订阅（按：此文乃四个多月前为某刊所写，不幸没用上，就当作新年礼物献给各位吧。本文部分内容与《冷却时代的文化禀赋》一文颇有关系，之前我没料到这篇会拖到现在才贴出，导致后一篇相关部分显得有些跳跃和费解。）
兰德热潮与个人主义
辉格
2012年8月27日
近几年，一股安·兰德（Ayn Rand）热潮在国内年轻人之间悄然涌动，小说《源泉》（The Fountainhead）广受热捧，仅在文艺小清新汇集的豆瓣上，便显示有8183人想读，2187人读过，1912人评价过，总评分高达9.3/10，若加上英文版，这些数字还要扩大12%【注：目前上述数字已分别升至：9334人想读，2486人读过，2160人评价过】；不少自由派学者也非常推崇这本书，认为兰德和她所塑造的主人公很好的体现了个人主义精神。
不仅如此，许多推崇市场制度和资本主义的人还认为，兰德——正如她自己所认为的那样——是资本主义和自由市场的一个吹鼓手，是对抗国家主义和集体主义的一面旗帜，这一认识似乎也暗示了，兰德思想与精神的传播发扬，将有助于市场制度的建立和维护，有助于解除加诸个人自由之上的种种枷锁。
可是，假如我们仔细检查兰德思想和市场制度的起源与基础，便不难发现，两者其实是格格不入的；兰德所奉行的，确实是一种个人主义，但那是一种非合作性的、独行侠式的个人主义，对于合作、互惠、利他、协调、组织、社会规范等等一切将众多个人聚合成一个社会的那些元素，兰德都表现出了极大的反感与抵触，认为这些要么与个人意志背道而驰，理应抛弃，要么是加诸其上的束缚，理应打破。
然而，市场制度如同其他社会结构一样，不正是以这些元素为基础建立起来的吗？若将它们统统消灭，连社会结构都将不复存在，只剩下一个个孤立的个人，谈何制度？在没有任何制度和秩序的社会中，人与人、群体与群体之间将陷入无休止的冲突之中，自由何存？至于市场，更是一种需要特殊制度保障的分工与合作体系，若没有分工与合作，那既不需要市场，也不可能建立市场。
这种将个人自由与人的社会性和超越个体的文化结构完全对立起来的倾向，倒是并不少见，只不过兰德表现的特别极端；在社会学领域，方法论上的个人主义和结构主义也长期争执不下；撒切尔的一句名言生动概括了这一倾向：根本没有社会，只有一个个的人；但是，假如你对人类有过深入的了解，便会发现，这种对立是虚妄的，也是毫无必要的，它建立在对人性与社会的深刻误解之上。
生物学家已发现，将基因视为利益主体，可以更好的理解生物行为，从这角度看，生物个体只是基因们合作建造的、用来散布它们自己的工具，比如雄蜘蛛为了获得交配机会以便散布它所携带的基因，不惜冒被交配对方吃掉的危险；那么能不能说：根本没有个体，只有一个个基因呢？显然不能，因为基因利益的实现，全靠个体这个工具的功能有效发挥，为此，同一基因组中的基因们达成了密切的合作关系。
类似的，人类个体为了实现各自的目标，也达成了各种合作互惠关系，建造了各种组织、规范、习俗和制度，个体利益要借助这些关系和结构来实现，离开它们，连生存都堪忧，更不可能追求情感、艺术和学问等较高层次的目标；从家庭、部落、村镇、城市、国家，人类已经建立了越来越复杂的社会结构，而迄今最繁荣、同时又最能让个体在其中自由追求自身目标的结构，便是法律保障下的市场社会。
与其他生物不同的是，人类拥有了自我意识和强大的理性能力，能对自己的行为和目标作出反思，因而可以不再盲目听从由基因（还有meme）为我们设定的某项偏好与功能而行动；然而，意识到这一点后的兴奋，常常冲昏人们的头脑，以至错误的以为人可以摆脱基因和文化“强加”在他身上的种种“包袱”和“枷锁”。
在好莱坞文艺片中，我们常听到“寻找真正的人性与自我”的俗套故事，据说，这个“自我”总是被包裹在外来束缚之下，迷失在文化染缸之中：你喜欢牛仔裤，那只是流行时尚让你觉得喜欢，并不是你“本性上真的”喜欢，你拼命挣钱，那是被流行成功标准和攀比文化裹挟了，你乐衷购物，是受了消费主义文化的熏陶，你以为如此行事很有尊严很体面，那是社会伦理强加给你的，甚至，你以为自己是个男人，是个异性恋，那也是因为从小就被当作男孩对待，是教育赋予了你一个性别身份。
