Nevada’s Voucher Breakout 内华达州的教育券突围 作者：WSJ @ 2015-9-01 译者：淡蓝 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：WSJ，http://www.wsj.com/articles/nevadas-voucher-breakout-1441150012 Unions and the ACLU fight universal statewide school choice. 工会正和美国公民自由联盟一起反对全州普适择校 The hullabaloo over Common Core is obscuring some major school choice flashpoints in the states. Consider Nevada, where the union for the public school status quo is suing to block revolutionary education savings accounts. 围绕“公共核心”的喧闹，盖住了各州主要的择校热点问题。看看内华达州，为公立学校现状发声的工会，正在通过起诉来到达封锁革命性的教育储蓄账户的目的。 Earlier this summer Nevada Republicans established universal education savings accounts (ESAs), which allow all parents who withdraw their kids from public schools to spend state funds on private school tuition, textbooks, tutoring fees and special services. Jeb Bush last month praised Nevada’s ESAs as a model for “total voucherization,” which is scaring the unions silly. 今年夏初，内华达州的共和党人建立了普适教育储蓄账户（ESAs)， 允许所有家长，在把孩子从公立学校退学之后，可以用州立基金来给孩子交私立学校的学费、书本费、家教费和特殊教育服务费。上个月，Jeb Bush称赞这是个"教育券全面化"的典范，这可把工会吓傻了。 Starting next year, parents who opt out of public schools can receive between 90% and 100% of the statewide average per-pupil allotment ($5,100 to $5,700) depending on their income. Unused funds can be rolled over for future expenses including college. According to the Friedman Foundation, ESAs will cover between 60% and 80% of the median tuition at private schools, many of which provide additional financial assistance. 自明年始，选择让自己的孩子退出公立学校的家长们，根据收入不同，可以拿到全州学生平均拨款的90%到100%（即5100 至5700美元）。未用完的资金可以结转为将来使用，包括上大学的费用。据Friedman基金会说，教育储蓄账户可以覆盖私立学校中位学费的60%到80%，且这种私立学校大多会提供额外的助学金。 Twenty-three states have enacted 48 private-school choice programs, but nearly all include income and eligibility caps. Four states other than Nevada—Arizona, Florida, Tennessee and Mississippi—offer ESAs that are limited to special needs or low-income students. 有23个州已经立法实施了48个私立学校择校方案，只是几近所有的方案都包含有收入和资格限制。与内华达州不同，有四个州——亚利桑那，佛罗里达，田纳西和密西西比——要求教育储蓄账户限用于特殊需求或低收入家庭学生。 Unions are desperate to prevent Nevada’s model from spreading. They argue that giving all parents these educational options will destroy public schools, but the real point is to break up the union monopoly. Universal ESAs give all low and middle-income students the ability to escape failing schools, while providing enough funding to seed alternatives. 为阻止内华达州模式的蔓延，工会已不顾一切。他们认为，赋予所有家长以教育选择，这对公立学校将是毁灭性的，但真正的要点是它会打破工会的垄断。在提供足够资金扶植替代选择的同时，普适教育储蓄账户会使所有低收入和中等收入家庭的学生有能力避开不合格的学校。 The American Civil Liberties Union last week took up the union water cannon. It argued in a lawsuit that ESAs violate the Nevada constitution’s ban on “public funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal” being used for a “sectarian purpose” and undermine “the public school system that the State is constitutionally required to support.” 美国公民自由联盟上周拿起了工会的水枪。在一起诉讼中，它辩称，教育储蓄账户违反了内华达州宪法禁止"任何种类或性质的公共基金，无论是州立、县立或市立"被用于"宗派目的"的规定，并从根本上破坏了"宪法规定州必须支持的公立学校系统"。 This is a legal Hail Mary. Dozens of state constitutions include these so-called Blaine amendments, which are a legacy of the anti-Catholic bigotry of the 19th century. Most state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark 2011 ruling, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, have interpreted these prohibitions narrowly. The High Court ruled that tax credits to nonprofits that fund private school scholarships aren’t government expenditures. 这真是个法律上的孤注一掷。数十个州的宪法包含有这类所谓的布莱恩修正案，这是19世纪反天主教偏执狂的一份遗产。在2011年亚利桑那州基督教学校学费组织诉Winn案中，绝大多数州法院和美国联邦最高法院在其具有里程碑意义的裁定中，都已狭义地解释过这些禁令。高等法院裁定，给予旨在资助私立学校奖学金的非营利组织的那些税收优惠，不属于政府支出。 Last year the Arizona Supreme Court upheld an appellate decision that ESAs are constitutional because they are “neutral in all respects toward religion” and direct “aid to a broad class of individuals without reference to religion.” What’s more, “the specified object of the ESA is the beneficiary families, not private or sectarian schools.” 去年，亚利桑那州最高法院维持了一项上诉判决，认为教育储蓄账户符合宪法，因为它们是"在各方面对于宗教均属中立"，并且“直接帮助了大量与宗教无关的个体"。更重要的是，"教育储蓄账户指定的对象是受益家庭，不是私人或者宗派学校"。 The Institute for Justice, which helped defend Arizona’s ESAs and craft Nevada’s, notes that it is “the independent decision-making by parents that severs any link between church and state.” ESAs give “parents a genuine choice as to how to spend the money.” If ESAs are unconstitutional, then so are state Medicaid reimbursements to religiously affiliated hospitals. 帮助保卫亚利桑那州教育储蓄账户并帮助精心构建内华达州教育储蓄账户的“正义协会"指出，教育储蓄账户是"家长们的独立决策，切断了所有政教关连"。它给了"家长们一个真正的选择机会来决定如何花这些钱"。如果教育储蓄账户是违宪的，那各州给宗教附属医院报销的国家医疗补助也同样是。 It’s both a shame and reflection of modern liberal politics that the ACLU is teaming up with the teachers union to squash educational freedom. 美国公民自由联盟与教师工会结盟，一起压制教育自由，这不仅是一种耻辱，也是对现代自由派政治面目的一个真实写照。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Imperial exams and human capital 科举考试与人力资本 作者：Stephen Hsu @ 2015-5-20 译者：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Information Processing，http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2015/05/imperial-exams-and-human-capital.html The dangers of rent seeking and the educational signaling trap. Although the imperial examinations were probably g loaded (and hence supplied the bureaucracy with talented administrators for hundreds of years), it would have been better to examine candidates on useful knowledge, which every participant would then acquire to some degree. 寻租的危险和教育信号陷阱。尽管科举考试基于一般智力因素（因此几百年来为官僚机构输送了很多优秀的行政人员）【校注：G因素，或一般智力因素，心理学上指人类一切认知活动都依赖的智力因素】，但如果它考察的是候选者的实用知识，那会更好，这样每个候选者都可以对这种知识有所掌握。 See also Les Grandes Ecoles Chinoises and History Repeats. 另请参考我的博文：“中国大学”和“历史在重复”

Farewell to Confucianism: The Modernizing Effect of Dismantling China’s Imperial Examination System Ying Bai The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 这里是香港科技大学Ying Bai的论文“告别儒家：中国废除科举制度的现代化影响” Imperial China employed a civil examination system to select scholar bureaucrats as ruling elites. This institution dissuaded high-performing individuals from pursuing some modernization activities, such as establishing modern firms or studying overseas. This study uses prefecture-level panel data from 1896-1910 to compare the effects of the chance of passing the civil examination on modernization before and after the abolition of the examination system. 中华帝国采用科举考试制度筛选士大夫来作为统治精英。这一机制阻止了优秀的个人从事一些现代化的活动，如建立现代企业或者去海外学习。本研究使用了从1896年到1910年废科举前后的府级名册数据，来考察科举晋身机会对现代化的影响。 Its findings show that prefectures with higher quotas of successful candidates tended to establish more modern firms and send more students to Japan once the examination system was abolished. As higher quotas were assigned to prefectures that had an agricultural tax in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643) of more than 150,000 stones, I adopt a regression discontinuity design to generate an instrument to resolve the potential endogeneity, and find that the results remain robust. 研究结果表明，废科举之后，那些科举取士配额较多的府建立的现代企业更多，向日本派遣的留学生也更多。由于那些在明朝时期（1368-1643）缴纳农业税超过15万石的府拥有的取士配额更多，我采用断点回归方法生成了一种工具，以解决潜在的内生相关性问题，发现结果依然稳固。【校注：此为论文“摘要”】

From the paper: 论文内容摘录：

Rent seeking is costly to economic growth if “the ablest young people become rent seekers [rather] than producers” (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991: 529). Theoretical studies suggest that if a society specifies a higher payoff for rent seeking rather than productive activities, more talent would be allocated in unproductive directions (Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 1993). 对于经济增长来说，寻租行为代价非常昂贵——如果“最优秀的年轻人倾向于成为寻租者，而不是生产者” (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991: 529) 的话。理论研究表明，如果社会让寻租行为比生产行为获利更多的话，更多有才能的人将会被分配到不事生产的方向(Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 1993)。 This was the case in late Imperial China, when a large part of the ruling class – scholar bureaucrats – was selected on the basis of the imperial civil examination. The Chinese elites were provided with great incentives to invest in a traditional education and take the civil examination, and hence few incentives to study other “useful knowledge” (Kuznets 1965), such as Western science and technology.2 Thus the civil examination constituted an institutional obstacle to the rise of modern science and industry (Baumol 1990; Clark and Feenstra 2003; Huff 2003; Lin 1995). 这就是中华帝国晚期的情况，统治阶级的很大一部分——即士大夫们——以科举考试的形式选拔出来。中国的精英们具有极大的激励来投资于传统教育，并且参加科举考试，因此对于其他“实用知识”就不那么热情了(Kuznets 1965)，比如说西方科学技术。这样，科举考试就构成了现代科学技术发展的制度性障碍(Baumol 1990; Clark and Feenstra 2003; Huff 2003; Lin 1995)。 This paper identifies the negative incentive effect of the civil exam on modernization by exploring the impact of the system’s abolition in 1904-05. The main empirical difficulty is that the abolition was universal, with no regional variation in policy implementation. To better understand the modernizing effect of the system’s abolition, I employ a simple conceptual framework that incorporates two choices open to Chinese elites: to learn from the West and pursue some modernization activities or to invest in preparing for the civil examination. 本文通过探索1904-1905年间废除科举考试的影响，来鉴别科举考试对于现代化的负面激励效应。主要的实证困难在于这一废除举动是全国性的，没有政策实施上的地区差异。为了更好地理解废除科举体制对于现代化建设的影响，我采用了一个简单的概念框架，其中包括了中国精英们在当时的两个选项：向西方学习并实行一些现代化举动，或是为准备科举考试而增加投入。 In this model, the elites with a greater chance of passing the examination would be less likely to learn from the West; they would tend to pursue more modernization activities after its abolition. Accordingly, the regions with a higher chance of passing the exam should be those with a larger increase in modernization activities after the abolition, which makes it possible to employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method to identify the causal effect of abolishing the civil examination on modernization. 在这个模型中，那些更有可能通过科举考试的精英们将不太可能向西方学习；而废除科举后他们将倾向于更多进行现代化活动。于是，科举晋身机会更大的地区应当也是那些废除科举之后现代化活动更为活跃的地区，这就使得我可以采用双重差分（DID）方法来鉴别废除科举制对于现代化的因果效应。 I exploit the variation in the probability of passing the examination among prefectures – an administrative level between the provincial and county levels. To control the regional composition of successful candidates, the central government of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) allocated a quota of successful candidates to each prefecture. In terms of the chances of individual participants – measured by the ratio of quotas to population – there were great inequalities among the regions (Chang 1955). 我利用了不同府在科举通过率上的差异——“府”这一地方的管理层级介于省级和县级之间。为了控制中选者的地域构成，清王朝（1644-1911）把取士名额分配到府。以个人投考者的成功率衡量——以配额占总人口比率计——不同地区很不平均（Chang 1955）。 To measure the level of modernization activities in a region, I employ (1) the number of newly modern private firms (per million inhabitants) above a designated size that has equipping steam engine or electricity as a proxy for the adoption of Western technology and (2) the number of new Chinese students in Japan – the most import host country of Chinese overseas students (per million inhabitants) as a proxy of learning Western science. Though the two measures might capture other things, for instance entrepreneurship or human capital accumulation, the two activities are both intense in modern science and technology, and thus employed as the proxies of modernization. ... 为衡量某个地区的现代化活动水平，我采用了（1）新成立的、具有一定规模、并应用了蒸汽机或者电力的现代私企数量（每百万居民），来代表对于西方科技的应用情况；以及（2）（每百万居民中）新近去往日本的中国留学生数量（日本是中国海外留学生的最主要目的地），来代表对于西方科学的学习情况。虽然这两者可能都会捕捉到其他东西，比如企业家或者人力资本积累，但这两个活动在现代科学技术中都是非常剧烈的，所以可用于代表现代化进程……

From Credentialism and elite employment: 以下摘自我之前的博文“文凭主义与精英雇佣”：

Evaluators relied so intensely on “school” as a criterion of evaluation not because they believed that the content of elite curricula better prepared students for life in their firms – in fact, evaluators tended to believe that elite and, in particular, super-elite instruction was “too abstract,” “overly theoretical,” or even “useless” compared to the more “practical” and “relevant” training offered at “lesser” institutions – but rather due to the strong cultural meanings and character judgments evaluators attributed to admission and enrollment at an elite school. I discuss the meanings evaluators attributed to educational prestige in their order of prevalence among respondents. ... 评价者们过于依赖于把“学校”作为评估的标准，这不是因为他们相信精英教育的内容可以使学生更善于应对公司生活——事实上，评价者倾向于相信，与“更差”的机构所提供的更“实用”和“更有意义”的训练相比，精英教育、特别是超级精英教育“太抽象”、“过于理论化”、甚或是“根本没用”——而是因为评价者给精英学校的招生录取赋予了丰厚的文化内涵和个性判断。我将按照它们各自在受访者中的流行程度次序，来讨论评价者在教育声望上所赋予的意义……

