The Human Breast Milk Market 母乳市场 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-08-24 译者：陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/08/the-human-breast-milk-market.html The market for human breast milk starts with demand from hospitals for pre-term infants. The American Academy of Pediatrics writes: 母乳市场起源于医院早产儿对母乳的需求。美国儿科学会写道：

The potent benefits of human milk are such that all preterm infants should receive human milk. ... Mother’s own milk, fresh or frozen, should be the primary diet, and it should be fortified appropriately for the infant born weighing less than 1.5 kg. If mother’s own milk is unavailable despite significant lactation support, pasteurized donor milk should be used. “母乳具有诸多益处，所有早产儿都应当接受母乳喂养。……母亲自身的乳汁，无论新鲜的还是冷冻的，都应该是婴儿的主要食物，而且对于出生时体重低于1.5千克的婴儿，应该在其饮用的母乳中适当添加营养成分。如果在相当程度的泌乳帮助之后，母亲仍无法给婴儿提供母乳，那么就应当使用他人捐献的经过巴氏杀菌法消毒的母乳。”

The demand then continues with a belief that human milk might have properties that are useful to adults as well. Some biomedical companies are involved in research, and there is apparently a subculture of bodybuilders who believe that consuming human milk helps them build muscle. 有些人相信，母乳的某些特性可能对成年人同样有益，这使得对母乳的需求进一步扩大。一些生物医药企业参与了对母乳的研究，同时，在健美圈有种亚文化，认为母乳有助于增强肌肉。 What are the sources of supply to meet this demand? One source is donations that happen through the 19 locations of the Human Milk Banking Association of North America, as well as other donor organizations. But there are also for-profit companies emerging like Prolacta Bioscience and International Milk Bank which buy breast-milk, screen and test it, sometimes add additional nutrients, and then sells it to hospitals. There are also websites that facilitate buying and selling breast-milk. 有哪些供给源来满足这些需求呢？来源之一是北美母乳银行协会19个驻地以及其他一些捐赠机构所得到的捐赠。但现在也出现了一些新兴的营利性公司，如“Prolacta生科”和“国际母乳银行”，他们收购母乳，在进行筛选、测试（有时还会添加一些额外的营养成分）后出售给医院。此外，还有一些方便母乳买卖的网站。 This market is one where prices are fairly clear: the for-profit companies typically offer moms $1.50- $2 per ounce for breast milk, and end up selling it to hospitals for roughly $4 per ounce. Quantities are less clear, although for a rough sense, the nonprofit Human Milk Banking Association of North America dispensed 3.1 million ounces of breast milk in 2013, while a single for-profit firm, Prolacta, plans to process 3.4 million ounces this year. 这是个价格相当透明的市场：那些营利性企业通常为每盎司母乳向妈妈们支付1.50-2美元，最后以大约每盎司4美元的价格出售给医院。但市场上母乳的数量就没那么透明了，不过从以下数据中可以得到一个大致的概念，非营利组织北美母乳银行协会在2013年配发了310万盎司母乳，然而，今年仅Prolacta一家营利性企业就计划处理340万盎司。 Any product that involves a mixture of donated and paid-for elements is going to be a source for controversy, and when the product involves fluids from the human body, the controversy is going to ramp up one more level. Here are some of the issues: 任何同时涉及捐赠和有偿元素的产品都会引来争议，而且，当产品包含来自人体的液体时，争议便会再上一个层次。相关问题包括： Many people have a gut-level reaction that human breast milk for neonatal children is the sort of product that should be run on the basis of donations. But two concerns arise here, as enunciated by Julie P. Smith in "Market, breastfeeding and trade in mother's milk," which appears earlier this year in the International Breastfeeding Journal (10:9). 许多人都有一种直觉反应，他们认为提供给新生儿的母乳应当是一种基于捐赠的产品。但正如Julie P. Smith在今年早些时候发表于《国际母乳喂养期刊》（10:9）上的文章《母乳的市场、喂养和交易》所表明的，这会带来两个问题。 As Smith writes: "Human milk is being bought and sold.Commodifying and marketing human milk and breastfeeding risk reinforcing social and gender economic inequities. Yet there are potential benefits for breastfeeding, and some of the world’s poorest women might profit. How can we improve on the present situation where everyone except the woman who donates her milk benefits?" There are a number of ideas to unpack here. Smith写道：“人们买卖母乳。将母乳和母乳喂养商品化、市场化，存在加剧社会不平等和性别间经济不平等的风险。然而，母乳喂养有潜在的益处，而且一些世界上最贫困的妇女也可能因此获益。现状是，除了捐赠母乳的女性外，人人都会受益，我们如何才能改善这种状况？”这里面有一些观点可供探讨。 First, a substantially expanded supply of breast-milk would improve the health prospects of pre-term infants. Donated breast-milk doesn't seem able to fill the need. 首先，母乳供给的大量增加将提升早产儿的预期健康水平。捐赠的母乳数量似乎供不应求。 Second, it's not clear why mothers should be expected to pump, save and donate breast milk for free, when the rest of the health care system is getting paid. In some practical sense, the social choice may come to paying the health care system to address the sicknesses that infants experience from a lack of breast milk, or paying mothers for breast milk. 第二，你很难解释清楚，为何在医疗保健系统的其余参与者都能得到报酬的情况下，母亲们却要挤出乳汁保存起并进行捐赠，而这一切都是无偿的。从实践意义上说，社会选择可能是：要么向医疗保健系统付钱，以解决婴儿因缺乏母乳而导致的疾病，要么向提供母乳的母亲们付钱。 Third, there are real issues here involving social inequalities. Earlier this year in Detroit, a company called Medolac announced a plan to purchase breast milk. It received a hostile open letter with a number of signatories, starting with the head of the Black Mothers' Breastfeeding Association. The letter read, in part: 第三，这里涉及了社会不平等这个大问题。今年早些时候，在底特律，一家名为Medolac的公司宣布了一项收购母乳的计划。它收到了一封联名反对的公开信，牵头者是黑人母亲母乳喂养协会负责人。信中提到：

[W]e are writing to you in the spirit of open dialogue about your company’s recent attempts to recruit African-American and low-income women in Detroit to sell their breast milk to your company, Medolac Laboratories. We are troubled by your targeting of African-American mothers, and your focus on Detroit in particular. We are concerned that this initiative has neither thoroughly factored in the historical context of milk sharing nor the complex social and economic challenges facing Detroit families. ... Around the country, African-American women face unique economic hardships, and this is no less true in our city. In addition, African American women have been impacted traumatically by historical commodification of our bodies. Given the economic incentives, we are deeply concerned that women will be coerced into diverting milk that they would otherwise feed their own babies. “我们本着公开对话的精神写这封信，谈谈贵公司近期的计划，你们在底特律招募非洲裔美国女性和低收入女性，让其出售母乳给贵公司——Medolac实验室。你们把目标对准非洲裔美国母亲，并且专注于底特律地区，这些让我们倍感困扰。我们担心这一举措既没有全面考虑母乳共享的历史背景，也没有考虑到底特律家庭所面临的复杂的社会和经济挑战。……全国非洲裔美国女性都面临着巨大的经济困难，我们这座城市中的情形也是如此。此外，历史上对我们非洲裔美国女性身体的商品化，已经让我们遭受过巨大的创伤。我们对女性将出于经济利益而被强迫出售本将用来喂养自己孩子的母乳深感担忧。”

Medolac withdrew its proposal. Without getting into the language of the letter ("commodification" and "coercion" are not being used in the sense of an economics class), the basic public health question remains: Given the very substantial health benefits of breast milk for infants, can it make sense to offer mothers a financial incentive to sell their breast milk? Especially knowing that this incentive will have greater weight for mothers in lower income groups? Medolac收回了计划。不去深究这封信的措辞（“商品化”和“强迫”不是在经济学课堂里的意义上使用的），也还有基本的公共卫生问题：鉴于母乳对婴儿健康所起到的至关重要的作用，向母亲们提供金钱上的激励，让她们出售母乳是否合理呢？尤其是当知道这些激励将会对较低收入群体的母亲们产生更大的影响时，其合理性又如何呢？ Fourth, the economic choices involves in breastfeeding are inevitably intertangled with other choices that face nursing mothers. Julie Smith points out that there are a variety of incentives to encourage early weaning of infants, like the promotion of infant formula and baby food products, combined with laws and rules affecting how quickly new mothers will re-enter the workforce. Reconsidering these incentives in a broader context, with an eye to encouraging breastfeeding in all contexts, could potentially lead both to more breastfeeding and to greater supplies of donated breast milk. Smith writes; 第四，母乳喂养中的经济选择不可避免地与摆在哺乳期母亲们面前的其他选择复杂地交织在一起。Julie Smith指出，有多种不同因素鼓励母亲们给婴儿提早断奶，例如婴儿配方奶粉和婴儿食品的广告，同时，还有影响产后母亲重回劳动力市场的法律法规。在更全面的背景下反思这些激励，同时着眼于全面鼓励母乳喂养，这可能会在带来母乳喂养增加的同时，也带来母乳捐献供给的增加。Smith写道：

‘The market’ fails to protect breastfeeding, because market prices give the wrong signals. An economic approach to the problem of premature weaning from optimal breastfeeding may help prioritise global maternity protection as the foundation for sustainable development of human capital and labour productivity. It would remove fiscal subsidies for breast milk substitutes, tax their sale to recoup health system costs, and penalise their free supply, promotion and distribution. By removing widespread incentives for premature weaning, the resources would be available for the world to invest more in breastfeeding. “在保护母乳喂养问题上市场失灵是因为市场价格给出了错误的信号。解决过早断奶与最优母乳喂养时间这一问题的经济学方法可能有助于优先考虑全球母道保护，将它作为人力资本及劳动生产力可持续发展的基础。这一方法将消除对母乳替代品的财政补贴，对其征收消费税以补贴医疗系统的成本，并对免费供应、促销和分发母乳替代品的行为进行处罚。通过消除普遍的过早断奶的激励因素，全社会的资源将被更多地用在母乳喂养投资上。”

Finally, in an internet-based economy that excels at connecting decentralized suppliers and buyers, there is no chance that the paid market for breast milk is going away. At least some of the market--say, the demand from body-builders--is likely to remain shadowy. But for neonatal infants and research purposes, it is useful for the bulk of the breast-milk market to come out of the shadows so that it can be subject to basic regulations, assuring that the breast milk isn't adulterated by cow's milk, microbes, or worse. 最后，在一个以互联网为基础的经济体系中——它特别善于将分散的供应商和买家联系起来——购买母乳的市场不可能会消失。至少一部分市场很可能仍会处于灰色地带，比如来自健美者的需求。然而对新生儿和研究而言，让母乳市场的主体走出阴影是有益的，这样它就能受到基本的监管，以确保母乳中不被掺入牛奶、微生物或者其他更不该加入的物质。 If you'd like another example of the potential for economic markets in bodily fluids, I discuss the arguments concerning how to increase the supply of blood in "Volunteers for Blood, Paying for Plasma" (May 16, 2014). A proposal for using the recently dead as a source of blood donations is here. 如果你想了解有关体液的潜在经济市场的另一个例子，我在《无偿献血，有偿使用血浆》（2014年5月16日）一文中对如何增加血液供应的各种观点做了讨论。一个关于采用新近死亡者的血液作为捐献来源的提议在此：http://www.realclearscience.com/blog/2015/07/a_simple_solution_to_end_blood_shortages.html。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

     

The Changing Patterns Of U.S. Immigration: What The Presidential Field should Know, And You 美国移民格局的变迁：你和总统候选人都该知道的事 作者：Joel Kotkin @ 2015-8-11 译者：陈小乖（@lion_kittyyyyy) 校对：带菜刀的诗人（@帶菜刀的詩人_），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2015/08/11/the-changing-patterns-of-u-s-immigration-what-the-presidential-field-should-know-and-you/ Public concern about illegalimmigration, particularly among older native-born Americans, as well as the rising voting power of Latinos, all but guarantees that immigration is an issue that will remain at the forefront in the run-up to the 2016 elections. 美国公众（尤其是较为年长的土生土长美国人）对非法移民问题的关切，以及拉丁裔投票权的日益增长，这两种因素几乎可以肯定让移民问题成为2016年大选的关键议题。 Nor is this merely a right-wing issue, as evidenced in the controversy over “sanctuary cities”; even the progressive Bernie Sanders has expressed concern that massive uncontrolled immigration could “make everybody in America poorer.” 这不仅仅是右翼所面临的问题，就像在“避难所城市”【译注：指那些有着旨在庇护非法移民政策的城市】的争议中所表明的那样；甚至进步派Bernie Sanders也表达了对大量不受限制的移民将“让在美国的每个人都变得更穷”的担忧。 Yet despite the political heat, there is precious little dispassionate examination of exactly where immigrants are coming from, and where in the U.S. they are headed. To answer these questions, we turned to demographer Wendell Cox, who analyzed the immigration data between 2010 and 2013 for the 52 metropolitan statistical areas with populations over a million. 然而，尽管它是政治热点，但对移民们究竟从哪里来，又去向美国何处的冷静分析却屈指可数。为了回答这些问题，我们咨询了人口学家Wendell Cox，他分析了2010至2013年52个人口超过百万的都市统计区的移民数据。 One would think listening to the likes of Donald Trump that the country is awash with hordes of unwanted newcomers from Mexico and Central America. But sorry, Donald, the numbers show a changing picture in terms of who is coming, as well as the places that they choose to settle. 人们可能会听信类似Donald Trump的言论，说这个国家充斥着大量来自于墨西哥和中美洲的不受欢迎的移民。可是，对不起，Donald，有关哪些人来到这个国家，以及他们选择去哪儿定居，数据揭示出的是一幅不断变化着的图景。 移民比重最大的美国城市 第一名：迈阿密，佛罗里达州 国外出生人口：226万 占总人口的比例，2013年：38.8% 第二名：圣何塞，加州 国外出生人口：719,460 占总人口的比例，2013年：37.5% 第三名：洛杉矶，加州 国外出生人口：439万 占总人口的比例，2013年：33.2% 第四名：旧金山，加州 国外出生人口：134万 占总人口的比例，2013年：29.7% 第五名：纽约，纽约州-新泽西州-宾夕法尼亚州 国外出生人口：569万 占总人口的比例，2013年：28.5% 第六名：圣迭戈，加州 国外出生人口：761,580 占总人口的比例，2013年：23.7% 第七名：休斯敦，德克萨斯州 国外出生人口：142万 占总人口的比例，2013年：22.6% 第八名：华盛顿，哥伦比亚特区 国外出生人口：131万 占总人口的比例，2013年：22.0% 第九名：拉斯维加斯，内华达州 国外出生人口：440,866 占总人口的比例，2013年：21.7% 第十名：河滨-圣伯纳迪诺，加州 国外出生人口：932,747 占总人口的比例，2013年：21.3% Perhaps due to Mexico’s stronger economy and lower birthrates, Mexicans are no longer as dominant in the ranks of new immigrants as in the last decade. Mexico is still the single largest place of origin of new immigrants, but from 2010 through 2013, Mexican migration to the U.S. dropped 17.7% to an average of 140,266 a year, according to data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 可能由于墨西哥经济状况改善及出生率下降等原因，墨西哥人在新移民中所占比重不像2001-2010年间那么高。虽然墨西哥仍然是新移民的最大单一来源地，但美国国土安全部的数据显示，在2010-2013年间，移民来美国的墨西哥人数量下降到了平均每年140,266人，降幅17.7%。 Meanwhile the inflow from Asia has increased: immigration from China is up 25.8% to 74,458 a year, and 10.7% from India to 65,336 a year. Asia now equals the Americas as a source of new immigrants, with each accounting for 40% of the annual total. 与此同时，亚洲移民的数量有所增加：来自中国的移民增加了25.8%，达到每年74,458人，来自印度的移民增加了10.7%，达到每年65,336人。目前，亚洲已成为和美洲份量相当的新移民来源，他们各占每年移民总数的40%。 European immigration, once the mainstay of growth for the U.S., fell 32% from 2010 to 2013 to an average of 91,000 a year, surpassed by the number of African immigrants, which has soared 29.6% to 98,000 annually. 曾一度是美国增长支柱的欧洲移民人数在2010-2013年下降到了平均每年91,000，降幅32%。欧洲移民人数已被非洲移民赶超，后者在此期间猛增29.6%，达到每年98,000人。 America’s new African population tends to be well-educated — considerably more than the national average: they are more than 60% more likely to have a graduate degree than other Americans. The vast majority are fluent in English and fully one-third hold management or professional level jobs. 美国的新非洲移民人口往往受过良好教育——显著高于全国平均水平：他们拥有硕士学历的比例比其他美国人高出60%。其中绝大多数人都能说流利的英语，同时，足足三分之一的人拥有管理或专业职位。 Not surprisingly, they are generally doing well in their new country. The places where they settle — notably New York, greater Washington, Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth — will likely benefit from their presence in coming years. 不出所料，他们在新的国家里都干得不错。今后几年，这些移民定居的地方可能会显现出他们所带来的益处，尤其是纽约、大华府、休斯敦和达拉斯-沃思堡。 Just as Mexican and Asian immigration changed the ethnic geography of America, boosting economies and changing local culture, one can expect the Africans to do much the same in the coming years. 就像墨西哥和亚洲移民改变了美国的族群分布，促进了经济增长，改变了当地的文化，我们可以预期，未来几年非洲移民也会产生相同的效应。 The Largest And Fastest-Growing Immigrant Hubs 最大、发展最快的移民聚集地 The largest foreign-born communities in America reflect both size and longstanding immigrant populations. The leader remains the New York metropolitan statistical area, which was home in 2013 to 5.69 million people born elsewhere, following by Los Angeles with 4.3 million, Miami with 2.2 million, Chicago with 1.69 million and Houston with 1.39 million. 美国最大的那些国外出生者社群，不仅反映了移民的规模，还反映了其持久性。排在首位的依然是纽约都会统计区，2013年569万出生于别处的人安家于此，洛杉矶以430万人紧随其后，然后是迈阿密220万，芝加哥169万，休斯敦139万。 But a look at the metro areas with the fastest-growing foreign-born communities tells a different story, one of growing migration into the more interior and central parts of the country. In many ways, this reflects the attraction of areas with relatively low housing prices and buoyant local economies. In contrast, the economies of many traditional immigrant hubs like Los Angeles and Chicago have not done so well, while places in coastal California and near New York suffer from high housing prices. 但细看这些拥有发展最快的国外出生人口社群的都会区，会发现另一幅景象，其一是，越来越多的人迁移到美国的内陆和中部地区。这从许多角度反映出了那些具有较低房价和较高经济增速的地区的吸引力。相反，许多传统移民聚集地的经济表现则较差，如洛杉矶和芝加哥，而加州沿海地区和纽约附近则受到高房价的制约。 Pittsburgh ranks first for recent pace of growth, with a 17.4% jump in its foreign-born population to 89,000 from 2010 through 2013, almost four times the 4.3% national rate over the same span. The western Pennsylvania city has built a robust economy based on energy, medical services and technology. 在最近的移民人口增速排名中，匹兹堡位列第一，2010-2013年间17.4%的增速使其国外出生人口达到了89,000，几乎四倍于同期国内平均水平4.3%。能源、医疗服务和科技给这个西宾夕法尼亚州城市带来了稳健的经济增长。 Its housing prices are low — roughly a third those of the Bay Area based on median income — and the city is situated in an attractive setting with rolling hills. 当地的房价也较低——按收入中位数算，其房价大约仅为湾区的三分之一，此外，匹兹堡还坐落于连绵起伏的迷人山丘之中。 Pittsburgh is attracting both less educated immigrants from more expensive places, and also educated newcomers, notes demographer Jim Russell, some due to the strong universities in the area. 人口学家Jim Russell指出，匹兹堡不仅从高物价地区吸引来了没受过太多教育的移民，同时也吸引着受过良好教育的新移民，部分原因在于该地区有着高质量的大学。 Other surprising heartland destinations for immigrants include Indianapolis, whose foreign-born population expanded 14.3% in 2010-13 to 127,767, the second fastest rate of growth among the largest metro areas; Oklahoma City (third fastest, up 12.9% to 110,269); and Columbus, Ohio (up 9.8% to 139,562). Generally, these cities, like Pittsburgh, have strong economies, low housing prices and favorable state regulatory climates. 其他出人意料的内陆移民目的地还包括印第安纳波利斯，其国外出生人口在2010-2013年扩张了14.3%，达到127,767人，在所有大都会区移民人口增速中排名第二；俄克拉荷马市（增速排名第三，增长了12.9%，达到110,269人）；俄亥俄州的哥伦布（增长了9.8%，达到139,562人）。这些城市通常都像匹兹堡一样，拥有如下特征：经济强劲、低房价、所在州监管环境有利。 The Move South Continues 向南移动仍在继续 Until the 1970s, the South was an also-ran in immigration, with the exception of Florida. But today many of the fastest-growing foreign-born communities are in the South. These include still-recovering New Orleans, whose numbers of foreign born surged 12.4% in 2010-13 to 91,412, as well as Charlotte (up 11.2% to 225,673) and Austin (up 10.7% to 279,923). 1970年代之前，除了佛罗里达，南方一直是移民方面的落后者。但如今许多快速发展中的国外出生者社群都在南方。这些地方包括仍在复苏的新奥尔良，其国外出生人口在2010-2013年增长了12.4%，达到91,412人，还有夏洛特（增长了11.2%，达到225,673人）和奥斯丁（增长了10.7%，达到279,923人）。 This movement to the South in recent decades has changed the geography of the most immigrant rich parts of the country. Three of the 10 metro areas with the largest number of foreign born residents are in the south. Miami has some 2.26 million immigrant residents make up with 38.8% of its population, the highest proportion of any large metro area in the country. The Houston metro area has the fifth biggest foreign-born population, Dallas-Ft. Worth, the eighth. 最近几十年的向南移动改变了移民人口最密集地区在全国的地理分布格局。10个国外出生居民数量最多的都会区中，3个在南方。迈阿密拥有226万移民，占其总人口的38.8%，也是全国各都会区中移民比重最大的。休斯敦都会区在国外出生者数量上排第五，达拉斯-沃斯堡排第八。 The Texas metro areas, and their emerging southern counterparts, offer much of what the prospering Rust Belt cities also provide — strong broad-based economies and an affordable cost of living, particularly housing. Immigrants tend to prioritize home ownership and often work in thriving blue-collar fields such as manufacturing, logistics and construction. 德克萨斯州的都会区，以及其它新兴南方城市，提供了那些欣欣向荣的铁锈带城市【译注：铁锈带又称制造带、工厂带，系指以钢铁业为代表的美国传统重工业密集分布区，大致位于美国中部靠近大湖区东侧，包括纽约、宾夕法尼亚、西弗吉尼亚、俄亥俄、印第安纳、密歇根等州的部分地区。这些地方后来因美国制造业外移而衰弱，留下大量生锈工厂，因而得名。作者此处“欣欣向荣”一语应是指近年的移民热潮，上文提到的匹兹堡、印第安纳波利斯、俄克拉荷马市、哥伦布市，皆处于该地带。】所能提供的一切——强劲并且基础深厚的经济和低廉的生活成本，尤其是住房成本。移民倾向于把拥有住房所有权放在优先位置，他们通常就职于蓬勃发展的蓝领产业，比如制造业、物流业和建筑业。 Coastal Growth Follows The Economy 沿海的移民增长紧随其经济增长 The Atlantic and Pacific coasts have long dominated immigration, but there appears to be some subtle changes in this picture. Most big coastal metro areas have logged steady but below average growth of their foreign-born populations, including New York, with a 3.67% increase. (Note that even with relatively slow growth in percentage terms, New York added a net 208,800 immigrants, more than the total foreign-born populations of any of the four fastest growers.) 在移民方面，大西洋沿岸和太平洋沿岸长期占主导地位，但这一情况正在发生一些微妙变化。多数沿海大都会区进入了外国出生人口稳定但低于平均水平的增长状态，包括纽约，其增速为3.67%。（值得一提的是，虽然纽约的相对增速较慢，但其净移民人数的增加仍然达到了208,800人，超过了四个增速最快地区中任何一个的国外出生人口总数。） Some blue areas are doing much better in terms of growth rate, including Seattle (9^th), Boston (11^th) and San Jose (15^th). All tend to be expensive, but have done very well in the recovery, largely due to technology-related growth. 一些蓝色地区【译注：蓝色是民主党的标志颜色】在增长率上表现得好得多，包括西雅图（第9名），波士顿（第11名），圣何塞（第15名）。这些城市的生活成本都相对较高，但在经济复苏方面表现不错，这主要源自与科技相关的经济增长。 In contrast, some traditional immigrant hubs with weaker economies have lagged behind. Chicago’s foreign-born population increased 1.71%, less than half the national average. Los Angeles’ foreign born population ticked down 0.1% amid economic stagnation and rising housing prices. When it comes to immigration, it is the geography of opportunity that still prevails. 与此相反，一些经济表现不佳的传统移民聚集地则处在落后位置。芝加哥的国外出生人口增长了1.71%，低于全国平均水平的一半。洛杉矶的国外出生人口则由于经济停滞和房价攀升略微下降了0.1%。从移民角度来看，充满机遇的地方仍然更受欢迎。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Iran and Saudi Arabia's cold war is making the Middle East even more dangerous 伊朗和沙特的冷战让中东局势变得愈加危险 作者：Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-3-30 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Vox，http://www.vox.com/2015/3/30/8314513/saudi-arabia-iran

