forgetting that a preferred level won’t be the only one needed to make headway in the sorts of reductions that can contribute to practically useful explanations. 在阐释他关于（任何成年人都应向往的那种）选择自由的观点时，他提醒我们不要忽略科学研究者选择何种层次的因果网络来研究。对某层次的分析有偏好完全没有错，但如果想要在那种能够产生有实际用处的解释的还原工作上取得进展，忘记你所偏爱的层次不是所需的唯一条件，则是不对的。 An Anxiolytic and a Mood Stabilizer 一种抗焦虑剂和情绪稳定剂 This brings us full circle to the growing anxiety swirling around the idea of “designer babies,” and more specifically to the idea that it will be possible to use “gene editing technologies” like CRISPR-Cas9 to engineer traits like intelligence. As we begin to appreciate that such traits involve hundreds or thousands of genes interacting with each other and with the cellular, extracellular, and extraorganismic environments, then the less seriously we can take the notion that it will be possible to enhance such traits by making changes at the level of the gene. 这把我们带回到文章开头提到的那萦绕在“设计婴儿”这一概念周围的日益增长的焦虑，或者更确切地说，带回到对利用“基因编辑技术”（如CRISPR-Cas9）来对诸如智力之类的性状进行工程设计的焦虑。当我们开始注意到这些性状涉及数百个基因的互动，以及和细胞内、细胞间和生物体外环境的交互作用，那么我们就更不会认为在基因层面做改动来增强这些性状是可能的了。 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, understanding this complexity can help stabilize the mania precipitated by the Human Genome Project. Ever since its launch in 1990, we have heard ecstatic claims about the imminent arrival of medical diagnoses, treatments, and preventive interventions tailored to individual genomes. 而且，如早先提到的，理解这种复杂性可以帮助平息人类基因组计划带来的急躁冒进。早在该项目于90年代发起之际，我们已经听到欣喜若狂的宣告，即针对个人基因定制的疾病诊疗预防手段即将问世。 While it is absolutely crucial to appreciate the real and important strides in diagnosis and treatment linked to advances in understanding the genome, it is equally important to appreciate that, with few exceptions, knowledge at the level of the genome alone will likely not be able to produce as much clinically relevant information as was once promised. 当然，重视由对基因组的深入理解而带来的诊疗方面的真实且重要的进步是绝对关键的，但同样重要的是要明白，除了少数几个例外，仅靠基因组层面的知识产生相关的临床信息，很可能不如之前曾经承诺的那么多。 As we taxpayers begin to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the Human Genome Project’s offspring, The Precision Medicine Initiative, we should hold its leaders to their word when they say that they are getting the mania under control. Given how ardently some of the leaders of that initiative — not least Francis Collins — have been committed to a geneocentric approach, and given how mesmerizing and cheap gene-sequencing has become, it may take significant effort on their part to live up to their new promise of pursuing a more multilevel and, dare one say, balanced approach. Reading Schaffner’s book could strengthen their resolve to live up to that promise. 既然我们纳税人已开始把数亿美元投入人类基因组计划的续集，精准药物计划，当计划的领袖们说他们正在控制关于基因疗法的急躁冒进，我们应当让他们遵守承诺。考虑到一些项目领袖们是如此热忱，不光Francis Collins一人决心采用基因导向的方法，而且目前基因测序已变得如此便宜又吸引人，让这些领袖信守他们采用更加多层次的，当然也就是更平衡的方法的承诺也许需要更大的努力。读Schaffner的书可以加强他们实现这个承诺的决心。 Erik Parens is a senior research scholar at The Hastings Center, a bioethics research institute in Garrison, New York, and is the author of Shaping Our Selves: On Technology, Flourishing, and a Habit of Thinking. Erik Parens 是Hastings中心（一个坐落于纽约州Garrison的生物伦理研究机构）的一位高级学者，他著有《塑造自我：关于技术，繁荣，和思维的习惯》。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Surrendering to Death 向死亡投降 作者：Gavin McInnes @ 2016-5-14 译者：Tankman 校对：babyface_claire（@许你疯不许你傻） 来源：Taki Mag，http://takimag.com/article/surrendering_to_death_gavin_mcinnes/ Eagles of Death Metal recently finished a Canadian tour and I got to sit down with vocalist Jesse Hughes and discuss the Bataclan attack in Paris that killed 89 of his fans. You’d think he’d want to avoid the topic, but he was actually eager to get into it. He sees it as a catharsis. 死亡金属之鹰乐队最近结束了一个加拿大巡演，我有机会和主唱Jesse Hughes坐下来讨论巴黎的Bataclan剧院惨案。该事件中，他的89位粉丝惨遭杀害。也许你认为他想回避这一话题，但他其实很渴望提到它。他将此视为一种宣泄。 Hughes is not happy with the way the media has treated the story. Details are randomly pulled from his interviews and entire angles are edited in later that are diametrically opposed to his beliefs. Jesse Hughes has been ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church. He’s pro-gun, pro-Trump, and pro-life. He recognizes that Islam is the problem and political correctness is literally killing us. Hughes 不满意媒体对待该故事的方式。他访谈中的细节被随意抽出，整个视角随后则被编写成与他的信念截然相反。Jesse Hughes 已经被任命为普世生命教会的牧师【译者注：该宗教流派鼓励行善，并允许牧师保持其原有信仰，无论是基督教、伊斯兰教和无神论等。】。他支持持枪权，支持川普，也反对堕胎。他认为伊斯兰教才是问题所在，而政治正确正在真真切切的杀死我们。 Takimag: It’s hard to talk about the attack without sounding like you’re blaming the victims, but it’s impossible to deny fear of Islamophobia and fear of guns led to a lot of deaths that night. Taki杂志：谈论这次袭击，却避免听起来像是指责受害者，是很难的。但是不能否认的是：对伊斯兰恐惧症的恐惧，和对枪支的恐惧，导致了那晚很多人的死亡。 Jesse Hughes: I saw fear fall like a blanket on the whole crowd and they fell like wheat in the wind—the way you would before a god. I was totally alert from the very beginning. The first thing I needed to do was find my girl. Fear took a backseat and “where’s my girl?” took over. Jesse Hughes：我看见恐惧如毯子一样盖在整个人群上，人群倒伏在地，如风中的麦子——就是那种面对上帝你会下拜的姿态。我从一开始就非常的警觉。首先，我需要做的是找到我的女朋友。恐惧退居第二位，而“我的女朋友在哪”则位居第一。 I could smell gunpowder in the backstage area and I knew someone fired a round back there. I saw a guy with an FAL and when he turned to face me his eyes looked like marbles. He was stoned out of his mind, and we now know they were on Xanax and cocaine. I recognized him. I’d seen him earlier in the day and noticed him staring at us. 我可以在后台区域闻到火药味，我知道某人往那边打了一梭子。我看见一个配有轻型自动步枪的人，当他面朝我时，他的眼睛看起来像玻璃弹珠一样。他整个呆住了，现在我们知道他们当时是嗑了蝴蝶丸和可卡因。我认出了他。当天早些时候，我看到过他并注意到他盯着我们看。 They were in the venue early. That implies some staff were in on it. 他们早先就在会场。这意味着有些工作人员参与了此事。 I got in a lot of trouble for saying that. I know for sure that they were in there early. I remember them staring at my buddy. I just chalked it up to Arab envy. You know what I mean? When a Muslim sees a cocky American dude with tattoos, he stares at him. 因为声称这点，我遭遇了很多麻烦。我很肯定他们早先就在那里。我记得他们盯着乐队成员看。我当时认为那只是阿拉伯式的羡慕。你懂吧？当一个穆斯林看到一个臭屁的纹着身的美国哥们，他就盯着那人看。 I realized later it was Abdeslam and he was staring at my buddy because they thought he was a threat. There’s no denying the terrorists were already inside, and they had to get in somehow. During the shooting I went outside and the backstage door was propped open. How did that happen? 之后我意识到那人是 Abdeslam【译者注：袭击参与者之一】。他盯着我哥们看，因为他们认为他是个威胁。无可否认，恐怖分子已经混进里面了，他们必须用某种法子混进去。在枪击中，我跑到外面去，而后台的门是大开着的。这是怎么发生的？ Do you think political correctness is killing our natural instincts and making us vulnerable? 你认为政治正确正在杀死我们的自然直觉，并使得我们变得易受攻击吗？ Definitely. There were two girls who were involved. They were at the venue and vanished before the shooting, and these women were in traditional Muslim garb. They knew people wouldn’t check them because of the way they were dressed. They got caught a few days later. 当然。有两个女孩参与了此事。她们曾在大厅里，但在枪击前又消失了。这些女士穿着传统穆斯林服装。他们知道因为她们的穿着，人们不会检查她们。几天后她们被抓获。 The fear of offending Muslims is a terrorist’s greatest weapon. 害怕冒犯穆斯林的心态是恐怖分子最有力的武器。 Look at the guys who bombed Brussels. They were wearing black gloves on one hand. Their luggage was too heavy to lift, but they didn’t want anyone helping them with it. Nobody brought any of this up until after the bombs went off. 看看那些在布鲁塞尔放炸弹的家伙。他们一只手带着黑手套，他们的行李太重举不起来，但是他们不想让任何人帮助他们搬行李。直到炸弹爆炸后才有人把这些线索联系起来。 We’d rather die than be called a bigot. 我们宁死也不愿意被称作是偏执狂。 How is a faith being associated with racism? Just take out the word “Islam” and replace it with “communism.” It’s an ideology. The same way the Rosenbergs could sell nuclear secrets from within America is the same way Muslim terrorists can attack us from within. It’s okay to be discerning when it comes to Muslims in this day and age. 一种信仰是如何被和种族主义联系起来的？只要把“伊斯兰”一词抽掉，换成“共产主义”。这就是一种意识形态。和卢森堡夫婦出卖美国的原子弹机密一样，穆斯林恐怖分子也从内部袭击我们。今时今日，一旦涉及到穆斯林，小心一点没错。 Where is this push coming from? Is it all our fault? 这动机从何而来？都是我们的错吗？ Of course not. When you’re at a soccer game in Europe and you see the words “United Arab Emirates,” you know there is a lot of Arab money floating around and influencing the dialogue. The conversation is constantly being steered away from scrutiny. They think we’re fools. 当然不是。当你在欧洲的足球赛场看到阿联酋一词，你就知道有很多阿拉伯资金流入并影响了交流。这一交流始终得以避开审慎的检视。他们觉得我们是白痴。 Arab money is a pollutant. So many movies are made with Arab money. George Clooney doesn’t kiss the ass of the Arabs for no reason. American movies are the best way to influence the hearts and minds of the world. 阿拉伯资金是一种污染物。如此多的电影是在阿拉伯资金的支持下拍摄的。乔治·克鲁尼不是无缘无故跪舔这些阿拉伯人的。美国电影是影响这世界的心灵和思想的最佳方式。 You never see bad guys in movies who are Arab terrorists. It’s always Germans or French… 电影中，你从来看不到阿拉伯恐怖分子作为坏人出现。总是德国人或者法国人。 Or conservative Christian rednecks. They’re apparently what’s wrong with everything in the world now, including global warming. What about the other ice age we went through? There were no Christian Republicans back then. What caused that meltdown? 或者保守的红脖子基督徒。他们显然是这个世界当下各种麻烦的根源，包括全球变暖。那我们经历过的那个冰河时代呢？那时候可没有基督徒共和党人。那是什么导致了这场灾难呢？ The other problem with that is, when you get rid of these Christian rednecks, you create a vacuum and it gets filled with people way worse. It gets filled with Islam. You end up replacing evangelism with sharia law. 另一个麻烦是，如果你排挤走这些红脖基督徒，你就创造了一个真空，让更糟糕的人来填补。伊斯兰填补了这真空。你的结局就是用伊斯兰教法代替福音主义。 Politicians behave better when they know people are watching. We behave better when we believe Jesus is watching us. 当知道人们在监督时，政客们的行为更规矩。当相信耶稣在看着我们时，我们的行为更规矩。 These atheists tell us we don’t need religion, yet everyone seems to be creating flimsy substitutes to replace it. Rehab is just Lent. Meditation is just Latin Mass. Seeing a therapist is just talking to your priest. 那些无神论者告诉我们，我们不需要宗教，不过每个人似乎都在创造轻浮脆弱的替代品来代替宗教。修复期实际是大斋期【译者注：在西方基督教国家，每年的大斋期是基督徒献供与苦修的时期，也是洗涤罪恶，承蒙天主启示的时期】。冥想实际是拉丁弥撒。去看治疗师实际上是和你的牧师谈话。 And the thing about the Bible is it’s written down. A therapist can change his diagnosis just like that and there’s no way of calling him out on it. 而圣经，就是那些被写了下来的（治愈谈话），它不像一个治疗师可以任意更改其诊断，而且人们无法在这事上挑战他。 Let’s get back to the attack. Why didn’t the cops come in earlier? It seemed like the killing went on forever. 让我们回到袭击这个话题。为什么警察不能更早来呢？当时看起来杀戮好像会永远进行下去。 The press heard some kids were locked away in rooms so they reported it as a hostage situation. Those kids were hiding. This misinformation meant the cops set up outside for a negotiation while inside dozens of people were dying. 媒体听说一些小孩被锁在房间里，所以他们当时把这事当作人质危机报道。那些小孩在躲藏。这种信息误导意味着警察在外面准备谈判，而内部的数十人则正在死去。 The terrorists would go up to bodies and stick them with the gun. If they budged, they’d shoot them again. One girl got up and said she was scared. The guy said, “Don’t be scared, you’ll be dead in two minutes,” and then he shot her, BOOM. 恐怖分子们会走近倒下的人，用枪戳他们。如果倒地者动了，就会被补枪。一个女孩爬了起来，说她很害怕。一个恐怖分子说“别怕，你在两分钟内就会死。”然后他开枪打了她，砰。 The French are so concerned with racism, they’re letting Muslims get away with murder. 法国人太在意种族主义，他们让穆斯林逍遥法外。 A day after, at the stadium, Muslims booed the moment of silence and we barely heard about it in the press. I saw Muslims celebrating in the street during the attack. I saw it with my own eyes. In real time! How did they know what was going on? There must have been coordination. 一天后，在球场上，穆斯林在默哀时刻发出嘘声，而我们很少听到关于这一情节的媒体报道。袭击的时候，我看到穆斯林们在街上庆祝袭击。我亲眼看到这事。就在袭击的那个时刻。他们怎么知道袭击正在发生？这些事情一定有联系。 I’ve heard you say you credit your childhood with your survival. You had a real dad who stuck around and taught you about guns. 我听说你提到你的童年经历帮你幸存了下来。你有个陪伴你的父亲，而且教给你关于枪支的知识。 I knew what gunfire was. I was able to think through it. I was also able to remember practical lessons of my life because I had to be in fights as a kid. My mom didn’t go sue anyone. I didn’t have playdates. I had some practical upbringing growing up in the desert where you got to get yourself out of your problems. 我知道开枪是怎么回事。我能把这事考虑清楚。我也能记起我生活中的实际经验，因为我小时候不得不参与打架。我妈妈没有起诉任何人，我也没有大人给我找的玩伴。我有些实际成长经验，在孤立无援的困境中你只能靠你自己走出来。 Also, the reason I’ve done well with this healing process is everything I was raised to believe was affirmed that night. In a way, that’s a blessing of God. When the first bullets started being fired, people looked at me. I remember that. It pissed me off because I knew right then and there it was going to be bad. I knew these kids had no idea what was coming. None. They’d never heard a gunshot in real life and it hit them so hard. 而且，我从此事件中恢复的如此之好的原因是，我长大成人过程中得到的一切信念都在那一晚被肯定了。某种程度上，这是神的保佑。当第一颗子弹出膛，人们看着我。我记得这点。这让我愤怒，因为就在那刻那地我知道事情要坏了。我知道那些孩子们对即将发生的事情毫无概念。没有一个知道。他们从未在现实生活中听到过一声枪响，这重重的打击了他们。 Political correctness kills. 政治正确在杀人。 Davey [bassist Dave Catching] was in the middle of the stage and when the lights went on, he saw shit he’d never seen before in his life, awful stuff. It has no parallel. It’s not just death. It’s the most unsuspecting, innocent victims you can imagine—people who are gripped in terror and can’t move as a result of it. 当灯光开启时，Davey（贝斯手Dave Catching）在舞台中间，他看到了他此生从未见过的可怕场景，可怕极了。没什么可以与此相比。不仅仅是死亡。那是你可以想象的最无辜最没有防备的受害人——人们被笼罩在恐怖中呆若木鸡。 It’s like a metaphor for all of Western civilization. 这好像是所有西方文明的一个隐喻。 I watched about seven people die. A couple of them were three feet from the barrier. They could have fallen backwards and been alive but they were too scared to even turn around. I remember a woman just standing with her hands up in a surrender pose. The terrorist finally saw her and all she did was go, “No no no.” She surrendered to death in front of my very eyes. I was yelling at her, “HEY!” and I don’t think she could hear me. She was so terrified, I think she’d already given up. 我目睹了大约七个人死亡。他们中一些离护栏就三英尺远。他们也许能翻越护栏逃生，但他们太害怕了甚至不敢转身。我记得一个女人就站在那里，高举双手作投降状。恐怖分子终于看见了她，而她只是一味的说“不，不，不。”就在我的眼前，她向死亡投降了。我向她呐喊，“嗨！”。我不认为她听到了我。她如此害怕，我想她已经放弃了。 Is it fair to say the liberal mentality created this need to surrender? 说自由派的精神气质创造了投降的需要，合理吗？ I will lay the blame right in its lap. When you tell people they can’t help themselves and that they’re children, you weaken them to a point where three feet away is life and they can’t see it because they’re too scared. 对，我要责怪的正是他们。当你告诉人们他们不能自助，他们只是孩子，你就把他们变弱到一个连三英尺远的逃生机会都看不到的地步。他们看不到，因为他们太害怕了。 In a way we’re unarmed two fold. We’re literally unarmed and we’re also mentally unarmed. 某种程度上我们是双倍的赤手空拳。我们本来就赤手空拳，而且我们在精神上赤手空拳。 It’s like the bleating sheep from Animal Farm. You suggest anything that strays from the narrative and this chorus of bleats comes to drown you out. This attack didn’t happen by accident. 就像《动物庄园》中懦弱哀嚎的绵羊。当你的观点脱离叙述的主流，这懦弱哀嚎的合唱就把你的声音盖过。这个袭击不是偶然发生的。 I went to Paris after the attacks and was disgusted by the lack of rage. They didn’t blame Islam. In fact, many blamed the Jews. They seemed more concerned with us promoting xenophobia than laying blame on the terrorists. 我在袭击后去过巴黎，并对缺乏愤怒的程度感到恶心。他们没有谴责伊斯兰。事实上，很多人指责犹太人。比起指责恐怖分子，他们似乎更关心我们促进仇外情绪。 I hung out with plenty of Parisians who were fucking pissed off, but it was mostly cops and military. During the attack, one cop finally realized it wasn’t a hostage situation and yelled out, “It’s a turkey shoot” as he charged in, holding his gun. He got shot right through the hand and into the neck and kept going. He took a terrorist out, chased another one into the hallway, who then blew himself up, and did it to another guy, who blew himself up on stage. Our amplifiers were a gory mess. 我和很多出离愤怒的巴黎人交流过，但是这些主要都是警察和军人。在袭击期间，一个警察终于意识到这不是人质劫持，他持枪突入，并且大叫，“这是土耳其射击！”。他被子弹穿过手，击中脖子，仍然进击。他撂倒了一个恐怖分子，在走廊追击另一个。那恐怖分子就自爆了。之后又追击另一个，那人在舞台上自爆。我们的扩音器上血肉模糊。 Did that cop live? 那警察生还了吗？ Yes, I met him in triage. I hung out with him. Great guy. 是的。我在急救站见过他。我们后来又聚了一次。很好的人。 You went to the hospital? 你进医院了？ I had pieces of teeth and human bone pulled out of my face. A girl got shot right next to me by the shooter at the top of the stairs who I had met earlier. She stepped one step in front of me and her head just exploded. It blew pieces of her teeth and skull into my face. 从我的脸上取出了牙齿和人骨碎片。我旁边的女生被楼梯顶上我早先见过的枪手击中了，她在我面前踉跄了一下，接着她的头爆开了。她的牙齿和头骨碎片扎进了我的脸。 Why don’t we hear about this? 为何我们没听到此事？ The media wants to summarize it, and important details get lost. The most important detail being when they started shooting, they were already inside. If they were hanging out enough to let three people go, then they knew security dudes. They knew bouncers. They knew doormen. 媒体想要总结事件，而重要的细节则丢失了。最重要的细节是，在他们开始射击时，他们早已经混入内部了。如果他们让三个人混入都能保持隐蔽，那他们一定认识保安。他们认识门卫。 Do you think a percentage of the security staff was Muslim? 你认为有一定比例的保安人员是穆斯林？ I know they were. Look, security guards backstage are notorious for being dicks. They check your ID every few minutes and nobody goes back and forth without being checked, even if you’re in the band. This guy didn’t care what we did. He didn’t even look at me. 我知道他们其中一些是。听着，后台保安一般以严格著称。他们没几分钟就会查验你的证件。没人能不被检查来回穿梭，即使你是乐队的一员。而这次后台保安则不管我们是干什么的，他甚至没看我。 The only time he seemed remotely interested in us was when he said to my girlfriend, “Do you speak French?” and “Where are you from?” She said she was from Texas and he was getting frustrated because that’s not what he meant. Then she said, “I’m American” and he lost interest. I honestly think he was trying to determine if she was Arab or not. She’s Mexican and she could easily pass for Lebanese and I think he was going to warn her if she was Muslim. 唯一一次他看来对我们稍有兴趣是他问我女友“你说法语吗？”以及“你从哪里来？”她说她从德州来，而他则感到沮丧，因为这不是他所要问的。然后女友说“我是美国人。”他就失去了兴趣。坦率的说，我认为他试图判定她是不是阿拉伯人。她是个墨西哥人，很容易被错认成黎巴嫩人。我认为如果女友是穆斯林，他当时会警告她。 I kept opening up the back door to smoke and that’s usually a big no-no because of the sound ordinances. I’ve played there before and opening up that door to smoke got you in big trouble. This time, the security guy walks right past me and anxiously looks down the alleyway in either direction. 我让后门开着以便抽烟，通常这是绝不允许的，因为噪声管制。以前我在这里演奏过，开门抽烟会给你带来大麻烦。这次，保安径直从我身边走过，焦虑的打量通道的各个方向。 Maybe one of the reasons the cops are so much more pragmatic about this threat is that they are the ones who have to go into Les Banlieues and confront these people. Naïveté is a luxury they can’t afford. 也许对恐怖威胁，警察的态度现实得多的原因之一是，他们正是那些要去市郊移民聚居区，面对穆斯林的人。幼稚是他们负担不起的奢侈品。 When the cops went in after the attack, they shut down, what, 450 mosques? They found recruitment material in every single one of them. What the fuck is wrong with us that we don’t know about that? 当袭击后警察进入聚居区时，他们沉默了，什么，450个清真寺？他们在它们中的每一个都发现了招募材料。我们到底是怎么了，竟然不知道这事？ Parisians think everyone is innocent, but the cops don’t. They even investigated you. 巴黎人认为每个人都是无辜的，但是警察不这么想。他们甚至会调查你。 I was a person of interest, yes. They interrogated me for four days. I ended up helping them a lot by getting cell-phone footage. It was the cops and the FBI who asked me about the promoter and the security. This isn’t something I brought up to them. 我是个需要被调查的人，是的。他们盘问了我四天。最终我通过现场手机视频帮了他们很多。是警察和FBI问了我关于演出组织者和保安的问题。这不是我提出来的。 We had eight police officers in our audience that night. They all had the same conversation with their wives, which was “Should I bring my gun or not?” All of them said no. When we went back and played Paris again they stood in the same places they stood at the original show and they opened their jackets and showed me their guns as if to say, “Not tonight, motherfucker.” It was beautiful. 当晚观众中有八个警察。他们全都和太太有过相同的对话，“我应该带枪吗？”。太太们全都说不。当我们回到巴黎再次演出的时候，他们站在我以前演出时他们站过的地方，而且他们打开外套，向我展示他们的枪，好像在说，“今晚狗杂种们休想再搞事”。真赞。 Islam is crying wolf about Islamophobia in order to anesthetize us and make us easier prey. 对伊斯兰恐惧症，伊斯兰教不断叫嚷“狼来了”，为了麻痹我们，使我们更容易被猎杀。 They know there’s a whole group of white kids out there who are stupid and blind. You have these affluent white kids who have grown up in a liberal curriculum from the time they were in kindergarten, inundated with these lofty notions that are just hot air. Look at where it’s getting them. 他们知道有一大群白人孩子都是愚蠢和无知的。有大堆的白人孩子自幼儿园起，就成长于自由派课程中，沉浸在热空气般虚无不切实际的幻想中。看看这些白孩子将要面对的吧。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Israeli Marxism 以色列的马克思主义 作者：Steven Plaut @ 2011-8-7 译者：Tankman 校对：hkustliqi 来源：FrontPage Mag，http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/100988/israeli-marxism-steven-plaut It is difficult to explain to people living outside of Israel, and especially to Americans, the extent to which Israelis truly believe in communism. 很难对生活于以色列之外的人，尤其是美国人，解释清楚以色列人信仰共产主义的程度之深。 Sometimes they call it socialism, but they basically mean communism. 有时他们称其为社会主义，但是基本上他们指的就是共产主义。 This is not to say that they behave as communists in their private lives. Quite the contrary, Israelis live as the ultimate ideal of capitalism. They are enormously individualist. They are exceptionally good at starting and managing businesses, and of development and marketing innovations. Israel as a country has more start-up businesses than all of Europe. It registers more patents than any European country. 