【2021-12-12】 《暴力与社会秩序》这书总的来说不怎么样，不过有一点提的很好，（用我术语体系表达）大意是：那些未建立自由秩序的社会，在经济发展上的一个根本障碍是，无法容纳创造性毁灭， 因为既有产业持续取得租值的前提是与权力结构捆绑，而这一捆绑赋予了他们压制任何与既有产业模式不相容的创新苗头，因为创新浪潮引发的创造性毁灭过程会消灭其租值基础，大规模改变既得利益分配格局， 在自由社会，这样的改变也常会引发政治冲突，但由于权力结构与租值分布实现了足够高程度的解耦，因而通常都能顺利吸纳这些冲击，实现某种妥协，而不至于让系统垮掉，而在其他社会，创造性毁灭的浪潮要么被压制了，要么只有经历一番血肉横飞甚至改朝换代才完成，  

【2021-08-08】 @InquilineX 国内所谓的这种劝酒文化，其实就是长期以来对公权力和私权利之间界限不分，概念模糊的一个缩影，也就是严复说的“群己权界”概念，私人边界感极弱，而这种极弱的边界感经常导致各种形式的权力支配，个体压榨，甚至极端犯罪。 @whigzhou: 这跟公私之分没关系，都是私对私关系，工作与私人生活其余部分的边界，不是公与私的边界，而这种边界不明，是古代依附性雇佣关系的延续，表明现代自由雇佣关系在这个社会尚未确立 @whigzhou: 古代雇佣关系，像仆佣、农奴、门客、学徒，通常都是依附性的，只有少数按工作量计价的临时散工是自由雇佣 @whigzhou: 实际上，在一些古代司法传统中，长期雇佣关系的存在可以被用来证明的受雇者处于某种程度的奴役状态，而非完全自由身，如 Edward Coke 所言，假如你每天起床时不知道自己当天要干什么，那就说明你是个农奴，就是说，雇佣与奴役之间的关系，直到现代自由雇佣制确立之后才被完全切断

【2021-07-16】 听了个 podcast，在聊 [[Roe v. Wade]]，我对他们聊的内容本身兴趣不大，不过这让我想到一个问题，在有关 Roe v. Wade 的各种议论中，这个问题好像都被忽视了， 我对堕胎合法性本身没有很强烈的立场，我个人的道德观与之并不抵触，不过，一个共同体若是基于其传统而加以禁止，我看也未尝不可，Roe v. Wade 让我特别不爽的是，自由派法官在这事情上表现的非常虚伪和双标， Roe v. Wade 的裁决依据是第14修正案的正当程序（due process）条款：

nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

多数意见认为，德州的堕胎禁止法律侵犯了孕妇的隐私权，而该隐私权包含在上面这个条款所提及的个人权利（liberty）里， 这显然是对个人自然权利非常宽的解释，对此我并没意见，我也向来希望对个人自然权利做宽泛解释，问题是，这些自由派法官仅仅在他们关心的那些事情上才会做如此宽泛的解释，而在其他事情上，他们对自然权利的解释都比前辈大幅收紧， 实际上，通过拓宽解释第14修正案的 liberty 来实施重大司法干预，并非 Roe v. Wade 的首创，1905年 [[Lochner v. New York]] 一案的裁决，把契约自由也纳入了第14修正案的 liberty 中，从而认定各州的最低工资法和工作时间限制违宪，因为最低工资和工作时限剥夺了契约自由， 这条原则如果存在到今天的话，那么罗斯福以来的很多管制法律都会被判违宪了，当然，实际上，它早就被推翻了，而 Roe 时代的那些自由派法官，正是推动管制国家大幅扩张、个人自然权利大幅缩减的司法能动主义者，如果他们把 Roe 案的原则也运用于其他个人权利，那我们看到的是一个比镀金时代更自由的社会， 不妨举个更加赤裸裸的例子，可以帮助我们理解这事情， 纽约市政府是出了名的 nanny state，特别替市民健康操心，所以以前酒吧是禁止向孕妇卖酒的，前几年，纽约市废除了这条法律，说是这孕妇懂得怎么做对自己最好，卖酒禁令是对孕妇的歧视， 如此说来，纽约市终于变动不那么 nanny 了吗？ 这么想你就太幼稚了，也是那几年，纽约市出了新法律，限制餐馆在餐桌上摆盐罐子，因为食客太蠢了，总是给自己的菜撒太多盐， ---------------- @小金鱼上校: Unconventional opinion: there is no constitutional right to privacy. The closest opinion which may come to recognize a claim that is similiar to a constitutional right to privacy is Katz v United States @whigzhou: 扯上隐私权确实挺强词夺理的，姑且替他修正为身体自主权 @whigzhou: 其实 Roe 还有个更可笑的地方，法官竟然临时发明了一套胎儿发育三阶段理论，扮演速成医学专家，既表现了其自以为无所不知的狂妄，也大大突破了有关法官在裁决中可以做什么不可以做什么的司法传统

【2021-05-01】 签约的时候，拍着胸脯说自己是自愿的，等做的不开心了就说是资本家强加的，这种人，我叫他们自由意志机会主义者，俗称鸡贼， 另一种，自己的工作再忙再累也是自己心甘情愿，乐在其中，成就感十足，一看下等人也那么忙也那么累，就气鼓鼓受不了了，就你们那点下贱活，也配叫工作？就你们这整天愁吃愁喝的，也配说自己是自愿的？这种人，我叫他们自由意志特权主义者，俗称上等人， 每年庆祝这个 commie 节日最积极的，大概就是这两种人吧，

【2020-10-05】 @迢书 假如非要用一个指标衡量出版自由，不能用出版了多少书，而要用禁止出版了多少书。其他自由同理。 @whigzhou: 不对吧，北高丽这个指标好像是零。 @一步逃离危墙: [允悲]例外，例外 @whigzhou: 是基础假设不对，不是例外，和用『报纸天窗率』评估新闻自由度犯了同样错误 @whigzhou: 实在要设计一个单一量化指标，我看还是用『加权平均的书号成本/定价比』比较好，书号成本包括所有enabling costs，加权系数是同类渍油市场的各类别销售份额，若不可能出版，则enabling cost视为与定价相等 @whigzhou: 不少libertarian在评价管制的问题上也犯过同样的错误，比如以管制法规的篇幅来衡量管制严厉程度，他们难道就没想过，『一律禁止』的篇幅只有四个字啊。 ​​​​  

【2020-09-16】 之前在EconTalk听了一个对宗教经济学家 Laurence Iannaccone 的访谈，其中有个观点，认为宗教在美国之所以没有经历像欧洲那种程度的衰退（以信众人数，上教堂频率，捐款等活跃度指标衡量），是因为美国有着远更自由的宗教市场，这一点之所以被忽视，是因为以往人们在谈论宗教自由度时，通常只关注消费方的选择自由（即个人选择信不信、信什么，入哪派的自由），在这方面，欧美在过去一个半世纪中似乎已没多大差别，可是，假如我们将注意力转向供方，便可发现差异巨大，在美国，创立新教派或组织新教会，都是完全自由的，而在欧洲，这会面临非常大障碍，有时几乎不可能，究其因，在国家权力退出宗教事务这一点上，美国做的最为彻底，而且从建国起便已实现。 刚刚又想起这个话题，于是查了些资料，发现确实如此，仅以瑞典和德国为例。 在瑞典，直到1860年之前，脱离路德教会都是非法的，1860年后，允许脱离，但只能转入另一个基督教会，这一规定直到1951年才废除，而路德宗的国教地位一直维持到2000，目前，瑞典是全欧宗教活跃度最低的国家。 在战后德国，虽然政府并不限制创立新教会，但他有个奇葩政策：教会税，这是附加在所得税上的一个特别税种（约为所得税的8-9%），不管是不是信徒都得交，收来的钱分配给合格教会，所谓合格就是具有足够规模且历史足够长，这就相当于把宗教市场变成了single payer，既已立足的教会根本不需要操心筹款的事情，这当然极大削弱了宗教市场的竞争和创新，看了下 church tax 这个维基词条，貌似这种情况在欧洲还很流行。 缺乏供方自由的结果是阻断了供方通过竞争和创新不断进化的动力，令其难以适应始终处于变化之中的宗教需求，结果是信众不断流失。 而且这种阻断的效果是非常持久的，即便现在完全放开，供给活跃度也需要好几代人才会提高到新的均衡水平，因为正如Iannaccone在另一篇文章里所解释的，宗教供给和其他商品很不一样，建立新教派/新教会需要漫长而艰苦的努力，因而供方调整有很长的滞后期。 若考虑这一滞后期，便可发现，美国宗教市场还有另一个大优势：他的供给来源从一开始就非常丰富多样，殖民时代各殖民地就分属多个教派，而此后移民浪潮中，移民宗教背景更是无所不包，这一点，加上供方的充分自由，让美国的潜在信徒拥有其他任何地方都不可比拟的多样选择，这最生动的体现在四次大觉醒浪潮之中。 由此可见，所谓美国例外，要点其实还是在于自由。 附：Iannaccone 有篇文章介绍了他的宗教经济学概念和理论框架，收录于 John Hinnells 的 The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion (2009) 第27章，有兴趣可以找来读一下。 @如玉我从来不P图: 德国可以不交教堂税的，在市政厅登记人口时候报备无宗教就可以了。年纪大一些的人很多不会退出了，因为以后还要考虑葬礼和教堂墓地的问题。年轻一代退出的很多，我认识的德国人基本没人交教堂税。 @whigzhou: 多谢指正  

【2020-09-04】 听了个podcast，在说NYT那个1619 Project，非常恶心的一个东西，甚至可以说是NYT从liberal转向commie的一个标志。 不过这倒让我重新思考了一下奴隶制的问题，许多经济史家都将奴隶制的盛行视为工资率高企乃至长期脱离生存极限的一个迹象，包括Kyle Harper在《罗马的命运》里也是这么认为，其逻辑是：保有一个奴隶的成本=维持其生存的费用（S）+控制其人身的费用（C），在马尔萨斯均衡附近，市场工资率将低到只能勉强维生，也就是接近于S，那么使用奴隶就不如使用雇工合算，所以，假如我们看到某时某地奴隶被大量使用，就意味着此时此地的经济状况显著脱离了马尔萨斯均衡。 我对这种说法比较怀疑，它背后的理论当然没错，但适用条件可能比他们想的要狭窄的多，实际上，其逻辑链的每个环节都值得推敲：1）奴隶未必需要人身控制，2）生存费用不是常数，大量蓄奴或许会因为规模经济或合作效应而降低人均生存费用，至少可以降低调剂丰缺的风险储备，3）这一理论只适用于无技能劳力，对于有技能劳力，蓄奴所节省的技能溢价或许足以抵偿控制成本。 仔细想了想，我觉得，观察蓄奴与否，以及如何蓄奴，需要考虑几个因素：某种工作所需的激励，所需技能的特性，以及这种人力资本如何形成。 依我的印象，古代最流行的奴隶其实是家务仆佣，传统家务的特定是，它所需要的技能是高度特化的，而且只能在从业过程中形成，一个好的仆人需要对他主人的习惯，口味，偏好，忌讳……了如指掌，而所有这些知识换了主人就全部报废。 随便举个例子，你可能觉得打扫房间是一项无技能工作，实则不然，实际上很多人非常抵触让随便一个人打扫他的房间，因为他对自己房内各种物品的摆放位置有一套难以言说的复杂规则，一旦打乱就很恼火，类似例子不胜枚举，衣食住行都是如此。 家务工作的这种特性形成了一种双边垄断：对于已经积累足够经验的仆人，他的知识技能只有一位买家，对主人，他所需要的技能也只有这位仆人能提供，依我看，凡是人力资本存在这种特性的，都倾向于形成奴役或依附关系。 但这种奴役不需要太多人身控制，因为关系终结对双方都是很大损失，主人只须将报酬维持在高于市场无技能工资水平上，便可消除仆人逃跑的诱惑。 另一种容易形成奴役的是需要高技能但不需要特别激励的工作（不需要特别激励是指产出率与激励方式没多大关系），此时奴役可以免除技能溢价，但是，假如这种高技能不是特化的，因而市场价格足够高，那就需要人身控制，许多古代君主都会将一些工匠至于奴役地位，特别是那些具有战略价值的工匠职业，比如武器制造。 暂时先想到这些。 @簪美人: 看似是人身依附性的度的问题，度的一端是不自由民（奴隶关系，如奴隶、长工、短工、匠户），往前走是分配制劳工（铁饭碗式劳动关系），其后是聘用制劳工（聘用式劳动关系），另一端是合作关系（合作关系，如主播、艺人）。 @whigzhou: 对[good]，一个相当连续的光谱  

【2018-07-19】 像谷歌最近被布鲁塞尔黑帮大块割肉这种事情，放在十年前我会同情甚至愤怒，现在越来越觉得他们活该，在抵制日益膨胀的管制国家的抗争中，这些大企业不仅越来越缺乏道德勇气，向主流舆论献媚，附和反市场价值观，总是选择退让屈服，和解消灾，乃至认罪，还常常利用管制与干预打击排挤竞争对手（谷歌在这一点上也不清白），他们从自由市场获益无数，却将捍卫自由与市场的责任全然推却，和他们相比，镀金时代的强盗资本家高出一万倍。 从好的一面看，布鲁塞尔为美国大公司提供了一个品尝国家主义铁拳，体验什么是真正社会主义的场所，这或许可以帮助他们别在黑路上走的太远。  

【2017-10-06】 第一第二代进化论者通常也是古典自由主义者，第三第四代进化论者里却冒出了大批进步主义者、种族主义者和强制优生论者，这是怎么回事？奥秘在于福利制度，作为进化论者，他们很容易看出福利制度逆转选择压力的效果，这是对的，错误在于他们自负且狂妄到想要扮演上帝的角色。 在我们达尔萨斯主义者看来，通过育种计划来改进人类的想法是幼稚可笑的，消除福利制度，让自然选择在和平条件下继续起作用，才是正道。 类似的错误也发生在种族和民族问题上，常有人将我们的特殊主义和alt-right中的孤立主义和白人民族主义者相混淆，其实两者之间只有肤浅的相似性。 我们达尔萨斯主义者相信，存在种族、民族和文化差异，就现代文明的存在条件而言，一些种族比另一些优秀，一些民族比另一些优秀，一些文化比另一些文化优秀，一些共同体比另一些优秀…… 但我们不会像某些alt-right那样主张孤立主义、民族主义乃至种族隔离，因为所有这些都是在试图阻断自然选择和进化过程，而优秀群体的优秀正是选择和进化的结果，他们才是最不需要把自己圈闭起来的群体，他们唯一需要的是一个和平开放自愿条件下继续展开竞争的制度条件。 诸如『不能让我们优秀民族的血统被劣等民族污染了』这种念头，只有极度自卑者才会冒出来，用关税保护本国产业的性质完全一样。  

America’s Opportunity City 美国的机会之城 作者：Joel Kotkin, Tory Gattis @ 2014-夏 译者：尼克基得慢（@尼克基得慢） 校对：babyface_claire（@许你疯不许你傻） 来源：City Journal，http://city-journal.org/html/america%E2%80%99s-opportunity-city-13662.html Lots of new jobs and a low cost of living make Houston a middle-class magnet. 许多的新工作和低廉的生活成本使得休斯敦成为一个对中产阶级有着强大吸引力的城市。 David Wolff and David Hightower are driving down the partially completed Grand Parkway around Houston. The vast road, when completed, will add a third freeway loop around this booming, 600-square-mile Texas metropolis. David Wolff和David Hightower正驱车行驶在部分完工的环休斯敦花园大道上。完工之后，这条宽阔道路会成为围绕这座蓬勃发展的600平方英里德州大城市的高速公路第三环。 Urban aesthetes on the ocean coasts tend to have a low opinion of the flat Texas landscape—and of Houston, in particular, which they see as a little slice of Hades: a hot, humid, and featureless expanse of flood-prone grassland, punctuated only by drab office towers and suburban tract houses. 住在海岸城市的唯美主义者通常不喜欢平坦的德州地貌——尤其是休斯敦的地貌，他们将之视为一小片地狱：一片炎热潮湿且毫无特点的广阔区域，有洪水泛滥的草地，点缀着单调的办公大楼和郊区风格的大片房屋。 But Wolff and Hightower, major land developers on Houston’s outskirts for four decades, have a different outlook. “We may not have all the scenery of a place like California,” notes the 73-year-old Wolff, who is also part owner of the San Francisco Giants. “But growth makes up for a lot of imperfections.” 但是作为从业四十年的休斯敦郊区主要土地开发商，Wolff和Hightower有着不同的观点。“我们或许没有像加州那样的全部景色，”同时也是旧金山巨人队的共有者的73岁的Wolff提到。