含有〈进化〉标签的文章(70)

读史笔记#24:声望与权力

声望与权力
辉格
2016年12月24日

建立与维护自己的声望(prestige)是人类行为的一大动机,经济学家早已注意到,这一动机是许多消费行为背后的推动力,它构成了某些门类商品的主要甚至唯一的价值基础,而且看来有着牢固的心理基础和古老的渊源。

考古学家发现,用于此类目的的物品——被称为声望品(prestige goods)——在远古人类遗存中占了很大比例,是识别社会复杂程度的重要线索;对声望品的追逐也是推动早期手工业和贸易活动的主要动力,甚至像青铜器制造这样里程碑式的技术进步,最初也是由声望追逐者的需求所促成。

当然,拥有声望品更多的是对既已建立的声望的展示,而非声望本身,这一展示所传达的信息大约包括:我具备不俗的才智与鉴别力,据此取得了相当成就,过着一份体面生活,赢得了其他社会成员的尊重,建立了良好的社会关系,甚至不乏仰慕与追随者,我对他们慷慨大方,乐于出手相助,总之,我是一个有价值的交往对象。

高声望者不仅有着出色的个人禀赋,更重要的是(用社会学家的话说)拥有雄厚的社会资本(social capital),正是后者赋予他们在社会交往中的吸引力,也让他们愿意投入资源去经营和维护社会关系,因为首先,社交魅(more...)

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声望与权力 辉格 2016年12月24日 建立与维护自己的声望([[prestige]])是人类行为的一大动机,经济学家早已注意到,这一动机是许多消费行为背后的推动力,它构成了某些门类商品的主要甚至唯一的价值基础,而且看来有着牢固的心理基础和古老的渊源。 考古学家发现,用于此类目的的物品——被称为声望品(prestige goods)——在远古人类遗存中占了很大比例,是识别社会复杂程度的重要线索;对声望品的追逐也是推动早期手工业和贸易活动的主要动力,甚至像青铜器制造这样里程碑式的技术进步,最初也是由声望追逐者的需求所促成。 当然,拥有声望品更多的是对既已建立的声望的展示,而非声望本身,这一展示所传达的信息大约包括:我具备不俗的才智与鉴别力,据此取得了相当成就,过着一份体面生活,赢得了其他社会成员的尊重,建立了良好的社会关系,甚至不乏仰慕与追随者,我对他们慷慨大方,乐于出手相助,总之,我是一个有价值的交往对象。 高声望者不仅有着出色的个人禀赋,更重要的是(用社会学家的话说)拥有雄厚的社会资本([[social capital]]),正是后者赋予他们在社会交往中的吸引力,也让他们愿意投入资源去经营和维护社会关系,因为首先,社交魅力本身对倾向于社会资本的投资策略构成一种比较优势,其次,社会资本是一种越用越多的东西:今天你动用关系资源帮助了我,我就成了你的互惠网络的一部分,日后你又可以利用这份新增资源办成其他事情。 假如你和很多人建立这样的关系,并且频繁动用这些关系帮助他人,从而成为所在社会的互惠网络的一个中心节点,便可为自己赢得巨大声望;在人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔(Timothy Earle)看来,如此建立的声望是早期社会政治权力的几大来源之一,也是推动社会从游团向部落继而向酋邦发展的关键组织元素;在诸如社区牧师这样的人物身上,我们至今仍可看到部落中凭借声望而取得权力的『大人物(big man)』的影子。 不过,和其他依赖网络效应([[network effect]])的东西一样,声望的建立也面临着启动障碍:经营社会关系的成本很高,需要经常设宴请客,需要大宅子招待客人,奢华体面的服饰、器具和摆设,频繁送礼,有时还要收留孤弱或供养门客,虽然社会资本最终会带来回报,但在突破盈亏平衡点之前,需要大量前期投入。 问题是,在高度均等化的简单社会中,谁有这样的资源呢?而且,在社会资本经历长久积累终于产生价值之前,谁愿意为这样不确定的远期回报作持续投入呢?所以在有些学者看来,基于声望的权力只有在社会地位已经发生相当程度的分化之后才可能出现,而不是最初引发社会分化的先行元素。 然而,人类学家约瑟夫·亨里克([[Joseph Henrich]])在其新书《人类的成功秘诀》(The Secret of Our Success)中却提出了不同看法,他认为,人类强烈的学习需求为声望建设提供了启动机制,因而声望在人类数百万年文化进化历程的早期便已开始起作用。 由于进化路径的特殊性,我们的绝大部分生活技能需要后天习得,而且与这些技能相关的知识多半是无法言传的know-how,需要在直接的观察、模仿和实践中学会,于是我们发展出了许多心理机制帮助我们高效学习,比如强烈的模仿倾向,领会他人意图从而更有效的模仿,以及挑选最佳模仿对象的能力。 在判断身边的人中谁最值得学习时,我们会利用多种线索:直接观察他运用某种技能时的表现,他以往取得的成就,以及能够证明这些成就的器物或信息;我们也会利用二阶线索:他的言行举止是否得到他人的关注?其见解和意见是否被众人听取?有多少人向他请教或求助? 亨里克指出,即便是蹒跚学步的幼儿,也天生的对这些线索极为敏感,甚至年龄越小对二阶线索的反应越强烈,因为小孩尚缺乏直接评判技能高下所需要的经验(这大概可以解释为何年轻人更热衷于追星);而同时,这些线索与构成声望的那些元素高度重合;或许正是生活技能,以及让某些人善于且乐于为后生言传身教的那些个人禀赋,为建立声望提供了启动资本。 学习者和他们的家长乐意为这些楷模提供各种互惠性报酬作为学费,比如帮助做家务、照看孩子,充当无偿或低报酬的助手(学徒制的先驱),为宴席提供食物或劳力赞助,在纠纷冲突中站在他一边,在择偶与结亲时给予优先考虑或优惠条件,等等;这些回报进而帮助他们建立更多社会关系,积累更多社会资本。 无论声望机制是否果真如亨里克所认为那样发端于学习需求(比如,不妨考虑,语言才华和社交技能也完全可能为建立声誉提供启动资本),声誉既经建立,确实可以带来政治权力,个人一旦占据互惠网络中心节点的位置,便会自动吸引更多追随者和拥护者,因为接近中心节点是这些追随者建立自身社会资本的捷径,这反过来又强化了中心节点的地位。 对声望与权力关系的剖析,可以帮助我们理解,为何在没有世袭制的国家,一些政治家族也可能长期兴旺,而另一些裙带网又因某个中心人物的垮台而树倒猢狲散?为何从几位贵妇的客厅里会涌出一轮轮社会运动甚至革命浪潮?为何学术权威越老越受其门徒推崇,即便其理论早已过时?为何一位气功大师身边会浮动着那么多巨商大贾的身影,即便他们看起来不太像是真信那套拙劣把戏?  
[译文]文化与生物性如何协同进化

HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION
A Conversation with Joseph Henrich 
文化如何推动人类进化:与Joseph Henrich对话

时间:@ 2012-09-04
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution

Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 

导言:我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信,我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。

JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia.

约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家,同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。

[JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I’ve been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it’s so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it.

约瑟夫·亨里奇:过去几年,我反复追问自己的一个主要问题,大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指,观念在代际间不断积累,从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西,下一代人又添加一点点东西,如此接力,直到最后得出的工具无比复杂,以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。

This was a really important line in human evolution, and we’ve begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information.

这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索,我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点,这种观点认为,人脑增大的真正动力就是,文化信息以这种方式不断累积,由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息,存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the t(more...)

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HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION A Conversation with Joseph Henrich  文化如何推动人类进化:与Joseph Henrich对话 时间:@ 2012-09-04 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution.  导言:我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信,我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。 JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia. 约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家,同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。 [JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I've been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it's so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it. 约瑟夫·亨里奇:过去几年,我反复追问自己的一个主要问题,大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指,观念在代际间不断积累,从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西,下一代人又添加一点点东西,如此接力,直到最后得出的工具无比复杂,以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。 This was a really important line in human evolution, and we've begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information. 这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索,我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点,这种观点认为,人脑增大的真正动力就是,文化信息以这种方式不断累积,由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息,存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the things that culture creates—like tools. Compared to chimpanzees, we have high levels of manual dexterity. We're good at throwing objects. We can thread a needle. There are  aspects of our brain that seem to be consistent with that as being an innate ability, but tools and artifacts (the kinds of things that one finds useful to throw or finds useful to manipulate) are themselves products of cultural evolution. 随着时间推移,两个系统开始相互作用。在人类进化的过程中,最重要的选择压力正是文化所生成的事物,比如工具。与黑猩猩相比,我们的手要灵巧得多,比如我们善于抛掷东西,我们能够穿针引线。我们大脑的某些方面与此高度协调,使得这种能力看上去似乎与生俱来,但工具和人工制品——那种我们觉得扔出去有用或操作起来有用的东西——本身则是文化进化的产物。 Another example here is fire and cooking. Richard Wrangham, for example, has argued that fire and cooking have been important selection pressures, but what often gets overlooked in understanding fire and cooking is that they're culturally transmitted—we're terrible at making fires actually. We have no innate fire-making ability. But once you got this idea for cooking and making fires to be culturally transmitted, then it created a whole new selection pressure that made our stomachs smaller, our teeth smaller, our gapes or holdings of our mouth smaller, it altered the length of our intestines. It had a whole bunch of downstream effects. 另外一个例子就是用火和烹饪。Richard Wrangham就提出,用火和烹饪一直都是非常重要的选择压力。但在看待用火和烹饪的问题上,经常容易忽略的一点是,它们实际是通过文化进行传递的——人类原本是不怎么会生火的。我们不具备生火的先天能力。但一旦烹饪和生火的观念通过文化得以传递,就创造出一种全新的选择压力,使我们的胃容量变小、牙齿变小、嘴能张开的幅度变小,一口能吃下的东西也变少,而且我们肠道的长度也发生改变。这就带来了一系列的下游效应。 Another area that we've worked on is social status. Early work on human status just took humans to have a kind of status that stems from non-human status. Chimps, other primates, have dominant status. The assumption for a long time was that status in humans was just a kind of human version of this dominant status, but if you apply this gene-culture co-evolutionary thinking, the idea that culture is one of the major selection pressures in human evolution, you come up with this idea that there might be a second kind of status. We call this status prestige. 我们研究的另一个领域是社会地位。有关人类社会地位的早期研究只是简单地假定,人类的地位有其非人类时期的根源。黑猩猩和其他灵长类社群中都有拥有宰制地位的个体。长期以来,人们假定,人类的地位属性只不过是动物群体中的宰制地位的人类版本。但如果运用这种“基因和文化协同进化”的观念,也就是说把文化作为人类进化中的一种主要选择压力,你就会意识到或许存在另外一种类型的地位。我们称其为“威望地位”。 This is the kind of status you get from being particularly knowledgeable or skilled in an area, and the reason it's a kind of status is because once animals, humans in this case, can learn from each other, they can possess resources. 当你在某个领域的知识特别丰富或技能特别熟练时,你就能得到这种地位。这之所以能成为一种地位,是因为一旦动物(此处就是人)能够彼此学习,它们自身便可拥有资源【编注:此句较绕口,意思是相互学习的可能性,使得个体所拥有的知识成为一种对他人也有价值的人力资源】。 You have information resources that can be tapped, and then you want to isolate the members of your group who are most likely to have a lot of this resources, meaning a lot of the knowledge or information that could be useful to you in the future. This causes you to focus on those individuals, differentially attend to them, preferentially listen to them and give them deference in exchange for knowledge that you get back, for copying opportunities in the future. 如果存在可资利用的信息资源,那你就会想把你所属团体之中最有可能拥有大量此类资源的人单独区分出来,这是一大堆你将来有可能用得上的知识或信息。这会促使你关注这些人,特别地留意他们,更乐于倾听他们的意见,敬重他们,以此作为从他们那里获得知识、在未来运用这些知识的回报。

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From this we've argued that humans have two separate kinds of status, dominance and prestige, and these have quite different ethologies. Dominance [ethology] is about physical posture, of size (large expanded chest the way you'd see in apes). Subordinates in dominance hierarchies are afraid. They back away. They look away, where as prestige hierarchies are quite the opposite. 基于此,我们认为人类存在两种不同类型的地位,分别是宰制和威望,分别对应着不同的动物行为学。宰制(行为学)核心在于身体块头的展示(你能在猿类身上看到的那种大块胸肌)。在宰制等级中,处于从属地位的个体会感到害怕。他们会退缩。他们不会正视上级,而在威望等级中情况则正好相反。 You're attracted to prestigious individuals. You want to be near them. You want to look at them, watch them, listen to them, and interact with them. We've done a bunch of experimental work here at UBC and shown that that pattern is consistent, and it leads to more imitation. There may be even specific hormonal profiles with the two kinds of status. 你会被有威望的个体所吸引。你渴望亲近他们。你渴望看着他们,观察他们,倾听他们,与他们交往。在UBC(不列颠哥伦比亚大学),我们已经就此做过一连串实验,证明了这种模式总是存在,而且会引发更多的模仿。这两种不同的地位可能还对应着各自不同的激素配置。 I've also been trying to think broadly, and some of the big questions are, exactly when did this body of cumulative cultural evolution get started? Lately I've been pursuing the idea that it may have started early: at the origins of the genus, 1.8 million years ago when Homo habilis or Homo erectus first begins to emerge in Africa. 此外,我也一直在试图思考一些更为宏大的问题,比如,这一累积性的文化进化体到底是从什么时候开始的?最近,我一直致力于澄清一个想法,那就是它可能开始得很早:很可能在人属出现时就开始了,也就是180万年前能人或直立人最早出现于非洲的时候。 Typically, people thinking about human evolution have approached this as a two-part puzzle, as if there was a long period of genetic evolution until either 10,000 years ago or 40,000 years ago, depending on who you're reading, and then only after that did culture matter, and often little or no consideration given to a long period of interaction between genes and culture. 通常,研究人类进化的人在处理这一问题时,会把它看作是一个“两部分谜题”,就好像从一开始直到距今1万或4万年以前(具体时间取决于你正在阅读谁的研究),曾经存在过一个长时段的基因进化,自此以后,文化才开始发挥作用。他们很少或根本不会考虑基因和文化之间曾长期相互作用这种情形。 Of course, the evidence available in the Paleolithic record is pretty sparse, so another possibility is that it emerged about 800,000 years ago. One theoretical reason to think that that might be an important time to emerge is that there's theoretical models that show that culture, our ability to learn from others, is an adaptation to fluctuating environments. If you look at the paleo-climatic record, you can see that the environment starts to fluctuate a lot starting about 900,000 years ago and going to about six or five hundred thousand years ago. 当然,我们能得到的旧石器时代证据相当少。因此,另一种可能性是,这一文化进化体开始于大约80万年前。这个时间点之所以成为一个重要的起源时间选项,一个理论依据在于,已经有理论模型表明,文化——即我们从他人身上学习的能力——是我们对持续的环境变动的一种适应。翻一翻古气候记录就会发现,环境大概在距今90万年前的时候开始剧烈变动,直到距今60或50万年前才消停。 This would have created a selection pressure for lots of cultural learning for lots of focusing on other members of your group, and taking advantage of that cumulative body of non-genetic knowledge. 这有可能创造出一种选择压力,催生了更多的文化学习,促使人更多关注团体中的其他成员,也促使人们更多地利用那种累积性的非基因的知识体。

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Another signature of cultural learning is regional differentiation and material culture, and you see that by about 400,000 years ago. So, you could have a kind of late emergence at 400,000 years ago. A middle guess would be 800,000 years ago based on the climate, and then the early guess would be, say, the origin of genus, 1.8 million years ago. 文化学习的另外一个鲜明特征是地区分化和物质文化,这一点在大约40万年前可以看到。所以还有一种说法,认为这一文化进化体始于40万年前。这一时间比较晚,持中的猜测则是基于气候的80万年前起源说,更早的猜测则是人属出现的时候,即180万年前。 Along these same lines, I've been trying to figure out what the ancestral ape would have looked like. We know that humans share a common ancestry with chimpanzees about five or six million years ago with chimpanzees and bonobos, and the question is, what kind of ape was that? 沿着同样的思考线索,我还一直试图弄清祖猿长成什么样子。我们知道,大概500万或600万年前,人类和黑猩猩、倭黑猩猩拥有共同的祖先,问题是,这是种什么样的猿? One possibility, and the typical assumption, is that the ape was more like a chimpanzee or a bonobo. But there's another possibility that it was a different kind of ape that we don't have in the modern world: a communal breeding ape that lives in family units rather than the kind of fission fusion you might see in chimpanzees, and that actually chimpanzees and bonobos took a separate turn, and that lineage eventually went to humans spurred off a whole bunch of different kinds of apes. In the Pliocene, we see lots of different kinds of apes in terms of different species of Australopithecus. 其中一种可能是,这种祖猿更像黑猩猩或倭黑猩猩,这也是通常的假设。但还有另外一种可能性,它们可能是一种当今世界已经不存在的完全不同的猿:一种以家庭为单位、合作繁殖的猿,而不是黑猩猩那种裂变融合群体【译注:指群体的规模和成员不断变动】,而且黑猩猩和倭黑猩猩实际上是往另外一个不同方向上演变了,而最终进化出人类的那一谱系则进化成为一系列不同种类的猿。在上新世,我们可以看到大量不同种类的猿,他们都是南猿的不同种。 I'm just beginning to get into that, and I haven't gotten very far, but I do have this strong sense that we now have evidence to suggest that humans were communal breeders, so that we lived in family groups maybe somewhat similar to the way gorillas live in family groups, and that this is a much better environment for the evolution of capacities for culture than typical in the chimpanzee model, because for cultural learning to really take off, you need more than one model. 我才刚刚开始研究这一问题,成果还不多,但我强烈地感觉到,我们现在已经有证据说人类曾是合作繁殖的,因此我们是生活于家庭群体之中的,某种程度上就像大猩猩现在的那种家庭群体生活一样。相比黑猩猩的那种模式,这一模式为文化能力进化提供的环境要好得多,因为文化学习要真正实现飞跃,必须得有多种模式。 You want a number of individuals in your social environment to be trying out different techniques—say different techniques for getting nuts or for finding food or for tracking animals. Then you need to pay attention to them so you can take advantage of the variation between them. If there's one member of your group who's doing it a little bit better, you preferentially learn from them, and then the next generation gets the best technique from the previous generation. 这需要你所在的社会环境中拥有许多个体去尝试各不相同的技术,比如说取出果仁或找到食物或追踪猎物的不同技术。然后你就需要细心关注他们,以便能充分利用他们彼此之间的差异变化。如果群体之中有一个成员比其他成员做得稍微好一点点,你就更乐于向他们学习,于是下一代就能从上一代学到最好的技术。 Other things I've been thinking about along these lines are just trying to think through all the different adaptations that would have resulted from this gene culture interaction. One thing that's been noted by a number of people is that humans are strangely good at long distance running. We seem to have long distance running adaptations. 沿着这条线索,我还在考虑其他一些问题,那就是基于这种基因与文化的相互作用,到底我们会出现哪些不同的适应性变化。其中许多人已经注意到的一点是,人类特别善于长距离奔跑,这一点相当令人诧异。我们身上似乎出现了长距离奔跑的适应性变化。 Our feet have a particular anatomy. We have sweat glands and we can run really far. Hunter-gatherers can chase down game by just running the antelope down until it collapses. We run marathons. We seem generally attracted to running, and the question is, how did we become such long distance runners? 我们的脚具有一种独特的生理构造。我们拥有汗腺,可以跑得很远。狩猎采集者要追捕羚羊的话,只需要追着它跑,直到猎物筋疲力尽自己倒下。我们能跑马拉松。我们似乎全都对跑步感兴趣。问题是,我们是如何变得这样善于长跑的呢? We don't see this in other kinds of animals. We think if it was an obvious adaptation, we'd see it recurring through nature, but only humans have it. The secret is that humans who don't know how to track animals, can't run them down, so you need to have a large body of tracking knowledge that allows you to interpret spoors and identify individual animals and track animals over long distances when you can't see the animal, and without that body of knowledge, we're not very good at running game down. 在其他动物身上,我们看不到这一点。我们认为,如果这是一种简单的适应,那我们就应该能在自然界中看到它重复出现,但这一现象只有人类身上有。这里的隐秘在于,如果有的人类不知道如何追踪猎物,那他就不可能尾随追捕,所以你需要拥有一大套的追踪知识,以便你能在看不到猎物的时候分析足迹,能正确辨识猎物个体并能长距离追踪到它。如果没有这一知识体系,我们是不善于把猎物追倒的。 There's an interaction between genes and culture. First you have to get the culturally transmitted knowledge about animal behavior and tracking and spoor knowledge and the ability to identify individuals, which is something you need to practice, and only after that can you begin to take advantage of long distance running techniques and being able to run animals down. 在基因与文化之间存在着相互作用。首先你需要拥有那套关于动物行为和追踪的知识、足迹知识和辨识猎物个体的能力,而这是通过文化传递的,是一种需要练习的东西,只有这样,你才能用上长跑技巧,才能把猎物追倒。 That's a potential source for figuring out the origins of capacities for culture, because to the degree that we have information about the anatomy of feet, we can use that to figure out when it started. The same idea follows from cooking and fire. Since we know that those are culturally transmitted now, when we begin to see evidence that that affected our anatomy, that gives us clues to the origins of our capacities for culture. 要弄清人类文化能力的起源,这是一个可以思考的方向,因为凭借对人类足部构造的了解,我们可以弄清文化进化开始的时间。同样的思路也可以用在烹饪和用火问题上。因为我们现已知道烹饪和用火都是通过文化传递的,因此,如果我们能够找到它们影响身体构造的证据,就有了探究我们的文化能力之起源的线索。

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Most recently I've been also thinking about the evolution of societal complexity. This is the emergence of complex societies that happens after the origins of agriculture, when societies begin to get big and complex and you have lots of interactions among strangers, large-scale cooperation, market exchange, militaries, division of labor, substantial division of labor. We have a sense of the sequence of events, but we don't have good process descriptions of how it was. What are the causal processes that bring these things about? 最近,我还在思考社会复杂性的进化问题。这里说的是农业起源之后复杂社会的出现,社会开始变大、变复杂,在其中你能看到陌生人之间的大量互动、大范围的合作、市场交换、军队、劳动分工、深度劳动分工。我们对这些事件的发生次序有所了解,但对于它们到底是如何发生的,我们还没能形成一个很好的过程描叙。引发这些事件的因果过程到底是什么样的? One of the ideas I've been pursuing is that after the origins of agriculture, there was an intense period that continues today of intergroup competition, which favors groups who have social norms and institutions that can more effectively expand the group while maintaining internal harmony, leading to the benefits of exchange, of the ability to maintain markets, of division of labor and of higher levels of cooperation. Then you get intense competition amongst the early farming groups, and this is going to favor those groups who have the abilities to expand. 我一直在思考的一个想法是,在农业出现之后,曾有过一个群体之间激烈竞争的时期,一直持续到现在。这种竞争使得拥有社会规范和制度、从而能够更有效地在扩张的同时维持内部和谐的一类群体脱颖而出,进而凸显出了交易、维持市场的能力、劳动分工和更高水平的合作所能带来的好处。早期农耕群体之间存在激烈竞争,那些拥有扩张能力的群体在这种竞争中更占优势。 You need to be precise about what you mean by these cultural traits and norms. I've worked in a couple of different areas on this, and one is religion. We just got a big grant to study the cultural evolution of religion with the idea being that the religions of modern societies are quite different than the religions we see in hunter gatherers and small scale societies, because they've been shaped by this process over millennia, and specifically they've been shaped in ways that galvanize cooperation in larger groups and sustained cooperation amongst non relatives. 在谈及文化特征和规范时,需要精确界定它们表达的意思。我在许多不同领域中都研究过这一问题,其中一个领域就是宗教。我们刚刚拿到一大笔资金,来研究宗教的文化进化,主要的观点就是,现代社会的宗教与狩猎采集群体和小规模社会中的宗教大不相同,因为它们已经被这一进程不断塑造了几千年,特别是,它们已经被塑造得能够有助于大规模群体中的合作,以及非亲属之间的持续合作。 The emergence of high-moralizing gods is an important example of this. In small-scale hunter-gatherer religions, the gods are typically whimsical. They're amoral. They're not concerned with your sexual behavior or your social behavior. Often you'll make bargains with them, but as we begin to move to the religions in more complex societies, we find that the gods are increasingly moralizing. They're concerned about exactly the kinds of things that are going to be a problem for running a large-scale society, like how you treat other members of your religious group or your ethnic group. 这方面的一个重要例子就是具有高度道德教化意义的神的出现。在小规模狩猎采集群体的宗教中,神通常都是反复无常的。它们是非道德的。它们并不关心你的性行为或社会行为。通常你会跟它们讨价还价。但在更为复杂的社会中,我们发现神会变得越来越具有道德教化意义。它们所关注的,恰好就是会对大规模社会运行构成麻烦的那一类事情,比如你如何对待同一宗教团体或本种族中的其他成员。 Experiments run at UBC and elsewhere have shown that when you remind atheists, it doesn't matter, but if you remind believers of their god, believers cheat less, and they're more pro social or fair in exchange tasks, and the kinds of exchange tasks that they're more pro social in are the ones with anonymous others, or strangers. UBC和其他一些地方所做的实验都表明,如果你提醒无神论者注意自己的言行,基本没有什么效果,但如果你提醒有神论者,并抬出他们的神,他们就会更少说谎,在参与交易时也会表现得更亲社会或更公平,而且他们在其中表现得更亲社会的这类交易,其对象都是匿名人士或陌生人。 These are the kinds of things you need to make a market run to have a successful division of labor. We've been pursuing that hypothesis and, in fact, we've just sent a number of psychologists and anthropologists to the field, and we'll be doing more of that in the coming years to do these kinds of experiments in a diverse range of societies, seeing if the moralizing gods of a variety of religions create these same kinds of effects. 这恰好是维持市场运转、成功维系劳动分工所需要的特征。我们近来一直在研究这个假说,事实上,我们不久前刚派出了一批心理学家和人类学家就此去做田野研究,未来几年还会加大力度,在大量不同社会群体中去做这类实验,以检验不同宗教中的教化性神是否都能造成以上同样的效果。

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We also think that ritual plays a role in this in that rituals seem to be sets of practices engineered by cultural evolution to be effective at transmitting belief and transmitting faith. By attending a ritual, you elevate the degree of belief in the high-moralizing gods or the priests of the religion by the ritual practice. If you break down rituals common in many religions, they put the words in the mouths of a prestigious member of the group, someone everyone respects. That makes it more likely to transmit and be believed. 我们还认为,仪式在文化进化中发挥了作用。仪式似乎是文化进化所创造出来的一整套行为,有助于信念和信仰的传递。通过参与仪式,你就能通过仪式行为提高对高度教化性的神或传教者的信仰程度。如果你分析一下在许多宗教中都能找到的仪式行为就会发现,它们会借群体中某个威望很高、大家都尊重的人物之口来宣之于众。这会令其更易传播、更可能被相信。 People also engage in what we call credibility-enhancing displays [during rituals]. These are costly things. It might be an animal sacrifice or the giving of a large sum of money or some kind of painful initiation rite like circumcision, which one would only engage in if one actually believed in it. It's a demonstration of true belief, which then makes the observers more likely to acquire the belief. (在仪式过程中,)人们也会参与我们称为“提升可信度”的行为。这是一种代价颇高的事情。可能是以动物献祭,或者捐出大笔钱财,或者是某种痛苦的加入仪式,比如割礼,这些事都是只有真正的信徒才会参与的,是真信仰的展示,并能增加旁观者接受这些信仰的可能性。 Speaking in unison, large congregations saying the same thing, this all taps our capacity for conformist transmission; the fact that we weight what everybody believes in deciding in what we believe. 齐声说话,大规模集会倾诉同样的内容,这些都是在利用人们实现从众传递的潜力——也就是说我们在选择自己要相信什么的时候会考虑其他人都相信些什么。 These seem to want to tap our cultural transmission abilities to deepen the faith, and one of the interesting kind of ways that this has developed is that high-moralizing gods will often require rituals of this kind, and then by forcing people to routinely do the rituals, they then guarantee that the next generation acquires a deepened faith in the god, and then the whole thing perpetuates itself. It creates a self-perpetuating cycle. 这就像是要利用文化传递能力来加深信仰,它发展出来的有趣方式之一是,高度教化性的神通常都要求执行这类仪式,通过强迫人们经常性地履行仪式,就能保证下一代人对神能够拥有更深一层的信仰,然后整套体系就能实现永续。它创造出了一个自我存续的循环。 We think religions are just one element, one way in which culture has figured out ways to expand the sphere of cooperation and allow markets to form and people to exchange and to maintain the substantial division of labor. 我们认为,文化已经发展出了许多方式来扩大合作领域、允许市场形成、促进人们之间的交易,并维持明确的劳动分工,而宗教只是其中之一。 One of the interesting things about the division of labor is that you're not going to specialize in a particular trade—maybe you make steel plows—unless you know that there are other people who are specializing in other kinds of trades which you need—say food or say materials for making housing, and you have to be confident that you can trade with them or exchange with them and get the other things you need. 关于劳动分工,有一点非常有趣:你要选择专门从事某一特定行业,比如打造铁犁具,这需要一个前提,那就是你得知道有人专门从事你对之有需求的其他一些行业,比如食品或建材,而且你需要确信,自己能与他们进行贸易或交换,能够得到你需要的其他东西。 There's a lot of risk in developing specialization because you have to be confident that there's a market there that you can engage with. Whereas if you're a generalist and you do a little bit of farming, a little bit of manufacturing, then you're much less reliant on the market. 发展专业分工有很大的风险,因为你必须确信存在一个你能够利用的市场。如果你是个多面手,能做一点农活,再从事一些制造,那么你对这个市场的依赖度就大幅降低。 Markets require a great deal of trust and a great deal of cooperation to work. Sometimes you get the impression from economics that markets are for self-interested individuals. They're actually the opposite. Self-interested individuals don't specialize, and they don't take it [to market], because there's all this trust and fairness that are required to make markets run with impersonal others. 市场的运转需要很高的信任和大量的合作。你会从经济学得知,市场是由自利的个体组成的。实际上正好相反。自利的个体没法专业化,不能形成市场,因为要使市场在素昧平生的陌路人之间运作,那需要非常高的信任和公平。

