含有〈社会〉标签的文章(86)

权威的社会功能

【2017-10-14】

这本书因为翻译烂被我扣了三颗星,原因之一是原书太好,有足够多的星可以扣,原因之二是原书的特点让它对错译特别敏感,类似性质或数量的错译若发生在其他书上,效果就没这么显著 //《基因之外》 ★★☆☆☆ 又一本好书被烂翻译糟蹋了

这可能是对文化进化理论进行形式化和体系化方面迄今为止走得最远的一本书,而用自然语言做这件事(本书没有一个数学公式),对语言的精致、准确、清晰要求很高,每个错译都有很大破坏性,这就好比一份精炼的源代码,(more...)

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7825
【2017-10-14】 这本书因为翻译烂被我扣了三颗星,原因之一是原书太好,有足够多的星可以扣,原因之二是原书的特点让它对错译特别敏感,类似性质或数量的错译若发生在其他书上,效果就没这么显著 //《基因之外》 ★★☆☆☆ 又一本好书被烂翻译糟蹋了 这可能是对文化进化理论进行形式化和体系化方面迄今为止走得最远的一本书,而用自然语言做这件事(本书没有一个数学公式),对语言的精致、准确、清晰要求很高,每个错译都有很大破坏性,这就好比一份精炼的源代码,哪怕只以万分之一的比率随机乱改一些语句,也会变得完全读不懂且跑不动。 Richerson&Boyd的模型中遗漏了一个要点:权威的功能,权威的存在解决了群体内规范执行和惩罚机制的激励问题,而这一问题的解决是群体得以成为选择单元的关键。 ​​​​ 执行规范和实施惩罚的高成本,使得一般成员缺乏足够激励这么做,而宁愿搭便车,但假如一个或一些成员能可信的分得群体收益的某个确定份额,激励问题即可解决,我在《群居的艺术》里提出了两种可能性:1)血缘群体的长辈,辈份越高,个体利益与群体利益重合度越大,规范执行激励越强,2)首领,群体首领拥有某些公共资源支配权,可部分转变为个体利益,而且在分配战利品(包括掠得的女人)上享有优先权,这两项个体收益都与群体收益方向一致。 理论上,只须简单武断的将群体收益增量的(比如)十分之一规定给某一特定个体,后者即有了执行规范的强大激励,无论这一安排具体以何种形式实现。
一篇采访问答

《群居的艺术》新书发布座谈会(6月16日)之后,《南方周末》记者石岩先生向我提出了一组问题,并且很慷慨的允许我略过我不想回答的,所以我就略过了其中两个。

1,书的三部分结构很有意思,它让我推测你写作的过程和思考的过程可能是相反的:你是身在一个秩序解耦的大型社会,再去反推秩序是怎么建立起来的,脚手架是怎么拆除的,是不是?

答:实际上,我所经历的顺序是3-1-2,首先,对现代大型社会和市场体系,我自然有着直接而真切的认识,早些年专注于经济领域的写作时,也曾着力写过许多市场带给我们的种种好处,然后,当我读到邓巴的理论时,被他的深刻见解所打动,意识到这是观察早期人类社会的一条重要线索,也和我的已有知识相容,接着,一个困惑就很自然的冒了出来:如何看待现代大社会与传统小社会的强烈反差?这促使我去关注那些曾被我熟视无睹、却默默支撑着现代社会的制度和文化元素,最终,循着这条线索,我发现我对文化与社会的许多认识被串了起来,结果便是这本书。

2,三部分的关系:第一部分是战争史,是暴力建立秩序的过程;第二部分是“软实力”,是暴力之外的共同体的构成因素;第三部分是第一二部分的反过程,就像结构主义和解构主义一样,是不是这样?

答:我选择略过这个问题。

3,书的三部分可以看到你的知识谱系,第三部分让人想起你做过程序员,大学学的是经济管理,大概大学时代对西方思想史、政治经济学有特别的兴趣;第一部分让人觉得你大概对人类学特别感兴趣;第二部分兼有人类学和世界史的背景。这些专业知识跟你的人生经历有什么关联?

答:历史和人类学是我的长期兴趣,这是两个有很多素材和故事却没多少理论的学科,对历史的兴趣在小孩子当中大概是很普遍的,但传统或主流的历史著作有个问题,就是它们很大程度上是浮于表面的政治史,很少能告诉你古人究竟是怎么过日子的,生活在古代社会究竟是怎样一种体验,这就很难满足我的好奇心,年鉴学派也只是稍(more...)

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7586
《群居的艺术》新书发布座谈会(6月16日)之后,《南方周末》记者石岩先生向我提出了一组问题,并且很慷慨的允许我略过我不想回答的,所以我就略过了其中两个。 1,书的三部分结构很有意思,它让我推测你写作的过程和思考的过程可能是相反的:你是身在一个秩序解耦的大型社会,再去反推秩序是怎么建立起来的,脚手架是怎么拆除的,是不是? 答:实际上,我所经历的顺序是3-1-2,首先,对现代大型社会和市场体系,我自然有着直接而真切的认识,早些年专注于经济领域的写作时,也曾着力写过许多市场带给我们的种种好处,然后,当我读到邓巴的理论时,被他的深刻见解所打动,意识到这是观察早期人类社会的一条重要线索,也和我的已有知识相容,接着,一个困惑就很自然的冒了出来:如何看待现代大社会与传统小社会的强烈反差?这促使我去关注那些曾被我熟视无睹、却默默支撑着现代社会的制度和文化元素,最终,循着这条线索,我发现我对文化与社会的许多认识被串了起来,结果便是这本书。 2,三部分的关系:第一部分是战争史,是暴力建立秩序的过程;第二部分是“软实力”,是暴力之外的共同体的构成因素;第三部分是第一二部分的反过程,就像结构主义和解构主义一样,是不是这样? 答:我选择略过这个问题。 3,书的三部分可以看到你的知识谱系,第三部分让人想起你做过程序员,大学学的是经济管理,大概大学时代对西方思想史、政治经济学有特别的兴趣;第一部分让人觉得你大概对人类学特别感兴趣;第二部分兼有人类学和世界史的背景。这些专业知识跟你的人生经历有什么关联? 答:历史和人类学是我的长期兴趣,这是两个有很多素材和故事却没多少理论的学科,对历史的兴趣在小孩子当中大概是很普遍的,但传统或主流的历史著作有个问题,就是它们很大程度上是浮于表面的政治史,很少能告诉你古人究竟是怎么过日子的,生活在古代社会究竟是怎样一种体验,这就很难满足我的好奇心,年鉴学派也只是稍稍好一点,这方面的不满让我在成年后逐渐更偏爱人类学,其中理由依我看是很明显的。 至于理论方面,我受益最多的是经济学、博弈论和进化论,其中前两者和我的大学教育有关,我的专业虽然是信息系统,但也包含了许多经济学课程,进化理论则主要是靠自己的阅读。 4,你是怎么从一个专业知识分子变成一个知道分子,现在又变成一个哲学家的? 答:我始终有一种抵抗专业化的倾向,并不是说专业化有什么不好,这只是我的个人选择,当然,这也是一种托辞,用来为自己未能混进专业学术圈作辩解。可是现在,要靠写作谋生就得有个头衔,免得在别人问“你是干嘛的?”时张口结舌,又因为我没有专业,就只好为自己挑了哲学家这顶帽子,因为依我看,哲学不是专业,而是一种态度。 5,好奇心从哪里来,你的大学生活,比如说水木清华bbs对你好奇心的养成有哪些帮助?课堂和图书馆呢?以前你在bbs上经常混哪个版? 答:我是1993年毕业的,那时国内还没有互联网,水木清华也是两年后才建立,我没混过。说实话,我所接受的大学教育质量很烂,除了经济学和产业史方面的一些课程引发了我的持久兴趣之外,在社会科学方面,我长期处于无头苍蝇的状态,没有多少有益的启发和点拨,清华图书馆虽然不小,但在缺乏数字化检索的情况下,其实是很难利用的,况且你根本不知道该读些什么,完全是瞎蒙瞎撞,回顾起来,我的大学生涯绝大部分是虚度的。 这一状况直到互联网可用之后才开始改变,转折点大概在98年左右,那时我已毕业多年,网上开始出现大量电子书,然后又有了亚马逊和当当,我的系统化阅读从那时才开始。 我接触BBS也是在那时,或者稍晚,混得最多的是万科周刊论坛。 6,在1990年代,经管是大学“最好”的专业之一,你是怎么从经管专业出来去做程序员的?当然程序员也是那时候最好的工种。 答:当时的清华基本上是个纯工科学校,经管学院的前身是应用数学系,我的专业是信息系统,所以除了一些经济和产业类课程之外,我受的是标准的工科训练,程序员是我们专业的典型职业方向之一,一点不算出格,呵呵。 当然,我的个人兴趣始终在社会科学方面,但因为前面说到的无头苍蝇状态,我觉得在学院里寻求发展我的这项兴趣是毫无意义的。 不过我想补充一句:科学与工程方面的训练和职业经历,对我此后的思考与写作确实很有帮助,这是我从学校教育中的主要受益。 7,那天沙龙你说你不像哲学家那样,有个终极问题然后去求解。我觉得你思考的也许不是终极问题,但是是基本问题,比如这本群居的艺术其实就是在思考人类大型社会是怎么形成的。你是何时开始思考这种基本问题的?最初写的文章发在哪里?在给《二十一世纪经济报道》还是《经济观察报》写东西之前,你在哪里写东西?你和黄章晋是怎么认识的(其实我是关心,在你开始你的类哲学思考的时候,在线上或线下有没有一个“知识共同体”,大家可以一起讨论,评议彼此的想法)? 答:诸如此类的基本问题,或者叫宏大问题,从来不是我的思考起点,我的思考通常都是零敲碎打的,这一点你从我的博客和之前的两本书都可以看得很清楚,只有在事后作阶段性回顾时,幸运的话,一个轮廓就会顺着某条线索、某个视角浮现出来,这个轮廓可能会显得比较宏大,结果就会导致一些听上去有点吓人的书名,但书名主要是用来唬人的,呵呵。 我2008年到2012年之间为《21世纪经济报道》写评论,开始了职业写作,在此之前,我只是偶尔写写文章,主要发在自己的博客上,另外给《万科周刊》投过几篇稿。 我在网上的互动早先主要发生在万科周刊论坛,后来有一年多是牛博网,再后来是自己的博客,然后是微博。在万科论坛的几年认识了很多朋友,包括黄章晋老师,他们都很有见识,也经常讨论一些有意思的话题,不过,那算不上知识共同体,因为大家的兴趣其实非常不同,虽然热门话题会引来不少议论,但很少能深入下去,所以你会发现,每次有饭局,聊天的焦点很快就会自动滑向那少数几个已经被重复了无数遍的老话题上,这是观察交流质量的一个很好指标,说实话,回顾十几年来我所参与的互动,无论在哪个圈子或平台,无论线上线下,都是乏善可陈的。 当然,话说回来,能认识一些朋友,这本身也是很有价值的事情。 8,为什么人类学成为你一个重要的思想资源?一定要把思考的上限推到那么久以前吗?在书中你援引的人类学成果都是西方的,这固然是因为人类学本来就是西方的学科,但人类学的西方视角会不会形成你思考问题时候的局限呢?比如书中说名字的出现在西方是很晚近的事情,可是据傅乐成的中国通史,中国在西周、乃至商代就有了姓、氏(不是一个概念),名字,后代文人还有号和字,中国人的名字在共同体中的作用显然已经不再简单是为称呼和收税的方便。 答:对于想多了解点人类社会的人,人类学是绕不开的,其他学科,比如经济学和政治学,可能有漂亮的理论,简洁的模型,但有关真实社会的素材却很少,这些理论和模型可以成为方便的推演起点,但是假如你不掌握大量素材,很可能会有意无意的把它们当成真实社会的进化起点,误以为某种『自然状态』果真普遍存在,社会契约的订立果真是重大历史转折点,那就太幼稚了,在我看来,大量阅读人类学材料是预防此类幼稚病的一个办法。 实际上,一种素材只要扎实可靠,我并不介意它来自哪个学科哪个学术传统,我个人对任何学科都没有情感包袱,这可能也是我们民科的一大优势吧,所以最大的局限倒是我自己的阅读视野,我相信这个局限肯定很严重,不需要具体的例证。 9,1972年作家柳青问他的女儿:“如果说秦始皇没有统一中国,一直延续了春秋战国时期的纷争局面,中国现在会不会成为像欧洲一样的经济发达地区?”你会怎么回答这个问题?战国变成秦国是小型社会变成大型社会的例子吗?上古时代,今天是中国的地方也是部落林立、征伐不断,为什么大一统对这个地方的人有那么强的内驱力?就算分裂时代每一个稍有实力的小国做的也还是大一统的梦。 答:假如春秋的封建系统能延续下去(它在战国已经差不多瓦解了),文化无疑会更繁荣,经济或许也会更发达,但即便如此,恐怕也很难指望从中发展出我们在西北欧所见到的宪政、法治,乃至整套市场制度,并由此引发工业革命,封建是宪政的良好土壤,但仅有土壤不够,还需要很多条件,其中有不少偶然性和运气成分,另外,周式封建和日耳曼封建虽然都被归为封建体系,但差异非常大,特别是在军事组织和财政安排上,这个话题太大,很难在此细讲。 10,西周的分封体系为什么玩不转的?按照你在书中的理论,分封亲友,让每个层级的核心人数都在邓巴数以内,这不应该是一个很稳固的体系吗? 答:应该说是玩转了,转了好几百年,一个转了好几百年的系统,总不能说它是完全无效或失败的,对吧。 当然,最终它还是崩溃了,而且是不可逆的崩溃了。要我说,原因有两个,首先,周式封建缺乏一种成熟的、常规化的机制来维持其成员实体之间的紧密合作和一致行动能力,以便共同对抗外敌和压服内部的秩序破坏者,所谓霸主和会盟都是非常松散和随意的,没有制度化,其次,华夏共同体与北方蛮族之间有着一条漫长而缺乏屏障的边疆,结果是,要么共同体很容易被外力摧毁,要么某些边缘诸侯会在与蛮族的长期对抗中脱颖而出成为压倒性强权,从而打破内部均衡。 11,秦的迅速解体,秦汉之间各路反叛者重以战国时代各国国号为号召,乃至汉重新拾起分封制,这说明了什么?说明了当时的人们对于郡县制这种社会架构方式消化不良吗? 答:秦的成功得益于它利用土地权利和军功晋升这两种强大激励工具而赢得了对平民的大规模动员能力,然而,作为帝国开创者,它在走向极权主义方面野心过大,而同时却不具备像现代极权主义那么高超的社会控制技术,特别是它对士大夫阶层的疏远和排斥,让它丧失了一项重要的组织资源。 相比之下,汉帝国较好的解决了这个问题,一方面维持了对平民的动员能力,一方面收编了士大夫,让他们服务于帝国权力,维护官方意识形态,并运营上层官僚机器,士大夫与权力的这一紧密结合,构成了此后大一统帝国的最重要支柱。 12,经历了大一统的汉代,合久必分的三国时代又说明了什么?人类是否有挣脱过于庞大的共同体本能? 答:创建和维持集权帝国都是非常艰难的任务,能维持几百年已经算很成功了,将其最终失败归于某种人类本能的看法,是我难以赞同的。 除了种种外力打击,帝国权力结构有着内在的腐蚀倾向,其中最致命的一点可能是激励资源的耗尽,就是说,随着代际更替,所有可以用作激励诱饵来吸引社会精英效忠权力机器的资源最终都将分配消耗殆尽,因为分配出去的特权如果不能继承,激励效果就太弱,如果可以继承,就会永远被占住,定期清洗也只能部分解决这个问题,而且清洗和对清洗的担忧会导致激烈的内部冲突,一不小心就崩盘了。 13,你似乎认为共同体越大越丰富越好?可是有很多小而美的共同体。 答:我最希望看到的,是一个自下而上组织起来的多层次共同体,在最低层次上是众多紧密而同质化的小型共同体,相互间和平竞争,最高层次上则是一个类似北约的大型安全共同体,保障内部和平与安全,并维持最低限度的宪法原则和互通性,同时并不要求成员之间高度同质化(无论是文化上还是制度上),也不对个人施加强义务。 像瑞士这样的小共同体确实很美好,但她们只能在某些特定条件下存在于强权对峙的夹缝之中,或者强权所维持的和平秩序之下,假如国际社会果真是个丛林社会,而大国又有现代级别的武力,瑞士是无法存活的,安全永远是头号问题。 更极端的例子是阿米绪社群,他们本身也足够美好,但你很难想象,像他们这样彻底放弃了自卫权的和平主义者,假如脱离了美国的宪法秩序,来到更险恶的环境中,比如非洲和拉美,如何可能生存下去?事实上我们在盎格鲁世界之外确实见不到这样的美好小共同体。 14,用《群居的艺术》里的思考方法,你怎么看欧盟的成功和不成功? 答:从消除市场壁垒,提升互通性,自下而上的组织方式这几点看,欧盟都是建立多层次大型共同体的成功典范,然而,在欧盟占主导地位的意识形态有着深厚的国家主义、福利主义和天真普世主义的传统,这些祸根正在不断腐蚀着欧盟的宪政、法治和市场制度,扼杀其创造活力,最终也会恶化其内部安全环境,而且这一趋势眼下还看不出有逆转的迹象,所以我对她的前景十分不乐观。 欧盟的例子或许会提醒世人:即便人类能够以完全和平自愿的方式建立起按以往标准衡量相当理想的大型共同体,也没有什么东西能确保它会继续朝着理想的方向发展,这是个令人无奈的现实。 15,就你书里呈现的构成大型社会过程,中国似乎绝大部分路都走完了,只差最后临门一脚。而这一脚似乎也不知道往哪里踢,因为普世主义在你看来是虚妄的。 答:这个问题风险太大,我还是不说了。 16,为什么你说推动和维护宪政的是二阶美德? 答:大型社会对个人的美德提出了一些要求,才能确保其成员之间维持最低限度的和平、合作与互惠关系,其中有些是一阶美德,意思是它们能直接引出合作性行为(相对于对抗性或剥夺性行为),比如诚实无欺的美德,让我们的关系变得更具合作性,更多互惠和利他,更少欺诈、纠纷和冲突,还有一些是二阶美德,比如对独立司法裁判机构的尊重,对个人自卫权(包括持枪权)的执着,对私人财产权的珍爱,这些美德并不直接引出合作性行为,有时甚至还会引出对抗性行为,然而它们却在维持宪政上起着重要作用,而宪政以及由宪政所支持的法治与市场体系,却可系统性的引出大量合作性行为,尽管这一因果关系不容易看清,却有着基础性地位。 17,青春的躁动这件事在什么样的群体里最具离心力? 答:如果一个社会没有为那些行动能力强又富有野心的年轻人留出足够的上升通道,同时也没有向外输出压力的释放口,那么青春躁动就会形成一股危险的力量。 如果年轻一代的人口大大高出上一代人口,或者经济繁荣度下降,问题就尤为严重,因为上升通道因萧条而变窄,同时却有更多人需要挤进去。 18,在群居的人类社会,从来就有一些离群索居的人,比如狂生隐士竹林七贤,今天日本的宅男、食草男、中国的空巢青年。你怎么看待这种现象? 答:这是件很有意思的事情,一方面,人类是高度社会性动物,强社会性首先让我们建立了紧密合作的小共同体,继而又经历漫长过程发展出大型社会,而维系大社会的众多组织和制度元素同样高度依赖于我们的强社会性,但另一方面,当社会扩展到一定程度,分工日益精细化,在一个松耦合的市场体系之中,人际关系也可以变得十分单纯和简洁,结果就为宅男宅女创造了许多生态位,在市场中,一个人只要有一项谋生技能,就能在无须和外界发生很多关系的情况下舒适的生活下去。 然而,需要强调的是,这些生态位只是整个社会结构的一部分,虽然过去几百年中这个部分可能扩大了许多,但仍然只是一部分,重要的是,提供这些生态位的那整套市场制度,仍然要求人们积极参与并努力维护它,而这些维护工作需要人们结成各种社团和组织,从事大量社会活动,因而仍然离不开个人的社会性,简言之,市场为宅男宅女创造了更好的生存机会,但只有一群宅男是建立不了市场的,也没有能力维护它。  
[译文]创造阶级的一条途径

Class, Caste, and Genes
阶级、种姓和基因

作者:Henry Harpending @ 2012-01-13
译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/class-caste-and-genes/

An article by Sabrina Tavernise appeared in the New York Times a few days ago describing increasing perceptions of class conflict in America, and there is a lot of recent commentary in the press about this report from the Pew Charitable Trust that claims there is less class mobility here than in several other northern countries.   It is not very clear to me what the complaints really are or what alternatives exist. If there is any substantial heritability of merit, where merit is whatever leads to class mobility, then mobility ought to turn classes into hereditary castes surprisingly rapidly.

