作者:Jessie Geoffray @ 2016-08-02
翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny),龟海海
来源:PLAYBOY,http://www.playboy.com/articles/millennials-the-hookup-generation

Remember when Vanity Fair published an article last year gleefully proclaiming we were at the dawn of a “dating apocalypse” and promiscuous millennials and their newfangled internet-enabled devices were on their way to destroying sex and romance as we know it? And remember when Tinder, affronted by this suggestion of base crassness, took to Twitter to unleash a savage, epic rant directed at the magazine and its indelicate fingering of the app as a prime catalyst of our rude new world?

还记得《名利场》去年发表的文章吗？它兴高采烈地宣称我们正迎来“约炮盛世”，谁都知道，性关系混乱的千禧一代和他们时髦的互联网设备正在破坏着性和浪漫。Tinder【译注：一款流行的交友软件】认为文章暗示自己粗俗不堪，大为光火，在推特上火力全开，大骂《名利场》毫不客气地将Tinder斥为粗鲁新世界的主要催化剂。这些你都还记得吧？

–@VanityFair Little known fact: sex was invented in 2012 when Tinder was launched.

— Tinder (@Tinder) August 11, 2015

–《名利场》知道个屁：性是在2012年Tinder面市时被发明的。

—Tinder (@Tinder) 在2015年8月11号的推文

Tinder wasn’t the only collateral damage in journalist Nancy Jo Sales’s nearly 7,000-word piece: a widely circulated paper from Archives of Sexual Behavior claiming millennials have fewer sex partners than previous generations was bizarrely relegated to a dismissive parenthetical. Now, roughly a year later, the authors of that study are back and re-inviting us to the lively party that is speculating about millennials, and their perceived failings, on the internet.

Tinder不是Nancy Jo Sales那篇7000字文章的唯一受害者：《性行为档案》上一篇广为转载的论文也莫名其妙地被她在文章注释里轻蔑地嘲讽了一番。论文宣称比起前面几代人，千禧一代的性伴侣更少。现在，大概一年之后，这项研究的作者再次站出来，邀请我们加入这场网上大讨论，审视千禧一代和他们的堕落。

The new Archives of Sexual Behavior study uses data from the General Social Survey—a nationally representative sample of American adults aged 18 to 96, conducted biannually since 1989—to examine patterns of sexual inactivity over time. The analysis shows that not only are people born in the 1980s and 1990s reporting fewer sexual partners than GenX’ers or Baby Boomers, but also that the marked change in sexual inactivity is independent of the effects of age or time period. In other words, it can be attributed to a generation alone.

《性行为档案》的这项新研究采用了“综合大调查”——一项自1989年以来每两年举行一次的调查，其样本代表了全美范围内18至96岁的成人——的数据来研究性行为不活跃程度（sexual inactivity）随时间的变化。研究发现，不只是80后和90后们比起X一代【译注：约略指1965年至1980年出生的人】和婴儿潮一代【译注：约略指1946年至1964年出生的人】拥有更少的性伴侣，而且这种性行为不活跃程度的显著变化同年龄和时代没有关系。换句话说，原因可能仅仅出在这一代人身上。

“Americans born in the 1990s were more likely to be sexually inactive in their early 20s.”

“出生于1990年代的美国人更可能在20岁出头时表现得性行为不活跃。”

The numbers are significant: Fifteen percent of millennials born in the 1990s and between 20 and 24 years old reported having no sexual partners since the age of 18. That’s more than double the six percent of GenX’ers born in the 1960s who reported having no sexual partners during the same age ranges.

数字颇能说明问题：出生于90年代且年龄在20至24岁之间的千禧一代中，有15%的人报告说他们从18岁起就没有性伙伴。这个数字同出生在60年代的X一代相比翻了一倍——相比之下，只有6%的X一代在这个年龄段报告自己没有性伙伴。

These comparisons are purely descriptive in the sense that they give us clues about what, exactly, defines the millennial generation: Americans born in the 1990s were more likely to be sexually inactive in their early 20s; women were more likely to be sexually inactive than men; and people who did not attend college were more likely to be sexually inactive compared to those who did.

到底是什么定义了千禧一代，这些对比给出的线索是纯粹描述性的：90年代出生的美国人在他们20多岁时性活跃程度可能更低；女性性活跃程度低于男性；没有上大学的人性活跃程度低于那些上过大学的人。

“We can say ‘Here’s the trend’ and isolate it down to saying it’s a generational thing, but we can’t exactly say why,” says Ryne Sherman, co-author of the study and associate professor of psychology in the Charles E. Schmidt College of Science at Florida Atlantic University.

“我们可以说‘趋势便是如此’，然后孤立地看待这个问题并认为这是年代更替的自然结果，但我们却说不出来原因何在。”Ryne Sherman说道，她是该研究报告的共同作者，佛罗里达大西洋大学查理•施密特科学学院的心理学副教授。

Potential explanations explored in the paper include the rise of internet pornography, the economic downturn and its role in delaying millennials’ independence from their parents (think less independent lodgings to help facilitate sex), and the possibility that millennials are indeed hooking up with more partners, but engaging in penetrative sex less often. The explanation Sherman favors is that apps like Tinder—and the rise of the internet itself—provide an outlet for people to connect and be social without needing to pursue sex in real life.

论文讨论过的可能解释包括：网络色情的泛滥，经济下滑及其在推迟年轻人与父母分居上的作用（想想没有自己的房子多么不利于“房事”吧），以及这样一种可能：千禧一代确实有更多鬼混的伙伴，但更少进行插入式的性交。Sherman偏爱的一种解释是，像Tinder这样的应用软件以及互联网的兴起让人们能够相互联系和交往，却不必在真实生活中追求性关系。

Of course, another possible explanation is that different generations interpreted the survey’s key question—“Since the age of 18, how many sexual partners have you had?”—differently.

当然，另一个可能的解释是：不同年代的人对调查的核心问题——“从你18岁起，你有过多少性伙伴”——有着不同的理解。

Sherman thinks this is highly unlikely, saying that if interpretation of the phrase “sexual partners” was changing, it would show up in the period effect (i.e., everybody living in that time would experience a change in the meaning of the term) and not just the generational effect. It didn’t.

Sherman 认为这几乎不可能，他说如果对“性伙伴”这个词的理解一直在变，那它就会体现在时间效应上（比如，生活在某一时间段的每个人都会感受到词意的变化），而不仅仅体现在代际效应上。实际上并没有。

But, I’d challenge Sherman to have a conversation with my grandmother about “sexual partners” and see if he still feels we’re all still on the same page about words and what they mean.

但是，我倒想请Sherman同我的奶奶谈谈“性伙伴”，看看到时候他是否仍坚持认为人们对该词的理解并未改变。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

Kits are used in hospitals to collect forensic and other evidence from vicims of sexual assaults
取证套件是医务人员从性侵受害者身上提取法医学或其他证据时所使用的一套工具。

作者:Will Worley @ 2016-6-7
译者:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha)
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/analysis-5000-forgotten-rape-kits-serial-rapists-a7068761.html

Serial rapists are far more common than previously thought, analysis of 5,000 rape kits dating back more than 20 years has revealed.

专家对过去二十多年的5000套取证套件进行了研究，结果显示连环强奸犯的存在比人们过去想象的远为普遍。

Scientists in Ohio, United States, announced their findings after testing the backlog of rape kits, which were used between 1993 and 2010.

1993-2010年间使用过的一些强奸案取证套件一直积压着，美国俄亥俄州的科学家们对它们进行测试之后，公布了他们的研究结果。

Analysis of the kits – used to collect evidence from the victims of sexual attacks – has given the researchers greater insight into the behaviour of sexual predators.

这些取证套件用于从性侵犯受害者那里收集证据，对它们进行分析可以使研究者们进一步加深对性犯罪者行为的理解。

More than 250 people have already been convicted of sexual offences as a result of the tests and investigators expect the prosecutions to continue.

测试结果已经使得超过250人因性侵犯被定罪，调查人员希望对案件的起诉能够持续下去。

The Cuyahoga County Sexual Assault Kit Task Force – a multidisciplinary body dedicated to following up sexual assault cases stemming from the untested kits – worked with the Begun Centre for Violence Prevention Research and Education at Case Western Reserve University, who study violence and its prevention, to gain an insight into patterns revealed by the kits.

俄亥俄州凯霍加县性侵犯取证套件工作组是一个涵盖多学科的组织，致力于追踪由未测试的取证套件所牵连出的性侵犯案件。他们与研究暴力行为及其预防的凯斯西储大学贝贡犯罪预防研究与教育中心合作，希望能对取证套件披露出的犯罪行为模式有所发现。

Starting in 2014, the task force say the discovery that serial rapists are much more common than previous studies have suggested could change the way sexual assaults are investigated.

自2014年起，工作组开始公布他们的发现，连环强奸犯远比过往研究认为的更加普遍。这可能会改变性侵犯案件的调查方式。

Of 243 sexual assaults studied, 51 per cent were tied to serial offenders, who tended to have more extensive and violent criminal histories than one-off sexual offenders.

在被研究的243起性侵犯案件中，51%的案件涉及连环犯罪者。相比于单次作案者，他们往往会有更为严重和暴力的犯罪历史。

“Our findings suggest it is very likely that a sexual offender has either previously sexually assaulted or will offend again in the future,” said Rachel Lovell, senior research associate at the Begun Centre.

“我们的发现表明，一名性犯罪者非常有可能不是曾经实施过性侵犯，就是会在将来重犯。”贝贡中心的高级研究员Rachel Lovell这样说到。

“Investigating each sexual assault as possibly perpetrated by a serial offender has the potential to reduce the number of sexual assaults if investigations focus more on the offender than on single incidents.”

“调查一起性侵犯案件时，如果将犯罪者当作潜在的连环作案者来考虑，并将重点集中于侵害者而非将之作为单一事件调查，这有可能会减少性侵犯案件的数量。”

The researchers also found many rapists have long criminal histories, often beginning before their first documented sexual assault and continuing after it. Seventy-four per cent of serial rapists were found to have been arrested before the sexual attack and 95 per cent had been arrested afterwards. In contrast, for one-off rapists, the figures were 51 per cent and 78 per cent respectively.

研究者还发现，很多的强奸犯有很长的犯罪历史，通常在他们第一次登记在案的性侵犯发生之前就已开始，并且在之后继续犯下罪行。74%的连环强奸犯曾在实施性侵之前（因犯罪而）被捕，而有95%的人在此之后又被逮捕。相比之下，单次作案的强奸犯对应的两个比例分别是51%与78%。【译注：他们之前或之后被捕的原因可能不是性侵犯，或者相隔时间较长，所以他们仍被归为“单次作案者”。】

The different types of offenders were also found to behave differently during the course of their crimes, the researchers said.

不同类型的犯罪者在犯罪过程中的行为表现亦不相同，研究者们说。

Sexual assaults committed by serial offenders more frequently involved kidnapping victims and threatening them, the researchers found. Serial offenders were also less likely to be known to their victim.

研究者发现，连环作案者实施的性侵犯案件中更频繁地出现绑架与威胁受害者的情况，并且他们更可能不太与受害者相熟。

But sexual assaults committed by serial offenders less frequently involved restraining victims and injuring them in order to complete the attack. However, one-off offenders were more likely to punch, slap, hold down or restrain a victim.

但是连环作案者实施的性侵犯案件中较少涉及控制受害者以及为了完成侵犯而实施的伤害行为。而单次作案者更可能会殴打、掌掴、压制或控制受害者。

One-off offenders were more likely to attack in their own house or the house of the victim. However, 58 per cent of serial offenders committed all of their crimes in the same type of setting, such as a vehicle.

单次作案者更可能在他们自己或受害者的家里作案，而58%的连环作案者选择在同样的环境下实施犯罪，比如在车里。

The researchers also said one-off offenders were more likely than serial offenders to commit sexual assaults with others, such as participating in gang rapes.

研究者还说，单次作案者比连环作案者更可能与他人一起实施性侵犯，比如参与轮奸。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Jamie @ 2017-02-24
译者:eGregius (@eGregius)
校对:龙泉
来源:The American Interest,http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/23/europes-green-power-fueled-by-burning-wood/

Nearly two-thirds of the Europe’s renewable energy comes from burning wood. No, this isn’t some time capsule report from 500 years ago—that’s actually what the European Union is doing to meet its vaunted climate targets. The BBC reports:

欧洲近三分之二的可再生能量来自于木材燃烧——这可不是出自500年前时间胶囊中的记述，而是欧盟为了达到它吹嘘的气候目标所正在做的。据BBC报道：

While much of the discussion has focused on wind and solar power, across Europe the biggest source of green energy is biomass. It supplies around 65% of renewable power – usually electricity generated from burning wood pellets. EU Governments, under pressure to meet tough carbon cutting targets, have been encouraging electricity producers to use more of this form of energy by providing substantial subsidies for biomass burning.

尽管有大量的议题集中在风能和太阳能，生物质能仍然是目前整个欧洲最主要的绿色能源。它提供了约65%的可再生能量——以木屑颗粒燃烧发电为主。在严苛的减碳目标压力之下，欧盟各国政府为电力生产商制定了大量的补贴政策以激励他们采用此类能源。

If cutting down trees and burning them doesn’t sound green to you, that’s because, well, it’s not. It only becomes “climate neutral” when you include some clever accounting: if foresters replant a tree for every one they cut down, then from a “life-cycle” perspective, the emissions involved in burning that wood is offset by the carbon captured by the new forests.

如果你觉得伐木烧柴听起来并不那么“绿色”的话，那是因为，它确实不。哪怕你引入一些精明的算计：如果每伐一株木，护林人都会进行再种植，那么从“生命循环”的角度来看，烧柴所导致的碳排放会被新种树木的光合作用抵消，这也仅仅导致“气候中和”。

But a new report from Chatham House scrutinizes that calculus as little more than fuzzy math:

但来自Chatham House的一项最新报道仔细审视了上述算计，发现那仅仅是含糊的数学：

“It doesn’t make sense,” said [Duncan Brack, the report’s author], who is also a former special adviser at the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change. “The fact that forests have grown over the previous 20 or 100 years means they are storing large amounts of carbon, you can’t pretend it doesn’t make an impact on the atmosphere if you cut them down and burn them…You could fix them in wood products or in furniture or you could burn them, but the impact on the climate is very different.”

“那说不通，”报道的作者Duncan Brack表示——他同时也是英国能源与气候变化部的前任特别顾问——“无论过去20还是过去100年，森林面积都在增长，这一事实表明森林存储了大量的碳，你没有办法假装砍伐和燃烧它们对气候不会产生任何影响……你可以把这些碳继续固定闸木制品或家具里，你也可以把它们烧掉，但两种做法对气候的影响是很不同的。”

Mr Brack says the assumption of carbon neutrality misses out on some crucial issues, including the fact that young trees planted as replacements absorb and store less carbon than the ones that have been burned.

Brack先生表示碳中和的设想遗漏了一些重要的问题，包括新种植小树苗的贮碳能力并不及那些被烧掉的树。

This dodgy carbon accounting has come under fire (no pun intended) before, and for good reason: it doesn’t pass the common sense test. Even if you claim that the carbon capturing abilities of felled trees are offset by new forests, you need to consider that those new trees will take decades to reach full maturity—decades in which they won’t be sequestering carbon. Then too, consider that every step of the biomass production process—cutting trees down, trucking them out, machining them into pellets, and then shipping those pellets to the power plants where they’ll be burned—all entail emissions of their own.

这种鸡贼的碳核算方法此前就曾经受舆论炙烤（无意双关），这也理所应当，因为它并不符合常识。即使你声称新种植的木头会替代被伐木贮碳，你也需要考虑到这些替代者需要几十年的时间才能完全成熟——而在这几十年间，它们不怎么会吸碳。此外，想想生物质能生产的各个环节——伐木、运输、加工成颗粒再被运到发电厂（燃烧它们的地方）——都会产生排放。

There’s another big problem here, too. Europe buys much of their wood pellets from outside the bloc, and there’s little in the way of regulatory oversight to ensure felled trees are replanted, opening the door to opportunists looking to make a quick buck. And, as the BBC explains, the vagaries of international carbon accounting are producing some odd numbers for Europe:

还有一个不小的问题。欧洲大量的木屑颗粒采购于欧洲之外，没有多少监管措施去保证被伐木材会有新的树木取代，这为只想着快速捞一笔的机会主义者敞开了大门。正如BBC所解释的，国际间碳核算领域的奇招妙术正在给欧洲制造一些奇怪的数据：

[U]nder UN climate rules, emissions from trees are only counted when they are harvested. However the US, Canada and Russia do not use this method of accounting so if wood pellets are imported from these countries into the EU, which doesn’t count emissions from burning, the carbon simply goes “missing”.

根据联合国制定的气候规则，燃烧木材的排放只在被砍伐时记录一次，然而美国、加拿大和俄罗斯并不采取这样的计算方法，这样一来从这些国家进口到欧盟的木屑颗粒所导致的碳排放便不会被记录，就这么消失了。

With 65 percent of Europe’s renewable energy coming from biomass, you’d think this would be a bigger scandal. Perhaps the Eurocrats in Brussels are unwilling to examine the problem too closely, fearful that an in-depth investigation might kill the region’s best chance at meeting the climate targets it set for itself. Countries in Europe seem to be doubling down on biomass, too, a decision some observers say is “disastrous” for the environment. The longer this goes on, the more apparent it is that the EU cares more about appearing to be green than it does about actually tackling the issues it makes such a big to-do about on the international stage.

若再考虑到欧洲65%的可再生能源由生物质能组成，你会愈发觉得这是一桩丑闻。也许布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员们更愿意与这些调查保持距离，他们害怕深入的调查会让他们达到为自己设定的气候目标的希望落空。同时，欧洲各国在生物质能使用上似乎正在变本加利，一些观察家认为，对生态环境来说，这是“灾难性”的决定。这样的局面持续越久，欧盟的心思就愈发明显——相比应对让他们真正费力的气候问题，他们更在意台面上的“绿色”。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

时间:2017-02-12
译者:Luis Rightcon
校对:龙泉
来源:http://www.coyoteblog.com,http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2017/02/the-power-of-taxes-to-bend-behavior-often-in-unexpected-ways.html

Taxes are incredibly powerful things.  Tax something and you will get less of it.  But you might also get more of something you did not expect.  Taxes are the king of generating unintended consequences.  A huge part of human ingenuity (unfortunately) seems to be constantly geared towards evading taxes.  This is one reason I favor completely eliminating the corporate income tax — way too many otherwise productive resources are marshaled towards managing the consequences of these taxes.

税收具有无穷魔力。如果你向某物征税，那么它就会变少。不过你也会得到一些意外收获。税收是非意图后果的制造之王。人类的很大一部分聪明才智看起来都（很不幸的）用在了逃避税收上。这是我为什么倾向于完全废除公司所得税的一个原因。太多生产性资源被配置于对付这些税收造成的后果了。

Last weekend I was in Cabo visiting a few friends and practicing my Spanish.  Many of the buildings in town (at least away from the resort areas) look like this:

上周末我去Cabo城【译注：位于墨西哥下加利福尼亚半岛的一座城市】拜访一帮朋友顺便练习西班牙语。许多建筑（至少远离度假村的地方）看起来像这样：

This is a small retail commercial building with going concerns on the first floor (actually finished pretty nicely) but rebar and stuff sticking up from what looks like an unfinished second floor.   This is just one of many, many buildings that look like this.  My friend, who has run a resort in Cabo for decades, asked me what I thought was going on.  I said I assumed it was some sort of third world thing, perhaps a lack of financing that meant the first floor has to operate to generate cash flow for the second floor.

这是一栋一楼正在营业的小商业建筑（实际上一楼做的很棒），但是屋顶朝天戳着的钢筋和其他建筑材料使得二楼看起来没有完成。这只是许许多多同类建筑中的一个。我那位在Cabo开了几十年零售店的朋友问我：你觉得这是怎么回事？。我说我觉得这像一个第三世界的产物，资金短缺使得需要用一楼产生的现金流来支持二楼的工程。

He answered that yes, there was very little financing for small business and real estate development so that sort of thing did happen.  But what was really going on here is tax management.  Until construction is completed, this structure is taxed as raw land rather than as a valuable commercial building.  It was typical practice to get approved for a two story building in the original plans, then stop construction after completing the first floor (which was all that was wanted anyway) and act like the building is still under construction.   Voila (ed: lol, oops) — ugly building but hefty tax reduction.

他答道，小型企业和小房地产开发商的很少融资，所以这种事情确实会发生。但是在这里，真正的原因是避税。直到完工之前，这个地块都会被当作未开发土地而不是按有价值商业建筑征税。这栋建筑是个典型案例：最初获批时规划了两层，在完成第一层后停工（本来就是这么打算的），这栋建筑就像是仍然在施工一样。啊哈，丑陋但是可以躲掉很多税负的建筑。

For those of you who want to write this off as a third world phenomenon, I will offer a similar example from personal experience.  Some years ago, because I did not have enough value-destroying investments in my life, I bought some raw land in Hawaii.  It is actually in a gated community, about half-built-out, but if you drive past my land you will likely see a cow on it.

假如你认为这是第三世界特有现象，那我再举个相似的例子。若干年前，在我还没做那么多亏本投资之前，我在夏威夷买了一块荒地。它实际上位于一个封闭社区内，大概建好了一半，但是如果你开车经过我那块地，你会发现上边有一头奶牛。

What is a cow doing in a gated community on residential land?  Well, that is the point.  Without the cow, the land gets taxed as residential land.  With the cow, the land gets taxed as ranch land at perhaps a tenth the rate.  The homeowners association helps those of us with raw land to split the cost of the cows.

在建于住宅用地之上的封闭社区里放一头奶牛干啥呢？嗯，这个才是重点。如果没有这头奶牛的话，我这块荒地会被当成住宅用地征税。而有了这头奶牛，这块地则会被当成税率只有住宅用地十分之一的牧场征税。业主协会帮助我们这样的业主分担奶牛养殖的费用。

Update:  Here are the Hawaiian cows, next to one of my neighbor’s front gate.  While they are more attractive than the exposed rebar on the building in Cabo, they serve the same purpose.

更新：这些就是夏威夷的奶牛，旁边是我邻居的前门。虽然这些牛比Cabo城里那些裸露钢筋要好看一点，但是它们的作用却是一样的。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

A look at the racist history of the minimum wage.
最低工资中的种族歧视历史一瞥

作者:Walter Williams @ 2017-02-08
译者:龟海海
校对:龙泉
来源:Frontpage Mag,http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/265734/minimum-wage-and-discrimination-walter-williams

There is little question in most academic research that increases in the minimum wage lead to increases in unemployment. The debatable issue is the magnitude of the increase. An issue not often included in minimum wage debates is the substitution effects of minimum wage increases. The substitution effect might explain why Business for a Fair Minimum Wage, a national network of business owners and executives, argues for higher minimum wages. Let’s look at substitution effects in general.

提高最低工资会引起失业率上升，这一观点在大多数学术研究中都没多大争议。争议在于提高最低工资所能引起的失业率增加的幅度。一项最低工资辩论中不怎么讨论的议题是其增长所引发的“替代效应”。“替代效应”解释了为什么“商界支持合理最低工资”这个全国性企业主和管理者网站，也会主张更高的最低工资。那我们今天就讲一讲什么是“替代效应”。

When the price of anything rises, people seek substitutes and measures to economize. When gasoline prices rise, people seek to economize on the usage of gas by buying smaller cars. If the price of sugar rises, people seek cheaper sugar substitutes. If prices of goods in one store rise, people search for other stores. This last example helps explain why some businessmen support higher minimum wages. If they could impose higher labor costs on their less efficient competition, it might help drive them out of business. That would enable firms that survive to charge higher prices and earn greater profits.

当任何东西的价格上涨时，人们会寻求其他更实惠的替代品。当汽油价格上涨时，人们通过购买小型汽车（小排量）来节省油耗。如果一种糖的价格上涨，人们寻求更便宜的糖来替代。如果一家商店的商品价格上涨，人们寻找其他商店。最后一个例子有助于解释为什么有些商人支持更高的最低工资。如果可以对低效率的竞争对手施以更高的劳动力成本，这就可能使这些企业歇业。之后存活下来的公司可以提高产品价格并赚得更多利润。

There’s a more insidious substitution effect of higher minimum wages. You see it by putting yourself in the place of a businessman who has to pay at least the minimum wage to anyone he hires. Say that you are hiring typists. There are some who can type 40 words per minute and others, equal in every other respect, who can type 80 words per minute. Whom would you hire? I’m guessing you’d hire the more highly skilled.

更高的最低工资线还有隐蔽的“替代效应”。你从商人的角度就不难看出，无论如何他必须支付最低工资给所有他雇用的人。假如：你正在招聘打字员。有些人可以每分钟输入40个单词，在其他方面条件相同的情况下，有人每分钟可以输入80个单词。你会雇佣谁？ 我猜你会雇佣技艺精湛的那个。

Thus, one effect of the minimum wage is discrimination against the employment of lower-skilled workers. In some places, the minimum wage is $15 an hour. But if a lower-skilled worker could offer to work for, say, $8 an hour, you might hire him. In addition to discrimination against lower-skilled workers, the minimum wage denies them the chance of sharpening their skills and ultimately earning higher wages. The most effective form of training for most of us is on-the-job training.

因此，最低工资的影响之一是对低技能工人的歧视。在某些地方，最低工资是每小时15美元。但是，例如一个低技能工人愿意以每小时8美元为你工作，你可能会雇用他。除了对低技能工人的歧视外，最低工资阻碍了他们提升自己的技能并最终获得更高的工资的机会。对我们大多数人来说，最有效的培训形式是在工作中学习。

An even more insidious substitution effect of minimum wages can be seen from a few quotations. During South Africa’s apartheid era, racist unions, which would never accept a black member, were the major supporters of minimum wages for blacks. In 1925, the South African Economic and Wage Commission said, “The method would be to fix a minimum rate for an occupation or craft so high that no Native would be likely to be employed.”

最低工资更隐蔽的“替代效应”可以从几个引证中看出。在南非的种族隔离时代，种族主义者的工会绝对不会接受黑人成员，而这些人正是黑人最低工资的主要支持者。在1925年，南非经济和工资委员会说，“该方法将为某些职业（低技能）固定最低工资，技艺精湛者工资非常高，以至于土著几乎找不到工作。”

Gert Beetge, secretary of the racist Building Workers’ Union, complained, “There is no job reservation left in the building industry, and in the circumstances, I support the rate for the job (minimum wage) as the second-best way of protecting our white artisans.” “Equal pay for equal work” became the rallying slogan of the South African white labor movement. These laborers knew that if employers were forced to pay black workers the same wages as white workers, there’d be reduced incentive to hire blacks.

种族主义的建筑工人联盟秘书Gert Beetge抱怨：“建筑业没有工作职位空缺，在这种情况下，我支持建筑业施行（最低工资），作为对白人工匠们最好的保护措施。“同工同酬”成为南非白人工人运动的口号。这些工人知道，如果雇主被迫向黑人工匠支付与白人工匠相同的工资，那么就会减少雇用黑人的动机。

South Africans were not alone in their minimum wage conspiracy against blacks. After a bitter 1909 strike by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen in the U.S., an arbitration board decreed that blacks and whites were to be paid equal wages. Union members expressed their delight, saying, “If this course of action is followed by the company and the incentive for employing the Negro thus removed, the strike will not have been in vain.”

南非人用最低工资对付黑人的阴谋并非孤例。在经历了美国火车司炉工与引擎师兄弟会1909年一次罢工所带来的痛苦之后，仲裁委员会颁布仲裁令：黑人和白人应支付同等水平工资。工会成员表达了他们的喜悦，说：“如果公司遵循这一仲裁令，并且雇用黑人的动机便不复存在，罢工就没有白费。”

Our nation’s first minimum wage law, the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, had racist motivation. During its legislative debate, its congressional supporters made such statements as, “That contractor has cheap colored labor that he transports, and he puts them in cabins, and it is labor of that sort that is in competition with white labor throughout the country.” During hearings, American Federation of Labor President William Green complained, “Colored labor is being sought to demoralize wage rates.”

我国第一个最低工资法，1931年《戴維斯-培根法》，也有种族主义动机。在其立法辩论期间，国会中的支持者发表了如下声明：“承包商运送廉价的有色人种劳动力，把他们安置在小棚屋里，正是这类劳动力在与全国各地的白人劳动者竞争。”在听证会上，美国劳工联合会主席威廉·格林抱怨说：“有色人种的劳动力正在谋求将工资率拉低到令人沮丧的水平。”

Today’s stated intentions behind the support of minimum wages are nothing like yesteryear’s. However, intentions are irrelevant. In the name of decency, we must examine the effects.

如今的支持最低工资背后的意图与往昔截然不同。 然而，意图是无关紧要的。为体面起见，我们必须仔细考虑其影响。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Robert Colvile @ 2016-04-15
译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
校对:pathto(@pathto)
来源:CapX,http://capx.co/the-schools-that-katrina-built/

“Hey, guy, tuck your shirt in, yeah?” The boy scurrying across the cafeteria of Samuel J Green Charter School mumbles an apology, and tidies away the trailing flap of his white shirt. Jay Altman gives a satisfied nod, bends to pick up a stray piece of litter on the floor, and then continues on his way.

“嘿，伙计，把衣服束起来好吗？”在塞缪尔格林特许学校，一个小男生匆匆穿过餐厅，一边嘴上嘟哝着道了个歉，一边整理好白衬衫松出来的衣角。Jay Altman满意地点了点头，弯下腰捡起了地下的一片垃圾，然后继续往前走。

Samuel J Green feels like the kind of place you’d want to send your own children to. The pupils – ranging from the five-year-olds in kindergarten to 14-year-olds about to head off to high school – are bright, enthusiastic, neatly turned out in their dark green uniforms. The school’s red-brick facade is gleamingly clean.

塞缪尔格林让人感觉就是那种你想把自己孩子送去的地方。那里穿着墨绿色校服的学生——无论是那些才5岁的幼儿园学生，还是那些已经14岁快要上高中的学生——都显得那么聪明、整洁，而且充满活力。学校的那些红砖建筑外表都干净得发亮。

In the cafeteria, there are plastic compost buckets on every table, which will shortly be taken out to the “living playground” – the large garden that takes up much of the space behind the school, where the pupils learn to grow herbs and plants, or take lessons about nutrition in the shade of a vine-strewn canopy under the Louisiana sun.

餐厅里，每个餐桌旁都放着塑料有机堆肥桶，它们很快会被搬到“生活乐园”上去清空。“生活乐园”是一个占去学校后面大部分面积的大花园，学生在那儿学习种植各种香草和植物，在路易斯安那的阳光下藤曼遮蔽的树荫里了解植物营养学。

But there are several startling things about this school, one of five that Altman’s chain, FirstLine Schools, oversees. For one thing, there this used to be one of the worst schools, in one of the worst neighbourhoods, in one of the worst cities, in one of the worst states, in America. For another, 10 years ago Samuel J Green was underwater not just metaphorically but literally: on the cafeteria wall is a shoulder-high line, painted on to show where the waters reached their height in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. And its remarkable recovery – and that of the New Orleans school system as a whole – took place not despite that disaster, but largely because of it.

这所学校是Altman名为“前线学校”的学校联盟所监督的五所学校之一，在这里发生了一些令人惊讶的事。例如，它位于全美最糟糕的州里最糟糕的城市，曾经是全市最糟糕地段里最糟糕的学校之一。 另外，十年前这所学校还遭受了灭顶之灾，这不是一个比喻，而是一个事实——在学校餐厅的墙上，画了一条齐肩高的线，标示着在卡特里娜飓风肆虐后洪水达到的高度。而它令人瞩目的复兴——和整个新奥尔良校网的复兴——不仅是因为克服了巨大的困难，而且很大程度上是得益于这次灾难。

········

The story starts back in 1992, when Altman and his friend Tony Recasner, along with a group of other teachers, parents and activists, founded the James Lewis Extension school – a charter school (the equivalent of the UK’s free schools and academies) before such a thing even existed. It wasn’t meant to be the start of a movement: they just wanted to prove you could run a decent school without cherry-picking the pupils, and increase the life chances of some of the poorest families in New Orleans in the process. The key, Altman says, was to focus on the “middle school” years between 11 and 14, “because that’s where the big dip comes”, as rich students start to pull away from poor ones.

事情要回溯到1992年，那时Altman和朋友Tony Recasner联合了一班教师、家长和社会活动家，创立了詹姆斯刘易斯附属学校。这是一所特许学校（相当于英国的自由学校或自由学院），只是当时还没有这种说法。他们并没想开启一场运动，只是想证明，就算不对学生精挑细选，也一样可以办一所像样的学校，同时也可以为新奥尔良穷困家庭的孩子增加改变命运的机会。Altman说，其中的关键在于狠抓11岁到14岁这一段初中时期，“因为这是开始沉沦的年纪”，家庭富裕的学生开始甩下贫困的同学。

James Lewis was an enormous success: six years later, it became the first official charter school in New Orleans. In 2005, their group – then called Middle School Advocates, but now known as FirstLine Schools – was asked by the state to take over Samuel J Green. “It was out of control, it was chaotic,” recalls Altman. He actually advised Recasner to say no: “Don’t take over that school, that school will kill you.” But Recasner, who’d grown up in the neighbourhood, wanted to give something back.

詹姆斯刘易斯学校取得了巨大的成功，六年之后，它成为了新奥尔良第一所正式的特许学校。2005年，州政府邀请他们当时名为“剑指初中”的学校联盟（如今已更名为“前线学校”）， 接手萨缪尔格林。Altman回忆道，“那时候这学校失去了控制，简直乱作一团。”他实际上还建议Recasner回绝这一请求：“不要接那所学校，它会害死你的。”但在那一区长大的Rescasner，希望能对那里有所回馈。

By this stage, Altman was a hot commodity in education – and was recruited by the ARK charity to help bring the charter school ethos to its nascent network in the UK. But then fate intervened. “We moved in June 2005, and the levees broke here in August.” New Orleans essentially shut down: schools were boarded up with no idea of when, or whether, they would be reopened. James Lewis, by now renamed the New Orleans Charter Middle School, never was, because there was no longer a neighbourhood for it to serve.

那时候，Altman在教育界炙手可热——无保留援助儿童基金会邀请他，希望他能将特许学校的经验带到他们在英国的新兴校网去。但天意难料，“我们2005年6月进驻学校，洪水8月就来了。”新奥尔良基本上陷于瘫痪：学校被木板封门，也不知道何时能够重开，甚至还会否重开。当时已更名为新奥尔良特许初中的詹姆斯刘易斯中学，就再没有重开过，因为它所服务的社区已不复存在。

But amid this disaster, there was an opportunity. Back in 2003, Louisiana had passed a controversial law declaring New Orleans into a Recovery School District – essentially, an admission that the city’s education system was not fit for purpose. There were too many bad schools, bumping along at the bottom, and letting down their pupils in the process.

但灾难之中也有转机。在之前的2003年，路易斯安那州通过了一条有争议的法案，宣布新奥尔良为“学校重建区”——这实际上承认了该市的教育系统不如人意。糟糕的学校实在是太多了，它们把学生也拉进了泥潭，一同在底层挣扎。

Under the legislation, any school that did not meet basic standards could be taken over by those promising to do a better job: exactly what happened at Samuel J Green. Yet progress was glacial – until Katrina.

在这条法案下，那些达不到基本要求的学校，可以由那些承诺做得更好的人来接管：塞缪尔格林正是案例之一。但事情的进展极其缓慢，直到飓风卡特里娜的出现。

As it rebuilt, New Orleans decided to break with tradition. Instead of rebuilding the school system, it decided to set up what Altman calls “a system of schools”. Now, more than 95 per cent of public schools in the city are charter schools. Each has the freedom to specialise; each is open to any pupil in the city, with long yellow school buses ferrying them back and forth; and each is accountable for meeting those minimum standards. FirstLine now has 3,000 pupils at its four schools.

新奥尔良决定在重建中打破常规。与其重建单独的一所所学校，政府决定要像Altman所说的那样，重建一个有机结合的学校网络。如今，该市超过95%的公立学校是特许学校，每个学校都可以决定各自的特色，也可以在全市范围内招生，由黄色校巴负责每日接送，每个学校都需要就是否达到基本标准而接受问责。如今在“前线学校”属下的四所学校里已经有3,000学生。

If this sounds familiar to British readers, it’s because this was – consciously – the same recipe of choice, autonomy and accountability that powered the free schools and academies reforms in the UK, as well as other charter school movements in the US. The move was bitterly contested – but the results are impossible to argue with.

这对英国读者来说也许并不陌生，因为这有意识地借鉴了催生了自由学校与学院的英国教育改革的自由择校、自主办学与可问责三原则，而且同样的原则也推动了美国其他地方的特许学校热潮。这一举措本身充满争议，但其效果却无可辩驳。

As we sit in the shade of Samuel J Green’s “Living Playground” – on the exact spot where a powerboat washed up in the wake of Katrina – Altman shows me the figures. In 2005, 62 per cent of New Orleans schools were judged to be “failing”. Now, the figure is 7 per cent – even though the benchmarks for failure are tougher. A decade ago, 35 per cent of pupils were reaching basic standards, 23 per cent below the average across Louisiana as a whole. Now the figure is 62 per cent, and the gap is just six points. The proportion of disabled students hitting the same benchmarks has gone from 11 per cent to 39 per cent – and the gap with the state average has gone from 23 points to two. New Orleans has, in short, seen the most significant educational improvements of any city in America.

我们坐在塞缪尔格林那“生活乐园”的树荫下——当年有一艘快艇被卡特里娜一直冲到了这里——Altman让我看了一组数字。2005年，新奥尔良的学校里有62%被评定为“不及格”。现在，尽管标准比以前更严格，该百分比仍然降到了7%。十年前，只有35%的学生达到基本标准，比路易斯安那州整体平均水平要低23个百分点。如今达标的比例是62%，与全州差距仅剩6个百分点。残疾学生达到同样标准的比例从11%上升到39%，与全州平均水平的差距也从23个百分点降到了2个百分点。简而言之，新奥尔良的教育改善幅度在全美的城市中首屈一指。

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The lessons of Samuel J Green are not just about exam results, however. What shines through above all is its devotion to character. Since 95 per cent of the pupils are African-American – and 95 per cent are on free school meals – the hallways are festooned with inspirational pictures of pioneering figures: the first black president, the first black senator, the first black ballet superstar. Banners dangle from the roof containing inspirational quotes, stressing the virtues of manners, self-discipline, ambition. The walls are decorated with the pennants of universities from across America, after which the classrooms are named.

塞缪尔格林的经验并不仅仅体现在考试成绩，其亮点在于对品格的追求。由于95%的学生是非洲裔——由学校提供免费膳食的学生也达到了95%——走廊上挂着前辈们的励志照片：第一位黑人总统、第一位黑人参议员、第一位黑人芭蕾巨星。屋顶上悬挂的标语也是励志的名言，宣扬着美德、自律与梦想。墙壁上点缀着全美各所大学的校旗，教室也以这些大学来命名。

Most pointedly, the year groups are labelled “2024”, “2025”, “2026” – the years that these children will graduate not from high school, but university. Everything about the place is designed to ram home the message that going to college is not a rarity for these kids (as, statistically, it still is) but their natural and inevitable destiny.

最引人瞩目的是，学校特意用“2024”、“2025”、“2026”来标识年级——那不是孩子们从高中毕业的年份，而是从大学毕业的年份。这里的所有东西都旨在让这些孩子们明白，上大学对于他们来说并不是小概率事件（尽管目前的统计数据仍然如此），而是很自然的，甚至是理所应当的。

So what can others – such as the UK – learn from New Orleans? There are, obviously, special factors at play, from changes in the city’s demographics after Katrina to the determination, not just in New Orleans but more broadly, to build something better after the disaster. When FirstLine decided to tear up Samuel J Green’s concrete playground, Alice Waters, the gastro-goddess who created California’s Chez Panisse restaurant, helped plan the garden. The New Orleans Saints, the local football team, helped pay for the all-weather sports pitch in the other corner of the playground – and their star quarterback, Drew Brees, chipped in towards the kitchen classroom, as did celebrity chef Emeril Lagasse.

那么其他地方，比如英国，可以从新奥尔良学到什么呢？当然，很多特别的因素在这里起作用，从卡特里娜后这个城市的人口结构变化，到这城市内外希望灾后重建更胜以前的决心。当“前线学校”决定敲开塞缪尔格林的混凝土操场时，创建了加州Chez Panisse餐厅的女厨神Alice Waters帮忙规划花园。当地橄榄球队新奥尔良圣徒队捐助操场另一角的全天候运动场，而他们的明星四分卫Drew Brees则与名厨Emeril Lagasse共同资助了烹饪教室。

Some of the more general lessons have already been learned. For school reformers in the UK, New Orleans is further proof of the importance of autonomy, accountability and diversity: of giving schools the freedom to build themselves around a particular vision or specialism, but forcing them to meet certain standards at the same time.

人们已经从中得到某些更有普遍性的经验教训。对于英国的学校改革者来说，新奥尔良再次证明了自主权、问责制和多样性的重要性——给学校予自由空间，根据各自的愿景和特点建校，但同时要求他们达到某些标准。

FirstLine, for example, uses its Living Playground to teach kids about nutrition, biology and stewardship of the natural world, but other charters have another focus: the Bricolage Academy, says its head Josh Densen, is built around “creating innovators and creative problem solvers” – it has “an innovation classroom where we teach engineering and design and computer coding and electrical circuitry and robotics”, growing in complexity as the children advance from kindergarten. Teaching practices also vary: where FirstLine uses a split classroom, in which some kids talk to the teacher, others work on problems, and others work on computers to the side, Bricolage takes a workshop approach, “which we find drives learning better than traditional instruction”.

例如，前线学校利用生活乐园来向学生们教授营养学、生物学和园艺，但其它特许学校有别的侧重点：Bricolage 学院的校长Josh Densen说，他们学校的建校宗旨是“培养创造性解决问题的创新者”——学校“有一个创意课堂，在那里我们教授工程、设计、计算机编程、电子电路和机器人技术”，随着孩子们从幼儿园一路升学，课程的难度也随之加深。学校的教学方法也多种多样：前线学校采用分组学习的形式，一部分孩子与老师讨论，一部分孩子做题，其余的就可以使用旁边的电脑。而Bricolage 学院则采用讨论会的形式，“我们发现这种方式比传统授课更有助于学习。”

Another lesson is the importance of finding – and developing – teaching talent. While he was in the UK, Altman worked with Sir Iain Hall, founder of the King’s Leadership Academy in Warrington, to set up Future Leaders, in order to train and promote the very best teachers, including those who have come in via direct-entry programmes such as Teach First, Schools Direct or Teach for America. Altman explains that “one of the things we’re trying this year – and this is really experimental – is giving our lead teachers a four-day week, so they can come together one day a week for shared planning and professional development”.

