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[译文]捅刀起义的历史背景

The Paranoid, Supremacist Roots of the Stabbing Intifada
捅刀起义的种族优越论根源,一种妄想症

作者:Jeffrey Goldbery @ 2015-10-16
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
一校:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha)
来源:The Atlantic,www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/the-roots-of-the-palestinian-uprising-against-israel/410944/

Knife attacks on Jews in Jerusalem and elsewhere are not based on Palestinian frustration over settlements, but on something deeper.
耶路撒冷及其他地区发生的针对犹太人的持刀攻击,并非出于巴勒斯坦人因以色列定居活动而产生的挫败感,而是存在某些更深层次的原因。

In September of 1928, a group of Jewish residents of Jerusalem placed a bench in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, for the comfort of elderly worshipers. They also brought with them a wooden partition, to separate the sexes during prayer. Jerusalem’s Muslim leaders treated the introduction of furniture into the alleyway in front of the Wall as a provocation, part of a Jewish conspiracy to slowly take control of the entire Temple Mount.

1928年9月,耶路撒冷的一群犹太居民为了老年礼拜者的舒适着想,在圣殿山的哭墙前安放了一条长凳,还带去了一张木质隔板用来区隔异性祈祷者。耶路撒冷的穆斯林领袖认为,这种在过道安放家具的行为是挑衅,是犹太人缓图全面掌控圣殿山的阴谋的一部分。

Many of the leaders of Palestine’s Muslims believed—or claimed to believe—that Jews had manufactured a set of historical and theological connections to the Western Wall and to the Mount, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in order to advance the Zionist project.

巴勒斯坦的许多穆斯林领袖曾相信——或曾宣称其相信——犹太人捏造了一整套其与哭墙及圣殿山这一阿克萨清真寺和圆顶清真寺所在地之间的历史和神学联系,目的是为了推进犹太复国主义计划。

This belief defied Muslim history—the Dome of the Rock was built by Jerusalem’s Arab conquerors on the site of the Second Jewish Temple in order to venerate its memory (the site had previously been defiled by Jerusalem’s Christian rulers as a kind of rebuke to Judaism, the despised mother religion of Christianity). Jews themselves consider the Mount itself to be the holiest site in their faith. The Western Wall, a large retaining wall from the Second Temple period, is sacred only by proxy.

这一观念完全不顾穆斯林历史——圆顶清真寺是征服耶路撒冷的阿拉伯人为追思先人而在犹太人第二圣殿的旧址上建造的(原址被耶路撒冷的基督教统治者破坏,以谴责犹太教这一遭到鄙视的基督教母宗教)。犹太人自己则视圣殿山为其信仰的至圣之地。哭墙作为第二圣殿时期留存下来的巨大护墙,只是因其象征性才变得神圣。