几天前,Sabrina Tavernise一篇描写美国阶级矛盾越发明显的文章刊登在了《纽约时报》上,这份来自皮尤慈善信托基金(the Pew Charitable Trust)的报告宣称美国的阶级流动性少于其他几个北方国家,最近的新闻对此有很多评论。但是我并没有搞清楚他们究竟在抱怨什么或者存在什么可行的替代选项。假设存在实质性的个体优势遗传,同时个体优势总会导致阶级流动,那流动性应该会迅速地把阶层转化为世袭的种姓式分化。

A start at looking int(more...)

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Class, Caste, and Genes 阶级、种姓和基因 作者:Henry Harpending @ 2012-01-13 译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/class-caste-and-genes/ An article by Sabrina Tavernise appeared in the New York Times a few days ago describing increasing perceptions of class conflict in America, and there is a lot of recent commentary in the press about this report from the Pew Charitable Trust that claims there is less class mobility here than in several other northern countries.   It is not very clear to me what the complaints really are or what alternatives exist. If there is any substantial heritability of merit, where merit is whatever leads to class mobility, then mobility ought to turn classes into hereditary castes surprisingly rapidly. 几天前,Sabrina Tavernise一篇描写美国阶级矛盾越发明显的文章刊登在了《纽约时报》上,这份来自皮尤慈善信托基金(the Pew Charitable Trust)的报告宣称美国的阶级流动性少于其他几个北方国家,最近的新闻对此有很多评论。但是我并没有搞清楚他们究竟在抱怨什么或者存在什么可行的替代选项。假设存在实质性的个体优势遗传,同时个体优势总会导致阶级流动,那流动性应该会迅速地把阶层转化为世袭的种姓式分化。 A start at looking into genetic consequences of meritocracy is to create the simplest possible model and follow its implications. Consider free meritocracy in a two class system, meaning that each generation anyone in the lower class who has greater merit than someone in the upper class immediately swaps class with them. Mating then occurs at random within class. There are no fitness differences, no selection at all, everything is neutral. 要开始调查精英制度的遗传后果,应该建立尽可能简单的模型并遵循其推论。设想有两个阶级系统的自由精英制度,这意味着每一代中任何身处较低阶级的人,都可立刻与更高阶级中能力弱于自身的人互换阶级。然后阶级内随机通婚。这里没有健康程度的不同,也完全没有自然或人工选择,所有都保持中性。 It is convenient to discuss what happens in terms of IQ because IQ is familiar and, in northern industrial nations, closely related to merit. On the other hand we have to keep in mind that our focus on IQ is like that of the drunk searching for his keys under the lamppost: we can measure IQ but have no good way to measure honesty nor time preference nor conscientiousness and so on. 方便起见,不妨从IQ的角度来讨论由此引出的结果,因为IQ广为人知,而且在北方工业国家中,IQ跟个人优势紧密相关。另一方面,我们也必须谨记,我们对于IQ的关注就像醉汉在路灯下找寻钥匙:我们可以测量IQ,却没有好方法来测量诚实、时间偏好或者尽责性等特质。 initalgeneration This figure shows an initial population with normally distributed merit. A new merit based class system is imposed such that the two new classes are of equal size. In this free meritocracy everyone with merit exceeding the population mean moves into the upper class and everyone with merit less than the average moves into the lower class. The second panel of the figure shows the resulting merit distributions by class before reproduction and the bottom panel shows the distributions after endogamous reproduction. This model assumes that the reshuffling of genes during reproduction leads to normal distributions in the next generation within classes. 上图的顶层显示了个体优势呈正态分布的初始人口。一种基于阶级系统的新优势被引入进来,据此划分的两个新阶级的人口数量相当。在这种自由精英制度中,每个能力超过人口平均值的人都进入上层阶级,每个能力达不到平均值的人都进入下层阶级。上图的中层表示在生育前所处阶级导致的个体优势分布,底层则表示在同阶级通婚生育后的个体优势分布。这个模型假设生育过程中的基因重组会导致同阶级的下一代在个体优势上的正态分布。 The process continues for several generations. By analogy with IQ the additive heritability of merit is set to 0.6 so there are substantial random environmental effects. The second figure shows the evolution of class differences over four generations or about 100 years in human terms. 这个过程持续了几代的时间。通过类比IQ,个体优势的可加性遗传率设为0.6,所以这就有了大量随机的环境影响。下图展示了四代(人类角度的大约100年)时间内阶级差异的演化。 fourgenerations Class mobility after the first generation is 30% while after four generations it has declined to 10% and continues to decline after that.  The average merit in the two classes is about -1SD in the lower and +1SD in the upper on the original scale, corresponding to IQs of 85 and 115. 第一代之后的阶级流动性是30%,而四代之后这个数字就已跌至10%并且之后继续下降。相较于原始水平,较低阶级的平均个体优势降低了一个标准差,较高阶级的平均个体优势增加了一个标准差, 对应的IQ数值为较低阶级的85和较高阶级的115。 Recall that there are no fitness differences in this model. Still, after four generations, about 70% of the variance is between classes, which can be compared to  about 35% of the variance among continental human groups for random genetic markers, i.e. colloquially class differences are twice neutral race differences. (The familiar among-population figure of 15% made famous by Lewontin refers to gene differences while here we are comparing genotype differences of diploids, hence the difference between 15 and 35.) 回想下这模型中是没有健康水平的差异的。但在四代之后,阶级之间的方差仍到达了70%,这都可以与随机遗传标记的跨大陆种群间35%的方差相比了,例如,通俗语境中的阶级差异是纯粹种族差异的两倍。(Lewontin提出的著名的种群间15%的差异数据是指基因差异,而这里我们是比较二倍体的基因型差异,因此差别在15到35之间。) A surprise to me from this model was the rapidity with which classes turn into castes: most of the action is in the first generation or so. In retrospect this seems so obvious that it is hardly worth saying but it wasn’t so obvious to me when I started toying with it. 这模型让我吃惊的地方在于阶级转化为世袭种姓的速度之快:大部分转变在第一代左右就已发生。回想起来,这过程看起来如此明显以致于都不值得谈论,但是一开始我很随意地思考时,我并没有注意到这点。 Even though everything here is selectively neutral, I wonder about the extent to which this free meritocracy mimics selection. Any mutant that boosts merit in carriers will be concentrated in the upper class and vice versa. Greg and I discuss in our book how environmental change initially selects for dinged genes that are “quick fixes” in carriers but detrimental in homozygotes, citing sickle cell in humans, broken myostatin in beef cattle, and numerous others. Does this social system mimic selection? 即使这里的每件事情都是有选择地设为中性,我很想知道这个自由的精英制度与选拔制相似到什么程度。任何让携带者具有个体优势的基因突变都会聚集在较高阶级,反之亦然。Greg和我在我们的书【编注:Greg是Gregory Cochran,作者与他合著了《万年大爆炸》一书,West Hunter是这两位作者的合作博客】中讨论环境改变最初如何选择出了那些丧钟般的“临时补丁”基因,他们能为携带者快速解决一些问题,但对纯合子有害,造成人体内的镰状细胞,菜牛内残缺的肌肉生长抑制素,和很多其他坏处。这个社会系统也模仿选择机制吗? A correlate of IQ in humans is myopia, one idea being that IQ boosters relax early developmental constraints on CNS growth resulting in eyeballs too big for the socket, leading to myopia. I have read somewhere that myopia is positively related to income in the US. Time to try to find that literature. 跟人类IQ相关的是近视,一种观点认为IQ超群者放松了对中枢神经系统生长的早期发展限制,导致了眼球相比于眼窝过大,于是成了近视。我在某处读到,近视在美国跟收入是正相关的。该去试着找到那篇文献去了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]山巴佬该醒醒了!

‘We Hillbillies Have Got to Wake the Hell Up': Review of Hillbilly Elegy
“我们这些山巴佬该醒醒了”——《山乡挽歌》书评
A family chronicle of the crackup of poor working-class white Americans.
一份贫穷糟糕美国白人工薪阶层的家庭编年史

作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2016-07-29
翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
校对:babyface_claire
来源:reason.com,http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/29/we-hillbillies-have-got-to-wake-the-hell

编注:hillbilly和redneck、yankee、cracker一样,都是对美国某个有着鲜明文化特征的地方群体的蔑称,本文译作『山巴佬』

Read this remarkable book: It is by turns tender and funny, bleak and depressing, and thanks to Mamaw, always wildly, wildly profane. An elegy is a lament for the dead, and with Hillbilly Elegy Vance mourns the demise of the mostly Scots-Irish working class from which he springs. I teared up more than once as I read this beautiful and painful memoir of his hillbilly family and their struggles to cope with the modern world.

阅读这本非凡之作的感受时而温柔有趣,时而沮丧压抑,而且,亏了他的祖母,还往往十分狂野,狂野地对神不敬。挽歌是对死人的悼念。Vance用《山乡挽歌》缅怀了苏格兰-爱尔兰裔工人阶级的衰亡,他自己便出身于此阶级。这本书描写了他的乡下家庭及其在现代社会中的挣扎,在阅读这本美丽而痛苦的回忆录时,我几度流泪。

Vance grew up poor with a semi-employed, drug-addicted mother who lived with a string of five or six husbands/boyfrie(more...)

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‘We Hillbillies Have Got to Wake the Hell Up': Review of Hillbilly Elegy “我们这些山巴佬该醒醒了”——《山乡挽歌》书评 A family chronicle of the crackup of poor working-class white Americans. 一份贫穷糟糕美国白人工薪阶层的家庭编年史 作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2016-07-29 翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 校对:babyface_claire 来源:reason.com,http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/29/we-hillbillies-have-got-to-wake-the-hell编注:hillbilly和redneck、yankee、cracker一样,都是对美国某个有着鲜明文化特征的地方群体的蔑称,本文译作『山巴佬』】 Read this remarkable book: It is by turns tender and funny, bleak and depressing, and thanks to Mamaw, always wildly, wildly profane. An elegy is a lament for the dead, and with Hillbilly Elegy Vance mourns the demise of the mostly Scots-Irish working class from which he springs. I teared up more than once as I read this beautiful and painful memoir of his hillbilly family and their struggles to cope with the modern world. 阅读这本非凡之作的感受时而温柔有趣,时而沮丧压抑,而且,亏了他的祖母,还往往十分狂野,狂野地对神不敬。挽歌是对死人的悼念。Vance用《山乡挽歌》缅怀了苏格兰-爱尔兰裔工人阶级的衰亡,他自己便出身于此阶级。这本书描写了他的乡下家庭及其在现代社会中的挣扎,在阅读这本美丽而痛苦的回忆录时,我几度流泪。 Vance grew up poor with a semi-employed, drug-addicted mother who lived with a string of five or six husbands/boyfriends in the fading Rust Belt city of Middletown, Ohio. The only constants in his chaotic life were his grandparents, Mamaw and Papaw. Vance nearly failed out of high school but eventually graduated from Yale Law School. That personal journey is in the book, but Vance's main story is about the ongoing collapse of hillbilly culture as seen through the lens of his own family's disordered experiences. Vance在贫穷的环境中长大,他母亲半失业且吸毒成瘾,同她的五六个丈夫/男友生活在地处铁锈带、正在凋零中的俄亥俄州米德尔敦。他混乱糟糕的生活中唯一不变的是他的祖父母。Vance差点从高中退学,但最终还是从耶鲁法学院毕业。这段个人生活也被写进了书中,但书的主要情节是透过作者自己家庭颠沛流离的经历来描绘乡村文化的不断衰败。 Before going on, I should make a disclosure: Like Vance, I grew up as a hillbilly. Neither of my grandfathers could read nor write. My paternal grandparents, Mom and Daddy Bailey, left the Appalachian coal country of McDowell County, West Virginia, around 1950 and bought a dairy farm 80 miles away in Washington County, Virginia. I grew up on that farm. 在继续往下写之前,我要坦白:同Vance一样,我也是个山巴佬。我的爷爷外公都不会读写。我的爷爷、妈妈和爸爸Bailey在1950年左右离开了西弗吉尼亚州阿巴拉契亚山麓的煤城麦克道尔,在离弗吉尼亚州的华盛顿县80英里的地方买了处奶牛场。我便在那农场长大。 For most of my childhood, all six of my grandparents' adult children lived within 10 miles of the home place, as did my dozens of cousins. Every Sunday, a massive family midday "dinner"—somewhere around 40 to 50 people—convened at my grandparents' house. I left the farm at age 16, when my parents got divorced. I will spare you further details, but let's just say that the Baileys did not model their family life on the Waltons. Before I made my escape to the University of Virginia, I lived for a while with my mother and one of my sisters in a rented trailer. 在我童年的大部分时间,我祖父母的六个成年孩子都生活在离家10英里的范围内,我的表兄妹们自然也是如此。每个星期天中午,超级家宴——大约40到50个人——就会在我祖父母的家里上演。我16岁时离开那个农场,当时我父母离婚了。多的我就不讲了,我只告诉你,我们Bailey家后来在沃尔顿并没有继续那种家庭生活。在我逃到弗吉尼亚大学之前,我、妈妈和我的一个妹妹在一个租来的拖车里生活了一段时间。 HarperCollinsThough he mostly grew up in the Rust Belt, Vance identifies as a hillbilly—his family's roots are in the hollers of Breathitt County, Kentucky. Vance's Papaw and Mamaw, like tens of thousands of other mountain folk, left coal country in 1947 to find work and their shot at the American Dream in the booming steelworks 200 miles north. As a kid, Vance would accompany his grandparents as they traveled back nearly every weekend to visit with family in Kentucky. Middletown was Vance's "address," but the town of Jackson in Breathitt County where his great-grandmother Mamaw Blanton lived is his "home." 尽管Vance基本在铁锈带长大,但他自认为是个“山巴佬”——他家庭的根在肯塔基州布莱斯郡的溪谷中。Vance的爷爷奶奶,像成千上万其他山民一样,在1947年离开煤城到200英里以北的新兴钢铁企业寻找工作和实现美国梦的机会。小时候,每当他祖父母周末回到肯塔基,Vance总是陪伴他们左右。米德尔顿是Vance的“住址”,但他祖父母生活过的布莱斯郡的杰克逊才是他的“家”。 Today hillbilly culture is scarred by spectacular rates of joblessness, single motherhood, drug addiction, crime, and incarceration. Vance places most of the blame for this on the hillbillies' own shoulders. Globalization and automation decimated the manufacturing jobs that many low-skilled workers leveraged into a middle-class lives in the mid-20th century, he argues, but that's no excuse for fatalistic victimhood now. 今天的山巴佬文化被骇人的高失业率、单身母亲、毒品上瘾、犯罪和牢狱搞得遍体鳞伤。Vance认为责任主要在山巴佬自己。全球化和自动化削减了制造业的工作岗位,而20世纪中叶许多低技能的工人正是靠这些工作跻身中产阶级。但这并不能成为当下宿命论式的受害者情结的借口,Vance强调。 Throughout the book, Vance offers stories from family, friends, and neighbors that illustrate the growing cultural dysfunction among poor whites. For example, he takes a job at a floor tile warehouse for $13 an hour where one of his co-workers is a 19-year-old with a pregnant girlfriend. The warehouse owner gives the girlfriend a job as a receptionist. The 19-year-old and his girlfriend are warned about their increasingly frequent absences and tardiness, and eventually both were fired. The 19-year lashes out at the manager, saying, "How could you do this to me? Don't you know that I've got a pregnant girlfriend?" 通过这本书,Vance用自己家庭、朋友和邻居的故事向我们展示了贫穷白人中的文化失调。举个例子,他曾在一个地板瓷砖仓库工作,每小时13美元,他的一个同事是个19岁的小伙子,有个怀了孕的女友。仓库的主人给他同事的女友一份前台接待的工作。这个19岁的小伙子和他的女友因为越来越频繁的缺席和懈怠而被警告,并最终被解雇。小伙子对着经理大吼大叫,“你怎么能这样对我?你不知道我还有个怀孕的女友吗?” At another point, Vance meets an old acquaintance in a Middletown bar who tells him he recently quit his job because he was sick of waking up early. Later, the same guy was complaining on Facebook about the "Obama economy" and how it had affected his life. 还有一次,Vance在米德尔敦的一个酒吧碰见一位老熟人,那人告诉Vance,自己因为厌倦了早起而辞掉了工作。之后这个家伙又在Facebook上抱怨“奥巴马的经济政策”如何影响了他的生活。 Hillbilly culture is suspicious of outsiders and enforces a violent code of honor. Vance recalls that boys who got good grades in school were considered "sissies" or "faggots," an attitude that keeps people ill-educated and isolated. As their hopes for achieving the American Dream have faded, his hillbilly relatives, friends, and neighbors have come to see the institutions of society, government, and the economy as rigged against them. This has engendered a deep and debilitating pessimism among poor working-class whites. Hillbillies are killing themselves so effectively with drugs and alcohol that their life expectancies are actually falling. 山乡文化对外来者警惕怀疑并且极端强调荣誉。Vance回忆小时候在学校得了高分的男孩会被当成“娘炮”或“基佬”,这种态度让山巴佬无法受到良好教育并且被孤立。随着他们实现美国梦的机会逐渐消失,他的山巴佬亲戚、朋友和邻居逐渐认为社会体系、政府和经济都被操纵着跟他们作对。这在贫穷白人中催生了一股根深蒂固的、让人颓废的悲观情绪。山巴佬们用毒品和酒精毒害自己,他们的生活前景越发惨淡。 Does Vance offer any solutions for white working-class despondency and fatalism? "These problems were not created by government or corporations or anyone else. We created them, and only we can fix them," he argues. "We hillbillies have got to wake the hell up." He provides several examples of members of his extended family who have managed to leave poverty and family dysfunction behind. Tellingly, nearly all of them are women, got educations beyond high school, and married men who were not hillbillies. Vance是否为白人工薪阶级的悲观情节和宿命论提供了任何解决方案呢?“这些问题不是由政府或企业或任何人搞出来的。我们自己搞出了这些问题,只有我们自己能搞定它们,”他认为,“我们山巴佬们该清醒了。”他从他的亲戚中举了几个成功摆脱贫穷和家庭分崩离析命运的例子。值得一提的是,几乎所有人都是女性,在高中后继续接受教育并嫁给了不是山巴佬的男人。 "People sometimes ask whether I think there's anything we can do to 'solve' the problems of my community," Vance writes. "I know what they're looking for: a magical public policy solution or an innovative government program. But these problems of family, faith, and culture aren't like a Rubik's Cube, and I don't think that solutions (as most understand the term) really exist." “人们有时会问我是否觉得我们可以做些什么来‘解决’我们社区的问题,”Vance写道,“我知道他们想要什么:一个神奇的公共政策或一个创新的政府项目。但解决这些家庭、信仰、文化的问题不像玩魔方,我不认为存在什么通常意义上的解决方案。” Well, there is at least one "solution." Vance observes that all of his successful friends from Middletown did one other thing: They got the hell out of Middletown. They moved to where the jobs are. Just as Vance's hillbilly grandparents left the impoverished hollers of Kentucky to build middle-class lives in Middletown, today's urban hillbillies could get on the highway to opportunities elsewhere. In the meantime, the government should stop paying poor people to languish in Appalachian and Rustbelt poverty traps. 好吧,至少还是有个“药方”。Vance发现他所有来自米德尔敦的成功朋友都做了一件事:滚出米德尔敦。他们搬到有工作的地方。就像Vance的山巴佬祖父离开肯塔基毫无生气的溪谷并在米德尔敦过上中产生活一样,今天的城市山巴佬可以开车驶向高速公路,去别的地方找到机会。同时,政府应该停止向阿巴拉契亚和铁锈带陷入贫穷陷阱中的穷人发钱。 Vance calls himself a "cultural emigrant." By leaving his hillbilly culture behind, he has been able to create and enjoy a better life. I made much the same journey from Appalachian poverty to what has been a fascinating and fulfilling life. Vance clearly has some regrets about his cultural emigration; I have none. Vance称自己为“文化移民”。离开了山乡文化,他懂得了创造并过上了更好的生活。我走过相同的路,从我阿巴拉契亚的穷人生活中走出并过上了精彩充实的生活。Vance显然对自己的文化叛逃有几分悔意,而我没有。 Despite all their failings, Vance fiercely identifies with and loves his people. He is also a natural storyteller who makes compellingly personal the statistics and news stories about the cultural and economic coming apart of America. It hits close to home. 尽管山民在许多方面的失败,Vance仍视自己为其中一员并对他们怀着深厚感情。他天生会讲故事。关于美国在文化和经济上的分裂【编注:此处双关,Coming Apart是政治学家Charles Murray的一部著作】,在别处你会读到平淡的统计数字和新闻故事,但他能让你感同身受。这就是我们的家乡。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

读史笔记#23:封侯拜爵的神仙们

封侯拜爵的神仙们
辉格
2016年12月11日

中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称,宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗,有史料可查者即有92个,扣除名号重复者,还有50多个,粗略估算,全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间,看来古代中国人『积极造神,见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。

如此多神仙得到敬拜,还要归功于神仙来源的多样化,和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性;早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿,比如司掌某种自然力的自然神,或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神,然而自中古以降,一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。

这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物,因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力;认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官,参加过某次战役,遭受过冤屈,或者离奇死亡——总之,任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方(more...)