“但是经济增长弥补了许多不完美之处。” A host of newcomers—immigrants and transplants from around the United States—agree with that assessment. Its low cost of living and high rate of job growth have made Houston and its surrounding metro region attractive to young families. According to Pitney Bowes, Houston will enjoy the highest growth in new households of any major city between 2014 and 2017. 许多新来者——外国移民和美国本土移居者——都同意Wolff的评价。低生活成本和高职位增长率使休斯敦和周围城区对年轻家庭很有吸引力。据Pitney Bowes公司预测，2014年到2017年期间，休斯敦将会享有所有大城市中最高的新住户增长率。 A recent U.S. Council of Mayors study predicted that the American urban order will become increasingly Texan, with Houston and Dallas–Fort Worth both growing larger than Chicago by 2050. 最近一份美国市长委员会的研究预测，美国的城市秩序越来越德州化，休斯敦和达拉斯-沃思堡（Dallas–Fort Worth）的城市规模在2050年前都会超过芝加哥。 The Grand Parkway, Wolff points out, continues Houston’s pattern of outward development. The vast ExxonMobil campus being built in the far northern suburbs—and surrounded by its own master-planned community, Springwoods Village—will eventually be the nation’s second-largest office development, after Manhattan’s Freedom Tower. Houston is already home to numerous planned communities with bucolic-sounding names: Cinco Ranch, Bridgeland, Sienna Plantation, the Woodlands, and Sugar Land. Wolff 指出，花园大道延续了休斯敦的外向型发展模式。位于北部远郊正在修建的巨大的埃克森美孚校园最终将会成为仅次于曼哈顿自由塔的美国第二大办公楼, 周围环绕着埃克森美孚自己总体规划的社区，Springwoods Village。休斯敦已经拥有众多名字听起来田园风格的规划社区：Cinco Ranch, Bridgeland, Sienna Plantation, the Woodlands, 和Sugar Land。 “Open space is the most precious amenity,” says Wolff, a primary developer of the Energy Corridor, a Houston neighborhood boasting 22 million square feet of office space and housing the headquarters of such key energy firms as BP America, ConocoPhillips, and CITGO. “What we are creating here is a place where business can grow and people can afford to live. This is the key to Houston.” Indeed, the Houston model of development might be described as “opportunity urbanism.” “开放空间是最宝贵的生活设施”， 作为Energy Corridor——一个休斯敦社区，拥有2200万平方英尺办公空间并且容纳了诸多重要能源公司的总部，如BP美国、康菲和CITGO——主要开发商的Wolff 说道。“我们在这正在创造的是一个商业能发展、人们能有钱生活的地方。这是休斯敦的关键所在。”确实，休斯敦发展模式可以被描述为“都市化机会”。 Houston’s economic success over the past 20 years—and, more remarkably, since the Great Recession and the weak national recovery—rivals the performance of any large metropolitan region in the United States. For nearly a decade and a half, the city has been adding jobs at a furious pace—more than 600,000 since early 2000, and 263,000 since early 2008. 休斯敦过去20多年的经济成功——并且从大衰退和疲弱的全国性复苏以来越发明显——超过了美国任何其他大都市区的表现。在大约15年时间里，这座城市以极快的速度创造着工作机会——2000年初以来超过60万，2008年初以来为26.3万。 The greater New York City area, by contrast, has added just 103,000 jobs since 2008, and Los Angeles, Chicago, Phoenix, Atlanta, and Philadelphia remain well below their 2008 levels in total jobs. In fact, Los Angeles and Chicago, like Detroit, have fewer jobs today than they did at the turn of the millennium. 对比之下，规模更大的纽约都市区自2008年以来仅创造了10.3万份工作机会，而且洛杉矶、芝加哥、凤凰城、亚特兰大和费城的总工作机会远低于它们2008年的水平。事实上，正如底特律那样，洛杉矶和芝加哥现在拥有的工作机会已经少于世纪之交那时了。 And many of Houston’s jobs pay well. Using Praxis Strategy Group calculations that factor in the cost of living as well as salaries, Houston now has the highest standard of living of any large city in the U.S. and among the highest in the world. Indeed, the average cost-of-living-adjusted salary in Houston is about $75,000, compared with around $50,000 in New York and $46,000 in Los Angeles. 而且很多休斯敦的工作薪水颇高。根据实践战略集团（Praxis Strategy Group）的推算，同时考虑生活成本和薪资，休斯敦目前拥有全美所有大城市中最高的生活标准，而且也是全世界最高的城市之一。事实上，休斯敦按生活成本调整后的薪水是大约7.5万美元，相比之下纽约为约5万美元，洛杉矶为4.6万美元。 Personal household income has risen 20 percent since 2005 in Houston, compared with 14 percent in New York, 11 percent in Los Angeles, and less than 9 percent in Chicago. Former Federal Reserve economist Bill Gilmer notes that, except during the energy bust of the mid-1980s, Houston’s per-capita income growth has outpaced the nation’s since the late 1960s. 从2005年以来，休斯敦的个人家庭收入已经上涨20%，相比之下纽约为14%，洛杉矶为11%，芝加哥为不到9%。前美联储经济学家Bill Gilmer提到，自1960年代末以来，除1980年代中期能源业危机期间【编注：原油价格在1979年第二次石油危机期间升至顶峰，1982年开始下跌，1986年暴跌至1973年第一次能源危机前的水平，此后直到2005年之前始终未能回到历史最高点。】，休斯敦的人均收入增长已经超过了全美水平。 Not surprisingly, given Houston’s reputation as an oil town, much of the job growth in its metro region (known as Greater Houston) is tied to energy—particularly, to the technological revolution now reshaping that industry. Once widely derided as a “colony” of California- and New York–based companies, Houston has increasingly become the location of choice for American energy firms. 不出所料，考虑到休斯敦作为石油城的名声，这一都市区（被称为大休斯敦区）相当部分的工作机会增长跟能源有关——特别是跟正在重塑该行业的技术革命【编注：即页岩革命】有关。虽然曾被广泛嘲笑为总部设在加州和纽约的公司的“殖民地”，休斯敦已经越来越多的成为美国能源公司的总部所在地。 In 1960, for example, Houston was home to only one of the nation’s top energy firms; by 2013, it was home to 22 from the Fortune 500, more than all other cities combined—and that doesn’t include major non-headquarter locations for ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, and BP. This past spring, Occidental Petroleum, Los Angeles’s last major energy firm, announced plans to move to Houston’s Uptown district, near the famed Galleria. 例如在1960年，仅有一家美国顶级能源公司的总部设在休斯敦；截至2013年，22家世界五百强企业总部设在休斯敦，超过其他城市的总和——这还不包括作为埃克森美孚、壳牌、雪佛龙和BP的主要非总部所在地。今年春季，作为洛杉矶最后一个大能源公司，西方石油公司宣布了迁往休斯敦城郊区域的计划，靠近著名的Galleria商场。 Since 2001, the energy industry has been directly responsible for an increase of 67,000 jobs in Houston, and it now employs more than 240,000 people in the area. These jobs include many technical positions, one reason that the region now boasts the highest concentration of engineers outside Silicon Valley. 从2001年开始，休斯敦的能源产业已经直接产生了6.7万份工作的增长，现在该区域的能源行业已经雇佣了超过24万人。这些工作包含了许多技术岗位，一个原因就是这一区域的工程师密度现已成为硅谷之外最大的了。 Since 2001, Houston has seen a 24.1 percent growth in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) employment, compared with less than 5 percent growth in New York and San Francisco. The jobs should keep coming: Gilmer estimates that $25 billion to $40 billion in new petrochemical facilities is on its way to Greater Houston. 自从2001年以来，休斯敦在STEM（科学，技术，工程和数学）雇佣上经历了24.1%的增长，相比之下纽约和旧金山增长率不足5%。工作机会还会增长：Gilmer推测将有250亿到400亿美元的新建石化设施会在大休斯敦地区崛起。 “Oil and gas used to feel old, but that’s changing,” suggests Samina Farid, cofounder of Merrick Systems, a 25-year-old oil-services firm with 45 employees. “Younger people are coming into the business because they see opportunities to use new technologies that can really make a difference.” Farid’s firm is one of the thousands of smaller companies—including a group of new, tech-savvy start-ups—that serve the energy industry. “石油和天然气以前给人感觉很老气，但是它们正在改变，” Merrick Systems的联合创始人Samina Farid提到，Merrick Systems是一家拥有45名员工和25年历史的石油服务公司。“年轻人正加入能源行业，因为他们看见了应用能真正带来改变的新技术的机会。” Allison Lami Sawyer, the 29-year-old president of Rebellion Photonics, is part of a movement of younger professionals clustering in the area, many of them in the city’s inner ring. “I came here kicking and screaming,” said the British-educated Alabama native, whose nine-person company, mostly engineers and scientists, provides image-sensing equipment to firms such as Exxon. “But this was the place to be—it works well to be in the oil and gas capital of the world if that’s who you are selling to.” Allison Lami Sawyer，29岁的Rebellion Photonics总裁，是往该区域聚集的年轻专家中的一员，大部分年轻专家住在城市内环。“我当初很不情愿地来到这里，”这位受英式教育的亚拉巴马州土著说道，他的九人公司主要由工程师和科学家构成，为埃克森之类的公司提供图像传感设备。“但这是休斯敦以前的情况——如果你想在石油天然气的资本世界中兜售产品，休顿斯是理想之地。” Houston has embraced not only the energy industry’s white-collar professional jobs but also its well-paying blue-collar industrial positions. The city has seen a surge in mid-skills jobs (usually requiring a certificate or a two-year degree) in fields such as manufacturing, logistics, and construction, as well as energy. 休斯敦不仅拥有能源行业白领专家的工作机会，也拥有薪资不菲的蓝领产业工人职位。这座城市见证了诸如制造业、物流业、建筑业和能源业等领域内中等技能工作（通常要求一份执照或者两年的学位）的爆发性增长。 