【2021-07-28】 美国的社会流动性还是很高的，下图的样本来自1979年的青少年，他们20年后的收入等级与其父母当时的收入等级的关系

【2021-01-17】 @缸中之nao:我记得大伯之前的文章分析过，高考折射出的身份焦虑，恰恰是社会阶层流动性剧增的结果。现在阶层结构近乎固化的情况为什么人们还是如此焦虑。 @whigzhou: 固化了吗？空口无凭，给我数据 @whigzhou: 很多人说固化的时候，真正的意思可能只是：我这么优秀，竟然挤不进 @whigzhou: 而且他的挤不进可能只是*未能从Top 10%挤进Top 1%* 我还没弄明白流行中的*固化*一词究竟什么意思，两种可能：1）金字塔形状的转变（当代语境中即为中层膨胀）已经完成，2）塔内流动已基本停止， 无论哪种意思，固化的判断都不成立，形状转变或许已经减速，但还没完成，下层依然很庞大，同时，塔内流动也远未停止，首先，没有数据支持流动停止的判断，其次，读一下Gregory Clark的 The Son Also Rises 你就会知道，要阻止这种流动是多么困难，和想要加速这种流动一样困难， 【摘自评论：膨胀的中层一起下划算吗，比如南京服务员3000起步算底层不，然后通次下水三百，开个锁一百，住家保姆八千起步，类比有些手艺的普工八千应该没问题，但是税前开一万五在南京已经非常高了算top10绝对没有问题，到手也就12k-,然后他们都属于一种状态，吃喝不愁，买房无望，他们算南京的中层还是底层呢？】 听这意思，好像是部分白领中产愤懑于部分蓝领下层的正在逼近甚至眼看着就要被超越？ 【通次下水三百，开个锁一百，住家保姆八千起步】——这些显然是部分下层正在迅速上升的证据，而不是固化的证据 如果这种想法具有代表性的话，那我大概明白固化论者在说什么了，其实就是一种期望的落空，落空的原因可能有几种： 1）阶层结构转型初期的大流动将后来者的预期抬的过高，当90后发现自己面临的上升机会已远不如70后那么宽裕时，难免失落，这是注定的时代问题，转型必将终结，开闸放水期也就那么长，不可能持久， 2）许多以为自己已经实现地位提升的人，却发现其实根本无望如预期中那样过上足够体面的生活，比如无望买房，于是也难免失落，还有其他种种，这当然存在， 3）许多以为自己已经实现地位提升的人，基于以往的经验，以为会和蓝领下层继续拉开很大的距离，可是却吃惊的发现，【通次下水三百，开个锁一百，住家保姆八千起步】，于是也难免失落，可以理解，但他们的期望不对，这种期望立基于旧经验，看看已经完成转型的发达社会就知道，不是这样，勤勉自律的蓝领可以过的很好， 总之，这些失落都事出有因且可以理解，但把它们说成*固化*，实在是漂的太远了， @whigzhou: 我琢磨着，把这些失落叫做*固化*的唯一功能是可以安慰自己：挤不进不是我的错！  

【2019-10-20】 我觉得女性劳动参与率提高会降低阶层流动性，因为假如男性预期未来妻子是家庭妇女，择偶时就不会太在意其教育程度和潜在工资水平，反之，则会在这方面更assortative，从而提高阶层内婚比例，如图所示，工资收入Top10%的男性的配偶的工资收入也在Top10%里的比例自70年代以来一直在上升，同期女性劳动参与率也在提高，来源：How Assortative Mating Is Driving Income Inequality by Branko Milanovic  

Class, Caste, and Genes 阶级、种姓和基因 作者:Henry Harpending @ 2012-01-13 译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/class-caste-and-genes/ An article by Sabrina Tavernise appeared in the New York Times a few days ago describing increasing perceptions of class conflict in America, and there is a lot of recent commentary in the press about this report from the Pew Charitable Trust that claims there is less class mobility here than in several other northern countries.   It is not very clear to me what the complaints really are or what alternatives exist. If there is any substantial heritability of merit, where merit is whatever leads to class mobility, then mobility ought to turn classes into hereditary castes surprisingly rapidly. 几天前，Sabrina Tavernise一篇描写美国阶级矛盾越发明显的文章刊登在了《纽约时报》上，这份来自皮尤慈善信托基金（the Pew Charitable Trust）的报告宣称美国的阶级流动性少于其他几个北方国家，最近的新闻对此有很多评论。但是我并没有搞清楚他们究竟在抱怨什么或者存在什么可行的替代选项。假设存在实质性的个体优势遗传，同时个体优势总会导致阶级流动，那流动性应该会迅速地把阶层转化为世袭的种姓式分化。 A start at looking into genetic consequences of meritocracy is to create the simplest possible model and follow its implications. Consider free meritocracy in a two class system, meaning that each generation anyone in the lower class who has greater merit than someone in the upper class immediately swaps class with them. Mating then occurs at random within class. There are no fitness differences, no selection at all, everything is neutral. 要开始调查精英制度的遗传后果，应该建立尽可能简单的模型并遵循其推论。设想有两个阶级系统的自由精英制度，这意味着每一代中任何身处较低阶级的人，都可立刻与更高阶级中能力弱于自身的人互换阶级。然后阶级内随机通婚。这里没有健康程度的不同，也完全没有自然或人工选择，所有都保持中性。 It is convenient to discuss what happens in terms of IQ because IQ is familiar and, in northern industrial nations, closely related to merit. On the other hand we have to keep in mind that our focus on IQ is like that of the drunk searching for his keys under the lamppost: we can measure IQ but have no good way to measure honesty nor time preference nor conscientiousness and so on. 方便起见，不妨从IQ的角度来讨论由此引出的结果，因为IQ广为人知，而且在北方工业国家中，IQ跟个人优势紧密相关。另一方面，我们也必须谨记，我们对于IQ的关注就像醉汉在路灯下找寻钥匙：我们可以测量IQ，却没有好方法来测量诚实、时间偏好或者尽责性等特质。 This figure shows an initial population with normally distributed merit. A new merit based class system is imposed such that the two new classes are of equal size. In this free meritocracy everyone with merit exceeding the population mean moves into the upper class and everyone with merit less than the average moves into the lower class. The second panel of the figure shows the resulting merit distributions by class before reproduction and the bottom panel shows the distributions after endogamous reproduction. This model assumes that the reshuffling of genes during reproduction leads to normal distributions in the next generation within classes. 