所有这些说法都有道理，个人的偏好、习惯和价值观，确实很多是由社会赋予的，传统、风尚和规范，经由教养过程被潜移默化的植入了我们头脑中，变成了我们的习性和观念；问题是，我们能彻底摆脱它们吗？将这些“外来束缚”层层剥掉之后，剩下的是什么呢？是真正的自我吗？可是，把文化元素全部去掉之后，不是只有生物本能了吗？难道真正的人性就是无文化的动物性？
就算生物本能才是真正人性，那不也是为基因利益服务的吗？自我又在哪里？只是基因的奴隶？那么，连生物本能也剥掉会如何？依我看，那就什么也没有了，不过，在二元论者看来，还剩下个笛卡尔幽灵，可是这么一个光秃秃的幽灵实在很单调乏味，恐怕完全满足不了那些文艺片所带给你的浪漫期待。
问题是，你为何非要剥掉它们呢？正是这些元素构成了你，是它们让你成为了现在这个你，当你试图驱逐其中一些时，其实是你的一部分在驱逐另一部分；当然，有时候你需要这样的驱逐，当构成你的元素组合让你痛苦、纠结、迷茫时，驱逐其中一些会变得更协调，你会感觉更好，而人类的理性和反思能力恰好给了你这样的机会。
不仅人性和偏好的很大部分是由文化所塑造的，我们追求目标的行动也几乎总是在特定文化与社会结构中展开，因为合作与组织已将人类的能力提到了远远超出个体潜能的水平，因而如今绝大多数值得追求的目标，值得过的生活，都已无法由孤立的个人完成；随便做点什么有意义的事情，就要从市场买入材料，进入或开办企业，与同事和上下游合作，或者组织发起一场活动。
比如《源泉》主角的建筑师工作，就涉及无数合作，要倾听客户的需求，要考虑结构工程师的建议，请预算师帮你做成本测算，等等；像洛克这样完全无视他人看法和感受，缺乏合作与妥协精神的人，在市场社会无疑会四处碰壁，最终往往做不成任何事情。
更糟糕的是，他还漠视基本的社会规范，仅仅因为自己的设计意图没实现，就炸毁了私人财产，他甚至还强奸了弗兰肯，并且对这些恶行都拒不认罪，也毫无悔意，再看看他与身边人的关系吧：要么是猥琐自卑的小丑，要么是丧失自我的盲目崇拜者，要么是势不两立的敌人，没有一个是平等相处、合作互惠的关系。
市场的运行需要一整套规则来维持，遵守游戏规则也是市场参与者最重要的美德，标榜为资本主义旗手的兰德竟然颂扬如此漠视和践踏基本规范的行为，而且居然广受同样自称自由主义者的读者热捧，真是咄咄怪事；要知道，洛克是被作为一个完美理想人物、一个神话般的英雄来塑造的，所以这些恶习是无法用“凡人都有缺陷”来解释的。
兰德对自由的理解，是各种误解中最粗俗浅薄的一种，她心目中的自由就是任性放纵、恣意妄为、目空一切、旁若无人；实际上，自由制度的敌人们，最喜欢将自由曲解和污蔑为这个样子，对此，曾在专制国家生活过的人再熟悉不过了，它的唯一效果就是让善良的人们对自由产生错误的恐惧。
与此相应的，兰德独行侠式个人主义也无益于人们争取和维护自由；诚然，由于现代市场提供了高度发达的专业化和分工机制，因而附带的为不擅处理社会关系的独行侠们创造了更好的生存空间，因为在发达市场社会中，你只要会有一项专长、一门手艺，很少与人打交道也不难活下来，甚至轻度的自闭症患者也能活得很好，但这只是市场的副产品，市场制度的根基绝非建立在独行侠精神之上，正如一家成功企业可以为自闭者提供职位，但一群自闭者绝不可能组成一家企业。
幸好，我们还有另一种个人主义可供选择：它承认人的社会性，也坦然承认并接受文化对人性的塑造，它仅仅主张：个人可以自由的追求自己所认定的目标，尽管这些目标可能是文化所赋予的，只要这个赋予过程是自愿的，尽管对目标的追求需要在组织和社会结构中进行，只要其间不涉及强制，不要求个人为集体而牺牲，那么个人便是自由的，正如哈耶克所阐述的古典自由主义原则：自由是且只是免于强制。
holyghost @ 2013-01-03, 15:58
不知道耸肩那本是否也是一样的呢？
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范 回复:
3月 6th, 2013 at 17:04
耸肩表达一种情绪还可以，没有数目众多的庸人存在，精英也一文不值。
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alien @ 2013-01-03, 16:15