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封侯拜爵的神仙们 辉格 2016年12月11日 中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称,宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗,有史料可查者即有92个,扣除名号重复者,还有50多个,粗略估算,全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间,看来古代中国人『积极造神,见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。 如此多神仙得到敬拜,还要归功于神仙来源的多样化,和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性;早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿,比如司掌某种自然力的自然神,或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神,然而自中古以降,一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。 这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物,因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力;认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官,参加过某次战役,遭受过冤屈,或者离奇死亡——总之,任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方都可以让他们获得候选资格,但真正确立其神灵地位的,是『灵验』事迹,即有人在向他祈求佑助时得偿所愿。 在《变迁之神》一书中,人类学家韩森考察了此类神祗的兴起,发现其数量在宋代经历了爆发性增长,而之所以神界能容得下如此规模的神口增长,是因为他们都是地方性的,其神力作用半径不过数十里,各地若想有神可求,就得自己造一个,而同时,造神逻辑本身确保了新神的供给:灵验的随机性意味着总是不断会有旧神失宠,新神崛起。 有趣的是,帝国朝廷对这场民间造神运动颇为热心,从11世纪初起,宋廷便挑选一些信众认可度较高的地方神祗予以官方承认,编入祀典,许多还授予官爵名号,拨给公款用于立碑修庙;一旦某神获得这样的官方地位,地方官便有责任定期组织祭祀敬拜活动,甚至提供财政和劳役支持。 韩森注意到,从1075年起,为地方神仙封授官爵的做法大面积铺开,并在此后成为政府的一项常规职能,其规模甚大,每年封授数十位神仙,每次封授都要经历一个繁杂的流程,涉及尚书省、礼部和太常寺的众多衙门,还有地方政府的两轮灵验性查证,那么,朝廷为何要花费大量行政与财政资源来做这样一件看起来没有实际功效的事情呢? 要理解这一点,我们最好将它和帝国的另一项重要制度——科举——对照着看;表面上,科举只是为帝国选拔官员的(它也确实有这功能),但实际上,它最重要的功能是为全民提供一部开放、全面覆盖且贯通到底的社会上升阶梯,而在此之前,上升通道往往为数十个门阀豪族所垄断,其他人只能凭借战功、偶然的恩宠、内乱造成的重新洗牌等非经常性机会来谋求晋身。 科举的这一功能对赢取精英阶层的广泛效忠从而强化帝国权力起着极为根本的作用,它让人口中最富有、最有才智、最有野心的那些人将其视为实现抱负的好机会,而假如没有这样的机会,他们很可能去支持其他潜在的权力中心,或者以官方所不愿看到的方式施展抱负,因而对帝国权力构成威胁。 科举也是推行官方价值体系和历史叙事的工具,求取功名者心甘情愿接受和传播官方说辞,而一旦取得功名便成为这一体系的既得利益者因而有足够动机去维护它,并将其渗透植入到他们拥有巨大影响力的家族传统和地方文化中。 虽然只有百分之几的成年男性参与科举,取得功名者更少,但无论是巩固还是颠覆帝国权力基础,这都是最有能量的一群人,而且,科举功名带来的权力、财富、士绅特权,甚至仅仅是读写能力,都会将他们置于家族和地方社区的领袖地位,因而笼络他们就笼络了他们所在的家族和地方。 从唐代起,帝国通过封授土司对未归化地区实施羁縻政策,科举与士绅特权的结合,其实就是对政治结构中帝权难以直接通达的部分实施羁縻,通过士绅羁縻家族与地方,类似的,为地方神仙封授官爵,则是对民间信仰与崇拜活动的羁縻。 之所以神仙也需要羁縻,是因为,对于世俗权力,神是个危险的存在,每个神灵名下都可能凝聚起一套价值观,道德规范,行为准则,乃至行动纲领,其中每一样都可能与官方版本相冲突,都有潜力在权力竞争中成为敌方的动员与组织基础,特别是当它们被一个独立的僧侣团体所控制时,就更危险了。 凭借封授制度,朝廷有机会对神祗进行筛选、约束、引导、改造和控制,很明显,他们会竭力排除最危险的那些神,比如有着另一套行为准则的道德神,或一神教中极具动员力的排他性神,或有着现成经典因而其合法性可能被僧侣组织掌握的神,还有附带着行动纲领的弥赛亚,而最合他们胃口的,将是那些不具有全国性动员能力的地方神,以及能够提供现世佑助却又毫无道德要求的功利神,或许并非巧合的是,后两种恰是此后中国最流行的神灵。  
[译文]令人尴尬的社会学证据

The sobering evidence of social science
来自社会科学的证据发人深省

作者:George F. Will @ 2016-07
译者:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar)
来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sobering-evidence-of-social-science/2016/07/06/4a3831f8-42dd-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html

The report was so “seismic” — Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s word — that Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration released it on Fourth of July weekend, 1966, hoping it would not be noticed. But the Coleman Report did disturb various dogmatic slumbers and vested interests. And 50 years on, it is pertinent to today’s political debates about class and social mobility. So, let us now praise an insufficiently famous man, sociologist James Coleman, author of the study “Equality of Educational Opportunity.”

这份报告如此‘有震撼力’,用Daniel Patrick Moynihan的话来说,以至Lyndon B. Johnson政府选择在1966年独立日前的周末发布这份报告,冀望无人留意【编注:7月4日为美国独立日,乃公共假日,Fourth of July weekend就是恰好与独立日连上的那个周末,1966年7月4日为星期一,故此周末为独立日前之周末】。但“Coleman报告”确实惊扰了教条主义者的昏睡和既得利益团体的算盘。50年后,这份报告和眼下关于阶层和社会流动性的政治辩论仍息息相关。那么,让我们赞誉一位名气还不够大的男士,研究著作《教育机会的平等》的作者,社会学家James Coleman。

In 1966, postwar liberalism’s confidence reached its apogee. From 1938, when the electorate rebuked Franklin Roosevelt for his plan to “pack” the Supreme Court, through 1964, congressional Republicans and conservative Democrats prevented a liberal legislating majority. But Johnson’s 44-state victory that year gave Democrats 68 Senate seats and a majority of 155 in the House.

1966年,战后自由主义者的自信心膨胀到最高峰。1938年,选民严厉抨击了富兰克林·罗斯福“填充最高法院”的计划。自那时至1964年,多亏国会中的共和党议员和保守派民主党议员,自由主义者未能掌握立法机构多数议席。然而,1966年,约翰逊拿下来44个联邦州,民主党人在参议院占有68席,在众议院以155席拿下多数席位。

Effortless and unint(more...)

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The sobering evidence of social science 来自社会科学的证据发人深省 作者:George F. Will @ 2016-07 译者:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sobering-evidence-of-social-science/2016/07/06/4a3831f8-42dd-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html The report was so “seismic” — Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s word — that Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration released it on Fourth of July weekend, 1966, hoping it would not be noticed. But the Coleman Report did disturb various dogmatic slumbers and vested interests. And 50 years on, it is pertinent to today’s political debates about class and social mobility. So, let us now praise an insufficiently famous man, sociologist James Coleman, author of the study “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” 这份报告如此‘有震撼力’,用Daniel Patrick Moynihan的话来说,以至Lyndon B. Johnson政府选择在1966年独立日前的周末发布这份报告,冀望无人留意【编注:7月4日为美国独立日,乃公共假日,Fourth of July weekend就是恰好与独立日连上的那个周末,1966年7月4日为星期一,故此周末为独立日前之周末】。但“Coleman报告”确实惊扰了教条主义者的昏睡和既得利益团体的算盘。50年后,这份报告和眼下关于阶层和社会流动性的政治辩论仍息息相关。那么,让我们赞誉一位名气还不够大的男士,研究著作《教育机会的平等》的作者,社会学家James Coleman。 In 1966, postwar liberalism’s confidence reached its apogee. From 1938, when the electorate rebuked Franklin Roosevelt for his plan to “pack” the Supreme Court, through 1964, congressional Republicans and conservative Democrats prevented a liberal legislating majority. But Johnson’s 44-state victory that year gave Democrats 68 Senate seats and a majority of 155 in the House. 1966年,战后自由主义者的自信心膨胀到最高峰。1938年,选民严厉抨击了富兰克林·罗斯福“填充最高法院”的计划。自那时至1964年,多亏国会中的共和党议员和保守派民主党议员,自由主义者未能掌握立法机构多数议席。然而,1966年,约翰逊拿下来44个联邦州,民主党人在参议院占有68席,在众议院以155席拿下多数席位。 Effortless and uninterrupted prosperity seemed assured as the economy grew in 1965 and 1966 by 10.7 percent and 7.99 percent, respectively. So, a gusher of tax revenue coincided with liberalism’s pent-up demand for large projects. It hoped to meld two American traits — egalitarian aspirations and faith in education’s transformative power. 1965年和1966年的经济增长率分别为10.7%和7.99%,唾手可得且无间断的繁荣看似已不在话下。于是,井喷式的税入增长恰逢自由派对大项目压抑已久的热情,如同干柴烈火。自由派希望将两大美国特色融为一体——追求人人平等的志向和教育推动变革的信念。 The consensus then was that the best predictor of a school’s performance was the amount of money spent on it: Increase financial inputs, and cognitive outputs would increase proportionately. As the postwar baby boom moved through public schools like a pig through a python, almost everything improved — school buildings, teachers’ salaries, class sizes, per-pupil expenditures — except outcomes measured by standardized tests. 那时的共识是,学校经费数目是预测该校学生表现的最佳指标:增加经费投入,学生的认知水平会成比例地上升。二战后婴儿潮横扫公立学校,如同一头猪通过巨蟒体内,公立学校的任一方面几乎都比以往更上一层楼——校舍、教师薪资、班级规模、平均每个学生的经费投入——唯一的例外是由标准化考试衡量的学生表现。 Enter Coleman, and the colleagues he directed, to puncture complacency with the dagger of evidence — data from more than 3,000 schools and 600,000 primary and secondary school students. His report vindicated the axiom that social science cannot tell us what to do, it can tell us the results of what we are doing. He found that the best predictor of a school’s outcomes was the quality of the children’s families. And students’ achievements are influenced by the social capital (habits, mores, educational ambitions) their classmates bring to school: 让Coleman和受其指导的同僚上台,用证据之匕首——从3000所学校和60万名小学、初中生处收集的数据 —— 刺破自满的气球吧。Coleman的报告印证了一个公理:社会科学无法指导我们行事,它能告诉我们的是行动的后果。Coleman发现,预测某校学生表现的最佳指标是学生家庭的素质。学生的学业表现受其同学带到学校的社会资本(习惯、规矩、教育方面的进取心)的影响: “One implication stands out above all: That schools bring little influence to bear on a child’s achievement that is independent of his background and general social context; and that this very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities with which they confront adult life at the end of school.” “一个暗含推论尤为突出:将学生的家庭背景和社交圈子的影响排除后,学校教育对学生的学业成就影响极小;这意味着由家庭、社区和同侪环境带来的水平不均等,将一路伴随他们毕业,成为他们开启成人生活时面临的不均等。” Coleman’s report came exactly one year after — and as an explosive coda to — what is known as the Moynihan Report, which was leaked in July 1965. Moynihan, then a 37-year-old social scientist in Johnson’s Labor Department, presented in “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action” what then counted as shocking news: 23.6 percent of African American births were to unmarried women. Coleman的报告恰好于“Moynihan报告” 发表一年后面世,为后者燃起之火添柴加薪。 Moynihan在1965年7月被人泄露于众。当年Moynihan 37岁,是约翰逊执政下劳工部的一名社会学者,他的研究《黑人家庭:国家行动的案例》,成为令时人震惊的新闻:23.6%的非裔美籍婴儿由未婚女性所生。 Today 71 percent are. Almost 47 percent of all first births are to unmarried women, and a majority of all mothers under 30 are not living with the fathers of their children. 如今这个数字为71%。将近47%的头胎新生儿由未婚女性所生,大多数30岁以下的母亲和孩子的父亲分居。 The causes of family disintegration remain unclear, but 51 years ago Moynihan and then Coleman foresaw the consequences. Moynihan said the “tangle” of pathologies associated with the absence of fathers produces a continually renewed cohort of inadequately socialized adolescent males. Socializing them is society’s urgent business if it is to avoid chaotic neighborhoods and schools where maintaining discipline displaces teaching. Coleman documented how schools are reflections of, rather than cures for, the failure of families to function as the primary transmitters of social capital. 家庭解体的原因尚未明朗,但51年前Moynihan和Coleman先后预见到家庭解体的后果。Moynihan称,父亲缺位造成的种种困扰,源源不断地产生了一代社会化不充足的青春期男性。使他们充分社会化是社会的当务之急,否则难以避免产生混乱的社区和学校,在那里维持纪律取代了正常教学。学校本应是首要的社会资本传递途径,现在却成了家庭溃败的倒影,而非家庭溃败的解药,这一切都被Coleman记在笔下。 The extraordinary synergy between Moynihan and Coleman was serendipitous. Today, their baton of brave and useful sociology has passed to Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute. His “Losing Ground” (1984) was an autopsy of 1960s aspirations. His “Coming Apart” (2012) explores the social consequences — we are wallowing in the political consequences — of a bifurcated society in which many do very well while many others are unable to reach even the lowest rungs on the ladder of upward mobility. Moynihan和Coleman两项研究的协同增强效应,纯属意外。如今,他们勇敢、实用的社会学接力棒,传到了美国企业研究所的Charles Murray手上。Murray《站不住脚》(1984年出版)一书解剖了1960年代那场失败的壮举。他的《四分五裂》(2012年出版)一书探索了社会两极分化带来的社会后果。社会两极分化的表现是,许多人非常出色,而另外的很多人甚至连社会爬升阶梯的最低梯级都够不着,我们正在两极分化的政治后果中打滚。 Coleman’s evidence that cultural rather than financial variables matter most was not welcomed by education bureaucracies and unions. Similarly, we now have more than half a century of awkward, and often ignored, evidence about the mostly small and evanescent effects of early-childhood education. Today’s Democratic Party fancies itself “the party of science”; Barack Obama pledged, in his first inaugural address, to “restore science to its rightful place.” Social science, however, is respected by Democrats only when it validates policies congenial to the interests of favored factions. 比起经费投入,文化因素是最重要的影响变量,教育官僚机构和工会并不青睐Coleman提出的证据。与此情况相仿,早期儿童教育效果微弱,转瞬即逝,这方面令人尴尬、常被忽略的证据,我们已经积累了50多年了。如今民主党幻想自身为“科学之党”;贝拉克·奥巴马在他首个总统任期的就职演讲中,誓言“恢复科学理应占有的地位。”然而,仅在社会科学论证支持的政策有利于民主党所偏袒的利益团体时,民主党人才会尊重社会科学。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]丹麦童话 vs 美国梦

The Atlantic: Denmark Isn’t Magic
《大西洋月刊》:丹麦并不神奇

作者:DEREK THOMPSON @ 2016-08-02
译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/the-american-dream-isnt-alive-in-denmark/494141/

New research suggests that the American dream isn’t alive in Scandinavia—but generous redistribution of wealth isn’t a terrible consolation prize.

新的研究表明,美国梦在斯堪的纳维亚没市场,但慷慨大方的财富再分配并非糟糕的安慰奖。

Danophilia is alive and well in America. Bernie Sanders and other liberals have lauded Denmark’s social democratic dream state, with its free college tuition, nearly universal pre-K, and plentiful child care.

倒是丹麦迷在美国大受欢迎且很滋(more...)