另一个经验是发掘和培养教育人才的重要性。当年在英国的时候，Altman就和沃灵顿英皇领导学院的创办人Iain Hall爵士共同设立了公益组织“未来领袖”，旨在培训和选拔最出色的教师，当中包括来自直接衔接项目“教育第一”“名校指导”以及“教育为美国”的教师。Altman解释道，“我们今年尝试的事情之一——这还只是实验性的——是让我们的骨干教师一周工作四天，以令他们每周能有一天聚在一起，学习共同规划，接受专业培训”

The growth of diversity in the education system will also, its architects hope, lead to cross-fertilisation, as experiments such as Altman’s four-day week are evaluated by others. Even just spending a morning at Samuel J Green, it is easy to see ideas that could be profitably employed elsewhere: assessing the performance of each class every week, not every term, to enable regular course-correction and adapt to their needs; letting parents access their children’s computerised learning programmes from home; getting each class to do 10 minutes of exercise every few hours (done, as I see when I tour the classrooms, by getting them to dance along with pop videos); using education technology, which is finally starting to live up to its promise after years of wildly overstated claims for its effects.

它的设计者们希望，随着像Altman的每周四天授课的这类实验接受他人的评估，这个教育体系日趋多样，能够促进相互学习。哪怕只是在塞缪尔格林呆一个上午，也很容易观察到那些可以推广到别处的理念：每周评估各班的表现，而不是每个学期一次，以确保能及时纠正偏差，根据需要进行调整；让家长在家就可以了解孩子的电脑化的课程设置；让各个班级每几个小时就活动十分钟（确有做到，当我参观教室时，就看到学生们跟着流行曲的录像跳舞）；使用电子教学，这些高科技手段的效果多年来被过分地夸大，如今终于开始达到预期效果了。

Above all, however, Samuel J Green is tribute to the power of a single idea.

然而最重要的是，萨缪尔格林体现了一种简单理念的力量。

“People, whether they’re conscious of it or not, have these biases around low-income students and students from deprived areas,” says Altman. The guiding principle of FirstLine is “this real belief in the potential of all young people… a real sense of shared moral purpose”.

“不管他们自己是否意识到，人们对低收入与来自贫困地区的学生总是存在着各种的偏见，”Altman说道。“前线学校”的办学原则就是“坚信所有年轻人的潜力……和共同的道德追求”。

In New Orleans, those problems are usually linked to race – but in Britain, the culprit is more often class, especially in the former industrial areas of the North.

在新奥尔良，那些问题通常会与种族联系起来。但在英国，问题的根源更多是社会阶层，尤其在北部的老工业区。

“In the whole of the OECD, there’s a bigger correlation between parental income and child aspiration and success in the UK than anywhere else,” says Sir Iain Hall, who is now CEO of the Great Schools Trust. “If you’re a young child in a three-generation household, where there’s been no employment for a long time, aspiration’s died. You have to break through that aspirational poverty to get the child to say ‘I can succeed despite these circumstances’.”

“在经合组织内，英国的父母收入与子女的抱负和成就的相关性比其他国家更强，”现在担任伟大学校慈善信托CEO的 Iain Hall爵士说。“如果一个小孩子家里三代同堂，家人长期没有工作，他的志向就会消沉。你必须打破这种胸无大志，让孩子相信‘我能在逆境中成功’。”

His work, like Altman’s, is driven by “an emerging understanding that if you can improve the character of young children, you can actually improve their educational outcomes. That’s what Jay and I have been doing, either side of the Atlantic – working on motivational messages and strong values that motivate these children and build resilience into them.”

他的事业，和Altman的一样，都被一个新兴理念驱动：“如果你能提升孩子们的品格，你就能改善他们受教育的效果。这就是我和Jay (Altman)在大西洋两岸一直做的——向孩子们灌输励志的信息和强大的信念，以激励他们奋发向上，坚韧不拔。”

Hall claims that Nicky Morgan, the Education Secretary, is beginning to pick up on this. “She started to see, through the KIPP schools in US [another chain of charters], that a greater emphasis on character is starting to produce quite amazing outcomes,” he says. The concept of “high expectations and no excuses”, which was at the heart of Future Leaders, is now, he says, “on the website of almost every school. Whether they apply it or not is another matter…”

Hall声称教育大臣Nicky Morgan已开始接受这一理念。“通过美国的KIPP【另一个特许学校联盟】，她开始发现对品格培养的重视会带来令人惊讶的收获，”他说。“未来领袖”的核心理念——“目标远大，不找借口”，如今已经“出现在几乎所有学校的官方网站上，至于他们是否真正实践这一理念是另一回事……”

In many ways, Britain’s education reforms put it well ahead of the United States: the old New Orleans system was, says Altman, not just pre-Blair but pre-Thatcher in its lack of standards, inspection and accountability. But in other ways, says Hall, we have still much to learn. “There are more and more schools [in the UK] naming their classrooms after universities. But you’ve got to get it into teachers’ vocabularies – all day long they’ve got to talk about aspiration and endeavour.” That can come more naturally to Americans, with their can-do spirit and sense of manifest destiny, than hidebound Brits.

英国的教育改革在很多方面都领先于美国：如Altman所说，新奥尔良过去的教育系统，缺乏标准、监督和问责制度，不仅仅落后于英国的布莱尔时代，甚至是落后于撒切尔时代。但在另一些方面，Hall认为英国也有许多需要学习的地方。“（英国）越来越多的学校以大学校名来命名教室。但你还必须让老师们去配合——他们也要经常谈及个人抱负和不懈努力。”这些对美国人就比因循守旧的英国人来得更自然，因为他们有着万事皆可能的性格和明确的使命感。

Still, success stories such as New Orleans are, says Nick Timothy of the New Schools Network, “tremendously exciting”. It is a vindication of the idea that the best way to get schools is to give dedicated teachers and parents the power to control them – and set them up. The free schools built in Britain are, Timothy points out, “more likely to be rated outstanding than other state schools, more popular with parents, and more likely to teach the so-called facilitating subjects that get young people into top universities. We know that they are improving the quality of education and creating more opportunities for children whatever their background, just like charter schools are doing in the States.”

尽管如此，像新奥尔良那样的成功案例，用“新校网”的Nick Timothy的话来说，依然“令人欣喜若狂”。这也是该办校理念——最好让投身其中的老师和家长们有权参与学校的运营和建设——的一大佐证。Timothy指出，英国的自由学校“与其他公立学校相比更经常被评为表现优异，更受家长们欢迎，也更普遍设立所谓的提高课程以帮助年轻人考上顶尖大学。我们都能看到，它们和美国的特许学校一样，在不断地改善教育质量，为不同背景的学生创造更多的机会。”

But there is still work to be done, on both sides of the Atlantic. “In all honesty, all that we’ve done in New Orleans is gone from an F to a D or a C,” says Altman. “The schools aren’t failing any more, but we’ve got to do more than ‘not failing’, right?”

然而在大西洋两岸，要做的事情都还有很多。“坦率的讲，我们在新奥尔良做到的，只是从‘不及格’进步到‘尚可’和‘中等’”Altman说，“这些学校都不再不及格了，但我们也不能只满足于‘及格’是吧？”

Robert Colvile is the former comment editor of the Telegraph and news director of BuzzFeed UK. His new book, ‘The Great Acceleration: How Life is Getting Faster, Faster’, was published by Bloomsbury on April 7th.
Robert Colvile是英国《电迅报》评论编辑，也是BuzzFeed英国版的新闻总监。他的新书《伟大的加速：生活如何变得越来越快》由Bloomsbury出版社在2016年4月7日出版。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-08-26
译者:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
校对:babyface_claire (@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:Marginal Revolution,http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/08/is-the-fda-too-conservative-or-too-aggressive.html

I have long argued that the FDA has an incentive to delay the introduction of new drugs because approving a bad drug (Type I error) has more severe consequences for the FDA than does failing to approve a good drug (Type II error). In the former case at least some victims are identifiable and the New York Times writes stories about them and how they died because the FDA failed. In the latter case, when the FDA fails to approve a good drug, people die but the bodies are buried in an invisible graveyard.

我一直认为，FDA有充分的动机来延迟新药审批，因为对于FDA来说，批准一种不合格的药（第一型错误）比拒绝一种合格的药（第二型错误）后果要严重得多。在前一种情况下，至少某些受害人的身份是可以被证实的，《纽约时报》会报道他们的故事，和他们是怎么因为FDA的失败而死亡的。而在后一种情况下，FDA没能批准合格的药品，虽然导致死亡，但是受害者藉藉无名，只会被人们忘记。

In an excellent new paper (SSRN also here) Vahid Montazerhodjat and Andrew Lo use a Bayesian analysis to model the optimal tradeoff in clinical trials between sample size, Type I and Type II error. Failing to approve a good drug is more costly, for example, the more severe the disease. Thus, for a very serious disease, we might be willing to accept a greater Type I error in return for a lower Type II error. The number of people with the disease also matters. Holding severity constant, for example, the more people with the disease the more you want to increase sample size to reduce Type I error. All of these variables interact.

在一篇杰出的新论文中，Vahid Montazerhodjat和Andrew Lo使用了贝叶斯分析来为临床试验中的病人数量、第一型错误和第二型错误之间的取舍进行了建模。举个例子来说，疾病越严重，不批准一种优秀药品所造成的损失就越大。因此，对于非常严重的疾病，人们可能会愿意接受更大的犯第一型错误的可能，来换取较小的犯第二型错误的几率。患有疾病的人群数量也很关键。比如说在建模中控制疾病的严重性为常量之后，患病的人群数量越大，就越需要在临床试验中招募更多的病人，以此来降低犯第一型错误的可能性。以上提到的这些变量都是互相影响的。

In an innovation the authors use the U.S. Burden of Disease Study to find the number of deaths and the disability severity caused by each major disease. Using this data they estimate the costs of failing to approve a good drug. Similarly, using data on the costs of adverse medical treatment they estimate the cost of approving a bad drug.

作者创新性的使用了美国疾病负担研究结果中所有主要疾病所导致的死亡和残疾的数据。他们利用这些数据估算未批准一种合格药品所造成的损失。同样，他们也使用了药物不良反应带来的成本，以此来估算批准一种不合格药品所造成的损失。

Putting all this together the authors find that the FDA is often dramatically too conservative:

综上所述，作者发现FDA在新药审批方面通常是极为保守的：

“…we show that the current standards of drug-approval are weighted more on avoiding a Type I error (approving ineffective therapies) rather than a Type II error (rejecting effective therapies). For example, the standard Type I error of 2.5% is too conservative for clinical trials of therapies for pancreatic cancer—a disease with a 5-year survival rate of 1% for stage IV patients (American Cancer Society estimate, last updated 3 February 2013). The BDA-optimal size for these clinical trials is 27.9%, reflecting the fact that, for these desperate patients, the cost of trying an ineffective drug is considerably less than the cost of not trying an effective one.”

“……我们的结果显示，现有的药品审批标准更偏向于避免第一型错误（批准无效的疗法）而不是避免第二型错误（拒绝有效的疗法）。譬如，对于胰腺癌——一种四期病人五年内存活率仅有1%的疾病（美国癌症协会预测，最后更新于2013年2月3日）——标准的2.5%第一型错误率实在是太过保守。这些临床试验经过贝叶斯决策分析优化过的容错标准为27.9%，这表明对于这些绝望的患者们，试用一种无效药物的成本大大低于不尝试一种有效药物的成本。”

(The authors also find that the FDA is occasionally a little too aggressive but these errors are much smaller, for example, the authors find that for prostate cancer therapies the optimal significance level is 1.2% compared to a standard rule of 2.5%.)

（作者还发现FDA偶尔也会过于激进，但是偏离的程度小得多。例如，前列腺癌治疗的最优显著率是1.2%，而不是标准的2.5%。）

The result is important especially because in a number of respects, Montazerhodjat and Lo underestimate the costs of FDA conservatism. Most importantly, the authors are optimizing at the clinical trial stage assuming that the supply of drugs available to be tested is fixed. Larger trials, however, are more expensive and the greater the expense of FDA trials the fewer new drugs will be developed. Thus, a conservative FDA reduces the flow of new drugs to be tested.

该结果十分重要，尤其因为在很多方面，Montazerhodjat和Lo低估了FDA坚持保守标准的成本。最关键的一点在于，作者们假定了待评估药物的供给是恒定的，并在此基础之上来优化临床试验阶段的容错标准。然而大型临床试验往往花费更高，这又导致新药研发的萎缩。因此，保守的FDA会降低新药研发的数量。

In a sense, failing to approve a good drug has two costs, the opportunity cost of lives that could have been saved and the cost of reducing the incentive to invest in R&D. In contrast, approving a bad drug while still an error at least has the advantage of helping to incentivize R&D (similarly, a subsidy to R&D incentivizes R&D in a sense mostly by covering the costs of failed ventures).

从某种意义上说，错误的拒绝一种好的药品有两种成本，一是没能拯救那些本来可以被拯救的病人的机会成本，二是减少了对新药研发做投资的激励所带来的成本。与之相对的是，批准一种不合格的药品，尽管仍旧是个错误，但是至少可以给新药研发带来正面的激励（类似的，对研发进行补贴的一个主要形式就是支付那些失败的研发项目经费，以此来激励更多的新药研发）。

The Montazerhodjat and Lo framework is also static, there is one test and then the story ends. In reality, drug approval has an interesting asymmetric dynamic. When a drug is approved for sale, testing doesn’t stop but moves into another stage, a combination of observational testing and sometimes more RCTs–this, after all, is how adverse events are discovered. Thus, Type I errors are corrected. On the other hand, for a drug that isn’t approved the story does end. With rare exceptions, Type II errors are never corrected.

而且，Montazerhodjat和Lo的分析框架是静态的，一个试验完了，故事就结束了。可实际上，药物审批流程有个独特的非对称机制。当药物被批准上市之后，测试并非就此结束，而是进入下一个阶段，往往由一系列观测性的测试，有时甚至是随机临床试验构成——毕竟，这是发现不良反应的方式。因此，第一型错误往往得到纠正。另一方面，对于一种不被批准的药物，故事到这里就结束了。第二型错误几乎没有被纠正过。

The Montazerhodjat and Lo framework could be interpreted as the reduced form of this dynamic process but it’s better to think about the dynamism explicitly because it suggests that approval can come in a range–for example, approval with a black label warning, approval with evidence grading and so forth. As these procedures tend to reduce the costs of Type I error they tend to increase the costs of FDA conservatism.

Montazerhodjat和Lo的框架可以被视为这个机制的一个简化版本，但最好还是能具体的思考一下这个机制，因为这暗示了对于新药的审批结果其实可以是一个范围——比如说，批准（但是带有一个黑色警示标签），或是带有证据强度分级的批准，等等。因为这些举措可以有效降低第一型错误的成本，它们倾向于使FDA在过于保守时受到惩罚。

Montazerhodjat and Lo also don’t examine the implications of heterogeneity of preferences or of disease morbidity and mortality. Some people, for example, are severely disabled by diseases that on average aren’t very severe–the optimal tradeoff for these patients will be different than for the average patient. One size doesn’t fit all. In the standard framework it’s tough luck for these patients.

Montazerhodjat 和Lo也并没有检验新药特征的不均一性所带来的影响，这些不均一性主要体现于病人对于治疗结果的偏好或是疾病的发病率和死亡率。例如，有些病人被那些平均而言并不太严重的疾病弄成了严重残疾，对这些病人来说，最优的取舍显然不同于一般的病人。同一个标准并不适用于所有的情况。所以在标准的优化框架里面，这些病人就被忽略了。

But if the non-FDA reviewing apparatus (patients/physicians/hospitals/HMOs/USP/Consumer Reports and so forth) works relatively well, and this is debatable but my work on off-label prescribing suggests that it does, this weighs heavily in favor of relatively large samples but low thresholds for approval. What the FDA is really providing is information and we don’t need product bans to convey information. Thus, heterogeneity plus a reasonable effective post-testing choice process, mediates in favor of a Consumer Reports model for the FDA.

而如果非FDA的评价机构（包括病人、医生、医院、卫生保健组织、美国药典、消费者报告，等等）相对来说起作用的话——这个观点虽然有待商榷，但我给病人开非处方药的经验表明它们是起作用的——这些评价机构就更适合于那些需要大量病人但是批准门槛较低的药。FDA真正提供的是信息，而我们没法从一刀切的禁令中获取有效信息。因此，不均一性，加上一个合理有效的试验后选择机制，间接的指向一个更好的消费者报告式的FDA模式。

The bottom line, however, is that even without taking into account these further points, Montazerhodjat and Lo find that the FDA is far too conservative especially for severe diseases. FDA regulations may appear to be creating safe and effective drugs but they are also creating a deadly caution.

就算不考虑以上这些引申观点，最起码，Montazerhodjat 和 Lo的研究表明，FDA在新药的审批上，尤其是针对特别严重的疾病时，显得过于保守了。FDA的监管或许给我们带来了安全和有效的药品，但是同时也带来了致命的谨慎。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Henry Harpending @ 2012-01-13
译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/class-caste-and-genes/

An article by Sabrina Tavernise appeared in the New York Times a few days ago describing increasing perceptions of class conflict in America, and there is a lot of recent commentary in the press about this report from the Pew Charitable Trust that claims there is less class mobility here than in several other northern countries.   It is not very clear to me what the complaints really are or what alternatives exist. If there is any substantial heritability of merit, where merit is whatever leads to class mobility, then mobility ought to turn classes into hereditary castes surprisingly rapidly.

几天前，Sabrina Tavernise一篇描写美国阶级矛盾越发明显的文章刊登在了《纽约时报》上，这份来自皮尤慈善信托基金（the Pew Charitable Trust）的报告宣称美国的阶级流动性少于其他几个北方国家，最近的新闻对此有很多评论。但是我并没有搞清楚他们究竟在抱怨什么或者存在什么可行的替代选项。假设存在实质性的个体优势遗传，同时个体优势总会导致阶级流动，那流动性应该会迅速地把阶层转化为世袭的种姓式分化。

A start at looking into genetic consequences of meritocracy is to create the simplest possible model and follow its implications. Consider free meritocracy in a two class system, meaning that each generation anyone in the lower class who has greater merit than someone in the upper class immediately swaps class with them. Mating then occurs at random within class. There are no fitness differences, no selection at all, everything is neutral.

要开始调查精英制度的遗传后果，应该建立尽可能简单的模型并遵循其推论。设想有两个阶级系统的自由精英制度，这意味着每一代中任何身处较低阶级的人，都可立刻与更高阶级中能力弱于自身的人互换阶级。然后阶级内随机通婚。这里没有健康程度的不同，也完全没有自然或人工选择，所有都保持中性。

It is convenient to discuss what happens in terms of IQ because IQ is familiar and, in northern industrial nations, closely related to merit. On the other hand we have to keep in mind that our focus on IQ is like that of the drunk searching for his keys under the lamppost: we can measure IQ but have no good way to measure honesty nor time preference nor conscientiousness and so on.

方便起见，不妨从IQ的角度来讨论由此引出的结果，因为IQ广为人知，而且在北方工业国家中，IQ跟个人优势紧密相关。另一方面，我们也必须谨记，我们对于IQ的关注就像醉汉在路灯下找寻钥匙：我们可以测量IQ，却没有好方法来测量诚实、时间偏好或者尽责性等特质。

This figure shows an initial population with normally distributed merit. A new merit based class system is imposed such that the two new classes are of equal size. In this free meritocracy everyone with merit exceeding the population mean moves into the upper class and everyone with merit less than the average moves into the lower class. The second panel of the figure shows the resulting merit distributions by class before reproduction and the bottom panel shows the distributions after endogamous reproduction. This model assumes that the reshuffling of genes during reproduction leads to normal distributions in the next generation within classes.

上图的顶层显示了个体优势呈正态分布的初始人口。一种基于阶级系统的新优势被引入进来，据此划分的两个新阶级的人口数量相当。在这种自由精英制度中，每个能力超过人口平均值的人都进入上层阶级，每个能力达不到平均值的人都进入下层阶级。上图的中层表示在生育前所处阶级导致的个体优势分布，底层则表示在同阶级通婚生育后的个体优势分布。这个模型假设生育过程中的基因重组会导致同阶级的下一代在个体优势上的正态分布。

The process continues for several generations. By analogy with IQ the additive heritability of merit is set to 0.6 so there are substantial random environmental effects. The second figure shows the evolution of class differences over four generations or about 100 years in human terms.

这个过程持续了几代的时间。通过类比IQ，个体优势的可加性遗传率设为0.6，所以这就有了大量随机的环境影响。下图展示了四代（人类角度的大约100年）时间内阶级差异的演化。

Class mobility after the first generation is 30% while after four generations it has declined to 10% and continues to decline after that.  The average merit in the two classes is about -1SD in the lower and +1SD in the upper on the original scale, corresponding to IQs of 85 and 115.

第一代之后的阶级流动性是30%，而四代之后这个数字就已跌至10%并且之后继续下降。相较于原始水平，较低阶级的平均个体优势降低了一个标准差，较高阶级的平均个体优势增加了一个标准差， 对应的IQ数值为较低阶级的85和较高阶级的115。

Recall that there are no fitness differences in this model. Still, after four generations, about 70% of the variance is between classes, which can be compared to  about 35% of the variance among continental human groups for random genetic markers, i.e. colloquially class differences are twice neutral race differences. (The familiar among-population figure of 15% made famous by Lewontin refers to gene differences while here we are comparing genotype differences of diploids, hence the difference between 15 and 35.)

回想下这模型中是没有健康水平的差异的。但在四代之后，阶级之间的方差仍到达了70%，这都可以与随机遗传标记的跨大陆种群间35%的方差相比了，例如，通俗语境中的阶级差异是纯粹种族差异的两倍。（Lewontin提出的著名的种群间15%的差异数据是指基因差异，而这里我们是比较二倍体的基因型差异，因此差别在15到35之间。）

A surprise to me from this model was the rapidity with which classes turn into castes: most of the action is in the first generation or so. In retrospect this seems so obvious that it is hardly worth saying but it wasn’t so obvious to me when I started toying with it.

这模型让我吃惊的地方在于阶级转化为世袭种姓的速度之快：大部分转变在第一代左右就已发生。回想起来，这过程看起来如此明显以致于都不值得谈论，但是一开始我很随意地思考时，我并没有注意到这点。

Even though everything here is selectively neutral, I wonder about the extent to which this free meritocracy mimics selection. Any mutant that boosts merit in carriers will be concentrated in the upper class and vice versa. Greg and I discuss in our book how environmental change initially selects for dinged genes that are “quick fixes” in carriers but detrimental in homozygotes, citing sickle cell in humans, broken myostatin in beef cattle, and numerous others. Does this social system mimic selection?

即使这里的每件事情都是有选择地设为中性，我很想知道这个自由的精英制度与选拔制相似到什么程度。任何让携带者具有个体优势的基因突变都会聚集在较高阶级，反之亦然。Greg和我在我们的书【编注：Greg是Gregory Cochran，作者与他合著了《万年大爆炸》一书，West Hunter是这两位作者的合作博客】中讨论环境改变最初如何选择出了那些丧钟般的“临时补丁”基因，他们能为携带者快速解决一些问题，但对纯合子有害，造成人体内的镰状细胞，菜牛内残缺的肌肉生长抑制素，和很多其他坏处。这个社会系统也模仿选择机制吗？

A correlate of IQ in humans is myopia, one idea being that IQ boosters relax early developmental constraints on CNS growth resulting in eyeballs too big for the socket, leading to myopia. I have read somewhere that myopia is positively related to income in the US. Time to try to find that literature.

跟人类IQ相关的是近视，一种观点认为IQ超群者放松了对中枢神经系统生长的早期发展限制，导致了眼球相比于眼窝过大，于是成了近视。我在某处读到，近视在美国跟收入是正相关的。该去试着找到那篇文献去了。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Michael Q. McShane @ 2016-05-10
译者:Tankman
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:AEI,http://www.aei.org/publication/entrepreneurship-and-american-education/

Key Points
要点

• While educational entrepreneurship’s influence has been muted by policy and circumstance, this has nevertheless been a time of great growth for the field.
• 尽管政策和政治氛围已经压制了教育业中创业活动的影响，这个领域还是有了一段时间的显著增长。
• Over the next two decades, educational entrepreneurs will encounter a funding community, policy environment, and changing educational landscape that will profoundly affect the types of ventures and the ability of those ventures to scale, grow, and meet children’s needs.
• 在接下来二十年里，教育业的创业者会受到融资界，政策环境，教育业整体面貌变化等因素的冲击。这些因素会深刻影响风险投资的类型以及这些风险投资发起，壮大和满足孩子需求的能力。
• Entrepreneurship does not guarantee success. If anything, it ensures that there will be failure. For all its imperfections though, it offers a degree of imagination and natural winnowing well-suited to our sprawling, diverse, and pluralistic nation, and it creates an opportunity for truly world-changing products to emerge.
• 创业并不一定会成功。如果要说什么是确定的话，那就是一定会有失败产生。虽然有各种不完美，它提供了一定程度的想象空间和自然筛选，很好的适应了我们这个参差多元，分权共治的国家，而且创造机会让真正改变世界的成果得以涌现。

I have two adorable dogs who I love like children. Georgie is a precocious, 10-pound fur ball Bichon Frise I bought from an Amish man in rural Maryland. Beau is a seven-pound Maltese and silky terrier mix who spent the first five years of his life in a meth den in Missouri before my wife and I rescued him. When we travel, we have to find a place to board them. For years, we used kennels or “open-play” dog boarding facilities. By and large, we were pleased with the care that the dogs received, but boy, was it expensive.

我有两条可爱的狗，我像爱孩子那样爱他们。Georgie是只早熟的，10磅重的圆滚滚毛茸茸的比熊犬。我把它从马里兰州农村的一位阿米绪人那里买来。Beau有七磅，是一只的玛尔济斯犬和澳洲丝毛梗的后代。它生命的前五年在密苏里州的一个毒窝里度过，直到被我和我太太救了出来。当我们旅行时，我们必须为它们找个寄宿的地方。许多年以来，我们使用狗窝或者是“敞开”式宠物狗寄存设施。总体来说，我们对狗狗们受到的照顾感到满意。但这种服务很贵。

That is why it was great when my wife discovered the app Rover. Rover is kind of like Airbnb for dog sitters. Prospective sitters (or walkers or groomers) create profiles, post their rates, and have a space for customers to review them. People can find options that are convenient, in their price range, and the kind of environment they want for their dogs. We use the app whenever we travel and get what I think is far superior care for substantially less than we paid a kennel. It has been a big win for us and our dogs.

因此当我太太发现手机应用Rover时，一切实在太棒了。Rover像是宠物狗看护领域的Airbnb。潜在的看护们（或是遛狗者，或狗美容师）创建了个人简介，贴上他们的要价，留下一个给客户写评论的地方。人们能够在自己满意的价格区间，选择合适的选项，给宠物狗他们觉得合宜的环境。我们每次旅行都要使用这个应用，用明显比狗窝更低的价钱，换来一个更好的服务。这对狗狗和人都大有好处。

Rover illustrates disruptive innovation at work. Its founders identified a practical problem, leveraged knowledge and technology to devise a better solution, and then provided that solution in a way that upends old routines and assumptions.

Rover体现了破坏性创新是如何工作的。它的创始人确定了一个实际问题，利用知识和技术来提供一个更好的解决方案，而后那个方案在某种意义上颠覆了旧的常规和假设。

I am of the opinion that it would be good for K–12 schooling if more teachers, school leaders, and entrepreneurs took a Rover-like approach to challenges that plague education. How can we better use school facilities? How can we help children find schools that are a good match for them? How can we help teachers identify the best strategies to address specific learning challenges? The list of vexing problems goes on and on. But what does it take for entrepreneurial problem solving to actually help students, and how do we think about the obstacles it faces and the problems it may create?

我有一种看法：如果更多教师、学校领导和企业家提供一个Rover式的解决方案来挑战如今重疾缠身的教育业，对基础教育将会产生积极影响。如何能更好的使用学校设施？如何能帮助孩子发现适合他们的学校？如何能帮助教师发现应对特定教学挑战的最优策略？令人头痛的问题的清单越拉越长。但是需要什么条件，才能用企业家解决问题的思维来帮助学生？这一途径面临的障碍是什么呢？这种方法又会带来什么问题呢？

Look, Rover is no panacea, but it is a great improvement. I would be the first to admit that in some cities it is probably impractical. There might not be enough supply for great potential dog sitters to want to get involved, or there might not be enough demand to keep prices attractive to sitters. For many dog owners, it is still too expensive. That said, Rover does help solve a particular problem for a lot of people, while opening the door to newer and better solutions. This is what entrepreneurial activity can do.

看，Rover不是一个万灵药，但却是一个巨大的改进。我可以爽快地承认，在某些城市，它很可能不现实。那里可能没有足够多的潜在宠物狗看护者想加入该平台，或是需求量不够大，价格也就无法吸引看护者加入。对很多狗主人来说，价格仍然太高。尽管如此，Rover的确帮很多人解决了一个特殊的问题，也给更新更好的方案留出了机会。这正是创活动所能作的。

In May 2016, Harvard Education Press is releasing a volume called Educational Entrepreneurship Today, which Frederick Hess and I edited.[1] Its content arose during a conference we hosted at AEI during the summer of 2015, where we brought together leading educational entrepreneurs, researchers in the field, and people with experience funding entrepreneurial ventures. What follows are a couple of big ideas that are circulating in the educational entrepreneurship world today and some of the tensions that will define educational entrepreneurship in the future. Will education be a place where Rover- (or Uber- or Airbnb-) like innovation takes place? Do we want it to be?

在2016年五月，哈佛教育出版社发布了一卷Frederick Hess和我编辑的文集，题为《今日教育行业创投》。[1]文集的内容形成于2015年夏季我们在美国企业研究所主持的一个讨论会。在这个会议上，我们把一流的教育业创业者，该领域的研究者和有创投经验的人士召集在了一起。随之而来的则是一些在今日教育业创业界流行的非凡创意，同时还有一些争论将在未来定义教育行业的创投活动。教育业会是一个产生类似Rover（或优步，或Airbnb）那样的创新的领域吗？我们希望如此吗？

Trends in Educational Entrepreneurship
教育业创业的趋势

The first and most important idea that those observing educational entrepreneurship should know is that while its influence over the past decade or so has been muted by policy and circumstance, this has nevertheless been a time of great growth for the field. Sure, it is true that school procurement systems (how schools and teachers shop for and purchase new materials) are stifling and outdated. Teachers and principals have limited flexibility to redesign schools or put new tools to work in ambitious ways.

教育行业创投的观察人士应该知道的第一个也是最重要的一个概念就是：教育行业创投在过去十多年一直在发挥作用，尽管目前已被政策和环境压制，该领域仍然有过一段显著增长期。当然，学校采购平台系统（学校和教师采购新材料的方式）是压抑创新且过时的。老师和校长们重新设计学校，或积极使用新的工作工具的灵活性是有限的。

But there have been many bright spots. Enrollment in charter schools doubled, and then doubled again. Venture capital investments grew from almost nothing to hundreds of millions’ worth. Companies such as Wireless Generation and SchoolNet thrived and then were sold at a handsome rate of return, emboldening more entrepreneurs and investors who seek to emulate those efforts.

但这一行业已然有很多闪光点。特许学校的录取数翻倍，又再翻倍。风险投资额从接近于零，变成几亿美元。如无线世代（Wireless Generation)或学校网（SchoolNet）这样的公司茁壮成长然后再以可观的回报率被收购，这鼓励了更多企业家和投资者去尝试复制上述成果。

The second thing worth noting is that what gets measured gets valued. The No Child Left Behind era heavily emphasized how students perform on state tests in reading and math. In the modern era, there has also been far less appetite or room for entrepreneurs who are not focused on closing reading and math “gaps” for low-income, African American, or Latino youth. Teachers are increasingly evaluated based on these metrics, district schools are at risk of being sanctioned if their students do not perform adequately, and charter schools know their existence depends largely on their test scores.

第二个值得注意的事情是，能被衡量比较的方面才是被认为有价值的。这个“不让一个孩子落后”的时代特别重视学生在州统考中的阅读和数学成绩。在如今这个时代，那些不重视为低收入群体、非裔和拉丁裔青少年缩小阅读和数学成绩差距的企业家很少受到青睐或者得到发展空间。教师评估越来越基于这些指标，如果学生表现不够好，学区的学校可能面临被制裁的风险。而特许学校也知道其生存很大程度上依赖于测试分数。

Test scores tend to define the ways in which schools are judged and compared, and they also mean that new providers can really only demonstrate their mettle in terms of reading and math. When policy and philanthropy treat reading and math tests as the coin of the realm, it creates problems for entrepreneurs who are not offering “whole school” models, focusing on tested grades or subjects, or tackling English Language Arts and math in ways that do not map onto tests. The metrics used to measure success shape the types of solutions that will be offered.

州统考测试分数倾向于被拿来作为评判和比较学校的标准。这也意味着新的教育供应者只能通过阅读和数学成绩来彰显他们的能力。政策和慈善业把分数当作教育业的法定货币，这给一些企业家带来了麻烦。比如有些企业家不提供“完整学校”的模式，他们只关注学校课堂成绩或科目而非州统考成绩或科目；还有些企业家用来促进英语文学和数学教育的方法，无法反映在考试分数上。衡量成功的指标影响了哪些类型的解决方案将被提供。

Finally, the field of educational entrepreneurship needs to take a hard look in the mirror and realize it has suffered from its insularity. As New Schools Venture Fund President Stacey Childress points out in her chapter in Educational Entrepreneurship Today, Teach For America (TFA) alumni were key founders of nearly one in five education ventures launched in the past 20 years.[2] That data point reflects the larger reality that educational entrepreneurs are likely to share common formative experiences and worldviews. This has produced a community that has tended to share certain assumptions (such as the importance of reading and math tests) and embrace a certain set of policies (such as test-based teacher evaluation and charter schooling).

最后，教育行业创投这一领域自身需要被仔细审视，并意识到该领域已经被其孤立性深深伤害。教育行业创投会议上，新学校风险基金的主席Stacey Childress在其专题演讲中指出，过去20年发起的教育业风险投资中，五分之一的创业公司由“为美国而教书”(TFA)组织的前成员作为关键创始人。[2]这数据反映出一个更广泛的现实：教育业创业者很可能有着共同的成长经历或世界观。这就创造了一个倾向于分享特定假设的共同体（例如阅读和数学的重要性），并且支持某特定的政策集（如基于统考测试的教师评估和特许学校教学）。

This insularity has contributed to a simmering tension in several cities with an abundance of entrepreneurial activity and new school formation, such as Detroit, Newark, and New Orleans. Activists, politicians, and community members charge that these ventures are being done to marginalized communities, not with them. Part of this tension is stoked by conflating entrepreneurship and “education reform” more generally (a phenomenon that we will tackle momentarily), but another comes from a genuine fear of snake-oil salesmen and carpetbaggers with agendas of their own.

这种偏狭性在几个创业活动和新式学校丰富的城市导致了沸腾的矛盾，如底特律，纽瓦克和新奥尔良。活动家、政客和社区成员指责这些创业公司让社区边缘化，而不是和社区相伴。更广泛的来说，把创业和“教育改革”结合起来的尝试，激化了部分矛盾（这现象我们很快会谈到）。而另外的激化则来自于对于兜售冒牌货的奸商和有着自己小盘算、想趁机渔利的外来政客的真实恐惧。

Two Dynamics That Will Shape the Next Two Decades of Educational Entrepreneurship
未来20年塑造教育行业创投的两个机制

The “what” of educational entrepreneurship is exciting. The “how” is a lot tougher. Over the next two decades, educational entrepreneurs will encounter a funding community, a policy environment, and a changing educational landscape that will profoundly affect the types of ventures they are able to create and the ability of those ventures to scale, grow, and meet children’s needs. How these dynamics will play out remains to be seen. In fact, there are several key dynamics in educational entrepreneurship that are worth exploring.

教育行业创投的概念是令人激动的。而其实现途径则要困难多了。在接下来二十年，教育业的创业者会受到融资界、政策环境、变化的教育界等因素的冲击。这些因素会深刻影响风险投资以及这些风险投资发起、壮大和满足孩子需求的能力。这些机制如何运作还有待观察。事实上，教育创业有几个关键机制值得探索。

The first dynamic is the tension between big bets and small bets. Because the outcomes of new ventures are uncertain, it makes sense to make a large number of small bets and winnow them over time. This reduces risk for everyone involved and accelerates the rate at which new models can be tried. But this approach flies in the face of much of the thinking that has characterized educational innovation and entrepreneurship during the past decade. Philanthropists and investors have been eager to find “what works” and invest in scaling it up. Proponents of the scale-up approach point to the need nationwide, the slow pace of change, and the messiness of a small-bet strategy.

第一个机制是大额投资和小额投资之间的张力。因为新的风险投资的结果不确定，下很多的小赌注然后再不断筛选它们是有道理的。这减少了每个人涉及的风险，加速了尝试新模式的速率。但是过去十年，教育行业创新、创业的特色思维很大程度上与这一思路相悖。慈善家和投资者渴望发现可行的方案，并加大投资。加大投资这一做法的支持者，提到了全国性的需求、变革的慢节奏以及小赌注方案无序混乱等理由。

Fundamentally, this tension highlights the competing visions of educational improvement in America today. Some see experimentation as eventually converging on a single or small number of “best” models, practices, or programs that should ultimately be adopted everywhere. Others see a far more fluid world, with “best” answers being highly contingent and context dependent. This is not a simple story of entrepreneurs versus bureaucrats, but of good-faith disagreements on the approaches most likely to serve the needs of schools and schooling.

基本上，这种张力突显了在今日的美国教育改进中的竞争理念。有些人把实验看作是最终会收敛的过程。他们认为最后发现的一个或少数几个最优模式、做法或项目应当被用于全国。另一些人则看到一个更加多变的世界，最优答案是高度机缘性且情境依赖的。这不是一个企业家和官僚相争的简单故事，而是一个关于最大可能有助于学校和教学的需要的方法上的善意争执。

The second dynamic—a tension that actually poses a serious risk to current and future entrepreneurial ventures—is the simultaneous desire for experimentation and uniformly positive results. In the world of educational entrepreneurship, there are calls for experimentation, the need to “think outside the box,” and a need to “fundamentally change” American schools. However, in the next breath, the same leaders and advocates who have preached the Innovation Gospel insist on “no excuses” accountability systems aiming for 100 percent proficiency and charter-authorizing systems that require all schools and offerings to prioritize performance on state tests. While it is hypothetically possible to square this circle, the reality is that educational entrepreneurs are whipsawed between an appetite for risk-taking and a strong aversion to it.

第二种机制——实际上给现在和未来的创业风投带来了严重风险——即同时渴望实验和始终如一的正面结果。在教育业创投的世界，有对实验的呼唤，有“跳出盒子思考”的需求，也有对美国学校进行“根本变革”的需求。但同时，同样这些鼓吹创新思维福音的领袖和支持者坚持毫不妥协的系统可靠性，一定要向100%的师资能力水平看齐，而特许学校系统的学校和方案都必须优先考虑州统考的表现。两者兼顾在假想中是可能的，但现实中，教育业创投者则卡在冒险冲动和强烈的风险厌恶之间左右为难。

The casual observer can easily imagine that all the expertise and money involved in venture capital and startups must deliver a high rate of success. The truth is quite different. Ninety percent of all new enterprises fail. Failure is most of what new ventures actually do. That Darwinian process of figuring things out or learning from others’ mistakes is essential to entrepreneurial success.

漫不经心的观察者很容易觉得：风险资本和创业公司配置了所有这些专家技能和资金，回报率一定很高。真相则十分不同。90%的创业公司会失败。失败是大多数新的创投公司实际所做的事。以达尔文过程找到解决方案，或是从别人的错误中学习，对创业公司的成功至关重要。

While the idea of “failure” is disquieting when it comes to children and schools, the value of failure has an important place in classrooms and learning. Students have to feel free to try something new and learn from the experience, whether or not it works out. In American education today, however, there is little tolerance for failure—in classrooms, schools, or the larger landscape.

也许一旦涉及到孩子或者学校，“失败”这个词就让人心神不宁。学生必须有尝试新东西和从经验中学习的自由，无论最后结果成功与否。然而在今日的美国教育领域，失败一点都不被容忍——在教室，学校，或者更大的范围。

This tension is particularly evident in the inclination to support large, established “entrepreneurial” ventures such as TFA or the KIPP Academies. These ventures show track records of success, have proven leaders, and constitute a well-known quantity. At the same time, these are the very things that tend to produce rigidity and routine in any organization.

这种矛盾在支持大型的、发展完备的所谓“创业”风投企业的倾向中显得特别明显，如对TFA或KIPP学院。这些企业有一系列成功的记录，有资质的领袖，规模也广为人知。与此同时，任何这样的组织都倾向产生僵化和陈规。

Organizations such as TFA and KIPP, with more than two decades of experience, records of accomplishment, alumni networks, and stakeholders, are no longer positioned to pioneer wholly new approaches. Rather, they become attractive to funders, policymakers, and education officials as they become less and less the entrepreneurial upstart and more and more a familiar piece of the new education establishment. Rather than think about new ways of preparing teachers, people keep supporting TFA. The consequence is that these organizations are asked to do more and more, stretching their ability to excel while potentially crowding out interest in unproven ventures.

TFA和KIPP这样的组织拥有20多年经验、一系列的成就、会友网络和利益相关者，它们不再站在新方法的先驱位置。因为当它们变得越来越不像创业新星而越来越像人们熟悉的新的教育既得利益集团时，它们对投资人、政策制定者和教育官员都变得具有吸引力。人们一直支持TFA，而不是思考培训教师的新方法。后果就是，这些机构被要求做得更多，拓展了其卓越能力的同时也潜在地挤出了那些尚未被认可的创业公司的利益。

Questions about the importance of entrepreneurship and our tolerance for uncertainty are also central to policy debates over entrepreneur-friendly reforms such as education savings accounts, online learning, and expanded school choice programs. After all, such programs are, by their very nature, unproven.

在就对创投友好的各种改革进行政策辩论，如教育储蓄账户、线上课程和范围更宽的择校程序时，创投的重要性和我们对不确定性的容忍度等问题也居于中心。无论如何，这些项目在其最根本性质上尚未证明自己。

So What Can We Do?
那么我们能做什么呢？

If you, like me, appreciate the entrepreneurial impulse and think that it has something to offer the nation’s education system, then there are steps that can be taken to try and advance the cause.

