含有〈法律〉标签的文章(143)

同婚权与蛋糕权

【2017-10-10】

下午课上分组讨论婚姻话题,不出意料,焦点很快汇聚到当下正热门的同性婚姻上,同样不出意料,nayster在我的新移民同学中占压倒多数(除了香港同学表示不在乎,日本同学的意见没听到),为避免讨论变成异口同声宣示倾诉,我主要扮演倾听者、提问者和质疑者的角色,结果就不幸被认定为yesster了。

不过我确实不太接受nayster们最常提到的那些理由,我不相信同婚合法化会危及传统婚姻,传统婚姻是在衰弱,但和同性恋或同婚都没什么关系。

『会con(more...)

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【2017-10-10】 下午课上分组讨论婚姻话题,不出意料,焦点很快汇聚到当下正热门的同性婚姻上,同样不出意料,nayster在我的新移民同学中占压倒多数(除了香港同学表示不在乎,日本同学的意见没听到),为避免讨论变成异口同声宣示倾诉,我主要扮演倾听者、提问者和质疑者的角色,结果就不幸被认定为yesster了。 不过我确实不太接受nayster们最常提到的那些理由,我不相信同婚合法化会危及传统婚姻,传统婚姻是在衰弱,但和同性恋或同婚都没什么关系。 『会confuse孩子』也没多大说服力,首先,孩子恐怕没这么容易被confuse,其次,当前使劲confusing孩子的是女权主义、多元主义、相对主义乃至整个进步主义运动,只要他们仍然统治着媒体和教育系统,孩子们被confuse的风险是一样的,无论同婚是否合法化。 对收养问题的担忧更有道理一些,但这之所以成为问题主要是因为国家权力在收养事务上插手太深,我的立场是:如果我是孤儿院院长,我会拒绝任何同性恋者的收养请求,如果我是法官,我不会禁止孤儿院院长将孤儿交给同性恋收养者,如果我是议员,我会对任何扩大国家对收养事务干预权的法案投反对票…… 当然,如果有投票权,我肯定会投nay,因为尽管我不认为同性恋和同婚本身是什么洪水猛兽,但当前推动他们的那个政治运动和意识形态体系却是货真价实的洪水猛兽,特别是到他们在推进这一议题时所表现出的蛮横、不宽容、不可理喻、得寸进尺,更让我不愿看到他们又一次得手。 假如回到十年前,我可能会想,这事情没那么重要,最好满足他们吧,好让这议题从政治空间中消失,但近十几年的经验告诉我,事情不会这么发展,他们只会得寸进尺,得到同婚权之后,他们会进而要求同婚蛋糕权……他们总会找出办法让这议题延续下去,真正的伤害随后便会到来。  
细细的歧视

【2016-11-07】

最近闹得沸沸扬扬的亚裔细分,无非暴露了平权法的种族主义实质,所谓平权本来就是赤裸裸的种族歧视嘛,只不过没平到自己头上就体会不到,如今不光要歧视,还要细细的歧视。 ​​​​

 

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【2016-11-07】 最近闹得沸沸扬扬的亚裔细分,无非暴露了平权法的种族主义实质,所谓平权本来就是赤裸裸的种族歧视嘛,只不过没平到自己头上就体会不到,如今不光要歧视,还要细细的歧视。 ​​​​  
翘首期盼炸弹

在墨尔本,要想预防你家房子未来被council列入历史遗产名单,最好把它盖的无比平庸……一栋二十年历史估价一千万的房子最近在拍卖前两天被列入名单,比轰炸惨多了,不少city有1/5到1/4的房子已被列入名单,将来打起仗来估计大家都翘首期盼炸弹落到自家屋顶上,呵呵 ​​​​

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在墨尔本,要想预防你家房子未来被council列入历史遗产名单,最好把它盖的无比平庸……一栋二十年历史估价一千万的房子最近在拍卖前两天被列入名单,比轰炸惨多了,不少city有1/5到1/4的房子已被列入名单,将来打起仗来估计大家都翘首期盼炸弹落到自家屋顶上,呵呵 ​​​​
让美国成为美国的五件东西

【2017-02-21】

​​​​@whigzhou: 如果让你列出五件东西,没了它们美国(在你眼里)就不再是美国了,你会选哪五件?我的选择:持枪权,stand your ground,陪审团,最高法院,州权。

@都市学派:宪法必须排第一。

@whigzhou: 宪法很难判定怎么算『没了』,我列的五件都很容易判别

@慕容飞宇gg:辉总的意思是没了其中一件还是全部没了?

@whigzhou: 每少一件就更远离一点啊(幸亏我不是本质主义者)

(more...)
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【2017-02-21】 ​​​​@whigzhou: 如果让你列出五件东西,没了它们美国(在你眼里)就不再是美国了,你会选哪五件?我的选择:持枪权,[[stand your ground]],陪审团,最高法院,州权。 @都市学派:宪法必须排第一。 @whigzhou: 宪法很难判定怎么算『没了』,我列的五件都很容易判别 @慕容飞宇gg:辉总的意思是没了其中一件还是全部没了? @whigzhou: 每少一件就更远离一点啊(幸亏我不是本质主义者) @银色子弹V5: 那不也很好嘛,变成加拿大了 @whigzhou: 说到点子上了,没这些就是加拿大了,我之所以选这几件,不是说其他(比如言论自由、私人财产权)不重要,而是认为这些才是让美国比盎格鲁世界乃至自由世界的其他部分更自由的东西,是特别美国的东西  
保守派的污点

【2016-09-09】

@海德沙龙  《一场轰轰烈烈的反娼妓战争》 无论从哪个方面都很难论证禁娼的合理性,在性交易合法化的地方(比如澳洲),它并未带来风气败坏和道德沦丧,相反,禁娼总是恶化妓女的处境,将其推入黑帮之手,所以禁娼法已逐渐失去支持,然而在过去十几年,禁娼运动又戴着一副新面具卷土重来……

@whigzhou: 宗教保守派和进步主义者在这件事情上结成了奇特的联盟,这是宗教保守派的一个污点,和他们在禁酒和禁毒问题上的污点类似(more...)

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【2016-09-09】 @海德沙龙  《一场轰轰烈烈的反娼妓战争》 无论从哪个方面都很难论证禁娼的合理性,在性交易合法化的地方(比如澳洲),它并未带来风气败坏和道德沦丧,相反,禁娼总是恶化妓女的处境,将其推入黑帮之手,所以禁娼法已逐渐失去支持,然而在过去十几年,禁娼运动又戴着一副新面具卷土重来…… @whigzhou: 宗教保守派和进步主义者在这件事情上结成了奇特的联盟,这是宗教保守派的一个污点,和他们在禁酒和禁毒问题上的污点类似,这不禁让人感慨,基督徒什么时候又堕落到需要国家强制力来执行他们的教规了? @whigzhou: 相比之下,有些教派(比如阿米绪人)就从不诉求于国家强制,他们对自己的德行更有信心,也更值得得尊敬  
[译文]司法竞争如何带来自由

When Courts Compete for ‘Business,’ Liberty Wins
当法庭之间争夺“生意”时,自由就是赢家

作者:Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty

Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong.
那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的

Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it’s curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn’t that which produced liberty be up to preserving it?

考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果,很奇怪的是,现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢?

When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone’s objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an “invisible hand.” That’s how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek’s, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson).

当我说竞争产生自由时,我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了,就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的(和坏的)后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果(这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅)。

We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge(more...)

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When Courts Compete for 'Business,' Liberty Wins 当法庭之间争夺“生意”时,自由就是赢家 作者:Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong. 那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的 Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it's curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn't that which produced liberty be up to preserving it? 考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果,很奇怪的是,现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢? When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone's objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an "invisible hand." That's how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek's, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson). 当我说竞争产生自由时,我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了,就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的(和坏的)后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果(这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅)。 We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge unintentionally. It should give us hope for the future; if the libertarian movement is deficient, we need not assume that liberty has no chance. (I have more to say about liberty as an unintended consequence in the context of Magna Carta here.) 得知像自由那样美好的事物会非意图地产生,我们应该感到高兴。这会给我们的未来带来希望;如果自由意志主义运动是有缺陷的,我们却不必认为自由已经没有了机会。(关于自由在《大宪章》语境中是个意外产物,我还有更多的话要说,戳这里。) Many authors from the 18th century onward have written about the unintended good consequences of competition, i.e., the absence of central control. They emphasized that in the West the rivalries between church and state, between nobles or parliament and crown, and between nation-states yielded zones of liberty that endure to this day, however diminished in particular matters. 18世纪以来,许多作者已经描写过竞争(即中央控制的缺失)所带来的意外好处。他们强调,西方世界中教会和世俗国家的斗争,贵族或议会和王权的斗争,以及民族国家之间的斗争,产生了延续至今的自由空间,不管这一空间在一些特定方面衰减得有多么厉害。 Competition among legal institutions—courts and bodies of law—within overlapping jurisdictions played a large role in this centuries-long beneficent process. These of course are not examples of anarchism; on the contrary, states existed. But competitive overlapping legal regimes are an element of market anarchism. 管辖界限互相交错的司法制度——各法庭和各法体【编注:一个法体是指有着独特渊源和内在一致性的一组法律规则,比如衡平法、海事法、战争法分属不同法体。】——之间的竞争在这场持续数个世纪的有益历程中扮演了重要角色。这些当然不是无政府主义的例证,恰恰相反,国家是存在的。但是司法制度之间的交叉竞争是市场无政府主义的一个组成元素。 So where a state coexisted with a polycentric legal order, we may say, with Bryan Caplan, that there existed "less than the minimum" state, that is, something that fell short of the nightwatchman state favored by limited-government libertarians. 所以当一个国家存在一种多中心的法律秩序时,我们可以用Bryan Caplan的话来说,这里就存在着一种“比最小国家更弱一点”的国家,也就是说,比喜欢有限政府的自由意志主义者所期待的守夜人政府更弱一点的东西。 A good place to read about competition in law and dispute resolution is Todd J. Zywicki's highly accessible Northwestern University Law Review article "The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis." Todd J.Zywicki发表在Northwestern University Law Reviews上的文章“普通法中的效率兴衰史:一种供给侧分析”是一篇了解法律和争端解决机制中的竞争情形的深入浅出的文章。 An important feature that "influenced the common law's evolution," Zywicki writes, "was the competitive, or 'polycentric,' legal order in which the common law developed. During the era that the common law developed, there were multiple English courts with overlapping jurisdictions over most of the issues that comprise the common law. As a result, parties potentially could bring a particular lawsuit in a variety of different courts. In turn this created competition among these various courts for business." 一个“影响到了普通法进化的重要特征”,Zywicki写到:“是竞争性的,或者说是“多中心”的法律秩序,普通法就是在其中演化的。在普通法产生的时代,在构成普通法的绝大多数问题上都有很多管辖界限重叠的英格兰法庭(存在竞争)。结果就是当事人有可能从很多不同的法庭中选择一个来进行特定的诉讼。于是,这些法庭之间就产生了生意上的竞争。” The idea of courts competing for "business" sounds strange to modern ears, but it was commonplace before the 20th century. (The extent of private arbitration in international commerce is largely unappreciated.) 对于现代人来说,法庭在“生意”方面进行竞争这个想法听起来很怪,但是在二十世纪之前这是很常见的。(在这方面,私人仲裁在国际贸易中的普及程度并没有受到应有的注意)。 Zywicki's paper shows that the common law, which featured this competition, was efficient in the eyes of those who used its services. Monopoly is inefficient even (especially?) in matters of security, dispute resolution, and justice. Moreover, it's a mistake, as Hayek explains in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (volume 1)  to assume that government is the source of law. Zywicki的论文指出,有这种竞争特色的普通法在那些使用其服务的人们眼中是有效的。垄断性司法甚至(或者说尤其是?)在安全、调解纠纷和司法制裁方面都是效率低下的。此外,哈耶克在《法律、立法与自由》中指出,认为政府是法律源头的想法是极其错误的。 Moves away from competition and the common law, then, aren't adequately explained by shortcomings in its services to its consumers. Political ambition provides a more satisfactory explanation. (In the case of the criminal law, see this.) 因此,对司法竞争性与普通法传统的偏离,单从当事人所得服务有所欠缺这一角度是不能充分解释的。政治野心是一个更为令人满意的解释(至于刑法的情况,参见这里) Zywicki draws on the legal historian Harold Berman, who wrote, "Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems." Zywicki引用了法律史学家Harold Berman的话:“也许西方法律传统的最与众不同之处在于多样化的司法管辖权和多种法律体系在同一个共同体内部共存和竞争。” The legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller went further: "A possible objection to the view [of law] taken here is that it permits the existence of more than one legal system governing the same population. The answer is, of course, that such multiple systems do exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems." (Emphasis added.) 法哲学家Lon L.Fuller进一步指出:“对这种(法律)概念的一个可能的反对意见是,它允许多个司法体系管辖同一个人群。当然,对此的回答是:这样的重合体系确实存在,并且在历史上比一元化的(司法)体系更为常见”。 The limited-government libertarian who insists that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisiction is like the apocryphal aerodynamicist who calculated that a bumblebee couldn't possibly fly. One needed only to point out the window, saying, "Behold!" Likewise, the anarchist need only point to history. 有些相信有限政府的自由意志主义者坚持认为,市场无政府主义行不通,因为它缺乏能够实行最后裁决的垄断性法院。这就像假冒的空气动力学家计算得出大黄蜂根本无法飞起来一样。实际上我们只需要朝窗外指指说:“看呐!”。同样,无政府主义者只需要拿出历史事实。 Berman also wrote (quoted by Zywicki), "The same person might be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king's courts in another, his lord's courts in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court in a fifth, [and] a merchants' court in a sixth." This sounds as though the courts were not really competitive, but rather that the variety of courts constituted specialization and a division of labor. Berman又写道(引用自Zywicki):“同样的一个人可能在某种案子中服从于宗教法庭,在另外一种案子中则可能服从国王的法庭,也可能是其领主的法庭,又可能是庄园的法庭,城镇法庭,甚至是商人法庭。”听起来好像各个法庭并不存在真实的互相竞争关系,不同法庭之间存在专业区分和劳动分工。 But that inference would be wrong. To see this we may turn to a keen contemporaneous observer, Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations Smith notes that despite a de jure division of labor, courts in fact competed with one another, even to the point of entrepreneurially finding ways to lure cases from other courts. 但是这样的推断是错误的。为了了解这一点,我们可以求助于同时代的一位敏锐观察者,亚当·斯密。在《国富论》中,斯密提到,尽管从法理上来说,法庭之间存在劳动分工,但事实上他们是相互竞争的,竞争甚至到了多方钻营以从其他法庭中诱拐案件的程度。 Why do this? Because the courts obtained their revenues from fees paid by parties to cases. The more cases a court heard, the more money it earned, a state of affairs that Smith, no anarchist of course, approved of: "Public services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them." 为什么要这样做呢?因为法庭的经费来自案件各方所支付的费用。一个法庭开审的案件越多,那么得到的金钱就越多,斯密当然不是一位无政府主义者,但他赞成这样的一种状态:“公共服务办好才给予酬劳,并且按勤勉的程度决定酬额,这样才能办好。” Smith described the legal environment of his day: 斯密这样描述他那个时代的法律环境:
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. 英格兰各法院最初似乎主要仰赖于法院诉讼费。各法院都尽可能兜揽诉讼事件,那怕本来不是归自己管辖的案件,也乐于受理。例如,单为审理刑事案件而设的高等法院,居然接受民事案件,而以原告声称被告对他所行不义是犯了非法侵害罪或轻罪为受理的口实。 The court of king's bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognisance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognisance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king because the defendant would not pay him. 王室特别法院的设立,本来单是为了征收国王收入和强制人民偿清对于国王所欠债务的。但它后来居然受理关于一切其他契约债务的诉讼,原告陈诉的理由是,被告不偿还对他的债务,所以他不能偿还对国王的债务这个理由。 In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. 由于这种种的假托,结果许多案件,究竟归哪个法院审理,全由诉讼当事人选择,而各法院要想为自己方面多多招徕诉讼案件,也在审理上力求迅速公平。 The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for every sort of injustice. [Emphasis added.] 英格兰今日的法院制度,是值得赞赏的,但一探其究竟,恐怕在很大程度上须归因于往昔各法院法官的相互竞争,对一切不正当行为,各个力求在自己法院就法律许可的范围内给予最迅速最有效的救济这个事实。
Zywicki also quotes from Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence: Zywicki也引用了斯密在《法学讲稿》中的话:
Another thing which tended to support the liberty of the people and render the proceedings in the courts very exact, was the rivalship which arose betwixt them. 另一件倾向于支持人民的自由和使得法庭程序更为严谨的事务,是法庭之间的竞争关系。
It may be argued that the state provided a backdrop to the competitive legal order, such that a forum of last resort was always available. This argument loses its force, however, when one realizes, as Edward Stringham teaches, that private dispute-resolution procedures arose in matters where states abstained from involvement, such as the nascent stock markets. (For more on the weakness of the "shadow of the State" argument, see this.) 有人可能会认为,竞争性的法律秩序总有国家站在后面,因此终极的裁决平台总是存在。然而,就如Edward Stringham教导的那样:当国家放弃参与时,私人的纠纷解决程序才会出现,就像最初的股票市场那样。只要意识到这一点,上述论调就变得苍白无力。(关于“国家的影子”论调的弱点,详见这里)。 "In short," Zywicki sums up, "a market for law prevailed, with numerous court systems competing for market share in order to increase their fees. This competitive process generated rules that satisfied the demand of consumers (here litigants) for fairness, consistency, and reasonableness." “总而言之,”Zywicki总结道:“法律市场繁盛起来了,很多法庭系统为市场占有率和从中所获费用进行竞争。这一竞争过程产生了符合顾客(这里指诉讼当事人)对公平性、一致性和合理性的需求的规则。” Bumblebees fly and reasonably pro-freedom dispute resolution emerges without the state, no matter what a cloistered theoretician may think. 不论纸上谈兵的理论家们怎样思考,大黄蜂会飞,公道的、促进自由的纠纷解决方式无需国家也能产生。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]勿忘普通法

Remember the Common Law
勿忘普通法

作者:Jim Harper  @ 2016-4
译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
校对:小橘子
来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law

Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.”

优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论,这个理论说明了,在可见的经济活动之下,可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户,就要买一扇新的,所以人们很容易认为,通过促进生产和贸易,打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上,打破窗户使社会境况恶化了;财富被破坏了,而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。

A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly u(more...)