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In developing this line of thought, one of the things you need to be clear about is what you mean by culture and culture evolution. Culture is one of those terms that has lots of different meanings, and people have used it lots of different ways. In the intellectual tradition that I'm building on, culture is information stored in people's heads that gets there by some kind of social learning—so imitation, teaching, any kind of observational learning. 沿着这条思路想问题时,你需要清晰界定的事物之一就是文化和文化进化的含义。文化是那种带有很多不同含义的词汇,人们已经在用不同方式使用它。在我所背靠的智识传统中,文化指的是人们通过某种形式的社会化学习——如模仿、教育或任何形式的观察学习——而获得并储存在自己头脑中的信息。 We tend to think of cultural transmission, or at least many people think of cultural transmission as relying on language, but that's in part because in our culture, especially among academics, there tends to be a lot of talking, but in lots of small-scale societies, it's quite clear that there is a ton of cultural transmission that is just strictly by observational learning. 我们,或至少很多人,都倾向于认为文化传递是依赖语言的,但造成这种理解的部分原因在于,在我们的文化里,特别是在学术界,人们倾向于进行大量的语言交流,但是在众多小型社群中,很明显大量的文化传递纯粹是依靠观察学习来实现的。 If you're trying to make a tool, you're mostly watching the physical movements of the hands and the strategies taken. You might get tips that are transmitted verbally as you go along. In building a house, you're looking at how the house is built together, again with verbal comments as supplements to getting a sense for how the house goes together. 如果你想学习制造工具,就得主要观察手部的物理运动,以及其中的技巧。在这个过程中你可能会获得一些口头传达的指点。如果要学建房子,你要观察房子到底是怎么建造起来的,当然也会得到一些口头评论,帮助你理解房子到底如何拼起来。 If you're copying how to shoot an arrow, you're watching body position and bow position and aiming, and you're not listening to a lot of exposition on it, although clearly the verbal part of the transmission helps. We think and there's experimental evidence that show you can transmit lots of stuff without using any words. 如果你是在学习射箭,你观察的是身体的姿势、弓箭的位置及如何瞄准,你不会去听一大堆阐释,虽然很明显这种传达的口头部分也是有帮助的。我们认为,而且也有很多实验证据表明,无需使用任何词语,也能传达很多信息。 This is information stored in people's brains, and when we look at other animals, we find that the evolutionary models of culture make really good predictions about culture in fish. Fish will learn food foraging preferences from each other, and non-human primates can learn from each other, but what we don't see amongst other animals is cumulative cultural evolution. The case in which the cultural transmission is high enough fidelity that you can learn one thing from one generation, and that begins to accumulate in subsequent generations. 这是储存在人脑中的信息,当我们观察其他动物的时候,我们发现文化的进化模型能够很好地预测鱼类的文化。鱼类能够相互学习觅食偏好,人类之外的灵长类也能相互学习,但我们在其他动物身上看不到累积性的文化进化。也就是那种能从一代人身上学会某样事物,然后在接下来的数代人中间开始逐步累积的足够准确的文化传递。 One possible exception to that is bird song. Bird songs accumulate in such that birds from large continents have more complex songs than birds from islands. It turns out humans from smaller islands have less complex material culture than humans from larger islands, at least until recently, until communication was opened up. One of the interesting lines of research that's come out of this recognition is the importance of population size and the interconnectedness for technology. 此处有一个可能的例外,那就是鸟鸣。鸟类的鸣叫方式能够累积,以至于大陆鸟类的鸣叫方式要比海岛鸟类的更复杂。我们还发现,直到不久之前,也就是直到交流开放之前,在物质文化的复杂程度方面,来自小型海岛的人群不如来自更大型海岛的人群。源于这一认知的有趣研究领域之一,就是人口规模和互联程度对科技的重要影响。

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I began this investigation by looking at a case study in Tasmania. Tasmania's an island off the coast of Southern Victoria in Australia and the archeological record is really interesting in Tasmania. Up until about 10,000 years ago, 12,000 years ago, the archeology of Tasmania looks the same as Australia. It seems to be moving along together. It's getting a bit more complex over time, and then suddenly after 10,000 years ago, it takes a downturn. It becomes less complex. 调查开始之初,我回顾了一个关于塔斯马尼亚岛的案例研究。塔斯马尼亚岛是澳大利亚的维多利亚州南部海洋上的一个岛屿,这里的考古记录非常有趣。直到约1万年前,和1.2万年前,塔斯马尼亚岛的考古记录看起来都跟澳洲大陆是一样的。两者似乎是齐头并进的,随着时间推移而变得日渐复杂。但在距今1万年以后,突然它就衰退了,变得没有澳洲大陆复杂了。 The ability to make fire is probably lost. Bone tools are lost. Fishing is lost. Boats are probably lost. Meanwhile, things move along just fine back on the continent, so there's this kind of divergence, and one thing nice about this experiment is that there's good reason to believe that peoples were genetically the same. 生火的能力可能丢失了。骨制工具丢失了。不会打渔了。船可能也没有了。与此同时,大陆上的事物则照常发展,所以就出现了这种分化。这一案例特别好的一点在于,我们有很好的理由相信两地的人群原本拥有相同的基因。 You start out with two genetically well-intermixed peoples. Tasmania's actually connected to mainland Australia so it's just a peninsula. Then about 10,000 years ago, the environment changes, it gets warmer and the Bass Strait floods, so this cuts off Tasmania from the rest of Australia, and it's at that point that they begin to have this technological downturn. 最开始两个群体在基因方面是相互混杂的。塔斯马尼亚最早是跟澳大利亚本土连在一起的,因此只是个半岛。大约在距今1万年前,气候发生了变化,越来越暖,于是巴斯海峡形成了,把塔斯马尼亚岛和澳大利亚其余部分分隔开来。也就是在这时,他们开始出现这种技术上的倒退。 You can show that this is the kind of thing you'd expect if societies are like brains in the sense that they store information as a group and that when someone learns, they're learning from the most successful member, and that information is being passed from different communities, and the larger the population, the more different minds you have working on the problem. 假如把各个社会群体比作不同人的大脑,就可以说发生上述这种事情毫不奇怪。因为社会群体以集体的方式储存信息,如果某人要学习,他就会向最成功的成员学习,而且这种信息会在不同社群之间传播,人口规模越大,你在处理问题时所能依靠的不同头脑就更多。 If your number of minds working on the problem gets small enough, you can actually begin to lose information. There's a steady state level of information that depends on the size of your population and the interconnectedness. It also depends on the innovativeness of your individuals, but that has a relatively small effect compared to the effect of being well interconnected and having a large population. 如果处理问题时能够依靠的头脑数目少到一定程度,你实际上会开始丢失信息。信息的稳态水平依赖于人口规模和互联程度。它也依赖于个体的创造性,但后一方面的影响相对而言比较小,良好的互联水平和大量的人口更加重要。 There have been a number of tests of this recently, the best of which is this study by Rob Boyd and Michelle Kline in which they took the fishing technologies of different Oceanic islands from the time when Europeans first arrived, and they looked at how the population size of the island relates to the tool complexity, and larger islands had much bigger and more complex fishing technologies, and you can even show an effective contact. Some of the islands were in more or less contact with each other, and when you include that, you get the size effect, but you also get a contact effect, and the prediction is that if you're more in contact, you have fancier tools, and that seems to hold up. 在这方面,最近已经有了很多测试,其中最好的当属Rob Boyd和Michelle Kline所做的研究。他们研究了自欧洲人初次抵达以后大洋洲不同岛屿上的捕鱼技术,考察了岛上人口规模如何影响渔具的复杂度,结果发现更大的岛屿拥有更大型、更复杂的捕鱼技术。有效接触也会发挥作用。其中某些岛屿跟其他岛屿之间存在或多或少的接触,如果把这个考虑在内,就既能发现规模效应,又能发现接触效应,理论上的预测是,更多的接触就意味着更好的渔具,这似乎也得到了验证。 If you follow this idea a little bit further, then it does give you a sense that rates of innovation should continue to increase, especially with the emergence of communication technologies, because these allow ideas to flow very rapidly from place to place. 如果你顺着这一想法再进一小步,它就会促使你产生一种想法,那就是创新的速度应该还会继续提高,特别是在通信技术出现以后,因为这使得观念从一地到另一地的流动速度变得非常快。 An important thing to remember is that there's always an incentive to hide your information. As an individual inventor or company, you're best off if everybody else shares their ideas but you don't share your ideas because then you get to keep your good ideas, and nobody else gets exposed to them, and you get to use their good ideas, so you get to do more recombination. 这里要记住的重要一点是,对于你自己知道的信息,你总是有动力进行隐瞒。对于个体发明家或单个公司而言,如果其他所有人都分享他们的想法,而你不分享你的想法,那你就是最受益的。因为这种情况下你能保守自己的好想法,别人没法知道,而你却能使用他们的好想法,这样你就能尝试更多的组合。 Embedded in this whole information-sharing thing is a constant cooperative dilemma in which individuals have to be willing to share for the good of the group. They don't have to explicitly know it's for the good of the group, but the idea that a norm of information sharing is a really good norm to have because it helps everybody do better because we share more ideas, get more recombination of ideas. 信息分享本身就存在合作困境,这种情形是一致存在的。为了集体的利益,个体要有分享的意愿。他们不需要明确地知道这是为了集体的利益,但他们需要建立一个观念,即认为有一个信息分享的规范是件好事,因为这能帮助所有人过得更好,因为我们分享的观念越多,我们得到的观念组合就越多。

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I've done a lot of work on marriage systems with the evolution of monogamy. We have a sort of human nature that pushes us towards polygyny whenever there are sufficient resources. Eighty-five percent of human societies have allowed men to have more than one wife, and very few societies have adopted polyandry which would be the flip side of this, and then there's actually a number of societies that allowed both, but they tended to be polygynous because, assuming you have enough resources, the men are going to be more interested in having more wives than the wives are interested in having more husbands, and the husbands aren't inclined to be second husbands as much as the women are willing to be second wives. 我在婚姻体制方面下了很多功夫,研究过一夫一妻制的进化。我们有某种天性,促使我们在资源充分的前提下追求一夫多妻。85%的人类社会曾允许男人拥有一个以上妻子,极少有社会采用过这一制度的对立面,即一妻多夫制。有些社会实际上两者都允许,但最终更可能出现一夫多妻,因为假定有充足的资源,男人会对拥有更多妻子更感兴趣,女人对于拥有更多丈夫就没那么感兴趣,而且丈夫们并不太愿意成为别人的二号丈夫,而女人在做别人的二号妻子方面意愿相对更强。 But in the modern world, of course, monogamy is normative, and people who have too many wives are thought poorly of by the larger society. The question is, how did this ever get in place? And of course, it traces back through Europe. 但是在现代社会,当然一夫一妻制是规范性的,而且那些拥有很多妻子的人会被更大社群当中的人瞧不起。问题是,到底怎么会变成这样的?当然,这要从欧洲往上追溯。 One of the things that distinguished Europe from the rest of the world was something called the European Marriage Pattern, and part of that was normative monogamy, the idea that taking a second wife was wrong as long as you still had the first wife, and this actually traces back to Rome and eventually to Athens. Athens legislates the first rules about monogamous marriage just before the Classical period. 欧洲区别于世界其他地方的一个要点就是欧洲婚姻模式,规范性一夫一妻制就是其中之一。认为只要你的第一个妻子还在,娶第二个妻子就是错误的,这种观念实际上可以追溯到古罗马,甚至古雅典。在古典时代开始之前,雅典人就正式奠定了一夫一妻制的最初规则。 This was an example of a case where people are ready to moralize it, and I like to view it as the evolution of this marriage system of monogamy. It's peculiar. It doesn't fit with what we know about human nature, but it does seem to have societal level benefits. It reduces male-male competition. 人们会把一些东西道德化,婚姻制度就是例证之一,而且我倾向于从一夫一妻制婚姻体制的进化这个角度来考虑。这是很特别的。它跟我们对人性的认知相左,但确实具有社会层面的好处。它能减少男性之间的竞争。 We think there's evidence to say it reduces crime, reduces substance abuse, and it also engages males in ways that cause them to discount the future less and engage in productive activities rather than taking a lot of risks which include crime and other things. Depending on what your value systems are, if you think freedom is really important, then you might be for polygyny, but if you want to trade freedom off against other social ills like high crime, then you might favor the laws that prohibit polygamy. 我们认为,有证据表明这一制度可以减少犯罪,减少毒品滥用,而且它还能吸引男性更多地重视未来,更多地参与生产性活动,而不是到处冒险,制造犯罪及其他事端。这取决于你的价值观体系,如果你认为自由非常重要,那么你可能会支持一夫多妻,但如果你愿意为了减少社会麻烦(如高犯罪率)而牺牲一些自由,那么你可能就会支持立法禁止多偶制。 When I talk about success and un-success, I don't mean anything moralizing. I'm talking about the cultural evolutionary processes that favor the spread of one idea over another. If I talk about normative monogamy as being successful, I mean that it spread, and in this case the idea is that it spread despite the fact that it's contrary to some aspects of human nature. It does harness our pair bonding in some aspects, so it's a complex story there, but it creates societal level benefits. 我所说的成功或不成功,并不具有任何道德意味。我要表达的只是,在文化进化的过程中,某个理念的传播压倒了另外一个理念。当我说规范性一夫一妻制成功了的时候,我的意思只是它传播开了,而且在这个例子中,尽管它与人性某些方面相抵触,但仍然得以传播开来。它确实在某些方面约束了我们的结成配偶的行为,所以这个故事很复杂,但它带来了社会层面的好处。 Societies that have this are better able to maintain a harmonious population, increase trade and exchange, and have economic growth more than societies that allow polygamy, especially if you have a society with widely varying amounts of wealth, especially among males. Then you're going to have a situation that would normally promote high levels of polygyny. 实行一夫一妻制的社会更能维持人与人之间的和谐,增加贸易和交易,实现更快的经济增长,而允许多偶制的社会在这些方面就要差一些,特别是如果这一社会里财富差异非常大时(尤其是在男性之间)。如果存在上述情形,通常都会加剧一夫多妻的程度。 The absolute levels of wealth difference of, say, between Bill Gates and Donald Trump and the billionaires of the world, and the men at the bottom end of the spectrum is much larger than it's ever been in human history, and that includes kings and emperors and things like that in terms of total control of absolute wealth. 比如说,一边是比尔·盖茨、唐纳德·特朗普以及世上的亿万富翁,另一边则是处于财富分配末端的众多人口,财富差异绝对水平远远超过人类历史上的任何时候,而且这还把历史上那些国王、帝王等人物都考虑了在内,他们可是绝对财富的全权控制者。 Males will be males in the sense that they'll try to obtain extra matings, but the billionaires are completely curbed in terms of what they would do if they could do what emperors have done throughout the ages. They have harems and stuff like that. Norms of modern society prevent that. 男性作为男性,就会力图拥有更多的配偶,但现在的亿万富翁在这一点上却受到了完全的约束;本来如果他们可以这么做,他们会这么做的,历史上的所有帝王都不例外。他们会形成后宫体制,或类似的体制,但现代社会的道德规范阻止了他们。 Otherwise, there would be massive male-male competition, and even to get into the mating and marriage market you would have to have a high level of wealth if we were to let nature take it's course as it did in the earliest empires. It depends on what your views are about freedom versus societal level benefits. 否则的话,如果我们像早期帝国那样,让天性不加阻碍地发展,那将会出现大规模的男性竞争,甚至是仅仅想进入配偶和婚姻市场,你就得拥有很多的财富。这取决于你如何看待自由和社会层面利益之间的取舍。

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Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 我的研究课题之一就是要说服人们相信,人们应该停止在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们希望将所有这些事情整个当作生物进化看待。 We want to distinguish genetic evolution and cultural evolution, and then at some point we may have epigenetic evolution, and there are other kinds of inheritance systems. 我们要区分基因进化和文化进化,在某些情况下我们可能还发生了表观进化,此外还有其他种类的继承机制。 It's going to be a little bit more of a complex story. Culture is part of our biology. We now have the neuroscience to say that culture's in our brain, so if you compare people from different societies, they have different brains. Culture is deep in our biology. 接下来的故事更加复杂一点。文化是我们生物属性的一部分。现在,神经科学告诉我们,文化存在于我们的大脑中,所以如果你把来自不同社会的人进行比较,会发现他们拥有不同的大脑。文化深嵌于我们的生物属性之中。 We have people with different cultural backgrounds that have different hormonal reactions as well as having different brains on the MRI scan. So culture is just part of our biology, and we shouldn't take this dualistic view that there's this realm of ideas that somehow are separate from this realm of biology, and you're either talking about the realm of ideas or the realm of biology. 我们看到,来自不同文化背景的人会有不同的激素反应,而且在核磁共振扫描上显示的大脑也不一样。所以文化只是我们生物属性的一部分,我们不应该采取一种二元区分的观点,认为存在一个观念领域,和一个生物领域,两者截然分开,只能分别谈论。 Cognition and our ability to think are all interwoven, and we're a cultural species, which means one of our genetic programs is to be able to acquire ideas, beliefs and values and weave them into our brain such that they then affect our biology. A good example of this is the placebos. 认知和思考能力是相互交织的,我们就是一个文化物种,这就是说我们的基因程序之一就是使我们获得观念、信念和价值观并将它们编入我们的大脑,我们的生物属性也因而受到影响。 Placebos are something that depend on your cultural beliefs. If you believe that something will work, then when you take it, like you take an aspirin or you take a placebo for an aspirin, it initiates the same pathways as the chemically active substance. 这方面的一个恰当例子就是安慰剂。安慰剂的作用取决于你的文化信念。如果你相信某物会起作用,那在你服用它之后,比如把安慰剂当作阿司匹林来服用,那么安慰剂就会像阿司匹林那样开启同样的路径。 Placebos are chemically inert but biologically active, and it's completely dependent on your cultural beliefs. If you don't believe that cures come in pills, then taking a placebo aspirin does not have any effect on you. That's a case where it shows the ability of a cultural belief to activate biological processes, and then it's something we know a little bit about. 从化学角度来说,安慰剂是不会起效的,但从生物学上来说,它能起到跟阿司匹林一样的作用,这完全取决于你的文化信念。如果你不相信药能治病,那么服用阿司匹林安慰剂就不会对你产生任何效果。这是表明文化信念能够激发生物过程的一个案例,我们对此稍微有所了解。

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One of the large research projects that I run in an effort to understand human sociality is called The Root of Human Sociality Project. In the mid '90s I was working in the Peruvian Amazon and I was working with a group called the Machiguenga. Traditionally, the Machiguenga lived in single-family units scattered throughout the forest. I had been exposed through my advisor, Rob Boyd, at the time to something called the Ultimatum Game, and the Ultimatum Game seemed to provide evidence that humans were innately inclined to punish unfairness. 为了理解人类社会,我正在做的大型研究项目中包括一个“人类社会性探源项目”。上世纪90年代中期我在秘鲁的亚马逊地区工作,跟一个叫做Machiguenga的群体一起。传统上,该群体的人们以独户家庭为单位分散居住在森林里。通过我的导师Rob Boyd,我那时知道了一个叫做“最后通牒博弈”的东西,而这个博弈似乎能够证明人类天性倾向于对不公加以惩罚。 In the Ultimatum Game, two players are allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer a portion of this $100 to the second player who can either accept or reject. If the second player accepts, they get the amount of the money, and the first player gets the remainder. If they reject, both players get zero. 在“最后通牒博弈”中,两个参与者会拿到一笔钱,比如100块。参与者A可以开价,将100块中的一部分给予参与者B,后者既可以接受,也可以拒绝。如果参与者B接受,他就能拿走提议数目的钱,剩下的归参与者A。如果他拒绝,那两个参与者都拿不到钱。 Just to give you an example, suppose the money is $100, and the first player offers $10 out of the $100 to the second player. If the second player accepts, he gets the $10 and the first player gets $90. If he rejects, both players go home with zero. If you place yourself in the shoes of the second player, then you should be inclined to accept any amount of money if you just care about making money. 举个例子,假设总数为100块,参与者A开价将100块中的10块给参与者B。如果B接受,他就得10块,而A得90块。如果他拒绝,两人都只能空手而归。如果你站在参与者B的角度想问题,如果你只关心赚钱与否,那你就应该接受任何开价。 Now, if he offers you zero, you have the choice between zero and zero, so it's ambiguous what you should do. But assuming it's a positive amount, so $10, you should accept the $10, go home with $10 and let the other guy go home with $90. 如果A提出不给你钱,那无论如何选择,你都只能空手而归,在这种情况下你应该如何选择就是不确定的。但是,假定A提议分给你一个正数,比如10块,那你就应该接受这10块钱,拿着10块钱回家,让另外那个家伙拿90块回家。 But in experiments with undergraduates, Western undergraduates, going back to 1982, behavioral economists find that students give about half, sometimes a little bit less than half, and people are inclined to reject offers below about 30 percent. 但在实验中,在1982年针对大学生——西方大学生——的实验中,行为经济学家发现,学生们会开价给一半,有时候是略少于一半,一旦开价低于30%,人们就倾向于拒绝接受了。 Subsequent work with non-student adults in the West show that it's an even a stronger result. The older you get, even if you have more wealth and more income, you're especially inclined to only offer half, and you'll reject offers below 40 percent. 针对非学生的西方成人的后续研究显示出了比这更强的结果。随着年龄增长,不管你多么有钱收入多高,你都会特别倾向于只拿出一半钱来分享,而且你会拒绝任何低于40%的开价。 In 1995, it had been done in a number of different countries, and it seemed to be robust. I was thinking that the Machiguenga would be a good test of this, because if they also showed this willingness to reject and to make equal offers, it would really demonstrate the innateness of this finding, because they don't have any higher level institutions, and it would be hard to make a kind of cultural argument that they were bringing something into the experiment that was causing this behavior. 到1995年,研究者已在许多不同国家做过同一实验,这一关系都很明显。我当时想,拿Machiguenga人做个测试会相当好,因为如果他们也显示出拒绝的意愿和平等分享的意愿,那就真的能证明这一发现确属天性,因为这个群体中并没有任何高层次的制度,因此我们很难提出一种文化论证,说他们在参加实验时带入了某些(文化方面的)东西,影响了他们的行为。 I went and I did it in 1995 and 1996 there, and what I found amongst the Machiguenga was that they were completely unwilling to reject, and they thought it was silly. Why would anyone ever reject? They would almost explain the subgame perfect equilibrium, the solution that the economists use, back to me by saying, "Well, why would anybody ever reject? You lose money then." And they made low offers, the modal offer was 15 percent instead of 50, and the mean comes out to be about 25 percent. 我1995年和1996年去那里做了实验,而我从Machiguenga人那里得到的结论是,他们绝不愿意拒绝,而且他们觉得拒绝是愚蠢的做法。为什么有人会拒绝?而且他们几乎都能跟我解释经济学家使用的那个解,即子博弈完美均衡:“为什么会有人拒绝呢?拒绝了你就会损失钱啊。”而且他们还会给出很低额度的开价,开价的众数是15%而非50%,而平均值则是大约25%。 Rob Boyd then was my advisor, and we went to the MacArthur Foundation for some funding, and they funded us, and we were able to put together a team of anthropologists. We brought them to UCLA. We had some economists there, including Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles, and Herb Gintis, and we taught them some game theory. Rob Boyd那时候是我导师,我们跑去麦克阿瑟基金会要资助,他们资助了我们。我们由此得以组建了一个人类学家团队,把他们带到加州大学洛杉矶分校。我们在那还有一批经济学家,包括Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles和Herb Gintis,我们就教了他们一些博弈论。 There was large discussion about methods, about whether we could actually pull this off, and then over the next two summers these field anthropologists went to the field and conducted the ultimatum game as well as a few other games—not systemically across the societies— but it gave us insight that we would then later use, and what we found is that societies vary dramatically, from societies that would never reject, to societies that would even reject offers above 50 percent, and we found that mean offers ranged across societies from about 25 percent to even over 50 percent. We had some of what we called hyper fair societies. The highest was 57 percent in Lamalera, Indonesia. 当时就方法论有很多争论,还争论到了我们到底能否做成这事。但接下来的两个夏季,我们的田野人类学家就到了实地,实施了“最后通牒博弈”和其他一些博弈(并没有在不同社群中系统性实施),这给我们提供了一些见解,后来都能够用上。我们发现的是,社群与社群之间差别极大,有些社群绝不会选择拒绝任何开价,而有些社群甚至连高于50%的开价都会拒绝。而且我们发现,不同社群的平均开价从25%到高于50%不等。有些社群我们称为“极度公平”社会。其中最高的是印度尼西亚的Lamalera人,(开价)高达57%。 We found we were able to explain a lot of the variation in these offers with two variables. One was the degree of market integration. More market-integrated societies offered more, and less market integrated societies offered less. But also, there seemed to be other institutions, institutions of cooperative hunting seemed to influence offers. Societies with more cooperative institutions offered more, and these were independent effects. 我们发现,我们可以用两个变量解释开价方面的很大一部分差异。其中一个变量是市场整合的程度。市场整合度越高的社群开价越高,整合度越低的社群开价越低。不过似乎也还有其他的机制,比如合作狩猎的机制似乎也会影响开价。合作机制越多的社群开价越高,而且两者是独立发挥作用的。 This then led to a subsequent project where we measured market integration much more carefully along with a large number of other variables, including wealth, income, education, community size, and also religion. We did the Ultimatum Game along with two other experiments. The two other experiments were the Dictator Game (the Dictator Game is like the Ultimatum Game except the second player doesn't have the option to reject) and the Third Party Punishment Game. 这又引出了我们后来的项目,我们更加细致地测量了市场整合度,以及很多其他变量,包括财富、收入、教育、社区规模,还有宗教。除“最后通牒博弈”之外,我们还一同做了另外两个实验。一个是“独裁者博弈”(跟“最后通牒博弈”类似,只是参与者B没有拒绝的选项),另一个是“第三方惩罚博弈”。 In the Third Party Punishment Game, there are three players and the first two players play a Dictator Game. They're allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer any portion of the $100 to the second player, player B. Now, player B in this game can't do anything, and they just get whatever they're offered. But there is a third player, player C, and player C is given half the amount that A and B are dividing up, and he can use some of his money (20 percent of it actually) to pay to take money away from A at three times the rate. If he's given $50, he can use $10 of it to take $30 away from player A. Suppose player A gives only $10 to player B and keeps $90 for himself, then player B will go home with $10. Now, player C can pay $10, so he goes home with $40 instead of $50 in order to take $30 away from player A. Player A would go home with $60 instead of $90, because he got punished. Player B goes home with $10, and player C goes home with $40 instead of $50 because he chose to punish. 在“第三方惩罚博弈”中有三个参与者,头两个进行“独裁者博弈”。他们会得到一笔钱,比方说100块。然后参与者A可以提议将100块中的任意数目分给第二个参与者,参与者B。在这个游戏中,参与者B不能做任何事,A给他多少,他就只能得到多少。但是还有第三个参与者,参与者C。参与者C手里有相当于A和B所分数额一半的钱,他可以拿出其中的一部分(20%)去抵消掉参与者A手中的一部分钱,而且能1抵3。比如,C手里有50块,他就能花掉其中的10块去抵消掉参与者A手中的30块。假设参与者A只分了10块给B参与者,自己留下了90块,那么参与者B就得10块。但因为参与者C拿出了10块钱,那他拿回家的就是40块而非50块,又因为参与者A手中钱被抵消掉了30块。A拿回家的就是60块而非90块,因为他遭到了惩罚。参与者B拿回家10块,参与者C拿回家40块而非50块,因为他选择进行惩罚。 This gives us two different measures of willingness to punish strangers, ephemeral interactions—people that you don't know and won't see again. In the experiment, one is rejection in the Ultimatum Game, and then this Third Party Punishment measure, and it gives us three measures of fairness in this kind of transaction. 对于我们惩罚陌生人和一次性交往(那些你不认识并且以后也不会再见到的人)的意愿,这就提供了两种测量办法。在试验中,一种测量是看“最终通牒博弈”中的拒绝选项,另一个则是看“第三方惩罚”。并且,它还给我们提供了此类交易中关于公平的三种测量方式。 It gives us offers in all three games and what we found there is that market integration again predicts higher offers in all three games, and size of the community predicts willingness to punish and this fits with a lot of theoretical work, suggesting that if you have small communities, you don't need punishment. You don't need costly punishment. You need some kind of sanctioning system to keep people in line, but you're probably not going to do it with single individuals punishing. You have some other mechanism. It could be some kind of reputational mechanism like if they don't cooperate in this situation, then you won't interact with them in some other situation. It's a withdrawal of interaction rather than direct punishment. There's a number of different ways to create norm systems that operate like that. 在三种博弈中都有出价,而且我们再次发现,在三种博弈中,市场整合度能够预测出价的高低,社区的规模能够预测惩罚的意愿,而且这跟许多理论研究成果相吻合;这意味着,如果社区规模足够小,根本不需要惩罚。根本不需要代价高昂的惩罚。你需要建立某种处罚机制,以便人人都能守规矩,但你可能无需对个体施加单独的惩罚。你还有其他一些机制。可能是某种声誉机制,比方说如果他们在这种情况下不能够合作,那碰到其他情况你就不会与他们互动。这是取消交往,而不是直接惩罚。有许多办法可以创造出按照这个模式运行的规范制度。 In a big society punishment can be most effective because reputational mechanisms can be weak. If you're in a big society and you encounter somebody, you probably don't have friends in common through which you could pass reputational information for which punishment could be generated. You might want to punish them right on the spot or someone who observes the interaction might want to punish them right on the spot or call the authorities or whatever, which is also costly. 在大型社群中,惩罚可能是最有效的,因为声誉机制的效力可能很微弱。如果你在一个大型社群中与某人打交道,你和他之间可能并没有共同的朋友,那你就没法传递声誉信息,也就无从构成惩罚。你可能希望当场惩罚他,或者你们打交道时的某个旁观者可能想要当场惩罚他,或者诉诸权威,这样的代价都是很高的。

