【2021-11-11】 这个还真没想到，各科博士中，论来源背景，经济学博士的背景最精英化，其本科学位来自名校的比例最高（图1），其父母拥有学位的比例也最高（图2），我还以为最贵族的学位是比较艺术史之类，也可能这类专业没博士学位？

【2021-11-03】 发现 Russell Roberts 的访谈真会掐时机，在弗里德曼死前两个多月采访了他，还是两个多小时的长篇访谈，科斯死前一年多又采访了他，两个老家伙都当时快说不动话了， 不知道下一个被他采访死的会是谁，Thomas Sowell? 听了科斯的访谈，发现张五常好多牛逼哄哄的话，其实都是在学科斯的舌，比如对博弈论的鄙视和攻击，科斯那辈人这么想可以理解，属于代沟问题，你一小后生也跟着起哄，就只能算无知了， 科斯对博弈论的攻击，看来只是他整体上反理论化倾向的一种表现，这种倾向里包含着一些有价值的东西，所针对的一些具体现象也确实毛病不小，问题是科斯无法把这一倾向以某种自洽的形式表达出来，因而只能停留于一种好恶情绪，当然，科斯不可能完成这样的表达，因为那需要一种更高层次的理论化，甚至比他反对的那种理论化更理论化，也就是哲学思考， 听了他的一些具体抱怨后，我琢磨着，他真正反对的，其实是一种自上而下的理论化， 让我先解释一下什么叫自下而上的理论化，毕竟这是我刚刚发明的一对术语， 比如你研究了一家牙膏制造商，从中得到一些有关牙膏生产（或分销/定价/成本结构……）洞见，你想，或许这些道理也可适用于其他牙膏制造商，于是你把更多牙膏制造商纳入你的研究，然后，你最初那些见解中，有些得到了保留，有些被排除了，有些可能被修正了，但只要其中一部分得到了保留，你就完成了对这些见解的一次*一般化*，得到了一些比这些原始见解更一般的*理论*， 此类过程可以反复迭代，你可以把研究扩大到日化品制造业，然后整个制造业，或整个化工产业，或所以营利性私人企业…… 对这样的理论化，我想科斯是不会反对的， 他反对的其实是一种相反的过程，先发明一套概念和理论，然后用它去解释现实，当然在解释过程中，不可避免的需要将它具体化，于是便在理论内核外面衍生出一层又一层外围理论来解决使用内核理论时碰到的各种困难，这样的过程就是自上而下的理论化， 历史上，最典型的自上而下理论化就是牛顿体系的构建和扩展， 无需多言，这两种方向的理论化都是有价值的，恐怕科斯也无法反对牛顿体系创立的价值， 当然，他是在社会科学语境中谈这些事情的， 可是社会科学中的自上而下革命同样富有成果，边际分析，均衡，价格理论，达尔文主义，马尔萨斯，都是自上而下的方法， 科斯本人的最大贡献当然也是自上而下的，一个概念横空出世全面刷新了整个经济学学科，还部分刷新了政治学和法学， 可是他对此好像并不开心，他的一句名言是（大意）：科斯定理不是我发明的，我不知道那到底是什么意思，在访谈中，他对受他启发而试图将他的见解理论化的那些努力显然十分不以为然， 可见哲学家还是有事情可做的， @宁静投资-秦:是归纳和演绎吗？ @whigzhou: 和归纳/演绎没关系，自下而上就是奉行*最小程度一般化*原则，其最初洞见可能来自单一案例，而非归纳得来，然后小心翼翼的加以推广，每步推广的幅度不超出其能实际获取材料的范围 @whigzhou: 科斯反复宣扬的所谓真实世界经济学，大意便是如此，我也是听了这个访谈以后才弄明白  

【2021-10-24】 法学院的门户偏向还是挺明显的，图中显示了各顶级法学院教授的母校分布（母校指获得法学博士的学校），明显偏向本校博士， ​​ 经济学就没那么明显了 ​​​​

【2021-07-11】 学术圈在 Lab Leak Hypothesis 这事情上的表现，跟暖球圈的表现如出一辙，如果说有什么不同，那就是在背弃科学原则、合谋压制异端上表现的更加赤裸裸和肆无忌惮， 而且这事情让我对学术圈压制异端的动机有了更多认识，在暖球问题上，我看到的是一般的镇痔立场和职业利益在起作用，因为暖球是个推动大规模政府干预的绝佳主题，而暖球恐惧带来的巨额经费养肥了众多研究机构， 可是在 LLH 问题上，我看到一些远更细小琐碎的动机也会促使他们合谋压制异端，比如： 1）当他们觉得这个观点会被某位GOP大佬（比如川毛）用作武器，赞成它就是在给他递刀子，所以必须全力压制，不管它是否有一些道理或有望成立， 2）当他们觉得这个观点若是成立，会让他们曾与之有过密切合作关系的同行非常难堪，或陷于极为不利的境地，也会竭力压制，这既可能是他们确实不想让那些同行难堪，也可能只是不想失去从这种合作关系中得到的利益， 这刷新了我对学术圈堕落程度的观感，以前，有人若是告诉我上述两种动机会让一批人保持沉默，我可能会相信，但很难相信一大批专业权威会出于这种动机而给《柳叶刀》写联名信把一种观点斥责为阴谋论，  

【2021-06-19】 读了 [[Robert Boyd]] 的 A Different Kind of Animal（友情提示：此书中译本《人类的价值》是坨屎），好像是个讲座整理稿，新东西不多，大约2/3到3/4的论点在 Not by Genes Alone （再次友情提示：此书中译本《基因之外》也是坨屎）和他学生 [[Joseph Henrich]] 那本 The Secret of Our Success 里都已经说过了，不过对圈外人，或许是一份（对 Boyd 和 Richerson 以及他们的学生过去数十年的文化进化研究）不错的概述， 此书的后1/3收录了四位学者对 Boyd 所述内容的评论，以及 Boyd 的回应，吸引我注意的是他和 Allen Orr 之间的对话， Orr 指出，Boyd 和 Henrich 一些核心观点其实哈耶克早已提出，虽然哈耶克的写作没有那么模型化，但意思是一样的，而且这些观念的雏形甚至可以追溯到达尔文以前，比如伯克和休谟，Orr 倒不是在责怪 Boyd 他们偷用而没有 credit 哈耶克，而是（依我理解）觉得这两条思想传统若是能够交汇，或许会带来更多好东西， Orr 此说深得吾心，其实我在读 Boyd&Richerson 和 Henrich 时也有完全相同的感觉，在读到某些章节时，常忍不住暗骂：此时竟然没人提到哈耶克的名字，What a shame! 然后我就去看 Boyd 对 Orr 的回应，显然没有表现出一丝兴趣——

As Orr correctly notes, there are parallels in the work of the Austrian-school economist Friedrich Hayek. But after prospecting in Hayek’s work a bit, I decided that the basic structure of his thinking was sufficiently different from ours that my time was better invested in pursuing our own research program.

完全是不屑一顾的口气，我怀疑这个 prospecting a bit 大概就是查了个维基词条， 其实不止是哈耶克，读 Not by Genes Alone 时，我也期待作者会提到 [[Michael Polanyi]]，结果也没有， 这并不是个孤立现象，我在读丹内特时（比如 Darwin's Dangerous Idea），也曾期待他会提到哈耶克，结果当然也没有， 这事情让我深感学术界圈子之间隔膜之深，哈耶克显然并不是个无名之辈，可是竟然那么多研究文化进化的人好像从未听说过他，至少对其重要观点没什么了解， 当然，哈耶克这个例子可能有点特殊，他在保守派中的大神地位，或许让左派占绝大多数的学术界中很少有人敢提他的名字，所以我不确定究竟有多数人是故意不提，假装不知道，还是真的没听说过  

【2021-04-25】 @whigzhou: 不要读格拉德维尔的第73个理由（除非只是为了收集谈资） @学经济家: 看来前几十年的心理学框架太多胡说八道，得谨慎使用… @whigzhou: 社会心理学是重灾区，其次是人格心理学，认知心理学相对比较硬，所以我向来提倡从认知心理学入手 @shuli-rygh:进化心理学也很好 @whigzhou: 进化心理学和其他分支不是以同一个维度切分出来的，它是以方法论维度切出的，所以可以有进化认知心理学，进化人格心理学，进化社会心理学 @whigzhou: 也就是说，如果以主题维度切分的那些分支都接受了新达尔文方法论，那么进化心理学就没必要存在了 @whigzhou: 这就好比计量史学与政治史、经济史、社会史、生态史之间的关系  

【2020-09-14】 既然割命割到他老人家头上了，今天就多说几句，休谟最令人惊奇的地方是，他太早熟了，而且超前时代也太多了，他10岁或12岁上爱丁堡大学（当时上大学年龄一般是14岁），一头扎进书堆，他说从教授那里根本听不到书上没有的东西，看书就行了，所以最后也没毕业。 休谟25岁开始写《人性论》，28岁完成，这迄今仍被认为是他最重要的著作，包含了他几乎所有重要的哲学思想（依我看唯一没包含的是《自然宗教对话录》中的那些），可是此书出版后得到反应却十分冷淡，他失望之余反省了一下，是不是写的太难了？于是匿名给自己的书写了几篇书评，没用，于是他又从该书中抽出一些容易理解的点，写了两本较薄的书：《人类理解研究》和《道德原则研究》，这下反应好多了，可是也没好到那里去，至少没让他挣到钱，最后他只好放弃了，干脆说《人性论》是他年幼无知时的草率之作，不必认真对待。 休谟超前于时代的程度，可以这么说，一旦走出哲学圈之外，你就会发现，当代大部分学者的思维方式仍然停留在前休谟时代，包括像道金斯这样脑瓜还算灵光的，也不例外。 这也就难怪，真正让休谟在知识界赢得声望的，是他的社会/镇痔评论（这一点和当代作家的出名轨迹并无不同），而真正让他挣到钱的，则是六卷本《英格兰史》，前两卷反响就很好，所以写第三卷时出版商愿意预支1700镑稿费，当时一位体面白领的年薪也就200-300镑，长期困扰休谟的财务问题总算解决了，此时他已48岁高龄。 休谟长期陷于财务困境，是因为他被视为无神论者而无法获得大学教职，他三十多岁时声望已经很高，也多次被提名教职，可是都因为这个问题而被否了，甚至亚当斯密都在反对者之列，要知道，休谟在将斯密引介到学术圈的事情上出了大力，斯密给巴克勒公爵做游学导师（报酬是300镑终身年金）也是休谟推荐的，斯密因为做这导师而腾出了格拉斯哥大学的哲学讲席，很多人希望休谟接这个讲席，斯密却畏于镇痔正确压力而只能反对，但这件事并没有影响休谟对斯密的友情和继续帮助，其随和大度可见一斑。 休谟是史上排名第一的哲学家，这一点在圈内已有公论，不过尚未引起足够重视的是，他其实也是一位重要镇痔学家，联邦挡人的一些核心思想便来自于他，随便举个例子，休谟认为共同体规模不能太小，因为太小往往意味着高度同质化，易于达成强共识，使得权力结构失去制衡，于是国家权力膨胀，个人自油被压制（当然，休谟本人并没有用这套词汇来表达这一思想，这是我的解读）。  

【2018-05-16】 决定某一时代某社会之学术活动整体面貌的首要因素是，最具天赋的万分之一人口，都被吸引到哪些学科去了，更一般而言，决定某一社会之文化面貌的首要因素是，最具天赋的万分之一人口，都被吸引到哪些领域的智力活动中去了。 【2020-06-14】 隐约感觉，各学科之间的发展可能存在某些联动关系，比如：1）一些对智力要求极高的学科，比如理论物理，若遭遇平台期，看不到取得卓著成就的前景，就会提升其他学科产生巨匠的机会，2）某些产业的一时兴旺，会将大批高人吸引到该产业和相关学科，比如金融证券业，所以当这些产业出现一段较长的萧条期时，可能也会产生类似效果。总之，虽然全球人口已70多亿，可是像冯诺伊曼这样的高人，每代也不会有多少，所以这些人的流向就是个很重要的因素。不知道有没有相关研究。

【2018-02-28】 别的不说，引入定量方法至少可以把大批文青从一个学科里清除出去……近年来读的人类学著作中靠谱的比例越来越高，甚至历史学也是，这当然离不开新达尔文主义的持续渗透，但新统计学工具和定量方法的大量运用显然也起了很大作用，让四则运算都头疼的文青弄明白什么叫百分位、标准差、基尼系数、Herfindahl系数、p值、贝叶斯推断……确实勉为其难了。 没有啊，我挺喜欢文青的，只要你们专心于文艺、风月、酒肉，别那么努力的研究哲学或社会科学就好～ //@Hurrygigi: 大伯这么不待见我们文青[傻眼]

【2016-10-24】 我曾说过，90年代以来，西方左派经历了一次智识上的破产，不过我说这话时没有意识到的是，那次破产的结果不是左派从某些思想/学术领域退却，而是相反，但凡还有点脑子且有点自尊的人纷纷退出了某些学术领域（比如所有以Studies结尾的专业），结果剩下的更自信更得意更欢腾了…… ​​​​  

