超越邓巴数#7：暴力的垄断 辉格 2015年11月2日 马克斯·韦伯（[[Max Webb]]）将国家定义为一种垄断暴力的实体，即，它宣称在其领地内，只有它自己或经它允许，才能合法的使用暴力；这一定义（或至少作为判别标准之一）被政治学家普遍采纳，它确实抓住了国家的核心特征，对暴力的垄断，是私人武装组织向国家转变过程中的关键一步，假如一个社会始终没有任何组织能做到这一点，它便处于无政府状态。 之所以会发生这样的转变，是出于利益最大化的需要，当武装组织从特定劫掠对象那里榨取财富时，假如他预期这是与对方的最后一次遭遇，那么最优策略便是洗劫一空，但是由于活动范围总是受限于地理、交通和生态条件，劫掠者往往只能从十分有限的一群受害者那里渔利，此时，竭泽而渔，毁坏潜在劫掠对象的生计，或将其吓跑，皆非最佳策略。 这一点和经济学家阿瑟·拉弗（[[Arthur Laffer]]）就政府税收政策所提出的一条原理类似：当税率从低水平提升时，税入增加，但税率提升同时也在削弱税基，达到某个临界点之后，继续提高税率反而会减少税入；同样，在长期劫掠/勒索关系中，也存在一个相当于拉弗极限的最优剥削策略。 然而，要实施最优剥削策略，就必须垄断暴力，否则，你不竭泽而渔，别人也会，你精心呵护税基，结果却只是让竞争者占了便宜；为了避免这种特殊的公地悲剧，武装组织就需要在其势力范围内排除竞争者，从而将公地私有化，变成专属领地。 一旦垄断地位建立起来，这些组织的行为模式也随之而改变，索取定期贡赋将取代机会主义的劫掠行动，因为定期收保护费比伺机劫掠省事多了，遭遇的反抗也少得多，对于无力保护自己的弱者，纳贡也好过整日担惊受怕、生死难卜，固定的纳贡-保护关系对双方都是更有效率的安排，它避免了对抗所造成的阻值耗散，当然，这一安排的道德含义则另当别论。 实际上，取得优势地位的武装组织，只要有机会，总是会谋求在自己地盘内垄断暴力并建立此类纳贡保护关系，尽管我们很难追溯国家起源之前的这段发展，但从那些因各种原因而陷入无政府状态的社会中，可以看到这一模式反复出现，其中被研究的最多的一个例子，是西西里黑手党。 西西里的历史是被一连串形形色色的外来政权轮番转手的过程，就像一个成长过程中换了十几次爹妈的苦命孩子，民众对政权历来深怀疏离感和不信任；拿破仑战争期间英国人推行的土地改革逐渐瓦解了原有的封建体系，特别是长子继承制的废除，导致贵族的大地产不断分割，经过两代人之后，西西里的土地主数量从两千增加到了两万，和土地贵族相比，这些小地产主既无能力也无意愿保留他们的私人武装以维持地方秩序。 1860年的加里波第革命给了西西里本已脆弱不堪的社会秩序以致命一击，一时盗贼蜂起，但混乱并未持续太久，一种新型组织很快扮演起了地方秩序维护者的角色，它通常由一位权势人物（主要是早先替贵族打理地产的管家）网罗数十位追随者，组成恩主-门客关系，向当地土地主和商户勒索保护费，同时替他们防范盗贼，摆平争端，以及对抗政府管制和逃避关税。 如同其他黑社会组织一样，明确领地边界并在边界内实施垄断，是每个黑手党的头号诉求，领地之争也是各黑手党组织（名为“家族”，其实并非血缘组织）之间时而发生火并的主要原因；最常见的领地纷争，发生在一个家族为执行其保护任务而需要进入另一家族领地打击盗贼时，或者当某家族首领身亡，其旧“客户”安全信心动摇，转而向其他家族寻求保护时；为了减少领地纠纷，各黑手党家族还组成了被称为“委员会”的协调机构。 垄断暴力有着重要的制度含义，它迫使垄断者不得不扮演起纠纷裁决者的角色，而同时禁止针对其客户的同态复仇和自我执行等传统自力救济措施，因为这些措施很难和普通攻击或勒索行动区分开来，而后两种都是对他本人的直接挑战；比如甲从乙店里强行拿走几袋面粉，说是乙欠他的，于是乙向收了他保护费的丙求助，此时丙就必须查明实情之后才能决定如何行事，特别是当甲也是他的客户时，更不能单听偏信。 然而，等到自力救济既已发生，再要查明真相并实施矫正，就会变得非常困难，而且自力救济往往会发展成轮番报复和血仇循环，造成大量不可逆的后果，最初的是非曲直早已湮没于漫长纷争之中，后果更是无从矫正，如此一来，组织所提供的保护便失去了可信度，所以，可行的做法是干脆禁止自力救济（当然会有一些必要的豁免，比如紧急情况下的自卫），一切纠纷必须提交保护者裁决后才可实施矫正行动。 这样，保护组织便承担起了一种司法职能，它不同于传统部落社会常见的司法机制，后者的仲裁结果通常没有强制性，其约束力仅仅来自熟人社会的道德压力，因为这些社会缺乏拥有压倒性武力的组织可为裁决提供执行力，而且即便有这能力也未必有意愿，因为强制执行总要得罪一方，而社会秩序和其他公共品一样，大家都希望搭便车，却不愿为维护它而付出高昂代价，但垄断性保护组织就不同了，领地内的秩序直接关系到保护费收益，同时他也拥有执行能力。 对暴力的垄断不仅表现为抵御外部攻击和压制内部冲突，也体现在对对外攻击行动的约束上，因为攻击会招致报复，而报复行动常无差别的落在整个群体头上，这既抬高了保护成本，也会破坏保护组织与邻近组织的友好关系，从而危及其领地控制，所以只有符合组织外交策略的对外攻击才会被允许，假如没有这样的约束力，外交策略便无法展开；那个人人都是战士，谁都可以自由组队、自主选择对象发起攻击的时代，一去不复返了。 正如诺齐克在《无政府、国家与乌托邦》中所分析那样的，在某一群体内取得支配地位的保护组织，为了有效履行其保护责任，不得不约束所有群体成员的行为，无论是不是向其缴纳保护费的客户；结果，无论出于裁决纠纷的需要，还是约束行动的需要，保护组织必须向群体成员施加一套行为规范，它将部分取代原先由自发协调所形成的社会习俗。 至此为止，政治学家用于识别一个国家的那些元素，已逐一就绪了：一个职业化的统治团队，一块边界明确的领地，对暴力的垄断，常规化的财政来源，向社会成员施加一套行为规范，具有强制执行力的司法系统；从霍布斯自然状态中，巨人利维坦正森然浮现。 在此过程中，并没有自由人自愿向利维坦让渡权利这样的事情，只有威胁和恐惧之下基于利益考虑所达成的均衡，一些社会契约论所宣称的让渡契约，只是基于后来才出现的政治伦理，为将国家起源过程合理化而作出的理论虚构，这些伦理原则显然不存在于前国家社会，因而不可能被用来规范最初的让渡和缔约过程，相反，它们是国家所建立的和平秩序长期持续的结果，有些甚至只是近代化过程的新近产物。 国家的诞生改变了社会结构的发展方向和节奏，将大型社会的组织从社会关系协调问题转变成了政治组织和控制经营问题，统治团队无须与被统治的各群体保持熟人关系，只须通过定期征收赋税、裁决纠纷和惩罚叛逆来反复宣示统治权，在文官系统建立起来之后，核心权力集团甚至无须与下层官僚保持熟人关系，只须确保他们既可履行职责又不掌握武力即可。 只要能组建起一个紧密合作且拥有压倒性武力的统治团队，便可通过征服既有的、已经略具规模的定居社会而创建大型国家；在15世纪以前，秘鲁高原从未有过比酋邦更大的政治实体，每个酋邦约几万人，印加帝国的创建者只用了数十年时间，便逐个征服了这些酋邦，建立了一个拥有上百万平方公里领土、上千万臣民的帝国，这还是在没有车马和文字的条件下做到的。 在有了更强大的武器（特别是进攻武器）、更好的交通和通信工具、基于文字的更高效管理与控制手段之后，征服将更迅速，统治也更有效，所以，伴随着每一次重大技术和组织创新，就会有一轮大型国家创建运动，秦灭六国从长平之战算起也只用了40年，最后决战只花了10年，成吉思汗家族在三代之内就征服了大半个文明世界，如此快速而大跨度的征服，说明征服者根本不需要和被征服者具有文化同质性，而这是以往维系社会的必要纽带。 大型国家在其广阔领地中所建立的和平秩序，将众多小社会连结成了大社会，尽管占人口多数（常有90%左右）的农民仍生活在村镇庄园等小型熟人社会，但和平条件下变得更繁荣的分工和贸易，也孕育了许多更具流动性的专业阶层，武士、文官、行商、工匠、艺人，其活动范围和社会关系都突破了旧有的社区边界和家族结构，他们不仅在各社群之间建立了交流网络和联系纽带，也创造了一种全国范围的共同文化和通用语。 春秋战国时期“士”阶层的兴起演示了这一效果，士最初源自那些在宗法制下难有出头机会的诸侯幼子们，因为长子继承制，幼支小宗的地位随世代更替而不断跌落，特别是当土地充分开发、领地扩张也达到极限之后，次级分封无法继续，小宗子弟为维持其社会地位，必须发展某种专业技能，以求服务于某位领主。 早期的士大多是武士，因为武人是最早分化出的专业阶层，但逐渐的，他们发现还有众多专业技能可以发展，于是有了文士、谋士、策士、术士、方士……，最终形成所谓诸子百家；得益于贵族之间广泛的姻亲关系，他们都能在各国找到接待和庇护者，有能力周游列国寻找效力机会，因而这一阶层变得极具流动性，到战国时，他们已在各国取代世袭公卿的地位，也正是在此期间，该阶层创造并代表了华夏共同文化和民族认同。 这样，至少对于精英阶层，他们所面对并且感知到的，俨然已是个六合四海、布履星罗、轮运辐集、熙熙攘攘的大社会了。  

【2015-11-27】 @托派的李二锅 我大清是中国历史上少见的拿得出手的辉煌盛世，非要抱贼秃驴的大腿说明您大脑该上上油了。 @whigzhou: 所谓盛世不就是把专制推向极致，士大夫人格尊严降至最低嘛，电报出现之前，帝权没法比这更专横了 @whigzhou: 周亡之后，帝国盛世不少，开明时代也不少，但唯一称得上开明盛世的，只有两宋，当然，帝权爱好者最鄙视两宋了 @whigzhou: 推崇汉武、唐宗、朱和尚、满清、蒋氏民国的，都是帝权爱好者，自由爱好者喜欢的都是春秋、窦后、魏晋、两宋、北洋，简单粗暴的划分，但挺有效。  

超越邓巴数#6：武人的兴起 辉格 2015年10月20日 农业出现之前，所有适龄男性都是战士，但没人将打仗作为谋生之道，因为战争或暴力攻击虽可能带来各种利益——战利品、个人声誉、女人、消灭资源竞争对手，等等——，却无法为个人提供经常性收入或可靠生活保障，所以当时并不存在一个职业武人阶层，社会分工充其量只是在性别与年龄段之间发生。 但农业改变了这一状况，畜群和粮食成了可供持续劫掠的资源，有望为劫掠者提供持久生活来源，从而使得战争成为一种有可能赖以为生的职业；可以说，农耕和畜牧创造了一种新的生态位，吸引一些人逐渐将生计建立在此之上；对于有着长久狩猎历史的人类，这一生态位并不太陌生，农牧群体的生活资料只是另一种猎物而已。 不过，该生态位起初并不十分诱人，因为人类毕竟是最可怕的动物，几万年前便已占据了食物链顶端，从他们口中夺食太危险了，而且人类有着强烈的复仇倾向，被攻击、特别是亲友被杀之后，无论是个人情感还是社会规范，都要求人们实施报复，实际上，血仇循环也是传统小型社会之间暴力冲突的头号起因。 但劫掠机会的持续存在，激励着一代代劫掠和反劫掠者不断开发新的战争技术和组织方法，同时，凭借地位分化和财富积累所带来的比较优势，最终将战争变成了一种可持续的生计模式；首先是武器的发展，早先的武器十分简陋，而且制作材料都是分布广泛、容易获得的石料、竹木、骨料、皮革和贝壳，尽管有些材料（比如黑曜石）需要从远处交换而来，但价格也相当便宜，所以每个人都有能力为自己制作和装备与别人质量效力相当的武器。 据人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔（[[Timothy Earle]]）介绍，丹麦日德兰半岛的新石器时代晚期古日耳曼遗存中，最常见的武器是一种石制匕首，数量极多，几乎每个墓葬和房屋遗址中都有几把，当地农民在犁地时还经常翻到；然而在进入青铜时代早期之后，主要武器变成了青铜剑，它们仅见于小部分墓葬，而且这些墓葬的位置、形式和随葬内容，皆与其他墓葬有着显著区别。 【图1】北欧新石器时代的燧石匕首 更有意思的是，这些铜剑多数安装的是朴素剑柄，且剑刃上可观察到较多砍削所留下的痕迹，但有少数安装了采用失蜡工艺铸造的豪华剑柄，且较少使用痕迹；很明显，拥有青铜剑的武士已有别于普通人，而豪华剑的主人则是地位显赫的权势人物；这一变化的原因不难理解：制造石匕首的燧石材料唾手可得，而青铜剑所需材料则是从数百公里外的南方经由长途贸易而来，其制造工艺也并非人人都能掌握。 【图2】北欧青铜时代早期的青铜剑，有些装有豪华剑柄 我们不妨从投资者或企业家的角度来考虑，武器和战争技术的发展是如何改变战争形态的：武器成本的提高，使得战争从一个重人力轻资产行业向重资产方向转变，让富裕者拥有了额外优势，他们的财力不仅让自己获得更强大的武器，还可以保障材料来源和武器制造能力，为那些贫穷但又渴望获取战利品的人提供装备，换取他们听从自己指挥，展开协调行动，从而组织起一支效忠于自己的队伍。 由于首领拥有分配战利品的权力，让他有了足够的激励采用更多重资产的战争手段，投资建造更为昂贵的战争器具，组织更大规模的劫掠行动；早期维京人在欧洲海岸河口发动的袭击都规模不大，通常只有几十条小船、一两百人，参与者地位也较平等，行动很少受头领节制，但随着易受攻击的沿岸村镇纷纷开始设防，成功袭击所需队伍日益庞大，船只也变得更大更昂贵，到十世纪时，袭击队伍常达到上百条船、数千人的规模。 【图5】维京海盗船 夏威夷群岛各酋邦的大酋长们建造的战船丝毫不逊色于维京海盗船，它基于波利尼西亚传统独木舟改造而成，将平衡浮木换成了第二独木船体，并添加了三角帆；1779年Kaleiopuu大酋长出迎库克船长的船队旗舰上，装载了20位桨手和40位战士，另一位大酋长Peleioholani拥有的一艘战舰，据说可装载160位战士，这样的大型战争装备，显然不是普通家庭所能负担，而传统独木舟却是每个家庭都有能力制造的。 【图6-7】波利尼西亚传统独木舟，有些带三角帆 【图3】夏威夷群岛的双体独木战船 【图4】1779年Kaleiopuu大酋长出迎库克船长的船队 盔甲、马匹、马具和战车同样昂贵，实际上，和早期农业社会的多数创新一样，这些新技术都是战争向重资产方向发展的结果，直到变得足够普及和廉价之后，才被用于容器和农具等和平用途；这些创新离不开有组织私人武装的崛起，试想，假如战争仍像前农业社会那样，以分散自发无组织的方式进行，战利品谁拿到归谁，那就没人会愿意在重资产型的新技术上进行高风险投资。 对战争从事者来说，财力优势也体现在风险抵御能力上，和农业生产相比，劫掠的机会来得更随机，成败也更难预料，万一身亡家人也可能失去依靠，由富裕者出面组织，便提供了一种保险机制，平时由首领保障食宿，作战时提供武器装备，战死后还可抚恤家人，这对于那些缺少资源的穷人非常有吸引力，这一风险差异，和当代自由职业者与受薪雇员之间的差异一样。 农业社会的制度结构恰好创造了对此类机会的旺盛需求，基于经营效率上的考虑，土地财产常有着抗分割倾向，因而较多采用长子继承制，得不到土地的幼子们的一条常见出路，便是投靠一位首领，成为职业武士，首领族内的穷亲戚、孤儿、还不起债的债务人、有特殊技能却无处施展者，都可能选择这条出路。 如此一来，这些权势人物便逐渐将具备战争所需技能的各种人才聚集在其身边，包括战士，武器和车船工匠，厨师伙夫，水手马夫，学者谋士，采购关键物资的行商，还有兼任历史学家、宣传部长和情报收集者的说书艺人和吟游诗人，通过为他们提供食宿、赞助和庇护，在战争中共同行动，分享战利品和保护费，首领与其追随者之间便建立起了一种稳固的恩主-门客关系（[[patronage]]）。 这是早期农业社会从部落向酋邦发展的关键一步，它开启了社会进化的一个全新阶段，社会结构与秩序不再仅仅通过自发协调而产生，权势人物开始主动创建组织，实施集中式控制，这一转折，类似于管理学家钱德勒（[[Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.]]）所指出的现代规模化企业取代传统个体商人的过程，企业这只“看得见的手”在局部代替市场配置资源、组织生产、协调供应链，将这些战争团队的首领称为第一批钱德勒式企业家，也并不过分。 门客制广泛存在于各大文明的黎明期，在酋邦形态的社会中，统治阶层由一群通过宗族或姻亲纽带联合起来的恩主（酋长）组成，其中权势最显赫而取得霸主地位的大恩主便是酋邦首领；北欧萨迦史诗传颂的英雄，荷马史诗中的英雄和所谓国王（[[basileus]]）们，都是拥有众多门客的大恩主，随从或侍卫亲兵组成了其军队，相互间征战不休，争夺霸主地位。 恩主-门客关系也是早期罗马的重要社会纽带和基础政治结构，罗马城创建者罗穆鲁斯本人便是位大恩主，早先的恩主（patronus）后来成了罗马王国的贵族（[[patricius]]），他们同时也是元老（[[senator]]）的来源；在王国早期，称呼元老的词是patres，意思是父亲或族长，与“恩主”和“贵族”同源，与此同时，那些追随效忠恩主的门客（pietas），变成了罗马的平民阶层（[[plebeian]]），这一词义演变揭示了从部落到酋邦的发展过程：权势家族通过收容大批门客而变成政治组织，其族长作为恩主而成为该组织的首领，这些首领继而联合成为罗马国家。 历史学家阿扎尔·加特（[[Azar Gat]]）在对照分析了希腊罗马文献后发现，类似的演变也发生在凯尔特和日耳曼社会，在波利比乌斯（[[Polybius]]）所描绘的公元前二世纪北意大利凯尔特人社会中，已经有了拥有大批门客的显赫恩主，但此时这些大人物与其随从之间的关系仍较为平等，每日聚宴畅饮，同吃同住，分享战利品和奢侈品，早期称呼门客随从的词汇也多与“朋友”同源，大人物只是众多战士和战争首领中最富有、最成功、最声誉卓著的那些，社会结构也仍由亲属关系所主导。 然而一个多世纪后，凯撒在《高卢战记》中描绘情况已迥然不同，门客们对恩主唯命是从，且已转变为常年作战的职业武士，最显赫恩主的私人武装扩张到上万人规模，居住在新近兴起的城镇里，恩主们俨然已成为高高在上的贵族统治阶层，早先的部落平等主义已不复存在。 基于门客制的新型组织一方面充分利用传统的宗族结构和姻亲网络，同时又大加改造；首领们突出强调自己所在家系，并将其直系祖先加以神化，强加给其他支系和氏族，成为社区共同祀奉的神祗，希腊诸神连同其谱系便如此被创造了出来，夏威夷酋长们甚至阻止平民记诵家谱，结果平民往往只记得祖父辈是谁，罗马的门客则常以收养的名义被并入恩主的氏族，采用其姓氏，收养传统在罗马贵族中一直盛行到帝国时代。 恩主们在网罗门客时，也突破了宗族结构和部落边界，在选择与谁合作的问题上，亲缘关系退居其次，专业素养、忠诚勇武、个人友情成为更优先的考虑，更直接的物质报酬和利益算计取代传统互惠关系而成为主要激励来源，亲属义务则被效忠盟誓等契约性义务所取代，战友情谊代替血缘亲情，基于职位的权力代替家长和长老权威……所有这些改变，都是走向专业化所必需，类似于家族企业在去家族化过程中所经历的变化。 这些武装组织最初是为了对外发动劫掠，获取战利品，可一旦建立，便成为一股改变社会政治结构的力量；那些频遭劫掠却无力自保的群体，可能会向劫掠者定期缴纳贡赋以换取安宁，或者向其他同类组织纳贡以寻求庇护；同时，存在此类组织的群体，会因其对外劫掠行动而惹来报复，而报复通常会无差别的落在整个群体头上，这样，即便那些并未依附于武装首领的社会成员，也不得不与之建立关系，以免躺枪。 此时事情可能朝两个方向发展，假如部落长老们的影响力足够强大，便可将这些武装组织置于自己的控制之下，建立起某种军事民主制，相反，假如武装首领更强大，便可能篡夺原本由长老会议所拥有的部落政治权力而成为僭主，全面接管部落的公共事务，而其门客就成了他的统治团队。 重要的是，那些在竞争中胜出的武装组织，必定是有能力慑服了周边若干群体因而得以从中勒索贡赋的组织，所以他们基于纳贡与庇护关系而建立的政治结构，必定是跨部落的，结果便是酋邦的建立；尽管此前也存在跨部落联盟，但联盟是一种类似于商会的松散组织，而酋邦则是真正的企业，它将推动社会以更紧密的方式走向大型化。 武装首领一旦建立起酋邦，便可凭借姻亲网络进一步强化对各部落的控制，常见做法是从各部落娶妻，并将女儿嫁给各酋长，正如祖鲁王国诞生前的情况；假如首领实力足够强大，还可将其宗族近亲安插进各部落，在夏威夷酋邦中，部落酋长都是大酋长的父系近亲，亲缘通常不远于一级堂兄弟，更低级的社区酋长则是大酋长的亲兵随从，他们都直接听从其指挥，平时照管农务、组织人力修缮灌溉系统，定期收缴贡赋，必要时有义务参与大酋长的作战行动。 在夏威夷的案例中，一个层级化的官僚系统已呼之欲出，随着武装组织之间的竞争推动武器和组织技术持续改进，酋邦的统治范围和控制能力日益扩展，由此所开启的组织和制度发展进程，将最终导致国家的诞生。 门客制所创造的武装组织，也留下了一种不可逆的遗产，在此后历史上，每当国家崩溃、社会失序之际，凡已经历过这一阶段的社会，都不会再退回到部落状态，而会在各种类似恩主-门客关系的模式下实现政治权力重组，并重建地方秩序，罗马衰亡后西欧封建体系的兴起，汉帝国崩溃后士族门阀收纳部曲荫客、拥家兵而自保的做法，皆属此类。  

The Decline of Witch Trials in Europe 欧洲猎巫审判的衰落 作者：James Hannam @ 2007 译者：Yuncong Yang 校对：慕白 来源：作者个人网站，http://jameshannam.com/witchtrial.htm Preliminary considerations 绪论 Alice Molland was sent to the gallows at Exeter in 1684 and became the last witch to be executed in England. Scotland closed its account with Janet Horne in 1722 while trials wound down across Europe. However, it would not be until 1782 that the last witch to be legally executed met her fate at Glarus in Switzerland. 1684年，艾丽丝·莫兰在埃克塞特被处以绞刑，她是最后一个在英格兰被处决的女巫。 1722年，珍妮特·霍恩成为苏格兰最后一个被处决的女巫，此时，全欧洲的猎巫审判案件已经在减少，不过要等到1782年，全欧最后一个经法律程序被判死刑的女巫才在瑞士的格拉鲁斯被处决。 But by the late 17th century witch trials were already reasonably rare occurrences even in the same localities where, in the earlier part of that century, the greatest hunts had taken place. The crime itself was extinguished in France by royal edict in 1682, repealed in England in 1736 and abolished in Poland as late as 1776. 但是到17世纪晚期时，在那些之前猎巫运动最盛行的地区，猎巫审判已经是相当罕见的事情了。法国于1682年就通过王室敕令废除了巫术罪。英格兰取消巫术罪是在1736年，而直到1776年波兰才废除这一罪名。 However, the decline in trials and hunts did not necessarily presage a corresponding decline in the belief in witches just as their start did not correspond to any increase. Belief is a notoriously hard thing to measure, but almost all societies appear to have some tradition of witches and fear of magic has been nearly universal. The questions about witches in early modern Europe are not so much why people believed in them at that time and place, but why that belief manifested itself into the hunts and executions. 然而，正如猎巫审判和猎巫运动的兴起并不代表人们比以前更加相信巫术及巫师的存在一样，它的衰落也并不一定代表人们变得更不相信巫术及巫师的存在了。众所周知，信仰是非常难以度量的，而几乎所有社会里都存在着某种巫师传统，人们对魔法的恐惧也是处处有之。要研究近代早期欧洲的巫师这一题目，重要的问题不是为什么彼时彼地的人们相信有巫师存在，而是为什么彼时人们的这种信念导致了猎巫运动及对巫师的大规模处决。 The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the reasons that trials for the crime of witchcraft, from being relatively common before 1650, had, across Europe, become a rarity fifty years later and had died out altogether within another century. This rapid decline and then extinction is at least as puzzling as the widespread appearance of the phenomena in the first place at the end of the fifteenth century. 本文的宗旨是探讨这一问题：为什么在1650年前相当普遍的对施行巫术者的审判50年后就变得颇为罕见，而到了18世纪晚期就彻底绝迹了？猎巫审判在这一时期的急剧衰落与它在十五世纪末的急剧盛行一样令人费解。 Witch trials only became common during the Renaissance and the fiercest hunts took place in the 1620s and 1630s in German speaking areas. Contrary to popular belief, they were not a phenomenon of the Middle Ages. Although magical belief and practice were just as common during this earlier period, they did not often lead to trials, let alone executions. 猎巫审判要到文艺复兴时期才开始普遍出现，而最最激烈的猎巫高潮出现在十七世纪二三十年代的德语地区。与普遍的认知相反，猎巫运动不是中世纪的事情。在中世纪，人们对魔法的信仰和使用与猎巫运动时期一样普遍，但那时很少有巫师被送上法庭，更别说被处决了。 Until recently popular views of this subject were confused both by the agendas of rationalists who wanted to find examples of superstition and by neo-pagans seeking their own foundation myth. 直到最近，对猎巫运动的流行观点都相当混乱。其原因在于，一方面，理性主义者们希望找到迷信带来恶果的实例，另一方面，新异教的信徒们希望在历史中找到他们教义的根基。 The “Burning Times”, when, according to the most extreme polemicists, nine million women lost their lives after dreadful torture, has become an essential part of neo-paganism’s self identity. They also had Margaret Murray to assure them that witches really were the survivors of the old religion that neo-pagans were continuing in the present day [NOTE]. “大火刑时代”已经成为了新异教主义自我身份认同的核心部分。据一些最极端的论者说，这一时期有九百万女性在承受酷刑后被杀。除此之外，玛格丽特·穆雷断言巫师们是古老宗教的孑遗，而今天的新异教正是继承了这些古老宗教。 Murray’s thesis of the existence of a pre-Christian fertility cult remains influential outside the academy but, despite seeming to have gained some support from Carlo Ginzberg’s work on the benandanti who do appear to have had some of the attributes of a religious cult, it is dismissed by noted modern authority Robin Briggs as having “just enough marginal plausibility to be hard to refute completely, yet is almost wholly wrong.” [NOTE]. 穆雷认为，猎巫时代存在着一种源于前基督教时期的生殖崇拜。这一观点至今在学术圈外仍然颇有影响。尽管卡洛·金斯堡对于“善之行者”（benandanti）的研究结论（“善之行者”的身上确实存在某种宗教崇拜的特征）似乎部分支持穆雷的观点，现代的权威学者罗宾·布里格斯依然对穆雷的观点嗤之以鼻，在他眼里，穆雷的学说“只有刚好够使它难以被彻底驳斥的那么一点点说服力，但基本上是完全错误的。” This reassessment of the myth of the Burning Times has even reached neo-paganism’s own scholarship [NOTE] which is challenging the idea that the validity of their religion depends on its antiquity. Meanwhile, estimates of the total number of executions over three centuries has shrunk to about 60,000 or so [NOTE] which is of a similar order of magnitude to what the Jacobins managed in just three years of terror during the French Revolution. 即使新异教主义自己的学者们也开始重新审视“大火刑时代”，他们开始挑战这一令其信仰能够合理的建基于古代传统的观念了。同时，现今对猎巫运动在三个世纪内处决人数的估计已经下降到约六万人，这一处决规模和法国大革命时雅各宾派在三年恐怖时期内做到的不相上下。 There is very little agreement about the reasons for the end of witch trials and the scholars have tended each to be an advocate for their own ideas based on the study of particular localities rather than trying a more synoptic approach to bring some order to the myriad of available suggestions. It is not even clear whether we are looking for some new causes that helped end witch trials or simply the absence of whatever it was that had started them in the first place. 对于猎巫审判结束的原因，学术界没有什么统一意见。很多学者仅仅是在努力研究某一地区的情况，并以此支持他们自己的观点，而不是尝试进行综合研究以给各种可能假说梳理出头绪。我们甚至都不知道在研究中应该寻找什么。是某些新生因素结束了猎巫审判，还是某些在过去推动了猎巫审判的因素已经不复存在？ So, if we could identify the conditions that brought about the trials, the subsequent decline might simply be explained by their later disappearance. An example of this would be the religious confusion and violence of the Reformation that had largely worked itself out after the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century. 如此说来，如果我们能够找到最初猎巫审判产生时的种种条件，那么猎巫审判后来的衰落或许就可以归因于这些初始条件的不复存在。举例来说：宗教改革带来了宗教观点的混乱和大量暴力冲突，而这种混乱状况在十七世纪中叶威斯特伐利亚条约后大为缓解。 It has also been widely noticed that hunts tended to take place in areas and periods where central control had largely broken down or during interregnums between regimes. For example, the activities of Matthew Hopkins took place in the chaos of the English Civil War, the Great Hunt in Scotland in 1661 when English justices were replaced, and even the Salem of 1692 outbreak occurred in a temporary vacuum of authority. When control was restored, goes this theory, the witch hunts largely ceased. 很多人也都注意到，若一个地区中央统治秩序崩坏或正处于改朝换代时期，猎巫审判就比较易于在此地盛行。举例而言：马修·霍普金斯活跃于英国内战的混乱时期；1661年苏格兰的大规模猎巫运动发生时，当地的英格兰法官正遭到大规模替换；甚至1692年的萨勒姆大审判也是发生在当地短暂处于权力真空的时期。如这一理论预言的，在以上地区一旦秩序得到恢复，猎巫审判就大大减少了。 On the other hand, the original causes might long since have been removed without their effects likewise disappearing so that the decline of witch trials will be brought about by entirely different means. Examples frequently cited are the rise of secular rationalism or social trends that led to the discounting of devilry. It has been suggested that witchcraft simply became too old hat for the intelligentsia of the early Enlightenment to countenance and that they were wont to sneer at such outdated nonsense so as to reassure themselves of their own intellectual superiority. 另一方面，也有很多猎巫运动的初始动因早早消失，但其效力并未消失，在这种情况下，导致猎巫审判衰落的就应该是其他因素。经常被引用的例子是世俗理性主义的兴起，或社会潮流导致魔鬼信仰的自然衰落。一些人认为在启蒙运动早期的知识精英眼里，巫术罪太老套了，不值得他们支持；相反这些精英乐于鄙视这些过时的无稽之谈，从而获得智力上的优越感。 A good deal of recent work has concentrated on the social reasons for witchcraft accusations and has looked for the causes of both their rise and fall at a local level. For instance, Alan MacFarlane and Keith Thomas set out a complex web of interactions between vulnerable single women and other villagers motivated by guilt [NOTE]. They suggested that the full implementation of the Poor Laws sufficiently alleviated the situation so that the accusations ceased. While their careful research of depositions suggests they have accurately portrayed the mechanism by which social tensions manifested themselves, I do not think that they have explained why, at that particular place and time, it should be through witchcraft accusations. 许多近期的研究工作着重研究巫术罪指控背后的社会因素，并通过对局部地区的研究来寻找巫术罪指控增加和减少的原因。麦克法兰和基斯·托马斯的研究描述了一些村子中弱势单身女性与其他村民之间基于罪恶感而展开的错综复杂的互动。他们认为济贫法的全面贯彻实施大大缓解了此类困境，因而减少了巫术罪指控。尽管他们对各种证词的细致研究表明，他们确实精确地描述了当时社会矛盾的表现方式，我认为他们并没有解答“为何彼时彼地这些矛盾偏偏以巫术罪指控的形式表现出来”这一关键问题。 The era of the witch trials was one of great change and disruption but we must not forget that it was bracketed by the disastrous fourteenth century and the enormous social upheavals of enclosure and the industrial revolution. Any social explanation for witch hunts has to be specific enough to differentiate between the early modern period and those on each side of it, while also being general enough to apply to much of Europe over two centuries. 猎巫审判时代确实是一个剧烈变迁、社会失序的时代。但是不应忘记，这个时代之前是灾难不断的十四世纪，而后面则跟着圈地运动和工业革命这样的重大社会变迁。若要从社会角度解读猎巫运动的兴衰，这种解读必须足够具体，否则难以把近代早期和它前后的时期区分开来。同时这种解读又要有足够的一般性，能被应用来解释二百余年间的大半个欧洲发生的诸多相关事件。 The commonalties of witch beliefs are greater enough to make having lots of different social explanations for different environments unconvincing. For this reason I will be looking for general reasons for the decline that can be applied across Europe rather than seeking an individual cause for each locale. 当时的诸种巫术信仰存在非常之多的共同点，因此在解释猎巫运动的兴衰时，试图为不同地区不同环境的猎巫现象找出许多不同社会原因的思路是缺乏说服力的。所以，我要找到一般性原因来解释整个欧洲范围内的情况，而不是为每个不同的地方发生的事情找出一个特定的解释。 By a witch, I mean someone who is believed to have received magical power by some form of diabolical means. The diabolical source of this power is important because the mentality of most Christian intellectuals allowed only the devil as a source of supernatural power, except of course from God, and it led witchcraft to be viewed in much the same way as heresy. 在本文中，巫师一词指的是那些被认为通过某种与恶魔有关的方式得到了魔法力量的人。这种超自然力量的根源是魔鬼，这一点非常重要，因为除了上帝之外，魔鬼是唯一一个被当时的基督教知识分子接受的超自然力来源。也正是这一点使得巫术在很大程度上被当作一种异端行为来处理。 The connection between diabolism and magic is found in the documents of the Christian elite including, most famously, the Malleus Malificium (1486) of Kramer and Sprenger, but has an older provenance. The straightforward dichotomy between God and the devil was already present in late antiquity with the labelling of all pagan gods as demons but once they had been seen off, the church took a more sceptical attitude. Belief in magic was considered to be a sin but consequently actually practising it was nothing more than delusion. 魔法和魔鬼之间的联系载于许多当时基督教知识精英的著作中，最有名的是克拉默和斯普伦格著的《巫师之锤》一书。但这一观念的来源比这些著作更为古老。在古典时代晚期，上帝-魔鬼的简单二分法就已经出现了，当时基督教会把所有异端神祗都目为魔鬼。但击败异教信仰后，基督教会却转而采取一种更具怀疑色彩的立场。信仰魔法被认为是一种罪，但施行魔术不过是一种幻术而已。 This attitude is very much an intellectual one and reflects the continuing rejection of most forms of supernatural belief by theologians even when witchcraft was accepted. That is to say that rather than believing in the innate potency of ritual magic or in nature spirits, they insisted that God and the devil were the only possible agencies for magical or miraculous power. 这种态度很大程度上是基于智识的，它反映着自古以来神学家们对绝大多数超自然信仰的否定，即使后来巫术的存在被接受了，神学家们的态度也依然如此。也就是说：神学家们坚持认为上帝和魔鬼是仅有的能够施行魔法或奇迹力量的存在，而不承认各种仪式魔术或自然精灵本身具有某种能力。 This was not just a question of theology but also arose from the Aristotelian paradigm of natural science that had no room for spirits, magic or other such phenomena. We should note, however, that the word ‘magic’ was also used in medieval works like the Speculum Astronomiae of St Albertus Magnus to describe certain legitimate natural practices. 这种态度不仅是一个神学问题，它也来源于亚里士多德的自然哲学范式。在这一范式中没有精灵、魔法或其他类似现象的存在空间。然而我们也应注意到，一些中世纪著作也使用“魔法”一词来描述某些合法的、并非超自然的行为，例如圣阿尔伯特·马格努斯的《天文之镜》一书。 