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This creates a puzzle because typically people think of small-scale kinds of societies, where you study hunter-gatherers and horticultural scattered across the globe (ranging from New Guinea to Siberia to Africa) as being very pro social and cooperative. This is true, but the thing is those are based on local norms for cooperation with kin and local interactions in certain kinds of circumstances. 这就给我们制造了一个谜题。因为通常人们认为,小规模的社区——比如当你研究的是散布全球各地的狩猎采集者群体(从新几内亚到西伯利亚到非洲)——都是非常亲社会的、非常具有合作精神的。事实的确如此,但问题是这只是基于地方性的与亲族合作的的规范,以及在特定情形下的地方性交往规范。 Hunter-gatherers are famous for being great at food sharing, but these norms don't extend beyond food sharing. They certainly don't extend to ephemeral or strangers, and to make a large-scale society run you have to shift from investing in your local kin groups and your enduring relationships to being willing to pay to be fair to a stranger. 狩猎采集者在食物分享上的慷慨是出了名的,但这些规范并不会延伸到食物分享以外。它们绝对不会延伸到一次性交往或陌生人身上。要维持一个大型社会运转,你必须要转型,从投资于你的本地亲族群体和长久关系,转变为愿意为了公平对待陌生人而付出代价。 This is something that is subtle, and what people have trouble grasping is that if you're going to be fair to a stranger, then you're taking money away from your family. In the case of these dictator games, in order to give 50 percent to this other unknown person, it meant you were going home with less money, and that meant your family was going to have less money, and your kids would have less money. To observe modern institutions, to not hire your brother-in-law when you get a fancy job or you get elected to an office is to hurt your family. Your brother-in-law doesn't have a job now. He has to have whatever other job he has, a less good job. 这种情形非常微妙。人们不容易理解的是,如果你想要公平对待陌生人,那就会让你家里的钱变少。在上述独裁者博弈中,如果你要拿出50%的钱给另外一个陌生人,那就意味着你拿回家里的钱会变少,也就是你家的钱会变少,你孩子的钱会变少。要遵守现代的制度,比如在你得到一个好工作或被选为官员以后不要雇佣自己的小舅子,这就会对自己家庭造成伤害。你的小舅子现在没有工作。他必须自己去找其他工作,一个没那么好的工作。 A commitment to something like anti-nepotism norms is something that runs against our evolutionary inclinations and our inclinations to help kin and to invest in long-term close relationships, but it's crucial for making a large-scale society run. Corruption, things like hiring your brother-in-law and feathering the nest of your close friends and relatives is what really tears down and makes complex societies not work very well. In this sense, the norms of modern societies that make modern societies run now are at odds with at least some of our evolved instincts. 服膺于像反裙带关系这种规范,这是与我们的进化偏好相悖的,与我们帮助亲族、投资于长期亲密关系的偏好相悖,但它对大型社群的运转则至关重要。腐败,比如雇佣自己的小舅子、为自己的好友和亲属谋私利这种事,才真正会撕裂复杂社会,并令其不能良好运转。在这个意义上,令现代社会得以运转的现代社会规范是与我们进化形成的至少一部分本能相违背的。 Lately we've been focused on the effects of religion. One of the things I didn't mention from the experimental games project is that in addition to market integration in the second project, we found independently that adherence to a world religion matters. People from world religions were willing to give more to the other person in the experiment, the anonymous stranger. 近来我们研究的焦点是宗教的作用。关于我们的博弈实验项目,有一件事我还没有提到,那就是在第二个项目中,除了市场整合度之外,我们还独立地发现,人们对世界宗教的信仰也有关系。在实验中,信仰世界宗教的人会愿意分更多钱给另外一个人,另外一个匿名的陌生人。 We've been using these experiments in the context of behavioral games. There's since been a number of additional papers coming out of economics showing the relationship between market integrations using measures like distance from market and people's willingness to build impartial institutions. Part of this is your willingness to acquire a norm of impartial roles; that we have a set of rules that governs this system. 我们还将这些实验应用到了行为博弈的情境中去。自那以后至今,经济学领域已经又发表了很多论文,证明市场整合度(用与市场的距离之类方式测量)与人们建构公平制度之意愿之间的关系。内容之一包括,你习得一套关于公平角色的规范的意愿,也就是我们有一套规则来管理这个体系。 Sometimes historians or political scientists call it the rule of law. We have an impartial set of rules that we're going to follow, and those rules apply independently of the identities and our emotional reactions towards the participants. 有时候,历史学家或政治科学家会把它叫做法治。我们有一套需要遵守的公平规则,而且不管我们的身份如何,不管我们对其他参与者的感情态度如何,这套规则都适用。 One of the things we find with the relationship between norms and these risk-managing institutions is that when you have risk managing institutions these impartial norms can spread. Otherwise, people are strongly biased towards maintaining these local relationships. If you want the rule of law to spread or to be maintained, you need conditions in which you're managing risk. 关于规范和这类风险管理机制之间的关系,我们有一个发现是,如果你拥有风险管理机制,那么这种公平规范就能得以传播。否则,人们会强烈偏向于固守他们的地方性关系。如果你希望法治得到传播或维持,那就需要一个有风险管控的环境。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]战争如何推动社会合作

《超级社会:人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评
Review of “Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth”

作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/

Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader.

Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中,通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析,来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果,让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。

What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation.

什么是历史动力学?我能给出的最佳定义是:这是一种研究历史的科学方法,它试图通过量化的方法去检验,排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。

Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours.

Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣:是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力,完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢?他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年,也就是超过260亿工时。

The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale.

下一个容易想到的问题就是,这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢,例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔,还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场,以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式,是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上(more...)

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《超级社会:人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评 Review of "Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth" 作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/ Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader. Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中,通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析,来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果,让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。 What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation. 什么是历史动力学?我能给出的最佳定义是:这是一种研究历史的科学方法,它试图通过量化的方法去检验,排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。 Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours. Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣:是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力,完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢?他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年,也就是超过260亿工时。 The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale. 下一个容易想到的问题就是,这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢,例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔,还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场,以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式,是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上的进步呢? As an economist my bias is to see human actions in terms of self-interest, competition and conflict, where through the invisible hand the interaction of self-interested individuals can lead to productive outcomes. But like the fish who is blind to the vast ocean of water they live in, I realised I was blind to the ocean of cooperation that was the back-drop to my focus on self-interest and competition. 作为一个经济学家,我倾向于通过自利、竞争和冲突的视角来看待人类行为,在这些视角之下,自利个体之间能够通过“看不见的手”达致有效率的经济产出。但就像大海里一条对于自己所生存的广阔水域一无所知的鱼一样,我意识我对于合作行为这片广阔的大海实际上几乎一无所知,而这是我所关注的自利和竞争的基础。 In “Ultrasociety” Turchin provides a way to see and measure cooperation – to quantify its existence on a massive scale. Once you are able to see the great ocean of cooperation that dominates human society, it leads you to interesting and challenging lines of scientific inquiry. The puzzling question is then how a world dominated by ultra social human cooperation can also frequently succumb to large scale war and conflict? 在《超级社会》一书中,Turchin教授提供了一种看待并衡量合作的方式——在大尺度上将它的存在进行量化。当你能够看清合作这片统治着人类社会的汪洋大海,它就会将你的引向有趣而又富有挑战性的科学探索。之后的一个问题就是:为什么一个充盈着超大型社会合作的人类世界还会经常屈就于大规模的战争和冲突? Turchin’s answer, and one of the big ideas in the book, is that war between social groups is the mechanism by which cooperative behaviour develops “within groups”. It is a fundamental evolutionary process happening between societies at a large scale. He elevates war as a selection mechanism for cooperation, and values it above many of the technological factors like domestication of plants and the advent of agriculture. Turchin对这个问题的答案,同时也是本书的主要观点之一,是认为社会群体之间的战争是合作行为在群体内部发展的机制。它是一种基础性进化过程,发生于在各社会之间的大尺度上。他提升了战争在历史进程中的地位,将其视为对合作行为的一种选择机制,并且将其价值置于许多技术性因素之上,例如植物的驯化和农业的出现。 Turchin debunks many standard stories that “explain” the path to civilisation and eliminates glaring inconsistencies in the archaeological record. The naive view that the invention of agriculture “…set the ball rolling, and the entire history of civilisation followed from that” is a satisfying common story. But it seems a stretch to claim that the small scale practice of seasonally collecting and planting seeds nearby small permanent settlements, leads directly to the large-scale institutions observed in ancient civilisations. Turchin推翻了许多自称能够“解释”通向文明路径的标准叙事,认为它们忽视了自身与显而易见的考古学事实之间的重大矛盾。有一种天真的观点认为,农业的发明“……让雪球滚动了起来,而整个文明的历史则随之展开”,这是一种令很多人满意的常见叙事。但是,认为小规模永久定居点附近季节性的收集和播种行为可以直接导致古代文明中所呈现的一些大规模社会制度,这似乎有点太过牵强了。 The “agricultural snowball” story is also hampered by the fact that early agricultural societies had “a markedly negative effect on human health” as the poorer nutrition compared to hunter gatherers lead to smaller stature, higher sickness and the spread of pathogens through the high density settlements. Yet agriculture did spread and ultimately outcompeted nomadic hunter-gather societies. 早期的农业社会“对人类的健康水平产生了显著的负面影响”这一事实也削弱了“农业的雪球”这一叙事的说服力,相比于狩猎-采集社会,农业社会更差的营养水平导致了更小的体形,更多疾病,以及高密度的聚居区内病原体的传播。尽管如此,农业社会的确在之后得到了扩张并最终超过了游动性的狩猎-采集社会。 I have long been hesitant about “just so” explanations of social institutions based on historic physical and technological conditions that turn simple correlations into plausible causal mechanisms. Turchin provides the evidence that although all early large scale civilisations had agriculture, it was not the agriculture alone that directly caused large scale civilisation. 这种对于社会制度“原来如此”解释【编注:『原来如此故事』又称特例假设(ad hoc hypothesis),是一种为某一解释设置无法或难以验证的特殊条件,从而消除或降低该解释之可证伪性的做法。】,立足于物质和技术方面的历史条件,把简单的相关性当成了煞有其事的因果关系,我因此而一直对此抱有怀疑态度。Turchin教授提供了证据以显示虽然所有早期的大型文明都拥有农业,但并不是农业这一单一因素直接导致了大型文明的出现。 I felt foolish to have not recognised the array of “just so” stories in the study of history before Turchin pointed them out. In my field of economics, the existence of money is still explained in the textbooks as arising automatically once someone in human prehistory realised that some kind of currency made commerce easier than trying to directly trade a quarter of a cow for three baskets of vegetables. 对于没能在Turchin教授指出之前认出这些“原来如此”故事,我感到自己有点傻。在我所研究的经济学领域中,货币的存在仍然在教科书中被解释为在史前时代的某个时刻有当人意识到某种形式的通货比直接使用四分之一头牛去交换三筐蔬菜变得更加容易的时候自动产生的。 Yet many alternative social arrangements also solve the physical problem of a “double coincidence of wants”. We need look no further than current tribal societies that do not have or desire money despite their specialisation into many roles. They have instead resolved their double coincidence of wants dilemma through various other rituals, hierarchies, and institutions. 然而,许多其他的社会安排也同样解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这个实际问题。我们只需要看看一些现存的部落社会,虽然这些社会中已经出现了众多专业化的分工角色,但他们至今既没有货币,也看不出对货币有任何需求。取而代之的是,这些部落社会通过多种仪式,层级结构和社会制度的安排解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这一困境。 Turchin, through his cliodynamics research agenda, aims to rid the historical study of civilisation from these “just so” explanations. In the aim of scientific progress this research agenda uses quantifiable historical data to pit multi-level selection theory and its various components against many others, and in doing so eliminate bad theories and open up new avenues of inquiry. Most chapters of the books contain references to this emerging field of research which themselves are intriguing and enlightening. Turchin教授希望通过他的历史动力学使文明史的研究摆脱这些“原来如此”解释。为了推进研究的科学化进程,他的研究里使用了可量化的历史数据让多层次选择理论以及它的不同组成部分与众多其它的理论进行竞争,通过这种做法排除那些较差的理论并为之后的研究打开新方向。书中的大多数章节都包含了对这一蓬勃发展的研究领域的描述,而这本身已经足够有趣和富有启发性了。 Turchin argues that human societies, tribes, and groups, did not simply take a linear path from small hunter-gatherers tribes to large-scale civilisations. It was the competition through conquest and war between societies that lead to those with more effective weaponry and military organisations arising from greater internal cooperation, to survive at the expense of others. Turchin认为,人类社会,部落和群体并不是简单地通过一条线性的道路从小规模的狩猎-采集部落发展为大型文明的。不同社会之间在相互征服和战争中所展开的竞争,使得那些通过更好的内部合作发展出了更高效的武器和军事组织的社会生存了下来,而代价则是其对手的消亡。 The following excerpt summarises: 以下引文对此作了总结: “Here’s how I think these peaceful, stable societies came about. As war created large states, empires, and nation-states, societies evolved measures to suppress internal conflict and violence. Reduced internal violence is the obverse of increased cooperation. “我认为这些和平而稳定的社会是以这样的方式诞生的。随着战争创造出大型的城邦,帝国和民族国家,社会也演化出了一些压制自身内部的冲突和暴力的机制。内部暴力行为减少的另一面是更多的内部合作。 “Surprising as it may seem, the trend towards greater peace was already noticeable during the Ancient and Medieval historical eras, long before the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Of course, wars between empires dwarfed intertribal conflicts in scale. Huge armies fought increasingly bloody battles, and the numbers of casualties mounted. “也许看起来让人吃惊,但向更加和平的状态演化的趋势,实际上在古代和中世纪这些历史时期中就已经显而易见了,这要远远早于18世纪的启蒙运动。当然,帝国之间的战争在规模上让部落间冲突相形见绌。大型军队间战争的血腥程度持续上升,而战争中的伤亡人数也随之水涨船高。 “But the key point is that these wars moved away from imperial centers, towards the frontiers. More and more people—those living far from frontiers where battles were fought—never experienced conflict, and could enjoy relative prosperity. “但关键在于这些战争不再发生于帝国的中心区域,而被移到了前线。越来越多的人——那些生活在远离战争发生的前线地区的人——从来没有经历过冲突,他们享受到了相对的繁荣。 “There is no contradiction between larger armies and larger butcher’s bills from warfare, on the one hand, and on the other, a greater part of the population enjoying peace. What is important from the point of view of quality of life is not how many people, in total, are killed, but what the chances are that I (or you, or someone you care about) will be killed. In other words, the important statistic is the risk of violent death for each person.” “一方面,军队规模更大,战争的死亡人数更高,而另一方面,总人口中更大比例的人群却能够享受和平,这两点并不冲突。从生活质量的角度来看,重要的并不是总体上有多少人在战争中被杀死,而是作为社会中的个体,我(或者是你,或者是你所关心的人)有多大的可能被杀死。换句话说,对每个人而言,更重要的统计量是死于暴力的风险大小。” The power of this view is in the way the apparent contradiction of how war leads to peace becomes obvious once understood through an evolutionary lens. It changed my mental model of history from a series of inevitable linear events, to one of a branching tree of evolutionary paths, complete with many dead-ends of failed civilisations and their cultures, with many more merging and growing from conquest. 这一观点的强大之处在于,“战争是如何导向和平的?”这一看似矛盾的问题一旦通过进化的视角来理解,其中的逻辑就显而易见了。它将我理解历史的心智模型从一系列不可避免的线性事件的串联转变为一棵包含多种进化路径的分叉树,这棵树的许多分支都终结于失败的文明及其文化,但更多的分支则是通过征服合并在一起并继续成长的文明。 In short, I have shifted away from the popular but incorrect view of evolution as linear and subject only to environmental stresses rather than intra-species conflict. The left panel of the below image epitomises this popular confusion that I ignorantly held in the context of the study of history. 简而言之,我已经摒弃了那种流行却是错误的以线性视角看待文明演化的方式,该方式认为它仅仅受到外部环境的压力影响而不理会种群内部冲突的作用。下图左边的部分代表了之前的我出于无知而在历史研究中所采用的这种带有很强迷惑性的流行视角。 A more correct view of biological evolution is in the right panel, complete with mixing of genes and extinctions. It is more subtle and complex view, but provides a more useful story of the path of history, the dying out of civilisations and merging of cultures as a result of inter-group warfare. 而下图中右边的部分则代表了一种更加准确的看待生物进化的视角,进化是在众多基因的混合与消亡中完成的。这是一种更加精细也更加复杂的视角,但它提供了一种对历史路径更加有用的叙事,文明的消亡和文化的合并实际上是族群间战争的结果。 Screen-Shot-2016-02-02-at-3.47.06-pm Even more interesting is that when there is little external warfare and competition, the successful groups find it difficult to curtail infighting amongst sub-groups within their society, and their lack of internal cooperation begins to make them vulnerable to attack from outsiders. In Turchin’s own words, from Chapter 2: 更有趣的是,当来自外部的战争和竞争压力较小时,那些成功的族群会发现控制自身内部小群体间的明争暗斗变得更困难了,而缺乏内部合作将会让这些曾经成功的族群在面对外来者的攻击时变得脆弱。用Turchin在书中第二章的话来说就是: “Here’s how war serves to weed out societies that “go bad.” When discipline, imposed by the need to survive conflict, gets relaxed, societies lose their ability to cooperate. A reactionary catchphrase of the 1970s used to go, “what this generation needs is a war,” a deplorable sentiment but one that in terms of cultural evolution might sometimes have a germ of cold logic. “战争是以这样的方式淘汰掉那些“衰朽腐败”的社会的。当因生存压力而施加的纪律开始变得松弛的时候,社会就失去了合作的能力。1970年代曾经有一句反动标语,“这代人需要经历一场战争,”虽然这句话里满是可悲的情绪,但从文明进化的角度上说,也许其中的确包含着一些冷冰冰的真知灼见。 At any rate, there is a pattern that we see recurring throughout history, when a successful empire expands its borders so far that it becomes the biggest kid on the block. When survival is no longer at stake, selfish elites and other special interest groups capture the political agenda. The spirit that “we are all in the same boat” disappears and is replaced by a “winner take all” mentality. As the elites enrich themselves, the rest of the population is increasingly impoverished. Rampant inequality of wealth further corrodes cooperation. 无论如何,我们都能看到历史中不断重演的一种模式,当一个成功的帝国将自己的疆域扩展得如此之广以至于它成了“街区里的孩子王”,当生存的压力已不再迫在眉睫,那些自私的精英和其它一些特定的利益集团就会夺取帝国的政治议程。“大家同处一条船”的精神消失了,取而代之的是“赢者通吃”的心态。随着精英们发家致富,其它人则持续地变得更加贫困。肆无忌惮的贫富不均进一步腐蚀了合作的基础。 Beyond a certain point a formerly great empire becomes so dysfunctional that smaller, more cohesive neighbors begin tearing it apart. Eventually the capacity for cooperation declines to such a low level that barbarians can strike at the very heart of the empire without encountering significant resistance. 在超过一个临界点之后,一个曾经的伟大帝国就会变得机能失调,以至于它的那些更小但更具凝聚力的邻居们开始将它分裂。最终帝国内部的合作能力降到了一个太低的水平,以至于外来的野蛮人可以在几乎遇不上任何值得一提的抵抗的条件下直捣帝国的心脏。 But barbarians at the gate are not the real cause of imperial collapse. They are a consequence of the failure to sustain social cooperation. As the British historian Arnold Toynbee said, great civilisations are not murdered – they die by suicide.” 但那些“门口的野蛮人”并不是帝国崩溃的原因。他们的入侵只是帝国没能维持内部社会合作的结果。正如英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比所言,伟大的文明从来不会被谋杀——他们全都死于自杀。” I have explored this process of disintegration of groups into competing clans in small scale in experiments before. Yet I failed to see the link to the large scale selection processes occurring even at such large scales at the nation-state. The talk of sclerosis and the death of large scale cooperation made me recall the chart below on the growth of partisan policy in the US which shows the striking decline in cross-party cooperation on legislative changes. 我之前曾经用小规模实验的方式研究过族群瓦解为多个相互竞争的部落的情况。但我并没有意识到,即使在民族国家这么大的尺度上,也有类似的选择过程发生。书中关于社会固化和大规模合作的消亡的讨论,让我联想起了下面这幅关于美国党派政策演化的图中所显示出在立法变更上的党际合作水平的显著下降。 Each node in the visual is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949–2012, with Republicans in red and Democrats in blue. Edges are drawn between members who agree on legislative decisions more often than expected by chance, and the nodes are spaced out in a way so that those with more edges connecting them are closer together. The clustering therefore visualises who is cooperating with who in terms of developing legislation. 图中每个节点都代表美国在1949-2012年间的一位众议院议员,红色代表共和党人,而蓝色则代表民主党人。如果两位议员在立法决策上达成一致的频率高于由随机概率所预期的水平,那么他们所对应的节点之间就会被一条线连接,节点在图中的排列方式使得那些相互之间有更多连接的议员靠得更近。这样图中的聚类就从视觉上反映出了哪些议员在推进立法上相互合作。 Without the external threats to the nation as a whole after WWII, and later the Cold War, the ability to maintain a cohesive national whole in political terms appears to have broken down into partisan scrambling. No longer can we see a cooperative whole, but instead competing fairly arbitrary tribes of blues and reds. 在第二次世界大战和随后的冷战结束后,来自外部的对于美国作为一个整体的威胁都不复存在了,而从政治角度上看,似乎维系一个有凝聚力的国家整体的能力也随之分崩离析,取而代之的则是喋喋不休的党派纷争。在图中我们不再能看到一个富有合作性的整体,而是一些分别由红点和蓝点组成的武断分隔的竞争部落。 journal.pone.0123507.g002 I was left in a state of deep reflection after reading the book. Many other big ideas are woven through it to make you reconsider the popular but overly simplistic stories we tell ourselves to explain historical events. From the long term Z-shaped arc of quantifiable violence in human civilisation, to the role of horses, long range weaponry and population size in the success of inter-group warfare, and finally to the rise of God-kings and oppressive hierarchies. 在读完这本书后,我陷入了深刻的反思。本书中还贯穿了许多其它重要想法,它们会让你重新思考我们在解释历史事件时所常用的那些流行但过分简化的叙事。从人类文明中以可量化方式衡量的暴力水平在长期中所呈现出的Z型曲线,到马、远程武器和人口规模在族群间战争中所发挥的作用,以及最后君神合一政体和统治阶级的崛起。 Even Turchin’s incidental detours explore rather significant questions, such as in Chapter 4 when he clarifies a point about culture in human societies with the off-handed comment “Incidentally, why do we have culture? ” 即使是Turchin教授在书中偶然从主线上岔出的一些分支也讨论了相当重要的问题,例如在第四章中澄清关于人类社会中文化的作用的一个观点时,他随性地评论道“顺便问一句,为什么人类会拥有文化?”。 The same lesson applies in economics. Firms in highly competitive markets constantly face threats to their existence, leading to a type of destructive creation that ensures that surviving firms are internally highly cohesive and cooperative; economically efficient. 同样的道理也适用于经济学领域。高度竞争市场中的企业经常会面临威胁到自身生存的问题,这导致了一种毁灭性的创造过程以保证最终生存下来的企业在内部都具有极强的凝聚力和合作能力,我们称之为经济效率。 Yet the process of competition is highly inefficient in economic terms as only very slightly different production facilities are duplicated by competitors. For me the trade-off is rather radical just to think about. That the gains to internal cohesion require a cost of an external threat or else large-scale groups will be undermined by the interests of sub-groups within them. 然而从经济角度上说,竞争本身是非常低效的,因为众多互相竞争的对手所复制的生产设备之间的差别其实非常小。对我来说,其中的利弊权衡已经是一个相当深刻的问题了。即获得内部凝聚力所带来的收益需要以面对外部威胁为代价,否则大规模的群体将会被内部众多小团体的利益慢慢腐蚀。 Like any books that cover grand ideas about human civilisation there are probably some finer details to squabble about. I certainly don’t have the expertise to do so. Instead I want to share some of the thoughts that occupied my mind after reading Ultrasociety. These thoughts and comments should sufficiently signal the compelling nature of the discussions and ideas of the book. 与任何涉及关于人类文明的宏大观点的著作一样,书中几乎肯定会有一些值得争论的细节。我显然不具备足够的专业水平来这么做。但我希望与各位分享在读完《超级社会》这本书之后一直占据我脑海的一些想法。这些想法和评论应该足够说明这部大作的引人入胜之处以及其中的一些主题。 First, if sustained group cooperation relies on external competition, is there value in creating fictitious interstellar enemies to sustain better global cooperation? I’m thinking here of the film The Village, where the elders invented an outside enemy to sustain internal peace. The idea of creating an enemy for solidarity is popular, and even gets a run in the economics comics. 首先,如果持续的群体合作依赖于外部竞争,那么创造一些假想中的外星敌人是否对于维持更好的全球合作具有价值呢?这让我想起了一部名为《神秘村》的电影,在这部电影中,老人们创造出了一个外部敌人来维持村子内部的和平。为了维持团结而创造出一个敌人的想法现在很流行,即使在一些经济学漫画中也能看到它的影子。 Or perhaps the major modern religions fulfil this type of role so well that they can’t be displaced[1]? And surely it is the moral thing to do to promote human cooperation on an even larger scale without actual conflict and violence, if that indeed is possible. 或者也许主要的现代宗教已经扮演了这一角色而因此变得无可取代[1]? 毫无疑问,在不引发实际的冲突和暴力的前提下推进更大规模的人类合作在道德上是无可厚非的,如果这真的可能的话。 Second, and following directly on from the first, the use of the term morality is widely used with its common meaning as conforming to the cooperative norms of a group. Yet I can’t shake the nagging feeling that, like Darwin’s work on evolution, the idea that war with outsiders promotes peace is ripe to be corrupted for political gain because it can be so easily argued to be a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ position. 第二,紧跟第一点的思路,现在人们对于“道德”的惯常理解与维持社会的合作规范是一致的。然而我还是无法摆脱一种令人不安的感觉,正如达尔文在进化论上的贡献一样,认为与外来者的战争能够推进内部和平这一观点很容易被政治利益所利用,因为它很容易被说成是一种“自然的”或是“道德的”立场。 Third, how are these great feats of cooperation realised in practice? Is there a common recipe that can be adopted into 21st public policy? There is a brief mention of how tribes and groups ‘tag’ each other with signals of group membership as one way to create cooperation in the following passage from Chapter 10. 第三,这些宏大的合作是如何在实践中实现的?对于21世纪的公共政策而言,存在一种通用的实践模式吗?书中第十章的以下段落简要地提到了部落和群体是如何用“标签”来标识彼此群体身份的方式来创造合作的。 “An important evolutionary breakthrough was the capacity to tag cooperating groups with symbolic markers such as language and dialect, styles of clothing and ornamentation (including tattoos), and behavioral characteristics—for example, participation in collective rituals. Symbolically-tagged cooperative groups, or tribes and nations, allowed us to increase the scale of cooperation beyond the circle of people personally known to us. Of course, the downside of increasing cooperation within a tribe or a nation was greater intensity of conflict with other tribes and nations.” “一个进化上的重大突破就是人们通过诸如语言和方言,衣着和装饰(包括纹身)的风格,以及行为特征——举例来说,对于集体仪式的参与——这些符号化的标记来为与自己合作的群体贴上标签的能力。通过符号化标签来标记与自己合作的群体,或者部落和国家,让我们能够在熟人小圈子之外扩大合作的规模。当然,在部落或国家内部增进合作的负面效应是与其它部落和国家之间冲突强度的加剧。” But like many of the minor points in the book, this single paragraph opens, then closes, a massively interesting puzzle about how humans actually organise into tribes at all levels. While as outsiders we easily observe tags, or the signals and rituals of a cultural group, as insiders we often overlook the amount of resources devoted to these tagging rituals. 但与书中其它一些次要观点一样,书中的这个段落首先提出了一个重要而有趣的难题,也就是人类是如何在实际中被组织为各种层次的“部落”的,并在之后回答了这个问题。作为外人,我们很容易观察到一个文化群体的标签,或者信号和仪式,但作为群体内部的人,我们却通常会忽视投入到这些标记仪式上的大量资源。 The whole fashion industry is almost exclusively about signalling social status, religious, sporting, or gender loyalties. People don’t buy cars just for transport; otherwise there would be little demand for more than a few different models. 整个时尚产业的存在几乎就是为了标识人们的社会地位,宗教信仰,体育爱好或性别取向。人们买车的目的并不仅仅是为了交通,否则除了有限的几种不同车型之外,不会有多少对其它车型的需求。 Instead we buy into marketing messages about how purchasing different types of cars tag us with different traits in the minds of others. At a national sale with have flags, anthems, national colours, sports teams and more that promote a sense of belonging. 但实际上人们买车也是在购买一种营销符号——通过对不同车型的选择而为自己贴上标签——你开的车显示出你是什么样的人。而国家则通过国旗,国歌,国家的代表性颜色,各种体育项目的国家队以及诸如此类的东西来让人们产生认同感。 While I’ve always considered much of our conspicuous consumption to be wasteful, in the same way that the devotion of military resources often appears wasteful on the surface, a picture is emerging of the amazing gains from these types of tagging behaviours and rituals in terms of promoting high levels of cooperation. While not the direct focus of the book, I think more details on this part of the evolutionary view of cooperation and conflict would have been valuable. 虽然我之前一直认为大多数炫耀性消费都很浪费,正如我们投入在军事上的资源通常从表面上看来都很浪费一样,但一幅由这类“贴标签”的行为和仪式通过在更高层次上提升合作水平而带来巨大收益的图景正在我的脑海中浮现。虽然这并不是本书直接关注的内容,但我认为,就有关合作和冲突的进化观点的这一侧面挖掘更多细节将是非常有价值的。 Fourth, what role does the massive advance in long-range weaponry since the dawn of the nuclear age mean for inter-group warfare? Turchin explains vividly how technology that allows for killing enemy combatants from a distance was a recipe for success in most warfare; starting with our evolved physical ability to accurately throwing rocks and spears, to the invention of bows and arrows, to the use of horses to mobilise armies over great distances. In the age of intercontinental missiles, drones, and nuclear weapons, how does the function of long-range of weaponry play out when the whole world can be anyone’s target? 第四,自从核武时代以来,远程武器技术的巨大进步将在群体间战争中扮演怎样的角色?Turchin教授在书中生动地描述了为什么那些能够在远程杀死敌军战士的技术在大多数战争中都是制胜的法宝,从早期人类演化出的准确投掷石块和长矛的能力,到弓和箭的发明,到使用马匹来让军队获得远程的机动性。在这个洲际导弹,无人机和核武器的时代,当整个世界都可以成为任何人的打击目标,远程武器又将如何发挥其作用? Fifth, if the cooperative effort required to wage large scale war is a major part of the causal story of the history of civilisation, how significant is the legacy of previous wars in the current economic landscape? I have in mind the major industries of modern society, such as passenger airlines arising from industrial investment in aerial warfare, and the digital age legacy of military investment in remote communications. 第五,如果合作的努力是为大规模战争服务的这一因果叙事的确占据了大部分的文明史,那么之前的战争所留下的遗产在当今经济版图中又有着怎样的重要性?我所能想到的现代社会的一些重要产业,例如客运航空业,就是从对空中战争的产业投资中崛起的,而当今的数码时代也起源于军工行业对远程通信技术的投资。 Most major industrial firms of the modern age were intricately involved as military suppliers or were privatised former military organisations. Many modern cities only exist because of the strategic benefits of their local military bases, while public major works such as highway and rail systems, ports and airports, were products of military strategy more than peaceful economic investment. 现代大多数主要工业企业都曾经以各种复杂的方式扮演过军队供应商的角色,或者本身就是由之前的军工组织私有化而来。许多现代城市存在的原因就是处于当地的军事基地所带来的战略性优势,而高速公路,铁路系统,港口和机场这类重大的基础设施则更多都是军事战略的产物,而非和平时期经济投资的产物。 And, surprisingly to me, the cooperative legacy of previous wars is not simply technological, but also institutional; from the organisational structures of firms, to the welfare state, to international treaties on money and trade. The employer-worker relationship looks a lot like the soldier-army relationship, requiring induction, uniforms, codes of conduct, and hierarchal rule. 让我感到意外的是,之前的战争所带来的合作遗产并不仅仅存在于技术方面,它同样存在于组织制度中,从现代公司的组织结构,到福利国家,到国际货币和贸易条约。雇主和工人的关系看起来很像军队与士兵的关系,两者都要求正式入职程序,统一制服,行为准则以及层级化管理。 Modern provisions of the welfare state, including housing, health services and cash payments, were often originally created for returned soldiers following wars. It is no leap to suggest that our international monetary system, and the various international organisations and treaties that accompany it, is the direct result of resolutions in the shadow of the WWII. And perhaps the apparent breakdown of the social equality nurtured by post-war institutions observed since the late 1970s in many western countries is merely there result of the absence of external threats which breed infighting and abuses of power. 当代福利国家提供的各种供应品,包括住房,医疗服务和现金支付,最初通常都是在战后提供给退役士兵的。当今的国际货币体系以及与之配套的各种国际组织和条约,都是在第二次世界大战的阴影之下所达成的一系列决议的直接后果,这并不是什么新鲜的观点。而也许从1970年代晚期开始,许多西方国家中由战后建立的机构所导致的社会平等局面的崩塌,也仅仅是因为外部威胁的缺失为它们提供了内部斗争和权力滥用的温床。 As you can see, “Ultrasociety” will leave you pondering many big questions you may never have thought to ask before. I certainly see the world differently now. And that, to me, is the sign of a profound and insightful work. 正如你所看到的,《超级社会》这本书将会让你去深思一些之前不曾想到过的大问题。在读完这本书后,我眼中的世界变得明显不同了。对我来说,这意味着我读到了一部意义深远而富有洞见的大作。 尾注: Turchin cites Ara Norenzayan’s book Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict when explaining the role of religion in large scale cooperation, and I recommend reading it as well. 在解释宗教在大规模合作中所扮演的角色时,Turchin引用了Ara Norenzayan的著作《大神:宗教是如何改变合作与冲突的》一书中的内容,我也推荐读者阅读这本书。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