《群居的艺术》新书发布座谈会（6月16日）之后，《南方周末》记者石岩先生向我提出了一组问题，并且很慷慨的允许我略过我不想回答的，所以我就略过了其中两个。 1，书的三部分结构很有意思，它让我推测你写作的过程和思考的过程可能是相反的：你是身在一个秩序解耦的大型社会，再去反推秩序是怎么建立起来的，脚手架是怎么拆除的，是不是？ 答：实际上，我所经历的顺序是3-1-2，首先，对现代大型社会和市场体系，我自然有着直接而真切的认识，早些年专注于经济领域的写作时，也曾着力写过许多市场带给我们的种种好处，然后，当我读到邓巴的理论时，被他的深刻见解所打动，意识到这是观察早期人类社会的一条重要线索，也和我的已有知识相容，接着，一个困惑就很自然的冒了出来：如何看待现代大社会与传统小社会的强烈反差？这促使我去关注那些曾被我熟视无睹、却默默支撑着现代社会的制度和文化元素，最终，循着这条线索，我发现我对文化与社会的许多认识被串了起来，结果便是这本书。 2，三部分的关系：第一部分是战争史，是暴力建立秩序的过程；第二部分是“软实力”，是暴力之外的共同体的构成因素；第三部分是第一二部分的反过程，就像结构主义和解构主义一样，是不是这样？ 答：我选择略过这个问题。 3，书的三部分可以看到你的知识谱系，第三部分让人想起你做过程序员，大学学的是经济管理，大概大学时代对西方思想史、政治经济学有特别的兴趣；第一部分让人觉得你大概对人类学特别感兴趣；第二部分兼有人类学和世界史的背景。这些专业知识跟你的人生经历有什么关联？ 答：历史和人类学是我的长期兴趣，这是两个有很多素材和故事却没多少理论的学科，对历史的兴趣在小孩子当中大概是很普遍的，但传统或主流的历史著作有个问题，就是它们很大程度上是浮于表面的政治史，很少能告诉你古人究竟是怎么过日子的，生活在古代社会究竟是怎样一种体验，这就很难满足我的好奇心，年鉴学派也只是稍稍好一点，这方面的不满让我在成年后逐渐更偏爱人类学，其中理由依我看是很明显的。 至于理论方面，我受益最多的是经济学、博弈论和进化论，其中前两者和我的大学教育有关，我的专业虽然是信息系统，但也包含了许多经济学课程，进化理论则主要是靠自己的阅读。 4，你是怎么从一个专业知识分子变成一个知道分子，现在又变成一个哲学家的？ 答：我始终有一种抵抗专业化的倾向，并不是说专业化有什么不好，这只是我的个人选择，当然，这也是一种托辞，用来为自己未能混进专业学术圈作辩解。可是现在，要靠写作谋生就得有个头衔，免得在别人问“你是干嘛的？”时张口结舌，又因为我没有专业，就只好为自己挑了哲学家这顶帽子，因为依我看，哲学不是专业，而是一种态度。 5，好奇心从哪里来，你的大学生活，比如说水木清华bbs对你好奇心的养成有哪些帮助？课堂和图书馆呢？以前你在bbs上经常混哪个版？ 答：我是1993年毕业的，那时国内还没有互联网，水木清华也是两年后才建立，我没混过。说实话，我所接受的大学教育质量很烂，除了经济学和产业史方面的一些课程引发了我的持久兴趣之外，在社会科学方面，我长期处于无头苍蝇的状态，没有多少有益的启发和点拨，清华图书馆虽然不小，但在缺乏数字化检索的情况下，其实是很难利用的，况且你根本不知道该读些什么，完全是瞎蒙瞎撞，回顾起来，我的大学生涯绝大部分是虚度的。 这一状况直到互联网可用之后才开始改变，转折点大概在98年左右，那时我已毕业多年，网上开始出现大量电子书，然后又有了亚马逊和当当，我的系统化阅读从那时才开始。 我接触BBS也是在那时，或者稍晚，混得最多的是万科周刊论坛。 6，在1990年代，经管是大学“最好”的专业之一，你是怎么从经管专业出来去做程序员的？当然程序员也是那时候最好的工种。 答：当时的清华基本上是个纯工科学校，经管学院的前身是应用数学系，我的专业是信息系统，所以除了一些经济和产业类课程之外，我受的是标准的工科训练，程序员是我们专业的典型职业方向之一，一点不算出格，呵呵。 当然，我的个人兴趣始终在社会科学方面，但因为前面说到的无头苍蝇状态，我觉得在学院里寻求发展我的这项兴趣是毫无意义的。 不过我想补充一句：科学与工程方面的训练和职业经历，对我此后的思考与写作确实很有帮助，这是我从学校教育中的主要受益。 7，那天沙龙你说你不像哲学家那样，有个终极问题然后去求解。我觉得你思考的也许不是终极问题，但是是基本问题，比如这本群居的艺术其实就是在思考人类大型社会是怎么形成的。你是何时开始思考这种基本问题的？最初写的文章发在哪里？在给《二十一世纪经济报道》还是《经济观察报》写东西之前，你在哪里写东西？你和黄章晋是怎么认识的（其实我是关心，在你开始你的类哲学思考的时候，在线上或线下有没有一个“知识共同体”，大家可以一起讨论，评议彼此的想法）？ 答：诸如此类的基本问题，或者叫宏大问题，从来不是我的思考起点，我的思考通常都是零敲碎打的，这一点你从我的博客和之前的两本书都可以看得很清楚，只有在事后作阶段性回顾时，幸运的话，一个轮廓就会顺着某条线索、某个视角浮现出来，这个轮廓可能会显得比较宏大，结果就会导致一些听上去有点吓人的书名，但书名主要是用来唬人的，呵呵。 我2008年到2012年之间为《21世纪经济报道》写评论，开始了职业写作，在此之前，我只是偶尔写写文章，主要发在自己的博客上，另外给《万科周刊》投过几篇稿。 我在网上的互动早先主要发生在万科周刊论坛，后来有一年多是牛博网，再后来是自己的博客，然后是微博。在万科论坛的几年认识了很多朋友，包括黄章晋老师，他们都很有见识，也经常讨论一些有意思的话题，不过，那算不上知识共同体，因为大家的兴趣其实非常不同，虽然热门话题会引来不少议论，但很少能深入下去，所以你会发现，每次有饭局，聊天的焦点很快就会自动滑向那少数几个已经被重复了无数遍的老话题上，这是观察交流质量的一个很好指标，说实话，回顾十几年来我所参与的互动，无论在哪个圈子或平台，无论线上线下，都是乏善可陈的。 当然，话说回来，能认识一些朋友，这本身也是很有价值的事情。 8，为什么人类学成为你一个重要的思想资源？一定要把思考的上限推到那么久以前吗？在书中你援引的人类学成果都是西方的，这固然是因为人类学本来就是西方的学科，但人类学的西方视角会不会形成你思考问题时候的局限呢？比如书中说名字的出现在西方是很晚近的事情，可是据傅乐成的中国通史，中国在西周、乃至商代就有了姓、氏（不是一个概念），名字，后代文人还有号和字，中国人的名字在共同体中的作用显然已经不再简单是为称呼和收税的方便。 答：对于想多了解点人类社会的人，人类学是绕不开的，其他学科，比如经济学和政治学，可能有漂亮的理论，简洁的模型，但有关真实社会的素材却很少，这些理论和模型可以成为方便的推演起点，但是假如你不掌握大量素材，很可能会有意无意的把它们当成真实社会的进化起点，误以为某种『自然状态』果真普遍存在，社会契约的订立果真是重大历史转折点，那就太幼稚了，在我看来，大量阅读人类学材料是预防此类幼稚病的一个办法。 实际上，一种素材只要扎实可靠，我并不介意它来自哪个学科哪个学术传统，我个人对任何学科都没有情感包袱，这可能也是我们民科的一大优势吧，所以最大的局限倒是我自己的阅读视野，我相信这个局限肯定很严重，不需要具体的例证。 9，1972年作家柳青问他的女儿：“如果说秦始皇没有统一中国，一直延续了春秋战国时期的纷争局面，中国现在会不会成为像欧洲一样的经济发达地区?”你会怎么回答这个问题？战国变成秦国是小型社会变成大型社会的例子吗？上古时代，今天是中国的地方也是部落林立、征伐不断，为什么大一统对这个地方的人有那么强的内驱力？就算分裂时代每一个稍有实力的小国做的也还是大一统的梦。 答：假如春秋的封建系统能延续下去（它在战国已经差不多瓦解了），文化无疑会更繁荣，经济或许也会更发达，但即便如此，恐怕也很难指望从中发展出我们在西北欧所见到的宪政、法治，乃至整套市场制度，并由此引发工业革命，封建是宪政的良好土壤，但仅有土壤不够，还需要很多条件，其中有不少偶然性和运气成分，另外，周式封建和日耳曼封建虽然都被归为封建体系，但差异非常大，特别是在军事组织和财政安排上，这个话题太大，很难在此细讲。 10，西周的分封体系为什么玩不转的？按照你在书中的理论，分封亲友，让每个层级的核心人数都在邓巴数以内，这不应该是一个很稳固的体系吗？ 答：应该说是玩转了，转了好几百年，一个转了好几百年的系统，总不能说它是完全无效或失败的，对吧。 当然，最终它还是崩溃了，而且是不可逆的崩溃了。要我说，原因有两个，首先，周式封建缺乏一种成熟的、常规化的机制来维持其成员实体之间的紧密合作和一致行动能力，以便共同对抗外敌和压服内部的秩序破坏者，所谓霸主和会盟都是非常松散和随意的，没有制度化，其次，华夏共同体与北方蛮族之间有着一条漫长而缺乏屏障的边疆，结果是，要么共同体很容易被外力摧毁，要么某些边缘诸侯会在与蛮族的长期对抗中脱颖而出成为压倒性强权，从而打破内部均衡。 11，秦的迅速解体，秦汉之间各路反叛者重以战国时代各国国号为号召，乃至汉重新拾起分封制，这说明了什么？说明了当时的人们对于郡县制这种社会架构方式消化不良吗？ 答：秦的成功得益于它利用土地权利和军功晋升这两种强大激励工具而赢得了对平民的大规模动员能力，然而，作为帝国开创者，它在走向极权主义方面野心过大，而同时却不具备像现代极权主义那么高超的社会控制技术，特别是它对士大夫阶层的疏远和排斥，让它丧失了一项重要的组织资源。 相比之下，汉帝国较好的解决了这个问题，一方面维持了对平民的动员能力，一方面收编了士大夫，让他们服务于帝国权力，维护官方意识形态，并运营上层官僚机器，士大夫与权力的这一紧密结合，构成了此后大一统帝国的最重要支柱。 12，经历了大一统的汉代，合久必分的三国时代又说明了什么？人类是否有挣脱过于庞大的共同体本能？ 答：创建和维持集权帝国都是非常艰难的任务，能维持几百年已经算很成功了，将其最终失败归于某种人类本能的看法，是我难以赞同的。 除了种种外力打击，帝国权力结构有着内在的腐蚀倾向，其中最致命的一点可能是激励资源的耗尽，就是说，随着代际更替，所有可以用作激励诱饵来吸引社会精英效忠权力机器的资源最终都将分配消耗殆尽，因为分配出去的特权如果不能继承，激励效果就太弱，如果可以继承，就会永远被占住，定期清洗也只能部分解决这个问题，而且清洗和对清洗的担忧会导致激烈的内部冲突，一不小心就崩盘了。 13，你似乎认为共同体越大越丰富越好？可是有很多小而美的共同体。 答：我最希望看到的，是一个自下而上组织起来的多层次共同体，在最低层次上是众多紧密而同质化的小型共同体，相互间和平竞争，最高层次上则是一个类似北约的大型安全共同体，保障内部和平与安全，并维持最低限度的宪法原则和互通性，同时并不要求成员之间高度同质化（无论是文化上还是制度上），也不对个人施加强义务。 像瑞士这样的小共同体确实很美好，但她们只能在某些特定条件下存在于强权对峙的夹缝之中，或者强权所维持的和平秩序之下，假如国际社会果真是个丛林社会，而大国又有现代级别的武力，瑞士是无法存活的，安全永远是头号问题。 更极端的例子是阿米绪社群，他们本身也足够美好，但你很难想象，像他们这样彻底放弃了自卫权的和平主义者，假如脱离了美国的宪法秩序，来到更险恶的环境中，比如非洲和拉美，如何可能生存下去？事实上我们在盎格鲁世界之外确实见不到这样的美好小共同体。 14，用《群居的艺术》里的思考方法，你怎么看欧盟的成功和不成功？ 答：从消除市场壁垒，提升互通性，自下而上的组织方式这几点看，欧盟都是建立多层次大型共同体的成功典范，然而，在欧盟占主导地位的意识形态有着深厚的国家主义、福利主义和天真普世主义的传统，这些祸根正在不断腐蚀着欧盟的宪政、法治和市场制度，扼杀其创造活力，最终也会恶化其内部安全环境，而且这一趋势眼下还看不出有逆转的迹象，所以我对她的前景十分不乐观。 欧盟的例子或许会提醒世人：即便人类能够以完全和平自愿的方式建立起按以往标准衡量相当理想的大型共同体，也没有什么东西能确保它会继续朝着理想的方向发展，这是个令人无奈的现实。 15，就你书里呈现的构成大型社会过程，中国似乎绝大部分路都走完了，只差最后临门一脚。而这一脚似乎也不知道往哪里踢，因为普世主义在你看来是虚妄的。 答：这个问题风险太大，我还是不说了。 16，为什么你说推动和维护宪政的是二阶美德？ 答：大型社会对个人的美德提出了一些要求，才能确保其成员之间维持最低限度的和平、合作与互惠关系，其中有些是一阶美德，意思是它们能直接引出合作性行为（相对于对抗性或剥夺性行为），比如诚实无欺的美德，让我们的关系变得更具合作性，更多互惠和利他，更少欺诈、纠纷和冲突，还有一些是二阶美德，比如对独立司法裁判机构的尊重，对个人自卫权（包括持枪权）的执着，对私人财产权的珍爱，这些美德并不直接引出合作性行为，有时甚至还会引出对抗性行为，然而它们却在维持宪政上起着重要作用，而宪政以及由宪政所支持的法治与市场体系，却可系统性的引出大量合作性行为，尽管这一因果关系不容易看清，却有着基础性地位。 17，青春的躁动这件事在什么样的群体里最具离心力？ 答：如果一个社会没有为那些行动能力强又富有野心的年轻人留出足够的上升通道，同时也没有向外输出压力的释放口，那么青春躁动就会形成一股危险的力量。 如果年轻一代的人口大大高出上一代人口，或者经济繁荣度下降，问题就尤为严重，因为上升通道因萧条而变窄，同时却有更多人需要挤进去。 18，在群居的人类社会，从来就有一些离群索居的人，比如狂生隐士竹林七贤，今天日本的宅男、食草男、中国的空巢青年。你怎么看待这种现象？ 答：这是件很有意思的事情，一方面，人类是高度社会性动物，强社会性首先让我们建立了紧密合作的小共同体，继而又经历漫长过程发展出大型社会，而维系大社会的众多组织和制度元素同样高度依赖于我们的强社会性，但另一方面，当社会扩展到一定程度，分工日益精细化，在一个松耦合的市场体系之中，人际关系也可以变得十分单纯和简洁，结果就为宅男宅女创造了许多生态位，在市场中，一个人只要有一项谋生技能，就能在无须和外界发生很多关系的情况下舒适的生活下去。 然而，需要强调的是，这些生态位只是整个社会结构的一部分，虽然过去几百年中这个部分可能扩大了许多，但仍然只是一部分，重要的是，提供这些生态位的那整套市场制度，仍然要求人们积极参与并努力维护它，而这些维护工作需要人们结成各种社团和组织，从事大量社会活动，因而仍然离不开个人的社会性，简言之，市场为宅男宅女创造了更好的生存机会，但只有一群宅男是建立不了市场的，也没有能力维护它。  

New Study Indicates Existence of Eight Conservative Social Psychologists 最近研究显示：保守派社会心理学家现存8位 作者：Jonathan Haidt @ 2016-1-7 译者：Marcel ZHANG（@马赫塞勒张） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Heterodox Academy，http://heterodoxacademy.org/2016/01/07/new-study-finds-conservative-social-psychologists/ Just how much viewpoint diversity do we have in social psychology? In 2011 nobody knew, so I asked 30 of my friends in the field to name a conservative. They came up with several names, but only one suspect admitted, under gentle interrogation, to being right of center. 社会心理学领域到底有多大的观点多样性？2011年时还没人知道，所以我询问了30个该领域的朋友，让他们举出一位保守派。结果他们提到了好几个名字，但在温和的盘问之下，只有一位嫌疑人承认了自己的政治倾向是中间偏右的。 A few months later I gave a talk at the annual convention of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology in which I pointed out the field’s political imbalance and why this was a threat to the quality of our research. 几个月后，我在人格与社会心理学协会（SPSP）年会上发言时，指出了该领域的政治失衡现象，以及为什么这种现象会对我们的研究质量造成威胁。 I asked the thousand-or-so people in the audience to declare their politics with a show of hands, and I estimated that roughly 80% self-identified as “liberal or left of center,” 2% (I counted exactly 20 hands) identified as “centrist or moderate,” 1% (12 hands) identified as libertarian, and, rounding to the nearest integer, zero percent (3 hands) identified as “conservative or right of center.” That gives us a left: right ratio of 266 to one. I didn’t think the real ratio was that high; I knew that some conservatives in the audience were probably afraid to raise their hands. 我要求在场的约一千名听众举手表明自己的政治倾向，估计大略有80%的人认为自己是“自由派或者中间偏左派”，有2%（我数下来不多不少20个人）认为自己是“中立派或者温和派”，只有1%（12个人）自认自由意志主义者，如果直接取整的话，几乎0%（3个人）自认“保守派或者中间偏右派”。我们看到的是一个266:1的左右派比值。我不认为真实的比值会如此之高，我知道当时听众席里有些保守派可能会怯于举手。 Some of my colleagues questioned the validity of such a simple and public method, but Yoel Inbar and Yoris Lammers conducted a more thorough and anonymous survey of the SPSP email list later that year, and they too found a very lopsided political ratio: 85% of the 291 respondents self-identified as liberal overall, and only 6% identified as conservative. 有些同事对我这种简易公开方式的有效性提出了质疑。但是，同年晚些时候，Yoel Inbar 和 Yoris Lammers在该协会邮件组中进行了一场更加彻底的匿名调查，结果他们也发现了一边倒的政见比值：总共291个调查对象中，有85%认为自己基本可以算作自由派，而只有6%的调查对象认为自己是保守派。 That gives us our first good estimate of the left-right ratio in social psychology: fourteen to one. It’s a much more valid method than my “show of hands” (which was intended as a rhetorical device, not a real study). But still, we need more data, and we need to try more ways of asking the questions. 这就给我们提供了社会心理学界中左右派比值的第一份合理估计：14:1。这就比我之前的“举手”办法要可靠多了（当时我只是为了表明观点，并非真正的学术研究）。但是话说回来，我们还是需要更多的数据，而且需要尝试更多的调查途径。 A new data set has come in. Bill von Hippel and David Buss surveyed the membership of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology. That’s a professional society composed of the most active researchers in the field who are at least five years post-PhD. It’s very selective – you must be nominated by a current member and approved by a committee before you can join. 现在我们有了一组新数据。Bill von Hippel和David Buss调查了实验社会心理学会（SESP）的全体会员。这是个由该领域最活跃的研究者组成的专业协会，全体成员都至少已博士毕业5年。他们都是经过精挑细选的，入会必须获得会员提名且通过一个委员会的批准。 Von Hippel and Buss sent a web survey to the 900 members of SESP and got a response rate of 37% (335 responses). So this is a good sample of the mid-level and senior people (average age 51) who produce most of the research in social psychology. Von Hippel和Buss向该学会的900名会员发送了网上调查问卷，回应率为37%（共335个回应者）。所以，对于在社会心理学领域贡献了绝大部分研究的中高级人员（平均年龄51岁）而言，这是一个很不错的样本。 Von Hippel and Buss were surveying the members’ views about evolution, to try to understand the reasons why many social psychologists distrust or dislike evolutionary psychology. At the end of the survey, they happened to include a very good set of measures of political identity. Not just self-descriptions, but also whom the person voted for in the 2012 US Presidential election. And they asked nine questions about politically valenced policy questions, such as “Do you support gun control?” “Do you support gay marriage?” and “Do you support a woman’s right to get an abortion?” Von Hippel和Buss的问卷要调查的是会员们对进化问题的观点，试图了解许多社会心理学家怀疑或厌恶进化心理学的原因。在问卷最后一部分，他们碰巧设置了一组很棒的政治认同鉴别方法。不仅仅包括自我描述，而且还问到了他们在2012年美国大选中的投票对象。此外他们还提出了9个已成为政治心理价（valence）的政策问题【编注：心理价（valence）是指那些会恒常的引发正面或负面情绪的东西、事情或特征】，比如“你是否支持枪支管制”，“你是否支持同性婚姻”和“你是否支持妇女堕胎权”等等。 In a demonstration of the new openness and transparency that is spreading in social psychology, Von Hippel and Buss sent their raw data file and a summary report to all the members of SESP, to thank us for our participation in the survey. They noted that their preliminary analysis showed a massive leftward tilt in the field – only four had voted for Romney. Von Hippel和Buss体现了新近在社会心理学界蔚然成风的公开透明精神，将他们的原始数据文件和总结报告发送给了SESP的全体会员，以感谢我们在这场调查研究中的积极参与。他们指出，他们的初步分析显示出了该领域严重左倾的现象——只有四个人曾给罗姆尼投过票。 I then emailed them and asked if I could write up further analyses of the political questions and post them at Heterodox Academy. They generously said yes, and then went ahead and made all the relevant files available to the world at the Open Science Framework (you can download them all here). 而后我通过电邮联系了他们，问我能不能就这些政治问题写个深度分析并发到异端学院（Heterodox Academy）网站上。他们很大方地同意了，紧接着就把相关文件发到开放科学框架网（Open Science Framework）上并开放了下载（你们可以在这个网站下载全部资料https://osf.io/ebvtq/）。 So here are the results, on the political distribution only. (Von Hippel and Buss will publish a very interesting paper on their main findings about evolution and morality in a few months). There are three ways we can graph the data, based on three ways that participants revealed their political orientation. 下面就是仅涉及政见分布问题的成果了。（Von Hippel和Buss将会在几个月后发表一篇非常有意思的论文，主题是他们在进化和道德方面的主要发现。）依照参与者透露他们政治倾向的三种途径，我们也可以通过三种方式来将数据图表化。 1）Self-descriptions of political identity: 36 to one. 1）自我描述的政治认同：36:1。 One item asked “Where would you put yourself on a continuum from liberal to conservative?” The 11 scale points were labeled “very liberal” on the left-most point and “very conservative” on the right-most point. If we do a simple frequency plot (a graph of how many people chose each of the 11 possible responses) we get the following: 有一道题问到：“在自由派和保守派之间这个连续区间内，你会将自己定位于何处？”在这11个选项中，最左端的那个被标为“极端自由派”，最右端则为“极端保守派”。如果我们绘制一个频率分布直方图（一个体现11个选项对应人数的图表），则得下图：

【图表一：政治倾向自评分】

The graph shows that 291 of the 326 people who responded to this question picked a left-of-center label (that’s 89.3%), and only 8 people (2.5%) picked a right of center label, giving us a Left to Right ratio of 36 to one. This is much higher than that found by Inbar and Lammers. The main source of political diversity appears to be the 27 people (including me) who self-identified as centrists. 图表显示，该题的326位回答者中有291位选择了中间偏左标签（占总数89.3%），而只有8位选择了中间偏右标签（占总数2.5%），这就得出了一个36:1的左右派比值。这比Inbar和Lammers发现的比值还高。政治多样性主要基于27位自我定义为中间派的回答者（包括本人在内）。 2）Presidential voting: 76 to one. 2）总统选举投票：76:1。 Another item asked: “Who did you vote for in the last presidential election (if you are not a US citizen, or if you did not vote, who would you have voted for if you had voted)? The options were: “Obama,” “Romney,” or “Other.” If we do a frequency plot of the 3 possible choices we get this: 另有一道题问到：“在上次总统大选中你把选票投给了谁（如果你不是美国公民，或者你并未投票的话，假设让你投票，你可能会投给谁）？”选项有这么几个：“奥巴马”、“罗姆尼”或“其他”。如果我们依照这三个选项绘制频率分布直方图，则得下图：

