含有〈宗教〉标签的文章(43)

宗教经济学

【2020-09-16】

之前在EconTalk听了一个对棕教经济学家 Laurence Iannaccone 的访谈,其中有个观点,认为棕教在美国之所以没有经历像欧洲那种程度的衰退(以信众人数,上教堂频率,捐款等活跃度指标衡量),是因为美国有着远更渍油的棕教市场,这一点之所以被忽视,是因为以往人们在谈论棕教渍油度时,通常只关注消费方的选择渍油(即个人选择信不信、信什么,入哪派的渍油),在这方面,欧美在过去一个半世纪中似乎已没多大差别,可是,假如我们将注意力转向供方,便可发现差异巨大,在美国,创立新教派或组织新教会,都是完全渍油的,而在欧洲,这会面临非常大(more...)

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【2020-09-16】 之前在EconTalk听了一个对棕教经济学家 Laurence Iannaccone 的访谈,其中有个观点,认为棕教在美国之所以没有经历像欧洲那种程度的衰退(以信众人数,上教堂频率,捐款等活跃度指标衡量),是因为美国有着远更渍油的棕教市场,这一点之所以被忽视,是因为以往人们在谈论棕教渍油度时,通常只关注消费方的选择渍油(即个人选择信不信、信什么,入哪派的渍油),在这方面,欧美在过去一个半世纪中似乎已没多大差别,可是,假如我们将注意力转向供方,便可发现差异巨大,在美国,创立新教派或组织新教会,都是完全渍油的,而在欧洲,这会面临非常大障碍,有时几乎不可能,究其因,在国家权力退出棕教事务这一点上,美国做的最为彻底,而且从建国起便已实现。 刚刚又想起这个话题,于是查了些资料,发现确实如此,仅以瑞典和德国为例。 在瑞典,直到1860年之前,脱离路德教会都是非法的,1860年后,允许脱离,但只能转入另一个基督教会,这一规定直到1951年才废除,而路德宗的国教地位一直维持到2000,目前,瑞典是全欧棕教活跃度最低的国家。 在战后德国,虽然镇虎并不限制创立新教会,但他有个奇葩政策:教会税,这是附加在所得税上的一个特别税种(约为所得税的8-9%),不管是不是信徒都得交,收来的钱分配给合格教会,所谓合格就是具有足够规模且历史足够长,这就相当于把棕教市场变成了single payer,既已立足的教会根本不需要操心筹款的事情,这当然极大削弱了棕教市场的竞争和创新,看了下 church tax 这个维基词条,貌似这种情况在欧洲还很流行。 缺乏供方渍油的结果是阻断了供方通过竞争和创新不断进化的动力,令其难以适应始终处于变化之中的棕教需求,结果是信众不断流失。 而且这种阻断的效果是非常持久的,即便现在完全放开,供给活跃度也需要好几代人才会提高到新的均衡水平,因为正如Iannaccone在另一篇文章里所解释的,棕教供给和其他商品很不一样,建立新教派/新教会需要漫长而艰苦的努力,因而供方调整有很长的滞后期。 若考虑这一滞后期,便可发现,美国棕教市场还有另一个大优势:他的供给来源从一开始就非常丰富多样,殖民时代各殖民地就分属多个教派,而此后移民浪潮中,移民棕教背景更是无所不包,这一点,加上供方的充分渍油,让美国的潜在信徒拥有其他任何地方都不可比拟的多样选择,这最生动的体现在四次大觉醒浪潮之中。 由此可见,所谓美国例外,要点其实还是在于渍油。 附:Iannaccone 有篇文章介绍了他的棕教经济学概念和理论框架,收录于 John Hinnells 的 The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion (2009) 第27章,有兴趣可以找来读一下。 @如玉我从来不P图: 德国可以不交教堂税的,在市政厅登记人口时候报备无宗教就可以了。年纪大一些的人很多不会退出了,因为以后还要考虑葬礼和教堂墓地的问题。年轻一代退出的很多,我认识的德国人基本没人交教堂税。 @whigzhou: 多谢指正  
难以置信的信条

【2020-08-06】

很多人可能觉得,woke教那些信条那么荒唐(比如否认性别的生物学基础),怎么竟然还有人信,人怎么可以愚蠢到这种程度(不少还是藤校教授),其实,对比一下其他教派,这事情并不算太奇特。

所有教派都会要求信徒相信一些难以置信的东西,这些信条实际上是一种组织工具,它们有两个功能:第一是考验和筛选信徒,原理和一些首领以指鹿为马来考验部下的忠诚度一样——如果你觉得那难以置信,说明你还不够忠诚不够服帖,区别只是,在教派形成过程中,这种(more...)

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【2020-08-06】 很多人可能觉得,woke教那些信条那么荒唐(比如否认性别的生物学基础),怎么竟然还有人信,人怎么可以愚蠢到这种程度(不少还是藤校教授),其实,对比一下其他教派,这事情并不算太奇特。 所有教派都会要求信徒相信一些难以置信的东西,这些信条实际上是一种组织工具,它们有两个功能:第一是考验和筛选信徒,原理和一些首领以指鹿为马来考验部下的忠诚度一样——如果你觉得那难以置信,说明你还不够忠诚不够服帖,区别只是,在教派形成过程中,这种考验未必需要围绕某位首领进行,而可以以协调博弈的方式在群体中自发的进行。 第二个功能是剥离信徒的常规社会关系,以强化教派成员的相互依赖,正因为信条极其荒谬而难以置信,宣称相信它,会让那些忠诚的信徒被旁人另眼相看,视为异类怪人,敬而远之,从而迫使他们转向教内兄弟抱团取暖,建立起一种强排他性的组织,并在组织内部实现强互惠和高合作性。 有个例子或许可以帮助我们理解第二点,北美有一些摩托车帮派,入伙者必须在臂膀上纹上纳粹图案,所以经常被视为新纳粹组织,可是有人研究发现,他们对纳粹的意识形态,镇痔诉求,或反犹主义,其实毫无兴趣,他们的活动也跟这些完全没关系,要求成员纹上这些图案,仅仅是因为他们知道这些符号是主流文化所不容的,所以,一旦纹上,你在主流社会就很难混了(交朋友找工作租房子都难),你的主要社会关系都被限定在帮派内部了,社交需求/情感需求/安全需求等等只能在那里寻求满足,这就极大提升了帮派的凝聚力。 当然,并非所有信条都能产生如此强的排他性和凝聚力,教条的考验与筛选强度,信条的难以置信的程度,都存在一个从弱到强的连续梯度,相应的,教派从松散到紧密也有一个连续梯度。
作为希腊遗产的基督教

【2018-06-13】

越来越觉得,基督教基本上是希腊遗产,希伯来成分只是个空壳,虽然壳也不是完全不相关…… ​​​​

使徒们生活于希腊化世界,成长于希腊文化,往往来自高流动性阶层因而更具希腊性而非地方性或民族性,福音书皆以希腊语写作,其普世主义建基于希腊化时代之新兴价值观,其哲学内核同样取自希腊哲学传统。 ​​​​

 

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【2018-06-13】 越来越觉得,基督教基本上是希腊遗产,希伯来成分只是个空壳,虽然壳也不是完全不相关…… ​​​​ 使徒们生活于希腊化世界,成长于希腊文化,往往来自高流动性阶层因而更具希腊性而非地方性或民族性,福音书皆以希腊语写作,其普世主义建基于希腊化时代之新兴价值观,其哲学内核同样取自希腊哲学传统。 ​​​​  
伊斯兰的新教运动

【2016-12-23】

@海德沙龙 《伊斯兰改革是否可能? ​​​​》 一种观点认为激进派和原教旨主义并不能代表伊斯兰,后者总体而言是和平宽容向善的,另一种观点认为基本教义决定了伊斯兰只能陷于目前这种不堪的状态,而在Daniel Pipes看来,第一种观点无视了当前的基本事实,第二种观点则既与伊斯兰历史不符……

@海德沙龙:Pipes指出了两个难以否认的历史事实:1)在历史上,伊斯兰社会并未被束缚于基本教义,2)假如基本教义能够如此决定一个宗教群体的社会生活和制度走向,那么基督教世界的近代转变同样不会发生。

(more...)
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【2016-12-23】 @海德沙龙 《伊斯兰改革是否可能? ​​​​》 一种观点认为激进派和原教旨主义并不能代表伊斯兰,后者总体而言是和平宽容向善的,另一种观点认为基本教义决定了伊斯兰只能陷于目前这种不堪的状态,而在Daniel Pipes看来,第一种观点无视了当前的基本事实,第二种观点则既与伊斯兰历史不符…… @海德沙龙:Pipes指出了两个难以否认的历史事实:1)在历史上,伊斯兰社会并未被束缚于基本教义,2)假如基本教义能够如此决定一个宗教群体的社会生活和制度走向,那么基督教世界的近代转变同样不会发生。 @whigzhou: Pipes对历史的回顾很有价值,可以清除最简单的那些错误,但他的乐观展望并没有说服力 @whigzhou: 依我看,1)伊斯兰改革当然可能,而且已经发生了,不止一次,2)当代伊斯兰主义就是一种伊斯兰的新教运动,3)宗教改革中诞生的教派通常都是激进的和原教旨主义的,4)基督教改革最初也产生了各种激进和暴力教派,以及宗教战争,5)基督教新教运动最终达致的可意结果和教义没多大关系, @whigzhou: 6)基督教世界最终迎来的政教分离、宗教宽容和信仰自由,不是任何新旧教义的逻辑后果,而是既已存在的文化背景、制度基础和政治权力结构共同作用的结果,这个(广义的)制度框架将教派冲突约束在令其有可能向宪政均衡收敛的限度之内,类似的事情发生在另一个环境中,结果十有八九是糟糕的, @whigzhou: 7)实际上,这一最终的均衡只有我们局外人在事后看来才是理想的,而在参与其中的任何教派眼里,那既不是他们期望的,也不是他们想要或喜欢的 @whigzhou: 8)在美国,新教运动和教派分化其实从来没有停止过,新教派伴随一轮轮大觉醒不断涌现,其中绝大部分是和平的,据此你很容易得出结论:新教基本上是和平的,这当然没错,但你也很可能进而断定:这一宗教『本质上』就是和平的,其教义决定了它是和平的,那就错了, @whigzhou: 试想,在一次次教派裂变中,只要出现一个非和平的变种,同时又没有宪政确保其他教派不受其伤害,那么其他教派要么(A)消失,要么(B)也变成暴力教派,要么(C)谋求自己动手建立秩序(从而破坏政教分离原则) @whigzhou: 9)那么,伊斯兰可能得到良性改革所需要的文化/政治条件吗?当然不会,因为大英帝国早已解散,如今连羞涩勉强版的美帝国也正在解散  
读史笔记#23:封侯拜爵的神仙们

封侯拜爵的神仙们
辉格
2016年12月11日

中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称,宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗,有史料可查者即有92个,扣除名号重复者,还有50多个,粗略估算,全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间,看来古代中国人『积极造神,见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。

如此多神仙得到敬拜,还要归功于神仙来源的多样化,和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性;早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿,比如司掌某种自然力的自然神,或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神,然而自中古以降,一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。

这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物,因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力;认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官,参加过某次战役,遭受过冤屈,或者离奇死亡——总之,任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方(more...)

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封侯拜爵的神仙们 辉格 2016年12月11日 中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称,宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗,有史料可查者即有92个,扣除名号重复者,还有50多个,粗略估算,全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间,看来古代中国人『积极造神,见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。 如此多神仙得到敬拜,还要归功于神仙来源的多样化,和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性;早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿,比如司掌某种自然力的自然神,或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神,然而自中古以降,一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。 这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物,因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力;认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官,参加过某次战役,遭受过冤屈,或者离奇死亡——总之,任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方都可以让他们获得候选资格,但真正确立其神灵地位的,是『灵验』事迹,即有人在向他祈求佑助时得偿所愿。 在《变迁之神》一书中,人类学家韩森考察了此类神祗的兴起,发现其数量在宋代经历了爆发性增长,而之所以神界能容得下如此规模的神口增长,是因为他们都是地方性的,其神力作用半径不过数十里,各地若想有神可求,就得自己造一个,而同时,造神逻辑本身确保了新神的供给:灵验的随机性意味着总是不断会有旧神失宠,新神崛起。 有趣的是,帝国朝廷对这场民间造神运动颇为热心,从11世纪初起,宋廷便挑选一些信众认可度较高的地方神祗予以官方承认,编入祀典,许多还授予官爵名号,拨给公款用于立碑修庙;一旦某神获得这样的官方地位,地方官便有责任定期组织祭祀敬拜活动,甚至提供财政和劳役支持。 韩森注意到,从1075年起,为地方神仙封授官爵的做法大面积铺开,并在此后成为政府的一项常规职能,其规模甚大,每年封授数十位神仙,每次封授都要经历一个繁杂的流程,涉及尚书省、礼部和太常寺的众多衙门,还有地方政府的两轮灵验性查证,那么,朝廷为何要花费大量行政与财政资源来做这样一件看起来没有实际功效的事情呢? 要理解这一点,我们最好将它和帝国的另一项重要制度——科举——对照着看;表面上,科举只是为帝国选拔官员的(它也确实有这功能),但实际上,它最重要的功能是为全民提供一部开放、全面覆盖且贯通到底的社会上升阶梯,而在此之前,上升通道往往为数十个门阀豪族所垄断,其他人只能凭借战功、偶然的恩宠、内乱造成的重新洗牌等非经常性机会来谋求晋身。 科举的这一功能对赢取精英阶层的广泛效忠从而强化帝国权力起着极为根本的作用,它让人口中最富有、最有才智、最有野心的那些人将其视为实现抱负的好机会,而假如没有这样的机会,他们很可能去支持其他潜在的权力中心,或者以官方所不愿看到的方式施展抱负,因而对帝国权力构成威胁。 科举也是推行官方价值体系和历史叙事的工具,求取功名者心甘情愿接受和传播官方说辞,而一旦取得功名便成为这一体系的既得利益者因而有足够动机去维护它,并将其渗透植入到他们拥有巨大影响力的家族传统和地方文化中。 虽然只有百分之几的成年男性参与科举,取得功名者更少,但无论是巩固还是颠覆帝国权力基础,这都是最有能量的一群人,而且,科举功名带来的权力、财富、士绅特权,甚至仅仅是读写能力,都会将他们置于家族和地方社区的领袖地位,因而笼络他们就笼络了他们所在的家族和地方。 从唐代起,帝国通过封授土司对未归化地区实施羁縻政策,科举与士绅特权的结合,其实就是对政治结构中帝权难以直接通达的部分实施羁縻,通过士绅羁縻家族与地方,类似的,为地方神仙封授官爵,则是对民间信仰与崇拜活动的羁縻。 之所以神仙也需要羁縻,是因为,对于世俗权力,神是个危险的存在,每个神灵名下都可能凝聚起一套价值观,道德规范,行为准则,乃至行动纲领,其中每一样都可能与官方版本相冲突,都有潜力在权力竞争中成为敌方的动员与组织基础,特别是当它们被一个独立的僧侣团体所控制时,就更危险了。 凭借封授制度,朝廷有机会对神祗进行筛选、约束、引导、改造和控制,很明显,他们会竭力排除最危险的那些神,比如有着另一套行为准则的道德神,或一神教中极具动员力的排他性神,或有着现成经典因而其合法性可能被僧侣组织掌握的神,还有附带着行动纲领的弥赛亚,而最合他们胃口的,将是那些不具有全国性动员能力的地方神,以及能够提供现世佑助却又毫无道德要求的功利神,或许并非巧合的是,后两种恰是此后中国最流行的神灵。  
[译文]伊斯兰改革是否可能?

Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes.
伊斯兰教能够被改革吗?历史和人的本性告诉我们:能。

作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08
译者:Tankman
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed

Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here.
《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上:伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。

Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate?

伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退,激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗?或是能被改革,变得更加温和,现代且与邻为善呢?伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利,并给穆斯林信仰自由,接受现代金融和司法的基本原则,而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗?

A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that “radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution,” the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, “He’s wrong. Sorry about that.” She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point.

越来越多的分析家认为不会,穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情,这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中,成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注:一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物,以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题,温和伊斯兰是解药”时,她说:“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕,追求同一目标,和相同的敌人战斗,但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。

My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge.

我的论述有两部分。第一,很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的;第二,革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。

Arguing Against Essentialism
对本质主义的驳斥

To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion’s core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past.

声称伊斯兰不可被改变,则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解,而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误,因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切,包括对圣典的解读,随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。

Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran’s interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of “no compulsion in religion,” and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi’i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam.

只有不考虑人类本性,无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁,一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变,像圣战,奴隶,高利贷,“宗教的非(more...)

