〈译文〉分类下的文章(234)

[译文]汇报一下我实践旧石器食谱的情况

An Update on My (So-Called) Paleo Diet
汇报一下我实践(所谓的)旧石器食谱的情况

作者:Peter Turchin @ 2012­8­23
译者:bear,校对:陈小乖(lion_kittyyyyy)
来源:Social Evolution Forum,https://evolution-institute.org/blog/an-update-on-my-so-called-paleo-diet/

As I wrote in this blog, in early May I started on a new diet, which is misleadingly (for reasons I will come back to) called the ‘Paleo Diet.’

正如我在早先那篇博客中所写的那样【编注:本组翻译了这篇博客,见:http://weibo.com/p/1001603875391709540593 】,五月初我开始尝试一种新食谱,这种食谱有个容易误导人的名字——“旧石器食谱”(我会在之后说明它容易误导人的原因)。

First, a progress report. Over the 3.5 months I lost 15 pounds, or around a pound per week. (more...)

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5978
An Update on My (So-Called) Paleo Diet 汇报一下我实践(所谓的)旧石器食谱的情况 作者:Peter Turchin @ 2012­8­23 译者:bear,校对:陈小乖(lion_kittyyyyy) 来源:Social Evolution Forum,https://evolution-institute.org/blog/an-update-on-my-so-called-paleo-diet/ As I wrote in this blog, in early May I started on a new diet, which is misleadingly (for reasons I will come back to) called the ‘Paleo Diet.’ 正如我在早先那篇博客中所写的那样【编注:本组翻译了这篇博客,见:http://weibo.com/p/1001603875391709540593 】,五月初我开始尝试一种新食谱,这种食谱有个容易误导人的名字——“旧石器食谱”(我会在之后说明它容易误导人的原因)。 First, a progress report. Over the 3.5 months I lost 15 pounds, or around a pound per week. Not particularly impressive by the standards of super diets that promise that you will lose 20 pounds of fat in a month, or even in a week. On the other hand, I haven’t done anything drastic, like starving myself, or undergoing stomach stapling. In fact, I eat as much as I want, I just don’t eat certain foods (as a reminder – no cereals, no legumes, and no dairy). 首先,报告进度。经过三个半月,我的体重减轻了15磅,大约每周减一磅。以那些保证你在一个月甚至一周内减掉20磅脂肪的超级减肥食谱的标准来说,这一成果并不让人印象深刻。另一方面,我没有采取任何激烈的手段,比如让自己挨饿或去做缩胃手术。事实上,我想吃多少就吃多少,我只是不吃特定种类的食物。(友情提示:不吃谷物、豆类和奶制品)。 In any case, losing weight was never the main purpose, getting healthier was. And it worked remarkably well, much better than I expected. It is difficult to describe, but basically I feel much younger and I have a lot more energy. Probably the best way to put it is that I feel as though I stopped poisoning myself. 无论如何,减重从来不是我的主要目的,变得更健康才是。这个食谱的效果非常好,比我预期的要好得多。这很难形容,但基本上,我感觉自己更年轻、更有精力了。或许对这个食谱带给我的变化最好的表述是——我感觉好像不再毒害自己了。 I was raised in a big city (Moscow) and lived for several years in another one (New York). In 1980 I moved away from NYC and since then I have lived in a succession of small towns or in rural areas (except for two years in Seattle, but it’s hardly a megalopolis). After a while I noticed that when I come for an extended visit to a big city, after a few days I start feeling ‘off,’ not really sick, but not really well either. 我在大城市(莫斯科)长大,然后在另一个大城市(纽约)住了几年。1980年,我搬离了纽约市,之后就一直在一些小城镇或者郊区居住(在这期间我在西雅图住了两年,但它也算不上大都市)。一段时间之后,我注意到当我去大城市进行长期访问时,几天后我就会有一种“宕机”的感觉,不是真的生病,但也不是很健康。 After returning to my rural abode, I almost immediately get better. This happens every time when I have to stay in a city for longer than 3-5 days. I think what happens is that the urban pollution simply poisons your body. People who live in cities all the time are used to it, and stop noticing it (as I did, when I was a megalopolis dweller myself). 回到郊区的住所之后,我几乎立即就会变好。每次待在城市超过3-5天就会这样。我想这是因为城市的污染一直在毒害着你的身体。一直住在城里的人已经习惯了这些污染,而且也不再注意到这些污染(我自己是大城市居民的时候也是这样)。 Well, switching to my new diet was like moving away from New York (although it took a little longer to flush the poisons out of the system, but the effect was even more striking). This is what I mean when I say that I feel as though I stopped poisoning myself. So the diet definitely works. I have not done any blind trials, so it all could be just the placebo effect, but I don’t give a damn. It works. Initially I was going to give it 6 months and then decide whether to stick with it. But now, just past the midpoint, it is clear that I will be sticking with it. 切换到我的新食谱就好比搬离纽约(尽管它需要更多时间排出毒素,但效果甚至更加显著)。这就是之前我说“我感觉好像不再毒害自己了”的意思。所以,这个食谱绝对有效。我没有做过任何盲测,所以这可能仅仅是安慰剂效果,但我才不管呢!它是有效的!起初我打算用六个月时间尝试这个食谱,然后再决定是不是要继续。但现在时间只过了一半我就肯定自己会继续了。 Now to why calling this a ‘Paleo diet’ is a complete misnomer. Most people, when they hear me explain that I am on the paleo diet, at best think that I don’t eat carbs (a la Atkinson). At worst, they think I run around through the bushes barefoot and hunt game with my bare hands. 现在来说说为什么管它叫“旧石器食谱”完全是用词不当。当我给人们解释我在尝试旧石器食谱的时候,大多数人最好的理解就是我不吃碳水化合物(就像Atkins食谱)。最差的理解是,他们认为我光着脚丫在灌木丛中乱跑,赤手空拳进行追猎野兽。 I need to come up with a better name – how about the ‘post-neolithic diet’? I’ll still have to explain it, but at least people will not have any preconceived notions that I will have to dispel. 我要想个好点的名字——“后新石器时代食谱”怎么样?我仍然不得不解释它,但至少大家不会先入为主地以为我必须去追逐猎物。 When I explain to friends that I don’t eat any cereals or grains, legumes, or dairy, a frequent reply is – “what’s left?!” Actually, a lot. All kinds of meat, any seafood, eggs, all kinds of fresh vegetables (salad type – lettuce, tomatoes, cukes, radishes, green scallions, cilantro, peppers), other vegetables (all varieties of cabbages, numerous kinds of squash, avocado, olives, asparagus, onions and leaks, spinach), root vegetables (potatoes, yams, carrots, root parsley, yucca, and a number of others I haven’t explored yet), fruits and berries and nuts. No caveman ate the kind of varied diet that we can obtain by an easy trip to the supermarket. So the ‘paleo diet’ is a complete misnomer. 当我对朋友们说我不吃谷物、豆类和奶制品的时候,得到最多的回答是“那还剩啥?!”事实上,还剩非常多。所有肉类、任何种类的海鲜、蛋类、各种新鲜蔬菜(沙拉类—生菜、番茄、黄瓜、萝卜、葱、香菜、甜椒),还有其他蔬菜(各种卷心菜、种类繁多的南瓜、牛油果、橄榄、芦笋、洋葱、韭葱和菠菜),根类蔬菜(土豆、番薯、胡萝卜、欧洲防风、木薯【译注:此处原文yucca疑为yuca之讹】和其它许多我还没尝试过的根类蔬菜),还有水果、浆果和坚果。没有原始人能够吃到种类这么丰富的食物,而我们只要简单地去超市逛一圈就行。所以旧石器食谱这种叫法完全是用词不当。 Additionally, there is no particular virtue in eating an undomesticated variety, compared to a domesticated one. In particular, I suspect that wild rice is probably worse for you than white rice. Both are grass seeds, and so poisonous by definition. But with the domesticated rice there is at least hope that the most poisonous varieties have been selected out (although it is not a certainty). Interesting how an evolutionary approach makes you look at things from a very different angle. 此外,和吃养殖的食物相比,吃各种野生的食物并没有什么好处。特别是,我怀疑对人类来说菰可能不如大米【编注:菰又称茭米,与水稻同属禾本科稻亚科稻族,虽名为wild rice,但与水稻亲缘并不很近】。两者都是草的种子,所以根据定义都是有毒的。但对于种植的稻米而言,至少可以期望其中多数有毒物质在人类培育选择大米的过程中都已经被排除出去了(尽管这事并不确定)。进化论的思路能让你从不同角度看问题,这很有趣。 Another problem with this diet is that food now takes a larger chunk from the budget. Fresh vegetables are expensive! And you need to eat a lot of them to get an equivalent of a one pound package of pasta, even a fancy one. This is no poor person’s diet… Also, wild-caught salmon is more expensive than cultured salmon. And it goes without saying that a steak from a grass-fed cow will cost an order of magnitude more than a pound of pink slime. Although I haven’t yet been able to find a reliable supplier of grass-fed beef around here. 另一个问题是这种食谱要花更多钱。新鲜蔬菜很贵!并且你需要吃大量的新鲜蔬菜才能和吃一磅意大利面相当,即使是上等意大利面价格也低于这些新鲜蔬菜。这不是穷人能负担得起的食谱……此外,野生三文鱼也比家养的贵。更不用说牛排的价格了,一块草饲牛排的价格可以买到超过一磅的粉红肉泥。尽管我还没在附近找到过能买到可靠的草饲牛肉的地方。 In addition to expense in terms of money, following this diet is more time-consuming. In my family’s division of labor I am the one who cooks. So now I can’t simply stop, on my way from work, for a Chinese take-out or a pizza, I have to cook each and every meal myself. I mean, I like to cook, but doing it every day is a chore. 除了钱上的开销之外,遵照这个食谱需要花费更多时间。在我家的分工中,我是负责做饭的。所以现在我不能简单地在回家路上停车买个中餐外卖或匹萨了,我必须每顿都自己做。我的意思是,尽管我喜欢做饭,但每天都做是一种负担。 Travel has also been complicated. Most restaurants are worthless. Mexican food, for example – it’s all about tortillas, rice, beans, and cheese. There is nothing left. Indian is all about rice, lentils, other  beans, nan. In most other restaurants they add ingredients I can’t eat into almost everything. Because I haven’t eaten wheat-based products for three months, I find that I am now more sensitive to small amounts of flour that may be added to a sauce. 旅行也变得麻烦了。大多数餐馆都不能吃。比如墨西哥菜,都是面饼、米饭、豆子和奶酪,没有别的了。印度菜都是米饭、扁豆、其它豆子和馕。其他大多数餐馆都会在食物中加入我不能吃的食材。由于我已经三个月没吃小麦制品了,所以我发现现在我对酱料中加入的少量面粉更加敏感了。 The best bet is French restaurants (also Italian and Spanish), but they are also the most expensive. I now have to study the menu real careful, and then negotiate substitutions. Fortunately, American waiters seem to be used to all kinds of weird dieting preferences, and in most cases are very gracious and accommodating. 最好的选择是去法式餐厅(还有意大利餐厅和西班牙餐厅),但他们都是最贵的。我现在必须非常认真地研究菜单,然后商量能不能替换掉一些食材。幸运的是,美国的服务员看上去已经习惯了各种特殊的饮食偏好,大多数情况下他们都非常友善和包容。 Finally, I had to give up beer. I still like the taste (now the memory of it…), but when I look at a glass of beer that a friend is drinking, I see the distillation of all the worst grass seed poisons (shudder). So there is no temptation to order one for myself. 最后,我不得不放弃喝啤酒。我还是很喜欢它的味道(此刻正在回想这美味……),可当我看着朋友喝的那杯啤酒时,我看见的是最糟糕的有毒种子的蒸馏提取物(不寒而栗)。所以就没有给自己也来一杯的欲望了。 The psychological aspects of this dietary shift are also very fascinating. My good colleague Jon Haidt has a wonderful metaphor. He compares our conscious mind to the rider of an elephant (the subconscious mind). The rider may be thinking he is in charge, but the elephant will do whatever he wants. That’s why it is so difficult to be on most diets, and that’s why dieters are prone to recurrent bingeing on forbidden foods. I will not embarrass myself with examples, but I have about as much control over my own elephant as an average person. 这个饮食转变引起的心理上的变化同样令人着迷。我的好同事Jon Haidt有个精彩的比喻。他把我们有意识的心智比作骑在大象上的人(大象是潜意识的心智)。骑象人认为他在掌控,但大象其实可以做任何自己想做的事。这就是为什么大多数节食食谱都很难被坚持下来的原因,这也是为什么节食者倾向于重新大吃大喝食谱禁止的食品。很尴尬,我自己就是个例子,但在控制自己大象的能力上,我已经有平均水平了。 But in the case of this diet my elephant and I seem to be of the same mind. My wife continues to eat bread, occasionally pasta and rice, and ice-cream. Today I had a dinner in a restaurant with a good friend, who was eating yammy-looking rolls, among other things. What I find surprising is that I don’t need to exert my will to stay away from these foods. At least so far – we’ll see if it lasts. 但现在这个食谱的情况是,我和我的大象看上去想法一致。我老婆继续吃她的面包,偶尔来点意大利面和米饭,还有冰激凌。今天我和一个好朋友在餐馆吃晚饭,他吃着看上去很好吃的面包卷,还有一些其它东西。让我感到惊喜的是,我不需要使用意志力就能抵制这些食物。至少现在是这样,我们以后会知道这种情况能不能持续。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]市场如何拯救白犀牛

Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story
拯救非洲犀牛:一个关于市场成功的故事

作者:Michael ‘t Sas-Rolfes @ 2011-8-19
编辑:Laura Huggins
译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
校对:带菜刀的诗人(@带菜刀的诗人_),林翠(@cwlinnil)
来源:Property and Environment Research Center,http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/Saving%20African%20Rhinos%20final.pdf

译注:现存犀牛分五种:白犀牛,黑犀牛,苏门答腊犀牛,印度犀牛,爪哇犀牛。本文的白犀牛主要是指白犀牛的亚种南方白犀牛。

In 1900, the southern white rhinoceros was the most endangered of the world’s five rhinoceros species. Less than 20 rhinos remained in a single reserve  in South Africa. By 2010, white rhino numbers had climbed to more than 20,000, making it the most common rhino species on the planet.

在1900年,南方白犀牛曾是世界上五个犀牛物种中最濒危的一种。不到20头犀牛生活在仅存于南非的一个保护区里。到2010年,白犀牛数量攀升至20000头以上,成了这个星球上最常见的犀牛物种。

While southern white rhino numbers rose, populations of the other rhino species declined. This included the African black rhino and three Asian species. Why did the white rhino thrive whereas the others did not? In short, South Africa and a few other African countries adopted policies that created the right incentives for rhino conservation.

当南方白犀牛的数量增加时,其它犀牛物种(包括非洲黑犀牛以及三种亚洲犀牛)的数量却减少了。为什么白犀牛种群繁衍壮大了,而其它犀牛种群没有?简而言之,南非和其它几个非洲国家采用的政策,对犀牛保护产生了正确的激励效果。

BACKGROUND
背景

The white rhino, once plentiful in southern Africa, was all but hunted to extinction in the nineteenth century. As Dutch and English settlers colonized the region, they killed rhinos for meat and sport.

白犀牛曾经大量存在于非洲南部,然而在19世纪被捕猎至几近灭绝。荷兰和英国殖民者在此地区建立起殖民地,他们为取食和娱乐而捕杀犀牛。

By the early twentieth century, only a small population survived  in what is now the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in South Africa. Initially a royal hunting area for  the Zulu Kingdom, the park was officially protected in 1895. Its population of white rhinos slowly recovered and by the mid-twentieth century had reached the park’s full ecological carrying capacity.

至20世纪早期(more...)

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Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story 拯救非洲犀牛:一个关于市场成功的故事

作者:Michael 't Sas-Rolfes @ 2011-8-19 编辑:Laura Huggins 译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 校对:带菜刀的诗人(@带菜刀的诗人_),林翠(@cwlinnil) 来源:Property and Environment Research Center,http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/Saving%20African%20Rhinos%20final.pdf译注:现存犀牛分五种:白犀牛,黑犀牛,苏门答腊犀牛,印度犀牛,爪哇犀牛。本文的白犀牛主要是指白犀牛的亚种南方白犀牛。】 In 1900, the southern white rhinoceros was the most endangered of the world's five rhinoceros species. Less than 20 rhinos remained in a single reserve  in South Africa. By 2010, white rhino numbers had climbed to more than 20,000, making it the most common rhino species on the planet. 在1900年,南方白犀牛曾是世界上五个犀牛物种中最濒危的一种。不到20头犀牛生活在仅存于南非的一个保护区里。到2010年,白犀牛数量攀升至20000头以上,成了这个星球上最常见的犀牛物种。 While southern white rhino numbers rose, populations of the other rhino species declined. This included the African black rhino and three Asian species. Why did the white rhino thrive whereas the others did not? In short, South Africa and a few other African countries adopted policies that created the right incentives for rhino conservation. 当南方白犀牛的数量增加时,其它犀牛物种(包括非洲黑犀牛以及三种亚洲犀牛)的数量却减少了。为什么白犀牛种群繁衍壮大了,而其它犀牛种群没有?简而言之,南非和其它几个非洲国家采用的政策,对犀牛保护产生了正确的激励效果。 BACKGROUND 背景 The white rhino, once plentiful in southern Africa, was all but hunted to extinction in the nineteenth century. As Dutch and English settlers colonized the region, they killed rhinos for meat and sport. 白犀牛曾经大量存在于非洲南部,然而在19世纪被捕猎至几近灭绝。荷兰和英国殖民者在此地区建立起殖民地,他们为取食和娱乐而捕杀犀牛。 By the early twentieth century, only a small population survived  in what is now the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in South Africa. Initially a royal hunting area for  the Zulu Kingdom, the park was officially protected in 1895. Its population of white rhinos slowly recovered and by the mid-twentieth century had reached the park’s full ecological carrying capacity. 至20世纪早期,只有少量白犀牛还幸存于如今成为南非Hluhluwe-Umfolozi公园的地区。这个公园最初是祖鲁王国的皇家狩猎区,在1895年正式成为保护区。保护区内的白犀牛数量渐渐回升,并在20世纪中期达到了公园生态承载能力的极限。 At that time, the Natal Parks Board decided to take bold action to expand the white rhino population by capturing and relocating animals to new areas. Breeding groups of white rhinos were moved to other state-owned parks, such as Kruger National Park, and also to private game ranches and zoos. This program, known as Operation Rhino, successfully re-established many new breeding groups throughout southern Africa. 就在那时,纳塔尔公园董事会决定采取大胆行动,通过捕获动物并将其迁移至新地区来扩张白犀牛的种群规模。白犀牛繁殖群被迁移到了其它诸如克鲁格国家公园这样的国有公园、私人狩猎牧场和动物园。这个以“犀牛行动”闻名的迁移项目成功地在整个非洲南部重建了许多新的犀牛繁殖群。 By 1960, the white rhino population had grown to 840. The next decade saw increased interest in private game ranching, and in 1968 the first legal white rhino trophy hunt took place. 到1960年,白犀牛数量已增加到了840头。在接下去的十年中,人们对私人狩猎牧场的兴趣不断增加,并在1968年出现了首个合法的白犀牛战利品狩猎。【编注:战利品狩猎是指参与者以获取猎物留作纪念品为主要目的的狩猎活动,与之相对照的另一种商业性狩猎是运动狩猎(sports hunting)】 The Natal Parks Board continued to supply live white rhinos to private landowners for a nominal fee on a first-come, first-served basis. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that there was a problem with this system. A long waiting list of private owners was eager to acquire rhinos for trophy hunting, but they showed little interest in breeding them. This led conservationists to question whether the private sector could actually be entrusted with rhino conservation. On closer examination, however, it appeared the problem was a matter of fixing the incentive structure. 纳塔尔公园董事会继续对私人土地所有者提供活白犀牛,先到先得,只收取象征性费用。到1980年代中期,这项制度的一个问题已显露了出来。有一长串私人地主渴望获得白犀牛来开展战利品狩猎,但他们对养殖白犀牛兴趣寥寥。这使得动物保护主义者质疑私人机构是否能真正被委以保护犀牛的重任。然而,在对情况仔细审视后,人们发现问题关键是要调整激励结构。 PRIVATIZING RHINOS 犀牛的私有化 Before 1991, all wildlife in South Africa was treated by law as res nullius or un-owned property. To reap the benefits of ownership from a wild animal, it had to be killed, captured, or domesticated. This created an incentive to harvest, not protect, valuable wild species— meaning that even if a game rancher paid for a rhino, the rancher could not claim compensation if the rhino left his property or was killed by a poacher. 1991年以前,南非所有的野生动物都被法律当作无主财产(res nullius)对待。对野生动物拥有所有权的好处,就只有通过猎杀、捕获或驯养来获得。这激励了捕猎而非保护珍稀野生物种——意味着即使一个狩猎农场主为一头犀牛付了钱,一旦犀牛离开农场主的所有地或被偷猎者捕杀,农场主将无法索要补偿。 The Natal Parks Board thought that providing rhinos for a low fee—an effective subsidy— would encourage private owners to be good stewards of rhinos. However, a closer look at rhino prices—both for buying and for hunting— suggests that this view was mistaken. 纳塔尔公园董事会曾经认为,提供犀牛时收取较低费用——相当于补贴——将鼓励私有业主对犀牛妥善照料。然而,在仔细考察犀牛价格——包括购买犀牛的价格和捕猎犀牛的价格——后,人们发现这种观点有误。 In 1982, the Natal Parks Board list price for a live white rhino was 1,000 South African rands (R). That same year, the average trophy price was R6,000. Any private landowner receiving a live rhino had a very strong incentive to sell it as a trophy as quickly as possible to pocket  a 600 percent profit. The alternative was allowing it to roam on his property where there was a risk of losing it to a poacher or neighbor. 1982年时,纳塔尔公园董事会对一头活白犀牛的明码标价是1,000南非兰特。而同年一头犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价是6,000兰特。任何得到活犀牛的私人地主都有非常强烈的动机将犀牛作为狩猎战利品尽快卖掉,以便将六倍之利收入囊中。不然,私人地主只能让犀牛在土地上闲逛,犀牛有落入偷猎者或邻居之手的风险。
THINKING CREATIVELY Rhino poaching is driven by economic forces. If we really want to save the rhino, we must understand how those forces work and look at examples of success stories to see what we can learn from them. 创造性思维 偷猎犀牛的行为受经济力量驱使。如果我们真想拯救犀牛,我们就必须了解经济力量是如何起作用的,并看看我们能从那些成功案例中学到什么。
For the next three years, as the waiting list for white rhinos grew, the Natal Parks Board tripled its list prices, but demand continued to outstrip the rate of supply. In 1985, a private rancher offered a few rhinos up for auction, prompting the Natal Parks Board to do the same. 接下去三年里,白犀牛的申请名单不断增加,纳塔尔公园董事会将价格升至三倍,然而白犀牛依然供不应求。1985年,一位私人农场主拍卖了几头犀牛,这促使纳塔尔公园董事会也将白犀牛进行拍卖。 In 1986, the board auctioned six rhinos, which sold for an average price of just above R10,000—more than double the list price. Encouraged by this success, the board increasingly embraced the auction system over the next three years, during which time the market price soared to an average of almost R49,000 by 1989. 1986年董事会拍卖了六头犀牛,均价刚刚超过10000兰特——高于标价的两倍。受此鼓励,董事会在此后三年中越来越多地进行犀牛拍卖,而在此期间犀牛的平均市场价格飙升到了1989年的接近49000兰特。 During this same period, the average price for a rhino trophy also rose, but peaked in 1989 at just under R92,000 before pulling back to R80,000 in 1990. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between list prices, auction prices, and trophy prices between 1982 and 1990. 同时期,犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价也在上升,但在1989年达到了顶峰,价格为略低于每头92000兰特,并在1990年回落到了80000兰特。图1为1982年至1990年间标价、拍得价和战利品价之间的关系。 From 1990 onward, list prices were abandoned and rhinos were mostly auctioned, as the Natal Parks Board realized the benefits of market pricing. By this time the gap between the price of a live rhino and a trophy had narrowed such that the trophy price was only about 60 percent higher than the live price—a more realistic mark-up. 自1990年起,随着纳塔尔公园董事会意识到市场定价带来的益处,标价被废除,绝大部分犀牛被拍卖。此时活犀牛与战利品犀牛的价格差距已经缩小,一头战利品价格只比一头活犀牛价格高了百分之六十——一个现实得多的溢价。 Also during this period, the South African Law Commission addressed the issue of ownership of valuable game animals. Recognizing the problems associated with the res nullius maxim, the commission drafted a new piece of legislation: the theft of game act of 1991. This policy allowed for private ownership of any wild animal that could be identified according to certain criteria such as a brand or ear tag. 还是在这一时期,南非法律委员会着手处理有关珍稀狩猎动物所有权的问题。委员会意识到,这些问题涉及无主财产准则,便起草了一项新的立法:《1991年猎物偷盗法案》。按照这项政策,任何野生动物的私人所有权可以根据确切的判别标准来识别,比如烙印或耳牌。 The combined effect of market pricing through auctions and the creation of stronger property rights over rhinos changed the incentives of private ranchers. It now made sense to breed rhinos rather than shoot them as soon as they were received. 通过拍卖实现的市场定价机制,创造对犀牛更牢固的财产权,这二者的共同作用,改变了对私人农场主的激励。养殖犀牛而非一得到犀牛就射杀终于成了明智的做法。 Interestingly, the private market also benefited state agencies such as the Natal Parks Board, which gained from the increased income from rhino sales. From a mere few thousand rands in the early 1980s (the rand/US dollar rate was one to one at this time), the annual market value of live rhino sales grew to R64.5 million (uS$7.8 million) by 2008. 有趣的是,私人市场也使国有机构(比如纳塔尔公园董事会)获益,因为他们通过出售犀牛而获得的收入增加了。出售活犀牛的年市值从1980年代早期的几千兰特(当时兰特对美元汇率为1:1)增长到了2008年的6450万兰特(合780万美元)。 BLACK AND WHITE 黑与白 Not only did the white rhino market grow in value, but white rhino populations also flourished. Figure 2 shows trends in white rhino numbers from 1960 until 2007. Contrast those numbers with the black rhino, which mostly lived in African countries with weak or absent wildlife market institutions such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. In 1960, about 100,000 black rhinos roamed across Africa, but by the early 1990s poachers had reduced their numbers to less than 2,500. 白犀牛不仅市值增长,种群也繁荣了起来。图2展示了从1960年到2007年的白犀牛数量变化趋势。与之形成鲜明对比的是黑犀牛,主要生活在诸如肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚和赞比亚这些野生动物市场制度薄弱或缺失的非洲国家。1960年时大约有10万头黑犀牛分布在非洲,但到1990年代早期,偷猎者使黑犀牛的数量下降到了不足2500头。
RHINO HORN USES There are two major markets for rhino horn. Throughout Asia, rhino horn has been used for thousands of years for both ornamental and medicinal purposes. Ailments that rhino body parts supposedly cure include skin disease, bone disorders, and fever. The second market for rhino horn is the dagger trade in the Middle Eastern nation of Yemen where carved rhino horns are used as handles for ceremonial daggers called jambiyas. 犀牛角的用途 犀牛角有两个主要市场。在整个亚洲,犀牛角被用作装饰和药材已有上千年的历史。人们认为犀牛的身体部位可以用来治疗皮肤病、骨骼疾病和发热等病症。中东国家也门的匕首生意是犀牛角的第二个市场,在那里,经过雕刻的犀牛角被用作一种称作jambiyas的仪式性匕首的手柄。
Rhino poaching is driven by the demand for rhino horn of  both species, which is used for ornamental and medicinal purposes in Asia. Since the mid-1970s, international trade in rhino horn has been subject to a ban under CITES, the United Nations Convention on international trade in Endangered Species. After the CITES ban came into effect, prices for rhino horn soared on black markets and have continued rising ever since. 对两种犀牛牛角的需求驱使了偷猎犀牛的行为。犀牛角在亚洲用于装饰和药材。从1970年代中期开始,根据CITES,即关于濒危物种国际贸易的联合国公约,犀牛角的国际贸易被禁止。自公约生效起,黑市上的犀牛角价格一路飙升。
ABOUT CITES CITES was formed in the mid-1970s as an international treaty to protect wild species threatened by trade. All member countries (more than 175) agree to regulate the trade in species across their borders in one of two ways. Species are either listed on Appendix 1, under which no trade is allowed, or Appendix 2, under which trade is allowed under a permit system only. About 800 species are listed on Appendix 1 and 32,500 on Appendix 2. CITES employs only a single officer to oversee global enforcement of the treaty. 关于CITES 作为一项保护被贸易所威胁的野生物种的国际公约,CITES形成于1970年代中期。所有成员国(超过175个)约定以两种方式之一对通过其边境的物种贸易进行管制。被列入公约附录1的物种被禁止贸易,被列入公约附录2的物种只能在许可证制度下进行贸易。大约有800个物种被列入附录1,而有32500个物种被列入附录2。 CITES只雇佣了一名官员来监督公约在全球的实施情况。
By the mid-1990s, rhino poaching had declined to sustainable levels and many conservationists assumed that the CITES ban had solved the problem. Rhino poaching, however, has re-emerged as a serious problem since 2008. 到1990年代中期,偷猎犀牛的行为已减少到了可持续水平,许多动保主义者认为CITES的禁令起了作用。然而自2008年起偷猎犀牛行为再次成为一个严重问题。 A more plausible reason for the temporary respite in poaching pressure is that all the “easy pickings” were gone. Unprotected wild rhino populations are rare to non-existent in modern Africa. The only surviving African rhinos remain either in countries with strong wildlife market institutions (such as South Africa and Namibia) or in intensively protected zones. 对此前偷猎压力暂时缓解的一个更可信的解释是,所有“易得手猎物”都消失了。在现代非洲,不受保护的野生动物数量非常稀少甚至不复存在。幸存的非洲犀牛只存在于那些有强大野生动物市场制度的国家(比如南非和纳米比亚),或在受严密保护的地区。 South Africa and Namibia have replicated the successful approach to white rhino conservation with black rhinos, currently protecting 75 percent of the world’s black rhino population and 96 percent of the white rhino population. After receiving CITES approval in 2004, both countries have even introduced limited black rhino trophy hunting. 南非和纳米比亚在黑犀牛上复制了保护白犀牛的成功方法,目前保护了世界上百分之七十五的黑犀牛和百分之九十六的白犀牛。在2004年得到CITES的批准后,两国甚至都引进了有限的黑犀牛战利品狩猎活动。 CROSSROADS 十字路口 Despite clear evidence that strong property rights and market incentives constitute the most sensible model for rhino conservation in Africa, many international conservationists and policymakers do not recognize this. Through institutions such as CITES, they continue to pursue a command-and-control approach that depends on regulations or bans to restrict wildlife use. This approach now threatens to undermine the success achieved thus far, as the extraordinarily high black market price for rhino horn has fuelled a new poaching drive. 尽管有清楚的证据表明,强有力的财产权和市场激励在非洲构建了最合理的犀牛保护模式,很多国际保护主义者和政策制定者对此依然不予认可。通过诸如CITES这样的机构,他们一直追求一种“命令加控制”的方法,依靠监管和禁令来限制对野生动物的使用。随着犀牛角异乎寻常的黑市高价促成了新的偷猎驱动力,这种方法如今威胁到了到目前为止已经取得的成功。 Before the recent upsurge in poaching, Asian nationals attempted to gain legitimate access to rhino horn by posing as trophy hunters. In response, South Africa’s government tightened controls over the hunting industry as well as the sale and use of live rhinos and rhino horn. Unfortunately, these restrictions only seemed to precipitate the current poaching crisis. The demand for rhino horn is significant and persistent enough to be very rewarding to criminals who are willing to supply it. 在最近的偷猎高潮之前,一些亚洲人试图作为战利品猎人而合法获取犀牛角。作为应对,南非政府加紧了对狩猎业以及贩卖和使用活犀牛和犀牛角的控制。不幸的是,这些限制看来仅仅加剧了当下的偷猎危机。对犀牛角的需求足够庞大而持久,这使那些愿意提供犀牛角的罪犯获利颇丰。
THREE RHINO MYTHS 有关犀牛的三个传说
  • Rhino horn is used as an aphrodisiac in Asia. Rhino horn is used as an ingredient in traditional Chinese medicine to treat serious illnesses involving high fevers and toxicity. In Vietnam, it is sought as a cancer remedy.
  • 犀牛角在亚洲被用作一种壮阳药。犀牛角作为一种传统中药成分,用来治疗伴有高烧和中毒症状的严重疾病。在越南,人们认为犀牛角可以治愈癌症
  • Rhino poaching is driven by greed and evil people. Rhino poaching is driven by the high price for rhino horn, which is caused by an artificial supply restriction from the ban in the face of persistent demand, creating perverse incentives.
  • 人性的贪婪邪恶驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。面对持续的需求,贸易禁令制造了人为的供应限制,产生了不正当的激励,导致犀牛角的高价,驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。
  • The medicinal demand for rhino horn is unscientific and therefore not legitimate. Use of rhino horns in Chinese medicine has cultural roots going back thousands of years and many of its adherents are unlikely to pay much attention to scientific arguments.
  • 对犀牛角的药用需求缺乏科学根据,因此非法。犀牛角用作中药有数千年的文化根基,因此很多中医拥护者不太会关心有关的科学争论。
South Africa’s game ranchers are also willing to supply the market, and some have already experimented with ways to increase breeding and horn growth rates in a free-range farming environment. Rhino horn is made of keratin (similar to fingernails and hair) and can be periodically and humanely harvested from live rhinos at minimal cost (as little as $20 dollars to sedate an animal and cut off its horns). If the CITES ban was lifted, legal commercial rhino horn production from ranchers could outcompete most illegal harvesting by poachers. 南非的狩猎农场主也愿意向市场供应犀牛,而且一些农场主已经尝试了在放养的农场环境中增加犀牛繁殖和犀牛角生长率的方法。犀牛角由角蛋白(类似于指甲和头发)构成,能周期性地且人道地以最小代价从活犀牛上获得。(麻醉一头犀牛采割牛角的花费低至20美元。)假如CITES的禁令放开,来自农场主的合法商业犀牛角生产便可在竞争中击败绝大多数偷猎者非法获得的犀牛角。 Unfortunately, this pragmatic market solution does not appeal to key international conservationists, who insist that better enforcement and more political will are needed to solve the poaching crisis. Tragically, this may not be enough. 不幸的是,这种务实的市场解决方案对主要的国际保护主义者没有吸引力。他们坚持认为需要更好的执法和更多的政治意愿来解决偷猎危机。可悲的是,更好的执法和更多的政治意愿可能是不够的。 There are many other examples of failed bans, such as alcohol prohibition and the war on drugs, characterized by insufficient incentives to implement them successfully. The market-incentive success story of African rhino conservation may yet be undermined by a failure to recognize and learn from it. 已经有很多禁令失败的例子,比如禁酒和禁毒战争,就是因为没有充分的激励使这些禁令成功实施。市场激励在保护非洲犀牛上取得的成功,可能会由于人们未能认识激励机制并吸取经验而受挫。 MICHAEL 'T SAS-ROLFES is an environmental economist based in South Africa and a 2011 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow. 作者MICHAEL 'T SAS-ROLFES是位南非环境经济学家,2011年的 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]离开以色列:居澳以人重新定义流散身份

Out of Israel: Ausraelis re-invent the diasporic identity
离开以色列:居澳以人重新定义流散身份

作者:Ran Porat @ 2015-8-10
译者:带菜刀的诗人(@帶菜刀的詩人_)
校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子),Drunkplane (@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:The Conversation,https://theconversation.com/out-of-israel-ausraelis-re-invent-the-diasporic-identity-44706

【在澳大利亚犹太侨民早已认可了锡安主义的梦想之后,更多新晋的“居澳以人”都将离开以色列视为一种解脱。澳大利亚联合通讯社/ Dean Lewins】

Approximately 15,000 Israelis live in Australia, mostly in Melbourne and Sydney. Almost all of them are Jews and they constitute around 12% of the 120,000-strong Australian Jewish community. Yet several factors and recent developments give “Ausraelis” (Australian-resident Israelis) an importance that outweighs their numbers.

澳大利亚有着将近15000名以色列人,他们中的大多数都生活在墨尔本和悉尼。这些以色列人几乎全都是犹太人,大约占12万澳大利亚犹太人群体的12%。然而,由于某些原因和近来的发展,这些“居澳以人”(居住在澳大利亚的以色列人)的数量并不足以说明他们的重要性。

The first factor is demography, as reflected in Australian census data. Since the turn of the century, immigration from Israel to Australia has skyrocketed, leading to a 20% jump in the number of Ausraelis every five years. This trend escalated recently, with a possible 30% growth since 2011.

第一个因素便是人口结构,澳大利亚人口统计数据也显示了这一点。自本世纪始,移民澳大利亚的以色列人暴涨,每隔5年居澳以色列人就增长20%。这一趋势在近年来还在加剧,2011年以来的增幅可能达到30%。

Israelis are by far the fastest-growing non-Australian-born group in the Australian Jewish community in recent years.

近些年来,以色列人是澳大利亚犹太人中,人数增长遥遥领先的“非澳大利亚出生”群体。

These Ausraelis make a range of positive contributions to the demographic profile of Australian Jews. Many are young families with children, who invigorate an ageing(more...)

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Out of Israel: Ausraelis re-invent the diasporic identity 离开以色列:居澳以人重新定义流散身份 作者:Ran Porat @ 2015-8-10 译者:带菜刀的诗人(@帶菜刀的詩人_) 校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子),Drunkplane (@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:The Conversation,https://theconversation.com/out-of-israel-ausraelis-re-invent-the-diasporic-identity-44706 【在澳大利亚犹太侨民早已认可了锡安主义的梦想之后,更多新晋的“居澳以人”都将离开以色列视为一种解脱。澳大利亚联合通讯社/ Dean Lewins】 Approximately 15,000 Israelis live in Australia, mostly in Melbourne and Sydney. Almost all of them are Jews and they constitute around 12% of the 120,000-strong Australian Jewish community. Yet several factors and recent developments give “Ausraelis” (Australian-resident Israelis) an importance that outweighs their numbers. 澳大利亚有着将近15000名以色列人,他们中的大多数都生活在墨尔本和悉尼。这些以色列人几乎全都是犹太人,大约占12万澳大利亚犹太人群体的12%。然而,由于某些原因和近来的发展,这些“居澳以人”(居住在澳大利亚的以色列人)的数量并不足以说明他们的重要性。 The first factor is demography, as reflected in Australian census data. Since the turn of the century, immigration from Israel to Australia has skyrocketed, leading to a 20% jump in the number of Ausraelis every five years. This trend escalated recently, with a possible 30% growth since 2011. 第一个因素便是人口结构,澳大利亚人口统计数据也显示了这一点。自本世纪始,移民澳大利亚的以色列人暴涨,每隔5年居澳以色列人就增长20%。这一趋势在近年来还在加剧,2011年以来的增幅可能达到30%。 Israelis are by far the fastest-growing non-Australian-born group in the Australian Jewish community in recent years. 近些年来,以色列人是澳大利亚犹太人中,人数增长遥遥领先的“非澳大利亚出生”群体。 These Ausraelis make a range of positive contributions to the demographic profile of Australian Jews. Many are young families with children, who invigorate an ageing population. Recent Israeli emigrants are skilled and educated, and can integrate relatively swiftly as middle-class Australians. 这些以色列人给澳大利亚的犹太人人口结构做出了一系列积极的贡献。他们大多是有孩子的年轻家庭,令原本正在老龄化的人口年轻化。新来的以色列移民身怀技能并受过良好的教育,他们作为澳大利亚的中产阶级能相对迅速地融入社会。

【从以色列到澳大利亚的移民在近几年有所加快。来源:移民局】

From a Jewish community perspective, Ausraelis could be regarded as a healthy cadre for a new generation of active members. However, as a rule, Israelis remain estranged from organised Jewish Australia. 从犹太社群的角度看,这些以色列人可以被视为新一代活跃成员的健康核心。然而,以色列人通常和有组织的澳大利亚犹太人社会保持距离。 One reason for this is life in Israel, where the state provides all educational, social and religious services for the Jewish majority. Israelis abroad rarely go to or join synagogues, which are centres of social activity for diaspora Jews. 其中一个原因是,在以色列,国家会为作为主体民族的犹太人提供全面的教育、社会和宗教服务。所以国外的以色列人很少去犹太会堂,但那里却是流散犹太人社会活动的中心。 Most Israeli emigrants are secular. They associate synagogues with religion and its institutions and political parties. Both are unpopular in light of Israel’s long history of secular-religious tensions. 多数以色列侨民是世俗的。他们会将犹太会堂同宗教以及与之相应的机构和政治党派这三者联系起来。由于以色列长期以来世俗-宗教之间存在的紧张气氛,两者都不受他们欢迎。 The lack of a community mentality is just the tip of the iceberg. Living in a diaspora setting determines the boundaries and content of the conversation between Ausraelis and Australian Jewry. The latter can be conceptualised as the Aussie subsidiary of a historic worldwide religious diaspora. The former is evolving a budding Ausraelidiasporic identity, part of the wider national Israeli diaspora. 缺乏共同体精神只是问题的冰山一角。流散的生存环境决定了居澳以人和澳大利亚犹太人之间的交流范围和内容。概念上,可将后者视为历史上全球流散的犹太人在澳大利亚的分支。前者则正在萌生为一种“居澳流散以人”的身份认同,这是更广泛的以色列民族流散的一部分。 This new identity is constructed around a triangle of affiliations: Israeli (homeland nationalism), Australian (new home society) and Jewish (religious). Each is internally debated: by individuals themselves and/or vis-à-vis the relevant sector of Israeli residents in Australia, other Australian Jews and the wider Australian society. 该新身份由相互关联的三个角色构成:以色列人(故土民族主义)、澳大利亚人(以澳大利亚社会为新家园)和犹太人(宗教身份)。你会发现这些角色相互之间都存在纷争:作为个人的居澳以人之间,作为在澳以色列人社群成员之间,他们同其他澳大利亚犹太人之间,以及和更广泛的澳大利亚社会之间。 The state of Israel participates in, and even moderates, discussion between its national and historic diasporas across the globe. These days, Jerusalem is officially reaching out to and embracing its former residents. This is possible because current Israeli emigrants display features of confident transnational migrants, with a growing cross-border political awareness of issues facing the homeland. 以色列国家政权会参与,甚至出面缓和以色列国民与散布全球的流散以色列人之间的讨论。如今,耶路撒冷正式伸出双手拥抱以前居住在那里的居民。这可能是因为现在的以色列侨民展现出自信的跨国移民的风范,当面对故土时,他们越来越有跨越国界的政治觉悟。 Institutionalisation is the latest trend of the Israeli diaspora. Newly formed local organisations of Israelis abroad, including AIA (the Association of Israelis in Australia, co-founded by the author), are on the verge of creating a global Israeli diaspora roof body. 流散以色列人最近呈现出组织化的趋势。包括像AIA(澳大利亚以色列人协会,由作者参与创立)这种以色列人在国外新成立的地方组织,正成为全球流散以色列人的庇护所。 【虽然犹太会堂对于散居犹太人来说有非常的历史意义,但它并不是现代居澳以人身份的重点。澳大利亚联合通讯社/ Julian Smith】 Reversing the Zionist narrative 颠覆关于锡安主义的叙事译注:锡安主义又称为犹太复国主义,是犹太人发起的一种民族主义政治运动和犹太文化模式,旨在支持或认同在以色列地带重建“犹太家园”的行为,也是建基于犹太人在宗教思想与传统上对以色列土地之联系的一种意识形态】 Tapping into the inner voices of the Australian Israeli community reveals another interesting finding. Inside closed online social platforms, within their own Hebrew-only forums, websites and print media, Ausraelis are engaged in a dynamic redefinition of their identity in the diaspora setting. Specifically, among recent Israeli newcomers to Australia is a dominant group with a distinct self-perception, the “Ausraeli approach”. 倾听澳大利亚以色列人群体的心声,会有另外一个有趣的发现。在他们封闭的网上社交平台,在他们自己的希伯来语论坛、网站和出版媒体上,居澳以人在风风火火地讨论如何重新定义他们在流散环境下的身份。特别是在新到澳大利亚来的以色列人中,有一个占主导地位的群体,他们带有一种清晰的自我认知,叫“居澳以人路线”(“Ausraeli approach”)。 This is based on a certain demarcation of Israel’s past and on a negative prognosis for its future. The Ausraeli approach challenges the original Zionist nation-building narrative, which stigmatised past emigrants as Yordim (descending) - a derogatory label. In 1976, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described Yordim as “the fallen among the weaklings”. 这一路线基于同以色列的过往划定界限和对以色列未来的消极预测。“居澳以人路线”质疑锡安主义者的民族建构叙事,后者为以前移居他国的以色列人烙上了Yordim这个带有侮辱性的负面标签。1976年,以色列总理伊扎克·拉宾形容Yordim是“弱者中的堕落者”。 Yerida (the act of emigration) revolved around guilt, shame and temporariness as embodied in cultivation of the “myth of return”, constantly contemplating resettling in Israel. The Ausraeli approach sees immigration to Australia as Aliyah (ascendance) – a term exclusively used for incoming Jews to Israel (Olim, ascenders). Aliyah further implies an improved personal status and a higher moral and normative character as a result of the homecoming. 在“回归神话”的建立之中,Yerida(移居他国的行为)【译注:Yerida是一个希伯来术语,指的是以色列的犹太人移民到别的国家的行为,贬义】总是与负罪、耻辱和临时性联系在一起,移居他国的人则终日思索着重返以色列。居澳以人则将移民澳洲视为Aliyah——这个褒义词原本专门用于指代回归以色列的犹太人。Aliyah一词进而也暗示了因为回归故土而拥有的更高的个人地位和道德规范。 The Ausraeli approach is a reversal of this. The classic Zionist discourse sees settling in Israel as the only path towards redemption for diaspora Jews and the only way to escape a deterministic fate in the “Mortified Exile” (GolahDvuyaih). This idea of “negation of exile” was embodied by early Zionism’s adoption of “the wandering Jew” anti-Semitic myth. 但“居澳以人路线”颠覆了这种说法。经典的锡安主义话语将定居以色列视为流散犹太人达成救赎的唯一途径,并且也是逃脱“耻辱放逐”(GolahDvuyaih)这一注定命运的唯一方法。早期锡安主义对“流浪犹太人”这个反犹寓言的采纳,便体现了“反对放逐”这一观念。 The Christian fable of “the wandering Jew” holds that Jews are to always wander the earth. The Zionist version suggested that the Israeli – a new and reinvented national Jew – was supposed to lay his wandering forefather to rest. “流浪犹太人”这个基督教寓言认为,犹太人会一直在地球上流浪下去。而锡安主义的版本却认为,以色列——一个重新创造的新生犹太民族——会让其流浪的远古祖先灵魂安定下来。 On the other hand, the Ausraeli approach repositions leaving Israel as an escape to the diaspora from a deterministic fate of never-ending troublesome life in Israel with its ongoing security and social tensions (“the myth of no return”). It suggests that “the wandering Jew” did not find spiritual relief following Jewish national resurrection in Israel. Therefore, his journey continues. 另一方面,鉴于以色列持续的安全问题和社会紧张,烦恼的生活注定永无休止,“居澳以人路线”转而将离开以色列投入流散生活视为从这种注定命运的逃离(“不归神话”)。这表明了“流浪犹太人”并没有因犹太国家复兴而得到精神上的宽慰。因此,他们将继续流浪下去。 What can be learnt from the Ausraeli approach? That Zionist success in manufacturing new Jews – the Israelis – was so great that Israeli emigrants feel detached from their forefathers, diaspora Jews. The emigrants themselves are evolving into a new segment of Israeli society, as Israeli diasporants. 那么,我们可以从“居澳以人路线”中学到什么呢?锡安主义成功地制造了新犹太人——以色列人,他们如此成功,以至于移居他国的以色列侨民发觉,他们与自己的流散犹太人祖先越来越疏离。以色列海外侨民们正演变成为以色列社会的一个新组成部分——以色列流散者。 Now it is high time to examine the identity of children of Ausraelis. As one vocal Ausraeli said in an internal online forum: “What is the relevance of an Israeli tradition for a child who is about to turn into an Australian?” I wonder. 如今,是时候思考居澳以人的后代拥有何种身份了。正如一位在内部在线论坛积极发言的居澳以人所说:“对于一个即将成为澳大利亚人的孩子来说,以色列的传统和他有什么关系呢?”我也想知道。
This article is based on a chapter written by the author in the new book Australia and Israel: A Diasporic, Cultural and Political Relationship (Sussex Academic, 2015) launched in Sydney on August 9 and in Melbourne on August 13. 这篇文章是基于本文作者新书《澳大利亚和以色列:流散,文化及政治关系》(Sussex Acadamic出版社,2015年出版)中的一个章节写就,该书于8月9日在悉尼发表,8月13日在墨尔本发表。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]为什么美国人数学这么差?