【图表二：2012年美国总统大选】

The graph shows that 305 of the 322 people (94.7%) who responded to this question voted for Obama, 4 (1.2%) voted for Romney, and 13 (4.0%) said they voted for another candidate. This gives us a Democrat to Republican ratio of 76 to one. 图表显示，该题的322位回答者中有305位（占94.7%）投给了奥巴马，4位（占1.2%）投给了罗姆尼，而有13位（占4.0%）回答者投给了其他总统候选人。这就得出了一个76:1的“驴象比”比值。 3）Views on political issues: 314 to one. 3）政治议题上的观点：314:1。 A third way of graphing the viewpoint diversity of these senior social psychologists is by computing an average score across all 9 of the politically valenced policy items. For each one, the 11 point response scale was labeled “strongly oppose” on the left-most point and “strongly support” on the right-most point. 将这些资深社会心理学家的观点多元状况图表化的第三条途径，就是算出他们在九道政治心理价问题上的平均得分。每个问题的答案选项都有11个，最左端的为“强烈反对”，最右端为“强烈支持”。 I converted all responses to the same 11 point scale used in figure 1 so that “strongly supporting” the progressive position (e.g., pro-choice) was scored as -5 and “strongly supporting” the conservative position (e.g., prayer in school) was scored as +5. That puts the leftists on the left and the rightists on the right of the graph. Here’s the graph: 我将所有回答都转换成与图表1中的11个选项一一对应，也就是说，“强烈支持”进步派立场的（比如主张堕胎权）就会被记作-5分，而“强烈支持”保守派立场（比如支持校内祷告）就会被记作5分。这样就可以在图表上把左派标到左侧，右派标到右侧。图表如下：

【图表三：对九个政治议题的观点】

I counted anyone whose average score fell between -1.0 and +1.0 (inclusive) as a centrist. The graph shows that 314 of the 327 participants (96.0%) had an average score below -1.0 (i.e., left of center), one had an average score above +1.0 (i.e., right of center), and 12 were centrists. That gives us a Left to Right ratio of 314 to one. 我将所有平均得分在-1.0与1.0之间的参与者都算作中间派。图表显示，在327名参与者中有314位（占96.0%）的平均得分低于-1.0（即中间偏左），只有一位参与者的平均得分高于1.0（即中间偏右），另外还有12位是中间派。这样我们就得出了一个314:1的左右派比值。 What does this mean? 这意味着什么？ However you measure it, and for all samples measured so far, social psychology leans heavily to the left and has very few people right of center. Von Hippel and Buss’s new data confirms the story that a few of us told in a recent paper (Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim & Tetlock, 2015) in which we created the graph below, which shows just how fast psychology has been moving to the left since the 1990s. The ratio of Democrats to Republicans (diamonds) and liberals to conservatives (circles) was roughly 3 to 1 for most of the 20th century. But it skyrockets beginning in the 1990s as the Greatest Generation retires and the Baby Boomers take over. 不论你如何衡量，就目前已经测得的样本来看，社会心理学界已经左倾得非常严重了，只有很少人是中间偏右的。Von Hippel和Buss的新数据也证实了我们几个在最近的一篇论文（Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim和Tetlock于2015年发表）里说到的情况，文中我们绘制了下面这张图表，它显示了从1990年代起心理学界是以何等之快的速度左倾化的。“驴象比”（在图中以方块示出）和“左右比”（在图中以圆圈示出）比值在上个世纪基本为3:1。但随着“最伟大世代”【编注：作家Tom Brokaw将成长于大萧条年代，接着参加二战，随后又经历了战后大繁荣的那一代人称为最伟大一代】的退休和婴儿潮一代的接班，这个比值在90年代开始直线窜升。