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Remember the Common Law 勿忘普通法 作者:Jim Harper  @ 2016-4 译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 校对:小橘子 来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” 优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论,这个理论说明了,在可见的经济活动之下,可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户,就要买一扇新的,所以人们很容易认为,通过促进生产和贸易,打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上,打破窗户使社会境况恶化了;财富被破坏了,而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。 A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly unseen. Legal doctrines such as property and contract emerged quietly from series of court decisions over decades and even centuries, so they often go unconsidered and unspoken. Many people may believe that legislation and regulation do most of the work of ordering society. 在法律领域,类似的情况也同样存在。立法与监管程序是显而易见的。大选会定期让民众注意到立法与行政机构,选举的与非选举的官员会通过媒体来阐述他们的举措。相比之下,普通法下的规则绝大部分是看不见的。有关财产与契约等范畴的法律原则,在数十年甚至数百年来的法庭判例中悄无声息地形成,因此往往既不为人留意,也未经言明。许多人可能会认为,规范社会的,主要是法典与规条。 Libertarians should remember the common law and generally prefer it. The common law process for making the rules of a free society has much to commend it. And where it falls down, it is more readily fixable than legislation and government regulation. 自由意志主义者应该谨记普通法,并将其置于优先地位。普通法体系在形成自由社会规则方面确有不少令人赞许之处。而且与成文法和行政规制体系相比,普通法在其失足跌倒之处也更便于调整修正。 American law students learn early that the common law is an important inheritance from England that differs from the civil-law tradition dominant on the European continent. In the common-law tradition, the basic rules that govern our interactions arise from years of experience over generations. Our forebears learned that justice is served and benefits accrue when people avoid violence, stick to their promises, and allocate things in an orderly way. 美国法学学生很早就认识到普通法体系是继承自英国的一项重要遗产,该法系与欧洲大陆盛行的民法传统大相径庭。在普通法传统下,基本法律规范由一代代人的长期经验积累而来。我们的祖先发现,当人们免于暴力,信守承诺,分配有序时,正义便得到伸张,福祉便得到增长。 The law of battery, contract law, and property law all emerged as common practice solidified into common law. It’s often called “judge-made” law, but at its best common law is “judge-found” law— that is, judges discover law in common practices that are deeply ingrained in society. 有关殴打的法律、契约法以及财产法,都是由惯例凝结固化而成的普通法。普通法常被称为“法官制造的”法律,但最恰当的说法应该是“法官发现的”法律——意思是说,法官们发掘出社会上根深蒂固的惯例中所蕴含的规则。 In contrast, the source of rules in civil-law countries is the code books issued by rulers and governments. Civil codes establish the rules governing contracts, trade, property, criminal law, and so on. The civil-law tradition extols the great law-givers—Solon, Hammurabi, Napoleon—who wrote down the law codes purporting to govern their societies. 对比之下,民法体系国家的规则来源是统治者与政府颁布的法律条文。有关契约、商业、财产、刑法等各方面的规则,均由民法法典确立。民法传统推崇伟大的立法者——梭伦、汉穆拉比、拿破仑——他们一手制订治理社会的法典。 But the founding of civil law is something of a myth. In the times when civil law originated, the bulk of most populations was illiterate. These citizens did not have copies of the civil codes that purported to govern them. The civil-law tradition relies on the fiction that certain powerful men produced laws—but they actually arose like common law from the time-worn habits and customs of their subjects. 然而,民法起源于一个神话。在民法最初形成的时候,大部分民众还是文盲,他们并没有读过那些用来管辖他们的民法法典。民法传统建基于强人立法的虚构故事——实际上它们和普通法一样,源自于古老的习惯与惯例。【编注:作者的意思大概是,有关强人立法的虚构故事为民法赋予了其被广泛接受所需的权威性。】 Part of the genius of the common law is its mix of adaptability and consistency. When new circumstances arise, common-law courts, urged on and educated by the parties to disputes, adapt existing rules in ways that they believe produce the most just and fair outcomes. 普通法的优越之处,部分表现在它在适应性和连贯性之间的平衡。当新的环境条件出现时,普通法的法庭在争讼各方的敦促与启发下,会灵活理解运用现有规则,以期达到一个他们都认为公正公平的结果。 They look for comparable cases in their own and other jurisdictions to learn what adaptation of existing law will produce the best results. Over time, new doctrines emerge and old ones may die out. But at any given time there is a stable rule-set people can use to organize their lives and business activities. 法庭将在本身与其他司法管辖区中查找可供比附的案例,以研究如何调整现有规则才能达致最佳的结果。随着时间的推移,新的法律原则形成,旧的则被淘汰。但在任何一个时间点上,人民生活经商都有一套相对稳定的规则可供遵循。 THE COMMON LAW OF PRIVACY 有关隐私的普通法 The field of privacy protection illustrates how common law develops. In 1890 a Harvard Law Review article entitled “The Right to Privacy” made the original argument that law should address privacy. Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, later to become a U.S. Supreme Court justice, catalogued the legal doctrines that might control certain abuses of private life arising from photography and mass circulation newspapers. They argued that the law should explicitly protect privacy. 普通法规则的发展演变,从保护隐私领域就可觅一斑。1890年,一篇刊载在《哈佛法学评论》上题为《隐私权》的文章首次提出,法律需要处理隐私问题。萨缪尔•沃伦与后来成为美国最高法院大法官的路易斯•布兰代斯,整理出了能够制止因拍照和大发行量报纸而引致侵犯私生活的法律原则。他们认为法律应明确保护隐私。 Over time, a new branch of common law was born. Courts across the country began to recognize privacy torts—legally recognized wrongs that give victims of privacy invasions the right to sue invaders. In 1960 eminent legal scholar William L. Prosser documented how privacy as a legal concept had come to constitute four distinct torts: intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of name or likeness. 随着时间推移,普通法的一个新分支出现了。全国的法庭都开始承认隐私侵权——从法律上确认侵犯隐私是错的,受害者可以控告侵权者。1960年,杰出的法律学者威廉•普罗萨总结了隐私权这一法律概念,并界定了四种不同的侵权类型:侵扰他人独处或私人领域;曝光令人困窘的私人信息;不当报道,以造成对个人的错误印象;盗用人名等个人标记。 The common law of privacy continues to develop and advance. In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized invasion of privacy as a tort in that state for the first time. The case was Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores. The defendant’s photo-developing shop failed to deliver two women their vacation photos, but an employee distributed a photo of the two showering together, spurring the court to adopt the “public disclosure” branch of the privacy torts. 有关隐私权的普通法不断地发展和推进。1998年,明尼苏达州最高法院首次裁定侵犯隐私在该州构成民事侵权行为。该案为“莱克诉沃尔玛”(Lake v. Wal-Mart)案。被告的照片冲印店未能交付两位女顾客度假时拍的照片,但被告的一名员工却对外散布了这两名女顾客一起淋浴的照片。法庭认为此举适用于隐私侵权分类中的“公开泄露私人信息”。 Like most law, the privacy torts work in the background, through the threat of lawsuits and not actual days in court or big damage awards. The rarity of lawsuits under the privacy torts may show how consistent these baseline privacy rules are with society’s general mores. Some would argue, of course, that they’re not strict enough and that debatable uses of information should produce successful privacy lawsuits more often. Legal evolution will decide who is right. 与大多数的其他法律一样,隐私侵权的法规在社会背景中默默运作,通过潜在的诉讼威胁,而不是大量的实际庭审或高额赔偿来发挥作用。有关隐私侵权的实际案件之少,可能正说明了保护隐私的法律规则与社会上普遍的道德观念高度一致。当然,可能有些人会认为这些法规不够严厉,信息的争议性使用应该产生更多的隐私案胜诉。孰是孰非,在法律演变中自有定夺。 Privacy law may be in tension with free speech and the First Amendment, so it’s not clear that the privacy torts are a permanent fixture in the common-law pantheon. On the other hand, privacy-law professors and others often use the phrase “privacy harm” in a tacit effort to impress into common language— and ultimately common law—that more offenses against privacy or data security should be recognized as legally actionable harms. It’s all part of a quiet but important debate about our privacy values and what may become our privacy laws. 隐私法也许与言论自由和宪法第一修正案有一定的矛盾,因此隐私侵权能否成为普通法神殿的永久基石之一,并未有定论。而在另一方面,隐私法领域的教授与其他学者经常引用“隐私伤害”来试图与普通用语挂钩——最终与普通法挂钩——并试图将更多侵害隐私或信息安全的行为纳入可采取法律行动的伤害行为。 这些争论虽然悄然进行,但对于我们确立有关隐私的价值观,以及确立针对隐私的法律,都非常重要。 But people don’t often ask how common law torts, property rights, and contracts protect privacy. They ask: “What will Congress and our state legislatures do?” Legislation and regulation get most of the attention. 但人们并不会经常过问,隐私权如何得到普通法的侵权法、财产法,以及契约法的保护。他们会问:“国会和我们的州立法机构会怎么做?”。引人注目的是立法与规制。 The top-down process that established federal privacy regulation of health information illustrates some differences between understated common-law development and cacophonous civil-law-style rule-writing. 有关健康信息隐私的联邦管制规则,是通过一个由上至下的程序确立的,从中可以看出低调的普通法发展与喧闹的民法式规则制定之间的某些区别。 In 1996 Congress revamped the rules around health insurance. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) also addressed health privacy, but it didn’t set new privacy rules. Instead, Congress instructed the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make recommendations about the privacy of individually identifiable health information. It told HHS to go ahead and write privacy regulations based on those recommendations if Congress did not act. 1996年,国会对有关医疗保险的法规进行修订。《健康保险隐私及责任法案》(HIPAA)也涉及健康隐私,但其并未对隐私做出新规定。相反,国会要求卫生及公共服务部(HHS)部长就个人可辨识医疗信息的隐私提供建议,并指示HHS,如果国会没有采取相应行动,该部可根据这些建议撰写隐私相关规定。 When HHS reported back to Congress, it downplayed many safeguards for privacy that already existed. These included medical ethics, explicit and implied contract rights, malpractice claims, and state privacy torts— non regulatory privacy protections that got only a few cryptic lines buried deep in the report. In addition to largely ignoring them, HHS advocated eliminating some of them. 此后,当HHS向国会汇报时,对已有的隐私保护措施予以淡化处理,这些措施包括医疗道德,明确及隐含的契约权利,针对专业失当的索赔,以及各州的隐私侵权法——即非行政的隐私保护,仅在报告的某个角落以寥寥数行隐晦提及。HHS不仅对其几近无视,甚至建议将它们当中的一部分予以剔除。 Today, with the HIPAA privacy regulations in place, people seeking health care sign a lot of forms and see a lot of notices discussing health privacy—but it’s not at all clear that their privacy is well protected. The HIPAA rules preserved and helped solidify behind the- scenes information-sharing practices in the health care industry that may or may not serve consumers and society well. Every year, it seems, there is less and less of a free market in health care to test for and discover consumers’ true interests in health privacy and every other dimension of health care. The common law of health privacy is widely ignored. 如今,由于HIPAA的隐私条文已付诸实施,人们接受医疗保健服务需要签署大量表格,阅读大量讨论健康隐私的告示,但他们的隐私是否得到很好的保障,却根本不清楚。医疗行业幕后的信息共享机制未必能很好地满足消费者和社会整体的要求,而HIPAA的条文则保护了这一机制,并使之更加稳固。年复一年,自由的医疗保健市场似乎正在日益萎缩,我们难以探知与发掘消费者在健康隐私乃至医疗保障其他方面的真正利益之所在。健康隐私方面的普通法原则被普遍忽略了。 INDUCTIVE COMMON LAW VS. DEDUCTIVE REGULATION 归纳式的普通法与推论式的立法 Common law is inductive. Building on experience in case after real-world case, common- law courts accrete knowledge about the rule-set that best serves society. Because rule development occurs with reference to real life cases, it takes advantage of local knowledge about the precise disputes that occur. This allows better approximation of what the truly just rules will be for most cases. 普通法是归纳性的。在众多真实案例的经验基础上,普通法法庭在不断积累认知,寻求最适合社会的法则。由于规则在参照真实案例的过程中发展,其优势是能够利用实际发生的真切争议中所包含的局部知识。在绝大多数情况下,这种方式都能达致较为接近公平法则的效果。【编注:此处作者援引的是哈耶克在1948年的论文《社会中的知识利用》中阐述的思想,哈耶克认为,中央计划者或理性建构者的根本困难在于,无法收集和利用作出正确决定所需的分散的局部知识。】 Hayek emphasized the value of local knowledge in economic decision making. He also emphasized the distinction between common law and top-down legislation in his three-volume work Law, Legislation and Liberty. The Italian lawyer Bruno Leoni is another great thinker in this area. His book Freedom and the Law extolled the virtue of English common law compared to Roman jus civile. The two systems have very different ways of developing rules. Common-law systems hew closer to common justice. 哈耶克强调过局部知识对于经济决策的重要价值,也在他的三卷本著作《法律、立法与自由》中强调了普通法与由上至下立法的区别。意大利律师布鲁诺•莱奥尼在这一领域也颇有研究,他在其著作《自由与法律》中赞扬了英式普通法较之罗马市民法的优点。两套体系在发展法规方面大相径庭,普通法更倾向于追求常理上的正义。 Legislation and regulation more often produce rank re-ordering of rights and liabilities because legislation is deductive. At a single point in time, based on all the knowledge it has drawn together at that moment, a legislature establishes the rule-set that it believes to make the most sense. This is often what it perceives as pleasing the most— or the most important—constituencies. That imperative to please constituencies means that the information legislatures codify often comes from well-organized interests with substantial resources. Special- interest pleading is a hallmark of legislation and regulation. 由于立法是演绎性的,因此权利与义务的轻重经常通过订立法律与规章来编排。在某个给定的时点上,立法机关基于当时所知,建立一整套它认为最合理的法规。这又被认为是在迎合最多数或者最重要的选民。迎合选民,意味着立法机关为之编写法规的诉求,经常会来自于掌握重要资源的有组织团体。因而,制定法律与规章带有满足特殊利益诉求的印记。 Judges in common law courts have fewer of the perverse incentives that legislators and regulators do, particularly when judges are appointed for life terms. A tenured judge gets professional acclaim from developing a reputation for fairness, from clearing dockets, and from suffering few reversals in higher courts. Judges generally don’t anticipate growing their courts’ budgets, getting post-service perks, or being re-installed in office due to the outcomes in their cases, as legislators and regulators often do. Legislation and regulation are systematically subject to a kind of intellectual corruption in which self interest diverges from the public interest. 与立法者和监管者相比,普通法法庭的法官带有的不当动机较少,尤其当法官职位是终身制的时候。为赢得专业上的赞誉,一个终身制的法官需要建立断案公正的名声,避免案件积压,以及减少其裁定被高一级法院推翻的案件。与立法者和监管者不同,法官一般来说并不需要担心他们的判决会对法庭的收入,个人离任津贴,或者恢复职位造成影响。而立法与监管机构则由于自身利益与公众利益有所偏离,容易系统性的滋生智识上的腐败。 WRITING THE RIGHT RULES 编写正确的规则 Rules produced by the deductions of legislators and regulators don’t always fail, of course, and they aren’t always wrong. But it is better to arrive at just rules through a long, society-wide deliberation than through a legislative debate. To illustrate this subtle point, consider the rules that govern the liability of interactive computer services like YouTube, Yelp, craigslist, and Facebook. 当然,立法者与监管者通过推导演绎编写的规则并非必然失败,也并非总是错的。但为了得到公正的规则,经由全社会参与的长期讨论始终还是比经由立法辩论为好。为了体现这当中的微妙之处,让我们来研究规管诸如YouTube、Yelp、Craigslist和Facebook等电脑互动服务供应商之责任的规则。 In the mid-1990s courts were considering whether interactive online services would be considered publishers of the information people uploaded and posted to them. If they were publishers, websites might be liable for defamation and other causes of action because of the material users contributed to them. Had this rule taken hold, operators of online services would probably have allowed only tightly controlled and monitored interactions among users. The rollicking, interactive Internet we know today would have been sharply curtailed. 1990年代中期,法庭在研究在线互动服务是否应该被视为其用户张贴上载信息的发布人。如果是的话,这些网站可能将会因为其用户所提供的信息,而负上诽谤及其他法律责任。如果确立了这一规则,在线服务运营商就很可能会对用户间的交流进行严密的控制与监视,我们今天所见到的生动活泼、积极互动的互联网必将大打折扣。 In response to this concern, Congress passed legislation saying that interactive computer services are not publishers or speakers of any information others provide using their services. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is one of the most important protections for online speech in the United States. 出于这一顾虑,国会通过法案表明,电脑互动服务供应商并非其用户上载信息的发布人或发言人。《通信规范法案》(CDA)第230条,便是美国网上言论最重要的保障之一。 But CDA section 230 is often talked about as an “immunity” Congress gave to online service providers, a carve-out from general liability rules, put in place to advance a certain public policy goal. The perception of CDA section 230 as a special-interest favor means that other interests are on relatively strong footing when they come to Congress seeking to overturn it. Today, CDA section 230 is under attack from groups who would like to see it reversed. The rule against liability for online service providers would be stronger if courts had arrived at a rule of “no liability” based in considerations of natural justice. 但CDA第230条经常被认为有异于一般的责任条款,是国会旨在推动某一特定的公共政策,而赋予网络服务运营商的“豁免权”。该条款给人以一种照顾特殊利益的印象,这意味着当其他利益的代表寻求在国会推翻这一条款的时候,将会有较强的理据。如今,一些持反对立场的团体正在挑战该条款。如果在线服务供应商的“免责”是经由法庭考虑自然正义原则之后确立的话, 该规则就将会有较强的说服力。 When the rules that organize our society are temporal products of legislation, they may always be “in play” for a legislative reversal. Online service providers must always remain vigilant in Washington, D.C., for attempts to undercut their special “immunity.” The rules that govern online liability were established quickly, which is good, but they are less settled than they otherwise would be, and there is one more reason for private businesses to maintain a stable of lobbyists and lawyers in Washington. 如果规制社会的规则是因应时势的立法产物,那么这些规则就处于一种随时可能被立法推翻的状态之下。在线服务供应商就必须在华盛顿特区保持高度警觉,以防有人破坏他们的特殊“豁免权”。迅速订立规制网上责任的规则是好事,但这些规则的认受性本来可以更高一些,而且这也为私营企业在华盛顿豢养着一班说客和律师提供了多一个理由。 There is no guarantee, of course, that the common-law rule would be the same right now as what CDA section 230 produced. The common-law process might still be searching for the right rule. Common-law development would probably find, though, that online service providers are not liable for the acts of others. 当然,普通法体系下订立的规则,未必就和CDA第230条的内容一样。在普通法程序下,我们可能仍在寻找恰当的规则,当然,普通法体系很可能会认为在线服务供应商无需为他人的行为负责。 FAR FROM PERFECT, BUT BETTER IN PRACTICE 虽远未完美,但在实践中占优 This is no argument that common-law courts are perfect. They are not. It takes a very long time for just rules to be found out and settled on through common-law development. Elected judges often have incentives to please powerful constituencies. The class-action mechanism is prone to abuse and often used to reward plaintiffs’ lawyers. Punitive damages are too often a source of windfalls to lucky plaintiffs. The rules about who pays for litigation may be changed to improve the delivery of justice in the courts. 没有人会认为普通法法庭运作得很完美。并非如此。在普通法体系下,确立公平规则,并得到认受,需要很长的时间;选举产生的法官常有动机去迎合强大的利益团体;集体诉讼机制容易被滥用,而且常常有利于原告的律师;幸运的原告经常从惩罚性赔偿中大捞一票;为了正义能更好地在法庭上体现,诉讼费用的分担规则可能需要进行修改。 But these challenges are more correctable than the dynamics in legislation and regulation. Public choice economics teaches that actors in all these rule-making processes will pursue their own self-interest, but the interests of legislators and regulators are likely to diverge from justice more often than the interests of judges. 但这些难题,要比立法与规制过程中的纠葛易于解决。公共选择经济学指出,在规则制定的过程中,相关各方会追求自身的最大利益,但与法官比起来,立法者与监管者的利益很可能更容易与社会公义有分歧。 There is a fair argument that legislation and government regulation create certainty, which may make it worthwhile to accept their many costs. This is particularly acute in the area of high tech, where the application of common law may be unclear. 一种意见认为,明文立法与政府规章带来了确定性,因此随之而来的众多代价也就变得可以接受。这不是没有道理,特别在普通法的适用性并不明确的高科技领域,这显得尤其突出。 But regulation produces certainty in theory better than it does in practice. Witness the recent “BitLicense” fiasco in New York State. When Bitcoin, a digital currency, first captured public attention a few years ago, New York superintendent of financial services Ben Lawsky saw it as an opportunity to make his mark in a hot new area. He proposed an ill-defined “BitLicense” that would require registration of Bitcoin businesses in New York. During the rule-making process, his office declined to release “research and analysis” backing the necessity of a BitLicense, in violation of New York’s Freedom of Information Law. 成文法规理论上能带来确定性,但在实践中却未必。近来“比特登记证”(BitLicense)在纽约州的惨败便是一例。当电子货币比特币在几年前引起公众关注的时候,纽约金融服务主管本•洛斯基将其视为他在这个炙手可热的新领域留名的机会。他提议推出含混不清的“比特登记证”条例,要求纽约的比特币业务进行注册登记。在条例制定过程中,他的部门不惜违反纽约的《信息自由法》,拒绝提供与证明“比特登记证”之必要性相关的“研究与分析”。 The final “BitLicense” was a hodgepodge of regulations like the ones that burden the mainstream financial services sector. They were an ill fit with this emerging technology and a hindrance to innovation because they drove up the cost of starting new businesses. They didn’t acknowledge the technology’s inherent capability to provide consumer protections that surpass existing financial services. Shortly after the “BitLicense” was finalized, Lawsky stepped down from his post to establish a financial regulation consultancy. 和那些为主流金融服务增加负担的规章一样,最终出台的“比特登记证”条例是个大杂烩。这些条例完全不适应这一新兴技术,并且因提高创业成本而妨碍了创新。它们无视新技术内在的保护消费者的能力,这种保护超越了现有的金融服务。“比特登记证”条例推出不久,洛斯基就下台创立了一家金融监管咨询公司。 Today, it is anyone’s guess whether and how the New York Department of Financial Services will amend or enforce the technology- specific regulation that Lawsky produced. The “BitLicense” did not create certainty about the rules of the road for Bitcoin businesses in New York, and it did not create an upwelling of Bitcoin business activity in New York. America’s financial capital appears to be ceding ground on financial innovation to London, in the birthplace of common law. 今天,大家都在猜测纽约的金融服务管理局是否会修订或者执行洛斯基留下来的这一针对特定科技的条例,以及具体如何修订或执行。“比特登记证”并没有为比特币业务在纽约的发展之路带来确定性,也没有令比特币业务在纽约蓬勃发展。美国的金融之都在金融创新方面似乎正在让位于伦敦,普通法的发源地。 Common-law rules foster innovation because they allow anyone with a new idea or process to experiment with it, subject only to background rules, such as “stick to your promises” and “do no harm.” There are no forms to fill out or licensing fees. There is no oversight body that must examine how an innovation fits into pre-existing regulation. “Permissionless innovation” does mean some more risk to consumers and society, but our experience with high tech shows just how great the reward is when behavior is controlled with light-touch, simple, fair common-law rules. 普通法规则有利于创新,因为它允许人们去试验新主意和新方法,只要遵守诸如“履行承诺”、“避免伤害”等基本规则即可。不需要填表格,不需要付牌照费,也没有监管部门去检验一项创新在现行规章下如何自处。“免许可创新”的确意味着消费者和社会将面对较高的风险,但经验已经告诉我们,当我们的行为处于简单、公平的普通法规则的规制之下时,高科技将会给我们带来多么巨大的回报。 The United States and England today live under a dual system. In many areas, they continue to enjoy the benefits of the common law. But legislatures increasingly insert themselves, making temporal judgments that rejigger the rules that people and businesses must live by. In many fields, people look to legislation and regulation first, rather than examining how time-honored rules can be adapted to solve new problems. 现今的美国与英格兰生活在一个双重体系之下。在很多方面,她们继续享受着普通法的益处。但立法机关正不断强化自己的作用,用世俗的判断来改变日常生活与商业活动所需遵守的规则。在很多领域,人们首先寄望于立法与规管,而不是去审视自古以来的规则可以如何调适,以解决新生的问题。 Legislatures and regulatory agencies have a lot of smart people working in them. They universally believe they are pursuing the best interests of their jurisdictions. But the system they work in has perverse incentives, and they have little of the knowledge that common-law processes gather and pass down through the ages. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” wrote jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his 1881 book, The Common Law. 立法机关与监管部门当中不乏能人,他们普遍认为他们在为其辖区的最大利益而努力。但他们所供职的体系有着不当的激励,并且他们对普通法体系经年累月累积传承下来的知识知之甚少。法学家小奥利佛•温德尔•霍姆斯在他1881年所著的《普通法》一书中写道,“法律的生命从不在于逻辑,而在于经验,” The common law is an important part of structuring and ordering a free and prosperous society. It is preferable to legislation and government regulation. Even when we confront new problems, we lovers of liberty should remember the common law. 构建与规范一个自由繁荣的社会,普通法体系乃重要一环,它比成文的法律与政府规章更为可取。即便遭遇新的挑战,热爱自由的我们也不应该忘记普通法。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

军令如丝

【2016-04-22】

@whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时,我常常为其(操作主义意义上的)精确性所折服,与其他系统中常见的(看不出操作性含义的)泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照,这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础,每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示,再往前追究,这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系,

@whigzhou: 和其他文书相比,军令应该是最讲究(操作意义上的)明确性的——你,和谁谁谁一起,(more...)

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【2016-04-22】 @whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时,我常常为其(操作主义意义上的)精确性所折服,与其他系统中常见的(看不出操作性含义的)泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照,这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础,每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示,再往前追究,这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系, @whigzhou: 和其他文书相比,军令应该是最讲究(操作意义上的)明确性的——你,和谁谁谁一起,带上这个那个,于某月某日几点前,到达某地。——读令状的感觉就像这样。史家也曾指出,在亨利二世之前,司法令状和其他令状并没有明确区别,依我看,他们都有着军令的背景。  
赔死活该

【2016-02-04】

@草莓酱改: 老太开捷达“碰伤”劳斯莱斯,赔死真就活该吗? http://t.cn/RbFAl6x

@鹿兔马朦:@whigzhou 你们觉得呐?