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Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes. 伊斯兰教能够被改革吗?历史和人的本性告诉我们:能。 作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08 译者:Tankman 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here. 《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上:伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。 Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate? 伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退,激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗?或是能被改革,变得更加温和,现代且与邻为善呢?伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利,并给穆斯林信仰自由,接受现代金融和司法的基本原则,而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗? A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that "radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution," the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, "He's wrong. Sorry about that." She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point. 越来越多的分析家认为不会,穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情,这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中,成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注:一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物,以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题,温和伊斯兰是解药”时,她说:“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕,追求同一目标,和相同的敌人战斗,但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。 My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge. 我的论述有两部分。第一,很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的;第二,革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。 Arguing Against Essentialism 对本质主义的驳斥 To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion's core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past. 声称伊斯兰不可被改变,则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解,而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误,因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切,包括对圣典的解读,随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。 Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran's interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of "no compulsion in religion," and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam. 只有不考虑人类本性,无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁,一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变,像圣战,奴隶,高利贷,“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且,我们容易想到过去的1400年,很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi'i,al-Ghazali,Ibn Taymiya,Rumi,Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。 However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam's scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country's history would lead to a distorted understanding. 可兰经和圣训也许是中心,而不是穆斯林经验的全部;从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国;忽略了这个国家的历史,会导致认知的扭曲。 Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today's Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline. 换一种说法就是,中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的,今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟,它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业,1969年我进入该领域时,我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起,到今天享有着巨大能量;如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大,那么它也可能衰落。 How might that happen? 这种变化可能会如何发生呢? The Medieval Synthesis 中世纪整合 Key to Islam's role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia's prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much. 伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的;而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢?一个刑罚体系,要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争,遵循这禁令是不可能的;实际上,穆斯林发起的战争中,约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地,坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。 To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad. 为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求,前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法,允许放松一些伊斯兰法条,而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal(花招)和其他方式,遵循法律的形式,同时否定其实质。比如,为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家,很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。 This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam's "medieval synthesis" in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists: 沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》(1983)中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象,不切实际的要求,翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中,它减低了沙利亚的力度,使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行,同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali,在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话: One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to "compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court." As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, "Social patterns were in great contrast to the 'official' picture presented by these 'formal' sources." Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of "the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian." 律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时,“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。” While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability. 虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪,它并未克服一个基本的弱点:它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本,或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷,面对原教旨主义者的挑战,它仍然是脆弱的。实际上,前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战,包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中,原教旨主义的努力最终被软化,中世纪整合重新回到轨道,而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色,助长了其不稳定性。 The Challenge of Modernity 现代性的挑战 The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization. 中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断,传统观点来看,这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中,把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向:西方化或是伊斯兰化。 Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile. 西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象,他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法,代之以同类领域的西方做法,比如不利用法律确立宗教,妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前,这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运,对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。 But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back. 但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多,而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底,西方化表面上看起来强大,实则不然,因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高,有话语权的精英,而广大民众则被压制。 Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam. 从1930年代起,抗拒因素开始组织起来,发展他们自己的力量,尤其是在阿尔及利亚,埃及,伊朗,和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果,呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般,坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。 Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West. 虽然排斥西方,这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动,依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身,比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设,比如国家优先于个人,可以接受暴力斗争,和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术,尤其是军事和医疗方面。 Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways. 通过创造性的努力,伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长,最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者,霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中,显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件,和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序,在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步,用各种创新且极端的方式,变革社会,实行伊斯兰教法。 For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls' schools and music stores. The Islamists' influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas. 比如,在伊朗,什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者,并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗,塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身,你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱,头巾和罩袍。 Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country's established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism. 虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型,相比法西斯和共产主义,伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动,被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党(AKP)领导着,已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台,AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕,借助该国已经建立的民主制度,和良好的施政表现,逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量,而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。 The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction. 伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健,但是它们的势头并不是由来已久,也并不保证能持续下去。实际上,像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样,伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力,其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗,明确体现了这点。 Toward a Modern Synthesis 通向一个现代的整合 If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a "modern synthesis" comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps. 若要打败伊斯兰主义,反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景,来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点,他们可以回溯历史,尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力,对照“中世纪整合”,来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等,和不信伊斯兰者和平共存,并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。 Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans. 在此,把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较,不无益处。五个世纪前,犹太教徒,基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的,借贷收利息则不被允许。最终,经过了苦涩和反复的辩论,犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点;今天,没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。 Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, ("pretend" because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.) 然而在穆斯林当中,这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年,沙特阿拉伯在1962年,毛里塔尼亚在1980年,官方禁止了蓄奴,奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在(尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦)。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元,并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息,(“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。) Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else. 穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好,并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教,他们必须模仿其他一神教,改变自己宗教在蓄奴,利息,妇女权益,背教自由,司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。 When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy. 当一个改革的,现代的伊斯兰涌现,它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益,统治异教徒的观念,圣战,或者自杀性恐怖主义,它也不会要求对通奸,危害家族荣誉,渎神和背教者处以死刑。 Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women: 在这一新的世纪,一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下:
  • Saudi Arabia's Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn't end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
  • 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒,把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚,但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
  • Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
  • 土耳其神职人员已经同意,让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜,并且和男人一起祷告。
  • The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
  • 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
  • Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
  • 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
  • A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
  • 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议,认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰,事实上应该被惩罚。
  • A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
  • 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法,反对多妻制。
Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include: 其他显著进步,不一定局限于妇女权益方面,包括:
  • The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
  • 沙特政府终止了Jizya(向非穆斯林征收人头税)。
  • An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
  • 一个伊朗法庭,判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
  • Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
  • 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会,开始就处决背教者展开辩论。
All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times. 同时,倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法,如果不是着眼于改进,那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir,一个沙特女记者,大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利,和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴,包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责,但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论,在以前时代这是无法想象的。 Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad's example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today's Muslims make of it. 和其中世纪的先行者一样,面对原教旨人士的攻击,现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子,然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是,已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果,有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想,并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念;它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。 Policy Implications 政策含义 What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims? 反对伊斯兰教法,哈里发国,和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢? For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process. 对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林,最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义,而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力,通过慷慨和无私,达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者,必须也经过可能是数十年的努力,发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态,然后推广它。在这个过程中,解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。 Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey's AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism. 非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰:第一,坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登,也可以是隐秘鬼祟,表面合法的政治性运动,如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍,但他却更有效,危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由,法律面前人人平等和其他人权,珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。 Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization. 第二,非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天,这些人物弱小零散,且面对着艰巨的任务,但是他们确实存在,他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权,代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。 Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum. Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。 July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title "What Is Islam?" 2013年7月7日更新: Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章,标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。 Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at "Islam's Future." 2013年10月1日更新:六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章,我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。 Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that "Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation." So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all. 2014年4月10日更新:虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段,并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道,“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以,她也许开始接受我的观点了。 Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that "When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history." 2016年2月4日更新:我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰,门外汉讨论文本,内行讨论历史。” Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking's illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's headquarters (as photographed by me). It's a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above. 2016年2月24日更新:这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片,也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划,这版本似乎并不让人激动。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

保守派的污点

【2016-09-09】

@海德沙龙  《一场轰轰烈烈的反娼妓战争》 无论从哪个方面都很难论证禁娼的合理性,在性交易合法化的地方(比如澳洲),它并未带来风气败坏和道德沦丧,相反,禁娼总是恶化妓女的处境,将其推入黑帮之手,所以禁娼法已逐渐失去支持,然而在过去十几年,禁娼运动又戴着一副新面具卷土重来……

@whigzhou: 宗教保守派和进步主义者在这件事情上结成了奇特的联盟,这是宗教保守派的一个污点,和他们在禁酒和禁毒问题上的污点类似(more...)

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7613
【2016-09-09】 @海德沙龙  《一场轰轰烈烈的反娼妓战争》 无论从哪个方面都很难论证禁娼的合理性,在性交易合法化的地方(比如澳洲),它并未带来风气败坏和道德沦丧,相反,禁娼总是恶化妓女的处境,将其推入黑帮之手,所以禁娼法已逐渐失去支持,然而在过去十几年,禁娼运动又戴着一副新面具卷土重来…… @whigzhou: 宗教保守派和进步主义者在这件事情上结成了奇特的联盟,这是宗教保守派的一个污点,和他们在禁酒和禁毒问题上的污点类似,这不禁让人感慨,基督徒什么时候又堕落到需要国家强制力来执行他们的教规了? @whigzhou: 相比之下,有些教派(比如阿米绪人)就从不诉求于国家强制,他们对自己的德行更有信心,也更值得得尊敬  
基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家

【2016-09-06】

@whigzhou: 好像很少有人提到这个事实:基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家里,有6个在阿拉伯半岛,仅仅是regression to mean吗?不太像

 

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【2016-09-06】 @whigzhou: 好像很少有人提到这个事实:基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家里,有6个在阿拉伯半岛,仅仅是regression to mean吗?不太像  
[译文]什么鸭玩意儿!

What the Duck?
你鸭的!

作者:Drew Magary @ 2013-11-17
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:GQ,http://www.gq.com/story/duck-dynasty-phil-robertson

How in the world did a family of squirrel-eating, Bible-thumping, catchphrase-spouting duck hunters become the biggest TV stars in America? And what will they do now that they have 14 million fervent disciples? Our Drew Magary toured the Louisiana backwater with Phil Robertson and the Duck Dynasty gang to find out.

究竟是出于什么缘故,才会使得这样一个捕食松鼠、大肆宣扬圣经、口头禅滔滔不绝的猎鸭大家庭成了全美最耀眼的电视明星?现拥1400万狂热信徒,他们又会做些什么?为解答这些问题,本刊记者Drew Magary在路易斯安那的穷乡僻壤走访了Phil Robertson及《鸭子王朝》一伙人。

……

Let’s start with the crossbow, because the crossbow is huge. I’m sitting in the passenger seat of a camo-painted ATV, rumbling through the northern Louisiana backwoods with Phil Robertson, founder of the Duck Commander company, patriarch at the heart of A&E’s smash reality hit Duck Dynasty, and my tour guide for the afternoon.

首先说说手弩,因为它实在太大了。当时我坐在一辆涂了迷彩的全地形车的副驾位置上,跟Phil Robertson一起颠簸在路易斯安那北部的老林中。Robertson是“鸭司令”公司的创始人,A & E有线台极为轰动的热播真人秀《鸭子王朝》的核心家长,也是我本次午后之旅的导游。

There are seat belts in this ATV, but it doesn’t look like they’ve ever been used. Phil is not wearing one. I am not wearing one, because I don’t want Phil to think I’m a pussy. (Too late!) The crossbow—a Barnett model equipped with a steel-tipped four-blade broadhead arrow—is perched on the dash between us. It looks like you could shoot through a goddamn mountain with it.

车上配有安全带,但似乎从来没人用过。Phil没系。我也没系,因为我可不想让Phil看扁。(然而太迟了……)手弩就趴在我俩之间的仪表板上。那是只巴内特弩,装备有一根箭头钢制、四向开刃的阔首箭。它看上去会让你觉得拿着它就可以他妈的射穿一座山。

“That’ll bury up in you and kill you dead,” Phil says.

“这东西能把你射穿,彻底干掉你”,Phil说。

The bow is cocked and loaded, just in case a deer stumbles in front of us and we need to do a redneck drive-by on the poor bastard, but the safety is on. SAFETY FIRST. Still, Phil warns me, “You don’t want to be bumping that.”

弓已装好,扳机已扣上,万一有野鹿突然跑到我们的车子面前,那我们就需要在这倒霉蛋身上玩一场红脖式飞车射击了。但保险栓还是拉上了。安全第一!不过,Phil还是告诫我,“你最好还是不要碰到它。”

As we drive out into the woods, past a sign that reads parish maintenance ends, Phil is telling me all about the land around us and how the animals are a glorious gift from God and how blowing their heads off is part of His plan for us.

随着我们驱车驶入丛林,把一个写着“县政府维护界”的牌子甩在后面,Phil(more...)

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7290
What the Duck? 你鸭的! 作者:Drew Magary @ 2013-11-17 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 来源:GQ,http://www.gq.com/story/duck-dynasty-phil-robertson How in the world did a family of squirrel-eating, Bible-thumping, catchphrase-spouting duck hunters become the biggest TV stars in America? And what will they do now that they have 14 million fervent disciples? Our Drew Magary toured the Louisiana backwater with Phil Robertson and the Duck Dynasty gang to find out. 究竟是出于什么缘故,才会使得这样一个捕食松鼠、大肆宣扬圣经、口头禅滔滔不绝的猎鸭大家庭成了全美最耀眼的电视明星?现拥1400万狂热信徒,他们又会做些什么?为解答这些问题,本刊记者Drew Magary在路易斯安那的穷乡僻壤走访了Phil Robertson及《鸭子王朝》一伙人。

……

Let's start with the crossbow, because the crossbow is huge. I'm sitting in the passenger seat of a camo-painted ATV, rumbling through the northern Louisiana backwoods with Phil Robertson, founder of the Duck Commander company, patriarch at the heart of A&E's smash reality hit Duck Dynasty, and my tour guide for the afternoon. 首先说说手弩,因为它实在太大了。当时我坐在一辆涂了迷彩的全地形车的副驾位置上,跟Phil Robertson一起颠簸在路易斯安那北部的老林中。Robertson是“鸭司令”公司的创始人,A & E有线台极为轰动的热播真人秀《鸭子王朝》的核心家长,也是我本次午后之旅的导游。 There are seat belts in this ATV, but it doesn't look like they've ever been used. Phil is not wearing one. I am not wearing one, because I don't want Phil to think I'm a pussy. (Too late!) The crossbow—a Barnett model equipped with a steel-tipped four-blade broadhead arrow—is perched on the dash between us. It looks like you could shoot through a goddamn mountain with it. 车上配有安全带,但似乎从来没人用过。Phil没系。我也没系,因为我可不想让Phil看扁。(然而太迟了……)手弩就趴在我俩之间的仪表板上。那是只巴内特弩,装备有一根箭头钢制、四向开刃的阔首箭。它看上去会让你觉得拿着它就可以他妈的射穿一座山。 "That'll bury up in you and kill you dead," Phil says. “这东西能把你射穿,彻底干掉你”,Phil说。 The bow is cocked and loaded, just in case a deer stumbles in front of us and we need to do a redneck drive-by on the poor bastard, but the safety is on. SAFETY FIRST. Still, Phil warns me, "You don't want to be bumping that." 弓已装好,扳机已扣上,万一有野鹿突然跑到我们的车子面前,那我们就需要在这倒霉蛋身上玩一场红脖式飞车射击了。但保险栓还是拉上了。安全第一!不过,Phil还是告诫我,“你最好还是不要碰到它。” As we drive out into the woods, past a sign that reads parish maintenance ends, Phil is telling me all about the land around us and how the animals are a glorious gift from God and how blowing their heads off is part of His plan for us. 随着我们驱车驶入丛林,把一个写着“县政府维护界”的牌子甩在后面,Phil一路都在跟我介绍周边的土地,说动物们是上帝赠与的极好礼物,又说把它们爆头是他为我们此行准备的计划之一。 "Look at this," he says, gesturing to the surrounding wilderness. "The Almighty gave us this. Genesis 9 is where the animals went wild, and God gave them wildness. After the flood, that's when he made animals wild. Up until that time, everybody was vegetarian. After the flood, he said, 'I'm giving you everything now. Animals are wild.'" “看看这个”,他说,手指着我们周围的荒野。“上帝把它赐予了我们。动物们走向野生是在《创世纪》第9章,上帝赐予了它们荒野。是在洪水之后,他才让动物们野生的。直到那时以前,所有人都吃素。洪水以后,上帝就说,‘我把一切都赐予你们。动物是野生的。’” There's a fly parked on Phil's long beard. It's been there the whole ride, and I desperately want to pluck it out, but I decide against it. Along with the crossbow, there's a loaded .22-caliber rifle rattling around in the footwell. Phil的长胡子上停着一只苍蝇。整个行驶过程中,它一直都在那儿,我极度想要把它抓走,但最终还是决定不这么干。除了手弩之外,车上还有支已经装上弹药的点22口径步枪在脚坑里一直晃荡。 And yet, much like the 14 million Americans who Nielsen says tune in to Duck Dynasty every week—over 2 million more than the audience for the Breaking Bad finale—I am comfortable here in these woods with Phil and his small cache of deadly weaponry. He is welcoming and gracious. 不过,跟Nielsen所说的每周都收看《鸭子王朝》的1400万美国人(比《绝命毒师》大结局的观众还要多200万)一样,我跟Phil及他的一小批致命武器藏品一起呆在丛林中时,感到非常舒适。他热心好客、和蔼可亲。 He is a man who preaches the gospel of the outdoors and, to my great envy, practices what he preaches. He spends most of his time out here, daydreaming about what he calls a "pristine earth": a world where nothing gets in the way of nature or the hunters who lovingly maintain it. No cities. No buildings. No highways. 他是一个户外运动的布道者,而且令我非常嫉妒的是,他实践了他所传之道。他大部分时候都呆在这里,梦想存在一个他称为“原始地球”的地方:整个世界没有任何东西会妨碍自然,或者妨碍那些细心维护自然的猎人。没有城市。没有建筑。没有高速公路。 Oh, and no sinners, too. So here's where things get a bit uncomfortable. Phil calls himself a Bible-thumper, and holy shit, he thumps that Bible hard enough to ring the bell at a county-fair test of strength. If you watch Duck Dynasty, you can hear plenty of it in the nondenominational supper-table prayer the family recites at the end of every episode, and in the show's no-cussing, no-blaspheming tone. 哦,还得没有罪人。说到这里事情就有点尴尬了。Phil称自己是个圣经狂人,而且我的神啊,他宣扬圣经的力度都可以把县农贸市场的力量测试钟给敲响了。如果你也看《鸭子王朝》,那你就能听到很多,包括他们一家在每集节目结尾时的晚餐桌前都会念诵的无宗派祈祷文,以及整个节目不乱诅咒、不亵渎神明的语气。 But there are more things Phil would like to say—"controversial" things, as he puts it to me—that don't make the cut. (This March, for instance, he told the Christian-oriented Sports Spectrum magazine that he didn't approve of A&E editing out "in Jesus" from a family prayer scene, even though A&E says that the phrase has been uttered in at least seventeen episodes.) 但Phil想要表达的东西更多,用他自己的话说,那都是些“有争议的”事情,而这些就不太符合要求了。(比如,今年三月,Phil就跟具有基督教倾向的《运动光谱》杂志说他并不赞成A&E台将“奉耶稣”一语从家庭祷告镜头中剪辑掉的做法,尽管A&E台宣称这一词汇已经在至少17集节目中被他们提到过。) Out here in these woods, without any cameras around, Phil is free to say what he wants. Maybe a little too free. He's got lots of thoughts on modern immorality, and there's no stopping them from rushing out. Like this one: 在这种丛林之中,周围没有摄像机,Phil拥有了想说啥就说啥的自由。可能还有点过分自由了。他对于现代的道德败坏想法甚多,根本无法阻止它们脱口而出。比如: "It seems like, to me, a vagina—as a man—would be more desirable than a man's anus. That's just me. I'm just thinking: There's more there! She's got more to offer. I mean, come on, dudes! You know what I'm saying? But hey, sin: It's not logical, my man. It's just not logical." “在我看来,作为一个男人,阴道似乎要比男人的后门更可爱。我就是这样。我的想法就是:那可要好多了!她能给我提供更多东西。我的意思是,别这样,男人们!你明白我在说什么吧?但世上就是会有罪恶。这没道理,兄弟。这就是没道理。” Perhaps we'll be needing that seat belt after all. 我想我们终究还是需要把安全带系好。