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The Paranoid, Supremacist Roots of the Stabbing Intifada 捅刀起义的种族优越论根源,一种妄想症 作者:Jeffrey Goldbery @ 2015-10-16 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 一校:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha) 来源:The Atlantic,www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/the-roots-of-the-palestinian-uprising-against-israel/410944/ Knife attacks on Jews in Jerusalem and elsewhere are not based on Palestinian frustration over settlements, but on something deeper. 耶路撒冷及其他地区发生的针对犹太人的持刀攻击,并非出于巴勒斯坦人因以色列定居活动而产生的挫败感,而是存在某些更深层次的原因。 In September of 1928, a group of Jewish residents of Jerusalem placed a bench in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, for the comfort of elderly worshipers. They also brought with them a wooden partition, to separate the sexes during prayer. Jerusalem’s Muslim leaders treated the introduction of furniture into the alleyway in front of the Wall as a provocation, part of a Jewish conspiracy to slowly take control of the entire Temple Mount. 1928年9月,耶路撒冷的一群犹太居民为了老年礼拜者的舒适着想,在圣殿山的哭墙前安放了一条长凳,还带去了一张木质隔板用来区隔异性祈祷者。耶路撒冷的穆斯林领袖认为,这种在过道安放家具的行为是挑衅,是犹太人缓图全面掌控圣殿山的阴谋的一部分。 Many of the leaders of Palestine’s Muslims believed—or claimed to believe—that Jews had manufactured a set of historical and theological connections to the Western Wall and to the Mount, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in order to advance the Zionist project. 巴勒斯坦的许多穆斯林领袖曾相信——或曾宣称其相信——犹太人捏造了一整套其与哭墙及圣殿山这一阿克萨清真寺和圆顶清真寺所在地之间的历史和神学联系,目的是为了推进犹太复国主义计划。 This belief defied Muslim history—the Dome of the Rock was built by Jerusalem’s Arab conquerors on the site of the Second Jewish Temple in order to venerate its memory (the site had previously been defiled by Jerusalem’s Christian rulers as a kind of rebuke to Judaism, the despised mother religion of Christianity). Jews themselves consider the Mount itself to be the holiest site in their faith. The Western Wall, a large retaining wall from the Second Temple period, is sacred only by proxy. 这一观念完全不顾穆斯林历史——圆顶清真寺是征服耶路撒冷的阿拉伯人为追思先人而在犹太人第二圣殿的旧址上建造的(原址被耶路撒冷的基督教统治者破坏,以谴责犹太教这一遭到鄙视的基督教母宗教)。犹太人自己则视圣殿山为其信仰的至圣之地。哭墙作为第二圣殿时期留存下来的巨大护墙,只是因其象征性才变得神圣。 The spiritual leader of Palestine’s Muslims, the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, incited Arabs in Palestine against their Jewish neighbors by arguing that Islam itself was under threat. (Husseini would later become one of Hitler’s most important Muslim allies.) Jews in British-occupied Palestine responded to Muslim invective by demanding more access to the Wall, sometimes holding demonstrations at the holy site. 巴勒斯坦穆斯林的精神领袖、耶路撒冷的“穆夫提”【译注:教法说明官】Amin al-Husseini认为是伊斯兰本身受到了威胁,以此来煽动巴勒斯坦的阿拉伯人反对他们的犹太邻居(Husseini后来成为希特勒最重要的穆斯林盟友之一)。英国治下的巴勒斯坦犹太人对穆斯林的谩骂进行了回应,要求提高哭墙对他们的开放程度,有时还会在这一圣地举行示威。 By the next year, violence directed against Jews by their neighbors had become more common: Arab rioters took the lives of 133 Jews that summer; British forces killed 116 Arabs in their attempt to subdue the riots. In Hebron, a devastating pogrom was launched against the city’s ancient Jewish community after Muslim officials distributed fabricated photographs of a damaged Dome of the Rock, and spread the rumor that Jews had attacked the shrine. 次年,由其近邻发动的、针对犹太人的暴力变得愈发常见:当年夏天阿拉伯暴徒就夺走了133条犹太人性命,而英国军队则在镇压暴乱的行动中杀死了116名阿拉伯人。在希布伦市,穆斯林官员四处传播圆顶清真寺遭到破坏的虚假照片,并散布谣言说犹太人攻击了这一神殿,随后该市最为古老的犹太人社区遭到了令人震惊的大屠杀。 The current “stabbing Intifada” now taking place in Israel—a quasi-uprising in which young Palestinians have been trying, and occasionally succeeding, to kill Jews with knives—is prompted in good part by the same set of manipulated emotions that sparked the anti-Jewish riots of the 1920s: a deeply felt desire on the part of Palestinians to “protect” the Temple Mount from Jews. 以色列当下正出现一种“刺杀起义”,巴勒斯坦年轻人试图用刀砍杀犹太人,并且偶尔能够成功。这一具有半暴动性质的行动,很大程度上被同一套人为操纵的情绪所推动,正是这种情绪在1920年代点燃了反犹暴乱——即巴勒斯坦人内心深处的想要“保护”圣殿山不被犹太人染指的强烈情感。 