The Global Vote of No Confidence in Pax Americana 全球对美利坚治世投下不信任票 作者：WRM @ 2016-4-5 译者：焦美淳（@火车入巷） 校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：The American Interest，http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/05/the-global-vote-of-no-confidence-in-pax-americana/ Defense spending is rising around the world, and it’s not because people feel safer. Bloomberg: 世界各地的国防开支都在上升，而这不是因为人们感到越来越安全。彭博社讯：

Global military spending has begun rising in real terms for the first time since the U.S. began its withdrawal of troops from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 根据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所（SIPRI）的数据，自美军从伊拉克和阿富汗撤军后，全球军事开支第一次有了实际增长。 Defense budgets rose 1 percent to $1.68 trillion in 2015, making up about 2.3 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, Sipri said in a report Tuesday. While the U.S. spent the most at $596 billion, that was down 2.4 percent compared with 2014, while China’s outlay increased 7.4 percent to $215 billion. SIPRI在周二的报告中指出，2015年全球国防预算增加了1%，达到1.68万亿美元，占世界国内生产总值的2.3%。其中美国以5960亿美元的支出高居首位，这一数据比2014年降低2.4%。而中国的国防经费则提高了7.4%，达2150亿美金。 Concern about a possible advance by Russia into North Atlantic Treaty Organization territory following the Crimea invasion and hostilities in east Ukraine led to a surge in spending in Eastern Europe, as Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea spurred arms purchases among Southeast Asian states. 随着克里米亚的遭受入侵以及发生在东乌克兰的敌对行动，对俄罗斯可能挺进北约领土的担忧已导致东欧的军事支出出现了井喷式的增长。同时中国在南海的野心也刺激了东亚国家的武器采购。

What’s forgotten among all the grousing by President Obama and Donald Trump about ‘free riding’ allies is this basic fact of international life: the Pax Americana was intended to suppress global geopolitical and military competition by providing a framework for international security. That benefitted the world by making countries safer at a lower cost and by assuring people that their national defense and access to world trade and markets did not require them to build huge military establishments. 在奥巴马总统和唐纳德·川普抱怨那些“搭顺风车”的盟国时，他们忘记了国际生活的这一基本事实：美利坚治世【译注：第二次世界大战后美国强权主导之下非共产世界的和平秩序】提供一个国际安全框架，旨在抑制全球地理政治和军事的竞争。美利坚治世让全世界受益，它以更低的开支使各国更加安全，并向人们保证他们不需要去建造大量的军事设施来换取国防安全和世界贸易市场的通行证。 People who don’t know much about history or understand American foreign policy will look at the result—that the U.S. spent more on the military than other countries—and think that we were somehow getting snookered. But they forget—or perhaps they never learned—some vital facts: 不怎么懂历史或者不理解美国外交政策的人只会看结果——美国在军事上的花费比其他国家都多——从而认为我们以前不知怎地就被骗了。但是他们忘记了——或者说也许他们从不知道——一些重要的事实： 1. The U.S., a country whose economic and security interests extend globally more than those of any other country thanks both to our geography and the nature of our economy, benefits more than any other country from the existence of a global economic and security system 1. 因为我们的地理位置和经济性质，美国的经济和安全利益辐射全球，甚于其他任何一个国家，因此从全球经济和安全体系中的所获利益也甚于其他任何一个国家。 2. It is actually cheaper for us to maintain this framework when other countries don’t feel the need to spend lots of money on their militaries—when the U.S. spends less than 4% of GDP on defense but has a bigger defense budget than the rest of the world combined, that is the sign of a successful strategy: our military superiority is immense and unchallengeable, yet the cost to us, is by historical great power standards, low. That is the sign of strategic success, not of ‘free riding allies’, Mr. Obama and Mr. Trump. 2. 事实上，当其他国家觉得在军事上并不需要有大量开销的时候，维持这个框架对我们来说成本更低——当美国的国防开支少于GDP的4%，国防预算却比其他所有国家总和还多，这标志着一个成功的战略：我们的军事优势是巨大且不容挑战的；而其成本——按照历史上的强国标准——仍是很低的。奥巴马先生和川普先生，这就是战略成功的标志，而不是让同盟国“搭顺风车”。 3. The other reason that the U.S. has followed this strategy is the bitter experience of the past that teaches an important lesson: multipolar arms races lead to great power war. The U.S. has believed since the 1940s that another global conflict on the scale of World War I and World War II would mean the collapse of global civilization, or even the extermination of the human race. We have therefore made it a centerpiece of our policy to deter other powers from building huge military establishments and, when they do it—as the USSR did in its day—to ensure that such powers are deterred from war and that other powers feel safe enough in the shadow of U.S. strength that their military responses, though real, are limited. 3. 令美国遵循这个战略的另一个原因是，过去的苦涩经验给我们上了重要一课：多极的军备竞赛导致强国间战争。自1940年代起，美国就相信，另一场规模如一战和二战的全球冲突意味着全球文明的崩塌，甚至是全人类的灭亡。因此我们政策的中心就是阻止其他政权建立起庞大的军事设施，并且，当有国家这么做时——就像前苏联当初的所作所为——我们会确保阻止这些政权走向战争，并且使其他政权在美国军事力量的羽翼下感到安心，即便他们的军事反应能力被切实地限制了。 For 70 years this strategic approach has prevented the outbreak of devastating wars like those of the first half of the twentieth century. That we did so at an affordable, though not an insignificant, cost, is a triumph of strategic thinking and of American foreign policy. 过去70年，这项战略方针阻止了很多发生在20世纪上半叶那样的毁灭性战争。尽管我们做到了，其代价不能说不大，但仍是我们能够承受的，这是美国战略思考和外交政策的胜利。 Weak leadership and a failure of strategic intelligence now threatens the success of the most successful world strategy of modern times, a strategy whose success has been the root cause of American prosperity and global stability for two generations. There is no enemy powerful enough to destroy the Pax Americana today, except for the greatest of all great powers in human affairs: the power of stupidity. 软弱的领导力和战略情报的失败，如今威胁着现代最成功的世界战略。这个战略的成功，在整整两代人的时间里，是美国繁荣和全球稳定的根本原因。当下没有任何敌人有足够的能力去摧毁美利坚治世，除了所有影响人类事物的伟力中最强大的：愚蠢之力。 We will know that American foreign policy has started to work again when military budgets around the world go down, while ours remains at an affordable level. Those are the metrics we are looking for; right now, we seem to be getting the opposite. 当全世界军事预算下降，而美国的军事预算尚在可负担水平时，我们会知道美国的外交政策又开始起作用了。这些就是我们要达到的指标；而现在，我们似乎正与之背道而驰。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-06-02】 @海德沙龙 《从阿富汗的耻辱撤退》 奥巴马从就任伊始便再三誓言要从阿富汗撤军，然而很少有人注意到这样一个事实：正是从撤军前景开始明朗之际，阿富汗的恐怖活动和美军伤亡也开始急剧增加，而在此前，美军对阿富汗的控制其实相当有效且伤亡极低，这一模式在美国的海外干预中屡屡重现 @海德沙龙: 2001-07年，美军在阿富汗总共阵亡279人，而奥巴马第一个任期（2009-2012）四年的阵亡数分别为266，440，365，246，参见： http://t.cn/R5bxYkO @whigzhou: 1）只有长期承诺才能给失败国家带来实质性改变，2）相比尽快脱身+周期性干预，长期占领的代价反而更低 @whigzhou: 长期承诺不仅代价低，而且付出代价确实买到了东西，而短期干预到最后都是一场空，白死几千人白花几千亿 @whigzhou: 提早宣布的撤军承诺实际上把无限期博弈变成了有限次且次数很少的博弈，这种情况下，你的潜在敌人不会选择放弃，而你的潜在朋友也不会坚定的站在你这边，大家都在为你走之后的局面而做打算，结果可想而知 @whigzhou: 孤立主义在理论上毫无问题（至少我毫无意见），问题出在对现实的判断上，多了解点历史你就会知道：孤立主义一点不便宜，比帝国主义贵多了。川普说美国承担了整个自由世界的安全成本，让欧洲日本搭了便车，这没错，问题是不让他们搭便车的方案对美国更贵而不是更便宜，这有点反直觉，但符合历史经验。 @whigzhou: 在一家独霸的条件下，美国只须付出3-4%的GDP用作军费，这个比例和1815-1914年大英治世中英国的军费开支相仿，而在缺乏霸主、各大强权分头自保各自承担代价的条件下，军费开支通常是5-10%，这还是没有大战的情况下，大战频仍时，这一比例上升到10-20%。 @whigzhou: 这还没算上，若要维持目前的贸易量，你得为所有商船护航，要么只能放弃大部分现有贸易，无论何种选择，国内消费品价格可能都要翻番 @whigzhou: 相比之下，帝国主义便宜到何种程度呢？大英只用20多万军队+几十万殖民地军队就维持了1/4个地球的安全，在印度只用了900名文官管理4亿国民。  

Obama’s shameful Afghanistan retreat: This will embolden the Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIS 奥巴马撤离阿富汗之举很可耻：这会鼓励塔利班、基地组织和伊斯兰国 作者：Frederick Kagan @ 2015-10-18 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Whig zhou（@whigzhou） 来源：NEW YORK DAILY NEWS，http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/frederick-kagan-obama-shameful-afghanistan-retreat-article-1.2400776 The headlines should read: “Obama to slash U.S. troops in Afghanistan by over 40% weeks before he hands over responsibility to a new President.” Instead they say: “Obama extends U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.” Talk about controlling the narrative. 新闻头条应该这么写：“在向新总统移交责任数周前，奥巴马将削减驻阿美军40%以上”。但实际上它们是这么写的：“奥巴马延长美军驻阿时间。”看看什么叫做控制叙事方式。 We’re missing the plot here. The President announced on Thursday the most irresponsible decision he could have made about Afghanistan — second only to the promise he had made earlier to pull almost all U.S. troops. The right decision would have been to keep forces at current levels, or, better, send reinforcements. 我们错过了重点情节。总统本周四宣布了他在阿富汗问题上可能做出的最不负责任的决定——仅次于他此前做出的撤离全部美军的承诺。正确的决定应当是，保持当前的驻军水平，最好是能增加援军。 For we are losing in Afghanistan, again. Security is deteriorating. The Taliban seized and briefly held the capital of an important province north of Kabul. They are threatening another one a short drive southwest of Kabul. U.S. forces destroyed two Al Qaeda training camps in Kandahar, one very large. The Islamic State controls part of Nangarhar Province, east of Kabul. Afghan security forces cannot hold what they have, let alone regain what they have lost. 因为，又一次，我们正在失去阿富汗。安全形势正在恶化。塔利班攻占并短暂占据了喀布尔以北一个重要省份的首府。他们现在还对喀布尔以南车程很近的另外一座首府构成威胁。美军摧毁了基地组织位于坎大哈的两座训练营，其中一座非常之大。伊斯兰国控制了喀布尔以东楠格哈尔省的部分地区。阿富汗安全部队根本守不住他们的地盘，更别说收复失地。 The Taliban had been driven out of almost all the important areas in southern Afghanistan and disrupted elsewhere by the additional forces Obama sent in 2010. The premature reduction of American and allied troops and the operational restrictions imposed on the remaining troops have let the Taliban rebuild. 由于奥巴马在2010年派出增援部队，塔利班曾被赶出阿富汗南部的几乎所有重要区域，在其它地区也遭到破坏。但过早的削减美军及联军部队，并对留守部队施加行动限制，已经让塔利班得以重建。 A couple of years ago the Taliban would not have dared mass forces for an offensive against a major city, because American airpower supporting U.S. and Afghan troops would have decimated them. No more. Now the enemy masses and maneuvers as they did from 2006 to 2009, when they nearly toppled the Afghan government. 数年之前，塔利班根本不敢集结力量攻打任何主要城市，因为支援美军和阿富汗部队的美国空军会将其加以摧毁。现在不再如此了。如今，敌人像他们在2006年至2009年期间那样集结和运动，当时他们差点推翻了阿富汗政府。 A limited number of American forces with the right authorities could prevent them from doing that. But Obama has chosen to allow the Taliban the freedom of action to threaten the survival of the Afghan state once again. 有限数量的美军，如果具有正确的权限，也可以阻止敌人这么做。但奥巴马所做的选择，给了塔利班再次威胁阿富汗政权生存的行动自由。 American forces with Afghan partners drove Al Qaeda almost entirely out of Afghanistan in 2002. U.S., Afghan and allied troops kept them out for a decade — the one enduring success against Al Qaeda President Obama had maintained. 2002年，美军联同阿富汗盟友几乎已将基地组织完全赶出阿富汗。美国、阿富汗和联军部队连续十年将它们拒之门外——这是奥巴马总统对基地组织取得的唯一持久成功。 Now they’re back. The President has thus put in danger even the most limited of the goals he had identified in Afghanistan. 如今他们又回来了。因此，甚至是总统在阿富汗定下的最有限目标，都已被他自己置于摇摇欲坠之地。 The emergence of fighters loyal to the Islamic State in Afghanistan is even more disturbing. The vast majority of them are local insurgents who had been fighting under other banners, so it’s not as if new forces have invaded Afghanistan. But the ISIS brand is much more virulent, violent and extreme even than al Qaeda. It makes the Taliban look moderate. 更令人忧心的是，效忠伊斯兰国的战士也出现于阿富汗。他们中的绝大多数都是当地的叛乱者，此前一直在其他旗帜下战斗，因此并不是说有新的力量入侵阿富汗了。但伊斯兰国的标签更为恶性、更为暴力、更为极端，甚至连基地组织都相形见绌。塔利班看起来都是温和派了。 That such a group has drawn Afghans under its banner is proof of the failure of U.S. efforts against ISIS broadly. Success attracts followers. ISIS will likely radicalize those followers even further, while preparing to unleash greater violence against Afghan forces and U.S. troops. That will be further proof to potential recruits of its success and power, encouraging radicals elsewhere to join ISIS. It is a disaster in every respect. 这一组织已将阿富汗人吸引到其旗帜之下，这是美军全面打击伊斯兰国之努力遭遇失败的明证。成功才能吸引追随者。伊斯兰国很有可能将会使这些追随者进一步激进化，同时准备对阿富汗武装力量和美军部队发动更大规模的暴力活动。而这将进一步向其潜在追随者提供成功与力量的证据，鼓励其他地方的激进分子参加伊斯兰国。方方面面来看，这都是灾难性的。 The Afghan security forces, meanwhile, are suffering badly. Losses and desertion rates are too high. They lack the equipment to prosecute a modern war against a serious enemy. We built those forces on the assumption that the U.S. and its allies would continue to provide meaningful and reliable air support, help with logistics, planning and intelligence and more. As we have withdrawn that support, they have faltered. 与此同时，阿富汗安全部队正在遭受巨大损失。伤亡率和逃兵率居高不下。他们缺乏装备，没法与可怕的敌人开展一场现代战争。我们建立这些部队时曾假定，美国及其盟友会持续提供有意义的、可靠的空中支援，并在后勤、部署和情报及其他方面给予帮助。随着我们撤销这类支援，他们就变得力不从心。 All this was both predictable and avoidable. The President was warned that he had announced too aggressive a drawdown plan in 2009. He disdained recommendations to keep 20,000 or 30,000 troops in place after the drawdown. He is once again disregarding advice to maintain the current — inadequate — force level in favor of scheduling yet another unjustifiable withdrawal. 所有这些都既可以预测，也可以避免。2009年，已经有人警告总统，他宣布的撤军计划过于激进。他无视了在撤军之后保持20000或30000驻军的建议。现在，他又一次无视了保持当前——尚不足够——驻军数量的建议，而支持新一轮毫无依据的撤军计划。 All Presidents make mistakes. Most come to recognize and learn from them. Others double down. In this case, doubling down on retreat is doubling down on failure. 所有的总统都会犯错。他们中大多数都会承认错误并吸取教训。其他人则加倍下注。在当前例子中，在撤军上面加倍下注就是在加倍失败。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-05-22】 @whigzhou: 大英帝国犯下的最大错误是让听任普鲁士统一德国，结果在一战时只好派自己的陆军上场，而不能像以前那样，只要花钱雇一批德国人打另一批德国人就行了。#后见之明 @whigzhou: 大英走的是弱共同体路线，这条路线有利于自由、繁荣和个人主义，以及为一个族群/文化高度混杂的社会建立普遍秩序，弱点是动员能力不足，难以像强共同体路线的德国那样建立庞大陆军，只能倚重于重资产轻人力的海军，拼钱不拼人头，靠金钱、外交和战略性封锁勉力维持平衡。 @whigzhou: 但这就要求他必须阻止欧洲后院出现任何过于强大的民族国家，强大到能够建立一支他无法扶持装备几个盟友即可轻易打败的陆军  

Why Mali was attacked 马里缘何被袭击 作者：Ian Birrell @ 2015-11-20 译者：黑色枪骑兵（@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君） 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Capx，http://www.capx.co/166181-2/ So here we go again. First the tragic slaughter of innocents in Paris, followed by that tense, bloodstained hunt for the murderers. Now 170 largely-foreign hostages have been seized by gunmen in an upmarket hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako. 一而再、再而三。首先是无辜巴黎人民遭受悲惨屠杀，然后是紧张而又血腥的追凶。现在，170名主要为外国人的人质，又被武装分子扣押在马里首都巴马科的一所高档酒店里。 The 140 guests being held reportedly include people from France, China and Turkey, along with 30 hotel staff; at least we can give thanks that members of Western air crews along with many others escaped amid the chaos of the assault. There are reports of deaths, while special forces are moving in. 据报道，与30名酒店工作人员一同被扣押的140名房客来自法国、中国和土耳其。值得庆幸的是，“西部航空”的职员以及其他一些人借着袭击时的混乱而得以逃脱。报道称，特种部队进入时，有死亡消息传出。 There are strong chances, sadly, that this is instant blowback from the shocking events in France. The rather soulless Radisson Blu hotel is a well-known landmark in the dusty Malian capital; a British journalist who interviewed one of the country’s famous musical bands told me he stayed there just weeks ago. The capital felt secure when I was last there a couple of years ago, yet sadly it is no surprise to see that the jihadists have struck back in this beautiful yet battered nation. 令人沮丧的是，这次事件很可能是之前震惊世人的巴黎事件的即时反弹。那座没有灵魂的丽笙酒店是灰蒙蒙的马里首都的知名地标建筑，一个曾经采访过该国最著名乐队的英国记者告诉我，仅在两周前他还住在那里。几年前我在那里时，这座都城还能让人感到安全，但是令人伤感的是，伊斯兰圣战者杀回这个美丽而又饱受折磨的国度并不让人感到意外。 For two decades Mali was seen as a model democracy, with many analysts ignoring its corrosion through corruption and drug trafficking across the desert. Then it collapsed three years ago following an almost-accidental coup led by a disgruntled army captain, which was seized immediately by Toureg rebels seeking independence in the north. 二十年来，许多分析人士忽略腐败和穿越沙漠的贩毒活动对马里的侵蚀，一直视其为民主政治的模范。三年前，在一场由一位心怀不满的陆军上尉发动的近乎偶然的政变中，这个国家倒下了，之后她迅速被一直寻求北部独立的图阿雷格反抗军掌握。 They were well-armed after returning from fighting for their long-term supporter Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and one key figure had fallen under the spell of Islamic radicals; soon, moderates were forced aside and the huge desert areas fell under the control of fundamentalists. 他们曾为其长期支持者——利比亚的穆哈迈尔·卡扎菲——作战，归来之后就变得武装精良。而且他们的一位核心人物已经中了伊斯兰激进分子的魔咒。很快，温和派被迫让位，这片广阔的沙漠地区落入原教旨主义者之手。 Islamist groups allied to al Qa’ida had grown rich exploiting traditional Saharan smuggling routes as cocaine began to carve its way through west Africa en route to Europe, then boosted their income by kidnapping tourists visiting cities such as the wondrous Timbuktu. Having captured the region, foreign fighters poured in to create a caliphate in the desert. 与基地组织关系密切的各种伊斯兰组织，先是抓住可卡因开始经西非由空运输往欧洲的机会，利用传统的撒哈拉走私线路大发横财，之后又通过绑架古城（例如神奇的廷巴克图城）的游客来增收。在控制这个地区之后，来自其他国家的伊斯兰武装分子涌入当地，在沙漠中建立了一个哈里发国。 Yet it is important to note their imposition of hardline sharia law – with women forced to cover up, tombs destroyed, adulterers stoned and thieves having hands cut off – was alien to both Tuareg tradition and the sufistic Islam of the south. The banning of music in a nation famous worldwide for so many of its astonishing artists was especially shocking. 值得注意的是，他们强制推行的强硬伊斯兰教法——强迫妇女裹紧全身，毁坏墓穴，对通奸者施以石刑，砍掉偷窃者的手——既非图阿雷格传统，也和南部苏菲派伊斯兰格格不入。在一个因杰出艺术家层出不穷而蜚声国际的民族中禁止音乐，这种做法尤为令人震惊。 So there was immense popular support when a 4,000-strong French force invaded in support of the inept and poorly-equipped Malian army two years ago. They took rapid action when it looked like the bustling trading port of Mopti with its population of 120,000 people was about to fall to the militants. 因此，两年前一支4000人的法国部队进入马里，支援作战力弱、装备差的马里部队时，受到了热烈的欢迎和支持。当莫普提这一繁华的贸易港口和当地12万人口即将落入武装分子之手时，他们采取了快速行动。 Yet while they drove away Islamist militias and re-imposed a veneer of democracy, the fissures in this alluring country remained close to the surface. The new president has done little to restore faith in politics, while tensions remain between Tuaregs and southerners. 然而，尽管他们把伊斯兰武装分子驱逐了出去，并再次扶持建立起名义上的民主，但这个美丽国度的裂痕依旧呼之欲出。新总统没能重建民众对政治的信任，图阿雷格人和南部人民之间的紧张关系依旧持续。 In Mali, as elsewhere in parts of Africa, Muslim fanatics tapped into faultlines created through corruption, discrimination and poverty. And as we see again today, the jihadists may have been defeated but never disappeared. It was easy for them to melt back into the desert, surfacing again and again to strike back at their enemies. 就像非洲的其他地方一样，马里的穆斯林狂热分子利用了腐败、歧视和贫穷所造成的社会裂痕。正如我们今天再次看到的一样，圣战分子可以被打败，但是绝不会消失。对于他们来说，藏身沙漠，然后再次出来回击他们的敌人相当轻松。 United Nations blue helmets have been attacked so often it was seen as the most dangerous of their missions around the world, with 53 peacekeepers killed. There have also been deadly attacks on hotels and restaurants popular with foreigners, even in Bamako. 联合国维和部队多次被袭，53名维和人员丧生，使得驻防此地被看作全世界最危险的。即使在巴马科，针对外国人经常光顾的酒店和餐馆的致命袭击也时有发生。 These depressing events in Bamako prove two things. First, there are huge hurdles ahead in the fight to restore stability in the Sahel, many of which policymakers blinkered by the past have barely begun to understand. And second, that the worldwide war with Islamic militants has few boundaries. This is perhaps the most terrifying aspect of the latest attack. 在巴马科发的这些令人沮丧的事件证明了两件事：第一，想要重建萨赫勒地区的稳定局势的话，还有很多巨大的障碍亟待破除，然而许多眼光局限于过去的决策者尚未意识到这个问题；第二，伊斯兰激进分子在世界范围内发起的战争没有边界。这可能是最近这次袭击最令人恐惧的地方。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