Later, the hermetic systems that became popular during the Renaissance did allow for spirits and angels to be summoned so consequently their practitioners were always vulnerable to accusations of devilry. This ambiguity about what was and was not acceptable remained a feature of intellectual debate throughout the Middle Ages and Early Modern period with both sides using magic to make their own polemical points. In the late seventeenth century we find Joseph Glanvill and Henry More, representing learned science and theology, defending the belief in witchcraft against occultist and radical sectarian John Webster [NOTE]. Webster is keen to deny diabolic involvement in great part because he does not want his own ‘natural magic’ to be confused with witchcraft while Glanville and More are defending the mechanistic new philosophy which, like Aristotelianism, insists all magic must be supernatural - and that can only mean God or the devil. 晚些时候，文艺复兴期间广为流传的赫尔墨斯派哲学系统允许信者召唤天使和精灵，这就使得其信众更容易被指控为魔鬼信者。在中世纪及近代早期，知识界一直在就何种形态的超自然存在可以接受展开辩论。辩论双方都会使用“魔法”一词来阐述论点。在十七世纪后期我们可以看到约瑟夫·格兰维尔和亨利·摩尔代表神学和科学阵营肯定巫术的存在，与神秘主义者兼激进的宗派主义者约翰·韦伯斯特辩论。韦伯斯特努力否定巫术中的魔鬼因素，因为他不希望他的“自然魔法”和巫术扯上关系。而格兰维尔和摩尔捍卫的是新的机械论哲学，这种哲学和亚里士多德派一样，认为魔法一定是超自然的，因而只可能来源于上帝或魔鬼。 At a popular level, beliefs about the supernatural were far more varied and indeed, one of the only commonalties appears to be that they did not involve the devil, at least without prompting from educated interrogators. MacFarlane mentions that the devil hardly figured at all in the depositions to the Essex assizes and in other English cases, he makes few appearances even in confessions [NOTE]. Elsewhere, especially in confessions under torture, diabolic themes are much more prevalent. This seems likely to have been due to the use of torture, together with leading questions, causing the defendants to start echoing the more learned views of their prosecutors. 在大众中，对超自然力的信仰更加五花八门，诸种信仰仅有的一个重要共同点似乎就是，它们都与魔鬼无关，起码在没有遭到博学的审判者追问时是这样。麦克法兰提到：在埃塞克斯郡巡回法院及其它英格兰案件的证言中几乎没有人提起魔鬼，即使在罪人的供词中魔鬼都没怎么露面。在其他地方，特别是那些刑讯之下获得的供词里，魔鬼的主题则明显得多。这种现象看起来应归因于刑讯和诱供。在这二者的共同作用下，被告人们开始重复指控者嘴里的高深说法了。 Restrictions in space make a discussion of how witch trials started impossible here, but it seems likely that a key factor was the overlaying of the elite mentality of diabolism and its associated perversions onto the pre-existing magical beliefs and social tensions among the people. This had happened before with the heretics of the Middle Ages when much of what was believed about them came from ancient authorities rather than their actual activities. It was the combination of learned thought with real factors on the ground (as there really were heretics and people claiming magical powers) that turned deadly. 材料来源的空间限制使得我们难以讨论猎巫审判是如何起源的，但看起来一个重要因素是精英阶层和普通民众的合力。精英们对超自然力来源的“魔鬼说”理论把魔鬼帽子扣在了很多已有的超自然信仰身上，而民众之间的矛盾需要一个发泄的出口。类似的现象在此前也曾发生在中世纪的异端们身上，人们对他们的许多认识并非源于异端们本身的行动，而是来自古老的权威观点。当知识阶层的思想和底层存在的现实因素（因为社会上确有异端，也有号称拥有魔法能力的人）结合起来，其效果是致命的。 Many, but by no means all, so-called witches seem to have been healers, wise women and cunning men who previously would have been of no interest to the higher clergy or secular legal authorities. If they were brought before any authority it would tend to be the local church court that would prescribe some penance like walking around the parish wearing sackcloth. 许多——但绝非全部——所谓的巫师似乎是一些治疗师。在猎巫运动之前，教会高层或者世俗法律体系对这些聪慧的女性或头脑灵活的男性是没有什么兴趣的。如果真可能有什么权威机构想审判他们，那十有八九是当地的教会法庭，判处的刑罚也就是一些类似穿着麻衣绕教区走一周的赎罪行为。 The village healers indulged in a wide variety of ritual magic, healing or mediation with spirits but they had little or no idea of any theory attached to these actions. In other words, to the lower orders, magic was a question of practice while to the elite it was something that required explanation with the devil usually the only explanation available. 当时这些乡村治疗师使用很多仪式魔法，用于治疗，或者让活人与死去的人对话，但是他们头脑里并没有什么关于这些做法的理论。换句话说，对于下层社会，问题的关键是怎么使用魔法。而对上层社会，问题的关键是如何解释魔法，通常魔鬼是唯一的备选答案。 The topography of the decline in trials and executions strongly suggests there were two distinct phases. The first phase, which takes place from the first half of the seventeenth century, is a large falling of in the number of accusations and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of capital convictions obtained. Thomas states that the large majority of executions in England had already taken place by 1620 [NOTE] and in Spain the Basque hunt marks the end of large scale prosecutions. Appeals heard by the Parlement of Paris after about 1610 show a large reduction in the number of capital sentences that were confirmed and after about 1630 an equally precipitous drop in the number of cases heard (even though all witchcraft cases at this time were subject to automatic appeal to Paris) [NOTE]. 猎巫审判及处决的减少并不是平均的，其分布表明猎巫审判的衰落经历了两个不同的阶段。第一阶段自十七世纪中叶开始，其标志是巫术罪起诉数大大减少，及与之相应的死刑判决比例下降。托马斯的研究表明，英格兰的绝大多数巫师处决都发生在1620年前，在西班牙，巴斯克大猎巫标志着大规模巫术罪起诉时期的终结。1610年后，巴黎高等法院的上诉记录显示，在巫术罪案件中死刑判决比例大幅下降。到1630年后，巫术罪案件的数量也出现了同样的大幅下降（尽管在此时期，所有下级法院审理的巫术罪案件都会自动上诉到巴黎高等法院）。 The pattern is repeatedly seen in almost all localities although the time scales are often different. The last hunt in Scotland took place 1661 – 2, large-scale scares continued to claim many lives in parts of Germany through the 1630s but became much rarer thereafter. This is not the end of the prosecution of witches - that continued even with sporadic outbursts of panic - but it is rather the normalisation of the crime as it fades into the background of early modern life. 同样的变化模式出现在欧洲几乎所有地区，尽管时间先后常常不同。苏格兰的最后一次大规模猎巫是在1661-1662年间。1630年代，德国部分地区还时有大规模的猎巫运动，很多人因此丧命，但在那之后就很罕见了。当然，这并不代表对巫师的审判已经消失。审判依然在进行——而且还有间歇性的恐慌带来的小高潮，但这更应解释为这种罪行的常态化。巫术罪行已不是社会关注的焦点，它正在渐渐隐入近代早期社会生活的背景之中。 The second phase is the complete cessation or abolition of prosecutions for witchcraft and this tends to take place in the eighteenth century. It can either take the form of a gradual petering out; some form of legislative act such as Louis XIV’s decree extinguishing the crime after a poisoning plot panic; or the English Act of Parliament abolishing it in 1736 [NOTE]. Often, it had become impossible to secure a conviction before the crime itself was removed from the statute book. 第二阶段是各国彻底停止起诉（或取消）巫术罪的时期，发生在十八世纪。这一阶段，各国停止猎巫的方式各有不同。有的国家逐渐停止了对巫术罪的起诉审理，有些国家采取某些立法措施取消了巫术罪，如路易十四在一次投毒阴谋引起的恐慌后颁布敕令取消了巫术罪，英国国会在1736年通过法案取消了巫术罪。即使在巫术罪被正式从刑法里取消之前，想要说服法庭判决被告巫术罪罪名成立已经很难了。 It seems extremely likely that in looking for causes we must treat these two phases as separate events to be handled individually and that consequently we will not find any single reason for the end of witch trials. 由此看来，在寻找猎巫审判衰落原因时，我们应把这两个阶段分开来看。这也就意味着，猎巫审判的消失不是任一因素单独作用的结果。 Explaining the decline of witch trials and executions 对猎巫审判及处决减少的解释 Under Roman law, to achieve a capital conviction required a full proof consisting of material evidence, witnesses of good standing or a free confession. Torture could be used to extract a confession if sufficient partial proofs had been accumulated but the defendant had to repeat themselves after they recovered and then again in court. Even if they later retracted their confession they were not supposed to be put to the question again [NOTE]. 在罗马法下，要判处死刑需要一条完整的证据链，支持证据链的可以是物证、合格的人证或被告自由自愿提供的证词。如果已经有足够的间接证据指向嫌疑人，则可以使用刑讯取得供诉，但犯人在养好伤后必须再次重复他们在刑讯下作出的供诉，此后还要当庭再重复一次。即使犯人后来撤回了自己在刑讯下作出的供词，他们也不应就同一问题再受到讯问了。 English common law forbade the use of torture in criminal cases altogether unless with the permission of the privy council (effectively meaning only for treason) but had similar systems of evidences and proofs of witchcraft as codified by William Perkins [NOTE]. 英格兰普通法在刑事案件中严格禁止刑讯，仅有的例外是由枢密院审判的案件（通常都是叛国案）。然而，根据威廉·珀金斯的案例汇编，在巫术罪案件中，英格兰有着一套和罗马法相似的取证和证明方式。【编注：威廉·珀金斯是16世纪英格兰著名教士和神学家，清教运动先驱，著述颇丰，曾编有一部三卷本的信仰审判案例集】 In the case of witches, material evidence was usually lacking, as the village healers did not go in for the kind of occult paraphernalia that characterised higher magic. It is also hard to see how the social interactions thought to lead to the initial accusation by Thomas and Briggs could give rise to witnesses able to say they had caught the witch casting a spell red handed, let alone flying through the air. 在审判巫师时，一般都没有物证，一般的乡村治疗师是不会去搞那些高等魔法式的繁琐神秘学仪式的。托马斯和布里格斯认为社会互动可能导致巫术罪指控的出现，但这些通常没法让一个证人到法庭上作证宣称他抓到了一个正在施法术的巫师，更别说亲眼看到巫师在空中飞翔了。 That said, when a witness was produced before the dubious English judge Sir John Powell, declaring that the defendant had been seen travelling on her broomstick, his lordship is said to have dryly remarked that there was no law against flying (sadly the provenance of the story is doubtful [NOTE]). In short, to get a capital conviction if the proper procedures were followed was extremely difficult. 话虽如此，当一个证人被带到对巫术问题持怀疑态度的英格兰法官约翰·鲍威尔爵士面前时，他宣称看到了被告骑着扫帚飞行，据说，鲍威尔爵士不动声色地答道，没有哪条法律禁止人飞行。（可惜这个故事的来源可疑，未可尽信。）总而言之，如果遵循正当的法律程序，受指控者被判处死刑罪名成立是非常困难的。 That is not to say that one could not be punished in other ways where the proof was deficient and the grounds of suspicion that could lead to the application of torture were considerably wider. Simply having a bad local reputation could land someone in a lot of official trouble. This was due to an important reform in the legal system in the late Middle Ages when the accusatio was gradually replaced with the inquisitio. To modern ears this immediately summons up images of the Inquisition although it was secular rather than clerical courts and certainly not papal inquisitors that were responsible for the vast majority of fatal witch trials. 当然， 这并不是说在证据不全且使用刑讯的条件颇为宽松时，被疑为巫师的人无法以别的方式受到惩罚。仅仅是在当地名声不好就可以给人带来很多麻烦了。这种情况的原因是中世纪晚期的一项重要司法改革，在案件审理中控诉制逐渐被纠问制所取代。听在现代人的耳朵里，“纠问制”会让人立即想起宗教裁判所。但这里的裁判官是世俗职务而非宗教职务，在绝大多数巫师被处决的庭审中，作出裁决的也不是宗教裁判官。 When before the Inquisition, a confession and willingness to do penance was always supposed to be sufficient to avoid the death penalty for a first offence while no such leeway existed in most secular courts [NOTE]. Instead, iniquisitio was a method of legal proceedings used in all courts outside England which dropped the dependence on an accuser to bring a complaint. The accuser (who could be punished himself if the defendant was acquitted) was replaced by an inquirer whose role was slowly taken over by professional magistrates. 在宗教裁判所里，初犯的嫌疑人通过忏悔和表达赎罪意愿通常就可以逃过死刑。但在大多数世俗法庭里，是没有这等出路的。在英格兰之外的所有国家，纠问制是被法庭普遍采用的司法程序，这种程序中，不需要一个起诉人来提起诉讼。起诉人（若被告被判无罪则可能受到反坐）被换成了讯问人，讯问人又逐渐被职业地方法官代替了。 This inquirer was expected to investigate matters brought to their attention or the subject of rumour, and was equipped with various powers to enable them to do so. Once they had a case it was presented before a court for consideration and sentence. Provided the procedures were followed and the magistrate was fair and competent, this was a huge improvement over the system of personal accusation and trial by ordeal that preceded it. 讯问人的工作是调查那些引起他们注意的事或流言的源头，并被赋予种种权力以便履行他们的职责。如果他们有足够的理由，相关案件就会提交给法院供审理判刑。如果能够遵守程序，并且地方法官公正且能胜任，这一改革相对于过去的个人起诉及神判法而言将是一个巨大进步。 But it is clear that during the great hunts the rules were not followed. Torture was liberally applied and the atmosphere was one of siege where it was felt the circumstances demanded extreme action. It is interesting to note that the Matthew Hopkins episode, where pseudo-torture such as sleep deprivation and ‘pricking’ was used, was the closest example to a full-scale continental witch hunt that occurred in England. 但是很明显，在大规模猎巫运动期间，司法程序并未得到遵守。刑讯逼供是家常便饭，而且当人们认为事态严重到需要采取极端行动时，全社会的气氛就好像被围在孤城里一样，什么极端行为都不在话下。很有意思的是，在英格兰发生的最像欧陆大规模猎巫的事件就是马修·霍普金斯主导的猎巫运动。在这场运动中使用的大多是一些“类刑讯”手段，比如睡眠剥夺和使用穿刺法鉴别巫师（https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pricking）. The most prolific hunters tended to be lay magistrates and middle ranking clerics of some education while in the higher and appeal courts such as at Paris the conviction rate was much lower, mainly because the sense of panic was absent, torture kept to the statutory limits and evidence examined with a cooler eye [NOTE]. The actual abolition of torture took place too late in most jurisdictions to have had a significant effect on reducing convictions of witches [NOTE]. 成果最为卓著的猎巫者通常都是未受训练的地方法官和受过一点教育的中层牧师，而在较高等的法院和上诉法院里（如巴黎高等法院）判决率明显低得多。主要原因是在这些法院里没有恐慌气氛，对刑讯的法律限制遵守的较好，法官检视证据的态度也较为冷静。在多数地区，取消刑讯对于减少巫师判决率没有什么影响，因为这一改变来得太晚了。 Neither was it the case that most senior judges denied the very possibility of witchcraft for if they had it is hard to see how they could have countenanced any executions at all. Rather, they were removed from the panic on the ground so they could take a more objective and professional stance. 高等法院的判决率较低并不是因为高等法官们本身就不相信巫术，如果他们真的不信巫术，那他们大可以一个巫师都不判。真正的原因是他们没有受到底层的恐慌气氛感染，因而可以在一个较为客观和职业的立场上审理案件。 It was not just lawyers who could become more lenient as they became more expert in their subjects. In Geneva, when the devil’s mark became an accepted form of evidence, the city’s surgeons were delegated to carry out the examination. However, no doubt as a result of having seen a huge range of moles, growths and boils on patients of unimpeachable character, they simply refused to be drawn as to whether a particular lump was of diabolic or purely natural origin. This made a capital prosecution almost impossible and only one witch was executed after 1625 [NOTE]. 都说律师随着对自身所从事领域了解得越多就会变得越宽容，其实不止律师，很多职业都是这样。在日内瓦，当“恶魔的印记”被认定为可接受的证据时，法院授权本地的外科医生检验被告身上有无恶魔的印记。然而，无疑是由于他们平日见多了那些人品端正无瑕的病人们身上的痣、增生和烫伤，医生们拒绝对某一肿块是恶魔的印记还是自然原因所致做出判断。其结果就是想根据恶魔的印记判处死刑基本上成了不可能的任务。1625年之后，日内瓦只有一个巫师被处决。 So the reduction of witch trials from epidemic to endemic proportions requires little else than the assertion of central control over convictions to ensure the legal forms were being adhered to and that local courts could not execute people without sufficient evidence. This central control could be achieved either through allowing appeals to higher courts (or even making them mandatory) or else by ensuring the proper training and oversight of local magistrates. In particular, the strict controls over the use of torture had to be reinstated, notwithstanding the status of witchcraft as a crimen exceptum (an exceptional crime) in most states, and confessions achieved through torture treated with the necessary scepticism. 由此看来，要把猎巫审判由传染性变为地方性不需要什么高深手段，只要有一个中央权威来控制地方法院，确保他们遵守法律程序，不在证据不足的情况下处决犯人就可以了。这种中央控制可以通过设置上诉程序（或像法国一样规定巫术罪案件自动上诉）来达到，也可以通过确保地方法官受过合适的训练且有合理的监督来达到。尤为重要的是要严格控制刑讯，而不是像很多地方一样把巫术罪看作一种“例外犯罪”而放松刑讯控制。法官对由刑讯得来的供词应有足够的怀疑态度。 In either case, this was extremely difficult during times of political upheaval, which explains the prevalence of hunts in the areas of the Holy Roman Empire most affected by the fragmentation of control up to the Thirty Years War and the same situation in France during the Wars of Religion. Although war itself distracted from witch trials as they were no longer the most pressing concern, the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity engendered by possible conflict could increase them. 不管采用哪种方法，建立此类中央控制在政治混乱时期都非常困难。这解释了猎巫为何在三十年战争期间中央权威破坏最为严重的神圣罗马帝国领地最为盛行，同样的情况也发生在宗教战争期间的法国。尽管作为新的麻烦来源，战争从猎巫那边吸引走了世人的一些注意力，但它带来的不确定感和不安全感也会使得人们对猎巫更加狂热。 At first sight, the abuse of judicial process was not so prevalent in England and a crack down on the use of torture can hardly explain anything in a jurisdiction in which torture was not used. The reasons for the hotspots of witch prosecutions in Essex and Lancashire also remain a mystery now that the theory of proxy persecutions of religious minorities has been called into question. 乍一看，在英格兰司法程序的滥用并不是那么厉害，对刑讯逼供的打击也很难解释在一个不允许刑讯逼供的地区出现的猎巫减少。在英格兰的猎巫高发区埃塞克斯和兰开夏，猎巫运动的起因依然是一个谜。目前有人已开始怀疑，这些地区的猎巫审判只是个幌子，实际上针对的是少数教派。 It is ironic that English witch trials faded at much the time that a king who was personally interested in them came to the throne. The North Berwick trials and his publication of Demonologie (1597) suggest that when he became James I of England, he would have been as concerned in his new realm as he was in his old. Perhaps the events surrounding the state opening of Parliament in 1605 focused his mind on more concrete threats to the royal person. The constant danger from Spain that was present during the rule of Elizabeth, as well as fears about the succession, might well have contributed to an atmosphere that encouraged trials. The ascension of James solved the later problem as well as closing off Scotland as a bridgehead for foreign invaders. 颇为讽刺的是，英格兰猎巫运动的衰落居然主要是在一位个人热衷于猎巫的国王在位期间发生的。由北贝斯维克发生的一系列审判以及詹姆斯一世本人于1597年出版的著作《恶魔学》来看，在他当了英王之后可能仍然和在苏格兰时一样热衷于猎巫。也许1605年国会开会前后的一系列事件所表现出的对国王本人的威胁吸引走了他的注意力。自伊丽莎白一世在位期间就长期存在的来自西班牙的威胁，以及对女王继位者问题的恐慌，都可能在伊丽莎白时期导致了一种鼓励猎巫的不安气氛。詹姆斯一世的继位解决了继承者问题，而且也使得苏格兰再不能成为入侵者的桥头堡了。 While the lack of judicial torture in England made witch prosecutions more difficult, the use of juries of laymen probably had the opposite effect. Whereas in the higher continental courts, the entire trial process, including reaching a verdict, was in the hands of professionals, in England a conviction had to be obtained through a jury of commoners (although they were landowners and burghers) who were often more credulous than the judge. The judge did have a considerable ability to influence the juror and, as he was a professional travelling around the circuit, could considerably reduce the number of convictions. 虽说在英格兰因为没有刑讯，要以巫术罪定罪较为困难，但由非专业人士组成的陪审团参与审理可能产生了相反的效果。在大陆上的高等法院里，整个审理程序包括定罪在内都是由专业人士来掌握的。而在英格兰，定罪工作是由一个一般民众（虽然通常都是地主或体面市民）组成的陪审团来做的。这些人比法官要轻信得多。不过法官对陪审团有相当大的影响力，而且当时的法官又是在辖区内巡回审理案件的专业法官，因此可以有效减少定罪的数量。 In the mid-seventeenth century guides like Robert Filmer’s An Advertisement to the Jurymen of England Touching Witches (1653) and reprints of Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witches (1584) were used as guides to the evidence that took a much more sceptical line than Perkins’ effort. But the jury could also reach a verdict of guilty no matter what directions came from the bench as happened during the last successful prosecution in England in 1712 [NOTE]. 在十七世纪中期，陪审员们使用断案指南来帮助他们衡量证据。常用的断案指南包括罗伯特·菲尔莫的《英格兰巫师案件陪审员须知》（1653）和雷吉纳德·斯科特的《发现女巫》（1584）的重印版。这些书对证据的怀疑态度比起珀金斯的著作来要强得多了。但是陪审员们也有权无视法官的指引而作出有罪裁定，在1712年英格兰最后一次成功定罪的猎巫审判中就出现了这种情况。 Rationalism and the final end of the witch trials 理性主义和猎巫审判的终结 By 1700, witch trials had become rare things across much of Europe although they remained reasonably common in Poland until 1725 [NOTE]. When they did occur, they excited a good deal of interest and usually ended with the liberty of the witch. The position of even the lower judiciary was now that maleficia was extremely hard to prove and it was not acceptable to accept lower standards of evidence simply because the crime was so serious. 到了1700年，在欧洲的大部分地区猎巫审判已经很少见了——尽管在波兰猎巫审判要到1725年才变得稀少。这一时期的猎巫审判一旦举行总能吸引众人的兴趣，而结果通常都是巫师嫌疑人被无罪开释。即使较低层的法院都开始认为要证明巫术诅咒是非常困难的事了，不能因为此类犯罪性质严重就采用较低的证据审查标准。 But from time to time, for one reason or another, a conviction was achieved and the statutory punishment was usually death. There were ways around this, such as the judge in England’s last case personally and successfully petitioning for a royal pardon for the accused in 1712 but even ten years after that the Scots executed Janet Horne [NOTE]. 然而间或还是会因为种种原因判决一个两个的巫师，而法律规定的刑罚一般都是死刑。当然即使判了死刑也不是没有办法，比如在1712年英格兰那最后一次成功定罪的巫师案判决后，法官通过个人的努力从王室拿到了特赦令。但在十年之后，苏格兰人还是处决了珍妮特·霍恩。 Positivist historians have long looked upon the end of witch trials as victory for rationalism over superstition. Michael de Montaigne’s scepticism about reports of witchcraft and the veracity of confessions in his essay On the Lame （1588） is a popular example of Renaissance humanism. 一直以来，实证主义历史学家把猎巫审判的终结看作是理性主义对迷信取得的胜利。米歇尔·德·蒙田在他的散文《论跛子》中表现出的对巫术及巫师供词的怀疑态度，是文艺复兴时期人文主义思想的一个著名例子。 However, closer examination of the rationalists has frequently found them to be something of a disappointment for their champions who do not share their mentality. Learned sceptics are often advocates of a mystical or hermetic point of view and are seeking to defend magic from the taint of diabolism rather than claiming that it is impossible. 然而，对理性主义者进行的仔细观察，时常会让他们的支持者们失望，因为这些理性主义者们想的和他们的现代支持者不是一回事。当时学者们之所以对巫术表现怀疑态度，时常是因为他们要推销自己的神秘主义或赫尔墨斯派观点。他们希望从魔法身上揭去魔鬼的污名，而不是认为魔法根本不存在。 The best known sixteenth century critic of witch trials, Johann Weyer, was a pupil of the great neo-Platonist magician Cornelius Agrippa as well as being a radical Protestant. In his De praestigiis daemonum (1583), Weyer was completely orthodox in his belief in devils and his condemnation of almost any kind of magical practice, but just did not think it was the kind of thing that old ladies got up to. 十六世纪最有名的猎巫审判批评者约翰·韦尔是伟大的新柏拉图主义魔法师科尔奈利乌斯·阿格里帕的学生，他也是一位激进的新教徒。在他的《论恶魔幻觉》（1583）一书中，韦尔表现出的相信魔鬼存在和谴责各种魔法实践的观点完全是正统派的。他只是认为，他说的魔法和老太太们做的那些不是一回事。 His English contemporary, Reginald Scot appears at first sight to be more conducive to the views of modern sceptics, but on closer examination his thought also turns out to be almost entirely a function of his Puritan theology [NOTE]. A century later John Webster had a remarkably similar outlook as he too is a sectarian and defender of alchemy. 与他同时代的英国人雷吉纳德·斯科特乍看起来好像更倾向于近代怀疑主义观点，但仔细审视就会发现，斯科特的观点完全是他清教信仰的衍生品。