……

The Duck Dynasty origin story is the mighty river from which all other Robertson-family stories flow. And it is an awesome story, one that improves the more it is told, so here is my stab at it: 《鸭子王朝》的起源故事是一条滔滔大河,Robertson家族此后所有的故事都发源于此。这是一个精彩的故事,而且每讲一次就会愈加完美一次,所以让我来试着叙述一下: Phil Robertson grew up bone poor in the northwest corner of this state—a place where Cajun redneck culture and Ozark redneck culture intersect—to a manic-depressive mother and a roughneck father. Phil Robertson成长于该州西北角一个极度贫困的家庭,当地乃是卡真人红脖文化【译注:卡真人是路易斯安那州的法国后裔。】与欧扎卡红脖文化【译注:欧扎卡山区位于密苏里南部与阿肯色和俄克拉荷马交界处。】的交汇之处。他的母亲患有狂躁抑郁症,父亲则是一个大老粗。 He was a star quarterback in high school and earned a scholarship to play at Louisiana Tech, but quit after one season because football interfered with duck-hunting season. The guy who took his roster spot at Tech was Terry Bradshaw, because that's how these kinds of stories go. 高中时代,他是个明星四分卫,后来获得奖学金在路易斯安那理工大学校队打球。但一个赛季以后他就退学了,因为橄榄球赛季和猎鸭季节相互冲突。在理工大学校队球员名册上顶替他位置的是Terry Bradshaw【译注:著名四分卫】,因为所有这类故事都有这种情节走向。 Phil On Growing Up in Pre-Civil-Rights-Era Louisiana Phil谈民权时代以前的路易斯安那成长经历 "I never, with my eyes, saw the mistreatment of any black person. Not once. Where we lived was all farmers. The blacks worked for the farmers. I hoed cotton with them. I'm with the blacks, because we're white trash. We're going across the field.... They're singing and happy. “我从未亲眼看过对任何黑人的虐待。一次都没有。我们住的地方全是农民。黑人们都为农民工作。我跟他们一起锄棉花。我跟黑人是一边的,因为我们都是穷苦白人。我们横穿田野……他们兴高采烈地歌唱。 "I never heard one of them, one black person, say, I tell you what: These doggone white people—not a word!... Pre-entitlement, pre-welfare, you say: Were they happy? They were godly; they were happy; no one was singing the blues." “我从未听他们,从未听任何一个黑人说过,嘿,我跟你说,这些他妈的白人——我从未听过此类说辞……这是在补贴以前,在福利制度以前。你要问:他们开心吗?他们是虔诚的、开心的;根本没人丧气埋怨。” According to Phil's autobiography—a ghostwritten book he says he has never read—he spent his days after Tech doing odd jobs and his evenings getting drunk, chasing tail, and swallowing diet pills and black mollies, a form of medicinal speed. In his midtwenties, already married with three sons, a piss-drunk Robertson kicked his family out of the house. 根据Phil的自传——该书由影子写手完成,Phil称自己从未读过——他从理工大学退学后,白天做零工,晚上则喝个大醉、拈花惹草、吞服减肥药和“黑玛丽鱼”(一种药物兴奋剂)。20多岁时,他已经结婚,并生有3个孩子,某次酩酊大醉后将家人全部赶出了自己的房子。 "I'm sick of you," he told his wife, Kay. But Robertson soon realized the error of his ways, begged Kay to come back, and turned over his life to Jesus Christ. “我看见你就烦”,他这么跟他老婆Kay说。但Robertson很快就意识到这种生活方式的错误,求Kay回家,并将自己的生命托付给了耶稣基督。 In 1972, with Jesus at the wheel, Robertson founded the Duck Commander company, which sold a line of custom-made duck-hunting calls that quickly became popular among avid hunters for their uncanny accuracy in replicating the sound of a real duck. 1972年,在耶稣的指引下,Robertson创办了“鸭司令”公司,出售一种定制的猎鸭哨子。这种哨子很快就在贪婪的猎人中流行开来,因为它能出奇精准地再现真鸭子的声音。最终,他将公司的一半卖给了自己现年41岁的儿子Willie。 He eventually sold half the company to his son Willie, now 41, and together they made a DVD series about the family's duck hunts, which led to a show on the Outdoor Channel, which led to Duck Dynasty on A&E, which led to everything blowing right the fuck up. 他们还一起录制了一个DVD系列,内容是全家的猎鸭活动,此举促使他们后来在“户外频道”上过一期节目,又催生了A&E台的《鸭子王朝》,而后者则促成了此后所有名声大噪的一切。 The show—a reality sitcom showcasing the semiscripted high jinks of Phil, his brother "Uncle Si," his four sons, Alan, Willie, Jase, and Jep, and the perpetually exasperated but always perfectly accessorized Robertson-family ladies—has become the biggest reality-TV hit in the history of cable television, reportedly earning the family a holy shit worthy $200,000-an-episode paycheck. 《鸭子王朝》是个真人秀情景剧,剧中展现的是Phil,他的兄弟“Uncle Si”和他4个儿子Alan、Willie、Jase和Jep之间半编排半自发的嬉笑怒骂,以及永远怒气冲冲但又总是穿戴整齐完美的Robertson家族的女士们。该剧已经成为有线电视史上最为成功的真人秀热播节目。据报道,这一家子收获了每集20万美元的天价报酬。 It's a funny, family-friendly show, with "skits that we come up with," as Phil describes the writing process. They plunder beehives. They blow up beaver dams. And when the Robertson-family ladies go up to a rooftop in a hydraulic lift, you just know that lift will "accidentally" get stuck and strand them. 这个节目既逗乐又适合家庭观看,据Phil介绍其写作过程,其中“有些搞笑是我们想出来的”。他们偷蜂巢。他们炸河狸坝。如果Robertson家族的女士们想要通过液压升降机爬到屋顶上去,你就知道升降机肯定会“突然”卡住,把她们困在里面。 But the show, whose fifth season premieres on January 15, is just one part of the family's pop-cultural dominance. In 2013 four books written (kind of!) by Robertson family members made the top ten on the New York Times nonfiction best-seller list. 该剧第5季将在1月15日首播,但它还只是Robertson家族在流行文化界统治地位的一个侧面。2013年,Robertson家族成员写作(请自行加上引号!)的4本书进入了《纽约时报》畅销书非虚构类前十榜单。 Another book—penned by Jase Robertson and detailing his Christian rebirth at age 14, his struggle to forgive his father's past behavior, and his young daughter's struggle through five facial-reconstruction surgeries to overcome a severe cleft lip and palate—is forthcoming and destined to make it five best-sellers. 还有一本马上要出的书——由Jase Robertson写作,详述他本人14岁时经历的基督教新生、他如何努力原谅其父过去的所作所为、他的小女儿为了治疗严重的唇腭裂如何挣扎着经历5次面部修复手术——也注定要成为第5本畅销书。 There's also a book of devotionals somewhere in there, along with Duck Dynasty themed birthday cards, bobblehead dolls, camo apparel (pink camo for the ladies), Cajun-spice seasoning, car fresheners, iPhone games (from the press release: "As players successfully complete the challenges, their beards grow to epic proportions and they start to transform from a yuppie into a full-blown redneck!"), and presumably some sort of camouflage home-pregnancy test. 这家人的作品清单里还有一本关于宗教仪式的书,此外还有《鸭子王朝》主题生日卡片、大头塑像、迷彩服(女士还有粉红迷彩)、卡真香料调味品、车用空气清新剂、iPhone游戏(游戏的新闻稿称,“如果玩家成功完成挑战,他们的胡子就会长到极为浓密,于是他们就会开始从雅皮转变为一个货真价实的红脖!”),可能还有某种具有伪装性的居家验孕办法。 It's easy to see the appeal. The Robertsons are immensely likable. They're funny. They look cool. They're "smarter than they look," says sportswriter Mark Schlabach, who co-writes the family's books. 他们的吸引力显而易见。Robertson一家子极为可爱。他们很搞笑。他们看起来很酷。他们“比看上去要聪明得多”,体育作家Mark Schlabach说道,他参与了写作该家族的书籍。 And they are remarkably honest both with one another and with the viewing audience: Phil's old hell-raising, Si's traumatic stint in Vietnam, the intervention that the family staged for Jep when he was boozing and doing drugs in college (Phil placed him under house arrest for three months)—all of it is out in the open. The more they reveal, the more people feel connected to them. 而且,他们对于彼此以及对于收看节目的观众也极为诚实。Phil曾经的捣蛋胡闹、Si在越南的痛苦岁月、Jep大学期间嗜酒嗜毒时全家为他而安排的干预矫治(Phil把他软禁在家中长达3个月)等等,所有这些都公之于众。他们展示给人的越多,人们就越是觉得自己与他们有共鸣。 And then, of course, there is their faith, which plays no small role here. During the family's initial negotiations about the show with A&E, Jase told me, "the three no-compromises were faith, betrayal of family members, and duck season." 当然,此外还有就是他们的信仰,这也发挥了不小的作用。Jase告诉我,在家族与A&E台最初就节目进行交涉时,“我们绝不让步的有三样,那就是信仰、背叛家族成员和猎鸭季节。” That refusal to betray their faith or one another has been a staple of every media article about the Robertson family. It's their elevator pitch, and it has made them into ideal Christian icons: beloved for staking out a bit of holy ground within the mostly secular, often downright sinful, pop culture of America. 拒绝背叛信仰、拒绝背叛彼此,已经成为了所有关于Robertson家族的媒体文章的共同主题。这就是他们的“电梯演讲”【译注:指推销自己的简短自我介绍】,使他们成为了完美的基督徒典范:因为在通常都很世俗、经常纯属邪恶的美国流行文化界圈出了一小块圣洁土壤而受到人们钟爱。

……

Phil Robertson's house is located in the sticks about twenty miles outside the city of Monroe (pronounce it mun-roe). It's a rather small house—the kind of place its owner would proudly call "humble." The kitchen table is covered with big plastic tubs of cinnamon rolls and mini muffins. There are candy dishes filled to the brim, bricks of softening butter, and packages of jerky made from unknown animals, sent by unnamed fans. (I tried some, and it was awesome.) Phil Robertson的家安在距门罗市大约20英里的边远地区。房子相对较小——主人很可以骄傲地称这种住所为“寒舍”。厨房餐桌上摆满了大塑料盆装的肉桂饼和迷你松糕。还有满到冒尖的糖果盘子、快要融化的黄油块以及一包包由不知名粉丝送来的不知何种动物的肉干(我试吃了一些,味道棒极了)。 Just inside the front door, a giant flat-screen TV shows Fox News on mute at all times, and a bunch of big squishy sofas are arranged in a rectangle around it. 一进前门,就可以看到一个巨大的平面屏幕电视机,不间断地静音播放Fox News。好几个松垮垮的沙发就呈矩形摆放在电视机周围。 Si Robertson is sitting on the couch facing the TV. Jep Robertson, age 35, the youngest son, curls up in a recliner in the corner with a pistol strapped to his waist. He barely speaks, like a countrified Silent Bob. Si Robertson坐在正对电视机的沙发上。35岁的Jep Robertson是最小的儿子,蜷缩在角落里的一条躺椅上,腰上别支手枪。他很少说话,就像是个乡村版的“沉默的鲍勃”【译注:美国制片人Kevin Smith创造的虚拟人物,沉默寡言】。 Jase, 44, and Willie share a love seat while Phil lounges barefoot on a camo-patterned recliner in the far corner of the room. Two dogs share the recliner's footrest with Phil's heavily callused bare feet. He has severe bunions, so his big toes jut in at forty-five-degree angles. 44岁的Jase和Willie一起坐在一张双人沙发上,而Phil则赤脚躺在房间最远处角落里的一张涂着迷彩图案的躺椅上。两只狗跟Phil那长满老茧的赤脚一同靠着脚垫。他患有严重的拇囊炎,所以大脚趾根呈45度角突出【编注:据某些医生认为,拇囊炎和长期穿不合脚的鞋有关,比如特别窄的尖头皮靴。】。 The main TV room is cluttered with mismatched furniture and photos hung haphazardly on the walls. And Phil looks like part of the clutter himself, as if he'd been wedged into that recliner a while back by some absentminded homeowner who didn't know where else to put him. 放电视机的主客厅里胡乱摆放着互不搭配的家具,墙上随意挂着些照片。Phil本人看起来似乎就是杂物之一,就好像是之前某个心不在焉的房主不知道要把他摆哪里,所以就塞进了那个躺椅中。 When I walk into the TV area, no one makes a move to get up—the Robertson men greet you as they would a friend who just came back from a beer run. Not only are the Robertsons among the most famous people in the country, they also happen to be among the most recognizable. 我走进电视房时,没人做出什么要起来的动作。Robertson家的男人欢迎你的方式,就像他们对待一个刚买啤酒回来的朋友一样。Robertson一家不但是全县最出名的人物之一,他们也是最好认的人之一。凭着那些大胡子,你在一英里以外都能认出他们。 You can spot them from a mile away with those beards. Imagine Johnny Depp walking around every day in his Jack Sparrow costume and you begin to get an idea of how much they stand out. It's gotten to the point that they say they can't fly commercial anymore. 想象一下约翰·尼德普天天顶着杰克船长的那套装扮四处晃悠,你就能大体理解他们有多么突兀显眼。这事已经发展到了他们说他们再也不能乘坐普通民航的程度。 "You been hunting yet this year?" Phil asks me, by way of introduction. “今年你打过猎?”Phil这么问我,算是引见。 I have not. In fact, I confess to Phil, I've never been hunting before. But I have fired a gun! NOT A TOTAL LIGHTWEIGHT, GANG! 没有。事实上,我跟Phil坦白说,我还从未打过猎。但是开过枪!绝不是完全的废材,酷! "Si went this morning and killed three squirrels," says Phil. "They're delicious. One of the best meats there is in the woods, I'll tell you that. Very clean animal." He nods toward Uncle Si, who, with his mangy ponytail, looks very much like the squirrels he hunts. “Si今天早上去了,杀了三只松鼠”,Phil说。“太美味了。我跟你说,这可是丛林中最美的肉食之一。非常干净的动物。”他朝Uncle Si点点头,后者顶着一条脏兮兮的马尾辫,看起来倒是蛮像他猎杀的松鼠。 Phil On Why He Voted Romney in 2012 Phil谈他2012年为什么给罗姆尼投票 "If I'm lost at three o'clock in a major metropolitan area...I ask myself: Where would I rather be trying to walk with my wife and children? One of the guys who's running for president is out of Chicago, Illinois, and the other one is from Salt Lake City, Utah. [Editor's note: Romney is from Boston, not Salt Lake City.] Where would I rather be turned around at three o'clock in the morning? I opted for Salt Lake City. I think it would be safer." “如果我早上三点在一个大都市区迷路了……我会问我自己:我更想带着我的妻子和孩子朝哪个方向走?竞选总统的人中有一个来自伊利诺斯的芝加哥,另一个来自犹他的盐湖城[原文编辑注:罗姆尼来自波士顿,而不是盐湖城]【译注:罗姆尼虽不是来自盐湖城,但确实是摩门教徒。】。凌晨3点钟,我应该朝哪个方向走?我选择盐湖城。我觉得这样安全些。” Even though he's in the far corner of the room, Phil dominates the house. There are times when he doesn't look you in the eye while he's speaking—he looks just off to the side of you, as if Jesus were standing nearby, holding a stack of cue cards. Everyone else in the room just stares at his phone, or at the TV, or holds side conversations as Phil preaches. 尽管他只是远远地坐在房间的角落里,但Phil仍俯视着整个屋子。有时候,他在跟你说话时并不会和你对视,他的视线会朝向你的左右两边,就好像耶稣正手拿一堆提示卡站在旁边一样。Phil布道时,屋子里的其他人要么就盯着自己的手机,要么就盯着电视机,要么就继续和其他人单独说话。 "We're Bible-thumpers who just happened to end up on television," he tells me. "You put in your article that the Robertson family really believes strongly that if the human race loved each other and they loved God, we would just be better off. We ought to just be repentant, turn to God, and let's get on with it, and everything will turn around." “我们都是些圣经狂人,只是碰巧跑到电视上去了而已”,他跟我说。“你写的文章要说一说,Robertson一家人确实非常相信,如果人类能够爱彼此同时爱上帝,我们就会过得更加好。我们就是应该悔改、应该皈依上帝。只要我们努力如此,一切都会好转。” What does repentance entail? Well, in Robertson's worldview, America was a country founded upon Christian values (Thou shalt not kill, etc.), and he believes that the gradual removal of Christian symbolism from public spaces has diluted those founding principles. (He and Si take turns going on about why the Ten Commandments ought to be displayed outside courthouses.) He sees the popularity of Duck Dynasty as a small corrective to all that we have lost. 悔改意味着什么?关于这事,在Robertson的世界观里,美国的建国基础是基督教价值观(“不可杀人”等等)。而且他认为,将基督教符号从公共空间中逐步清除的做法已经冲淡了这些建国原则。(他和Si轮流喋喋不休地谈论为什么应该将十诫摆在法院外边。)他将《鸭子王朝》的风靡视作对我们所丢弃之物的一点点矫正。 "Everything is blurred on what's right and what's wrong," he says. "Sin becomes fine." “何为是?何为非?一切都模糊了”,他说。“罪恶通行无阻。” What, in your mind, is sinful? 在你心目中,什么是有罪? "Start with homosexual behavior and just morph out from there. Bestiality, sleeping around with this woman and that woman and that woman and those men," he says. Then he paraphrases Corinthians: "Don't be deceived. Neither the adulterers, the idolaters, the male prostitutes, the homosexual offenders, the greedy, the drunkards, the slanderers, the swindlers—they won't inherit the kingdom of God. Don't deceive yourself. It's not right." 他说,“首先是同性恋,然后就从那开始分化。兽交,跟这个女的那个女的厮混,然后又跟那个女的这群男的厮混。”然后他改述《哥林多前书》:“不要自欺。无论是奸淫的、拜偶像的、做男妓的、行同性恋的冒犯者、贪婪的、醉酒的、造谣的、行骗的,他们都不能承受神的国。不要自欺。这是不对的。” During Phil's darkest days, in the early 1970s, he had to flee the state of Arkansas after he badly beat up a bar owner and the guy's wife. Kay Robertson persuaded the bar owner not to press charges in exchange for most of the Robertsons' life savings. ("A hefty price," he notes in his memoir.) I ask Phil if he ever repented for that, as he wants America to repent—if he ever tracked down the bar owner and his wife to apologize for the assault. He shakes his head. 在他过往的黑暗日子里,1970年代早期,Phil曾将一个酒吧店主及其妻子打成重伤,自己不得不逃离阿肯色。Kay Robertson说服酒吧店主不起诉,代价是付出了Robertson一辈子攒下的大部分积蓄。(“沉重的代价”,他在自传中说。)我问他,如果他要美国悔改,那他是否曾为此悔改过,是否曾追寻那个店主及其妻子的下落并为其袭击行为致歉。他摇了摇头。 "I didn't dredge anything back up. I just put it behind me." “我不会在任何旧事上徘徊。我会径直将它们丢在脑后。” As far as Phil is concerned, he was literally born again. Old Phil—the guy with the booze and the pills—died a long time ago, and New Phil sees no need to apologize for him: 在Phil看来,他已经真真切切地重生了一次。旧的Phil,那个饮酒嗑药的Phil,很久以前就已死去,新的Phil不觉得有必要帮他道歉。 "We never, ever judge someone on who's going to heaven, hell. That's the Almighty's job. We just love 'em, give 'em the good news about Jesus—whether they're homosexuals, drunks, terrorists. We let God sort 'em out later, you see what I'm saying?" “谁会上天堂,谁会下地狱,在这个问题上我们从不、绝不对人加以评判。这是上帝的事务。我们只需爱他们,向他们传递关于耶稣的好消息,不管他们是同性恋、酒鬼还是恐怖分子。我们让上帝以后来挑选他们,你知道我什么意思吗?” Okay, so perhaps it's not exactly shocking that a deeply religious 67-year-old hunter from rural Louisiana would have, shall we say, enthusiastic ideas about what constitutes good Christian morality. That's the unspoken red-state appeal of Duck Dynasty. They're godly folk. "Real" folk. 好吧。所以,一个信仰极为真诚的67岁路易斯安那乡下猎人会对什么是好的基督教伦理这一问题抱有(也许可以说)极为狂热的想法,这也许并不是特别令人震惊。这是《鸭子王朝》对于红州不言而喻的感染力。他们是一帮虔诚的老百姓。“真正的”老百姓。 It helps explain why people flock to Monroe in droves to visit the Duck Commander store (which, shockingly, does not sell firearms). It's why Willie Robertson can walk out of work on a regular Thursday afternoon and be greeted by a cheering crowd that seemingly stretches back to the horizon. He shows me a video of the crowd on his phone. 它可以解释,为什么人们会成群结队地涌入门罗市,只为参观“鸭司令”的门店(令人惊讶的是,店里并不出售武器)。这也是为何当Willie Robertson在某个平常的周四下午歇工后会受到一大群人欢呼致意,拥挤的人群似乎要延伸到天边去。他用手机向我展示了人群的视频。 "This was one day just in the summer," he says. "I was just going in my car to go home. " “这就只是夏日的一天”,他说。“我只是朝我的车子走去,准备回家。” Does it ever wear you down? 这是否会让你疲倦? "Oh yeah." “嗯。” Willie has just come back from Washington, D.C., where he accepted an award at the Angels in Adoption Gala. (He and his wife, Korie, adopted a biracial child named Will and are dedicated advocates of the practice.) As we speak, there's a film crew outside the house, prepping for a State Farm ad that the family will be shooting here on the property tomorrow. Willie刚从华盛顿回来,他去“收养天使庆典”上领了一个奖。(Willie和妻子Korie领养了一个混血儿,叫做Will,两人都是领养行为的热情拥护者。)我们交谈的时候,屋子外头还有一个制片组,正在为全家人明天将在这片宅子上拍摄的一个“州立农业保险公司”广告做准备。 The Robertsons receive more than 500 media requests a day, and Willie had to negotiate down to four shooting days a week with A&E just so the family would have a bit of breathing room. Phil knows it won't last. He can already see that the end is near, and he's prepared for it. 每天,Robertson一家都会收到500多份媒体请求,Willie则需要和A&E台商量,将拍摄日减少到每周4天,以便全家能稍微有一些喘息空间。Phil知道事情不会一直如此。他已经预见到,快要到头了,而且正在为之做准备。 "Let's face it," he says. "Three, four, five years, we're out of here. You know what I'm saying? It's a TV show. This thing ain't gonna last forever. No way." “承认吧”,他说。“三年、四年、五年,我们肯定会停的。你知道我什么意思不?这只是个电视节目。这种东西不会永远持续。绝不可能。” When the show runs its course and the production trucks drive off the Robertson property for good, there will be nothing keeping Phil from his greater mission. He could step back if he felt like it, given that he's now a very wealthy man. He could stay in these woods and live out the rest of his days hunting. But he has a flock now. He and the other Robertson men happily tour the country, giving speeches and hosting Bible studies. 如果节目寿终正寝,摄制组的大卡车彻底离Robertson一家人的领地而去,那时候将没有任何事物能够阻止Phil去履行他那更伟大的使命。如果他愿意,他可以退隐,因为他现在已经非常富有。他可以呆在这些林子里,余生全用来打猎。但是他现在有了一批教徒。他和Robertson家的其他男人一起,愉快地在全国巡回,发表演讲,主持圣经研究。 I ask Jep Robertson later on if the second generation of Robertson men shares Phil's views on sin and morality. "We're not quite as outspoken as my dad, but I'm definitely in line," he says. "If somebody asks, I tell 'em what the Bible says." 我后来曾问过Jep Robertson,在罪行和道德问题上,Robertson家的第二代男人是否跟Phil持有一样的观点。“我们并不像爸爸那样坦率直言,但我绝对是跟随着他的”,他说。“如果有人问我什么事,我会告诉他圣经怎么说。” When Uncle Si went to Conway, Arkansas, recently for a paid appearance, 20,000 people showed up. It led the local news that night in Little Rock. The show is merely the platform. The end goal is to save souls. And the Robertson family is more than happy to sacrifice a little privacy out here in the woods—visitors regularly congregate outside Phil's security gate hoping for a glance at the family— to spread the good word. Uncle Si最近参加阿肯色州康威市的一次商业登台时,有20000人出席。该活动在小石城当晚的地方新闻中大放异彩。演出只是一个平台。最终目的是拯救灵魂。而且,为了传播上帝的好消息,Robertson一家非常乐意在这片林子里牺牲一点隐私——参观者经常会聚集在Phil的防盗闸前面,盼望着能窥探一下这个家庭。 "For the sake of the Gospel, it was worth it," Phil tells me. "All you have to do is look at any society where there is no Jesus. I'll give you four: Nazis, no Jesus. Look at their record. Uh, Shintos? They started this thing in Pearl Harbor. Any Jesus among them? None. Communists? None. Islamists? Zero. That's eighty years of ideologies that have popped up where no Jesus was allowed among those four groups. Just look at the records as far as murder goes among those four groups." “为了福音,这么做是值得的”,Phil跟我说。“你只需要看看那些没有耶稣的社会。我给你举4个。纳粹,没有耶稣。看看他们的历史。呃,神道教?他们搞出了珍珠港这档子事。他们有耶稣吗?没有。共产主义者?没有。伊斯兰主义者?零。这4个群体中有80年不允许耶稣出现,结果就冒出了这么些意识形态。只需要看看这4个群体中谋杀蔓延的记录。” Phil On Health Insurance Phil谈医疗保险 "Temporary is all you're going to get with any kind of health care, except the health care I'm telling you about. That's eternal health care, and it's free.... I've opted to go with eternal health care instead of blowing money on these insurance schemes." “你从任何医疗保健上面得到的,都只能是暂时的。除非你采用我跟你说的这种医疗保健,那就是永恒医疗保健,而且它是免费的……我选择采用永恒医疗保健,不会把钱浪费在那些保险计划上头。” For what it's worth—and since I actually looked it up—the violent-crime rate here in America has plummeted since 1990, even as church attendance has stayed the same. And, of course, Phil is conveniently ignoring centuries upon centuries of war, bloodshed, and human enslavement committed in the name of Christ. 或可加以参考的是——我确实查证过——美国的暴力犯罪率自1990年以来已经大幅下降了,尽管去教堂的人数并没有什么变化。而且,Phil显然随手就把历史上数个世纪里以基督的名义犯下的种种战争、杀戮和奴役他人等行为给忽略了。 But I doubt any of that would sway Phil. And anyway, I'm a guest in his house and he is my welcoming host, so I smile politely and nod like the milquetoast suburban WASP that I am. 但是,我怀疑所有这些都不会动摇Phil。而且,不管怎样,我是到他家作客的,他又是个好客的主人,所以我一直礼貌地笑着,恰如其分地像个城郊盎格鲁萨克逊白人新教徒那样温驯地点头。 If you can't reconcile some of the things Phil says with his otherwise friendly demeanor—perhaps because you are gay, or a duck—I don't blame you. And I don't blame Duck Dynasty for keeping the show safely apolitical, ensuring smooth digestion for a mass audience. 如果你没法很好地调和Phil的部分言论与他的另外一些友好举止——也许因为你是同性恋,或者你是只鸭子——我并不会怪你。我也不怪《鸭子王朝》一剧刻意小心地保持其非政治性质的做法,这是为了确保大众受众能够毫无阻碍地接受它。 While Phil proselytizes, I lean over to Willie, who is playing a video game on his phone. 在Phil推销其宗教信仰的时候,我侧身探向Willie,他正在手机上玩电子游戏。 Boy, it's hard to get a word in with him! 哎呀,要在他面前插进一句话可真难啊! Willie nods knowingly, barely looking up. I get the sense he's heard all this before, many, many times. It's taken me a while to figure out that you can cut Phil off and it's not rude. He's like a sidewalk preacher. One look from a stranger is all he needs to delve into the story bank and dole out his sermon. You can stop and listen for a bit, and then move on if you like. So even though he's rolling, I change the subject. Willie会意地点点头,基本没看我。于是我就知道,他之前肯定已经听过这些话了,而且是很多很多次。我费了好一会儿才明白,你可以直接打断Phil的话,他不会觉得你粗鲁。他就像是那些呆在路边的布道者。只要有陌生人看他一眼,就足够让他深入到他自己的故事库里,开始他的讲道。你可以驻足一会,稍微听听,然后想走就走。所以尽管他还在滔滔不绝,我却换了一个话题。 You know what, Phil? Maybe we should just go shoot some stuff. Can we do that? 你知道吗,Phil?也许我们应该直接跑去射点东西。行不? "Oh yeah. You betcha we can." “当然行。这还用问吗?”