这并非指他们在自己的私人生活中像共产主义者那么行动。恰恰相反，以色列人像资本主义的终极典范那样生活。他们很大程度上是个人主义者。他们极其善于创建和管理企业，并对开发和推销创新也很在行。作为一个国家，以色列拥有比整个欧洲更多的创业公司。它的专利注册数也比任何一个欧洲国家多。 Yet those very same Israelis, who demonstrate every day their skills in succeeding in markets, hate markets. The word "socialism" carries enormously romantic and positive implications for Israelis. Especially among educated (non-Russian-born) Israelis. The word capitalism is something of an obscenity for most Israelis. 然而，这些每天展示着在市场中如鱼得水技能的以色列人却讨厌市场。对以色列人来说，“社会主义”这个词带有极大的浪漫和正面意味，尤其是在受过教育的以色列人之中（在俄国出生的以色列人除外）。资本主义这个词则对大部分以色列人带有某些侮辱意味。 I suspect that someone arrested for assault could get himself off in court if he claimed the victim had called him a capitalist, it being a form of hate speech. The Israeli media invariably use the word "capitalism" in conjunction with the word piggish. (Ironically, the one exception is the business editor of Haaretz, who supports market capitalism, while the rest of the same newspaper yearns for communism.) 我怀疑因人身侵害被逮捕的人如果宣称受害人称其为资本主义者，他也许能让自己被当庭释放。称人为资本主义者算得上一种仇恨言论。以色列媒体一成不变的把“资本主义”这个词和贪婪一词搭配使用。（讽刺的是，有个例外是Haaretz的商业编辑，他支持市场资本主义，然而同一份报纸的其他同仁们则痴迷于共产主义。） The only conceivable form of market economy in the minds of the Israeli chattering class is "piggish capitalism." You would not believe the portion of Israeli professors and intellectuals who use that expression. The head of the Histadrut, Israel's largest organized crime family, uses it, being a loyal believer in piggish communism. 有话语权的以色列中产们头脑中能够想象的市场经济的唯一形式是“贪婪的资本主义”。你甚至难以相信以色列教授和知识分子中使用这个词的比例。以色列最大的有组织犯罪集团【译者注：一个工团组织】Histadrut的领袖，也用着这个词，充当着贪婪的社会主义的忠实信徒。 In normal countries, pointing out that someone is a card-carrying member of the communist party is usually more than enough to discredit that person. Not in Israel. Carriers of communist party membership cards do so with pride. Most of the members of the history department at Tel Aviv University are such communists. So are oodles of other academics. 在正常国家，指出某人是共产党的活跃成员常常意味着对此人的侮辱。但在以色列不是这样。共产党的活跃分子骄傲的公开身份。大多数特拉维夫大学历史系的成员是共产主义分子。其他学术机构也有大批类似现象。 On the one hand, the operation of markets is what makes Israel a successful viable country, one incidentally that experienced almost no implosion at all during the global financial collapse of the past 4 years. But on the other hand, markets are things Israelis claim they want suppressed. Literate Israelis insist in unison that markets are what is wrong with the world, and suppressing markets is the answer to Israel's problems. Markets are evil, rewarding selfishness. Benevolent governmental bureaucrats controlling the economy are what is needed. 一方面，市场运作使以色列成为一个成功的有活力的国家，而且在全球金融崩溃的过去四年中，它几乎没有受到一点影响。但另一方面，市场是以色列人宣称想要压制的那类事物。以色列的智识阶层一致坚持市场导致了世界的种种问题，而压制市场则是解决以色列各种问题的答案。市场是邪恶的，鼓励自私的。善意的政府官僚管制经济是必需的。 Not every Israeli, mind you. Russian-Israelis, who today are maybe a fifth of the population, have no patience for those preaching the wonders of communism. And they are notably absent in the current "social justice" rallies and marches, or what I have been calling the Woodstock along the Yarkon Festival. 并不是每个以色列人都这么。俄罗斯以色列人，如今也许占到人口的五分之一，对鼓吹共产主义奇迹的人没有耐心。他们明显地缺席当下各种“社会正义”的集会游行，或者被我称为雅孔河边的伍德斯托克狂欢的Yarkon 节会【编注：雅孔河是以色列主要河流，流经行政首府特拉维夫，河边常有集庆】。 Orthodox Jews rarely mouth the slogans of nostalgia for Bolshevik central planning of markets, although there are exceptions. (The commentator on the Torah portion in Maariv cannot get enough of communism and insists that suppressing piggish-capitalism is the highest form of Jewish ethics.) 正统派犹太教徒很少装腔作势的唠叨那些对布尔什维克中央计划经济心存怀旧之情的口号，虽然也有例外。（晚报Torah板块的评论员宣扬起共产主义总是没个够，并坚持认为压制贪婪资本主义是犹太伦理的最高形式。） Israeli academics are almost universally anti-capitalism. I am on the list of a chat list of Israeli social science faculty members, and for the past few weeks it has carried hundreds of postings yearning for socialist controls and denouncing capitalism. The posteurs universally fantasize about Israel adopting Scandinavian-style "socialism." 以色列学术界也几乎普遍地反资本主义。我本人被列在以色列社会科学教职人员的聊天通讯录上，过去几周，我从这个联系列表上收到了几百份向往社会主义管制和批评资本主义的传单。这些传单全是鼓吹把以色列改造成斯堪迪纳维亚式“社会主义”的狂想。 Putting aside some doubts as to how pleasant life really is in Scandinavia (witness Norway recently), Scandinavian "socialism" is actually not. It is essentially free markets mixed with very high tax rates and a gargantuan welfare state providing cradle-to-grave welfare services at state expense. 先不提一些疑问：斯堪迪纳维亚的生活是否真正那么快活（看看最近的挪威），斯堪迪纳维亚式“社会主义”其实并不美好。它其实是自由市场制度混合了极高的税率和从摇篮到坟墓的繁多福利，这些福利由政府提供和付费。 In other words, Scandinavia has always been far more capitalistic countries than Israel, certainly of Israel was before the 1980s. In addition, Israel has always provided Scandinavian-style welfare state services, but without the freeing of markets and liberalization of production that characterized Scandinavia. 换句话说，斯堪迪纳维亚国家其实一直比以色列更接近资本主义，特别是比80年代以前的以色列。而且，以色列已经提供了斯堪迪纳维亚式的政府福利，但却没有斯堪迪纳维亚特征的市场自由化和生产力解放。 Academic economists generally do not join the antlered herds in pining for bolshevism, but there are exceptions. Israeli economists are among the few who know what a market is, what a price is, what a wage is. The protesters never know these things. 学术界的经济学家们总的来说没有加入坚持布尔什维克主义的群落，但也有些例外。以色列经济学家位列少数知道什么市场，什么是价格，什么是工资的人当中。抗议者则从来不知道这些东西是什么。 But Israel has a long history of academic prostitution and one can always find a few academic economists willing to endorse the most idiotic "ideas" of those who understand nothing about economics, if it earns them a shekel or advances their careers. 但是以色列的学术婊源远流长，你总能发现几个经济学家愿意为那些根本不懂经济的人的愚蠢“理念”背书，只要这能够带给他们经济利益或改善其职业前途。 Hence the most passionate supporter of RAISING the minimum wage is "economist" Avishai Braverman, the guy who turned Ben Gurion University into Hamastan, and one can find similar cases of street-walking economists endorsing rent controls, nationalizations, and other fundamental axioms of economic Bolshevism. 所以提高最低工资的最热忱支持者是“经济学家”Avishai Braverman。该人让本·古里安大学变成了反以色列的先锋。你也可发现类似的例子，如一些站街经济学家支持租金管制、国有化、和一些基本的布尔什维克主义经济原则。 Most people are not aware of it but Israel began its existence as a country with a system of Bolshevik central control. In its first years Ben Gurion implemented a system of massive nationalization and near-universal price and wage controls. It differed little from the economic structure created by Lenin. 尽管大部分人没有意识到，但是以色列国从建国伊始，便拥有一个布尔什维克主义的中央计划系统。在立国的头十年，本·古里安实现了一个系统，来进行大规模国有化和几乎全面的价格及工资管制。 这几乎和列宁创建的经济系统没有区别。 Ben Gurion got away with it for a while because of the War of Independence and the national emergency. Like in that old joke about how communism in the Sahara would produce a shortage of sand, by the early 1950s everything in Israel was in shortage, buying anything and everything involved endless Soviet-style queues, and most products could only be obtained in the black markets. 由于立国战争和全国紧急状态，本·古里安曾一度逃脱了共产主义的诅咒。如那个撒哈拉的共产主义怎样能让沙子产生短缺的笑话一样【注：米尔顿·弗里德曼曾说：假如你把撒哈拉交给政府经营，我们很快会面临沙子短缺】，在50年代早期，以色列的一切物资都陷于短缺。购买任何一切东西都免不了无尽的苏联式排队，而且大部分产品只能够在黑市里弄到。 To Ben Gurion's credit, he realized by the early 1950s that the system of Bolshevik controls was unworkable. Curiously, Lenin had also understood this and took steps to dismantle the controls, except that he died and was replaced by Stalin before serious reform took place in the Soviet Union. Lenin called his plan for partial de-Bolshevikation of the economy the "New Economic Plan" or NEP, exactly the SAME name adopted by Ben Gurion for HIS reforms in the early 1950s. (No coincidence!) 本·古里安的功劳是，他在1950年代早期认识到布尔什维克计划经济行不通。令人奇怪的是，列宁也曾认识到这点，并采取了放松管制的措施，只是他去世了，而斯大林在任何深度改革实施之前就接管了权力。列宁把他的部分去布尔什维克经济计划称作“新经济计划”（New Economic Plan，NEP），和本·古里安在50年代早期实施的改革计划的名称一模一样。（这可不是巧合！） While most price controls were ended, other forms of economic Bolshevism were retained by Ben Gurion and his MAPAI party comrades. Huge portions of Israeli industry were nationalized, and much of what was left was semi-nationalized and grossly mismanaged by turning it over to the Histadrut trade union federation. 尽管大多数价格管制被终结了，其他布尔什维克主义的经济措施则仍被本·古里安和他的工党同志们保留了下来。当时以色列工业的很大比例被国有化，而剩下部分中很多被半国有化，而且把这些企业交给Histadrut工团照管造成了严重的经营不善。 Economic policy sought to suppress competition everywhere. It strived to maximize the number of monopolies and cartels in the economy. The government controlled enormous amounts of resources, which it handed out as political favors, often to cronies and party oligarchs. Tax rates were enormous and sometimes exceed 100%. Profits by enterprises were derived mainly from government subsidies and handouts. 经济政策曾试图在所有地方抑制竞争，它努力要最大程度的增加经济中垄断和卡特尔组织的数目。政府曾控制了巨量资源，并按政治偏好进行分配，这些资源常流向亲信和寡头。那时税率极高，有时甚至超过100%。企业利润曾主要依靠政府补贴和帮扶。 Government policy was protectionist and anti-competitive. The capital market was suppressed and nationalized. The government's working philosophy demanded that Israelis essentially turn all their income, savings, and wealth over to the government, and then the government bureaucracy would take care of the needs of the public and of citizens. 政府政策曾非常偏向保护主义和抑制竞争，资本市场则被抑制和国有化。政府的工作哲学要求以色列人实际上把他们所有的收入、储蓄和财富交给政府照管，然后政府官僚将会照顾公共和公民的所需。 The result was a Third World economy, albeit one dominated by a political system that actually involved elections and parliamentary processes. Israel was pauperized by the Bolshevism. It remained poor and underdeveloped. 结果就是，尽管被一个拥有选举和代议程序的政治体系所统治，经济上却仍是第三世界。以色列被共产主义弄的赤贫。而后也仍然贫困落后。 Things only began to change in a significant manner in the 1970s. Israel was being coerced into liberalizing its economy and removing some of the socialist controls because of Israel joining and signing various international trade agreements. The treaty partners refused to allow the Israeli government to continue its policies. The long period of zero growth following the Yom Kippur War also woke some people up to the necessity of having a functional economy. 70年代，事情才开始明显转变。以色列在那时被强制要求经济自由化，并除去一些社会主义管制，因为它需要加入和签署一些国际贸易协定。缔约国拒绝允许以色列政府继续其政策。在赎罪日战争后的长时期零增长，也让一些人意识到亟需一个能够有效运转的经济。 In the 1950s and 1960s it was not unusual for people to lump Israeli economic policies and conditions together with those in Egypt and other Third World backwaters. 在50和60年代，人们把以色列的经济政策和状况混同于埃及和其他死气沉沉的第三世界并不奇怪。 Things changed remarkably starting in the 1980s. Most of the nationalized industry was privatized, largely because state enterprises were losing so much money. Partly, this was due to the change in public willingness to tolerate the controls. Partly it was because of the growing number of people who had taken freshmen economics and understood the idiocy of Bolshevik controls. Partly, it was because of the growth of high tech, which the government could not control or understand. Partly, it was because of international trade treaty pressures. 直到80年代开始，情况才开始发生显著改变。大多数国有企业被私有化了，很大程度上因为国有企业的亏损如此之巨。部分地是因为容忍管制的公众意愿改变了。部分是因为越来越多的人受了基本经济学教育，并理解了布尔什维克管制的愚蠢。部分是因为高科技产业的发展，而政府并不能理解或者控制这些产业。部分是因为国际贸易压力。 There are still plenty of Bolshevik controls in place. Israel has a single-payer health system with four tightly regulated HMO-style providers. It works a lot better than you would expect, for some extraneous reasons (Israel has a young population that eats well and huge numbers of MDs). 目前仍有很多的布尔什维克管制。以色列拥有一个政府全包的医疗系统和四个被严密管制的医疗保险集团。因为一些外部因素，该系统运作的比你预期的好得多（以色列拥有年轻的人口结构，饮食健康，医生数量也很多。） There are still oodles of monopolies and cartels. Agriculture is still largely anti-competitive and inefficient, dominated by government-erected cartels. Taxes are too high. The government owns a large portion of the land in the country. Some sectors are still distorted by protectionism, especially food. 目前仍然存在很多垄断和卡特尔。农业仍然被政府设立的卡特尔控制，很大程度上是反竞争和低效的。税率太高。在国内，政府拥有很大比例的土地。一些部门仍被保护主义扭曲，尤其是食物。 The Woodstock on the Yarkon protesters are by and large leftist secularist Israelis demanding a return to the Bolshevik controls of the 1950s. They pine for the shortages and the rationing of that era because they figure that in a shortage THEY will be granted priority. 在Yarkon节日嘉年华上的抗议者完全就是要求回到50年代布尔什维克管制的左派世俗主义者。他们渴慕那时代的短缺和票证，因为他们觉得在那种短缺中，他们会被优先供给。 The central demand of the protesters is rent controls. This will end up destroying the Israeli housing stock and pauperizing elderly owners of rental property who purchased those units with the intention of earning rental income in their old age. Like in New York and other cities having rent controls, the controls will create shortages, where the true cost of obtaining rental housing actually goes UP, not down. 抗议者的核心诉求是租金管制。这最终会破坏以色列的房屋供给，并且让老迈的房东陷入赤贫。这些房东为了收租养老的缘故买了这些房子。如同纽约和其他有租金管制的城市那样，管制会产生短缺，而租到房子的真实成本实际上提高了，而不是降低了。 The protesters pine for the Soviet steppes. They demand other forms of price controls so that Israel can turn into a Brezhnev-era style of country, where people spend their days waiting in lines for commodities in perpetual and growing shortage. They want markets to be suppressed, where squads of social justice commandos can decide who gets to live in which apartment, who gets to consume those commodities in shortage, and who earns what. 抗议者们仍怀念着苏联的大平原。他们要求其他形式的价格管制，让以色列回到如勃涅日涅夫时代那样的国家。在那里有无尽的日益增长的短缺，人们为了购物整日排队。他们希望市场被抑制，而社会公正的斗士们有权决定谁搬进哪一个公寓，谁消费短缺中的那些商品，谁赚得什么。 They insist that wages be set based on what the protesters think people deserve to earn. Since there is not a single person in Israel who earns what he thinks he deserves to earn, this amounts to a demand for a Soviet-style wage board that fixes wages for all professions, starting with those who are on strike, like the MDs. 他们坚持说工资要基于抗议者认为人们理应挣多少而设定。因为在以色列没有任何人挣着自认为理应得到的数目，这就导致需要一个苏式工资系统，对所有职业设定固定工资，从罢工的人群开始，比如医生们。 In other words, wages in the opinion of the protesters do not have to clear markets and signal where shortages and surpluses are. Wages should be arbitrary measures of "fairness." Try to imagine just what happens when half the jobs in Israel attract no applicants because the fair wages there are insufficient to draw workers, while the other jobs have six applicants for each position because the fair wages there are much too high to clear the market. Try to imagine what life would be like if a Marxist sociologist or a caring social worker were appointed as economic dictator to decide all economic matters and decisions in Zion. 另一方面，抗议者认为工资没必要让市场均衡并发挥信号作用，以显示何处短缺，何处过剩。工资应该是“公平”的武断标准。试想以色列有一半职位都不能吸引到申请者，因为所谓的公平工资不能够吸引工人，而同时以色列的另外一半工作每个职位有六个申请人，因为所谓的公平工资远高于市场均衡水平，将会发生什么?试想一个马克思主义社会学家或一个慈善社工被任命为经济独裁者，来负责锡安的所有经济事务和决策，会发生什么？ Every society on earth and every society in human history has people living in hardship and in poverty. There are poor people in all countries, including Scandinavia. Mankind has not discovered an innovation that eliminates poverty and hardship. 地球上的每个社会，乃至人类历史上每个社会，都有生活在艰难困苦中的人们。所有的国家都有穷人，包括斯堪迪纳维亚。人类尚未能发现一种创新，能消灭贫穷和困苦。 Yet the caring dreamers about Bolshevism along Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv (note the irony of the name) demand an instant magic pill that will eliminate all hardship and inequality. And the failure of the government to provide one is proof that the evil "tycoons" are in charge and preventing the government from serving the people. 然而，和布尔什维克主义相关的爱心白日梦人士沿着特拉维夫的罗斯柴尔德大道（请注意这街名的讽刺性）要求一个立即奏效的神奇药方，来消除贫穷和困苦。而政府没能提供这个药方，则是邪恶的“权贵”在掌权并阻止政府服务人民的证据。 "People not profits" is the slogan of choice used by those who are too stupid to understand that the only way to make producers serve the people and produce things the people want is for them to make profits doing so. Outlaw profits and you create mass starvation. 让厂商服务人民和创造人民需要的产品的唯一途径是让他们借此获得利润，而太蠢不能理解这点的人们则打出了“为人民而不是为利润”的口号。取缔利润，那么你就创造了大饥荒。 The tycoon fetish continues to dominate the protests. I have suggested that Mikey Lerner even change the name of his idiotic magazine from Tikkun to Tycoon. Many Israeli tycoons, at least outside high-tech, were made tycoons because of sweetheart deals with the political establishment, particularly back in the days of MAPAI socialism. 权贵迷信继续主导着这些抗议。我已经建议Mikey Lerner把他白痴杂志的名字从改正（Tikkun ）改为权贵（Tycoon ）。很多以色列的权贵，至少在高科技产业之外，是被政治既得利益者的幕后交易创造出来的，尤其是回溯到工党社会主义时期。 The other irony is that the only "reform" the protesters have extracted from Netanyahu is the setting up of "Planning Speed-up Commissions." And the most ironic part of this irony is that the main effect of those commissions will be to fatten up the "tycoons." 更讽刺的是，抗议者从内塔尼亚胡那里得到的唯一“改革”就是设立一些“规划加速委员会”。并且这一讽刺的最尖锐的部分是：这些委员会的主要作用将是让“权贵”脑满肠肥。 Israel's municipal planning and regulation of construction is a fever swamp of corruption and inefficiency. It takes two years to get a license to put windows in your porch and you may have to bribe city officials to get it. The endless bureaucratic pencil pushing and bickering does indeed slow down construction, affecting housing prices and availability. 以色列的建筑业市政规划管理部门是腐败和低效的温床。给你的门廊加上窗户需要两年时间办理许可证，而你可能不得不贿赂市政官员来拿到它。无穷的官僚系统的文书案牍和磨嘴皮的确减慢了建筑业发展，影响了房屋的价格和供给。 At the same time, these planning dinosaurs DO allow a certain amount of public involvement and intervention, especially when it comes to combating corrupt sweetheart dirty deals between municipalities and construction contractor "tycoons." Corrupt municipal officials are constantly attempting to get approval for construction projects that will enrich contractor cronies, even when these are illegal, harmful to the public interest, ugly, and in some case built on public park lands and beaches. The officials attempt to bend zoning laws and regulations to "help their buddies." 同时，这些计划经济恐龙允许一定的公共介入和干涉，尤其是人们反对市政机构和有背景的建筑承包商之间的内幕交易的时候。腐败的市政官员一直试图为建筑项目拿到许可，这些项目可以让有关系的承包商致富，即使它们是非法可耻的，有害公共利益的，而且有时是在公园和公共海滩上建造。这些官员试图扭曲法律和规制，来“帮助他们的兄弟”。 As a sop to the demonstrators, Netanyahu has proposed and the Knesset just passed the creation of "Planning Speed-Up Commissions," to cut through the red tape and bureaucracy. The problem with the idea is simple: it will still take two years and possibly some bribes if you want to put a window pane on your porch. 作为对示威者的安抚，内塔尼亚胡提出了创建一些“规划加速委员会”，议会批准了这个动议，想要削减繁文缛节和官僚主义。这个主意的缺陷很明了：未来如果你想要在自己的门廊上开一扇窗，还是需要两年，也许还要一些贿赂。 But the oligarchs will be able to use the Speed Up mechanism to push aside public opposition and suppress sensible zoning and planning regulations. The oligarchs are also being offered by Netanyahu public lands at below-market prices, where Netanyahu insists this will lower housing prices. The reality, as any freshman econ student can tell you, is that it will not lower housing prices by a shekel, and instead will only inflate the profits of the cronies getting in on the deal. 但寡头们将能用加速机制来置公众抗议于不顾，压制合理的区域规划和管制。寡头也能够拿到内塔尼亚胡提供的低于市场价的公地，内塔尼亚胡坚称这能降低房价。就如任何经济系一年级学生能告诉你的那样，事实是这不会让房价降低一个子儿，反倒会增加参与项目的关系户公司的利润。 ABOUT STEVEN PLAUT 关于作者 Steven Plaut is a native Philadelphian who teaches business finance and economics at the University of Haifa in Israel.  He holds a PhD in economics from Princeton.  He is author of the David Horowitz Freedom Center booklets about the Hamas  and Jewish Enablers of the War against Israel. Steven Plaut是一位土生土长的费城人。他在以色列的海法大学教授商务金融和经济学。他拥有普林斯顿经济学博士学位。他是David Horowitz自由中心的作者，撰写了一些小册子，讲述哈马斯和一些犹太人积极促成针对以色列的战争。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of Kidney Donors 政府补贴捐肾者的成本效益分析 作者：Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-25 译者：Eartha（@王小贰_Eartha) 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：Marginal Revolution，http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/a-cost-bene%EF%AC%81t-analysis-of-government-compensation-of-kidney-donors.html The latest issue of the American Journal of Transplantation has an excellent and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of paying kidney donors by Held, McCormick, Ojo, and Roberts. 最新一期【译注：即2015年第十期】的《美国移植杂志》刊登了一篇由Held, McCormick, Ojo, 与 Roberts合著的文章，出色且全面地描述了关于支付捐肾者报酬的成本效益分析。 Earlier, Becker and Elias estimated that a payment of $15,000 per living donor would be sufficient to eliminate the US waiting list. The authors adopt a larger figure of $45,000 for living donors and $10,000 for deceased donors and find that even at these rates paying donors generates benefits far in excess of costs. 早些时候，Becker与 Elias就估算过，如果向每位活体捐赠者支付15,000美元，就会有足够的捐赠者来满足全美的肾脏移植需求。上述论文的作者们在分析中采用了更高的补贴数额，给予活体捐献者45,000美元，遗体捐献者10,000美元。结果显示，即使以这样的高价格补贴捐献者，其产生的效益也远超过成本。 In particular, a program of government compensation of kidney donors would provide the following benefits (quoting from the article): 具体而言，政府补贴捐肾者的计划将会带来下列好处（摘自该文章）：