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Decline of Witch Trials in Europe 欧洲猎巫审判的衰落 作者：James Hannam @ 2007 译者：Yuncong Yang 校对：慕白 来源：作者个人网站，http://jameshannam.com/witchtrial.htm Preliminary considerations 绪论 Alice Molland was sent to the gallows at Exeter in 1684 and became the last witch to be executed in England. Scotland closed its account with Janet Horne in 1722 while trials wound down across Europe. However, it would not be until 1782 that the last witch to be legally executed met her fate at Glarus in Switzerland. 1684年，艾丽丝·莫兰在埃克塞特被处以绞刑，她是最后一个在英格兰被处决的女巫。 1722年，珍妮特·霍恩成为苏格兰最后一个被处决的女巫，此时，全欧洲的猎巫审判案件已经在减少，不过要等到1782年，全欧最后一个经法律程序被判死刑的女巫才在瑞士的格拉鲁斯被处决。 But by the late 17th century witch trials were already reasonably rare occurrences even in the same localities where, in the earlier part of that century, the greatest hunts had taken place. The crime itself was extinguished in France by royal edict in 1682, repealed in England in 1736 and abolished in Poland as late as 1776. 但是到17世纪晚期时，在那些之前猎巫运动最盛行的地区，猎巫审判已经是相当罕见的事情了。法国于1682年就通过王室敕令废除了巫术罪。英格兰取消巫术罪是在1736年，而直到1776年波兰才废除这一罪名。 However, the decline in trials and hunts did not necessarily presage a corresponding decline in the belief in witches just as their start did not correspond to any increase. Belief is a notoriously hard thing to measure, but almost all societies appear to have some tradition of witches and fear of magic has been nearly universal. The questions about witches in early modern Europe are not so much why people believed in them at that time and place, but why that belief manifested itself into the hunts and executions. 然而，正如猎巫审判和猎巫运动的兴起并不代表人们比以前更加相信巫术及巫师的存在一样，它的衰落也并不一定代表人们变得更不相信巫术及巫师的存在了。众所周知，信仰是非常难以度量的，而几乎所有社会里都存在着某种巫师传统，人们对魔法的恐惧也是处处有之。要研究近代早期欧洲的巫师这一题目，重要的问题不是为什么彼时彼地的人们相信有巫师存在，而是为什么彼时人们的这种信念导致了猎巫运动及对巫师的大规模处决。 The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the reasons that trials for the crime of witchcraft, from being relatively common before 1650, had, across Europe, become a rarity fifty years later and had died out altogether within another century. This rapid decline and then extinction is at least as puzzling as the widespread appearance of the phenomena in the first place at the end of the fifteenth century. 本文的宗旨是探讨这一问题：为什么在1650年前相当普遍的对施行巫术者的审判50年后就变得颇为罕见，而到了18世纪晚期就彻底绝迹了？猎巫审判在这一时期的急剧衰落与它在十五世纪末的急剧盛行一样令人费解。 Witch trials only became common during the Renaissance and the fiercest hunts took place in the 1620s and 1630s in German speaking areas. Contrary to popular belief, they were not a phenomenon of the Middle Ages. Although magical belief and practice were just as common during this earlier period, they did not often lead to trials, let alone executions. 猎巫审判要到文艺复兴时期才开始普遍出现，而最最激烈的猎巫高潮出现在十七世纪二三十年代的德语地区。与普遍的认知相反，猎巫运动不是中世纪的事情。在中世纪，人们对魔法的信仰和使用与猎巫运动时期一样普遍，但那时很少有巫师被送上法庭，更别说被处决了。 Until recently popular views of this subject were confused both by the agendas of rationalists who wanted to find examples of superstition and by neo-pagans seeking their own foundation myth. 直到最近，对猎巫运动的流行观点都相当混乱。其原因在于，一方面，理性主义者们希望找到迷信带来恶果的实例，另一方面，新异教的信徒们希望在历史中找到他们教义的根基。 The “Burning Times”, when, according to the most extreme polemicists, nine million women lost their lives after dreadful torture, has become an essential part of neo-paganism’s self identity. They also had Margaret Murray to assure them that witches really were the survivors of the old religion that neo-pagans were continuing in the present day [NOTE]. “大火刑时代”已经成为了新异教主义自我身份认同的核心部分。据一些最极端的论者说，这一时期有九百万女性在承受酷刑后被杀。除此之外，玛格丽特·穆雷断言巫师们是古老宗教的孑遗，而今天的新异教正是继承了这些古老宗教。 Murray’s thesis of the existence of a pre-Christian fertility cult remains influential outside the academy but, despite seeming to have gained some support from Carlo Ginzberg’s work on the benandanti who do appear to have had some of the attributes of a religious cult, it is dismissed by noted modern authority Robin Briggs as having “just enough marginal plausibility to be hard to refute completely, yet is almost wholly wrong.” [NOTE]. 穆雷认为，猎巫时代存在着一种源于前基督教时期的生殖崇拜。这一观点至今在学术圈外仍然颇有影响。尽管卡洛·金斯堡对于“善之行者”（benandanti）的研究结论（“善之行者”的身上确实存在某种宗教崇拜的特征）似乎部分支持穆雷的观点，现代的权威学者罗宾·布里格斯依然对穆雷的观点嗤之以鼻，在他眼里，穆雷的学说“只有刚好够使它难以被彻底驳斥的那么一点点说服力，但基本上是完全错误的。” This reassessment of the myth of the Burning Times has even reached neo-paganism’s own scholarship [NOTE] which is challenging the idea that the validity of their religion depends on its antiquity. Meanwhile, estimates of the total number of executions over three centuries has shrunk to about 60,000 or so [NOTE] which is of a similar order of magnitude to what the Jacobins managed in just three years of terror during the French Revolution. 即使新异教主义自己的学者们也开始重新审视“大火刑时代”，他们开始挑战这一令其信仰能够合理的建基于古代传统的观念了。同时，现今对猎巫运动在三个世纪内处决人数的估计已经下降到约六万人，这一处决规模和法国大革命时雅各宾派在三年恐怖时期内做到的不相上下。 There is very little agreement about the reasons for the end of witch trials and the scholars have tended each to be an advocate for their own ideas based on the study of particular localities rather than trying a more synoptic approach to bring some order to the myriad of available suggestions. It is not even clear whether we are looking for some new causes that helped end witch trials or simply the absence of whatever it was that had started them in the first place. 对于猎巫审判结束的原因，学术界没有什么统一意见。很多学者仅仅是在努力研究某一地区的情况，并以此支持他们自己的观点，而不是尝试进行综合研究以给各种可能假说梳理出头绪。我们甚至都不知道在研究中应该寻找什么。是某些新生因素结束了猎巫审判，还是某些在过去推动了猎巫审判的因素已经不复存在？ So, if we could identify the conditions that brought about the trials, the subsequent decline might simply be explained by their later disappearance. An example of this would be the religious confusion and violence of the Reformation that had largely worked itself out after the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century. 如此说来，如果我们能够找到最初猎巫审判产生时的种种条件，那么猎巫审判后来的衰落或许就可以归因于这些初始条件的不复存在。举例来说：宗教改革带来了宗教观点的混乱和大量暴力冲突，而这种混乱状况在十七世纪中叶威斯特伐利亚条约后大为缓解。 It has also been widely noticed that hunts tended to take place in areas and periods where central control had largely broken down or during interregnums between regimes. For example, the activities of Matthew Hopkins took place in the chaos of the English Civil War, the Great Hunt in Scotland in 1661 when English justices were replaced, and even the Salem of 1692 outbreak occurred in a temporary vacuum of authority. When control was restored, goes this theory, the witch hunts largely ceased. 很多人也都注意到，若一个地区中央统治秩序崩坏或正处于改朝换代时期，猎巫审判就比较易于在此地盛行。举例而言：马修·霍普金斯活跃于英国内战的混乱时期；1661年苏格兰的大规模猎巫运动发生时，当地的英格兰法官正遭到大规模替换；甚至1692年的萨勒姆大审判也是发生在当地短暂处于权力真空的时期。如这一理论预言的，在以上地区一旦秩序得到恢复，猎巫审判就大大减少了。 On the other hand, the original causes might long since have been removed without their effects likewise disappearing so that the decline of witch trials will be brought about by entirely different means. Examples frequently cited are the rise of secular rationalism or social trends that led to the discounting of devilry. It has been suggested that witchcraft simply became too old hat for the intelligentsia of the early Enlightenment to countenance and that they were wont to sneer at such outdated nonsense so as to reassure themselves of their own intellectual superiority. 另一方面，也有很多猎巫运动的初始动因早早消失，但其效力并未消失，在这种情况下，导致猎巫审判衰落的就应该是其他因素。经常被引用的例子是世俗理性主义的兴起，或社会潮流导致魔鬼信仰的自然衰落。一些人认为在启蒙运动早期的知识精英眼里，巫术罪太老套了，不值得他们支持；相反这些精英乐于鄙视这些过时的无稽之谈，从而获得智力上的优越感。 A good deal of recent work has concentrated on the social reasons for witchcraft accusations and has looked for the causes of both their rise and fall at a local level. For instance, Alan MacFarlane and Keith Thomas set out a complex web of interactions between vulnerable single women and other villagers motivated by guilt [NOTE]. They suggested that the full implementation of the Poor Laws sufficiently alleviated the situation so that the accusations ceased. While their careful research of depositions suggests they have accurately portrayed the mechanism by which social tensions manifested themselves, I do not think that they have explained why, at that particular place and time, it should be through witchcraft accusations. 许多近期的研究工作着重研究巫术罪指控背后的社会因素，并通过对局部地区的研究来寻找巫术罪指控增加和减少的原因。麦克法兰和基斯·托马斯的研究描述了一些村子中弱势单身女性与其他村民之间基于罪恶感而展开的错综复杂的互动。他们认为济贫法的全面贯彻实施大大缓解了此类困境，因而减少了巫术罪指控。尽管他们对各种证词的细致研究表明，他们确实精确地描述了当时社会矛盾的表现方式，我认为他们并没有解答“为何彼时彼地这些矛盾偏偏以巫术罪指控的形式表现出来”这一关键问题。 The era of the witch trials was one of great change and disruption but we must not forget that it was bracketed by the disastrous fourteenth century and the enormous social upheavals of enclosure and the industrial revolution. Any social explanation for witch hunts has to be specific enough to differentiate between the early modern period and those on each side of it, while also being general enough to apply to much of Europe over two centuries. 猎巫审判时代确实是一个剧烈变迁、社会失序的时代。但是不应忘记，这个时代之前是灾难不断的十四世纪，而后面则跟着圈地运动和工业革命这样的重大社会变迁。若要从社会角度解读猎巫运动的兴衰，这种解读必须足够具体，否则难以把近代早期和它前后的时期区分开来。同时这种解读又要有足够的一般性，能被应用来解释二百余年间的大半个欧洲发生的诸多相关事件。 The commonalties of witch beliefs are greater enough to make having lots of different social explanations for different environments unconvincing. For this reason I will be looking for general reasons for the decline that can be applied across Europe rather than seeking an individual cause for each locale. 当时的诸种巫术信仰存在非常之多的共同点，因此在解释猎巫运动的兴衰时，试图为不同地区不同环境的猎巫现象找出许多不同社会原因的思路是缺乏说服力的。所以，我要找到一般性原因来解释整个欧洲范围内的情况，而不是为每个不同的地方发生的事情找出一个特定的解释。 By a witch, I mean someone who is believed to have received magical power by some form of diabolical means. The diabolical source of this power is important because the mentality of most Christian intellectuals allowed only the devil as a source of supernatural power, except of course from God, and it led witchcraft to be viewed in much the same way as heresy. 在本文中，巫师一词指的是那些被认为通过某种与恶魔有关的方式得到了魔法力量的人。这种超自然力量的根源是魔鬼，这一点非常重要，因为除了上帝之外，魔鬼是唯一一个被当时的基督教知识分子接受的超自然力来源。也正是这一点使得巫术在很大程度上被当作一种异端行为来处理。 The connection between diabolism and magic is found in the documents of the Christian elite including, most famously, the Malleus Malificium (1486) of Kramer and Sprenger, but has an older provenance. The straightforward dichotomy between God and the devil was already present in late antiquity with the labelling of all pagan gods as demons but once they had been seen off, the church took a more sceptical attitude. Belief in magic was considered to be a sin but consequently actually practising it was nothing more than delusion. 魔法和魔鬼之间的联系载于许多当时基督教知识精英的著作中，最有名的是克拉默和斯普伦格著的《巫师之锤》一书。但这一观念的来源比这些著作更为古老。在古典时代晚期，上帝-魔鬼的简单二分法就已经出现了，当时基督教会把所有异端神祗都目为魔鬼。但击败异教信仰后，基督教会却转而采取一种更具怀疑色彩的立场。信仰魔法被认为是一种罪，但施行魔术不过是一种幻术而已。 This attitude is very much an intellectual one and reflects the continuing rejection of most forms of supernatural belief by theologians even when witchcraft was accepted. That is to say that rather than believing in the innate potency of ritual magic or in nature spirits, they insisted that God and the devil were the only possible agencies for magical or miraculous power. 这种态度很大程度上是基于智识的，它反映着自古以来神学家们对绝大多数超自然信仰的否定，即使后来巫术的存在被接受了，神学家们的态度也依然如此。也就是说：神学家们坚持认为上帝和魔鬼是仅有的能够施行魔法或奇迹力量的存在，而不承认各种仪式魔术或自然精灵本身具有某种能力。 This was not just a question of theology but also arose from the Aristotelian paradigm of natural science that had no room for spirits, magic or other such phenomena. We should note, however, that the word ‘magic’ was also used in medieval works like the Speculum Astronomiae of St Albertus Magnus to describe certain legitimate natural practices. 这种态度不仅是一个神学问题，它也来源于亚里士多德的自然哲学范式。在这一范式中没有精灵、魔法或其他类似现象的存在空间。然而我们也应注意到，一些中世纪著作也使用“魔法”一词来描述某些合法的、并非超自然的行为，例如圣阿尔伯特·马格努斯的《天文之镜》一书。 Later, the hermetic systems that became popular during the Renaissance did allow for spirits and angels to be summoned so consequently their practitioners were always vulnerable to accusations of devilry. This ambiguity about what was and was not acceptable remained a feature of intellectual debate throughout the Middle Ages and Early Modern period with both sides using magic to make their own polemical points. In the late seventeenth century we find Joseph Glanvill and Henry More, representing learned science and theology, defending the belief in witchcraft against occultist and radical sectarian John Webster [NOTE]. Webster is keen to deny diabolic involvement in great part because he does not want his own ‘natural magic’ to be confused with witchcraft while Glanville and More are defending the mechanistic new philosophy which, like Aristotelianism, insists all magic must be supernatural - and that can only mean God or the devil. 晚些时候，文艺复兴期间广为流传的赫尔墨斯派哲学系统允许信者召唤天使和精灵，这就使得其信众更容易被指控为魔鬼信者。在中世纪及近代早期，知识界一直在就何种形态的超自然存在可以接受展开辩论。辩论双方都会使用“魔法”一词来阐述论点。在十七世纪后期我们可以看到约瑟夫·格兰维尔和亨利·摩尔代表神学和科学阵营肯定巫术的存在，与神秘主义者兼激进的宗派主义者约翰·韦伯斯特辩论。韦伯斯特努力否定巫术中的魔鬼因素，因为他不希望他的“自然魔法”和巫术扯上关系。而格兰维尔和摩尔捍卫的是新的机械论哲学，这种哲学和亚里士多德派一样，认为魔法一定是超自然的，因而只可能来源于上帝或魔鬼。 At a popular level, beliefs about the supernatural were far more varied and indeed, one of the only commonalties appears to be that they did not involve the devil, at least without prompting from educated interrogators. MacFarlane mentions that the devil hardly figured at all in the depositions to the Essex assizes and in other English cases, he makes few appearances even in confessions [NOTE]. Elsewhere, especially in confessions under torture, diabolic themes are much more prevalent. This seems likely to have been due to the use of torture, together with leading questions, causing the defendants to start echoing the more learned views of their prosecutors. 在大众中，对超自然力的信仰更加五花八门，诸种信仰仅有的一个重要共同点似乎就是，它们都与魔鬼无关，起码在没有遭到博学的审判者追问时是这样。麦克法兰提到：在埃塞克斯郡巡回法院及其它英格兰案件的证言中几乎没有人提起魔鬼，即使在罪人的供词中魔鬼都没怎么露面。在其他地方，特别是那些刑讯之下获得的供词里，魔鬼的主题则明显得多。这种现象看起来应归因于刑讯和诱供。在这二者的共同作用下，被告人们开始重复指控者嘴里的高深说法了。 Restrictions in space make a discussion of how witch trials started impossible here, but it seems likely that a key factor was the overlaying of the elite mentality of diabolism and its associated perversions onto the pre-existing magical beliefs and social tensions among the people. This had happened before with the heretics of the Middle Ages when much of what was believed about them came from ancient authorities rather than their actual activities. It was the combination of learned thought with real factors on the ground (as there really were heretics and people claiming magical powers) that turned deadly. 材料来源的空间限制使得我们难以讨论猎巫审判是如何起源的，但看起来一个重要因素是精英阶层和普通民众的合力。精英们对超自然力来源的“魔鬼说”理论把魔鬼帽子扣在了很多已有的超自然信仰身上，而民众之间的矛盾需要一个发泄的出口。类似的现象在此前也曾发生在中世纪的异端们身上，人们对他们的许多认识并非源于异端们本身的行动，而是来自古老的权威观点。当知识阶层的思想和底层存在的现实因素（因为社会上确有异端，也有号称拥有魔法能力的人）结合起来，其效果是致命的。 Many, but by no means all, so-called witches seem to have been healers, wise women and cunning men who previously would have been of no interest to the higher clergy or secular legal authorities. If they were brought before any authority it would tend to be the local church court that would prescribe some penance like walking around the parish wearing sackcloth. 许多——但绝非全部——所谓的巫师似乎是一些治疗师。在猎巫运动之前，教会高层或者世俗法律体系对这些聪慧的女性或头脑灵活的男性是没有什么兴趣的。如果真可能有什么权威机构想审判他们，那十有八九是当地的教会法庭，判处的刑罚也就是一些类似穿着麻衣绕教区走一周的赎罪行为。 The village healers indulged in a wide variety of ritual magic, healing or mediation with spirits but they had little or no idea of any theory attached to these actions. In other words, to the lower orders, magic was a question of practice while to the elite it was something that required explanation with the devil usually the only explanation available. 当时这些乡村治疗师使用很多仪式魔法，用于治疗，或者让活人与死去的人对话，但是他们头脑里并没有什么关于这些做法的理论。换句话说，对于下层社会，问题的关键是怎么使用魔法。而对上层社会，问题的关键是如何解释魔法，通常魔鬼是唯一的备选答案。 The topography of the decline in trials and executions strongly suggests there were two distinct phases. The first phase, which takes place from the first half of the seventeenth century, is a large falling of in the number of accusations and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of capital convictions obtained. Thomas states that the large majority of executions in England had already taken place by 1620 [NOTE] and in Spain the Basque hunt marks the end of large scale prosecutions. Appeals heard by the Parlement of Paris after about 1610 show a large reduction in the number of capital sentences that were confirmed and after about 1630 an equally precipitous drop in the number of cases heard (even though all witchcraft cases at this time were subject to automatic appeal to Paris) [NOTE]. 猎巫审判及处决的减少并不是平均的，其分布表明猎巫审判的衰落经历了两个不同的阶段。第一阶段自十七世纪中叶开始，其标志是巫术罪起诉数大大减少，及与之相应的死刑判决比例下降。托马斯的研究表明，英格兰的绝大多数巫师处决都发生在1620年前，在西班牙，巴斯克大猎巫标志着大规模巫术罪起诉时期的终结。1610年后，巴黎高等法院的上诉记录显示，在巫术罪案件中死刑判决比例大幅下降。到1630年后，巫术罪案件的数量也出现了同样的大幅下降（尽管在此时期，所有下级法院审理的巫术罪案件都会自动上诉到巴黎高等法院）。 The pattern is repeatedly seen in almost all localities although the time scales are often different. The last hunt in Scotland took place 1661 – 2, large-scale scares continued to claim many lives in parts of Germany through the 1630s but became much rarer thereafter. This is not the end of the prosecution of witches - that continued even with sporadic outbursts of panic - but it is rather the normalisation of the crime as it fades into the background of early modern life. 同样的变化模式出现在欧洲几乎所有地区，尽管时间先后常常不同。苏格兰的最后一次大规模猎巫是在1661-1662年间。1630年代，德国部分地区还时有大规模的猎巫运动，很多人因此丧命，但在那之后就很罕见了。当然，这并不代表对巫师的审判已经消失。审判依然在进行——而且还有间歇性的恐慌带来的小高潮，但这更应解释为这种罪行的常态化。巫术罪行已不是社会关注的焦点，它正在渐渐隐入近代早期社会生活的背景之中。 The second phase is the complete cessation or abolition of prosecutions for witchcraft and this tends to take place in the eighteenth century. It can either take the form of a gradual petering out; some form of legislative act such as Louis XIV’s decree extinguishing the crime after a poisoning plot panic; or the English Act of Parliament abolishing it in 1736 [NOTE]. Often, it had become impossible to secure a conviction before the crime itself was removed from the statute book. 第二阶段是各国彻底停止起诉（或取消）巫术罪的时期，发生在十八世纪。这一阶段，各国停止猎巫的方式各有不同。有的国家逐渐停止了对巫术罪的起诉审理，有些国家采取某些立法措施取消了巫术罪，如路易十四在一次投毒阴谋引起的恐慌后颁布敕令取消了巫术罪，英国国会在1736年通过法案取消了巫术罪。即使在巫术罪被正式从刑法里取消之前，想要说服法庭判决被告巫术罪罪名成立已经很难了。 It seems extremely likely that in looking for causes we must treat these two phases as separate events to be handled individually and that consequently we will not find any single reason for the end of witch trials. 由此看来，在寻找猎巫审判衰落原因时，我们应把这两个阶段分开来看。这也就意味着，猎巫审判的消失不是任一因素单独作用的结果。 Explaining the decline of witch trials and executions 对猎巫审判及处决减少的解释 Under Roman law, to achieve a capital conviction required a full proof consisting of material evidence, witnesses of good standing or a free confession. Torture could be used to extract a confession if sufficient partial proofs had been accumulated but the defendant had to repeat themselves after they recovered and then again in court. Even if they later retracted their confession they were not supposed to be put to the question again [NOTE]. 在罗马法下，要判处死刑需要一条完整的证据链，支持证据链的可以是物证、合格的人证或被告自由自愿提供的证词。如果已经有足够的间接证据指向嫌疑人，则可以使用刑讯取得供诉，但犯人在养好伤后必须再次重复他们在刑讯下作出的供诉，此后还要当庭再重复一次。即使犯人后来撤回了自己在刑讯下作出的供词，他们也不应就同一问题再受到讯问了。 English common law forbade the use of torture in criminal cases altogether unless with the permission of the privy council (effectively meaning only for treason) but had similar systems of evidences and proofs of witchcraft as codified by William Perkins [NOTE]. 英格兰普通法在刑事案件中严格禁止刑讯，仅有的例外是由枢密院审判的案件（通常都是叛国案）。然而，根据威廉·珀金斯的案例汇编，在巫术罪案件中，英格兰有着一套和罗马法相似的取证和证明方式。【编注：威廉·珀金斯是16世纪英格兰著名教士和神学家，清教运动先驱，著述颇丰，曾编有一部三卷本的信仰审判案例集】 In the case of witches, material evidence was usually lacking, as the village healers did not go in for the kind of occult paraphernalia that characterised higher magic. It is also hard to see how the social interactions thought to lead to the initial accusation by Thomas and Briggs could give rise to witnesses able to say they had caught the witch casting a spell red handed, let alone flying through the air. 在审判巫师时，一般都没有物证，一般的乡村治疗师是不会去搞那些高等魔法式的繁琐神秘学仪式的。托马斯和布里格斯认为社会互动可能导致巫术罪指控的出现，但这些通常没法让一个证人到法庭上作证宣称他抓到了一个正在施法术的巫师，更别说亲眼看到巫师在空中飞翔了。 That said, when a witness was produced before the dubious English judge Sir John Powell, declaring that the defendant had been seen travelling on her broomstick, his lordship is said to have dryly remarked that there was no law against flying (sadly the provenance of the story is doubtful [NOTE]). In short, to get a capital conviction if the proper procedures were followed was extremely difficult. 话虽如此，当一个证人被带到对巫术问题持怀疑态度的英格兰法官约翰·鲍威尔爵士面前时，他宣称看到了被告骑着扫帚飞行，据说，鲍威尔爵士不动声色地答道，没有哪条法律禁止人飞行。（可惜这个故事的来源可疑，未可尽信。）总而言之，如果遵循正当的法律程序，受指控者被判处死刑罪名成立是非常困难的。 That is not to say that one could not be punished in other ways where the proof was deficient and the grounds of suspicion that could lead to the application of torture were considerably wider. Simply having a bad local reputation could land someone in a lot of official trouble. This was due to an important reform in the legal system in the late Middle Ages when the accusatio was gradually replaced with the inquisitio. To modern ears this immediately summons up images of the Inquisition although it was secular rather than clerical courts and certainly not papal inquisitors that were responsible for the vast majority of fatal witch trials. 当然， 这并不是说在证据不全且使用刑讯的条件颇为宽松时，被疑为巫师的人无法以别的方式受到惩罚。仅仅是在当地名声不好就可以给人带来很多麻烦了。这种情况的原因是中世纪晚期的一项重要司法改革，在案件审理中控诉制逐渐被纠问制所取代。听在现代人的耳朵里，“纠问制”会让人立即想起宗教裁判所。但这里的裁判官是世俗职务而非宗教职务，在绝大多数巫师被处决的庭审中，作出裁决的也不是宗教裁判官。 When before the Inquisition, a confession and willingness to do penance was always supposed to be sufficient to avoid the death penalty for a first offence while no such leeway existed in most secular courts [NOTE]. Instead, iniquisitio was a method of legal proceedings used in all courts outside England which dropped the dependence on an accuser to bring a complaint. The accuser (who could be punished himself if the defendant was acquitted) was replaced by an inquirer whose role was slowly taken over by professional magistrates. 在宗教裁判所里，初犯的嫌疑人通过忏悔和表达赎罪意愿通常就可以逃过死刑。但在大多数世俗法庭里，是没有这等出路的。在英格兰之外的所有国家，纠问制是被法庭普遍采用的司法程序，这种程序中，不需要一个起诉人来提起诉讼。起诉人（若被告被判无罪则可能受到反坐）被换成了讯问人，讯问人又逐渐被职业地方法官代替了。 This inquirer was expected to investigate matters brought to their attention or the subject of rumour, and was equipped with various powers to enable them to do so. Once they had a case it was presented before a court for consideration and sentence. Provided the procedures were followed and the magistrate was fair and competent, this was a huge improvement over the system of personal accusation and trial by ordeal that preceded it. 讯问人的工作是调查那些引起他们注意的事或流言的源头，并被赋予种种权力以便履行他们的职责。如果他们有足够的理由，相关案件就会提交给法院供审理判刑。如果能够遵守程序，并且地方法官公正且能胜任，这一改革相对于过去的个人起诉及神判法而言将是一个巨大进步。 But it is clear that during the great hunts the rules were not followed. Torture was liberally applied and the atmosphere was one of siege where it was felt the circumstances demanded extreme action. It is interesting to note that the Matthew Hopkins episode, where pseudo-torture such as sleep deprivation and ‘pricking’ was used, was the closest example to a full-scale continental witch hunt that occurred in England. 但是很明显，在大规模猎巫运动期间，司法程序并未得到遵守。刑讯逼供是家常便饭，而且当人们认为事态严重到需要采取极端行动时，全社会的气氛就好像被围在孤城里一样，什么极端行为都不在话下。很有意思的是，在英格兰发生的最像欧陆大规模猎巫的事件就是马修·霍普金斯主导的猎巫运动。在这场运动中使用的大多是一些“类刑讯”手段，比如睡眠剥夺和使用穿刺法鉴别巫师（https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pricking）. The most prolific hunters tended to be lay magistrates and middle ranking clerics of some education while in the higher and appeal courts such as at Paris the conviction rate was much lower, mainly because the sense of panic was absent, torture kept to the statutory limits and evidence examined with a cooler eye [NOTE]. The actual abolition of torture took place too late in most jurisdictions to have had a significant effect on reducing convictions of witches [NOTE]. 