比他晚一个世纪的约翰·韦伯斯特看起来和他异常相似，而韦伯斯特也是一个宗派主义者和炼金术的捍卫者。 The argument was between, on one side Aristotelians and their heirs, the mechanical philosophers, and on the other neo-Platonists and hermetists. As we have seen, it was usually the former, with what we might call the more scientific attitude, who defended belief in witchcraft. This causes a serious problem for traditional explanations for the end of witch trials as there is almost nobody whose particular bundle of motivations and beliefs are entirely comfortable to positivist sensibilities. 论争的一方是亚里士多德派及他们的继承者，机械主义哲学家们，另一方则是新柏拉图主义者和赫尔墨斯派。正如我们前面看到的，通常总是前一派人——也就是我们可能会觉得态度更科学的那一派——相信巫术的存在并努力为之辩护。对女巫审判终结的传统解释在这一点上遇上了难题，因为在这场论争中没有任何一位参与者的信念和动机完全合乎现代实证主义者的口味。 There certainly is a rise in scepticism as Glanville and More (who was a mechanistic Platonist and thus demonstrates the impossibility of fitting anyone’s beliefs into a neat box) are both keen to combat it but, as far as the positivist is concerned, it is not always the right people being sceptics. 当时对巫术持怀疑态度者确实有所增加，以至于格兰维尔和摩尔要努力与之斗争（摩尔是个机械主义派的柏拉图主义者，这又一次证明了想把人的信仰套进方便的模式里是不可能的）。但是困扰实证主义者的是：持怀疑主义的不总是合适的人。 Likewise, Cotton Mather manages to receive both excretion and exoneration for his conduct in the Salem witch trials and later his work on smallpox immunisation. Even a bona fide freethinker like Thomas Hobbes thought that it was justified to convict someone of witchcraft if they had knowingly tried to carry out maleficia even if they were incapable of it [NOTE]. 与之类似，科顿·马瑟既因他在萨勒姆审判中的作为被人痛诋，又因他推广天花疫苗的功劳为人称颂。即使一个托马斯·霍布斯这样十足真金的自由思考者也认为：如果有人有意试图施加诅咒，那尽管他实际上没有巫术能力，判他个巫术罪也是正当的。 The pamphlet wars give us some idea of the motivations of both sides of the argument. Defenders of the belief in witches, such as Sir Thomas Browne in Religio Medici (1634), seemed more worried about atheists than the devil. 当年的小册子论战可以让我们对论战双方的动机略作管窥。为相信巫师存在者辩护的人似乎更担心否定巫师会让无神论者——而非魔鬼——得势。此类思维的例子可参见托马斯·布朗尼爵士的《一个医生的宗教观》（1634）一书。 Similarly, in Saducismus Triumphantus (1681), Glanvill did not appear to be so much concerned about witchcraft being a serious threat to life and limb, especially after his careful investigations revealed rather feeble examples, but instead that a denial of the witch was a big step towards the denial of all religion. 格兰维尔在他的著作《巫师及鬼怪的完整直接证据》（1681）中也表达了类似的意思。他仔细调查了他书中举出的那些巫术例子之后，发现它们都不太经得起推敲，在书中他并不认为巫术对人的生命或肢体能够造成什么实质威胁，更使他担心的是对巫师及巫术的否定可能导致对所有宗教的全面否定。 Even a hundred years later John Wesley had much the same concerns saying “giving up witchcraft is in effect giving up the bible” [NOTE]. Clearly the intention of these writers is not the same as earlier demonologists like Jean Bodin. 甚至在一百年之后，约翰·韦斯利也表达出了相同的担忧。他写道：“否认巫术实质上就是否认《圣经》。”很明显，这些作者支持巫术存在的目的与早期的恶魔学者如让·博丹等人大相径庭。 So, while Cotton Mather’s The Wonders of the Invisible World (1693) fits the bill as a the work of old fashioned cleric, seeing devils under the bed, convinced there is a vast diabolical conspiracy that justifies desperate retaliatory measures, many of the learned defenders had a much narrower interest. 所以，虽然科顿·马瑟的《不可见世界中的奇观》一书的确够得上老派教士著作的标准——书中他认为魔鬼就在我们身边、坚信存在一个魔鬼策划的大规模阴谋且人们应以极端手段对抗这一阴谋，但很多颇有学识的巫术捍卫者所感兴趣的领域则要窄得多。 Ultimately it was these learned men, who simply did not care about old women and their muttered curses, who had to be won around for the prosecutions to stop altogether. What eventually defeated the likes of More and Glanville was the same thing that has invalidated so many of the last ditch defences conducted in the name of religion. 归根结底，要结束猎巫指控和审判，反猎巫派必须把这些饱学者争取过来。而这些人并不关心村中的某个老妇是不是女巫，或她们口中咕哝的诅咒是否灵验。最终击败摩尔和格兰维尔及其同道的，此前也曾扫清过无数以宗教之名誓死捍卫某种信念的人。 There are always a few people who become fixated on a piece of doctrine and insist that the world will be imperilled by giving it up. This happened over the movement of the earth and is happening today over women priests. 历史上不论何时总有一些人执着于某些教条，并宣称如果放弃这些教条世界就会大难临头。围绕着地球是否在转动发生过类似的论争，而今天我们还可以在关于女性牧师问题的讨论中找到这些人的影子。 But once the dogma has in fact been dropped de facto despite the protestations of its defenders, it usually becomes clear that the terrible consequences of which they warned have not come to pass and a new generation has no concerns about amending the writ to conform with practice. 但是，尽管这些人誓死捍卫旧教条，一旦这些旧教条的死亡成为事实，人们就会发现捍卫者们拿来吓唬人的那些严重后果一样都没发生。这种情况下，新一代人就不惮于修改教条来使之适应新的现实了。 Essentially, most people were able to see that the church could sail serenely on despite the loss of an occasional doctrine and that its problems were rather more fundamental than just a matter of believing in witches. 最重要的是，大多数人都能够看到：虽然教会失去了某个教条，但它依旧安然无恙，而教会面临的问题也比巫术问题要深层的多。 While the contention of some scholars that there was a wholesale withdrawal of the elite from popular culture seems to me to be thrown into doubt by the enormous unifying effect of the English bible, it is true that certain beliefs can drop out of ‘high’ culture – especially when they become associated with vulgarity or lack of sophistication. In late seventeenth century England this happened to nearly all magical ideas as the New Philosophy became the in-thing. 虽然英文版《圣经》表现出的巨大文化统合力已使得某些学者声称的“精英阶层大规模退出大众文化圈”这一结论遭到质疑，但不可否认，有些时候一些信念确实会逐渐从“高等”文化的范畴里被排斥出去——尤其是当人们开始认为这些信念太过鄙俗或太过粗浅的时候。在十七世纪晚期的英格兰，这种现象导致了几乎所有与魔法相关的思想被思想界扫地出门，因为这一时期新哲学才是最时髦的。 While actually understanding the scientific results of Boyle or Newton was beyond most people, anyone could attack the superstitions of peasants and thus reassure themselves of their membership of the intelligentsia. Just as the learned ideas about the devil were absorbed by the middling classes who then put them into practice by hunting witches, so the New Philosophy, percolating into the middle class consciousness, helped instil them with scepticism. 虽然大多数人都很难准确理解牛顿或者玻义耳的科学发现，随便什么人都可以通过攻击农民的迷信而获得“自己是个知识分子”的自信。正如之前大众接受了学者们关于魔鬼的理论而置身于猎巫运动，新哲学也渐渐被大众接受，在他们的头脑里种下了怀疑主义的种子。 Even those who were willing to accept the existence of witches in principle did not feel they could countenance any specific examples. As Joseph Addison wrote in the Spectator in 1711 “I believe in general that there is and has been such a thing as witchcraft; but at the same time can give credit to no particular instance of it” [NOTE]. 即使那些愿意在理论上接受巫术存在的人也开始变得难以支持某个特定的巫术案例了。比如约瑟夫·艾迪逊在1711年的《观察家》中写到：“在一般意义上，我相信过去和现在都存在巫术，但与此同时我难以相信任何巫术案例。” To actually abolish the crime required more than the belief that proof was difficult to obtain. The twin pillars of witchcraft were maleficia and the pact with the devil - both aspects needed to be dealt with. Witchcraft had to be thought impossible (in the case of maleficia) and irrelevant (in the case of the pact with the devil). 要废除巫术罪名，只让人们相信其证据难以获得是不够的。巫术罪的两大要件是诅咒行为和与魔鬼所定的契约，必须把这两点都打倒才能废除巫术罪。人们必须认识到，巫术罪是不可能的（打倒诅咒行为）并且和魔鬼并无相干（打倒魔鬼契约）。 Belief in magic was largely absent from the elite long before the existence of the devil himself was being denied although he was becoming a spiritual being whose abilities were far more limited than they had been in the past. He could not really do anything miraculous but only foster illusions in the gullible. Eventually, his power became merely the ability to tempt Christians into sin by mental suggestion and so his threat was but a moral challenge. 在人们开始否定魔鬼的存在以前，知识阶层早已不信魔法存在了。而且现在魔鬼虽然还没被彻底打倒，但它已经成了一种精神性的存在，它的威能已经大不如前，目前它已经无法展示任何奇迹，它能做到的只是用幻觉蛊惑那些容易上当的人了。最终，魔鬼的能力只剩了以精神暗示诱惑基督徒犯下罪孽这一项，这样他对人们的威胁也就只停留在道德层面，而与法律无涉了。 It is also possible that the near complete lack of any solid evidence for devil worship finally began to make itself felt and that consequently fears of a fifth column in the midst of society faded but they would reappear from time to time, most recently in Orkney and Rochdale in the 1991. 另一个可能是，人们终于发现了他们对恶魔信仰的恐惧其实没有任何现实证据，因此，对社会中可能存在一个魔鬼势力第五纵队的恐惧也就消退了。当然，类似的恐惧日后还是会不时爆发出来，最近的例子就是1991年在奥克尼和罗什戴尔发生的“从魔鬼崇拜的家庭中解救儿童”的丑闻。【编注：参见维基词条Orkney child abuse scandal】 Neutering Satan and turning him into a more transcendent figure is often ascribed to Protestantism although Luther himself claims he suffered many physical encounters with the devil who threw excrement at him. Whatever the causes, the devil faded from view and this turned the question of what to do about his alleged disciples into a purely religious matter. 把撒旦无力化并使他成为一个更加虚幻的存在一事时常被记到新教的账上——虽然马丁路德本人宣称撒旦曾多次与他相遇并扔大便攻击他。不管原因为何，魔鬼从人们眼中消失了。这样，如何处理那些被指控是魔鬼信徒的人就变成了一个宗教性的问题，而与社会安全无关了。 The process was a drawn out one that should perhaps be studied in parallel with the decline of heresy and blasphemy as a crime against the state. This slowly faded as the eighteenth century wore on although there were isolated prosecutions, such as the La Barre case of 1766 in France made famous by Voltaire [NOTE]. （巫术罪的消失）这一过程相当漫长，或许较好的办法是把它与“异端诽谤危害国家罪”的消失一同研究。虽然仍有零星的异端指控（如因伏尔泰而大大出名的拉·巴尔案），异端罪在十八世纪已经慢慢淡出了人们的视野。 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there might simply have been a change in the jurisdiction for witch trials from secular to ecclesiastical courts but during the seventeenth century heresy had gradually ceased to be seen as a crime deserving temporal punishment and the church courts could no longer expect the secular arm to carry out their orders. 在十五至十六世纪，巫术罪的管辖权可能确由世俗法院转到了宗教法庭。但到了十七世纪，异端信仰已经渐渐不再被人视作一种需要神罚的罪行了。与此同时，宗教法庭也渐渐不能指望世俗法院执行它的判决了。 Even in countries which retained strong church courts, most especially Spain and Portugal, sentences became lighter as the eighteenth century progressed with a return to the medieval idea of penance and reconciliation rather than punishment. The stalemate that had ended the wars between Catholics and Protestants, coupled with the fostering of national over religious identity, meant the ideals of tolerance expressed as early as Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) were finally implemented. 即使在那些仍保留了相对强势宗教法庭的国家如西班牙和葡萄牙，进入十八世纪后对异端罪行的定罪也逐渐变轻了。以忏悔和赎罪代替刑罚的中世纪思想逐渐回归。天主教徒和新教徒长年战争结束后，两派进入了对峙局面，再加上人们的头脑中国家意识也开始取代宗教意识而成为主要的身份认同，这似乎意味着早在1516年托马斯·莫尔在《乌托邦》中写到的宗教宽容理想终于得以实现。 This is not to say that atheism or devil worship were socially acceptable, but rather that if a man or woman minded their own business and kept their views quiet, nobody would hunt them down. Essentially ones private religion became a private matter and, as long as one did not cause a public disturbance, the public sphere had little interest. 当然，这并不意味着无神论或恶魔信仰得到了社会的承认。只是如果一个人自扫门前雪，不把自己的宗教主张到处宣扬，那么不管他相信什么，都不会有人来猎捕他了。基本上，个人的宗教信仰终于被社会认可为个人事务了。而只要一个人不制造公共事端，那么公众方面对他的个人事务是没有什么兴趣的。 Conclusion 结论 Witchcraft is an imaginary crime. It has, as Robin Briggs says, a hole in the middle which demonologists were able to fill with their speculations [NOTE]. They were then able to persuade others, including the actual accused, of the veracity of these ideas. 巫术罪是一种想象出来的犯罪。正如罗宾·布里格斯所说：它的中心有个空洞，正方便那些魔鬼学者把他们的臆测填进去。这样，魔鬼学者就可以说服旁人——甚至包含被控为巫师的人——认同他们的观点。 As Briggs says, after Alasdair MacIntyre, a rational thought is one that coheres with the thoughts around it and, to the mentality of the demonologists and enough of those around them, their writings made perfect sense. We do not need to call them superstitious charlatans to say that they were wrong. 布里格斯说的好：阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔把“合理的想法”定义为“与周围人的想法一致的想法”。按这一定义，对那些魔鬼学者及他们身边足够多的人们来说，他们的著述是非常合理的。我们可以說他们是錯的，但没有必要称他们为迷信的骗子。 A defendant, accused of a non-existent crime, should expect that any effective legal process will find them not guilty and in witch trials this is eventually what happened. It remained possible that someone could (and perhaps should) be convicted if, believing they have the power, they bewitched a person who then conveniently started to ail, but this will be a very rare case. 一个被控犯了不存在的罪行的被告人应该期待一个合理的司法系统还他清白，就猎巫审判而言，最终情形也确实如此。如果一个真心相信自己能施巫术的人对别人施了巫术，而受术者正巧就病倒了，因此给施术者定一个巫术罪是完全可能的。但这种案子即使有，也应该非常稀少。 Renaissance magicians never won their argument with the demonologists as they were both swept aside by the intellectual changes of the seventeenth century. The devil found himself relegated to the role assigned for him by Milton in Paradise Lost (1667) as a tempter who must rely on God to effect any real change. Milton also gives us an idea of the penetration of the New Philosophy, although he hardly approves of it, with his running joke about the configuration of the solar system and Raphael’s admonition of Adam for being too curious about the heavens. 文艺复兴时代的魔术师们从未在与魔鬼学者的辩论中获胜，因为他们一起被十七世纪的知识界剧变甩下了辩论台。魔鬼被贬到弥尔顿在《失乐园》中给他安排的位置上去了，他现在是一个教唆者，他只有依靠上帝的力量才能导致实质性的改变。弥尔顿也通过他时常提到的笑话（例如“太阳系的构成”和“拉斐尔警告亚当不要对天堂太过好奇”）让我们了解了当时正破土而出的新哲学，虽然弥尔顿本人并不认同这新哲学。 To the New Philosophers, the rhetorical purpose of a defence of witchcraft was completely different to that of the earlier demonologists, which shows how attitudes had already changed. Perhaps the decline of the trials taking place without the world being overwhelmed by devilry had made the issue seem less urgent. 一篇为巫术罪的辩护词对新一代的哲学家们而言的修辞意义与它在早期恶魔学者眼中的修辞意义截然不同，这一点就证明了知识界的态度已然改变了。也许在猎巫审判越来越少的时代里，世界依然如常运转而并未充斥着魔鬼的术法这一事实，就使得魔鬼问题变得不那么迫切了。 On the same note, once it became clear that most people were already sceptical about witches and this had not led to a collapse of the Christian religion, intellectuals had no further use for witchcraft except for English Tories who wanted to do a bit of Whig baiting. As moral and religious matters were assigned more to the private than the public sphere, a pact with the devil ceased to be a crime against the state and maleficia ceased to be anything at all. 同样，一旦大多数人都已对巫师的存在产生怀疑而基督宗教也并未崩塌，对知识分子们而言巫术问题就没用了。只有英格兰的托利党人还会拿巫术问题来钓一钓辉格党人。当道德和宗教逐渐由社会事务变成私人事务，与魔鬼定约也就不再是危害国家的犯罪，而诅咒也就不再被人当作一回事了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

An Odd Couple: Did Economic Prosperity Lead to the Emergence of World Religions? 奇异的组合：经济繁荣导致世界宗教的兴起？ 作者：Tahereh Haji @ 2015-9-01 译者：李九喻( @李九喻) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The Evolution Institute，https://evolution-institute.org/article/an-odd-couple-did-economic-prosperity-lead-to-the-emergence-of-world-religions-2/ Nearly 2500 years ago, in three different areas of the world, the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the Easter Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley, conditions were ideal for the emergence of a number of religious traditions, ones which would shape the future of human life to this very day. This 200-year period is called the “Axial Age,” and these doctrines would later become the world’s major religions, including Buddhism, Daoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The history of this process is well documented, but a key question remains unanswered: why did these similar movements emerge simultaneously? 大约2500年前，在长江和黄河流域、地中海东部及恒河流域这三个世界不同地区，数个宗教传统的兴起遇到了理想的条件，它们将会塑造人类的未来生活，直至今日。这个长约200年的时间段被称为“轴心时代”，其间诞生的教义日后逐渐衍变成了世界上的主要宗教，包括佛教、道教、犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教。这段被详细记录的历史中有一个关键问题尚未探明：为什么相似的宗教运动会同时兴起？ Prior to the Axial Age, in hunter-gatherer societies, early chiefdoms and archaic states, religions were focused on rituals, sacrifices, and respecting taboos, practices that were believed to ensure prosperity. However, the new doctrines were extremely different. Now, “personal transcendence” was valued. “轴心时代”之前，在狩猎-采集社会中，在酋邦和原始国家里，宗教活动侧重于能够确保社会繁荣的仪式、献祭与图腾崇拜等实践。，然而，后来兴起的新教义与这些非常不同。如今，“个人超越”变得重要起来。 Human existence was believed to have a purpose, distinct from the material world, and it lay in a moral existence and control of one’s material desires through moderation, asceticism, and compassion. Central importance was placed on the idea that human beings have a soul that can survive the mortal world; only moderation of these material desires, asceticism, and moral behavior can guarantee the salvation of that soul in the afterlife. 人类的存在被认为具有目的，与物质世界有所不同，而这在于道德生活和通过节制、禁欲和怜悯而实现对自身物质欲望的控制。至关重要的是这样一种观念：人类拥有超越有朽世界的灵魂；只有对物质欲望的节制、禁欲和道德操守能够确保灵魂在死后得到救赎。 In a 2015 publication in Current Biology, researchers in the United States and France, led by Nicolas Baumard, compared the political and economic conditions at that time in order to determine what led to the Axial Age. The religious movements were too innovative to be accounted for through the emergence of large empires, which tended to have organized religions, but lacked the essential focus on asceticism and morality. 在《当代生物学》2015年所登的一篇文章中，以Nicholas Baumard为首来自美国和法国的研究者试图通过对比同时期的政治与经济情况来解释轴心时代出现的原因。当时的宗教运动高度创新，不能用大型帝国的出现来解释，后者趋向于形成有组织的宗教，但禁欲与道德操守却不是其本质重点。 Drawing on recent evidence from evolutionary psychology that suggested that affluence has a predictable effect on human motivation and reward systems, Baumard and colleagues hypothesized that increased affluence was the major factor in all three areas (the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the Easter Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley). They used energy capture as a marker of affluence. Quantitative studies had already shown that, at the time, there was a sharp increase in energy capture occurring in exactly those three areas. 进化心理学的近期研究表明，富足的社会对人类的刺激与奖励系统有着可预测的影响，受此启发，Baumard和同事们假设财富增长是上述地区（长江和黄河流域、地中海东部及恒河流域）的重点因素。他们用能量获取作为富足的标识。量化研究已经表明，正是上述三个区域，当时在能量获取方面均曾有过突然的增长。 The researchers tested this link by developing and comparing statistical models in which the likelihood of the emergence of a religion was dependent on a single factor. The models either used the level of affluence or political success as a factor. Their results confirmed that affluence markers provide very good indicators for the emergence of axial religions, whereas political success markers did not. 研究者通过开发和比较统若干计模型来测试上述联系，每一种模型均将宗教兴起的可能性设置为依赖于单一因素。模型使用的因素或者是经济富裕水平，或者是政治成功。研究结果证实，经济富裕标志为轴心宗教的出现提供了非常好的指标，而政治成功标志则没有。 History would agree with these results as well; religious historians have noted that Axial Age movements did not appear in the largest states at the time (eg. Assyria, Egypt, Persia), but in smaller prosperous polities such as Greek city-states, Mahajanapada, and the most developed of Chinese states. However, the authors noted that a number of questions remain. More data on affluence and political success, both in these societies and in other non-Eurasian empires, is needed to test the robustness of the conclusions and would strengthen the model. 历史也会同意以上结论；宗教历史学家已经指出，轴心时代运动并没有在当时最大的国家（如亚述、埃及、波斯）出现，而是在类似希腊城邦、印度列国和最发达的中国诸侯等较小的繁荣政体中兴起。然而，文章作者们认为一些问题仍旧存在。为检验结论的稳健性并且巩固模型，需要有更多这些社会和其他非亚欧帝国在经济富裕和政治成功方面的数据。 In addition, though the analysis presented here suggests a general set of conditions, which led to the emergence of these religions, the more specific mechanism remains unknown. Was it a new class of priests or scholars who now had the time and resources to develop more abstract religions? Did economic prosperity lead to an increase in literacy among the believers? Did affluence promote a more cosmopolitan society in which generosity, universality, and self-control were more attractive? The answers to these questions may well explain some of our most basic current beliefs, and shed light on our shared history. 此外，尽管这些分析展示了一组导致上述宗教涌现的一般条件，更具体的机制则尚不清楚。是由于出现了新的祭司阶级或者学者，有时间和资源来发展更为抽象的宗教？经济繁荣是否令更多信徒识字？经济繁荣是否促成了一个更加趋于世界主义的世界，其中慷慨、普世性与自控更具吸引力？这些问题的答案可能有助于更好解释我们当下一些最基本的信仰，并照亮我们的共同历史。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Myth of Free-Trade Britain 自由贸易英国的神话 作者：John V.C. Nye @ 2003-3-03 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Library of Economics and Liberty，http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Nyefreetrade.html In the two and a half centuries since Adam Smith first articulated the basic case for free trade, no event has been more significant than the British conversion to open markets in the nineteenth century. In the fable that is now conventional wisdom, nineteenth century Britain turned its back on protection and chose to open its markets to the world. 在亚当·斯密首次清晰阐述了自由贸易基本原理后的两个半世纪里，没有比十九世纪英国转为开放市场更为重要的事件了。在如今已成传统智慧的寓言里，十九世纪的英国放弃了市场保护政策，转而选择向世界开放其市场。 A reform-minded British leadership, preaching the new gospel of free trade pushed their European confreres to open up their own markets, eventually ushering in an age of expansive commerce the likes of which the world had never seen—a precursor of late twentieth century globalization that was in many ways more open than anything before or since. 富有改革思想的英国领导人鼓吹自由贸易的新福音，推动了欧洲同仁们开放市场，最终开启了全世界前所未见的商业扩张时代——这是二十世纪晚期全球化的发端，许多方面比此前此后任何时期都要更加开放。 Yet this story has one big flaw: it's inconsistent with the facts. 然而这个故事有个巨大的缺陷：与事实不符。 As the story is usually told, British free trade came in the 1840s after a bitter political struggle to repeal the Corn Laws—a name given to a series of agricultural tariffs and quotas designed to keep farm prices high. This was quickly followed by rapid and dramatic reductions in duties on hundreds of imports. By the 1850s, all but a handful of commodities were admitted to Britain free of all duties. 