上图的顶层显示了个体优势呈正态分布的初始人口。一种基于阶级系统的新优势被引入进来，据此划分的两个新阶级的人口数量相当。在这种自由精英制度中，每个能力超过人口平均值的人都进入上层阶级，每个能力达不到平均值的人都进入下层阶级。上图的中层表示在生育前所处阶级导致的个体优势分布，底层则表示在同阶级通婚生育后的个体优势分布。这个模型假设生育过程中的基因重组会导致同阶级的下一代在个体优势上的正态分布。 The process continues for several generations. By analogy with IQ the additive heritability of merit is set to 0.6 so there are substantial random environmental effects. The second figure shows the evolution of class differences over four generations or about 100 years in human terms. 这个过程持续了几代的时间。通过类比IQ，个体优势的可加性遗传率设为0.6，所以这就有了大量随机的环境影响。下图展示了四代（人类角度的大约100年）时间内阶级差异的演化。 Class mobility after the first generation is 30% while after four generations it has declined to 10% and continues to decline after that.  The average merit in the two classes is about -1SD in the lower and +1SD in the upper on the original scale, corresponding to IQs of 85 and 115. 第一代之后的阶级流动性是30%，而四代之后这个数字就已跌至10%并且之后继续下降。相较于原始水平，较低阶级的平均个体优势降低了一个标准差，较高阶级的平均个体优势增加了一个标准差， 对应的IQ数值为较低阶级的85和较高阶级的115。 Recall that there are no fitness differences in this model. Still, after four generations, about 70% of the variance is between classes, which can be compared to  about 35% of the variance among continental human groups for random genetic markers, i.e. colloquially class differences are twice neutral race differences. (The familiar among-population figure of 15% made famous by Lewontin refers to gene differences while here we are comparing genotype differences of diploids, hence the difference between 15 and 35.) 回想下这模型中是没有健康水平的差异的。但在四代之后，阶级之间的方差仍到达了70%，这都可以与随机遗传标记的跨大陆种群间35%的方差相比了，例如，通俗语境中的阶级差异是纯粹种族差异的两倍。（Lewontin提出的著名的种群间15%的差异数据是指基因差异，而这里我们是比较二倍体的基因型差异，因此差别在15到35之间。） A surprise to me from this model was the rapidity with which classes turn into castes: most of the action is in the first generation or so. In retrospect this seems so obvious that it is hardly worth saying but it wasn’t so obvious to me when I started toying with it. 这模型让我吃惊的地方在于阶级转化为世袭种姓的速度之快：大部分转变在第一代左右就已发生。回想起来，这过程看起来如此明显以致于都不值得谈论，但是一开始我很随意地思考时，我并没有注意到这点。 Even though everything here is selectively neutral, I wonder about the extent to which this free meritocracy mimics selection. Any mutant that boosts merit in carriers will be concentrated in the upper class and vice versa. Greg and I discuss in our book how environmental change initially selects for dinged genes that are “quick fixes” in carriers but detrimental in homozygotes, citing sickle cell in humans, broken myostatin in beef cattle, and numerous others. Does this social system mimic selection? 即使这里的每件事情都是有选择地设为中性，我很想知道这个自由的精英制度与选拔制相似到什么程度。任何让携带者具有个体优势的基因突变都会聚集在较高阶级，反之亦然。Greg和我在我们的书【编注：Greg是Gregory Cochran，作者与他合著了《万年大爆炸》一书，West Hunter是这两位作者的合作博客】中讨论环境改变最初如何选择出了那些丧钟般的“临时补丁”基因，他们能为携带者快速解决一些问题，但对纯合子有害，造成人体内的镰状细胞，菜牛内残缺的肌肉生长抑制素，和很多其他坏处。这个社会系统也模仿选择机制吗？ A correlate of IQ in humans is myopia, one idea being that IQ boosters relax early developmental constraints on CNS growth resulting in eyeballs too big for the socket, leading to myopia. I have read somewhere that myopia is positively related to income in the US. Time to try to find that literature. 跟人类IQ相关的是近视，一种观点认为IQ超群者放松了对中枢神经系统生长的早期发展限制，导致了眼球相比于眼窝过大，于是成了近视。我在某处读到，近视在美国跟收入是正相关的。该去试着找到那篇文献去了。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Atlantic: Denmark Isn't Magic 《大西洋月刊》：丹麦并不神奇 作者:DEREK THOMPSON @ 2016-08-02 译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/the-american-dream-isnt-alive-in-denmark/494141/ New research suggests that the American dream isn’t alive in Scandinavia—but generous redistribution of wealth isn’t a terrible consolation prize. 新的研究表明，美国梦在斯堪的纳维亚没市场，但慷慨大方的财富再分配并非糟糕的安慰奖。 