【2021-08-08】
@InquilineX 国内所谓的这种劝酒文化,其实就是长期以来对公权力和私权利之间界限不分,概念模糊的一个缩影,也就是严复说的“群己权界”概念,私人边界感极弱,而这种极弱的边界感经常导致各种形式的权力支配,个体压榨,甚至极端犯罪。
@whigzhou: 这跟公私之分没关系,都是私对私关系,工作与私人生活其余部分的边界,不是公与私的边界,而这种边界不明,是古代依附性雇佣关系的延续,表明现代自由雇佣关系在这个(more...)
【2021-08-08】
@InquilineX 国内所谓的这种劝酒文化,其实就是长期以来对公权力和私权利之间界限不分,概念模糊的一个缩影,也就是严复说的“群己权界”概念,私人边界感极弱,而这种极弱的边界感经常导致各种形式的权力支配,个体压榨,甚至极端犯罪。
@whigzhou: 这跟公私之分没关系,都是私对私关系,工作与私人生活其余部分的边界,不是公与私的边界,而这种边界不明,是古代依附性雇佣关系的延续,表明现代自由雇佣关系在这个(more...)
【2021-07-16】
听了个 podcast,在聊 Roe v. Wade,我对他们聊的内容本身兴趣不大,不过这让我想到一个问题,在有关 Roe v. Wade 的各种议论中,这个问题好像都被忽视了,
我对堕胎合法性本身没有很强烈的立场,我个人的道德观与之并不抵触,不过,一个共同体若是基于其传统而加以禁止,我看也未尝不可,Roe v. Wade 让我特别不爽的是,自由派法官在这事情上表现的非常虚伪和双标,
Roe v. Wade 的裁决依据是第14修正案的正当程序(due process)条款:
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within (more...)
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.多数意见认为,德州的堕胎禁止法律侵犯了孕妇的隐私权,而该隐私权包含在上面这个条款所提及的个人权利(liberty)里, 这显然是对个人自然权利非常宽的解释,对此我并没意见,我也向来希望对个人自然权利做宽泛解释,问题是,这些自由派法官仅仅在他们关心的那些事情上才会做如此宽泛的解释,而在其他事情上,他们对自然权利的解释都比前辈大幅收紧, 实际上,通过拓宽解释第14修正案的 liberty 来实施重大司法干预,并非 Roe v. Wade 的首创,1905年 [[Lochner v. New York]] 一案的裁决,把契约自由也纳入了第14修正案的 liberty 中,从而认定各州的最低工资法和工作时间限制违宪,因为最低工资和工作时限剥夺了契约自由, 这条原则如果存在到今天的话,那么罗斯福以来的很多管制法律都会被判违宪了,当然,实际上,它早就被推翻了,而 Roe 时代的那些自由派法官,正是推动管制国家大幅扩张、个人自然权利大幅缩减的司法能动主义者,如果他们把 Roe 案的原则也运用于其他个人权利,那我们看到的是一个比镀金时代更自由的社会, 不妨举个更加赤裸裸的例子,可以帮助我们理解这事情, 纽约市政府是出了名的 nanny state,特别替市民健康操心,所以以前酒吧是禁止向孕妇卖酒的,前几年,纽约市废除了这条法律,说是这孕妇懂得怎么做对自己最好,卖酒禁令是对孕妇的歧视, 如此说来,纽约市终于变动不那么 nanny 了吗? 这么想你就太幼稚了,也是那几年,纽约市出了新法律,限制餐馆在餐桌上摆盐罐子,因为食客太蠢了,总是给自己的菜撒太多盐, ---------------- @小金鱼上校: Unconventional opinion: there is no constitutional right to privacy. The closest opinion which may come to recognize a claim that is similiar to a constitutional right to privacy is Katz v United States @whigzhou: 扯上隐私权确实挺强词夺理的,姑且替他修正为身体自主权 @whigzhou: 其实 Roe 还有个更可笑的地方,法官竟然临时发明了一套胎儿发育三阶段理论,扮演速成医学专家,既表现了其自以为无所不知的狂妄,也大大突破了有关法官在裁决中可以做什么不可以做什么的司法传统
【2019-04-05】
@whigzhou: bear问:『对Google, Facebook, Twitter甚至airbnb这些公司封保守派活动家的账号,你怎么看?这些已经类似于水电那样的公共服务公司有权拒绝向特定人提供服务吗?』,说几点看法:
1)我不赞成立法者向水电等基础设施服务商施加普遍服务义务(即不得拒绝向接受并遵守服务契约的特定个体提供服务),这是对自由选择的无端干涉,
2)一个看起来相似但其实不同的问题是:超市有权拒绝特定个体进店购物吗?我认为没有,因为依习俗,超市饭馆之类设立于开放公共区域的商家,其开门营业这一事实本身已构成了一种要约((more...)
【2015-09-03】
@海德沙龙 大卫·弗里德曼代表了市场无政府主义的功利主义一派,此派对哲学的兴趣不大,所以他们有关制度的论证,往往从问题直接跳到经济学(包括法律经济学)层次上,却很少对其暗中预设的前提或原则作出交代,本文罕见的例外,从中可以一窥大卫体系的伦理学基础
@whigzhou: 大卫的论证非常清晰,但依我看,这一论证很容易被击破,其实他对自己的薄弱环节(从均衡事实到伦理规则的过渡)应该也是清楚的,只是不想细究而已,结果最终,他用一个“令人欣慰的双重巧合”,就把自己的功利主(more...)
A Positive Account of Property Rights
关于财产权的实证解释
作者:David Friedman
翻译:思考一下名字
校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:作者个人网站,http://daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html
In thinking and talking about rights, including property rights, it seems natural to put the argument in either moral or legal terms. From the former viewpoint, rights are part of a description of what actions are right or wrong. The fact that I have a right to do something is an argument, although not necessarily a sufficient argument, that someone who prevents me from doing it is acting wrongly.
在我们思考和讨论包括财产权在内的权利时,我们的论证往往自然地使用道德的或者法律的语言。从道德角度来讲,权利是关于行为对错之描述的一部分。我有权利做一件事情这个事实,可以作为论据来论证(尽管未必充分):阻止我做此事的行为是错误的。
From the legal standpoint, rights are a description either of what the law says or of how it is enforced. On the latter interpretation, “I have a right to do X” translates as something like “If I do X the police will not arrest me; if someone tries to stop me from doing X the police will arrest him.” From this standpoint, one might claim that people in Holland have the right to buy marijuana and people in America have the right to drive 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, even though both are illegal.
从法律角度看,权利是对“法律讲了什么”或者“法律如何被执行”的描述。在第二种阐释中,“我有权利做X”大概可以理解为“假如我做了X,警察不会逮捕我;假如别人试图阻止我做X,警察会逮捕他。”从这个角度来说,我们可以说,荷兰人有权利买大麻,美国人有权利把车子开得比限速快5英里每小时,尽管二者都是违法的。
Both of these approaches have serious difficulties if our goal is to understand the phenomenon of rights, and associated phenomena, as they actually exist in the real world. We frequently observe behavior which looks like the claiming of rights and the recognition of rights in contexts where neither a moral nor a legal account seems relevant.
如果我们旨在理解现实世界中存在的权利现象及其相关现象,那么以上两种方法都有严重困难。我们经常观察到一些好像是在主张权利和认可权利的行为,而相关情境则与道德或法律解释都不相干。
Consider, for example, Great Britain’s “right” to control Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. It is difficult to explain Communist China’s willingness to respect that right on legal grounds, given that, from the Maoist standpoint, neither the government of Britain nor previous, non-communist governments with which it had signed agreements were entities entitled to any moral respect.
比如说英国控制香港、九龙及新界的“权利”。从法律层面【译注:从上下文看,此处恐有笔误,“法律层面”似应为“道德层面”】很难解释清楚共产中国为何愿意尊重这一权利(假设事实确实如此),因为从毛主义的立场看,无论是英国政府,还是和它签订条约的以往非共产主义中国政府,都不是在道德上值得给予任何尊重的实体。
It seems equally difficult to explain it on legal grounds, given the general weakness of international law and the fact that for part of the period in question Great Britain (as a member state of the United (more...)
A Positive Account of Property Rights 关于财产权的实证解释
作者:David Friedman 翻译:思考一下名字 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster),沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:作者个人网站,http://daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html In thinking and talking about rights, including property rights, it seems natural to put the argument in either moral or legal terms. From the former viewpoint, rights are part of a description of what actions are right or wrong. The fact that I have a right to do something is an argument, although not necessarily a sufficient argument, that someone who prevents me from doing it is acting wrongly. 在我们思考和讨论包括财产权在内的权利时,我们的论证往往自然地使用道德的或者法律的语言。从道德角度来讲,权利是关于行为对错之描述的一部分。我有权利做一件事情这个事实,可以作为论据来论证(尽管未必充分):阻止我做此事的行为是错误的。 From the legal standpoint, rights are a description either of what the law says or of how it is enforced. On the latter interpretation, "I have a right to do X" translates as something like "If I do X the police will not arrest me; if someone tries to stop me from doing X the police will arrest him." From this standpoint, one might claim that people in Holland have the right to buy marijuana and people in America have the right to drive 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, even though both are illegal. 从法律角度看,权利是对“法律讲了什么”或者“法律如何被执行”的描述。在第二种阐释中,“我有权利做X”大概可以理解为“假如我做了X,警察不会逮捕我;假如别人试图阻止我做X,警察会逮捕他。”从这个角度来说,我们可以说,荷兰人有权利买大麻,美国人有权利把车子开得比限速快5英里每小时,尽管二者都是违法的。 Both of these approaches have serious difficulties if our goal is to understand the phenomenon of rights, and associated phenomena, as they actually exist in the real world. We frequently observe behavior which looks like the claiming of rights and the recognition of rights in contexts where neither a moral nor a legal account seems relevant. 如果我们旨在理解现实世界中存在的权利现象及其相关现象,那么以上两种方法都有严重困难。我们经常观察到一些好像是在主张权利和认可权利的行为,而相关情境则与道德或法律解释都不相干。 Consider, for example, Great Britain's "right" to control Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. It is difficult to explain Communist China's willingness to respect that right on legal grounds, given that, from the Maoist standpoint, neither the government of Britain nor previous, non-communist governments with which it had signed agreements were entities entitled to any moral respect. 比如说英国控制香港、九龙及新界的“权利”。从法律层面【译注:从上下文看,此处恐有笔误,“法律层面”似应为“道德层面”】很难解释清楚共产中国为何愿意尊重这一权利(假设事实确实如此),因为从毛主义的立场看,无论是英国政府,还是和它签订条约的以往非共产主义中国政府,都不是在道德上值得给予任何尊重的实体。 It seems equally difficult to explain it on legal grounds, given the general weakness of international law and the fact that for part of the period in question Great Britain (as a member state of the United Nations) was at war with China. An alternative explanation—that the Chinese government believed that British occupation of Hong Kong was in its own interest—seems inconsistent with the Chinese failure to renew the lease on the New Territories, due to expire in 1997. 同样,考虑到国际法总体很羸弱,且当时英国(作为联合国一员)与中国有段时间曾处于战争状态【译注:指朝鲜战争】,想从法律角度解释这一点也很困难。而第三种解释——中国政府认为英国占领香港对自己有利——也和中国拒绝续签将于1997年过期的新界租约这一事实不符。 A second example is presented by the 1982 Falklands war. On the face of it, the clash looks like an attempted trespass repelled. Moral and legal accounts seem irrelevant, given the attitude of Argentina to the British claim. Yet the willingness of Britain to accept costs far out of proportion to the value of the prize being fought over is difficult to explain except on the theory that the British felt they were defending their property, which raises the question of what that concept means in such a context. 第二个例子是1982年的福克兰群岛战争。表面上看,此次冲突就是一次被击退的入侵。考虑到阿根廷对英国之权利主张的态度,道德和法律论述似乎都不相干。然而,英国愿意付出远超受争议领土价值的代价,这一点除非用“英国人觉得他们是在保卫自己的财产权”这一理论,否则很难解释。所以问题来了:财产权的概念在此情境中究竟意味着什么呢? A further difficulty with moral accounts of rights, in particular of property rights, is the degree to which the property rights that people actually respect seem to depend on facts that are morally irrelevant. This difficulty presents itself in libertarian accounts of property as the problem of initial acquisition. It is far from clear even in principle how unowned resources such as land can become private property. 