2014年一次阅兵中的沙特特种警察

Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, was incensed enough over what was happening in Syria that in a 2013 press conference alongside Secretary of State John Kerry he declared, "I consider Syria an occupied land." 沙特外交大臣Saud al-Faisal亲王【译注：已于此文发表后不久辞职】对叙利亚局势感到异常愤怒，在2013年与美国国务卿约翰·克里共同出席一次新闻发布会时，他甚至宣称：“我认为叙利亚已经被占领了。” The occupier, he said, was Iran, which had sent military forces to fight alongside of those of besieged Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. 他说，占领者就是伊朗，当时伊朗已经派出军队与被反政府武装围困的叙利亚领导人巴沙尔·阿萨德并肩作战。 "How can a neighboring country that’s supposed to uphold good relationships get involved in a civil war and help one side over the other?" he asked. “一个本该与邻国维持良好关系的国家，怎么能卷入一场邻国的内战，并在其中帮助一方与另一方作战呢？”他问道。 It's amazing Prince Saud managed to ask his question with straight face. Saudi Arabia was also taking sides, providing large numbers of weapons to rebels in Syria, some of them Islamist extremists who have contributed to the conflict's downward spiral. 但Saud亲王能如此理直气壮地问出这个问题本身也很令人惊讶。沙特阿拉伯同样在叙利亚内战中有着鲜明的立场，他们向叙利亚反政府武装提供了大量武器，而这些反政府武装中有一部分是伊斯兰极端分子，他们是将冲突引入恶性循环的重要推手。 Syria had become more than just a civil war: it was a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which were escalating the war in their effort to combat each other. 叙利亚所经历的动荡已经不只是一场内战，它成为了伊朗和沙特之间的一场代理人冲突，在与对方的较量中，双方都不断地将战争升级。 Over the past decade, the Saudis and Iranians have supported opposing political parties, funded opposing armies, and directly waged war against one another's proxies in Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. While they did not create the crises in those places, they have exacerbated them considerably. 在过去十年间，沙特和伊朗在黎巴嫩、巴林、伊拉克、叙利亚和也门这些国家分别支持着相互对立的政党，为对立的武装提供资金，并且直接操纵代理人向对方的代理人发动战争。虽然这些国家的危机并不是他们直接造成的，但他们却大大地加深了这些危机的严重程度。 Driven by power politics, and fueled by Sunni-Shia sectarianism, the conflict between the two powers — often called the Middle East's cold war — has become one of the most dangerous elements defining Middle Eastern politics today. 在强权政治的驱动下，加上逊尼派与什叶派之间的教派斗争，伊朗和沙特这两个中东大国之间的冲突——通常被人们称为“中东冷战”——已经成为主导当今中东地区政治局势的最危险因素之一。 As the 2003 Iraq invasion and the uprisings of the Arab Spring have upended status quos across the region, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have rushed in to shape events to their benefit — often at the cost of worsening instability and violence. The more the Iranian-Saudi rivalry escalates, the worse the region is likely to get. 在2003年美国入侵伊拉克和“阿拉伯之春”的动乱打破中东地区原有秩序之后，沙特和伊朗都在努力试图根据自身利益塑造地区事务——而代价通常是让该地区变得更加不稳定，让暴力活动加剧。伊朗和沙特的敌对关系越是升级，中东地区的状况就可能变得越糟糕。 Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting for supremacy of the Middle East 伊朗和沙特争夺中东地区霸权

1979年，德黑兰，一位支持革命的妇女

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, at its core, a competition going back years for power and dominance across the Middle East. 沙特和伊朗之间敌对的核心是双方多年以来对整个中东地区政治权力和主导权的争夺。 "The new Middle East cold war predates the Arab Spring by at least half a decade, but increased Iranian influence in the Arab world dates back even longer," F. Gregory Gause III, a professor of international affairs at Texas A&M, writes. “这场新的‘中东冷战’在‘阿拉伯之春’开始之前已经持续了至少5年，而伊朗在阿拉伯世界的影响力上升则可追溯到更早以前，”德克萨斯A&M大学的国际关系教授F. Gregory Gause III 写道。 After Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, the new Islamic Republic established an aggressive foreign policy of exporting the Iranian revolution, attempting to foment Iran-style theocratic uprisings around the Middle East. That was a threat to Saudi Arabia's heavy influence in the Middle East, and perhaps to the Saudi monarchy itself. 在1979年伊朗的伊斯兰革命推翻了亲西方的国王之后，新建立的伊朗伊斯兰共和国制定了一项旨在输出伊朗革命的激进外交政策，他们试图在整个中东地区煽动伊朗式的神权起义。这对于沙特阿拉伯长期以来在中东地区建立的巨大影响力是一个严重威胁，甚至威及沙特王室本身。 "The fall of the shah and the establishment of the militant Islamic Republic of [founding leader] Ruhollah Khomeini came as a particularly rude shock to the Saudi leadership," University of Virginia's William Quandt writes. It "brought to power a man who had explicitly argued that Islam and hereditary kingship were incompatible, a threatening message, to say the least, in [the Saudi capital of] Riyadh." In response, Saudi Arabia and other ultra-conservative Gulf monarchies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an organization initially designed to counter and contain Iranian influence. “伊朗国王的垮台和鲁霍拉·霍梅尼建立的好战的伊斯兰共和国对沙特在中东的领导地位造成了非常猛烈的冲击，”弗吉尼亚大学教授William Quandt写道。“一个明确主张伊斯兰教义与世袭君主制不相容的人获得了权力，对利雅得（沙特首都）来说，这至少是一个威胁的信号。”作为回应，沙特和其他极端保守的海湾地区君主创立了海湾合作委员会（GCC），该组织设立的初衷就是反击和遏制伊朗的影响力。 Iran, weakened by the Iran-Iraq war, backed off of its more aggressive attempts to remake the Middle East in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the groundwork for conflict was already laid: Saudi Arabia and Iran had come to see each other as dangerous threats. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as bent on overturning a Middle Eastern political order that's quite friendly to Saudi interests; the Iranians believe the Saudis are actively attempting to keep Iran weak and vulnerable. 由于在两伊战争中实力受到削弱，在上世纪80年代末90年代初，伊朗有所收敛，不再过分激进地试图重塑中东。但是冲突的根基已经埋下：沙特和伊朗开始将对方视作非常危险的威胁。沙特认为伊朗一心想要推翻对于自身利益非常友好的中东政治秩序；而伊朗则相信沙特一直在很积极地试图削弱伊朗，让伊朗变得脆弱。 This creates what political scientists call a security dilemma: one side, fearing attack, ramps up defense spending or supports a regional proxy in order to guard against a perceived threat. The other side sees that as threatening — what if they're planning to attack? — and feels compelled to respond in kind. 这就造成了一种被政治科学家们称作“安全困境”的局面：困境中的一方害怕受到攻击，通过增加国防支出或者支持区域性代理人来防范自身感知到的威胁；而另一方则将对方的这种行为视作对己方的一种威胁——如果它们是在准备向我们发动攻击呢？——同时觉得自己不得不对此做出针锋相对的反应。 This creates a self-sustaining cycle in which both countries to take actions that are designed to make their country more secure, but end up scaring the other side and thus raising both the chances and the potential severity of conflict. 这就造成了一种自我维持的循环，双方都在采取一些旨在让自己国家变得更加安全的措施，但结果则是让对方感到更加不安，这最终让冲突发生的几率以及冲突的烈度都大大上升了。 "It's what the US and the Soviet Union were involved in" during the Cold War, Daniel Serwer, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, explains. “这就是美国和苏联在冷战中所卷入的局面”，约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际问题研究院教授Daniel Serwer解释道。 Serwer believes the security dilemma "is what really brings us to this point." The Saudis and Iranians see regional power in zero-sum terms: the more powerful Iran is, the more vulnerable the Saudis feel. And, again, vice versa: "The rationale [the Iranians] give themselves is very heavily defensive," he says. Serwer教授相信，正是安全困境“将伊朗和沙特之间的关系带到了今天的局面”。沙特和伊朗都以一种零和的视角看待地区权力：伊朗越强大，沙特就会觉得自己越脆弱，反之亦然。“伊朗人给自己（对沙特采取敌对态度）的理由中有很大一部分都是出于自卫，”他说道。 That's why proxy struggles in countries such as Syria and Yemen start to seem so important: Saudi Arabia sees Iran backing the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and believes it's an initial step toward not just creating chaos in Yemen but overturning the entire regional order that is so important to Saudi Arabia's security. 这也是为何两国在叙利亚和也门这些国家通过代理人展开的争夺开始显得如此重要的原因：沙特认为伊朗在背后支持也门的胡塞叛军，并相信伊朗的目的并不只是为了在也门制造混乱，这仅仅是伊朗为推翻对沙特的安全至关重要的地区秩序所采取的第一步。 Iran, meanwhile, sees Saudi Arabia arming anti-Assad rebels in Syria and believes the Saudis want to deprive Tehran of an important ally, with the ultimate goal of isolating Iran and surrounding it with hostile regimes. 同时伊朗则认为沙特武装了叙利亚国内的反阿萨德叛军，并相信沙特想要除掉德黑兰的一个重要盟友，其最终目的则是将伊朗孤立起来，让伊朗处于敌对政权的包围之中。 Neither wants the other to gain in influence, so they intervene and counter-intervene. For both, the stakes seem high, so they respond with measures that feel appropriately severe to them: for Saudi Arabia, bombing Yemen's Houthi rebels and threatening to invade; for Iran, sending more troops and military advisers to Syria. This ends up escalating both conflicts further, heightening the mutual fears and, of course, increasing the suffering of Yemenis and Syrians. 双方都不希望对方获得更大的影响力，所以他们不断地采取干预和反干预的措施。对双方而言，其中牵涉到重大的利益，所以对于对方的行为，他们都采取了自己认为“适度激烈”的应对措施：沙特轰炸了也门的胡塞叛军，并以入侵相威胁；而伊朗则向叙利亚派出了更多的部队和军事顾问。最终这些措施让双方的冲突不断升级，同时也让双方的不安全感不断加深，当然，同时也加深了也门和叙利亚人民所遭受的苦难。 The Iraq War and the Arab Spring set the stage for today's proxy conflict 伊拉克战争和“阿拉伯之春”为双方当前的代理人冲突埋下了伏笔

伊拉克军队战士，正在美军支持下清扫巴格达由什叶派武装控制的区域，2008年

During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry was fairly quiet. According to both Gause and Serwer, that's because Iran's opportunities to challenge the Saudi-led political order were fairly limited. Tehran was just too focused on the threat from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. 在1990年代和2000年代初，沙特和伊朗之间的敌对关系曾一度相对平静。Gause和Serwer教授都认为，这是因为当时伊朗挑战沙特主导的地区政治秩序的机会非常有限。德黑兰当时的注意力主要放在了伊拉克领导人萨达姆·侯赛因的威胁之上。 Then the US led the 2003 Iraq invasion that toppled Saddam and changed everything. Iran saw an opportunity to strengthen reliable, pro-Iran Shia militant groups (Iraq is majority Shia) and to replace Saddam with a friendlier Shia-led regime — which is exactly what happened. 之后美国在2003年入侵伊拉克，并推翻了萨达姆政权，这改变了一切。伊朗看到了一个机会，加强可靠的亲伊朗什叶派激进团体（伊拉克人口中什叶派占多数）的实力，用一个对自己更友好的由什叶派主导的政权取代萨达姆。这正是随后发生的事情。 "Until the American invasion of Iraq," Serwer says, "the door wasn't really open [for Iran to challenge the regional order], except in limited ways like supporting Hezbollah and Hamas. Serwer教授表示：“直到美国入侵伊拉克之前，除了支持黎巴嫩真主党和哈马斯这些有限的方式之外，伊朗挑战地区秩序的大门并未真正打开。” "What the United States did in Iraq, by opening the door to the Shia majority, is part of the story for the Saudis." “美国在伊拉克所做的一切，为占伊拉克人口多数的什叶派打开了大门，而且也是沙特不得不面临当前局面的部分原因。” Then the Arab Spring, by toppling governments or inspiring uprisings throughout the region, created a whole new set of openings in which Iran could seek to expand its influence — and Saudi Arabia would struggle to maintain the status quo. When a Saudi-friendly regime was threatened, the Iranians supported the opposition while the Saudis tried to prop them up. When it was an Iranian ally on the brink of collapse, Saudi Arabia tried to push it over the edge while Iran tried to pull it back. 随后到来的“阿拉伯之春”则通过在整个中东地区推翻现有政权或煽动起义的方式，为伊朗在地区内扩大自己的影响力创造了一系列新的机会，而沙特则要力争维持现状。当亲沙特的政权受到威胁时，伊朗人就会支持反对派，而沙特则努力维持现政权的统治。而当伊朗的盟友到了悬崖边上，沙特会努力把他推下去，而伊朗则努力把他拉上来。 In Syria, Saudi Arabia funded and supplied the rebels fighting Iran's ally Bashar al-Assad; Iran sent troops into the country to defend the government and showered Assad with military aid. 在叙利亚，沙特为那些与伊朗盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德作战的叛军提供资金和补给；而伊朗则派部队进入叙利亚保护阿萨德政府，并为他提供大量军事援助。 In Bahrain, the country's Shia majority staged pro-democracy protests against the Sunni monarchy; Saudi Arabia, fearing Iranian influence, sent in soldiers to crush the protests. 在巴林，占全国人口多数的什叶派发起了反对逊尼派君主统治的亲民主抗议，出于对伊朗影响的担忧，沙特派军队进入巴林镇压抗议活动。 In Yemen, Iran stepped up its financial and military aid for the Houthi rebels; after the rebels seized the capital Sanaa in early 2015 and began moving to take the rest of it, Saudi Arabia launched a bombing campaign to stop them. 在也门，伊朗不断增加对胡塞叛军的财力和军事援助；而当叛军在2015年初占领了也门首都萨那，并试图进一步占领也门其它地区时，沙特对他们发动了轰炸袭击以阻止他们。 "The retreat of the state made it possible for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states to play an increasing role in the civil conflicts of Lebanon (for some time), Iraq (since 2003), and Syria (since 2011)," Gause writes. "This is the core, bottom-up dynamic driving the new Middle East cold war." “当地政权力量的衰退，使伊朗、沙特阿拉伯和该地区其他一些国家得以在黎巴嫩（在某些时间段内）、伊拉克（自2003年开始）和叙利亚（自2011年开始）的国内冲突中扮演日趋重要的角色成为了可能，”Gause教授写道，“这才是核心：自下而上的对抗态势驱动着新中东冷战。” Though the conflict isn't driven by Sunni-Shia hatred, sectarianism makes it especially dangerous 虽然双方的冲突并非起于逊尼派和什叶派的仇恨，教派主义却让形势变得特别危险

一位叙利亚反叛者正在哀悼他死去的同志

Even though Iran is a Shia theocracy and Saudi Arabia is a Sunni theocracy of a different sort, their struggle isn't really motivated by religion or theology. 虽然伊朗是一个什叶派的神权政体，而沙特则是一个不同形式的逊尼派神权政体，他们之间的斗争却并不是由宗教或是神学原因导致的。 "I don't think the Saudis and Iranians are engaged in a sectarian war with each other; I think they're engaged in a balance of power conflict for regional influence," Gause told me in July. Gause教授7月份对我说：“我并不认为伊朗人和沙特人之间发生的是一场教派战争，我觉得实际上他们之间发生的是一场争夺地区影响力的事关权力平衡的冲突。” "But," he says, "they use sectarianism." In fact, the Saudi-Iranian struggle is a significant reason for why sectarianism has gotten as bad as it has in the Middle East. “但是，他们的确利用了教派主义。”他补充道。事实上，沙特和伊朗之间的斗争正是让教派主义问题在当前中东地区变得如此严重的一个显著原因。 Shared sectarian identities make political alliances easier. Sunni governments and rebels are more likely to turn to Saudi Arabia for help; same for Shia groups turning to Iran. And as conflicts go on, their sectarian cast tends to intensify — inviting Saudi and Iranian intervention, which further polarizes countries on sectarian lines. 共同的教派认同会让建立政治同盟变得更容易。逊尼派政府或叛军都更可能向沙特寻求支持，而同样地，对什叶派政府和叛军来说，他们更可能向伊朗寻求支持。而随着冲突持续，教派色彩也趋于强化——例如直接邀请沙特或是伊朗干预，而这种行为则进一步极化了国家间的教派阵线。 "The retreat of the state ... drove people in these countries to look to sectarian identities and groups for the protection and material sustenance that the state either could or would no longer provide," Gause writes. "As sectarianism increasingly defined their struggles, it was natural that they look to co-religionists — Iran for Shia and Saudi Arabia for Sunnis — for that support." “国家力量的衰退……促使这些国家的人民到教派认同和教派团体那里去寻求国家所不愿或无法提供的保护和物质支持，”Gause教授写道。“随着斗争中的教派主义色彩变得愈发浓烈，人们自然会向拥有相同宗派信仰的国家寻求支持——什叶派找伊朗，逊尼派则找沙特。” Take Syria, for example. The country's crisis began, in 2011, as a non-sectarian mass uprising against the Assad dictatorship. But the Assad regime, which is Alawite Shia and backed by Iran, very explicitly targeted Sunnis in an attempt to make the conflict sectarian and force Syria's Shia and Christian minorities to rally behind Assad. Saudi backing of Sunni militant groups helped intensify this sectarian divide, ironically playing into Assad's hands. 以叙利亚为例。叙利亚危机始于2011年，最初发端于一场反对阿萨德独裁统治的人民起义，没有教派性质。而阿萨德政权属于什叶派中的阿拉维派，得到了伊朗的支持。阿萨德政权非常鲜明地将矛头对准了逊尼派，试图将这场危机变成一场教派冲突，以逼迫叙利亚的什叶派和基督教少数族群支持阿萨德。沙特对叙利亚逊尼派激进团体的支持，则进一步加剧了这种教派分裂，而讽刺的是，这正中阿萨德下怀。 The danger of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry is that they'll replicate Syria's experience across the Middle East, by intervening and counter-intervening to support Sunni and Shia proxies. The longer this goes on, the more entrenched and violent the regional Sunni-Shia divide will become, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq — and who knows where could be next. 伊朗和沙特之间敌对关系的危险之处在于，他们会通过各种干预和反干预措施分别支持什叶派和逊尼派的代理人，在整个中东地区复制叙利亚的经历。而这种状态持续得越久，中东地区逊尼派和什叶派之间的分裂就会愈加根深蒂固，暴力冲突也会愈加剧烈，叙利亚如此，也门和伊拉克也是如此——天知道谁会是下一个。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

An Update on My (So-Called) Paleo Diet 汇报一下我实践（所谓的）旧石器食谱的情况 作者：Peter Turchin @ 2012­8­23 译者：bear，校对：陈小乖（lion_kittyyyyy） 来源：Social Evolution Forum，https://evolution-institute.org/blog/an-update-on-my-so-called-paleo-diet/ As I wrote in this blog, in early May I started on a new diet, which is misleadingly (for reasons I will come back to) called the ‘Paleo Diet.’ 正如我在早先那篇博客中所写的那样【编注：本组翻译了这篇博客，见：http://weibo.com/p/1001603875391709540593 】，五月初我开始尝试一种新食谱，这种食谱有个容易误导人的名字——“旧石器食谱”（我会在之后说明它容易误导人的原因）。 First, a progress report. Over the 3.5 months I lost 15 pounds, or around a pound per week. Not particularly impressive by the standards of super diets that promise that you will lose 20 pounds of fat in a month, or even in a week. On the other hand, I haven’t done anything drastic, like starving myself, or undergoing stomach stapling. In fact, I eat as much as I want, I just don’t eat certain foods (as a reminder – no cereals, no legumes, and no dairy). 首先，报告进度。经过三个半月，我的体重减轻了15磅，大约每周减一磅。以那些保证你在一个月甚至一周内减掉20磅脂肪的超级减肥食谱的标准来说，这一成果并不让人印象深刻。另一方面，我没有采取任何激烈的手段，比如让自己挨饿或去做缩胃手术。事实上，我想吃多少就吃多少，我只是不吃特定种类的食物。（友情提示：不吃谷物、豆类和奶制品）。 In any case, losing weight was never the main purpose, getting healthier was. And it worked remarkably well, much better than I expected. It is difficult to describe, but basically I feel much younger and I have a lot more energy. Probably the best way to put it is that I feel as though I stopped poisoning myself. 无论如何，减重从来不是我的主要目的，变得更健康才是。这个食谱的效果非常好，比我预期的要好得多。这很难形容，但基本上，我感觉自己更年轻、更有精力了。或许对这个食谱带给我的变化最好的表述是——我感觉好像不再毒害自己了。 I was raised in a big city (Moscow) and lived for several years in another one (New York). In 1980 I moved away from NYC and since then I have lived in a succession of small towns or in rural areas (except for two years in Seattle, but it’s hardly a megalopolis). After a while I noticed that when I come for an extended visit to a big city, after a few days I start feeling ‘off,’ not really sick, but not really well either. 我在大城市（莫斯科）长大，然后在另一个大城市（纽约）住了几年。1980年，我搬离了纽约市，之后就一直在一些小城镇或者郊区居住（在这期间我在西雅图住了两年，但它也算不上大都市）。一段时间之后，我注意到当我去大城市进行长期访问时，几天后我就会有一种“宕机”的感觉，不是真的生病，但也不是很健康。 After returning to my rural abode, I almost immediately get better. This happens every time when I have to stay in a city for longer than 3-5 days. I think what happens is that the urban pollution simply poisons your body. People who live in cities all the time are used to it, and stop noticing it (as I did, when I was a megalopolis dweller myself). 回到郊区的住所之后，我几乎立即就会变好。每次待在城市超过3-5天就会这样。我想这是因为城市的污染一直在毒害着你的身体。一直住在城里的人已经习惯了这些污染，而且也不再注意到这些污染（我自己是大城市居民的时候也是这样）。 Well, switching to my new diet was like moving away from New York (although it took a little longer to flush the poisons out of the system, but the effect was even more striking). This is what I mean when I say that I feel as though I stopped poisoning myself. So the diet definitely works. I have not done any blind trials, so it all could be just the placebo effect, but I don’t give a damn. It works. Initially I was going to give it 6 months and then decide whether to stick with it. But now, just past the midpoint, it is clear that I will be sticking with it. 切换到我的新食谱就好比搬离纽约（尽管它需要更多时间排出毒素，但效果甚至更加显著）。这就是之前我说“我感觉好像不再毒害自己了”的意思。所以，这个食谱绝对有效。我没有做过任何盲测，所以这可能仅仅是安慰剂效果，但我才不管呢！它是有效的！起初我打算用六个月时间尝试这个食谱，然后再决定是不是要继续。但现在时间只过了一半我就肯定自己会继续了。 Now to why calling this a ‘Paleo diet’ is a complete misnomer. Most people, when they hear me explain that I am on the paleo diet, at best think that I don’t eat carbs (a la Atkinson). At worst, they think I run around through the bushes barefoot and hunt game with my bare hands. 现在来说说为什么管它叫“旧石器食谱”完全是用词不当。当我给人们解释我在尝试旧石器食谱的时候，大多数人最好的理解就是我不吃碳水化合物（就像Atkins食谱）。最差的理解是，他们认为我光着脚丫在灌木丛中乱跑，赤手空拳进行追猎野兽。 I need to come up with a better name – how about the ‘post-neolithic diet’? I’ll still have to explain it, but at least people will not have any preconceived notions that I will have to dispel. 我要想个好点的名字——“后新石器时代食谱”怎么样？我仍然不得不解释它，但至少大家不会先入为主地以为我必须去追逐猎物。 When I explain to friends that I don’t eat any cereals or grains, legumes, or dairy, a frequent reply is – “what’s left?!” Actually, a lot. All kinds of meat, any seafood, eggs, all kinds of fresh vegetables (salad type – lettuce, tomatoes, cukes, radishes, green scallions, cilantro, peppers), other vegetables (all varieties of cabbages, numerous kinds of squash, avocado, olives, asparagus, onions and leaks, spinach), root vegetables (potatoes, yams, carrots, root parsley, yucca, and a number of others I haven’t explored yet), fruits and berries and nuts. No caveman ate the kind of varied diet that we can obtain by an easy trip to the supermarket. So the ‘paleo diet’ is a complete misnomer. 当我对朋友们说我不吃谷物、豆类和奶制品的时候，得到最多的回答是“那还剩啥？！”事实上，还剩非常多。所有肉类、任何种类的海鲜、蛋类、各种新鲜蔬菜（沙拉类—生菜、番茄、黄瓜、萝卜、葱、香菜、甜椒），还有其他蔬菜（各种卷心菜、种类繁多的南瓜、牛油果、橄榄、芦笋、洋葱、韭葱和菠菜），根类蔬菜（土豆、番薯、胡萝卜、欧洲防风、木薯【译注：此处原文yucca疑为yuca之讹】和其它许多我还没尝试过的根类蔬菜），还有水果、浆果和坚果。没有原始人能够吃到种类这么丰富的食物，而我们只要简单地去超市逛一圈就行。所以旧石器食谱这种叫法完全是用词不当。 Additionally, there is no particular virtue in eating an undomesticated variety, compared to a domesticated one. In particular, I suspect that wild rice is probably worse for you than white rice. Both are grass seeds, and so poisonous by definition. But with the domesticated rice there is at least hope that the most poisonous varieties have been selected out (although it is not a certainty). Interesting how an evolutionary approach makes you look at things from a very different angle. 此外，和吃养殖的食物相比，吃各种野生的食物并没有什么好处。特别是，我怀疑对人类来说菰可能不如大米【编注：菰又称茭米，与水稻同属禾本科稻亚科稻族，虽名为wild rice，但与水稻亲缘并不很近】。两者都是草的种子，所以根据定义都是有毒的。但对于种植的稻米而言，至少可以期望其中多数有毒物质在人类培育选择大米的过程中都已经被排除出去了（尽管这事并不确定）。进化论的思路能让你从不同角度看问题，这很有趣。 Another problem with this diet is that food now takes a larger chunk from the budget. Fresh vegetables are expensive! And you need to eat a lot of them to get an equivalent of a one pound package of pasta, even a fancy one. This is no poor person’s diet… Also, wild-caught salmon is more expensive than cultured salmon. And it goes without saying that a steak from a grass-fed cow will cost an order of magnitude more than a pound of pink slime. Although I haven’t yet been able to find a reliable supplier of grass-fed beef around here. 另一个问题是这种食谱要花更多钱。新鲜蔬菜很贵！并且你需要吃大量的新鲜蔬菜才能和吃一磅意大利面相当，即使是上等意大利面价格也低于这些新鲜蔬菜。这不是穷人能负担得起的食谱……此外，野生三文鱼也比家养的贵。更不用说牛排的价格了，一块草饲牛排的价格可以买到超过一磅的粉红肉泥。尽管我还没在附近找到过能买到可靠的草饲牛肉的地方。 In addition to expense in terms of money, following this diet is more time-consuming. In my family’s division of labor I am the one who cooks. So now I can’t simply stop, on my way from work, for a Chinese take-out or a pizza, I have to cook each and every meal myself. I mean, I like to cook, but doing it every day is a chore. 除了钱上的开销之外，遵照这个食谱需要花费更多时间。在我家的分工中，我是负责做饭的。所以现在我不能简单地在回家路上停车买个中餐外卖或匹萨了，我必须每顿都自己做。我的意思是，尽管我喜欢做饭，但每天都做是一种负担。 Travel has also been complicated. Most restaurants are worthless. Mexican food, for example – it’s all about tortillas, rice, beans, and cheese. There is nothing left. Indian is all about rice, lentils, other  beans, nan. In most other restaurants they add ingredients I can’t eat into almost everything. Because I haven’t eaten wheat-based products for three months, I find that I am now more sensitive to small amounts of flour that may be added to a sauce. 旅行也变得麻烦了。大多数餐馆都不能吃。比如墨西哥菜，都是面饼、米饭、豆子和奶酪，没有别的了。印度菜都是米饭、扁豆、其它豆子和馕。其他大多数餐馆都会在食物中加入我不能吃的食材。由于我已经三个月没吃小麦制品了，所以我发现现在我对酱料中加入的少量面粉更加敏感了。 The best bet is French restaurants (also Italian and Spanish), but they are also the most expensive. I now have to study the menu real careful, and then negotiate substitutions. Fortunately, American waiters seem to be used to all kinds of weird dieting preferences, and in most cases are very gracious and accommodating. 最好的选择是去法式餐厅（还有意大利餐厅和西班牙餐厅），但他们都是最贵的。我现在必须非常认真地研究菜单，然后商量能不能替换掉一些食材。幸运的是，美国的服务员看上去已经习惯了各种特殊的饮食偏好，大多数情况下他们都非常友善和包容。 Finally, I had to give up beer. I still like the taste (now the memory of it…), but when I look at a glass of beer that a friend is drinking, I see the distillation of all the worst grass seed poisons (shudder). So there is no temptation to order one for myself. 最后，我不得不放弃喝啤酒。我还是很喜欢它的味道（此刻正在回想这美味……），可当我看着朋友喝的那杯啤酒时，我看见的是最糟糕的有毒种子的蒸馏提取物（不寒而栗）。所以就没有给自己也来一杯的欲望了。 The psychological aspects of this dietary shift are also very fascinating. My good colleague Jon Haidt has a wonderful metaphor. He compares our conscious mind to the rider of an elephant (the subconscious mind). The rider may be thinking he is in charge, but the elephant will do whatever he wants. That’s why it is so difficult to be on most diets, and that’s why dieters are prone to recurrent bingeing on forbidden foods. I will not embarrass myself with examples, but I have about as much control over my own elephant as an average person. 这个饮食转变引起的心理上的变化同样令人着迷。我的好同事Jon Haidt有个精彩的比喻。他把我们有意识的心智比作骑在大象上的人（大象是潜意识的心智）。骑象人认为他在掌控，但大象其实可以做任何自己想做的事。这就是为什么大多数节食食谱都很难被坚持下来的原因，这也是为什么节食者倾向于重新大吃大喝食谱禁止的食品。很尴尬，我自己就是个例子，但在控制自己大象的能力上，我已经有平均水平了。 But in the case of this diet my elephant and I seem to be of the same mind. My wife continues to eat bread, occasionally pasta and rice, and ice-cream. Today I had a dinner in a restaurant with a good friend, who was eating yammy-looking rolls, among other things. What I find surprising is that I don’t need to exert my will to stay away from these foods. At least so far – we’ll see if it lasts. 但现在这个食谱的情况是，我和我的大象看上去想法一致。我老婆继续吃她的面包，偶尔来点意大利面和米饭，还有冰激凌。今天我和一个好朋友在餐馆吃晚饭，他吃着看上去很好吃的面包卷，还有一些其它东西。让我感到惊喜的是，我不需要使用意志力就能抵制这些食物。至少现在是这样，我们以后会知道这种情况能不能持续。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