成果最为卓著的猎巫者通常都是未受训练的地方法官和受过一点教育的中层牧师，而在较高等的法院和上诉法院里（如巴黎高等法院）判决率明显低得多。主要原因是在这些法院里没有恐慌气氛，对刑讯的法律限制遵守的较好，法官检视证据的态度也较为冷静。在多数地区，取消刑讯对于减少巫师判决率没有什么影响，因为这一改变来得太晚了。 Neither was it the case that most senior judges denied the very possibility of witchcraft for if they had it is hard to see how they could have countenanced any executions at all. Rather, they were removed from the panic on the ground so they could take a more objective and professional stance. 高等法院的判决率较低并不是因为高等法官们本身就不相信巫术，如果他们真的不信巫术，那他们大可以一个巫师都不判。真正的原因是他们没有受到底层的恐慌气氛感染，因而可以在一个较为客观和职业的立场上审理案件。 It was not just lawyers who could become more lenient as they became more expert in their subjects. In Geneva, when the devil’s mark became an accepted form of evidence, the city’s surgeons were delegated to carry out the examination. However, no doubt as a result of having seen a huge range of moles, growths and boils on patients of unimpeachable character, they simply refused to be drawn as to whether a particular lump was of diabolic or purely natural origin. This made a capital prosecution almost impossible and only one witch was executed after 1625 [NOTE]. 都说律师随着对自身所从事领域了解得越多就会变得越宽容，其实不止律师，很多职业都是这样。在日内瓦，当“恶魔的印记”被认定为可接受的证据时，法院授权本地的外科医生检验被告身上有无恶魔的印记。然而，无疑是由于他们平日见多了那些人品端正无瑕的病人们身上的痣、增生和烫伤，医生们拒绝对某一肿块是恶魔的印记还是自然原因所致做出判断。其结果就是想根据恶魔的印记判处死刑基本上成了不可能的任务。1625年之后，日内瓦只有一个巫师被处决。 So the reduction of witch trials from epidemic to endemic proportions requires little else than the assertion of central control over convictions to ensure the legal forms were being adhered to and that local courts could not execute people without sufficient evidence. This central control could be achieved either through allowing appeals to higher courts (or even making them mandatory) or else by ensuring the proper training and oversight of local magistrates. In particular, the strict controls over the use of torture had to be reinstated, notwithstanding the status of witchcraft as a crimen exceptum (an exceptional crime) in most states, and confessions achieved through torture treated with the necessary scepticism. 由此看来，要把猎巫审判由传染性变为地方性不需要什么高深手段，只要有一个中央权威来控制地方法院，确保他们遵守法律程序，不在证据不足的情况下处决犯人就可以了。这种中央控制可以通过设置上诉程序（或像法国一样规定巫术罪案件自动上诉）来达到，也可以通过确保地方法官受过合适的训练且有合理的监督来达到。尤为重要的是要严格控制刑讯，而不是像很多地方一样把巫术罪看作一种“例外犯罪”而放松刑讯控制。法官对由刑讯得来的供词应有足够的怀疑态度。 In either case, this was extremely difficult during times of political upheaval, which explains the prevalence of hunts in the areas of the Holy Roman Empire most affected by the fragmentation of control up to the Thirty Years War and the same situation in France during the Wars of Religion. Although war itself distracted from witch trials as they were no longer the most pressing concern, the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity engendered by possible conflict could increase them. 不管采用哪种方法，建立此类中央控制在政治混乱时期都非常困难。这解释了猎巫为何在三十年战争期间中央权威破坏最为严重的神圣罗马帝国领地最为盛行，同样的情况也发生在宗教战争期间的法国。尽管作为新的麻烦来源，战争从猎巫那边吸引走了世人的一些注意力，但它带来的不确定感和不安全感也会使得人们对猎巫更加狂热。 At first sight, the abuse of judicial process was not so prevalent in England and a crack down on the use of torture can hardly explain anything in a jurisdiction in which torture was not used. The reasons for the hotspots of witch prosecutions in Essex and Lancashire also remain a mystery now that the theory of proxy persecutions of religious minorities has been called into question. 乍一看，在英格兰司法程序的滥用并不是那么厉害，对刑讯逼供的打击也很难解释在一个不允许刑讯逼供的地区出现的猎巫减少。在英格兰的猎巫高发区埃塞克斯和兰开夏，猎巫运动的起因依然是一个谜。目前有人已开始怀疑，这些地区的猎巫审判只是个幌子，实际上针对的是少数教派。 It is ironic that English witch trials faded at much the time that a king who was personally interested in them came to the throne. The North Berwick trials and his publication of Demonologie (1597) suggest that when he became James I of England, he would have been as concerned in his new realm as he was in his old. Perhaps the events surrounding the state opening of Parliament in 1605 focused his mind on more concrete threats to the royal person. The constant danger from Spain that was present during the rule of Elizabeth, as well as fears about the succession, might well have contributed to an atmosphere that encouraged trials. The ascension of James solved the later problem as well as closing off Scotland as a bridgehead for foreign invaders. 颇为讽刺的是，英格兰猎巫运动的衰落居然主要是在一位个人热衷于猎巫的国王在位期间发生的。由北贝斯维克发生的一系列审判以及詹姆斯一世本人于1597年出版的著作《恶魔学》来看，在他当了英王之后可能仍然和在苏格兰时一样热衷于猎巫。也许1605年国会开会前后的一系列事件所表现出的对国王本人的威胁吸引走了他的注意力。自伊丽莎白一世在位期间就长期存在的来自西班牙的威胁，以及对女王继位者问题的恐慌，都可能在伊丽莎白时期导致了一种鼓励猎巫的不安气氛。詹姆斯一世的继位解决了继承者问题，而且也使得苏格兰再不能成为入侵者的桥头堡了。 While the lack of judicial torture in England made witch prosecutions more difficult, the use of juries of laymen probably had the opposite effect. Whereas in the higher continental courts, the entire trial process, including reaching a verdict, was in the hands of professionals, in England a conviction had to be obtained through a jury of commoners (although they were landowners and burghers) who were often more credulous than the judge. The judge did have a considerable ability to influence the juror and, as he was a professional travelling around the circuit, could considerably reduce the number of convictions. 虽说在英格兰因为没有刑讯，要以巫术罪定罪较为困难，但由非专业人士组成的陪审团参与审理可能产生了相反的效果。在大陆上的高等法院里，整个审理程序包括定罪在内都是由专业人士来掌握的。而在英格兰，定罪工作是由一个一般民众（虽然通常都是地主或体面市民）组成的陪审团来做的。这些人比法官要轻信得多。不过法官对陪审团有相当大的影响力，而且当时的法官又是在辖区内巡回审理案件的专业法官，因此可以有效减少定罪的数量。 In the mid-seventeenth century guides like Robert Filmer’s An Advertisement to the Jurymen of England Touching Witches (1653) and reprints of Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witches (1584) were used as guides to the evidence that took a much more sceptical line than Perkins’ effort. But the jury could also reach a verdict of guilty no matter what directions came from the bench as happened during the last successful prosecution in England in 1712 [NOTE]. 在十七世纪中期，陪审员们使用断案指南来帮助他们衡量证据。常用的断案指南包括罗伯特·菲尔莫的《英格兰巫师案件陪审员须知》（1653）和雷吉纳德·斯科特的《发现女巫》（1584）的重印版。这些书对证据的怀疑态度比起珀金斯的著作来要强得多了。但是陪审员们也有权无视法官的指引而作出有罪裁定，在1712年英格兰最后一次成功定罪的猎巫审判中就出现了这种情况。 Rationalism and the final end of the witch trials 理性主义和猎巫审判的终结 By 1700, witch trials had become rare things across much of Europe although they remained reasonably common in Poland until 1725 [NOTE]. When they did occur, they excited a good deal of interest and usually ended with the liberty of the witch. The position of even the lower judiciary was now that maleficia was extremely hard to prove and it was not acceptable to accept lower standards of evidence simply because the crime was so serious. 到了1700年，在欧洲的大部分地区猎巫审判已经很少见了——尽管在波兰猎巫审判要到1725年才变得稀少。这一时期的猎巫审判一旦举行总能吸引众人的兴趣，而结果通常都是巫师嫌疑人被无罪开释。即使较低层的法院都开始认为要证明巫术诅咒是非常困难的事了，不能因为此类犯罪性质严重就采用较低的证据审查标准。 But from time to time, for one reason or another, a conviction was achieved and the statutory punishment was usually death. There were ways around this, such as the judge in England’s last case personally and successfully petitioning for a royal pardon for the accused in 1712 but even ten years after that the Scots executed Janet Horne [NOTE]. 然而间或还是会因为种种原因判决一个两个的巫师，而法律规定的刑罚一般都是死刑。当然即使判了死刑也不是没有办法，比如在1712年英格兰那最后一次成功定罪的巫师案判决后，法官通过个人的努力从王室拿到了特赦令。但在十年之后，苏格兰人还是处决了珍妮特·霍恩。 Positivist historians have long looked upon the end of witch trials as victory for rationalism over superstition. Michael de Montaigne’s scepticism about reports of witchcraft and the veracity of confessions in his essay On the Lame （1588） is a popular example of Renaissance humanism. 一直以来，实证主义历史学家把猎巫审判的终结看作是理性主义对迷信取得的胜利。米歇尔·德·蒙田在他的散文《论跛子》中表现出的对巫术及巫师供词的怀疑态度，是文艺复兴时期人文主义思想的一个著名例子。 However, closer examination of the rationalists has frequently found them to be something of a disappointment for their champions who do not share their mentality. Learned sceptics are often advocates of a mystical or hermetic point of view and are seeking to defend magic from the taint of diabolism rather than claiming that it is impossible. 然而，对理性主义者进行的仔细观察，时常会让他们的支持者们失望，因为这些理性主义者们想的和他们的现代支持者不是一回事。当时学者们之所以对巫术表现怀疑态度，时常是因为他们要推销自己的神秘主义或赫尔墨斯派观点。他们希望从魔法身上揭去魔鬼的污名，而不是认为魔法根本不存在。 The best known sixteenth century critic of witch trials, Johann Weyer, was a pupil of the great neo-Platonist magician Cornelius Agrippa as well as being a radical Protestant. In his De praestigiis daemonum (1583), Weyer was completely orthodox in his belief in devils and his condemnation of almost any kind of magical practice, but just did not think it was the kind of thing that old ladies got up to. 十六世纪最有名的猎巫审判批评者约翰·韦尔是伟大的新柏拉图主义魔法师科尔奈利乌斯·阿格里帕的学生，他也是一位激进的新教徒。在他的《论恶魔幻觉》（1583）一书中，韦尔表现出的相信魔鬼存在和谴责各种魔法实践的观点完全是正统派的。他只是认为，他说的魔法和老太太们做的那些不是一回事。 His English contemporary, Reginald Scot appears at first sight to be more conducive to the views of modern sceptics, but on closer examination his thought also turns out to be almost entirely a function of his Puritan theology [NOTE]. A century later John Webster had a remarkably similar outlook as he too is a sectarian and defender of alchemy. 与他同时代的英国人雷吉纳德·斯科特乍看起来好像更倾向于近代怀疑主义观点，但仔细审视就会发现，斯科特的观点完全是他清教信仰的衍生品。比他晚一个世纪的约翰·韦伯斯特看起来和他异常相似，而韦伯斯特也是一个宗派主义者和炼金术的捍卫者。 The argument was between, on one side Aristotelians and their heirs, the mechanical philosophers, and on the other neo-Platonists and hermetists. As we have seen, it was usually the former, with what we might call the more scientific attitude, who defended belief in witchcraft. This causes a serious problem for traditional explanations for the end of witch trials as there is almost nobody whose particular bundle of motivations and beliefs are entirely comfortable to positivist sensibilities. 论争的一方是亚里士多德派及他们的继承者，机械主义哲学家们，另一方则是新柏拉图主义者和赫尔墨斯派。正如我们前面看到的，通常总是前一派人——也就是我们可能会觉得态度更科学的那一派——相信巫术的存在并努力为之辩护。对女巫审判终结的传统解释在这一点上遇上了难题，因为在这场论争中没有任何一位参与者的信念和动机完全合乎现代实证主义者的口味。 There certainly is a rise in scepticism as Glanville and More (who was a mechanistic Platonist and thus demonstrates the impossibility of fitting anyone’s beliefs into a neat box) are both keen to combat it but, as far as the positivist is concerned, it is not always the right people being sceptics. 当时对巫术持怀疑态度者确实有所增加，以至于格兰维尔和摩尔要努力与之斗争（摩尔是个机械主义派的柏拉图主义者，这又一次证明了想把人的信仰套进方便的模式里是不可能的）。但是困扰实证主义者的是：持怀疑主义的不总是合适的人。 Likewise, Cotton Mather manages to receive both excretion and exoneration for his conduct in the Salem witch trials and later his work on smallpox immunisation. Even a bona fide freethinker like Thomas Hobbes thought that it was justified to convict someone of witchcraft if they had knowingly tried to carry out maleficia even if they were incapable of it [NOTE]. 与之类似，科顿·马瑟既因他在萨勒姆审判中的作为被人痛诋，又因他推广天花疫苗的功劳为人称颂。即使一个托马斯·霍布斯这样十足真金的自由思考者也认为：如果有人有意试图施加诅咒，那尽管他实际上没有巫术能力，判他个巫术罪也是正当的。 The pamphlet wars give us some idea of the motivations of both sides of the argument. Defenders of the belief in witches, such as Sir Thomas Browne in Religio Medici (1634), seemed more worried about atheists than the devil. 当年的小册子论战可以让我们对论战双方的动机略作管窥。为相信巫师存在者辩护的人似乎更担心否定巫师会让无神论者——而非魔鬼——得势。此类思维的例子可参见托马斯·布朗尼爵士的《一个医生的宗教观》（1634）一书。 Similarly, in Saducismus Triumphantus (1681), Glanvill did not appear to be so much concerned about witchcraft being a serious threat to life and limb, especially after his careful investigations revealed rather feeble examples, but instead that a denial of the witch was a big step towards the denial of all religion. 格兰维尔在他的著作《巫师及鬼怪的完整直接证据》（1681）中也表达了类似的意思。他仔细调查了他书中举出的那些巫术例子之后，发现它们都不太经得起推敲，在书中他并不认为巫术对人的生命或肢体能够造成什么实质威胁，更使他担心的是对巫师及巫术的否定可能导致对所有宗教的全面否定。 Even a hundred years later John Wesley had much the same concerns saying “giving up witchcraft is in effect giving up the bible” [NOTE]. Clearly the intention of these writers is not the same as earlier demonologists like Jean Bodin. 甚至在一百年之后，约翰·韦斯利也表达出了相同的担忧。他写道：“否认巫术实质上就是否认《圣经》。”很明显，这些作者支持巫术存在的目的与早期的恶魔学者如让·博丹等人大相径庭。 So, while Cotton Mather’s The Wonders of the Invisible World (1693) fits the bill as a the work of old fashioned cleric, seeing devils under the bed, convinced there is a vast diabolical conspiracy that justifies desperate retaliatory measures, many of the learned defenders had a much narrower interest. 所以，虽然科顿·马瑟的《不可见世界中的奇观》一书的确够得上老派教士著作的标准——书中他认为魔鬼就在我们身边、坚信存在一个魔鬼策划的大规模阴谋且人们应以极端手段对抗这一阴谋，但很多颇有学识的巫术捍卫者所感兴趣的领域则要窄得多。 Ultimately it was these learned men, who simply did not care about old women and their muttered curses, who had to be won around for the prosecutions to stop altogether. What eventually defeated the likes of More and Glanville was the same thing that has invalidated so many of the last ditch defences conducted in the name of religion. 归根结底，要结束猎巫指控和审判，反猎巫派必须把这些饱学者争取过来。而这些人并不关心村中的某个老妇是不是女巫，或她们口中咕哝的诅咒是否灵验。最终击败摩尔和格兰维尔及其同道的，此前也曾扫清过无数以宗教之名誓死捍卫某种信念的人。 There are always a few people who become fixated on a piece of doctrine and insist that the world will be imperilled by giving it up. This happened over the movement of the earth and is happening today over women priests. 历史上不论何时总有一些人执着于某些教条，并宣称如果放弃这些教条世界就会大难临头。围绕着地球是否在转动发生过类似的论争，而今天我们还可以在关于女性牧师问题的讨论中找到这些人的影子。 But once the dogma has in fact been dropped de facto despite the protestations of its defenders, it usually becomes clear that the terrible consequences of which they warned have not come to pass and a new generation has no concerns about amending the writ to conform with practice. 但是，尽管这些人誓死捍卫旧教条，一旦这些旧教条的死亡成为事实，人们就会发现捍卫者们拿来吓唬人的那些严重后果一样都没发生。这种情况下，新一代人就不惮于修改教条来使之适应新的现实了。 Essentially, most people were able to see that the church could sail serenely on despite the loss of an occasional doctrine and that its problems were rather more fundamental than just a matter of believing in witches. 最重要的是，大多数人都能够看到：虽然教会失去了某个教条，但它依旧安然无恙，而教会面临的问题也比巫术问题要深层的多。 While the contention of some scholars that there was a wholesale withdrawal of the elite from popular culture seems to me to be thrown into doubt by the enormous unifying effect of the English bible, it is true that certain beliefs can drop out of ‘high’ culture – especially when they become associated with vulgarity or lack of sophistication. In late seventeenth century England this happened to nearly all magical ideas as the New Philosophy became the in-thing. 虽然英文版《圣经》表现出的巨大文化统合力已使得某些学者声称的“精英阶层大规模退出大众文化圈”这一结论遭到质疑，但不可否认，有些时候一些信念确实会逐渐从“高等”文化的范畴里被排斥出去——尤其是当人们开始认为这些信念太过鄙俗或太过粗浅的时候。在十七世纪晚期的英格兰，这种现象导致了几乎所有与魔法相关的思想被思想界扫地出门，因为这一时期新哲学才是最时髦的。 While actually understanding the scientific results of Boyle or Newton was beyond most people, anyone could attack the superstitions of peasants and thus reassure themselves of their membership of the intelligentsia. Just as the learned ideas about the devil were absorbed by the middling classes who then put them into practice by hunting witches, so the New Philosophy, percolating into the middle class consciousness, helped instil them with scepticism. 虽然大多数人都很难准确理解牛顿或者玻义耳的科学发现，随便什么人都可以通过攻击农民的迷信而获得“自己是个知识分子”的自信。正如之前大众接受了学者们关于魔鬼的理论而置身于猎巫运动，新哲学也渐渐被大众接受，在他们的头脑里种下了怀疑主义的种子。 Even those who were willing to accept the existence of witches in principle did not feel they could countenance any specific examples. As Joseph Addison wrote in the Spectator in 1711 “I believe in general that there is and has been such a thing as witchcraft; but at the same time can give credit to no particular instance of it” [NOTE]. 即使那些愿意在理论上接受巫术存在的人也开始变得难以支持某个特定的巫术案例了。比如约瑟夫·艾迪逊在1711年的《观察家》中写到：“在一般意义上，我相信过去和现在都存在巫术，但与此同时我难以相信任何巫术案例。” To actually abolish the crime required more than the belief that proof was difficult to obtain. The twin pillars of witchcraft were maleficia and the pact with the devil - both aspects needed to be dealt with. Witchcraft had to be thought impossible (in the case of maleficia) and irrelevant (in the case of the pact with the devil). 要废除巫术罪名，只让人们相信其证据难以获得是不够的。巫术罪的两大要件是诅咒行为和与魔鬼所定的契约，必须把这两点都打倒才能废除巫术罪。人们必须认识到，巫术罪是不可能的（打倒诅咒行为）并且和魔鬼并无相干（打倒魔鬼契约）。 Belief in magic was largely absent from the elite long before the existence of the devil himself was being denied although he was becoming a spiritual being whose abilities were far more limited than they had been in the past. He could not really do anything miraculous but only foster illusions in the gullible. Eventually, his power became merely the ability to tempt Christians into sin by mental suggestion and so his threat was but a moral challenge. 在人们开始否定魔鬼的存在以前，知识阶层早已不信魔法存在了。而且现在魔鬼虽然还没被彻底打倒，但它已经成了一种精神性的存在，它的威能已经大不如前，目前它已经无法展示任何奇迹，它能做到的只是用幻觉蛊惑那些容易上当的人了。最终，魔鬼的能力只剩了以精神暗示诱惑基督徒犯下罪孽这一项，这样他对人们的威胁也就只停留在道德层面，而与法律无涉了。 It is also possible that the near complete lack of any solid evidence for devil worship finally began to make itself felt and that consequently fears of a fifth column in the midst of society faded but they would reappear from time to time, most recently in Orkney and Rochdale in the 1991. 另一个可能是，人们终于发现了他们对恶魔信仰的恐惧其实没有任何现实证据，因此，对社会中可能存在一个魔鬼势力第五纵队的恐惧也就消退了。当然，类似的恐惧日后还是会不时爆发出来，最近的例子就是1991年在奥克尼和罗什戴尔发生的“从魔鬼崇拜的家庭中解救儿童”的丑闻。【编注：参见维基词条Orkney child abuse scandal】 Neutering Satan and turning him into a more transcendent figure is often ascribed to Protestantism although Luther himself claims he suffered many physical encounters with the devil who threw excrement at him. Whatever the causes, the devil faded from view and this turned the question of what to do about his alleged disciples into a purely religious matter. 把撒旦无力化并使他成为一个更加虚幻的存在一事时常被记到新教的账上——虽然马丁路德本人宣称撒旦曾多次与他相遇并扔大便攻击他。不管原因为何，魔鬼从人们眼中消失了。这样，如何处理那些被指控是魔鬼信徒的人就变成了一个宗教性的问题，而与社会安全无关了。 The process was a drawn out one that should perhaps be studied in parallel with the decline of heresy and blasphemy as a crime against the state. This slowly faded as the eighteenth century wore on although there were isolated prosecutions, such as the La Barre case of 1766 in France made famous by Voltaire [NOTE]. （巫术罪的消失）这一过程相当漫长，或许较好的办法是把它与“异端诽谤危害国家罪”的消失一同研究。虽然仍有零星的异端指控（如因伏尔泰而大大出名的拉·巴尔案），异端罪在十八世纪已经慢慢淡出了人们的视野。 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there might simply have been a change in the jurisdiction for witch trials from secular to ecclesiastical courts but during the seventeenth century heresy had gradually ceased to be seen as a crime deserving temporal punishment and the church courts could no longer expect the secular arm to carry out their orders. 在十五至十六世纪，巫术罪的管辖权可能确由世俗法院转到了宗教法庭。但到了十七世纪，异端信仰已经渐渐不再被人视作一种需要神罚的罪行了。与此同时，宗教法庭也渐渐不能指望世俗法院执行它的判决了。 Even in countries which retained strong church courts, most especially Spain and Portugal, sentences became lighter as the eighteenth century progressed with a return to the medieval idea of penance and reconciliation rather than punishment. The stalemate that had ended the wars between Catholics and Protestants, coupled with the fostering of national over religious identity, meant the ideals of tolerance expressed as early as Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) were finally implemented. 即使在那些仍保留了相对强势宗教法庭的国家如西班牙和葡萄牙，进入十八世纪后对异端罪行的定罪也逐渐变轻了。以忏悔和赎罪代替刑罚的中世纪思想逐渐回归。天主教徒和新教徒长年战争结束后，两派进入了对峙局面，再加上人们的头脑中国家意识也开始取代宗教意识而成为主要的身份认同，这似乎意味着早在1516年托马斯·莫尔在《乌托邦》中写到的宗教宽容理想终于得以实现。 This is not to say that atheism or devil worship were socially acceptable, but rather that if a man or woman minded their own business and kept their views quiet, nobody would hunt them down. Essentially ones private religion became a private matter and, as long as one did not cause a public disturbance, the public sphere had little interest. 当然，这并不意味着无神论或恶魔信仰得到了社会的承认。只是如果一个人自扫门前雪，不把自己的宗教主张到处宣扬，那么不管他相信什么，都不会有人来猎捕他了。基本上，个人的宗教信仰终于被社会认可为个人事务了。而只要一个人不制造公共事端，那么公众方面对他的个人事务是没有什么兴趣的。 Conclusion 结论 Witchcraft is an imaginary crime. It has, as Robin Briggs says, a hole in the middle which demonologists were able to fill with their speculations [NOTE]. They were then able to persuade others, including the actual accused, of the veracity of these ideas. 巫术罪是一种想象出来的犯罪。正如罗宾·布里格斯所说：它的中心有个空洞，正方便那些魔鬼学者把他们的臆测填进去。这样，魔鬼学者就可以说服旁人——甚至包含被控为巫师的人——认同他们的观点。 As Briggs says, after Alasdair MacIntyre, a rational thought is one that coheres with the thoughts around it and, to the mentality of the demonologists and enough of those around them, their writings made perfect sense. We do not need to call them superstitious charlatans to say that they were wrong. 布里格斯说的好：阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔把“合理的想法”定义为“与周围人的想法一致的想法”。按这一定义，对那些魔鬼学者及他们身边足够多的人们来说，他们的著述是非常合理的。我们可以說他们是錯的，但没有必要称他们为迷信的骗子。 A defendant, accused of a non-existent crime, should expect that any effective legal process will find them not guilty and in witch trials this is eventually what happened. It remained possible that someone could (and perhaps should) be convicted if, believing they have the power, they bewitched a person who then conveniently started to ail, but this will be a very rare case. 一个被控犯了不存在的罪行的被告人应该期待一个合理的司法系统还他清白，就猎巫审判而言，最终情形也确实如此。如果一个真心相信自己能施巫术的人对别人施了巫术，而受术者正巧就病倒了，因此给施术者定一个巫术罪是完全可能的。但这种案子即使有，也应该非常稀少。 Renaissance magicians never won their argument with the demonologists as they were both swept aside by the intellectual changes of the seventeenth century. The devil found himself relegated to the role assigned for him by Milton in Paradise Lost (1667) as a tempter who must rely on God to effect any real change. Milton also gives us an idea of the penetration of the New Philosophy, although he hardly approves of it, with his running joke about the configuration of the solar system and Raphael’s admonition of Adam for being too curious about the heavens. 文艺复兴时代的魔术师们从未在与魔鬼学者的辩论中获胜，因为他们一起被十七世纪的知识界剧变甩下了辩论台。魔鬼被贬到弥尔顿在《失乐园》中给他安排的位置上去了，他现在是一个教唆者，他只有依靠上帝的力量才能导致实质性的改变。弥尔顿也通过他时常提到的笑话（例如“太阳系的构成”和“拉斐尔警告亚当不要对天堂太过好奇”）让我们了解了当时正破土而出的新哲学，虽然弥尔顿本人并不认同这新哲学。 To the New Philosophers, the rhetorical purpose of a defence of witchcraft was completely different to that of the earlier demonologists, which shows how attitudes had already changed. Perhaps the decline of the trials taking place without the world being overwhelmed by devilry had made the issue seem less urgent. 一篇为巫术罪的辩护词对新一代的哲学家们而言的修辞意义与它在早期恶魔学者眼中的修辞意义截然不同，这一点就证明了知识界的态度已然改变了。也许在猎巫审判越来越少的时代里，世界依然如常运转而并未充斥着魔鬼的术法这一事实，就使得魔鬼问题变得不那么迫切了。 On the same note, once it became clear that most people were already sceptical about witches and this had not led to a collapse of the Christian religion, intellectuals had no further use for witchcraft except for English Tories who wanted to do a bit of Whig baiting. As moral and religious matters were assigned more to the private than the public sphere, a pact with the devil ceased to be a crime against the state and maleficia ceased to be anything at all. 同样，一旦大多数人都已对巫师的存在产生怀疑而基督宗教也并未崩塌，对知识分子们而言巫术问题就没用了。只有英格兰的托利党人还会拿巫术问题来钓一钓辉格党人。当道德和宗教逐渐由社会事务变成私人事务，与魔鬼定约也就不再是危害国家的犯罪，而诅咒也就不再被人当作一回事了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-11-14】 @朱海就 “恐怖主义”与“资本主义”互为敌人：前段时间看到有文章说秘鲁政府通过产权改革、推动市场化，成功地消除了反政府武组织“光辉道路”的威胁。确实，如能通过商业改变自己命运，那总比搞恐怖强。恐怖组织在资本主义文明之光未照耀到的地方更容易出现，而恐怕分子可能更多的是寄生虫。 @高贤林l:德索托强调：正如1980年代和1990年代的秘鲁所证明的（就是他的《另一条道路》打败了“光辉道路”），只有合理的经济授权和对企业家精神的鼓励才是根治全球恐怖主义顽疾的良药。 @朱萧木: 天天为生计和发财梦打拼，谁搞恐怖袭击 @whigzhou: 德索托的书很好，但光辉道路的溃败不需要用他的理由来解释 @whigzhou: 苏联解体后全球倒了无数马列毛党，但发生藤森式改革的地方没几个 @whigzhou: 贫穷能提供恐怖分子，但造不出恐怖主义，假如战后美国托管中东全部油田，收入转交听话的地方政府，今天就不会有这些烂事了 @战争史研究WHS: 伊朗的巴列维国王和利比亚的伊德里斯国王都表示这条路走不通。 @whigzhou: 根本没走过，美国从来没形成过这样的政治意愿 @whigzhou: 假如你家附近来了群整天喊打喊杀的邻居，又不肯坐下来跟你谈，你的选择：1）控制其行为——成本可能很高，难度可能超出你能力，2）削弱其加害能力，定期打断他的腿，让他爬不进你家篱笆——可能相对容易做到，3）等死——容易倒是容易，就看你愿不愿意。 @PlusKing2022:假设美国不是70年代至今对瓦哈比教派的扩张睁只眼闭只眼，事态也不致于如此。穆斯林几十年，在某些地区是几百年的世俗化进程完全逆转了 @whigzhou: 与其叫瓦哈比派不如叫石油土豪金派，没被文明驯服的人就不能让他有钱，就好比我家猫没学会收好自己爪子，我就只能把它们都剪了～