对权利——特别是财产权——的道德解释所面临的另一个困难是:人们对财产权的实际尊重程度,似乎依赖于一些与道德无关的事实。这一困难在自由意志主义的财产权解释中,表现为初始占有问题。即便在理论上,土地这样的无主资源如何得以变成私人财产,也远非明白清楚。 Even if one accepts an account, such as that of Locke, of how initial acquisition might justly have occurred, that account provides little justification for the existing pattern of property rights, given the high probability that any piece of property has been unjustly seized at least once since it was first cleared. Yet billions of people, now and in the past, base much of their behavior on respect for property claims that seem either morally arbitrary or clearly unjust. 即使一个人接受某种如洛克那样的关于初始占有如何可能正当发生的解释,这种解释也很难给现存的财产权形式提供辩护,因为任何财产,在成为私产之后,都有很大可能被非正当地僭取过至少一次。但是古今数十亿人的多数行为,仍旧出于这一基础:尊重那些要么是道德上武断,要么是明显不义的权利主张。 A further difficulty with legal accounts of rights is that they are to some degree circular. We observe that police will act in certain ways and that their action (and related actions by judges, juries, etc.) implies that certain people have certain rights. But the behavior of police is itself in part a consequence of rights—such as the right of the state to collect taxes and pay them to the police as wages and the property right that the police then have over the money they receive. 权利的法律解释的另一个问题是,他们在某种程度上是循环论证。我们观察到警察按照确定方式行动,他们的行动(及法官、陪审团等的相关行动)表明某些人有某些权利。但是警察的行为本身就是权利的结果的一部分——比如政府收税发给警察作工资的权利,和警察对于他们收到的金钱的财产权。 For all of these reasons, I believe it is worth attempting a positive account of rights—an account which is both amoral and alegal. In part I of this essay I present such an account—one in which rights, in particular property rights, are a consequence of strategic behavior and may exist with no moral or legal support. 出于以上所有原因,我认为尝试一种关于权利的实证解释——一种既非道德也非法律的解释——是值得的。在本文的第一部分我将提出这一解释——其中权利,尤其财产权,是策略性行为的结果,无须道德或法律支持。 The account is presented both as an explanation of how rights could arise in a Hobbesian anarchy and as an explanation of the nature of rights as we observe them around us. In Part II I suggest ways in which something like the present structure of rights might have developed. 此解释既可以用来说明在霍布斯式的无政府世界里权利如何产生,又可以用来说明我们日常观察到的权利的性质。在第二部分,我会提出像现存权利体系这种事物得以发展出来的几种可能路径。 One puzzling feature of rights as we observe them is the degree to which the same conclusions seem to follow from very different assumptions. Thus roughly similar structures of rights can be and are deduced by libertarian philosophers trying to show what set of natural rights is just and by economists trying to show what set of legal rules would be efficient. 我们观察到的权利有一个令人困惑的特征:基于不同的假设似乎可以得出一样的结论。自由意志主义哲学家试图证明哪套自然权利是正义的;而经济学家则试图证明哪套法律规则是有效率的;二者可能并且已经推演出大致相似的权利架构。 And the structures of rights that they deduce seem similar to those observed in human behavior and embodied in the common law. In Part III of this essay I will try to suggest at least partial explanations for this triple coincidence—the apparent similarity between what is, what is just, and what is efficient. 而他们推演出的这套权利架构似乎与我们在人类行为中观察到的也相去不远,在普通法(common law)中亦有体现。在文章第三部分,我会试图对这种三重巧合——“实然”“应然”和“有效率”三者之间的明显相似,至少提出部分解释。 Part I: Schelling Points, Self-Enforcing Contracts, and the Paradox of Order 第一部分:谢林点,自执行契约和秩序悖论 Several writers have tried to analyze the transition from a Hobbesian state of nature to a state of civil order in terms of a set of hypothetical contracts establishing an initial distribution of property rights based on a preexisting distribution of power. One difficulty with this approach is that in the initial situation there are no institutions to enforce contracts. How can people in that situation change it by making contracts which are unenforceable and so of no effect? 一些作家曾尝试用一套基于既存权力分布而确定初始财产权分布的假想契约,来分析从霍布斯自然状态到文明秩序状态的过渡。这种方法的一个难点是,初始状况下没有强制执行契约的制度。人们又如何能通过订立无法强制执行、因而无效的契约,来改变现有状况呢? The same problem can be seen from the other side by asking in what sense we, or any society, are ever out of a Hobbesian state of nature. What do we have, what have we created, that does not exist in the Hobbesian jungle? 这一问题当我们从另一个方向上追问时同样可以看到:我们,或任何社会,到底在何种意义上已经走出霍布斯自然状态呢?我们拥有或创造了什么在霍布斯丛林中并不存在的东西呢? Civil order is not defined by the existence of physical objects—court rooms, police uniforms, law books. We can easily enough imagine a Hobbesian jungle—in the middle of a war, say—coexisting with all the physical appurtenances of civil society. And primitive peoples, without court rooms or law books, nonetheless live in a state of civil order. 文明秩序并不是按照法庭,警服,法律书等物理对象的存在而定义的。我们很容易想象一个拥有一切文明社会物质构件的霍布斯丛林,例如战争时期。而(同样可以想象)一个原始人群体,尽管没有法庭或法律典籍,却生活在文明秩序状态之中。 Nor does it suffice to say that we are in a state of civil order because we have judges to interpret our laws and police to enforce them. Why do those people act in that way? Presumably because it is in their private interest to do so—just as potential criminals obey the law for the same reason. But that is how people act in the Hobbesian jungle. 仅仅因为我们有法官来阐释法律,警察来执行法律,就说我们处于文明秩序状态之中,理由也是不充分的。法官和警察为何要按照此种方式行动?或许是因为这么做符合他们的私人利益——就好像潜在罪犯也出于同一理由而遵守法律。但这正是人们处于霍布斯丛林时的做法。 There too, one man may happen to enforce a rule, and another happen to obey it, because each finds it in his own interest to do so. What is it that we have and the Hobbesian jungle does not have that makes it in the interest of people to behave in a law abiding and peaceful manner? To say that the answer is "police, courts, government" only throws the question back a step; if civil order is enforced by men with guns, what controls them? 在那里,同样地,一个人碰巧执行一条规则,另一个人碰巧遵守它,正因为他们俩都觉得这样做符合个人利益。我们有而霍布斯丛林没有的是一种什么东西,能够使整个社会从全体的利益出发,遵守法律而和平相处呢?回答“警察,法庭和政府”只能把问题往前推进一步;如果文明秩序是靠手里有枪的人强制施行的,那么谁控制这些有枪的人呢? There are two sorts of answers to these questions. One is that the difference is a moral one. People somehow accept an obligation, agree not to behave according to simple self interest, feel themselves bound by that agreement and alter their actions accordingly. 这些问题有两类答案。其一认为区别是道德上的。不知何故,人们了接受了一项义务,同意不仅仅依照个人利益行事,认识到自己受该协定的约束,并依此调整自己的行为。 There are difficulties with this sort of explanation. First, there is the empirical observation that people do not feel themselves bound to obey laws; many, perhaps most, people feel free to violate those laws (speed limits, drinking laws, customs regulations) which they disagree with and believe they can get away with breaking. 这类解释有一些难点。首先,有经验观察发现,人们并不觉得自己有义务遵守法律;很多人,也许是大多数人,当他们不认同某项法律(比如限速,饮酒法律,海关规定),并且相信自己能够逃脱惩罚时,就会随意违反这些法律。 Second, to the extent that people do feel a moral obligation to obey social rules, it is hard to derive that feeling from any variant of social contract theory. The traditional variants encounter the difficulty eloquently described by Lysander Spooner; since we ourselves did not sign the contract we are not bound by it. 第二,即便在人们觉得自己有道德义务去遵守社会准则时,这种道德感也很难从任何版本的社会契约论中推导出来。传统的社会契约论版本都面临Lysander Spooner曾有力陈述过的困难:我们自己没有签订过契约,所以不受其约束。 The difficulties with deriving moral obligation from the sort of pairwise social contract suggested by Winston Bush are equally great. Even if we consider that each of us is, at every instant, in an implicit contract with each of his neighbors to respect some agreed upon set of rights, still that contract, in Bush's model, is based on the threat of coercion. It has no more moral legitimacy, according to conventional moral ideas, than the obligation to pay off a protection racket. 从Winston Bush提出的两两契约之类的理论推导出道德义务,也一样困难重重。即便设想,在Bush的模型之中,我们每个人在每一时刻,都和每个旁人处于一种隐性契约之中,约定尊重某一套协商好的权利,这种契约仍然是基于威胁使用强制手段的。依照传统的道德观念,其中所含的道德合法性并不比交保护费义务中所含的要多。 It may be possible to explain the difference between a Hobbesian state of nature and civil society as a moral difference, but I prefer the alternative explanation—that the essential difference is not in the motivation of the players but in the strategic situation they face. This raises the question of how making an agreement—in a society with no mechanisms for enforcing agreements—can change anything, the strategic situation included. 霍布斯自然状态和文明社会之间的区别,或许可以解释为一种道德区别,但我更喜欢另一种解释——其中本质区别不在于参与者的动机,而在于他们面临的策略处境。于是问题来了:在没有机制可以强制执行约定的社会,订下合约又能改变什么呢?包括,能改变他们面临的策略处境么? I. A. The Tool: Schelling Points 第一部分之一,工具:谢林点 Two people are separately confronted with the list of numbers shown above and offered a reward if they independently choose the same number. If the two are mathematicians, it is likely that they will both choose 2—the only even prime. Non-mathematicians are likely to choose 100—a number which seems, to the mathematicians, no more unique than the other two exact squares. Illiterates might agree on 69, because of its peculiar symmetry—as would, for a different reason, those whose interest in numbers is more prurient than mathematical. 向两个人分别出示以下数列:2,5,9,25,69,73,82,96,100,126,150。如果两人独立选择了同一数字就给予奖励。如果二人是数学家,他们有可能都选2——唯一的偶质数。非数学家们可能选择100——一个在数学家们看来和另外两个平方数并无区别的数字。文盲可能同时选69,出于它奇特的对称——那些对于数字的兴趣主要在色情而非数学的人,出于另一种理由,也可能选择69。 There are three things worth noting about this simple problem in coordination without communication. The first is that each pair of players is looking for a number that is in some way unique. To a mathematician, all three squares are special numbers, as are the three primes. But if they try to coordinate on a square or a prime, they have only one chance in three of success—and besides, one may be trying primes and the other squares. 