ISIS简史：全球最可怕的恐怖组织是如何长成的 ISIS, a history: how the world's worst terror group came to be

作者：Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：VOX，http://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9760284/isis-history To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria — why it exists, what it wants, and why it commits terrible violence of which the Paris attacks are only the latest — you need to understand the tangled story of how it came to be. 如果想了解伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（ISIS）——为什么它会存在，它想要什么，还有为什么它会犯下诸如最近的巴黎恐怖袭击之类可怕暴行——你需要了解在它成长历程中所发生的曲折故事。 The group began, in a very different form, in 1999. In the 16 years since, it has been shaped by — and has at moments helped to shape — the conflicts, physical and ideological, of the Middle East. 该组织始建于1999年，但它在当时的形式与现在大不相同。在之后的16年中，它被中东的武力和意识形态冲突所塑造，也时而塑造着这些冲突。 Here, then, is a concise history of the rise of ISIS from its earliest origins to the present day. It is the story of one of the richest and most powerful terrorist organizations ever to exist — but it's also a story that reveals the ways in which ISIS has proven much weaker than you might think. 在这里，我将呈现ISIS从最初的起源直到今天的一部简明历史。这是关于史上最富有也最强悍的恐怖组织之一的故事——但这个故事也同样揭示了，ISIS的一些所作所为，证明了它实际上比人们所想象的要脆弱得多。 1989–1999: The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the beginning of ISIS 1989-1999：苏联的阿富汗战争和ISIS的发端

【Abu Musab al-Zarqawi（即扎卡维）在伊拉克。】

You cannot understand ISIS without understanding al-Qaeda and the history they share, as well as the differences, there at the beginning, that would ultimately divide them. And al-Qaeda's origin story begins with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 如果不了解基地组织以及它和ISIS的共同历史，还有它们之间一开始就存在的差异（正是这些差异让它们最终分道扬镳），你就无法真正地了解ISIS。基地组织的故事最初始于苏联在1979年入侵阿富汗。 Soviet aggression shocked the Muslim world, galvanizing roughly 20,000 foreign fighters to help Afghans resist Soviet forces. That's where Osama bin Laden met a number of other young radicals, who together formed the core of the al-Qaeda network. 苏联的侵略震惊了整个穆斯林世界，并激起了大约2万名外国战士帮助阿富汗人抵抗苏联军队。正是在那里，奥萨马·本·拉登遇上了一群年轻的极端分子，他们共同组建了基地组织网络的核心团队。 The Soviets withdrew in 1988, but they left a puppet regime in place, and the war continued. The next year, a Jordanian man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah joined them. 苏联人在1988年撤离了阿富汗，但是他们留下了一个傀儡政权，而战争也还在继续。第二年，一个名叫Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah的约旦人加入进来。 Al-Khalaylah would, years later, achieve global infamy under his nom de guerre, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He would found the group that became what we today call ISIS. 几年后，al-Khalaylah以他的别名Abu Musab al-Zarqawi（即扎卡维）在全球臭名昭著。他创建了在今天被我们称之为ISIS的恐怖组织。 When Zarqawi first traveled to Afghanistan, in 1989, he wasn't all that religious: He was, as Mary Anne Weaver writes in a definitive Atlantic profile, something of a petty thug. But once there, he met a man named Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading proponent of violent, fundamentalist Islam. Maqdisi converted Zarqawi to his cause. 当扎卡维在1989年第一次来到阿富汗时，他并不是那么满怀宗教热情：正如Mary Anne Weaver在《大西洋月刊》发布的一份权威传略中所写道的，他当时只不过是个小流氓。但一到阿富汗，他就遇上了一个名叫Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi的暴力伊斯兰原教旨主义的主要倡导者。Maqdisi按照自己的理念改造了扎卡维。 Zarqawi would not meet bin Laden for years, and the two men built up allies and followers independently from each other — a dynamic that made Zarqawi's network even more extreme than bin Laden's. 在之后的数年中，扎卡维都还没有遇上本·拉登，两人各自独立地建立起了自己的盟友和追随者网络——在此过程中，扎卡维的网络甚至比本·拉登的更极端。 "Whereas bin Laden and his cadre grew up in at least the upper middle class and had a university education, Zarqawi and those closest to him came from poorer, less educated backgrounds," Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes. "Zarqawi’s criminal past and extreme views on takfir (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) created major friction and distrust with bin Laden when the two first met in Afghanistan in 1999." “本·拉登和他的核心骨干都至少是在上层中产阶级长大的，而且也都受过大学教育，而扎卡维和他的亲信们则来自较贫穷，教育程度也较低的阶层，”华盛顿近东政策研究所的学者Aaron Zelin如此写道。“1999年扎卡维在阿富汗首次见到本·拉登时，他的犯罪前科和他关于塔克菲（通过将另一名穆斯林控诉为异教徒，而为将他杀死的行为提供穆斯林教法上的合法性）的极端观点在两人之间造成了很大的摩擦和不信任感。” 2003–2009: The rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Iraq 2003-2009：伊拉克基地组织的兴衰

【2006年，伊拉克北部不明身份的反美武装。】

Zarqawi returned from Afghanistan, and in 1999 in Jordan formed his own group, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ), or the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. For the first few years, Zarqawi's group was a bit player among jihadists, overshadowed by al-Qaeda. But this was the group, then little known, that would later become ISIS. 从阿富汗回来之后，扎卡维1999年在约旦建立了自己的组织，名为Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad（JTWJ），或叫“一神论与圣战组织”。在最初的几年中，扎卡维的组织和基地组织相比相形见绌，在众多伊斯兰圣战组织中只是个小玩家。但这个在当时还默默无闻的组织就是日后ISIS的雏形。 In 2003, the US led its invasion of Iraq and changed, in the world of jihadists, everything. 2003年，美国领导了对伊拉克的入侵行动，这完全改变了伊斯兰圣战者的世界。 The American-led war, by destroying the Iraqi state, left much of the country in chaos. Foreign fighters and extremists began moving into Iraq, assisted by Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, which sought to bog down the US. Zarqawi and his group were among them. 由美国所主导的伊拉克战争摧毁了伊拉克的国家机器，让这个国家的大部分地区陷入混乱的深渊。在力图将美国拖入泥潭的叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的帮助下，来自外国的战士和极端分子开始涌入伊拉克，而扎卡维和他的极端组织也在其中。 The Sunni extremists who arrived found a friendly audience among former Iraqi soldiers and officers: The US had disbanded Saddam Hussein's overwhelmingly Sunni army, which was disbanded in 2003, creating a group of men who were unemployed, battle-trained, and scared of life in an Iraq dominated by its Shia majority. 这些来到伊拉克的逊尼派极端分子在伊拉克前政权的士兵和军官中找到了一批知音：美国在2003年解散了效忠于萨达姆·侯赛因，以逊尼派占压倒性多数的军队，从而创造了一个受过实战训练的失业军人群体，他们对于生活在一个由占人口多数的什叶派统治的国家感到十分恐惧。 Zarqawi's group, as it fought in Iraq, grew to prominence, attracting al-Qaeda's attention. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, for which he would receive access to its funds and fighters. His group was renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and it became the country's leading Sunni insurgent group. 扎卡维的组织在伊拉克的战斗中不断成长壮大，最终吸引到了基地组织的注意。2004年，扎卡维宣誓向基地组织效忠，以换取基地组织所提供的资金和战士。他的组织被更名为伊拉克基地组织（AQI），而该组织也成为了伊拉克境内最主要的逊尼派武装力量。 AQI didn't just fight the Americans, it also attacked fellow Iraqis. It bombed Shia mosques and slaughtered Shia civilians, hoping to provoke mass Shia reprisals against Sunni civilians and thus force the Sunnis to rally behind AQI. It worked, and it's a tactic ISIS still uses today. It also helped spark a civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shia. 伊拉克基地组织不仅仅与美国人作战，它同样也攻击伊拉克同胞。它炸毁什叶派的清真寺并且屠杀什叶派平民，力图煽动什叶派对逊尼派平民的大规模报复，从而迫使逊尼派聚集在自己的羽翼之下。这一策略取得了成功，并且直到今天ISIS还在使用这样的策略。而这也引发了一场伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派之间的内战。 But these methods were too vicious even for al-Qaeda, which warned Zarqawi to cool it. He ignored the warnings, and AQI came to hold a swath of territory in Sunni parts of Iraq, roughly along the lines of what ISIS controls there today. Yet between 2006 and 2009, it all came crashing down: 但即使对于基地组织而言，这样的方法也显得太恶毒了，于是基地组织警告扎卡维，让他把事态冷却下来。但扎卡维无视这一警告，而伊拉克基地组织则进一步占领了伊拉克逊尼派聚居的一片土地，与ISIS今天在这里所控制区域的边界相仿。然而在2006年和2009年之间，这一切几乎都土崩瓦解了：

【由AQI和其他逊尼派叛乱团体控制的领土。】

Starting in 2006, AQI's extremism began to backfire. Sunni tribal leaders, who had always hated living under AQI's harsh and often violent rule, became convinced that the Shias were starting to win Iraq's sectarian civil war. To avoid being on the losing end of a bloody war, they up took arms against AQI in a movement called the Awakening. 从2006年开始，伊拉克基地组织所贯彻的极端主义开始遭遇挫折。那些对于生活在伊拉克基地组织严酷而暴力的统治之下一直心怀怨恨的逊尼派部落长老们开始相信，什叶派将会赢得这场伊拉克的宗派内战。为了避免在一场血腥战争中成为失败的一方，他们发起了一场称为“觉醒”的运动，武装反抗伊拉克基地组织。 Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a US airstrike, and the US increased its troop presence in Iraq that year and the next. But it was, more than anything else, the Awakening that defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq. 扎卡维在2006年死于美军空袭，而美国在当年和次年都往伊拉克增派驻军。但是在打败伊拉克基地组织的过程中，“觉醒”运动所发挥的作用还是超过了任何其它因素。 By 2009, almost all of AQI's fighters were dead or in prison, and the group was a shadow of itself. But it had learned a valuable lesson: Dissent from Sunnis under its rule could be disastrous. That's why, years later, ISIS has slaughtered members of Sunni tribes, such as Iraq's Abu Nimr, en masse. It sees brutality as the best way to prevent a replay of the 2006 uprising that led to its downfall. 到2009年，几乎所有伊拉克基地组织的战士都已被歼灭或是被关进了监狱，组织几乎名存实亡。但是它学到了宝贵的一课：受其统治的逊尼派的不满可以带来灾难性的后果。这也是为何在几年之后，ISIS屠杀了一些逊尼派的部族成员，例如对伊拉克Abu Nimr部落的集体屠杀。为防止类似2006年那场导致它衰落的起义重演，它将残酷暴行视为最佳的预防措施。 2010: Iraq begins unraveling, setting the stage for AQI's comeback 2010年：伊拉克开始解体，并为伊拉克基地组织的回归创造了舞台

【伊拉克前总理Nouri al-Maliki（马利基）。】

ISIS was able to rise from AQI's ashes in no small part because of Iraq's catastrophic internal politics. ISIS之所以能从伊拉克基地组织的废墟之上重新崛起，很大程度上是由于伊拉克灾难性的国内政治。 "Iraq was the essential incubator," according to Fred Hof, who for part of 2012 served as the Obama administration's special adviser for the transition in Syria. “伊拉克是ISIS成长所必需的孵化器”，Fred Hof如此评论道。2012年有段时间，他曾担任奥巴马政府关于叙利亚过渡时期问题的特别顾问。 By 2010, "Iraq finally had relatively good security, a generous state budget, and positive relations among the country’s various ethnic and religious communities," Zaid al-Ali, author of The Struggle for Iraq's Future, wrote in Foreign Policy. But it was squandered. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stripped political opponents of power, appointed his cronies to run the army, and killed peaceful protestors. 到2010年，“伊拉克终于拥有了相对较好的安全局势，宽松的国家预算，国内各种族和宗教群体之间的关系也比较积极，”《挣扎中的伊拉克》的作者Zaid al-Ali在《外交政策》杂志上写道。但这些有利形势最终都被浪费掉了。伊拉克总理Nouri al-Maliki（马利基）剥夺了政敌们的权力，安排自己的亲信控制军队，并且杀害了一些和平抗议者。 Most importantly, he reconstructed the Iraqi state on sectarian lines, privileging the Shia majority over the Sunni minority. This exacerbated Iraq's existing sectarian tensions: Sunni Iraqis falsely believed themselves to be Iraqi's majority (owing to Saddam-era propaganda) and saw Maliki as depriving them of their rightful control of the state. He only deepened their belief that the Iraqi state was fundamentally illegitimate. 而最重要的是，他按照宗教派别重塑了伊拉克，让占人口多数的什叶派获得了比占人口少数的逊尼派更多的特权。这加剧了伊拉克国内本已存在的宗派紧张局势：伊拉克的逊尼派总是误以为他们才是伊拉克真正的“多数派”（这要归因于萨达姆时期的宣传），因而觉得马利基在剥夺他们对国家应有的控制权。逊尼派认为伊拉克现政府根本不具有合法性，而马利基的做法加深了他们的这一信念。 By this time, al-Qaeda in Iraq had a new leader: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi who had a background in serious religious scholarship. Under his leadership, AQI began allying with former officers from Saddam Hussein's army and recruited disaffected Sunnis. Iraq's own government, unintentionally, gave them exactly the opening they needed to regain strength. 此时，伊拉克基地组织有了一位新领袖：巴格达迪，他是一个拥有着严肃宗教学术背景的伊拉克人。在他的领导下，伊拉克基地组织开始与一些前萨达姆军队的军官建立同盟，并且招募了一些对伊拉克现政府极度不满的逊尼派穆斯林。伊拉克政府在不经意间为他们的东山再起提供了绝佳机会。 "Raw political sectarianism in Iraq was the main causal factor [in ISIS's rise]," Hof writes. “伊拉克国内原始的政治宗派斗争是ISIS再次崛起的主要原因，”Hof如此写道。 August 2011: AQI's remnants move into Syria — with a little help from Assad 2011年8月：在阿萨德的一点帮助下，伊拉克基地组织的残余力量进入叙利亚

【叙利亚叛军哀悼战友的死亡。】

Around this same time, Syria erupted in Arab Spring protests that became a civil war. In March 2011, Syrian demonstrators took to the streets to demand Bashar al-Assad step down. Almost right away, the Syrian regime began slaughtering protestors in an attempt to provoke a civil war. 几乎在同一时间，叙利亚 爆发了“阿拉伯之春”运动，而这最终演变成了一场内战。在2011年3月，叙利亚的抗议者占领了大街小巷，要求巴沙尔·阿萨德下台。叙利亚政权很快开始屠杀抗议者，以图引发内战。 "It was very much a strategic decision that the regime made, to militarize the conflict right away," Glenn Robinson, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me in a phone conversation. "I think, in their mind and correctly, if this becomes a political battle where populations matter, the regime probably only has support of a third of the country ... the opposition has the numbers." “迅速地将这场冲突军事化，实际上是阿萨德政权所采取的一项相当有战略意义的决策”，美国海军研究生院的副教授Glenn Robinson在一次电话采访中如此对我说。“我认为，在他们看来，如果这场冲突演变成一场人口因素起重要作用的政治斗争，阿萨德政权可能仅仅能获得全国三分之一人口的支持……反对派则占据着人口的大多数，这个判断是正确的。”【编注：叙利亚1700万人口中，74%为逊尼派，控制政权的阿拉维派（什叶派的一个支派）仅占12%。】 Perhaps the most devious part of this strategy was Assad's deliberate effort to promote Islamic extremism among the opposition. In amnesties issued between March and October 2011, Assad released a significant number (exact counts are hard to know) of extremists from Syrian prisons. Hof called this an "effort to pollute the opposition with sectarianism": Assad gambled that if his enemies were Islamic militants, then the West wouldn't intervene against him. 也许这一策略中最为邪恶的部分在于，阿萨德蓄意地在反对派中散布伊斯兰极端主义。在2011年3月到10月的大赦中，阿萨德从叙利亚监狱中释放了相当数量（很难得知准确数字）的极端分子。Hof称之为“一项试图用宗派主义污染反对派阵营的举措”：阿萨德赌了一把，如果他的敌人是伊斯兰激进武装分子，那么西方各国就不会采取针对他的干预行动。 In August 2011, Baghdadi sent a top deputy, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, to Syria to set up a new branch of the AQI in the country. Joulani succeeded, establishing Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012. Joulani's fighters quickly proved themselves to be some of the most effective fighters on the Syrian battlefield, swelling their ranks with new recruits. 2011年8月，巴格达迪将他的得力副手Abu Mohammad al-Joulani派往叙利亚，以在叙境内建立伊拉克基地组织的新分支。Joulani的行动获得了成功，他在2012年1月建立了一个名为Jabhat al-Nusra（即努斯拉阵线）的组织。Joulani的战士们迅速证明了他们是叙利亚战场上最高效的战斗群体之一，并通过招募大量新成员提升了组织的地位。 At this point, Baghdadi's original group was still in Iraq alone. It had not become ISIS. But to understand how it did, you have to see the larger forces that opened his way. 巴格达迪的组织此时仍仅限于在伊拉克境内活动，它还没有成为那个令人谈之色变的ISIS。如果想要了解它后来是如何做到这一点的，你需要了解一下为巴格达迪铺平道路的那些更加强大力量。 Early 2012: Syrian jihadists get their "angel investors" 2012年初：叙利亚的圣战者迎来了他们的“天使投资人” Today, ISIS is the world's richest terrorist group, its funding coming mostly from various extortion schemes in the territory it controls. But back in 2012, foreign donations played a crucial role in growing the group from the poor organization it was then into the monster it is today. 今天，ISIS是世界上最富有的恐怖组织，它主要依靠在控制区进行各种掠夺来获得资金。但回到2012年，在这个当时还穷困潦倒的组织成长为今天这头恐怖怪兽的过程中，来自国外的捐助扮演了关键角色。 In 2012, money flew into Syria from the Gulf Arab states — places like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The key investments in ISIS didn't come directly from those countries' governments, but rather from private individuals living there who wanted to see the Assad regime fall — and perhaps to promote extremism itself. 2012年，来自波斯湾阿拉伯国家（例如科威特、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔）的资金涌入了叙利亚。ISIS所得到的主要投资并不直接来自这些国家的政府，而是来自生活在这些国家的国民，他们希望看到阿萨德政权倒台——也可能只是为了推行伊斯兰极端主义。 "These rich Arabs are like what 'angel investors' are to tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred," former US Navy Admiral and NATO Supreme Commander James Stavridis told NBC last June. "Groups like al-Nusra and ISIS are better investments for them [than moderates]." “这些阿拉伯富豪所扮演的角色就像是科技初创企业的‘天使投资人’，唯一的区别在于，他们的目的是创立一些旨在煽动仇恨的极端组织，”前美国海军上将和北约总司令James Stavridis将军在去年6月向NBC表示，“（相对于温和派），像努斯拉阵线和ISIS这样的组织对他们而言是更好的投资。” Though these donors have since faded in importance, they were invaluable at the time. "The individuals," Stavridis explained, "act as high rollers early, providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly capable of raising funds through other means, like kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling women into slavery, etc." 虽然这些捐款人的重要性自此逐渐减退，但他们在当时对ISIS是无价之宝。Starvridis将军解释道，“这些富人在早期一掷千金，为极端组织提供了种子基金。而一旦这些组织能够站稳脚跟，他们就完全有能力通过其它的手段获得资金，例如绑架人质，走私石油，将妇女贩卖为奴等等。” But while the Gulf financiers' intent may have been to hurt Assad, they actually ended up propping him up by playing into his strategy of promoting extremism. 虽然这些波斯湾“投资人”最初可能是为了打击阿萨德政权，但结果却是通过散布极端主义而成了阿萨德的棋子，最终帮助了阿萨德。 "It was a service of incalculable value to the Assad regime: It enabled him to say — albeit inaccurately — that he was the alternative to terrorism and sectarianism," Hof told me via email. “这对阿萨德政权是无价之宝：这让他可以说——虽然并不准确——自己是恐怖主义和宗派极端主义之外的另一个选项，”Hof通过电子邮件对我说。 July 2012: The great ISIS prison break begins 2012年7月：ISIS的大规模劫狱行动开始