……

The Robertson family spread is a 20,000-acre stretch of Louisiana floodplain. At first glance, it looks like an untouched expanse of rural wilderness. It is not. Phil stops the ATV in the middle of the trail, which runs atop a levee that he built himself, to show me a vast field of pink wild flowers. He crumbles one of the wild flowers and shows me the black seeds inside. Robertson家族散居在路易斯安那20000英亩的大片洪泛平原上。乍一看,此地就像是一个未经开发的辽阔荒野。但它不是。Phil半路中停住了他的全地形车,我们行驶的小径就修在他自己建的一条堤坝上。Phil带我去看一大片的粉红色银莲花。他捏碎其中一个,让我看里面的黑色种子。 "See them little black seeds? See that? That's what ducks eat. They love that. It's called Pennsylvania smartweed. So we basically grow either natural vegetation or plants, or augment it, and we flood it." In other words, the Robertsons are a legit farm-to-table family. Real pre-hipster shit. “看到那些小小的黑色种子没有?看到不?鸭子就吃那个。它们很喜欢。这叫做宾夕法尼亚荨麻。所以我们基本上要么就是种天然的植被,要么就是种作物,或者帮助其增长,然后就把它们放水淹起来。”换句话说,Robertson一家可是正统的从农场到餐桌的家庭。真正是颓废派出现之前的做派。 When the waters from the nearby Ouachita River flood, it creates an ideal place to feed ducks. Which means it's also the ideal place to kill ducks, who fly all the way from the Canadian prairies just to find themselves at the wrong end of Phil's shotgun. 当附近的沃希托河洪水泛滥时,这里就成了一个饲养鸭子的理想场所。这也意味着,它同样是猎杀鸭子的理想场所。鸭子们从加拿大的大草原上一路飞过来,却发现自己错误地撞到了Phil的枪口。 "Whack 'em and stack 'em," as he says. And if the river doesn't flood during the sixty-day duck season between November and January, Robertson has a pipeline installed to flood the lowlands anyway so that they don't lose a day of hunting. “啪一下、堆起来”,他是这么说的。如果在11月至1月之间的60天猎鸭季节之内,河里没有涨水,那么Robertson就会装上一根管子,总之要把低洼地带淹没起来,这样他们就不会浪费一天打猎机会。 The ecology here has been so perfectly manipulated that it feels as if two giant hands reached down from the sky and molded the land itself, an effect that I'm sure would please Phil. Whatever you think of Phil's beliefs, it's hard not to gaze upon his cultivations and wonder if you've gotten life all wrong. 这里的生态营造得如此完美,以至于你会觉得好像是有两只巨手从天而降亲自塑造了这片大地。我想这肯定让Phil特别愉悦。无论你怎么看待Phil的信仰, 当你看着他种植的东西时,你几乎总会纳闷自己的生活是不是都错了。 This is life as summer camp. It's gorgeous, in a way that alters you on an elemental level. I feel it when I breathe the air. I feel it when I survey the enormity of the space around me. I shouldn't be sitting around the house and bitching because the new iOS 7 touchscreen icons don't have any fucking drop shadow. I should be out here, dammit! Killing things and growing things and bringing dead things home to cook! There is a life out in this wilderness that I am too chickenshit to lead. 这是一种夏令营似的生活。它无比动人,会从最根本的层面上改变你。我呼吸的时候,有这种体会。我纵览周边的无垠空间时,有这种体会。我不应该在屋子里呆着,为那见鬼的新版iOS 7触屏图标没有阴影效果而满腹牢骚。我应该跑到这儿来,该死的!杀点东西、种点东西,然后带点打死的东西回家煮!这片荒野中有一种生活方式,而我胆小懦弱、无力体验。 As we speed along, a speck of mud gets on my shirt—OMG MUD EWW SO GROSS!—and I flick it away. Meanwhile, Phil sits next to me, and his whole life is caked in mud. He's been out here plunging his hands into the earth and ripping the heads off ducks while I've been in suburbia with my thumb up my ass. I feel both inadequate and ungrateful. There's only one way to absolve myself, I figure, and that is to shoot the fuck out of this crossbow. 疾驰而过的时候,一小块泥巴溅到了我的衬衫上——天啦!泥巴!呃,太恶心啦!——我把它给弹走了。这时,Phil就坐在我旁边,他的整个人生就凝结在泥巴里。当我在郊区呆着没事抠屁眼的时候,他却一直呆在这片荒野中,双手扒进泥土里,撕扯鸭子们的脑袋。我既感到自己人生不够完整,又感到自己不知感恩。我想,只有一种办法能赦免我自己,那就是拿着这只手弩射他妈的几发。 Can I shoot the crossbow? And the rifle, for that matter? 我能不能射射这只手弩?还有那条步枪? "It's ready to go," he says. "Let's see what you can shoot at." “已经弄好了”,他说。“看看你能射到什么。” Since it isn't duck season yet, and since there are no deer around, Phil tosses out a bottle of water from the ATV for me to target. I grab the .22 first, step out of the vehicle, and nail it dead on. first shot. I AM THE HUNTER. 因为现在还没到猎鸭季节,而且周围也没有野鹿,所以Phil从车上往外边扔出一瓶水,让我去瞄准。我先拿起那条点22步枪,爬出车子,十分精准地击中了它。第一枪。我是个猎人! Time for the crossbow. Phil steps in front of the ATV to move the bottle so that I have a clear shot. I jokingly pantomime grabbing at the crossbow to shoot him. 接着是手弩。Phil跑到车子前面去挪动那只瓶子,以便让我能看得更清。我开玩笑地打手势,假装拿着弩要去射他。 Just stay there, Phil! That's perfect! 就呆在那儿,Phil!很好! He laughs and pats his pant leg: "That's why I keep an extra sidearm here." 他笑了,拍拍自己的裤腿。“这就是为啥我要额外在这里再放一支小手枪。” Phil hands me the bow, and I try to get a bead on the bottle through the scope. I close my eyes just as I'm squeezing the trigger. I hear the rush of the arrow and open my eyes in time to see the bottle jump up and start bleeding water down into the swamplands. The arrow is stuck a foot deep in the muck. I feel so very alive. Phil把弩交给我,我试着用瞄准器的准星去对那只瓶子。扣下扳机时,我闭上了眼睛。我听到箭支射出去的声音,睁开眼睛,就看到瓶子飞了起来,正往底下的沼泽地里漏水。箭支没地足有一英尺。我感到活力十足。 Phil nods in approval. "What do they call you where you're from? Deadeye? Let me guess: You were a mischievous boy when you were younger." I was indeed. Perhaps I should have stayed that way. Phil赞赏地点点头。“在你们那边,人们管你叫啥?我猜,是‘神射手’?你小的时候肯定是个淘气的孩子。”我确实是。也许我应该一直保持那样。 "So you and your woman: Are y'all Bible people?" “那么,你和你的女人,信圣经的吗?” Not really, I'm sorry to say. 恐怕不是,很遗憾地说。 "If you simply put your faith in Jesus coming down in flesh, through a human being, God becoming flesh living on the earth, dying on the cross for the sins of the world, being buried, and being raised from the dead—yours and mine and everybody else's problems will be solved. And the next time we see you, we will say: ‘You are now a brother. Our brother.' So then we look at you totally different then. See what I'm saying?" “只要你能相信耶稣通过一个人的形式以肉身降临,相信上帝变成肉身,生活在地球上,为着世上的罪恶而死在了十字架上,被埋进土里又死而复生。那么你的问题、我的问题、所有其他人的问题就都解决了。下次我们再看到你,我们就会说:‘你现在是兄弟。我们的兄弟’。那时候我们看待你就会完全不同了。知道我什么意思不?” I think so? 大概知道? We hop back in the ATV and plow toward the sunset, back to the Robertson home. There will be no family dinner tonight. No cameras in the house. No rowdy squirrel-hunting stories from back in the day. There will be only the realest version of Phil Robertson, hosting a private Bible study with a woman who, according to him, "has been on cocaine for years and is making her decision to repent. I'm going to point her in the right direction." 我们跳回车上,车子朝着夕阳颠簸,往Robertson家开回去。今晚不会有家庭晚餐。家里不会有摄像机。不会有人叽叽喳喳地讲述白天猎松鼠的故事。只会有最真实版本的Phil Robertson,他将举办一个私人的圣经学习会。另外一位参与者是个妇女,据Robertson说,“她多年来一直吸食可卡因,正决定悔改。我会为她指明正确的方向。” It's the direction he would like to point everyone: back to the woods. Back to the pioneer spirit. Back to God. "Why don't we go back to the old days?" he asked me at one point. But now, I'm afraid, I must get out of the ATV and go back to where I belong, back to the godless part of America that Phil is determined to save. 这方向是他愿意为任何人指明的:回归丛林;回归拓荒者的精神;回归上帝。“为什么不能回到老时光呢?”他曾这样问我。但是,我想我现在必须离开他的全地形车,回到属于我的地方、回到Phil下定决心要去拯救的那个不虔诚的美国去了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

文化气味

【2016-07-23】

@linsantu 发表了博文《科学家和哲学家的宗教信仰》(6月24日改自去年知乎回答,7月10日发表于腾讯大家)一我们生活在一个科学主义的时代,科学家(尤其是自然科学家)常常被视为理性与真理的化身。因此一般人在讨论“神 http://t.cn/R5gmmgp

@Drunkplane-zny: @whigzhou 辉总也许会对这文章感兴趣。我感觉挺有趣的。

@whigzhou: 这主要是个文化现象,不从文化方面入手没啥意思

@whigzhou: 我见过一些信仰调查问卷,基本观(more...)

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【2016-07-23】 @linsantu 发表了博文《科学家和哲学家的宗教信仰》(6月24日改自去年知乎回答,7月10日发表于腾讯大家)一我们生活在一个科学主义的时代,科学家(尤其是自然科学家)常常被视为理性与真理的化身。因此一般人在讨论“神 http://t.cn/R5gmmgp @Drunkplane-zny: @whigzhou 辉总也许会对这文章感兴趣。我感觉挺有趣的。 @whigzhou: 这主要是个文化现象,不从文化方面入手没啥意思 @whigzhou: 我见过一些信仰调查问卷,基本观感是,通常它们的问题都问的很蠢,让我无从回答,比如『你认为上帝存在吗?』这种问题,若不澄清其操作性含义,便毫无意义,『你有宗教信仰吗?』也差不多,『你觉得下列哪顶帽子更适合你:无神论者、怀疑论者、不可知论者、基督徒……』稍微好一点,但信息量也不大。 @whigzhou: 假如1950年的一位数学家说自己是基督徒,2010年的一位数学家说自己是无神论者,依我看,这一不同表态对于我们判断他们在基本哲学立场上有何差异毫无帮助。 @whigzhou: 因为如何表态主要取决于他们是否喜欢『基督徒』和『无神论者』这两个词所沾上的文化气味 @whigzhou: 宗教信仰主要是一种文化认同,跟哲学立场没什么关系,或者说两者间关系是高度任意的,『全知全能的上帝规定了物理定律并通过这些定律运行世界』和无神论有什么经验上可辨认差异吗?反之,无神论者照样可以相信灵性、感质和各种天钩。 @whigzhou: 所以,假如你要把宗教当成一个哲学问题来问,那么你的问题就不能这么幼稚或暗含立场,假如你要把它当成文化认同问题来问,那么像『你经常去教堂吗?』『假如你没受过洗,你会在未来受洗吗?』『你常阅读圣经吗?』『教会生活对你重要吗?』『你希望自己的葬礼遵循基督教仪轨吗?』之类的问题会更好。 @whigzhou: 当代美国社会的语境中,信仰问题其实已经收窄到了其伦理方面,即,争议参与者所关切的,主要是其伦理方面,其中要点可表述为:在判定某一人类行动应该与否时,除了个人欲望、理性及其集体表达之外,是否存在某个更高(或最高)的外部指引,若是,它具体给出了哪些指引? @whigzhou: 多数坚守信仰者所意图坚守的,其实是这个,尽管他们自己往往也表达不清楚。  
分明以人代畜

【2016-06-18】

@希波克拉底门徒 今天听说一个朋友要退党,我问他有没有读过圣经,他说没有,我说去信这个的人大多数没完整读完圣经。我最后跟他讲:我尊重你,尊重你的信仰自由权利,但不会尊重基督教信仰。我替你最后选择基督教信仰感到惋惜。希望你在选择一种信仰前,先了解它的来龙去脉、真实面貌,完全不了解就去信,跟不知道对方性格、历史就去领结婚证有什么区别?over

@黄章晋ster: 宗教提供的价值体系的非理性化,恰恰是一个社会道德伦理体系能相对稳定的保证。如果一个社会的道德伦理是可以讨论的,是服从理性的,它必然是不稳定甚至是无从建立的,它必然很快会讨论人肉是否好吃这样(more...)