右侧的相关作品报错了。
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辉格 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 00:30
嗯，有一阵了，豆瓣改了API，我还没来得及做相应修改
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elfdemon @ 2013-01-03, 18:30
不知道辉总最欣赏哪个自由主义的”知识分子” ??? 对于兰德, 我所知道的是, 兰德主义者, 强烈反对所谓的自由主义 (libertarianism), 视其为比保守主义, liberalism, 甚至社会主义更为危险的主义. 给人感觉, 有路线斗争的味道. 就像当初西班牙内战中, 斯大林所资助的社会主义分子最痛恨的, 不是佛朗哥的保皇派, 而是同样是马克思主义的无政府主义者. 这其中的意味, 很耐人寻味.
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辉格 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 02:23
这些派系我不大弄得清楚，不过主张接近的派系争斗更凶，这是有的，因为他们在观念市场上构成了更直接的竞争嘛，他们的潜在赞助金主重合的可能性也更大
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辉格 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 02:23
而且通常也有更多的共同话题可供吵架
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amover @ 2013-01-03, 18:41
兰德提倡的所谓自由主义是否可以称之为虚无主义？
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辉格 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 02:20
有点文化/制度虚无主义的意思，虚无主义一词用法很多，且通常是以“某某虚无主义”的形式，以表明它所拒绝的是哪种实体。
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小橘子 @ 2013-01-03, 20:52
社会结构、规范和组织带来了繁荣，但为什么人们会感到仿佛迷失了“真正的人性与自我”？
人们做决定时，永远是在选择取舍。例如，一类选择是两份工作在报酬和做事的乐趣上相差很大，而综合得分难分上下。
另一类常见的例子是，两份工作收入相同，综合得分相近，但在办公室文化和工作强度上相差很大（国企外企可作一比）。
第三类权衡是，一个高强度高收入的工作，和一个轻松而低收入的工作（暂且称为全职和半职）。
可以想象，好莱坞文艺片更推崇做事的乐趣、外企和半职工作。
那么，报酬和做事的乐趣、国企和外企、全职和半职的区别中有什么共同之处？它们的共同区别是，前者蕴含着较大的内心冲突。
报酬具有工具价值，而做事的乐趣具有目的价值，或者说，前者的工具性更强。无论报酬带来物质享受、社会地位还是使用这笔收入的其他好处，它都不如“做事的乐趣”来得直接。一方面，抵制现下的利益而等待未来的收获是一件痛苦的事，另一方面，利用一件事达到一个目的对于视纯粹性为一种价值的人来说，本身就是一种冲突。
勾心斗角和加班虽然都是可恶的，但前者能引起更大的内心冲突。事实上，如果加班引起的不适和内心冲突一样大，那么两种工作就没有哪种更“自我”可言。
同样，只有在一个人在低强度低收入的工作中比前者更平静时，才会称他做出了符合“真正的人性与自我”的选择，如果他在后者的状态下感到焦虑，也就没有俗套故事了。