【伊拉克在2009年重开阿布格莱布监狱。大约四年之后，ISIS从这里释放了500-1000名囚犯。】

There's one chapter of the story of ISIS's rise that very rarely gets mentioned: its spectacular series of attacks on Iraqi prisons in 2012 and 2013. These prison breaks supplied it with a huge infusion of recruits, and also illustrates how effectively ISIS took advantage of the Iraqi government's weakness. 在ISIS的崛起中，有一个很少被人们提起的重要章节：它在2012年和2013年间对伊拉克境内的监狱发动了一系列惊人的袭击。这一系列的劫狱行动为它注入了大量新鲜血液，而这同时也显示了ISIS多么懂得利用伊拉克政府的弱点。 In July 2012, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a statement to his loyalists. "We remind you of your top priority, which is to release the Muslim prisoners everywhere," he said, "and making the pursuit, chase, and killing of their butchers from amongst the judges, detectives, and guards to be on top of the list." 巴格达迪在2012年7月向他的效忠者们发布了如下声明：“我们在此提醒你们，当前的首要任务是在各地解放被关押在监狱里的穆斯林，而从法官、警探和守卫中找出那些迫害他们的人，追捕并杀死这些刽子手，也是你们极其重要的任务。” This was, unambiguously, a call to break former Iraqi insurgents out of jail — and ISIS followed their leader's order. Over the next year, they attacked a number of prisons across Iraq, freeing somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 inmates. 毫无疑问，巴格达迪这是在号召自己的支持者帮助伊拉克的前叛乱分子越狱——而ISIS成员也忠实执行了领袖的命令。在接下来的一年中，他们袭击了伊拉克境内的多所监狱，并放出了其中的大约1000名囚犯。 These included, former CIA analyst Aki Peretz writes, "many terrorists [that] elite US military forces caught over the years and then handed over to the Iraqi government when the United States turned over custody of its prison facilities in 2010." 前中央情报局分析员Aki Peretz写道：“这其中包括许多由美军精英部队在过去数年中抓捕的恐怖分子，在美国2010年向伊拉克移交监狱设施时，他们也被交给了伊拉克政府。” People incarcerated for common crimes were also recruited. "Prisoners convicted of criminal charges provide advantages to the terrorist group, because they could have been recruited during their incarceration," Peretz writes. "Even if common criminals were able to resist jihadist persuasion efforts while in prison, they may now feel indebted to their 'liberators.'" 一些之前因普通罪行而被送进监狱的人也在ISIS的招募之列。“受过犯罪指控的囚犯对恐怖组织很有价值，因为他们可能在服刑期间就已经被招募了，”Peretz写道，“这些普通罪犯即使在狱中能够经受住圣战分子的劝说，他们在逃出监狱之后也可能对这些‘解放者’心存感激。” This won ISIS a rapid infusion of manpower — and also illustrates that well before the 2014 crisis, we had signs that the Iraqi state was falling apart in a way that would empower extremists. The ISIS crisis didn't come out of nowhere, in other words: It was a slow motion disaster with plenty of advance warning. 这为ISIS迅速注入了大量人力——同时也表明，早在2014年的危机之前很久，已经有了一些迹象让我们就能够看到伊拉克国家的解体方式将会增强极端势力。ISIS危机并不是凭空出现的，换句话说：这实际上是一场“慢动作”的灾难，而且有着大量的预先警示。 April 2013: ISIS officially becomes ISIS — and divorces al-Qaeda 2013年4月：ISIS正式成为“伊斯兰国”——并与“基地组织”分道扬镳

【一个ISIS战士拿着组织的旗帜。】

As all this was happening, Baghdadi's organization was still named al-Qaeda in Iraq. But Baghdadi worried that Joulani — his commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, the group in Syria — was acting too independently and would quit AQI to make Jabhat al-Nusra a separate group. 发生了那么多事情，巴格达迪的组织在此时仍然叫伊拉克基地组织。但是巴格达迪开始担心，他的手下Joulani——也就是叙利亚努斯拉阵线的首领——行动变得过于独立，而这可能会让他决定退出伊拉克基地组织，将努斯拉阵线变成一个独立的组织。 In April 2013, Baghdadi did something dramatic: He asserted unilateral control over all al-Qaeda operations in both Syria and Iraq. To demonstrate this change, he renamed AQI "the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria" — or ISIS, for short. 2013年4月，巴格达迪做了一件戏剧性的事情：他声称自己单方面控制了叙利亚和伊拉克境内所有的基地组织行动。为了证明这一点，他将伊拉克基地组织更名为“伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国”——简称ISIS。 This didn't sit well with Joulani, who appealed to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, who'd never really trusted AQI, sided with Joulani — a decision that Baghdadi rejected. ISIS and al-Qaeda eventually split, dividing the jihadist movement in Syria. 而Joulani则对此感到不满，他向基地组织领导人Ayman al-Zawahiri（即扎瓦赫里）申诉此事。扎瓦赫里从来就没有信任过伊拉克基地组织，他站在了Joulani一边——而巴格达迪则抵制了他的这一决定。ISIS和基地组织最终分道扬镳了，叙利亚境内的圣战运动也就此分裂。 This left ISIS to "gradually emerge as an autonomous component within the Syrian conflict," Brookings Doha's Charles Lister writes, by absorbing Nusra fighters and territory in northern and eastern Syria. It ended up taking firm control of much of this territory, establishing a de facto capital in the northern city of Raqqa. 在这之后，通过在叙利亚北部和东部地区吸收努斯拉阵线的战士和领地，ISIS“作为一个完全独立的组织逐渐在叙利亚内战中成长壮大”，布鲁金斯学会多哈分会的Charles Lister写道。最终，ISIS牢牢地控制了该区域的大部分地区，并在叙利亚北部城市拉卡建立了一个实质上的首都。 Assad, for his part, was perfectly happy to leave ISIS alone — particularly as it primarily fought other rebel groups. "ISIS almost never fought the Assad regime," Robinson says. "They were much more focused on fighting other opposition groups and gaining land their opponents had already acquired." 对于阿萨德来说，他非常乐于对ISIS置之不理——部分原因是它主要在与叙利亚的其它叛军组织作战。“ISIS几乎从来没有和阿萨德政权打过仗，”Robinson说。“他们更专注于和其它反对派组织作战，并且抢占他们的领地。” By February 2014, Zawahiri had had enough. He formally exiled ISIS from al-Qaeda, leading to what Zelin describes as "open warfare in Syria" between the groups. Today, the groups continue to struggle over territory and ideological control over the global jihadist movement. 到2014年2月，扎瓦赫里终于受够了ISIS的所作所为。他正式将ISIS逐出了基地组织，这导致了这两个组织间开始爆发冲突，Zelin称之为“叙利亚境内的公开战争”。直至今天，ISIS和基地组织仍然在争夺领地，以及对全球伊斯兰圣战运动的意识形态控制权。 This dynamic, in part, drives ISIS's brutality: One of the group's key means of capturing foreign fighters' hearts and minds is through public, over-the-top slaughter that wins their attention. 这在一定程度上也助长了ISIS的残暴作风：该组织在吸引外国战士的人心方面最强的杀手锏之一，就是通过公开而极端残暴的屠杀行为来吸引注意。 June 2014: ISIS sweeps northern Iraq and declares a caliphate 2014年6月：ISIS横扫伊拉克北部，并宣布建立哈里发国家

【Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi。（巴格达迪）】

This is the moment when everything that had happened before in ISIS's rise came to a head. On June 10, 2014, a force of about 800 ISIS fighters defeated 30,000 Iraqi government troops to capture Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. In the next two days, ISIS fighters swept through Iraq's heavily Sunni northwestern and central provinces — coming, at their peak, extremely close to Baghdad. 经过之前所发生的一切之后，ISIS的崛起迎来了高潮。2014年6月10日，一支由800名ISIS战士组成的军队战胜了3万名伊拉克政府军，攻占伊拉克第二大城市摩苏尔。其后两天，ISIS战士横扫了逊尼派人口集中的伊拉克西北部和中部省份——在他们推进到最远的时候，曾一度非常接近巴格达。 This blitzkrieg built on months of ISIS momentum. In January, ISIS had seized control of Fallujah, a former AQI stronghold in western Iraq. The Iraqi government's repeated inability to retake Fallujah in the following months illustrated the depleted and incompetent state of the Iraqi army after years of Maliki's mismanagement. 这场闪电战建立在ISIS持续数月的凌厉攻势之上。在1月份，ISIS已经占领了费卢杰——伊拉克基地组织之前在伊拉克西部的重要堡垒。伊拉克政府军在之后几个月中数次试图夺回对费卢杰的控制权，但全都无功而返，这也表现出在马利基多年的糟糕治理之后，伊拉克政府军已经筋疲力尽，无力回天。 The conquest of Mosul and much of northern Iraq led a triumphant Baghdadi to declare his territory a "caliphate" on July 4. By this, Baghdadi meant that ISIS was now a state — and not just any state but the only Islamically legitimate state in the world. All Muslims, Baghdadi said, were obligated to support the nascent Islamic state in its struggle to hold and expand its land. 征服摩苏尔以及伊拉克北部大片地区，令志得意满的巴格达迪在7月4日宣布在他领地上建立了一个“哈里发国”。巴格达迪想借此宣示ISIS现在是一个国家——不是一个平常的国家，而是全球唯一在伊斯兰教义上合法的国家。巴格达迪表示，所有的穆斯林都有义务支持这个新生的伊斯兰国守卫并扩张领土。 Establishing a caliphate had long been the goal of the entire jihadist movement. By declaring that he had actually created one, Baghdadi gained a huge leg up on al-Qaeda in the struggle for global jihadist supremacy. 建立一个哈里发国一直以来都是整个伊斯兰圣战运动的目标。通过宣称建立一个这样的国家，巴格达迪在对全球伊斯兰圣战运动领导权的争夺中，获得了相对于基地组织的巨大优势。 Since then, ISIS has "succeeded in attracting far, far more recruits" than al-Qaeda, Will McCants, the director of the Brookings Institution's Project on US Relations With the Islamic World, told me. This has also has allowed it to gain a following among foreign terrorist groups, with major ISIS franchises in Libya, Egypt's Sinai desert, and Nigeria. 从那以后，ISIS比基地组织“成功地招募到了多得多的新鲜血液”，布鲁金斯学会美国与伊斯兰世界关系研究项目主任Will McCants如此对我说。这还使得ISIS能够获得其它境外恐怖组织的效忠，这些追随者主要在利比亚，埃及的西奈沙漠和尼日利亚。 But ISIS had also taken a task with burdens beyond what it can perhaps sustain. By committing to actually governing a swath of territory in Syria and Iraq as a state, ISIS couldn't rely purely on insurgent tactics or hiding among civilians. It needed to engage in pitched conventional battles to defend its land. 但与此同时，ISIS也承担了一项超出其能力的任务。由于承诺将叙利亚和伊拉克的一片土地作为一个国家来治理，ISIS不能继续仅仅依赖武装暴乱或是藏身于平民之中这类策略。它将要面对守卫领土的常规战斗。 "When they declared the caliphate, their legitimacy came to rest on the continuing viability of their state," Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told me last October. In the coming year, this would prove to be a serious problem for the group. “当他们宣布建立哈里发国，他们的合法性就建立在这个国家持续生存的状态之上，”保卫民主基金会的一位资深研究员Daveed Gartenstein-Ross去年十月对我说。在之后的一年中，事实证明这是ISIS所面对的一个严重问题。 August 2014: ISIS makes its first huge mistake — invading Kurdistan 2014年8月：ISIS犯下第一个大错——入侵库尔德斯坦

【2015年，一个身处与ISIS战争前线的库尔德战士】

Ever since its AQI days, ISIS had been prone to ideological and political overstretch. 从伊拉克基地组织年代开始，ISIS就已经热衷于在意识形态和政治上的过度扩张。 "To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law," Graeme Wood explains in an excellent Atlantic feature on ISIS's theology. One condition is that "the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law." Once the caliphate is established, "the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph." “一个人如果想成为哈里发，就必须满足逊尼派教法中所规定的诸多条件，”Graeme Wood在一篇发表在《大西洋月刊》上的关于ISIS宗教意识形态的出色专题文章中写道。其中一个条件就是“哈里发必须拥有一块他能够实施伊斯兰教法的领土。”一旦建立了哈里发国家，“发动战争以扩张哈里发国的领土就成为了哈里发本人的一项重要责任。” Everything we know about ISIS suggests that both its fighters and Baghdadi himself earnestly believe this. This is what led them to attack Iraq's Kurds. 从我们对ISIS的了解来看，不论是ISIS战士还是巴格达迪本人都虔诚地相信这一点。而这也导致了他们攻击伊拉克库尔德人。 Iraq's Kurdish minority controls a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Iraq, and has a powerful military force known as the peshmerga. For the first half of 2014, they had been content to sit out the ISIS conflict. 伊拉克的库尔德少数民族控制着伊拉克东北部一块半自治的区域，并且拥有一支被称为“自由战士”的强大军事力量。在2014年上半年，他们还安于与ISIS井水不犯河水的状态。 But in August 2014, ISIS decided to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, quickly advancing to within several miles of the capital, Erbil. It also launched a genocidal campaign against a minority group known as the Yazidi, who are ethnically Kurdish. 但在2014年8月，ISIS决定入侵伊拉克的库尔德斯坦，并迅速推进到库尔德斯坦首府阿尔比尔之外仅仅数英里的地方。它还发动了一场针对少数教派雅兹迪派的种族清洗行动，而雅兹迪人在种族上属于库尔德人。 This brought the peshmerga into the war, which have since dealt ISIS a series of stinging defeats. It also drew the United States into the war: President Obama's bombing campaign against ISIS initially began as a limited intervention to protect American personnel in Erbil and stem the slaughter of the Yazidis. ISIS的这一行径令库尔德“自由战士”加入战团，并多次痛击ISIS。美国也卷了进来：奥巴马总统对ISIS的轰炸行动最初就是为了保护阿尔比尔的美国人并阻止对雅兹迪人的屠杀而实行的一项有限干预措施。 ISIS's progress into Kurdistan was reversed. Pressed by Kurds, a regrouping Iraqi military, Iranian-backed Shia militias, and US aircraft, ISIS began to fall back. By early 2015, ISIS began taking losses: The heavily Sunni city of Tikrit fell to Iraqi forces in April. ISIS进军库尔德斯坦失败了。在库尔德人，重新集结的伊拉克军队，由伊朗支持的什叶派武装，以及美国空军的共同打压之下，ISIS开始撤退。到2015年初，ISIS开始遭受进一步的损失：逊尼派居民占多数的提克里特的控制权在4月被伊拉克军队夺走。 "The Islamic State ... will lose its battle to hold territory in Iraq," Douglas Ollivant, the former national security adviser for Iraq under both George W. Bush and Obama, wrote in War on the Rocks this February. "The outcome in Iraq is now clear to most serious analysts." “伊斯兰国...将无法守住他们在伊拉克的领地，”曾在布什政府和奥巴马政府担任伊拉克问题国家安全顾问的Douglas Ollivant在今年二月发表在网站War on the Rocks上的一篇文章中写道。“绝大多数严肃的分析家都已经看清了他们在伊拉克的结局。” June 2015: ISIS's capital comes under threat 2015年6月：ISIS的首都受到威胁

【6月25日左右叙利亚北部战线的地图。注意库尔德人的阵地离拉卡有多近。】

In Syria, things had long looked better for ISIS than they had in Iraq: the multi-sided civil war meant that there was no unified, reliable force to challenge them. But in mid-2015, Syrian Kurds began threatening ISIS's territory. 一直以来，ISIS在叙利亚所面临的局面看起来都要比在伊拉克好得多：多方内战意味着不会有联合武装力量持续向他们发起挑战。但是在2015年年中，叙利亚的库尔德人也开始威胁ISIS在叙境内的领地。 ISIS, as in Iraq, had attempted to invade and conquer the territory within Syria that is dominated by Kurdish groups — and came damn close. In October 2014, ISIS nearly seized Kobane, a Kurdish stronghold on Syria's northern border with Turkey. 就像在伊拉克一样，ISIS也曾经在叙利亚境内试图侵略并征服由库尔德人统治的领地——并且差一点就得逞了。2014年10月，ISIS几乎攻占了库尔德人在叙利亚北部与土耳其接壤的边境要塞科巴尼。 But the Kurds held out for months. In January, aided by US support and US-led coalition air strikes, they pushed ISIS out of Kurdish territory. Then they kept going, seizing ISIS territory elsewhere in Syria. They advanced to within 30 miles of ISIS's de facto capital at Raqqa. 但是库尔德人坚守了数月。2015年1月，在美国的支持以及美军主导的多国联合轰炸之下，他们将ISIS从库尔德人的领地中赶了出去。之后他们进一步攻占了ISIS在叙利亚境内的一些其它领地，甚至推进到离ISIS的实际首都拉卡不到30英里的位置。 The Soufan Group, a private intelligence firm focusing on terrorism, described the Kurdish-led advance on Raqqa as the "most serious symbolic and meaningful threat [to ISIS] since it declared itself a caliphate almost one year ago." 专门关注恐怖主义的私人情报公司Soufan集团，将库尔德人领导的向拉卡进军的行动称作“自从大约一年前ISIS宣称成为一个哈里发国之后，它所遭受的最具象征意义和实际意义的威胁。” These Kurdish victories showed that ISIS was running up against the limits of its military strategy. Since last June, the group has been fighting too many enemies on too many different fronts. Its ability to maneuver rapidly around its territory has been limited by coalition airstrikes. Slowly but steadily, it has been losing ground. 库尔德人的胜利表明，ISIS所采取的行动超出了其军事能力的上限。自从去年6月开始，他们已经在太多的战线上与太多的敌人作战。它在自己领地内部的快速机动应变能力也受到了多国联合空袭的限制。事实上，它正在缓慢而稳定地失去根据地。 ISIS "lost something like 25 percent of their territory" since its peak last summer, McCants says. 相比去年夏天的顶峰，ISIS已经“失去了他们大约25%的领地”，McCants说道。 Autumn 2015: ISIS turns to international terrorism 2015年秋：ISIS开始发动国际性恐怖袭击