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【2016-06-18】 @希波克拉底门徒 今天听说一个朋友要退党,我问他有没有读过圣经,他说没有,我说去信这个的人大多数没完整读完圣经。我最后跟他讲:我尊重你,尊重你的信仰自由权利,但不会尊重基督教信仰。我替你最后选择基督教信仰感到惋惜。希望你在选择一种信仰前,先了解它的来龙去脉、真实面貌,完全不了解就去信,跟不知道对方性格、历史就去领结婚证有什么区别?over @黄章晋ster: 宗教提供的价值体系的非理性化,恰恰是一个社会道德伦理体系能相对稳定的保证。如果一个社会的道德伦理是可以讨论的,是服从理性的,它必然是不稳定甚至是无从建立的,它必然很快会讨论人肉是否好吃这样的话题。我们反对器官人肉的自由买卖,其实是自觉使用了宗教提供的绝对伦理。 @黄章晋ster:从社会功能而言,除了为一个社会提供稳定的价值锚链,它还早就衍生出为社会提供反哺和救济功能,社区的化精神纽带功能,跨阶层交流沟通的调适功能……这些社会功能,都是世俗政府无法有效提供的,而西方社会提供类似功能的非宗教社会组织,本身就是宗教组织启发的产物。 @黄章晋ster:我们不用去做历史表现的对照,仅从将来的可能性而言,在彼岸建立天国的信仰和在现世建立人间天国的社会,必然是前者造成灾难的可能性更小。 @黄章晋ster:基督教诞生前的希腊罗马世界,只有崇拜英雄、强者、理性的价值取向,并无同情弱者之类的价值取向,虽然多数人有共情同理心,但不意味着它能上升为稳固的群居规则,尤其是在生产力低下的时代。虽然中国两千年来儒表法里,但儒家伦理若不成意识形态,以韩非子价值观造就的社会必然是斗兽场。 @whigzhou: 前面几点我都没意见,这条不同意 @whigzhou: 需要注意到,所有文明都经历了一个残忍行为逐渐减少的过程,特别是人牲和肉刑的普遍消亡,这个过程发生的很早,宗教在其中似乎并未扮演关键角色 @whigzhou: 去残忍化的过程可能是社会大型化及和平秩序长期持续的自然后果,宗教或意识形态未必是前导因素 @whigzhou: 类似对战场(和角斗场)上的失败者缺乏同情的残酷文化在罗马存续得较久,可能和他的普遍兵役义务有关,当军事职业与其他职业分化更明确,壁垒更森严之后,军事阶层之外的文化就会改变 @whigzhou: 另一方面,就『同情弱者』的经济方面而言,罗马帝国向其公民大派面包可是福利国家的先驱 @baidu冷兵器吧: 希腊和基督教前罗马世界有着长期的慈善行为和组织,这不可能是没有同情价值观的社会 @whigzhou: 对,以后世标准,罗马人表现得缺乏同情心的方面主要是针对战斗中的失败者,依我看这是尚武精神与普遍兵役的结果 @whigzhou: 说起同情心,想到个事情,轿子从北宋开始流行,起初士大夫都鄙视坐轿子的,认为太残忍(也太娘炮),程颐还说『吾不忍乘,分明以人代畜』,但此后轿子地位不断提升,到清代已是官绅富家主要交通工具,是个官没有不坐的,毫无压力,原因显然不是儒家意识形态衰弱,而是人口压力提高,人力益发便宜了。 @whigzhou: 明廷已重新控制北方,清廷更控制了草原,所以这事情不能以缺驴马解释,只能说人比驴便宜。
根本没有发生

【2016-05-15】

@whigzhou: 从上世纪中后期开始,基督教在全球范围的扩张势头逐渐消退…………除了其中最保守、生育率最高的那些教派,目前,加纳有6万多摩门教徒,肯尼亚有15万贵格派教徒,门诺派在埃塞俄比亚有47万信徒(其中26万已受洗),当然,对于主流媒体,这些事情根本没有发生。

@zeroclyy:去年埃博拉病毒感染的医生全家都是传教士,一边治病教书一边传教,感召上帝,奉献自己,传播福音。媒体不在乎,美国福音派和摩(more...)

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【2016-05-15】 @whigzhou: 从上世纪中后期开始,基督教在全球范围的扩张势头逐渐消退…………除了其中最保守、生育率最高的那些教派,目前,加纳有6万多摩门教徒,肯尼亚有15万贵格派教徒,门诺派在埃塞俄比亚有47万信徒(其中26万已受洗),当然,对于主流媒体,这些事情根本没有发生。 @zeroclyy:去年埃博拉病毒感染的医生全家都是传教士,一边治病教书一边传教,感召上帝,奉献自己,传播福音。媒体不在乎,美国福音派和摩门教一直坚持在全球传教,而且都是自愿的,竟然有人说是强迫的!!!,你去强迫试一试? @whigzhou: 非洲少有的一股积极力量  
Amish自动扶梯

【2016-04-26】

@人造史诗:假设一个要求信徒尽可能降低物质消费的宗教或教派在当代西方世界大规模发展,那么这个宗教或教派算不算反对当代西方世界?算不算从经济社会基础上与西方社会无法相容?

@whigzhou: 你说的就是Amish人啊,当然不算反西方,而且只要他们一直像现在这样保持和平主义,就与西方世界完全相容

@whigzhou: 实际上Amish人过去几十年的历史很好的演示了这个相容过程会如何发生,随着人口急增,土地价格上涨,多数Amish人已无法坚持传统家庭农业,但他们是和平主义者,不能去抢土地,而且按教规不能领福利,于是只好转向制造业和服务业,为此不得不接受越来越多的现代元素,今天2/3以上Amish人已经不务农了。

@whigzhou: 但这一转变不是均匀和整体的,而是以教派分裂的方式发生,每当一组新的现代元素引进来时,(more...)

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【2016-04-26】 @人造史诗:假设一个要求信徒尽可能降低物质消费的宗教或教派在当代西方世界大规模发展,那么这个宗教或教派算不算反对当代西方世界?算不算从经济社会基础上与西方社会无法相容? @whigzhou: 你说的就是Amish人啊,当然不算反西方,而且只要他们一直像现在这样保持和平主义,就与西方世界完全相容 @whigzhou: 实际上Amish人过去几十年的历史很好的演示了这个相容过程会如何发生,随着人口急增,土地价格上涨,多数Amish人已无法坚持传统家庭农业,但他们是和平主义者,不能去抢土地,而且按教规不能领福利,于是只好转向制造业和服务业,为此不得不接受越来越多的现代元素,今天2/3以上Amish人已经不务农了。 @whigzhou: 但这一转变不是均匀和整体的,而是以教派分裂的方式发生,每当一组新的现代元素引进来时,就会针对是否接受这些元素(比如能不能用手机)而发生一次分裂,若干次分裂之后,便产生几十个分支教派,构成一个从最保守到最开明的连续光谱, @whigzhou: 这个光谱被称为“Amish自动扶梯”,对个体来说,选择站在扶梯的哪个位置是完全自由的,但从整体看,由于人口迅速增长,往上走的人流必定称为主导趋势,否则新增人口无法生存 @whigzhou: 实际上,Amish自动扶梯只是新教保守派这部大扶梯的最底端那一截,从Amish扶梯的顶端(即最开明端)再往上走,就是普通门诺派(Mennonites),再往上走就是福音派(evangelical),由于越下面生育率越高,所以这部大扶梯一直在为美国社会源源不断的输送保守派。 @whigzhou: 类似情况(教派分裂-形成光谱-生育率驱动下变成扶梯)也发生在摩门教中,这里有份摩门教的教派列表,以感受一下摩门自动扶梯 @人造史诗:我想进一步请教:如果有个亿人级的群体,知识,生产率和技能都不低,但因为教义要求苦行。所以故意采用降低生产率,减少劳动时间的方式来避免无用劳动。那么对社会会有世俗意义上的负面影响吗? @whigzhou: 如果这种(或类似)教义被90%人奉行,那文明无疑会萎缩 @whigzhou: 可是你只要想一想支撑现有文明社会的基本条件,就会发现这种情况根本不会发生,所以认真讨论它没什么意义,重点是:在考虑社会长期演变时,你不能把某个因素(或趋势)单独放大一万倍,同时假定其他都不变,这么想没什么意义 @whigzhou: 关键是,“其他条件”一定会变,自动扶梯就是变的一种方式 @whigzhou: 比如你问:按目前的生育率,长此以往等到Amish占美国人口90%会怎么样?但怎么不想想:这些人住哪里?土地怎么得来的?他们仍然不肯投票吗?掌握全部选票的另外10%公民仍然愿意为他们提供安全保障和司法系统?此时北美大陆仍能抵御入侵者?在丧失现有安全保障后Amish人仍然会坚持和平主义任人宰割?  
[译文]伊斯兰的新教运动

Tom Holland: We must not deny the religious roots of Islamic State
Tom Holland: 我们不能否认伊斯兰国的宗教根基

作者:Tom Holland @ 2015-3-17
译者:Horace Rae
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:News Statesman,http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/03/tom-holland-we-must-not-deny-relgious-roots-islamic-state

Its jihadis call for a global caliphate. So why deny religion drives Isis?

伊斯兰圣战者呼吁建立一个全球哈里发帝国。所以,我们何以否认伊斯兰国乃由宗教所驱动?

in 1545, a general council of the Western Church was convened by Pope Paul III in the Tyrolean city of Trent. The ambition of the (more...)

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Tom Holland: We must not deny the religious roots of Islamic State Tom Holland: 我们不能否认伊斯兰国的宗教根基 作者:Tom Holland @ 2015-3-17 译者:Horace Rae 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:News Statesman,http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/03/tom-holland-we-must-not-deny-relgious-roots-islamic-state Its jihadis call for a global caliphate. So why deny religion drives Isis? 伊斯兰圣战者呼吁建立一个全球哈里发帝国。所以,我们何以否认伊斯兰国乃由宗教所驱动? in 1545, a general council of the Western Church was convened by Pope Paul III in the Tyrolean city of Trent. The ambition of the various bishops and theologians in attendance was to affirm Catholic doctrine in the face of the Protestant Reformation. Accordingly, when the council issued its first significant decree on 8 April 1546, it was targeted very precisely at what the delegates saw as most noxious about Luther and his followers. 1545年,教皇保禄三世主持的天主教会大公会议在提洛尔地区的塔兰托召开。与会的主教和神学家们想要在新教改革如火如荼之际巩固天主教信条的地位。于是,1546年4月8日,当会议发布第一条重要教令时,其对象很明确,就是被代表们视为罪大恶极的路德及其追随者。 Whereas Protestants, following Luther’s lead, aspired to strip away the cladding of tradition and learn the will of God from scripture alone, the Council of Trent condemned this ambition as a pernicious heresy. Divine revelation, it declared firmly, was not confined to the Bible. Tradition, too, “preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession”, expressed the essence of Christ’s teachings. To doubt this was no longer to rank as Christian. 跟随路德指引的新教徒们决意打破传统,只从经文中领悟上帝的意志。塔兰托大公会议谴责这种想法,称其为罪大恶极的异端邪说。会议坚持,神圣启示并非只存在于《圣经》之中。传统——“经由连续传承而被保存在天主教会中”——也同样能传达上帝教导的实质。质疑这一说法的人将被剥夺基督徒身份。 It is in a kindred spirit that Mehdi Hasan, in his article in last week’s issue of the New Statesman, would deny the title of Islamic to Islamic State, also known as Isis. That Isis militants, in justifying their actions, can quote the Quran, or the example or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, does not necessarily make them orthodox Muslims. 在上周New Statesman 杂志刊登的一篇文章中,Mehdi Hasan也表达了类似的想法:否认伊斯兰国的“伊斯兰”特性。尽管伊斯兰国的战士们在为其行为辩解时大可引用《古兰经》或先知穆罕默德的行迹或言论,但这并不能令他们成为正统的穆斯林。 Islam, like Christianity, is more than the sum of its scriptures. Over the course of its near 1,500 years of existence, an immense corpus of commentary and interpretation has accrued. “. . . the religion’s teachings in every age are determined by scholarly consensus on the meaning of the complex scriptural texts.” So declares Timothy Winter, the director of the Cambridge Muslim College, as quoted by Hasan. It is an assertion that would not have looked out of place in the decrees of the Council of Trent. 就像基督教一样,伊斯兰教的内涵远比经文总和丰富得多。在它1500余年历史中,无数人对它做过解释和评论,“……在每个时代,教义都是由关于复杂经文之内涵的学术共识决定的。” Hasan 引用剑桥穆斯林学院院长Timothy Winter如此说到。这种主张如果插到塔兰托会议的纲领中去,也不会令人觉得格格不入。 The problem faced by the orthodox religious authorities in the Muslim world, however, is very similar to that which confronted the Catholic Church in the 16th century: escaped genies are tricky things to get back into bottles. The same impulse that prompted Luther to affirm the primacy of scripture over Catholic doctrine has also long been at work in Islam. 然而,正统穆斯林权威现在面对的问题与16世纪困扰天主教会的问题很相似:逃脱的精灵很难回到瓶子里。促使路德把经文置于天主教信条之上的念头在伊斯兰教中也是由来已久。 As far back as the 13th century, a scholar based in Damascus by the name of Ibn Taymiyya proposed that the surest way to know God’s purpose was to study the practices of the first three generations of Muslims: the “forebears”, or “Salafs”. Reports of what Muhammad and his earliest followers had done, so he argued, should always trump subsequent tradition. Like Luther, Ibn Taymiyya was condemned as a heretic; but he also, again like Luther, blazed a momentous trail. 早在13世纪,大马士革一位名叫Ibn Taymiyya的学者就认为,领悟真主意图最稳妥的方法就是研习最早三代穆斯林(“先贤”,或称“萨拉菲”)的事迹。他宣称,关于穆罕默德及其最早期追随者所作所为的记载,永远比后来形成的传统更为权威。正如路德一样,Ibn Taymiyya也曾被斥为异端;但是,还是跟路德一样,他同样开辟了一条重要道路。 Salafism today is probably the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world. The interpretation that Isis applies to Muslim scripture may be exceptional for its savagery – but not for its literalism. Islamic State, in its conceit that it has trampled down the weeds and briars of tradition and penetrated to the truth of God’s dictates, is recognisably Salafist. 萨拉菲主义可能是当今世界扩散最迅速的伊斯兰教运动。伊斯兰国对伊斯兰经文的解释,在其野蛮性上或许颇为罕见,但是在字面主义上却绝对正宗。伊斯兰国幻想自己消灭了宗教传统中的毒草,洞悉上帝的旨意,这很明显是萨拉菲主义的特质。 When Islamic State fighters smash the statues of pagan gods, they are following the example of the Prophet; when they proclaim themselves the shock troops of a would-be global empire, they are following the example of the warriors of the original caliphate; when they execute enemy combatants, and impose discriminatory taxes on Christians, and take the women of defeated opponents as slaves, they are doing nothing that the first Muslims did not glory in. 当伊斯兰国战士毁坏异教神祗的雕像时,他们效仿的是先知的先例;当他们宣称自己是未来统治世界的帝国的骁勇之师时,他们效仿的是最早的哈里发国的军队。当他们处决敌军战士,对基督徒征收歧视性的税目,以及把被打败对手的女人当作奴隶时,没有一件不是初代穆斯林引以为豪的。 Such behaviour is certainly not synonymous with Islam; but if not Islamic, then it is hard to know what else it is. 这种行为与伊斯兰教肯定不是百分之百相符的;但要是说这种行为不是伊斯兰的,那就很难说它到底是什么了。 Admittedly the actions of those signed up to Islamic State are unlikely to have been inspired exclusively by religious teachings. Many of those fighting for Isis may indeed, as Hasan points out, be varnishing their taste for violence or power with a sheen of piety. But the same was true of those inspired by Luther’s teachings – not to mention the early Muslims themselves. 诚然,伊斯兰国的这些行为不可能仅仅由宗教教义驱动。Hasan指出,isis的许多斗士,可能仅仅是将他们对权力和暴力的欲望粉饰为了对神的虔诚。但是,被路德的教导所鼓舞的人也是如此呀——更不要提那些早期的穆斯林们了。 Back in the time of the Salafs, avarice and religiosity frequently coincided. When a slave revolt erupted in Syria and Iraq less than 50 years after the death of Muhammad, the Arab conquerors were outraged. “These slaves are our booty,” one of them exclaimed. “They were granted us by God!” 在萨拉菲们的时代,虔诚与贪婪往往同时发生。穆罕默德去世不到50年,叙利亚和伊拉克爆发了奴隶起义,阿拉伯征服者们大发雷霆,其中一人宣称“这些奴隶是我们的战利品,他们是真主赐予我们的!” Jihadis in Raqqa have tweeted in similar tones about uppity Yazidi slaves. To imagine that religious motivation can somehow be isolated from the complex swirl of ambitions, fears and desires that constitute human nature is to fall for an illusion: that religions, contingent as they are, and as subject to evolution as any other manifestation of culture, exist as abstract ideals. 在推特上,拉卡的圣战者对不易控制的雅兹迪奴隶也有相同的论调。如果我们假想宗教驱动力可以从构成人类本性的野心、恐惧、欲望所组成的复杂漩涡中独立出来,我们就会陷入一种幻觉:宗教飘忽不定,并且如同其他文化表现形式一样总在持续演变,只是作为抽象理念而存在。 The truth is that in Islam today, as in Christianity during the Reformation, the spectrum of those who practise the faith is widening to convulsive effect. Hasan’s dismissal of two Isis recruits from Birmingham as “religious novices” echoes the horror of Catholic scholars such as Thomas More at the pretensions of Protestant tailors and tinkers. 真相是,今日的伊斯兰教就如同宗教改革期间的基督教一样,信徒们的思想差异极大,造成了令人震惊的后果。Hasan对Isis从伯明翰招募的两名成员不屑一顾,称之为“宗教菜鸟”,这种反感与Thomas More等天主教学者面对新教裁缝和修补匠的主张时的感觉一样。 Just as in the early 16th century the printing press and the efforts of translators such as Luther and Tyndale served to democratise knowledge of the Bible, so in the 21st century has the ready availability on the internet of the Quran and the hadiths in the vernacular enabled rappers, security guards and schoolgirls all to bandy scripture. 正如16世纪时出版印刷业以及路德和廷代尔等翻译者曾对《圣经》知识平民化作出过贡献一样,在21世纪,网络上译成本地语言的《古兰经》及《穆罕默德言行录》唾手可得,这也使得说唱艺人、保安和女学生们都能把经文挂在嘴边。 To complain that quranic verses which mandate crucifixion or beheading are being cited without reference to the traditions of Islamic jurisprudence is to miss the point. It is precisely because Isis militants imagine themselves the equivalent of Muhammad’s companions, blessed with an unadorned understanding of God’s commands, that they feel qualified to establish a caliphate. 指责他们不参考伊斯兰教法传统就直接引用那些鼓励刑罚和砍头的《古兰经》经文,这种批评没有抓住要点。正是因为Isis战士认为他们自己等同于穆罕默德的同伴,被赐予了对真主旨意的准确理解,他们才认为自己有资格建立哈里发国。 “My people,” so Muhammad is once said to have warned, “are destined to split into 73 factions – all of which, except one, will end up in hell.” Who, then, Muslims have often wondered, will gain paradise? Isis, like so many of the various other sects that have emerged in the course of Islamic history, appears confident of the answer. 据说穆罕默德曾经警告过:“我的人民注定要分裂成73个派别,除了一个,其他的都要下地狱。”穆斯林们一直在疑惑:究竟是谁会上天堂?正如历史上涌现出的其他伊斯兰教派别一样,Isis对这个问题的答案似乎很自信。 It is not merely coincidence that IS currently boasts a caliph, imposes quranically mandated taxes, topples idols, chops the hands off thieves, stones adulterers, executes homosexuals and carries a flag that bears the Muslim declaration of faith. If Islamic State is indeed to be categorised as a phenomenon distinct from Islam, it urgently needs a manifest and impermeable firewall raised between them. At the moment, though, I fail to see it. 现在,IS夸口自居为哈里发,征收《古兰经》要求的税目、推倒偶像、砍掉盗贼的手、把通奸者石刑处死、处死同性恋者,并且采用穆斯林的见证言作为旗帜,所有这些都并非巧合。如果伊斯兰国一定要被定义成与伊斯兰教毫无关系的现象,那么两者之间就需要树立一堵明白无误、密不透风的防火墙。现在,我还没有看到这堵墙。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]猎巫审判的勃兴与衰落

The Decline of Witch Trials in Europe
欧洲猎巫审判的衰落

作者:James Hannam @ 2007
译者:Yuncong Yang
校对:慕白
来源:作者个人网站,http://jameshannam.com/witchtrial.htm

Preliminary considerations
绪论

Alice Molland was sent to the gallows at Exeter in 1684 and became the last witch to be executed in England. Scotland closed its account with Janet Horne in 1722 while trials wound down across Europe. However, it would not be until 1782 that the last witch to be legally executed met her fate at Glarus in Switzerland.