2 is unique. If the set of numbers did not contain 2 but did contain only one prime (or only one square, or one perfect number) they would choose that. 这个简单的无交流协调问题有三点值得注意。第一是,每一对参与者都在找一个以某种方式看独特的数字。对于数学家,三个平方数都特别,三个质数也是。但如果他们协同选择一个平方数或质数,他们只有三分之一的成功机会——何况还可能一个人选质数而另一个选了平方数。2则是独一无二的。如果这列数字里不包含2,但只包含一个质数(或一个平方数,或一个完全数),他们就会选这个数。 The second thing to note is that there is no single right answer; the number chosen by one player, and hence the number that ought to be chosen by the other, depends on the categories that the person choosing uses to classify the alternatives. The right strategy is to find some classification in terms of which there is a unique number, then choose that number—a strategy whose implementation depends on the particular classifications that pair of players uses. Thus the right answer depends on subjective characteristics of the players. 第二点值得注意的是,这里没有唯一的正确答案;一人选中并且也应当被另一人选中的那个数字,取决于前者所用的分类方法。正确的策略是找出一种产生独一无二数字的分类,然后选择此数字——这种策略的实施取决于两个参与者选择的特定分类方法。因此正确答案也取决于参与者的主观特性。 The third point, which follows from this, is that it is possible to succeed in the game because of, not in spite of, the bounded rationality of the players. To a mind of sufficient scope every number is unique. It is only because the players are limited to a small number of the possible classification schemes for numbers, and because the two players may be limited to the same schemes, that a correct choice may exist. 第三点是,由此可知,在这一博弈中取得成功之所以可能,不是由于参与者克服了自己的有限理性,而正是由于他们只拥有有限理性。对于一个充分理性的头脑,每一个数字都是独特的。正因为参与者受限于少量几种可能的数字分类方法,并且两人或许受限于同样的几种,正确的选择才可能存在。 In this respect the theory of this game is radically different from conventional game theory, which assumes players with unlimited ability to examine alternatives and so abstracts away from all subjective characteristics of the players except those embodied in their utility functions. 从这个角度来看,这种博弈的理论和传统博弈论极为不同,后者假设参与者有无限的能力去考虑备选项,因此除体现于效用函数中的那些之外,它剥离了参与者其它所有主观特性。 Consider now two players playing the game called bilateral monopoly. They have a dollar to divide between them, provided they can agree how to divide it. Superficially there is no resemblance between this game and that discussed above; the players are free to talk with each other as much as they want. 现在设想两个参与者在玩一个叫“双边垄断”(bilateral monopoly)的游戏。如果能就如何分配达成同意的话,他们就可以瓜分一块钱。表面上看,这和之前讨论的博弈一点也不像:参与者只要愿意就可以和对方自由交谈。 But while they can talk freely, there is a sense in which they cannot communicate at all. It is in my interest to persuade you that I will only be satisfied with a large fraction of the dollar; if I am really unwilling to accept anything less than ninety cents, you are better off agreeing to accept ten cents than holding out for more and getting nothing. Since it is in the interest of each of us to persuade the other of his resolve, all statements to that effect can be ignored; they would be made whether true or not. 可即便他们可以自由交谈,从一种意义上说,他们仍是完全无法沟通的:我的利益所在,是劝说你接受,我只有得到这块钱中的大头才会满足;如果我真的不愿接受少于九毛,那么你同意接受一毛比要求更多却一分都没拿到更好。因为向对方展示决心对自己有利,所有表达此种意思的言论都可以忽略,因为无论真假双方都会做这样的声明。 What each player has to do is to guess what the other's real demand is, what the fraction of the dollar is without which he will refuse to agree. That cannot be communicated, simply because it pays each player to lie about it. The situation is therefore similar to that in the previous game; the players must coordinate their demands (so that they add up to a dollar) without communication. It seems likely that they will do so by agreeing to split the dollar fifty-fifty. 每个参与者必须要做的,是猜测对方的真实需求,即,少于几毛钱对方一定会拒绝同意。而这不可能付诸沟通,因为每人说谎对自己都有利。所以这个场景和上一个游戏类似;参与者必须在无法沟通的前提下协同他们的需求(使得总和是一块钱)。他们有可能会同意五五分成。 The same points made about the previous game apply here, although less obviously. The players are looking for a unique solution; if I decide that the natural split is one third-two thirds and you agree, both of us reasoning from a mystic belief in the significance of the number three, there is still the risk that each will decide he is entitled to the two-thirds. 关于头一个游戏的论点在此同样有效,尽管不如之前的明显。参与者们也在寻找一个独一无二的答案;如果我断定1/3和2/3是自然的分割,基于我们对于数字三的某种共同的神秘信仰,你也表示同意,但我们依旧有无法达成一致的风险,因为可能每个人都觉得自己应得2/3。 To see that the solution depends on the particular categories used by the players, imagine that both have been brought up to believe that utility, not money, is the relevant payoff, and suppose further that both believe the marginal utility of a dollar to be inversely proportional to the recipient's income. In that case, the solution to the game is not a fifty-fifty split of money but a fifty-fifty split of utility—implying a division of the dollar into shares proportional to the two players' incomes. 为了看清答案依赖于参与者们特有的分类方式,请想象两人的成长环境都让他们认为效用而非金钱才是被看重的回报;同时假设两人都认为一块钱的边际效用和受惠者的收入成反比。在这种情况下,博弈解不再是金钱的对半分成,而是效用的对半分成——意即一块钱被分成和两个参与者收入成比例的两部分。 Such an outcome, chosen because of its uniqueness, is called a Schelling point, after Thomas Schelling who originated the idea. It provides a possible solution to the problem of coordination without communication. As this example shows, it is relevant both to situations where communication is physically impossible and to situations where communication is impossible because there is no way that either party can provide the other with a reason to believe that what he says is true. 这种因其唯一性而被选中的结果,叫做谢林点,得名于提出这一观点的托马斯·谢林(Thomas Schelling)。这给无沟通协调问题提供了一个可能的解答。正如这个例子所表明的,即便交流在物理上不可能发生,或是交流可以发生但是双方都拿不出理由让对方相信自己所说为真时,协调同样能起作用。 Even if it is impossible for the players in such a game to communicate their real demands, it may still be possible for them to affect the outcome by what they say. They could do so, not by directly communicating their own strategies (any such statement will be disbelieved), but by altering the other player's categories, the ways in which he organizes the alternatives of the game, and so changing the Schelling points which depend on those categories. 即使在这个博弈中参与者无法交流他们的真实需求,他们仍然可能通过言语影响结果。做到这一点,需直接交流自己的他们不策略(这样的话说了也没人相信),而会去试图改变对方的分类方式,即对方为博弈构造不同备选项的方式,从而改变依赖于这些分类的谢林点。 In the example just discussed, for example, one player (presumably the richer) might remind the other of their shared belief in the importance of utility in order to make sure the equi-utility Schelling point would be chosen. If, in the first game I described, the players were allowed to talk before seeing the numbers, a conversation on the interesting properties of primes or the special uniqueness of the lowest of a series of numbers might well alter the Schelling point, and so the result of the game. One can interpret a good deal of bargaining behaviour in this light—as an attempt by one party to make the other see the situation in a particular way, so as to generate a Schelling point favorable to the first party. 在上述例子中,一个参与者(比如说更有钱的那个)可能提醒对方,两人都相信效用的重要性,试图保证同效用(equi-utility)谢林点被选中。假如在第一个博弈中,参与者在看到数字之前可以交谈,那么关于质数的有趣特征或是关于数列中最小值的特别之处的谈话,很可能会改变谢林点,进而改变博弈结果。人们可以如此解释很大一部分议价行为——它就是一方尝试让另一方用某种特定眼光看待当前场景,以便产生一个对自己有利的谢林点。 A slightly different way in which one may conceptualize the process of agreement on a Schelling point is in terms of bargaining costs in a context of continuous bargaining. Consider a situation in which the number of possible outcomes is very large. Suppose the process of bargaining is itself costly, either because it consumes time or because each player bears costs (such as staying out on strike) in trying to validate his threats. As long as the players are faced with a choice among a large number of comparable alternatives, each proposal by one player is likely to call forth a competing proposal from another, slanted a little more in his own interest. 概念化地理解协议达致谢林点的过程,还有个稍微不同的方式:那就是考虑持续议价情境中的议价成本。设想一个情境之中,可能的结果选项非常多。假设议价过程本身是有成本的,这或者是因为花费时间,或者是因为参与者证实自己的威胁需要成本(比如罢工)。只要参与者需要从很多备选项中做出选择,那么一个参与者提出的每个建议都很可能促使对方提出一个竞争性的选项,使之稍微向己方利益倾斜。 But suppose there is one outcome that is seen as unique. A player who proposes that outcome may be perceived as offering, not a choice between that outcome, another slightly different, another different still, . . . but a choice between that outcome and continued bargaining. 但假设有一个结果被认为是特殊的。那么一方提议这个结果,就可能被视为提出了一个“要么就这个结果”要么就“继续议价”的选择,而非那种你提一个我再提一个稍微不同的,你再提个又有所不同的……的情况。 A player who says that he insists on the unique outcome and will not settle for anything less may be believable, where a similar statement about a different outcome would not be. He can convincingly argue that he will stand by his proposed outcome because, once he gives it up, he has no idea where he will end up or how high the costs of getting there will be. 一个说自己坚持要该独特结果而不会屈就的参与者,可能是可信的;而换个结果,同样的声明则不可信。此人可以论证说,他会坚持自己提议的结果,因为一旦放弃,他就完全不知道自己的结局会怎样,也不知道到达该结局之前的议价成本会有多高。这种论证能够让人信服。, In order for a Schelling point to provide a peaceful resolution to a conflict of interest, both parties must conceptualize the alternatives in similar ways—similar enough so that they can agree about which possible outcomes are unique, and thus attractive as potential Schelling points. 为让谢林点能够于利益冲突之中提供和平解决方案,双方必须能用类似的方式去考虑备选项——类似到双方能够同意什么结果是独特的,因而有足够吸引力而可能成为谢林点。 