@whigzhou: 我觉得原文说的有道理,赔偿应有个合理上限,若没有上限,那么把极端贵重的财产置于开放场所,便向他人强加了异乎寻常且难以负担的审慎责任

@tuxt520:这不是保险应该干的事吗

@whigzhou: 保险覆盖了当然好,但一个没有保险的世界里也可以谈论正义与合理性

@whig(more...)

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【2016-02-04】 @草莓酱改: 老太开捷达“碰伤”劳斯莱斯,赔死真就活该吗? http://t.cn/RbFAl6x @鹿兔马朦:@whigzhou 你们觉得呐? @whigzhou: 我觉得原文说的有道理,赔偿应有个合理上限,若没有上限,那么把极端贵重的财产置于开放场所,便向他人强加了异乎寻常且难以负担的审慎责任 @tuxt520:这不是保险应该干的事吗 @whigzhou: 保险覆盖了当然好,但一个没有保险的世界里也可以谈论正义与合理性 @whigzhou: 而且保险定价也是以权利边界为基础的(同时保险的存在也会改变权利边界),因而保险并不会终结这一法律问题 @whigzhou: 我向来认为,将保护财产权免遭破坏的审慎责任过分加之于财产主人以外的他人,是一种不好的做法,当代专利制度便有着这一倾向,我在旧文《专利制度为祸日炽》中曾讨论过 @人格显示器: 该不该,合不合理,共同体说了算。如果在一个城邦中平民力量占了上风,毫无疑问这就不合理。如果是贵族占了上风,这就是合理的。理想的情况是公民大会对此提出法案,经元老院审议通过后形成一种各方都能接受法律。 @whigzhou: 你这是强共同体的看法,我还是喜欢开放社会,不喜欢强共同体  
[译文]宪法回归主义者在行动

The Rehabilitationists
回归主义者

作者:Brian Beutler,《新共和》高级编辑 @ 2015-08-30
译者:@Ghostmarine
来源:《新共和》(The Republic) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal

How a small band of determined legal academics set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won.

一小撮坚定的法学家如何游说最高法院撤销新政,并如何距成功一步之遥。

In November 2013, a who’s who of America’s conservative legal establishment descended on the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., for an annual meeting of the Federalist Society, the most influential conservative legal organization in the country. Current presidential candidates Scott Walker and Ted Cruz each made appearances, ingratiating themselves with the influence peddlers in attendance. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was a featured speaker at the event’s black-tie-optional dinner.

2013年11月,美国保守派法律界名流纷纷降临华盛顿特区五月花酒店,参加全美最具影响力的保守派法学组织——联邦党人协会(Federalist Society)举办的年会。眼下正在争取总统获选人党内提名的斯科特·沃克和泰迪·克鲁兹也分别到场,搔首弄姿,试图赢得与会大佬们的垂青。最高法院大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯作为特邀演讲嘉宾出席年会的半正装宴会。

One of the biggest stars of the conference, however, was neither a Senate-confirmed official nor an elected politician, but a libertarian law professor at Georgetown named Randy Barnett. This wasn’t Barnett’s first turn as a Federalist Society eminence, but his recept(more...)