1684年,艾丽丝·莫兰在埃克塞特被处以绞刑,她是最后一个在英格兰被处决的女巫。 1722年,珍妮特·霍恩成为苏格兰最后一个被处决的女巫,此时,全欧洲的猎巫审判案件已经在减少,不过要等到1782年,全欧最后一个经法律程序被判死刑的女巫才在瑞士的格拉鲁斯被处决。

But by the late 17th century witch trials were already reasonably rare occurrences even in the same localities where, in the earlier part of that century, the greatest hunts had taken place. The crime itself was extinguished in France by royal edict in 1682, repealed in England in 1736 and abolished in Poland as late as 1776.

但是到17世纪晚期时,在那些之前猎巫运动最盛行的地区,猎巫审判已经是相当罕见的事情了。法国于1682年就通过王室敕令废除了巫术罪。英格兰取消巫术罪是在1736年,而直到1776年波兰才废除这一罪名。

However, the decline in trials and hunts did not necessarily presage a corresponding decline in the belief in witches just as their start did not correspond to any increase. Belief is a notoriously hard thing to measure, but almost all societies appear to have some tradition of witches and fear of magic has been nearly universal. The questions about witches in early modern Europe are not so much why people believed in them at that time and place, but why that belief manifested itself into the hunts and executions.

然而,正如猎巫审判和猎巫运动的兴起并不代表人们比以前更加相信巫术及巫师的存在一样,它的衰落也并不一定代表人们变得更不相信巫术及巫师的存在了。众所周知,信仰是非常难以度量的,而几乎所有社会里都存在着某种巫师传统,人们对魔法的恐惧也是处处有之。要研究近代早期欧洲的巫师这一题目,重要的问题不是为什么彼时彼地的人们相信有巫师存在,而是为什么彼时人们的这种信念导致了猎巫运动及对巫师的大规模处决。

The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the reasons that trials for the cr(more...)