So one interesting implication of the argument is that violent conflict is especially likely to occur on the boundary between cultures, where people with very different ways of viewing the world interact. 所以这一论证的一个有趣结论是:暴力冲突尤其可能在不同文化的边界发生,在那里,遭遇双方具有截然不同的世界观。 I. B. Up From Hobbes 第一部分之二,跳出霍布斯状态 Two people are living in a Hobbesian state of nature. Each can injure or steal from the other, at some cost, and each can spend resources on his own defense. Since conflict consumes resources, both could benefit by agreeing on what each owns and thereafter each respecting the other's property. 两人生活在霍布斯自然状态中。每人都可以以一定成本伤害或者窃取对方,也可以花费资源来增强个人防卫。因为冲突消耗资源,所以通过协议确定谁拥有什么,继而尊重对方的财产权,二者均可获益。 The joint benefit might be divided in different ways, according to the particular set of property rights they agree on—what property belongs to whom, and whether either has a property right in tribute from the other. This is a special case of the game—bilateral monopoly—described above. 根据他们约定的不同财产权组合,这一共同利益也有不同的分割方法——谁拥有哪些财产,一方是否拥有从对方那里索取贡奉的财产权。这是上述“双边垄断”博弈的一种特殊形式。 Each player, of course, will threaten to refuse to make any such agreement unless he gets the division he wants. Each will disbelieve most of the other's threats. If their ability to coerce and defend is roughly equal, and if there is some natural division of contested property (such as a stream running between their farms), it is likely that they will find a Schelling point in the form of an agreement to accept that division, respect each other's rights, and pay no tribute. 每个参与者当然会威胁拒绝任何此类协定——除非他得到自己想要的分额。每个人都会拒绝相信对方的大部分威胁。如果他们的胁迫和自卫能力大抵相当,而且争议财产有某种自然分割(比如他们各自农地之间有一条溪流),那么他们就有可能找到一个谢林点:其表现就是他们订立一个协定,接受这种分割,尊重彼此的权利并且贡奉无须纳贡。 If one (being, perhaps, slightly more powerful) tries to insist on a small tribute, arguing that it will still leave the other better off than continued conflict, the other may believably refuse, arguing that once he concedes any tribute there is no natural limit to what the other can demand. 如果一人(也许是稍微强壮的那个)试图要求一小部分贡奉,争辩说,即便如此对方的状况也会比继续冲突要好;那么对方能够可信地拒绝,其理由可以是,一旦他同意交纳任何贡奉,对方索求就没有一个自然上限。 Agreeing to tribute costs the victim not only the tribute but the only available Schelling point. The expected cost to him of such an agreement includes both the possible cost of paying higher tribute in the future and the risk of future conflicts if in the future he rejects demands for higher tribute. That cost may be high enough to make his insistence that he will choose continued conflict over the payment of even a small tribute believable. 对于受害者来说,同意纳贡不仅花费贡奉本身,还令其失去了仅有的谢林点。对他来说,这个协定的预期成本不仅包括未来可能支付的更多贡奉,还包括一旦未来拒绝更多贡奉所带来的冲突风险。这种成本可能足够高,足以使得他的这种宁愿选择延续冲突也不会支付哪怕是少许贡奉的坚持是可信的。 So far we have considered the Schelling point that generates an agreement. But the agreement itself, whether generated by a Schelling point or in some other way, is thereafter itself a Schelling point. It is a unique outcome of which both players are conscious. Once it has been made, a policy of "if you do not abide by the agreement I will revert to the use of force, even if the violation is small compared to the cost of conflict" is believable for precisely the same reason the refusal to pay tribute, or any insistence by a bargainer on a Schelling point, is believable. The signing of a contract establishes a new Schelling point and thereby alters the strategic situation. The contract enforces itself. 到此为止,我们考虑的是促成协定的谢林点。然而这一协定,无论是源于谢林点或别的什么,在此之后本身也成了谢林点。这是一个双方都知道的独特结果。一旦它得以确立,一种“你不遵守协定我就回归使用武力,哪怕毁约所害比冲突的代价要小”的策略就是可信的,正如拒绝纳贡,或任何对于谢林点的坚持是可信的一样。签订契约建立了新的谢林点,进而改变了策略场景。这种契约能够自我强制执行。 This applies not only to the initial pairwise social contract but to subsequent contracts as well. Suppose you have an orchard and I have an axe. After agreeing on our mutual property rights, you offer me a bushel of apples to cut down a tree that is shading your orchard. I cut down the tree as agreed, but you refuse to give me the apples. What happens? 以上论述不仅适用于初始的双边社会契约,也适用于后继的契约。假设你有一个果园而我有一把斧头。在我们确定了各自的财产权之后,你答应给我一蒲式耳苹果,换取我砍倒一棵遮挡你果园阳光的树。我依照协议砍倒了树,你却拒绝给我苹果。接下来怎么办呢? So far as our physical situation is concerned, I am in no more able to compel you to pay me a bushel of apples now than I was before you made the offer and I cut down the tree—our material resources, our ability to hurt each other and defend ourselves, are the same as they were. 就我们的物质状况来说,和你提出该建议然后我把树砍倒之前相比,现在我强迫你给我一蒲式耳苹果的能力并没有增加——我们的物质资源,我们伤害对方和保护自己的能力,都和之前一样。 Yet my threat to cut down your orchard unless you pay up is more credible than it would have been before, both because I have more reason to carry through on it and because you have less reason to resist it. Before, the attempt to get a bushel of apples from you would have been an attempt to move you away from the Schelling point established by the initial contract. Now it is an attempt to restore the Schelling point established by our subsequent agreement. 但是假设你不如约支付的话我就要砍倒你的果树,这个威胁会比之前更加可信;因为不仅我更有理由执行它,而且你也更少理由抗拒它。在(订立上述契约)之前,从你手中拿走一蒲式耳苹果,是一个试图使你偏离由该初始契约所确立的谢林点的行为。而现在,我(砍倒你果树)的行为,则是一个试图恢复由该契约所确立的谢林点的行为。 A more conventional explanation of this is that the reason it is in your interest to deliver the apples once you have agreed to do so is that you wish to establish a reputation for keeping promises, and that the reason it is in my interest to punish you if you do not deliver the apples is because I wish to establish a reputation for enforcing contracts made with me. While this may be true, there are two reasons why it cannot be a complete explanation. 对于这种情况的一个更通常的解释是:你依约交出苹果之所以符合你的利益,乃是因为你想建立一个守信的名声;而如果你不交出苹果我就要惩罚你,这之所以符合我的利益,乃是因为我想建立一个与我签订的契约会得到强制执行的名声。这也许是真的,但是有两个理由告诉我们,这不是一个完备的解释。 First, it depends on a particular perception of consistent behavior—in pure logic, there is no more reason to think of "always enforce" as more consistent then "back down the first, third, fifth, ... time and fight the second, fourth, ...." Both describe single possible strategies. The important difference between them is that the former is a Schelling point and the latter is not— a fact not about the strategies but about the way we classify them. 首先,这取决于对行为一致性的某种特殊理解——纯逻辑来说,“永远强制执行”并不比“第一三五次退缩、第二四六次对抗”更一致。二者都是单一可能性策略。两者之间的重要区别是,前者是谢林点而后者不是——一个无关于策略本身,而是关乎于我们如何对策略进行分类的事实。 A second and related problem with the conventional account is that I might equally well wish to establish a reputation for following through on extortionary demands. We need some way of explaining why I cut down the shade tree first, instead of simply committing myself to demand your apples. If the former pattern creates a Schelling point of contract fulfillment and the latter does not, that provides a possible explanation. 传统解释的第二个问题(与第一个不无关系)是,我有同等的可能性,想要建立一种坚持实现勒索性要求的名声。我们需要某种方法来解释,为什么我会把遮阳的树砍倒,而不是直接强行索取你的苹果。如果前一个行为模式建立了一个履行协约的谢林点,而后者不能,那这就是一个可能的解释。 I believe I have now resolved the apparent paradox of contracting out of the Hobbesian jungle. The process of contracting changes the situation because it establishes new Schelling points, which in turn affect the strategic situation and its outcome. The same analysis can be used from the other side to explain what constitutes civil society. The laws and customs of civil society are an elaborate network of Schelling points. 我相信我现在已经解决了通过建立契约脱离霍布斯丛林的表面悖论。建立契约的过程能够改变情境,正因为它建立了新的谢林点;后者继而影响了策略场景及其结果。另一方面,同样的分析也可以用来解释文明社会如何构成。文明社会的法律和习俗组成了一个复杂精密的谢林点网络。 If my neighbor annoys me by growing ugly flowers, I do nothing. If he dumps his garbage on my lawn, I retaliate—possibly in kind. If he threatens to dump garbage on my lawn, or play a trumpet fanfare at 3 A.M. every morning, unless I pay him a modest tribute I refuse—even if I am convinced that the available legal defenses cost more than the tribute he is demanding. 如果我的邻居种了难看的花来烦我,我啥也不做。如果他把垃圾倒在我的草坪上,我就会反击——很可能把垃圾倒回去。如果他威胁要把垃圾倒在我的草坪上,或者要在每天凌晨三点大声吹号,除非我给他一点贡奉,那么我就会拒绝——即使我确信所需的法律诉讼成本要比他要的那点贡奉还多。 If a policeman arrests me—even for a crime I did not commit—I go along peacefully. If he tries to rob my house, I fight, even if the cost of doing so is more than the direct cost of letting him rob me. 如果警察要逮捕我——即使我没犯所控罪名——我也会平静配合。如果他企图抢劫我的家,我就反抗——即使这样做的成本比让他抢我的直接成本还高。 Each of us knows what behavior by everyone else is within the rules and what behaviour implies unlimited demands, the violation of the Schelling point, and the ultimate return to the Hobbesian jungle. The latter behaviour is prevented by the threat of conflict even if (as in the British defense of the Falklands) the direct costs of surrender are much lower than the direct costs of conflict. 我们每人都知道,别人什么行为是符合规则的,什么行为隐含着无限制的索求,而什么行为是对谢林点的违反,什么则是对霍布斯丛林的终极回归。最后一种情况之所以得以防止,是因为存在战斗威慑,即便投降的直接成本比战斗的直接成本低很多(比如英国保卫福克兰群岛)。 One question this raises is how we succeed in committing ourselves not to back down in such situations. One answer has been suggested already. It is in my long run interest not to back down because if I do I can expect further demands: "if once you have paid him the danegeld/You never get rid of the Dane." 由此引发的一个问题是,我们如何保证自己在这种场景中不会退缩。一个答案上文已经提及了。不退缩符合我的长期利益,因为一旦退缩我就可能面临更多索求——“一旦你交了丹麦金,就永远摆脱不了丹麦人。”【译注:丹麦金是9世纪到11世纪之间西欧受丹麦入侵者频繁劫掠的地区(特别是英格兰东南和布列塔尼),当地政府向居民征收用以向入侵者支付贡奉以免遭劫掠的一种特别税。】 