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The Atlantic: Denmark Isn't Magic 《大西洋月刊》:丹麦并不神奇 作者:DEREK THOMPSON @ 2016-08-02 译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/the-american-dream-isnt-alive-in-denmark/494141/ New research suggests that the American dream isn’t alive in Scandinavia—but generous redistribution of wealth isn’t a terrible consolation prize. 新的研究表明,美国梦在斯堪的纳维亚没市场,但慷慨大方的财富再分配并非糟糕的安慰奖。 Danophilia is alive and well in America. Bernie Sanders and other liberals have lauded Denmark’s social democratic dream state, with its free college tuition, nearly universal pre-K, and plentiful child care. 倒是丹麦迷在美国大受欢迎且很滋润。伯尼·桑德斯和其他自由派盛赞丹麦是社会民主主义的梦想国度,因其免费的大学教育,几乎无所不包的学前教育和对孩童的充分关照。 While Republicans and Democrats both praise the virtues of what economists call “intergenerational mobility”—the chance for a poor young child to become at least a middle-class adult—America doesn’t lead the world in the pursuit of the American Dream. 共和党和民主党都赞美经济学家所谓的“代际流动性”——一个贫穷孩子长大至少成为中产阶级的机会——的优点,而在这一点上,美国并未在对美国梦的追求中身先士卒。 The standard social mobility statistic measures how much each generation's income is determined by its parents' income. By that measure, northern Europe and Scandinavia have the highest social mobility in the advanced world, and Denmark tops the list. 标准的社会流动性统计衡量一代人的收入多大程度上由其父母收入所决定。按照这种衡量方式,欧洲北部和斯堪的纳维亚的社会流动性在发达世界排名最高,其中丹麦名列第一。 But this Danish Dream is a “Scandinavian Fantasy,” according to a new paper by Rasmus Landersø at the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit in Copenhagen and James J. Heckman at the University of Chicago. Low-income Danish kids are not much more likely to earn a middle-class wage than their American counterparts. What’s more, the children of non-college graduates in Denmark are about as unlikely to attend college as their American counterparts. 但是,哥本哈根的Rockwool基金会研究部Rasmus Landersø和芝加哥大学James J. Heckman的一项新研究指出,丹麦梦是一个“斯堪的纳维亚空想”。相较于美国的低收入家庭的孩子,丹麦低收入家庭的孩子不会更有可能挣到中产阶级的工资。甚至相较于美国的情况,丹麦无大学文凭者的孩子上大学的希望同样渺茫。 If that’s true, how does Denmark rank number-one among all rich countries in social mobility? It’s all about what happens after wages: The country’s high taxes on the rich and income transfers to the poor “compress” economic inequality within each generation: When the rungs on the economic ladder are closer together, it’s easier to move a little bit up (or down) over the course of a generation. 如果真是这样,为何丹麦的社会流动性在所有富裕国家排名第一?这都源于工资背后的事:国家把从富人和收入里征收的高额税款转移给穷人的做法,“压缩”了代际之间的经济不平等:当社会上升阶梯的横档靠得更近时,代际之间向上(或下)移动就更容易一点。 “The Scandinavian Fantasy” is a rich, complex paper that is already making waves in the newly popular subject of intergenerational mobility. It makes three major points. “斯堪的纳维亚空想”是一篇丰富而复杂的论文,它推波助澜了代际流动性这一新近的流行主题。论文提出三个主要观点。 The first big idea is that Denmark is not a nation of Horatio Algersens. Its high social mobility is not the result of an economy that is uniquely good at helping poor children earn middle-class salaries. Instead, it is a country much like the U.S., where the children of poor parents who don’t go to college are also unlikely to attend college or earn a high wage. Social mobility in Denmark and the U.S. seem to be remarkably similar when looking exclusively at wages—that is, before including taxes and transfers. 第一个是,丹麦不是Horatio Algersens的国家。其高社会流动性并非来自利于贫穷孩子挣到中产薪水的经济。相反它很像美国,在那里没上大学的穷父母的孩子也不大可能上大学或赚取高薪。只看工资——在不考虑税收和财富转移时——丹麦和美国的社会流动性非常相似。【译注:Horatio Alger,1832年1月13日出生,是19世纪一位多产的美国作家,以少年小说而闻名。阿尔杰小说的风格大多一致,均描述一个贫穷少年如何通过其正直、努力、少许运气以及坚持不懈最终取得成功。历史学家认为,阿尔杰的作品绝不仅局限于其有趣的故事本身,小说中描述的通过自身努力获得成功的主人公,给予了大量当时美国穷人力量、信心及动力,更加刻苦工作换取成功。】 It is only after accounting for Denmark’s high taxes on the rich and large transfers to the poor that its social mobility looks so much better than the U.S.’s. America’s (relatively conservative) economic philosophy is that, with low taxes and little regulation, the market is an open savannah where the most talent will win out. But Denmark’s economic philosophy seems to be that the market is an unfortunate socioeconomic lottery system, and so the country compensates the poor with generous transfers paid by high taxes on the rich. 只有平衡了丹麦对富人征高税收和向穷人大量转移财富的因素以后,其社会流动性看上去比美国好很多。美国(相对保守的)的经济哲学是低税收和少管制,市场如同一片开放的大草原,大多数天才自然脱颖而出。而丹麦的经济理念则是,市场是一个不怎么靠谱的社会经济彩票投注系统,所以需要政府通过多征富人税并以慷慨的转移支付补偿穷人。 The second big idea in the paper is that Denmark’s large investment in public education pays off in higher cognitive skills among low-income children, but not in higher-education mobility—i.e., the odds that a child of a non-college grad will go on to finish college. 论文第二个重要观点是,丹麦公共教育的大量投资,在提高低收入家庭孩子的认知技能方面有所斩获,但未增加高等教育的流动性,比如,非大学毕业生子女完成大学学业的几率并未提高。 Overall, Denmark spends much more than the U.S. on all levels of education. In particular, a much higher share of its poor young children is enrolled in daycare and preschool than the United States. This large public investment in kids seems to increase cognitive skills among poor Danish children compared to their American peers. In international math and reading scores, for example, the poorest quartile in Denmark far outperforms their counterparts in the U.S. 总体而言,丹麦在各级教育上的花费比美国多得多。特别是贫困孩子上幼儿园和学前班的比例远高于美国。比起美国的同龄孩子,丹麦对孩子的大量公共投资提高了贫困儿童的认知能力。以国际数学和阅读考试为例,丹麦的最低四分位数的成绩值远优于美国。 But despite this far greater investment in young children and public colleges, Danish children of high-school graduates are still extremely unlikely to go onto college. Put slightly differently, a tiny share of Denmark’s college graduate population comes from homes where neither parent finished high school. The children of college-grads almost always go to college; the children of non-grads often don’t—even in Denmark. 但是,尽管在儿童和公立大学的投资大了很多,丹麦高中毕业生进入大学的可能性仍然非常低。稍有一点不同,极小一部分丹麦大学毕业生来自父母都没读完高中的家庭。大学生的孩子上大学;没上大学的父母,孩子往往也不上大学——即使在丹麦也是这样。 The third big idea is that Denmark’s welfare policies might reduce its citizens’ incentives to go to college. In the early 1990s, when Denmark raised the minimum age of eligibility for social assistance, college enrollment among Danish twenty somethings fell below its trajectory. Based on this finding, the researchers conclude that welfare policies may reduce college enrollment. Denmark makes it more comfortable to be poor and less lucrative to be rich, so many young people decide to end their education after high school. 第三个重要观点是,丹麦的福利政策可能降低了公民上大学的激励。1990年代初,丹麦提高了获得社会援助资格的最低年龄,大学在二十多岁青年人中的招生数随即跌入下行轨迹。基于这项发现,研究人员得出结论,福利政策会减少高校招生。丹麦让穷人更舒适,富人更无利可图,故而很多年轻人决定高中毕业后不再接受教育。 This final idea may be the most controversial. After all, it’s not clear how to frame this finding. Democrats can say: Despite conservative arguments that a welfare state could destroy poor young people’s ambition, Denmark’s educational mobility is no worse than the U.S. But Republicans can say: Despite liberal arguments that Denmark is so much better than the U.S. at social mobility, its poor kids are no more likely to go to college. “There is something here for the Republicans and for the Democrats,” Heckman told me. 最后这个观点可能最具争议。毕竟,目前还不清楚如何解释这个发现。民主党人可以说:尽管保守派观点认为福利国家可能毁掉贫穷年轻人的雄心壮志,可是丹麦的教育流动性并不比美国差。而共和党人可以说:尽管自由派认为丹麦的社会流动性比美国更好,可是其贫穷孩子们同样不太可能进入大学。“这些就是共和党和民主党的说辞”,Heckman告诉我。 The most significant implication of this paper is not a happy one: Equality of opportunity is a fantasy. It does not exist in the U.S., it does not exist in Denmark, and it probably doesn’t exist anywhere. The children of rich college graduates are far more likely to grow up to become rich college graduates, even in the world's social-democratic fantasyland. That is because, everywhere, parents matter. 本文最有意义的推论并不让人开心:机会平等是一种幻想。它在美国不存在,在丹麦不存在,可能在任何地方都不存在。富有的大学毕业生的孩子更有可能成长为富有的大学毕业生,即使在这世界的社会民主乐园——丹麦也是这样。这是因为,任何地方,父母都很重要。 And it’s probably a good thing that parents matter. For the government to make equality of opportunity its singular and absolute policy goal would probably mean breaking up neighborhoods, forcing arranged marriages, enrolling all children in a unified curriculum, and having them all taught by a mass-produced robot; that would eliminate neighborhood effects, assortative mating, peer effects, curricular differences, and the problem of unequal teaching quality. It is unclear that there is a constituency for this policy, even among the most radical of Bernie bros. 当然,父母很重要可能是件好事。对想要实现机会平等的政府来说,其单一而绝对的政策目标,将可能意味着打破邻里关系,强行安排婚姻,统一所有孩子的学习课程,让大批量生产的机器人教授所有孩子;那样将消除邻里影响、选择性的婚配关系【编注:即人们从与自己地位、收入、教育等方面背景相似的人群中选择配偶的倾向】、同侪效应、课程差异和不同教学质量的问题。不知道是否有选区支持这种政策,即使是最激进的桑德斯支持者。 But just as Denmark’s policy may have its own unintended consequences, the American philosophy of opportunity has its own dark side. For example, high income inequality in the U.S. makes a college degree more valuable in America than in similar countries. This may encourage more poor Americans to enroll in college. 但是,正如丹麦政策有自己意想不到的后果,美国式的自我奋斗争取机会的哲学也有自己的暗面。例如,美国显著的收入不平等使美国大学学位比在同类国家更值钱。这会鼓励更多美国穷人上大学。 For many, college pays off. But the recent rise in college attainment in the U.S. has come at a terrible cost for some. Student debt has exploded, particularly at for-profit colleges serving older, poorer students, the majority of whom drop out with student loans that aren’t dischargeable in bankruptcy. 对于很多人来说,上大学是值得的。但是对于一些人,近期大学费用已经上涨到了糟糕的程度。学生债务激增,特别是上营利性院校的年纪较大的穷学生,他们中的大多数辍学时仍带着就算破产也必须偿还的学生贷款。 So the social siren of American inequality—join the rich! go to college!—lures many first-generation students to put tens of thousands of dollars toward a degree that they never get. If they default on their student loans, they won’t be able to get a loan to buy a house. Which means the housing market is constrained by student debt defaults. Which means other industries that rely on a healthy housing market—furniture, cars, plants, kitchen appliances, apparel—are also affected. 因此,美国社会不公平的刺耳警报——成为富人!考上大学!——诱使许多第一代学生花费上万美元以期获得一张他们得不到的文凭。如果他们拖欠学生贷款,将无法获得贷款买房子。这意味着学生债务违约限制了房地产市场发展。也意味着依赖良好运行的房地产市场的其他工业,如家具、汽车、种植、厨房电器和服装都会受到影响。 Denmark doesn’t have all the answers, and apparently its leaders know it—that’s why they have such a strong public assistance system in the first place. But the U.S. mythology of social mobility is also self-defeating, in ways that are exceptionally American. 丹麦没有给出所有的答案,显然其领导人知道这一点,这就是为什么他们首先建立了一套强有力的公共援助制度。但是,美国社会流动性的神话,以非常美国的方式,也打了自己的脸。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]聪明人不需要那么多朋友?

Why smart people are better off with fewer friends
为什么聪明人最好少交朋友

作者:Christopher Ingraham @ 2016-03-18
翻译:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/18/why-smart-people-are-better-off-with-fewer-friends/

Hell might actually be other people — at least if you’re really smart.

他人没准还真是地狱——至少对一个真正聪明的人来说是这样的。

That’s the implication of fascinating new research published last month in the British Journal of Psychology. Evolutionary psychologists Satoshi Kanazawa of the London School of Economics and Norman Li of Singapore Management University dig in to the question of what makes a life well-lived. While traditionally the domain of priests, philosophers and novelists, in recent years survey researchers, economists, biologists and scientists have been tackling that question.

这是上个月在《英国心理学杂志》发表的一篇有趣的新研究中说的。两位进化心理学家,伦敦政治经济学院的Satoshi Kanazawa和新加坡管理大学的Norman Li,对于如何活出幸福人生进行了深入的研究。这个传统上被神父、哲学家和小说家把控的议题,近年来却被问卷调查者、经济学家、生物学家和科学家所关注。

Kanazawa and Li theorize that the hunter-gatherer lifestyles of our ancient ancestors form the foundation for what make us happy now. “Situations and circumstances that would have increased our ancestors’ life satisfaction in the ancestral environment may still increase our life satisfaction today,” they write.

Kanazawa和Li提出的理论是,我们祖先的狩猎采集生活方式决定了我们感受幸福的底层机制。他们认为,“在原始环境中能够使我们祖先得到满足的情境,或许在今天仍然可以提升我们的满足感。”

They use what they call “the savanna theory of happiness” to explain two main findings from an analysis of a large national survey (15,000 respondents) of adults aged 18 to 28.

他们使用了这个所谓的“关于幸福的热带草原理论”来解释两个主要的研究发现,被研究对象是一项涵盖了15,000个18到28岁成年人的大型全国调查。

First, they find that people who live in more densely populated areas tend to report less satisfaction with their life overall. “The higher the population density of the immediate environment, the less happy” the survey respondents said they were. Second, they find that the more social in(more...)

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Why smart people are better off with fewer friends 为什么聪明人最好少交朋友 作者:Christopher Ingraham @ 2016-03-18 翻译:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/18/why-smart-people-are-better-off-with-fewer-friends/ Hell might actually be other people — at least if you're really smart. 他人没准还真是地狱——至少对一个真正聪明的人来说是这样的。 That's the implication of fascinating new research published last month in the British Journal of Psychology. Evolutionary psychologists Satoshi Kanazawa of the London School of Economics and Norman Li of Singapore Management University dig in to the question of what makes a life well-lived. While traditionally the domain of priests, philosophers and novelists, in recent years survey researchers, economists, biologists and scientists have been tackling that question. 这是上个月在《英国心理学杂志》发表的一篇有趣的新研究中说的。两位进化心理学家,伦敦政治经济学院的Satoshi Kanazawa和新加坡管理大学的Norman Li,对于如何活出幸福人生进行了深入的研究。这个传统上被神父、哲学家和小说家把控的议题,近年来却被问卷调查者、经济学家、生物学家和科学家所关注。 Kanazawa and Li theorize that the hunter-gatherer lifestyles of our ancient ancestors form the foundation for what make us happy now. "Situations and circumstances that would have increased our ancestors’ life satisfaction in the ancestral environment may still increase our life satisfaction today," they write. Kanazawa和Li提出的理论是,我们祖先的狩猎采集生活方式决定了我们感受幸福的底层机制。他们认为,“在原始环境中能够使我们祖先得到满足的情境,或许在今天仍然可以提升我们的满足感。” They use what they call "the savanna theory of happiness" to explain two main findings from an analysis of a large national survey (15,000 respondents) of adults aged 18 to 28. 他们使用了这个所谓的“关于幸福的热带草原理论”来解释两个主要的研究发现,被研究对象是一项涵盖了15,000个18到28岁成年人的大型全国调查。 First, they find that people who live in more densely populated areas tend to report less satisfaction with their life overall. "The higher the population density of the immediate environment, the less happy" the survey respondents said they were. Second, they find that the more social interactions with close friends a person has, the greater their self-reported happiness. 第一个发现是,在高人口密度地区生活的人们对他们的生活总体上更缺乏满足感。被调查者回应说“周围人口密度越大,就越感觉不幸福”。第二个发现是,和亲密朋友的更多交往伴随着更多的幸福感。 But there was one big exception. For more intelligent people, these correlations were diminished or even reversed. 但是有一个明显的例外,对于高智商人群,上述相关性会变弱,甚至反转。 "The effect of population density on life satisfaction was therefore more than twice as large for low-IQ individuals than for high-IQ individuals," they found. And "more intelligent individuals were actually less satisfied with life if they socialized with their friends more frequently." “所以,对于低智商人群来说,人口密度对于生活满足度的影响会比对于高智商人群大一倍以上”他们还发现,“高智商人群的生活满意度甚至会因为和朋友交往过多而下降。” Let me repeat that last one: When smart people spend more time with their friends, it makes them less happy. 容我重复一下后一个发现:如果聪明人在与朋友交往上花更多的时间,他们反倒会感觉不开心。 Now, the broad contours of both findings are largely uncontroversial. A large body of previous research, for instance, has outlined what some have called an "urban-rural happiness gradient." Kanazawa and Li explain: "Residents of rural areas and small towns are happier than those in suburbs, who in turn are happier than those in small central cities, who in turn are happier than those in large central cities." 现在,两个研究发现的粗线条概要大体是无争议的。例如,曾有一大批研究项目概括出被有些人称为“市区-郊区幸福梯度”的东西。Kanazawa和Li解释说:“乡村和小镇的居民比近郊居民更幸福,后者又比生活在小型中心城市的居民幸福,而小型中心城市的居民又比生活在大城市的人幸福。” imrs Why would high population density cause a person to be less happy? There's a whole body of sociological research addressing this question. But for the most visceral demonstration of the effect, simply take a 45-minute ride on a crowded rush-hour Red Line train and tell me how you feel afterward. 为什么高人口密度会使一个人不开心呢?现在已有大量的社会学研究瞄准了这个问题。但是如果要最感同身受地体现这种影响,莫过于在高峰期搭乘45分钟的拥挤地铁,然后告诉我你的心情如何。 Kanazawa and Li's second finding is a little more interesting. It's no surprise that friend and family connections are generally seen as a foundational component of happiness and well-being. But why would this relationship get turned on its head for really smart people? Kanazawa和Li的第二个发现则更有意思一些。毫无疑问,亲情和友情往往是构成个人生活幸福快乐的基础之一。但是为什么对于聪明人来说,这种关系会被反过来呢? I posed this question to Carol Graham, a Brookings Institution researcher who studies the economics of happiness. "The findings in here suggest (and it is no surprise) that those with more intelligence and the capacity to use it ... are less likely to spend so much time socializing because they are focused on some other longer term objective," she said. 我就此问题请教了在布鲁金斯学会研究幸福经济学的Carol Graham。“这个发现(毫不奇怪地)表明具有高智商并且能将其驾驭自如的人……较不愿意将大量时间花费在与人交往上面,因为他们专注于其他更长期的目标,”她解释道。 Think of the really smart people you know. They may include a doctor trying to cure cancer or a writer working on the great American novel or a human rights lawyer working to protect the most vulnerable people in society. To the extent that frequent social interaction detracts from the pursuit of these goals, it may negatively affect their overall satisfaction with life. 想想你认识的真正聪明人。他们也许是一个试图治愈癌症的医生,一个想要写出一部杰出的美国小说的作者,或是一个关注保护社会弱势群体的人权律师。如果社交活动过于频繁,以至妨碍他们追求这些远大目标,就会降低他们整体的生活满意度。 But Kanazawa and Li's savanna theory of happiness offers a different explanation. The idea starts with the premise that the human brain evolved to meet the demands of our ancestral environment on the African savanna, where the population density was akin to what you'd find today in, say, rural Alaska (less than one person per square kilometer). Take a brain evolved for that environment, plop it into today's Manhattan (population density: 27,685 people per square kilometer), and you can see how you'd get some evolutionary friction. 但是Kanazawa和Li的热带草原幸福理论提供了一个不一样的解释。该理论始于一个前提,即人类大脑进化是为了适应我们祖先在非洲大草原上的生存环境。在这种环境下的人口密度近似于如今的阿拉斯加荒野(每平方公里不到一人)。从这种环境下进化出的大脑,被丢进当今的曼哈顿(人口密度每平方公里27,685人),这种进化上的摩擦可想而知。 Similarly with friendship: "Our ancestors lived as hunter–gatherers in small bands of about 150 individuals," Kanazawa and Li explain. "In such settings, having frequent contact with lifelong friends and allies was likely necessary for survival and reproduction for both sexes." We remain social creatures today, a reflection of that early reliance on tight-knit social groups. 对友情来说也近似:“我们祖先作为狩猎采集者,生活在一个个约为150人的小集体里,”Kanazawa和Li解释说。“在这样的环境中,和终生朋友以及盟友的频繁接触对于生存和繁衍 很可能是必要的,无论是男性还是女性。”我们至今仍是社会性的物种,这反映了我们早期对于被社会关系纽带紧密编织起来的小集体的依赖。 The typical human life has changed rapidly since then — back on the savanna we didn't have cars or iPhones or processed food or "Celebrity Apprentice" — and it's quite possible that our biology hasn't been able to evolve fast enough to keep up. As such, there may be a "mismatch" between what our brains and bodies are designed for, and the world most of us live in now. 从那时起,人类生活有了极大改变——在热带草原时期我们可没有汽车、iPhone、加工食品或是“明星学徒”【译注:电视真人秀节目】——而我们生理特性的进化极可能赶不上这些改变。因此,在我们的身心设定与我们生存的世界之间,可能会存在着“错配”。 To sum it all up: You've heard of the paleo-diet. But are you ready for paleo-happiness? 简而言之,你知道有旧石器食谱,但是你想不想试试旧石器幸福感? There's a twist, though, at least as Kanazawa and Li see it. Smarter people may be better equipped to deal with the new (at least from an evolutionary perspective) challenges present-day life throws at us. "More intelligent individuals, who possess higher levels of general intelligence and thus greater ability to solve evolutionarily novel problems, may face less difficulty in comprehending and dealing with evolutionarily novel entities and situations," they write. 但是剧情到这里有个反转,至少Kanazawa和Li这么觉得。聪明人可能更擅长处理现代生活中的新(至少从进化的观点看)挑战。“那些更有智慧,更具有高等的通用智能从而可以更好的解决新进化问题的个体,可能会较易于理解和应对进化上的新实体或是新问题,”他们写道。 If you're smarter and more able to adapt to things, you may have an easier time reconciling your evolutionary predispositions with the modern world. So living in a high-population area may have a smaller effect on your overall well-being — that's what Kanazawa and Li found in their survey analysis. Similarly, smarter people may be better-equipped to jettison that whole hunter-gatherer social network — especially if they're pursuing some loftier ambition. 如果你更聪明,并且更有能力适应环境,你应能更容易处理好先天进化不足和现代社会生活的错配。所以住在高人口密度地区可能对你的总体生活舒适程度影响很小——这就是Kanazawa和Li的调查研究发现。同样的,聪明人更有能力能力人更有可能完全放应对进化上的新实体或是情景说有些人称为“市中舍弃那套狩猎采集式的社交网络——特别是当他们有远大目标的时候。 It's important to remember that this is an argument Kanazawa and Li are proposing and that it's not settled science. "Paleo-" theories — the idea that our bodies are best adapted to the environment of our earliest ancestors — have come under fire in recent years, especially as food companies and some researchers over-hyped the alleged benefits of the paleo-diet fad. 值得注意的是,这只是Kanazawa和Li提出的论点,绝非科学定论。以“旧石器”开头的理论——基于我们的身体仍与我们最早期的祖先所处环境相适应之假设——在近年来饱受争议,特别是由于食品公司和某些学者过于推崇当下流行的旧石器食谱所带来的可能好处。 Kanazawa and Li's main findings about population density, social interaction and happiness are relatively uncontroversial. But Brookings's Carol Graham says one potential flaw in their research is that it defines happiness in terms of self-reported life satisfaction ("How satisfied are you with your life as a whole?"), and doesn't consider experienced well-being ("How many times did you laugh yesterday? How many times were you angry?" etc.). Survey researchers know that these two types of questions can lead to very different assessments of well-being. Kanazawa和Li对于人口密度,社会交往以及幸福感的主要观点相对来说并没有太大的争议。但是布鲁金斯学会的Carol Graham认为他们的研究有个潜在的缺陷,即用受访者自我报告的生活满意程度来定义幸福(“整体上来说,你对自己的生活满意么?”),而不考虑受访者关于舒适生活的实际体验(“你昨天笑了几次?生气了几次?”等等)。问卷调查者都知道这两类问题对于幸福生活的衡量可以得出完全不同的结果。 For their part, Kanazawa and Li maintain that that distinction doesn't matter too much for their savanna theory. "Even though our empirical analyses ... used a measure of global life satisfaction, the savanna theory of happiness is not committed to any particular definition and is compatible with any reasonable conception of happiness, subjective well-being, and life satisfaction," they write. Kanazawa和Li则认为这一区别对他们的热带草原理论影响不大。“虽然我们的实证研究……使用了总体的生活满意度,关于幸福的热带草原理论并不局限于任何一种定义,并且适用于任何对于幸福、主观幸福感和生活满意度的合理的概念化处理,”他们写道。 Kanazawa himself is no stranger to controversy. In 2011 he wrote a blog post for Psychology Today entitled "Why Are Black Women Less Physically Attractive Than Other Women?" The post ignited a firestorm of criticism and was swiftly taken down. Kanazawa本人也经常处于争议之中。2011年他给《今日心理学》写了一篇名为“为什么黑人女性在生理上不如其他女性具有吸引力?”的博客文章。该文引发了猛烈的批评,并且被迅速撤下了。 His current research on well-being is not likely to generate as much criticism as that blog post. But the evolutionary perspective on happiness and intelligence is likely to prompt some heated discussion in the field. 他现在关于幸福的研究不大可能引发类似的抨击。但从进化角度解读幸福和智力很可能会在该领域引发一些热烈的讨论。 In an email, Kanazawa said that his approach to understanding happiness is fundamentally different than the arguments about, say, the benefits of a paleo-diet. "Blindly introducing our ancestors’ diet when we do not have other aspects of the ancestral life seems like a dangerous and nonsensical prescription to me," he said. 在一封电子邮件里, Kanazawa认为他理解幸福的方式和关于比如说旧石器食谱的好处的论证有着本质的区别。“盲目的引入我们祖先的食谱,而不考虑到我们生活的其他方面与祖先有异,在我看来是危险且毫无道理的,”他说。 "I only explain nature; I do not tell people what to do or not to do," he added. “我只是解释自然现象;我并不是告诉人们去做什么或是不做什么,”他补充道。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