通往现代文明的两条路线 辉格 2015年9月11日 上个月有幸和阿姨谈了两次，成效颇丰，一开始我们花了点时间，快速核对了一下各自在一些要点上的看法，后面的交谈就比较轻松流畅、海阔天空了。 主要的收获在我这边，我现在比较明白阿姨的大致思路了，至于我，因为历来坚持以最直白易懂的方式说话，我想大概从来就是袒露无遗的。（通俗版：大伯总是光着膀子，阿姨则难得玉体袒裎。） 众多基本共识，和一些细节分歧，我就不细说了，因为这些异同旁观者容易理解，从记录文字和我以往文章中也不难找到。这里我想解释的，是我和阿姨最基本的分歧，这涉及到相当纵深的渊源脉络，所以旁观者恐怕不容易看清。 简单说，基本分歧是，对于西方文明走向其现代形态的两条路线——姑且称为封建路线和城邦路线（不过这两个名字可能造成误解，我后面还会说）——我们有着不同态度，阿姨（在不同语境中）同时推崇两者，而我对后者相当拒斥，即便有所接受也很勉强。 需要声明，这一二分叙事是我的个人看法，和阿姨的交谈让我在这问题上思路更清楚了，但这并不代表阿姨也持同样看法，他未必会认可这样的二分。 下面我以最简略的方式解释一下这两条路线究竟是什么，它们的历史渊源，以及各自在现代文明中留下的遗产；这个高度概括性的叙述难免会留下大量有待推敲的疑点和过度片面化之类的问题，我会在未来恰当时候作出更细致的说明。 【前传：农业带来的新冲突局面】 前农业社会也充满暴力冲突，但农业改变了冲突的方式，狩猎采集者相互攻击的目的主要是消灭、驱逐或削弱对方，因为他们没什么东西可抢的，因而也没什么东西（除了人身）需要保卫，而农耕者有了可供劫掠的财产（牲畜、谷物和农具），这就完全改变了战争形态。 狩猎采集者之间的战争以伏击和偷袭为主，阵地战多半是仪式性的，伤亡很小；一旦被成功偷袭，占下风一方的主要策略是逃跑，而不会组织阵地对抗，农耕者就不同了，他们逃跑就只能饿死，所以必须留下来设法捍卫家园。 这是国家诞生前夜的基本背景，然后，在如何保卫家园上，农耕者发展出了两种模式。 【城邦】 一种是城邦，它源自基于血缘/文化纽带而组成的农耕部落，这些部落在面临新的战争形态时，出于自我保卫的需要，转变成了比原有部落更紧密的共同体，同时继承了部落的两大特性：高度文化认同和平等主义，在外部冲突的压力之下，从中发展出了城邦民主制、公民责任和步兵传统。 其核心特征是高度重合的共同利益，以及由此带来的强凝聚力和集体行动能力，面对外来入侵者时，所有公民不仅都有自身利益需要捍卫，也有义务和同胞并肩捍卫城邦利益，每个公民都是平等战士，这一集体行动的责任，将狩猎者的仪式性阵地战转变成了希腊式步兵方阵。 （在有些案例中，城邦的基础可以由自由农民换成有组织的自由手工业者或小商人，但原理类似。） 城邦是现代公民社会和民主政治的原型。 【封建】 另一种是封建，它起源于武装劫掠团伙，而后者是农业所导致的分工的结果，狩猎者中，每位猎人同时也是战士，不存在分工，因为光靠打仗养不活自己（毕竟抓人吃远不如抓动物吃容易嘛），而农业创造了可供劫掠的财产，因而打仗成了一门可以独立谋生的手艺，于是一部分人从农耕者或狩猎者中分化出来，成为专以劫掠为生的职业武人。 这就给农耕者带来很大麻烦，必须寻求自保，一种方法是组织成自卫共同体，就是城邦，但并非所有农民都能成功创建这样的组织，做不到的那些，只能寻求庇护，与庇护者建立依附关系，交纳保护费，获得其免于劫掠的保证，并得到其帮助抵御其他劫掠者的服务。 寻求庇护者的途径，大致分两种：一种外来劫掠者，这就相当于接受其征服，另一种是本部落内分化出的职业武人（还有一种是像罗马崩溃后留在部落地区的残余军队这样特殊来源）；这种区别的意义主要在初始阶段，双方在种族、语言和文化上存在隔阂，但时间长了，其实没什么不同。 这是最底层的庇护关系，但武装团伙之间的竞争仍然存在，幸运的话，他们之间也可能建立联盟和依附关系，最终构成一个多层次的庇护网络。 假如这种多层庇护网络长期稳定下来，各方遵守效忠/庇护责任（这一责任在底层是一方交保护费，一方提供保护，在上层是一方履行军役，一方封授领地）就转变成封建契约，庇护网络变成了领地封授体系，领地和保护费权益变成了封建式财产权。 需要强调，这一发展不是必然的，在许多条件下，庇护关系可能始终稳定不下来，因而机会主义盛行，长期处于欺骗、背叛、压制和报复的循环之中；但足够幸运的是，封建体系至少在西欧稳定存续了很长时间。 封建制是普通法、普通法下的财产权和英格兰宪政的渊源。（注意是渊源，封建制本身不包括这些元素） 【民族国家：城邦的现代对应物】 民族国家是近代在大得多的规模上复制城邦的产物，不过，规模问题也让它在一些重要方面不同于城邦： 1）对于城邦，文化同质性和民族认同几乎是自动获得的，只是被外部威胁强化了一下，而近代民族国家的同质性和民族认同，则是由政府强力推行的结果，印刷术、公立教育和官僚系统等等现代技术与组织手段，使得这一民族再发明工作有可能完成； 2）城邦的共同利益和共同命运对个体是切实可见的，有说服力的，而民族国家的共同利益多半是虚幻遥远的，需要编造各种神话进行忽悠，有时还需要借助像挑动战争之类的卑劣手段来刻意制造共同命运，即便如此，其集体行动的有效性也远逊于城邦； 3）高出两三个数量级的人口规模，使得城邦的直接民主变得不可行，只能改成代议制；而代议制里的委托代理问题，实际上让权力落入了精英手中，国民虽有公民之名，无政治参与之实，城邦公民真正的现代对应物其实是民族国家的精英； 4）由于上述几点（还有更多），城邦的主要优势，全民动员能力（这可以让他能够召集起大量步兵），在一战之后其实已经逐渐丧失，能否复兴十分可疑； 【自由市场秩序：封建的现代对应物】 自由市场秩序是指，存在一个普通法体系，保障人身和财产权利，除此之外，政府不干预任何私人事务，简单说，其终极形态就是市场无政府，即，当司法系统能够自我维持时，政府就被取消或私有化了。 民族国家和城邦之间的对应关系是容易理解的，因为他们保留了许多外观上的相似性，自由市场秩序和封建之间的对应关系则不容易看出也较难解释清楚，因为它更迂回曲折，封建制为现代市场制度的起源提供了良好土壤，但两者本身十分不同，其间经历了一系列演变，而且依赖于许多因缘际会的巧合，后者远远不是前者的“必然产物”。 （我不打算在这里详述这一演变过程，从我的旧文章里可以找到一些粗略的叙述，比如：《王权削弱不是宪政发展的结果》，《封建主义和专制主义一样坏？》，《天堂不远，就在索马里》，《封建与宪政》） 不过，深入一点就会发现，在一些基本要点上，两者仍有着共性，最根本的共性是：它们都是高度私人化的——没有公法，只有私法，没有公权力，只有私权利，没有公民，只有个人，没有主权，只有法人，…… 当然，这里的“没有”都是针对其终极形态而言，实际上尚不存在接近完美的自由市场秩序，因而这些“没有”在特定社会都要打不同程度的折扣。 【概括性对比】 当然，两条路线之间也有不少非常重要的共同点，首先，两者都要求有一套社会契约，或者叫共同规范，据此而建立契约共同体，不同的是，民族国家的契约内容更多，是一种强共同体，对成员施加强义务，要求更多的价值认同和普遍伦理；其次，两者都为广大地域的众多人口提供了普遍司法保护，从而使得现代流动性社会和大规模市场成为可能。 为方便理解，我概括对比一下两条路线的要点（我用城邦和封建来命名两条路线，仅仅是基于渊源上的考虑，目标形态其实是它们各自的现代对应物）：

	城邦路线	封建路线
文化同质性要求	强	弱
民族认同/价值认同	强	弱
共同利益/共同命运	强	弱
社会契约	强	弱
公民义务	强	弱
公法领域	强	弱
主权地位	至高无上/明确/集中	受限/模糊/分散
政府规模	大	小
地方自治	弱	强
普选制	必须	不必
义务兵役	必须	不必/无
全民动员能力	强	弱
国民教育	必须	弱/无
福利主义倾向	强	弱
个人自由	受限	充分
对制度创新的开放性	低	高

  【站队理由】 作为个人主义者，我自然倾向于第二条路线，第一条为个人自由留下的空间太小，阿姨也承认，他在内心也是更喜欢第二种的，但现实条件不允许，只能退而求其次，主权民族国家已成为主导，用阿姨的话说，除非发生一次末日级的大变故，否则私人秩序已没有出头机会，对此判断，我能理解，但有保留，存疑。 确实，在一个险恶环境中（比如老欧洲），缺乏全民动员能力可能是致命的，大英在其全盛期，步兵数量也是少得可怜，对于维持其所主导的全球秩序完全不够，所以只能依靠外交手腕、借力打力，或者花钱雇佣，一旦民族国家纷纷崛起，秩序便难以为继。相比之下，普鲁士这个按城邦路线创建民族国家的典范，其崛起速度和动员能力则有目共睹。 （其实荷兰比大英更能代表封建路线，但因为荷兰过早退出历史舞台，没多少东西可说，而且荷兰的命运也说明了封建路线的脆弱性。） 历史上的情况确实如此，但更重要的是现在，所以关键问题是，美国究竟属于哪一类？假如美国是另一个普鲁士，那我们确实没得选了。 这问题很难回答，美国太特殊了，而这一特殊又是因为他太安全了，远离险恶旧世界，所以即便骨子里有不少城邦元素，也鲜有机会发育成普鲁士那样，并在行动上表现出来，偶尔爆发一下倒是能动员起一支上千万的军队，和吓死人的军工产能，但这种爆发注定是短暂的。 反过来也是，假如美国代表了市场秩序模式，也同样缺乏机会发育和表现出来，还是因为他太安全也太辽阔因而太容易自足了，没必要去建立一个帝国来维持他所需要的安全秩序，至少没必要为此付出大规模动员的代价。 但依我看，美国还是更接近后一种情况，当然我可能只是被愿望蒙蔽了判断力；但无论如何，我是不会为任何一个普鲁士站队的，即便和霍布斯状态或极权主义相比，普鲁士要好多了，但对我来说还是远远不够好。 这么说吧，假如人类贱到不得不靠普鲁士来拯救，那我对他们还有没有救这件事情就没多大兴趣了。 （随便记录一些交谈当时闪过的念头，不成条理，读着吃力的话还望见谅，要把这种大话题写流畅太吃力了）

【2015-09-11】 @whigzhou: 在豆瓣上看到一张图，很有意思，非常适合为丹内特的“天钩（skyhook）”概念配图，假如你将生活意义寄托在天上，必须求助于从天上挂下来的某个钩子才能获得拯救，那么俗世中的一切自然就都成了你的负担，相反，假如你把天钩换成举升机，所有这些都成了意义来源或意义本身

【2015-09-11】 @按当地市话标准计费手机快速注册:辉格，可否问一个略不相干的问题？家长竞相给小学老师送钱，两千块起。但是因为有家长送贵重首饰，送几千块的还是被老师看不起，在学校还是很容易被老师抓住小辫子批评。六年级刚开学。有什么好办法避免这种情况吗？谢谢 @whigzhou: 一毛别送，并建议孩子无视这位老师的批评 @whigzhou: 如果孩子足够好学的话，不上学也没关系，多买点书放家里就行了，我记忆中在课堂上从来没学到过什么（体育课和生物解剖课除外），一般开学那天课本发下来当天就看完了，然后一学期就发呆，可惜我小时候可读的东西实在太少，我们镇上每面墙上糊的报纸差不多都被我读完了，读过最无聊的东西是一本化学词典 @熊也餐厅: 如果孩子不足够好学的话更没有必要送去读书了。 @whigzhou: “不足够好学”的孩子，也可能“不足够不好学” @whigzhou: 原则上我不反对学校教育，正如许多朋友在评论中指出的，同龄伙伴环境很重要，自家生十几个还是有点困难，我昨天的评论是有上下文的，意思是，如果可供选择的学校已恶劣到如此程度（其实我并不了解到底有多恶劣，只是基于随机传闻而有此印象），那么不上学的坏处跟这种恶劣相比，可能远更容易接受。

【2015-09-10】 抱歉，此微博已被作者删除。 @whigzhou: 我们并非完全不愿把一支军队看作个体，比如我们会说，“第2旅决定埋伏在A山坡上，等待敌人路过时发动袭击”——若非将它当个体看待，这句子就是不合法的，当然，和一只猫相比，这么做的有效性要差很多，语义也大为受限，但假如军队的连贯性和协调一致性达到蚂蚁巢群的程度，就是完全合格的个体了 @那个朗格诺人:您认为是什么使某物在形而上学的意义上被看作一个个体？ @whigzhou: 一个成本收益账户，就是说，假如你能用一个成本收益账户来为其每次行动评估得失，并据此预测其行为，那它就是个体，当然，这不是个要么是要么不是的二值判断，这种评估方式越有效，它就越像个体 @whigzhou: 或者用Dennett的话说，假如对它采取意向性立场会让你更好的理解其行为，它就是个体，假如你必须采取意向性立场才能理解其行为，那它就必须是个体，参见 http://t.cn/Ry4nJQv @whigzhou: 这样就把一个形而上学问题化解成了一个功能性问题，后者容易给出操作性的判定方法，于是哲学家的任务完成了 @老太婆尖尖角:为什么我对它存在方式的理解会影响其存在本身？或者说“个体”只能作为理解世界的一个概念，而我们不知道是否存在绝对的“个体”？ @whigzhou: 对啊，所有我们谈论世界时所使用的概念都是头脑里的东西，谈论对象本身不包含也不依赖这些概念 @平遥-深柳读书堂:我们必然都在某种意向性立场上看事物＿它是先验之物，但不一定都对此有自觉。当你说“必须”时，显然是感受到了一种压力施加于对意向性的选择之上。那么，这种压力会消失吗＿有人认为会在“上帝”那里消失？ @whigzhou: 按我们奎因主义的说法，就是用一个本体论承诺来取代无聊的本体论之争 @whigzhou: 这个承诺只是为了方便把话说下去（因为说不下去会死），说得好不好，最终要在整体上评判，而不是在形而上学起点上评判，否则的话，你就只能永远停留在起点上挪不动脚。 @whigzhou: 奎因这种整体主义，用拉卡托斯的话说，就是你先别着急攻击人家纲领的内核，而要看这套纲领最终成效如何，人家把卫星发上天转了那么多圈还让你坐在家里看到直播球赛了，他们那套体系总是有些道理的吧？

【2015-09-10】 @whigzhou: 接受学生对教授讲课内容作出的投诉，真是件非常奇葩的事情，没想到这情况在美国大学已经那么严重了，如此看来，这可能是推动大学政治氛围单一化和极端化关键因素，试想，若起初教授中左右比例是7：3，现在7感染了9成学生（左派思想总是更有感染力），去打击剩下的3，最后比例就变成了9.5：0.5。 @whigzhou: 要让我挑的话，肯定不会挑接受此类投诉、并将压力传导给被投诉教授的学校，这就好比，假如一位画家允许一群买家在他创作过程中拥在边上指指点点甚至推推搡搡，你能相信他画得出好东西吗？ @今天深度报道拍了吗:如果所谓的教授，讲课就是一坨屎，学生作为“顾客”（别管他妈的钱是父母给的还是我自己贷款的）应该怎么维护自己的权益呢？ @whigzhou: 怪自己眼瞎啊，实在不解气就抽自己两个大嘴巴，再上豆瓣骂一通，我读完一本烂书、看完一部烂片后就是这样的，从来没想过要退书退票 @sentimental-fog:辉总你还是没回答他啊，他问怎么维护权益，你说怪自己瞎，意思就是不要维护或者说这不算权益。 @whigzhou: 对，我认为不算权益，大学录取契约里显然不包括“包您喜欢包您满意”之类的承诺

Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story 拯救非洲犀牛：一个关于市场成功的故事

作者：Michael 't Sas-Rolfes @ 2011-8-19 编辑：Laura Huggins 译者：混乱阈值（@混乱阈值） 校对：带菜刀的诗人（@带菜刀的诗人_），林翠（@cwlinnil） 来源：Property and Environment Research Center，http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/Saving%20African%20Rhinos%20final.pdf 【译注：现存犀牛分五种：白犀牛，黑犀牛，苏门答腊犀牛，印度犀牛，爪哇犀牛。本文的白犀牛主要是指白犀牛的亚种南方白犀牛。】 In 1900, the southern white rhinoceros was the most endangered of the world's five rhinoceros species. Less than 20 rhinos remained in a single reserve  in South Africa. By 2010, white rhino numbers had climbed to more than 20,000, making it the most common rhino species on the planet. 在1900年，南方白犀牛曾是世界上五个犀牛物种中最濒危的一种。不到20头犀牛生活在仅存于南非的一个保护区里。到2010年，白犀牛数量攀升至20000头以上，成了这个星球上最常见的犀牛物种。 While southern white rhino numbers rose, populations of the other rhino species declined. This included the African black rhino and three Asian species. Why did the white rhino thrive whereas the others did not? In short, South Africa and a few other African countries adopted policies that created the right incentives for rhino conservation. 当南方白犀牛的数量增加时，其它犀牛物种（包括非洲黑犀牛以及三种亚洲犀牛）的数量却减少了。为什么白犀牛种群繁衍壮大了，而其它犀牛种群没有？简而言之，南非和其它几个非洲国家采用的政策，对犀牛保护产生了正确的激励效果。 BACKGROUND 背景 The white rhino, once plentiful in southern Africa, was all but hunted to extinction in the nineteenth century. As Dutch and English settlers colonized the region, they killed rhinos for meat and sport. 白犀牛曾经大量存在于非洲南部，然而在19世纪被捕猎至几近灭绝。荷兰和英国殖民者在此地区建立起殖民地，他们为取食和娱乐而捕杀犀牛。 By the early twentieth century, only a small population survived  in what is now the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in South Africa. Initially a royal hunting area for  the Zulu Kingdom, the park was officially protected in 1895. Its population of white rhinos slowly recovered and by the mid-twentieth century had reached the park’s full ecological carrying capacity. 至20世纪早期，只有少量白犀牛还幸存于如今成为南非Hluhluwe-Umfolozi公园的地区。这个公园最初是祖鲁王国的皇家狩猎区，在1895年正式成为保护区。保护区内的白犀牛数量渐渐回升，并在20世纪中期达到了公园生态承载能力的极限。 At that time, the Natal Parks Board decided to take bold action to expand the white rhino population by capturing and relocating animals to new areas. Breeding groups of white rhinos were moved to other state-owned parks, such as Kruger National Park, and also to private game ranches and zoos. This program, known as Operation Rhino, successfully re-established many new breeding groups throughout southern Africa. 就在那时，纳塔尔公园董事会决定采取大胆行动，通过捕获动物并将其迁移至新地区来扩张白犀牛的种群规模。白犀牛繁殖群被迁移到了其它诸如克鲁格国家公园这样的国有公园、私人狩猎牧场和动物园。这个以“犀牛行动”闻名的迁移项目成功地在整个非洲南部重建了许多新的犀牛繁殖群。 By 1960, the white rhino population had grown to 840. The next decade saw increased interest in private game ranching, and in 1968 the first legal white rhino trophy hunt took place. 到1960年，白犀牛数量已增加到了840头。在接下去的十年中，人们对私人狩猎牧场的兴趣不断增加，并在1968年出现了首个合法的白犀牛战利品狩猎。【编注：战利品狩猎是指参与者以获取猎物留作纪念品为主要目的的狩猎活动，与之相对照的另一种商业性狩猎是运动狩猎（sports hunting）】 The Natal Parks Board continued to supply live white rhinos to private landowners for a nominal fee on a first-come, first-served basis. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that there was a problem with this system. A long waiting list of private owners was eager to acquire rhinos for trophy hunting, but they showed little interest in breeding them. This led conservationists to question whether the private sector could actually be entrusted with rhino conservation. On closer examination, however, it appeared the problem was a matter of fixing the incentive structure. 纳塔尔公园董事会继续对私人土地所有者提供活白犀牛，先到先得，只收取象征性费用。到1980年代中期，这项制度的一个问题已显露了出来。有一长串私人地主渴望获得白犀牛来开展战利品狩猎，但他们对养殖白犀牛兴趣寥寥。这使得动物保护主义者质疑私人机构是否能真正被委以保护犀牛的重任。然而，在对情况仔细审视后，人们发现问题关键是要调整激励结构。 PRIVATIZING RHINOS 犀牛的私有化 Before 1991, all wildlife in South Africa was treated by law as res nullius or un-owned property. To reap the benefits of ownership from a wild animal, it had to be killed, captured, or domesticated. This created an incentive to harvest, not protect, valuable wild species— meaning that even if a game rancher paid for a rhino, the rancher could not claim compensation if the rhino left his property or was killed by a poacher. 1991年以前，南非所有的野生动物都被法律当作无主财产（res nullius）对待。对野生动物拥有所有权的好处，就只有通过猎杀、捕获或驯养来获得。这激励了捕猎而非保护珍稀野生物种——意味着即使一个狩猎农场主为一头犀牛付了钱，一旦犀牛离开农场主的所有地或被偷猎者捕杀，农场主将无法索要补偿。 The Natal Parks Board thought that providing rhinos for a low fee—an effective subsidy— would encourage private owners to be good stewards of rhinos. However, a closer look at rhino prices—both for buying and for hunting— suggests that this view was mistaken. 纳塔尔公园董事会曾经认为，提供犀牛时收取较低费用——相当于补贴——将鼓励私有业主对犀牛妥善照料。然而，在仔细考察犀牛价格——包括购买犀牛的价格和捕猎犀牛的价格——后，人们发现这种观点有误。 In 1982, the Natal Parks Board list price for a live white rhino was 1,000 South African rands (R). That same year, the average trophy price was R6,000. Any private landowner receiving a live rhino had a very strong incentive to sell it as a trophy as quickly as possible to pocket  a 600 percent profit. The alternative was allowing it to roam on his property where there was a risk of losing it to a poacher or neighbor. 1982年时，纳塔尔公园董事会对一头活白犀牛的明码标价是1,000南非兰特。而同年一头犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价是6,000兰特。任何得到活犀牛的私人地主都有非常强烈的动机将犀牛作为狩猎战利品尽快卖掉，以便将六倍之利收入囊中。不然，私人地主只能让犀牛在土地上闲逛，犀牛有落入偷猎者或邻居之手的风险。