When Israel captured the Old City of Jerusalem in June of 1967 in response to a Jordanian attack, the first impulse of some Israelis was to assert Jewish rights atop the Mount. Between 1948, the year Israel achieved independence, and 1967, Jordan, then the occupying power in Jerusalem, banned Jews not only from the 35-acre Mount—which is known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, the noble sanctuary—but also from the Western Wall below. 1967年6月,以色列占领了耶路撒冷古城区域以报复约旦的攻击,部分以色列人的第一反应就是主张犹太人在圣殿山上的权利。在1948年(此年以色列实现独立)至1967年间,耶路撒冷的占领国约旦不但禁止犹太人进入圣殿山周围35英亩范围内——这块区域在穆斯林中以Haram al-Sharif,即“高贵的避难所”著称,而且也禁止他们靠近山下的哭墙。 When paratroopers took the Old City, they raised the Israeli flag atop the Dome of the Rock, but the Israeli defense minister, Moshe Dayan, ordered it taken down, and soon after promised leaders of the Muslim Waqf, the trust that controlled the mosque and the shrine, that Israel would not interfere in its activities. Since then, successive Israeli governments have maintained the status quo established by Dayan. 伞兵控制旧城以后,在圆顶清真寺顶上升起以色列国旗,但以色列国防部长Moshe Dayan命令降旗,随后很快就向穆斯林“瓦克夫”(受托控制清真寺和圣堂的组织)的领袖承诺,以色列不会干涉他们的活动。自此以后,历届以色列政府均对Dayan所立态势萧规曹随。 There is another status quo associated with the Temple Mount, however, that has been showing signs of weakening. This is a religious status quo. The mainstream rabbinical view for many years has been that Jews should not walk atop the Mount for fear of treading on the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctum of the Temple that, according to tradition, housed the Ark of the Covenant. The Holy of Holies is the room in which the Jewish high priest spoke the Tetragrammaton, the ineffable name of God, on Yom Kippur. 但是,与圣殿山相关的另一态势则显现出弱化的迹象。这是种宗教态势。多年来,主流的拉比教义观认为犹太人不应该在圣殿山顶行走,以免踩踏了“至圣所”。这是圣殿中一直用于存放有约柜的内部圣所,是犹太大祭司在赎罪日讲述神圣而需避讳的上帝之名“Tetragrammaton”的地方。 The exact location of the Holy of Holies is not known, and Muslim authorities have prevented archeologists from conducting any excavations on the Mount, in part out of fear that such explorations will uncover further evidence of a pre-Islamic Jewish presence. This mainstream rabbinical view concerning the Mount—that it should be the direction of Jewish prayer, rather than a place of Jewish prayer—has made the lives of Jerusalem’s temporal authorities easier, by keeping Muslim and Jewish worshippers separated. “至圣所”的确切所在并不为人所知,而穆斯林当局一直阻止考古学家对圣殿山实施发掘,一部分也是担心此类勘探有可能会发现更多的证据,证明犹太人先于伊斯兰教存在于此。这种主流的拉比教义观认为圣殿山应是犹太信徒祷告时的朝向而非他们应该出现的地方。这让耶路撒冷的世俗政府由此轻松一些,因为穆斯林礼拜者和犹太礼拜者被泾渭分明的隔开了。 In recent years, however, small groups of radical religious innovators who oppose the mainstream rabbinical view have sought to make the Mount, once again, a site of Jewish prayer. (Here is a New York Times Magazine story I wrote about these radical groups.) These activists have gained sympathizers among some far-right political figures in Israel, though the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not altered the separation-of-religions status quo. 然而,近年来,一些反对主流拉比教义观的激进宗教改革者小团体已在寻求将圣殿山重新确定为犹太祷告之地。(我为《纽约时报》所写的一篇文章所论的正是这些激进团体。)这些积极分子已获得以色列某些极右政治人物的同情,尽管总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡领导下的政府仍未改变两种宗教分离的现状。 One of the tragedies of the settlement movement is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict. 定居行动的悲剧之一是它可能模糊了中东冲突的真正起因。 Convincing Palestinians that the Israeli government is not trying to alter the status quo on the Mount has been difficult because many of today’s Palestinian leaders, in the manner of the Palestinian leadership of the 1920s, actively market rumors that the Israeli government is seeking to establish atop the Mount a permanent Jewish presence. 要让巴勒斯坦人相信以色列政府无意改变圣殿山的现状,这一直很困难。因为巴勒斯坦当今的许多领袖采用了1920年代巴勒斯坦领导层的做法,积极地散布谣言,声称以色列政府想要在圣殿山顶建立永久性的犹太人驻地。 The comments of the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas—by general consensus the most moderate leader in the brief history of the Palestinian national movement—have been particularly harsh. Though Abbas has authorized Palestinian security services to work with their Israeli counterparts to combat extremist violence, his rhetoric has inflamed tensions. 