群选择争议

【2016-09-14】

@海德沙龙: 《战争如何推动社会合作》 是什么让人类建立起了如今这样的复杂社会,让我们发展出如此高度的合作与组织能力,得以从事需要数十万人共同参与的大型活动?Peter Turchin在其新书《超级社会》中提出,众多人类共同体之间的竞争与冲突,特别是战争,是推动这一发展进程的基本动力。 ​​​​

@海德沙龙:乍一看,这似乎只是群选择理论的又一次复活,但Turchin的理论建立在全新的方法论基础之上,他将进化生物学的思想扩展运用于文化进化,为各种社会/文化指标给出了度量方法,并大量采用数量模型和统计工具,使得其理论在经验上变得可(more...)

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【2016-09-14】 @海德沙龙: 《战争如何推动社会合作》 是什么让人类建立起了如今这样的复杂社会,让我们发展出如此高度的合作与组织能力,得以从事需要数十万人共同参与的大型活动?[[Peter Turchin]]在其新书《超级社会》中提出,众多人类共同体之间的竞争与冲突,特别是战争,是推动这一发展进程的基本动力。 ​​​​ @海德沙龙:乍一看,这似乎只是群选择理论的又一次复活,但Turchin的理论建立在全新的方法论基础之上,他将进化生物学的思想扩展运用于文化进化,为各种社会/文化指标给出了度量方法,并大量采用数量模型和统计工具,使得其理论在经验上变得可验证,由此,Turchin及其同道开创了一个自称为历史动力学的新学派。 @whigzhou: 说到群选择,早先我也曾被道金斯带进过坑里,五年前围观威尔逊帮和道金斯帮那场大争吵时重新思考了这个问题,见旧帖。 @whigzhou: 简单说,只要说清楚群体解决搭便车/损公肥私问题的组织/控制机制(因而回答了反对者的核心质疑),群选择是可以成立的,其余争论只是词汇之争  
[译文]彩票会改变中奖者命运吗?

The Lottery
彩票

作者:Gregory Cochran @ 2015-04-22
译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen)
来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/the-lottery/

Lotteries can be useful natural experiments; we can use them to test the accuracy of standard sociological theories, in which rich people buy their kids extra smarts, bigger brains, better health, etc.

彩票可以视为一种有用的自然实验。我们可以用它们来检测标准社会学理论的准确度。这些理论认为,富人能给他们的孩子买到额外的智慧、更大的大脑和更健康的身体,等等。

David Cesarini, who I met at that Ch(more...)

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The Lottery 彩票 作者:Gregory Cochran @ 2015-04-22 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen) 来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/the-lottery/ Lotteries can be useful natural experiments; we can use them to test the accuracy of standard sociological theories, in which rich people buy their kids extra smarts, bigger brains, better health, etc. 彩票可以视为一种有用的自然实验。我们可以用它们来检测标准社会学理论的准确度。这些理论认为,富人能给他们的孩子买到额外的智慧、更大的大脑和更健康的身体,等等。 David Cesarini, who I met at that Chicago meeting, has looked at the effect of winning the lottery in Sweden. He found that the “effects of parental wealth on infant health, drug consumption, scholastic performance and cognitive and non-cognitive skills can be bounded to a tight interval around zero.” 在芝加哥那次会议上我遇到了David Cesarini。他研究了在瑞典中彩票的影响。他发现,“父母的财富对婴儿健康、药品消费、学业表现,以及认知和非认知技能的影响,仅在一个几乎为零的小区间内。” As I once mentioned, there was an important land lottery in Georgia in 1832. The winners received an 160-acre farm. But by 1880, their descendants were no more literate, their occupational status no higher. The families in the top 2/3rds of income managed to hang on to some of their windfall, but lower-income families did not. 我曾经提到过,1832年在佐治亚州有过一次重要的土地抽彩。中奖者们得到了160英亩的农场。但是到1880年,(和未中奖者相比),他们后代的教育水平并不更高,他们的职业地位也不更好。收入在前2/3的家庭设法保住了他们的一些意外之财,而低收入的家庭则没能如此。 This remind of a story by Gerald Kersh, “Whatever Happened to Corporal Cuckoo?” – About a medieval soldier who stumbled into immortality. Someone asks him (in 1945) – why hadn’t he saved his pay?  With compound interest, yaddaa yadda. 这让我想起Gerald Kersh写的一个故事,“Cuckoo下士怎么了?”——讲的是一个无意间获得了永生的中世纪士兵的故事。有人问他(在1945年),为什么不把工资存下来呢?有复利,等等等等。 “Why didn’t I save my pay? Because I’m what I am, you mug! Hell, once upon a time, if I’d stayed away from cards, I could’ve bought Manhattan Island for less than what I lost to a Dutchman called Bruncker drawing ace-high for English guineas!  Save my pay! If it wasn’t one thing it was another. I lay off liquor. Okay. So if it’s not liquor, it’s a woman. I lay off women. Okay. Then it’s cards or dice. I always meant to save my pay; but I never had it in me to save my pay!  Doctor Paré’s stuff fixed me–and when I say it fixed me, I mean, it fixed me, just like I was, and am, and always will be. ” “为什么我没有存下工资? 因为我就是我,你个傻瓜!见鬼,曾几何时,如果我离开了牌局,把和人玩‘A大’赌几尼时输给那个叫Bruncker的荷兰佬的钱省下来,那可是买下曼哈顿岛还有余。存钱!不是这事就是那事。我戒掉了酒。好吧,如果不是酒,那便是女人。我戒掉了女人。好吧,接着就是牌或者骰子。我总是想要存钱,但是我从来就不是存工资的人! Paré医生的药治好了我——当我说它治好了我,我的意思是,它装配好了我,就像我过去,现在,永远都是的那样。” Low leverage of wealth on your children’s traits is something that exists in a particular society, with a particular kind of technology. Back in medieval times, a windfall could have kept your kids alive in a famine, and that certainly had a long-term positive effect on their cognitive skills.  Dead men take no tests. The most effective medical interventions today are cheap – everyone in Sweden and the US already has them – but there are places where those interventions are not universally available. Some families in Mozambique can afford artemisin, some can’t – this must make a difference. 财富对儿童性格的低影响存在于拥有特定技术的特定社会。回到中世纪时代,一笔意外之财可以让你的小孩在饥荒中存活,这必然就会对他们的认知技能有长期的正面影响。死人不能参加测试。当今最有效的医疗干预措施是便宜的——在瑞典和美国人人都已经拥有了——然而还有些地方,这些干预并不是普遍可得的。莫桑比克的一些家庭可以负担得起青蒿素『译注:一种有效的抗疟疾药物』,另一些则负担不起——这肯定会有重大影响。 Suppose we had a method of dramatically improving a kid’s genetic potential for intelligence and success, one that cost five million dollars a pop: then wealth could influence the next generation in ways that it can’t today. In other words, Cesarani’s conclusions are correct for Sweden-now (but not for Sweden in 1700), probably correct for the US today, but maybe not true tomorrow. 假设我们有一种特效药可以显著提高孩子在智力和成就方面的遗传潜力,五百万美元一针;那么财富将可以以现在不能的方式影响下一代。换句话说,Cesarani的结论对今天的瑞典来说是正确的(但不是1700年的瑞典),可能对今天的美国也是对的,但未来却不一定正确。 It is not just wealth that has a small effect on your kid’s potential: playing Mozart doesn’t help either. Other than locking away the ball-peen hammers, it’s hard to think of any known approach that does have much effect – although we don’t know everything, and maybe there are undiscovered effective approaches (other than genetic engineering). For example, iodine supplements have a good effect in areas that are iodine-deficient. We now know (since 2014) that bromine is an essential trace element – maybe people in some parts of the world would benefit from bromine supplementation. 不仅仅是财富对小孩的潜能影响甚微:练习莫扎特也没有什么帮助。除了锁起圆头锤【编注:意思大概是可以防止孩子把自己的脑袋敲破】,很难想象任何已知的方法会有很大的影响——虽然我们不知道所有的事情,或许有未被发现的有效方法(除基因工程以外)。比如,碘补充剂对碘缺乏地区有很好的效果。现在(2014年之后)我们知道,溴也是一种必要的微量元素——或许在这个世界的一些地方人们会受益于溴补充。 What about the social interventions that people are advocating, like Pre-K?  Since shared family effects (family environment surely matters more than some external social program) are small by adulthood, I think they’re unlikely to have any lasting effect.  We might also note that the track record isn’t exactly encouraging. If there was a known and feasible way of boosting academic performance, you’d think that those teachers in Atlanta would have tried it. Sure beats prison. 人们提倡的社会干预怎么样呢,比如学前教育?由于共享家庭的影响(家庭环境肯定比一些外部社会项目更重要)到成年时已经很小,我认为他们不太可能会有持久的影响。我们可能也已注意到这方面的跟踪研究并不那么令人鼓舞。如果有一个已知且可行的方法来提高学习成绩,我想那些亚特兰大的教师们大概已经试过了。当然,肯定比监狱强多了。 Maybe there’s an effective approach using fmri and biofeedback – wouldn’t hurt to take a look.  But even if it did work, it might simply boost everyone equally, and obviously nobody gives a shit about that. 或许有一个有效的方法使用功能性磁共振成像(fmri)和生物反馈——看一看无妨。但是即便可以,它可能只是平等的提高每个人,但显然没有人在乎这一点。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]重新审视六度分隔理论

How small is the world, really?
世界何其小,真的吗?

作者:Duncan Watts @ 2016-02-10
译者:龟海海
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:七分钟阅读,https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/how-small-is-the-world-really-736fa21808ba

Last week’s finding by a team of data scientists at Facebook that everyone in the social network is connected by an average of 3.5 “intermediaries” has renewed interest in the longstanding “Six Degrees of Separation” hypothesis: that everyone in the world is connected by some short chain of acquaintances.

上周,一个脸书数据分析专家小组发现,社交网络中的每个人都可经由平均3.5个“媒介好友”而联系起来,这一发现刷新了之前长期流行的“六度分隔”理论,即世上任何两人皆可通过某条较短的熟人链条连接起来。

Not surprisingly, the attention has focused on the plausible assertion that online social networks like Facebook have made the world smaller: that whatused to be six degrees is now almost half that. But really what it has revealed is how little we understand this intriguing phenomenon and what it might mean for our world.

无出意外,人们的注意力被吸引到了一个看似可能的判断上:像脸书这样的社交网络让世界变得更小:以前的六度现在一半就足够。但它真正揭示的是,对此令人神迷的现象和它对我们世界的意义何在,我们的理解何等浅薄。

This “small world” hypothesis, as it is known in sociology, has been percolating in popular culture for a long time. Almost a century ago the Hungarian poet Frigyes Karinthy wrote a short story called “Chain Links” in which he claimed he could reach anyone in the world, whether a Nobel Prize winner or a worker in a Ford auto factory, through a series of no more than five intermediaries.

在社会学领域内,大家都已了解,这个“小小世界”假说久已渗透进我们的文化之中。早在一个世纪前,匈牙利诗人Frigyes Karinthy就写了一则题为“链接”的小故事,文中他声称可以通过一系列不超过5个的“媒介”,联络到世界上任何人,无论是诺奖得主,或是一名福特工厂的工人。

Subsequently, writers like Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell have periodically reinvigorated the idea with their own colorful characters and fantastical speculations about who really runs the world.

此后,像Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell等等作家时不时的通过他们自己书中丰富的人物重塑了这一假说,并天马行空的猜测究竟是谁在真正掌控这个世界。

But arguably no one has had more impact on the question of how small the world is than Stanley Milgram, a Harvard psychologist who in the 1960s conducted an ingenious experiment to test it (Milgram is even more famous for another experiment of his, on obedience to authority, but that’s for another day).

但是,毋庸置疑,没有人对此“小小世界”问题的影(more...)