Why Do Americans Stink at Math?
为什么美国人数学这么差?

作者:Elizabeth Green @ 2014-7-23
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:带菜刀的诗人(@带菜刀的诗人_),慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:The New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/magazine/why-do-americans-stink-at-math.html

【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师:Randi Brookman Harris。计算器图标来自于Tim Boelaars】

When Akihiko Takahashi was a junior in college in 1978, he was like most of the other students at his university in suburban Tokyo. He had a vague sense of wanting to accomplish something but no clue what that something should be. But that spring he met a man who would become his mentor, and this relationship set the course of his entire career.

1978年,高桥昭彦还是东京郊外一所大学的三年级学生,和其他大多数同学没什么两样。他模模糊糊觉得自己想要做点什么,但对于到底该做什么却毫无头绪。但那年春天他遇到了他后来的导师,就此确定了他此后全部事业的方向。

Takeshi Matsuyama was an elementary-school teacher, but like a small number of instructors in Japan, he taught not just young children but also college students who wanted to become teachers. At the university-affiliated elementary school where Matsuyama taught, he turned his classroom into a kind of laboratory, concocting and trying out new teaching ideas. When Takahashi met him, Matsuyama was in the middle of his boldest experiment yet — revolutionizing the way students learned math by radically changing the way teachers taught it.

松山武士是位小学教师,不过跟日本的一小批类似教员一样,他不止教小孩子,也给想当教师的大学生上课。松山武士任教于这所大学的附属小学。他把自己的课堂改造成了一个实验室,策划并尝试各种教学新理念。高桥昭彦刚认识他时,松山武士正在进行一项空前大胆的试验——通过改变教师的教学方法,全面革新学生们的数学学习方法。

Instead of having students memorize and then practice endless lists of equations — which Takahashi remembered from his own days in school — Matsuyama taught his college students to encourage passionate discussions among children so they would come to uncover math’s procedures, properties and proofs for themselves.

松山武士并不要求学生背诵并练习无穷无尽的公式——松山武士自己念书时就记了很多方程式——,而是教育他的大学生,应当鼓励孩子们激烈讨论,从而能自行找出数学中的解题流程、性质和证明。

One day, for example, the young students would derive the formula for finding the area of a rectangle; the next, they would use what they learned to do the same for parallelograms. Taught this new way, math itself seemed transformed. It was not dull misery but challenging, stimulating and even fun.

(more...)
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Why Do Americans Stink at Math? 为什么美国人数学这么差?

作者:Elizabeth Green @ 2014-7-23 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:带菜刀的诗人(@带菜刀的诗人_),慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:The New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/magazine/why-do-americans-stink-at-math.html 【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师:Randi Brookman Harris。计算器图标来自于Tim Boelaars】 When Akihiko Takahashi was a junior in college in 1978, he was like most of the other students at his university in suburban Tokyo. He had a vague sense of wanting to accomplish something but no clue what that something should be. But that spring he met a man who would become his mentor, and this relationship set the course of his entire career. 1978年,高桥昭彦还是东京郊外一所大学的三年级学生,和其他大多数同学没什么两样。他模模糊糊觉得自己想要做点什么,但对于到底该做什么却毫无头绪。但那年春天他遇到了他后来的导师,就此确定了他此后全部事业的方向。 Takeshi Matsuyama was an elementary-school teacher, but like a small number of instructors in Japan, he taught not just young children but also college students who wanted to become teachers. At the university-affiliated elementary school where Matsuyama taught, he turned his classroom into a kind of laboratory, concocting and trying out new teaching ideas. When Takahashi met him, Matsuyama was in the middle of his boldest experiment yet — revolutionizing the way students learned math by radically changing the way teachers taught it. 松山武士是位小学教师,不过跟日本的一小批类似教员一样,他不止教小孩子,也给想当教师的大学生上课。松山武士任教于这所大学的附属小学。他把自己的课堂改造成了一个实验室,策划并尝试各种教学新理念。高桥昭彦刚认识他时,松山武士正在进行一项空前大胆的试验——通过改变教师的教学方法,全面革新学生们的数学学习方法。 Instead of having students memorize and then practice endless lists of equations — which Takahashi remembered from his own days in school — Matsuyama taught his college students to encourage passionate discussions among children so they would come to uncover math’s procedures, properties and proofs for themselves. 松山武士并不要求学生背诵并练习无穷无尽的公式——松山武士自己念书时就记了很多方程式——,而是教育他的大学生,应当鼓励孩子们激烈讨论,从而能自行找出数学中的解题流程、性质和证明。 One day, for example, the young students would derive the formula for finding the area of a rectangle; the next, they would use what they learned to do the same for parallelograms. Taught this new way, math itself seemed transformed. It was not dull misery but challenging, stimulating and even fun. 比如,学生们某天可能会推导出矩形的面积公式,那么第二天他们就可以用已经学到的东西去推导平行四边形的面积公式。以这种新方法教学,数学这门课似乎完全不同了。它不再枯燥痛苦,而是富有挑战性、刺激性,甚至很有趣。

【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师:Randi Brookman Harris】

Takahashi quickly became a convert. He discovered that these ideas came from reformers in the United States, and he dedicated himself to learning to teach like an American. Over the next 12 years, as the Japanese educational system embraced this more vibrant approach to math, Takahashi taught first through sixth grade. 高桥昭彦很快就信服了。他发现这些理念最早是由美国的一些改革者提出来的,于是致力于像美国人一样教学。此后12年里,日本的教育体系采纳了这一更富活力的数学教育方法,高桥昭彦则从一年级一直教到六年级。 Teaching, and thinking about teaching, was practically all he did. A quiet man with calm, smiling eyes, his passion for a new kind of math instruction could take his colleagues by surprise. “He looks very gentle and kind,” Kazuyuki Shirai, a fellow math teacher, told me through a translator. “But when he starts talking about math, everything changes.” 教育以及反思教育几乎就是他的全部活动。他安静沉稳,眼带笑意,对数学教学新方法的激情常令同事大吃一惊。数学教师白井一之通过翻译告诉我:“他看上去特别温和、特别友善。不过一旦说起数学,情况就全变了。” Takahashi was especially enthralled with an American group called the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, or N.C.T.M., which published manifestoes throughout the 1980s, prescribing radical changes in the teaching of math. Spending late nights at school, Takahashi read every one. Like many professionals in Japan, teachers often said they did their work in the name of their mentor. It was as if Takahashi bore two influences: Matsuyama and the American reformers. 高桥昭彦对一个叫全美数学教师委员会(NCTM)的美国机构特别着迷。1980年代,该委员会持续发表宣言,建议对数学教学进行彻底改革。高桥昭彦在学校熬夜阅读了所有这些宣言。跟日本的许多专业人士一样,日本教师常说自己所做的都应归于其导师名下。高桥昭彦身上似乎体现了两种影响:一种来自松山武士,一种来自美国的改革者。 Takahashi, who is 58, became one of his country’s leading math teachers, once attracting 1,000 observers to a public lesson. He participated in a classroom equivalent of “Iron Chef,” the popular Japanese television show. 高桥昭彦现年58岁,已是日本数学教师的领军人物之一。他的一次公开课曾吸引了1000人旁听。他还参加了一个类似于“铁人料理”的课堂【译注:铁人料理是富士电视台的一档烹饪节目,每集由不同的挑战者选择挑战三位“铁厨”中的一位,用一小时来烹制围绕该集主题材料的菜式】。 But in 1991, when he got the opportunity to take a new job in America, teaching at a school run by the Japanese Education Ministry for expats in Chicago, he did not hesitate. With his wife, a graphic designer, he left his friends, family, colleagues — everything he knew — and moved to the United States, eager to be at the center of the new math. 不过,当他1991年有机会到美国工作,在一所由文部省为芝加哥日侨办的学校教课时,他没有犹豫。带着自己的平面设计师妻子,他辞别了朋友、家人、同事以及他所熟知的一切,移居美国,热切地想要走进新数学的中心。 As soon as he arrived, he started spending his days off visiting American schools. One of the first math classes he observed gave him such a jolt that he assumed there must have been some kind of mistake. The class looked exactly like his own memories of school. “I thought, Well, that’s only this class,” Takahashi said. 一到美国,他就开始利用空闲时间走访各学校。最早旁听到的其中一门数学课让他无比震惊,以至于他只能假定一定有什么地方出错了。这堂数学课看起来跟他念书时的记忆一模一样。“我想,呃,只是这堂课如此而已”,高桥昭彦说。 But the next class looked like the first, and so did the next and the one after that. The Americans might have invented the world’s best methods for teaching math to children, but it was difficult to find anyone actually using them. 但接下来第二堂课依然如此,接下来、再接下来都是这样。美国人或许发明了世界上最好的针对孩子的数学教学方法,但很难找到有人真的在实践这种方法。 It wasn’t the first time that Americans had dreamed up a better way to teach math and then failed to implement it. The same pattern played out in the 1960s, when schools gripped by a post-Sputnik inferiority complex unveiled an ambitious “new math,” only to find, a few years later, that nothing actually changed. 美国人构想出数学教学的改良方法却没能实施,这已不是第一次了。1960年代出现过同样的事,受“后斯普特尼克自卑情结”影响【译注:斯普特尼克一号(Sputnik 1)是世界上第一颗人造卫星,前苏联造,是冷战时期美苏太空竞争、科技竞争的标志之一】,美国学校公布了一项雄心勃勃的“新数学”计划,数年之后却发现什么都未曾改变过。 In fact, efforts to introduce a better way of teaching math stretch back to the 1800s. The story is the same every time: a big, excited push, followed by mass confusion and then a return to conventional practices. 事实上,引入更好方法改进数学教学的种种努力可以追溯到1800年代。每一次的故事都一模一样:一股庞大、兴奋的劲头之后,出现了大量混乱,然后又回归到老办法。 The trouble always starts when teachers are told to put innovative ideas into practice without much guidance on how to do it. In the hands of unprepared teachers, the reforms turn to nonsense, perplexing students more than helping them. 一旦教师们被要求将创新理念付诸实践,但却不在如何去做这方面为他们提供多少指导,麻烦就总会出现。在毫无准备的教师手中,改革变成了胡闹,学生得到的困惑费解多于助益。 One 1965 Peanuts cartoon depicts the young blond-haired Sally struggling to understand her new-math assignment: “Sets . . . one to one matching . . . equivalent sets . . . sets of one . . . sets of two . . . renaming two. . . .” After persisting for three valiant frames, she throws back her head and bursts into tears: “All I want to know is, how much is two and two?” 1965年《花生》(Peanuts)上的一则漫画就曾描绘了,金发小女孩萨丽如何绞尽脑汁去理解她的“新数学”功课:“集合……单射……相等的集合……1的集合……2的集合……对2进行重命名……”。在顽强坚持了三格漫画之后,她仰头大哭:“我就想知道2加2等于几?” Today the frustrating descent from good intentions to tears is playing out once again, as states across the country carry out the latest wave of math reforms: the Common Core. 今天,这种令人揪心的好心变泪水的场景正在重演。美国各州纷纷着手实施最新一轮数学改革,采纳“公共核心”(Common Core)。 A new set of academic standards developed to replace states’ individually designed learning goals, the Common Core math standards are like earlier math reforms, only further refined and more ambitious. 公共核心数学标准是一套新的教学标准,旨在替代各州先前自行设定的学习目标。这套标准与之前的数学改革相似,只是更为细致,抱负更大。 Whereas previous movements found teachers haphazardly, through organizations like Takahashi’s beloved N.C.T.M. math-teacher group, the Common Core has a broader reach. 此前的改革行动只是偶尔有一些教师参加,而相比之下,通过像NCTM这种高桥昭彦所钟爱的数学教师团体,“公共核心”影响范围更广。 A group of governors and education chiefs from 48 states initiated the writing of the standards, for both math and language arts, in 2009. The same year, the Obama administration encouraged the idea, making the adoption of rigorous “common standards” a criterion for receiving a portion of the more than $4 billion in Race to the Top grants. Forty-three states have adopted the standards. 2009年,来自48个州的州长和教育官员发起制定了有关数学和语言技能的公共核心标准。同年,奥巴马政府支持了这一理念,将严格采纳“公共标准”确定为能否从40多亿美元的“力争上游”(Race to the Top)专款中分得一杯羹的评判准则。现在,已有43个州采纳了这一标准。 The opportunity to change the way math is taught, as N.C.T.M. declared in its endorsement of the Common Core standards, is “unprecedented.” And yet, once again, the reforms have arrived without any good system for helping teachers learn to teach them. 正如NCTM在其对公共核心标准的公开支持中所宣称的,采纳这一标准所带来的数学教学革新机会“前所未见”。然而,又一次,能够帮助教师们学会如何教授这一标准的良好体系并没有随着改革一起到来。 Responding to a recent survey by Education Week, teachers said they had typically spent fewer than four days in Common Core training, and that included training for the language-arts standards as well as the math. 在回答《教育周刊》的调查提问时,教师们说,他们所接受的“公共核心”培训普遍不超过4天,而且还是语言技能标准和数学标准培训都包含在内。 Carefully taught, the assignments can help make math more concrete. Students don’t just memorize their times tables and addition facts but also understand how arithmetic works and how to apply it to real-life situations. But in practice, most teachers are unprepared and children are baffled, leaving parents furious. 如果精心教授,新功课能让数学更为具体实际。学生们不仅仅会背诵乘法表和加法口诀,还能理解算术的原理,并能将其应用于实际生活。但事实上,大部分教师都毫无准备,孩子们被搞得一头雾水,家长们则怒气冲冲。 The comedian Louis C.K. parodied his daughters’ homework in an appearance on “The Late Show With David Letterman”: “It’s like, Bill has three goldfish. He buys two more. How many dogs live in London?” 喜剧演员Louis C. K. 在参加《大卫·莱特曼深夜秀》时曾搞笑模仿他女儿的作业:“比如,比尔有三条金鱼。他又买了两条。请问伦敦有多少条狗?” The inadequate implementation can make math reforms seem like the most absurd form of policy change — one that creates a whole new problem to solve. Why try something we’ve failed at a half-dozen times before, only to watch it backfire? Just four years after the standards were first released, this argument has gained traction on both sides of the aisle. 实施不到位,可能会让数学课改革变成一次将会制造出有待解决的全新麻烦的那种政策变动,愚蠢之极。为什么要去做那些我们已屡试屡败的事呢?就为了弄巧成拙?标准发布才4年,左右两翼就都已经开始这么想了。 Since March, four Republican governors have opposed the standards. In New York, a Republican candidate is trying to establish another ballot line, called Stop Common Core, for the November gubernatorial election. On the left, meanwhile, teachers’ unions in Chicago and New York have opposed the reforms. 3月以来,已有4位共和党州长反对该标准。纽约的一位共和党候选人正在推动为11月的州长选举设立一个投票选项栏(ballot line),就叫“停止公共核心”【编注:ballot line是合并选举制度(electoral fusion)中的一种投票安排,一个ballot line在选票上单独占据一栏,但多个ballot line可以对应同一位候选人,这一安排改善了小党派和单议题政党参与单一选区制下竞选活动的机会,不然的话,单一选区制通常会造成两党寡头垄断。这项制度在19世纪晚期曾流行于美国各州,后来逐渐被各州禁止,目前尚有8个州采用,包括纽约州】。在左翼那边,芝加哥和纽约的教师工会也已对改革表示反对。 The fact that countries like Japan have implemented a similar approach with great success offers little consolation when the results here seem so dreadful. Americans might have written the new math, but maybe we simply aren’t suited to it. “By God,” wrote Erick Erickson, editor of the website RedState, in an anti-Common Core attack, is it such “a horrific idea that we might teach math the way math has always been taught.” 结局如此糟糕,以至于日本等国实施类似办法而取得的巨大成功都于事无补。美国人也许制定了“新数学”标准,但它可能确实不适合我们。在一篇反公共核心的批评文章中,RedState网站的编辑Erick Erickson写道:“神啊,以历来如此的数学教学方式教数学,这个想法难道就那么可怕吗?” The new math of the ‘60s, the new new math of the ‘80s and today’s Common Core math all stem from the idea that the traditional way of teaching math simply does not work. As a nation, we suffer from an ailment that John Allen Paulos, a Temple University math professor and an author, calls innumeracy — the mathematical equivalent of not being able to read. 60年代的新数学,80年代的新新数学,以及当下的公共核心数学,都源于同一个观念,即传统的数学教学方式就是行不通。我们的国民染上了一种病,天普大学数学教授和作家John Allen Paulos称之为数盲——数学方面的文盲。 On national tests, nearly two-thirds of fourth graders and eighth graders are not proficient in math. More than half of fourth graders taking the 2013 National Assessment of Educational Progress could not accurately read the temperature on a neatly drawn thermometer. (They did not understand that each hash mark represented two degrees rather than one, leading many students to mistake 46 degrees for 43 degrees.) 全国性考试显示,将近三分之二的四年级和八年级学生数学不熟练。在2013年“国家教育进步评价”中,过半数的四年级学生无法准确认读描画清晰的温度计上的读数(他们不知道每个小刻度代表2度而非1度,因此许多学生误将46度认读成了43度)。 On the same multiple-choice test, three-quarters of fourth graders could not translate a simple word problem about a girl who sold 15 cups of lemonade on Saturday and twice as many on Sunday into the expression “15 + (2×15).” Even in Massachusetts, one of the country’s highest-performing states, math students are more than two years behind their counterparts in Shanghai. 同样在上述选择题测试中,四分之三的四年级学生无法将“小女孩周六卖了15杯柠檬汁,周日卖了周六的2倍”这种简单的文字问题转换为“15+(2X15)”这一表达式。即使在马萨诸塞这种全国表现最好的州,数学课学生进度也落后于上海同年级学生两年以上。 Adulthood does not alleviate our quantitative deficiency. A 2012 study comparing 16-to-65-year-olds in 20 countries found that Americans rank in the bottom five in numeracy. On a scale of 1 to 5, 29 percent of them scored at Level 1 or below, meaning they could do basic arithmetic but not computations requiring two or more steps. 成年并未能缓解我们的数学缺陷。2012年一项针对20个国家的16-65岁人口的比较研究发现,美国人的算术能力排在最后5名。按1-5的等级衡量,29%的美国人得分在等级1或更低,表明他们会做基本的算术,但碰到两步或两步以上的运算就不会了。 One study that examined medical prescriptions gone awry found that 17 percent of errors were caused by math mistakes on the part of doctors or pharmacists. A survey found that three-quarters of doctors inaccurately estimated the rates of death and major complications associated with common medical procedures, even in their own specialty areas. 针对医药处方差错的一项分析研究发现,17%的失误源于医生或药剂师的数学错误。一项调查发现,四分之三的医生对于常见手术的死亡率和主要并发症发病率存在错误估计,即使在他们自身的专业领域也不例外。 One of the most vivid arithmetic failings displayed by Americans occurred in the early 1980s, when the A&W restaurant chain released a new hamburger to rival the McDonald’s Quarter Pounder. With a third-pound of beef, the A&W burger had more meat than the Quarter Pounder; in taste tests, customers preferred A&W’s burger. And it was less expensive. A lavish A&W television and radio marketing campaign cited these benefits. Yet instead of leaping at the great value, customers snubbed it. 美国人数学缺陷的一次生动展示发生在1980年代初,当时A&W连锁快餐为与麦当劳的“1/4磅汉堡”竞争,推出了一种新汉堡,里面有1/3磅牛肉,比麦当劳的“1/4磅”要多。在品尝活动中,顾客也更喜欢A&W汉堡。而且它还更便宜。A&W在电视和广播上做了大量市场推广活动,宣传这些优点。然而对这样的超值之物,消费者并不买账,反而是冷落有加。 Only when the company held customer focus groups did it become clear why. The Third Pounder presented the American public with a test in fractions. And we failed. Misunderstanding the value of one-third, customers believed they were being overcharged. Why, they asked the researchers, should they pay the same amount for a third of a pound of meat as they did for a quarter-pound of meat at McDonald’s. The “4” in “¼,” larger than the “3” in “⅓,” led them astray. 直到A&W公司开展了消费者焦点组调研,事情的原因才搞清楚。“1/3磅汉堡”给美国公众出了道分数题,我们却没有答对。消费者误解了1/3的数值,认为这种汉堡价格过高。他们问调研人员,凭什么要他们为三分之一磅肉支付那么多钱,而同样的钱在麦当劳可以买到四分之一磅肉。“1/4”中的“4”大于“1/3”中的“3”,这导致他们理解错误。 But our innumeracy isn’t inevitable. In the 1970s and the 1980s, cognitive scientists studied a population known as the unschooled, people with little or no formal education. Observing workers at a Baltimore dairy factory in the ‘80s, the psychologist Sylvia Scribner noted that even basic tasks required an extensive amount of math. 但我们的数盲并非无可避免。在1970年代和1980年代,认知科学家对一个失学人群——即没有或几乎没有受过正式教育的人群——进行了研究。通过考察80年代巴尔的摩乳品厂的工人,心理学家Sylvia Scribner发现,即使最基本的工作也要求掌握大量数学。 For instance, many of the workers charged with loading quarts and gallons of milk into crates had no more than a sixth-grade education. But they were able to do math, in order to assemble their loads efficiently, that was “equivalent to shifting between different base systems of numbers.” 比如,负责将牛奶成夸脱成加仑地装入大货箱的工人,所受教育均不超过六年级。但为了高效装箱,他们能做数学,装箱“就相当于在不同的基本数字系统之间进行换算”。 Throughout these mental calculations, errors were “virtually nonexistent.” And yet when these workers were out sick and the dairy’s better-educated office workers filled in for them, productivity declined. 在这种心算过程中,“基本不存在”错误。而当这些工人因病休假,由乳品厂受过更好教育的办公室职员来顶缺时,生产率就会下降。 The unschooled may have been more capable of complex math than people who were specifically taught it, but in the context of school, they were stymied by math they already knew. 虽然相比受过特定教育的人来说,失学人群进行复杂数学运算的能力更强,但一旦处于学校环境中,他们却被他们其实已经掌握的数学问题难住了。 Studies of children in Brazil, who helped support their families by roaming the streets selling roasted peanuts and coconuts, showed that the children routinely solved complex problems in their heads to calculate a bill or make change. When cognitive scientists presented the children with the very same problem, however, this time with pen and paper, they stumbled. 在巴西,为贴补家用,很多小孩在大街上沿街贩卖烤花生和椰子。研究发现,这些孩子经常在脑子里默算复杂的账单和找零问题。但是,当认知科学家向他们提出同样的问题,让他们用笔和纸作答时,这些孩子就卡壳了。 A 12-year-old boy who accurately computed the price of four coconuts at 35 cruzeiros each was later given the problem on paper. Incorrectly using the multiplication method he was taught in school, he came up with the wrong answer. 有个12岁男孩,能准确算出4个单价为35克鲁塞罗【译注:巴西旧币】的椰子的总价,但是同样的问题写在纸上时,他得出的却是一个错误的答数,因为他用错了学校里教的乘法。 Similarly, when Scribner gave her dairy workers tests using the language of math class, their scores averaged around 64 percent. The cognitive-science research suggested a startling cause of Americans’ innumeracy: school. 同样,当Scribner用数学课上用的语言对她考察的乳品厂工人进行测验时,他们的平均成绩大概是64分(总分100分)。认知科学研究表明,美国人患上数盲症的原因竟然是学校。 Most American math classes follow the same pattern, a ritualistic series of steps so ingrained that one researcher termed it a cultural script. Some teachers call the pattern “I, We, You.” After checking homework, teachers announce the day’s topic, demonstrating a new procedure: “Today, I’m going to show you how to divide a three-digit number by a two-digit number” (I). 大多数美国数学课程采用同样的模式,一系列程式化的步骤根深蒂固,有位研究者干脆称之为“训练脚本”。一些教师把这种模式叫做“我、我们、你”模式。检查完作业,教师们先宣布当日要讲的内容,展示一套新的解题流程:“今天,我来教你们怎么做三位数除以两位数的除法”(我)。 Then they lead the class in trying out a sample problem: “Let’s try out the steps for 242 ÷ 16” (We). Finally they let students work through similar problems on their own, usually by silently making their way through a work sheet: “Keep your eyes on your own paper!” (You). 然后他们就带领全班尝试解答例题:“我们来试试242÷16的解题步骤”(我们)。最后,他们让学生们自己去解决类似的题目,通常就是要他们安静地做一套练习题:“专心做自己的题!”(你们)。 By focusing only on procedures — “Draw a division house, put ‘242’ on the inside and ‘16’ on the outside, etc.” — and not on what the procedures mean, “I, We, You” turns school math into a sort of arbitrary process wholly divorced from the real world of numbers. “我、我们、你”模式只关心解题流程——“画个除法小屋【译注:即长除法竖式中的√符号】,把242放在里面,16放在外边,等等”,而不关心这些流程的意义,把课堂数学变成了一种独断的过程,与真实世界的数字完完全全不搭边。 Students learn not math but, in the words of one math educator, answer-getting. Instead of trying to convey, say, the essence of what it means to subtract fractions, teachers tell students to draw butterflies and multiply along the diagonal wings, add the antennas and finally reduce and simplify as needed. 用一位数学教育者的话说,学生们学的不是数学,而是解题。比如,教师们不是试图去传授做分数减法的实质意义,而是告诉学生们先画蝴蝶,然后将蝴蝶对角翅膀上的数字做乘法,再把两个触角上的数字做加法,最后,如果需要,再化简分数。 The answer-getting strategies may serve them well for a class period of practice problems, but after a week, they forget. And students often can’t figure out how to apply the strategy for a particular problem to new problems. 这种解题策略虽然能让学生们在上课期间把练习题做得很好,但一个星期之后,他们就会忘光。而且学生们还经常搞不清楚如何用这种针对个别问题的策略解决新问题。 How could you teach math in school that mirrors the way children learn it in the world? That was the challenge Magdalene Lampert set for herself in the 1980s, when she began teaching elementary-school math in Cambridge, Mass. 我们应该如何模仿孩子们在真实世界的学习方式来进行课堂数学教育呢?这就是玛达勒纳·兰珀特(Magdalene Lampert)在1980年代为自己设定的挑战,当时她刚开始在马萨诸塞的坎布里奇担任小学数学教师。 She grew up in Trenton, accompanying her father on his milk deliveries around town, solving the milk-related math problems he encountered. “Like, you know: If Mrs. Jones wants three quarts of this and Mrs. Smith, who lives next door, wants eight quarts, how many cases do you have to put on the truck?” Lampert, who is 67 years old, explained to me. 她在特伦顿长大,从小就随父亲一起在镇上派送牛奶,帮着父亲处理相关算术问题。“比如:琼斯先生要3夸脱这个,他隔壁的史密斯太太则要8夸脱,那么要往卡车上装几箱奶?”现年67岁的兰珀特这么跟我说。 She knew there must be a way to tap into what students already understood and then build on it. In her classroom, she replaced “I, We, You” with a structure you might call “You, Y’all, We.” 她深知必然存在一种方法,可以让我们利用学生们已经理解的东西,再在上面添砖加瓦。她在自己的课堂里抛弃了“我、我们、你”模式,采纳了一种可称为“你、你们、我们”的模式。 Rather than starting each lesson by introducing the main idea to be learned that day, she assigned a single “problem of the day,” designed to let students struggle toward it — first on their own (You), then in peer groups (Y’all) and finally as a whole class (We). 她的每节课并不从介绍当日要学的主要内容开始,而是布置一个“每日一问”。设计这个问题,是为了让学生们努力去解决它——首先是自己想(“你”),然后是小组讨论(“你们”),最后是全班一起来(“我们”)。 The result was a process that replaced answer-getting with what Lampert called sense-making. By pushing students to talk about math, she invited them to share the misunderstandings most American students keep quiet until the test. In the process, she gave them an opportunity to realize, on their own, why their answers were wrong. 通过由此形成的一套程序,兰珀特所说的“理解”就取代了“解题”。通过调动学生们讨论数学,她也引导他们交流彼此的错解,而多数美国人是直到考试都还对此一声不吭的。这一过程让学生们有机会自己认识到自己的答案为什么是错的。 Lampert, who until recently was a professor of education at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, now works for the Boston Teacher Residency, a program serving Boston public schools, and the New Visions for Public Schools network in New York City, instructing educators on how to train teachers. 兰珀特不久前还是密歇根大学安娜堡分校的教育学教授,现任职于“波士顿教师驻校”项目,该项目专为波士顿公立学校服务,同时她还在纽约市的公立学校新视野网络任职,职责是对教育者训练教师的方法进行指导。 In her book, “Teaching Problems and the Problems of Teaching,” Lampert tells the story of how one of her fifth-grade classes learned fractions. One day, a student made a “conjecture” that reflected a common misconception among children. The fraction 5 / 6, the student argued, goes on the same place on the number line as 5 / 12. 在她的著作《问题的教学与教学的问题》中,兰珀特讲述了她的一个五年级班级如何学习分数的故事。某天,有学生提出了一个“猜想”,他认为分数5/6和5/12在数轴上应该处于同一位置。这是孩子们中间很常见的一个误解。 For the rest of the class period, the student listened as a lineup of peers detailed all the reasons the two numbers couldn’t possibly be equivalent, even though they had the same numerator. A few days later, when Lampert gave a quiz on the topic (“Prove that 3 / 12 = 1 / 4 ,” for example), the student could confidently declare why: “Three sections of the 12 go into each fourth.” 这节课之后的时间里,这个学生就听他的一组同伴依次详细说明为什么这两个数不可能相等,尽管它们分子相同。几天之后,兰珀特针对这个内容出了个小测验(比如,“证明3/12=1/4”),学生们能够很有信心地说明理由:“12份中的三份,相当于四份中的一份”。 Over the years, observers who have studied Lampert’s classroom have found that students learn an unusual amount of math. Rather than forgetting algorithms, they retain and even understand them. One boy who began fifth grade declaring math to be his worst subject ended it able to solve multiplication, long division and fraction problems, not to mention simple multivariable equations. It’s hard to look at Lampert’s results without concluding that with the help of a great teacher, even Americans can become the so-called math people we don’t think we are. 多年以来,通过研究兰珀特的课堂,观察者已经发现,学生们学到的数学多到超乎寻常。他们不会忘记运算法则,不但记住了,而且还能理解。有个男生刚进五年级时说数学是他最差的科目,但五年级结束时他却学会了解决乘法、长除和分数问题,更别说简单的多元方程组了。看到兰珀特的成绩,人们自会得出这样的结论:只要有了不起的教师,即使美国人也可能变成数学民族,我们现在可不会这么认为。 Among math reformers, Lampert’s work gained attention. Her research was cited in the same N.C.T.M. standards documents that Takahashi later pored over. She was featured in Time magazine in 1989 and was retained by the producers of “Sesame Street” to help create the show “Square One Television,” aimed at making math accessible to children. 兰珀特的工作在数学改革家中受到了关注。高桥昭彦曾仔细研读过的NCTM教学标准文件就曾引用过她的研究。1989年,《时代周刊》曾刊载关于她的特稿。她还曾被《芝麻街》(Sesame Street)的制片人所聘,协助创作了“起点电视”节目,旨在让数学更易于被小孩子理解。 Yet as her ideas took off, she began to see a problem. In Japan, she was influencing teachers she had never met, by way of the N.C.T.M. standards. But where she lived, in America, teachers had few opportunities for learning the methods she developed. 然而在她的理念流行起来之后,她开始注意到一个问题。在日本,通过NCTM标准,她正在持续影响着许多她从未谋面的教师。但在她生活的美国,教师们却很少有机会学习她所开发的这些方法。 【照片插图来自于Andrew B. Myers 道具师:Randi Brookman Harris。蝴蝶图标来自于Tim Boelaars】 American institutions charged with training teachers in new approaches to math have proved largely unable to do it. At most education schools, the professors with the research budgets and deanships have little interest in the science of teaching. Indeed, when Lampert attended Harvard’s Graduate School of Education in the 1970s, she could find only one listing in the entire course catalog that used the word “teaching” in its title. (Today only 19 out of 231 courses include it.) Methods courses, meanwhile, are usually taught by the lowest ranks of professors — chronically underpaid, overworked and, ultimately, ineffective. 对教师们负有新方法培训之责的美国机构,已被证明几乎无力承担这一任务。在多数教育学校里,拥有研究预算和系主任职位的教授们很少有兴趣钻研教育科学。事实上,兰珀特1970年代在哈佛大学的教育学研究所上学时,在整个课程目录表中,名称里带有“教学”一词的课程竟然只有一门。(今天的231门课中也只有19门含有该词。)同时,方法课通常都由级别最低的教授来上——常年低薪、工作负担过重,而且终究并不称职。 Without the right training, most teachers do not understand math well enough to teach it the way Lampert does. “Remember,” Lampert says, “American teachers are only a subset of Americans.” As graduates of American schools, they are no more likely to display numeracy than the rest of us. “I’m just not a math person,” Lampert says her education students would say with an apologetic shrug. 由于缺乏正确的培训,多数教师对数学的了解不够深入,不能像兰珀特那样教书。兰珀特说:“记住,美国教师只是美国人的一个子集”。他们毕业于美国的学校,数学程度并不比其余美国人更高。兰珀特说,她的教育学学生会抱歉地耸耸肩跟她说“我确实不擅长数学”。 Consequently, the most powerful influence on teachers is the one most beyond our control. The sociologist Dan Lortie calls the phenomenon the apprenticeship of observation. Teachers learn to teach primarily by recalling their memories of having been taught, an average of 13,000 hours of instruction over a typical childhood. The apprenticeship of observation exacerbates what the education scholar Suzanne Wilson calls education reform’s double bind. The very people who embody the problem — teachers — are also the ones charged with solving it. 结果是,对教师们最有影响的因素,就是最不由我们掌控的。社会学家丹·洛尔蒂将这种现象叫做“旁观习艺”(apprenticeship of observation)。教师们主要是通过回忆自己的受教经历来学习教书,一般人童年时接受的教导平均有13000小时。“旁观习艺”现象加剧了教育学家苏珊·威尔逊所称的教育改革双重困境:问题本就在于教师,而负责解决这一问题的也是教师。 Lampert witnessed the effects of the double bind in 1986, a year after California announced its intention to adopt “teaching for understanding,” a style of math instruction similar to Lampert’s. A team of researchers that included Lampert’s husband, David Cohen, traveled to California to see how the teachers were doing as they began to put the reforms into practice. 1986年,也就是加利福尼亚宣布要采用与兰珀特的数学教育方式类似的“达成理解的教学”的第二年,兰珀特见证了这种双重困境的后果。教师们开始将改革付诸实践后,一个研究小组(其中包括兰珀特的丈夫大卫·科恩)就跑到加利福尼亚去观察他们到底是如何做的。 But after studying three dozen classrooms over four years, they found the new teaching simply wasn’t happening. Some of the failure could be explained by active resistance. One teacher deliberately replaced a new textbook’s problem-solving pages with the old worksheets he was accustomed to using. 4年以后,通过研究30多个课堂,他们发现“新教学法”根本没有出现。这种失败部分源于主动的抵制。有个教师就故意拿他惯于使用的旧习题集替换掉了新教材中的问题解答部分。 Much more common, though, were teachers who wanted to change, and were willing to work hard to do it, but didn’t know how. Cohen observed one teacher, for example, who claimed to have incited a “revolution” in her classroom. But on closer inspection, her classroom had changed but not in the way California reformers intended it to. 然而,更为普遍的情况是,教师们想要有所改变,也愿意努力去实现改变,但他们不知道如何下手。科恩就观察了一位自称在课堂里引发了“革命”的教师。细查发现,她的课堂确实有所改变,但方向却与加利福尼亚改革家的意图不同。 Instead of focusing on mathematical ideas, she inserted new activities into the traditional “I, We You” framework. The supposedly cooperative learning groups she used to replace her rows of desks, for example, seemed in practice less a tool to encourage discussion than a means to dismiss the class for lunch (this group can line up first, now that group, etc.). 她没能聚焦于数学理念,而是在传统的“我、我们、你”框架中加入了一些新活动。比如,她撤掉成排的课桌,代之以意在增进合作的学习小组,但从实践情形来看,这一替换与其说是鼓励了讨论,倒不如说是方便了学生下课吃午饭(比如,这组先排队,那组再上)。 And how could she have known to do anything different? Her principal praised her efforts, holding them up as an example for others. Official math-reform training did not help, either. Sometimes trainers offered patently bad information — failing to clarify, for example, that even though teachers were to elicit wrong answers from students, they still needed, eventually, to get to correct ones. Textbooks, too, barely changed, despite publishers’ claims to the contrary. 不过,她又能知晓什么其它办法呢?校长鼓励了她所做的努力,将其树为他人学习的榜样。官方的数学改革培训也没能帮到她。有时候培训者还会提供明显糟糕的信息——比如,没能清楚地说明,尽管教师们需要从学生那里诱导出错误的回答,但最终仍然需要让学生们给出正确的答案。同样,教材也基本保持原样,尽管出版社声称已经做出了改变。 With the Common Core, teachers are once more being asked to unlearn an old approach and learn an entirely new one, essentially on their own. Training is still weak and infrequent, and principals — who are no more skilled at math than their teachers — remain unprepared to offer support. 现在公共核心来了,再一次要求教师们忘记旧的方法,而且基本上要全靠他们自己去学会全新的方法。培训力度仍很弱,且频率很低,校长们——其数学技能当然跟教师们一样差——也仍然是毫无准备,无力提供支持。 Textbooks, once again, have received only surface adjustments, despite the shiny Common Core labels that decorate their covers. “To have a vendor say their product is Common Core is close to meaningless,” says Phil Daro, an author of the math standards. 教材依然如故只做了表面的调整,就只有封面上装饰有公共核心那闪闪发亮的标签。该数学标准的作者之一菲尔·达罗说:“让小贩们去说他们的产品是公共核心,这几近于毫无意义。” Left to their own devices, teachers are once again trying to incorporate new ideas into old scripts, often botching them in the process. One especially nonsensical result stems from the Common Core’s suggestion that students not just find answers but also “illustrate and explain the calculation by using equations, rectangular arrays, and/or area models.” 教师们只能自摸门道,又一次尝试把新理念塞进旧的脚本里,通常还只能一边尝试一边缝缝补补。公共核心建议学生们不仅要找到答案,而且要“运用等式、矩形阵列和(或)面积模型来图解和阐述其计算过程”,这一建议导致了一个特别荒谬的结果。 The idea of utilizing arrays of dots makes sense in the hands of a skilled teacher, who can use them to help a student understand how multiplication actually works. For example, a teacher trying to explain multiplication might ask a student to first draw three rows of dots with two dots in each row and then imagine what the picture would look like with three or four or five dots in each row. 在经验丰富的教师手中,使用成列的小圆点这一想法确实有道理,有助于学生理解乘法的实际运算过程。比如,正在讲解乘法的教师可以让学生先画3排小圆点,每排2个,然后让他去想象如果每排有3个或4个或5个点,会构成什么样的图形。 Guiding the student through the exercise, the teacher could help her see that each march up the times table (3x2, 3x3, 3x4) just means adding another dot per row. But if a teacher doesn’t use the dots to illustrate bigger ideas, they become just another meaningless exercise. 通过引导学生做这种活动,教师可以让他们看到,乘法表上每进一格(3x2,3x3,3x4),意思不过是每排多加1个圆点而已。但是如果教师使用这些圆点不是为了说明更大的概念,它们就只会成为另一种无意义的演练。 Instead of memorizing familiar steps, students now practice even stranger rituals, like drawing dots only to count them or breaking simple addition problems into complicated forms (62+26, for example, must become 60+2+20+6) without understanding why. This can make for even poorer math students. “In the hands of unprepared teachers,” Lampert says, “alternative algorithms are worse than just teaching them standard algorithms.” 学生们不用再背诵熟悉的步骤,但现在却要练习更为奇怪的程序,比如画小圆点就是为了数点数,或将简单的加法问题拆解为复杂形式(如62+26必须变成60+2+20+6),而并不理解这么做的理由。这可能使学生的数学技能变得更差。兰珀特说:“在毫无准备的教师手中,换个算法教学生比只按常规算法来教效果更糟。” No wonder parents and some mathematicians denigrate the reforms as “fuzzy math.” In the warped way untrained teachers interpret them, they are fuzzy. 家长们和一些数学家将这一改革贬称为“糊涂数学”,这一点都不奇怪。由未经训练的教师们扭曲表达之后,这一改革确实是糊涂的。 When Akihiko Takahashi arrived in America, he was surprised to find how rarely teachers discussed their teaching methods. A year after he got to Chicago, he went to a one-day conference of teachers and mathematicians and was perplexed by the fact that the gathering occurred only twice a year. 高桥昭彦到了美国后,吃惊地发现极少有教师会讨论各自的教学方法。到芝加哥后一年,他去参加一个由教师和数学家组成的会议,会期一天。他对该集会每年只办两次这一事实感到困惑。 In Japan, meetings between math-education professors and teachers happened as a matter of course, even before the new American ideas arrived. More distressing to Takahashi was that American teachers had almost no opportunities to watch one another teach. 在日本,即使是在美国人的新理念传入之前,数学教育教授和教师之间的会议也是一件理所当然的事。更令高桥昭彦感到忧虑的是,美国教师几乎没有任何观摩彼此教学的机会。 In Japan, teachers had always depended on jugyokenkyu, which translates literally as “lesson study,” a set of practices that Japanese teachers use to hone their craft. A teacher first plans lessons, then teaches in front of an audience of students and other teachers along with at least one university observer. Then the observers talk with the teacher about what has just taken place. Each public lesson poses a hypothesis, a new idea about how to help children learn. And each discussion offers a chance to determine whether it worked. 日本教师历来依赖“授业研究”(jugyokenkyu),这是他们用以磨炼自身技艺的一套做法。教师首先备课,然后要在由学生、其他教师和至少一名来自大学的旁听者组成的听众面前讲授。然后旁听者要和该教师交流刚才的授课如何。每一次公开课都会提出一条假想,即如何帮助孩子们学习的新想法。而每一次讨论都为确定这一想法是否有效提供了机会。 Without jugyokenkyu, it was no wonder the American teachers’ work fell short of the model set by their best thinkers. Without jugyokenyku, Takahashi never would have learned to teach at all. Neither, certainly, would the rest of Japan’s teachers. 因此毫不奇怪,由于没有授业研究,美国教师的工作达不到由美国最好的思想家所设定的典范。如果没有授业研究,高桥昭彦压根就无从学会如何教书。当然,日本的其他教师也同样学不会。 The best discussions were the most microscopic, minute-by-minute recollections of what had occurred, with commentary. If the students were struggling to represent their subtractions visually, why not help them by, say, arranging tile blocks in groups of 10, a teacher would suggest. 其中最好的讨论就是对授课过程最微观的、一分钟一分钟的回忆和评论。某位教师可能建议,如果学生们难以用形象的方式来表达减法,为什么不帮帮他们呢,比如让他们10个一组地排列一些砖块。 Or after a geometry lesson, someone might note the inherent challenge for children in seeing angles as not just corners of a triangle but as quantities — a more difficult stretch than making the same mental step for area. By the end, the teachers had learned not just how to teach the material from that day but also about math and the shape of students’ thoughts and how to mold them. 或者一堂几何课之后,也许有人会注意到,对于小孩子而言,把角不仅视作三角形的角落,而且视为一种数量,这件事有着其固有的挑战——这种延伸比在面积问题上完成同样的思考步骤更为困难。最后,教师们不仅能学到如何讲授当日要讲的内容,也能学到数学和学生思维的特性,以及如何塑造他们的思维方法。 If teachers weren’t able to observe the methods firsthand, they could find textbooks, written by the leading instructors and focusing on the idea of allowing students to work on a single problem each day. Lesson study helped the textbook writers home in on the most productive problems. For example, if you are trying to decide on the best problem to teach children to subtract a one-digit number from a two-digit number using borrowing, or regrouping, you have many choices: 11 minus 2, 18 minus 9, etc. 如果教师们无法亲自观摩这种方法,他们还可以找教材。教材由首屈一指的教育者写成,专注于让学生每天攻克一个题目这一理念。教学研究能让教材作者专门注意那些最有成效的题目。比如,你要教小孩子用借数法或重组法来做两位数减一位数的减法,假如你想知道用哪个题目最好,就可能面临多种选择:比如11减2,18减9等。 Yet from all these options, five of the six textbook companies in Japan converged on the same exact problem, ToshiakiraFujii, a professor of math education at Tokyo Gakugei University, told me. They determined that 13 minus 9 was the best. 然而,东京学艺大学(Tokyo Gakugei University)的藤井斋亮教授告诉我,在那么多的选择中,日本六分之五的教材出版社扎堆似地选择了完全一样的一个题目。他们都确认13减9是最好的题目。 Other problems, it turned out, were likely to lead students to discover only one solution method. With 12 minus 3, for instance, the natural approach for most students was to take away 2 and then 1 (the subtraction-subtraction method). Very few would take 3 from 10 and then add back 2 (the subtraction-addition method). 实践表明,其它题目都很可能只能引导学生发现一种解法。就拿12减3来说,大部分学生很自然地就会先减去2再减去1(先减再减法)。很少有人会先从10中减去3,再加回2(先减再加法)。 But Japanese teachers knew that students were best served by understanding both methods. They used 13 minus 9 because, faced with that particular problem, students were equally likely to employ subtraction-subtraction (take away 3 to get 10, and then subtract the remaining 6 to get 4) as they were to use subtraction-addition (break 13 into 10 and 3, and then take 9 from 10 and add the remaining 1 and 3 to get 4). A teacher leading the “We” part of the lesson, when students shared their strategies, could do so with full confidence that both methods would emerge. 但是日本的教师知道,同时领会这两种方法,对学生最好。他们使用13减9这个题目,是因为学生们在面对这一特殊题目时,使用先减再减法(减3得10,再减剩下的6得4)和先减再加法(把13拆为10加3,从10中减去9,把剩下的1和3相加得4)的可能性一样大。课堂上,当教师引导学生做“我们”这一步(让学生们交流彼此的解题方法)时,就有信心看到两种方法都会出现。 By 1995, when American researchers videotaped eighth-grade classrooms in the United States and Japan, Japanese schools had overwhelmingly traded the old “I, We, You” script for “You, Y’all, We.” (American schools, meanwhile didn’t look much different than they did before the reforms.) 到1995年,当美国研究者对美日两国的八年级数学课堂进行录像时,日本学校已经势不可挡地用“你、你们、我们”模式取代了老式的“我、我们、你”脚本。(与此同时,美国学校则看起来与改革前相比没有什么大的变化)。 Japanese students had changed too. Participating in class, they spoke more often than Americans and had more to say. In fact, when Takahashi came to Chicago initially, the first thing he noticed was how uncomfortably silent all the classrooms were. One teacher must have said, “Shh!” a hundred times, he said. 日本学生也有所改变。在课堂参与上,他们比美国人说得更多,也更有东西可说。事实上,高桥昭彦初到芝加哥时,他注意到的第一件事就是所有课堂都安静得令人极为难受。他说,有个老师肯定说了一百次“嘘!”。 Later, when he took American visitors on tours of Japanese schools, he had to warn them about the noise from children talking, arguing, shrieking about the best way to solve problems. The research showed that Japanese students initiated the method for solving a problem in 40 percent of the lessons; Americans initiated 9 percent of the time. 后来,他带美国访客参观日本学校,不得不预先提醒他们,孩子们就最佳解题方法进行交谈、争辩、尖叫时会很吵。前述研究表明,日本学生在40%的课上提出过解答问题的方法,美国学生则为9%。 Similarly, 96 percent of American students’ work fell into the category of “practice,” while Japanese students spent only 41 percent of their time practicing. Almost half of Japanese students’ time was spent doing work that the researchers termed “invent/think.” (American students spent less than 1 percent of their time on it.) 同样,美国学生课堂上所做的,有96%属于“练习”这个类别,而日本学生做练习的时间只有41%。日本学生有将近一半的时间是在做研究者称为“创造/思考”一类的事。(美国学生做此类活动的时间不到1%)。 Even the equipment in classrooms reflected the focus on getting students to think. Whereas American teachers all used overhead projectors, allowing them to focus students’ attention on the teacher’s rules and equations, rather than their own, in Japan, the preferred device was a blackboard, allowing students to track the evolution of everyone’s ideas. 即便是教室里的教具也体现了对于促进学生思考的关注。美国教师习惯用越过头顶的投影仪,方便他们将学生的注意力集中于教师们的、而非学生自己的规则和等式。日本老师更喜爱的教具则是黑板,它能让学生们追踪每个人想法的演变。 Japanese schools are far from perfect. Though lesson study is pervasive in elementary and middle school, it is less so in high school, where the emphasis is on cramming for college entrance exams. As is true in the United States, lower-income students in Japan have recently been falling behind their peers, and people there worry about staying competitive on international tests. 日本学校远非完美。尽管小学和初中里面授业研究很普遍,但在高中就并非如此了。高中侧重的是为大学入学考试死记硬背。跟美国一样,来自收入较低家庭的日本学生近来也已落后于同龄人,同时,日本人也很担心他们在国际测试中的竞争力。 Yet while the United States regularly hovers in the middle of the pack or below on these tests, Japan scores at the top. And other countries now inching ahead of Japan imitate the jugyokenkyuapproach. Some, like China, do this by drawing on their own nativejugyokenkyu-style traditions (zuanyanjiaocai, or “studying teaching materials intensively,” Chinese teachers call it). 不过,与美国在这类测试中长期徘徊于中等或下等不同,日本得分总是靠前。而其他正在慢慢超过日本的国家,也模仿了授业研究方法。有些国家,比如中国,还吸收了他们自己本土存在的授业研究式的传统(中国教师把它叫做“钻研教材”)。 Others, including Singapore, adopt lesson study as a deliberate matter of government policy. Finland, meanwhile, made the shift by carving out time for teachers to spend learning. There, as in Japan, teachers teach for 600 or fewer hours each school year, leaving them ample time to prepare, revise and learn. By contrast, American teachers spend nearly 1,100 hours with little feedback. 其他国家,包括新加坡,将教学研究接纳为政府政策的一项明确内容。同时,芬兰的应对办法是为教师提供用于学习的时间。跟日本一样,芬兰教师每学年只要教课600或不到600小时,有充足的时间备课、修订和学习。与此相比,美国教师每学年教课将近1100小时,还得不到多少反馈。 It could be tempting to dismiss Japan’s success as a cultural novelty, an unreproducible result of an affluent, homogeneous, and math-positive society. Perhaps the Japanese are simply the “math people” Americans aren’t. Yet when I visited Japan, every teacher I spoke to told me a story that sounded distinctly American. 有种想法很吸引人,那就是认为日本的成功乃是一种文化上的新奇事物,是富裕、同质且有数学天赋的社会的一个不可复制的结果,然后对之不加理会。也许日本人就是那种“数学民族”,而美国人不是。不过,我在日本旅游时,每位跟我交谈过的教师都跟我讲过一个听起来美国味特别浓的故事。 “I used to hate math,” an elementary-school teacher named Shinichiro Kurita said through a translator. “I couldn’t calculate. I was slow. I was always at the bottom of the ladder, wondering why I had to memorize these equations.” Like Takahashi, when he went to college and saw his instructors teaching differently, “it was an enlightenment.” 一位名为栗田辰一朗的小学教师通过翻译跟我说:“我以前特别讨厌数学。我不会计算,反应也慢。我总是处于梯子的最底下,心想为什么必须要背那些等式。”就跟高桥昭彦一样,他到了大学以后,得以看到他的老师用一种不同的方式上课,“那是一种启蒙”。 Learning to teach the new way himself was not easy. “I had so much trouble,” Kurita said. “I had absolutely no idea how to do it.” He listened carefully for what Japanese teachers call children’s twitters — mumbled nuggets of inchoate thoughts that teachers can mold into the fully formed concept they are trying to teach. 他本人学习这种新的教学方式并不容易。栗田辰一朗说道:“困难重重。我完全不知道怎么去做”。他仔细倾听日本教师所说的“小孩的叽喳”——含有尚未成熟的想法的含糊信息,教师们可以将之形塑成为他们正要讲授的完全成型的概念。 And he worked hard on bansho, the term Japanese teachers use to describe the art of blackboard writing that helps students visualize the flow of ideas from problem to solution to broader mathematical principles. But for all his efforts, he said, “the children didn’t twitter, and I couldn’t write on the blackboard.” Yet Kurita didn’t give up — and he had resources to help him persevere. 而且他也努力学做板书,板书的作用是帮助学生形象地看到从题目到解答到更广泛的数学原理中的观念流变。然而不管他如何努力,他说:“孩子们不叽喳,我也写不出板书”。不过栗田辰一朗没有放弃,而且他也有资源支撑他继续坚持。 He went to study sessions with other teachers, watched as many public lessons as he could and spent time with his old professors. Eventually, as he learned more, his students started to do the same. Today Kurita is the head of the math department at Setagaya Elementary School in Tokyo, the position once held by Takahashi’s mentor, Matsuyama. 他和其他教师一起去参加研讨会,尽其所能地观看了许多公开课,还与他以前的教授进行交流。最终,随着他所学日多,他的学生也开始如此。如今,栗田辰一朗是东京世田谷小学校数学部的主任,这个职位以前曾由高桥昭彦的导师松山武士充任。 Of all the lessons Japan has to offer the United States, the most important might be the belief in patience and the possibility of change. Japan, after all, was able to shift a country full of teachers to a new approach. Telling me his story, Kurita quoted what he described as an old Japanese saying about perseverance: “Sit on a stone for three years to accomplish anything.” 在日本能够向美国提供的诸多教益中,最重要的也许是对耐心和改变的可能性所抱持的信念。日本最终得以将一个满是教师的国家导向一种新的方法。栗田辰一朗跟我讲述他的故事时,引用了一句日本老话:石坐三年自然暖,就是说要有毅力。 Admittedly, a tenacious commitment to improvement seems to be part of the Japanese national heritage, showing up among teachers, autoworkers, sushi chefs and tea-ceremony masters. Yet for his part, Akihiko Takahashi extends his optimism even to a cause that can sometimes seem hopeless — the United States. 必须承认,对精益求精的执着信奉似乎是日本民族遗产的一部分,突出体现在教师、汽车工人、寿司厨师和茶道大师身上。不过就高桥昭彦而言,他甚至还将这种乐观精神拓展到了一个有时看起来完全无望的事业之上——美国。 After the great disappointment of moving here in 1991, he made a decision his colleagues back in Japan thought was strange. He decided to stay and try to help American teachers embrace the innovative ideas that reformers like Magdalene Lampert pioneered. 在经历了1991年搬到此国时的巨大失望之后,他做出了一个令他的日本同事感到奇怪的决定。他决心留在美国,并试着帮助美国教师采用兰珀特等改革家所开创的创新理念。 Today Takahashi lives in Chicago and holds a full-time job in the education department at DePaul University. (He also has a special appointment at his alma mater in Japan, where he and his wife frequently visit.) When it comes to transforming teaching in America, Takahashi sees promise in individual American schools that have decided to embrace lesson study. 高桥昭彦现居芝加哥,在德保罗大学(DePaul Univerisity)的教育系拥有全职工作。(他还在他的日本母校拥有一个特殊职位,并经常与妻子一起回去)。在美国教学转型问题上,高桥昭彦从那些决心采纳教学研究方法的个别美国学校那里看到了希望。 Some do this deliberately, working with Takahashi to transform the way they teach math. Others have built versions of lesson study without using that name. Sometimes these efforts turn out to be duds. When carefully implemented, though, they show promise. In one experiment in which more than 200 American teachers took part in lesson study, student achievement rose, as did teachers’ math knowledge — two rare accomplishments. 有些学校是刻意如此去做的,它们跟高桥昭彦合作,尝试改变教授数学的方式。其它学校也开展了不同形式的教学研究,只是没有采用这个名称。有时这些努力会归于失败。但如果精心实施,那就颇有前景。某项实验中,有200多名美国教师参与了教学研究,学生成绩有所提高,教师们的数学知识也有所提高——这两项成就都非常稀罕。 Training teachers in a new way of thinking will take time, and American parents will need to be patient. In Japan, the transition did not happen overnight. When Takahashi began teaching in the new style, parents initially complained about the young instructor experimenting on their children. 训练教师们用新的方式思考,这需要时间。所以美国家长也需要耐心。日本的转型不是一夜之间实现的。当初,高桥昭彦开始用新方式教书时,家长们最初也对这位年轻老师在他们的孩子身上做实验表示抱怨。 But his early explorations were confined to just a few lessons, giving him a chance to learn what he was doing and to bring the parents along too. He began sending home a monthly newsletter summarizing what the students had done in class and why. 不过他最初的探索也只局限于不多的一些课程,他由此有机会搞清自己在做什么,同时也能带着家长们一起进步。后来他开始每个月寄一份通讯给家长,概述学生们在课堂上都做了什么及其原因。 By his third year, he was sending out the newsletter every day. If they were going to support their children, and support Takahashi, the parents needed to know the new math as well. And over time, they learned. 到第三年,他寄出的通讯就成了每日一份。要让家长们支持他们的孩子,支持高桥昭彦,他们同样需要了解这种新数学。最后,他们学会了。 To cure our innumeracy, we will have to accept that the traditional approach we take to teaching math — the one that can be mind-numbing, but also comfortingly familiar — does not work. We will have to come to see math not as a list of rules to be memorized but as a way of looking at the world that really makes sense. 要治疗我们的数盲,就必须承认,我们用以教授数学的传统方法——那种可能会麻木心灵,不过同时又让我们感到熟悉而安逸的方法——行不通。我们终究必须要认识到,数学不是一份有待背诵的规则列表,而是一种有意义的看待世界的方式。 The other shift Americans will have to make extends beyond just math. Across all school subjects, teachers receive a pale imitation of the preparation, support and tools they need. And across all subjects, the neglect shows in students’ work. In addition to misunderstanding math, American students also, on average, write weakly, read poorly, think unscientifically and grasp history only superficially. 美国人必须要做的另一个转变超出了数学的范围。学校里所有科目的老师,在他们所需要的准备、支持和工具方面,都只能得到劣质的仿品。这种轻忽在学生所有学科的成绩中都表现了出来。除了搞不懂数学之外,平均而言,美国学生写作也差,阅读也差,不能进行科学思考,对历史也只有肤浅的了解。 Examining nearly 3,000 teachers in six school districts, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation recently found that nearly two-thirds scored less than “proficient” in the areas of “intellectual challenge” and “classroom discourse.” Odds-defying individual teachers can be found in every state, but the overall picture is of a profession struggling to make the best of an impossible hand. 盖茨基金会最近针对6个学区近3000名教师的测验发现,有将近三分之二的教师在“智识挑战”和“课堂讨论”领域达不到“熟练”级别。背离这一几率的个别教师在每个州都能找到,不过整体的图景就是这样:这个行业中的人正在艰苦努力,试图把手里的一副烂牌打好。 Most policies aimed at improving teaching conceive of the job not as a craft that needs to be taught but as a natural-born talent that teachers either decide to muster or don’t possess. Instead of acknowledging that changes like the new math are something teachers must learn over time, we mandate them as “standards” that teachers are expected to simply “adopt.” We shouldn’t be surprised, then, that their students don’t improve. 意在改进教学的多数政策,都没有将教学视作一种需要学习的技艺,而是把它视做一种与生俱来的天赋,教师们要么只需要召唤技能,要么就干脆没有。我们没有认识到像“新数学”这种转变,教师们是必须花时间去学的。相反,我们把新数学颁布为“标准”,教师们只要直接“采用”就好。这样,他们的学生没有进步,我们就不应该对此感到惊讶。 Here, too, the Japanese experience is telling. The teachers I met in Tokyo had changed not just their ideas about math; they also changed their whole conception of what it means to be a teacher. 在这里,日本人的经验同样有益。我在东京见过的教师不但已经转变了他们对数学的观念,他们还转变了他们对身为教师意味着什么的整个理解。 “The term ‘teaching’ came to mean something totally different to me,” a teacher named Hideto Hirayama told me through a translator. It was more sophisticated, more challenging — and more rewarding. 一位名叫平山秀人的教师通过翻译告诉我:“对我来说,‘教书’这个词的意义已经完全不同”。它变得更为精致复杂,更富于挑战——回报也更大。 “The moment that a child changes, the moment that he understands something, is amazing, and this transition happens right before your eyes,” he said. “It seems like my heart stops every day.” “一个孩子发生变化的时候,他理解了某个事物的时候,那真是美妙,这种转变就正好发生在你眼前”,他说,“就好像我每天都会心跳停止一样。” (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]自由派和斯大林的爱情故事