如果你像我一样欣赏创业精神的脉动并认为这可以给这个国家的教育系统带来些什么，那么有以下策略可以尝试和推进这项事业。

Funders can make small bets, as well as large ones. This can help address both the fear of “failing big” and the sense that so much of education reform today is imposed by outsiders on local communities. Insofar as the groups receiving the majority of funding are outsiders that come to town with their already-baked models, well-intentioned philanthropy can unwittingly exacerbate this divide.

投资者可以进行小额投资，就像大投资一样。这可以帮助处理对“大失败”的恐惧，也缓和了如下事实所带来的隔阂感：今日如此之多的教育改革是本地社区的外来者强制推行的。目前的情况是，当拿到大笔投资的团体是来到镇上的外来人，并带着他们已备好的模式时，好心的慈善可以无意中加剧这一隔阂。

An easy rule of thumb here is for funders to be sure they are devoting some modest percentage of their investment giving—whether that is 5 percent or 20 percent—to new ventures. Fortunately, the resources to support the developing, prototyping, and testing process tend to be only a fraction of what it costs to contribute meaningfully to an established operation.

在这里，对投资人来说一个易于施行的拇指规则是，保证他们把投资的一些小额部分，不管是5%还是20%，捐给新的创新公司。幸运的是，用来支持开发，原型制作，和测试过程的资源往往只是有效地捐助一个已建成项目的所需的一小部分。

Entrepreneurs can start with “tiny schools.” Given varying tolerance for risk and limited resources for experimentation, prospective entrepreneurs should take a good look at New Orleans’ 4.0 Schools and their idea of “tiny schools” (described by 4.0 CEO Matt Candler in his chapter).[3] Creating a new charter school typically entails a dozen or more employees, scores or even hundreds of students, and a budget north of $1 million—meaning that failure is slow, expensive, and enormously disruptive.

创业者可以从“小微学校”开始。给定不同的风险容忍度和有限的实验资源，潜在的企业家可以好好审视一下新奥尔良的4.0学校和他们的“小微学校”理念（引自4.0的首席执行官Matt Candler的专题讲座）[3]。创建一所新的特许学校通常需要十几个或者更多雇员，几十甚至几百个学生，一个一百万美元以上的预算——这意味着失败是缓慢、昂贵和极其麻烦的。

Tiny schools mean that educators with a promising idea can start with 5 to 10 kids on Saturday mornings in a public library or school cafeteria. Such a model allows entrepreneurs to experiment, fail, improve, and iterate over the course of several sessions at very low cost and next to zero risk to students. Just as evolutionary change accelerates when new generations are born more often, so entrepreneurial invention benefits from shortened time horizons and more rapid iteration.

小微学校意味着带着有潜质创意的教育者可以从周六上午在公共图书馆或学校食堂以五到十个孩子的规模开始。这种模式允许创业者以一个很低的费用和对学生来说几乎为零的风险，来对课程环节进行实验、失败、改进和试错。就如同新世代出生得更频繁时进化会加速一样。这样，创业型发明就从更短的周期和更快的试错中获益。

Tiny schools accomplish two central tasks. First, they lower the risk of starting a new school. If the idea bears fruit, it can be ramped up. If the teaching methods do not connect with students, at worst, students have lost a couple of Saturdays. Even if the transition cannot be made to a whole-year model, only a few students are affected.

小微学校完成了两个核心任务。第一，他们降低了创立一个新学校的风险。如果创业有成果，它就可以壮大。如果教学方法对学生不起作用，最差也不过就是学生损失几个星期六。即使这一过渡模式无法变为一个全年模式，也只有几个学生会受影响。

Second, they lower the cost of experimentation. In starting an entire charter school, substantial philanthropic and then public dollars are spent on an experiment. It might work out; it might not. While over time there is reason to believe that this will lead to better schools, it is an expensive way to get there. By bridging the gap between nothing and a whole school, tiny schools create space for rapid iteration and improvement.

第二，它们降低了实验成本。为了启动一个完备的特许学校，大笔慈善和财政资金会被用于一次实验。也许有好结果，也许不成功。虽然一直以来这方法被认为会产生好学校，这仍是一个昂贵的手段。通过跨越从一无所有到完备学校的鸿沟，小微学校为快速试错和改进提供了一个空间。

State leaders can complete a comprehensive regulatory review. Although mundane, rules regarding subjects such as procurement, teacher preparation, new school creation, reporting, facilities, special education, online provision, staff development, and charter school authorization can create huge, counterproductive hurdles to new providers and new models of provision. Although these regulations may have made sense at one time, many no longer do.

州政府的领袖可以完成一个综合性规制评议。虽然平凡庸常，但在采购、教师培训、新学校创设、报告、设施、特殊教育、在线授课、雇员培训和特许学校授权机构等诸方面，各种规制能够产生巨大的消极作用，阻碍新的提供者和新的模式投入使用。虽然这些规制过去可能有意义，但也许现在很多已并非如此了。

State leaders would do well to put together a blue-ribbon panel of experts to scour the state education code for outdated and ill-suited statutes and regulations that may be stymieing entrepreneurial solutions. They can also encourage districts, charter authorizers, and schools of education to conduct similar surveys of their own operations and publicly report on where and what they are streamlining.

州政府的领导们能做得更好的方面，也许是推动组成专家委员会来革新州的教育法规并去除那些过时和适应性差并可能阻碍创投方案的法律和规章。他们也可以鼓励学区、特许学校授权机构和学校对其自身的运作进行类似的调查，并公布它们在何处采取了何种加强效率的措施。

Don’t Go Gaga for Entrepreneurs; Foster Entrepreneurship
不要迷信企业家；要鼓励创业精神

The exciting source of dynamism that created everything from Rover to the next cool app to teach students to read is entrepreneurialism, not any particular entrepreneur or entrepreneurial venture. Exciting new entrants age, grow, and evolve. Some succeed and some fail. Those that succeed, with time and success, tend to become members in good standing of the stodgy old establishment. That is the cycle of entrepreneurial life.

企业家精神而不是某个企业家或者创投企业才是令人振奋的动力源。这动力可以创造从Rover到下一个很酷的手机应用，也可以教学生阅读。令人振奋的参与者变得成熟，成长，并且进化。一些成功了，一些失败了。那些成功者，随着它们的年岁和成功，变成了乏味沉闷的老既得利益集团的一部分。这就是创业生命体的周期。

Entrepreneurship does not guarantee success. If anything, it ensures that there will be failure. Of course, if a half century of school reform has taught us anything, it is that system reform is also sure to produce failure—except on a much larger scale and without the dynamism, inventiveness, and self-correction that characterizes vibrant entrepreneurial sectors.

创业不能保证成功。如果说能保证什么的话，它保证这里将会有失败。当然，如果半个世纪的学校改革教会了我们什么的话，那就是系统改革也当然会产生失败–只不过这失败的规模更大，而且没有活力、激励、自我修正等这些有生命力的创业部门所拥有的特征。

For all its imperfections though, educational entrepreneurship offers a degree of imagination and natural winnowing that seems especially well-suited to the sprawling, diverse, and pluralistic nation that we live in, and it creates an opportunity for truly world-changing products to emerge. Those who believe in the power of the entrepreneurial impulse would do well never to cling to any particular venture. The social good is best served by creating the conditions in which entrepreneurs can thrive if—and only if—they are serving the best interests of students.

虽然有种种不完美，教育行业创投活动提供着某种程度的想象力和自然筛选，这些看来对于我们所生活的这个分散，多元和分权共治的国家特别合适。并且创投创造了机会，使得真正改变世界的产品可能涌现。那些相信创业冲劲的人应该避免一成不变地支持某个特定的创投公司。创造条件，让并且只让那些最能为学生利益服务的企业茁壮成长，才是服务社会的最好途径。

Notes
注记

1. Frederick M. Hess and Michael Q. McShane, Educational Entrepreneurship Today (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2016).
2. Stacy Childress, “From Generation to Generation: Fifteen Years of Education Entrepreneurship,” in Educational Entrepreneurship Today, ed. Frederick M. Hess and Michael Q. McShane (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2016).
3. Matt Candler, “Go Small or Go Home: Innovation in Schooling,” in Educational Entrepreneurship Today, ed. Frederick M. Hess and Michael Q. McShane (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2016).

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Benjamin Powell @ 2014-07-29
译者:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/case-against-child-labor-prohibitions

Halima is an 11-year-old girl who clips loose threads off of Hanes underwear in a Bangladeshi factory.1 She works about eight hours a day, six days per week. She has to process 150 pairs of underwear an hour. At work she feels “very tired and exhausted,” and sometimes falls asleep standing up. She makes 53 cents a day for her efforts. Make no mistake, it is a rough life.

哈丽玛是个十一岁的小女孩，在孟加拉的工厂里给Hanes牌内衣修线头，每天工作八小时，每周六天。① 她每小时需要处理150套内衣，工作时觉得“非常劳累”，有时站着就睡着了。而这样的努力工作每天能换来53美分。毫无疑问，这种生活非常艰苦。

Any decent person’s heart would go out to Halima and other child employees like her. Unfortunately, all too often, people’s emotional reaction lead them to advocate policies that will harm the very children they intend to help. Provisions against child labor are part of the International Labor Organization’s core labor standards. Anti-sweatshop groups almost universally condemn child labor and call for laws prohibiting child employment or boycotting products made with child labor.

任何一个正派人的内心都会对像哈丽玛这样的童工充满同情。但遗憾的是，人们的情绪化反应常常指引他们支持错误的政策，这反而会伤害那些他们原本想帮助的孩子。禁用童工条款是国际劳工组织的核心劳工标准的一部分。反对血汗工厂的团体几乎一致谴责使用童工的行为，呼吁通过禁止雇佣童工的法律或是抵制使用童工生产的商品。

In my recent book, Out of Poverty: Sweatshops in the Global Economy, I argue that much of what the anti-sweatshop movement agitates for would harm workers and that the process of economic development, in which sweatshops play an important role, is the best way to raise wages and improve working conditions. Child labor, although the most emotionally charged aspect of sweatshops, is not an exception to this analysis.

在我的新书《走出贫困：全球经济中的血汗工厂》中，我认为反血汗工厂运动的许多诉求将会损害工人们的利益，经济发展才是提高工资与改善工作环境的最好办法，而血汗工厂在其中发挥着重要作用。虽然在情感上，雇佣童工是血汗工厂最受世人谴责的方面，但它在上述分析中也不例外。

We should desire to see an end to child labor, but it has to come through a process that generates better opportunities for the children—not from legislative mandates that prevent children and their families from taking the best option available to them. Children work because their families are desperately poor, and the meager addition to the family income they can contribute is often necessary for survival. Banning child labor through trade regulations or governmental prohibitions often simply forces the children into less-desirable alternatives. When U.S. activists started pressuring Bangladesh into eliminating child labor, the results were disastrous.

我们期望看到童工的终结，但是这需要一个过程，要能为孩子们提供更好的机会，而不是通过法令阻止儿童和他们的家庭做出最佳的可行选择。儿童去工作是因为他们的家庭陷入了极度贫困，尽管收入微薄，但这对于整个家庭的生存来说通常是必要的。通过商业法规或政府管制来禁止雇佣童工常常只是在逼迫儿童们进入更糟糕的环境。美国的活动家们开始对孟加拉施压要求消除童工之后，显现的结果是灾难性的。

Effects of Child Labor Bans
童工禁令的效果

In 1993 Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA) introduced the Child Labor Deterrence Act, which would have banned imports from countries employing children. In response, that fall Bangladeshi garment companies let go approximately 50,000 children. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, “It is widely thought that most of them have found employment in other garment factories, in smaller, unregistered subcontracting garment workshops, or in other sectors.”2

1993年，爱荷华州的民主党参议员汤姆·哈金提出了《童工慑止法》（the Child Labor Deterrence Act），意在禁止从雇佣童工的国家进口商品。那年秋天，孟加拉服装制造业对此作出反应，解雇了约50,000名童工。据美国劳工部的信息，“普遍认为，这些被解雇的儿童大部分在其他服装工厂，更小的、未经注册的转包作坊或是其他行业里找到了工作。”②

That makes the introduction of the bill seem simply ineffective. The Department of Labor is sugarcoating the situation. Paul Krugman summarizes what happened more bluntly: “The direct result was that Bangladeshi textile factories stopped employing children. But did the children go back to school? Did they return to happy homes? Not according to Oxfam, which found that the displaced child workers ended up in even worse jobs, or on the streets—and that a significant number were forced into prostitution.”3

提出这部法案看起来毫无作用。劳工部的说法是在粉饰现实。保罗·克鲁格曼作了更直白的总结：“直接结果是孟加拉的纺织工厂停止了雇佣童工，但是这些孩子就此回到学校了吗？他们回到快乐的家里了吗？至少根据乐施会的资料，并没有。他们发现这些被解雇的童工最终找了更加糟糕的工作，或是流落街头——其中相当多的孩子被迫出卖身体。”③

Based on the information they have, families tend to choose the best available job for their children. Taking that option away does not eliminate the necessity of work; it forces them to take a less-desirable job. As repulsive as a child working in a sweatshop may be, it is not nearly as repulsive as a child forced into prostitution through the actions of unthinking Western activists.

基于所拥有的信息，每个家庭都想为自己的孩子在可选职业中挑出最好的。剥夺了那个选项并不等于消除了工作的需求，反而逼迫他们选择一个没那么好的工作。一个儿童在血汗工厂里工作，这确实让人反感，但这远远比不上看着一个孩子因为不动脑子的西方活动家而被迫出卖身体来的让人厌恶。

The Bangladesh story is a dramatic one, but it illustrates the general point that when children lose factory jobs they find less desirable jobs to replace the jobs they lost. In countries where sweatshops locate, child labor is often the norm, and most of the children work in less remunerative sectors with fewer opportunities for advancement than manufacturing, such as agriculture or domestic services.

孟加拉的故事有些极端，但它展示了一个要点：当儿童们失去了工厂里的工作之后，他们会寻找稍次的工作作为替代。在那些血汗工厂所处的国家里，雇佣童工是个惯例，并且大部分儿童工作的行业，如农业与国内服务业，酬劳没有制造业那么多，晋升机会也比较少。

In 2003 the World Bank measured the percentage of children aged 10 to 14 that were working in most countries.4 As Table 1 shows, child labor is not uncommon. Rates of child labor range from a high of nearly 27 percent of children in Bangladesh to a low of 3.3 percent in Costa Rica.5

2003年，世界银行调查了大部分国家中10至14岁儿童中童工的比例。④如表一所示，童工并不罕见，比例高可至孟加拉的几近27%，低的如哥斯达黎加的3.3%。⑤

The World Bank also collects data on the economic sectors in which children are employed. Figure 1 presents the distribution of employment of economically active children between the ages of 7 and 14 by sector.6

世界银行也从雇佣童工的各个经济部门收集数据。表一依照经济部门展示了7-14岁年龄段中参与经济活动的儿童在各行业中的分布情况。⑥

In seven of the nine countries for which data exists, most children were employed in agriculture, often by a wide margin.7 In the two exceptions, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, the leading sector employing children was service. India had the highest proportion of children employed in manufacturing, and there it was a little over 14 percent.

有数据可查的九个国家中，七个国家的大部分儿童受雇于农业部门，远超其他行业。⑦ 哥斯达黎加与多米尼加共和国是两个例外，雇佣童工最多的是服务业。印度制造业雇佣童工的比例在各国中最高，略超过14%。

Protests against sweatshops that use child labor implicitly assume that ending child labor in sweatshops by taking away the option to work in a factory will, on net, reduce child labor. Evidence on child labor in countries that have sweatshops indicates that is wrong. It is not a few “bad apple” firms exploiting children in factories. Child labor is common. Employment in agriculture is not necessarily safer, either. A 1997 child labor survey showed that 12 percent of children working in agriculture reported injuries, compared with 9 percent of those who worked in manufacturing.8

对雇佣童工的血汗工厂进行抗议，这种行为暗含了一种预设，即通过除去儿童在工厂工作的选择从而终结血汗工厂里的童工现象，童工数量就会出现净减少。从拥有血汗工厂的国家所获取的证据显示，这是错的。真相并不是个别“害群之马”在工厂里剥削儿童。雇佣童工的现象是普遍的。而且，在农地里工作也并不必然更加安全。一份1997年的童工调查显示，农业部门有12%的童工曾遭伤害，制造业则是9%。⑧

Child Labor and Economic Development
童工与经济发展

The thought of Third World children toiling in factories to produce garments for us in the developed world to wear is appalling, at least in part because child labor is virtually nonexistent in the United States and the rest of the more developed world.9 Virtually nowhere in the developed world do kids toil long hours every week in a factory in a manner that prevents them from obtaining schooling.

第三世界的儿童们在工厂里辛苦劳动，为我们这些发达地区的人生产服装——这种念头让人惊骇，至少部分原因在于童工事实上并不存在于美国及其他发达地区。⑨ 事实上，没有发达国家会允许儿童们每周长时间地在工厂里辛苦工作，以至于无法接受学校教育。

Children typically worked throughout human history, either long hours in agriculture or in factories once the industrial revolution emerged. The question is, why don’t kids work today? Rich countries do have laws against child labor, but so do many poor countries. In Costa Rica the legal working age is 15, but an ILO survey found 43 percent of working children were under the legal age.10

纵观人类历史，儿童其实一直都在工作，不管是长时间在农地里劳作，还是工业革命之后进入工厂工作。真正该问的问题是：为何今天儿童不工作了？富裕国家确实有禁止童工的法律，但是很多贫穷的国家也有。哥斯达黎加的法定工作年龄是15岁，但是国际劳工组织的一项调查发现有43%的童工低于法定年龄。⑩

Similarly, in the United States, Massachusetts passed the first restriction on child labor in 1842. However, that law and other states’ laws affected child labor nationally very little.11 By one estimate, more than 25 percent of males between the ages of 10 and 15 participated in the labor force in 1900.12 Another study of both boys and girls in that age group estimated that more than 18 percent of them were employed in 1900.13 Economist Carolyn Moehling also found little evidence that minimum-age laws for manufacturing implemented between 1880 and 1910 contributed to the decline in child labor.14

同样，在美国，马萨诸塞州在1842年最先对童工加以限制。然而，那部法律连同其他州的法律对于全国范围内的童工情况影响甚微。⑾ 有人估算过，1900年10-15岁的男性中超过25%的人参与工作.⑿ 另一项研究将同年龄段的女性也纳入了估算范围，结果发现1900年有超过18%的儿童参与了工作。⒀ 经济学家卡洛琳·莫和林也找不到证据证明1880至1910年间针对制造业实施的最低工资法起到了减少童工的作用。⒁

Similarly, economists Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz examined the period between 1910 and 1939 and found that child labor laws and compulsory school-attendance laws could explain at most 5 percent of the increase in high school enrollment.15 The United States did not enact a national law limiting child labor until the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938. By that time, the U.S. average per capita income was more than $10,200 (in 2010 dollars).

经济学家克劳迪亚·戈尔丁与拉里·卡茨仔细调查了1910至1939年间的情况，发现童工相关的法律与强制入学的法律最多只能解释5%的高中入学率增长幅度。⒂ 直到1938年《公平劳动标准法》通过，美国才有了全国性的限制童工的法律。在那时，美国人均收入已超过10,200美元（以2010年美元计算）。

Furthermore, child labor was defined much more narrowly when today’s wealthy countries first prohibited it. Massachusetts’s law limited children who were under 12 years old to no more than 10 hours of work per day. Belgium (1886) and France (1847) prohibited only children under the age of 12 from working. Germany (1891) set the minimum working age at 13.16

此外，如今的富裕国家当年第一次出台法律禁止童工时，其定义要比现在狭窄的多。马萨诸塞州法禁止12岁以下儿童每天工作超过10小时。比利时（1886年）与法国（1847年）只禁止12岁以下儿童工作。德国（1891年）将最低工作年龄限定在13岁。⒃

England, which passed its first enforceable child labor law in 1833, merely set the minimum age for textile work at nine years old. When these countries were developing, they simply did not put in place the type of restrictions on child labor that activists demand for Third World countries today. Binding legal restrictions came only after child labor had mostly disappeared.

英格兰在1833年通过了第一部童工法，将纺织业的最低工作年龄仅仅设在9岁。当这些国家处于发展阶段，他们通过的限制标准可比不上今天这些活动家对第三世界国家所要求的。有效的法律约束只有在童工几近消失之后才会到来。

The main reason children do not work in wealthy countries is precisely because they are wealthy. The relationship between child labor and income is striking. Using the same World Bank data on child labor participation rates we can observe how child labor varies with per capita income. Figure 2 divides countries into five groups based on their level of per capita income adjusted for purchasing power parity. In the richest two fifths of countries, all of whose incomes exceed $12,000 in 2010 dollars, child labor is virtually nonexistent.

富裕国家的儿童不工作的主要原因就是他们比较富有。童工比例与收入之间的相关性是显著的。通过前文提到的世界银行关于童工比例的数据，我们可以观察到童工比例是如何随人均收入的变化而改变的。经购买力平价调整后，图2按照人均收入水平将各国分成五组。最富有的两组国家人均收入超过12，000美元（以2010年美元计算），童工几乎不存在。

It is only when countries have an income less than $11,000 per year that we start to observe children in the labor force. But even here, rates of child labor remain relatively low through both the third and fourth quintiles. It is the poorest countries where rates of child labor explode. More than 30 percent of children work in the fifth of countries with incomes ranging from $600 to $2,000 per year. Economists Eric Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik econometrically estimate that 73 percent of the variation of child labor rates can be explained by variation in GDP per capita.17

只有当一个国家的人均年收入低于11,000美元时，我们才开始观察到童工。即便如此，在第三与第四组国家中，中等及中等偏上收入家庭的童工比例相对来说也很低。而在穷国，童工比例暴增。最为贫穷的那组国家中，人均年收入在600美元到2，000美元之间，童工比例超过了30%。经济学家Eric Edmonds 与 Nina Pavcnik 运用计量经济学测算，认为童工比例差异中的73%可由人均GDP差异来解释。⒄

Of course, correlation is not causation. But in the case of child labor and wealth, the most intuitive interpretation is that increased wealth leads to reduced child labor. After all, all countries were once poor; in the countries that became rich, child labor disappeared. Few would contend that child labor disappeared in the United States or Great Britain prior to economic growth taking place—children populated their factories much as they do in the Third World today.

当然，有相关性不代表存在因果关系。但是当我们思考童工与财富之间的关系时，最符合直觉的解读就是财富的增长减少了童工。毕竟，所有国家都有过贫穷的阶段；在那些富裕起来的国家里，童工就消失了。鲜有人认为美国或者英国的童工在经济发展之前就已经消失了——就像今日的第三世界，工厂里到处都是儿童。

A little introspection, or for that matter our moral indignation at Third World child labor, reveals that most of us desire that children, especially our own, do not work. Thus, as we become richer and can afford to allow children to have leisure and education, we choose to.

我们对历史所做的一些反省，抑或出于对第三世界童工现象的道德愤慨，这些其实都反映了我们中的大部分人不希望孩子们去工作，尤其是自己的孩子。因此，当我们变得有钱，能够为孩子们提供闲暇的生活与教育之时，我们就这样做了。

Conclusion
结论

The thought of children laboring in sweatshops is repulsive. But that does not mean we can simply think with our hearts and not our heads. Families who send their children to work in sweatshops do so because they are poor and it is the best available alternative open to them. The vast majority of children employed in countries with sweatshops work in lower-productivity sectors than manufacturing.

让儿童在血汗工厂里工作的想法令人厌恶，但这不意味着我们就该简单地让同情心泛滥，而舍弃大脑的思考。家长把孩子送去血汗工厂里工作，是因为他们太穷了，而这已是可选的选项中最好的选择。在有着血汗工厂的国家里，大多数童工所在行业的生产能力比制造业更低。

Passing trade sanctions or other laws that take away the option of children working in sweatshops only limits their options further and throws them into worse alternatives. Luckily, as families escape poverty, child labor declines. As countries become rich, child labor virtually disappears. The answer for how to cure child labor lies in the process of economic growth—a process in which sweatshops play an important role.

出台贸易制裁措施或其他法律，将这些儿童的工作机会夺走，这只会进一步限制他们的选择，陷他们于更糟糕的境地之中。值得庆幸的是，当这些家庭脱离贫困之后，童工就减少了。随着国家慢慢富裕起来，童工在事实上就会消失。如何解决童工问题的答案就在经济发展的过程之中，而血汗工厂则在其中扮演了重要角色。

Notes
注记

1. National Labor Committee, “Child Labor: 11 year-old Halima Sews Clothing for Hanes,” 2006. A video of this interview with Halima is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTIfY9SmJdA.
2. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1994 Child Labor Report, Bangladesh, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/sweat/bangladesh.htm
3. Paul Krugman, “Reckonings; Hearts and Heads,” New York Times (April 22, 2001), p. 17. Similarly, UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/, reports that many of these children turned to prostitution.
4. World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM (Washington: World Bank, 2005).
5. Mauritius is excluded from Table 1 because it is an outlier that is not representative of the general situation as I explain in Out of Poverty.
6. For each country, an average was taken for all years between 2000 and 2009 for which data are available.
7. The World Bank database does not include data for Vietnam, but Eric V. Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik, “Child Labor in the Global Economy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 204, report that 92 percent of children working in Vietnam in 1998 worked in agriculture.
8. Kebebew Asshagrie, Statistics on Working Children and Hazardous Child Labour in Brief, Geneva: International Labor Organization (1997).
9. The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that 18 percent of children aged 5 to 14 are economically active worldwide. Of these, it estimates that 94 percent of them are in low-income countries, and only 2 percent are in what it classifies as developed countries. ILO, Every Child Counts: New Global Estimates on Child Labour, Geneva: ILO (2002).
10. International Labor Organization, Summary of the Results of the Child and Adolescent Labour Survey in Costa Rica, Geneva: ILO (2002), http://www.ilo.org/ipec/ChildlabourstatisticsSIMPOC/Questionnairessurveysandreports/lang—en/index.htm.
11. The remainder of this paragraph and the next draws on research found in Joshua C. Hall and Peter T. Leeson, “Good for the Goose, Bad for the Gander: International Labor Standards and Comparative Development,” Journal of Labor Research 28, no. 4 (September 2007): 658–76.
12. Robert Whaples, “Child Labor in the United States,” in EH.Net Encyclopedia, ed. R. Whaples, retrieved from http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/whaples.childlabor.
13. Samuel Lindsay, “Child Labor in the United States,” American Economic Association 8, (February 1907): 256–259.
14. Carolyn Moehling, “State Child Labor Laws and the Decline in Child Labor,” Explorations in Economic History 36, no. 1 (1999): 72–105.
15. Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz, “Mass Secondary Schooling and the State: The Role of State Compulsion and the High School Movement,” NBER Working Paper No. 10075 (2003).
16. France and Prussia both had earlier laws prohibiting child labor, but they were not enforceable. See Hall and Leeson (2007).
17. Edmonds and Pavcnik, (2005): 210.

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

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——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Angus Deaton @ 2013-08-16
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:Princeton University Press,http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s2_10054.pdf

To understand how aid works we need to study the relationship between aid and politics. Political and legal institutions play a central role in setting the environment that can nurture prosperity and economic growth. Foreign aid, especially when there is a lot of it, affects how institutions function and how they change. Politics has often choked off economic growth, and even in the world before aid, there were good and bad political systems.

要理解援助是如何运作的，我们需要对援助与政治之间的关系做一番研究。在创造恰当环境以促进繁荣和经济增长方面，政治和法律制度扮演着关键的角色。外国援助，特别是大额外国援助，会影响制度的运作及其变迁。政治向来能阻碍经济增长，即便是在援助流行以前，世上也既有好的政治体系，也有坏的。

But large inflows of foreign aid change local politics for the worse and undercut the institutions needed to foster long-run growth. Aid also undermines democracy and civic participation, a direct loss over and above the losses that come from undermining economic development. These harms of aid need to be balanced against the good that aid does, whether educating children who would not otherwise have gone to school or saving the lives of those who would otherwise have died.

但是，外国援助的大规模流入恶化了地方政治，损害了促进长期增长所必须的体制。援助还会破坏民主和公民参与，这种直接损失比破坏经济发展所导致的损失更为严重。援助的这些危害需要与援助所带来的好处进行平衡考量，不管这些好处是给那些原本无法上学的孩子提供教育，还是挽救原本会死去的生命。

From its beginnings after World War II, development economics saw growth and poverty reduction as technical problems. Economists would provide the knowledge that would tell the newly independent rulers how to bring prosperity to their people. If development economists thought about politics at all, they saw politicians as the guardians of their people, motivated by the promotion of social welfare. Politics as an end in itself, as a means of civic participation, or as a way of managing conflict was not part of their operations manual.

自二战结束后发展经济学建立伊始，这门学科就将经济增长和减少贫困视为技术问题。经济学家会向新近获得独立的统治者们提供知识，告诉他们如何为自己的人民带去繁荣。如果说发展经济学家思考过任何政治问题，那就是将政客们看作是人民的守护人，他们的动机是促进社会福利。政治，无论作为目的本身、作为公民参与手段，还是作为冲突管理方式，都不曾体现于他们的操作手册中。

Nor would development experts much concern themselves with the fact that, in many cases, the governments through which they were working had interests of their own that made them improbable partners in a broad-based development effort. There have been dissenting voices over the years, but it is only relatively recently that mainstream development economics has focused on the importance of institutions, including political institutions, and on politics itself.

发展专家们也不太关心这一事实：在许多情形下，他们的工作所需借力的那个政府，自身也拥有利益诉求，因而不太可能在一个牵涉广泛的发展计划中当好合作伙伴。历年来，持不同意见的声音一直都存在，但直到相对晚近时，主流的发展经济学才开始集中关注包括政治制度在内的制度的重要性以及政治本身。

Economic development cannot take place without some sort of contract between those who govern and those who are governed. The government needs resources to carry out its functions—preserving territorial integrity and maintaining its monopoly of violence, at the very least, and beyond that providing a legal system, public safety, national defense, and other public goods—and the resources that these functions require must be raised in taxes from the governed. It is this need to raise taxes, and the difficulty of doing so without the participation of those who are taxed, that places constraints on the government and to some extent protects the interests of taxpayers.

如果在统治者和被统治者之间不存在某种形式的契约，那么经济就不太可能得到发展。政府需要资源才能执行其功能——至少需要保持领土完整、维持垄断暴力，更进一步则需要提供法律体系、公共安全、国防和其他公共物品。而维持这些功能所需要的资源则必须从被统治者头上以税收形式获得。正是这种征税需求，再加上如果没有征税对象参与，税收很难征得，这就给政府施加了约束，并在一定程度上保护了纳税人的利益。

In a democracy, direct feedback from the electorate evaluates the government’s performance, in effect a sort of project evaluation on the programs that are carried out using taxpayers’ money. While this sort of feedback works best in a democracy, the need to raise funds exists every where, and it will often constrain the ruler to pay attention to the demands of at least some of the population. One of the strongest arguments against large aid flows is that they undermine these constraints, removing the need to raise money with consent and in the limit turning what should be beneficial political institutions into toxic ones.

在民主国家，直接来自选民的反馈可以评估政府的表现，实际上就是对那些用纳税人的钱实施的项目进行评估。虽然这种反馈只在民主国家才运作得最好，但是筹集资金的需要到处都存在，而这通常都会约束统治者，迫使他们关心至少人口中一部分人的需求。反对巨额援助涌入的最强论点之一就是：援助会破坏这种约束，移除征得同意以筹集资金的必要性，在极端情况下还会将本来有益的政治制度变成有害的。

Without an adequate capacity to tax, a state denies its citizens many of the protections that are taken for granted in the rich world. They may lack the protection of the law, because the courts do not work or are corrupt, and the police may harass or exploit poor people instead of protecting them. People may be unable to start businesses, because debts are not paid and contracts are not enforced or because civil “servants” extort bribes. They may face threats of violence from gangs or warlords. They may lack clean water or minimal sanitation facilities. There may be local endemic pests that threaten them and especially their children with medically preventable but potentially fatal diseases. They may lack access to electricity, to functioning schools, or to a decent health service. All of these risks are part of what it means to be poor in much of the world, all are causes of poverty, and all are attributable to the lack of state capacity. Anything that threatens that capacity is inconsistent with improving the lives of poor people.

如果缺乏足够的征税能力，国家就不会向其国民提供富裕世界的人认为理所当然的许多保护措施。他们可能会缺少法律保护，因为法院不起作用或者腐败不堪。警察也可能骚扰或剥削穷苦人群，而不是给他们提供保护。人们可能没法做生意，因为欠债可以不还、契约无法执行，或者因为人民“公仆”会索取贿赂。他们还可能面临黑社会或军阀分子的暴力威胁，可能缺少淡水或最基本的卫生设施。也可能存在地方性的病害虫，给他们、特别是他们的孩子带来潜在致命的疾病威胁，尽管它们医学上完全可以预防。他们可能得不到电力供应，没有学校，或者适当的医疗服务。在世界的许多地区，所有这些风险正是贫穷这一词汇的部分内涵所在，也都是贫困的原因所在，并且都可归因于国家能力的缺乏。所有一切损害这一能力的事物，都与改善穷人生活这一目的相悖。

The argument that aid threatens institutions depends on the amount of aid being large. In China, India, or South Africa, where ODA in recent years has been less than 0.5 percent of national income, and only occasionally more than 1 percent of total government expenditures, aid is not important in affecting government behavior or the development of institutions. The situation is quite different in much of Africa. Thirty-six (out of forty-nine) countries in sub-Saharan Africa have received at least 10 percent of their national income as ODA for three decades or more.

援助危及制度这一论点能否成立，取决于援助量的大小。在中国、印度或南非，近年来的政府开发援助（ODA）都只相当于国民收入的不到0.5%，而且只是偶尔才会占到政府财政支出总量的1%以上，因此援助在影响政府行为或者制度变迁方面并不重要。但在非洲的大部分地区，情况则截然不同。撒哈拉以南非洲（49国之中）有36国的国民收入中至少10%来自于ODA，这种情况已延续长达三十年甚至更久。

Given that ODA comes to governments, the ratio of aid to government expenditure is larger still. Benin, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Uganda are among the countries where aid has exceeded 75 percent of government expenditure for a run of recent years. In Kenya and Zambia, ODA is a quarter and a half of government expenditure, respectively.

考虑到ODA是流向政府的，因此援助在政府支出中所占比例会更高。贝宁、布基纳法索、刚果（金）、埃塞俄比亚、马达加斯加、马里、尼日尔、塞拉利昂、多哥和乌干达等国所接受的援助最近连续多年占到政府开支的75%以上。在肯尼亚和赞比亚，ODA分别是政府开支的四分之一和二分之一。

Given that much of government expenditure is pre-committed and almost impossible to change in the short run, for these countries (and others for which the data are not available) discretionary expenditures by governments are almost entirely dependent on funds from foreign donors. As we shall see, this does not mean that the donors are dictating what governments spend—far from it. Yet the behavior of both donors and recipients is fundamentally affected by the existence and magnitude of these aid flows.

考虑到大部分政府开支都有预定用途，短期内不太可能改变，因此这些国家（以及数据尚不可得的其他一些国家）政府的自由开支几乎就全部依赖于外国援助者手中的资金。我们将看到，这并不意味着援助者能够决定政府把钱花在哪里——远非如此。不过，援助者和受援者的行为都从根本上受到这类援助资金的存在与规模的影响。

Aid is not the only way in which rulers can rule without consent. A commodity price boom is another. One famous example comes from Egypt in the mid-nineteenth century. Then, at the height of the Industrial Revolution, with its insatiable demand for cotton, the two main sources were the American South and Egypt, and Egypt’s sales of cotton accounted for most of its trade with the outside world. Egypt’s ruler, Muhammad Ali Pasha, often described as the founder of modern Egypt, paid only a fraction of the world price to the fellaheen who produced the cotton, and he and his court became fabulously wealthy on the proceeds.

援助并不是统治者不经同意而实现统治的唯一途径。大宗商品价格飙升也是。一个著名的例子是19世纪中期的埃及。在这个工业革命的鼎盛时期，市场对棉花的需求无穷无尽，主要的棉花产地有美国南部和埃及，而埃及的棉花销售占了该国对外贸易的绝大部分。当时的埃及统治者穆罕默德·阿里帕夏（常被称为现代埃及的奠基人）只给种植棉花的农民支付世界市场价格的一个零头，自己及朝廷则因棉花收益而富得流油。

The American Civil War tripled the world price in only three years, and under Ali’s successor Isma’il Pasha, this led to what a British report later described as “fantastic extravagance,” while “immense sums were expended on public works in the manner of the East, and on productive works carried out in the wrong way or too soon,” including the Suez Canal. The scale of the spending was so great that it could not be supported even by the wartime cotton price, and Isma’il borrowed on the international capital market. When the price of cotton collapsed after the war, there were riots, armed intervention, and ultimately foreign occupation by Britain.

因美国发生内战，世界棉花价格三年内翻了三倍。在阿里的继任者伊斯梅尔帕夏治下，这种价格飙升导致了一份英国报告后来所称的“极端挥霍”，“发挥东方国家风格，公共工程靡费巨资，生产性项目上的巨额开销要么方向错误，要么上马太快”，其中包括苏伊士运河的开凿。开支规模如此巨大，以至于连战时棉花价格都难以支撑，伊斯梅尔只能向国际资本市场借款。随着战后棉花价格暴跌，埃及出现暴乱，接受武装调停，最后引来英国的占领。

Cotton prices rose from $9.00 for 112 pounds in 1853 to $14.00 in 1860, to a peak of $33.25 in 1865, and they fell to $15.75 in 1870. One might have thought that the foreign lenders—if not Isma’il—would have understood the trouble that lay ahead, but then, as now, the lenders could rely on another government—Britain—to protect and recover their investments. Yet this story of catastrophe is not without its bright side; the Suez Canal, after all, was a useful investment whose benefits need to be counted.

棉花价格从1853年的每112磅9美元上升到1860年的14美元，再于1865年攀至最高价33.25美元，然后在1870年回落到15.75美元。你也许会想，即便伊斯梅尔想不到，那外国放款人本来总该能认清即将发生的麻烦。但那个时候跟现在一样，放款人可以依靠另外一个国家——英国——来保护和收回自己的投资。当然，这场灾难并非全无是处；苏伊士运河毕竟是个有用的投资，其好处需要承认。

There are many parallels between commodity price booms and foreign aid. One is that cash flows come and go in a way that is divorced from domestic needs or domestic politics. In the cotton boom, the cause was the Civil War in America; with aid, it is the economic and political conditions in the donor countries, or international events such as the Cold War, or the war on terror. That aid stimulates government expenditure has been repeatedly documented, and, as in the Egyptian case, the government is freed of the need to consult or to gain the approval of its people.

大宗商品价格和外国援助之间存在许多相似之处，其中之一就是：现金流的进出与国内需求或国内政治脱节。棉花热的原因是美国内战；援助则视乎援助国的经济政治状况，或如冷战一类的国际事件，或反恐战争。援助会刺激政府开支，此类事例史载不绝，如埃及案例所显示的，此时政府已不再需要征询民众意见或寻求民众认可。

With state-owned mines, a high world price, an unlimited supply of poor workers, or a well-funded army, a ruler can stay in power without the consent of his people. With sufficient foreign aid, the ruler can even do without the mines, as eventually happened in Zaire under Mobutu. Aid from abroad kept the regime in business, and most of the aid went to doing so, so that when the regime eventually fell, there was little left, in Swiss bank accounts or elsewhere.

如果统治者拥有国有矿藏，国际市场价格高企，贫穷工人源源不断，或军队资金充裕，那他就能无需其人民同意而掌握大权。若有充足的外国援助，统治者甚至可以无需占有矿藏，蒙博托治下的扎伊尔最终就是如此。外国援助维持着政权运转，而且绝大多数援助款都被用在这方面，所以最终政权垮台时，不管是瑞士的银行账户还是别的什么地方，全都所剩无几。

Of course, with aid the government has a responsibility to the donors, and, unlike in the Mobutu case, which was driven by Cold War geopolitics, one might hope that the donors have the interests of the people in mind. But as we shall see, there are good reasons why this does not work in practice; the motivation of the donors helps much less than one might think.

当然，接受援助的政府对援助者负有责任，而且与冷战地缘政治所导致的蒙博托案例不同，你可能觉得，援助者心中会考虑人民的利益。但我们将看到，有很多可信的理由使得实情并非如此。援助者的动机助益不大，比你想象的要小得多。

Aid, like commodity price booms, can have other unhappy effects on local institutions. Without unrestricted inflows, governments not only need taxes, but also need to be able to collect them. The huge oil revenues in the Middle East are partly responsible for poor democratic institutions in the oil-producing countries. In Africa, presidential systems are common, and an externally funded president can govern through patronage or military repression. Parliaments have limited power; they are rarely consulted by the president; and neither parliaments nor judiciaries have power to rein in the presidency. There are no checks and balances. In extreme cases, large external flows, from aid or commodity sales, can increase the risk of civil war, because rulers have the means to avoid sharing power, and because the value of the inflows gives both sides a prize that is worth fighting over.

跟大宗商品价格飙升一样，援助可能对当地制度造成不幸的影响。如果没有源源不断的资金流入，政府不仅仅需要税收，而且需要有能力征税。中东地区产油国缺少民主，部分原因就在于它们拥有巨额石油收入。总统制在非洲很流行，一个得到外部资金支持的总统能够通过政治分赃或军事镇压维持统治。议会权力有限；总统很少征求其意见；不管是议会还是司法机关都无力约束总统。没有分权制衡。在极端情况下，大额的外部资金流入，不管是来自援助还是来自商品销售，都可能增加内战之危，因为统治者有办法拒绝分享权力，也因为流入资金庞大到值得双方不惜为之一战。

Why does accountability to the donors not replace accountability to the local population? Why can’t the donors withhold aid if the president refuses to consult parliament, declines to reform a corrupt police force, or uses aid flows to bolster his own political position?

那么，为什么受援国统治者对本国人民负责的必要性（因外国援助而放松之后）无法由他们对援助者负责的必要性所取代呢？如果总统拒绝与议会磋商，拒不改革腐败的警察机关，或者使用援助资金来巩固自身政治地位，为什么援助者不能暂停援助呢？

One problem is that the donor governments and their constituents—the ultimate donors—can’t make the right calls because they do not experience the effects of aid on the ground. Even when the crunch comes, and the donors see what is happening, it is rarely in the interests of the donor countries to withhold aid, even in the face of egregious violations of agreements, however much they may have wished to do so in advance.