• Transplant kidneys would be readily available to all patients who had a medical need for them, which would prevent 5000 to 10 000 premature deaths each year and significantly reduce the suffering of 100 000 more receiving dialysis.
• 所有有医疗需求的患者都能够顺利地获得肾脏移植，每年将会挽救5,000至10,000例早逝患者，并为超过100,000名依赖透析的患者极大地减缓病痛。
• This would be particularly beneficial to patients who are poor and African American because they are considerably overrepresented on the transplant waiting list. Indeed, it would be a boon to poor kidney recipients because it would enable them to reap the great benefits of transplantation at very little expense to themselves.
• 穷人和非裔病患将尤其从中受益，因为他们在移植等候名单中明显占据了多数。对于贫苦的肾脏移植接受者来说，这的确是一件好事，因为这将使得他们能以非常低的价格享受到肾脏移植的巨大好处。
• Because transplant candidates would no longer have to spend almost 5 years receiving dialysis while waiting for a transplant kidney, they would be younger and healthier when they receive their transplant, increasing the chances of a successful transplantation.
• 因为移植接受者将不必再依赖透析等待近5年，他们接受移植的时候也会更加年轻与健康，移植的成功率将会得到提高。
• With a large number of transplant kidneys available, it would be much easier to ensure the medical compatibility of donors and recipients, which would increase the success rate of transplantation.
• 由于有大量的肾脏可供移植，捐献者与受移植者在医学上的相容性会更容易得到保障，这也会提高移植的成功率。
• Taxpayers would save about $12 billion each year. Dialysis is not only an inferior therapy for end-stage renal disease (ESRD), it is also almost 4 times as expensive per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained as a transplant.
• 纳锐人将因此每年节省大约120亿美元。对末期肾衰竭（ESRD）患者来说，肾透析不仅是一种次等的治疗方法，而且延长每个经质量调整寿命年（QALY）的花费，几乎是肾移植的四倍。【译注：QALY是一种经调整的期望寿命，其计算方式是将实际年数乘上该健康状态下的效用价值。如果在效用价值为5的健康状态持续3年，QALY就等于1.5，相当于保持1.5年的完美健康状态。】