这故事常说，在寻求废除《谷物法》——一系列旨在维持农产品高价的农业关税和配额政策的总称——的艰苦政治斗争后，英国的自由贸易在1840年代来临了。紧接着便是几百种进口物关税的迅速急剧减少。到1850年代，除少数例外，几乎所有商品都获准完全免税进入英国。 Sounds good, until you look closely at what products remained subject to high duties: those handful of items were the most contentious and some of the most highly taxed items that historically had been at the core of the mercantile debate in British history. In previous centuries they formed a large and significant fraction of British trade. 这听起来很好，但待你看清关税仍然高启的产品到底是什么之后，就不会这么想了：那少数商品是英国历史上最具争议的，而且属于赋税负担最高的商品之列，它们一直都处于商业争论的核心。在那之前的几个世纪里，这些商品构成了英国贸易的重要部分。 Free trade should mean just that: free trade, with all goods admitted without duties, quotas, or restrictions. That was not British policy. They removed most tariffs but mostly on items in which they had a comparative advantage. In other words, they mostly removed tariffs on items for which Britain had little to fear in terms of competition or which were of trivial importance in overall trade. 自由贸易的内涵应该是：所有商品无关税、无限额、无限制的自由贸易。这可不是英国的政策。他们取消了大部分关税，但大部分都在他们有比较优势的产品上。换句话说，英国人主要取消了他们不惧任何竞争的产品的关税，或者在整体贸易中无足轻重的产品的关税。 Britain in the early 1800s had just passed through the Industrial Revolution and was the world's leading producer of cotton textiles and other industrial products. It took little courage to lower tariffs on British manufactures. It would be like Japan promoting free trade in the 1980s by arguing for lower tariffs on compact cars imported from America. Since Japan already made some of the world's best and most economical small cars, such a policy would have had very limited economic impact. Japan's lowering trade barriers in agriculture would have been substantially more important and would have run up against enormous political resistance. 十九世纪早期的英国刚经历工业革命，是棉纺织品和其他工业产品的世界领先生产者。降低英国制造品的关税并不需要多大勇气。这就像1980年代的日本，通过主张降低从美国进口的紧凑型汽车的关税来促进自由贸易。因为日本已经制造出世界上最好、最经济的小型汽车，这样的政策对经济的冲击非常有限。如果日本降低农业方面的贸易壁垒，其重要性会大大加强，也会遇到极大的政治阻力。 Nineteenth-century Britain had no comparative advantage in agricultural and foodstuffs. That is why the Corn Laws were initially so controversial. Consumers had a lot to gain from the state's permitting the import of grain, because the British were not the cheapest producers of grain, while British farmers had much to lose. Unfortunately, the British did little to modify the tariffs on other contentious items, goods which had made for the commercial equivalent of war. Of these goods, the most important and the most troublesome was wine. 十九世纪的英国在农业和食品上没有比较优势。这就是为何《谷物法》从一开始就备受争议。英国的消费者能从国家允许进口粮食中受益良多，因为英国人生产的粮食并不是最便宜的，而同时，英国农民则损失惨重。遗憾的是，英国人对其他有争议商品的关税少有改动，这些商品曾导致商战。在这些商品中，最重要且最棘手的就是葡萄酒。 But how important is wine? To answer that we need to go back to the 1600s. Britain in the mid-seventeenth century was a prodigious importer of wine, mostly French. 但是葡萄酒有多重要呢？回答这个问题我们要追溯到十七世纪。十七世纪中期的英国是葡萄酒的重要进口国，主要是法国葡萄酒。 So much so, in fact, that her trade balance was in the red, mostly because of trade with France and mostly because of French wine, spirits and a number of luxury goods. Attempts to limit these imports by restricting trade had mostly failed. Tariffs were levied but never so high as to reduce the imports drastically. But then came the wars. 如此这般，事实上，英国的贸易收支是呈赤字的，主要是源于跟法国的贸易，也就是法国葡萄酒、烈酒和诸多奢侈品导致的。通过限制贸易来减少这些商品进口的企图都失败了。关税一直在征收，但是从未高到能明显减少进口的程度。但是接着战争开始了。 Two major conflicts spanning a quarter century kept French wine—indeed, all French imports—out of the British market from 1689 to 1713. The Nine Years' War and the War of Spanish Succession led to hostilities between Britain and France and a complete breakdown in trade for this quarter century. 绵延1/4世纪的两场大型冲突让法国葡萄酒——实际上，所有的法国进口产品——在1689年到1713年间退出了英国市场。九年战争和西班牙王位继承战争导致了英法之间的敌对和长达1/4世纪的彻底贸易中断。 During this grape-challenged period, three interest groups derived enormous benefit from the embargo on France—the British brewing industry, British distillers (gin, etc.) and British interests in foreign producers of alcohol—most notably the shippers of Portuguese wine. Prior to the late 1600s, the British drank plenty of wine, mostly French, a little Spanish, but virtually nothing from Portugal. The wars of 1689-1713 gave the Portuguese allies the opportunity of ten lifetimes. 在这葡萄酒缺乏的时期，三个利益集团从对法禁运中获得巨额利益——英国发酵酒工业、英国蒸馏酒商（杜松子酒等）、外国酒商中的英国利益集团——最明显的就是葡萄牙葡萄酒的运货商。在十七世纪晚期之前，英国人饮葡萄酒颇多，大部分是法国进口的，加上一点西班牙进口的，但是几乎没有葡萄牙进口的。1689-1713年的战争让葡萄牙盟友获得了千载难逢的良机。 Beginning in 1703 a treaty was signed granting Portugal access to British markets for their wines—generally of a much lower quality than those of France, and often needing to be fortified with brandy or spirits in order to keep from going bad. The Methuen Treaty (as it was known) promised that Portuguese tariffs would always be at least a third lower than those of other nations, most especially France. 从1703年开始，一个允许葡萄牙人的葡萄酒进入英国市场的条约就签订了——这些葡萄酒质量普遍不及法国葡萄酒，并且经常需要添加白兰地或者烈酒来防止其变质。这个被称为《梅图恩条约》的协定，承诺葡萄牙人的关税会一直比其他国家低至少1/3，尤其是法国。 Of course, most of the Portuguese wine trade was dominated by British ships, merchants, and even vintners working in Iberia. The end of hostilities between Britain and France was seen as a grave threat to all these British interests, and vigorous lobbying by brewers, distillers, and the Anglo-Portuguese merchants stopped attempts to return to the period of open trade with the French. A bill to revive trade on prewar conditions between Britain and France was defeated in Parliament. 当然，大多数葡萄牙葡萄酒贸易都被英国船只、英国商人乃至在伊比利亚半岛的英国酿酒商所控制。英法之间敌对状态的结束被视为是对所有这些英国利益集团的巨大威胁，啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和英葡商人的大力游说阻止了重回英法开放贸易时代的企图。一项旨在恢复英法战前贸易状态的提案在议会被否决。 Even worse, tariffs were raised even higher throughout the eighteenth century. The result was that French exports of wine to Britain in the 1700s fell to less than 5% of the levels (measured by volume) that had prevailed in the 1600s. A twenty-fold decrease! The high taxes kept out all but the finest French products. 更糟的是，整个十八世纪的关税甚至更高了。结果就是十八世纪法国出口到英国的葡萄酒降到不足之前十七世纪水平的5%（以体积计）。减少了二十倍！高关税驱逐了所有法国产品，除了最好的那些。 Indeed, the French were kept out of the British market for most of the period of the Industrial Revolution, when the middle classes emerged and middle class tastes developed. Only the rich had access to the very finest clarets of Bordeaux. Cheap wine was simply not worth importing. And the British brewers, distillers, and merchant shippers never had it better. One historian has remarked that absent war and protection, the Gin Age1 might never have come into existence. 事实上，在工业革命的大多数时期，当中产阶级出现并且中产品味得到发展时，法国产品都是被挡在英国市场之外的。只有富人才能找到最好的波尔多红葡萄酒。便宜的葡萄酒根本不值得进口。英国啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和运货商从未提高这些劣质葡萄酒的品质。一位历史学家曾说，若没有战争和保护政策，杜松子酒时代（脚注1）可能根本就不会出现。 These assorted tariffs on wine and other consumables—which Adam Smith had condemned for their inefficiency in the eighteenth century—remained at the core of British protection in the nineteenth, when trade was supposedly made free. Though claiming to have moved to open markets, the British hung on to tariffs that were of long standing, and that moreover, prevented much progress from being made in bilateral treaty negotiations. France was not about to sign a bilateral commercial treaty if Britain was unwilling to compromise on wine and spirits. 十九世纪，在这个人们认为贸易已变得自由的时期，这一系列对葡萄酒和其他消费品的关税——亚当·斯密在十八世纪就谴责过其低效——仍然是英国保护政策的核心。虽然声称已转变为开放市场，英国人还是坚持长期存在的关税，而且此举还阻止了双边条约谈判的进展。如果英国在葡萄酒和烈酒上不愿意妥协，法国就不会签署双边商务协定。 Figure 1. Average Tariffs in the U.K. and France, 1820–1913 图1.英国和法国的平均关税，1820-1913 [From: A. Imlah, 1958 Economic Elements of the PaxBritannica, New York; and M. Levy-Leboyerand F. Bourguignon, 1985L'Economie Francaise au XIXesiecle,Paris.] [来源：A. Imlah，1958，“不列颠治世”中的经济元素，纽约；M. Levy-Leboyer和F. Bourguignon，1985，十九世纪的法国经济，巴黎] Britain preached the gospel of free trade and France was cast in the role of the sinner, but there was little truth in this stereotype. France did have more protected products than England did but the average level of French tariffs (measured as total value of duties divided by total value of imports, cf. Figure 1) was actuallylower than in Britain for three-quarters of the nineteenth century.2 In other words, tariffs had a smaller impact on French trade than British duties had on Britain's trade. 英国是自由贸易新福音的布道者，而法国则被铸为罪人的角色，但是这种刻板偏见里并没有多少事实。法国确实比英格兰有更多的受保护产品，但是法国关税的平均水平（以关税总值除以进口总值衡量，如图1）在十九世纪3/4的时间里实际上比英国要低（脚注2）。换句话说，关税对法国贸易的影响要比英国关税对于英国贸易的影响小。【编注：这一比较方法存在严重问题：它体现不出那些因税率过高乃至无利可图的贸易，或者被非关税壁垒禁止了的贸易，因而无法准确反映贸易自由度，比如在极端情况下，某国以零关税开放一项小规模贸易，同时禁止其他所有贸易，此时该指标为零，但贸易显然极度不自由，所以它必须结合其他指标才有意义。不过，它确实揭示了当时英国的关税率是非常高的。】 The French, while eschewing free trade, and openly rejecting the Anglo doctrine of open markets, actually succeeded in making their trade more liberal and more open than that of the more vocal British. The master of this was Napoleon III—Bonaparte's nephew—who throughout the 1850s promoted the most radical liberalizing reforms of the French economy, all the while insisting that France was only interested in moderate reform. 法国人虽然避开自由贸易并且公开拒绝英国人的开放市场学说，但是它实际上却成功使其贸易比鼓噪发声的英国人更加自由和开放。这过程的主导是拿破仑三世——波拿巴的侄子——他在整个1850年代都在推动对法国经济最激进的自由化改革，却一直坚称法国只对温和改革有兴趣。 Indeed, it was not British unilateral tariff reduction that moved the world to freer trade. Despite the belief that is still common today that British exhortation opened the doors to European free trade in the late 19th century, it was the 1860 Treaty of Commerce, promoted by the Napoleon III and concluded between Britain and France, that really ushered in the age of nineteenth century "globalization". British demands for unilateral tariff reduction usually fell on deaf ears. 事实上，并不是英国的单方面关税削减使得世界贸易更加自由。尽管认为十九世纪末英国的呼吁打开了欧洲自由贸易之门的观点现在仍很普遍，但其实是1860年《商贸条约》才真正开启了十九世纪的“全球化”时代，该条约由拿破仑三世推动，在英法之间缔结。英国提出的单方面降低关税要求通常无人理睬。 Doctrinaire free traders and economic theorists opposed the use of commercial treaties since they felt that unilateral reductions were the most efficient policies for all countries. While correct in the abstract, such claims did little to overcome political resistance to trade liberalization in most countries. On the other hand, unwillingness on the part of the British to lower wine tariffs killed early trade negotiations with both France and Spain. 教条主义的自由贸易者和经济理论家反对使用商业条约，因为他们认为单方面降低关税对所有国家来说都是最有效的政策。尽管理论上是正确的，但这种主张在大多数国家却很少能克服政治阻力，实现贸易自由。另一方面，部分英国人不情愿降低葡萄酒关税的态度已经早早地扼杀了该国与法国及西班牙的贸易协商。 When the British finally decided to moderate their wine tariffs, Britain and France successfully concluded a treaty in 1860 which dramatically changed the landscape of European commerce. Politicians throughout Europe—who had till then resisted all pressure to liberalize trade—suddenly became fearful of being left out of a trade pact that united the two great European powers. The result was that the other major European powers quickly signed bilateral treaties with Britain and France as well. 当英国最终决定将葡萄酒关税调整到适度水平时，英法才在1860年成功缔结了条约，这极大地改变了欧洲商业的形势。全欧洲的政治人物——不久前还抗拒贸易自由化的压力——突然开始担心被遗落在连接欧洲两大势力的贸易协定之外。结果就是，其他欧洲大国也迅速地与英法签署了双边条约。 Since these treaties were all Most Favored Nation treaties—whereby concessions to one party meant extending such concessions to all the others—not just France and Britain, but by 1870 nearly all of Europe including the German states, Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and so on were integrated into a highly open trading market. 由于这些条约都是最惠国待遇条约——给予一方特权就意味着要给所有相关方特权——所以不仅法国和英国，到1870年几乎全欧洲，包括日耳曼各邦、西班牙、俄罗斯、荷兰、丹麦和瑞典等，都被整合进了一个高度开放的贸易市场里。 In many ways, Europe was freer than today, partly because the gold standard made capital extremely mobile, and because limitations in border control made immigration and the free movement of labor easy in practice despite differing rules across the continent. 在很多方面，那时欧洲都比现在更加自由，部分原因是金本位让资本极具流动性，还有边境控制有限使得移民和劳工的自由活动实际上比较容易，尽管欧洲大陆有各种不同的规定。 What politicians do and say are often quite different. That hasn't changed. Indeed, though there is much talk about globalization and unfettered trade, there is no country in existence today whose policies come anywhere near the ideal of free trade. 政治人物的言行往往不相一致。这一点从未改变。确实，虽然现在有很多关于全球化和自由贸易的讨论，今天还没有哪个国家的政策在任何方面能接近自由贸易的理想状态。 Goods and services do flow vigorously throughout the globe, but most countries suffer from a mix of import duties and non-tariff barriers such as quotas, unnecessary inspection rules and a bewildering variety of regulations that make it impossible for any of us to benefit fully from the specialization possible in a truly open world economy. 虽然产品和服务在全球频繁流通，但是大多数国家都承受一系列的进口关税和非关税壁垒，比如配额、不必要的检查规则和诸多令人困惑的条例，这些让我们所有人都不可能从真正开放的世界经济可能带来的专业化中充分受益。 But more importantly, the example of Britain and France in the 1800s challenges us to rethink and reanalyze the relationship between trade policy and growth. The story of Britain and France shows how easy it is to be misled by the fables of conventional wisdom. The fact that Britain was not as free trade as it claimed doesn't make the case for protectionism. The British did lower their tariffs, and in the last third of the nineteenth century, Britain did fully liberalize trade and benefited from the change. 但更重要是，十九世纪英国和法国的例子能让我们重新思考和重新分析贸易政策和增长之间的关系。英法的故事说明了我们是多么容易被传统智慧的寓言所误导。英国并不像它所声称的那样贸易自由，但这一事实并不证明贸易保护主义有足够的理由。英国人确实降低了本国的关税，而且在十九世纪最后1/3的时间里完全实现了贸易自由化，并从中受益。 But the interesting and unexamined story is France. Nineteenth-century France doesn't fit our preconceptions. France was in fact, closer to the free trade ideal than the British for much of the century, and did in fact do well, raising the standard of living of the average worker from the 1850s onward. 但有关法国的有趣故事却经不起检验。十九世纪的法国并不符合我们的偏见。事实上，法国在十九世纪大部分时间都比英国更接近自由贸易的理想境界，而且确实做的不错，从1850年代起提高了普通工人的生活水平。 Footnotes 脚注 1.The Gin Age is often used to describe the early to middle years of the eighteenth century, when the consumption of hard liquor grew substantially, and the consumption of gin, especially among the poor, was seen to be a national problem. 1.“杜松子酒时代”经常被用来描述十八世纪早期到中期的时间，这段时期烈酒的消费量大增，而杜松子酒的消费，尤其是在穷人之中，被认为是全国性的问题。 2.Readers interested in a more technical discussion of the problem of tariff levels in the nineteenth century may consult Nye, 1991, "The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France," Journal of Economic History and S. Dakhlia and J.V.C. Nye, "Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income," working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114. 2.对十九世纪关税水平问题的更多技术细节感兴趣的读者可以查阅Nye于1991年在《经济史杂志》上发表的论文“自由贸易英国和堡垒法国的神话”和S. Dakhlia与 J.V.C. Nye的论文“‘不列颠治税’：十九世纪关税和英国国家收入”，获取论文的网址为http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114。 * John Nye is Associate Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. This piece is adapted from a book in progress to be released under the title, War, Wine, and Taxes. John Nye是华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校的经济学和历史学副教授。这篇文章摘编自《战争，葡萄酒和税收》，该书即将要出版。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The V.C.s of B.C. 公元前的风险投资 作者：Adam Davidson @ 2015-8-27 译者：淡蓝 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The New York Times Magazine，http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-vcs-of-bc.html One morning, just before dawn, an old man named Assur-idi loaded up two black donkeys. Their burden was 147 pounds of tin, along with 30 textiles, known as kutanum, that were of such rare value that a single garment cost as much as a slave. Assur-idi had spent his life’s savings on the items, because he knew that if he could convey them over the Taurus Mountains to Kanesh, 600 miles away, he could sell them for twice what he paid. 清晨，天刚蒙蒙亮，老汉Assur-idi给两头黑驴装上了货。货物有147磅锡，另有30件叫作kutanum的纺织品，kutanum异常稀有，一件衣物就相当于一个奴隶的价钱。这些货花光了Assur-idi 一生的积蓄，因为他知道，只要越过托罗斯山脉运到600英里外的卡内什，这些东西能卖出双倍的价钱。 At the city gate, Assur-idi ran into a younger acquaintance, Sharrum-Adad, who said he was heading on the same journey. He offered to take the older man’s donkeys with him and ship the profits back. The two struck a hurried agreement and wrote it up, though they forgot to record some details. Later, Sharrum-­Adad claimed he never knew how many textiles he had been given. Assur-idi spent the subsequent weeks sending increasingly panicked letters to his sons in Kanesh, demanding they track down Sharrum-Adad and claim his profits. 在城门口，Assur-idi遇到了个年轻的熟人Sharrum-Adad，说正好他也要去同样的地方。Sharrum-Adad主动提出可以带着老人的驴子们同行并把赚的钱带回来。于是俩人匆匆拟定了协议并写了下来，但他们忘记了记录一些细节。后来，Sharrum-­Adad声称，他当时并不清楚到底有多少件纺织品。在随后的几周里，日益恐慌的Assur-idi不断给他远在卡内什的儿子们写信，要求他们追踪Sharrum-Adad并收回应当属于他的利润。 These letters survive as part of a stunning, nearly miraculous window into ancient economics. In general, we know few details about economic life before roughly 1000 A.D. But during one 30-year period — between 1890 and 1860 B.C. — for one community in the town of Kanesh, we know a great deal. 这些保存下来的信件，为我们打开了深入了解古代经济的一扇窗，它令人惊叹、近乎奇迹一般。总体而言，我们对大约公元1000年之前的经济生活知之甚少。但是对这个近30年的时间段——公元前1890 到1860 之间——在卡内什镇的社会经济情形，我们却知之甚多。 Through a series of incredibly unlikely events, archaeologists have uncovered the comprehensive written archive of a few hundred traders who left their hometown Assur, in what is now Iraq, to set up importing businesses in Kanesh, which sat roughly at the center of present-day Turkey and functioned as the hub of a massive global trading system that stretched from Central Asia to Europe. 在一系列令人难以置信的考古发现中，考古学家们找到了周详的文书档案，里面记录了数百个离开家乡亚述（在今日伊拉克）的商人，在异乡卡内什做起了进口生意。当时的卡内什大致位于今日土耳其的中心，是从中亚延伸到欧洲的巨大全球贸易体系的中枢。 Kanesh’s traders sent letters back and forth with their business partners, carefully written on clay tablets and stored at home in special vaults. Tens of thousands of these records remain. One economist recently told me that he would love to have as much candid information about businesses today as we have about the dealings — and in particular, about the trading practices — of this 4,000-year-old community. 这些卡内什商人与贸易伙伴之间的来往信件，被小心仔细地写在泥板上，并储存在家里的地窖中。数以千记的这种记录因此得以保存。一位经济学家最近跟我说，要是他对当今的真实商业信息、特别是有关贸易的信息的了解，能有我们对这个距今4000年的社会的交易的了解一样多，那就好了。 Trade is central to every key economic issue we face. Whether the subject is inequality, financial instability or the future of work, it all comes down to a discussion of trade: trade of manufactured goods with China, trade of bonds with Europe, trade over the Internet or enabled by mobile apps. For decades, economists have sought to understand how trade works. Can we shape trade to achieve different outcomes, like a resurgence of manufacturing or a lessening of inequality? Or does trade operate according to fairly fixed rules, making it resistant to conscious planning? 贸易是我们所面临的所有重要经济问题的中心点。无论是不平等、金融不稳定、或是工作前景等问题，一切都可以归结到对贸易的讨论上：与中国的制造品贸易，与欧洲的债券交易，以及通过互联网或移动应用的交易。几十年来，经济学家尝试弄清贸易是如何运转的。能否通过塑造贸易来实现不同的结果，比如复苏制造业，或是减少不平等？还是说，贸易运转遵循着固定的规则，根本就抵制有意的计划？ Economists, creating models of trade, have faced a challenge, because their data have derived exclusively from the modern world. Are their models universal or merely reflections of our time? It’s a crucial question, because many in our country would like to change our trading system to protect American jobs and to improve working conditions here and abroad. The archives of Kanesh have proved to be the greatest single source of information about trade from an entirely premodern milieu. 创建贸易模型的经济学家们因仅能从现代世界里获得数据而面临着挑战。他们的模型是普适的抑或仅是我们这个时代的反映？这个问题很关键，因为我国的很多人想改变我们的贸易体制，以保护美国的就业或是改善国内国外的工作环境。卡内什档案被证实是有关发生于彻底的前现代环境中的贸易的最大单一信息来源。 In a beautifully detailed new book — ‘‘Ancient Kanesh,’’ written by a scholar of the archive, Mogens Trolle Larsen, to be published by Cambridge University Press later this year — we meet dozens of the traders of Kanesh and their relatives back home in Assur. Larsen has been able to construct family trees, detailing how siblings and cousins, parents and spouses, traded with one another and often worked against one another. We meet struggling businessmen, like Assur-idi, and brilliant entrepreneurs, like Shalim-Assur, who built a wealthy dynasty that lasted generations. 在一本精美详细的新书《古代卡内什》中，我们将遇到数十个返回亚述的卡内什商人和他们的亲戚。此书由研究该档案的学者 Mogens Trolle Larsen著述，今年晚些时候将由剑桥大学出版社出版。 从Larsen描绘出的家族中，可以看到兄弟姊妹和他们的表亲之间，父母和夫妻之间相互交易的细节，以及时常针锋相对的细节。我们遇到了奋争的商人，比如Assur-idi，和杰出的企业家，比如建立了延续数代的富裕世家的Shalim-Assur。 In 2003, while covering the war in Iraq, I traveled to many ancient archaeological sites; the huge burial mounds, the carvings celebrating kings as relatives to the gods, all gave the impression of a despotic land in which a tiny handful of aristocrats and priests enjoyed dictatorial control. But the Kanesh documents show that at least some citizens had enormous power over their own livelihoods, achieving wealth and power through their own entrepreneurial endeavors. 