THINKING CREATIVELY Rhino poaching is driven by economic forces. If we really want to save the rhino, we must understand how those forces work and look at examples of success stories to see what we can learn from them. 创造性思维 偷猎犀牛的行为受经济力量驱使。如果我们真想拯救犀牛，我们就必须了解经济力量是如何起作用的，并看看我们能从那些成功案例中学到什么。

For the next three years, as the waiting list for white rhinos grew, the Natal Parks Board tripled its list prices, but demand continued to outstrip the rate of supply. In 1985, a private rancher offered a few rhinos up for auction, prompting the Natal Parks Board to do the same. 接下去三年里，白犀牛的申请名单不断增加，纳塔尔公园董事会将价格升至三倍，然而白犀牛依然供不应求。1985年，一位私人农场主拍卖了几头犀牛，这促使纳塔尔公园董事会也将白犀牛进行拍卖。 In 1986, the board auctioned six rhinos, which sold for an average price of just above R10,000—more than double the list price. Encouraged by this success, the board increasingly embraced the auction system over the next three years, during which time the market price soared to an average of almost R49,000 by 1989. 1986年董事会拍卖了六头犀牛，均价刚刚超过10000兰特——高于标价的两倍。受此鼓励，董事会在此后三年中越来越多地进行犀牛拍卖，而在此期间犀牛的平均市场价格飙升到了1989年的接近49000兰特。 During this same period, the average price for a rhino trophy also rose, but peaked in 1989 at just under R92,000 before pulling back to R80,000 in 1990. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between list prices, auction prices, and trophy prices between 1982 and 1990. 同时期，犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价也在上升，但在1989年达到了顶峰，价格为略低于每头92000兰特，并在1990年回落到了80000兰特。图1为1982年至1990年间标价、拍得价和战利品价之间的关系。 From 1990 onward, list prices were abandoned and rhinos were mostly auctioned, as the Natal Parks Board realized the benefits of market pricing. By this time the gap between the price of a live rhino and a trophy had narrowed such that the trophy price was only about 60 percent higher than the live price—a more realistic mark-up. 自1990年起，随着纳塔尔公园董事会意识到市场定价带来的益处，标价被废除，绝大部分犀牛被拍卖。此时活犀牛与战利品犀牛的价格差距已经缩小，一头战利品价格只比一头活犀牛价格高了百分之六十——一个现实得多的溢价。 Also during this period, the South African Law Commission addressed the issue of ownership of valuable game animals. Recognizing the problems associated with the res nullius maxim, the commission drafted a new piece of legislation: the theft of game act of 1991. This policy allowed for private ownership of any wild animal that could be identified according to certain criteria such as a brand or ear tag. 还是在这一时期，南非法律委员会着手处理有关珍稀狩猎动物所有权的问题。委员会意识到，这些问题涉及无主财产准则，便起草了一项新的立法：《1991年猎物偷盗法案》。按照这项政策，任何野生动物的私人所有权可以根据确切的判别标准来识别，比如烙印或耳牌。 The combined effect of market pricing through auctions and the creation of stronger property rights over rhinos changed the incentives of private ranchers. It now made sense to breed rhinos rather than shoot them as soon as they were received. 通过拍卖实现的市场定价机制，创造对犀牛更牢固的财产权，这二者的共同作用，改变了对私人农场主的激励。养殖犀牛而非一得到犀牛就射杀终于成了明智的做法。 Interestingly, the private market also benefited state agencies such as the Natal Parks Board, which gained from the increased income from rhino sales. From a mere few thousand rands in the early 1980s (the rand/US dollar rate was one to one at this time), the annual market value of live rhino sales grew to R64.5 million (uS$7.8 million) by 2008. 有趣的是，私人市场也使国有机构（比如纳塔尔公园董事会）获益，因为他们通过出售犀牛而获得的收入增加了。出售活犀牛的年市值从1980年代早期的几千兰特（当时兰特对美元汇率为1:1）增长到了2008年的6450万兰特（合780万美元）。 BLACK AND WHITE 黑与白 Not only did the white rhino market grow in value, but white rhino populations also flourished. Figure 2 shows trends in white rhino numbers from 1960 until 2007. Contrast those numbers with the black rhino, which mostly lived in African countries with weak or absent wildlife market institutions such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. In 1960, about 100,000 black rhinos roamed across Africa, but by the early 1990s poachers had reduced their numbers to less than 2,500. 白犀牛不仅市值增长，种群也繁荣了起来。图2展示了从1960年到2007年的白犀牛数量变化趋势。与之形成鲜明对比的是黑犀牛，主要生活在诸如肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚和赞比亚这些野生动物市场制度薄弱或缺失的非洲国家。1960年时大约有10万头黑犀牛分布在非洲，但到1990年代早期，偷猎者使黑犀牛的数量下降到了不足2500头。

RHINO HORN USES There are two major markets for rhino horn. Throughout Asia, rhino horn has been used for thousands of years for both ornamental and medicinal purposes. Ailments that rhino body parts supposedly cure include skin disease, bone disorders, and fever. The second market for rhino horn is the dagger trade in the Middle Eastern nation of Yemen where carved rhino horns are used as handles for ceremonial daggers called jambiyas. 犀牛角的用途 犀牛角有两个主要市场。在整个亚洲，犀牛角被用作装饰和药材已有上千年的历史。人们认为犀牛的身体部位可以用来治疗皮肤病、骨骼疾病和发热等病症。中东国家也门的匕首生意是犀牛角的第二个市场，在那里，经过雕刻的犀牛角被用作一种称作jambiyas的仪式性匕首的手柄。

Rhino poaching is driven by the demand for rhino horn of  both species, which is used for ornamental and medicinal purposes in Asia. Since the mid-1970s, international trade in rhino horn has been subject to a ban under CITES, the United Nations Convention on international trade in Endangered Species. After the CITES ban came into effect, prices for rhino horn soared on black markets and have continued rising ever since. 对两种犀牛牛角的需求驱使了偷猎犀牛的行为。犀牛角在亚洲用于装饰和药材。从1970年代中期开始，根据CITES，即关于濒危物种国际贸易的联合国公约，犀牛角的国际贸易被禁止。自公约生效起，黑市上的犀牛角价格一路飙升。

ABOUT CITES CITES was formed in the mid-1970s as an international treaty to protect wild species threatened by trade. All member countries (more than 175) agree to regulate the trade in species across their borders in one of two ways. Species are either listed on Appendix 1, under which no trade is allowed, or Appendix 2, under which trade is allowed under a permit system only. About 800 species are listed on Appendix 1 and 32,500 on Appendix 2. CITES employs only a single officer to oversee global enforcement of the treaty. 关于CITES 作为一项保护被贸易所威胁的野生物种的国际公约，CITES形成于1970年代中期。所有成员国（超过175个）约定以两种方式之一对通过其边境的物种贸易进行管制。被列入公约附录1的物种被禁止贸易，被列入公约附录2的物种只能在许可证制度下进行贸易。大约有800个物种被列入附录1，而有32500个物种被列入附录2。 CITES只雇佣了一名官员来监督公约在全球的实施情况。

By the mid-1990s, rhino poaching had declined to sustainable levels and many conservationists assumed that the CITES ban had solved the problem. Rhino poaching, however, has re-emerged as a serious problem since 2008. 到1990年代中期，偷猎犀牛的行为已减少到了可持续水平，许多动保主义者认为CITES的禁令起了作用。然而自2008年起偷猎犀牛行为再次成为一个严重问题。 A more plausible reason for the temporary respite in poaching pressure is that all the “easy pickings” were gone. Unprotected wild rhino populations are rare to non-existent in modern Africa. The only surviving African rhinos remain either in countries with strong wildlife market institutions (such as South Africa and Namibia) or in intensively protected zones. 对此前偷猎压力暂时缓解的一个更可信的解释是，所有“易得手猎物”都消失了。在现代非洲，不受保护的野生动物数量非常稀少甚至不复存在。幸存的非洲犀牛只存在于那些有强大野生动物市场制度的国家（比如南非和纳米比亚），或在受严密保护的地区。 South Africa and Namibia have replicated the successful approach to white rhino conservation with black rhinos, currently protecting 75 percent of the world’s black rhino population and 96 percent of the white rhino population. After receiving CITES approval in 2004, both countries have even introduced limited black rhino trophy hunting. 南非和纳米比亚在黑犀牛上复制了保护白犀牛的成功方法，目前保护了世界上百分之七十五的黑犀牛和百分之九十六的白犀牛。在2004年得到CITES的批准后，两国甚至都引进了有限的黑犀牛战利品狩猎活动。 CROSSROADS 十字路口 Despite clear evidence that strong property rights and market incentives constitute the most sensible model for rhino conservation in Africa, many international conservationists and policymakers do not recognize this. Through institutions such as CITES, they continue to pursue a command-and-control approach that depends on regulations or bans to restrict wildlife use. This approach now threatens to undermine the success achieved thus far, as the extraordinarily high black market price for rhino horn has fuelled a new poaching drive. 尽管有清楚的证据表明，强有力的财产权和市场激励在非洲构建了最合理的犀牛保护模式，很多国际保护主义者和政策制定者对此依然不予认可。通过诸如CITES这样的机构，他们一直追求一种“命令加控制”的方法，依靠监管和禁令来限制对野生动物的使用。随着犀牛角异乎寻常的黑市高价促成了新的偷猎驱动力,这种方法如今威胁到了到目前为止已经取得的成功。 Before the recent upsurge in poaching, Asian nationals attempted to gain legitimate access to rhino horn by posing as trophy hunters. In response, South Africa’s government tightened controls over the hunting industry as well as the sale and use of live rhinos and rhino horn. Unfortunately, these restrictions only seemed to precipitate the current poaching crisis. The demand for rhino horn is significant and persistent enough to be very rewarding to criminals who are willing to supply it. 在最近的偷猎高潮之前，一些亚洲人试图作为战利品猎人而合法获取犀牛角。作为应对，南非政府加紧了对狩猎业以及贩卖和使用活犀牛和犀牛角的控制。不幸的是，这些限制看来仅仅加剧了当下的偷猎危机。对犀牛角的需求足够庞大而持久，这使那些愿意提供犀牛角的罪犯获利颇丰。

THREE RHINO MYTHS 有关犀牛的三个传说

• Rhino horn is used as an aphrodisiac in Asia. Rhino horn is used as an ingredient in traditional Chinese medicine to treat serious illnesses involving high fevers and toxicity. In Vietnam, it is sought as a cancer remedy.

• 犀牛角在亚洲被用作一种壮阳药。犀牛角作为一种传统中药成分，用来治疗伴有高烧和中毒症状的严重疾病。在越南，人们认为犀牛角可以治愈癌症。

• Rhino poaching is driven by greed and evil people. Rhino poaching is driven by the high price for rhino horn, which is caused by an artificial supply restriction from the ban in the face of persistent demand, creating perverse incentives.

• 人性的贪婪邪恶驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。面对持续的需求，贸易禁令制造了人为的供应限制，产生了不正当的激励，导致犀牛角的高价，驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。

• The medicinal demand for rhino horn is unscientific and therefore not legitimate. Use of rhino horns in Chinese medicine has cultural roots going back thousands of years and many of its adherents are unlikely to pay much attention to scientific arguments.

• 对犀牛角的药用需求缺乏科学根据，因此非法。犀牛角用作中药有数千年的文化根基，因此很多中医拥护者不太会关心有关的科学争论。

South Africa’s game ranchers are also willing to supply the market, and some have already experimented with ways to increase breeding and horn growth rates in a free-range farming environment. Rhino horn is made of keratin (similar to fingernails and hair) and can be periodically and humanely harvested from live rhinos at minimal cost (as little as $20 dollars to sedate an animal and cut off its horns). If the CITES ban was lifted, legal commercial rhino horn production from ranchers could outcompete most illegal harvesting by poachers. 南非的狩猎农场主也愿意向市场供应犀牛，而且一些农场主已经尝试了在放养的农场环境中增加犀牛繁殖和犀牛角生长率的方法。犀牛角由角蛋白（类似于指甲和头发）构成，能周期性地且人道地以最小代价从活犀牛上获得。（麻醉一头犀牛采割牛角的花费低至20美元。）假如CITES的禁令放开，来自农场主的合法商业犀牛角生产便可在竞争中击败绝大多数偷猎者非法获得的犀牛角。 Unfortunately, this pragmatic market solution does not appeal to key international conservationists, who insist that better enforcement and more political will are needed to solve the poaching crisis. Tragically, this may not be enough. 不幸的是，这种务实的市场解决方案对主要的国际保护主义者没有吸引力。他们坚持认为需要更好的执法和更多的政治意愿来解决偷猎危机。可悲的是，更好的执法和更多的政治意愿可能是不够的。 There are many other examples of failed bans, such as alcohol prohibition and the war on drugs, characterized by insufficient incentives to implement them successfully. The market-incentive success story of African rhino conservation may yet be undermined by a failure to recognize and learn from it. 已经有很多禁令失败的例子，比如禁酒和禁毒战争，就是因为没有充分的激励使这些禁令成功实施。市场激励在保护非洲犀牛上取得的成功，可能会由于人们未能认识激励机制并吸取经验而受挫。 MICHAEL 'T SAS-ROLFES is an environmental economist based in South Africa and a 2011 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow. 作者MICHAEL 'T SAS-ROLFES是位南非环境经济学家，2011年的 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Out of Israel: Ausraelis re-invent the diasporic identity 离开以色列：居澳以人重新定义流散身份 作者：Ran Porat @ 2015-8-10 译者：带菜刀的诗人（@帶菜刀的詩人_） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子），Drunkplane (@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：The Conversation，https://theconversation.com/out-of-israel-ausraelis-re-invent-the-diasporic-identity-44706 【在澳大利亚犹太侨民早已认可了锡安主义的梦想之后，更多新晋的“居澳以人”都将离开以色列视为一种解脱。澳大利亚联合通讯社/ Dean Lewins】 Approximately 15,000 Israelis live in Australia, mostly in Melbourne and Sydney. Almost all of them are Jews and they constitute around 12% of the 120,000-strong Australian Jewish community. Yet several factors and recent developments give “Ausraelis” (Australian-resident Israelis) an importance that outweighs their numbers. 澳大利亚有着将近15000名以色列人，他们中的大多数都生活在墨尔本和悉尼。这些以色列人几乎全都是犹太人，大约占12万澳大利亚犹太人群体的12%。然而，由于某些原因和近来的发展，这些“居澳以人”（居住在澳大利亚的以色列人）的数量并不足以说明他们的重要性。 The first factor is demography, as reflected in Australian census data. Since the turn of the century, immigration from Israel to Australia has skyrocketed, leading to a 20% jump in the number of Ausraelis every five years. This trend escalated recently, with a possible 30% growth since 2011. 第一个因素便是人口结构，澳大利亚人口统计数据也显示了这一点。自本世纪始，移民澳大利亚的以色列人暴涨，每隔5年居澳以色列人就增长20%。这一趋势在近年来还在加剧，2011年以来的增幅可能达到30%。 Israelis are by far the fastest-growing non-Australian-born group in the Australian Jewish community in recent years. 近些年来，以色列人是澳大利亚犹太人中，人数增长遥遥领先的“非澳大利亚出生”群体。 These Ausraelis make a range of positive contributions to the demographic profile of Australian Jews. Many are young families with children, who invigorate an ageing population. Recent Israeli emigrants are skilled and educated, and can integrate relatively swiftly as middle-class Australians. 这些以色列人给澳大利亚的犹太人人口结构做出了一系列积极的贡献。他们大多是有孩子的年轻家庭，令原本正在老龄化的人口年轻化。新来的以色列移民身怀技能并受过良好的教育，他们作为澳大利亚的中产阶级能相对迅速地融入社会。

【从以色列到澳大利亚的移民在近几年有所加快。来源：移民局】

From a Jewish community perspective, Ausraelis could be regarded as a healthy cadre for a new generation of active members. However, as a rule, Israelis remain estranged from organised Jewish Australia. 从犹太社群的角度看，这些以色列人可以被视为新一代活跃成员的健康核心。然而，以色列人通常和有组织的澳大利亚犹太人社会保持距离。 One reason for this is life in Israel, where the state provides all educational, social and religious services for the Jewish majority. Israelis abroad rarely go to or join synagogues, which are centres of social activity for diaspora Jews. 其中一个原因是，在以色列，国家会为作为主体民族的犹太人提供全面的教育、社会和宗教服务。所以国外的以色列人很少去犹太会堂，但那里却是流散犹太人社会活动的中心。 Most Israeli emigrants are secular. They associate synagogues with religion and its institutions and political parties. Both are unpopular in light of Israel’s long history of secular-religious tensions. 多数以色列侨民是世俗的。他们会将犹太会堂同宗教以及与之相应的机构和政治党派这三者联系起来。由于以色列长期以来世俗－宗教之间存在的紧张气氛，两者都不受他们欢迎。 The lack of a community mentality is just the tip of the iceberg. Living in a diaspora setting determines the boundaries and content of the conversation between Ausraelis and Australian Jewry. The latter can be conceptualised as the Aussie subsidiary of a historic worldwide religious diaspora. The former is evolving a budding Ausraelidiasporic identity, part of the wider national Israeli diaspora. 缺乏共同体精神只是问题的冰山一角。流散的生存环境决定了居澳以人和澳大利亚犹太人之间的交流范围和内容。概念上，可将后者视为历史上全球流散的犹太人在澳大利亚的分支。前者则正在萌生为一种“居澳流散以人”的身份认同，这是更广泛的以色列民族流散的一部分。 This new identity is constructed around a triangle of affiliations: Israeli (homeland nationalism), Australian (new home society) and Jewish (religious). Each is internally debated: by individuals themselves and/or vis-à-vis the relevant sector of Israeli residents in Australia, other Australian Jews and the wider Australian society. 该新身份由相互关联的三个角色构成：以色列人（故土民族主义）、澳大利亚人（以澳大利亚社会为新家园）和犹太人（宗教身份）。你会发现这些角色相互之间都存在纷争：作为个人的居澳以人之间，作为在澳以色列人社群成员之间，他们同其他澳大利亚犹太人之间，以及和更广泛的澳大利亚社会之间。 The state of Israel participates in, and even moderates, discussion between its national and historic diasporas across the globe. These days, Jerusalem is officially reaching out to and embracing its former residents. This is possible because current Israeli emigrants display features of confident transnational migrants, with a growing cross-border political awareness of issues facing the homeland. 以色列国家政权会参与，甚至出面缓和以色列国民与散布全球的流散以色列人之间的讨论。如今，耶路撒冷正式伸出双手拥抱以前居住在那里的居民。这可能是因为现在的以色列侨民展现出自信的跨国移民的风范，当面对故土时，他们越来越有跨越国界的政治觉悟。 Institutionalisation is the latest trend of the Israeli diaspora. Newly formed local organisations of Israelis abroad, including AIA (the Association of Israelis in Australia, co-founded by the author), are on the verge of creating a global Israeli diaspora roof body. 流散以色列人最近呈现出组织化的趋势。包括像AIA（澳大利亚以色列人协会，由作者参与创立）这种以色列人在国外新成立的地方组织，正成为全球流散以色列人的庇护所。 【虽然犹太会堂对于散居犹太人来说有非常的历史意义，但它并不是现代居澳以人身份的重点。澳大利亚联合通讯社/ Julian Smith】 Reversing the Zionist narrative 颠覆关于锡安主义的叙事 【译注：锡安主义又称为犹太复国主义，是犹太人发起的一种民族主义政治运动和犹太文化模式，旨在支持或认同在以色列地带重建“犹太家园”的行为，也是建基于犹太人在宗教思想与传统上对以色列土地之联系的一种意识形态】 Tapping into the inner voices of the Australian Israeli community reveals another interesting finding. Inside closed online social platforms, within their own Hebrew-only forums, websites and print media, Ausraelis are engaged in a dynamic redefinition of their identity in the diaspora setting. Specifically, among recent Israeli newcomers to Australia is a dominant group with a distinct self-perception, the “Ausraeli approach”. 倾听澳大利亚以色列人群体的心声，会有另外一个有趣的发现。在他们封闭的网上社交平台，在他们自己的希伯来语论坛、网站和出版媒体上，居澳以人在风风火火地讨论如何重新定义他们在流散环境下的身份。特别是在新到澳大利亚来的以色列人中，有一个占主导地位的群体，他们带有一种清晰的自我认知，叫“居澳以人路线”(“Ausraeli approach”)。 This is based on a certain demarcation of Israel’s past and on a negative prognosis for its future. The Ausraeli approach challenges the original Zionist nation-building narrative, which stigmatised past emigrants as Yordim (descending) - a derogatory label. In 1976, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described Yordim as “the fallen among the weaklings”. 这一路线基于同以色列的过往划定界限和对以色列未来的消极预测。“居澳以人路线”质疑锡安主义者的民族建构叙事，后者为以前移居他国的以色列人烙上了Yordim这个带有侮辱性的负面标签。1976年，以色列总理伊扎克·拉宾形容Yordim是“弱者中的堕落者”。 Yerida (the act of emigration) revolved around guilt, shame and temporariness as embodied in cultivation of the “myth of return”, constantly contemplating resettling in Israel. The Ausraeli approach sees immigration to Australia as Aliyah (ascendance) – a term exclusively used for incoming Jews to Israel (Olim, ascenders). Aliyah further implies an improved personal status and a higher moral and normative character as a result of the homecoming. 在“回归神话”的建立之中，Yerida（移居他国的行为）【译注：Yerida是一个希伯来术语，指的是以色列的犹太人移民到别的国家的行为，贬义】总是与负罪、耻辱和临时性联系在一起，移居他国的人则终日思索着重返以色列。居澳以人则将移民澳洲视为Aliyah——这个褒义词原本专门用于指代回归以色列的犹太人。Aliyah一词进而也暗示了因为回归故土而拥有的更高的个人地位和道德规范。 The Ausraeli approach is a reversal of this. The classic Zionist discourse sees settling in Israel as the only path towards redemption for diaspora Jews and the only way to escape a deterministic fate in the “Mortified Exile” (GolahDvuyaih). This idea of “negation of exile” was embodied by early Zionism’s adoption of “the wandering Jew” anti-Semitic myth. 但“居澳以人路线”颠覆了这种说法。经典的锡安主义话语将定居以色列视为流散犹太人达成救赎的唯一途径，并且也是逃脱“耻辱放逐”（GolahDvuyaih）这一注定命运的唯一方法。早期锡安主义对“流浪犹太人”这个反犹寓言的采纳，便体现了“反对放逐”这一观念。 The Christian fable of “the wandering Jew” holds that Jews are to always wander the earth. The Zionist version suggested that the Israeli – a new and reinvented national Jew – was supposed to lay his wandering forefather to rest. “流浪犹太人”这个基督教寓言认为，犹太人会一直在地球上流浪下去。而锡安主义的版本却认为，以色列——一个重新创造的新生犹太民族——会让其流浪的远古祖先灵魂安定下来。 On the other hand, the Ausraeli approach repositions leaving Israel as an escape to the diaspora from a deterministic fate of never-ending troublesome life in Israel with its ongoing security and social tensions (“the myth of no return”). It suggests that “the wandering Jew” did not find spiritual relief following Jewish national resurrection in Israel. Therefore, his journey continues. 另一方面，鉴于以色列持续的安全问题和社会紧张，烦恼的生活注定永无休止，“居澳以人路线”转而将离开以色列投入流散生活视为从这种注定命运的逃离（“不归神话”）。这表明了“流浪犹太人”并没有因犹太国家复兴而得到精神上的宽慰。因此，他们将继续流浪下去。 What can be learnt from the Ausraeli approach? That Zionist success in manufacturing new Jews – the Israelis – was so great that Israeli emigrants feel detached from their forefathers, diaspora Jews. The emigrants themselves are evolving into a new segment of Israeli society, as Israeli diasporants. 那么，我们可以从“居澳以人路线”中学到什么呢？锡安主义成功地制造了新犹太人——以色列人，他们如此成功，以至于移居他国的以色列侨民发觉，他们与自己的流散犹太人祖先越来越疏离。以色列海外侨民们正演变成为以色列社会的一个新组成部分——以色列流散者。 Now it is high time to examine the identity of children of Ausraelis. As one vocal Ausraeli said in an internal online forum: “What is the relevance of an Israeli tradition for a child who is about to turn into an Australian?” I wonder. 如今，是时候思考居澳以人的后代拥有何种身份了。正如一位在内部在线论坛积极发言的居澳以人所说：“对于一个即将成为澳大利亚人的孩子来说，以色列的传统和他有什么关系呢？”我也想知道。