【图表四： 1920年代起学院心理学家左右派比值的攀升。（详见Duarte等人在2015年发表的论文）】

Why does this matter? 这为什么重要？ Most people know that professors in America, and in most countries, generally vote for left-leaning parties and policies. But few people realize just how fast things have changed since the 1990s. An academic field that leans left (or right) can still function, as long as ideological claims or politically motivated research is sure to be challenged. But when a field goes from leaning left to being entirely on the left, the normal safeguards of peer review and institutionalized disconfirmation break down. Research on politically controversial topics becomes unreliable because politically favored conclusions receive less-than-normal scrutiny while politically incorrect findings must scale mountains of motivated and hostile reasoning from reviewers and editors. 美国以及大多数国家的教授们一般都会支持左翼政党或政策，这没什么新鲜，但鲜为人知的是， 1990年代以来事态是以何其快的速度转变着。只要意识形态主张或者出于政治目的的研究仍必然会遭到挑战，那么一个左倾（或右倾）的学术领域就还能运转。但是当一个学术领域从左倾发展到铁板一块的左翼时，同行评议或者体制化否证的正常保障监督措施就会崩溃。对在政治上有争议的论题的研究会变得不再可靠，因为存在政治偏袒的结论现在受到的审查少之又少，而政治不正确的发现则需要排除万难，须要遭受评议人和编辑们发出的种种带有政治动机和敌意的论证。 I consider the rapid loss of political diversity, over the last 20 years, to be the second-greatest existential threat to the field of social psychology, after the “replication crisis.” The field is responding constructively to the replication crisis. Will it also attend to its political diversity crisis? Or will it continue to think of diversity only in terms of the demographic categories that most matter to people on the left: race, gender and sexual orientation? 我将过去二十年间发生的这次政见多样性的迅速退减视为，社会心理学领域的第二大致命威胁，仅次于“可重复性危机”。这个领域正在积极地应对可重复性危机，那么它也会去解决它的政见多样性危机吗？还是说，它仍旧只会从人口统计学这个对左派人士来说至关重要的角度来考虑多样性？只会考虑种族、性别和性向问题？ I don’t mean to single out social psychology. It is the field that I know best, but what we have learned at Heterodox Academy is that this problem, this rapid shift to political purity, has happened to most fields in the humanities and social sciences in just the last 2 decades. 我并不是故意要把社会心理学挑出来。这只是我最熟悉的领域，但我们在异端学院意识到了：这个问题，即政治单一化现象，仅在过去的短短20年内就在大部分人文社科领域都已经发生了。 An optimistic ending 一个乐观的结局 I would like to end by thanking my colleagues. I have been raising a fuss about these issues since 2011. In that time I also moved from the left to the center, politically. I am no longer a progressive. So you might expect that I’ve been ostracized, but I have not. Nothing bad has happened to me. 我想以我对同事们的感激来结尾。从2011年开始我就因为这些事搞得他们鸡犬不宁，那时候我也在政治倾向方面由左派转变为中间派。我不再是个进步主义者了。所以你可能以为我已经被排挤了，但是并没有，万事顺遂。 Some of my colleagues believe that the political imbalance is not a problem. But the majority response has been, roughly: “This is really interesting. We really truly value diversity, and we agree with you and your co-authors that diversity of viewpoints is the kind that confers the most benefits on groups. But gosh, how are we going to get more?” 我的有些同事觉得政见失衡没什么大不了的。但大多数回答大概是这样的：“这确实挺有意思的。我们的确很看重多样性，而且我们同意你和你的合著者的观点，观点多样性是那种可以为团体带来最大益处的东西。但是啊，我们怎么才能获取更多多样性呢？” That’s our mission at Heterodox Academy – to figure out how to get more. It will be hard, but it can and must be done. Please see our “solutions page.” 这就是我们在异端学院中的使命了，那就是搞清楚如何能获得更多的多样性。道路是曲折的，但前途是光明的。请参看我们的“方案页”。 Post script: Paul Krugman recently referred to us at Heterodox Academy as “outraged conservatives,” and he said that the leftward shift in the academy was really just the rightward shift of the Republican Party since the 1990s. He suggests that professors didn’t change their views on policy, they just stopped identifying as Republicans as the party went off the deep end. 附：Paul Krugman最近将我们这些异端学院上的人称为“愤怒的保守派”，他说1990年代以来学界的左转其实只是共和党的右转。他的言下之意是，教授们并没有改变过他们的政见，他们只是在共和党转入极端时不再自我标榜为共和派了而已。 There is surely some truth to Krugman’s argument, but that doesn’t negate our claim that the makeup of the professoriate really did change after the Greatest Generation retired. Krugman’s argument could not explain graph #3, for example, which shows just a single person with views on social issues that are right of center. Also, I should point out that most of us at Heterodox Academy are not conservatives, and if you read everything on our site, it will be hard to find evidence of “outrage.” Krugman的质疑确实反映了部分事实，但这并没有驳倒我们的主张，最伟大世代逝去之后教授阶层的组成结构确实发生了变化。比如，Krugman的质疑就没能解释图表三里只有一个人对偏右社会事件支持的现象。此外，我必须要指出，异端学院上的大多数人都不是保守派，而且如果读过我们网站上的所有文章的话，你会很难发现有“愤怒”的踪迹。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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Postmodernism Unpeeled 后现代主义又被剥了皮 作者：David Thompson与Stephen Hicks @ 2009-3-22 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Whig Zhou（@whigzhou） 来源：David Thompson 博客，http://davidthompson.typepad.com/davidthompson/2009/03/postmodernism-unpeeled.html A discussion with Stephen Hicks. 与Stephen Hicks讨论。 “In politicized forms, then, postmodernists will behave like the stereotypical unscrupulous lawyer trying to win the case: truth and justice aren’t the point; instead using any rhetorical tool or trick that works is the point. Sometimes contradictory lines of argument work. Sometimes your audience’s desire to belong to the in-group can be played upon. Sometimes appearing absolutely authoritative works to camouflage a weak case. Sometimes condescension works.” “因此，表现在政治形式上，后现代主义者的行为就像是典型的无良律师，一心想着打赢官司：真理和正义不是关键；相反，使用任何能够成功的修辞工具或策略才是关键。有时候相互矛盾的论证方式管用。有时候你的听众渴望自己属于某个小团体，这可以加以利用。有时候要表现得绝对权威，这有助于掩饰一个案子的虚弱。有时候则是纡尊降贵管用。” Dr Stephen Hicks is Professor of Philosophy and Executive Director of the Centre for Ethics and Entrepreneurship at Rockford College, Illinois. He is co-editor with David Kelley of Readings for Logical Analysis (W. W. Norton, 1998), and has published in academic journals as well as The Wall Street Journal, The Baltimore Sun, and Reader's Digest. His book Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault was published in 2004 by Scholargy Publishing and is now in its eighth printing. He is the author and narrator of a DVD documentary entitled Nietzsche and the Nazis, which was published in 2006 by Ockham’s Razor Publishing. Stephen Hicks博士是伊利诺伊斯州罗克福德学院哲学教授、伦理学与企业家精神研究中心执行主任。他曾与David Kelly合作编辑有《逻辑分析读本》（1998），作品发表于众多学术期刊及《华尔街日报》《巴尔的摩太阳报》《读者文摘》等。其著作《解释后现代主义：从卢梭至福柯的怀疑主义与社会主义》于2004年由Scholargy出版社出版，如今已是第八次印刷。他还是题为《尼采与纳粹》的DVD纪录片的作者和解说，该纪录片于2006年由Ockham’s Razor出版社发行。 DT: In an exchange with Ophelia Benson, I mentioned Explaining Postmodernism and suggested one of the book’s main themes is that postmodernism marks a crisis of faith and a retreat from reality among the academic left. Is that a fair, if crude, summary? DT【译注：即David Thompson，下同】：“在与Ophelia Benson的一次交流中，我提到了《解释后现代主义》一书，并提到，此书的一个主题就是后现代主义标志着一场信仰危机以及学院左派对于现实的一种逃避。这种总结算得上公平吗？即使过于直白。 SH: It is striking that the major postmodernists - Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Richard Rorty - are of the far left politically. And it is striking that all four are Philosophy Ph.D.s who reached deeply skeptical conclusions about our ability to come to know reality. So one of my four theses about postmodernism is that it develops from a double crisis - a crisis within philosophy about knowledge and a crisis within left politics about socialism. SH【译注：即Stephen Hicks，下同】很令人震惊的是，主要的后现代主义者——米歇尔·福柯、雅克·德里达、让—弗朗索瓦·利奥塔、理查德·罗蒂——在政治上都是极左。同样令人震惊的是，这四个哲学博士都得出结论，极度怀疑我们认识实在的能力。所以，我所提出的关于后现代主义的四个主题之一是，它发源于一种双重危机——一面是哲学领域中的知识危机，一面是左派政治领域中的社会主义危机。 DT: It seems to me that in its broadest sense postmodernism is as much a rhetorical device as it is a set of theories and political stances. For instance, Slavoj Žižek can dismiss aspects of postmodern theorising while employing much the same manoeuvres in his own writing. Much of what he says is clever in a rhetorical sense, in terms of manoeuvring around a dubious and unproven premise, while being enormously tendentious or simply glib. DT：在我看来，最广义而言，后现代主义既是一种修辞工具，也是一套理论和政治立场。比如，斯拉沃热·齐泽克能够在拒绝后现代理论若干方面的同时将同样的操控策略用于自己的写作中。从操控暧昧不明、未经验证的前提这个角度来看，他所说的很多东西从修辞上看非常聪明，但其内容的倾向性却非常明显或干脆就是耍嘴皮子。 If you don’t accept the premise - say, a tarted-up rehash of “false consciousness” or an antipathy towards capitalism - then what follows is unpersuasive, even absurd. Geoffrey Galt Harpham pointed out that Žižek’s essays often disregard conventional argumentative structures in favour of stylistic effects and bald assertion: 如果你不接受其前提——比如，对“虚假意识”的一种改头换面式的打扮或者对资本主义的反感——那么随之推演而来的就不具说服力，甚至荒谬至极。Geoffrey Galt Harpham曾指出，齐泽克的文章经常无视传统的论证结构，喜欢追求文体效果和不加解释地提出断言： “[E]ven the earnest reader who begins at page one has the constant impression of having opened to a page somewhere in the middle. This sense of an endless middle is achieved by reducing the conventional middle to almost zero. The typical Žižekian unit of discourse - a wittily-titled passage of between five and fifteen pages - begins abruptly with the kind of confident assertion commonly associated with the conclusion; there is no phase of doubt, no pretence of unprejudiced inquiry, only a series of demonstrations, exemplifications, and restatements.” “即便是最为真诚的读者，刚刚打开第一页，也总是会有一种印象，像是自己翻到了该书中部的某一页一样。制造出这种无休止的中部感的，是他将传统上的中部几乎压缩为零的做法。齐泽克一篇典型论文——5到15页的一段文字，题目机智巧妙——开头总是突兀地提出那种充满自信的断言，通常还跟结论混同在一起；没有怀疑的段落，绝不假装自己要做无偏见的探讨，只有一系列展示、举例和重申。” Bold yet unsupported claims are pretty much a signature of Žižek’s output -and of postmodernist writing more generally -and this is tolerated, indeed championed, by his more cultish admirers. What seems to matter is a “provocative” conclusion, at least of a certain kind, not how that conclusion was arrived at or whether it can be justified. 大胆而没有支撑的断言，几乎就是齐泽克作品的标志——也是更一般的后现代主义者作品的标志——而这得到了他那些狂热崇拜者的宽容、实际上是支持。对于他们来说，重要的是“令人振奋的”结论，至少是某种类别的此种结论，而不是如何得出这一结论或它是否可靠。 For instance, we’re told that fundamentalist Islam constitutes a “site of resistance” from which “one can deploy critical doubts about today’s society.” Yet “today’s society” - i.e. Western, liberal, capitalist society – is questioned openly, at length, and as a matter of routine - more so, I’d guess, than any other society in history. However, the societies envisioned by enthusiasts of fundamentalist Islam don’t seem likely to foster similar reflection or dissent; nor do they seem likely to equip their inhabitants with the tools of such endeavours. Yet these basic considerations don’t delay Žižek in his rush to assert. 比如，我们被告知，伊斯兰原教旨主义构成了一个“反抗地”，从此出发“人们可以对今日社会加以批判性的怀疑”。然而，“今日社会”——即西方，自由资本主义社会——经常公开地、详尽地、司空见惯地遭到质疑——程度超过历史上的任何社会，我想。可是，伊斯兰原教旨主义的狂热分子所设想的社会不太可能鼓励类似的反思或异议；他们也不太可能赋予其居民以从事这种事业的工具。但是，这些基本的考虑并不会耽误齐泽克匆忙提出其断言。 SH: Pomo is rhetoric-heavy, yes. But rhetoric is a tool, so one can ask how it’s being used and why it’s being used that way. The postmodernists have rejected reason, and along with it concern for evidence and consistency. What then is the purpose of rhetoric? In pomo practice, there are a couple of possibilities. SH：是的，后现代确实修辞繁复。但修辞是个工具，所以人们可以追问，它是被怎样使用使用的，以及为什么要这样使用。后现代主义者已经拒斥理性，连带着也拒斥了对于证据和一致性的关心。那么，修辞的目的是什么？在后现代实践中，有多种可能的回答。 One is that rhetoric becomes a kind of subjectivist expressionism - you play around with language and hope that something interesting pops out. Derrida is often like this - I think of him as a performance artist of postmodernism. In its darker moods, this approach recalls a line from Kate Ellis, a sympathetic-to-postmodernism commentator, who noted “the characteristically apolitical pessimism of most postmodernism, by which creation is simply a form of defecation.” Whatever’s been processing and churning up inside you - you just let ‘er rip. 一是修辞成为一种主观主义的表现主义——你摆弄语词，期待有啥有意思的东西自己跳出来。德里达经常就像是这样——我把他看作是一个后现代主义的行为艺术家。如果这种路径的基调更为阴郁一些，那就会让人想起Kate Ellis说过的一句话，Ellis是一个同情后现代主义的评论家，她提到过“绝大多数后现代主义中典型的非政治的悲观主义，这种悲观主义认为创作只不过是排泄的一种形式”。不管你体内正在处理、正在搅拌的都是些什么——你只管有屁快放。 The other use of rhetoric is politically-charged persuasion. Pomo rhetoric becomes long on emotionalism, ad hominem, and so on, and it becomes short on logic and evidence. But the point of such rhetoric is effectiveness, not truth. 修辞的另外一种用法是作为一种充满政治意味的劝服。后现代主义修辞富于感情主义、以情动人等等，同时缺乏逻辑和证据。但这类修辞的关键是有效性，而非真实性。 You mention that much pomo political rhetoric is anti-capitalist and champions unlikely causes such as fundamentalist Islam. Here the pomo are taking a page out of Lenin’s and Marcuse’s playbooks. There’s a long-ish story here that I talk about in Chapter 5 of Explaining Postmodernism: Traditional Marxism said that capitalism would collapse from the inside (the exploited and alienated workers would rise); but when that didn’t happen, Marxists theorized that capitalism had exported its misery to the Third World (Lenin’s idea) or to outcast and marginalized subcultures (Marcuse’s idea). So the new strategy was to cultivate the anti-capitalist resistance in those places. 你提到，众多后现代的政治言说都反对资本主义且支持如伊斯兰原教旨主义之类的无望事业。这是后现代在利用列宁和马尔库塞的一部分剧本。这里有个略微有点长的故事，我在《解释后现代主义》第五章曾谈及：传统的马克思主义提出，资本主义将会从内部瓦解（遭到剥削和异化的工人会站起来）；但这事没有发生，于是马克思主义者就提出一个理论，认为资本主义已经将其不幸输出到了第三世界（列宁的观点）或者输出到了“被排斥者”和被边缘化的亚文化群体中（马尔库塞的观点）。所以，新的策略应是在这些地方培育反对资本主义的抵抗运动。 Like other pomo of this generation, Žižek is an evolving combination of the above. 跟这一代后现代的其他人一样，齐泽克是以上几种情形逐步发展出来的结合。 DT: You say, “The postmodernists have rejected reason, and along with it concern for evidence and consistency,” and I suspect some readers will find this hard to accept. It sounds outlandish. But, as you point out in the book, Lyotard explicitly rejected notions of truth and clarity as being synonymous with “prisons and prohibitions.” DT: 你提到，“后现代主义者已经拒斥理性，连带着也拒斥了对于证据和一致性的关心。”我怀疑有些读者可能觉得这种说法难以接受。听起来很稀奇。但是，正如你在书中指出的，利奥塔明确拒绝了真理和清晰这两个概念，认为它们与“监狱和禁令”是同义词。 Foucault shared these sentiments, claiming “reason is the ultimate language of madness,” suggesting that nothing should constrain our beliefs and political preferences, not even logic or evidence. Frank Lentricchia, another left-wing theorist, said the postmodern movement “seeks not to find the foundation and conditions of truth, but to exercise power for the purpose of social change.” 福柯也持有这种观点，宣称“理性就是疯癫的终极语言”，认为我们的信念和政治倾向不应该受到任何东西的拘束，即便是逻辑或证据的拘束也不行。弗兰克·伦特恰瓦，又一个左翼理论家，曾说后现代运动“并不打算找出真理的基础和条件，而是要通过行使权力来致力于社会改造。” And Stanley Fish, who rushed to defend Social Text after the Sokal hoax, had previously argued that theorising and deconstruction “relieves me of the obligation to be right … and demands only that I be interesting.” There is a pattern here. 而在“索卡尔恶作剧”【译注：物理学家Alan Sokal曾瞎写一篇充满后现代味道但胡话连篇的论文，成功发表在著名文化研究杂志《社会文本》上，然后将实情公开。】之后匆忙跳出来为《社会文本》杂志辩解的斯坦利·费什，之前则曾争辩说，建立理论和进行解构“将我从保持正确的义务中解放出来……只要求我是有趣的。”这里确实存在一种普遍模式。 SH:It is hard to accept the rejection of reason, especially if you’re outside of academic circles, but it’s no secret inside. You nicely quote some representative statements - it’s also worth noting that the leading pomo thinkers cite Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Existentialists as their forerunners, and the rejection of reason runs deep in those lines of thought too. SH：说他们拒斥理性，这种判断很难接受，特别是如果你身在学术圈以外，但在学术圈内这不是什么秘密。你引用的这几个有代表性的陈述就很精到——同样值得注意的是，后现代思想家中的领军人物经常引尼采、海德格尔和存在主义者为其先驱，在这类思想脉络中，对理性的拒斥也是根深蒂固的。 DT: A while ago, I quoted a chunk of Derrida prose that’s hilarious nonsense. I’ve defied several Derrida enthusiasts to explain what this particular passage means, or might mean if you squint and tilt your head, but so far no-one has managed to tell me. DT：不久前，我曾引用过德里达的一段文章，那就是一段可笑的胡说八道。我拿着它去挑衅过几个德里达粉，让他们解释这段话的意思，或者如果你作眯眼翘首状，那在你的理解中它可能是什么意思，但迄今为止还没有一个人能回答我。 And the essay from which the quote is taken has numerous, equally baffling, paragraphs which could be arranged in almost any order with no perceptible difference. Much of the essay is wilfully incomprehensible, like some Dadaist prank that no-one dares to mention. 而且我引用的这段话所在的文章中到处可见诸如此类的令人困惑的段落，把它们按任何一个次序排列，你都不会看出有什么差别。文章的大部分是刻意写得难以理解，就像是某种达达主义的玩笑，没人敢于提及。 And there seems to be a taboo against even entertaining the possibility that such a thing could happen, and happen quite often, with little if any protest from colleagues and students. It’s unthinkable that such a con could be perpetrated, and maybe that’s why it goes on happening. 似乎还存在一种禁忌，连设想这种事情会发生并会频繁发生且几乎不会遭到同行和学生的抗议都不行。人们根本不会相信这种欺诈竟然能发生，这可能就是它得以发生的原因。 More recently, in a piece about the art world’s reliance on postmodernist rhetoric – what’s often called “art bollocks” - I pointed out that the artist Aliza Shvarts was mouthing opaque gibberish while pretending to be profound. The text she’d written and presented as a key part of her art was clumsy, incoherent and often simply meaningless. It was a kind of verbal flailing and rhetorical camouflage. (It’s difficult to determine exactly how wrong an unintelligible analysis is.) 最近，在一篇讨论艺术界对后现代主义修辞——经常被成为“艺术扯淡”——的依赖的文章中，我指出，艺术家Aliza Shvarts所夸夸其谈的，都是些晦涩的胡扯，她还装作很深刻。她所写的、作为其艺术的关键组成部分的那些文本词不达意、文理不通并且多数全无意义。那就是一种词汇抽搐和修辞伪装。（我们很难确定一则莫名其妙的分析到底有多少错误。） One postmodernist commenter took exception to my criticism - first by accusing me of arguing things I clearly wasn’t arguing, then by saying I was holding “entrenched positions” in which “aesthetic values” (in scare quotes), “scientific reality/clarity” (again, in scare quotes) and my own “reliance on logical consistency” (ditto) were obstacles to comprehension. Specifically, they were obstacles to comprehending Shvarts’ alleged (but oddly unspecified) “arguments of power, control [and] dominance.” The tone was, of course, condescending and self-satisfied. I’m guessing the commenter in question didn’t pause to consider the possibility that one might find pomo bafflegab objectionable precisely because it represents the “power, control [and] dominance” of what amounts to a priestly caste. 有个后现代主义评论家对我的批评提出异议——首先是指责我所争辩的是我明显并未在争辩的事情，接着说我持有“根深蒂固的立场”，且其中的“美学价值”（此处加讽刺引号）、“科学实在/清晰”（再加讽刺引号）及我自己对“逻辑一致性的依赖”（同上符号）都是理解能力的阻碍。特别是，它们阻碍了我理解Shvarts那些据称（但奇怪的是并没有具体指出来）“充满力量、控制及支配力的论证”。这一批评的语调自然是高人一等、自鸣得意。我猜我所说的这个评论家可能都不曾想过，人们之所以觉得后现代黑话难以接受，有可能就是因为它代表了一个相当于祭祀阶级的群体的“权力、控制和支配力”。 SH: A lot of what you’re getting from your various commentators seems like third-raters playing the game, so it’s probably not worth focusing on them - instead of attending to the lessons they’re learning from the leading pomo strategists. SH: 你从针对你的各种不同评论家那里获得的，就像是一群三流玩家在玩游戏，所以他们可能并不值得去关注——不如去注意他们都在学习的那些最重要的后现代战略家的教义。 Another clue is that some postmodernists prefer “neo-pragmatist.” Rorty, Fish, and many of the legal postmodernists sometimes use that label. Pragmatism as a school of thought thinks of knowledge, truth, and certainty as chimerical quests and suggests that we focus our efforts on what works. 另外一条线索是，某些后现代主义者喜爱“新实用主义”。罗蒂、费什和许多法律后现代主义者有时会使用这个标签。实用主义这一思想学派认为知识、真理和确定性都是虚假问题，建议我们把自己的努力集中到真正起作用的东西上来。 In politicized forms, then, postmodernists will behave like the stereotypical unscrupulous lawyer trying to win the case: truth and justice aren’t the point; instead using any rhetorical tool or trick that works is the point. Sometimes contradictory lines of argument work. Sometimes your audience’s desire to belong to the in-group can be played upon. Sometimes appearing absolutely authoritative works to camouflage a weak case. Sometimes condescension works. And so on. 因此，表现在政治形式上，后现代主义者的行为就像是典型的无良律师，一心想着打赢官司：真理和正义不是关键；相反，使用任何能够成功的修辞工具或策略才是关键。有时候，相互矛盾的论证方式管用。有时候你的听众渴望自己属于某个小团体，这可以加以利用。有时候要表现得绝对权威，这有助于掩饰一个案子的虚弱。有时候则是纡尊降贵管用。如此等等。 DT: I suppose, then, “neo-pragmatism” is often a euphemism for “bad faith,” or “rhetorical authoritarianism”? DT: 因此，我想，“新实用主义”通常就是“毫无诚信”或“修辞独断”的委婉语吗？ SH: Not necessarily. Some neo-pragmatists take the milder position that truth is hard, our data always partial, and the world always evolving - and so rather than obsessing about truth we should be flexible and focus on working hypotheses and workable results. Susan Haack comes to mind here. That doesn’t have to be bad faith or authoritarianism. But other neo-pragmatists do push hard on the skepticism-about-truth button, as Rorty does, and that takes them into postmodernism. SH: 并不必然如此。某些新实用主义者采取更为温和的立场，认为真理很难，我们的资料总是不全，而且世界总在变化——所以我们不能执迷于真理，而应更加灵活，专注于可行的假说和可用的结果。这里，我想到的就是苏珊·哈克。这就不一定会是毫无诚信或独断主义。但其他新实用主义者，如罗蒂做的那样，确实会使劲地按住这个“对真理持怀疑主义”的按钮不放，而这就会令其陷入后现代主义。 DT: It’s interesting to contrast Explaining Postmodernism with some of the material you criticise. The writing is always clear, even when you’re dealing with quite detailed and knotty concepts or loaded obscurantism. I suppose some pomo theorists might consider your prose “unproblematic,” which is a pejorative, apparently. DT: 如果把《解释后现代主义》一书与你所批评的一些材料对比一下，就很有意思。你的写作总是清晰的，即便是在处理非常微妙且棘手的概念或者意味深长的玄虚隐晦时也是如此。我想，有些后现代理论家会认为你的文章“没有疑问”，而且显然用的是贬义。 Writing in Innovations of Antiquity, Ralph Hexter and Daniel Selden dismissed “transparent prose” as “the approved mode of expression for the society and values of the newly empowered middle class.” In the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Mas’ud Zavarzadeh denounced “unproblematic prose and clarity of presentation” as “the conceptual tools of conservatism.” 在《古代之创新》中，Ralph Hexter和Daniel Selden将“清晰的文章”拒斥为“得到社会以及刚刚获得权力的中产阶级的价值观批准的表达方式”。在《美学与艺术批评杂志》上，Mas’ud Zavarzadeh贬斥“没有疑问的文章和清晰的表述”，认为它们都是“保守主义的概念工具”。 The rejection of transparency as “conservative” is particularly odd, since transparency makes a claim amenable to broad critical enquiry, and thus public correction. Without transparency, what do we have? A private language shared only by likeminded peers, in which one is “free” to assert, largely unopposed? Is that really a marker of progress? 将清晰拒斥为“保守”，这一点特别怪异，因为清晰性使得一个断言能够经受广泛的批判性考察，因而能够得到公众的纠正。没有清晰性，我们还有什么？只有一种私人语言，由几个想法相近的同类来分享，人们可以“自由”断言，基本上说不会遭遇反驳？这真是进步的标志吗？ In the essay linked above, Keith Windschuttle names various academics and educational advisors who claim that truth and reality are “authoritarian weapons” and that disinterested scholarship is merely “an ideological position” favoured by “traditionalists and the political right.” 在上面链接的文章中【译注：大概是指前面提到的Ralph Hexter和Daniel Selden的文章，标题是Truth and Tribalism，不过链接已失效】，Keith Windschuttle列举了许多学术界和教育顾问，他们声称真理和实在都是“专断工具”，而不偏不倚的学术研究则仅仅是“传统主义者和政治右派”所喜爱的“一种意识形态立场”。 This presents a rather handy excuse to dismiss political dissent without having to engage with inconvenient arguments. Presumably, if you prefer arguments that are comprehensible and open to scrutiny, this signals some reactionary tendency and deep moral failing. 这就给人提供了一个顺手的借口，无需通过麻烦的论证，就可以无视政治上的异议。他们假定，如果你偏爱那些能为人所理解、允许人审查的论证，这就标志着某种反动的倾向和深层的道德过失。 On the other hand, if you sneer at such bourgeois trifles, you’re radical, clever and very, very sexy. (Though I wonder what mathematicians and structural engineers would make of this claim. Is there such a thing as a rightwing calculation, or a rightwing bridge - I mean a bridge that’s rightwing because it doesn’t promptly collapse?) 另一方面，如果你会嘲弄这类资产阶级的细枝末节，那你就是激进的、聪明的，而且特别特别性感。（尽管我很想知道数学家和结构工程师会如何看待这一断言。是否存在一种叫做右翼计算的东西？或者是否存在右翼桥梁——我指的是那种因为不会立即倒塌而成其为右翼的桥梁？） SH: There’s that line from Nietzsche about obscurantists - they muddy the waters to make them appear deep. SH: 这里有尼采论故弄玄虚者的一句话——他们把水搅浑，以使自己看上去深沉。 But there is a deeper point about form following function, or in this case rhetorical style matching the content of one’s beliefs. The function of language is to express one’s thoughts. If you think truth is possible, then you work hard to understand the world clearly and completely. 但是，形式服从功能——或者在我们当前讨论的问题中即修辞风格对应个人信念内容——还有一层更深的意思。语言的功能就是表达人的思想。如果你认为真理是可能的，那你就会努力争取去清晰、完整地理解世界。 But if you doubt that truth is possible, that has psycho-epistemological consequences: you come to believe that the world is at best fuzzy and your mind incapable of grasping it - you come to believe deep down that all is fractured and disjointed - and your writing will tend to the fuzzy, the fractured, and the disjointed. And in consequence you will come to be suspicious of clarity in others. Clarity, from this perspective, must be an over-simplifying. 但如果你怀疑真理的可能性，那就会引发一些心理-认识论上的后果：你会开始相信，世界最多就是朦胧模糊的，而你的心智无力理解它——你内心深处会相信一切都是破碎的、脱节的——而你的写作就会倾向于模糊、破碎、脱节。结果就是你会开始怀疑他人写作的清晰性。在这种视角看来，清晰必然就是一种过分简化。 And there is a cheap rhetorical variant as well: if the data and the arguments, when presented clearly, are going against you, muddying the waters gives you some breathing room, so to speak. 当然，也存在一种粗劣的修辞形式：如果清晰表述的资料和论证都与你的观点相左，这时把水搅浑一些，可以说，就能给你留点可以呼吸的空间。 DT: How was the book received by defenders of the faith? Was there any serious attempt at refutation by those whose views you criticise? DT: 这种信仰的捍卫者们是如何看待你的书的？在其观点被你批评过的人中，是否有人真诚地尝试过反驳你？ SH: It’s been well received and reviewed by realist liberals, conservatives, and libertarian intellectuals. From postmodernists, I have received only a few email denunciations. SH：在现实主义的自由派、保守派和自由意志论知识分子那里，我的书都得到了很好的反响和评论。至于后现代主义者，我只收到过几封谴责性的电邮。 DT: One of the recurrent themes here is the self-inflicted disrepute of large parts of academia. Whether it’s the spread of political lockstep and the consequent intolerance and extremism, or hucksterism and incompetence (and those who champion it), or student “activists” who regurgitate postmodernist clichés while enacting their dreary psychodramas. It seems to me that many of these things are related to the subject of your book. Whether viewed as a set of claims, as a political movement or as a rhetorical device, how would you describe the general fallout of postmodernism? DT：此处，一个反复出现的论题就是学术界很大一部分人自己给自己造成的声名狼藉。这既表现为政治上的因循守旧及随之而来的不宽容与极端主义，也包括自吹自擂与颟顸无能，还有拾人牙慧的学生“活动分子”，在出演那些做梦一样的心理剧时总是重复后现代主义的陈词滥调。在我看来，许多此类事情都跟你书中的主题有关。不管后现代主义被看做一套主张，还是一种政治运动，还是一种修辞工具，请问你会如何描述其一般后果？ SH: In the shorter term, postmodernism has caused an impoverishment of much of the academic humanities, both in the quality of the work being done and the civility of the debates.The sciences have been less affected and are relatively healthy. The social sciences are mixed. SH: 短期来看，后现代主义已经导致了众多人文学科的贫乏，不管是说既有成果的质量，还是说学术讨论的礼节。自然科学受影响较小，相对来说更加健康。社会科学居中。 I am optimistic, though, for a couple of reasons. One is that pomo was able to entrench itself in the second half of the twentieth century in large part because first-rate intellectuals were mostly dismissive of it and focused on their own projects. But over the last ten years, after pomo’s excesses became blatant, there has been a vigorous counter-attack and pomo is now on the defensive. 不过，我还是个乐观主义者，理由有好几个。首先是，后现代之所以能在20世纪下半叶变得根深蒂固，很大一部分原因在于一流的知识分子大多不屑于理它，而是专注于他们自己的工作。但过去十年间，在后现代过分猖獗之后，已经出现了一轮强有力的反击，现在后现代已处于守势。 Another reason for optimism is that, as a species of skepticism, pomo is ultimately empty and becomes boring. Eventually intellectually-alert individuals get tired of the same old lines and move on. It is one thing, as the pomo can do well, to critique other theories and tear them down. But that merely clears the field for the next new and intriguing theory and for the next generation of energetic young intellectuals. 另一个保持乐观的原因是，作为怀疑主义的一个类别，后现代最终来说空洞无聊。最终来看，对于智识非常敏感的个体将会厌烦一模一样的陈旧言辞，就会另寻出路。批评其他理论并把他们推翻，这方面后现代可以做得很好，但这只是事情的一个方面。它做到的仅仅是清理了场面，留待下一个新的、有意思的理论出现，留待下一代充满活力的年轻知识分子。 So while the postmodernism has had its generation or two, I think we’re ready for the next new thing - a strong, fresh, and positive approach to the big issues, one that of course takes into account the critical weapons the pomo have used well over the last while. 所以，尽管后现代主义占据了一代或两代人，我想我们已为下一个新事物做好了准备——一种探讨宏大问题的强劲、新鲜、积极的路径，这种路径当然会将后现代在上一阶段中充分使用过的批判武器考虑在内。 It’s a big and interesting world out there. Let the best arguments prevail. 前面是一个无比广阔而有趣的天地。让最好的论证遍布其中吧。 Update: Over at The Augean Stables, Richard Landes has some interesting commentary on the above. Well worth reading. 更新：在The Augean Stables上，Richard Landes对上述内容提出了一些有趣评论，值得一读。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Lenin’s Ghost: How Did Marxist Professors Create a New Wave of Political Leaders? 列宁的幽灵：马克思主义学者是如何培养出新一拨政治领袖的？ 作者：Mihail Neamtu @ 2016-1-12 译者：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 校对：慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Law & Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/01/22/lenins-ghost-how-did-marxist-professors-create-a-new-wave-of-political-leaders/ Europe has by no means recovered from its crisis. The new wave of migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has worsened the economic forecast. The economies of the Eurozone, with a collective growth rate of under 1.5 percent in 2015, are almost stagnant. Gone are the days of the German economic miracle. Nowadays, nearly 4.5 million young persons under 25 are unemployed in the EU-28 — a staggering figure, to which Chancellor Merkel just added an extra million refugees. Particularly in the Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is at very high levels: 47.9 percent in Greece, 47.7 percent in Spain and 39.8 percent in Italy. 欧洲还远未从危机中恢复过来，来自非洲、亚洲和中东的新一波移民令经济预测更加悲观。欧元区的经济发展几近停滞，其2015年整体增长率不足1.5%。德国创造经济奇迹的时期早已远去，如今欧盟28国25岁以下年轻人的失业人数接近4500万，令人瞠目结舌，而德国总理默克尔还刚刚再往上面增加了100万难民。年轻人的失业率在地中海沿岸国家尤其居高不下：希腊为47.9%，西班牙为47.7%，意大利则为39.8%。 Confronted with this bleak picture, politicians, journalists, religious leaders, and public intellectuals all search for an explanation. Why is the European dream failing so many young people? How long will the economic recovery last? Will the EU be able to cope with another massive crash of the financial international system? 面对这般凄惨景况，政治家、记者、宗教领袖以及公共知识分子都在寻找个中原因。为什么欧洲梦会让如此多的年轻人无法企及？经济复苏还能维持多久？欧盟有没有能力应对另一次国际金融系统崩溃的巨大冲击？ While experts ponder such questions, legions of university students face the grim, day-to-day reality. Still in their thirties, they cannot leave their parents’ homes. It would be hard to find university graduates from Thessalonica or Malaga with bank savings or with enough funds to allow them to establish a family of their own. Many rely directly on social benefits, while switching from one low-paid job to another. In the public square, the notion of individual responsibility has become unfashionable. Angry crowds demonstrating in Athens, Madrid, or Bucharest call for ever new governmental solutions. 专家们在思考这些问题，而众多大学生则日复一复地面对残酷现实。他们已经三十多岁，但仍未能脱离父母独立生活。在萨洛尼卡和马拉加的大学毕业生当中，极少人有存款或其他财务来源足以让他们组建自己的家庭。他们当中很多人不停地辗转于不同的低薪工作，转工期间仅能依靠社会救济过活。“个人责任”的观念在社会上不再那么时髦了，雅典、马德里和布加勒斯特都有愤怒的群众游行示威，要求政府提供更新的解决方案。 In this atmosphere, both far Right parties and far Left political platforms have been mounting radical proposals. Populism is on the rise, in the form of nationalism, or revolutionary Marxism, or in some cases a strange mix of the two—as can be seen in the “Red-Brown-White” coalition that constitutes Vladimir Putin’s motley political base. Odd as it may seem, the two extremes can, as with the far-Left Syriza and the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a new Rightwing party, march together shoulder to shoulder. 在这种氛围下，无论极右政党还是极左政治联盟都不停地提出激进的建议。民粹主义正在升温，表现形式有民族主义，有宣扬革命的马克思主义，也有两者的奇特组合——例如普京混杂政权基础中的“红-棕-白”政治联盟【译注：在俄罗斯的政治语境中，红色代表社会主义和共产主义，棕色代表极端民族主义，白色代表君主政体】。虽然看起来很古怪，但是位处两个对立极端的势力（正如希腊的激进左翼联盟(Syriza)和新右翼政党独立希腊人(ANEL)那样）却可以并肩前行。 The present essay will examine the Left side of the ledger to see what intellectual and cultural forces account for the resurgence of Left radicalism in various European countries. My claim is that old-school Marxists in Western academia have managed to produce a new class of revolutionary politicians, who are currently challenging the foundations of the Western capitalist order. 本文将研究政治光谱中的左翼，以寻找极左激进思潮在欧洲各国重新抬头背后的思想与文化推力。我的看法是，西方学术界中老派的马克思主义者已经培养出了新一批的革命政客，而这些政客正在对西方资本主义秩序的根基提出挑战。 We have, for example, the British Labor Party’s new leader Jeremy Corbyn, an anti-NATO politician and welfare devotee. He has called for a friendlier approach to Putin’s Russia. (In accord with the above-noted trend, this puts him in line with Rightwing populists in his country, of the UKIP Party, and Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France.) 例如，英国工党的新党魁科尔宾就是一个反北约的政客，也是福利主义的狂热信徒。他还呼吁以友善的态度对待普京治下的俄罗斯（在前文所述的趋势之下，科尔宾凭着他的这一主张，与英国独立党的右翼民粹主义者，以及法国民族阵线的马琳•勒庞，成为同道中人）。 In Spain, there has emerged Podemos, a Leftwing movement that ran candidates for the general elections under the motto Libertad, igualdad, y fraternidad, and that late last year won 20.65 percent of the national vote, vaulting to the position of third largest political organization in the country.A 37-year-old political science professor named Pablo Manuel Iglesias Turrión is the leader of Podemos, which means “We Can”—an echo of Barack Obama’s “Yes, We Can.” 而西班牙则冒出了一个叫“我们可以”的左翼团体，他们派出代表以“自由、平等、博爱”的口号参加大选，并在去年年底赢得全国20.65%的选票，一跃成为全国第三大政治组织。“我们可以”的领袖，是一个名叫伊格莱西亚斯的37岁政治学教授。“我们可以”这个名字，呼应了奥巴马的竞选口号“是的，我们可以”。 Iglesias, an admirer of the Bolshevik Revolution, was a member of the Spanish Communist Party until 1999. In 2014, Comrade Iglesias was elected to the European Parliament as a member of his new party. Its growth in the last election came after it gathered in representatives of Izquierda Anticapitalista, an organization that includes some Trotskyites and Gramscians. (Sample press release from that group: “Toward a Democratic Disruption and an End to Austerity”). 伊格莱西亚斯对布尔什维克革命心怀敬佩，他自己在1999年之前也是西班牙共产党员。2014年，伊格莱西亚斯同志以其新政党【译注：即“我们可以”】成员的身份，成为欧洲议会的议员。在去年的大选中冒升之前，“我们可以”吸收了政治组织“左翼反资本主义”的代表，而该组织网罗的是一些托派和葛兰西学派的人。（该组织对外发表的范文之一：“迈向民主之崩溃与紧缩政策之终结”。） Podemos takes pride in presenting youthful faces to the Spanish electorate, and advocates of liberation theology (in the person of Teresa Forcades, “the radical Catalan nun on a mission,” as London’s Guardian newspaper called her). In the land of Don Quixote, Pope Francis’ sympathy for the Bolivarian economic model did make a lasting impression. “我们可以”让年轻人更多地参与政治，让他们成为解放神学倡导者（例如被伦敦《卫报》称之为“肩负使命的加泰罗尼亚激进修女”的特蕾莎•福加德斯），并以此为傲。在这片诞生了堂吉诃德的土地上，教宗方济各对玻利维亚经济模式的同情的确令人经久不忘。 In fact among former leaders of Podemos, one counts Juan Carlos Monedero, an advisor to the late Hugo Chávez. Incidentally, Hugo Chávez and his successor in Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, have sponsored Spain’s Leftwing parties and associations in the same explicit manner that President Putin has channeled Russian rubles toward his political puppets from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 实际上，“我们可以”的前领袖之一胡安•卡洛斯•莫内德罗就在委内瑞拉总统查韦斯执政后期担任其顾问。顺便说一句，查韦斯和他的继任人尼古拉斯•马杜罗都毫不掩饰地为西班牙左翼的政党和组织提供资助，与普京总统向他在乌克兰、摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚的傀儡政权输送卢布同出一辙。 The European Left, in short, is very much alive and kicking. From Britain, Greece, and Spain to the Die Linke party in Germany, the heirs of Marx show a remarkable efflorescence, resembling the Greek mythological Hydra endowed with multiple serpentine heads, despite its one and only reptilian body. We may ask ourselves who the future Heracles will be, slaying the beast with the humor of Winston Churchill and the manly determination of Mrs. Thatcher… 简而言之，欧洲的左翼势力仍生机勃勃。从英国、希腊、西班牙，到德国的左翼党，马克思的继承人向世人展现了他们的欣欣向荣，一如希腊神话中的九头蛇，尽管只有一副羸弱的身躯，却生出许多个蛇头。我们也许可以问问自己，谁将成为未来的赫拉克勒斯，以丘吉尔的幽默和撒切尔夫人的铁腕，手刃这头怪兽。 Why are the ghosts of Marxism haunting the political life of Europe? Mainly because neither the structural evils of communist ideology nor its perpetrators in the former Soviet bloc have  experienced a proper Nurnberg-style scrutiny. After the Second World War, the dismantling of the Nazi network in Germany created the proper context for the carrying out of the Marshall Plan. 为何马克思主义在欧洲政坛阴魂不散？这主要是因为，无论是共产主义意识形态在体制上的恶性，还是前苏维埃统治集团中的恶徒，都没有经历过一场纽伦堡审判式的彻底清算。二战之后，纳粹主义机体在德国土崩瓦解，为实行马歇尔计划提供了适当条件。 After 1989, the EU’s expansion toward former Socialist republics did not require a similar political lustration. To this day, most of the societal and economic disasters produced by the communist experiment remain largely unknown to the general public from the Western European countries, particularly those not yet born at the time of the 1989 revolutions or who were young at the time 1989年之后，欧盟向前社会主义国家扩张，却并没有要求在政治体制上进行类似的清理。时至今日，共产主义实验在社会制度和经济上所造成的重大灾难，大多仍不为西欧普通民众所知，尤其是那些在1989年还没出生——或当时还很年轻——的民众。 It was widely expected that these revolutions would put Leftist academics, or at least most of them, out of business. Their voices were certainly muted for a time, but that time has expired. Rejecting the notion of public penance, old Marxist professors have resumed their project, and carried on with their negation of historical facts. By spinning their simplistic understanding of the relationship between labor and capital, Marxist ideologues in the North-Atlantic hemisphere have hatched a new generation—one that seeks, and in many cases finds, electoral validation. 人们曾普遍预期，在经历了那些革命之后，就算不是全部，起码绝大部分的左翼学者不会再有市场。他们的确销声匿迹了一段时间，然而这段时间已经过去了。那些老派马克思主义学者又开始重操旧业，他们仍然拒绝接受公开忏悔的理念，继续否定历史事实。基于对劳动力与资本两者间关系的粗浅理解，北大西洋区的马克思主义追随者们牵强附会地虚构编造，孵化出了新一代——他们寻求通过参选得到承认，有好些已经获得成功。 Just as the young Barack Obama absorbed Frank Marshall Davis’ worldview in the 1970s, so too have European elites imbibed the vapors of the Maoist philosopher Alain Badiou in Paris, the late historian Eric Hobsbawm in London, cultural critic Slavoj Žižek in Ljubljana, or the Hungarian writer G.M. Tamás in Budapest. Such Marxist professors are responsible, indeed, for the birth of a new generation of historically ignorant opinion-makers in Europe. 和巴拉克•奥巴马年轻时吸收了1970年代弗兰克•马歇尔•戴维斯的世界观一样，欧洲精英阶层也受到了马克思主义学者影响，当中有巴黎的毛主义哲学家阿兰•巴迪欧，伦敦的当代历史学家艾瑞克•霍布斯鮑姆，卢布尔雅那的文化评论家斯拉沃热•齐泽克，以及布达佩斯的匈牙利作家贾斯伯•米克罗斯•塔马斯。欧洲出现了对历史愚昧无知的新一代意见领袖，这些马克思主义学者对此难辞其咎。 The economic crisis of late 2008 proved to be a good moment for high-brow academics and social justice street activists. They came together with the dream of rekindling the May 1968 movement against the bourgeois, middle-class establishment in France. Alienated youth flooded social media with Marxist jingles about American imperialism, the existence of banks and mortgages, the privatization of state assets, and the hierarchical structures of traditional family (depicted as sexist and homophobic). 2008年末爆发的经济危机，成了撮合高高在上的学术界和追求社会公义的街头行动家的大好时机。他们梦想着重燃法国1968年5月反资产阶级风暴之火，走到了一起。离群索居的年轻人在社交媒体大肆张贴马克思主义的宣传短曲，攻击美帝国主义，反对银行与抵押贷款、国有资产私有化以及传统家庭等级制度（认为这是性别歧视和恐同的表现）。 Day and night during—and since—the Great Recession, on television and radio programs, at public rallies, and throughout academic colloquia, utopians recycle the mantras of “equality,” “identity politics,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination.” At times, the fresh young European Marxists may speak more eloquently than the worn-out Bernie Sanders does in the Democratic Party’s primaries. However, this lyrical exaltation of Marxism brings nothing new in terms of understanding economic cycles or the way out of poverty. 自2008年经济大衰退开始，不切实际的空想家们无论在电视和电台节目、公众集会，还是学术界的研讨会上，都日以继夜地把“平等”“身份政治”“偏见”和“ 歧视”等概念像咒语一样翻来覆去地念诵。有时候，年轻的欧洲马克思主义者说起话来，比疲惫的桑德斯在民主党党内初选的演说还要滔滔不绝。然而，无论听起来多么激动人心，马克思主义仍然不能为研究经济规律和摆脱贫穷带来任何新东西。 Podemos and Syriza won their respective elections by vaguely promising the voters another future—a distant reality in which decisions about individual happiness would be made through a Rousseau-styled “collective deliberation.” How would poverty be eliminated? Through cooperatives, we are told, which would be less profit-driven than the “neoliberal enterprises” but which would benefit from a state-controlled redistribution of wealth. “我们可以”和激进左翼联盟通过含糊其辞地承诺选民“另一个”未来，赢得了西班牙和希腊的大选。而在这个遥远的未来中，有关个人幸福的问题则需要通过卢梭式的“集体研究”来决定。该怎样消灭贫穷呢？据说可以通过合作社，因为合作社不像“新自由主义企业”那样唯利是图，还可以从国家控制下的财富再分配中获益。 The call to ideological warfare from Podemos (be it in the form of political correctness, student strikes, militias on campuses, or voluntary sit-ins) flirts with the image of a cosmic deliverance from the “hegemonic powers” of capitalism. The relationship between the individual and the crowd is construed erotically. Comrade Iglesias’ speeches set the stage for a quasi-spiritual, if not mystical, interpretation of the revolutionary endeavor. “我们可以”所宣扬的意识形态斗争（无论是以讲求政治正确、学生罢课、校园民兵组织，还是自愿静坐的形式）引发了全球摆脱资本主义霸权这一遐想。个人与集体的关系被描绘得很诱人。伊格莱西亚斯同志的演讲令人容易对革命行动产生类似宗教般的，甚至神秘的理解。 The Leftist revolutionaries accuse “the agents of laissez-faire capitalism” of having created a new class of underpaid employees. They depict students, workers, and trade unionists as innocent victims of a vast conspiracy set up by the owners of multinational companies. In response to the selfish individualism of the Right, the new Marxists celebrate the collectivist frenzy of anti-bourgeois demonstrators. By singing the litany of “fairness,” they forget the importance of moral virtue, human character, and individual responsibility. They avoid addressing the psychological dimension of behavioral traits such as laziness, low-esteem, or procrastination. 左翼革命家们谴责“自由放任的资本主义代理人”制造了新的受剥削阶层，他们认为跨国公司股东之间互相勾结，而学生、工人、工会会员则是这一巨大阴谋的无辜受害者。针对右翼利己的个人主义，新马克思主义者为反资产阶级示威者的集体主义狂热唱赞歌。在喋喋不休地歌颂“公正”的时候，他们忘却了道德伦理、人类本性与个人责任的重要性，而且对诸如懒惰、缺乏自尊和拖延等行为特征的心理因素避而不谈。 Professor Claude Karnoouh (who taught Marxist sociology at a prominent university in the central Romanian region of Transylvania) argues that free markets produce social disasters by destroying neighborhoods and towns. He nowhere takes into account the creative nature of capitalist disruptions, so powerfully defended by Joseph Schumpeter and strikingly visible in the recent replacement of old postal offices by email (or in the mass-production of electronic tablets and the rapid decline of desktop computers). 在位于罗马尼亚中部特兰西瓦尼亚地区某知名大学教授马克思主义社会学的克劳德•卡努教授认为，自由市场摧毁了社区和小城镇，制造了社会灾难。但他完全没有考虑到资本主义式破坏的创造性本质，而这一点已经得到了约瑟夫•熊彼特强有力的论证，并且在近年来电子邮件取代传统邮局（或者平板电脑盛行和桌面电脑式微）的范例中得到清晰的体现。 The Marxist revolutionaries of 21st century Europe ignore the subtle contrivances of human motivation and organizational behavior, which typically make people leave behind the poor conditions of their ancestors, acquire new skills, and transcend the national barriers in search for a better life. 那些针对人类动机和组织行为的微妙设置，能够驱使人们挣脱先辈的困境，学习新的技能，超越国家壁垒，以求改善生活，而二十一世纪欧洲的马克思主义革命家忽略了这一点。 Also based on false assumptions is Podemos’ rhetoric against corruption. It underestimates the welfare state’s role in diminishing individual freedom and economic opportunity for young Spaniards and young people everywhere. In search of the heroic proletariat, Professor Iglesias is still obsessed with the class struggle and the victory of workers through larger trade unions and more frequent strikes. He ignores that every individual is paid for the skills, and for the needs, that he or she brings to the marketplace. “我们可以”针对贪污腐败的激烈言辞，也建基于错误假设之上，他们低估了福利制度对西班牙乃至世界各地的年轻人的个体自由和经济发展的抑制作用。怀着对英雄无产阶级的向往，伊格莱西亚斯教授仍然沉迷于阶级斗争，渴望工人阶级通过更大规模的工会和更频繁的示威来获得胜利。每个人的薪水都是由其在市场上展现出来的技能和对这种技能的需求决定的，但他完全无视这一点。 The leaders of Podemos and Syriza are blind to the differences between an Anglo American approach to economic competition (as a cure to favoritism) and a South American (but of course not uniquely South American) support for state monopoly. Rampant corruption stems not only from the ills of human nature (“the greed of the Wall Street party,” as Iglesias puts it). Corruption is the result of poor institutional arrangements: volatile property rights, overregulation, laws preventing the free association of individuals, rigged contracts pushed by central governments, as well as high taxes for small businesses. It is corruption that kills the natural instinct for entrepreneurship, individual freedom, personal growth, and economic development. 英语美洲鼓励经济竞争（以避免偏袒徇私），南美洲（当然也不仅限于南美洲）支持国家垄断，但“我们可以”和激进左翼联盟的领袖对两者间的差异却视而不见。猖獗的贪污腐败行为不仅仅源于人性中之恶（伊格莱西亚斯谓之为“华尔街派对中的贪婪”），也源于糟糕的制度安排：产权缺乏保障、过度监管、法律限制自由结社、中央政府非法操纵合同，以及对小企业高额征税。正是贪污腐败扼杀了与生俱来的创业精神、个体自由、个人成长与经济发展。 Speaking of poverty and wealth, the Jacobins haven’t managed to create a single socialist success story. No one in contemporary Cuba, Laos, or North Korea goes to “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, and criticize after dinner.” Except for the privileged nomenklatura and the party apparatchiks, ordinary people from socialist countries have never experienced the coexistence of these leisurely activities. 说到贫穷与财富，雅各宾派并没能创造出社会主义的成功案例，一个都没有。在当代的古巴、老挝或者朝鲜，都没有人能够“上午打猎，下午捕鱼，晚上喂牛，晚饭后搞批判”【编注：语出马克思《德意志意识形态》（1845）第9页】。除了拥有特权的某些阶层和党员，社会主义国家的平民百姓从未过上这种悠闲生活。 Why should we believe that Syriza or Podemos will unchain millions of unemployed people through the shameless rescue of Lenin? In recent times, countries run by radical socialist governments have made no significant contribution to the flourishing of scientific research or to the groundbreaking technological innovations which have spread across the world. 我们为什么要相信，“我们可以”和激进左翼联盟搬出列宁的那一套，就能解救数以百万计的失业人口呢？在近代社会，科学研究百花齐放，科技创新突破惠及全球，但激进社会主义政权领导的国家从未对此做出过任何重大贡献。 Neither Communist China nor authoritarian Russia can boast impressive advances in the field of medical science. Such achievements still crown the healthcare systems of the free world. From its very first political application in real time and real history, Marxist ideology has been a painful failure of astonishing proportions. 无论是共产主义中国，还是威权主义俄国，都没能在医学研究领域取得引以为豪的突破进展。那些令人瞩目的成就，仍然出自自由国度的医疗系统。从其历史上第一次付诸政治实践开始，马克思主义意识形态带来的从来都是极其惨痛的失败。 What about the scientific claims made by Karl Marx (1818–1883)? As Dr. Paul Aligică from George Mason University once put it, Marxist economists currently employ epistemic tools that resemble the phlogiston theory used by the 17th century physicists. Das Kapital can explain the wealth and the poverty of nations with the same measure of clarity that Johann Joachim Becher’s (1635–1682) alchemist views of combustion help us understand a Ferrari engine. 那么马克思在科学方面的论断又是否有过什么贡献呢？正如乔治梅森大学的保罗•阿里吉卡博士曾经说的那样，马克思主义经济学家如今使用的认知工具，类似于17世纪物理学家使用的燃素理论。用《资本论》来解释国家的财富和贫穷，和以约翰•约钦姆•贝歇尔（1635-1682年）炼金术的燃烧理论来研究法拉利引擎，效度不相伯仲。 A century and half since the Communist Manifesto was published, the entire scientific scaffolding of Marxism has fallen to pieces. Marx got it all wrong when he spoke about the future developments of the Western society. As a reductionist theory, Marxism today cannot account for the economic transformation of the West. 自《共产党宣言》发表一个半世纪以来，马克思主义的整个科学理论框架已经分崩离析，支离破碎。马克思对西方社会的未来展望，无一应验。作为一种还原主义理论，如今马克思主义完全无法解释西方国家的经济转型。 Let us compare the income and lifestyle of a 19th century worker from a steel factory in Manchester, England with the monthly salary and the spare time enjoyed by a Google employee at the dawn of the third millennium. Would a ship worker from Gdansk in the early 1980s have dreamt of possessing a satellite home television or a mobile phone in his pocket? What is, then, left of all Marxist “prophecies”? 我们不妨将19世纪英国曼彻斯特钢铁厂工人的月薪和生活方式，和21世纪初谷歌员工的月薪与闲暇时间进行对比。1980年代初格但斯克的船坞工人能想象家里装上卫星电视，兜里揣着手机吗？那马克思主义的“预言”还剩下些什么？ Since Marxist doctrine has no scientific grounding, it would seem to follow that its popularity ought to be examined from the perspective of rhetoric, theology, or literary studies. Decades ago, Robert C. Tucker convincingly argued that myth is a central category in the writings of the young Marx. 马克思主义学说没有科学基础，因此要分析它为何盛行，似乎应该从修辞艺术、宗教信仰和文学研究角度入手。数十年前，罗伯特•塔克就已经很有力地论述过，神话是马克思年轻时写作的中心主题。 From time immemorial, people cherished the eschatological promise of a savior (rebranded by Marx as “the proletariat” and by Stalin under the name of “the Party leader”). Since Marxism is neither a serious economic theory nor a rigorous social science, we would understand it better as the secular religion of modernity, which uses a redemptive language for the alienated masses. 自古以来，人们就对承诺拯救万民于水火的救世主心怀向往（马克思将其包装为“无产阶级”，而斯大林则称其为“党的领袖”）。鉴于马克思主义既不是严肃的经济理论，也不是严谨的社会科学，因此要更好地理解这一理论，我们应该将其视作追求现代性的世俗宗教，它运用救赎的语言来面对异化了的普罗大众。 Alain Besançon identified the presence of Gnostic themes in the Marxist narrative of class warfare, while the University of Chicago’s Mircea Eliade has shown the extent to which the historicist myth of a classless society projects the image of a Golden Age into modern times. 阿兰•贝桑松指出，马克思主义对于阶级斗争的叙述中包含了诺斯替派的主张，而芝加哥大学的米尔恰•伊利亚德则指出，消除社会阶级乃历史必然这一迷思，其实很大程度上只是一厢情愿地将希腊的黄金时代投射到现代社会之中。 Traditional societies had foundational stories about charismatic, heroic individuals who fought against an evil enemy and promised a radical, not an incremental, improvement of the human condition. Marxists revolutionaries have taken up this apocalyptic imagery. The new small “c” catholic church is the international socialist movement, which brings to the afflicted world a message of a redeemed humanity. 传统社会总流传着一些英雄故事，这些英雄魅力非凡，勇于对抗恶势力，他们许诺的不是渐进的改良，而是一夜之间改善人们的生活现状。马克思主义革命家宣扬的就是这种末日天启般的景象。这一新的全人类的教会就是国际社会主义运动，他们宣称，要为这个受尽磨难的世界带来人性救赎的福音。 Prime Minister Tsipras (known as the Greek “Che Guevara”) said that “the communist regime . . . at least had humanity at the center of their thinking.” Young and radical politicians such as he do not feel the need to explain the criminal deeds of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 被称为“希腊的切•格瓦拉”的希腊总理齐普拉斯说，“共产主义政权……起码以人道主义作为核心考量。”像他那样年轻激进的政客们，似乎从不觉得有必要解释1917年布尔什维克革命所犯下的罪行。 Instead of looking at the horrors of the Gulag, the leaders of Syriza and Podemos offer their audience the same toxic and yet mesmerizing incantations that make people forget about the Ukrainian Holodomor or about the Stalinist labor camps of Perm, Volga Canal, and Pitești (the latter experiment being described by Vladimir Tismăneanu in his 2014 book on The Devil in History). 激进左翼联盟和“我们可以”的领袖们也无视古拉格的丑陋和残酷，他们拿催眠咒语来荼毒信众，让他们忘记乌克兰大饥荒，忘记设在彼尔姆、伏尔加运河与皮特什蒂的斯大林式劳改营（弗拉迪米尔•蒂斯马尼努在他2014年出版的《历史中的魔鬼》中对皮特什蒂的实验项目也有所描述）。 When a freely elected leader of a European nation can say that “humanity” was “at the center” of the communist experiment, we must pause and ask ourselves: How can Europe regain the vast amount of moral clarity it has lost since the 1989-1991 period? Will perhaps the foe of the former evil empire make a Reaganite comeback to help Europe find its way? Might we believe that a future President of the United States will call out the new Jacobins? May we hope that future leaders of democratic parties will stop indulging in a shameless nostalgia for Marx and Lenin? 连一个欧洲国家自由选举产生的领导人，都能说出“人道主义”处于共产主义实践的“核心位置”这样的话来，我们必须停下来问问自己：欧洲如何能重新厘清自1989-1991年巨变以来就已经变得模糊的道德观念？过往邪恶帝国的敌人会不会以一个里根式的王者归来，帮助欧洲重回正轨？我们会不会相信美国未来的总统会请新雅各宾派重出江湖？我们可不可以希望未来民主政党的领导人不要再不知廉耻地缅怀马克思和列宁？ It is a matter of historical record that, like the victims of the Shoah, the prisoners of communism underwent unimaginable physical degradation and psychological torture. Who will educate the Prime Minister of Greece and tell him of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s long-lasting witness? Who will enlighten Pablo Iglesias Turrión about the black mass which, in the name of humanity, the KGB proxies organized at Pitești Prison during the late 1950s? Students of theology living under communism were forced to denounce God, to mock Christ, and to blaspheme the name of the Virgin Mary under the burden of extreme beatings and despicable sufferings. 就如同电影《浩劫》中的受害人那样，共产主义的囚徒经受了无法想象的身体摧残和心理折磨，这是铁一般的历史事实。难道没有人教育一下希腊总理，告诉他索尔仁尼琴长期以来所目睹的那些惨况？难道没有人告诉伊格莱西亚斯，1950年代末克格勃特工以人道主义的名义在皮特什蒂监狱组织的黑色弥撒是什么？生活在共产主义国家的神学学生，在酷刑的胁迫之下，要被迫批判上帝，嘲笑耶稣基督，亵渎中伤圣母玛利亚。 Such was the “love” for “humanity” that millions of people witnessed during the 20th century. Such are the untruths that vote-seeking, parliament-leading Marxist revolutionaries want to pour into the minds of ordinary men and women, who may begin their adult life by searching for a better job, but might end their pursuit of happiness by embracing an obsolete and evil ideology. 这些就是数以百万计的民众在20世纪所亲眼目睹的“人道主义”之“爱”，这些也是唯选票是图的马克思主义革命家们想对普通民众灌输的颠倒黑白的谎言。人们原本不过是想在成年后找一份好点的工作，但却可能只因向一种过时而邪恶的意识形态张开怀抱，而令追求幸福的梦想彻底破灭。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