困难之一是：援助国政府及其选民——也就是最终的援助者——并不能做出正确的决策，因为他们并没有亲自体验援助的影响。即便危机降临，援助者看清了正在发生的事，哪怕恶性违反协议的行为当面发生，暂停援助也很少会符合援助国的利益——无论事前他们是多么渴望这么做。

It is the local people, not the donors, who have direct experience of the projects on which aid is spent and who are in a position to form a judgment. Such judgments will not always be well informed, and there will always be domestic debate on cause and effect and on the value of specific government activities; but the political process can mediate these normal divergences of views. For foreign donors or their constituents—who do not live in the recipient countries—there is no such feedback. They have no direct information on outcomes; they must rely on the reports of the agencies disbursing the aid, and so tend to focus on the volume of aid, not its effectiveness.

只有当地人民，而不是援助者，才能直接体验援助款所支持的那些项目，也才有资格做出判断。这类判断并不总是信息周全的，对于特定政府活动的原因结果及其价值，国内也总是存在争议，但政治进程能够调和这类常规的观点分歧。然而对于外援国或他们的选民而言，由于他们并不生活在受援国，就不存在这种反馈。对于结果，他们没有直接的信息来源，他们必须依赖负责分配援助的各种机构所提供的报告，所以会倾向于更加关注援助的体量，而不是其效力。

The aid agencies, in turn, are accountable to their ultimate donors, and there is no mechanism that holds them responsible if things go wrong for the recipients. I once asked an official of one of the most prominent non-governmental aid agencies in which part of the world she spent most of her time. “The West Coast”—which turned out not to be Africa, but the United States, where several of the agency’s largest donors lived. As we have already seen, World Bank officials have long moved on to other things by the time the effects of their handiwork become visible. There is no responsibility of donors to the recipients of their aid.

而援助机构则是对最终援助者负责，如果受援者那里出了问题，并没有什么机制来追究援助机构的责任。我曾问过某著名非政府援助机构的一个官员，她在世界上什么地方呆的时间最长久。答案是“西海岸”——不是非洲西海岸，而是美国西海岸，该机构几位最大的援助者就住在那里。正如我们所见，早在他们的劳动效果显现之前很久，世界银行的官员们就已经忙别的事去了。援助者对于受援者并没有负什么责任。

Sometimes the agencies know that aid is going wrong and are alarmed by what they see, but can do nothing about it. The director of one national aid agency gave me a bloodcurdling account of how aid funds had gone to gangs of murderers—people who had already carried out one massacre and were training and arming themselves to return to finish the job. I asked him why he continued to supply aid. Because, he replied, the citizens of this country believe that it is their duty to give and will accept no argument that aid is hurting people. The best that he could do was to try to limit the harm.

有时候，援助机构知道援助已出了问题，并且已经对所见所闻感到忧虑，却什么也做不了。某国家援助机构的主任曾向我提供过一份令人毛骨悚然的记录：援助资金到了谋杀团伙的手里，这些人已经实施过一次大屠杀，现在正在加强训练和武装，准备杀回去把事情做个彻底。我问他为什么还要继续提供援助。他回答说，因为本国公民相信提供援助是他们的义务，并且拒不接受任何指出援助正在害人的观点。他能做的，只是尽力减少伤害。

Even when donors know what conditions ought to be imposed, they will often be reluctant to penalize recipient governments who flout them. Donors may threaten punishment to induce good behavior, but when the good behavior is not forthcoming they may be reluctant to take action if the penalties harm themselves or their constituents.

即便援助者知道应该施加何种限制条件，但当受援政府无视这些条件的时候，通常援助者也会对是否惩罚左右迟疑。援助者可能会以惩罚相威胁的方式来诱导良好的行为，但如果好行为迟迟不出现，且如果真正施加惩罚会伤及自身或本国选民，他们可能又会迟疑。

This would hardly apply to the arming of murderers, but it can be a problem in lesser cases. In effect, aid conditionality is “time-inconsistent,” a favorite term of economists: what you want to do in advance is no longer in your interests after the fact. The governments who are receiving aid understand this very well; they can call the donor’s bluff and ignore the conditions with impunity.

在武装谋杀犯问题上，这种情况当然不太可能发生，但在其他没那么严重的事情上，则可能成问题。实际上，援助的限制条款具有“时间不一致性”（这是经济学家爱用的一个词汇）：在木已成舟的情况下，你原先想做的事已经不再符合你的利益。接受援助的各国政府深知这一点，他们面对援助者的虚张声势，会直接要他们摊牌，从而能无视限制条件而不受任何惩罚。

Why the reluctance to enforce conditionality?

为什么在执行限制条件上产生迟疑？

The economist Ravi Kanbur was the World Bank representative in Ghana in 1992. He was called upon to enforce conditionality by withholding a tranche of a previously agreed loan in response to the government having violated the agreement by awarding an 80 percent pay increase to public-sector workers. The tranche was large, almost an eighth of Ghana’s annual import bill. Opposition to the cut-off came from many sources, not just the government of Ghana. Many innocent bystanders would be hurt, both Ghanaians and foreign contractors, who would likely not be paid.

经济学家Ravi Kanbur曾于1992年担任世界银行驻加纳代表。由于加纳政府违反协定，给公共部门工作人员增加了80%的工资，Kanbur接到呼吁，要求他执行限制条款，暂停拨付贷款协议中的一笔款项。这笔款项数额巨大，大约是加纳年度进口额的八分之一。反对中断贷款的呼声此起彼伏，加纳政府只是其中之一。许多无辜旁人，包括加纳和外国的承包商，都有可能受到伤害，因为他们可能将收不到工程款。

More fundamentally, the normal, good relations between the donors and the government would be disrupted, threatening not only the government but also the operations of the aid industry itself; “the donors control so much in the way of funds that to stop these, at any rate to stop them sharply, would cause major chaos in the economy.” In effect, it is the aid industry’s job to disburse funds, and its operatives are paid to do so and to maintain good relations with its client countries. A face-saving compromise was eventually reached, and the loan went ahead.

更为根本的是，援助国与加纳政府的正常友好关系可能受到破坏，不仅会危及加纳政府，而且也会危及援助行业本身的运转。“援助者对资金运作有很大控制，以至于如果停止贷款，至少停贷过于突然，将会给经济造成重大混乱。”实际上，援助行业的任务就是分配资金，从业人员拿着薪水就是要做好这一本职工作，并与客户国维持良好关系。最终，双方保存体面，达成妥协，贷款得以继续发放。

Kenya provides another example of the dance among donors, the president, and parliament. The donors periodically become exasperated by the corruption of the president and his cronies, and they turn off the flow of aid. Parliament meets and starts discussing how to raise the revenue required for the government to meet its obligations. The donors heave a huge sigh of relief—they too are under threat if the aid ceases to flow—and turn the taps back on; parliament is shuttered until the next time. Government ministers also sigh with relief and order up the latest-model Mercedes from Germany; the locals refer to these wealthy beneficiaries as the “WaBenzi.”

关于援助者、总统和议会之间的这种委蛇周旋游戏，肯尼亚也是个例子。援助者总是会周期性地被总统及其党羽的腐败激怒，然后暂停援助。此时议会就会召开，开始商量如何增加政府收入，以满足政府履行义务的必需用度。援助者会大松一口气，然后又把水龙头打开——因为如果援助真正停止，他们也会面临威胁。于是，议会就可以关门歇业了，直到下次再发生类似事情。政府的部长们也会大松一口气，又开始从德国订购最新型号的奔驰汽车。当地人管这些富裕的受益者叫做“奔驰族”。

The award for sheer creativity might go to Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, president of Mauritania from 1984 to 2005. He adopted a pro-Western stance and in 1991 abandoned his previous support for the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Even so, in the early 1990s, his domestic repression became too much for donors, and aid was withdrawn. Real political reforms were begun—at least until the president had the brilliant idea of becoming one of the few Arab countries to recognize Israel. The aid taps were reopened and the reforms rescinded.

绝对原创奖可能还是要颁给1984至2005年任毛里塔尼亚总统的马维亚·乌尔德·西德·艾哈迈德·塔亚。塔亚1991年采取了亲西方的立场，放弃支持伊拉克的萨达姆·侯赛因政权。即便如此，90年代初他在国内的镇压行动对援助者来说仍属过分，援助因此而撤销。此时，真正的政治改革拉开大幕，改革至少维持到了总统突发奇想，成为承认以色列的极少数阿拉伯国家之一。援助龙头重新打开，改革又被废止了。

Domestic policies in the donor countries can also make it difficult to turn off aid. Government aid agencies are under pressure from their domestic constituencies to “do something” about global poverty —a pressure that is stoked by a well-intentioned but necessarily poorly informed domestic population—and this makes it hard for government agencies to cut back on aid even when their representatives on the ground know that it is doing harm. Politicians in both donor and recipient countries understand this process.

援助国的国内政策也可能使停止援助面临阻碍。国内选民会向政府援助机构施加压力，要求他们为全球贫困“做点事”。这些国内民众虽然满怀好意，但在信息掌握上却总是非常缺乏。他们把这压力之火烧得通红，使得政府机构难以切断援助，即便它们在当地的代表知道援助正在害人。

Recipient governments can use their own poor people as “hostages to extract aid from the donors.” In one of the worst such cases, government officials in Sierra Leone held a party to celebrate the fact that UNDP had, once again, classed their country as the worst in the world and thus guaranteed another year’s worth of aid.

受援国政府能把自己的贫困人口当做“从援助国身上索取资金的人质”来使用。塞拉利昂的政府官员是此类案例最糟糕的表现之一，在联合国开发计划署再次将该国列为世界最差国家，因此保证了该国下一年度的援金之后，他们居然开了一个派对来庆祝。

On the other side, donor politicians can give aid to buy political credibility at home when they are deeply unpopular for unrelated reasons; they too will oppose the cessation of aid, even when it is clearly being misused. When this happens—as it did with British aid during the Kenyan elections in 2001, when aid was used to subvert the elections and preserve the power of a corrupt elite—Africans suffer to burnish the tarnished reputations of Western politicians.

另一方面，如果援助国的政客因为其他一些无关原因而非常不受欢迎，他们也可能通过提供援助来收买国内政治信用。因此即便援金明显遭到滥用，他们也会反对停止提供。比如英国在肯尼亚2001年大选期间提供的援助就是如此，当时援金就被用于颠覆选举，帮助腐败精英维持大权。此类事情发生时，相当于非洲人民为了擦洗西方政客的声名污点而受苦受难。

Lyndon Johnson helped hype a largely nonexistent famine in India in order to distract attention from the Vietnam War, not to mention to gather support from American farmers by buying their crops. The givers and receivers of aid, the governments in both countries, are allied against their own peoples. All that has changed from colonial times is the nature of what is being extracted.

为了把民众视线从越南战争上面引开，林登·约翰逊不仅帮助印度虚假宣传了一场基本上并不存在的大饥荒，还通过收购美国农民的农产品来收买支持。援助的提供者和接受者，即两国政府，联合起来欺瞒自己的人民。与殖民时代相比，唯一的变化只是它们索取的东西性质不同了。

There are also practical reasons that restrict the ability of donors to enforce conditionality. Aid is fungible; a recipient can promise to spend aid on health care and do so with projects that would have been undertaken in any case, freeing up funds for nonapproved purposes. It is often difficult for donors to monitor such diversions. The aid industry is competitive, and if one country refuses to fund another will often step in, with a different set of priorities and conditions. The donor who tries to enforce conditions is then shut out and may lose political influence or commercial opportunities, with no compensating gain.

也有一些实践上的原因会限制援助国执行限制条款的能力。援助具有可替代性；比如受援国可以先承诺将援助用于医疗保健，然后用即使没有援助本来就会实施的项目来履行承诺，从而腾挪资金用于未经授权的项目。援助者很难对这类腾挪实施监督。援助行业充满竞争，某国拒绝提供援助，另一国就会带着一套新的政策偏好和限制条款来插手。于是，试图执行限制条款的援助国会被拒之门外，可能会丧失其政治影响力或商业机会，而且得不到补偿。

Aid agencies have recently tried to move away from conditionality, and their language has moved toward an emphasis on partnership. The recipient proposes a plan according to its own needs, and the donor decides what to finance. Of course, none of this disposes of the reality that the donors are responsible to their constituents in the rich world, and that the recipients, knowing this, will design plans that mimic just what they think the donors would have proposed on their own—a process that has been aptly described as “ventriloquism.” It is not clear what sort of partnership is sustainable when one side has all the money.

近来，援助机构已在试图放弃限制条款，转而强调伙伴关系。受援国会根据自身需要提出一份计划，然后由援助国来决定向哪些提供资助。当然，这些都无法绕开援助者需对身处富裕世界的本国选民负责这一现实，受援者深知这一点，因此他们在提出计划时会刻意鹦鹉学舌，提出在他们的心目中援助国自身可能设想出的方案。这一过程已经被人恰当地称为“腹语术”。在一方拥有全部资金的情况下，我们想不出何种伙伴关系才是可持续的。

Politics and politicians, doing what they regularly do, undermine aid effectiveness, but it works the other way too: aid flows undermine the effectiveness of politics. Donors decide matters that should be decided by recipients; even democratic politics in donor countries has no business deciding whether HIV/AIDS should be prioritized over antenatal care in Africa. Conditionality violates national sovereignty.

政治和政治家的惯常行事准则会破坏援助的有效性，但事情也可能在相反方向上发生：援助资金会破坏政治的有效性。本应由受援者决定的事，变得由援助者来决定了。即便是援助国的民主政治也没有理由来决定非洲国家是否应将艾滋病优先于产前保健考虑。限制条款侵犯国家主权。

Imagine a well-funded Swedish aid agency coming to Washington, D.C., and promising to pay off the national debt and fund Medicare for fifty years. The conditions are that the United States abolish capital punishment and fully legalize gay marriage. Perhaps some governments are so dysfunctional that such violations have little cost to their populations. But taking a country into foreign receivership is hardly a good start on building the kind of contract between government and governed that might support economic growth over the long haul. It is not possible to develop someone else’s country from the outside.

试想，如果瑞典一家资金充裕的援助机构跑到华盛顿来，承诺帮我们清偿所有国家债务，并会援助国家医疗保险五十年，条件是美国废除死刑，并将同性结婚全面合法化。也许有些国家政府确实无能透顶，因而此类侵犯行为并不会对该国人民造成什么损害。但是，一国接受外国的托管，对于建立政府与人民之间的契约关系而言并不是什么好开头，而这种契约关系从长远来看可能有助于经济增长。不可能从外部来发展别国。

We have already seen that it is difficult to give convincing evidence of the effects of aid on economic growth, and the same applies when we look at the effects of aid on democracy or on other institutions. Yet once again, we have the fact that small countries that get a lot of aid also tend to be less democratic; sub-Saharan Africa is the least democratic area of the world, and the one that receives the most aid. Countries that receive aid from their ex-colonists are not the most democratic. Perhaps most interesting is a counterpoint to Figures 1 and 2: there has been an upsurge not only in growth but also in democracy in Africa since the cut in aid that followed the end of the Cold War. As always, there are other possible explanations for these facts, but they are what we would expect if democracy were undermined by foreign aid.

之前我们已经提到，关于援助对经济增长的效用，我们拿不出什么有说服力的证据。同样，援助对民主或其他制度的效用也是如此。不过，我们这里又有一个事实：接受大量援助的小国也趋向于更不民主；撒哈拉以南的非洲是全世界最不民主的地区，同时也是接受援助最多的地区。接受原殖民母国援助的国家并非最民主的。最有意思的可能是图1和图2【译注：原文无图，略】的对比：随着冷战结束后援助的减少，非洲不但出现了经济上升，而且出现了更多的民主政体。当然，对于这类事实，总是有其他可能的解释。但是如果民主会受到外援的破坏，这一事实就与我们的预期一致了。

The antidemocratic aspects of foreign aid have been exacerbated by the long-held donors’ belief that aid—and economic development itself—is a technical issue, not a political one. In the hydraulic theory (recall, we are just fixing the plumbing), there can be no legitimate dispute over what needs to be done. This belief has led donors and advisers to ignore or be impatient with local politics.

外援的反民主面向还被援助者长期持有的一种信念加剧了：他们相信援助和经济发展本身都只是技术问题，而非政治问题。在水力学理论（记住，我们不过是在修理水管）看来，关于我们需要做什么，没有什么值得争论的。这一信念导致援助者和建议者都对当地政治置之不理或毫无耐心。

Worse still, the donors have often deeply misunderstood what people needed or wanted. Population control is the worst case; to the donors it was obvious that if there were fewer people each person would be better off, while to the recipients, the opposite was just as obviously (and correctly) true. Western-led population control, often with the assistance of nondemocratic or well-rewarded recipient governments, is the most egregious example of antidemocratic and oppressive aid. Effective democracy is the antidote to the tyranny of foreign good intentions.

更糟的是，关于人民需要什么或渴望什么，援助者通常误解甚深。人口控制就是最糟糕的例子：在援助者看来，很显然人口更少则人均状况就会更好，但是在受援者看来，相反的看法【编注：即人口多没坏处】同样显而易见且真确无误。西方人推动的人口控制，通常伴随着非民主或受益丰厚的受援国政府的协助，是援助之反民主和压迫性的最恶劣例证。有效的民主是外国善心暴政的解毒剂。

The anthropologist James Ferguson, in The Anti-Politics Machine, one of the greatest books about aid and economic development, describes a large Canadian-funded development project in Lesotho in the 1980s that was based on a profound misunderstanding of the way the economy functioned; what in reality was a reservoir of labor for the South African mines was reimagined as a textbook subsistence-farming economy.

人类学家詹姆斯·弗格森在《反政治机器》这本有关援助和经济发展的杰作中，为我们描绘了1980年代在莱索托实施的一项由加拿大资助的发展项目，该项目从根本上就对经济运转方式存在深刻误解。该国经济模式实际本来应是南非矿业的劳动力储军，却被臆想为一种教科书式的自给农业经济。

The agricultural investment projects designed for the imagined economy were about as likely to be successful as a project to grow flowers on the moon. The project administrators—busily fixing the plumbing—remained unaware of how the project was being manipulated by the ruling party for its own political purposes and against its political opponents. In the end, there was no development or poverty reduction, only an extension of the state’s monopoly of political control, an anti-politics machine that made an extractive elite even less responsive to its people.

为这种想象的经济所设计出来的农业投资项目，其成功的可能性就跟在月球上栽花差不多。该项目被执政党操纵，以实现他们自身的政治意图，压制政治对手，而忙于修水管的项目管理人员自始至终对此毫不知情。最后，项目得到的并不是发展或贫困减少，而只是加强了国家对政治控制的垄断性质，催生了一种反政治的机器，这种机器使得榨取型精英对其人民甚至更加漠视。

The technical, anti-political view of development assistance has survived the inconvenient fact that the apparently clear technical solutions kept changing—from industrialization, planning and the construction of infrastructure to macroeconomic structural adjustment, to health and education, and most recently back to infrastructure. That the ideas kept changing did nothing to imbue the developers with humility or uncertainty, nor did the sensitivity of the fashions to first-world politics appear to undercut the technical certainty of the aid industry. The antipoverty rhetoric of the World Bank when Lyndon Johnson was U.S. president was replaced by the “getting prices right” rhetoric when Ronald Reagan was president. “Our” politics seems to be a legitimate part of development thinking, while “their” politics is not.

发展援助问题上的这种技术性、反政治的观点始终存在，尽管我们面临一个尴尬事实：看似显然的技术解决方案经常在变，从工业化、计划和基础设施建设变成宏观经济结构调整，又变成健康和教育，最近又回到基础设施。想法一直在变，但这并没能促使开发人员保持谦逊或心生犹疑，发生在第一世界政治领域中的潮流敏感似乎也没能减少援助行业的技术自信。林登·约翰逊担任美国总统期间由世界银行提出的反贫困辞藻在罗纳德·里根当政时期被“矫正价格”的辞藻所取代。“我们的”政事似乎在发展思考当中理所应当占据一席之地，而“他们的”政事则并不如此。

Aid and aid-funded projects have undoubtedly done much good; the roads, dams, and clinics exist and would not have existed otherwise. But the negative forces are always present; even in good environments, aid compromises institutions, it contaminates local politics, and it undermines democracy. If poverty and underdevelopment are primarily consequences of poor institutions, then by weakening those institutions or stunting their development, large aid flows do exactly the opposite of what they are intended to do. It is hardly surprising then that, in spite of the direct effects of aid that are often positive, the record of aid shows no evidence of any overall beneficial effect.

毫无疑问，援助和由援金所资助的项目助益良多；世上多出了许多公路、大坝和医院，没有援助是不可能的。但援助的负面影响始终存在；即便实施环境友好，援助也会损害制度、污染当地政治，且会破坏民主。如果说贫困和欠发达首先是因为制度糟糕，那么通过削弱此类制度或阻碍其正常发展，大规模援助资金的实际效果确实事与愿违。因此，尽管援助的直接效果通常都是正面的，但援助史上并没有证据表明它们总体上带来了有益效果，对此我们不必感到惊讶。

The arguments about foreign aid and poverty reduction are quite different from the arguments about domestic aid to the poor. Those who oppose welfare benefits often argue that aid to the poor creates incentives for poor behavior that help to perpetuate poverty. These are not the arguments here. The concern with foreign aid is not about what it does to poor people around the world—indeed it touches them too rarely—but about what it does to governments in poor countries. The argument that foreign aid can make poverty worse is an argument that foreign aid makes governments less responsive to the needs of the poor, and thus does them harm.

关于外国援助与减少贫困之间关系的论争，与关于针对穷人的国内援助的论争颇为不同。反对福利津贴的人通常论证说，援助穷人会激励穷人做出使得贫困得以长期维持的行为。我们这里的论证则与此不同。在外国援助问题上，我们所关注的并不是它们对世上的穷人起到了什么作用——实际上援助极少触及穷人——而是它们对贫穷国家的政府起到了什么作用。外国援助会使得贫困恶化这一论点说的是，外国援助会使得受援国政府更加漠视穷人的需求，从而对他们造成损害。

The harm of aid—even in the presence of some good—poses difficult ethical problems. The philosopher Leif Wenar, criticizing Peter Singer’s vision, with which I began this chapter, notes that “poverty is no pond”; Singer’s analogy is not helpful. Those who advocate more aid need to explain how it can be given in a way that deals with the political constraints. They should also think hard about the parallels with the colonialism that came before the era of aid.

援助的危害——即使也会有某些好处——提出了一些伦理难题。本章开头，我曾引用过哲学家彼得·辛格的设想【译注：本文是作者著作The Great Escape第7章的一小节。第7章开头数页，作者曾提到辛格的著名比喻：由于我们所需要付出都很小，拒绝援助非洲儿童的伦理错误就跟拒绝挽救池塘落水儿童一样。而我们离非洲较远、离落水儿童较近这一事实并不会造成什么伦理上的区别】。莱夫·韦纳对此提出批评，他说“贫困并非池塘”，辛格的比喻并没有什么用。鼓吹加大援助的人需要解释，援助如何以一种能够考虑政治约束的方式分发。他们也应该努力思考，援助与援助时代之前的殖民主义之间的对比。

We now think of colonialism as bad, harming others to benefit ourselves, and aid as good, hurting us (albeit very mildly) to help others. But that view is too simple, too ignorant of history, and too self-congratulatory. The rhetoric of colonialism too was all about helping people, albeit about bringing civilization and enlightenment to people whose humanity was far from fully recognized. This may have been little more than a cover for theft and exploitation.

我们现在觉得殖民主义是坏的，只是损人利己，而援助则是好的，是损己（尽管很轻微）利人。但这种观点过于简化，对历史过于无知，同时也过分自夸。殖民主义的论调一样说的全是帮助他人，虽然只是要把文明和启蒙带给其人性尊严远远还未被承认的人们。这种说法有可能仅仅只是偷盗或剥削的文过饰非。

The preamble to the charter of the UN, with its ringing and inspiring rhetoric, was written by Jan Smuts, premier of South Africa, who saw the UN as the best hope of preserving the British Empire and the dominance of white “civilization.” Yet at its worst, decolonization installed leaders who differed little from those who preceded them, except for where they were born and the color of their skins.

联合国宪章的序言部分用语响亮且令人振奋，其作者南非前总理杨·史末资可是将联合国视为维持大英帝国和白人“文明”统治地位的最大希望所在。然而，在最糟糕的情形中，殖民地独立后上台的领导人跟他们的前辈并没有什么不同，区别只在于出生地点和皮肤颜色。

Even today, when our humanitarian rhetoric acts as a cover for our politicians to buy themselves virtue, and when aid is our way of meeting our moral obligations to deal with global poverty, we need to be sure that we are not doing harm. If we are, we are doing it for “us,” not for “them.”

即便是在今天，当人道主义辞藻被我们的政客用来为自己购买德性名声时，当援助被我们当成是履行自己对于全球贫困所负道德义务的手段时，我们也需要明确，我们并没有在害人。如果我们确实在害人，那援助就只是为了“满足自己”，而不是为了“帮助他人”。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2016-07-29
翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
校对:babyface_claire
来源:reason.com,http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/29/we-hillbillies-have-got-to-wake-the-hell

【编注：hillbilly和redneck、yankee、cracker一样，都是对美国某个有着鲜明文化特征的地方群体的蔑称，本文译作『山巴佬』】

Read this remarkable book: It is by turns tender and funny, bleak and depressing, and thanks to Mamaw, always wildly, wildly profane. An elegy is a lament for the dead, and with Hillbilly Elegy Vance mourns the demise of the mostly Scots-Irish working class from which he springs. I teared up more than once as I read this beautiful and painful memoir of his hillbilly family and their struggles to cope with the modern world.

阅读这本非凡之作的感受时而温柔有趣，时而沮丧压抑，而且，亏了他的祖母，还往往十分狂野，狂野地对神不敬。挽歌是对死人的悼念。Vance用《山乡挽歌》缅怀了苏格兰-爱尔兰裔工人阶级的衰亡，他自己便出身于此阶级。这本书描写了他的乡下家庭及其在现代社会中的挣扎，在阅读这本美丽而痛苦的回忆录时，我几度流泪。

Vance grew up poor with a semi-employed, drug-addicted mother who lived with a string of five or six husbands/boyfriends in the fading Rust Belt city of Middletown, Ohio. The only constants in his chaotic life were his grandparents, Mamaw and Papaw. Vance nearly failed out of high school but eventually graduated from Yale Law School. That personal journey is in the book, but Vance’s main story is about the ongoing collapse of hillbilly culture as seen through the lens of his own family’s disordered experiences.

Vance在贫穷的环境中长大，他母亲半失业且吸毒成瘾，同她的五六个丈夫/男友生活在地处铁锈带、正在凋零中的俄亥俄州米德尔敦。他混乱糟糕的生活中唯一不变的是他的祖父母。Vance差点从高中退学，但最终还是从耶鲁法学院毕业。这段个人生活也被写进了书中，但书的主要情节是透过作者自己家庭颠沛流离的经历来描绘乡村文化的不断衰败。

Before going on, I should make a disclosure: Like Vance, I grew up as a hillbilly. Neither of my grandfathers could read nor write. My paternal grandparents, Mom and Daddy Bailey, left the Appalachian coal country of McDowell County, West Virginia, around 1950 and bought a dairy farm 80 miles away in Washington County, Virginia. I grew up on that farm.

在继续往下写之前，我要坦白：同Vance一样，我也是个山巴佬。我的爷爷外公都不会读写。我的爷爷、妈妈和爸爸Bailey在1950年左右离开了西弗吉尼亚州阿巴拉契亚山麓的煤城麦克道尔，在离弗吉尼亚州的华盛顿县80英里的地方买了处奶牛场。我便在那农场长大。

For most of my childhood, all six of my grandparents’ adult children lived within 10 miles of the home place, as did my dozens of cousins. Every Sunday, a massive family midday “dinner”—somewhere around 40 to 50 people—convened at my grandparents’ house. I left the farm at age 16, when my parents got divorced. I will spare you further details, but let’s just say that the Baileys did not model their family life on the Waltons. Before I made my escape to the University of Virginia, I lived for a while with my mother and one of my sisters in a rented trailer.

在我童年的大部分时间，我祖父母的六个成年孩子都生活在离家10英里的范围内，我的表兄妹们自然也是如此。每个星期天中午，超级家宴——大约40到50个人——就会在我祖父母的家里上演。我16岁时离开那个农场，当时我父母离婚了。多的我就不讲了，我只告诉你，我们Bailey家后来在沃尔顿并没有继续那种家庭生活。在我逃到弗吉尼亚大学之前，我、妈妈和我的一个妹妹在一个租来的拖车里生活了一段时间。

HarperCollinsThough he mostly grew up in the Rust Belt, Vance identifies as a hillbilly—his family’s roots are in the hollers of Breathitt County, Kentucky. Vance’s Papaw and Mamaw, like tens of thousands of other mountain folk, left coal country in 1947 to find work and their shot at the American Dream in the booming steelworks 200 miles north. As a kid, Vance would accompany his grandparents as they traveled back nearly every weekend to visit with family in Kentucky. Middletown was Vance’s “address,” but the town of Jackson in Breathitt County where his great-grandmother Mamaw Blanton lived is his “home.”

尽管Vance基本在铁锈带长大，但他自认为是个“山巴佬”——他家庭的根在肯塔基州布莱斯郡的溪谷中。Vance的爷爷奶奶，像成千上万其他山民一样，在1947年离开煤城到200英里以北的新兴钢铁企业寻找工作和实现美国梦的机会。小时候，每当他祖父母周末回到肯塔基，Vance总是陪伴他们左右。米德尔顿是Vance的“住址”，但他祖父母生活过的布莱斯郡的杰克逊才是他的“家”。

Today hillbilly culture is scarred by spectacular rates of joblessness, single motherhood, drug addiction, crime, and incarceration. Vance places most of the blame for this on the hillbillies’ own shoulders. Globalization and automation decimated the manufacturing jobs that many low-skilled workers leveraged into a middle-class lives in the mid-20th century, he argues, but that’s no excuse for fatalistic victimhood now.

今天的山巴佬文化被骇人的高失业率、单身母亲、毒品上瘾、犯罪和牢狱搞得遍体鳞伤。Vance认为责任主要在山巴佬自己。全球化和自动化削减了制造业的工作岗位，而20世纪中叶许多低技能的工人正是靠这些工作跻身中产阶级。但这并不能成为当下宿命论式的受害者情结的借口，Vance强调。

Throughout the book, Vance offers stories from family, friends, and neighbors that illustrate the growing cultural dysfunction among poor whites. For example, he takes a job at a floor tile warehouse for $13 an hour where one of his co-workers is a 19-year-old with a pregnant girlfriend. The warehouse owner gives the girlfriend a job as a receptionist. The 19-year-old and his girlfriend are warned about their increasingly frequent absences and tardiness, and eventually both were fired. The 19-year lashes out at the manager, saying, “How could you do this to me? Don’t you know that I’ve got a pregnant girlfriend?”

通过这本书，Vance用自己家庭、朋友和邻居的故事向我们展示了贫穷白人中的文化失调。举个例子，他曾在一个地板瓷砖仓库工作，每小时13美元，他的一个同事是个19岁的小伙子，有个怀了孕的女友。仓库的主人给他同事的女友一份前台接待的工作。这个19岁的小伙子和他的女友因为越来越频繁的缺席和懈怠而被警告，并最终被解雇。小伙子对着经理大吼大叫，“你怎么能这样对我？你不知道我还有个怀孕的女友吗？”

At another point, Vance meets an old acquaintance in a Middletown bar who tells him he recently quit his job because he was sick of waking up early. Later, the same guy was complaining on Facebook about the “Obama economy” and how it had affected his life.

还有一次，Vance在米德尔敦的一个酒吧碰见一位老熟人，那人告诉Vance，自己因为厌倦了早起而辞掉了工作。之后这个家伙又在Facebook上抱怨“奥巴马的经济政策”如何影响了他的生活。

Hillbilly culture is suspicious of outsiders and enforces a violent code of honor. Vance recalls that boys who got good grades in school were considered “sissies” or “faggots,” an attitude that keeps people ill-educated and isolated. As their hopes for achieving the American Dream have faded, his hillbilly relatives, friends, and neighbors have come to see the institutions of society, government, and the economy as rigged against them. This has engendered a deep and debilitating pessimism among poor working-class whites. Hillbillies are killing themselves so effectively with drugs and alcohol that their life expectancies are actually falling.

山乡文化对外来者警惕怀疑并且极端强调荣誉。Vance回忆小时候在学校得了高分的男孩会被当成“娘炮”或“基佬”，这种态度让山巴佬无法受到良好教育并且被孤立。随着他们实现美国梦的机会逐渐消失，他的山巴佬亲戚、朋友和邻居逐渐认为社会体系、政府和经济都被操纵着跟他们作对。这在贫穷白人中催生了一股根深蒂固的、让人颓废的悲观情绪。山巴佬们用毒品和酒精毒害自己，他们的生活前景越发惨淡。

Does Vance offer any solutions for white working-class despondency and fatalism? “These problems were not created by government or corporations or anyone else. We created them, and only we can fix them,” he argues. “We hillbillies have got to wake the hell up.” He provides several examples of members of his extended family who have managed to leave poverty and family dysfunction behind. Tellingly, nearly all of them are women, got educations beyond high school, and married men who were not hillbillies.

Vance是否为白人工薪阶级的悲观情节和宿命论提供了任何解决方案呢？“这些问题不是由政府或企业或任何人搞出来的。我们自己搞出了这些问题，只有我们自己能搞定它们，”他认为，“我们山巴佬们该清醒了。”他从他的亲戚中举了几个成功摆脱贫穷和家庭分崩离析命运的例子。值得一提的是，几乎所有人都是女性，在高中后继续接受教育并嫁给了不是山巴佬的男人。

“People sometimes ask whether I think there’s anything we can do to ‘solve’ the problems of my community,” Vance writes. “I know what they’re looking for: a magical public policy solution or an innovative government program. But these problems of family, faith, and culture aren’t like a Rubik’s Cube, and I don’t think that solutions (as most understand the term) really exist.”

“人们有时会问我是否觉得我们可以做些什么来‘解决’我们社区的问题，”Vance写道，“我知道他们想要什么：一个神奇的公共政策或一个创新的政府项目。但解决这些家庭、信仰、文化的问题不像玩魔方，我不认为存在什么通常意义上的解决方案。”

Well, there is at least one “solution.” Vance observes that all of his successful friends from Middletown did one other thing: They got the hell out of Middletown. They moved to where the jobs are. Just as Vance’s hillbilly grandparents left the impoverished hollers of Kentucky to build middle-class lives in Middletown, today’s urban hillbillies could get on the highway to opportunities elsewhere. In the meantime, the government should stop paying poor people to languish in Appalachian and Rustbelt poverty traps.

好吧，至少还是有个“药方”。Vance发现他所有来自米德尔敦的成功朋友都做了一件事：滚出米德尔敦。他们搬到有工作的地方。就像Vance的山巴佬祖父离开肯塔基毫无生气的溪谷并在米德尔敦过上中产生活一样，今天的城市山巴佬可以开车驶向高速公路，去别的地方找到机会。同时，政府应该停止向阿巴拉契亚和铁锈带陷入贫穷陷阱中的穷人发钱。

Vance calls himself a “cultural emigrant.” By leaving his hillbilly culture behind, he has been able to create and enjoy a better life. I made much the same journey from Appalachian poverty to what has been a fascinating and fulfilling life. Vance clearly has some regrets about his cultural emigration; I have none.

Vance称自己为“文化移民”。离开了山乡文化，他懂得了创造并过上了更好的生活。我走过相同的路，从我阿巴拉契亚的穷人生活中走出并过上了精彩充实的生活。Vance显然对自己的文化叛逃有几分悔意，而我没有。

Despite all their failings, Vance fiercely identifies with and loves his people. He is also a natural storyteller who makes compellingly personal the statistics and news stories about the cultural and economic coming apart of America. It hits close to home.

尽管山民在许多方面的失败，Vance仍视自己为其中一员并对他们怀着深厚感情。他天生会讲故事。关于美国在文化和经济上的分裂【编注：此处双关，Coming Apart是政治学家Charles Murray的一部著作】，在别处你会读到平淡的统计数字和新闻故事，但他能让你感同身受。这就是我们的家乡。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Pat Harriman & Heather Ashbach, UC Irvine @ 2016-08-23
译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:UC, http://universityofcalifornia.edu/news/why-are-we-so-afraid-leave-children-alone

Leaving a child unattended is considered taboo in today’s intensive parenting atmosphere, despite evidence that American children are safer than ever. So why are parents denying their children the same freedom and independence that they themselves enjoyed as children?
在今天这种强化父母责任的社会氛围中，留下孩子无人照看被视为禁忌，虽然有证据表明美国孩子比以往任何时候都更安全。那么，为什么父母拒绝孩子拥有从前他们自己是孩子时享受的同样的自由和独立呢？

A new study by University of California, Irvine social scientists suggests that our fears of leaving children alone have become systematically exaggerated in recent decades – not because the practice has become more dangerous, but because it has become socially unacceptable.

加州大学尔湾分校社会学家们的一项新研究认为，近几十年，我们对单独留下孩子的恐惧被系统性地放大了——不是因为这种做法更危险，而是它对社会已变得不可接受。

“Without realizing it, we have consistently increased our estimates of the amount of danger facing children left alone in order to better justify or rationalize the moral disapproval we feel toward parents who violate this relatively new social norm,” said Ashley Thomas, cognitive sciences graduate student and lead author of the work, published online this month in the open-access journal Collabra.

“我们没有意识到这一点，所以不断提高对孩子被留下独处时所面临危险的估值，并以此更好地为我们对违反这个相对较新的社会规范的家长所做出的道义谴责加以正当化或合理化，”Ashley Thomas说。他是一名认知科学研究生，也是本月在开放获取期刊COLLABRA上在线发表的相关研究的第一作者。

The survey-based study found that children whose parents left them alone on purpose – to go to work, help out a charity, relax or meet an illicit lover – were perceived to be in greater danger than those whose parents were involuntarily separated from them.

一项基于调查的研究结果发现，（人们对被单独留下的孩子所面临危险的评估，和父母离开的原因有关，）比起情非得已的离开，因自己有事而离开，比如上班、助阵慈善、放松或与非法情人幽会，人们感知到的危险更大。

The researchers presented survey participants with five different scenarios in which a child was left alone for less than an hour. Situations ranged from a 10-month-old who was left asleep for 15 minutes in a cool car parked in a gym’s underground garage to an 8-year-old reading a book alone at a coffee shop a block from home for 45-minutes.

研究者为被调查者提供了五种不同场景，每个场景里有一个孩子独处不超过1小时。情景从10个月的婴儿独自躺在停于体育馆地下车库的凉爽小汽车里熟睡15分钟，到8岁孩子独自在离家一个街区的咖啡店看书45分钟。

“Within a given scenario, the only thing that varied was the reason for the parent’s absence,” said Kyle Stanford, professor and chair of logic & philosophy of science. “These included an unintentional absence – caused by a fictitious accident in which the mother was hit by a car and briefly knocked unconscious – and four that were planned: leaving for work, volunteering for a charity, relaxing or meeting an illicit lover. After reading each scenario and the reason behind each child being left alone, the participants ranked on a scale of 1 to 10 how much estimated danger the child was in while the parent was gone, 10 being the most risk.”

“在每个给定场景中，唯一变量是父母离开的原因，”逻辑学和科学哲学教授Kyle Stanford说。“这些场景包括一个不得已的离开，比如虚构一个事故导致母亲被车撞暂时昏迷，另外四个是有计划的：工作，到慈善机构志愿服务，放松和与非法情人见面。了解每个场景和孩子被单独留下的原因后，被调查者从1到10给父母不在期间孩子独处的危险性评分排序，10最危险。”

Moral disapproval inflates estimate of risk
道义谴责放大了风险评估

Overall, survey participants saw all of these situations as quite dangerous for children: The average risk estimate was 6.99, and the most common ranking in all scenarios was 10. Despite identical descriptions of each set of circumstances in which children were alone, those left alone on purpose were estimated to be in greater danger than those whose parents left them alone unintentionally.

总体上，被调查者认为所有场景对孩子都相当危险：平均危险值是6.99，而在所有场景中最常见值是10。尽管孩子独处的每个场景描述相同，但父母有意离开留孩子独处的危险评估比无意留下他们的情况更大。

“In fact, children left alone on purpose are almost certainly safer than those left alone by accident, because parents can take steps to make the situation safer, like giving the child a phone or reviewing safety rules,” said Barbara Sarnecka, study co-author and associate professor of cognitive sciences. “The fact that people make the opposite judgment strongly suggests that they morally disapprove of parents who leave their children alone, and that disapproval inflates their estimate of the risk.”

“其实，有意让孩子单独留家几乎肯定比因意外让孩子单独留家更安全，因为父母可以采取措施让情况变得更安全，比如给孩子一个电话或重申安全准则，”认知科学副教授和研究共同作者Barbara Sarnecka说。“人们坚定做出相反判断的事实表明，他们在道德上不赞成父母离开让孩子独处，这种谴责放大了对风险的评估。”

This is also born out in participants’ view of children left alone by a parent meeting an illicit lover as being in significantly more danger than children left alone in precisely the same circumstances by a parent who leaves in order to work, volunteer for charity or just relax.

这也是为何在完全相同的环境背景下，受调查者认为家长约会非法情人而把儿童留家独处比起父母因工作、参加慈善志愿服务或放松而离开让儿童留家独处更危险。

In scenarios where participants were asked to judge not only how much danger the child was facing, but also whether the mother had done something morally wrong, researchers expected the perceived risk ranking to be lower.

当受调查者不仅被要求判断孩子面临多少危险，还要判断母亲是否有失德行为时，研究人员预计在这些场景下所感知的风险排名会降低。

“We thought giving people an alternative way to express their disapproval of the parent’s action would reduce the extent to which moral judgments influenced perceptions of risk,” Thomas said. “But just the opposite happened. When people gave an explicit judgment about the parent’s conduct, estimates of risk to the child were even more inflated by moral disapproval of the parent’s reason for leaving.”

“我们认为，给人们一种不喜欢父母行为的替代表达方式，能减少影响感知风险的道德评判程度。”Thomas说。“然而事实正好相反。当人们对父母行为给出明确评判后，对孩子的风险估计会因对父母离开原因的道义谴责而更加被放大。”

In fact, people’s risk estimates closely followed their judgments of whether mothers in the scenarios had done something morally wrong. Even parents who left children alone involuntarily were not held morally blameless, receiving an average “moral wrongness” judgment of 3.05 on a 10-point scale.