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This article is based on a chapter written by the author in the new book Australia and Israel: A Diasporic, Cultural and Political Relationship (Sussex Academic, 2015) launched in Sydney on August 9 and in Melbourne on August 13. 这篇文章是基于本文作者新书《澳大利亚和以色列：流散，文化及政治关系》（Sussex Acadamic出版社，2015年出版）中的一个章节写就，该书于8月9日在悉尼发表，8月13日在墨尔本发表。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Why Do Americans Stink at Math? 为什么美国人数学这么差？

作者：Elizabeth Green @ 2014-7-23 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：带菜刀的诗人（@带菜刀的诗人_），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：The New York Times，http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/magazine/why-do-americans-stink-at-math.html 【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师：Randi Brookman Harris。计算器图标来自于Tim Boelaars】 When Akihiko Takahashi was a junior in college in 1978, he was like most of the other students at his university in suburban Tokyo. He had a vague sense of wanting to accomplish something but no clue what that something should be. But that spring he met a man who would become his mentor, and this relationship set the course of his entire career. 1978年，高桥昭彦还是东京郊外一所大学的三年级学生，和其他大多数同学没什么两样。他模模糊糊觉得自己想要做点什么，但对于到底该做什么却毫无头绪。但那年春天他遇到了他后来的导师，就此确定了他此后全部事业的方向。 Takeshi Matsuyama was an elementary-school teacher, but like a small number of instructors in Japan, he taught not just young children but also college students who wanted to become teachers. At the university-affiliated elementary school where Matsuyama taught, he turned his classroom into a kind of laboratory, concocting and trying out new teaching ideas. When Takahashi met him, Matsuyama was in the middle of his boldest experiment yet — revolutionizing the way students learned math by radically changing the way teachers taught it. 松山武士是位小学教师，不过跟日本的一小批类似教员一样，他不止教小孩子，也给想当教师的大学生上课。松山武士任教于这所大学的附属小学。他把自己的课堂改造成了一个实验室，策划并尝试各种教学新理念。高桥昭彦刚认识他时，松山武士正在进行一项空前大胆的试验——通过改变教师的教学方法，全面革新学生们的数学学习方法。 Instead of having students memorize and then practice endless lists of equations — which Takahashi remembered from his own days in school — Matsuyama taught his college students to encourage passionate discussions among children so they would come to uncover math’s procedures, properties and proofs for themselves. 松山武士并不要求学生背诵并练习无穷无尽的公式——松山武士自己念书时就记了很多方程式——，而是教育他的大学生，应当鼓励孩子们激烈讨论，从而能自行找出数学中的解题流程、性质和证明。 One day, for example, the young students would derive the formula for finding the area of a rectangle; the next, they would use what they learned to do the same for parallelograms. Taught this new way, math itself seemed transformed. It was not dull misery but challenging, stimulating and even fun. 比如，学生们某天可能会推导出矩形的面积公式，那么第二天他们就可以用已经学到的东西去推导平行四边形的面积公式。以这种新方法教学，数学这门课似乎完全不同了。它不再枯燥痛苦，而是富有挑战性、刺激性，甚至很有趣。