It’s finally out–The big review paper on the lack of political diversity in social psychology 终于来啦：关于社会心理学缺乏政治多元性的大型综述论文 作者：Jonathan Haidt @ 2015-9-14 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：龟海海 来源：Heterodox Academy，http://heterodoxacademy.org/2015/09/14/bbs-paper-on-lack-of-political-diversity/ Heterodox Academy has its origins in a collaborative effort by five social psychologists and a sociologist to study a problem that has long been noted in psychology: nearly everyone in the field is on the left, politically. We have been working together since 2011 to write a paper explaining how this situation came about, how it reduces the quality of science published in social psychology, and what can be done to improve the science. (Note that none of us self-identifies as conservative.)  In the process we discovered the work of the other scholars in other fields who joined with us to create this site. “异端学院”发端于五位社会心理学家和一位社会学家对心理学领域早被注意到的一个问题的合作研究：该领域中几乎所有人都是政治上的左派。自2011年始，我们就一直在共同写作一篇论文，解释这一现象是如何产生的、它如何降低了社会心理学领域所发表的科学文章的质量，以及为改进这一科学可以做些什么。（注意我们之中没人自认为是保守派）在此过程中，我们发现了其他一些学者在其它领域的研究成果，他们加入了我们的队伍，一起创建了这个网站。 Our paper is finally published this week! A preprint of the manuscript was posted last year, but now we have the final typeset version, plus the 33 commentaries. Here is a link to the PDF of the final manuscript, on the website of Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Thanks to Paul Bloom for his wise and patient editorship.) Here’s a link to a page linking to HTML versions of all the documents. But because our article is long (13 dense pages) and the 33 commentaries are longer (another 31 pages) — and then there’s our response (another 7 pages) — we recognize that few people will ever read the whole package. 我们的论文终于在本周出版啦！我们去年曾贴出原稿的预印本，但现在我们已经有了排版稿，外加33条评论。以下是《行为与脑科学》杂志网站上最终稿的PDF版链接（感谢Paul Bloom明确且细致的编辑工作。）以下则是所有文档的HTML版的网页链接。不过，由于我们的文章很长（密密麻麻13页），那33条评论更长（加31页）——还有我们的回应（再加7页）——我们认为没什么人会读完全部材料。 For all these reasons, we offer here a “CliffsNotes” version, giving the basics of our argument using excerpts copied directly from the paper.  [Occasional comments from me–Jonathan Haidt–are interspersed in brackets] Please also see this post by Lee Jussim, explaining why we think this problem is so serious. In a later post Jarret Crawford summarizes the 33 commentaries on our article. 出于以上理由，我们现在提供一份“克里夫笔记”【导读荟萃】版，通过对论文的直接复制摘录，给出我们的论证要点。[间或在括号中加入了由我（Jonathan Haidt）写的评论]。此外，还请阅读Lee Jussim发布的这个帖子，他解释了我们为何认为这个问题很严重。在之后的一片帖子中，Jarret Crawford总结了33条关于我们文章的评论。 CITATION: Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Political diversity will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 1-13.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000430[and try this link, with no paywall, or this link to the preprint version] 引用：Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). 政治多样性将会改善社会心理科学。《行为和脑科学》, 38, 1-13.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000430[另外，试试这个链接，没有付费墙，或者这个预印本] ABSTRACT 摘要 Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity – particularly diversity of viewpoints – for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. 心理学家已向我们展示，多元性——特别是视角的多元性——对于提高创造力、促进新发现和解决问题的价值。但是，一般而言在学院心理学以及特别而言在社会心理学领域，却缺乏一种关键形式的视角多元性：政治多元性。 This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: (1) Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years. 本文考察了可见的证据，并为下列四个论断提供了支撑：(1)学院心理学过去曾有过相当大的政治多元性，但在过去50年间几乎已将其丧失殆尽。 (2) This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike. (2)这种政治多元性的缺乏，可能破坏社会心理科学的有效性，破坏可能通过这样一些机制发生：将自由派价值观预置于研究问题和方法中，引导研究者避开事关重大但在政治上不受待见的研究课题，并得出对自由派抑或保守派特征的错误描绘。 (3) Increased political diversity would improve social psychological science by reducing the impact of bias mechanisms such as confirmation bias, and by empowering dissenting minorities to improve the quality of the majority’s thinking. (3)增加政治多元性，能够改善社会心理科学，其途径包括降低偏见机制如确认偏误的影响，让持异议的少数派有机会改进多数派的思考质量。 (4) The underrepresentation of non-liberals in social psychology is most likely due to a combination of self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination. We close with recommendations for increasing political diversity in social psychology. (4)社会心理学中非自由派的人数不足，最有可能是自我选择、敌对气氛以及歧视等因素共同作用的结果。文章结尾我们就增进社会心理学中政治多元化提出了一些建议。