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The Rehabilitationists 回归主义者 作者:Brian Beutler,《新共和》高级编辑 @ 2015-08-30 译者:@Ghostmarine 来源:《新共和》(The Republic) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal How a small band of determined legal academics set out to persuade the Supreme Court to undo the New Deal—and have almost won. 一小撮坚定的法学家如何游说最高法院撤销新政,并如何距成功一步之遥。 In November 2013, a who’s who of America’s conservative legal establishment descended on the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., for an annual meeting of the Federalist Society, the most influential conservative legal organization in the country. Current presidential candidates Scott Walker and Ted Cruz each made appearances, ingratiating themselves with the influence peddlers in attendance. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was a featured speaker at the event’s black-tie-optional dinner. 2013年11月,美国保守派法律界名流纷纷降临华盛顿特区五月花酒店,参加全美最具影响力的保守派法学组织——联邦党人协会(Federalist Society)举办的年会。眼下正在争取总统获选人党内提名的斯科特·沃克和泰迪·克鲁兹也分别到场,搔首弄姿,试图赢得与会大佬们的垂青。最高法院大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯作为特邀演讲嘉宾出席年会的半正装宴会。 One of the biggest stars of the conference, however, was neither a Senate-confirmed official nor an elected politician, but a libertarian law professor at Georgetown named Randy Barnett. This wasn’t Barnett’s first turn as a Federalist Society eminence, but his reception that year was especially rapturous. 然而,年会上最耀眼的明星并非是由参议院批准的法官,也不是民选政客,而是一个来自乔治城、名叫兰迪·巴奈特的法学教授,是个自由意志主义者。巴奈特并非首次在联邦党人协会上出风头,但那年,他格外火。 “The younger people, the people in law school, they seem to be gravitating toward people like Randy,” said attendee Josh Blackman, an associate law professor at the South Texas College of Law and a close friend of Barnett’s. “When he gets off the stage he’s mobbed. ... There’s a crowd of people five or six feet deep surrounding him.” “年轻人,法学院的学生们,他们为兰迪这样的人所倾倒,”与会者、巴奈特的密友、南德克萨斯法学院副教授乔什·布莱克曼如是说。“他下台时,被围住了······围在他身边的人群足有五、六英尺那么厚。” Barnett had been invited to participate in a lunchtime debate against J. Harvie Wilkinson, a Reagan-appointed judge serving on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the topic of whether courts are too deferential to legislatures. The event was sold out. 巴奈特曾被邀请参加午餐辩论,对手是里根任命的第四巡回上诉法院法官J·哈维·威尔金森,讨论法院是否对立法机关过于顺从。那次活动的票卖得精光。 Thinking back on that day recently, Barnett marveled at his emergence as a celebrity. “One of the leaders of the Federalist Society—one of the senior staff—said clearly I had the room,” Barnett told me. “It wasn’t that I beat J. Harvie Wilkinson in a debate—who knows?—it’s just that the room was with me. The room would not have been with me ten years ago.” 回想起那天的情形,巴奈特依然为自己成为一个明星而惊讶不已。“联邦党人协会的一名领导,高管,再明白不过地告诉我,说那间屋子是我的,”巴奈特对我说。“不是说我在辩论中赢了J·哈维·威尔金森,那种场合哪有胜负可言,他是指那间房子里全是我的支持者。要在十年前,根本不会出现这种情况。” Back then, Barnett was one of a handful of academics on the fringes of conservative legal thought. Today, their views are taking hold within the mainstream of our politics. Barnett and his compatriots represent the vanguard of a lasting shift toward greater libertarian influence over our law schools and, increasingly, throughout our legal system. They’re building networks for students and young lawyers and laying the foundation for a more free-market cast of federal judges in the next presidential administration. Their goal is to fundamentally reshape the courts in ways that will have profound effects on society. 十年前,巴奈特只是保守派法学思想边缘的少数几名学者之一。而今天,他们的观点开始在我们主流政治视野中显山露水。在长久以来自由意志主义向法学院乃至整个法律体系逐渐扩大影响的过程中,巴奈特和他的同袍们扮演了急先锋的角色。他们为学生和年轻律师构建了一个网络,打造了更为壮大的拥护自由市场的联邦法官阵容,为下一届政府选拔法官奠定了基础。他们的目标是,用一种能够对社会产生深远影响的方式,彻底重塑法庭体系。 Barnett’s political philosophy took root when he was a child. His father was a conservative, and he became one, too. When he was a junior at Northwestern University, one of his professors introduced him to libertarianism, as distinct from the more staid Republicanism of his youth. While attending law school at Harvard, a classmate took him to New York to meet the famed but controversial theorist Murray Rothbard, an encounter that inspired his lifelong affiliation with the libertarian movement and its prominent institutions, like the Cato Institute. His lone professional detour outside that world was a four-year stint as a prosecutor in Illinois. After that, he obtained a fellowship at the University of Chicago under Richard Epstein, a giant of American law in the twentieth century and a patron saint of modern libertarian scholars. 巴奈特的政治哲学植根于儿提时代。父亲是个保守派,他也成了保守派。在西北大学读大三时,一位教授向他介绍了自由意志主义,这套理论显然与他青年时所信仰的更为古板的共和主义大相径庭。进入哈佛法学院后,一位同窗带他前往纽约,拜见名满天下谤亦随之的思想家罗斯巴德。这次邂逅促成了他终生卷入自由意志主义运动之中,并与加图研究所这样的运动重镇始终保持良好关系。巴奈特孤寂的职业生涯并非起步于学术界,他最初在伊利诺伊清贫地干了四年检察官。此后,二十世纪美国法学巨擘理查德·爱泼斯坦主持下的芝加哥大学为他提供了一份奖学金,要知道,爱泼斯坦可是现代自由意志主义学者的守护神。 Barnett’s career as an academic began far from the center of the action, however, at Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he became a professor in 1982. “It was a good school,” Barnett told me, “but one reason it was a bummer to teach there was no one had ever heard of it.” 然而,巴奈特的学术之旅可谓发轫于蛮荒,他于1982年在芝加哥肯特法学院获得教授职称。“那是所好学校,”巴奈特告诉我道,“但是在那教书令人困扰的是,没几个人听说过那座学校。” Eventually, Barnett clawed his way to Boston University, and then to Georgetown, where he joined the faculty in 2006. (“I love the situation here,” he said of his current digs. “I don’t need to be on the outs.”) But even as his career took off, his legal views remained decidedly anti-establishment. Barnett believes the Constitution exists to secure inalienable property and contract rights for individuals. This may sound like a bland and inconsequential opinion, but if widely adopted by our courts and political systems it would prohibit or call into question basic governmental protections—minimum wages, food-safety regulations, child-labor laws—that most of us take for granted. For nearly a century now, a legal counterculture has insisted that the whole New Deal project was a big, unconstitutional error, and Barnett is a big part of that movement today. 最终,巴奈特费尽九牛二虎之力,辗转波士顿大学,于2006年成为乔治城的教员。(“我喜欢这里的环境,”他谈及自己当前的教职。“再不用跟别人格格不入了。”)虽然职业生涯平步青云,他依然坚定地秉承反建制派的法学观点。巴奈特深信,宪法存在的意义是为了确保个人财产和订约权不被侵犯。这种观点似乎是一种陈词滥调,无关紧要。但,如果美国的法院和政治体系能够彻底吸纳这种观点,就会彻底禁绝基本的政府保护行为,至少也会对我们绝大部分人都视作理所当然的一些举措,例如最低工资、食品安全管制、禁止童工法等等,产生怀疑。近百年来,法律界的非主流观点一直声称,整个新政项目都是一个巨大的违宪错误,而今天,巴奈特正在该运动中扮演重要的角色。 The main object of this group’s obsession is the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. Joseph Lochner was the owner of a bakery in Utica, New York, at the turn of the last century, who sought relief from the Bakeshop Act, under which he was fined for allowing an employee to work more than 60 hours a week. He believed that the act’s workplace-safety rationale was in fact a government-sanctioned tool for the bakers union to attack nonunion bakeries like his own and that it deprived him and his employees of their right to enter into their own contracts. The Supreme Court narrowly agreed. Its 5–4 ruling struck down the law and, more importantly, provided the rationale justices would use to invalidate other legislation over the course of a generation. 这群人念念不忘的是1905年最高法院就洛克纳诉纽约州(Lochner v. New York)一案的判决。约瑟夫·洛克纳是纽约尤蒂卡一家面包坊的主人,上世纪之交,由于让员工一周工作超过六十小时,受到了《面包坊法》(Bakeshop Act)的处罚,他决定找法院说理。他认为,《面包坊法》所谓基于工作场所安全的理由,其实是面包师工会的一种得到政府批准的工具,用于整治像自己这样的非工会面包师,而且这种法律也侵犯了他和员工之间自由订立契约的权利。最高法院勉强认同了他的观点。判决结果5-4,推翻了《面包坊法》。更重要的是,此次判决提供了一种司法逻辑依据,本足以颠覆此后整整一代所修筑而成的法律体系。 For decades now, legal academics and elites have considered the early twentieth century one of the Supreme Court’s darkest eras. Lochner, it’s been viewed, belongs with Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 1857 decision holding that neither slaves nor freedmen were U.S. citizens, and Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 decision upholding racial segregation under the separate-but-equal doctrine, in a Malebolge of rejected rulings. 最近几十年来,法学学者和精英们都将二十世纪早期视为最高法院的黑历史阶段。洛克纳一案,与1857年裁定奴隶和已解放奴隶均不享有公民权的斯科特诉桑福德案(Dred Scott v. Sandford),以及1896年在“隔离但平等”的原则下实行种族隔离的普莱西诉弗格森案(Plessy v. Ferguson)一道,被视为奇葩判决的典型。 In 1936, after the Supreme Court struck down a New York minimum-wage law, one of a series of New Deal measures it ruled unconstitutional, a dejected Franklin D. Roosevelt complained to the press that the Court had created “a ‘no-man’s land’ where no government—state or federal—can function.” 1936年,最高法院宣布新政措施之一、纽约州最低工资法违宪,沮丧的富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福对媒体抱怨道,最高法院开辟了“一片‘真空地带’,无论是联邦政府还是州政府,在这里都无能为力。” A year later, after Roosevelt had been reelected overwhelmingly on a New Deal platform, the Supreme Court effectively repudiated Lochner when a 5–4 majority upheld Washington’s state minimum-wage law for women. “More than 25 years ago we set forth the applicable principle in these words, after referring to the cases where the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been broadly described,” the Court ruled. “But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses.” In addition to forming the basis of the modern American social contract, this decision was a hard-fought victory over fierce opposition to government regulation by employers and property owners. The enduring postwar political consensus about the proper role of government may have masked that opposition, but it was never completely vanquished. 一年后,随着罗斯福挟新政以绝对优势连任,最高法院以5-4的多数支持华盛顿州女性最低工资法,事实上推翻了洛克纳案先例。 “二十五年前,在大量援引了明显涉及宪法第十四修正案所保障的众多自由的案件后,我们以这样的字眼陈述了一条适用原则,”法庭裁定。“然而,我们需要认识到,像其他所有案件一样,在所引用的案例中,订立契约的自由是一种具有限制的权利,而非绝对权利。并不存在随心所欲行事的绝对自由,也不存在任意订立契约的绝对自由。”此判决除了奠定现代美国社会契约基础外,还艰难地战胜了雇主和业主对政府管制的强烈反对。虽然战后长期以来,关于政府恰当角色的政治共识掩盖了这种反对,但反对的声音从未彻底消失。 All libertarians want to fight federal regulations in Congress and the executive branch. But Barnett and his allies think courts should be empowered to throw regulations out even if political majorities support them. These Lochner revivalist professors have established beachheads at law schools across the country. In 2002, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh founded a blog, The Volokh Conspiracy, as a hub for libertarian ideas, including Lochner revisionism. Today, it has become the most prominent academic legal blog in the country and now publishes under the auspices of The Washington Post. It boasts nearly two dozen contributing professors and mainlines detailed and informed libertarian legal arguments to thousands of the nation’s top lawyers, law students, clerks, judges, and opinion-makers every day. 所有自由意志主义者都试图在国会和行政分支与联邦管制作斗争。然而,巴奈特和他的盟友认为,即使政治主流乐见管制,司法系统也应当有能力推翻管制。这些以复兴洛克纳案为己任的教授们已经在全美各地的法学院建立起滩头阵地。2002年,加州大学洛杉矶分校的法学教授尤金·沃洛克创建了一个名叫“沃洛克共谋”的博客,成为自由意志主义理念,的大本营,其中就包括洛克纳修正主义。今天,该网站已经成为美国最引人瞩目的法学博客,并在《华盛顿邮报》的资助下结集出版。网站声称,有二十多位教授参与博客内容撰写,网站涉及大量详尽而具体的自由意志主义法学热点,每天有数以千计的国内顶级律师、法学院学生、书记员、法官,以及意见领袖浏览。 The contributors to The Volokh Conspiracy teach at the University of Minnesota, Northwestern, Emory, Duke, and elsewhere. Several hold positions at George Mason University’s law school, which is famous for its conservative faculty and, in 36 short years, has rocketed to prominence as one of the 50 best law schools in the country. In 2011, GMU law professor and Volokh Conspiracy contributor David Bernstein published a book titled Rehabilitating Lochner, and that’s exactly what he, Barnett, and their contemporaries have been attempting to do. “沃洛克共谋”的撰稿人在明尼苏达大学、西北大学、埃莫里大学、杜克大学,以及其他地方任教。还有几人把持乔治梅森大学法学院教席,该大学最引人注目之处就是其保守派教员,以及在短短三十六年时间里,以火箭的速度攀升至全国法学院前五十强。2011年,乔治梅森大学法学教授、沃洛克共谋撰稿人大卫·伯恩斯坦出版了一本名为《回归洛克纳》的书,而这正是伯恩斯坦、巴奈特,以及他们的同袍们所一直努力加以实现的目标。 That project aims to extend the reach of their dissident school of thought beyond academia and into the workings of government. In 1991, two former members of the Reagan administration, Chip Mellor and Clint Bolick, founded the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public-interest law firm now based in Arlington, Virginia, with $350,000 a year in seed money from the oil and gas magnate Charles Koch. They’ve challenged state licensing laws on behalf of hair braiders, florists, and other tradespeople across the country, but have also undertaken loftier crusades, including a doomed effort to overturn the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires that contractors pay their employees competitive wages on government-funded projects. 自由意志主义运动旨在扩展这一思想异端学派的影响力,从学术界渗透入政府运作领域。1991年,曾在里根政府任职的奇普·梅勒和克林特·波力克创立了一家自由意志主义公共利益律师事务所——司法研究所,该机构目前位于弗吉尼亚阿灵顿市,每年由石油大亨查尔斯·科赫慷慨解囊三十五万美元作为种子基金。研究所已经代表全国的编辫工、花匠,以及其他生意人挑战了各州的特许经营法,同时他们还在进行一场更为深远的变革,其中包括彻底推翻《戴维斯—培根法》(Davis-Bacon Act),因为该法案要求在政府出资的项目上,承包商应向员工支付具有竞争力的工资,虽然这项努力前景不妙。 The Volokh Conspiracy, too, was designed not just as a place where law professors could talk with each other, but as a platform from which to broadcast libertarian ideas to a wider audience. Barnett joined the blog as a contributor in 2004. In its early days, its views could be read as a counterpoint to prevailing conservative legal thought. In the summer of 2005, for example, when the overwhelming majority of conservative elites were celebrating John Roberts’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Barnett interjected with a typically contrarian but in some ways fundamental caveat. “Who is John Roberts?” he asked in a Volokh Conspiracypost. “We know nothing about what he stands for.” 同样,沃洛克共谋也不仅仅是个供法学教授们谈天说地的所在,而是一个向更多听众传播自由意志主义理念的平台。2004年,巴奈特成为该博客的撰稿人。起先,该博客的观点更像是保守派同行们所奉行法学观点的对位旋律。例如,2005年夏,当绝大多数保守派精英为约翰·罗伯茨被任命为最高法院首席大法官而欢呼雀跃时,巴奈特以一种典型的鹤立鸡群的姿态,问了一个更为本质的问题,“约翰·罗伯茨是谁?”他在沃洛克共谋发帖写道。“我们对于他所持有的立场一无所知。” Few professors see their academic work reflected in the public realm, and fewer still after cutting so aggressively against the grain. In 2004, when Barnett argued his first and only case before the Supreme Court, Lochner was a distant specter, and libertarian influence over the law more generally was hard to detect. The case concerned two women, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, who used marijuana to treat their chronic medical conditions. Monson’s homegrown medical marijuana plants were seized and destroyed by federal agents pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. Barnett contended the law was an overbroad application of the Commerce Clause to regulate economic activity. He lost 6–3. The following year, the Rehnquist Court dealt libertarians another major blow when it ruled 5–4 in Kelo v. New London that the Connecticut city could use its eminent domain powers to condemn private property and hand it over to private developers. The plaintiffs in that case were represented by the Institute for Justice. 做研究的很少能看到自己的成果反映在公共领域中,如果他们还如此咄咄逼人地与主流观点相悖,可能性就更微乎其微了。2004年,当巴奈特为他第一个也是唯一一个案子在最高法院展开唇枪舌战时,洛克纳只是一个遥远的幽灵,自由意志主义对于整个法律体系的影响微乎其微。那起案子关乎两名女性,安吉尔·赖希和黛安·蒙森,她们利用大麻治疗自己的慢性病。联邦探员依据《管制药品法》(Controlled Substances Act),查抄并销毁了蒙森在自己家种植的药用大麻。巴奈特慷慨陈词,认为利用商业条款对经济活动进行管制实在过于宽泛。他以3-6输了官司。来年,伦奎斯特法庭给了自由意志主义者又一击重拳,在凯洛诉新伦敦市一案(Kelo v. New London)中以5-4裁定,这座康涅狄格小城可以行使土地征用权,征收私人地产,并将其转售给私人开发商。这起案子的原告凯洛就是由司法研究所代理。 To anyone who lived through Bush v. Gore it might seem strange that a judiciary as conservative as the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts would rule for the government so regularly. But the dominant strain of conservative legal thought for the last half-century has largely been shaped by the right’s backlash to the social revolution stemming from the 1960s and the Warren and Burger Courts’ use of the Constitution to further progressive ends like desegregation and access to abortion. For conservatives, the main villain of the last 50 years has been creeping liberal judicial activism and a willingness to overturn legislative action. Conservative legal scholars and jurists like Robert Bork held that judges should refrain from projecting personal or political values into their judicial opinions. This principle became a cornerstone of traditional conservative legal thought, but it effectively created a presumption that democratically enacted laws are constitutional. Such a restrained judicial philosophy makes it difficult for judges to void properly enacted laws like the Controlled Substances Act. 对于任何经历过布什诉戈尔案(Bush v. Gore)的人来说,看到伦奎斯特法庭和罗伯茨法庭这种如此保守的司法机构却这般频繁地做出有利于政府的判决,难免惊诧莫名。然而,源于1960年代的社会革命,再加上沃伦法庭和伯格法庭以宪法为武器,达到诸如废除种族歧视、堕胎合法化之类的进步主义目的,这一切导致过去五十年间右翼反弹,进而塑造了保守派法学思潮的主要观点。在保守派看来,过去五十年中,最大的敌人一直是如影随形的自由派司法能动主义,以及法院推翻立法行动的强烈意愿。类似罗伯特·伯克这样的保守派法学学者和法学家,坚持认为,法官应当努力克制,避免将自己的私人政治价值观投射进司法意见之中。这种原则构成了传统保守法学思想的基石。然而这种价值观实际会产生一个假定:凡经民主程序颁布的法律一定合宪。一旦法官需要酌情废止诸如《管制药品法》之类的法规时,这样一种克制的司法哲学,就会显得力不从心。 But it has been nearly 30 years since Chief Justice Warren E. Burger retired. For many younger conservatives, the Court’s cardinal sin isn’t Brown v. Board of Education or even Roe v. Wade. And Barnett and his allies have helped make many conservatives more comfortable with the idea of judicial activism. 然而,伯格首席大法官退休已近三十年。对很多年轻一代保守派而言,最高法院的头等大罪并非是布朗诉托皮卡教育局案(Brown v. Board of Education),甚至也不是罗诉韦德案(Roe v. Wade)。巴奈特和他的战友们已经帮助很多保守派对于司法能动主义更为习以为常。 With five offices around the country, a legal clinic training students at the University of Chicago Law School, and a staff of nearly 100, the Institute for Justice has become a proving ground for aspiring, ideologically committed lawyers. Every year, the group sends lawyers to law schools around the country to give presentations on public-interest law and recruit students into its ranks. “It’s certainly done with the intent to make sure that libertarian-minded law students know who we are and what we have to offer,” Clark Neily, a senior attorney at the Institute for Justice, said of the group’s outreach. Each summer, a couple dozen clerks join the group in its Beltway headquarters and state offices. From there, these young lawyers typically move on to more traditional clerkships at law firms and federal courts—one former Institute for Justice clerk worked for Chief Justice Roberts from 2008 to 2009—and when the Institute hires new staff attorneys, it often culls from the ranks of these same pupils. 司法研究所拥有员工近百人,全国设有五家办事处,在芝加哥大学法学院开设一间用于学生培训的法律诊所,是志向远大、笃定于意识形态的律师一试身手的理想所在。每年,研究所都会派遣律师前往全国各地的法学院,就涉及公共利益的法律进行演讲,同时招兵买马,扩充队伍。“这些举措显然融入了我们的目的,就是确保具有自由意志主义意识的法学院学生知道我们是谁,我们能提供什么,”谈及研究所正在努力扩大影响时,司法研究所高级律师克拉克·莱利评论道。每年夏天,研究所位于特区政治圈的总部和各州的办事处都会迎来几十名书记员。这些年轻律师通常会从这里起步,跻身律师事务所和联邦法院担任传统书记员——其中有位司法研究所的前书记员在2008年至2009年期间听候首席大法官罗伯茨的差遣——而一旦研究所需要聘用新律师时,就会从这些曾经的学生中精挑细选。 “Ten to 15 years ago, conservatives who were in positions of influence—educating young lawyers, or in a position to hire them to politically desirable positions—were unified by what you might call Borkian restraint, or knee-jerk deference,” Neily said. “What has really changed in the last four or five years is a real skepticism, particularly but not exclusively among young law students, toward this kind of acquiescence to whatever government does.” “十到十五年前,调教年轻律师、能够在政治职位上安插自己人的这些举足轻重的保守派,信奉的都是那种所谓的伯克(Bork)式克制理念,你也可以管那套哲学叫做‘下意识的顺从’,”莱利批评道。“过去四五年里真正的变化就是出现了一种真正的怀疑主义,主要体现在那些法学院青年学生中,他们会怀疑这种默认政府一切举动的做法。” In 2013, the Institute for Justice enjoyed one of its biggest successes to date. It prevailed in a federal appeals court on behalf of the Benedictine monks of St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana, who had sued for the right to sell handmade, inexpensive funeral caskets after the state Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors ordered them to desist. Like Lochner, the case represents a challenge to government health and safety rules. And like Lochner, it could theoretically become the basis for invalidating scores of unrelated business regulations. The Supreme Court declined to hear the state board’s appeal in that case, but different appeals courts have taken different views of this general dispute, which means the Supreme Court—now more conservative than it was a decade ago—may well step in to settle it at some point. 2013年,司法研究所迎来了迄今最大的胜利。研究所在联邦上诉法院帮路易斯安那圣约瑟夫修道院的一群本笃僧打赢了官司,推翻了州殡葬业委员会对僧侣们销售自己手工制作廉价棺材的禁令。和洛克纳案一样,这起案子是对政府健康和安全领域管制的挑战。同样,和洛克纳案一样,这起案子能够成为推翻众多其它商业管制的起点。最高法院拒绝听取州委员会就该案件的上诉意见,然而,不同的上诉法院对同类案件有着不同的理解,这或许意味着,有朝一日,相比十年前更加保守的最高法院将会置身其中,一举解决类似分歧。 Each success on behalf of an everyman struggling against the government serves the libertarian cause well, but these victories pale in comparison to the role that President Obama and the Affordable Care Act have played in convincing mainstream conservatives to give judicial activism a second look. 平凡个人与政府抗争所取得的每一个胜利,都令自由意志主义更加强大,然而在奥巴马总统和《平价医疗法案》面前,这些胜利显得黯然失色,迫使主流保守派不得不重新打量司法能动主义。 Barnett has been at the forefront of the fight against Obamacare, and the 2012 constitutional challenge to the law’s insurance-coverage mandate was largely his brainchild. He argued that requiring private citizens to purchase health insurance against their will exceeded Congress’s powers. A clearly conflicted Chief Justice Roberts ultimately bent over backwards to construe the law in a constitutional way, out of deference to the elected branches, enraging the entire right. If Barnett viewed Roberts as an enigma back in 2005, it’s clear to him now that he finds the chief justice’s approach to the law deeply wanting, and many conservatives agree with him. 巴奈特始终战斗在抵制奥巴马医改的最前线,2012年就《平价医疗法案》中的保险涵盖范围规定上诉最高法院进行宪法挑战,很大程度上就是出自他的思想成果。巴奈特声称,要求私人违背个人意愿,购买健康保险,属国会越权。最终,出于对民选分支的尊重,倍感分裂的首席大法官罗伯茨使出浑身解数,从宪法的角度为该法案再三辩解,令整个右翼暴怒。如果说,2005年,巴奈特还将罗伯茨视作一团迷雾,那么现在他已经看清了,首席大法官对于法律的理解完全不及格,而很多保守派对巴奈特的这一评论颇为激赏。 “Selecting judges with the judicial mindset of ‘judicial restraint’ and ‘deference’ to the majoritarian branches leads to the results we witnessed,” Barnett warned in another Volokh Conspiracy post this summer, after Roberts once again saved the health care law. To Barnett, the proper role for judges isn’t modest or deferential at all, and it’s time for Republicans to start promoting conservatives who will embrace a more activist approach on the bench. “If conservative Republicans want a different performance from the judiciary in the future,” Barnett argued, “they must vet their presidential candidates to see whether they understand this point.” “选一个信奉‘司法克制主义’,对政府、国会‘言听计从’的法官会带来什么后果,我们都已经见识过了,”罗伯茨再次拯救医保法案后,今年夏天,巴奈特在沃洛克共谋的另一篇帖子中敲响警钟。对巴奈特来说,想要当法官,就绝不能温良恭俭让,共和党现在就应该开始动员保守派,将一个更为积极的人推上最高法院。“如果保守派共和党希望将来在司法系统能够有所作为,”巴奈特大声疾呼,“就必须好好敲打敲打总统候选人,看看他们能不能搞清楚这个问题。” Barnett’s opposition to Obamacare made him a hero to the conservative legal establishment. It was for this reason that he was greeted with such enthusiasm at the Federalist Society meeting in Washington two years ago. And it’s what catapulted his ideas about the proper role of judges fully into the mainstream. 巴奈特对于奥巴马医保改革的反对让他在保守派法学界成为一名英雄。这正是两年前的华盛顿特区联邦党人协会的年会中,他受到如此狂热欢迎的原因所在。也正是由于这样的原因,他关于法官适当人选的看法才得以被主流所了解。 To dismiss the debate between libertarians and traditional conservatives over Lochner as an academic sideshow is to misunderstand the stakes. “A full-fledged return to Lochner would put a constitutional cloud over a whole host of laws that we all take for granted today,” said Sam Bagenstos, a liberal constitutional scholar at the University of Michigan who has argued cases before the Supreme Court. “Laws guaranteeing workers the right to join a union without being fired, and the right to earn a minimum wage and receive overtime if working more than 40 hours a week, laws protecting worker safety, and laws protecting workers and customers against discrimination based on race or other protected statuses, just for starters.” 如果简单认定,自由意志主义者和传统保守派关于洛克纳案的争论仅仅是一场无伤大雅的学术小插曲,那就彻底没认清问题的利害所在。“彻底回归洛克纳案,将在我们今天习以为常的整套法律体系上,罩起一片宪法乌云,”曾在最高法院交锋过的密歇根大学自由派宪法学者塞缪尔·巴根斯托斯认为。“保障工人加入工会而不被开除的法律、保证工人把最低工资挣到手、每周工作超过四十小时能拿到加班费的法律、保护工人安全的法律、防止工人和消费者受到种族歧视或者别的什么歧视的法律,统统完蛋,而这统统只是前菜。” I asked Barnett whether the social welfare laws on the books today would be permitted under his reading of the Constitution. “Probably not at the federal level,” he said. 我问过巴奈特,依照他于宪法的理解,今天这些关乎社会福利的成文法还能不能通过。“大概在联邦层面不可能,”他回答。 That’s why Barnett and his contemporaries prefer to root their arguments in specific injustices rather than categorical abstractions. Why shouldn’t bakers be allowed to work more than 60 hours a week, or individuals be allowed to remain uninsured? Why should the government be allowed to regulate out of existence my right to hail a driver or your right to rent a stranger’s house for a weekend? 这就是为什么巴奈特和他的同袍们更愿意将论点放在具体的不公正上,而不是推而广之,形成一套抽象的体系。为什么面包师就不能一周工作六十小时?为什么一个人就不能不买保险?我招个司机,你租个陌生人的房子过周末,政府有什么资格无事生非地对这些权利指手画脚? Even if you believe these regulations are the result of collusion between government and industry cronies, that doesn’t mean they should be constitutionally prohibited, or even that they have no merit. Once courts are empowered to invalidate sordid government regulations, they are also on a slippery slope to tossing out standards that serve useful purposes—in part because some laws that appear unprincipled at a glance actually do important work. If an Airbnb customer and a hotel guest are each badly burned in preventable fires, the hotel guest is likely to have a great deal more recourse—and would have government regulation to thank. 就算你认为这种管制是政府及其行业亲信共谋的结果,也并不意味着这些管制就应该被彻底禁绝,也并不意味着这些管制就丝毫没有优点。一旦法院有权将这些肮脏的政府管制统统取消,就有可能引发雪崩,将某些发挥重要作用的标准也随之抛弃——部分原因就在于,某些大眼一看不符合原则的法律,却在现实中发挥中重要的作用。要是Airbnb和一个酒店的顾客都在一场本可避免的火灾中被严重烧伤,酒店的顾客很可能享有更多的追索权。这时他或许会对政府管制千恩万谢。 That’s not a persuasive rationale in Barnett’s mind. “You should have your own insurance,” he told me emphatically. “You should be insured. You should have health insurance, you should probably have life insurance, disability insurance. I insure myself.” (The irony of this position should be lost on no one—had Barnett’s Obamacare challenge succeeded, 16 million fewer people would have health insurance today.) 在巴奈特看来,这套说辞并没什么说服力。“你是该有自己的保险,”他断然告诉我,“你该有个保障。你该有套健康保险,你或许还该套生命保险、残疾保险。我就为自己投保。”(这种姿态的讽刺意味倒是路人皆知——要是巴奈特挑战奥巴马医保法案成功,有保险的人就会比今天少一千六百万。) The movement to rehabilitate Lochner now faces a crucial test: Can it endure after the spasms of resistance to the Obama presidency have quieted, or will it burn out along with them? When I put this question to Barnett, he demurred. “I didn’t really have a strategy to get us this far,” he said. 目前,回归洛克纳案运动面临一个非常严峻的挑战:随着奥巴马总统任期结束,对其政策抵抗的退潮,这项运动能否延续下去?还是会随之偃旗息鼓?当我向巴奈特抛出这个问题时,他不以为然。“我们能发展到今天这步,也并不是靠一套什么战略。”巴奈特说道。 Nevertheless, Barnett believes that he and his contemporaries have laid a solid foundation for turning back the legal clock to Lochner. “I don’t think it’s top-down,” Barnett said of the overall approach. “You don’t get Justice Whatever without having a huge bottom-up.” 然而无论如何,巴奈特坚信,他和他的同袍们已经打下了坚实的基础,为法律的钟摆回归洛克纳案创造了条件。“我不觉得这项运动是自上而下组织的,”论及运动的整体方式,巴奈特说道, “没有一个巨大的底层基础,什么法官你都提不起来。” That bottom-up effect has arguably had a big impact on the judiciary already. The 2010 Citizens United decision upended the government’s ability to limit campaign spending by corporations. In 2012, four conservative Supreme Court justices declared, in a dissenting opinion, that the entire Affordable Care Act should be vacated as an improper use of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. This was Lochner cloaked in fresh garb: The government can’t tell me how many hours I can work at a bakery; the government can’t tell me to buy insurance. Roberts salvaged the law, but on the basic point about compulsion, he agreed with Barnett, too. It wasn’t just four conservative justices who bought into a kind of Lochnerism. It was all five. 或许可以这么说,自底向上的效果已经对司法体系产生了影响。2010年,联合公民诉联邦选举委员会案的裁决推翻了政府对于企业竞选资金的限制。2012年,四位保守派大法官在反对意见中声称,《平价医疗法案》应当被彻底取消,因为这是国会滥用权力,干涉州际贸易。其实就是把洛克纳案这样陈年老酒装进了一个新瓶子:政府不能告诉我在面包坊工作几个小时;政府不能逼我买保险。虽然罗伯茨拯救了该项法律,但是对强制性的基本看法,他和巴奈特没什么不同。并不是只有四名保守派法官具有一定的洛克纳主义倾向。所有五名保守派法官全都持有类似观点。 Ultimately, the success of any bottom-up movement will depend as much on voters as on legal scholars and the activists they inform. The biggest setback for Lochnerians could be an establishment Republican like Jeb Bush winning the presidency and cannibalizing the grassroots right’s enthusiasm for taking apart the Obama-era administrative state. A Hillary Clinton presidency would put off a Lochner revival for another four or eight years, but it would keep the fires of opposition to big government raging in the meantime. Bush, by contrast, is an advocate of judicial restraint, and once he started appointing traditional conservatives to the bench, it would be difficult to stop him. But Barnett and the Lochnerians hope that the right’s antipathy toward Obama, the Affordable Care Act, and the Roberts Court’s interventions to salvage it will give a Republican president no choice but to move in a new direction. 从根本上来说,任何自底向上的运动要想取得成功,一方面的确需要法学学者的摇旗呐喊,另一方面,选民也发挥着同样重要的作用。洛克纳分子们所能遭遇的最大挫败就是像杰布·布什这样倾向于大政府的共和党人赢得总统大选,挪用草根右翼的热情,向奥巴马时代的行政举措开火。一旦希拉里·克林顿当政,洛克纳的回归大业将会延后那么四到八年,但同时,这也会为反对大政府的熊熊烈火上浇上几桶热油。而相反,如果像布什这样鼓吹司法克制主义的人当了总统,只要他开始提名传统保守主义者当法官,局面几乎铁定难以挽回。但是,巴奈特和洛克纳分子们希望,奥巴马、《平价医疗法案》,以及罗伯茨法庭对于法案的挽救,已经让右翼分子深恶痛绝,这将会让共和党总统别无选择,只能另辟蹊径。 Conservatives, Barnett said, “have to decide, ‘Well, why am I furious? What am I furious at? ... They put John Roberts on the court. I didn’t put him on the court. Bill Clinton didn’t put him on the court. George Bush put him on the court, and he was considered by the Ted Cruzes of this world as a superstar, and then look what he does. There’s something wrong with this picture.” 巴奈特说道,保守派“必须痛下决心了”,“好吧,我为什么愤怒?是什么让我愤怒?······他们把约翰·罗伯茨抬上了首席大法官的宝座。不是我让他当的法官,不是比尔·克林顿让他当的法官,是乔治·布什任命他当了法官,泰迪·克鲁兹那群人把他当天皇巨星一样崇拜,可是你看看他都干了些什么。这种事压根就不对。” The hope is that this anger propels a libertarian-minded president into office and inspires him to nominate less restrained judges. The next president will likely have the opportunity to appoint at least one, and possibly as many as four Supreme Court justices. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is now 82. Stephen Breyer is 77. Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia are both 79. If one of these justices retires under a Republican president, who then appoints a Lochnerian to fill the vacancy, it will change the Court profoundly. If more than one of them steps down, the Court will become unrecognizable. 洛克纳分子们所寄予厚望的就是,这种愤怒能够将一位具有自由意志主义思想的总统推进白宫,并启发他提名一些不那么束手束脚的大法官。下一任总统将至少有可能提名一位大法官,要是机缘巧合,说不定能提名四位大法官。鲁斯·巴德·金斯伯格今年82,斯蒂芬·布雷耶77,安东尼·肯尼迪、安东宁·斯卡利亚都是79。如果这些法官随便哪个在共和党总统任内退休,而总统又指定了一位洛克纳主义者填补空缺,这将能够彻底改变最高法院。如果他们中不止一位归隐,那最高法院将会彻底面目全非。 If that plan fails, Barnett’s cause will be set back years, and the project of pushing his ideas into the Republican mainstream will continue sub rosa. But Barnett has influential allies. 如果计划难遂人意,巴奈特的回归大业将会蛰伏数年,将其理念变成共和党主流的进程也还会继续秘密推进。然而,巴奈特确有几位说得上话的朋友。 In July, the conservative columnist George Will made a provocative new demand of the next Republican president: “Ask this of potential court nominees: Do you agree that Lochner correctly reflected the U.S. natural rights tradition and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments’ affirmation of unenumerated rights?” 七月,保守派专栏作家乔治·威尔大肆宣扬,要为下一任共和党总统设置一个新的标准:“问他会提名谁当大法官:你是否认同洛克纳案正确地反映出美国自然权利传统,是宪法第九、第十四修正案对于宪法未规定公民权利的肯定。” Thanks to the efforts to grow their ranks, there are a few suitable Supreme Court candidates already. In his column, Will identified one: Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett. In a footnote to a recent opinion, Willett celebrated the fact that “a wealth of contemporary legal scholarship is reexamining Lochner, its history and correctness as a matter of constitutional law.” 多亏洛克纳分子们不遗余力地壮大队伍,现在已经有了几位理想的最高法院大法官人选。威尔在他的专栏中就点到了这么一位:德克萨斯最高法院法官丹·威利特。在最近一份判决意见的脚注中,威利特不无欣慰地写到,“当今法学界已经对洛克纳案作出了再三审视,审视其历史和其在宪法学上的正确性。” As for Will’s proposed litmus test, a few Republican presidential candidates this cycle have passed it. Rand Paul has praised the Lochner decision explicitly multiple times, most recently at the Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit this January. “I’m not a judicial restraint guy,” he told an audience of avowed judicial activism foes. “I’m a judicial activist when it comes to Lochner. I’m a judicial activist when it comes to the New Deal.” 至于威尔提出的资格审查测试,本轮有些共和党候选人已经合格。兰德·保罗曾多次明确盛赞洛克纳案,在今年一月传统保护保守派政策峰会(Heritage Action Conservative Policy Summit)上,他对听众中一位据称是司法能动主义的反对者说,“我不是司法克制主义者”,“谈到洛克纳案,谈到新政,我就是一个司法能动主义者。” In August, Rick Perry boasted on Twitter that he was “proud” to have nominated Willett to the Texas Supreme Court, calling the justice “a model of conservative jurisprudence.” Whether they know it or not, both politicians are already speaking a language Barnett and his libertarian contemporaries have successfully injected into the mainstream of conservative strategic thought. 八月份,里克·佩里在推特上自吹,提名威利特进入德克萨斯最高法院是他的“骄傲”,称这位法官是“保守派法学界的楷模。”无论他们是否意识到了,这两位政治家操持的政治话语,正是由巴奈特和他的自由意志主义战友们成功注入主流保守派政策思想的。 These are dark horse candidates, but any Republican president will face much more pressure than George W. Bush ever did to nominate the kind of judges Paul or Perry might. Another candidate, Scott Walker, is more of an enigma, but he’s an equally doctrinaire opponent of economic regulation and has a liaison to the pro-Lochner world in George Will’s wife, Mari, who is an adviser to his campaign. History shows it’s difficult to stop a determined president from shaping the courts to reflect a particular conception of law. “There was a whole series of hot-button issues that the Reagan administration decided were exceptionally important in articulating the right kind of judicial restraint,” Bagenstos explained. “Affirmative action was one. The exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment was another. ... So they had a whole hit list of legal principles that they thought were misguided, which got the Constitution wrong, and so they worked really hard to explain why the decisions they thought were wrong, were wrong. 他们都是黑马,但任何共和党总统在提名保罗或者佩里中意的那类法官时,都面临着远远大于乔治·W·布什所遇到的压力。另一位候选人斯科特·沃克更像是一团谜,但他同样在理论上反对经济管制,并且与洛克纳案阵营有着千丝万缕的联系,乔治·威尔的妻子毛伊正是他的竞选顾问。历史一再告诉我们,让一位心意已决的总统不要插手法律系统,以反映其所认同的某种特定法律理念,是非常困难的。“里根执政时期,曾经有一系列热点问题,被政府认为对于恰当地体现司法克制而言极为重要,”巴根斯托斯解释道。“平权运动是一个例子。第四条修正案下的证据排除法则是另一个例子······所以当局列了一个法律原则黑名单,把他们认为搞错的案子、和宪法起冲突的案子统统装进去,于是千辛万苦地解释为什么他们认为错误的案子是错误的。” “It influenced the way they looked at judges, and once they put those judges on the lower court they started to put that agenda into action,” he continued. “Sometimes the Supreme Court went along with the more aggressive lower-court judges, and sometimes they didn’t. But you had this dynamic that things liberals thought they had won in the Burger and Warren Courts were not secure and suddenly were being contested.” “这甚至还影响了政府对待法官的方式,一旦政府提名某些法官在下级法院任职,他们便开始行动起来。” 巴根斯托斯继续说到,“有时候最高法院会认同更为活跃的下级法院法官,有时则不会。但问题在这里,自由派原本以为在伯格法庭、沃伦法庭斩获的胜利果实,突然就变得岌岌可危起来,” This is a lesson every Democrat, and really every establishment-minded Republican, should relearn, because a president who adopted the same model, with the goal of rehabilitating Lochner, could erode the legal and administrative foundations of the past century in a matter of years. A rule change undertaken by Senate Democrats last Congress eliminated the filibuster for nominees to lower courts, and by the time the next president is sworn into office, three sitting Supreme Court justices will be over 80 years old. 历史为每一个民主党以及倾向于大政府思想的共和党拉响了警报,倘若一旦有位以里根为楷模,以回归洛克纳案为己任的总统上台,过去一百多年来构建的法律和行政基础几年以内就可能受到极大侵蚀。要知道,上届国会,民主党参议员们废除了本可用来抵御下级法院法官提名的阻挠议事规则,而等到下一位总统宣誓就职时,三位最高法院大法官将年过八十。 “The next Republican president will have a choice,” Bagenstos said. “I don’t know which way that choice is going to come out.” “下一任共和党总统将有机会做出选择,”巴根斯托斯说道,“我只是不清楚这一选择会朝向何方。” To Randy Barnett the choice is obvious. 对兰迪·巴奈特来说,答案明摆着。
[译文]宗教自由的丧钟已经敲响?