巴勒斯坦民族权力机构(自治政府)总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯的评论尤其尖锐。在巴勒斯坦民族主义运动的简短历史中,他已是公认的最温和的领袖。尽管阿巴斯已下令巴勒斯坦安全部门配合以色列的相关部门打击极端主义暴行,他的说辞却是在火上浇油。 “Every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem is pure, every martyr will reach paradise, and every injured person will be rewarded by God,” he said last month, as rumors about the Temple Mount swirled. He went on to say that Jews “have no right to desecrate the mosque with their dirty feet.” 上个月,关于圣殿山的谣言甚嚣尘上之时,他说:“洒在耶路撒冷的每一滴血都是纯洁的,每一个殉难者都将上天堂,每个受伤的人都将得到上帝的奖赏。”他接着说,犹太人“无权用他们的脏脚玷污清真寺。” Taleb Abu Arrar, an Israeli Arab member of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, argued publicly that Jews “desecrate” the Temple Mount by their presence. (Fourteen years ago, Yasser Arafat, then the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, told me that “Jewish authorities are forging history by saying the Temple stood on the Haram al-Sharif. Their temple was somewhere else.”) 以色列议会中的一位阿拉伯议员,Taleb Abu Arrar,公开发表言论说,犹太人的出现就是对圣殿山的“玷污”。(14年前,巴勒斯坦解放组织时任领导人亚瑟·阿拉法特曾告诉我,“犹太当局说圣殿位于‘高贵的避难所’,这是伪造历史。他们的庙在别的地方。”) These sorts of comments, combined with the violence of the past two weeks—including the sacking and burning of a Jewish shrine outside Nablus—suggest a tragic continuity between the 1920s and today. For those who believe not only in the necessity, but in the practical possibility, of an equitable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and in particular, for those who believe that the post-1967 settlement project is the root cause of the conflict—recent events have been sobering. 诸如此类的言论,再结合过去两周发生的暴力活动——包括洗劫和焚烧纳布卢斯市外的一处犹太圣地——表明在1920年代与今日之间存在一种可悲的持续性。对于那些相信巴以冲突不仅必须、而且实践上也能够通过双方平等建国方案来解决的人来说,尤其是认为1967年后的定居点计划才是冲突根源的人,近期的事态发人深省。 One of the tragedies of the settlement movement is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict: the unwillingness of many Muslim Palestinians to accept the notion that Jews are a people who are indigenous to the land Palestinians believe to be exclusively their own, and that the third-holiest site in Islam is also the holiest site of another religion, one whose adherents reject the notion of Muslim supersessionism. 定居行动的悲剧之一是它可能模糊了中东冲突根本原因:许多巴勒斯坦穆斯林不愿意接受一个观念:犹太人是巴勒斯坦人自信为其所独有的土地上的原住民族,且伊斯兰教的第三大圣地同样也是另外一个宗教的至圣之地,而该宗教的信徒拒斥伊斯兰教的取代论。【译注:又称替换神学,是探讨基督教与犹太教和犹太人民关系的一种基督教神学观点,认为基督教徒已取代以色列人成为上帝的子民、新约已取代旧约。(译自wiki词条)】 The status quo on the Temple Mount is prudent and must remain in place. It saves lives, lives fundamentalist Jewish radicals would risk in order to advance their millennial dreams. But it is the byproduct of the intolerance of Jerusalem’s Muslim leadership. 圣殿山的现状是明智的,且必须继续保持。它确实挽救了人命,那些原教旨主义犹太教激进分子为了推进其千禧年之梦而愿意牺牲的人命。但它也是耶路撒冷的穆斯林领导层不宽容政策的副产品。 When violence against Jews occurs inside Israel, or on the West Bank, a consensus tends to be reached quickly by outside analysts and political leaders, one that holds that such violence represents the inevitable consequence of Israel’s occupation and settlement of Palestinian territory. John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of state, said in an appearance earlier this week at Harvard that, “What’s happening is that unless we get going, a two-state solution could conceivably be stolen from everybody. And there’s been a massive increase in settlements over the course of the last years.” He went on to say, “Now you have this violence because there’s a frustration that is growing, and a frustration among Israelis who don’t see any movement.” 当针对犹太人的暴力发生在以色列内部或约旦河西岸时,外部的分析人士和政治领袖倾向于迅速达成一种共识,认为这些暴力行为是以色列占领并定居于巴勒斯坦领土的必然后果。美国国务卿约翰·克里在本周早些时候出席哈佛的一个公开活动时说:“现状是,除非我们开始采取行动,否则可以预见两国方案将再无可能。而在过去的几年中,定居点已经有了极大的增加。”