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1. Introduction 1. 导论 In the last few years, social psychology has faced a series of challenges to the validity of its research, including a few high-profile replication failures, a handful of fraud cases, and several articles on questionable research practices and inflated effect sizes… In this article, we suggest that one largely overlooked cause of failure is a lack of political diversity. We review evidence suggesting that political diversity and dissent would improve the reliability and validity of social psychological science… 过去数年间，社会心理学在其研究有效性上面临一系列挑战，包括一些众人瞩目的试验重复失败，一些造假事件，还有一些文章用的是有问题的研究操作和夸大的效应量……我们在本文中表明，此种失败的一个原因受到广泛忽视，即缺乏政治多元性。我们考察了相关证据，表明政治多元性和异议能够改进社会心理科学的可靠性和有效性…… We focus on conservatives as an underrepresented group because the data on the prevalence in psychology of different ideological groups is best for the liberal-conservative contrast – and the departure from the proportion of liberals and conservatives in the U.S. population is so dramatic. However, we argue that the field needs more non-liberals however they specifically self-identify (e.g., libertarian, moderate)… 我们将保守派这个代表性不足的群体作为关注焦点，因为在心理学中，不同意识形态群体的流行程度数据最适合进行自由派－保守派对比，也因为与全美人口的自由派与保守派占比相比，心理学领域偏差极为惊人。不过，我们论证道，这个领域需要更多非自由派，无论他们的自我认同具体为何（如自由意志主义者、温和派等）…… The lack of political diversity is not a threat to the validity of specific studies in many and perhaps most areas of research in social psychology. The lack of diversity causes problems for the scientific process primarily in areas related to the political concerns of the Left – areas such as race, gender, stereotyping, environmentalism, power, and inequality – as well as in areas where conservatives themselves are studied, such as in moral and political psychology. 多元政治的缺乏对某些特定领域（或许是大多数社会心理学领域）的研究有效性，并不构成威胁。多元政治的缺失造成问题的主要是科研过程中涉及那些跟左派的政治关怀有关的领域——如种族、性别、刻板印象、环保主义、权力和不平等，以及在那些研究对象就包括了保守派的领域——如道德和政治心理学。

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2. Psychology is less politically diverse than ever 2. 心理学的政治多元性之少史无前例 [In this section we review all available information on the political party identification of psychologists, as well as their liberal-conservative self descriptions. The graph below says it all. Whichever of those two measures you use, you find a big change after 1990. Before the 1990s, academic psychology only LEANED left. Liberals and Democrats outnumbered Conservatives and Republican by 4 to 1 or less. But as the “greatest generation” retired in the 1990s and was replaced by baby boomers, the ratio skyrocketed to something more like 12 to 1. In just 20 years. Few psychologists realize just how quickly or completely the field has become a political monoculture. This graph took us by surprise too.] [本部分我们就心理学家的政治党派认同以及他们对属于自由派还是保守派的自我描述，回顾所有可以找到的信息。下列图表说明了一切。不论你采用两种测量方法中的哪一种，你都能发现1990年后发生了一个重大变化。1990年代以前，学院心理学只是倾向左派。自由派和民主党比保守派和共和党多，比率为4:1及以下。但到了1990年代，“最伟大的一代”退休【译注：指1920年代生人，因其经历大萧条、二战、战后重建而与美国同铸辉煌而得此名】，“婴儿潮一代”取而代之【译注：指战后至1960年代中期生人】，这一比率飙升到12:1以上的程度。只用了20年。极少有心理学家意识到这一领域转变为一种政治单一栽培的快速程度和彻底程度。这个图标也令我们大吃一惊。] Figure 1. The political party and ideological sympathies of academic psychologists have shifted leftward over time. Circles show ratios of self-reports of liberal vs. conservative. Diamonds show ratios of self-reports of party preference or voting (Democrat vs. Republican). Data for 1924–60 is reported in McClintock et al. (1965). Open diamonds are participants’ recollections of whom they voted for; gray diamonds are self-reported party identification at time of the survey. Data for 1999 is reported in Rothman et al. (2005). Data from 2006 is reported in Gross and Simmons (2007). The right-most circle is from Inbar and Lammers (2012) and is the ratio of selfidentified liberal/conservative social psychologists. 图1. 学院心理学家的政治党派和意识形态倾向已经随时间流逝而趋向左转。圆形表示自陈自由派的与自陈保守派的比率。菱形则表示自陈的政党偏好或投票记录（民主党vs.共和党）的比率。1924-60年数据据McClintock 等（1965）。空心菱形是参与者对投票给谁的回忆；灰色菱形则是被调查时自陈的政党身份。1999年的数据据Rothman等（2005）。2006年的数据据Gross和 Simmons （2007）。最右边的圆形则来自Inbar和Lammers（2012），指的是自认自由派和自认保守派的社会心理学家之比。