Many of these jobs pay more than $100,000 a year, and since 2007, according to calculations derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the Praxis Strategy Group’s Mark Schill, Houston led the 52 major metropolitan areas in creating them, at a rate of 6.6 percent annually. In contrast, these jobs have declined by more than 10 percent in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco, which have not been friendly to such industries. 很多这类工作的年薪超过十万美元，而且根据实践战略集团（Praxis Strategy Group）的Mark Schill对劳工统计局数据的分析，休斯敦从2007年起就以每年6.6%的中等技能工作增长率领跑52个大都市区。相比之下，纽约、洛杉矶、芝加哥和旧金山的此类工作已经减少了超过10%，这几个地区一直对这些行业不友好。 Trade is robust. The Port of Houston, connected with the Gulf of Mexico by the 50-mile Houston Ship Channel, is now the nation’s Number One export hub, feeding off the energy revolution and expanding economic exchange with Latin America. Mexico and Brazil are by far the port’s largest trading partners. 贸易正如火如荼。休斯敦港通过50英里的休斯敦航道与墨西哥湾相连，得益于能源革命和与拉美经济交流的扩大，现已成为美国的头号出口中心。墨西哥和巴西是目前休斯顿港的最大贸易伙伴。 Houston’s port business has grown almost fourfold since 2000—far faster than either New York’s or Los Angeles’s. Port officials estimate that the trade sector contributes $500 billion in economic activity and more than 1 million jobs to the state of Texas annually. 休斯敦的港口生意自2000年以来几乎已经增长四倍——远快于纽约和洛杉矶的港口。港口官员认为，港口贸易部门为经济活动贡献了5000亿美元的产值，而且每年为德州增加100万工作机会。 Houston is also home to the Texas Medical Center, the largest concentration of hospitals and research institutions in the world and, by itself, the metro region’s third-largest source of jobs—employing 106,000 people, including 20,000 physicians, scientists, and other professionals. 休斯敦也是德州医学中心（TMC）——世界上最大的医院和研究机构综合体的所在地，此中心也是该都市区第三大工作来源——雇佣了包括2万名医生、科学家和其他专家在内的10.6万人。 Fifty-two separate medical institutions are located on the campus, equal in size to Chicago’s Loop. It currently has over 28.3 million square feet of office space, more than the downtowns of both Houston and Los Angeles. By the end of 2014, TMC top officials predict, the area will be the nation’s seventh-largest business district. 52个单独的医疗机构位于与芝加哥环区同等规模的园区内。它目前拥有超过2830万平方英尺的办公空间，比休斯敦和洛杉矶的商业区都大。TMC的高级官员预测，这一区域将在2014年末成为美国第七大商业区。 Houston is neither the libertarian paradise imagined by many conservatives nor the antigovernment Wild West town conjured by liberals. The city is better understood as relentlessly pragmatic and pro-growth. 休斯敦既不是许多保守派想象中的自由意志主义者的天堂，也不是自由派臆想的反政府狂野西部城镇。这座城市更应被理解为是冰冷的实用主义的和促进经济增长的。 Bob Lanier, the legendary three-time Democratic mayor who steered the city’s recovery from the 1980s oil bust, when the metro region bled more than 220,000 jobs in just five years, epitomized this can-do spirit. Bob Lanier 是这种充满干劲精神的典型代表，当1980年代的休斯敦地区在短短五年内减少了超过22万份工作时，这位连任三届传奇般的民主党市长带领这座城市从石油业危机中恢复过来。 Lanier was more interested in building infrastructure and promoting growth than in regulation and redistribution. That focus remains strong today. “Houston is getting very comfortable with itself and what it is,” says retired Harris County judge Robert Eckels. “We are a place that has a big idea—supporting and growing through private industry, and that’s something everyone pretty much accepts.” Lanier更喜欢修建基础设施、促进经济增长，而不是推动立法、实行再分配。这种偏向现在仍然很强烈。“休斯敦对于自身现状很满意，”退休的Harris县法官Robert Eckels说道。“我们是一个有远大理想的地方——通过支持私营企业来实现自身发展，这是这里每个人都深以为然的道理。” Low taxes are part of that idea. Texas has no income tax, as Governor Rick Perry frequently points out to businesses in other states, and its average state and local tax burden is 11th-lowest in the nation. New York, New Jersey, and California, by contrast, impose the three highest state tax burdens in the nation. 低税也是这理念的一部分。正如德州州长Rick Perry经常给其他州的生意人所说的那样，德州没有所得税，而且它的平均州税和本地税负担是全美第11低的。相比之下，纽约、新泽西和加州是全美州税负担前三名。 The friendly tax environment is one reason that Houston ranked as the most affordable city to do business in a recent survey of global metropolitan areas by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Partnership for New York City. It means a lot more money in their employees’ pockets, too. A family of three making $150,000 moving from New York City to Houston would save upward of $8,000 in taxes, an analysis conducted by the District of Columbia found. 最近由普华永道（PricewaterhouseCoopers）和纽约合伙人（the Partnership for New York City）发起的全球都市区调查中，休斯敦被评为最容易做生意的城市，其中一个原因就是友好的税收环境。这也意味着更多的钱落进雇员的口袋里。一份由哥伦比亚特区主持的分析报告发现，一个从纽约搬到休斯敦的收入15万美元的三口之家可以省下高达八千美元的税费。 An even bigger component of Houston’s growth, however, may be its planning regime, which allows development to follow the market instead of top-down government directives. The city and its unincorporated areas have no formal zoning, so land use is flexible and can readily meet demand. 然而，休斯敦的经济增长可能更多来自它的规划制度，遵从市场规律而不是自上而下的政府指令来促进发展。休斯敦和周围未并入地区没有正式的边界，所以土地使用很灵活而且能很好地迎合需求。 Getting building permits is simple and quick, with no arbitrary approval boards making development an interminable process. Neighborhoods can protect themselves with voluntary, opt-in deed restrictions or minimum lot sizes. Architect and developer Tim Cisneros credits the flexible planning system for the city’s burgeoning apartment and town-home development. 获得建筑许可简单迅速，没有专横的审批委员会使得土地开发变成没完没了的恼人流程。社区可以通过自愿的可选的限制性契约或者最小批量方法来保护自己。建筑师兼开发商Tim Cisneros将这座城市迅速崛起的公寓和联排住宅的开发归功于灵活的规划系统。 “There are a lot of people who come here for jobs but don’t want to live, at least not yet, in the Woodlands,” he notes. “We can respond to this demand fast because there’s no zoning, and approvals don’t take forever. You could not do this so fast in virtually any city in America. The lack of zoning allows us not only to do neat things—but do them quickly and for less money.” “有很多人为工作来到这里，但却不想住在伍德兰（Woodlands），至少现在还不想。”他提到。“我们可以迅速对这种要求做出回应，因为这里没有区域划分，审批也不会耗时太久。事实上，你在美国任何其他城市都不可能如此快速地获得审批。无区域划分让我们不仅做实事，而且做得迅速且省钱。” The flexible planning regime is also partly responsible for keeping Houston’s housing prices low compared with those of other major cities. On a square-foot basis, according to Knight Frank, a London-based real-estate consultancy, the same amount of money buys you almost seven times as much space in Houston as it does in San Francisco and more than four times as much as in New York. (See “Houston, New York Has a Problem,” Summer 2008.) Houston has built a new kind of “self-organizing” urban model, notes architect and author Lars Lerup, one that he calls “a creature of the market.” 相比其他大城市，灵活的规划制度也在某种程度上使得休斯敦房价较低。据位于伦敦的不动产咨询公司Knight Frank统计，以每平方英尺计，你花同样的钱在休斯敦能买的空间几乎七倍于旧金山，四倍于纽约。（参阅“休斯敦，纽约有一个问题”，2008年夏。）建筑师兼作者Lars Lerup表示，休斯敦已经建立起了一种新型的“自组织”城市模式，他称之为“市场的产物”。 Some cities—such as Los Angeles—grow as a progression of larger communities around a relatively small core. Others—such as New York and Chicago—form dependent communities surrounding a dynamic central core. Houston is different: it revolves around a patchwork of centers, such as the aforementioned Woodlands, home to some 40,000 residences and more than 50,000 jobs. 一些城市——比如洛杉矶——发展成一系列围绕相对较小中心的较大社区。其它城市——比如纽约和芝加哥——则形成了依赖并围绕唯一动态核心的社区。休斯敦与两者都不同：它是围绕着一系列中心的拼图，比如说之前提到的拥有4万居民和超过5万份工作的伍德兰（Woodlands）。 Other centers exist within the city limits, but Houston also retains a strong core that never imploded, as did those of so many American cities. The city turns the whole debate that dominates urban thinking today—whether to grow the suburbs or downtown—on its head. Rather than advocate one kind of housing, Houston prides itself on providing choices. 城市边界内还有着其他中心，但是休斯顿也保留了一个从未衰退的强大核心区，正如许多美国城市那样。这座城市让左右今日城市思维的整个辩论——是发展郊区还是中心商业区——变得易如反掌。休斯敦自豪于提供各种住房选择，而不是大力推进任何一种住宅形式。 In fact, as the city’s outer suburban ring has grown—last year attracting roughly 80 percent of all new home buyers—the downtown has also boomed. The city’s vibrant inner ring, notes demographer Wendell Cox, grew 3 percent during the last decade—four times the average in the top 15 metropolitan areas and more than Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. 