2003年，在报道伊拉克战争时，我走访了很多古代考古遗址；其中有巨大的坟岗，为礼赞作为神灵亲属的国王而做的雕刻，所有这些给人一种很深的印象：在这片专制的土地上，只有极少数贵族和祭司享受着独裁统治。但是卡内什的文件显示，至少有一些市民对他们自己的生计拥有巨大的支配力，并通过他们自己创业的努力获得了财富和实力。 The details of daily life are amazing, but another scholar, Gojko Barjamovic, of Harvard, realized that the archive also offered insight into something potentially more compelling. Many of the texts enumerate specific business details: the price of goods purchased and sold, the interest rate on debt, the costs of transporting goods and the various taxes in the many city-states that the donkey caravans passed on the long journey from Assur to Kanesh. Like most people who have studied Kanesh, Barjamovic is an Assyriologist, an expert in ancient languages and culture. Earlier this year, he joined some economists, as well as some other Assyriologists and archaeologists, on a team that analyzed Kanesh’s financial statistics. 日常生活的细节是令人惊叹的，不过另一位来自哈佛的学者，Gojko Barjamovic，意识到这些档案还提供了一些有可能更引人注目的东西。其中许多文本列举了具体的贸易细节：某一货物买进和卖出的价格，借债的利息，货物运输费用，以及驴队在亚述与卡内什之间长途跋涉中所经过的众多城邦的不同税费。像许多研究卡内什的人一样，Barjamovic是一个亚述学家，是古代语言和文化专家。今年早些时候，他加入了一支由经济学家、其他亚述学家和考古学家的组成的团队，对卡内什的金融统计数据进行分析。 The picture that emerged of economic life is staggeringly advanced. The traders of Kanesh used financial tools that were remarkably similar to checks, bonds and joint-stock companies. They had something like venture-capital firms that created diversified portfolios of risky trades. And they even had structured financial products: People would buy outstanding debt, sell it to others and use it as collateral to finance new businesses. The 30 years for which we have records appear to have been a time of remarkable financial innovation. 团队分析描绘出的经济生活画面先进得令人惊奇。卡内什的商人们使用的金融工具，与当今的支票、债券和股份公司十分相似。他们有些东西就像风险投资公司，创建了针对有风险贸易的多元化投资组合。他们甚至有结构性理财产品：人们会购买未偿债务，将其卖给他人或用于抵押以便为新业务融资。我们手里有记录的这30年表现为一个有着卓越的金融创新的时期。 It’s impossible not to see parallels with our own recent past. Over the 30 years covered by the archive, we see an economy built on trade in actual goods — silver, tin, textiles — transform into an economy built on financial speculation, fueling a bubble that then pops. After the financial collapse, there is a period of incessant lawsuits, as a central government in Assur desperately tries to come up with new regulations and ways of holding wrongdoers accountable (though there never seems to be agreement on who the wrongdoers are, exactly). The entire trading system enters a deep recession lasting more than a decade. The traders eventually adopt simpler, more stringent rules, and trade grows again. 与我们自己最近的过去相比，我们不可能看不到其中的相似之处。在档案记录的30年里，我们看到一个建立在实体货物上的经济——银、锡、纺织品——转变为一个建立在金融投机上的经济，这样的转变助长了泡沫，随后又突然破灭。金融崩溃后，一度曾充满了诉讼。亚述的中央政府不顾一切地试图拿出新的法规和办法，来迫使那些肇事者承担责任（虽然关于谁是真正的肇事者似乎从未有过一致意见）。整个贸易体系陷入了一个10年以上的严重衰退。商人们最终采取了更简单、更严格的规则，由此贸易再次增长。 In 1962 A.D., as our modern era of globalization was just beginning, the economist Jan Tinbergen — who would later share the first Nobel in economic science — noted something curious: Trade within and between countries followed a mathematical formula. He called it the Gravity Model, sort of an E=mc2 for global business. It comes with an imposing formula: Fij = G(Mi x Mj)/Dij. Which, simplified, means that trade between two markets will equal the size of the two markets multiplied together and then divided by their distance. (The model gets its name from its mathematical similarity to the equation in physics that describes gravitational pull.) 公元1962年，正当我们这个现代的全球化时代开始之际，经济学家Jan Tinbergen——后来的第一届诺贝尔经济学科学奖获得者之一——注意到一些令人好奇的事：国内贸易和国际贸易遵循一个数学公式。他称之为引力模型，有点像全球贸易的E=mc2。这是个气势宏伟的公式：Fij = G(Mi x Mj)/Dij。简单的说，就是两个市场之间的贸易等于两个市场规模相乘然后除以两个市场之间的距离。（该模型因与物理学中描述引力的公式数学上相似而得名） Since Tinbergen first published his finding, others have tested it on thousands of trade routes around the modern world, as well as on trade records going back a couple of centuries. In extreme cases (for example, trade between warring countries or during periods of sanction), the formula can fail to predict the volume of trade, but over all the model works extremely well. It’s a striking finding, suggesting that, for all the debate about trade agreements and currency rates, import duties and World Trade Organization disputes, trade tends to follow its own rules. 自Tinbergen 首次公布他的发现以来，很多人已在数以千计的环绕现代世界的贸易路径、以及几个世纪以来的贸易记录上对之进行了验证测试。在极端情况下（例如交战国之间或是制裁期间的贸易），这个公式在预测贸易量时可能失败。但总的来说，该模型运作十分出色。这是个令人震惊的发现，这表明，不管人们在有关贸易协定和货币汇率、进口关税和世贸组织争端等方面如何争论不休，贸易仍趋于遵循其自身的法则。 Economists were drawn to the Kanesh archive because it offered an unprecedented chance to see how well the Gravity Model applied in an economy entirely unlike our own. This was trade conducted via donkey, through a land of independent city-states whose legal and cultural systems were totally dissimilar to any we know. But still, the model held up: Ali Hortacsu, a University of Chicago economist on the Kanesh team, says that the trade figures between Assur and Kanesh matched the formula almost perfectly. ‘‘It was a very nice surprise,’’ he told me. 卡内什档案之所以吸引经济学家们，是因为它提供了一个前所未有的机会，来验证当引力模型应用到一种完全不同于现有情形的经济体时的契合程度。这种贸易借助驴进行，经过一片由独立城邦组成的地区，这些城邦的法律和文化体系与我们所知的一切均完全不同。只是，这样的贸易情况下该模型仍然屹立：Ali Hortacsu，卡内什团队的芝加哥大学经济学家，说亚述和卡内什之间的贸易数据，与上述公式匹配得近乎完美。“是个十分不错的惊喜。”他跟我说。 The Gravity Model may seem like bad news for people who want the economy to be fairer. I have spoken to countless activists and concerned friends who see global trade as a choice, something a specific set of politicians and businesses decided to impose on the rest of us, through all those confusing acronymic trade deals: GATT, Nafta and (probably, soon) the T.P.P. To me, though, the model suggests that these deals have less impact than either their boosters or their detractors imagine. 对那些想要更多经济公平的人们来说，引力模型可不像是啥好消息。我曾跟无数将全球贸易视为一种选择的活动家和关心公共事务的朋友们交谈过，他们认为全球贸易只是特定政治家或者企业决定通过一堆令人迷糊的首字母缩写贸易协定：GATT、Nafta 和（可能很快就签订的）T.P.P.而强加给其余人的。然而对我来说，这个模型表明：此类协定对于贸易的影响，比支持者或是批评者想象的都要少。 There is a natural tendency for different regions to trade at fairly predictable volumes. However much politicians might want to change those outcomes, they have only crude tools at their disposal: They can stop trade through blockades, slow it through tariffs or try to jump-start it with trade agreements. What they can’t do, at least not reliably, is shape it with precision to achieve their preferred outcomes. 不同地区之间以基本可以预测的总量发生贸易，这是一种自然趋势。无论政治家多么想要改变其结果，他们都只有一些很原始的工具可用：通过封锁停止贸易，通过海关放缓贸易，或是通过贸易协议助推贸易。他们无法做到的，或者至少无法确切做到的，是有目的的精确塑造贸易以达到他们期望的结果。 But despite trade’s intractability, we still have a lot of room to address the impact of trade on our economy. Trade with China and other nations may be all but inevitable, but growing wealth inequality and disproportionate pain (blue-collar workers losing their jobs, investors reaping a fortune) are not. There is much we can do within our borders to address the unequal impact of global trade. We can educate children for more competitive careers, train displaced workers for new industries or even directly compensate those who fail to benefit from global trade. 尽管贸易难以驾驭，我们仍然有巨大的空间来处理贸易对我们经济的影响。与中国或者其他国家的贸易可能不可避免，但可避免的是日益增加的财富不均和不成比例的痛苦（蓝领工人失业，投资者获得利益）。在国界以内解决全球贸易导致的不平等，我们可做的事太多了。我们可以教育自己的孩子，以利于其从事更具有竞争力的职业，培训下岗工人进入新产业，甚至可以直接赔偿那些在全球贸易中丧失利益的人们。 That, in fact, is what the people of Assur did, 4,000 years ago, as Barjamovic pointed out to me. Trade brought enormous wealth to a dozen or so families. But rather than hold all of it for themselves, the wealthy were made to redistribute a high percentage of their earnings through taxes and religious foundations that used the money for the public good. This way, the wealth created by trading with Kanesh made nearly everybody — at least every free citizen — better off. 就像Barjamovic向我指出的那样，这些其实就是亚述人在4000年前所做的。贸易给数十个家庭带来了巨大的财富。但富人们并未将所有的财富据为己有，通过交税和交纳用于公益的宗教基金，他们将自己所获财富中的很大比例进行了再分配。以这种方式，通过与卡内什进行贸易而创造的财富，几乎使每一个人——至少是每一个自由城民——都过得更好了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

An interview with Josiah Ober, author of The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece 《古典希腊的崛起与衰落》作者Josiah Ober访谈 作者：Debra Liese @ 2015-5-13 译者：尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对：Pyro，小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源：Princeton University Press网址，http://blog.press.princeton.edu/2015/05/13/an-interview-with-josiah-ober-author-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-classical-greece/ The period considered classical Greece (roughly the 4th through 5th century BC) had a profound effect on Western civilization, forming the foundations of politics and philosophy, as well as artistic and scientific thought. Why did Greece experience such economic and cultural growth—and why was it limited to this 200-year period? Josiah Ober, Professor of Political Science and Classics at Stanford University and author of The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, took the time to explain the reasons behind Greece’s flourishing, and what its economic rise and political fall can tell us about our own world. 古典希腊时期（大约公元前4-5世纪）对于西方文明有着深远的影响，构建了其政治、哲学和艺术科学思想的基础。为何希腊经历了这样的经济增长和文化进步——而又为何仅限于这200年？斯坦福大学政治学和古典学教授、《古典希腊的崛起与衰落》一书作者Josiah Ober解释了希腊繁荣背后的原因，以及其经济崛起和政治衰落给我们现代世界的启示。 What was the rise of classical Greece and when and why did it happen? 什么是古典希腊的崛起？它于何时因何而发生？ JO: Basically, sustained economic growth lead to the rise of Ancient Greek civilization. JO：基本上，是持续的经济增长导致了古希腊文明的崛起。 At the Early Iron Age nadir, in ca. 1000 BCE, the Greek world was sparsely populated and consumption rates hovered near subsistence. Some 650 years later, in the age of Aristotle, the population of the Greek world had increased at least twenty-fold. During that same period, per capita consumption probably doubled. 在早期铁器时代的最低谷，约公元前1000年，希腊世界人烟稀少，消费水平徘徊在生存线附近。到了约650年之后的亚里士多德时代，希腊世界的人口已经增长了至少20倍，人均消费大约翻了一倍。 That rate of growth is far short of modern rates, but it equals the growth rate of the two standout societies of early modern Europe: Holland and England in the 16^th to 18^th centuries. Historians had long thought that the Greek world was impoverished and its economy overall static –which of course made Greek culture (art, philosophy, drama, and so on) seem that much more “miraculous.” 那时的增长速度远低于现代，但是已经相当于现代欧洲早期的两个杰出社会——16到18世纪荷兰和英格兰。历史学家曾在很长时间里以为希腊世界相当贫困，其经济总体上停滞不前，这当然让希腊文化（艺术、哲学、戏剧等）看起来更加“不可思议”。 But, thanks to the recent availability and quantification of a huge mass of data, drawn from both documentary and archaeological sources, we can now trace the amazing growth of the Greek economy, both in its extent (how many people, how much urbanization, and so on), and in terms of per capita consumption (how well people lived). 但是，多亏了近来文献和考古提供的大量量化数据，我们现在可以追溯希腊经济的惊人增长，不论是在规模方面（人口数量，城市化程度等等）还是人均消费方面（人民生活水平）。 So the rise of the Greek world was predicated on sustained economic growth, but why did the Greek economy grow so robustly for so long? 所以希腊世界的崛起立基于持续的经济增长之上，但是为什么希腊经济能保持强劲增长如此之久？ JO: In the 12th century BCE, the palace-centered civilization of Bronze Age Greece collapsed, utterly destroying political and social hierarchies. Surviving Greeks lived in tiny communities, where no one was rich or very powerful. JO：在公元前12世纪，以宫殿为中心的希腊青铜时代文明崩溃，彻底摧毁了社会和政治的等级制度。幸存的希腊人生活在小社区之内，没有人特别富裕或特别强大。 As Greece slowly recovered, some communities rejected attempts by local elites to install themselves as rulers. Instead, ordinary men established fair rules (fair, that is, for themselves) and governed themselves collectively, as political equals. Women and slaves were, of course, a very different story. 随着希腊慢慢复元，一些社区拒绝让当地精英自立为统治者。相反，普通男性们建立起公平的规则（公平仅限于他们男性自己），并在相互间政治平等的基础上实行集体自我治理。当然，女人和奴隶又是另一回事了。 But because these emerging citizen-centered states often out-competed elite-dominated rivals, militarily and economically, citizenship proved to be adaptive. Because participatory citizenship was not scalable, Greek states stayed small as they became increasingly democratic. 但是，因为这些以公民为中心的新兴城邦通常在军事和经济上胜过由精英统治的竞争对手，所以它证明了公民制度是很有适应性的。由于直接参与式的公民制度无法规模化，希腊城邦在日益民主化的同时仍保持着较小的规模。 Under conditions of increasingly fair rules, individuals and states rationally invested in human capital, leading to increased specialization and exchange. The spread of fair rules and a shared culture across an expanding Greek world of independent city-states drove down transaction costs. Meanwhile competition encouraged continuous institutional and technological innovation. 在规则日趋公平的条件下，个人和城邦均愿意对人力资本进行理性投资，从而促进了专业化和交易。在由独立城邦组成的不断扩张的希腊世界中，公平规则的传播和共同文化的建立，降低了交易成本。同时，竞争鼓励了制度和技术的持续创新。 The result was 700+ years of world-class efflorescence, marked by exceptional demographic and per capita growth, and by immensely influential ideas, literature, art, and science. But, unlike the more familiar story of ancient empires, no one was in running the show: Greece remained a decentralized ecology of small states. 其结果就是超过700年的世界级繁华盛世，史无前例的人口和人均（收入）增长，以及影响巨大的思想、文学、艺术和科学，是这一时期的标志。但是，与我们更熟悉的那些古代帝国的故事不一样的是，这齣大剧无人主导：希腊仍然是个分散的小国生态。 So what about the fall? 那衰落又是怎么回事？ JO: There are two “falls”–one political and one economic. The economic fall is the decline of the Greek economy from its very high level in the age of Aristotle to a “premodern Greek normal”of low population and near-subsistence consumption levels with the disintegration of the Roman empire. That low normal had pertained before the rise of the city-state ecology. After the fall, it persisted until the 20^th century. JO：衰落体现在两个方面：一个是政治上，一个是经济上。经济上的衰落是指希腊经济从亚里士多德时代的高水平，随着罗马帝国解体而下降到“前现代希腊标准”——低人口和徘徊在生存线的消费水平。那种低标准还是属于城邦生态兴起之前的。在衰落之后，这种状态一直持续到20世纪。 But we also need to explain an earlier political fall. Why, just when the ancient Greek economy was nearing its peak, were Philip II andAlexander (“the Great”) ofMacedon able to conquer the Greek world? And then there is another puzzle: Why were so many Greek city-states able to maintain independence and flourishing economies in the face of Macedonian hegemony? 但是我们还需要解释一下更早的政治衰落。当古希腊经济接近巅峰时，为什么马其顿的菲利普二世和亚历山大大帝能够征服希腊世界？随之而来的是另一个疑问：为什么这么多的希腊城邦在面对马其顿霸权时能够保持独立和经济繁荣？ The city-states were overtaken by the Macedonians in part because human-capital investments created a class of skilled and mobile experts in state finance and military organization. Hired Greek experts provided Philip and Alexander with the technical skills they needed to build a world-class army. 马其顿人夺取这些城邦的部分原因，是前述人力资本投资创造出了一个富有流动性的专业阶层，他们精通城邦财政和军队组织。通过雇佣这些希腊专家，菲利普和亚历山大大帝得到了他们创建世界级军队所急需的技术。 But meanwhile, deep investments by city-states in infrastructure and training made fortified cities expensive to besiege. As a result, after the Macedonian conquest, royal taxes on Greek cities were negotiated rather than simply imposed. That ensured enough independence for the Greek cities to sustain economic growth until the Roman conquest. 但与此同时，城邦在基础设施和训练上的大力投入，也使得攻占这些坚固设防的城邦代价高昂。因此，在征服了希腊城邦之后，马其顿人并不是单方面强加，而是通过谈判来确定希腊城邦的皇家税。这确保了希腊城邦的独立性，维持了其经济增长，直至被罗马人征服。 What does the economic rise and political fall of classical Greece have to tell us about our own world? 古典希腊的经济崛起和政治衰落对我们现代世界有何启示？ JO: The new data allows us to test the robustness of contemporary theories of political and economic development. In the classical Greek world, political development was a primary driver of economic growth; democracy appears to be a cause rather than simply an effect of prosperity. JO：新的数据让我们可以检验当代政治和经济发展理论的可靠性。在古典希腊时代，政治发展是经济发展的原始驱动力；民主看来是繁荣的原因而不只是结果。 The steep rise and long duration of the city-state ecology offers a challenge to neo-Hobbesian centralization theories of state formation, which hold that advanced economic and political development requires the consolidation of centralized state power. The comparatively low rate of ancient Greek income inequality, along with the high rate of economic growth, suggests that the negative correlation of sustained growth with extreme inequality, observed in some recent societies, is not a unique product of modernity. 这种城邦生态的迅速兴起和经久不衰，对关于国家构建的新霍布斯主义的中央集权化理论提出了挑战，该理论认为先进的经济和政治发展，需要中心化的国家权力的巩固。古希腊相对程度较低的收入不均和高速的经济增长并存，表明了在一些现代社会观察到的持续增长和极端不均等之间的负相关并不是现代化的独特产物。 Finally, the history of the ancient Greek world can be read as a cautionary tale about the unanticipated consequences of growth and human capital investment: It reveals how innovative institutions and technologies, originally developed in the open-access, fair-rules context of democratic states, can be borrowed by ambitious autocrats and redeployed to further their own, non-democratic purposes. 最后，古希腊世界的历史可以被解读为关于增长和人力资本投资的意外结果的警世寓言：它揭示了最初起源于对外开放，规则公平的民主政体的制度和技术创新，是如何被有野心的独裁者借用，并应用于推动他们自己的非民主目标的。 How did you get interested in the topic of rise and fall –was it just a matter of “Edward Gibbon envy”? 你是怎么对崛起与衰落这个主题感兴趣的？仅仅是由于“嫉妒Edward Gibbon”？ 【译注：Edward Gibbon是《罗马帝国衰亡史》的作者】 JO: Gibbon is amazing, as a prose stylist and historian. But the origin of my project actually goes back to a quip by a senior colleague at the very beginning of my career: “The puzzle is not why the Greek world fell, it is why it lasted more than 20 minutes.”Twenty-five years ago (and fifteen years after my colleague’s quip), the historical sociologist W.G. Runcimanclaimed that classical Greece was “doomed to extinction”because the Greek city-states were, “without exception, far too democratic.” JO：Gibbon作为一个散文家和历史学家非常优秀。但是我课题的起源要追溯到我职业生涯刚开始时一个资深同事的玩笑话：“费解的不是为何希腊世界会衰落，而是它竟然撑过了20分钟。”25年前（我同事那句玩笑话的15年后），历史社会学家W.G. Runciman声称古典希腊“注定要灭亡”，因为希腊城邦“无一例外，都过于民主。” True enough: the classical Greek world eventually went extinct. But then, so did all other ancient societies, democratic or otherwise. The Greek city-state culture lasted for the better part of a millennium; much longer than most ancient empires. I’ve long felt that I owed my colleague a solution to his puzzle. This book is an attempt to pay that debt. 确实，古典希腊最终灭亡了。但是其他所有古代社会，无论是否民主，也都灭亡了。希腊城邦文化持续了好几百年，比大多数古代帝国都要更长。我一直感觉我欠那个同事一个答案，我想用这本书试试。 Josiah Oberis the Mitsotakis Professor of Political Science and Classics at Stanford University. His books include Democracy and Knowledge, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens, The Athenian Revolution, and Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens(all Princeton). He lives in Palo Alto, California. Josiah Ober是斯坦福大学政治学和古典学Mitsotakis讲席教授。他的著作包括《民主与知识》，《民主雅典的政治异议》，《雅典的革命》，《民主雅典的群众和精英》（均由普林斯顿大学出版社出版）。他现居于加利福尼亚州的帕罗奥多市。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#2：扩张的动力 辉格 2015年9月14日 自从人类过上定居生活之后，便开始组织起规模越来越大的社会，这一趋势如此普遍的存在于各大文明中，以至给人一种印象：社会向大型化发展似乎是不可避免的；实际上并非如此，正如我在上一篇文章里所提到的，在定居之前的漫长历史（至少占整个智人历史的19/20）中，人类社会的规模始终处于邓巴数限制之下。 社会的大型化趋势不仅表现在不同群体间结成的政治实体日益扩张和复杂化——从几十人的游团，几百上千人的部落，几万人的酋邦，到数十上百万人的王国——，也表现在生活在同一定居点的单一社区的规模越来越庞大。 在大约一万年前，文明的黎明时分，文明摇篮新月沃地诞生了第一批有着永久性建筑的城市，据认为是史上最古老城市的杰里科（[[Jericho]]），拥有一两千居民；从大约六千年前开始，另一个文明摇篮乌克兰出现了一批拥有一万多居民的更大城市，其中包括印欧人祖先所建立的塔连基（[[Talianki]]）。 约一千年后，青铜时代的苏美尔人在两河地区建立的一系列城邦，人口更达到了四五万；到铁器时代，出现了新巴比伦这样人口过十万的大城市，随后数百年，欧亚多个文明中心进入了被哲学家卡尔·雅斯培（[[Karl Jaspers]]）称为“轴心时代”（[[Axial Age]]）的繁荣期，地中海世界、印度和中国都涌现了一批和巴比伦规模相当的城市。 城市的下一轮扩张伴随着地域辽阔的帝国的崛起，从迦太基、亚历山大到罗马，这些都市的规模和繁荣背后，是整个帝国的疆域和权力，而作为首个人口过百万的城市，罗马的规模为此后所有古代城市设定了上限（罗马的后继者，比如长安和巴格达，规模可能略大于罗马，但差距不明显），直到工业革命之后，这一上限才被伦敦所超越。 那么，是何种力量在推动社会规模——无论是政治实体还是聚居社区——不断扩大？考虑到这一扩张趋势普遍存在于各大洲相互孤立的文明中心，它显然不是偶然的；定居生活究竟带来了什么新情况，使得社会大型化成为不可避免的趋势？ 答案或许是战争。 前定居社会同样充斥着暴力冲突和有组织的群体间攻击（也就是战争），而且按冲突频率和死亡率算，其暴力程度远远超出后来的文明社会，大约1/5到1/3的男性死于暴力，游团一级小型血缘群体之间的关系，非常接近霍布斯所描绘的“自然状态”，很少有经常性的政治安排能够抑制群体间冲突。 这一背景提示了，或许定居化本身就改善了相邻群体间抑制冲突的前景，有关合作博弈的研究表明，博弈双方对持久交往的预期，将增进合作意愿，预期中的交往关系越长久，合作意愿越强，假如双方都认为这是最后一次交往，或者交往关系将在某个明确时间终结，那么背叛就成为最优选择——尽管与都选择合作相比，这给双方都带来更坏的结果。 一项案例研究很好的演示了这一原理，在一战的西线战场，当战争进入僵持状态时，前沿阵地上长期对峙的双方士兵之间，逐渐达成了一种默契：每天只在固定时间例行公事式的向对方射击，其余时间可以大胆走出战壕；在协约国军方高层察觉这一情况后，为打破这种默契，迫使前线军队积极行动，采取的措施是定期调防，以避免形成长久交往预期。 可以想象，相邻关系变动不居的游动性社会（无论是游猎、游耕还是游牧），很难建立牢固的信任与合作关系，定居者却相对容易做到；这种群体间合作关系，不仅帮助他们抑制相互间的冲突，还可以联合对付外来攻击者，或对其他群体发动攻击；这种关系一旦稳定下来，便在游团之上形成了部落或部落联盟一级的政治实体。 不过，这里并不存在一条截然分明的界线，因为首先，游动群体的游动程度是不同的，其次，游动路线并不是随机的，这两方面都和群体赖以生存的资源分布状况有关，当若干群体游动程度较小，或漫游路线较固定，或围绕某些关键资源而频繁持久发生关系时，他们之间就或多或少存在稳定的相邻关系，并据此而发展出一些合作性安排。 比如卡拉哈里沙漠的狩猎采集者桑人（!Kung），每当枯水期来临，相邻的十几个游团会聚拢到少数几个尚有水可取的天然水井附近，而平时他们则依靠各自巡游范围内的水源，这样的安排能够和平达成，离不开这些游团相对稳定的漫游范围和相邻关系；类似的情况，在干湿变化剧烈的热带草原畜牧者，和冬季草场高度稀缺的温带游牧者那里，也可看到。 然而，和稳定相邻关系比起来，定居农业带来的另一个变化，其影响要深远的多，那就是战争形态的改变；在前农业时代，战争的主要目的是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，以便为自己谋得更好的生存空间，当然还包括掳掠女性，抢劫则不在考虑之列，因为没什么东西可抢的，同样，对于被攻击者，除了生命之外，没有什么需要捍卫的。 与此相应，那时的主要战斗形式是伏击和偷袭，阵地战也有，但多半是仪式性的，就像集体约架，伤亡很小（这一点常误导早期观察者，让他们误以为前文明社会是相当和平的）；在伏击和偷袭战斗中，形势不利的一方会毫不犹豫的选择逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗；在非定居者的价值观中，逃跑无损于战士声誉，相反，死守或不利条件下坚持进攻，被认为是愚蠢的。 正是在这一点上，定居农业带来了根本性的改变，农耕者的生计全赖于庄稼、牲畜和存粮，逃跑很可能意味着饿死，所以在面临攻击时，不得不留下来捍卫家园。 可是这样一来，攻防双方的地位就变得十分不对称：进攻者可以从容选择进攻时机和攻击对象，形势不利可以随时撤逃，因而风险较小，而一旦得手，收益却极大，而防守者不知袭击何时发生，又不能逃跑，输了失去全部，赢了却也得不到什么，而假如对方来自游动群体，连报复的机会都很难找到；这样的成本收益对比，无疑会激励出大量针对定居者的攻击。 想象一下早期农民的处境，身处一个毫无安全感的霍布斯世界，周围还有许多非定居群体，而农业生产模式所必须依赖的存量财产，正为自己引来越来越多的敌人，随着这样的局面日益明朗，如何保卫家园便成为生死攸关的头等大事。 和此后的所有定点防卫者一样，农民首先作出的反应是修筑防御工事，并采取紧密聚居模式，形成设防村寨，这样，在面临攻击时，全村男性便可迅速集结，组织抵抗。 从考古记录可以看出，最初的农业定居点都是设防的；杰里科遗址围有一道六百米长的石墙，墙外挖了壕沟；多见于黎凡特的一种村落结构，比如安纳托利亚的加泰土丘（[[Çatalhöyük]]），由一群砖石房屋相互紧贴组成一个蜂窝状结构，没有侧面的门窗，也没有街道，只能靠梯子由天窗出入；门窗狭小也是上古农村住宅的普遍特征，吕宋山区伊富高人的房门狭小到必须侧身才能出入。 新月沃地还有许多村落是在山壁上凿出来的；乌克兰发现的几个五六千年前的万人大城，包括涅伯利夫卡（[[Nebelivka]]）、多布罗沃迪（[[Dobrovody]]）和之前提到的塔连基，都是设防城市；科罗拉多著名的印第安农业村寨梅萨维德（[[Mesa Verde]]），修建在一整块巨大石崖下面，这块向外伸出的巨石像一个罩子，保护了村庄的三个方向；在西北欧，许多新石器时代村庄都坐落于湖泊或沼泽中间，通过可开关的桥廊与外界相通；在没有山崖河湾江心洲等有利地势可依凭的地方，城墙与壕沟便是标准配置。 实际上，设防城镇并非像过去许多人认为的那样，是文明较成熟、政治结构较发达之后的才出现的，而是从一开始就伴随着定居农业，非如此就他们无法生存下来，这一点，我们从相当晚近的历史中仍可看出端倪；在农业帝国的广阔疆域中，越是靠近农耕拓殖前线，因而面临越多来自原住民的威胁，也越难指望国家力量保护的群体，就越倾向于紧密聚居并严密设防。 比如汉族农民的拓殖前锋客家人，建造了极重防御的大型围楼，还有带围墙壕沟的棋盘式致密村寨（所谓九井十八巷），有些还在四角设有碉堡；相反，在帝国核心腹地江南，农村民居是高度分散的，通常十几户人家沿河道散列成一长串（所谓宅基），房屋的封闭性也很弱，毫无防御能力；所以讽刺的是，山水派文人所描绘的那种三两农家零星散布，鸡犬相闻炊烟相望而互不相扰的安宁和谐场面，只有在帝国权力的卵翼之下才见得到。 然而，修筑防御工事带来了非常高昂的成本，是传统小型群体无力负担的，而且定点防卫所必需的阵地对抗，也对人数提出了很高要求；因为和伏击或偷袭战不同，阵地防御的有效性，常依赖于组织严密的密集阵列；假如阵列深度为四层（这相当于典型希腊步兵方阵的一半），那么，一个150人的小型群体，其全部成年男性也最多只能排成一个宽度不足五米的阵列，即便是防御最小型的村庄，即便该村庄在多个方向上有着天然屏障，这样的规模也是远远不够的。 所以，一旦就地防卫成为一种经常性的需要，超越邓巴数限制而组织更大型社会，就成了定居者攸关生死存亡的迫切任务；而一旦其中一部分群体这么做了，就会引发一系列连锁反应，迫使其他群体也走向大型化，并且越来越大；因为首先，当你周围的其他群体提升了防御能力之后，保持原状的群体就成了攻击者的优选对象。 其次，也更要命的是，在一个霍布斯世界里，不存在好人与恶棍之分，每个防御者也是潜在的攻击者，出于防卫需要而建立的新型组织，同样可以用于攻击，那些未能组织起来的群体，随时可能沦为听任宰割的羔羊，这样，最终幸存下来并扩张壮大的，是那些成功实现了大型化组织的群体。 幸运的是，在最初的定居者中，至少有一部分找到了有效的组织方法，帮助他们克服了相对于游动者的攻防劣势，否则，定居农业这种生活方式就无法维系下去，也就不会有此后的文明历史了，那么，他们是怎么做到的？  