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3. Three ways that the lack of diversity undermines social psychology 3. 多元性的缺乏对社会心理学造成破坏的三种方式 Might a shared moral-historical narrative [the “liberal progress” narrative described by sociologist Christian Smith] in a politically homogeneous field undermine the self-correction processes on which good science depends? We think so, and present three risk points— three ways in which political homogeneity can threaten the validity of social psychological science—and examples from the extant literature illustrating each point. 在一个政治同质化的领域内，一种共享的道德-历史叙事（社会学家Christian Smith所描绘的那种“自由进步”叙事），会破坏良好科学所赖以存在的自我纠正过程吗？我们认为会，并提出了三个风险点——政治同质性能够威胁社会心理科学有效性的三种方式，针对每一点，我们都从现存文献中提出例证来作了说明。 3.1. Risk point 1: Liberal values and assumptions can become embedded into theory and method 3.1. 风险点之一：自由派价值观和假设可能预装到理论和方法之中 The embedding of values occurs when value statements or ideological claims are wrongly treated as objective truth, and observed deviation from that truth is treated as error. 当价值陈述或意识形态主张被错误地当成客观真理对待时，或者与这一真理有出入的现象被观测到，却被当成错误对待时，价值观的预装就发生了。 [Example:] and McBride (2007) found that: 1) people high in social dominance orientation (SDO) were more likely to make unethical decisions, 2) people high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) were more likely to go along with the unethical decisions of leaders, and 3) dyads with high SDO leaders and high RWA followers made more unethical decisions than dyads with alternative arrangements (e.g., low SDO—low RWA dyads). [例证：]Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna和 McBride（2007）发现：1）社会支配倾向（SDO）高的人更可能作出不道德的决定，2）右翼权威主义（RWA）程度高的人更可能遵从领导人作出的不道德决定，以及3）高SDO的领导人与高RWA的追随者这一组合作出的不道德决定比其它形式的排列组合（如低SDO和低RWA组合）要多。 Yet consider the decisions they defined as unethical: not formally taking a female colleague’s side in her sexual harassment complaint against her subordinate (given little information about the case), and a worker placing the well-being of his or her company above unspecified harms to the environment attributed to the company’s operations. Liberal values of feminism and environmentalism were embedded directly into the operationalization of ethics, even to the extent that participants were expected to endorse those values in vignettes that lacked the information one would need to make a considered judgment. 不过，看看被他们界定为不道德的决定：在女性同事对其下属提出性骚扰投诉时不正式站在她的一边（几乎没有任何案件相关信息），工人将他或她所属公司的利益置于未明确说明的环境损害之上（这种损害被归罪于该公司的运营）。自由派的女性主义和环保主义价值取向被直接预装进了伦理概念的执行之中，甚至到了这种程度：在某个场景下缺乏信息的个体不得不做出审慎判断，仍指望参与者支持这些价值。 The appearance of certain words that imply pernicious motives (e.g., deny, legitimize, rationalize, justify, defend, trivialize) may be particularly indicative of research tainted by embedded values. 对某些特定词汇的使用，暗中指涉险恶的动机（如拒斥、合法化、合理化、正当化、维护、琐碎化等）。出现这些词汇，可能就具有特别的标志性，表明研究已被预装的价值观污染。 3.2. Risk point 2: Researchers may concentrate on topics that validate the liberal progress narrative and avoid topics that contest that narrative 3.2 风险点之二：研究者可能全神关注那些能够证实自由进步叙事的论题，避开那些对这一叙事构成质疑的论题 Since the enlightenment, scientists have thought of themselves as spreading light and pushing back the darkness. The metaphor is apt, but in a politically homogeneous field, a larger-than-optimal number of scientists shine their flashlights on ideologically important regions of the terrain. Doing so leaves many areas unexplored. Even worse, some areas become walled off, and inquisitive researchers risk ostracism if they venture in. 自启蒙运动以来，科学家们一直认为自己所做的，乃是拒绝黑暗、传播光明的事业。这个暗喻是恰当的，不过，在一个政治同质化的地界，把灯光照向境内那些在意识形态上很重要的领域的科学家数目实在是多得过分。这么做会令许多领域无人探索。更糟糕的是，有些领域还会被高墙围起来，任何求知好问的研究者胆敢冒险进入，就有被放逐的风险。 [Example:] Stereotype accuracy. Since the 1930s, social psychologists have been proclaiming the inaccuracy of social stereotypes, despite lacking evidence of such inaccuracy. Evidence has seemed unnecessary because stereotypes have been, in effect, stereotyped as inherently nasty and inaccurate (see Jussim, 2012a for a review). [例证：]刻板印象的准确性。自1930年代起，社会心理学家一直声称，社会刻板印象是不准确的，尽管他们拿不出相关证据。此类证据一直被视为毫无必要，因为刻板印象本身事实上已经被刻板印象化了，成了一种本质上恶劣且不准确的事物（评论见Jussim, 2012a）。 Some group stereotypes are indeed hopelessly crude and untestable. But some may rest on valid empiricism—and represent subjective estimates of population characteristics (e.g. the proportion of people who drop out of high school, are victims of crime, or endorse policies that support women at work, see Jussim, 2012a, Ryan, 2002 for reviews). 某些群体刻板印象确实无可救药地生硬粗糙、不可验证。但还有一些，则可能确实建立在有效的经验主义基础之上——并体现了对于人群特征的主观估计（比如高中辍学的人口比例、罪案受害者的人口比例、支持职业女性的政策的支持者比例等，评论见Jussim, 2012a和Ryan，2002）。 In this context, it is not surprising that the rigorous empirical study of the accuracy of factual stereotypes was initiated by one of the very few self-avowed conservatives in social psychology—Clark McCauley (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). Since then, dozens of studies by independent researchers have yielded evidence that stereotype accuracy (of all sorts of stereotypes) is one of the most robust effects in all of social psychology (Jussim, 2012a). 在这种氛围中，毫不稀奇，关于有事实基础的刻板印象之准确性，最严谨的经验研究是由社会心理学领域极少见的自陈保守派之一——Clark McCauley开创的（McCauley和Stitt, 1978）。自那以后，独立研究者的数十种研究已经得出证据，在所有社会心理学成果中，（关于所有种类的刻板印象的）刻板印象准确性之说乃是最为有力的之一（Jussim, 2012a）。 Here is a clear example of the value of political diversity: a conservative social psychologist asked a question nobody else thought (or dared) to ask, and found results that continue to make many social psychologists uncomfortable. McCauley’s willingness to put the assumption of stereotype inaccuracy to an empirical test led to the correction of one of social psychology’s most longstanding errors. 这是政治多元性之价值的清楚一例：一个保守派社会心理学家追问了一个别人都没想过（或敢于）去问的问题，并得出了一个让许多社会心理学家现在仍一直感到不舒服的结论。McCauley决心对刻板印象不准确这一假设进行经验验证，这就导致了对于社会心理学中最长寿错误之一的纠正。 3.3. Risk point 3: Negative attitudes regarding conservatives can produce a psychological science that mischaracterizes their traits and attributes 3.3 风险点之三：对于保守派的负面看法可能导致心理科学错误地描绘保守派的特征和性质 A long-standing view in social-political psychology is that the right is more dogmatic and intolerant of ambiguity than the left, a view Tetlock (1983) dubbed the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis…. But had social psychologists studied a broad enough range of situations to justify these broad conclusions? Recent evidence suggests not. 社会—政治心理学中存在已久的一个看法是，右派比左派更为教条，更不能容忍模棱两可。Tetlock（1983）将这种看法叫作“右派的死板”假说……但是，社会心理学家为了证明这种一般性的结论，是否研究过范围足够广泛的情形？近来的证据显示：并非如此。 The ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM; Crawford, 2012) posits that people on the political left and right are equally likely to approach political judgments with their ideological blinders on. That said, they will only do so when the premise of a political judgment is ideologically acceptable. If it’s objectionable, any preferences for one group over another will be short-circuited, and biases won’t emerge. 据“意识形态争议性前提模型”（IOPM; Crawford, 2012）推断，政治上的左派和右派戴着意识形态眼罩形成政治判断的可能性是一样大的。当然，这只会发生于政治判断的前提在意识形态上可以接受的情况下。如果这一前提是可争议的，那么偏好其中任意一个群体都会引起直接短路，偏见就不会出现。 The IOPM thus allows for biases to emerge only among liberals, only among conservatives, or among both liberals and conservatives, depending on the situation. For example, reinterpreting Altemeyer’s mandatory school prayer results, Crawford (2012) argued that for people low in RWA who value individual freedom and autonomy, mandatory school prayer is objectionable; thus, the very nature of the judgment should shut off any biases in favor of one target over the other. 由此，随着情况的不同，IOPM模型可让偏见仅出现于自由派中，或仅出现于保守派中，或同时出现于自由派和保守派中。比如，Crawford（2012）在重新解释Altemeyer的强制性学校祷告数据时论证到，对于右翼权威主义（RWA）程度低、看重个体自由与自主的人，强制性学校祷告是可争议的；因此，这一判断的性质本身会将任何重此轻彼的偏见排斥在外。 However, for people high in RWA who value society-wide conformity to traditional morals and values, mandating school prayer is acceptable; this acceptable premise then allows for people high in RWA to express a bias in favor of Christian over Muslim school prayer. 然而，对于RWA程度高、看重全社会对传统道德和价值观的遵从的人，强制性学校祷告是可以接受的；于是，这种可接受的前提就会让RWA程度高的人表达出重基督教校园祈祷者、轻穆斯林校园祈祷者的偏见。 Crawford (2012, Study 1) replaced mandatory prayer with voluntary prayer, which would be acceptable to both people high and low in RWA. In line with the IOPM, people high in RWA were still biased in favor of Christian over Muslim prayer, while people low in RWA now showed a bias in favor of Muslim over Christian voluntary prayer. Hypocrisy is therefore not necessarily a special province of the right. Crawford（2012，研究1）用自愿祈祷者代替强制祈祷者，于是前提变成了对于RWA程度高和低的两种人都可以接受。与IOPM模型预测一致，RWA程度高的人仍然存在重基督教祈祷者、轻穆斯林祈祷者的偏见，与此同时，RWA程度低的人现在表现出重穆斯林自愿祈祷者、轻基督教自愿祈祷者的偏见。因此，虚伪矫饰可不一定是右派的特殊地盘。 These example illustrate the threats to truth-seeking that emerge when members of a politically homogenous intellectual community are motivated to cast their perceived outgroup (i.e., the ones who violate the liberal progressive narrative) in a negative light. If there were more social psychologists who were motivated to question the design and interpretation of studies biased towards liberal values during peer review, or if there were more researchers running their own studies using different methods, social psychologists could be more confident in the validity of their characterizations of conservatives (and liberals). 这些例子说明，当一个政治同质化的知识群体的成员被鼓励用一种负面灯光去映照他们所理解的圈外人士（比如，冒犯自由进步叙事的人）时，追求真理的事业会受到何种威胁。如果在同行评审中，能有更多的社会心理学家被鼓励去质疑那些偏向自由派价值观的研究的设计和解释，如果能有更多的研究者采用不同的方法来进行他们自己的研究，社会心理学家就能对他们关于保守派（和自由派）的描绘的可信度拥有更多自信。

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4. Why political diversity is likely to improve social psychological science 4. 为什么政治多元性有可能改进社会心理科学 Diversity can be operationalized in many ways, including demographic diversity (e.g., ethnicity, race, and gender) and viewpoint diversity (e.g., variation in intellectual viewpoints or professional expertise). 将多元性这一概念变得可操作的方式很多，包括人口学多元化（如族群、种族和性别）和视角多元化（比如各种不同的知识视角或专业技能）。 Research in organizational psychology suggest that: a) the benefits of viewpoint diversity are more consistent and pronounced than those of demographic diversity (Menz, 2012; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998); and 组织心理学研究表明：a）视角多元化比人口学多元化的益处更为一贯、更为显著（Menz, 2012; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998）；又 b) the benefits of viewpoint diversity are most pronounced when organizations are pursuing open-ended exploratory goals (e.g., scientific discovery) as opposed to exploitative goals (e.g., applying well-established routines to well-defined problems; Cannella, Park & Hu, 2008). b）与追求利用性目标（比如，在界定明确的问题上执行已良好确立的例行程序）的组织相比，在追求开放式的探索性目标（比如，科学发现）的组织中，视角多元化的益处最为显著（Cannella, Park & Hu, 2008）。 Viewpoint diversity may therefore be more valuable than demographic diversity if social psychology’s core goal is to produce broadly valid and generalizable conclusions. (Of course, demographic diversity can bring viewpoint diversity, but if it is viewpoint diversity that is wanted, then it may be more effective to pursue it directly.) 因此，如果社会心理学的核心目标在于得出广泛有效且可以一般化的结论，那么视角多元性似乎比人口学多元性更有价值。（当然，人口学多元性能带来视角多元性，但如果我们需要的正是视角多元性，那么直接追求它可能更为有效。） It is the lack of political viewpoint diversity that makes social psychology vulnerable to the three risks described in the previous section. Political diversity is likely to have a variety of positive effects by reducing the impact of two familiar mechanisms that we explore below: confirmation bias and groupthink/majority consensus. 正是政治视角多元性的缺乏，才使得社会心理学在前一部分描述的三大风险面前显得很脆弱。通过削弱我们下面将讨论的两个我们熟知的机制的影响，政治多元性很可能具有多种多样的积极功效：确认偏误和群体思维/多数一致。 4.1. Confirmation bias 4.1 确认偏误 People tend to search for evidence that will confirm their existing beliefs while also ignoring or downplaying disconfirming evidence. This confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) is widespread among both laypeople and scientists (Ioannidis, 2012). Confirmation bias can become even stronger when people confront questions that trigger moral emotions and concerns about group identity (Haidt, 2001; 2012). 人们更喜欢为他们已有的信念搜罗证据，同时无视或轻视与既有信念抵触的证据。这种确认偏误（Nickerson, 1998）在外行和科学家中都很常见（Ioannidis, 2012）。当人们面对的问题还能够引发对于群体认同的道德情绪和关怀时，确认偏误可能会变得更为强烈（Haidt, 2001; 2012）。 Further, group-polarization often exacerbates extremism in echo chambers (Lamm & Myers, 1978). [and note from the graph above that social psychology has become an echo chamber since the 1990s] 此外，群体的极化通常还会在回音室中加剧极端主义（Lamm & Myers, 1978）。[并且注意，前面的图表已经显示，社会心理学自1990年代起已经变成了一个回音室]。 Indeed, people are far better at identifying the flaws in other people’s evidence-gathering than in their own, especially if those other people have dissimilar beliefs (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sperber et al., 2010). 实在来说，人们在别人的证据搜集过程中找出错误，可比针对自己时要得心应手得多，特别是当别人具有不同的信念时（如见Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sperber等, 2010）。 Although such processes may be beneficial for communities whose goal is social cohesion (e.g., a religious or activist movement), they can be devastating for scientific communities by leading to widely-accepted claims that reflect the scientific community’s blind spots more than they reflect justified scientific conclusions (see, e.g., the three risk points discussed previously). 对于目标在于社会团结的共同体（如一个宗教运动或激进运动）来说，这类事情也许是有益的，但是对于科学共同体来说，这将是毁灭性的。因为它们将会导致一些被广泛接受的论断产生，而这些论断更多反映的是科学共同体的盲点，而非科学上得到证明的结论（如见前文所论的三个风险点）。 The most obvious cure for this problem is to increase the viewpoint diversity of the field. Nobody has found a way to eradicate confirmation bias in individuals (Lilienfeld et al., 2009), but we can diversify the field to the point where individual viewpoint biases begin to cancel each other out. 对于这个问题，最显而易见的疗法就是增加该领域的视角多元性。从来没有人找到过在个体身上根除确认偏误的办法（Lilienfeld等, 2009），但我们可以不断增加一个领域的多元性，直到个体的视角偏见开始相互抵消。 4.2. Minority influence 4.2 众从 Minority influence research has focused on the processes by which minorities influence majority members’ (and thus the groups’) reasoning (e.g., Crano, 2012; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). Majorities influence decision-making by producing conformity pressure that creates cohesion and community, but they do little to enhance judgmental depth or quality (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). They also risk creating the type of groupthink that has long been a target of criticism by social psychologists (e.g., Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004; Janis, 1972)…. 众从研究聚焦于一种过程：少数派影响多数成员（进而是整个群体）的论证（如见Crano, 2012; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980）。多数派通过制造顺从压力影响决策，而这种压力能够创造凝聚力和共同体，但无益于提高决断的深度或质量（Crisp & Turner, 2011; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980）。他们也导致群体思维的风险，而这被社会心理学家诟病已久（如见Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004; Janis, 1972）…… There is even evidence that politically diverse teams produce more creative solutions than do politically homogeneous teams on problems such as “how can a person of average talent achieve fame” and how to find funding for a partially-built church ineligible for bank loans (Triandis, Hall, & Ewen, 1965)…. 甚至有证据表明，即使是在“某个资质平平的人如何成名”以及怎样为一个烂尾的教堂筹集资金，取得银行贷款这样的问题上，政治上多元的团队也比政治同质的团队更能找到创造性的解决方案。 In sum, there are grounds for hypothesizing that increased political diversity would improve the quality of social psychological science because it would increase the degree of scientific dissent, especially, on such politicized issues as inequality versus equity, the psychological characteristics of liberals and conservatives, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Social psychologists have shown these effects in many settings; they could take advantage of them within their own ranks. 总之，政治多元性的增加有助于改善社会心理科学的质量，这一假设是有理有据的，因为它会增加科学分歧的程度。当我们面对的是诸如不平等与平等、自由派和保守派的心理特征、刻板印象、偏见和歧视等等政治化的议题时，情况尤其如此。社会心理学家已经针对许多场合说明过此类效应；他们可以在自己的队伍中好好对其加以利用。