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The New York Times’ Nail Salons Series Was Filled with Misquotes and Factual Errors. Here’s Why That Matters. （Part 1） 《纽约时报》美甲沙龙系列文章充满征引错误和事实错误。我们来看看这事为什么要紧。（第一弹） 作者：Jim Epstein @ 2015-10-27 译者：沈沉（你在何地-sxy） 校对：Tankman 来源：Reason ，https://reason.com/blog/2015/10/27/new-york-times-nail-salon-unvarnished Reporter Sarah Maslin Nir's investigative series violated the standards of responsible journalism. 记者Sarah Maslin Nir的系列调查报道违反了负责任新闻报道的规范。 A two-part series in The New York Times on nail salons has brought sweeping changes to an industry dominated by Korean and Chinese immigrants. Written by reporter Sarah Maslin Nir, the series, which ran in print on May 10 and 11, focused on the plight of nail salon manicurists in New York City and Long Island. It depicted a community of immigrant workers paid shockingly low wages to beautify the fingers and toes of affluent New Yorkers while inhaling toxic fumes that cause miscarriages and cancer. 《纽约时报》关于美甲沙龙的前后两篇报道给这个由韩国移民和中国移民主导的产业带来了深远影响。这一系列报道由记者Sarah Maslin Nir撰写，发表于5月10日和11日，集中讲述了纽约市和长岛美甲沙龙里美甲师的窘困境况。在它所描绘的画面里，一群移民工人为了点极度微薄的工资，呼吸着能够导致流产和癌症的有毒气体，为纽约的富人们修饰手指和脚趾。 Nir, who spent 13 months on the project, said in an interview that she initially pitched the story as an "expose," adding that the "great lesson" readers should come away with is that there's "no such thing as a cheap luxury." The only way "you can have something decadent for a cheap price is by someone being exploited." (My Reason colleague, Elizabeth Nolan Brown, wrote a critique of Nir's series shortly after it was published.) Nir在这篇报道上耗费了13个月时间。在接受采访时她说，最初设计这个故事就是为了“曝光”。她还补充说，读者应从该报道中得到一个“重大教训”：世上并不存在“所谓的廉价奢华”。“廉价的放纵奢靡”只能用一个办法得到，那就是“某人遭到剥削”。（我在Reason的同事Elizabeth Nolan Brown在Nir的系列见报不久就写了一篇批评文章。） The "great lesson" here is actually something different. I've spent the last several weeks re-reporting aspects of Nir's story and interviewing her sources. Not only did Nir's coverage broadly mischaracterize the nail salon industry, several of the men and women she spoke with say she misquoted or misrepresented them. In some cases, she interviewed sources without translators despite their poor English skills. When her sources' testimonies ran counter to her narrative, she omitted them altogether. 但事实上，这里应被视为“重大教训”的，是另外一件事。过去几周，我都在重新报道Nir的故事的方方面面，并重新采访其信源。Nir的报道不仅明显扭曲了美甲沙龙产业，而且，曾与之交谈的几位男女还说她错误引用了他们的话或对他们描绘有误。有时候，尽管信源的英语水平很低，她在采访时也没有带翻译。如果信源的说法与她的故事有所抵触，她就会彻底无视这类说法。 The second article lent the Times' imprimatur to unproven theories, while committing science journalism's cardinal sin of highlighting alarmist anecdotes that aren't representative of systematic research. 系列文章中的第二篇则让《时报》为未经验证的理论提供了官方认可，该文犯下了科学新闻的核心重罪：突出强调危言耸听者所提供的那些不能代表系统研究的小道消息。 If it hadn't had real-world consequences, the series—and subsequent attempt by Nir and her editors to parry criticism—wouldn't be worth such intense scrutiny. But the day after the first article appeared in the print edition of the Times, Gov. Andrew Cuomo (D-NY) announced a new multi-agency task force to inspect nail salons. In August, Cuomo issued an emergency order mandating that salons purchase a new form of insurance called a "wage bond" so that if owners are discovered paying their employees less than the legally required wage, the workers have recourse to collect. 两篇文章及随后Nir及其编辑为了回避批评所做出的种种努力本不值得用心细细考察，但是它们对真实世界的影响实在太大了。首篇文章在《时报》印刷版登出来的第二天，Andrew Guomo州长（民主党-纽约州）就宣布成立一个新的多部门联合特别小组，负责调查美甲沙龙。8月，Guomo签发了一条紧急命令，责令各沙龙购买一种叫做“工资保证金”的保险，一旦店主支付雇员的工资低于法定要求，工人们就有办法收账。 The rush to legislate based solely on the Times' shoddy reporting has hurt the industry. New nail salons, "which used to open every week in New York," have stopped appearing, according to Aiming Feng, an accountant and leading business advisor to nail shops. 这种仅仅基于《时报》劣质报道就做出的匆忙立法已经对这一行业造成伤害。据身为会计师和顶尖的美甲业商业顾问Aiming Feng所说，新的美甲沙龙已经停止开业，“此前纽约可是每周都会有新店开张”。 Salons once provided a steady source of jobs for undocumented immigrants; now many owners say they'll hire only legal workers who've completed an occupational licensing program because they're afraid of getting in trouble. 美甲沙龙曾为非法移民提供了一个稳定的工作来源。但是，许多店主说，他们以后只会雇佣完成了执业执照课程的合法工人，因为他们担心惹麻烦。 In September, two industry groups filed a discrimination lawsuit over the wage-bond mandate in New York State Supreme Court on the grounds that the state has unfairly singled out an Asian-dominated industry. 9月，有两个行业团体就工资保险令向纽约州最高法院提起歧视诉讼，理由是州政府此举单独针对由亚裔主导的行业，很不公平。 Another group has organized multiple protests, including a demonstration on October 6 in front of The New York Times Company's offices in midtown Manhattan. "Apology Now, Fire Nir!" was printed on one sign at the protest; "Shame On You New York Times, Your Lies Kill Our Shops," read another. Another protest is scheduled at 11a.m. today in front of the Times building. 另有一个团体则已经组织了多次抗议，包括10月6日在纽约时报公司位于曼哈顿中城的办公室外面所举行的示威。抗议活动中打出的一个标语上写着“立刻道歉、开除Nir”；另有一个标语则是“纽约时报你不知羞耻、你们的谎言害死我们的店”。按照计划，今天11点在时报大厦前面将举行另外一场抗议活动。 I'm not the first reporter to scrutinize Nir's reporting. In July, Richard Bernstein, a 24-year veteran of the Times who left the paper in 2006, published "What the Times Got Wrong About Nail Salons" in the online edition of The New York Review of Books. His knowledge of the industry comes through his wife, Zhongmei Li, who owns and manages two nail salons in Manhattan. 我并是不第一个仔细检讨Nir报道的记者。曾为《时报》工作24年并于2006年离职的老前辈Richard Bernstein已在《纽约书评》在线版上发表文章“时报在美甲沙龙问题上犯了什么错”。他对这一行业的了解来自他的妻子Zhongmei Li，Li在曼哈顿拥有并管理着两家美甲沙龙。 Bernstein charged that Nir's story focused on a small segment of the industry while ignoring the vast majority of nail salons, which pay above the minimum wage and hire only licensed manicurists. His piece specifically challenged the Times' claim that the Asian-language newspapers are "rife" with manicurist ads offering shockingly low wages. After Bernstein's story appeared, the Times' editors penned a public letter offering new evidence to support Nir's claim. Bernstein指责Nir在报道中只注意了该行业的一隅，忽视了大多数美甲沙龙，它们的薪酬高于最低工资，并且只录用拥持证美甲师。针对《时报》关于亚州语言报纸“充斥”着工资极低的美甲师招聘广告的说法，Bernstein在文章中还专门提出质疑。此文问世之后，《时报》编辑又撰写了一封公开信，提供新的证据支持Nir的说法。 As I'll explain, the Times editors mistranslated and misconstrued that new evidence, which actually validates Bernstein's argument. 下文我将解释，《时报》的编辑们对这一新证据的翻译和解释都有误，该证据实际上证实了Bernstein的论点。 Nir and her editors declined my interview requests. Instead, a Times spokesperson provided a prepared statement, asserting that the paper is "extremely proud" of the series and pointing to the high number of labor violations discovered by Cuomo's inspection task force since the series appeared. Nir及其编辑拒绝了我的采访请求。反倒是《时报》有个发言人提供了一份事先准备好的声明，坚持说该报为这两篇报道感到“非常骄傲”，并且援引了报道问世后由Cuomo的特别调查小组所发现的大量违法用工案例。 Those labor violations don't reveal what the Times claims they do. In its zeal to cite the government's ex post vindication of its own reporting, the paper further obfuscated what's really happening in the industry. 这些违法用工并不能展现《时报》认为它们所能展现的情况。通过热情征引政府在其报道之后所提供的事后证词，时报进一步模糊了这一行业中正在发生的实情。 My look at Nir's reporting and its shortcomings will appear in three installments. First, I'll revisit the Times' back-and-forth with Bernstein and explain why the paper's claim that manicurists are paid shockingly low wages is based on shoddy research and misconstrued evidence. 我对Nir报道及其缺陷的检查将分为三个部分呈现。首先，我要再次分析《时报》与Bernstein之间的交锋，并解释为什么说该报关于美甲师工资极低的断言只是基于劣质的调研和曲解的证据。 Next, I'll look at Cuomo's inspection task force, the fines and violations being handed out to salon owners, and how the governor's actions have had the unintended consequence of making it harder for undocumented immigrants to get jobs in nail salons. (That article is now online here.) 然后，我会考察Cuomo的特别调查小组、沙龙店主接到的罚款和违章，以及州长的行动如何产生了意料之外的后果，使得非法移民比之前更难在美甲沙龙找到工作。（第二弹在线阅读地址在这里。 ） The third installment will look at the Times' claim that chemicals present in nail salons are causing cancer and miscarriages, which is based on nonexistent evidence. (Click here to read part three.) 第三部分要考察的则是《时报》的一个说法：美甲沙龙中的化学物质正在导致癌症和流产。这一说法全无依据。（可通过以下链接阅读第三弹。） Job Ads "Paying So Little" They "Appear To Be a Typo" 招聘广告“工资极低”“还以为是印刷错误”。 In an early paragraph in the Times' first story in the nail salon series, we read: 在《时报》关于美甲沙龙的系列文章第一篇中，我们在前面几段中可以读到以下说法：