【巴黎Bataclan音乐厅周围的哀悼者】

On November 13, terrorists attacked several locations around Paris, killing more than 130 and wounding more than 380. ISIS claimed responsibility, and the French government has said that it believes the group was responsible. 在今年11月13日，恐怖分子在巴黎的多个地点发动了恐怖袭击，造成130多人死亡，380多人受伤。ISIS宣称对此次恐怖袭击负责，而法国政府在之前也已表示他们相信ISIS应对此次事件负责。 So why, as it slowly loses ground in Iraq and Syria, bit by bit losing the caliphate that has been its primary focus, might ISIS be sending fighters abroad at this critical moment? 那么，当ISIS正慢慢地在伊拉克和叙利亚丧失阵地，一点点失去这个曾是它主要奋斗目标的哈里发国之时，为什么却在这个生死攸关的时刻将它的战士们送到国外去发动恐怖袭击呢？ ISIS thrives on a narrative of victory. In order to sell itself as the prophesied return of the caliphate, it needs to show that its victories are inevitable and divinely inspired. If it's losing territory, then it needs to sell its narrative through other means. That means claiming "victory" over foreign enemies by hitting them with terrorist attacks. Indeed, Paris wasn't the only foreign attack ISIS has launched: ISIS suicide bombers have hit Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. It also claimed responsibility for taking down a Russian civilian airliner in Egypt's Sinai desert. ISIS是建立在一个关于胜利的叙事之上的。为了将自己塑造成伊斯兰预言中的哈里发帝国的形象，它需要展示出它的胜利是必然而神启的。如果它正在失去领土，那么它就必须通过其它方式来延续这个胜利的叙事。通过向外国敌人发动恐怖袭击来表示 “战胜了”他们，便是一种方式。显然，巴黎惨案并不是ISIS在国外所发动的唯一恐怖袭击：ISIS在科威特，黎巴嫩和沙特阿拉伯都发动过自杀式炸弹袭击。它还宣称对在埃及西奈沙漠中炸毁俄罗斯民用客机的事件负责。 "Much of ISIS's ideological support and recruiting strength emanates from a narrative that it is victorious," J.M. Berger, the co-author of ISIS: A State of Terror, explains via email. The Paris attack "changes the conversation from 'ISIS is contained' on November 12 to 'ISIS is rampaging uncontrollably' on November 14." “ISIS在意识形态上所获得的支持以及招募新员的能力在很大程度上都建立在一个它是胜利者的叙事之上，”《ISIS：一个恐怖国家》的合著者J.M. Berger在电子邮件中向我解释道。巴黎恐怖袭击“将人们所谈论的话题从11月12日的‘ISIS已经受到遏制’转变为了11月14日的‘ISIS的疯狂行为完全不受控制’。” Moreover, ISIS may believe that terrorist attacks are its best way of striking back against — and maybe, it believes, deterring — foreign attacks. (The French are part of the US-led coalition bombing ISIS in Syria and Iraq). That conclusion would likely be wrong, but ISIS may still believe it. 此外，ISIS可能还相信恐怖袭击是回击——甚至是阻止——外国敌人攻击的最佳方式。（法国参与了美国主导的对叙利亚和伊拉克境内ISIS的联合轰炸）。这个结论很可能是错误的，但ISIS也许仍然执着地相信这一点。 "I think it has made the calculation that it can no longer pursue its expansion strategy in Syria and Iraq without changing the calculations of the enemies currently halting its expansion," McCants says. "These attacks would be a way of inflicting costs on them." “我认为ISIS应该已经算计过，凭借自己身的实力，如果不改变那些正在阻止它扩张的敌人所面对的利害格局，它就无法继续实施在叙利亚和伊拉克的扩张策略，”McCants如此说道。“这些恐怖袭击就是对敌人们造成伤害的一种方式。” But here's one final scary twist: ISIS may not have planned it at all. The attack could have been independently undertaken by European IS

【2016-01-08】 @whigzhou: 无论你们怎么嘲笑二胖三胖的发型，还是不得不承认，他们的边缘策略玩的非常成功，把边界一点点往看似不可理喻的方向上推，这样当形势不利不得不退让时，只须从边缘往后撤一小步，大家就觉得他很乖了，至于贩毒绑架印假钞，就都是没人关心的小把戏了，趁列强正焦头烂额，而且民主党还在台上，赶紧推几把  

恐怖主义土壤肥沃，众多落后国家制度建设鲜有成就，甚至沦为失败国家，社会失序，这些问题其实有着一个共同的背景：西方文化和价值观对这些国家的精英或潜在精英失去了吸引力，或者，即便仍有吸引力，以往那个以西方价值为灯塔的、并且可供这些落后国家精英分子或有志青年向上爬升的社会阶梯，已经断裂了。 这一情景与维多利亚时代形成鲜明对比，那时所有已经接触西方的传统社会，无不仰慕西方文化，这些社会中禀赋优秀、志向高远、不安现状的青年，都清楚的知道，通往西方价值的阶梯在哪里，可以如何通过自身努力而一级级爬升，从而获得个人成就。 在晚清最后三十年，有点志向的青年都知道，学英语、接受西式教育、在铁路局、电报局、工厂等西式产业谋得一份差事、留学，都是令人艳羡的社会晋身之途，按西方模式创办现代企业、组织自治社区，甚至改革政治制度，这些成就可以为个人带来新的荣耀，赢得西方式的尊严和体面，甚至被女王封爵。 这就像之前科举阶梯，即便对不识字的人也是一目了然。 即便禀赋较差、地位较低的青年，无望获得这样的成就，也同样会受这一价值阶梯的影响，因为他身边总会有一些成功者、高地位者，他们的一举一动都在告诉他：什么才是更值得追求的价值，如何行事才显得更体面；这就好比，尽管科举体系仅仅容纳了社会极小部分成员（最多几十万），但其价值吸引力却影响了所有人的观念和行为。 上述价值阶梯之所以那么清晰可见，是因为西方元素的现场存在，其优势亲眼可见，不容否认，并且对个人可以伸手触及，而不像如今许多落后国家，可以在电视和互联网上看到，却遥不可及。 优势文化的现场存在所带来的价值引导作用，被社会学家称为橱窗效应，研究发现，晚清大量商业和政治制度创新，比如新式企业、商业行会、慈善机构的组织模式，都是橱窗效应的表现，许多都是照抄香港同类。 可是现如今，西方橱窗里只剩下商品和娱乐，制度元素都不见了。 这部价值阶梯的断裂，始于上世纪六十年代，西方从殖民地和保护国全面撤离；与此同时，一战后西方左派知识分子在文化上的自我否定运动，也在六七十年代达到高峰；九十年代，这一趋势因苏联崩溃而有所回潮，但很快又重新掀起，特别是在08年之后。 这一撤离之所以导致阶梯断裂，是因为，价值阶梯要起作用，必须和权力结构相对应，否则即便还有大批传教士、慈善组织、教师、人类学家、考古学家在现场，橱窗效应也会大大削弱，因为在价值吸引和文化仿效方面，多数人尤其是处于这一发展阶段的人，都是很势利很低俗的，谁发财谁有权势，就仰慕和效仿谁，村里首富开奔驰，就觉得奔驰是天下最好的车，当地土豪军阀以砍头剁手展示权力，大家就都觉得这才是赢得尊严和体面的可行方式，无论外人觉得金三胖多丑陋，在朝鲜那都是时尚先锋。 细说起来话就太长…… 总之，只要西方不在文化和价值观重建其自信心，本文开头所提到的那些问题，就不会有出路，更糟糕的是，西方世界本身也会因此而继续颓废下去，那才是真正的悲剧。  

当前中东乱局，看来只有大强度——二战以来的最大强度——干预才足以解决，但以我对美国干预方式的观感，恐怕既不会有好效果，也难以长期坚持。 美式干预的固有缺陷，让他在越南、阿富汗、伊拉克一次次陷入泥潭。 所谓美式干预，简单说有这样几个要点：

1. 推翻坏政权；
2. 扶持政治伦理上可接受的、战略上愿意配合的友好政权；
3. 干预费用由美国买单，包括大把军事和经济援助；
4. 好不容易扶持起来的友好政权，为了让它维持下去，不得不很大限度上容忍其违反规则和协议的鸡贼小动作（比如巴基斯坦、埃及和海外各国）；
5. 尊重主权（否则伊拉克早就该一拆三了）；

这一模式的问题是：

1. 推翻旧政权容易，但扶持新政权困难，往往很脆弱，依赖性很强，结果美军被长期拖在那里，越卷越深，无法脱身；
2. 军费开支膨胀乃至失控，加上伤亡数积累，过不了几年就丧失国内支持；
3. 有些问题不破坏主权根本解决不了，比如南斯拉夫。

越战以来，这个模式只在格林纳达和巴拿马这种情况单纯的迷你国家才成功过，在阿富汗和伊拉克都失败的很惨，但看不出有改弦更张的迹象。 美国人执着于这种模式，原因有几个：

1. 殖民地历史和独立建国经历，使得美国人有着根深蒂固的反殖民反帝倾向，远离旧大陆的和平环境又造成了孤立主义倾向，所以总是希望外科手术式的尽快解决问题，不愿将干预经常化和长期化；
2. 反殖民反帝倾向也导致他们特别愿意尊重主权和领土完整；
3. 战后对德国日本的占领和改造异常成功，这可能让他们对该模式抱有过度信心。

有关干预和秩序重建的困难，有各种分析，很多也都言之成理，可问题是，为何当年大英帝国以规模小得多的军队、少得多的军费、薄弱得多的财政基础，却能在那么广阔的世界维持相当水平的秩序？ 不妨看看一下英式干预有何不同：

1. 尽量不更换旧政权，这一点很重要，因为一个政权既然能够建立并自我维持，必定已经找到了足够的存在基础和可行的组织方式，而这些是很难从头建立的；
2. 向既有政权施加规范，不遵守就狠狠打，打到肉痛，但别推翻；
3. 抓住既有政权最心疼的利益要害（俗话叫捏住卵子）；
4. 干预费用主要由当地承担（有人可能会说落后国家怎么承担得起发达国家标准的军费开支？错了，秩序可以带来巨额红利，没有秩序，伊拉克石油可能一桶都运不出波斯湾，马关条约带来的FDI和工业增长，远远足以抵偿赔款额）；
5. 别拿主权太当回事，从伦理上说，非契约性国家的主权根本不值得尊重，扶谁灭谁，全看哪个对建立秩序有利，等到他们宪政发育成熟，转变成契约性国家，再尊重不迟；

很明显，这一模式是很帝国主义的，有人会说，当前政治环境下不可能，确实，不过部分的往这方向靠拢还是可能的，比如：

1. 南斯拉夫和塞尔维亚的主权就没尊重，不是也挺好？伊拉克为啥不能拆？
2. 第一次海湾战争的军费就摊了，后来的没摊，是因为美国让埃米尔们感觉太安全了，不像之前被萨达姆吓尿了裤子，要改变这一点，必须将干预经常化，也就是让他们时不时尿一次裤子；
3. 为此，就需要建立地区性的条约体系，类似冷战期间的东盟，实际上第一次海湾战争是建立此类体系千载难逢的良机，当时就该乘他们裤子未干把条约义务施加上去；
4. 有了条约体系，像卡塔尔给哈马斯一箱箱拎钱这种事情，一旦发现就得狠狠打；
5. 利比亚在阿拉伯之春前其实有望成为一个英式干预的案例，可惜半途而废；
6. 在中东这样的乱局中，出现危机的政权从来不少，美国应该抓住每次这样的机会，迫使危机中的政权接受条约义务，便可为后续干预提供合法性；

我对“该怎么办”这种问题向来兴趣不大，说这些，主要是为了回答这样一种可能的质疑：你的政治哲学究竟有何操作性含义？在现实政治问题上究竟对应何种做法？确实，这是一个合理质疑，所以，为了表明自己说的不是空话，就需要给出一个操作性的演示，但也仅仅是个演示（比方说，可以如此这般），并不打算仔细展开。

