【2017-05-04】 伊斯兰世界的平均智商大概在82-85之间，低于欧洲和东亚不止一个标准差，对于一个早已文明化、社会结构也足够复杂的地区，这是件有点蹊跷的事情，其选择机制一定其他文明社会十分不同，不知道多妻制，奴隶的广泛使用，权力继承模式，等级结构的特征，分别在其中起了什么作用没有。 ​​​​  

【2016-12-23】 @海德沙龙 《伊斯兰改革是否可能？ ​​​​》 一种观点认为激进派和原教旨主义并不能代表伊斯兰，后者总体而言是和平宽容向善的，另一种观点认为基本教义决定了伊斯兰只能陷于目前这种不堪的状态，而在Daniel Pipes看来，第一种观点无视了当前的基本事实，第二种观点则既与伊斯兰历史不符…… @海德沙龙:Pipes指出了两个难以否认的历史事实：1）在历史上，伊斯兰社会并未被束缚于基本教义，2）假如基本教义能够如此决定一个宗教群体的社会生活和制度走向，那么基督教世界的近代转变同样不会发生。 @whigzhou: Pipes对历史的回顾很有价值，可以清除最简单的那些错误，但他的乐观展望并没有说服力 @whigzhou: 依我看，1）伊斯兰改革当然可能，而且已经发生了，不止一次，2）当代伊斯兰主义就是一种伊斯兰的新教运动，3）宗教改革中诞生的教派通常都是激进的和原教旨主义的，4）基督教改革最初也产生了各种激进和暴力教派，以及宗教战争，5）基督教新教运动最终达致的可意结果和教义没多大关系， @whigzhou: 6）基督教世界最终迎来的政教分离、宗教宽容和信仰自由，不是任何新旧教义的逻辑后果，而是既已存在的文化背景、制度基础和政治权力结构共同作用的结果，这个（广义的）制度框架将教派冲突约束在令其有可能向宪政均衡收敛的限度之内，类似的事情发生在另一个环境中，结果十有八九是糟糕的， @whigzhou: 7）实际上，这一最终的均衡只有我们局外人在事后看来才是理想的，而在参与其中的任何教派眼里，那既不是他们期望的，也不是他们想要或喜欢的 @whigzhou: 8）在美国，新教运动和教派分化其实从来没有停止过，新教派伴随一轮轮大觉醒不断涌现，其中绝大部分是和平的，据此你很容易得出结论：新教基本上是和平的，这当然没错，但你也很可能进而断定：这一宗教『本质上』就是和平的，其教义决定了它是和平的，那就错了， @whigzhou: 试想，在一次次教派裂变中，只要出现一个非和平的变种，同时又没有宪政确保其他教派不受其伤害，那么其他教派要么（A）消失，要么（B）也变成暴力教派，要么（C）谋求自己动手建立秩序（从而破坏政教分离原则） @whigzhou: 9）那么，伊斯兰可能得到良性改革所需要的文化/政治条件吗？当然不会，因为大英帝国早已解散，如今连羞涩勉强版的美帝国也正在解散  

Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes. 伊斯兰教能够被改革吗？历史和人的本性告诉我们：能。 作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08 译者:Tankman 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here. 《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上：伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。 Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate? 伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退，激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗？或是能被改革，变得更加温和，现代且与邻为善呢？伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利，并给穆斯林信仰自由，接受现代金融和司法的基本原则，而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗？ A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that "radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution," the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, "He's wrong. Sorry about that." She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point. 越来越多的分析家认为不会，穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情，这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中，成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注：一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物，以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题，温和伊斯兰是解药”时，她说：“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕，追求同一目标，和相同的敌人战斗，但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。 My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge. 我的论述有两部分。第一，很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的；第二，革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。 Arguing Against Essentialism 对本质主义的驳斥 To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion's core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past. 声称伊斯兰不可被改变，则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解，而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误，因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切，包括对圣典的解读，随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。 Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran's interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of "no compulsion in religion," and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam. 只有不考虑人类本性，无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁，一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变，像圣战，奴隶，高利贷，“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且，我们容易想到过去的1400年，很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi'i，al-Ghazali，Ibn Taymiya，Rumi，Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。 However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam's scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country's history would lead to a distorted understanding. 可兰经和圣训也许是中心，而不是穆斯林经验的全部；从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国；忽略了这个国家的历史，会导致认知的扭曲。 Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today's Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline. 换一种说法就是，中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的，今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟，它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业，1969年我进入该领域时，我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起，到今天享有着巨大能量；如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大，那么它也可能衰落。 How might that happen? 这种变化可能会如何发生呢？ The Medieval Synthesis 中世纪整合 Key to Islam's role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia's prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much. 伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的；而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢？一个刑罚体系，要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争，遵循这禁令是不可能的；实际上，穆斯林发起的战争中，约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地，坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。 To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad. 为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求，前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法，允许放松一些伊斯兰法条，而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal（花招）和其他方式，遵循法律的形式，同时否定其实质。比如，为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家，很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。 This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam's "medieval synthesis" in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists: 沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》（1983）中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象，不切实际的要求，翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中，它减低了沙利亚的力度，使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行，同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali，在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话： One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to "compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court." As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, "Social patterns were in great contrast to the 'official' picture presented by these 'formal' sources." Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of "the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian." 律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时，“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。” While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12^th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18^th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability. 虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪，它并未克服一个基本的弱点：它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本，或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷，面对原教旨主义者的挑战，它仍然是脆弱的。实际上，前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战，包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中，原教旨主义的努力最终被软化，中世纪整合重新回到轨道，而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色，助长了其不稳定性。 The Challenge of Modernity 现代性的挑战 The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization. 中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断，传统观点来看，这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中，把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向：西方化或是伊斯兰化。 Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile. 西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象，他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法，代之以同类领域的西方做法，比如不利用法律确立宗教，妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前，这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运，对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。 But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back. 但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多，而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底，西方化表面上看起来强大，实则不然，因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高，有话语权的精英，而广大民众则被压制。 Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam. 从1930年代起，抗拒因素开始组织起来，发展他们自己的力量，尤其是在阿尔及利亚，埃及，伊朗，和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果，呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般，坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。 Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West. 虽然排斥西方，这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动，依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身，比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设，比如国家优先于个人，可以接受暴力斗争，和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术，尤其是军事和医疗方面。 Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways. 通过创造性的努力，伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长，最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者，霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中，显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件，和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序，在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步，用各种创新且极端的方式，变革社会，实行伊斯兰教法。 For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls' schools and music stores. The Islamists' influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas. 比如，在伊朗，什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者，并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗，塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身，你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱，头巾和罩袍。 Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country's established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism. 虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型，相比法西斯和共产主义，伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动，被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党（AKP）领导着，已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台，AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕，借助该国已经建立的民主制度，和良好的施政表现，逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量，而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。 The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction. 伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健，但是它们的势头并不是由来已久，也并不保证能持续下去。实际上，像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样，伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力，其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗，明确体现了这点。 Toward a Modern Synthesis 通向一个现代的整合 If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a "modern synthesis" comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps. 若要打败伊斯兰主义，反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景，来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点，他们可以回溯历史，尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力，对照“中世纪整合”，来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等，和不信伊斯兰者和平共存，并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。 Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans. 在此，把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较，不无益处。五个世纪前，犹太教徒，基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的，借贷收利息则不被允许。最终，经过了苦涩和反复的辩论，犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点；今天，没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。 Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, ("pretend" because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.) 然而在穆斯林当中，这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年，沙特阿拉伯在1962年，毛里塔尼亚在1980年，官方禁止了蓄奴，奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在（尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦）。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元，并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息，（“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。） Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else. 穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好，并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教，他们必须模仿其他一神教，改变自己宗教在蓄奴，利息，妇女权益，背教自由，司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。 When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy. 当一个改革的，现代的伊斯兰涌现，它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益，统治异教徒的观念，圣战，或者自杀性恐怖主义，它也不会要求对通奸，危害家族荣誉，渎神和背教者处以死刑。 Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women: 在这一新的世纪，一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下：

• Saudi Arabia's Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn't end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
• 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒，把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚，但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
• Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
• 土耳其神职人员已经同意，让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜，并且和男人一起祷告。
• The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
• 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
• Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
• 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
• A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
• 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议，认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰，事实上应该被惩罚。
• A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
• 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法，反对多妻制。

Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include: 其他显著进步，不一定局限于妇女权益方面，包括：

• The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
• 沙特政府终止了Jizya（向非穆斯林征收人头税）。
• An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
• 一个伊朗法庭，判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
• Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
• 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会，开始就处决背教者展开辩论。

All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times. 同时，倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法，如果不是着眼于改进，那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir，一个沙特女记者，大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利，和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴，包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责，但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论，在以前时代这是无法想象的。 Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad's example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today's Muslims make of it. 和其中世纪的先行者一样，面对原教旨人士的攻击，现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子，然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是，已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果，有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想，并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念；它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。 Policy Implications 政策含义 What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims? 反对伊斯兰教法，哈里发国，和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢？ For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process. 对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林，最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义，而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力，通过慷慨和无私，达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者，必须也经过可能是数十年的努力，发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态，然后推广它。在这个过程中，解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。 Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey's AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism. 非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰：第一，坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登，也可以是隐秘鬼祟，表面合法的政治性运动，如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍，但他却更有效，危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由，法律面前人人平等和其他人权，珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。 Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization. 第二，非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天，这些人物弱小零散，且面对着艰巨的任务，但是他们确实存在，他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权，代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。 Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum. Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。 July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title "What Is Islam?" 2013年7月7日更新： Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章，标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。 Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at "Islam's Future." 2013年10月1日更新：六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章，我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。 Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2^nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that "Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation." So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all. 2014年4月10日更新：虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段，并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道，“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以，她也许开始接受我的观点了。 Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that "When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history." 2016年2月4日更新：我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰，门外汉讨论文本，内行讨论历史。” Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking's illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's headquarters (as photographed by me). It's a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above. 2016年2月24日更新：这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片，也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划，这版本似乎并不让人激动。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-07-19】 @隐藏的火星人:我就想问辉总，兼顾后果和公平的最好的策略是什么，对待绿化 @whigzhou: 宪法容许范围内可做的很多，比如停止穆斯林移民，犯罪移民驱逐出境（像瑞士），取缔国内赞助恐怖主义的组织，禁止国内政治组织接受伊斯兰主义组织或政权（比如沙特政府）的捐款，在公职人员中展开忠诚调查（即麦卡锡行动） @whigzhou: 从佛罗里达Boca Raton伊斯兰中心 ([[ICBR]])的例子可看出有多少早该做事情没做，ICBR与恐怖组织的关系确凿无疑，毫不掩饰，十几年来屡屡被联邦政府抓包和定罪，却始终活得好好的，不久前还被棕榈滩县选为投票点，直到本次惨案发生遭大量抗议后才换地方 http://t.cn/RtzHREz @whigzhou: 类似例子比比皆是，几乎是常态 【2016-08-24】 @whigzhou: 终于有动作了  

【2016-07-18】 @whigzhou: 凯末尔主义终结之后，土耳其的一些可能发展：离开北约（主动或被动），占领叙利亚的部分地区，攻击伊拉克库尔德地区，在高加索和中亚扶植马仔因而与俄国发生冲突，为争夺中东霸权而与伊朗和/或沙特发生冲突…… @whigzhou: 七年前的诺贝尔和平奖不愧为史上最具预见性和最具激励效果的诺贝尔奖～ @龙与羊驼: 凯末尔主义是和纳赛尔一样的工业党，为什么不能被终结？经济只有自由化才能最终推动政治自由化，不自由的经济根本不可能推进政治社会风气的开放。 @whigzhou: 绿化是『一颗要命丸』，都不用第二颗，跟这个抉择相比，其他都不重要了 @whigzhou: 宪政基础是根，经济表现是果，经济政策、自由化、私有化，都只是小枝桠而已，都是很容易逆转的事情，花枝插在花瓶里不也能绚烂几天嘛，鸟用 @blue-tomato: 像土尔其这么大的一个国家，而且是一个有着一定经济能力的宪政民主国家，还需要依靠军队的协助才能摆脱宗教（绿化）的入侵，这是否说明绿化的强大与及宪政民主的无能呢？ @whigzhou: 说明宪政存续条件之苛刻 @blue-tomato: 非常有意思。如果是这样，谁人可以在规则既定的条件下，推翻规则，扮演最后的救世主，而且有充足的理由得到人们的信任？貌似魔兽里的守护者最终却是引进兽人的作恶者 @whigzhou: 以前是英帝，后来是美帝，现在，恐怕已经没了 @whigzhou: 多年来我已反复强调宪政基础相对于中短期变革与增长的重要性，复习一下：《从摊贩胜诉看印度法治》 《不必对南非期望太高》 《下一块金砖在哪里？》 @安德鲁杰克逊蓝卫兵:但是弗里德曼说只要经济自由，社会必定开放，政治必定自由，这个怎么讲？ @whigzhou: http://headsalon.org/archives/7107.html  