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The Decline of Witch Trials in Europe 欧洲猎巫审判的衰落 作者:James Hannam @ 2007 译者:Yuncong Yang 校对:慕白 来源:作者个人网站,http://jameshannam.com/witchtrial.htm Preliminary considerations 绪论 Alice Molland was sent to the gallows at Exeter in 1684 and became the last witch to be executed in England. Scotland closed its account with Janet Horne in 1722 while trials wound down across Europe. However, it would not be until 1782 that the last witch to be legally executed met her fate at Glarus in Switzerland. 1684年,艾丽丝·莫兰在埃克塞特被处以绞刑,她是最后一个在英格兰被处决的女巫。 1722年,珍妮特·霍恩成为苏格兰最后一个被处决的女巫,此时,全欧洲的猎巫审判案件已经在减少,不过要等到1782年,全欧最后一个经法律程序被判死刑的女巫才在瑞士的格拉鲁斯被处决。 But by the late 17th century witch trials were already reasonably rare occurrences even in the same localities where, in the earlier part of that century, the greatest hunts had taken place. The crime itself was extinguished in France by royal edict in 1682, repealed in England in 1736 and abolished in Poland as late as 1776. 但是到17世纪晚期时,在那些之前猎巫运动最盛行的地区,猎巫审判已经是相当罕见的事情了。法国于1682年就通过王室敕令废除了巫术罪。英格兰取消巫术罪是在1736年,而直到1776年波兰才废除这一罪名。 However, the decline in trials and hunts did not necessarily presage a corresponding decline in the belief in witches just as their start did not correspond to any increase. Belief is a notoriously hard thing to measure, but almost all societies appear to have some tradition of witches and fear of magic has been nearly universal. The questions about witches in early modern Europe are not so much why people believed in them at that time and place, but why that belief manifested itself into the hunts and executions. 然而,正如猎巫审判和猎巫运动的兴起并不代表人们比以前更加相信巫术及巫师的存在一样,它的衰落也并不一定代表人们变得更不相信巫术及巫师的存在了。众所周知,信仰是非常难以度量的,而几乎所有社会里都存在着某种巫师传统,人们对魔法的恐惧也是处处有之。要研究近代早期欧洲的巫师这一题目,重要的问题不是为什么彼时彼地的人们相信有巫师存在,而是为什么彼时人们的这种信念导致了猎巫运动及对巫师的大规模处决。 The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the reasons that trials for the crime of witchcraft, from being relatively common before 1650, had, across Europe, become a rarity fifty years later and had died out altogether within another century. This rapid decline and then extinction is at least as puzzling as the widespread appearance of the phenomena in the first place at the end of the fifteenth century. 本文的宗旨是探讨这一问题:为什么在1650年前相当普遍的对施行巫术者的审判50年后就变得颇为罕见,而到了18世纪晚期就彻底绝迹了?猎巫审判在这一时期的急剧衰落与它在十五世纪末的急剧盛行一样令人费解。 Witch trials only became common during the Renaissance and the fiercest hunts took place in the 1620s and 1630s in German speaking areas. Contrary to popular belief, they were not a phenomenon of the Middle Ages. Although magical belief and practice were just as common during this earlier period, they did not often lead to trials, let alone executions. 猎巫审判要到文艺复兴时期才开始普遍出现,而最最激烈的猎巫高潮出现在十七世纪二三十年代的德语地区。与普遍的认知相反,猎巫运动不是中世纪的事情。在中世纪,人们对魔法的信仰和使用与猎巫运动时期一样普遍,但那时很少有巫师被送上法庭,更别说被处决了。 Until recently popular views of this subject were confused both by the agendas of rationalists who wanted to find examples of superstition and by neo-pagans seeking their own foundation myth. 直到最近,对猎巫运动的流行观点都相当混乱。其原因在于,一方面,理性主义者们希望找到迷信带来恶果的实例,另一方面,新异教的信徒们希望在历史中找到他们教义的根基。 The “Burning Times”, when, according to the most extreme polemicists, nine million women lost their lives after dreadful torture, has become an essential part of neo-paganism’s self identity. They also had Margaret Murray to assure them that witches really were the survivors of the old religion that neo-pagans were continuing in the present day [NOTE]. “大火刑时代”已经成为了新异教主义自我身份认同的核心部分。据一些最极端的论者说,这一时期有九百万女性在承受酷刑后被杀。除此之外,玛格丽特·穆雷断言巫师们是古老宗教的孑遗,而今天的新异教正是继承了这些古老宗教。 Murray’s thesis of the existence of a pre-Christian fertility cult remains influential outside the academy but, despite seeming to have gained some support from Carlo Ginzberg’s work on the benandanti who do appear to have had some of the attributes of a religious cult, it is dismissed by noted modern authority Robin Briggs as having “just enough marginal plausibility to be hard to refute completely, yet is almost wholly wrong.” [NOTE]. 穆雷认为,猎巫时代存在着一种源于前基督教时期的生殖崇拜。这一观点至今在学术圈外仍然颇有影响。尽管卡洛·金斯堡对于“善之行者”(benandanti)的研究结论(“善之行者”的身上确实存在某种宗教崇拜的特征)似乎部分支持穆雷的观点,现代的权威学者罗宾·布里格斯依然对穆雷的观点嗤之以鼻,在他眼里,穆雷的学说“只有刚好够使它难以被彻底驳斥的那么一点点说服力,但基本上是完全错误的。” This reassessment of the myth of the Burning Times has even reached neo-paganism’s own scholarship [NOTE] which is challenging the idea that the validity of their religion depends on its antiquity. Meanwhile, estimates of the total number of executions over three centuries has shrunk to about 60,000 or so [NOTE] which is of a similar order of magnitude to what the Jacobins managed in just three years of terror during the French Revolution. 即使新异教主义自己的学者们也开始重新审视“大火刑时代”,他们开始挑战这一令其信仰能够合理的建基于古代传统的观念了。同时,现今对猎巫运动在三个世纪内处决人数的估计已经下降到约六万人,这一处决规模和法国大革命时雅各宾派在三年恐怖时期内做到的不相上下。 There is very little agreement about the reasons for the end of witch trials and the scholars have tended each to be an advocate for their own ideas based on the study of particular localities rather than trying a more synoptic approach to bring some order to the myriad of available suggestions. It is not even clear whether we are looking for some new causes that helped end witch trials or simply the absence of whatever it was that had started them in the first place. 对于猎巫审判结束的原因,学术界没有什么统一意见。很多学者仅仅是在努力研究某一地区的情况,并以此支持他们自己的观点,而不是尝试进行综合研究以给各种可能假说梳理出头绪。我们甚至都不知道在研究中应该寻找什么。是某些新生因素结束了猎巫审判,还是某些在过去推动了猎巫审判的因素已经不复存在? So, if we could identify the conditions that brought about the trials, the subsequent decline might simply be explained by their later disappearance. An example of this would be the religious confusion and violence of the Reformation that had largely worked itself out after the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century. 如此说来,如果我们能够找到最初猎巫审判产生时的种种条件,那么猎巫审判后来的衰落或许就可以归因于这些初始条件的不复存在。举例来说:宗教改革带来了宗教观点的混乱和大量暴力冲突,而这种混乱状况在十七世纪中叶威斯特伐利亚条约后大为缓解。 It has also been widely noticed that hunts tended to take place in areas and periods where central control had largely broken down or during interregnums between regimes. For example, the activities of Matthew Hopkins took place in the chaos of the English Civil War, the Great Hunt in Scotland in 1661 when English justices were replaced, and even the Salem of 1692 outbreak occurred in a temporary vacuum of authority. When control was restored, goes this theory, the witch hunts largely ceased. 很多人也都注意到,若一个地区中央统治秩序崩坏或正处于改朝换代时期,猎巫审判就比较易于在此地盛行。举例而言:马修·霍普金斯活跃于英国内战的混乱时期;1661年苏格兰的大规模猎巫运动发生时,当地的英格兰法官正遭到大规模替换;甚至1692年的萨勒姆大审判也是发生在当地短暂处于权力真空的时期。如这一理论预言的,在以上地区一旦秩序得到恢复,猎巫审判就大大减少了。 On the other hand, the original causes might long since have been removed without their effects likewise disappearing so that the decline of witch trials will be brought about by entirely different means. Examples frequently cited are the rise of secular rationalism or social trends that led to the discounting of devilry. It has been suggested that witchcraft simply became too old hat for the intelligentsia of the early Enlightenment to countenance and that they were wont to sneer at such outdated nonsense so as to reassure themselves of their own intellectual superiority. 另一方面,也有很多猎巫运动的初始动因早早消失,但其效力并未消失,在这种情况下,导致猎巫审判衰落的就应该是其他因素。经常被引用的例子是世俗理性主义的兴起,或社会潮流导致魔鬼信仰的自然衰落。一些人认为在启蒙运动早期的知识精英眼里,巫术罪太老套了,不值得他们支持;相反这些精英乐于鄙视这些过时的无稽之谈,从而获得智力上的优越感。 A good deal of recent work has concentrated on the social reasons for witchcraft accusations and has looked for the causes of both their rise and fall at a local level. For instance, Alan MacFarlane and Keith Thomas set out a complex web of interactions between vulnerable single women and other villagers motivated by guilt [NOTE]. They suggested that the full implementation of the Poor Laws sufficiently alleviated the situation so that the accusations ceased. While their careful research of depositions suggests they have accurately portrayed the mechanism by which social tensions manifested themselves, I do not think that they have explained why, at that particular place and time, it should be through witchcraft accusations. 许多近期的研究工作着重研究巫术罪指控背后的社会因素,并通过对局部地区的研究来寻找巫术罪指控增加和减少的原因。麦克法兰和基斯·托马斯的研究描述了一些村子中弱势单身女性与其他村民之间基于罪恶感而展开的错综复杂的互动。他们认为济贫法的全面贯彻实施大大缓解了此类困境,因而减少了巫术罪指控。尽管他们对各种证词的细致研究表明,他们确实精确地描述了当时社会矛盾的表现方式,我认为他们并没有解答“为何彼时彼地这些矛盾偏偏以巫术罪指控的形式表现出来”这一关键问题。 The era of the witch trials was one of great change and disruption but we must not forget that it was bracketed by the disastrous fourteenth century and the enormous social upheavals of enclosure and the industrial revolution. Any social explanation for witch hunts has to be specific enough to differentiate between the early modern period and those on each side of it, while also being general enough to apply to much of Europe over two centuries. 猎巫审判时代确实是一个剧烈变迁、社会失序的时代。但是不应忘记,这个时代之前是灾难不断的十四世纪,而后面则跟着圈地运动和工业革命这样的重大社会变迁。若要从社会角度解读猎巫运动的兴衰,这种解读必须足够具体,否则难以把近代早期和它前后的时期区分开来。同时这种解读又要有足够的一般性,能被应用来解释二百余年间的大半个欧洲发生的诸多相关事件。 The commonalties of witch beliefs are greater enough to make having lots of different social explanations for different environments unconvincing. For this reason I will be looking for general reasons for the decline that can be applied across Europe rather than seeking an individual cause for each locale. 当时的诸种巫术信仰存在非常之多的共同点,因此在解释猎巫运动的兴衰时,试图为不同地区不同环境的猎巫现象找出许多不同社会原因的思路是缺乏说服力的。所以,我要找到一般性原因来解释整个欧洲范围内的情况,而不是为每个不同的地方发生的事情找出一个特定的解释。 By a witch, I mean someone who is believed to have received magical power by some form of diabolical means. The diabolical source of this power is important because the mentality of most Christian intellectuals allowed only the devil as a source of supernatural power, except of course from God, and it led witchcraft to be viewed in much the same way as heresy. 在本文中,巫师一词指的是那些被认为通过某种与恶魔有关的方式得到了魔法力量的人。这种超自然力量的根源是魔鬼,这一点非常重要,因为除了上帝之外,魔鬼是唯一一个被当时的基督教知识分子接受的超自然力来源。也正是这一点使得巫术在很大程度上被当作一种异端行为来处理。 The connection between diabolism and magic is found in the documents of the Christian elite including, most famously, the Malleus Malificium (1486) of Kramer and Sprenger, but has an older provenance. The straightforward dichotomy between God and the devil was already present in late antiquity with the labelling of all pagan gods as demons but once they had been seen off, the church took a more sceptical attitude. Belief in magic was considered to be a sin but consequently actually practising it was nothing more than delusion. 魔法和魔鬼之间的联系载于许多当时基督教知识精英的著作中,最有名的是克拉默和斯普伦格著的《巫师之锤》一书。但这一观念的来源比这些著作更为古老。在古典时代晚期,上帝-魔鬼的简单二分法就已经出现了,当时基督教会把所有异端神祗都目为魔鬼。但击败异教信仰后,基督教会却转而采取一种更具怀疑色彩的立场。信仰魔法被认为是一种罪,但施行魔术不过是一种幻术而已。 This attitude is very much an intellectual one and reflects the continuing rejection of most forms of supernatural belief by theologians even when witchcraft was accepted. That is to say that rather than believing in the innate potency of ritual magic or in nature spirits, they insisted that God and the devil were the only possible agencies for magical or miraculous power. 这种态度很大程度上是基于智识的,它反映着自古以来神学家们对绝大多数超自然信仰的否定,即使后来巫术的存在被接受了,神学家们的态度也依然如此。也就是说:神学家们坚持认为上帝和魔鬼是仅有的能够施行魔法或奇迹力量的存在,而不承认各种仪式魔术或自然精灵本身具有某种能力。 This was not just a question of theology but also arose from the Aristotelian paradigm of natural science that had no room for spirits, magic or other such phenomena. We should note, however, that the word ‘magic’ was also used in medieval works like the Speculum Astronomiae of St Albertus Magnus to describe certain legitimate natural practices. 这种态度不仅是一个神学问题,它也来源于亚里士多德的自然哲学范式。在这一范式中没有精灵、魔法或其他类似现象的存在空间。然而我们也应注意到,一些中世纪著作也使用“魔法”一词来描述某些合法的、并非超自然的行为,例如圣阿尔伯特·马格努斯的《天文之镜》一书。 Later, the hermetic systems that became popular during the Renaissance did allow for spirits and angels to be summoned so consequently their practitioners were always vulnerable to accusations of devilry. This ambiguity about what was and was not acceptable remained a feature of intellectual debate throughout the Middle Ages and Early Modern period with both sides using magic to make their own polemical points. In the late seventeenth century we find Joseph Glanvill and Henry More, representing learned science and theology, defending the belief in witchcraft against occultist and radical sectarian John Webster [NOTE]. Webster is keen to deny diabolic involvement in great part because he does not want his own ‘natural magic’ to be confused with witchcraft while Glanville and More are defending the mechanistic new philosophy which, like Aristotelianism, insists all magic must be supernatural - and that can only mean God or the devil. 晚些时候,文艺复兴期间广为流传的赫尔墨斯派哲学系统允许信者召唤天使和精灵,这就使得其信众更容易被指控为魔鬼信者。在中世纪及近代早期,知识界一直在就何种形态的超自然存在可以接受展开辩论。辩论双方都会使用“魔法”一词来阐述论点。在十七世纪后期我们可以看到约瑟夫·格兰维尔和亨利·摩尔代表神学和科学阵营肯定巫术的存在,与神秘主义者兼激进的宗派主义者约翰·韦伯斯特辩论。韦伯斯特努力否定巫术中的魔鬼因素,因为他不希望他的“自然魔法”和巫术扯上关系。而格兰维尔和摩尔捍卫的是新的机械论哲学,这种哲学和亚里士多德派一样,认为魔法一定是超自然的,因而只可能来源于上帝或魔鬼。 At a popular level, beliefs about the supernatural were far more varied and indeed, one of the only commonalties appears to be that they did not involve the devil, at least without prompting from educated interrogators. MacFarlane mentions that the devil hardly figured at all in the depositions to the Essex assizes and in other English cases, he makes few appearances even in confessions [NOTE]. Elsewhere, especially in confessions under torture, diabolic themes are much more prevalent. This seems likely to have been due to the use of torture, together with leading questions, causing the defendants to start echoing the more learned views of their prosecutors. 在大众中,对超自然力的信仰更加五花八门,诸种信仰仅有的一个重要共同点似乎就是,它们都与魔鬼无关,起码在没有遭到博学的审判者追问时是这样。麦克法兰提到:在埃塞克斯郡巡回法院及其它英格兰案件的证言中几乎没有人提起魔鬼,即使在罪人的供词中魔鬼都没怎么露面。在其他地方,特别是那些刑讯之下获得的供词里,魔鬼的主题则明显得多。这种现象看起来应归因于刑讯和诱供。在这二者的共同作用下,被告人们开始重复指控者嘴里的高深说法了。 Restrictions in space make a discussion of how witch trials started impossible here, but it seems likely that a key factor was the overlaying of the elite mentality of diabolism and its associated perversions onto the pre-existing magical beliefs and social tensions among the people. This had happened before with the heretics of the Middle Ages when much of what was believed about them came from ancient authorities rather than their actual activities. It was the combination of learned thought with real factors on the ground (as there really were heretics and people claiming magical powers) that turned deadly. 材料来源的空间限制使得我们难以讨论猎巫审判是如何起源的,但看起来一个重要因素是精英阶层和普通民众的合力。精英们对超自然力来源的“魔鬼说”理论把魔鬼帽子扣在了很多已有的超自然信仰身上,而民众之间的矛盾需要一个发泄的出口。类似的现象在此前也曾发生在中世纪的异端们身上,人们对他们的许多认识并非源于异端们本身的行动,而是来自古老的权威观点。当知识阶层的思想和底层存在的现实因素(因为社会上确有异端,也有号称拥有魔法能力的人)结合起来,其效果是致命的。 Many, but by no means all, so-called witches seem to have been healers, wise women and cunning men who previously would have been of no interest to the higher clergy or secular legal authorities. If they were brought before any authority it would tend to be the local church court that would prescribe some penance like walking around the parish wearing sackcloth. 许多——但绝非全部——所谓的巫师似乎是一些治疗师。在猎巫运动之前,教会高层或者世俗法律体系对这些聪慧的女性或头脑灵活的男性是没有什么兴趣的。如果真可能有什么权威机构想审判他们,那十有八九是当地的教会法庭,判处的刑罚也就是一些类似穿着麻衣绕教区走一周的赎罪行为。 The village healers indulged in a wide variety of ritual magic, healing or mediation with spirits but they had little or no idea of any theory attached to these actions. In other words, to the lower orders, magic was a question of practice while to the elite it was something that required explanation with the devil usually the only explanation available. 当时这些乡村治疗师使用很多仪式魔法,用于治疗,或者让活人与死去的人对话,但是他们头脑里并没有什么关于这些做法的理论。换句话说,对于下层社会,问题的关键是怎么使用魔法。而对上层社会,问题的关键是如何解释魔法,通常魔鬼是唯一的备选答案。 The topography of the decline in trials and executions strongly suggests there were two distinct phases. The first phase, which takes place from the first half of the seventeenth century, is a large falling of in the number of accusations and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of capital convictions obtained. Thomas states that the large majority of executions in England had already taken place by 1620 [NOTE] and in Spain the Basque hunt marks the end of large scale prosecutions. Appeals heard by the Parlement of Paris after about 1610 show a large reduction in the number of capital sentences that were confirmed and after about 1630 an equally precipitous drop in the number of cases heard (even though all witchcraft cases at this time were subject to automatic appeal to Paris) [NOTE]. 猎巫审判及处决的减少并不是平均的,其分布表明猎巫审判的衰落经历了两个不同的阶段。第一阶段自十七世纪中叶开始,其标志是巫术罪起诉数大大减少,及与之相应的死刑判决比例下降。托马斯的研究表明,英格兰的绝大多数巫师处决都发生在1620年前,在西班牙,巴斯克大猎巫标志着大规模巫术罪起诉时期的终结。1610年后,巴黎高等法院的上诉记录显示,在巫术罪案件中死刑判决比例大幅下降。到1630年后,巫术罪案件的数量也出现了同样的大幅下降(尽管在此时期,所有下级法院审理的巫术罪案件都会自动上诉到巴黎高等法院)。 The pattern is repeatedly seen in almost all localities although the time scales are often different. The last hunt in Scotland took place 1661 – 2, large-scale scares continued to claim many lives in parts of Germany through the 1630s but became much rarer thereafter. This is not the end of the prosecution of witches - that continued even with sporadic outbursts of panic - but it is rather the normalisation of the crime as it fades into the background of early modern life. 同样的变化模式出现在欧洲几乎所有地区,尽管时间先后常常不同。苏格兰的最后一次大规模猎巫是在1661-1662年间。1630年代,德国部分地区还时有大规模的猎巫运动,很多人因此丧命,但在那之后就很罕见了。当然,这并不代表对巫师的审判已经消失。审判依然在进行——而且还有间歇性的恐慌带来的小高潮,但这更应解释为这种罪行的常态化。巫术罪行已不是社会关注的焦点,它正在渐渐隐入近代早期社会生活的背景之中。 The second phase is the complete cessation or abolition of prosecutions for witchcraft and this tends to take place in the eighteenth century. It can either take the form of a gradual petering out; some form of legislative act such as Louis XIV’s decree extinguishing the crime after a poisoning plot panic; or the English Act of Parliament abolishing it in 1736 [NOTE]. Often, it had become impossible to secure a conviction before the crime itself was removed from the statute book. 第二阶段是各国彻底停止起诉(或取消)巫术罪的时期,发生在十八世纪。这一阶段,各国停止猎巫的方式各有不同。有的国家逐渐停止了对巫术罪的起诉审理,有些国家采取某些立法措施取消了巫术罪,如路易十四在一次投毒阴谋引起的恐慌后颁布敕令取消了巫术罪,英国国会在1736年通过法案取消了巫术罪。即使在巫术罪被正式从刑法里取消之前,想要说服法庭判决被告巫术罪罪名成立已经很难了。 It seems extremely likely that in looking for causes we must treat these two phases as separate events to be handled individually and that consequently we will not find any single reason for the end of witch trials. 由此看来,在寻找猎巫审判衰落原因时,我们应把这两个阶段分开来看。这也就意味着,猎巫审判的消失不是任一因素单独作用的结果。 Explaining the decline of witch trials and executions 对猎巫审判及处决减少的解释 Under Roman law, to achieve a capital conviction required a full proof consisting of material evidence, witnesses of good standing or a free confession. Torture could be used to extract a confession if sufficient partial proofs had been accumulated but the defendant had to repeat themselves after they recovered and then again in court. Even if they later retracted their confession they were not supposed to be put to the question again [NOTE]. 在罗马法下,要判处死刑需要一条完整的证据链,支持证据链的可以是物证、合格的人证或被告自由自愿提供的证词。如果已经有足够的间接证据指向嫌疑人,则可以使用刑讯取得供诉,但犯人在养好伤后必须再次重复他们在刑讯下作出的供诉,此后还要当庭再重复一次。即使犯人后来撤回了自己在刑讯下作出的供词,他们也不应就同一问题再受到讯问了。 English common law forbade the use of torture in criminal cases altogether unless with the permission of the privy council (effectively meaning only for treason) but had similar systems of evidences and proofs of witchcraft as codified by William Perkins [NOTE]. 英格兰普通法在刑事案件中严格禁止刑讯,仅有的例外是由枢密院审判的案件(通常都是叛国案)。然而,根据威廉·珀金斯的案例汇编,在巫术罪案件中,英格兰有着一套和罗马法相似的取证和证明方式。【编注:威廉·珀金斯是16世纪英格兰著名教士和神学家,清教运动先驱,著述颇丰,曾编有一部三卷本的信仰审判案例集】 In the case of witches, material evidence was usually lacking, as the village healers did not go in for the kind of occult paraphernalia that characterised higher magic. It is also hard to see how the social interactions thought to lead to the initial accusation by Thomas and Briggs could give rise to witnesses able to say they had caught the witch casting a spell red handed, let alone flying through the air. 在审判巫师时,一般都没有物证,一般的乡村治疗师是不会去搞那些高等魔法式的繁琐神秘学仪式的。托马斯和布里格斯认为社会互动可能导致巫术罪指控的出现,但这些通常没法让一个证人到法庭上作证宣称他抓到了一个正在施法术的巫师,更别说亲眼看到巫师在空中飞翔了。 That said, when a witness was produced before the dubious English judge Sir John Powell, declaring that the defendant had been seen travelling on her broomstick, his lordship is said to have dryly remarked that there was no law against flying (sadly the provenance of the story is doubtful [NOTE]). In short, to get a capital conviction if the proper procedures were followed was extremely difficult. 话虽如此,当一个证人被带到对巫术问题持怀疑态度的英格兰法官约翰·鲍威尔爵士面前时,他宣称看到了被告骑着扫帚飞行,据说,鲍威尔爵士不动声色地答道,没有哪条法律禁止人飞行。(可惜这个故事的来源可疑,未可尽信。)总而言之,如果遵循正当的法律程序,受指控者被判处死刑罪名成立是非常困难的。 That is not to say that one could not be punished in other ways where the proof was deficient and the grounds of suspicion that could lead to the application of torture were considerably wider. Simply having a bad local reputation could land someone in a lot of official trouble. This was due to an important reform in the legal system in the late Middle Ages when the accusatio was gradually replaced with the inquisitio. To modern ears this immediately summons up images of the Inquisition although it was secular rather than clerical courts and certainly not papal inquisitors that were responsible for the vast majority of fatal witch trials. 当然, 这并不是说在证据不全且使用刑讯的条件颇为宽松时,被疑为巫师的人无法以别的方式受到惩罚。仅仅是在当地名声不好就可以给人带来很多麻烦了。这种情况的原因是中世纪晚期的一项重要司法改革,在案件审理中控诉制逐渐被纠问制所取代。听在现代人的耳朵里,“纠问制”会让人立即想起宗教裁判所。但这里的裁判官是世俗职务而非宗教职务,在绝大多数巫师被处决的庭审中,作出裁决的也不是宗教裁判官。 When before the Inquisition, a confession and willingness to do penance was always supposed to be sufficient to avoid the death penalty for a first offence while no such leeway existed in most secular courts [NOTE]. Instead, iniquisitio was a method of legal proceedings used in all courts outside England which dropped the dependence on an accuser to bring a complaint. The accuser (who could be punished himself if the defendant was acquitted) was replaced by an inquirer whose role was slowly taken over by professional magistrates. 在宗教裁判所里,初犯的嫌疑人通过忏悔和表达赎罪意愿通常就可以逃过死刑。但在大多数世俗法庭里,是没有这等出路的。在英格兰之外的所有国家,纠问制是被法庭普遍采用的司法程序,这种程序中,不需要一个起诉人来提起诉讼。起诉人(若被告被判无罪则可能受到反坐)被换成了讯问人,讯问人又逐渐被职业地方法官代替了。 This inquirer was expected to investigate matters brought to their attention or the subject of rumour, and was equipped with various powers to enable them to do so. Once they had a case it was presented before a court for consideration and sentence. Provided the procedures were followed and the magistrate was fair and competent, this was a huge improvement over the system of personal accusation and trial by ordeal that preceded it. 讯问人的工作是调查那些引起他们注意的事或流言的源头,并被赋予种种权力以便履行他们的职责。如果他们有足够的理由,相关案件就会提交给法院供审理判刑。如果能够遵守程序,并且地方法官公正且能胜任,这一改革相对于过去的个人起诉及神判法而言将是一个巨大进步。 But it is clear that during the great hunts the rules were not followed. Torture was liberally applied and the atmosphere was one of siege where it was felt the circumstances demanded extreme action. It is interesting to note that the Matthew Hopkins episode, where pseudo-torture such as sleep deprivation and ‘pricking’ was used, was the closest example to a full-scale continental witch hunt that occurred in England. 但是很明显,在大规模猎巫运动期间,司法程序并未得到遵守。刑讯逼供是家常便饭,而且当人们认为事态严重到需要采取极端行动时,全社会的气氛就好像被围在孤城里一样,什么极端行为都不在话下。很有意思的是,在英格兰发生的最像欧陆大规模猎巫的事件就是马修·霍普金斯主导的猎巫运动。