超越邓巴数#5：青春的躁动 辉格 2015年10月7日 当多个群体联合成为更大社会时，总是面临这样一个组织问题：如何将维持秩序和协调集体行动的权力集团的规模限制得足够小，以确保其紧密合作；在前面的文章里，我已介绍了几种方法：1）强化父权和宗族，以将权力限制在长辈手里，2）赋予长支与幼支以不平等地位，从而将权力集中在长支手里，3）通过婚姻关系的内聚化，形成上层姻亲联盟，并垄断权力。 后两种方法都意味着地位分化，然而，只有当权势能够跨代积累时，个体和支系间的权势差异才能固化成阶层，进而形成稳定牢固的权力集团；可继承的财产权恰好创造了这样的条件，但是，不同类型的财产权有着不同的积累特性，而后者限定了地位分化的可能性，从而将社会大型化引向不同方向。 早期农民的主要财产是土地和牲畜，在旧大陆的多数农业社会，种植和畜牧都以某种比例混合搭配；在跨代传承过程中，土地数量要恒定的多（尽管也会因土壤退化或河流改道等原因而变动），牲畜数量则波动很大，而且出于生产组织的考虑，人们在处置土地产权时，有着普遍的抗分割倾向，即便不得不分也会尽可能推迟，而畜群则很容易分割，事实上也总是一有机会就分割。 例如，蒙古游牧者的多妻家庭，每位妻子和她的孩子们拥有单独的帐幕和自己的畜群，构成独立家户，而约鲁巴宗族社区（规模常达数百人）的土地归宗族集体所有，核心家庭只拥有使用权，成员去世后就被收回重新分配，马里多贡人（[[Dogon]]）的多妻家庭则处于中间状态：土地由家庭集体所有，并由长妻带领诸妻共同耕种，而牲畜则由每位妻子分别拥有，类似情况在非洲农牧混业社会十分常见。 土地和牲畜的差异也体现在分割时机上，畜牧者往往在男孩成年时便分给他几头牲口，作为其建立自己畜群的启动资本，到他结婚时，再分走一群牲畜（否则就无法成家），所以，以畜牧为主业者，家产分割继承是随每个继承人结婚而逐次进行的，最后父母保留的那一份由幼子继承，相比之下，以种植为主业者，通常要等到大家长去世之后，或宗族裂变之际，才一次性分家，在采用长子继承制的社会，甚至在分家时，也只分牲畜（和其他动产）而不分土地。 由于畜产的固有分割倾向，很难跨代积累，每一代的财富差异很快被子女数量所抹平，这样，以牲畜为主要资产的社会就难以形成稳定的阶层分化，因而无法通过上述后两条途径实现大型化，结果，要么停留在碎片化状态（就像中亚游牧民在多数时候那样），要么必须找出其他途径，他们找到的方法之一，是年龄组（[[age set]]）。 年龄组是这样一种制度（本文介绍的是非洲的年龄组，南岛和美洲的年龄组性质有所不同）：所有男性按年龄和资质被分入依次相继的五六个组别，这些组大致可归为四个阶段：未成年、战士、长老、隐退者，其中战士和长老还常分为新晋和资深两组；各组在发型、服饰、文身、彩绘等身体装饰上有着显著区分，在社会分工中承担不同任务，有着各自的社会地位和相应的义务，遵循不同的社会规范。 每隔若干年（短则六七年，长则十几年），当长老们决定晋升一批新战士时，符合条件者便在经历一系列仪式和品质考验之后，升入上一组；对于个人，最关键的两个环节是经由成年礼而成为战士和从战士晋升为长老，前者意味着被共同体接纳为有用一员，而后者往往与结婚成家的权利联系在一起，并在公共事务决策中拥有发言权。 非洲成年礼的核心是割礼，其过程极为痛苦，远不像现代医学条件下的包皮环切术那么轻松，接受割礼的男孩，不仅不许挣扎、呻吟、眨眼、扭头，还要长时间忍受众人刻意营造的恐怖气氛：在仪式临近前几天，前辈们就不断渲染割礼有多痛苦难熬，施礼当天早晨，男孩被一桶冰水浇头，接着，父辈谆谆教诲割礼有多重要，母亲手执棍子随时准备在他表现出怯懦时给予痛打，兄弟们以几近辱骂呵斥的口吻大声质疑他能否经受住考验，姐妹们则在一旁紧张的走来走去，担心着兄弟的怯懦会影响自己未来嫁个好丈夫。割礼所留下的伤疤，往往要过三四个月才完全愈合。 也有些成年礼不是割礼，但同样痛苦，比如南苏丹努尔人（[[Nuer]]）的额部切割：顺着抬头纹的路线，从左耳到右耳，切出六道深入额骨的切口，切口之深，从遗骸头骨上都能看到。 年龄组普遍存在于非洲的农牧混业社会，从非亚语系的奥罗莫人（[[Oromo]]），到尼罗-撒哈拉语系的马赛人（[[Maasai]]），到尼日尔-刚果语系的祖鲁人（[[Zulu]]），横跨非洲三大语系，如此广泛的流行，表明它作为一种社会组织工具大概颇有成效，才会被众多民族所模仿，那么，它是如何起作用的呢？ 年龄组在实践中有很多变化，最重要的区别是对各组成员所施加的约束，强弱十分不同，处于光谱最弱一端的是努尔人，他们的年龄组最松散，大致是一种区分尊卑和声望的标志，功能上有点像军衔，其约束力限于社交和仪式性场合，比如节庆宴会上某人该坐在什么位置，或者两个陌生人相遇时，是该平等相待还是尊卑有别，它带给群体的组织功能是最弱的。 肯尼亚的马赛人则处于光谱另一端，男孩一旦晋升为战士，便离开所在家庭，和同组兄弟集中居住在村外的专属营地里，并开始接受资深战士的训练，担负起保卫社区的责任，包括巡视领地边界，寻找新牧场（特别是在旱季来临之前），击退盗牛团伙，对外发动盗牛突袭，猎杀领地内危及牲畜的食肉动物（主要是狮子——有人因此误以为猎杀狮子是成年礼的一部分，其实那只是新晋战士迅速建立声望的多种方法之一），等等。 年龄组对马赛男性施加的最重要约束是，战士不可以结婚，也被禁止与任何已接受割礼的女孩交往，只有在晋升为长老之后，才能回到原先的家族，并娶妻成家；由于两次新战士招募之间通常相隔15年，而接受成年礼的年龄下限大约14岁，所以，晋升长老时至少已经29岁，运气差的话已接近45岁（13岁时刚好错过一次招募，于是28岁成为战士，43岁熬成长老）。 这显然是一种严酷的老人统治，通过禁止年轻男性结婚，并赋予其最危险的任务，老人们降低了自己面临的资源竞争（包括性资源）；和普通的家长制和宗族老人政治不同的是，通过强化同龄合作，长老组将家长权威集体化了，因而可以更有效的压制年轻人的反抗，而同龄合作的强化，恰恰又得益于同组长老早年在战士组中长达十五年的共同居住和集体行动经历。 长期合作所建立的兄弟情谊可以达到这样的程度：同组伙伴（age mate）被认为应该分享任何东西，甚至是妻子，当伙伴来访时，主人会在晚上让出他的茅屋，让妻子和来访者自己决定是否一起过夜。 可是长老们如何压制晚辈的反抗呢？要知道，刚刚经历了成年礼的新战士，大多处于好斗而危险的青春期，正是制造骚乱和挑战权威最积极的叛逆阶段，青春期躁动带来的高犯罪率也是每个现代社会面临的一大麻烦，欧美的大量犯罪学研究都显示，在所有社会中，15-19岁总是暴力犯罪率最高的年龄段，而且远远高于其他年龄段。 【图1：美国青少年犯罪率，来源：http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/4/1/16】 按某些进化心理学理论，青春期躁动并非由性功能发育所附带的有害副产品，而是年轻男性为自己在即将进入的社会竞技场中争得有利地位的一种方式，暴涨的雄性激素只是执行这一心理功能的媒介；这种躁动就像把一群母鸡刚刚放到一起时所引发的频繁啄击一样，等到啄序确立下来，就相安无事了。 支持这一适应性解释的一个证据是，在地位高度平等、没有阶层分化的小型狩猎采集社会，比如卡拉哈里沙漠的桑人（San）游团中，青春期躁动的表现要轻微的多，因为既然没有明显地位差别，也就没啥好争的。 那么长老如何避免这一躁动伤及自己呢？答案就隐藏在躁动的性质之中，由于它是一种适应，躁动和所谓“叛逆”的指向并非随机，而是相当有策略的，简单说就是欺软怕硬，这一点从校园团伙和街头帮派中很容易观察到，许多挑衅和惹是生非只是为了测试对方是否好欺负，以便将自己的啄序排到他前面，只有当大量年轻人找不到比自己更软弱的欺负对象时，青春期躁动才会因绝望反扑而伤及当权者。 年龄组和成年礼的要点在于，通过一系列精心安排的震慑性仪式和清晰可见的晋升阶梯，明确告诉其成员：你目前处于啄序的哪个位置，而且不必着急，只要你活得足够久，总有一天会升到高位，同时，它并不试图压制年轻人的躁动，相反它还鼓励和嘉奖这一躁动，并将其引向群体外部，把他们的好斗和不满变成服务于群体利益的战斗力。 实际上，类似的机制普遍存在于各种需要人为排定啄序的组织机构中，大学里老生仪式性欺负新生，军队中老兵考验新兵，秘密会社的残酷入会仪式，监狱里对新来囚犯的虐待，往往都是极具羞辱性和压制性的，排定啄序的用意昭然若揭；极度夸张的闹洞房习俗，或许也是出于类似心理，因为结婚和成年一样，也是社会地位的一次重大晋升。 总结起来，年龄组制度的妙处在于，它同时解决了这些社会面临的几大组织问题： 1）通过深化年龄段之间的垂直不平等，从而在维持个体间和家族支系间平等的条件下，控制了当权集团的规模——这意味着同等规模的当权集团能够管理更大型的社会； 2）通过细分年龄组，并在各组间实行社会分工，从而将每类公共事务上所需要的紧密合作圈子规模限制在邓巴数之下； 3）通过另辟战士营地并建立军事化集体生活，将战士组升级成了真正的战争团队，为其成员日后成为当权长老时保持紧密合作创造了条件； 4）通过强化年龄段之间等级区分和长老权威，将冲突压力引向外部，由于晚辈在家长去世前无望分到大额家产，不得不在群体外部寻找机会，积极发动袭击，特别是盗牛袭击； 5）让年轻组别承担主要战争任务，使得死亡率分布像低年龄段偏移，从而降低每个晋升环节的竞争压力。 基于这些组织优势，许多非洲农牧混业社会建立起了部落和部落联盟一级的政治结构，人数可达数千和数万人，若辅以选举制从而组建更高层次联盟，更可达到数十上百万人的规模。 奥罗莫人于16至19世纪间在埃塞俄比亚建立的嘎达（Gadaa）体制或许展示了它的极限能力，这是个三级共同体，其最高层酋长会议（luba）由各支系选举产生，任期八年——也就是奥罗莫年龄组的间隔年数，在较低层次上，资深长老组直接实施集体统治；有意思的是，奥罗莫人每过八年招募新战士组时，都要发动一场对外战争，此类战争还专门有个名字叫butta，从1522年到1618年共发动了12场butta。 年龄组所带来的战斗力，从祖鲁王国的崛起中也可窥见一斑，祖鲁军队的基本作战单位Impi的前身便是战士组，受所在部落长老和酋长的支配，服务于部落利益，后来，得益于其前辈丁吉斯瓦约（[[Dingiswayo]]）在数十个部落组成的联盟中所建立的霸权，祖鲁王国的创建者沙卡（[[Shaka]]）在持续不断的征战中逐渐强化了对这些战士组的控制，最终通过打散部落编制而消除了其部落身份，成为直接服务于祖鲁国王的国家军队。 作为一种军事组织，年龄组的痕迹甚至在罗马军团中也可看到，罗马军团（早期）的步兵基本作战单位是一个四排阵列，每排由一个120人小队构成20×6的小矩阵，这四排由前至后分别由少年兵（velites）、青年兵（hastati）、壮年兵（principie）和老兵（triarii）组成；如此排阵的结果，无疑也是越年轻的士兵死亡率越高（少年兵或许是例外，他们虽然冲在最前面，但以投掷标枪为主，并不近身接战）。 或许并非巧合的是，罗马（至少在早期）也是实行民主选举的平等社会，而且，直到公元前1000年左右的青铜时代晚期，古拉丁人仍以畜牧为主业，以季节性移牧（[[transhumance]]）方式过着半定居生活。  