超越邓巴数#1：规模局限的含义 辉格 2015年9月8日 人类学家罗宾·邓巴（[[Robin Dunbar]]）提出过一个著名理论，大意是说，每个人与之维持持久关系的熟人，数量最多不超过200，通常只有100多；所谓熟人，不仅是指你认识这个人（对此常存在误解），更是指你记住了和他的交往历史，以及他和你认识的其他人之间的关系；这一数量限制，后来被称为邓巴数（[[Dunbar's number]]）。 在邓巴看来，造成这一限制的，是人类认知能力的局限：尽管一百多看起来不是很大的数字，但两两关系的数量却可以非常庞大，而且随着人数增长，关系数量将指数式的膨胀，所以尽管我们的大脑已经比黑猩猩大了三四倍，也很难处理更庞大的关系网络和交往历史了；况且，社会关系只是我们面临的诸多认知任务之一，虽然对人类来说它是非常重要的一类。 受制于这样的认知局限，人类不得不以两种截然不同的方式对待他人：对熟知者，我们会把他当作有血有肉的特殊个体对待，会关注他的喜好和秉性，揣摩他的动机和意图，并以此决定如何与他交往和相处；相反，对半生不熟者或陌生人，我们会简单的做类型化处理：归类、贴标签，凭借刻板印象迅速决定如何相待。 用计算主义的话说，人类认知系统中处理社会关系的模块，有着两套相互独立的算法，用于处理熟识关系的那套，会为每个交往对象单独建模，据此预测其行为，而另一套则只对每种关系类型建模，具体运用时，将个体对象作类型识别后套入其中一个模型，便得出判断。 果若如此，我们就容易理解某些社会心理现象了：比如许多人持有种族偏见，但这种偏见常常并不妨碍他拥有该种族的朋友；再如，当一个人进入文化迥异的陌生社会，起初往往会遭遇刻板化的对待，但时间长了，那些和他建立起熟识关系的人，就会改变态度。 这两种交往模式，在我们的称谓方式中也留下了鲜明痕迹；对于和自己较亲密的人，我们会以名字相称，连名带姓就显得见外，只称姓就更疏远；因为名字是标识个体的，而姓氏则是标识家族、宗族或更大世系群的；昵称则是更亲密的称谓，因为正式名字是给所有需要的人用的，所以最亲密的关系中需要换用另一个特殊称谓，才能将两种关系区分开来。 类似的，当我们使用比较客气的称谓时（客气的意思是刻意强调与对方的社会距离），就会选择一些标签式称谓（相对于个体式称谓），这些标签用于标识对方的社会身份，比如职业、职务、爵位、军衔等等。（这里存在一些微妙情形，当既要表示客气或尊敬，又要表示亲密时，会组合使用标签和个体名字，比如杰克叔叔，小波老师，泰迪上校，等等。） 进而，（特别是在第三人称场合）当我们想要表达对他人的轻蔑，或强调自己和他的差异，并以此强调自己和他根本不是同类人，也不屑于将他当作特定个体对待时，便会倾向于选择类别称谓，常见的类别涉及种族、民族、地域、阶层、宗教、政治派别和亚文化群体，还有身体残疾特征。 当然，对交往模式的这种二分法可能过于简化了，一个多层次渐变模型或许更接近现实，单独建模和刻板化处理这两种评估和判断方法，会以不同比例混合使用，因而对个人而言，其关系网将按交往密切程度而构成一组由亲及疏的同心圆结构，其中最内圈大概只有小几十人。 邓巴数理论对我们理解人类社会很有帮助，人类学家早已注意到，传统乡村社会大多是小型熟人社会，游动性的狩猎采集群体更是无一例外，定居文明出现之前，不存在比熟人社会更大的社会结构，而邓巴告诉我们，这不是偶然现象，而是人类认知局限所造成的结果。 邓巴对社会化灵长类的群体规模和脑容量的统计研究，支持了基于认知能力的解释，他发现，这些群体的规模和它们的大脑新皮层容量之间，存在着显著的相关性，从新皮层的尺寸可以粗略推测群体规模，而脑科学告诉我们，新皮层确实和社会化行为、表情处理和语言能力等社会性动物特有的认知能力有密切关系。 熟人社会的特点是，其内部秩序主要靠熟人之间的合作与信任来维持，这是一种在人际交往中自发建立并自我维持的秩序，不依赖于中心执行机构（比如司法系统）；这些人之所以相互熟识并生活在一起，通常是因为血缘和姻亲关系为合作互惠创造了前提；而记忆交往历史和两两关系之所以重要，是因为这些记忆在上述合作互惠关系的建立和维持中扮演了关键角色。 政治学家罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德（[[Robert Axelrod]]）的理论研究发现，在重复性合作博弈中，达成互惠合作从而避免囚徒困境的可能性，与此类社会关系记忆有着密切关系，这些记忆能够帮助个体区别对待不同交往对象，如此才可能发展出各种复杂的合作策略，让自己既乐于合作（从而最大可能的获取合作收益），又尽可能的避免受骗吃亏。 所以，当一个熟人社会人口接近或超出邓巴数限制，因而社会关系记忆的负担超出个体认知能力局限时，确保社会和谐的合作互惠规范便难以为继，于是该社会就会发生分裂；这一理论预测，得到了人类学调查的印证，一个特别完美的当代案例，是北美的胡特尔人（[[Hutterites]]）社区。 胡特尔人是新教再洗礼派的一支，他们离群索居，拒斥现代生活，并在最大程度上实现了自我治理；每个社区由若干扩展家庭组成，人数在60-140人之间，过着部落公社式的生活；由于生育率非常高，每过十几二十年，当人口接近上限时，就会安排一次分家，拆成两个社区。类似的情况，在再洗礼派的另一个分支阿米绪人（[[Amish]]）中也可观察到。 狩猎采集社会的典型组织单位——游团——的规模一般不足百人，比如非洲西南部卡拉哈里沙漠的桑人（[[San people|San]]），每个游团大约20-60人，邻近农耕区的游团则较大，100-150人；从事游耕农业的半定居社会，规模也只是略大，比如缅甸克钦邦山区的一个500人游耕群落，共有9个村寨，其中最大的也只有31个家户100多人。 即便是完全定居且人口密集的农耕社会，若缺乏较发达的政治结构，其规模也接近或略高于邓巴数，这种情况在交通不便的山区尤为普遍，比如菲律宾吕宋山区从事灌溉农业并建造了辉煌梯田的伊戈罗特人（[[Igorots]]），其村寨规模常有一两千人，粗看是个大社会，但其实里面分成了十几个相互独立、互不统辖、自行其是的单元（叫ato），其规模恰好接近邓巴数。 游牧社会的情况则比较多样和多变，因为游牧者的社会结构高度依赖于他们和邻近农耕定居者的关系，以及这些农耕社会本身的结构特征；通常，当远离农耕区，或者邻近的农耕者也缺乏大型社会时，游牧者的社会结构便与狩猎采集者相似，随人口增长而不断分支裂变，从而将规模限制在邓巴数之下。 比如地处草原腹地的哈萨克和北部蒙古，一个典型的牧团规模大约五六帐，最多十几帐（一帐相当于一个家户），由于过冬草场相对稀缺，冬季会有几十帐聚在一起；在资源贫瘠、人口稀疏的牧区，比如阿拉伯和北非的沙漠贝都因人，牧团规模更可小至两三帐。 只有当他们频繁接触较大规模的农耕定居社会，与之发展出勒索、贡奉、庇护、军事雇佣等关系，并因大额贡奉的分配和劫掠行动的协调等问题而引发内部冲突时，才会发展出更大更复杂的社会结构。 而在某些特殊地理条件下，游牧者即便与农耕社会长期频密接触，也难以发展出大型社会，比如青海河湟地区的羌人，其牧区被崇山峻岭分割成一条条难以相互通行的山谷，因而其社会结构也和在类似皱褶地带从事农业的族群一样，长期处于碎片化状态。 如此看来，我们不无理由将小型熟人社会视为人类社会结构的“自然状态”，在人类漫长历史的绝大部分时期，它都是唯一可能的形态，更大更复杂的社会是十分晚近的发展；然而，人类毕竟还是建立起了大型复杂社会，现代都市社会的规模，已超出邓巴数五个数量级，像大公司这样的机构，常拥有数十万成员，却仍可协调一致的行动，持续追求特定目标。 既然人类能够做到这一点，必定是找到了某些特别的办法，创造出了与之相应的文化和制度元素，从而帮助他们克服了邓巴数所揭示的认知局限，那么，他们是怎么做到的？在此过程中他们创造了什么？还有更基本的问题：社会最初为何会向大型化方向发展？是何种力量在推动着社会变得越来越大？在后续文章里，我将顺着这些疑问，继续追寻人类社会的发展历史。 （本系列文章首发于“大象公会”，纸媒转载请先征得公会同意。）

Peace for Our Time? 我们这个时代的和平? 作者：Azar Gat @ 2012-09-20 发表于奥斯陆 译者：@Ghostmarine     校对：林翠、@Drunkplane-zny 来源：Peace Research Institute Oslo, https://www.prio.org/Peace-Address/download/PAPA%20Programme%202012.pdf 这次活动组织者建议，用“我们这个时代的和平？”——问号——这样一个多少有些古怪的问句为题进行演讲，我欣然同意。 你们都知道，1938年9月慕尼黑会议，与希特勒达成和平解决捷克斯洛伐克冲突的共识后，手握和平协议志得意满的张伯伦，向迎接他凯旋的人们所作的，正是这句承诺。然而，不到半年时间，希特勒的军队占领了捷克斯洛伐克全境，一年不到，欧洲，继而全世界，沦入另一场世界大战之中，五千五百万人丧生。 张伯伦，连同他那把标志性的雨伞，成了一个永恒的小丑形象。而张伯伦的和平预言，就像其他类似断语一样——比如说一战是一场“终结所有战争的战争”，讲冷战之后建立起一个“新世界秩序”——足以引作对任何宣称战争业已消亡高论的警示。此类宣言总是难免失于幼稚，正如马克·吐温妙评报道自己死亡的新闻【编注：这句妙评是：“有关我死亡的报道过于夸张了。”】。 因此，我不会试图预言未来，未来是开放的，是遍布种种可能性的疆域。相反，我将聚焦历史趋势，通过或远或近的历史，告诉大家战争的确正在减少，和平与日俱增。我会力图阐释其中的原因，并且说明，是什么滋生了张伯伦以及上述其他人的宣言，而在现代社会之前，掌握实际权柄的政治家可不会像先知或者道德家一样信誓旦旦地下各种断语。毕竟，张伯伦之流并非完全被形势所误导。 过去十几二十年里，一些学者提出这样的观点，认为纵观整个历史，战争分阶段减少，例如最近斯蒂芬·平克（Steven Pinker）在畅销书《人性中更好的天使》（The Better Angels of Our Nature）中的论述。人类战争第一次大幅减少，是因为大约五千年前，利维坦国家崛起于当时世界最先进的一些地区。 就拿挪威来说，这是世界上最晚近才被开发的地区，现在看来与北欧和西欧其他地方没什么两样，可挪威的战争减少现象仅仅从一千年前才开始——当然，虽然你们挪威人有着黑暗的历史，但从那往后做得还不错。 针对此课题的几项综合研究，的的确确从人类学和考古学层面，证明霍布斯对无政府自然状态的描述基本正确。而卢梭主义者的想象，即和平的原始人因为学会了农业，划分私产，建立国家，由此遭到腐蚀，这种在二十世纪中期人类学和流行文化中占主流的观点，已经被证实是无凭无据的。 卢梭主义者的观点基于这样一种假设，认定人烟稀少就不大可能有太多战争好打。然而，现存的狩猎采集社会证明实际情况恰恰相反。澳洲是狩猎采集社会最佳实验室，1788年欧洲人抵达之前，那片辽阔大陆曾经遍布狩猎采集者的身影，一直未被农民、牧民，或者国家之类的概念“污染”。有证据显示，澳大利亚部族之间战争频繁。 即便在人口密度低至每35平方英里一人的中澳沙漠（Central  Australian  Desert），冲突和致命战斗也是家常便饭。很多战争的焦点是水源，后者对该地区的人生死攸关。澳洲土著手提之盾可不是用来狩猎袋鼠的。绝大部分其他地区，狩猎领地被垄断，受到狩猎采集者凶猛的保护，因为区域资源很容易就会被耗尽。 二十世纪六十年代，以和平著称的卡拉哈里布希曼人（Kalahari Bushmen）是卢梭主义者的研究焦点。然而，真相很快水落石出，在国家权力介入之前，该族的暴力死亡率四倍于1990年的美国，而那时美国的这项数据就已经是全球发达国家中最高且遥遥领先的了。 对加拿大北极圈内的因纽特人来说，人口稀少到不知道什么叫资源竞争，可即使这样，绑架女性的战斗也异常普遍，暴力死亡率十倍于1990年的美国。新几内亚高地和亚马逊流域为我们提供了一个初级农业社会的大型缩微世界，两个地区都包含数以百计的部落，以及数以百计的语种，这些社会确实都揭示了类似情况：永不停息的战争和非常高的暴力死亡率。 进一步来说，人类的自然状态和生物界的一般自然状态没什么区别。二十世纪六十年代的普遍看法是，同一个物种的动物不会自相残杀，这就让人类成为一种凶残的例外，并且滋生了这样的猜想：战争完全伴随文明的出现而产生。可是，从那时起，人们发现物种内部的动物之间存在大量的相互杀戮现象，现在每个坐在电视机前看自然纪录片的观众都能对此耳熟能详。也就是说，就这方面而言，人类的行为也不足为奇。 根据几十个前国家社会的数据，前国家社会平均暴力死亡率高达总人口的15%，男性人口的25%，活着的男人统统伤痕累累，而历史上国家社会平均暴力死亡率在1%至5%之间。下降幅度如此之大，主要是由于利维坦国家强制推行的内部和平所致。霍布斯认为，无政府状态是引发暴力死亡的最重要因素，他是对的。另一方面，在绝大多数历史阶段，国家权力不仅仅具有强制性，还具有极强的压迫性，所以社会经济压迫和更加安全的生活常常相伴而行，虽然这种结合并非始终如此。这就是利维坦崛起所带来的代价。 伴随国家的出现，战争死亡率大幅下降的第二点原因相对不那么明显，较少被人提及。和之前的部落群体相比，国家及其军队的规模都更庞大，往往要大得多，从而形成了一种国家间大规模战争冲突的宏大印象。国家战争看似很大，论绝对规模的确不小。然而，主要的问题并非是绝对死亡数，而是相对死亡率，即死于暴力的人口百分比。国家状态下，恰恰由于国家庞大，相对死亡率其实是下降的。与部落群体相比，大型国家面对战争，只需要更低的动员强度，从而令更多的平民免于战争的袭扰。 以人类历史上最早的国家和帝国之一埃及为例。公元前十三世纪，法老拉美西斯二世率军在叙利亚北部与赫梯帝国爆发卡迭石战役，麾下士兵两万至两万五千人。在那个时代，这是一只规模庞大的军队。然而，当时埃及总人口约为两百至三百万，因此，这支军队最多占总人口的百分之一。 纵观历史，对于大型国家和帝国而言，这是一个非常标准的比例，因为长期维持一支远离本土的大规模部队，涉及各种繁杂的财政与后勤问题。因此，对比小规模部落社会的全民皆兵，大型国家部队的参军率以及战争伤亡要低得多。此外，小型部落的战争和冲突中，最容易遭受损失的是女性和儿童，而埃及的平民则远离战争的喧嚣，通常也不会直面战争的恐惧。 这种相对安全，是国家出现后社会人口大量增长的主要原因之一，只有在发生大规模入侵时才会被破坏。这也正是为什么内战——国家内部肆虐的战火——往往会成为最具杀伤力的战争形式，这点也曾被霍布斯清楚地认识到。因此，国家的崛起，意味着规模更大、更加恢弘的战争，然而就整体而言，相对于总人口的伤亡更低。 继利维坦国家崛起之后，战争减少的第二大阶段伴随着过去两个多世纪现代工业化时代而出现。自从1815年拿破仑兵败滑铁卢之后，战争数量和战争总体死亡率锐减，发达国家尤甚，乍听这种观点，很多人往往惊讶莫名。1945年后列强间的所谓长期和平则更多地得到承认，这其中当然应该肯定核武器这个决定性因素的作用，核武器成功地吸引了所有玩家的注意，成为他们脖子上的绞索。民主国家之间的和平也得到了相当程度的认可。 然而，早在核子时代之前，无论是民主国家还是非民主国家，战争便已经非常显著地减少。1815年之后的一个世纪，经济发达国家的战争频率降至此前一个世纪的三分之一，变化幅度空前。我必须强调：降至三分之一，而非下降三分之一。事实上，自1945年至今2012年，现代强权之间已共享长期和平长达六十七年之久，史上第二长的和平期则历时四十三年，从1871年普法战争至1914年一战，第三长和平期跨越三十九年，从1815年拿破仑战争终结至1854年克里米亚战争。可见，迄今为止，现代强权体系中三段长期和平全部都出现在1815年之后，前两段均早于核子时代。这种引人注目的现象绝非偶然。显而易见，如果要解释自1815年之后，战争状态整体上的减少，那么同时也需要说明，这一大潮中两段刺眼的逆流：两次世界大战。 越来越多的人开始认为，过去两个世纪里，战争频率之所以开始下降，是因为战争变得太过致命、太过具有毁灭性，太过昂贵。然而这一假说很难成立，因为战争所造成的相对伤亡、所消耗的相对财富并不比以前的历史阶段更惊人或者更高昂。十九世纪作为欧洲史上最宁静的世纪，其战争程度相对而言格外温和。的确，世界大战，尤其是二战，在伤亡方面绝对位列前茅。然而，不同于我们的直观认识，两次世界大战远非史上惨烈之最。再一次，我们需要审视相对伤亡，战争中的总体死亡率，而不是因为参战的国家多，就把数字一个个加起来。 举几个例子就足以证明，前现代战争的伤亡率和毁灭性并不比现代战争来得小。第二次布匿战争（公元前218-216年）的头三年，罗马损失了约五万17至46岁之间的男性公民，而帝国全境该年龄段的男子一共才二十万人。仅仅三年时间，损失兵役人口的四分之一，与二战期间苏联军事死亡率相当，高于德军的军事死亡率。 与之类似，十三世纪蒙古铁骑横扫欧亚大陆，所造成的伤亡和毁灭性在历史上名列前茅。据估计，中国、俄罗斯人口大幅下降，尽管估算数据颇有浮动。然而，即使按照最低值计算，也与苏联二战时期高达15%的恐怖人口损失数据相当，而中国地区的人口损失率几乎肯定远超该数据。最后一个例子是三十年战争（1618-1648），德国人口损失在五分之一至三分之一，无论哪个数字都比德国一战、二战死亡率之和还高。 人们通常也认定，现代更发达的军事技术意味着更高的杀伤力和毁灭性。然而，更发达的军事技术其实也意味着更好的防护力，例如机械化装甲、摩托化机动，以及防御性电子手段。攻防的先进性通常交替上升，此消彼长。此外，我们太容易忘记，无论是犹太人、苏联战俘，还是苏联平民，二战期间被德国杀害的数以百万计非战斗人员中的绝大部分，他们忍饥挨饿，暴尸荒野，被大量处决，而非死于什么精密的军事技术。 二十世纪发生的几次种族灭绝，与历史上更为古老的屠杀一样，都是利用最简单的技术加以实现，卢旺达种族灭绝者手中的弯刀时时刻刻提醒着我们这一点。是啊，核武器是终极武器，其杀伤力和毁灭性的确空前。然而，正如我们刚才所提到的，远在核子时代之前，战争就开始减少，该趋势同样适用于核子时代的无核国家。因此，尽管二战之后，核武器为促进世界和平发挥了重要的作用，军事技术也很难被视作1815年之后战争减少的原因。 说在过去二百年里，战争比以前更花钱，这也不是真的，因为还是要考虑相对于整体财富这个因素。战争总会牵扯经济运行的方方面面，也是最昂贵的单项国家开支。十六、十七世纪西班牙、十八世纪法国的经济都被战争以及高昂的战争赔款所摧毁，法国甚至因此爆发革命。还有，前现代战争普遍会引发饥荒，这同样会导致死亡。因此，与现代战争相比，前现代战争既不少死人，也不少花钱，或更少毁灭性。 另一种对近代战争行为减少的解释颇有点一厢情愿，认为这是社会对于战争“态度转变”使然。也没人解释为什么这一态度转变，以及民众乐于“戒掉战争瘾”的意愿，会出现在这个历史时间点，而不是更早。毕竟，绝大多数类似佛教、基督教这样的强势道德主义都在谴责战争，千百年下来也没什么成效。这种理论是在说，人民突然就意识到战争就算不疯狂，也是很愚蠢，毫无理性可言。 对于战争的这种看法，在当今现代而又富足的世界里得到了广泛传播。但是想想成吉思汗，他的子孙后代盘踞东亚和中亚长达几个世纪，基因研究表明，他们加班加点，制造出占这些地区全部男性总数8%的子孙，这是何等令人瞠目的性机遇。 不要以为只有独裁者和军事贵族才能从战争中获益，我们应当谨记，古典时代靠战争发家的两大城邦国家分别是民主的雅典和共和的罗马。这两大文明之所以能够成功的关键因素，恰恰是这些政治体系中的人民能够从战争和帝国扩张中获益，所以人们拥护战争，积极投身其中。此外，纵观历史，人民常常会恐惧战争，哀悼战争，正如他们经常热情洋溢地歌颂战争的荣光，传扬英雄的伟业一样。 为了达到目的，人们会采用合作、和平竞争，或者暴力冲突等手段。每种行为策略都是精心设计的工具，可以根据具体的环境和对成功的预期交替使用。暴力并非是一种盲目的生物本能，而是一种为了达到目的，精心选择的策略。这是我们行为工具箱的一把重锤，曾经总是那么趁手自如；其必要性和优越性常常能得到证明。因此，为了理解人类的选择和规范，从暴力冲突转向合作及和平竞争这样的非暴力选项，就必须理解在过去两个世纪以及最近几十年中，环境以及效费比计算方式发生了何种改变。 的确，如果过去两个世纪，战争没有变得更花钱，更具毁灭性，人们对战争态度的改变也不是从空气中蹦出来的，那为什么战争减少了，尤其在发达国家之间？甚至在十九世纪中叶以前，类似圣西门、奥古斯特·孔德、约翰·斯图尔特·密尔，以及曼彻斯特学派的思想家们便很快注意到了这种变化，并且意识到这是由工商业革命的兴起所引发，这一革命是自新石器时代人类学会农业之后，最为深远的人类社会转型。 首先，在世界上已完成工业革命的地区，从工业革命伊始到现在，人均财富翻了三十到五十倍，由于人均财富呈现爆炸性增长，马尔萨斯陷阱得以克服。财富总量再也不会成为基本限制，唯一的问题是如何对财富进行分配，因此，对财富的追求渐渐不再是一个零和博弈。 其次，各国的经济活动不再完全自给自足，通过专业化、规模化，以及交易，国际互联性与日俱增。因此，外国的灾难有可能令整个经济系统变得萧条，从而损害本国自己的利益。（这种现象，最早被密尔所注意，在一战后得到完全证实，凯恩斯在1920年出版的《和约的经济后果》（The Economic Consequences of the Peace）一书中批评向德国索取战争赔款时，便已经预计到了相应的后果。） 第三，更大程度的经济开放，将经济活动与政治主权剥离开来，从而减少了战争爆发的可能。从某个地区获利，不再需要对其进行政治统治。所有这些因素之中，商业上的相互依赖吸引了学术界最多的关注。然而，其他两项因素的重要性也毫不承让。 因此，竞争性经济活动的收益越大，冲突发生的阻力越大，吸引力越小。并非是广为认可的“战争更加费钱”，其实是“和平更加有利可图”。 如果情况的确如此，那为什么过去二百年里，战争还是在发生，尽管频率低得多？首先，种族和民族之间的张力常常盖过新兴的经济逻辑，这足以解释1815年至1945年之间欧洲绝大部分战争。直到今天，这种现象依然存在，在全球不发达地区尤为明显。 此外，十九世纪末二十世纪初，新经济逻辑出现倒退，起因是列强重拾保护主义政策，并随着新帝国主义将保护主义扩展至不发达地区。保护主义与新帝国主义扩张相结合，意味着新兴全球经济被分割成不同的帝国区域，每个帝国领域都会对外变得封闭，而不是更加开放。二十世纪三十年代，全球经济也的确演变成为这种格局。 雪球效应由此产生，列强竞相争夺帝国殖民地。对于领土受限的德国和日本，“帝国生存空间”或“共荣圈”的需求变得极为紧迫。两次大战的种子由此埋下。进而，二十世纪最初十年经济自由主义的衰退，导致反自由、反民主的政治理念和政权的崛起，而这种反自由、反民主势头的崛起，又反过来使经济自由主义更加衰退。二者的相互作用，便催生出一种暴力信条：共产主义和法西斯主义。 1945年之后，大战出现的概率进一步减少。在此期间，核武器发挥了重要的作用。但自由贸易的制度化，以及与之密切相关的经济快速且可持续发展也非常重要。自由民主的传播同样功不可没。的确，尽管在工业时代，不自由不民主的国家一样不怎么打仗，但自由民主政体才更符合和平的主旋律。 由于国内专制高压，非民主国家对外用兵更加自然。相反，自由民主社会内部以和平、法律仲裁关系为主导，因此人民往往希望将同样的范式应用于国际事务。生活在一个越来越宽容的社会中，人民也就越来越容易包容别人的观点。尽管民主国家最初也是庞大的帝国，然而随着提倡自由、法律平等、以及国内政治参与等理念的深入人心，自由民主国家便会发现，在没有得到外国人民同意的情况下，对其进行统治，合理性受到越来越多的质疑。 由于珍视生命、自由，倡导人权，当试图推行压迫统治时，自由民主国家变会陷入被动。进而，在自由民主社会，个人生命和追求幸福的价值被认为远高于集体价值，在战争中牺牲生命正在越来越多地丧失其合法性。只有在极少数正式而实用的情况下，战争才具有合法性。同时战争被广泛地厌恶，不受大众欢迎。 这种不断深化的潮流和共识简直就是奇迹。其最耀眼而广受世人所认可的成就便是民主国家间的和平。随着自由化、民主化，以及经济发展的深入，富裕民主国家之间爆发战争的可能性已降至零点，它们甚至不认为有必要就可能发生的军事纠纷而对另一个民主国家进行军事准备。历史上第一次，曾经是国际无政府主义状态之内在特性的邻国安全困境（security dilemma）【编注：安全困境也叫霍布斯陷阱，是指这样一种局面：当你附近出现一个有能力对你进行打击的邻居，而你又无法确信其善意，就不得不采取预防措施，要么增强防御，要么先发制人，同样的逻辑在对方也成立，结果要么是直接导致战争，要么引发不断升级的军备竞赛，而后者在力量失衡时同样导致战争。这一困境提示了，即便各方最初都无意攻击对方而只是想自保，霍布斯状态下战争也难以避免】不复存在，尤其是在北美、西欧这样世界上最现代化、最自由民主的地区，和平得到实现。 随着苏维埃帝国的崩溃，前社会主义政权汇入全球资本经济的大潮之中，东欧、南亚、东南亚，以及拉丁美洲的经济快速增长与民主化结伴而行，发达国家爆发大战的前景变得愈加遥远。战争的地缘中心从根本上发生了转移。世界上现代化的、经济发达的地区已经变成了“和平区”。战争现在主要限定在不发达地区，即世界的“战争区”，这些国家在现代化进程中落在了后面，其相应的副产品就是时不时地打来打去，有时还会和发达国家开战。 1945年后，国家间战争大幅减少的同时，国内战争有所增加，所以有人就信誓旦旦，说战争并未减少，只不过形式有所转变。就好像说有个什么暴力守恒定律，规定暴力总数为一个定值。然而，这是一种误解，源于对材料的无差别诠释，就像有句谚语里说，平均两寸深的湖水也能淹死人。 现实中，世界上不同地区的社会经济发展非常不均衡，所以，国内战争同样出现了国家间战争所表现出的下降趋势。由于具有更强的共识性、多数代表性、包容度，以及在和平分离方面更大的合法性，现代化的、经济发达、自由民主的国家，实际上已不会发生内战。 相反，不发达或者发展中国家更容易发生内战。这样的国家，往往民族四分五裂，中央政府软弱无力，于二战后去殖民地化并独立建国，从而造成全球范围的内战数量增长。因此，无论是国家间战争还是内战，均主要出现在世界上不发达或者发展中地区。如果考虑到这些地区终将实现现代化，从这个意义上来讲，未来尚且光明。 说了这么多最近几十年的现代化进程中，战争大幅减少，和平播撒人间之后，应当强调，这些巨大的改善或者说正在改善的条件，并非完全确凿无疑，不足以确保人类免于大规模战争的阴影。随着世界新秩序被世界新无序威胁，冷战后的欣快时光恐怕会转瞬即逝。发达国家爆发大战的可能性依然很低。然而，1989柏林墙崩塌后，基于资本主义和民主胜利的那种深刻的变革感，已备受侵蚀。 或许，最重要的改变就是非民主资本主义强权的回归，这种政体自1945年德国、日本被击败之后就长期缺席于国际社会。前共产主义国家中国经历了大发展和工业化，已经演变为专制资本主义，这将成为改变全球平衡的最重要因素。还有俄罗斯，褪去后共产自由主义之后，正逐渐成为一个独裁国家。这些国家是否能够随发展而最终实现民主化，大概是二十一世纪最重大的问题。 早在当前这轮经济大衰退开始之前，我就曾经在《外交事务》上撰文指出，历史的教训并不明朗，并非进步主义者——例如最近，也是最有名的福山——所深信的那样具有必然性。此次经济危机爆发以来，专制强权更加自信。继二十世纪三十年代因资本主义民主的失败而导致法西斯和共产主义极权的崛起之后，全球霸主和民主资本主义遭受无与伦比的一记重拳。 有人希望，当前的经济危机不会演变成一场灾难。然而，国家驱动和民族资本主义专制的诱惑的的确确增加了。与此同时，二十世纪民主胜利的支柱——虽然世人一贯对此有所低估——美国势力正在经历相对衰退，尽管或许不会像某些人预想的那么严重。 新资本主义专制势力分享了“发展、开放、贸易、资本”的和平，深深地整合进了世界经济之中，但却没有成为自由民主国家。因此，在该系统中，避免任何贸易保护主义就显得至关重要，不仅仅是因为贸易保护主义有可能损害经济，还因为避免保护主义可以防止出现抢夺市场和原材料的风潮，在二十世纪最初几十年中，正是这些行为，最终导致了灾难性的帝国保护主义和国际纷争。 即使前景并非如此暗淡，随着实力的增长，中国也有可能成为一个更加专断跋扈的势力，就算不会变得具有十足的侵略性，也会像超级强权那样四处秀肌肉。民主和非民主势力或许多少可以和平地共存，出于相互的恐惧和疑虑彼此戒备。然而还是存在这样一种前景，更具对抗性的关系、意识形态方面增强竞争、潜在和现实的摩擦、军备竞赛加剧，甚至启动新一轮的冷战。中国和俄罗斯对于全球专制政权的支持——最明显的就是叙利亚和伊朗——或许只是将来局面的牛刀小试。 战争减少的第二个明显反例是，过去二十多年里局部战争不断上演，这些战争大部分由美国连同其北约或其他盟友发动，但对手却十分落后，跟现代化民主化几乎沾不上边。反叛乱战争格外吸引到大量关注和批评，而且确实构成了一个难解之谜。超级强国能够轻而易举地碾压最为强大的敌对国家，然而却在世界上最贫穷积弱的地区面对武力孱弱的对手一筹莫展。 但是，人们往往忽略了这样的一个事实，这种困难并非普遍难题，而一边倒的出现在很多自由民主国家，他们之所以遇上这样的问题，恰恰因为他们是自由民主国家。民主国家的行为招致了大量的批评非议，其中有些并非无理取闹，这或许可以看作民主的荣誉而非包袱。 历史经验表明，粉碎叛乱就需要无情地压迫平民，这令自由民主国家越来越难以接受。前现代国家，以及现代独裁国家和极权国家，就不会为使用这些手段而感到困扰，而且总的来说，他们的压迫行动相当成功。 压迫，是帝国统治不可或缺之基石。大英帝国和法兰西帝国之所以能够以如此低的成本维持统治，仅仅是因为他们能够毫无忌惮地推行无情压迫，就拿英国来说，直到1857年还在镇压印度叛变。然而，自十九世纪末以来，自由主义观点深入人心，尽管表面上风头无两，民主帝国其实已时日无多。 转入二十世纪，大英举步维艰，最终在南非达成和解，从爱尔兰撤军，这对于其他自由民主帝国也是一个明确的信号。几乎被世人所忽视的一个事实是，二战后，去殖民化大潮仅仅发生在自由民主帝国之中（以英国和法国为甚）。根本谈不上什么民意压力的非民主帝国，要么像德国和日本一样在两次世界大战中被摧毁，要么在独裁统治土崩瓦解之际和平解体，例如苏联。 质疑者或许会说，当年纳粹德国面对南斯拉夫和苏联的游击队同样一筹莫展。但是，如果德国赢了二战，就能向各种争议地区派遣更多军队，其种族清洗手段也能大展神威。苏联在阿富汗的失败是另一个鲜明的反例，但阿富汗是个例外，位于苏维埃帝国统治系统之外。 车臣或许更能说明问题，而且前因后果一目了然：运用大规模放逐手段的斯大林苏维埃铁腕统治是最残忍也是有效的，九十年代的自由俄罗斯最为温情脉脉，也最无效，而普京制下的独裁俄罗斯介于二者之间。 值得留意的是，在苏联和东欧内部压制反对声音确实更加容易。实际上，我们所能看到的成功叛乱样本，在遭受严重的选择偏差之后，完全被扭曲了，有点像福尔摩斯说的，“一条不叫的狗”——独裁的铁腕下，帝国内部万马齐喑——我们看到的只是最突出的、最具故事性的案例。同样的情况适用于中国，那里成功地对藏人和穆斯林民族主义者进行长期压制，只要中国一日不民主，这些镇压就还将继续存在下去。 人们指责阿萨德在叙利亚的统治残暴，平叛无功。叙利亚的悲剧至2012年的今天已经持续一年半有余，据估计两万多人因此丧命。然而，1982年镇压穆斯林兄弟会哈马城起义时，老阿萨德在三天时间就制造出数量与此相当的尸体。由于害怕外国势力介入，小阿萨德不能像他的父亲那样肆无忌惮。而普京的俄罗斯也没能全盘承袭其前任苏联的那种超级力量，那种东西已经怅然消失了。 并不是说民主国家的所作所为就神圣得无可挑剔。无论是由政治军事当局实施的暴力，还是军队的恣意妄为，都会无差别地针对战斗人员和非战斗人员。自由民主国家严格限制针对平民的暴力，这构成其法律规范标准。尽管很多——或许是绝大部分——违反这条标准的暴力行为都未经报道，但那些已经被自由媒体捅出来的案子，还是会受到公众的谴责和法律的制裁。根据历史纵向比较和国家间横向比较可知，所有这些措施，极大限制了自由民主国家的压迫能力。 要想取得反叛乱战争的胜利就非得残忍无情的观点，其对立面正是近代自由民主宣传中所认定的 “赢得民心”。诚然，施以恩惠、与之合作，展现出令人愉悦的“软实力”，至少赢得被征服社会精英阶层的民心，是帝国“绥靖”政策的中心环节。然而，天鹅绒手套总是罩着一只铁拳，当机立断粉碎本地抵抗，毫无疑问依然是异国统治的终极手段。“赢得民心”确实已成为维持外国社会和平的脆弱而昂贵的指导方针，但那只是因为，自由民主国家实际上已经丧失了武力碾压这些社会的能力。 尽管存在无可辩驳的残忍行为以及政策错误，民主国家的反叛乱战争史依然可以算作其高贵品行的明证。对别国的人道主义干涉同样不可避免地会遭遇上述棘手问题，这的确在一定程度上阻挠了这些干涉。而且，对外干涉逐渐增多，也是为了应对笼罩在战争减少大势上的另一团阴影——非传统恐怖主义。 2001年9月11日，美国遭受大规模恐怖袭击，这起事件成为划时代的界标，并非由于恐怖活动本身，而是一个可怕的征兆，预示着一个晦暗的未来。那就是非传统恐怖主义采用大规模杀伤性武器带来的威胁：核武器、生物武器，以及化学武器。其中，化学武器威胁最小，再成功不过的化学武器顶多杀伤数千人。生物武器的杀伤力要大几个数量级。 基因解码和生物技术方面革命性的突破，大大提升了生物武器的杀伤力和易用性。实验室培育的一株剧毒的细菌或病毒就能够造成与核弹相当的伤亡，更不用说经过特殊选育、尚未出现免疫的超级细菌了，而恐怖分子要搞到这些生物武器远比核弹容易。幸运的是，相对于化学武器和生物武器，恐怖分子无法生产核武器。当然，他们可能从那些能够生产核武器的国家获得。 这个问题的根源在于，原本属于国家级别的大规模杀伤性武器的技术和原料向下流动。核技术流入低安全标准、高度腐败的国家带来的最严峻风险就是与日俱增的泄密危机。迄今为止最著名的案例，就是阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗（Abdul Qadeer Khan），这位掌舵巴基斯坦核弹项目的负责人把核武器秘密卖给了大概十多个国家。 而且，世界上不发达不稳定的地区也有可能陷入分裂和无政府状态。一旦国家政府崩溃，无政府状态取而代之，谁能确保这个国家的核武库安全无虞？这方面，巴基斯坦再次成为一个值得再三讨论的案例。其实，前核武器超级大国苏联的崩溃就是未来威胁的典型模式。出于上述诸多原因，恐怖分子购买、偷窃、抢劫，甚至制造大规模杀伤性武器的能力已经大幅增加了。 007这种类型小说里老生常谈的威胁世界的个人和组织，突然一下子变成了现实。今天这个时代，无需变得强大就可以给世界重重一击。核武器的威慑作用就是基于确保相互摧毁，而这对恐怖分子而言毫无意义，正是他们，而非国家政权，更乐于使用终极武器。与超级大国在冷战中形成的规范不同，恐怖分子所获得的非传统能力非常实用。一旦存在可能，就很难看到什么东西会制止这种事在某时某地变成实实在在的威胁，尤其对于生物技术，潜力确实存在，并且正在逐渐扩大。 这是一个盘根错节的问题，不存在简洁明快的解决方案。防止核扩张，追剿恐怖分子的国际合作至关重要，但是很多国家要么主动抵制，要么作壁上观。外界军事干预极具争议，充满种种困难。一旦这样的事情发生【编注：从上下文看，似乎是指核扩散这件事】，对核武装的伊朗进行军事打击，就成了以色列或美国手中可以打出的一张牌，进而有可能演变成一场涉及世界主要力量的战争。 防御策略基本与先发制人一样问题丛生，对民主国家尤甚。对嫌疑犯的超期羁押意味着异乎寻常的法律程序，繁杂善后处理方法，对民众的监视监听，和其他侵犯隐私的行为，这正是民主国家舆论热火朝天讨论的、法庭上唇枪舌战的话题。涉及反恐战争的进攻和防御两方面议题时，讨论便带有了苦涩的意识形态和义愤色彩。然而，非传统恐怖主义的威胁是真实存在的，也将长期存在，此事绝难善罢甘休。 我们无疑正在经历史上最和平的时代，这是充满喜悦且有着深厚基础的和平大潮。然而，至少自1945年以来，现在是最危险的时代，因为人类第一次具有彻底摧毁自身的能力，即使个人和小团体也能够制造大规模的伤亡，毫无疑问。 众所周知，只要不和未来进行对照，预测就很准。即使最为基础的历史趋势，也会随时间改变方向，产生不同寻常的相互作用。只有时间才能告诉我们答案。我们只能希望，尽管小有起伏，整体趋势依然是确保并且深化我们这个时代的和平。虽然海里的鲸鱼们可能会反对，我们还是希望整个世界都能更像挪威一样。 （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Triumph of Robert Conquest 罗伯特·康奎斯特的功绩 译者：Horace Rae（@sheldon_rae）     校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The Wall Street Journal @ 2015-08-05 网址：http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-triumph-of-robert-conquest-1438814435 He chronicled the Soviet terror that so many in the West refused to see. 他记述了许多西方人拒绝正视的苏联大恐怖。 [caption id="attachment_6041" align="alignnone" width="300"] President George W. Bush presents the Presidential Medal of Freedom to historian Robert Conquest, left, in Washington on Nov. 9, 2005. PHOTO: EVAN VUCCI/ASSOCIATED PRESS 小布什总统在华盛顿为历史学家罗伯特·康奎斯特（左）颁发总统自由勋章。2005年11月9日。供图：EVAN VUCCI/ASSOCIATED PRESS。[/caption] Robert Conquest was born in 1917, the year of the Russian Revolution, so it seems fitting that he outlived the Soviet Union by more than 25 years. The indefatigable historian, and enemy, of Soviet totalitarianism died Tuesday at age 98. 罗伯特·康奎斯特生于1917年——俄国十月革命的那一年，所以他比苏联多活了25年是很恰当的。这位苏联极权主义的不倦史家和不懈之敌，于本周二【译注：2015年8月3日】逝世，享年89岁。 Conquest’s major themes were reality and delusion. “The Great Terror” (1968) was the first and still definitive treatment of Stalin’s purges, gulags, show trials and secret police, meticulously documenting the enormity of the death toll. “Harvest of Sorrow”(1986) chronicled what he called the “terror famines” that followed agricultural collectivization. 康奎斯特的研究主题是真实与幻想。《大恐怖》（1968）是关于斯大林政权的大清洗、古拉格集中营、审判秀和秘密警察的第一部论述，翔实记录了庞大的死亡人数，时至今日仍属权威。《苦难的丰收》（1986）则记录了农业集体化之后被他称为“恐怖饥荒”的事件。 When sources inside Russia were few and most Kremlinologists were oblivious, these classics contributed immensely to understanding the nature of the Communist project. They also helped shape the response that won the Cold War; Reagan and Thatcher were among his readers. 当时苏联内部的信息来源少之又少，而苏联问题专家们又袖手旁观，这些经典著作对理解共产主义事业的本质助益极大。它们也有助于制定针对苏联的对策，使我们赢得冷战。里根和撒切尔都读过他的书。 [Hoover Institution Research Fellow Stephen Kotkin on the late Anglo-American historian and his expose of Communist atrocities. Photo credit: Associated Press.] 【胡佛研究所研究员Stephen Kotkin谈论这位已故英裔美国历史学家及他对共产主义暴行的揭露。图片来源：Associated Press.】 Still, until Moscow opened the archives post-1989, leftist intellectuals and especially academics denied the realities Conquest exposed, claiming he exaggerated Stalin’s evil. That debate is now closed beyond challenge. 尽管如此，直到莫斯科1989年以后公开档案之前，左翼知识分子尤其是学术界一直否定康奎斯特所揭露的事实，说他夸大了斯大林的邪恶。现在，这种论调已经毫无争议地停歇了。 Conquest dedicated his later years at Stanford’s Hoover Institution to plumbing delusion, which he defined as “massive reality denial,” or why Russia had so many apologists and sympathizers. He blamed the persistence of destructive beliefs and the bottomless human capacity for self-deception. 康奎斯特晚年在斯坦福的胡佛研究所致力于研究幻想。他把“幻想”定义为“大规模否认事实”，或者（更具体而言），为什么有这么多人维护俄国，同情俄国。他谴责破坏性信念的顽固和人类无穷无尽的自我欺骗能力。 “The mere existence of the U.S.S.R., and its ideas, distorted the way in which many people over the whole world thought about society, the economy, human history,” Conquest wrote in these pages in 1992. “Many were seduced by the comfortable word ‘socialism,’ even to the extent of rejecting the Western ideas of free discussion, political compromise, plural society, piecemeal practicality, change without chaos.” “仅仅是苏联及其理念的存在，就扭曲了全世界很多人思考社会、经济、人类历史的方式，”1992年康奎斯特写道，“许多人都被‘社会主义’这个让人舒心的词汇引诱了，甚至到了抛弃西方的自由讨论、政治妥协、多元社会、零敲碎打式改良的务实精神、有序演变等理念的程度。” Conquest added that the lessons of the bloody 20th century “have not yet been learned, or not adequately so.” Many today across the world still offer solace to dictators and mass murderers, whatever their reasons, so Conquest’s insights into human deception remain and will always be relevant. 