Surrendering to Death 向死亡投降 作者：Gavin McInnes @ 2016-5-14 译者：Tankman 校对：babyface_claire（@许你疯不许你傻） 来源：Taki Mag，http://takimag.com/article/surrendering_to_death_gavin_mcinnes/ Eagles of Death Metal recently finished a Canadian tour and I got to sit down with vocalist Jesse Hughes and discuss the Bataclan attack in Paris that killed 89 of his fans. You’d think he’d want to avoid the topic, but he was actually eager to get into it. He sees it as a catharsis. 死亡金属之鹰乐队最近结束了一个加拿大巡演，我有机会和主唱Jesse Hughes坐下来讨论巴黎的Bataclan剧院惨案。该事件中，他的89位粉丝惨遭杀害。也许你认为他想回避这一话题，但他其实很渴望提到它。他将此视为一种宣泄。 Hughes is not happy with the way the media has treated the story. Details are randomly pulled from his interviews and entire angles are edited in later that are diametrically opposed to his beliefs. Jesse Hughes has been ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church. He’s pro-gun, pro-Trump, and pro-life. He recognizes that Islam is the problem and political correctness is literally killing us. Hughes 不满意媒体对待该故事的方式。他访谈中的细节被随意抽出，整个视角随后则被编写成与他的信念截然相反。Jesse Hughes 已经被任命为普世生命教会的牧师【译者注：该宗教流派鼓励行善，并允许牧师保持其原有信仰，无论是基督教、伊斯兰教和无神论等。】。他支持持枪权，支持川普，也反对堕胎。他认为伊斯兰教才是问题所在，而政治正确正在真真切切的杀死我们。 Takimag: It’s hard to talk about the attack without sounding like you’re blaming the victims, but it’s impossible to deny fear of Islamophobia and fear of guns led to a lot of deaths that night. Taki杂志：谈论这次袭击，却避免听起来像是指责受害者，是很难的。但是不能否认的是：对伊斯兰恐惧症的恐惧，和对枪支的恐惧，导致了那晚很多人的死亡。 Jesse Hughes: I saw fear fall like a blanket on the whole crowd and they fell like wheat in the wind—the way you would before a god. I was totally alert from the very beginning. The first thing I needed to do was find my girl. Fear took a backseat and “where’s my girl?” took over. Jesse Hughes：我看见恐惧如毯子一样盖在整个人群上，人群倒伏在地，如风中的麦子——就是那种面对上帝你会下拜的姿态。我从一开始就非常的警觉。首先，我需要做的是找到我的女朋友。恐惧退居第二位，而“我的女朋友在哪”则位居第一。 I could smell gunpowder in the backstage area and I knew someone fired a round back there. I saw a guy with an FAL and when he turned to face me his eyes looked like marbles. He was stoned out of his mind, and we now know they were on Xanax and cocaine. I recognized him. I’d seen him earlier in the day and noticed him staring at us. 我可以在后台区域闻到火药味，我知道某人往那边打了一梭子。我看见一个配有轻型自动步枪的人，当他面朝我时，他的眼睛看起来像玻璃弹珠一样。他整个呆住了，现在我们知道他们当时是嗑了蝴蝶丸和可卡因。我认出了他。当天早些时候，我看到过他并注意到他盯着我们看。 They were in the venue early. That implies some staff were in on it. 他们早先就在会场。这意味着有些工作人员参与了此事。 I got in a lot of trouble for saying that. I know for sure that they were in there early. I remember them staring at my buddy. I just chalked it up to Arab envy. You know what I mean? When a Muslim sees a cocky American dude with tattoos, he stares at him. 因为声称这点，我遭遇了很多麻烦。我很肯定他们早先就在那里。我记得他们盯着乐队成员看。我当时认为那只是阿拉伯式的羡慕。你懂吧？当一个穆斯林看到一个臭屁的纹着身的美国哥们，他就盯着那人看。 I realized later it was Abdeslam and he was staring at my buddy because they thought he was a threat. There’s no denying the terrorists were already inside, and they had to get in somehow. During the shooting I went outside and the backstage door was propped open. How did that happen? 之后我意识到那人是 Abdeslam【译者注：袭击参与者之一】。他盯着我哥们看，因为他们认为他是个威胁。无可否认，恐怖分子已经混进里面了，他们必须用某种法子混进去。在枪击中，我跑到外面去，而后台的门是大开着的。这是怎么发生的？ Do you think political correctness is killing our natural instincts and making us vulnerable? 你认为政治正确正在杀死我们的自然直觉，并使得我们变得易受攻击吗？ Definitely. There were two girls who were involved. They were at the venue and vanished before the shooting, and these women were in traditional Muslim garb. They knew people wouldn’t check them because of the way they were dressed. They got caught a few days later. 当然。有两个女孩参与了此事。她们曾在大厅里，但在枪击前又消失了。这些女士穿着传统穆斯林服装。他们知道因为她们的穿着，人们不会检查她们。几天后她们被抓获。 The fear of offending Muslims is a terrorist’s greatest weapon. 害怕冒犯穆斯林的心态是恐怖分子最有力的武器。 Look at the guys who bombed Brussels. They were wearing black gloves on one hand. Their luggage was too heavy to lift, but they didn’t want anyone helping them with it. Nobody brought any of this up until after the bombs went off. 看看那些在布鲁塞尔放炸弹的家伙。他们一只手带着黑手套，他们的行李太重举不起来，但是他们不想让任何人帮助他们搬行李。直到炸弹爆炸后才有人把这些线索联系起来。 We’d rather die than be called a bigot. 我们宁死也不愿意被称作是偏执狂。 How is a faith being associated with racism? Just take out the word “Islam” and replace it with “communism.” It’s an ideology. The same way the Rosenbergs could sell nuclear secrets from within America is the same way Muslim terrorists can attack us from within. It’s okay to be discerning when it comes to Muslims in this day and age. 一种信仰是如何被和种族主义联系起来的？只要把“伊斯兰”一词抽掉，换成“共产主义”。这就是一种意识形态。和卢森堡夫婦出卖美国的原子弹机密一样，穆斯林恐怖分子也从内部袭击我们。今时今日，一旦涉及到穆斯林，小心一点没错。 Where is this push coming from? Is it all our fault? 这动机从何而来？都是我们的错吗？ Of course not. When you’re at a soccer game in Europe and you see the words “United Arab Emirates,” you know there is a lot of Arab money floating around and influencing the dialogue. The conversation is constantly being steered away from scrutiny. They think we’re fools. 当然不是。当你在欧洲的足球赛场看到阿联酋一词，你就知道有很多阿拉伯资金流入并影响了交流。这一交流始终得以避开审慎的检视。他们觉得我们是白痴。 Arab money is a pollutant. So many movies are made with Arab money. George Clooney doesn’t kiss the ass of the Arabs for no reason. American movies are the best way to influence the hearts and minds of the world. 阿拉伯资金是一种污染物。如此多的电影是在阿拉伯资金的支持下拍摄的。乔治·克鲁尼不是无缘无故跪舔这些阿拉伯人的。美国电影是影响这世界的心灵和思想的最佳方式。 You never see bad guys in movies who are Arab terrorists. It’s always Germans or French… 电影中，你从来看不到阿拉伯恐怖分子作为坏人出现。总是德国人或者法国人。 Or conservative Christian rednecks. They’re apparently what’s wrong with everything in the world now, including global warming. What about the other ice age we went through? There were no Christian Republicans back then. What caused that meltdown? 或者保守的红脖子基督徒。他们显然是这个世界当下各种麻烦的根源，包括全球变暖。那我们经历过的那个冰河时代呢？那时候可没有基督徒共和党人。那是什么导致了这场灾难呢？ The other problem with that is, when you get rid of these Christian rednecks, you create a vacuum and it gets filled with people way worse. It gets filled with Islam. You end up replacing evangelism with sharia law. 另一个麻烦是，如果你排挤走这些红脖基督徒，你就创造了一个真空，让更糟糕的人来填补。伊斯兰填补了这真空。你的结局就是用伊斯兰教法代替福音主义。 Politicians behave better when they know people are watching. We behave better when we believe Jesus is watching us. 当知道人们在监督时，政客们的行为更规矩。当相信耶稣在看着我们时，我们的行为更规矩。 These atheists tell us we don’t need religion, yet everyone seems to be creating flimsy substitutes to replace it. Rehab is just Lent. Meditation is just Latin Mass. Seeing a therapist is just talking to your priest. 那些无神论者告诉我们，我们不需要宗教，不过每个人似乎都在创造轻浮脆弱的替代品来代替宗教。修复期实际是大斋期【译者注：在西方基督教国家，每年的大斋期是基督徒献供与苦修的时期，也是洗涤罪恶，承蒙天主启示的时期】。冥想实际是拉丁弥撒。去看治疗师实际上是和你的牧师谈话。 And the thing about the Bible is it’s written down. A therapist can change his diagnosis just like that and there’s no way of calling him out on it. 而圣经，就是那些被写了下来的（治愈谈话），它不像一个治疗师可以任意更改其诊断，而且人们无法在这事上挑战他。 Let’s get back to the attack. Why didn’t the cops come in earlier? It seemed like the killing went on forever. 让我们回到袭击这个话题。为什么警察不能更早来呢？当时看起来杀戮好像会永远进行下去。 The press heard some kids were locked away in rooms so they reported it as a hostage situation. Those kids were hiding. This misinformation meant the cops set up outside for a negotiation while inside dozens of people were dying. 媒体听说一些小孩被锁在房间里，所以他们当时把这事当作人质危机报道。那些小孩在躲藏。这种信息误导意味着警察在外面准备谈判，而内部的数十人则正在死去。 The terrorists would go up to bodies and stick them with the gun. If they budged, they’d shoot them again. One girl got up and said she was scared. The guy said, “Don’t be scared, you’ll be dead in two minutes,” and then he shot her, BOOM. 恐怖分子们会走近倒下的人，用枪戳他们。如果倒地者动了，就会被补枪。一个女孩爬了起来，说她很害怕。一个恐怖分子说“别怕，你在两分钟内就会死。”然后他开枪打了她，砰。 The French are so concerned with racism, they’re letting Muslims get away with murder. 法国人太在意种族主义，他们让穆斯林逍遥法外。 A day after, at the stadium, Muslims booed the moment of silence and we barely heard about it in the press. I saw Muslims celebrating in the street during the attack. I saw it with my own eyes. In real time! How did they know what was going on? There must have been coordination. 一天后，在球场上，穆斯林在默哀时刻发出嘘声，而我们很少听到关于这一情节的媒体报道。袭击的时候，我看到穆斯林们在街上庆祝袭击。我亲眼看到这事。就在袭击的那个时刻。他们怎么知道袭击正在发生？这些事情一定有联系。 I’ve heard you say you credit your childhood with your survival. You had a real dad who stuck around and taught you about guns. 我听说你提到你的童年经历帮你幸存了下来。你有个陪伴你的父亲，而且教给你关于枪支的知识。 I knew what gunfire was. I was able to think through it. I was also able to remember practical lessons of my life because I had to be in fights as a kid. My mom didn’t go sue anyone. I didn’t have playdates. I had some practical upbringing growing up in the desert where you got to get yourself out of your problems. 我知道开枪是怎么回事。我能把这事考虑清楚。我也能记起我生活中的实际经验，因为我小时候不得不参与打架。我妈妈没有起诉任何人，我也没有大人给我找的玩伴。我有些实际成长经验，在孤立无援的困境中你只能靠你自己走出来。 Also, the reason I’ve done well with this healing process is everything I was raised to believe was affirmed that night. In a way, that’s a blessing of God. When the first bullets started being fired, people looked at me. I remember that. It pissed me off because I knew right then and there it was going to be bad. I knew these kids had no idea what was coming. None. They’d never heard a gunshot in real life and it hit them so hard. 而且，我从此事件中恢复的如此之好的原因是，我长大成人过程中得到的一切信念都在那一晚被肯定了。某种程度上，这是神的保佑。当第一颗子弹出膛，人们看着我。我记得这点。这让我愤怒，因为就在那刻那地我知道事情要坏了。我知道那些孩子们对即将发生的事情毫无概念。没有一个知道。他们从未在现实生活中听到过一声枪响，这重重的打击了他们。 Political correctness kills. 政治正确在杀人。 Davey [bassist Dave Catching] was in the middle of the stage and when the lights went on, he saw shit he’d never seen before in his life, awful stuff. It has no parallel. It’s not just death. It’s the most unsuspecting, innocent victims you can imagine—people who are gripped in terror and can’t move as a result of it. 当灯光开启时，Davey（贝斯手Dave Catching）在舞台中间，他看到了他此生从未见过的可怕场景，可怕极了。没什么可以与此相比。不仅仅是死亡。那是你可以想象的最无辜最没有防备的受害人——人们被笼罩在恐怖中呆若木鸡。 It’s like a metaphor for all of Western civilization. 这好像是所有西方文明的一个隐喻。 I watched about seven people die. A couple of them were three feet from the barrier. They could have fallen backwards and been alive but they were too scared to even turn around. I remember a woman just standing with her hands up in a surrender pose. The terrorist finally saw her and all she did was go, “No no no.” She surrendered to death in front of my very eyes. I was yelling at her, “HEY!” and I don’t think she could hear me. She was so terrified, I think she’d already given up. 我目睹了大约七个人死亡。他们中一些离护栏就三英尺远。他们也许能翻越护栏逃生，但他们太害怕了甚至不敢转身。我记得一个女人就站在那里，高举双手作投降状。恐怖分子终于看见了她，而她只是一味的说“不，不，不。”就在我的眼前，她向死亡投降了。我向她呐喊，“嗨！”。我不认为她听到了我。她如此害怕，我想她已经放弃了。 Is it fair to say the liberal mentality created this need to surrender? 说自由派的精神气质创造了投降的需要，合理吗？ I will lay the blame right in its lap. When you tell people they can’t help themselves and that they’re children, you weaken them to a point where three feet away is life and they can’t see it because they’re too scared. 对，我要责怪的正是他们。当你告诉人们他们不能自助，他们只是孩子，你就把他们变弱到一个连三英尺远的逃生机会都看不到的地步。他们看不到，因为他们太害怕了。 In a way we’re unarmed two fold. We’re literally unarmed and we’re also mentally unarmed. 某种程度上我们是双倍的赤手空拳。我们本来就赤手空拳，而且我们在精神上赤手空拳。 It’s like the bleating sheep from Animal Farm. You suggest anything that strays from the narrative and this chorus of bleats comes to drown you out. This attack didn’t happen by accident. 就像《动物庄园》中懦弱哀嚎的绵羊。当你的观点脱离叙述的主流，这懦弱哀嚎的合唱就把你的声音盖过。这个袭击不是偶然发生的。 I went to Paris after the attacks and was disgusted by the lack of rage. They didn’t blame Islam. In fact, many blamed the Jews. They seemed more concerned with us promoting xenophobia than laying blame on the terrorists. 我在袭击后去过巴黎，并对缺乏愤怒的程度感到恶心。他们没有谴责伊斯兰。事实上，很多人指责犹太人。比起指责恐怖分子，他们似乎更关心我们促进仇外情绪。 I hung out with plenty of Parisians who were fucking pissed off, but it was mostly cops and military. During the attack, one cop finally realized it wasn’t a hostage situation and yelled out, “It’s a turkey shoot” as he charged in, holding his gun. He got shot right through the hand and into the neck and kept going. He took a terrorist out, chased another one into the hallway, who then blew himself up, and did it to another guy, who blew himself up on stage. Our amplifiers were a gory mess. 我和很多出离愤怒的巴黎人交流过，但是这些主要都是警察和军人。在袭击期间，一个警察终于意识到这不是人质劫持，他持枪突入，并且大叫，“这是土耳其射击！”。他被子弹穿过手，击中脖子，仍然进击。他撂倒了一个恐怖分子，在走廊追击另一个。那恐怖分子就自爆了。之后又追击另一个，那人在舞台上自爆。我们的扩音器上血肉模糊。 Did that cop live? 那警察生还了吗？ Yes, I met him in triage. I hung out with him. Great guy. 是的。我在急救站见过他。我们后来又聚了一次。很好的人。 You went to the hospital? 你进医院了？ I had pieces of teeth and human bone pulled out of my face. A girl got shot right next to me by the shooter at the top of the stairs who I had met earlier. She stepped one step in front of me and her head just exploded. It blew pieces of her teeth and skull into my face. 从我的脸上取出了牙齿和人骨碎片。我旁边的女生被楼梯顶上我早先见过的枪手击中了，她在我面前踉跄了一下，接着她的头爆开了。她的牙齿和头骨碎片扎进了我的脸。 Why don’t we hear about this? 为何我们没听到此事？ The media wants to summarize it, and important details get lost. The most important detail being when they started shooting, they were already inside. If they were hanging out enough to let three people go, then they knew security dudes. They knew bouncers. They knew doormen. 媒体想要总结事件，而重要的细节则丢失了。最重要的细节是，在他们开始射击时，他们早已经混入内部了。如果他们让三个人混入都能保持隐蔽，那他们一定认识保安。他们认识门卫。 Do you think a percentage of the security staff was Muslim? 你认为有一定比例的保安人员是穆斯林？ I know they were. Look, security guards backstage are notorious for being dicks. They check your ID every few minutes and nobody goes back and forth without being checked, even if you’re in the band. This guy didn’t care what we did. He didn’t even look at me. 我知道他们其中一些是。听着，后台保安一般以严格著称。他们没几分钟就会查验你的证件。没人能不被检查来回穿梭，即使你是乐队的一员。而这次后台保安则不管我们是干什么的，他甚至没看我。 The only time he seemed remotely interested in us was when he said to my girlfriend, “Do you speak French?” and “Where are you from?” She said she was from Texas and he was getting frustrated because that’s not what he meant. Then she said, “I’m American” and he lost interest. I honestly think he was trying to determine if she was Arab or not. She’s Mexican and she could easily pass for Lebanese and I think he was going to warn her if she was Muslim. 唯一一次他看来对我们稍有兴趣是他问我女友“你说法语吗？”以及“你从哪里来？”她说她从德州来，而他则感到沮丧，因为这不是他所要问的。然后女友说“我是美国人。”他就失去了兴趣。坦率的说，我认为他试图判定她是不是阿拉伯人。她是个墨西哥人，很容易被错认成黎巴嫩人。我认为如果女友是穆斯林，他当时会警告她。 I kept opening up the back door to smoke and that’s usually a big no-no because of the sound ordinances. I’ve played there before and opening up that door to smoke got you in big trouble. This time, the security guy walks right past me and anxiously looks down the alleyway in either direction. 我让后门开着以便抽烟，通常这是绝不允许的，因为噪声管制。以前我在这里演奏过，开门抽烟会给你带来大麻烦。这次，保安径直从我身边走过，焦虑的打量通道的各个方向。 Maybe one of the reasons the cops are so much more pragmatic about this threat is that they are the ones who have to go into Les Banlieues and confront these people. Naïveté is a luxury they can’t afford. 也许对恐怖威胁，警察的态度现实得多的原因之一是，他们正是那些要去市郊移民聚居区，面对穆斯林的人。幼稚是他们负担不起的奢侈品。 When the cops went in after the attack, they shut down, what, 450 mosques? They found recruitment material in every single one of them. What the fuck is wrong with us that we don’t know about that? 当袭击后警察进入聚居区时，他们沉默了，什么，450个清真寺？他们在它们中的每一个都发现了招募材料。我们到底是怎么了，竟然不知道这事？ Parisians think everyone is innocent, but the cops don’t. They even investigated you. 巴黎人认为每个人都是无辜的，但是警察不这么想。他们甚至会调查你。 I was a person of interest, yes. They interrogated me for four days. I ended up helping them a lot by getting cell-phone footage. It was the cops and the FBI who asked me about the promoter and the security. This isn’t something I brought up to them. 我是个需要被调查的人，是的。他们盘问了我四天。最终我通过现场手机视频帮了他们很多。是警察和FBI问了我关于演出组织者和保安的问题。这不是我提出来的。 We had eight police officers in our audience that night. They all had the same conversation with their wives, which was “Should I bring my gun or not?” All of them said no. When we went back and played Paris again they stood in the same places they stood at the original show and they opened their jackets and showed me their guns as if to say, “Not tonight, motherfucker.” It was beautiful. 当晚观众中有八个警察。他们全都和太太有过相同的对话，“我应该带枪吗？”。太太们全都说不。当我们回到巴黎再次演出的时候，他们站在我以前演出时他们站过的地方，而且他们打开外套，向我展示他们的枪，好像在说，“今晚狗杂种们休想再搞事”。真赞。 Islam is crying wolf about Islamophobia in order to anesthetize us and make us easier prey. 对伊斯兰恐惧症，伊斯兰教不断叫嚷“狼来了”，为了麻痹我们，使我们更容易被猎杀。 They know there’s a whole group of white kids out there who are stupid and blind. You have these affluent white kids who have grown up in a liberal curriculum from the time they were in kindergarten, inundated with these lofty notions that are just hot air. Look at where it’s getting them. 他们知道有一大群白人孩子都是愚蠢和无知的。有大堆的白人孩子自幼儿园起，就成长于自由派课程中，沉浸在热空气般虚无不切实际的幻想中。看看这些白孩子将要面对的吧。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Tom Holland: We must not deny the religious roots of Islamic State Tom Holland: 我们不能否认伊斯兰国的宗教根基 作者：Tom Holland @ 2015-3-17 译者：Horace Rae 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：News Statesman，http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/03/tom-holland-we-must-not-deny-relgious-roots-islamic-state Its jihadis call for a global caliphate. So why deny religion drives Isis? 伊斯兰圣战者呼吁建立一个全球哈里发帝国。所以，我们何以否认伊斯兰国乃由宗教所驱动？ in 1545, a general council of the Western Church was convened by Pope Paul III in the Tyrolean city of Trent. The ambition of the various bishops and theologians in attendance was to affirm Catholic doctrine in the face of the Protestant Reformation. Accordingly, when the council issued its first significant decree on 8 April 1546, it was targeted very precisely at what the delegates saw as most noxious about Luther and his followers. 1545年，教皇保禄三世主持的天主教会大公会议在提洛尔地区的塔兰托召开。与会的主教和神学家们想要在新教改革如火如荼之际巩固天主教信条的地位。于是，1546年4月8日，当会议发布第一条重要教令时，其对象很明确，就是被代表们视为罪大恶极的路德及其追随者。 Whereas Protestants, following Luther’s lead, aspired to strip away the cladding of tradition and learn the will of God from scripture alone, the Council of Trent condemned this ambition as a pernicious heresy. Divine revelation, it declared firmly, was not confined to the Bible. Tradition, too, “preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession”, expressed the essence of Christ’s teachings. To doubt this was no longer to rank as Christian. 跟随路德指引的新教徒们决意打破传统，只从经文中领悟上帝的意志。塔兰托大公会议谴责这种想法，称其为罪大恶极的异端邪说。会议坚持，神圣启示并非只存在于《圣经》之中。传统——“经由连续传承而被保存在天主教会中”——也同样能传达上帝教导的实质。质疑这一说法的人将被剥夺基督徒身份。 It is in a kindred spirit that Mehdi Hasan, in his article in last week’s issue of the New Statesman, would deny the title of Islamic to Islamic State, also known as Isis. That Isis militants, in justifying their actions, can quote the Quran, or the example or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, does not necessarily make them orthodox Muslims. 在上周New Statesman 杂志刊登的一篇文章中，Mehdi Hasan也表达了类似的想法：否认伊斯兰国的“伊斯兰”特性。尽管伊斯兰国的战士们在为其行为辩解时大可引用《古兰经》或先知穆罕默德的行迹或言论，但这并不能令他们成为正统的穆斯林。 Islam, like Christianity, is more than the sum of its scriptures. Over the course of its near 1,500 years of existence, an immense corpus of commentary and interpretation has accrued. “. . . the religion’s teachings in every age are determined by scholarly consensus on the meaning of the complex scriptural texts.” So declares Timothy Winter, the director of the Cambridge Muslim College, as quoted by Hasan. It is an assertion that would not have looked out of place in the decrees of the Council of Trent. 就像基督教一样，伊斯兰教的内涵远比经文总和丰富得多。在它1500余年历史中，无数人对它做过解释和评论，“……在每个时代，教义都是由关于复杂经文之内涵的学术共识决定的。” Hasan 引用剑桥穆斯林学院院长Timothy Winter如此说到。这种主张如果插到塔兰托会议的纲领中去，也不会令人觉得格格不入。 The problem faced by the orthodox religious authorities in the Muslim world, however, is very similar to that which confronted the Catholic Church in the 16th century: escaped genies are tricky things to get back into bottles. The same impulse that prompted Luther to affirm the primacy of scripture over Catholic doctrine has also long been at work in Islam. 然而，正统穆斯林权威现在面对的问题与16世纪困扰天主教会的问题很相似：逃脱的精灵很难回到瓶子里。促使路德把经文置于天主教信条之上的念头在伊斯兰教中也是由来已久。 As far back as the 13th century, a scholar based in Damascus by the name of Ibn Taymiyya proposed that the surest way to know God’s purpose was to study the practices of the first three generations of Muslims: the “forebears”, or “Salafs”. Reports of what Muhammad and his earliest followers had done, so he argued, should always trump subsequent tradition. Like Luther, Ibn Taymiyya was condemned as a heretic; but he also, again like Luther, blazed a momentous trail. 早在13世纪，大马士革一位名叫Ibn Taymiyya的学者就认为，领悟真主意图最稳妥的方法就是研习最早三代穆斯林（“先贤”，或称“萨拉菲”）的事迹。他宣称，关于穆罕默德及其最早期追随者所作所为的记载，永远比后来形成的传统更为权威。正如路德一样，Ibn Taymiyya也曾被斥为异端；但是，还是跟路德一样，他同样开辟了一条重要道路。 Salafism today is probably the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world. The interpretation that Isis applies to Muslim scripture may be exceptional for its savagery – but not for its literalism. Islamic State, in its conceit that it has trampled down the weeds and briars of tradition and penetrated to the truth of God’s dictates, is recognisably Salafist. 萨拉菲主义可能是当今世界扩散最迅速的伊斯兰教运动。伊斯兰国对伊斯兰经文的解释，在其野蛮性上或许颇为罕见，但是在字面主义上却绝对正宗。伊斯兰国幻想自己消灭了宗教传统中的毒草，洞悉上帝的旨意，这很明显是萨拉菲主义的特质。 When Islamic State fighters smash the statues of pagan gods, they are following the example of the Prophet; when they proclaim themselves the shock troops of a would-be global empire, they are following the example of the warriors of the original caliphate; when they execute enemy combatants, and impose discriminatory taxes on Christians, and take the women of defeated opponents as slaves, they are doing nothing that the first Muslims did not glory in. 当伊斯兰国战士毁坏异教神祗的雕像时，他们效仿的是先知的先例；当他们宣称自己是未来统治世界的帝国的骁勇之师时，他们效仿的是最早的哈里发国的军队。当他们处决敌军战士，对基督徒征收歧视性的税目，以及把被打败对手的女人当作奴隶时，没有一件不是初代穆斯林引以为豪的。 Such behaviour is certainly not synonymous with Islam; but if not Islamic, then it is hard to know what else it is. 这种行为与伊斯兰教肯定不是百分之百相符的；但要是说这种行为不是伊斯兰的，那就很难说它到底是什么了。 Admittedly the actions of those signed up to Islamic State are unlikely to have been inspired exclusively by religious teachings. Many of those fighting for Isis may indeed, as Hasan points out, be varnishing their taste for violence or power with a sheen of piety. But the same was true of those inspired by Luther’s teachings – not to mention the early Muslims themselves. 诚然，伊斯兰国的这些行为不可能仅仅由宗教教义驱动。Hasan指出，isis的许多斗士，可能仅仅是将他们对权力和暴力的欲望粉饰为了对神的虔诚。但是，被路德的教导所鼓舞的人也是如此呀——更不要提那些早期的穆斯林们了。 Back in the time of the Salafs, avarice and religiosity frequently coincided. When a slave revolt erupted in Syria and Iraq less than 50 years after the death of Muhammad, the Arab conquerors were outraged. “These slaves are our booty,” one of them exclaimed. “They were granted us by God!” 在萨拉菲们的时代，虔诚与贪婪往往同时发生。穆罕默德去世不到50年，叙利亚和伊拉克爆发了奴隶起义，阿拉伯征服者们大发雷霆，其中一人宣称“这些奴隶是我们的战利品，他们是真主赐予我们的！” Jihadis in Raqqa have tweeted in similar tones about uppity Yazidi slaves. To imagine that religious motivation can somehow be isolated from the complex swirl of ambitions, fears and desires that constitute human nature is to fall for an illusion: that religions, contingent as they are, and as subject to evolution as any other manifestation of culture, exist as abstract ideals. 在推特上，拉卡的圣战者对不易控制的雅兹迪奴隶也有相同的论调。如果我们假想宗教驱动力可以从构成人类本性的野心、恐惧、欲望所组成的复杂漩涡中独立出来，我们就会陷入一种幻觉：宗教飘忽不定，并且如同其他文化表现形式一样总在持续演变，只是作为抽象理念而存在。 The truth is that in Islam today, as in Christianity during the Reformation, the spectrum of those who practise the faith is widening to convulsive effect. Hasan’s dismissal of two Isis recruits from Birmingham as “religious novices” echoes the horror of Catholic scholars such as Thomas More at the pretensions of Protestant tailors and tinkers. 真相是，今日的伊斯兰教就如同宗教改革期间的基督教一样，信徒们的思想差异极大，造成了令人震惊的后果。Hasan对Isis从伯明翰招募的两名成员不屑一顾，称之为“宗教菜鸟”，这种反感与Thomas More等天主教学者面对新教裁缝和修补匠的主张时的感觉一样。 Just as in the early 16th century the printing press and the efforts of translators such as Luther and Tyndale served to democratise knowledge of the Bible, so in the 21st century has the ready availability on the internet of the Quran and the hadiths in the vernacular enabled rappers, security guards and schoolgirls all to bandy scripture. 正如16世纪时出版印刷业以及路德和廷代尔等翻译者曾对《圣经》知识平民化作出过贡献一样，在21世纪，网络上译成本地语言的《古兰经》及《穆罕默德言行录》唾手可得，这也使得说唱艺人、保安和女学生们都能把经文挂在嘴边。 To complain that quranic verses which mandate crucifixion or beheading are being cited without reference to the traditions of Islamic jurisprudence is to miss the point. It is precisely because Isis militants imagine themselves the equivalent of Muhammad’s companions, blessed with an unadorned understanding of God’s commands, that they feel qualified to establish a caliphate. 指责他们不参考伊斯兰教法传统就直接引用那些鼓励刑罚和砍头的《古兰经》经文，这种批评没有抓住要点。正是因为Isis战士认为他们自己等同于穆罕默德的同伴，被赐予了对真主旨意的准确理解，他们才认为自己有资格建立哈里发国。 “My people,” so Muhammad is once said to have warned, “are destined to split into 73 factions – all of which, except one, will end up in hell.” Who, then, Muslims have often wondered, will gain paradise? Isis, like so many of the various other sects that have emerged in the course of Islamic history, appears confident of the answer. 据说穆罕默德曾经警告过：“我的人民注定要分裂成73个派别，除了一个，其他的都要下地狱。”穆斯林们一直在疑惑：究竟是谁会上天堂？正如历史上涌现出的其他伊斯兰教派别一样，Isis对这个问题的答案似乎很自信。 It is not merely coincidence that IS currently boasts a caliph, imposes quranically mandated taxes, topples idols, chops the hands off thieves, stones adulterers, executes homosexuals and carries a flag that bears the Muslim declaration of faith. If Islamic State is indeed to be categorised as a phenomenon distinct from Islam, it urgently needs a manifest and impermeable firewall raised between them. At the moment, though, I fail to see it. 现在，IS夸口自居为哈里发，征收《古兰经》要求的税目、推倒偶像、砍掉盗贼的手、把通奸者石刑处死、处死同性恋者，并且采用穆斯林的见证言作为旗帜，所有这些都并非巧合。如果伊斯兰国一定要被定义成与伊斯兰教毫无关系的现象，那么两者之间就需要树立一堵明白无误、密不透风的防火墙。现在，我还没有看到这堵墙。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