How Liberals Funked It?
自由派是如何可耻遁匿的?

作者:Robert Conquest @ 1999-7-30
译者:Yuncong Yang
校对:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Hoover Institution,http://www.hoover.org/research/how-liberals-funked-it

A liberal is, by definition, one whose aim is the furtherance of ever greater political liberty, freedom of thought, and social justice. A number of those who thought of themselves as, and were thought of as, liberals became apologists for Stalinist or similar regimes whose most notable characteristics were extreme terror, narrow dogmatism, social oppression, and economic failure. That is, they were all that the liberal tradition opposed.

按定义,一个“自由派”理应是以推进政治自由、思想自由与社会公正为其目标。但是,许多自认为且被大众认为是自由派的人,却成了斯大林主义及类似政权的辩护士。这类政权最昭著的特征是极度的恐怖,僵化的教条主义,社会压制,以及经济失败。显然,所有这些都是自由派最应当反对的东西。

How, and why, did a number of liberals explicitly, and a large swath of liberaldom implicitly, overcome this objection? How did this apparent paradox come to pass? Why in the 1930s and later do we find a sort of general infection of the atmosphere in which much of the intelligentsia moved? Even apart from those who became more or less addicted to communism, there was also a stratum that usually gave the Soviet Union and such regimes some moral advantage over the West.

那么,那些明确这么做的自由派,以及更多默认其做法的泛自由派人士,为何能够克服这种显而易见的自相矛盾?它们又是如何做到这一点的?为什么会出现一个如此明显的悖论?为什么自1930年代起,整个知识界都感染了这种气氛?即使不算那些多少痴迷于共产主义的人,知识界里还有一大批人乐于认为:与西方相比,苏联及类似政权具有某种道义优势。

First, of course, we should say that there were many liberals—and in general many on the left—who kept their principles unsullied and were often among the strongest opponents of the communist despotisms. Liberal is, indeed, a vague term. Many of us would take a “liberal” position on some issues, a “conservative” one on others—as most of the American or British people in fact do (an attitude shared by the present writer).

首先应当指出的是:许多自由派——以及一般而言,许多左派——还是保持着他们的原则未受玷污的。他们时常还属于共产暴政最坚决的反对者之列。“自由派”这个词的意义本身就是相当含糊的。大多数人都在一些问题上抱着“自由派”的看法,而在另一些问题上持“保守派”观点,多数英国人或美国人——含笔者在内——都是这样。

These two vaguely differentiated attitudes are the poles within the normal development, or balance, of a civic or consensual society. But all those with a reasonably critical intelligence, whether “conservative” or “liberal” on other issues, were hostile to the USSR. Those who supported it unreservedly were Communists; those who excused it may have thought of themselves as liberals, but to that extent they degraded the term.

在一个平衡发展的公民社会或协约社会(consensual society)里,出现“自由派”和“保守派”这样两种各居一极但分野并不明确的观点,是再正常不过的了。但是所有具有适当批判思维能力的人,不管他在其它问题上自认为是保守派还是自由派,都是对苏联怀有敌意的。明确表态支持苏联的人无疑是共产主义者,而那些对苏联抱有心怀体谅的人,或许自认为是自由派,但他们这么做时,正是在给“自由派”这个词抹黑。

The phenomenon we deal with here is what Orwell called “renegade liberalism.” He defined these renegade liberals with char(more...)

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How Liberals Funked It? 自由派是如何可耻遁匿的? 作者:Robert Conquest @ 1999-7-30 译者:Yuncong Yang 校对:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Hoover Institution,http://www.hoover.org/research/how-liberals-funked-it A liberal is, by definition, one whose aim is the furtherance of ever greater political liberty, freedom of thought, and social justice. A number of those who thought of themselves as, and were thought of as, liberals became apologists for Stalinist or similar regimes whose most notable characteristics were extreme terror, narrow dogmatism, social oppression, and economic failure. That is, they were all that the liberal tradition opposed. 按定义,一个“自由派”理应是以推进政治自由、思想自由与社会公正为其目标。但是,许多自认为且被大众认为是自由派的人,却成了斯大林主义及类似政权的辩护士。这类政权最昭著的特征是极度的恐怖,僵化的教条主义,社会压制,以及经济失败。显然,所有这些都是自由派最应当反对的东西。 How, and why, did a number of liberals explicitly, and a large swath of liberaldom implicitly, overcome this objection? How did this apparent paradox come to pass? Why in the 1930s and later do we find a sort of general infection of the atmosphere in which much of the intelligentsia moved? Even apart from those who became more or less addicted to communism, there was also a stratum that usually gave the Soviet Union and such regimes some moral advantage over the West. 那么,那些明确这么做的自由派,以及更多默认其做法的泛自由派人士,为何能够克服这种显而易见的自相矛盾?它们又是如何做到这一点的?为什么会出现一个如此明显的悖论?为什么自1930年代起,整个知识界都感染了这种气氛?即使不算那些多少痴迷于共产主义的人,知识界里还有一大批人乐于认为:与西方相比,苏联及类似政权具有某种道义优势。 First, of course, we should say that there were many liberals—and in general many on the left—who kept their principles unsullied and were often among the strongest opponents of the communist despotisms. Liberal is, indeed, a vague term. Many of us would take a “liberal” position on some issues, a “conservative” one on others—as most of the American or British people in fact do (an attitude shared by the present writer). 首先应当指出的是:许多自由派——以及一般而言,许多左派——还是保持着他们的原则未受玷污的。他们时常还属于共产暴政最坚决的反对者之列。“自由派”这个词的意义本身就是相当含糊的。大多数人都在一些问题上抱着“自由派”的看法,而在另一些问题上持“保守派”观点,多数英国人或美国人——含笔者在内——都是这样。 These two vaguely differentiated attitudes are the poles within the normal development, or balance, of a civic or consensual society. But all those with a reasonably critical intelligence, whether “conservative” or “liberal” on other issues, were hostile to the USSR. Those who supported it unreservedly were Communists; those who excused it may have thought of themselves as liberals, but to that extent they degraded the term. 在一个平衡发展的公民社会或协约社会(consensual society)里,出现“自由派”和“保守派”这样两种各居一极但分野并不明确的观点,是再正常不过的了。但是所有具有适当批判思维能力的人,不管他在其它问题上自认为是保守派还是自由派,都是对苏联怀有敌意的。明确表态支持苏联的人无疑是共产主义者,而那些对苏联抱有心怀体谅的人,或许自认为是自由派,但他们这么做时,正是在给“自由派”这个词抹黑。 The phenomenon we deal with here is what Orwell called “renegade liberalism.” He defined these renegade liberals with characteristic felicity, in the unused preface to Animal Farm, as those who hold that “democracy” can only be defended by discouraging or suppressing independent thought. 本文要讨论的,是被乔治·奥威尔称为“变节的自由主义”的现象。奥威尔在《动物庄园》的一篇未发表的序文中,以他标志性的精妙笔触,定义了这些变节的自由派:这些人认为保卫他们眼中的“民主”的唯一方式,就是阻止或压制独立思考。 His immediate concern was that “where the USSR and its policies are concerned one cannot expect intelligent criticism or even, in many cases, plain honesty from liberal writers and journalists who are under no direct pressure to falsify their opinions.” 当时,最令奥威尔感到担忧的现象是,“即使并未受到什么迫使他们说假话的直接压力,自由派作家或记者们在讨论苏联及其政策时,也难以指望他们表现出一点批判性智慧,许多时候他们甚至都不肯说句实话。” Elsewhere (in “The Prevention of Literature”), he comments, “When one sees highly educated men looking on indifferently at oppression and persecution, one wonders which to despise more, their cynicism or their shortsightedness.” And, he felt obliged to add, “it is the liberals who fear liberty and intellectuals who want to do dirt on the intellect.” 在另一篇文章(《对文学的阻碍》)中,奥威尔评论道:“当一个受过高等教育的人对他眼前的压制和迫害熟视无睹,我真不知道是更应当鄙视他的冷漠还是他的短视。”可能是觉得自己有义务说得更明白一些,他又写道:“害怕自由的恰恰是那些自由派,而抹黑智识的正是知识分子。” THE SLIPPERY CONCEPT OF EQUALITY 平等:一个难以捉摸的概念 We can trace the roots of this aberration a long way back. Even before the First World War, L. T. Hobhouse in his classic Liberalism had written, “liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid meaning.” “Equality” is a slippery word. In a general sense we may allow that genuine liberals—and others—are committed to a society of equal citizens. 自由派的这种错乱由来已久。在第一次世界大战前,L.T.霍布豪斯在其经典著作《自由主义》中已然写道:“如果不讲平等,那么自由只是个表面好听而含义令人作呕的名词。”“平等”是个不大好定义的词。往大里说,我们可以认为那些真诚的自由派——也算上其他自由派好了——希望建成一个由平等公民组成的社会。 The liberal state may have a legitimate role in redressing poverty, making health care available, and so forth, but after a point we find that the liberté and égalité that proved incompatible in the 1790s are still awkward companions. 一个秉承自由派理念的国家,或许可以合法地在消除贫困,普及医疗保健等方面发挥作用。可是当自由派理念进一步延伸到社会生活的其他方面时,我们将会发现,在法国大革命时曾被证明不能无限相容的“liberté”和“égalité”依然会起冲突。 And, as the liberal attitude became more and more concerned with the use of political power to promote equality, it tended to become less and less concerned with the liberty side; even domestically (in Thomas Sowell’s words), “the grand delusion of contemporary liberals is that they have both the right and the ability to move their fellow creatures around like blocks of wood—and that the end results will be no different than if people had voluntarily chosen the same actions.” 并且,当自由派们越来越重视使用政治权力来推进平等的时候,他们会渐渐倾向于无视他们理念里的“自由”部分,即使这自由是他们同胞的自由。用托马斯·索维尔的话讲:“当代自由派陷入了一个巨大的幻觉:他们觉得他们既有权利也有能力像搬动木材一样随意指挥他们的同胞们。而且在他们指挥下,最终结果就跟人们最初自发选择同样的行动没什么差别。” And when these liberals looked abroad they found a regime that claimed to have the same aims—and used the same, or much the same, vocabulary. If anything, from a skeptic’s point of view, the Communists overdid it (with the result that any country nowadays calling itself a People’s Republic or a Democratic Republic is known at once to be a ruthless dictatorship). 当这些自由派们放眼海外,他们看到了一个号称和他们追求同一个目标的政权——而且这个政权也说着和他们大体相同的一套话。不,从一个怀疑者的眼里看来,共产主义者甚至可以说是把自由派的理想做过了头(其结果是现在人们看到一个“某某人民共和国”或者“某某民主主义共和国”,就立刻知道那是个残忍无情的专制政权)。 ROTTEN LIBERALS—AND THE VAST KLEPTOCRACY 腐臭的自由派——及广泛的盗贼统治 Communists in fact despised liberals, even if not quite as much as they despised social-democrats. It was in his procommunist period that W. H. Auden wrote: 共产主义者们实际上是鄙视自由派的,当然可能没有他们鄙视社会民主党人来得那么厉害。W.H.奥登在他支持共产主义的那段时期写下过这样的诗句:
Because you saw but were not indignant The invasion of the great malignant Cambridge ulcer That army intellectual Of every kind of liberal, Smarmy with friendship but of all There are none falser. 你看到了那恶心的剑桥脓疮, 看到了它入侵我们的国度, 却并不感到愤怒。 那支诸种自由派知识分子组成的侵略军, 表演着种种虚假的好意, 实际上,没人比他们更加虚伪卑鄙
“Rotten liberalism” was, of course, the conventional charge made by the Soviet Communists against those insufficiently ruthless in the repression of enemies of the people. 当然,“腐臭的自由主义者”这个词也是苏维埃共产主义者创造出来的。他们时常拿这个词来鄙视那些在镇压人民的敌人方面做得不够狠辣到位的家伙们。 Moreover, Lenin’s own interest in the overthrow of the existing order was so intense that he did not spread his progressivism into any other fields and had nothing but contempt for modern art, free love, unorthodox medicine, and all the other paraphernalia. Communist artistic principles—socialist realism and so forth—remained overtly hostile to all the modernisms dear to many liberal hearts. 此外,列宁本人是如此醉心于推翻现有秩序,以致他只有在这一方面才表现出了那么一点进步派倾向,而与此同时彻底无视了其他领域。对于现代艺术、自由恋爱、非传统医学,以及其它种种现代事物,列宁的态度只有鄙视。共产主义艺术的准则——社会主义现实主义等等——始终全面敌视各种形式的现代艺术,而这些现代艺术正是许多自由派们全心珍爱着的。 The Communists’ attitude to homosexuality, at least after its criminalization in the USSR in 1935, was contrary to an important component of the liberal worldview—but Moscow did not lose the allegiance even of homosexuals such as Guy Burgess. The Soviets suppressed and maligned all the psychological views, Freudian and other, dear to Western intellectuals. And Stalin’s extreme anti-Semitism in the post–World War II years ran against anything describable as liberal. 共产主义者对同性恋的态度,至少是在1935年苏联将同性恋入刑之后,是与自由派世界观的一个重要方面相抵触的。但即使是盖伊·伯吉斯【译注:英国情报人员和外交官,著名苏联间谍】这样的同性恋者,也从未放弃过对莫斯科的忠诚。苏联压制和批判所有那些西方知识分子视若珍宝的心理学学说——弗洛伊德主义等等。战后斯大林表现出的露骨的极端反犹倾向,更是和一切能被称为自由主义的思想相对立的。 But, some liberals felt, at least the Stalinists were not capitalists, not motivated by greed, which, taken as the defining quality of the economic system in the West, was thus the most detested of all vices for certain liberals. These were, in general, those who gained their income (and were highly competitive with rivals for it) in academic or media spheres, that is, money derived from, but not directly dependent on, “capitalism.” 但是,一些自由派们还是认为,至少斯大林主义者不是利欲熏心的资本家,而后者在一些自由派看来,是整个西方经济制度的根本特质,因此是所有罪恶中最可鄙弃的罪恶。抱有这样看法的人,通常都是从学术界或媒体业挣得收入(而且是通过与其对手的高强度竞争而挣得),这些钱自然也派生于 “资本主义”,虽然并不直接依靠于它。 Greed, it might be argued, is not as bad as mass murder. But in any case greed was equally prevalent in the mass murder societies. Corruption of every possible type has flourished in all the communist countries. It is not only that the USSR, for example, became a vast kleptocracy but also that even the supposedly pristine early revolutionaries were anything but immune. 或许有人会说,贪欲再怎么也没有大规模屠杀那么坏呀?可事实上,在那些发生大屠杀的国家里,贪欲和西方社会一样盛行。在所有共产主义国家里,一切人类社会中可能发生的腐败活动都大行其道。不仅苏联很快变成了一个巨大的盗贼统治国家,那些据说品行高洁的早期革命家们也都绝非纯洁无瑕。 In fact, with few exceptions the victorious Bolsheviks lived comfortably through the deprivations of the postrevolutionary period. Milovan Djilas, then a Yugoslav communist leader, was shocked at how his victorious partisans, on entering Belgrade, seized villas, cars, women, and so on. The same was noted of the Sandinistas when they entered Managua. 事实上,在革命后的匮乏时期里,得胜的布尔什维克领袖几无例外都过着优裕生活。米洛凡·吉拉斯,当年的南斯拉夫共产党领导人,震惊地看到他的同志们获胜进入贝尔格莱德后个个都开始霸占别墅、汽车和女人了。尼加拉瓜的桑地诺武装分子们打进马那瓜后的表现也一模一样。 THE SWING IN LEFTISH OPINION 左派观点的转变 The phenomenon of renegade liberalism arose in the early days of the Soviet regime. Lincoln Steffens, the fearless journalist exposer of American corruption, famously said of the USSR, “I have seen the future and it works.” He had seen nothing and that future didn’t work. 在苏维埃政权的幼年时期,变节的自由主义现象已经出现了。林肯·斯蒂芬斯,那位无畏的揭露美国种种腐败现象的名记者,曾说过一句关于苏联的名言:“我看到了它的未来,它行得通。”当然,实际上他啥也没看到,而那个未来也没行通。 But until the 1930s the Sovietophiles were a minority among liberals. It is in 1933 that we see a real swing in leftish opinion. The terror-famine early that year, in which millions died, had been widely and accurately reported in much of the Western press. 但直到2ij如此醉心于推翻现有秩序写下过这样的诗句191919119130年代,亲苏分子还只占自由派中的一小部分。西方左派对苏联态度的真正转变发生在1933年。在那年初,恐怖的乌克兰大饥荒——数百万人丧生——在西方得到了广泛且准确的报道。 But the Soviet government simply denied that any famine had taken place. President Kalinin, speaking of “political cheats who offer to help the starving Ukraine,” commented that, “only the most decadent classes are capable of producing such cynical elements.” 苏联政府则矢口否认曾发生过任何饥荒。最高苏维埃主席加里宁在谈到那些“号称要帮助饥饿的乌克兰的政治骗子”时说道:“只有那些最最卑劣的家伙才能编出这种犬儒主义的谎言。” The Soviet story was supported—as we now know for disreputable reasons—by reporters such as Walter Duranty. Thus two versions were available to the American liberals. But it was Duranty who received the Pulitzer Prize—for “dispassionate, interpretive reporting of the news from Russia.” 一些像沃尔特·杜兰蒂之类的记者支持了苏联方面的说法——我们今天知道,这些支持背后有着不可见人的理由。这样,在美国自由派的面前就出现了两种迥然相异的说法。但是最后得到普利策奖的是杜兰蒂——为他“就俄国消息作出的冷静的,解读性的报道”。 The announcement of the prize added that Duranty’s dispatches were “marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity,” being “excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.” 普利策评奖委员会的颁奖通稿里继续写道,杜兰蒂的报道表现了“学术性,洞察力,中立性,优秀的判断力,而且格外清晰明了”,这些报道是“最佳外国新闻报道的杰出典范”。 The Nation, citing him in its annual “honor roll,” described his as “the most enlightening, dispassionate and readable dispatches from a great nation in the making which appeared in any newspaper in the world.” 《国家》杂志在它一年一度的“荣誉榜”里列入了杜兰蒂的名字,说他的报道是“最富启示的公允冷静报道,可读性极佳。来自一个正浮现于全世界所有报章之上的,正在创建中的伟大国家”。 A banquet was given at the Waldorf Astoria in 1933 to celebrate the recognition of the USSR by the United States. A list of names was read, each politely applauded by the guests until Walter Duranty’s was reached; then, Alexander Woollcott wrote in the New Yorker, “the only really prolonged pandemonium was evoked. . . . Indeed, one got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty.” 1933年,在纽约华尔道夫饭店举办了一场盛大宴会,旨在庆祝美国对苏联的承认。会上宣读了一串名字,每个名字都得到了人们礼貌性的掌声。接着杜兰蒂的名字出现了,亚历山大·沃尔科特在《纽约客》上写道:“(杜兰蒂的名字)激发了当晚唯一一次长时间的狂热喧腾……的确,当晚来宾都感觉到,仿佛美国出现了一次鉴别力大爆发,同时承认了苏联和杜兰蒂。” This scene in the Waldorf was clearly a full-dress appearance of the liberal establishment. And all this was before Stalin and his Comintern had given up their overt hostility to social democrats and liberals and moved over to a popular front. 华尔道夫饭店的景象,无疑象征着美国自由派当权集团的正式亮相。而所有这些,都是在斯大林和他的第三国际全面放弃对社会民主主义者及自由派的公开敌视态度、转而采取一种更受欢迎的面貌之前发生的。 THE ACADEMIC FRONDE 学术界的投石党人 From the start, it was not only the occasional corrupt journalist such as Walter Duranty but also a veritable Fronde of academics who were at least equally responsible for mediating the Soviet phenomena for the Western liberal intelligentsia. It would be to present all the horrors of expert academe. 打一开始,在西方自由派知识界面前为苏联洗地的,就不只是杜兰蒂等几个腐败记者。一伙名副其实的学术界投石党人至少要和杜兰蒂之流负相等的责任。从中将揭示出整个专业学界最恶心的事。 Most notorious, of course, were the deans of Western social science, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who went to Russia, saw the system, and produced what purported to be a learned tome on the subject—Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?—which in its second edition, at the height of the terror, dropped the question mark. 最臭名昭著的,当然是当时西方社会科学界掌门人西德尼·韦伯和贝亚特丽斯·韦伯夫妇。他们前往苏联,看到了苏联体制,然后写出了号称苏联问题权威著作的《苏联共产主义:一种新的文明?》——此书再版时,书名里的那个问号被删掉了,而此时正值苏联政治恐怖的高峰。 Their massive exercise in drivel was largely based on believing Soviet official documents. They were, in effect, taken in above all by Potemkin paperwork—of elections, trade unions, cooperatives, statistics, all the documents of the phantom USSR. 韦伯夫妇之所以表现出如此惊人的愚蠢和幼稚,很大程度上归因于他们对苏联官方文件的盲信。实际上,他们被眼前的波将金式虚假资料彻底蒙骗了。这些资料里描述了选举,工会,合作社,包含各种统计数据,向韦伯夫妇呈现了一个完全虚假的苏联。 Many others followed, such as Harold Laski, professor of political science at the London School of Economics and at one point chairman of the Labour Party. When Sir Bernard Pares, the West’s leading “Russianist,” arrived in Russia, his previous anti-Soviet feelings evaporated. 很多人趋步韦伯夫妇之后尘,比如伦敦经济学院的政治学教授哈罗德·拉斯基,他后来曾任工党主席。西方世界的首席“俄国通”伯纳德·帕雷斯爵士一踏上俄国国土,他之前的反苏倾向立刻烟消云散了。 As his son admiringly put it, he “had not left the Moscow railway station before his mind was flooded with the realization that the Bolsheviks were, after all, Russia.” He, Laski, the Webbs, and others all pronounced the show trials genuine exercises in truth and legality. 就像后来他儿子满怀着敬慕之心写下的那样,他“在踏出莫斯科火车站之前就已得出结论,布尔什维克就是俄国”。帕雷斯,拉斯基,韦伯夫妇和许多其他人都认为,他们看到的那些审判秀都是真正基于真相与合法性的实践。 These were, indeed, individuals. The academic world, though liberal in a general way, was not as yet a scene of organized error on the communist regime. That came later and in particular in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 以上说到的这些多是个人行为,当时的学术界,虽然总的来说是偏自由派的,还并没有在共产政权问题上表现出后来那种几乎是有组织的错误倾向。那要等到以后,特别是要在二十世纪的最后1/4才会大行其道呢。 THE POTEMKIN PHENOMENON 波将金现象 The Potemkin phenomenon proper—the presentation of faked appearances of prosperity or social triumphs—was, of course, widespread in all the communist countries. Anyone who ever visited the Exhibition of Economic Achievements in Moscow will know the score. Similarly, when Vice President Henry Wallace, on a flight from America to China, was for a few days in the midst of the frightful Kolyma labor camps, the guard towers and barbed wires were torn down, the miserable prisoners replaced by strong and healthy NKVD men, and so on. 波将金现象——伪造出虚假的繁荣或社会成就用于展示——当然在所有共产主义国家中都广泛存在。随便哪个看过莫斯科的经济成就展的人都知道那是怎么回事。与此相似,当美国副总统亨利·华莱士自美国飞往中国时,他曾在那恐怖的科雷马劳改营中待过几天。在华莱士停留期间,所有的守卫塔和铁丝网都拆掉了。可怜的囚犯们被换成了身强力壮的内务人民委员部人员。诸如此类。 Many such stories could be told. Yet the most extraordinary are those representing the Soviet penal system as humane and progressive. The facts about the Gulag were already available in a number of firsthand accounts. But, entirely for deceiving the Western liberals, the Stalinists maintained some “model prisons”—in particular one at Bolshevo where J. L. Gillin, a former president of the American Sociological Society, noted that: 这样的故事还有很多,其中最为卓异的,无疑是那些把苏联刑罚系统包装为“人道”和“进步”的体制。当时,已经有一些有关古拉格实情的第一手记述出现了。然而,斯大林主义者们为了蒙骗西方自由派,特意设置了一些“模范监狱”。比如设在波尔谢夫的模范监狱。曾任美国社会学学会主席的J.L.季林在访问波尔谢夫监狱后写道:
In accordance with the spirit of the Revolution the terms current in capitalist penology are discarded. There are no “crimes”; there are “wrongs.” . . . There is no “punishment,” only “measures of social defence.” 根据革命精神,资本主义刑罚学说里的词语都被抛弃了。不再有“犯罪”了,只有“错误”……再也没有“惩罚”,有的只是“社会防卫措施”。
One liberal visitor, Jerzy Gliksman, a progressive member of the Warsaw City Council, was thus deceived but later experienced the real Soviet penal behavior—described in his striking memoirs of the Gulag. 一位自由派访问者乔治·格利克斯曼当时是华沙市议会的一位进步派成员,他也上了当。不过后来他亲身体验了真正的苏联刑罚,并在回忆录中记下了自己令人发指的古拉格体验。 As Hans Magnus Enzensberger writes of Havana two generations later, there were delegates living “in the hotels for foreigners who had no idea that the energy and water supply in the working quarters had broken down during the afternoon, that bread was rationed, and that the population had to stand for two hours in line for a slice of pizza; meanwhile the tourists in their hotel rooms were arguing about Lukacs.” 就像汉斯·马格努斯·恩森斯伯格在几十年后描写的哈瓦那一样,很多访问者住在“外国人专用的旅馆里。这些外国佬根本不知道当天下午工人居住区曾经断水断电,不知道面包是按配给定额发放的,不知道他们在旅馆房间里争论有关卢卡奇的问题时,群众们在外面为领一块比萨饼要排两个小时的队。” Even the actual optic nerves of Western viewers seem to have become distorted, with falsehood coming from both outside and inside. As Malcolm Muggeridge noted: 在内外夹攻的假话冲击之下,这些西方访客的视神经似乎都被扭曲了。正如马尔科姆·穆格里奇写到的:
There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU with tears of gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest clergymen who walked reverently through anti-God museums and reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists who watched delightedly tanks rattle across the Red Square and bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town planning specialists who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered: “If only we had something like this in England!” The almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university-educated tourists astonished even Soviet officals used to handling foreign visitors. “望见国家政治保卫总局总部的宏伟大厦时,一些真诚主张人道屠宰牲口的活动家流下了感激的热泪;听完苏联的无产阶级专政是如何必要的说教后,一些真诚主张比例代表制的活动家热切地表示着同感;真诚的教士们满怀敬意的走在反上帝主题博物馆里,翻阅着宣扬无神论的著作;真诚的和平主义者们高兴地观看开过红场的坦克和遮天蔽日的轰炸机;真诚的城市设计专家们站在拥挤失修的居民楼外,嘴里嘟囔着:‘我们英国要是也有这个就好了!’这些几乎都受过高等教育的访客们表现的这种令人难以置信的轻信,甚至把那些专职糊弄外国来客的苏联官员都惊呆了。”
GOGHDZE IS A FINE MAN 贡加泽是个好人 It was not only the facts about communist regimes that received such treatment but even Stalinist personalities. The French progressive novelist Romain Rolland described secret police chief Genrikh Yagoda (later shot) as sensitive and intellectual. Harold Laski had a long discussion with Vyshinsky, faker of show trials, whom he found “a man whose passion was law reform. . . . He was doing what an ideal Minister of Justice would do if we had such a person in Great Britain.” 受到这种对待的不止是共产主义政权的方方面面,还包括斯大林主义者的品格。法国进步小说家罗曼·罗兰把秘密警察头子亨利希·亚戈达(后被枪毙)描述为一个敏感聪慧的人。哈罗德·拉斯基在和维辛斯基——一系列审判秀的策划者和执行者——长谈之后,觉得他是“一个全心投入法律改革事业的人……如果他生在英国,他做的就是一个理想的司法大臣所做的事。” Vice President Henry Wallace later described Beria’s terror henchman in the Soviet Far East, Goghdze, as “a very fine man, very efficient, gentle and understanding with people.” Owen Lattimore saw I. F. Nikishov, the head of the most murderous camp system in the Gulag, as having “a trained and sensitive interest in art and music and also a deep sense of civic responsibility.” 在亨利·华莱士副总统口中,贝利亚在远东的忠实走狗贡加泽是“一个非常好的人,效率很高,待人温和,善于理解他人。”欧文·拉铁摩尔认为I.F.尼基绍夫——他管辖的集中营系统即使在古拉格中也是最凶残致命的一个——拥有“在音乐和艺术上训练有素且趣味敏锐,同时对于公民责任的深刻认知”。 H. G. Wells arrived in Moscow in 1934 full of hostility to communism and to Stalin. An interview changed that. Stalin, it is true, “looked past me rather than at me” but “not evasively.” He asked Wells’s permission to smoke his pipe and in this and other ways soon allayed Wells’s hostility. H.G.威尔斯在1934年满怀着对共产主义和斯大林的敌意来到了莫斯科。和斯大林的一次会面完全改变了他的态度。斯大林,当真的,“把目光投向了我的身后而不是看着我”,但“并不是为了躲开我。”在点燃烟斗前,斯大林特意征得了客人的同意。这样那样的小姿态很快就把威尔斯的敌意消解于无形了:
I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest, and to these qualities it is, and nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia. I had thought before I saw him that he might be where he was because men were afraid of him but I realize that he owes his position to the fact that no one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him. “我从没见过一个更加直率、公正且诚实的人。正是由于他的这些品质,而非什么神秘或卑劣的因素,他才能得到他在今日俄国的伟大且无争议的统治地位。在见到他之前,我曾认为他是由于别人对他的恐惧才得到今天的地位的。我现在才明白,他的地位正是来源于这一事实:没有人害怕他,相反所有人都信赖他。”
Even Franklin Roosevelt—deceived indeed by Harold Ickes—was charmed by Stalin into speaking of his being above all “getatable”: the great British Russianist Ronald Hingley commented that “ungetatability” was one of Stalin’s central characteristics. 即使富兰克林·罗斯福——其实他是被哈罗德·伊克斯骗了——也被斯大林的魅力打动,以致他评论斯大林首先是个“易于亲近的人”:伟大的俄国通,英国人罗纳德·辛格利对此评论说,“不易亲近”正是斯大林性格的核心特征之一。 Among the most egregious of what I hope I may be excused as calling the Kremlin creepers was a number of those who would have been called liberal Christians. One might have expected a certain alienation from communism by any of them that had read Lenin’s virulent condemnation of all religion but particularly of sophisticated religion. The active persecution of religion in the communist countries might, you would also think, have also had an effect. 在所有那些“克里姆林宫的小爬虫”——希望大家原谅我使用这个词——中,最令人震惊不解的,就是那些曾被称作自由派基督徒的家伙。一般人都会认为:宗教人士只要读过列宁对宗教,特别是繁琐神学的那些恶毒攻击,总会对共产主义有所疏远。共产主义国家对于宗教的现实迫害也应该会加深这种排斥。 But to take only one example—the World Council of Churches Central Committee’s meeting in 1973 passed a resolution deploring oppression in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the United States, and elsewhere. An attempt by a Swedish clergyman to add the communist countries was defeated ninety-one to three, with twenty-six abstentions. 但让我举一个例子吧:世界基督教协进会在1973年的中央委员会上通过了一项决议,谴责中东、非洲、拉丁美洲、美国和其他一些地方对宗教的压迫。会上一位瑞典教士试图把共产主义国家加入谴责范围,对这一提案的投票结果是:三票赞成,九十一票反对,二十六票弃权。
We might say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. 或许可以这么说:正如胆固醇有两种,自由派也有两种:好的和坏的。
Here again, the commitment has often been so strong that it is hard to imagine that complete conversion to communism has not taken place. A Communist once told me his method. First you explain to a Christian sympathizer that communism is compatible with Christianity. That accomplished, you explain that Christianity is not compatible with communism. 在这里我们也看到,他们对共产主义的支持是如此强烈,以致人们很难想象他们居然还没有完全改宗共产主义。一位共产主义者曾经跟我说过他的妙法:首先,对一个同情共产主义的基督徒解释共产主义与基督教义可以相容,完成这一步之后,你再向他解释基督教义和共产主义不能相容就行了。 BUT WHY? 为什么? I started by advancing a general reason, or context, for these phenomena. I argued that they arose from an excessive regard for equality as against liberty. That is, people thought they saw a system, superior to our own, in which the abhorrent profit motive had been eliminated (in a sense so it had, but there are other ways of robbing the population). It was rather as if they would rejoice to find that a slum landlord had been replaced by a gangster extortionist. 在本文开始时,我试图为这些现象提出一个总体原因或情境。我提出:这种现象出现的根源是过分注重平等而不惜放弃自由。也就是说:这些人认为他们看到了一种比我们的体制更优越的体制,这种体制消灭了追逐利润这一可怕动机(一定意义上它确实做到了,当然与此同时,搜刮民脂民膏的办法还多得很呢)。事实上,他们更像是乐于看到一个黑帮勒索者取代一个贫民窟房东。 But even this is hardly enough to explain how the mind of the liberal intelligentsia became so much a subject of deception and self-deception. We must inquire further. 但是就算这一原因也不足以解释,为什么自由派知识分子的心智沦落至此,以至让他们成为如此程度的欺骗和自欺的牺牲品。还有必要向更深处找寻原因。 That is so even when we consider the attraction of anything “noncapitalist”—even when we consider domestic resentment against “conservatives” on home soil—for, as Macaulay writes of British politicians in the eighteenth century, “it is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original principles.” 即使我们考虑到任何“非资本主义”事物对自由派的吸引力,即使我们考虑自由派对本国“保守派”的忿恨——正如麦考莱在论述18世纪英国政治家时写下的:“政党总是把它的最初之敌而非最初宗旨记得更牢”——,也无法解释这种现象。 But pas d’ennemi à gauche—the idea that the far left, even if wrong in some respects, when it came down to essentials was against the real enemy, the right—cannot sustain the procommunist liberal case. “敌人永远在右”——也就是说,极左即使某些方面是错的,本质上也还是在反对真正的敌人,也就是右派——即便这句格言也不能解释为什么会有亲共产主义自由派这一现象。 For not all on the far left were covered: Trotskyites, the POUM in Spain, Anarchists. If we ask why this did not affect some “liberal” minds, it seems that in the first two cases, at least, the Stalinist version (that these were not “left” at all but secret agencies of Hitler) had some distractive effect. 因为并非所有极左翼都得到自由派的亲近,托派、西班牙的马克思主义统一工人党(POUM)或无政府主义者都无此幸运。为什么这些组织没有打动自由派的心呢?看来,至少托派和POUM可能受害于斯大林主义者的宣传,后者坚持这些组织都不是真左派,而是希特勒的特务。 Then again, the Trotskyites lacked the huge propaganda funding available to Stalinists everywhere, though the pervasiveness of a notion has traditionally not been the key point for critical minds. Where issues of fact were in question, the anti-Stalinist left was not only truer but also far more plausible. 另外,托派没有斯大林主义者那么多的宣传资金,尽管对于具有批判性头脑的人来讲,一种思想的传播力度不该影响它的说服力。实际上,当涉及事实问题时,那些反斯大林左派的说法不仅更加真实,还更有说服力。 We can list, in addition to utopianism and parochial partisanship, a number of other characteristics to be found, if not in all, than in many of the Stalinophiles (and Mao-ophiles, Castrophiles, and Ho-ophiles): in some cases vanity, in others pleasure at adulation, in others yet an adolescent romanticism about “revolution” as such. 除了乌托邦情结和狭隘的党派偏见外,在很多斯大林粉(还有毛粉,卡斯特罗粉,胡志明粉等等)身上通常都可以找到一些其他特性:一些人的共同点是求名的欲望;另一些人的共同点是爱听奉承话;而其他一些人的共同点是有一种对“革命”的青春浪漫主义。 Nor should mere boredom be omitted, as Simone de Beauvoir once confessed, which may remind us of the attitudes of a certain type of French intellectual, different, but not all that different, from his American or British counterparts, as given by Herbert Luthy in the early 1960s. 当然,单纯的无聊也是个不能不提的因素,正如西蒙·德·波伏娃曾经坦白过的那样,这或许能使我们想起赫伯特·卢蒂曾于1960年代初描述过的那类法国知识分子的态度,这种态度与他们的英美同行有所不同,但其实也相去不远:
For ten years the French intellectuals have discussed the big issues of the day so to speak in front of the looking-glass,in search less of facts and knowledge than of an attitude befitting their traditional role—of the “correct pose.” “十年来,法国知识分子们一直在镜子前讨论着所谓的‘当前重大问题’,他们的讨论与其说是为了寻求真相或知识,不如说是为了找到一种适合他们传统角色的态度——所谓的‘正确姿态’。”
THE HEROES OF THE ARGUMENT 论争中的英雄们 Nevertheless, it might be argued that the true heroes of the long argument were not so much the committed anticommunist conservatives (who were, of course, right, and fully deserve the verdict in their favor as against the procommunist liberals) as those within the liberal intelligentsia who not only were not deceived but also fought for the truth over years of slander and discouragement. 尽管如此,我们依然可以说:在这场漫长的论争中,真正的英雄与其说是那些坚定反共的保守派,不如说是那些虽身在自由派阵营却不仅不受蒙蔽,还常年冒着中伤和挫折而努力寻求真相的自由派们。当然,反共的保守派是正确的,他们在与亲共自由派论争中做出的功绩也完全值得肯定。 We might in fact say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. The difficulty is, or has been, that good liberalism implies a good deal of mental self-control. 实际上,我们可以说,正如胆固醇有两种,自由派也有两种,一种好,一种坏。如今的困难在于——或者说一直如此——好的自由主义必然要求强大的精神自律。 AND NOWADAYS? 今天呢? Kenneth Minogue, the Anglo-Australian political scientist, has observed that “as radicals have lost plausible utopias of one kind or another—from the Soviet Union to Cuba—they have become more ferociously intolerant of the society in which they live.” 英裔澳大利亚政治学家肯尼思·米诺格观察到,“当激进派失去一个又一个曾经具有说服力的乌托邦——从苏联到古巴——时,他们对自己身处其中的这个社会变得越来越不宽容了。” There are plenty of up-to-date insane absurdities, such as John Le Carré writing (in a letter to the Washington Post) that capitalism was today killing many more than communism ever had; such as Nigel Nicolson in Britain saying that Solzhenitsyn had betrayed his country just as Anthony Blunt had his. 时至今日,疯狂的荒谬论调依然层出不穷。比如约翰·勒卡雷投书《华盛顿邮报》,声称今天资本主义正在杀死的人数比共产主义曾经杀掉的还要多的多;比如英国的奈杰尔·尼科尔森声称,索尔仁尼琴正像安东尼·勃朗特【校注:英国艺术史家、苏联间谍】一样,无非是个叛国者。 And in academe we still find noisy cliques working to lower the Soviet death roll, to prove the West as the villain of the Cold War, and to call for “dispassionate” study of Stalin and Mao. 在学术界,我们也可以发现一些吵闹的小集团努力降低苏联时期的死亡数字,以便证明西方才是冷战中的那个恶棍,并呼吁对斯大林和毛泽东进行“公允不偏”的研究。 Such notions are, of course, not confined to campuses. We now get an allegedly historical film series sponsored by Ted Turner, which, with some concessions to reality, in effect tilts the balance against the West, Stalin offset by McCarthy, Castro better than Kennedy. 这种思潮当然不只存在于大学校园之内。现在出现了泰德·透纳赞助的一些所谓历史影集。虽然在一定程度上承认事实,这些影集事实上在把天平翘向反西方的那一侧。在这些影片中,麦卡锡主义被拿来抵销斯大林的罪恶,而卡斯特罗被塑造成了一个比肯尼迪更好的人。 A WORD TO YOUNG LIBERALS 对年轻自由派们的赠言 Can one offer any advice to the current generation of liberals? Well, one can advise them not to let passions provoked by the internal politics of their homelands go too far. Rhetoric of party faction is part of democratic life, but do not project it into your assessment of alien regimes and mentalities and do not accept accounts of these cultures provided by partisan sources without a critical assessment (a point that applies, indeed, to the acceptance of supposed facts in any field in which strong emotions prevail). 我们能对现今一代的自由派提出什么建言吗?当然,我们可以建议他们控制头脑里被本国政治斗争挑起的激情。党派话语是民主政治生活的一部分,但不要让这些话语影响了你对外国政权或思想的评价。此外,不要照单全收有党派偏见的来源所提供的各种关于外国文化的材料(这一点还适用于接受各种可能受到强烈感情因素影响的领域的材料)。 As to the academics criticized above, it seems that nothing is to be done. They are committed to their misconceptions. One can only urge their younger colleagues (even if hardly able to speak out frankly in an atmosphere of academic persecution, denial of tenure, and so on) that they should work at least at thinking independently, while biding their time. 至于上文中批判到的那些学者们,看起来无可救药了。他们虔诚于自己的错误信念。我们只能呼吁他们的年轻同事们(当然,在目前的大学空气里充斥着学术迫害,否决终身教职等等威胁,要直率说出自己的想法并不容易),至少努力做到独立思考,等着属于他们的时代到来。 Above all, as Granville Hicks, himself temporarily deceived, put it: “It is no defence whatever for an intellectual to say that he was duped, since that is what, as an intellectual, he should never allow to happen to him.” 毕竟,正如自己也曾一度受到蒙骗的格兰维尔·希克斯所说的:“知识分子是不能用一句‘我上当了’来为自己辩护的。因为一个知识分子有不受蒙骗的义务。” Excerpted and adapted from the New Criterion, February 1999, from an essay entitled “Liberals and Totalitarianism.” 摘编改写自《新标准(The New Criterion)19992月号刊登的《自由派与极权主义》一文。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]1714年的辉格党政变