值得深究的是，为什么人们经常愿意忍受较大的内心冲突？与内心冲突相对的，或者说，内心冲突换取的，只能是社会认同。
对社会认同的重视，是人类社会性的基础，当然有其巨大的价值，正如社会结构、规范和组织带来了繁荣。然而，社会繁荣是一种远期的效果，而内心冲突是一种近期的体验。前者不容易看到，但后者容易体验。因为远期效果的缺位，在这种权衡中，对内心平静的追求，就拥有了一种道德上的优势。在这种意义上，舍近而求远是本能，而不满于内心冲突的现状，反倒是思考的结果。
PS.我本来是要为好莱坞文艺片辩护几句的，没想到写到最后变成了上面这样。
pps.即使有上述思考，作为个人，我似乎仍然很难忍受内心冲突，而我实际上又相当隐忍无争。真是奇特。
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小橘子 回复:
1月 3rd, 2013 at 21:28
当然了，重视社会认同的远期效果不全是社会繁荣。在任何一个时期，都有一些社会规范是落伍的，即将被抛弃的，还有一些是机会主义的。追寻自我的一部分道德高尚感来自对落伍的坏的社会规范的抵制。
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小橘子 回复:
1月 3rd, 2013 at 22:49
我好像天生地被“真正的人性与自我”吸引，天生被夏山和大理吸引，这可能和我天生看淡物质享受有关。毕竟，社会认同的主要意义就是物质繁荣。有时候我也确实感觉到，虽然人们通常会选择正规的人生道路，但假如他们有机会尝试一种更自我的生活，也许很多人会感到后者更幸福。
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范 回复:
3月 6th, 2013 at 17:11
没有人是天生的看淡物质享受，说这类话的人都是具备一定物质能力的。
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辉格 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 02:26
同意，类似的意思其实我在《冷却时代的文化禀赋》里也表达过了，在哲学基础上撇清了二元论之后，这样的区分还是很有意义的
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小橘子 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 14:32
在《冷却》文中，你说：
“当你认为自己“发自内心的真正”喜欢某种事物或热爱某项事业时，这种偏爱并非如某些人所认为的那样，是从内心凭空而来的，事实上并不存在这样一个可以凭空产生偏好的“内心”，之所以让你觉得那是“真正属于自己的”，或许只是因为进化已将它们植入你的本能，或者你在童年时期便已从文化中习得。”
从上面这段分析中可以隐约看出，你认为是否“真心喜欢”的两类行为，其界限并非截然可分，而是源于多层次人性内核的不同层次，这个层次区别不是二值的——内心、外界，而是多值的——你的皮球模型有8个层次。
在某种意义上，我同意你的看法，正如我把重视社会认同称为“本能的”。把不同的价值偏好用是否“内心的”“真正的”来区分，是一种本质主义的错误。
但另一方面，我想指出，人们通常所指的“内心的”、“真正的”，以及好莱坞文艺片所宣扬的那种“追寻真实的自我”，这些词语所意指的那个维度，很含糊，很难用语言确切地表达。在某些情况下，可能与“人性内核的层次”重合，在另一些情况下，则是指“对他人感受的重视程度”，还有时，和两者都没有关系。归纳起来，我认为可以说是“选择与价值的紧密程度”。
需要指出，对他人感受的重视程度，与人性内核的层次，不具有对应关系。重视他人感受的价值偏好，可以位于非常底层的人性内核上。例如，女性对忠贞的重视，与对志同道合者的吸引，前者即更重视他人感受，又很可能处于更底层的人性内核上。
下面回顾前面的例子。