总会起作用

【2016-08-10】

@海德沙龙 《噩梦般的底特律教育系统》 底特律自70年代以来就在持续衰败,居民不断逃离,工厂和住宅区一个个沦为废墟,犯罪率攀至榜首,随之一起沦落的还有它的公立教育系统,学生大量流失,出勤率、毕业率和学习成绩快速下降,然而这些学校的开支却并未减少,它正在从一个教育机构变成教师救济所…

@whigzhou: 选择机制总会起作用,问题是在哪个层次上起作用,假如你阻止自由市场在个体和企业层次上起选择作(more...)

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【2016-08-10】 @海德沙龙 《噩梦般的底特律教育系统》 底特律自70年代以来就在持续衰败,居民不断逃离,工厂和住宅区一个个沦为废墟,犯罪率攀至榜首,随之一起沦落的还有它的公立教育系统,学生大量流失,出勤率、毕业率和学习成绩快速下降,然而这些学校的开支却并未减少,它正在从一个教育机构变成教师救济所… @whigzhou: 选择机制总会起作用,问题是在哪个层次上起作用,假如你阻止自由市场在个体和企业层次上起选择作用,那么其他选择机制便会在产业、组织、城市、地区、国家等层次上起作用。  
呼之欲出

【2016-04-16】

@whigzhou: 个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把Charles MurrayGarett JonesGregory Clark的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。

@whigzhou: 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但(more...)

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【2016-04-16】 @whigzhou: 个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把[[Charles Murray]],[[Garett Jones]]和[[Gregory Clark]]的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。 @whigzhou: 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的,然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认,文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。 @whigzhou: 转变最初起于对南北欧的比较,北欧(包括英德)在制度上也有种种问题,但表现总是比南欧强很多,日耳曼/拉丁这条分界线实在太清晰了,怎么辩解否认都不可能 @whigzhou: 想来想去,一个直觉上的印象反而比种种“客观原因”更有说服力:南欧的政治家(和他们的民众一样)普遍没有责任感,没有政治担当,没有认错然后做个决断的能力,只会命苦怪别人,就这么简单 @whigzhou: 看看希腊人在债务危机后的丑态,一门心思只想着赖账,从不想想自己有什么问题,和西班牙政府在历史上无数次赖账如出一辙,这种事情北欧人就做不出来,默克尔移民大放水这件事情虽然是做得很坏,但不得不承认她是有担当的,在非常清楚代价的情况下勇于承担责任的,这种事情你在南欧永远看不到 @whigzhou: 我曾经认为夏威夷是个支持制度主义的鲜明案例,但后来发现,直到几十年前,欧裔和日裔加起来还占夏威夷人口多数 @whigzhou: 然后我又看了一下波多黎各和英属洪都拉斯(包括伯利兹),很明显的制度主义反例 @whigzhou: 可以设想一下,其他条件不变,把波多黎各或洪都拉斯的70%人口全部换成日裔,会是什么样,要我说答案很明显 @养猪专业户王福贵:特别想听听您对南北朝鲜,东西德国的解读。 @whigzhou: 外部强加的制度当然可以造成很大差别,这个以前说过很多了,现在我想强调的是,对于某些文化,某些族群,外部再怎么强加制度,可能都不会达到很好的状态,当然,正面外部力量可以让它避免最坏的状态(比如变成朝鲜) @whigzhou: 简单说,在所有拉丁社会中,波多黎各当然已经非常好了,再怎么说,因为有美国,它不会变成阿根廷,或委内瑞拉,或古巴,而我的意思是,它也不大会变成夏威夷,变成韩国,变成香港,论制度条件,英属/美属加勒比的条件再理想不过了,但并未冒出任何加勒比小龙 @whigzhou: 再看以色列,不考虑文化/遗传因素的话,当初的条件真是恶劣到无以复加,建国者满脑子共产主义,沉重战争负担,重税,重管制,恶性通胀,啥坏事都摊上过,最后愣是给拗过来了。 @whigzhou: 转个两年前的旧帖,大意如此。//@whigzhou: 随着技术/文化/制度的丰满成熟,地理因素对社会间差异变得越来越无关,地理大发现以来,英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会,德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民,犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……,换句话说:更成熟的文化与制度更有能力控制和适应各种环境。  
一包补丁

【2016-04-14】

@海德沙龙 《历史如何造就美国人》 在常见历史叙事中,移民北美的清教徒,早在五月花号尚未靠岸时,便已确立了日后美国宪政的基本原则,清教徒的文化气质也构成了美国精神的核心内容,但真实历史往往没有这么理想,在本文所介绍的新书中,历史学家Malcolm Gaskill讲述了一个十分不同的故事

@whigzhou: 有关制度起源的简单叙事基本上都是错的,制度就是陆续积累的一大包补丁,其实复杂的软件系统也有点类似,虽然软件系统的整体设计成分要多一些,但大量功(more...)

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【2016-04-14】 @海德沙龙 《历史如何造就美国人》 在常见历史叙事中,移民北美的清教徒,早在五月花号尚未靠岸时,便已确立了日后美国宪政的基本原则,清教徒的文化气质也构成了美国精神的核心内容,但真实历史往往没有这么理想,在本文所介绍的新书中,历史学家Malcolm Gaskill讲述了一个十分不同的故事 @whigzhou: 有关制度起源的简单叙事基本上都是错的,制度就是陆续积累的一大包补丁,其实复杂的软件系统也有点类似,虽然软件系统的整体设计成分要多一些,但大量功能其实仍是打补丁打出来的,只不过这个版本的补丁,到下一个版本可能就成了设计方案中的组件了,所谓迭代演进是也。 @whigzhou: 最具误导性的一种观点被我称为同态论,即把我们事后从制度中找出的一些原则,等同于当初打补丁的码农头脑里的观念,研究思想史的那帮人特别痴迷于这种念头 @辻郖杉:记得有一阵子辉总在刷《技术史》。那么辉总是否认为新技术的出现也是这种“打补丁”呢? @whigzhou: 是啊,汽车的早期发展就是在四轮马车上不断打补丁嘛 @whigzhou: 另外军队也类似,有句名言说每支军队都是为上一次战争设计的,无论事先考虑多周到,一旦开打,立马手忙脚乱狂打补丁,等战争结束,军校里又手忙脚乱一通研究,这些补丁(中的大部分)就变成下一代军队的标准组件了  
[译文]人类听力的进化

Testing ancient human hearing via fossilized ear bones
利用耳骨化石测量古人听力

作者:Rolf Quam @ 2015-9-26
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:Whig Zhou(@whigzhou)
来源:The Conversation,https://theconversation.com/testing-ancient-human-hearing-via-fossilized-ear-bones-47973

How did the world sound to our ancient human relatives two million years ago?

整个世界在我们200万年前的人族亲戚听来是个什么样子?

While we obviously don’t have any sound recordings or written records from anywhere near that long ago, we do have one clue: the fossilized bones from inside their ears. The internal anatomy of the ear influences its hearing abilities.

显然,我们并没有那么久以前留下来的录音资料或书面记录,但我们确实拥有一条线索:古人耳内的骨头化石。耳朵的内部构造能够影响其听觉能力。

Using CT scans and careful virtual reconstructions, my international colleagues and I think we’ve demonstrated how our very ancient ancestors heard the world. And this isn’t just an academic enterprise; hearing abilities are closely tied with verbal communication.

经CT扫描并精心进行虚拟重构之后,我和一些国际同僚认为,我们已经展示出了远古先人是如何听到这个世界的。这可不仅仅是一项学术事业,因为听觉能力与口头交流是密切相关的。

By figuring out when certain hearing capacities emerged during our evolutionary history, we might be able to shed some light on when spoken language started to evolve. That’s one of the most hotly debated questions in paleoanthropology, since many researchers consider the capacity for spoken language a defining human feature.

通过估计特定听觉能力在人类进化史上何时出现,我们就可能对口头语言何时开始进化有所了解。这是古人类学目前争论最为火热的问题之一,因为许多研究者认为口语能力是一项用来定义人类的特征。

Human hearing is unique among primates
人类听觉在灵长类中非常独特

We modern human beings have better hearing across a wider range of frequencies (more...)

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Testing ancient human hearing via fossilized ear bones 利用耳骨化石测量古人听力 作者:Rolf Quam @ 2015-9-26 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:Whig Zhou(@whigzhou) 来源:The Conversation,https://theconversation.com/testing-ancient-human-hearing-via-fossilized-ear-bones-47973 How did the world sound to our ancient human relatives two million years ago? 整个世界在我们200万年前的人族亲戚听来是个什么样子? While we obviously don’t have any sound recordings or written records from anywhere near that long ago, we do have one clue: the fossilized bones from inside their ears. The internal anatomy of the ear influences its hearing abilities. 显然,我们并没有那么久以前留下来的录音资料或书面记录,但我们确实拥有一条线索:古人耳内的骨头化石。耳朵的内部构造能够影响其听觉能力。 Using CT scans and careful virtual reconstructions, my international colleagues and I think we’ve demonstrated how our very ancient ancestors heard the world. And this isn’t just an academic enterprise; hearing abilities are closely tied with verbal communication. 经CT扫描并精心进行虚拟重构之后,我和一些国际同僚认为,我们已经展示出了远古先人是如何听到这个世界的。这可不仅仅是一项学术事业,因为听觉能力与口头交流是密切相关的。 By figuring out when certain hearing capacities emerged during our evolutionary history, we might be able to shed some light on when spoken language started to evolve. That’s one of the most hotly debated questions in paleoanthropology, since many researchers consider the capacity for spoken language a defining human feature. 通过估计特定听觉能力在人类进化史上何时出现,我们就可能对口头语言何时开始进化有所了解。这是古人类学目前争论最为火热的问题之一,因为许多研究者认为口语能力是一项用来定义人类的特征。 Human hearing is unique among primates 人类听觉在灵长类中非常独特 We modern human beings have better hearing across a wider range of frequencies than most other primates, including chimpanzees, our closest living relative. Generally, we’re able to hear sounds very well between 1.0-6.0 kHz, a range that includes many of the sounds emitted during spoken language. Most of the vowels fall below about 2.0 kHz, while the higher frequencies mainly contain consonants. 与绝大多数灵长动物(包括与我们血缘最近的近亲黑猩猩)相比,现代人在一个更大的频率区间内拥有更好的听力。一般来说,我们能够很好地听清1.0-6.0千赫之间的声音,口语交流时发出的许多声音就处于这一区间内。绝大多数元音大概落在2.0千赫以下,更高的频率则主要包含辅音。 Thanks to testing of their hearing in the lab, we know that chimpanzees and most other primates aren’t as sensitive in that same range. Chimpanzee hearing – like most other primates who also live in Africa, including baboons – shows a loss in sensitivity between 1.0-4.0 kHz. In contrast, human beings maintain good hearing throughout this frequency range. 基于实验室的听力测量,我们知道黑猩猩和绝大多数其他灵长动物对于上述频率区间并没有这么敏感。黑猩猩的听力在1.0-4.0千赫区间内丧失了敏感性,其他绝大多数生活于非洲的灵长动物也是如此,包括狒狒。人类与之不同,在这一频率区间内仍然能有很好的听力。 We’re interested in finding out when this human hearing pattern first emerged during our evolutionary history. In particular, if we could find a similar pattern of good hearing between 1.0-6.0 kHz in a fossil human species, then we could make an argument that language was present. 我们的兴趣是想要找出人类的这种听觉模式在进化史上最早出现于何时。特别是,如果我们能从某个人类化石上面找到在1.0-6.0千赫之间拥有良好听力这种类似模式,那么我们就可以论证说语言已经存在。 Testing the hearing of a long-gone individual 测量远古人类的听力 To study hearing using fossils, we measure a large number of dimensions of the ancient ears – including the length of the ear canal, the size of the ear drum and so on – using virtual reconstructions of the fragile skulls on the computer. Then we input all these data into a computer model. 使用化石来测量听力,我们需要在电脑上对易碎的头骨进行虚拟重构,然后测量古人耳朵的许许多多指标,包括耳道长度、耳膜大小等等。然后我们将所有这些数据都输入一个电脑模型之中。 Published previously in the bioengineering literature, the model predicts how a person hears based on his ear anatomy. It studies the capacity of the ear as a receiver of a signal, similar to an antenna. The results tell us how efficiently the ear transmits sound energy from the environment to the brain. 这个模型此前已经在生物工程文献中发表,能够根据一个人的耳朵构造预测其听力。它研究了耳朵作为与天线类似的信号接收器的能力,其结果能告诉我们耳朵将周围环境中的声能传输到大脑的效率。 We first tested the model on chimpanzee skulls, and got results similar to those of researchers who tested chimpanzee hearing in the lab. Since we know the model accurately predicts how humans hear and how chimpanzees hear, it should provide reliable results for our fossil human ancestors as well. 我们在黑猩猩头骨上面检验了这个模型,得到的结果与研究人员在实验室得到的黑猩猩听力相似。因此,我们知道这个模型能够准确预测人类听力和黑猩猩听力,所以将它应用于古人化石上面,也应该能够为我们提供可靠的结论。 What do the fossils tell us? 化石告诉了我们什么? Previously, we studied the hearing abilities in several fossil hominin individuals from the site of the Sima de los Huesos (Pit of the Bones) in northern Spain. These fossils are about 430,000 years old, and anthropologists consider them to represent ancestors of the later Neanderthals. Based on ear bone measurements we took, the computer model calculated that hearing abilities in the Sima hominins were nearly identical to living humans in showing a broad region of good hearing. 此前,我们已经研究过西班牙北部“胡瑟裂谷”(西班牙语意为“骨坑”)遗址的几个古人类化石的听觉能力。这些化石大概是43万年前的,人类学家认为他们代表了晚期尼安德特人的祖先。基于我们所进行的耳骨测量,电脑模型计算出“裂谷”古人类的听觉能力与现存人类的几近相同,都在很大范围内表现出良好听力。 In our current study published in Science Advances, we worked with much earlier hominin individuals, representing the species Australopithecus africanus and Paranthropus robustus. These fossils were excavated at the sites of Sterkfontein and Swartkrans in South Africa, and likely date to around two million years ago. 在发表于《科学进展》上的最新研究中,我们研究了更为远古的古人类,即非洲南猿和傍人粗壮种。这些化石是在南非的斯特克方藤和斯沃特兰斯遗址发掘出来的,很可能存活于约200万年以前。 image-20150923-2626-3ujn1b Auditory sensitivity between 0.5-5.0 kHz for chimpanzees, humans and the early hominins. Points higher on the curve indicate greater auditory sensitivity. (A) Region of maximum sensitivity. The early hominins are shifted toward slightly higher frequencies compared with chimpanzees. (B) Hearing results. The early hominins are more sensitive than either chimpanzees or humans up to around 3 kHz. Above around 3.5 kHz, the early hominins resemble chimpanzees more closely in showing a drop-off in sensitivity. 黑猩猩、人类和早期古人类在0.5-5.0千赫之间的听觉敏感度。曲线中更高的点代表更高的听觉敏感度。(A)代表敏感度最高区间。与黑猩猩相比,早期古人类的对应区间向更高频率略有偏移。(B)代表听力结果。在约3千赫之前,早期古人类的敏感度既高于黑猩猩,也高于人类。在高于3.5千赫的区间,早期古人类更接近黑猩猩,表现出敏感度的下降。 When we measured their ear structures and modeled their hearing, we found they had a hearing pattern that was more similar to a chimpanzee – but slightly modified in the human direction. In fact, these early hominins showed better hearing than either chimpanzees or modern humans from about 1.0-3.0 kHz, and the region of best hearing was shifted toward slightly higher frequencies compared with chimpanzees. 在测量了他们的耳朵构造并用模型计算了其听力以后,我们发现他们的听觉模式更接近于黑猩猩,但朝人类的方向略有修正。事实上,在1.0-3.0千赫区间,这些早期古人类的听力比黑猩猩或现代人的都要好。而且与黑猩猩相比,他们的最佳听力区间向高频率方向略有偏移。 It turns out this auditory pattern may have been a particular advantage for living on the savanna. We know A. africanus and and P. robustus regularly occupied the savanna, since as much as half of their diet was made up of resources found in open environments, based on measurements of isotopes in their teeth. 原来,对于稀树大草原上的生活而言,这种听力模式可能别有优势。我们知道,非洲南猿和傍人粗壮种经常会生活在稀树大草原上,因为他们的食谱有一半来自于开阔环境中才能找到的资源,而这是对他们牙齿中的同位素进行测量后发现的。 In more open environments, sound waves don’t travel as far as they do in the rain forest canopy. Sound signals tends to fade out sooner, and short-range communication is favored on the savanna. The hearing pattern of these early hominins – greater sensitivity than humans or chimpanzees to frequencies between 1.0-3.0 kHz and maximum sensitivity at slightly higher frequencies than in chimps – that would work well in these conditions. 在更为开阔的环境中,声波传播不到热带雨林密林中那么远。声音信号消逝更快,因此在稀树大草原上短程交流更受喜爱。在这种环境中,这些早期古人类的听觉模式(在1.0-3.0千赫的频率区间中比黑猩猩或现代人更敏感,且敏感度最高区间的对应频率比黑猩猩要稍高一些)相当适用。 From hearing to talking 从听到说 A. africanus and P. robustus had hearing abilities similar to a chimpanzee, but with some slight differences in the direction of humans. 非洲南猿和傍人粗壮种的听觉能力与黑猩猩近似,同时向人类的方向略有偏差。 There is a general consensus among anthropologists that the small brain size and ape-like cranial anatomy and vocal tract in these early hominins indicates they likely did not have the capacity for language. 人类学家中存在一个普遍共识:这些早期古人类的大脑尺寸较小、颅骨构造和声道更像猿,表明他们很可能并不具备语言能力。 My colleagues and I aren’t arguing that these early hominins had language, with its implications of symbolic content. They certainly could communicate vocally, though. All primates do, and many species regularly emit a variety of vocalizations including grunts, screams, howls and so on. 我和同僚并不是争论说这些早期古人类拥有语言,因为语言包含有符号性内容这层意思。但是,他们肯定能够进行口头交流。所有灵长动物都能做到这一点,而且许多物种还能经常性地发出各种不同的声音,包括咕噜、尖叫、咆哮等等。 But these South African fossils have given us another hearing data point as we try to puzzle out the emergence of language. Two million years ago, it looks like they didn’t have language. But 430,000 years ago, it looks like the Sima de los Huesos hominins did. We suspect that sometime between these early South African forms and the later more human-like forms from the Sima, language emerged. Now we just need to narrow that window. 但在我们尝试解答语言起源的难题时,南非的这些化石给我们提供了另外一组听力数据论点。200万年前,他们似乎还没有语言。但43万年前,似乎“胡瑟裂谷”的古人类已经拥有语言了。我们估计,大概在这些早期南非种和更晚的更像人类的“裂谷”种之间的某个时候,语言就出现了。现在,我们只需要把这个窗口期进一步缩短。 We hope to continue this kind of work on hearing patterns in different groups of ancient hominins from various places and time periods. The discovery of a new hominin species, Homo naledi, announced just a couple of weeks ago from a different site in South Africa, underscores how much there is left to uncover. 我们希望把这项工作继续做下去,研究来自不同地区和时期的不同古人类群体的听觉模式。仅在数周之前,南非另外一个遗址又宣布发现了一种新的古人类物种,即纳勒迪人。这一发现凸显了我们还有多少事情需要去发现。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

功利计算vs拇指法则

【2016-04-14】

@whigzhou: 最优化vs满意解,功利计算vs拇指法则,天堂墙外寻路者vs险恶世界幸存者,画出世界地图然后大步迈向天堂vs泥泞大雾中小步摸索,进步主义vs保守主义……所以这其实是个算法问题,在一个可行解分布极为稀疏且迷雾重重能见度极低的险恶世界中,保守主义是不二之选,可惜哈耶克死得太早没想明白这一点。

@whigzhou: 只要你是进化论者,就会认识到我们面临的选择空间中可行解分布极为稀疏,是进化算法帮我们找出了这些可行解孤岛,而不是世界恰好被上帝造得那么宜居,进步主义的乐观假定其实是一种幸存者偏(more...)