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How small is the world, really? 世界何其小,真的吗? 作者:Duncan Watts @ 2016-02-10 译者:龟海海 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:七分钟阅读,https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/how-small-is-the-world-really-736fa21808ba Last week’s finding by a team of data scientists at Facebook that everyone in the social network is connected by an average of 3.5 “intermediaries” has renewed interest in the longstanding “Six Degrees of Separation” hypothesis: that everyone in the world is connected by some short chain of acquaintances. 上周,一个脸书数据分析专家小组发现,社交网络中的每个人都可经由平均3.5个“媒介好友”而联系起来,这一发现刷新了之前长期流行的“六度分隔”理论,即世上任何两人皆可通过某条较短的熟人链条连接起来。 Not surprisingly, the attention has focused on the plausible assertion that online social networks like Facebook have made the world smaller: that whatused to be six degrees is now almost half that. But really what it has revealed is how little we understand this intriguing phenomenon and what it might mean for our world. 无出意外,人们的注意力被吸引到了一个看似可能的判断上:像脸书这样的社交网络让世界变得更小:以前的六度现在一半就足够。但它真正揭示的是,对此令人神迷的现象和它对我们世界的意义何在,我们的理解何等浅薄。 This “small world” hypothesis, as it is known in sociology, has been percolating in popular culture for a long time. Almost a century ago the Hungarian poet Frigyes Karinthy wrote a short story called “Chain Links” in which he claimed he could reach anyone in the world, whether a Nobel Prize winner or a worker in a Ford auto factory, through a series of no more than five intermediaries. 在社会学领域内,大家都已了解,这个“小小世界”假说久已渗透进我们的文化之中。早在一个世纪前,匈牙利诗人Frigyes Karinthy就写了一则题为“链接”的小故事,文中他声称可以通过一系列不超过5个的“媒介”,联络到世界上任何人,无论是诺奖得主,或是一名福特工厂的工人。 Subsequently, writers like Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell have periodically reinvigorated the idea with their own colorful characters and fantastical speculations about who really runs the world. 此后,像Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell等等作家时不时的通过他们自己书中丰富的人物重塑了这一假说,并天马行空的猜测究竟是谁在真正掌控这个世界。 But arguably no one has had more impact on the question of how small the world is than Stanley Milgram, a Harvard psychologist who in the 1960s conducted an ingenious experiment to test it (Milgram is even more famous for another experiment of his, on obedience to authority, but that’s for another day). 但是,毋庸置疑,没有人对此“小小世界”问题的影响超过1960年代任教于哈佛大学的心理学家史丹利·米尔格拉姆,他进行了一个原创试验来测试此理论(米尔格拉姆其实有另一个更加有名的试验,“权力服从研究”,这个我们改天再谈)。 In brief, Milgram chose a single person, an acquaintance of his who was a stockbroker living in Sharon Mass, just outside of Boston, to be the “target” of the experiment. In addition he chose roughly 300 others — 100 from Boston itself and the other 200 from Omaha Nebraska, which Milgram figured was about as far away from Boston, socially and geographically, as one could get within the US. 简言之,米尔格拉姆选择他的一位朋友作为其实验的“靶标”,他是一位股票经纪人,住在波士顿城外的Sharon Mass。另外,他还另外选择了约300名实验对象——其中100名来自波士顿,其他200名来自内布拉斯加的奥马哈市,米尔格拉姆认为,就美国境内而言,奥马哈无论在社会关系上还是在地理上,都距离波士顿足够远。 Milgram then sent these 300 subjects special packets containing a good deal of information about the target — his name, address, occupation, etc. — and also instructions that they were to try to get the packet to him. But there was a catch: they could only send the packet to him if they knew him personally, meaning on a first-name basis. 随后,米尔格拉姆为这300名实验对象送出了特殊的包裹,其中包涵他这名股票经纪人(靶标)的许多信息——他的名字,地址,职业,等等——以及一些让他们试着将包裹寄给他的提示。但是,这儿有个坑:他们只能在个人直接认识他的情况下才能寄出包裹。 In the overwhelmingly likely event that that they did not, they were instead to send to someone they did know on a first name basis and who was closer to the target than they were themselves. These new participants would then get the same packet with the same instructions, and the process would repeat until — hopefully — some of the packets reached the target. 而实际上,在绝大部分情况下,他们不满足这一条件,所以只能将包裹寄给某位他们直接认识并且和靶标的关系距离更近一层的人。而这个收到包裹的新参与者,得到的是同样的包裹和提示,这一过程会一直持续循环下去,直到——幸运的话——有些包裹能顺利到达“靶标”。 Milgram’s question then was: for successfully delivered packets, how long would the chains be? Curiously, before he ran the experiment Milgram asked lots of people to guess the answer. Many assumed it wasn’t possible while others figured it would take hundreds of steps. So when Milgram found that not only did 64 packets, roughly one fifth of the initial sample, reached the target, but that the average length of the successful chains was just 6, he knew it would surprise many people. 米尔格拉姆接下来的问题是:如果包裹递送成功,那么这些链条有多长呢?有趣的是,在米尔格拉姆进行此实验之前就让很多人猜过答案。一些人表示根本不可能送达目标,另一些则认为至少得通过成百上千个步骤。所以,当米尔格拉姆得知不仅64个包裹(占初始样本的五分之一)到达了靶标,而且这些成功链条的平均长度仅仅为6。他知道这会让许多人咋舌。 In many ways, it still does. Although the phrase “Six Degrees of Separation” has become a cliché, when pressed many people still find it difficult to imagine how they could really reach anyone — not just someone like them or someone near to them, but anyone at all in the whole world — in something like six steps. 从许多方面看,这仍然令人惊奇。虽说“六度分隔”已经成了陈词滥调,但这一结果发布之后,许多人仍难以相信自己仅仅只需六步即可链接到世界上的任何人——不仅是自己一个圈子的人,或是周边的人,而是整个世界的任何人。 Understandably then, the Facebook result also attracted some resistance: “Facebook is an unrepresentative sample of the population;” “Facebook friends aren’t real friends” and so on. But although these critiques may have merit, they miss the point. In reality, the 3.5 number is simply incomparable to Milgram’s 6 for three reasons. 所以不难理解,脸书的研究结果发布后吸引了许多反对声音:“脸书是个不具代表性的人口样本;”“脸书的朋友并非真朋友”等等。虽说这些批评也许有可取之处,但是他们没抓住要点。实际上,这个3.5不能和米尔格拉姆的“六度”直接对比,理由有三: First, the number 3.5 counts intermediaries not degrees of separation. If I am “one degree” from someone I know them directly; there are zero intermediaries between me and them. Likewise, there is one intermediary between me and my “two degree” neighbors, and so on. 首先,3.5这个数字计算的是“媒介”的数量,而不是分隔度数。如果我是某人的“一度”友邻,我就直接认识此人;我和他们间没有“媒介”。类似的,我和我的“二度”友邻之间存在一个“媒介”,以此类推。 In general, therefore, an average of 3.5 intermediaries corresponds to 4.5 degrees of separation, which is almost exactly what Facebook itself found when it performed a similar exercise a few years ago. Conversely, Milgram’s six degrees result corresponds to five intermediaries, which is actually the number he reported in his original paper with Jeffery Travers. So already the difference is one less than it appears. 因此,平均3.5个“媒介”对应的是“4.5度分隔”,这和几年前脸书自己通过类似实验得出的发现几乎相同。反之,米尔格拉姆的“六度”所对应的是5个“媒介”——其实他和Jeffery Travers发表的文章中所用的正是这个数字。所以上述差异比表面看起来就已经少了1 。 Second, though, Milgram’s experiment was a subtly but importantly different test than the one run by Facebook. Whereas the latter measured the length of the shortest possible path between two people — by exhaustively searching every link in the underlying Facebook graph — the former is simply the shortest path that ordinary people could find given very limited information about the underlying social network. 第二,虽然米尔格拉姆的试验很巧妙,但是,和脸书做的这个测试有重要差异。后者度量的是两个人之间的最短可能路径的长度——通过穷举搜索脸书关系图上的每条链接,而前者则是普通人基于其所掌握的极为有限的社会关系信息而能够找到的路径长度。 There are, in other words, two versions of the small-world hypothesis — the “topological” version, which refers only to underlying network structure, and the “algorithmic” version, which refers to the ability of people to search this underlying structure. 换言之,其实“小世界假说”有两个版本:“拓扑版”,它度量的是社会关系网络结构,和“算法版”,它度量的则是人们在此网络中进行搜索的能力。 From these definitions, it follows that algorithmic (search) paths cannot be shorter than topological paths and are almost certainly longer. Saying that the world has gotten smaller because the shortest topological path length is 4.5 not 6 therefore makes no sense — because the equivalent number would have been smaller in Milgram’s day as well. 从这些定义得出,“算法版”(搜索)路径不可能短于“拓扑版”。仅仅因为最短拓扑路径的长度是4.5而非6就说世界变小了,这么说毫无意义——因为米尔格拉姆时代的相应数字同样小于6。 Finally, the number 6 is also in some respects too small. As has been pointed out many times since Milgram’s experiment, only about 20% of the letters made it to their target. More importantly, these letters were almost certainly on shorter paths than the ones that didn’t make it, meaning that estimates of path length that don’t take into account the missing data are almost certainly biased downwards. 最后,从某些角度看,数字6也太小了。因为自从米尔格拉姆试验后就被很多人指出,仅有20%的信封送到了靶标。更重要的是,这些信所通过的途径几乎肯定短于那些没有到达靶标的,这就意味着那些投递失败的长链条在估算链条长度时没有被计算在内,这肯定会造成向下偏差。 Fortunately it is possible to correct for this bias using standard statistical methods. In a 2009 paper my colleagues and I performed exactly this analysis both on Milgram’s original data and also on our data from a similar — but much larger — experiment that we had conducted ourselves in 2003. 有幸的是,我们可以通过标准的统计算法来更正这一偏差。在2009年的一篇论文中我和我的同事们对米尔格拉姆的原始数据和我们自己在2003年做的一个大得多的类似试验的数据进行了恰如上面所述的分析。 Remarkably we found that after the correction, both experiments yielded similar results: the median shortest path was 7, meaning that 50% of chains should complete in 7 or fewer steps while the other 50% would be longer. Many people find this result surprising because it seems so clear that the world has gotten smaller in the last 50 years. 我们惊喜的发现,在矫正了数据后,两个试验得出相似的结果:最短链条的中位值是7,即50%的链条会7步或少于7步时完成,而另外50%则会更长。许多人觉得这个结果不思议,因为过去50年世界变得更小了这个事实看起来如此明白无误。 Yet this apparent stability is exactly what one would predict from my early theoretical work with Steven Strogatz back in the late 1990’s. In a nutshell what we showed is that it is easy to turn a “large” world into a “small” one, just by adding a small fraction of random, long-range links, reminiscent of Mark Granovetter’s famous “weak ties.” 但这一明显的稳定性正是我和Steven Strogatz在1990年代后期的理论研究中预见到的。简言之,我们要证明的是,只需要在“大”世界中加入一小部分随机的“长范围”链接,就可以把世界变“小”,这让人联想起马克·格兰诺维特著名的“弱关系”理论。 The flip side of our result, however, is that once the world has already gotten small — as it was already by the 1960's — it is extremely hard to make it smaller. Obviously Facebook did not exist in 2003 so possibly since then something has indeed changed. But I suspect that the difference will be small. 实际上,这一结果反过来说就是,一旦世界变小之后——其实它在60年代已经变小了——想要把它变得更小就极为困难。很明显,脸书2003年并不存在,所以有可能某些东西真的已经改变了。但是我估计这个变化是微小的。 Why does any of this matter? There are three reasons. First, the two versions of the small-world hypothesis — topological and algorithmic — are relevant to different social processes. The spread of a sexually transmitted disease along networks of sexual relations, for example, does not require that participants have any awareness of the disease, or intention to spread it; thus for an individual to be at risk of acquiring an infection, he or she need only be connected in the topological sense to existing infectives. 何以见得这些差异是要紧的呢?理由有三:第一,两个版本的“小世界假说”——拓扑版和算法版——关乎不同的社会过程。例如,就像性病通过两性关系而传播,这并不需要参与者意识到疾病的存在或者拥有传播它的意图,而仅需要他或她在拓扑上链接到既有的感染者即可。 On the contrary, individuals attempting to “network” — in order to locate some resources like a new job or a service provider — must actively traverse chains of referrals, and thus must be connected in the algorithmic sense. Depending on the application of interest, therefore, either the topological or algorithmic distance between individuals may be more relevant — or possibly both together. 相反,若是个人想要“建立链接”寻找资源,比如找工作,寻找服务商,则必须积极的遍历中间人链条,因而必须在算法上建立链接。所以,根据实际应用中的关注重点,有些情况下个体之间的拓扑距离更切题,有时则算法距离更切题,或者两者同时切题。 Second, whereas the topological hypothesis has been shown to apply essentially universally, to networks of all kinds, the algorithmic hypothesis is largely (although not exclusively) concerned with social networks in which human agents make decisions about how to direct messages. 第二,拓扑版小世界假说已经表明普遍适用于所有类型的网络结构,而算法版假说则大致上量(虽然不完全)适用于社交网络,在这些网络中,人类主体就如何引导信息流向做出决定。 And third, whereas the topological version is supported by an overwhelming volume of empirical evidence — hundreds of studies, if not thousands — have found that nodes in even the very largest known networks are connected by short paths, the practical difficulty of running “small-world” experiments of the sort that Milgram conducted in the 1960s has meant that much less is known about the algorithmic version. 第三,鉴于“拓扑版”得到了压倒性数量的经验证据——来自数百甚至数千项研究——支持这些证据表明,即使在最大的关系网中,节点之间也可通过较短路径相连接,进行像米尔格拉姆在1960年代所做的那种“小世界效应”试验的实际困难意味着,我们对“算法版”的情况其实所知不多。 On this last point, for example, our 2009 analysis also found evidence that some of the longer paths could be much longer than the median, adding weight to the skeptics’ claims that in spite of the small-world phenomenon, some people remain socially isolated. 有关最后这一点,(例如)我们2009年的分析同样发现了证据表明,一些长路径可以远远长于中位值,这为那些怀疑者的主张提供了依据:即使存在小世界现象,总有些人在社会关系上是保持孤立的。 Given the importance of social networks in determining life outcomes, it would be extremely interesting and useful to understand better who these people are and why they are isolated. Is it something to do with their underlying networks or is it that their search strategies are somehow less effective? 考虑到社会关系网在决定生活质量上的重要性,研究并理解这些孤立者是谁,为何变得孤立,将是件极为有趣且有用的事情。这跟他们的下层关系网有关?【编注:此处underlying networks应是指亲戚、邻里等个人被预先给定的被动关系,相对于个人主动寻求建立的社会关系】还是他们的搜索策略不够有效? Could it be, as my coauthors and I speculated many years ago, some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the perception of social isolation discourages one from searching one’s network, and that the resulting lack of success reinforces the original perception of isolation? 有没有可能,正如多年前我和我的共同作者所推测的那样,是某种自我实现的预言?即,对社会孤立的感知,使得个人不愿意搜索自己的关系网,由此导致的关系建立失败进而强化了对孤立的最初感知? Answering these questions would require new experiments that are only now just becoming possible. But the answers would not only be of academic interest — they could also potentially help many people access currently inaccessible reserves of “social capital” thereby improving their lives. Far from being settled, the small-world problem still has much to teach us about the world, and ourselves. 要回答这些问题需要更新的试验,而此类实验直到最近才变得可行。但是,这些问题的答案不仅仅是满足学术兴趣——它们同样可能帮助很多人得以访问目前对他们来说还不可触及的“社会资本”储备,从而来改善他们的生活。 小世界问题还远未解决,在未来,它仍将为我们带来有关这个世界以及我们自身的诸多教益。 Duncan Watts is a principal researcher at Microsoft and author of Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (WW Norton, 2003). 邓肯·J·瓦茨是微软首席研究员和《六度分隔理论》作者 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]战争如何推动社会合作

《超级社会:人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评
Review of “Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth”

作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/

Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader.

Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中,通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析,来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果,让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。

What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation.

什么是历史动力学?我能给出的最佳定义是:这是一种研究历史的科学方法,它试图通过量化的方法去检验,排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。

Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours.

Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣:是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力,完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢?他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年,也就是超过260亿工时。

The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale.

下一个容易想到的问题就是,这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢,例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔,还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场,以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式,是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上(more...)