This explanation is not entirely adequate. In some situations, the aggressor may be able to commit himself to keep your surrender secret and limit his own demands. In others, the short run costs of resistance may be larger than the long run costs of surrender. 这并不足以解释所有的情况。在某些场景中,侵略者可能会承诺保守你投降的秘密,并限制他自身的索求。另一些场景中,抵抗带来的短期成本也许高于投降并纳贡所带来的长期成本。 People (and nations) do sometimes surrender to such demands. If they do so less often then a simple calculation of costs and benefits might predict, the explanation may be found in a class of arguments made by Robert Frank and others. 人们(和国家)有时候会向这种索求投降。如果他们这样做的频率低于简单的收益成本分析所得出的结果,那么或许可以从Robert Frank等人提出的一类论证中找到解释。 The central insight of such arguments is that even if surrender is sometimes in my private interest, being the sort of person who will surrender when it is in his interest to do so may not be, since if it is known that I will not back down there is no point in making the initial demand. My first best option is to pretend to be tough, in the hope that the demand will not be made, while reserving the option of surrendering if my bluff is called. 此类论证的核心思想是,即便投降有时符合我的个人利益,做一个“符合个人利益时就投降”的人并不符合我的利益;因为如果人尽皆知我不会退缩,那么一开始就没理由提出索求。我的最优选择是装作强硬,期望不会有人提出索求,同时保留虚张声势被戳穿后投降的选择。 If, however, humans are imperfectly able to lie to each other about what sort of people they are—as seems to be the case—then the best available option may be to really be tough, despite the risk that I will occasionally find myself forced to fight when I would be better off surrendering. 但是如果人类对于自己是什么样的人并没有完美的撒谎能力——事实好像正是如此——那么最优选择也许是真正强硬,尽管这样做的话,就得冒这样的风险:有时投降更有利,但我却不得不战斗。 None of this argument depends on moral sanctions. I may (indeed do) believe that the tax collector is morally equivalent to the thief. I accept one and fight the other because of my beliefs about other people's behaviour—what they will or will not fight for—and because there are beliefs about my behaviour which I wish others to hold. We are bound together by a set of mutually reinforcing strategic expectations. 这些论证都不依赖于道德约束。我可能(其实就是)认为税官和窃贼在道德上没有区别。我接受其中一个而反抗另一个,是基于我对他人行为的信念——他们会(或不会)为何物而抗争——也基于我希望别人对我的行为能持有某种信念。我们被一套相互强化的策略期望束缚在一起。 Part II: Two Routes from Hobbes to Here 第二部分:从霍布斯到当今秩序的两种途径 My argument so far has dealt with two ends of an extended process. I started with an explanation of how it was possible, in a two person world, to take the first steps towards bargaining out of a Hobbesian state of nature. I ended with an explanation of how the same logic maintains civil order as we know it. Missing is any explanation of the intermediate steps by which the complicated and functional order in which we live might have been constructed. 到现在为止,我的论述集中在这个漫长过程的两端。一开始我解释了,在一个两人世界中,跨出通过议价而脱离霍布斯自然状态的第一步,何以是可能的。在结尾我解释了,同样的逻辑如何维持我们所了解的文明秩序。其中缺少的是,我们生活于其中的复杂功能秩序,是如何构建出来的,即对中间步骤的解释。 One possibility is legislation. If an important part of the way in which individuals classify actions is "legal/illegal," then the fact of legal change, whether by a king, legislature, or court system, changes the way in which they classify the alternatives, which in turn changes the set of Schelling points. 一种可能解释是立法。如果个人对行为的一个重要分类是“合法/非法”,那么无论是国王、立法者还是法院系统带来的法律变化,都会改变人们对备选项进行分类的方式,继而改变谢林点集合。 If the court has recognized property rights in water but not in air, I classify pollution of my section of the river as aggression and fight it, by legal, social, or even illegal means. I classify pollution of my air by my neighbor's soap factory as an inconvenient nuisance and either put up with it or try to buy him off. Under these circumstances legislation is, to a considerable degree, self-enforcing; the pattern of property rights might well survive even if the enforcement arm of the state vanished or became impotent. 如果法院认可对于水的财产权,而不认可对于空气的财产权,那么我就把针对我的河流段的污染看作是入侵,进而通过法律的、社会的、甚至非法手段进行抗争。而我把周边空气受到邻居肥皂厂的污染当作一个不便的日常琐事,或者忍了或者给钱让他不要再排污了。在这些情况下,立法在某种程度上是自我执行的;即使政府的强制执行机器消失或者变得无能了,这种财产权模式也很可能延续下去。 While this may be part of the explanation for civil order, it cannot be all of it, for at least three reasons. First, some rights have no legal rules associated with them. Second, many, perhaps most, people are selective about which legal rules they take seriously—as can easily be observed on any U.S. highway. And finally, there are well documented situations in which property rights exist and are respected even though they are inconsistent with the relevant legal rights. 尽管这也许能部分解释文明秩序,至少有三种原因使它不可能是全部的解释。第一,有些权利没有相关的法律规定。第二,很多人,或许是大部分人,只选择性的严肃对待一部分法规——在任何美国高速上都很容易看到。最后,即便和有关法规相悖,财产权仍然存在并受人们尊重,这种情形记录详多。 This final point brings up a second possible explanation of how the pattern of expectations might have come into existence—that it is due not to the creation of laws but to the evolution of norms. Robert Ellickson, in a recent book, describes how relations among neighbors function in Shasta County California. 最后一点提示了对于可能的模式如何成为现实的第二种可能解释——它的产生不基于法律的创制,而是基于规范的演化。Robert Ellickson在他最近的书中描述了在加州夏斯塔郡邻里关系是如何运作的。【编注:书名为Order Without Law,中译本《无需法律的秩序》。】 One of his most striking observations was that in several cases, including conflicts over trespass by animals and the allocation of the cost of building fences between neighbors, the inhabitants ignore the relevant laws and act instead according to well understood non-legal norms. 他最令人惊讶的发现之一是,在一些情况下,包括动物擅闯和邻里分担建造篱笆成本这样的纠纷中,居民忽略了相关法律,而依照众所周知的非法律规范(non-legal norm)行事。 Ellickson offers no adequate account of how such norms develop or of why they provide, in some contexts but not in all, at least approximately efficient rules. A possible answer to that puzzle brings us back to the two person social contract discussed in the previous section. 至于这些规范如何发展出来,或者它们为何能够在某些而不是全部情境中提供至少近乎高效的规则,Ellickson没有提供足够的解释。对这个谜团的可能回答,将带我们回到上一部分讨论过的二人社会契约。 One might try to explain functional norms by evolution. Perhaps, over time, societies with better norms conquer, absorb, or are imitated by societies with worse norms, producing a world of well designed societies. The problem with that explanation is that such a process should take centuries, if not millennia—which does not fit the facts as Ellickson reports them. Whaling norms in the 19th century, for example, seem to have adjusted rapidly to changes in the species being hunted. 演化也许可以用来解释功能性规范。也许随着时间流逝,有更好规范的社群征服、吸收了有不好规范的社群,或被后者所模仿——这造就了一个充满设计良好的社群的世界。这种解释的问题是,此过程应该需要几个世纪,如果不是几千年的话——但这和Ellickson所报告的事实不符。举例来说,19世纪的捕鲸规范似乎随着被猎物种的变化而迅速调整了。 Perhaps what is happening is evolution, but evolution involving groups much smaller and more fluid than entire societies. Consider a norm, such as honesty, that can profitably be followed by small groups within a society, applicable only within the group. Groups with efficient norms will prosper and grow by recruitment. Others will imitate them. Groups with similar norms will tend to fuse, in order to obtain the same benefits on a larger scale. 也许其中发生的确是一种演化,不过演化所涉及的是比整个社群更小更有流动性的团体。请设想一种可以被社群中的小团体遵守且受益的规范,设想它仅仅适用于此种小团体内部。有高效规范的团体能够繁荣并且通过吸收新成员而扩张。其他团体会模仿此类团体。有类似规范的团体为了在更大规模上取得此种收益,会倾向于融合。 If one system of norms works better than its competitors, it will eventually spread through the entire society. When circumstances change and new problems arise the process can repeat itself on a smaller scale, generating modified norms to deal with the new problems. In effect, what we have is the pairwise contracting out of the Hobbesian state of nature, repeated many times between pairs and within small groups. 如果一套规范比另一套好,它最终会变遍布整个社群。如果情况变化,出现了新问题,整个过程可以在较小的规模上重复,产生出改良的规范来应对新问题。结果我们将看到,两两订立契约而脱离霍布斯自然状态这一过程,将在两两之间、和在小团体内反复发生。 This conjecture about how norms arise and change suggests a prediction: Even if a norm is efficient, it will not arise if its benefits depend on its being generally adopted. Suppose we define a norm as locally efficient if, with regard to any two individuals following the norm, there is no different norm such that at least one would be better off and the other no worse off if they both switched to it. A norm is globally efficient if there is no different norm such that at least one person would be better off and nobody worse off if everyone switched to it. 这个关于规范如何出现和如何变化的猜想暗含一个预测:即使一个规范是高效的,假如它的好处依赖于对它的普遍遵循,它也无法出现。让我们定义:对任意两个遵循某规范的个体来说,如果没有别的规范能够使两人在转而遵循它之后,其中至少一人情况变得更好,而另一人情况不会变差,那么此规范就是局部高效的(locally efficient)。如果没有别的规范能够使得所有人在转而遵循它之后,其中至少一人情况变得更好,而所有人都不会变差,那么这个规范是全局高效的(globally efficient)。 Consider the whaling norms that Ellickson discusses. It is in the interest of any pair of captains to agree in advance to an efficient rule for dealing with whales that one ship harpoons and another one brings in, just as it is in the interest of a pair of individuals to agree to be honest with each other. 设想Ellickson提到的捕鲸规范。任何两个船长,若能先行达成一条有效规则,解决一船射中而另外一船捕获的鲸鱼处理问题,那对双方都是有好处的;就像答应相互诚实对两人都有好处一样。 But a rule for holding down the total number of whales killed so as to preserve the population of whales is useful only if almost everyone follows it. The former type of norm existed, the latter did not—with the result that 19th century whalers did an efficient job of hunting one species after another to near extinction. 但是降低捕杀鲸的总数,从而保存鲸种群这种规则,只有所有人都遵守时才会有用。前面这种规范存在过,后者就没有——结果是19世纪捕鲸人高效的把一个又一个鲸种驱向灭绝。 