在这场运动中使用的大多是一些“类刑讯”手段,比如睡眠剥夺和使用穿刺法鉴别巫师(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pricking). The most prolific hunters tended to be lay magistrates and middle ranking clerics of some education while in the higher and appeal courts such as at Paris the conviction rate was much lower, mainly because the sense of panic was absent, torture kept to the statutory limits and evidence examined with a cooler eye [NOTE]. The actual abolition of torture took place too late in most jurisdictions to have had a significant effect on reducing convictions of witches [NOTE]. 成果最为卓著的猎巫者通常都是未受训练的地方法官和受过一点教育的中层牧师,而在较高等的法院和上诉法院里(如巴黎高等法院)判决率明显低得多。主要原因是在这些法院里没有恐慌气氛,对刑讯的法律限制遵守的较好,法官检视证据的态度也较为冷静。在多数地区,取消刑讯对于减少巫师判决率没有什么影响,因为这一改变来得太晚了。 Neither was it the case that most senior judges denied the very possibility of witchcraft for if they had it is hard to see how they could have countenanced any executions at all. Rather, they were removed from the panic on the ground so they could take a more objective and professional stance. 高等法院的判决率较低并不是因为高等法官们本身就不相信巫术,如果他们真的不信巫术,那他们大可以一个巫师都不判。真正的原因是他们没有受到底层的恐慌气氛感染,因而可以在一个较为客观和职业的立场上审理案件。 It was not just lawyers who could become more lenient as they became more expert in their subjects. In Geneva, when the devil’s mark became an accepted form of evidence, the city’s surgeons were delegated to carry out the examination. However, no doubt as a result of having seen a huge range of moles, growths and boils on patients of unimpeachable character, they simply refused to be drawn as to whether a particular lump was of diabolic or purely natural origin. This made a capital prosecution almost impossible and only one witch was executed after 1625 [NOTE]. 都说律师随着对自身所从事领域了解得越多就会变得越宽容,其实不止律师,很多职业都是这样。在日内瓦,当“恶魔的印记”被认定为可接受的证据时,法院授权本地的外科医生检验被告身上有无恶魔的印记。然而,无疑是由于他们平日见多了那些人品端正无瑕的病人们身上的痣、增生和烫伤,医生们拒绝对某一肿块是恶魔的印记还是自然原因所致做出判断。其结果就是想根据恶魔的印记判处死刑基本上成了不可能的任务。1625年之后,日内瓦只有一个巫师被处决。 So the reduction of witch trials from epidemic to endemic proportions requires little else than the assertion of central control over convictions to ensure the legal forms were being adhered to and that local courts could not execute people without sufficient evidence. This central control could be achieved either through allowing appeals to higher courts (or even making them mandatory) or else by ensuring the proper training and oversight of local magistrates. In particular, the strict controls over the use of torture had to be reinstated, notwithstanding the status of witchcraft as a crimen exceptum (an exceptional crime) in most states, and confessions achieved through torture treated with the necessary scepticism. 由此看来,要把猎巫审判由传染性变为地方性不需要什么高深手段,只要有一个中央权威来控制地方法院,确保他们遵守法律程序,不在证据不足的情况下处决犯人就可以了。这种中央控制可以通过设置上诉程序(或像法国一样规定巫术罪案件自动上诉)来达到,也可以通过确保地方法官受过合适的训练且有合理的监督来达到。尤为重要的是要严格控制刑讯,而不是像很多地方一样把巫术罪看作一种“例外犯罪”而放松刑讯控制。法官对由刑讯得来的供词应有足够的怀疑态度。 In either case, this was extremely difficult during times of political upheaval, which explains the prevalence of hunts in the areas of the Holy Roman Empire most affected by the fragmentation of control up to the Thirty Years War and the same situation in France during the Wars of Religion. Although war itself distracted from witch trials as they were no longer the most pressing concern, the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity engendered by possible conflict could increase them. 不管采用哪种方法,建立此类中央控制在政治混乱时期都非常困难。这解释了猎巫为何在三十年战争期间中央权威破坏最为严重的神圣罗马帝国领地最为盛行,同样的情况也发生在宗教战争期间的法国。尽管作为新的麻烦来源,战争从猎巫那边吸引走了世人的一些注意力,但它带来的不确定感和不安全感也会使得人们对猎巫更加狂热。 At first sight, the abuse of judicial process was not so prevalent in England and a crack down on the use of torture can hardly explain anything in a jurisdiction in which torture was not used. The reasons for the hotspots of witch prosecutions in Essex and Lancashire also remain a mystery now that the theory of proxy persecutions of religious minorities has been called into question. 乍一看,在英格兰司法程序的滥用并不是那么厉害,对刑讯逼供的打击也很难解释在一个不允许刑讯逼供的地区出现的猎巫减少。在英格兰的猎巫高发区埃塞克斯和兰开夏,猎巫运动的起因依然是一个谜。目前有人已开始怀疑,这些地区的猎巫审判只是个幌子,实际上针对的是少数教派。 It is ironic that English witch trials faded at much the time that a king who was personally interested in them came to the throne. The North Berwick trials and his publication of Demonologie (1597) suggest that when he became James I of England, he would have been as concerned in his new realm as he was in his old. Perhaps the events surrounding the state opening of Parliament in 1605 focused his mind on more concrete threats to the royal person. The constant danger from Spain that was present during the rule of Elizabeth, as well as fears about the succession, might well have contributed to an atmosphere that encouraged trials. The ascension of James solved the later problem as well as closing off Scotland as a bridgehead for foreign invaders. 颇为讽刺的是,英格兰猎巫运动的衰落居然主要是在一位个人热衷于猎巫的国王在位期间发生的。由北贝斯维克发生的一系列审判以及詹姆斯一世本人于1597年出版的著作《恶魔学》来看,在他当了英王之后可能仍然和在苏格兰时一样热衷于猎巫。也许1605年国会开会前后的一系列事件所表现出的对国王本人的威胁吸引走了他的注意力。自伊丽莎白一世在位期间就长期存在的来自西班牙的威胁,以及对女王继位者问题的恐慌,都可能在伊丽莎白时期导致了一种鼓励猎巫的不安气氛。詹姆斯一世的继位解决了继承者问题,而且也使得苏格兰再不能成为入侵者的桥头堡了。 While the lack of judicial torture in England made witch prosecutions more difficult, the use of juries of laymen probably had the opposite effect. Whereas in the higher continental courts, the entire trial process, including reaching a verdict, was in the hands of professionals, in England a conviction had to be obtained through a jury of commoners (although they were landowners and burghers) who were often more credulous than the judge. The judge did have a considerable ability to influence the juror and, as he was a professional travelling around the circuit, could considerably reduce the number of convictions. 虽说在英格兰因为没有刑讯,要以巫术罪定罪较为困难,但由非专业人士组成的陪审团参与审理可能产生了相反的效果。在大陆上的高等法院里,整个审理程序包括定罪在内都是由专业人士来掌握的。而在英格兰,定罪工作是由一个一般民众(虽然通常都是地主或体面市民)组成的陪审团来做的。这些人比法官要轻信得多。不过法官对陪审团有相当大的影响力,而且当时的法官又是在辖区内巡回审理案件的专业法官,因此可以有效减少定罪的数量。 In the mid-seventeenth century guides like Robert Filmer’s An Advertisement to the Jurymen of England Touching Witches (1653) and reprints of Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witches (1584) were used as guides to the evidence that took a much more sceptical line than Perkins’ effort. But the jury could also reach a verdict of guilty no matter what directions came from the bench as happened during the last successful prosecution in England in 1712 [NOTE]. 在十七世纪中期,陪审员们使用断案指南来帮助他们衡量证据。常用的断案指南包括罗伯特·菲尔莫的《英格兰巫师案件陪审员须知》(1653)和雷吉纳德·斯科特的《发现女巫》(1584)的重印版。这些书对证据的怀疑态度比起珀金斯的著作来要强得多了。但是陪审员们也有权无视法官的指引而作出有罪裁定,在1712年英格兰最后一次成功定罪的猎巫审判中就出现了这种情况。 Rationalism and the final end of the witch trials 理性主义和猎巫审判的终结 By 1700, witch trials had become rare things across much of Europe although they remained reasonably common in Poland until 1725 [NOTE]. When they did occur, they excited a good deal of interest and usually ended with the liberty of the witch. The position of even the lower judiciary was now that maleficia was extremely hard to prove and it was not acceptable to accept lower standards of evidence simply because the crime was so serious. 到了1700年,在欧洲的大部分地区猎巫审判已经很少见了——尽管在波兰猎巫审判要到1725年才变得稀少。这一时期的猎巫审判一旦举行总能吸引众人的兴趣,而结果通常都是巫师嫌疑人被无罪开释。即使较低层的法院都开始认为要证明巫术诅咒是非常困难的事了,不能因为此类犯罪性质严重就采用较低的证据审查标准。 But from time to time, for one reason or another, a conviction was achieved and the statutory punishment was usually death. There were ways around this, such as the judge in England’s last case personally and successfully petitioning for a royal pardon for the accused in 1712 but even ten years after that the Scots executed Janet Horne [NOTE]. 然而间或还是会因为种种原因判决一个两个的巫师,而法律规定的刑罚一般都是死刑。当然即使判了死刑也不是没有办法,比如在1712年英格兰那最后一次成功定罪的巫师案判决后,法官通过个人的努力从王室拿到了特赦令。但在十年之后,苏格兰人还是处决了珍妮特·霍恩。 Positivist historians have long looked upon the end of witch trials as victory for rationalism over superstition. Michael de Montaigne’s scepticism about reports of witchcraft and the veracity of confessions in his essay On the Lame (1588) is a popular example of Renaissance humanism. 一直以来,实证主义历史学家把猎巫审判的终结看作是理性主义对迷信取得的胜利。米歇尔·德·蒙田在他的散文《论跛子》中表现出的对巫术及巫师供词的怀疑态度,是文艺复兴时期人文主义思想的一个著名例子。 However, closer examination of the rationalists has frequently found them to be something of a disappointment for their champions who do not share their mentality. Learned sceptics are often advocates of a mystical or hermetic point of view and are seeking to defend magic from the taint of diabolism rather than claiming that it is impossible. 然而,对理性主义者进行的仔细观察,时常会让他们的支持者们失望,因为这些理性主义者们想的和他们的现代支持者不是一回事。当时学者们之所以对巫术表现怀疑态度,时常是因为他们要推销自己的神秘主义或赫尔墨斯派观点。他们希望从魔法身上揭去魔鬼的污名,而不是认为魔法根本不存在。 The best known sixteenth century critic of witch trials, Johann Weyer, was a pupil of the great neo-Platonist magician Cornelius Agrippa as well as being a radical Protestant. In his De praestigiis daemonum (1583), Weyer was completely orthodox in his belief in devils and his condemnation of almost any kind of magical practice, but just did not think it was the kind of thing that old ladies got up to. 十六世纪最有名的猎巫审判批评者约翰·韦尔是伟大的新柏拉图主义魔法师科尔奈利乌斯·阿格里帕的学生,他也是一位激进的新教徒。在他的《论恶魔幻觉》(1583)一书中,韦尔表现出的相信魔鬼存在和谴责各种魔法实践的观点完全是正统派的。他只是认为,他说的魔法和老太太们做的那些不是一回事。 His English contemporary, Reginald Scot appears at first sight to be more conducive to the views of modern sceptics, but on closer examination his thought also turns out to be almost entirely a function of his Puritan theology [NOTE]. A century later John Webster had a remarkably similar outlook as he too is a sectarian and defender of alchemy. 与他同时代的英国人雷吉纳德·斯科特乍看起来好像更倾向于近代怀疑主义观点,但仔细审视就会发现,斯科特的观点完全是他清教信仰的衍生品。比他晚一个世纪的约翰·韦伯斯特看起来和他异常相似,而韦伯斯特也是一个宗派主义者和炼金术的捍卫者。 The argument was between, on one side Aristotelians and their heirs, the mechanical philosophers, and on the other neo-Platonists and hermetists. As we have seen, it was usually the former, with what we might call the more scientific attitude, who defended belief in witchcraft. This causes a serious problem for traditional explanations for the end of witch trials as there is almost nobody whose particular bundle of motivations and beliefs are entirely comfortable to positivist sensibilities. 论争的一方是亚里士多德派及他们的继承者,机械主义哲学家们,另一方则是新柏拉图主义者和赫尔墨斯派。正如我们前面看到的,通常总是前一派人——也就是我们可能会觉得态度更科学的那一派——相信巫术的存在并努力为之辩护。对女巫审判终结的传统解释在这一点上遇上了难题,因为在这场论争中没有任何一位参与者的信念和动机完全合乎现代实证主义者的口味。 There certainly is a rise in scepticism as Glanville and More (who was a mechanistic Platonist and thus demonstrates the impossibility of fitting anyone’s beliefs into a neat box) are both keen to combat it but, as far as the positivist is concerned, it is not always the right people being sceptics. 当时对巫术持怀疑态度者确实有所增加,以至于格兰维尔和摩尔要努力与之斗争(摩尔是个机械主义派的柏拉图主义者,这又一次证明了想把人的信仰套进方便的模式里是不可能的)。但是困扰实证主义者的是:持怀疑主义的不总是合适的人。 Likewise, Cotton Mather manages to receive both excretion and exoneration for his conduct in the Salem witch trials and later his work on smallpox immunisation. Even a bona fide freethinker like Thomas Hobbes thought that it was justified to convict someone of witchcraft if they had knowingly tried to carry out maleficia even if they were incapable of it [NOTE]. 与之类似,科顿·马瑟既因他在萨勒姆审判中的作为被人痛诋,又因他推广天花疫苗的功劳为人称颂。即使一个托马斯·霍布斯这样十足真金的自由思考者也认为:如果有人有意试图施加诅咒,那尽管他实际上没有巫术能力,判他个巫术罪也是正当的。 The pamphlet wars give us some idea of the motivations of both sides of the argument. Defenders of the belief in witches, such as Sir Thomas Browne in Religio Medici (1634), seemed more worried about atheists than the devil. 当年的小册子论战可以让我们对论战双方的动机略作管窥。为相信巫师存在者辩护的人似乎更担心否定巫师会让无神论者——而非魔鬼——得势。此类思维的例子可参见托马斯·布朗尼爵士的《一个医生的宗教观》(1634)一书。 Similarly, in Saducismus Triumphantus (1681), Glanvill did not appear to be so much concerned about witchcraft being a serious threat to life and limb, especially after his careful investigations revealed rather feeble examples, but instead that a denial of the witch was a big step towards the denial of all religion. 格兰维尔在他的著作《巫师及鬼怪的完整直接证据》(1681)中也表达了类似的意思。他仔细调查了他书中举出的那些巫术例子之后,发现它们都不太经得起推敲,在书中他并不认为巫术对人的生命或肢体能够造成什么实质威胁,更使他担心的是对巫师及巫术的否定可能导致对所有宗教的全面否定。 Even a hundred years later John Wesley had much the same concerns saying “giving up witchcraft is in effect giving up the bible” [NOTE]. Clearly the intention of these writers is not the same as earlier demonologists like Jean Bodin. 甚至在一百年之后,约翰·韦斯利也表达出了相同的担忧。他写道:“否认巫术实质上就是否认《圣经》。”很明显,这些作者支持巫术存在的目的与早期的恶魔学者如让·博丹等人大相径庭。 So, while Cotton Mather’s The Wonders of the Invisible World (1693) fits the bill as a the work of old fashioned cleric, seeing devils under the bed, convinced there is a vast diabolical conspiracy that justifies desperate retaliatory measures, many of the learned defenders had a much narrower interest. 所以,虽然科顿·马瑟的《不可见世界中的奇观》一书的确够得上老派教士著作的标准——书中他认为魔鬼就在我们身边、坚信存在一个魔鬼策划的大规模阴谋且人们应以极端手段对抗这一阴谋,但很多颇有学识的巫术捍卫者所感兴趣的领域则要窄得多。 Ultimately it was these learned men, who simply did not care about old women and their muttered curses, who had to be won around for the prosecutions to stop altogether. What eventually defeated the likes of More and Glanville was the same thing that has invalidated so many of the last ditch defences conducted in the name of religion. 归根结底,要结束猎巫指控和审判,反猎巫派必须把这些饱学者争取过来。而这些人并不关心村中的某个老妇是不是女巫,或她们口中咕哝的诅咒是否灵验。最终击败摩尔和格兰维尔及其同道的,此前也曾扫清过无数以宗教之名誓死捍卫某种信念的人。 There are always a few people who become fixated on a piece of doctrine and insist that the world will be imperilled by giving it up. This happened over the movement of the earth and is happening today over women priests. 历史上不论何时总有一些人执着于某些教条,并宣称如果放弃这些教条世界就会大难临头。围绕着地球是否在转动发生过类似的论争,而今天我们还可以在关于女性牧师问题的讨论中找到这些人的影子。 But once the dogma has in fact been dropped de facto despite the protestations of its defenders, it usually becomes clear that the terrible consequences of which they warned have not come to pass and a new generation has no concerns about amending the writ to conform with practice. 但是,尽管这些人誓死捍卫旧教条,一旦这些旧教条的死亡成为事实,人们就会发现捍卫者们拿来吓唬人的那些严重后果一样都没发生。这种情况下,新一代人就不惮于修改教条来使之适应新的现实了。 Essentially, most people were able to see that the church could sail serenely on despite the loss of an occasional doctrine and that its problems were rather more fundamental than just a matter of believing in witches. 最重要的是,大多数人都能够看到:虽然教会失去了某个教条,但它依旧安然无恙,而教会面临的问题也比巫术问题要深层的多。 While the contention of some scholars that there was a wholesale withdrawal of the elite from popular culture seems to me to be thrown into doubt by the enormous unifying effect of the English bible, it is true that certain beliefs can drop out of ‘high’ culture – especially when they become associated with vulgarity or lack of sophistication. In late seventeenth century England this happened to nearly all magical ideas as the New Philosophy became the in-thing. 虽然英文版《圣经》表现出的巨大文化统合力已使得某些学者声称的“精英阶层大规模退出大众文化圈”这一结论遭到质疑,但不可否认,有些时候一些信念确实会逐渐从“高等”文化的范畴里被排斥出去——尤其是当人们开始认为这些信念太过鄙俗或太过粗浅的时候。在十七世纪晚期的英格兰,这种现象导致了几乎所有与魔法相关的思想被思想界扫地出门,因为这一时期新哲学才是最时髦的。 While actually understanding the scientific results of Boyle or Newton was beyond most people, anyone could attack the superstitions of peasants and thus reassure themselves of their membership of the intelligentsia. Just as the learned ideas about the devil were absorbed by the middling classes who then put them into practice by hunting witches, so the New Philosophy, percolating into the middle class consciousness, helped instil them with scepticism. 虽然大多数人都很难准确理解牛顿或者玻义耳的科学发现,随便什么人都可以通过攻击农民的迷信而获得“自己是个知识分子”的自信。正如之前大众接受了学者们关于魔鬼的理论而置身于猎巫运动,新哲学也渐渐被大众接受,在他们的头脑里种下了怀疑主义的种子。 Even those who were willing to accept the existence of witches in principle did not feel they could countenance any specific examples. As Joseph Addison wrote in the Spectator in 1711 “I believe in general that there is and has been such a thing as witchcraft; but at the same time can give credit to no particular instance of it” [NOTE]. 即使那些愿意在理论上接受巫术存在的人也开始变得难以支持某个特定的巫术案例了。比如约瑟夫·艾迪逊在1711年的《观察家》中写到:“在一般意义上,我相信过去和现在都存在巫术,但与此同时我难以相信任何巫术案例。” To actually abolish the crime required more than the belief that proof was difficult to obtain. The twin pillars of witchcraft were maleficia and the pact with the devil - both aspects needed to be dealt with. Witchcraft had to be thought impossible (in the case of maleficia) and irrelevant (in the case of the pact with the devil). 要废除巫术罪名,只让人们相信其证据难以获得是不够的。巫术罪的两大要件是诅咒行为和与魔鬼所定的契约,必须把这两点都打倒才能废除巫术罪。人们必须认识到,巫术罪是不可能的(打倒诅咒行为)并且和魔鬼并无相干(打倒魔鬼契约)。 Belief in magic was largely absent from the elite long before the existence of the devil himself was being denied although he was becoming a spiritual being whose abilities were far more limited than they had been in the past. He could not really do anything miraculous but only foster illusions in the gullible. Eventually, his power became merely the ability to tempt Christians into sin by mental suggestion and so his threat was but a moral challenge. 在人们开始否定魔鬼的存在以前,知识阶层早已不信魔法存在了。而且现在魔鬼虽然还没被彻底打倒,但它已经成了一种精神性的存在,它的威能已经大不如前,目前它已经无法展示任何奇迹,它能做到的只是用幻觉蛊惑那些容易上当的人了。最终,魔鬼的能力只剩了以精神暗示诱惑基督徒犯下罪孽这一项,这样他对人们的威胁也就只停留在道德层面,而与法律无涉了。 It is also possible that the near complete lack of any solid evidence for devil worship finally began to make itself felt and that consequently fears of a fifth column in the midst of society faded but they would reappear from time to time, most recently in Orkney and Rochdale in the 1991. 另一个可能是,人们终于发现了他们对恶魔信仰的恐惧其实没有任何现实证据,因此,对社会中可能存在一个魔鬼势力第五纵队的恐惧也就消退了。当然,类似的恐惧日后还是会不时爆发出来,最近的例子就是1991年在奥克尼和罗什戴尔发生的“从魔鬼崇拜的家庭中解救儿童”的丑闻。【编注:参见维基词条Orkney child abuse scandal】 Neutering Satan and turning him into a more transcendent figure is often ascribed to Protestantism although Luther himself claims he suffered many physical encounters with the devil who threw excrement at him. Whatever the causes, the devil faded from view and this turned the question of what to do about his alleged disciples into a purely religious matter. 把撒旦无力化并使他成为一个更加虚幻的存在一事时常被记到新教的账上——虽然马丁路德本人宣称撒旦曾多次与他相遇并扔大便攻击他。不管原因为何,魔鬼从人们眼中消失了。这样,如何处理那些被指控是魔鬼信徒的人就变成了一个宗教性的问题,而与社会安全无关了。 The process was a drawn out one that should perhaps be studied in parallel with the decline of heresy and blasphemy as a crime against the state. This slowly faded as the eighteenth century wore on although there were isolated prosecutions, such as the La Barre case of 1766 in France made famous by Voltaire [NOTE]. (巫术罪的消失)这一过程相当漫长,或许较好的办法是把它与“异端诽谤危害国家罪”的消失一同研究。虽然仍有零星的异端指控(如因伏尔泰而大大出名的拉·巴尔案),异端罪在十八世纪已经慢慢淡出了人们的视野。 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there might simply have been a change in the jurisdiction for witch trials from secular to ecclesiastical courts but during the seventeenth century heresy had gradually ceased to be seen as a crime deserving temporal punishment and the church courts could no longer expect the secular arm to carry out their orders. 在十五至十六世纪,巫术罪的管辖权可能确由世俗法院转到了宗教法庭。但到了十七世纪,异端信仰已经渐渐不再被人视作一种需要神罚的罪行了。与此同时,宗教法庭也渐渐不能指望世俗法院执行它的判决了。 Even in countries which retained strong church courts, most especially Spain and Portugal, sentences became lighter as the eighteenth century progressed with a return to the medieval idea of penance and reconciliation rather than punishment. The stalemate that had ended the wars between Catholics and Protestants, coupled with the fostering of national over religious identity, meant the ideals of tolerance expressed as early as Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) were finally implemented. 即使在那些仍保留了相对强势宗教法庭的国家如西班牙和葡萄牙,进入十八世纪后对异端罪行的定罪也逐渐变轻了。以忏悔和赎罪代替刑罚的中世纪思想逐渐回归。天主教徒和新教徒长年战争结束后,两派进入了对峙局面,再加上人们的头脑中国家意识也开始取代宗教意识而成为主要的身份认同,这似乎意味着早在1516年托马斯·莫尔在《乌托邦》中写到的宗教宽容理想终于得以实现。 This is not to say that atheism or devil worship were socially acceptable, but rather that if a man or woman minded their own business and kept their views quiet, nobody would hunt them down. Essentially ones private religion became a private matter and, as long as one did not cause a public disturbance, the public sphere had little interest. 当然,这并不意味着无神论或恶魔信仰得到了社会的承认。只是如果一个人自扫门前雪,不把自己的宗教主张到处宣扬,那么不管他相信什么,都不会有人来猎捕他了。基本上,个人的宗教信仰终于被社会认可为个人事务了。而只要一个人不制造公共事端,那么公众方面对他的个人事务是没有什么兴趣的。 Conclusion 结论 Witchcraft is an imaginary crime. It has, as Robin Briggs says, a hole in the middle which demonologists were able to fill with their speculations [NOTE]. They were then able to persuade others, including the actual accused, of the veracity of these ideas. 巫术罪是一种想象出来的犯罪。正如罗宾·布里格斯所说:它的中心有个空洞,正方便那些魔鬼学者把他们的臆测填进去。这样,魔鬼学者就可以说服旁人——甚至包含被控为巫师的人——认同他们的观点。 As Briggs says, after Alasdair MacIntyre, a rational thought is one that coheres with the thoughts around it and, to the mentality of the demonologists and enough of those around them, their writings made perfect sense. We do not need to call them superstitious charlatans to say that they were wrong. 布里格斯说的好:阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔把“合理的想法”定义为“与周围人的想法一致的想法”。按这一定义,对那些魔鬼学者及他们身边足够多的人们来说,他们的著述是非常合理的。我们可以說他们是錯的,但没有必要称他们为迷信的骗子。 A defendant, accused of a non-existent crime, should expect that any effective legal process will find them not guilty and in witch trials this is eventually what happened. It remained possible that someone could (and perhaps should) be convicted if, believing they have the power, they bewitched a person who then conveniently started to ail, but this will be a very rare case. 一个被控犯了不存在的罪行的被告人应该期待一个合理的司法系统还他清白,就猎巫审判而言,最终情形也确实如此。如果一个真心相信自己能施巫术的人对别人施了巫术,而受术者正巧就病倒了,因此给施术者定一个巫术罪是完全可能的。但这种案子即使有,也应该非常稀少。 Renaissance magicians never won their argument with the demonologists as they were both swept aside by the intellectual changes of the seventeenth century. The devil found himself relegated to the role assigned for him by Milton in Paradise Lost (1667) as a tempter who must rely on God to effect any real change. Milton also gives us an idea of the penetration of the New Philosophy, although he hardly approves of it, with his running joke about the configuration of the solar system and Raphael’s admonition of Adam for being too curious about the heavens. 文艺复兴时代的魔术师们从未在与魔鬼学者的辩论中获胜,因为他们一起被十七世纪的知识界剧变甩下了辩论台。魔鬼被贬到弥尔顿在《失乐园》中给他安排的位置上去了,他现在是一个教唆者,他只有依靠上帝的力量才能导致实质性的改变。弥尔顿也通过他时常提到的笑话(例如“太阳系的构成”和“拉斐尔警告亚当不要对天堂太过好奇”)让我们了解了当时正破土而出的新哲学,虽然弥尔顿本人并不认同这新哲学。 To the New Philosophers, the rhetorical purpose of a defence of witchcraft was completely different to that of the earlier demonologists, which shows how attitudes had already changed. Perhaps the decline of the trials taking place without the world being overwhelmed by devilry had made the issue seem less urgent. 一篇为巫术罪的辩护词对新一代的哲学家们而言的修辞意义与它在早期恶魔学者眼中的修辞意义截然不同,这一点就证明了知识界的态度已然改变了。也许在猎巫审判越来越少的时代里,世界依然如常运转而并未充斥着魔鬼的术法这一事实,就使得魔鬼问题变得不那么迫切了。 On the same note, once it became clear that most people were already sceptical about witches and this had not led to a collapse of the Christian religion, intellectuals had no further use for witchcraft except for English Tories who wanted to do a bit of Whig baiting. As moral and religious matters were assigned more to the private than the public sphere, a pact with the devil ceased to be a crime against the state and maleficia ceased to be anything at all. 同样,一旦大多数人都已对巫师的存在产生怀疑而基督宗教也并未崩塌,对知识分子们而言巫术问题就没用了。只有英格兰的托利党人还会拿巫术问题来钓一钓辉格党人。当道德和宗教逐渐由社会事务变成私人事务,与魔鬼定约也就不再是危害国家的犯罪,而诅咒也就不再被人当作一回事了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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