事实上，人们的风险评估与母亲在场景中是否做了失德的事的判断密切相关。在10分制评价里，即便不得已导致孩子单独在家的父母也并非被认为在道德上无可指责，他们也要接受平均3.05分的“失德”判断。

Fathers given more leeway than mothers
父亲的回旋余地比母亲更多

The authors found another interesting pattern when they replaced mothers in the stories with fathers: For fathers – but not mothers – a work-related absence was treated more like an involuntary absence. This difference could stem from the view that work is more obligatory and less of a voluntary choice for men.

作者把故事里的母亲替换成父亲时，发现另一个有趣的现象：对于父亲——而不是母亲——因为工作离开更容易被当作不得已的情况对待。这种差异源于一种观念，认为工作对男人而言更义不容辞，是更不得已的选择。

“Exaggerating the risks of allowing children some unsupervised time has significant costs besides the loss of children’s independence, freedom and opportunity to learn how to solve problems on their own,” Sarnecka said. “As people have adopted the idea that children must never be alone, parents increasingly face the possibility of arrest, charges of abuse or neglect, and even incarceration for allowing their children to play in parks, walk to school or wait in a car for a few minutes without them.”

“除了在孩子的独立性、自由和学习自己解决问题的机会方面的损失之外，夸大给孩子些无人看管时间的风险，有很大的代价。”Sarnecka说。“当人们都认为孩子们绝对不能独处的时候，家长越来越多面临逮捕，被指控虐待或疏忽的可能性，甚至因为允许孩子在公园玩，步行到学校或独自在车里待几分钟而被监禁。”

“At a minimum,” she continued, “these findings should caution those who make and enforce the law to distinguish evidence-based and rational assessments of risk to children from intuitive moral judgments about parents – and to avoid investing the latter with the force of law.”

“至少，”她继续说，“这些发现应该提醒那些制定和执行法律的人，把依据证据与理性地评估孩子的风险从对家长的直觉道德评判中区分出来——并避免因为法律的力量而将判断权交给后者。”

The study involved survey responses by 1,328 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk ranging in age from 18 to 75, with a fairly even split of men and women and those with and without children. Females accounted for 52 percent of respondents, while 48 percent were male; and 56.43 percent had children, while 43.57 percent did not. More than 80 percent of the participants were white, and two-thirds had completed at least some college.

本研究在Amazon Mechanical Turk网站上调查了从18岁至75岁的1328人，男性与女性，有孩子与没孩子人的回答有相当差异甚至泾渭分明。受调查者中，女性占52％，男性48％；有孩子的占56.43％，没有的占43.57％。超过80％是白人，三分之二有大学文凭。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:George F. Will @ 2016-07
译者:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar)
来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sobering-evidence-of-social-science/2016/07/06/4a3831f8-42dd-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html

The report was so “seismic” — Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s word — that Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration released it on Fourth of July weekend, 1966, hoping it would not be noticed. But the Coleman Report did disturb various dogmatic slumbers and vested interests. And 50 years on, it is pertinent to today’s political debates about class and social mobility. So, let us now praise an insufficiently famous man, sociologist James Coleman, author of the study “Equality of Educational Opportunity.”

这份报告如此‘有震撼力’，用Daniel Patrick Moynihan的话来说，以至Lyndon B. Johnson政府选择在1966年独立日前的周末发布这份报告，冀望无人留意【编注：7月4日为美国独立日，乃公共假日，Fourth of July weekend就是恰好与独立日连上的那个周末，1966年7月4日为星期一，故此周末为独立日前之周末】。但“Coleman报告”确实惊扰了教条主义者的昏睡和既得利益团体的算盘。50年后，这份报告和眼下关于阶层和社会流动性的政治辩论仍息息相关。那么，让我们赞誉一位名气还不够大的男士，研究著作《教育机会的平等》的作者，社会学家James Coleman。

In 1966, postwar liberalism’s confidence reached its apogee. From 1938, when the electorate rebuked Franklin Roosevelt for his plan to “pack” the Supreme Court, through 1964, congressional Republicans and conservative Democrats prevented a liberal legislating majority. But Johnson’s 44-state victory that year gave Democrats 68 Senate seats and a majority of 155 in the House.

1966年，战后自由主义者的自信心膨胀到最高峰。1938年，选民严厉抨击了富兰克林·罗斯福“填充最高法院”的计划。自那时至1964年，多亏国会中的共和党议员和保守派民主党议员，自由主义者未能掌握立法机构多数议席。然而，1966年，约翰逊拿下来44个联邦州，民主党人在参议院占有68席，在众议院以155席拿下多数席位。

Effortless and uninterrupted prosperity seemed assured as the economy grew in 1965 and 1966 by 10.7 percent and 7.99 percent, respectively. So, a gusher of tax revenue coincided with liberalism’s pent-up demand for large projects. It hoped to meld two American traits — egalitarian aspirations and faith in education’s transformative power.

1965年和1966年的经济增长率分别为10.7%和7.99%，唾手可得且无间断的繁荣看似已不在话下。于是，井喷式的税入增长恰逢自由派对大项目压抑已久的热情，如同干柴烈火。自由派希望将两大美国特色融为一体——追求人人平等的志向和教育推动变革的信念。

The consensus then was that the best predictor of a school’s performance was the amount of money spent on it: Increase financial inputs, and cognitive outputs would increase proportionately. As the postwar baby boom moved through public schools like a pig through a python, almost everything improved — school buildings, teachers’ salaries, class sizes, per-pupil expenditures — except outcomes measured by standardized tests.

那时的共识是，学校经费数目是预测该校学生表现的最佳指标：增加经费投入，学生的认知水平会成比例地上升。二战后婴儿潮横扫公立学校，如同一头猪通过巨蟒体内，公立学校的任一方面几乎都比以往更上一层楼——校舍、教师薪资、班级规模、平均每个学生的经费投入——唯一的例外是由标准化考试衡量的学生表现。

Enter Coleman, and the colleagues he directed, to puncture complacency with the dagger of evidence — data from more than 3,000 schools and 600,000 primary and secondary school students. His report vindicated the axiom that social science cannot tell us what to do, it can tell us the results of what we are doing. He found that the best predictor of a school’s outcomes was the quality of the children’s families. And students’ achievements are influenced by the social capital (habits, mores, educational ambitions) their classmates bring to school:

让Coleman和受其指导的同僚上台，用证据之匕首——从3000所学校和60万名小学、初中生处收集的数据 —— 刺破自满的气球吧。Coleman的报告印证了一个公理：社会科学无法指导我们行事，它能告诉我们的是行动的后果。Coleman发现，预测某校学生表现的最佳指标是学生家庭的素质。学生的学业表现受其同学带到学校的社会资本（习惯、规矩、教育方面的进取心）的影响：

“One implication stands out above all: That schools bring little influence to bear on a child’s achievement that is independent of his background and general social context; and that this very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities with which they confront adult life at the end of school.”

“一个暗含推论尤为突出：将学生的家庭背景和社交圈子的影响排除后，学校教育对学生的学业成就影响极小；这意味着由家庭、社区和同侪环境带来的水平不均等，将一路伴随他们毕业，成为他们开启成人生活时面临的不均等。”

Coleman’s report came exactly one year after — and as an explosive coda to — what is known as the Moynihan Report, which was leaked in July 1965. Moynihan, then a 37-year-old social scientist in Johnson’s Labor Department, presented in “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action” what then counted as shocking news: 23.6 percent of African American births were to unmarried women.

Coleman的报告恰好于“Moynihan报告” 发表一年后面世，为后者燃起之火添柴加薪。 Moynihan在1965年7月被人泄露于众。当年Moynihan 37岁，是约翰逊执政下劳工部的一名社会学者,他的研究《黑人家庭：国家行动的案例》，成为令时人震惊的新闻：23.6%的非裔美籍婴儿由未婚女性所生。

Today 71 percent are. Almost 47 percent of all first births are to unmarried women, and a majority of all mothers under 30 are not living with the fathers of their children.

如今这个数字为71%。将近47%的头胎新生儿由未婚女性所生，大多数30岁以下的母亲和孩子的父亲分居。

The causes of family disintegration remain unclear, but 51 years ago Moynihan and then Coleman foresaw the consequences. Moynihan said the “tangle” of pathologies associated with the absence of fathers produces a continually renewed cohort of inadequately socialized adolescent males. Socializing them is society’s urgent business if it is to avoid chaotic neighborhoods and schools where maintaining discipline displaces teaching. Coleman documented how schools are reflections of, rather than cures for, the failure of families to function as the primary transmitters of social capital.

家庭解体的原因尚未明朗，但51年前Moynihan和Coleman先后预见到家庭解体的后果。Moynihan称，父亲缺位造成的种种困扰，源源不断地产生了一代社会化不充足的青春期男性。使他们充分社会化是社会的当务之急，否则难以避免产生混乱的社区和学校，在那里维持纪律取代了正常教学。学校本应是首要的社会资本传递途径，现在却成了家庭溃败的倒影，而非家庭溃败的解药，这一切都被Coleman记在笔下。

The extraordinary synergy between Moynihan and Coleman was serendipitous. Today, their baton of brave and useful sociology has passed to Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute. His “Losing Ground” (1984) was an autopsy of 1960s aspirations. His “Coming Apart” (2012) explores the social consequences — we are wallowing in the political consequences — of a bifurcated society in which many do very well while many others are unable to reach even the lowest rungs on the ladder of upward mobility.

Moynihan和Coleman两项研究的协同增强效应，纯属意外。如今，他们勇敢、实用的社会学接力棒，传到了美国企业研究所的Charles Murray手上。Murray《站不住脚》（1984年出版）一书解剖了1960年代那场失败的壮举。他的《四分五裂》（2012年出版）一书探索了社会两极分化带来的社会后果。社会两极分化的表现是，许多人非常出色，而另外的很多人甚至连社会爬升阶梯的最低梯级都够不着，我们正在两极分化的政治后果中打滚。

Coleman’s evidence that cultural rather than financial variables matter most was not welcomed by education bureaucracies and unions. Similarly, we now have more than half a century of awkward, and often ignored, evidence about the mostly small and evanescent effects of early-childhood education. Today’s Democratic Party fancies itself “the party of science”; Barack Obama pledged, in his first inaugural address, to “restore science to its rightful place.” Social science, however, is respected by Democrats only when it validates policies congenial to the interests of favored factions.

比起经费投入，文化因素是最重要的影响变量，教育官僚机构和工会并不青睐Coleman提出的证据。与此情况相仿，早期儿童教育效果微弱，转瞬即逝，这方面令人尴尬、常被忽略的证据，我们已经积累了50多年了。如今民主党幻想自身为“科学之党”；贝拉克·奥巴马在他首个总统任期的就职演讲中，誓言“恢复科学理应占有的地位。”然而，仅在社会科学论证支持的政策有利于民主党所偏袒的利益团体时，民主党人才会尊重社会科学。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Thomas Sowell @ 2016-10-04
译者:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar)
来源:RealClearPolitics,http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/10/04/dunbar_high_school_after_100_years_131956.html

One hundred years ago, on October 2, 1916, a new public high school building for black youngsters was opened in Washington, D.C. and named for black poet Paul Laurence Dunbar. Its history is a story inspiring in many ways and appalling in many other ways.

一百年前，1916年10月2日，一座为年轻黑人而设的公立高中教学楼在华盛顿特区投入使用。这座教学楼以非洲诗人 Paul Laurence Dunbar 的姓氏命名，它的历史是个令人既振奋又惊骇的故事。

Prior to 1916, the same high school had existed under other names, housed in other buildings — and with a remarkable academic record.

在1916年前，这所高中以其它名字运营，在另外的建筑中教学，教学成果显著。

In 1899, when it was called “the M Street School,” a test was given in Washington’s four academic public high schools, three white and one black. The black high school scored higher than two of the three white high schools. Today, it would be considered Utopian even to set that as a goal, much less expect to see it happen.

1899年，当时学校还叫“ M 街学校”，华盛顿特区四所公立高中进行学业测试，三所白人高中，一所黑人高中。黑人高中的成绩高于其中两所白人高中。如今，人们会认为设立这样的目标本身就是做白日梦，更别说指望其变为现实。

The M Street School had neither of two so-called “prerequisites” for quality education. There was no “diversity.” It was an all-black school from its beginning, and on through its life as a high quality institution under the name Dunbar High School.

优质教育所需的两项所谓“前提条件”，M街学校通通没有。没有“多样性”。一开始就是全黑人学校，直到保持高质量教学水平的Dunbar高中时期，依然如此。

But its days as a high quality institution ended abruptly in the middle of the 1950s. After that, it became just another failing ghetto school.

然而，这首优质教学之歌在1950年代中期戛然而止。之后，Dunbar 高中沦为又一所溃败的贫民窟学校。

The other so-called “prerequisite” that the M Street School lacked was an adequate building. Its student body was 50 percent larger than the building’s capacity, a fact that led eventually to the new Dunbar High School building. But its students excelled even in their overcrowded building.

另一项所谓的“前提条件”——一座适宜教学的大楼——M街学校也没有。全校学生数量超过建筑物设计容纳人数50%，因此才兴建新的Dunbar高中教学楼。尽管如此，学生成绩依然优秀。

Some students at the M Street School began going to some of the leading colleges in the country in the late 19th century. The first of its graduates to go to Harvard did so in 1903. Over the years from 1892 to 1954, thirty-four of the graduates from the M Street School and Dunbar went on to Amherst.

在19世纪晚期，M街学校开始有学生考上国内顶尖大学。1903年，该校首次有学生考入哈佛大学。1892至1954年间，M街学校和Dunbar高中合共有34名毕业生考入 Amherst 学院【译注：位于马萨诸塞州的一所精英男校】

Of these, 74 percent graduated from Amherst and 28 percent of these graduates were Phi Beta Kappas. Other graduates from M Street High School and Dunbar became Phi Beta Kappas at Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth and other elite institutions.

这些学生中，74%顺利从Amherst 学院毕业，其中28%毕业生为最高荣誉优等生。其他M街学校和Dunbar 高中的一些毕业生，在哈佛、耶鲁、达特茅斯和其它精英院校成为最高荣誉优等生。

Graduates of this same high school pioneered as the first black in many places. These included the first black man to graduate from Annapolis, the first black woman to receive a Ph.D. from an American institution, the first black federal judge, the first black general, the first black Cabinet member and, among other notables, a doctor who became internationally renowned for his pioneering work in developing the use of blood plasma.

这一所高中的毕业生在多个领域都是首次取得杰出成就的黑人。包括第一名从美国海军学院毕业的黑人男生，第一名从美国高等院校获得博士学位的黑人女性，第一名黑人联邦法官，第一名黑人将军，第一名黑人内阁成员。在众多取得不凡成就的黑人中，特别值得一提的是，在保存血浆以供使用方面做出开拓性工作的一名享誉全球的黑人医生【译注：Charles Drew】

How could all of this come to an abrupt end in the 1950s? Like many other disasters, it began with good intentions and arbitrary assumptions.

这一切怎么会在1950年代突然完结？跟很多灾难一样，一切以善意和武断的假设前提开始。

When Chief Justice Earl Warren declared in the landmark 1954 case of “Brown v. Board of Education” that racially separate schools were “inherently unequal,” Dunbar High School was a living refutation of that assumption. And it was within walking distance of the Supreme Court.

1954年里程碑式的“ 布朗诉教育委员会” 一案宣判，Earl Warren大法官代表的多数判词称种族隔离的学校‘ 在本性上就是不平等的’，Dunbar高中是对这一假设前提活生生的反驳。学校就位于最高法院的步行距离之内。

A higher percentage of Dunbar graduates went on to college than the percentage at any white public high school in Washington. But what do facts matter when there is heady rhetoric and crusading zeal?

Dunbar高中毕业生考入大学的比例高于华盛顿特区内任何一所白人公立高中。但在令人头脑发热的修辞和运动式的热情面前，事实又有什么用呢？

There is no question that racially segregated schools in the South provided an inadequate education for blacks. But the assumption that racial “integration” was the answer led to years of racial polarization and turmoil over busing, with little, if any, educational improvement.

毋庸置疑，南部各州的种族隔离学校未能为黑人提供足够的教育。但种族“融合”才是解决之道的假设导致连年的种族极化和骚乱，用几近于无的教育成果提升来代替种族隔离的校巴。

For Washington, the end of racial segregation led to a political compromise, in which all schools became neighborhood schools. Dunbar, which had been accepting outstanding black students from anywhere in the city, could now accept only students from the rough ghetto neighborhood in which it was located.

对华盛顿特区而言，种族隔离的结束导致一项政治让步。所有学校都转为就近入学的学区学校。Dunbar 高中此前一直在全市范围内招收学业突出的黑人学生，现在只能从学校周边的贫民窟社区招收学生。

Virtually overnight, Dunbar became a typical ghetto school. As unmotivated, unruly and disruptive students flooded in, Dunbar teachers began moving out and many retired. More than 80 years of academic excellence simply vanished into thin air.

几乎一夜之间，Dunbar高中变为一所典型的贫民窟学校。没有学习动力、没有规矩和爱捣蛋的学生涌入学校后，原先的教师开始离开、退休。80多年的教学成果随风飘逝。

Nobody, black or white, mounted any serious opposition. “Integration” was the cry of the moment, and it drowned out everything else. That is what happens in politics.

不论黑人或白人，没有人提出任何严肃的反对意见。“融合”是当红的口号，让其它都沉没于海底。这就是政治领域正在发生的事情。

Today, there is a new Dunbar High School building, costing more than $100 million. But its graduates go on to college at only about half the rate of Dunbar graduates in earlier and poorer times. Politics can deliver costly “favors,” even when it cannot deliver quality education.

如今，Dunbar新高中教学楼耗资超过1亿美元。但学校毕业生的大学入学率仅为早期贫穷世代的一半。哪怕政治无法提供优质的教育，一样可以提供昂贵的“惠泽”。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Judith Rich Harris @ 2016-09
译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:The Psychologist, http://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-29/september/when-life-hands-you-lemon-just-bite

Judith Rich Harris takes Lance Workman through her extraordinary fightback against entrenched views of child development.
Judith Rich Harris对话Lance Workman，对已被深深认同的儿童发展心理学观点作出了非同寻常的回击。

Judith Rich Harris is a psychologist and author.
Judith Rich Harris是一位心理学家和作家。

【译注：粗体字是Workman的提问，常字体是Harris的回答】

I first become aware of you when I read The Nurture Assumption in 1998. In it you proposed that a child’s peer group has greater influence on development than her parents. Can we begin by outlining this theory?

我第一次认识你是读到你1998年出版的《教养的迷思》。在书中你提到，同龄人群体对孩子成长的影响大于父母。我们从简要概括这个理论开始，好吗？

Group socialisation theory was my attempt to solve a puzzle I had encountered while writing child development textbooks for college students. My textbooks endorsed the conventional view of child development – that what makes children turn out the way they do is ‘nature’ (their genes) and ‘nurture’ (the way their parents bring them up). But after a while it dawned on me that there just wasn’t enough solid evidence to support that view, and there was a growing pile of evidence against it.

群体社会化理论是我在撰写儿童发展心理学的大学教材时试图解决的难题。我的教材赞同儿童发展心理学的传统观点——是‘先天本性’（基因）和‘后天培养’（父母养育他们的方式）共同使孩子们形成他们的做事方式。但一段时间后我明白了，并没有足够确凿的证据支持这个观点，同时，反对证据却越来越多。

The problem was not with the ‘nature’ part – genes were having their expected effect. But ‘nurture’ wasn’t working the way it was supposed to. In studies that provided some way of controlling for or eliminating the effects of heredity, the environment provided by parents had little or no effect on how the children turned out.

问题不在于‘天性’部分——基因有其预期效果。不过‘培养’并未如大家所认为的方式发生作用。在一些以某种方式控制或消除了遗传作用的研究中，父母提供的环境对孩子如何变成后来的样子很少或者没有影响。

And yet, genes accounted for only about 50 per cent of the variation in personality and social behaviour. The environment must be playing some role. But it wasn’t the home environment. So I proposed that the environment that has lasting effects on personality and social behaviour is the one the child encounters outside the home.

然而，基因改变个性和社会行为的作用大约只占50%。环境肯定发挥着一定的作用。但这不是家庭环境。因此我认为，持久影响孩子个性和社交行为的环境是其面对的家庭之外的环境。

This makes sense if you think about the purpose of childhood. What do children have to accomplish while they’re growing up? They have to learn how to behave in a way that is acceptable to the other members of their society. How do they do this? Not by imitating their parents! Parents are adults, and every society prescribes different behaviours for children and adults.

如果想想童年的目标，你会发现这是有道理的。随着孩子长大他们不得不做什么呢？他们不得不学习他们的社交圈里其他成员可以接受的行为方式。他们如何做到这一点？不是通过模仿父母！父母是成年人，社会给孩子和成人规定了不同的行为。

A child who behaved like his or her parents (in any context other than a game) would be seen as impertinent, unruly or weird. So the first step in becoming socialised must be to figure out what sort of person you are. Are you a child or an adult? A male or a female? In complex societies there are more categories, but age and gender were probably enough for the small groups of hunter-gatherers of our ancestors.

在除游戏之外的任何情境下，孩子若像父母那样行事，会被视为不得体、任性或怪异。因此，社会化的第一步是弄清楚你属于哪类人。是孩子还是成人？男人还是女人？复杂社会分类更多，但年龄和性别对于我们祖先的狩猎采集小团体可能足够了。

Once a child had identified with a particular social category – let’s say, female child – her next job would be to learn how to behave like the others in her category. A social category is an abstract concept, not necessarily an actual group of children. My use of the term ‘peer group’ turned out to be misleading. I should have said ‘social category’ or perhaps ‘reference group’.

一旦一个孩子明确了自己属于某个特定社会类别——比方说，女童——她接下来的工作将是学会如何像她这个类别的其他人一样行事。一个社会类别是一个抽象概念，并非儿童的实际群体。我后来发现使用‘同龄人群体’这个术语是个误导。我应该说‘社会类别’或者‘参照群体’。

Why? 

为什么？

The problem with ‘peer group’ was that it made people think ‘friends’. Group socialisation theory is not about the influence of friends. Friendships are relationships. Socialisation is not a product of relationships.

‘同龄人群体’这个词的问题在于，它让人想到‘朋友’。群体社会化理论无关朋友的影响。友谊是关系。社会化不是关系的产物。

The expanded theory presented in my second book, No Two Alike, explains why. The theory is based on the idea, put forth by evolutionary psychologists such as Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, that the human mind is modular, a collection of specialised devices which each evolved as a solution to a specific problem or need.

我在第二本书《没有两个人是一样》中提出的扩展理论解释了其中缘由。这个理论基于如进化心理学家Leda Cosmides和John Tooby所提出的思想，即人类大脑是模块化的，是一套随着解决某个特定问题或需要而进化出的专门化元件的集合。

I proposed that there are three such devices involved in social development – the relationship system, the socialisation system and the status system. These systems work more or less independently; sometimes they even issue contradictory commands. They collect different kinds of information from the environment and process it in different ways. Friendships – like parent–child relationships – are in the purview of the relationship system, which collects data on specific individuals and makes fine distinctions among them. The socialisation system, in contrast, doesn’t bother with individuals – it computes means. It forms a prototype for each social category. The child is influenced by the norms of the social category she identifies with, even if she never interacts personally with any of its members.

我提出三种元件参与社会发展——关系系统、社会化系统和身份系统。这些系统或多或少独立工作；有时他们甚至发出相互矛盾的命令。它们从环境中收集不同种类信息并以不同方式进行处理。友谊——如亲子关系——属于关系系统范畴，它收集特定个体的数据，并在它们之间做出精准区别。相反，社会化系统与个体无关，它计算的是平均情况。它构成了每种社会类别的原型范式。孩子是被其身份认同的社会类别的规范所影响，即便她从未亲自与群体其他成员发生互动。

The Nurture Assumption completely split the field. People either said it was a serious step forward in our understanding of child development or they just weren’t having any of it. I’m in the first camp – it changed my view of child development. But why do you think there was so much hostility?

《教养的迷思》彻底分裂了这个研究领域。要么有人说这是我们理解儿童发展心理向前迈进的重要一步，要么就说它什么也不是。我是前者，它改变了我关于儿童发展心理学的看法。但是，为什么对它有这么多敌意呢？

Part of the problem was the media coverage, which was often headlined ‘Do parents matter?’. Parents were understandably irked by the question. (My answer, by the way, is: Of course parents matter!)

部分问题出在媒体报道，它们常用‘父母重要吗？’这样的标题。可以理解家长们被这样的问题搞得苦恼不已。（顺便说一句，我的回答是：当然，父母重要！）

But the real opposition to my work came from the academic world – from professors of developmental psychology. Some of these people had spent their entire careers doing studies designed to support the traditional view of child development. Then some troublemaker pops up – a complete nobody, with no PhD and no academic affiliation – and announces that the professors are wrong and their studies are worthless. You wouldn’t expect them to greet me with open arms, would you?

但是对我工作的真正反对来自学术世界——发展心理学的教授们。他们中的一些人毕其全部职业生涯做研究，旨在支持儿童发展心理学的传统观点。然后一些捣乱者冒了出来——不知何方人士，没有博士学位，没有学术任职——就胆敢声称教授们是错误的，他们的研究毫无价值。你不会指望他们张开双臂欢迎我，对吗？

You were particularly critical of their correlational studies of development. 

你对于发展心理学相关研究表现的特别有批判性。

I still see those worthless studies all the time – they get a lot of publicity. I see them as a shameful waste of time and research money. I see them as reminders that I failed in my goal of reforming the methodology of developmental psychology.

我总是仍然看到那些毫无价值的研究——他们获得大量宣传。我认为这是时间和研究经费的可耻浪费。我将这些视为对我改革发展心理学之方法论的雄心所受挫折的提醒。

The studies are worthless because the results they produce are ambiguous, so the researchers can interpret them any way they please. Let’s say they find a correlation between how often a family eats dinner together and how well their teenager manages to stay out of trouble. Such results are presented as evidence that eating dinner with their parents has ‘protective’ effects on teenagers.

这些研究毫无价值，因为其结果模棱两可，研究者以他们乐意的任何方式解释之。比方说，他们找到了一家人多久一起共进晚餐和青少年多大程度上努力不出乱子之间的相关性。这个结果作为与父母共进晚餐对青少年有‘保护’作用的证据呈现出来。

But the research method provides no way of controlling for, or estimating, the effects of inherited genes on the teenagers’ behaviour. (Conscientious parents tend to have conscientious children.) No way of controlling for what I call ‘child-to-parent effects.’ (Parents are more likely to enjoy eating dinner with well-behaved teenagers.) No way of controlling for the teenagers’ own willingness to show up at dinnertime. (Teenagers are less likely to enjoy eating dinner with their parents if they are doing things their parents don’t approve of.) The researchers assume that, even though these other factors might play a role, some of the correlation must be due to the beneficial effects of family dinners. That is a logically indefensible assumption, not supported by studies that do provide the necessary controls.

但是研究方法却没有提供任何控制或者估计遗传基因影响青少年行为的方法（有责任心的父母的孩子往往有责任心）。没有控制我所说的‘从孩子到父母的影响’（父母更乐意与举止礼貌的孩子共进晚餐）。没有控制青少年自己乐意露面的晩餐时间（如果青少年正在做父母不认可的事情，他们不大可能喜欢与父母共进晚餐）。研究者认为，尽管其他因素可能有一定作用，但一些相关肯定是由于家庭晚餐的正面作用。这是一个逻辑上站不住脚的假设，并且没有得到那些确实控制了其他因素的研究的支持。

I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to state that The Nurture Assumption pretty much made you famous almost overnight. It’s not only a radical alternative to traditional ideas, but also a real ‘page-turner’. Was it your intention to write in that style?

我不觉得《教养的迷思》几乎让你一夜之间出名是夸张的措词。这本书不仅对传统观点来说是激进的，也是真正的‘新篇章开启者’。用这种风格写作是你的目的吗？

Actually, I started out by writing a traditional article and publishing it in a traditional journal, the Psychological Review. No one called it a page-turner. In fact, though it did get some favourable responses from people in other areas of psychology, it was completely ignored by the audience I was hoping to reach – those professors of developmental psychology.

实际上，我一开始是要写篇传统文章发表在传统期刊《心理学评论》上。没有人把它称为新篇章开启者。事实上，尽管它确实得到了其他心理学领域的积极反响，但却被我希望能看到它的观众——发展心理学领域的教授们——完全忽略了。

So I decided to go over their heads, as it were, and take my message directly to the general public. If you’re writing a book on a complex topic and you want people to read it, you have to make it interesting. It also helps if you can give your readers an occasional laugh. My model for how to write a book for the general public was Steven Pinker’s The Language Instinct.

因此我决定，这么说吧，越过他们，直接把我的研究呈现在广大公众面前。假如你正在写一本复杂话题的书，还希望有人读它，那你就要让它有趣起来。如果读者时而笑出声来，那也有所帮助。我所借鉴的如何为广大公众写书的模本，是Steven Pinker的《语言本能》一书。

Pinker of course went on to write several more books for the public – all page turners, and in many cases game changers. I noticed that he dedicated The Blank Slate to ‘Don, Judy, Leda and John’. I would assume that three of these are Don Symons, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. Would I be right in thinking you are the Judy? 

当然，Pinker为大众写了不少书——全都是新篇章开启者，许多情况下还是游戏改变者。我注意到他把《白板论》一书献给‘Don, Judy, Leda and John’。我猜其中三个是Don Symons, Leda Cosmides和John Tooby。你是Judy，对吗？

Yes. Steve and I became e-mail friends after I sent him a copy of my Psych Review paper and some comments on The Language Instinct. After we had exchanged a few e-mails, he asked, ‘Have you ever thought of writing a book?’ It wasn’t exactly a new idea to me, but it was nice to have the encouragement.

是的。在我给他寄送了我写的《心理学评论》论文拷贝和对《语言本能》一书的个人见解后，Steve和我成了电邮笔友。后来，我们互通了一些电子邮件，他问我：“你有没有想过写一本书？”这对我实在不是新想法，但它是很好的鼓励。

I think Steve was particularly receptive to my arguments because he’s a psycholinguist. I often use examples from psycholinguistics in explaining my theory, for two reasons. First, the outcome is usually obvious. You don’t need fancy statistical tests to decide whether or not someone has a foreign accent. Second, language and accent are among the very few social behaviours in which genetic differences play no role at all. Whether you speak Japanese or Swahili, whether your accent is Oxbridge or Liverpudlian, has nothing to do with heredity. But it does have a great deal to do with social context. The children of immigrants have the same accent as the other kids in the neighbourhood, even if they use their parents’ native language at home. Around the world, it is quite common for children to use one language at home and a different one outside the home, or one language with Mummy and a different one with Daddy.

我感觉Steve特别能接受我的观点，因为他是心理语言学家。我经常使用心理语言学例子解释我的理论，有两个原因。首先，结果通常显而易见。不需要花哨的统计学计算来确定某人是否有外国口音。其次，语言和口音是极少数遗传基因差异不起作用的社会行为之一。无论你说日语或者斯瓦希里语，无论你操牛津剑桥口音或者利物浦口音，均与遗传无关。而它确实与社会背景有很大关系。即便在家说父母亲的母语，移民孩子的口音与其他邻居孩子也一样。在世界各地，常常可见孩子在家使用一种语言而出门使用另外一种，或者和妈咪说一种语言而和爹地说另一种。

A central tenet of my theory is that social behaviours are tightly linked to the context in which they were acquired. It’s a mistake – one that’s incorporated into all the major theories of child development – to assume that children automatically generalise what they learn, from one context or person to another: Mummy is nice to them so they expect everyone to be nice to them. But discrimination, not generalisation, is the default setting of the baby’s mind.

我的理论的核心要义是，社会性行为与从中习得它的社会情境紧密相连。假设孩子自动将所学内容一般化，从一种情境或一个人推及另外一种或另一个人：就像妈咪善待他们，因此期待人人善待他们——这个假定被植入了儿童发展学的所有重要理论中，但它是错误的。相反，区别对待而非一般化处理，是婴儿心理的默认设置。

Many of the behaviours that children acquire at home would be counterproductive elsewhere. Children who dominate their younger siblings at home would be making a mistake if they tried to treat their schoolmates the same way, especially if they happen to be small for their age. Fortunately, children don’t make that mistake. Firstborns are no more likely than laterborns to try to dominate their peers.

孩子在家习得的许多行为在别处则是有害无益的。在家对弟妹指手划脚的孩子，如果试图以同样方式对待同学，就犯错了，尤其如果他们碰巧在同龄人中个头偏小。幸运的是，孩子不会犯类似错误。排行高的孩子不比排行低的孩子有更多可能性对同龄人指手划脚。

Of course, some of the things children learn at home are useful elsewhere. Those who learn to speak the local language, or to read, or to play a musical instrument, don’t have to acquire these skills all over again when they step outside. But they don’t trot them out automatically. They are tentative at first, until they’re sure that the behaviour or skill they learned at home will also work in the new setting.

当然，也有孩子在家学习的一些事情在别处是有用的。掌握了言说和阅读本地语言或演奏乐器的人，走出家门不必重新学习这些技能。但是，他们不必机械地小跑离家出来。他们先试探，直到确信那些在家里学到的行为或技能在新的环境设定中也管用。

For a young child, it’s safer to discriminate than to generalise. The child’s mind is not short of storage space. A child can store different rules of behaviour for every setting, and different expectations for every individual he or she encounters.

对于小孩子，区别对待比一般化处理更安全。孩子的意识不缺存储空间。可以为不同环境设定存储不同行为规范，以及为他所与之交往的每个人分别存储各自对对方的期望。

Your goal in No Two Alike was to explain why individuals differ so much, even if they grew up in the same family, right?

您写《没有两个人一样》一书是解释为什么每个人如此不同，即使他们在同一家庭长大，对吗？

Right. I realised a couple of years after The Nurture Assumption was published that I had done only half the job: I had explained only how children get socialised. Socialisation is a process that causes children to become more similar in behaviour to their same-sex peers. And yet, despite being socialised, children continue to differ from one another in personality and social behaviour.

对。《教养的迷思》出版后过了几年，我发现自己只做了一半工作：我只解释了孩子是如何社会化的。社会化是导致孩子行为处事更像同性同龄人的过程。尽管被社会化，孩子们的个性和社会行为仍然彼此不同。

If anything, the differences widen during childhood and adolescence. I made some ineffectual efforts to deal with that problem in The Nurture Assumption, but I didn’t have a theory to account for it till I wrote the second book. The improved version of the theory presented in No Two Alike explains how children can, at the same time, become more similar to their peers in some ways and more different in other ways.

很可能，个体差异在孩童期和青春期扩大了。在《教养的迷思》中我做了些无效努力面对这个问题，但没有理论可以解释它，直到我写第二本书。《没有两个人一样》提出的改进版理论解释了为什么孩子在一些方面与同伴更相似，与此同时在另一些方面却变得更为不同。

There was a fair bit of replying to arguments put forward by critics of The Nurture Assumption. Was that one of the aims?

之前你针对《教养的迷思》批评者所提出的观点给出了不少直接回应。那是你的写作目的之一吗？

It was. I was tired of journalists telling me that my theory must be wrong because some expert at some big university had told them that there were plenty of studies that disproved it. I searched diligently for the studies they cited. In some cases they were nowhere to be found; at any rate, they had never been published in a peer-reviewed journal. In other cases a study had been published but the results didn’t do what the experts claimed – they didn’t disprove my theory. In one case, a study they cited actually did the opposite – it supported my theory!

是的。我厌烦了记者告诉我，我的理论肯定错误，因为某些著名大学的某些专家已经告诉他们，有大量研究反驳我的理论。我努力分析他们引用的研究。有些研究什么也没发现；不管怎么说，它们从未在同行评议的学术期刊上发表。另一些研究，发表的一项实验没获得专家声称的实验结果——并没有反驳我的理论。一个研究援引的一项实验结果实际上恰好相反——它支持我的理论！

That 1995 Psychological Review piece you mentioned won the George A. Miller award for an outstanding article in general psychology. There was a certain irony about that?

你提到的1995年那篇《心理学评论》文章荣获了George A. Miller心理学杰出论文奖。这是某种嘲讽吗？

In 1960 I was a graduate student in the Department of Psychology at Harvard. One day I got a letter saying that the Department had decided to kick me out of their PhD programme. They doubted I would ever make a worthwhile contribution to psychology, the letter said, due to my lack of ‘originality and independence’. The letter was signed by the acting chairman of the Department, George A. Miller!

1960年，我是哈佛大学心理学系研究生。有一天，我收到一封信，说系里已经决定把我排除在博士项目之外。信中说，由于我缺乏‘原创性和独立性’，他们对我做出有价值的心理学贡献表示怀疑。这封信正是由代理系主席George A. Miller签署的！

Sometimes, when life hands you a lemon, you should just bite in. Getting kicked out of Harvard was a devastating blow at the time, but in retrospect, it was the best thing that Harvard ever did for me. It freed me from the influence of ‘experts’. It kept me from being indoctrinated. Many years later, it enabled me to write The Nurture Assumption.

有时，当生活递给你一个柠檬时，你就应该咬它。当时被踢出哈佛是一个毁灭性打击，但现在回想起来，这是哈佛为我所做过的最好的事情。这让我从‘专家’的影响解脱出来。让我不被灌输。许多年以后，让我写出《教养的迷思》。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08
译者:Tankman
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed

Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here.
《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上：伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。

Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate?

伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退，激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗？或是能被改革，变得更加温和，现代且与邻为善呢？伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利，并给穆斯林信仰自由，接受现代金融和司法的基本原则，而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗？

A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that “radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution,” the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, “He’s wrong. Sorry about that.” She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point.

越来越多的分析家认为不会，穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情，这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中，成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注：一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物，以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题，温和伊斯兰是解药”时，她说：“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕，追求同一目标，和相同的敌人战斗，但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。

My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge.

我的论述有两部分。第一，很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的；第二，革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。

Arguing Against Essentialism
对本质主义的驳斥

To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion’s core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past.

声称伊斯兰不可被改变，则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解，而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误，因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切，包括对圣典的解读，随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。

Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran’s interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of “no compulsion in religion,” and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi’i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam.

只有不考虑人类本性，无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁，一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变，像圣战，奴隶，高利贷，“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且，我们容易想到过去的1400年，很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi’i，al-Ghazali，Ibn Taymiya，Rumi，Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。

However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam’s scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country’s history would lead to a distorted understanding.

可兰经和圣训也许是中心，而不是穆斯林经验的全部；从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国；忽略了这个国家的历史，会导致认知的扭曲。

Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today’s Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline.

换一种说法就是，中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的，今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟，它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业，1969年我进入该领域时，我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起，到今天享有着巨大能量；如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大，那么它也可能衰落。

How might that happen?

这种变化可能会如何发生呢？

The Medieval Synthesis
中世纪整合

Key to Islam’s role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia’s prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much.

伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的；而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢？一个刑罚体系，要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争，遵循这禁令是不可能的；实际上，穆斯林发起的战争中，约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地，坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。

To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad.

为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求，前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法，允许放松一些伊斯兰法条，而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal（花招）和其他方式，遵循法律的形式，同时否定其实质。比如，为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家，很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。

This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam’s “medieval synthesis” in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists:

沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》（1983）中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象，不切实际的要求，翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中，它减低了沙利亚的力度，使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行，同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali，在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话：

One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to “compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court.” As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, “Social patterns were in great contrast to the ‘official’ picture presented by these ‘formal’ sources.” Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of “the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian.”

律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时，“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。”

While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12^th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18^th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability.

虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪，它并未克服一个基本的弱点：它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本，或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷，面对原教旨主义者的挑战，它仍然是脆弱的。实际上，前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战，包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中，原教旨主义的努力最终被软化，中世纪整合重新回到轨道，而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色，助长了其不稳定性。

The Challenge of Modernity
现代性的挑战

The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon’s attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization.

中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断，传统观点来看，这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中，把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向：西方化或是伊斯兰化。

Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile.

西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象，他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法，代之以同类领域的西方做法，比如不利用法律确立宗教，妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前，这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运，对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。

But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back.

但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多，而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底，西方化表面上看起来强大，实则不然，因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高，有话语权的精英，而广大民众则被压制。

Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam.

从1930年代起，抗拒因素开始组织起来，发展他们自己的力量，尤其是在阿尔及利亚，埃及，伊朗，和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果，呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般，坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。

Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West.

虽然排斥西方，这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动，依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身，比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设，比如国家优先于个人，可以接受暴力斗争，和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术，尤其是军事和医疗方面。

Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways.

通过创造性的努力，伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长，最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者，霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中，显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件，和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序，在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步，用各种创新且极端的方式，变革社会，实行伊斯兰教法。

For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls’ schools and music stores. The Islamists’ influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas.

比如，在伊朗，什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者，并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗，塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身，你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱，头巾和罩袍。

Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey’s Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country’s established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism.

虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型，相比法西斯和共产主义，伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动，被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党（AKP）领导着，已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台，AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕，借助该国已经建立的民主制度，和良好的施政表现，逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量，而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。

The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction.

伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健，但是它们的势头并不是由来已久，也并不保证能持续下去。实际上，像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样，伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力，其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗，明确体现了这点。

Toward a Modern Synthesis
通向一个现代的整合

If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a “modern synthesis” comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps.

若要打败伊斯兰主义，反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景，来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点，他们可以回溯历史，尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力，对照“中世纪整合”，来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等，和不信伊斯兰者和平共存，并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。

Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans.

在此，把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较，不无益处。五个世纪前，犹太教徒，基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的，借贷收利息则不被允许。最终，经过了苦涩和反复的辩论，犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点；今天，没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。

Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, (“pretend” because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.)

然而在穆斯林当中，这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年，沙特阿拉伯在1962年，毛里塔尼亚在1980年，官方禁止了蓄奴，奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在（尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦）。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元，并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息，（“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。）

Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else.

穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好，并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教，他们必须模仿其他一神教，改变自己宗教在蓄奴，利息，妇女权益，背教自由，司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。

When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy.

当一个改革的，现代的伊斯兰涌现，它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益，统治异教徒的观念，圣战，或者自杀性恐怖主义，它也不会要求对通奸，危害家族荣誉，渎神和背教者处以死刑。

Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women:

在这一新的世纪，一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下：

• Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn’t end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
• 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒，把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚，但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
• Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
• 土耳其神职人员已经同意，让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜，并且和男人一起祷告。
• The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
• 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
• Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
• 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
• A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
• 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议，认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰，事实上应该被惩罚。
• A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
• 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法，反对多妻制。

Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include:

其他显著进步，不一定局限于妇女权益方面，包括：

• The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
• 沙特政府终止了Jizya（向非穆斯林征收人头税）。
• An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
• 一个伊朗法庭，判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
• Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
• 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会，开始就处决背教者展开辩论。

All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times.