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【2016-04-14】 @whigzhou: 最优化vs满意解,功利计算vs拇指法则,天堂墙外寻路者vs险恶世界幸存者,画出世界地图然后大步迈向天堂vs泥泞大雾中小步摸索,进步主义vs保守主义……所以这其实是个算法问题,在一个可行解分布极为稀疏且迷雾重重能见度极低的险恶世界中,保守主义是不二之选,可惜哈耶克死得太早没想明白这一点。 @whigzhou: 只要你是进化论者,就会认识到我们面临的选择空间中可行解分布极为稀疏,是进化算法帮我们找出了这些可行解孤岛,而不是世界恰好被上帝造得那么宜居,进步主义的乐观假定其实是一种幸存者偏见(喂,这才是幸存者偏见的正确用法, @whigzhou: 只要你认识到人类认知局限,就会同意我们面对的(认识论上的)世界迷雾重重,能见度极低,随便乱走很危险。 @whigzhou: 在这两个前提下,就有了对待功利主义的两种态度:功利主义(至少流行的版本)总想在给定价值函数之后寻求最大化,保守派天然讨厌功利主义,因为我们不要最大化,世界太险恶,如何保住我们所珍视的东西才最重要,所以,在弄清进化如何带给我们这些珍宝之前,不如先找出一组拇指法则。 @whigzhou: 这些拇指法则只能从那些有幸成功保有了这些珍宝的前辈的实践中去寻找,(基于前述局限)不可能是从头算出来的,正如我们已经看到的,功利主义算法对条件过于敏感,略微改变一个条件,或者稍稍多考虑一步,结论就可能完全翻转(黑话叫很混沌),如此便无法为我们提供一个可用的行动指导。 @战拖拉夫卡: "中国模式"到底是更接近于辉总所说的“功利最大化计算”,还是更接近于中国情境意义下的“拇指法则”?毕竟,摸石头过河这一策略也算得上实用主义范畴吧。需要甄别的是在中国现有路径依赖之上的实用主义,算是画地图大步迈向天堂还是在泥泞大雾中小步摸索? @whigzhou: 彼之珍宝,吾之敝履 @whigzhou: 我说的保守主义/进步主义,是元政治哲学层次上的分野,不涉及保守的具体是什么东西,哈耶克没想明白的,正是这一层次之别 @whigzhou: 正如契约主义/普世主义之别,是元伦理层次上的分野,不涉及具体契约内容 @whigzhou: 摸着石头过河这句话本身是契合保守主义的,问题是说这句话的人心目中的珍宝是什么?如果他的意思是“咱们就此散伙吧,让各省人民自己摸着石头爬向美国去”,那自然好~  
[译文]农作物类型如何影响制度进化

Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy
谷物、可收夺性和等级制

作者:Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:VoxEU,http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions

Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers.

传统理论认为,等级制和国家产生的缘由在于:人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出,上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此,仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区,才会产生等级制和国家。

What explains underdevelopment?
欠发达的原因是什么?

One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equato(more...)

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Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy 谷物、可收夺性和等级制 作者:Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:VoxEU,http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers. 传统理论认为,等级制和国家产生的缘由在于:人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出,上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此,仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区,才会产生等级制和国家。 What explains underdevelopment? 欠发达的原因是什么? One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equator. Acemoglu et al. (2001) point to extractive institutions as the root cause for underdevelopment. Besley and Persson (2014) emphasise the persistent effects of low fiscal capacity in underdeveloped countries. 我们这个时代最为紧迫的问题之一就是存在许多欠发达国家,而政府失灵在这些国家极为常见。它们大多数都位于赤道附近。Acemoglu等(2001年)认为,榨取型制度是欠发达的根本原因。Besley和Persson(2014年)强调,欠发达国家财政能力的低弱具有持久影响。 On the other hand, Diamond (1997) argues that it is geographical factors that explain why some regions of the world remain underdeveloped. In particular, he argues that the east-west orientation of Eurasia resulted in greater variety and productivity of cultivable crops, and in larger economic surplus, which facilitated the development of state institutions in this major landmass. Less fortunate regions, including New Guinea and sub-Saharan Africa, were left underdeveloped due to low land productivity. 而另一方面,Diamond(1997年)则提出,地理因素能够解释为什么世界某些地区会停留在欠发达状态。具体来说,他指出,欧亚大陆的东西走向使得适合驯化的谷物产量更大、种类更多,也使其经济剩余更多,后者为这块大陆上的国家制度的发展提供了便利。至于那些不那么幸运的地域,诸如新几内亚、撒哈拉以南非洲等,就因为土地生产率低下而停留在了欠发达状态。 In a recent paper (Mayshar et al. 2015), we contend that fiscal capacity and viable state institutions are conditioned to a major extent by geography. Thus, like Diamond, we argue that geography matters a great deal. But in contrast to Diamond, and against conventional opinion, we contend that it is not high farming productivity and the availability of food surplus that accounts for the economic success of Eurasia. 在最近的一篇论文(Mayshar等,2015年)中,我们主张:财政能力和国家机构的维系,很大程度上受地理条件限制。因此和Diamond一样,我们认为地理条件异常重要。不过与Diamond和其他传统观点不同的是,我们认为欧亚大陆的经济成功并非源于高农业生产率和获得粮食盈余的可能性。
  • We propose an alternative mechanism by which environmental factors imply the appropriability of crops and thereby the emergence of complex social institutions.
  • 我们提出了一个(用于解释国家起源的)替代机制:环境因素决定谷物的可收夺性,从而决定了复杂社会制度的产生。
To understand why surplus is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of hierarchy, consider a hypothetical community of farmers who cultivate cassava (a major source of calories in sub-Saharan Africa, and the main crop cultivated in Nigeria), and assume that the annual output is well above subsistence. 为了理解为什么粮食盈余既不是等级制产生的必要条件,也不是充分条件,让我们假设:有这么一个种植木薯(撒哈拉以南非洲的一种主要热量来源,尼日利亚的主要农作物)的农民群体,并且假设每年的产量远远超过生存所需。 Cassava is a perennial root that is highly perishable upon harvest. Since this crop rots shortly after harvest, it isn't stored and it is thus difficult to steal or confiscate. As a result, the assumed available surplus would not facilitate the emergence of a non-food producing elite, and may be expected to lead to a population increase. 木薯是多年生宿根植物,收获以后很容易腐烂。既然这种作物在收获后不久就会腐烂,它就不会被贮藏,因此很难被盗取或征用。结果就是,这种假定可以获得的粮食盈余将不会促成那些不事农业生产的统治精英的产生,而且可能会导致人口增长。 Consider now another hypothetical farming community that grows a cereal grain – such as wheat, rice or maize – yet with an annual produce that just meets each family's subsistence needs, without any surplus. Since the grain has to be harvested within a short period and then stored until the next harvest, a visiting robber or tax collector could readily confiscate part of the stored produce. Such ongoing confiscation may be expected to lead to a downward adjustment in population density, but it will nevertheless facilitate the emergence of non-producing elite, even though there was no surplus. 现在设想另外一个种植谷类作物的农民群体——比如小麦、稻米或者玉米,且假定这些作物的年产量只能刚好满足每个家庭的生存需求,没有任何盈余。因为粮食作物要在很短时间内收割完毕,并需要一直贮藏到下次收获,所以袭击而来的盗贼或者税吏可以很容易地拿走储藏量的一部分。这种不断出现的损失,可能会导致人口密度下降,但是它却会促进不事生产的统治精英的产生,尽管完全没有粮食盈余。 Emergence of fiscal capacity and hierarchy and the cultivation of cereals 财政能力及等级制的产生与谷物栽培的关系 This simple scenario shows that surplus isn't a precondition for taxation. It also illustrates our alternative theory that the transition to agriculture enabled hierarchy to emerge only where the cultivated crops were vulnerable to appropriation. 这个简单的设想表明,粮食盈余并不是税收的前提条件。同时,它也说明了我们所提出的新理论——农业转向促成了等级制的萌生,但这一过程只会发生在所培植的作物很容易被掠夺的地方。
  • In particular, we contend that the Neolithic emergence of fiscal capacity andhierarchy was conditioned on the cultivation of appropriable cereals as the staple crops, in contrast to less appropriable staples such as roots and tubers.
  • 具体来说,我们认为,财政能力与等级制在新石器时代出现,需要一个前提条件:以易于收夺的谷类为主要作物,而不是以不易收夺的块根和块茎作物等为主要作物。
According to this theory, complex hierarchy did not emerge among hunter-gatherers because hunter-gatherers essentially live from hand-to-mouth, with little that can be expropriated from them to feed a would-be elite. 根据这一理论,狩猎采集者群体中间没能产生复杂的等级制,是因为他们本质上是现挣现吃的,在他们身上很难征用到足够的资源来供养潜在的统治精英。
  • Thus, rather than surplus facilitating the emergence of the elite, we argue that the elite only emerged when and where it was possible to expropriate crops.
  • 因此,并非粮食盈余促进了统治精英的出现。我们认为,只有在粮食收成容易被征用的地方和时期,才会产生统治精英。
Due to increasing returns to scale in the provision of protection from theft, early farmers had to aggregate and to cooperate to defend their stored grains. Food storage and the demand for protection thus led to population agglomeration in villages and to the creation of a non-food producing elite that oversaw the provision of protection. 鉴于防备盗窃所带来的收益是随规模递增的,远古时代的农民们必须聚集在一起共同合作来守护他们的储粮。因此,食物贮藏和保护的需要使得人口集聚成村落,并且创造了负责提供保护而不事农业生产的精英。 Once a group became larger than a few dozen immediate kin, it is unlikely that those who sought protection services were as forthcoming in financing the security they desired. This public-good nature of protection was resolved by the ability of those in charge of protecting the stored food to appropriate the necessary means. 而一旦某个群体的数量超过了几十个直系亲属的规模的话,那么这些寻求保护性服务的人们就不太可能心甘情愿地支付维持众人渴望的安全所需的费用。解决安全保卫的这种公共物品性质,要求那些负责保护储粮的人提高自身对于必要财产的征用能力。
  • That is, we argue that it was this transformation of the appropriation technology, due to the transition to cereals, which created both the demand for protection and the means for its provision.
  • 也就是说,我们认为,是由于征用技术随着谷物种植出现而发生转变,才既创造了对于安全保卫的需求,也创造了提供安全保卫的手段。
This is how we explain the emergence of complex and hereditary social hierarchy, and eventually the state. 这就是我们解释复杂的、世袭性的社会等级制乃至国家最终形成的方法。 Applied to Diamond's prototypic contrast between Eurasia and New Guinea, our theory suggests that the crucial distinction between these two regions is that farming in Eurasia relied on the cultivation of cereals, while in New Guinea it relied mostly on the cultivation of tubers (yam and taro, and, more recently, sweet potato) and bananas, where long-term storage is neither feasible (due to perishability) nor necessary (because harvesting is essentially non-seasonal). 应用于Diamond对比欧亚大陆和新几内亚的原型理论,我们的理论表明:这两个地域之间最关键的差别是欧亚大陆的农业依赖于谷物栽培,而新几内亚依赖的主要是块茎作物(白薯,芋头,最近也有甘薯)和香蕉,这些作物既不可能长期保存(因为易腐性),又没有必要长期保存(因为收获时节基本上是非季节性的)。 This provided farmers in New Guinea with sufficient immunity against bandits and potential tax collectors. More generally, we contend that the underdevelopment of tropical areas is not due to low land fertility but rather the reverse. Farmers in the tropics can choose to cultivate highly productive, non-appropriable tuber crops. This inhibits both the demand for socially provided protection and the emergence of a protection-providing elite. It is a curse of plenty. 这使得新几内亚的农民们对抢匪和潜在的税吏有足够的免疫力。更一般地说,我们认为,热带地区的欠发达原因并不是土壤产出低,而是恰好相反。热带地区的农民可以选择种植高产量而不易收夺的块茎作物。这样就既抑制了对于作为社会公共品提供的保护的需求,也妨碍了负责提供保护的统治精英的出现。这是一种资源诅咒。 In the empirical section of our paper we demonstrate that, contrary to the standard productivity-and-surplus theory, land productivity per se has no direct effect on hierarchy. We also show that, consistent with our theory, the cultivation of roots or tubers is indeed detrimental to hierarchy. 在论文的实证部分,我们证明了,与标准的生产率—盈余理论不同,土地生产率本身对于等级制形成没有直接影响。我们同时也表明,种植块根和块茎作物确实是不利于等级制的形成,这与我们的理论一致。 Empirical finding 实证结果 These results are established by employing two datasets with information on social hierarchy: a cross section and a panel of countries. For our cross-sectional analysis we use Murdock's (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, which contains information on cultural, institutional, and economic features of 1,267 societies from around the world at an idealised time period of first contact with Europeans. Our main outcome variable is ‘jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community’. The Ethnographic Atlas also provides information on the major crop type grown by societies that practice agriculture. 上述结果是基于应用两个包含社会等级制信息的数据集而得出的:一组是截面数据,一组则是面板数据。在截面分析中,我们使用了Murdock的“民族志图集”(1967年),其中包含了世界各地1267个社群在刚刚接触欧洲人的理想化时间段内的文化、制度和经济特征方面的信息。我们主要的结果变量是“超越地方性社群的管辖层级”。“民族志地图”里面也提供了各个从事农业的社群所种植的主要作物种类的信息。 Since the cultivated crop is a decision variable, we instrument for the crop type by using data on land suitability for different crops from the Food and Agriculture Organisation. We first show that the decision whether to cultivate cereals as a main crop depends positively on the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers (in terms of potential caloric yields per hectare). 因为农作物是我们模型中的决策变量【编注:指模型中可加以控制或先于其他参数而改变的主动变量】,我们利用联合国粮农组织有关土地对不同作物之适宜性的数据,来推测各社群的农作物类型。首先我们分析表明,是否将谷物作为主要作物,实际上依赖于谷物对于块根和块茎作物的生产率优势(以每公顷的潜在热量产出计算)。 We then find that societies tend to have a more complex hierarchal organisation where the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers is higher, as predicted by our theory. Furthermore, we find that societies that practice agriculture are more hierarchical only where they cultivate cereals. This means that societies that cultivate roots and tubers have similar levels of hierarchy to those of pastoral or foraging societies. 而后我们发现,那些谷物比根块茎作物拥有更高生产率优势的社群,往往会拥有更复杂的层级机构,这与我们所提理论的预期相符。此外,我们发现,在从事农业生产的社群中,只有种植谷物的那些才具有更多的等级性质。这意味着,种植根块茎的社群与游牧社群或采集社群具有相似的社会分层水平。 We also show that land productivity, measured by the potential yield of calories per acre of the most productive crop in each area, does not affect hierarchy once we control for the productivity advantage of cereals. Thus, our empirical findings challenge the conventional argument that it is increased land productivity that leads to more hierarchical societies. 我们还展示了,一旦控制了谷物的生产率优势,土地生产率(以每个地方最适应生产的作物的每英亩潜在热量产出计算)就不会影响社会等级性。因此,我们的实证结果质疑了土地生产率提高导致社会等级性增强的传统理论。 Although this cross-sectional analysis accounts for a wide range of confounding factors, we cannot rule out completely that omitted variables may bias the estimates. To overcome this concern, we employ another dataset compiled by Borcan et al. (2014). This is a panel, based on present-day boundaries of 159 countries, with institutional information every five decades over the last millennium. 虽然这个截面分析考虑到了很多干扰因子,但我们依然不能完全排除遗漏某些变量造成推算偏差的可能性。为了解除这一疑虑,我们应用了另外一个由Borcan等人(2014年)编制的数据集。这是一项历时性数据,以159个国家的现代边界为基础,包含有过去一千年中每隔五十年的制度信息。 This panel enables us to exploit the ‘Columbian exchange’ of crops across continents as a natural experiment. The new crops that became available after 1492 in the New and the Old World changed both the productivity of land and the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers in the majority of the countries in the sample. 这项历时性数据使得我们可以把农作物跨越各大陆的“哥伦布交换”当作一个自然实验来利用。对于样本国家中的大多数而言,新旧两个大陆在1492年之后所得到的新型农作物都既改变了他们的土地生产率,也改变了谷物相对块根块茎作物的生产率优势。 Consistent with our theory, the panel regressions confirm that an increase in the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers has a positive impact on hierarchical complexity, while an increase in land productivity does not. 与我们的理论一致的是,基于历时性数据的回归分析证实:如果谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势增加,那就会对社会分层的复杂性产生正面影响,而土地生产率的增加则不会引发这种正面影响。 Concluding remarks 结论 These findings support our theory that it is not agricultural productivity and surplus per se that explains more complex hierarchical societies, but rather the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers, the type of crop that is cultivated as a result, and the appropriability of the crop type. Given that the productivity of roots and tubers is typically high in the tropics, these results also support the claim that deep-rooted geographical factors may explain the current weakness of state institutions in these regions. 这些发现支持了我们的理论:农业生产率和粮食盈余本身并不能解释更为复杂的等级制社会的出现,毋宁说,它们之出现,原因在于谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势,也就是由此导致的栽培农作物的种类选择以及此种农作物的可收夺性。鉴于块根块茎作物在热带地区产量一般来说更高,上述结论也支持这样一种说法:这些地域的国家机构的孱弱现状,可能从深层次的地理原因方面可以得到解释。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]为何人类阴道那么大

Why Is the Human Vagina So Big?
为什么人类阴道那么大

作者:Holly Dunsworth @ 2015-12-03
译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
校对:林翠(@cwlinnil)
来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/blog/why-is-the-human-vagina-so-big/

We are obsessed with penis and testicle size. Yet, we can barely say “vagina” and when we do we’re usually talking about the vulva.

我们总是着迷于阴茎和睾丸的尺寸,却极少谈及“阴道”,就算我们提到了,一般也只是讨论外阴。

Everyone’s come across some article somewhere on-line that is thrilled to share how big human penises really are, for primates, and to explain why they evolved to be so big. It’s not really the length, but the girth. Alan Dixson is your go-to on this. He’s conservative in his assessment of the literature on penis size and even he concedes that human penis “circumference is unusual when compared to the penes of other hominoids (apes)” (p. 65 in Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems).

每个人都见过,网上的一些文章在兴奋不已地告诉你,人类的阴茎在灵长类中有多大,为什么会进化成这么大。其实所谓的大,不是指长度,而是指茎围。说到这个话题,你去问Alan Dixson就准没错。他对有关阴茎大小的文献一贯持比较谨慎的态度,但连他也承认,人类的阴茎“周长和其他人猿的阳具相比是个异数” (见《性选择与人类繁衍系统起源》第65页)

A favorite explanation for the big phallus is female mate choice, that females selectively make babies with males who have larger and, presumably, more pleasurable semen delivery devices. This is backed up by studies. When life size projections of naked men are shown to female subjects, they say they find the ones with bigger ones to be more attractive. [This is exactly how mate choice works where I live, how about you?]

对阳具大型化的一个比较受欢迎的解释是雌性交配偏好,也就是说雌性倾向于选择与有着较硕大、想来也较受用的“精液注射器”的雄性交配产子。这一理论得到了一些研究的支持。有研究让女性受访对象看真实大小的裸男幻灯片,她们纷纷表示阳具伟岸的男性比较有吸引力。(这完全符合我日常所见的择偶选择,你呢?)

Other explanations include male competition. If you can deliver your package to the front yard but the other guy can deliver to the front door, his is more likely to be carried inside the house first. Or, if he can steal away what you just delivered, then, again, his package has yours beat. Thanks to his big penis he’s more likely to pass on his winning penis genes than you are to pass on your loser penis genes. Loser.

雄性竞争也是一种解释。如果你只能把包裹投递到院子里,但另一个人可以把包裹放到屋门前,那他的包裹先进屋的几率就高一些。又或者,如果他可以偷走你刚送的包裹,那他的包裹也一样打败了你的。因为器材比较大,他延续他那“赢茎”基因的可能性比你延续你那“输茎”基因的可能性也就比较大。于是你就完蛋了。

All this is just terribly fun to write about and I’m not even going nuts (gah) like they do. And they do. They really do(more...)

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Why Is the Human Vagina So Big? 为什么人类阴道那么大 作者:Holly Dunsworth @ 2015-12-03 译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 校对:林翠(@cwlinnil) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/blog/why-is-the-human-vagina-so-big/ We are obsessed with penis and testicle size. Yet, we can barely say “vagina” and when we do we’re usually talking about the vulva. 我们总是着迷于阴茎和睾丸的尺寸,却极少谈及“阴道”,就算我们提到了,一般也只是讨论外阴。 Everyone’s come across some article somewhere on-line that is thrilled to share how big human penises really are, for primates, and to explain why they evolved to be so big. It’s not really the length, but the girth. Alan Dixson is your go-to on this. He’s conservative in his assessment of the literature on penis size and even he concedes that human penis “circumference is unusual when compared to the penes of other hominoids (apes)” (p. 65 in Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems). 每个人都见过,网上的一些文章在兴奋不已地告诉你,人类的阴茎在灵长类中有多大,为什么会进化成这么大。其实所谓的大,不是指长度,而是指茎围。说到这个话题,你去问Alan Dixson就准没错。他对有关阴茎大小的文献一贯持比较谨慎的态度,但连他也承认,人类的阴茎“周长和其他人猿的阳具相比是个异数” (见《性选择与人类繁衍系统起源》第65页) A favorite explanation for the big phallus is female mate choice, that females selectively make babies with males who have larger and, presumably, more pleasurable semen delivery devices. This is backed up by studies. When life size projections of naked men are shown to female subjects, they say they find the ones with bigger ones to be more attractive. [This is exactly how mate choice works where I live, how about you?] 对阳具大型化的一个比较受欢迎的解释是雌性交配偏好,也就是说雌性倾向于选择与有着较硕大、想来也较受用的“精液注射器”的雄性交配产子。这一理论得到了一些研究的支持。有研究让女性受访对象看真实大小的裸男幻灯片,她们纷纷表示阳具伟岸的男性比较有吸引力。(这完全符合我日常所见的择偶选择,你呢?) Other explanations include male competition. If you can deliver your package to the front yard but the other guy can deliver to the front door, his is more likely to be carried inside the house first. Or, if he can steal away what you just delivered, then, again, his package has yours beat. Thanks to his big penis he’s more likely to pass on his winning penis genes than you are to pass on your loser penis genes. Loser. 雄性竞争也是一种解释。如果你只能把包裹投递到院子里,但另一个人可以把包裹放到屋门前,那他的包裹先进屋的几率就高一些。又或者,如果他可以偷走你刚送的包裹,那他的包裹也一样打败了你的。因为器材比较大,他延续他那“赢茎”基因的可能性比你延续你那“输茎”基因的可能性也就比较大。于是你就完蛋了。 All this is just terribly fun to write about and I’m not even going nuts (gah) like they do. And they do. They really do. And all over the Internet they do: “Evolution of human penis” gets 53,000 hits just on scholar.google alone, and about 832,000 on Google. 写这些东西真是好玩死了,而我又不会像他们那样疯狂,咔咔。他们真是挺疯的,不骗你。男人在网上有这么疯:搜索“人类阴茎的进化”,仅仅在谷歌学术上就得到了53,000个结果,在整个谷歌上则得到了832,000个。 But doesn’t it make sense that for a penis to be somewhat useful it has to be somewhat correlated to vagina size? 但是,如果阴茎要发挥功能,难道不是应该和阴道的大小联系起来才说的通吗? I’m talking about all penises in the universe and all vaginas too. Sure there’s variation, but a penis can’t be too wide. It helps to be long, probably, but it can’t be too long. 我在讨论的是地球上所有的阴茎,和地球上所有的阴道。当然它们会有差异,但阴茎也不能太粗。长应该是有好处,但也不能太长。 So neither pleasure nor psychology need matter at all, just function associated with some sort of fit. Pleasure and psychology are never invoked to explain penis morphology in other animals. If anything, it’s the cornucopia of horrifying, not pleasing, animal penises that begs for evolutionary explanations. 其实肉体欢愉和心理需要都根本不重要,重要的只是与大小匹配相关的功能。肉体欢愉和心理感受从来就没有被拿来解释其他动物的阴茎形态。如果非要从进化论的角度看,就要去解释太多种并不讨喜,反而可怕的动物阴茎了。 Wouldn’t you explain the size and shape of the key by the size and shape of the lock? So wouldn’t it be a little more scientifically sound to hypothesize that the human penis is sized and shaped like that because it fits well into the human vagina? 你在解释钥匙的大小和形状的时候,不是以锁的大小和形状为参照的吗?因此,人类阴茎之所以是如此的大小和形状,是为了要匹配人类的阴道,这种猜想在科学上不是比较合理么? Sure, it gets chicken-and-eggy or turtles-all-the-way-downy, but c’mon. Isn’t it a bit obvious that the privates that fit inside the other privates are probably correlated? You’d think that even the people who have never had intercourse would default to this explanation for the evolution of the human penis. 当然,这会演变成一个鸡先蛋先,又或者是龟下有龟的问题【译注:”It’s turtles all the way down”来自一则古老的轶事,体现逻辑上的无限递归,后来成为一句玩笑话,用来表达表面立于不败之地,而实则回避逻辑问题的境况】。不过,拜托,互相契合的灵长类体征具有相关性,这不是很明显吗?你应该会同意,就算没有性经验的人,不需多想也会接受这个有关人类阴茎进化的理论吧。 But we’re rarely, if ever, told that human penises are relatively girthy because human vaginas are. It’s always about male competition or female preference. 但我们极少,甚至从没有听人提过,人类的阴茎之所以比较粗大,是因为人类的阴道比较粗大。大家总是在研究那些雄性竞争和雌性偏好的理论。 Sure, we may be a little weird compared to our close relatives for not having a baculum (penis bone), and maybe that’s the sort of thing you want to explain for whatever reason, but does human penis size and shape need a uniquely human story? 人类阴茎没有骨骼,和人类的近亲相比这也许显得有些奇怪,你可能会出于种种原因想为这一现象找个解释。但人类阴茎的大小和形状有别于其它动物,真的需要一个独特的解释吗? Assuming it’s correlated to the vagina like it probably is in many other species,* then no it doesn’t… unless the size and shape of the human vagina has an exceptional story. 有不少其他动物的阴茎大小和形状很可能和它们的阴道相关,假设人类也是如此,那除非人类阴道的形态有异于其它动物,否则人类阴茎的形态不应该有什么特别。

journal.pone_.0000418.g002 [水禽雌雄生殖器官协同变异的图例。标星型的为雄性生殖器,箭头指向的是女性生殖器。图片来自“水禽雌雄生殖形态的协同进化”。DOI编码: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000418]

Does it? We wouldn’t know. There are zero (look!) articles titled “Why is the human vagina so big?” 究竟有没什么特别呢,我们不知道。从来都没有文章(你自己看!)以“为何人类的阴道那么大”为题。 Until right now. 直到现在才有。 Here we go. If we were going to answer it the same way we’ve long explained the human penis, and other animal penis shapes, then we’ve got a few ideas… 来吧,如果以我们长期以来解释人类和其他动物阴茎形态的思路,来回答这一问题的话,我们可以有如下一些解释…… Because walking upright made the vagina conspicuous and males thought a bigger vagina was better. Because big vaginas outcompete small ones at catching sperm. Because of male pleasure from coitus with a big vagina. Because of heat dissipation or thermoregulation. Because of a tradeoff with brain size. 因为直立行走让阴道外露,雄性认为阴道大一点比较好。因为大点的阴道比小点的更易于捕捉精子。因为大一点的阴道令雄性性交更舒服。因为有利于散热和调节体温。因为这是针对脑量增大的折衷方案。 And of course, we’d need to demonstrate that the human vagina is in fact larger, relative to body size, than the vaginas of other primates. Regardless, a sound answer to the question of vagina size and shape focuses on childbirth, wouldn’t you say? She’s got to be big enough to push out a baby and, for humans, it’s a great big baby. 当然,我们需要证明人类阴道相对于身体的比例,比起其它灵长类动物来说的确要更大。无论如何,难道你不觉得要回答人类阴道大小形状的问题,重点应该放在分娩上吗?阴道得足够大才能把婴儿生出来呀,人类婴儿的个头可大得很。 #169-3

[红毛猩,大猩猩,黑猩猩与人类的对比。这些数值偏离了灵长类总体的回归分析。数据来自Dunsworth等人,2012年,PNAS第 109(38):15212-15216]

So if there’s an exceptionally human story for the great big human penis, that exceptional story originates not in a woman’s orgasms, not in her pornographic thoughts or her lustful eyes, but in her decidedly unsexy “birth canal.” 所以如果人类阴茎硕大有什么特别原因的话,那原因既不是来自女人的性高潮,也不是来自女人的淫思欲眼,而是来自于那毫无性感可言的“产道”。 And I dug up a nice little note to explain this to us all written by Dr. Bowman, a gynecologist, back in 2008 for the Archives of Sexual Behavior which is magnificent. It starts out giving the only vagina-size-based, not to mention childbirth-based, explanation for human penises that I can find in the literature (which is thankfully cited by Dixson in his book mentioned above). But it still manages to bring the explanation beyond the vagina and onto another proud triumph: “In sum, man’s larger penis is a consequence of his larger brain.” 我找到了妇科医生Bowman于2008年发表在《性行为档案》上的一篇文章,该文很好地向大家解释了上述问题。文章开始以阴道大小和分娩需要为切入点来解释人类阴茎的大小,这是我能找到的以阴道大小来解释阴茎大小的唯一文献,从分娩需要着眼就更不用说了。这要感谢Dixson在前文提到的书中引用了这一资料。Bowman在文中还站在一个比阴道更高的层次,去解释这个问题:“总而言之,人类阴茎巨大是脑量增加的后果”。 After you clean up the coffee you just spat onto your computer screen, you can read it all for yourself by clicking on the link up there (or emailing me for the pdf). 你可以先把喷到电脑上的咖啡抹干净,然后点击上面的链接,通读一下那篇文章(想要pdf格式的可以发邮件给我)。 Guess who didn’t read it? That study in PNAS, mentioned above, that showed women naked penises, got a high attractive score for the big ones, and thinks that’s evidence for mate choice now, today, let alone back when (I’m going to speculate that) women had a tiny bit less of it. 你猜谁没有读过那篇文章?就是文章开头提到的那项研究的研究者【编注:指本文第三节提到的“让女性受访对象看真实大小的裸男幻灯片”的那项研究】,他们把阴茎赤裸裸地呈现给女人看,让那些大家伙拿到高分,然后认为拿到了交配偏好在当代的证据,至于过去女人眼福稍浅(我只是猜的)的年代是什么情况,就更不用废话了。 Point is, the literature rages on with the special explanations for the big penis with nary a big vagina in sight. 重点是,各路文章热火朝天地为大阴茎找了各种特别的原因,却对大阴道视而不见。 But you heard it here, at least. 但起码你在这里听说了。 Childbirth is why the human vagina is so big and, consequently, why the male penis is so big. It’s pretty straightforward. Yet we’re still left scratching our heads as to why the penis question endures. 分娩导致了人类阴道如此巨大,进而导致人类阴茎如此巨大。这很直观。然而大阴茎的话题经久不衰,这很令我们挠头。 Is evolutionary science averse to big vaginas? 难道进化研究是反大阴道的么? Does nobody love a big vagina? 难道就没人喜欢大阴道么? Because that’s just ridiculous. Everybody came from one. 这很荒谬,每个人都是从那儿出来的呀。

******

P.S. Unfortunately a few scholar.google searches led me to find no cross-species comparisons of mammalian vagina lengths or any vaginal measures. It may be out there, but I haven’ t found it. I found some measures for bitches… DOGS! And some heifers… COWS! So I’ve got to compile some data if I’m to do this properly. Baby size might be a way to do this. P.S. 我在谷歌学术搜索了一下,可惜没有找到不同哺乳动物阴道长度或尺码的对比。也许有,但我找不到。我倒是找到了狗娘的尺码……是真的母狗啦!还有牛逼的尺码……也是真的母牛啦!所以如果要认真对比的话,我得收集整理一些数据才行。通过分析婴儿的大小可能也是一个办法。 P.P.S. p. 73 in Dixson has Figure 4.3 with nine primate species’ penile and vaginal lengths plotted. Thanks Patrick C. for reminding me where I’d seen something like this and where to point readers! P.P.S. Dixson书中第73页的图表4.3,列出了九种灵长类动物的阴茎与阴道的长度。谢谢Patrick C.提醒我曾经看到过这样的图表,让我可以告诉读者上哪里找。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]长寿、祖母假说与配偶关系

Got a great relationship? You may want to thank your prehistoric grandmother
拥有美妙的关系?你可能想感谢你远古的祖母

作者:Jo Setchell @ 2015-09-08
译者:淡蓝 (lilacinrain@gmail.com)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:THE CONVERSATION,https://theconversation.com/got-a-great-relationship-you-may-want-to-thank-your-prehistoric-grandmother-47181

I went to a cross-cultural wedding last weekend. The guests travelled across continents to be there, spoke mutually incomprehensible languages and came from different traditions. However, they all shared a common understanding of the relationship between the bride and the groom. Pair bonds are, after all, universal in human societies, despite being rare in other mammals. And we don’t exactly know why.