【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师：Randi Brookman Harris】

Takahashi quickly became a convert. He discovered that these ideas came from reformers in the United States, and he dedicated himself to learning to teach like an American. Over the next 12 years, as the Japanese educational system embraced this more vibrant approach to math, Takahashi taught first through sixth grade. 高桥昭彦很快就信服了。他发现这些理念最早是由美国的一些改革者提出来的，于是致力于像美国人一样教学。此后12年里，日本的教育体系采纳了这一更富活力的数学教育方法，高桥昭彦则从一年级一直教到六年级。 Teaching, and thinking about teaching, was practically all he did. A quiet man with calm, smiling eyes, his passion for a new kind of math instruction could take his colleagues by surprise. “He looks very gentle and kind,” Kazuyuki Shirai, a fellow math teacher, told me through a translator. “But when he starts talking about math, everything changes.” 教育以及反思教育几乎就是他的全部活动。他安静沉稳，眼带笑意，对数学教学新方法的激情常令同事大吃一惊。数学教师白井一之通过翻译告诉我：“他看上去特别温和、特别友善。不过一旦说起数学，情况就全变了。” Takahashi was especially enthralled with an American group called the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, or N.C.T.M., which published manifestoes throughout the 1980s, prescribing radical changes in the teaching of math. Spending late nights at school, Takahashi read every one. Like many professionals in Japan, teachers often said they did their work in the name of their mentor. It was as if Takahashi bore two influences: Matsuyama and the American reformers. 高桥昭彦对一个叫全美数学教师委员会（NCTM）的美国机构特别着迷。1980年代，该委员会持续发表宣言，建议对数学教学进行彻底改革。高桥昭彦在学校熬夜阅读了所有这些宣言。跟日本的许多专业人士一样，日本教师常说自己所做的都应归于其导师名下。高桥昭彦身上似乎体现了两种影响：一种来自松山武士，一种来自美国的改革者。 Takahashi, who is 58, became one of his country’s leading math teachers, once attracting 1,000 observers to a public lesson. He participated in a classroom equivalent of “Iron Chef,” the popular Japanese television show. 高桥昭彦现年58岁，已是日本数学教师的领军人物之一。他的一次公开课曾吸引了1000人旁听。他还参加了一个类似于“铁人料理”的课堂【译注：铁人料理是富士电视台的一档烹饪节目，每集由不同的挑战者选择挑战三位“铁厨”中的一位，用一小时来烹制围绕该集主题材料的菜式】。 But in 1991, when he got the opportunity to take a new job in America, teaching at a school run by the Japanese Education Ministry for expats in Chicago, he did not hesitate. With his wife, a graphic designer, he left his friends, family, colleagues — everything he knew — and moved to the United States, eager to be at the center of the new math. 不过，当他1991年有机会到美国工作，在一所由文部省为芝加哥日侨办的学校教课时，他没有犹豫。带着自己的平面设计师妻子，他辞别了朋友、家人、同事以及他所熟知的一切，移居美国，热切地想要走进新数学的中心。 As soon as he arrived, he started spending his days off visiting American schools. One of the first math classes he observed gave him such a jolt that he assumed there must have been some kind of mistake. The class looked exactly like his own memories of school. “I thought, Well, that’s only this class,” Takahashi said. 一到美国，他就开始利用空闲时间走访各学校。最早旁听到的其中一门数学课让他无比震惊，以至于他只能假定一定有什么地方出错了。这堂数学课看起来跟他念书时的记忆一模一样。“我想，呃，只是这堂课如此而已”，高桥昭彦说。 But the next class looked like the first, and so did the next and the one after that. The Americans might have invented the world’s best methods for teaching math to children, but it was difficult to find anyone actually using them. 但接下来第二堂课依然如此，接下来、再接下来都是这样。美国人或许发明了世界上最好的针对孩子的数学教学方法，但很难找到有人真的在实践这种方法。 It wasn’t the first time that Americans had dreamed up a better way to teach math and then failed to implement it. The same pattern played out in the 1960s, when schools gripped by a post-Sputnik inferiority complex unveiled an ambitious “new math,” only to find, a few years later, that nothing actually changed. 美国人构想出数学教学的改良方法却没能实施，这已不是第一次了。1960年代出现过同样的事，受“后斯普特尼克自卑情结”影响【译注：斯普特尼克一号（Sputnik 1）是世界上第一颗人造卫星，前苏联造，是冷战时期美苏太空竞争、科技竞争的标志之一】，美国学校公布了一项雄心勃勃的“新数学”计划，数年之后却发现什么都未曾改变过。 In fact, efforts to introduce a better way of teaching math stretch back to the 1800s. The story is the same every time: a big, excited push, followed by mass confusion and then a return to conventional practices. 事实上，引入更好方法改进数学教学的种种努力可以追溯到1800年代。每一次的故事都一模一样：一股庞大、兴奋的劲头之后，出现了大量混乱，然后又回归到老办法。 The trouble always starts when teachers are told to put innovative ideas into practice without much guidance on how to do it. In the hands of unprepared teachers, the reforms turn to nonsense, perplexing students more than helping them. 一旦教师们被要求将创新理念付诸实践，但却不在如何去做这方面为他们提供多少指导，麻烦就总会出现。在毫无准备的教师手中，改革变成了胡闹，学生得到的困惑费解多于助益。 One 1965 Peanuts cartoon depicts the young blond-haired Sally struggling to understand her new-math assignment: “Sets . . . one to one matching . . . equivalent sets . . . sets of one . . . sets of two . . . renaming two. . . .” After persisting for three valiant frames, she throws back her head and bursts into tears: “All I want to know is, how much is two and two?” 1965年《花生》（Peanuts）上的一则漫画就曾描绘了，金发小女孩萨丽如何绞尽脑汁去理解她的“新数学”功课：“集合……单射……相等的集合……1的集合……2的集合……对2进行重命名……”。在顽强坚持了三格漫画之后，她仰头大哭：“我就想知道2加2等于几？” Today the frustrating descent from good intentions to tears is playing out once again, as states across the country carry out the latest wave of math reforms: the Common Core. 今天，这种令人揪心的好心变泪水的场景正在重演。美国各州纷纷着手实施最新一轮数学改革，采纳“公共核心”（Common Core）。 A new set of academic standards developed to replace states’ individually designed learning goals, the Common Core math standards are like earlier math reforms, only further refined and more ambitious. 公共核心数学标准是一套新的教学标准，旨在替代各州先前自行设定的学习目标。这套标准与之前的数学改革相似，只是更为细致，抱负更大。 Whereas previous movements found teachers haphazardly, through organizations like Takahashi’s beloved N.C.T.M. math-teacher group, the Common Core has a broader reach. 此前的改革行动只是偶尔有一些教师参加，而相比之下，通过像NCTM这种高桥昭彦所钟爱的数学教师团体，“公共核心”影响范围更广。 A group of governors and education chiefs from 48 states initiated the writing of the standards, for both math and language arts, in 2009. The same year, the Obama administration encouraged the idea, making the adoption of rigorous “common standards” a criterion for receiving a portion of the more than $4 billion in Race to the Top grants. Forty-three states have adopted the standards. 2009年，来自48个州的州长和教育官员发起制定了有关数学和语言技能的公共核心标准。同年，奥巴马政府支持了这一理念，将严格采纳“公共标准”确定为能否从40多亿美元的“力争上游”（Race to the Top）专款中分得一杯羹的评判准则。现在，已有43个州采纳了这一标准。 The opportunity to change the way math is taught, as N.C.T.M. declared in its endorsement of the Common Core standards, is “unprecedented.” And yet, once again, the reforms have arrived without any good system for helping teachers learn to teach them. 正如NCTM在其对公共核心标准的公开支持中所宣称的，采纳这一标准所带来的数学教学革新机会“前所未见”。然而，又一次，能够帮助教师们学会如何教授这一标准的良好体系并没有随着改革一起到来。 Responding to a recent survey by Education Week, teachers said they had typically spent fewer than four days in Common Core training, and that included training for the language-arts standards as well as the math. 在回答《教育周刊》的调查提问时，教师们说，他们所接受的“公共核心”培训普遍不超过4天，而且还是语言技能标准和数学标准培训都包含在内。 Carefully taught, the assignments can help make math more concrete. Students don’t just memorize their times tables and addition facts but also understand how arithmetic works and how to apply it to real-life situations. But in practice, most teachers are unprepared and children are baffled, leaving parents furious. 如果精心教授，新功课能让数学更为具体实际。学生们不仅仅会背诵乘法表和加法口诀，还能理解算术的原理，并能将其应用于实际生活。但事实上，大部分教师都毫无准备，孩子们被搞得一头雾水，家长们则怒气冲冲。 The comedian Louis C.K. parodied his daughters’ homework in an appearance on “The Late Show With David Letterman”: “It’s like, Bill has three goldfish. He buys two more. How many dogs live in London?” 喜剧演员Louis C. K. 在参加《大卫·莱特曼深夜秀》时曾搞笑模仿他女儿的作业：“比如，比尔有三条金鱼。他又买了两条。请问伦敦有多少条狗？” The inadequate implementation can make math reforms seem like the most absurd form of policy change — one that creates a whole new problem to solve. Why try something we’ve failed at a half-dozen times before, only to watch it backfire? Just four years after the standards were first released, this argument has gained traction on both sides of the aisle. 实施不到位，可能会让数学课改革变成一次将会制造出有待解决的全新麻烦的那种政策变动，愚蠢之极。为什么要去做那些我们已屡试屡败的事呢？就为了弄巧成拙？标准发布才4年，左右两翼就都已经开始这么想了。 Since March, four Republican governors have opposed the standards. In New York, a Republican candidate is trying to establish another ballot line, called Stop Common Core, for the November gubernatorial election. On the left, meanwhile, teachers’ unions in Chicago and New York have opposed the reforms. 3月以来，已有4位共和党州长反对该标准。纽约的一位共和党候选人正在推动为11月的州长选举设立一个投票选项栏（ballot line），就叫“停止公共核心”【编注：ballot line是合并选举制度（electoral fusion）中的一种投票安排，一个ballot line在选票上单独占据一栏，但多个ballot line可以对应同一位候选人，这一安排改善了小党派和单议题政党参与单一选区制下竞选活动的机会，不然的话，单一选区制通常会造成两党寡头垄断。这项制度在19世纪晚期曾流行于美国各州，后来逐渐被各州禁止，目前尚有8个州采用，包括纽约州】。在左翼那边，芝加哥和纽约的教师工会也已对改革表示反对。 The fact that countries like Japan have implemented a similar approach with great success offers little consolation when the results here seem so dreadful. Americans might have written the new math, but maybe we simply aren’t suited to it. “By God,” wrote Erick Erickson, editor of the website RedState, in an anti-Common Core attack, is it such “a horrific idea that we might teach math the way math has always been taught.” 结局如此糟糕，以至于日本等国实施类似办法而取得的巨大成功都于事无补。美国人也许制定了“新数学”标准，但它可能确实不适合我们。在一篇反公共核心的批评文章中，RedState网站的编辑Erick Erickson写道：“神啊，以历来如此的数学教学方式教数学，这个想法难道就那么可怕吗？” The new math of the ‘60s, the new new math of the ‘80s and today’s Common Core math all stem from the idea that the traditional way of teaching math simply does not work. As a nation, we suffer from an ailment that John Allen Paulos, a Temple University math professor and an author, calls innumeracy — the mathematical equivalent of not being able to read. 60年代的新数学，80年代的新新数学，以及当下的公共核心数学，都源于同一个观念，即传统的数学教学方式就是行不通。我们的国民染上了一种病，天普大学数学教授和作家John Allen Paulos称之为数盲——数学方面的文盲。 On national tests, nearly two-thirds of fourth graders and eighth graders are not proficient in math. More than half of fourth graders taking the 2013 National Assessment of Educational Progress could not accurately read the temperature on a neatly drawn thermometer. (They did not understand that each hash mark represented two degrees rather than one, leading many students to mistake 46 degrees for 43 degrees.) 全国性考试显示，将近三分之二的四年级和八年级学生数学不熟练。在2013年“国家教育进步评价”中，过半数的四年级学生无法准确认读描画清晰的温度计上的读数（他们不知道每个小刻度代表2度而非1度，因此许多学生误将46度认读成了43度）。 On the same multiple-choice test, three-quarters of fourth graders could not translate a simple word problem about a girl who sold 15 cups of lemonade on Saturday and twice as many on Sunday into the expression “15 + (2×15).” Even in Massachusetts, one of the country’s highest-performing states, math students are more than two years behind their counterparts in Shanghai. 同样在上述选择题测试中，四分之三的四年级学生无法将“小女孩周六卖了15杯柠檬汁，周日卖了周六的2倍”这种简单的文字问题转换为“15+（2X15）”这一表达式。即使在马萨诸塞这种全国表现最好的州，数学课学生进度也落后于上海同年级学生两年以上。 Adulthood does not alleviate our quantitative deficiency. A 2012 study comparing 16-to-65-year-olds in 20 countries found that Americans rank in the bottom five in numeracy. On a scale of 1 to 5, 29 percent of them scored at Level 1 or below, meaning they could do basic arithmetic but not computations requiring two or more steps. 成年并未能缓解我们的数学缺陷。2012年一项针对20个国家的16-65岁人口的比较研究发现，美国人的算术能力排在最后5名。按1-5的等级衡量，29%的美国人得分在等级1或更低，表明他们会做基本的算术，但碰到两步或两步以上的运算就不会了。 One study that examined medical prescriptions gone awry found that 17 percent of errors were caused by math mistakes on the part of doctors or pharmacists. A survey found that three-quarters of doctors inaccurately estimated the rates of death and major complications associated with common medical procedures, even in their own specialty areas. 针对医药处方差错的一项分析研究发现，17%的失误源于医生或药剂师的数学错误。一项调查发现，四分之三的医生对于常见手术的死亡率和主要并发症发病率存在错误估计，即使在他们自身的专业领域也不例外。 One of the most vivid arithmetic failings displayed by Americans occurred in the early 1980s, when the A&W restaurant chain released a new hamburger to rival the McDonald’s Quarter Pounder. With a third-pound of beef, the A&W burger had more meat than the Quarter Pounder; in taste tests, customers preferred A&W’s burger. And it was less expensive. A lavish A&W television and radio marketing campaign cited these benefits. Yet instead of leaping at the great value, customers snubbed it. 美国人数学缺陷的一次生动展示发生在1980年代初，当时A&W连锁快餐为与麦当劳的“1/4磅汉堡”竞争，推出了一种新汉堡，里面有1/3磅牛肉，比麦当劳的“1/4磅”要多。在品尝活动中，顾客也更喜欢A&W汉堡。而且它还更便宜。A&W在电视和广播上做了大量市场推广活动，宣传这些优点。然而对这样的超值之物，消费者并不买账，反而是冷落有加。 Only when the company held customer focus groups did it become clear why. The Third Pounder presented the American public with a test in fractions. And we failed. Misunderstanding the value of one-third, customers believed they were being overcharged. Why, they asked the researchers, should they pay the same amount for a third of a pound of meat as they did for a quarter-pound of meat at McDonald’s. The “4” in “¼,” larger than the “3” in “⅓,” led them astray. 直到A&W公司开展了消费者焦点组调研，事情的原因才搞清楚。“1/3磅汉堡”给美国公众出了道分数题，我们却没有答对。消费者误解了1/3的数值，认为这种汉堡价格过高。他们问调研人员，凭什么要他们为三分之一磅肉支付那么多钱，而同样的钱在麦当劳可以买到四分之一磅肉。“1/4”中的“4”大于“1/3”中的“3”，这导致他们理解错误。 But our innumeracy isn’t inevitable. In the 1970s and the 1980s, cognitive scientists studied a population known as the unschooled, people with little or no formal education. Observing workers at a Baltimore dairy factory in the ‘80s, the psychologist Sylvia Scribner noted that even basic tasks required an extensive amount of math. 但我们的数盲并非无可避免。在1970年代和1980年代，认知科学家对一个失学人群——即没有或几乎没有受过正式教育的人群——进行了研究。通过考察80年代巴尔的摩乳品厂的工人，心理学家Sylvia Scribner发现，即使最基本的工作也要求掌握大量数学。 For instance, many of the workers charged with loading quarts and gallons of milk into crates had no more than a sixth-grade education. But they were able to do math, in order to assemble their loads efficiently, that was “equivalent to shifting between different base systems of numbers.” 比如，负责将牛奶成夸脱成加仑地装入大货箱的工人，所受教育均不超过六年级。但为了高效装箱，他们能做数学，装箱“就相当于在不同的基本数字系统之间进行换算”。 Throughout these mental calculations, errors were “virtually nonexistent.” And yet when these workers were out sick and the dairy’s better-educated office workers filled in for them, productivity declined. 在这种心算过程中，“基本不存在”错误。而当这些工人因病休假，由乳品厂受过更好教育的办公室职员来顶缺时，生产率就会下降。 The unschooled may have been more capable of complex math than people who were specifically taught it, but in the context of school, they were stymied by math they already knew. 虽然相比受过特定教育的人来说，失学人群进行复杂数学运算的能力更强，但一旦处于学校环境中，他们却被他们其实已经掌握的数学问题难住了。 Studies of children in Brazil, who helped support their families by roaming the streets selling roasted peanuts and coconuts, showed that the children routinely solved complex problems in their heads to calculate a bill or make change. When cognitive scientists presented the children with the very same problem, however, this time with pen and paper, they stumbled. 在巴西，为贴补家用，很多小孩在大街上沿街贩卖烤花生和椰子。研究发现，这些孩子经常在脑子里默算复杂的账单和找零问题。但是，当认知科学家向他们提出同样的问题，让他们用笔和纸作答时，这些孩子就卡壳了。 A 12-year-old boy who accurately computed the price of four coconuts at 35 cruzeiros each was later given the problem on paper. Incorrectly using the multiplication method he was taught in school, he came up with the wrong answer. 有个12岁男孩，能准确算出4个单价为35克鲁塞罗【译注：巴西旧币】的椰子的总价，但是同样的问题写在纸上时，他得出的却是一个错误的答数，因为他用错了学校里教的乘法。 Similarly, when Scribner gave her dairy workers tests using the language of math class, their scores averaged around 64 percent. The cognitive-science research suggested a startling cause of Americans’ innumeracy: school. 同样，当Scribner用数学课上用的语言对她考察的乳品厂工人进行测验时，他们的平均成绩大概是64分（总分100分）。认知科学研究表明，美国人患上数盲症的原因竟然是学校。 Most American math classes follow the same pattern, a ritualistic series of steps so ingrained that one researcher termed it a cultural script. Some teachers call the pattern “I, We, You.” After checking homework, teachers announce the day’s topic, demonstrating a new procedure: “Today, I’m going to show you how to divide a three-digit number by a two-digit number” (I). 大多数美国数学课程采用同样的模式，一系列程式化的步骤根深蒂固，有位研究者干脆称之为“训练脚本”。一些教师把这种模式叫做“我、我们、你”模式。检查完作业，教师们先宣布当日要讲的内容，展示一套新的解题流程：“今天，我来教你们怎么做三位数除以两位数的除法”（我）。 Then they lead the class in trying out a sample problem: “Let’s try out the steps for 242 ÷ 16” (We). Finally they let students work through similar problems on their own, usually by silently making their way through a work sheet: “Keep your eyes on your own paper!” (You). 然后他们就带领全班尝试解答例题：“我们来试试242÷16的解题步骤”（我们）。最后，他们让学生们自己去解决类似的题目，通常就是要他们安静地做一套练习题：“专心做自己的题！”（你们）。 By focusing only on procedures — “Draw a division house, put ‘242’ on the inside and ‘16’ on the outside, etc.” — and not on what the procedures mean, “I, We, You” turns school math into a sort of arbitrary process wholly divorced from the real world of numbers. “我、我们、你”模式只关心解题流程——“画个除法小屋【译注：即长除法竖式中的√符号】，把242放在里面，16放在外边，等等”，而不关心这些流程的意义，把课堂数学变成了一种独断的过程，与真实世界的数字完完全全不搭边。 Students learn not math but, in the words of one math educator, answer-getting. Instead of trying to convey, say, the essence of what it means to subtract fractions, teachers tell students to draw butterflies and multiply along the diagonal wings, add the antennas and finally reduce and simplify as needed. 用一位数学教育者的话说，学生们学的不是数学，而是解题。比如，教师们不是试图去传授做分数减法的实质意义，而是告诉学生们先画蝴蝶，然后将蝴蝶对角翅膀上的数字做乘法，再把两个触角上的数字做加法，最后，如果需要，再化简分数。 The answer-getting strategies may serve them well for a class period of practice problems, but after a week, they forget. And students often can’t figure out how to apply the strategy for a particular problem to new problems. 这种解题策略虽然能让学生们在上课期间把练习题做得很好，但一个星期之后，他们就会忘光。而且学生们还经常搞不清楚如何用这种针对个别问题的策略解决新问题。 How could you teach math in school that mirrors the way children learn it in the world? That was the challenge Magdalene Lampert set for herself in the 1980s, when she began teaching elementary-school math in Cambridge, Mass. 我们应该如何模仿孩子们在真实世界的学习方式来进行课堂数学教育呢？这就是玛达勒纳·兰珀特（Magdalene Lampert）在1980年代为自己设定的挑战，当时她刚开始在马萨诸塞的坎布里奇担任小学数学教师。 She grew up in Trenton, accompanying her father on his milk deliveries around town, solving the milk-related math problems he encountered. “Like, you know: If Mrs. Jones wants three quarts of this and Mrs. Smith, who lives next door, wants eight quarts, how many cases do you have to put on the truck?” Lampert, who is 67 years old, explained to me. 她在特伦顿长大，从小就随父亲一起在镇上派送牛奶，帮着父亲处理相关算术问题。“比如：琼斯先生要3夸脱这个，他隔壁的史密斯太太则要8夸脱，那么要往卡车上装几箱奶？”现年67岁的兰珀特这么跟我说。 She knew there must be a way to tap into what students already understood and then build on it. In her classroom, she replaced “I, We, You” with a structure you might call “You, Y’all, We.” 她深知必然存在一种方法，可以让我们利用学生们已经理解的东西，再在上面添砖加瓦。她在自己的课堂里抛弃了“我、我们、你”模式，采纳了一种可称为“你、你们、我们”的模式。 Rather than starting each lesson by introducing the main idea to be learned that day, she assigned a single “problem of the day,” designed to let students struggle toward it — first on their own (You), then in peer groups (Y’all) and finally as a whole class (We). 她的每节课并不从介绍当日要学的主要内容开始，而是布置一个“每日一问”。设计这个问题，是为了让学生们努力去解决它——首先是自己想（“你”），然后是小组讨论（“你们”），最后是全班一起来（“我们”）。 The result was a process that replaced answer-getting with what Lampert called sense-making. By pushing students to talk about math, she invited them to share the misunderstandings most American students keep quiet until the test. In the process, she gave them an opportunity to realize, on their own, why their answers were wrong. 通过由此形成的一套程序，兰珀特所说的“理解”就取代了“解题”。通过调动学生们讨论数学，她也引导他们交流彼此的错解，而多数美国人是直到考试都还对此一声不吭的。这一过程让学生们有机会自己认识到自己的答案为什么是错的。 Lampert, who until recently was a professor of education at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, now works for the Boston Teacher Residency, a program serving Boston public schools, and the New Visions for Public Schools network in New York City, instructing educators on how to train teachers. 兰珀特不久前还是密歇根大学安娜堡分校的教育学教授，现任职于“波士顿教师驻校”项目，该项目专为波士顿公立学校服务，同时她还在纽约市的公立学校新视野网络任职，职责是对教育者训练教师的方法进行指导。 In her book, “Teaching Problems and the Problems of Teaching,” Lampert tells the story of how one of her fifth-grade classes learned fractions. One day, a student made a “conjecture” that reflected a common misconception among children. The fraction 5 / 6, the student argued, goes on the same place on the number line as 5 / 12. 在她的著作《问题的教学与教学的问题》中，兰珀特讲述了她的一个五年级班级如何学习分数的故事。某天，有学生提出了一个“猜想”，他认为分数5/6和5/12在数轴上应该处于同一位置。这是孩子们中间很常见的一个误解。 For the rest of the class period, the student listened as a lineup of peers detailed all the reasons the two numbers couldn’t possibly be equivalent, even though they had the same numerator. A few days later, when Lampert gave a quiz on the topic (“Prove that 3 / 12 = 1 / 4 ,” for example), the student could confidently declare why: “Three sections of the 12 go into each fourth.” 这节课之后的时间里，这个学生就听他的一组同伴依次详细说明为什么这两个数不可能相等，尽管它们分子相同。几天之后，兰珀特针对这个内容出了个小测验（比如，“证明3/12=1/4”），学生们能够很有信心地说明理由：“12份中的三份，相当于四份中的一份”。 Over the years, observers who have studied Lampert’s classroom have found that students learn an unusual amount of math. Rather than forgetting algorithms, they retain and even understand them. One boy who began fifth grade declaring math to be his worst subject ended it able to solve multiplication, long division and fraction problems, not to mention simple multivariable equations. It’s hard to look at Lampert’s results without concluding that with the help of a great teacher, even Americans can become the so-called math people we don’t think we are. 多年以来，通过研究兰珀特的课堂，观察者已经发现，学生们学到的数学多到超乎寻常。他们不会忘记运算法则，不但记住了，而且还能理解。有个男生刚进五年级时说数学是他最差的科目，但五年级结束时他却学会了解决乘法、长除和分数问题，更别说简单的多元方程组了。看到兰珀特的成绩，人们自会得出这样的结论：只要有了不起的教师，即使美国人也可能变成数学民族，我们现在可不会这么认为。 Among math reformers, Lampert’s work gained attention. Her research was cited in the same N.C.T.M. standards documents that Takahashi later pored over. She was featured in Time magazine in 1989 and was retained by the producers of “Sesame Street” to help create the show “Square One Television,” aimed at making math accessible to children. 兰珀特的工作在数学改革家中受到了关注。高桥昭彦曾仔细研读过的NCTM教学标准文件就曾引用过她的研究。1989年，《时代周刊》曾刊载关于她的特稿。她还曾被《芝麻街》（Sesame Street）的制片人所聘，协助创作了“起点电视”节目，旨在让数学更易于被小孩子理解。 Yet as her ideas took off, she began to see a problem. In Japan, she was influencing teachers she had never met, by way of the N.C.T.M. standards. But where she lived, in America, teachers had few opportunities for learning the methods she developed. 然而在她的理念流行起来之后，她开始注意到一个问题。在日本，通过NCTM标准，她正在持续影响着许多她从未谋面的教师。但在她生活的美国，教师们却很少有机会学习她所开发的这些方法。 【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师：Randi Brookman Harris。蝴蝶图标来自于Tim Boelaars】 American institutions charged with training teachers in new approaches to math have proved largely unable to do it. At most education schools, the professors with the research budgets and deanships have little interest in the science of teaching. Indeed, when Lampert attended Harvard’s Graduate School of Education in the 1970s, she could find only one listing in the entire course catalog that used the word “teaching” in its title. (Today only 19 out of 231 courses include it.) Methods courses, meanwhile, are usually taught by the lowest ranks of professors — chronically underpaid, overworked and, ultimately, ineffective. 对教师们负有新方法培训之责的美国机构，已被证明几乎无力承担这一任务。在多数教育学校里，拥有研究预算和系主任职位的教授们很少有兴趣钻研教育科学。事实上，兰珀特1970年代在哈佛大学的教育学研究所上学时，在整个课程目录表中，名称里带有“教学”一词的课程竟然只有一门。（今天的231门课中也只有19门含有该词。）同时，方法课通常都由级别最低的教授来上——常年低薪、工作负担过重，而且终究并不称职。 Without the right training, most teachers do not understand math well enough to teach it the way Lampert does. “Remember,” Lampert says, “American teachers are only a subset of Americans.” As graduates of American schools, they are no more likely to display numeracy than the rest of us. “I’m just not a math person,” Lampert says her education students would say with an apologetic shrug. 由于缺乏正确的培训，多数教师对数学的了解不够深入，不能像兰珀特那样教书。兰珀特说：“记住，美国教师只是美国人的一个子集”。他们毕业于美国的学校，数学程度并不比其余美国人更高。兰珀特说，她的教育学学生会抱歉地耸耸肩跟她说“我确实不擅长数学”。 Consequently, the most powerful influence on teachers is the one most beyond our control. The sociologist Dan Lortie calls the phenomenon the apprenticeship of observation. Teachers learn to teach primarily by recalling their memories of having been taught, an average of 13,000 hours of instruction over a typical childhood. The apprenticeship of observation exacerbates what the education scholar Suzanne Wilson calls education reform’s double bind. The very people who embody the problem — teachers — are also the ones charged with solving it. 结果是，对教师们最有影响的因素，就是最不由我们掌控的。社会学家丹·洛尔蒂将这种现象叫做“旁观习艺”（apprenticeship of observation）。教师们主要是通过回忆自己的受教经历来学习教书，一般人童年时接受的教导平均有13000小时。“旁观习艺”现象加剧了教育学家苏珊·威尔逊所称的教育改革双重困境：问题本就在于教师，而负责解决这一问题的也是教师。 Lampert witnessed the effects of the double bind in 1986, a year after California announced its intention to adopt “teaching for understanding,” a style of math instruction similar to Lampert’s. A team of researchers that included Lampert’s husband, David Cohen, traveled to California to see how the teachers were doing as they began to put the reforms into practice. 1986年，也就是加利福尼亚宣布要采用与兰珀特的数学教育方式类似的“达成理解的教学”的第二年，兰珀特见证了这种双重困境的后果。教师们开始将改革付诸实践后，一个研究小组（其中包括兰珀特的丈夫大卫·科恩）就跑到加利福尼亚去观察他们到底是如何做的。 But after studying three dozen classrooms over four years, they found the new teaching simply wasn’t happening. Some of the failure could be explained by active resistance. One teacher deliberately replaced a new textbook’s problem-solving pages with the old worksheets he was accustomed to using. 4年以后，通过研究30多个课堂，他们发现“新教学法”根本没有出现。这种失败部分源于主动的抵制。有个教师就故意拿他惯于使用的旧习题集替换掉了新教材中的问题解答部分。 Much more common, though, were teachers who wanted to change, and were willing to work hard to do it, but didn’t know how. Cohen observed one teacher, for example, who claimed to have incited a “revolution” in her classroom. But on closer inspection, her classroom had changed but not in the way California reformers intended it to. 然而，更为普遍的情况是，教师们想要有所改变，也愿意努力去实现改变，但他们不知道如何下手。科恩就观察了一位自称在课堂里引发了“革命”的教师。细查发现，她的课堂确实有所改变，但方向却与加利福尼亚改革家的意图不同。 Instead of focusing on mathematical ideas, she inserted new activities into the traditional “I, We You” framework. The supposedly cooperative learning groups she used to replace her rows of desks, for example, seemed in practice less a tool to encourage discussion than a means to dismiss the class for lunch (this group can line up first, now that group, etc.). 她没能聚焦于数学理念，而是在传统的“我、我们、你”框架中加入了一些新活动。比如，她撤掉成排的课桌，代之以意在增进合作的学习小组，但从实践情形来看，这一替换与其说是鼓励了讨论，倒不如说是方便了学生下课吃午饭（比如，这组先排队，那组再上）。 And how could she have known to do anything different? Her principal praised her efforts, holding them up as an example for others. Official math-reform training did not help, either. Sometimes trainers offered patently bad information — failing to clarify, for example, that even though teachers were to elicit wrong answers from students, they still needed, eventually, to get to correct ones. Textbooks, too, barely changed, despite publishers’ claims to the contrary. 不过，她又能知晓什么其它办法呢？校长鼓励了她所做的努力，将其树为他人学习的榜样。官方的数学改革培训也没能帮到她。有时候培训者还会提供明显糟糕的信息——比如，没能清楚地说明，尽管教师们需要从学生那里诱导出错误的回答，但最终仍然需要让学生们给出正确的答案。同样，教材也基本保持原样，尽管出版社声称已经做出了改变。 With the Common Core, teachers are once more being asked to unlearn an old approach and learn an entirely new one, essentially on their own. Training is still weak and infrequent, and principals — who are no more skilled at math than their teachers — remain unprepared to offer support. 现在公共核心来了，再一次要求教师们忘记旧的方法，而且基本上要全靠他们自己去学会全新的方法。培训力度仍很弱，且频率很低，校长们——其数学技能当然跟教师们一样差——也仍然是毫无准备，无力提供支持。 Textbooks, once again, have received only surface adjustments, despite the shiny Common Core labels that decorate their covers. “To have a vendor say their product is Common Core is close to meaningless,” says Phil Daro, an author of the math standards. 教材依然如故只做了表面的调整，就只有封面上装饰有公共核心那闪闪发亮的标签。该数学标准的作者之一菲尔·达罗说：“让小贩们去说他们的产品是公共核心，这几近于毫无意义。” Left to their own devices, teachers are once again trying to incorporate new ideas into old scripts, often botching them in the process. One especially nonsensical result stems from the Common Core’s suggestion that students not just find answers but also “illustrate and explain the calculation by using equations, rectangular arrays, and/or area models.” 教师们只能自摸门道，又一次尝试把新理念塞进旧的脚本里，通常还只能一边尝试一边缝缝补补。公共核心建议学生们不仅要找到答案，而且要“运用等式、矩形阵列和（或）面积模型来图解和阐述其计算过程”，这一建议导致了一个特别荒谬的结果。 The idea of utilizing arrays of dots makes sense in the hands of a skilled teacher, who can use them to help a student understand how multiplication actually works. For example, a teacher trying to explain multiplication might ask a student to first draw three rows of dots with two dots in each row and then imagine what the picture would look like with three or four or five dots in each row. 在经验丰富的教师手中，使用成列的小圆点这一想法确实有道理，有助于学生理解乘法的实际运算过程。比如，正在讲解乘法的教师可以让学生先画3排小圆点，每排2个，然后让他去想象如果每排有3个或4个或5个点，会构成什么样的图形。 Guiding the student through the exercise, the teacher could help her see that each march up the times table (3x2, 3x3, 3x4) just means adding another dot per row. But if a teacher doesn’t use the dots to illustrate bigger ideas, they become just another meaningless exercise. 通过引导学生做这种活动，教师可以让他们看到，乘法表上每进一格（3x2,3x3,3x4），意思不过是每排多加1个圆点而已。但是如果教师使用这些圆点不是为了说明更大的概念，它们就只会成为另一种无意义的演练。 Instead of memorizing familiar steps, students now practice even stranger rituals, like drawing dots only to count them or breaking simple addition problems into complicated forms (62+26, for example, must become 60+2+20+6) without understanding why. This can make for even poorer math students. “In the hands of unprepared teachers,” Lampert says, “alternative algorithms are worse than just teaching them standard algorithms.” 学生们不用再背诵熟悉的步骤，但现在却要练习更为奇怪的程序，比如画小圆点就是为了数点数，或将简单的加法问题拆解为复杂形式（如62+26必须变成60+2+20+6），而并不理解这么做的理由。这可能使学生的数学技能变得更差。兰珀特说：“在毫无准备的教师手中，换个算法教学生比只按常规算法来教效果更糟。” No wonder parents and some mathematicians denigrate the reforms as “fuzzy math.” In the warped way untrained teachers interpret them, they are fuzzy. 家长们和一些数学家将这一改革贬称为“糊涂数学”，这一点都不奇怪。由未经训练的教师们扭曲表达之后，这一改革确实是糊涂的。 When Akihiko Takahashi arrived in America, he was surprised to find how rarely teachers discussed their teaching methods. A year after he got to Chicago, he went to a one-day conference of teachers and mathematicians and was perplexed by the fact that the gathering occurred only twice a year. 高桥昭彦到了美国后，吃惊地发现极少有教师会讨论各自的教学方法。到芝加哥后一年，他去参加一个由教师和数学家组成的会议，会期一天。他对该集会每年只办两次这一事实感到困惑。 In Japan, meetings between math-education professors and teachers happened as a matter of course, even before the new American ideas arrived. More distressing to Takahashi was that American teachers had almost no opportunities to watch one another teach. 在日本，即使是在美国人的新理念传入之前，数学教育教授和教师之间的会议也是一件理所当然的事。更令高桥昭彦感到忧虑的是，美国教师几乎没有任何观摩彼此教学的机会。 In Japan, teachers had always depended on jugyokenkyu, which translates literally as “lesson study,” a set of practices that Japanese teachers use to hone their craft. A teacher first plans lessons, then teaches in front of an audience of students and other teachers along with at least one university observer. Then the observers talk with the teacher about what has just taken place. Each public lesson poses a hypothesis, a new idea about how to help children learn. And each discussion offers a chance to determine whether it worked. 日本教师历来依赖“授业研究”（jugyokenkyu），这是他们用以磨炼自身技艺的一套做法。教师首先备课，然后要在由学生、其他教师和至少一名来自大学的旁听者组成的听众面前讲授。然后旁听者要和该教师交流刚才的授课如何。每一次公开课都会提出一条假想，即如何帮助孩子们学习的新想法。而每一次讨论都为确定这一想法是否有效提供了机会。 Without jugyokenkyu, it was no wonder the American teachers’ work fell short of the model set by their best thinkers. Without jugyokenyku, Takahashi never would have learned to teach at all. Neither, certainly, would the rest of Japan’s teachers. 因此毫不奇怪，由于没有授业研究，美国教师的工作达不到由美国最好的思想家所设定的典范。如果没有授业研究，高桥昭彦压根就无从学会如何教书。当然，日本的其他教师也同样学不会。 The best discussions were the most microscopic, minute-by-minute recollections of what had occurred, with commentary. If the students were struggling to represent their subtractions visually, why not help them by, say, arranging tile blocks in groups of 10, a teacher would suggest. 其中最好的讨论就是对授课过程最微观的、一分钟一分钟的回忆和评论。某位教师可能建议，如果学生们难以用形象的方式来表达减法，为什么不帮帮他们呢，比如让他们10个一组地排列一些砖块。 Or after a geometry lesson, someone might note the inherent challenge for children in seeing angles as not just corners of a triangle but as quantities — a more difficult stretch than making the same mental step for area. By the end, the teachers had learned not just how to teach the material from that day but also about math and the shape of students’ thoughts and how to mold them. 或者一堂几何课之后，也许有人会注意到，对于小孩子而言，把角不仅视作三角形的角落，而且视为一种数量，这件事有着其固有的挑战——这种延伸比在面积问题上完成同样的思考步骤更为困难。最后，教师们不仅能学到如何讲授当日要讲的内容，也能学到数学和学生思维的特性，以及如何塑造他们的思维方法。 If teachers weren’t able to observe the methods firsthand, they could find textbooks, written by the leading instructors and focusing on the idea of allowing students to work on a single problem each day. Lesson study helped the textbook writers home in on the most productive problems. For example, if you are trying to decide on the best problem to teach children to subtract a one-digit number from a two-digit number using borrowing, or regrouping, you have many choices: 11 minus 2, 18 minus 9, etc. 如果教师们无法亲自观摩这种方法，他们还可以找教材。教材由首屈一指的教育者写成，专注于让学生每天攻克一个题目这一理念。教学研究能让教材作者专门注意那些最有成效的题目。比如，你要教小孩子用借数法或重组法来做两位数减一位数的减法，假如你想知道用哪个题目最好，就可能面临多种选择：比如11减2，18减9等。 Yet from all these options, five of the six textbook companies in Japan converged on the same exact problem, ToshiakiraFujii, a professor of math education at Tokyo Gakugei University, told me. They determined that 13 minus 9 was the best. 然而，东京学艺大学（Tokyo Gakugei University）的藤井斋亮教授告诉我，在那么多的选择中，日本六分之五的教材出版社扎堆似地选择了完全一样的一个题目。他们都确认13减9是最好的题目。 Other problems, it turned out, were likely to lead students to discover only one solution method. With 12 minus 3, for instance, the natural approach for most students was to take away 2 and then 1 (the subtraction-subtraction method). Very few would take 3 from 10 and then add back 2 (the subtraction-addition method). 实践表明，其它题目都很可能只能引导学生发现一种解法。就拿12减3来说，大部分学生很自然地就会先减去2再减去1（先减再减法）。很少有人会先从10中减去3，再加回2（先减再加法）。 But Japanese teachers knew that students were best served by understanding both methods. They used 13 minus 9 because, faced with that particular problem, students were equally likely to employ subtraction-subtraction (take away 3 to get 10, and then subtract the remaining 6 to get 4) as they were to use subtraction-addition (break 13 into 10 and 3, and then take 9 from 10 and add the remaining 1 and 3 to get 4). A teacher leading the “We” part of the lesson, when students shared their strategies, could do so with full confidence that both methods would emerge. 但是日本的教师知道，同时领会这两种方法，对学生最好。他们使用13减9这个题目，是因为学生们在面对这一特殊题目时，使用先减再减法（减3得10，再减剩下的6得4）和先减再加法（把13拆为10加3，从10中减去9，把剩下的1和3相加得4）的可能性一样大。课堂上，当教师引导学生做“我们”这一步（让学生们交流彼此的解题方法）时，就有信心看到两种方法都会出现。 By 1995, when American researchers videotaped eighth-grade classrooms in the United States and Japan, Japanese schools had overwhelmingly traded the old “I, We, You” script for “You, Y’all, We.” (American schools, meanwhile didn’t look much different than they did before the reforms.) 到1995年，当美国研究者对美日两国的八年级数学课堂进行录像时，日本学校已经势不可挡地用“你、你们、我们”模式取代了老式的“我、我们、你”脚本。（与此同时，美国学校则看起来与改革前相比没有什么大的变化）。 Japanese students had changed too. Participating in class, they spoke more often than Americans and had more to say. In fact, when Takahashi came to Chicago initially, the first thing he noticed was how uncomfortably silent all the classrooms were. One teacher must have said, “Shh!” a hundred times, he said. 日本学生也有所改变。在课堂参与上，他们比美国人说得更多，也更有东西可说。事实上，高桥昭彦初到芝加哥时，他注意到的第一件事就是所有课堂都安静得令人极为难受。他说，有个老师肯定说了一百次“嘘！”。 Later, when he took American visitors on tours of Japanese schools, he had to warn them about the noise from children talking, arguing, shrieking about the best way to solve problems. The research showed that Japanese students initiated the method for solving a problem in 40 percent of the lessons; Americans initiated 9 percent of the time. 后来，他带美国访客参观日本学校，不得不预先提醒他们，孩子们就最佳解题方法进行交谈、争辩、尖叫时会很吵。前述研究表明，日本学生在40%的课上提出过解答问题的方法，美国学生则为9%。 Similarly, 96 percent of American students’ work fell into the category of “practice,” while Japanese students spent only 41 percent of their time practicing. Almost half of Japanese students’ time was spent doing work that the researchers termed “invent/think.” (American students spent less than 1 percent of their time on it.) 同样，美国学生课堂上所做的，有96%属于“练习”这个类别，而日本学生做练习的时间只有41%。日本学生有将近一半的时间是在做研究者称为“创造/思考”一类的事。（美国学生做此类活动的时间不到1%）。 Even the equipment in classrooms reflected the focus on getting students to think. Whereas American teachers all used overhead projectors, allowing them to focus students’ attention on the teacher’s rules and equations, rather than their own, in Japan, the preferred device was a blackboard, allowing students to track the evolution of everyone’s ideas. 即便是教室里的教具也体现了对于促进学生思考的关注。美国教师习惯用越过头顶的投影仪，方便他们将学生的注意力集中于教师们的、而非学生自己的规则和等式。日本老师更喜爱的教具则是黑板，它能让学生们追踪每个人想法的演变。 Japanese schools are far from perfect. Though lesson study is pervasive in elementary and middle school, it is less so in high school, where the emphasis is on cramming for college entrance exams. As is true in the United States, lower-income students in Japan have recently been falling behind their peers, and people there worry about staying competitive on international tests. 日本学校远非完美。尽管小学和初中里面授业研究很普遍，但在高中就并非如此了。高中侧重的是为大学入学考试死记硬背。跟美国一样，来自收入较低家庭的日本学生近来也已落后于同龄人，同时，日本人也很担心他们在国际测试中的竞争力。 Yet while the United States regularly hovers in the middle of the pack or below on these tests, Japan scores at the top. And other countries now inching ahead of Japan imitate the jugyokenkyuapproach. Some, like China, do this by drawing on their own nativejugyokenkyu-style traditions (zuanyanjiaocai, or “studying teaching materials intensively,” Chinese teachers call it). 不过，与美国在这类测试中长期徘徊于中等或下等不同，日本得分总是靠前。而其他正在慢慢超过日本的国家，也模仿了授业研究方法。有些国家，比如中国，还吸收了他们自己本土存在的授业研究式的传统（中国教师把它叫做“钻研教材”）。 Others, including Singapore, adopt lesson study as a deliberate matter of government policy. Finland, meanwhile, made the shift by carving out time for teachers to spend learning. There, as in Japan, teachers teach for 600 or fewer hours each school year, leaving them ample time to prepare, revise and learn. By contrast, American teachers spend nearly 1,100 hours with little feedback. 其他国家，包括新加坡，将教学研究接纳为政府政策的一项明确内容。同时，芬兰的应对办法是为教师提供用于学习的时间。跟日本一样，芬兰教师每学年只要教课600或不到600小时，有充足的时间备课、修订和学习。与此相比，美国教师每学年教课将近1100小时，还得不到多少反馈。 It could be tempting to dismiss Japan’s success as a cultural novelty, an unreproducible result of an affluent, homogeneous, and math-positive society. Perhaps the Japanese are simply the “math people” Americans aren’t. Yet when I visited Japan, every teacher I spoke to told me a story that sounded distinctly American. 有种想法很吸引人，那就是认为日本的成功乃是一种文化上的新奇事物，是富裕、同质且有数学天赋的社会的一个不可复制的结果，然后对之不加理会。也许日本人就是那种“数学民族”，而美国人不是。不过，我在日本旅游时，每位跟我交谈过的教师都跟我讲过一个听起来美国味特别浓的故事。 “I used to hate math,” an elementary-school teacher named Shinichiro Kurita said through a translator. “I couldn’t calculate. I was slow. I was always at the bottom of the ladder, wondering why I had to memorize these equations.” Like Takahashi, when he went to college and saw his instructors teaching differently, “it was an enlightenment.” 一位名为栗田辰一朗的小学教师通过翻译跟我说：“我以前特别讨厌数学。我不会计算，反应也慢。我总是处于梯子的最底下，心想为什么必须要背那些等式。”就跟高桥昭彦一样，他到了大学以后，得以看到他的老师用一种不同的方式上课，“那是一种启蒙”。 Learning to teach the new way himself was not easy. “I had so much trouble,” Kurita said. “I had absolutely no idea how to do it.” He listened carefully for what Japanese teachers call children’s twitters — mumbled nuggets of inchoate thoughts that teachers can mold into the fully formed concept they are trying to teach. 他本人学习这种新的教学方式并不容易。栗田辰一朗说道：“困难重重。我完全不知道怎么去做”。他仔细倾听日本教师所说的“小孩的叽喳”——含有尚未成熟的想法的含糊信息，教师们可以将之形塑成为他们正要讲授的完全成型的概念。 And he worked hard on bansho, the term Japanese teachers use to describe the art of blackboard writing that helps students visualize the flow of ideas from problem to solution to broader mathematical principles. But for all his efforts, he said, “the children didn’t twitter, and I couldn’t write on the blackboard.” Yet Kurita didn’t give up — and he had resources to help him persevere. 而且他也努力学做板书，板书的作用是帮助学生形象地看到从题目到解答到更广泛的数学原理中的观念流变。然而不管他如何努力，他说:“孩子们不叽喳，我也写不出板书”。不过栗田辰一朗没有放弃，而且他也有资源支撑他继续坚持。 He went to study sessions with other teachers, watched as many public lessons as he could and spent time with his old professors. Eventually, as he learned more, his students started to do the same. Today Kurita is the head of the math department at Setagaya Elementary School in Tokyo, the position once held by Takahashi’s mentor, Matsuyama. 他和其他教师一起去参加研讨会，尽其所能地观看了许多公开课，还与他以前的教授进行交流。最终，随着他所学日多，他的学生也开始如此。如今，栗田辰一朗是东京世田谷小学校数学部的主任，这个职位以前曾由高桥昭彦的导师松山武士充任。 Of all the lessons Japan has to offer the United States, the most important might be the belief in patience and the possibility of change. Japan, after all, was able to shift a country full of teachers to a new approach. Telling me his story, Kurita quoted what he described as an old Japanese saying about perseverance: “Sit on a stone for three years to accomplish anything.” 在日本能够向美国提供的诸多教益中，最重要的也许是对耐心和改变的可能性所抱持的信念。日本最终得以将一个满是教师的国家导向一种新的方法。栗田辰一朗跟我讲述他的故事时，引用了一句日本老话：石坐三年自然暖，就是说要有毅力。 Admittedly, a tenacious commitment to improvement seems to be part of the Japanese national heritage, showing up among teachers, autoworkers, sushi chefs and tea-ceremony masters. Yet for his part, Akihiko Takahashi extends his optimism even to a cause that can sometimes seem hopeless — the United States. 必须承认，对精益求精的执着信奉似乎是日本民族遗产的一部分，突出体现在教师、汽车工人、寿司厨师和茶道大师身上。不过就高桥昭彦而言，他甚至还将这种乐观精神拓展到了一个有时看起来完全无望的事业之上——美国。 After the great disappointment of moving here in 1991, he made a decision his colleagues back in Japan thought was strange. He decided to stay and try to help American teachers embrace the innovative ideas that reformers like Magdalene Lampert pioneered. 在经历了1991年搬到此国时的巨大失望之后，他做出了一个令他的日本同事感到奇怪的决定。他决心留在美国，并试着帮助美国教师采用兰珀特等改革家所开创的创新理念。 Today Takahashi lives in Chicago and holds a full-time job in the education department at DePaul University. (He also has a special appointment at his alma mater in Japan, where he and his wife frequently visit.) When it comes to transforming teaching in America, Takahashi sees promise in individual American schools that have decided to embrace lesson study. 高桥昭彦现居芝加哥，在德保罗大学（DePaul Univerisity）的教育系拥有全职工作。（他还在他的日本母校拥有一个特殊职位，并经常与妻子一起回去）。在美国教学转型问题上，高桥昭彦从那些决心采纳教学研究方法的个别美国学校那里看到了希望。 Some do this deliberately, working with Takahashi to transform the way they teach math. Others have built versions of lesson study without using that name. Sometimes these efforts turn out to be duds. When carefully implemented, though, they show promise. In one experiment in which more than 200 American teachers took part in lesson study, student achievement rose, as did teachers’ math knowledge — two rare accomplishments. 有些学校是刻意如此去做的，它们跟高桥昭彦合作，尝试改变教授数学的方式。其它学校也开展了不同形式的教学研究，只是没有采用这个名称。有时这些努力会归于失败。但如果精心实施，那就颇有前景。某项实验中，有200多名美国教师参与了教学研究，学生成绩有所提高，教师们的数学知识也有所提高——这两项成就都非常稀罕。 Training teachers in a new way of thinking will take time, and American parents will need to be patient. In Japan, the transition did not happen overnight. When Takahashi began teaching in the new style, parents initially complained about the young instructor experimenting on their children. 训练教师们用新的方式思考，这需要时间。所以美国家长也需要耐心。日本的转型不是一夜之间实现的。当初，高桥昭彦开始用新方式教书时，家长们最初也对这位年轻老师在他们的孩子身上做实验表示抱怨。 But his early explorations were confined to just a few lessons, giving him a chance to learn what he was doing and to bring the parents along too. He began sending home a monthly newsletter summarizing what the students had done in class and why. 不过他最初的探索也只局限于不多的一些课程，他由此有机会搞清自己在做什么，同时也能带着家长们一起进步。后来他开始每个月寄一份通讯给家长，概述学生们在课堂上都做了什么及其原因。 By his third year, he was sending out the newsletter every day. If they were going to support their children, and support Takahashi, the parents needed to know the new math as well. And over time, they learned. 到第三年，他寄出的通讯就成了每日一份。要让家长们支持他们的孩子，支持高桥昭彦，他们同样需要了解这种新数学。最后，他们学会了。 To cure our innumeracy, we will have to accept that the traditional approach we take to teaching math — the one that can be mind-numbing, but also comfortingly familiar — does not work. We will have to come to see math not as a list of rules to be memorized but as a way of looking at the world that really makes sense. 要治疗我们的数盲，就必须承认，我们用以教授数学的传统方法——那种可能会麻木心灵，不过同时又让我们感到熟悉而安逸的方法——行不通。我们终究必须要认识到，数学不是一份有待背诵的规则列表，而是一种有意义的看待世界的方式。 The other shift Americans will have to make extends beyond just math. Across all school subjects, teachers receive a pale imitation of the preparation, support and tools they need. And across all subjects, the neglect shows in students’ work. In addition to misunderstanding math, American students also, on average, write weakly, read poorly, think unscientifically and grasp history only superficially. 美国人必须要做的另一个转变超出了数学的范围。学校里所有科目的老师，在他们所需要的准备、支持和工具方面，都只能得到劣质的仿品。这种轻忽在学生所有学科的成绩中都表现了出来。除了搞不懂数学之外，平均而言，美国学生写作也差，阅读也差，不能进行科学思考，对历史也只有肤浅的了解。 Examining nearly 3,000 teachers in six school districts, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation recently found that nearly two-thirds scored less than “proficient” in the areas of “intellectual challenge” and “classroom discourse.” Odds-defying individual teachers can be found in every state, but the overall picture is of a profession struggling to make the best of an impossible hand. 盖茨基金会最近针对6个学区近3000名教师的测验发现，有将近三分之二的教师在“智识挑战”和“课堂讨论”领域达不到“熟练”级别。背离这一几率的个别教师在每个州都能找到，不过整体的图景就是这样：这个行业中的人正在艰苦努力，试图把手里的一副烂牌打好。 Most policies aimed at improving teaching conceive of the job not as a craft that needs to be taught but as a natural-born talent that teachers either decide to muster or don’t possess. Instead of acknowledging that changes like the new math are something teachers must learn over time, we mandate them as “standards” that teachers are expected to simply “adopt.” We shouldn’t be surprised, then, that their students don’t improve. 意在改进教学的多数政策，都没有将教学视作一种需要学习的技艺，而是把它视做一种与生俱来的天赋，教师们要么只需要召唤技能，要么就干脆没有。我们没有认识到像“新数学”这种转变，教师们是必须花时间去学的。相反，我们把新数学颁布为“标准”，教师们只要直接“采用”就好。这样，他们的学生没有进步，我们就不应该对此感到惊讶。 Here, too, the Japanese experience is telling. The teachers I met in Tokyo had changed not just their ideas about math; they also changed their whole conception of what it means to be a teacher. 在这里，日本人的经验同样有益。我在东京见过的教师不但已经转变了他们对数学的观念，他们还转变了他们对身为教师意味着什么的整个理解。 “The term ‘teaching’ came to mean something totally different to me,” a teacher named Hideto Hirayama told me through a translator. It was more sophisticated, more challenging — and more rewarding. 一位名叫平山秀人的教师通过翻译告诉我：“对我来说，‘教书’这个词的意义已经完全不同”。它变得更为精致复杂，更富于挑战——回报也更大。 “The moment that a child changes, the moment that he understands something, is amazing, and this transition happens right before your eyes,” he said. “It seems like my heart stops every day.” “一个孩子发生变化的时候，他理解了某个事物的时候，那真是美妙，这种转变就正好发生在你眼前”，他说，“就好像我每天都会心跳停止一样。” （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-09-08】 @格林黑风:请问不同类型的（有欧洲人血统）的混血儿自我族裔判定的影响因素是什么？据调查，在美国黑白混血儿自认为白人的比重大大低于黄白混血儿和拉白混血儿 @whigzhou: 美国黑人的“一滴血法则”大概是特殊历史造成的例外，最初是白人方面排斥的结果，而不是黑人方面的主动选择，久而久之，双方都这么认为了 @whigzhou: 因为早期白人和黑人地位过于悬殊，黑白通婚和混血儿皆不被白方社会接受，而且多数是私生子，他们在自我认同上没有别的选择。 @whigzhou: 不过，单单地位悬殊原本未必有这效果，还要加上基督教的婚姻传统，单妻制对夫妻地位对称性要求更高，若换成阿拉伯的多妻制，结果就不一样了 @whigzhou: 阿拉伯人历史上娶黑人的很多（其中很多是奴隶），假如我的解释没错，对阿拉伯混血儿应该就不存在一滴血法则之类的习惯，你可以查一下 @格林黑风:问题是印第安人的地位难道比黑人还要高吗？ @whigzhou: 大概是吧，印第安人和殖民者曾是对等敌手，打过仗，签过条约，划过边界，而不是被奴役过