The Beginning of the End of Religious Freedom
宗教自由终结的开始

作者:David Harsanyi @ 2015-8-21
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:Reason,http://reason.com/archives/2015/08/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-religious-fr

Compelling bakers to bake cakes part of a broader drive to limit faith-based decisions by private businesses.
强迫糕点师制作蛋糕是限制私营企业基于信仰作决策的广泛攻势的一部分

Just in case you need a refresher: Back in 2012, a baker in the Denver suburb of Lakewood was asked by a gay couple to make them a(more...)

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The Beginning of the End of Religious Freedom 宗教自由终结的开始 作者:David Harsanyi @ 2015-8-21 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说),小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:Reason,http://reason.com/archives/2015/08/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-religious-fr Compelling bakers to bake cakes part of a broader drive to limit faith-based decisions by private businesses. 强迫糕点师制作蛋糕是限制私营企业基于信仰作决策的广泛攻势的一部分 Just in case you need a refresher: Back in 2012, a baker in the Denver suburb of Lakewood was asked by a gay couple to make them a wedding cake—two years before gay marriage was even legalized in Colorado. The owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, declined to participate in Charlie Craig and David Mullins' celebration because such an event conflicted with his Christian faith. 也许你需要重温一下:2012年,在丹佛市郊的莱克伍德,一对同性恋人要求一名糕点师为他们制作一个婚礼蛋糕——那是科罗拉多州同姓婚姻合法化之前两年的事了。“杰作蛋糕”的店主,Jack Phillip,拒绝让自己参与进Charlie Craig和David Mullins的婚礼,因为这与他的基督教信仰相冲突。 Here are a few things Phillips didn't do: He didn't query consumers about their sexual preferences. He didn't bar same-sex couples from purchasing a cake at a place of public accommodation. He didn't ask consumers traveling in same-sex pairs to leave his shop. He didn't hang a "No Gays Allowed" sign in his window. Phillips没有做以下这些事情:他没有查问顾客的性取向。他没有禁止同性伴侣在公共场所购买蛋糕。他没有要求出双入对的同性客人离开他的店铺。他也没有在窗户上挂“同性恋勿入”的牌子。 What he could never have known when he first opened his shop was that celebrating gay marriages would be a precondition for making a living. And when you consider that there are at least a few dozen other bakeries within a short drive from Masterpiece Cakeshop that could have accommodated the couple's celebratory pastry needs, why would he? 他刚开店的时候绝对想不到,为同性婚姻服务会成为谋生的前提条件。你想想,“杰作蛋糕”周边极短车程以内就有至少好几十家其它烘焙店,它们原本都能帮这对恋人制作婚礼蛋糕,这让他怎么想得到呢? Yet instead of exhibiting a basic level of tolerance (or dignity), two priggish bullies decided to call the authorities when Phillips refused to bake them a cake. And the cultural commissars at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission soon ruled that he had discriminated against the couple. 然而,在Phillips拒绝为他们制作蛋糕之后,这两位自命道德高尚的霸道人物,没有表现出起码的宽容(或体面),而是决定报告政府。科罗拉多民权委员会的文化专员很快就裁定Phillips歧视了这对同性恋。 The shop was not only ordered to alter store policy and start baking cakes for gay weddings—or else face debilitating fines, a consequence often reported on by the media—but also forced to provide comprehensive staff training, ensure compliance and then file quarterly obedience reports with the government for two years. In these reports, Phillips has to describe exactly which remedial measures the shop has taken to conform and document the reasons any other patrons were denied service. 这家店不但被勒令店铺更改规定,从今往后要为同性婚礼制作蛋糕——否则就要面临惩罚性罚款,媒体对此后果多有报道——而且还被强制要求开展全面的员工培训、保证遵守规定并在两年内每季度定期向政府提交合规报告。Phillips在报告中必须具体描述店里为了合规都采取了何种整改措施,并要记录店里拒绝为任何其他主顾提供服务的原因。 So, you know, I'm sure this is exactly how Thomas Jefferson imagined America would turn out when he was writing the Declaration of Independence. 所以,你知道的,我确信托马斯·杰弗逊写《独立宣言》时就料到美国未来会变成这样。 Phillips appealed the decision, and a three-panel Colorado Court of Appeals unanimously decided that Masterpiece Cakeshop's policy against creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples was a "discriminatory and unfair practice," further ruling that the shop must continue to answer to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission or else be run out of business. Phillips对这一判决提出了上诉,结果由三人组成的科罗拉多上诉法院一致裁定“杰作蛋糕”拒绝为同性伴侣制作婚礼蛋糕的方针乃是“歧视性的不公正行为”,同时判决该店必须继续听从科罗拉多民权委员会的要求,否则就要停止营业。 Incredibly, the court acknowledged in its decision that it would have looked at the First Amendment arguments more closely had the gay couple ordered a cake with some explicit messaging that advocated gay marriage. In other words, the Colorado Court of Appeals believes that the threshold for denying religious liberty is the presence of advocacy. The court has effectively tasked itself with determining for you when religion should matter. 令人难以置信的是,法院在其判决中承认,假如当事的同性伴侣在订购蛋糕时明确传递了提倡同性婚姻的信息,那么法院会更为仔细地考虑宪法第一修正案。换句话说,科罗拉多上诉法院认为,否定宗教自由的门槛乃是公开提倡。法院因此实质上为自己赋予了一项任务:替你决定什么时候宗教是要紧的。 If nothing else, it's comforting to know that Colorado can force an orthodox Muslim butcher to make sausages for a polyamorous, bisexual bachelor/bachelorette party, as long as no one asks the butcher to outwardly promote swine and free love. 别的不论,以下事实实在让我们感到安慰:科罗拉多可以强迫正统的穆斯林屠户为开放多偶、双性恋的单身派对制作猪肉肠,只要没人要求这位屠户公开推广猪和自由性爱。 In any event, I'm sure there will be an appeal. But seeing as most Americans are fine with gay marriage and simultaneously put off by unpleasant (though deceptive, in this case) words such as "discrimination" and "prejudice," the courts—nearly always driven by the vagaries of public opinion—will find a way to force all to comply. 无论如何,我确信还会有场上诉。但看到多数美国人都觉得同性婚姻没什么大不了,同时又容易因“歧视”和“偏见”等令人不快(尽管在本案中这一不快是有欺骗性的)的词汇引发反感,几乎总是被反复莫测的公共意见所左右的法院总会找到办法来令所有人顺从。 This will go for any other businesses even tangentially related to weddings, such as food catering, music and so on. And the crusade will accelerate until the legal lynch mob gets to religious institutions. No doubt advocates will work backward to come up with a great legal rationalization for all of it. 这甚至还会延伸到只与婚礼擦边的行业,比如酒席承办、音乐伴奏等等。这场讨伐运动还会愈演愈烈,直到那些利用法律行私刑的暴民们一路杀到宗教组织那里。毫无疑问,支持者们会事后努力,为所有这一切进行法律上的合理化。 All of this is not to say that in American life, the minority should never be compelled to surrender to some form of majoritarianism, judicial force or government. In this case, though, the minority does not have the ability to compromise without abandoning its faith. The other side refuses to compromise precisely because of this reality. And courts and commissions around the country are willing to destroy businesses—businesses that sometimes took a large part of a lifetime to build—by ignoring one of the most vital functions of the First Amendment. 以上所论当然不是说,在美国人的生活中,少数派永远不应该被迫向某种形式的多数主义、司法机关和政府让步。只不过,在眼前的这一案例中,少数派没有能力在遵从自己信仰的条件下达成妥协。而另一方之所以拒绝妥协,恰恰就是因为这一现实。而全国各地的法院和委员会无视第一修正案的最关键功能之一,愿意去摧毁企业——有时还是某些人花了大半辈子才建立起来的企业。 The position of these businesspeople, unlike Southern racists decades ago, in no way undermines the newfound right of gay Americans to marry, nor does it inhibit them from enjoying freedom or finding happiness. In this case, only one side is attempting to legislate morality. 与几十年前南方的种族主义者不同,这些生意人的立场完全不会破坏美国同性恋者新近得以确立的结婚权利,也不会阻止他们享受自由和追求幸福。在本案中,只有一方试图将道德问题法律化。 If you admit—and many rational people do, even those who quarrel with the reasoning behind religious obstinacy—that millions of Christians hold some form of a genuine, long-standing religious conviction that prohibits them from celebrating gay marriages but you still support state coercion against them, then you might as well just concede that religious freedom isn't compatible with your conception of a contemporary society. 如果你承认——许多理性的人都会承认,即便是那些反对固执宗教思维的人——数以百万计的基督徒持有某种真诚的、存在已久的宗教信念,使得他们不可能去庆祝同性婚姻,但你还是支持国家对他们采取强制措施,那你就不如直接承认宗教自由与你所理解的现代社会不相容。 Whereas at one time the state wouldn't substantially burden religious exercise and would use the least restrictive means to further "compelling interests," the state today is inclined to substantially burden a Christian by the mere fact that someone's feelings are hurt. 从前,国家并不会实质性地增加宗教活动的义务,并以最不具有限制性的方式推动“重大迫切利益”。然而现在,国家已倾向于实质性地加重基督徒的义务,只是因为有人的感情受到了伤害。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]美国需要一部新大宪章

The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State
监管型国家的法治

作者:John Cochrane @ 2015-6
译者:Ether(@大小眼不能飞)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy),陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy)
来源:John Cochrane’s blog,http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf

1.Introduction
1.引言

The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom.

美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意,而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济,但很少有人认识到,日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁,而这一点恐怕更加重要。

What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board?

银行敢对美联储叫板吗?券商对证券交易委员会(SEC)又敢怎样?医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部(HHS)或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗?一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢?医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗?我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗?

The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support.

这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵,国王之忧还在其次。但是,现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下,各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。

The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around.

过去800年,美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力,保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治,我们的民主脱胎于法治,而非相反。

This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now.

法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今,其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现;也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天,对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张,且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大,或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险,并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。

Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress.

没错,我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身:宽泛模糊的法律,政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。

Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course.

当然,利用法律和规章奖励支持者,惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。

Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger.

富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功,甚至可能延长了大萧条,但在政治上则取得了极大的成功,民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。

A label?
用什么标签好?

I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control.

我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。

Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money.

很多人称之为“社会主义”,但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里,私有企业是存在的,但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织,控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业,它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局,也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。

It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support (more...)