上周末我参加了一场跨文化的婚礼。源自不同的文化传统、说着彼此都听不懂的语言的婚礼嘉宾们穿越各大洲来到这里。虽然如此,对新郎和新娘的关系,他们却有着共识。在其他哺乳动物中罕见的配偶式结对,却实实在在地在全人类社会中普遍存在。而我们却不太清楚这是为什么。

Before the wedding breakfast, I chatted with a relaxed couple who had left their kids with their grandparents for the day. This is not unusual; UK grandparents babysit on average 76 times a year – and we often take it for granted. But now a new study finally gives grandparents the credit they deserve by arguing that long-term relationships actually evolved thanks to grandmothers helping out with kids in prehistoric times.

婚礼早餐之前,我与一对十分放松闲适的夫妇聊了会。那天他俩把孩子交给了他们的祖父母照看。这种做法应该不在少数;在英国,祖父母们每年平均照顾孙辈76次——而我们常常也觉得这是理所当然(more...)

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Got a great relationship? You may want to thank your prehistoric grandmother 拥有美妙的关系?你可能想感谢你远古的祖母 作者:Jo Setchell @ 2015-09-08 译者:淡蓝 (lilacinrain@gmail.com) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:THE CONVERSATION,https://theconversation.com/got-a-great-relationship-you-may-want-to-thank-your-prehistoric-grandmother-47181 I went to a cross-cultural wedding last weekend. The guests travelled across continents to be there, spoke mutually incomprehensible languages and came from different traditions. However, they all shared a common understanding of the relationship between the bride and the groom. Pair bonds are, after all, universal in human societies, despite being rare in other mammals. And we don’t exactly know why. 上周末我参加了一场跨文化的婚礼。源自不同的文化传统、说着彼此都听不懂的语言的婚礼嘉宾们穿越各大洲来到这里。虽然如此,对新郎和新娘的关系,他们却有着共识。在其他哺乳动物中罕见的配偶式结对,却实实在在地在全人类社会中普遍存在。而我们却不太清楚这是为什么。 Before the wedding breakfast, I chatted with a relaxed couple who had left their kids with their grandparents for the day. This is not unusual; UK grandparents babysit on average 76 times a year – and we often take it for granted. But now a new study finally gives grandparents the credit they deserve by arguing that long-term relationships actually evolved thanks to grandmothers helping out with kids in prehistoric times. 婚礼早餐之前,我与一对十分放松闲适的夫妇聊了会。那天他俩把孩子交给了他们的祖父母照看。这种做法应该不在少数;在英国,祖父母们每年平均照顾孙辈76次——而我们常常也觉得这是理所当然的。但是,现在一项新研究终于承认了爷爷奶奶们应得的功劳,研究认为,长期夫妻关系的进化产生,实际上多亏了远古时代祖母们对孩子们的照看。 The greatness of grandparents 祖父母的伟大之处 The question of why humans form pair bonds – the biological term for the strong affinity that develops between partners (often a male-female pair but not always) – is in fact one of the biggest puzzles in evolutionary anthropology. Humans are apes, yet our closest living relatives – chimpanzees and bonobos – have no such long-term relationships between male-female pairs. 人类为何会形成配偶式结对——生物学术语,指伴侣之间(常常是雌雄配对,但并不全然如此)发展出的强亲和关系——事实上是进化人类学上的最大谜题之一。人类是一种猿,可我们的现存近亲——黑猩猩和倭黑猩猩——的雌雄伴侣之间却不存在这种长期关系。 In the late 1990s, anthropologists put forward the “grandmother hypothesis” to explain why human females stop reproducing at a similar age to other great apes, but live markedly longer lives. Chimpanzees live into their 30s or 40s, but human females often live decades beyond their child-bearing years. 1990年代末,人类学家提出了“祖母假说”,以解释为何人类女性停止生育的年龄与其他大猿相仿,却明显更加长寿。黑猩猩可以活到30多或40多岁,人类女性却能在育龄后再活数十年。 The grandmother hypothesis was based on observations of the Hadza people, in Tanzania. Hadza people live by hunting and gathering food, like our ancestors, although, they are of course modern people. 祖母假说基于对坦桑尼亚哈扎族人的观察而提出。尽管哈扎族人象我们祖先一样,靠狩猎和采集食物而生,但他们当然也是现代人。 Older Hadza women dig up tubers to feed youngsters who aren’t strong enough to it themselves. The grandmother hypothesis suggests that this help allows daughters to have their next baby sooner than they would otherwise. Over time, grandmothers who lived longer and helped more had more grandchildren, who shared their genes for longer life and care of their grandchildren. Thus, these genes became increasingly common in the population and human lifespan increased. 年老的哈扎族妇女靠挖掘植物块茎来喂养不够强壮、不能自食其力的年幼者。祖母假说认为,这种帮助让女儿们能更快地孕育下一个宝宝,否则间隔时间会更久。随着时间推移,更长寿并能提供更多帮助的祖母们就拥有了更多的孙辈,这些孙辈会共享她们的长寿基因并再去照顾自己的孙辈。这样一来,这些基因在人口中变得越来越普遍,人类寿命就此增加了。 The evolution of partnership 伴侣关系的演变 The new study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, has used computer simulations to link this hypothesis to the evolution of pair-bonding in humans. The authors argue that long-term romantic relationships evolved due to a combination of people living longer and men remaining fertile longer than women. This situation led to a surplus of older men competing for younger, fertile women. 发表在《美国国家科学院院刊》上的一项新研究,用计算机模拟将这一假说与人类固定配偶关系的进化联系了起来。作者们认为,长期浪漫关系之所以进化出来,是因为人类越来越长寿,并且男性保有生殖能力的时间比女性更长。这种状况使得有更多相对较老的男性为年轻的育龄女性而相互竞争。 In fact, the study shows that the ratio of fertile males to fertile females in humans is twice as big as it is in chimpanzees, making humans very unusual mammals. This excess of males makes us more like birds. And birds are well-known for their pair-bonds. 事实上,这项研究显示,人类的育龄男女比,要比黑猩猩群体中的同一比例大两倍,这让人类成为十分不同寻常的哺乳动物。男性过多,使得我们更像鸟类,而鸟类的配偶关系是众所周知的。 Where many males compete for relatively few females, a male who develops a strong bond with one female will have more surviving offspring than males who seek numerous partners. The authors suggest that this created increasing incentives for men to “guard” their mate against rival males. 在数量更多的男性为相对较少的女性而彼此竞争时,与那些寻求众多伴侣的男性相比,同某一女性发展出强结合的男性将会拥有更多的成活后代。作者们认为,这就造成了很大的激励,促使男性去“守卫”他们的伴侣,赶走竞争对手。 While mate-guarding is not necessarily the same thing as pair-bonding, the authors argue that both involve a trade-off between paying attention to the current partner and seeking a new one. Of course, although the study concentrates on male strategy, females are not passive in this scenario – it takes two to bond. 当然,守卫伴侣与配偶关系未必是同一回事,作者们认为,两者有共同点,即都涉及在专心于当前伴侣和寻找新伴侣之间的权衡取舍。当然,尽管这项研究集中于男性的策略,女性在这一情景中也不是被动的——配偶结合需要两个人。 So, to put the wedding celebrations into their evolutionary context, perhaps it was the caring grandparents who led to the special relationship that we celebrated. A toast to the bride and groom … and one to their parents. 因此,把婚礼庆典放到进化论中来说,也许是因为那些曾经照看孙子的爷爷奶奶们,才造就了今天我们来庆祝的这种特殊关系吧。来吧,让我们为新娘和新郎干一杯……也为新人的父母干一杯。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]为何最大动物的精子最小

Why do the largest animals have the tiniest sperm? A brief investigation.
为什么全球最大动物的精子却是最小的?一份简要调查报告。

作者:Brian Resnick @ 2015-11-20
翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:Vox.com,http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2015/11/20/9768864/largest-animals-have-the-tiniest-sperm

Stefan Lüpold is a sperm guy. The Swiss evolutionary biologist did his masters work on sexual selection and bat genitalia, his PhD on the evolution of bird sperm, and a postdoctorate on how fruit fly sperm compete. “I’m fascinated by the almost unlimited diversity in both size and shape of sperm,” he writes me in an email from Zurich, describing his chosen sub-sub-discipline.

Stefan Lüpold 是个精子达人。这位瑞士进化生物学家硕士时研究的是性选择和蝙蝠的生殖器,博士时研究的是禽类精子的进化,博士后时则研究果蝇的精子如何竞争。“精子大小和形状近乎无穷的多样性让我着迷。”他从苏黎世给我发来电邮,讲述了他所选择的这一学科分支。

I’ve emailed him because he’s recently found evidence to answer a perplexing question: Why are sperm so weird?

我给他发邮件是因为他最近的发现能回答一个令人费解的问题:精子为什么这么诡异?

Mice, for instance, have sperm that’s twice as long as elephants’. The world’s longest spe(more...)

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Why do the largest animals have the tiniest sperm? A brief investigation. 为什么全球最大动物的精子却是最小的?一份简要调查报告。 作者:Brian Resnick @ 2015-11-20 翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:Vox.com,http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2015/11/20/9768864/largest-animals-have-the-tiniest-sperm Stefan Lüpold is a sperm guy. The Swiss evolutionary biologist did his masters work on sexual selection and bat genitalia, his PhD on the evolution of bird sperm, and a postdoctorate on how fruit fly sperm compete. "I’m fascinated by the almost unlimited diversity in both size and shape of sperm," he writes me in an email from Zurich, describing his chosen sub-sub-discipline. Stefan Lüpold 是个精子达人。这位瑞士进化生物学家硕士时研究的是性选择和蝙蝠的生殖器,博士时研究的是禽类精子的进化,博士后时则研究果蝇的精子如何竞争。“精子大小和形状近乎无穷的多样性让我着迷。”他从苏黎世给我发来电邮,讲述了他所选择的这一学科分支。 I've emailed him because he's recently found evidence to answer a perplexing question: Why are sperm so weird? 我给他发邮件是因为他最近的发现能回答一个令人费解的问题:精子为什么这么诡异? Mice, for instance, have sperm that's twice as long as elephants'. The world's longest sperm belongs to a fruit fly. And across the animal kingdom, sperm take on extremely odd and varied shapes and sizes. The "tadpole" shape we most associate with sperm is not at all common outside of mammals. Rat and mice sperm can have hook-like attachments on their heads. "In some species they seem to allow sperm to connect by their heads and form so-called sperm trains," Lüpold says. "These groups of sperm seem to swim faster than individual sperm." Fascinating! 举例来讲,老鼠精子的长度是大象精子的两倍。世界上最长的精子属于一种果蝇。纵观整个动物王国,精子的形状和大小极其古怪和多变。“蝌蚪”状这一我们最为熟悉的形状在哺乳动物以外根本不常见。老鼠精子的头部会有钩子形状的附属物。“一些物种的精子似乎可以通过头部连接在一起,形成所谓的精子列车。” Lüpold说,“这种精子群似乎比单个的精子游得更快。”多么神奇! From an evolutionary perspective this raises an intriguing question: Why are sperm so varied among different species when they all have the exact same purpose — fertilizing eggs? 从进化的角度看,这带来一个引人入胜的问题:所有的精子都有一个相同的目的——让卵子受精,但为什么不同物种的精子相差如此巨大?

Screen Shot 2015-11-19 at 5.54.26 PM[Four wildly different shapes of sperm, as illustrated in the text Sperm Competition and the Evolution of Animal Mating Systems (only 700 pages long!). A) Silverfish sperm, B) sponge sperm. C) molluscan sperm.,D) gyrinid beetle sperm.] 【四种截然不同的精子形状,来自《精子竞争和动物交配系统的进化》一书(也就700页而已啦!)A) 蠹虫的精子 B) 海绵的精子 C)软体动物的精子 D) 一种豉甲的精子】

Lüpold has a theory. Analyzing the sperm of 100 species of mammals, he and a co-author found a pattern amid the chaos: the larger the species, the smaller the sperm. The results were recently published in Proceedings B, a journal of the Royal Society of London. Lüpold有个理论。他和一位合著者分析了近百种哺乳动物的精子后,从这千头万绪中发现了一个规律:物种个体越大,精子越小。最近其成果已发表在伦敦皇家学会的《Proceedings B》杂志上。 Why would evolution favor such a pattern? Lüpold explains that longer sperm has some advantages — they are better at "elbowing" aside the competition. But it also takes a lot of energy to make long sperm, which larger animals can't afford. So it's a trade-off: 为什么进化倾向于这样一种规律?Lüpold 解释说,更长的精子具有某些优势——它们更能将竞争者“排挤”开;但是制造长精子会消耗大量能量,这是大型动物无法负担的,所以这是一种权衡取舍。
If there were no constraints on sperm production and assuming that longer sperm are advantageous, each male would probably produce lots of impressively big sperm. But in nature there are always constraints because resources and energy are not unlimited. For a testis of a given size, producing bigger sperm thus means it cannot produce as many of them (producing big sperm takes more resources, energy and time). 如果在精子生产方面没有限制,并且假设更长的精子确实更有优势,那么每个雄性也许会造出大量个头大得吓人的精子。但是自然界中总是存在种种限制,因为资源和能量不是无限的。对给定大小的睾丸来说,生产更大的精子意味着它生产的精子数量会减少(生产大精子会消耗更多资源、能量和时间)。 So, whether investing more in sperm size or in sperm number to maximize sperm competitiveness really depends on the circumstances, for example the size of the female reproductive tract. In large species, the female reproductive tract is massive compared to the tiny sperm, so sperm can easily be lost or diluted in it. Males have to compensate by transferring more sperm. Simply making longer sperm really wouldn’t make a difference in an elephant. They would have to be incredibly large. So males are better off making lots of tiny sperm. 所以,为了将精子的竞争力最大化,是在精子尺寸还是精子数量上“投资”取决于环境条件,比如雌性的生殖道。对大体型的物种来说,雌性的生殖道相较微小的精子来说太大了,所以精子很容易在其中迷失或被稀释掉。雄性只能通过投送更多的精子来弥补损失。简单通过制造更长的精子对大象来说于事无补,精子得大到离谱才行【编注:是指大到离谱才能产生阻挡其他精子的效果】。所以对雄性来讲,更好的策略是制造大量的小精子。
This inverse correlation between animal size and sperm size might be a consistent pattern across the animal kingdom. Almost all animals with sperm longer than a 10th of a millimeter, he explains, weigh less than one or two pounds. "Our results certainly suggest a unifying pattern that is likely to explain much of the diversity in mammalian sperm size and possibly beyond," he says, while noting more research is still needed. 动物的体型尺寸和精子尺寸之间这种负相关关系也许是动物王国里的普遍规律。几乎所有精子尺寸长于十分之一毫米的动物,体重都不超过一两磅。“我们的研究成果明确揭示了一个统一的模式,基本可以解释哺乳动物精子的多样性,也许还不止于此。”Lüpold说,然而他同时也表示还需要做更多的研究。 The mammal with the longest sperm? It's not the human. That distinction belongs to the honey possum, a very small (they grow to 3.5 inches long ) marsupial that lives in western Australia. They are adorable. Their sperm is 350 micrometers (.014 inches) long. 拥有最长精子的哺乳动物?不是人类。这一殊荣属于长吻袋貂,一种生活在澳大利亚西部的非常小(它们能长到八九厘米长)的有袋动物。它们很是可爱。它们的精子有0.356毫米长。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]音乐起源与人类进化

人类进化历程中的音乐
Music in Human Evolution

作者:Kevin Simler @ 2015-10-16
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:Melting Asphalt,http://www.meltingasphalt.com/music-in-human-evolution/

I just finished the strangest, most disconcerting little book. It’s called Why Do People Sing?: Music in Human Evolution by Joseph Jordania.

我刚刚读完了一本让人称奇,又极为令人不安的小书——Joseph Jordania的《为什么人们会唱歌?——人类进化历程中的音乐》。

If the title hasn’t already piqued your interest, its thesis surely will. The thesis is wild, bold, and original, but makes an eerie amount of sense. If true, it would be a revolution — and I don’t use the term lightly — in how we understand the evolution of music, cooperation, warfare, and even religion.

如果这个标题还不足以激起你的兴趣,那么书中的理论一定会让你兴味盎然。该书论点狂野大胆又富于原创,但却合乎情理到可怕的程度。如果成立,它将成为我们理解音乐,人类合作,战争甚至宗教之演化过程的一项革命性理论——我一般不轻易使用“革命性”这个词。

I have my reservations about Jordania’s theory (and his book), but I’ll save them for a later time. As Daniel Dennett once wrote about another remarkable theory:

对于Jordania的理论(以及这本书)我仍有一些保留意见,但我打算把它们留到以后再讨论。正如Daniel Dennett曾就另一项卓越理论所写道的:

I think first it is very important to understand [the] project, to see a little bit more about what the whole shape of it is, and delay the barrage of nitpicking objections and criticisms until we have seen what the edifice as a whole is. After all, on the face of it, [the project] is preposterous… [but] I take it very seriously.

我认为首要的任务是理解这项理论,多看看它的整体是什么样的,在我们完全看清整个理论大厦前,不要急着接二连三地提出那些挑剔的反对和批评。尽管该理论表面看来荒诞不经……但我会很认真地对待它。

These are exactly my feelings about Jordania’s project. Seemingly preposterous, but worth taking very seriously.

对于Jordania的工作,我的感觉也正是如此。它看似荒谬,却值得我们非常认真地对待。

0.STYLIZED FACTS
0.典型事实

I’m going to share Jordania’s theory with you, but first I want to present a set of “stylized facts” — curious, disparate, and nearly inexplicable phenomena that would seem to have little relation to each other. Then I’ll present the theory that (uncannily) links them all together and explains everything.

下面我将与你分享Jordania的理论,但首先,我想向你呈现一组“典型事实”——这是一组奇怪的,完全不同的,而且几乎无法解释的现象,互相之间看起来也没什么联系。之后,我会展示这项能够(以一种不可思议的方式)将它们联系在一起并且解释这一切现象的理论。

OK, brace yourself. Here come the facts:

打起精神,做好准备。让我们来看看这些“典型事实”:

  • When our ancestors [1] first moved from the forest to the savannah, we were not yet capable of making tools. But early hominid evolution tended away from a physiology that would have helped us hunt and/or defend ourselves from predators. Our canine teeth receded, we became slower and weaker, and we didn’t develop tough skin (in fact the opposite).
  • 当我们的祖先第一次从森林中迁徙到热带稀树草原时,人类还没有获得制造工具的能力。但从生理学上看,早期原始人类的进化却并不利于人们狩猎以及防御捕食者。人类的犬齿退化了,运动变得缓慢,身体也变得更弱,而且也没有进化出坚韧的皮肤(事实上恰恰相反)。
  • Lion evolution and migration seems to have mirrored early hominid patterns, both spatiotemporally and (in some ways) behaviorally and morphologically. Lions, for example, are the only social species of cat.
  • 狮子的进化以及迁徙模式看起来与早期人类恰好互为镜像,不论从时间和空间上,还是从(某些方面的)行为和形态上说都是如此。举个例子,狮子是唯一一种群居的猫科动物。
  • Humans are the only ground-dwelling species that sings. There are over 4000 singing species — mostly birds, but also gibbons, dolphins, whales, and seals. But they all sing from water or the trees. When a bird lands on the ground, it invariably stops singing.
  • 人类是唯一一种会唱歌的地栖动物。世界上有超过4000种会唱歌的物种——其中大多数都是鸟类,此外还包括长臂猿,海豚,鲸类和海豹。但是这些物种全都是在水中或者树上唱歌。不论哪种鸟类,一旦降落到陆地上,它都会停止歌唱。
  • Of all singing creatures, humans are the only ones who use rhythm.
  • 在所有会唱歌的生物中,人类是唯一会使用韵律的。
  • When we sing, we almost always dance, even if it’s just nodding along or tapping a foot. Both singing and dancing (whether together or separate) are group activities used across the world in tribal bonding rituals. Isolated ethnic groups have remarkably similar styles of song and dance.
  • 当我们唱歌时,我们几乎也总会跳起舞来,即使这种“舞蹈”也许仅仅是随着歌声点头,或者用脚打着节拍。歌唱和舞蹈(不论是同时或是分开进行的)是在世界各地的部落情感强化仪式中广泛使用的集体活动。相互孤立的族群常有着非常相似的歌曲和舞蹈风格。
  • Rhythmic chanting and dancing induce trance states.
  • 有节律的吟唱和舞蹈会诱导人进入恍惚状态。
  • Early hominids quite possibly ate their dead, and (some while later) definitely started burying them. The instinct to preserve a dead human body from mutilation, and then to dispose of it, is fairly universal. E.g. we strive to retrieve corpses even from a battlefield.
  • 早期的原始人很有可能食用同类尸体,但(在晚些时候)肯定开始埋葬尸体了。保护尸体不被损毁,将尸体妥善处置,是一种相当普遍的人类本能。一个典型的例证是,人们即使在战场上也会努力将同伴的尸体取回。

I hope you are intrigued. Each of these facts is hard to explain even in isolation. So a theory that can unify and account for all of them will have to be either profound or crazy — or both.

我希望上述事实激发了你的好奇心。这些事实中的每一条即使是孤立地来看也很难解释。一个能对这些事实做出统一解释的理论要么很深刻,要么很疯狂——也许二者兼有。

At this point I’m going to present Jordania’s theory as clearly and comprehensively as I can. I’ll interpolate a bit and add my own explanatory flare, but the ideas come straight out of his book.

接下来我将尽可能清晰而全面地展示Jordania的理论。我会不时插入一些自己的解释性看法,但其中的观点则直接来自于他的著作。

(more...)