Asian-language newspapers are rife with classified ads listing manicurist jobs paying so little the daily wage can at first glance appear to be a typo. Ads in Chinese in both Sing Tao Daily and World Journal for NYC Nail Spa, a second-story salon on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, advertised a starting wage of $10 a day. The rate was confirmed by several workers. “亚洲语言报纸充满了列有美甲师招聘的分类广告，日薪极低，初看起来还以为是印刷错误。“NYC美甲Spa”是曼哈顿上西区一家位于二楼的沙龙，在《星岛日报》和《世界日报》上的中文广告中给出的起薪是10美元一天。好几位工人证实确为这一价格。”

Richard Bernstein, who rightly called this paragraph a "linchpin" of Nir's first article, was incredulous that anyone would advertise a day wage of $10 given that his wife must guarantee wages of about ten times that to attract qualified applicants. So he went looking through the classifieds in back issues of the Chinese-language newspaper, The World Journal, and couldn't find a single ad that mentioned wages under $70 per day. He found one ad offering to pay between $110 and $130 per day. Richard Bernstein极为正确地把这一段叫做Nir首篇文章的“要害之处”。他不相信有任何人会在广告中登出日薪10美元的工资，因为他的妻子必须保证提供大约10倍左右的工资才能吸引到合格的应聘者。所以他就去翻阅《世界日报》这份中文报纸过刊中的分类广告，结果没能找到任何一个广告所提工资低于70美元一天。其中一份广告甚至愿意支付110到130美元的日薪。 Other than the $10 ad that Nir references—which I'll return to in a moment—Nir doesn't cite any other specific ads paying wages so low they "appear to be a typo." But after Bernstein highlighted this passage in The New York Review of Books, Times editors Dean Baquet, Wendell Jamieson, and Michael Luo co-signed a letter defending Nir's reporting. Nir除了提到这一10美元广告之外（下文会再来讨论这个问题），并没有引用过任何其他工资极低以至于让人“以为是印刷错误”的特定广告。但在Bernstein在《纽约书评》上突出强调了这一段之后，《时报》的编辑Dean Baquet, Wendell Jamieson和Michael Luo一起签署了一封公开信，捍卫Nir的报道。 Their letter cites three more ads to support Nir's claim: 这封信又提到另外三份广告，以支撑Nir的说法：