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The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State 监管型国家的法治 作者:John Cochrane @ 2015-6 译者:Ether(@大小眼不能飞) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy),陈小乖(@lion_kittyyyyy) 来源:John Cochrane's blog,http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/rule%20of%20law%20and%20regulation%20essay.pdf 1.Introduction 1.引言 The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom. 美国的监管机构拥有极其广泛的权力。监管部门可以迅速毁掉你的生活和生意,而你几乎没有什么可以求助的资源。人们普遍抱怨这一权力正在损害经济,但很少有人认识到,日益扩张的政府管制给我们的政治自由带来了新的威胁,而这一点恐怕更加重要。 What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board? 银行敢对美联储叫板吗?券商对证券交易委员会(SEC)又敢怎样?医院、医疗保险公司敢对卫生与公共服务部(HHS)或者“奥巴马医改”说三道四吗?一个其项目需要环境审批的公司对环境保护署呢?医药公司敢挑战联邦食品药品监督局吗?我们的问题还不止在于联邦层面。一个需要规划审批的房地产开发商敢对当地土地规划委员会说什么吗? The agencies demand political support for themselves first of all. They are like barons in monarchies, and the King’s problems are secondary. But they can now demand broader support for their political agendas. And the larger partisan political system is discovering how the newly enhanced power of the regulatory state is ideal for enforcing its own political support. 这些机构首先得为自己争得政治支持。他们就好比君主制下的男爵,国王之忧还在其次。但是,现在他们可以为自己的政治议程要求更广泛的支持。在更为庞大的政党政治体制下,各党派都发现监管型国家的权力扩张十分有利于巩固其自身的政治支持。 The big story of the last 800 years of United States and British history, is the slow and painful emergence of our political institutions, broadly summarized as “rule of law,” which constrain government power and guarantee our political liberty. The U.S. had rule of law for two centuries before we had democracy, and our democracy sprang from it not the other way around. 过去800年,美国和英国历史的主线是我们这套被笼统称为“法治”的政治体制缓慢而痛苦地浮现成形的历程。法治限制政府权力,保障我们的政治自由。美国在民主诞生前两个世纪就有了法治,我们的民主脱胎于法治,而非相反。 This rule of law always has been in danger. But today, the danger is not the tyranny of kings, which motivated the Magna Carta. It is not the tyranny of the majority, which motivated the bill of rights. The threat to freedom and rule of law today comes from the regulatory state. The power of the regulatory state has grown tremendously, and without many of the checks and balances of actual law. We can await ever greater expansion of its political misuse, or we recognize the danger ahead of time and build those checks and balances now. 法治自始至今一直处于危险之中。但是当今,其面临的危险并非来自国王的暴政——它曾促动了大宪章的出现;也非来自多数人的暴政——它曾促动了权利法案的出现。今天,对自由和法治的威胁来自监管型国家。监管型国家的权力急剧扩张,且没有多少真正法律的制约和制衡。我们可以等待其行政权力滥用的不断扩大,或者我们也可以提早认识到其危险,并从现在开始建立制约和制衡。 Yes, part of our current problem is law itself, big vague laws, and politicized and arbitrary prosecutions. But most of “law” is now written and administered by regulatory agencies, not by Congress. 没错,我们当前问题的一部分就是法律本身:宽泛模糊的法律,政治化的、专断的控告。但是目前大多数“法律”都是由监管机构——而不是国会——起草和执行的。 Use of law and regulation to reward supporters and punish enemies is nothing new, of course. 当然,利用法律和规章奖励支持者,惩罚敌人也不是什么新鲜事。 Franklin Roosevelt understood that New Deal jobs and contracts were a great way to demand political support. His “war on capital” hounded political opponents. The New Deal may not have been an economic success, and likely prolonged the Great Depression. But it was above all a dramatic political success, enshrining Democratic power for a generation. Richard Nixon tried to get the IRS to audit his “enemies list.” But the tool is now so much stronger. 富兰克林·罗斯福知道“新政”带来的工作机会和商业合同是获取政治支持的绝佳方法。他的“反资本战争”以追猎政敌为务。新政在经济上也许不算成功,甚至可能延长了大萧条,但在政治上则取得了极大的成功,民主党的权力被整整一代人奉若神明。理查德·尼克松也曾想通过联邦税务局对其“政敌名单”上的人进行审计。政治工具如今已变得更加强大。 A label? 用什么标签好? I haven’t yet found a really good word to describe this emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as tool of political control. 我尚未找到一个很好的词来形容拥有极大自由裁量权的管制作为政治控制的工具所带来的新威胁。 Many people call it “socialism.” But socialism means government ownership of the means of production. In our brave new world private businesses exist, but they are tightly controlled. Obamacare is a vast bureaucracy controlling a large cartelized private business, which does the governments political and economic bidding. Obamacare is not the Veteran’s Administration, or the British National Health Service. Socialism doesn’t produce nearly as much money. 很多人称之为“社会主义”,但社会主义是指生产资料的政府所有制。在我们的美丽新世界里,私有企业是存在的,但它们受到严格控制。“奥巴马医改”就是一个大规模的官僚组织,控制着一个卡特尔化的私人产业,它在政治和经济上都听命于政府。“奥巴马医改”既不是退伍军人健康管理局,也不是英国国民保健署。社会主义远不会产生这么多钱。 It’s not “capture.” George Stigler described the process by which regulated businesses “capture” their regulators, using regulations to keep competition out. Stigler’s regulated businesses certainly support their regulators politically. But Stigler’s regulators and business golf together and drink together, and the balance power is strongly in the hands of the businesses. “Capture” doesn't see billion-dollar criminal cases and settlements. And “capture” does not describe how national political forces use regulatory power to extract political support. 这也不是“捕获”。乔治·斯蒂格勒描述过受管制的企业“捕获”其监管者的过程,企业借监管之手排除竞争。斯蒂格勒所研究的受管制企业一定会在政治上支持其监管者。但是在斯蒂格勒的叙述中,监管者和商人一起打高尔夫一起喝酒,制衡的权力牢牢地掌握在企业手中。“捕获”中见不着上十亿美元的刑事案件及和解协议。“捕获”也不能描述国家政治力量如何利用监管权力攫取政治支持。 It’s not really “crony capitalism.” That term has a bit more of the needed political flavor than “capture.” Yes, there is a revolving door, connections by which businesses get regulators to do them favors. But what’s missing in both “capture” and “cronyism” is the opposite flow of power, the Devil’s bargain aspect of it from the point of view of the regulated business or individual, the silencing of political opposition by threat of regulation. 这也不是真正的“裙带资本主义”。这个词相比“捕获”多了一份应有的政治意味。的确,这里面有一扇旋转门,企业通过这种关系让监管者们施以援手。但无论“捕获”还是“裙带主义”都没能体现逆向的权力作用。对受管制的企业和个人来说,这是一笔与魔鬼的交易,是通过监管的威胁对政治反对的压制。 We’re headed for an economic system in which many industries have a handful of large, cartelized businesses— think 6 big banks, 5 big health insurance companies, 4 big energy companies, and so on. Sure, they are protected from competition. But the price of protection is that the businesses support the regulator and administration politically, and does their bidding. If the government wants them to hire, or build factory in unprofitable place, they do it. The benefit of cooperation is a good living and a quiet life. The cost of stepping out of line is personal and business ruin, meted out frequently. That’s neither capture nor cronyism. 我们正在迈入这样一种经济体制:很多行业只有少数几家大型的、卡特尔化的企业——比如6家银行、5家健康保险公司、4家能源公司等等。的确,他们受到保护,免于竞争,但保护的代价是企业政治上支持其监管者和行政机关,并听命于它们。如果政府想要他们雇工或者在无法盈利的地方建厂,他们就会照做。合作的好处是日子好过、生活太平。越界的成本就是个人和企业的毁灭,这种惩罚频繁出现。这既不是捕获也不是裙带主义。 “Bureaucratic tyranny,” a phrase that George Nash quotes Herbert Hoover as using is a contender. “官僚暴政”——这个乔治·纳什引自赫伯特·胡佛的短语倒是值得考虑。 Charles Murray, writing recently on the status of the regulatory state notes many of these issues. He totals 4,450 distinct federal crimes— just the law, not including regulations with criminal penalties, or the vastly greater number with civil penalties. He adds up the 175,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the vagueness of the enabling legislation — Congress only decrees that rules are “generally fair and equitable,” “just and reasonable,” prohibits “unfair methods of competition” or “excessive profits.” He notes the absence of judicial rights in administrative courts. He notes the wide scope of regulation and the comparatively tiny — but ruinous to those charged — enforcement: 最近,查尔斯·墨里在论述监管型国家的现状时关注了诸多类似议题。他一共数出了4,450条联邦刑事罪名。这还仅仅是法律规定,不包括附有刑事惩罚的行政规章或者数量更大的附有民事惩罚的规章。他核查了一共175,000页的《美国联邦法规汇编》,以及含糊不清的授权立法条款。国会仅要求规章条款“原则上公平、公正”、“公正、合理”,禁止“不公平竞争”或者“过分利得”。他指出,行政法庭上司法权利缺失。他还指出,规章管辖范围广泛,执法却相对不足,但执法的结果对被控诉者却是毁灭性的: the “Occupational Safety and Health Administration has authority over more than eight million workplaces. But it can call upon only one inspector for about every 3,700 of those workplaces. The Environmental Protection Agency has authority ... over every piece of property in the nation. It conducted about 18,000 inspections in 2013—a tiny number in proportion to its mandate. “职业安全与健康管理局有权管辖超过八百万个工作场所,但是每3,700个工作场所只能均摊到一个巡视员。环境保护署有权管辖美国每一处资产。2013年,它一共进行了18,000次检查,仅是其管辖范围中极小的一部分。” Murray advocates civil disobedience with insurance for the few zebras who get caught by the regulators. 墨里提倡每个公民都购买保险以弥补万一被监管者抓到所带来的损失,同时对管制采取不予合作的态度。 But by and large Murray deplores merely the silliness of and economic inefficiency of the regulatory state. This misses, I think, the greatest danger, that to our political freedom. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect. 但总体而言,墨里憎恶的只是监管型国家的愚蠢和经济不效率。我认为这漏掉了最大的危险,那就是对政治自由的危害。仅仅是想到有可能被环保署拜访这一点,就有显著的噤声效果。 And it also misses, I think, an explanation for how we got here. Regulators and politicians aren’t nitwits. The libertarian argument that regulation is so dumb — which it surely is — misses the point that it is enacted by really smart people. The fact that the regulatory state is an ideal tool for the entrenchment of political power was surely not missed by its architects. 我认为他还漏掉了一点:我们是怎么走到这一步的。监管者和政客都不是傻子。自由意志主义者关于监管很愚蠢的观点,尽管正确,但没有看到一点:这些法律法规也是非常聪明的人制定的。监管型国家的建造者肯定对其是保有政治权力的最佳工具这一点心知肚明。 Likewise, Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen make a good casethat most of the economic rationale for regulation has disappeared along with information. Uber stars are far more effective than the Taxi Commission. But the demand for protection and the desire to trade economic protection for political support will remain unchanged. “Protect the consumer” is as much a distracting argument in the Uber vs. Taxi debate as it was when the medieval guilds advanced it. 同样,亚历克斯·塔巴洛克和泰勒·考恩很好地证明了,大多数赞成监管的经济学原理已经随着充分的信息而消失。优步的星级评定远比出租车委员会有效,但是对监管保护的需求以及用经济上的保护来换取政治上的支持仍然不会改变。在优步和出租车之争中,“保护消费者”不过是个掩人耳目的论点,和中世纪行会利用它时一样。 Rule of Law: the Devil in the Details 法治:细节里的魔鬼 “Rule of law” and “regulation” are dangerous Big Vague Words. The rule of law is so morally powerful that the worst tyrants go through the motions. Stalin bothered with show trials. Putin put Pussy Riot on trial, and then they were “legally” convicted of and jailed for the crime of ”hooliganism.” Even Henry the Eighth had trials before chopping heads. Is this not rule of law? “法治”和“监管”是危险的模糊大词。法治在道德上如此有力,以至于最坏的暴君也要应付一下。斯大林费力搞出走秀似的审判。普京审判暴动小猫【译注:俄罗斯女性主义朋克乐队,经常在各大景点举办有关俄罗斯政治生活的行为艺术表演,都未经政府批准】,然后“依法”宣判“流氓罪”罪名成立并判入狱。甚至亨利八世把那么多人头砍下了之前也经过了审判。这难道不是法治吗? No, of course, but it’s worth reminding ourselves why not as we think about bureaucracies. 当然不是,但在我们思考官僚体系的时候,值得提醒一下自己,为什么它们不是。 “Rule of law” ultimately is a set of restrictions to keep the state from using its awesome power of coercion to force your political support. If you oppose Castro, you go to prison. If you opposed Herbert Hoover, could you still run a business? Sure. If you oppose President Obama, or the future President Hilary Clinton can you do so? If you oppose the polices of one of their regulatory agencies, now powers unto themselves, or speak out against the leaders of those agencies, can you do so? If you support candidates with unpopular positions, can you still get the regulatory approvals you need? It’s not so clear. That is our danger. “法治”说到底是一系列对国家的限制,防止国家动用可怕的强制权力强迫你的政治支持。如果你反对卡斯特罗,你会被关进监狱。如果你反对赫伯特·胡佛,你还可以经营一家公司吗?当然可以。如果你反对奥巴马总统或者未来的希拉里·克林顿总统呢?如果你反对他们手下某个现已有权有势的监管机构的政策,或是公开反对他们的领导呢,你还可以继续经营公司吗?如果你支持立场不受欢迎的候选人,你还能获得经营公司所需的行政审批吗?答案并不清楚。这就是我们所面临的危险。 “Rule of law” is not just about the existence of written laws, and the superficial mechanics of trials, judges, lawyers, ad sentences. Rule of law lies deep in the details of how those institutions work. Do you have the right to counsel, the right to question witnesses, the right to discovery, the right to appeal, and so forth. Like laws, what matters about regulation, both in its economic efficiency and in its insulation from politics, is not its presence but its character and operation. “法治”不仅仅是成文法和形式上的审判、法官、律师和判决等机制。法治根植于这些制度如何运作的细节中。你是否有权利获得律师辩护、质证、证据开示、上诉,等等。和法律一样,不管是从经济效率还是政治独立性上来说,监管的要害不在于它的存在,而在于它的特点和操作。 Regulators write rules too. They fine you, close down your business, send you to jail, or merely harass you with endless requests, based on apparently written rules. We need criteria to think about whether “rule of law” applies to this regulatory process. Here are some suggestions. 监管者也制定规则。他们依据成文法开罚单、关闭你的公司、送你入监,或者就不停地提要求骚扰你。我们需要一些标准来思考“法治”一词是否适用于这套监管程序。以下是一些建议:
Rule vs. Discretion? 规则vs自由裁量? Simple/precise or vague/complex? 简单/准确,还是模糊/复杂? Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? 可知的规则vs溯及既往? Permission or rule book? 批准,还是规则手册 Plain text or fixers? 直白文本,还是掮客? Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? 普通执法还是专断执法? Right to discovery and challenge decisions. 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。 Right to appeal. 上诉权。 Insulation from political process. 与政治活动隔离。 Speed vs. delay? 快捷还是拖延? Consultation, consent of the governed. 被治理人的意见和合意。  
  • Rule vs. Discretion?
  • 规则vs自由裁量?
This is really a central distinction. Does the regulation, in operation, function as a clear rule? Or is it simply an excuse for the regulator to impose his or her will on the regulated firm or person? Sometimes discretion is explicit. Sometimes discretion comes in the application of a rule book thousands of pages long with multiple contradictory and vague rules. 这是一个核心区别。在操作中规章是不是作为明确的规则发挥作用?还是规章仅是监管者对被监管公司和个人施加自身意志的借口?有时候自由裁量是很明确的,有时候自由裁量则来自对上千页且存在大量冲突、模糊规则的规章手册的运用。
  • Simple/precise or vague/complex?
  • 简单/准确还是模糊/复杂?
Regulations can be simple and precise — even if silly. “Any structure must be set back six feet from the property line” is simple and precise. Or the regulation can be long, vague and complex. “The firm shall not engage in abusive practices.” 规章可以简单、准确,即使其很愚蠢。例如“所有建筑必须在界址线后6英尺”,这就很简单、准确。规章也可以很长、模糊且复杂,比如“公司不允许从事违规行为”。 Many regulations go on for hundreds of pages. Long, vague, and complex is a central ingredient which gives the appearance of rules but amounts to discretion. 很多规章长达数百页。冗长、模糊、复杂是让规则成为自由裁量,只具有规则的表象的核心因素。
  • Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions?
  • 可知的规则vs溯及既往?
Is the rule book knowable ex ante? Or is it, in application, simply a device for ex-post prosecutions. Insider trading rules are, at present, a good example of the latter. The definition of “insider” varies over time, and there is really little hope for a firm to read a coherent rule book to know what is and is not allowed. Much better to stay on good terms with the regulator. 规则事先可知吗?还是其实只是一种溯及既往的工具。内幕交易规则就是后一种情况的很好例子。“内幕”的定义随时间而变,公司几乎不可能从一本融贯的规则手册中知道什么是允许的,什么不被允许。与其如此,还远不如和监管者搞好关系。
  • Permission or rule book?
  • 批准还是规则手册?
In one kind of regulation, there is a rule book. If you follow the rule book, you’re ok. You go ahead and do what you want to do. In much regulation, however, you have to ask for permission from the regulator, and that permission includes a lot of discretion. Environmental review is a good example. 有一种监管,依据就是一本规则手册。只要你遵循上面的规则就没事,你可以做其他任何你想做的。但是有很多监管,你需要征得监管者的批准,而批准则包括了很多自由裁量。环境审评就是一个好例证。
  • Plain text or fixers?
  • 通俗文本还是掮客?
Can a normal person read the plain text of the rule, and understand what action is allowed or not? Or is the rule so complex that specialists are required to understand the rule, and the regulatory agency’s current interpretation of the rule? In particular, are specialists with internal agency contacts necessary, or specialists who used to work at the agency? 一个普通人是否能够阅读规则的文本并理解何种行为被允许,何种不被允许?还是规则太复杂,想要理解规则需要专家,需要依靠监管机构对规则的最新阐释?特别是,是不是需要一个拥有监管机构内部关系的专家或者是前工作人员? As a private pilot, I often bristle at the FAA’s mindless bureaucracy and the plain silliness of much of their regulation. But to their credit, there is a strong culture that the plain text of the rule counts, and each pilot should read the rules and know what they mean. That is a system much harder to misuse. Financial, banking, environmental, health care, and housing regulation stand on the opposite end of the spectrum. 作为一个私人飞行员,我经常恼怒于联邦航空管理局的无脑官僚做派和很多愚蠢的规章。但是有一点不得不承认,他们那里盛行一种文化,就是保持规则文本的通俗易懂,每一位飞行员都应该能读懂规则。在这种体制下,监管者滥用规则的难度就会加大。但金融、银行、环境、医疗保健、住房的规章却完全处于光谱的相反一端。
  • Enforced commonly or arbitrarily?
  • 普通执法还是专断执法?
Regulations that are seldom enforced, but then used occasionally to impose enormous penalties are clearly more open to political abuse. If Americans commit three felonies a dayin “conspiracy,” internet use, endangered species, wetlands, or employment and immigration regulations (just to start), but one in a hundred thousand is ever prosecuted, just who gets prosecuted is obviously ripe for abuse. 很少执行但偶尔用来施加重罚的规章显然更易被滥用。如果美国人每天都在有关“合谋”、互联网使用、濒危物种、湿地或雇佣和移民等等规章(远远还没数完)下犯下三项重罪,但是只有十万分之一的机率被起诉,那么挑谁来起诉这件事显然就成了滥权的温床。
  • Right to discovery, see evidence, and challenge decisions.
  • 证据开示权和对判决提出异议的权利。
Do you have the right to know how a regulatory agency decided your case? Step by step, what assumptions, calculations, or interpretations did it use? Often not, and even in high profile cases. 你是否有权知道监管机构是如何裁决你的案子的?每一步,他们用了什么假设、如何计算或者解释?通常你无权知道,即使是要案。 For example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverageof Met Life’s “systemic” designation reports 比如,《华尔街日报》关于大都会人寿保险公司被划定为具有“系统性风险”的报道写道: The feds ...still refuse to say exactly which [threats] make MetLife a systemic risk or what specific changes the company could make to avoid presenting such a risk. “联邦政府……依然拒绝说明是什么(威胁)使得大都会保险公司具有系统性风险或者公司可以通过何种具体的改变来避免出现这种风险。” and continues ...MetLife says that…the government’s decision is based on mere speculation and “undisclosed evidentiary material.” 接着又提到: “大都会保险公司表示……政府的裁决是基于纯粹臆测以及‘未公开的证明材料’。” Since the case is still being decided, the point here is not the correctness or not of these charges. But the charges are a clear example of the kind of regulation that can go wrong (In fact, the miracle of the MetLife case is that the company had the chutzpah to sue. They are taking a big bet that FSOC doesn’t believe in revenge.) 因为案件尚无定论,这里的重点并非这些指控正确与否,而是这些指控作为一个清楚的例证,表明监管可以变味。(事实上,大都会保险公司一案的奇迹在于公司竟然敢起诉监管机构。他们在金融稳定监督委员不会报复上面押了好大一注。)
  • Right to appeal.
  • 上诉权。
And not just to the same agency that makes the decision! In law, the right to appeal is central. In regulation, the right to appeal is often only to appeal to the same agency that made the decision. The Chevron doctrine severely limits your ability to appeal regulatory decisions (and the regulations themselves) to any outside entity. As an example, continuing the above MetLife coverage, 这里说的不仅仅是向作出裁决的机构提出上诉!法律上,上诉权是核心。在监管中,上诉权通常只是向作出行政裁决的同一机构提出上诉。“雪佛龙原则”严重地限制了你向机构外其他实体对监管裁决(和监管本身)提起上诉的能力。作为例子,我们接着看关于大都会保险公司一案的报道。 The ... stability council “lacks any separation in its legislative, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.” That combined with MetLife’s inability to see the full record on which the decision was based made it “impossible” to get a fair hearing. 金融稳定监督委员会“缺乏立法、调查、起诉和司法各职能的分立”。加上大都会无法看到裁决依据的完整记录,这使得他们“不可能”得到一个公平的听证。 As in law, secret evidence, secret decisions, secret testimony; and legislature, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled in to one are classic ingredients for subverting rule of law. And, eventually, for using the machinery of law to silence political opposition. 和在法律领域一样,秘密证据、秘密裁决、秘密证词以及立法、起诉、判决、陪审和执行不加区分都是破坏法治的典型元素。最终,它们都是为了利用法律机器来压制政治反对。
  • Insulation from political process.
  • 与政治活动隔离。
There are many structures in place to try to ensure the “independence” of independent agencies. There is also a tension that we live in a democracy, so independent agencies can’t be too independent if they have great discretionary power. 目前有很多架构想要确保独立机构的“独立”。但在民主国家,这也带来一个内在的压力。独立机构如果有很大的裁量权,那就不可能太独立。 These important structures try to limit explicit party politics’ use of the regulatory state. They are less successful at limiting the bureaucracy’s use of its regulatory power to prop up its own separate fiefdom. They are also less successful at limiting unwitting political cooperation. When vast majorities of the bureaucracy belong to one political party, when government employee unions funnel unwitting contributions to candidates of that party, and when strong ideological currents link decisions across agencies, explicit cooperation is less necessary. 这些重要的架构都是为了限制政党政治对监管型国家的公开利用,但它们在限制官僚机构利用监管权力强化自己的独立王国上则不那么成功。在限制无意的政治合作上也不成功。当机构的绝大部分人属于一个政党时,当政府雇员工会无意中资助那个政党的候选人时,当强烈的意识形态动向将各部门的裁决关联起来时,公开的合作就没那么必要了。 And, though it was ever thus, the enormous expansion of the size, power, and discretion of the regulatory state makes the insulation structures more important, just as they are falling apart. 即使这样,监管型国家的规模、权力和自由裁量权的扩张也使得隔离架构更加重要,而这些架构却正在分崩离析。
  • Speed vs. delay.
  • 快捷还是拖延。
The regulatory process can take years, and a canny regulator need not explicitly rule against a political foe. Delay is enough. Lois Lerner herself didn’t deny applications. She just endlessly delayed them. The FDA similarly sits on applications, sometimes for decades. 监管流程可以耗费数年。一个狡猾的监管者并不需要作出明显不利于政治对手的裁决,拖延就够了。洛伊丝·勒纳【编注:勒纳是美国国税局处理税务豁免申请的部门负责人,从2010年起,该部门被发现对涉及保守派特别是茶党人士及捐赠对象的豁免申请施加额外苛刻的审查,2013年的国会调查确认了这些滥权行为的存在,国税局官方也予以承认,并导致勒纳先被停职,后来辞职。】本人并不拒绝任何申请,她只是无限地拖延。类似地,食品药品监督局也拖延审核申请,有时一拖就是几十年。 A central element of a new Magna Carta for regulatory agencies should be a right to speedy decision. If a decision is not rendered in say, 6 months, it is approved. 一部针对监管机构的新大宪章的核心元素,就应该是速决的权利。如果一项裁决,比如说6个月内未作出,就相当于得到批准。
  • Consultation, consent of the governed.
  • 被治理人的意见及合意。
The process by which rules are written needs to be reformed. Congress writes empowering legislation, usually vague and expansive. The agencies undertake their own process for rule writing. They usually invite comment from interested parties, but are typically free to ignore it when they wish. We are as supplicants before the King, asking for his benevolent treatment. 规则制定的流程需要改革。国会制定的授权法律通常模糊、宽泛。机构根据各自的流程制定规则。它们常常会邀请利益相关方提出意见,但当他们不愿意接受这些意见时,通常可以直接无视它们。我们就像国王面前的恳请者,乞求他的仁慈。 And that was before the current transformation. As exemplified by the EPA’s decision to brand carbon dioxide a pollutant (coverage here), to extend the definition of “navigable waters” to pretty much every puddle, HHS’ many reinterpretations of the ACA, and the Education Department’s “Dear Colleague” letters, even the barely-constrained rule-making process now proceeds beyond its previous mild legal and consultative constraints. 这还是发生在如今的转变之前的事。从环境保护局宣布二氧化碳为污染物(见报道),将“可通行水域”的范围延伸到几乎所有的池塘,到卫生与公共服务部数次重新解释患者保护与平价医疗法案,以及教育部的“致同僚的一封信”,都是例证。现在,即使原本就不怎么受约束的规则制定过程也突破了本已有限的法律和征求意见方面的约束。 A structure with more formal representation, and more formal rights to draft the rules that govern us, is more in keeping with the parliamentary lessons of the Rule of Law tradition. 在起草治理我们的规则方面,一个有着更为正式的代议机制和更为正式的权利的制度结构,将更加符合法治传统下的议会经验。 2.A Tour 2.浏览 Do we really have reason to be afraid? Let’s take a tour. 我们真的有理由害怕吗?我们来浏览一下。 These cases are drawn mostly from media coverage, which allows me a quick and current high- level tour. Each case, and many more that are unreported, and a serious investigation to the structure of our massive regulatory state, could easily be drawn out to book length. 以下案例大多来自媒体报道,让我得以对当前情况做一次鸟瞰式的快速浏览。每一起案件和更多没有报道的案件以及对大型监管型国家架构的严肃检视,都可以轻而易举地写成一本书。 My point is not so much a current scandal. My case is that the structure that has emerged is ripe for the Faustian political bargain to emerge, that the trend of using regulation to quash political freedom is in place and will only increase. 我的意图不是要讲一件当下的丑闻。我是认为,现已出现的架构很容易导致浮士德式政治交易的出现,使用监管来压制政治自由的趋势已经形成而且只会不断加强。 As we tour our current regulatory state of affairs, then, think of how well the current regime represents “rule of law,” how well it respects your freedom to speak, your freedom to object, your freedom to oppose the regulator and regulatory regime. Think how insulated it is against the strong temptations of our increasingly polarized, winner-take-all, partisan political system to use regulatory power as a means of enshrining political power. 当我们检视当前监管型国家的事务时,想一想现有体制体现了多少“法治”,它在多大程度上尊重了你的言论自由、反对自由和反对监管者及监管型政权的自由,想一想它与两极分化日益严重、赢家通吃、政党体系动用监管权力来固化政治权力的强烈冲动隔离得怎么样。 Banks 银行 Start with finance. Finance is, of course, where the money is. 从金融业开始。金融,顾名思义,是钱之所在。 The Dodd-Frank act is 2,300 pages of legislation, in which “systemic” is never defined, making a “systemic” designation nearly impossible to fight. The act has given rise to tens of thousands of pages of subsidiary regulation, much still to be written. The Volker rule alone — do not fund proprietary trading with insured deposits — runs now to nearly 1,000 pages. To call this Talmudic is to insult the clarity and concision of the Talmud. 《多德-弗兰克法案》有2,300页长,但里面并未定义何为“系统性的”。这就使得监管者对企业具有“系统性风险”的划定几乎无法反驳。法案也带来了上万页的附加规章,需要接着撰写的还有很多。单是沃尔克规则——禁止用参加存款保险的存款进行自营交易­­——现在就已经快1,000页了。以“塔木德式”来称呼它,是对塔木德之清晰、简洁的亵渎。【编注:塔木德是犹太教的一套口传律法,由拉比传承,记录该教的传统习俗和行为规范。】 The result is immense discretion, both by accident and by design. There is no way one can just read the regulations and know which activities are allowed. Each big bank now has dozens to hundreds of regulators permanently embedded at that bank. The regulators must give their ok on every major decision of the banks. 结果就是巨大的自由裁量权,既有意外也有蓄意。仅仅阅读这些规章绝无可能知道什么活动是被允许的。每家大银行现在都被永久性地安插了几十至几百个监管者。银行的每一项重大决定都必须得到监管者的批准。 The “stress tests” are a good case in point. Seeing, I suspect, the futility of much Dodd-Frank regulation, and with the apparent success of the Spring 2009 stress tests in the rear view mirror, such tests have become a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory efforts. But what worked once does not necessarily work again if carved in stone. “压力测试”是一个好例子。我怀疑是看到了众多多德-弗兰克规章的无效,同时,回顾过去又有2009年春天压力测试的成功,这些使得压力测试成了美联储加强监管的柱基。但是成功一次不代表常规化后次次都能成功。 In “stress tests,” Federal Reserve staff make up various scenarios, and apply their own computer models and the banks’ computer models to see how the banks fare. However, the Fed does not announce a set scenario ahead of time. They Fed staffers make up new scenarios each time. They understand that if banks know ahead of time what the scenario is and the standards are, then the clever MBAs at the banks will make sure the banks all pass. And billions of dollars hang on the results of this game. “压力测试”中,美联储职员制造不同的情境,然后应用联储自己的电脑模型和银行的模型来看银行如何反应。但是联储不会提前公布一组情境都有什么,美联储职员每次都制造一组新的情境。他们知道如果银行事先知道情境及标准,银行里那些聪明的MBA们就有办法保证银行通过测试。而数十亿美元系于这场游戏的结果。 Now, the Fed staffers playing this game, at least those that I have talked to, are honest and a- political. For now. But how long can that last? How long can the Fed resist the temptation to punish banks who have stepped out of line with a stress test designed to exploit their weakness? Is it any wonder that few big banks are speaking out against the whole regime? They understand that being an “enemy” is not the way to win approvals. 现在,参与这个游戏的联储职员,至少那些和我说过话的,都是诚实且无涉政治的。目前是这样,但这能维持多久呢?联储能够抵御诱惑多久,而不去惩罚那些在专门设计来利用银行弱点的压力测试中行为出格的银行?鲜有大银行敢于直言反对整个体系,这很奇怪吗?他们明白,成为“敌人”并不是获得审批的办法。 And the stress-test staff are getting handsome offers already to come work for the banks, to help the banks to pass the Fed’s stress tests. Ben Bernanke himself is now working for Citadel. 参与设计压力测试的联储职员现已从银行获得了待遇不菲的工作邀请,来帮助银行通过测试。本·伯南克自己现在就为城堡投资集团工作。 If this sounds like the cozy world of “capture,” however, remember the litany of criminal prosecutions and multibillion-dollar settlements. These are instigated by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, with much closer ties to the Administration, but they revolve around violations of securities regulations. Is it a coincidence that S&P, who embarrassed the Administration by downgrading U.S. debt, faced a $1.4 billion dollar settlement for ratings shenanigans, while Moody’s, which gave the same ratings, did not? Pay up, shut up, and stay out of trouble is the order of the day. 如果这听起来像是一个“捕获”的温馨世界,那请记住刑事诉讼和数十亿美元的和解下的哀鸣。这些都是由与行政分支关系更紧密的司法部长和司法部发起的,涉及的则是违反证券法规的行为。降低美国债务评级而让行政分支蒙羞的标准普尔因评级欺诈而面临14亿美元的和解,但给出同样评级的穆迪却没有受罚。这难道是巧合?破财消灾、闭上嘴、远离是非,是当今市场的生存之道。 The Wall Street Journal nicely characterized today’s Wall Street, quotingJohn J. Mack, Morgan Stanley's ex-chairman “Your No.1 client is the government,” which embeds “About 50 full-time government regulators.” 《华尔街日报》引述摩根士丹利前主席约翰·马克的话,漂亮地描述了今天华尔街的特点,他说:“你的头号客户是政府”,它安插了“大约50个全职监管者。” CFPB 消费者金融保护局 Another example: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice charged Ally Bank with discrimination in auto lending, and extracted a nearly $100 million settlement. Ally provides money to auto lenders. Lenders negotiate interest rates. Nobody is allowed to collect data on borrowers’ race. So Justice ran statistical analysis on last names and zip codes — Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding — to decide that minorities are being charge more than they should, essentially encoding ethnic jokes into law. 另一个例子:美国消费者金融保护局和司法部指控Ally银行在汽车贷款中歧视,并获取了一份价值约一亿美元的和解。Ally向汽车贷款放贷人提供资金。放贷人协商利率。不允许任何人收集借贷人的种族信息。所以司法部就通过贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法统计分析借贷人的姓和邮编作出裁决,认为少数族裔被收取了过高的费用——这等于是将种族笑话秘密地写入了法律。 Why did Ally pay? Sure, they might survive in court. But nobody wants to be branded a racist. And DOJ and CFPB have many more cards up their sleeves. CFPB now can disapprove any retail financial arrangement it deems “abusive,” and put Ally out of business. Ally为什么答应和解呢?当然,他们可能在法庭上获胜。但没人愿意被称作种族主义者。此外,司法部和消费者金融保护局袖子里还藏着很多牌。消费者金融保护局现在可以否决一切它们认为“滥用”的零售金融合约,它们可以让Ally破产。 Note in this case, there was no charge or evidence of discriminatory practice or intent. The case was purely that DOJ and CFPB didn’t like the statistics of the outcome. 注意,此案中并无歧视行为或意图的指控或证据。一切只因为司法部和消费者金融保护局不喜欢最后的数据统计分布。 