Danophilia is alive and well in America. Bernie Sanders and other liberals have lauded Denmark’s social democratic dream state, with its free college tuition, nearly universal pre-K, and plentiful child care. 倒是丹麦迷在美国大受欢迎且很滋润。伯尼·桑德斯和其他自由派盛赞丹麦是社会民主主义的梦想国度，因其免费的大学教育，几乎无所不包的学前教育和对孩童的充分关照。 While Republicans and Democrats both praise the virtues of what economists call “intergenerational mobility”—the chance for a poor young child to become at least a middle-class adult—America doesn’t lead the world in the pursuit of the American Dream. 共和党和民主党都赞美经济学家所谓的“代际流动性”——一个贫穷孩子长大至少成为中产阶级的机会——的优点，而在这一点上，美国并未在对美国梦的追求中身先士卒。 The standard social mobility statistic measures how much each generation's income is determined by its parents' income. By that measure, northern Europe and Scandinavia have the highest social mobility in the advanced world, and Denmark tops the list. 标准的社会流动性统计衡量一代人的收入多大程度上由其父母收入所决定。按照这种衡量方式，欧洲北部和斯堪的纳维亚的社会流动性在发达世界排名最高，其中丹麦名列第一。 But this Danish Dream is a “Scandinavian Fantasy,” according to a new paper by Rasmus Landersø at the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit in Copenhagen and James J. Heckman at the University of Chicago. Low-income Danish kids are not much more likely to earn a middle-class wage than their American counterparts. What’s more, the children of non-college graduates in Denmark are about as unlikely to attend college as their American counterparts. 但是，哥本哈根的Rockwool基金会研究部Rasmus Landersø和芝加哥大学James J. Heckman的一项新研究指出，丹麦梦是一个“斯堪的纳维亚空想”。相较于美国的低收入家庭的孩子，丹麦低收入家庭的孩子不会更有可能挣到中产阶级的工资。甚至相较于美国的情况，丹麦无大学文凭者的孩子上大学的希望同样渺茫。 If that’s true, how does Denmark rank number-one among all rich countries in social mobility? It’s all about what happens after wages: The country’s high taxes on the rich and income transfers to the poor “compress” economic inequality within each generation: When the rungs on the economic ladder are closer together, it’s easier to move a little bit up (or down) over the course of a generation. 如果真是这样，为何丹麦的社会流动性在所有富裕国家排名第一？这都源于工资背后的事：国家把从富人和收入里征收的高额税款转移给穷人的做法，“压缩”了代际之间的经济不平等：当社会上升阶梯的横档靠得更近时，代际之间向上（或下）移动就更容易一点。 “The Scandinavian Fantasy” is a rich, complex paper that is already making waves in the newly popular subject of intergenerational mobility. It makes three major points. “斯堪的纳维亚空想”是一篇丰富而复杂的论文，它推波助澜了代际流动性这一新近的流行主题。论文提出三个主要观点。 The first big idea is that Denmark is not a nation of Horatio Algersens. Its high social mobility is not the result of an economy that is uniquely good at helping poor children earn middle-class salaries. Instead, it is a country much like the U.S., where the children of poor parents who don’t go to college are also unlikely to attend college or earn a high wage. Social mobility in Denmark and the U.S. seem to be remarkably similar when looking exclusively at wages—that is, before including taxes and transfers. 第一个是，丹麦不是Horatio Algersens的国家。其高社会流动性并非来自利于贫穷孩子挣到中产薪水的经济。相反它很像美国，在那里没上大学的穷父母的孩子也不大可能上大学或赚取高薪。只看工资——在不考虑税收和财富转移时——丹麦和美国的社会流动性非常相似。【译注：Horatio Alger，1832年1月13日出生，是19世纪一位多产的美国作家，以少年小说而闻名。阿尔杰小说的风格大多一致，均描述一个贫穷少年如何通过其正直、努力、少许运气以及坚持不懈最终取得成功。历史学家认为，阿尔杰的作品绝不仅局限于其有趣的故事本身，小说中描述的通过自身努力获得成功的主人公，给予了大量当时美国穷人力量、信心及动力，更加刻苦工作换取成功。】 It is only after accounting for Denmark’s high taxes on the rich and large transfers to the poor that its social mobility looks so much better than the U.S.’s. America’s (relatively conservative) economic philosophy is that, with low taxes and little regulation, the market is an open savannah where the most talent will win out. But Denmark’s economic philosophy seems to be that the market is an unfortunate socioeconomic lottery system, and so the country compensates the poor with generous transfers paid by high taxes on the rich. 只有平衡了丹麦对富人征高税收和向穷人大量转移财富的因素以后，其社会流动性看上去比美国好很多。美国（相对保守的）的经济哲学是低税收和少管制，市场如同一片开放的大草原，大多数天才自然脱颖而出。而丹麦的经济理念则是，市场是一个不怎么靠谱的社会经济彩票投注系统，所以需要政府通过多征富人税并以慷慨的转移支付补偿穷人。 The second big idea in the paper is that Denmark’s large investment in public education pays off in higher cognitive skills among low-income children, but not in higher-education mobility—i.e., the odds that a child of a non-college grad will go on to finish college. 