Peace for Our Time? 我们这个时代的和平? 作者：Azar Gat @ 2012-09-20 发表于奥斯陆 译者：@Ghostmarine     校对：林翠、@Drunkplane-zny 来源：Peace Research Institute Oslo, https://www.prio.org/Peace-Address/download/PAPA%20Programme%202012.pdf 这次活动组织者建议，用“我们这个时代的和平？”——问号——这样一个多少有些古怪的问句为题进行演讲，我欣然同意。 你们都知道，1938年9月慕尼黑会议，与希特勒达成和平解决捷克斯洛伐克冲突的共识后，手握和平协议志得意满的张伯伦，向迎接他凯旋的人们所作的，正是这句承诺。然而，不到半年时间，希特勒的军队占领了捷克斯洛伐克全境，一年不到，欧洲，继而全世界，沦入另一场世界大战之中，五千五百万人丧生。 张伯伦，连同他那把标志性的雨伞，成了一个永恒的小丑形象。而张伯伦的和平预言，就像其他类似断语一样——比如说一战是一场“终结所有战争的战争”，讲冷战之后建立起一个“新世界秩序”——足以引作对任何宣称战争业已消亡高论的警示。此类宣言总是难免失于幼稚，正如马克·吐温妙评报道自己死亡的新闻【编注：这句妙评是：“有关我死亡的报道过于夸张了。”】。 因此，我不会试图预言未来，未来是开放的，是遍布种种可能性的疆域。相反，我将聚焦历史趋势，通过或远或近的历史，告诉大家战争的确正在减少，和平与日俱增。我会力图阐释其中的原因，并且说明，是什么滋生了张伯伦以及上述其他人的宣言，而在现代社会之前，掌握实际权柄的政治家可不会像先知或者道德家一样信誓旦旦地下各种断语。毕竟，张伯伦之流并非完全被形势所误导。 过去十几二十年里，一些学者提出这样的观点，认为纵观整个历史，战争分阶段减少，例如最近斯蒂芬·平克（Steven Pinker）在畅销书《人性中更好的天使》（The Better Angels of Our Nature）中的论述。人类战争第一次大幅减少，是因为大约五千年前，利维坦国家崛起于当时世界最先进的一些地区。 就拿挪威来说，这是世界上最晚近才被开发的地区，现在看来与北欧和西欧其他地方没什么两样，可挪威的战争减少现象仅仅从一千年前才开始——当然，虽然你们挪威人有着黑暗的历史，但从那往后做得还不错。 针对此课题的几项综合研究，的的确确从人类学和考古学层面，证明霍布斯对无政府自然状态的描述基本正确。而卢梭主义者的想象，即和平的原始人因为学会了农业，划分私产，建立国家，由此遭到腐蚀，这种在二十世纪中期人类学和流行文化中占主流的观点，已经被证实是无凭无据的。 卢梭主义者的观点基于这样一种假设，认定人烟稀少就不大可能有太多战争好打。然而，现存的狩猎采集社会证明实际情况恰恰相反。澳洲是狩猎采集社会最佳实验室，1788年欧洲人抵达之前，那片辽阔大陆曾经遍布狩猎采集者的身影，一直未被农民、牧民，或者国家之类的概念“污染”。有证据显示，澳大利亚部族之间战争频繁。 即便在人口密度低至每35平方英里一人的中澳沙漠（Central  Australian  Desert），冲突和致命战斗也是家常便饭。很多战争的焦点是水源，后者对该地区的人生死攸关。澳洲土著手提之盾可不是用来狩猎袋鼠的。绝大部分其他地区，狩猎领地被垄断，受到狩猎采集者凶猛的保护，因为区域资源很容易就会被耗尽。 二十世纪六十年代，以和平著称的卡拉哈里布希曼人（Kalahari Bushmen）是卢梭主义者的研究焦点。然而，真相很快水落石出，在国家权力介入之前，该族的暴力死亡率四倍于1990年的美国，而那时美国的这项数据就已经是全球发达国家中最高且遥遥领先的了。 对加拿大北极圈内的因纽特人来说，人口稀少到不知道什么叫资源竞争，可即使这样，绑架女性的战斗也异常普遍，暴力死亡率十倍于1990年的美国。新几内亚高地和亚马逊流域为我们提供了一个初级农业社会的大型缩微世界，两个地区都包含数以百计的部落，以及数以百计的语种，这些社会确实都揭示了类似情况：永不停息的战争和非常高的暴力死亡率。 进一步来说，人类的自然状态和生物界的一般自然状态没什么区别。二十世纪六十年代的普遍看法是，同一个物种的动物不会自相残杀，这就让人类成为一种凶残的例外，并且滋生了这样的猜想：战争完全伴随文明的出现而产生。可是，从那时起，人们发现物种内部的动物之间存在大量的相互杀戮现象，现在每个坐在电视机前看自然纪录片的观众都能对此耳熟能详。也就是说，就这方面而言，人类的行为也不足为奇。 根据几十个前国家社会的数据，前国家社会平均暴力死亡率高达总人口的15%，男性人口的25%，活着的男人统统伤痕累累，而历史上国家社会平均暴力死亡率在1%至5%之间。下降幅度如此之大，主要是由于利维坦国家强制推行的内部和平所致。霍布斯认为，无政府状态是引发暴力死亡的最重要因素，他是对的。另一方面，在绝大多数历史阶段，国家权力不仅仅具有强制性，还具有极强的压迫性，所以社会经济压迫和更加安全的生活常常相伴而行，虽然这种结合并非始终如此。这就是利维坦崛起所带来的代价。 伴随国家的出现，战争死亡率大幅下降的第二点原因相对不那么明显，较少被人提及。和之前的部落群体相比，国家及其军队的规模都更庞大，往往要大得多，从而形成了一种国家间大规模战争冲突的宏大印象。国家战争看似很大，论绝对规模的确不小。然而，主要的问题并非是绝对死亡数，而是相对死亡率，即死于暴力的人口百分比。国家状态下，恰恰由于国家庞大，相对死亡率其实是下降的。与部落群体相比，大型国家面对战争，只需要更低的动员强度，从而令更多的平民免于战争的袭扰。 以人类历史上最早的国家和帝国之一埃及为例。公元前十三世纪，法老拉美西斯二世率军在叙利亚北部与赫梯帝国爆发卡迭石战役，麾下士兵两万至两万五千人。在那个时代，这是一只规模庞大的军队。然而，当时埃及总人口约为两百至三百万，因此，这支军队最多占总人口的百分之一。 纵观历史，对于大型国家和帝国而言，这是一个非常标准的比例，因为长期维持一支远离本土的大规模部队，涉及各种繁杂的财政与后勤问题。因此，对比小规模部落社会的全民皆兵，大型国家部队的参军率以及战争伤亡要低得多。此外，小型部落的战争和冲突中，最容易遭受损失的是女性和儿童，而埃及的平民则远离战争的喧嚣，通常也不会直面战争的恐惧。 这种相对安全，是国家出现后社会人口大量增长的主要原因之一，只有在发生大规模入侵时才会被破坏。这也正是为什么内战——国家内部肆虐的战火——往往会成为最具杀伤力的战争形式，这点也曾被霍布斯清楚地认识到。因此，国家的崛起，意味着规模更大、更加恢弘的战争，然而就整体而言，相对于总人口的伤亡更低。 继利维坦国家崛起之后，战争减少的第二大阶段伴随着过去两个多世纪现代工业化时代而出现。自从1815年拿破仑兵败滑铁卢之后，战争数量和战争总体死亡率锐减，发达国家尤甚，乍听这种观点，很多人往往惊讶莫名。1945年后列强间的所谓长期和平则更多地得到承认，这其中当然应该肯定核武器这个决定性因素的作用，核武器成功地吸引了所有玩家的注意，成为他们脖子上的绞索。民主国家之间的和平也得到了相当程度的认可。 然而，早在核子时代之前，无论是民主国家还是非民主国家，战争便已经非常显著地减少。1815年之后的一个世纪，经济发达国家的战争频率降至此前一个世纪的三分之一，变化幅度空前。我必须强调：降至三分之一，而非下降三分之一。事实上，自1945年至今2012年，现代强权之间已共享长期和平长达六十七年之久，史上第二长的和平期则历时四十三年，从1871年普法战争至1914年一战，第三长和平期跨越三十九年，从1815年拿破仑战争终结至1854年克里米亚战争。可见，迄今为止，现代强权体系中三段长期和平全部都出现在1815年之后，前两段均早于核子时代。这种引人注目的现象绝非偶然。显而易见，如果要解释自1815年之后，战争状态整体上的减少，那么同时也需要说明，这一大潮中两段刺眼的逆流：两次世界大战。 越来越多的人开始认为，过去两个世纪里，战争频率之所以开始下降，是因为战争变得太过致命、太过具有毁灭性，太过昂贵。然而这一假说很难成立，因为战争所造成的相对伤亡、所消耗的相对财富并不比以前的历史阶段更惊人或者更高昂。十九世纪作为欧洲史上最宁静的世纪，其战争程度相对而言格外温和。的确，世界大战，尤其是二战，在伤亡方面绝对位列前茅。然而，不同于我们的直观认识，两次世界大战远非史上惨烈之最。再一次，我们需要审视相对伤亡，战争中的总体死亡率，而不是因为参战的国家多，就把数字一个个加起来。 举几个例子就足以证明，前现代战争的伤亡率和毁灭性并不比现代战争来得小。第二次布匿战争（公元前218-216年）的头三年，罗马损失了约五万17至46岁之间的男性公民，而帝国全境该年龄段的男子一共才二十万人。仅仅三年时间，损失兵役人口的四分之一，与二战期间苏联军事死亡率相当，高于德军的军事死亡率。 与之类似，十三世纪蒙古铁骑横扫欧亚大陆，所造成的伤亡和毁灭性在历史上名列前茅。据估计，中国、俄罗斯人口大幅下降，尽管估算数据颇有浮动。然而，即使按照最低值计算，也与苏联二战时期高达15%的恐怖人口损失数据相当，而中国地区的人口损失率几乎肯定远超该数据。最后一个例子是三十年战争（1618-1648），德国人口损失在五分之一至三分之一，无论哪个数字都比德国一战、二战死亡率之和还高。 人们通常也认定，现代更发达的军事技术意味着更高的杀伤力和毁灭性。然而，更发达的军事技术其实也意味着更好的防护力，例如机械化装甲、摩托化机动，以及防御性电子手段。攻防的先进性通常交替上升，此消彼长。此外，我们太容易忘记，无论是犹太人、苏联战俘，还是苏联平民，二战期间被德国杀害的数以百万计非战斗人员中的绝大部分，他们忍饥挨饿，暴尸荒野，被大量处决，而非死于什么精密的军事技术。 二十世纪发生的几次种族灭绝，与历史上更为古老的屠杀一样，都是利用最简单的技术加以实现，卢旺达种族灭绝者手中的弯刀时时刻刻提醒着我们这一点。是啊，核武器是终极武器，其杀伤力和毁灭性的确空前。然而，正如我们刚才所提到的，远在核子时代之前，战争就开始减少，该趋势同样适用于核子时代的无核国家。因此，尽管二战之后，核武器为促进世界和平发挥了重要的作用，军事技术也很难被视作1815年之后战争减少的原因。 说在过去二百年里，战争比以前更花钱，这也不是真的，因为还是要考虑相对于整体财富这个因素。战争总会牵扯经济运行的方方面面，也是最昂贵的单项国家开支。十六、十七世纪西班牙、十八世纪法国的经济都被战争以及高昂的战争赔款所摧毁，法国甚至因此爆发革命。还有，前现代战争普遍会引发饥荒，这同样会导致死亡。因此，与现代战争相比，前现代战争既不少死人，也不少花钱，或更少毁灭性。 另一种对近代战争行为减少的解释颇有点一厢情愿，认为这是社会对于战争“态度转变”使然。也没人解释为什么这一态度转变，以及民众乐于“戒掉战争瘾”的意愿，会出现在这个历史时间点，而不是更早。毕竟，绝大多数类似佛教、基督教这样的强势道德主义都在谴责战争，千百年下来也没什么成效。这种理论是在说，人民突然就意识到战争就算不疯狂，也是很愚蠢，毫无理性可言。 对于战争的这种看法，在当今现代而又富足的世界里得到了广泛传播。但是想想成吉思汗，他的子孙后代盘踞东亚和中亚长达几个世纪，基因研究表明，他们加班加点，制造出占这些地区全部男性总数8%的子孙，这是何等令人瞠目的性机遇。 不要以为只有独裁者和军事贵族才能从战争中获益，我们应当谨记，古典时代靠战争发家的两大城邦国家分别是民主的雅典和共和的罗马。这两大文明之所以能够成功的关键因素，恰恰是这些政治体系中的人民能够从战争和帝国扩张中获益，所以人们拥护战争，积极投身其中。此外，纵观历史，人民常常会恐惧战争，哀悼战争，正如他们经常热情洋溢地歌颂战争的荣光，传扬英雄的伟业一样。 为了达到目的，人们会采用合作、和平竞争，或者暴力冲突等手段。每种行为策略都是精心设计的工具，可以根据具体的环境和对成功的预期交替使用。暴力并非是一种盲目的生物本能，而是一种为了达到目的，精心选择的策略。这是我们行为工具箱的一把重锤，曾经总是那么趁手自如；其必要性和优越性常常能得到证明。因此，为了理解人类的选择和规范，从暴力冲突转向合作及和平竞争这样的非暴力选项，就必须理解在过去两个世纪以及最近几十年中，环境以及效费比计算方式发生了何种改变。 的确，如果过去两个世纪，战争没有变得更花钱，更具毁灭性，人们对战争态度的改变也不是从空气中蹦出来的，那为什么战争减少了，尤其在发达国家之间？甚至在十九世纪中叶以前，类似圣西门、奥古斯特·孔德、约翰·斯图尔特·密尔，以及曼彻斯特学派的思想家们便很快注意到了这种变化，并且意识到这是由工商业革命的兴起所引发，这一革命是自新石器时代人类学会农业之后，最为深远的人类社会转型。 首先，在世界上已完成工业革命的地区，从工业革命伊始到现在，人均财富翻了三十到五十倍，由于人均财富呈现爆炸性增长，马尔萨斯陷阱得以克服。财富总量再也不会成为基本限制，唯一的问题是如何对财富进行分配，因此，对财富的追求渐渐不再是一个零和博弈。 其次，各国的经济活动不再完全自给自足，通过专业化、规模化，以及交易，国际互联性与日俱增。因此，外国的灾难有可能令整个经济系统变得萧条，从而损害本国自己的利益。（这种现象，最早被密尔所注意，在一战后得到完全证实，凯恩斯在1920年出版的《和约的经济后果》（The Economic Consequences of the Peace）一书中批评向德国索取战争赔款时，便已经预计到了相应的后果。） 第三，更大程度的经济开放，将经济活动与政治主权剥离开来，从而减少了战争爆发的可能。从某个地区获利，不再需要对其进行政治统治。所有这些因素之中，商业上的相互依赖吸引了学术界最多的关注。然而，其他两项因素的重要性也毫不承让。 因此，竞争性经济活动的收益越大，冲突发生的阻力越大，吸引力越小。并非是广为认可的“战争更加费钱”，其实是“和平更加有利可图”。 如果情况的确如此，那为什么过去二百年里，战争还是在发生，尽管频率低得多？首先，种族和民族之间的张力常常盖过新兴的经济逻辑，这足以解释1815年至1945年之间欧洲绝大部分战争。直到今天，这种现象依然存在，在全球不发达地区尤为明显。 此外，十九世纪末二十世纪初，新经济逻辑出现倒退，起因是列强重拾保护主义政策，并随着新帝国主义将保护主义扩展至不发达地区。保护主义与新帝国主义扩张相结合，意味着新兴全球经济被分割成不同的帝国区域，每个帝国领域都会对外变得封闭，而不是更加开放。二十世纪三十年代，全球经济也的确演变成为这种格局。 雪球效应由此产生，列强竞相争夺帝国殖民地。对于领土受限的德国和日本，“帝国生存空间”或“共荣圈”的需求变得极为紧迫。两次大战的种子由此埋下。进而，二十世纪最初十年经济自由主义的衰退，导致反自由、反民主的政治理念和政权的崛起，而这种反自由、反民主势头的崛起，又反过来使经济自由主义更加衰退。二者的相互作用，便催生出一种暴力信条：共产主义和法西斯主义。 1945年之后，大战出现的概率进一步减少。在此期间，核武器发挥了重要的作用。但自由贸易的制度化，以及与之密切相关的经济快速且可持续发展也非常重要。自由民主的传播同样功不可没。的确，尽管在工业时代，不自由不民主的国家一样不怎么打仗，但自由民主政体才更符合和平的主旋律。 由于国内专制高压，非民主国家对外用兵更加自然。相反，自由民主社会内部以和平、法律仲裁关系为主导，因此人民往往希望将同样的范式应用于国际事务。生活在一个越来越宽容的社会中，人民也就越来越容易包容别人的观点。尽管民主国家最初也是庞大的帝国，然而随着提倡自由、法律平等、以及国内政治参与等理念的深入人心，自由民主国家便会发现，在没有得到外国人民同意的情况下，对其进行统治，合理性受到越来越多的质疑。 由于珍视生命、自由，倡导人权，当试图推行压迫统治时，自由民主国家变会陷入被动。进而，在自由民主社会，个人生命和追求幸福的价值被认为远高于集体价值，在战争中牺牲生命正在越来越多地丧失其合法性。只有在极少数正式而实用的情况下，战争才具有合法性。同时战争被广泛地厌恶，不受大众欢迎。 这种不断深化的潮流和共识简直就是奇迹。其最耀眼而广受世人所认可的成就便是民主国家间的和平。随着自由化、民主化，以及经济发展的深入，富裕民主国家之间爆发战争的可能性已降至零点，它们甚至不认为有必要就可能发生的军事纠纷而对另一个民主国家进行军事准备。历史上第一次，曾经是国际无政府主义状态之内在特性的邻国安全困境（security dilemma）【编注：安全困境也叫霍布斯陷阱，是指这样一种局面：当你附近出现一个有能力对你进行打击的邻居，而你又无法确信其善意，就不得不采取预防措施，要么增强防御，要么先发制人，同样的逻辑在对方也成立，结果要么是直接导致战争，要么引发不断升级的军备竞赛，而后者在力量失衡时同样导致战争。这一困境提示了，即便各方最初都无意攻击对方而只是想自保，霍布斯状态下战争也难以避免】不复存在，尤其是在北美、西欧这样世界上最现代化、最自由民主的地区，和平得到实现。 随着苏维埃帝国的崩溃，前社会主义政权汇入全球资本经济的大潮之中，东欧、南亚、东南亚，以及拉丁美洲的经济快速增长与民主化结伴而行，发达国家爆发大战的前景变得愈加遥远。战争的地缘中心从根本上发生了转移。世界上现代化的、经济发达的地区已经变成了“和平区”。战争现在主要限定在不发达地区，即世界的“战争区”，这些国家在现代化进程中落在了后面，其相应的副产品就是时不时地打来打去，有时还会和发达国家开战。 1945年后，国家间战争大幅减少的同时，国内战争有所增加，所以有人就信誓旦旦，说战争并未减少，只不过形式有所转变。就好像说有个什么暴力守恒定律，规定暴力总数为一个定值。然而，这是一种误解，源于对材料的无差别诠释，就像有句谚语里说，平均两寸深的湖水也能淹死人。 现实中，世界上不同地区的社会经济发展非常不均衡，所以，国内战争同样出现了国家间战争所表现出的下降趋势。由于具有更强的共识性、多数代表性、包容度，以及在和平分离方面更大的合法性，现代化的、经济发达、自由民主的国家，实际上已不会发生内战。 相反，不发达或者发展中国家更容易发生内战。这样的国家，往往民族四分五裂，中央政府软弱无力，于二战后去殖民地化并独立建国，从而造成全球范围的内战数量增长。因此，无论是国家间战争还是内战，均主要出现在世界上不发达或者发展中地区。如果考虑到这些地区终将实现现代化，从这个意义上来讲，未来尚且光明。 说了这么多最近几十年的现代化进程中，战争大幅减少，和平播撒人间之后，应当强调，这些巨大的改善或者说正在改善的条件，并非完全确凿无疑，不足以确保人类免于大规模战争的阴影。随着世界新秩序被世界新无序威胁，冷战后的欣快时光恐怕会转瞬即逝。发达国家爆发大战的可能性依然很低。然而，1989柏林墙崩塌后，基于资本主义和民主胜利的那种深刻的变革感，已备受侵蚀。 或许，最重要的改变就是非民主资本主义强权的回归，这种政体自1945年德国、日本被击败之后就长期缺席于国际社会。前共产主义国家中国经历了大发展和工业化，已经演变为专制资本主义，这将成为改变全球平衡的最重要因素。还有俄罗斯，褪去后共产自由主义之后，正逐渐成为一个独裁国家。这些国家是否能够随发展而最终实现民主化，大概是二十一世纪最重大的问题。 早在当前这轮经济大衰退开始之前，我就曾经在《外交事务》上撰文指出，历史的教训并不明朗，并非进步主义者——例如最近，也是最有名的福山——所深信的那样具有必然性。此次经济危机爆发以来，专制强权更加自信。继二十世纪三十年代因资本主义民主的失败而导致法西斯和共产主义极权的崛起之后，全球霸主和民主资本主义遭受无与伦比的一记重拳。 有人希望，当前的经济危机不会演变成一场灾难。然而，国家驱动和民族资本主义专制的诱惑的的确确增加了。与此同时，二十世纪民主胜利的支柱——虽然世人一贯对此有所低估——美国势力正在经历相对衰退，尽管或许不会像某些人预想的那么严重。 新资本主义专制势力分享了“发展、开放、贸易、资本”的和平，深深地整合进了世界经济之中，但却没有成为自由民主国家。因此，在该系统中，避免任何贸易保护主义就显得至关重要，不仅仅是因为贸易保护主义有可能损害经济，还因为避免保护主义可以防止出现抢夺市场和原材料的风潮，在二十世纪最初几十年中，正是这些行为，最终导致了灾难性的帝国保护主义和国际纷争。 即使前景并非如此暗淡，随着实力的增长，中国也有可能成为一个更加专断跋扈的势力，就算不会变得具有十足的侵略性，也会像超级强权那样四处秀肌肉。民主和非民主势力或许多少可以和平地共存，出于相互的恐惧和疑虑彼此戒备。然而还是存在这样一种前景，更具对抗性的关系、意识形态方面增强竞争、潜在和现实的摩擦、军备竞赛加剧，甚至启动新一轮的冷战。中国和俄罗斯对于全球专制政权的支持——最明显的就是叙利亚和伊朗——或许只是将来局面的牛刀小试。 战争减少的第二个明显反例是，过去二十多年里局部战争不断上演，这些战争大部分由美国连同其北约或其他盟友发动，但对手却十分落后，跟现代化民主化几乎沾不上边。反叛乱战争格外吸引到大量关注和批评，而且确实构成了一个难解之谜。超级强国能够轻而易举地碾压最为强大的敌对国家，然而却在世界上最贫穷积弱的地区面对武力孱弱的对手一筹莫展。 但是，人们往往忽略了这样的一个事实，这种困难并非普遍难题，而一边倒的出现在很多自由民主国家，他们之所以遇上这样的问题，恰恰因为他们是自由民主国家。民主国家的行为招致了大量的批评非议，其中有些并非无理取闹，这或许可以看作民主的荣誉而非包袱。 历史经验表明，粉碎叛乱就需要无情地压迫平民，这令自由民主国家越来越难以接受。前现代国家，以及现代独裁国家和极权国家，就不会为使用这些手段而感到困扰，而且总的来说，他们的压迫行动相当成功。 压迫，是帝国统治不可或缺之基石。大英帝国和法兰西帝国之所以能够以如此低的成本维持统治，仅仅是因为他们能够毫无忌惮地推行无情压迫，就拿英国来说，直到1857年还在镇压印度叛变。然而，自十九世纪末以来，自由主义观点深入人心，尽管表面上风头无两，民主帝国其实已时日无多。 转入二十世纪，大英举步维艰，最终在南非达成和解，从爱尔兰撤军，这对于其他自由民主帝国也是一个明确的信号。几乎被世人所忽视的一个事实是，二战后，去殖民化大潮仅仅发生在自由民主帝国之中（以英国和法国为甚）。根本谈不上什么民意压力的非民主帝国，要么像德国和日本一样在两次世界大战中被摧毁，要么在独裁统治土崩瓦解之际和平解体，例如苏联。 质疑者或许会说，当年纳粹德国面对南斯拉夫和苏联的游击队同样一筹莫展。但是，如果德国赢了二战，就能向各种争议地区派遣更多军队，其种族清洗手段也能大展神威。苏联在阿富汗的失败是另一个鲜明的反例，但阿富汗是个例外，位于苏维埃帝国统治系统之外。 车臣或许更能说明问题，而且前因后果一目了然：运用大规模放逐手段的斯大林苏维埃铁腕统治是最残忍也是有效的，九十年代的自由俄罗斯最为温情脉脉，也最无效，而普京制下的独裁俄罗斯介于二者之间。 值得留意的是，在苏联和东欧内部压制反对声音确实更加容易。实际上，我们所能看到的成功叛乱样本，在遭受严重的选择偏差之后，完全被扭曲了，有点像福尔摩斯说的，“一条不叫的狗”——独裁的铁腕下，帝国内部万马齐喑——我们看到的只是最突出的、最具故事性的案例。同样的情况适用于中国，那里成功地对藏人和穆斯林民族主义者进行长期压制，只要中国一日不民主，这些镇压就还将继续存在下去。 人们指责阿萨德在叙利亚的统治残暴，平叛无功。叙利亚的悲剧至2012年的今天已经持续一年半有余，据估计两万多人因此丧命。然而，1982年镇压穆斯林兄弟会哈马城起义时，老阿萨德在三天时间就制造出数量与此相当的尸体。由于害怕外国势力介入，小阿萨德不能像他的父亲那样肆无忌惮。而普京的俄罗斯也没能全盘承袭其前任苏联的那种超级力量，那种东西已经怅然消失了。 并不是说民主国家的所作所为就神圣得无可挑剔。无论是由政治军事当局实施的暴力，还是军队的恣意妄为，都会无差别地针对战斗人员和非战斗人员。自由民主国家严格限制针对平民的暴力，这构成其法律规范标准。尽管很多——或许是绝大部分——违反这条标准的暴力行为都未经报道，但那些已经被自由媒体捅出来的案子，还是会受到公众的谴责和法律的制裁。根据历史纵向比较和国家间横向比较可知，所有这些措施，极大限制了自由民主国家的压迫能力。 要想取得反叛乱战争的胜利就非得残忍无情的观点，其对立面正是近代自由民主宣传中所认定的 “赢得民心”。诚然，施以恩惠、与之合作，展现出令人愉悦的“软实力”，至少赢得被征服社会精英阶层的民心，是帝国“绥靖”政策的中心环节。然而，天鹅绒手套总是罩着一只铁拳，当机立断粉碎本地抵抗，毫无疑问依然是异国统治的终极手段。“赢得民心”确实已成为维持外国社会和平的脆弱而昂贵的指导方针，但那只是因为，自由民主国家实际上已经丧失了武力碾压这些社会的能力。 尽管存在无可辩驳的残忍行为以及政策错误，民主国家的反叛乱战争史依然可以算作其高贵品行的明证。对别国的人道主义干涉同样不可避免地会遭遇上述棘手问题，这的确在一定程度上阻挠了这些干涉。而且，对外干涉逐渐增多，也是为了应对笼罩在战争减少大势上的另一团阴影——非传统恐怖主义。 2001年9月11日，美国遭受大规模恐怖袭击，这起事件成为划时代的界标，并非由于恐怖活动本身，而是一个可怕的征兆，预示着一个晦暗的未来。那就是非传统恐怖主义采用大规模杀伤性武器带来的威胁：核武器、生物武器，以及化学武器。其中，化学武器威胁最小，再成功不过的化学武器顶多杀伤数千人。生物武器的杀伤力要大几个数量级。 基因解码和生物技术方面革命性的突破，大大提升了生物武器的杀伤力和易用性。实验室培育的一株剧毒的细菌或病毒就能够造成与核弹相当的伤亡，更不用说经过特殊选育、尚未出现免疫的超级细菌了，而恐怖分子要搞到这些生物武器远比核弹容易。幸运的是，相对于化学武器和生物武器，恐怖分子无法生产核武器。当然，他们可能从那些能够生产核武器的国家获得。 这个问题的根源在于，原本属于国家级别的大规模杀伤性武器的技术和原料向下流动。核技术流入低安全标准、高度腐败的国家带来的最严峻风险就是与日俱增的泄密危机。迄今为止最著名的案例，就是阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗（Abdul Qadeer Khan），这位掌舵巴基斯坦核弹项目的负责人把核武器秘密卖给了大概十多个国家。 而且，世界上不发达不稳定的地区也有可能陷入分裂和无政府状态。一旦国家政府崩溃，无政府状态取而代之，谁能确保这个国家的核武库安全无虞？这方面，巴基斯坦再次成为一个值得再三讨论的案例。其实，前核武器超级大国苏联的崩溃就是未来威胁的典型模式。出于上述诸多原因，恐怖分子购买、偷窃、抢劫，甚至制造大规模杀伤性武器的能力已经大幅增加了。 007这种类型小说里老生常谈的威胁世界的个人和组织，突然一下子变成了现实。今天这个时代，无需变得强大就可以给世界重重一击。核武器的威慑作用就是基于确保相互摧毁，而这对恐怖分子而言毫无意义，正是他们，而非国家政权，更乐于使用终极武器。与超级大国在冷战中形成的规范不同，恐怖分子所获得的非传统能力非常实用。一旦存在可能，就很难看到什么东西会制止这种事在某时某地变成实实在在的威胁，尤其对于生物技术，潜力确实存在，并且正在逐渐扩大。 这是一个盘根错节的问题，不存在简洁明快的解决方案。防止核扩张，追剿恐怖分子的国际合作至关重要，但是很多国家要么主动抵制，要么作壁上观。外界军事干预极具争议，充满种种困难。一旦这样的事情发生【编注：从上下文看，似乎是指核扩散这件事】，对核武装的伊朗进行军事打击，就成了以色列或美国手中可以打出的一张牌，进而有可能演变成一场涉及世界主要力量的战争。 防御策略基本与先发制人一样问题丛生，对民主国家尤甚。对嫌疑犯的超期羁押意味着异乎寻常的法律程序，繁杂善后处理方法，对民众的监视监听，和其他侵犯隐私的行为，这正是民主国家舆论热火朝天讨论的、法庭上唇枪舌战的话题。涉及反恐战争的进攻和防御两方面议题时，讨论便带有了苦涩的意识形态和义愤色彩。然而，非传统恐怖主义的威胁是真实存在的，也将长期存在，此事绝难善罢甘休。 我们无疑正在经历史上最和平的时代，这是充满喜悦且有着深厚基础的和平大潮。然而，至少自1945年以来，现在是最危险的时代，因为人类第一次具有彻底摧毁自身的能力，即使个人和小团体也能够制造大规模的伤亡，毫无疑问。 众所周知，只要不和未来进行对照，预测就很准。即使最为基础的历史趋势，也会随时间改变方向，产生不同寻常的相互作用。只有时间才能告诉我们答案。我们只能希望，尽管小有起伏，整体趋势依然是确保并且深化我们这个时代的和平。虽然海里的鲸鱼们可能会反对，我们还是希望整个世界都能更像挪威一样。 （编辑：@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Iran and Saudi Arabia's cold war is making the Middle East even more dangerous 伊朗和沙特的冷战让中东局势变得愈加危险 作者：Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-3-30 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说） 来源：Vox，http://www.vox.com/2015/3/30/8314513/saudi-arabia-iran