同时，倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法，如果不是着眼于改进，那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir，一个沙特女记者，大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利，和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴，包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责，但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论，在以前时代这是无法想象的。

Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad’s example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today’s Muslims make of it.

和其中世纪的先行者一样，面对原教旨人士的攻击，现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子，然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是，已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果，有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想，并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念；它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。

Policy Implications
政策含义

What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims?

反对伊斯兰教法，哈里发国，和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢？

For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process.

对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林，最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义，而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力，通过慷慨和无私，达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者，必须也经过可能是数十年的努力，发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态，然后推广它。在这个过程中，解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。

Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey’s AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism.

非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰：第一，坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登，也可以是隐秘鬼祟，表面合法的政治性运动，如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍，但他却更有效，危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由，法律面前人人平等和其他人权，珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。

Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization.

第二，非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天，这些人物弱小零散，且面对着艰巨的任务，但是他们确实存在，他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权，代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。

Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum.
Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。

July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title “What Is Islam?”
2013年7月7日更新： Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章，标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。

Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at “Islam’s Future.”
2013年10月1日更新：六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章，我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。

Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2^nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that “Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation.” So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all.
2014年4月10日更新：虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段，并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道，“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以，她也许开始接受我的观点了。

Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that “When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history.”
2016年2月4日更新：我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰，门外汉讨论文本，内行讨论历史。”

Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking’s illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank’s headquarters (as photographed by me). It’s a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above.
2016年2月24日更新：这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片，也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划，这版本似乎并不让人激动。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Christopher Ferguson @ 2016-08-02
译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
来源:https://theconversation.com/sex-on-tv-less-impact-on-teens-than-you-might-think-61957

Few people would doubt that sex is ubiquitous in media – whether movies, television, music or books – and that teens today have unprecedented access to all of it. It’s often taken for granted that this easy access to “sexy media” has an influence on teenage sexuality.

性在媒体上无处不在，这个论断少有人质疑。无论电影、电视、音乐或书籍，对当今的青少年而言，有关性的一切信息触手可及，这种便捷史无前例。人们经常理所当然的认为，随处可见的“色情媒体”会对青少年性行为产生影响。

Specifically, the worry is that teens may have sex earlier or engage in higher-risk sexual activities such as having multiple partners or exposing themselves to potential pregnancies or STDs. In 2010 the American Academy of Pediatrics even published a position paper claiming that sexually explicit media could promote risky teen sexual behavior.

具体来说，人们担心的是青少年可能更早发生性行为，或者参与高风险性行为。比如与多位同伴有性行为，或者暴露于怀孕或染上性病的风险中。2010年美国儿科协会甚至发表了一篇意见书，声称色情媒体可能诱发青少年危险性行为。

But government data find that teens are actually waiting longer than in the past to have sex. And teen pregnancy rates are at historic lows. How is it possible that sexy media has such a pernicious effect even as teen sexuality is becoming healthier?

然而政府数据显示，事实上青少年发生性行为前的等待时间比过去更长。且现时未成年人怀孕率处于历史最低点。色情媒体如此有害，而青少年性行为反而比以往健康，这怎么可能呢？

I’ve spent more than a decade researching how media – like video games or advertising – influences youth behavior. What fascinates me is how society interacts with media, often embracing salacious content while simultaneously blaming it for societal problems, whether real or imagined.

我花了超过十年的时间研究视频游戏和广告之类的媒体如何影响青少年行为。让我着迷的是，社会如何与媒体相互作用。媒体经常热衷于色情内容，同时却将之归咎于真实或假想中的社会问题。

So my colleagues and I decided to look at the research on sexy media and teenage sexual behavior to see how the strong the link between the two is.

于是我和我的同事们决定研究色情媒体和青少年性行为的关系，看看这两者之间的相关性有多高。

Sexy media doesn’t predict sexual behavior
色情媒体不是性行为的有效预测变量

Despite the common assumptions about sex in the media and its alleged effects on teens, the evidence behind the link is weak. Some studies find evidence for a small effect (perhaps in some circumstances but not others), while others find no evidence for any effect.

尽管人们声称媒体上的性信息会影响青少年，这个受到普遍认同的假设前提并未得到多少证据支持。有些研究发现了微弱效应存在的证据（可能在某些情形下有相关性，其它情形下没有），然而另一些研究没有发现存在任何影响的证据。

One reason the evidence may not be conclusive is that there are practical and ethical limitations to conducting research. We can’t run experiments where teens watch different TV shows and we wait around to see who has sex. This means research often relies on self-reported data. What we do is ask teens to report on their sexual behavior and their media preferences, as well as other variables we might like to control for (such as personality or family environment) and see if correlations exist.

证据可能不够有说服力的原因之一是，开展此类研究有操作上的和伦理上的限制。我们不能在青少年观看不同电视节目的地方进行实验，并且在周围等待，看谁发生了性行为。这意味着研究经常依赖自我报告的数据。我们所做的是，让青少年报告他们的性行为和偏好的媒体，以及我们可能想控制的其它变量（比如性格和家庭环境），来看是否存在相关性。

With this in mind, my colleagues Patrick Markey at Villanova and Danish researcher Rune Nielsen and I conducted a meta-analysis of 22 studies with over 22,000 participants that examine the correlation between sexy media and teenage sexual behavior. A meta-analysis lets us look for commonalities in the results, and is something that had not been done previously with this pool of research.

出于这种考虑，我和在维拉诺瓦的同事Patrick Markey，还有丹麦研究员Rune Nielsen进行了一项对22个研究，包含超过2.2万参与者的荟萃分析，来检验色情媒体和青少年性行为之间的相关性。这个荟萃分析让我们寻找已有研究结果中的共性，这批研究此前未做过荟萃分析。

All of the studies in the meta-analysis looked at depictions of sexual situations, nudity, partial nudity or explicit discussions of sex in television shows or movies easily accessible to minors (and thus excluded pornography).

这次荟萃分析里的研究都着眼于电视节目上对行为情景的描述、裸露、部分裸露或者公开讨论的性内容, 或者容易被未成年人接触到的电影 （因此排除了色情文学）。

In particular, we were curious to see whether sexy media predicted teen sexual behavior once other variables had been controlled. For instance, maybe boys tend to watch sexier media and also are more sexually risk-taking. Or perhaps youth who are more liberal in terms of personality are more open both to sexy media and earlier sexual initiation. Perhaps a difficult family background is the underlying key to understanding any correlation between media use habits and actual sexual behavior.

我们特别好奇的是，一旦其它变量受到控制，色情媒体接触行为能否预测青少年性行为。例如，可能男孩更倾向于观看更色情的媒体内容，并且愿意承担更多的性风险。或者有更自由人格的青少年更易于接受色情媒体和早期性启蒙。也许一个复杂的家庭背景是理解媒体使用习惯和实际性行为相关性背后的关键。

Ultimately, this is what we found. Once other factors such as family environment, personality or even gender were controlled, sexy media exposure did not meaningfully correlate with teen sexual behavior.

最后，这是我们的发现。一旦其它因素，比如家庭环境、性格甚至性别都受到控制，色情媒体的曝光与青少年性行为没有显著的相关。

Contrary to common fears, sexy media doesn’t seem to have any practical significance for when teens first have sex or start other sexual behaviors. This lack of correlation is a warning sign we might be on the wrong track in trying to blame media for teen sexual risk-taking.

与常见的恐惧相反，色情媒体内容似乎对青少年首次性行为或者进行其它性接触的时间没有任何实际影响。缺乏相关性是一个警告信号，我们将青少年冒险的性行为归咎于媒体的观点可能是错误的。

Why doesn’t media influence teens?
为什么媒体内容影响不了青少年？

There are numerous theories that discuss how individuals and media interact. However, many older media effects theories didn’t consider why people were drawn to media, how they processed it, or what they hoped to get from it. Such theories assumed viewers simply irrationally and purposelessly imitated what they saw. Most of the papers we examined in our meta-analysis were tests of these basic, automatic, media effects theories.

有很多理论讨论个人和媒体如何相互影响。然而，许多早期媒体效应理论没有考虑为什么人们被媒体内容吸引，他们如何处理媒体内容，或者他们想从媒体内容中得到什么。这些理论假设观众只是简单非理性和无目的地模仿他们观看的内容。我们荟萃分析里的大多数论文就是这些基本、自动的媒体效应理论的实验测试。

In the past few years, some scholars (myself included) have specifically called for the retirement of these older media effects theories. This is because the evidence increasingly suggests that fictional media such as feature movies or sitcoms media is too remote to have a clear impact on consumers’ behavior, especially compared to families and peers.

过去几年，一些学者（包括我自己）号召淘汰这些早期媒体效应理论。越来越多的证据表明，像故事电影和情景喜剧这样的虚构媒体内容太遥不可及，不足以对消费者的行为产生清晰明确的影响，尤其是与家庭和同龄人这两个因素相比。

In addition, emerging evidence suggests that young children process fictional media differently from real events. If small children are able to process a difference between fictional events and real events, we can assume that teens don’t really expect media to reflect reality.

此外，新出现的证据表明，年轻的孩子处理虚构媒体的方式不同于真实事件。如果小孩子都能够辨别虚构事件和真实事件之间的差异，我们可以假设青少年从来没有真正想过媒体反映了现实。

Our results regarding the limited impact of media also fit with the observations from societal data. Despite a plethora of sexual media available to teens, a crisis of risky teen sexual behavior has not emerged.

我们关于媒体有限影响的研究结果也符合来自社会数据的观察。尽管青少年接触到种类繁多的色情媒体，高风险青少年性行为的危机并没有出现。

We watch what we’re interested in watching
我们观看我们感兴趣的

Newer models of media use suggest that it is the individuals who consume media, not the media itself, who are the driving agents of behavior. Evidence suggests that users seek out and interpret media according to what they want to get from it, rather than passively imitating it.

较新的媒体使用模型表明，是消费媒体内容的个人而不是媒体本身，驱动了行为。有证据表明，用户根据他们想要从中得到什么来寻找和解读媒体，而不是被动的模仿。

People don’t generally accidentally watch media, sexual or otherwise, but are motivated to do so because of preexisting desires.

人们通常不是偶然地观看媒体、性或者其它，而是被先前存在的欲望驱动。

For instance, some recent studies have indicated that youth seek out media that fit with preexisting motives, called a selection effect, but that media don’t necessarily lead to further problem behaviors. For example, research suggests that some teens who are already aggressive might be interested in violent video games, but playing such games doesn’t make kids more aggressive.

例如，最近的一些研究显示青年人寻求适合先前已经存在的动机的媒体，这被称为“选择效应”。但是媒体并不一定导致进一步的问题行为。比如，研究表明一些本来就已经好斗的青年人可能对暴力视频游戏感兴趣，但玩这样的游戏并没有让孩子更好斗。

That’s a point that sometimes seems ignored when we talk about teens and sex. Interest in sex is a largely biologically motivated process; fictional media really isn’t required. Teens will become interested in sex all on their own.

这就是当我们谈论青少年与性时，有时候会忽略的一点。对性的兴趣很大程度上是生物性驱动的过程，虚构媒体并非必需。青少年自发的对性产生兴趣。

Parents have more influence than the media
父母比媒体影响更大

Parents can rest a bit easier since the evidence suggests that media isn’t a primary driver of teen sexuality.

父母们可以松口气了，因为证据表明媒体不是一个青少年性行为的主要驱动力。

To the extent media has any impact at all, it is likely only in a vacuum left by adults reluctant to talk to kids about sex, especially the stuff kids really want to know.

即便媒体能施加影响，也只是在一个由成人所留下的真空内起作用，有些成人不愿意跟孩子谈论与性有关的话题，尤其是孩子真正想知道的事情，由此便产生了真空。

How do you ask someone out on a date and how do you handle it if they say no? What does sex feel like? When is it OK to have sex? What are the risks and how do you avoid them? In the face of patient, empathic and informative discussions about sex by adults kids trust, the media likely has little influence.

你怎么邀请别人出去约会？如果他们拒绝了，你怎么处理？性爱是怎么样的？什么时候可以发生性行为？性行为有什么风险，你怎么避免这些风险？在成人与孩子之间互相信任、耐心、有同理心和有理有据的讨论面前，媒体可能几乎没有影响。

Ultimately, whether media have salacious or more conscientious portrayals of sexuality, we should not expect media to replace conversations with youth by parents, guardians and educators.

最后，无论媒体是否有露骨或更谨慎的性描写，我们都不应期待媒体取代父母、监护人和教育工作者与青少年的谈话。

I’m not suggesting everyone run out and buy “50 Shades of Grey” for their teen, but if teens happen to come across it (and they will), it’s not the end of the world.

我不是建议每个人都跑出去买《五十度灰》给他们的小孩，但是如果青少年无意中发现这本书（他们肯定会），这不是世界末日。

The important thing for parents is to talk to their kids.

作为父母，重要的是和他们的孩子谈一谈。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者:Jeffrey Tucker @ 2016-02-17
译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
来源:FEE,https://fee.org/articles/government-s-war-on-women-1900-1920/

Many now credit government for past progress in gender equality, mostly because of late 20th-century legislation that appeared to benefit women in the workplace. This is a distorted view. Few know that government at all levels actually sought to prevent that progress.

如今许多人把过去在性别平等上的进步归功于政府，主要是因为二十世纪后期的立法看似让职业女性受益。然而这个观点与现实不符。鲜为人知的是，各个层级的政府都曾企图阻挠这种进步。

A century ago, just as markets were attracting women to professional life, government regulation in the United States specifically targeted women to restrict their professional choices. The regulations were designed to drive them out of offices and factories and back into their homes — for their own good and the good of their families, their communities, and the future of the race.

一个世纪前，正当市场吸引女性进入职场之际，美国的政府管制刻意将女性作为目标人群，限制她们的职业选择。这些管制措施的目的是把女性从办公室和工厂驱赶回家中——为了女性和她们家庭、社区，以及民族的未来。

The new controls — the first round of a century of interventions in the free labor market — were designed to curb the sweeping changes in economics and demographics that were taking place due to material advances in the last quarter of the 19th century. The regulations limited women’s choices so they would stop making what elites considered the wrong decisions.

这些新的控制措施——是整整一个世纪对自由劳动力市场的干涉浪潮的第一波——意在阻止由于十九世纪最后二十五年物质进步所带来的经济和人口统计上的巨大变化。管制措施限制了女性的选择，这样她们就无法做出当时社会精英眼中的“错误”决定。

The real story, which is only beginning to emerge within the academic literature, is striking. It upends prevailing narratives about the relationship between government and women’s rights. Many cornerstones of the early welfare and regulatory state were designed to hobble women’s personal liberty and economic advancement. They were not progressive but reactionary, an attempt to turn back the clock.

Women’s Work Is Not New
女性工作不是什么新鲜事

It was the freedom and opportunity realized in the latter period of the 19th century that changed everything for women workers, opening up new lines of employment.

The growth of industrial capitalism meant that women could leave the farm and move to the city. They could choose to leave home without having married — and even stay in the workforce as married women. They enjoyed more choice in education and professional life than ever before.

New clerical jobs, unknown a century earlier, were everywhere to be had. Women’s wages were rising quickly, by an impressive 16 percent from 1890 through 1920. Nor were women working at “exploitative” wages. A Rand corporation study of wage differentials discovered an interesting fact: women’s wages relative to men’s were higher in 1920 than they were in 1980.

新的文书类工作在那之前一个世纪还不存在，而此时已经到处都是。从1890年至1920年女性的工资快速上升，涨幅高达16%。女性的工资并非是“剥削性”的。兰德公司一项关于工资差异的研究揭示了一个有趣的事实：1920年女性工资相对于男性工资的比率要高于1980年。

The Law Intervenes
法律介入

And yet, these were also the years in which we first saw government intervention in the labor market, much of it specifically targeting women. As historian Thomas Leonard argues in his spectacular book Illiberal Reformers (2016), an entire generation of intellectuals and politicians panicked about what this could mean for the future of humanity.

然而，在那些年政府首次开始介入劳动力市场，明确针对的目标主要是女性。正如历史学家Thomas Leonard在其力作《非自由的改革者（Illiberal Reformers）》中指出的，整整一代的知识分子和政治家恐慌于女性工资上升会给人类未来带来的影响。

Society must control reproduction and therefore what women do with their lives. So said the prevailing ideology of the age. We couldn’t have a situation in which markets enticed women to leave the control of their families and move to the city.

社会必须控制生育，因而也就必须控制女性的人生。那个时代盛行的意识形态如是说。市场引诱女性离开家庭的控制搬迁到城市，这种情况让人无法接受。

Though they are called Progressives, the reformers’ rhetoric had more in common with the “family values” movement of the 1970s and ‘80s — with pseudoscientific race paranoia playing the role that religion would later play. In many ways, they were the ultimate conservatives, attempting to roll back the tide of history made possible by the advance of the capitalist economy.

尽管他们被称为进步主义者，这些改革者的话语倒跟1970和80年代的“家庭价值观”运动有更多共同点——也包括日后宗教也运用的伪科学种族妄想狂那一套。在许多方面，这些人是终极的保守主义者，他们企图使资本经济的进步带来的历史浪潮倒流。

They were incredibly successful. Over a 10-year period between 1909 and 1919, 40 states restricted the number of hours that women employees could work. Fifteen states passed new minimum wage laws to limit entry-level jobs. Most states created stipends for single-parent families, specifically to incentivize women to reject commercial life, return to protected domesticity, and stop competing with men for wages.

他们大获全胜。1909年至1919年的十年间，40个州限制了女性雇员可以工作的小时数。15个州通过了新的最低工资法来限制初级工作职位。大多数州制定了对单职工家庭的津贴，特意激励女性抵制商业生活回归被保护的家庭生活，同时不再与男人在职场上竞争。

Such laws were completely new in American history (and in almost all of modern history) because they intervened so fundamentally in the right of workers and employers to make any sort of contract. The Progressive agenda involved government deeply in issues that directly affected people’s ability to provide for themselves. It also created unprecedented impositions on both employees and their employers. Such laws would have been inconceivable even 50 years earlier.

这些法律在美国历史上（同时也在几乎整个现代历史上）没有先例。原因在于它们如此根本性地介入了工人和雇主订立任意契约的权利。在一些直接影响人们自给自足能力的议题上，进步主义的议程和政府关联极深。同时进步主义创立了前所未有的税项，同时向雇主和雇员征收。这样的法律即使在五十年前也是不可想象的。

How did all this happen so fast, and why?

政府的干预如何迅速实施？为何能得逞？

The Inferiority of Women
女性的劣势

Richard T. Ely, the hugely influential founder of the American Economic Association and the godfather of progressive economics, explained the issue clearly, laying the groundwork for the laws that followed. His 1894 book Socialism and Social Reform expressed a panic about women’s entry into the workforce:

Richard T. Ely 是美国经济协会极具影响力的创建者，也是进步主义经济学的教父。他曾清楚地阐述了这个问题，为之后产生的法律打下了基石。他在1894年发表的著作《社会主义与社会改革》中对女性加入劳动力大军表达了恐慌：

Restrictions should be thrown about the employment of married women, and their employment for a considerable period before and after child-birth should be prohibited under any circumstances. There should also be a restriction of the work-day, as in England, for children and young persons under eighteen, and for women. Such a limitation having beneficial effect upon the health of the community…. Night work should be prohibited for women and persons under eighteen years of age and, in particular, all work injurious to the female organism should be forbidden to women.

应该限制雇用已婚女性，在任何情形下，都应该禁止雇用处于分娩期前后的女性，禁止雇用期应该相当长。我们应该仿效英格兰，限制儿童、十八岁以下的年轻人和女性的工作时长。这种限制利于社会健康发展。……应该禁止女性和不满十八岁者上夜班，尤其应该禁止女性从事那些损害女性生理机体的工作。

If the reference to the “female organism” sounds strange, remember that this generation of intellectuals believed in eugenics — using state force to plan the emergence of the model race — and hence saw women mainly as propagators of the race, not human individuals with the right to choose.

如果书中所谓的“女性生理机体”听着别扭，请记住那一代知识分子相信优生学——即使用国家的力量来制定生产模范种族的计划，因此他们将女性主要看成生育者，而非拥有选择权利的个人。

For anyone who believed that government had a responsibility to plan human production (and most intellectuals at the time did believe this), the role of women was critical. They couldn’t be allowed to do what they wanted, go where they wanted, or make lives for themselves. This was the normal thought pattern for the generation that gave the United States unprecedented legal restrictions on the labor market.

对于任何相信政府有责任对人类生育做规划的人（当时大多数知识分子确实相信）来说，女性的角色至关重要。女性不能被允许做自己想做的事，去她们想去的地方，或过她们自己想要的生活。这就是当时一代人通常的思维模式，而正是这种思维模式让美国政府对劳动力市场进行前所未有的法律限制。

The Supreme Court Weighs In
最高法院的介入

Consider the Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which considered state legislation on maximum working hours and decided in favor of the state. Oregon was hardly unusual; it was typical of the 20 states that had already passed such laws directed at women’s freedom to choose employment. From the text of Colorado’s law passed in 1903: “No woman” shall “work or labor for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day … where such labor, work, or occupation by its nature, requires the woman to stand or be upon her feet.”

看一下Muller诉俄勒冈州这个最高法院案例，最高法院认可对最大工作小时数的州立法，并做了对州政府有利的判决。俄勒冈州并非特别，它只是已经通过此类针对女性选择工作自由的法律的二十个州的典型。在1903年通过的科罗拉多州的法律这样写道：“没有女性”应该“在一天的24小时中进行8小时以上的工作或劳动……这里指的是需要女性站立完成的工作、劳动或职业。”

The decision in Muller v. Oregon, then, ratified such laws all over the country. Today, this case is widely considered the foundation of progressive labor law. What’s not well known is that the brief that settled the case was a remarkable piece of pseudoscience that argued for the inferiority of women and hence their need for special protections from the demands of commercial enterprise. That brief was filed by future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis.

于是，最高法院对Muller诉俄勒冈州案的判决正式批准了全国范围内此类法律。今天，该诉讼被普遍认为是进步主义劳动法的基础。而不为人所周知的是，终结该诉讼的那份简报是一篇令人称奇的伪科学文章，该简报论述了女性的劣势，认为女性需要特殊的保护使她们免受商业公司侵害。这份简报正是后来成为最高法院法官的Louis Brandeis提交的。

The Weird and Awful “Brandeis Brief”
奇怪又糟糕的“Brandeis简报”

The “Brandeis Brief” argued that the law had to stop the massive influx of women into the workplace because women have “special susceptibility to fatigue and disease,” because female blood has more water in it than men’s blood. Their blood composition also accounts for why women have less focus, energy, and strength generally, according to the brief.

“Brandeis简报”认为法律必须制止大量女性流入劳动力大军，因为女性“特别容易疲劳和生病”，原因是与男性相比，女性血液中含有更高比例的水分。按照这份简报的说法，女性的血液成分比例也解释了为何女性通常在注意力、精力和体力上逊于男性。。

“Physicians are agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in the powers of persistent attention and application.”

“医生们认同女性在一切和耐力有关的方面从根本上弱于男性的观点：这些方面包括肌肉力量，神经系统的能量，持续保持注意力和坚持的能力。”

Moreover, “In strength as well as in rapidity and precision of movement women are inferior to men. This is not a conclusion that has ever been contested.”

此外，“不仅在力量上，在速度和动作的精确度上，女性都劣于男性。这一结论从未受到过质疑。”

Long hours are “more disastrous to the health of women than to men,” the brief explained. Government therefore needed to regulate work hours for the “health, safety, morals, and general welfare of women.”

长时间工作“对女性健康的损害要大于对男性，”该简报这样解释道。因此政府需要为了“女性的健康、安全、道德，以及生活幸福”对工作时长进行管制。

Restrictions on work hours were therefore essential. “It is of great hygienic importance on account of the more delicate physical organization of woman,” the brief said, “and will contribute much toward the better care of children and the maintenance of a regular family life.”

因此限制工作时间就至关重要。“考虑到女性生理组织更脆弱，（限制工作时间长度）在卫生上具有重大意义”，该简报这样写道，“这对关爱儿童和维持正常家庭生活都非常有益。”

This brief is also notable for being the first to combine science, however bogus, and public policy in an appeal to the Supreme Court.

这份简报另一个闻名于世的原因，是它首次在向最高法院的上诉中将科学——尽管是冒牌货——与公共政策结合在一起。

Florence Kelley’s Dream of Nonworking Women
Florence Kelley的女性不工作梦想

One might suspect that the entire effort was a male-driven one to stop female progress, but that’s not the case. A leader in the campaign for such labor interventions was writer and activist Florence Kelley. Modern progressives celebrate her activism for maximum work hours, the 10-hour workday, minimum wages, and children’s rights. Indeed, she is considered a great hero by the sanitized version of history that progressives tell each other.

现在可能有人会怀疑这整个事情都是男性驱使的，意在阻止女性进步，但事实并非如此。支持政府介入劳动力市场的运动的一位领导者Florence Kelley是一名作家兼激进分子。现代进步主义者颂扬了她在最大工作时长、十小时工作制、最低工资和儿童权益上的激进主义。没错，在进步主义者相互传颂的历史洁本中，她是一位伟大的英雄。

Before we cheer her accomplishments, however, we should look at Kelley’s driving motivation. Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, she explained that she wanted a minimum wage as a wage floor to stop manufacturing plants and retail outlets from employing women for less than they could otherwise employ men.

但在为她的成就欢呼之前，我们应该看看Kelley的动机。在发表于《美国社会学杂志》的文章上，她解释道，她支持最低工资标准是因为最低工资相当于工资门槛，可以不让工厂和零售商店以低于男性工资的标准雇佣女性。

Retail stores, she wrote, tend to “minimize the employment of men, substituting them for women, girls, and boys, employed largely at less than living wages.” It was precisely such competition from women and children that Kelley intended to stop, so that men could earn higher wages and women could return to traditional roles.

她写道，零售商店倾向于“将雇佣的男性数量最小化，取而代之的是以低于基本生活工资的薪酬雇佣女性，女孩和男孩。”Kelley希望制止的正是这些来自于女性和儿童的就业竞争，这样男性就可以赚更多工资，而女性则可以回归她们的传统角色。

In her book Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905), Kelley said that long working hours had to be ended for women because commercial life was introducing “vice” into communities (“vice” for this generation was the preferred euphemism for every manner of sexual sin). Worse, women were choosing commercial life over home “on their own initiative.”

在出版于1905年的《一些通过立法获得的伦理好处》一书中，Kelley认为女性长时间工作必须被阻止，因为商业化生活正在将“恶习”带入社区（那一代人更喜欢用“恶习”这一委婉说法来指代任何与性相关的罪孽 ）。而更糟的是，女性在商业化生活和家庭二者间选择了前者，完全是“自己主动的”。

Kelley considered it necessary to restrict women’s rights for their own “health and morality,” she said, and also to boost men’s wages so women would stay home under the care of their mothers, fathers, suitors, and husbands.

Kelley认为有必要为了女性的“健康和道德”限制女性权利。在书中她写道，限制女性权利也是为了推动男性工资的增长，从而使得女性可以留在家中受她们的父母、求婚者和丈夫们的照顾。

Moreover, to make such work illegal would make “righteous living” more practical for women. If they stopped being rewarded in wages, they would return to domestic life. Kelley even regretted the invention of electricity because it allowed women to work late at factories, when they should be at home reading to children by firelight.

此外，将女性长时间工作定为非法会使得“正直的生活”对女性来说更为实际可行。如果女性不再受工资回报的奖励，她们就会回归家庭生活。Kelley甚至还为电的发明感到遗憾，因为是电让女性可以夜晚在工厂工作，而此时她们本应在家中的炉火旁给孩子们讲故事。

In Kelley’s view, the ideal role of women with children is not to enter commercial life at all: “Family life in the home is sapped in its foundation when mothers of young children work for wages.” It’s an opinion with which some may still sympathize, but should such an opinion be imposed on working families by coercive legislation? For this paragon of progressive social reform, it was clear that lawmakers had to force women back into the home.

在Kelley看来，女性面对孩子的理想角色是完全不进入商业化生活：“当小孩的母亲们为工资工作时，家庭生活的基础被削弱了。”现在有些人依然支持这样的观点，但这样的观点应该通过强制性立法被强加于双职工家庭吗？按照这种进步主义社会改革的范式，立法者必须强迫女性回家。

Florence Kelley and the movement she represented sought to disemploy women and get everyone back to a premodern form of domestic living. She wanted not more rights for women but fewer. The workplace was properly for men, who were to get paid high wages sufficient for the whole family. That was the basis for her support of a range of legislation to drive women out of the workforce and put an end to the new range of options available to them, options that many women were happy to choose.

Florence Kelley与她代表的运动，追求的是女性不被雇佣以及所有人都回归现代之前的家庭生活。她要的不是女性拥有更多权利，而是更少。工作场所适合男性，因为他们在那里能获得高薪酬，足够养活全家人。就是基于这样的理念，她支持通过广泛的立法将女性从工作场所驱逐出去，使女性不再有一系列新的选项——很多女性乐于选择的选项。

Fear the Women of East Prussia
对东普鲁士女性的恐惧

All this scholarship and activism is one thing, but what about the popular press?

这些学术研究和激进主义是一回事，那大众传媒又怎么样呢？

Professor Edward A. Ross, author of Sin and Society, spoke out in the New York Times on May 3, 1908. In an article titled “The Price Woman Pays to Industrial Progress,” Ross warned that America’s “fine feminine form” was endangered by commercial society.

Edward A. Ross教授是《罪与社会》一书的作者。他在1908年3月3日纽约时报上一篇题为《女性为产业进步所付出的代价》文章中警告了“精致的女性气质”正在被商业化社会所危害。

If women were permitted to work, an evolutionary selection process would govern their reproduction to the detriment of the human race. The graceful women who would otherwise bear beautiful children would be pushed out of the gene pool and replaced by “squat, splay-footed, wide-backed, flat-breasted, broad-faced, short-necked — a type that lacks every grace that we associate with women.”

如果允许女性工作，进化选择过程会主宰她们的生育，危害人类。本来会生养漂亮孩子的优雅女性会被挤出基因池，取而代之的将是“矮胖、八字脚、宽背、平胸、脸蛋平庸、脖子短的女性——这种类型的女性在任何方面都不能让我们把女性优雅与之相联系。”

Ross’s example: “the women of East Prussia,” who “bear a child in the morning” and “are out in the field in the afternoon.”

Ross举的例子是“东普鲁士女人”，她们“在早晨刚生完孩子”，“下午就下地”。

The professor explained that women who had worked in factories would not make suitable bearers of children. “Think of the discouraging situation of the young man who after he has been married two or three years finds he has a wife who at the age of 28 or 30 has collapsed, become a miserable invalid, suffering aches and pains all the time.” Why, she might find herself “unable to keep the home attractive.” And all of this “because of just a few extra dollars added to the profits of the employer or a few extra dollars saved to the consumer.”

该教授解释说，在工厂工作的女性不会是合适的生养者。“试想一下这样令人沮丧的情况：一个年轻男人在和他妻子结婚两三年后发现她在28或30岁的年纪垮掉了，终日一身病痛。”这样的妻子可能会发现自己“无法把家里弄得漂亮”。而这一切“仅仅是为了让雇主多赚几美元，或是让消费者多省几美元”。

Because of the dangerous combination of employment and natural selection, Ross contended, the government had to extend a hand to help these women by limiting working hours and establishing a high bar to enter the workforce: minimum wages.

由于雇佣劳动和自然选择的危险结合，Ross主张政府必须通过限制工作时长，并对进入劳动力市场设置高门槛——即最低工资——向女性伸出援手。

Only through such enlightened interventions could government save women from the workplace, so that they could return to the maternal duties of rearing “girls who have the qualities of fineness — grace and charm.”

政府只有通过这样高明的干预才能将女性从工作场所中拯救出来，这样女性才能回归母亲的角色，抚养“具有优雅和美丽这些优秀特质的女孩”。

Is This Satire?
讽刺否？

If this reads like satire, sadly it is not. Nor were such views unusual in a generation of ruling-class intellectuals, politicians, and activists that embraced eugenics and rejected capitalism as too random, too chaotic, too liberating. Their plan was to reestablish and entrench by law the family and marital structure they believed in, which absolutely precluded a generation of women making individual choices over their own lives.

Every trend panicked the eugenic generation. They fretted about the falling birth rate among those who should be reproducing and the rising birth rate among those who shouldn’t be. They worried about morals, about competition, about health, about culture. Most of all, they regretted the change that a dynamic economy was bringing about.

所有的时代趋向都让相信优生学的一代人恐慌。他们担心本应生养的群体的生育率在下降，而那些本不应生育的群体的生育率却在上升。他们忧虑于道德、竞争、健康和文化。所有问题中他们最担心的是充满活力的经济即将带来的改变。

Thus, from 1900 through 1920, a period that set the stage for a century of interventions in the labor market, hundreds of laws stifling women were passed in every state and at the federal level, too. None dared call it misogyny, but this is real history, however rarely it is told.

因此，1900至1920年间，政府为干预劳动力市场打好了舞台，这种干预持续了一个世纪。数以百计窒息女性的法律在所有州以及联邦层面上通过。没人敢称之为厌女，但这是真实的历史，尽管很少被说起。

Feminists against Regulation
对抗管控的女权主义

Laws that disemployed thousands of women nationwide led to vast protests. The Equal Opportunity League, an early feminist organization in New York, lobbied the state legislature to repeal the bans on work. And it received quite the press coverage.

使全国范围内成千上万的女性失去工作的法律导致了大范围的抗议。机会平等联盟是一个位于纽约的早期女权组织，它游说州立法机构废除对女性工作的禁令，得到了相当多的媒体报道。

“So-called ‘welfare’ legislation is not asked for or wanted by real working women,” the league said. “These ‘welfare’ bills are drafted by self-styled social uplifters who assert that working women do not know enough to protect themselves.”

“所谓的“福利”立法不是真正在工作的女性要求或内心想要的，”该联盟如是说。“这些“福利”法案由自封的社会提升者起草，他们认为工作的女性不知如何保护自己。”

“Are women people? Women are no longer the wards of the State and a law that is unconstitutional for a man voter is equally unconstitutional for a woman voter.”

“女性也是人吧？女性不再是州政府的被监护人，对男性投票人来说违宪的法律对女性投票人来说一样违宪。”

“Working at night is not more injurious than working in the daytime,” the league argued. “Many women prefer to work at night because the wage is higher, opportunities for advancement greater, and women with children can enjoy being with their child after school hours in the day time.”

“在晚上工作不比在白天工作更有害”，该联盟这样认为。“许多女性喜欢在晚上工作是因为工资更高，升职的机会更大，而且有孩子的女性可以在白天孩子放学后和孩子在一起。”

In fact, the phrase “equal pay for equal work” was not created to mandate higher wages for women. It was a league slogan invoked to argue against laws that made it “a crime to employ women even five minutes after the eight-hour day.” The phrase emerged as a preferred slogan to protest in favor of free markets, not against them.

事实上，“同工同酬”这一警句的出现并非为了强制提高女性工资。它是联盟的一句口号，用来反对那些认定“8小时工作时间之外即使多雇佣女性5分钟也是犯罪”的法律。这一广受欢迎警句的是作为亲市场而非反对自由市场的口号而提出的。

The Equal Opportunity League also passionately opposed the minimum wage law. Such laws, it argued, “while purporting to be for [women’s] benefit, would really be a serious handicap to them in competing with men workers for desirable positions.”

平等机会联盟也积极地反对最低工资法。联盟认为这样的法律“尽管本意是为了照顾（女性）利益，实质上却让女性在与男性工人竞争好职位时受到严重妨碍”。

In short, the conclusion of the League is that these proposed bills and laws, ostensibly intended to protect and shield the woman worker, will, if permitted to stand, unquestionably work her industrial ruin and throw her back into the slough of drudgery out of which she is just emerging after centuries of painful, laborious effort to better her condition. (“Women’s Work Limited by Law,” New York Times, January 18, 1920)

简单来说，联盟的结论是这些提议中的法案和法律表面上意在保护女性工人，实际上一旦通过则毫无疑问会毁坏女性的职业生涯，将女性赶回家务重活的泥沼。而女性在经历数个世纪痛苦艰难的努力后才刚刚脱离这一泥沼而改善了自己的状况。（《女性的工作被法律所限》，《纽约时报》1920年1月18日。）

Restriction Becomes Liberation?
限制变成了解放？

The fairy tale version of history says that during the 20th century, government freed women to become newly empowered in the workplace. The reality is exactly the opposite. Just as the market was granting women more choices, government swept in to limit them in the name of health, purity, family values, and social uplift. Such laws and regulations are still around today, though they have been recharacterized in a completely different way. As Orwell might say, somewhere along the way, restriction became liberation.

历史的童话版本说，在20世纪政府给予了女性自由，让女性在工作场所拥有了权利。真相恰好相反。市场给予女性更多的选择，而政府却插手进来以健康、纯洁、家庭价值观和社会地位提升等名义限制女性的选择。这类法律和法规在今天仍然存在，虽然它们以完全不同的方式被重新描绘。正如奥威尔所说，在通往动物庄园路途中，不知从何处起，限制变成了解放。

(Author’s note: I’m grateful to Thomas Leonard’s Illiberal Reformers for providing the footnotes I followed to write this piece. Also, much more rethinking of Progressive Era politics and its impact on the family is discussed in Steven Horwitz’s Hayek’s Modern Family, newly published by Palgrave.)
（作者附言：非常感激Thomas Leonard的《非自由的改革者》，循着该书提供的脚注，我写下了此文。另外，对进步时代的政治及其对家庭之影响的更多再思考，在Steven Horwitz所著的由Palgrave最新出版的《哈耶克的现代家庭》一书中有更多讨论。）

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

*注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

作者：SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27
译者：Tankman
校对：沈沉（@沈沉-Henrysheen）
来源：http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/

I.

Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does.

《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注：阿尔比恩，英国旧称，据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松，而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何，我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书，他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上，此书做到了这点。

In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US.

在学校，我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”，这是一个最不多元化的群体，并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景，宗教，社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层，令其与其他阶层隔绝，而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。

I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects.

我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景：一个波多黎各生存狂，一个非洲财阀，以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险，相互竞争，来占领领土和资源。你能探索的，不单单只是对新世界拓殖，而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。

What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states.

当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展，不受其他群体影响时，你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢？《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。

Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s.

Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种：在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒，在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”，在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会，以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注：指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。

II.

A: The Puritans
A：清教徒

I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity.

我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人，而后在接下来的364天，就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派，对英国国教会持异议，而且遵从他们特有的严厉，勤奋，厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。

Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors.

他们中的大多数，来自东英吉利，是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国，部分是因为他们感到被迫害，但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶，如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活，他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。

I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream.

我知道五月花，我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋，我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。

Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.”

清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派，其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民，其拥有读写能力的比例，是英国平均水平的两倍；在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代，大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方，受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响；历史学家Havelock Ellis发现，“相比英国的其他任何地区，该地很大程度上以文艺，科学和知识成就著称。”

Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”.

而且，只有最好的清教徒，才能被允许来到马萨诸塞；Fischer写道，“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”，而且“不适合该地的移民，则被放逐到其他殖民地，或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”，这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。

INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS:
关于清教徒的一些有趣事实：

1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”.

Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格，以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。

2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us’”

马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手，从他嘴里喊出五个词：‘来帮助我们’”。

3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark.

新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克

4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.”

马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力；Fischer记录了一个故事：一个旅行者问一个男人“您是在此地服侍的牧师吗？”被问者纠正了他的问题，“先生，我是统治此地的牧师。”

5. The Puritans tried to import African slaves, but they all died of the cold.

清教徒试图进口黑奴，但是黑奴全部死于严寒。

6. In 1639, Massachusetts declared a “Day Of Humiliation” to condemn “novelties, oppression, atheism, excesse, superfluity, idleness, contempt of authority, and trouble in other parts to be remembered”.

1639年，马萨诸塞发起了“羞辱日”，以谴责“新潮，压迫，无神论，纵欲，奢侈，懒散，轻视权威以及其他引人注目的麻烦”。

7. The average family size in Waltham, Massachusetts in the 1730s was 9.7 children.

1730年代，在马萨诸塞的Waltham，平均家庭规模是9.7个孩子。

8. Everyone was compelled by law to live in families. Town officials would search the town for single people and, if found, order them to join a family; if they refused, they were sent to jail.

按照法律，每个人都必须生活在家庭中。城镇官员会搜查镇中的单身者，如果发现，则会命令其加入一个家庭；如果单身者拒绝，则会被投入监狱。

9. 98% of adult Puritan men were married, compared to only 73% of adult Englishmen in general. Women were under special pressure to marry, and a Puritan proverb said that “women dying maids lead apes in Hell”.

98%的清教徒成年男子都结了婚，而英国成年男子总体的结婚率为73%。要求妇女结婚的压力特别大，一句清教徒格言说“没结婚的女人死后在地狱里带领着猿猴”。【译注：这一格言大意是谴责独身主义，但字面意思难考，一说是因为猿猴在当时人看来是没有价值的动物，肉不可吃，也不能做驼兽或者看家。】

10. 90% of Puritan names were taken from the Bible. Some Puritans took pride in their learning by giving their children obscure Biblical names they would expect nobody else to have heard of, like Mahershalalhasbaz. Others chose random Biblical terms that might not have technically been intended as names; “the son of Bostonian Samuel Pond was named Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”. Still others chose Biblical words completely at random and named their children things like Maybe or Notwithstanding.

90%清教徒的名字都取自圣经。一些清教徒引以为豪的是：用他们料想没人听过的圣经中的生僻词给孩子取名，并以此夸耀自己的学问，以至于他们可以预期人们从来没听过这个名字，比如 Mahershalalhasbaz【译者注：掳掠速临，抢夺快到。见圣经以赛亚书第八章1节】。另一些则随机取用圣经中的词，有些词技术上说本不是用来做名字的；“Bostonian Samuel Pond的孩子被起名为 Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”【译者注：前四个单词作为孩子的名，引自圣经但以理书第五章25节。四个单词都是亚兰文的度量单位，表示神已经数算过巴比伦的岁月，神已称量了巴比伦的道德】。也有些人，完全随机取用圣经中的词，给他们的孩子取名为Maybe或者是Notwithstanding。

11. Puritan parents traditionally would send children away to be raised with other families, and raise those families’ children in turn, in the hopes that the lack of familiarity would make the child behave better.