ISIS简史：全球最可怕的恐怖组织是如何长成的 ISIS, a history: how the world's worst terror group came to be

作者：Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：VOX，http://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9760284/isis-history To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria — why it exists, what it wants, and why it commits terrible violence of which the Paris attacks are only the latest — you need to understand the tangled story of how it came to be. 如果想了解伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（ISIS）——为什么它会存在，它想要什么，还有为什么它会犯下诸如最近的巴黎恐怖袭击之类可怕暴行——你需要了解在它成长历程中所发生的曲折故事。 The group began, in a very different form, in 1999. In the 16 years since, it has been shaped by — and has at moments helped to shape — the conflicts, physical and ideological, of the Middle East. 该组织始建于1999年，但它在当时的形式与现在大不相同。在之后的16年中，它被中东的武力和意识形态冲突所塑造，也时而塑造着这些冲突。 Here, then, is a concise history of the rise of ISIS from its earliest origins to the present day. It is the story of one of the richest and most powerful terrorist organizations ever to exist — but it's also a story that reveals the ways in which ISIS has proven much weaker than you might think. 在这里，我将呈现ISIS从最初的起源直到今天的一部简明历史。这是关于史上最富有也最强悍的恐怖组织之一的故事——但这个故事也同样揭示了，ISIS的一些所作所为，证明了它实际上比人们所想象的要脆弱得多。 1989–1999: The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the beginning of ISIS 1989-1999：苏联的阿富汗战争和ISIS的发端

【Abu Musab al-Zarqawi（即扎卡维）在伊拉克。】

You cannot understand ISIS without understanding al-Qaeda and the history they share, as well as the differences, there at the beginning, that would ultimately divide them. And al-Qaeda's origin story begins with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 如果不了解基地组织以及它和ISIS的共同历史，还有它们之间一开始就存在的差异（正是这些差异让它们最终分道扬镳），你就无法真正地了解ISIS。基地组织的故事最初始于苏联在1979年入侵阿富汗。 Soviet aggression shocked the Muslim world, galvanizing roughly 20,000 foreign fighters to help Afghans resist Soviet forces. That's where Osama bin Laden met a number of other young radicals, who together formed the core of the al-Qaeda network. 苏联的侵略震惊了整个穆斯林世界，并激起了大约2万名外国战士帮助阿富汗人抵抗苏联军队。正是在那里，奥萨马·本·拉登遇上了一群年轻的极端分子，他们共同组建了基地组织网络的核心团队。 The Soviets withdrew in 1988, but they left a puppet regime in place, and the war continued. The next year, a Jordanian man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah joined them. 苏联人在1988年撤离了阿富汗，但是他们留下了一个傀儡政权，而战争也还在继续。第二年，一个名叫Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah的约旦人加入进来。 Al-Khalaylah would, years later, achieve global infamy under his nom de guerre, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He would found the group that became what we today call ISIS. 几年后，al-Khalaylah以他的别名Abu Musab al-Zarqawi（即扎卡维）在全球臭名昭著。他创建了在今天被我们称之为ISIS的恐怖组织。 When Zarqawi first traveled to Afghanistan, in 1989, he wasn't all that religious: He was, as Mary Anne Weaver writes in a definitive Atlantic profile, something of a petty thug. But once there, he met a man named Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading proponent of violent, fundamentalist Islam. Maqdisi converted Zarqawi to his cause. 当扎卡维在1989年第一次来到阿富汗时，他并不是那么满怀宗教热情：正如Mary Anne Weaver在《大西洋月刊》发布的一份权威传略中所写道的，他当时只不过是个小流氓。但一到阿富汗，他就遇上了一个名叫Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi的暴力伊斯兰原教旨主义的主要倡导者。Maqdisi按照自己的理念改造了扎卡维。 Zarqawi would not meet bin Laden for years, and the two men built up allies and followers independently from each other — a dynamic that made Zarqawi's network even more extreme than bin Laden's. 在之后的数年中，扎卡维都还没有遇上本·拉登，两人各自独立地建立起了自己的盟友和追随者网络——在此过程中，扎卡维的网络甚至比本·拉登的更极端。 "Whereas bin Laden and his cadre grew up in at least the upper middle class and had a university education, Zarqawi and those closest to him came from poorer, less educated backgrounds," Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes. "Zarqawi’s criminal past and extreme views on takfir (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) created major friction and distrust with bin Laden when the two first met in Afghanistan in 1999." “本·拉登和他的核心骨干都至少是在上层中产阶级长大的，而且也都受过大学教育，而扎卡维和他的亲信们则来自较贫穷，教育程度也较低的阶层，”华盛顿近东政策研究所的学者Aaron Zelin如此写道。“1999年扎卡维在阿富汗首次见到本·拉登时，他的犯罪前科和他关于塔克菲（通过将另一名穆斯林控诉为异教徒，而为将他杀死的行为提供穆斯林教法上的合法性）的极端观点在两人之间造成了很大的摩擦和不信任感。” 2003–2009: The rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Iraq 2003-2009：伊拉克基地组织的兴衰

【2006年，伊拉克北部不明身份的反美武装。】

Zarqawi returned from Afghanistan, and in 1999 in Jordan formed his own group, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ), or the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. For the first few years, Zarqawi's group was a bit player among jihadists, overshadowed by al-Qaeda. But this was the group, then little known, that would later become ISIS. 从阿富汗回来之后，扎卡维1999年在约旦建立了自己的组织，名为Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad（JTWJ），或叫“一神论与圣战组织”。在最初的几年中，扎卡维的组织和基地组织相比相形见绌，在众多伊斯兰圣战组织中只是个小玩家。但这个在当时还默默无闻的组织就是日后ISIS的雏形。 In 2003, the US led its invasion of Iraq and changed, in the world of jihadists, everything. 2003年，美国领导了对伊拉克的入侵行动，这完全改变了伊斯兰圣战者的世界。 The American-led war, by destroying the Iraqi state, left much of the country in chaos. Foreign fighters and extremists began moving into Iraq, assisted by Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, which sought to bog down the US. Zarqawi and his group were among them. 由美国所主导的伊拉克战争摧毁了伊拉克的国家机器，让这个国家的大部分地区陷入混乱的深渊。在力图将美国拖入泥潭的叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的帮助下，来自外国的战士和极端分子开始涌入伊拉克，而扎卡维和他的极端组织也在其中。 The Sunni extremists who arrived found a friendly audience among former Iraqi soldiers and officers: The US had disbanded Saddam Hussein's overwhelmingly Sunni army, which was disbanded in 2003, creating a group of men who were unemployed, battle-trained, and scared of life in an Iraq dominated by its Shia majority. 这些来到伊拉克的逊尼派极端分子在伊拉克前政权的士兵和军官中找到了一批知音：美国在2003年解散了效忠于萨达姆·侯赛因，以逊尼派占压倒性多数的军队，从而创造了一个受过实战训练的失业军人群体，他们对于生活在一个由占人口多数的什叶派统治的国家感到十分恐惧。 Zarqawi's group, as it fought in Iraq, grew to prominence, attracting al-Qaeda's attention. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, for which he would receive access to its funds and fighters. His group was renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and it became the country's leading Sunni insurgent group. 扎卡维的组织在伊拉克的战斗中不断成长壮大，最终吸引到了基地组织的注意。2004年，扎卡维宣誓向基地组织效忠，以换取基地组织所提供的资金和战士。他的组织被更名为伊拉克基地组织（AQI），而该组织也成为了伊拉克境内最主要的逊尼派武装力量。 AQI didn't just fight the Americans, it also attacked fellow Iraqis. It bombed Shia mosques and slaughtered Shia civilians, hoping to provoke mass Shia reprisals against Sunni civilians and thus force the Sunnis to rally behind AQI. It worked, and it's a tactic ISIS still uses today. It also helped spark a civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shia. 伊拉克基地组织不仅仅与美国人作战，它同样也攻击伊拉克同胞。它炸毁什叶派的清真寺并且屠杀什叶派平民，力图煽动什叶派对逊尼派平民的大规模报复，从而迫使逊尼派聚集在自己的羽翼之下。这一策略取得了成功，并且直到今天ISIS还在使用这样的策略。而这也引发了一场伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派之间的内战。 But these methods were too vicious even for al-Qaeda, which warned Zarqawi to cool it. He ignored the warnings, and AQI came to hold a swath of territory in Sunni parts of Iraq, roughly along the lines of what ISIS controls there today. Yet between 2006 and 2009, it all came crashing down: 但即使对于基地组织而言，这样的方法也显得太恶毒了，于是基地组织警告扎卡维，让他把事态冷却下来。但扎卡维无视这一警告，而伊拉克基地组织则进一步占领了伊拉克逊尼派聚居的一片土地，与ISIS今天在这里所控制区域的边界相仿。然而在2006年和2009年之间，这一切几乎都土崩瓦解了：

【由AQI和其他逊尼派叛乱团体控制的领土。】

Starting in 2006, AQI's extremism began to backfire. Sunni tribal leaders, who had always hated living under AQI's harsh and often violent rule, became convinced that the Shias were starting to win Iraq's sectarian civil war. To avoid being on the losing end of a bloody war, they up took arms against AQI in a movement called the Awakening. 从2006年开始，伊拉克基地组织所贯彻的极端主义开始遭遇挫折。那些对于生活在伊拉克基地组织严酷而暴力的统治之下一直心怀怨恨的逊尼派部落长老们开始相信，什叶派将会赢得这场伊拉克的宗派内战。为了避免在一场血腥战争中成为失败的一方，他们发起了一场称为“觉醒”的运动，武装反抗伊拉克基地组织。 Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a US airstrike, and the US increased its troop presence in Iraq that year and the next. But it was, more than anything else, the Awakening that defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq. 扎卡维在2006年死于美军空袭，而美国在当年和次年都往伊拉克增派驻军。但是在打败伊拉克基地组织的过程中，“觉醒”运动所发挥的作用还是超过了任何其它因素。 By 2009, almost all of AQI's fighters were dead or in prison, and the group was a shadow of itself. But it had learned a valuable lesson: Dissent from Sunnis under its rule could be disastrous. That's why, years later, ISIS has slaughtered members of Sunni tribes, such as Iraq's Abu Nimr, en masse. It sees brutality as the best way to prevent a replay of the 2006 uprising that led to its downfall. 到2009年，几乎所有伊拉克基地组织的战士都已被歼灭或是被关进了监狱，组织几乎名存实亡。但是它学到了宝贵的一课：受其统治的逊尼派的不满可以带来灾难性的后果。这也是为何在几年之后，ISIS屠杀了一些逊尼派的部族成员，例如对伊拉克Abu Nimr部落的集体屠杀。为防止类似2006年那场导致它衰落的起义重演，它将残酷暴行视为最佳的预防措施。 2010: Iraq begins unraveling, setting the stage for AQI's comeback 2010年：伊拉克开始解体，并为伊拉克基地组织的回归创造了舞台

【伊拉克前总理Nouri al-Maliki（马利基）。】

ISIS was able to rise from AQI's ashes in no small part because of Iraq's catastrophic internal politics. ISIS之所以能从伊拉克基地组织的废墟之上重新崛起，很大程度上是由于伊拉克灾难性的国内政治。 "Iraq was the essential incubator," according to Fred Hof, who for part of 2012 served as the Obama administration's special adviser for the transition in Syria. “伊拉克是ISIS成长所必需的孵化器”，Fred Hof如此评论道。2012年有段时间，他曾担任奥巴马政府关于叙利亚过渡时期问题的特别顾问。 By 2010, "Iraq finally had relatively good security, a generous state budget, and positive relations among the country’s various ethnic and religious communities," Zaid al-Ali, author of The Struggle for Iraq's Future, wrote in Foreign Policy. But it was squandered. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stripped political opponents of power, appointed his cronies to run the army, and killed peaceful protestors. 到2010年，“伊拉克终于拥有了相对较好的安全局势，宽松的国家预算，国内各种族和宗教群体之间的关系也比较积极，”《挣扎中的伊拉克》的作者Zaid al-Ali在《外交政策》杂志上写道。但这些有利形势最终都被浪费掉了。伊拉克总理Nouri al-Maliki（马利基）剥夺了政敌们的权力，安排自己的亲信控制军队，并且杀害了一些和平抗议者。 Most importantly, he reconstructed the Iraqi state on sectarian lines, privileging the Shia majority over the Sunni minority. This exacerbated Iraq's existing sectarian tensions: Sunni Iraqis falsely believed themselves to be Iraqi's majority (owing to Saddam-era propaganda) and saw Maliki as depriving them of their rightful control of the state. He only deepened their belief that the Iraqi state was fundamentally illegitimate. 而最重要的是，他按照宗教派别重塑了伊拉克，让占人口多数的什叶派获得了比占人口少数的逊尼派更多的特权。这加剧了伊拉克国内本已存在的宗派紧张局势：伊拉克的逊尼派总是误以为他们才是伊拉克真正的“多数派”（这要归因于萨达姆时期的宣传），因而觉得马利基在剥夺他们对国家应有的控制权。逊尼派认为伊拉克现政府根本不具有合法性，而马利基的做法加深了他们的这一信念。 By this time, al-Qaeda in Iraq had a new leader: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi who had a background in serious religious scholarship. Under his leadership, AQI began allying with former officers from Saddam Hussein's army and recruited disaffected Sunnis. Iraq's own government, unintentionally, gave them exactly the opening they needed to regain strength. 此时，伊拉克基地组织有了一位新领袖：巴格达迪，他是一个拥有着严肃宗教学术背景的伊拉克人。在他的领导下，伊拉克基地组织开始与一些前萨达姆军队的军官建立同盟，并且招募了一些对伊拉克现政府极度不满的逊尼派穆斯林。伊拉克政府在不经意间为他们的东山再起提供了绝佳机会。 "Raw political sectarianism in Iraq was the main causal factor [in ISIS's rise]," Hof writes. “伊拉克国内原始的政治宗派斗争是ISIS再次崛起的主要原因，”Hof如此写道。 August 2011: AQI's remnants move into Syria — with a little help from Assad 2011年8月：在阿萨德的一点帮助下，伊拉克基地组织的残余力量进入叙利亚