事实上，随着城外的郊区不断发展——去年吸引了约80%的新房买家——城区也在繁荣向前。人口统计学家Wendell Cox提到，这座城市生机勃勃的内环在过去十年增长了3%【编注：大概是指人口增长。】——4倍于15个大都市区的平均水平，也高于芝加哥、洛杉矶、纽约和费城。 “Most cities would die for our in-fill,” says Jeff Taebel, director of Community and Environmental Planning at the Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC). No one would mistake downtown Houston for midtown Manhattan, true; but it represents 6 percent of the region’s jobs—a proportion 2.5 to 4.5 times greater than one finds, say, in downtown Los Angeles or Phoenix. Houston’s experience refutes the popular notion that urban density and central city development require heavy regulation. “大部分城市都会渴望我们这种重建”休斯敦-加尔维斯顿地区议会（HGAC）中的社区与环境规划主任Jeff Taebel说到。没人会把休斯敦市中心误认为曼哈顿中心区，前者确实不如后者繁华；但是休斯敦市中心贡献了整个区域6%的工作机会——这一比例是洛杉矶或费城市区的2.5-4.5倍。休斯敦的经验驳斥了城区密度和中心城区发展需要严厉管制的流行观念。 Houston’s housing-market flexibility has also benefited some of the city’s historically neglected areas. The once-depopulating Fifth Ward has seen a surge of new housing—much of it for middle-income African-Americans, attracted by the area’s long-standing black cultural vibe and close access to downtown as well as the Texas Medical Center. 休斯敦房地产市场的灵活性也有益于部分历史上被忽略的地区。曾经人口负增长的第五区现在新房激增——很多新房都是为中等收入的非裔美国人所有，他们被该区长久的黑人文化氛围和靠近市区与德州医疗中心的位置所吸引。 Rather than worry about gentrification, many locals support the change in fortunes. “In Houston, we don’t like the idea of keeping an image of poverty for our neighborhood,” explained Rev. Harvey Clemons, chairman of the Fifth Ward Community Redevelopment Corporation. “We welcome renewal.” 许多当地人都支持这种财富转变，而不是去担心衰败社区的中产化升级会排挤贫穷居民。“在休斯敦，我们不喜欢那种保持自己社区贫穷形象的想法，”第五区社区重建局的主席，牧师Harvey Clemons解释道， “我们欢迎事物更新。” By allowing and encouraging development in the inner ring and on the fringe, the city increases its attractiveness to younger people, who want to live close to the urban core, while also providing affordable suburban housing. “Houston thrives because it has someplace for young people to stay inside the city but also offers an alternative when they get older. Just because you grow up doesn’t mean you have to leave the region,” notes Gilmer, now head of the Institute for Regional Forecasting at the University of Houston. 通过允许、鼓励内环和外围的发展，这座城市提高了对于那些想住在市中心附近的年轻人的吸引力，同时也为提供了其他人负担得起的郊区住房。“休斯敦之所以繁荣发展是因为它既提供了年轻人在城里生活的地方，也提供了当他们变老时的去处。你变老了并不意味着你必须要离开这城市，”休斯敦大学的区域预测学会会长Gilmer说到。 Houston’s explosive economic growth has engendered another kind of boom: a human one. Between 2000 and 2013, Greater Houston’s population expanded by 35 percent. In contrast, New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago grew by 4 percent to 7 percent. 休斯敦经济的爆发式增长已经产生了另一种形式的迅速发展：人口的增长。2000年到2013年期间，大休斯敦地区的人口增加了35%。相比之下，纽约、洛杉矶、波士顿、费城和芝加哥仅增长了4-7%。 These figures reflect emerging migration patterns. Texas once sent large numbers of people to California and the East Coast, but now, considerable numbers of New Yorkers, San Franciscans, and Los Angelenos are picking up stakes and heading for Houston, Dallas, Austin, and San Antonio. 这些数字反映了正在浮现的移居模式。德州曾有很多人去往加州和东海岸，但是现在，相当数量的纽约人，旧金山人和洛杉矶人正带着财产向休斯敦、达拉斯、奥斯丁和圣安东尼奥进发。 As it grows, Houston’s ethnic demography is shifting. Two decades ago, Houston struggled to attract foreign-born immigrants, as did Texas generally. But since the 1990s, Texas’s immigration rates have surpassed the national average. 随着休斯敦的发展，它的少数种族人口也在转变。二十年前，休斯敦很难吸引到外国移民，整个德州也普遍如此。但是自从1990年代以来，德州的移民率已经超过全国平均值。 Over the past decade, Houston added 440,000 foreign-born residents, the second-most in the country, while New York, with more than three times the population, added 660,000. In a dramatic sign of changing trends, Houston attracted more than three times as many foreign-born immigrants as did Los Angeles, which is more than double its size. 在过去十年里，休斯敦增加了44万外国出生的居民，数量全国第二，而有着超过三倍人口的纽约增加了66万。这种变化趋势的重要信号就是，休斯敦吸引了超过洛杉矶三倍的外国移民，而洛杉矶的规模是休斯敦的两倍。 “This is the big deal for immigrants,” suggests HGAC’s Taebel. “We are a very attractive place for working-class people to settle.” The immigrant surge has turned what was once a conventional Southern city into a multiracial melting pot. “这对移民来说是件大事，” HGAC的Taebel表示。“我们是一个非常吸引工薪阶层人们前来定居的地方。”激增的移民已经把一座曾经保守的南方城市转变为多种族熔炉。 Indeed, a 2012 Rice University study claimed that Greater Houston is now the most ethnically diverse metro region in America, as measured by the balance between four major groups: African-American, white, Asian, and Hispanic. Hispanics alone constitute nearly half the core city’s population, while the Asian population has surged almost fourfold; whites constitute barely a quarter of the total. The entire Greater Houston metro region—roughly 6.3 million people—is now 60 percent nonwhite, up from 42 percent in 1990. 事实上， 2012年莱斯大学的一份研究声称，通过衡量四个主要族群之间的平衡：非裔美国人、白人、亚裔和拉丁裔，大休斯敦区现已成为美国种族多样性程度最高的都市区。仅拉丁裔就贡献了核心城区人口的近一半，同时亚裔人口激增了几乎四倍；白人仅占总人口的四分之一。整个大休斯敦都市区——大约630万人——在1990年有42%是非白人种族，如今增长到了60%。 Houston’s new diversity is not confined to one neighborhood or district. Suburban Sugarland is over 35 percent Asian and home to one of the nation’s largest and most elaborate Hindu temples. “This place is as diverse as California,” notes David Yi, a Korean-American energy trader who moved to the city from Los Angeles in 2013 and lives in the suburb of Katy, west of the central core. 休斯敦如今的种族多样性并不局限在一个社区或者区域。郊区的糖城超过35%都是亚裔，还拥有美国最大最精美的印度寺庙之一。“这地方跟加州一样多元化，”韩裔美国能源交易商David Yi提到，他于2013年从洛杉矶搬到休斯敦并住在中心区西侧的凯蒂城（Katy）郊区。 “But it is affordable, with good schools. Our kids, who are learning Spanish, can afford to stay and have a house, which is not the case in California.” Pearland, located 17 miles south of downtown, has also become a draw for upwardly mobile minorities and immigrants. “但是这边房子是能支付得起的，而且有着很好的学校。我们正学习西班牙语的孩子也有能力留在这里并买套房子，而加州情况就不一样了。”位于市中心以南17英里的梨城也成为了吸引向上流动的少数族裔和移民的地方。 “This is very different from Dallas, where I grew up, which was very segregated,” notes African-American entrepreneur Carla Lane, president of Lane Staffing, which works with energy, construction, and other local firms. “My daughter has a totally different experience—many of her friends are white, Hispanic, or Asian. Living out in Pearland, you can have that experience, and then you cross Highway 6 and you see people with big hats, boots, and straw in the mouth. That’s Houston to a tee.” “这里与我从小长大的达拉斯很不同，达拉斯是各自独立的，”非裔美国企业家、Lane Staffing公司主席Carla Lane说到，Lane Staffing与能源、建筑和其他当地公司都有合作。“我女儿有着完全不同的经历——她的很多朋友是白人、拉丁裔或者亚裔。在梨城生活，你会有这样的体验，当你越过6号高速公路，你会看到戴着大帽子、穿着大靴子、嘴上还有稻草的人们。这恰恰就是休斯敦。” Immigration is driving growth but also creating new challenges. Though skilled immigrants are beginning to flock to Houston, observes former state demographer Steven Murdock, Texas’s immigrants also include many lower-skilled workers, primarily because of the state’s proximity to Mexico. 移民促进了经济增长但是也带来了新的挑战。虽然如前联邦人口统计学家Steven Murdock观察的那样，技术移民正开始蜂拥向休斯敦，但是德州的移民里也包括很多低技能工作者，主要因为德州靠近墨西哥。 Leaders in the petrochemical and construction industries complain about looming shortages in the skilled trades. A dearth of plumbers and electricians is already affecting construction of new housing, offices, and industrial facilities, impinging on developers’ ability to expand, despite a thriving housing market. 石化和建筑行业的领导者抱怨即将到来的技术行业人才短缺。尽管房地产市场火爆，但管道工和电工的短缺已经影响了新房子、办公室和工业设施的建设，限制了开发商扩大生产的能力。 “We have all these jobs but not the people in the pipelines,” says Marshall Schott, associate vice chancellor at Lone Star community college. “Sure, we have need for more geologists and engineers; but by an order of magnitude, we need skilled workers such as welders and machinists. These jobs pay $80,000 a year, a lot better than being a barista at Starbucks.” “我们有这些工作机会却没有可用之人，”孤星社区大学的助理副校长Marshall Schott说。