报酬与做事的乐趣。简单起见，比成一个喜欢画画会编程的人面临的选择。首先，与“对他人感受的重视程度”关系不大（如果选择编程时考虑了报酬带来的社会地位，那么也有一定关系），与“人性内核的层次”的关系则与预测不相符。报酬所能带来的那些价值，恐怕比画画的乐趣，更加底层。然而，我们会认为这个人选择画画更加符合“真实的自我”，这是因为这种选择与其价值之间联系更紧密。
国企与外企。忍受勾心斗角与忍受加班，其与收入的紧密程度是相同的。在这个例子中，如果某人做选择时没有考虑他人的感受，那么并不会说哪个选择更加发自内心。但是，如果他因为考虑他人的愿望而选择某一个工作（国企、外企都可以，虽然在中国语境中他人愿望偏向国企的情况更常见），那么，就可以说，这个选择不是“发自内心”的。
全职与半职。这个选择与画画和编程类似，清闲的价值，比收入的价值更直接。清闲本身就是价值，而收入还要转化一步，才能变成使用收入带来的价值。
两个新例子。
让老婆呆在家和出去工作，对应占有欲和提高收入的选择。收入可以对应很多种价值——食欲、舒适、社会地位等，在人性内核上对应着不同层次，因此无法比较占有欲和收入带来的价值哪个更加底层。这里和“对他人感受的重视程度”也没有关系。这个例子里，有人认为让老婆呆在家是一种更加发自内心的选择，这是因为这种选择与其价值的联系更紧密。
廊桥遗梦中女主角的选择。这恐怕就是典型的好莱坞文艺片了。显然，跟着摄影师跑是追寻真实自我的选择，而她选择留在婚姻中，则是因为她重视丈夫、子女的感受。
总结起来，把选择编程、国企、全职、让老婆去工作、留在婚姻中称为不属于真实自我的选择，是一种本质主义的错误。（当然，实际上，又一次，我发现哲学上的错误是语言的含糊引起的。）但是，所谓“发自内心”“真实自我”与否，对应着一种（经过上述澄清，我想把它称为“确切的”）区别，这种区别并不是“价值的较底层”与否，而是“选择与价值的较紧密联系”与否。
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zhang3 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 16:32
1做某件事更能得到社会认同 2 我希望社会认同 3所以我要去做某事 —— 这个选择是在外界影响下做出的. 1 做某件事我有兴趣 2 所以我要去做某事 —— 这个选择是自我所选择的,和内心的其他部分冲突会更小,前面的选择和后面的选择还是很不一样的,后面那个选择虽然也是自我所做出的,但是这种方式更容易造成价值观冲突
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zhang3 回复:
1月 4th, 2013 at 16:37
只有把 (2 希望社会认同) 内化到兴趣中,因为有社会认同让我更有兴趣,这样才容易避免价值观冲突,也许,通过一定的训练,这是可以做到的,但在训练和内化的过程中,也会有来自其他部分的反抗,并造成内心不适.—-前面这些,似乎是在用很拗口的话说了一个老生常谈的过程—–社会化,或者,平庸化.
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辉格 回复:
1月 5th, 2013 at 15:41
我同意楼下三总说的，区别在于是否“内化”或内化的程度，也就是对“自我”之边界的认定，这个过程中是伴随着个人成长和教化过程的“人格确立”过程，在青春期后逐渐稳定下来，40岁之后就很少改变了。
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辉格 回复:
1月 5th, 2013 at 15:42
但有些人的自我人格认知一辈子的都稳定不下来，这大概和平常说的“艺术家气质”有些关系。
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zhang3 回复:
1月 6th, 2013 at 13:22
不过现代市场化的社会不同于传统人格化社会的特点是这种内化可以具备多个不同的方向,与原先自我的”天性”更少产生冲突.