An Odd Couple: Did Economic Prosperity Lead to the Emergence of World Religions? 奇异的组合：经济繁荣导致世界宗教的兴起？ 作者：Tahereh Haji @ 2015-9-01 译者：李九喻( @李九喻) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The Evolution Institute，https://evolution-institute.org/article/an-odd-couple-did-economic-prosperity-lead-to-the-emergence-of-world-religions-2/ Nearly 2500 years ago, in three different areas of the world, the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the Easter Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley, conditions were ideal for the emergence of a number of religious traditions, ones which would shape the future of human life to this very day. This 200-year period is called the “Axial Age,” and these doctrines would later become the world’s major religions, including Buddhism, Daoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The history of this process is well documented, but a key question remains unanswered: why did these similar movements emerge simultaneously? 大约2500年前，在长江和黄河流域、地中海东部及恒河流域这三个世界不同地区，数个宗教传统的兴起遇到了理想的条件，它们将会塑造人类的未来生活，直至今日。这个长约200年的时间段被称为“轴心时代”，其间诞生的教义日后逐渐衍变成了世界上的主要宗教，包括佛教、道教、犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教。这段被详细记录的历史中有一个关键问题尚未探明：为什么相似的宗教运动会同时兴起？ Prior to the Axial Age, in hunter-gatherer societies, early chiefdoms and archaic states, religions were focused on rituals, sacrifices, and respecting taboos, practices that were believed to ensure prosperity. However, the new doctrines were extremely different. Now, “personal transcendence” was valued. “轴心时代”之前，在狩猎-采集社会中，在酋邦和原始国家里，宗教活动侧重于能够确保社会繁荣的仪式、献祭与图腾崇拜等实践。，然而，后来兴起的新教义与这些非常不同。如今，“个人超越”变得重要起来。 Human existence was believed to have a purpose, distinct from the material world, and it lay in a moral existence and control of one’s material desires through moderation, asceticism, and compassion. Central importance was placed on the idea that human beings have a soul that can survive the mortal world; only moderation of these material desires, asceticism, and moral behavior can guarantee the salvation of that soul in the afterlife. 人类的存在被认为具有目的，与物质世界有所不同，而这在于道德生活和通过节制、禁欲和怜悯而实现对自身物质欲望的控制。至关重要的是这样一种观念：人类拥有超越有朽世界的灵魂；只有对物质欲望的节制、禁欲和道德操守能够确保灵魂在死后得到救赎。 In a 2015 publication in Current Biology, researchers in the United States and France, led by Nicolas Baumard, compared the political and economic conditions at that time in order to determine what led to the Axial Age. The religious movements were too innovative to be accounted for through the emergence of large empires, which tended to have organized religions, but lacked the essential focus on asceticism and morality. 在《当代生物学》2015年所登的一篇文章中，以Nicholas Baumard为首来自美国和法国的研究者试图通过对比同时期的政治与经济情况来解释轴心时代出现的原因。当时的宗教运动高度创新，不能用大型帝国的出现来解释，后者趋向于形成有组织的宗教，但禁欲与道德操守却不是其本质重点。 Drawing on recent evidence from evolutionary psychology that suggested that affluence has a predictable effect on human motivation and reward systems, Baumard and colleagues hypothesized that increased affluence was the major factor in all three areas (the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys, the Easter Mediterranean, and the Ganges Valley). They used energy capture as a marker of affluence. Quantitative studies had already shown that, at the time, there was a sharp increase in energy capture occurring in exactly those three areas. 进化心理学的近期研究表明，富足的社会对人类的刺激与奖励系统有着可预测的影响，受此启发，Baumard和同事们假设财富增长是上述地区（长江和黄河流域、地中海东部及恒河流域）的重点因素。他们用能量获取作为富足的标识。量化研究已经表明，正是上述三个区域，当时在能量获取方面均曾有过突然的增长。 The researchers tested this link by developing and comparing statistical models in which the likelihood of the emergence of a religion was dependent on a single factor. The models either used the level of affluence or political success as a factor. Their results confirmed that affluence markers provide very good indicators for the emergence of axial religions, whereas political success markers did not. 研究者通过开发和比较统若干计模型来测试上述联系，每一种模型均将宗教兴起的可能性设置为依赖于单一因素。模型使用的因素或者是经济富裕水平，或者是政治成功。研究结果证实，经济富裕标志为轴心宗教的出现提供了非常好的指标，而政治成功标志则没有。 History would agree with these results as well; religious historians have noted that Axial Age movements did not appear in the largest states at the time (eg. Assyria, Egypt, Persia), but in smaller prosperous polities such as Greek city-states, Mahajanapada, and the most developed of Chinese states. However, the authors noted that a number of questions remain. More data on affluence and political success, both in these societies and in other non-Eurasian empires, is needed to test the robustness of the conclusions and would strengthen the model. 历史也会同意以上结论；宗教历史学家已经指出，轴心时代运动并没有在当时最大的国家（如亚述、埃及、波斯）出现，而是在类似希腊城邦、印度列国和最发达的中国诸侯等较小的繁荣政体中兴起。然而，文章作者们认为一些问题仍旧存在。为检验结论的稳健性并且巩固模型，需要有更多这些社会和其他非亚欧帝国在经济富裕和政治成功方面的数据。 In addition, though the analysis presented here suggests a general set of conditions, which led to the emergence of these religions, the more specific mechanism remains unknown. Was it a new class of priests or scholars who now had the time and resources to develop more abstract religions? Did economic prosperity lead to an increase in literacy among the believers? Did affluence promote a more cosmopolitan society in which generosity, universality, and self-control were more attractive? The answers to these questions may well explain some of our most basic current beliefs, and shed light on our shared history. 此外，尽管这些分析展示了一组导致上述宗教涌现的一般条件，更具体的机制则尚不清楚。是由于出现了新的祭司阶级或者学者，有时间和资源来发展更为抽象的宗教？经济繁荣是否令更多信徒识字？经济繁荣是否促成了一个更加趋于世界主义的世界，其中慷慨、普世性与自控更具吸引力？这些问题的答案可能有助于更好解释我们当下一些最基本的信仰，并照亮我们的共同历史。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Myth of Free-Trade Britain 自由贸易英国的神话 作者：John V.C. Nye @ 2003-3-03 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Library of Economics and Liberty，http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Nyefreetrade.html In the two and a half centuries since Adam Smith first articulated the basic case for free trade, no event has been more significant than the British conversion to open markets in the nineteenth century. In the fable that is now conventional wisdom, nineteenth century Britain turned its back on protection and chose to open its markets to the world. 在亚当·斯密首次清晰阐述了自由贸易基本原理后的两个半世纪里，没有比十九世纪英国转为开放市场更为重要的事件了。在如今已成传统智慧的寓言里，十九世纪的英国放弃了市场保护政策，转而选择向世界开放其市场。 A reform-minded British leadership, preaching the new gospel of free trade pushed their European confreres to open up their own markets, eventually ushering in an age of expansive commerce the likes of which the world had never seen—a precursor of late twentieth century globalization that was in many ways more open than anything before or since. 富有改革思想的英国领导人鼓吹自由贸易的新福音，推动了欧洲同仁们开放市场，最终开启了全世界前所未见的商业扩张时代——这是二十世纪晚期全球化的发端，许多方面比此前此后任何时期都要更加开放。 Yet this story has one big flaw: it's inconsistent with the facts. 然而这个故事有个巨大的缺陷：与事实不符。 As the story is usually told, British free trade came in the 1840s after a bitter political struggle to repeal the Corn Laws—a name given to a series of agricultural tariffs and quotas designed to keep farm prices high. This was quickly followed by rapid and dramatic reductions in duties on hundreds of imports. By the 1850s, all but a handful of commodities were admitted to Britain free of all duties. 这故事常说，在寻求废除《谷物法》——一系列旨在维持农产品高价的农业关税和配额政策的总称——的艰苦政治斗争后，英国的自由贸易在1840年代来临了。紧接着便是几百种进口物关税的迅速急剧减少。到1850年代，除少数例外，几乎所有商品都获准完全免税进入英国。 Sounds good, until you look closely at what products remained subject to high duties: those handful of items were the most contentious and some of the most highly taxed items that historically had been at the core of the mercantile debate in British history. In previous centuries they formed a large and significant fraction of British trade. 这听起来很好，但待你看清关税仍然高启的产品到底是什么之后，就不会这么想了：那少数商品是英国历史上最具争议的，而且属于赋税负担最高的商品之列，它们一直都处于商业争论的核心。在那之前的几个世纪里，这些商品构成了英国贸易的重要部分。 Free trade should mean just that: free trade, with all goods admitted without duties, quotas, or restrictions. That was not British policy. They removed most tariffs but mostly on items in which they had a comparative advantage. In other words, they mostly removed tariffs on items for which Britain had little to fear in terms of competition or which were of trivial importance in overall trade. 自由贸易的内涵应该是：所有商品无关税、无限额、无限制的自由贸易。这可不是英国的政策。他们取消了大部分关税，但大部分都在他们有比较优势的产品上。换句话说，英国人主要取消了他们不惧任何竞争的产品的关税，或者在整体贸易中无足轻重的产品的关税。 Britain in the early 1800s had just passed through the Industrial Revolution and was the world's leading producer of cotton textiles and other industrial products. It took little courage to lower tariffs on British manufactures. It would be like Japan promoting free trade in the 1980s by arguing for lower tariffs on compact cars imported from America. Since Japan already made some of the world's best and most economical small cars, such a policy would have had very limited economic impact. Japan's lowering trade barriers in agriculture would have been substantially more important and would have run up against enormous political resistance. 十九世纪早期的英国刚经历工业革命，是棉纺织品和其他工业产品的世界领先生产者。降低英国制造品的关税并不需要多大勇气。这就像1980年代的日本，通过主张降低从美国进口的紧凑型汽车的关税来促进自由贸易。因为日本已经制造出世界上最好、最经济的小型汽车，这样的政策对经济的冲击非常有限。如果日本降低农业方面的贸易壁垒，其重要性会大大加强，也会遇到极大的政治阻力。 Nineteenth-century Britain had no comparative advantage in agricultural and foodstuffs. That is why the Corn Laws were initially so controversial. Consumers had a lot to gain from the state's permitting the import of grain, because the British were not the cheapest producers of grain, while British farmers had much to lose. Unfortunately, the British did little to modify the tariffs on other contentious items, goods which had made for the commercial equivalent of war. Of these goods, the most important and the most troublesome was wine. 十九世纪的英国在农业和食品上没有比较优势。这就是为何《谷物法》从一开始就备受争议。英国的消费者能从国家允许进口粮食中受益良多，因为英国人生产的粮食并不是最便宜的，而同时，英国农民则损失惨重。遗憾的是，英国人对其他有争议商品的关税少有改动，这些商品曾导致商战。在这些商品中，最重要且最棘手的就是葡萄酒。 But how important is wine? To answer that we need to go back to the 1600s. Britain in the mid-seventeenth century was a prodigious importer of wine, mostly French. 但是葡萄酒有多重要呢？回答这个问题我们要追溯到十七世纪。十七世纪中期的英国是葡萄酒的重要进口国，主要是法国葡萄酒。 So much so, in fact, that her trade balance was in the red, mostly because of trade with France and mostly because of French wine, spirits and a number of luxury goods. Attempts to limit these imports by restricting trade had mostly failed. Tariffs were levied but never so high as to reduce the imports drastically. But then came the wars. 如此这般，事实上，英国的贸易收支是呈赤字的，主要是源于跟法国的贸易，也就是法国葡萄酒、烈酒和诸多奢侈品导致的。通过限制贸易来减少这些商品进口的企图都失败了。关税一直在征收，但是从未高到能明显减少进口的程度。但是接着战争开始了。 Two major conflicts spanning a quarter century kept French wine—indeed, all French imports—out of the British market from 1689 to 1713. The Nine Years' War and the War of Spanish Succession led to hostilities between Britain and France and a complete breakdown in trade for this quarter century. 绵延1/4世纪的两场大型冲突让法国葡萄酒——实际上，所有的法国进口产品——在1689年到1713年间退出了英国市场。九年战争和西班牙王位继承战争导致了英法之间的敌对和长达1/4世纪的彻底贸易中断。 During this grape-challenged period, three interest groups derived enormous benefit from the embargo on France—the British brewing industry, British distillers (gin, etc.) and British interests in foreign producers of alcohol—most notably the shippers of Portuguese wine. Prior to the late 1600s, the British drank plenty of wine, mostly French, a little Spanish, but virtually nothing from Portugal. The wars of 1689-1713 gave the Portuguese allies the opportunity of ten lifetimes. 在这葡萄酒缺乏的时期，三个利益集团从对法禁运中获得巨额利益——英国发酵酒工业、英国蒸馏酒商（杜松子酒等）、外国酒商中的英国利益集团——最明显的就是葡萄牙葡萄酒的运货商。在十七世纪晚期之前，英国人饮葡萄酒颇多，大部分是法国进口的，加上一点西班牙进口的，但是几乎没有葡萄牙进口的。1689-1713年的战争让葡萄牙盟友获得了千载难逢的良机。 Beginning in 1703 a treaty was signed granting Portugal access to British markets for their wines—generally of a much lower quality than those of France, and often needing to be fortified with brandy or spirits in order to keep from going bad. The Methuen Treaty (as it was known) promised that Portuguese tariffs would always be at least a third lower than those of other nations, most especially France. 从1703年开始，一个允许葡萄牙人的葡萄酒进入英国市场的条约就签订了——这些葡萄酒质量普遍不及法国葡萄酒，并且经常需要添加白兰地或者烈酒来防止其变质。这个被称为《梅图恩条约》的协定，承诺葡萄牙人的关税会一直比其他国家低至少1/3，尤其是法国。 Of course, most of the Portuguese wine trade was dominated by British ships, merchants, and even vintners working in Iberia. The end of hostilities between Britain and France was seen as a grave threat to all these British interests, and vigorous lobbying by brewers, distillers, and the Anglo-Portuguese merchants stopped attempts to return to the period of open trade with the French. A bill to revive trade on prewar conditions between Britain and France was defeated in Parliament. 当然，大多数葡萄牙葡萄酒贸易都被英国船只、英国商人乃至在伊比利亚半岛的英国酿酒商所控制。英法之间敌对状态的结束被视为是对所有这些英国利益集团的巨大威胁，啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和英葡商人的大力游说阻止了重回英法开放贸易时代的企图。一项旨在恢复英法战前贸易状态的提案在议会被否决。 Even worse, tariffs were raised even higher throughout the eighteenth century. The result was that French exports of wine to Britain in the 1700s fell to less than 5% of the levels (measured by volume) that had prevailed in the 1600s. A twenty-fold decrease! The high taxes kept out all but the finest French products. 更糟的是，整个十八世纪的关税甚至更高了。结果就是十八世纪法国出口到英国的葡萄酒降到不足之前十七世纪水平的5%（以体积计）。减少了二十倍！高关税驱逐了所有法国产品，除了最好的那些。 Indeed, the French were kept out of the British market for most of the period of the Industrial Revolution, when the middle classes emerged and middle class tastes developed. Only the rich had access to the very finest clarets of Bordeaux. Cheap wine was simply not worth importing. And the British brewers, distillers, and merchant shippers never had it better. One historian has remarked that absent war and protection, the Gin Age1 might never have come into existence. 事实上，在工业革命的大多数时期，当中产阶级出现并且中产品味得到发展时，法国产品都是被挡在英国市场之外的。只有富人才能找到最好的波尔多红葡萄酒。便宜的葡萄酒根本不值得进口。英国啤酒商、蒸馏酒商和运货商从未提高这些劣质葡萄酒的品质。一位历史学家曾说，若没有战争和保护政策，杜松子酒时代（脚注1）可能根本就不会出现。 These assorted tariffs on wine and other consumables—which Adam Smith had condemned for their inefficiency in the eighteenth century—remained at the core of British protection in the nineteenth, when trade was supposedly made free. Though claiming to have moved to open markets, the British hung on to tariffs that were of long standing, and that moreover, prevented much progress from being made in bilateral treaty negotiations. France was not about to sign a bilateral commercial treaty if Britain was unwilling to compromise on wine and spirits. 十九世纪，在这个人们认为贸易已变得自由的时期，这一系列对葡萄酒和其他消费品的关税——亚当·斯密在十八世纪就谴责过其低效——仍然是英国保护政策的核心。虽然声称已转变为开放市场，英国人还是坚持长期存在的关税，而且此举还阻止了双边条约谈判的进展。如果英国在葡萄酒和烈酒上不愿意妥协，法国就不会签署双边商务协定。 Figure 1. Average Tariffs in the U.K. and France, 1820–1913 图1.英国和法国的平均关税，1820-1913 [From: A. Imlah, 1958 Economic Elements of the PaxBritannica, New York; and M. Levy-Leboyerand F. Bourguignon, 1985L'Economie Francaise au XIXesiecle,Paris.] [来源：A. Imlah，1958，“不列颠治世”中的经济元素，纽约；M. Levy-Leboyer和F. Bourguignon，1985，十九世纪的法国经济，巴黎] Britain preached the gospel of free trade and France was cast in the role of the sinner, but there was little truth in this stereotype. France did have more protected products than England did but the average level of French tariffs (measured as total value of duties divided by total value of imports, cf. Figure 1) was actuallylower than in Britain for three-quarters of the nineteenth century.2 In other words, tariffs had a smaller impact on French trade than British duties had on Britain's trade. 英国是自由贸易新福音的布道者，而法国则被铸为罪人的角色，但是这种刻板偏见里并没有多少事实。法国确实比英格兰有更多的受保护产品，但是法国关税的平均水平（以关税总值除以进口总值衡量，如图1）在十九世纪3/4的时间里实际上比英国要低（脚注2）。换句话说，关税对法国贸易的影响要比英国关税对于英国贸易的影响小。【编注：这一比较方法存在严重问题：它体现不出那些因税率过高乃至无利可图的贸易，或者被非关税壁垒禁止了的贸易，因而无法准确反映贸易自由度，比如在极端情况下，某国以零关税开放一项小规模贸易，同时禁止其他所有贸易，此时该指标为零，但贸易显然极度不自由，所以它必须结合其他指标才有意义。不过，它确实揭示了当时英国的关税率是非常高的。】 The French, while eschewing free trade, and openly rejecting the Anglo doctrine of open markets, actually succeeded in making their trade more liberal and more open than that of the more vocal British. The master of this was Napoleon III—Bonaparte's nephew—who throughout the 1850s promoted the most radical liberalizing reforms of the French economy, all the while insisting that France was only interested in moderate reform. 法国人虽然避开自由贸易并且公开拒绝英国人的开放市场学说，但是它实际上却成功使其贸易比鼓噪发声的英国人更加自由和开放。这过程的主导是拿破仑三世——波拿巴的侄子——他在整个1850年代都在推动对法国经济最激进的自由化改革，却一直坚称法国只对温和改革有兴趣。 Indeed, it was not British unilateral tariff reduction that moved the world to freer trade. Despite the belief that is still common today that British exhortation opened the doors to European free trade in the late 19th century, it was the 1860 Treaty of Commerce, promoted by the Napoleon III and concluded between Britain and France, that really ushered in the age of nineteenth century "globalization". British demands for unilateral tariff reduction usually fell on deaf ears. 事实上，并不是英国的单方面关税削减使得世界贸易更加自由。尽管认为十九世纪末英国的呼吁打开了欧洲自由贸易之门的观点现在仍很普遍，但其实是1860年《商贸条约》才真正开启了十九世纪的“全球化”时代，该条约由拿破仑三世推动，在英法之间缔结。英国提出的单方面降低关税要求通常无人理睬。 Doctrinaire free traders and economic theorists opposed the use of commercial treaties since they felt that unilateral reductions were the most efficient policies for all countries. While correct in the abstract, such claims did little to overcome political resistance to trade liberalization in most countries. On the other hand, unwillingness on the part of the British to lower wine tariffs killed early trade negotiations with both France and Spain. 教条主义的自由贸易者和经济理论家反对使用商业条约，因为他们认为单方面降低关税对所有国家来说都是最有效的政策。尽管理论上是正确的，但这种主张在大多数国家却很少能克服政治阻力，实现贸易自由。另一方面，部分英国人不情愿降低葡萄酒关税的态度已经早早地扼杀了该国与法国及西班牙的贸易协商。 When the British finally decided to moderate their wine tariffs, Britain and France successfully concluded a treaty in 1860 which dramatically changed the landscape of European commerce. Politicians throughout Europe—who had till then resisted all pressure to liberalize trade—suddenly became fearful of being left out of a trade pact that united the two great European powers. The result was that the other major European powers quickly signed bilateral treaties with Britain and France as well. 当英国最终决定将葡萄酒关税调整到适度水平时，英法才在1860年成功缔结了条约，这极大地改变了欧洲商业的形势。全欧洲的政治人物——不久前还抗拒贸易自由化的压力——突然开始担心被遗落在连接欧洲两大势力的贸易协定之外。结果就是，其他欧洲大国也迅速地与英法签署了双边条约。 Since these treaties were all Most Favored Nation treaties—whereby concessions to one party meant extending such concessions to all the others—not just France and Britain, but by 1870 nearly all of Europe including the German states, Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and so on were integrated into a highly open trading market. 由于这些条约都是最惠国待遇条约——给予一方特权就意味着要给所有相关方特权——所以不仅法国和英国，到1870年几乎全欧洲，包括日耳曼各邦、西班牙、俄罗斯、荷兰、丹麦和瑞典等，都被整合进了一个高度开放的贸易市场里。 In many ways, Europe was freer than today, partly because the gold standard made capital extremely mobile, and because limitations in border control made immigration and the free movement of labor easy in practice despite differing rules across the continent. 在很多方面，那时欧洲都比现在更加自由，部分原因是金本位让资本极具流动性，还有边境控制有限使得移民和劳工的自由活动实际上比较容易，尽管欧洲大陆有各种不同的规定。 What politicians do and say are often quite different. That hasn't changed. Indeed, though there is much talk about globalization and unfettered trade, there is no country in existence today whose policies come anywhere near the ideal of free trade. 政治人物的言行往往不相一致。这一点从未改变。确实，虽然现在有很多关于全球化和自由贸易的讨论，今天还没有哪个国家的政策在任何方面能接近自由贸易的理想状态。 Goods and services do flow vigorously throughout the globe, but most countries suffer from a mix of import duties and non-tariff barriers such as quotas, unnecessary inspection rules and a bewildering variety of regulations that make it impossible for any of us to benefit fully from the specialization possible in a truly open world economy. 虽然产品和服务在全球频繁流通，但是大多数国家都承受一系列的进口关税和非关税壁垒，比如配额、不必要的检查规则和诸多令人困惑的条例，这些让我们所有人都不可能从真正开放的世界经济可能带来的专业化中充分受益。 But more importantly, the example of Britain and France in the 1800s challenges us to rethink and reanalyze the relationship between trade policy and growth. The story of Britain and France shows how easy it is to be misled by the fables of conventional wisdom. The fact that Britain was not as free trade as it claimed doesn't make the case for protectionism. The British did lower their tariffs, and in the last third of the nineteenth century, Britain did fully liberalize trade and benefited from the change. 但更重要是，十九世纪英国和法国的例子能让我们重新思考和重新分析贸易政策和增长之间的关系。英法的故事说明了我们是多么容易被传统智慧的寓言所误导。英国并不像它所声称的那样贸易自由，但这一事实并不证明贸易保护主义有足够的理由。英国人确实降低了本国的关税，而且在十九世纪最后1/3的时间里完全实现了贸易自由化，并从中受益。 But the interesting and unexamined story is France. Nineteenth-century France doesn't fit our preconceptions. France was in fact, closer to the free trade ideal than the British for much of the century, and did in fact do well, raising the standard of living of the average worker from the 1850s onward. 但有关法国的有趣故事却经不起检验。十九世纪的法国并不符合我们的偏见。事实上，法国在十九世纪大部分时间都比英国更接近自由贸易的理想境界，而且确实做的不错，从1850年代起提高了普通工人的生活水平。 Footnotes 脚注 1.The Gin Age is often used to describe the early to middle years of the eighteenth century, when the consumption of hard liquor grew substantially, and the consumption of gin, especially among the poor, was seen to be a national problem. 1.“杜松子酒时代”经常被用来描述十八世纪早期到中期的时间，这段时期烈酒的消费量大增，而杜松子酒的消费，尤其是在穷人之中，被认为是全国性的问题。 2.Readers interested in a more technical discussion of the problem of tariff levels in the nineteenth century may consult Nye, 1991, "The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France," Journal of Economic History and S. Dakhlia and J.V.C. Nye, "Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income," working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114. 2.对十九世纪关税水平问题的更多技术细节感兴趣的读者可以查阅Nye于1991年在《经济史杂志》上发表的论文“自由贸易英国和堡垒法国的神话”和S. Dakhlia与 J.V.C. Nye的论文“‘不列颠治税’：十九世纪关税和英国国家收入”，获取论文的网址为http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=282114。 * John Nye is Associate Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. This piece is adapted from a book in progress to be released under the title, War, Wine, and Taxes. John Nye是华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校的经济学和历史学副教授。这篇文章摘编自《战争，葡萄酒和税收》，该书即将要出版。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The V.C.s of B.C. 公元前的风险投资 作者：Adam Davidson @ 2015-8-27 译者：淡蓝 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：The New York Times Magazine，http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-vcs-of-bc.html One morning, just before dawn, an old man named Assur-idi loaded up two black donkeys. Their burden was 147 pounds of tin, along with 30 textiles, known as kutanum, that were of such rare value that a single garment cost as much as a slave. Assur-idi had spent his life’s savings on the items, because he knew that if he could convey them over the Taurus Mountains to Kanesh, 600 miles away, he could sell them for twice what he paid. 清晨，天刚蒙蒙亮，老汉Assur-idi给两头黑驴装上了货。货物有147磅锡，另有30件叫作kutanum的纺织品，kutanum异常稀有，一件衣物就相当于一个奴隶的价钱。这些货花光了Assur-idi 一生的积蓄，因为他知道，只要越过托罗斯山脉运到600英里外的卡内什，这些东西能卖出双倍的价钱。 At the city gate, Assur-idi ran into a younger acquaintance, Sharrum-Adad, who said he was heading on the same journey. He offered to take the older man’s donkeys with him and ship the profits back. The two struck a hurried agreement and wrote it up, though they forgot to record some details. Later, Sharrum-­Adad claimed he never knew how many textiles he had been given. Assur-idi spent the subsequent weeks sending increasingly panicked letters to his sons in Kanesh, demanding they track down Sharrum-Adad and claim his profits. 在城门口，Assur-idi遇到了个年轻的熟人Sharrum-Adad，说正好他也要去同样的地方。Sharrum-Adad主动提出可以带着老人的驴子们同行并把赚的钱带回来。于是俩人匆匆拟定了协议并写了下来，但他们忘记了记录一些细节。后来，Sharrum-­Adad声称，他当时并不清楚到底有多少件纺织品。在随后的几周里，日益恐慌的Assur-idi不断给他远在卡内什的儿子们写信，要求他们追踪Sharrum-Adad并收回应当属于他的利润。 These letters survive as part of a stunning, nearly miraculous window into ancient economics. In general, we know few details about economic life before roughly 1000 A.D. But during one 30-year period — between 1890 and 1860 B.C. — for one community in the town of Kanesh, we know a great deal. 这些保存下来的信件，为我们打开了深入了解古代经济的一扇窗，它令人惊叹、近乎奇迹一般。总体而言，我们对大约公元1000年之前的经济生活知之甚少。但是对这个近30年的时间段——公元前1890 到1860 之间——在卡内什镇的社会经济情形，我们却知之甚多。 Through a series of incredibly unlikely events, archaeologists have uncovered the comprehensive written archive of a few hundred traders who left their hometown Assur, in what is now Iraq, to set up importing businesses in Kanesh, which sat roughly at the center of present-day Turkey and functioned as the hub of a massive global trading system that stretched from Central Asia to Europe. 在一系列令人难以置信的考古发现中，考古学家们找到了周详的文书档案，里面记录了数百个离开家乡亚述（在今日伊拉克）的商人，在异乡卡内什做起了进口生意。当时的卡内什大致位于今日土耳其的中心，是从中亚延伸到欧洲的巨大全球贸易体系的中枢。 Kanesh’s traders sent letters back and forth with their business partners, carefully written on clay tablets and stored at home in special vaults. Tens of thousands of these records remain. One economist recently told me that he would love to have as much candid information about businesses today as we have about the dealings — and in particular, about the trading practices — of this 4,000-year-old community. 这些卡内什商人与贸易伙伴之间的来往信件，被小心仔细地写在泥板上，并储存在家里的地窖中。数以千记的这种记录因此得以保存。一位经济学家最近跟我说，要是他对当今的真实商业信息、特别是有关贸易的信息的了解，能有我们对这个距今4000年的社会的交易的了解一样多，那就好了。 Trade is central to every key economic issue we face. Whether the subject is inequality, financial instability or the future of work, it all comes down to a discussion of trade: trade of manufactured goods with China, trade of bonds with Europe, trade over the Internet or enabled by mobile apps. For decades, economists have sought to understand how trade works. Can we shape trade to achieve different outcomes, like a resurgence of manufacturing or a lessening of inequality? Or does trade operate according to fairly fixed rules, making it resistant to conscious planning? 贸易是我们所面临的所有重要经济问题的中心点。无论是不平等、金融不稳定、或是工作前景等问题，一切都可以归结到对贸易的讨论上：与中国的制造品贸易，与欧洲的债券交易，以及通过互联网或移动应用的交易。几十年来，经济学家尝试弄清贸易是如何运转的。能否通过塑造贸易来实现不同的结果，比如复苏制造业，或是减少不平等？还是说，贸易运转遵循着固定的规则，根本就抵制有意的计划？ Economists, creating models of trade, have faced a challenge, because their data have derived exclusively from the modern world. Are their models universal or merely reflections of our time? It’s a crucial question, because many in our country would like to change our trading system to protect American jobs and to improve working conditions here and abroad. The archives of Kanesh have proved to be the greatest single source of information about trade from an entirely premodern milieu. 创建贸易模型的经济学家们因仅能从现代世界里获得数据而面临着挑战。他们的模型是普适的抑或仅是我们这个时代的反映？这个问题很关键，因为我国的很多人想改变我们的贸易体制，以保护美国的就业或是改善国内国外的工作环境。卡内什档案被证实是有关发生于彻底的前现代环境中的贸易的最大单一信息来源。 In a beautifully detailed new book — ‘‘Ancient Kanesh,’’ written by a scholar of the archive, Mogens Trolle Larsen, to be published by Cambridge University Press later this year — we meet dozens of the traders of Kanesh and their relatives back home in Assur. Larsen has been able to construct family trees, detailing how siblings and cousins, parents and spouses, traded with one another and often worked against one another. We meet struggling businessmen, like Assur-idi, and brilliant entrepreneurs, like Shalim-Assur, who built a wealthy dynasty that lasted generations. 在一本精美详细的新书《古代卡内什》中，我们将遇到数十个返回亚述的卡内什商人和他们的亲戚。此书由研究该档案的学者 Mogens Trolle Larsen著述，今年晚些时候将由剑桥大学出版社出版。 从Larsen描绘出的家族中，可以看到兄弟姊妹和他们的表亲之间，父母和夫妻之间相互交易的细节，以及时常针锋相对的细节。我们遇到了奋争的商人，比如Assur-idi，和杰出的企业家，比如建立了延续数代的富裕世家的Shalim-Assur。 In 2003, while covering the war in Iraq, I traveled to many ancient archaeological sites; the huge burial mounds, the carvings celebrating kings as relatives to the gods, all gave the impression of a despotic land in which a tiny handful of aristocrats and priests enjoyed dictatorial control. But the Kanesh documents show that at least some citizens had enormous power over their own livelihoods, achieving wealth and power through their own entrepreneurial endeavors. 2003年，在报道伊拉克战争时，我走访了很多古代考古遗址；其中有巨大的坟岗，为礼赞作为神灵亲属的国王而做的雕刻，所有这些给人一种很深的印象：在这片专制的土地上，只有极少数贵族和祭司享受着独裁统治。但是卡内什的文件显示，至少有一些市民对他们自己的生计拥有巨大的支配力，并通过他们自己创业的努力获得了财富和实力。 The details of daily life are amazing, but another scholar, Gojko Barjamovic, of Harvard, realized that the archive also offered insight into something potentially more compelling. Many of the texts enumerate specific business details: the price of goods purchased and sold, the interest rate on debt, the costs of transporting goods and the various taxes in the many city-states that the donkey caravans passed on the long journey from Assur to Kanesh. Like most people who have studied Kanesh, Barjamovic is an Assyriologist, an expert in ancient languages and culture. Earlier this year, he joined some economists, as well as some other Assyriologists and archaeologists, on a team that analyzed Kanesh’s financial statistics. 日常生活的细节是令人惊叹的，不过另一位来自哈佛的学者，Gojko Barjamovic，意识到这些档案还提供了一些有可能更引人注目的东西。其中许多文本列举了具体的贸易细节：某一货物买进和卖出的价格，借债的利息，货物运输费用，以及驴队在亚述与卡内什之间长途跋涉中所经过的众多城邦的不同税费。像许多研究卡内什的人一样，Barjamovic是一个亚述学家，是古代语言和文化专家。今年早些时候，他加入了一支由经济学家、其他亚述学家和考古学家的组成的团队，对卡内什的金融统计数据进行分析。 The picture that emerged of economic life is staggeringly advanced. The traders of Kanesh used financial tools that were remarkably similar to checks, bonds and joint-stock companies. They had something like venture-capital firms that created diversified portfolios of risky trades. And they even had structured financial products: People would buy outstanding debt, sell it to others and use it as collateral to finance new businesses. The 30 years for which we have records appear to have been a time of remarkable financial innovation. 团队分析描绘出的经济生活画面先进得令人惊奇。卡内什的商人们使用的金融工具，与当今的支票、债券和股份公司十分相似。他们有些东西就像风险投资公司，创建了针对有风险贸易的多元化投资组合。他们甚至有结构性理财产品：人们会购买未偿债务，将其卖给他人或用于抵押以便为新业务融资。我们手里有记录的这30年表现为一个有着卓越的金融创新的时期。 It’s impossible not to see parallels with our own recent past. Over the 30 years covered by the archive, we see an economy built on trade in actual goods — silver, tin, textiles — transform into an economy built on financial speculation, fueling a bubble that then pops. After the financial collapse, there is a period of incessant lawsuits, as a central government in Assur desperately tries to come up with new regulations and ways of holding wrongdoers accountable (though there never seems to be agreement on who the wrongdoers are, exactly). The entire trading system enters a deep recession lasting more than a decade. The traders eventually adopt simpler, more stringent rules, and trade grows again. 与我们自己最近的过去相比，我们不可能看不到其中的相似之处。在档案记录的30年里，我们看到一个建立在实体货物上的经济——银、锡、纺织品——转变为一个建立在金融投机上的经济，这样的转变助长了泡沫，随后又突然破灭。金融崩溃后，一度曾充满了诉讼。亚述的中央政府不顾一切地试图拿出新的法规和办法，来迫使那些肇事者承担责任（虽然关于谁是真正的肇事者似乎从未有过一致意见）。整个贸易体系陷入了一个10年以上的严重衰退。商人们最终采取了更简单、更严格的规则，由此贸易再次增长。 In 1962 A.D., as our modern era of globalization was just beginning, the economist Jan Tinbergen — who would later share the first Nobel in economic science — noted something curious: Trade within and between countries followed a mathematical formula. He called it the Gravity Model, sort of an E=mc2 for global business. It comes with an imposing formula: Fij = G(Mi x Mj)/Dij. Which, simplified, means that trade between two markets will equal the size of the two markets multiplied together and then divided by their distance. (The model gets its name from its mathematical similarity to the equation in physics that describes gravitational pull.) 公元1962年，正当我们这个现代的全球化时代开始之际，经济学家Jan Tinbergen——后来的第一届诺贝尔经济学科学奖获得者之一——注意到一些令人好奇的事：国内贸易和国际贸易遵循一个数学公式。他称之为引力模型，有点像全球贸易的E=mc2。这是个气势宏伟的公式：Fij = G(Mi x Mj)/Dij。简单的说，就是两个市场之间的贸易等于两个市场规模相乘然后除以两个市场之间的距离。（该模型因与物理学中描述引力的公式数学上相似而得名） Since Tinbergen first published his finding, others have tested it on thousands of trade routes around the modern world, as well as on trade records going back a couple of centuries. In extreme cases (for example, trade between warring countries or during periods of sanction), the formula can fail to predict the volume of trade, but over all the model works extremely well. It’s a striking finding, suggesting that, for all the debate about trade agreements and currency rates, import duties and World Trade Organization disputes, trade tends to follow its own rules. 自Tinbergen 首次公布他的发现以来，很多人已在数以千计的环绕现代世界的贸易路径、以及几个世纪以来的贸易记录上对之进行了验证测试。在极端情况下（例如交战国之间或是制裁期间的贸易），这个公式在预测贸易量时可能失败。但总的来说，该模型运作十分出色。这是个令人震惊的发现，这表明，不管人们在有关贸易协定和货币汇率、进口关税和世贸组织争端等方面如何争论不休，贸易仍趋于遵循其自身的法则。 Economists were drawn to the Kanesh archive because it offered an unprecedented chance to see how well the Gravity Model applied in an economy entirely unlike our own. This was trade conducted via donkey, through a land of independent city-states whose legal and cultural systems were totally dissimilar to any we know. But still, the model held up: Ali Hortacsu, a University of Chicago economist on the Kanesh team, says that the trade figures between Assur and Kanesh matched the formula almost perfectly. ‘‘It was a very nice surprise,’’ he told me. 卡内什档案之所以吸引经济学家们，是因为它提供了一个前所未有的机会，来验证当引力模型应用到一种完全不同于现有情形的经济体时的契合程度。这种贸易借助驴进行，经过一片由独立城邦组成的地区，这些城邦的法律和文化体系与我们所知的一切均完全不同。只是，这样的贸易情况下该模型仍然屹立：Ali Hortacsu，卡内什团队的芝加哥大学经济学家，说亚述和卡内什之间的贸易数据，与上述公式匹配得近乎完美。“是个十分不错的惊喜。”他跟我说。 The Gravity Model may seem like bad news for people who want the economy to be fairer. I have spoken to countless activists and concerned friends who see global trade as a choice, something a specific set of politicians and businesses decided to impose on the rest of us, through all those confusing acronymic trade deals: GATT, Nafta and (probably, soon) the T.P.P. To me, though, the model suggests that these deals have less impact than either their boosters or their detractors imagine. 对那些想要更多经济公平的人们来说，引力模型可不像是啥好消息。我曾跟无数将全球贸易视为一种选择的活动家和关心公共事务的朋友们交谈过，他们认为全球贸易只是特定政治家或者企业决定通过一堆令人迷糊的首字母缩写贸易协定：GATT、Nafta 和（可能很快就签订的）T.P.P.而强加给其余人的。然而对我来说，这个模型表明：此类协定对于贸易的影响，比支持者或是批评者想象的都要少。 There is a natural tendency for different regions to trade at fairly predictable volumes. However much politicians might want to change those outcomes, they have only crude tools at their disposal: They can stop trade through blockades, slow it through tariffs or try to jump-start it with trade agreements. What they can’t do, at least not reliably, is shape it with precision to achieve their preferred outcomes. 不同地区之间以基本可以预测的总量发生贸易，这是一种自然趋势。无论政治家多么想要改变其结果，他们都只有一些很原始的工具可用：通过封锁停止贸易，通过海关放缓贸易，或是通过贸易协议助推贸易。他们无法做到的，或者至少无法确切做到的，是有目的的精确塑造贸易以达到他们期望的结果。 But despite trade’s intractability, we still have a lot of room to address the impact of trade on our economy. Trade with China and other nations may be all but inevitable, but growing wealth inequality and disproportionate pain (blue-collar workers losing their jobs, investors reaping a fortune) are not. There is much we can do within our borders to address the unequal impact of global trade. We can educate children for more competitive careers, train displaced workers for new industries or even directly compensate those who fail to benefit from global trade. 尽管贸易难以驾驭，我们仍然有巨大的空间来处理贸易对我们经济的影响。与中国或者其他国家的贸易可能不可避免，但可避免的是日益增加的财富不均和不成比例的痛苦（蓝领工人失业，投资者获得利益）。在国界以内解决全球贸易导致的不平等，我们可做的事太多了。我们可以教育自己的孩子，以利于其从事更具有竞争力的职业，培训下岗工人进入新产业，甚至可以直接赔偿那些在全球贸易中丧失利益的人们。 That, in fact, is what the people of Assur did, 4,000 years ago, as Barjamovic pointed out to me. Trade brought enormous wealth to a dozen or so families. But rather than hold all of it for themselves, the wealthy were made to redistribute a high percentage of their earnings through taxes and religious foundations that used the money for the public good. This way, the wealth created by trading with Kanesh made nearly everybody — at least every free citizen — better off. 就像Barjamovic向我指出的那样，这些其实就是亚述人在4000年前所做的。贸易给数十个家庭带来了巨大的财富。但富人们并未将所有的财富据为己有，通过交税和交纳用于公益的宗教基金，他们将自己所获财富中的很大比例进行了再分配。以这种方式，通过与卡内什进行贸易而创造的财富，几乎使每一个人——至少是每一个自由城民——都过得更好了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