The coup d’etat of 1714 – when the Whigs won
1714年辉格党人赢取的那场政变

作者:Matt Ridley @ 2014-8-2
翻译:陆嘉宾(@晚上不买白天买不到)
校对:Pyro,沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:作者个人博客,http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/the-coup-d’etat-of-1714-when-the-whigs-won.aspx

Was an English Enlightenment delayed by the Hanoverian succession?
汉诺威王室入继大统拖延了英格兰的启蒙运动吗?

The centenary of the start of the first world war is getting much more attention than the tricentenary of the accession of George I, which also falls this week. As far as I can tell, no new biographies of the first Hanoverian king are imminent, whereas books on the great war are pouring forth. You can see why.

相比于同在本周的一战爆发百年纪念,乔治一世登基三百周年就没有那么引人注目了。据我所知,短期内没有这位汉诺威王朝首位国(more...)

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The coup d'etat of 1714 - when the Whigs won 1714年辉格党人赢取的那场政变

作者:Matt Ridley @ 2014-8-2 翻译:陆嘉宾(@晚上不买白天买不到) 校对:Pyro,沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:作者个人博客,http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/the-coup-d'etat-of-1714-when-the-whigs-won.aspx Was an English Enlightenment delayed by the Hanoverian succession? 汉诺威王室入继大统拖延了英格兰的启蒙运动吗? The centenary of the start of the first world war is getting much more attention than the tricentenary of the accession of George I, which also falls this week. As far as I can tell, no new biographies of the first Hanoverian king are imminent, whereas books on the great war are pouring forth. You can see why. 相比于同在本周的一战爆发百年纪念,乔治一世登基三百周年就没有那么引人注目了。据我所知,短期内没有这位汉诺威王朝首位国王的新传记出版,而关于一战的书籍却是铺天盖地。原因是显而易见的。 The replacement of a plump, if benign, queen by an ‘obstinate and humdrum German martinet with dull brains and coarse tastes’ (Winston Churchill’s words), who presided over a huge financial scandal and died unlamented after a short reign, need hardly detain us. 乔治在位经历了巨大的财务丑闻,不久便去世了,无人哀悼。用丘吉尔的话说,他是个“固执、无聊、头脑迟钝、品味糟糕的德国呆子”——这样一位国王取代一位胖得恰到好处的女王。算了吧,我们不必为此多费口舌了。 But forget the royals and focus on what we might call the reshuffle among politicians that accompanied the change. 还是忘记这些皇室成员,让我们把注意力放到那些伴随这一变故的所谓“政治洗牌”上来吧。 Here’s how Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, described the last week of July 1714 in a letter to Dean Swift: ‘The Earl of Oxford was removed on Tuesday. The Queen died on Sunday. What a world this is, and how does fortune banter us.’ 第一代博林布鲁克子爵,亨利·圣约翰,在一封写给斯威夫特教长【译注:即Jonathan Swift,文学家,《格列佛游记》作者,曾担任都柏林圣帕特里克大教堂教长】的信中是这样描写1714年7月最后一周的:“牛津伯爵【译注:Robert Harley, 1st Earl of Oxford,安妮女王事实上的首席大臣】在周二被罢免,女王在周日去世。这是一个怎样的世界,命运如此戏弄我们。” The fall of the Jacobite-leaning Tories, led by Bolingbroke and his rival and former friend Oxford, with a coup d’état in the Privy Council by the Hanoverian-favouring Whigs, led by the Duke of Shrewsbury, on 30 July turned out to be a key moment in British history. It was never reversed, despite several attempts. In its own way it was as significant as 1215 and 1688. 发生在7月30日的两件事——博林布鲁克子爵及其前密友、现对手牛津伯爵所领导的亲詹姆斯派的托利党人失利,什鲁斯伯里公爵领导的亲汉诺威辉格党在枢密院政变成功——使这一天成为了英国历史上的关键时刻。尽管失败者数次试图反扑,但结果从未改变。这一年份在历史上和签署大宪章的1215年以及光荣革命的1688年同等重要。 The Tory Bolingbroke, a dazzling orator and spectacular libertine, had been stuffing positions of power with fellow Jacobites since becoming secretary of state and overshadowing his erstwhile ally the Earl of Oxford. 托利党人博林布鲁克能言善辩、风流成性,成为国务大臣之后一直忙于在重要职位上安插詹姆斯派党羽,压制前战友牛津伯爵。 But at an emergency privy council meeting on 30 July following the Queen’s stroke, he found himself outwitted by Shrewsbury, who unexpectedly summoned two fellow Whigs, the Dukes of Argyll and Somerset. The council got the barely conscious Queen to make Shrewsbury Lord Treasurer, then sat late into the night dispatching messages to alert garrisons and ensure that the Hanoverian succession was proclaimed. 但是在7月30日那次女王中风后的紧急枢密院会议上,他发现自己被什鲁斯伯里摆了一道。什鲁斯伯里出乎意料的招集了自己的两位辉格党同党——阿盖尔公爵和萨默塞特公爵。枢密院先是让几乎丧失意识的女王任命什鲁斯伯里为财政大臣,然后又连夜发送急件通知警备队保持警惕,以确保汉诺威王室宣告继位。 Had Bolingbroke prevailed at that meeting, we would probably have had a King James III, though there would almost certainly have been a civil war (instead of the minor fiasco of the Fifteen). Britain might have been more absolutist, more French influenced, more Catholic-tolerant and less commercial. 如果博林布鲁克在那场会议上取胜,我们也许会迎来一位詹姆斯三世国王,虽然那几乎一定会引发一场内战(而不是1715年詹姆斯党叛乱那种小闹剧)。不列颠也许会更加专制,受法国影响更大,更能容忍天主教,商业化也更少。 The stirrings of steam in the north that were to start the industrial revolution — the first faltering steps to turning heat into work — might have fizzled. The Act of Union with Scotland, agreed to some years earlier as part of the English insistence on the Hanoverian succession, might have unravelled. 北方那即将开启工业革命的滚滚蒸汽,也就是将热能用于生产活动的蹒跚尝试,也许就会胎死腹中。几年前通过的苏格兰联合法案——这是英国人坚持施加于汉诺威继承者的要求之一——,则可能就此解除。 At least, so goes conventional wisdom. In Churchill’s words, the outcome of that long meeting of the privy council was ‘No popery, no disputed succession, no French bayonets, no civil war’. 至少,传统的看法就是这样的。用丘吉尔的话说,枢密院那次长时间会议的结果是“没有罗马天主教,没有王位继承争端,没有法国的刺刀,没有内战。” However, there is another possibility. When not bonking, Bolingbroke was a philosopher, a religious free thinker greatly admired by Voltaire and Alexander Pope. 然而事情还有另一种可能性。当博林布鲁克并不沉迷于风月的时候,他是一位深受伏尔泰和亚历山大·蒲柏大力推崇的哲学家和宗教自由思想家。 His speeches and writings were read with avidity by the American founding fathers, who credited Bolingbroke with the idea that liberty means being free, ‘not of the law but by the law’. 其演讲和著作曾被后来的美国国父们如饥似渴地阅读,他们信奉博林布鲁克的这一理念:自由并不是“免于法律约束”的自由,而是“依靠法律而获得”的自由。 He invented the concept of an official political opposition and saw it as his duty to prevent the Whigs turning into a perpetual oligarchy. He proposed free trade with France. 博林布鲁克开创了正式政治反对派的概念,并将阻止辉格党成为永久性政治寡头视为己任。他还提出了与法国的自由贸易。 He was, in other words, a great deal more of an Enlightenment figure than the Whig who replaced him and, thanks to the blind support of George I and II, dominated politics for 20 years, while filling his pockets with ill-gotten gains: Robert Walpole. 换句话说,相比那个取代他的辉格党人——罗伯特·沃波尔,他远更像一位启蒙人物。而后者全靠乔治一世和二世的盲目支持,才主导政坛20年,并用不义之财塞满了自己的腰包。 Thus the cartoon version of history in which Whigs and Hanoverians brought liberty, parliament, Protestantism and trade, while Tories and Stuarts would have brought absolutism, Popery and civil war, may not be right. 因此,“辉格党和汉诺威王朝带来了自由、国会、新教和贸易,而如果换了托利党和斯图亚特王朝,带来的则会是专制、罗马天主教和内战”,这种卡通版历史可能是错误的。 You cannot quite help wondering if a Bolingbroke ascendancy might have given England a more vigorous Enlightenment, too, to rival those in France and Scotland. It has always puzzled me that the stars of the Enlightenment — Voltaire, Diderot, Hume, Smith and co. — included plenty of Scots and French, but no Englishmen. 你会不禁想象,如果当时博林布鲁克占据了主导,他也许会给英格兰带来一个更为活跃、足以媲美法国和苏格兰的启蒙运动。我一直有一个疑问,启蒙运动的璀璨群星,如伏尔泰、狄德罗、休谟和斯密等,其中有很多苏格兰人和法国人,却从来没有英格兰人。 Had Bolingbroke persuaded James Edward Stuart to turn Protestant, as he had tried to, then many British people would have welcomed a Stuart king. The idea of a German-speaking monarch was not at all popular. Shrewsbury’s coup might well have failed. 博林布鲁克曾尝试劝说詹姆斯·爱德华·斯图亚特【校注:即前述1715年叛乱的主导者,詹姆斯二世之子,史称“老僭王”】改信新教,如果他得以成功,那么许多不列颠人将会欢迎一位斯图亚特国王。由一位讲德语的人来当君主,这个主意从来都不受欢迎。这样的话,什鲁斯伯里的政变也许会彻底失败。 As it was, it was a close-run thing. There were plenty of Protestants who favoured James. I recently found out that my ancestor, who was Tory mayor of Newcastle that year, refused to declare the accession of George despite being a staunch Protestant. 其实就那时的情况来说,局面还是比较胶着的。当时有很多支持詹姆斯党的新教徒。我最近才发现我的祖先Richard Ridley那年担任纽卡斯尔的托利党人市长。虽然他是一位坚定的新教徒,但也拒绝宣布乔治登基的消息。 A rival faction did declare it, so Richard Ridley sent his thugs to stamp it out, resulting in a Friday night riot on the Quayside (nothing much has changed). 但有一个敌对派别宣布了,他就派手下的那些恶棍去摆平这件事情,结果某个周五晚上还在码头区导致了一场骚乱(这种情况现在也好不了多少)。 Still, it all worked out in the end. Britain may not have loved its new king, nor the corrupt grandees who ruled in his name and promptly debauched the currency in the South Sea Bubble. But George did give sanctuary to Voltaire when he was exiled from France, and gradually the country did take advantage of the largest free-trade area in Europe (England and Scotland) to sow the seeds of prosperity and incubate freedom. 尽管如此,事情最后还是得以解决。不列颠人也许从未爱戴过他们的新国王,更别说那些打着他名号统治,还在南海泡沫事件中快速贬值货币的腐败高官了。不过乔治毕竟在伏尔泰被法国驱逐之后给予其庇护,而且这个国家也逐步利用欧洲最大的自由贸易区(英格兰和苏格兰)播下了繁荣的种子,并且孕育了自由。 Bolingbroke’s most famous work, The Idea of a Patriot King, was written at Alexander Pope’s behest much later in 1738 to influence George I’s grandson Frederick, Prince of Wales, into being a monarch who rose above faction, was a father to his country and championed trade. 博林布鲁克最著名的作品《爱国者君主的观念》晚至1738年才在亚历山大·蒲柏的请求下写成,其目的是用来引导乔治一世的孙子,威尔士亲王弗雷德里克,成为一个超越党派、扮演国家慈父角色、并拥护贸易的君主。 Which, if you think about it, is roughly what we have now. 仔细想想,我们现在所拥有的体制,大体就是如此。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]新仙女木冷期是陨石撞出来的?

Rival theories for a global cooling
有关一次全球冷却事件的竞争理论   

作者:Matt Ridley @ 2013-1-13
译者:史祥莆(微博:@史祥莆)
校对:Marcel ZHANG(微博:@马赫塞勒张),小册子(微博:@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:作者个人网站,http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/younger-dryas.aspx

Did a cosmic impact cause the Younger Dryas cooling?
新仙女木降温事件是天体撞击导致的吗?

My latest Mind and Matter column for the Wall Street Journal:

Scientists, it’s said, behave more like lawyers than philosophers. They do not so much test their theories as prosecute their cases, s(more...)

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Rival theories for a global cooling 有关一次全球冷却事件的竞争理论    作者:Matt Ridley @ 2013-1-13 译者:史祥莆(微博:@史祥莆) 校对:Marcel ZHANG(微博:@马赫塞勒张),小册子(微博:@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:作者个人网站,http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/younger-dryas.aspx Did a cosmic impact cause the Younger Dryas cooling? 新仙女木降温事件是天体撞击导致的吗? My latest Mind and Matter column for the Wall Street Journal: Scientists, it's said, behave more like lawyers than philosophers. They do not so much test their theories as prosecute their cases, seeking supportive evidence and ignoring data that do not fit-a failing known as confirmation bias. They then accuse their opponents of doing the same thing. This is what makes debates over nature and nurture, dietary fat and climate change so polarized. 我在《华尔街日报》Mind and Matter专栏的最新文章中说: 据说科学家表现得更像律师而不是哲学家。他们不像对待案件诉讼那样详细地检验他们的理论,他们寻找支撑证据并且忽略掉那些不合用的数据——这就是被称为确认偏误【校注:指个人选择性地回忆、搜集有利细节,忽略不利或矛盾的资讯,来支持自己已有的想法的片面诠释的现象。】的过失。接着他们指控他们的对手在做同样的事。就是这个原因,导致有关先天与后天、膳食脂肪和气候变化等问题上的争议变得如此两极化。 But just because the prosecutor is biased in favor of his case does not mean the defendant is innocent. Sometimes biased advocates are right. An example of this phenomenon is now being played out in geology over the controversial idea that a meteorite or comet hit the earth 12,900 years ago and cooled the climate. 但检察官对案件带有偏见,并不意味着被告人无辜。有时候带偏见地坚决拥护是对的。这种现象最近在地质学领域有了个例子,那就是关于12900年前陨石(或彗星)撞击地球导致气候变冷的争议。 That the climate suddenly cooled then, plunging the Northern Hemisphere back into an ice age for 1,300 years, is not in doubt. The episode is known as the Younger Dryas, because in Scandinavia abundant pollen from a tundra flower called the mountain avens, Dryas octopetala, reappears in soil from this date, indicating that the forest had once more given way to tundra. With the sudden arrival of cooler, drier and less predictable seasons, early human attempts at agriculture in the Near East ceased, and people returned to nomadic hunting and gathering. 气候在那时突然变冷,使北半球猛然回到冰河时期并持续长达1300年,这是毫无疑问的。这段插曲被称为新仙女木事件,因为在斯堪的纳维亚,大量来自苔原花朵仙女木的花粉,在这一时期的土壤中再次出现,意味着森林曾经又一次让位于苔原。因为更加寒冷干旱和更加难以预测的季节变化突然出现,人类在近东的早期农业尝试停止了,人们回到了游动性的捕猎采集生活。 The cause of this cold lurch was seemingly settled some time ago when Wallace Broecker, a Columbia University geochemist, suggested that a North American ice sheet collapsed, flooding the Atlantic with fresh water, which interrupted the normal circulation of the Gulf Stream. 早些时候,造成这次寒冷突变的原因看似已有了定论。哥伦比亚大学的地质化学家Wallace Broecker认为,因北美冰盖崩塌而新增的融水涌入大西洋,这使得墨西哥湾流的正常循环被打断。 Then a marine geologist, James Kennett of the University of California, Santa Barbara, said he had found evidence of the impact of a large object from space 12,900 years ago, in the form of carbon spherules in silt. 然而,加州大学圣芭芭拉分校的一位海洋地理学家James Kennett说,他从淤泥里碳球粒状体的形态中发现了12900年前大型天体撞击的证据。 Dr. Kennett's argument is that a swarm of meteorites punched through the atmosphere and caused a vast conflagration, filling the air with dust and soot. This shut out the sun, causing decades of continuous winter -sufficient to trigger an advance of ice sheets that, even when the dust cleared, kept the climate cool for more than a thousand years, at least in the Northern Hemisphere. Kennett博士的观点是,大量陨石击穿大气层并导致了大规模燃烧,使空气中充满了灰尘和烟雾。它们遮蔽了太阳,导致了持续数十年的冬天,从而引致冰盖大幅扩张。即使灰尘消散后,这些冰盖也足以使寒冷气候维持一千年以上,至少在北半球是这样。 Dr. Kennett prosecuted his case with gusto, also suggesting that the impact had extinguished North American mammoths, just as an earlier impact had finished off the dinosaurs (a theory hard to reconcile with the survival of mammoths for thousands of years longer on islands off Siberia and Alaska, where hunters could not reach them). Kennett博士兴致盎然地提出了他的根据,还认为这次撞击导致了北美猛犸象的灭绝,就像之前的一次撞击导致了恐龙灭绝那样(不过这个理论很难和如下事实协调起来:猛犸象在猎人无法到达的西伯利亚和阿拉斯加边缘岛屿又生存了几千年)。 He suffered a key setback in recent years when several groups failed to find the right kinds of spherules or otherwise duplicate the results of his team's work-and, worse, when a spherule sample from Younger Dryas rocks proved to be only 135 years old. 近年来他遭受的一个重要挫折是,几个小组都没能找到能印证该理论的其他球粒体,或者好歹和他的团队有同样的发现,并且更糟糕的是,一个新仙女木岩石中的球粒体样本被证明只有135年历史。 But spherules, dated to the right period, now have apparently shown up. Dr. Kennett and colleagues have published evidence in the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that a "black mat" from the sediment of a Mexican lake dates to 12,900 years ago and shows a sudden peak of magnetic and carbon spherules, "nanodiamonds" of a kind known as lonsdaleite, and charcoal: all of it evidence of extreme heat. 但是如今,形成年代与该理论吻合的球粒体看来已经被找到了。Kennett博士和他的同事们在权威的《美国国家科学院院刊》(PNAS)上发表了证据,表明墨西哥湖沉积物中有一黑色薄层形成于12900年前,其中含有突然陡增的带磁性碳球粒体,一种被称为六方碳的“纳米钻石”,还有木炭:所有这些都是极端高温的证据。 Last year Michael Higgins of the University of Quebec published details of an underwater crater in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, arguing that it may also date from as little as 12,900 years ago. The crater, three miles across, has the characteristic central mound of a fresh meteorite impact. Its meteorite was probably too small to shift the climate, but perhaps it was part of a swarm. 去年,魁北克大学的Michael Higgins发表了关于圣劳伦斯湾一个水下陨石坑的细节,声称它也可以追溯到12900年前。这处3英里宽的陨石坑具有新陨石撞击坑所特有的中心土丘。这颗陨石可能太小,尚不足以影响气候,但也许它是一个陨石群的一部分。 After the previous debacles, the jury will take much convincing that the new results can be replicated. But the burden of proof has shifted a little in Dr. Kennett's favor. After all, Dr. Broecker and his followers, too, may be emotionally invested in his ice-sheet theory: Confirmation bias can affect us all. 先前的论点垮台之后,要让陪审团相信新结果能够重复观察到,还需要花很多功夫。但举证责任现在向有利于Kennett博士的方向偏移了一点。毕竟,Broecker博士和他的追随者们也可能已经在他的冰盖理论上投入了情感:确认偏误可以影响我们所有人。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]猿猴的把戏,人类也在玩

Games Primates Play-People behave just like the apes they are
灵长类的把戏——人的行为就像猿猴

作者:Matt Ridley @ 2012-4-20
译者:张三(@老子毫无动静的坐着像一段呆木头)
校对:Drunkplane(@暂时只看书不旅行了-zny),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:作者个人网站,http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/games-primates-play-(1).aspx

Generally, junior professors write long and unsolicited emails to senior professors, who reply with short ones after a delay; the juniors then reply quickly and at length. This is not because the seniors are busier, for they, too, write longer and more punctually when addressing their deans an(more...)

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Games Primates Play-People behave just like the apes they are 灵长类的把戏——人的行为就像猿猴 作者:Matt Ridley @ 2012-4-20 译者:张三(@老子毫无动静的坐着像一段呆木头) 校对:Drunkplane(@暂时只看书不旅行了-zny),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:作者个人网站,http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/games-primates-play-(1).aspx Generally, junior professors write long and unsolicited emails to senior professors, who reply with short ones after a delay; the juniors then reply quickly and at length. This is not because the seniors are busier, for they, too, write longer and more punctually when addressing their deans and funders, who reply more briefly and tardily. The asymmetry in length and speed of reply correlates with dominance. 在学术界,一般来说年轻的教授会主动地给资深教授写长长的邮件,而后者会在拖延一段时间后简短地回复,然后年轻教授很快又详尽地回复。这并不是因为资深教授们更忙,他们自己也常常会在给他们的院长或研究资金提供者写信时把邮件写得较长较详细,然后在经过漫长的等待后得到一封简短的回复。邮件回复长度和速度上的这种不对称性,和双方关系中支配地位的归属有关。 When a subordinate chimpanzee grooms a dominant one, it often does so for a long time and unsolicited. When it then requests to be groomed in turn, it receives only a brief grooming and usually after having to ask a second time. 在动物界,地位较低的黑猩猩常常自愿为占主导地位的黑猩猩仔细梳理毛发,但当他反过来要求对方帮忙梳理毛发时,通常要一再要求才行,而对方往往也只是简单应付一下了事。 This gorgeous little juxtaposition of tales comes from a new book by Dario Maestripieri of the University of Chicago, who is both a professor and a primatologist (and a primate). His book, called "Games Primates Play," is devoted to ramming home a lesson that we all seem very reluctant to learn: that much of our behavior, however steeped in technology, is entirely predictable to primatologists. 这两个相互映照的趣味小故事来自一本叫《灵长类的把戏》(Game Primates Play)的新书,作者Dario Maestripieri教授供职于芝加哥大学,是一名灵长类动物学家(也是一头灵长类动物J)。他的书想让我们彻底认清一个我们似乎都极不情愿去了解的事实:尽管人类在科技上已经有了长足的进步,但我们的很多行为仍完全在一个灵长类动物学家的预料之内。 He observes two university colleagues in a coffee shop and notes how the senior one takes the chair with the back to the wall (the better to spot attacks by rivals or leopards), is less attentive to her colleague's remarks than vice versa, stares down her colleague when a contentious issue comes up and takes the lead on walking out the door at the end-all of it neatly corresponding to the behavior of two baboons when one is dominant. 他在一家咖啡店观察了两位大学同事的举止。他注意到,两人中较资深的一位选择了背靠着墙的椅子(更容易发现对手或者豹子,如果有的话),和对方相比在对话中较不专心,当发生分歧时双眼直盯着对方,最后出门时也走在前面。他们在整个过程中的表现和两只有着支配-从属关系的狒狒毫无二致。 (A new member of a committee on which I served once asked me why a senior colleague was being so horrible to him. I replied: "Oh, it's because when a new male baboon joins a troop, it's traditional for the alpha male to beat him up before becoming his best friend-soon he'll think the world of you." I was right.) (有一次,我所在委员会的一位新成员问我为什么一位资深同事对他那么差。我回答说:“哦,这是因为一只新的公狒狒加入一个群体时,群内雄一号通常会先暴揍它一顿,然后再成为它最好的朋友——那位同事不久就会成为处处为你着想的朋友了。”我果然猜对了。) Dr. Maestripieri's most intriguing chapter is entitled "Cooperate in the Spotlight, Compete in the Dark." He describes how people, like monkeys, can be angels of generosity when all eyes are on them, but devils of spite in private. Famously, the citizens of New York City turned to crime when the lights went out in the blackout of July 13, 1977-not because they were evil but because the cost-benefit calculus was altered by the darkness. Maestripieri博士书中最引人注目的一章名为:“光明促进合作,黑幕导致竞争”。他描述道,人就像猴子一样,在受人瞩目时可以慷慨得像个天使,但私下里却可以恶毒得像个魔鬼。正如广为人知的那样,在1977年7月13日夜晚那次大停电期间,纽约发生了很多恶性犯罪,这并不是因为人性本恶,只是由于黑暗使得犯罪成本降低而已。 Dr. Maestripieri then offers a fascinating analysis of the conundrum of peer review in science. Peer review is asymmetric: The author's name is known, but the reviewers remain anonymous. This is to prevent reciprocal cooperation (or "pal review"): I'll be nice about your paper if you're nice about mine. 然后,Maestripieri博士提供了一个对科学界同行评审机制的有趣分析。同行评审本身是不对称的:论文作者的名字是公开的,而评审者却是匿名的。这种机制是为了防止互惠合作(reciprocal cooperation),或者叫“熟人评审”——如果这次你对我的论文高抬贵手,那下一次我也会投桃报李。 In this it partly works, though academics often drop private hints to each other to show that they have done review favors. But peer review is plagued by the opposite problem-spiteful criticism to prevent competitors from getting funded or published. 这种机制还算发挥了一些作用,尽管学者们常常相互留下隐秘线索,表示自己已经照顾了人情。然而,同行评审中反面的问题却要严重得多:评审者可能用恶意差评来打击同行竞争者,以阻止对方发表论文或得到科研基金资助。 Like criminals in a blackout, anonymous reviewers, in the book's words, "loot the intellectual property of the authors whose work they review" (by delaying publication while pinching the ideas for their own projects) and "damage or destroy the reviewed authors' property" (by denying their competitors grants and publications). 就像停电时的罪犯,用书中的话来说,匿名评审者还会“掠夺了被评审作者的知识产权”(借助评审来拖延原作者论文的发表,然后窃取论文中的研究成果,用于自己的研究项目),而且“毁掉了原作者的劳动成果”(通过否决竞争者的研究资金申请和发表申请)。 Studies show that peer reviewers are motivated by tribal as well as individual rivalry. Says Dr. Maestripieri: "I am a Monkey-Man, and when I submit a grant application for peer review, I am terrified that it might fall into the hands of the Rat-People. They want to exterminate all of us…(because our animals are cooler than theirs)." 研究表明,同行评审者利用评审机制进行恶意竞争,既可能出于个人竞争,也可能出于学术派系斗争。Maestripieri博士说道:当我提交研究资金申请给同行评审时,我总是害怕它可能会落到一些卑鄙小人的手中,他们总想着把我们赶尽杀绝。因为他们是一群鼠辈,而我们好歹和猴子同属灵长类,比他们要高级。 His answer (and it applies to far more fields than science) is total transparency with the help of the Internet. The more light you shine, the less crime primates commit. Once everybody can see who's reviewing whose papers and grant applications, then not only will spite decline, but so will nepotism and reciprocity. Anonymity alters the cost-benefit balance in favor of competition; transparency alters it in favor of cooperation. (至于如何解决这一问题)他的回答是(还可适用于科研以外的更多领域),我们要利用互联网让评审达到完全公开透明。事情越公开,灵长类能犯的罪恶就越少。如果每个人都可以知道每一篇论文、每一项研究资金评审的评审者和作者,不仅恶意评审会减少,任人唯亲,互惠合作的现象也会减少。匿名机制使得成本收益的天平偏向竞争,而公开透明则使得合作成为较好的选择。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]中产阶级在哪里死得最惨?

Where the Middle Class Goes to Die
哪里的中产阶级没活路?

作者:Kevin D. Williamson @ 2014-9-18
译者:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张)
校对:史祥莆(@史祥莆),慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:National Review,http://www.nationalreview.com/article/388336/where-middle-class-goes-die-kevin-d-williamson

In progressive Manhattan, inequality is maxed out.

在进步主义盛行的曼哈顿,不平等已达到空前程度。

A new report being released today by the Census Bureau finds that Manhattan has the highest level of income inequality in the United States. That is not entirely surprising, though it would also not have been surprising if it had been San Francisco or another progressive fiefdom.

美国人口调查局(Census (more...)