传统上，清教徒父母把孩子送给别的家庭寄养，作为交换，他们也寄养别人家的孩子，他们希望家中缺失亲情可以让孩子们被管教得更好。

12. In 1692, 25% of women over age 45 in Essex County were accused of witchcraft.

在1692年，Essex郡25%的45岁以上妇女被控为女巫。

13. Massachusetts passed the first law mandating universal public education, which was called The Old Deluder Law in honor of its preamble, which began “It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the scriptures…”

马萨诸塞通过了第一部强制普及公共教育的法律，被称为“老说谎者法案”，因为其前言的开头写道：“老牌说谎者撒旦的一个主要活动，就是阻止人们接触到经文的知识……”

14. Massachusetts cuisine was based around “meat and vegetables submerged in plain water and boiled relentlessly without seasonings of any kind”.

马萨诸塞的饮食基本上是“白水炖煮肉和蔬菜，不加任何调料”。

15. Along with the famous scarlet A for adultery, Puritans could be forced to wear a B for blasphemy, C for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, and so on.

除了著名的表示通奸的红字A，清教徒还因为渎神被强制穿上B（blasphemy），因为造假被穿上C（ counterfeiting ），因为醉酒被穿上D（ drunkenness ），如此种种。

16. Wasting time in Massachusetts was literally a criminal offense, listed in the law code, and several people were in fact prosecuted for it.

在马萨诸塞，浪费时间是一种犯罪行为，列在法条上，并有几人的确因此被起诉。

17. This wasn’t even the nadir of weird hard-to-enforce Massachusetts laws. Another law just said “If any man shall exceed the bounds of moderation, we shall punish him severely”.

这还不是难以被执行的马萨诸塞法律的极点。另一条法律说：“如果任何人超越了适度的界限，我们将对其进行严惩。”

Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote of Massachusetts Puritanism: “The underlying foundation of life in New England was one of profound, unutterable, and therefore unuttered mehalncholy, which regarded human existence itself as a ghastly risk, and, in the case of the vast majority of human beings, an inconceivable misfortune.”

Harriet Beecher Stowe就马萨诸塞的清教主义写道：“新英格兰生活的基础是一种深刻微妙，无法言说，因此也就未被说破的惆怅，即人类的存在本身就是一种可怖的风险，绝大多数人，其存在是一种不可思议的不幸。”

And indeed, everything was dour, strict, oppressive, and very religious. A typical Massachusetts week would begin in the church, which doubled as the town meeting hall. There were no decorations except a giant staring eye on the pulpit to remind churchgoers that God was watching them.

而且的确，一切都是严厉，严格，压抑并且非常宗教化的。马萨诸塞典型的一周生活开始于教堂，其规模是镇议事厅的两倍。教堂里没有别的装饰，除了牧师讲道台上的一个巨大眼睛，提醒来教堂的人们上帝在看着他们。

Townspeople would stand up before their and declare their shame and misdeeds, sometimes being forced to literally crawl before the other worshippers begging for forgiveness. THen the minister would give two two-hour sermons back to back. The entire affair would take up to six hours, and the church was unheated (for some reason they stored all their gunpowder there, so no one was allowed to light a fire), and this was Massachusetts, and it was colder in those days than it is now, so that during winter some people would literally lose fingers to frostbite (Fischer: “It was a point of honor for the minister never to shorten a sermon merely because his audience was frozen”). Everyone would stand there with their guns (they were legally required to bring guns, in case Indians attacked during the sermon) and hear about how they were going to Hell, all while the giant staring eye looked at them.

在讲道开始前，镇上的人坦白自己的羞耻和劣迹，有时真的是被强迫匍匐在其他敬拜者前，乞求饶恕。然后布道者会开始连续两场两小时长的证道。整个过程可以花掉六小时，而且教堂里没有取暖设施（出于一些原因，人们把所有的火药储存在教堂，所以那里禁止生火），而且这可是马萨诸塞，那时候天气比今天更冷，所以在冬季，有人真的会因为冻疮失去手指。（Fischer：“对布道者来说，从不因听众冻僵而缩短证道是一种荣耀。”）每个人站在那里，带着他们的枪（法律上，他们被要求携带武器，以防印第安人在其听讲道时袭击），听着他们将会怎样下地狱，整个过程，那巨大的眼睛一直盯着他们。

So life as a Puritan was pretty terrible. On the other hand, their society was impressively well-ordered. Teenage pregnancy rates were the lowest in the Western world and in some areas literally zero. Murder rates were half those in other American colonies.

所以一个清教徒的生活是非常恐怖的。另一方面，他们的社会有着令人印象深刻的良好秩序。未成年人怀孕率曾是西方世界中最低的，在某些地方则实际上为零。谋杀率则只有其他北美殖民地的一半。

There was remarkably low income inequality – “the top 10% of wealthholders held only 20%-30% of taxable property”, compared to 75% today and similar numbers in other 17th-century civilizations. The poor (at least the poor native to a given town) were treated with charity and respect – “in Salem, one man was ordered to be set by the heels in the stocks for being uncharitable to a poor man in distress”.

收入差距很低——“10%最富者只占有可税财产的20%-30%”，对比而言，今天这个比例是75%，17世纪时的其他文明也近似这个数字。穷人（至少是在镇上的本地穷人）受到尊重和接济——“在Salem，一个男人因为不肯接济一位在苦难中的穷人，被罚上脚枷示众”。

Government was conducted through town meetings in which everyone had a say. Women had more equality than in most parts of the world, and domestic abuse was punished brutally. The educational system was top-notch – “by most empirical tests of intellectual eminence, New England led all other parts of British America from the 17th to the early 20th century”.

政府通过镇上的议事会议得以运作，每个人在会上都有发言权。比世界其他地方，妇女享有更多平等，而家庭暴力则会遭到严酷惩罚。教育系统是顶尖的——“从十七世纪到二十世纪早期，在大多数有关智识能力的经验测试中，新英格兰领先所有其他北美的英国殖民地”。

In some ways the Puritans seem to have taken the classic dystopian bargain – give up all freedom and individuality and art, and you can have a perfect society without crime or violence or inequality. Fischer ends each of his chapters with a discussion of how the society thought of liberty, and the Puritans unsurprisingly thought of liberty as “ordered liberty” – the freedom of everything to tend to its correct place and stay there.

某种程度上，清教徒似乎选择了经典的敌托邦方案——放弃一切自由、个体性和艺术，得到一个没有犯罪、暴力和不平等的完美社会。Fischer在每一章的结尾部分都会探讨该社会如何看待自由，而清教徒毫不奇怪地认为自由是“有秩序的自由”——在这种自由下，万物都处于正确的位置，并且保持这种状态。

They thought of it as a freedom from disruption – apparently FDR stole some of his “freedom from fear” stuff from early Puritan documents. They were extremely not in favor of the sort of liberty that meant that, for example, there wouldn’t be laws against wasting time. That was going too far.

他们认为这是一种免于被扰乱的自由——显然富兰克林·罗斯福从早期清教徒的文档中，偷取了一些创意，用于他的“免于恐惧的自由”的理念。他们非常不喜欢某些类型的自由，比如，没有禁止浪费时间的法律。这种自由实在是过度了。

B: The Cavaliers
B：骑士党

The Massachusetts Puritans fled England in the 1620s partly because the king and nobles were oppressing them. In the 1640s, English Puritans under Oliver Cromwell rebelled, took over the government, and killed the king. The nobles not unreasonably started looking to get the heck out.

马萨诸塞清教徒在1620年代逃离英格兰，部分是因为国王和贵族压迫他们。在1640年代，英国清教徒在奥利弗·克伦威尔的领导下反叛，夺取了政权，处死了国王。贵族在此时开始想要尽快逃离并不是没有原因的。

Virginia had been kind of a wreck ever since most of the original Jamestown settlers had mostly died of disease. Governor William Berkeley, a noble himself, decided the colony could reinvent itself as a destination for refugee nobles, and told them it would do everything possible to help them maintain the position of oppressive supremacy to which they were accustomed. The British nobility was sold. The Cavaliers – the nobles who had fought and lost the English Civil War – fled to Virginia.

自从詹姆斯敦最初一批殖民者中的大部分死于疾病，弗吉尼亚一度沦落得像一片废墟。殖民地长官 William Berkeley自己就是个贵族。他决定殖民地应该转型为一个避难贵族的目的地。他告诉避难的贵族，殖民地将会竭尽全力，帮他们维持其久已习惯的压迫性支配地位。不列颠的贵族地位标价出售。骑士党——在英国内战中顽抗继而失败的贵族——逃至弗吉尼亚。

Historians who cross-checking Virginian immigrant lists against English records find that of Virginians whose opinions on the War were known, 98% were royalists. They were overwhelming Anglican, mostly from agrarian southern England, and all related to each other in the incestuous way of nobility everywhere: “it is difficult to think of any ruling elite that has been more closely interrelated since the Ptolemies”. There were twelve members of Virginia’s royal council; in 1724 “all without exception were related to one another by blood or marriage…as late as 1775, every member of that august body was descended from a councilor who had served in 1660”.

历史学家交叉对比了弗吉尼亚移民的名单和英国的记录，他们发现，对于英国内战，立场可知的弗吉尼亚人当中，98%是保皇党。他们绝大多数都是国教徒，大部分来自英国南部的农业区，互相之间都有贵族间内婚的血缘关系：“很难想到自托勒密王朝以来，统治精英还有比这更近的亲缘关系”。弗吉尼亚皇家议会有十二名成员；在1724年“无一例外的彼此有着血缘或姻亲关系……迟至1775年，这一庄严机构的每个成员都是其1660年委员的后代”。

These aristocrats didn’t want to do their own work, so they brought with them tens of thousands of indentured servants; more than 75% of all Virginian immigrants arrived in this position. Some of these people came willingly on a system where their master paid their passage over and they would be free after a certain number of years; others were sent by the courts as punishments; still others were just plain kidnapped. The gender ratio was 4:1 in favor of men, and there were entire English gangs dedicated to kidnapping women and sending them to Virginia, where they fetched a high price. Needless to say, these people came from a very different stratum than their masters or the Puritans.

这些贵族不想自己做工，所以他们带来上万的契约仆佣；超过75%的弗吉尼亚移民以这个身份【编注：即契约仆佣】到来。一些人是自愿而来，主人支付了他们的旅费，他们在服务一些年份后会获得自由；另一些人则被法庭判罚来到这里；还有些人明显是被拐骗的。男女性别比是4：1，存在专门贩卖妇女到弗吉尼亚的英国黑帮，他们从中赚取高价。无需多言，相比于他们的贵族主人或清教徒，这些人来自一个非常不同的阶层。

People who came to Virginia mostly died. They died of malaria, typhoid fever, amoebiasis, and dysentery. Unlike in New England, where Europeans were better adapted to the cold climate than Africans, in Virginia it was Europeans who had the higher disease-related mortality rate. The whites who survived tended to become “sluggish and indolent”, according to the universal report of travellers and chroniclers, although I might be sluggish and indolent too if I had been kidnapped to go work on some rich person’s farm and sluggishness/indolence was an option.

来到弗吉尼亚的人多数都死了。他们死于疟疾，伤寒，阿米巴病，和痢疾。不像在新英格兰，在那里欧洲人比非洲人更好的适应了寒冷气候，在弗吉尼亚，欧洲人有着更高的疾病死亡率。参考旅行者的报告和编年史，幸存下来的白人倾向于变得“低迷和懒惰”，当然，我也许也会变得低迷和懒惰，如果我被诱拐到某个富人的农场做工而且可以选择低迷/懒惰的话。

The Virginians tried their best to oppress white people. Really, they did. The depths to which they sank in trying to oppress white people almost boggle the imagination. There was a rule that if a female indentured servant became pregnant, a few extra years were added on to their indenture, supposedly because they would be working less hard during their pregnancy and child-rearing so it wasn’t fair to the master. Virginian aristocrats would rape their own female servants, then add a penalty term on to their indenture for becoming pregnant.

弗吉尼亚人竭尽全力的压迫白人。确实，他们干过这种事。他们试图压迫白人的深度，超乎想象。有一条规矩：如果女性契约仆人怀了孕，她们的服务期会被延长几年，大概是因为她们的产出在孕期和抚育期会下降，这就对主人不公平。弗吉尼亚贵族们会强奸自己的女性仆人，而后给她们的服务期加上基于怀孕的惩罚期限。

That is an impressive level of chutzpah. But despite these efforts, eventually all the white people either died, or became too sluggish to be useful, or worst of all just finished up their indentures and became legally free. The aristocrats started importing black slaves as per the model that had sprung up in the Caribbean, and so the stage was set for the antebellum South we read about in history classes.

这种无耻妄为令人印象深刻。但是虽然有这些努力，最终所有白人不是死了，就是变得太低迷以至于无用，或者最糟糕的是他们结束了服务期限，在法律上变得自由了。贵族开始按照加勒比地区涌现的那种模式引进黑奴，于是我们在历史课上读到的内战前南方的一幕幕已经预备好上演。

INTERESTING CAVALIER FACTS:
关于骑士党的有趣事实：

1. Virginian cavalier speech patterns sound a lot like modern African-American dialects. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out why, but it’s strange to think of a 17th century British lord speaking what a modern ear would clearly recognize as Ebonics.

弗吉尼亚骑士党的说话腔调听来更像是现代非裔美国人。不用多想就能推测出原因，不过想到17世纪的不列颠贵族讲一口现在听来是黑人英语的腔调，的确很奇怪。

2. Three-quarters of 17th-century Virginian children lost at least one parent before turning 18.

四分之三的17世纪弗吉尼亚孩子在十八岁之前至少丧失父母之一。

3. Cousin marriage was an important custom that helped cement bonds among the Virginian elite, “and many an Anglican lady changed her condition but not her name”.

堂亲结婚是弗吉尼亚精英加固联盟的重要习俗，“很多国教徒女士改变了她们的境遇，但不改变其姓氏”。

4. In Virginia, women were sometimes unironically called “breeders”; English women were sometimes referred to as “She-Britons”.

在弗吉尼亚，并非出于讽刺，妇女有时被称作“育仔员”；英国妇女有时被称作“女不列颠人”。

5. Virginia didn’t really have towns; the Chesapeake Bay was such a giant maze of rivers and estuaries and waterways that there wasn’t much need for land transport hubs. Instead, the unit of settlement was the plantation, which consisted of an aristocratic planter, his wife and family, his servants, his slaves, and a bunch of guests who hung around and mooched off him in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality.

弗吉尼亚没有真正的城镇；切萨皮克湾是众多河流、河口和水路组成的迷宫，并不需要陆路运输的集散地。相反，殖民的基本单位是种植园，由一位贵族种植园主，他的妻子和家庭，他的仆人，他的奴隶，以及一群借着古已有之的好客传统依附寄生于主人的宾客们组成。

6. Virginian society considered everyone who lived in a plantation home to be a kind of “family”, with the aristocrat both as the literal father and as a sort of abstracted patriarch with complete control over his domain.

弗吉尼亚社会认为每个生活在种植园中的人多少都算是“家庭成员”，而贵族既是真正的父亲，也是控制自己地域的抽象家主。

7. Virginia governor William Berkeley probably would not be described by moderns as ‘strong on education’. He said in a speech that “I thank God there are no free schools nor printing [in Virginia], and I hope we shall not have these for a hundred years, for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divuldged them, and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!”

按现代观点，弗吉尼亚殖民地长官William Berkeley很可能算不上“重视教育”。他在一次演说中说“我感谢上帝，（在弗吉尼亚）没有免费学校和印刷术，而且我希望我们一百年也不要有这些东西，因为学习给世界带来不服从、异端、和结党，印刷术则传播上述这些，以及对最佳政府的诽谤。上帝让我们远离学校和印刷术。”

8. Virginian recreation mostly revolved around hunting and bloodsports. Great lords hunted deer, lesser gentry hunted foxes, indentured servants had a weird game in which they essentially draw-and-quartered geese, young children “killed and tortured songbirds”, and “at the bottom of this hierarchy of bloody games were male infants who prepared themselves for the larger pleasures of maturity by torturing snakes, maiming frogs, and pulling the wings off butterflies. Thus, every red-blooded male in Virginia was permitted to slaughter some animal or other, and the size of his victim was proportioned to his social rank.”

弗吉尼亚的休闲活动大多涉及打猎和血腥运动。大领主猎鹿，小绅士猎狐，契约仆人玩着奇怪的游戏来肢解鹅，年幼的孩子“杀死和折磨鸣禽”，而“在这一血腥游戏等级体系底部的则是男性幼童，为了长大后享受更大的猎杀愉悦，他们折磨蛇、残害青蛙、扯掉蝴蝶的翅膀。因此，每个热血的弗吉尼亚男性都被允许屠杀这样或那样一些动物，其受害者的尺寸则和他的社会等级成比例。”

9. “In 1747, an Anglican minister named William Kay infuriated the great planter Landon Carter by preaching a sermon against pride. The planter took it personally and sent his [relations] and ordered them to nail up the doors and windows of all the churches in which Kay preached.”

“在1747年，一个叫William Kay的国教会牧师因为一篇反对骄傲的讲道，激怒了大种植园主Landon Carter。种植园主认为这是对其个人的冒犯，派出了他的亲属，命其钉死所有Kay牧师曾讲过道的教堂的门窗。

10. Our word “condescension” comes from a ritual attitude that leading Virginians were supposed to display to their inferiors. Originally condescension was supposed to be a polite way of showing respect those who were socially inferior to you; our modern use of the term probably says a lot about what Virginians actually did with it.

我们的“屈尊”一词来自于，弗吉尼亚的领袖应该对自己的下级表示的一种礼仪性态度。最初屈尊应该是一种礼貌的方式，对社会等级比自己低的人表示尊敬；我们现在对这个词的用法，很可能反映了当时弗吉尼亚人是怎么使用它的。

In a lot of ways, Virginia was the opposite of Massachusetts. Their homicide rate was sky-high, and people were actively encouraged to respond to slights against their honor with duels (for the rich) and violence (for the poor). They were obsessed with gambling, and “made bets not merely on horses, cards, cockfights, and backgammon, but also on crops, prices, women, and the weather”.

在很多方面，弗吉尼亚是马萨诸塞的反面。他们的谋杀率非常高，而人们实际上被鼓励用决斗（富人）和暴力（穷人）来回应对他们荣誉的轻慢。他们沉迷于赌博，“不仅仅在马，扑克，斗鸡，和十五子棋上打赌，而且还在庄稼，价格，妇女和天气上下注”。

Their cuisine focused on gigantic sumptuous feasts of animals killed in horrible ways. There were no witchcraft trials, but there were people who were fined for disrupting the peace by accusing their neighbors of witchcraft. Their church sermons were twenty minutes long on the dot.

他们的饮食注重巨大奢靡的欢宴，充斥着用各种可怕方法杀死的动物。这里没有女巫审判，倒是有人因为指控其邻居是女巫而犯了寻衅滋事被罚款的。他们的教会布道只有20分钟那么长。

The Puritans naturally thought of the Virginians as completely lawless reprobate sinners, but this is not entirelytrue. Virginian church sermons might have been twenty minutes long, but Virginian ballroom dance lessons could last nine hours. It wasn’t that the Virginians weren’t bound by codes, just that those codes were social rather than moral.

清教徒自然认为弗吉尼亚人是完全不遵法纪的邪恶罪人，但是这并不是完全正确的。弗吉尼亚教会的讲道也许只有20分钟，但其舞池中的交谊舞教学课可以长达九小时。并不是弗吉尼亚人不受法规约束，只是这些法规是社交上的，而不是道德上的。

And Virginian nobles weren’t just random jerks, they were carefully cultivated jerks. Planters spared no expense to train their sons to be strong, forceful, and not take nothin’ from nobody. They would encourage and reward children for being loud and temperamental, on the grounds that this indicated a strong personality and having a strong personality was fitting of a noble.

而且弗吉尼亚贵族并不仅仅是混蛋，他们是被精心教化过的混蛋。种植园主不惜代价训练他们的儿子，令其强壮、坚决，不受任何人摆弄。他们会因孩子们声音洪亮、感情激烈而加以鼓励和奖励，因为这意味着强烈的个性，而有强烈个性和做一个贵族是相符的。

When this worked, it worked really well – witness natural leaders and self-driven polymaths like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. More often it failed catastrophically – the rate of sex predation and rape in Virginia was at least as high as anywhere else in North America.

当这种做法奏效时，它确实有很好的效果——天然的领袖和自我激励的博学者例如乔治·华盛顿和托马斯·杰弗逊即是明证。更多的时候，这做法导致了灾难性的失败，弗吉尼亚的性侵犯和强奸率至少和北美其他地方一样高。

The Virginian Cavaliers had an obsession with liberty, but needless to say it was not exactly a sort of liberty of which the ACLU would approve. I once heard someone argue against libertarians like so: even if the government did not infringe on liberties, we would still be unfree for other reasons. If we had to work, we would be subject to the whim of bosses. If we were poor, we would not be “free” to purchase most of the things we want. In any case, we are “oppressed” by disease, famine, and many other things besides government that prevent us from implementing our ideal existence.

弗吉尼亚骑士党着迷于自由，但是不用说，这自由不完全等同于美国民权自由联盟（ACLU）所支持的那种自由。我曾听某人和自由意志主义者做如此争辩：即使政府不侵犯我们的自由，我们仍然会因为其他原因不自由。如果我们必须工作，我们就会被老板的兴之所至所限制。如果我们贫穷，我们就不可能“自由的”购买我们所需的大部分物品。在任何时候，我们都会被疾病、饥饿和其他很多政府之外的事情“压迫”，来阻止我们达到理想的状态。

The Virginians took this idea and ran with it – in the wrong direction. No, they said, we wouldn’t be free if we had to work, therefore we insist upon not working. No, we wouldn’t be free if we were limited by poverty, therefore we insist upon being extremely rich. Needless to say, this conception of freedom required first indentured servitude and later slavery to make it work, but the Virginians never claimed that the servants or slaves were free.

弗吉尼亚人采纳了这个主意，并且践行了它——在错误的方向上。不，他们说，如果我们必须工作，我们不可能自由，所以我们坚持不工作。不，如果我们被贫穷限制，我们不可能自由，所以我们坚持要极度的富有。无需多言，要实行这种自由观念，起先要求契约仆人的服侍，而后要求奴隶的劳动，但弗吉尼亚人从来没有宣称仆人或奴隶是自由的。

That wasn’t the point. Freedom, like wealth, was properly distributed according to rank; nobles had as much as they wanted, the middle-class enough to get by on, and everyone else none at all. And a Virginian noble would have gone to his grave insisting that a civilization without slavery could never have citizens who were truly free.

问题不在这里。自由，像财富一样，按照等级进行恰当分配；贵族想要多少就要多少，中间阶层也得到了足够的，而其他人则什么也没有。一个弗吉尼亚贵族可能至死都会坚持：没有奴隶制的文明，不可能有真正自由的公民。

C: The Quakers
C：贵格会

Fischer warns against the temptation to think of the Quakers as normal modern people, but he has to warn us precisely because it’s so tempting. Where the Puritans seem like a dystopian caricature of virtue and the Cavaliers like a dystopian caricature of vice, the Quakers just seem ordinary. Yes, they’re kind of a religious cult, but they’re the kind of religious cult any of us might found if we were thrown back to the seventeenth century.

Fischer警告我们小心那种想要把贵格会看作正常现代人的倾向，但是他之所以不得不警告我们，恰好就是因为这种想法是如此诱人。清教徒看上去像关于德行的敌托邦讽刺画，骑士党看起来像关于邪恶的敌托邦讽刺画，而贵格会则看起来刚好正常。是的，他们是一种教派，但是他们是那种我们中任何人如果穿越回17世纪都会成立的教派。

Instead they were founded by a weaver’s son named George Fox. He believed people were basically good and had an Inner Light that connected them directly to God without a need for priesthood, ritual, Bible study, or self-denial; mostly people just needed to listen to their consciences and be nice. Since everyone was equal before God, there was no point in holding up distinctions between lords and commoners: Quakers would just address everybody as “Friend”.

其实贵格会是被一个纺织工的儿子George Fox创立的。他相信，人基本上是善的，而且人心有内在的光亮，可以把人和上帝直接联系起来，不需要牧师、仪式、解经或者自我否定；大部分时候，人只需要听从他们良心的召唤，为人友善。因为每个人在神面前都是平等的，所以没有任何理由坚持领主和平民之间的分别：贵格会对每个人都以“朋友”称呼。

And since the Quakers were among the most persecuted sects at the time, they developed an insistence on tolerance and freedom of religion which (unlike the Puritans) they stuck to even when shifting fortunes put them on top. They believed in pacificism, equality of the sexes, racial harmony, and a bunch of other things which seem pretty hippy-ish even today let alone in 1650.

而且因为贵格会在当时是最受迫害的宗派，他们发展出了对宗教宽容和信仰自由的坚持，这点不像清教徒。他们甚至在自身有幸掌权时，仍然坚持这点。他们信仰和平主义、性别平等、种族和谐，以及其他很多即使在今天看来都很嬉皮士的观念，更遑论在1650年。

England’s top Quaker in the late 1600s was William Penn. Penn is universally known to Americans as “that guy Pennsylvania is named after” but actually was a larger-than-life 17th century superman. Born to the nobility, Penn distinguished himself early on as a military officer; he was known for beating legendary duelists in single combat and then sparing their lives with sermons about how murder was wrong.

17世纪晚期，英国最重要的贵格会信徒是William Penn。对大多数美国人而言，他只是因“宾夕法尼亚以其得名”而广为人知。但其实，他是17世纪的超凡人物。生于贵族之家，Penn早年担任军官，崭露头角；他因以下事迹而著名：在一对一决斗中击败传奇般的对手们，而后饶过其性命，并发表讲道，指出谋杀是错误的。

He gradually started having mystical visions, quit the military, and converted to Quakerism. Like many Quakers he was arrested for blasphemy; unlike many Quakers, they couldn’t make the conviction stick; in his trial he “conducted his defense so brilliantly that the jurors refused to convict him even when threatened with prison themselves, [and] the case became a landmark in the history of trial by jury.”

渐渐的，他开始经历神秘的异象，退出军旅，改宗成为贵格会信徒。就像很多贵格会信徒一样，他因渎神被逮捕；和许多贵格会信徒不同，审判者没能给他定罪；在审判中，他“如此精彩的辩护，以至于陪审团成员甚至在面对牢狱之灾威胁时，都不肯定他的罪，而且该案成为了陪审团审判历史上的里程碑。”

When the state finally found a pretext on which to throw him in prison, he spent his incarceration composing “one of the noblest defenses of religious liberty ever written”, conducting a successful mail-based courtship with England’s most eligible noblewoman, and somehow gaining the personal friendship and admiration of King Charles II.

当政府终于找到借口将其投入监狱时，他在狱中创作了“有史以来，对宗教自由的最高贵辩护之一的文章”，以信件形式向英国最有贵族资格的女士成功求爱，而且不知何故得到了查理二世的个人友谊和敬佩。

Upon his release the King liked him so much that he gave him a large chunk of the Eastern United States on a flimsy pretext of repaying a family debt. Penn didn’t want to name his new territory Pennsylvania – he recommended just “Sylvania” – but everybody else overruled him and Pennyslvania it was.

获释之后，国王如此喜爱他，以至于把美国东部的一大片以偿还家庭债务的单薄借口划给了他。Penn不想把他的新领地命名为宾夕法尼亚——他推荐的命名仅仅是“夕法尼亚”——但是其他所有人否决了他的意见，宾夕法尼亚就这样得名。

The grant wasn’t quite the same as the modern state, but a chunk of land around the Delaware River Valley – what today we would call eastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, southern New Jersey, and bits of Maryland – centered on the obviously-named-by-Quakers city of Philadelphia.

授予Penn的这份领地和现在宾州的疆域并不完全一样，而是德拉维尔河谷周围的一大片土地——今天我们称为宾夕法尼亚东部、德拉维尔北部、新泽西南部，以及很小一部分马里兰州的地区——该地区的中心的费城，显然是由贵格会命名的【编注：Philadelphia一词希腊文本意为“兄弟情谊”】。

Penn decided his new territory would be a Quaker refuge – his exact wording was “a colony of Heaven [for] the children of the Light”. He mandated universal religious toleration, a total ban on military activity, and a government based on checks and balances that would “leave myself and successors no power of doing mischief, that the will of one man may not hinder the good of a whole country”.

Penn决定把他的新领土变成贵格会的避难地——他的原话是“一个面向圣光之子们的天国殖民地”。他强制实施普遍的宗教宽容，完全禁止军事活动，基于分权和制衡的政府将“不会给我自己和继任者留下作恶的权力，个人的意志不会妨害整个国家的益处”。

His recruits – about 20,000 people in total – were Quakers from the north of England, many of them minor merchants and traders. They disproportionately included the Britons of Norse descent common in that region, who formed a separate stratum and had never really gotten along with the rest of the British population. They were joined by several German sects close enough to Quakers that they felt at home there; these became the ancestors of (among other groups) the Pennsylvania Dutch, Amish, and Mennonites.

他招募了总共大约两万人——他们是英格兰北部的贵格会信徒，很多是小商小贩。不成比例地，他们中很多是那个区域很常见的具有北欧血统的英国人，构成了不列颠的一个特殊阶层，并且从未和其他不列颠人真正融合在一起。几个和贵格会近似的德国宗派加入了他们，教义相似使得这些人在那里能找到家的感觉；这些人和其他一些团体成为了德裔宾州人、阿米绪人和门诺派的祖先。

INTERESTING QUAKER FACTS:
关于贵格会的有趣事实：

1. In 1690 a gang of pirates stole a ship in Philadelphia and went up and down the Delaware River stealing and plundering. The Quakers got in a heated (but brotherly) debate about whether it was morally permissible to use violence to stop them. When the government finally decided to take action, contrarian minister George Keith dissented and caused a major schism in the faith.

在1690年，一帮海盗在费城偷了一艘船，在德拉维尔河上四处偷盗劫掠。贵格会信徒们展开了一场激烈（但是兄弟般的）辩论，讨论用暴力阻止这帮海盗在道德上是否合理。当政府最终决定采取行动，持反对意见的牧师George Keith表示不同意，并引发了信仰上的一次重大分裂。

2. Fischer argues that the Quaker ban on military activity within their territory would have doomed them in most other American regions, but by extreme good luck the Indians in the Delaware Valley were almost as peaceful as the Quakers. As usual, at least some credit goes to William Penn, who taught himself Algonquin so he could negotiate with the Indians in their own language.

Fischer认为贵格会在他们的领土上禁止军事活动，在全美大部分别的地区可能都会给他们带来悲惨的命运。然而非常幸运的是，德拉维尔谷地的印第安人几乎和贵格会会众一样和平。和通常一样，这至少部分功绩归于William Penn，他自学了Algonquin语，所以他可以用印第安人的母语与其谈判。

3. The Quakers’ marriage customs combined a surprisingly modern ideas of romance, with extreme bureaucracy. The wedding process itself had sixteen stages, including “ask parents”, “ask community women”, “ask community men”, “community women ask parents”, and “obtain a certificate of cleanliness”. William Penn’s marriage apparently had forty-six witnesses to testify to the good conduct and non-relatedness of both parties.

贵格会信徒的婚姻习俗结合了令人惊讶的现代浪漫创意和极端的官僚化。婚姻过程本身有十六个阶段，包括“问询父母”，“问询社区里的妇人”，“问询社区里的男人”，“社区里的妇人问询父母”，以及“获得一个清白认证”。William Penn的婚姻显然有46位证人，见证夫妻双方都德行良好，没有亲属关系。

4. Possibly related: 16% of Quaker women were unmarried by age 50, compared to only about 2% of Puritans.

可能相关的事实：16%的贵格会妇女到50岁时都没有结婚，清教徒中这一数字仅为2%。

5. Quakers promoted gender equality, including the (at the time scandalous) custom of allowing women to preach (condemned by the Puritans as the crime of “she-preaching”).

贵格会推行性别平等，包括允许妇女讲道（在那时算是丑闻，被清教徒谴责为“妇女讲道”罪）

6. But they were such prudes about sex that even the Puritansthought they went too far. Pennsylvania doctors had problems treating Quakers because they would “delicately describe everything from neck to waist as their ‘stomachs’, and anything from waist to feet as their ‘ankles’”.

但是他们对性十分的正经，甚至清教徒都认为他们在这方面走得太远。宾州医生在治疗贵格会会众时会遇到麻烦，因为他们“故意把所有从颈到腰的部位都称为‘肚子’，而任何从腰到脚的地方都称为‘脚踝’”。

7. Quaker parents Richard and Abigail Lippincott named their eight children, in order, “Remember”, “John”, “Restore”, “Freedom”, “Increase”, “Jacob”, “Preserve”, and “Israel”, so that their names combined formed a simple prayer.

贵格会的一对父母Richard和Abigail Lippincott把他们的八个孩子按顺序起名叫做，“记得”，“约翰”，“恢复”，“自由”，“增加”，“雅各”，“存留”，“以色列”，他们的名字合起来构成一个简单的祷词。

8. Quakers had surprisingly modern ideas about parenting, basically sheltering and spoiling their children at a time when everyone else was trying whip the Devil out of them.

贵格会在教养孩童方面有着令人惊讶的现代观点，在那个其他人都试图从孩子身上赶出魔鬼的时代，他们基本上是保护和宠爱孩子的。

9. “A Quaker preacher, traveling in the more complaisant colony of Maryland, came upon a party of young people who were dancing merrily together. He broke in upon them like an avenging angel, stopped the dance, and demanded to know if they considered Martin Luther to be a good man. The astonished youngsters answered in the affirmative. The Quaker evangelist then quoted Luther on the subject of dancing: ‘as many paces as the man takes in his dance, so many steps he takes toward Hell. This, the Quaker missionary gloated with a gleam of sadistic satisfaction, ‘spoiled their sport’.”

“一个贵格会的传道人，在更殷勤有礼的马里兰殖民地旅行时，遇到了一群年轻人在欢快的跳舞。他如复仇天使般闯入其中，停止了舞会，要求众人考虑马丁·路德是否是个好人。被惊呆的年轻人给出了肯定的答案。这位贵格会传道人接着引用了路德关于跳舞的评论：‘一个人在舞蹈中跳多少步，就朝地狱走了多少步。’这个贵格会传道人带着一种施虐的快感吹嘘，‘毁掉了他们的活动’。”

10. William Penn wrote about thirty books defending liberty of conscience throughout his life. The Quaker obsession with the individual conscience as the work of God helped invent the modern idea of conscientious objection.

终其一生，William Penn写下了约三十本书，为良心自由辩护。贵格会着迷于把个人良心看作是上帝的造物，这促进了因良心拒绝服兵役这一现代观念的产生。

11. Quakers were heavily (and uniquely for their period) opposed to animal cruelty. When foreigners introduced bullbaiting into Philadelphia during the 1700s, the mayor bought a ticket supposedly as a spectator. When the event was about to begin, he leapt into the ring, personally set the bull free, and threatened to arrest anybody who stopped him.

贵格会会众十分强力的反对虐待动物（在他们的时代，这是很独特的）。当外地人在18世纪把猎犬咬牛游戏引入费城时，市长买了一张票，本应作为观众呆在现场。当活动快开始时，他跃入场地，自己把牛放走，并威胁逮捕任何阻止他的人。

12. On the other hand, they were also opposed to other sports for what seem like kind of random reasons. The town of Morley declared an anathema against foot races, saying that they were “unfruitful works of darkness”.

在另一方面，他们借着各种任意的理由，反对各种其他运动。Morley镇宣布取缔长跑，因为长跑是“黑暗徒劳的工作”。

13. The Pennsylvania Quakers became very prosperous merchants and traders. They also had a policy of loaning money at low- or zero- interest to other Quakers, which let them outcompete other, less religious businesspeople.

宾夕法尼亚的贵格会信徒成了非常兴旺的商人。他们也有着一项以低利率或零利率贷款给其他贵格会成员的政策，这使得贵格会会众比其他更少宗教化的人更有竞争优势。

14. They were among the first to replace the set of bows, grovels, nods, meaningful looks, and other British customs of acknowledging rank upon greeting with a single rank-neutral equivalent – the handshake.

把英国的等级化问候动作，如鞠躬、下拜、点头、注目礼等等，更换为不具有等级意味的握手礼，贵格会是首先实施这种变革的群体之一。

15. Pennsylvania was one of the first polities in the western world to abolish the death penalty.

宾夕法尼亚是在西方世界首先废除死刑的政治体之一。

16. The Quakers were lukewarm on education, believing that too much schooling obscured the natural Inner Light. Fischer declares it “typical of William Penn” that he wrote a book arguing against reading too much.

贵格会会众对教育有些冷淡，认为太多学校教育会掩蔽人内心自然的灵性之光。Fischer宣称这是“William Penn的典型做法”，他写了一本书来反对过多的阅读。

17. The Quakers not only instituted religious freedom, but made laws against mocking another person’s religion.

贵格会会众不仅仅制定了宗教自由制度，还颁布法律，禁止嘲笑他人的宗教。

18. In the late 1600s as many as 70% of upper-class Quakers owned slaves, but Pennsylvania essentially invented modern abolitionism. Although their colonial masters in England forbade them from banning slavery outright, they applied immense social pressure and by the mid 1700s less than 10% of the wealthy had African slaves. As soon as the American Revolution started, forbidding slavery was one of independent Pennsylvania’s first actions.

在17世纪晚期，多达70%的上层贵格会人士拥有奴隶，但是宾夕法尼亚的确发明了现代废奴主义。虽然他们在英国的殖民地宗主们不准他们公然废除奴隶制，但是他们施加了巨大的社会压力，到18世纪中叶，少于10%的富裕阶层拥有黑奴。美国革命一开始，废奴就成为了宾州独立后的第一批举措之一。

Pennsylvania was very successful for a while; it had some of the richest farmland in the colonies, and the Quakers were exceptional merchants and traders; so much so that they were forgiven their military non-intervention during the Revolution because of their role keeping the American economy afloat in the face of British sanctions.

宾夕法尼亚曾非常成功；它拥有殖民地当中最肥沃的农地，贵格会会众是出色的商人；这些优势如此之大，以至于独立战争期间，他们的军事不干涉态度得到了原谅，因为面临英国的制裁，他们起到了支撑美国经济的作用。

But by 1750, the Quakers were kind of on their way out; by 1750, they were a demographic minority in Pennsylvania, and by 1773 they were a minority in its legislature as well. In 1750 Quakerism was the third-largest religion in the US; by 1820 it was the ninth-largest, and by 1981 it was the sixty-sixth largest.

但是到1750年代，贵格会信徒日渐式微；到1750年，他们变成了宾州人口上的少数派，到1773年，他们又变成了宾州立法机构中的少数。在1750年，贵格主义是美国的第三大宗教；到1820年，变成了第九大，到1981年，变成了第六十六大。

What happened? The Quakers basically tolerated themselves out of existence. They were so welcoming to religious minorities and immigrants that all these groups took up shop in Pennsylvania and ended its status as a uniquely Quaker society. At the same time, the Quakers themselves became more “fanatical” and many dropped out of politics believing it to be too worldly a concern for them; this was obviously fatal to their political domination.

发生了什么呢？贵格会信徒基本上是因宽容而使得他们自己逐步消逝。他们如此欢迎少数教派和移民，这些人占据了宾州，结束了宾州贵格会一统天下的状态。同时，贵格会自身变得更具属灵热忱，许多人从政治领域退出，他们认为该领域对于他们而言属于过于世俗的关怀；这对于他们的政治影响力显然是致命的。

The most famous Pennsylvanian statesman of the Revolutionary era, Benjamin Franklin, was not a Quaker at all but a first-generation immigrant from New England. Finally, Quakerism was naturally extra-susceptible to that thing where Christian denominations become indistinguishable from liberal modernity and fade into the secular background.

独立战争时期最著名的宾州政治家是本杰明·富兰克林。他完全不是贵格会信徒，而是来自新英格兰的第一代移民。最后，贵格主义自然而然地特别易于受这一趋势影响：即基督教派日渐变得和自由主义现代性难以区分，从而渐渐融于世俗背景中去。

But Fischer argues that Quakerism continued to shape Pennsylvania long after it had stopped being officially in charge, in much the same way that Englishmen themselves have contributed disproportionately to American institutions even though they are now a numerical minority. The Pennsylvanian leadership on abolitionism, penal reform, the death penalty, and so on all happened after the colony was officially no longer Quaker-dominated.

但是Fischer争辩说，在退出官方主导地位后，贵格主义的影响在宾州持续了很长一段时间，正如英国裔本身对美国的制度有着不成比例的巨大贡献那样，即使他们现在是数量上的少数派。宾州在废奴、刑罚改革、死刑等等方面的领袖地位全部出现在该殖民地官方不再被贵格会掌控之后。

And it’s hard not to see Quaker influence on the ideas of the modern US – which was after all founded in Philadelphia. In the middle of the Puritans demanding strict obedience to their dystopian hive society and the Cavaliers demanding everybody bow down to a transplanted nobility, the Pennsylvanians – who became the thought leaders of the Mid-Atlantic region including to a limited degree New York City – were pretty normal and had a good opportunity to serve as power-brokers and middlemen between the North and South. Although there are seeds of traditionally American ideas in every region, the Quakers really stand out in terms of freedom of religion, freedom of thought, checks and balances, and the idea of universal equality.

而且，很难忽略贵格会对现代美国理念上的影响——不管如何，现代美国创建于费城。清教徒严格要求服从他们的敌托邦集体主义社会，骑士党人要求每个人都在移植的贵族制度中鞠躬，介于两者之间，宾夕法尼亚人——作为中大西洋地区，一定程度上也包括纽约市的思想领袖——则相当正常，并且有很好的机会作为南方和北方的中间人和权力经纪人。虽然在每个区域都有美国传统观念的种子，贵格会在宗教自由、思想自由、分权制衡和普世平等理念上真的表现很突出。

It occurs to me that William Penn might be literally the single most successful person in history. He started out as a minor noble following a religious sect that everybody despised and managed to export its principles to Pennsylvania where they flourished and multiplied. Pennsylvania then managed to export its principles to the United States, and the United States exported them to the world. I’m not sure how much of the suspiciously Quaker character of modern society is a direct result of William Penn, but he was in one heck of a right place at one heck of a right time

我突然想到，William Penn也许真的是史上最成功的个人。一开始，作为一个小贵族，他皈依了一个人人蔑视的宗派，他尽力把该宗派的原则输出到了宾夕法尼亚，让其发扬光大。宾夕法尼亚则尽力把它的原则输出到美国，而美国则将之输出到全世界。我不确定现代社会的贵格会特征有多大可能是William Penn的直接成果，但他的确是一个在非常正确的时间，出现在非常正确的地点的人。

D: The Borderers
D: 边民们

The Borderers are usually called “the Scots-Irish”, but Fischer dislikes the term because they are neither Scots (as we usually think of Scots) nor Irish (as we usually think of Irish). Instead, they’re a bunch of people who lived on (both sides of) the Scottish-English border in the late 1600s.