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阿斗 @ 2013-01-05, 22:07
文章好懂，评论都好晦涩难懂啊。。。。。。。。。
难道这就是所谓的上课都懂了，一做课外书的题就全不会了？还是不要看课外书了。。。
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501HIT @ 2013-01-06, 11:42
“兰德所奉行的，确实是一种个人主义，但那是一种非合作性的、独行侠式的个人主义”
确实，看她理想中的山谷，就是这样一个制度。每个人都有局限。
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辉格 @ 2013-03-08, 03:11
Ayn Rand vs. the Pygmies
Did human evolution favor individualists or altruists?
By Eric Michael Johnson|Posted Wednesday, Oct. 3, 2012, at 12:02 AM
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_evolution/2012/10/groups_and_gossip_drove_the_evolution_of_human_nature.single.html
One person can’t hold up the whole world alone.
Illustration by Nathaniel Gold.
Black-and-white colobus monkeys scrambled through the branches of Congo’s Ituri Forest in 1957 as a small band of Mbuti hunters wound cautiously through the undergrowth, joined by anthropologist Colin Turnbull. The Mbuti are pygmies, about 4 feet tall, but they are powerful and tough. Any one of them could take down an elephant with only a short-handled spear. Recent genetic evidence suggests that pygmies have lived in this region for about 60,000 years. But this particular hunt reflected a timeless ethical conflict for our species, and one that has special relevance for contemporary American society.
The Mbuti employed long nets of twined liana bark to catch their prey, sometimes stretching the nets for 300 feet. Once the nets were hung, women and children began shouting, yelling, and beating the ground to frighten animals toward the trap. As Turnbull came to understand, Mbuti hunts were collective efforts in which each hunter’s success belonged to everybody else. But one man, a rugged individualist named Cephu, had other ideas. When no one was looking, Cephu slipped away to set up his own net in front of the others. “In this way he caught the first of the animals fleeing from the beaters,” explained Turnbull in his book The Forest People, “but he had not been able to retreat before he was discovered.” Word spread among camp members that Cephu had been trying to steal meat from the tribe, and a consensus quickly developed that he should answer for this crime.
At an impromptu trial, Cephu defended himself with arguments for individual initiative and personal responsibility. “He felt he deserved a better place in the line of nets,” Turnbull wrote. “After all, was he not an important man, a chief, in fact, of his own band?” But if that were the case, replied a respected member of the camp, Cephu should leave and never return. The Mbuti have no chiefs, they are a society of equals in which redistribution governs everyone’s livelihood. The rest of the camp sat in silent agreement.
Faced with banishment, a punishment nearly equivalent to a death sentence, Cephu relented. “He apologized profusely,” Turnbull wrote, “and said that in any case he would hand over all the meat.” This ended the matter, and members of the group pulled chunks of meat from Cephu’s basket. He clutched his stomach and moaned, begging that he be left with something to eat. The others merely laughed and walked away with their pound of flesh. Like the mythical figure Atlas from Greek antiquity, condemned by vindictive gods to carry the world on his shoulders for all eternity, Cephu was bound to support the tribe whether he chose to or not.
Meanwhile, in the concrete jungle of New York City, another struggle between the individual and the group was unfolding. In October of 1957, Ayn Rand published her dystopian novel Atlas Shrugged, in which a libertarian hero named John Galt condemns his collectivist society because of its failure to support individual rights. “By the grace of reality and the nature of life, man—every man—is an end in himself,” Galt announced, “he exists for his own sake, and the achievement of his own happiness is his highest moral purpose.” Unlike Cephu, Galt had the means to end his societal bondage. By withdrawing his participation and convincing others to do the same, he would stop the motor of the world. Atlas would shrug. “Every living species has a way of survival demanded by its nature,” Galt insisted. “I swear by my life, and my love of it, that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine.”