2014年一次阅兵中的沙特特种警察

Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, was incensed enough over what was happening in Syria that in a 2013 press conference alongside Secretary of State John Kerry he declared, "I consider Syria an occupied land." 沙特外交大臣Saud al-Faisal亲王【译注：已于此文发表后不久辞职】对叙利亚局势感到异常愤怒，在2013年与美国国务卿约翰·克里共同出席一次新闻发布会时，他甚至宣称：“我认为叙利亚已经被占领了。” The occupier, he said, was Iran, which had sent military forces to fight alongside of those of besieged Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. 他说，占领者就是伊朗，当时伊朗已经派出军队与被反政府武装围困的叙利亚领导人巴沙尔·阿萨德并肩作战。 "How can a neighboring country that’s supposed to uphold good relationships get involved in a civil war and help one side over the other?" he asked. “一个本该与邻国维持良好关系的国家，怎么能卷入一场邻国的内战，并在其中帮助一方与另一方作战呢？”他问道。 It's amazing Prince Saud managed to ask his question with straight face. Saudi Arabia was also taking sides, providing large numbers of weapons to rebels in Syria, some of them Islamist extremists who have contributed to the conflict's downward spiral. 但Saud亲王能如此理直气壮地问出这个问题本身也很令人惊讶。沙特阿拉伯同样在叙利亚内战中有着鲜明的立场，他们向叙利亚反政府武装提供了大量武器，而这些反政府武装中有一部分是伊斯兰极端分子，他们是将冲突引入恶性循环的重要推手。 Syria had become more than just a civil war: it was a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which were escalating the war in their effort to combat each other. 叙利亚所经历的动荡已经不只是一场内战，它成为了伊朗和沙特之间的一场代理人冲突，在与对方的较量中，双方都不断地将战争升级。 Over the past decade, the Saudis and Iranians have supported opposing political parties, funded opposing armies, and directly waged war against one another's proxies in Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. While they did not create the crises in those places, they have exacerbated them considerably. 在过去十年间，沙特和伊朗在黎巴嫩、巴林、伊拉克、叙利亚和也门这些国家分别支持着相互对立的政党，为对立的武装提供资金，并且直接操纵代理人向对方的代理人发动战争。虽然这些国家的危机并不是他们直接造成的，但他们却大大地加深了这些危机的严重程度。 Driven by power politics, and fueled by Sunni-Shia sectarianism, the conflict between the two powers — often called the Middle East's cold war — has become one of the most dangerous elements defining Middle Eastern politics today. 在强权政治的驱动下，加上逊尼派与什叶派之间的教派斗争，伊朗和沙特这两个中东大国之间的冲突——通常被人们称为“中东冷战”——已经成为主导当今中东地区政治局势的最危险因素之一。 As the 2003 Iraq invasion and the uprisings of the Arab Spring have upended status quos across the region, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have rushed in to shape events to their benefit — often at the cost of worsening instability and violence. The more the Iranian-Saudi rivalry escalates, the worse the region is likely to get. 在2003年美国入侵伊拉克和“阿拉伯之春”的动乱打破中东地区原有秩序之后，沙特和伊朗都在努力试图根据自身利益塑造地区事务——而代价通常是让该地区变得更加不稳定，让暴力活动加剧。伊朗和沙特的敌对关系越是升级，中东地区的状况就可能变得越糟糕。 Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting for supremacy of the Middle East 伊朗和沙特争夺中东地区霸权

1979年，德黑兰，一位支持革命的妇女

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, at its core, a competition going back years for power and dominance across the Middle East. 沙特和伊朗之间敌对的核心是双方多年以来对整个中东地区政治权力和主导权的争夺。 "The new Middle East cold war predates the Arab Spring by at least half a decade, but increased Iranian influence in the Arab world dates back even longer," F. Gregory Gause III, a professor of international affairs at Texas A&M, writes. “这场新的‘中东冷战’在‘阿拉伯之春’开始之前已经持续了至少5年，而伊朗在阿拉伯世界的影响力上升则可追溯到更早以前，”德克萨斯A&M大学的国际关系教授F. Gregory Gause III 写道。 After Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, the new Islamic Republic established an aggressive foreign policy of exporting the Iranian revolution, attempting to foment Iran-style theocratic uprisings around the Middle East. That was a threat to Saudi Arabia's heavy influence in the Middle East, and perhaps to the Saudi monarchy itself. 在1979年伊朗的伊斯兰革命推翻了亲西方的国王之后，新建立的伊朗伊斯兰共和国制定了一项旨在输出伊朗革命的激进外交政策，他们试图在整个中东地区煽动伊朗式的神权起义。这对于沙特阿拉伯长期以来在中东地区建立的巨大影响力是一个严重威胁，甚至威及沙特王室本身。 "The fall of the shah and the establishment of the militant Islamic Republic of [founding leader] Ruhollah Khomeini came as a particularly rude shock to the Saudi leadership," University of Virginia's William Quandt writes. It "brought to power a man who had explicitly argued that Islam and hereditary kingship were incompatible, a threatening message, to say the least, in [the Saudi capital of] Riyadh." In response, Saudi Arabia and other ultra-conservative Gulf monarchies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an organization initially designed to counter and contain Iranian influence. “伊朗国王的垮台和鲁霍拉·霍梅尼建立的好战的伊斯兰共和国对沙特在中东的领导地位造成了非常猛烈的冲击，”弗吉尼亚大学教授William Quandt写道。“一个明确主张伊斯兰教义与世袭君主制不相容的人获得了权力，对利雅得（沙特首都）来说，这至少是一个威胁的信号。”作为回应，沙特和其他极端保守的海湾地区君主创立了海湾合作委员会（GCC），该组织设立的初衷就是反击和遏制伊朗的影响力。 Iran, weakened by the Iran-Iraq war, backed off of its more aggressive attempts to remake the Middle East in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the groundwork for conflict was already laid: Saudi Arabia and Iran had come to see each other as dangerous threats. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as bent on overturning a Middle Eastern political order that's quite friendly to Saudi interests; the Iranians believe the Saudis are actively attempting to keep Iran weak and vulnerable. 由于在两伊战争中实力受到削弱，在上世纪80年代末90年代初，伊朗有所收敛，不再过分激进地试图重塑中东。但是冲突的根基已经埋下：沙特和伊朗开始将对方视作非常危险的威胁。沙特认为伊朗一心想要推翻对于自身利益非常友好的中东政治秩序；而伊朗则相信沙特一直在很积极地试图削弱伊朗，让伊朗变得脆弱。 This creates what political scientists call a security dilemma: one side, fearing attack, ramps up defense spending or supports a regional proxy in order to guard against a perceived threat. The other side sees that as threatening — what if they're planning to attack? — and feels compelled to respond in kind. 这就造成了一种被政治科学家们称作“安全困境”的局面：困境中的一方害怕受到攻击，通过增加国防支出或者支持区域性代理人来防范自身感知到的威胁；而另一方则将对方的这种行为视作对己方的一种威胁——如果它们是在准备向我们发动攻击呢？——同时觉得自己不得不对此做出针锋相对的反应。 This creates a self-sustaining cycle in which both countries to take actions that are designed to make their country more secure, but end up scaring the other side and thus raising both the chances and the potential severity of conflict. 这就造成了一种自我维持的循环，双方都在采取一些旨在让自己国家变得更加安全的措施，但结果则是让对方感到更加不安，这最终让冲突发生的几率以及冲突的烈度都大大上升了。 "It's what the US and the Soviet Union were involved in" during the Cold War, Daniel Serwer, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, explains. “这就是美国和苏联在冷战中所卷入的局面”，约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际问题研究院教授Daniel Serwer解释道。 Serwer believes the security dilemma "is what really brings us to this point." The Saudis and Iranians see regional power in zero-sum terms: the more powerful Iran is, the more vulnerable the Saudis feel. And, again, vice versa: "The rationale [the Iranians] give themselves is very heavily defensive," he says. Serwer教授相信，正是安全困境“将伊朗和沙特之间的关系带到了今天的局面”。沙特和伊朗都以一种零和的视角看待地区权力：伊朗越强大，沙特就会觉得自己越脆弱，反之亦然。“伊朗人给自己（对沙特采取敌对态度）的理由中有很大一部分都是出于自卫，”他说道。 That's why proxy struggles in countries such as Syria and Yemen start to seem so important: Saudi Arabia sees Iran backing the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and believes it's an initial step toward not just creating chaos in Yemen but overturning the entire regional order that is so important to Saudi Arabia's security. 这也是为何两国在叙利亚和也门这些国家通过代理人展开的争夺开始显得如此重要的原因：沙特认为伊朗在背后支持也门的胡塞叛军，并相信伊朗的目的并不只是为了在也门制造混乱，这仅仅是伊朗为推翻对沙特的安全至关重要的地区秩序所采取的第一步。 Iran, meanwhile, sees Saudi Arabia arming anti-Assad rebels in Syria and believes the Saudis want to deprive Tehran of an important ally, with the ultimate goal of isolating Iran and surrounding it with hostile regimes. 同时伊朗则认为沙特武装了叙利亚国内的反阿萨德叛军，并相信沙特想要除掉德黑兰的一个重要盟友，其最终目的则是将伊朗孤立起来，让伊朗处于敌对政权的包围之中。 Neither wants the other to gain in influence, so they intervene and counter-intervene. For both, the stakes seem high, so they respond with measures that feel appropriately severe to them: for Saudi Arabia, bombing Yemen's Houthi rebels and threatening to invade; for Iran, sending more troops and military advisers to Syria. This ends up escalating both conflicts further, heightening the mutual fears and, of course, increasing the suffering of Yemenis and Syrians. 双方都不希望对方获得更大的影响力，所以他们不断地采取干预和反干预的措施。对双方而言，其中牵涉到重大的利益，所以对于对方的行为，他们都采取了自己认为“适度激烈”的应对措施：沙特轰炸了也门的胡塞叛军，并以入侵相威胁；而伊朗则向叙利亚派出了更多的部队和军事顾问。最终这些措施让双方的冲突不断升级，同时也让双方的不安全感不断加深，当然，同时也加深了也门和叙利亚人民所遭受的苦难。 The Iraq War and the Arab Spring set the stage for today's proxy conflict 伊拉克战争和“阿拉伯之春”为双方当前的代理人冲突埋下了伏笔

伊拉克军队战士，正在美军支持下清扫巴格达由什叶派武装控制的区域，2008年

During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry was fairly quiet. According to both Gause and Serwer, that's because Iran's opportunities to challenge the Saudi-led political order were fairly limited. Tehran was just too focused on the threat from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. 在1990年代和2000年代初，沙特和伊朗之间的敌对关系曾一度相对平静。Gause和Serwer教授都认为，这是因为当时伊朗挑战沙特主导的地区政治秩序的机会非常有限。德黑兰当时的注意力主要放在了伊拉克领导人萨达姆·侯赛因的威胁之上。 Then the US led the 2003 Iraq invasion that toppled Saddam and changed everything. Iran saw an opportunity to strengthen reliable, pro-Iran Shia militant groups (Iraq is majority Shia) and to replace Saddam with a friendlier Shia-led regime — which is exactly what happened. 之后美国在2003年入侵伊拉克，并推翻了萨达姆政权，这改变了一切。伊朗看到了一个机会，加强可靠的亲伊朗什叶派激进团体（伊拉克人口中什叶派占多数）的实力，用一个对自己更友好的由什叶派主导的政权取代萨达姆。这正是随后发生的事情。 "Until the American invasion of Iraq," Serwer says, "the door wasn't really open [for Iran to challenge the regional order], except in limited ways like supporting Hezbollah and Hamas. Serwer教授表示：“直到美国入侵伊拉克之前，除了支持黎巴嫩真主党和哈马斯这些有限的方式之外，伊朗挑战地区秩序的大门并未真正打开。” "What the United States did in Iraq, by opening the door to the Shia majority, is part of the story for the Saudis." “美国在伊拉克所做的一切，为占伊拉克人口多数的什叶派打开了大门，而且也是沙特不得不面临当前局面的部分原因。” Then the Arab Spring, by toppling governments or inspiring uprisings throughout the region, created a whole new set of openings in which Iran could seek to expand its influence — and Saudi Arabia would struggle to maintain the status quo. When a Saudi-friendly regime was threatened, the Iranians supported the opposition while the Saudis tried to prop them up. When it was an Iranian ally on the brink of collapse, Saudi Arabia tried to push it over the edge while Iran tried to pull it back. 随后到来的“阿拉伯之春”则通过在整个中东地区推翻现有政权或煽动起义的方式，为伊朗在地区内扩大自己的影响力创造了一系列新的机会，而沙特则要力争维持现状。当亲沙特的政权受到威胁时，伊朗人就会支持反对派，而沙特则努力维持现政权的统治。而当伊朗的盟友到了悬崖边上，沙特会努力把他推下去，而伊朗则努力把他拉上来。 In Syria, Saudi Arabia funded and supplied the rebels fighting Iran's ally Bashar al-Assad; Iran sent troops into the country to defend the government and showered Assad with military aid. 在叙利亚，沙特为那些与伊朗盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德作战的叛军提供资金和补给；而伊朗则派部队进入叙利亚保护阿萨德政府，并为他提供大量军事援助。 In Bahrain, the country's Shia majority staged pro-democracy protests against the Sunni monarchy; Saudi Arabia, fearing Iranian influence, sent in soldiers to crush the protests. 在巴林，占全国人口多数的什叶派发起了反对逊尼派君主统治的亲民主抗议，出于对伊朗影响的担忧，沙特派军队进入巴林镇压抗议活动。 In Yemen, Iran stepped up its financial and military aid for the Houthi rebels; after the rebels seized the capital Sanaa in early 2015 and began moving to take the rest of it, Saudi Arabia launched a bombing campaign to stop them. 在也门，伊朗不断增加对胡塞叛军的财力和军事援助；而当叛军在2015年初占领了也门首都萨那，并试图进一步占领也门其它地区时，沙特对他们发动了轰炸袭击以阻止他们。 "The retreat of the state made it possible for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states to play an increasing role in the civil conflicts of Lebanon (for some time), Iraq (since 2003), and Syria (since 2011)," Gause writes. "This is the core, bottom-up dynamic driving the new Middle East cold war." “当地政权力量的衰退，使伊朗、沙特阿拉伯和该地区其他一些国家得以在黎巴嫩（在某些时间段内）、伊拉克（自2003年开始）和叙利亚（自2011年开始）的国内冲突中扮演日趋重要的角色成为了可能，”Gause教授写道，“这才是核心：自下而上的对抗态势驱动着新中东冷战。” Though the conflict isn't driven by Sunni-Shia hatred, sectarianism makes it especially dangerous 虽然双方的冲突并非起于逊尼派和什叶派的仇恨，教派主义却让形势变得特别危险