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5. Why are there so few non-liberals in social psychology? 5. 为什么非自由派在社会心理学中难得一见？ the evidence does not point to a single answer. To understand why conservatives are so vastly underrepresented in social psychology, we consider five explanations that have frequently been offered to account for a lack of diversity not just in social psychology, but in other contexts (e.g., the underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities in STEM fields, e.g., Pinker, 2008). 证据表明，答案不止一个。为了理解为什么保守派在社会心理学中的人数如此不足，我们考虑了五种解释，这五种解释不仅在说明社会心理学中多元性的缺乏时，而且在其它学术文章中也经常被人提到（如在STEM领域内妇女和少数族裔的缺乏，如见Pinker, 2008）【译注：STEM为科学、技术、工程和数学四个学科的英文首字母缩写】。 5.1. Differences in ability 5.1. 能力差异 [Are conservatives simply less intelligent than liberals, and less able to obtain PhDs and faculty positions?] The evidence does not support this view… [published studies are mixed. Part of the complexity is that…] Social conservatism correlates with lower cognitive ability test scores, but economic conservatism correlates with higher scores (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Kemmelmeier 2008). [Libertarians are the political group with the highest IQ, yet they are underrepresented in the social sciences other than economics] [难道保守派就是没有自由派那么聪明，取得博士学位和教职岗位的能力要差些？]证据不支持这种观点……[已有的研究形形色色。情况的复杂性部分体现在……]社会保守派与认知能力测试得分较低存在相关性，不过经济保守派则与得分较高存在相关性（Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Kemmelmeier 2008）[自由意志主义者是IQ最高的政治团体，但他们在除经济学以外的所有社会科学中人数均不足] 5.2. The effects of education on political ideology 5.2. 政治意识形态教育的影响 Many may view education as “enlightening” and believe that an enlightened view comports with liberal politics. There is little evidence that education causes students to become more liberal. Instead, several longitudinal studies following tens of thousands of college students for many years have concluded that political socialization in college occurs primarily as a function of one’s peers, not education per se (Astin, 1993; Dey, 1997). 许多人可能将教育视为“启蒙”，并相信经过启蒙的观念会与自由派政治一致。鲜有证据表明教育会使得学生更为趋向自由派。几项对数万名大学生的多年追踪研究倒是得出结论认为，大学里的政治社会化过程【译注：指个体形塑政治态度的过程】主要取决于一个人的同伴，而非教育本身（Astin, 1993; Dey, 1997）。 5.3. Differences in interest 5.3. 兴趣差异 Might liberals simply find a career in social psychology (or the academy more broadly) more appealing? Yes, for several reasons. The Big-5 trait that correlates most strongly with political liberalism is openness to experience (r = .32 in Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloways’s 2003 meta-analysis), and people high in that trait are more likely to pursue careers that will let them indulge their curiosity and desire to learn, such as a career in the academy (McCrae, 1996). An academic career requires a Ph.D., and liberals enter (and graduate) college more interested in pursuing Ph.D.s than do conservatives (Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009)… 有没有可能就是因为自由派觉得社会心理学（或更广泛而言，整个学术界）这种职业更有吸引力？有可能，理由有多个。与政治自由主义相关性最强的“五大”人格特点【译注：五大人格特点，指心理学上描述人格特征时常用的五维度模型，分别为外倾性、经验开放性、随和性、神经质和尽责性】就是“经验开放性”（在Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski和 Sulloways 2003年所做的meta分析中，r=0.32），而在这一特点上得分高的人更有可能从事能让他们的好奇心和求知欲得到满足的职业，比如学术事业（McCrae, 1996）。从事学术事业要求博士学位，而入读大学（和从大学毕业）的自由派比保守派更有兴趣谋求博士学位（Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009）…… Such intrinsic variations in interest may be amplified by a “birds of a feather” or “homophile” effect. “Similarity attracts” is one of the most well-established findings in social psychology (Byrne, 1969). As a field begins to lean a certain way, the field will likely become increasingly attractive to people suited to that leaning. 这种兴趣上的内在差异有可能通过“物以类聚”或“同性相爱”效应而得到放大。“同类相吸”是社会心理学中理据最为坚实的成果之一（Byrne, 1969）。随着某个领域开始向一个特定方向倾斜，那么对于适应这种倾斜的人，这个领域就很可能会变得越来越具有吸引力。 Over time the group itself may become characterized by its group members. Professors and scientists may come to be seen as liberal just as nurses are typically thought of as being female. Once that happens, conservatives may disproportionately self-select out of joining the dissimilar group, based on a realistic perception that they “do not fit well.” [See Gross (2013)]… 长此以往，群体本身就被其成员特征化了。教授和科学家可能会逐渐被视为自由派，就像护士经常被理解成为女性一样。一旦如此，保守派就可能自我选择不参加这种异己群体，因为他们有一种现实的认知：他们“合不来”（见Gross , 2013）…… Self-selection clearly plays a role. But it would be ironic if an epistemic community resonated to empirical arguments that appear to exonerate the community of prejudice—when that same community roundly rejects those same arguments when invoked by other institutions to explain the under-representation of women or ethnic minorities (e.g., in STEM disciplines or other elite professions). [Note: we agree that self-selection is a big part of the explanation. If there were no discrimination and no hostile climate, the field would still lean left, as it used to. But it would still have some diversity, and would work much better.] 自我选择很明显起了作用。但是，这种经验论证似乎是在为共同体的歧视行为洗白，如果一个知识共同体与之产生共鸣，这会太讽刺——而且，正是这同一个共同体，在其它机构使用同一论证来解释女性或少数族裔代表性不足的问题时（如在STEM学科或其它精英行业中），对自我选择解释表示了严厉的拒斥。[注意：我们同意，自我选择在原因中占了很大比例。如果不存在歧视、不存在敌对的气氛，这个领域仍然会左倾，正如它在1990年代之前那样。但是它仍会有某种程度的多元性，并会运作得好得多。] 5.4. Hostile climate 5.4. 敌对气氛 Might self-selection be amplified by an accurate perception among conservative students that they are not welcome in the social psychology community? Consider the narrative of conservatives that can be formed from some recent conclusions in social psychological research: compared to liberals, conservatives are less intelligent (Hodson & Busseri, 2012) and less cognitively complex (Jost et al., 2003). They are more rigid, dogmatic, and inflexible (Jost et al., 2003). Their lower IQ explains their racism and sexism (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008), and their endorsement of inequality explains why they are happier than liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008). 自我选择有没有可能因为保守派学生的一种正确认知——他们得不到社会心理学共同体的欢迎——而被放大？考虑一下我们能从最近的一些社会心理学研究结论中得出的关于保守派的叙述：比起自由派，保守派没那么聪明（Hodson & Busseri, 2012），认知复杂度没那么高（Jost等, 2003）。他们更死板、更教条、更不懂变通（Jost等, 2003）。他们IQ低，所以他们有种族主义和性别歧视（Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008），他们对不平等的支持正是他们之所以比自由派更快乐的理由（Napier & Jost, 2008）。 As conservative undergraduates encounter the research literature in their social psychology classes, might they recognize cues that the field regards them and their beliefs as defective? And what happens if they do attend graduate school and take part in conferences, classes, and social events in which almost everyone else is liberal? 当保守派本科生在他们的社会心理学课堂上接触到研究文献时，他们是否可能认出这种信号，猜到这个领域认为他们以及他们的信念存在缺陷？如果他们确实念上了研究生，那么当他们参会、上课、参加社会活动时，发现参与者几乎个个都是自由派，这时会发生什么？ We ourselves have often heard jokes and disparaging comments made by social psychologists about conservatives, not just in informal settings but even from the podium at conferences and lectures. The few conservatives who have enrolled in graduate programs hear these comments too, and some of them wrote to Haidt in the months after his 2011 remarks at the SPSP convention to describe the hostility and ridicule that force them to stay “in the closet” about their political beliefs—or to leave the field entirely. 我们自己就经常听到社会心理学家关于保守派的种种笑话和鄙夷的评论，这不仅出现于非正式场合，而且也出现在会议和讲座的讲台上。注册参加了研究生项目的几个罕见的保守派学生，也听到了这些评论，其中一些在听了Haidt在人格与社会心理学学会2011年年会上所发评论后的几个月里还曾给他写信。他们在信中描写到，敌对和嘲弄迫使他们将自己的政治信念藏在“深柜”——或干脆离开这个领域。 Haidt (2011) put excerpts from these emails online (in anonymous form); representative of them is this one from a former graduate student in a top 10 Ph.D. program: Haidt（2011）在网上贴出了这些邮件的摘录（以匿名形式）；其中一封的作者曾是排名前十的博士项目的研究生，很具有代表性：

I can’t begin to tell you how difficult it was for me in graduate school because I am not a liberal Democrat. As one example, following Bush’s defeat of Kerry, one of my professors would email me every time a soldier’s death in Iraq made the headlines; he would call me out, publicly blaming me for not supporting Kerry in the election. 要向你描述我在研究生院时因为不是自由派民主党而过得有多么艰难，我都没法开始。举个例子吧，布什打败克里之后，每逢有驻伊士兵死亡事件上头条，有位教授就会给我发邮件；他会指名道姓的公开指责我没在选举中支持克里。 I was a reasonably successful graduate student, but the political ecology became too uncomfortable for me. Instead of seeking the professorship that I once worked toward, I am now leaving academia for a job in industry. 作为一个研究生，我相当成功，但政治生态变得令我非常不舒服。我没有去谋求我曾为之奋斗的教授职位，而是离开学术圈，现在在实业部门工作。

Evidence of hostile climate is not just anecdotal. Inbar and Lammers (2012) asked members of the SPSP discussion list: “Do you feel that there is a hostile climate towards your political beliefs in your field?” 敌对气氛存在的证据并非只有个别逸闻。Inbar和 Lammers（2012）曾询问人格与社会心理学学会讨论组成员以下问题：“你是否觉得你所在的领域针对你的政治信念存在一种敌对气氛？” Of 17 conservatives, 14 (82%) responded “yes” (i.e., a response at or above the midpoint of the scale, where the midpoint was labeled “somewhat” and the top point “very much”), with half of those responding “very much.” 17个保守派中，14个（即82%）回答了“是”（即回应大于等于量表的中间选项，中间选项是“有些”，最大值则是“非常”），答“是”的人中又有一半回答的是“非常”。 In contrast, only 18 of 266 liberals (7%) responded “yes”, with only two of those responding “very much.” Interestingly, 18 of 25 moderates (72%) responded “yes,” with one responding “very much.” 与此形成对比的是，266个自由派中只有18个（即7%）回答了“是”，其中只有两个答的是“非常”。有意思的是，25个温和派中有18个（即72%）回答了“是”，1个答“非常”。 This surprising result suggests that the hostile climate may adversely affect not only conservatives, but anyone who is not liberal or whose values do not align with the liberal progress narrative. 这一令人惊讶的结果表明，敌对气氛所产生的负面影响不仅仅是对保守派而言，而且针对所有的非自由派，或者所有价值观不能与自由进步叙事相符的人。 5.5. Discrimination 5.5 歧视 The literature on political prejudice demonstrates that strongly identified partisans show little compunction about expressing their overt hostility toward the other side (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013; Haidt, 2012). Partisans routinely believe that their hostility towards opposing groups is justified because of the threat posed to their values by dissimilar others (see Brandt et al., 2014, for a review). 政治偏见方面的研究文献证明，认同感强烈的党徒毫不避讳公开表达对对方的敌意（如见Chambers等, 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013; Haidt, 2012）。党徒们例行公事般认为他们针对对立团体的敌视态度是合理的，因为异己分子威胁到他们珍视的价值（相关评论见Brandt 等, 2014）。 Social psychologists are unlikely to be immune to such psychological processes. Indeed, ample evidence using multiple methods demonstrates that social psychologists do in fact act in discriminatory ways toward non-liberal colleagues and their research. 社会心理学家不太可能对这种心理过程免疫。事实上，基于多种方法的大量证据表明，社会心理学家确实以歧视方式对待他们的非自由派同事及其学术研究。 [Here we review experimental field research: if you change a research proposal so that its hypotheses sound conservative, but you leave the methods the same, then the manuscript is deemed less publishable, and is less likely to get IRB approval] [我们这里来回顾一下实验性的实地研究：如果改动一下你的研究计划，使其假设看起来像个保守派假设，但研究方法保持不变，那么这个稿子发表的可能性在人们眼里就会降低，得到伦理委员会认可的可能性也会降低] Inbar and Lammers (2012) found that most social psychologists who responded to their survey were willing to explicitly state that they would discriminate against conservatives. Their survey posed the question: “If two job candidates (with equal qualifications) were to apply for an opening in your department, and you knew that one was politically quite conservative, do you think you would be inclined to vote for the more liberal one?” Inbar和Lammers（2012）发现，绝大多数接受调查的社会心理学家都愿意明白无误地表明，他们会歧视保守派。他们在调查中提出这样一个问题：“两个求职者（条件相同）申请你所在院系的空缺，你要是知道其中一个政治上特别保守，你觉得你会倾向于投票赞成更自由派的那个吗？” Of the 237 liberals, only 42 (18%) chose the lowest scale point, “not at all.” In other words, 82% admitted that they would be at least a little bit prejudiced against a conservative candidate, and 43% chose the midpoint (“somewhat”) or above. In contrast, the majority of moderates (67%) and conservatives (83%) chose the lowest scale point (“not at all”)…. 在237个自由派中，仅有42个（即18%）选择了量表上的最低值，“绝不会”。换句话说，82%的人承认他们至少会对保守派求职者有一点点歧视，43%选择了中间值（“有些”）及以上。与此形成对比的是，多数温和派（67%）和保守派（83%）选择了最低值（“绝不”）…… Conservative graduate students and assistant professors are behaving rationally when they keep their political identities hidden, and when they avoid voicing the dissenting opinions that could be of such great benefit to the field. Moderate and libertarian students may be suffering the same fate. 当保守派研究生和助理教授隐瞒他们政治派别时，他们是在依理性行事，然而如果他们缄默不言，那却将是这个领域的巨大损失。温和派和自由意志主义的学生或许也正在遭受同一命运。

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6. Recommendations 6. 建议 [Please see the longer discussion of recommended steps on our “Solutions” page. In the BBS paper we offer a variety of specific recommendations for what can be done to ameliorate the problem. These are divided into three sections] [建议措施的更长讨论，见我们的“方案”页面。在发表于《行为与脑科学》的文章中，我们提供了多种具体可行建议，以改进这一问题。建议分为三部分] 6.1. Organizational responses 6.1. 组织方面的回应 [We looked at the list of policy steps that the American Psychological Association recommended for itself to improve diversity with regard to race, gender, and sexual orientation. Many of them work well for increasing political diversity, e.g.,:] [我们查看了美国心理学会为增加自身的种族、性别和性取向多元性而建议的系列政策措施。其中许多同样可以有效的增加政治多元性，如……]

• Formulate and adopt an anti-discrimination policy resolution.
• 制定并采纳一项反歧视政策决议。
• Implement a “climate study” regarding members’ experiences, comfort/discomfort, and positive/negative attitudes/opinions/policies affecting or about members of politically diverse groups.
• 实施一项“气氛研究”，研究对象是其成员的经历，包括舒适的/不适的，以及他们持有的、会影响政治多样化的不同团体（或与他们有关）的积极/消极的态度/观点/政策
• Each organization should develop strategies to encourage and support research training programs and research conferences to attract, retain, and graduate conservative and other non-liberal doctoral students and early career professionals.
• 每一个组织都应该形成各种策略，鼓励和支持研究训练项目和研究会议去吸引、留住或毕业送走保守派及其他非自由派博士研究生和新入行的业内人士。

6.2. Professorial responses 6.2. 教授方面的回应 There are many steps that social psychologists who are also college professors can take to encourage non-liberal students to join the field, or to “come out of the closet”: 1) Raise consciousness [acknowledge publicly that we have problem]; 2) Welcome feedback from non-liberals. 3) Expand diversity statements. [i.e., add “political diversity” to any list of kinds of diversity being encouraged]. 同时身为大学教授的社会心理学家，可以采用多个措施来鼓励非自由派学生加入这个领域，或者“出柜”：1）提高意识[公开承认我们有问题]；2）欢迎非自由派的反馈。3）扩充有关多元性的声明。[即在任何形式的多元性鼓励列表中加入“政治多元性”]。 6.3. Changes to research practices 6.3. 改变研究做法 1.Be alert to double standards. 2. Support adversarial collaborations.  3. Improve research norms to increase the degree to which a research field becomes self-correcting. 1.警惕双重标准。2. 支持对抗性合作。3. 改进研究规范，以增加研究领域趋向自我纠正的程度。

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7. Conclusion 7. 结论 Others have sounded this alarm before (e.g., MacCoun, 1998; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994)… No changes were made in response to the previous alarms, but we believe that this time may be different. Social psychologists are in deep and productive discussions about how to address multiple threats to the integrity of their research and publication process. This may be a golden opportunity for the field to take seriously the threats caused by political homogeneity. 早已有人敲响过这一警钟（如MacCoun, 1998; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994）……对于之前的警钟却无人回应，不过我们相信这次可能有点不同。关于如何应对他们的研究和出版程序之健全性所面临的诸多威胁的问题，社会心理学家目前正在进行深入且卓有成效的讨论。现在也许就是严肃对待政治同质化所导致危机的黄金时期。 We have focused on social (and personality) psychology, but the problems we describe occur in other areas of psychology (Redding, 2001), as well as in other social sciences (Gross, 2013; Redding, 2013). 我们的焦点是社会（及人格）心理学，但我们所描述的问题也发生于心理学的其它领域（Redding, 2001），以及其它社会科学领域（Gross, 2013; Redding, 2013）。 Fortunately, psychology is uniquely well-prepared to rise to the challenge. The five core values of APA include “continual pursuit of excellence; knowledge and its application based upon methods of science; outstanding service to its members and to society; social justice, diversity and inclusion; ethical action in all that we do.” (APA, 2009). 幸运地是，心理学是唯一有准备来应对之个挑战的领域。美国心理学会的五大核心价值包括“不断追求卓越；基于科学方法的知识及其应用；对成员和社会的出色服务；社会正义、多元性和包容性；一切行动遵守伦理规范。”（APA, 2009）。 If discrimination against non-liberals exists at even half the level described in section 4 of this paper, and if this discrimination damages the quality of some psychological research, then all five core values are being betrayed. 如果针对非自由派的歧视存在，哪怕只达到本文第四部分所描述的一半水平，且如果这种歧视损害了某些心理学研究的质量，那就和五大核心价值背道而驰了。 Will psychologists tolerate and defend the status quo, or will psychology make the changes needed to realize its values and improve its science? Social psychology can and should lead the way. 心理学家会容忍并捍卫现状？还是心理学会作出必要改变，实现自己所珍视的价值，改进这一科学？社会心理学能够且应该带个好头。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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