Ayn Rand’s defense of a human nature based on rationality and individual achievement, with capitalism as its natural extension, became the rallying cry for an emerging libertarian stripe in conservative American politics. Paul Ryan cites Atlas Shrugged as forming the basis of his value system and says it was one of the main reasons he chose to enter politics. Other notable admirers include Rush Limbaugh, Alan Greenspan, Clarence Thomas, as well as Congressional Tea Party Caucus members Steve King, Mick Mulvaney, and Allen West.
“Collectivism,” Rand wrote in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, “is the tribal premise of primordial savages who, unable to conceive of individual rights, believed that the tribe is a supreme, omnipotent ruler, that it owns the lives of its members and may sacrifice them whenever it pleases.” An objective understanding of “man’s nature and man’s relationship to existence” should inoculate society from the disease of altruistic morality and economic redistribution. Therefore, “one must begin by identifying man’s nature, i.e., those essential characteristics which distinguish him from all other living species.” She identifies two: a brain evolved for rational thought and a survival instinct based on the desire for personal freedom.
Ultimately, Rand was searching for the origin of John Galt in the pages of human nature. But was she right? Are we rational egotists trapped in a net of social obligations? Or are we an innately social species for whom altruism was integral to our success on this planet? There was only one place she could look: the Pleistocene.
The Pleistocene epoch, from 2.6 million to 11,700 years ago, was a formative time in our species’ development. The first members of the genus Homo began to walk the great savannas of Africa at the beginning of this epoch. In a little more than 2 million years, we went from loose aggregations of bonobo-like bipeds, traveling upright between patches of forest, to highly integrated societies made up of multiple families and clans. By studying the archaeological record as well as modern-day hunter-gatherers, evolutionary scientists have been constructing a record of how our early human ancestors made this journey. It is clear that John Galt was not present in our ancestral family tree.
Christopher Boehm has been studying the interplay between the desires of an individual and that of the larger group for more than 40 years. Currently the director of the Jane Goodall Research Center and professor of anthropology and biological sciences at the University of Southern California, he has conducted fieldwork with both human and nonhuman primates and has published more than 60 scholarly articles and books on the problem of altruism. In his newest book, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame, Boehm synthesizes this research to address the question of why, out of all the social primates, are humans so altruistic?
“There are two ways of trying to create a good life,” Boehm states. “One is by punishing evil, and the other is by actively promoting virtue.” Boehm’s theory of social selection does both. The term altruism can be defined as extra-familial generosity (as opposed to nepotism among relatives). Boehm thinks the evolution of human altruism can be understood by studying the moral rules of hunter-gatherer societies. He and a research assistant have recently gone through thousands of pages of anthropological field reports on the 150 hunter-gatherer societies around the world that he calls “Late-Pleistocene Appropriate” (LPA), or those societies that continue to live as our ancestors once did. By coding the reports for categories of social behavior such as aid to nonrelatives, group shaming, or the execution of social deviants, Boehm is able to determine how common those behaviors are.
What he has found is in direct opposition to Ayn Rand’s selfish ideal. For example, in 100 percent of LPA societies—ranging from the Andaman Islanders of the Indian Ocean archipelago to the Inuit of Northern Alaska—generosity or altruism is always favored toward relatives and nonrelatives alike, with sharing and cooperation being the most cited moral values. Of course, this does not mean that everyone in these societies always follow these values. In 100 percent of LPA societies there was at least one incidence of theft or murder, 80 percent had a case in which someone refused to share, and in 30 percent of societies someone tried to cheat the group (as in the case of Cephu).