论文第二个重要观点是，丹麦公共教育的大量投资，在提高低收入家庭孩子的认知技能方面有所斩获，但未增加高等教育的流动性，比如，非大学毕业生子女完成大学学业的几率并未提高。 Overall, Denmark spends much more than the U.S. on all levels of education. In particular, a much higher share of its poor young children is enrolled in daycare and preschool than the United States. This large public investment in kids seems to increase cognitive skills among poor Danish children compared to their American peers. In international math and reading scores, for example, the poorest quartile in Denmark far outperforms their counterparts in the U.S. 总体而言，丹麦在各级教育上的花费比美国多得多。特别是贫困孩子上幼儿园和学前班的比例远高于美国。比起美国的同龄孩子，丹麦对孩子的大量公共投资提高了贫困儿童的认知能力。以国际数学和阅读考试为例，丹麦的最低四分位数的成绩值远优于美国。 But despite this far greater investment in young children and public colleges, Danish children of high-school graduates are still extremely unlikely to go onto college. Put slightly differently, a tiny share of Denmark’s college graduate population comes from homes where neither parent finished high school. The children of college-grads almost always go to college; the children of non-grads often don’t—even in Denmark. 但是，尽管在儿童和公立大学的投资大了很多，丹麦高中毕业生进入大学的可能性仍然非常低。稍有一点不同，极小一部分丹麦大学毕业生来自父母都没读完高中的家庭。大学生的孩子上大学；没上大学的父母，孩子往往也不上大学——即使在丹麦也是这样。 The third big idea is that Denmark’s welfare policies might reduce its citizens’ incentives to go to college. In the early 1990s, when Denmark raised the minimum age of eligibility for social assistance, college enrollment among Danish twenty somethings fell below its trajectory. Based on this finding, the researchers conclude that welfare policies may reduce college enrollment. Denmark makes it more comfortable to be poor and less lucrative to be rich, so many young people decide to end their education after high school. 第三个重要观点是，丹麦的福利政策可能降低了公民上大学的激励。1990年代初，丹麦提高了获得社会援助资格的最低年龄，大学在二十多岁青年人中的招生数随即跌入下行轨迹。基于这项发现，研究人员得出结论，福利政策会减少高校招生。丹麦让穷人更舒适，富人更无利可图，故而很多年轻人决定高中毕业后不再接受教育。 This final idea may be the most controversial. After all, it’s not clear how to frame this finding. Democrats can say: Despite conservative arguments that a welfare state could destroy poor young people’s ambition, Denmark’s educational mobility is no worse than the U.S. But Republicans can say: Despite liberal arguments that Denmark is so much better than the U.S. at social mobility, its poor kids are no more likely to go to college. “There is something here for the Republicans and for the Democrats,” Heckman told me. 最后这个观点可能最具争议。毕竟，目前还不清楚如何解释这个发现。民主党人可以说：尽管保守派观点认为福利国家可能毁掉贫穷年轻人的雄心壮志，可是丹麦的教育流动性并不比美国差。而共和党人可以说：尽管自由派认为丹麦的社会流动性比美国更好，可是其贫穷孩子们同样不太可能进入大学。“这些就是共和党和民主党的说辞”，Heckman告诉我。 The most significant implication of this paper is not a happy one: Equality of opportunity is a fantasy. It does not exist in the U.S., it does not exist in Denmark, and it probably doesn’t exist anywhere. The children of rich college graduates are far more likely to grow up to become rich college graduates, even in the world's social-democratic fantasyland. That is because, everywhere, parents matter. 本文最有意义的推论并不让人开心：机会平等是一种幻想。它在美国不存在，在丹麦不存在，可能在任何地方都不存在。富有的大学毕业生的孩子更有可能成长为富有的大学毕业生，即使在这世界的社会民主乐园——丹麦也是这样。这是因为，任何地方，父母都很重要。 And it’s probably a good thing that parents matter. For the government to make equality of opportunity its singular and absolute policy goal would probably mean breaking up neighborhoods, forcing arranged marriages, enrolling all children in a unified curriculum, and having them all taught by a mass-produced robot; that would eliminate neighborhood effects, assortative mating, peer effects, curricular differences, and the problem of unequal teaching quality. It is unclear that there is a constituency for this policy, even among the most radical of Bernie bros. 当然，父母很重要可能是件好事。对想要实现机会平等的政府来说，其单一而绝对的政策目标，将可能意味着打破邻里关系，强行安排婚姻，统一所有孩子的学习课程，让大批量生产的机器人教授所有孩子；那样将消除邻里影响、选择性的婚配关系【编注：即人们从与自己地位、收入、教育等方面背景相似的人群中选择配偶的倾向】、同侪效应、课程差异和不同教学质量的问题。