An interview with Josiah Ober, author of The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece 《古典希腊的崛起与衰落》作者Josiah Ober访谈 作者：Debra Liese @ 2015-5-13 译者：尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对：Pyro，小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源：Princeton University Press网址，http://blog.press.princeton.edu/2015/05/13/an-interview-with-josiah-ober-author-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-classical-greece/ The period considered classical Greece (roughly the 4th through 5th century BC) had a profound effect on Western civilization, forming the foundations of politics and philosophy, as well as artistic and scientific thought. Why did Greece experience such economic and cultural growth—and why was it limited to this 200-year period? Josiah Ober, Professor of Political Science and Classics at Stanford University and author of The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, took the time to explain the reasons behind Greece’s flourishing, and what its economic rise and political fall can tell us about our own world. 古典希腊时期（大约公元前4-5世纪）对于西方文明有着深远的影响，构建了其政治、哲学和艺术科学思想的基础。为何希腊经历了这样的经济增长和文化进步——而又为何仅限于这200年？斯坦福大学政治学和古典学教授、《古典希腊的崛起与衰落》一书作者Josiah Ober解释了希腊繁荣背后的原因，以及其经济崛起和政治衰落给我们现代世界的启示。 What was the rise of classical Greece and when and why did it happen? 什么是古典希腊的崛起？它于何时因何而发生？ JO: Basically, sustained economic growth lead to the rise of Ancient Greek civilization. JO：基本上，是持续的经济增长导致了古希腊文明的崛起。 At the Early Iron Age nadir, in ca. 1000 BCE, the Greek world was sparsely populated and consumption rates hovered near subsistence. Some 650 years later, in the age of Aristotle, the population of the Greek world had increased at least twenty-fold. During that same period, per capita consumption probably doubled. 在早期铁器时代的最低谷，约公元前1000年，希腊世界人烟稀少，消费水平徘徊在生存线附近。到了约650年之后的亚里士多德时代，希腊世界的人口已经增长了至少20倍，人均消费大约翻了一倍。 That rate of growth is far short of modern rates, but it equals the growth rate of the two standout societies of early modern Europe: Holland and England in the 16^th to 18^th centuries. Historians had long thought that the Greek world was impoverished and its economy overall static –which of course made Greek culture (art, philosophy, drama, and so on) seem that much more “miraculous.” 那时的增长速度远低于现代，但是已经相当于现代欧洲早期的两个杰出社会——16到18世纪荷兰和英格兰。历史学家曾在很长时间里以为希腊世界相当贫困，其经济总体上停滞不前，这当然让希腊文化（艺术、哲学、戏剧等）看起来更加“不可思议”。 But, thanks to the recent availability and quantification of a huge mass of data, drawn from both documentary and archaeological sources, we can now trace the amazing growth of the Greek economy, both in its extent (how many people, how much urbanization, and so on), and in terms of per capita consumption (how well people lived). 但是，多亏了近来文献和考古提供的大量量化数据，我们现在可以追溯希腊经济的惊人增长，不论是在规模方面（人口数量，城市化程度等等）还是人均消费方面（人民生活水平）。 So the rise of the Greek world was predicated on sustained economic growth, but why did the Greek economy grow so robustly for so long? 所以希腊世界的崛起立基于持续的经济增长之上，但是为什么希腊经济能保持强劲增长如此之久？ JO: In the 12th century BCE, the palace-centered civilization of Bronze Age Greece collapsed, utterly destroying political and social hierarchies. Surviving Greeks lived in tiny communities, where no one was rich or very powerful. JO：在公元前12世纪，以宫殿为中心的希腊青铜时代文明崩溃，彻底摧毁了社会和政治的等级制度。幸存的希腊人生活在小社区之内，没有人特别富裕或特别强大。 As Greece slowly recovered, some communities rejected attempts by local elites to install themselves as rulers. Instead, ordinary men established fair rules (fair, that is, for themselves) and governed themselves collectively, as political equals. Women and slaves were, of course, a very different story. 随着希腊慢慢复元，一些社区拒绝让当地精英自立为统治者。相反，普通男性们建立起公平的规则（公平仅限于他们男性自己），并在相互间政治平等的基础上实行集体自我治理。当然，女人和奴隶又是另一回事了。 But because these emerging citizen-centered states often out-competed elite-dominated rivals, militarily and economically, citizenship proved to be adaptive. Because participatory citizenship was not scalable, Greek states stayed small as they became increasingly democratic. 但是，因为这些以公民为中心的新兴城邦通常在军事和经济上胜过由精英统治的竞争对手，所以它证明了公民制度是很有适应性的。由于直接参与式的公民制度无法规模化，希腊城邦在日益民主化的同时仍保持着较小的规模。 Under conditions of increasingly fair rules, individuals and states rationally invested in human capital, leading to increased specialization and exchange. The spread of fair rules and a shared culture across an expanding Greek world of independent city-states drove down transaction costs. Meanwhile competition encouraged continuous institutional and technological innovation. 在规则日趋公平的条件下，个人和城邦均愿意对人力资本进行理性投资，从而促进了专业化和交易。在由独立城邦组成的不断扩张的希腊世界中，公平规则的传播和共同文化的建立，降低了交易成本。同时，竞争鼓励了制度和技术的持续创新。 The result was 700+ years of world-class efflorescence, marked by exceptional demographic and per capita growth, and by immensely influential ideas, literature, art, and science. But, unlike the more familiar story of ancient empires, no one was in running the show: Greece remained a decentralized ecology of small states. 其结果就是超过700年的世界级繁华盛世，史无前例的人口和人均（收入）增长，以及影响巨大的思想、文学、艺术和科学，是这一时期的标志。但是，与我们更熟悉的那些古代帝国的故事不一样的是，这齣大剧无人主导：希腊仍然是个分散的小国生态。 So what about the fall? 那衰落又是怎么回事？ JO: There are two “falls”–one political and one economic. The economic fall is the decline of the Greek economy from its very high level in the age of Aristotle to a “premodern Greek normal”of low population and near-subsistence consumption levels with the disintegration of the Roman empire. That low normal had pertained before the rise of the city-state ecology. After the fall, it persisted until the 20^th century. JO：衰落体现在两个方面：一个是政治上，一个是经济上。经济上的衰落是指希腊经济从亚里士多德时代的高水平，随着罗马帝国解体而下降到“前现代希腊标准”——低人口和徘徊在生存线的消费水平。那种低标准还是属于城邦生态兴起之前的。在衰落之后，这种状态一直持续到20世纪。 But we also need to explain an earlier political fall. Why, just when the ancient Greek economy was nearing its peak, were Philip II andAlexander (“the Great”) ofMacedon able to conquer the Greek world? And then there is another puzzle: Why were so many Greek city-states able to maintain independence and flourishing economies in the face of Macedonian hegemony? 但是我们还需要解释一下更早的政治衰落。当古希腊经济接近巅峰时，为什么马其顿的菲利普二世和亚历山大大帝能够征服希腊世界？随之而来的是另一个疑问：为什么这么多的希腊城邦在面对马其顿霸权时能够保持独立和经济繁荣？ The city-states were overtaken by the Macedonians in part because human-capital investments created a class of skilled and mobile experts in state finance and military organization. Hired Greek experts provided Philip and Alexander with the technical skills they needed to build a world-class army. 马其顿人夺取这些城邦的部分原因，是前述人力资本投资创造出了一个富有流动性的专业阶层，他们精通城邦财政和军队组织。通过雇佣这些希腊专家，菲利普和亚历山大大帝得到了他们创建世界级军队所急需的技术。 But meanwhile, deep investments by city-states in infrastructure and training made fortified cities expensive to besiege. As a result, after the Macedonian conquest, royal taxes on Greek cities were negotiated rather than simply imposed. That ensured enough independence for the Greek cities to sustain economic growth until the Roman conquest. 但与此同时，城邦在基础设施和训练上的大力投入，也使得攻占这些坚固设防的城邦代价高昂。因此，在征服了希腊城邦之后，马其顿人并不是单方面强加，而是通过谈判来确定希腊城邦的皇家税。这确保了希腊城邦的独立性，维持了其经济增长，直至被罗马人征服。 What does the economic rise and political fall of classical Greece have to tell us about our own world? 古典希腊的经济崛起和政治衰落对我们现代世界有何启示？ JO: The new data allows us to test the robustness of contemporary theories of political and economic development. In the classical Greek world, political development was a primary driver of economic growth; democracy appears to be a cause rather than simply an effect of prosperity. JO：新的数据让我们可以检验当代政治和经济发展理论的可靠性。在古典希腊时代，政治发展是经济发展的原始驱动力；民主看来是繁荣的原因而不只是结果。 The steep rise and long duration of the city-state ecology offers a challenge to neo-Hobbesian centralization theories of state formation, which hold that advanced economic and political development requires the consolidation of centralized state power. The comparatively low rate of ancient Greek income inequality, along with the high rate of economic growth, suggests that the negative correlation of sustained growth with extreme inequality, observed in some recent societies, is not a unique product of modernity. 这种城邦生态的迅速兴起和经久不衰，对关于国家构建的新霍布斯主义的中央集权化理论提出了挑战，该理论认为先进的经济和政治发展，需要中心化的国家权力的巩固。古希腊相对程度较低的收入不均和高速的经济增长并存，表明了在一些现代社会观察到的持续增长和极端不均等之间的负相关并不是现代化的独特产物。 Finally, the history of the ancient Greek world can be read as a cautionary tale about the unanticipated consequences of growth and human capital investment: It reveals how innovative institutions and technologies, originally developed in the open-access, fair-rules context of democratic states, can be borrowed by ambitious autocrats and redeployed to further their own, non-democratic purposes. 最后，古希腊世界的历史可以被解读为关于增长和人力资本投资的意外结果的警世寓言：它揭示了最初起源于对外开放，规则公平的民主政体的制度和技术创新，是如何被有野心的独裁者借用，并应用于推动他们自己的非民主目标的。 How did you get interested in the topic of rise and fall –was it just a matter of “Edward Gibbon envy”? 你是怎么对崛起与衰落这个主题感兴趣的？仅仅是由于“嫉妒Edward Gibbon”？ 【译注：Edward Gibbon是《罗马帝国衰亡史》的作者】 JO: Gibbon is amazing, as a prose stylist and historian. But the origin of my project actually goes back to a quip by a senior colleague at the very beginning of my career: “The puzzle is not why the Greek world fell, it is why it lasted more than 20 minutes.”Twenty-five years ago (and fifteen years after my colleague’s quip), the historical sociologist W.G. Runcimanclaimed that classical Greece was “doomed to extinction”because the Greek city-states were, “without exception, far too democratic.” JO：Gibbon作为一个散文家和历史学家非常优秀。但是我课题的起源要追溯到我职业生涯刚开始时一个资深同事的玩笑话：“费解的不是为何希腊世界会衰落，而是它竟然撑过了20分钟。”25年前（我同事那句玩笑话的15年后），历史社会学家W.G. Runciman声称古典希腊“注定要灭亡”，因为希腊城邦“无一例外，都过于民主。” True enough: the classical Greek world eventually went extinct. But then, so did all other ancient societies, democratic or otherwise. The Greek city-state culture lasted for the better part of a millennium; much longer than most ancient empires. I’ve long felt that I owed my colleague a solution to his puzzle. This book is an attempt to pay that debt. 确实，古典希腊最终灭亡了。但是其他所有古代社会，无论是否民主，也都灭亡了。希腊城邦文化持续了好几百年，比大多数古代帝国都要更长。我一直感觉我欠那个同事一个答案，我想用这本书试试。 Josiah Oberis the Mitsotakis Professor of Political Science and Classics at Stanford University. His books include Democracy and Knowledge, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens, The Athenian Revolution, and Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens(all Princeton). He lives in Palo Alto, California. Josiah Ober是斯坦福大学政治学和古典学Mitsotakis讲席教授。他的著作包括《民主与知识》，《民主雅典的政治异议》，《雅典的革命》，《民主雅典的群众和精英》（均由普林斯顿大学出版社出版）。他现居于加利福尼亚州的帕罗奥多市。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