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《超级社会:人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评 Review of "Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth" 作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/ Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader. Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中,通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析,来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果,让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。 What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation. 什么是历史动力学?我能给出的最佳定义是:这是一种研究历史的科学方法,它试图通过量化的方法去检验,排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。 Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours. Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣:是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力,完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢?他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年,也就是超过260亿工时。 The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale. 下一个容易想到的问题就是,这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢,例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔,还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场,以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式,是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上的进步呢? As an economist my bias is to see human actions in terms of self-interest, competition and conflict, where through the invisible hand the interaction of self-interested individuals can lead to productive outcomes. But like the fish who is blind to the vast ocean of water they live in, I realised I was blind to the ocean of cooperation that was the back-drop to my focus on self-interest and competition. 作为一个经济学家,我倾向于通过自利、竞争和冲突的视角来看待人类行为,在这些视角之下,自利个体之间能够通过“看不见的手”达致有效率的经济产出。但就像大海里一条对于自己所生存的广阔水域一无所知的鱼一样,我意识我对于合作行为这片广阔的大海实际上几乎一无所知,而这是我所关注的自利和竞争的基础。 In “Ultrasociety” Turchin provides a way to see and measure cooperation – to quantify its existence on a massive scale. Once you are able to see the great ocean of cooperation that dominates human society, it leads you to interesting and challenging lines of scientific inquiry. The puzzling question is then how a world dominated by ultra social human cooperation can also frequently succumb to large scale war and conflict? 在《超级社会》一书中,Turchin教授提供了一种看待并衡量合作的方式——在大尺度上将它的存在进行量化。当你能够看清合作这片统治着人类社会的汪洋大海,它就会将你的引向有趣而又富有挑战性的科学探索。之后的一个问题就是:为什么一个充盈着超大型社会合作的人类世界还会经常屈就于大规模的战争和冲突? Turchin’s answer, and one of the big ideas in the book, is that war between social groups is the mechanism by which cooperative behaviour develops “within groups”. It is a fundamental evolutionary process happening between societies at a large scale. He elevates war as a selection mechanism for cooperation, and values it above many of the technological factors like domestication of plants and the advent of agriculture. Turchin对这个问题的答案,同时也是本书的主要观点之一,是认为社会群体之间的战争是合作行为在群体内部发展的机制。它是一种基础性进化过程,发生于在各社会之间的大尺度上。他提升了战争在历史进程中的地位,将其视为对合作行为的一种选择机制,并且将其价值置于许多技术性因素之上,例如植物的驯化和农业的出现。 Turchin debunks many standard stories that “explain” the path to civilisation and eliminates glaring inconsistencies in the archaeological record. The naive view that the invention of agriculture “…set the ball rolling, and the entire history of civilisation followed from that” is a satisfying common story. But it seems a stretch to claim that the small scale practice of seasonally collecting and planting seeds nearby small permanent settlements, leads directly to the large-scale institutions observed in ancient civilisations. Turchin推翻了许多自称能够“解释”通向文明路径的标准叙事,认为它们忽视了自身与显而易见的考古学事实之间的重大矛盾。有一种天真的观点认为,农业的发明“……让雪球滚动了起来,而整个文明的历史则随之展开”,这是一种令很多人满意的常见叙事。但是,认为小规模永久定居点附近季节性的收集和播种行为可以直接导致古代文明中所呈现的一些大规模社会制度,这似乎有点太过牵强了。 The “agricultural snowball” story is also hampered by the fact that early agricultural societies had “a markedly negative effect on human health” as the poorer nutrition compared to hunter gatherers lead to smaller stature, higher sickness and the spread of pathogens through the high density settlements. Yet agriculture did spread and ultimately outcompeted nomadic hunter-gather societies. 早期的农业社会“对人类的健康水平产生了显著的负面影响”这一事实也削弱了“农业的雪球”这一叙事的说服力,相比于狩猎-采集社会,农业社会更差的营养水平导致了更小的体形,更多疾病,以及高密度的聚居区内病原体的传播。尽管如此,农业社会的确在之后得到了扩张并最终超过了游动性的狩猎-采集社会。 I have long been hesitant about “just so” explanations of social institutions based on historic physical and technological conditions that turn simple correlations into plausible causal mechanisms. Turchin provides the evidence that although all early large scale civilisations had agriculture, it was not the agriculture alone that directly caused large scale civilisation. 这种对于社会制度“原来如此”解释【编注:『原来如此故事』又称特例假设(ad hoc hypothesis),是一种为某一解释设置无法或难以验证的特殊条件,从而消除或降低该解释之可证伪性的做法。】,立足于物质和技术方面的历史条件,把简单的相关性当成了煞有其事的因果关系,我因此而一直对此抱有怀疑态度。Turchin教授提供了证据以显示虽然所有早期的大型文明都拥有农业,但并不是农业这一单一因素直接导致了大型文明的出现。 I felt foolish to have not recognised the array of “just so” stories in the study of history before Turchin pointed them out. In my field of economics, the existence of money is still explained in the textbooks as arising automatically once someone in human prehistory realised that some kind of currency made commerce easier than trying to directly trade a quarter of a cow for three baskets of vegetables. 对于没能在Turchin教授指出之前认出这些“原来如此”故事,我感到自己有点傻。在我所研究的经济学领域中,货币的存在仍然在教科书中被解释为在史前时代的某个时刻有当人意识到某种形式的通货比直接使用四分之一头牛去交换三筐蔬菜变得更加容易的时候自动产生的。 Yet many alternative social arrangements also solve the physical problem of a “double coincidence of wants”. We need look no further than current tribal societies that do not have or desire money despite their specialisation into many roles. They have instead resolved their double coincidence of wants dilemma through various other rituals, hierarchies, and institutions. 然而,许多其他的社会安排也同样解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这个实际问题。我们只需要看看一些现存的部落社会,虽然这些社会中已经出现了众多专业化的分工角色,但他们至今既没有货币,也看不出对货币有任何需求。取而代之的是,这些部落社会通过多种仪式,层级结构和社会制度的安排解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这一困境。 Turchin, through his cliodynamics research agenda, aims to rid the historical study of civilisation from these “just so” explanations. In the aim of scientific progress this research agenda uses quantifiable historical data to pit multi-level selection theory and its various components against many others, and in doing so eliminate bad theories and open up new avenues of inquiry. Most chapters of the books contain references to this emerging field of research which themselves are intriguing and enlightening. Turchin教授希望通过他的历史动力学使文明史的研究摆脱这些“原来如此”解释。为了推进研究的科学化进程,他的研究里使用了可量化的历史数据让多层次选择理论以及它的不同组成部分与众多其它的理论进行竞争,通过这种做法排除那些较差的理论并为之后的研究打开新方向。书中的大多数章节都包含了对这一蓬勃发展的研究领域的描述,而这本身已经足够有趣和富有启发性了。 Turchin argues that human societies, tribes, and groups, did not simply take a linear path from small hunter-gatherers tribes to large-scale civilisations. It was the competition through conquest and war between societies that lead to those with more effective weaponry and military organisations arising from greater internal cooperation, to survive at the expense of others. Turchin认为,人类社会,部落和群体并不是简单地通过一条线性的道路从小规模的狩猎-采集部落发展为大型文明的。不同社会之间在相互征服和战争中所展开的竞争,使得那些通过更好的内部合作发展出了更高效的武器和军事组织的社会生存了下来,而代价则是其对手的消亡。 The following excerpt summarises: 以下引文对此作了总结: “Here’s how I think these peaceful, stable societies came about. As war created large states, empires, and nation-states, societies evolved measures to suppress internal conflict and violence. Reduced internal violence is the obverse of increased cooperation. “我认为这些和平而稳定的社会是以这样的方式诞生的。随着战争创造出大型的城邦,帝国和民族国家,社会也演化出了一些压制自身内部的冲突和暴力的机制。内部暴力行为减少的另一面是更多的内部合作。 “Surprising as it may seem, the trend towards greater peace was already noticeable during the Ancient and Medieval historical eras, long before the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Of course, wars between empires dwarfed intertribal conflicts in scale. Huge armies fought increasingly bloody battles, and the numbers of casualties mounted. “也许看起来让人吃惊,但向更加和平的状态演化的趋势,实际上在古代和中世纪这些历史时期中就已经显而易见了,这要远远早于18世纪的启蒙运动。当然,帝国之间的战争在规模上让部落间冲突相形见绌。大型军队间战争的血腥程度持续上升,而战争中的伤亡人数也随之水涨船高。 “But the key point is that these wars moved away from imperial centers, towards the frontiers. More and more people—those living far from frontiers where battles were fought—never experienced conflict, and could enjoy relative prosperity. “但关键在于这些战争不再发生于帝国的中心区域,而被移到了前线。越来越多的人——那些生活在远离战争发生的前线地区的人——从来没有经历过冲突,他们享受到了相对的繁荣。 “There is no contradiction between larger armies and larger butcher’s bills from warfare, on the one hand, and on the other, a greater part of the population enjoying peace. What is important from the point of view of quality of life is not how many people, in total, are killed, but what the chances are that I (or you, or someone you care about) will be killed. In other words, the important statistic is the risk of violent death for each person.” “一方面,军队规模更大,战争的死亡人数更高,而另一方面,总人口中更大比例的人群却能够享受和平,这两点并不冲突。从生活质量的角度来看,重要的并不是总体上有多少人在战争中被杀死,而是作为社会中的个体,我(或者是你,或者是你所关心的人)有多大的可能被杀死。换句话说,对每个人而言,更重要的统计量是死于暴力的风险大小。” The power of this view is in the way the apparent contradiction of how war leads to peace becomes obvious once understood through an evolutionary lens. It changed my mental model of history from a series of inevitable linear events, to one of a branching tree of evolutionary paths, complete with many dead-ends of failed civilisations and their cultures, with many more merging and growing from conquest. 这一观点的强大之处在于,“战争是如何导向和平的?”这一看似矛盾的问题一旦通过进化的视角来理解,其中的逻辑就显而易见了。它将我理解历史的心智模型从一系列不可避免的线性事件的串联转变为一棵包含多种进化路径的分叉树,这棵树的许多分支都终结于失败的文明及其文化,但更多的分支则是通过征服合并在一起并继续成长的文明。 In short, I have shifted away from the popular but incorrect view of evolution as linear and subject only to environmental stresses rather than intra-species conflict. The left panel of the below image epitomises this popular confusion that I ignorantly held in the context of the study of history. 简而言之,我已经摒弃了那种流行却是错误的以线性视角看待文明演化的方式,该方式认为它仅仅受到外部环境的压力影响而不理会种群内部冲突的作用。下图左边的部分代表了之前的我出于无知而在历史研究中所采用的这种带有很强迷惑性的流行视角。 A more correct view of biological evolution is in the right panel, complete with mixing of genes and extinctions. It is more subtle and complex view, but provides a more useful story of the path of history, the dying out of civilisations and merging of cultures as a result of inter-group warfare. 而下图中右边的部分则代表了一种更加准确的看待生物进化的视角,进化是在众多基因的混合与消亡中完成的。这是一种更加精细也更加复杂的视角,但它提供了一种对历史路径更加有用的叙事,文明的消亡和文化的合并实际上是族群间战争的结果。 Screen-Shot-2016-02-02-at-3.47.06-pm Even more interesting is that when there is little external warfare and competition, the successful groups find it difficult to curtail infighting amongst sub-groups within their society, and their lack of internal cooperation begins to make them vulnerable to attack from outsiders. In Turchin’s own words, from Chapter 2: 更有趣的是,当来自外部的战争和竞争压力较小时,那些成功的族群会发现控制自身内部小群体间的明争暗斗变得更困难了,而缺乏内部合作将会让这些曾经成功的族群在面对外来者的攻击时变得脆弱。用Turchin在书中第二章的话来说就是: “Here’s how war serves to weed out societies that “go bad.” When discipline, imposed by the need to survive conflict, gets relaxed, societies lose their ability to cooperate. A reactionary catchphrase of the 1970s used to go, “what this generation needs is a war,” a deplorable sentiment but one that in terms of cultural evolution might sometimes have a germ of cold logic. “战争是以这样的方式淘汰掉那些“衰朽腐败”的社会的。当因生存压力而施加的纪律开始变得松弛的时候,社会就失去了合作的能力。1970年代曾经有一句反动标语,“这代人需要经历一场战争,”虽然这句话里满是可悲的情绪,但从文明进化的角度上说,也许其中的确包含着一些冷冰冰的真知灼见。 At any rate, there is a pattern that we see recurring throughout history, when a successful empire expands its borders so far that it becomes the biggest kid on the block. When survival is no longer at stake, selfish elites and other special interest groups capture the political agenda. The spirit that “we are all in the same boat” disappears and is replaced by a “winner take all” mentality. As the elites enrich themselves, the rest of the population is increasingly impoverished. Rampant inequality of wealth further corrodes cooperation. 无论如何,我们都能看到历史中不断重演的一种模式,当一个成功的帝国将自己的疆域扩展得如此之广以至于它成了“街区里的孩子王”,当生存的压力已不再迫在眉睫,那些自私的精英和其它一些特定的利益集团就会夺取帝国的政治议程。“大家同处一条船”的精神消失了,取而代之的是“赢者通吃”的心态。随着精英们发家致富,其它人则持续地变得更加贫困。肆无忌惮的贫富不均进一步腐蚀了合作的基础。 Beyond a certain point a formerly great empire becomes so dysfunctional that smaller, more cohesive neighbors begin tearing it apart. Eventually the capacity for cooperation declines to such a low level that barbarians can strike at the very heart of the empire without encountering significant resistance. 在超过一个临界点之后,一个曾经的伟大帝国就会变得机能失调,以至于它的那些更小但更具凝聚力的邻居们开始将它分裂。最终帝国内部的合作能力降到了一个太低的水平,以至于外来的野蛮人可以在几乎遇不上任何值得一提的抵抗的条件下直捣帝国的心脏。 But barbarians at the gate are not the real cause of imperial collapse. They are a consequence of the failure to sustain social cooperation. As the British historian Arnold Toynbee said, great civilisations are not murdered – they die by suicide.” 但那些“门口的野蛮人”并不是帝国崩溃的原因。他们的入侵只是帝国没能维持内部社会合作的结果。正如英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比所言,伟大的文明从来不会被谋杀——他们全都死于自杀。” I have explored this process of disintegration of groups into competing clans in small scale in experiments before. Yet I failed to see the link to the large scale selection processes occurring even at such large scales at the nation-state. The talk of sclerosis and the death of large scale cooperation made me recall the chart below on the growth of partisan policy in the US which shows the striking decline in cross-party cooperation on legislative changes. 我之前曾经用小规模实验的方式研究过族群瓦解为多个相互竞争的部落的情况。但我并没有意识到,即使在民族国家这么大的尺度上,也有类似的选择过程发生。书中关于社会固化和大规模合作的消亡的讨论,让我联想起了下面这幅关于美国党派政策演化的图中所显示出在立法变更上的党际合作水平的显著下降。 Each node in the visual is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949–2012, with Republicans in red and Democrats in blue. Edges are drawn between members who agree on legislative decisions more often than expected by chance, and the nodes are spaced out in a way so that those with more edges connecting them are closer together. The clustering therefore visualises who is cooperating with who in terms of developing legislation. 图中每个节点都代表美国在1949-2012年间的一位众议院议员,红色代表共和党人,而蓝色则代表民主党人。如果两位议员在立法决策上达成一致的频率高于由随机概率所预期的水平,那么他们所对应的节点之间就会被一条线连接,节点在图中的排列方式使得那些相互之间有更多连接的议员靠得更近。这样图中的聚类就从视觉上反映出了哪些议员在推进立法上相互合作。 Without the external threats to the nation as a whole after WWII, and later the Cold War, the ability to maintain a cohesive national whole in political terms appears to have broken down into partisan scrambling. No longer can we see a cooperative whole, but instead competing fairly arbitrary tribes of blues and reds. 在第二次世界大战和随后的冷战结束后,来自外部的对于美国作为一个整体的威胁都不复存在了,而从政治角度上看,似乎维系一个有凝聚力的国家整体的能力也随之分崩离析,取而代之的则是喋喋不休的党派纷争。在图中我们不再能看到一个富有合作性的整体,而是一些分别由红点和蓝点组成的武断分隔的竞争部落。 journal.pone.0123507.g002 I was left in a state of deep reflection after reading the book. Many other big ideas are woven through it to make you reconsider the popular but overly simplistic stories we tell ourselves to explain historical events. From the long term Z-shaped arc of quantifiable violence in human civilisation, to the role of horses, long range weaponry and population size in the success of inter-group warfare, and finally to the rise of God-kings and oppressive hierarchies. 在读完这本书后,我陷入了深刻的反思。本书中还贯穿了许多其它重要想法,它们会让你重新思考我们在解释历史事件时所常用的那些流行但过分简化的叙事。从人类文明中以可量化方式衡量的暴力水平在长期中所呈现出的Z型曲线,到马、远程武器和人口规模在族群间战争中所发挥的作用,以及最后君神合一政体和统治阶级的崛起。 Even Turchin’s incidental detours explore rather significant questions, such as in Chapter 4 when he clarifies a point about culture in human societies with the off-handed comment “Incidentally, why do we have culture? ” 即使是Turchin教授在书中偶然从主线上岔出的一些分支也讨论了相当重要的问题,例如在第四章中澄清关于人类社会中文化的作用的一个观点时,他随性地评论道“顺便问一句,为什么人类会拥有文化?”。 The same lesson applies in economics. Firms in highly competitive markets constantly face threats to their existence, leading to a type of destructive creation that ensures that surviving firms are internally highly cohesive and cooperative; economically efficient. 同样的道理也适用于经济学领域。高度竞争市场中的企业经常会面临威胁到自身生存的问题,这导致了一种毁灭性的创造过程以保证最终生存下来的企业在内部都具有极强的凝聚力和合作能力,我们称之为经济效率。 Yet the process of competition is highly inefficient in economic terms as only very slightly different production facilities are duplicated by competitors. For me the trade-off is rather radical just to think about. That the gains to internal cohesion require a cost of an external threat or else large-scale groups will be undermined by the interests of sub-groups within them. 然而从经济角度上说,竞争本身是非常低效的,因为众多互相竞争的对手所复制的生产设备之间的差别其实非常小。对我来说,其中的利弊权衡已经是一个相当深刻的问题了。即获得内部凝聚力所带来的收益需要以面对外部威胁为代价,否则大规模的群体将会被内部众多小团体的利益慢慢腐蚀。 Like any books that cover grand ideas about human civilisation there are probably some finer details to squabble about. I certainly don’t have the expertise to do so. Instead I want to share some of the thoughts that occupied my mind after reading Ultrasociety. These thoughts and comments should sufficiently signal the compelling nature of the discussions and ideas of the book. 与任何涉及关于人类文明的宏大观点的著作一样,书中几乎肯定会有一些值得争论的细节。我显然不具备足够的专业水平来这么做。但我希望与各位分享在读完《超级社会》这本书之后一直占据我脑海的一些想法。这些想法和评论应该足够说明这部大作的引人入胜之处以及其中的一些主题。 First, if sustained group cooperation relies on external competition, is there value in creating fictitious interstellar enemies to sustain better global cooperation? I’m thinking here of the film The Village, where the elders invented an outside enemy to sustain internal peace. The idea of creating an enemy for solidarity is popular, and even gets a run in the economics comics. 首先,如果持续的群体合作依赖于外部竞争,那么创造一些假想中的外星敌人是否对于维持更好的全球合作具有价值呢?这让我想起了一部名为《神秘村》的电影,在这部电影中,老人们创造出了一个外部敌人来维持村子内部的和平。为了维持团结而创造出一个敌人的想法现在很流行,即使在一些经济学漫画中也能看到它的影子。 Or perhaps the major modern religions fulfil this type of role so well that they can’t be displaced[1]? And surely it is the moral thing to do to promote human cooperation on an even larger scale without actual conflict and violence, if that indeed is possible. 或者也许主要的现代宗教已经扮演了这一角色而因此变得无可取代[1]? 毫无疑问,在不引发实际的冲突和暴力的前提下推进更大规模的人类合作在道德上是无可厚非的,如果这真的可能的话。 Second, and following directly on from the first, the use of the term morality is widely used with its common meaning as conforming to the cooperative norms of a group. Yet I can’t shake the nagging feeling that, like Darwin’s work on evolution, the idea that war with outsiders promotes peace is ripe to be corrupted for political gain because it can be so easily argued to be a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ position. 第二,紧跟第一点的思路,现在人们对于“道德”的惯常理解与维持社会的合作规范是一致的。然而我还是无法摆脱一种令人不安的感觉,正如达尔文在进化论上的贡献一样,认为与外来者的战争能够推进内部和平这一观点很容易被政治利益所利用,因为它很容易被说成是一种“自然的”或是“道德的”立场。 Third, how are these great feats of cooperation realised in practice? Is there a common recipe that can be adopted into 21st public policy? There is a brief mention of how tribes and groups ‘tag’ each other with signals of group membership as one way to create cooperation in the following passage from Chapter 10. 第三,这些宏大的合作是如何在实践中实现的?对于21世纪的公共政策而言,存在一种通用的实践模式吗?书中第十章的以下段落简要地提到了部落和群体是如何用“标签”来标识彼此群体身份的方式来创造合作的。 “An important evolutionary breakthrough was the capacity to tag cooperating groups with symbolic markers such as language and dialect, styles of clothing and ornamentation (including tattoos), and behavioral characteristics—for example, participation in collective rituals. Symbolically-tagged cooperative groups, or tribes and nations, allowed us to increase the scale of cooperation beyond the circle of people personally known to us. Of course, the downside of increasing cooperation within a tribe or a nation was greater intensity of conflict with other tribes and nations.” “一个进化上的重大突破就是人们通过诸如语言和方言,衣着和装饰(包括纹身)的风格,以及行为特征——举例来说,对于集体仪式的参与——这些符号化的标记来为与自己合作的群体贴上标签的能力。通过符号化标签来标记与自己合作的群体,或者部落和国家,让我们能够在熟人小圈子之外扩大合作的规模。当然,在部落或国家内部增进合作的负面效应是与其它部落和国家之间冲突强度的加剧。” But like many of the minor points in the book, this single paragraph opens, then closes, a massively interesting puzzle about how humans actually organise into tribes at all levels. While as outsiders we easily observe tags, or the signals and rituals of a cultural group, as insiders we often overlook the amount of resources devoted to these tagging rituals. 但与书中其它一些次要观点一样,书中的这个段落首先提出了一个重要而有趣的难题,也就是人类是如何在实际中被组织为各种层次的“部落”的,并在之后回答了这个问题。作为外人,我们很容易观察到一个文化群体的标签,或者信号和仪式,但作为群体内部的人,我们却通常会忽视投入到这些标记仪式上的大量资源。 The whole fashion industry is almost exclusively about signalling social status, religious, sporting, or gender loyalties. People don’t buy cars just for transport; otherwise there would be little demand for more than a few different models. 整个时尚产业的存在几乎就是为了标识人们的社会地位,宗教信仰,体育爱好或性别取向。人们买车的目的并不仅仅是为了交通,否则除了有限的几种不同车型之外,不会有多少对其它车型的需求。 Instead we buy into marketing messages about how purchasing different types of cars tag us with different traits in the minds of others. At a national sale with have flags, anthems, national colours, sports teams and more that promote a sense of belonging. 但实际上人们买车也是在购买一种营销符号——通过对不同车型的选择而为自己贴上标签——你开的车显示出你是什么样的人。而国家则通过国旗,国歌,国家的代表性颜色,各种体育项目的国家队以及诸如此类的东西来让人们产生认同感。 While I’ve always considered much of our conspicuous consumption to be wasteful, in the same way that the devotion of military resources often appears wasteful on the surface, a picture is emerging of the amazing gains from these types of tagging behaviours and rituals in terms of promoting high levels of cooperation. While not the direct focus of the book, I think more details on this part of the evolutionary view of cooperation and conflict would have been valuable. 虽然我之前一直认为大多数炫耀性消费都很浪费,正如我们投入在军事上的资源通常从表面上看来都很浪费一样,但一幅由这类“贴标签”的行为和仪式通过在更高层次上提升合作水平而带来巨大收益的图景正在我的脑海中浮现。虽然这并不是本书直接关注的内容,但我认为,就有关合作和冲突的进化观点的这一侧面挖掘更多细节将是非常有价值的。 Fourth, what role does the massive advance in long-range weaponry since the dawn of the nuclear age mean for inter-group warfare? Turchin explains vividly how technology that allows for killing enemy combatants from a distance was a recipe for success in most warfare; starting with our evolved physical ability to accurately throwing rocks and spears, to the invention of bows and arrows, to the use of horses to mobilise armies over great distances. In the age of intercontinental missiles, drones, and nuclear weapons, how does the function of long-range of weaponry play out when the whole world can be anyone’s target? 第四,自从核武时代以来,远程武器技术的巨大进步将在群体间战争中扮演怎样的角色?Turchin教授在书中生动地描述了为什么那些能够在远程杀死敌军战士的技术在大多数战争中都是制胜的法宝,从早期人类演化出的准确投掷石块和长矛的能力,到弓和箭的发明,到使用马匹来让军队获得远程的机动性。在这个洲际导弹,无人机和核武器的时代,当整个世界都可以成为任何人的打击目标,远程武器又将如何发挥其作用? Fifth, if the cooperative effort required to wage large scale war is a major part of the causal story of the history of civilisation, how significant is the legacy of previous wars in the current economic landscape? I have in mind the major industries of modern society, such as passenger airlines arising from industrial investment in aerial warfare, and the digital age legacy of military investment in remote communications. 第五,如果合作的努力是为大规模战争服务的这一因果叙事的确占据了大部分的文明史,那么之前的战争所留下的遗产在当今经济版图中又有着怎样的重要性?我所能想到的现代社会的一些重要产业,例如客运航空业,就是从对空中战争的产业投资中崛起的,而当今的数码时代也起源于军工行业对远程通信技术的投资。 Most major industrial firms of the modern age were intricately involved as military suppliers or were privatised former military organisations. Many modern cities only exist because of the strategic benefits of their local military bases, while public major works such as highway and rail systems, ports and airports, were products of military strategy more than peaceful economic investment. 现代大多数主要工业企业都曾经以各种复杂的方式扮演过军队供应商的角色,或者本身就是由之前的军工组织私有化而来。许多现代城市存在的原因就是处于当地的军事基地所带来的战略性优势,而高速公路,铁路系统,港口和机场这类重大的基础设施则更多都是军事战略的产物,而非和平时期经济投资的产物。 And, surprisingly to me, the cooperative legacy of previous wars is not simply technological, but also institutional; from the organisational structures of firms, to the welfare state, to international treaties on money and trade. The employer-worker relationship looks a lot like the soldier-army relationship, requiring induction, uniforms, codes of conduct, and hierarchal rule. 让我感到意外的是,之前的战争所带来的合作遗产并不仅仅存在于技术方面,它同样存在于组织制度中,从现代公司的组织结构,到福利国家,到国际货币和贸易条约。雇主和工人的关系看起来很像军队与士兵的关系,两者都要求正式入职程序,统一制服,行为准则以及层级化管理。 Modern provisions of the welfare state, including housing, health services and cash payments, were often originally created for returned soldiers following wars. It is no leap to suggest that our international monetary system, and the various international organisations and treaties that accompany it, is the direct result of resolutions in the shadow of the WWII. And perhaps the apparent breakdown of the social equality nurtured by post-war institutions observed since the late 1970s in many western countries is merely there result of the absence of external threats which breed infighting and abuses of power. 当代福利国家提供的各种供应品,包括住房,医疗服务和现金支付,最初通常都是在战后提供给退役士兵的。当今的国际货币体系以及与之配套的各种国际组织和条约,都是在第二次世界大战的阴影之下所达成的一系列决议的直接后果,这并不是什么新鲜的观点。而也许从1970年代晚期开始,许多西方国家中由战后建立的机构所导致的社会平等局面的崩塌,也仅仅是因为外部威胁的缺失为它们提供了内部斗争和权力滥用的温床。 As you can see, “Ultrasociety” will leave you pondering many big questions you may never have thought to ask before. I certainly see the world differently now. And that, to me, is the sign of a profound and insightful work. 正如你所看到的,《超级社会》这本书将会让你去深思一些之前不曾想到过的大问题。在读完这本书后,我眼中的世界变得明显不同了。对我来说,这意味着我读到了一部意义深远而富有洞见的大作。 尾注: Turchin cites Ara Norenzayan’s book Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict when explaining the role of religion in large scale cooperation, and I recommend reading it as well. 在解释宗教在大规模合作中所扮演的角色时,Turchin引用了Ara Norenzayan的著作《大神:宗教是如何改变合作与冲突的》一书中的内容,我也推荐读者阅读这本书。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