One [ad] from June 19, 2014, in the World Journal, for example, showed a starting wage of $40 a day for "small job"…Another ad from July 17, 2014 in The World Journal also showed a $40 a day wage. And another one from April 17, 2014 showed a pay range of $40 to $90 a day. These examples were taken from a random sampling of days. “比如，在《世界日报》2014年6月19日的一份广告里，一份‘小工作’的起薪是40美元每天……《世界日报》2014年7月17日的另外一份广告，也开出了40美元的日薪。另外一份2014年4月17日的，则提到日薪在40美元至90美元之间。这些例子只是我们从随机选择的日子里看到的。”

The Times editors also posted high-resolution copies of the three ads to the photo-sharing site Flickr, but, somewhat suspiciously, the Chinese characters are out of focus and my translator couldn't decipher them. So I went to The World Journal's headquarters in Queens and obtained new copies of the ads, which I've posted here. 《时报》编辑还把这三份广告的高清复印件放到了图片分享网站Flicker上面，但有些可疑的是，上面的中文却没有对好焦，我的翻译都看不清。所以我去了《世界日报》位于皇后区的总部，找到了这些广告的新拷贝，将它们贴在这里。 The ads don't say what the Times editors claim they do. Two of the ads they cite actually say that a mani/pedi costs $40 at the salon, not that a worker would be paid $40. Why include such a detail in a job ad? It implies big tips. 这些广告并没有表达《时报》编辑宣称它们所表达的那层意思。他们所提到的广告中，其中有两份实际说的是在沙龙中做一次指甲/趾甲全套需花费40美元，而不是说工人工资是40美元。为什么广告中要提到这种细节？因为它意味着小费很高。 The first one translates as: "UV gel, big jobs, experienced small jobs, and cosmeticians. Flushing pickup and drop-off. Mani/Pedi $40 with commission, good percentage tips, may file taxes." 第一份广告翻译如下：“UV胶、大工、熟手小工兼美容。法拉盛接送。手脚$40，多提成。好小费。可报税。” The second one reads: "Seeking UV gel experienced big jobs, small jobs, and cosmeticians. Pickup and drop-off at Flushing, Mani/Pedi $40 or more, expensive jobs." 第二份广告说的是：“请UV大工，经验小工，兼美容。开车，法拉盛接送。手脚$40，多大脚。” Both ads were posted by Michael Ling, the owner of a nail salon in Fairfield, Connecticut. (The World Journal is a regional paper). In an interview conducted through a translator, Ling confirmed that what the ad said is correct. He included the price of a mani/pedi to entice potential employees by indicating that the store serves a wealthy, and likely generous, clientele. 登广告的是Michael Ling，他是康涅狄格州费尔菲尔德一家美甲沙龙的店主（《世界日报》是一家区域性报纸）。在有翻译在场的采访中，Ling确认广告所言没错。他将做指甲/趾甲全套的价格写进去是为了表示店里服务的都是富裕且可能很慷慨的客户，以吸引潜在雇员。 The third ad the Times editors produced in response to Bernstein offers a wage of "$40-90." I interviewed the salon owner who posted that ad, David Lee. His shop went out of business in 2014, in part, he says, because he struggled to attract enough qualified manicurists. Lee says he was offering full-time workers a base salary of $90 per day and part-time workers $40 per day. 《时报》编辑为回应Bernstein而找出的第三份广告提供的工资是“40至90美元”。我采访了刊登这一广告的沙龙店主David Lee。他的沙龙已经于2014年停业，据他所说，部分的是因为他奋力想要吸引足够的合格美甲师。Lee说他给全职员工支付的底薪是每天90美元，而兼职工则是每天40美元。 The $10 Ad 日薪10美元的广告 The only remaining evidence that the Asian-language newspapers are "rife" with ads listing "jobs paying so little the daily wage can at first glance appear to be a typo" is the $10 ad Nir specifically referenced. 亚洲语言报纸“充斥”着“日薪极低，初看起来还以为是印刷错误”的广告，这种说法现在只剩下唯一的证据了，那就是Nir特别提到的日薪10美元的广告。 "[I]t’s not clear whether the reporter saw the ad at all," Richard Bernstein wrote in the New York Review of Books. “完全不知道记者有没有看到这份广告。”Richard Bernstein在《纽约书评》上如是说。 It turns out Nir did see the ad, but once again it doesn't say what the Times claimed it does. The day Bernstein's article appeared, Nir posted an image of the ad to Twitter: 结果是，Nir确实看过这份广告，但这里也一样，这份广告并没有表达《时报》宣称它所表达的意思。Bernstein的文章出来的当天，Nir就在Twitter上贴出了这份广告的图像：

The ad that "doesn't exist" according to @R_Bernstein & @nybooks who calls me a liar & didn't bother to interview me — Sarah Nir (@SarahMaslinNir) July 25, 2015 @R_Bernstein和@nybooks 宣称这份广告“并不存在”，说我是骗子，却不愿意费心采访一下我 —— Sarah Nir （@SaraMaslinNir）2015年7月25日

That ad (Nir later tweeted a magnified version) actually offers to pay manicurists $75 per day in base pay; under that, it notes that "apprentices," or "trainees," can earn $10 per day. What does it mean to be a "trainee?" Was Nir wrong to leave that detail out? 这份广告（Nir后来曾在Twitter上贴出其放大版）实际上给美甲师开出的底薪是每天75美元；后面则提到“学徒”或“实习工”每天可以赚到10美元。“实习工”是什么意思？Nir对这一细节的忽略有错吗？ "Lest there be confusion...these are not the equivalent of unpaid summer interns at a magazine," wrote the Times editors in their defense of Nir's reporting. "Interviews by Ms. Nir and her team with employees of the salon confirmed that these were essentially beginning workers, doing the same jobs as others in the salon," they wrote. “不要误解……他们跟没有薪酬的杂志暑期实习生并不一样”，《时报》编辑在他们为Nir报道的辩护中如此写道。他们还说，“Nir小姐及其团队经与沙龙雇员交谈证实，实习工本质上就是新手，在沙龙里做的事与其他人没有什么不同。” But the salon owner who posted the ad disputes the Times’ characterization—as does one former apprentice who answered that $10 ad back in 2014. 但是，刊登这一广告的沙龙店主可不同意《时报》的描述。同样，一位在2014年曾答复过这份日薪10美元广告的前学徒工也不同意。 "We would never let them touch customers," said Yun Jun Long, the former owner of NYC Nail Spa, in an interview conducted through a translator. "If the customer is spending money, you can't stick them with an inexperienced worker." (Long's salon went out of business a month after the Times' story appeared, which he attributes to the negative publicity. He's now helping to organize the recent protests.) “我们绝不会让他们接触顾客”，“NYC美甲Spa”的前店主Yun Jun Long在有翻译在场的一次采访中如是说。“如果顾客花了钱，你不能让一个没有经验的员工去应付他们。”Long的沙龙在《时报》报道出来一个月之后停业了，他认为原因就是负面名声。他现在正帮忙组织近期的抗议活动。 The $10, he says, was meant to cover subway fare and lunch, and those who signed on could come and go as they pleased. During slow periods they could practice on other employees or receive lessons from Long's wife and mother-in-law—partners in the business who also worked in the store. 他还说，广告里提到的10美元只是为了提供地铁票和午餐，并且受雇的人来去自如。如果店里不忙，他们就可以在其他员工身上做练习，或者跟着Long的妻子和岳母（都是Long的生意合伙人，同时也在店里工作）学习。 At my request, Long put me in touch with Jay, a 28-year old undocumented immigrant and former trainee at NYC Nail Spa who asked that I not include his full name. Through a translator, Jay confirmed that he never worked on a customer for the two weeks when he was making just $10 per day. 应我的请求，Long帮我联系上了Jay。Jay是个28岁的无证移民，曾在“NYC美甲Spa”当过实习工。他要求我不提及其全名。通过翻译，Jay向我证实，在每天只赚取10美元的两个星期中，他从没有给任何顾客做过美甲。 Nir has said on Twitter that she visited NYC Nail Spa six times. (Long recalls seeing her come into the store just once.) Even if that's true, it wouldn't be surprising if she misreported what was actually going on in the shop; at several points in her coverage, Nir muddled what apprenticeship programs of this sort are all about. Nir在Twitter上曾说，她到“NYC美甲Spa”访问过6次（而Long记得她只到过店里1次）。即便这是真的，她对店里的真实情况的报道会出错，也并不令人生奇；在报道中的数个地方，她都没有搞清这种学徒计划到底是什么意思。 The main character in the first installment of the series was a 20-year-old Chinese immigrant named Jing Ren, who also went through an apprenticeship program. Without any prior experience doing nails, she got a job working unpaid for her first three months. Ren was also initially asked to pay $100 to the owner of her salon for teaching her basic skills. 在这个系列报道的第一部分中，主要人物是一个20岁的中国移民，名叫任静。任静也参加过学徒计划。在此前没有任何美甲经验的情况下，她找到了一份工作，头三个月没有工资。一开始，她还被要求向她所在沙龙的店主支付100美元，因为后者要教她基本技能。 Times readers may find this practice reprehensible, but Nir left out background details that might lessen their outrage. These apprentice programs are an alternative to going through one of the New York State-certified nail training programs, where tuition is about $1,000 and students must complete 250 hours of formal training before getting licensed. 《时报》的读者可能觉得这种做法应该谴责。但是Nir在此略去了一些背景细节，而这些细节有可能能够缓解读者的愤慨。如果不参加这种学徒计划，你就得全程参加由纽约州批准的美甲培训计划之一，费用大约1000美元，而学员必须在完成250小时的正式培训之后，才能得到执照。 It was technically illegal to work as a manicurist without completing one of these training programs when Nir was doing her reporting. (In July, two months after the Times series appeared, the state passed a bill creating a legal pathway to learn on the job, which I'll discuss in the next installment in this series.) 在Nir进行报道的时候，如果没有完成任何一个此类培训计划就去做美甲师，严格来说是非法的。（7月份，也就是《时报》的系列报道面世两个月之后，纽约州通过了一项法律，为边做边学提供了合法通道。关于这一点，我将在第二弹中加以讨论。） This type of arrangement is by no means an industry norm, but some salon owners flouted the law because they had more customers than employees; generally, the demand for skilled labor outpaces the number of licensed manicurists the beauty schools can mint. They got away with it because enforcement was lax. 这种办法绝非行业通例，一些沙龙店主对这一法律并不以为然，因为他们的顾客比雇员要多。一般来说，对熟练劳工的需求会超过美容学校能够生产生的持证美甲师的数量。店主们之所以能够铤而走险，是因为执法并不严格。 Like Jay, Jing Ren had the option of spending about a month and a half studying at a state-certified school and paying $1,000 to learn her craft. Instead, she opted to pay $100 and work for no pay for three months. It’s not clear that Nir ever asked Ren why she made that choice. 任静跟Jay一样，本可以选择去一个由州政府批准的学校学习这门技术，所费时间大约是一个半月，而价格则是1000美元。不过，她选择的是花费100美元，不领工资上班3个月。我们不清楚Nir是否追问她做出这种选择的理由。 Jay, who was in debt when he started as a trainee at NYC Nail Spa, couldn't afford beauty school. The apprenticeship program worked out for him: Now he's employed as a manicurist at a salon in New Jersey, where his daily base pay is $90, not including tips. Jay刚开始在“NYC美甲Spa”做实习工时已经负债累累，无法支付美容学校的费用。学徒计划对他很有帮助。他如今在新泽西的一家美甲店里被聘为美甲师，每天的底薪是90美元，此外还有小费。 The apprenticeship program also worked out for Jing Ren, who by the end of the Times story was making $65 a day in base compensation. 学徒计划对任静也很有帮助，在《时报》报道的结尾，她的底薪已经是每天65美元了。 Are Apprenticeship Programs Prevalent in the Nail Industry? 美甲行业中学徒制很流行吗？ Nir declares that "[Jing Ren's] deal was the same as it is for beginning manicurists in almost any salon in the New York area." (Italics mine.) Nir宣称，“在纽约地区几乎所有沙龙中，刚刚入行的美甲师都需要经历类似任静的这种交易。”（斜体为本文所加。） Yet she provides no proof for this statement, and all the available evidence indicates that Ren's deal was unusual. There are 30,610 licensed manicurists in New York State, all of whom would have had no need for an apprenticeship program. According to the Korean-American Nail Salon Association, there are more than 7,000 shops. 但她没有为这一断言提供任何证据，而所有可以找到的证据都表明，任静所做的交易并不寻常。纽约州有30610位持证美甲师，他们就无需学徒计划。根据“韩裔美国人美甲沙龙协会”的信息，美甲店超过7000家。 Nir supports this claim with anecdotal examples, including a disputed paragraph about a shop called May's Nail Salon, located on 14^th Street: Nir为这一说法提供的支撑都是些道听途说的个例，其中有一段涉及位于十四街一家叫做“小梅美甲沙龙”的，就很有争议：