不知道是否有选区支持这种政策，即使是最激进的桑德斯支持者。 But just as Denmark’s policy may have its own unintended consequences, the American philosophy of opportunity has its own dark side. For example, high income inequality in the U.S. makes a college degree more valuable in America than in similar countries. This may encourage more poor Americans to enroll in college. 但是，正如丹麦政策有自己意想不到的后果，美国式的自我奋斗争取机会的哲学也有自己的暗面。例如，美国显著的收入不平等使美国大学学位比在同类国家更值钱。这会鼓励更多美国穷人上大学。 For many, college pays off. But the recent rise in college attainment in the U.S. has come at a terrible cost for some. Student debt has exploded, particularly at for-profit colleges serving older, poorer students, the majority of whom drop out with student loans that aren’t dischargeable in bankruptcy. 对于很多人来说，上大学是值得的。但是对于一些人，近期大学费用已经上涨到了糟糕的程度。学生债务激增，特别是上营利性院校的年纪较大的穷学生，他们中的大多数辍学时仍带着就算破产也必须偿还的学生贷款。 So the social siren of American inequality—join the rich! go to college!—lures many first-generation students to put tens of thousands of dollars toward a degree that they never get. If they default on their student loans, they won’t be able to get a loan to buy a house. Which means the housing market is constrained by student debt defaults. Which means other industries that rely on a healthy housing market—furniture, cars, plants, kitchen appliances, apparel—are also affected. 因此，美国社会不公平的刺耳警报——成为富人！考上大学！——诱使许多第一代学生花费上万美元以期获得一张他们得不到的文凭。如果他们拖欠学生贷款，将无法获得贷款买房子。这意味着学生债务违约限制了房地产市场发展。也意味着依赖良好运行的房地产市场的其他工业，如家具、汽车、种植、厨房电器和服装都会受到影响。 Denmark doesn’t have all the answers, and apparently its leaders know it—that’s why they have such a strong public assistance system in the first place. But the U.S. mythology of social mobility is also self-defeating, in ways that are exceptionally American. 丹麦没有给出所有的答案，显然其领导人知道这一点，这就是为什么他们首先建立了一套强有力的公共援助制度。但是，美国社会流动性的神话，以非常美国的方式，也打了自己的脸。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好 Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US 作者：Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13 译者：Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/ Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates. 美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西，一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。 It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have more economic mobility than the US. But what we admire about Nordic countries frays when you dig into their wealthiest 1%. 北欧国家确实有着更平均的财富和收入分配。他们在经济流动性方面也比美国表现得更好。但是当我们深入了解北欧国家的那1%最富有的人群时，我们的上述赞誉便可能遭到严重动摇。 Economists Simon Halphen, Wojciech Kopczuk, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner studied wealth among Danes(pdf). They observed that the extraordinary mobility found at lower levels disappears once you get into the very top of the wealth distribution. 三位经济学家Simon Halphen,Wojciech Kopczuk和Claus Thustrup研究了丹麦人的财富。他们观察到，丹麦较富及以下阶层中能看到的那种极高的经济流动性，在财富金字塔的最高层是不存在的。 If you are born into a family in the top 1% of wealth, odds are pretty good, you’ll end up there too. They estimate having parents in the 1% makes you 18 times more likely to be in the top 1% yourself; the odds double if your grandparents and parents were also in the 1%. 如果你出生在前1%的最富裕家庭，那么你就很可能一直留在这一阶层直到离世。他们估计，如果你的父母属于最富1%，那你进入最富1%的可能性就会增加18倍；如果你的祖父母和父母都属于最富1%，那么这一可能性会再增加一倍。 Studies also find that if a man’s father was not in the 0.1% he can forget about reaching the 0.1% in Sweden. The very wealthy ranks in Sweden tend to be dominated by the same family dynasties each generation. 研究还发现，对于一个普通瑞典人来说，如果他父亲不在财富积累的前0.1%，那么他自己也就别想着进入这0.1%的群体了。瑞典的财富排行榜往往被同样的豪族世家一代代把持着。 Nordic tax policy protects the wealthiest 1% by placing very high taxes on income and, by American standards, modest taxes on large inheritances. The high income taxes make it harder for a successful Scandinavian entrepreneur to earn his way into the top 1%. The low inheritance taxes make it relatively easy to pass on large estates. In America, income taxes are lower, and estate taxes higher on wealthy fortunes are higher. 