他接着说:“这些暴力之所以出现是因为挫败感在弥漫,而看不到任何进展的以色列人也很失望。” (On Friday morning, speaking with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, Kerry revised and extended his comments, criticizing Abbas—in a passive way — for the violence: “There's no excuse for the violence. ... And the Palestinians need to understand, and President Abbas has been committed to nonviolence. He needs to be condemning this, loudly and clearly. And he needs to not engage in some of the incitement that his voice has sometimes been heard to encourage.”) (周五早上,参加美国国家公共电台Steve Inskeep的节目时,克里对他的前述评论进行了修正和扩展,就发生的暴力活动(以一种消极方式)批评阿巴斯:“暴力没有任何借口……巴勒斯坦人需要明白,阿巴斯总统也承诺了非暴力,他需要就此高调且清楚地谴责这些暴力行为,并且应当避开使用有时被人当作鼓励的煽动言辞”。) Many Palestinians believe that “this is not a conflict between two national movements, but a conflict between one national movement and a colonial and imperialistic entity.” 许多巴勒斯坦人认为,“这并非两个民族运动之间的冲突,而是一个民族运动和另一个殖民和帝国主义实体之间的冲突。” It is sometimes difficult for policymakers such as Kerry, who has devoted so much time and energy to the search for a solution to the Israeli-Arab impasse, to acknowledge the power of a particular Palestinian narrative, one that obviates the possibility of a solution that allows Jews national and religious equality. 如克里这样的政策制定者,由于他们已经为解决以巴冲突僵局付出了太多时间和精力,有时候难以认识到一种特定的巴勒斯坦叙事的力量,这种叙事排除了允许犹太人获得民族和宗教平等的方案可能性。 Writing in Haaretz, the left-center political scientist Shlomo Avineri describes an important disconnect that often goes unnoticed, even in times like these: Many Palestinians believe that “this is not a conflict between two national movements but a conflict between one national movement (the Palestinian) and a colonial and imperialistic entity (Israel).” 在《国土报》上,中左翼的政治学家Shlomo Avineri描述了一个通常不被注意(即便是当下也是如此)的重要断裂。许多巴勒斯坦人相信,“这并非是两个民族运动之间的冲突,而是一个民族运动(巴勒斯坦)和一个殖民和帝国主义实体(以色列)之间的冲突。” He goes on to write, “According to this view, Israel will end like all colonial phenomena—it will perish and disappear. Moreover, according to the Palestinian view, the Jews are not a nation but a religious community, and as such not entitled to national self-determination which is, after all, a universal imperative.” 他接着写道,“根据这种观点,以色列会跟其他所有殖民现象一样,终将走向灭亡。而且,根据巴勒斯坦人的观点,犹太人不是一个民族,而是一个宗教共同体,因此没有民族自决的权利,毕竟这是一条普遍诫规。” Avineri, like most sensible analysts, understands the many and variegated reasons for the continued failure of the peace process: 跟绝大多数明智的分析家一样,Avineri认识到了和平进程不断失败的原因众多而繁杂:
[M]utual distrust between the two populations, internal pressures from the rejectionists on both sides, Yasser Arafat’s repeated deceptions, the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the electoral victories of Likud in Israeli elections, Palestinian terrorism, continuing Israeli settlement activities in the territories, the bloody rift between Fatah and Hamas, American presidents who did too little (George W. Bush) or too much and in a wrong way (Barack Obama), the political weakness of Mahmoud Abbas, governments headed by Netanyahu that did everything possible to undermine effective negotiations. All this is true, and everyone picks and chooses what fits their views and interests—but beyond all these lies a fundamental difference in the terms in which each side views the conflict, a difference many tend or choose to overlook. “两个群体之间的互不信任,双方抵制派所造成的内部压力,亚瑟·阿拉法特反复无常的欺诈,对伊扎克·拉宾总理的谋杀,利库德集团在以色利选举中的胜利,巴勒斯坦恐怖主义,以色列在该地区持续不断的定居活动,法塔赫和哈马斯之间的血腥纷争,美国总统的无所作为(乔治·W·布什)抑或在错误的方向上做得太多(巴拉克·奥巴马),马哈茂德·阿巴斯的政治软弱,内塔尼亚胡为首的政府干尽了一切有可能破坏有效和谈的事。这些都是对的,每个人都能从中挑选出与合于自身观点和利益的原因——但在此之外,还存在一个易被人忽略的因素,即双方看待这一冲突的角度存在根本性的差别。”
The violence of the past two weeks, encouraged by purveyors of rumors who now have both Israeli and Palestinian blood on their hands, is rooted not in Israeli settlement policy, but in a worldview that dismisses the national and religious rights of Jews. There will not be peace between Israelis and Palestinians so long as parties on both sides of the conflict continue to deny the national and religious rights of the other. 过去两周发生的暴力活动受到了谣言散布者的鼓动,他们的手上现已沾满了以色列人还有巴勒斯坦人的鲜血。这种暴力并非根源于以色列的定居政策,而是源于一种拒绝承认犹太人享有民族和宗教权利的世界观。只要冲突双方继续否定彼此的民族和宗教权利,以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间就不会出现和平。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[微言]清真寺/兄弟会/阿拉伯社会主义