边民们经常被叫做“苏格兰-爱尔兰人”，但是Fischer不喜欢这个称谓，因为他们既不是如我们通常想象的苏格兰人，也不是如我们通常想象的爱尔兰人。相反，他们是一群17世纪晚期生活在苏格兰-英格兰边界两侧的人。

None of this makes sense without realizing that the Scottish-English border was terrible. Every couple of years the King of England would invade Scotland or vice versa; “from the year 1040 to 1745, every English monarch but three suffered a Scottish invasion, or became an invader in his turn”. These “invasions” generally involved burning down all the border towns and killing a bunch of people there.

如果没有意识到苏格兰-英格兰边境曾极其可怕，事情就说不通。每隔几年，英格兰的国王就会侵略苏格兰，或者反之；“从1040年到1745年，除了三个君主之外，每个英格兰君主都遭遇过苏格兰的入侵，或者反之变成了入侵者”；这些“入侵”总的来说，就是烧毁所有边境城镇，杀死那地区的一大批人。

Eventually the two sides started getting pissed with each other and would also torture-murder all of the enemy’s citizens they could get their hands on, ie any who were close enough to the border to reach before the enemy could send in their armies. As if this weren’t bad enough, outlaws quickly learned they could plunder one side of the border, then escape to the other before anyone brought them to justice, so the whole area basically became one giant cesspool of robbery and murder.

最终，双方都被激怒了，开始虐杀所有落入手中的对方平民，也就是任何住的离边境足够近、在敌方军队赶来前就能实施侵害的人。好像嫌这还不够糟，法外匪徒很快学到他们可以在边境一侧抢掠，而后在被绳之以法前，逃到另一边去。所以整个地区基本上是充满抢劫谋杀的血腥地狱。

In response to these pressures, the border people militarized and stayed feudal long past the point where the rest of the island had started modernizing. Life consisted of farming the lands of whichever brutal warlord had the top hand today, followed by being called to fight for him on short notice, followed by a grisly death. The border people dealt with it as best they could, and developed a culture marked by extreme levels of clannishness, xenophobia, drunkenness, stubbornness, and violence.

面对这些压力，边民武装了起来，在大不列颠岛的其他地方已经开始现代化之后很久，他们还保持着封建制度。生活由以下部分构成：耕种土地，这些土地属于当时军阀混战的胜利者，服从突然而至的上战场的征召，面对悲惨的死亡。边民在此条件下，竭力挣扎求活，发展出一种以极端小集团、排外、酗酒、倔强和暴力为特征的文化。

By the end of the 1600s, the Scottish and English royal bloodlines had intermingled and the two countries were drifting closer and closer to Union. The English kings finally got some breathing room and noticed – holy frick, everything about the border is terrible.

到1600年代末，苏格兰和英格兰的皇族变得血脉相连，两个国家开始接近并组成联邦【编注：1603年苏格兰国王詹姆斯六世继承英格兰王位，成为英格兰的詹姆斯一世】。此后的英格兰国王们终于缓过气来，并且发现——天哪，边境的一切都很可怕。

They decided to make the region economically productive, which meant “squeeze every cent out of the poor Borderers, in the hopes of either getting lots of money from them or else forcing them to go elsewhere and become somebody else’s problem”. Sometimes absentee landlords would just evict everyone who lived in an entire region, en masse, replacing them with people they expected to be easier to control.

他们决定让这个地区在经济产出上有效，这意味着“从贫穷边民身上榨出每一分钱，目的是要么从边民那里得到很多收入，要么强迫他们搬到别处，变成他人的麻烦。”有时候，外居的领主会直接把整个区域的居民驱逐，代之以他们预期会更好控制的人。

Many of the Borderers fled to Ulster in Ireland, which England was working on colonizing as a Protestant bulwark against the Irish Catholics, and where the Crown welcomed violent warlike people as a useful addition to their Irish-Catholic-fighting project. But Ulster had some of the same problems as the Border, and also the Ulsterites started worrying that the Borderer cure was worse than the Irish Catholic disease. So the Borderers started getting kicked out of Ulster too, one thing led to another, and eventually 250,000 of these people ended up in America.

许多边民逃到爱尔兰的阿尔斯特，英国人当时正要在此地殖民，将之变成新教针对爱尔兰天主教的堡垒。所以皇室欢迎暴力好战的人，用于补充他们和爱尔兰天主教的斗争工程。但是阿尔斯特也有一些和边境地区相同的麻烦，而阿尔斯特人也开始担忧，边民作为一种解药，也许比爱尔兰天主教这一疾病更糟。所以边民又开始被驱逐出阿尔斯特，事情接踵而至，最终边民中有25万人移居美国。

250,000 people is a lot of Borderers. By contrast, the great Puritan emigration wave was only 20,000 or so people; even the mighty colony of Virginia only had about 50,000 original settlers. So these people showed up on the door of the American colonies, and the American colonies collectively took one look at them and said “nope”.

25万人可是很大一批。对比之下，清教徒移民大潮只有2万人左右；即使是弗吉尼亚巨大的殖民地，也只有5万初始殖民者。所以当这些人出现在北美殖民地的大门口，各个殖民地一齐打量了他们一下，然后说“不”。

Except, of course, the Quakers. The Quakers talked among themselves and decided that these people were also Children Of God, and so they should demonstrate Brotherly Love by taking them in. They tried that for a couple of years, and then they questioned their life choices and also said “nope”, and they told the Borderers that Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley were actually kind of full right now but there was lots of unoccupied land in WesternPennsylvania, and the Appalachian Mountains were very pretty at this time of year, so why didn’t they head out that way as fast as it was physically possible to go?

当然，贵格会会众例外。贵格会内部进行了讨论，认定这些人也是上帝的孩子，所以他们应该彰显兄弟之爱，接纳边民们。他们尝试了几年，然后他们对自己的选择产生了疑问，也转向了说“不”。他们告诉边民，费城和德拉威尔河谷现在其实已经很满了，但是西宾夕法尼亚有很多无主之地，而阿巴拉契亚山脉在这个季节也很好，为什么不向那些方向尽快开拓，趁着自然条件还允许？

At the time, the Appalachians were kind of the booby prize of American colonization: hard to farm, hard to travel through, and exposed to hostile Indians. The Borderers fell in love with them. They came from a pretty marginal and unproductive territory themselves, and the Appalachians were far away from everybody and full of fun Indians to fight.

在那时，阿巴拉契亚的群山对北美殖民者来说，是分给最后一名的奖品：很难耕种，很难通行，暴露于充满敌意的印第安人面前。边民却爱上了它们。他们本就来自贫瘠的边缘化的故土，而阿巴拉契亚群山远离所有人，充满了与印第安人战斗的乐趣。

Soon the Appalachian strategy became the accepted response to Borderer immigration and was taken up from Pennsylvania in the north to the Carolinas in the South (a few New Englanders hit on a similar idea and sent their own Borderers to colonize the mountains of New Hampshire).

很快，阿巴拉契亚策略成为了对移入边民的既定策略，北到宾夕法尼亚，南到卡罗莱纳的殖民地都加以采纳（几个新英格兰殖民地也想出了相似的办法，把他们自己的边民打发到新罕布什尔的群山去殖民）。

So the Borderers all went to Appalachia and established their own little rural clans there and nothing at all went wrong except for the entire rest of American history.

所以边民们都去了阿巴拉契亚，建立了他们自己的小群农村宗族，一切都相安无事，除了整个美国历史被大大影响。

INTERESTING BORDERER FACTS:
关于边民的有趣事实：

1. Colonial opinion on the Borderers differed within a very narrow range: one Pennsylvanian writer called them “the scum of two nations”, another Anglican clergyman called them “the scum of the universe”.

对边民，殖民地人们的看法相去不远：一个宾夕法尼亚作家把他们叫做“两个国家之间的渣滓”，另一个国教会牧师把他们叫做“宇宙的渣滓”。

2. Some Borderers tried to come to America as indentured servants, but after Virginian planters got some experience with Borderers they refused to accept any more.

一些边民试图以契约仆人身份来美国，但是在弗吉尼亚种植园主得到了一些关于边民的教训后，他们不再接收边民。

3. The Borderers were mostly Presbyterians, and their arrival en massestarted a race among the established American denominations to convert them. This was mostly unsuccessful; Anglican preacher Charles Woodmason, an important source for information about the early Borderers, said that during his missionary activity the Borderers “disrupted his service, rioted while he preached, started a pack of dogs fighting outside the church, loosed his horse, stole his church key, refused him food and shelter, and gave two barrels of whiskey to his congregation before a service of communion”.

边民们大部分是长老会信徒，他们的成群到达开启了一场其他既有美国宗派转化他们的竞赛。基本上，这是不成功的；国教会传道人 Charles Woodmason是研究早期边民的重要资料来源。他说在他的传道活动期间，边民“打断他的侍奉，在其讲道时作乱，在教会外面斗狗，放了他的马，偷了他的教堂钥匙，拒绝给他食物和住宿，在一次擘饼聚会时，给他的会众两桶威士忌。

4. Borderer town-naming policy was very different from the Biblical names of the Puritans or the Ye Olde English names of the Virginians. Early Borderer settlements include – just to stick to the creek-related ones – Lousy Creek, Naked Creek, Shitbritches Creek, Cuckold’s Creek, Bloodrun Creek, Pinchgut Creek, Whipping Creek, and Hangover Creek. There were also Whiskey Springs, Hell’s Half Acre, Scream Ridge, Scuffle town, and Grab town. The overall aesthetic honestly sounds a bit Orcish.

边民的集镇命名规则非常不同于清教徒的圣经命名法，或者弗吉尼亚人的仿古英文命名法。早期边民殖民点中和溪流有关的名字有——糟糕溪，裸露溪，烂裤衩溪，戴绿帽溪，流血溪，吃不饱溪，鞭打溪，以及宿醉溪。当然，也有威士忌泉，地狱半英亩，尖叫岭，混战镇，揪住镇。总体审美的确听来有些野蛮。

5. One of the first Borderer leaders was John Houston. On the ship over to America, the crew tried to steal some of his possessions; Houston retaliated by leading a mutiny of the passengers, stealing the ship, and sailing it to America himself. He settled in West Virginia; one of his descendants was famous Texan Sam Houston.

第一代边民的领袖之一是约翰·休斯顿。在来美国的船上，船员试图偷窃他的财产；作为报复，他领导乘客发动事变，劫持了船，自己航行到美国。他在西弗吉尼亚安顿下来，后代之一，就是著名的德州佬山姆·休斯顿。

6. Traditional Borderer prayer: “Lord, grant that I may always be right, for thou knowest I am hard to turn.”

传统的边民祷词：“上帝，让我一直都走对路吧，因为你最清楚，我是难以回转的。”

7. “The back country folk bragged that one interior county of North Carolina had so little ‘larnin’ that the only literate inhabitant was elected ‘county reader’”

“荒野的乡民吹嘘北卡的一个内陆郡是如此的缺乏‘蚊化’，以至于唯一识字的定居者被选为“‘郡阅读员’”。

8. The Borderer accent contained English, Scottish, and Irish elements, and is (uncoincidentally) very similar to the typical “country western singer” accent of today.

边民的口音包括了英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰元素，而且并非巧合，它和今天的“乡村西部歌手”腔调十分相似。

9. The Borderers were famous for family feuds in England, including the Johnson clan’s habit of “adorning their houses with the flayed skins of their enemies the Maxwells in a blood feud that continued for many generations”. The great family feuds of the United States, like the Hatfield-McCoy feud, are a direct descendent of this tradition.

边民在英格兰以家族世仇闻名，包括Johnson宗族的习惯：“在持续多代的血腥世仇中，用他们的敌人，Maxwells家族身上剥下来的皮装饰自己的房子”。在美国，大型的家族世仇，比如Hatfield家族与McCoy家族的世仇，则直接继承自这种传统。

10. Within-clan marriage was a popular Borderer tradition both in England and Appalachia; “in the Cumbrian parish of Hawkshead, for example, both the bride and the groom bore the same last names in 25 percent of all marriages from 1568 to 1704”. This led to the modern stereotype of Appalachians as inbred and incestuous.

在英格兰和阿巴拉契亚，宗族内婚都是边民流行的传统；“例如在Hawkshead的Cumbrian教区，从1568年到1704年，25%的新郎和新娘都有着相同的姓。”这导致了现代对阿巴拉契亚山民的刻板印象：近亲繁殖和内婚盛行。

11. The Borderers were extremely patriarchal and anti-women’s-rights to a degree that appalled even the people of the 1700s.

边民极端家长制，反对女权，其极端程度甚至吓坏了十八世纪的人们。

12. “In the year 1767, [Anglican priest] Charles Woodmason calculated that 94 percent of backcountry brides whom he had married in the past year were pregnant on their wedding day”

“在1767年，国教会牧师Charles Woodmason统计，上一年度他主持结婚的乡下新娘中有94%在婚礼之日已经怀孕了。”

13. Although the Borderers started off Presbyterian, they were in constant religious churn and their territories were full of revivals, camp meetings, born-again evangelicalism, and itinerant preachers. Eventually most of them ended up as what we now call Southern Baptist.

虽然边民本来信长老会，但他们持续处于信仰流失中，而他们的领地上则充满了复兴、营会、重生福音主义和巡回布道者。最终，他们中大部分变成了我们现在所称的南方浸信会信徒。

14. Borderer folk beliefs: “If an old woman has only one tooth, she is a witch”, “If you are awake at eleven, you will see witches”, “The howling of dogs shows the presence of witches”, “If your shoestring comes untied, witches are after you”, “If a warm current of air is felt, witches are passing”. Also, “wet a rag in your enemy’s blood, put it behind a rock in the chimney, and when it rots your enemy will die”; apparently it was not a coincidence they were thinking about witches so much.

边民相信：“如果一个老妇人只有一颗牙，她就是个女巫”，“如果你在11点醒来，你会看到女巫”，“嚎叫的狗显示了女巫的存在”，“如果你的鞋带松了，女巫在跟着你”，“如果空气中有一股暖流，女巫正在经过”。而且，“用抹布沾湿敌人的血，把它放在烟囱里的一块石头后面，当它烂掉，你的敌人就会死了”；显然，他们如此多的考虑女巫，不是巧合。

15. Borderer medical beliefs: “A cure for homesickness is to sew a good charge of gunpowder on the inside of ths shirt near the neck”. That’ll cure homesickness, all right.

边民的医疗观念：“治疗思乡的方子是在衬衫靠近脖子的部位缝上大量火药”。好吧，这会治好乡愁。

16. More Borderer medical beliefs: “For fever, cut a black chicken open while alive and bind it to the bottom of your foot”, “Eating the brain of a screech owl is the only dependable remedy for headache”, “For rheumatism, apply split frogs to the feet”, “To reduce a swollen leg, split a live cat and apply while still warm”, “Bite the head off the first butterfly you see and you will get a new dress”, “Open the cow’s mouth and throw a live toad-frog down her throat. This will cure her of hollow-horn”. Also, blacksmiths protected themselves from witches by occasionally throwing live puppies into their furnaces.

边民的其他医疗观念：“如果发烧，活活剖开一只黑鸡，把它绑在你的脚底”，“吃掉尖叫猫头鹰的脑子是唯一可靠的治头痛药方”，“对风湿病，在脚上绑上撕开的青蛙”，“为了给腿消肿，劈开一只活猫，趁还温热敷上”，“把你见到的第一只蝴蝶的头拽掉，你会得到一件新裙子”，“把奶牛的嘴打开，扔一只活的癞蛤蟆到它喉咙里。这会治好它的空角病”。而且，铁匠们为了避免女巫的危害，会时不时把活着的小狗扔进他们的炉子里。

17. Rates of public schooling in the backcountry settled by the Borderers were “the lowest in British North America” and sometimes involved rituals like “barring out”, where the children would physically keep the teacher out of the school until he gave in and granted the students the day off.

边民乡村的公共学校入学率是“北美英国殖民地”中最低的，而且有些时候会发生“封门”的仪式，即孩子们会用身体阻挡教师进入学校，除非他让步并给学生们当天放假。

18. “Appalachia’s idea of a moderate drinker was the mountain man who limited himself to a single quart [of whiskey] at a sitting, explaining that more ‘might fly to my head’. Other beverages were regarded with contempt.”

“阿巴拉契亚关于适度饮酒的理念是，一个山民会克制自己一次只喝一夸脱以下的威士忌，解释是喝更多‘也许会让我的脑袋发晕’。其他饮品则是被轻视的。”

19. A traditional backcountry sport was “rough and tumble”, a no-holds-barred form of wrestling where gouging out your opponent’s eyes was considered perfectly acceptable and in fact sound strategy. In 1772 Virginia had to pass a law against “gouging, plucking, or putting out an eye”, but this was the Cavalier-dominated legislature all the way on the east coast and nobody in the backcountry paid them any attention. Other traditional backcountry sports were sharpshooting and hunting.

一项传统的乡下运动是“混战”，一种无规则限制的摔角，在运动中挖掉对手的眼睛被认为是完全可以接受，且实际上非常有效的策略。在1772年弗吉尼亚被迫通过一项法律反对“抠，挖，挤出眼球”，但这是骑士党主导的法律，只在东海岸有效，在阿巴拉契亚的山民根本不理会。另一项传统的乡下运动则是射击和打猎。

20. The American custom of shooting guns into the air to celebrate holidays is 100% Borderer in origin.

美国向天鸣枪庆祝节日的传统100%来自于山民。

21. The justice system of the backcountry was heavy on lynching, originally a race-neutral practice and named after western Virginian settler William Lynch.

山民地区的法律体系非常依赖于私刑审判，这种做法（原本并无种族倾向）即以西弗吉尼亚殖民者William Lynch得名。【编注：lynch一词在内战后常常特指美国南方白人种族主义者针对黑人的私刑。】

22. Scottish Presbyterians used to wear red cloth around their neck to symbolize their religion; other Englishmen nicknamed them “rednecks”. This maybe the origin of the popular slur against Americans of Borderer descent, although many other etiologies have been proposed. “Cracker” as a slur is attested as early as 1766 by a colonist who says the term describes backcountry men who are great boasters; other proposed etymologies like slaves talking about “whip-crackers” seem to be spurious.

苏格兰长老会教徒曾在脖子周遭围上红布来象征他们的宗教；其他英国人昵称其为“红脖”。这也许是这一对美国边民后裔的流行贬称的起源，虽然有很多其他的语源学解释也被提出过。“大话精”则是另一个贬称，验证发现，早在1766年一个殖民者曾以该词表示边民们中的吹牛者；其他语源学解释包括奴隶们谈到的“挥鞭子的人”，看来是谬误的。

This is not to paint the Borderers as universally poor and dumb – like every group, they had an elite, and some of their elite went on to become some of America’s most important historical figures. Andrew Jackson became the first Borderer president, behaving exactly as you would expect the first Borderer president to behave, and he was followed by almost a dozen others. Borderers have also been overrepresented in America’s great military leaders, from Ulysses Grant through Teddy Roosevelt (3/4 Borderer despite his Dutch surname) to George Patton to John McCain.

并不是说边民普遍贫穷愚笨——如同每个群体一样，他们也有精英，有些精英成了美国史上最重要的历史人物之一。Andrew Jackson成为第一任边民总统，其作为和你预期的第一任边民总统会做的一样，他之后又有十多个边民总统。边民在美国伟大军事领袖中的比例也高得过分，从尤利西斯·格兰特到泰迪·罗斯福（3/4的边民血统，虽然他有个荷兰裔姓氏），再到乔治·巴顿，再到约翰·麦凯恩。

The Borderers really liked America – unsurprising given where they came from – and started identifying as American earlier and more fiercely than any of the other settlers who had come before. Unsurprisingly, they strongly supported the Revolution – Patrick Henry (“Give me liberty or give me death!”) was a Borderer. They also also played a disproportionate role in westward expansion.

边民真的很爱美国——考虑到他们来自何处，这不奇怪——而且他们产生美国人的自我认同比其他在他们之前到的殖民者更早，程度更强烈。并不奇怪的是，他们强烈支持独立革命——Patrick Henry(“不自由，宁毋死！”）是个边民。他们也在西进运动中发挥了不成比例的重要作用。

After the Revolution, America made an almost literal 180 degree turn and the “backcountry” became the “frontier”. It was the Borderers who were happiest going off into the wilderness and fighting Indians, and most of the famous frontiersmen like Davy Crockett were of their number. This was a big part of the reason the Wild West was so wild compared to, say, Minnesota (also a frontier inhabited by lots of Indians, but settled by Northerners and Germans) and why it inherited seemingly Gaelic traditions like cattle rustling.

革命后，美国实际上是180度转向，“内地”变成了“边疆”。对于深入荒野，和印第安人战斗，边民是最开心的，大部分著名的边疆拓荒者如Davy Crockett即是其中一员。很大程度上，这就是为什么狂野西部是如此狂野，相比于比如说明尼苏达（也是个有很多印第安人定居的边疆地带，但是由北方人和德国裔开拓殖民），这也解释了为何西部有套小牛的传统，这疑似是苏格兰盖尔人的传统。

Their conception of liberty has also survived and shaped modern American politics: it seems essentially to be the modern libertarian/Republican version of freedom from government interference, especially if phrased as “get the hell off my land”, and especially especially if phrased that way through clenched teeth while pointing a shotgun at the offending party.

他们的自由观念也存留下来并塑造了美国的政治：它看起来基本上是现代自由意志主义者/共和党版本的免于政府干涉的自由，特别是“滚出我的土地”这句话，尤其是这话以咬牙切齿的腔调说出，伴着指向入侵者的霰弹枪的时候。

III.

This is all interesting as history and doubly interesting as anthropology, but what relevance does it have for later American history and the present day?

这些从历史学上来说，很有意思，从人类学角度来说，更有意思。但是这些和美国之后的历史以及今天又什么关系吗？

One of my reasons reading this book was to see whether the link between Americans’ political opinions and a bunch of their other cultural/religious/social traits (a “Blue Tribe” and “Red Tribe”) was related to the immigration patterns it describes. I’m leaning towards “probably”, but there’s a lot of work to be done in explaining how the split among these four cultures led to a split among two cultures in the modern day, and with little help from the book itself I am going to have to resort to total unfounded speculation.

我读这本书的理由之一，是想看看美国政治观点和一系列文化/宗教/社会特质（“红部落”和“蓝部落”）是否和该书描述的移民模式相关。我倾向“很可能”这一结论，但是还需要大量的工作来解释这四种文化之分裂是如何导致今日的两种文化之分裂，而且接下来我将要不依赖这本书的帮助，诉诸未经验证的大胆猜想。

But the simplest explanation – that the Puritans and Quakers merged into one group (“progressives”, “Blue Tribe”, “educated coastal elites”) and the Virginians and Borderers into another (“conservatives”, “Red Tribe”, “rednecks”) – has a lot going for it.

然而最简单的解释有很大的说服力——清教徒和贵格会融合成了一个团体（“进步派”，“蓝部落”，“受过教育的东西岸精英”），而弗吉尼亚人和边民则汇聚成另一个（“保守派”，“红部落”，“红脖子”）。

Many conservatives I read like to push the theory that modern progressivism is descended from the utopian Protestant experiments of early America – Puritanism and Quakerism – and that the civil war represents “Massachusetts’ conquest of America”. I always found this lacking in rigor: Puritanism and Quakerism are sufficiently different that positing a combination of them probably needs more intellectual work than just gesturing at “you know, that Puritan/Quaker thing”.

我所读到的很多保守派喜欢这一理论：现代进步主义来自于早期乌托邦式的新教实验——清教主义和贵格主义——而内战则代表“‘马萨诸塞’”征服了美国”。我总是发现这个说法缺乏严谨：清教主义和贵格主义有很大的不同，把他们合并起来很可能需要更多的智力工作，而不是仅仅陈述“你知道的，清教徒/贵格会的那套”。

But the idea of a Puritan New England and a Quaker-(ish) Pennsylvania gradually blending together into a generic “North” seems plausible, especially given the high levels of interbreeding between the two (some of our more progressive Presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, were literally half-Puritan and half-Quaker).

但是一个清教徒的新英格兰和一个贵格会的宾夕法尼亚逐渐融合在一起，被统称为“北方”，这一说法似乎有道理，尤其是考虑到两个群体之间很高的通婚率（我们一些更偏进步派的总统，包括亚伯拉罕·林肯，实际上是半清教徒半贵格会血统）。

Such a merge would combine the Puritan emphasis on moral reform, education, and a well-ordered society with the Quaker doctrine of niceness, tolerance, religious pluralism, individual conscience, and the Inner Light. It seems kind of unfair to just mix-and-match the most modern elements of each and declare that this proves they caused modernity, but there’s no reason that couldn’t have happened.

这种融合把清教徒对道德改革、教育和有序社会的强调，以及贵格会友善、容忍、宗教多元、个人良心和内在灵性之光的教义结合了起来。把两个宗派最现代化的元素混合对应起来，然后宣称这证明了他们导致了现代性，这似乎有点不公平，但是没有理由否定，这可能发生。

The idea of Cavaliers and Borderers combining to form modern conservativism is buoyed by modern conservativism’s obvious Border influences, but complicated by its lack of much that is recognizably Cavalier – the Republican Party is hardly marked by its support for a hereditary aristocracy of gentlemen.

骑士党和边民结合形成了现代保守主义这一看法，被现代保守主义明显受边民影响所支持。但更复杂的是，它缺乏可以被辨认为骑士党文化的成分——共和党在支持绅士们的世袭贵族政治方面并不突出。

Here I have to admit that I don’t know as much about Southern history as I’d like. In particular, how were places like Alabama, Mississippi, et cetera settled? Most sources I can find suggest they were set up along the Virginia model of plantation-owning aristocrats, but if that’s true how did the modern populations come to so embody Fischer’s description of Borderers? In particular, why are they so Southern Baptist and not very Anglican?

这里我不得不承认，我所知的南方历史，并不如我渴望的那么多。特别是，像阿拉巴马，密西西比这些地方是如何被开发的？我所找到的大部分资料都暗示，他们是按照弗吉尼亚那种拥有种植园的贵族模式发展，但是如果这是真的，为何现代这片土地上的人口和Fischer描述的边民如此相似？特别是，为什么他们如此倾向于南方浸信会，而不是国教会？

And what happened to all of those indentured servants the Cavaliers brought over after slavery put them out of business? What happened to that whole culture after the Civil War destroyed the plantation system? My guess is going to be that the indentured servants and the Borderer population mixed pretty thoroughly, and that this stratum was hanging around providing a majority of the white bodies in the South while the plantation owners were hogging the limelight – but I just don’t know.

而所有那些骑士党带来的契约仆人在被奴隶取代而不再做仆人后，又经历了什么？在内战毁灭了南方种植园系统后，整个文化经历了什么？我的猜想是契约仆人和边民人口深度融合，而这个阶层蔓延开来，构成了南方白人的主体，而与此同时种植园主们则吸引了太多关注——但是我就是不知道。

A quick argument that I’m not totally making all of this up:

以下的简易论证并非纯属编造：

This is a map of voting patterns by county in the 2012 Presidential election. The blue areas in the South carefully track the so-called “black belt” of majority African-American areas. The ones in the Midwest are mostly big cities. Aside from those, the only people who vote Democrat are New England (very solidly!) and the Delaware Valley region of Pennsylvania.

这是2012年总统大选在郡层面的投票模式的地图。蓝色区域在南方精确地分布在大量非裔美国人聚居的所谓“黑带”上。在中西部的蓝色基本上是大城市。除了这些，选民主党的人只有新英格兰人（支持度很高！）和宾州德拉威尔河谷地区。

In fact, you can easily see the distinction between the Delaware Valley settled by Quakers in the east, and the backcountry area settled by Borderers in the west. Even the book’s footnote about how a few Borderers settled in the mountains of New Hampshire is associated with a few spots of red in the mountains of New Hampshire ruining an otherwise near-perfect Democratic sweep of the north.

事实上，你能一眼看出，贵格会开拓的东部德拉威尔河谷和边民开拓的西部区域之间的区别。即便是书中脚注提到的少量边民移居新罕布尔州群山也能对应图中新罕布尔州群山中的几个红点，如果不是这几个红点，民主党在北方就拥有了完美的全胜。

One anomaly in this story is a kind of linear distribution of blue across southern Michigan, too big to be explained solely by the blacks of Detroit. But a quick look at Wikipedia’s History of Michigan finds:

这个故事中的一个异常就是在南密歇根存在一种线性分布的蓝色，面积太大，不能仅用底特律的黑人来解释。但是快速浏览维基百科上密歇根的历史条目就会发现：

In the 1820s and 1830s migrants from New England began moving to what is now Michigan in large numbers (though there was a trickle of New England settlers who arrived before this date). These were “Yankee” settlers, that is to say they were descended from the English Puritans who settled New England during the colonial era….Due to the prevalence of New Englanders and New England transplants from upstate New York, Michigan was very culturally contiguous with early New England culture for much of its early history…The amount with which the New England Yankee population predominated made Michigan unique among frontier states in the antebellum period. Due to this heritage Michigan was on the forefront of the antislavery crusade and reforms during the 1840s and 1850s.

在1820年代到1830年代，来自新英格兰的移民大量移居到今日的密歇根（虽然有少量新英格兰开拓者在之前就移居此地）。这些是“扬基”开拓者，这意味着他们是在殖民地时期住在新英格兰的英国清教徒的后裔……因为新英格兰人众多，以及从纽约上州移入的新英格兰人，在它早期历史的相当长时间，密歇根在文化上和早期新英格兰文化很相近……新英格兰扬基人口的庞大数量使得密歇根在内战前时期边疆州当中与众不同。因为这种传统，密歇根站在1840年代和1850年代的废奴十字军和改革的前列。

Alhough I can’t find proof of this specifically, I know that Michigan was settled from the south up, and I suspect that these New England settlers concentrated in the southern regions and that the north was settled by a more diverse group of whites who lacked the New England connection.

虽然我不能发现专门的证据，我知道密歇根是从南方被开拓的，我怀疑新英格兰开拓者集中于南部区域，而北部则被更多元的白人群体开拓，这些人缺乏和新英格兰地区的联系。

Here’s something else cool. We can’t track Borderers directly because there’s no “Borderer” or “Scots-Irish” option on the US census. But Albion’s Seed points out that the Borderers were uniquely likely to identify as just “American” and deliberately forgot their past ancestry as fast as they could.

还有更有趣的发现。我们不能直接跟踪边民，因为在美国人口普查中没有“边民”或者“苏格兰人-爱尔兰人”的选项。但是《阿尔比安的种子》一书指出，边民特别倾向于自我认同为“美国人”，并故意尽快忘记自己过去的先祖。

Meanwhile, when the census asks an ethnicity question about where your ancestors came from, every year some people will stubbornly ignore the point of the question and put down “America” (no, this does not track the distribution of Native American population). Here’s a map of so-called “unhyphenated Americans”, taken from this site:

同时，当普查问及关于你先祖来自何处的族裔问题时，每年都有一些人顽固的忽略这一问题的目的，而填上“美国”（不，这并不能代表印第安人的分布）。下面是所谓的“纯粹的美国人”的地图，来自这个网站。

We see a strong focus on the Appalachian Mountains, especially West Virginia, Tennesee, and Kentucky, bleeding into the rest of the South. Aside from west Pennsylvania, this is very close to where we would expect to find the Borderers. Could these be the same groups?

我们看到了该人群在阿巴拉契亚山脉区域有很高的密度，尤其是西弗吉尼亚，田纳西，和肯塔基，延伸到南方其他地区。除了西宾夕法尼亚之外，这和我们预期能发现边民的地区非常接近。这些可能是相同的人群吗？

Meanwhile, here is a map of where Obama underperformed the usual Democratic vote worst in 2008:

同时，这里还有奥巴马在08年民主党选举中表现最差的地区的一张地图：

These maps are small and lossy, and surely unhyphenatedness is not an exact proxy for Border ancestry – but they are nevertheless intriguing. You may also be interested in the Washington Post’s correlation between distribution of unhyphenated Americans and Trump voters, or the Atlantic’s article on Trump and Borderers.

这些地图也许小且模糊，而且纯种美国人认同也不是边民先祖的精确表征——但是它们仍然十分吸引人。你也许会对《华盛顿邮报》在纯种美国人分布和川普支持者之间相关性的报道感兴趣，还有《大西洋月刊》关于川普和边民的文章。

If I’m going to map these cultural affiliations to ancestry, do I have to walk back on my previous theory that they are related to class? Maybe I should. But I also think we can posit complicated interactions between these ideas. Consider for example the interaction between race and class; a black person with a white-sounding name, who speaks with a white-sounding accent, and who adopts white culture (eg listens to classical music, wears business suits) is far more likely to seem upper-class than a black person with a black-sounding name, a black accent, and black cultural preferences; a white person who seems black in some way (listens to hip-hop, wears baggy clothes) is more likely to seem lower-class. This doesn’t mean race and class are exactly the same thing, but it does mean that some races get stereotyped as upper-class and others as lower-class, and that people’s racial identifiers may change based on where they are in the class structure.

如果我把这些文化偏好对应到祖先谱系，我是否也不得不回到我之前的理论上，即这些和阶层有关？也许我应该这么做。但是我也认为我们应该注意这些看法之间的交互作用。比如考虑一下种族和阶层的交互关系；一个黑人带着一个白人式的名字，带白人口音，适应了白人文化（比如听古典音乐，穿西装），则比取黑人名、带黑人口音、偏好黑人文化的黑人更可能是上等阶级；一个某方面像黑人的白人（听嘻哈，穿松垮的衣服）则更可能属于底层。这并不是说种族和阶层完全是一码事，但是这说明一些族群给人的固定印象是上层，另一些是底层，而基于人们在阶层结构中位置，人们的和种族相关的特征可能会变化。

I think something similar is probably going on with these forms of ancestry. The education system is probably dominated by descendents of New Englanders and Pennsylvanians; they had an opportunity to influence the culture of academia and the educated classes more generally, they took it, and now anybody of any background who makes it into that world is going to be socialized according to their rules. Likewise, people in poorer and more rural environments will be surrounded by people of Borderer ancestry and acculturated by Borderer cultural products and end up a little more like that group. As a result, ethnic markers have turned into and merged with class markers in complicated ways.

我认为族裔血统的构成中，很可能发生了相似的事情。教育系统很可能被新英格兰人和宾夕法尼亚人把持，他们更有机会普遍地影响学术界的文化和受教育阶层，他们把握了这个机会，现在任何背景的人，要进入他们的世界，都会按照他们的规则被社会化。相似的，更穷和更乡村化的人，被边民的先祖和边民文化的产物包围，最终变得有点像这个群体。结果，族裔标志以种种复杂的方式转化成了阶层标志并与之融合。

Indeed, some kind of acculturation process has to have been going on, since most of the people in these areas today are not the descendents of the original settlers. But such a process seems very likely. Just to take an example, most of the Jews I know (including my own family) came into the country via New York, live somewhere on the coast, and have very Blue Tribe values. But Southern Jews believed in the Confederacy as strongly as any Virginian – see for example Judah Benjamin. And Barry Goldwater, a half-Jew raised in Arizona, invented the modern version of conservativism that seems closest to some Borderer beliefs.

的确，某种同化过程一定发生过，因为这些地区今天的大部分人并不是初代开拓者的后代。但是这样一个过程很可能发生。仅举一个例子，大部分我所认识的犹太人（包括我自己的家庭），从纽约来到这个国家，生活在靠海岸的某处，拥有蓝色的价值观。但是南方犹太人曾和任何弗吉尼亚人一样，相信南部邦联——可以参考Judah Benjamin的例子。而且Barry Goldwater，一个长在亚利桑那的半血犹太人，发明了现代版本的保守主义，其观点看起来最接近一些边民信仰。

All of this is very speculative, with some obvious flaws. What do we make of other countries like Britain or Germany with superficially similar splits but very different histories? Why should Puritans lose their religion and sexual prudery, but keep their interest in moralistic reform? There are whole heaps of questions like these.

所有这些都是很大胆的假设，带有一些明显的缺陷。对于英国或者德国，这些国家表面上有类似的分裂，但是有很不同的历史，我们如何来解释呢？为什么清教徒失去了他们的宗教和在性上的规矩，但是仍然在道德改革上保持兴趣？还有一大堆类似的问题。

But look. Before I had any idea about any of this, I wrote that American society seems divided into two strata, one of which is marked by emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, academic/financial jobs, and Democratic party affiliation, and furthermore that this group was centered in the North.

但是看看，在我有这些想法之前，我就曾写道美国社会看来被分裂成两层，其中之一有以下特征：重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容，很低的未成年怀孕率，学术和财经工作，以及支持民主党，而且这个群体以北方为中心。

Meanwhile, now I learn that the North was settled by two groups that when combined have emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, an academic and mercantile history, and were the heartland of the historical Whigs and Republicans who preceded the modern Democratic Party.

同时，我现在知道了北方曾被两个团体所开拓，两个群体结合起来，拥有以下特征：重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容，很低的未成年怀孕率 ，具有学术和商业历史，而且是历史上辉格党和共和党（后来的地位被现代的民主党取代）的核心地域。

And I wrote about another stratum centered in the South marked by poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high teenage pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, country western music, and support for the Republican Party. And now I learn that the South was settled by a group noted even in the 1700s for its poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high premarital pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, accent exactly like the modern country western accent, and support for the Democratic-Republicans who preceded the modern Republican Party.

我还写到过另一个集中于南方的阶层，它以教育贫乏，枪文化，暴力文化，排外，高未成年人怀孕率，军国主义，爱国主义，西部乡村音乐，和支持共和党为特征。现在我知道，开拓南方的群体，在18世纪就以教育的贫乏， 枪文化，暴力文化，排外，高未成年人怀孕率，尚武精神，爱国主义，接近现代西部乡村的口音，以及支持民主-共和党为特征（后来地位被现代的共和党取代）。

If this is true, I think it paints a very pessimistic world-view. The “iceberg model” of culture argues that apart from the surface cultural features we all recognize like language, clothing, and food, there are deeper levels of culture that determine the features and institutions of a people: whether they are progressive or traditional, peaceful or warlike, mercantile or self-contained.

如果这是真的，我认为这给出了一个非常悲观的世界图景。文化的“冰山模型”认为，撇开我们都能识别的文化表面特征，例如语言、衣着、和食物，存在更深层次的文化，它们决定了上述特征和人们的制度：决定他们是进步的还是传统的，和平的还是好战的，爱经商的还是自给自足的。

We grudgingly acknowledge these features when we admit that maybe making the Middle East exactly like America in every way is more of a long-term project than something that will happen as soon as we kick out the latest dictator and get treated as liberators. Part of us may still want to believe that pure reason is the universal solvent, that those Afghans will come around once they realize that being a secular liberal democracy is obviously great.

当我们承认也许让中东在每一方面都变成和美国一样是一个长期过程，而不是如我们把最近的独裁者赶下台，像解放者般被接待那么快，我们就是在勉强承认这些文化特征的存在。我们中的部分人还想相信纯粹理性是普遍适用的答案，只要阿富汗人意识到一个世俗化的自由主义的民主制度明显很棒，他们就会觉醒。

But we keep having deep culture shoved in our face again and again, and we don’t know how to get rid of it. This has led to reasonable speculation that some aspects of it might even be genetic – something which would explain a lot, though not its ability to acculturate recent arrivals.

但是我们已经一而再地被深层文化打脸，我们不知道如何摆脱它。这导致了合理的猜想，深层文化的某方面可能是遗传性的——这可以解释很多事情，虽然这个因素不能解释其同化最近的新来者的能力。

This is a hard pill to swallow even when we’re talking about Afghanistan. But it becomes doubly unpleasant when we think about it in the sense of our neighbors and fellow citizens in a modern democracy. What, after all, is the point? A democracy made up of 49% extremely liberal Americans and 51% fundamentalist Taliban Afghans would be something very different from the democratic ideal; even if occasionally a super-charismatic American candidate could win over enough marginal Afghans to take power, there’s none of the give-and-take, none of the competition within the marketplace of ideas, that makes democracy so attractive. Just two groups competing to dominate one another, with the fact that the competition is peaceful being at best a consolation prize.

即便我们讨论的是阿富汗，这也是一枚难以下咽的药丸。但如果我们从现代民主制中我们的邻舍和公民同胞的角度来考虑这个问题时，难受程度又要翻倍。这到底有什么意义？一个由49%的极端自由派的美国人和51%的基本教义派的阿富汗塔利班组成的民主制恐怕和民主典范非常不同；即使有时，一个很有人格魅力的美国候选人能赢得足够的阿富汗人摇摆票，获得权力，这里也没有讨价还价，没有思想市场的竞争，而正是这些因素才使得民主制如此有吸引力。只剩两个团体相互竞争来统治对方，事实上，如果竞争是和平的，就已经是谢天谢地了。

If America is best explained as a Puritan-Quaker culture locked in a death-match with a Cavalier-Borderer culture, with all of the appeals to freedom and equality and order and justice being just so many epiphenomena – well, I’m not sure what to do with that information.

如果美国可以很好地被解释成一种清教徒-贵格会文化，和一种骑士党-边民文化锁在一起的拼死对决，并且所有对自由，平等，秩序，正义的呼求仅是众多附带现象——那么我不确定该如何处理这个信息。

Push it under the rug? Say “Well, my culture is better, so I intend to do as good a job dominating yours as possible?” Agree that We Are Very Different Yet In The End All The Same And So Must Seek Common Ground? Start researching genetic engineering? Maybe secede?

把它藏在桌布下？说“好，我的文化更好，所以我打算竭尽全力做做好事，来统治你？”同意我们是非常不同的，但最终我们会变得一样，所以我们必须寻求共同立场？开始研究基因工程？也许独立分裂？

I’m not a Trump fan much more than I’m an Osama bin Laden fan; if somehow Osama ended up being elected President, should I start thinking “Maybe that time we made a country that was 49% people like me and 51% members of the Taliban –maybe that was a bad idea“.

我不是个川普粉，就像我不是奥萨马·本·拉登粉丝一样；如果不知何故，本·拉登当选了总统，我应该开始思考“也许那时候我们由49%的像我这样的人和51%的塔利班组成了一个国家——也许这是一个坏主意”。

I don’t know. But I highly recommend Albion’s Seed as an entertaining and enlightening work of historical scholarship which will be absolutely delightful if you don’t fret too much over all of the existential questions it raises.

我不知道。但是我高度推荐《阿尔比安的种子》这本富有娱乐性和启发性的历史学著作。如果你没有过多地被它引起的实在性问题吓到，读它绝对会是非常愉悦的。

（编辑：辉格@whigzhou）

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——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——