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人类进化历程中的音乐 Music in Human Evolution 作者:Kevin Simler @ 2015-10-16 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:Melting Asphalt,http://www.meltingasphalt.com/music-in-human-evolution/ I just finished the strangest, most disconcerting little book. It's called Why Do People Sing?: Music in Human Evolution by Joseph Jordania. 我刚刚读完了一本让人称奇,又极为令人不安的小书——Joseph Jordania的《为什么人们会唱歌?——人类进化历程中的音乐》。 If the title hasn't already piqued your interest, its thesis surely will. The thesis is wild, bold, and original, but makes an eerie amount of sense. If true, it would be a revolution — and I don't use the term lightly — in how we understand the evolution of music, cooperation, warfare, and even religion. 如果这个标题还不足以激起你的兴趣,那么书中的理论一定会让你兴味盎然。该书论点狂野大胆又富于原创,但却合乎情理到可怕的程度。如果成立,它将成为我们理解音乐,人类合作,战争甚至宗教之演化过程的一项革命性理论——我一般不轻易使用“革命性”这个词。 I have my reservations about Jordania's theory (and his book), but I'll save them for a later time. As Daniel Dennett once wrote about another remarkable theory: 对于Jordania的理论(以及这本书)我仍有一些保留意见,但我打算把它们留到以后再讨论。正如Daniel Dennett曾就另一项卓越理论所写道的:
I think first it is very important to understand [the] project, to see a little bit more about what the whole shape of it is, and delay the barrage of nitpicking objections and criticisms until we have seen what the edifice as a whole is. After all, on the face of it, [the project] is preposterous... [but] I take it very seriously. 我认为首要的任务是理解这项理论,多看看它的整体是什么样的,在我们完全看清整个理论大厦前,不要急着接二连三地提出那些挑剔的反对和批评。尽管该理论表面看来荒诞不经……但我会很认真地对待它。
These are exactly my feelings about Jordania's project. Seemingly preposterous, but worth taking very seriously. 对于Jordania的工作,我的感觉也正是如此。它看似荒谬,却值得我们非常认真地对待。 0.STYLIZED FACTS 0.典型事实 I'm going to share Jordania's theory with you, but first I want to present a set of "stylized facts" — curious, disparate, and nearly inexplicable phenomena that would seem to have little relation to each other. Then I'll present the theory that (uncannily) links them all together and explains everything. 下面我将与你分享Jordania的理论,但首先,我想向你呈现一组“典型事实”——这是一组奇怪的,完全不同的,而且几乎无法解释的现象,互相之间看起来也没什么联系。之后,我会展示这项能够(以一种不可思议的方式)将它们联系在一起并且解释这一切现象的理论。 OK, brace yourself. Here come the facts: 打起精神,做好准备。让我们来看看这些“典型事实”:
  • When our ancestors [1] first moved from the forest to the savannah, we were not yet capable of making tools. But early hominid evolution tended away from a physiology that would have helped us hunt and/or defend ourselves from predators. Our canine teeth receded, we became slower and weaker, and we didn't develop tough skin (in fact the opposite).
  • 当我们的祖先第一次从森林中迁徙到热带稀树草原时,人类还没有获得制造工具的能力。但从生理学上看,早期原始人类的进化却并不利于人们狩猎以及防御捕食者。人类的犬齿退化了,运动变得缓慢,身体也变得更弱,而且也没有进化出坚韧的皮肤(事实上恰恰相反)。
  • Lion evolution and migration seems to have mirrored early hominid patterns, both spatiotemporally and (in some ways) behaviorally and morphologically. Lions, for example, are the only social species of cat.
  • 狮子的进化以及迁徙模式看起来与早期人类恰好互为镜像,不论从时间和空间上,还是从(某些方面的)行为和形态上说都是如此。举个例子,狮子是唯一一种群居的猫科动物。
  • Humans are the only ground-dwelling species that sings. There are over 4000 singing species — mostly birds, but also gibbons, dolphins, whales, and seals. But they all sing from water or the trees. When a bird lands on the ground, it invariably stops singing.
  • 人类是唯一一种会唱歌的地栖动物。世界上有超过4000种会唱歌的物种——其中大多数都是鸟类,此外还包括长臂猿,海豚,鲸类和海豹。但是这些物种全都是在水中或者树上唱歌。不论哪种鸟类,一旦降落到陆地上,它都会停止歌唱。
  • Of all singing creatures, humans are the only ones who use rhythm.
  • 在所有会唱歌的生物中,人类是唯一会使用韵律的。
  • When we sing, we almost always dance, even if it's just nodding along or tapping a foot. Both singing and dancing (whether together or separate) are group activities used across the world in tribal bonding rituals. Isolated ethnic groups have remarkably similar styles of song and dance.
  • 当我们唱歌时,我们几乎也总会跳起舞来,即使这种“舞蹈”也许仅仅是随着歌声点头,或者用脚打着节拍。歌唱和舞蹈(不论是同时或是分开进行的)是在世界各地的部落情感强化仪式中广泛使用的集体活动。相互孤立的族群常有着非常相似的歌曲和舞蹈风格。
  • Rhythmic chanting and dancing induce trance states.
  • 有节律的吟唱和舞蹈会诱导人进入恍惚状态。
  • Early hominids quite possibly ate their dead, and (some while later) definitely started burying them. The instinct to preserve a dead human body from mutilation, and then to dispose of it, is fairly universal. E.g. we strive to retrieve corpses even from a battlefield.
  • 早期的原始人很有可能食用同类尸体,但(在晚些时候)肯定开始埋葬尸体了。保护尸体不被损毁,将尸体妥善处置,是一种相当普遍的人类本能。一个典型的例证是,人们即使在战场上也会努力将同伴的尸体取回。
I hope you are intrigued. Each of these facts is hard to explain even in isolation. So a theory that can unify and account for all of them will have to be either profound or crazy — or both. 我希望上述事实激发了你的好奇心。这些事实中的每一条即使是孤立地来看也很难解释。一个能对这些事实做出统一解释的理论要么很深刻,要么很疯狂——也许二者兼有。 At this point I'm going to present Jordania's theory as clearly and comprehensively as I can. I'll interpolate a bit and add my own explanatory flare, but the ideas come straight out of his book. 接下来我将尽可能清晰而全面地展示Jordania的理论。我会不时插入一些自己的解释性看法,但其中的观点则直接来自于他的著作。 1.HUNTERS OR SCAVENGERS? 1.猎人还是腐食者? When human ancestors first descended from the trees and stepped out onto the grasslands, they faced two critical problems: acquiring food and defending themselves from predators. We'll discuss food acquisition in this section and defense in the next section, but as you'll see they're linked by a similar mechanism. 当人类祖先第一次从树上下来走进草原时,他们面临着两个至关重要的问题:获取食物以及防御捕食者的捕杀。我们会这一节里讨论食物的获取,之后在下一节里讨论防御问题。但正如你将看到的,这两个问题实际上是由一种类似的机制联系在一起的。 I hadn't thought deeply about these problems until I read Jordania's book. I always imagined, naively, that early humans had been "hunter-gatherers." While this is true of later humans, it's almost certainly not true of our earliest savannah-dwelling ancestors. Gathering? yes. But hunting, especially big-game hunting, was out of the question. As I mentioned, our earliest ancestors hadn't yet learned how to make or use tools beyond simple rocks and sticks, and we were fairly weak. 在读到Jordania的书之前,我从来没有深入地思考过这些问题。我总是天真地设想,早期人类是“狩猎-采集者”。虽然之后的人类的确如此,但对于最早生活在热带稀树草原上的人类祖先而言,这几乎是不可能的。他们会采集食物吗?是的。但是狩猎,尤其是大规模的群体狩猎,则是完全不现实的。我之前提到过,除了简单的石块和树枝以外,我们最早的祖先还没有学会如何制造和使用工具,而且人类的身体也相当弱。 Yet we certainly ate meat — the archaeological record is pretty clear on that. So there's a growing consensus that we were actually scavengers (or perhaps "scavenger-gatherers"). 但是当时的人类显然是吃肉的——在这方面有相当清楚的考古学证据。所以现在学术界有了一种越来越强的共识,认为早期人类实际上是食腐者(或者也可称为“食腐-采集者”)。 Now there are two types of scavenging, two strategies for "carcass acquisition": passive and confrontational. Passive scavenging occurs when the scavenger comes across an undefended carcass. If the carcass was the result of a natural (non-predatory) death, there will be plenty to eat, assuming the scavenger finds it before putrefaction sets in (about 48 hours). 食腐行为可以分为两类,分别对应着两种不同的获取尸体方式:被动式获取和对抗式获取。当食腐者发现一具无守卫的尸体时,我们称之为被动式食腐。如果尸体是自然死亡(而非被捕食)的结果,就会有大量可供食用的肉,前提是食腐者能在尸体腐烂之前找到它(这个时间窗口约为48小时)。 But even if the carcass was killed and eaten by a predator, there's going to be some meat left on the bone. And, just as important, inside the bone. Marrow was an excellent source of calories for our early ancestors, and we were in a unique position to access it, since we could use rocks as primitive tools to break the bones open. 但即使尸体被某个掠食者杀死并吃掉,骨头上也会剩下一些肉。而且同样重要的是,在骨头里面也有可供食用的东西。对于我们早期祖先而言,骨髓是一种优质的能量来源,而且人类在获取骨髓方面处于独特的优势地位,因为人类可以将石头作为一种原始工具将骨头砸开。 The archeological record shows bones that were repeatedly smashed with "hammering stones," as well as bones that had scrape-marks, indicating that we also used sharp stones to carve off some of the clingier meat. 考古学记录显示,有些骨头被反复地用“锤石”敲碎,而有些骨头上则有刮擦的痕迹,这表明人类同样会使用锋利的石头以切下一些粘在骨头上的肉。 Now, confrontational scavenging is where it gets interesting — and also more circumstantial. Confrontational scavenging, also known as power or aggressive scavenging, happens when an animal (or group of animals) comes across a carcass that's in the process of being eaten, whether by the original predator or another scavenger. In this case, a confrontation ensues, and to the victor go the spoils. 相对来说,对抗式的食腐行为则更有趣,虽然支持证据也更为间接。对抗式食腐也被称为力量式或侵略式食腐,它通常是指当一只(或一群)动物遭遇了一具正在被其他动物(可能是最初的捕食者,也可能是其它食腐者)食用的尸体。在这种情况下,对抗随之而来,而胜者则将获得战利品。 Whether our ancestors practiced confrontational scavenging is hard to determine, given the evidence available to us at this point, but it's not a crazy idea. It happens all the time in the (non-human) animal kingdom, as when a pack of hyenas scares a lion away from its kill. 通过当前所能获得的证据,我们很难确定人类祖先是否有过对抗式食腐行为,但这并不是一个疯狂的想法。在动物王国(不包括人类)中,对抗式的食腐行为时刻都在发生,例如一群鬣狗会将一头狮子从它杀死的猎物身边吓走。 2.DEFENSE FROM PREDATORS 2.防御捕食者的捕杀 Along with finding food, defense from predators is crucial to the survival of any species, and ours presents a puzzle. 除了寻找食物之外,防御捕食者的捕杀对于任何物种的生存而言都至关重要,而我们祖先在这方面则给我们留下了一个谜题。 We definitely had predators — lions, principally, but also other big cats (jaguars, leopards), as well as hyenas and maybe crocodiles. (Or more accurately, the ancestors of those species, since they've been evolving just as we have. Hyena-ancestors, for example, were much larger than their modern descendants.) 很明显,有些动物会捕杀人类——主要是狮子,但也包括其它的大型猫科动物(美洲虎,豹子等),此外,鬣狗,可能还有鳄鱼,也会将人类当作捕猎对象。(更准确地说,是这些动物的祖先,因为和人类一样,这些物种也一直在进化。举例来说,鬣狗的祖先就比它们生活在今天的后代要大得多。) Physically, early humans were quite weak — and getting weaker with each generation. As I mentioned earlier, our canines were receding and our skin was growing softer. And we were getting bigger, it's true, but not stronger. Our size developed in service of bipedalism, which made us both weaker and slower(!). 从身体上说,早期人类是很弱的——而且还在一代代地变得更弱。正如我之前所提到的,人类的犬齿在退化,而且皮肤也变得更加柔软。人类的体型在变得更大,这是事实,但并没有变得更强壮。人类的体型是为了适应两足行走而变得更大,但这却让人类的身体变得更弱,也变得更慢。 A chimpanzee, for instance, is roughly twice as strong as a modern human, and can run just as fast if not faster. In the general case, bipedalism results in slower sprinting speeds, even if it increases efficiency (allowing us to walk/run for longer stretches). 例如,黑猩猩身体的强壮程度大约是现代人的两倍,而且并不比人类跑得慢。总体上说,两足行走降低了人类短距离奔跑的速度,即使它的确提升了效率(这让我们能够行走/奔跑更长的距离)。 Across the animal kingdom there are various strategies for evading or defending against predators, known in the literature as antipredator adaptations. Each adaptation defends against one of the four stages of predation: detection, attack, capture, and consumption. 在整个动物王国中,存在许多不同的躲避或防御捕食者捕杀的策略,这些策略在文献中被称为反捕食者适应性。每一种适应性都是为了防御猎食过程中的四个阶段之一:侦查、攻击、捕捉和摄食。 To evade detection, for example, most species pursue a strategy of crypsis, aka hiding. To evade capture, species rely on speed, burrowing, climbing into trees, etc. And to evade consumption, species develop physical defenses like claws, fangs, horns, shells (or at least a tough hide), venom, etc. 例如,为了躲避捕食者的侦查,多数物种都会采用一种保护色策略,或者叫隐藏策略。而不同的物种会依靠速度、挖洞、爬树等不同方式来躲避捕食者的捕捉。为了逃避捕食者的摄食,各物种进化出了多种身体上的防御机制,例如利爪、尖牙、长角、贝壳(或至少是一个坚硬的藏身之所)、毒液等等。 But early humans weren't doing any of these things. Physiologically, we weren't getting stronger or faster, or developing sharper claws or teeth or tougher skin. Nor were we trying to hide. Habitual bipedalism has its benefits, but going unnoticed in the grass certainly isn't one of them. 但是早期人类却没有做到以上的任何一件事情。生理上,人类没有变得更强壮或更快速,也没有进化出尖利的爪牙或强韧的皮肤。人类也没有试图将自己隐藏起来。习惯于两足行走当然有它的好处,但是这却让人类无法在草丛里行走时不被发现。 In fact, we seem to have evolved to become more noticeable, more conspicuous. We grew taller, we sang and made noise (the only animal who sings from the ground), we painted our bodies, and we developed strong body odor. [2] 事实上,人类似乎进化得更加容易引起注意了。人类变得更高,唱歌并且发出噪音(人类是唯一一种会在地上唱歌的动物),在身体上绘上色彩,并且进化出了浓重的体味。[2] The strategy of being conspicuous is known as aposematism: apo (away from) + sematism (signalling) = counter-signalling. Aposematism is an antipredator adaptation which prevents an attack from happening in the first place, by making it easier for the predator to recognize you as unprofitable. 这种故意引起注意的策略通常被称作“警示信号”(aposematism):这个词的词根apo-意为“远离”,-sematism则意为“信号”,合起来的意思就是“反向信号”。“警示信号”是一种能从根源上防止捕食者发动攻击的反捕食者适应性策略,它让捕食者很容易地意识到将你作为捕食对象是一件无利可图的事情。 Species who counter-signal (aposematically) abound in nature, but they all have something up their sleeves, so to speak. Being conspicuous is a viable strategy only when you're advertising an otherwise invisible weapon. Consider the following aposematic species from across the animal kingdom: 自然世界中有许多采取这类(有警示作用的)“反向信号”策略的物种,但是可以说所有这些物种都有自己的杀手锏。只有当你的行为实际上是为了突出某种看不见的武器时,故意引起注意才是一个有效的策略。让我们来看看动物王国中的这些采用“警示信号”策略的物种: Each of these species has a powerful defensive weapon — often some kind of venom/poison, but also noxious odors. And most species advertise this with distinctive coloration (bright and high-contrast), but some use other signals. Rattlesnakes and bees use sound, for example, and many species, including zorillas, 'mark their territory' using scents. [3] 所有的这些物种都拥有各自强大的防御武器——通常是某种毒液或毒物,也有一些是有毒气体。而其中大多数物种都会通过独特的颜色(艳丽而对比度鲜明的)来给自己的武器打广告,但有些物种也会通过其它信号来达到这个目的。例如,响尾蛇和蜜蜂使用声音,而包括非洲臭鼬在内的许多物种则通过气味来“标识”自己的领地。 Aposematism (being conspicuous) doesn't help an organism in a single encounter with a predator; in fact it's a liability. But it helps with repeated encounters. When a predator gets sprayed by a skunk or stung by a bee, it quickly learns to avoid future encounters with all members of the species. 这种(故意引起注意的)“警示信号”策略无法孤立地在一次与捕食者的遭遇中帮助某一个体逃出生天;事实上,这反而是一种拖累。但是一旦与捕食者的遭遇频繁地重复发生,这种策略就能发挥作用。当某个捕食者被臭鼬放出的气体熏到或是被蜂刺蜇过之后,它会迅速地学会在以后尽量避免去碰这些不好惹的物种。 All of this raises a most important question: how did early humans manage to get away with aposematism? What defensive weapons did we have up our sleeves? 所有这些都引出了一个最为重要的问题:早期人类是如何做到通过“警示信号”让捕食者远离自己的?他们到底有什么能够用于防身的“杀手锏”? The answer probably won't surprise you: we used stones. It's how we used them (section 4) that's so unusual. 答案大概不会让你感到吃惊:人类会使用石器。但不寻常的地方则在于人类使用石器的方式(我们会在第4节讨论这个话题)。 3.STONES 3.石器 Stones were the most fundamental weapon at our disposal — the only means we had of causing actual physical damage to another animal. 石器是人类能够支配的最基础的武器——也是人类唯一能够对其它动物造成物理伤害的方式。 When we first started living on the savannah, we hadn't yet developed the hand/eye coordination necessary to hunt with stones (or to make and use other tools for that purpose). But self-defense is a much simpler proposition, for a number of reasons. 当人类最初开始在稀树草原上生活时,我们祖先还没有进化出使用石器捕猎所必需的手眼协调能力(或者制造和使用其它工具以进行捕猎的能力)。但由于以下的一些原因,使用石器自卫则是一个简单得多的命题。 First, using stones to hunt requires a lot of force and a lot of dexterity. You need to hit a target that's moving away from you at high speed, and gravity is not on your side. But defense is different. Defense happens up close. It's much easier to bash a lion with a large rock when the lion is coming toward you. And bringing the rock down allows gravity to work for you rather than against you. 首先,使用石器捕猎要求很大的力量以及很高的敏捷度。你需要能够准确地打中一个快速离你而去的目标,而且重力也并不站在你这一边。但自我防御则完全不同。通常防御都发生在很近的距离内。当一头狮子向你跑来时,用一块大石头砸中它会变得容易很多。而且将石头从上往下砸的动作也能够让重力助你一臂之力,而不是相反。 Moreover, attack and defense are fundamentally asymmetrical. Like in a lawsuit, where the prosecution assumes the burden of proof, in a hunt the predator assumes the burden of actually killing its prey. But to succeed at defense, you don't need to kill your would-be predator — you only need to injure it. If a lion or other competitor gets injured while attacking a human, it will flee the scene, opting to lose a meal rather than risk its life by continuing to fight. 除此之外,进攻和防御从根本上说也是两种完全不对称的行为。就像在一场诉讼中,举证的责任是由原告承担的,在一场捕猎中,杀死猎物的重担完全落在了捕食者的肩上。但是要在防御中获胜,你并不需要杀死潜在的捕猎者——你只需要弄伤它就行了。如果一头狮子或者其它捕食者在攻击人的时候受到伤害,它通常会逃离现场,相比于冒着生命危险继续搏斗下去,捕食者显然更愿意选择少吃这一顿。 And finally, defense was easier for early humans because we helped each other. In most of these circumstances (while being attacked and during confrontational scavenging raids), we had group members by our sides, ready to throw their own stones if others in the group became incapacitated. 最后,对于早期人类而言,防御捕食者之所以变得更容易,还因为人类会互相帮助。在绝大多数情况下(当遇到捕食者的攻击,以及在对抗式食腐的遭遇战中),人类拥有众多一起战斗的同伴,如果同伴中有人丧失了行动能力,他们时刻都准备着掷出手中的石头以帮助他。 Cooperation was indeed our biggest advantage, and our early ancestors refined it, quite literally, to a high art. 事实上,协作才是人类所拥有的最大优势,而我们的祖先则将这个优势发扬光大,毫不夸张地说,他们将协作上升到了艺术的高度。 4.AUDIO-VISUAL INTIMIDATION DISPLAY 4.恐吓性视听展示 Here, finally, is the crux of Jordania's thesis. His claim is that early humans developed a unique defense he calls the Audio-Visual Intimidation Display: 到这里,我们终于触及了Jordania理论中最关键的部分。他的观点是,早期人类发展出了一种被他称作“恐吓性视听展示”的独特防御机制。
My suggestion is that our ancestors turned loud singing into a central element of their defence system against predators. They started using loud, rhythmic singing and shouting accompanied by vigorous, threatening body movements and object throwing to defend themselves from predators. [4] 我对此的看法是,人类祖先将大声歌唱的行为转化为了对抗捕食者的防御机制中的一个核心要素。他们使用大声而富有节律的歌唱和叫喊,伴以有力而富有威胁性的身体动作以及向对方投掷各种物品来防御捕食者的进攻。
Before we go any further, I'd like you to see the AVID in action. Amazingly, some 'primitive' ethnic groups have maintained an AVID-like tradition into modern times. The kailao war dance of the Wallisian people and the Samoan cibi are two examples, but the best-documented tradition is the haka of the New Zealand Māori. 在我们更进一步之前,我希望你能够看看“恐吓性视听展示”(AVID)这种行为是什么样子的。令人惊讶的是,一些“原始的”人类族群将此类传统保留到了现代。瓦利斯群岛原住民的kailao战舞和萨摩亚人的cibi战舞是其中的两个例子,而被记载得最全面的此类传统则是新西兰毛利人的haka战舞。 Wikipedia describes the haka as 维基百科对haka战舞的描述如下:
a traditional ancestral war cry, dance or challenge from the Māori people of New Zealand. It is a posture dance performed by a group, with vigorous movements and stamping of the feet with rhythmically shouted accompaniment.... 新西兰毛利人的一种继承自祖先的传统战争呼喊、舞蹈或挑战形式。这是一种由群体表演的姿势性舞蹈,伴之以有力的动作和脚步的冲踏以及有节奏的大声喊叫... Various actions are employed in the course of a performance, including facial contortions such as showing the whites of the eyes and the poking out of the tongue, and a wide variety of vigorous body actions such as slapping the hands against the body and stamping of the feet. As well as chanted words, a variety of cries and grunts are used. 整个表演过程中包含了多种行为,包括面部表情的扭曲——例如翻出眼白和伸出舌头,以及一系列有力的身体动作——例如用手掌拍击身体和脚步的冲踏。还有高声喊出的话语,一系列的呼喊和低沉的咕哝声都被用于其中。
For a demonstration we now turn to YouTube. Here's a video of a haka by the New Zealand army, showing just how visually and auditorily intimidating it could be: 现在让我们上YouTube来看看haka战舞的演示。下面是一段新西兰军队表演的haka战舞,这段视频充分显示了这种战舞在视觉和听觉上具有多么强的恐吓力量: https://youtu.be/-rDoV0EBu44 And here's a more traditional version: 下面这段视频则记录了一段更传统的haka战舞: https://youtu.be/BI851yJUQQw The point of the AVID (of which the haka is the best-known example) is: “恐吓性视听展示”(haka战舞是其中最富盛名的例子)的意义在于:
  • To intimidate competitors with loud sounds. Shouting in unison is clearly the best way to do this, because the result is far louder than any sound an individual human can make. But clapping, slapping, stomping, and banging rocks together would have added nicely to the cacophony.
  • 用响亮的声音来恐吓对手。同时发出喊声显然是最好的办法,因为这种喊声比单独的一个人所能发出的声音要响亮得多。而同时伴以击掌,拍击身体,跺脚以及敲击石头这些动作则能够恰如其分地为这种刺耳的声音添油加醋。
  • To intimidate competitors visually. The synchronized movements, body paint, and bizarre gestures (including facial expressions) would confuse and intimidate even the fiercest competitors.
  • 在视觉上恐吓对手。这些同步的动作,身体上的绘画,以及奇怪的姿势(包括面部的奇怪表情)能够迷惑和恐吓甚至是那些最强悍的对手。
  • To project the image of a single, powerful organism. As Jordania puts it, "rhythmically well-organized group vocalizations [and movements] send a strong message to the predator about the unity and determination of the group." Although the group is composed of individual humans, during an AVID the group acts as if it were a single, multiheaded, many-armed creature. In some ways it's a fiction, but as far as the competitor is concerned, if the movements and actions are sufficiently coordinated, the group becomes a unitary beast for all intents and purposes.
  • 为了呈现一个强大的单一有机体的形象。如同Jordania所说,“富有节奏的有序的集体发声(和动作)向捕食者传递着关于这个群体的团结和决心的强烈信息。”尽管群体是由单独的个人组成的,在“恐吓性视听展示”的过程中,这样一个群体所表现出的行为就好像它是一个有着多个脑袋和无数只手的单一生物个体。从某种角度看来,这是一种欺骗行为,但是对于这个群体的对手来说,如果这种动作和行为足够地协调,这个群体实际上就成为了一只整一的怪兽。
Remember, the AVID would have been used for confrontational scavenging as well as defense against predators — and would have included rocks as physical weapons to fall back on when the intimidation display wasn't perfectly effective as a non-contact defense. 记住,“恐吓性视听展示”除了会在防御捕食者的攻击时使用之外,也同样适用于对抗性食腐的场景——而这种恐吓性的展示行为毕竟只是一种非接触的防御行为,一旦它不能完美地发挥作用,人们还需要求助于石头这样的物理性武器。 5.BATTLE TRANCE 5.“战斗恍惚”状态 Jordania also suggests that humans evolved a specific state of consciousness — the battle trance — to go along with the Audio-Visual Intimidation Display. This state has several characteristics: Jordania还认为,伴随着“恐吓性视听展示”行为,人类进化出了一种被称为“战斗恍惚”的特殊意识状态。这种状态有如下的几个特征:
  • Analgesia and aphobia — no pain and no fear.
  • 痛感缺失和恐惧缺失——感受不到疼痛和恐惧。
  • Neglect of individual survival instincts.
  • 忽视了个体的生存本能。
  • Loss of individual identity and acquisition of a collective identity.
  • 失去个人身份意识并获得集体的身份意识。
Central to the battle trance is the notion of collective or group identity: “战斗恍惚”状态的核心是集体(或群体)认同的概念:
Like in a well-established combat unit, where in the heat of the battle one can sacrifice his own life to save a friend's life, human ancestors developed the feel of group identity. The feel of group identity is based on the total trust and dedication of each member of the group to the common interest. 在一个稳固的作战单位中,当战斗进行得如火如荼时,一个战士可以为了拯救伙伴的生命牺牲自己。同样的,人类祖先也进化出了一种类似的集体认同感。集体认同感建立在对集体中所有成员的完全信任和对于集体共同利益的奉献精神之上。 Group identity kicks in when there is a critical situation, a mortal danger for survival of the group or any of its members. In such moments, the noble principle of 'One for all, all for one' rules any individual self-preserving instinct, fear and pain. 在某个生死攸关的时刻,当整个集体或其中某个成员的生存处于危险之中,集体身份意识就会发挥作用。在这样的时刻,“我为人人,人人为我”这种高尚的原则会超越任何个体的自我保护本能、恐惧和疼痛,主导集体成员的行为。
This state of consciousness may have originally evolved for parents (especially mothers) to defend their children when threatened, but it was repurposed for group defense and confrontational scavenging. And in the process, we developed a new trigger for it: rhythmic chanting and synchronized body movements. 这种意识状态可能最初是从父母(尤其是母亲)在受到威胁时保护孩子的本能中进化出来的,但之后被用于集体防御和对抗性食腐行为中。而在这个过程中,人类发展出了一种新的触发这种状态的机制:有节奏的吟唱和同步化的肢体动作。
Evolution supplied powerful neurological mechanisms to make this feeling a positive experience. Going into group identity brings the most exhilarating feelings to every member of the group. Every member of the group feels bigger, feel stronger, and virtually feels immortal.... Group members in such an altered state of mind, when they share total trust with each other, emotionally believe that the group cannot be defeated. 进化为将这种感觉变成一种积极的体验提供了强大的神经机制。进入集体身份意识状态为集体中的所有成员带来了一种最为振奋的感觉。集体中的所有人都感觉到自己变得更大,更强,并且几乎感觉到自己是不朽的……在这意识状态中,集体成员分享着对彼此的完全信任,他们会在感情上相信这个集体是不可战胜的。 This unique altered state of mind is supported (and most likely caused) by the powerful neurological substances such as endorphins and oxytocin, which are momentarily released in the brain when a critical survival situations arises. As the neurological substances are released into the brain, feelings of pain and fear are blocked, and total trust and exhilaration of being part of a supernaturally strong unit becomes overwhelming. 这种特别的意识状态是由诸如脑内啡(endorphin)和催产素(oxytocin)这类强大的神经物质所支持的(而且非常可能是由它们引发的),当某种生死攸关的状况出现时,大脑中会暂时释放出这些物质。一旦它们被释放到大脑中,疼痛和恐惧的感觉就被阻断了,而成为某个超自然的强大整体的一部分所带来的完全信任和振奋感则变得不可阻挡。
Actual combat isn't as central to our lives in the 21st century, but the battle trance and feelings of collective identity still echo in many of our modern rituals of solidarity, which I wrote about last year, and they're particularly pronounced in religion/politics and team/spectator sports. 真实的战斗在我们21世纪的生活中已经变得不那么重要了,但正如我在去年曾写道过的,在许多现代的团体性仪式中,我们仍然可以找到“战斗恍惚”和集体身份意识状态的影子。在宗教性/政治性活动以及集体性/观赏性体育项目中,它们表现得尤其明显。 6.CANNIBALISM (AND BURIAL) OF THE DEAD 6.吃掉(并埋葬)同类的尸体 As if Jordania's theory didn't cover enough ground already, he has one last surprise in store for us. He claims that early humans practiced cannibalism of their dead as a key part of their comprehensive antipredator strategy. 即使到了这里,Jordania的理论似乎仍然意犹未尽,他还为我们准备了最后一个惊喜。他声称,早期人类吃掉自己同类尸体这种行为实际上是他们整体的防御捕食者捕杀策略中非常重要的一环。 If you recall from section 2, the goal of aposematism is to advertise that, as a piece of prey, you are decidedly unprofitable for the predator. If a predator can easily recognize you (and other members of your species), and remembers getting burned during past encounters, it will quickly learn to stop attacking you in the first place. 回想一下我们在第2节里所提到的,“警示信号”这种策略的目的是让捕食者确认将你作为食物是一件无利可图的事情。如果捕食者能够轻易地认出你(以及你同类的其它成员),并且记起在之前的教训,它就会迅速意识到从一开始就不应该向你发起攻击。 Given this strategy, it's very important not to let the lions (or any other predator) get away with killing and eating a human. The more our ancestors were able to reinforce the message that humans are not a (good) meal, the safer they would be across repeated encounters. This was especially important for early humans because, unlike an actually poisonous species, human meat is worth eating, if a predator can get away with it. 在这种策略之下,不要让狮子(或者其它的任何捕食者)成功地杀死并吃掉人类就变得非常重要。人类祖先们越是能够强化“人类不是好食物”这条信息,在与捕食者们不断的重复相遇中他们就会越安全。对于早期人类来说这一点尤其重要,因为人并不是一种有毒性的物种,如果捕食者能够成功地捕杀人类,人肉其实是很有食用价值的。 This implies a heavy selection pressure for the following behaviors among our ancestors: 这就意味着,自然选择在引导人类祖先做出如下一些行为方面施加了很重的压力:
  • If a predator attacks during a confrontation, make sure it gets injured.
  • 如果捕食者在对抗中发动了攻击,必须保证将它弄伤。
  • If a predator manages to kill one of your fellow humans, don't let it eat. Retrieve the body of your fallen comrade or your whole tribe will be in danger.
  • 如果捕食者成功地杀死了你的同类,不要让它吃掉尸体。将你死去同伴的尸体弄回来,否则你的整个部落都将处于危险之中。
  • When a human dies naturally, make sure the corpse is properly disposed of. The corpse is a liability because a predator will associate even a scavenged meal (of human meat) with 'profitability'.
  • 当一个人自然死亡,必须保证尸体被以一种适当的方式处理掉。人类尸体实际上会成为一种负担,因为即使是一顿腐肉(人肉)大餐也会让捕食者认为吃人肉是有利可图的。
None of this implies that our ancestors had to practice cannibalism of their dead. Any means of keeping human meat out of the mouths of predators would have been effective. But there's some evidence that suggests cannibalism (stone scrapings on human bones similar to the scrapings on the bones of other animals), and if calories were hard to come by, it might have been an ecological necessity. 上面的任何一点都不意味着人类的祖先必须吃掉同类的尸体。任何一种不让人肉落入捕食者口中的方法都是有效的。但是一些证据表明人类的确会吃掉同类的尸体(人骨上和其它动物的骨头上都有类似的的石器划痕),而且如果能量并不是那么容易获取,吃掉同类尸体可能也是一种生态上的必要做法。 CONCLUSION 结论 There's so much more to say about this theory, but I'll save most of it for another time. 关于Jordania的这个理论,可说的还有很多,但我会把它们留到以后。 I'd just like to end by showing how some our beliefs and behaviors take on new significance in light of Jordania's theory, especially those that relate to how we handle the bodies of our dead. 我只是希望通过展示Jordania的理论能够如何为人类的一些信仰和行为赋予新的意义来结束这篇文章,特别是那些与我们处理同类尸体的方式相关的部分。 Funerary traditions vary widely around the world, but all have one thing in common: disposal of the body. Mechanisms include burial, entombment, mummification, burial at sea, sky burial [5], and ritual cannibalism, and even more exotic mechanisms like hanging coffins or tree burial. 世界各地的葬礼传统差异非常大,但是所有这些传统都有一个共同的特征:将尸体处理掉。处理尸体的机制包括土葬、墓葬、干尸化、海葬、天葬以及食人仪式,甚至还存在一些更加奇异的机制,例如悬棺葬和树葬等。 The common reasons given for disposal practices are all public-health-related, but intentional burial is at least 225,000 years old. Of course our ancestors wouldn't want a corpse rotting in their camp, but there's quite a leap from disposal to burial. Why not just drag the corpse away from camp and expose it to the elements? 通常人们对于这些处理尸体方式的解释都与公共卫生相关,但是人类从至少22.5万年前就开始有意识地埋葬尸体了。我们的祖先们当然不会希望尸体在他们的营地中腐烂,但是从处理掉尸体到埋葬尸体是一个不小的飞跃。他们为什么不只是简单地把尸体拖到远离营地的地方然后让它自然腐烂呢? Jordania's theory doesn't predict how exactly we should dispose of our dead, but it predicts that we should care an awful lot about it (i.e. that it should be something sacred), and that we should be especially concerned that the body doesn't fall into the wrong hands. In Paleolithic times, this ensured that our ancestors retrieved the bodies of their comrades when they were killed by predators. Jordania的理论并没有对人类应该如何处理尸体做出具体的预言,但是它预测了人类应该对处理尸体的方式给予高度重视(例如,它应该是一种神圣的仪式),而且人类需要特别注意不能让尸体落入那些它不应该落入的对象手里。在石器时代,这意味着我们祖先会将他们被杀死的同伴尸体从捕食者那里抢回来。 But you can see vestiges of this in historic times — e.g. in our concern for salvaging bodies of the war dead. Mutilating or otherwise desecrating the war dead is an ancient practice, a ghastly way for the victor to show utter dominance over the loser. 但在历史上的各个时期中,你都能看到这种做法的痕迹——例如在战争中人们对于寻回战死者尸体的关切。毁尸或是以其它方式亵渎敌方战死者的尸体是一种古老的传统,这是一种胜者用以展示对失败者的完全统治的可怕方式。 And finally, Jordania's theory helps explain the religious nature of our funerary practices. Burial has always been a quintessentially religious practice. For example, we date the earliest religious behavior in our ancestors by when they started burying their dead. But religions are fundamentally about the living — a set of beliefs and practices that relate to collective identity and tribal cohesion. 最后,Jordania的理论还能够帮助解释人类葬礼活动的宗教性。葬礼一直是一项典型的宗教活动。例如,我们总是将人类祖先最早的宗教行为追溯到他们开始埋葬同类尸体的时刻。但是宗教从本质上说是关于活着的人的——它是一系列与集体身份意识和部落凝聚力相关的信仰和实践。 Why do religions care about the disposal of corpses? This has always puzzled me. It's always seemed like such a mundane concern. When someone dies, that should be the end of what we care about, and removing the body should be no more sacred than taking out the trash. Chimpanzees, for instance, can perceive when another chimp passes away (and mourn), but they soon lose interest in the body. 为什么宗教会关注处理处理尸体的方式?我长久以来都被这个问题困扰着。因为对尸体的处理看起来总是更像一个世俗的问题。当一个人死去,我们对于他的关注也应该随之结束了,而将尸体处理掉这件事情并不应该比我们清除垃圾的行为更加神圣。例如,当同类死去时,黑猩猩会对此有所感知(并感到悲伤),但是它们会迅速失去对同类尸体的兴趣。 But if Jordania is right, it's no coincidence that death rituals are intimately bound up with collective identity, because they're two parts of the same system. 但如果Jordania是对的,那么与死亡相关的仪式会与集体身份意识天然地联系在一起就并不是巧合了,因为它们实际上是从属于同一个体系的两个部分。 ------------------------------------ Update 2015/10/16. For the record, I don't think Jordania's theory explains (or even tries to explain) the lyrical aspects of music — only rhythm. But it's the only plausible account I've read that explains how music may have helped us survive. There's always the mate-selection hypothesis, of course. 更新于2015年10月16日。郑重声明,我并不认为Jordania的理论解释了(甚至仅仅是试图解释)音乐的抒情部分——他的理论所解释的仅仅是音乐的韵律部分。但这是我所读到过的唯一能够合理地解释音乐是如何帮助人类生存下来的理论。当然,关于这方面的理论还有配偶选择假说。 Endnotes 尾注 [1] human ancestors. I'm going to write about "human ancestors" and "early humans" — or sometimes simply "us" — knowing that there are more precise terms to describe the different stages (and branches) of our evolutionary path. Please forgive me — I'm not particularly steeped in the distinctions, and I doubt many of my readers are either. [1] 人类祖先。在下面我将会经常使用“人类祖先”以及“早期人类”——有时也会仅仅使用“我们”这个代词——来指代人类进化道路上的不同阶段(以及分支),虽然我知道还有更加精确的术语来描述它,但请原谅我在这里没有使用它们,因为我并不觉得这些术语之间的差异有多么重要,而且我怀疑我的读者中许多人也和我有同感。 [2] singing, body painting, body odor. It's unclear whether early humans actually sang habitually, painted their bodies, or had B.O., but modern humans certainly do, and there's a case to be made for our ancestors as well. Red ochre is noted as far back as 100,000 years ago, but earlier humans could easily have used simpler preparations like blood or berries, which would have left no trace in the archeological record. [2] 歌唱,体绘,和体味。现在仍不清楚早期人类是否会习惯性地歌唱、在身体上绘画、或者有体味,但现代人身上显然的确存在这些特点,而对于我们祖先而言,也的确存在这方面的可能性。氧化铁作为一种红色颜料最早可以追溯到十万年前,但早期人类也许能够轻易地使用血液和浆果这些更简单的颜料,而这些则并不会在考古学记录上留下痕迹。 [3] aposematism. A particularly interesting example is stotting — when a gazelle springs into the air by lifting all four feet off the ground simultaneously. Stotting is an aposematic display because (1) it makes the gazelle more visible, but (2) it's an honest signal of unprofitability. By stotting, a gazelle signals to a potential predator, "I'm in peak physical condition. Don't both chasing me, because I can easily outrun you." [3] “警示信号”策略。这方面一个特别有趣的例子是“跳跑”——这指的是羚羊四蹄同时离地,将身体弹到空中。“跳跑”之所以是一种具有警示信号的策略,主要是因为(1)它让羚羊更容易被看见,(2)这是一种真实地表明向羚羊发动攻击无利可图的信号。通过“跳跑”的动作,羚羊向潜在的捕食者发出了这样一个信号,“我的身体状态正处在巅峰。不用费工夫来追我了,因为我可以轻易地跑赢你。” [4] Audio-Visual Intimidation Display. I'm taking a couple liberties here. For one, Jordania calls it an "intimidating" display, but I prefer the noun form. But more substantively, Jordania lumps our morphological changes (bipedalism, hair, etc.) into the AVID, whereas I'm presenting the AVID as just the behavioral part (rhythmic chanting and dancing). [4] “恐吓性视听展示”。在这里我有两处自由发挥的地方。其一是Jordania在表达“恐吓性”这个意思时实际上使用的是intimidating这个词,但是我觉得使用名词形式更好一些。而更具实质意义的一点区别则是,Jordania将人类的一些形态学变化(例如双足行走,毛发等)也归入了“恐吓性视听展示”的范畴,而我仅仅对“恐吓性视听展示”的行为部分(有节奏地喊叫和舞蹈)进行了说明。 [5] sky burial. Yes, during a sky burial we let another animal eat our corpses, but they are always scavenging birds (e.g. vultures), never a potential predator. See also Dakhma for the Zoroastrian tradition. [5] 天葬。在天葬仪式中人类的确让别的动物吃掉了同类的尸体,但是这类动物都是腐食性的鸟类(例如秃鹫),而从来不会是某种潜在的捕食者。关于这个问题,可参考Dakhma对于琐罗亚斯德教传统的论著。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[微言]趋势与倾向