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Where the Middle Class Goes to Die 哪里的中产阶级没活路? 作者:Kevin D. Williamson @ 2014-9-18 译者:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张) 校对:史祥莆(@史祥莆),慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:National Review,http://www.nationalreview.com/article/388336/where-middle-class-goes-die-kevin-d-williamson In progressive Manhattan, inequality is maxed out. 在进步主义盛行的曼哈顿,不平等已达到空前程度。 A new report being released today by the Census Bureau finds that Manhattan has the highest level of income inequality in the United States. That is not entirely surprising, though it would also not have been surprising if it had been San Francisco or another progressive fiefdom. 美国人口调查局(Census Bureau)今天发表的一份报告显示,曼哈顿是全美收入差距最悬殊的地方。而这并不怎么出人意料,就算是出现在旧金山或其他进步主义大本营也不会令人吃惊。 For all the rhetoric about wicked 1 percenters and inequality, progressivism is a luxury good, and progressive-dominated enclaves are generally pretty okay places to live if you have a fair amount of money, but sort of stink if you’re in the middle or at the lower end of the earnings curve. 不论怎样夸张描绘那可恶的“1%”【译注:在近年来美国有关贫富差距和反全球化的抗议(比如“占领华尔街”运动)中,抗议者常自称为“99%”,而将最富裕阶层称为“1%”】和收入差距,进步主义都是一种奢侈品。此外,如果你手头有些钱的话,这些由进步派主导的地方都是很不错的安居之地;但若你处于收入曲线的中段或末端的话,那就有点不妙了。 Because most Americans experience New York City as tourists or in television shows and movies, it is easy to forget that the hometown of Wall Street and a very large population of obnoxious celebrities is a poor city: New York City is not only poorer than the New York State average, its median household income is, in absolute dollar terms, lower than that of such dramatically less expensive areas as Austin, Texas, or Cleveland County, Okla., where the typical household income is a few thousand dollars a year more than in New York City but the typical house costs less than a third of what the typical New York City home costs — and 17 percent of what the average Manhattan home costs. (And it’s a house, not a two-room coop.) 由于大多数美国人都只是到纽约旅行过,或是在电影电视中了解的纽约,所以很容易忘了,这个华尔街的故乡,这个充斥着众多令人生厌的名流的城市,其实是个“穷人之城”——在富裕程度方面,纽约市不仅低于纽约州的平均水平,而且其家庭中位数收入(以不变价美元计算)甚至还低于诸如德克萨斯州的奥斯汀和俄克拉何马州的克里夫兰县这样物价远低于纽约市的地区,这些地区的典型家庭年收入比纽约市高出几千美元,但是其一般房价却不足纽约一般房价的三分之一,甚至仅相当于曼哈顿房屋均价的17%。(而且这可是独栋屋,不是两居室公寓。) Inequality per se is a relatively minor and generally misunderstood issue, inasmuch as if New York’s median household earned four times what it does now but its top–5 percent households earned ten times what they do, there would be more income inequality but a much higher overall standard of living for rich and middle-class alike. 不平等本身其实是个相对次要并且被广泛误解的问题,因为如果纽约的家庭中位数收入是现有水平的四倍,但收入排名前5%的家庭收入是现在的10倍,那么收入差距就会更加悬殊,但是富裕阶层和中产阶层的总体生活水平却大大提高了。 What is particularly salient about the progressive governance of places such as New York City and San Francisco is not the income inequality coincident with it — which has many causes, only some of which are directly related to public policy — but the myriad ways in which misgovernment makes these cities such hostile places to live for people of relatively modest means. 像纽约和旧金山这种城市的进步主义治理模式,其最显眼的地方,不是与这种治理模式相伴的收入不平等(收入不平等的原因有很多,而只有一部分与公共政策有关),而是对于相对不富裕的人群来说,这些城市处处表现出敌意,而那都是由于治理不善的缘故。 As indicated above, the income figures by themselves hardly tell the story. The median household income in the city of New York is a few hundred dollars a year more than the median household income in the state of Texas, but in practical terms the average New York City household is much worse off. 正如上文所指出,收入数据本身并不能解释一切。纽约的家庭中位数年收入比德州高出几百美元,但实际上纽约普通家庭的状况要差得多。 The most obvious issue is the cost of housing, which for New Yorkers is about four times what it is for Texans. Housing prices are a function of supply and demand, and demand for New York City housing is relatively high, a fact that probably does not have very much to do with public policy. I have lived in New York City for some time, and I have never met anybody who says he moved here because it is so well governed. 其中最明显的问题就是住房成本,纽约人的住房成本大约是德州人的四倍。房价乃供求使然,而且纽约的住房需求相对较高,这个事实恐怕跟公共政策没多大关系。本人在纽约住过一段时间,而我从未听闻有人说搬到这是因为这儿的治理有多么好。 On the other hand, supply is highly restricted, and that is a direct consequence of bad public policy, an economic reality that is obvious even to such sympathetic progressives as Matt Yglesias, who sensibly notes that limitations on the number of new housing units in places such as Washington, D.C., bias construction toward high-priced luxury homes, while hostile zoning codes in places such as San Francisco prevent markets from responding to demand and lead to “deliberately underutilized” mass-transit arteries. 另一方面,住房供给却是被严格限制的,而这就是不良政策的直接后果了,这个经济现状非常显而易见,就连Matt Yglesias这样抱同情之心的进步派人士都说,在像华盛顿这样的地方对新建住房单位数量加以限制,会导致高价豪宅数量增多,而在旧金山等地实施的限制措施则阻碍了市场对需求的回应,从而导致了“蓄意不充分利用的”公交要道的产生。 In New York City, housing prices are kept artificially high by draconian restrictions on new construction, rent control and the less aggressive “rent stabilization,” political interference with development financing, onerous union rules that drive up construction prices, byzantine regulation that imposes enormous compliance costs, and more. Even in a city in which four of the five boroughs are located on islands, there are vast tracts of underused real estate, the development of which could alleviate housing expenses for the middle class and the poor. 在纽约,房价被人为抬高的原因有很多:针对新建房屋的严苛限制、租房管制以及不那么激进的“租房稳定措施”、政治因素对开发融资的妨碍、抬升造价的繁冗的工会规定、错综复杂的监管规章带来的巨大合规成本,如此等等不一而足。即使是在这个五个行政区中有四个都坐落在岛屿上的城市,也有大片的地产都未被充分利用,对这些地产的开发,将能够减轻中产和贫困阶层的住房负担。 There is also the problem of the 13th month’s rent in New York City. 纽约市还有个第13个月房租的问题。 If you earn the median income of $52,223 in New York City and you live within the city limits — not just in Manhattan but in the distant Bronx and Staten Island, too — you pay the city nearly $1,800 a year in additional income tax for the privilege. 在纽约市,如果你能赚到该市的中位数收入52,223美元,并且住在纽约市区里(不仅仅是曼哈顿,还包括布朗克斯和史泰登岛),那么你就要为这项特权支付每年近1,800美元的附加所得税。 You can basically forget about owning a home — the median house price in the city is more than a half a million dollars — but renting won’t be easy, either: Applying New York landlords’ prevailing 40-times-the-rent rule, you can afford about $1,300 a month; not impossible if you’re single, but a substantial challenge for a family. 你基本可以不用想买房子的事了,因为这个城市的房价中位数已经不止50万美元,但租房住也不容易:套用盛行于纽约房东之间的“40倍房租规则”,你仅能负担不到每月1,300美元的房租,如果你是单身的话,这个数目不至于完全租不到够你住的房子,但这点钱要想租到够一家人住的房子,那就难咯。 But in any case, you’ll be paying a 13th month’s rent and change to the city for the privilege of residing within its boundaries. Assuming you are single, taxes and rent would consume between 50 percent and 60 percent of your income. Move to Houston, and you’d get a $3,000-a-year discount before even accounting for the lower cost of housing. 但无论如何,你都要为了居于城内这项特权支付这第13个月的租金给这座城市。假设你是单身,那么光缴税缴租都要花掉你收入的五到六成。如果搬到休斯敦,你就能每年少付3,000美元,就这还没算更低的住房成本呢。 If you are truly concerned about inequality, then that matters a great deal, because income inequality is only one kind of economic inequality, and one of the less important kinds: Wealth inequality is more significant. If the majority of your income is being consumed by taxes and rent, saving and investing becomes hard. 如果你果真对不平等耿耿于怀的话,那这就是关乎要害的大事了,因为收入不平等只是经济不平等的一种,而且还是不那么重要的一种——财富不平等更加重要。如果你的大部分收入都用来缴税缴租了的话,那就很难进行储蓄和投资。 And given progressives’ abysmal record in providing key municipal services such as effective law enforcement and decent public schools to low-income communities, there are powerful incentives to take on additional expenses by paying the premium for living in a better neighborhood or enrolling your children in private schools. 而且考虑到进步派在提供关键市政公共服务上(比如有力的执法和面向低收入社群的适宜的公立学校)的糟糕记录,那你就有很强动机想要居住在更好的街区,或让你的孩子就读于私立学校,但这就要支付额外的费用。 When it comes time to pay for college or to leave behind a bequest for children or grandchildren — an important means of building wealth within families — you’re almost certainly better off in San Antonio or Provo than in New York or San Francisco. 一旦到了该支付大学学费或为你的子孙后代留下遗产(这是一种积累家族财富的重要方式)的时候,那么几乎可以肯定的是,如果你住在圣安东尼奥或普罗沃的话,会比住在纽约或旧金山的情况要好。 Highly skilled, highly educated people are likely to do well wherever they are, and creative, dynamic, global cities such as New York are gold mines for them. But not everybody is going to be an investment banker or a tech entrepreneur. If you want to get a picture of what progressive policies look like for everybody else, try living in New York City for a year with an average New York City income — and try it with a family. 高技能水平、高学历人群可能在哪里都会过得不错,而且像纽约这样富有创意和活力四射的国际大都市对于他们来说更是一座金矿。但并不是每个人都能成为投行家,或创办一家科技企业。如果你想了解一下在其他人眼中进步主义政策是怎么样的,那就试试在纽约市拿着平均收入生活一年,而且要拖家带口。 Kevin D. Williamson is roving correspondent at National Review. Kevin D. Williamson,《国家评论》杂志流动通讯记者 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]一位生态学家有关IPCC报告的国会证词

In House Testimony, Botkin Dismantles the IPCC 2014 Report
Botkin在众院听证中推翻了IPCC 2014年度报告

作者:Daniel B. Botkin @ 2014-5-31
译者:陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy)
校对:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha),二校:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Anthony Watts的博客(Watts Up With That?), http://wattsupwiththat.com/2014/05/31/in-house-testimony-botkin-dismantles-the-ipcc-2014-report/

Policycritic writes: You need to read this, Anthony. He dismantles the IPCC 2014 report for Congress.

Policycritic写道:Anthony你得读读这个。他推翻了政府间气候变化专门委员会(IPCC)提交给国会的2014年度报告。

Botkin’s bio:

“Daniel B. Botkin, a world-renowned ecologist, is Professor (Emeritus), Department of Ecology, Evolution and Marine Biology, UC Santa Barbara, and President of The Center for The Study of The Environment, which provides independent, science-based analyses of complex environmental issues. The New York Times said his book, *Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the 21st Century* is considered by many ecologists to be the classic text of the [environmental] movement.” His Environmental Science, now in its Sixth Edition, was named 2004′s best textbook by the Textbook and Academic Authors Association.”

Botkin的简历:

“Daniel B. Botkin是一位享誉世界的生态学家,也是加利福尼亚大学圣塔芭芭拉分校生态、进化和海洋生物学系荣休教授兼环境研究中心主任,该机构对复杂的环境问题进行独立的、基于科学的研究。《纽约时报》称,‘他的著作《不谐和的和谐:二十一世纪新生态学》被众多生态学家认可为环保运动经典教科书。’他的《环境科学》一书目前已出到第六版,该书曾被教科书及学术作家协会评选为2004年度最佳教科书。”

Indeed, and I’ve made the full written testimony available, plus a video showing Rep. Joe Kennedy (D-MA) poses questions to the witness panel at the Full Committee hearing titled, “Examining the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Process.” where he grills Daniel B. Botkin with idiotic questions like: ‘Doctor, do you look both ways before you cross the street?’

我找到了Botkin的书面证词全文,还有一段众议员Joe Kennedy(民主党,马塞诸塞州)的一个视频,内容是在主题为“审查联合国政府间气候变化专门委员会的工作进程”的全体委员会听证会上,对证人小组作出的提问。听证会上,Joe用诸如“博士,您过马路前两边都需要看吗?”等愚蠢问题刁难Daniel B. Botkin。

WRITTEN TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY. MAY 29, 2014
致众议院小组委员会关于科学、太空和技术的书面证词

DANIEL B. BOTKIN
证人:Daniel B. Botkin

Since 1968 I have published research on theoretical global warming, its potential ecological effects, and the implications for people and biodiversity. I have spent my career trying to help conserve our environment and its great diversity of species. In doing so I have always attempted to maintain an objective, intellectually honest, scientific approach in the best tradition of scientific endeavor.

1968年至今,我发表的学术论文涉及全球变暖的理论问题、它的潜在生态效应,以及对人类和生物多样性的影响。我的整个职业生涯都致力于保护我们的环境及其丰富的物种多样性。为此,我一直努力尝试继承科学事业的优良传统,坚守一种客观的、智识诚实的和科学的工作方法。

I have, accordingly, been dismayed and disappointed in recent years that this subject has been converted into a political and ideological debate. I have colleagues on both sides of the debate and believe we should work together as scientists instead of arguing divisively about preconceived, emotionally based “positions.”

因此,近几年,我对这个话题已被转变为一场政治和意识形态的辩论而倍感沮丧和失望。辩论双方都有我的同事,我坚信我们应当作为科学家共同努力,而不该为了先入为主的、基于情绪的“站队”互相争论。

I hope my testifying here (more...)

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In House Testimony, Botkin Dismantles the IPCC 2014 Report Botkin在众院听证中推翻了IPCC 2014年度报告 作者:Daniel B. Botkin @ 2014-5-31 译者:陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy) 校对:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha),二校:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Anthony Watts的博客(Watts Up With That?), http://wattsupwiththat.com/2014/05/31/in-house-testimony-botkin-dismantles-the-ipcc-2014-report/ Policycritic writes: You need to read this, Anthony. He dismantles the IPCC 2014 report for Congress. Policycritic写道:Anthony你得读读这个。他推翻了政府间气候变化专门委员会(IPCC)提交给国会的2014年度报告。 Botkin’s bio: “Daniel B. Botkin, a world-renowned ecologist, is Professor (Emeritus), Department of Ecology, Evolution and Marine Biology, UC Santa Barbara, and President of The Center for The Study of The Environment, which provides independent, science-based analyses of complex environmental issues. The New York Times said his book, *Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the 21st Century* is considered by many ecologists to be the classic text of the [environmental] movement.” His Environmental Science, now in its Sixth Edition, was named 2004′s best textbook by the Textbook and Academic Authors Association.” Botkin的简历: “Daniel B. Botkin是一位享誉世界的生态学家,也是加利福尼亚大学圣塔芭芭拉分校生态、进化和海洋生物学系荣休教授兼环境研究中心主任,该机构对复杂的环境问题进行独立的、基于科学的研究。《纽约时报》称,‘他的著作《不谐和的和谐:二十一世纪新生态学》被众多生态学家认可为环保运动经典教科书。’他的《环境科学》一书目前已出到第六版,该书曾被教科书及学术作家协会评选为2004年度最佳教科书。” Indeed, and I’ve made the full written testimony available, plus a video showing Rep. Joe Kennedy (D-MA) poses questions to the witness panel at the Full Committee hearing titled, “Examining the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Process.” where he grills Daniel B. Botkin with idiotic questions like: ‘Doctor, do you look both ways before you cross the street?’ 我找到了Botkin的书面证词全文,还有一段众议员Joe Kennedy(民主党,马塞诸塞州)的一个视频,内容是在主题为“审查联合国政府间气候变化专门委员会的工作进程”的全体委员会听证会上,对证人小组作出的提问。听证会上,Joe用诸如“博士,您过马路前两边都需要看吗?”等愚蠢问题刁难Daniel B. Botkin。 WRITTEN TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY. MAY 29, 2014 致众议院小组委员会关于科学、太空和技术的书面证词 DANIEL B. BOTKIN 证人:Daniel B. Botkin Since 1968 I have published research on theoretical global warming, its potential ecological effects, and the implications for people and biodiversity. I have spent my career trying to help conserve our environment and its great diversity of species. In doing so I have always attempted to maintain an objective, intellectually honest, scientific approach in the best tradition of scientific endeavor. 1968年至今,我发表的学术论文涉及全球变暖的理论问题、它的潜在生态效应,以及对人类和生物多样性的影响。我的整个职业生涯都致力于保护我们的环境及其丰富的物种多样性。为此,我一直努力尝试继承科学事业的优良传统,坚守一种客观的、智识诚实的和科学的工作方法。 I have, accordingly, been dismayed and disappointed in recent years that this subject has been converted into a political and ideological debate. I have colleagues on both sides of the debate and believe we should work together as scientists instead of arguing divisively about preconceived, emotionally based “positions.” 因此,近几年,我对这个话题已被转变为一场政治和意识形态的辩论而倍感沮丧和失望。辩论双方都有我的同事,我坚信我们应当作为科学家共同努力,而不该为了先入为主的、基于情绪的“站队”互相争论。 I hope my testifying here will help lead to a calmer, more rational approach to dealing with not only climate change but also other major environmental problems. The IPCC 2014 report does not have this kind of rational discussion we should be having. I would like to tell you why. 我希望此次作证能有助于开启一条更平和、更理性的进路,以便应对包括但不仅限于气候变化的重大环境问题。IPCC 2014年度报告不具备这种我们本应有的理性讨论。我想告诉你为什么。 The IPCC 2014 report is actually a series of reports, each long, complex in organization, and extensive in scope. Since it’s not possible to discuss the Summary Reports for Policymakers in detail today, I will highlight some of my thoughts for you here as they relate to the reports, hoping to bring a saner, more sober approach to this highly charged issue. IPCC 2014年度报告实际上是一系列报告的集结。这些报告每一篇都结构复杂,篇幅冗长,涉猎广泛。因为今天不可能就其中《决策者参考摘要》进行详细讨论,所以我将着重谈谈我与这些报告有关的一些想法。希望它们能给这个极具争议的话题带来更理智、更冷静的处理方法。 To characterize where we are with this report and this issue, I would like to quote James R. Schlesinger, the first U.S. Energy Secretary, who said:“We have only two modes — complacency and panic.”—commenting on the country’s approach to energy (1977) 为了描述我们在这份报告以及这个问题上的处境,我想引用美国首任能源部长James R. Schlesinger于1977年就美国能源政策所做的评论,他说:“我们只有两种状态——怡然自得和惊慌失措。” Now to my major points. 现在来谈谈我的主要观点。 1.I want to state up front that we have been living through a warming trend driven by a variety of influences. However, it is my view that this is not unusual, and contrary to the characterizations by the IPCC and the National Climate Assessment, these environmental changes are not apocalyptic nor irreversible. 1.我想声明在先,我们一直在经历由各种因素导致的变暖趋势。然而,我认为这并非异常,与IPCC及《国家气候评估》的描述恰恰相反,这些环境变化既不会带来世界末日也不是不可逆转的。 2.My biggest concern is that both the reports present a number of speculative, and sometimes incomplete, conclusions embedded in language that gives them more scientific heft than they deserve. The reports are “scientific-sounding” rather than based on clearly settled facts or admitting their lack. Established facts about the global environment exist less often in science than laymen usually think. 2.我最担忧的是,这两份报告都展示了一系列推测性的结论,有时候还并不完备,但经过语言修饰后却具有了名不副实的科学份量。他们只是“听上去科学”,并非基于真实确定的事实,或者没有承认这一点。在全球环境问题上, 科学界公认的既定事实远比外行通常认为的少。 3.HAS IT BEEN WARMING? Yes, we have been living through a warming trend, no doubt about that. The rate of change we are experiencing is also not unprecedented, and the “mystery” of the warming “plateau” simply indicates the inherent complexity of our global biosphere. Change is normal, life on Earth is inherently risky; it always has been. The two reports, however, makes it seem that environmental change is apocalyptic and irreversible. It is not. 3.一直在变暖吗?是的,我们一直在经历变暖的趋势,这一点毫无疑问。我们正在经历的升温速度也并非史无前例,持续变暖期的“神秘性”仅仅表明,全球生物圈具有内在的复杂性。变化是正常现象,地球上的生命从诞生之初就一直面临危险。然而,这两份报告令环境变化看起来像是末日灾难,并且无法逆转,可事实并非如此。 4.IS CLIMATE CHANGE VERY UNUSUAL? No, it has always undergone changes. 环境变化是极其异常的现象吗?不是的,环境一直在经历变化。 5.ARE GREENHOUSE GASES INCREASING? Yes, CO2 rapidly. 5.温室气体在增加吗?是的,二氧化碳浓度正快速上升。 6.IS THERE GOOD SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON CLIMATE CHANGE?Yes, a great deal of it. 6.关于气候变化,有优秀的科学研究吗?有,有很多。 7.ARE THERE GOOD SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN THE IPCC 2014 REPORT? Yes, the lead author of the Terrestrial (land) Ecosystem Report is Richard Betts, a coauthor of one my scientific papers about forecasting effects of global warming on biodiversity. 7.有优秀的科学家参与到IPCC 2014年度报告中吗?有,例如陆地生态系统报告的主要作者Richard Betts,他是我的一篇关于预测全球变暖对生物多样性的影响的科学论文的共同作者。 8.ARE THERE SCIENTIFICALLY ACCURATE STATEMENTS AT PLACES IN THE REPORT? Yes, there are. 8.在报告中是否有科学、精确的表述呢?有。 9.What I sought to learn was the overall take-away that the reports leave with a reader. I regret to say that I was left with the impression that the reports overestimate the danger from human-induced climate change and do not contribute to our ability to solve major environmental problems. I am afraid that an “agenda” permeates the reports, an implication that humans and our activity are necessarily bad and ought to be curtailed. 9.我试图罗列读者能从这些报告中得到哪些有用的信息。遗憾的是,这些报告留给我的印象是:过分强调人为因素引起的气候变化的危险性,而对我们解决重大环境问题毫无贡献。恐怕报告前前后后都渗透了一个“意图”:一种关于人类及其活动必然有害、必须加以削减的暗示。 10.ARE THERE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE REPORTS? Yes, in assumptions, use of data, and conclusions. 10.报告中是否存在重大缺陷?是,在提出假设、数据使用、以及结论部分,都存在问题。 11.My biggest concern about the reports is that they present a number of speculative, and sometimes incomplete, conclusions embedded in language that gives them more scientific heft than they deserve. The reports, in other words, are “scientific- sounding,” rather than clearly settled and based on indisputable facts. Established facts about the global environment exist less often in science than laymen usually think. 11.我最担忧的是,这两份报告中都展示了一系列推测性的结论,有时候还并不完备,但经过语言修饰后,却具有了名不副实的科学份量。他们只是“听上去科学”,并非基于真实确定的事实,或者没有承认这一点。在全球环境问题上, 科学界公认的既定事实远比外行通常认为的少。【译注:此条似与第二条重复,原文如此12.The two reports assume and/or argue that the climate warmingforecast by the global climate models is happening and will continueto happen and grow worse. Currently these predictions are way off the reality (Figure 1)Models, like all scientific theory, have to be tested against real-world observations. Experts in model validation say that the climate models frequently cited in the IPCC report are little if any validated. This means that as theory they are fundamentally scientifically unproven. 12.这两份报告或假设或肯定地表示,全球气候模型所作的气候变暖预测正一步步变成现实,并将一直持续,越来越糟。目前,这些预测都远远脱离现实(图一)。和所有的科学理论一样,模型需要通过对照现实观测进行检验。模型验证领域的专家说,IPCC报告频繁引用的气候模型极少通过了验证。这意味着作为理论他们根本未经科学证实。 Figure 1: Climate model forecasts compared to real worldtemperature observations (From John Christy, University of Alabama and Alabama State Climatologist. Reproduced with permission from him.) 图一:气候模型预测结果与真实气温观测数据对比(来自John Christy,阿拉巴马大学、阿拉巴马州气候学家,经许可转载) 【图一】 13.The reports suffers from the use term “climate change” with two meanings: natural and human-induced. These are both given as definitions in the IPCC report and are not distinguished in the text and therefore confuse a reader. (The Climate Change Assessment uses the term throughout including its title, but never defines it.) There are places in the reports where only the second meaning—human induced—makes sense, so that meaning has to be assumed. There are other places where either meaning could be applied. 13.这些报告因混淆了“气候变化”的两层含义而变得更糟,气候变化可以自然发生,也可以因人类活动而起。IPCC报告为两者都给出了定义,但在行文中却并未明确区分,并因此而迷惑了读者。(《气候变化评估》中随处可见“气候变化”一词,包括报告标题,但从未明言它是哪一种。)报告中的一些地方,只有按照第二层含义——人类活动引起的气候变化,才能让人看懂,此时,我们不得不假定作者采用了这层含义。而在另一些地方,这两种含义由都对得上。 In those places where either meaning can be interpreted, if the statement is assumed to be a natural change, then it is a truism, a basic characteristic of Earth’s environment and something people have always know and experienced. If the meaning is taken to be human-caused, then in spite of the assertions in the report, the available data do not support the statements. 在那些两种含义均可的地方,如果该陈述被假定为一种自然现象,那这便是不言而喻的老调,是地球环境的基本特征,是人们早已了解并不断经历着的。而假如它指的是人类导致的暖化,那么尽管报告言之凿凿,现有数据却并不支持这些陈述。 14.Some of the reports conclusions are the opposite of those given in articles cited in defense of those conclusions. For example, the IPCC 2014 Terrestrial Ecosystem Report states that “there is medium confidence that rapid change in the Arctic is affecting its animals. For example, seven of 19 subpopulations of the polar bear are declining in number” citing in support of this an article by Vongraven and Richardson, 2011. That report states the contrary, that the “‘decline’ is an illusion. 14.报告的部分结论与其所引用作为证据的文章给出的结论恰恰相反。例如,IPCC 2014陆地生态系统报告说:“北极的快速(气候)变化正影响着当地动物,这一论断具有中等可信度。比如,北极熊的19个亚种群中,有7个数量正在减少。”这一陈述引用了Vongraven和Richardson于2011年发表的一篇文章作为支撑。但原文所传达的信息与IPCC的报告恰好相反,他们认为“减少”是一种错觉。 In addition, I have sought the available counts of the 19 subpopulations. Of these, only three have been counted twice; the rest have been counted once. Thus no rate of changes in the populations can be determined. The first count was done 1986 for one subpopulation. 此外,我找到了这19个北极熊亚种群的可用数据。其中只有三个亚种群的数量被统计过两次,其余都只被统计过一次。因此,根本无法确定北极熊数量的变化速度。第一次统计完成于1986年,只对一个亚种群进行了计数。 The U. S. Marine Mammal Commission, charged with the conservation of this species, acknowledges“Accurate estimates of the current and historicsizes of polar bear stocks are difficult to obtain for several reasons–thespecies‘ inaccessible habitat, the movement of bears across internationalboundaries, and the costs of conducting surveys.” 美国海洋哺乳动物委员会负有保护北极熊的责任,委员会承认“对北极熊当前及历史存量的精确估计非常困难,原因很多:这一物种的栖息地位于人迹罕至的地方,北极熊的活动跨越国境以及调查成本高。” According to Dr. Susan Crockford, “out of the 13 populations for whichsome kind of data exist, five populations are now classified by the PBSG [IUCN/SSC Polar Bear Specialist Group] as ‘stable’ (two more than 2009),one is still increasing, and three have been upgraded from declining to datadeficient. . . . That leaves four that are still considered declining’‐ two of those judgments are based primarily on concerns of overhunting, and one is based on a statistically insignificant decline that may not be valid and is being reassessed (and really should have been upgraded to ‘data deficient’). That leaves only one population – Western Hudson Bay – where PBSG biologists tenaciously blame global warming for all changes to polar bear biology, and even then, the data supporting that conclusion is still not available.“ 根据Susan Crockford博士称,“在有部分数据的13个种群中,5个被PBSG【译注:PBSG,全称Polar Bear Specialist Group,是国际自然保护联盟物种存续委员会的北极熊专项小组】归为‘数量稳定’(比2009年多了两个),有1个数量仍在增加,有3个的数据信息从‘数量减少’更新为‘数据不足’……这样,被认为数量正在减少的就只剩下4个,其中有2个主要是受到过度捕猎的影响,另1个种群的数量减少在统计意义上则并不显著,这一数据信息可能无效,正在被重新评估(实在应该被更新为“数据不足”)。这样,唯一剩下的就是西哈德森湾种群。当地的所有北极熊生物学变化都被PBSG的生物学家坚定地归咎于全球变暖,而即便如此,仍然没有充分数据支持这一结论。” Polar Bear Status (Source: Polar Bear Science Website.) 北极熊的状况(来源:北极熊科学网站。) 【插图】 15.Some conclusions contradict and are ignorant of the best statistically valid observations. For example, the Terrestrial Ecosystems Report states that “terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems have sequestered about a quarter of the carbon dioxide emitted to the atmosphere by human activities in the past three decades (high confidence).” 15.有些结论无视统计上最有效的观测数据,甚至与其矛盾。例如,陆地生态系统报告指出“过去30年,陆地和淡水生态系统吸收了大约四分之一人类活动所排放的二氧化碳(高可信度)。” I have done the first statistically valid estimate of carbon storage and uptake for any large area of Earth’s land, the boreal forests and eastern deciduous forest of North America, and subtropical forests in Queensland, Australia. 我对地球上大面积陆地、北美寒带森林和东部落叶林以及澳大利亚昆士兰的亚热带森林对二氧化碳的储存和吸收做了第一次有效统计估计。【译注:意思是他这份更系统全面的研究却被无视了】 The estimates of carbon uptake by vegetation used by IPCC and in major articles cited by the reports are based on what can best be called “grab samples,” a relatively small number of studies done at a variety of times using a variety of methods, mainly in old- growth areas. The results reported by IPCC overestimate carbon storage and uptake by as much as 300 percent. IPCC报告及其所引用的主要文章在估计植物对二氧化碳的吸收时,采用的是最多能被称为“随意抓取样本”的方法,即一种在涉及多个时段、多种研究方法的课题上只做相对少量研究的做法,且集中于老林区域。IPCC报告的研究结果对二氧化碳的存储和吸收高估了百分之三百。 16.The report for policy makers on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability repeats the assertion of previous IPCC reports that “large fraction of species” face “increase extinction risks” (p15). Overwhelming evidence contradicts this assertion. And it has been clearly shown that models used to make these forecasts, such as climate envelope models and species-area curve models, make incorrect assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions, over-estimating extinction risks. 16.向决策者提供的《关于影响、适应性及脆弱性》的报告,重复了之前IPCC报告中的断言:“大部分物种”面临“持续增加的灭绝风险”(第15页)。然而,压倒性的证据与这一断言相抵触。如今我们已经很清楚,这些预测所用的模型,如气候包络模型、物种-面积曲线模型,设置了不正确的假设,从而导致了错误的结论,高估了物种灭绝的风险。 Surprisingly few species became extinct during the past 2.5 million years, a period encompassing several ice ages and warm periods.Among other sources, this is based on information in the book Climate Change and Biodiversity edited by Thomas Lovejoy, one of the leaders in the conservation of biodiversity. The major species known to have gone extinct during this period are 40 species of large mammals in North America and Northern Europe. (There is a “background” extinction rate for eukaryotic species of roughly one species per year.) 过去250万年间,尽管经历了多个冰川期和温暖期,灭绝的物种却少得惊人。得出这一结论的证据,包括Thomas Lovejoy编辑的《气候变化和生物多样性》一书,Lovejoy是保护物种多样性的领军人物之一。这一时期内灭绝的物种,主要为生活在北美和北欧的40种大型哺乳动物。(真核生物物种有一个“背景”灭绝率,大约每年有一个物种灭绝。) 17.THE REPORT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT LIVING THINGS ARE FRAGILE AND RIGID, unable to deal with change. The opposite is to case. Life is persistent, adaptable, adjustable. 17.报告给人的印象是生物脆弱又呆板,无法应对变化,而事实恰恰相反。生命是持久的、具有良好的适应性和调整能力。 18.STEADY-STATE ASSUMPTION: There is an overall assumption in the IPCC 2014 report and the Climate Change Assessment that all change is negative and undesirable; that it is ecologically and evolutionarily unnatural, bad for populations, species, ecosystems, for all life on planet Earth, including people. This is the opposite of the reality: The environment has always changed and is always changing, and living things have had to adapt to these changes. Interestingly, many, if not most, species that I have worked on or otherwise know about require environmental change. 18.稳态假设:IPCC 2014年度报告和《气候变化评估》中有一个基本的假设:所有的变化都是负面的,会带来麻烦;变化在生态和进化上是非自然的,对生物种群、物种、生态系统、地球上包括人类在内的所有生命都是有害的。这与现实完全相反:环境过去一直在改变,现在也仍然在变化着,生物需要适应这些变化。有趣的是,许多我所研究过或者了解的物种,如果不是大部分的话,需要环境的变化才能生存。 19.The summary for policy makers on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability makes repeated use of the term “irreversible” changes. A species going extinct is irreversible, but little else about the environment is irreversible. The past confirms this. Glaciers have come and gone repeatedly. The Northwest Passage of North America has gone and come again. The average temperature has greatly exceeded the present and forecasted and has declined only to rise again. 19.有关《影响、适应性及脆弱性》的决策者参考摘要中,不断使用“不可逆转的”变化这一说法。一个物种灭绝是不可逆转的,但其他环境现象很少是不可逆转的。历史证实了这点。冰川周期性地累积、消融。曾经消失的北美西北航道再次出现。【校注:指北大西洋经北冰洋至太平洋的航道,可能因冰层融化而变得可通行】(全球)平均气温曾远高于今天,也远高于我们对未来的预测值,只是后来下降了,然后再次回升。 Implicit in this repeated use of irreversible is the belief that Earth’s environment is constant — stable, unchanging — except when subjected to human actions.This is obviously false from many lines of evidence, including the simple experience of all people who have lived before the scientific-industrial age and those who live now and so such work as farm, manage rivers, wildlife and forests. 大量重复使用“不可逆转”,表明报告作者相信地球环境是始终如一的——稳定、一成不变——除非受到人类活动影响。种种证据表明这显然是错的。这些证据包括所有生活在科学和工业时代之前的人们,以及当代从事农耕,管理河道、野生动物和森林的人们的普通生活经历。 20.The extreme overemphasis on human-induced global warming has taken our attention away from many environmental issues that used to be front and center but have been pretty much ignored in the 21st century. The Terrestrial report in a sense acknowledges this, for example by stating: “Climate stresses occur alongside other anthropogenic influences on ecosystems, including land-use changes, nonnative species, and pollution, and in many cases will exacerbate these pressures (very high confidence).” 20.过度强调人为因素对全球变暖的影响,已将我们的注意力从许多曾经备受关注的环境问题上转移开了,在21世纪,这些问题大都被忽视了。陆地生态系统报告在某种程度上承认了这点,比如,报告指出:“气候变化与其他对生态系统的人类影响同时发生,包括土地利用的变化,外来物种,污染等等,而且很多时候会加剧后者的压力(极高可信度)。” 【插图】 21.Do the problems with these reports mean that we can or should abandon any concerns about global warming or abandon any research about it?Certainly not, but we need to put this issue within an appropriate priority with other major here-and-now environmental issues that are having immediate effects. 21.这些报告中存在的问题,是不是就意味着我们能够或者应该对全球变暖这一问题漠不关心,或者放弃关于这一问题的任何研究呢?当然不是, 只是相比那些此时此地正对我们生活产生直接影响的主要环境问题,全球变暖议题应当被放在一个恰当的优先级上。 22.The concerns I have mentioned with the IPCC apply as well to the White House’s National Climate Assessment. I reviewed and provided comments on the draft White House’s National Climate assessment and, unfortunately, it appears that these issues have not been addressed in the final assessment. For example, I stated: 22.我提及的对IPCC年度报告的担忧,同样适用于白宫《国家气候评估》报告。我分析了白宫的国家气候评估报告草案,并提出了一些建议。可惜的是,我所指出的这些问题并没有在终稿中得到解决。例如,我曾表示: “The executive summary is a political statement, not a scientific statement. It is filled with misstatements contradicted by well-established and well-known scientific papers.” “它的执行摘要是一份政治声明,而非科学声明。摘要中充斥着与得到公认且广为人知的科学论文相抵触的虚假陈述。” “Climate has always affected people and all life on Earth, so it isn’t new to say it is ‘already affecting the American people.’ This is just a political statement.” “气候一直影响着人类及其他地球上的生命,所以说它‘已经影响到了美国人民’是毫无新意的。这只是一个政治声明。” “It is inappropriate to use short-term changes in weather as an indication one way or another about persistent climate change.” “用天气的短期变化作为气候持续变暖或变冷的指标是不恰当的。” WHAT HAS GONE WRONG, AND HOW TO FIX IT 问题出在哪里,要怎么解决 1.Rather than focus on key, specific and tractable aspects of climate-change science, the long-term approach throughout the 20th century was to try to create de nova a complete model of the climate. 1.气候变化科学贯穿整个20世纪的长期做法,是试图创造一个全新的、完备的气候模型,而不是将焦点集中于气候变化的关键、特定、可把握的方面。 2.This approach has been taken despite a lack of focus on monitoring key variables over time in statistically and scientifically valid ways, e. g. carbon sequestering by forests; polar bear population counts. As a result, there is an odd disconnect between theory and observation. The attempt to create complete models of every aspect of climate has meant that many factors had to be guessed at, rather than using the best scientific methods. Too many guesses, too little checking against real, observed effects. 2.尽管缺乏对关键变量——比如,森林对二氧化碳的吸收,北极熊的种群规模计算——统计上和科学上有效的观测手段的持续关注,上述做法还是被采用了。结果,在理论与观测值之间出现了奇怪的裂痕。尝试建立一个囊括每个气候因素的完备模型,意味着许多因素要靠猜测,而不是依靠最佳科学方法。太多猜测,太少基于真实观测数据的检验。 3.The IPCC reports are the result of a very large number of people doing long reviews of the scientific literature. This easily leads to people being so overburdened that they misinterpret specific papers, fail to understand where the major observational gaps are, and have trouble making an accurate list of citations and all sources of information. The fundamental IPCC and White House Climate Change Assessment approach has been to gather a huge number of scientists from a large number of disciplines, on the assumption that a kind of crowd approach to what can be agreed on is the same as true scientific advance. While this might seem a reasonable and effective approach, there is some danger in relying on this “crowd-sourced” model of information sharing. 3.IPCC报告是一大群人进行大规模科学论文综述的结果。这很容易导致人们负担过重而曲解某些论文,他们不能很好地理解哪些地方会产生主要的观测误差,也无法准确罗列出参考文献和各种信息来源。IPCC和白宫《气候变化评估》所采用的基本方法,是基于“人多势众就是科学进步”的假设,集合大批涉及大量学科的科学家。虽然这是个看似合理有效的方法,但依赖于这样一个“源于大伙”的信息共享模型有一定的危险。 Groups of people, particularly when credentialed “experts” are involved, are very prone to a condition called an “information cascade” in which error is compounded by group think, assumptions become unchallenged “fact” and observations play second fiddle to unchallenged models. 一群人,尤其是有权威的“专家”参与其中,很容易出现所谓“信息裹挟”的问题,这种情况下,错误是集体“智慧”的结果,假设则成了无可辩驳的“事实”,观测到的真实信息在不容挑战的模型中居于次要地位。 The excellent scientists involved with the IPCC reports are no less prone to this than the excellent scientists who relied on Aristotelian models of a geocentric universe. Entrenched beliefs are hard to extricate, even amongst supposedly rational thinkers. This is probably in part responsible for the problems listed with the White House Climate Assessment report’s table of Biological Effects, discussed in my document reviewing that report. 参与IPCC报告的优秀科学家们并不比那些依赖亚里士多德的地心说的科学家更不容易犯这种错误。根深蒂固的想法很难被改变,甚至那些理应理性的学者也很难改变固有的想法。这或许可以部分解释我在针对白宫《气候评估报告》里那个“生物效应”表格所做的评论中列出的那一系列问题。 4.What a scientist discovers is different from what a scientist says. The first is science, the second is opinion. Have small groups of scientists work on this problem, no more than can easily argue with one another, that is less than 20 and preferably even smaller, representing the primary disciplines. Divide the problem into areas, rather than try to answer all questions in one analysis. I have used this approach in my own work and found it to be successful. 4.科学家发现的不同于科学家所说的。前者是科学,后者是观点。组织一小群科学家研究这一问题,人数不应超过便于他们互相争论的范围,也就是少于20人甚至更少,让他们代表主要的学科。将这一问题划分为不同领域,而不是试图在一个分析中回答所有问题。我自己在研究中就用这个方法,发现这很有效。 5.The desire to do good has ironically overridden the desire to do the best science. 5.讽刺的是,行善的愿望盖过了做最佳科学研究的愿望。 6.Under the weight of this kind of crowd rule and approach, some specific alternative approaches to the science of climate change, have not been allowed to rise to the surface. 6.在这样一种集体规则和路线的重压下,研究气候变化科学的某些特定替代路线就没有机会得见天日。 7.Among the approaches that would improve climate science: 7.可以改进气候科学的做法包括: a.Return to the former reliance on science done by individuals and small groups with a common specific interest and focus. a.回归到之前的状态,信任个人的科学研究,信任对特定领域感兴趣且专注于此的小团体所做的研究。 b.Change the approach from trying to make a complete, definitive model of every aspect of climate to a different level. See kinds of models that explore specific possibilities and phenomena. b.在方法论上,由试图建立一个涵盖气候各个方面的、完备的、精确的模型,转变到另一层面,研究探索具体的可能性和现象的各种模型。 c.Get out of the blame game. None of the above suggestions can work as long as global warming remains a moral, political, ideologically dominated topic, with scientists pushed into, or at least viewed as, being either for or against a single point of view. c.停止互相指责。只要全球变暖还是由道德、政治、意识形态主导的话题,科学家要被迫卷入其中明确站队,或者至少仍被看作在这么做,那么以上所有的建议都不会有用。 9.We need to focus again on major environmental Issues that need our attention now (see the list above). 9.我们需要将目标移回真正需要我们关注的主要环境问题(参见上表)。【编注:编码有误,原文如此。10.ARE THERE EXAMPLES OF THE KIND OF RESEARCH I BELIEVE WE NEED MORE OF? YES. 10.能否举出一些依我看我们更为需要的此类研究? 能。 a.NASA Carbon Monitoring System (CMS) b. Hubbard Brook Ecosystem Study c. Whooping Crane monitoring, e.g. of an endangered species d. In-place monitoring on carbon flux, being done by the USGS in the Great Cypress Swamp, Florida. e. Many others. a.美国国家航空航天局碳排放监测系统。 b. 哈伯德·布鲁克生态系统研究。 c.对濒临灭绝的物种进行监测,例如,美洲鹤监测。 d. 碳排放波动实地监测,由美国地质调查局(USGS)在佛罗里达州大柏树沼泽实施。 e. 还有很多。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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[译文]印欧语故乡之争:库尔干假说扳回一局

Mysterious Indo-European homeland may have been in the steppes of Ukraine and Russia
乌俄大草原或许是印欧人的神秘故乡

作者:Michael Balter @ 2015-2-13
译者:@Ulula_Ali_Reis
校对:林翠(@cwlinnil),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
制图:amen
来源:sciencemag.org,http://news.sciencemag.org/archaeology/2015/02/mysterious-indo-european-homeland-may-have-been-steppes-ukraine-and-russia

What do you call a male sibling? If you speak English, he is your “brother.” Greek? Call him “phrater.” Sanskrit, Latin, Old Irish? “Bhrater,” “frater,” or “brathir,” respectively.

你如何称呼与你同父母的男性呢?如果用英语,他就是你的“brother”。在希腊语里,他就叫“phrater”。而在梵语、拉丁语、古爱尔兰语里,他分别是“bhrater”、“frater”、“brathir”。

Ever since the mid-17th century, scholars have noted such similarities among the so-called Indo-European languages, which span the world and number more than 400 if dialects are included. Researchers agree that they can probably all be traced back to one ancestral language, called Proto-Indo-European (PIE). But for nearly 20 years, scholars have debated vehemently when and where PIE arose.

自17世纪中叶起,学者们已注意到所谓“印欧系”各语言之间,有着诸如此类的相似性。印欧语系横跨全世界,算上方言的话,包括了超过400多种语言。研究者认为,这些语言都可追溯到同一始祖语言——原始印欧语(PIE)。然而关于原始印欧语在何时何地出现,学者们已经激烈争论了近20年。

Two long-awaited studies, one described online this week in a preprint and another scheduled for publication later this month, have now used different (more...)