How Liberals Funked It? 自由派是如何可耻遁匿的？ 作者：Robert Conquest @ 1999-7-30 译者：Yuncong Yang 校对：Marcel ZHANG（@马赫塞勒张），沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Hoover Institution，http://www.hoover.org/research/how-liberals-funked-it A liberal is, by definition, one whose aim is the furtherance of ever greater political liberty, freedom of thought, and social justice. A number of those who thought of themselves as, and were thought of as, liberals became apologists for Stalinist or similar regimes whose most notable characteristics were extreme terror, narrow dogmatism, social oppression, and economic failure. That is, they were all that the liberal tradition opposed. 按定义，一个“自由派”理应是以推进政治自由、思想自由与社会公正为其目标。但是，许多自认为且被大众认为是自由派的人，却成了斯大林主义及类似政权的辩护士。这类政权最昭著的特征是极度的恐怖，僵化的教条主义，社会压制，以及经济失败。显然，所有这些都是自由派最应当反对的东西。 How, and why, did a number of liberals explicitly, and a large swath of liberaldom implicitly, overcome this objection? How did this apparent paradox come to pass? Why in the 1930s and later do we find a sort of general infection of the atmosphere in which much of the intelligentsia moved? Even apart from those who became more or less addicted to communism, there was also a stratum that usually gave the Soviet Union and such regimes some moral advantage over the West. 那么，那些明确这么做的自由派，以及更多默认其做法的泛自由派人士，为何能够克服这种显而易见的自相矛盾？它们又是如何做到这一点的？为什么会出现一个如此明显的悖论？为什么自1930年代起，整个知识界都感染了这种气氛？即使不算那些多少痴迷于共产主义的人，知识界里还有一大批人乐于认为：与西方相比，苏联及类似政权具有某种道义优势。 First, of course, we should say that there were many liberals—and in general many on the left—who kept their principles unsullied and were often among the strongest opponents of the communist despotisms. Liberal is, indeed, a vague term. Many of us would take a “liberal” position on some issues, a “conservative” one on others—as most of the American or British people in fact do (an attitude shared by the present writer). 首先应当指出的是：许多自由派——以及一般而言，许多左派——还是保持着他们的原则未受玷污的。他们时常还属于共产暴政最坚决的反对者之列。“自由派”这个词的意义本身就是相当含糊的。大多数人都在一些问题上抱着“自由派”的看法，而在另一些问题上持“保守派”观点，多数英国人或美国人——含笔者在内——都是这样。 These two vaguely differentiated attitudes are the poles within the normal development, or balance, of a civic or consensual society. But all those with a reasonably critical intelligence, whether “conservative” or “liberal” on other issues, were hostile to the USSR. Those who supported it unreservedly were Communists; those who excused it may have thought of themselves as liberals, but to that extent they degraded the term. 在一个平衡发展的公民社会或协约社会（consensual society）里，出现“自由派”和“保守派”这样两种各居一极但分野并不明确的观点，是再正常不过的了。但是所有具有适当批判思维能力的人，不管他在其它问题上自认为是保守派还是自由派，都是对苏联怀有敌意的。明确表态支持苏联的人无疑是共产主义者，而那些对苏联抱有心怀体谅的人，或许自认为是自由派，但他们这么做时，正是在给“自由派”这个词抹黑。 The phenomenon we deal with here is what Orwell called “renegade liberalism.” He defined these renegade liberals with characteristic felicity, in the unused preface to Animal Farm, as those who hold that “democracy” can only be defended by discouraging or suppressing independent thought. 本文要讨论的，是被乔治·奥威尔称为“变节的自由主义”的现象。奥威尔在《动物庄园》的一篇未发表的序文中，以他标志性的精妙笔触，定义了这些变节的自由派：这些人认为保卫他们眼中的“民主”的唯一方式，就是阻止或压制独立思考。 His immediate concern was that “where the USSR and its policies are concerned one cannot expect intelligent criticism or even, in many cases, plain honesty from liberal writers and journalists who are under no direct pressure to falsify their opinions.” 当时，最令奥威尔感到担忧的现象是，“即使并未受到什么迫使他们说假话的直接压力，自由派作家或记者们在讨论苏联及其政策时，也难以指望他们表现出一点批判性智慧，许多时候他们甚至都不肯说句实话。” Elsewhere (in “The Prevention of Literature”), he comments, “When one sees highly educated men looking on indifferently at oppression and persecution, one wonders which to despise more, their cynicism or their shortsightedness.” And, he felt obliged to add, “it is the liberals who fear liberty and intellectuals who want to do dirt on the intellect.” 在另一篇文章（《对文学的阻碍》）中，奥威尔评论道：“当一个受过高等教育的人对他眼前的压制和迫害熟视无睹，我真不知道是更应当鄙视他的冷漠还是他的短视。”可能是觉得自己有义务说得更明白一些，他又写道：“害怕自由的恰恰是那些自由派，而抹黑智识的正是知识分子。” THE SLIPPERY CONCEPT OF EQUALITY 平等：一个难以捉摸的概念 We can trace the roots of this aberration a long way back. Even before the First World War, L. T. Hobhouse in his classic Liberalism had written, “liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid meaning.” “Equality” is a slippery word. In a general sense we may allow that genuine liberals—and others—are committed to a society of equal citizens. 自由派的这种错乱由来已久。在第一次世界大战前，L.T.霍布豪斯在其经典著作《自由主义》中已然写道：“如果不讲平等，那么自由只是个表面好听而含义令人作呕的名词。”“平等”是个不大好定义的词。往大里说，我们可以认为那些真诚的自由派——也算上其他自由派好了——希望建成一个由平等公民组成的社会。 The liberal state may have a legitimate role in redressing poverty, making health care available, and so forth, but after a point we find that the liberté and égalité that proved incompatible in the 1790s are still awkward companions. 一个秉承自由派理念的国家，或许可以合法地在消除贫困，普及医疗保健等方面发挥作用。可是当自由派理念进一步延伸到社会生活的其他方面时，我们将会发现，在法国大革命时曾被证明不能无限相容的“liberté”和“égalité”依然会起冲突。 And, as the liberal attitude became more and more concerned with the use of political power to promote equality, it tended to become less and less concerned with the liberty side; even domestically (in Thomas Sowell’s words), “the grand delusion of contemporary liberals is that they have both the right and the ability to move their fellow creatures around like blocks of wood—and that the end results will be no different than if people had voluntarily chosen the same actions.” 并且，当自由派们越来越重视使用政治权力来推进平等的时候，他们会渐渐倾向于无视他们理念里的“自由”部分，即使这自由是他们同胞的自由。用托马斯·索维尔的话讲：“当代自由派陷入了一个巨大的幻觉：他们觉得他们既有权利也有能力像搬动木材一样随意指挥他们的同胞们。而且在他们指挥下，最终结果就跟人们最初自发选择同样的行动没什么差别。” And when these liberals looked abroad they found a regime that claimed to have the same aims—and used the same, or much the same, vocabulary. If anything, from a skeptic’s point of view, the Communists overdid it (with the result that any country nowadays calling itself a People’s Republic or a Democratic Republic is known at once to be a ruthless dictatorship). 当这些自由派们放眼海外，他们看到了一个号称和他们追求同一个目标的政权——而且这个政权也说着和他们大体相同的一套话。不，从一个怀疑者的眼里看来，共产主义者甚至可以说是把自由派的理想做过了头（其结果是现在人们看到一个“某某人民共和国”或者“某某民主主义共和国”，就立刻知道那是个残忍无情的专制政权）。 ROTTEN LIBERALS—AND THE VAST KLEPTOCRACY 腐臭的自由派——及广泛的盗贼统治 Communists in fact despised liberals, even if not quite as much as they despised social-democrats. It was in his procommunist period that W. H. Auden wrote: 共产主义者们实际上是鄙视自由派的，当然可能没有他们鄙视社会民主党人来得那么厉害。W.H.奥登在他支持共产主义的那段时期写下过这样的诗句：

Because you saw but were not indignant The invasion of the great malignant Cambridge ulcer That army intellectual Of every kind of liberal, Smarmy with friendship but of all There are none falser. 你看到了那恶心的剑桥脓疮， 看到了它入侵我们的国度， 却并不感到愤怒。 那支诸种自由派知识分子组成的侵略军， 表演着种种虚假的好意， 实际上，没人比他们更加虚伪卑鄙

“Rotten liberalism” was, of course, the conventional charge made by the Soviet Communists against those insufficiently ruthless in the repression of enemies of the people. 当然，“腐臭的自由主义者”这个词也是苏维埃共产主义者创造出来的。他们时常拿这个词来鄙视那些在镇压人民的敌人方面做得不够狠辣到位的家伙们。 Moreover, Lenin’s own interest in the overthrow of the existing order was so intense that he did not spread his progressivism into any other fields and had nothing but contempt for modern art, free love, unorthodox medicine, and all the other paraphernalia. Communist artistic principles—socialist realism and so forth—remained overtly hostile to all the modernisms dear to many liberal hearts. 此外，列宁本人是如此醉心于推翻现有秩序，以致他只有在这一方面才表现出了那么一点进步派倾向，而与此同时彻底无视了其他领域。对于现代艺术、自由恋爱、非传统医学，以及其它种种现代事物，列宁的态度只有鄙视。共产主义艺术的准则——社会主义现实主义等等——始终全面敌视各种形式的现代艺术，而这些现代艺术正是许多自由派们全心珍爱着的。 The Communists’ attitude to homosexuality, at least after its criminalization in the USSR in 1935, was contrary to an important component of the liberal worldview—but Moscow did not lose the allegiance even of homosexuals such as Guy Burgess. The Soviets suppressed and maligned all the psychological views, Freudian and other, dear to Western intellectuals. And Stalin’s extreme anti-Semitism in the post–World War II years ran against anything describable as liberal. 共产主义者对同性恋的态度，至少是在1935年苏联将同性恋入刑之后，是与自由派世界观的一个重要方面相抵触的。但即使是盖伊·伯吉斯【译注：英国情报人员和外交官，著名苏联间谍】这样的同性恋者，也从未放弃过对莫斯科的忠诚。苏联压制和批判所有那些西方知识分子视若珍宝的心理学学说——弗洛伊德主义等等。战后斯大林表现出的露骨的极端反犹倾向，更是和一切能被称为自由主义的思想相对立的。 But, some liberals felt, at least the Stalinists were not capitalists, not motivated by greed, which, taken as the defining quality of the economic system in the West, was thus the most detested of all vices for certain liberals. These were, in general, those who gained their income (and were highly competitive with rivals for it) in academic or media spheres, that is, money derived from, but not directly dependent on, “capitalism.” 但是，一些自由派们还是认为，至少斯大林主义者不是利欲熏心的资本家，而后者在一些自由派看来，是整个西方经济制度的根本特质，因此是所有罪恶中最可鄙弃的罪恶。抱有这样看法的人，通常都是从学术界或媒体业挣得收入（而且是通过与其对手的高强度竞争而挣得），这些钱自然也派生于 “资本主义”，虽然并不直接依靠于它。 Greed, it might be argued, is not as bad as mass murder. But in any case greed was equally prevalent in the mass murder societies. Corruption of every possible type has flourished in all the communist countries. It is not only that the USSR, for example, became a vast kleptocracy but also that even the supposedly pristine early revolutionaries were anything but immune. 或许有人会说，贪欲再怎么也没有大规模屠杀那么坏呀？可事实上，在那些发生大屠杀的国家里，贪欲和西方社会一样盛行。在所有共产主义国家里，一切人类社会中可能发生的腐败活动都大行其道。不仅苏联很快变成了一个巨大的盗贼统治国家，那些据说品行高洁的早期革命家们也都绝非纯洁无瑕。 In fact, with few exceptions the victorious Bolsheviks lived comfortably through the deprivations of the postrevolutionary period. Milovan Djilas, then a Yugoslav communist leader, was shocked at how his victorious partisans, on entering Belgrade, seized villas, cars, women, and so on. The same was noted of the Sandinistas when they entered Managua. 事实上，在革命后的匮乏时期里，得胜的布尔什维克领袖几无例外都过着优裕生活。米洛凡·吉拉斯，当年的南斯拉夫共产党领导人，震惊地看到他的同志们获胜进入贝尔格莱德后个个都开始霸占别墅、汽车和女人了。尼加拉瓜的桑地诺武装分子们打进马那瓜后的表现也一模一样。 THE SWING IN LEFTISH OPINION 左派观点的转变 The phenomenon of renegade liberalism arose in the early days of the Soviet regime. Lincoln Steffens, the fearless journalist exposer of American corruption, famously said of the USSR, “I have seen the future and it works.” He had seen nothing and that future didn’t work. 在苏维埃政权的幼年时期，变节的自由主义现象已经出现了。林肯·斯蒂芬斯，那位无畏的揭露美国种种腐败现象的名记者，曾说过一句关于苏联的名言：“我看到了它的未来，它行得通。”当然，实际上他啥也没看到，而那个未来也没行通。 But until the 1930s the Sovietophiles were a minority among liberals. It is in 1933 that we see a real swing in leftish opinion. The terror-famine early that year, in which millions died, had been widely and accurately reported in much of the Western press. 但直到2ij如此醉心于推翻现有秩序写下过这样的诗句191919119130年代，亲苏分子还只占自由派中的一小部分。西方左派对苏联态度的真正转变发生在1933年。在那年初，恐怖的乌克兰大饥荒——数百万人丧生——在西方得到了广泛且准确的报道。 But the Soviet government simply denied that any famine had taken place. President Kalinin, speaking of “political cheats who offer to help the starving Ukraine,” commented that, “only the most decadent classes are capable of producing such cynical elements.” 苏联政府则矢口否认曾发生过任何饥荒。最高苏维埃主席加里宁在谈到那些“号称要帮助饥饿的乌克兰的政治骗子”时说道：“只有那些最最卑劣的家伙才能编出这种犬儒主义的谎言。” The Soviet story was supported—as we now know for disreputable reasons—by reporters such as Walter Duranty. Thus two versions were available to the American liberals. But it was Duranty who received the Pulitzer Prize—for “dispassionate, interpretive reporting of the news from Russia.” 一些像沃尔特·杜兰蒂之类的记者支持了苏联方面的说法——我们今天知道，这些支持背后有着不可见人的理由。这样，在美国自由派的面前就出现了两种迥然相异的说法。但是最后得到普利策奖的是杜兰蒂——为他“就俄国消息作出的冷静的，解读性的报道”。 The announcement of the prize added that Duranty’s dispatches were “marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity,” being “excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.” 普利策评奖委员会的颁奖通稿里继续写道，杜兰蒂的报道表现了“学术性，洞察力，中立性，优秀的判断力，而且格外清晰明了”，这些报道是“最佳外国新闻报道的杰出典范”。 The Nation, citing him in its annual “honor roll,” described his as “the most enlightening, dispassionate and readable dispatches from a great nation in the making which appeared in any newspaper in the world.” 《国家》杂志在它一年一度的“荣誉榜”里列入了杜兰蒂的名字，说他的报道是“最富启示的公允冷静报道，可读性极佳。来自一个正浮现于全世界所有报章之上的，正在创建中的伟大国家”。 A banquet was given at the Waldorf Astoria in 1933 to celebrate the recognition of the USSR by the United States. A list of names was read, each politely applauded by the guests until Walter Duranty’s was reached; then, Alexander Woollcott wrote in the New Yorker, “the only really prolonged pandemonium was evoked. . . . Indeed, one got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty.” 1933年，在纽约华尔道夫饭店举办了一场盛大宴会，旨在庆祝美国对苏联的承认。会上宣读了一串名字，每个名字都得到了人们礼貌性的掌声。接着杜兰蒂的名字出现了，亚历山大·沃尔科特在《纽约客》上写道：“（杜兰蒂的名字）激发了当晚唯一一次长时间的狂热喧腾……的确，当晚来宾都感觉到，仿佛美国出现了一次鉴别力大爆发，同时承认了苏联和杜兰蒂。” This scene in the Waldorf was clearly a full-dress appearance of the liberal establishment. And all this was before Stalin and his Comintern had given up their overt hostility to social democrats and liberals and moved over to a popular front. 华尔道夫饭店的景象，无疑象征着美国自由派当权集团的正式亮相。而所有这些，都是在斯大林和他的第三国际全面放弃对社会民主主义者及自由派的公开敌视态度、转而采取一种更受欢迎的面貌之前发生的。 THE ACADEMIC FRONDE 学术界的投石党人 From the start, it was not only the occasional corrupt journalist such as Walter Duranty but also a veritable Fronde of academics who were at least equally responsible for mediating the Soviet phenomena for the Western liberal intelligentsia. It would be to present all the horrors of expert academe. 打一开始，在西方自由派知识界面前为苏联洗地的，就不只是杜兰蒂等几个腐败记者。一伙名副其实的学术界投石党人至少要和杜兰蒂之流负相等的责任。从中将揭示出整个专业学界最恶心的事。 Most notorious, of course, were the deans of Western social science, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who went to Russia, saw the system, and produced what purported to be a learned tome on the subject—Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?—which in its second edition, at the height of the terror, dropped the question mark. 最臭名昭著的，当然是当时西方社会科学界掌门人西德尼·韦伯和贝亚特丽斯·韦伯夫妇。他们前往苏联，看到了苏联体制，然后写出了号称苏联问题权威著作的《苏联共产主义：一种新的文明？》——此书再版时，书名里的那个问号被删掉了，而此时正值苏联政治恐怖的高峰。 Their massive exercise in drivel was largely based on believing Soviet official documents. They were, in effect, taken in above all by Potemkin paperwork—of elections, trade unions, cooperatives, statistics, all the documents of the phantom USSR. 韦伯夫妇之所以表现出如此惊人的愚蠢和幼稚，很大程度上归因于他们对苏联官方文件的盲信。实际上，他们被眼前的波将金式虚假资料彻底蒙骗了。这些资料里描述了选举，工会，合作社，包含各种统计数据，向韦伯夫妇呈现了一个完全虚假的苏联。 Many others followed, such as Harold Laski, professor of political science at the London School of Economics and at one point chairman of the Labour Party. When Sir Bernard Pares, the West’s leading “Russianist,” arrived in Russia, his previous anti-Soviet feelings evaporated. 很多人趋步韦伯夫妇之后尘，比如伦敦经济学院的政治学教授哈罗德·拉斯基，他后来曾任工党主席。西方世界的首席“俄国通”伯纳德·帕雷斯爵士一踏上俄国国土，他之前的反苏倾向立刻烟消云散了。 As his son admiringly put it, he “had not left the Moscow railway station before his mind was flooded with the realization that the Bolsheviks were, after all, Russia.” He, Laski, the Webbs, and others all pronounced the show trials genuine exercises in truth and legality. 就像后来他儿子满怀着敬慕之心写下的那样，他“在踏出莫斯科火车站之前就已得出结论，布尔什维克就是俄国”。帕雷斯，拉斯基，韦伯夫妇和许多其他人都认为，他们看到的那些审判秀都是真正基于真相与合法性的实践。 These were, indeed, individuals. The academic world, though liberal in a general way, was not as yet a scene of organized error on the communist regime. That came later and in particular in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 以上说到的这些多是个人行为，当时的学术界，虽然总的来说是偏自由派的，还并没有在共产政权问题上表现出后来那种几乎是有组织的错误倾向。那要等到以后，特别是要在二十世纪的最后1/4才会大行其道呢。 THE POTEMKIN PHENOMENON 波将金现象 The Potemkin phenomenon proper—the presentation of faked appearances of prosperity or social triumphs—was, of course, widespread in all the communist countries. Anyone who ever visited the Exhibition of Economic Achievements in Moscow will know the score. Similarly, when Vice President Henry Wallace, on a flight from America to China, was for a few days in the midst of the frightful Kolyma labor camps, the guard towers and barbed wires were torn down, the miserable prisoners replaced by strong and healthy NKVD men, and so on. 波将金现象——伪造出虚假的繁荣或社会成就用于展示——当然在所有共产主义国家中都广泛存在。随便哪个看过莫斯科的经济成就展的人都知道那是怎么回事。与此相似，当美国副总统亨利·华莱士自美国飞往中国时，他曾在那恐怖的科雷马劳改营中待过几天。在华莱士停留期间，所有的守卫塔和铁丝网都拆掉了。可怜的囚犯们被换成了身强力壮的内务人民委员部人员。诸如此类。 Many such stories could be told. Yet the most extraordinary are those representing the Soviet penal system as humane and progressive. The facts about the Gulag were already available in a number of firsthand accounts. But, entirely for deceiving the Western liberals, the Stalinists maintained some “model prisons”—in particular one at Bolshevo where J. L. Gillin, a former president of the American Sociological Society, noted that: 这样的故事还有很多，其中最为卓异的，无疑是那些把苏联刑罚系统包装为“人道”和“进步”的体制。当时，已经有一些有关古拉格实情的第一手记述出现了。然而，斯大林主义者们为了蒙骗西方自由派，特意设置了一些“模范监狱”。比如设在波尔谢夫的模范监狱。曾任美国社会学学会主席的J.L.季林在访问波尔谢夫监狱后写道：