【叙利亚叛军哀悼战友的死亡。】

Around this same time, Syria erupted in Arab Spring protests that became a civil war. In March 2011, Syrian demonstrators took to the streets to demand Bashar al-Assad step down. Almost right away, the Syrian regime began slaughtering protestors in an attempt to provoke a civil war. 几乎在同一时间，叙利亚 爆发了“阿拉伯之春”运动，而这最终演变成了一场内战。在2011年3月，叙利亚的抗议者占领了大街小巷，要求巴沙尔·阿萨德下台。叙利亚政权很快开始屠杀抗议者，以图引发内战。 "It was very much a strategic decision that the regime made, to militarize the conflict right away," Glenn Robinson, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me in a phone conversation. "I think, in their mind and correctly, if this becomes a political battle where populations matter, the regime probably only has support of a third of the country ... the opposition has the numbers." “迅速地将这场冲突军事化，实际上是阿萨德政权所采取的一项相当有战略意义的决策”，美国海军研究生院的副教授Glenn Robinson在一次电话采访中如此对我说。“我认为，在他们看来，如果这场冲突演变成一场人口因素起重要作用的政治斗争，阿萨德政权可能仅仅能获得全国三分之一人口的支持……反对派则占据着人口的大多数，这个判断是正确的。”【编注：叙利亚1700万人口中，74%为逊尼派，控制政权的阿拉维派（什叶派的一个支派）仅占12%。】 Perhaps the most devious part of this strategy was Assad's deliberate effort to promote Islamic extremism among the opposition. In amnesties issued between March and October 2011, Assad released a significant number (exact counts are hard to know) of extremists from Syrian prisons. Hof called this an "effort to pollute the opposition with sectarianism": Assad gambled that if his enemies were Islamic militants, then the West wouldn't intervene against him. 也许这一策略中最为邪恶的部分在于，阿萨德蓄意地在反对派中散布伊斯兰极端主义。在2011年3月到10月的大赦中，阿萨德从叙利亚监狱中释放了相当数量（很难得知准确数字）的极端分子。Hof称之为“一项试图用宗派主义污染反对派阵营的举措”：阿萨德赌了一把，如果他的敌人是伊斯兰激进武装分子，那么西方各国就不会采取针对他的干预行动。 In August 2011, Baghdadi sent a top deputy, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, to Syria to set up a new branch of the AQI in the country. Joulani succeeded, establishing Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012. Joulani's fighters quickly proved themselves to be some of the most effective fighters on the Syrian battlefield, swelling their ranks with new recruits. 2011年8月，巴格达迪将他的得力副手Abu Mohammad al-Joulani派往叙利亚，以在叙境内建立伊拉克基地组织的新分支。Joulani的行动获得了成功，他在2012年1月建立了一个名为Jabhat al-Nusra（即努斯拉阵线）的组织。Joulani的战士们迅速证明了他们是叙利亚战场上最高效的战斗群体之一，并通过招募大量新成员提升了组织的地位。 At this point, Baghdadi's original group was still in Iraq alone. It had not become ISIS. But to understand how it did, you have to see the larger forces that opened his way. 巴格达迪的组织此时仍仅限于在伊拉克境内活动，它还没有成为那个令人谈之色变的ISIS。如果想要了解它后来是如何做到这一点的，你需要了解一下为巴格达迪铺平道路的那些更加强大力量。 Early 2012: Syrian jihadists get their "angel investors" 2012年初：叙利亚的圣战者迎来了他们的“天使投资人” Today, ISIS is the world's richest terrorist group, its funding coming mostly from various extortion schemes in the territory it controls. But back in 2012, foreign donations played a crucial role in growing the group from the poor organization it was then into the monster it is today. 今天，ISIS是世界上最富有的恐怖组织，它主要依靠在控制区进行各种掠夺来获得资金。但回到2012年，在这个当时还穷困潦倒的组织成长为今天这头恐怖怪兽的过程中，来自国外的捐助扮演了关键角色。 In 2012, money flew into Syria from the Gulf Arab states — places like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The key investments in ISIS didn't come directly from those countries' governments, but rather from private individuals living there who wanted to see the Assad regime fall — and perhaps to promote extremism itself. 2012年，来自波斯湾阿拉伯国家（例如科威特、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔）的资金涌入了叙利亚。ISIS所得到的主要投资并不直接来自这些国家的政府，而是来自生活在这些国家的国民，他们希望看到阿萨德政权倒台——也可能只是为了推行伊斯兰极端主义。 "These rich Arabs are like what 'angel investors' are to tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred," former US Navy Admiral and NATO Supreme Commander James Stavridis told NBC last June. "Groups like al-Nusra and ISIS are better investments for them [than moderates]." “这些阿拉伯富豪所扮演的角色就像是科技初创企业的‘天使投资人’，唯一的区别在于，他们的目的是创立一些旨在煽动仇恨的极端组织，”前美国海军上将和北约总司令James Stavridis将军在去年6月向NBC表示，“（相对于温和派），像努斯拉阵线和ISIS这样的组织对他们而言是更好的投资。” Though these donors have since faded in importance, they were invaluable at the time. "The individuals," Stavridis explained, "act as high rollers early, providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly capable of raising funds through other means, like kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling women into slavery, etc." 虽然这些捐款人的重要性自此逐渐减退，但他们在当时对ISIS是无价之宝。Starvridis将军解释道，“这些富人在早期一掷千金，为极端组织提供了种子基金。而一旦这些组织能够站稳脚跟，他们就完全有能力通过其它的手段获得资金，例如绑架人质，走私石油，将妇女贩卖为奴等等。” But while the Gulf financiers' intent may have been to hurt Assad, they actually ended up propping him up by playing into his strategy of promoting extremism. 虽然这些波斯湾“投资人”最初可能是为了打击阿萨德政权，但结果却是通过散布极端主义而成了阿萨德的棋子，最终帮助了阿萨德。 "It was a service of incalculable value to the Assad regime: It enabled him to say — albeit inaccurately — that he was the alternative to terrorism and sectarianism," Hof told me via email. “这对阿萨德政权是无价之宝：这让他可以说——虽然并不准确——自己是恐怖主义和宗派极端主义之外的另一个选项，”Hof通过电子邮件对我说。 July 2012: The great ISIS prison break begins 2012年7月：ISIS的大规模劫狱行动开始

【伊拉克在2009年重开阿布格莱布监狱。大约四年之后，ISIS从这里释放了500-1000名囚犯。】

There's one chapter of the story of ISIS's rise that very rarely gets mentioned: its spectacular series of attacks on Iraqi prisons in 2012 and 2013. These prison breaks supplied it with a huge infusion of recruits, and also illustrates how effectively ISIS took advantage of the Iraqi government's weakness. 在ISIS的崛起中，有一个很少被人们提起的重要章节：它在2012年和2013年间对伊拉克境内的监狱发动了一系列惊人的袭击。这一系列的劫狱行动为它注入了大量新鲜血液，而这同时也显示了ISIS多么懂得利用伊拉克政府的弱点。 In July 2012, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a statement to his loyalists. "We remind you of your top priority, which is to release the Muslim prisoners everywhere," he said, "and making the pursuit, chase, and killing of their butchers from amongst the judges, detectives, and guards to be on top of the list." 巴格达迪在2012年7月向他的效忠者们发布了如下声明：“我们在此提醒你们，当前的首要任务是在各地解放被关押在监狱里的穆斯林，而从法官、警探和守卫中找出那些迫害他们的人，追捕并杀死这些刽子手，也是你们极其重要的任务。” This was, unambiguously, a call to break former Iraqi insurgents out of jail — and ISIS followed their leader's order. Over the next year, they attacked a number of prisons across Iraq, freeing somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 inmates. 毫无疑问，巴格达迪这是在号召自己的支持者帮助伊拉克的前叛乱分子越狱——而ISIS成员也忠实执行了领袖的命令。在接下来的一年中，他们袭击了伊拉克境内的多所监狱，并放出了其中的大约1000名囚犯。 These included, former CIA analyst Aki Peretz writes, "many terrorists [that] elite US military forces caught over the years and then handed over to the Iraqi government when the United States turned over custody of its prison facilities in 2010." 前中央情报局分析员Aki Peretz写道：“这其中包括许多由美军精英部队在过去数年中抓捕的恐怖分子，在美国2010年向伊拉克移交监狱设施时，他们也被交给了伊拉克政府。” People incarcerated for common crimes were also recruited. "Prisoners convicted of criminal charges provide advantages to the terrorist group, because they could have been recruited during their incarceration," Peretz writes. "Even if common criminals were able to resist jihadist persuasion efforts while in prison, they may now feel indebted to their 'liberators.'" 一些之前因普通罪行而被送进监狱的人也在ISIS的招募之列。“受过犯罪指控的囚犯对恐怖组织很有价值，因为他们可能在服刑期间就已经被招募了，”Peretz写道，“这些普通罪犯即使在狱中能够经受住圣战分子的劝说，他们在逃出监狱之后也可能对这些‘解放者’心存感激。” This won ISIS a rapid infusion of manpower — and also illustrates that well before the 2014 crisis, we had signs that the Iraqi state was falling apart in a way that would empower extremists. The ISIS crisis didn't come out of nowhere, in other words: It was a slow motion disaster with plenty of advance warning. 这为ISIS迅速注入了大量人力——同时也表明，早在2014年的危机之前很久，已经有了一些迹象让我们就能够看到伊拉克国家的解体方式将会增强极端势力。ISIS危机并不是凭空出现的，换句话说：这实际上是一场“慢动作”的灾难，而且有着大量的预先警示。 April 2013: ISIS officially becomes ISIS — and divorces al-Qaeda 2013年4月：ISIS正式成为“伊斯兰国”——并与“基地组织”分道扬镳

【一个ISIS战士拿着组织的旗帜。】

As all this was happening, Baghdadi's organization was still named al-Qaeda in Iraq. But Baghdadi worried that Joulani — his commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, the group in Syria — was acting too independently and would quit AQI to make Jabhat al-Nusra a separate group. 发生了那么多事情，巴格达迪的组织在此时仍然叫伊拉克基地组织。但是巴格达迪开始担心，他的手下Joulani——也就是叙利亚努斯拉阵线的首领——行动变得过于独立，而这可能会让他决定退出伊拉克基地组织，将努斯拉阵线变成一个独立的组织。 In April 2013, Baghdadi did something dramatic: He asserted unilateral control over all al-Qaeda operations in both Syria and Iraq. To demonstrate this change, he renamed AQI "the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria" — or ISIS, for short. 2013年4月，巴格达迪做了一件戏剧性的事情：他声称自己单方面控制了叙利亚和伊拉克境内所有的基地组织行动。为了证明这一点，他将伊拉克基地组织更名为“伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国”——简称ISIS。 This didn't sit well with Joulani, who appealed to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, who'd never really trusted AQI, sided with Joulani — a decision that Baghdadi rejected. ISIS and al-Qaeda eventually split, dividing the jihadist movement in Syria. 而Joulani则对此感到不满，他向基地组织领导人Ayman al-Zawahiri（即扎瓦赫里）申诉此事。扎瓦赫里从来就没有信任过伊拉克基地组织，他站在了Joulani一边——而巴格达迪则抵制了他的这一决定。ISIS和基地组织最终分道扬镳了，叙利亚境内的圣战运动也就此分裂。 This left ISIS to "gradually emerge as an autonomous component within the Syrian conflict," Brookings Doha's Charles Lister writes, by absorbing Nusra fighters and territory in northern and eastern Syria. It ended up taking firm control of much of this territory, establishing a de facto capital in the northern city of Raqqa. 在这之后，通过在叙利亚北部和东部地区吸收努斯拉阵线的战士和领地，ISIS“作为一个完全独立的组织逐渐在叙利亚内战中成长壮大”，布鲁金斯学会多哈分会的Charles Lister写道。最终，ISIS牢牢地控制了该区域的大部分地区，并在叙利亚北部城市拉卡建立了一个实质上的首都。 Assad, for his part, was perfectly happy to leave ISIS alone — particularly as it primarily fought other rebel groups. "ISIS almost never fought the Assad regime," Robinson says. "They were much more focused on fighting other opposition groups and gaining land their opponents had already acquired." 对于阿萨德来说，他非常乐于对ISIS置之不理——部分原因是它主要在与叙利亚的其它叛军组织作战。“ISIS几乎从来没有和阿萨德政权打过仗，”Robinson说。“他们更专注于和其它反对派组织作战，并且抢占他们的领地。” By February 2014, Zawahiri had had enough. He formally exiled ISIS from al-Qaeda, leading to what Zelin describes as "open warfare in Syria" between the groups. Today, the groups continue to struggle over territory and ideological control over the global jihadist movement. 到2014年2月，扎瓦赫里终于受够了ISIS的所作所为。他正式将ISIS逐出了基地组织，这导致了这两个组织间开始爆发冲突，Zelin称之为“叙利亚境内的公开战争”。直至今天，ISIS和基地组织仍然在争夺领地，以及对全球伊斯兰圣战运动的意识形态控制权。 This dynamic, in part, drives ISIS's brutality: One of the group's key means of capturing foreign fighters' hearts and minds is through public, over-the-top slaughter that wins their attention. 这在一定程度上也助长了ISIS的残暴作风：该组织在吸引外国战士的人心方面最强的杀手锏之一，就是通过公开而极端残暴的屠杀行为来吸引注意。 June 2014: ISIS sweeps northern Iraq and declares a caliphate 2014年6月：ISIS横扫伊拉克北部，并宣布建立哈里发国家

【Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi。（巴格达迪）】

This is the moment when everything that had happened before in ISIS's rise came to a head. On June 10, 2014, a force of about 800 ISIS fighters defeated 30,000 Iraqi government troops to capture Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. In the next two days, ISIS fighters swept through Iraq's heavily Sunni northwestern and central provinces — coming, at their peak, extremely close to Baghdad. 经过之前所发生的一切之后，ISIS的崛起迎来了高潮。2014年6月10日，一支由800名ISIS战士组成的军队战胜了3万名伊拉克政府军，攻占伊拉克第二大城市摩苏尔。其后两天，ISIS战士横扫了逊尼派人口集中的伊拉克西北部和中部省份——在他们推进到最远的时候，曾一度非常接近巴格达。 This blitzkrieg built on months of ISIS momentum. In January, ISIS had seized control of Fallujah, a former AQI stronghold in western Iraq. The Iraqi government's repeated inability to retake Fallujah in the following months illustrated the depleted and incompetent state of the Iraqi army after years of Maliki's mismanagement. 这场闪电战建立在ISIS持续数月的凌厉攻势之上。在1月份，ISIS已经占领了费卢杰——伊拉克基地组织之前在伊拉克西部的重要堡垒。伊拉克政府军在之后几个月中数次试图夺回对费卢杰的控制权，但全都无功而返，这也表现出在马利基多年的糟糕治理之后，伊拉克政府军已经筋疲力尽，无力回天。 The conquest of Mosul and much of northern Iraq led a triumphant Baghdadi to declare his territory a "caliphate" on July 4. By this, Baghdadi meant that ISIS was now a state — and not just any state but the only Islamically legitimate state in the world. All Muslims, Baghdadi said, were obligated to support the nascent Islamic state in its struggle to hold and expand its land. 征服摩苏尔以及伊拉克北部大片地区，令志得意满的巴格达迪在7月4日宣布在他领地上建立了一个“哈里发国”。巴格达迪想借此宣示ISIS现在是一个国家——不是一个平常的国家，而是全球唯一在伊斯兰教义上合法的国家。巴格达迪表示，所有的穆斯林都有义务支持这个新生的伊斯兰国守卫并扩张领土。 Establishing a caliphate had long been the goal of the entire jihadist movement. By declaring that he had actually created one, Baghdadi gained a huge leg up on al-Qaeda in the struggle for global jihadist supremacy. 建立一个哈里发国一直以来都是整个伊斯兰圣战运动的目标。通过宣称建立一个这样的国家，巴格达迪在对全球伊斯兰圣战运动领导权的争夺中，获得了相对于基地组织的巨大优势。 Since then, ISIS has "succeeded in attracting far, far more recruits" than al-Qaeda, Will McCants, the director of the Brookings Institution's Project on US Relations With the Islamic World, told me. This has also has allowed it to gain a following among foreign terrorist groups, with major ISIS franchises in Libya, Egypt's Sinai desert, and Nigeria. 从那以后，ISIS比基地组织“成功地招募到了多得多的新鲜血液”，布鲁金斯学会美国与伊斯兰世界关系研究项目主任Will McCants如此对我说。这还使得ISIS能够获得其它境外恐怖组织的效忠，这些追随者主要在利比亚，埃及的西奈沙漠和尼日利亚。 But ISIS had also taken a task with burdens beyond what it can perhaps sustain. By committing to actually governing a swath of territory in Syria and Iraq as a state, ISIS couldn't rely purely on insurgent tactics or hiding among civilians. It needed to engage in pitched conventional battles to defend its land. 但与此同时，ISIS也承担了一项超出其能力的任务。由于承诺将叙利亚和伊拉克的一片土地作为一个国家来治理，ISIS不能继续仅仅依赖武装暴乱或是藏身于平民之中这类策略。它将要面对守卫领土的常规战斗。 "When they declared the caliphate, their legitimacy came to rest on the continuing viability of their state," Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told me last October. In the coming year, this would prove to be a serious problem for the group. “当他们宣布建立哈里发国，他们的合法性就建立在这个国家持续生存的状态之上，”保卫民主基金会的一位资深研究员Daveed Gartenstein-Ross去年十月对我说。在之后的一年中，事实证明这是ISIS所面对的一个严重问题。 August 2014: ISIS makes its first huge mistake — invading Kurdistan 2014年8月：ISIS犯下第一个大错——入侵库尔德斯坦