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Mysterious Indo-European homeland may have been in the steppes of Ukraine and Russia 乌俄大草原或许是印欧人的神秘故乡 作者:Michael Balter @ 2015-2-13 译者:@Ulula_Ali_Reis 校对:林翠(@cwlinnil),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 制图:amen 来源:sciencemag.org,http://news.sciencemag.org/archaeology/2015/02/mysterious-indo-european-homeland-may-have-been-steppes-ukraine-and-russia What do you call a male sibling? If you speak English, he is your “brother.” Greek? Call him “phrater.” Sanskrit, Latin, Old Irish? “Bhrater,” “frater,” or “brathir,” respectively. 你如何称呼与你同父母的男性呢?如果用英语,他就是你的“brother”。在希腊语里,他就叫“phrater”。而在梵语、拉丁语、古爱尔兰语里,他分别是“bhrater”、“frater”、“brathir”。 Ever since the mid-17th century, scholars have noted such similarities among the so-called Indo-European languages, which span the world and number more than 400 if dialects are included. Researchers agree that they can probably all be traced back to one ancestral language, called Proto-Indo-European (PIE). But for nearly 20 years, scholars have debated vehemently when and where PIE arose. 自17世纪中叶起,学者们已注意到所谓“印欧系”各语言之间,有着诸如此类的相似性。印欧语系横跨全世界,算上方言的话,包括了超过400多种语言。研究者认为,这些语言都可追溯到同一始祖语言——原始印欧语(PIE)。然而关于原始印欧语在何时何地出现,学者们已经激烈争论了近20年。 Two long-awaited studies, one described online this week in a preprint and another scheduled for publication later this month, have now used different methods to support one leading hypothesis: that PIE was first spoken by pastoral herders who lived in the vast steppe lands north of the Black Sea beginning about 6000 years ago. One study points out that these steppe land herders have left their genetic mark on most Europeans living today. 如今,有两份众人期待已久的研究报告,其中一份本周已在网上发布了预印本,而另一份则安排在本月稍晚时出版,通过不同方法,两份报告都支持了一个主流假说:最先使用原始印欧语的,是6000年前生活在黑海以北大草原的畜牧群体。其中一份研究指出,在今天大多数欧洲人身上均能找到这些草原牧民的遗传标记。 The studies’ conclusions emerge from state-of-the-art ancient DNA and linguistic analyses, but the debate over PIE’s origins is likely to continue. A rival hypothesis—that early farmers living in Anatolia (modern Turkey) about 8000 years ago were the original PIE speakers—is not ruled out by the new analyses, most agree. 这两份研究的结论,得自于最新技术下的古DNA研究以及语言学分析,不过有关原始印欧语起源的争论大约还得继续下去。大多数研究者同意,另一个与之竞争的假说——认为距今8000余年前生活在安纳托利亚(今土耳其)的早期农耕者,才是原始印欧语的最初使用者——并未被新的分析成果所排除。 Although the steppe hypothesis has now received a major boost, “I would not say the Anatolian hypothesis has been killed,” says Carles Lalueza-Fox, a geneticist at PompeuFabra University in Barcelona, Spain, who participated in neither of the new studies. 尽管如今草原假说得到了较多的支持【译注:草原假说又称库尔干假说】,卡勒斯·拉鲁扎-福克斯表示:"我不认为安纳托利亚假说已经寿终正寝。”他是西班牙巴塞罗那庞贝法布拉大学的一名遗传学家,未参与上述两项新研究。 Up until the 1980s, variations of the steppe hypothesis held sway among most linguists and archaeologists tracking down Indo-European’s birthplace. Then in 1987, archaeologist Colin Renfrew of the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom proposed that PIE spread with farming from its origins in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East, moving west into Europe and east further into Asia; over time the languages continued to spread and diversify into the many Indo-European languages we know today. 直到80年代,各种版本的草原假说深深影响着寻找印欧语发源地的多数语言学家和考古学家。之后在1987年,英国剑桥大学考古学家科林·伦弗鲁提出,原始印欧语是从其发源地中东新月沃地(Fertile Crescent)出发,伴随着农业扩张,向西传播至欧洲,向东传播远至亚洲。随着时间推移,印欧语持续四处传播,分化成了今天我们所知的诸多印欧语系语言。 Traditional linguists, meanwhile, painstakingly reconstructed PIE by extrapolating back from modern languages and ancient writings. (Listen to a short fable spoken in PIE here.) They disdained Renfrew’s idea of an Anatolian homeland, arguing for example that the languages were still too similar to have begun diverging 8000 years ago. 与此同时,传统语言学家则从现代语言和古代文字材料回推,煞费苦心地重建原始印欧语(点击此处收听一小段以原始印欧语讲述的传说故事)。他们鄙视伦弗鲁的安纳托利亚起源观点,他们的论证理由之一是,印欧诸语言迄今仍太过相似,因而还不可能从8000年前就开始分化了。【译注:这一论证基于某些语言学家的这样一个假设:语言分化程度随时间而提高,当两支语言分开五六千年以上时,其词汇上的同源关系就难以辨认了,分开一万年时,即便综合其他语言学特性,同源关系也难以辨认。】 【图一】 从右往左分别是:安纳托利亚语族,吐火罗语族,亚美尼亚语族,希腊语族,阿尔巴尼亚语族,印度-伊朗语族,波罗的-斯拉夫语族,日尔曼语族,意大利语族,凯尔特语族 More than 400 Indo-European languages diverged from a common ancestral tongue; the earliest ones (top right), Anatolian and Tocharian, arose in today’s Turkey and China, respectively. 超过400种印欧语系内的语言从一种共同的始祖语言分化而出;最早的两支(右侧顶部),安纳托利亚语族和吐火罗语族分别出现在今天的土耳其和中国。 But many archaeologists noted that genetic and archaeological studies did indeed suggest massive ancient migrations from the Middle East into Europe that could have brought PIE and sparked such language diversification. In 2003, evolutionary biologists Russell Gray and Quentin Atkinson of the University of Auckland in New Zealand used computational methods from evolutionary biology to track words as they changed over time, and concluded that the Anatolian hypothesis was right. But steppe supporters remained unconvinced, even after Gray’s team published a confirming analysis in Science in 2012. 但是很多考古学家注意到,遗传学和考古学研究证实了,由中东至欧洲的古代大规模迁徙确实发生过,这一迁徙可能令原始印欧语随之传播并促进其分化。2003年,新西兰奥克兰大学进化生物学家拉塞尔·格雷和昆廷·阿特金森使用进化生物学所发展出的计算技术,跟踪对比了词汇随时间推移而发生的变化,并断定安纳托利亚假说是正确的。但是,尽管格雷的团队2012年在《科学》杂志上发表了确认这一判断的分析,仍未能说服草原假说的支持者。 Fans of the steppe hypothesis are now hailing a genetics study that used ancient DNA from 69 Europeans who lived between 8000 and 3000 years ago to genetically track ancient population movements. 草原假说的支持者们如今正在为一项遗传学研究而欢呼雀跃,该研究利用了生活在3000至8000年前的69个古代欧洲人的DNA样本,从遗传学上追踪了古代人群的迁移活动。 The work, now posted on the bioRxiv preprint server, was done by a large team led by geneticists David Reich and Iosif Lazaridis of Harvard Medical School in Boston and Wolfgang Haak of the University of Adelaide in Australia. 这项研究由三位遗传学家——波士顿哈佛医学院的大卫·赖克、约瑟夫·拉扎里迪斯和澳大利亚阿德莱德大学的沃尔夫冈·哈克——所领导的一个庞大研究团队承担,其结果已公布在bioRxiv的预印本服务器上。 Among the team’s samples were nine ancient individuals—six males, two females, and a child of undetermined sex—from the Yamnaya culture north of the Black Sea in today’s Russia. Beginning about 6000 years ago, these steppe people herded cattle and other animals, buried their dead in earthen mounds called kurgans, and may have created some of the first wheeled vehicles. (Many linguists think PIE already had a word for “wheel.”) 该团队所使用的基因样本中,有9份古代个体样本采自黑海北岸今俄罗斯境内的颜那亚(Yamnaya)文化群体,其中包括6个男性、2个女性和一个无法确定性别的儿童。大约从6000年前开始,这群草原居民畜养牛群和其他动物,把族人的遗骸埋葬在被称为库尔干(kurgans)的土丘中,而且可能已制造出一些最早期的有轮车辆(许多语言学家认为原始印欧语中已有表示“车轮”的单词)。 The team also retrieved ancient DNA from four skeletons from the later Corded Ware culture of central Europe, known for the distinctive pottery for which they are named (see photo above), as well as their dairy farming skills. Archaeologists had noted similarities among these cultures, especially in their emphasis on cattle herding. 研究团队还从中欧地区属于晚期绳纹器(Corded Ware)文化的四具骨骸中提取了古DNA,该文化以其独具特色并因此得名的陶器(见图2)和发达的乳业技术而闻名。考古学家业已指出这些文化之间的相似性,特别是在重视养牛业这一点上。 【图2】 The creators of the Corded Ware culture, named after this intricate pottery, may have spoken an Indo-European language derived from one spoken by herders from the East. 绳纹器文化以其复杂的陶器而得名,该文化的创造者们可能讲一种从东部牧民语言衍化而来的印欧语。 The team focused on sections of DNA that they suspected would provide markers for past population movements and identified nearly 400,000 DNA positions across the genome in each individual. They used new techniques to zero in on the key positions in the nuclear DNA, allowing them to analyze twice as many ancient nuclear DNA samples from Europe and Asia as previously reported in the entire literature. 研究团队将注意力集中在一些DNA片段上,他们猜测其中包含了能够揭示过去人口迁移的标记,并在每一个体样本的基因组上识别了将近40万个基因位置。研究者借助新技术校正了核DNA上的关键点位,从而得以分析来自古代欧亚的大量核DNA样本,数量两倍于之前所有文献报告过的总数。 The comparison of the two cultures’ DNA showed that the four Corded Ware people could trace an astonishing three-quarters of their ancestry to the Yamnaya. That suggests a massive migration of Yamnaya people from their steppe homeland into central Europe about 4500 years ago, one that could have spread an early form of the Indo-European language, the team concludes. Thus the paper for the first time links two far-flung material cultures to specific genetic signatures and to each other—and suggests, the team says, that they spoke a form of Indo-European. 通过比对两种文化的DNA,发现四个绳纹器人样本中,有高达3/4的血统可以追溯到颜那亚人。研究团队的结论是,这一证据说明了,大约在4500年前,大量颜那亚人从他们的草原故土迁入中欧,并可能将一种早期形态的印欧语传播了出去。这份报告首次将两个相距甚远的物质文化通过明确的基因标识联系在了一起。同时,研究团队还指出,两个人群使用的都是某种印欧语言。 The Corded Ware culture soon spread across north and central Europe, extending as far as today’s Scandinavia. So the “steppe ancestry,” as the authors of the preprint call it, is found in most present-day Europeans, who can trace their ancestry back to both the Corded Ware people and the earlier Yamnaya. The work thus adds to genetic findings from last fall showing that the genetic makeup of today’s Europeans is more complicated than anyone expected. 绳纹器文化迅速扩散到整个北部和中部欧洲,最远到达今天的斯堪的纳维亚地区。所以预印本作者所说的“草原血统”,在当今大部分欧洲人身上都能找到,他们可以循系谱上溯到绳纹器人和更早的颜那亚人。这项工作因而补充了去年秋天的遗传学研究成果,揭示了当今欧洲人的基因构成比大家预计的要复杂得多。 The results are a “smoking gun” that an ancient migration into Europe from the steppe occurred, says Pontus Skoglund, an ancient DNA specialist who is now working in Reich’s lab but was not a co-author on the paper. (Although the paper is publicly available on a preprint server, it is not yet published, and the authors declined to discuss their work until it’s published.) The paper “levels the playing field between the steppe hypothesis and the Anatolian hypothesis by showing that the spread of farming was not the only large migration into Europe,”Skoglund says. 古DNA专家蓬图斯·斯科格隆目前在赖克实验室工作,但并未参与编写上述研究报告,他说上述研究成果为古代草原牧民入欧大迁徙提供了“确凿证据”。(尽管该报告已经在预印本服务器上公开,但尚未出版,编者们拒绝在正式出版前讨论他们的研究成果。)如斯科格隆所说,这一报告“显示了农业扩张并非唯一一次进入欧洲的大迁徙,从而拉平了草原假说与安纳托利亚假说之间的竞争局面。” The second new paper to address PIE’s origin, in press at Language and due to be published online during the last week of February, uses linguistic data to focus on when PIE arose. A team led by University of California, Berkeley, linguists Andrew Garrett and Will Chang employed the language database and evolutionary methods previously used by Gray to create a family tree of the Indo-European languages from their first origins in PIE. 第二份关于探寻原始印欧语起源地的新报告,已发表在Language杂志上,并准备于二月份最后一周在网上公布,该报告运用语言学数据来研究原始印欧语出现的时间。加州大学伯克利分校的语言学家安德鲁·加勒特和威尔·张所领导的团队使用了语言学数据库以及之前格雷使用过的进化生物学计算方法,构建了以原始印欧语为起点的印欧语系家族树。 But in certain cases, Garrett and Chang’s group declared that one language was directly ancestral to another and put that into their tree as a certainty. For example, they assumed that Latin was directly ancestral to Romance languages such as Spanish, French, and Italian—something that many but not all linguists agree on—and that Vedic Sanskrit was directly ancestral to the Indo-Aryan languages spoken on the Indian subcontinent. 但在某些实例中,加勒特和张领导的团队宣称某种语言为另一语言的直接先祖,并确切地将其安置在树状图中。例如他们认为拉丁语是罗曼语族(如西班牙语、法语和意大利语)的直接先祖(许多但并非所有语言学家赞同这一点),而吠陀梵语则是在印度次大陆盛行的印度-雅利安语支的直接先祖。 These constraints transformed the results from what Gray’s team has published: Garrett, Chang, and their colleagues found that the origins of PIE were about 6000 years ago, consistent with the steppe hypothesis but not the Anatolian, because the farming migration out of the Middle East was 8000 years ago. Once the original PIE speakers began to sweep out of the steppes about 4500 years ago, their languages spread and diversified, Garrett’s team says. 这些限定改变了格雷团队的研究报告所引出的结论:加勒特和张以及他们的同事发现,原始印欧语大致起源于6000年前,这与草原假说一致,而与安纳托利亚假说不符——因为走出中东的农业迁移发生在8000年前。加勒特团队认为,在约4500年前,使用最初原始印欧语的人群开始从草原向外迁徙,他们的语言也随之传播并分化。 But many supporters of the Anatolian hypothesis remain staunchly unconvinced. Paul Heggarty, a linguist at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, questions Garrett’s methods, arguing that, for example, linguists cannot be sure if the Latin attested to in written documents really was the direct ancestor of later Romance languages, rather than some dialect of Latin for which no record remains. Even small differences in the true ancestral language, Heggarty insists, could throw off the timing estimates. 但是许多安纳托利亚假说的支持者依然坚持己见,德国莱比锡的马克斯·普朗克进化人类学研究所的语言学家保罗·赫加蒂质疑了加勒特的研究方法。例如,他认为语言学家无法确定,后来的罗曼语族的直接先祖,是由书写文档所见证的拉丁语,还是某种无文字记录留存的拉丁方言。赫加蒂坚称,即使在真正先祖语言的判定上仅有细微差异,也可使时间推算工作前功尽弃。 As for the Reich paper, many archaeologists and linguists praise the data on ancient migrations. But they challenge what they see as its speculative link to language. The movement out of the steppes, Renfrew says, “may be a secondary migration into central Europe 3000 to 4000 years later than the spread of farmers, which first brought Indo-European speech to Europe.” 至于赖克的那篇论文,许多考古学家和语言学家高度评价了其有关古代迁徙的数据资料,但他们质疑这些数据和语言传播的联系只是猜测性的。对于来自草原的大迁徙,伦弗鲁声称:“也许进入中欧的第二次大迁徙比农业扩张晚了3000到4000年,而第一次大迁徙已经将印欧语言带进了欧洲。” If so, the Yamnaya steppe people would not have spoken PIE but an already derived Indo-European tongue ancestral to today’s Balto-Slavic languages such as Russian and Polish, Heggarty says. He adds that the wording of the Reich paper is “misleading.” 赫加蒂说,如果是这样的话,那么颜那亚的草原居民说的就不是原始印欧语,而是一种已从原始印欧语中分化出来的印欧语言——也就是今日俄语、波兰语之类波罗的-斯拉夫语族的先祖语言。他认为赖克论文中的措辞具有“误导性”。 Indeed, in a lengthy discussion in the paper’s Supplementary Information section, Reich and colleagues do concede that “the ultimate question of the Proto-Indo-European homeland is unresolved by our data.” They suggest that more ancient DNA, especially from points east of the steppes, may finally tie our linguistic history with our genes. 实际上,在论文补充信息部分的一段冗长讨论中,赖克和他同事的确承认:“我们的数据并未彻底解决PIE起源地这一终极问题。”他们认为,如果能收集到更多古DNA,特别是来自草原东部边界的DNA的话,也许最终能够把基因与语言演变史联系起来。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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[译文]再论和平野蛮人神话

More on the Myth of the Peaceful Savage
再论和平野蛮人神话

作者: Peter Turchin @ 2015-7-22
译者:yusong ( [email protected] )
校对:Who视之(@Who视之),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Cliodynamica,http://peterturchin.com/blog/2015/07/22/more-on-the-myth-of-the-peaceful-savage/

In the current issue of Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution the anthropologist Sarah Mathew reviews War, Peace, and Human Nature, edited by Douglas Fry. Fry is one of the large group of anthropologists and other social scientists who have been critical of Steven Pinker’s book The Better Angels of Our Nature.

在最新一期的《历史动力学:计量历史和文化演进》杂志中,人类学家Sarah Mathew对Douglas Fry主编的《战争、和平与人性》一书做了评论。许多人类学家和社会科学研究者对Steven Pinker那本《人性中善良天使》持批评态度,Fry是其中之一。

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More on the Myth of the Peaceful Savage 再论和平野蛮人神话 作者: Peter Turchin @ 2015-7-22 译者:yusong ( [email protected] ) 校对:Who视之(@Who视之),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Cliodynamica,http://peterturchin.com/blog/2015/07/22/more-on-the-myth-of-the-peaceful-savage/ In the current issue of Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution the anthropologist Sarah Mathew reviews War, Peace, and Human Nature, edited by Douglas Fry. Fry is one of the large group of anthropologists and other social scientists who have been critical of Steven Pinker’s book The Better Angels of Our Nature. 在最新一期的《历史动力学:计量历史和文化演进》杂志中,人类学家Sarah Mathew对Douglas Fry主编的《战争、和平与人性》一书做了评论。许多人类学家和社会科学研究者对Steven Pinker那本《人性中善良天使》持批评态度,Fry是其中之一。 Sarah makes the following important point about War, Peace, and Human Nature: Sarah对《战争、和平与人性》提出了以下重要论点:
Note that the book is not just about warfare, but about conflict in general, which can include a variety of inter-personal conflict, including physical aggression between same-sex individuals, domestic violence, conflict within social relationships, verbal aggression, and alcohol-induced fights. 值得一提的是,这本书不只是关于战争,而是关于广义的冲突,后者包括各种各样的个人间冲突,比如同性个体间的身体攻击、家庭暴力、社会关系中的冲突、言语攻击和醉酒引发的斗殴等。 Some readers may find this problematic. The evolutionary forces that shape warfare differ from the evolutionary forces that shape inter-personal violence because warfare can occur only if the problem of collective action is solved. Thus, the evolution of warfare is tightly linked to the mechanisms underpinning the evolution of cooperation. 一些读者可能会发现这是有问题的。塑造战争的进化力量不同于塑造个体间暴力的进化力量,因为只有在解决了集体行动的问题之后,战争才有可能发生。因此,战争的进化与合作的进化在基础机制上有着十分紧密的联系。 This fact alone accounts for the rarity of warfare in most of the animal kingdom despite the prevalence of myriad other forms of conflict. So, for readers interested in the evolution of warfare, the book may seem like a grab bag of too many unrelated phenomena. 单单这个事实便可解释为何在动物世界战争如此罕见,尽管其它各式各样的冲突十分常见。所以,那些对战争的进化感兴趣的读者,可能会觉得这本书像是太多无关现象的杂糅之物。
There is a reason why many authors of the book conflate warfare and violence. To see this, I recommend taking a look at a recent article by Azar Gat, Proving Communal Warfare among Hunter-Gatherers: The Quasi-Rousseauan Error. 这本书中的许多作者把战争和暴力并在一起讨论,这么做是有理由的,对此,我建议参考Azar Gat最近发表的一篇文章:“对狩猎采集者之间群体战争的证明:准卢梭式缪见” The target of Gat’s critique is “Rousseauism,” the idea that humans were basically nonviolent before the transition to agriculture and the rise of complex societies—civilization. At the peak of the Rousseauism in the 1960s, anthropologists celebrated Kalahari Bushmen as “harmless people” and wrote books about the Inuits of polar Canada with titles like “Never in Anger.” 【插图1,图片来源:Australian Art Auction Records网站,http://www.artrecord.com/index.cfm/artist/11893-mcrae-tommy/medium/2-works-on-paper/?page=2】 Gat批评的是卢梭主义。卢梭主义认为:在转向农业之前,在复杂社会即文明诞生之前,人类总体上是非暴力的。在卢梭主义影响力达到顶峰的1960年代,人类学家们欣喜地把卡拉哈里沙漠布希曼人(Kalahari Bushmen)称为“无的民族”,并在描写加拿大极地因纽特人的书中使用了“从不发怒”之类的标题。 These descriptions of peaceful hunter-gatherer groups were revealed by subsequent research to be complete fantasies. The seminal publication that turned the tide against Rousseauism in modern anthropology was the 1996 book by Lawrence Keeley, War Before Civilization: the Myth of the Peaceful Savage. 然而,后续的研究指出,这些关于和平的狩猎采集群体的描述纯属想象。在现代人类学中,逆转卢梭主义潮流的开创性文献是1996年Lawrence Keeley的著作《文明之前的战争:和平野蛮人的神话》。 【插图2,图片来源:维基百科https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Showing_method_of_attack_with_boomerang_-_NMA-15147.jpg】 Meanwhile, another strand developed in the anthropological study of warfare. These researchers did not deny that small-scale societies studied by anthropologists had very high levels of homicide due to warfare, but argued that it was due to the contact of these previously peaceful societies with the intrusive states. 同时,关于战争的人类学研究中兴起了另一个学派。这些学者并不否认,人类学家研究过的小规模社会有着非常多的战争杀害,但他们争辩说,这是因为这些本来爱好和平的社会接触了具有侵略性的国家。 According to such anthropologists as Brian Ferguson, expanding states, both modern European colonial powers and ancient empires, create “tribal zones” on their frontiers, in which warfare is frequent and intense. 根据Brian Ferguson等人类学家的观点,正在扩张的国家,包括现代欧洲殖民势力和古代帝国,都在它们的扩张前沿创造了“部落地带”,在这些地带,战争显得尤其频繁和剧烈。 Professional anthropologists who, of course, come from civilized state-level societies study the tribal zone and are fooled to believe that all small-scale societies, even those before exposure to the corrupting influence of the states, are very violent. 他们认为,职业人类学家(当然都来自已经建立国家的文明社会)在研究这个部落地带时被愚弄了,以至于相信所有小规模社会,包括那些受国家腐蚀影响之前的,都非常暴力。 Empirical evidence supports the idea that the arrival of centralized states in a region increases the intensity of warfare. But that doesn’t mean that before such intrusion small-scale societies were peaceful. 经验证据确实支持集权国家的到来会增加一个区域战争强度的观点,但这并不意味着,在这种入侵之前,小规模社会就是和平的。 Gat reviews several lines of evidence, including archaeological, but probably the most convincing is his extended review of what we know about the pre-contact Australia. Gat回顾了几组不同证据,包括考古学上的,但其中最具说服力的,可能是他就我们所了解的澳大利亚接触现代文明之前的情况所做的长篇讨论。 Australia was an entire continent inhabited by hunter-gatherers, with no agriculturalists, pastoralists, or states. The first non-foraging society that arrived in Australia was the British, who established the penal colony at the Botany Bay in 1788, and for a while Australia was a dumping ground for the undesirables from the British Isles. It was not until the 1820s when the free settlers started to arrive, and massive immigration began during the Gold rush era, starting in 1851. 整个澳洲大陆原先由狩猎采集者居住,没有农民、牧人,也没有国家。到达澳大利亚的第一个非狩猎群体是英国人,他们在1788年把鲍特尼湾建成一个犯人流放地,澳大利亚一度曾是容纳不列颠群岛不良分子的垃圾场。直到1820年代,才有第一批自由定居者到达,大批移民则始于1851年后兴起的淘金热时代。 【插图3,图片来源:Gat 2015文章】 Much before that, in 1803, the 23-year old Englishman William Buckley escaped from a penalty settlement and lived with an Aboriginal tribe for 32 years. His account gives us an invaluable glimpse into the life of a hunter-gathering society before it was changed by the intruding state-level civilization. Buckley was not a trained anthropologist, but that doesn’t disqualify him from reporting on such basic issues as war and peace. 远在这之前的1803年,一个23岁的英国人William Buckley从罪犯流放地逃脱,在一个澳洲土著部落中生活了32年。他的叙述非常珍贵,让我们得以一窥尚未被有国家文明闯入并改变的狩猎采集社会的生活状态。Buckley并非受过专业训练的人类学家,但这并不意味着他没有能力来报告像战争与和平这样的基础事务。 Buckley recounts some dozen battle scenes, as well as many lethal feuds, raids, and ambushes, comprising a central element of the natives’ traditional way of life. He describes their weapons of war in great detail: clubs, spears, “war boomerangs,” throwing sticks, and shields. Buckley叙述了几十起战斗场景,还有致命的争斗、突袭和伏击,这些共同组成了土著传统生活方式的核心要素。他十分详细地描述了他们使用的武器:棍棒,矛,回旋镖,投掷棍,盾牌等。 Tribes typically consisted of 20–60 families each and were egalitarian, without chiefs. There was fighting at all levels: individual, familial, and tribal. Some of the intertribal encounters that Buckley recorded involved large numbers: five different tribes collected for battle; a battle and raid against an intruding enemy tribe, 300 strong; several full-scale intertribal encounters, the last one a raid with many dead; two other encounters, the second against a war party of 60 men. 这些部落通常由20-60个的家庭组成,内部平等,没有首领。争斗存在于各个层次上:个人间的,家庭间的,和部落间的。Buckley记录的一些部落间交战涉及大量人员:五个不同部落聚集在一起战斗;一场针对入侵部落的战斗和突袭有300多人参战;几场部落之间的全面战争,最后一场是次突袭,造成了许多死亡;还有另外两起遭遇战,其中第二起面对的是一支60人队伍。 Ceremonial cannibalism of the vanquished was customary. Buckley reported that the large-scale raid was the deadliest form of violence and often involved indiscriminate massacre: “The contests between the Watouronga, of Geelong, and the Warrorongs, of the Yarra, were fierce and bloody. I have accompanied the former in their attacks on the latter. When coming suddenly upon them in the night, they have destroyed without mercy men, women and children.” (Gat 2015) 针对败者的仪式性食人行为成立一种惯例。Buckley记述说,大规模突袭是最致命的暴力模式,而且其中经常包括无差别屠杀:‘ Geelong地区的Watouronga部落,与Yarra地区的Warrorongs部落之间的战斗激烈而血腥。我随队亲历了前者对后者的袭击。深夜里突然接近敌方居所后,他们无情地进行屠杀,包括男人、女人和小孩。’(引自Gat 2015年文) The Australian evidence is particularly important because it comes from eyewitnesses to the crime, so to speak. Archaeological evidence tells us that violent death was very frequent in prehistoric societies. But it is difficult to distinguish death in war from death resulting from within-group violence. 澳大利亚的这一证据尤其重要,因为它来自亲眼目睹这类罪行的人。考古学证据告诉我们,在史前社会,暴力造成的死亡非常频繁。但是要区分因为战争造成的死亡和群体内部暴力造成的死亡是十分困难的。 This uncertainty allows Douglas Fry to write, “whereas homicide has occurred periodically over the enduring stretches of Pleistocene millennia, warfare is young, that is, arising within the timeframe of the agricultural revolution.” But the Australian evidence decisively demonstrates that war precedes the agricultural revolution. 由于有这种不确定性, Douglas Fry就可以说,“尽管在漫长的旧石器时代,杀戮周期性地发生,但战争却是一种新事物,也就是说,它起源于农业革命那段时间。”但是澳大利亚的证据确切表明了,战争在农业革命之前就已存在。 ============================== Note added 22.VII.2015: As Scott Atran points out in the comments, the last sentence is too strong. But read the article by Azar Gat, which brings together numerous lines of evidence, making the case for war before civilization very convincing to me. 2015年7月22日注: 正如 Scott Atran在评论里指出的,最后一句显得过于肯定了。但是在读过Azar Gat这篇搜罗了大量证据的文章之后,战争诞生于文明之前的结论在我看来已经非常有说服力了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]关于财产权的一种实证解释

A Positive Account of Property Rights
关于财产权的实证解释

作者:David Friedman
翻译:思考一下名字
校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:作者个人网站,http://daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html

In thinking and talking about rights, including property rights, it seems natural to put the argument in either moral or legal terms. From the former viewpoint, rights are part of a description of what actions are right or wrong. The fact that I have a right to do something is an argument, although not necessarily a sufficient argument, that someone who prevents me from doing it is acting wrongly.

在我们思考和讨论包括财产权在内的权利时,我们的论证往往自然地使用道德的或者法律的语言。从道德角度来讲,权利是关于行为对错之描述的一部分。我有权利做一件事情这个事实,可以作为论据来论证(尽管未必充分):阻止我做此事的行为是错误的。

From the legal standpoint, rights are a description either of what the law says or of how it is enforced. On the latter interpretation, “I have a right to do X” translates as something like “If I do X the police will not arrest me; if someone tries to stop me from doing X the police will arrest him.” From this standpoint, one might claim that people in Holland have the right to buy marijuana and people in America have the right to drive 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, even though both are illegal.

从法律角度看,权利是对“法律讲了什么”或者“法律如何被执行”的描述。在第二种阐释中,“我有权利做X”大概可以理解为“假如我做了X,警察不会逮捕我;假如别人试图阻止我做X,警察会逮捕他。”从这个角度来说,我们可以说,荷兰人有权利买大麻,美国人有权利把车子开得比限速快5英里每小时,尽管二者都是违法的。

Both of these approaches have serious difficulties if our goal is to understand the phenomenon of rights, and associated phenomena, as they actually exist in the real world. We frequently observe behavior which looks like the claiming of rights and the recognition of rights in contexts where neither a moral nor a legal account seems relevant.

如果我们旨在理解现实世界中存在的权利现象及其相关现象,那么以上两种方法都有严重困难。我们经常观察到一些好像是在主张权利和认可权利的行为,而相关情境则与道德或法律解释都不相干。

Consider, for example, Great Britain’s “right” to control Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. It is difficult to explain Communist China’s willingness to respect that right on legal grounds, given that, from the Maoist standpoint, neither the government of Britain nor previous, non-communist governments with which it had signed agreements were entities entitled to any moral respect.

比如说英国控制香港、九龙及新界的“权利”。从法律层面【译注:从上下文看,此处恐有笔误,“法律层面”似应为“道德层面”】很难解释清楚共产中国为何愿意尊重这一权利(假设事实确实如此),因为从毛主义的立场看,无论是英国政府,还是和它签订条约的以往非共产主义中国政府,都不是在道德上值得给予任何尊重的实体。

It seems equally difficult to explain it on legal grounds, given the general weakness of international law and the fact that for part of the period in question Great Britain (as a member state of the United (more...)

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A Positive Account of Property Rights 关于财产权的实证解释