More importantly, was this a knowable regulation, or a bill of attainder? Did CFPB and Justice make available the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding program on their website, and tell financial institutions “please download the BISG program, make sure you run loans through it, and that they come out with the right statistics?” Obviously not. This was an unknowable regulation. Ally had no way to make sure it was lending to the right last names. 更重要的是,这究竟是一条可知的规章,还是褫夺公民权的法案?消费者金融保护局和司法部有没有在网站公布贝叶斯改良姓氏坐标法,并告诉金融机构“请下载该程序,根据它发放贷款并确保最终数据统计分布正确”?显然没有。这是一个不可知的法规。Ally无法保证它们把钱贷给了正确的姓氏。 Ominously, in Wall Street Journal coverage, 《华尔街日报》的报道带来了不详的预兆: Larger settlements may be on the horizon. J.P. Morgan...warned in a recent filing that it is discussing the issue of possible “statistical disparities” in auto lending with Justice. With more than $50 billion in auto loans on Morgan’s balance sheet at the end of last year, real or imaginary disparities wouldn’t have to be that large to generate a fat settlement. “更大的和解可能就在眼前。JP摩根……在最近提交的一份公告中警示投资者,它正在与司法部讨论汽车贷款中可能存在的‘统计偏差’问题。根据公司去年底资产负债表上超过500亿美元的汽车贷款,真实或者想象的偏差不必过大,也会产生巨额和解。” While the Obamacare (King v. Burwell) and gay marriage decisions soaked up the airtime in the summer of 2015, the Court’s upholdingof statistical discrimination and disparate impact stands as the greatest affront to liberty. Without even alleging discriminatory intent, without following any established procedure, the Justice Department can chew numbers as it feels, and based on statistical analysis brand you a racist and drag you to court. 尽管奥巴马医改案(金诉布维尔案)和同性恋婚姻判决占据了2015年整个夏天的聚光灯,但联邦最高法院对数据统计分布所体现的歧视和差别影响的认可才是对自由最严重的侵犯。甚至无需指称歧视意图,无需遵循任何现有程序,司法部就可以随意咀嚼数字,根据统计分析为你打上种族歧视者的标签,把你拖上法庭。 SEC 美国证券交易委员会 The SEC’s regulation of insider trading is a fine example of discretion run amok. There is no legal definition of insider trading. Other than corporate insiders (who have legal fiduciary responsibilities not to trade on information) there is little economic rationale for this witch hunt. The game is characterized by big suits with big settlements and novel theories. 证券交易委员会对内幕交易的监管是自由裁量权失控的一个很好例证。法律上没有内幕交易的定义。除去企业内部人(他们有法律上的受托人责任,不利用信息进行交易)之外,这种猎巫式的监管没有多少经济依据。这场游戏的特点是大案件、高额和解和新颖的理论。 And thus, big discretion. The SEC can ruin anyone it wants to. If you’re running a hedge fund and the SEC accuses you of insider trading, it grabs your computers and shuts down your business. Sure, 5 years from now you might win in court, but your customers left and the fund shut down the day they took the computers away. And appeal is only to the SEC itself. 于是,这带来了广泛的自由裁量权。证券交易委员会可以摧毁想要摧毁的任何人。如果你经营一家对冲基金,而证券交易委员会指控你内幕交易,它会带走公司的电脑,关闭你的公司。当然,5年后你可能赢下官司,但是客户全都离开了,基金公司也在取走电脑的那天关了。而且你就算上诉也只能上诉到证券交易委员会。 Robosigning 自动签名 During the financial crisis, many banks didn’t fill out all the forms correctly when foreclosing on houses. The charge was entirely about process — there was no charge that anyone was evicted who was paying his or her mortgages. From the Federal Reserve’s own press releaseswe learn that the Fed found them guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices.” 金融危机期间,许多银行取消房屋抵押赎回权时没有正确填写所有表格。这项指控纯粹只和流程有关,没有任何关于仍在还按揭的房主被驱逐的指控。从美联储自己的官方新闻通报中我们知道,美联储认为银行因“不安全、不合理的程序和操作”而犯有过错。 The Fed was acting in conjunction with a comprehensive settlement agreed in principle between the five banking organizations, the state Attorneys General, and the Department of Justice ... The Settlement Agreement requires these organizations to provide $25 billion in payments and other designated types of monetary assistance and remediation to residential mortgage borrowers. 在一项五家银行机构、各州检察长和司法部……之间达成的、内容广泛的原则性和解中,美联储也参与了联合行动。和解协议要求银行赔付给民宅按揭借贷者总额为250亿美元的款项和其他指定的资金支持和救助。 The Fed, a supposedly non-political independent agency devoted to bank safety and monetary policy, acted with the Administration, to transfer $25 billion dollars from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers (not the victims of robosigning, other borrowers) and “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” 美联储——一家理应政治中性、独立,致力于银行安全和实施货币政策的机构——和行政分支一起将250亿美元从银行股东那里转移给按揭借贷者(他们还不是自动签名的受害者)和“非营利性住房咨询机构”。 It’s a small example, but a concrete one. 这是一个小例子,但很实在。 Regulation in general is transitioning from widespread application of rules to sporadic but very large enforcement actions, frequently involving threat of criminal prosecution and ending in large settlements. Documenting this trend, the Wall Street Journalnoted the spread of Department of Justice Attorneys to regulatory agencies. For example, the EPA “described a strategy of pursuing larger, more complicated enforcement cases, albeit fewer in number.” 总体上看,监管正由规则的广泛适用转向不定期的大型执法活动,还经常伴随着刑事诉讼的威胁,并以大额和解而终结。在记录这一趋势时,《华尔街日报》注意到很多司法部律师转到了其他监管机构。比如,环境保护署“描绘了一个策略,就是追求更大、更复杂的执法案件,哪怕案件数量更少”。 Similarly,Larry Parkinson, another former federal prosecutor who runs FERC’s [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] investigations, described it as an outgrowth of shifting resources to more serious matters—like market manipulation—and away from more traditional violations. In 2008, for example, a majority of the agency’s penalties were against firms that violated requirements that natural-gas shippers maintain title to the gas. 类似地,拉里·帕金森,另一位前联邦检察官,现负责联邦能源监管委员会的调查,将此说成是资源从传统违法行为转移到更严重问题的结果,如市场操控。比如,2008年,该委员会的大部分处罚是针对那些违反天然气航运商必须保有天然气所有权这一规定的公司。 “Market Manipulation” is of course a lot more nebulous and discretionary than natural-gas title checks. “市场操控”当然比天然气所有权检查更加模糊、有更多自由裁量权。 The ACA, AKA Obamacare 患者保护与平价医疗法案,即奥巴马医改法案 The ACA is 2,700 pages, and the subsidiary regulation is so convoluted that there is an active debate on the page count of its actual regulations. Justice Scalia invoked the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment as protection against actually reading it. 奥巴马医改法案长达2,700页,配套法规也相当复杂,以至于其到底有多少页还存在争议。斯卡利亚大法官援引第八修正案——不得施加残酷和非常惩罚——来保护自己不去读它。 The Heritage foundation counted 1,327 waivers. Clearly, someone needing a discretionary waiver shouldn’t be a big critic of HHS or the law. 美国传统基金会统计到了1,327份弃权声明。显然,有人需要自主弃权,这不应算是对卫生与公共服务部或者这项法案的严厉批评。 The cartelization of health insurance and health care under the ACA is almost a textbook case of corporatism. The big hospitals doctors, and insurers get a protected small cartel. In return for political support for the ACA, HHS, state exchanges, and so on. And, the ACA itself being an intensely partisan question, that support already leaks into major party politics. 奥巴马医改法案下健康保险和医疗卫生服务的卡特尔化是社团主义的教科书式案例。大医院、医生和保险公司获得了一个受保护的小卡特尔。作为回报,他们从政治上支持医改法案、卫生与公共服务部及州立医疗保险交易所等等。由于医改法案本身已经成为了一个很严重的党派问题,对法案的支持也卷入到了政党政治中。 Writing on the consolidation of health insurance into two or three big companies, the Wall Street Journal quotesAetna CEO Mark Bertolini that the federal regulators “happen to be, for most of us now, our largest customer,” adding 《华尔街日报》在关于健康保险公司整合为两到三家大公司的报道中,引用了安泰保险首席执行官马克·伯特利尼的话说,联邦监管机构“对我们大多数人而言,现在恰好是我们最大的客户”。他又补充道: “So there is a relationship you need to figure out there if you’re going to have a sustained positive relationship with your biggest customer. And we can all take our own political point of view of whether it’s right or wrong, but in the end-analysis, they’re paying us a lot of money and they have a right to give us some insight into how they think we should run our business.” “所以如果你想要和最大的客户有一个长久积极的关系,就需要认清这个关系。关于对错,我们都可以有自己的政治观点,但是最终来看,他们支付我们很大一笔钱,他们有权利给我们一些见解,告诉我们该如何经营。” The Journal opined that “such domestication is part of ObamaCare’s goal of political control,” echoing my fear. 《华尔街日报》评论道,“这种驯服是奥巴马医改法案政治控制意图的一部分”,这呼应了我的忧惧。 United Healthwanted to join the California exchange Covered California. Many areas of California have only one or two insurers now, so competition and choice are clearly needed. But participation in the exchange needs prior regulatory approval, and United Health was denied. Why? The LA Times wrote 联合健康保险想要加入加州健康保险交易所——医保加州。加州很多地方现在只有一两家保险公司,所以显然是很需要竞争和更多选择余地的。但是参加交易所需要事先得到审批,联合健康保险被否决了。为什么?《洛杉矶时报》写到: Peter Lee, executive director of Covered California, said established insurers shouldn't be free to come in right away. Those insurers, he said, should not be allowed to undercut rivals who stepped up at the start and made significant investments to sign up 1.2 million Californians during the first open enrollment. “彼得·李,医保加州的执行董事,表示老牌保险公司不应该立刻自由进入市场。他说那些保险公司不应该被允许以更低地成本与那些在第一次公开登记时就进场,并为签下120万加州人作出巨大投资的对手竞争。” and quoting Lee further, 李还说, We think the health plans that helped make California a national model should not be in essence undercut by plans that sat on the sidelines. “我们认为帮助加州成为全国模范的保险计划不应该被那些坐在一边看热闹的计划比下去。” You can’t ask for a clearer example of a regulator, using discretionary power to cartelize his industry, protect incumbent profits, and punish a business for failure to support political objectives. He said nothing about United Health’s ability to serve California customers, or to abide by any regulation. 没有什么是比这个更明显的监管者的例子了,利用自由裁量权将他管辖的行业卡特尔化,保护既得利益,惩罚没能支持其政治目标的公司。李一点没提联合健康保险服务加州消费者的能力或者其遵守了所有的法规。 Again in California, reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Daughters of Charity Health system wanted to sell six insolvent hospitals to Prime, which agreed to take on their debt and a $300 million pension liabilities. Under state law, Attorney General Kamala Harris must approve nonprofit hospital sales or acquisitions, with only a vague guideline that such transactions must be “in the public interest.” But only four of Prime’s 15 California hospitals are unionized, so the Service Employees International Union was against the merger. Ms. Harris torpedoed the merger, despite a positive report form her own staff. 还是在加州,据《华尔街日报》报道,仁爱女儿连锁医院想要将六所破产的医院卖给基本医疗。后者同意接受破产医院的债务和3亿美元的养老金负债。根据州法律,非营利医院的收购或出售须得到州检察长卡马拉·哈里斯批准,而指导其审批的只有一条模糊原则,就是这一交易必须“符合公共利益”。但是基本医疗在加州的15家医院只有4家参加了工会,所以服务业员工国际工会就起来反对这一并购。哈里斯女士阻止了这次并购,尽管她自己的手下出具了对并购持正面评价的报告。 Was the event a political cave to unions, as represented by the Journal? Perhaps; perhaps not. What matters here is that it certainly could be, as the Attorney General has enormous discretionary power to approve or disapprove hospital mergers. Hospitals are well advised to stay on her good side. 这一事件是不是如《华尔街日报》报道的那样,是对工会的政治屈服呢?也许是,也许不是。这里真正重要的是,完全有可能如此,因为检察长有很大的自由裁量权批准或否决医院并购。医院得到的建议是乖乖站在检察长一边。 FDA 食品药品监督管理局 Henry Miller at Hoover tells the sad tale of the Aquadvantage salmon, submitted for review in 1996 and still under review20: 胡佛研究所的亨利·米勒说了关于AquAdvantage转基因鲑鱼的悲伤故事,这一品种1996年提交评审,到现在还在评审: ...Consider what they [FDA] have inflicted on a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon, which differs from its wild cohorts only by reaching maturity about 40 percent faster, as the result of the addition to its genome of a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon... “……想一想食品药品监督管理局(FDA)对这一转基因大西洋鲑鱼都做了什么。这种鲑鱼与其它野生同类唯一不同的是比它们快40%达到成熟期,因为它的基因组中添加了帝王鲑的生长荷尔蒙基因……” It took FDA more than a decade just to decide how they would regulate the AquAdvantage salmon. Characteristically, they decided on the most onerous pathway, regulating the new construct in genetically engineered animals as though it were a veterinary drug, similar to a flea medicine or pain reliever. After several years of deliberation, regulators concluded as early as 2012 that the AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon has no detectable differences and that it “is as safe as food from conventional Atlantic salmon.” ... FDA用了超过十年时间来决定要怎样监管这种鲑鱼。跟往常一样,他们决定通过最繁复的路径来监管转基因动物体内的新构造,就像把它当作兽药,类似跳蚤药或者镇痛药那样对待。经过数年的研究,监管者早在2012年就得出结论认为这种鲑鱼没有可探知的差异,它“和大西洋传统鲑鱼一样安全”。 When the FDA completed its Environmental Assessment in April 2012 and was ready to publish it—the last necessary hurdle before approving the salmon for marketing—the White House mysteriously intervened. The review process vanished from sight until December of that year, when the FDA was finally permitted to publish the EA (the unsurprising verdict: “no significant impact”), which should then have gone out for a brief period of public comment prior to approval. 就在2012年4月FDA完成环境评价准备公布结果时——这也是最后一道挡在鲑鱼上市前的障碍——白宫却神秘地干涉了进来。审批过程从公众视野中消失了。直到那年12月,FDA才最终被批准公布环境评价,结果并不出人意料——“没有显著影响”。这之后理应是短暂的公开征求意见阶段,然后就是正式批准。 The reason for the delay in the FDA’s publishing the needed Environmental Assessment was exposed by science writer Jon Entine. He related that the White House interference “came after discussions [in the spring of 2012] between Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ office and officials linked to Valerie Jarrett at the Executive Office [of the President], who were debating the political implications of approving the [genetically modified] salmon. Genetically modified plants and animals are controversial among the president’s political base, which was thought critical to his reelection efforts during a low point in the president’s popularity.” 科学作家乔恩•昂蒂纳揭露了FDA推迟公布环境评价的原因。他谈到,白宫的干涉“发生于2012年春天卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳·西贝利厄斯的部长办公室和总统办公室瓦莱丽·贾勒相关的官员进行的一场讨论之后。这些官员的辩论围绕着批准转基因鲑鱼的政治影响。在总统的政治大本营,转基因植物和动物是有争议的话题。这一话题被认为在总统的支持率处于低点的时候对总统的再次当选至关重要。” Needless to say, 20 years of delay makes a project pretty unprofitable. 不用说,20年的拖延让转基因鲑鱼项目变得几乎无利可图。 This is a good example, because the FDA regulations prescribe a precise science-based process for evaluating a food. There are time limits for rendering decisions, which the FDA ignores. But strong political forces don’t like GM foods, science be damned. 这是一个绝佳的例子,因为FDA的法规规定了评价食品的一套基于科学的精确程序。作出裁决是有时限的,但被FDA忽略了。当强大的政治力量不喜欢转基因食品时,科学就屁也不是了。 EPA 环境保护署 A clean environment is important. Pollution is a clear externality. We can also regard it as a Nash equilibrium. Each competitor in an industry is happy to pay the extra money to produce cleanly if all his or her competitors do so. 清洁环境很重要。污染显然是一个外部性。我们也可以把它看作一个纳什均衡。如果竞争对手也这么做,行业里的每一个竞争对手都愿意花额外的钱清洁地生产。 But the modern EPA violates just about every one of my suggested bullet points for preserving rule of law in the regulatory bureaucracy, and is ripe for political misuse. Discretion vs. rules, the potential for endless delay, the need for ex-ante permission, and a politicized and partisan bureaucracy are just the beginning. 但是现代的环境保护署违背了我为在监管型官僚机构下维护法治所提出的几乎每一条建议,政治滥用就在眼前。自由裁量权而非规则、无限拖延的可能、事前批准的要求、政治化和党派化的官僚机构,这些都还只是开始。 In the Pebble Mine controversy, EPA issued a preemptive veto of a project before a request for review was submitted, and was found colluding with mining opponents. Note, I’m not opining on whether the mine was a good or bad idea. Merely that the process in view is clearly one that could be misused for political purposes, and that mine owners already must know not to speak ill of the EPA or administration with such sway over the EPA. 在佩柏金矿争议中,环境保护署在项目审批申请递交前就发出了事先否决,并且被发现和开采的反对方相勾结。请注意,我并不是在就开矿是好是坏发表意见。我要说的仅仅是,这个程序明显可以因政治目的而遭到利用,而矿主一定已经知道不要说环境保护署以及可以对其施加影响的其他机构的坏话。 The Keystone pipeline stands as the example par excellence of regulatory delay and politicization. Perhaps next to the EPA’s decision to take on carbon as a pollutant. Keystone石油管线是监管拖延和政治化的绝佳例证。可能仅次于环境保护署决定将二氧化碳列为污染物。 Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project. 如今,任何因其他理由——比如遮住了视野——而反对一个项目的人,都可以利用环境评估来加以阻止。在任何商业项目中,拖延跟否决一样有效。 The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed “crucifying” some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying: 环境保护署第六区主管阿尔·阿曼达里兹的小故事很有启发性。他建议把一些大的石油公司“钉死在十字架上”,以儆效尤。录音显示,他说: The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years. “罗马人曾经征服地中海地区的小村庄。他们进入某个土耳其小镇,将最先看到的五个人钉死在十字架上。然后整个镇子在接下来的几年都会很好管理。 ...we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly. ……我们确实有一些很有效的执法工具。如此,顺服便唾手可得,而且程度很高,来得很快,非常快。 According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases. 故事里,阿曼达里兹关闭了Range Resources,首批水力压裂公司之一。Range予以了回击,最终一位联邦法官作出了有利于Range的判决。但是一个通过杀鸡儆猴、明显增加企业合规成本来运作的机构,当然易于根据政治考量而选择 “钉死”哪些儆猴之鸡。 Internet 网络 The Internet is the central disruptive technology of our time. So far it has been “permissionless” — unlike just about every other activity in the contemporary United States, you do not need prior approval of a regulator to put up a website. 网络是这个时代核心的颠覆性科技。截至目前,它还是“无需审批”的。不像当代美国的其他任何活动,你不需要事前审批就能上线一个网站。 Pressure grew under the reasonable-sounding banner of “net neutrality,” though what was at stake was the right of some businesses to pay extra for faster delivery. “Net neutrality” meant outlawing business class. The FCC, a supposedly independent agency, studied the issue and found no reason to regulate the internet. 但是,在听似合理的“网络中立性”旗帜下,压力与日俱增,虽然这里受到危及的是一些公司通过额外付费来获得更快传输的权利。“网络中立性”意味着宣布通过额外付费取得一定特权不合法。联邦通信委员会(FCC)——一个本该中立的机构,研究了这个议题,然后发现没有理由监管网络。 One fine day in November 2014, FCC commissioner Tom Wheeler must have found horse head in bed. Well, more specifically a surprise public announcement from President Obama that “blindsided officials at the FCC” per WSJ coverage. 2014年11月某个美好的日子,FCC主席汤姆·惠勒一定在床上发现了一个血淋淋的马头【译注:电影《教父》梗】,更准确地说是奥巴马总统惊人的公开言论。据《华尔街日报》报道,奥巴马提到了“FCC那些钻进死胡同的官员”。 The result is not just “net neutrality” but to apply full telecommunications regulation circa 1935. In particular, this includes Title II rate regulation, in which the FCC has full power to determine what rates are “reasonable.” 奥巴马的言论带来的结果不仅仅是“网络中立性”,而是FCC将动用其约于1935年获得的全面电信监管权力。尤其是,这其中包括有关费用管制的第二条款。据此,FCC可以全权决定什么样的费用是“合理”的。 The FCC announces it will “forbear” to use that power. Along with its right, under the regulation, to impose content restrictions — yes, to tell you what to put on your website — and the “fairness doctrine.” But forebearance is discretionary. So, a company thinking of investing money in fiber-optic lines had better invest in good relations with the FCC and the Administration that apparently drives its decisions. FCC宣布他们会“克制”使用该权力,以及在该监管下实施内容限制(是的,就是告诉你网站放什么内容)和“公平原则”的权力。但是克制也是有裁量的。所以,一家打算投资光纤电缆的公司最好多多投资于它和FCC以及能够影响其裁决的行政分支的关系。 The “independence” of regulatory agencies is one of the key structures impeding widespread use of regulatory power to induce political support. The WSJ coverage of the politics behind the decision describes well how specific businesses’ access to the White House drove the result. On the commission, the 3-2 vote with 2 republicans issuing withering dissents speaks of the partisan nature of this regulation. 监管机构的“独立”是阻止广泛使用监管权力争取政治支持的关键架构之一。《华尔街日报》关于裁决背后的政治勾当的报道,很好地描述了特定公司通往白宫的门道是如何推动结果的。通信委员会3:2的投票结果,以及2名共和党挖苦式地发表少数意见,正说明了这一监管的党派政治本质。 Alas, the internet is all moving to Washington. Uber hired, straight from the Administration, well known tech wizard, David Pflouffe. Given Uber’s troubles with labor law — a California court recently ruling that its contractors are employees — and taxi regulation throughout the U.S., investing in politics is good business for Uber. 可叹的是,网络公司都向华盛顿涌来。优步直接从政府雇佣了著名的科技巫师大卫·普罗夫。鉴于优步面临的劳动法方面的麻烦(一家加州法庭最近裁定它旗下的合约司机是正式雇员)和在全美出租车法规面前遭遇的麻烦,投资于政治对它来说是一笔好生意。 Campaign finance 竞选筹款 Campaign finance law and regulation is all about restricting freedom of speech and altering who wins elections. So one should not be surprised about its political use to restrict freedom of speech and alter who wins elections. 竞选筹款的法律法规就是关于限制言论自由和改变胜选人的。所以对于它被政治性的用来限制言论自由和改变胜选人也不应感到意外。 Still, the recent trend is more troubling than usual. 但尽管如此,最近的趋势仍比往常更加令人不安。 Lois Lerner, director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Unit, famously derailed applications for nonprofit status from conservative groups, ahead of the 2012 Presidential election. Her main tactic was endless delay. All you need is for the election to pass. 洛伊丝·勒纳,联邦税务局免税机构部主管,在2012年总统大选前阻挠保守派团体获得非盈利性资格的申请【编注:被认定为非盈利性机构意味着其所获得的捐赠可以让捐赠者享受相应的税务豁免,按机构性质不同,豁免的可能是应税收入,也可能是应缴税额。】,并因此出名。她的主要战术就是无限期拖延。她需要的只是等到大选过去。 Scott Walker’s troubles are similarly renown. Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm filed “John Doe” probes against conservative issue advocacy groups, “blanketed conservatives with subpoenas, raided their homes and put the targets under a gag order” that they could not even reveal the fact of the investigation. It came to light, and is now in the courts, but not until well after the election. Walker won anyway, but might not have. 斯科特·沃克的麻烦也差不多出名。密尔沃基地区检察官约翰·奇瑟姆发起了一项针对保守议题倡导组织的“无名氏”调查。“给保守派人士发法庭传票来妨碍他们,突然查抄他们的家,为目标人士申请禁口令”,使得他们甚至无法揭露这些调查存在的事实。整件事直到选举之后很久才曝光,目前正在庭审阶段。不管怎样,沃克最后还是赢了,但完全可能因此而输掉。 The Administration has been pushing since 2010 to force nonprofits to disclose all donors, as campaigns must disclose contributors. It sounds innocuous: “Disclosures?” Who can be against that? Shouldn’t “big money” contributing to politics be public information? 政府自2010年以来一直在推动强令非营利组织公开捐款人,就像竞选必须公开捐助人一样。这听起来很无害。“公开”?谁敢反对?难道捐助政治的“大钱”不应该成为公开信息吗? Not when the vast power of the regulatory state can come down on whomever it wants to. Tyrannies always start by making lists. Nixon at least had to compile his own enemies list. 当监管型国家的权力触角可以伸到它希望的任何人时,就不应该了。暴政都是从列名单开始的。尼克松至少还需要自己动手编列一份政敌名单。 Snowden 斯诺登 The Snowden affair taught us some important lessons about our government. The NSA collected phone call “metadata.” Well, it’s just who called who and not the content of phone calls (unless you call abroad), you may say. 斯诺登事件教给我们一些关于我们政府的重要教训。国家安全局收集电话“元数据”。你也许会说,只是谁打给谁,又不是电话的内容(除非打到国外)。 But even metadata is revealing. Suppose you called three cancer doctors, alcoholics anonymous, and two divorce lawyers. And you want to run for the senate. That kind of information is political dynamite. 但即使是元数据信息量也很大。假设你打给了三个癌症医生,匿名戒酒会和两个离婚律师。你还想要竞选参议员。这些信息在政治上就是爆炸性的。 The NSA has the content, not just metadata, of any emails that go abroad. The NSA likely has many Hilary Clinton’s missing emails. And Jeb Bushes’. Unless neither has ever written an email that rises to the embarrassment level of Mitt Romney’s 47% remark, the information to sink either campaign is likely sitting on NSA computers. 国安局掌握着发往国外的任何邮件的内容,不仅仅是元数据。国安局里很可能有很多希拉里·克林顿的失踪邮件。以及杰布·布什的。除非两人写过的邮件没有一封能达到罗姆尼47%言论【译注:罗姆尼2012年曾经在私下场合表示,有47%的选民无论如何都会选奥巴马,他们相信政府对他们有责任、有义务。罗姆尼表示自己不需要去担心这些人】的尴尬程度,否则击沉任意一个候选人的信息就在国安局的电脑里。 That information would never leak out, you say? Snowden proves the opposite. Any piece of information on a government computer is one Snowden, one Lois Lerner, or one Chinese hacker away from a twitter feed. 你说什么?信息永远不会泄露?斯诺登证明了信息会泄露。政府电脑里的任何信息离推特信息都只有一个斯诺登、一个洛伊丝·勒纳或者一个中国黑客的距离。 John Oliver’s Snowden interview contained an interesting revelation. The internet is an amazing thing. What do Americans do with it? They send around pictures of their private parts. And NSA employees regularly pass the pictures around to great hilarity. 约翰·奥利弗对斯诺登的采访披露了一个有意思的情节。网络是个奇妙的东西。美国人用它来干什么呢?他们到处发送自己私处的照片。而国安局职员经常传阅这些照片来取乐。 E-Verify 电子查证 As part of most immigration deals we are likely to see strong enforcement of the right of employees to work via e-verify. Every single human being who wishes to work in the United States must ask for the ex-ante permission the Federal Government. 作为绝大多数移民政策的一部分,我们可能会看到,借助电子查证,有关雇员工作权的法规得到了强有力实施。每个想在美国工作的人都必须征得联邦政府的事先准许。 Leave aside here the obvious question how the same government that runs the Obamacare website, and, as I write, has had all visa applications to the U.S. shut down for two weeks due to hardware failures, will manage this. Let’s focus on the political implications. 一个运营着奥巴马医改网站的政府,一个因为硬件故障关闭所有签证申请达两周的政府,如何能够管理电子查证?这里先别管这个明显的问题,我们把焦点集中到政治影响上吧。 This power will naturally expand. First, people without proper immigration documents. But once in place, why only enforce immigration laws? Already there are a long list of laws governing who can work and when and where. People must have the right licenses, the right background checks, union memberships and so on. Are you guilty in the latest SEC which hunt? E-verify can really make sure you never work in finance again, not so much as a bank teller. Or that a conviction for violating the endangered species act keeps you out of the work force. 这一权力会自然延伸。首先是没有正当移民文件的人。但是电子查证一旦到位,为什么只用来执行移民法呢?已经有一长串的法律管理着谁可以工作以及什么时候在哪儿工作。人们必须要有正确的执照、正确的背景审查、工会会员身份等等。在证券交易委员会最近的一次政治迫害中你有罪吗?电子查证可以确保你再也不能从事金融业,即使是银行柜员也不行。或者一项威胁濒危物种的行为的定罪,也可以把你隔离在劳动力市场之外。 Every tyranny controls its citizens by controlling their right to work. Do we really want every American who wants employment to have to ask for the ex-ante permission of the Federal Government of Edward Snowden and Lois Lerner? 任何暴政都通过控制公民的工作权来控制公民。我们真的希望每个想要工作的人都必需事先征得一个由爱德华·斯诺登和洛伊丝·勒纳组成的联邦政府的许可吗? Transactions 交易 We have lost the right to transact privately in the terror and drug wars. The right to political dissent requires the ability to speak freely and privately; the right to earn a living despite political opposition; and the right to transact in private. All three are vanishing. 我们已经在反恐和禁毒战争中失去了私下交易的权利。政治异见的权利要求人们能够自由和私密地表达的可能性,政治反对者仍能谋生的权利,以及私下交易的权利。这三种权利都在消失。 You may have reveled in the ending of Stephen King’s Shawshank Redemption, in which the hero takes cash out of banks and heads to Mexico. Under today’s banking laws, that could no longer happen. 你也许很喜欢史蒂夫·金的《肖申克的救赎》的结尾,男主角从银行取出钱,前往墨西哥。在今天的银行法律下,这一幕再也不会发生了。 As a recent political example, Dennis Hastert was recently indictedf or violating the spirit of the $10,000 limit on bank withdrawals, by withdrawing amounts just shy of the limit. Hastert wanted the money, apparently, to pay blackmail to someone with an embarrassing personal secret. 最近的一个政治例子是,丹尼斯·哈斯特尔特最近因违背银行取款不超过10,000美元的宗旨而受到起诉。他取出的额度恰好略低于限额。原来,哈斯特尔特需要钱去支付某人利用其尴尬的私人秘密所进行的勒索。 Hastert is retired. But should aspiring politicians really have no privacy in their personal transactions? 哈斯特尔特退休了。但是有抱负的政客在私人交易中就真的没有任何隐私吗? Education 教育 As Daniel Henninger put it: 正如丹尼尔·海宁格所说: ...historians of the new system will cite the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights’ 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter on sexual harassment as the watershed event. “新系统下的历史学家会将教育部民权办公室2011年关于性骚扰的致同僚信作为分水岭事件。” This letter—not even a formal regulation—forced creation of quasi-judicial systems of sexual-abuse surveillance on every campus in America. The universities complied for fear of lawsuits from enforcers at the Departments of Education and Justice. 这封信,甚至都不是一个正式的法规,但其强制建立了一个准司法体系,监视美国每一个校园的性侵害。大学都遵守这一要求,因为怕惹上教育部和司法部的官司。 The Justice Department’s Special Litigation Section and Housing and Civil Enforcement Section have forced numerous settlements from police departments, school districts, jails and housing agencies. Whatever the merits, the locals know the price of resisting Justice is too high. 司法部的特殊诉讼处及住房和民事执法处已经强制和解了好几起来自警察局、学区、监狱和住房机构的案件。不管是不是在法律上站得住脚,当地人知道抵抗司法部的成本太高。 National Review’s coverageof Laura Kipinis’ travails is a good example of the political use of this regulation. Professor Kipinis “wrote a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education arguing that college campuses are in a state of ‘sexual paranoia.’” She quickly became the subject of a “Title IX inquisition,” documented in her essayby that name. Though eventually cleared, the point is the use of regulatory power to silence speech. 《国家评论》对劳拉·吉普尼斯的痛苦经历的报道是这项监管被政治利用的一个好例子。吉普尼斯教授“在《高等教育纪事报》上写了一篇专栏,表示大学校园正处于一种‘性受迫害妄想狂’的状态”。她很快成为了“第九条调查”的对象,她在一篇文章里用的就是这个词。尽管最终洗清了嫌疑,重点是利用监管权力压制了言论。 3.A Magna Carta for the Regulatory State 3.为监管型国家寻求一部大宪章 The power of the regulatory state has increased steadily. And it lacks many of the checks and balances that give us some “rule of law” in the legal system. (A system which has its own troubles.) The clear danger we face is the use of regulation for political control. Each industry gets carved up into a few compliant oligopolies. And the threat of severe penalties, with little of the standard rule-of-law recourse, keeps people and businesses in line and supporting the political organization or party that controls the agencies. 监管型国家的权力已持续增长。它缺少了很多在法律体系(该体系也面临着自己的麻烦)里给我们带来一些“法治”的制衡。我们面对的最明显的危险,就是利用监管实现政治控制。每个行业都若干顺服的寡头所瓜分。严厉处罚的威胁,以及法治援助标准的缺失,让个人和公司对控制着监管机构的政治组织或政党既保持服从,又提供支持。 We’re not there yet. The Koch Brothers are not on the EPA “crucifixion” list, an investigation of every plant they own, or probes by the DOJ, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, and so on and so on. They could be. The Hoover institution retains its tax-exempt status despite writings such as this one. A free media still exists, and I can read all my horror stories in the morning Wall Street Journal, and the free (for now) internet. 我们还没到那一步。科赫兄弟公司还不在环境保护署的“钉死”名单上,他们旗下的工厂没有被逐一调查,也没有被司法部、国家劳动关系委员会、公平就业机会委员会、职业安全与健康管理局等等调查。但他们可能成为调查对象。胡佛研究所仍保有免税资格,尽管发表了类似于这篇文章的东西。自由媒体依然存在,每天早上我仍可在《华尔街日报》上读到各种恐怖故事。互联网(目前)也还是自由的。 But we are getting there. What stops it from happening? A tree ripe for picking will be picked. 但是我们正滑向那里。什么能够阻止它发生呢?一颗易于采摘的树最终会被采摘的。 The easy answers are too easy. “Get rid of regulations” is true, but simplistic like “get rid of laws.” What we learned in the 800 years since Magna Carta is that the character of law, and the detailed structures of its operation that matter. Law is good, as it protects citizens from arbitrary power. 简单的回答过于简单了。“取消监管”是真的,但和“取消法律”一样太过简化。大宪章以来的800年,我们学到的一样东西就是法律的特征以及它运作的详细架构很重要。法律是好的,因为它保护公民免于专断的权力。 It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one. 是时候为监管型国家起草一部大宪章了。规章需要按照我之前列的几点来制定。人们需要有挑战监管者的权利:证据开示权、对判决提出异议的权利、上诉权。是的,这就意味着制衡的场所在法庭。人人都恨律师,除了自己需要一个的时候。 People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor. 人们需要速决的权利。一个针对规章的“人身保护令”会起作用:如果任何裁决未在6个月内作出,则自动视为有利于你。 A return to economic growth depends on reforming the regulatory state. But the deeper and perhaps more important preservation of our political freedom depends on it even more. 经济的重新增长依赖于改革监管型国家,但从更深层或许也更重要的意义上说,我们政治自由的存续甚至更加依赖于这一改革。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