往坏里带

【2016-08-20】

@whigzhou: 对比两组数据挺有意思,左图美国黑人比例最高的前10个城市(city),从84%到56%不等,右图黑人比例最高的前10个都市区(metropolis),从48%到31%,左图蓝色数字是对应都市区的黑人比例,很明显,在这些城市,白人中产者基本上放弃了内城,这个趋势估计还会延续下去,最终产生一批黑人城市。

@whigzhou: 这些城市的共同特点是犯罪率极高,1/3-1/2的成年黑人男性被关在牢里,民主党长期垄断权力,福利计划一个接一个,政府开支和税率不断上涨,公立学校一团糟,大片街区沦为废墟,官僚机构腐败透顶……

@whigzhou: 这是内城/郊区的分化,类似的分化也发生在城(more...)

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【2016-08-20】 @whigzhou: 对比两组数据挺有意思,左图美国黑人比例最高的前10个城市(city),从84%到56%不等,右图黑人比例最高的前10个都市区(metropolis),从48%到31%,左图蓝色数字是对应都市区的黑人比例,很明显,在这些城市,白人中产者基本上放弃了内城,这个趋势估计还会延续下去,最终产生一批黑人城市。 @whigzhou: 这些城市的共同特点是犯罪率极高,1/3-1/2的成年黑人男性被关在牢里,民主党长期垄断权力,福利计划一个接一个,政府开支和税率不断上涨,公立学校一团糟,大片街区沦为废墟,官僚机构腐败透顶…… @whigzhou: 这是内城/郊区的分化,类似的分化也发生在城市之间,未来也会发生在州与州之间。 @whigzhou: 有些城市通过土地管制、建筑管制和分区规划把房价抬的极高,也起到了挤出贫穷黑人的效果,过去二十年湾区的黑人比例就在下降 @whigzhou: 相对于现代文明生活,黑人确实有些弱点,但要是没有民主党过去半个世纪不遗余力地残害,也不至于落得这个地步 @whigzhou: 残害政策从两个方向同时下手:压制他们人性中所有积极向善的倾向,纵容娇惯他们所有坏的那些方面:用最低工资法剥夺工作机会,用福利救济削弱工作激励和家庭责任,用禁毒法施饵下套,用平权法强化种族身份,总统和司法部长赤膊上阵煽动种族对立……所有你能想到的把他们往坏里带的办法,全用上了 @路人萨维:辉总的意思是太傻了政策形同残害,还是故意的? @whigzhou: 一开始应该不是故意的,毕竟谁都没有这样的远见,只是民主党惯于玩族裔政治而已,但那么多年过去,效果这么明显,再变本加利的坚持玩,就有点故意了 @whigzhou: 动员少数群体,强化族裔身份,玩族裔政治和裙带政治,是民主党的看家本领,看看坦慕尼协会的历史就很清楚 @whigzhou: 有人可能对60年代民主党180度大转身感到困惑,其实一点不奇怪,他们的族裔/身份政治把戏是一贯的,改变的只是选择哪些族裔/身份群体建立票仓 @whigzhou: 所以无论站在哪一边,他们决不能让黑人这个身份标签消失 @whigzhou: 对黑人来说,不幸的是,他们被挑中时,正是福利主义大跃进之际,结果就被坑惨了 @whigzhou: 当然黑人自身的弱点也起了作用,自律性、延迟满足、责任心方面,比起有着数千年文明历史的民族都差一些,因而福利主义和娇惯政策负面激励效果也更显著 @沉思之后:黑人自身的问题才是主因吧。即便没有民主党的政策,全世界哪个黑人主导的国家或地区繁荣了呢?反之,北欧以及荷兰福利主义和娇惯政策也不少,但是黑人少,也还在持续繁荣中 @whigzhou: 可是平权运动之前美国黑人的状况要好很多啊,非洲人自己未能建立好国家,不等于他们不能作为少数群体在已经建立的好国家中获得良好发展 @SenatusPopulusqueRomanus: 日耳曼人没有数千年文明史,埃及、巴比伦文明史最长。 @whigzhou: 日耳曼人的文明化进程少说也有一千五百年了吧 @whigzhou: 文明化不是全部(在何种文明中被文明化也很重要),但很关键,所有中东来源的移民群体中,波斯裔表现最好,不是没缘由的  
[译文]北欧的顶层为何坐得那么安稳

北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好
Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US

作者:Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/

Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates.

美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西,一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。

It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have 标签: | |

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北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好 Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US 作者:Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/ Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates. 美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西,一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。 It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have more economic mobility than the US. But what we admire about Nordic countries frays when you dig into their wealthiest 1%. 北欧国家确实有着更平均的财富和收入分配。他们在经济流动性方面也比美国表现得更好。但是当我们深入了解北欧国家的那1%最富有的人群时,我们的上述赞誉便可能遭到严重动摇。 Economists Simon Halphen, Wojciech Kopczuk, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner studied wealth among Danes(pdf). They observed that the extraordinary mobility found at lower levels disappears once you get into the very top of the wealth distribution. 三位经济学家Simon Halphen,Wojciech Kopczuk和Claus Thustrup研究了丹麦人的财富。他们观察到,丹麦较富及以下阶层中能看到的那种极高的经济流动性,在财富金字塔的最高层是不存在的。 If you are born into a family in the top 1% of wealth, odds are pretty good, you’ll end up there too. They estimate having parents in the 1% makes you 18 times more likely to be in the top 1% yourself; the odds double if your grandparents and parents were also in the 1%. 如果你出生在前1%的最富裕家庭,那么你就很可能一直留在这一阶层直到离世。他们估计,如果你的父母属于最富1%,那你进入最富1%的可能性就会增加18倍;如果你的祖父母和父母都属于最富1%,那么这一可能性会再增加一倍。 Studies also find that if a man’s father was not in the 0.1% he can forget about reaching the 0.1% in Sweden. The very wealthy ranks in Sweden tend to be dominated by the same family dynasties each generation. 研究还发现,对于一个普通瑞典人来说,如果他父亲不在财富积累的前0.1%,那么他自己也就别想着进入这0.1%的群体了。瑞典的财富排行榜往往被同样的豪族世家一代代把持着。 Nordic tax policy protects the wealthiest 1% by placing very high taxes on income and, by American standards, modest taxes on large inheritances. The high income taxes make it harder for a successful Scandinavian entrepreneur to earn his way into the top 1%. The low inheritance taxes make it relatively easy to pass on large estates. In America, income taxes are lower, and estate taxes higher on wealthy fortunes are higher. 北欧的税收政策保护最富有的1%人群,这体现在所得税极高,而大额遗产税与美国标准相比则要轻些。高所得税把斯堪迪纳维亚的成功企业家们拦在了1%的大门外。相对较低的遗产税给巨额遗产继承提供了方便。相较之下,美国的所得税较轻,而越富裕的人群所面对的遗产税也越高。 Tax policy may make it harder for rich Americans to maintain a spot in the top 1% generation after generation. It is hard to make a simple comparison between Nordic countries because American tax returns don’t include wealth holdings until people die and taxes are paid on their estates. But there is some evidence the richest Americans are more likely to be self-made entrepreneurs rather than members of family dynasties. 这样的税收政策可能使得富有的美国人难以一代代保持住财富最顶端1%的位置。但我们很难将北欧国家同美国简单地做比较,因为美国的纳税申报表是直到纳税人离世后征收遗产税时才会将持有财富计入征收。不过有一些证据表明最富有的美国人更多是白手起家的企业家,而不是富豪世家的成员。 A study by Kopczuk and Lena Edlund looked at estate tax data and observed that there are fewer women in the top 0.01% than in the 1960s. They argue that this is evidence of more self-made people cracking the 0.01% because heirs are equally likely to be male or female, but successful entrepreneurs tend to be male. Kopczuk和Lena Edlund所做的一项针对遗产税数据的研究显示,现在(美国的)财富顶端0.01%的人群中女性比例比1960年代时更少了。他们认为这是许多白手起家的人们挤进0.01%财富榜的表现,因为财富继承人总是男女均衡的,而成功的(白手起家)企业家则往往是男性。 The turnover in America’s top 0.01% comes from some combination of new entrepreneurs accumulating more wealth than established wealthy families, multiple heirs dividing fortunes, and estate taxes eroding family fortunes (though Kopczuk cautions there’s a lot of tax evasion when it comes to inheritances). 美国财富顶端的0.01%的流动是多重因素作用的结果,包括新晋企业家财富积累速度比老牌富豪家族更快、多个继承人分割财富和遗产税对于家族财富的侵蚀等(虽然Kopczuk告诫称美国的遗产税方面有相当程度的漏税逃税情况)。 Since most of the population lives outside the 1%, the mobility among the poor and middle class in Scandinavia is enviable and probably more important. But if you think the biggest threat to the economy is wealth concentration among the 1% being limited to a few powerful families, Scandinavia is not the utopia people make it out to be. 由于绝大多数人群与1%无关,北欧地区的贫穷和中产阶层的高流动性确实值得羡慕,或许也更为重要。但是如果你认为经济发展所面临的最大威胁是财富金字塔的顶层被极少数世家豪族霸占,那么北欧国家着实不是人们期盼的乌托邦。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]弗格森的一半黑人男青年不见了

Half Of Ferguson’s Young African-American Men Are Missing
弗格森的半数非洲裔年轻男子不见了

作者:Adam Ozimek @ 2015-03-18
译者:bear
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Forbes,http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2015/03/18/half-of-fergusons-young-african-american-men-are-missing/

Michael Brown’s tragic death, violent protests including the shootings of police officers, a Justice Department investigation describing a pattern and practice of disc(more...)

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Half Of Ferguson's Young African-American Men Are Missing 弗格森的半数非洲裔年轻男子不见了 作者:Adam Ozimek @ 2015-03-18 译者:bear 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Forbes,http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2015/03/18/half-of-fergusons-young-african-american-men-are-missing/ Michael Brown’s tragic death, violent protests including the shootings of police officers, a Justice Department investigation describing a pattern and practice of discrimination in the Ferguson police department, and the resignation of six city officials, including the police chief, have focused attention on racial divisions in this St. Louis suburb.  The Justice Department investigation alleges that the lack of diversity in the Ferguson police department, only 4 of 54 commissioned officers are African American compared to 67% of the town’s population, undermines the community’s trust of law enforcement. 圣路易斯郡郊区小镇弗格森的种族分裂近来一直极受关注,起因包括一系列事件:麦克·布朗悲剧性的死亡,暴力示威、包括对警察的枪击,司法部调查认为弗格森警察局存在歧视惯例和行为,包括警长在内的6名市政官员辞职。司法部的调查结果声称,全社区对执法的信任度受损,是由于弗格森警察局内缺乏种族多样性:54名现任警官中仅有四名非洲裔美国人,而该镇67%的人口是非洲裔。 An important but unreported indicator of Ferguson’s dilemma is that half of young African American men are missing from the community.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, while there are 1,182 African American women between the ages of 25 and 34 living in Ferguson, there are only 577 African American men in this age group.  In other words there are more than two young black women for each young black man in Ferguson.  The problem of missing black men extends to other age groups.  More than 40% of black men in both the 20 to 24 and 35 to 54 age groups in Ferguson are missing. 关于弗格森困境,一个重要但未被报道的指标是,这一社区中有一半的黑人年轻男性消失无踪了。根据美国人口统计局的数据,有1182名25至34岁的黑人女性生活在弗格森,但同年龄段的黑人男性只有557名。换句话说,弗格森的黑人年轻人中,每名男性都对应着2名以上女性。黑人男性缺席的问题也出现在别的年龄段。20岁至24岁段和35岁至54岁段都有超过40%的黑人男性不见了。 It is worth noting that there are approximately equal numbers of African American boys and girls, under the age of 20, in Ferguson (2,332 boys and 2,341 girls).  What has happened to young African American men in Ferguson?  There are several possibilities.  First, the Census counts only the civilian population, and excludes individuals serving in the Armed Forces.  Second, tragically, some of these young men have already died.  Third, Census figures do not include individuals who are incarcerated at the time of the survey.  Finally, the Census Bureau may undercount homeless men, men who are marginally attached to the community, and men who are primarily engaged in criminal behavior. 值得注意的是,黑人男孩和女孩的数量几乎是相等的,在20岁以下年龄段,弗格森有2332名黑人男孩和2341名黑人女孩。弗格森的年轻黑人男性到底去哪了?有几种可能。第一,统计局的数据仅仅包括了平民,不包括军中服役的。第二,十分悲惨,其中一些年轻男性已经死了。第三,人口统计数据没有包括调查时正在服刑的人员。最后,人口统计局低估了流浪汉的数量,这些男性生活在社会边缘,大多数都涉及犯罪活动。 While the problem of missing African American men is especially severe in Ferguson, young black men are absent from most U.S. cities.  In the neighboring cities of East St. Louis, IL and St. Louis, about 38% and 24% of African American men age 25 to 34 are absent from their communities, respectively.  On average, about 18 percent of young African American men are absent from large cities.  (This calculation is based on the combined population of 33 cities with the largest African American populations, home to about one quarter of African Americans in the U.S.)  In contrast, outside of large cities only about 4% of young black men are absent from their communities.  The challenges posed by an absence of black men in Ferguson are problems faced primarily by larger cities. 尽管黑人男性缺席问题在弗格森特别严重,但在大多数美国城市中,年轻黑人男性消失无踪的情况都存在。在伊利诺斯州的东圣路易斯市和圣路易斯市两个临近城市中,社区里分别大约有38%和24%的25至34岁黑人男性消失了。平均而言,大城市中大约有18%的年轻黑人男性缺席。(这个结果是根据33个黑人人口最多的城市计算出来的,覆盖了大约美国四分之一的非洲裔人口)作为对比,在大城市之外,只有4%的年轻黑人男性不在其社区之内。弗格森这种因年轻黑人男性缺席而造成的挑战,主要是较大城市面临的问题。 Outside of large cities the absence of young African American men is explained by gender differences in mortality rates and military service.  Almost two percent of African Americans between the ages of 25 and 34 are in the active military, and about 85% are men, so military service can explain a two percent shortfall in the civilian black male population. 除开大城市以外,其他地方的年轻黑人男性缺席现象可以用死亡率和军队服役上的性别差异来解释。25至34岁的美国黑人中,有大约2%在军中服役,其中约85%是男性,所以军队服役状况能够解释2%的男性黑人平民的数量差额。 Vital Statistics data indicate that about 96% of African American men will survive to the age of 30 compared to 98% of women.  Shorter life expectancies can explain why an additional two percent of young African American men are missing.  After adjustments for gender differences in mortality rates and military service, 14% of African American men age 25 to 34 are missing from our largest cities, and 47% are missing from Ferguson. 人口动态统计数据显示,大约有96%的美国黑人男性能活到30岁,而女性则有98%。男性相对更短的预期寿命可以再解释两个百分点的年轻黑人男性缺席现象。基于死亡率和军中服役状况上的性别差异进行调整后,我国大城市中有14%的25至34岁的黑人男性缺席,而弗格森则达47%。 Incarceration is the primary reason why young black men are missing from our largest cities.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics about 9.4% of African American men age 25 to 34 are incarcerated, compared to 0.6% of African American women.  However, an incredibly high incarceration rate would be necessary to account for all of Ferguson’s missing young black men.  Ferguson’s challenge is likely the result of a combination of problems including incarceration, criminal behavior, homelessness and substance abuse. 服刑是我国大城市中年轻黑人男性缺席的主要原因。根据司法统计局的数据,大约9.4%的25至34岁美国黑人男性正在服刑,而黑人女性则只有0.6%。然而,只有高到令人难以置信的服刑率,才能够解释弗格森年轻黑人男性缺席的总量。弗格森面临的挑战可能是一系列麻烦综合导致的结果,包括服刑、犯罪行为、无家可归和滥用药物。 It will be difficult for Ferguson to prosper economically as long as half of young black men are absent from the community.  According to Census data 60% of households with children in Ferguson are headed by women and 48% of these female-headed households are below the poverty line. 只要社区中始终有一半的年轻黑人男性不见踪影,弗格森的经济发展就会很困难。根据人口统计数据,在弗格森,60%的有孩子家庭由妇女当家,而这些由妇女当家的家庭中又有48%生活在贫困线以下。 Although the Justice Department views the racial disparity among Ferguson’s police officers as a potential cause of racial unrest in the community, the dearth of black police officers is also a consequence of the socioeconomic problems facing Ferguson’s African American community.  While there have been important changes in the past few decades, law enforcement is an occupation disproportionately represented by younger men.  According to the Census Bureau over 85% of police officers in the U.S. are men and only 13% are age 55 and above. 尽管司法部认为弗格森警察构成中的种族不平衡是该社区内种族矛盾的潜在原因之一,但黑人警察不足也是弗格森的黑人社区所面临的社会经济问题的结果。尽管在过去几十年有一些重大的改变,但执法行业依旧不成比例地由年轻男性主导。根据人口统计局,超过85%的美国警察是男性,只有13%是55岁以上的。 As Ferguson strives to achieve greater racial diversity in its police force, one of the first problems civic leaders will face is a shortage of young African American men from Ferguson who can fill positions in the police department.  Many of the socioeconomic problems that have caused these young men to be absent from their community will also make it difficult, if not impossible, for these men to pursue a career in law enforcement. 弗格森正在努力强化其警力配置中的种族多样性,但是,市政领导人将要面临的一个头等难题是:弗格森没有足够的年轻黑人男性来充任警察局的岗位。导致这些年轻人在各自社区中缺席的社会经济问题,同样也会使这些男性很难去从事执法行业,如果不是不可能的话。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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