北欧的税收政策保护最富有的1%人群，这体现在所得税极高，而大额遗产税与美国标准相比则要轻些。高所得税把斯堪迪纳维亚的成功企业家们拦在了1%的大门外。相对较低的遗产税给巨额遗产继承提供了方便。相较之下，美国的所得税较轻，而越富裕的人群所面对的遗产税也越高。 Tax policy may make it harder for rich Americans to maintain a spot in the top 1% generation after generation. It is hard to make a simple comparison between Nordic countries because American tax returns don’t include wealth holdings until people die and taxes are paid on their estates. But there is some evidence the richest Americans are more likely to be self-made entrepreneurs rather than members of family dynasties. 这样的税收政策可能使得富有的美国人难以一代代保持住财富最顶端1%的位置。但我们很难将北欧国家同美国简单地做比较，因为美国的纳税申报表是直到纳税人离世后征收遗产税时才会将持有财富计入征收。不过有一些证据表明最富有的美国人更多是白手起家的企业家，而不是富豪世家的成员。 A study by Kopczuk and Lena Edlund looked at estate tax data and observed that there are fewer women in the top 0.01% than in the 1960s. They argue that this is evidence of more self-made people cracking the 0.01% because heirs are equally likely to be male or female, but successful entrepreneurs tend to be male. Kopczuk和Lena Edlund所做的一项针对遗产税数据的研究显示，现在（美国的）财富顶端0.01%的人群中女性比例比1960年代时更少了。他们认为这是许多白手起家的人们挤进0.01%财富榜的表现，因为财富继承人总是男女均衡的，而成功的（白手起家）企业家则往往是男性。 The turnover in America’s top 0.01% comes from some combination of new entrepreneurs accumulating more wealth than established wealthy families, multiple heirs dividing fortunes, and estate taxes eroding family fortunes (though Kopczuk cautions there’s a lot of tax evasion when it comes to inheritances). 美国财富顶端的0.01%的流动是多重因素作用的结果，包括新晋企业家财富积累速度比老牌富豪家族更快、多个继承人分割财富和遗产税对于家族财富的侵蚀等（虽然Kopczuk告诫称美国的遗产税方面有相当程度的漏税逃税情况）。 Since most of the population lives outside the 1%, the mobility among the poor and middle class in Scandinavia is enviable and probably more important. But if you think the biggest threat to the economy is wealth concentration among the 1% being limited to a few powerful families, Scandinavia is not the utopia people make it out to be. 由于绝大多数人群与1%无关，北欧地区的贫穷和中产阶层的高流动性确实值得羡慕，或许也更为重要。但是如果你认为经济发展所面临的最大威胁是财富金字塔的顶层被极少数世家豪族霸占，那么北欧国家着实不是人们期盼的乌托邦。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-07-13】 1）影响幸福感主要因素是相对社会地位及地位之近期变动，可以几个指标衡量：社会阶梯的级数（N），个体所能感知到的级数（M），个体处于哪一级（P），最近之升降（C）， 2）处于各级的人口比例是不均匀的，至少从中位阶梯（即，站在该级上的人，其地位不低于一半人口）往上，数量呈指数下降， 3）社会大型化和复杂化将增加总的级数N， 4）密集居住、高流动性、发达媒体，将增加个体所能感知到的级数M， 5）增加M会让一些人（X）感觉自己相对地位下降了，同时让另一些人（Y）感觉自己相对地位上升了，因为（2），X的比例远高于Y，所以增加M总是拉低社会总的幸福感水平， 6）城市化、大众媒体和网络社交都会提高M 7）高等教育也会提高个体的M值 8）传统社会的结构较为扁平，同等规模的N值小于现代社会 9）传统社会绝大多数人生活中小社会，城市规模也较小，社会视野和社交范围皆较小，故同等经济条件下M值更小 10）以上大概可以解释，为何当收入提高到某个水平之后，增加收入不再能提高幸福感 11）以上还可得出几个推断：同等经济条件下，都市人比小城市人幸福感低，博士生比高中生幸福感低，用微信的比不用微信的幸福感低…… 12）我认为『追求幸福』毫无意义  

Social mobility: why does private school give you such a leg up? 社会流动性：为什么私立学校能助你一臂之力？

作者：Matt Dickson @ 2015-8-18 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：小册子（@昵称被抢的小册子） 来源：The Conversation，https://theconversation.com/social-mobility-why-does-private-school-give-you-such-a-leg-up-45739 Ever since John Major declared his shock at the dominance of the privately educated throughout Britain’s “upper echelons of power”, there has been a brighter spotlight shone on the way top professions in society are dominated by a selective elite. 约翰·梅杰曾对私立学校毕业生在英国“权力梯次上层”的支配地位表示震惊，自此以后，优选精英如何占据社会顶层职业就受到越来越多的关注。 Addressing this problem has never been more important for UK social mobility. With the re-shaping of the economy towards services, it’s predicted that four out of five future jobs will be in these professions, making them key to the future of social mobility. 对于英国的社会流动性而言，处理这个问题的重要性前所未有。由于经济正在向服务业转型，预计未来有五分之四的工作岗位将来自这些顶层职业，因此它们就成为未来社会流动性的关键。 Alan Milburn’s 2012 report into fair access to the professions showed 43% of barristers, 54% of chief executives, 51% of top medics and 54% of leading journalists attended private schools. Nationally, only 7% of children attend private schools. Alan Milburn 2012年关于公平职业机会的报告显示，43%的高级律师、54%的行政总监、51%的高级医生以及54%的新闻行业领袖念过私立学校。