【2012-07-21】

@秦訇-taras 清真寺和社区的关系比教堂更密切, 比如巴扎。部分因道统强大,教与集权的关系在一千多年伊斯兰史上总会出问题,不会有中央集权模式。伊朗1979是教士从左派牢友那里习得系统控制国家的经验,而埃及无这个机会。所以埃及不会伊朗化,这也许是乐观的一面@黄章晋ster

@whigzhou: 嗯,传统清真寺是积极因素,可怕的是兄弟会和阿拉伯社会主义

@秦訇-taras: 你说这两点的共同因素就是城市里未能近代化也不在巴扎里的那个群体吧,就是贫民窟出身在大街上摆地摊的

@whigzhou(more...)

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【2012-07-21】 @秦訇-taras 清真寺和社区的关系比教堂更密切, 比如巴扎。部分因道统强大,教与集权的关系在一千多年伊斯兰史上总会出问题,不会有中央集权模式。伊朗1979是教士从左派牢友那里习得系统控制国家的经验,而埃及无这个机会。所以埃及不会伊朗化,这也许是乐观的一面@黄章晋ster @whigzhou: 嗯,传统清真寺是积极因素,可怕的是兄弟会和阿拉伯社会主义 @秦訇-taras: 你说这两点的共同因素就是城市里未能近代化也不在巴扎里的那个群体吧,就是贫民窟出身在大街上摆地摊的 @whigzhou: 我的意思是兄弟会有组织能力,也不难学会利用国家工具,一旦上台,清真寺传统作用不足以阻止其实施暴政 @秦訇-taras 叙利亚运动的混乱暴力确实值得担忧,但不能回避地是,原有体制中没有正常表达与博弈的资源和渠道,才会有暴力。而这个问题不解决,稳定就是虚假的。哪怕是发展,在价值观序列里也不可能优先于人权。 @whigzhou: 之前的叙利亚当然不是什么好东西,问题是替代它的是什么?现代史上出现过的方案无非三种:1)占领改造;2)威慑,迫使当权者接受某些规范;3)打散了听任它自动重组。1代价太高被否决了,2被民主派认为不够民主,3我看没戏 @秦訇-taras:是,极端点说,我觉得除非一个国家城市化水平很高且有真正的中产阶级,否则都没戏,第二种最可行,但阿列维这个包袱太重了?类似格局无成功解扣先例 @whigzhou: 方案2是性价比最好的,利比亚本来已经有起色了,不过叙利亚可能不一样 @古希腊人: 二位属于沙盘推演,那实际情况也可能出人意料呢? @whigzhou: 这似乎是让谈论变得有意义的要点所在吧?跟在事实后面,做一台发讣告的机器,没啥意思吧? @古希腊人 忘记谁说的“任何对对利比亚战后伊斯兰化的忧虑都是故作天真,假扮世俗。因为利比亚的革命本身就是世界性的,未来的转型也是世界性的,部分的伊斯兰化既是对卡大佐绿色运动的反动,也是部分参与力量的呼声,反而更能加强利比亚与伊斯兰世界的关联。利比亚的未来取决于伊斯兰世界的未来” @whigzhou: 他眼中的前景看起来比我眼中的更可怕
[饭文]阿拉伯之春开启后反恐时代