What makes these violations of moral rules so instructive is how societies choose to deal with them. Ultimately, it all comes down to gossip. More than tool-making, art, or even language, gossip is a human universal that is a defining feature of our species (though this could change if we ever learn to translate the complex communication system in whales or dolphins). Gossip is intimately connected with the moral rules of a given society, and individuals gain or lose prestige in their group depending on how well they follow these rules. This formation of group opinion is something to be feared, particularly in small rural communities where ostracism or expulsion could mean death. “Public opinion, facilitated by gossiping, always guides the band’s decision process,” Boehm writes, “and fear of gossip all by itself serves as a preemptive social deterrent because most people are so sensitive about their reputations.” A good reputation enhances the prestige of those individuals who engage in altruistic behavior, while marginalizing those with a bad reputation. Since prestige is intimately involved with how desirable a person is to the opposite sex, gossip serves as a positive selection pressure for enhancing traits associated with altruism. That is, being good can get you laid, and this will perpetuate your altruistic genes (or, at least, those genes that allow you to resist cheating other members of your group).
Sometimes gossip is not enough to reduce or eliminate antisocial behavior. In Boehm’s analysis of LPA societies, public opinion and spatial distancing were the most common responses to misbehavior (100 percent of the societies coded). But other tactics included permanent expulsion (40 percent), group shaming (60 percent), group-sponsored execution (70 percent), or nonlethal physical punishment (90 percent). In the case of expulsion or execution, the result over time would be that traits promoting antisocial behavior would be reduced in the populations. In other words, the effect of social selection would be that altruists would have higher overall fitness and out-reproduce free riders. The biological basis for morality in our species could therefore result from these positive and negative pressures carried out generation after generation among our Pleistocene ancestors. Who is John Galt? He refused to participate in society and no one has seen him since.
In fairness to the Russian-born Ayn Rand, the collectivist society she was most opposed to was the Soviet regime, which justified its consolidation of power with the veneer of altruism. Rand’s mistake was in essentializing the distinction between “individualist freedom” vs. “collectivist tyranny” and then transporting it into our human past.
However, deep in the Ituri Forest was a man Ayn Rand might have felt a bond with. Cephu had a reputation as someone who valued himself above all others long before he decided to maximize his personal profit margin on the community hunt. As Turnbull found when talking to the Mbuti tribesmen, Cephu never joined the rest of the group at breakfast whenever they strategized about where to set their nets. He would simply follow along once the decision had been made. To make matters worse, he was often loud and would frighten the animals away before they got close to the trap. Whenever he did get his share of the community meat, he would always take it to his own campsite rather than eat with everyone else (and could sometimes be heard yelling insults at the main camp once he was there). According to Turnbull, nearly everyone was irritated with Cephu’s self-serving behavior and gossiped about it. But most members of the community tolerated him in order to maintain unity. “Rather than cause an open breach,” Turnbull wrote, “everyone in the main camp kept his thoughts to himself and was silent.” But finally Cephu went one step too far.
“Cephu committed what is probably one of the most heinous crimes in Pygmy eyes, and one that rarely occurs. Yet the case was settled simply and effectively,” Turnbull concluded. Among the Mbuti, as with most hunter-gatherer societies, altruism and equality are systems that enhance individual freedom. Following these moral rules helps prevent any one individual from taking advantage of others or even dominating the group as a whole because of unequal privileges. However, just as it is in our society, the negotiation between the individual and the group is always a work in progress. Perhaps that is why, after the Mbuti had feasted on the day’s successful hunt, one member of the group slipped away to give the still moaning Cephu some of the cooked meat and mushroom sauce that everyone else had enjoyed. Later that night, Cephu turned up at the main camp, where he sat on the ground and sang songs with the rest of his tribe. Holding up the world isn’t so trying when there are others who can lend a helping hand.
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jc @ 2020-09-21, 11:31
文化大革命呢？算是社会性的副产吧
大多数文化知识不足的人，被潮流裹挟。
一个普通人，怎么才能做到不被裹挟？
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Xavier @ 2020-10-07, 22:03
自由是且只是免于强制。强制是指国家机器吗，那来自道德与文化的约束是强制吗，如果是，这种强制如何得以免于？
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