“我们确实需要更多地质学家和工程师；但是我们更需要十倍数量的技术工人，如焊工和机械工。这些工作年薪8万美元，比在星巴克当一个咖啡师要好多了。” To address these shortfalls, many companies have invested in workforce training programs, some in collaboration with local high schools as part of “cooperative education,” where students go to school part-time and work part-time. “This is a typically Houston solution—very pragmatic,” Mike Temple, director of the Gulf Coast Workforce Board, points out. “We are trying to tell kids that it’s not only what you know but also what you can do.” 为了解决这些短缺问题，许多公司已经投资了劳动力培训项目，一些与当地高校合作作为“共同教育”的一部分，这些项目的学生半工半读。“这是很典型的休斯敦式解决方法——很务实，”墨西哥湾沿岸劳动力委员会主管Mike Temple指出。“我们正尽力告诉孩子，你不仅要懂得知识，也要运用。” Enrollment at Houston’s largest community college, Lone Star, has exploded 58 percent, to 78,000 students, in just the past five years, and the college expects it to reach 100,000 students by 2018. 休斯敦最大社区大学，孤星社区大学的注册人数在过去5年暴涨了58%，达到了7.8万名学生，而且它预期2018年会达到10万名学生。 Often attacked for under-investing in education, Houston has actually shown encouraging educational progress. Many of the schools in the outer rings, often predominantly white and Asian, perform well in state performance rankings. Houston Independent School District, the largest district in Texas and seventh-largest in the country, has won the Broad Prize for urban education twice. 虽然常被批评对教育缺乏投资，但休斯敦事实上已经显示出了在鼓励教育上的进展。外环的很多以白人和亚裔为主的学校在联邦成就排名中表现不错。作为德州最大、全国第七大的学区，休斯敦独立学区已经两次赢得城区教育大奖了。 Houston has also been called “the Silicon Valley of education reform,” with several highly successful charter school networks such as KIPP, Harmony, and YES Prep setting up shop in the city. 休斯敦也被称为“教育改革的硅谷”，有一些十分成功的特许学校网络在城里了设立办事处，如KIPP、 Harmony和 YES Prep。 These schools and others within the Houston Independent School District will have much to do with Houston’s future success, which, in Murdock’s view, will come down to “how well minorities are going to do.” Murdock is optimistic, in part, because Houston’s minorities share the city’s basic culture of faith in hard work as a means of upward mobility. 这些学校和其他休斯敦独立学区内的学校跟休斯敦未来的成功息息相关，在Murdock看来，这也会影响到“少数族裔未来的表现”。在某种程度上，Murdock对此持乐观态度，因为休斯敦的少数族裔继承了这座城市的基本文化，相信向上层流动的方法就是努力工作。 According to Rice University’s Houston Area Survey, 85 percent of Houstonians—including 79 percent of blacks and 89 percent of Hispanics—agreed with the statement “if you work hard in this city, eventually you will succeed.” Nationwide, this sentiment is shared by only 60 percent of those surveyed. 根据莱斯大学的休斯敦地区调查，85%的休斯敦人——包括79%的黑人和89%的拉丁裔——同意“如果你在这座城市努力工作，最终你会成功”的说法。而全国范围内，这种观点只有60%的被调查者认同。 Not everyone is impressed by Houston’s growth and prospects. Critics dismiss the city’s development model as a disaster for the environment, quality of life, and civic culture. For the most part, they regard Houston as a cultural desert—a throwback to the sprawling postwar model of many American cities. “When one asks to see the social center of Houston,” scoffs architect Andrés Duany, “one is taken to the mall.” 休斯敦的发展和前景并没有让所有人都印象深刻。批评者将这座城市的发展模型斥为一场环境、生活质量和城市文化的灾难。多数情况下，他们都将休斯敦视为文化沙漠——倒退回了许多美国城市战后那种无计划模型。“当有人想要看休斯敦的社会中心，”建筑师Andrés Duany嘲弄道，“他就会被带去商场。” But such statements don’t reflect a city where opportunity urbanism is shaping an impressively vibrant cultural landscape. A 2012 survey by Economic Modeling Specialists International (EMSI) of the city’s creative economy found 146,000 jobs, generating an annual economic impact of $9.1 billion. 但是这些说法并不能反映这座城市的真实情况，注重机会的城市化正塑造一种其勃勃生机令人印象深刻的文化地貌。一份2012年由国际经济建模专家（EMSI）对城市创新经济的调查发现了14.6万份工作，每年产生了91亿美元的经济效益。 Houston is projected to have the largest gain in arts-related jobs by 2016 of any city in the study. Arts and culture expenditures totaled almost $1 billion per year in 2010, with total event attendance topping 16 million—numbers sure to grow, with almost 150,000 people per year moving into Greater Houston. 研究预测，到2016年休斯敦在艺术相关工作上的收益会超过所有被调研城市。2012年全年的艺术和文化支出总计约10亿美元，活动参与总人数以1600万高居榜首——随着每年大约15万人移居大休斯敦地区，这个数目肯定还会增加。 The city boasts permanent professional resident companies in all of the major performing arts, including opera, ballet, symphony, and theater, and its theater district has more seats than any rival in the country, except for New York’s. Houston’s 18 museums attract 8.7 million visitors a year. This is no cultural backwater. 这座城市在所有主要的表演艺术领域都涌现了大批常驻专业公司，包括歌剧、芭蕾、交响乐和戏剧，并且它的剧院区拥有的座位比除纽约外的任何城市都要多。休斯敦的18个博物馆每年吸引870万游客。这才不是文化的倒退。 With their higher real incomes and lower taxes, Houstonians dine out substantially more than residents of any other major American city—and they’ve got lots of options. “You used to go to New Orleans for food and music,” notes Chris Williams of Lucille’s, a cutting-edge Houston restaurant that serves sophisticated Southern food. “Now you go down the block.” 因为有更高的收入和更低的税费，休斯敦人外出用餐的次数明显多于其他任何美国城市的居民——而且他们有多样的选择。“你过去习惯去新奥尔良寻访美食和音乐，”Lucille’s餐厅的Chris Williams说到，Lucille’s是休斯敦一家提供精致南方食物的高端餐厅。 Taylor Francis, a 24-year-old advertising executive who moved recently from the Bay Area, points to restaurants like Underbelly, a popular Beard Prize–winning restaurant in the fashionable Montrose district. “My friends in the Bay Area rarely go out because it’s too expensive,” he said. “All their money goes to rent—but here, I can live in a roomy place and go out. There’s something attractive about that.” Taylor Francis是一位24岁的广告经理，刚从湾区搬到休斯敦，他指着类似Underbelly（一家很受欢迎的位于时髦的蒙特罗斯区的餐厅，曾获Beard奖）的餐厅说，“现在你只需走过街区就能找到美食。”他说：“我在湾区的朋友很少外出娱乐，因为太贵了。所有的钱都用来付房租了——但是在这里，我可以住在宽敞的地方，也可以外出娱乐。这点很吸引人。” Houston’s leaders hope to lure more young people like Francis away from coastal cities such as Portland, Boston, New York, and Los Angeles. The city is building one of the nation’s most extensive bike systems and constructing a $215 million park system along its long-disdained bayous. 休斯敦的领导人希望吸引更多的像Francis这样的年轻人远离像波特兰、波士顿、纽约和洛杉矶这样的沿海城市。这座城市正在打造全国最大规模之一的自行车系统，而且沿着长时间被鄙弃的长沼建设着价值2.15亿美元的停车系统。 Marcus Davis, who grew up in the hardscrabble Fifth Ward, says that growth is simply part of the Houstonian ethos. “This place is pure opportunity, including for African-Americans,” he said at his successful and usually crowded restaurant, the Breakfast Klub, just outside downtown. 在贫瘠的第五区长大的Marcus Davis说，追求增长已是休斯敦人精神特质的一部分。“这地方是真正的机会之城，即使对非裔美国人来说也是，”他在自己位于市中心外的餐厅Breakfast Klub里如是说，该餐厅很成功且常常人满为患。 Davis’s customer base includes young professionals and middle-class families. “This is a place where everyone wants to figure out how to do business. And since Houstonians like to do things over food, having a restaurant can be very lucrative.” Davis的顾客组成中包括年轻专家和中产之家。“这是一个人人都想搞清如何做生意的地方。因为休斯敦人喜欢做跟食品相关的事情，所以开家餐厅是十分有利可图的。” The growth-friendly attitude is what holds everything together in Houston, and it will be crucial whenever the next slowdown comes—when oil prices could drop, say, to below $100 a barrel. It remains to be seen whether a large influx of newcomers to Greater Houston from the ocean coasts will clamor, as they have elsewhere—notably, in Colorado—for a more controlled, high-regulation urban environment. 增长友好的态度将休斯敦的一切凝聚在一起，无论下次的增速减缓发生在何时，这态度至关重要——比如说，当油价降至低于100美元一桶时。从沿海城市移居到大休斯敦地区的大批新来者是否会像别的地方一样，特别是科罗拉多，引发对城市环境更多管控的呼吁？尚不得而知。 For now, though, most Houstonians see the city as a place that works—for minorities and immigrants, for suburbanites and city dwellers—and few want to fix what isn’t broken. “The key to Houston’s future is to keep thinking about how to be a greater city,” notes David Wolff as he passes a new set of towers off the Grand Parkway. “This road, it wouldn’t be built in many places. People might talk about these things, but in most places, they don’t get done. In Houston, we don’t just talk about the future—we’re building it.” 