刑讯与战俘

【2015-07-03】

@whigzhou: 发表了文章 刑讯逼供与刑求情报的差别 《纽时》:参院周二投票禁止刑讯逼供,将采取措施确保政府不再利用水刑一类的审问技巧。参议员们以78票对21票的结果通过了国防授权议案的一项修正案,据此,包括军方在内的任何政府机构将只能使用《陆军战地手册》所载的审问技巧。

@sonicblue_nju2: 战俘这个推理不行。战俘总归会持有一些你不知道的话将来会对你方造成损害的情报,越高级的知道越多。不能把隐瞒这类情报当作犯罪。

@whigzhou: 区分关键是威胁的直接、显明和急迫,这与自力救济的前提类似,何种条件下我可以拔枪击毙对我构成威胁的攻击者?(more...)

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【2015-07-03】 @whigzhou: 发表了文章 刑讯逼供与刑求情报的差别 《纽时》:参院周二投票禁止刑讯逼供,将采取措施确保政府不再利用水刑一类的审问技巧。参议员们以78票对21票的结果通过了国防授权议案的一项修正案,据此,包括军方在内的任何政府机构将只能使用《陆军战地手册》所载的审问技巧。 @sonicblue_nju2: 战俘这个推理不行。战俘总归会持有一些你不知道的话将来会对你方造成损害的情报,越高级的知道越多。不能把隐瞒这类情报当作犯罪。 @whigzhou: 区分关键是威胁的直接、显明和急迫,这与自力救济的前提类似,何种条件下我可以拔枪击毙对我构成威胁的攻击者? @whigzhou: 我们不能以一条规则在语言表述上的模糊,否认这条规则的有效性,不然的话,没多少法律规则有资格保存下来,表述模糊性对大陆法才是问题,在普通法程序机制下不是问题 @whigzhou: 在有关淫秽品的诉讼历史上,不断有人要求法官/法学家对淫秽给出一个精确定义,也确实有不少人接招尝试了,但没有一个定义找不到直觉上的反例,最后一位大法官说:(大意)我给不出精确定义,但你拿给我看我就说得出算不算淫秽。我觉得这位法官抓住了语言学的一个要点。 @sentimental-fog:抓到了敌方的高级将领,由于他掌握的许多情报都会对我方造成持续的伤害,所以我们一直对他用刑? @whigzhou: 有关战俘,我举的例子是定时炸弹,不是情报,后者是针对恐怖分子的例子,对前者采用更严格的标准,是因为这么做可以保护被对方俘虏的我方战士 @whigzhou: 正是基于后一种考虑,我们订立了《日内瓦公约》,而恐怖分子没有加入公约,故我们针对他们的行动不受其约束 @whigzhou: 按《日内瓦公约》,被俘者必须报出国籍、姓名、番号,供对方确认其隶属于立约国军队,才能享受其保护,恐怖分子显然做不到这一点 @Ghostmarine: ……但是,请注意,实际上,刑讯逼供出错的概率相当高。曾经有个人被怀疑是恐怖分子,关在关塔那摩很多年,严刑拷问,最后才发现是当局搞错了。这或许正是法律上严禁刑讯逼供的道理:根本没那么管用。 @whigzhou: 嗯,这是个经验问题,争议各方可以在法庭上举证说服法官/陪审团 @rjxghg:善待俘虏与平民的条款与某些日内瓦公约条款(例如禁止达姆弹)不同,后者只是双方的约定,一方违约另一方可以报复。前者不是约定而是某种具有绝对效力的条款。若说只有订约国才有义务遵循,那内战叛军怎么办? @whigzhou: 日内瓦公约只是约束我们行动的规范之一,我们还受其他伦理规范约束,但标准不同 @whigzhou: 若报复有效,且这是保护我方共同体成员的最有利方案,那当然要报复,实际上我们可能选择不报复,那是因为:1)对方政权根本不在乎平民伤亡,2)这不是最佳方案,3)有其他选择时,共同体成员不喜欢这么做 @whigzhou: 法外之人不受保护,但我们也不会任意虐待他们,这不是因为我们承认他们拥有自然权利,而是因为需要顾及本共同体成员的感受,其原理和反对虐待动物一样  
偷听来的羞辱可以要求赔偿吗?

【2015-06-26】

@勿怪幸 2013年,维吉尼亚州一男子在接受结肠镜检查时偷偷打开了手机的录音。在他被麻醉后,麻醉师和GI医生嘲笑他怕打针,胆小,笨,阴茎上有一个红斑,是“梅毒或结核”等。于是将俩医生告了。周二陪审团判赔偿他50万美元,20万为医疗失职,5万为梅毒的羞辱,5万为结核羞辱,20万为惩罚。http://weibo.com/1878363622/CoiP2EaKS

@whigzhou: 我不同意这个判决,两位医生的言论属于密室交谈,麻醉状态也(more...)

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【2015-06-26】 @勿怪幸 2013年,维吉尼亚州一男子在接受结肠镜检查时偷偷打开了手机的录音。在他被麻醉后,麻醉师和GI医生嘲笑他怕打针,胆小,笨,阴茎上有一个红斑,是“梅毒或结核”等。于是将俩医生告了。周二陪审团判赔偿他50万美元,20万为医疗失职,5万为梅毒的羞辱,5万为结核羞辱,20万为惩罚。http://weibo.com/1878363622/CoiP2EaKS @whigzhou: 我不同意这个判决,两位医生的言论属于密室交谈,麻醉状态也排除了“当面羞辱”这一要件,而改变该言论之伦理性质的,正是原告故意打开手机这一行动,其责任不应由被告承担 @慕容飞宇gg:很难说是密室交谈,这是工作场所。不算公共场所,但也不是私人空间。不管怎么说,病人本人是有访问权的。当然,病人是否有权偷录,另当别论。不过,病人被麻醉这一场景特殊,可能法官认为以往的判例不适用了。 @whigzhou: 要点是,两位医生是否可以合理的假定这些话不会被病人听到,因而不会对他造成伤害 @whigzhou: 伤害是侵权的要件,而合理的预见到伤害可能性,是侵权责任的要件  
巫术与侵权

【2015-06-12】

@whigzhou: 假设某一社会的成员普遍相信“针扎布偶”这种巫术确实可以加害于人,现在某甲对某乙施行了这一巫术,且证据确凿,而你是被大英帝国派去那里的法官,你完全不信此类巫术的效力,那么,当乙诉甲侵权时,你是否会裁定甲侵犯了乙?或者,你是否认为乙的诉讼理由可以成立,因而至少可以立案?

 

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【2015-06-12】 @whigzhou: 假设某一社会的成员普遍相信“针扎布偶”这种巫术确实可以加害于人,现在某甲对某乙施行了这一巫术,且证据确凿,而你是被大英帝国派去那里的法官,你完全不信此类巫术的效力,那么,当乙诉甲侵权时,你是否会裁定甲侵犯了乙?或者,你是否认为乙的诉讼理由可以成立,因而至少可以立案?