In accordance with the spirit of the Revolution the terms current in capitalist penology are discarded. There are no “crimes”; there are “wrongs.” . . . There is no “punishment,” only “measures of social defence.” 根据革命精神，资本主义刑罚学说里的词语都被抛弃了。不再有“犯罪”了，只有“错误”……再也没有“惩罚”，有的只是“社会防卫措施”。

One liberal visitor, Jerzy Gliksman, a progressive member of the Warsaw City Council, was thus deceived but later experienced the real Soviet penal behavior—described in his striking memoirs of the Gulag. 一位自由派访问者乔治·格利克斯曼当时是华沙市议会的一位进步派成员，他也上了当。不过后来他亲身体验了真正的苏联刑罚，并在回忆录中记下了自己令人发指的古拉格体验。 As Hans Magnus Enzensberger writes of Havana two generations later, there were delegates living “in the hotels for foreigners who had no idea that the energy and water supply in the working quarters had broken down during the afternoon, that bread was rationed, and that the population had to stand for two hours in line for a slice of pizza; meanwhile the tourists in their hotel rooms were arguing about Lukacs.” 就像汉斯·马格努斯·恩森斯伯格在几十年后描写的哈瓦那一样，很多访问者住在“外国人专用的旅馆里。这些外国佬根本不知道当天下午工人居住区曾经断水断电，不知道面包是按配给定额发放的，不知道他们在旅馆房间里争论有关卢卡奇的问题时，群众们在外面为领一块比萨饼要排两个小时的队。” Even the actual optic nerves of Western viewers seem to have become distorted, with falsehood coming from both outside and inside. As Malcolm Muggeridge noted: 在内外夹攻的假话冲击之下，这些西方访客的视神经似乎都被扭曲了。正如马尔科姆·穆格里奇写到的：

There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU with tears of gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest clergymen who walked reverently through anti-God museums and reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists who watched delightedly tanks rattle across the Red Square and bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town planning specialists who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered: “If only we had something like this in England!” The almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university-educated tourists astonished even Soviet officals used to handling foreign visitors. “望见国家政治保卫总局总部的宏伟大厦时，一些真诚主张人道屠宰牲口的活动家流下了感激的热泪；听完苏联的无产阶级专政是如何必要的说教后，一些真诚主张比例代表制的活动家热切地表示着同感；真诚的教士们满怀敬意的走在反上帝主题博物馆里，翻阅着宣扬无神论的著作；真诚的和平主义者们高兴地观看开过红场的坦克和遮天蔽日的轰炸机；真诚的城市设计专家们站在拥挤失修的居民楼外，嘴里嘟囔着：‘我们英国要是也有这个就好了！’这些几乎都受过高等教育的访客们表现的这种令人难以置信的轻信，甚至把那些专职糊弄外国来客的苏联官员都惊呆了。”

GOGHDZE IS A FINE MAN 贡加泽是个好人 It was not only the facts about communist regimes that received such treatment but even Stalinist personalities. The French progressive novelist Romain Rolland described secret police chief Genrikh Yagoda (later shot) as sensitive and intellectual. Harold Laski had a long discussion with Vyshinsky, faker of show trials, whom he found “a man whose passion was law reform. . . . He was doing what an ideal Minister of Justice would do if we had such a person in Great Britain.” 受到这种对待的不止是共产主义政权的方方面面，还包括斯大林主义者的品格。法国进步小说家罗曼·罗兰把秘密警察头子亨利希·亚戈达（后被枪毙）描述为一个敏感聪慧的人。哈罗德·拉斯基在和维辛斯基——一系列审判秀的策划者和执行者——长谈之后，觉得他是“一个全心投入法律改革事业的人……如果他生在英国，他做的就是一个理想的司法大臣所做的事。” Vice President Henry Wallace later described Beria’s terror henchman in the Soviet Far East, Goghdze, as “a very fine man, very efficient, gentle and understanding with people.” Owen Lattimore saw I. F. Nikishov, the head of the most murderous camp system in the Gulag, as having “a trained and sensitive interest in art and music and also a deep sense of civic responsibility.” 在亨利·华莱士副总统口中，贝利亚在远东的忠实走狗贡加泽是“一个非常好的人，效率很高，待人温和，善于理解他人。”欧文·拉铁摩尔认为I.F.尼基绍夫——他管辖的集中营系统即使在古拉格中也是最凶残致命的一个——拥有“在音乐和艺术上训练有素且趣味敏锐，同时对于公民责任的深刻认知”。 H. G. Wells arrived in Moscow in 1934 full of hostility to communism and to Stalin. An interview changed that. Stalin, it is true, “looked past me rather than at me” but “not evasively.” He asked Wells’s permission to smoke his pipe and in this and other ways soon allayed Wells’s hostility. H.G.威尔斯在1934年满怀着对共产主义和斯大林的敌意来到了莫斯科。和斯大林的一次会面完全改变了他的态度。斯大林，当真的，“把目光投向了我的身后而不是看着我”，但“并不是为了躲开我。”在点燃烟斗前，斯大林特意征得了客人的同意。这样那样的小姿态很快就把威尔斯的敌意消解于无形了：

I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest, and to these qualities it is, and nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia. I had thought before I saw him that he might be where he was because men were afraid of him but I realize that he owes his position to the fact that no one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him. “我从没见过一个更加直率、公正且诚实的人。正是由于他的这些品质，而非什么神秘或卑劣的因素，他才能得到他在今日俄国的伟大且无争议的统治地位。在见到他之前，我曾认为他是由于别人对他的恐惧才得到今天的地位的。我现在才明白，他的地位正是来源于这一事实：没有人害怕他，相反所有人都信赖他。”

Even Franklin Roosevelt—deceived indeed by Harold Ickes—was charmed by Stalin into speaking of his being above all “getatable”: the great British Russianist Ronald Hingley commented that “ungetatability” was one of Stalin’s central characteristics. 即使富兰克林·罗斯福——其实他是被哈罗德·伊克斯骗了——也被斯大林的魅力打动，以致他评论斯大林首先是个“易于亲近的人”：伟大的俄国通，英国人罗纳德·辛格利对此评论说，“不易亲近”正是斯大林性格的核心特征之一。 Among the most egregious of what I hope I may be excused as calling the Kremlin creepers was a number of those who would have been called liberal Christians. One might have expected a certain alienation from communism by any of them that had read Lenin’s virulent condemnation of all religion but particularly of sophisticated religion. The active persecution of religion in the communist countries might, you would also think, have also had an effect. 在所有那些“克里姆林宫的小爬虫”——希望大家原谅我使用这个词——中，最令人震惊不解的，就是那些曾被称作自由派基督徒的家伙。一般人都会认为：宗教人士只要读过列宁对宗教，特别是繁琐神学的那些恶毒攻击，总会对共产主义有所疏远。共产主义国家对于宗教的现实迫害也应该会加深这种排斥。 But to take only one example—the World Council of Churches Central Committee’s meeting in 1973 passed a resolution deploring oppression in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the United States, and elsewhere. An attempt by a Swedish clergyman to add the communist countries was defeated ninety-one to three, with twenty-six abstentions. 但让我举一个例子吧：世界基督教协进会在1973年的中央委员会上通过了一项决议，谴责中东、非洲、拉丁美洲、美国和其他一些地方对宗教的压迫。会上一位瑞典教士试图把共产主义国家加入谴责范围，对这一提案的投票结果是：三票赞成，九十一票反对，二十六票弃权。

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We might say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. 或许可以这么说：正如胆固醇有两种，自由派也有两种：好的和坏的。

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Here again, the commitment has often been so strong that it is hard to imagine that complete conversion to communism has not taken place. A Communist once told me his method. First you explain to a Christian sympathizer that communism is compatible with Christianity. That accomplished, you explain that Christianity is not compatible with communism. 在这里我们也看到，他们对共产主义的支持是如此强烈，以致人们很难想象他们居然还没有完全改宗共产主义。一位共产主义者曾经跟我说过他的妙法：首先，对一个同情共产主义的基督徒解释共产主义与基督教义可以相容，完成这一步之后，你再向他解释基督教义和共产主义不能相容就行了。 BUT WHY? 为什么？ I started by advancing a general reason, or context, for these phenomena. I argued that they arose from an excessive regard for equality as against liberty. That is, people thought they saw a system, superior to our own, in which the abhorrent profit motive had been eliminated (in a sense so it had, but there are other ways of robbing the population). It was rather as if they would rejoice to find that a slum landlord had been replaced by a gangster extortionist. 在本文开始时，我试图为这些现象提出一个总体原因或情境。我提出：这种现象出现的根源是过分注重平等而不惜放弃自由。也就是说：这些人认为他们看到了一种比我们的体制更优越的体制，这种体制消灭了追逐利润这一可怕动机（一定意义上它确实做到了，当然与此同时，搜刮民脂民膏的办法还多得很呢）。事实上，他们更像是乐于看到一个黑帮勒索者取代一个贫民窟房东。 But even this is hardly enough to explain how the mind of the liberal intelligentsia became so much a subject of deception and self-deception. We must inquire further. 但是就算这一原因也不足以解释，为什么自由派知识分子的心智沦落至此，以至让他们成为如此程度的欺骗和自欺的牺牲品。还有必要向更深处找寻原因。 That is so even when we consider the attraction of anything “noncapitalist”—even when we consider domestic resentment against “conservatives” on home soil—for, as Macaulay writes of British politicians in the eighteenth century, “it is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original principles.” 即使我们考虑到任何“非资本主义”事物对自由派的吸引力，即使我们考虑自由派对本国“保守派”的忿恨——正如麦考莱在论述18世纪英国政治家时写下的：“政党总是把它的最初之敌而非最初宗旨记得更牢”——，也无法解释这种现象。 But pas d’ennemi à gauche—the idea that the far left, even if wrong in some respects, when it came down to essentials was against the real enemy, the right—cannot sustain the procommunist liberal case. “敌人永远在右”——也就是说，极左即使某些方面是错的，本质上也还是在反对真正的敌人，也就是右派——即便这句格言也不能解释为什么会有亲共产主义自由派这一现象。 For not all on the far left were covered: Trotskyites, the POUM in Spain, Anarchists. If we ask why this did not affect some “liberal” minds, it seems that in the first two cases, at least, the Stalinist version (that these were not “left” at all but secret agencies of Hitler) had some distractive effect. 因为并非所有极左翼都得到自由派的亲近，托派、西班牙的马克思主义统一工人党（POUM）或无政府主义者都无此幸运。为什么这些组织没有打动自由派的心呢？看来，至少托派和POUM可能受害于斯大林主义者的宣传，后者坚持这些组织都不是真左派，而是希特勒的特务。 Then again, the Trotskyites lacked the huge propaganda funding available to Stalinists everywhere, though the pervasiveness of a notion has traditionally not been the key point for critical minds. Where issues of fact were in question, the anti-Stalinist left was not only truer but also far more plausible. 另外，托派没有斯大林主义者那么多的宣传资金，尽管对于具有批判性头脑的人来讲，一种思想的传播力度不该影响它的说服力。实际上，当涉及事实问题时，那些反斯大林左派的说法不仅更加真实，还更有说服力。 We can list, in addition to utopianism and parochial partisanship, a number of other characteristics to be found, if not in all, than in many of the Stalinophiles (and Mao-ophiles, Castrophiles, and Ho-ophiles): in some cases vanity, in others pleasure at adulation, in others yet an adolescent romanticism about “revolution” as such. 除了乌托邦情结和狭隘的党派偏见外，在很多斯大林粉（还有毛粉，卡斯特罗粉，胡志明粉等等）身上通常都可以找到一些其他特性：一些人的共同点是求名的欲望；另一些人的共同点是爱听奉承话；而其他一些人的共同点是有一种对“革命”的青春浪漫主义。 Nor should mere boredom be omitted, as Simone de Beauvoir once confessed, which may remind us of the attitudes of a certain type of French intellectual, different, but not all that different, from his American or British counterparts, as given by Herbert Luthy in the early 1960s. 当然，单纯的无聊也是个不能不提的因素，正如西蒙·德·波伏娃曾经坦白过的那样，这或许能使我们想起赫伯特·卢蒂曾于1960年代初描述过的那类法国知识分子的态度，这种态度与他们的英美同行有所不同，但其实也相去不远：

For ten years the French intellectuals have discussed the big issues of the day so to speak in front of the looking-glass,in search less of facts and knowledge than of an attitude befitting their traditional role—of the “correct pose.” “十年来，法国知识分子们一直在镜子前讨论着所谓的‘当前重大问题’，他们的讨论与其说是为了寻求真相或知识，不如说是为了找到一种适合他们传统角色的态度——所谓的‘正确姿态’。”

THE HEROES OF THE ARGUMENT 论争中的英雄们 Nevertheless, it might be argued that the true heroes of the long argument were not so much the committed anticommunist conservatives (who were, of course, right, and fully deserve the verdict in their favor as against the procommunist liberals) as those within the liberal intelligentsia who not only were not deceived but also fought for the truth over years of slander and discouragement. 尽管如此，我们依然可以说：在这场漫长的论争中，真正的英雄与其说是那些坚定反共的保守派，不如说是那些虽身在自由派阵营却不仅不受蒙蔽，还常年冒着中伤和挫折而努力寻求真相的自由派们。当然，反共的保守派是正确的，他们在与亲共自由派论争中做出的功绩也完全值得肯定。 We might in fact say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. The difficulty is, or has been, that good liberalism implies a good deal of mental self-control. 实际上，我们可以说，正如胆固醇有两种，自由派也有两种，一种好，一种坏。如今的困难在于——或者说一直如此——好的自由主义必然要求强大的精神自律。 AND NOWADAYS? 今天呢？ Kenneth Minogue, the Anglo-Australian political scientist, has observed that “as radicals have lost plausible utopias of one kind or another—from the Soviet Union to Cuba—they have become more ferociously intolerant of the society in which they live.” 英裔澳大利亚政治学家肯尼思·米诺格观察到，“当激进派失去一个又一个曾经具有说服力的乌托邦——从苏联到古巴——时，他们对自己身处其中的这个社会变得越来越不宽容了。” There are plenty of up-to-date insane absurdities, such as John Le Carré writing (in a letter to the Washington Post) that capitalism was today killing many more than communism ever had; such as Nigel Nicolson in Britain saying that Solzhenitsyn had betrayed his country just as Anthony Blunt had his. 时至今日，疯狂的荒谬论调依然层出不穷。比如约翰·勒卡雷投书《华盛顿邮报》，声称今天资本主义正在杀死的人数比共产主义曾经杀掉的还要多的多；比如英国的奈杰尔·尼科尔森声称，索尔仁尼琴正像安东尼·勃朗特【校注：英国艺术史家、苏联间谍】一样，无非是个叛国者。 And in academe we still find noisy cliques working to lower the Soviet death roll, to prove the West as the villain of the Cold War, and to call for “dispassionate” study of Stalin and Mao. 在学术界，我们也可以发现一些吵闹的小集团努力降低苏联时期的死亡数字，以便证明西方才是冷战中的那个恶棍，并呼吁对斯大林和毛泽东进行“公允不偏”的研究。 Such notions are, of course, not confined to campuses. We now get an allegedly historical film series sponsored by Ted Turner, which, with some concessions to reality, in effect tilts the balance against the West, Stalin offset by McCarthy, Castro better than Kennedy. 这种思潮当然不只存在于大学校园之内。现在出现了泰德·透纳赞助的一些所谓历史影集。虽然在一定程度上承认事实，这些影集事实上在把天平翘向反西方的那一侧。在这些影片中，麦卡锡主义被拿来抵销斯大林的罪恶，而卡斯特罗被塑造成了一个比肯尼迪更好的人。 A WORD TO YOUNG LIBERALS 对年轻自由派们的赠言 Can one offer any advice to the current generation of liberals? Well, one can advise them not to let passions provoked by the internal politics of their homelands go too far. Rhetoric of party faction is part of democratic life, but do not project it into your assessment of alien regimes and mentalities and do not accept accounts of these cultures provided by partisan sources without a critical assessment (a point that applies, indeed, to the acceptance of supposed facts in any field in which strong emotions prevail). 我们能对现今一代的自由派提出什么建言吗？当然，我们可以建议他们控制头脑里被本国政治斗争挑起的激情。党派话语是民主政治生活的一部分，但不要让这些话语影响了你对外国政权或思想的评价。此外，不要照单全收有党派偏见的来源所提供的各种关于外国文化的材料（这一点还适用于接受各种可能受到强烈感情因素影响的领域的材料）。 As to the academics criticized above, it seems that nothing is to be done. They are committed to their misconceptions. One can only urge their younger colleagues (even if hardly able to speak out frankly in an atmosphere of academic persecution, denial of tenure, and so on) that they should work at least at thinking independently, while biding their time. 至于上文中批判到的那些学者们，看起来无可救药了。他们虔诚于自己的错误信念。我们只能呼吁他们的年轻同事们（当然，在目前的大学空气里充斥着学术迫害，否决终身教职等等威胁，要直率说出自己的想法并不容易），至少努力做到独立思考，等着属于他们的时代到来。 Above all, as Granville Hicks, himself temporarily deceived, put it: “It is no defence whatever for an intellectual to say that he was duped, since that is what, as an intellectual, he should never allow to happen to him.” 毕竟，正如自己也曾一度受到蒙骗的格兰维尔·希克斯所说的：“知识分子是不能用一句‘我上当了’来为自己辩护的。因为一个知识分子有不受蒙骗的义务。” Excerpted and adapted from the New Criterion, February 1999, from an essay entitled “Liberals and Totalitarianism.” 摘编改写自《新标准》(The New Criterion)1999年2月号刊登的《自由派与极权主义》一文。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-09-06】 @whigzhou: 智能手机年代，可以想象这些广告的号召力有多大 //FW 难民，在德国得到“All Inkluisve”的特殊客人 O网页链接 作者小语，以国际援助组织一名员工的身份，细数她在难民营内部一些鲜为人知的感触与见闻。 @whigzhou: 欧洲最坏的结果是缓慢而均匀的绿化，这样的话，等土著醒悟过来就晚了，票数不够了，要挽回只能靠硬打了，相对不坏的结果是，其中一国迅速沦陷，然后炸锅逆天了，可是我真心不愿看到这是德国啊。 @梳皇斗饮口味刁:德国人认死理，不如英国佬转变快 @whigzhou: 是，所以一旦翻转过来，又会从另一个方向上变得非常可怕 @whigzhou: 欧洲政治精英圈高度封闭，而该圈的意识形态又一边倒，大众的相反诉求在上层根本找不到出路，结果最后只能诉诸民粹主义，看不到平缓扭转的可能性 @whigzhou: 法国选民把右派一次次选上去，结果却发现他们跟左派差不多一路货 @研二公知苗:政治精英封闭是因为比例代表加政党名单制吗？ @whigzhou: 我觉得跟教育和学校体制关系更大，公立的基础教育，官办的大学体系，都有着强烈的封闭化倾向，比如按德国的体制，孩子从小学高年级开始，就被分入技术/职业轨道和学术/精英轨道了，进前一条轨道的，就一辈子老老实实听精英的好了 @whigzhou: 详情可参考 http://t.cn/RPKxQAC 每个孩子读完四年小学后，经学校甄别后被分入三条轨道：Hauptschule：老老实实学手艺做工人吧，Realschule：老老实实做个白领吧，Gymnasium：恭喜，你是未来精英。 @Kameeldoring:你该去法国成立政党。 @whigzhou: 拯救人类这事儿不归我管，我看看热闹就行了 @Kameeldoring:欧洲人自己都不管自己了，或许以后会爆发各种极端主义，或者改革福利、移民政策吧。 @whigzhou: 改革福利怎么可能，民粹主义者一般都热爱福利，无论左右，Trump也不例外