So the evolution of norms provides a second possible account of how we get from Hobbes to here. Where the recognition of rights between two people, such as neighbors, or within a small group, provides mutual benefits, it is in the interest of the parties concerned to recognize such rights. 所以,规范的演化为我们如何能从霍布斯抵达当今秩序这一问题提出了另一种可能解释。当两人,比如邻居之间,或者小团体内部,同时承认彼此权利能带来共同好处时,对于相关各方来说,承认权利均符合其利益。 By doing so they change the pattern of Schelling points that determines the equilibrium of their interaction, in a way which provides (some) protection for the rights in question. Over a long period of time, the result is to create a set of consistent mutual expectations, and one that tends to be locally, although not necessarily globally, efficient. 他们这样做的时候就改变了谢林点的格局——后者决定着他们之间的互动均衡——,使之朝着为相关权利提供(某些)保护的方向变化。长此以往,结果是创造出一套一致的共同预期,而它即便不是全局高效,也往往是局部高效的。 III: Law, Justice, and Efficiency 第三部分:法律,正义和效率 In thinking about issues of rights, I find myself playing two quite different roles. As a human being and (like all human beings) an amateur philosopher, I have moral intuitions; from that standpoint, the question is "why ought one not to steal" and the answer is "because it is wicked." 在思考权利问题的时候,我发现自己经常扮演两种迥异角色。作为人类一员和业余哲学家(就像所有人一样),我有道德直觉;从这个角度出发,问题是“为什么人不应该盗窃”,而答案是“因为这是邪恶的”。 As an economist I ask and answer different questions. One is "what are the consequences of people being free to steal." Much of the economic analysis of law is devoted to answering questions of that sort. Another is "why do people (often) not steal?" 而作为经济学家,我提出和回答的是不同的问题。其中一个就是“如果允许自由偷窃,结果会怎样”。大部分关于法律的经济分析都致力于回答此类问题。另一个问题则是“为什么人们(一般)不偷窃?” This essay is an attempt to answer that final sort of question. I have tried to answer the economist's question about rights rather than the philosopher's not because economics is more important than moral philosophy but because I am more confident in my ability to use economics to produce answers. I have been encouraged in this policy by a curious and convenient coincidence: in most cases, the rules I conclude to be efficient are also the rules I believe to be just. 这篇文章试图回答最后这种问题。我尝试回答关于权利的经济问题而不是哲学问题,不是因为经济学比道德哲学更重要,而是因为我对自己运用经济学回答问题的能力更有信心。鼓励我采用这一策略的是一种奇特而便利的巧合:在大多数场合中,我推演得出的高效规则,同样也被我认为是正义的。 It is not a double but a triple coincidence. The rules I believe to be efficient and just are also, to a significant degree, the rules enforced by the laws and norms of the society I live in. In this essay I have sketched some ideas about the nature of those rules and how they have evolved. This raises the question of why, if my account is correct, the rules produced in this way resemble those that I deduce to be efficient and intuit to be just. 这不是一个双重巧合,而是一个三重巧合。我认为是高效而且正义的规则,在很大程度上也是我所生活的那个社会的法律和规范所施行的规则。在这篇文章中我简单描述了这些规则的性质和它们是如何演化的。于是问题来了:如果我的解释是正确的,那么为什么这样产生的规则,和我推导为高效的规则,以及我在直觉上认为是正义的规则,是如此的相似呢? In trying to answer that question, I find it useful to start by considering a class of property which underlies all other property and exists even in a Hobbesian state of nature. 试图回答这个问题的时候,我发现最好先从考虑作为所有其他财产基础的一类财产开始,这类财产甚至存在于霍布斯自然状态之中。 I can control the motions of my body by a simple act of will. You can control its motions by imposing overwhelming force, by making believable threats to which I will yield, or in various other ways. Controlling it may be possible for both of us, but it is much cheaper and easier for me. In this sense, we may describe my body as my natural property. 我凭借简单的意愿活动就可以控制我身体的动作。你想控制我身体的动作,必须通过做出可信的能屈服我的威胁,或者别的方法来施之强力。控制我的身体这件事,你我都可能做到,但是对我来说简单且便宜得多。在此意义上,我们可以把我的身体称作我的自然财产。 The same description applies to my gun—because I know where I hid it and you do not. Even land may be natural property to some extent if my detailed knowledge of the terrain makes it easier for me to use or defend it. Such property is natural inasmuch as my possession of it exists in the state of nature and is independent of social convention. The fact that I can control certain things more cheaply than you can is technology, not law or morals. 同样的描述也适用于我的枪——因为我知道我把它藏在哪里而你不知道。如果我对地形的详细了解使我更方便使用或者防卫一片土地,那么甚至土地在一定程度上也是自然财产。这样的财产之所以是自然的,是因为我对它的掌控发生于自然状态之中,并且独立于社会习俗。我能对特定的事物实施更低成本的控制这一事实,是种技术,而非法律或道德。 Natural property is a useful starting point for explaining the similarities among what is, what should be, and what would be efficient because it is relevant to all three. 解释“实然”、“应然”和“效率”这三者之间的相似之处,自然财产是一个有用的起点,因为它和三者都有关。 If the account I have offered is correct, our actual civil order is the result of extended bargaining, based ultimately on natural property. It was my control over my body that made the initial steps out of the state of nature possible. So natural property is relevant to what is—to the existing pattern of laws and norms. 如果我提出的解释是正确的,那么现实的政治秩序就是最终基于自然财产的长期议价的结果。正是我对于我身体的控制,使得脱离自然状态的最初几步变为可能。所以自然财产和“实然”这问题相关——即和现存的法律和社会规范模式相关。 In a world of no transaction costs, any initial allocation of property rights is efficient. In a world with positive transaction costs, the basis for choosing among alternative allocations is the cost of enforcing and changing them. A set of rules in which I own my body and you own yours is superior to one in which each owns the other's body, or each has a half interest in each body, in part because it is so much easier to enforce. So we have a Coasian argument for the relevance of natural property to what is efficient. 在没有交易成本的世界,财产权的任何初始分配都是高效的。在交易成本为正的世界,选择不同分配形式的基础就是执行和改变它们的成本高低。我拥有我的身体而你拥有你身体这样一套规则,就比相互拥有对方身体的另一套规则优越,也比两人分别拥有两个身体的一半的规则优越。这在某种程度上是因为前者更好执行的多。所以,关于自然财产与效率问题的相关性,现在我们有了一个科斯式(Coasian)论证。 This argument also provides a second connection between natural property and what is. My earlier arguments suggest that the evolution of rules tends to move in a direction that is at least locally efficient. If so, and if rules that allocate natural property to its natural owner are efficient, we would expect to observe such rules. Put differently, the argument for local efficiency of evolved norms provides a reason for some similarity between the rules we observe and the rules that are efficient. 此论证也提供了关于自然财产和“实然”问题的第二个联系。我早先的论证表明,规则演化趋向于至少是局部高效的方向。如果情况是这样的,并且如果依照自然所有者分配自然财产的规则是高效的,那么我们就可以期望会观察到这样的规则。换种方法说,对于社会规范在演进过程中的局部高效性的论证,为现实中所见规则和高效规则之间的相似性,提供了一种说明。 What, if anything, does natural property have to do with what ought to be? That depends on what normative account one accepts. For those of us who accept a libertarian account, in which the underlying right is my right to own myself and whatever I have obtained by voluntary agreement with others who own it, the connection is immediate. 自然财产和“应然”问题又有什么关系呢?这就取决于我们接受哪一类规范性论述了。对于我们这些接受自由意志主义论述的人,根本性的权利就是,拥有自身的权利,和对经由自愿协定从其他拥有者处获取的任何事物的权利;对于我们来说这联系是直接的。 Self ownership is both a moral axiom and a technological fact. Voluntary exchange is both a morally legitimate way of altering the pattern of ownership and, if my account of bargaining from the state of nature is correct, a technologically possible way (although not necessarily the only such) of altering a Schelling point and thus an equilibrium. 自我所有权既是一个道德公理,又是一个技术事实。自愿交换既是道德上合法地改变所有权模式的方法,又是一种技术上可行(尽管不一定是唯一)的改变谢林点继而改变均衡的方法——如果我关于自然状态下议价的解释是正确的话。 We now have the beginning of an explanation of the similarity among actual rules, efficient rules, and just rules. The status of this explanation, and of the fact being explained, is not, however, the same for the relation between the first two as it is for the relation of either to the third. 我们现在有了一个关于现实规则、高效规则和正义规则之间相似性的初步解释。然而,对于前两者之间的关系,以及前两者中任一个之于第三者的关系来说,这一解释本身的地位,不同于被解释的事实的地位。 What rules exist can be observed and what rules are efficient can be deduced, at least in principle, from observed technologies and economic theory. Thus the claim that there is some correspondence between what exists and what is efficient is a positive rather than a normative claim. 什么规则实际存在,这能被观察到,而什么规则是高效的,则能(至少在原则上)从所观察到的技术和经济理论中推导得出。所以“实然”和“高效”两者有某种关系,这一断言是实证的而不是规范的。 What ought to be, on the other hand, is, at least in this essay, simply a description of my moral intuitions. If I conclude that the rules that would be just are similar to both the rules that exist and the rules that would be efficient, that may simply be evidence that my moral judgments are ex post rationalizations of the world I live in or the conclusions of my economic analysis. 另一方面,“应然”(至少在此文中)仅仅是对于我道德直觉的描述。如果我得出,正义规则和现实规则及高效规则这三者是相似的,这也许只说明我的道德判断不过是我对所生活世界的事后(ex post)合理化,或者只是我的经济分析的结论。 One further similarity between the ethics and the social order that I have been discussing is worth mentioning. Both are essentially decentralized. The ethical position makes no attempt to evaluate individuals from above—in terms of their worth in the eyes of God. It consists rather of a description of what obligations each individual has to each other individual. The social order, to the extent that it is evolved rather than legislated, is a set of rules that exist because it was in the interest of pairs of individuals to abide by them, not because they promote the general good of society. 我正讨论的伦理和社会秩序之间的另一个相似点也值得提及。二者本质上都是去中心化的。伦理立场并不试图去从上至下考量个体——以他们在上帝眼中的价值作为考量。不如说,它是一个对于每个人对他人所负义务的描述。而社会秩序,就其是演化来的而不是通过立法实现的而言,就是一套规则,其存在是因为遵循它们对一对对个体有利,而不是因为它们会提高社会总体福利。 