Step into the prim confines of almost any salon and workers paid astonishingly low wages can be readily found. At May's…new employees must pay $100, then work unpaid for several weeks, before they are started at $30 or $40 a day, according to a worker. A man who identified himself as the owner, but would give his name only as Greg, said the salon did not charge employees for their jobs, but would not say how much they are paid. 走进几乎任何一家沙龙的整洁隔间，很容易就能找到工资低得惊人的员工。在小梅美甲店，一个员工说，新员工要先交100美元，接下来需要免费工作几周，然后才开始日薪30-40美元的工作。一个自称店主的男人只愿意透露自己叫Greg，他说他们不要求员工交钱换工作，但拒绝透露员工工资。

The owner of May's Nail Salon is actually a woman named Bao Mei Fitzgibbons, who goes by "Mei." Greg, who Nir mistook as the owner, is an employee at the shop. Nir could easily have found Fitzgibbons' name by searching New York State's online corporation and business entity database. 小梅美甲店的店主实际上是个女的，叫做Bao Mei Fitzgibbons，大家管她叫“梅”。而被Nir误认为店主的Greg则是店里的一个雇员。如果Nir搜索一下纽约州的“公司与企业单位在线数据库”，她就能轻松找到Fitzgibbons的名字。 Fitzgibbons says she was never interviewed by Nir, and scoffed when I asked if she charges new employees $100. "Think about it," Fitzgibbons says, "you work for me and I charge you $100?" The framed licenses of Fitzgibbons' employees are prominently displayed on the wall of her shop, indicating that they went through the official, state-authorized training program. Fitzgibbons说Nir从来没有采访过她，当我问她是不是向新员工收取100美元时，她连连冷笑。“你想想嘛”，她说：“你为我工作，然后我收你100美元？”Fitzgibbons把雇员们的执照装裱好，显眼地挂在门店的墙上，以表明他们都完整接受过正式的、经州政府认可的培训计划。 Fitzgibbons says she observed Nir come into her store and engage one of her manicurists in conversation without a translator. According to Fitzgibbons, the woman, who barely speaks English, later said that she was misquoted in the Times. The manicurist says she told Nir—again according to Fitzgibbons—that there are salons out there that charge trainees $100; she didn't say that May's is one of them. Fitzgibbons说她注意到Nir进了她的店子，并与她的美甲师之一进行了交谈，当时没有翻译。Fitzgibbons还说，被采访的女性基本不会说英语，后来还表示《时报》错误引用了她的话。这位美甲师说（这里还是根据Fitzgibbons的说法），她告诉Nir的是，有些沙龙会向实习工收取100美元，她没说梅的店也是如此。 (On my behalf, Fitzgibbons reached out to the manicurist interviewed by Nir, who no longer works at the store. Fitzgibbons says the woman declined my interview request on the grounds that "she doesn't want publicity.") （Nir采访过的这位美甲师现已不再在Fitzgibbons的店里工作。应我的请求，Fitzgibbons联系了她。Fitzgibbons说她拒绝了我的采访请求，原因是“她不想曝光”。） In another case, Nir spent time reporting at a salon that hires only licensed manicurists trained at a beauty school but left it out of her coverage. 另外，Nir还曾花费时间在一家只雇佣受过美容学校培训的持证美甲师的沙龙里采访，但在文章中却没有提及。 ThinkPink is a small chain of nail salons in Manhattan run by Eun Hye Lee (she goes by "Grace"), who says she was interviewed by Nir. Lee, who is careful to maintain her books to the letter of the law, granted my request to inspect her payroll records. They showed that one experienced manicurist at ThinkPink's West Village branch had earned $680 in base pay, plus $216 in overtime, totaling $896 for a 48.5 hour week. A beginning manicurist in the same shop earned $493 for a 39-hour workweek, or $12.64 per hour. ThinkPink是曼哈顿一家小型美甲连锁店，经营者叫做Eun Hye Lee（人们叫她Grace）。她表示曾接受过Nir的采访。Lee恪守法律条文的规定，很仔细地记有账本，并惠允我查阅她的薪酬发放记录。记录表明，一个在ThinkPink西村分店工作的熟练美甲师，某星期工作48.5小时，赚到底薪680美元，另外还有216美元加班费，共896美元。在同一门店，某位刚入行的美甲师某周工作39小时，赚得493美元，每小时合12.64美元。 Lee says Nir first interviewed her at ThinkPink in 2014. Several months later, she returned unannounced and asked for a pedicure. She struck up a conversation with her manicurist, a Chinese immigrant named Xiao Su, who goes by Zoey. Lee说Nir第一次采访她是在2014年，在ThinkPink店里。几个月后，Nir没打招呼就来到店里，请人给她修脚。之后她就和美甲师谈了起来，她的美甲师是位来自中国的移民，叫做小苏，大家都叫她Zoey。 Lee put me in touch with Su, who no longer works at ThinkPink. She said in a phone interview that she told Nir that the pay at ThinkPink was "very good" and that Lee was a good boss who's always "very nice." She declined to tell Nir her salary, deeming it a rude question. Su, who emigrated from China in 1997, is a licensed technician who attended manicurists' school. Lee帮我联系上了小苏，她如今已不在ThinkPink工作。她在电话采访中说，她告诉过Nir，ThinkPink的薪酬“很可观”，而且Lee是个好老板，总是“特别友善”。她拒绝向Nir告知自己的薪水，认为这种追问是失礼。小苏1997年从中国移民到美，上过美甲师学校，是位持证技师。 Neither ThinkPink, nor Nir's interview with Lee, were mentioned in the Times' coverage. 关于ThinkPink以及Nir对Lee的采访，《时报》的报道均没有提及。 More Evidence of Low Wages? 更多低薪证据？ To gauge the average pay for manicurists, Nir might have turned first to the federal government's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The agency reported that in 2014, manicurists in New York's metropolitan area earned an average hourly wage of $9.19 per hour. It also reports an annual mean wage of $19,110. 要估计美甲师的平均薪酬，Nir本该首先求助联邦劳工统计局（BLS）。根据该局2014年报告，纽约大都市区范围内的美甲师赚取的平均时薪是9.19美元。报告里还提到，他们的平均年薪为19110美元。 BLS data, which is routinely cited in the Times, is subject to error and certainly overly precise. But in this case, these figures are the best information available. And the numbers indicate that the average manicurist earns above the minimum wage. BLS的数据经常被《时报》引用，当然包含有错漏之处，有时则显得过分精确。但就当前争论而言，这些数据是我们可以拿到的最可靠信息。数据表明，美甲师的工资平均而言高于最低工资。 Instead of citing the BLS' numbers, however, Nir relied on her own survey that included "more than 100 workers." In fact, other than the classified ads, this is her main piece of evidence that the "vast majority" of salon workers earn less than the minimum wage. 但是，Nir却没有引用BLS的数据，而是依靠自己针对“超过100位工人”的调查。事实上，“绝大部分”美甲店员工工资低于最低工资这一说法的主要证据，除了分类广告之外，就是她的这一调查了。 Nir collected the data on the streets of Queens early in the morning, where salon owners (mostly from Long Island) often pick up manicurists in vans and drive them to work, and in chats that she struck up with manicurists (many of whom aren't native English speakers) while having her nails done. Nir是在清晨的皇后区大街上收集到这些数据的，那正是沙龙店主（主要来自长岛）用面包车来接美甲师并把他们送到工作地点的时候，也有一些是在做指甲时通过和她的美甲师（其中大多数人母语非英语）交谈获得的。 In an interview with the Times about her series after it appeared, Nir says she kept "detailed spreadsheets" with this information. I asked for a copy of these spreadsheets. She declined my request. 在系列文章面世之后接受《时报》采访时，Nir说她保存有这些信息的“详细表格”。我曾问她索要一份，遭到了她的拒绝。 Gathering data of this sort is inherently difficult, even for professionals. Pollsters at organizations like Gallup, Pew, and BLS strive to reach population samples that mirror the broader communities they're studying. They carefully frame questions in an unbiased manner, and only impartial interviewers do the asking. Under the best of circumstances, figures derived with these methods are imprecise and reporters generally cite them along with a margin of error. 即便对于专家，此类数据收集工作也有着内在的困难。在盖洛普、皮尤和BLS等组织工作的民意测验专家都要辛苦奔忙，以使自己的人口样本能够反映他们所研究的更大群体。他们以一种无偏的方式小心设计问题，而且只找不带偏见的访谈者来提问。在最好的情况下，以这种方法得到的数据都并不精确，记者在引用它们的时候通常也会附带些许错误。 Economists are skeptical of the wage survey data collected by the BLS because it's based on trust and memory. (How many hours did you work last week?) The gold standard in wage data—reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis—is derived from documentation that companies are required to provide the government related to unemployment insurance. 经济学家并不太相信BLS收集的工资调查数据，因为这项调查基于信任和记忆。（比如，请问你上周工作了多长时间？）工资数据的优质标准是联邦经济分析局的报告，它来自于各公司按要求提供的与失业保险有关的文件。 The Times might have hired a polling firm to improve on the BLS' finding. Instead, it relied on Nir's survey, which was drawn from a non-representative sample and carried out by a reporter who won't share her methodology, question phrasing, or tabulated results. There’s simply no reason to believe that Nir’s data presents an accurate, representative picture of nail industry wages. 《时报》本来可以请一家调查公司来改进BLS的发现。不过，它选择依靠Nir的调查，而该调查的抽样并不具备代表性，而负责实施的记者又不愿意公开其方法、提问措辞或调查结果表格。我们没法相信Nir的数据呈现出了美甲行业工资的准确且有代表性的图景。 Also, Nir’s report doesn’t discuss gratuities. In fact, nowhere does the Times coverage attempt to gauge average daily tips in the industry or what workers actually take home in total compensation. 另外，Nir的报告还没有提及小费。事实上，《时报》的报道没有一处地方试图估计一下美甲行业的日均小费是多少，或者员工们拿到手的总报酬是多少。 This is like writing a 7,000-word piece on what waiters make for a living but focusing only on base compensation. "There should have been several paragraphs on the subject," says Aiming Feng, the accountant and business consultant who counts about 50 nail salons as clients. (Feng also volunteers once a week at once a week at the Lin Sing Association, a social service organization in Manhattan's Chinatown, where he helps manicurists with legal and tax issues.) 这就像是写篇7000字的文章描述餐厅服务员们以何为生，却只关注他们的底薪。“应该花几个段落讨论下这个问题”，Aiming Feng说，他是一位会计兼商业顾问，大概有50家美甲沙龙是他的客户。（Feng也是曼哈顿唐人街一家叫做“Lin Sing协会”的社会服务组织的志愿者，他每周服务一次，帮助美甲师们解决法律和税务问题。） Feng says that during "sandal season" at many shops tips equal or exceed base compensation. Feng说，一到“凉鞋季”，许多店里的小费能够追平甚至超过底薪。 Another "Damning" Piece of Evidence? 另一条“确凿” 罪证？ Nir offers more proof that the "vast majority" of manicurists earn less than the minimum wage: a two-sentence summary quote derived from an interview with Sangho Lee, the president of the Korean-American Nail Salon Association. 关于“绝大多数”美甲师工资低于最低工资，Nir有更多证据：一条两句话的总结，引用来自她对Sangho Lee的采访。Lee是“韩裔美国人美甲沙龙协会”的主席。 Nir writes: Nir写道：