阿拉伯之春开启后反恐时代
辉格
2012年6月29日

已持续18个月的阿拉伯之春虽还说不上尘埃落定:埃及军方会负隅顽抗多久?叙利亚内战会不会点燃该地区错综复杂的民族、教派和国家间冲突?利比亚和也门会不会沦为另一个索马里?这些都还有待观察,但这场变动的格局和走向却已相当清楚:该地区的政治进程,正在从大国所主导的国际秩序中游离出来,按自身的逻辑发展。

考虑到该地区之庞大——从马格里布到印度河谷——这一转变影响深远,将带给世人一个十分陌生的世界格局;从18世纪中叶的七年战争开始,欧洲王国之间的合纵连横便开始通过其殖民体系向世界范围蔓延,不断将各大小国家、民族和文化卷入由阵营对立所构成的国际(more...)

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阿拉伯之春开启后反恐时代 辉格 2012年6月29日 已持续18个月的阿拉伯之春虽还说不上尘埃落定:埃及军方会负隅顽抗多久?叙利亚内战会不会点燃该地区错综复杂的民族、教派和国家间冲突?利比亚和也门会不会沦为另一个索马里?这些都还有待观察,但这场变动的格局和走向却已相当清楚:该地区的政治进程,正在从大国所主导的国际秩序中游离出来,按自身的逻辑发展。 考虑到该地区之庞大——从马格里布到印度河谷——这一转变影响深远,将带给世人一个十分陌生的世界格局;从18世纪中叶的七年战争开始,欧洲王国之间的合纵连横便开始通过其殖民体系向世界范围蔓延,不断将各大小国家、民族和文化卷入由阵营对立所构成的国际秩序之中,此后历经拿破仑战争、克里米亚、两次大战,最后在冷战时达到高峰,几乎所有国家都被卷入其中。 冷战是一次重大转折,此前,对立阵营是按一时的利益和战略需要而拼凑的,敌我关系变动频繁,那时主导各阵营的大国并不关心其盟友的文化和制度,只要冲突时站在同一边就行,而冷战则是一次意识形态和社会制度的全面对抗,因而超级大国不仅拉拢盟友,也努力让他们采纳自己的制度和意识形态,必要时甚至强加给他们,这样一来,国际秩序对各国的影响便开始深入骨髓,与该体系的关系常很大程度上决定一国的制度基调和社会发展方向。 冷战结束后,人们一度担心国际秩序丧失维持动力,不过至少在中东,萨达姆及时提供了新动力,此后在石油利益和对以色列的安全承诺推动下,美国主导下的海湾联盟和戴维营秩序维持了中东的十年稳定,直到911;反恐战争大幅改变了美国对中东和伊斯兰世界的利益关切点,不再只是确保运输贸易畅通和避免战争,而是要通过改变该地区的社会政治面貌来消除恐怖主义土壤,那就必须进行深度干预。 假如美国真有决心和能力持续推行深度干预战略的话,尽管会有许多艰难曲折,中东将朝另一个方向发展,阿伊两战之后,甚至已经有一些迹象显示干预策略开始获得成效,特别是利比亚的转变,还有也门和埃塞俄比亚等国在美国强大施压下对反恐战争作出的配合;然而后来的事实表明,小布什政策在国内和西方世界所获得的支持是脆弱而短暂的。 恐怖威胁毕竟不具备珍珠港、地面入侵或核战争前景那么巨大而无可置疑的动员能力,它让国民愿意容忍的战场伤亡和财政负担都十分有限,况且,通过加强国内防范措施,似乎也能避免大多数和最严重的恐怖袭击;当连续多年没有发生恐怖袭击,国民很快对持续扩大的伤亡和财政赤字失去耐心,而金融危机又施加了致命一击。 