而全国范围内，现在只有7%的儿童在私立学校读书。 Research from the UCL Institute of Education and the University of Cambridge found that in a raw comparison, graduates who had attended private schools were 32% more likely to gain a “high-status” job – defined as the “higher managerial, administrative or professional” occupations – than state-school graduates from similar family types. 伦敦大学学院教育研究所和剑桥大学的研究发现，以来自相似家庭类型的大学毕业生做粗略比较，曾念过私立学校的比只念过公立学校的毕业生，找到“高等”工作的可能性要高出32%。该项研究将“高等”工作界定为“管理上、行政上或专业性上较高的”职业。 Even when accounting for other factors that could be driving this difference – such as a person’s grades in school, the university they attended, the course and qualification they got, or their age and gender – people who went to private school were still 8% more likely to access a high-status job after leaving university. 有一些其它因素也可能促成这一差异，比如在校成绩、所念大学、所修课程和专业资格、以及年龄与性别等。但即使将这些因素全都考虑在内，念过私立学校的学生大学毕业后获得高等工作的可能性仍然要高出8%。 A new report from the Sutton Trust and upReach charities has taken the analysis a step further. The report found that six-months after finishing university, private school graduates in high-status jobs are earning £670 per year more than those from the state sector in the same high-status positions, even after taking into account any differences in age, gender, university attended and degree obtained. Three years later, this gap has grown such that a private-school graduate is on average earning £2,198 per year more than the comparable state-school graduate. Sutton Trust和upReach两家慈善机构新近发布的一份报告对此问题做了进一步的分析。报告发现，大学毕业6个月后，即使将年龄、性别、所念大学及所获学位的差异都考虑进去，从事高等工作的私立学校毕业生，年收入也比从事同样职业的国立学校毕业生多出670磅。三年之后这种差距拉得更大，相比于国立学校毕业生，私立学校毕业生平均每年收入要多2198磅。 Elite firms look for ‘soft skills’ 精英公司想要“软技能” What is it about private schooling that causes this to happen? When it comes to getting a job and progressing up pay scales, there are always other factors apart from grades that are difficult to measure, such as self-confidence, assertiveness, ambition, determination or communication skills. These may differ between the average private and state school students and may be driving the difference. 念私立学校有什么不同，以至于出现上述差异呢？在找工作和提高收入等级时，除了成绩之外，总还有一些其它难以衡量的影响因素，比如自信、坚定、抱负、决心或沟通能力等。私立和公立学校学生一般在这些方面可能有些不同，并可能因此导致了上述差异。 This is consistent with other research from the Sutton Trust which has found that applicants to high-status jobs from less-privileged backgrounds lack self-confidence. Recent research from the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (SMCP) looking at recruitment to elite law, accountancy and financial services firms also identified that the differences in the non-academic skills of graduates from different school types played a key role in explaining different access to jobs and career progression. 这与Sutton Trust的另一项研究发现是一致的：出身弱势群体的人在申请高等工作时更加缺乏自信。社会流动性与儿童贫困委员会近期对法律、会计和金融服务等精英公司的招聘进行了研究，他们同样发现，在解释找工作和职业发展机会上的差异时，来自不同类型学校的毕业生在非学术技能上的差异是一个关键因素。 These elite firms look to recruit and promote “talent”. Their definitions incorporate the sort of non-academic skills that are not lacking in private school students, but can be lacking even among the most academically able state-school students. 这些精英公司想要招聘和提拔的是“才干之士”。在他们对“才干之士”的定义中，包含了私立学校学生从不缺乏的那些非学术技能，而在这些方面，即便是学术上最为杰出的公立学校学生也可能存在不足。 Gap in grades remains stark 成绩差距依然显著 There are policies that can help break down these barriers. The first requirement is to close the gap in attainment between different types of school. IFS research comparing the pay of state and privately educated people across all professions, found a 12% pay gap, half of which can be explained by prior attainment and the university subsequently attended. So, much of the gap is down to what happens in school. 有一些政策可以打破上述壁垒。第一个必须要做的，就是缩小不同类型学校在学业成就上的差距。英国财政研究学会对公立和私立学校毕业生在各类行业的薪酬水平进行了比较研究，发现其间存在12%的差距，该差距有一半源于早前的学业成就及随后所念的大学。因此，差距的很大一部分来自于在校经历。 