一位叙利亚反叛者正在哀悼他死去的同志

Even though Iran is a Shia theocracy and Saudi Arabia is a Sunni theocracy of a different sort, their struggle isn't really motivated by religion or theology. 虽然伊朗是一个什叶派的神权政体，而沙特则是一个不同形式的逊尼派神权政体，他们之间的斗争却并不是由宗教或是神学原因导致的。 "I don't think the Saudis and Iranians are engaged in a sectarian war with each other; I think they're engaged in a balance of power conflict for regional influence," Gause told me in July. Gause教授7月份对我说：“我并不认为伊朗人和沙特人之间发生的是一场教派战争，我觉得实际上他们之间发生的是一场争夺地区影响力的事关权力平衡的冲突。” "But," he says, "they use sectarianism." In fact, the Saudi-Iranian struggle is a significant reason for why sectarianism has gotten as bad as it has in the Middle East. “但是，他们的确利用了教派主义。”他补充道。事实上，沙特和伊朗之间的斗争正是让教派主义问题在当前中东地区变得如此严重的一个显著原因。 Shared sectarian identities make political alliances easier. Sunni governments and rebels are more likely to turn to Saudi Arabia for help; same for Shia groups turning to Iran. And as conflicts go on, their sectarian cast tends to intensify — inviting Saudi and Iranian intervention, which further polarizes countries on sectarian lines. 共同的教派认同会让建立政治同盟变得更容易。逊尼派政府或叛军都更可能向沙特寻求支持，而同样地，对什叶派政府和叛军来说，他们更可能向伊朗寻求支持。而随着冲突持续，教派色彩也趋于强化——例如直接邀请沙特或是伊朗干预，而这种行为则进一步极化了国家间的教派阵线。 "The retreat of the state ... drove people in these countries to look to sectarian identities and groups for the protection and material sustenance that the state either could or would no longer provide," Gause writes. "As sectarianism increasingly defined their struggles, it was natural that they look to co-religionists — Iran for Shia and Saudi Arabia for Sunnis — for that support." “国家力量的衰退……促使这些国家的人民到教派认同和教派团体那里去寻求国家所不愿或无法提供的保护和物质支持，”Gause教授写道。“随着斗争中的教派主义色彩变得愈发浓烈，人们自然会向拥有相同宗派信仰的国家寻求支持——什叶派找伊朗，逊尼派则找沙特。” Take Syria, for example. The country's crisis began, in 2011, as a non-sectarian mass uprising against the Assad dictatorship. But the Assad regime, which is Alawite Shia and backed by Iran, very explicitly targeted Sunnis in an attempt to make the conflict sectarian and force Syria's Shia and Christian minorities to rally behind Assad. Saudi backing of Sunni militant groups helped intensify this sectarian divide, ironically playing into Assad's hands. 以叙利亚为例。叙利亚危机始于2011年，最初发端于一场反对阿萨德独裁统治的人民起义，没有教派性质。而阿萨德政权属于什叶派中的阿拉维派，得到了伊朗的支持。阿萨德政权非常鲜明地将矛头对准了逊尼派，试图将这场危机变成一场教派冲突，以逼迫叙利亚的什叶派和基督教少数族群支持阿萨德。沙特对叙利亚逊尼派激进团体的支持，则进一步加剧了这种教派分裂，而讽刺的是，这正中阿萨德下怀。 The danger of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry is that they'll replicate Syria's experience across the Middle East, by intervening and counter-intervening to support Sunni and Shia proxies. The longer this goes on, the more entrenched and violent the regional Sunni-Shia divide will become, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq — and who knows where could be next. 伊朗和沙特之间敌对关系的危险之处在于，他们会通过各种干预和反干预措施分别支持什叶派和逊尼派的代理人，在整个中东地区复制叙利亚的经历。而这种状态持续得越久，中东地区逊尼派和什叶派之间的分裂就会愈加根深蒂固，暴力冲突也会愈加剧烈，叙利亚如此，也门和伊拉克也是如此——天知道谁会是下一个。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers 专制强权的回归 作者：Azar Gat @ 2007-07-01 译者：sheperdmt（@-3co） 校对：Kyo(@tfny.kyo)，沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Foreign Affairs，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2007-07-01/return-authoritarian-great-powers THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY “历史终结”论的终结 【译注：《历史的终结》是美国学者弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）1989年发表的一篇文章，后又于1992年扩写成书。福山认为自由民主制是人类社会演化的终点。】 Today's global liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam -- and it is the lesser of the two challenges. Although the proponents of radical Islam find liberal democracy repugnant, and the movement is often described as the new fascist threat, the societies from which it arises are generally poor and stagnant. 当今全球自由民主秩序面临两大挑战。第一个是伊斯兰极端主义——它的威胁程度相对较小。尽管伊斯兰极端主义的支持者对自由民主制恨之入骨，而且经常有人将这一运动描绘为新法西斯式的威胁，但其生根发芽的社会大多穷困潦倒、停滞不前。 They represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world. It is mainly the potential use of weapons of mass destruction -- particularly by nonstate actors -- that makes militant Islam a menace. 它们既不代表通往现代社会的另一条可行道路，也无法对发达国家形成明显的军事威胁。对它们可能会使用大规模杀伤性武器的担忧——尤其是在非国家行动者手中——才让伊斯兰武装算得上一个威胁。 The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback. 第二个也是更为显著的挑战，来自崛起中的非民主强权：西方世界的冷战老对手，中国与俄罗斯，它们正处于专制资本主义，而非共产主义政权统治之下。直到1945年以前，专制资本主义强权国家曾在国际体系中占据主导地位，但自那以后便销声匿迹。今天，它们似乎已准备好东山再起。 Capitalism's ascendancy appears to be deeply entrenched, but the current predominance of democracy could be far less secure. Capitalism has expanded relentlessly since early modernity, its lower-priced goods and superior economic power eroding and transforming all other socioeconomic regimes, a process most memorably described by Karl Marx in The Communist Manifesto. 资本主义的优势看来牢不可破，而民主制度目前所拥有的主导地位，却远不如前者那样安枕无忧。从现代早期开始，资本主义便所向披靡，其廉价商品和优势经济力量腐蚀并改变了其他一切社会经济制度，对此过程，马克思在《共产党宣言》里有过最令人难忘的记述。 Contrary to Marx's expectations, capitalism had the same effect on communism, eventually "burying" it without the proverbial shot being fired. 然而与马克思的期望截然相反，资本主义对共产主义产生了同样的作用，最终“不费一枪一炮”便将后者“埋葬”了。【译注：英语世界流传赫鲁晓夫的一句名言：“我们将不费一枪一炮将你们埋葬。”（We will bury you without firing a shot.）然而这句话的真实来源存疑】 The triumph of the market, precipitating and reinforced by the industrial-technological revolution, led to the rise of the middle class, intensive urbanization, the spread of education, the emergence of mass society, and ever greater affluence. 市场的胜利加速并强化了工业技术革命，也反过来从中得到力量，带来了中产阶级崛起、急剧的城镇化、教育普及、大众社会兴起，以及前所未有的富裕。 In the post-Cold War era (just as in the nineteenth century and the 1950s and 1960s), it is widely believed that liberal democracy naturally emerged from these developments, a view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama. 在后冷战时代（正如19世纪及1950、1960年代一样），人们普遍认同自由民主制是上述发展的自然结果，这一观点最著名的支持者是弗朗西斯·福山。 Today, more than half of the world's states have elected governments, and close to half have sufficiently entrenched liberal rights to be considered fully free. 如今，世界上有超过一半的国家拥有民选政府，还有接近一半的国家拥有牢固的自由权利，因而足以被视为充分自由的。 But the reasons for the triumph of democracy, especially over its nondemocratic capitalist rivals of the two world wars, Germany and Japan, were more contingent than is usually assumed. 但民主究竟是如何获胜的，尤其是如何在两次世界大战中获胜，如何战胜了非民主的资本主义对手德国和日本，其原因要比普遍认为的更具偶然性。 Authoritarian capitalist states, today exemplified by China and Russia, may represent a viable alternative path to modernity, which in turn suggests that there is nothing inevitable about liberal democracy's ultimate victory -- or future dominance. 今天，以中国和俄罗斯为代表的专制资本主义国家，或许提供了另一条通往现代社会的可行路径，而这反过来说明，自由民主制的最终胜利，或者说未来的主导地位，并非必然之事。 CHRONICLE OF A DEFEAT NOT FORETOLD 实录：无人预见的胜利 The liberal democratic camp defeated its authoritarian, fascist, and communist rivals alike in all of the three major great-power struggles of the twentieth century -- the two world wars and the Cold War. In trying to determine exactly what accounted for this decisive outcome, it is tempting to trace it to the special traits and intrinsic advantages of liberal democracy. 在20世纪的三次主要强权争锋——两次世界大战和冷战——中，自由民主阵营将其对手——专制主义、法西斯主义和共产主义——逐一击败。要确定究竟是哪些因素导致了这一决定性结局，我们很难不从自由民主制的诸多特点和内在优势开始追溯。 One possible advantage is democracies' international conduct. Perhaps they more than compensate for carrying a lighter stick abroad with a greater ability to elicit international cooperation through the bonds and discipline of the global market system. 民主国家的优势之一可能来自其国际表现。或许，借助全球市场体系中建立的种种纽带及互律准则，它们获得了引导国际合作的强大力量，足以补偿了其海外军事力量上的劣势。【译注：原文carrying a lighter stick语出老罗斯福的巨棒外交：“温言在口，大棒在手。”其中大棒指代军事实力。】 This explanation is probably correct for the Cold War, when a greatly expanded global economy was dominated by the democratic powers, but it does not apply to the two world wars. Nor is it true that liberal democracies succeed because they always cling together. 这一解释似乎适用于冷战，正是在冷战期间，民主强国主导了大幅扩张的全球经济；但它没法解释两次大战。另一种解释也难以成立：自由民主国家的成功源于它们之间的紧密团结。 Again, this was true, at least as a contributing factor, during the Cold War, when the democratic capitalist camp kept its unity, whereas growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and China pulled the communist bloc apart. 同样，后一解释适用于冷战，至少这是影响因素之一，因为在冷战期间，资本主义民主阵营始终团结一致，而共产主义联盟却因中苏之间日渐增长的敌意而破裂。 During World War I, however, the ideological divide between the two sides was much less clear. The Anglo-French alliance was far from preordained; it was above all a function of balance-of-power calculations rather than liberal cooperation. At the close of the nineteenth century, power politics had brought the United Kingdom and France, bitterly antagonistic countries, to the brink of war and prompted the United Kingdom to actively seek an alliance with Germany. 然而反观一战，战争双方的意识形态分歧却模糊得多。英法协约的签署远非注定；它首先是基于对力量均衡的算计而得出的权宜之计，而非出于共同自由理念所达成的合作。19世纪末，强权政治曾将敌意颇深的英法两国带到战争边缘，致使英国积极寻求与德国结盟。 Liberal Italy's break from the Triple Alliance and joining of the Entente, despite its rivalry with France, was a function of the Anglo-French alliance, as Italy's peninsular location made it hazardous for the country to be on a side opposed to the leading maritime power of the time, the United Kingdom. 自由主义的意大利退出三国同盟，不顾与法国的敌对关系转投协约国阵营，乃是英法结盟的结果。因为意大利身处半岛，与当时的海上第一强国英国抗衡有害无益。 Similarly, during World War II, France was quickly defeated and taken out of the Allies' side (which was to include nondemocratic Soviet Russia), whereas the right-wing totalitarian powers fought on the same side. 类似的，二战中法国迅速战败，就此脱离同盟国（之后非民主国家苏联加入），反倒是右翼极权主义强权全在同一战壕之内。 Studies of democracies' alliance behavior suggest that democratic regimes show no greater tendency to stick together than other types of regimes. Nor did the totalitarian capitalist regimes lose World War II because their democratic opponents held a moral high ground that inspired greater exertion from their people, as the historian Richard Overy and others have claimed. 对民主国家结盟行为的研究显示，民主政体并不比其他类型的政体更倾向团结合作。极权资本主义政权在二战中失败，也不是历史学家理查德·奥弗里（Richard Overy）等人所说的那样，是因为民主国家占据了道德高地，因而能在其人民中间鼓舞动员起更多力量。 During the 1930s and early 1940s, fascism and Nazism were exciting new ideologies that generated massive popular enthusiasm, whereas democracy stood on the ideological defensive, appearing old and dispirited. If anything, the fascist regimes proved more inspiring in wartime than their democratic adversaries, and the battlefield performance of their militaries is widely judged to have been superior. 在20世纪30和40年代早期，法西斯和纳粹思想都是激动人心的新型意识形态，激起了大范围的民众热情，而民主国家则在意识形态上处于守势，面目苍老毫无生气。两者差别恰恰是，法西斯政权在战时比它们的民主敌人更能鼓舞人心，其军队的战场表现也被公认为更加优秀。 Liberal democracy's supposedly inherent economic advantage is also far less clear than is often assumed. All of the belligerents in the twentieth century's great struggles proved highly effective in producing for war. During World War I, semiautocratic Germany committed its resources as effectively as its democratic rivals did. 人们认为自由民主制天生具有经济优势，其实这一点远不如想象中明显。20世纪的几次对抗已经证明，所有交战国都有极强的军事生产能力。一战期间，半独裁的德国可以与其民主对手同样有效地调配资源。 After early victories in World War II, Nazi Germany's economic mobilization and military production proved lax during the critical years 1940-42. Well positioned at the time to fundamentally alter the global balance of power by destroying the Soviet Union and straddling all of continental Europe, Germany failed because its armed forces were meagerly supplied for the task. 在取得最初胜利之后，纳粹德国却在至关紧要的1940至1942年间，经历了经济动员和军事生产上的松懈。当德国已做好准备消灭苏联，彻底打破世界均势、横扫欧洲大陆之际，却因部队供给不足而遭致失败。 The reasons for this deficiency remain a matter of historical debate, but one of the problems was the existence of competing centers of authority in the Nazi system, in which Hitler's "divide and rule" tactics and party functionaries' jealous guarding of their assigned domains had a chaotic effect. 虽然供给短缺的原因至今仍是历史争论的主题，但一个已知的问题是，纳粹党内存在相互争权夺利的多个权力中心。希特勒的“分而治之”策略，以及党务官员对各自职权领地的精心守护，都加剧了其内部混乱。 Furthermore, from the fall of France in June 1940 to the German setback before Moscow in December 1941, there was a widespread feeling in Germany that the war had practically been won. All the same, from 1942 onward (by which time it was too late), Germany greatly intensified its economic mobilization and caught up with and even surpassed the liberal democracies in terms of the share of GDP devoted to the war (although its production volume remained much lower than that of the massive U.S. economy). Likewise, levels of economic mobilization in imperial Japan and the Soviet Union exceeded those of the United States and the United Kingdom thanks to ruthless efforts. 另外，从1940年6月法国沦陷，到1941年12月德军受阻于莫斯科期间，德国全国上下充溢着战争实际已经胜利的情绪。尽管如此，从1942年开始（为时已晚），德国大幅加强了自己的经济动员能力，在军费占GDP的比例上追赶甚至超越了各民主国家（尽管与规模庞大的美国经济相比，其产量仍然十分低下）。相似的情形也发生在日本帝国和苏联，经过残酷努力，两国经济动员水平超越了美国和英国。 Only during the Cold War did the Soviet command economy exhibit deepening structural weaknesses -- weaknesses that were directly responsible for the Soviet Union's downfall. The Soviet system had successfully generated the early and intermediate stages of industrialization (albeit at a frightful human cost) and excelled at the regimentalized techniques of mass production during World War II. 只有在冷战期间，苏联的指令经济体系才显现出不断加深的结构性缺陷——这类缺陷是苏联覆灭的直接原因。苏维埃体系成功到达了工业化的早期和中期阶段（尽管为此付出了可怕的人员代价），并在二战期间出色实现了整编有方的大规模生产。 It also kept abreast militarily during the Cold War. But because of the system's rigidity and lack of incentives, it proved ill equipped to cope with the advanced stages of development and the demands of the information age and globalization. 即使在冷战期间，它的军事建设也并不曾落后。但因为它僵硬死板、缺乏激励，在高级的发展阶段，以及信息时代和全球化的要求面前，这一体系装备不良，无力应对。 There is no reason, however, to suppose that the totalitarian capitalist regimes of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan would have proved inferior economically to the democracies had they survived. The inefficiencies that favoritism and unaccountability typically create in such regimes might have been offset by higher levels of social discipline. 但我们也没有证据认为，如果纳粹德国和日本帝国的极权资本主义政权延续至今，它们的经济实力会逊于民主国家。这样的政权往往徇私泛滥，缺乏监察问责，造成效率低下，但这可以被更高水平的社会纪律所抵消。 Because of their more efficient capitalist economies, the right-wing totalitarian powers could have constituted a more viable challenge to the liberal democracies than the Soviet Union did; Nazi Germany was judged to be such a challenge by the Allied powers before and during World War II. The liberal democracies did not possess an inherent advantage over Germany in terms of economic and technological development, as they did in relation to their other great-power rivals. 由于接纳了更为有效的资本主义经济，比起苏联，这些右翼极权主义强权有可能对自由民主国家构成更有力的挑战；二战结束之前，同盟国就曾如此看待纳粹德国。自由民主制相比其他强权，在经济和技术发展上体现出的内在优势，与德国相比却并不存在。 So why did the democracies win the great struggles of the twentieth century? The reasons are different for each type of adversary. They defeated their nondemocratic capitalist adversaries, Germany and Japan, in war because Germany and Japan were medium-sized countries with limited resource bases and they came up against the far superior -- but hardly preordained -- economic and military coalition of the democratic powers and Russia or the Soviet Union. 那么，究竟是什么原因，使得民主国家在20世纪的三场对抗中都取得了胜利呢？对不同类型的对手，答案不尽相同。战胜同样实行资本主义、但无民主的德国和日本，是因为这两个国家领土面积中等，资源基础有限，却要面对各民主强国及俄国（或苏联）结成的经济和军事联盟，其实力远超前者——尽管这次结盟只是机缘巧合。 The defeat of communism, however, had much more to do with structural factors. The capitalist camp -- which after 1945 expanded to include most of the developed world -- possessed much greater economic power than the communist bloc, and the inherent inefficiency of the communist economies prevented them from fully exploiting their vast resources and catching up to the West. 共产主义的失败则更多出于结构性因素。1945年后，资本主义阵营囊括了几乎所有发达国家，它们比起共产主义阵营拥有强大得多的经济实力，而共产主义经济固有的低效也妨碍了它们充分利用其丰富的资源，拖累了它们追赶西方的步伐。 Together, the Soviet Union and China were larger and thus had the potential to be more powerful than the democratic capitalist camp. Ultimately, they failed because their economic systems limited them, whereas the nondemocratic capitalist powers, Germany and Japan, were defeated because they were too small. Contingency played a decisive role in tipping the balance against the nondemocratic capitalist powers and in favor of the democracies. 苏联和中国加起来面积更大，因而其实力确有潜力超越资本主义民主阵营。中苏最终失败于其经济体系对自身的制约，而德日作为实行资本主义的非民主强权，却因为领土面积太小失败。在打破力量平衡，使天平向民主国家一边倾斜的过程中，偶然因素起了决定性的作用。 AMERICAN EXCEPTION 美国例外论 The most decisive element of contingency was the United States. After all, it was little more than a chance of history that the scion of Anglo-Saxon liberalism would sprout on the other side of the Atlantic, institutionalize its heritage with independence, expand across one of the most habitable and thinly populated territories in the world, feed off of massive immigration from Europe, and so create on a continental scale what was -- and still is -- by far the world's largest concentration of economic and military might. 最具决定性的偶然因素就是美国。盎格鲁-撒克逊自由主义的后裔在大西洋彼岸生根发芽，取得独立，并将自由主义的遗产加以制度化，在地球上最为宜居、同时人烟最稀的土地上纵横扩张，接纳来自欧洲的庞大移民，并在大陆级的规模上，集合起曾经是、现在仍然是全世界最强的经济和军事力量——这一切几乎全是出于历史的巧合。 A liberal regime and other structural traits had a lot to do with the United States' economic success, and even with its size, because of its attractiveness to immigrants. But the United States would scarcely have achieved such greatness had it not been located in a particularly advantageous and vast ecological-geographic niche, as the counterexamples of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand demonstrate. 美国经济的成功，应在很大程度上归功于其自由政体，以及其他结构性特点；甚至美国的规模也与此有关，因为自由主义能吸引大量移民。然而，如果不是位居这块生态和地理条件都极其优越、丰富的土地，美国不太可能取得如今的成就，加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰就是反例。 And location, of course, although crucial, was but one necessary condition among many for bringing about the giant and, indeed, United States as the paramount political fact of the twentieth century. Contingency was at least as responsible as liberalism for the United States' emergence in the New World and, hence, for its later ability to rescue the Old World. 地理位置确实十分关键，但造就美国这个巨人，造就这个20世纪最为重要的政治实体，所需的必要条件不可胜数，位置不过是其中之一。对于美国在新世界的崛起，以及后来出手挽救旧世界的过程，偶然因素发挥的作用至少并不少于自由主义。 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States' power consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. If any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. 整个20世纪，美国国力始终领先于世界，实力超过全球第二、三位的总和，因此全球均势的天平不可避免地滑向华盛顿所支持的那一边。如果要为民主阵营略占上风找一个原因，那首先是因为美国的加入，而非民主制度有什么内在优势。 In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the twentieth century. This is a sobering thought that is often overlooked in studies of the spread of democracy in the twentieth century, and it makes the world today appear much more contingent and tenuous than linear theories of development suggest. 事实上，如果没有美国，自由民主阵营很可能输掉20世纪的三次对抗。这个观点发人深省，却常常被有关20世纪民主扩张的研究所忽略。也正因此，和那些线性发展理论所设想的情况相比，今日世界之存在更像是巧合的产物，也更为脆弱。 If it were not for the U.S. factor, the judgment of later generations on liberal democracy would probably have echoed the negative verdict on democracy's performance, issued by the fourth-century-BC Greeks, in the wake of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. 如果没有美国这个因素，后世大概会给自由民主制以负面评价，就像公元前4世纪的希腊人评价败于斯巴达的雅典民主时一样。 THE NEW SECOND WORLD 新第二世界 But the audit of war is, of course, not the only one that societies -- democratic and nondemocratic -- undergo. One must ask how the totalitarian capitalist powers would have developed had they not been defeated by war. Would they, with time and further development, have shed their former identity and embraced liberal democracy, as the former communist regimes of eastern Europe eventually did? 然而对于各社会，无论民主与否，战争都不是唯一的考验。我们应该问一句：如果没有战败，这些极权资本主义国家将如何发展。是否，经过足够的时间和进一步的发展，它们会改头换面，接受自由民主，走上东欧各个前共产主义政权最终选择的道路吗？ Was the capitalist industrial state of imperial Germany before World War I ultimately moving toward increasing parliamentary control and democratization? Or would it have developed into an authoritarian oligarchic regime, dominated by an alliance between the officialdom, the armed forces, and industry, as imperial Japan did (in spite of the latter's liberal interlude in the 1920s)? 一战前的资本主义工业国家德意志帝国，会逐渐加强议会监察制度，继而走向民主吗？还是会像日本帝国一样，受官僚、军队和工业联合把控，变成一个专制主义的寡头政体（即便日本1920年代出现过短暂的自由期）？ Liberalization seems even more doubtful in the case of Nazi Germany had it survived, let alone triumphed. Because all these major historical experiments were cut short by war, the answers to these questions remain a matter of speculation. But perhaps the peacetime record of other authoritarian capitalist regimes since 1945 can offer a clue. 假如纳粹德国幸存了下来，其自由化（相比德意志帝国）的可能性则更渺茫，更别说假如它当初得胜了。战争切断了这些大型历史实验的进程，这些回答永远只能是想象。不过，还有一些专制资本主义国家延续到了1945年之后，它们在和平年代的表现可以提供一条线索。 Studies that cover this period show that democracies generally outdo other systems economically. Authoritarian capitalist regimes are at least as successful -- if not more so -- in the early stages of development, but they tend to democratize after crossing a certain threshold of economic and social development. This seems to have been a recurring pattern in East Asia, southern Europe, and Latin America. 关于这段时期的研究显示，民主政体的经济发展总体而言优于其它制度。在发展的早期阶段，专制资本主义国家也取得了至少不逊于民主国家的成就，但当经济和社会发展越过了某一特定水平，它们就有民主化的趋势。这一模式似乎在东亚、南欧及拉丁美洲反复出现过。 The attempt to draw conclusions about development patterns from these findings, however, may be misleading, because the sample set itself may be polluted. Since 1945, the enormous gravitational pull exerted by the United States and the liberal hegemony has bent patterns of development worldwide. 然而，试图从上述现象中得出任何有关发展模式的结论，可能会误入歧途，因为样本集合本身可能已被污染。自1945年起，美国及自由主义全球霸权所发挥的强大引力，已然影响了世界各国的发展轨迹。 Because the totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war, and these countries were subsequently threatened by Soviet power, they lent themselves to a sweeping restructuring and democratization. 极权资本主义的德日两国被战争击垮，接着又受到苏联霸权威胁，因而走上了彻底的重构和民主化之路。 Consequently, smaller countries that chose capitalism over communism had no rival political and economic model to emulate and no powerful international players to turn to other than the liberal democratic camp. These small and medium-sized countries' eventual democratization probably had as much to do with the overwhelming influence of the Western liberal hegemony as with internal processes. 结果，同属资本主义而非共产主义阵营的小国，没有其他对立的政经体制可以效仿，除了自由民主制，他们在国际舞台上也找不到可以投靠的其它选手。这些中小型国家最终走向民主化，内在发展恐怕只占一半的原因，另有一半则应是西方自由霸权的压倒性影响。 Presently, Singapore is the only example of a country with a truly developed economy that still maintains a semiauthoritarian regime, and even it is likely to change under the influence of the liberal order within which it operates. But are Singapore-like great powers that prove resistant to the influence of this order possible? 当前，经济真正发达同时仍保留半专制主义政权的例子，只有新加坡一个，但即使是新加坡，也可能因为受到它运行于其中的自由秩序之影响而发生改变。但是，有可能存在一种能够对抗该秩序之影响的新加坡式强权大国吗？ The question is made relevant by the recent emergence of nondemocratic giants, above all formerly communist and booming authoritarian capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. 这个问题的意义随着近来非民主大国的兴起愈发明显。突出代表就是放弃共产主义，正在专制资本主义的统治下繁荣发展的中国。同样，俄国也从后共产时代的自由主义之中回归，并且随着经济实力的增长，显现出越来越多的专制主义特征。 Some believe that these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence, and outside influence. Alternatively, they may have enough weight to create a new nondemocratic but economically advanced Second World. They could establish a powerful authoritarian capitalist order that allies political elites, industrialists, and the military; that is nationalist in orientation; and that participates in the global economy on its own terms, as imperial Germany and imperial Japan did. 有人认为，经过内部发展、财富增长及外部影响的共同作用，此类国家可能最终接纳自由民主。或者，它们也可能有足够的实力，创造一个新的第二世界，不实行民主，却有高度发达的经济。它们可以集结政治精英、工业家和军队，建立一个强大的专制资本主义秩序；以民族主义为发展方向；并与帝国主义的德国、日本一样，按照他们自己设定的规则参与全球经济。 It is widely contended that economic and social development creates pressures for democratization that an authoritarian state structure cannot contain. There is also the view that "closed societies" may be able to excel in mass manufacturing but not in the advanced stages of the information economy. The jury on these issues is still out, because the data set is incomplete. 普遍认为，经济和社会发展不断创造趋向民主化的压力，会使专制国家的结构无法承受。还有观点认为，“封闭社会”可能擅长大规模生产，却会在信息经济的高级阶段落到下风。上述问题悬而未决，因为数据资料尚不完整。 Imperial and Nazi Germany stood at the forefront of the advanced scientific and manufacturing economies of their times, but some would argue that their success no longer applies because the information economy is much more diversified. Nondemocratic Singapore has a highly successful information economy, but Singapore is a city-state, not a big country. 德意志帝国和纳粹德国在它们的时代，先进科学和制造业经济都处于世界前列，但有人会说它们的成功无法复制，因为信息经济的细化程度深入得多。新加坡这个非民主国家有十分成功的信息经济，但它只是一座城邦，而非一个大国。 It will take a long time before China reaches the stage when the possibility of an authoritarian state with an advanced capitalist economy can be tested. All that can be said at the moment is that there is nothing in the historical record to suggest that a transition to democracy by today's authoritarian capitalist powers is inevitable, whereas there is a great deal to suggest that such powers have far greater economic and military potential than their communist predecessors did. 先进的资本主义经济能否在专制国家实现，只有等中国的发展到达那一阶段才能得知，而这还要很久。当下只能得出这样的结论：历史记载并未表明今天的专制资本主义大国必然会转向民主，倒是有足够证据说明这些大国有着远超其共产主义前辈的经济和军事潜力。 China and Russia represent a return of economically successful authoritarian capitalist powers, which have been absent since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, but they are much larger than the latter two countries ever were. Although Germany was only a medium-sized country uncomfortably squeezed at the center of Europe, it twice nearly broke out of its confines to become a true world power on account of its economic and military might. 1945年德日战败，经济上成功的专制资本主义一度消失过。现在，中俄两国代表了这股力量的回归，并有远超前两者的国家规模。尽管德国只是蜷缩在欧洲中心的一个中等国家，它却因其经济和军事力量之故，有两次几近于突破约束，成为真正的世界大国。 In 1941, Japan was still behind the leading great powers in terms of economic development, but its growth rate since 1913 had been the highest in the world. Ultimately, however, both Germany and Japan were too small -- in terms of population, resources, and potential -- to take on the United States. Present-day China, on the other hand, is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is experiencing spectacular economic growth. 1941年，日本的经济发展水平仍落后于领先强国，但它1913年以来的增长率一直保持世界第一。然而最终，无论从人口、资源还是潜力来说，德国和日本都太小了，无法与美国抗衡。与之相比，从人口上来说，现在的中国是国际舞台上最重量级的选手，正在经历惊人的经济增长。 By shifting from communism to capitalism, China has switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. As China rapidly narrows the economic gap with the developed world, the possibility looms that it will become a true authoritarian superpower. 经过从共产主义向资本主义的转变，中国形成了一种远更高效的专制主义。随着中国快速缩小着自己与发达国家间的经济差距，一个真正的超级专制大国也就离我们越来越近。 Even in its current bastions in the West, the liberal political and economic consensus is vulnerable to unforeseen developments, such as a crushing economic crisis that could disrupt the global trading system or a resurgence of ethnic strife in a Europe increasingly troubled by immigration and ethnic minorities. 即使在其当下的西方堡垒之内，自由主义的政治和经济共识在难以预见的发展面前也颇为脆弱，比如可能扰乱全球贸易体系的惨重经济危机，或随着移民不断涌入，少数族裔问题日渐突出，最终种族冲突在欧洲复兴。 Were the West to be hit by such upheavals, support for liberal democracy in Asia, Latin America, and Africa -- where adherence to that model is more recent, incomplete, and insecure -- could be shaken. A successful nondemocratic Second World could then be regarded by many as an attractive alternative to liberal democracy. 假如西方遭此剧变，亚洲、拉美和非洲各地的自由民主拥趸就会动摇（这些地区接受自由民主的时间十分晚近，也不够完备，因而更不稳固）。到那时，一个不实行民主然而经济上成功的第二世界，就会对许多国家形成诱惑，成为自由民主制之外的另一种选择。 MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 给民主一个安全世界 Although the rise of authoritarian capitalist great powers would not necessarily lead to a nondemocratic hegemony or a war, it might imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union's collapse will be short-lived and that a universal "democratic peace" is still far off. 专制资本主义超级大国的崛起，并不必然会催生一个非民主国家的世界霸权，也不一定导致战争；然而，这可能暗示着，自由民主制自苏联解体以来所享有的那种近乎完全的支配地位，可能不会长久，而全球范围内的“民主和平”仍将遥不可及。 The new authoritarian capitalist powers could become as deeply integrated into the world economy as imperial Germany and imperial Japan were and not choose to pursue autarky, as Nazi Germany and the communist bloc did. A great-power China may also be less revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were (although Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, is more likely to tend toward revisionism). 新的专制资本主义强国可能与德意志帝国、日本帝国一样，与世界经济紧密结为一体，而不会像纳粹德国和共产主义阵营那样追求自给自足。一个既已崛起的强大中国，可能不会像领土受限的德日一样奉行修正主义（但仍未从帝国失落的眩晕中恢复的俄国，更有可能向修正主义迈进）。 Still, Beijing, Moscow, and their future followers might well be on antagonistic terms with the democratic countries, with all the potential for suspicion, insecurity, and conflict that this entails -- while holding considerably more power than any of the democracies' past rivals ever did. 但是，北京、莫斯科以及它们未来的追随者极有可能站在民主国家的对立面，因此包含着发生猜忌、不安全和冲突的全部可能，同时它们还拥有民主阵营以往任何对手都不曾拥有过的强大实力。 So does the greater power potential of authoritarian capitalism mean that the transformation of the former communist great powers may ultimately prove to have been a negative development for global democracy? It is too early to tell. Economically, the liberalization of the former communist countries has given the global economy a tremendous boost, and there may be more in store. 那么，专制资本主义会成为更大强权的可能性，是否意味着那些前共产主义大国的转型最终将对全球民主产生负面作用？现在下结论还为时尚早。从经济上来说，前共产主义国家的自由化已极大地推动了全球经济，更不用说这一助力尚未充分释放。 But the possibility of a move toward protectionism by them in the future also needs to be taken into account -- and assiduously avoided. It was, after all, the prospect of growing protectionism in the world economy at the turn of the twentieth century and the protectionist bent of the 1930s that helped radicalize the nondemocratic capitalist powers of the time and precipitate both world wars. 但是，这些国家未来转向保护主义的可能性也应加以考虑，并且小心避免。毕竟，正是由于20世纪初对于世界经济中保护主义会不断增长的预期，以及1930年代的保护主义倾向，才使得当时的非民主资本主义强权趋向激进，并催生了两次世界大战。 On the positive side for the democracies, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire stripped Moscow of about half the resources it commanded during the Cold War, with eastern Europe absorbed by a greatly expanded democratic Europe. This is perhaps the most significant change in the global balance of power since the forced postwar democratic reorientation of Germany and Japan under U.S. tutelage. 从对民主国家有利的一面来看，，苏联及其帝国的解体使莫斯科失去了冷战中拥有的一半资源，东欧被规模大幅扩张的民主欧洲吸收同化。这大概是自德日两国受美国监管，强制进行战后民主转型以来，全球均势最为重要的变化。 Moreover, China may still eventually democratize, and Russia could reverse its drift away from democracy. If China and Russia do not become democratic, it will be critical that India remain so, both because of its vital role in balancing China and because of the model that it represents for other developing countries. 此外，中国最终仍有可能选择民主化道路，而俄国也可能会从偏离民主的轨道上修正回来。如果中俄最终没有转向民主，印度保持民主就显得意义重大，不仅因为印度扮演着平衡中国的重要角色，也因为他对其他发展中国家起着示范作用。 But the most important factor remains the United States. For all the criticism leveled against it, the United States -- and its alliance with Europe -- stands as the single most important hope for the future of liberal democracy. Despite its problems and weaknesses, the United States still commands a global position of strength and is likely to retain it even as the authoritarian capitalist powers grow. 然而，最重要的因素依旧是美国。面对一切针对美国的公开指责，美国及其与欧洲的结盟关系，仍然是自由民主在未来至为关键的希望。尽管存在诸多问题和弱点，美国仍然具有全球实力，即使专制资本主义强权发展壮大，美国仍不会轻易失去这一地位。 Not only are its GDP and productivity growth rate the highest in the developed world, but as an immigrant country with about one-fourth the population density of both the European Union and China and one-tenth of that of Japan and India, the United States still has considerable potential to grow -- both economically and in terms of population -- whereas those others are all experiencing aging and, ultimately, shrinking populations. 美国不仅有发达国家中最高的GDP和生产力增速，同时，作为一个移民国家，其人口密度仅为欧盟和中国的四分之一，日本和印度的十分之一，因此美国仍有相当可观的发展潜能——无论是就经济还是人口而言——相反，其他国家都在遭受老龄化的困扰，并且最终将面临人口缩减的问题。 China's economic growth rate is among the highest in the world, and given the country's huge population and still low levels of development, such growth harbors the most radical potential for change in global power relations. But even if China's superior growth rate persists and its GDP surpasses that of the United States by the 2020s, as is often forecast, China will still have just over one-third of the United States' wealth per capita and, hence, considerably less economic and military power. 中国的经济增长率居于世界前列，加上巨大的人口数量和目前较低的发展水平，这样的增长率之下潜藏着改变全球力量对比的巨大潜能。不过，即便中国能够保持如此高速的增长，能像普遍预测的那样，实现2020年之前GDP超越美国的目标，其人均财富也刚刚企及美国的三分之一，因此经济和军事实力仍旧相对较弱。 Closing that far more challenging gap with the developed world would take several more decades. Furthermore, GDP alone is known to be a poor measure of a country's power, and evoking it to celebrate China's ascendency is highly misleading. As it was during the twentieth century, the U.S. factor remains the greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the periphery of the international system. 弥补这个差距的任务极其艰巨，赶上发达国家还需花费好几十年。另外，众所周知，单独考察GDP不足以全面衡量一国国力，仅凭这一项来赞颂中国的支配地位十分具有误导性。如同20世纪的情形一样，要使自由民主制免于陷入守势，免于落得国际体系中脆弱的边缘位置，美国的存在仍是最大的保障。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The return of Authoritarian Capitalists 专制资本主义的归来 作者：Azar Gat @ 2007-6-14 译者：史祥莆（@史祥莆）    校对：Drunkplane（@Drunkplane-zny） 来源：The New York Times，http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/opinion/14iht-edgat.1.6137311.html Today's global liberal democratic order faces a significant challenge from the rise of nondemocratic great powers - the West's old Cold War rivals, China and Russia, now operating under "authoritarian capitalist" rather than Communist regimes. 今天，全球自由民主秩序面临着来自非民主强权崛起的巨大挑战——冷战中西方的老对手，中国和俄罗斯，如今处于专制资本主义而非共产主义政权控制之下。 The category is not new - authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. 专制资本主义国家并不是一个新类别——它们在1945年之前的国际体系中一直扮演着领导角色。 But they have been largely absent since then. The liberal democratic camp defeated its authoritarian, Fascist and Communist rivals alike in all of the three major great-power struggles of the 20th century - the two world wars and the Cold War. 但是在那之后他们就基本上消失了。自由民主阵营在20世纪的三次强权争锋（两次世界大战加上冷战）中战胜了其专制主义、法西斯主义和共产主义对手。 It is tempting to trace this outcome to the special traits and intrinsic advantages of liberal democracy. But the reasons for the liberal democracies' victories were different for each type of adversary. 人们很容易将这一结果追溯到自由民主的特性和内在优势。然而面对不同的对手，自由民主胜利的原因也是不同的。 The Soviet Union failed because its economic systems limited it. But the nondemocratic capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were defeated in war fundamentally because they were medium-sized countries with limited resource bases. 苏联是因为其经济体系的局限而失败的。但非民主资本主义强国德国和日本，却根本上是因为其屈居中等的国家面积和有限的资源而在战争中被打败。 Thus contingency, not inherent advantages of liberal democracy, played a decisive role in tipping the balance against the non-democratic capitalist powers and in favor of the democracies. 所以，在与非民主资本主义强国的对抗中起着打破平衡的决定性作用，从而使天平偏向民主一方的，是偶然因素而不是固有优势。 The most decisive element of contingency was the United States. 最关键的偶然因素是美国。 Because of its continental size, no less than its democratic-capitalist system, the power of the United States consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined throughout the 20th century, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. 因为美国有着与一个大陆相当的面积和民主资本主义体系，在整个20世纪，美国的力量总是比紧随其后最大的两个国家加起来还要大。这决定性地使全球力量平衡偏向了华盛顿所在的那一边。 So if any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the 20th century. 所以，如果说有什么因素给了自由民主优势，那么美国的存在高于一切内在优势。事实上，如果没有美国的存在，自由民主很可能已经在20世纪的大搏斗中失败。 This is a sobering thought that is often overlooked in studies of the spread of democracy in the 20th century, and it makes the world today appear much more contingent and tenuous than linear theories of development suggest. 这一发人深省的想法，在有关20世纪民主传播的研究中往往被忽视，并且它使得当今世界显得比线性发展理论所设想的更加偶然与脆弱。 This is especially true in light of the recent emergence of nondemocratic powers, above all booming, authoritarian, capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its post-Communist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. 这一观点在观察最近出现的非民主强国时尤其正确，其中最突出的是繁荣而又专制的资本主义中国。俄罗斯也正在从后共产主义的自由主义退出，并且在经济实力增强的同时表现出越来越多的专制特征。 Some believe these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence and outside influence. 一些人相信这些国家可以通过内部发展、财富的增加，以及外部影响的共同作用而最终成为自由民主国家。 Alternatively, they may have enough weight to create a new non-democratic but economically advanced Second World. They could establish a powerful authoritarian-capitalist order that allies political elites, industrialists and the military; that is nationalist in orientation; and that participates in the global economy on its own terms, as imperial Germany and imperial Japan did. 或者，他们可能有足够的实力来创造一个非民主却有着发达经济的新第二世界。他们可能建立一个联合了政治精英、企业家和军队的强大专制资本主义秩序；这将是民族主义取向的，他们会以自己的方式参与国际经济，就像曾经的德意志帝国和日本帝国那样。 By shifting from Communist command economy to capitalism, China and Russia have switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. Although the rise of these authoritarian capitalist great powers would not necessarily lead to a non-democratic hegemony or war, it might imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union's collapse will be short-lived and that a universal "democratic peace" is still far off. 通过从共产主义指令经济转向资本主义，中国和俄罗斯转向了一种远更高效的专制主义。尽管这些专制资本主义大国的崛起，未必会导致非民主霸权或者战争，但它可能意味着，苏联解体之后那种自由民主几乎完全主宰世界的局面是短暂的，而普遍的“民主和平”仍然遥远。 Beijing and Moscow and their future followers might well become antagonists of the democratic countries - with all the potential for insecurity and conflict that this entails- while holding considerably more power than any of the democracies' past rivals ever did by virtue of being both large and capitalist. 北京、莫斯科和他们未来的追随者可能成为民主国家的对手——连同它必定携带的潜在冲突和不安全因素——他们有着比民主国家以往对手更强的实力，这一实力既来自其国家规模，也来自其资本主义性质。 The most important counterweight remains the United States. For all the criticism leveled against it, the United States and its alliance with Europe stands as the single most important hope for the future of liberal democracy. 最重要的砝码依然是美国。尽管遭受种种批评，美国和它的欧洲盟友仍是未来自由民主无可替代的最重要希望。 As it was during the 20th century, the United States remains the greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the periphery of the international system. 正如在20世纪那样，美国仍是确保自由民主免于屈居守势并沦落至国际体系边缘脆弱地位的最大保障。 Azar Gat is professor of national security at Tel Aviv University and the author of "War in Human Civilization." A longer version of this article appears in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs. Azar Gat是特拉维夫大学国家安全教授，《人类文明进程中的战争》的作者。本文的更长版本刊载于7/8 月的《外交事务》（Foreign Affairs）杂志。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-07-17】 @zenisolation:我有一个问题一直不解，请问有核武器的国家不让别国研制核武器是不是耍流氓啊？ @whigzhou: 不是，因为：1）个人才是道德主体，2）个人经由对共同规范的认可而结成共同体，3）有些政权有资格代表共同体，有些没有，4）一些能够代表其共同体的政府，可经由盟约而建立更高层次的共同体， @whigzhou: 5）所以，当政府甲对政府乙采取行动时，该行动是否道德，要看这两个政府性质和他们所在共同体的关系：A）他们是否有资格代表所在共同体？B）甲乙之间有盟约吗？仅当这两个问题的答案皆为肯定时，才存在道德问题，此时我们可以问：C）该行动是否违反了共同体甲的规范或甲与乙的盟约？ @whigzhou: 我们契约主义和其他道德哲学的根本区别是：不会仅仅因为对方的生物学特性而自动接受其共同体成员资格、从而让自己在和他的关系中承担相应的道德义务，必须经过一个最低限度的立约过程（比如对习俗和宪法原则的默会认可），不存在契约时，本方安全便上升为首要行动准则，也就是自然状态的法则。 @whigzhou: 其他道德哲学家会给你讲各种更动听的理论，在安全无虞的情况中，那些听起来确实很美妙，但我可以打赌，一旦大难临头，他们溜得比你我都快，契约主义则要求我们慎于承担义务，而一旦承诺，不得逃避其后果 @zenisolation:是不是这个意思，作为共同体内的国家，代表共同体强制非共同体内的某些国家不能研制核武器。是符合共同体内的契约的 @whigzhou: 对，比如为保护共同体成员不受伤害，英国政府不惜屠灭境内所有家牛，这种时候连动保分子也缩头乌龟了，业余玻璃心则假装没看见，我们契约主义就不会这么演戏～ @公民林恩翰:即是说，如果强者与弱者之间没有契约，当强者欺负弱者的时候，没有道德上的问题？而是自然状态的法则 @whigzhou: 不一定，该强者所在共同体的规范中可能有这么一条：当外人不对我们构成威胁时，不得欺负他们。这种规则是合理的，而且从长远看往往也是有利于共同体安全和利益的 @whigzhou: 契约主义是一种元元元……元规则，在其之下如何构建或识别具体的契约内容，是可以进一步讨论的问题 @whigzhou: 但很明显，“外人无论如何行事，都既不得强行干预同时还必须对其适用与共同体成员相同的标准”，这样的规则是无法维持共同体安全的，除非该共同体已强大到能把外人视为人畜无害的小动物，但实际上人类太危险了，看看IS  