超越邓巴数#4：婚姻粘结剂 辉格 2015年9月29日 通过组织宗族和强化父权而扩展父系继嗣群，终究会因亲缘渐疏和协调成本剧增而遭遇极限，西非约鲁巴宗族社区和华南众多单姓村显示了，其规模最多比狩猎采集游团高出一两个数量级（几百到几千人），若要组织起更大型社会，便需要借助各种社会粘结剂，将多个父系群联合成单一政治结构，而婚姻是最古老也最常见的粘结剂。 婚姻的粘结作用，在前定居社会便已存在，列维－斯特劳斯发现，相邻的若干继嗣群之间建立固定通婚关系，以交表婚之类的形式相互交换女性，是初民社会的普遍做法；持久通婚维系了群体间血缘纽带，促进语言上的融合，共享文化元素，让双方更容易结盟共同对抗其他群体，即便发生冲突也比较容易协商停战，所有这些，都有助于它们建立更高一级的政治共同体。 此类固定结对通婚关系广泛存在于澳洲土著和北美印第安人中，其最显著特点是，它是群体本位而非个体本位的，缺乏定居者所熟悉的从个体出发的各种亲属称谓，有关亲属关系的词汇，所指称的都是按继嗣群（或曰氏族，常由图腾标识）、性别和辈份三个维度所划分出的一个组别，婚姻必须发生在两个特定组别之间。（值得留意的是：这种模式常被错误的称为“群婚制”，实际上，其中每桩婚姻都发生在男女个体之间，并非群婚。） 典型的做法是，两个父系群结对通婚，澳洲西北阿纳姆地的雍古人（[[Yolngu]]），20个氏族分为两个被人类学家称为半偶族（[[moiety]]）的组，每个半偶族的女性只能嫁到另一个半偶族；这确保了夫妻双方的血缘不会比一级表亲更近；周人姬姓与姜姓的持续频繁通婚，或许也是此类安排的延续；不那么系统化的交表婚则更为普遍，几乎见于所有古代社会。 以此为基础，还发展出了更复杂的结对安排，比如西澳的马图苏利纳人（[[Martuthunira]]）采用一种双代交替的半偶族模式，运作机制如下图所示： 【图一】 每个半偶群的奇数辈和偶数辈又分成两个组，一个半偶群的奇数辈，只能和对方的奇数辈婚配。这样就把婚姻限制在了同辈之间，避免了娶到姨母或外甥女的可能性。这同时也起到了拉远夫妻血缘的效果，因为交表兄妹的亲缘系数比舅甥或姨甥小了一半；周人宗法制中的昭穆轮替标记法，或许也有类似用意。 为将更多单系继嗣群拉进固定通婚关系，从而扩大内婚群的规模，有些族群还采用了一种单向循环通婚圈，例如缅甸山区从事游耕的克钦人（Kachin）和苏门答腊种植水稻为生的巴塔克人（[[Batak]]），由三到六个父系群组成循环圈：A群男性从B群娶妻，B从C娶，C从A娶；这种安排不仅进一步拉远了夫妻血缘，也提升了内婚群的遗传多样性。 结对通婚关系促进群体间合作的效果十分显著，雍古人活动范围内的各种自然物——土地、河流、鱼种、山岩等等——都被赋予了和某一半偶族相同的名称，这显然是两组群体就共同领地内自然资源分配所达成的一种协调，而这一成就是在完全缺乏高级政治结构的条件下达成的。 也正是借助循环通婚圈，克钦人才可能在文化和种族成分极为复杂横断山区建立多种族复合社区，在埃德蒙·利奇（[[Edmund Leach]]）调查的一个500人社区（帕朗）中，六种语言并存，仍可维持大致和平，对外关系中还表现出了相当团结性。 然而正如澳洲土著的经验所显示，固定通婚关系本身并不能带来高级政治结构，而充其量只能产生一个文化共同体，即有着粗略地理边界、较强血缘纽带、具有一定文化同质性的血缘/文化群（[[ethnic group]]），澳洲人始终缺乏游团以上的部落结构，因而澳洲也是唯一一个英国殖民者未能与当地土著达成土地协议的殖民地，因为找不到适当的谈判和签约对手。 若要借助婚姻粘结剂建立更大社会，还需要父系群本身的升级改造（如我在上一篇所述），以及群内的等级分化和政治权力崛起，这一点，我们需要从群体角度转到个体角度才能看清。 在一个缺乏人身与财产权普遍保护，离开熟人小群体便毫无安全可言的霍布斯世界，姻亲关系对个人利益极为重要；当你在群体之外寻求合作与帮助时，它常常也是唯一的来源；当你为狩猎、作战，或采集某些重要材料（比如石料或盐），或从事交易，或战败逃亡，而需要穿越相邻群体的地盘时，若在该群体中无人为你提供担保和庇护，是极其危险的；所以，在霍布斯世界，陌生群体间的商品交易普遍采用“沉默交易”的方式，以避免近距离接触。 姻亲是个人将其互惠合作网络延伸至群体之外的主要途径，重要的是，它带来的一些合作关系是群内合作所无法替代的，包括：拓宽安全活动范围和信息来源，饥荒时的求助对象，发生群内冲突时的临时避难所，交易对象，和第三方建立合作或交易关系的中间人或担保人，等等。 马林诺夫斯基在其名著《西太平洋的航行者》中描述的特罗布里恩岛民的库拉圈交易是个很好的例子，分布在方圆数百英里海域的数十个岛屿的居民中，存在一个奇特的双向礼物流动圈，该圈每一环由来自不同群体的一对成员结成，在专门为此而举行的聚会上，双方隆重交换礼物——臂镯和项圈，用于仪式性场合上佩戴——，两种礼物总是朝相对方向流动，有数千人卷入这一交换活动。 乍看起来，库拉交换纯属仪式，毫无实用价值，其实不然，正是这种仪式性交换，为结成库拉对的两个人创造了定期拜访对方社区、参与其聚会和双方友好交往的机会，在库拉交换中拜访对方的人，都会随船携带一些实用商品用于交易，与我们主题有关的要点是：一个人库拉伙伴通常都是他的姻亲。 看上面的介绍，你可能会觉得这些群体和睦友好，实际上并非如此，库拉关系只是让群体间交往能够发生（否则根本无法和平接触），但平时关系仍然充满敌意和恐惧，远远谈不上友好；为了克服恐惧、确保自己不受对方伤害，拜访者在整个交易旅程中会施行大量巫术，一位土著对人类学家如此描述其即将拜访的库拉伙伴：