The SMCP research also supports previous work that suggests attending “elite” universities and the course studied is becoming more and more important for access to top professions and higher pay. If we look at the difference in A-level attainment in the sort of “facilitating” subjects (such as maths, sciences and languages) that are preferred by the elite institutions, there is a suggestion that the gap between state and private school is narrowing. 前引社会流动性和儿童贫困委员会的研究结果也支持早前的一项研究，后者认为，接受“精英”大学教育及所学课程对于进入顶层职业和获得更高报酬的重要性与日俱增。精英机构更为偏爱那些使得进一步学习变得容易的“促进性”科目（比如数学、科学和语言等），如果我们去看中学高级水平考试中这些科目上的成绩差异，似乎有迹象表明，公立和私立学校之间的差距正在缩小。 Among 18-year-olds in 2004, 7.8% of state-school students had A*-B in three or more of these A-level subjects, compared with 21.6% of private school students. By 2010 the gap had closed slightly, largely due to a dip in independent schools' performance, but the proportion of state-school students attaining the grades required to access elite universities remains constant. 2004年的全部18岁学生中，有7.8%的公立学校学生在三门以上的中学高级水平考试“促进性”科目中得到了B或以上成绩，与之相比，私立学校学生则有21.6%。到了2010年，这一差距已略为减小，主要是因为独立学校的表现有所下滑，但取得精英大学最低录取成绩的公立学校学生比例并没有变化。   Unsurprisingly then, there is little evidence that the gap in attendance at elite universities has changed over time for students from comparable family backgrounds who attend state and private schools. The proportion of children who go to elite universities from the highest income group (which it is assumed includes private school attendees) was approximately 28% in 2010-11, compared to 12% for the next highest income group. However, this 16 percentage point gap is all but eliminated when researchers take into account how students did at A-level. 因此毫不奇怪，现在也没有什么证据表明家庭背景近似的公立和私立学校毕业生之间的精英大学录取差距有什么变化。2010-11年，最高收入群体的子女（假定包括私立学校入读者）就读精英大学的比例约为28%，与之相比，次高收入群体则为12%。不过，一旦研究人员将学生们在高级水平考试中的表现也考虑进来，这个16个百分点的差距也几乎完全不存在了。 More mentoring, earlier 更多、更早的辅导 So, the big question is how to improve the A-level results of students from state schools. After examining what can help predict better performance at A-level for bright but less advantaged students, research from Oxford University has suggested a series of policies to help boost performance by bright but less advantaged students. 因此，最大问题是如何提高公立学校学生的高级水平考试成绩。牛津大学一项研究考察了哪些因素有助于预测那些聪明但出身弱势的学生在高级水平考试中取得好成绩，并提出了帮助这一类学生改善表现的一系列政策建议。 These range from access to high-quality pre-school, daily homework, encouraging reading for pleasure, and educationally enriching activities outside of school, to greater guidance regarding the choice of subjects at GCSE and A-level likely to pay the highest future dividends in university access and beyond. 其中包括接受高质量学前教育的机会、每天做家庭作业、鼓励出于兴趣的阅读、开展具有教育意义的课外活动，还包括在普通中学教育证书和高级水平考试中为学生的科目选择提供更多指导，以帮助学生选择那些在未来的大学经历及以后人生中回报最大的科目。 The need for greater guidance, advice and mentoring for state-school pupils is also endorsed by the Sutton Trust research into recruitment for the financial services sector. These policy recommendations are now being implemented in a project that began in 2014 in which four major banks – Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Lloyds – are providing “end-to-end” support to young people from state schools. They will get help to develop non-academic skills both at school and university and then receive mentoring while in the job. 公立学校学生需要更多的指导、建议和辅导，这一点也得到了Sutton Trust关于金融服务行业招聘的一项研究的支持。这些政策建议现已在一个始于2014年的项目中得到实施，四家大银行——巴克莱、德意志银行、汇丰以及劳埃德——通过该项目向公立学校的年轻人提供“从头到尾”的支持。这些年轻人在中学和大学时都能得到培养非学术技能方面的帮助，工作以后还能得到辅导。 These closer links between state schools and professions was also identified by Milburn, who suggested that work experience placements, internships and university sandwich-year courses can all be routes to improve the transition for state students from school, through university and into the “upper echelons” of British society. Milburn也发现了这种公立学校和职业之间的紧密联系，他建议通过工作经验职位、实习期以及带“三明治年”的大学课程【译注：英国大学一种学制，大学期间有一年为实习期，通常为第三年】等途径，来帮助公立学校学生更好地实现从中学到大学最后进入英国社会“梯次上层”的转化。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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