作者:David Friedman 翻译:思考一下名字 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:作者个人网站,http://daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html In thinking and talking about rights, including property rights, it seems natural to put the argument in either moral or legal terms. From the former viewpoint, rights are part of a description of what actions are right or wrong. The fact that I have a right to do something is an argument, although not necessarily a sufficient argument, that someone who prevents me from doing it is acting wrongly. 在我们思考和讨论包括财产权在内的权利时,我们的论证往往自然地使用道德的或者法律的语言。从道德角度来讲,权利是关于行为对错之描述的一部分。我有权利做一件事情这个事实,可以作为论据来论证(尽管未必充分):阻止我做此事的行为是错误的。 From the legal standpoint, rights are a description either of what the law says or of how it is enforced. On the latter interpretation, "I have a right to do X" translates as something like "If I do X the police will not arrest me; if someone tries to stop me from doing X the police will arrest him." From this standpoint, one might claim that people in Holland have the right to buy marijuana and people in America have the right to drive 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, even though both are illegal. 从法律角度看,权利是对“法律讲了什么”或者“法律如何被执行”的描述。在第二种阐释中,“我有权利做X”大概可以理解为“假如我做了X,警察不会逮捕我;假如别人试图阻止我做X,警察会逮捕他。”从这个角度来说,我们可以说,荷兰人有权利买大麻,美国人有权利把车子开得比限速快5英里每小时,尽管二者都是违法的。 Both of these approaches have serious difficulties if our goal is to understand the phenomenon of rights, and associated phenomena, as they actually exist in the real world. We frequently observe behavior which looks like the claiming of rights and the recognition of rights in contexts where neither a moral nor a legal account seems relevant. 如果我们旨在理解现实世界中存在的权利现象及其相关现象,那么以上两种方法都有严重困难。我们经常观察到一些好像是在主张权利和认可权利的行为,而相关情境则与道德或法律解释都不相干。 Consider, for example, Great Britain's "right" to control Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. It is difficult to explain Communist China's willingness to respect that right on legal grounds, given that, from the Maoist standpoint, neither the government of Britain nor previous, non-communist governments with which it had signed agreements were entities entitled to any moral respect. 比如说英国控制香港、九龙及新界的“权利”。从法律层面【译注:从上下文看,此处恐有笔误,“法律层面”似应为“道德层面”】很难解释清楚共产中国为何愿意尊重这一权利(假设事实确实如此),因为从毛主义的立场看,无论是英国政府,还是和它签订条约的以往非共产主义中国政府,都不是在道德上值得给予任何尊重的实体。 It seems equally difficult to explain it on legal grounds, given the general weakness of international law and the fact that for part of the period in question Great Britain (as a member state of the United Nations) was at war with China. An alternative explanation—that the Chinese government believed that British occupation of Hong Kong was in its own interest—seems inconsistent with the Chinese failure to renew the lease on the New Territories, due to expire in 1997. 同样,考虑到国际法总体很羸弱,且当时英国(作为联合国一员)与中国有段时间曾处于战争状态【译注:指朝鲜战争】,想从法律角度解释这一点也很困难。而第三种解释——中国政府认为英国占领香港对自己有利——也和中国拒绝续签将于1997年过期的新界租约这一事实不符。 A second example is presented by the 1982 Falklands war. On the face of it, the clash looks like an attempted trespass repelled. Moral and legal accounts seem irrelevant, given the attitude of Argentina to the British claim. Yet the willingness of Britain to accept costs far out of proportion to the value of the prize being fought over is difficult to explain except on the theory that the British felt they were defending their property, which raises the question of what that concept means in such a context. 第二个例子是1982年的福克兰群岛战争。表面上看,此次冲突就是一次被击退的入侵。考虑到阿根廷对英国之权利主张的态度,道德和法律论述似乎都不相干。然而,英国愿意付出远超受争议领土价值的代价,这一点除非用“英国人觉得他们是在保卫自己的财产权”这一理论,否则很难解释。所以问题来了:财产权的概念在此情境中究竟意味着什么呢? A further difficulty with moral accounts of rights, in particular of property rights, is the degree to which the property rights that people actually respect seem to depend on facts that are morally irrelevant. This difficulty presents itself in libertarian accounts of property as the problem of initial acquisition. It is far from clear even in principle how unowned resources such as land can become private property. 对权利——特别是财产权——的道德解释所面临的另一个困难是:人们对财产权的实际尊重程度,似乎依赖于一些与道德无关的事实。这一困难在自由意志主义的财产权解释中,表现为初始占有问题。即便在理论上,土地这样的无主资源如何得以变成私人财产,也远非明白清楚。 Even if one accepts an account, such as that of Locke, of how initial acquisition might justly have occurred, that account provides little justification for the existing pattern of property rights, given the high probability that any piece of property has been unjustly seized at least once since it was first cleared. Yet billions of people, now and in the past, base much of their behavior on respect for property claims that seem either morally arbitrary or clearly unjust. 即使一个人接受某种如洛克那样的关于初始占有如何可能正当发生的解释,这种解释也很难给现存的财产权形式提供辩护,因为任何财产,在成为私产之后,都有很大可能被非正当地僭取过至少一次。但是古今数十亿人的多数行为,仍旧出于这一基础:尊重那些要么是道德上武断,要么是明显不义的权利主张。 A further difficulty with legal accounts of rights is that they are to some degree circular. We observe that police will act in certain ways and that their action (and related actions by judges, juries, etc.) implies that certain people have certain rights. But the behavior of police is itself in part a consequence of rights—such as the right of the state to collect taxes and pay them to the police as wages and the property right that the police then have over the money they receive. 权利的法律解释的另一个问题是,他们在某种程度上是循环论证。我们观察到警察按照确定方式行动,他们的行动(及法官、陪审团等的相关行动)表明某些人有某些权利。但是警察的行为本身就是权利的结果的一部分——比如政府收税发给警察作工资的权利,和警察对于他们收到的金钱的财产权。 For all of these reasons, I believe it is worth attempting a positive account of rights—an account which is both amoral and alegal. In part I of this essay I present such an account—one in which rights, in particular property rights, are a consequence of strategic behavior and may exist with no moral or legal support. 出于以上所有原因,我认为尝试一种关于权利的实证解释——一种既非道德也非法律的解释——是值得的。在本文的第一部分我将提出这一解释——其中权利,尤其财产权,是策略性行为的结果,无须道德或法律支持。 The account is presented both as an explanation of how rights could arise in a Hobbesian anarchy and as an explanation of the nature of rights as we observe them around us. In Part II I suggest ways in which something like the present structure of rights might have developed. 此解释既可以用来说明在霍布斯式的无政府世界里权利如何产生,又可以用来说明我们日常观察到的权利的性质。在第二部分,我会提出像现存权利体系这种事物得以发展出来的几种可能路径。 One puzzling feature of rights as we observe them is the degree to which the same conclusions seem to follow from very different assumptions. Thus roughly similar structures of rights can be and are deduced by libertarian philosophers trying to show what set of natural rights is just and by economists trying to show what set of legal rules would be efficient. 我们观察到的权利有一个令人困惑的特征:基于不同的假设似乎可以得出一样的结论。自由意志主义哲学家试图证明哪套自然权利是正义的;而经济学家则试图证明哪套法律规则是有效率的;二者可能并且已经推演出大致相似的权利架构。 And the structures of rights that they deduce seem similar to those observed in human behavior and embodied in the common law. In Part III of this essay I will try to suggest at least partial explanations for this triple coincidence—the apparent similarity between what is, what is just, and what is efficient. 而他们推演出的这套权利架构似乎与我们在人类行为中观察到的也相去不远,在普通法(common law)中亦有体现。在文章第三部分,我会试图对这种三重巧合——“实然”“应然”和“有效率”三者之间的明显相似,至少提出部分解释。 Part I: Schelling Points, Self-Enforcing Contracts, and the Paradox of Order 第一部分:谢林点,自执行契约和秩序悖论 Several writers have tried to analyze the transition from a Hobbesian state of nature to a state of civil order in terms of a set of hypothetical contracts establishing an initial distribution of property rights based on a preexisting distribution of power. One difficulty with this approach is that in the initial situation there are no institutions to enforce contracts. How can people in that situation change it by making contracts which are unenforceable and so of no effect? 一些作家曾尝试用一套基于既存权力分布而确定初始财产权分布的假想契约,来分析从霍布斯自然状态到文明秩序状态的过渡。这种方法的一个难点是,初始状况下没有强制执行契约的制度。人们又如何能通过订立无法强制执行、因而无效的契约,来改变现有状况呢? The same problem can be seen from the other side by asking in what sense we, or any society, are ever out of a Hobbesian state of nature. What do we have, what have we created, that does not exist in the Hobbesian jungle? 这一问题当我们从另一个方向上追问时同样可以看到:我们,或任何社会,到底在何种意义上已经走出霍布斯自然状态呢?我们拥有或创造了什么在霍布斯丛林中并不存在的东西呢? Civil order is not defined by the existence of physical objects—court rooms, police uniforms, law books. We can easily enough imagine a Hobbesian jungle—in the middle of a war, say—coexisting with all the physical appurtenances of civil society. And primitive peoples, without court rooms or law books, nonetheless live in a state of civil order. 文明秩序并不是按照法庭,警服,法律书等物理对象的存在而定义的。我们很容易想象一个拥有一切文明社会物质构件的霍布斯丛林,例如战争时期。而(同样可以想象)一个原始人群体,尽管没有法庭或法律典籍,却生活在文明秩序状态之中。 Nor does it suffice to say that we are in a state of civil order because we have judges to interpret our laws and police to enforce them. Why do those people act in that way? Presumably because it is in their private interest to do so—just as potential criminals obey the law for the same reason. But that is how people act in the Hobbesian jungle. 仅仅因为我们有法官来阐释法律,警察来执行法律,就说我们处于文明秩序状态之中,理由也是不充分的。法官和警察为何要按照此种方式行动?或许是因为这么做符合他们的私人利益——就好像潜在罪犯也出于同一理由而遵守法律。但这正是人们处于霍布斯丛林时的做法。 There too, one man may happen to enforce a rule, and another happen to obey it, because each finds it in his own interest to do so. What is it that we have and the Hobbesian jungle does not have that makes it in the interest of people to behave in a law abiding and peaceful manner? To say that the answer is "police, courts, government" only throws the question back a step; if civil order is enforced by men with guns, what controls them? 在那里,同样地,一个人碰巧执行一条规则,另一个人碰巧遵守它,正因为他们俩都觉得这样做符合个人利益。我们有而霍布斯丛林没有的是一种什么东西,能够使整个社会从全体的利益出发,遵守法律而和平相处呢?回答“警察,法庭和政府”只能把问题往前推进一步;如果文明秩序是靠手里有枪的人强制施行的,那么谁控制这些有枪的人呢? There are two sorts of answers to these questions. One is that the difference is a moral one. People somehow accept an obligation, agree not to behave according to simple self interest, feel themselves bound by that agreement and alter their actions accordingly. 这些问题有两类答案。其一认为区别是道德上的。不知何故,人们了接受了一项义务,同意不仅仅依照个人利益行事,认识到自己受该协定的约束,并依此调整自己的行为。 There are difficulties with this sort of explanation. First, there is the empirical observation that people do not feel themselves bound to obey laws; many, perhaps most, people feel free to violate those laws (speed limits, drinking laws, customs regulations) which they disagree with and believe they can get away with breaking. 这类解释有一些难点。首先,有经验观察发现,人们并不觉得自己有义务遵守法律;很多人,也许是大多数人,当他们不认同某项法律(比如限速,饮酒法律,海关规定),并且相信自己能够逃脱惩罚时,就会随意违反这些法律。 Second, to the extent that people do feel a moral obligation to obey social rules, it is hard to derive that feeling from any variant of social contract theory. The traditional variants encounter the difficulty eloquently described by Lysander Spooner; since we ourselves did not sign the contract we are not bound by it. 第二,即便在人们觉得自己有道德义务去遵守社会准则时,这种道德感也很难从任何版本的社会契约论中推导出来。传统的社会契约论版本都面临Lysander Spooner曾有力陈述过的困难:我们自己没有签订过契约,所以不受其约束。 The difficulties with deriving moral obligation from the sort of pairwise social contract suggested by Winston Bush are equally great. Even if we consider that each of us is, at every instant, in an implicit contract with each of his neighbors to respect some agreed upon set of rights, still that contract, in Bush's model, is based on the threat of coercion. It has no more moral legitimacy, according to conventional moral ideas, than the obligation to pay off a protection racket. 从Winston Bush提出的两两契约之类的理论推导出道德义务,也一样困难重重。即便设想,在Bush的模型之中,我们每个人在每一时刻,都和每个旁人处于一种隐性契约之中,约定尊重某一套协商好的权利,这种契约仍然是基于威胁使用强制手段的。依照传统的道德观念,其中所含的道德合法性并不比交保护费义务中所含的要多。 It may be possible to explain the difference between a Hobbesian state of nature and civil society as a moral difference, but I prefer the alternative explanation—that the essential difference is not in the motivation of the players but in the strategic situation they face. This raises the question of how making an agreement—in a society with no mechanisms for enforcing agreements—can change anything, the strategic situation included. 霍布斯自然状态和文明社会之间的区别,或许可以解释为一种道德区别,但我更喜欢另一种解释——其中本质区别不在于参与者的动机,而在于他们面临的策略处境。于是问题来了:在没有机制可以强制执行约定的社会,订下合约又能改变什么呢?包括,能改变他们面临的策略处境么? I. A. The Tool: Schelling Points 第一部分之一,工具:谢林点 Two people are separately confronted with the list of numbers shown above and offered a reward if they independently choose the same number. If the two are mathematicians, it is likely that they will both choose 2—the only even prime. Non-mathematicians are likely to choose 100—a number which seems, to the mathematicians, no more unique than the other two exact squares. Illiterates might agree on 69, because of its peculiar symmetry—as would, for a different reason, those whose interest in numbers is more prurient than mathematical. 向两个人分别出示以下数列:2,5,9,25,69,73,82,96,100,126,150。如果两人独立选择了同一数字就给予奖励。如果二人是数学家,他们有可能都选2——唯一的偶质数。非数学家们可能选择100——一个在数学家们看来和另外两个平方数并无区别的数字。文盲可能同时选69,出于它奇特的对称——那些对于数字的兴趣主要在色情而非数学的人,出于另一种理由,也可能选择69。 There are three things worth noting about this simple problem in coordination without communication. The first is that each pair of players is looking for a number that is in some way unique. To a mathematician, all three squares are special numbers, as are the three primes. But if they try to coordinate on a square or a prime, they have only one chance in three of success—and besides, one may be trying primes and the other squares. 2 is unique. If the set of numbers did not contain 2 but did contain only one prime (or only one square, or one perfect number) they would choose that. 这个简单的无交流协调问题有三点值得注意。第一是,每一对参与者都在找一个以某种方式看独特的数字。对于数学家,三个平方数都特别,三个质数也是。但如果他们协同选择一个平方数或质数,他们只有三分之一的成功机会——何况还可能一个人选质数而另一个选了平方数。2则是独一无二的。如果这列数字里不包含2,但只包含一个质数(或一个平方数,或一个完全数),他们就会选这个数。 The second thing to note is that there is no single right answer; the number chosen by one player, and hence the number that ought to be chosen by the other, depends on the categories that the person choosing uses to classify the alternatives. The right strategy is to find some classification in terms of which there is a unique number, then choose that number—a strategy whose implementation depends on the particular classifications that pair of players uses. Thus the right answer depends on subjective characteristics of the players. 第二点值得注意的是,这里没有唯一的正确答案;一人选中并且也应当被另一人选中的那个数字,取决于前者所用的分类方法。正确的策略是找出一种产生独一无二数字的分类,然后选择此数字——这种策略的实施取决于两个参与者选择的特定分类方法。因此正确答案也取决于参与者的主观特性。 The third point, which follows from this, is that it is possible to succeed in the game because of, not in spite of, the bounded rationality of the players. To a mind of sufficient scope every number is unique. It is only because the players are limited to a small number of the possible classification schemes for numbers, and because the two players may be limited to the same schemes, that a correct choice may exist. 第三点是,由此可知,在这一博弈中取得成功之所以可能,不是由于参与者克服了自己的有限理性,而正是由于他们只拥有有限理性。对于一个充分理性的头脑,每一个数字都是独特的。正因为参与者受限于少量几种可能的数字分类方法,并且两人或许受限于同样的几种,正确的选择才可能存在。 In this respect the theory of this game is radically different from conventional game theory, which assumes players with unlimited ability to examine alternatives and so abstracts away from all subjective characteristics of the players except those embodied in their utility functions. 从这个角度来看,这种博弈的理论和传统博弈论极为不同,后者假设参与者有无限的能力去考虑备选项,因此除体现于效用函数中的那些之外,它剥离了参与者其它所有主观特性。 Consider now two players playing the game called bilateral monopoly. They have a dollar to divide between them, provided they can agree how to divide it. Superficially there is no resemblance between this game and that discussed above; the players are free to talk with each other as much as they want. 现在设想两个参与者在玩一个叫“双边垄断”(bilateral monopoly)的游戏。如果能就如何分配达成同意的话,他们就可以瓜分一块钱。表面上看,这和之前讨论的博弈一点也不像:参与者只要愿意就可以和对方自由交谈。 But while they can talk freely, there is a sense in which they cannot communicate at all. It is in my interest to persuade you that I will only be satisfied with a large fraction of the dollar; if I am really unwilling to accept anything less than ninety cents, you are better off agreeing to accept ten cents than holding out for more and getting nothing. Since it is in the interest of each of us to persuade the other of his resolve, all statements to that effect can be ignored; they would be made whether true or not. 可即便他们可以自由交谈,从一种意义上说,他们仍是完全无法沟通的:我的利益所在,是劝说你接受,我只有得到这块钱中的大头才会满足;如果我真的不愿接受少于九毛,那么你同意接受一毛比要求更多却一分都没拿到更好。因为向对方展示决心对自己有利,所有表达此种意思的言论都可以忽略,因为无论真假双方都会做这样的声明。 What each player has to do is to guess what the other's real demand is, what the fraction of the dollar is without which he will refuse to agree. That cannot be communicated, simply because it pays each player to lie about it. The situation is therefore similar to that in the previous game; the players must coordinate their demands (so that they add up to a dollar) without communication. It seems likely that they will do so by agreeing to split the dollar fifty-fifty. 每个参与者必须要做的,是猜测对方的真实需求,即,少于几毛钱对方一定会拒绝同意。而这不可能付诸沟通,因为每人说谎对自己都有利。所以这个场景和上一个游戏类似;参与者必须在无法沟通的前提下协同他们的需求(使得总和是一块钱)。他们有可能会同意五五分成。 The same points made about the previous game apply here, although less obviously. The players are looking for a unique solution; if I decide that the natural split is one third-two thirds and you agree, both of us reasoning from a mystic belief in the significance of the number three, there is still the risk that each will decide he is entitled to the two-thirds. 关于头一个游戏的论点在此同样有效,尽管不如之前的明显。参与者们也在寻找一个独一无二的答案;如果我断定1/3和2/3是自然的分割,基于我们对于数字三的某种共同的神秘信仰,你也表示同意,但我们依旧有无法达成一致的风险,因为可能每个人都觉得自己应得2/3。 To see that the solution depends on the particular categories used by the players, imagine that both have been brought up to believe that utility, not money, is the relevant payoff, and suppose further that both believe the marginal utility of a dollar to be inversely proportional to the recipient's income. In that case, the solution to the game is not a fifty-fifty split of money but a fifty-fifty split of utility—implying a division of the dollar into shares proportional to the two players' incomes. 为了看清答案依赖于参与者们特有的分类方式,请想象两人的成长环境都让他们认为效用而非金钱才是被看重的回报;同时假设两人都认为一块钱的边际效用和受惠者的收入成反比。在这种情况下,博弈解不再是金钱的对半分成,而是效用的对半分成——意即一块钱被分成和两个参与者收入成比例的两部分。 Such an outcome, chosen because of its uniqueness, is called a Schelling point, after Thomas Schelling who originated the idea. It provides a possible solution to the problem of coordination without communication. As this example shows, it is relevant both to situations where communication is physically impossible and to situations where communication is impossible because there is no way that either party can provide the other with a reason to believe that what he says is true. 这种因其唯一性而被选中的结果,叫做谢林点,得名于提出这一观点的托马斯·谢林(Thomas Schelling)。这给无沟通协调问题提供了一个可能的解答。正如这个例子所表明的,即便交流在物理上不可能发生,或是交流可以发生但是双方都拿不出理由让对方相信自己所说为真时,协调同样能起作用。 Even if it is impossible for the players in such a game to communicate their real demands, it may still be possible for them to affect the outcome by what they say. They could do so, not by directly communicating their own strategies (any such statement will be disbelieved), but by altering the other player's categories, the ways in which he organizes the alternatives of the game, and so changing the Schelling points which depend on those categories. 即使在这个博弈中参与者无法交流他们的真实需求,他们仍然可能通过言语影响结果。做到这一点,需直接交流自己的他们不策略(这样的话说了也没人相信),而会去试图改变对方的分类方式,即对方为博弈构造不同备选项的方式,从而改变依赖于这些分类的谢林点。 In the example just discussed, for example, one player (presumably the richer) might remind the other of their shared belief in the importance of utility in order to make sure the equi-utility Schelling point would be chosen. If, in the first game I described, the players were allowed to talk before seeing the numbers, a conversation on the interesting properties of primes or the special uniqueness of the lowest of a series of numbers might well alter the Schelling point, and so the result of the game. One can interpret a good deal of bargaining behaviour in this light—as an attempt by one party to make the other see the situation in a particular way, so as to generate a Schelling point favorable to the first party. 在上述例子中,一个参与者(比如说更有钱的那个)可能提醒对方,两人都相信效用的重要性,试图保证同效用(equi-utility)谢林点被选中。假如在第一个博弈中,参与者在看到数字之前可以交谈,那么关于质数的有趣特征或是关于数列中最小值的特别之处的谈话,很可能会改变谢林点,进而改变博弈结果。人们可以如此解释很大一部分议价行为——它就是一方尝试让另一方用某种特定眼光看待当前场景,以便产生一个对自己有利的谢林点。 A slightly different way in which one may conceptualize the process of agreement on a Schelling point is in terms of bargaining costs in a context of continuous bargaining. Consider a situation in which the number of possible outcomes is very large. Suppose the process of bargaining is itself costly, either because it consumes time or because each player bears costs (such as staying out on strike) in trying to validate his threats. As long as the players are faced with a choice among a large number of comparable alternatives, each proposal by one player is likely to call forth a competing proposal from another, slanted a little more in his own interest. 概念化地理解协议达致谢林点的过程,还有个稍微不同的方式:那就是考虑持续议价情境中的议价成本。设想一个情境之中,可能的结果选项非常多。假设议价过程本身是有成本的,这或者是因为花费时间,或者是因为参与者证实自己的威胁需要成本(比如罢工)。只要参与者需要从很多备选项中做出选择,那么一个参与者提出的每个建议都很可能促使对方提出一个竞争性的选项,使之稍微向己方利益倾斜。 But suppose there is one outcome that is seen as unique. A player who proposes that outcome may be perceived as offering, not a choice between that outcome, another slightly different, another different still, . . . but a choice between that outcome and continued bargaining. 但假设有一个结果被认为是特殊的。那么一方提议这个结果,就可能被视为提出了一个“要么就这个结果”要么就“继续议价”的选择,而非那种你提一个我再提一个稍微不同的,你再提个又有所不同的……的情况。 A player who says that he insists on the unique outcome and will not settle for anything less may be believable, where a similar statement about a different outcome would not be. He can convincingly argue that he will stand by his proposed outcome because, once he gives it up, he has no idea where he will end up or how high the costs of getting there will be. 一个说自己坚持要该独特结果而不会屈就的参与者,可能是可信的;而换个结果,同样的声明则不可信。此人可以论证说,他会坚持自己提议的结果,因为一旦放弃,他就完全不知道自己的结局会怎样,也不知道到达该结局之前的议价成本会有多高。这种论证能够让人信服。, In order for a Schelling point to provide a peaceful resolution to a conflict of interest, both parties must conceptualize the alternatives in similar ways—similar enough so that they can agree about which possible outcomes are unique, and thus attractive as potential Schelling points. 为让谢林点能够于利益冲突之中提供和平解决方案,双方必须能用类似的方式去考虑备选项——类似到双方能够同意什么结果是独特的,因而有足够吸引力而可能成为谢林点。 So one interesting implication of the argument is that violent conflict is especially likely to occur on the boundary between cultures, where people with very different ways of viewing the world interact. 所以这一论证的一个有趣结论是:暴力冲突尤其可能在不同文化的边界发生,在那里,遭遇双方具有截然不同的世界观。 I. B. Up From Hobbes 第一部分之二,跳出霍布斯状态 Two people are living in a Hobbesian state of nature. Each can injure or steal from the other, at some cost, and each can spend resources on his own defense. Since conflict consumes resources, both could benefit by agreeing on what each owns and thereafter each respecting the other's property. 两人生活在霍布斯自然状态中。每人都可以以一定成本伤害或者窃取对方,也可以花费资源来增强个人防卫。因为冲突消耗资源,所以通过协议确定谁拥有什么,继而尊重对方的财产权,二者均可获益。 The joint benefit might be divided in different ways, according to the particular set of property rights they agree on—what property belongs to whom, and whether either has a property right in tribute from the other. This is a special case of the game—bilateral monopoly—described above. 根据他们约定的不同财产权组合,这一共同利益也有不同的分割方法——谁拥有哪些财产,一方是否拥有从对方那里索取贡奉的财产权。这是上述“双边垄断”博弈的一种特殊形式。 Each player, of course, will threaten to refuse to make any such agreement unless he gets the division he wants. Each will disbelieve most of the other's threats. If their ability to coerce and defend is roughly equal, and if there is some natural division of contested property (such as a stream running between their farms), it is likely that they will find a Schelling point in the form of an agreement to accept that division, respect each other's rights, and pay no tribute. 每个参与者当然会威胁拒绝任何此类协定——除非他得到自己想要的分额。每个人都会拒绝相信对方的大部分威胁。如果他们的胁迫和自卫能力大抵相当,而且争议财产有某种自然分割(比如他们各自农地之间有一条溪流),那么他们就有可能找到一个谢林点:其表现就是他们订立一个协定,接受这种分割,尊重彼此的权利并且贡奉无须纳贡。 If one (being, perhaps, slightly more powerful) tries to insist on a small tribute, arguing that it will still leave the other better off than continued conflict, the other may believably refuse, arguing that once he concedes any tribute there is no natural limit to what the other can demand. 如果一人(也许是稍微强壮的那个)试图要求一小部分贡奉,争辩说,即便如此对方的状况也会比继续冲突要好;那么对方能够可信地拒绝,其理由可以是,一旦他同意交纳任何贡奉,对方索求就没有一个自然上限。 Agreeing to tribute costs the victim not only the tribute but the only available Schelling point. The expected cost to him of such an agreement includes both the possible cost of paying higher tribute in the future and the risk of future conflicts if in the future he rejects demands for higher tribute. That cost may be high enough to make his insistence that he will choose continued conflict over the payment of even a small tribute believable. 对于受害者来说,同意纳贡不仅花费贡奉本身,还令其失去了仅有的谢林点。对他来说,这个协定的预期成本不仅包括未来可能支付的更多贡奉,还包括一旦未来拒绝更多贡奉所带来的冲突风险。这种成本可能足够高,足以使得他的这种宁愿选择延续冲突也不会支付哪怕是少许贡奉的坚持是可信的。 So far we have considered the Schelling point that generates an agreement. But the agreement itself, whether generated by a Schelling point or in some other way, is thereafter itself a Schelling point. It is a unique outcome of which both players are conscious. Once it has been made, a policy of "if you do not abide by the agreement I will revert to the use of force, even if the violation is small compared to the cost of conflict" is believable for precisely the same reason the refusal to pay tribute, or any insistence by a bargainer on a Schelling point, is believable. The signing of a contract establishes a new Schelling point and thereby alters the strategic situation. The contract enforces itself. 到此为止,我们考虑的是促成协定的谢林点。然而这一协定,无论是源于谢林点或别的什么,在此之后本身也成了谢林点。这是一个双方都知道的独特结果。一旦它得以确立,一种“你不遵守协定我就回归使用武力,哪怕毁约所害比冲突的代价要小”的策略就是可信的,正如拒绝纳贡,或任何对于谢林点的坚持是可信的一样。签订契约建立了新的谢林点,进而改变了策略场景。这种契约能够自我强制执行。 This applies not only to the initial pairwise social contract but to subsequent contracts as well. Suppose you have an orchard and I have an axe. After agreeing on our mutual property rights, you offer me a bushel of apples to cut down a tree that is shading your orchard. I cut down the tree as agreed, but you refuse to give me the apples. What happens? 以上论述不仅适用于初始的双边社会契约,也适用于后继的契约。假设你有一个果园而我有一把斧头。在我们确定了各自的财产权之后,你答应给我一蒲式耳苹果,换取我砍倒一棵遮挡你果园阳光的树。我依照协议砍倒了树,你却拒绝给我苹果。接下来怎么办呢? So far as our physical situation is concerned, I am in no more able to compel you to pay me a bushel of apples now than I was before you made the offer and I cut down the tree—our material resources, our ability to hurt each other and defend ourselves, are the same as they were. 就我们的物质状况来说,和你提出该建议然后我把树砍倒之前相比,现在我强迫你给我一蒲式耳苹果的能力并没有增加——我们的物质资源,我们伤害对方和保护自己的能力,都和之前一样。 Yet my threat to cut down your orchard unless you pay up is more credible than it would have been before, both because I have more reason to carry through on it and because you have less reason to resist it. Before, the attempt to get a bushel of apples from you would have been an attempt to move you away from the Schelling point established by the initial contract. Now it is an attempt to restore the Schelling point established by our subsequent agreement. 但是假设你不如约支付的话我就要砍倒你的果树,这个威胁会比之前更加可信;因为不仅我更有理由执行它,而且你也更少理由抗拒它。在(订立上述契约)之前,从你手中拿走一蒲式耳苹果,是一个试图使你偏离由该初始契约所确立的谢林点的行为。而现在,我(砍倒你果树)的行为,则是一个试图恢复由该契约所确立的谢林点的行为。 A more conventional explanation of this is that the reason it is in your interest to deliver the apples once you have agreed to do so is that you wish to establish a reputation for keeping promises, and that the reason it is in my interest to punish you if you do not deliver the apples is because I wish to establish a reputation for enforcing contracts made with me. While this may be true, there are two reasons why it cannot be a complete explanation. 对于这种情况的一个更通常的解释是:你依约交出苹果之所以符合你的利益,乃是因为你想建立一个守信的名声;而如果你不交出苹果我就要惩罚你,这之所以符合我的利益,乃是因为我想建立一个与我签订的契约会得到强制执行的名声。这也许是真的,但是有两个理由告诉我们,这不是一个完备的解释。 First, it depends on a particular perception of consistent behavior—in pure logic, there is no more reason to think of "always enforce" as more consistent then "back down the first, third, fifth, ... time and fight the second, fourth, ...." Both describe single possible strategies. The important difference between them is that the former is a Schelling point and the latter is not— a fact not about the strategies but about the way we classify them. 首先,这取决于对行为一致性的某种特殊理解——纯逻辑来说,“永远强制执行”并不比“第一三五次退缩、第二四六次对抗”更一致。二者都是单一可能性策略。两者之间的重要区别是,前者是谢林点而后者不是——一个无关于策略本身,而是关乎于我们如何对策略进行分类的事实。 A second and related problem with the conventional account is that I might equally well wish to establish a reputation for following through on extortionary demands. We need some way of explaining why I cut down the shade tree first, instead of simply committing myself to demand your apples. If the former pattern creates a Schelling point of contract fulfillment and the latter does not, that provides a possible explanation. 传统解释的第二个问题(与第一个不无关系)是,我有同等的可能性,想要建立一种坚持实现勒索性要求的名声。我们需要某种方法来解释,为什么我会把遮阳的树砍倒,而不是直接强行索取你的苹果。如果前一个行为模式建立了一个履行协约的谢林点,而后者不能,那这就是一个可能的解释。 I believe I have now resolved the apparent paradox of contracting out of the Hobbesian jungle. The process of contracting changes the situation because it establishes new Schelling points, which in turn affect the strategic situation and its outcome. The same analysis can be used from the other side to explain what constitutes civil society. The laws and customs of civil society are an elaborate network of Schelling points. 我相信我现在已经解决了通过建立契约脱离霍布斯丛林的表面悖论。建立契约的过程能够改变情境,正因为它建立了新的谢林点;后者继而影响了策略场景及其结果。另一方面,同样的分析也可以用来解释文明社会如何构成。文明社会的法律和习俗组成了一个复杂精密的谢林点网络。 If my neighbor annoys me by growing ugly flowers, I do nothing. If he dumps his garbage on my lawn, I retaliate—possibly in kind. If he threatens to dump garbage on my lawn, or play a trumpet fanfare at 3 A.M. every morning, unless I pay him a modest tribute I refuse—even if I am convinced that the available legal defenses cost more than the tribute he is demanding. 如果我的邻居种了难看的花来烦我,我啥也不做。如果他把垃圾倒在我的草坪上,我就会反击——很可能把垃圾倒回去。如果他威胁要把垃圾倒在我的草坪上,或者要在每天凌晨三点大声吹号,除非我给他一点贡奉,那么我就会拒绝——即使我确信所需的法律诉讼成本要比他要的那点贡奉还多。 If a policeman arrests me—even for a crime I did not commit—I go along peacefully. If he tries to rob my house, I fight, even if the cost of doing so is more than the direct cost of letting him rob me. 如果警察要逮捕我——即使我没犯所控罪名——我也会平静配合。如果他企图抢劫我的家,我就反抗——即使这样做的成本比让他抢我的直接成本还高。 Each of us knows what behavior by everyone else is within the rules and what behaviour implies unlimited demands, the violation of the Schelling point, and the ultimate return to the Hobbesian jungle. The latter behaviour is prevented by the threat of conflict even if (as in the British defense of the Falklands) the direct costs of surrender are much lower than the direct costs of conflict. 我们每人都知道,别人什么行为是符合规则的,什么行为隐含着无限制的索求,而什么行为是对谢林点的违反,什么则是对霍布斯丛林的终极回归。最后一种情况之所以得以防止,是因为存在战斗威慑,即便投降的直接成本比战斗的直接成本低很多(比如英国保卫福克兰群岛)。 One question this raises is how we succeed in committing ourselves not to back down in such situations. One answer has been suggested already. It is in my long run interest not to back down because if I do I can expect further demands: "if once you have paid him the danegeld/You never get rid of the Dane." 由此引发的一个问题是,我们如何保证自己在这种场景中不会退缩。一个答案上文已经提及了。不退缩符合我的长期利益,因为一旦退缩我就可能面临更多索求——“一旦你交了丹麦金,就永远摆脱不了丹麦人。”【译注:丹麦金是9世纪到11世纪之间西欧受丹麦入侵者频繁劫掠的地区(特别是英格兰东南和布列塔尼),当地政府向居民征收用以向入侵者支付贡奉以免遭劫掠的一种特别税。】 This explanation is not entirely adequate. In some situations, the aggressor may be able to commit himself to keep your surrender secret and limit his own demands. In others, the short run costs of resistance may be larger than the long run costs of surrender. 这并不足以解释所有的情况。在某些场景中,侵略者可能会承诺保守你投降的秘密,并限制他自身的索求。另一些场景中,抵抗带来的短期成本也许高于投降并纳贡所带来的长期成本。 People (and nations) do sometimes surrender to such demands. If they do so less often then a simple calculation of costs and benefits might predict, the explanation may be found in a class of arguments made by Robert Frank and others. 人们(和国家)有时候会向这种索求投降。如果他们这样做的频率低于简单的收益成本分析所得出的结果,那么或许可以从Robert Frank等人提出的一类论证中找到解释。 The central insight of such arguments is that even if surrender is sometimes in my private interest, being the sort of person who will surrender when it is in his interest to do so may not be, since if it is known that I will not back down there is no point in making the initial demand. My first best option is to pretend to be tough, in the hope that the demand will not be made, while reserving the option of surrendering if my bluff is called. 此类论证的核心思想是,即便投降有时符合我的个人利益,做一个“符合个人利益时就投降”的人并不符合我的利益;因为如果人尽皆知我不会退缩,那么一开始就没理由提出索求。我的最优选择是装作强硬,期望不会有人提出索求,同时保留虚张声势被戳穿后投降的选择。 If, however, humans are imperfectly able to lie to each other about what sort of people they are—as seems to be the case—then the best available option may be to really be tough, despite the risk that I will occasionally find myself forced to fight when I would be better off surrendering. 但是如果人类对于自己是什么样的人并没有完美的撒谎能力——事实好像正是如此——那么最优选择也许是真正强硬,尽管这样做的话,就得冒这样的风险:有时投降更有利,但我却不得不战斗。 None of this argument depends on moral sanctions. I may (indeed do) believe that the tax collector is morally equivalent to the thief. I accept one and fight the other because of my beliefs about other people's behaviour—what they will or will not fight for—and because there are beliefs about my behaviour which I wish others to hold. We are bound together by a set of mutually reinforcing strategic expectations. 这些论证都不依赖于道德约束。我可能(其实就是)认为税官和窃贼在道德上没有区别。我接受其中一个而反抗另一个,是基于我对他人行为的信念——他们会(或不会)为何物而抗争——也基于我希望别人对我的行为能持有某种信念。我们被一套相互强化的策略期望束缚在一起。 Part II: Two Routes from Hobbes to Here 第二部分:从霍布斯到当今秩序的两种途径 My argument so far has dealt with two ends of an extended process. I started with an explanation of how it was possible, in a two person world, to take the first steps towards bargaining out of a Hobbesian state of nature. I ended with an explanation of how the same logic maintains civil order as we know it. Missing is any explanation of the intermediate steps by which the complicated and functional order in which we live might have been constructed. 到现在为止,我的论述集中在这个漫长过程的两端。一开始我解释了,在一个两人世界中,跨出通过议价而脱离霍布斯自然状态的第一步,何以是可能的。在结尾我解释了,同样的逻辑如何维持我们所了解的文明秩序。其中缺少的是,我们生活于其中的复杂功能秩序,是如何构建出来的,即对中间步骤的解释。 One possibility is legislation. If an important part of the way in which individuals classify actions is "legal/illegal," then the fact of legal change, whether by a king, legislature, or court system, changes the way in which they classify the alternatives, which in turn changes the set of Schelling points. 一种可能解释是立法。如果个人对行为的一个重要分类是“合法/非法”,那么无论是国王、立法者还是法院系统带来的法律变化,都会改变人们对备选项进行分类的方式,继而改变谢林点集合。 If the court has recognized property rights in water but not in air, I classify pollution of my section of the river as aggression and fight it, by legal, social, or even illegal means. I classify pollution of my air by my neighbor's soap factory as an inconvenient nuisance and either put up with it or try to buy him off. Under these circumstances legislation is, to a considerable degree, self-enforcing; the pattern of property rights might well survive even if the enforcement arm of the state vanished or became impotent. 如果法院认可对于水的财产权,而不认可对于空气的财产权,那么我就把针对我的河流段的污染看作是入侵,进而通过法律的、社会的、甚至非法手段进行抗争。而我把周边空气受到邻居肥皂厂的污染当作一个不便的日常琐事,或者忍了或者给钱让他不要再排污了。在这些情况下,立法在某种程度上是自我执行的;即使政府的强制执行机器消失或者变得无能了,这种财产权模式也很可能延续下去。 While this may be part of the explanation for civil order, it cannot be all of it, for at least three reasons. First, some rights have no legal rules associated with them. Second, many, perhaps most, people are selective about which legal rules they take seriously—as can easily be observed on any U.S. highway. And finally, there are well documented situations in which property rights exist and are respected even though they are inconsistent with the relevant legal rights. 尽管这也许能部分解释文明秩序,至少有三种原因使它不可能是全部的解释。第一,有些权利没有相关的法律规定。第二,很多人,或许是大部分人,只选择性的严肃对待一部分法规——在任何美国高速上都很容易看到。最后,即便和有关法规相悖,财产权仍然存在并受人们尊重,这种情形记录详多。 This final point brings up a second possible explanation of how the pattern of expectations might have come into existence—that it is due not to the creation of laws but to the evolution of norms. Robert Ellickson, in a recent book, describes how relations among neighbors function in Shasta County California. 最后一点提示了对于可能的模式如何成为现实的第二种可能解释——它的产生不基于法律的创制,而是基于规范的演化。Robert Ellickson在他最近的书中描述了在加州夏斯塔郡邻里关系是如何运作的。【编注:书名为Order Without Law,中译本《无需法律的秩序》。】 One of his most striking observations was that in several cases, including conflicts over trespass by animals and the allocation of the cost of building fences between neighbors, the inhabitants ignore the relevant laws and act instead according to well understood non-legal norms. 他最令人惊讶的发现之一是,在一些情况下,包括动物擅闯和邻里分担建造篱笆成本这样的纠纷中,居民忽略了相关法律,而依照众所周知的非法律规范(non-legal norm)行事。 Ellickson offers no adequate account of how such norms develop or of why they provide, in some contexts but not in all, at least approximately efficient rules. A possible answer to that puzzle brings us back to the two person social contract discussed in the previous section. 至于这些规范如何发展出来,或者它们为何能够在某些而不是全部情境中提供至少近乎高效的规则,Ellickson没有提供足够的解释。对这个谜团的可能回答,将带我们回到上一部分讨论过的二人社会契约。 One might try to explain functional norms by evolution. Perhaps, over time, societies with better norms conquer, absorb, or are imitated by societies with worse norms, producing a world of well designed societies. The problem with that explanation is that such a process should take centuries, if not millennia—which does not fit the facts as Ellickson reports them. Whaling norms in the 19th century, for example, seem to have adjusted rapidly to changes in the species being hunted. 演化也许可以用来解释功能性规范。也许随着时间流逝,有更好规范的社群征服、吸收了有不好规范的社群,或被后者所模仿——这造就了一个充满设计良好的社群的世界。这种解释的问题是,此过程应该需要几个世纪,如果不是几千年的话——但这和Ellickson所报告的事实不符。举例来说,19世纪的捕鲸规范似乎随着被猎物种的变化而迅速调整了。 Perhaps what is happening is evolution, but evolution involving groups much smaller and more fluid than entire societies. Consider a norm, such as honesty, that can profitably be followed by small groups within a society, applicable only within the group. Groups with efficient norms will prosper and grow by recruitment. Others will imitate them. Groups with similar norms will tend to fuse, in order to obtain the same benefits on a larger scale. 也许其中发生的确是一种演化,不过演化所涉及的是比整个社群更小更有流动性的团体。请设想一种可以被社群中的小团体遵守且受益的规范,设想它仅仅适用于此种小团体内部。有高效规范的团体能够繁荣并且通过吸收新成员而扩张。其他团体会模仿此类团体。有类似规范的团体为了在更大规模上取得此种收益,会倾向于融合。 If one system of norms works better than its competitors, it will eventually spread through the entire society. When circumstances change and new problems arise the process can repeat itself on a smaller scale, generating modified norms to deal with the new problems. In effect, what we have is the pairwise contracting out of the Hobbesian state of nature, repeated many times between pairs and within small groups. 如果一套规范比另一套好,它最终会变遍布整个社群。如果情况变化,出现了新问题,整个过程可以在较小的规模上重复,产生出改良的规范来应对新问题。结果我们将看到,两两订立契约而脱离霍布斯自然状态这一过程,将在两两之间、和在小团体内反复发生。 This conjecture about how norms arise and change suggests a prediction: Even if a norm is efficient, it will not arise if its benefits depend on its being generally adopted. Suppose we define a norm as locally efficient if, with regard to any two individuals following the norm, there is no different norm such that at least one would be better off and the other no worse off if they both switched to it. A norm is globally efficient if there is no different norm such that at least one person would be better off and nobody worse off if everyone switched to it. 这个关于规范如何出现和如何变化的猜想暗含一个预测:即使一个规范是高效的,假如它的好处依赖于对它的普遍遵循,它也无法出现。让我们定义:对任意两个遵循某规范的个体来说,如果没有别的规范能够使两人在转而遵循它之后,其中至少一人情况变得更好,而另一人情况不会变差,那么此规范就是局部高效的(locally efficient)。如果没有别的规范能够使得所有人在转而遵循它之后,其中至少一人情况变得更好,而所有人都不会变差,那么这个规范是全局高效的(globally efficient)。 Consider the whaling norms that Ellickson discusses. It is in the interest of any pair of captains to agree in advance to an efficient rule for dealing with whales that one ship harpoons and another one brings in, just as it is in the interest of a pair of individuals to agree to be honest with each other. 设想Ellickson提到的捕鲸规范。任何两个船长,若能先行达成一条有效规则,解决一船射中而另外一船捕获的鲸鱼处理问题,那对双方都是有好处的;就像答应相互诚实对两人都有好处一样。 But a rule for holding down the total number of whales killed so as to preserve the population of whales is useful only if almost everyone follows it. The former type of norm existed, the latter did not—with the result that 19th century whalers did an efficient job of hunting one species after another to near extinction. 但是降低捕杀鲸的总数,从而保存鲸种群这种规则,只有所有人都遵守时才会有用。前面这种规范存在过,后者就没有——结果是19世纪捕鲸人高效的把一个又一个鲸种驱向灭绝。 So the evolution of norms provides a second possible account of how we get from Hobbes to here. Where the recognition of rights between two people, such as neighbors, or within a small group, provides mutual benefits, it is in the interest of the parties concerned to recognize such rights. 所以,规范的演化为我们如何能从霍布斯抵达当今秩序这一问题提出了另一种可能解释。当两人,比如邻居之间,或者小团体内部,同时承认彼此权利能带来共同好处时,对于相关各方来说,承认权利均符合其利益。 By doing so they change the pattern of Schelling points that determines the equilibrium of their interaction, in a way which provides (some) protection for the rights in question. Over a long period of time, the result is to create a set of consistent mutual expectations, and one that tends to be locally, although not necessarily globally, efficient. 他们这样做的时候就改变了谢林点的格局——后者决定着他们之间的互动均衡——,使之朝着为相关权利提供(某些)保护的方向变化。长此以往,结果是创造出一套一致的共同预期,而它即便不是全局高效,也往往是局部高效的。 III: Law, Justice, and Efficiency 第三部分:法律,正义和效率 In thinking about issues of rights, I find myself playing two quite different roles. As a human being and (like all human beings) an amateur philosopher, I have moral intuitions; from that standpoint, the question is "why ought one not to steal" and the answer is "because it is wicked." 在思考权利问题的时候,我发现自己经常扮演两种迥异角色。作为人类一员和业余哲学家(就像所有人一样),我有道德直觉;从这个角度出发,问题是“为什么人不应该盗窃”,而答案是“因为这是邪恶的”。 As an economist I ask and answer different questions. One is "what are the consequences of people being free to steal." Much of the economic analysis of law is devoted to answering questions of that sort. Another is "why do people (often) not steal?" 而作为经济学家,我提出和回答的是不同的问题。其中一个就是“如果允许自由偷窃,结果会怎样”。大部分关于法律的经济分析都致力于回答此类问题。另一个问题则是“为什么人们(一般)不偷窃?” This essay is an attempt to answer that final sort of question. I have tried to answer the economist's question about rights rather than the philosopher's not because economics is more important than moral philosophy but because I am more confident in my ability to use economics to produce answers. I have been encouraged in this policy by a curious and convenient coincidence: in most cases, the rules I conclude to be efficient are also the rules I believe to be just. 这篇文章试图回答最后这种问题。我尝试回答关于权利的经济问题而不是哲学问题,不是因为经济学比道德哲学更重要,而是因为我对自己运用经济学回答问题的能力更有信心。鼓励我采用这一策略的是一种奇特而便利的巧合:在大多数场合中,我推演得出的高效规则,同样也被我认为是正义的。 It is not a double but a triple coincidence. The rules I believe to be efficient and just are also, to a significant degree, the rules enforced by the laws and norms of the society I live in. In this essay I have sketched some ideas about the nature of those rules and how they have evolved. This raises the question of why, if my account is correct, the rules produced in this way resemble those that I deduce to be efficient and intuit to be just. 这不是一个双重巧合,而是一个三重巧合。我认为是高效而且正义的规则,在很大程度上也是我所生活的那个社会的法律和规范所施行的规则。在这篇文章中我简单描述了这些规则的性质和它们是如何演化的。于是问题来了:如果我的解释是正确的,那么为什么这样产生的规则,和我推导为高效的规则,以及我在直觉上认为是正义的规则,是如此的相似呢? In trying to answer that question, I find it useful to start by considering a class of property which underlies all other property and exists even in a Hobbesian state of nature. 试图回答这个问题的时候,我发现最好先从考虑作为所有其他财产基础的一类财产开始,这类财产甚至存在于霍布斯自然状态之中。 I can control the motions of my body by a simple act of will. You can control its motions by imposing overwhelming force, by making believable threats to which I will yield, or in various other ways. Controlling it may be possible for both of us, but it is much cheaper and easier for me. In this sense, we may describe my body as my natural property. 我凭借简单的意愿活动就可以控制我身体的动作。你想控制我身体的动作,必须通过做出可信的能屈服我的威胁,或者别的方法来施之强力。控制我的身体这件事,你我都可能做到,但是对我来说简单且便宜得多。在此意义上,我们可以把我的身体称作我的自然财产。 The same description applies to my gun—because I know where I hid it and you do not. Even land may be natural property to some extent if my detailed knowledge of the terrain makes it easier for me to use or defend it. Such property is natural inasmuch as my possession of it exists in the state of nature and is independent of social convention. The fact that I can control certain things more cheaply than you can is technology, not law or morals. 同样的描述也适用于我的枪——因为我知道我把它藏在哪里而你不知道。如果我对地形的详细了解使我更方便使用或者防卫一片土地,那么甚至土地在一定程度上也是自然财产。这样的财产之所以是自然的,是因为我对它的掌控发生于自然状态之中,并且独立于社会习俗。我能对特定的事物实施更低成本的控制这一事实,是种技术,而非法律或道德。 Natural property is a useful starting point for explaining the similarities among what is, what should be, and what would be efficient because it is relevant to all three. 解释“实然”、“应然”和“效率”这三者之间的相似之处,自然财产是一个有用的起点,因为它和三者都有关。 If the account I have offered is correct, our actual civil order is the result of extended bargaining, based ultimately on natural property. It was my control over my body that made the initial steps out of the state of nature possible. So natural property is relevant to what is—to the existing pattern of laws and norms. 如果我提出的解释是正确的,那么现实的政治秩序就是最终基于自然财产的长期议价的结果。正是我对于我身体的控制,使得脱离自然状态的最初几步变为可能。所以自然财产和“实然”这问题相关——即和现存的法律和社会规范模式相关。 In a world of no transaction costs, any initial allocation of property rights is efficient. In a world with positive transaction costs, the basis for choosing among alternative allocations is the cost of enforcing and changing them. A set of rules in which I own my body and you own yours is superior to one in which each owns the other's body, or each has a half interest in each body, in part because it is so much easier to enforce. So we have a Coasian argument for the relevance of natural property to what is efficient. 在没有交易成本的世界,财产权的任何初始分配都是高效的。在交易成本为正的世界,选择不同分配形式的基础就是执行和改变它们的成本高低。我拥有我的身体而你拥有你身体这样一套规则,就比相互拥有对方身体的另一套规则优越,也比两人分别拥有两个身体的一半的规则优越。这在某种程度上是因为前者更好执行的多。所以,关于自然财产与效率问题的相关性,现在我们有了一个科斯式(Coasian)论证。 This argument also provides a second connection between natural property and what is. My earlier arguments suggest that the evolution of rules tends to move in a direction that is at least locally efficient. If so, and if rules that allocate natural property to its natural owner are efficient, we would expect to observe such rules. Put differently, the argument for local efficiency of evolved norms provides a reason for some similarity between the rules we observe and the rules that are efficient. 此论证也提供了关于自然财产和“实然”问题的第二个联系。我早先的论证表明,规则演化趋向于至少是局部高效的方向。如果情况是这样的,并且如果依照自然所有者分配自然财产的规则是高效的,那么我们就可以期望会观察到这样的规则。换种方法说,对于社会规范在演进过程中的局部高效性的论证,为现实中所见规则和高效规则之间的相似性,提供了一种说明。 What, if anything, does natural property have to do with what ought to be? That depends on what normative account one accepts. For those of us who accept a libertarian account, in which the underlying right is my right to own myself and whatever I have obtained by voluntary agreement with others who own it, the connection is immediate. 自然财产和“应然”问题又有什么关系呢?这就取决于我们接受哪一类规范性论述了。对于我们这些接受自由意志主义论述的人,根本性的权利就是,拥有自身的权利,和对经由自愿协定从其他拥有者处获取的任何事物的权利;对于我们来说这联系是直接的。 Self ownership is both a moral axiom and a technological fact. Voluntary exchange is both a morally legitimate way of altering the pattern of ownership and, if my account of bargaining from the state of nature is correct, a technologically possible way (although not necessarily the only such) of altering a Schelling point and thus an equilibrium. 自我所有权既是一个道德公理,又是一个技术事实。自愿交换既是道德上合法地改变所有权模式的方法,又是一种技术上可行(尽管不一定是唯一)的改变谢林点继而改变均衡的方法——如果我关于自然状态下议价的解释是正确的话。 We now have the beginning of an explanation of the similarity among actual rules, efficient rules, and just rules. The status of this explanation, and of the fact being explained, is not, however, the same for the relation between the first two as it is for the relation of either to the third. 我们现在有了一个关于现实规则、高效规则和正义规则之间相似性的初步解释。然而,对于前两者之间的关系,以及前两者中任一个之于第三者的关系来说,这一解释本身的地位,不同于被解释的事实的地位。 What rules exist can be observed and what rules are efficient can be deduced, at least in principle, from observed technologies and economic theory. Thus the claim that there is some correspondence between what exists and what is efficient is a positive rather than a normative claim. 什么规则实际存在,这能被观察到,而什么规则是高效的,则能(至少在原则上)从所观察到的技术和经济理论中推导得出。所以“实然”和“高效”两者有某种关系,这一断言是实证的而不是规范的。 What ought to be, on the other hand, is, at least in this essay, simply a description of my moral intuitions. If I conclude that the rules that would be just are similar to both the rules that exist and the rules that would be efficient, that may simply be evidence that my moral judgments are ex post rationalizations of the world I live in or the conclusions of my economic analysis. 另一方面,“应然”(至少在此文中)仅仅是对于我道德直觉的描述。如果我得出,正义规则和现实规则及高效规则这三者是相似的,这也许只说明我的道德判断不过是我对所生活世界的事后(ex post)合理化,或者只是我的经济分析的结论。 One further similarity between the ethics and the social order that I have been discussing is worth mentioning. Both are essentially decentralized. The ethical position makes no attempt to evaluate individuals from above—in terms of their worth in the eyes of God. It consists rather of a description of what obligations each individual has to each other individual. The social order, to the extent that it is evolved rather than legislated, is a set of rules that exist because it was in the interest of pairs of individuals to abide by them, not because they promote the general good of society. 我正讨论的伦理和社会秩序之间的另一个相似点也值得提及。二者本质上都是去中心化的。伦理立场并不试图去从上至下考量个体——以他们在上帝眼中的价值作为考量。不如说,它是一个对于每个人对他人所负义务的描述。而社会秩序,就其是演化来的而不是通过立法实现的而言,就是一套规则,其存在是因为遵循它们对一对对个体有利,而不是因为它们会提高社会总体福利。 IV: Conclusions 第四部分:结论 The central project of this essay has been to give an account of rights, especially property rights, that is both amoral and alegal—an account that would explain the sort of behavior we associate with rights even in a world lacking law, law enforcement, and feelings of moral obligation. 此文的中心目标,是提供一种关于权利,特别是关于财产权的非道德、非法律的解释——此种解释将能够说明我们那种与权利相伴随的行为,这种行为甚至存在于缺乏法律、执法机构和道德义务感的世界中。 I have tried first to explain how, with no legal system to enforce contracts, it might still be possible to contract out of a Hobbesian state of nature, and then to show how the same analysis can be used to understand in what sense a civil order, such as our own society, is different from a Hobbesian state of nature. 我首先试图解释,在没有法律系统强制执行契约的情况下,如何能够通过建立契约脱离霍布斯自然状态;其次说明了同一种分析如何能够用于理解(像我们社会这种)文明秩序和霍布斯自然状态有什么不同。 Having offered answers to those questions, I then tried to show how we might get from the state of nature to something like the present society, and to use the analysis to partially explain the puzzling similarity between actual rules, just rules, and efficient rules. 回答了这些问题之后,我接下来试图说明我们如何从自然状态到达类似现今社会的状态;继而用这种分析部分地解释了现实规则,正义规则和高效规则之间令人困惑的相似性。 If my analysis is correct, civil order is an elaborate Schelling point, maintained by the same forces that maintain simpler Schelling points in a state of nature. Property ownership is alterable by contract because Schelling points are altered by the making of contracts. Legal rules are in large part a superstructure erected upon an underlying structure of self-enforcing rights. 如果我的分析正确,文明秩序就是一个精巧的谢林点,被在自然状态中维持更为简单谢林点的同一种力量所维持。财产所有权能够通过契约改变,是因为建立契约的行为改变了谢林点。法律规则在很大程度上是一个上层结构(superstructure),建立在底层自我执行的权利结构之上。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]科学万岁!

All Hail Science!
科学万岁!

作者:Jonah Goldberg @ 2015-2-14
译者:普罗米修斯(@普箩米修思),校对:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张)
来源:National Review,http://www.nationalreview.com/article/398591/all-hail-science-jonah-goldberg

Memo to progressives: Unlike God, science doesn’t care if you believe in it.
进步主义者请记住:与上帝不同,科学并不在乎你是否信仰它。

Dear Reader (Unless you’re at the screening of Al-Qaeda Sniper),

亲爱的读者(除非你恰好在看《基地组织的狙击手》(Al-Qaeda Sniper)这部电影),
译注:实际上不存在这部电影,那是一个叫“非裔美国人保守派”的博客虚构的,其副标题是“一个变性圣战者为使用‘无性别卫生间’的权利而抗争的故事”,显然是用来嘲讽目前在美国风起云涌的左翼平权运动的。

All of us are equal in the eyes of God and the law — or at least that’s how it’s supposed to work. (Though the fact that Jon Corzine has neither been hit by lightning nor carted off to jail sometimes causes me moments of doubt on both fronts.)

无论在法律还是上帝面前,我们都是平等的——至少本该是这样。(尽管Jon Corzine既没遭雷劈也没被扔进监狱这一事实,让我时常对此感到疑惑)。

I try pay lip-service to the same principle about readers of this “news”letter, but let’s face it. That’s not true. Nearly all G-File readers are cherished, but not all are cherished equal.