[Lee] declined a request to address issues of underpayment. So many owners do not pay minimum wage, he said, that he believed answering any questions would hurt the industry. “Lee拒绝回应我关于报酬过低问题的提问。他说，许多店主支付不到最低工资，所以他觉得回答此类问题会伤害到整个行业。”

In their letter defending Nir's reporting, the Times editors highlighted Lee's testimony as among "the most damning findings." 在为Nir的报道辩护的公开信中，《时报》的编辑们强调，Lee的证词是“罪证确凿的发现”之一。 These two sentences came from the roughly two-and-a-half hours Nir spent interviewing Lee on two occasions. First, she met with him in person at the Association's office in Flushing, Queens with a Korean translator named Jiha Ham present. She later did a follow-up interview over the phone without a translator. According to Lee, Nir's paraphrase of his statement comes from the second interview. 这两句话来自于Nir对Lee的采访，两次采访总长大概有两个半小时。第一次，她亲自去皇后区法拉盛该协会的办公室拜访Lee，当时有一位韩国翻译Jiha Ham在场。后来，她又在电话里做了一次跟踪访谈，这次没带翻译。根据Lee的说法，Nir转述的他的言论发生于第二次访谈。 Lee says that he was misquoted. "I told her that like any industry, there are nail salons that pay less and have worse conditions," he said. "Then I told her that even though 80 to 90 percent of the industry pays much more than the minimum wage, it would inappropriate for me to say anything negative about the industry as the president of the leading industry association." Lee说他遭到了错误引用。“我告诉她的是，跟许多行业一样，也有些美甲沙龙存在薪酬较低、条件恶劣的情况”，他说，“然而，我还告诉她，尽管行业中有80%到90%的薪酬水平远高于最低工资，让我发表关于这一行业的负面看法也是不恰当的，因为我是一个十分重要的行业协会的主席。” Is Lee telling the truth that Nir distorted his comments? Since there were no third-party witnesses to the conversation, there's no way to know. But it's hard to believe that Lee would disparage the nail salon industry. Lee有关Nir曲解了他的言论的说法是否真实？由于谈话时并没有第三方见证人在场，我们不得而知。但我们很难相信Lee会诋毁整个美甲行业。 Founded 28 years ago, the Korean-American Nail Salon Association's mission is to promote best practices in the industry. It has 1,200 dues-paying member stores. A thick glossy magazine published annually by the Association includes letters from elected officials lauding nail salons for their contribution to the local economy. The group also awards an annual $1,000 scholarship to six college students whose parents work as manicurists in its members' shops. 成立于28年之前的韩裔美国人美甲沙龙协会致力于在整个行业中推广最好的做法。它拥有1200家缴纳会费的成员店。协会每年出版一份厚厚的有光纸杂志，上面还刊登有经选举上任的官员因美甲沙龙对地方经济作出贡献而撰写的表扬信。该团体每年还给父母为成员门店美甲师的6位大学生提供各1000美元的奖学金。 So why would the president of an industry organization undo decades of hard public relations work by making a "damning" statement to a Times reporter? Maybe Nir misconstrued his remarks: Lee barely speaks English, and yet Nir interviewed him over the phone without a translator on the line. 因此，为什么一位行业组织主席会破坏几十年来的公共关系辛苦成果，向《时报》记者提供这种“罪证确凿”的陈述呢？也许Nir误会了他的说法。Lee的英语非常不好，而Nir却不请翻译就通过电话采访了他。 How the Times Responded to a Salon Owner's Attempt to Correct the Record 当沙龙店主试图更正记载时，《时报》是如何回应的呢 Nir writes that at Iris Nails on Manhattan's Upper East Side "longtime workers described starting out at wages of $30 and $40 a day." Nir写道，在位于曼哈顿上东区的“艾丽斯美甲”店，“长期工人说他们的起步工资是每天30或40美元。” It's hard to believe that even beginning manicurists at Iris Nails would earn such meager pay. Located in one of New York City's wealthiest neighborhoods, Iris is the type of shop manicurists aspire to work at for the generous tips. 即便是艾丽斯美甲店里的美甲师新手拿到这么低的工资，那也很难令人置信。艾丽斯开在纽约市最富有的街区之一，是所有美甲师都渴望去工作的地方，因为小费很慷慨。 When reporting the story, Nir left a message for Iris Nails' owner, a Korean immigrant named Alex Park. He says he didn't return her message because he didn't understand the nature of the request. 在报道这一故事的时候，Nir给艾丽斯美甲的店主留了一则消息。这位名叫Alex Park的韩国移民说，他并没有回复，因为他没搞明白Nir的请求是什么意思。 When Park attempted to defend his reputation after the article appeared, the Times thwarted his efforts. The whole episode highlights the power imbalance between the Times and an immigrant community lacking in media savvy. 文章出来以后，Park试图捍卫自己的名声，而《时报》挫败了这一企图。整个剧情凸显了《时报》与缺乏媒体经验的移民群体之间的权力不平衡。 Park emphatically denies that his workers earn so little in base pay. He estimates that his lowest-level employees earn about $180 a day, including tips, and his most experienced employees can earn as much as $400 per day including tips and commission. (Park declined to allow me to examine his wage statements.) Park断然否认他的员工所赚取的底薪如此之低。据他估计，最底层的雇员每天大约能挣到180美元，其中包含小费，而最熟练的雇员最多时每天能挣到400美元，其中包括小费和提成。（Park拒绝让我查看他的工资详单。） After the article appeared, Park hired attorney Daniel Kim to contact the Times and demand a correction. Kim had a back and forth with the company's assistant general counsel, David McCraw. (Through a spokesperson, McGraw declined my request for an interview.) The paper refused to alter the online version of the article, and it didn't investigate the truthfulness of Park's claim. Instead, Kim says, McCraw agreed that the Times would print a letter to the editor written by Park. 文章见报后，Park就聘请律师Daniel Kim联系纽约时报，要求进行更正。Kim和时报公司的助理法律总顾问David McCraw来来回回接触了多次。（McCraw通过发言人拒绝了我的采访请求）。时报拒绝更改文章的在线版本，也没有调查Park说法的真实性。作为替代，Kim说，McCraw同意在《时报》上刊登Park写给编辑的一封信。 Kim shared with me the letter Park submitted to Sue Mermelstein, an editor in the paper's letters department: Kim向我展示了Park写给时报读者来信部编辑Sue Mermelstein的信件：

To the Editor: 致编辑： Your recent article "The High Price of Pretty Nails" will damage my business, Iris Nails. It seems that you needed a nail salon in a well-heeled neighborhood and targeted my business. 你们最近刊发的“漂亮指尖的高昂代价”一文将会伤害我的企业，即艾丽斯美甲。你们似乎就是想找到这么一家位于富裕街区的美甲沙龙，然后瞄准了我的企业。 I am preparing to retire after having worked for more than 22 years without any incident. Many of the employees in this type of services business have learned, earned and moved on to open their own shops. I have always treated all of my employees fairly and never took advantage of them. 我工作22年了，从未发生任何事故，现在正准备退休。在这类服务性企业工作过的许多雇员都已经学到东西、赚到钱并且更进一步经营起他们自己的门店。在对待自己的员工方面，我从来都很公平，从未占过他们便宜。 There is no employee who receives $30 to $40 a day on a full-time basis. There is no employee who receives below the minimum wages required by the State of New York. In fact, most of our employees make double of minimum wages including tips. 根本就没有全职员工每天只能获得30到40美元的事。也没有任何员工拿到的工资低于纽约州规定的最低工资水平。事实上，把小费包含在内，我的大多数员工能赚到最低工资的两倍。 Korean-American business owners in New York are very hard-working people. We have dedicated our lives to whichever field afforded us an opportunity to prosper and live out the American dream. I write this letter with great sorrow and anger. 生活于纽约的韩裔美国人店主都很吃苦耐劳。只要某个领域能够给我们提供机会，让我们走向成功并实现美国梦，我们都会全身心地投入进去。写这封信的时候，我心中充满悲伤和愤怒。

The Times did print a version of the letter on May 17—but with notable changes. 《时报》5月17日确实刊登了此信件的一个版本，但改动颇大。 First, it cut out Park's assertion that the paper had erred in its reporting. These three sentences were dropped: 首先，它删除了Park认为该报之前报道出错的观点。删去的是以下三句话：

There is no employee who receives $30 to $40 a day on a full-time basis. There is no employee who receives below the minimum wages required by the State of New York. In fact, most of our employees make double of minimum wages including tips. 根本就没有全职员工每天只能获得30到40美元的事。也没有任何员工拿到的工资低于纽约州规定的最低工资水平。事实上，把小费包含在内，我的大多数员工能赚到最低工资的两倍。

In their place, the Times added a new sentence that reads, "I am committed to abiding by the law in paying my employees." In other words, the rewrite makes it sound as if Park was conceding that the Times' reporting on his store was not only correct, but that it inspired him to reform his illegal practices. 在这个地方，《时报》插入了一个新句子，内容是：“在支付员工工资方面，我决心遵从法律规定。”换句话说，这一改写让Park听起来像是在承认《时报》关于他的美甲店的报道很正确，不仅如此，他似乎还受此激励，准备改变之前的非法做法。 Times editor Sue Mermelstein said in a phone interview that there was an extensive back-and-forth with attorney McGraw over the wording of the letter. "We don't have the resources to go out and check the facts," she says, "and we didn't want to let him make a statement that we felt was inaccurate." 《时报》编辑Sue Mermelstein在接受电话采访时说，在该信件的措辞方面，曾与律师McGraw进行过大量的意见交换。“我们没有办法去检验事实”，她说，“而且我们也不想让他发表一个我们觉得并不准确的声明。” So they decided to cut out Park's contention that the coverage was inaccurate and replaced it with a line that McGraw "felt comfortable with because it's not a factual statement." 所以他们决定删除Park关于报道不真实的观点，并用McGraw“觉得舒坦”的一句话取而代之，因为“这句话不是在陈述事实。” The Times ran the new wording by Kim and Park, and they signed off on it. Attorney Kim doesn't recall the specific details, but says his client decided not to pursue the matter any further because he's "afraid of The New York Times." 《时报》把新的措辞发回Kim和Park征求意见，他们在上面签字了。律师Kim不再记得具体细节，但是他说，他的客户决定不再继续追究这一事件，因为他“害怕《纽约时报》”。 Did the Times Get the Story Right Anyway? 《时报》的故事究竟是对是错？ Nir's claim that manicurists earn shockingly low wages was based on mistranslated and misconstrued classified ads, anecdotes and interviews contested by her sources, and an anecdotal survey that she used in place of official data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Nir关于美甲师工资极低的说法，依据只有翻译错误和理解错误的分类广告、道听途说和遭到其信源反驳的采访，另外还有她弃劳工统计局官方数据不用而进行的一次业余调查。 Yet did she still get the story right? In response to Nir's critics, the Times has pointed to the high number of minimum wage violations reported by the state Department of Labor since the article appeared. 但是，她的故事仍然还是对的吗？在回应对Nir的批评时，《时报》又指出该文发表以后由州劳工部提供的违反最低工资法的超高案例数。 In the next piece in this series, I'll scrutinize those violations and explain why, in fact, they don't show what the Times claims. (That article is now online here.) 在本系列的下一篇中，我将仔细考察这些违法案例，并解释为什么它们事实上并没能证明《时报》的说法。（此文已经上线。） （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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