然而就现在而言，大多数休斯敦人都认为这城市运转正常——对于少数族裔和移民，对于郊区居民和城市居民来说都是如此——无人想去修复那未坏的东西。“休斯敦的未来关键在于要不断思考如何成为一座更伟大的城市，” 当David Wolff在花园大道上经过一幢幢新大楼时说道。“在许多地方，这条路根本不会建成。人们或许会谈论这些事情，但是大多数地方都不会真正实施。在休斯敦，我们不仅仅谈论未来——我们正在创造未来。” Joel Kotkin is a City Journal contributing editor and the R. C. Hobbs Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University. Tory Gattis writes the Houston Strategies blog, which covers topics including transit, economy, quality of life, city identity, and development and land-use regulations. Joel Kotkin是《城市杂志》的特约编辑，同时也是查普曼大学城市研究R. C. Hobbs研究员。Tory Gattis撰写了《休斯敦策略》博客，主题涵盖了运输、经济、生活质量、城市身份和发展与土地使用规则。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-05-23】 1）达尔萨斯主义者（Darthusian）和古典自由主义者的根本区别在于：不许诺一个共同富裕普遍康乐的前景，并认为那注定是个虚假的许诺， 2）尽管我们相信（也乐意称颂）自由市场可以最大限度的拓展合作共赢的领域，也承认（统计上）自由社会的最穷困阶层也比非自由社会的普通人状况更好，但不会否认自由竞争终究会有失败者，自由化甚至可能在绝对水平上恶化一些人的处境， 3）马尔萨斯法则为这一判断提供了兜底保证，尽管不是唯一理由， 4）达尔文的启示在于，这完全不是坏事，而是文明进步的动力，试图消除它的努力将摧毁文明赖以繁荣的基础， 5）只有认清这一点才能将自由主义建立在真实而牢靠的基础上，而虚假承诺终究会被现实所揭穿， 6）这也是为何许诺共同康乐的强共同体难以长久维系，除非它能通过周期性重组摆脱一部分成员， 7）或者像罗马那样有着永无止境的拓殖边疆让他得以向其贫穷公民许诺美好前程， 8）对达尔萨斯主义者，自由的伦理基础不是帕累托效率，而是契约合意：我们同意这样的竞争规则，无论结果是谁赢——通俗的说，就是愿赌服输，  

【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始，libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任，许多追随者也人云亦云，他们的用意很好，但说法是错的，实际上，即便西方世界中最自由的部分，（除了少数袖珍国之外）距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远，只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点：1）自由贸易，古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒，而关税始终很高，各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多，关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情，但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要，因为当时关税再高，和运费比还是很低，所以只要拆除壁垒，效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2）管制，随便翻翻经济史就知道，18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛，但给人的印象很不一样，我猜这是因为，早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行，而较少以行为管控的方式进行，大量限制法规，但较少执行官僚，所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见，究其因，当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3）19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少，但州政府和市政府管的可不少，看看产业史，哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的，那时候联邦政府站在自由一边，多数州政府站在另一边，联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒，由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了，铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场，州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了，只好偏向自由化，但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4）政府规模，从财政开支和雇员数量看，那时候的政府确实小得多，但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看，也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5）福利制度，这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点，那时候基本上没有福利制度，济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中，国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊，仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级，何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的，所以不要相信什么自由天国，也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  

【2016-02-16】 @whigzhou: 个人主义必定伴随着对抗性，否认对抗、讲究隐忍退让、一团和气、齐心协力拧成一股绳、为此诉诸权威以压制对抗、抹除差异的群体，无论是家庭还是社会，都是容不下个人主义的，我们不能在提倡个人主义的同时否认对抗，而只能在承认对抗的同时设法学会以诚实、体面、守信、有尊严的方式处理对抗。 @whigzhou: 至于从何时开始、在何种程度上将孩子作为独立自主的个人对待，我的看法是分年龄段逐步推进，并鼓励孩子证明自己已配得上更高一级的对待，最终在某个时刻承认其自由人的地位，至于我家的猫，则注定只能永远处于我的权威主义控制之下。 @rainbowend:把儿童培养成成人的一大目标就是让他像个人一样为自己争取利益表达诉求， 同时也学会有礼貌的沟通达成妥协吧。把这说成对抗性也太怪了 @whigzhou: 把礼貌和对抗对立起来才叫怪，两支球队可以很有礼貌很讲规则很有尊严的进行对抗 @whigzhou: 自由主义者最具误导性的一句格言是，人生而自由，要我说，“人生而为暴徒”更接近真相，自由是已经学会收好爪子的好猫们所创造的俱乐部公共品，加入这个俱乐部的资格不是与生俱来的，既要学会收好爪子，否则就是暴徒，又要学会在必要时挥出爪子，否则便是奴隶。 @whigzhou: 文明社会驯服暴徒的方式有两种，一是权威主义的压制和惩戒，让暴徒了解不收好爪子的惨痛代价，二是对合作性的社会奖励机制，让暴徒意识到，收好爪子也可以维护自己的利益，还能带来合作收益，第一种方式导向专制社会，第二种导向自由社会。  

CapX Reviews: By the People CapX评论:《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》 作者：Fred Smith @ 2015-9-13 译者：Lai Shawn（@NiGuoNiGuoNi） 校对：王涵秋（@你们都是乡非） 来源：CAPX，http://www.capx.co/capx-reviews-by-the-people/ Charles Murray, in his new book, By the People: Rebuilding Liberty without Permission, argues that America’s constitutional checks on the growth of spending, taxation, and regulation have largely been undermined. The result, he fears, is an America moving rapidly toward the kinder, gentler tyranny Alexis de Tocqueville warned about. Murray focuses—wisely in my view—on the massive expansion of federal regulations as the vehicle hurtling us down that road. 查尔斯·穆瑞在他的新书《民治：重建无须仰赖许可的自由》中说到，美国对政府支出、税收、管制的宪法审查机制已经被严重破坏。他担心，其结果是美国快速滑向托克维尔所警告的“温和专制”。穆瑞认为，巨幅扩张的联邦政府管制像失控的汽车一样带着我们冲向这条道路。 Murray documents how the regulatory state, by shifting legislative powers to the Executive, has given Congress the green light to pass broad laws that are little more than aspirational resolutions—for better workplace safety, improved public health, energy conservation, clean air, safe drugs and food, you name it—while leaving the writing of rules to achieve these goals to anonymous, off-stage executive bureaucrats. 穆瑞讲述了，通过将立法权转移到行政分支，管制型国家是如何为议会大开绿灯，让它得以通过那些宽泛的法律的，而这些法律充其量只是些一厢情愿的决心——诸如提高工作环境的安全性，改善公众卫生状况，节约能源，清洁空气，确保食品药品安全等等。同时，为实现这些目的而制订具体规则的工作，却被丢给了幕后不知名的行政官僚。 Given this hollowing out of the Constitution, and the cultural and political changes that drove it, Murray concludes that America is so far down the road to serfdom that the political process can no longer restore the Founders’ vision of an institutionally constrained federal government. A solution, if one exists, must rely on massive civil disobedience and a populist and moral critique of regulatory predation. Yet, is it prudent to fully dismiss “normal” political approaches? 基于上述的宪法“中空化”，以及导致这一点的文化和政治上的变化，穆瑞认为美国已经在“通向奴役之路”上走得太远，以至于已经无法依靠正常的政治途径来将美国恢复成建国者们心目中那个其权力受制度性限制的联邦政府。如果有解决方案，那只能是依靠大规模的公民不服从运动和民粹主义者，以及对政府无情管制的道德批判。然而，完全忽略“正常”政治途径是不是谨慎的做法呢？ Murray’s first section, “Coming to Terms with Where We Stand,” tells the story of how Progressives, chafing at the limited government institutions bequeathed by the Founders, gutted constraints on federal power and unleashed the technocratic Leviathan, staffed by civil servants trained in scientific management and protected from political interference by the independent agency system. This is an oft-cited and depressing history but one that Murray summarizes well. 穆瑞书中的第一部分“面对现实”讲述了进步派是如何破坏国父们留下的有限政府制度，破坏对联邦政府权力的限制，释放出那头专家治国主义权力巨兽，这头巨兽由受过科学管理训练的公务员组成，并且免受独立机构的政治干预。这是一段常被提起的沉痛历史，但是穆瑞总结的很好。 His second section, “Opening a New Front,” develops his civil disobedience proposal, including the creation of a new group, the Madison Fund, to manage and finance that work and take on some support functions, such as educational and public affairs efforts. The moral case for civil disobedience, he argues, stems from citizens’ growing alienation from a government they feel no longer represents them. A government that has lost our trust, he argues, has lost legitimacy, which justifies civil disobedience. 该书的第二部分“开辟新战线”进一步阐述了他的公民不服从运动倡议，包括建立一个叫麦迪逊基金的新组织，用于管理和资助不服从运动，并且通过教育和公共事务去支持这项运动。他认为，公民不服从的伦理基础在于公民和政府越来越疏远，并且感到政府已经不再能代表他们。一个政府如果失去了人民的信任，就失去了其合法性，公民不服从运动也就有了正当的理由。 Murray suggests the Madison Fund might also offer “insurance” against regulatory predation, much like malpractice insurance gives professionals some financial protection from the threat of lawsuits. However, the diversity and complexity of regulations makes estimating risks, and thus setting premiums, very difficult. In fact, insurance as an alternative to regulation was once explored for Superfund and largely abandoned for these reasons. Moreover, the criminalization of many regulatory violations casts doubt on the ability of such insurance to survive in a hostile regulatory environment. 穆瑞建议，麦迪逊基金应为那些对抗管制掠夺的行动提供“保险”，这跟职业过失保险很像，后者帮助专业人士规避因职业行为而遭受诉讼所带来的财务风险。然而，政府管制的多样性和复杂性，让预估风险以及设置保险费率非常困难。