我本想以此搪塞这封“新闻信”的读者:人人平等这项原则也适用于你们。不过我们还是直面现实吧,那并不是真的。我对几乎所有G-File的读者都很重视,但并非同等的重视。

(And, in a year or two when my next book comes out, the great schism in my heart will be between those of you who eagerly purchase my book, and you shameful free riders who, for years, were perfectly happy for me to throw you the gold Aztec idol week after week, but now refuse to throw me the whip as promised, saying “Adios, Señor.” This is the quid people, my next book will be the pro quo. If you assume each Goldberg File I’ve written is worth a quarter, you should probably convert it into zombie-apocalypse currency and assume it’s equal in value to a can of dog food, six dead D batteries, or a fully operational calk gun. But the price is what the market will bear, and even at that valuation, it would more than cover the price of my forthcoming magnum opus for any longtime reader. You have been put on notice.)

(并且,等一两年后我的新书出版时,我内心会在两类人之间撕扯:一类是那些迫不及待想要买书的读者,另一类则是那些可耻的搭便车者,多年来,他们满心欢喜地盼着我一周周地把阿兹特克金像(the gold Aztec idol)扔给他们,却不愿如之前说好的那样把鞭子给我扔过来,临走时只留下一句“再见,先生。”(“Adios, Señor.”西班牙语)。我的下一本书需要你用东西来交换的。如果你觉得我写的每一本G-File值得上一毛钱,或许你应该按僵尸界的汇率把它兑换成一罐狗粮、六个D号废旧电池或者一把铆钉枪。当然,书的价格应当是市场可以承受的,并且,对于我的长期读者,我即将出版的煌煌巨著应该是对得起它的标价的。我可是通知你们了哦。)【译注:这里有关阿兹特克金像和鞭子的哏出自电影《夺宝奇兵》。

I bring this up because Charles Krauthammer is a reader of this “news”letter which, like seeing a spider monkey in your brand new kitchen making crème brûlée with a blowtorch, is both cool and scary. Why it’s cool should be obvious. He’s the Hammer. It’s scary because . . . he’s the Hammer.

我提这茬,是因为得知查尔斯·克劳萨默(Charles Krauthammer)也是这封“新闻信”的读者,这就像看见一只蜘蛛猴在你的崭新厨房里用喷灯做焦糖布丁,让人不知道该觉得有趣还是害怕。说他有趣的原因很明显,他是“锤子”,说他让人害怕是因为……他可是铁锤查理啊。【译注:注意Krauthammer中的hammer,意为锤子,铁锤查理(Charles Martel)则为查理大帝的祖父,法兰克王国实际掌权者,加洛林王朝奠基者,以武功著称的军事天才。

I try very hard not to put a face to my readers because, frankly, this thing is sometimes so stupid and self-indulgent if I imagined a real person reading it, I’d push the keyboard away. It’s best if I write this thing like a message in a bottle going to no one.

我竭力在读者面前展示真实自我,因为装模作样会让我会显得任性而愚蠢,每当想到有人读到虚伪的自己,我就忍不住想要摔键盘。我最好是把这些话塞进漂流瓶,随浪漂走。最可能让我怯场的,就是想象查尔斯·克劳萨默是打开漂流瓶的那个人。

And the last thing I need for my performance anxiety is to imagine Charles Krauthammer is the guy unspooling my missive from that bottle. The only thing worse would be to imagine George Will standing behind Charles looking over his shoulder and tsk-tsking all of my split infinitives. And yet, to my dismay, Will, too, has told me he on occasio(more...)

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All Hail Science! 科学万岁! 作者:Jonah Goldberg @ 2015-2-14 译者:普罗米修斯(@普箩米修思),校对:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张) 来源:National Review,http://www.nationalreview.com/article/398591/all-hail-science-jonah-goldberg Memo to progressives: Unlike God, science doesn’t care if you believe in it. 进步主义者请记住:与上帝不同,科学并不在乎你是否信仰它。 Dear Reader (Unless you’re at the screening of Al-Qaeda Sniper), 亲爱的读者(除非你恰好在看《基地组织的狙击手》(Al-Qaeda Sniper)这部电影), 【译注:实际上不存在这部电影,那是一个叫“非裔美国人保守派”的博客虚构的,其副标题是“一个变性圣战者为使用‘无性别卫生间’的权利而抗争的故事”,显然是用来嘲讽目前在美国风起云涌的左翼平权运动的。】 All of us are equal in the eyes of God and the law — or at least that’s how it’s supposed to work. (Though the fact that Jon Corzine has neither been hit by lightning nor carted off to jail sometimes causes me moments of doubt on both fronts.) 无论在法律还是上帝面前,我们都是平等的——至少本该是这样。(尽管Jon Corzine既没遭雷劈也没被扔进监狱这一事实,让我时常对此感到疑惑)。 I try pay lip-service to the same principle about readers of this “news”letter, but let’s face it. That’s not true. Nearly all G-File readers are cherished, but not all are cherished equal. 我本想以此搪塞这封“新闻信”的读者:人人平等这项原则也适用于你们。不过我们还是直面现实吧,那并不是真的。我对几乎所有G-File的读者都很重视,但并非同等的重视。 (And, in a year or two when my next book comes out, the great schism in my heart will be between those of you who eagerly purchase my book, and you shameful free riders who, for years, were perfectly happy for me to throw you the gold Aztec idol week after week, but now refuse to throw me the whip as promised, saying “Adios, Señor.” This is the quid people, my next book will be the pro quo. If you assume each Goldberg File I’ve written is worth a quarter, you should probably convert it into zombie-apocalypse currency and assume it’s equal in value to a can of dog food, six dead D batteries, or a fully operational calk gun. But the price is what the market will bear, and even at that valuation, it would more than cover the price of my forthcoming magnum opus for any longtime reader. You have been put on notice.) (并且,等一两年后我的新书出版时,我内心会在两类人之间撕扯:一类是那些迫不及待想要买书的读者,另一类则是那些可耻的搭便车者,多年来,他们满心欢喜地盼着我一周周地把阿兹特克金像(the gold Aztec idol)扔给他们,却不愿如之前说好的那样把鞭子给我扔过来,临走时只留下一句“再见,先生。”(“Adios, Señor.”西班牙语)。我的下一本书需要你用东西来交换的。如果你觉得我写的每一本G-File值得上一毛钱,或许你应该按僵尸界的汇率把它兑换成一罐狗粮、六个D号废旧电池或者一把铆钉枪。当然,书的价格应当是市场可以承受的,并且,对于我的长期读者,我即将出版的煌煌巨著应该是对得起它的标价的。我可是通知你们了哦。)【译注:这里有关阿兹特克金像和鞭子的哏出自电影《夺宝奇兵》。】 I bring this up because Charles Krauthammer is a reader of this “news”letter which, like seeing a spider monkey in your brand new kitchen making crème brûlée with a blowtorch, is both cool and scary. Why it’s cool should be obvious. He’s the Hammer. It’s scary because . . . he’s the Hammer. 我提这茬,是因为得知查尔斯·克劳萨默(Charles Krauthammer)也是这封“新闻信”的读者,这就像看见一只蜘蛛猴在你的崭新厨房里用喷灯做焦糖布丁,让人不知道该觉得有趣还是害怕。说他有趣的原因很明显,他是“锤子”,说他让人害怕是因为......他可是铁锤查理啊。【译注:注意Krauthammer中的hammer,意为锤子,铁锤查理(Charles Martel)则为查理大帝的祖父,法兰克王国实际掌权者,加洛林王朝奠基者,以武功著称的军事天才。】 I try very hard not to put a face to my readers because, frankly, this thing is sometimes so stupid and self-indulgent if I imagined a real person reading it, I’d push the keyboard away. It’s best if I write this thing like a message in a bottle going to no one. 我竭力在读者面前展示真实自我,因为装模作样会让我会显得任性而愚蠢,每当想到有人读到虚伪的自己,我就忍不住想要摔键盘。我最好是把这些话塞进漂流瓶,随浪漂走。最可能让我怯场的,就是想象查尔斯·克劳萨默是打开漂流瓶的那个人。 And the last thing I need for my performance anxiety is to imagine Charles Krauthammer is the guy unspooling my missive from that bottle. The only thing worse would be to imagine George Will standing behind Charles looking over his shoulder and tsk-tsking all of my split infinitives. And yet, to my dismay, Will, too, has told me he on occasion comes by here. I feel like Martin Short in a synchronized-swimming routine. 唯一比这更糟的事,就是想象乔治·威尔(George Will)也站在查尔斯身后,目光越过他肩膀落在信上,看到文中的分裂不定式,不住地摇头。并且,同样令我沮丧的是威尔告诉我,他只是恰巧经过这里而已。我的感觉就像是马丁·肖特(Martin Short)在花样游泳。【译注:指马丁·肖特在周六夜现场节目中拍的一个搞怪视频短片。FERNAL LINGUISTICS 良魔语言学 Anyway, Charles is a big fan of “unpaired words.” I don’t mean words with the Bluetooth turned off. I mean . . . hmmm . . . how do I explain? 总之,查尔斯是个“不成对单词(unpaired words)”爱好者,“不成对单词”并不是指你的设备在蓝牙没有配对时发出的提示,它指的是……额……我该怎么解释呢?【译注:在英语中,有些词汇是它的否定形式曾经同时存在,比如“innocent”和“nocent”。随着人们词汇使用习惯的改变,这些单词只有其否定形式被保留下来,肯定形式则很少再被使用,下文中作者大玩文字游戏,将出现很多由这种“不成对单词”拼凑的句子。】 Well, many times, during the commercial break on Special Report, we’ve gone back and forth — brandy snifters in hand — talking about how we need a president with more feck running an ept and gormful foreign policy. 好吧,在“特别报道”(Special Report)的广告时间,我们常常举着白兰地酒杯来回踱着步,谈论着我们需要一位“强势”(feck : feckless)总统来执行“精妙”(ept : inept)、“高明”(gormful : gormless)的外交政策。 These conversations usually take place after the make-up lady comes into the studio to make sure that we look kempt and shevelled. Well, last Wednesday, the topic came up again, and we kept bandying them about. Which made me think, “This is pretty cool.” It also made me think, “This would be a good riff for the G-File.” 此时,化妆助理通常会来到直播间确保我们看起来“干净”(kempt : unkempt)、“整洁”(shevelled : dishevelled)。就在上周三,我们又一次聊到了这个话题,并为此争吵不休。这让我感觉很有趣,同时也想,或许可以成为我写G-File的好题材。 Still, I’m hoping that he isn’t gruntled by this somewhat nocuous and entirely effable effort to rip off one of his favorite parlor games. Indeed, I could have dropped this choate schtick without name-dropping Charles, which might have made it seem less petuous, but why leave my motivation unbeknownst when it can be beknownst? 尽管如此,我希望他不要因为我们尝试对他最喜爱的室内游戏之一进行有点“恶意”(nocuous : innocuous)且“直白”(effable : ineffable)的剽窃而“高兴”(gruntled : disgruntled)。事实上,当我展示这些“低级”(choate : inchoate)把戏时,提起查尔斯的大名不过是为了借此抬高自己。这么说或许不够“谨慎”(petuous : impetuous),但是如果可以“公开”(beknownst : unbeknownst)我的意图时,又何必要“隐瞒”(unbeknownst)呢? Better to go communicado and cognito, I say. Particularly when I’m still throat clearing as I try to scrounge up a real topic to discuss. Still, I fear I seem quite chalant as I search for sipid things to say. If I don’t work harder, this “news”letter will never be combobulated. (“I don’t want to disrupt your flow here, so I’ll rupt it. But you should know this all comes across as soucient and below even your pareil writing style. I would have thrown this whole thing out the window, but you opted to fenestrate it.” — The Couch) 我想,“开诚布公”(communicado and cognito : incommunicado and incognito)总是好的。特别是在我找到一个真正的话题之前,需要用这个来拖延下时间。并且,在我急于寻找“有趣的”(sipid : insipid)话题时,会担心自己显得“紧张不安”(chalant : nonchalant)。如果我不更加努力工作,读者是不会对这封“新闻信”感到“满意”(combobulated : discombobulated)的。(沙发发话了:我不想在这里“打断”(disrupt)你们,所以我就“继续”(rupt : disrupt)了。但是你应当清楚,所有这一切都是被“精心”(soucient : insouciant)组合起来的而且甚至比不上你们“匹配”(pareil : nonpareil)写作的水平。我本该把所有写的这些都扔到窗外去的,但是这可是你们选择看下去的。) All Hail Science 科学万岁 So my column from yesterday was about the quizzing of Scott Walker and other Republicans about evolution. This is an incessant question every four years. And while it deserves to be cessant, it will never will be. (Okay, I’m done now.) 我昨天的专栏探讨了对Scott Walker和其他共和党人如何看待有关进化论的盘问,这个问题每隔四年就会被提出来,从未中断。这个问题本该“停止”(cessant : incessant)了,却永远停不下来。(好了,文字游戏到此为止。【译按:我的噩梦也终于结束了】) As many have noted, liberals in and out of the media are very selective in their celebration of science. Guy Benson reminded me of this nicely splenetic post I wrote three years ago in the Corner: 很多人也注意到了,在与媒体打交道时,自由派对科学的赞颂是有选择性的。Guy Benson让我想起自己三年前在专栏里写下的这段怒气冲冲的文字:
Why does the Left get to pick which issues are the benchmarks for “science”? Why can’t the measure of being pro-science be the question of heritability of intelligence? Or the existence of fetal pain? Or the distribution of cognitive abilities among the sexes at the extreme right tail of the bell curve? 凭什么自由派有权来决定哪个问题是“科学”的测试基准?用智力可遗传性问题作为是否支持科学的标准不行吗?或者是否存在胎儿疼痛?或者两性认知能力在正态曲线远右端的分布情况? Or if that’s too upsetting, how about dividing the line between those who are pro- and anti-science along the lines of support for geoengineering? Or — coming soon — the role cosmic rays play in cloud formation? Why not make it about support for nuclear power? Or YuccaMountain? Why not deride the idiots who oppose genetically modified crops, even when they might prevent blindness in children? 或者,如果这些问题过于让人心烦,那么把是否支持地质工程作为支持科学与否的分界线如何?或者,宇宙射线在云的形成中的作用?是否支持核电可以吗?或者雅卡山(Yucca Mountain)?【译注:雅卡山位于内华达州,用来堆放核废料。】为什么不嘲讽下反对转基因作物的白痴呢,即使转基因作物(黄金大米)可以防止儿童失明? Some of these examples are controversial, others tendentious, but all are just as fair as the way the Left framed embryonic stem-cell research and all are more relevant than questions about evolution. (Quick: If Obama changed his mind about evolution tomorrow and became a creationist, what policies would change? I’ll wait.) 上述这些例子都是有争议或者倾向性的,左派支持的干细胞研究也是如此,而且跟进化论比起来,这些问题与实际生活关系密切。(打断下:如果明天奥巴马改变对进化论的态度而变成一个神创论者,哪些政策会变化呢?我得等等看才知道。) The point is that the Left considers itself the undisputed champion of “science,” but there are scads of issues where they take un-scientific points of view. 问题在于,左派一直自诩为“科学”斗士,但是在很多问题上,他们的持有的观点并不科学。 Sure they can cite dissident scientists — just as conservatives can — on this or that issue. But everyone knows that when the science directly threatens the Left’s pieties, it’s the science that must bend — or break. During the Larry Summers fiasco at Harvard, comments delivered in the classic spirit of open inquiry and debate cost Summers his job. Actual scientists got the vapors because he violated the principles not of science but of liberalism. 他们当然可以引用非主流科学家的意见为某个议题辩护,保守派也可以这么做。但是大家都懂的,每当科学直接威胁到左派的信条时,让步的却总是科学。劳伦斯·萨默斯(Larry Summers)在哈佛时,曾因敢于大胆地公开质询和辩论而丢了工作。真正的科学家因为违反了自由派的信条而非科学原则而被驱逐。 During the Gulf oil spill, the Obama administration dishonestly claimed that its independent experts supported a drilling moratorium. They emphatically did not. The president who campaigned on basing his policies on “sound science” ignored his own hand-picked experts. 在墨西哥湾漏油事件(the Gulf oil spill)中,奥巴马当局谎称其独立专家支持钻探禁令,但确凿无疑,这些专家并未这么说。虽然总统先生一直宣称自己的政策有坚实的科学基础,但他对身边的专家却置若罔闻。 According to the GAO, he did something very similar when he shut down Yucca Mountain. His support for wind and solar energy, as you suggest, isn’t based on science but on faith. And that faith has failed him dramatically. 根据美国政府问责局(GAO)的消息,类似的情况还有奥巴马关停了雅卡山一事。可以看出,他对风能和太阳能的大力扶植同样基于政治信条而非科学而这一信条让他一败涂地。 The idea that conservatives are anti-science is self-evident and self-pleasing liberal hogwash. I see no reason why conservatives should even argue the issue on their terms when it’s so clearly offered in bad faith in the first place. 认为保守主义者反科学的观点,毫无疑问是自由派们自我陶醉的一派胡言。我不明白保守派为什么非要在任期内就此问题与其争论,很明显这压根就是血口喷人嘛。
Recently, others have made this point better than I have, but as the Marines say of their rifles, this “news”letter is mine. 最近也有其他人提出了类似的观点,而且表达得比我更好,但是——就像海军陆战队对自己的步枪敝帚自珍一样——这封“新闻信”毕竟是我自己的嘛。 Anyway, what I find really intriguing is the way people talk about “science” as if it is so much more — and occasionally less — than it is. Critics on Twitter and in my e-mail box say we need to know if Scott Walker “believes in science,” as if his answer on evolution will tell us if he’s a witch burner or not. 总之,我发现人们对科学的看法很有意思,他们似乎总是给科学赋予比事实上更多(有时候是更少)的含义,推特上和我邮箱中的一些批评意见,认为我们需要搞清楚斯科特·沃克是否真的“信仰科学”,似乎他的答案可以告诉我们他是否支持烧死女巫。 Well, I regularly get e-mail from creationists. E-mail. In other words, thanks to scientists, the words of creationists are transported through the sky into my phone or computer. And, while I haven’t checked, I’m pretty sure they don’t believe that their e-mail was carried to me on the backs of pixies. 我经常收到一些神创论者发来的电邮。是电子邮件哦。换句话说,幸亏有了科学家,这些神创论者的信息才得以穿越天空传到我的手机或者电脑中。尽管并未验证,但我很确定他们应当不会认为电邮是通过小精灵传给我的。 I’m also pretty sure that the vast majority of creationists drive cars, take antibiotics, watch TV, and eat foods with preservatives in them. For liberals, perhaps this is proof of some kind of hypocrisy or cognitive dissonance. And maybe it is, though I don’t see it. But it’s also a demonstration that having your faith — or your superstitions — bump into one of the farther borders of scientific knowledge doesn’t require one to reject all of science. 我也非常确信绝大多数神创论者开车、吃抗生素、看电视、食用含防腐剂的食品。自由派或许可以从中看出虚伪和认知失调的意味。也许是吧,但我没看出来。但对我来说,这一现象表明,你的信仰或迷信越出了科学知识的边界,并这不意味着你要摒弃科学这个整体。 It’s not a binary thing. Belief in something unconfirmed or even disproved by science is not a rejection of all science. Just as a refusal to believe unicorns are real doesn’t mean I have to reject the existence of the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, Kate Upton, or other allegedly mythical creatures. 这并不是非此即彼的。对未经科学验证、甚至被科学所证伪的事物的信仰,并非是对科学整体的拒绝。仅仅不承认独角兽存在,并不意味着一个人会否认尼斯湖水怪、大脚怪、凯特·阿普顿(Kate Upton),或者其他传说中的神秘造物存在。 That’s part of the irony. The way the science-lovers talk about science, you’d think science was a kind of magic that requires total faith and conviction. If you don’t believe with all of your heart in “science,” it will stop working. It’s like the scientific enterprise is akin to Santa’s sleigh in the movie Elf (a great film, and not just because it inspired my daughter to answer the phone “Buddy the Elf, what’s your favorite color?”). 这真是讽刺啊,一些科学狂热分子眼中的科学让人感觉像是某种魔法,需要完全的信仰和信念。如果你不是全身心地信仰“科学”,它就不再起作用。这样的话,科技企业倒是跟电影《圣诞精灵》中圣诞老人的雪橇有些类似。(《圣诞精灵》是一部不错的电影,我这么认为,不仅仅是因为我女儿受到电影的影响,在接电话的时候会说“我是精灵巴迪,你最喜欢什么颜色?”)。 In Elf, Santa’s sleigh no longer relies on flying reindeer. Instead it converts“Christmas cheer” into jet power. That’s how some of these people talk about believing in science. If we don’t project our positive emotions towards it, it won’t take off. 在《圣诞精灵》中,圣诞老人的雪橇不是由会飞的驯鹿来牵引的,而是把“圣诞欢呼”转化成飞行动力。这和某些人口中的科学是一样的,如果我们不把正能量投射到圣诞雪橇上,它就不会起飞。 I am typing this on a plane from Detroit, Michigan — on Friday the 13th, no less. What happens if I suddenly stop saying in a hopeful whisper “I believe in you, science!” or if I take a deist bent and hold out the possibility that there’s something more than the material world out there? Will my plane suddenly plummet? Will gremlins slowly emerge from behind the seat in front of me, like Miley Cyrus climbing over a toilet-stall door? 今天是黑色星期五,我正在一架从密歇根州底特律市起飞的一架飞机上写这篇文章。现在,如果我不再满怀希望的嘀咕着“我信仰你,科学!”,或者开始相信自然神论的观点,认为很有可能在已知物质世界之外,还有其他存在,那么我的飞机会不会突然一头栽下去呢?会不会有一只小魔怪(gremlins,喜欢恶作剧)在我前面的椅背上浮现呢,就跟麦莉·赛勒斯从厕所隔间的门上爬过似的? Look, science, unlike God, really doesn’t care if you believe in it. And casting doubt on one part of it doesn’t break the spell. That’s the whole point of science; it’s not magic. 所以你看,科学跟上帝不同,根本不在乎你是否信仰它,对它某一个方面有质疑,并不会打破魔咒,这才是科学的真相,它不是魔法。【译注:《打破魔咒》也是哲学家丹尼尔·丹内特2006年的一部作品,副标题是“作为一种自然现象的宗教”,认为宗教信仰是一种曾经有用的虚假信念,可以帮助人们做到一些不然就做不到的事情,但在科学高度发展的今天,已经成为理性进步的障碍,是该打破它们的时候了。丹内特也是长期活跃在论战前线的无神论四骑士之一。】 Democrats are more likely to believe in paranormal activity. They’re also more likely to believe in reincarnation and astrology. I have personally known liberals who think crystals have healing powers who nonetheless believe that the internal combustion engine doesn’t actually rely on magical horse power. 民主党人更有可能相信超自然现象,他们也更有可能相信轮回和占星术。我私下认识一些自由派,他们相信水晶有治愈的功能,尽管如此,他们从不认为内燃机是依靠魔法的马力来运转的。 HELP ME, SCIENCE, YOU’RE MY ONLY HOPE 帮帮我吧,科学,你是我唯一的希望 But you wouldn’t necessarily know that from listening to these people freak out about it. (Sorry, this “news”letter will be light in links because there’s no internet on this plane. Fun fact: If you shout “There’s no Internet on this plane!” in a really loud, terror-filled, voice — as if the plane runs on Internet — your fellow passengers freak out. Try it some time. If it doesn’t work the first time, say it over and over. Eventually you’ll get a lot of attention.) 但是,你从受到惊吓的人口中未必能听到这句话。(实在抱歉,这封“新闻信”链接很少,这是因为飞机上没有因特网。说件趣事:假如你在飞机上用一种惊恐的语气大声喊:“这架飞机上居然没有互联网!”——就好像这架飞机是靠互联网飞行的——这会吓坏你周围的旅客。如果第一次不成功也没关系,再大声点多喊几次,最终大家都会注意到你的。) When I hear people talk about science as if it’s something to “believe in,” particularly people who reject all sorts of science-y things (vaccines, nuclear power, etc. as discussed above), I immediately think of one of my favorite lines from Eric Voegelin: “When God is invisible behind the world, the contents of the world will become new gods; when the symbols of transcendent religiosity are banned, new symbols develop from the inner-worldly language of science to take their place.” This will be true, he added, even when “the new apocalyptics insist that the symbols they create are scientific.” 很多人一谈起“科学”,就好像它应该是某种“信仰”,特别是那些拒绝所有听起来像科学的事物(维生素、核能等等)的人。每当听到这些,我就会想起埃里克·沃格林说过的,也是我最喜欢的一句名言:“当上帝从世界逐渐隐去,新的神灵又将崛起,当超验的宗教符号遭到禁止,科学的世俗语言将会取而代之”。这是事实,他补充道,“届时,新的先知把他们新创造的符号称作“科学”。 In other words, the “Don’t you believe in evolution!?!” people don’t really believe in science qua science, what they’re really after is dethroning God in favor of their own gods of the material world (though I suspect many don’t even realize why they’re so obsessed with this one facet of the disco ball called “science”). “Criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticisms,” quoth Karl Marx, who then proceeded to create his own secular religion. 换句话说,说“你居然不相信进化论?!”的人们,其实并不相信所谓的科学,他们的真实目的,是把原来的上帝赶下神坛,让位于他们在物质世界的新神(然而我怀疑他们并不清楚,为什么迪斯科球上让他们如此着迷的一个小侧面,会被称作“科学”)。“对宗教的批判是一切批判的前提”,卡尔·马克思如是说,但他转身创建了自己的世俗宗教。 This is nothing new of course. This tendency is one of the reasons why every time Moses turned his back on the Hebrews they started worshipping golden calves and whatnot. 当然,这种现象并不新奇。同时也解释了为何每次摩西一离开希伯来人,他们就开始崇拜诸如金牛犊之类的东西。 At least Auguste Comte, the French philosopher who coined the phrase “sociology,” was open about what he was really up to when he created his “Religion of Humanity,” in which scientists, statesmen, and engineers were elevated to Saints. As I say in my column, the fight over evolution is really a fight over the moral status of man. 与他们相比,奥古斯特·孔德至少是个敢想敢做的人,这位法国哲学家,“社会学”的创始人,创立了他的“人道教”,在那里,科学家、政治家和工程师是被当作圣人而崇拜的。正如我曾在我专栏中说过的,围绕进化论的论战其实是对人类当前道德状态的争论。 And, if we are nothing but a few bucks worth of chemicals connected by water and electricity, than there’s really nothing holding us back from elevating “science” to divine status and in turn anointing those who claim to be its champions as our priests. It’s no coincidence that Herbert Croly was literally — not figuratively, the way Joe Biden means literally — baptized into Comte’s Religion of Humanity 如果我们不过是一些通过水和电连接在一起的化学物质,那还有什么可以阻止我们把“科学”供上神坛,并为那些所谓科学斗士行涂油礼令、让他们做我们的神父呢。难怪赫伯特·克劳利会(货真价实地,不是象征性地,此处“货真价实”一词不是按乔·拜登那种用法)皈依孔德的人道教。【译注:乔·拜登曾在演讲中多次错误地使用“literally”一词,一度成为笑柄 】 Personally, I think the effort to overthrow Darwin along with Marx and Freud is misguided. I have friends invested in that project and I agree that all sorts of terrible Malthusian and materialist crap is bound up in Darwinism. But that’s an argument for ranking out the manure, not burning down the stable. 我个人认为,试图将达尔文和马克思与弗洛伊德绑在一起打倒是不对的。我有朋友正在这么做,并且我也同意,马尔萨斯主义者和唯物主义者的废话确实和达尔文主义的颇有渊源。但是,如果只是想清理掉马粪,何必把整个马厩也烧了呢? IN MEMORIAM 悼念 My brother Josh passed away four years ago this month. If I couldn’t get a G-File done this morning, I was going to recycle the one I wrote not long after his funeral. An excerpt: 我哥哥乔什是在四年前的这个月去世的。如果今早没写完G-File的话,本来打算把我在他葬礼后不久写的悼词重复利用的,以下是摘要: My brother died last week. He had an accident. He fell down some stairs. He surely had too much to drink when it happened. It’s all such an awful waste. You can read how I felt — how I feel — about my brother here. 家兄在上周辞世,那是场意外,他从楼梯上摔了下来,当时肯定喝了不少酒。这实在是有点浪费。点击这里的链接,你可以看到我曾经和现在对他去世的感受。 But, you know, this is uncharted territory for me. And while I have little to no morbid desire to wallow indefinitely in a public display of grieving, the G-File has always been a dispatch from the frontlines of my mind, a quasi-personal letter to the collective You. Some might even call it the mad scribbling in the virtual ink of diluted fecal matter on my imaginary jail-cell wall. 但是,你们也知道,这种情景对我非常陌生。而且我也实在不想在公开场合表现出一副沉浸在悲痛中无法自拔的样子。G-File一直占据着我的思维,它就像写给你们的一封私人信。也有人甚至说,这是我在自己想象的监牢中,把稀释粪便当作墨水进行的疯狂涂鸦。 And, as you can imagine, there are few things more on my mind than this choking fog of awfulness. 但是,如你们所想,现在占据我思维的,除了这难堪呛人的烟雾之外,又多了一些事情。 I’m told by a friend that there’s a new book out, The Truth about Grief by Ruth Davis Konigsberg, that apparently demonstrates how Elisabeth Kubler-Ross made up all that stuff about the “five stages of grief.” 一位朋友曾经对我说,最近出了本新书,是鲁思·戴维斯·柯尼斯堡写的《悲伤的真相》。这本书显然在试图说明伊丽莎白·库伯勒-罗斯是如何编造出“悲伤的五个阶段”这种破玩意儿的。 I have no plans to read it. But I’m fully prepared to believe that any hard-and-fast five-point definition of grief is bogus. Admittedly, my data sample set is pretty small but hugely significant; in the last six years I’ve lost my father and my brother out of a family of four people. And, already, it’s clear to me that the geography of grief cannot be so easily mapped. 我没想去读这本书,但是我认为所有对悲伤的严格的五点定义都是扯淡。说实话,我的统计样本相当小,但是结果非常显著:我们原本的四口之家,在过去的六年里,先后失去了父亲和兄弟。并且,我非常清楚悲伤的地图是很难被轻易描绘出来的。 Obviously there are going to be similarities to the terrain. But just as there are different kinds of happiness — say, winning the lottery versus having a kid, or beating cancer versus seeing Keith Olbermann booted off of MSNBC — there are different kinds of sadness, too. And how they play out depends on the context. 显然,不同人的悲伤“地形”或许有些许相似,但是正如幸福有许多种一样(比如,彩票中奖与喜得贵子、战胜癌症或基思·奥伯曼被MSNBC辞退一事),悲伤也有好多种。他们最终怎样消散取决于当时的具体情境。 In terms of my own internal response, the most glaring continuity between my dad’s death and my brother’s is loneliness. Don’t get me wrong. I’ve got lots of company. I have lots of people who care for me more than I realized. I’m richer in friends and family than I could ever possibly expect or deserve. 至于我个人的感受,父亲和兄弟的相继去世留给我的是无尽的孤独。请不要误会,我有很多人陪伴,我自己都没有意识到会有这么多人关心着自己。我所得到的友情和亲情已经远超自己的预期。 But there’s a kind of loneliness that comes with death that cannot be compensated for. Tolstoy’s famous line in Anna Karenina was half right. All unhappy families are unhappy in their own way, but so are all happy ones. At least insofar as all families are ultimately unique. 但是有一种孤独与死亡相伴而来,无法慰藉。托尔斯泰在《安娜·卡列妮娜》中的一句名言说对了一半,不幸的家庭各有各的不幸,幸福的家庭也是如此。至少每个家庭都是独特的。 Unique is a misunderstood word. Pedants like to say there’s no such thing as “very unique.” I don’t think that’s true. For instance, we say that each snowflake is unique. That’s true. No two snowflakes are alike. But that doesn’t mean that pretty much all snowflakes aren’t very similar. But, imagine if you found a snowflake that was ten feet in diameter and hot to the touch, I think it’d be fair to say it was very unique. Meanwhile, each normal snowflake has its own contours, its own one-in-a-billion-trillion characteristics, that will never be found again. 独特这个词被误解了,学究们经常说:没有真正“独一无二”的事物。我并不这么认为。比如,我们常说每一片雪花都是独特的,这是真的,没有两片完全一样的雪花。但是这并不意味着所有的雪花都不相似。假设你找到一片直径十英尺、摸起来烫手的雪花,我想说它很独特应该没问题吧。同时,每一片普通的雪花都有只属于它自己的轮廓,只属于它自己的万中无一的特征,在其它雪花上永远找不到的特征。 Families are similarly unique. Each has its own cultural contours and configurations. The uniqueness might be hard to discern from the outside and it certainly might seem trivial to the casual observer. Just as one platoon of Marines might look like another to a civilian or one business might seem indistinguishable from the one next door. But, we all know the reality is different. Every meaningful institution has a culture all its own. Every family has its inside jokes, its peculiar way of doing things, its habits and mores developed around a specific shared experience. 家庭和雪花一样有类似的独特性,每个家庭有它自己的文化形态和内涵。其独特性从外部难得一窥,况且外人也不会真正在意。正如对平民来说,一队海军陆战队员看起来都差不多,一间商铺和隔壁的也很难区分。但是我们都清楚,事实上是不同的。每一个实体机构都有其独特的文化。每个家庭都有它自己的内部笑话,它做事的原则,它基于自己某种共同经历的习惯和习俗。 One of the things that keeps slugging me in the face is the fact that the cultural memory of our little family has been dealt a terrible blow. Sure, my mom’s around, but sons have a different memory of family life than parents. And Josh’s recall for such things was always not only better than mine, but different than mine as well. I remembered things he’d forgotten and vice versa. In what seems like the blink of an eye, whole volumes of institutional memory have simply vanished. And that is a terribly lonely thought, that no amount of company and condolence can ease or erase. 我们这个小家庭的文化正在经历严重的打击,这让我心如刀割。当然了,母亲还在身边,但是子女跟父母对于家庭的记忆并不完全相同。而乔什对这些事情的回忆比我更清晰,并与我有所不同。我记得一些他已忘记的事情,反之亦然。仿佛眨眼之间,一些独有的记忆就这么消失了。每念及此,心中倍感孤独,即使再多陪伴也难以慰藉。 The pain is duller now, but the feelings are the same. 现在伤痛减轻了些,但感受没变。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]巴尔的摩单月谋杀案数量创43年最高

Baltimore killings soar to a level unseen in 43 years
巴尔的摩的谋杀案数量跃升至一个43年未见的水平

作者:Associated Press(美联社) @ 2015-8-1
译者:陆嘉宾(@晚上不买白天买不到)
校对:陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:FOX NEWS,http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/08/01/baltimore-killings-soar-to-level-unseen-in-43-years/

BALTIMORE – Baltimore reached a grim milestone on Friday, three months after riots erupted in response to the death of Freddie Gray in police custody: With 45 homicides in July, the city has seen more bloodshed in a single month than it has in 43 years.

本周五,由Freddie Grey在警方拘留期间死亡而引发的暴乱发生三个月之后,巴尔的摩树立了一座严峻的里程碑:7月份共发生了45起凶杀案,是这座城市过去43年来单月流血事件之最。

Police reported three deaths — two men shot Thursday a(more...)

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Baltimore killings soar to a level unseen in 43 years 巴尔的摩的谋杀案数量跃升至一个43年未见的水平 作者:Associated Press(美联社) @ 2015-8-1 译者:陆嘉宾(@晚上不买白天买不到) 校对:陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:FOX NEWS,http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/08/01/baltimore-killings-soar-to-level-unseen-in-43-years/ BALTIMORE – Baltimore reached a grim milestone on Friday, three months after riots erupted in response to the death of Freddie Gray in police custody: With 45 homicides in July, the city has seen more bloodshed in a single month than it has in 43 years. 本周五,由Freddie Grey在警方拘留期间死亡而引发的暴乱发生三个月之后,巴尔的摩树立了一座严峻的里程碑:7月份共发生了45起凶杀案,是这座城市过去43年来单月流血事件之最。 Police reported three deaths — two men shot Thursday and one on Friday. The men died at local hospitals. 警方公布了三起死亡事件——周四有两名男性遭遇枪击,周五再添一位。三人都死在当地医院。 With their deaths, this year's homicides reached 189, far outpacing the 119 killings by July's end in 2014. Nonfatal shootings have soared to 366, compared to 200 by the same date last year. July's total was the worst since the city recorded 45 killings in August 1972, according to The Baltimore Sun. 在经历了这三起死亡事件之后,今年的谋杀案数量达到了189起,远远超过2014年截至七月底的119起。非致命枪击案相比去年同期的累计200起跃升至366起。据《巴尔的摩太阳报》报道,七月谋杀案的总数是这座城市自1972年八月发生45起以来最多的。 The seemingly Sisyphean task of containing the city's violence prompted Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake to fire her police commissioner, Anthony Batts, on July 8. 遏制这座城市的暴力事件仿佛是一个无穷无尽却又徒劳无功的任务,这也促使了市长斯蒂芬妮·罗林斯-布莱克在7月8日开除了她的警察局长,安东尼巴茨。 "Too many continue to die on our streets," Rawlings-Blake said then. "Families are tired of dealing with this pain, and so am I. Recent events have placed an intense focus on our police leadership, distracting many from what needs to be our main focus: the fight against crime." “太多的人接连死在街道上,”罗林斯-布莱克说,“人们厌倦了这种痛苦,我也是。最近的事件使得我们警察部门领导层受到强烈关注,同时,也令很多人从我们本该集中关注的地方——打击犯罪——,分散了许多注意力。 But the killings have not abated under Interim Commissioner Kevin Davis since then. 但是自那以后,在临时局长凯文·戴维斯的治理下,谋杀案并未有所减少。 Baltimore is not unique in its suffering; crimes are spiking in big cities around the country. 巴尔的摩的问题不是个例,全国大城市的罪案率都在剧增。 But while the city's police are closing cases— Davis announced arrests in three recent murders several days ago — the violence is outpacing their efforts. Davis said Tuesday the "clearance rate" is at 36.6 percent, far lower than the department's mid-40s average. 戴维斯在几天前刚刚宣布逮捕了近期三起谋杀案的凶手。这座城市的警察确实在处理案件,但他们的努力赶不上暴力的蔓延速度。戴维斯在周二给出的“结案率”为36.6%,这个数字远远低于该部门平时45%上下的平均水平。 Crime experts and residents of Baltimore's most dangerous neighborhoods cite a confluence of factors: mistrust of the police; generalized anger and hopelessness over a lack of opportunities for young black men; and competition among dealers of illegal drugs, bolstered by the looting of prescription pills from pharmacies during the riot. 对此,犯罪专家和巴尔的摩最危险街区的居民指出了共同起作用的诸多因素:对警方的不信任;年轻黑人缺乏机会导致的普遍愤怒和绝望;非法药贩子们为暴乱中药店里被抢掠的处方药销赃,冲突更为激化。 Federal drug enforcement agents said gangs targeted 32 pharmacies in the city, taking roughly 300,000 doses of opiates, as the riots caused $9 million in property damage in the city. 联邦缉毒署的探员表示,各帮派盯上了城里的32家药房,抢走了大约30万剂鸦片类药物,暴乱总共给这座城市带来九百万美元财产损失。 Perched on a friend's stoop, Sherry Moore, 55, said she knew "mostly all" of the young men killed recently in West Baltimore, including an 18-year-old fatally shot a half-block away. Moore said many more pills are on the street since the riot, making people wilder than usual. 雪莉·穆尔今年55岁,她坐在朋友家的门廊上说,最近在西巴尔的摩被杀的年轻人她“几乎都认识”,其中包括一名在半个街区之外遭遇致命枪击的18岁少年。穆尔说,暴乱之后有更多的药物出现在了街头,这也使得人们比平时更加疯狂。 "The ones doing the violence, the shootings, they're eating Percocet like candy and they're not thinking about consequences. They have no discipline, they have no respect — they think this is a game. How many can I put down on the East side? How many can I put down on the West side?" “那些实施暴力、枪击的人吃Percocet【译注:一种鸦片类麻醉止痛药,被称为“白领的海洛因”】就像吃糖一样,且不计后果。他们没有纪律、缺乏尊重,他们觉得这是场游戏。在东边我能干掉多少人呢?西面呢?” The tally of 42 homicides in May included Gray, who died in April after his neck was broken in police custody. The July tally likewise includes a previous death — a baby whose death in June was ruled a homicide in July. 五月记录的42起凶杀案中还包括了格雷,四月份的时候他在警局羁押期间由于颈部折断死亡。七月份的记录也同样包括了一个之前的死亡案件——一个于六月死亡的婴儿在七月被判定为谋杀。 Shawn Ellerman, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore division of the Drug Enforcement Administration, said May's homicide spike was probably related to the stolen prescription drugs, a supply that is likely exhausted by now. But the drug trade is inherently violent, and turf wars tend to prompt retaliatory killings. 肖恩·埃勒曼是毒品管制局巴尔的摩分局的助理特别探员。他说五月份凶杀案的激增应该和那些被盗处方药物有非常大的关系,这批货现在应该已经消耗得差不多了。但是毒品交易有着固有的暴力倾向,而地盘争夺战也往往会引发报复性谋杀。 "You can't attribute every murder to narcotics, but I would think a good number" of them are, he said. "You could say it's retaliation from drug trafficking, it's retaliation from gangs moving in from other territories. But there have been drug markets in Baltimore for years." “你不能将每一桩谋杀案都归因于毒品,但是我相信其中很大的一部分确是如此”,他说,“你可以说这是由于贩毒导致的报复,这是由于其他地区转移过来的帮派抢占地盘导致的报复。但是巴尔的摩的毒品市场已经存在很多年了。” Across West Baltimore, residents complain that drug addiction and crime are part of a cycle that begins with despair among children who lack educational and recreational opportunities, and extends when people can't find work. 整个西巴尔的摩的居民们都在抱怨说,吸毒和犯罪只是循环的一部分。这个循环始于孩子们由于缺乏教育和消遣机会所导致的绝望,而在人们找不到工作时得到了蔓延。 "We need jobs! We need jobs!" a man riding around on a bicycle shouted to anyone who'd listen after four people were shot, three of them fatally, on a street corner in July. “我们需要工作!我们需要工作!”一名男性在自行车上四处骑行并向所有可能听他说话的人呼喊着口号。这发生在七月份有四人在一个街角遭遇枪击,其中三人死亡之后。 More community engagement, progressive policing policies and opportunities for young people in poverty could help, community activist MunirBahar said. 更多的社区参与、进步的治安政策和为穷困年轻人提供机会,对事情会有很大帮助,社区活动家穆尼尔·巴哈尔说。 "People are focusing on enforcement, not preventing violence. Police enforce a code, a law. Our job as the community is to prevent the violence, and we've failed," said Bahar, who leads the annual 300 Men March against violence in West Baltimore. “人们专注于执法而不是预防暴力。警方在执行法律。而我们社区的工作则是预防暴力,我们失败了。”巴哈尔说。他每年都在西巴尔的摩领导一场叫“300人游行”的反暴力游行示威。 "We need anti-violence organizations, we need mentorship programs, we need a long-term solution. But we also need immediate relief," Bahar added. "When we're in something so deep, we have to stop it before you can analyze what the root is." “我们需要反暴力组织,我们需要辅导计划,我们需要一个长期的解决方案。但我们也需要紧急救助,”巴哈尔补充道,“当问题变得这么严重时,我们必须在弄清根源之前先阻止问题继续蔓延。” Strained relationships between police and the public also play a role, according to Eugene O'Donnell, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. 约翰·杰伊刑事司法学院的尤金·奥唐奈教授表示,警察与公众之间的紧张关系也是问题的原因之一。 Arrests plummeted and violence soared after six officers were indicted in Gray's death. Residents accused police of abandoning their posts for fear of facing criminal charges for making arrests, and said emboldened criminals were settling scores with little risk of being caught. 在六名警官因为格雷死亡案遭到起诉之后,罪犯逮捕数量暴跌,暴力犯罪猛增。居民们指责警方由于担心逮捕行动导致刑事指控而正在怠弃职责,他们还说鉴于被捕的风险很小,放大了胆子的罪犯还在继续实施犯罪。 The department denied these claims, and police cars have been evident patrolling West Baltimore's central thoroughfares recently. 警方否认了这些说法,并且最近已经可以看见警车在西巴尔的摩市中心要道执行巡逻。 But O'Donnell said the perception of lawlessness is just as powerful than the reality. 但是O'Donnell表示无法无天的感觉就是比现实更强大。 "We have a national issue where the police feel they are the Public Enemy No. 1," he said, making some officers stand down and criminals become more brazen. “警方感觉,现在他们自己才是头号公敌,这是个全国性的问题,”他说,这使得一些警官低声下气而犯罪分子则更加肆无忌惮。 "There's a rhythm to the streets," he added. "And when people get away with gun violence, it has a long-term emboldening effect. And the good people in the neighborhood think, 'Who has the upper hand?'" “街头有一种风气,”他补充道,“当人们持枪行凶却逃脱惩罚,这就产生了一种长期的鼓励效果。而附近的好人们也会想‘谁占了上风?’” (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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