多布人没我们这么好；他们凶恶，他们是食人族！我们来多布时，十分害怕。他们会杀死我们。但看到我们吐出施过法术的姜汁，他们的头脑改变了。他们放下矛枪，友善的招待我们。

当拜访船队接近对方岛屿时，他们反复念诵类似这样的咒语：

尔之凶恶消失，消失，噢，多布男人！ 尔之矛枪消失，消失，噢，多布男人！ 尔之战争油彩消失，消失，噢，多布男人！ ……

另一个故事则说明了在这种恐惧氛围中，拥有库拉伙伴的价值：一个叫Kaypoyla男人，航行中搁浅于一个陌生岛屿，同伴全部被杀死吃掉，他被留作下一顿美餐，夜晚侥幸逃出，流落至另一岛上，次日醒来发现自己被一群人围着，幸运的是，其中一位是他的库拉伙伴，于是被送回了家。 在特罗布里恩，一位酋长的地位很大程度上体现在众多妻子（常多达十几个）带给他的庞大姻亲网络上，通过与妻子兄弟的互惠交换，常积累起显示其权势的巨大甘薯库存，姻亲网络也让他在库拉圈中地位显赫，普通人一般只有几位库拉伙伴，而酋长则有上百位；人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔（[[Timothy Earle]]）也发现，在部落向酋邦的发展过程中，酋长们建立其权势地位的手段之一，便是通过精心安排婚姻来建立姻亲网络。 对于社会结构来说，重要的是，姻亲关系的上述作用，被宗族组织和父权成倍放大了，并且反过来强化了后两者；若没有紧密的宗族关系，一位男性从一桩婚姻中得到的姻亲就十分有限，岳父加上妻子的兄弟，但宗族的存在使得婚姻不仅是一对男女的联合，也是两个家族的联合，随着繁复婚姻仪式的逐步推进，双方众多成员的关系全面重组，并在此后的周期性节庆聚宴上得到反复强化，这也是为何在具有宗族组织的社会中，婚姻和生育仪式发展得那么繁杂隆重。 类似的，假如没有强父权，男性从婚姻中得到的姻亲数量，便主要取决于妻子数量，而在高度平等主义的前定居社会，多妻较少见，而且妻子数较平均（但也有例外，比如澳洲，但那里的高多妻率同样伴随着强父权和老人政治），但父权改变了姻亲性质，在控制了子女婚姻之后，长辈取代结婚者本人而成为姻亲关系的主导者，这样一来，一位男性能够主动建立并从中获益的姻亲关系，便大大增加了。 宗族和父权不仅拓展了个人发展姻亲的潜力，而且拉大了个体之间和家族支系之间社会地位的不均等；在游团一级的小型简单社会中，尽管个体境遇和生活成就也有着巨大差异，但这差异主要表现为后代数量，很少能积累起可以传给后代的资源，而现在，由于宗族使得姻亲关系成为两个家族的广泛结合，因而这一关系网成了家族支系的集体资产，而同时，由长辈安排子女婚姻，使得这一资产具有了可遗传性，这就好比现代家族企业在晚辈接班时，长辈会把整个商业关系网络连同有形资产一起传给他。 借助长辈所积累的资源，成功者的后辈从人生起步时便取得了竞争优势，这便构成了一种正反馈，使得父系群中发达的支系愈加发达，最终在群体内形成地位分化；这一分化也将自动克服我在上一篇中指出的父系群扩张所面临的一个障碍：当家长联盟向更高层次发展时，由于共祖已不在世，由谁来代表更高级支系？很明显，拥有压倒性权势的支系家长更有机会成为族长。 当若干相邻群体皆发生地位分化之后，权势家庭之间便倾向于相互通婚，并逐渐形成一个上层姻亲网络；这个圈子将带给其成员众多优势：从事甚至垄断跨群体的长距离贸易，在冲突中获得权势姻亲的襄助，影响联盟关系使其有利于自己；经过代代相袭，权势强弱不再只是个人境遇的差别，而成了固有地位，权势者逐渐成为固化成一个贵族阶层。 和族长联盟一样，权势姻亲联盟也可将若干群体连结为一个政治共同体，但效果更好；由于血缘随代际更替而逐渐疏远，单系群不可避免处于持续的分支裂变之中，成吉思汗的儿子们还能紧密合作，孙子辈就开始分裂，但还勉强能召集起忽里勒台，到第四代就形同陌路了；相反，姻亲关系则可以每代刷新，保持亲缘距离不变。 阿兹特克的事例很好的演示了，姻亲联盟在维系一个大型共同体时是如何起作用的；阿兹特克由数百个城邦组成，其中三个强势城邦联合成为霸主，垄断城邦间贸易，并向各邦索取贡赋，国王一般与友邦王室通婚，并通常将其正妻所生嫡女嫁给友邦王族或本邦高级贵族，而将庶女嫁给较低级贵族或有权势的家族首领，类似的，贵族在本邦同侪中通婚，也将庶女嫁给有权势平民，或战功卓著的武士，相比之下，下层平民的婚姻则限于所居住社区，每个社区由若干家族构成内婚群。 这样，在社会结构的每个层次上，国王或贵族通过正妻和嫡子女的婚姻而构建了一个维持该层次统治阶层的横向姻亲联盟，而通过庶妻和庶子女的婚姻则构建了一个纵向姻亲网络，将其合作关系和控制力向下延伸，如此便搭建起一个组织紧密的多层次政治结构，其中每个层次上的姻亲网络有着不同的覆盖范围，因而其合作圈规模皆可限于邓巴数之下。 类似景象在前现代欧洲也可看到，王室在全欧洲联姻，贵族在整个王国通婚，而普通人的婚嫁对象则很少越出邻近几个镇区；得益于阶层分化，婚姻为多层社会同时提供了横向和纵向的粘结纽带，然而，高级政治结构在创造出文明社会之前，许多功能仍有待开发，也还需要其他粘结剂，我会在后面的文章里逐一考察。  

【2015-11-03】 @海德沙龙 《宗教自由的丧钟已经敲响？》三年前，丹佛市一位糕点师拒绝为一对同性恋人制作婚礼蛋糕，这对恋人随后向科罗拉多州政府投诉，州政府民权委员会文化专员随即裁定糕点师歧视同性恋，勒令其更改店铺规定，并从此之后须为同性婚礼制作蛋糕，否则将面临罚款， 糕点师不服并开始了多年诉讼…… @whigzhou: [[The Good Wife]]里看到过这个故事，原来是真事，荒谬至此。 @whigzhou: 在这个玻璃心时代，直男基督徒是唯一可以摁住头随便冒犯的群体，也是活该，谁叫他们没长颗玻璃心呢～ @whigzhou: 最近听到的另一个案子荒谬程度雷同，华盛顿州一家药店基于宗教理由拒绝出售堕胎药，结果被法院勒令改正，官司打到第九巡回法院，输了 http://t.cn/RUJjMVf @whigzhou: 看来很多人没有意识到这个案子与一般区别对待消费者案子的不同之处：此案所涉及服务直接与店主信仰抵触，这不是饭店拒绝同性恋就餐，或服装店拒绝卖衣服给同性恋 @whigzhou: 更贴切的类比：一位基督徒开了家打字店，有人来打一份伊斯兰经文，里面充斥着对基督教的诋毁之词，他有权拒绝这笔生意吗？ @whigzhou: 或者你开了家印刷厂，有人要印一万份宗教宣传小册子，其中内容与你的宗教信仰直接抵触，你可以拒绝这笔生意吗？ @sonicblue3: 药店的公共属性是要高一些。不过要是不接受明的暗的政府补贴的话，那我觉得老板想卖啥不想卖啥也无所谓 @Stimmung: 这就是为什么政府补贴不该存在，政府一补贴你，你就归政府管了// @whigzhou: 而且暗的补贴也算，连拒绝都拒绝不掉～