IV: Conclusions 第四部分:结论 The central project of this essay has been to give an account of rights, especially property rights, that is both amoral and alegal—an account that would explain the sort of behavior we associate with rights even in a world lacking law, law enforcement, and feelings of moral obligation. 此文的中心目标,是提供一种关于权利,特别是关于财产权的非道德、非法律的解释——此种解释将能够说明我们那种与权利相伴随的行为,这种行为甚至存在于缺乏法律、执法机构和道德义务感的世界中。 I have tried first to explain how, with no legal system to enforce contracts, it might still be possible to contract out of a Hobbesian state of nature, and then to show how the same analysis can be used to understand in what sense a civil order, such as our own society, is different from a Hobbesian state of nature. 我首先试图解释,在没有法律系统强制执行契约的情况下,如何能够通过建立契约脱离霍布斯自然状态;其次说明了同一种分析如何能够用于理解(像我们社会这种)文明秩序和霍布斯自然状态有什么不同。 Having offered answers to those questions, I then tried to show how we might get from the state of nature to something like the present society, and to use the analysis to partially explain the puzzling similarity between actual rules, just rules, and efficient rules. 回答了这些问题之后,我接下来试图说明我们如何从自然状态到达类似现今社会的状态;继而用这种分析部分地解释了现实规则,正义规则和高效规则之间令人困惑的相似性。 If my analysis is correct, civil order is an elaborate Schelling point, maintained by the same forces that maintain simpler Schelling points in a state of nature. Property ownership is alterable by contract because Schelling points are altered by the making of contracts. Legal rules are in large part a superstructure erected upon an underlying structure of self-enforcing rights. 如果我的分析正确,文明秩序就是一个精巧的谢林点,被在自然状态中维持更为简单谢林点的同一种力量所维持。财产所有权能够通过契约改变,是因为建立契约的行为改变了谢林点。法律规则在很大程度上是一个上层结构(superstructure),建立在底层自我执行的权利结构之上。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——
【2015-06-06】
@连岳lianyue 抽不抽烟,是个人自由选择。让不让客人抽烟,是店主自由选择。支持政府干涉这些自由的人,都是优秀的少先队员。去你妈的。
@linsantu:杀不杀人,是个人自由选择。让不让客人杀人,是店主自由选择。支持政府干涉这些自由的人,都是优秀的少先队员。去你妈的。
@whigzhou: 连岳说的没错啊,这么简单的道理也会有人争,而且还被我看到,神了~
@五所雪子: 抽烟显然侵害他人健康权,不认为是自由。
@whigzhou: 他没说可以在任何地方任何人面前随便抽吧,比如你主动来我家做客,我接着抽,门开着,你随时可以离开,这样有啥问题?
@姚斯道:针对这个还有很多长篇累牍的反驳论述文,其核心观点中无主空间、公共空间管理、产权方自主规定的概念糊成一团都长出绿毛了。
@whigzhou: 奇怪的是为何有人会认为私人餐馆也是“公共场所”(more...)
【2015-06-05】
@abada张宏兵 很多人觉得禁烟与我无关,甚至有利,因为我又不吸烟。这样想太幼稚了!其实,禁止色情业都和你有天大的关系,尽管你不色。许许多多高科技,从BB机到手机,首先在色情业使用并收回投资,然后才能普及惠及到大众百姓的。
@abada张宏兵:@tertio @whigzhou 知道lT中的例子不少吧
@whigzhou: 是啊百度基本上就是靠那些相信鸡鸡能被拉长的人养活的
@innesfr(more...)
经过一番批改,@灰鸽子银水 的作业总算变得清楚一些,可以讨论下去了。
原来他说的议价(原话是“你给我多少钱?”)是指“社会议价”,意思是:在结果尚未明朗的政治进程中,利益相关的各方施展各种手段,去影响该进程的走向,以图让该进程最终得出一个有利于自己的结果。(当然,从“你给我多少钱?”这句话,是很难猜到这层意思的)
社会议价是民主主义者爱用的概念,他们认为,让利益相关方都参与到政治进程中,既体现了民主原则,也可将社会冲突纳入到既有的秩序框架中得以释放,而不至于积累爆发为社会动荡和革命,最终结果即便不是各方满意,也至少比较容易服气。
确实,和秩序崩溃、革命和战争相比,要好得多,问题是,与一个良好的法治社会相比,这样的评价标准太低了,社会议价的手段各种各样,拉选票、打广告、造谣诽谤、游行静坐、堵门封路、扔燃烧瓶、(流行于法国的)软禁雇主、破坏试验田、破坏油井……其中许多毫无正当性和公正性可言,唯一可以安慰的,是其中涉及的罪恶与暴力都是零星小规模的,作为革命和战争的替代品(假如能够替代的话),相对要好一点,如此而已。
而真正可以带来公正性的社会议价机制,只有司法程序,正如我在一个帖子里曾经总结过的,它具备了我们可以期待于一种社会议价机制的全部制度功能:
司法程序提供了:具体而直接的利益关切与诉求者、对立的证据呈现、对等的抗辩与质证、中立的倾听者、独立于政治派系的裁决者、基于众多分散案例的试错和反馈、渐进的惯例形成、修正和废弃,而在……政治过程中,这些元素要么不存在、要么缺乏程序规范。当然,有人可能不同意我这种“司法主义”,而偏爱欧洲式的社会议价,可是,无论我们赞同何种社会议价方式,至少需要承认一点:不是什么事情都可以放到社会议价过程中去解决的,有些既已划定的边界、既已明确的权利,不能随便被拿去议价,即便有人吵着要这么做也不行,否则就没完没了,没有权利保障可言了。 所以我举了炒菜的例子,在家炒菜是早已确立的权利,尽管这么做确实提高了邻居遭受火灾的风险,但因为我有权利这么做,所以他只能承受这样的风险。 不过看来灰鸽子误解了这个例子的意思,那我就说得更清楚一些吧。 当我们谈论“讨价还价”时,可能涉及三种情况: 1)市场议价:此时交易标的物的权利归属明确,且议价双方共同认可,需要商量的只是价格,比如我去菜场买西瓜,我和摊主都同意现在这个西瓜是属于他的,而需要付钱的是我; 2)丛林议价:权利归属不明确,或权利归属原本明确,但其中一方无视该权利,议价结果由双方实力对比和偏好决定,与权利状态无关,比如绑匪与被绑者家属的议价; 3)社会议价:旨在通过议价过程,从权利不明确状态中得出一个明确的权利归属结论;(按我的观点,唯一公正的社会议价机制就是司法程序,不过,为了讨论继续,可以把其他机制也包括在内) 所以,社会议价只能运用于权利不明确状态,如果权利本来已经明确,你还提出议价,那就是无视既有权利,转变成丛林议价(俗话叫耍流氓)了。 那么,转基因争议是怎么回事?考虑到转基因争议涉及好几个不同问题,首先要明确你谈论的是哪一个,起初灰鸽子的核电站类比让我以为他说的是消费者的安全担忧,不过后来他说,如果脑筋正常的话应该理解他指的其实是有机农场经营者所面临的损失。 可是,经营者担忧自己的生意因为其他竞争者的进入而受损,并不是阻止他人进入这个行业的正当理由,至少在行会权利早已瓦解的当代是如此,这和开餐馆的道理完全一样,怕别人抢了你家餐馆的生意,不是阻止别人开餐馆的正当理由,这件事不能拿来进行社会议价,你硬要堵在人家店门口,跟人讨价还价,说咱们算算你该赔我多少钱我才能答应你开店,这当然是流氓做法,这种议价只能叫做丛林议价。
27、28两章内容较简单,而且罗氏所提到的这两位学者(伯林和哈耶克)的观点和言论有许多与我的印象颇有出入,要细究的话需要查对的大量原文,我不打算花这个精力了,所以本篇仅就我与罗氏对这两位思想的认知的重合部分简单说几句,不过好在,我们在主要问题上的印象大致吻合。
#第27章#
罗氏在本章将矛头指向了以赛亚·伯林的两种自由理论,在我看来,伯林对积极自由和消极自由的辨析区分,为自由主义伦理提供了一块非常重要的理论基石,但罗氏否认这一点,可是他的理由比较奇特,主要有两条:1)伯林后来的许多言论偏离了他最初对消极自由的表述,2)伯林有许多与自由主义相抵触的言论。
假如伯林提出两种自由之分是为了建立一套(古典标准的)自由主义伦理,那么你倒是可以说他的努力是失败的,可是伯林显然并无此意,实际上他并不是立场很鲜明的古典自由主义者,其政治倾向只能算是中间偏右,作为一位分析哲学家和思想史家,他重在概念辨析和思想梳理,而非理论建构。
伯林的一些反市场反资本主义言论,并不让我吃惊,因为他虽然区分了积极自由与消极自由,但并未否定积极自由的伦理地位,在他看来,对于一个自由社会,两者都是重要的。
至于罗氏所说的前后表述不一致,我懒得查对,但很可能是他的误解,因为他提到的那些与最初表述不一致的言论中,伯林在说的似乎都是笼统的“自由”,而不是特指“消极自由”,这样的话,与他最初对消极自由的表述不一致也就很正常了,因为他并未拒斥积极自由,所以提到自由时当然可能把后者的涵盖内容也包括进去。
但是,伯林所阐明的消极自由概念确实能够为自由主义伦理提供一块重要的基石,其表述也是足够清晰的(而不是罗氏所暗示的那样,注定是表述不清的),请看伯林1958年在牛津的教席就职演说稿中 标签:
liberty in the negative sense involves an answer to the question: 'What is the area within which the subject — a person or group of persons — is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons'.这个表述中最重要的一个词是“area”,可以很自然的转换为我说的行为空间,而引入行为空间的概念可以让我们避免哈耶克所遭遇的困境:如何界定“强制”,因为哈耶克将自由定义为免于强制,可是他始终没能说清楚,到底什么才算强制。【我们马上会看到,这个弱点被罗氏抓住了。】 这样,消极自由的概念其实将自由与(以否定性句式定义的)权利内容上等同了起来,只是词性和语法地位上有所不同:权利是给定边界之内免受打扰的行为空间,而自由是该边界不受侵犯的状态;而在逻辑上,权利先于自由:必须先界定清楚权利,然后我们才能谈论自由;这一等同实际上恢复了古代传统,在大宪章时代,权利与自由原本就近乎于同义词,而且都是从消极意义上界定的。 在权利与自由的关系上,罗氏倒是和我没有分歧,他也认为自由就是权利不受侵犯的状态(p.280): 区别在于,他的权利是在物理空间上界定的,并且以人与物之间的关系(比如人对自己身体的掌控、劳动与土壤的结合)为基础,而不是像我那样,在行为空间上界定,以人与人之间的关系为基础;可是,这种界定方式注定解决不了伦理学所要解决的根本问题:协调和规范人际关系。 因为许多人可以在同一个物理空间中行动,这一点无法通过将物理空间的精细划分解决,因为考虑到时序性,无论多小的空间,都可以有多人进入;同样,许多人也可以与同一物品发生关系,仅仅基于人与物的关系而界定权利,实际上回避了人际冲突和拥挤问题,当这些人发生接触和拥挤时,仍没有相应的规范来解决纠纷。 罗氏理论的这一根本缺陷,在第二部分的各篇里已反复暴露过。 #第28章# 本章轮到了哈耶克,前面说了,我同意罗氏在此处对哈耶克的批评,将自由主义伦理仅仅建立在“免于强制”上面,是很难成立的,除非把强制这个概念扩大到非常离谱的程度,而且这种扩大是无原则的,完全是为了满足直觉需要的实用主义式扩展,否则你就无法处理欺诈、背诺、敲诈勒索、剽窃、隐私侵犯等等显然与自由主义相悖的行为范畴。 当然,实用主义也未必不可以,凭直觉罗列一组拇指法则,而不去考究它们的内在逻辑关系,不追求结构井然的统一体系,也未尝不可,但在罗氏这样的先验主义者眼里,这种做法无疑是拙劣的、不可接受的,更满足不了罗氏所设定的“为自由主义提供一个可防御的根基”这一要求。 不过按我的方案,这个困难不存在,行为空间上的边界划定之后,只须将“强制”替换为对权利的“侵犯”即可,自由不是免于强制,而是权利免于侵犯,于是问题转换为:权利边界从何而来,而哈耶克的思想恰好为此提供了启示:来自习俗这种自发秩序,也就是合作博弈与协调博弈过程中形成的信念,在连续迭代过程中,这些信念既来自博弈均衡,也强化和维持着均衡。 罗氏正确的指出了哈耶克的困难【这似乎也是诺齐克所面临的困难,他虽然给出了一些处理方法,但看上去不太理想】,可是他的替代方案却是非常糟糕的,一方面,他沉迷于古老的“物的迷信”中,将人际冲突仅仅理解为物理空间上的冲突,这样,为了确保其消极自由的纯粹性,只好把强制严格限制于“物理上的侵犯”。 这样,他就把欺诈、背诺、敲诈勒索、隐私散布等等显然与自由主义完全不容的行为都合法化了,或者像在商标权和著作权之类的信息财产权问题上,只能用一些无比荒唐的手法来处理(见第17篇),可以说,他察觉到了困难,但没有认真严肃的去处理,而是像面对难题无计可施的宠坏小孩那样采取了躺倒策略,往地上一躺,四腿一伸,宣布我啥也不搭理了。
#第21章#
罗氏在本章论证了动物权利问题,他的结论是:只有人类才是合格的权利主体,因而动物没有权利(p.216):
这个结论我完全同意,不久前曾就此写过两篇文章(一,二),甚至罗氏提出的理由我也部分同意,可是,他的论证过程却实在蹩脚,浑身槽点,随便一捅就穿帮,不过,为不偏离主线,本篇只对他的自然主义和本质主义说几句。
在本系列的最初两篇里,我曾指出罗氏在元伦理学上是自然主义,将自然法等同于自然律,将应然还原为了实然,这一认定当时曾在豆瓣上引来一片哗然,虽然文本证据明白无误,不过,从第三章起,罗氏果然滑向了康德主义,于是我也不再纠缠,承认他是康德主义,而且此后各章他确实没再表现出过他的自然主义。
可是在本章,这条尾巴又露了出来,这也是因为动物问题触及深层,把话题焦点又带回了元伦理学层面;罗氏之所以老是在自然主义和先验主义之间滑来滑去,是因为他的理论建立在一个搭配奇特、毫无指望的哲学基础之上,地基打歪了。
本来,若求助于上帝的话,自然法是很容易与自然律区分开(从而避开自然主义)的,因为上帝完全可以制订两套法则,一套让万物实际上按其运行,另一套是对部分被造物的“告诫”,可是罗氏一面把上帝开除了,一面却又要把伦理法则说成是永恒的、不变的、绝对的、普适的、客观的、存在于世界本质之中的,那就只能等同于自然律了,还能是别的东西吗?对此困境他自己似乎也隐约有点心虚(p.215):
#第16章#
本章仍是关于传统上的非财产性权利,不过转向了那些与信息有关的权利与责任;诸如诽谤、隐私、著作权、商标、专利等信息相关行为,与此前的权利论证所涉及的行为有个关键差别:物理上的非接触性和非排他性,即,相关的侵权行为都不涉及对他人财产的物理损害,也不影响既有实物财产的保有和利用。
原本,从罗斯巴德的权利理论推测,我预料他会否定所有这些权利,不过读过本章之后,我却惊讶的发现,罗氏似乎是支持上述后三种权利的,只是用了一种极为怪异的方式来论证,而且言辞闪烁暧昧,看不清真实立场。
另外,该章的主题次序穿插混杂,为了逐个检查他在上述各项权利上的观点,我不得不把背离原文顺序重新组织了一下。
先看诽谤,诽谤和侵犯隐私一样,都属于言语侵权,不过诽谤其实分两种,性质颇为不同,第一种是其实更贴切的称呼是辱骂,其要点在于给对方造成的心理伤害,而不在于其内容是否真实(辱骂的内容常常不构成一个命题,因而不存在真假之分),第二种是损害他人名誉,这才是通常所说的诽谤,其认定要件之一是内容虚假,对上述三种言语侵权的界定,我在一篇旧文中曾有论述。
不过,罗氏将诽谤和隐私侵犯不加区分的混在一起说,而是按言语内容是否真实来分别论证,我也只好跟着他了,首先看内容真实的情况(p.175):
按我上面的三分法,若言语内容不虚假,那就不可能是诽谤,而只能是辱骂或侵犯隐私了,首先,罗氏认为隐私不受法律保护,散布隐私不构成侵权(p.176):
在罗氏看来,通常被认为侵犯隐私的行为,只是因为其实施过程侵犯了财产权,才构成了侵权,而不是隐私本身需要保护,比如窃听非法是因为安装窃听器或进入获得窃听条件时需要侵犯财产权(p.176):
可是,有许多隐私侵犯行为是不需要以侵犯财产权为前提的,比如窃听,可以用远距离的高灵敏度定向集音器,偷拍私人泳池边景象也可以用高分辨率相机航拍;再如,某男甲和某女乙相恋同居时,甲拍下了乙的裸照,录了些私密言语,分手之后,甲散布这些信息,按罗氏理论,就不是侵权了。
不仅散布隐私不侵权,手握隐私者还可以借此合法的勒索对方(p.178):
当然,构成勒索犯罪的一个要件是:用来威胁的那项行为(即勒索者宣称对方若不答应自己就会去实施的那一行为)本身是非法的,既然罗氏认为散布隐私合法,那么据此而作的勒索也就是合法的,所以这一步论证我是同意的,它只是更清晰的显示了否认隐私权的不合理性。
【尽管实际上有些法律似乎将基于合法威胁的勒索也定为非法,而且还有些更复杂的情况,比如勒索者之前采取了非法行动,将对方置于不利境地,而用来威胁的行为却是合法的,不过这些复杂情况与这里的讨论关系不大,暂且按下不表】
可是,正当我认定罗氏不承认隐私权时,却意外发现这么一段(p.177):
再一次,我被罗氏面对自己混乱逻辑时的蛋定震惊了,来看看他的逻辑:在论证散布隐私合法时,他说:因为信息存在于散布者的头脑里,而头脑是他的财产,所以他当然也拥有其中所存信息的财产权,因而他可以随意处置这些信息,包括散布。【实际上,被散布的隐私信息可以存储在大脑以外的介质上,比如照片和磁带,不过,这不影响上述论证,因为和大脑一样,散布者通常也拥有这些介质的财产权。】
那么,当甲向乙说出甲的秘密时,乙听到之后,信息就在他头脑里了,按上述逻辑,他已当然的获得了这份信息的财产权,(more...)
#第15章#
罗氏将话题带到了传统上属于非财产性权利的领域,比如言论自由、通行权、采光权、取水权、隐私权、免受噪音侵扰等等,不过罗氏只谈论了前两项,在他看来,这些权利都没有独立存在的余地,因为它们都是财产权的当然组成部分,所以只要财产权明确了,相关的权利与责任问题便解决了(p.166):
问题是,人们的行为难道只发生在私人财产所构成的空间(比如私人土地、房屋、交通工具)里?果若如此,那当然没问题,主人既然可以阻止他人接触或进入自己的财产,当然更可以阻止他在其中的特定行为。
可是,稍微考虑一下现实情况就会知道,这一条件经常不成立,也难以成立;我在之前讨论财产权问题时就已指出,许多资源实际上长期处于公地状态,许多人在其中实施行为、获取利益,但没有任何特定个人拥有它,甚至没人主张这是他的财产;而且,即便按罗氏产权认定标准,也难以确定它属于谁。
那么,在这些场合,人的行为就没有任何规范来约束了吗?既有的种种约束人们在非私人场合的行为规范,都该抛弃?权利本来是规范行为的,它指向行为而非物,当它间接的用物来指称时(表现为物权),只是为了方便,但罗氏将古老的对物的迷信发挥到了极致,乃至否认所有与有形物无共同边界的权利和财产权,如此一来,让一个自由社会得以维持秩序的很大一部分行为规范,都被他一举废除了。
罗氏首先以言论自由为例(p.167):
霍姆斯以剧院为例,是因为他将剧院视为“公共场所”,公共场所未必是公地,只要是人员众多且混杂随机、事先无从知晓会在那里遇到谁的那些场合,都可以被称作公共场所,它可能处于私人财产中也可能不是,当然,剧院通常都有个主人,所以罗氏说这事好办,主人说了算就行(p.167):
可是,财产主人未必对自己所拥有的场所内的行为制订规范,他完全可能只在他所关切的那些事情作出规定,而对其余事情不置可否;此时,正常情况下这些行为仍受一般社会规范所约束,但按罗氏理论,这些行为就没有规范了。
比如一块私人土地上的一条道路,主人善意的允许社区居民在其中通行,但没有对此制订交通规则(凭啥要求他费这劲?),按正常法理,当然像公共道路一样,仍沿用通行的交通规则,可按罗氏理论,这里就没有交通规则了。
所以,罗氏说剧院主人可以制订规则只是回避了问题,剧院主人可以不制订规则,他没有这个义务,但有些行为必须有规范,因为出了事造成了损害需要认定责任,比如私人道路上的交通规范,两车相撞究竟谁负责?还是各自认倒霉?