【2015-09-20】

@whigzhou: “进化”还是“演化”? http://t.cn/R2gro9g

@whigzhou: 突然想到一点,任何有关“趋势”或“倾向”的谈论,和因果关系一样,必须假定某种程度上的条件稳定性,否则任何趋势都没法说,所以,对复杂化趋势的一种反驳,同样可以用来反驳“发育倾向”,因为任何发育过程都可能在任何阶段被环境变动所打断

@whigzhou: 比如有人说,陆生脊椎动物针对陆地环境所积累的任何适应性,一旦来一场环境大变故,陆地全部消失,就(more...)

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【2015-09-20】 @whigzhou: “进化”还是“演化”? http://t.cn/R2gro9g @whigzhou: 突然想到一点,任何有关“趋势”或“倾向”的谈论,和因果关系一样,必须假定某种程度上的条件稳定性,否则任何趋势都没法说,所以,对复杂化趋势的一种反驳,同样可以用来反驳“发育倾向”,因为任何发育过程都可能在任何阶段被环境变动所打断 @whigzhou: 比如有人说,陆生脊椎动物针对陆地环境所积累的任何适应性,一旦来一场环境大变故,陆地全部消失,就全都没有卵用了,所以你谈论方向性(或高级低级)没有意义,按此逻辑,任何个体发育过程中都可能被雷劈死,或中毒致畸,所以谈论“正常”发育,或“典型成熟形态”没有意义。 @whigzhou: 当然,这个类比并不暗示复杂性进化和个体发育有着类似的确定性(有时你必须说点废话) @whigzhou: 比如这个帖子里便可见到类似论调 http://t.cn/R2ktCU8 @tertio:不过进化有一种完全与环境无关的倾向,陆地变海洋,再变回陆地,生物也绝对不会再退回到第一阶段的状态。 @whigzhou: 方向性的意思(之一)就是这个嘛  
[译文]好东西通常不是计划出来的

Good News Is Unplanned
好事无须规划

作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2015-10-30
译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢)
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/30/good-news-is-unplanned

Incremental, bottom-up, trial-and-error innovation yields moral progress, superior technologies, and greater wealth. Top-down mandates from centralized authorities are more likely to produce ethical disasters, technological stagnation, and persistent poverty. “Bad news is man-made, top-down, purposed stuff, imposed on history,” Matt Ridley writes in The Evolution of Everything. “Good news is accidental, unplanned, emergent stuff that gradually evolves.”

缓慢增长的、自下而上的、试错式的创新,产生了道德的进步、先进的技术和更多的财富。来自中央权威、自上而下的命令,最容易造成道德灾难、技术停滞和持续贫穷。“坏事都是人为的、自上而下的、刻意设计、故意强加给历史的东西,” Matt(more...)

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Good News Is Unplanned 好事无须规划 作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2015-10-30 译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/30/good-news-is-unplanned Incremental, bottom-up, trial-and-error innovation yields moral progress, superior technologies, and greater wealth. Top-down mandates from centralized authorities are more likely to produce ethical disasters, technological stagnation, and persistent poverty. "Bad news is man-made, top-down, purposed stuff, imposed on history," Matt Ridley writes in The Evolution of Everything. "Good news is accidental, unplanned, emergent stuff that gradually evolves." 缓慢增长的、自下而上的、试错式的创新,产生了道德的进步、先进的技术和更多的财富。来自中央权威、自上而下的命令,最容易造成道德灾难、技术停滞和持续贫穷。“坏事都是人为的、自上而下的、刻意设计、故意强加给历史的东西,” Matt Ridley在《万物之进化》中写道。“好事都是意外的、未经计划的、缓慢进化的偶然事件。” Ridley, a British journalist who has written extensively about science, economics, and technological progress, begins by explaining the fundamentals of biological evolution by natural selection: Biological complexity evolves through random mutation followed by non-random survival. Ridley then argues that the Darwinian process is a "special theory of evolution" that is embedded in a more "general theory of evolution that applies to much more than biology." Ridley是一位广泛涉猎科学、经济学和技术进步的英国记者,在本书开头就解释了生物经由自然选择而进化的基础:生物的复杂性来自随机变异和紧随其后的非随机的适者生存。然后Ridley提出,达尔文过程(Darwinian process)只是一个特殊的进化理论,它包含在一个不止适用于生物学的更一般的进化论之中。 Decentralized evolution by trial and error, Ridley argues, is the chief way improvements have emerged in all sorts of human endeavor, including "morality, the economy, culture, language, technology, cities, firms, education, history, law, government, God, money, and society." As the 18th-century Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson argued, these phenomena are the result of human action, but not of human design. By book's end, Ridley has adeptly dismantled all forms of creationism, divine and Progressive. Ridley认为,通过试错而实现的分散进化是人类各种事业实现进步的主要途径,包括“道德、经济、文化、语言、技术、城市、公司、教育、历史、法律、政府、上帝、金钱和社会。”如18世纪苏格兰哲学家Adam Ferguson所说,这些现象都是人类行为的结果,而不是人类设计的结果。到书的结尾,Ridley已手法娴熟地拆解了所有类型的创造论,无论是诉诸神灵的还是进步主义的版本。 Consider the evolution of culture. More and more, cultural anthropologists have come to accept the view that—to quote a recent paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences—"human cultural groups have all the key attributes of a Darwinian evolutionary system." As Ridley explains, "Our habits and our institutions, from language to cities, are constantly changing, and the mechanism of change turns out to be surprisingly Darwinian: it is gradual, undirected, mutational, inexorable, combinatorial, selective and in some vague sense progressive." 不妨考虑一下文化的进化。越来越多的文化人类学家已经接受“人类文化群体具有达尔文进化系统所有的关键特征”——这一表述引自《行为与脑科学》上最近的一篇论文。Ridley解释道,“从语言到城市,我们的习性和制度都在不断变化,而令人吃惊的是,这些变化的原理被证明是达尔文式的:它是渐进的,无预定方向的,突变的,无情的,组合的,选择性的,并且在某种意义上是进步的。” One example: the institution of marriage. As our hunter-gatherer ancestors evolved into herders and farmers, polygamy became more common, since some men could now accumulate the resources needed to support and defend more than one woman and their progeny. However, polygamy has a big downside: Male sexual competition produces lots of violence. While some 80 percent of the distinct cultures identified by anthropologists still sanction polygamy, monogamy is by far now the most common form of marriage. Why? 举个例子:婚姻制度。随着我们狩猎采集的祖先演变成牧民和农民,一夫多妻制变得更常见,因为此时一些男性已能够积累起足够的资源来养活、守护多位女性及其后代。然而,一夫多妻制有个重大缺陷:男性性竞争会产生诸多暴力。尽管在已被人类学家辨明的不同文化中,约80%仍然实行一夫多妻制,但是到现在,一夫一妻制已经成了最常见的婚姻形式。为什么? The University of British Columbia anthropologist Joseph Henrich and his colleagues argue that societies that adopted normative monogamy increased their social solidarity and trust thus enhancing "the competitive success of the polities, nations and religions that adopted this cultural package." The upshot is that in the modern world, cultures where polygamy still thrives tend to be marginalized, poor, and violent. 英属哥伦比亚大学的人类学家Joseph Henrich和他同事们认为,接受标准一夫一妻制的社会提高了社会的团结和信任,因此增加了“接受一夫一妻制这一文化一揽子方案的政治组织、国家和宗教的竞争成功率。”最终结果就是在当今世界,一夫多妻制仍盛行的文化多是被边缘化的、贫穷的和充满暴力的。 Henrich and his colleagues also speculate that "the peculiar institutions of monogamous marriage may help explain why democratic ideals and notions of equality and human rights first emerged in the West." This egalitarian impulse, interestingly, may behind the evolving inclination toward including same-sex unions in the institution of marriage. Henrich和他同事们推断,“一夫一妻的婚姻制度也可能有助于解释为何民主的典范和平等与人权的概念首先出现在西方。”有趣的是,这种平等主义的冲动或许隐藏在这样一种进化倾向背后,即向包括同性结合的婚姻制度的进化。 What about the evolution of economics? Prior to the 18th century, top-down extraction of wealth by elites from hapless serfs and peasants was the nearly universal form of economic and political organization among settled societies. The result was persistent and pervasive poverty. 那么经济的进化呢?18世纪以前,精英阶层对于不幸的奴隶和农民自上而下的财富压榨几乎是所有稳定社会普遍的经济和政治组织形式。结果是持续和普遍的贫穷。 As the University of Groningen economist Angus Maddison has shown, economic growth proceeded at the stately pace of less than 0.1 percent per year in Western Europe for more than 18 centuries, rising in constant dollars from $425 per year in AD 1 to $1,200 in 1820. Towards the end of that period, a socioeconomic mutation—market liberalism—arose in Britain and the Netherlands. 正如格罗宁根(Groningen)大学经济学家Angus Maddison所展示的,在长达18个世纪的时间里,西欧的经济增长都稳定在每年0.1%以下,以不变价美元计,从公元元年的425美元涨到了1820年的1200美元。到了这段时期的末尾,一个社会经济的巨变———市场自由主义——在英国和荷兰出现了。 As it spread around the world, the mutation proved highly advantageous to the societies that accepted some degree of it, enabling them to prosper. This "great enrichment," as the University of Illinois at Chicago economist Deidre McCloskey calls it, boosted average incomes 10- to 20-fold in those countries where the mutation took hold. 随着它传遍全世界,这一突变被证明对于那些多少接受了它的社会非常有利,让他们变得繁荣。这次“财富大爆发”(伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校经济学家Deidre McCloskey语)使得发生突变的国家人均收入翻了10到20倍。 Ridley cites the economists Nick Hanauer and Eric Beinhocker, who assert that unfettered commerce is "best understood as an evolutionary system, constantly creating and trying out new solutions to problems in a similar way to how evolution works in nature. Some solutions are 'fitter' than others. The fittest survive and propagate. The unfit die." Ridley引用了经济学家Nick Hanauer 和 Eric Beinhocker的观点,他们认为最好将自由商业“理解为一个像自然进化那样不断创造、并发明出解决问题之新方法的系统。有些方法比其他方法更能“适应环境”。最适应环境的存活并增殖。不适应的就灭亡。” The consequence of competition is constant innovation, which the economist Joseph Schumpeter neatly summarized as "creative destruction." After accounting for the contributions of labor and capital, economist Robert Solow calculated that nearly 90 percent of the improvements in living standards are due to technological progress. 竞争的结果就是不断的创新,经济学家Joseph Schumpeter将其巧妙地总结为“创造性破坏”。在算上人力和资本的因素后,经济学家Robert Solow计算得出,生活水平的提高中约90%归功于技术进步。 How about technological evolution? "Biology and technology in the end boil down to systems of information...and both evolve by trial and error," writes Ridley. "Technology is in a sense a continuation of biological evolution—an imposition of informational order on a random world." 技术进化又是如何呢?“生物和技术归根结底都是一些信息系统……而且都通过试错来进化,”Ridley写道。“技术在某种意义上是生物进化的延续——一种随机世界中信息秩序的排列。” Every technology is built by recombining earlier technologies. Ridley makes the arresting but persuasive claim that, far more often than not, "scientific breakthroughs are the effect, not the cause, of technological change." In other words, technologists' tools are what enable basic researchers uncover nature's secrets. 每种技术都建立在对早前技术的重新组合之上。Ridley做出了吸引眼球但又有说服力的论断,认为多数情况下,“科学突破是技术变革的产物,而不是成因。”换言之,技术专家的工具使得基础研究人员解开自然的奥秘。 One modest example is the invention of the microscope in the 1590s by the Dutch spectacle maker Zacharias Jansen. Another is the automated gene sequencer introduced by Applied Biosystems in 1987, which ultimately made the discoveries of the Human Genome Project feasible. 一个客观的例子就是1590年代由荷兰镜片制造商Zacharias Jansen发明的显微镜。另一个例子是1987年由Applied Biosystems公司引进的自动基因测序机,最终使得人类基因组计划变得可行。 Ridley also suggests that scientific central planning, especially in the form of public funding of research, poses problems. In 2015, for example, the Institute for International Economics found that research and development in "the business sector had high social returns, and hence contributed to growth, but there was no evidence in this analysis of positive effects from government R&D." Ridley还认为,对科学的中央计划会制造问题,尤其是以公共财政资助研究这种形式。比如说,国际经济研究所在2015年发现,商业部门的研发“有着较高的社会回报,而且因此促进了经济增长,但是该项分析中没有证据表明政府研发存在积极影响。” It would be really surprising if government R&D did not help give birth to some technological breakthroughs—nuclear power and the Internet leap to mind. Still, a 2014 paper published in PLoS Medicine estimated that 85 percent of public research resources are wasted. 如果说政府研发对于一些技术突破——毫无帮助,这肯定会让人非常吃惊——有人会想到核能和互联网这样的例子。然而,一篇发表在2014年《PLoS Medicine》 杂志上的论文估计,有85%的公共研究资源是被浪费掉的。 What's more, a 2015 study in PLoS Biology alarmingly suggested that half of all preclinical research is irreproducible. Replication and cumulative knowledge production are cornerstones of the scientific progress. This means that in U.S. that about $28 billion in annual public biomedical research funding, arguably, is squandered. 更有甚者,发表于《 PLoS Biology》的一项研究惊人地表明,一半的前临床研究都是不可重复的。重复和可累计知识的生产是科学发展的基石。这意味着美国每年的公共生物医药研究资金中,约有280亿美元可认为被浪费了。 And then there is the evolution of government. States emerged from protection rackets in which a gang monopolizing violence demanded payment of goods and services—taxes—in exchange for promises to defend local farmers and artisans from predation by rival gangs. "Tudor monarchs and the Taliban are cut from exactly the same cloth," summarizes Ridley. 然后是政府的进化。国家脱胎于暴力垄断集团的保护网机制,他们承诺保护当地农民和工匠免受竞争团伙的侵害,作为交换他们要求受保护者支付货物或服务——即税收。“都铎王朝的国王和塔利班都是一个模子刻出来的,”Ridley总结道。 But two to three centuries ago, the fractured polities of Western Europe provided an open, speculative space where novel ideas about property rights, free trade, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and limits on government could mutate and grow. Where those bottom-up conceptual mutations took hold, technological innovation sped forward, incomes rose, and civil liberties were recognized. 但是两三个世纪以前,西欧支离破碎的政体结构为有关财产权、自由贸易、宗教自由、出版自由、限制政府等新思想提供了开放的探索空间,让这些创新理念得以变化和生长。哪里发生了这些自下而上的观念突变,哪里的技术创新就会加速,收入增长,公民自由得到承认。 Once established, liberal societies are veritable evolution machines that frenetically generate new mutations and swiftly recombine them to produce a vast array of new products, services, and social institutions that enable ever more people to flourish. So far liberal societies are outcompeting—in the sense of being richer and more appealing—those polities that are closer to the original protection rackets. 自由社会一旦建成,它就成了一架真正的进化机器,疯狂地产生新突变,并迅速将突变重新结合生产出一系列新产品、新服务和新机构,使得更多人获益。到目前为止,在变得更富裕和更吸引人这方面,自由社会完胜那些更接近最初保护网机制的政体。 “Perhaps," Ridley hopefully suggests, "the state is now evolving steadily towards benign and gentle virtue." He adds, "Perhaps not." In support of evolving benignity is the fact that the ratio of countries rated as free by Freedom House increased from 29 percent in 1973 to 47 percent in 2007. “或许,”Ridley满怀希望地认为,“国家正在向着善意和温良的美德稳步进化着。”他补充道,“也可能不是这样。”支持良性进化的一个事实是,被自由之家(Freedom House)评定为自由国家的比例已经由1973年的29%增长到2007年的47%。 Since then the spread of liberty has faltered. Ridley notes that "creationism in government shows no signs of fading." Communism and fascism are examples of man-made top-down creationism that produced plenty of bad-news history in the last century. 但自那之后,自由的传播已缓滞不前。Ridley提到“关于政府的创世论没有衰退的迹象。”共产主义和法西斯主义便是人为的自上而下的创世论,导致了上世纪的诸多历史惨剧。 Biological evolution has no end goals; those creatures that survive reproduce. Presumably the sorts of cultural, economic, technological, and governmental evolution described by Ridley also do not have end goals. What survives, replicates. It is not impossible that some future cultural mutation might arise and outcompete market liberalism. Yet as a constant novelty-generating dynamo, market liberalism has pretty good chance of staying ahead of mutations that tend in more authoritarian directions. 生物进化没有终极目标;存活的生物繁殖不息。也许Ridley所描述的各种文化、经济、技术和政府进化也都没有终极目标。得以存留的就不断复制。未来出现一些文化突变并胜过市场自由主义也不是不可能。然而作为一个持久的创新发动机,市场自由主义很可能继续领先于那些倾向于专制的突变体。 There is another way to think of the developments that are the result of human action, but not of human design. Human beings, through a long process of trial and error (mostly error), are slowly discovering our own given natures. We chance upon habits, institutions, moralities that increasingly incline our inborn predilections toward promoting human flourishing. 还有另一种方式来思考那些由人类的行为而不是人类的设计所导致的发展。经过长时间的试错过程(大部分是错误的),人类正在慢慢发现自己的天性。我们有幸恰好发现了一些习性、制度和德性,它们越来越倾向于推动我们的先天偏好向着促进人类繁荣的方向发展。 Flourishing does not mean sheer biological reproduction. After all, it is those societies in which the market liberalism mutation took hold earliest that have the lowest fertility rates. Flourishing means something like the pursuit and enjoyment of more meaningful lives. 繁荣并不意味着单纯的生物繁殖。毕竟,出生率最低的正是那些最早抓住市场自由主义这一变异的社会。繁荣意味着追求并享受更有意义的人生。 As Ridley concludes, "It is a fair bet that the twenty-first century will be dominated mostly by shocks of bad news, but will experience mostly invisible progress of good things. Incremental, inexorable, inevitable changes will bring us material and spiritual improvements that will make the lives of our grandchildren wealthier, healthier, happier, cleverer, kinder, freer, more peaceful, and more equal—almost entirely as a serendipitous by-product of cultural evolution." Ridley总结道,“很可能21世纪会被坏消息带来的震惊所笼罩,但是也会经历美好事物近乎无形的进步。”渐进的、不可阻挡的、无可避免的改变,会带给我们物质和精神的进步,使得我们孙辈的生活更富足、更健康、更幸福、更明智、更友善、更自由、更和平且更平等——这几乎全都是文化进化的偶然副产物。” Ronald Bailey is a science correspondent at Reason magazine and author of The End of Doom (July 2015). Ronald Bailey是《Reason》杂志的科学通讯记者,也是《末日终结》一书(2015年七月)的作者。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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