【2014-11-30】 @whigzhou: 好多年没关注福尔摩萨了，柯某和连某都不了解，但就凭这几年点滴观感，蓝比绿好是肯定的，当然，蓝绿都不如辉总好也是肯定的 @whigzhou: 阿辉伯，亚洲政坛千古一人 @whigzhou: 1）对我来说，保卫神圣三一（西方传统+自由世界+现代文明）永远比拯救雞国重要的多；2）福尔摩萨属于自由世界；3）所以对福尔摩萨候选人，我当然更关心谁对神圣三一更有价值，而不是谁在姿态上更反蚣；4）白左看起来反蚣姿态更高，其实口炮而已，关键时候帮不上的，反帝反殖反干预的，怎么会帮得上。 @whigzhou: 所以就算我更关心雞国，也不想附和白左绿左的口炮，我只欢迎货真价实的钢铁大炮 @段宇宏 网上流行说是因为“票选国民党，台湾变香港”让民进党赢了。香港都内地化成这样了，占中支持率现在只有30%，香港人都没急，台湾人居然比港人还急？ @只配叫猪 最主要是大多数港人认为改变不了大局，还有很多人反北京但也反占中，因为民生和法治问题。退一步说，30%的人受到影响也足够掀翻国民党了。 @段宇宏: 一：爱特我嘛，这话不知谁问我的 。但我觉得这个口号本身以及认为这个口号有助选作用很傻逼啊，完全没常识。国民党要把台湾变香港，自己一切说了算的七八十年代，选票盘子还有70%以上的九十年代就可以卖。在台湾，绿营的“卖台”和“台奸”棍子满天飞，就跟大陆二粪的“汉奸”和“卖国”帽子一样。 @段宇宏: 二：蓝绿两党大佬个个来过大陆，在大陆有家族生意利益，有的还有精神圣地，唯马没来过。比如绿营的左派大姐大陈菊来北京祭拜过老战友，还对我D说：“我们两党无冤无仇嘛，都是为穷人奔忙的，都是被国民党迫害的……”连曾经把D颂扬为民主先峰的笑蜀蜀黍都被恶心到怒了，陈菊大姐不一样高票当选了吗？ @段宇宏: 三、这口号当选举技术看得了，一本正经有点傻了。反帝反殖反商反现代化反美反核电，亲巴勒斯坦（甚至哈马斯和ISIS）反以色列，有很多元老是共产主义者，有不少粉丝信马克思主义，穿马克思格瓦拉T恤，还爱唱《国际歌》的绿营不卖台，不舔G。一个只是跟大陆谈经贸条件，骨子里反动透顶的马娘娘居然会卖？ @段宇宏: 四：再回过头来看你问我的那句话的逻辑，一个已被大陆间接控制了多年的香港，那么多"咱的人"的地方，都难以驯服，还要走“邪路”。一个有独立司法，行政，立法和军事体系的台湾，明主化已经多年，价值观早就根深蒂固，还有一个那么“爱台”的伟大台湾民族主义的民进党，谁能卖台，谁能把台变港？ @段宇宏: 五、有不少朋友认为，来过大陆18次的柯医生作为独立候选人能当选，实在牛大发了。这得多不了解民主社会的政党和政治运作。一个两党政治成熟运行多年的地方，会在最大都市出现这种“非组织化奇迹”？那是因为民进党为了让柯当选，自己不提出候选人，全力利用党组织力量为柯辅选。问题不复杂也不神奇。