实际上，保险作为管制的替代已经被 “超级基金”尝试过，又因上述理由而被放弃。此外，由于很多违反管制的行为已经被犯罪化，令人怀疑这种保险是否能在充满敌意的管制环境下幸存。 Murray suggests that many regulations are unenforceable, because there are far more parties subject to regulations than there are enforcers. As with highway speed limits, he notes, most drivers will rarely be ticketed as long as they go with the flow. Therefore, if large numbers can be induced to violate any specific regulation, that regulation will become unenforceable. Perhaps, but while the “flow defense” often works, some communities, rather than ease regulatory enforcement, create “speed traps” and impose large fines. Fierce, random enforcement is another way of ensuring less costly enforcement of compliance and makes Murray’s campaign less viable. 穆瑞提出，很多管制是无法强制进行的，因为监管对象的数量远超执法者。比如高速公路限速，大多数司机只要跟着车流就极少被罚款。因此，如果很多人被诱导去违反特定的法规，这个法规就无法被执行了。虽然“淹没防卫法”有时会奏效，但是很多地方，不仅没有放松执法，反而发明了“超速陷阱”（高速公路上一段严格执法的区域）并施加巨额罚金。大力度的随机执法是另一种确保低执法成本的方法，这让穆瑞的方法看上去难以实现。 Still, Murray hopes that organized resistance to overregulation might push lawmakers and regulators to adopt less burdensome regulatory practices. His cautious optimism stems from Herbert Stein’s famous quote, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” And as Murray notes, America’s regulatory burden is already massive, citing the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s recent estimate of federal regulatory costs at around $1.8 trillion annually. This suggests a “stop” may be imminent. 然而，穆瑞希望对过度执法的有组织抵抗或许会促使立法者和监管者采用不那么苛刻的管制措施。他的谨慎乐观态度来自于赫伯特·斯坦的名句“不能永恒的事物终将会停下。”穆瑞注意到，美国的管管负担已十分巨大，来自竞争性企业研究所的一份报告显示，联邦管制每年带来1.8万亿美元的成本，因此过度管制必须立刻被制止。 Murray is also cautiously optimistic that faith in the Progressive vision is fading. Progressivism was first premised on the notion that government guidance could ensure uninterrupted progress. Advances in the social and administrative sciences would enable the best and the brightest to regulate markets in the public interest. Civil service reforms would prevent ineptitude and corruption. Independent regulatory agencies would prevent political cronyism. Murray argues that the experiences of the last century have not been kind to these beliefs, resulting in progressivism losing some of its former appeal. 穆瑞同时谨慎乐观地认为，进步派的愿景正在逐渐失去光芒。进步主义的基本假设是，政府的引导可以确保社会持续进步，社会科学和行政科学的发展可以让最善良最聪明的人处于公众利益而规制市场，公民服务改革可以防止不平等和腐败，独立监管机构可以防止政治裙带关系。穆瑞认为，过去一个世纪的经验并不能支持这些想法，这使得进步主义正在丧失它之前的吸引力。 I’m less sure, given the current popularity of progressive firebrands like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. And the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Board is an exemplar progressive agency—run by experts with no accountability to elected officials, with a staggering and ever-widening array of regulatory powers, and self-financing to boot! 鉴于诸如伊丽莎白·沃伦和伯尼·桑德斯这些进步主义煽动者目前的旺盛人气，我对此并不那么确定。最近成立的消费者金融保护理事会是个典型的进步主义组织——由专家组成，无须对选举产生的官员负责，拥有令人震惊的广泛权力，甚至可以财政上自给自足地运作。 Murray next turns to the question of which criteria should determine those regulations suitable for challenge. Given the radical tone of Murray’s book, one might have expected an endorsement of a broad frontal attack on the regulatory Leviathan. Yet surprisingly, Murray’s target list is fairly narrow. He sees the original flurry of regulations in the late 19^th century as largely warranted. He exempts Internal Revenue Service regulations, seeing taxes as a legitimate role of government. He appears to endorse regulations designed to address issues related to externalities and public goods. He also argues against challenging regulations that enjoy overwhelming popular support. These exemptions mean a less aggressive challenge to the regulatory state. 穆瑞接下来讨论的是选择挑战哪些法规的标准。鉴于穆瑞的激进口吻，读者可能会猜想他将对“管制巨兽”发起全面攻势。然而让人吃惊的是，穆瑞的目标名单非常短。他认为源自19世纪末期的很多法律是正当的。他放过了国家税务总局，认为税收是政府的合法职能。他似乎同意那些与外部性和公共品相关的管制法规。他同时还反对挑战一些受到广泛支持的管制。这些豁免意味着他对管制型国家的挑战不是很具进攻性。 Murray’s exclusion criteria appear to be influenced by the successful strategy of the Institute for Justice (IJ), which has carved out an important niche challenging regulations that meet Murray’s rather restrictive criteria. IJ selects regulations that many see as unjust, seeks out clients likely to be viewed sympathetically by the public, and manages media strategies to frame their cases as examples of noble Davids fighting brutal regulatory Goliaths. 穆瑞的豁免名单似乎受到了“司法协会”（IJ）的成功策略的影响——他们选择加以挑战的管制恰好符合穆瑞的谨慎标准，挑选那些看起来不公平的管制法规，找出一些有望被公众同情的客户，并通过影响舆论把自己塑造成像挑战残暴巨兽歌利亚的大卫一样高贵的勇士，这一策略让他们开拓出了一个重要的生态位。 Yet, the Institute for Justice is not alone in its use of litigation to challenge regulations. To a limited extent, the free market movement already has created a “Madison Fund.” Free market policy organizations—the Pacific Legal Foundation, Becket Fund, Center for Individual Rights, Goldwater Institute, my own organization, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others—are taking on other complex regulatory challenges, with varying degrees of success and popular support. Murray might have discussed these efforts in greater detail. 然而，司法协会并不是唯一一个通过诉讼去挑战法规的。虽然规模不大，自由市场运动已经成立了一个“麦迪逊基金”。自由市场政策组织——太平洋法律基金会，贝克特基金，个人权利中心，戈德华特研究所，我自己的组织——竞争性企业研究所，以及其他各种组织，正在对管制展开复杂的挑战行动，取得了不同程度的成功和大众支持。穆瑞会在书中详细讨论了这些努力。 Murray seems to believe that common sense provides adequate guidance for sorting out “good” from “bad” regulations and that Americans oppose many of the bad ones. Yet, recent debates over financial, health, and environmental regulations cast doubt on this. Many feel that America is overregulated, but support specific regulations—such as for example, the left’s support for more restrictive environmental and financial regulations and the right’s calls for tighter security and immigration restrictions. 穆瑞似乎认为，凭常识足以区分“好”的和“坏”的管制，并且美国人都反对坏的那些。然而，近期关于金融、卫生、环境相关法律的争论让人怀疑这一点。很多人认识到美国被管的太多了，但却支持特定的管制——比如左派支持严格的环保措施和金融管制，右派呼吁更严格的安全措施和移民限制。 Citing polling data, Murray finds reason for optimism in the fact that trust in government is declining and that businesses view regulations as increasingly burdensome. But that does not necessarily indicate support for a specific reform agenda. Congress, too, has lost the trust of the American people, yet more than 90 percent of all Members of Congress are routinely reelected. 通过引用调查数据，穆瑞找到了乐观的理由——对政府的信任在下降，并且企业认为管制带给他们的负担正日益加重。但是这未必说明一项特定改革议程获得了支持。虽然国会同样失去了美国人民的信任，然而仍有超过90%的国会议员照样如期连任。 Lacking widespread support, Murray’s massive civil disobedience proposal is unlikely to prove a viable strategy. America’s early history experienced such an attempt to fend off federal taxation—the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790s. It enjoyed considerable local support, but was nonetheless quickly suppressed. 因为缺乏广泛的支持，穆瑞的大规模民众不服从策略并不可行。在美国的早期历史上有过抵抗联邦政府征税的行为——比如1790年代的威士忌叛乱，尽管这场抗税运动得到了当地大量支持，但仍被讯速镇压了。 Murray argues that an expanded effort might change all this. His proposed new and well-funded Madison Fund would organize protests, help businesses and individuals targeted by regulation, insure vulnerable parties against regulatory abuse, and ultimately strip regulators of their “white hat” public image. It would help, but as noted, many free market organizations are already doing much of this. Moreover, would many businessmen want to directly confront their overseers? And even if they did, would the public see them sympathetically? 穆瑞认为更大规模的支持可能会改变这些情况。全新的，资金充沛的麦迪逊基金可以组织抗议活动，帮助监管所针对的企业和个人，确保弱势团体也可以对抗滥用的权力，最终剥下监管者的正义外衣。这可能会有用，但是正如我们注意到的，已经有很多自由市场组织在做这些了。此外，会有很多商人想要直面他们的监管者们吗？而且即使他们愿意，公众会同情他们吗？ Murray seeks to addresses these challenges by drawing an analogy with the role civil disobedience, such as lunch counter sit-ins, played in advancing the civil rights movement. But this analogy falls short. The civil rights movement enjoyed widespread media, intellectual, and public support, including by many economic interests. Yet, it still took decades and required both a state-by-state as well as a national approach to bear fruit. Regulatory reform lacks this broad intellectual support and needs greater organized business support than it has received. 穆瑞将这些挑战类比成公民不服从运动，比如在推动了民权运动进程的静坐抗议。但是这些类比并不成立，因为民权运动有广泛的媒体、知识界和公众支持，包括很多出于经济利益考虑的支持。尽管如此，运动的成果仍然是在一个个州以及全国通过各种途径努力了几十年才获得的。管制改革缺少如此广泛的知识界支持，也缺乏更大的有组织商业支持。 Murray’s third and final section, “A Propitious Moment,” suggests reasons why his proposals need not be quixotic. America’s continued diversity, he suggests, makes one-size-fits-all regulation less attractive to large segments of the population. Technological innovations have rendered largely obsolete regulatory interventions intended to address information asymmetries and allowed entrepreneurs to bypass regulatory roadblocks, creating consumer constituencies before the regulators notice. Uber is a great example of both achievements. 穆瑞书中的第三也是最后一部分“一场胜算很大的运动”论述了为何他认为他的建议不是空想。美国长期持续的多样性，使得大多数人不会喜欢一刀切的管制。科技创新让那些为矫正信息不对称而设立的管制变得过时，也可以让企业家绕过监管，在监管者注意到之前就得到消费者的支持。Uber就是一个证明这两点的很好例子。 Murray has identified the regulatory challenge facing America. But his proposed reform strategy needs to be better developed if it is to achieve success. In my view, he is too optimistic about public attitudes toward the regulatory estate and the prospects for changing them. For instance, he suggests the federal bureaucracy is increasingly demoralized. Perhaps in some cases, but individuals and businesses at the regulatory reform frontier still find regulators to be self-confident, well-prepared, and aggressive. 穆瑞指出了美国所面临的管制挑战。但是若要取得成功，他提出的改革策略还有待完善。在我看来，他对公众的态度以及改变公众态度的可能性太过乐观。举个例子，他认为联邦政府官僚正逐渐失去其道德光环。这也许在某些情况下是对的，但在管制改革前线作战的个人和企业仍发现监管者们非常自信，准备充分，并具有进攻性。 Moreover, while the future Madison Fund might launch dozens of cases, regulations continue to proliferate. Murray seems to hope that the creative marketing of these cases will increase public anger at regulatory overreach, but they may not, given that many regulatory agencies still enjoy widespread public support. In fact, such efforts could even backfire, as irate regulators place resisting firms in the agency’s crosshairs. 此外，就算将来的麦迪逊基金可能会同时着手处理几十个针对过度管制的案件，同时却仍有更多的管制会不断诞生。穆瑞似乎希望对这些案例的营销会加深公众对过度管制的愤怒，但是他们也许根本不会，因为很多监管机构依然得到广泛支持。事实上，这些努力可能反而会帮倒忙，因为愤怒的监管者会 “重点关照”那些反抗的企业。 There are other approaches to reform, including legislation, such as the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would require Congress to vote on all regulations with $100 million or more in estimated annual costs (a threshold I’d like to see drop over time). Congress could also explore a one-in-one-out requirement for new rules, such as one now being tried in Canada, or even the one-in-two-out policy tried in the United Kingdom. States might also establish state regulatory ombudsmen to argue against both existing and new state regulations and to challenge on behalf of the state costly and restrictive federal regulations—that is, states might create their own Madison Groups. 但是还有其他改革方式，包括立法，比如REINS法案，这个法案要求所有每年花费一亿美元以上的监管措施都需要国会投票（我希望看到这个阈值越来越低）。国会可以尝试“一进一出”（每批准一项管制必须废弃之前的另一项）措施，就像加拿大已经在尝试的那样，甚至英国的“一进两出”。同时各州也可以设立管制巡察员来对抗已经存在的州法和新条例，挑战联邦政府加于各州的昂贵而又严格的管制——也就是说，各州可以建立自己的麦迪逊组织。 Murray deals only briefly with the business community’s role in the regulatory reform struggle. He notes, as economist Joseph Schumpeter did long ago, that, in the political world, business has too often been passive, or slipped into cronyism. Murray discusses the many reasons for this passivity. Firms are vulnerable to political retaliation, media attacks, shareholder activism, and consumer boycotts. Yet, Schumpeter also noted that business has critical resources—personnel, information, marketing and communication skills—needed for political success. And, as Murray notes, factors such as the slowing of innovation and the need for greater flexibility to operate in a global economy may be persuading some in the business community that this is a fight they must join and win. To do so, they need to ally with free market policy groups. 穆瑞只用了寥寥几笔简短地阐述了商业团体在改革中的角色。就像经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特很久以前就说过的那样，他认为在政治领域，企业要么消极被动，要么掉入裙带关系的陷阱。穆瑞认为以下几点造成了他们的消极。企业在政治报复，媒体攻击，股东维权，以及消费者抵制面前非常脆弱。但是熊彼特也指出，企业拥有重要的资源——人力，信息，市场和交流手段——这些都和政治成功有密切联系。此外，穆瑞也认为创新的减速和全球市场对运营灵活性提出的更高要求，会迫使企业加入这场战斗。为了获胜，他们必须和推广自由市场政策的组织结盟。 There are mutual advantages to such an alliance. Free market policy organizations are less vulnerable to political pressures, more credible as spokespeople, and skilled at crafting and promoting the narratives needed to advance the moral and intellectual case for reform. Meanwhile, businesspeople possess the localized knowledge, resources, and real-world experience to convey the human costs of overregulation. Businesses also enjoy cooperative links with their customers, employees, suppliers, and investors—relationships that give them both an audience and the clout to advance powerful narratives. 这种联盟可以给双方都带来好处。推广自由市场政策的组织更能应对政治压力，作为面对公众的发言人更容易被信任，并且擅长制造更具道德优势和知识水平的宣传攻势。同时，企业家具有本土化的知识、资源、和实打实的经验来转移过度管制的人力成本。企业家也更喜欢和他们客户、雇员、供应商、投资者的合作关系，这些人既是他们宣传的听众，也是推行这些宣传的重要力量。 In democratic market economies, most policy changes result from alliances of economic and moral interests. And indeed, such “Bootlegger and Baptist” alliances have long been a standard strategy used by those seeking greater political control of the economy. The cooperative efforts of trial lawyers and environmentalists, of consumer advocates and labor unions, explain much of the growth in regulation over the last decades. Our challenge, developed by Murray so well, is to learn from their successes. 在奉行市场经济的民主国家中，大部分政策改变都来自于经济利益和道德诉求的结合。实际上，类似“走私犯和教徒”的联盟很长时间以来一直是寻求对经济的更强政治控制的标准途径。诉讼律师、环保主义者、消费者保护组织，以及工会之间的合作，很大程度上导致了近几十年来增加的各种管制。正如穆瑞也提到过的，我们的挑战，就是从他们的成功中汲取经验。 Murray’s enthusiasm for reform is commendable, but those excited by his audacious plan must hope that he will lead an effort to advance it further. Stimulating resistance to regulation is key, but more will be needed to actually roll back Leviathan. The Progressives were successful in crafting the regulatory path to their goals, marketing that policy and gaining the influence and popular support to make it the dominant reality. Murray’s and our challenge is to find an equally effective strategy for economic liberalization. And Murray is well placed to suggest those next steps, having laid the intellectual groundwork for welfare reform in the 1990s, with his classic book, Losing Ground. Could Murray’s latest book provide the foundation for a new Doer/Thinker alliance? Stay tuned. 穆瑞对于改革的热情是值得赞扬的，但是那些因他的大胆计划而激动不已的人必须寄希望于他能更加完善这项计划。激起对管制的抵抗是关键，但更重要的是把权力关回笼子。进步派成功地借助管制实现了他们的目的，并且通过推销他们的策略，争取影响力和公众支持来使这些管制难以撼动。穆瑞和我们的挑战，是找出一套同样有效的策略来实现经济自由。在他的经典著作《倒退》中，穆瑞恰当的指出了，这些步骤如何为1990年代的福利改革打下了智识基础。那么，穆瑞的新书会为新一轮的实践家和思想家结盟提供基础吗？敬请期待。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2015-11-03】 @海德沙龙 《宗教自由的丧钟已经敲响？》三年前，丹佛市一位糕点师拒绝为一对同性恋人制作婚礼蛋糕，这对恋人随后向科罗拉多州政府投诉，州政府民权委员会文化专员随即裁定糕点师歧视同性恋，勒令其更改店铺规定，并从此之后须为同性婚礼制作蛋糕，否则将面临罚款， 糕点师不服并开始了多年诉讼…… @whigzhou: [[The Good Wife]]里看到过这个故事，原来是真事，荒谬至此。 @whigzhou: 在这个玻璃心时代，直男基督徒是唯一可以摁住头随便冒犯的群体，也是活该，谁叫他们没长颗玻璃心呢～ @whigzhou: 最近听到的另一个案子荒谬程度雷同，华盛顿州一家药店基于宗教理由拒绝出售堕胎药，结果被法院勒令改正，官司打到第九巡回法院，输了 http://t.cn/RUJjMVf @whigzhou: 看来很多人没有意识到这个案子与一般区别对待消费者案子的不同之处：此案所涉及服务直接与店主信仰抵触，这不是饭店拒绝同性恋就餐，或服装店拒绝卖衣服给同性恋 @whigzhou: 更贴切的类比：一位基督徒开了家打字店，有人来打一份伊斯兰经文，里面充斥着对基督教的诋毁之词，他有权拒绝这笔生意吗？ @whigzhou: 或者你开了家印刷厂，有人要印一万份宗教宣传小册子，其中内容与你的宗教信仰直接抵触，你可以拒绝这笔生意吗？ @sonicblue3: 药店的公共属性是要高一些。不过要是不接受明的暗的政府补贴的话，那我觉得老板想卖啥不想卖啥也无所谓 @Stimmung: 这就是为什么政府补贴不该存在，政府一补贴你，你就归政府管了// @whigzhou: 而且暗的补贴也算，连拒绝都拒绝不掉～