康奎斯特补充说，血腥的20世纪的教训“还没有被我们吸取，或者没有被完全吸取”。不管出于何种原因，现在世界上仍有许多人同情独裁者和屠杀者，所以，康奎斯特关于人类自我欺骗的论述会且一直会与我们息息相关。 （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Mythical conflict between science and Religion 科学与宗教间莫须有的冲突 作者：James Hannam @ 2009-10-17 译者：22（@ 22）     校对：白猫D（@白猫D） 来源：Medieval Science and Philosophy, http://jameshannam.com/conflict.htm Introduction 简介 Newspaper articles thrive on cliché. These are not so much hackneyed phrases but rather the useful shorthand for nuggets of popular perception that allow the journalist to immediately tune his readers to the right wavelength. Yesterday’s clichés are, of course, today’s stereotypes as any perusal of earlier writing will show. The conflict between science and religion is an acceptable cliché that crops up all over the place. 报纸文章充斥着陈词滥调。这些陈词滥调倒不是简单的陈腐语句，而是一个流行见解百宝箱，让记者可以方便趁手地用来将读者调到正确的认知波段上。当然，阅读任何早期文字都将发现，正是昨日的陈词滥调成就了今日的刻板印象。科学与宗教之间的矛盾冲突，便是一个到处都普遍为人所接受的陈词滥调。 In the episode of The Simpsons in which the late Stephen J. Gould was a guest voice, Lisa found a fossil angel and events led to a court order being placed on religion to keep a safe distance from science. Articles in magazines and on the internet all assume that a state of conflict exists between science and religion, always has existed and that science has been winning. 比如在《辛普森一家》Stephen J. Gould客串配音的那一集中，Lisa发现了一具天使化石，这一事件导致法院判令宗教要与科学保持一定的安全距离。杂志、网络文章也都假定宗教和科学间的冲突是存在的，并将一直存在着，而科学总会是获胜的一方。 Most popular histories of science view all the evidence through this lens without ever stopping to think that there might be another side to the story. But let us turn from popular culture to the academy where we find a rather different picture. 大多数通俗科学史将所有证据置于有色棱镜下观看，却从未停下思考过故事是否有另一面。那么，让我们从坊间传闻走向学院考据，或许在那里，我们可以看到另一幅历史景象。 Let’ s have a look at the comments of a few leading historians of science: 让我们来看几位主流科学史家的评论吧： John Hedley Brooke was the Andreas Idreos Professor of Science and Religion at the University of Oxford. He is a leading historian of science in England and the author of Science and Religion - Some Historical Perspectives (1991). In this book, he writes of the conflict hypothesis “In its traditional forms, the thesis has been largely discredited”. John Hedley Brooke是牛津大学科学与宗教学Andreas Idreos讲席教授。他是英国科学史的领军人物，著有《科学与宗教：历史学观点》（1991)。在该书中，他谈及冲突假说“以其一直以来的形式而言，是不足信的”。 David Lindberg is Hilldale Professor Emeritus of the History of Science at the University of Wisconsin - Madison. He is the author of many books on medieval science and also on religion. With Ronald Numbers, the current Hilldale and William Coleman Professor of the History of Science and Medicine at the same university, he writes “Despite a developing consensus among scholars that science and Christianity have not been at war, the notion of conflict has refused to die”. David Lindberg是威斯康辛大学麦迪逊分校科学史Hilldale讲席荣休教授，撰写了多本关于中世纪科学和宗教的著作。他和同校的Ronald Numbers，现任科学和医学史Hilldale & William Coleman讲席教授，都认为，“尽管学者已就科学和基督教间并未水火不容这点达成共识，但有关两者冲突的观念仍未消失”。 Steven Shapin is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego. He writes "In the late Victorian period it was common to write about the "warfare between science and religion" and to presume that the two bodies of culture must always have been in conflict. However, it is a very long time since these attitudes have been held by historians of science." Steven Shapin是加州大学圣地亚哥分校的社会学教授，他认为，“‘科学与宗教间的战争’是维多利亚时代晚期被反复书写的一个话题，大众也因而假定这两个文化团体一直以来都处于冲突之中”。 Finally, we come to the dean of medieval science, Edward Grant, Professor Emeritus of the History and Philosophy of Science at Indiana University who writes of that most slandered of periods, the Middle Ages, when faith was supposed to have snuffed out all forms of reason “If revolutionary rational thoughts were expressed in the Age of Reason [the 18th century], they were only made possible because of the long medieval tradition that established the use of reason as one of the most important of human activities”. 最后，让我们听听印第安纳大学中世纪科学系主任、历史与科学哲学荣休教授Edward Grant是如何评价这个一直被严重抹黑的、据认为在此期间信仰抹杀了所有形式理性的中世纪。Grant教授指出，“革命性的理性思想之所以能出现在理性时代（18世纪），正是因为在中世纪建立起来的运用理性作为人类最重要活动的悠久传统”。 So, as a theory believed by working historians, the conflict hypothesis is dead. In this article, I want to examine two questions that follow from this. Firstly, if the conflict hypothesis has been rejected by practically every scholar in the field, why is there such a rift between academic opinion and popular perception? And secondly, what has been the real relationship between science and religion? 因此，“冲突假设已经过时了”——这是一个被当今历史学家普遍接受的观点。在本文中，我将检验由此引出的两个问题。第一，如果冲突假说实际上真的被每一个业内学者抛弃，那么学院派观点和大众认知见的巨大分歧又是从何而来的？第二，科学与宗教间的真实关系到底是怎样的？ The conflict hypothesis 冲突假说 Science is the triumph of Western civilisation which has made all its other achievements possible. The enormity of this triumph has very often been reflected onto the historiography of science to produce a story akin to a triumphal progress. From Copernicus onwards, we are told, each generation built on the discoveries of their forerunners to produce a parade of successes with barely a backwards step. 科学是西方文明的胜利，它使得一切其他成就变为可能。这项胜利如此巨大，以至于反映到科学编史学中，就被谱成了一曲不断进步最终迈向胜利的凯旋之歌。我们被告知，从哥白尼开始，每一代人都在前人发现的基础上不断成功前进而少有退步。 This history has been built on two assumptions: that there is something epistemologically unique about science and that reason and rationality are what causes progress in science. Scientists themselves have generally been keen on these ideas and been happy to promote them. 这样的历史描述基于两点假设。第一，科学在认识论上有独一无二的优势；第二，理性与理性能力促进了科学的进步。科学家普遍热心于这些想法，也乐于传播它们。 Such has been status of science in modern society that this self description, promulgated by writers like Carl Sagan and Jacob Bronowski, has generally been respected by the general public who have been less interested in the more nuanced views historians. 这一对科学在现代社会中所居地位的自我描述，经由像卡尔·萨根（Carl Sagan）和雅各布·布朗劳斯基（Jacob Bronowski）这样的作家传播，逐渐为一般大众所接受，而这些大众却往往对历史学家们更细致入微的观点缺少兴趣。 The myth of conflict first really got going during the Enlightenment (itself a description intended to derogate earlier eras) with the fiercely anti-clerical French philosophes. In his Discours Preliminaire, Jean d’Alembert paints a picture of men of the Renaissance finally throwing off the shackles of church domination so that rational enquiry can at last begin. This idea was carried through the nineteenth century with historians like John William Draper and Andrew Dickson White. 这个冲突虚构的最初流行肇始于启蒙运动（这个词本身就是对先前时代的贬低）时期的一位激进反教权法国哲学家朗达贝尔（Jean d’Alembert）。在他的《百科全书序论》中，他将文艺复兴时期描绘为人们最终挣脱教会统治的枷锁，并开始理性思考的一个时代。这个想法持续到了19世纪被威廉·H·德雷珀（John William Draper）和安德鲁·D·怀特（Andrew Dickson White）等历史学家继承。 White was the most famous and successful exponent of the conflict hypothesis. He is commonly quoted at the start of modern books on science and religion as representing the soon-to-be-debunked traditional view. It is worth briefly examining whether White was being entirely honest in his work as no one doubts that Draper was engaged in nothing more that polemic. 怀特是冲突假说最著名、也是最成功的鼓吹者。他通常在有关科学与宗教的现代书籍中开篇即被援引，作为即将被我们揭穿的传统观点之代表而出现。我们有必要简要检验一下，怀特在捍卫其观点时是否完全诚实，因为没有人会怀疑德雷珀对这场论战的投入只有简单的争吵。 Neither of them were professional historians and both did seem to sincerely believe in the warfare theory they were expounding. Unfortunately, this meant that they set out to prove what they already believed rather than take their conclusions from the facts. White is quite explicit about this when he writes how he felt before he began his research, “I saw... the conflict between two epochs in the evolution of human thought - the theological and the scientific.” 他们两人都不是专业历史学家，但都坚信着他们提出的冲突理论。不幸的是，这意味着他们要去证明他们已经相信的观点，而不是从事实中提取结论。怀特对他在研究之前是如何想的这一点非常坦诚：“我先看到了人类思想发展中两个时代间的冲突——神学时代的和科学时代的”。 Any such statement should immediately set off alarm bells which grow louder as we look at his work The Warfare of Science with Theology. His usual tactics are to scour the sources for some stick-in-the-mud reactionary and claim this represents the consensus of religious opinion and then find another thinker (who is usually just as faithful a Christian as the reactionary) who turned out to be right, and claim that they represent reason. 任何此类的论述都应立即敲响我们的警钟。当我们读他的《科学与神学的战争》时，更要提高警惕。怀特惯用的手法是搜罗一些极端保守人士的观点，并声称这些人的观点代表了宗教人士的共识；接着又找到另一位思想家（通常是和那位极端保守分子一样也是忠实基督徒）证明他的观点是对的，并声称他们代表了理性。 Hence using anachronism and claiming obscure figures were in fact influential, he is able to manufacture a conflict where none exists. A detailed critique of his work from Lindberg and Numbers can be read here but I would like to point out a few errors in the specific area of religious persecution of scientists. 因此，利用这种时代错位、吹嘘一些名不见经传人士的重要性，怀特成功捏造了一个其实不曾存在的冲突。Lindberg和Numbers对他作品的更多详细批评可以在这里读到，但是我更想先澄清有关宗教迫害科学家这件事情的一些误解。 White's examples of actual prosecution are few and far between which is not very surprising as the only scientist the Christian Church ever prosecuted for scientific ideas per se was Galileo and even here historians doubt that was the major reason he got into trouble. 怀特提及迫害的例子屈指可数且多远离事实。这并不出人意料，因为唯一一个因为科学观点而被教会迫害的科学家便是伽利略，而历史学家甚至怀疑这并不是他惹上麻烦的真正原因。 This is an embarrassment for White as he thought that in the Middle Ages especially, the Church was burning freethinkers left, right and centre. The lack of any examples of this at all is a serious problem so he is forced to draft in non-scientists or else to claim that prosecutions on non-scientific matters were scientific persecutions after all. Here are some examples: 这一情形对怀特来说很尴尬，因为他认为教会，特别是中世纪教会，会烧死左、中、右派的所有自由思想家。缺乏证据对他来说是个大问题，因此他被迫加入一些非科学家的例子来证明针对非科学事物的迫害归根到底也是针对科学的迫害。这里有一些例子： Roger Bacon has been a popular martyr for science since the nineteenth century. He was a scholastic theologian who was keen to claim Aristotle for the Christian faith. He was not a scientist in any way we would recognise and his ideas are not nearly so revolutionary as they are often painted. 罗杰·培根 （Roger Bacon）从19世纪以来就是一个被人熟知的科学殉道者。他其实是一个热衷于宣传亚里士多德拥有基督教信仰的经院哲学家。他从任何一方面来说都不是科学家，他的想法也不像宣传的那样具有革命性。 In chapter 12 of his book, White writes of Roger “the charges on which St. Bonaventura silenced him, and Jerome of Ascoli imprisoned him, and successive popes kept him in prison for fourteen years, were "dangerous novelties" and suspected sorcery.” 怀特在他的书的第十二章中这样描写Roger，“圣波纳文图拉迫使他噤声，阿斯克利的杰罗姆监禁了他，继任的教皇们又关了他十四年，所有这些指控都是因为他‘危险的创新’和可疑的巫术。” This is untrue. As Lindberg says “his imprisonment, if it occurred at all (which I doubt) probably resulted with his sympathies for the radical “poverty” wing of the Franciscans (a wholly theological matter) rather than from any scientific novelties which he may have proposed.” 这不是真的。正如Lindberg所说，“他的监禁，如果是真的话（我很怀疑），很可能是因为他对于主张苦修的方济各会的同情（完全是神学原因），而不是因为他提倡的一些科学新思想”。 In chapter 2, White informs us “In 1327 Cecco d’Ascoli, noted as an astronomer, was for this [the doctrine of antipodes] and other results of thought, which brought him under suspicion of sorcery, driven from his professorship at Bologna and burned alive at Florence.” 在第二章里，怀特告诉我们，“在1327年，天文学家切科·达斯克利由于‘对跖点’学说和一些其他思想，被怀疑为行使巫术。他因此被剥夺了在博洛尼亚大学的教职，并在佛罗伦萨被活活烧死。” Cecco D’Ascoli was indeed burnt at the stake in 1327 in Florence. He is the only natural philosopher in the entire Middle Ages to pay this penalty and was executed for breaking parole after a previous trial when he had been convicted of heresy for, apparently, claiming Jesus Christ was subject to the stars. 切科·达斯克利确实在1327年被烧死在佛罗伦萨的木桩上。他是整个中世纪时期里唯一一个死于火刑的自然哲学家：而他被判死刑是因为，在他因为宣称耶稣基督受控于他的星座命宫而被判异端的假释期间，违反了假释条例。 This is not enough for White who claims, entirely without foundation, that Cecco met his fate partly for the scientific view that the antipodes were inhabited as well as dishonestly calling him an ‘astronomer’ rather than an ‘astrologer’ to strengthen his scientific credentials. 这显然不足以让怀特声称（完全是毫无根据），他的死部分是因为他“对跖点适宜居住”的科学观点。更不必说怀特不诚实将达斯克利称为“天文学家”而不是“占星家”来增强他的科学可信度了。 In the same chapter White claims “In 1316 Peter of Abano, famous as a physician, having promulgated this [the habitation of the antipodes] with other obnoxious doctrines in science, only escaped the Inquisition by death.” We have no good evidence that d’Abano was under investigation from the inquisition at his death. 在同一章里，怀特声称“在1316年，外科医生达巴诺的彼得因传播对跖点和其他有害的科学学说而受到审判，但在审判结束之前意外死亡”。我们没有明确的证据可以表明达巴诺死于审判期间。 However, he did gain a posthumous reputation as a sorcerer when spurious works were attributed to him. This may have led to the reports of his bones being dug up and burnt after his death. There is again, no evidence whatsoever that the antipodes debate or science had anything to do with the matter. 然后，他确实在死后由于一些归于其名下的伪造作品而得到了巫师的名声。这可能也导致了他死后骨头被挖出焚烧的传闻。但是，我们要再一次声明，没有任何证据可以表明对于科学或“对跖点”的争论和他的死有关系。 It is hard to confirm some of White’s victims existed at all. “The chemist John Barrillon was thrown into prison,” he says in chapter 12 “and it was only by the greatest effort that his life was saved.” The great historian of science, George Sarton, with a better knowledge of the sources of anyone before or since, says this episode is ‘completely unknown’ to him. Needless to say, White gives no reference. 我们很难确定怀特所说的一些受害者是否存在。他在第十二章里谈到，“化学家John Barrillon被投入狱，任何努力都救不了他”。而掌握史料前无古人后无来者的杰出历史学家乔治·萨顿（George Sarton）对这件事的回应是，“从未听说过”。不用说，怀特没有给出任何出处。 Vesalius, the founder of modern anatomy, is also held up as a martyr to science. White explains in chapter 13 “Vesalius was charged with dissecting a living man, and, either from direct persecution, as the great majority of authors assert, or from indirect influences, as the recent apologists for Philip II admit, he became a wanderer: on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, apparently undertaken to atone for his sin, he was shipwrecked, and in the prime of his life and strength he was lost to the world…. His death was hastened, if not caused, by men who conscientiously supposed that he was injuring religion.” 现代解剖学的奠基人维萨里（Vesalius）也常常被认为是科学殉道者。怀特在第十三章中解释道，“维萨里被指控解剖活人。无论是因为绝大多数学者确信的直接迫害，还是因为最近西班牙的腓力二世的辩护者承认的间接迫害，他实际上成了一个要被流放到圣地为自己赎罪的流浪汉。最终正值壮年的他在一次船难中去世。如果说他不是被那些认为他危害宗教的人害死的，也至少是因为他们而少活了很多年。” The trouble is that hardly a word of this has any basis in historical fact. Vesalius did go on a pilgrimage and was drowned on the way back. But there is no hint he was ever prosecuted and the idea his death was hastened by those who supposed he was injuring religion is simply wrong. 这段话的问题在于，没有哪一处是基于历史事实的。维萨里确实去朝圣了，并且在归途中溺水身亡，但是没有任何证据证明他是被害死的。那些认为他的英年早逝是由于他危害宗教的观点是错误的。 Discussing the heliocentric system, White goes on “Many minds had received it [the doctrine of Copernicus], but within the hearing of the papacy only one tongue appears to have dared to utter it clearly. This new warrior was that strange mortal, Giordano Bruno. He was hunted from land to land, until at last he turned on his pursuers with fearful invectives. For this he was entrapped at Venice, imprisoned during six years in the dungeons of the Inquisition at Rome, then burned alive, and his ashes scattered to the winds.” 当讨论到日心说时，怀特接着说，“虽然当时很多人接受了哥白尼的学说，但在教皇的威严下，只有一个人敢于发出自己的声音。这位新勇士是一个奇怪的凡人——乔尔丹诺·布鲁诺（Giordano Bruno），他在各地都被追捕，直到最后，他向对自己恶言相向的追捕者发出还击。为此，他在威尼斯被诱捕入狱，随后被囚禁在罗马地牢里，在审讯中度过了六年。最后他遭受火刑而死，他的骨灰散落在空中。 ” In fact, we do not know the exact reasons Bruno was prosecuted but modern scholars like Frances Yates suggest it was because he was a magus who was trying to start a new neo-Platonic religion. He did believe the earth revolved around the sun but this was purely for religious reasons as he effectively worshipped it. In any case, it was incidental to his fate as were his other pseudo-scientific ideas. 事实上，我们现在仍然不清楚布鲁诺被迫害的具体原因。现代学者如弗朗西斯·耶茨（Frances Yates）认为，那是因为他是一位尝试建立一个新柏拉图主义宗教的术士。他确实相信地球绕着太阳转，但那纯粹是因为他自身的宗教信仰让他相信的。无论如何，日心说跟他的其他伪科学想法一样，都不对他的命运负主要责任。 One would like to take the charitable view that White really believed his theory and was not making up evidence to support a position he knew to be false. Instead, he skews the evidence by accepting that which agrees with his hypothesis while being sceptical of what does not. This means that he has included falsehoods that he would have noticed if he had taken a properly objective attitude towards all his evidence. 我们应该采取一个比较宽厚的看法，相信怀特确实笃信自己的理论，而不是为了维护自己明知错误的立场刻意编造证据。然而，他歪曲了证据，仅接受那些符合他假说的，而质疑那些不符合的。这意味着，如果他以客观的态度对待所有证据，那他就可以避免引入那些他本可发现的错误。 The points given above together with Numbers and Lindberg’s criticisms noted in their article are sufficient, however, to prove White’s work as utterly worthless as history. 以上几点，连同Lindberg和Numbers的批评，已足以证明怀特的作品和普通历史一样是没有价值的。 Draper, with no footnotes or references cannot even claim to give an illusion of scholarship. Colin Russell, in a recent summary of the historiography of the alleged warfare, sums up the views of modern scholarship, saying “Draper takes such liberty with history, perpetuating legends as fact that he is rightly avoided today in serious historical study. The same is nearly as true of White, though his prominent apparatus of prolific footnotes may create a misleading impression of meticulous scholarship”. 至于Drape，他的作品根本没有脚注或者引用来源，我们很难称他是一个学者。Colin Russell在最近一份关于科学与宗教莫须有战争的历史编纂学综述中，总结了现代学者的观点，他说，“Drape解读历史的随意性很大，常常将传说当作史实。这也是他被当今严肃史学研究忽略的原因。White也同样很难被称作是一个合格的学者，尽管他通过丰富的脚注让我们产生了一种严谨学术的错觉”。 But even today, historians who should know better, like Daniel Boorstin, Charles Freeman and William Manchester, have produced popular books that wheel out all the old misconceptions and prejudices. 但即使在今天，像Daniel Boorstin，Charles Freeman还有William Manchester这些本应对此了解更多的历史学家，却还是将老旧的误解和偏见带进自己的通俗作品中。 Another reason for the myth of conflict continuing is because at the moment there is undoubtedly a conflict between one wing of Christianity and modern science. This is the battle over evolution. Although the Catholic Church and mainline protestants long ago reconciled themselves to Darwin’s theory and modified their theology accordingly, many conservative Christians remain deeply suspicious about evolution and its alleged metaphysical implications. 冲突假说持续流行的另一个原因是，当时确实有一支基督教信仰与现代科学产生了一场激烈冲突——关于演化论的争斗。虽然天主教会与主流新教徒在很久之前就调解了神学与达尔文理论之间的矛盾，但很多保守的基督徒仍对演化论及其背后的形而上学暗示表示深深的怀疑。 Unfortunately, many who are defending evolution try to widen the gap between religion and science and use it to push non-scientific but anti-religious philosophical agendas. This can be seen clearly in the work of Richard Dawkins and many writers on the internet. 不幸的是，很多为演化论辩护的人扩大了宗教与科学之间的分歧，并利用它推进了非科学但却反宗教的议程。这可以很明显地在网上从理查德·道金斯（Richard Dawkins）和其他作家的作品中看到。 Some observers would claim that now science holds the whip hand it is being no less intolerant of dissent as the church supposedly once was. This would not be an accurate view as instead the argument over evolution is carried on vehemently by a small number of extremists on both sides while the rest of the community looks on rather bemused. 一些观察者声称，如今处于支配地位的科学执鞭于手、厉对异己的不宽容做派，和人们设想中教会的表现相比，毫不逊色。这当然不是一个准确的看法，因为关于演化论的激烈争论仅仅在一些科学与宗教的极端群体中进行，而大众对于这些讨论则是相当茫然的。 Occasionally, it spills over in a public arena such as when pressure groups gain control of previously obscure bodies that set school curricula, but in general it does not have the slightest effect. Most of the occasions when there have been conflicts between science and religion were caused by someone seeking publicity and fame when the problem could much more easily be sorted by patient discussion. 偶尔，当某个压力集团控制了以前不起眼的学校机构并开始设置课程时，争论会溢出到公共领域，但在一般情况下，这些争论不会对公众有丝毫影响。很多情况下，那些本可通过耐心讨论解决的冲突是由那些寻求名气与曝光度的人引起的。 This is the case both of Galileo publishing his inflammatory popular tracts that provoked the church and John Scopes volunteering to be charged with teaching evolution. Even so, Galileo himself blamed jealous scientific rivals and professional spite for his predicament. 伽利略散发他煽动性的流行小册子从而激怒教会，约翰·斯科普斯（John Scopes）故意去违反法规教授演化论，都是这种情况。即使如此，伽利略仍将自己的困境归咎于那些嫉妒他的科学对手和来自同行的怨恨。 The reasons for the continuing popular belief in the historical conflict can probably be summed up as follows: 有关历史上宗教与科学间冲突的流行信念长盛不衰的原因，大概可以总结如下：

• The writings of an earlier generation of historians have yet to be eclipsed by modern scholarship;
• 早期历史学家的著作，其光芒仍未被现代学者掩盖；
• Some popular writers of today continue to recycle the old myths rather than using up to date research;
• 当今部分通俗作家不断重复过去的传说而没有采用最新的研究成果；
• A few famous events have given a misleading impression to people unfamiliar with their context;
• 一些著名的历史事件给不熟悉历史背景的大众产生了误导；
• The idea of a conflict makes for a better story than more multi-faceted truth.