【2015年，一个身处与ISIS战争前线的库尔德战士】

Ever since its AQI days, ISIS had been prone to ideological and political overstretch. 从伊拉克基地组织年代开始，ISIS就已经热衷于在意识形态和政治上的过度扩张。 "To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law," Graeme Wood explains in an excellent Atlantic feature on ISIS's theology. One condition is that "the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law." Once the caliphate is established, "the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph." “一个人如果想成为哈里发，就必须满足逊尼派教法中所规定的诸多条件，”Graeme Wood在一篇发表在《大西洋月刊》上的关于ISIS宗教意识形态的出色专题文章中写道。其中一个条件就是“哈里发必须拥有一块他能够实施伊斯兰教法的领土。”一旦建立了哈里发国家，“发动战争以扩张哈里发国的领土就成为了哈里发本人的一项重要责任。” Everything we know about ISIS suggests that both its fighters and Baghdadi himself earnestly believe this. This is what led them to attack Iraq's Kurds. 从我们对ISIS的了解来看，不论是ISIS战士还是巴格达迪本人都虔诚地相信这一点。而这也导致了他们攻击伊拉克库尔德人。 Iraq's Kurdish minority controls a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Iraq, and has a powerful military force known as the peshmerga. For the first half of 2014, they had been content to sit out the ISIS conflict. 伊拉克的库尔德少数民族控制着伊拉克东北部一块半自治的区域，并且拥有一支被称为“自由战士”的强大军事力量。在2014年上半年，他们还安于与ISIS井水不犯河水的状态。 But in August 2014, ISIS decided to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, quickly advancing to within several miles of the capital, Erbil. It also launched a genocidal campaign against a minority group known as the Yazidi, who are ethnically Kurdish. 但在2014年8月，ISIS决定入侵伊拉克的库尔德斯坦，并迅速推进到库尔德斯坦首府阿尔比尔之外仅仅数英里的地方。它还发动了一场针对少数教派雅兹迪派的种族清洗行动，而雅兹迪人在种族上属于库尔德人。 This brought the peshmerga into the war, which have since dealt ISIS a series of stinging defeats. It also drew the United States into the war: President Obama's bombing campaign against ISIS initially began as a limited intervention to protect American personnel in Erbil and stem the slaughter of the Yazidis. ISIS的这一行径令库尔德“自由战士”加入战团，并多次痛击ISIS。美国也卷了进来：奥巴马总统对ISIS的轰炸行动最初就是为了保护阿尔比尔的美国人并阻止对雅兹迪人的屠杀而实行的一项有限干预措施。 ISIS's progress into Kurdistan was reversed. Pressed by Kurds, a regrouping Iraqi military, Iranian-backed Shia militias, and US aircraft, ISIS began to fall back. By early 2015, ISIS began taking losses: The heavily Sunni city of Tikrit fell to Iraqi forces in April. ISIS进军库尔德斯坦失败了。在库尔德人，重新集结的伊拉克军队，由伊朗支持的什叶派武装，以及美国空军的共同打压之下，ISIS开始撤退。到2015年初，ISIS开始遭受进一步的损失：逊尼派居民占多数的提克里特的控制权在4月被伊拉克军队夺走。 "The Islamic State ... will lose its battle to hold territory in Iraq," Douglas Ollivant, the former national security adviser for Iraq under both George W. Bush and Obama, wrote in War on the Rocks this February. "The outcome in Iraq is now clear to most serious analysts." “伊斯兰国...将无法守住他们在伊拉克的领地，”曾在布什政府和奥巴马政府担任伊拉克问题国家安全顾问的Douglas Ollivant在今年二月发表在网站War on the Rocks上的一篇文章中写道。“绝大多数严肃的分析家都已经看清了他们在伊拉克的结局。” June 2015: ISIS's capital comes under threat 2015年6月：ISIS的首都受到威胁

【6月25日左右叙利亚北部战线的地图。注意库尔德人的阵地离拉卡有多近。】

In Syria, things had long looked better for ISIS than they had in Iraq: the multi-sided civil war meant that there was no unified, reliable force to challenge them. But in mid-2015, Syrian Kurds began threatening ISIS's territory. 一直以来，ISIS在叙利亚所面临的局面看起来都要比在伊拉克好得多：多方内战意味着不会有联合武装力量持续向他们发起挑战。但是在2015年年中，叙利亚的库尔德人也开始威胁ISIS在叙境内的领地。 ISIS, as in Iraq, had attempted to invade and conquer the territory within Syria that is dominated by Kurdish groups — and came damn close. In October 2014, ISIS nearly seized Kobane, a Kurdish stronghold on Syria's northern border with Turkey. 就像在伊拉克一样，ISIS也曾经在叙利亚境内试图侵略并征服由库尔德人统治的领地——并且差一点就得逞了。2014年10月，ISIS几乎攻占了库尔德人在叙利亚北部与土耳其接壤的边境要塞科巴尼。 But the Kurds held out for months. In January, aided by US support and US-led coalition air strikes, they pushed ISIS out of Kurdish territory. Then they kept going, seizing ISIS territory elsewhere in Syria. They advanced to within 30 miles of ISIS's de facto capital at Raqqa. 但是库尔德人坚守了数月。2015年1月，在美国的支持以及美军主导的多国联合轰炸之下，他们将ISIS从库尔德人的领地中赶了出去。之后他们进一步攻占了ISIS在叙利亚境内的一些其它领地，甚至推进到离ISIS的实际首都拉卡不到30英里的位置。 The Soufan Group, a private intelligence firm focusing on terrorism, described the Kurdish-led advance on Raqqa as the "most serious symbolic and meaningful threat [to ISIS] since it declared itself a caliphate almost one year ago." 专门关注恐怖主义的私人情报公司Soufan集团，将库尔德人领导的向拉卡进军的行动称作“自从大约一年前ISIS宣称成为一个哈里发国之后，它所遭受的最具象征意义和实际意义的威胁。” These Kurdish victories showed that ISIS was running up against the limits of its military strategy. Since last June, the group has been fighting too many enemies on too many different fronts. Its ability to maneuver rapidly around its territory has been limited by coalition airstrikes. Slowly but steadily, it has been losing ground. 库尔德人的胜利表明，ISIS所采取的行动超出了其军事能力的上限。自从去年6月开始，他们已经在太多的战线上与太多的敌人作战。它在自己领地内部的快速机动应变能力也受到了多国联合空袭的限制。事实上，它正在缓慢而稳定地失去根据地。 ISIS "lost something like 25 percent of their territory" since its peak last summer, McCants says. 相比去年夏天的顶峰，ISIS已经“失去了他们大约25%的领地”，McCants说道。 Autumn 2015: ISIS turns to international terrorism 2015年秋：ISIS开始发动国际性恐怖袭击

【巴黎Bataclan音乐厅周围的哀悼者】

On November 13, terrorists attacked several locations around Paris, killing more than 130 and wounding more than 380. ISIS claimed responsibility, and the French government has said that it believes the group was responsible. 在今年11月13日，恐怖分子在巴黎的多个地点发动了恐怖袭击，造成130多人死亡，380多人受伤。ISIS宣称对此次恐怖袭击负责，而法国政府在之前也已表示他们相信ISIS应对此次事件负责。 So why, as it slowly loses ground in Iraq and Syria, bit by bit losing the caliphate that has been its primary focus, might ISIS be sending fighters abroad at this critical moment? 那么，当ISIS正慢慢地在伊拉克和叙利亚丧失阵地，一点点失去这个曾是它主要奋斗目标的哈里发国之时，为什么却在这个生死攸关的时刻将它的战士们送到国外去发动恐怖袭击呢？ ISIS thrives on a narrative of victory. In order to sell itself as the prophesied return of the caliphate, it needs to show that its victories are inevitable and divinely inspired. If it's losing territory, then it needs to sell its narrative through other means. That means claiming "victory" over foreign enemies by hitting them with terrorist attacks. Indeed, Paris wasn't the only foreign attack ISIS has launched: ISIS suicide bombers have hit Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. It also claimed responsibility for taking down a Russian civilian airliner in Egypt's Sinai desert. ISIS是建立在一个关于胜利的叙事之上的。为了将自己塑造成伊斯兰预言中的哈里发帝国的形象，它需要展示出它的胜利是必然而神启的。如果它正在失去领土，那么它就必须通过其它方式来延续这个胜利的叙事。通过向外国敌人发动恐怖袭击来表示 “战胜了”他们，便是一种方式。显然，巴黎惨案并不是ISIS在国外所发动的唯一恐怖袭击：ISIS在科威特，黎巴嫩和沙特阿拉伯都发动过自杀式炸弹袭击。它还宣称对在埃及西奈沙漠中炸毁俄罗斯民用客机的事件负责。 "Much of ISIS's ideological support and recruiting strength emanates from a narrative that it is victorious," J.M. Berger, the co-author of ISIS: A State of Terror, explains via email. The Paris attack "changes the conversation from 'ISIS is contained' on November 12 to 'ISIS is rampaging uncontrollably' on November 14." “ISIS在意识形态上所获得的支持以及招募新员的能力在很大程度上都建立在一个它是胜利者的叙事之上，”《ISIS：一个恐怖国家》的合著者J.M. Berger在电子邮件中向我解释道。巴黎恐怖袭击“将人们所谈论的话题从11月12日的‘ISIS已经受到遏制’转变为了11月14日的‘ISIS的疯狂行为完全不受控制’。” Moreover, ISIS may believe that terrorist attacks are its best way of striking back against — and maybe, it believes, deterring — foreign attacks. (The French are part of the US-led coalition bombing ISIS in Syria and Iraq). That conclusion would likely be wrong, but ISIS may still believe it. 此外，ISIS可能还相信恐怖袭击是回击——甚至是阻止——外国敌人攻击的最佳方式。（法国参与了美国主导的对叙利亚和伊拉克境内ISIS的联合轰炸）。这个结论很可能是错误的，但ISIS也许仍然执着地相信这一点。 "I think it has made the calculation that it can no longer pursue its expansion strategy in Syria and Iraq without changing the calculations of the enemies currently halting its expansion," McCants says. "These attacks would be a way of inflicting costs on them." “我认为ISIS应该已经算计过，凭借自己身的实力，如果不改变那些正在阻止它扩张的敌人所面对的利害格局，它就无法继续实施在叙利亚和伊拉克的扩张策略，”McCants如此说道。“这些恐怖袭击就是对敌人们造成伤害的一种方式。” But here's one final scary twist: ISIS may not have planned it at all. The attack could have been independently undertaken by European IS