所以今天回顾起来,中东局势的转变实则始于金融危机和民主党的上台,深度干预政策被全面抛弃,退回到克林顿时代的价值观外交:从外部鼓励民主运动,仅在出现大规模人道灾难时进行有限干预,在推动一个国家变化的问题上,采用破而不立的策略,因为要“立”就必须长期深度干预,比如对付塞尔维亚的办法就是轰炸,炸到你秩序崩溃、政府垮台,然后静待其内部发生积极变化。 破而不立政策一度表现良好、令人振奋,铁幕落下之后,东欧似乎毫无阻力的自动拷贝了西欧的制度,也顺利融入欧盟大家庭,在全球化和自由贸易的大氛围中,东亚和拉美也出现了一些成功转型,以至于出现了像福山的“历史终结”之类惊人的乐观论调。 然而很快,从阿富汗、俄罗斯,到委内瑞拉、玻利维亚,乃至中东和中亚的伊斯兰地区,逆转的趋势出现了;金融危机之后,甚至作为以宪政和法治为基础的全球化市场社会之大本营的西方,其意识形态氛围和政策取向也已从冷战后的亲市场路线中大幅扭转;或许,此轮阿拉伯之春将最终埋葬福山式盲目相信“进步潮流难以阻挡”的乐观主义历史决定论。 于是我们就要问:为何现代市场制度在东欧的重建如开闸放水般容易,而在其他国家却屡遭挫折?特别是,为何在阿拉伯和伊斯兰世界,当外部压力减弱、原有社会控制松动时,重建起来的大多是反宪政法治和反市场的制度?甚至像索马里和阿富汗这样完全建立不起现代国家而退回到部落状态? 面对如此强烈的反差,我们难以忽视文化和传统的差异,然而这些差异中究竟哪些元素在起作用,如何起作用,却不容易看清;有些观点夸大了宗教传统的作用,首先,伊斯兰和基督教一样,从经文和教义中总是能挖掘支持任何主义的词句,那没有意义,实际上对广大信众来说,宗教只是以习俗传承的生活方式和社会规范,与经文教义关系不大。 其次,与信众相反,构成伊斯兰世界政治主导力量的精英和激进教派领袖们,多数都受过西方教育,许多甚至是学术和技术专业人士,其思考方式也非常西方化,而且越是这些人,具有越强烈的文化自觉意识,越是沉浸于阿拉伯社会现代化的失败历史所带来的挫折感之中,也越执着于复兴其梦想中的伊斯兰文化和历史荣耀,他们不仅十分了解西方,也梦寐以求实现现代化并超越西方。 真正的差异来自构成博弈环境的文化价值观和信念,正是各派在面临机会展开竞争时,对各自将会如何行动所持的信念,在制度演变起着关键作用;假如一个社会从来没有妥协和尊重惯例的传统,那么你死我活和机会主义便成为合理的预期,和平共存的均势和稳定的社会规范便难以维持甚至根本不会出现,比如在军方和选举占优的党派之间,假如前者相信后者上台必定会全面清算,后者相信对方若保留地位必定会任意干政,那和平过渡就难以实现。 同样,假如好不容易获得政权的一方确信反对派若上台必定全面推翻自己的政策,多年心血一夜泡汤,就很可能不惜破坏规则而阻止后者上台;出现一个导向宪政与法治的良性反馈过程所需的博弈条件非常严苛,不是几次圆桌会议和几份宪章条文就能创造的,而只能在一次次的社会互动过程中逐渐形成。 阿拉伯世界的条件尤其恶劣,该地区建立现代国家的努力其实从未成功,有些国家的基层组织方式仍处于部落状态,另一些则始终由外部力量所维持:奥斯曼帝国的总督、英法殖民者或托管当局、冷战和反恐时代由巨额外援所支撑的威权政府,社会各阶层和利益集团有序互动的机会很少,一旦外部力量撤出,很难指望一个好的秩序和制度能够自发的建立。