• 冲突观念比多面相的事实更适合写成动听故事。

The real historical relationship between science and religion 历史上科学与宗教间的真实关系 Through out history the real situation has been complicated and changeable. It has not proven possible, and nor is it ever likely to, for a single theory to explain the interaction of all forms of science and all forms of religion. It is certainly true that certain science (say, neo-Darwinist theory) is in conflict with certain kinds of religion (say, literalist Christianity) but even in an environment where both are present the effect is pretty negligible. 纵观历史，真正的局面是复杂且多变的，用某种单一理论来解释所有形式的科学与宗教之间的互动，从未被证明是可能的，或貌似可能的。确实，某些科学分支（比如新达尔文主义理论）与某些宗教派别（比如基督教经律主义）是有冲突的。但即使在它们两者都在场的情况下，这种冲突的影响也是微乎其微的。 For all the sound and fury over the teaching of evolution it is difficult to make any sort of case that science in the US has been adversely effected by creationism. If it means that scientists need to explain the theory of evolution better to suspicious laymen (which is something they are usually poor at doing), creationism could even serve an occasionally useful purpose. 面对演化论教学的喧哗与骚动，神创论很难以任何方式对美国的科学产生不利的影响。甚至有时候神创论可以让科学家们更好地向有疑虑的外行人解释演化论（这件事他们常常做得很差）。 Conversely, cosmology has found itself agreeing with religion rather more than some anti-religious thinkers would like. A hundred years ago nearly all non-religious thinkers took it for granted that the universe had always existed and always would. Despite the opposition of theologians claiming a real infinite in time was logically impossible (sometime called the Kalam cosmological argument), atheists seemed quite happy with an uncreated, eternal universe. 相反，不像某些反宗教思想家所认为的那样，宇宙学则与宗教远更相容。一百年前，几乎所有的非宗教思想家都将宇宙一直存在并且会一直存在下去视作理所当然。尽管持相反意见的神学家声称，真正无限的时间在逻辑上是不可能的（有时被称为卡拉姆宇宙论），无神论者似乎更乐于见到一个非创生的、永恒的宇宙。 When the Big Bang model was first suggested by the Jesuit priest Georges Le Maître, it was greeted with a certain amount of scepticism and the atheist Fred Hoyle coined the phrase ‘Big Bang’ intending it to be derogatory. 当大爆炸模型首次被耶稣会教士勒梅特（Georges Le Maître）提出时，受到了很多质疑，无神论者费雷德·霍伊尔（Fred Hoyle）杜撰“大爆炸”（Big Bang）一词来贬低这个发现。 His atheism also blinded him to the inadequacies of his steady state theory which one suspects he only came up with to avoid the uncomfortable metaphysical implications of a universe with a beginning. Atheist scientists have now come to terms with the big bang and adjusted their metaphysics accordingly, much like most Christians, after some debate, accepted evolution and twiddled their theology. 霍伊尔的无神论思想也使他看不到自己稳恒状态理论（steady state theory）的不足之处。有人怀疑这仅是因为霍伊尔要避免宇宙存在一个开端所带来的令他不舒服的形而上学暗示。如今，无神论科学家已经接受了“大爆炸”这个词，并且相应地调整了他们的形而上学假设；这非常像很多基督徒在经过一番辩论后，接受了进化论并且调整了自己的神学。 However, it is interesting to hear today’s atheists declaring that God must have a creator when their predecessors were quite happy for the universe not to have one. All this seems to demonstrate that when it comes to science, both sides find things they do not like and both sides argue against them until the evidence becomes impossible to deny. 但有趣的是，现在我们听见无神论者声称上帝本身必须有一个创造者，而他们的前辈们却为宇宙没有创造者而感到庆幸。所有这些似乎都表明了当涉及到科学时，双方都找出并反对自己不喜欢的一面，直到证据确凿到实在难以否认为止。 Today popular histories do try and recognise this variety. The people we want to eulogise as the great heroes of science rarely had such clear cut views as was once thought. This has led to what I call the 'examination' school of historical writing that can sometimes read like a series of end of term report cards where the figures of the past are praised or scolded according to how much the modern writer thinks they got right. 今天，通俗史确实在尝试并认可这些多样性。许多为我们所赞扬的科学英雄，很少像人们曾经以为的那样，提出过清晰明确的观点。这就会导致我称之为“考试”学派的历史著述。这些著述有时读起来就像一叠期末汇报卡片，上面写着当今作者认为应该会做的题目，然后他们根据一位历史人物答对了多少，来决定赞美还是贬斥他。 A good example of this approach is John Gribbin’s recent Science: A History 1543 - 2001 (published as The Scientists in the US) which is really just an entertaining collection of anecdotes covered in a positivist gloss. But at least he largely avoids the conflict myth and admits that neither Giordano Bruno nor the anti-Trinitarian Michael Servetus can be described as martyrs for science. 约翰·格里宾（John Gribbin）最近出版的《科学史：1543—2001》（美国版书名为《科学家》）就是一个很好的例子。该书披着实证主义的光彩外衣，其实只是本读起来令人愉悦的奇闻轶事集。但至少，格里宾也很大程度上避免了上述冲突神话，并且承认布鲁诺和反三位一体的米迦勒·塞尔维特（Michael Servetus）都很难称得上是科学殉道者。 Full-on confrontations between science and religion are reasonably rare. Even when such encounters occur, they are usually arguments between co-religionists with shared concerns about how new discoveries affect faith. We find this during the debate that followed the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species where Christians such as Asa Gray defended both the theory of evolution and Christianity’s accommodation with it. 科学与宗教间的全面冲突是相当罕见的。即使冲突发生了，往往也只是发生在拥有共同信仰的信徒中，他们对于这些新发现将如何影响信仰而展开争论。在达尔文的《物种起源》出版之后便产生了类似的讨论。基督徒阿萨·格雷（Asa Gray）便同时为基督教教义与演化论辩护，并努力使两者协调起来。 Another cause of confusion is when people seeking to attack religion seek to co-opt science onto their side. For instance, whether one is pro-life or not has nothing to do with science, but is often portrayed as such. Concerns about experiments on stem cells also arise from ethics. 混淆的另外一个原因是，当人们攻击宗教的时候，他们往往团结科学站到他们这一边。一个人支持堕胎与否无关科学，但往往就被描述为与科学相关。同样的例子还包括因为伦理道德而引发的对干细胞实验的忧虑。 This leads us straight to the real conflict which is between religion and naturalism. And here the warfare is real enough. Science is partly characterised by methodological naturalism which was used by natural philosophers of the Middle Ages and fully approved by the Church. 这把我们引向宗教与自然主义之间的真实冲突，这里才是交锋真正发生的地方。科学部分地带有方法论自然主义的色彩，这种方法论自然主义在中世纪时期被自然哲学家使用，并且得到了教会的支持。 They realised, as modern naturalists do not, that it is an error of logic to assume that because science assumes naturalism to simplify and explain, it follows that science shows naturalism is true. 当时他们认为（现代自然主义者没有意识到），仅仅因为科学假定自然主义解释简洁就得到“科学证明了自然主义是正确”的这个结论，逻辑上是不正确的。 It is not the purpose of this article to attack the naturalistic fallacy, merely to observe that many of the alleged battles between science and religion are actually being fought by proxy between naturalism and religion, with science as the weapon of both. And, as the defeats of naturalism over the big bang and spontaneous generation showed, the traffic is by no means all one way. 本文的目的不是要攻击自然主义谬误，而是想让人们看到，所谓的科学与宗教之间的冲突，其实是自然主义与宗教双方都利用科学而在他们之间进行的代理战争。而正如自然主义在大爆炸理论和自然发生学说上的失败所显示的，发展进程并非一条单向道。 Most academic historians, while rejecting outright conflict, would refuse to be drawn on whether or not the contribution of religion to science was broadly positive or negative citing the enormous amount of data that would have to be assimilated to give a sensible answer. Most are happy to say that the relationship has been positive in some ways and negative in others with an overall effect that is probably too subtle to be measured. 现在，大多数学院派历史学家并不认为科学与宗教完全站在对立面，也拒绝投身于这样一件事情：通过引证大量数据，从而给出一个敏感答案，并最终在宗教对科学的影响到底大致上是正面的还是负面的这个问题上站队表态。相反，他们会乐于承认两者的关系在某些方面是积极的，在另外一些方面是消极的；总体来说影响微妙，难以估算。 While I respect that cautious view, I believe it is wrong and that a very strong case can be made for the Christian religion be a specific factor in the rise of modern science in Western Europe. This is one of the ideas that I address in my new book God's Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science. 虽然我尊重这个审慎的观点，但我仍相信它是错误的，并认为，我们可以在很强的意义上说：基督教信仰是西欧现代科学兴起的一个重要因素。这也是我在新书《上帝的哲学家：中世纪世界是如何为现代科学奠定基础的》中要表达的一个观点。 （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Great Terror at 40 《大恐怖》四十周年 作者：Robert Conquest @ 2008-04-16 译者：Eartha（@王小贰_Eartha）   校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Hoover Digest, http://www.hoover.org/research/great-terror-40 In the late Sixties when my book The Great Terror came out, it was still true that, as the great historian François Furet noted, after the war and the demise of fascism, “all the major debates on postwar ideas revolved round a single question: the nature of the Soviet regime.” He adds the paradox that communism had two main embodiments—as a backward despotism and as a constituency in the West that had to be kept unaware of the other’s reality. And, up to the last, this was often accompanied by a view of the Cold War as an even exchange—with the imputation that any denigration of the Soviet regime was due to peace-hating prejudice. 上世纪六十年代后期，我的书《大恐怖》（The Great Terror）刚出版之际，有个论断还是正确的。如著名历史学家弗朗索瓦·傅勒所言，在二战结束与法西斯主义消亡之后，“战后所有的重大理念之争都只围绕着一个问题：苏联政权的本质。”他补充道，共产主义的两大现实是相互矛盾的：一个是落后的专制统治；另一个则是它在西方世界所获得的支持，这些支持者必须对前一项现实保持无知。直到最后，这一悖论通常还伴随了另一种观念，认为冷战是一场公平对抗，将任何对苏联政权的贬斥都归罪于厌恶和平的偏见。 What was the condition of our previous knowledge of Stalinist actuality before, let us say, 1956? We had for decades had a large amount of real information about the purges, all often rejected or ignored, while little truth and much falsehood had emerged from Moscow. However, since 1956, starting with the revelations of Nikita Khrushchev’s Secret Speech it was (or seemed) indisputable that a regime of lies and terror had indeed been in existence. Over the years that followed came the publication of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which, as Galina Vishnevskaya put it, “let the genie out of the bottle, and however hard they tried later, they couldn’t put it back in.” 比如说，1956年之前，我们对斯大林主义的真实状况到底知道多少呢？几十年来，我们拥有大量关于苏联政治清洗的真实资料，却大都不被认可或者被忽视，与此同时只有零星真相和大量谎言从莫斯科传来。但是，自1956年起，以尼基塔•赫鲁晓夫“秘密演讲”所揭露的为开端，这样一个事实已变得（或至少看起来）无可争议：那里早已存在一个由谎言和恐怖维持的政权。之后的数年间，《伊凡·杰尼索维奇的一天》【译注：索尔仁尼琴的一部中篇小说，以作者自己的劳改营生活为素材写成。】出版了，借用卡丽娜·维许涅芙丝卡雅的评价，这本书“将妖怪放出了魔瓶，不管当局之后多么努力，都已无可挽回。” So by 1964 or 1965 it had gradually become plain that a huge gap in history needed to be filled, and that the facts released over the past few years, plus the often denied testimony of some of the regime’s hostile but increasingly justified witnesses, could be put together, if carefully done, to produce a veridical story, a real history. 所以，到1964或1965年，一项清楚的共识逐渐形成：历史有一道鸿沟需要填补，如果将过去几年间揭露的真相，和过去遭否认但现在渐渐变得可信的苏联政权敌对证人的证言放在一起，足够仔细的话，就能呈现出一个真实的故事，一段真实的历史。 When my book came out in 1968, the publishers were surprised to have to reprint it time and time again to meet demand. Reviews, from left and right, were almost all very favorable. And it was soon published in most Western languages—and also Hindi, Arabic, Japanese, and Turkish. 我的书于1968年出版之后，出版商们吃惊地发现，需要不停地再版才能满足读者的需求。从左派到右派，几乎所有的书评都表示了赞赏。不久，这本书的译本也纷纷出版，不仅大多数西方语言有译本，还有印地语、阿拉伯语、日语以及土耳其语的译本。 Over the decades that followed, “the period of stagnation” as it became known in Russia, there was little further public addition to our knowledge—or to that of the Soviet citizen. But in those years came many breaches of the official silence. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn “illegally” gave us The Gulag Archipelago. From Andrei Sakharov came striking interviews and interventions. There was a flowering of samizdat and, to counter it, many arrests (and confinement in penal “psychiatric” wards— as reported by my friend Vladimir Bukovsky and others—as well as the Gulag). 在接下来的几十年中，俄国进入了一个此后被称为“停滞期”的阶段，我们几乎再没得到更多关于苏联政权的公开消息，苏联人民也是如此。但是在那些年间，官方的沉默也几次三番被打破。亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴 “非法地”将《古拉格群岛》传递出来。安德烈·萨哈罗夫【译注：苏联 “苏联氢弹之父”，人权运动家，1975年获诺贝尔和平奖。】则让我们看到了令人震惊的警察询问和干涉【编注：此句原文颇费解，姑作此译】。地下文学出版发行曾经历了一段兴盛期，与之相应的，有很多人因此被逮捕（以及被监禁在刑罚性的“精神病院”——由我的朋友Vladimir Bukovsky及其他人所报道——还有古拉格）。 And there was Roy Medvedev’s Let History Judge—from, what is more, a devoted Leninist: a deeply detailed blow at the Stalin terror. There was a liberalism of the catacombs. Above all, the old falsifications lost credibility among anything describable as an educated class in Russia. The public acceptance of what they knew to be not merely falsehoods, but stupid and long-exposed falsehoods—the mere disgrace of it ate into the morale of even the official intelligentsia, as I remember noting in conversations with Soviet diplomats. Meanwhile, the original 1968 edition of The Great Terror had been published in a Russian version (in Florence, in 1972) and was soon being smuggled into the USSR, where it was welcomed by many outside—and, as we now know, inside—official circles. 还有罗易·梅德韦杰夫的著作《让历史来审判》——特别是它来自一位真挚的列宁主义者，这是对斯大林恐怖统治沉重而细节详尽的一记重击。墓室里也藏着自由主义。尤其是，过去的弄虚作假已在俄国任何可称为受过教育的阶层中丢尽信誉。人们公开接受那些他们明知为错，而且还是愚蠢至极、久已揭露的错误——仅仅是由此产生的耻辱就能侵蚀掉甚至身在朝堂的知识阶层的士气，我记得自己在与苏联外交官的交谈中就有此观感。在此期间，1968初版的《大恐怖》也发行了俄文译本（1972年，在佛罗伦萨），并且不久就被走私到苏联，受到了官员圈子以外的热烈追捧——还有，如我们现在所知，也包括了官圈内部成员。 In the early 1980s came the realization by some in Moscow that the whole regime had become nonviable economically, ecologically, intellectually— and even militarily—largely because of its rejection of reality. When it came to Soviet history, and Stalin’s Terror, there was, as on other themes, some sharp disagreement in the Politburo—later to produce the attempted coup of 1991. The highest leadership itself had not managed to find the facts about the fate of its own relatives! It is only years later that records of these disputes have been published. 1980年代初期，莫斯科的一些人终于意识到，整个政权在经济层面、生态层面、智力层面——甚至是军事层面——无法继续维持下去的主要原因是它自身对现实的拒绝。当谈及苏联历史和斯大林的恐怖统治时，如同谈及其它一些议题一样，政治局中存在着尖锐的分歧——后来还曾引发了1991年的未遂政变。甚至连苏联最高领导层都弄不清楚有关其亲属下落的事实！数年后，有关这些争论的记录才被公开出版。 One finds Mikhail Gorbachev telling his colleagues, “Millions rehabilitated— that is the great service done by Nikita Khrushchev.” Why did this “stop short?” he asked. “Because Khrushchev too had blood on his hands.” As to his successors, they had done their best to keep the truth unknown: “Under Brezhnev, under Andropov, under Chernenko, even members of the Politburo had no information.” As to what followed, Stalin’s “use of the Kirov murder to bring in repression,” the only motive was “the struggle for power.” And Gorbachev adds: “Plots against him—that’s all rubbish (chepukkha).” 我们看到，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫曾对他的同僚说，“数百万人被平反了——这是由尼基塔•赫鲁晓夫完成的伟大贡献。”但为什么又“突然停下了呢？”他问道。“因为赫鲁晓夫的双手也沾满鲜血。”而他的继任者们则尽其所能隐瞒真相：在勃列日涅夫、安德罗波夫、契尔年科治下，甚至连某些政治局成员都不知道相关信息。”正如戈尔巴乔夫接下来所说的，斯大林“借基洛夫谋杀案实行镇压”的唯一动机就是“夺取权力”。”他还补充道：“针对他的阴谋——那全是胡说八道(chepukkha)。” “And this was Stalin,” Gorbachev told his colleagues. “How can that be accepted, let alone forgiven?” “这就是斯大林，”戈尔巴乔夫对他的同僚们说道。“这怎么可能被接受，更何谈原谅？” He then speaks of “3 million sentenced, and that the most active part of the nation. A million shot. And that is not counting the share of dekulakization and the fate of people at the time of deportations. And this was Stalin. How can that be accepted, let alone forgiven?” 他接着谈到了，“三百万人被判刑，而这些人正是这个国家最有活力的那部分。一百万人被枪毙了，这还没算上反富农斗争所造成的死亡人数和当时被流放者的命运。这就是斯大林。这怎么可能被接受，更何谈原谅？” This was not for publication. But the whole direction of glasnost, amongst other things, brought a mass of officially banned knowledge out of hiding. The first public mention in Russia of my book was when Katrina vanden Heuvel interviewed me for Moskovskie Novosti in April 1989. 这些本不会被公开。但是，在公开性政策等的大方向指引之下，大量官方封禁的内幕得见天日。俄国对我的著作的首次公开提及，是在1989年4月，《莫斯科新闻报》发表了记者Katrina vanden Heuvel对我的采访。 When I was in Moscow later that year, it was all over. Through the decade there had been little reply to the book from the party establishment. But now the Stalinist writer Aleksandr Chakovsky called me “anti-Sovietchik number one” at the last plenum of the Central Committee. By that time the Russian edition was being serialized (in a million copies each month) in Neva. 那一年再晚些时候，我正呆在莫斯科，一切都结束了。十年来，当权政党对这本书的回应微乎其微。但是现在，斯大林主义作家Aleksandr Chakovsky在中央委员会最后一次全体会议把我称作的“头号反苏联者”。那时候，俄文版《大恐怖》正在《涅瓦》杂志上连载（该刊月发行量一百万份）。 The new openness had produced so much new material that it became possible, and even necessary, to produce a new edition of this book. The Great Terror: A Reassessment was published in 1990. Over the next four or five years, I was welcomed in Russia, making many friends, speaking to cultural and other groups and at conferences hosted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. 新采取的公开性政策带来了如此多的新材料，使得为这本书重写一个新版本不仅是可能的，也是必须的。《大恐怖：重新评估》于1990年出版。在接下来的四、五年间，我受到了俄国的欢迎，结交了新朋友，向文化类与其它性质的团体发表讲话，还参与了由苏联外交部主办的研讨会。 Going into Izvestiya to collect payment for a contribution to a Moscow journal, I saw a portrait of Nikolai Bukharin (purged and executed in 1938) hanging alongside those of the other former editors. I spent some weeks being filmed there for the documentary series Red Empire, made by Granada Television. As I encountered those I had met earlier abroad, it was hard not to relish Andrei Voznesensky’s saying he could hardly believe I was there: could he pinch me to make sure? 在我前往《消息报》为我向莫斯科一家刊物的投稿领取稿酬时，我看到尼古拉·布哈林的画像（于1938年遭清洗、处决）与历任主编的画像挂在一起。我在莫斯科停留了几周，参与摄制了由格拉纳达电视台制作的系列纪录片《红色帝国》。当我在那儿与此前曾在国外见过的人相见时，安德烈·沃兹涅先斯基的说法就很容易引起我的回味，他说他真不敢相信我会出现在那里：他能够打我几拳来确认吗？ The information now available established the story clearly as to historical essentials, and in a generally correct way as to almost all crucial details. But we were soon like modern historians of an ancient empire who have had to rely on a few inscriptions, some only recently deciphered, when a huge store of firsthand records is discovered under some pyramid. It was enough for generations of archaeologists. . . . So eventually we come to the 2008 edition. 现在，可用的资料已然建构起整个故事，基础史实清晰，几乎所有的重要细节总体上都是正确的。但是很快，我们就像是研究古代帝国的现代历史学家了，本来一直依赖着一点点的碑文，其中一些还是最近才被破译的，忽然有天却从某个金字塔底下发现了大量的一手记录。这些记录足够好几代的考古学家去研究了……所以最后我们看到了2008版的《大恐怖》。 By far the most substantial additions, or amendments, to our knowledge have been the set of decrees on “Mass Operations” in 1937–38. The lists of those sentenced by the Military Collegium were sent to Stalin, and given his approval, with only a few Politburo members also signing. 到目前为止，对我们的认知产生了最实质的补充或者修正的，就是1937-1938“集体处决”的一系列判决了【编注：这次“大行动”是指1936-1938年大清洗期间由苏联内务人民委员会（NKVD）实施的一系列针对特定类别人群（比如富农、少数民族、外国人）的行动，共导致一百多万人被逮捕，数十万人被处决】。被苏联最高法院军事委员会审判的人，人员名单会递交给斯大林，获得他的批准和仅少许几个政治局成员的签字。【编注：大清洗期间经斯大林亲自签令处决的，据统计有681,692人。】 Nor did this informal leadership group have much time to spare. Records show that they had to make so many decisions on other urgent matters of policy that these terror orders were usually handled in twenty or thirty minutes. But when it comes to the Mass Operations, one finds that the number of victims in these accounted for nearly twenty times the number of victims of the Military Collegium and other lesser tribunals. 但这个非正式的领导小组也抽不出太多时间。记录显示，还有很多紧迫的其他政策事项需要他们做出决定，以至于这些恐怖命令通常在二、三十分钟内就被解决了。但到了“集体处决”阶段，我们发现，受难者的数量几乎是被军事委员会或其他次级法庭判刑的受难者的二十倍。 The mass terror was ordered in detail from the top, and was directed, with the numbers to be repressed laid down for each province and republic, for each stratum of the population—with individual crimes of terrorism, espionage, and so on added later by the local troika—and the lists of names then submitted to Moscow for final approval. 大恐怖是细致地自上而下要求的，各省、各共和国和各个阶层都受指定的镇压人数指导——个人犯下的恐怖主义活动罪、间谍罪及后来由当地三人领导小组增加的罪行——接着，罪犯名单就会递交给莫斯科以获得最终批准。 That is to say, the strata were condemned as such, and the mass terror was seen as a removal of all that seemed unassimilable to the Stalinist order. Stalin’s mass action against a section of the population was thus taken on “ideological” grounds, merely disguising it as a purge of terrorists, spies, and saboteurs necessary to the safety and survival of the regime. 换言之，社会阶层是因其存在本身而被定罪的，大恐怖行动可以看做是一项清除所有被认为无法被斯大林秩序同化的群体的行动。因此，斯大林针对该国人口的一部分所采取的大规模行动是出于“意识形态”基础，只是伪装成了为保证政权的安全和生存，对恐怖分子、间谍和破坏分子的肃清。 In the 2008 edition we have much new material on the personalities and activities of the key secret police operators and of the whole mechanism of terror. 2008年的版本中，我们增加了许多新材料，主要是关于秘密警察中核心人物的活动与性格，以及大恐怖的整体运作机制。 My book has been faulted for giving too little attention to the context of Russia and of the Russian historical and mental backgrounds. We find what seem to be contradictions. Any reader of the country’s great literature may feel an especially Russian humanism arising from the depths of the “national character.” 我的书有所不足，对俄国当时所处的历史情境、俄国的历史背景与精神背景给予的关注太少。我们发现了其中的一些矛盾。读过该国伟大文学的读者也许能从他们的“民族性格”深处感受到一种俄式人文主义。 On the other hand, Ronald Hingley (in his classic The Russian Mind) saw the fictional and the real Russian as living in great dullness interspersed with, or accompanying, extreme outbursts, but also possessed by a view of the country’s past and present as deplorable yet containing as recompense a wonderful future with some sort of national glory compensating for everything. A complementary trait often reported is the fear that a Russian, or Russia, is being deceived or cheated—the sort of thing we see in Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls and in Soviet xenophobia. 但另一方面，罗纳德·辛格雷（在他的杰作《俄罗斯心智》中）看见的却是虚构的、真实的俄国人生活在极度的无聊之中，点缀或伴随着极端的爆发。不仅如此，他们的头脑中同时也有一种观念，认为整个国家的过去和现在是恶劣的，但也相信会有个美好的未来作为补偿，那时某种国家荣誉将能弥补一切。而经常报道的一种相关特性是，一种对俄罗斯人或俄罗斯正在遭受欺骗的恐惧——从尼古莱·果戈理的《死魂灵》和苏联的仇外主义中可见一斑。 But this does downgrade Russia’s other options—liberalism or pluralism. As Boris Pasternak put it, in the 1880s came “the birth of an enlightened and affluent middle class, open to occidental influences, progressive, intelligent, artistic.” There are many historical and modern examples of this more “Western” style of thought in Russia, deep-set, and though often disenchanted continuing to present a more viable and civilized future. The present leadership has, at least to a large extent, given up Soviet-type economics. 但这的确低估了俄罗斯的其他选择——自由主义或者多元主义。举Boris Pasternak所言为例，1880年代“开化、富裕的中产阶级开始出现，他们愿意接纳西方影响，进步、睿智并且富有艺术气息。”纵观俄罗斯古今历史，这样的例子能够举出很多。这种更为“西式”的思想风格是根深蒂固的，尽管经常幻灭，但仍持续代表着一个具有更高可行性与文明度的未来。现在的领导层，至少在很大程度上，已经放弃了苏联模式的经济。 But one can have “reform” without liberalism— as with Peter the Great and Pyotr Stolypin. Above all, we are still far from the rule of law—much more important than “democracy.” As elsewhere, the problem seems to be to free the idea of the “nation” from both archaic barbarism and from the more recently bankrupted verbalisms that have partly melded into it. 但是，一个政权是可以不走自由主义道路而完成改革的——比如彼得大帝与彼得·斯托雷平所做的那样。毕竟，现今的俄罗斯还远没有做到法治——这比“民主”更为重要。和别处一样，问题似乎在于要将“国家”这一观念从陈旧的野蛮中解放出来，同时也从已部分融入其中、但不久前已破产的空洞教条中解放出来。 The history of the period covered by The Great Terror sees the enforcement of Stalin’s totally intolerant belief system—with terror as the decisive argument. Terror means terrorizing. Mass terror means terrorizing the whole population, and must be accompanied by the most complete public exposure of the worst enemies of the people, of the party line, and so of the truth. We know the results. One of the strangest notions put forward about Stalinism is that in the interests of “objectivity” we must be—wait for it—“nonjudgmental.” But to ignore, or downplay, the realities of Soviet history is itself a judgment, and a very misleading one. 《大恐怖》中提及的历史时期，见证了斯大林彻底不容异己的思想体制的贯彻过程——恐怖就是这一体制的硬道理。恐怖意味着施加恐吓，大恐怖则意味着对全体国民施加恐吓，同时必然伴随着对人民和政党的死敌，因此也是真理的死敌的最全面、公开的揭露。我们知道这样做的后果。对于斯大林主义，人们提出的最怪异的概念之一是，为了“客观性”，我们必须做到——听好了——“不加评判”。但是，刻意忽视或淡化苏联历史的实情，这本身就是一个评判，并且还是极具误导性的那种。 （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

通往现代文明的两条路线 辉格 2015年9月11日 上个月有幸和阿姨谈了两次，成效颇丰，一开始我们花了点时间，快速核对了一下各自在一些要点上的看法，后面的交谈就比较轻松流畅、海阔天空了。 主要的收获在我这边，我现在比较明白阿姨的大致思路了，至于我，因为历来坚持以最直白易懂的方式说话，我想大概从来就是袒露无遗的。（通俗版：大伯总是光着膀子，阿姨则难得玉体袒裎。） 众多基本共识，和一些细节分歧，我就不细说了，因为这些异同旁观者容易理解，从记录文字和我以往文章中也不难找到。这里我想解释的，是我和阿姨最基本的分歧，这涉及到相当纵深的渊源脉络，所以旁观者恐怕不容易看清。 简单说，基本分歧是，对于西方文明走向其现代形态的两条路线——姑且称为封建路线和城邦路线（不过这两个名字可能造成误解，我后面还会说）——我们有着不同态度，阿姨（在不同语境中）同时推崇两者，而我对后者相当拒斥，即便有所接受也很勉强。 需要声明，这一二分叙事是我的个人看法，和阿姨的交谈让我在这问题上思路更清楚了，但这并不代表阿姨也持同样看法，他未必会认可这样的二分。 下面我以最简略的方式解释一下这两条路线究竟是什么，它们的历史渊源，以及各自在现代文明中留下的遗产；这个高度概括性的叙述难免会留下大量有待推敲的疑点和过度片面化之类的问题，我会在未来恰当时候作出更细致的说明。 【前传：农业带来的新冲突局面】 前农业社会也充满暴力冲突，但农业改变了冲突的方式，狩猎采集者相互攻击的目的主要是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，因为他们没什么东西可抢的，因而也没什么东西（除了人身）需要保卫，而农耕者有了可供劫掠的财产（牲畜、谷物和农具），这就完全改变了战争形态。 狩猎采集者之间的战争以伏击和偷袭为主，阵地战多半是仪式性的，伤亡很小；一旦被成功偷袭，占下风一方的主要策略是逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗，农耕者就不同了，他们逃跑就只能饿死，所以必须留下来设法捍卫家园。 这是国家诞生前夜的基本背景，然后，在如何保卫家园上，农耕者发展出了两种模式。 【城邦】 一种是城邦，它源自基于血缘/文化纽带而组成的农耕部落，这些部落在面临新的战争形态时，出于自我保卫的需要，转变成了比原有部落更紧密的共同体，同时继承了部落的两大特性：高度文化认同和平等主义，在外部冲突的压力之下，从中发展出了城邦民主制、公民责任和步兵传统。 其核心特征是高度重合的共同利益，以及由此带来的强凝聚力和集体行动能力，面对外来入侵者时，所有公民不仅都有自身利益需要捍卫，也有义务和同胞并肩捍卫城邦利益，每个公民都是平等战士，这一集体行动的责任，将狩猎者的仪式性阵地战转变成了希腊式步兵方阵。 （在有些案例中，城邦的基础可以由自由农民换成有组织的自由手工业者或小商人，但原理类似。） 城邦是现代公民社会和民主政治的原型。 【封建】 另一种是封建，它起源于武装劫掠团伙，而后者是农业所导致的分工的结果，狩猎者中，每位猎人同时也是战士，不存在分工，因为光靠打仗养不活自己（毕竟抓人吃远不如抓动物吃容易嘛），而农业创造了可供劫掠的财产，因而打仗成了一门可以独立谋生的手艺，于是一部分人从农耕者或狩猎者中分化出来，成为专以劫掠为生的职业武人。 这就给农耕者带来很大麻烦，必须寻求自保，一种方法是组织成自卫共同体，就是城邦，但并非所有农民都能成功创建这样的组织，做不到的那些，只能寻求庇护，与庇护者建立依附关系，交纳保护费，获得其免于劫掠的保证，并得到其帮助抵御其他劫掠者的服务。 寻求庇护者的途径，大致分两种：一种外来劫掠者，这就相当于接受其征服，另一种是本部落内分化出的职业武人（还有一种是像罗马崩溃后留在部落地区的残余军队这样特殊来源）；这种区别的意义主要在初始阶段，双方在种族、语言和文化上存在隔阂，但时间长了，其实没什么不同。 这是最底层的庇护关系，但武装团伙之间的竞争仍然存在，幸运的话，他们之间也可能建立联盟和依附关系，最终构成一个多层次的庇护网络。 假如这种多层庇护网络长期稳定下来，各方遵守效忠/庇护责任（这一责任在底层是一方交保护费，一方提供保护，在上层是一方履行军役，一方封授领地）就转变成封建契约，庇护网络变成了领地封授体系，领地和保护费权益变成了封建式财产权。 需要强调，这一发展不是必然的，在许多条件下，庇护关系可能始终稳定不下来，因而机会主义盛行，长期处于欺骗、背叛、压制和报复的循环之中；但足够幸运的是，封建体系至少在西欧稳定存续了很长时间。 封建制是普通法、普通法下的财产权和英格兰宪政的渊源。（注意是渊源，封建制本身不包括这些元素） 【民族国家：城邦的现代对应物】 民族国家是近代在大得多的规模上复制城邦的产物，不过，规模问题也让它在一些重要方面不同于城邦： 1）对于城邦，文化同质性和民族认同几乎是自动获得的，只是被外部威胁强化了一下，而近代民族国家的同质性和民族认同，则是由政府强力推行的结果，印刷术、公立教育和官僚系统等等现代技术与组织手段，使得这一民族再发明工作有可能完成； 2）城邦的共同利益和共同命运对个体是切实可见的，有说服力的，而民族国家的共同利益多半是虚幻遥远的，需要编造各种神话进行忽悠，有时还需要借助像挑动战争之类的卑劣手段来刻意制造共同命运，即便如此，其集体行动的有效性也远逊于城邦； 3）高出两三个数量级的人口规模，使得城邦的直接民主变得不可行，只能改成代议制；而代议制里的委托代理问题，实际上让权力落入了精英手中，国民虽有公民之名，无政治参与之实，城邦公民真正的现代对应物其实是民族国家的精英； 4）由于上述几点（还有更多），城邦的主要优势，全民动员能力（这可以让他能够召集起大量步兵），在一战之后其实已经逐渐丧失，能否复兴十分可疑； 【自由市场秩序：封建的现代对应物】 自由市场秩序是指，存在一个普通法体系，保障人身和财产权利，除此之外，政府不干预任何私人事务，简单说，其终极形态就是市场无政府，即，当司法系统能够自我维持时，政府就被取消或私有化了。 民族国家和城邦之间的对应关系是容易理解的，因为他们保留了许多外观上的相似性，自由市场秩序和封建之间的对应关系则不容易看出也较难解释清楚，因为它更迂回曲折，封建制为现代市场制度的起源提供了良好土壤，但两者本身十分不同，其间经历了一系列演变，而且依赖于许多因缘际会的巧合，后者远远不是前者的“必然产物”。 （我不打算在这里详述这一演变过程，从我的旧文章里可以找到一些粗略的叙述，比如：《王权削弱不是宪政发展的结果》，《封建主义和专制主义一样坏？》，《天堂不远，就在索马里》，《封建与宪政》） 不过，深入一点就会发现，在一些基本要点上，两者仍有着共性，最根本的共性是：它们都是高度私人化的——没有公法，只有私法，没有公权力，只有私权利，没有公民，只有个人，没有主权，只有法人，…… 当然，这里的“没有”都是针对其终极形态而言，实际上尚不存在接近完美的自由市场秩序，因而这些“没有”在特定社会都要打不同程度的折扣。 【概括性对比】 当然，两条路线之间也有不少非常重要的共同点，首先，两者都要求有一套社会契约，或者叫共同规范，据此而建立契约共同体，不同的是，民族国家的契约内容更多，是一种强共同体，对成员施加强义务，要求更多的价值认同和普遍伦理；其次，两者都为广大地域的众多人口提供了普遍司法保护，从而使得现代流动性社会和大规模市场成为可能。 为方便理解，我概括对比一下两条路线的要点（我用城邦和封建来命名两条路线，仅仅是基于渊源上的考虑，目标形态其实是它们各自的现代对应物）：

	城邦路线	封建路线
文化同质性要求	强	弱
民族认同/价值认同	强	弱
共同利益/共同命运	强	弱
社会契约	强	弱
公民义务	强	弱
公法领域	强	弱
主权地位	至高无上/明确/集中	受限/模糊/分散
政府规模	大	小
地方自治	弱	强
普选制	必须	不必
义务兵役	必须	不必/无
全民动员能力	强	弱
国民教育	必须	弱/无
福利主义倾向	强	弱
个人自由	受限	充分
对制度创新的开放性	低	高

  【站队理由】 作为个人主义者，我自然倾向于第二条路线，第一条为个人自由留下的空间太小，阿姨也承认，他在内心也是更喜欢第二种的，但现实条件不允许，只能退而求其次，主权民族国家已成为主导，用阿姨的话说，除非发生一次末日级的大变故，否则私人秩序已没有出头机会，对此判断，我能理解，但有保留，存疑。 确实，在一个险恶环境中（比如老欧洲），缺乏全民动员能力可能是致命的，大英在其全盛期，步兵数量也是少得可怜，对于维持其所主导的全球秩序完全不够，所以只能依靠外交手腕、借力打力，或者花钱雇佣，一旦民族国家纷纷崛起，秩序便难以为继。相比之下，普鲁士这个按城邦路线创建民族国家的典范，其崛起速度和动员能力则有目共睹。 （其实荷兰比大英更能代表封建路线，但因为荷兰过早退出历史舞台，没多少东西可说，而且荷兰的命运也说明了封建路线的脆弱性。） 历史上的情况确实如此，但更重要的是现在，所以关键问题是，美国究竟属于哪一类？假如美国是另一个普鲁士，那我们确实没得选了。 这问题很难回答，美国太特殊了，而这一特殊又是因为他太安全了，远离险恶旧世界，所以即便骨子里有不少城邦元素，也鲜有机会发育成普鲁士那样，并在行动上表现出来，偶尔爆发一下倒是能动员起一支上千万的军队，和吓死人的军工产能，但这种爆发注定是短暂的。 反过来也是，假如美国代表了市场秩序模式，也同样缺乏机会发育和表现出来，还是因为他太安全也太辽阔因而太容易自足了，没必要去建立一个帝国来维持他所需要的安全秩序，至少没必要为此付出大规模动员的代价。 但依我看，美国还是更接近后一种情况，当然我可能只是被愿望蒙蔽了判断力；但无论如何，我是不会为任何一个普鲁士站队的，即便和霍布斯状态或极权主义相比，普鲁士要好多了，但对我来说还是远远不够好。 这么说吧，假如人类贱到不得不靠普鲁士来拯救，那我对他们还有没有救这件事情就没多大兴趣了。 （随便记录一些交谈当时闪过的念头，不成条理，读着吃力的话还望见谅，要把这种大话题写流畅太吃力了）