苍白无力的欧洲普世主义 Europe’s Bloodless Universalism 作者：Theodore Dalrymple @ 2015-11-19 译者：Veidt（@Veidt) 校对：Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源：Library of Law and Liberty，http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/19/europes-bloodless-universalism/ By now the story of Omar Ismail Mostefai, the first of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks to be named, is depressingly familiar. One could almost have written his biography before knowing anything about him. A petty criminal of Algerian parentage from what all the world now calls the banlieue, he was sustained largely by the social security system, an erstwhile fan of rap music, and a votary of what might be called the continuation of criminality by other means, which is to say Islamism and the grandiose purpose in life that it gives to its adherents. For feeble minds, the extremity of the consequences for self and others serves as some kind of guarantee that their cause is just. 到今天，巴黎袭击事件中第一个确定姓名的案犯Omar Ismail Mostefai的故事已经家喻户晓了。即使对他完全不了解，人们也能凭猜测为他写出一本传记。一个小混混，有着阿尔及利亚血统，成长于今天被世人称为“暴力街区”的市郊，主要依靠社保体系生活，曾经是饶舌音乐的爱好者，热诚地致力于伊斯兰教和它给予信徒们的宏伟人生目标——或者，从另一种意义上也可以说，是持续犯罪。对那些意志薄弱的人来说，最终将自己和他人带向死亡，也有着某种正当理由。 Nor was the connection to Molenbeek, a neighborhood in Brussels where at least three of the terrorists lived, much of a surprise to anyone. Brussels—the “capital of Europe,” be it remembered—is slightly more than a quarter Muslim, and nearly 100 percent of Molenbeek’s residents are Muslims of North African background. When a few years ago I was shown around the place, my acquaintances told me it was virtually extraterritorial as far as the Belgian state was concerned—apart from the collection of social security, of course. 而他与莫伦贝克区（至少三名参与巴黎恐袭的恐怖分子都来自这里）之间的联系也丝毫不会让人感到惊奇。布鲁塞尔——人们记忆中的“欧洲之都”——的穆斯林人口占比略高于四分之一，而几乎所有的莫伦贝克区居民都是北非裔穆斯林。几年前一些熟人带着我在那里参观的时候，他们告诉我，对比利时政府来说，这个区域几乎就是“免受司法管辖的治外之地”——当然，除了它还享受着这个国家的社保体系之外。 All the women wore headscarves, and the young men dressed like American rap music fans. The police rarely entered and were far more concerned not to offend Muslim sensibilities—for example, by not being seen to eat during Ramadan—than to find or capture the miscreants who made the area so dangerously crime-ridden. Businesses there (so my guides told me) paid no taxes but were not investigated for evasion by the tax authorities: it was the tax authorities who did the evading. 那里所有的女人都戴着头巾，而年轻男人都穿得像是美国饶舌音乐的狂热粉丝。警察很少进入这个区域，相比追踪和抓捕那些将这里变成一个犯罪猖獗之地的恶棍，他们更关心的是千万不要触碰到穆斯林的敏感之处——例如，不要在斋月期间被穆斯林看到在白天吃东西。在那里做各种生意（我的导游告诉我）都不交税，而且也不会受到税务局的调查：相反，税务局只要一听这个地方就会躲得远远的。 Everyone knew Islamist preaching and plotting were rife in Molenbeek, but nothing was done to stop it, in order to keep the tense and fragile peace going as long as possible. Sympathy for terrorism was the norm—or, it would be more correct to say, that no one dared publicly voice opposition to it. 所有人都知道，莫伦贝克区伊斯兰极端分子的宣传策划工作十分猖獗，却没有任何加以阻止的努力，而这只是为了将现有的脆弱和平状态维持得尽量久一些。对恐怖主义的同情成为常态——或者更准确的说，没有谁敢于公开反对。 If my informants were right, this was the perfect place for psychopaths with an illusion of purpose to flourish and make plans undisturbed by the authorities, while being supported by the welfare state. Events since have demonstrated that they did not exaggerate (as, to my regret, I rather suspected at the time that they did, for alarm is so often disproportionate to the reality that gives rise to it). 如果告诉我这些的人是对的，那么对于那些抱有疯狂幻想并且希望在不受当局干扰的状态下筹划自己行动的疯子们而言，这里就是人间天堂，与此同时，他们还能够享受福利国家的支持。之后发生的事件已经证明了他们并没有夸大其词（而令我后悔的是，当时他们提醒我时，我也对他们的看法表示怀疑，相比警告成真后人们所面对的残酷现实，之前的警告声总是显得微不足道）。 Recall that the terrorists who were disarmed on the train from Amsterdam to Paris in August came from Molenbeek, as did the man who killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. More volunteers to fight for ISIS have come from Molenbeek than anywhere else in Europe. 回想一下，今年8月那帮在阿姆斯特丹开往巴黎的火车上被人们提前发现并解除了武装的恐怖分子就来自于莫伦贝克区，而那个2014年在布鲁塞尔的犹太人博物馆里杀害了4个人的凶手也同样来自那里。莫伦贝克区为ISIS提供了比全欧洲任何其它地方都要多的志愿战士。 The Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel, has now virtually admitted that the area was extraterritorial to Belgium, and out of all control. The time had come “to focus more on repression,” he said. But whether the determination or sufficient political unity necessary to carry it out will last is doubtful. Repression requires discrimination; we live in a regime in which murderers may come and go, but social security goes on forever. 现在，比利时首相米歇尔实际上已经承认该区域已成比利时的“治外之地”，并且已经完全失去了控制。他说，现在应该“把更多的注意力集中在压制上”。但这种决心是否能得以坚持，或者，为实现这一目标所必须的足够的政治团结能够得以坚持，是值得怀疑的。压制就意味着区别对待，但在我们如今生活的这个社会制度下，杀人犯来来去去，而社会保障则永不中断。 Do we have the stomach to tar many people with the same brush? That we now know that terrorists among the Syrian refugees have entered Europe, which was precisely the objection of those opposed to accepting them (who were vilified by immigration-liberals for their moral obtuseness or nastiness, and have been proven right, which is even more unforgivable), now raises the disturbing question: How many innocent people should Europe accept for one suicide bomber? 但我们要不要一竿子打倒一船人呢？现在我们已经知道，有些恐怖分子藏在叙利亚难民队伍里混入了欧洲，这正是之前那些反对接纳叙利亚难民入欧的人们所提出的拒绝理由（为了诋毁他们，那些移民自由派们给他们扣上了“道德迟钝”或“道德败坏”之类的帽子，但最终事实证明他们的担忧是对的，这就让我们所犯下的错误变得更加不可原谅），而现状又给我们提出了一个令人困扰的问题：为了一个自杀式炸弹袭击者欧洲要接纳多少无辜的难民？ A striking thing about the immigration debate before the massacres of November 13 was the almost complete absence of references, at least by the “respectable” politicians, to the national interest of the various countries. The debate was couched in Kantian moral terms. Sweden, for example, which has no imperative to take refugees other than moral grandiosity and its desire to feel itself virtuous, has had a hard enough time integrating the immigrants it has already taken; their entry has made that country one with nearly the highest crime rate in Western Europe. Current family re-unification laws in Europe mean that the numbers any country agrees to take will soon be expanded. 11月13日的巴黎大屠杀发生之前，在有关移民政策的辩论中令人吃惊的一点是，几乎完全没有人——至少那些“令人尊敬的”政客们中没有人——提及各国的国家利益。这场辩论是以一种康德式道德辩论的方式进行的。举例来说，除了道德上华而不实的崇高感以及让自己觉得高尚之外，瑞典并没有任何必要去接收难民，整合已接收的难民也让其已经历了一段非常困难的时期；这些难民进入之后，几乎把瑞典变成了整个西欧犯罪率最高的国家。而当前欧洲有关家庭重聚的法律则意味着，很快每个国家都将同意接收数量更多的难民。 There is a real moral dilemma, of course. Recently in Bodrum, on the Aegean coast of Turkey, I was approached by a family of four Syrian refugees begging for alms. The father of the family showed me his Syrian passport (precisely of the kind so easily forged by the terrorists), but all I could see was his wife and two small children who were obviously bereft of support and who would obviously suffer without charity. That day, 22 refugees were reported drowned as they tried to reach Turkey by boat, an occurrence so regular that it was not reported in the Western press. No one undertakes such a journey lightly: only safety or an egocentric thirst for “martyrdom” could impel him. 显然，这里有个道德困境。最近在土耳其爱琴海沿岸城市博德鲁姆，一个叙利亚难民的四口之家走近我，希望我能施舍给他们些什么。这家的父亲给我看了他的叙利亚护照（正是那种恐怖分子非常容易伪造的护照），但我所看到的只是他妻子和两个年幼的孩子所表现出的无助，如果得不到施舍，他们显然会吃很多苦。在同一天，当地新闻报道了22名难民在乘船试图前往土耳其的途中溺水身亡的消息，而由于这类事情发生得如此频繁，西方媒体甚至都没有报道这条消息。没有人会轻易选择踏上这样一段旅途：只有对安全的强烈渴求或是个人主义的“殉道”热望才能让人踏上这条路。 Europe has nothing equivalent to national interest, and if it did, it would have no way of acting on it. A kind of bloodless universalism has rushed in to fill the vacuum, whose consequences are now visible to all. The first thing President Hollande tried to do after the attacks was close the borders; he now talks (understandably, of course) of national security. He talks also of defeating ISIS militarily, but France, along with all of the other European countries, has run down its armed forces in the name of the social security that paid for at least some of the terrorists. 欧洲没有国家利益之类的东西，即使有，也不存在以之为名做些什么的政治途径。于是一种苍白无力的普世主义便趁虚而入填补了这一空白，其后果已经呈现在了每个人面前。巴黎恐怖袭击发生后，奥朗德总统试图做的第一件事就是关闭边境；他现在开始谈论国家安全了（当然，这可以理解）。他同样开始谈论军事打击ISIS，然而法国和其它的欧洲国家一样，已经以社保资金不足为由削减了自己武装力量，而这些钱中至少有一部分落入了恐怖分子的口袋。 Just because Europe’s weakness is clear doesn’t mean that our heads are clear. Three days after the attacks, the most influential newspaper in Britain (and in certain ways the best), the liberal-Left Guardian, ran 40 small photos of some the victims, with the headline, “Killed in the Pitiless Name of Terrorism.” 虽然欧洲的弱点已展露无遗，但这并不意味着我们的脑子就清醒了。在巴黎恐怖袭击发生仅仅三天之后，英国最具影响力的报纸（从某些角度说也是最好的）——左翼自由派的《卫报》，刊登了40张遇害者的小幅照片，而使用的标题则是“以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而遭杀害”。 They were not killed in the pitiless name of terrorism, of course. They were killed in the pitiless name of Islam—not the only possible interpretation if Islam, no doubt, but still in its name. In the cowardice of this headline was the encapsulated all the weakness of Europe, a real encouragement to the terrorists. 当然,他们并非以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而被杀死。他们是以冷酷无情的伊斯兰之名而被杀死——是的，这不是解读伊斯兰的唯一方式，但这些杀戮仍是以伊斯兰之名而行。《卫报》标题中所表现出的懦弱是今天欧洲所有弱点的集中体现，而这对恐怖分子们来说则是一种实实在在的激励。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2014-09-27】 @whigzhou: 有些问题还是内部人看得比较明白 http://t.cn/RhHmztf “伊斯兰国的圣战分子，并不是凭空冒出来的。他们脱胎于一具日趋腐朽的巨人空壳——一个崩坏文明的残骸……他们所有人都相信那种同样的意识形态，对于这样一种他们自身抱有并深入到骨子里的意识形态，他们怎么可能去抗击？” @whigzhou: 伊斯兰精英/恐怖首领的心态，让我想起侯景，侯景是个胡人，但仰慕华夏文明，一心想混进士族豪门，却不得其门而入，加上脚瘸，内心极度自卑导致报复性的狂妄和凶残，一旦得势便成天下大祸。阿拉伯因石油而暴富，恰如侯景意外得势。 @whigzhou: 到伦敦去效仿贵族生活的，和资助恐怖分子的，基本上是同一批人  

迁就暴行换不来宗教宽容 辉格 2012年9月13日 9.11惨案11周年之际，伊斯兰激进主义者再次以其瞒旰暴行震惊了世人，比暴行本身更让人吃惊的是，从当事国家政要和媒体的反应中，正义的身影正在消退，是非不分的声音占了上风；在利比亚和埃及的美国使馆受攻击之后，希拉里的第一反应是“我的心都碎了”，好像这只是一次意外事故，奥巴马的最初声明也只是谴责，第二天才誓言要伸张正义，将罪犯绳之以法。 奥巴马后来变得强硬起来，明显是出于竞选需要，同时还迫不及待的将利比亚政府与攻击事件做切割，而实际上到目前为止只有个别利比亚官员对暴行作了谴责，其中只有议会主席一人向美国作了道歉；而在埃及，刚刚掰倒军方风头正健的兄弟会总统穆尔西，不仅没有谴责和道歉，反而要求美国政府对影片制作者采取行动。 奥巴马的急切切割，只是为了掩盖一个明显的事实：这次事件是阿拉伯之春的直接后果，而这场革命达到目前这样的糟糕局面：利比亚陷入极端教派横行的无政府状态，埃及被伊斯兰激进教派全面掌控，很大程度上要归咎于奥巴马错误的外交政策。 美国政要乃至许多媒体所犯的另一个错误是，当暴行发生时，去指责激怒暴徒的影片制作者，这是赤裸裸的混淆是非，这位制作人仅仅是在用完全和平的方式表达自己对某一宗教的看法，他既没有煽动暴力，更没有组织、策划和准备暴力行动，其行为是完全合法的。 当然，你可以反对他的看法，也可以谴责他公布视频的做法，但这一谴责只能基于你认为其言论内容本身是荒谬或恶劣的，而不能以它会刺激某些人作出疯狂举动为由，否则我们的言行自由，岂不是要被那些瞒旰无理的念头所约束？ 比如，你生活的社区旁边有几个神经过敏的极端守旧分子，看见有人穿超短裙就要往小区里扔炸弹，难道穿超短裙的人为此而理应被谴责？当然，假如你是温和的守旧分子，你可以因为有碍观瞻而谴责她们，但那是基于另一种的逻辑。 假如我们因为某一和平合法的言论可能激怒暴徒而谴责它，那就是在迁就和奖励暴行，假如这样的谴责起到了效果，压制了这些言论，那么暴徒便借助舆论压力而将自己的行为规范强加给了大众。 这一结果为“谁言辞冒犯我我就炸你全小区”的瞒旰狂暴作派创造了激励，告诉人们：谁想推行自己的信仰和规范，最好都这么做；你仇富吗？那就见谁开宝马就去炸他小区，然后他的邻居会去谴责他，迫使他接受你的简朴规范。 伊斯兰激进主义如今在全球所获得的处处被迁就、无人敢招惹丝毫的特殊地位，正是这一激励的结果，它不仅没有带来迁就者所希望的宗教宽容，反而让激进分子变得更加敏感狂暴，导致日益蔓延失控的宗教冲突。 若要避免这等荒唐局面，那么即便我们非常讨厌焚烧古兰经的做法，大声谴责它，可一旦有人因此而向焚烧者和他的邻居发动暴行，我们的谴责就应立即停止，转而将矛头指向暴徒，否则就会发出错误的信号，混淆了是非；而奥巴马作为总统，肩负保卫公民安全与自由的责任，更不能发出这样的错误信号，相反，此时他应该站到制片人身边，告诉他：请放心，在这个自由社会，你不会因此而受到伤害。 对暴力威胁的迁就纵容，在普通百姓还只是道德问题，而对于政府，这么做已经违反了不偏袒任何宗教和教派的宪法原则，因为迁就的结果，为某些教派创造了免受言论冒犯的特殊地位，这是其他宗教都无缘享受的，而这仅仅是因为他们足够温和。 像道金斯这样的无神论者，四处宣讲基督教是文化毒瘤、教皇是罪犯的言论，许多基督徒深感被冒犯，可是哪位美国总统出面谴责过？假如有人贬低孔子焚烧《论语》呢？政治家会谴责吗？难道世人所崇尚的宗教宽容，指的是谁蛮横谁就不能招惹？  

【2012-07-21】 @秦訇-taras 清真寺和社区的关系比教堂更密切， 比如巴扎。部分因道统强大，教与集权的关系在一千多年伊斯兰史上总会出问题，不会有中央集权模式。伊朗1979是教士从左派牢友那里习得系统控制国家的经验，而埃及无这个机会。所以埃及不会伊朗化，这也许是乐观的一面@黄章晋ster @whigzhou: 嗯，传统清真寺是积极因素，可怕的是兄弟会和阿拉伯社会主义 @秦訇-taras: 你说这两点的共同因素就是城市里未能近代化也不在巴扎里的那个群体吧，就是贫民窟出身在大街上摆地摊的 @whigzhou: 我的意思是兄弟会有组织能力，也不难学会利用国家工具，一旦上台，清真寺传统作用不足以阻止其实施暴政 @秦訇-taras 叙利亚运动的混乱暴力确实值得担忧，但不能回避地是，原有体制中没有正常表达与博弈的资源和渠道，才会有暴力。而这个问题不解决，稳定就是虚假的。哪怕是发展，在价值观序列里也不可能优先于人权。 @whigzhou: 之前的叙利亚当然不是什么好东西，问题是替代它的是什么？现代史上出现过的方案无非三种：1）占领改造；2）威慑，迫使当权者接受某些规范；3）打散了听任它自动重组。1代价太高被否决了，2被民主派认为不够民主，3我看没戏 @秦訇-taras:是，极端点说，我觉得除非一个国家城市化水平很高且有真正的中产阶级，否则都没戏，第二种最可行，但阿列维这个包袱太重了？类似格局无成功解扣先例 @whigzhou: 方案2是性价比最好的，利比亚本来已经有起色了，不过叙利亚可能不一样 @古希腊人: 二位属于沙盘推演，那实际情况也可能出人意料呢？ @whigzhou: 这似乎是让谈论变得有意义的要点所在吧？跟在事实后面，做一台发讣告的机器，没啥意思吧？ @古希腊人 忘记谁说的“任何对对利比亚战后伊斯兰化的忧虑都是故作天真，假扮世俗。因为利比亚的革命本身就是世界性的，未来的转型也是世界性的，部分的伊斯兰化既是对卡大佐绿色运动的反动，也是部分参与力量的呼声，反而更能加强利比亚与伊斯兰世界的关联。利比亚的未来取决于伊斯兰世界的未来” @whigzhou: 他眼中的前景看起来比我眼中的更可怕