退一步,就算私人场所的主人都制订了规则,还有大量非私人场所怎么办?比如一条没有特定主人的公共道路,穿过一个城镇,有人站在这条路上对高喊“上游水库垮坝啦”,而实际上水库并未垮坝,或者他站在山下公共道路上,举块牌子,上面写“前方滑坡(more...)
#第14章#
罗氏在该章论证了与儿童有关的权利和责任问题,这是个困难的领域,说实话许多要点我还没有确切的看法,不过这并不妨碍我们来检查他的所谓论证和推导,我在系列的头几篇里已经说过,由于罗氏糟糕的哲学基础和颠三倒四的论证方式,无论什么话题,他总是会为我们提供足够的笑料。
讨论儿童权利问题,不可避免的几个问题是:儿童是否具备权利主体资格?如果是,它是什么时候获得的?这些权利具体包括些什么?即,人们(特别是父母)可以或不可以对儿童做些什么?
对第一个问题,罗氏的回答与主流观点相同:儿童是合格的权利主体;对第二个问题,罗氏给出了一个中间派答案:主体资格从出生那一刻获得,因而他否定了他的左边的受精卵派和成形胎儿派,和他右边的种种年龄界线派,请看(p.148):
罗氏认为其它界线都是“任意的”,而他的是“合适的”,可是任意跟合适好像并不矛盾啊?我猜他想说的大概是“自然的”,可是受精卵形成的那一刻,不是也很自然吗?周岁、断奶、换牙、学会说话、月经初潮、身高停长呢?假如存在许多自然界线可供选择,那么取此舍彼何以不算“任意”呢?实际上,这条标准注定是武断的。
与主体资格相关的头一项争议便是堕胎,罗氏既然否定了胎儿主体资格,原本可以顺理成章的推出堕胎合法的结论(因为按他的权利理论,第三者在这件事上是不可能有权利的,而他的体系更容不下独立于权利的禁则),奇怪的是,他选择了绕远路,他说,即便承认胎儿主体资格,堕胎也是合法的(p.148):
因为孕妇拥有自己的身体,而胎儿是入侵者和寄生者(p.148):
这就荒唐了,胎儿身处子宫并依赖于它,是孕妇行为的直接后果,是孕妇将它带到那里的,怎么孕妇念头一变就成了入侵者?为了弄清这里的关系,我不妨看一个更清晰的例子:
甲拥有一座小岛,邀请乙去做客,并答应管吃管住,可是乙真的去了之后,甲却突然翻脸,不提供任何生活资料,也拒绝用他的船送乙回陆地,不仅如此,甲还要动手将乙推入大海【假如你觉得私人拥有小岛太稀罕,换成游艇也无妨】;请问:甲这么做合法吗?
罗氏说,毫无问题,因为他压根不承认不涉及实物交付的单纯承诺的有效性,所以甲无须为他的承诺承担任何责任,而他对小岛的财产权是绝对的(p.148):
当然,这么说可以自圆,可是,你不觉得太荒唐一点了吗?
不过,尽管这通绕远引出了这么荒唐的结果,看了后面之后,我知道罗氏为何要这么绕远了,因为这活儿反正省不掉:因为罗氏认为,即便孩子已经生下来,成了权利主体,父母也没有保护和抚养的责任,他们只对它拥有财产权(p.149):
不过罗氏又说了,虽然孩子是父母的财产,但父母也不能任意处置这份财产(p.149-150):
#第6章#
总算来到了第二部分,在交代完他的哲学之后,现在罗斯巴德开始具体论证权利和法律规则了。
他的论证是从鲁滨逊世界开始的,而且他认为,自由和权利在鲁滨逊世界便已存在,对这种说法,我在多年前便表达了自己的观点:古典自由主义所说的伦理上的自由,是指免受他人的强制,是一种消极自由,而权利是在人与人之间所划出的行为边界,因而鲁滨逊世界不存在谈论自由和权利的前提,这两个概念在这个世界里是没有意义的。
所以,既然罗氏能在鲁滨逊世界发现自由,这种自由必定是积极自由,而我们知道,积极自由所引出的伦理结论是与古典自由主义格格不入的,倒是与当代力勃儒十分合拍。
不过,我可以暂时搁置自己的看法,看看罗氏是怎么论证的。在描述了一番鲁滨逊的处境和状况之后,他说(p.77):
注意这句话:
他也发现了自己的意识能够控制自己身体和行为的事实:也就是个体对自己享有自然的所有权的事实。
“也就是”三个字很重要,表示前后两个事实是“同一的”,即:“能够控制自己身体和行为”(事实A)等同于“个体对自己享有自然的所有权”(事实B)。
假如这构成了一个合法论证,那么,若我们观察到某人甲能够控制某人乙的身体和行为这一事实,是不是我们就能将之等同于“甲对乙享有自然的所有权”?假如甲用镣铐锁着乙的身体,随时将乙拉到他所指向的地方,算不算“控制着乙的身体”?假如甲对乙发出的每个命令都会导致乙的相应行为,算不算“控制着乙的行为”?
这里,罗氏显然混淆了自由意志和伦理上的自由,自由意志是人的一种能力,一个人只要活着和清醒着,即便处于被奴役状态,也仍然拥有自由意志,但他却失去了自由。
如果你将两者等同,那就相当于说:即便他处于被奴役状态,他的内心仍是自由的——听上去好听,可是如果你要的就是这种“自由”,那还需要反对奴役吗?
对意志能力与自由的这一混淆,显然被其他学者指出过,所以罗氏做了个回应(p.79):
瞧,泥鳅式滑行又开始了,前面白纸黑字刚刚说了意志与自由和权利是同一回事,现在却指责别人“一直将能力与自由相混淆”,他很狡猾的用“跨越海洋”这种显白的类比来撇清自己对能力与自由的混淆,却好像忘了他刚刚在上一页里说过“意识控制身体和行为的能力”等同于自由和权利。
再来看罗氏是如何论证生命权的(p.78):
他也发现了自己的意识能够控制自己身体和行为的事实:也就是个体对自己享有自然的所有权的事实。
“也就是”三个字很重要,表示前后两个事实是“同一的”,即:“能够控制自己身体和行为”(事实A)等同于“个体对自己享有自然的所有权”(事实B)。 假如这构成了一个合法论证,那么,若我们观察到某人甲能够控制某人乙的身体和行为这一事实,是不是我们就能将之等同于“甲对乙享有自然的所有权”?假如甲用镣铐锁着乙的身体,随时将乙拉到他所指向的地方,算不算“控制着乙的身体”?假如甲对乙发出的每个命令都会导致乙的相应行为,算不算“控制着乙的行为”? 这里,罗氏显然混淆了自由意志和伦理上的自由,自由意志是人的一种能力,一个人只要活着和清醒着,即便处于被奴役状态,也仍然拥有自由意志,但他却失去了自由。 如果你将两者等同,那就相当于说:即便他处于被奴役状态,他的内心仍是自由的——听上去好听,可是如果你要的就是这种“自由”,那还需要反对奴役吗? 对意志能力与自由的这一混淆,显然被其他学者指出过,所以罗氏做了个回应(p.79): 瞧,泥鳅式滑行又开始了,前面白纸黑字刚刚说了意志与自由和权利是同一回事,现在却指责别人“一直将能力与自由相混淆”,他很狡猾的用“跨越海洋”这种显白的类比来撇清自己对能力与自由的混淆,却好像忘了他刚刚在上一页里说过“意识控制身体和行为的能力”等同于自由和权利。 再来看罗氏是如何论证生命权的(p.78): 罗氏认为,生命具有终极价值,所以伤害生命是“在客观上是不道德的”【注意:“客观上”这个限定词其实是多余的,因为在罗氏体系中只有客观道德,没有主观道德】,即便伤害的是自己的生命;可是,既然罗氏认为生命权是一种所有权,那么它的主人为何不可任意处置呢?任意处置了就不道德呢? 【假如鲁滨逊明知蘑菇有毒还吃是不道德的,那么我明知有损健康还是抽烟,当然也是不道德的,那么,强行阻止我抽烟岂不是正当的?——瞧,我在第四篇里已经说过,罗氏理论很容易滑向专制主义,这就来了具体例子,不过,既然他自己还没滑到这里,那就先按下不表。】 看看罗氏是如何回答可能质疑的,#罗氏归谬法#来了:当否定一个命题的人在进行反驳的过程中运用了这个命题,则这个命题就上升为了公理。
笑话! 1)反驳者可以持否定态度的“运用这个命题”,只要他不用它来支持自己的结论,怎么会让它“上升为公理”? 2)反驳者也可以姑且接受这个命题,并从它开始推理,导出一个荒谬的结论,这叫归谬法,怎么会让它“上升为公理”呢? 再看#罗氏归谬法#在生命问题上的具体应用:任何人,只要其参与某种形式的讨论,包括对价值观的讨论,他的参与本身就是对生命的肯定。
笑话!他的参与只是运用了生命,显示了生命存在这一事实,并不需要在价值上对其加以“肯定”。 罗氏继续推进:因为如果他真的反对生命,则这样的讨论与其无关,事实上,他不应该继续活着。
笑话! 1)他完全可以否定生命的终极价值,而只肯定其工具价值,即宣称:我活着的唯一目标就是消灭全部其他生命,然后自杀。 2)罗氏没有明确他说的“生命”是泛指所有生物的生命,还是特指人的生命,所以,即便承认生命终极价值的人,也可以宣称:对于其余所有生命,人类是祸害,所以为了获得总体上的最大价值,我的目标就是消灭全部其他人类,然后自杀。 上述两种宣称,都与“继续活着”并“参与某种形式的讨论”丝毫不矛盾。由此可见,被罗粉们奉若法宝的#罗氏归谬法#只是一种修辞,与逻辑毫无关系。 【注意:我在这里的反驳,沿用了#罗氏归谬法#,即,上述两种宣称表明:即便按罗氏归谬法,也无法推出生命权这个“公理”,所以这里说的“矛盾”并非指逻辑矛盾,而按罗氏的用法,指“主张或价值冲突”,类似于康德所说的“实践理性”,在形式逻辑上,罗氏所说的情况原本就不存在什么矛盾】 再来看罗氏对土地所有权的论证(p.80): 像洛克这样用“劳动与土壤相混合”来论证土地所有权,是一种十分原始的民粹主义观念,其结论常常是仇富的、反资本主义的、指向土地革命的,当然,洛克是古人,思想原始还可以原谅,20世纪的罗斯巴德居然拿来做理论基础,同时还自称是古典自由主义者和资本主义的捍卫者,实在不可思议。 罗氏说:每个人享有的财产,取决于他生产了什么,即他通过自己的努力开发利用了什么。
那么请问:假如某人占领一大块无主地,比如一平方公里,在所有可能的入口处都安排了守卫,事实上也成功的阻止了别人进入的屡次尝试,但他未对土地进行任何开发和使用,未用他生产任何东西,他只想等着今后别人想用这块地的时候卖给他们,那么,他是否享有这块土地的所有权? 按罗氏理论,回答显然是否定的,当后来的农民试图入侵这块土地,去建造住宅、耕种庄稼时,罗氏显然会站在他们一边,或者,他们已经实施了入侵,种上了庄稼,盖上了房子,那么罗氏显然更会站在他们一边,因为他认为:享有财产取决于他生产了什么,农民生产了粮食和住宅,而原地主什么也没生产。 这不是民粹主义是什么?持枪权的制度意义
辉格
2012年7月27日
上周末造成12死58伤的丹佛枪击案,又引发了人们对美国的枪支管理和持枪权问题的讨论,不过这次或许是选战正酣的缘故,两党候选人都声明不主张通过新立法强化枪支控制,虽然罗姆尼此前曾表示赞同此类立法,这大概也反映了美国选民对持枪权的执着,政治家轻易不敢得罪。
当代关于持枪权的争议,多半围绕着它对个人的防卫价值展开,枪支是否真的能帮助个人捍卫其人身和财产权利?能有效震慑罪犯?学术研究也多以此为主题;然而在早先,人们为持枪权辩护时更多提到的,则是用它来组织民兵,保卫(more...)