阿拉伯之春开启后反恐时代 辉格 2012年6月29日 已持续18个月的阿拉伯之春虽还说不上尘埃落定：埃及军方会负隅顽抗多久？叙利亚内战会不会点燃该地区错综复杂的民族、教派和国家间冲突？利比亚和也门会不会沦为另一个索马里？这些都还有待观察，但这场变动的格局和走向却已相当清楚：该地区的政治进程，正在从大国所主导的国际秩序中游离出来，按自身的逻辑发展。 考虑到该地区之庞大——从马格里布到印度河谷——这一转变影响深远，将带给世人一个十分陌生的世界格局；从18世纪中叶的七年战争开始，欧洲王国之间的合纵连横便开始通过其殖民体系向世界范围蔓延，不断将各大小国家、民族和文化卷入由阵营对立所构成的国际秩序之中，此后历经拿破仑战争、克里米亚、两次大战，最后在冷战时达到高峰，几乎所有国家都被卷入其中。 冷战是一次重大转折，此前，对立阵营是按一时的利益和战略需要而拼凑的，敌我关系变动频繁，那时主导各阵营的大国并不关心其盟友的文化和制度，只要冲突时站在同一边就行，而冷战则是一次意识形态和社会制度的全面对抗，因而超级大国不仅拉拢盟友，也努力让他们采纳自己的制度和意识形态，必要时甚至强加给他们，这样一来，国际秩序对各国的影响便开始深入骨髓，与该体系的关系常很大程度上决定一国的制度基调和社会发展方向。 冷战结束后，人们一度担心国际秩序丧失维持动力，不过至少在中东，萨达姆及时提供了新动力，此后在石油利益和对以色列的安全承诺推动下，美国主导下的海湾联盟和戴维营秩序维持了中东的十年稳定，直到911；反恐战争大幅改变了美国对中东和伊斯兰世界的利益关切点，不再只是确保运输贸易畅通和避免战争，而是要通过改变该地区的社会政治面貌来消除恐怖主义土壤，那就必须进行深度干预。 假如美国真有决心和能力持续推行深度干预战略的话，尽管会有许多艰难曲折，中东将朝另一个方向发展，阿伊两战之后，甚至已经有一些迹象显示干预策略开始获得成效，特别是利比亚的转变，还有也门和埃塞俄比亚等国在美国强大施压下对反恐战争作出的配合；然而后来的事实表明，小布什政策在国内和西方世界所获得的支持是脆弱而短暂的。 恐怖威胁毕竟不具备珍珠港、地面入侵或核战争前景那么巨大而无可置疑的动员能力，它让国民愿意容忍的战场伤亡和财政负担都十分有限，况且，通过加强国内防范措施，似乎也能避免大多数和最严重的恐怖袭击；当连续多年没有发生恐怖袭击，国民很快对持续扩大的伤亡和财政赤字失去耐心，而金融危机又施加了致命一击。 所以今天回顾起来，中东局势的转变实则始于金融危机和民主党的上台，深度干预政策被全面抛弃，退回到克林顿时代的价值观外交：从外部鼓励民主运动，仅在出现大规模人道灾难时进行有限干预，在推动一个国家变化的问题上，采用破而不立的策略，因为要“立”就必须长期深度干预，比如对付塞尔维亚的办法就是轰炸，炸到你秩序崩溃、政府垮台，然后静待其内部发生积极变化。 破而不立政策一度表现良好、令人振奋，铁幕落下之后，东欧似乎毫无阻力的自动拷贝了西欧的制度，也顺利融入欧盟大家庭，在全球化和自由贸易的大氛围中，东亚和拉美也出现了一些成功转型，以至于出现了像福山的“历史终结”之类惊人的乐观论调。 然而很快，从阿富汗、俄罗斯，到委内瑞拉、玻利维亚，乃至中东和中亚的伊斯兰地区，逆转的趋势出现了；金融危机之后，甚至作为以宪政和法治为基础的全球化市场社会之大本营的西方，其意识形态氛围和政策取向也已从冷战后的亲市场路线中大幅扭转；或许，此轮阿拉伯之春将最终埋葬福山式盲目相信“进步潮流难以阻挡”的乐观主义历史决定论。 于是我们就要问：为何现代市场制度在东欧的重建如开闸放水般容易，而在其他国家却屡遭挫折？特别是，为何在阿拉伯和伊斯兰世界，当外部压力减弱、原有社会控制松动时，重建起来的大多是反宪政法治和反市场的制度？甚至像索马里和阿富汗这样完全建立不起现代国家而退回到部落状态？ 面对如此强烈的反差，我们难以忽视文化和传统的差异，然而这些差异中究竟哪些元素在起作用，如何起作用，却不容易看清；有些观点夸大了宗教传统的作用，首先，伊斯兰和基督教一样，从经文和教义中总是能挖掘支持任何主义的词句，那没有意义，实际上对广大信众来说，宗教只是以习俗传承的生活方式和社会规范，与经文教义关系不大。 其次，与信众相反，构成伊斯兰世界政治主导力量的精英和激进教派领袖们，多数都受过西方教育，许多甚至是学术和技术专业人士，其思考方式也非常西方化，而且越是这些人，具有越强烈的文化自觉意识，越是沉浸于阿拉伯社会现代化的失败历史所带来的挫折感之中，也越执着于复兴其梦想中的伊斯兰文化和历史荣耀，他们不仅十分了解西方，也梦寐以求实现现代化并超越西方。 真正的差异来自构成博弈环境的文化价值观和信念，正是各派在面临机会展开竞争时，对各自将会如何行动所持的信念，在制度演变起着关键作用；假如一个社会从来没有妥协和尊重惯例的传统，那么你死我活和机会主义便成为合理的预期，和平共存的均势和稳定的社会规范便难以维持甚至根本不会出现，比如在军方和选举占优的党派之间，假如前者相信后者上台必定会全面清算，后者相信对方若保留地位必定会任意干政，那和平过渡就难以实现。 同样，假如好不容易获得政权的一方确信反对派若上台必定全面推翻自己的政策，多年心血一夜泡汤，就很可能不惜破坏规则而阻止后者上台；出现一个导向宪政与法治的良性反馈过程所需的博弈条件非常严苛，不是几次圆桌会议和几份宪章条文就能创造的，而只能在一次次的社会互动过程中逐渐形成。 阿拉伯世界的条件尤其恶劣，该地区建立现代国家的努力其实从未成功，有些国家的基层组织方式仍处于部落状态，另一些则始终由外部力量所维持：奥斯曼帝国的总督、英法殖民者或托管当局、冷战和反恐时代由巨额外援所支撑的威权政府，社会各阶层和利益集团有序互动的机会很少，一旦外部力量撤出，很难指望一个好的秩序和制度能够自发的建立。

（咦？怎么刚好轮到今天？莫非...） 【2012-05-27】 @whigzhou: #饭文#埃及，下一个伊朗？还是土耳其？或者泰国？ http://t.cn/S5v7BZ ……兄弟会在这次革命过程中展现了惊人的动员组织能力和高超的政治技巧，低调克制、进退有据；他们现在宣称自己是温和伊斯兰主义，但这显然是策略性的，恐怕也没多少人会相信，因为真正的温和派早在96年就分裂出去了；况且，以…… @踢星星: 没有自由的民主？但是没有民主，这里的自由也无从成长？没有万全策 @whigzhou: 那可未必，忘了四小龙了？ @踢星星: 那么辉总还是可以乐观点，毕竟埃及还是在美国监护之下啊 @whigzhou: 我一直都很乐观，因为我对这个世界的期望低的吓人 @acparty: 他们抵触的是现代文明，恢复的是中世纪的宗教传统，看起来是激进的，但这种激进是为了回到过去，骨子里还是保守。 @whigzhou: 他们抵触的是现代主流文明，他们本身也构成了现代文明的一部分，古代既不存在这种意识形态，也未出现过他们试图建立的那种社会，他们很像当初的新教加尔文派 @黄章晋ster：他们用来阐述回到“传统”的逻辑和道理，来自典型的现代思潮的若干流派。 @旁观用: 无民主有自由（主要是经济自由）的例子还有皮氏智利。问题是这些不民主而自由的政权大多连自己都保不住。也可以说普通人不经训练也能走钢丝，但其实绝大多数只能走两步，普通人走钢丝的说法没意义啊 @whigzhou: 是啊，耶稣没保证救每个人嘛，美军也没有 @喂羊的月亮熊: 耶稣不太保证的。美军则不知道。 @whigzhou: 呵呵，我不久前还跟人说：福音起初叫“奥秘”，就像2012船票，只送亲友，不随便对人说的，后来船没来才变成福音到处宣讲了 @whigzhou: 所以嘛，到处宣扬使劲让你信的，都是作废的旧船票 @whigzhou: 所以早期修道士都躲的远远的，非洲沙漠里、爱尔兰崖壁上，那是怕泄露奥秘，到时候挤不上船就悲剧了 @喂羊的月亮熊: 船没来伊讲。请教两个问题。神是否只对选民尤太人有效？因信而得救还是因行而得救？ @whigzhou: 这个恐怕都是各说各话吧，加尔文不是还说unconditional election嘛 @喂羊的月亮熊 unconditional eletion到底是什么意思？ @whigzhou: 大概就是类似宿命论的意思吧，谁获救是上帝早就定好了的，跟他做什么或不做什么都没关系 @whigzhou: 新教运动当然是一次思想/言论/信仰大解放，可千万别以为他们的思考有多高明多进步，那阵势很像刚有网络时一下子冒出大批网上思想家一样  

埃及，下一个伊朗？还是土耳其？ 辉格 2011年12月8日 近日，迫于西方国家的压力，埃及军方向又一任过渡政府移交了绝大部分行政权力；与此同时，分三轮进行的议会选举的首轮结果也已出炉，该结果所显示的政治风向是明确无疑的：伊斯兰派大获全胜，两大一小三个伊斯兰政党共赢得2/3选票，而大中小三个世俗派政党得票不足1/4。 考察其中细节更可以感知选民的伊斯兰倾向有多强烈：极端伊斯兰主义的萨拉菲派（[[Al Nour Party]] of [[Sarafi]]）异军突起，得票率高达24.4%，仅次于穆斯林兄弟会（[[Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt)|Freedom and Justice Party]] of [[Muslim Brotherhood]])），而1996年从兄弟会中分裂出去的温和派瓦萨特党（[[Al-Wasat Party]]）则只得到了4.3%；而在另一边，所谓的世俗派阵营中，其实也包括了许多伊斯兰倾向强烈的派系，只是因为与兄弟会不合，才站到了世俗阵营中，比如新瓦夫脱党（[[New Wafd Party]]），就是一个公然宣称纳粹大屠杀是犹太谎言、911是摩萨德阴谋的派系，这种世俗（[[secularism]]）绝不是土耳其式的世俗。 兄弟会在这次革命过程中展现了惊人的动员组织能力和高超的政治技巧，低调克制、进退有据；他们现在宣称自己是温和伊斯兰主义，但这显然是策略性的，恐怕也没多少人会相信，因为真正的温和派早在96年就分裂出去了；况且，以选举所表现出的政治风向和意识形态氛围来看，即便他们果真是温和的，未来也会被迫变得激进，否则就可能在选举中被更激进的派系所替代。 对于国际社会，令人担忧的不仅是伊斯兰主义（[[Islamism]]），在埃及的世俗派阵营中，还有很多属于老派的阿拉伯社会主义（[[Arab socialism]]）者，比如新瓦夫脱党和塔噶木党（[[Tagammu Party]]），他们的理想是回到1978年戴维营协定（[[Camp David Accords]]）之前，延续[[1952 Revolution|1952年革命]]的未竟事业，也就是[[Gamal Abdel Nasser|纳赛尔]]、[[Hafez al-Assad|老阿萨德]]和[[Saddam Hussein|萨达姆]]的事业；这样，无论这两大阵营中的哪些派系最终以何种多数组合获得政权，埃及的未来政治走向，恐怕都不会是那些希望维持阿以缓和、推动中东和平、遏制宗教极端主义和恐怖组织的人们所愿意看到的。 所以现在的问题是：埃及会不会成为下一个伊朗？ 在决定未来走势的各支力量中，唯一尚未明确其地位的是军方，它显然是世俗的，同时也是希望维持戴维营秩序的，因而是未来遏制伊斯兰主义和反戴维营势力的唯一指望；理想的结果是，它继续拥有像土耳其军方所拥有的那种宪法守护者地位，后者曾在[[1960 Turkish coup d'état|1960年]]、[[1971 Turkish coup d'état|71年]]和[[1980 Turkish coup d'état|80年]]三次通过政变捍卫了凯末尔主义（[[Kemalism]]），还在1997年逼迫[[Necmettin Erbakan|一位伊斯兰主义倾向的总理]]下台退隐，此后，它仍时而发表声明警告伊斯兰倾向。 但是，我们很难指望埃及军方拥有同样的地位，进行类似的干预而不引发强烈的反弹和流血冲突；土耳其军方护宪地位的合法性和权威性，是从凯末尔（[[Kemal Atatürk]]）那里长期延续下来的，土耳其社会已默认了这一地位，而根基深厚的世俗主义氛围也与军方有着相同的取向，干预和政变也不再是会引发强烈反弹的爆炸性事件，就像泰国的情况一样。 但埃及军方远远不具备这种权威性，当萨达特（[[Anwar Sadat]]）在戴维营倒向美国怀抱时，埃及统治层已经部分丧失了其作为国家缔造者的合法性资源，而本次革命中，他们再次丢失了一个领袖和偶像，也丢失了作为其动员组织基础的民族民主党（[[National Democratic Party]]），实际上，他们已经成为革命的目标，正在为自己的生存而挣扎。 所以，除非社会的意识形态氛围是世俗主义的，埃及不可能成为另一个土耳其；不过还有另一个可能，{*quote(泰国模式)它能不能变成过去五年的泰国呢？即，尽管多数选民的政治立场已经与军方对立，但军方凭借一个少数派的支持，通过不断的政变和干预，来遏制他们不愿看到的那种政治倾向的过度发展？ 这种模式的前景也是非常可疑的，首先，它在泰国是否已经稳定下来并且制度化了，尚待时间考验；其次，它需要军方和少数派拥有强大的资源，泰国少数派除了选票不足之外，在武力、君主支持、精英支持、城市影响力、媒体等等方面，都拥有优势，还有一个中立的外交环境/quote*}，相比之下，埃及军方除了武力和经济资源外，没有多少优势可言，它甚至无力组织一个拥护自己的少数派，它唯一有望拉拢的，是老派阿拉伯社会主义者，但这么做马上会让它丧失美国支持。 埃及军方能否维持其政治地位，并对未来政治走向施加最低限度的约束，这很大程度上取决于美国的政策；军方在埃及社会所拥有的庞大资源和强大控制力，主要得益于过去三十年来自美国的200多亿美元军事援助和300多亿经济援助，如此庞大的援助，加上订单和工程的乘数效应，不仅赋予其力量，更足以让它成为这个中等穷国的头号资源分配者，让大量人口依靠它工作、生活和做生意。 目前，这一援助仍维持在每年15亿美元的规模，这是让军方在失去传统合法性资源、领袖和政党组织基础之后，仍能继续存在下去并发挥影响力的仅存一线希望；然而，在美国现行政策之下，这线希望很快就会破灭，眼下，迟钝无知的西方政客们正在为埃及民主浪潮而欢呼，奥巴马在白宫声明中已经把这轮浪潮列入他的功劳簿，他仍在不断向军方施压要求它尽快移交权力。 迫于内外压力，军方启动了选举，但把选举分成了三个阶段，这表明他们或许还抱有一丝幻想，希望第一阶段选举结果中展露无遗的激进伊斯兰主义倾向将警醒西方大国，促使他们及时改变政策，但从各方反应看，这一招恐怕也已来不及挽救他们的命运了。