含有〈文化〉标签的文章(173)

遗传差异与文化进化

【2017-10-14】

Richerson&Boyd模型的另一个相对外围的问题是,他们认为群体间遗传差异很小且对文化进化不构成什么影响,他们用来支持该判断的仅有证据来自跨文化收养研究,这是缺乏说服力的。 ​​​​

确实,跨文化/跨种族被收养者(稍低程度上也包括二代以上移民)都能顺利习得当地文化并正常生活于其中,但这并不表明:1)当一个群体的成员被大部分或全部替换成另一个种族或文化不同的群体成员时,其原有文化仍可保持,2)当外部条件适宜时,任何群体都能采纳某种特定文化。

这里的要害是:一种文化结构(包括制度(more...)

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【2017-10-14】 Richerson&Boyd模型的另一个相对外围的问题是,他们认为群体间遗传差异很小且对文化进化不构成什么影响,他们用来支持该判断的仅有证据来自跨文化收养研究,这是缺乏说服力的。 ​​​​ 确实,跨文化/跨种族被收养者(稍低程度上也包括二代以上移民)都能顺利习得当地文化并正常生活于其中,但这并不表明:1)当一个群体的成员被大部分或全部替换成另一个种族或文化不同的群体成员时,其原有文化仍可保持,2)当外部条件适宜时,任何群体都能采纳某种特定文化。 这里的要害是:一种文化结构(包括制度)得以产生和维持,可能取决于某些特定个人禀赋,拥有这些禀赋的个体在群体中的比例可能很低(比如1%),但不能没有,也不能低于某个下限(比如0.1%),假如这些禀赋的分布曲线只要向左移动一个标准差,该文化便难以为继。 假设群体A的这组禀赋比群体B高一个标准差,那么,即便来自群体B的移民都可顺利习得A的文化且正常生活于其中,可一旦群体A的人口被来自B的移民替换掉一半,原有文化即可能瓦解 容易想到的此类禀赋有:道德感,尽责性,实施惩罚的意愿,亲社会性,智力,延迟满足,自我克制…… 假如盎格鲁文化需要80%的群体成员具有亲社会性,70%中等以上延迟满足,60%中等以上尽责性,10%强惩罚意愿,1%120以上智商……任何几条的大幅改变可能都是颠覆性的 很明显,这组条件与少量移民顺利融入和正常生活的可能性完全不矛盾 比如,道德规范,一个社区中,可能只要60%的人具有中等以上道德感,规范即可产生,再加上5%的人有强道德感和强惩罚意愿,规范便可稳定持续,但只要分布曲线偏离一个标准差,局面完全不同 极端情形下(其实我觉得很可能),文化的某些重要方面可能仅仅由群体0.1%精英成员的禀赋所决定,此时分布曲线的轻微移动即可让这0.1%变得不合格 回复@慕容飞宇gg:嗯,但那是另一个问题,我正在论证的是:即便最完美融入条件下也不行//@慕容飞宇gg:外来移民不是随机或均匀发布,而是集中在某些区域形成移民小社区,而在这些区域内移民比例远高于宿主,所以一开始就不会被同化。  
有点蹊跷

【2017-05-04】

伊斯兰世界的平均智商大概在82-85之间,低于欧洲和东亚不止一个标准差,对于一个早已文明化、社会结构也足够复杂的地区,这是件有点蹊跷的事情,其选择机制一定其他文明社会十分不同,不知道多妻制,奴隶的广泛使用,权力继承模式,等级结构的特征,分别在其中起了什么作用没有。 ​​​​

 

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【2017-05-04】 伊斯兰世界的平均智商大概在82-85之间,低于欧洲和东亚不止一个标准差,对于一个早已文明化、社会结构也足够复杂的地区,这是件有点蹊跷的事情,其选择机制一定其他文明社会十分不同,不知道多妻制,奴隶的广泛使用,权力继承模式,等级结构的特征,分别在其中起了什么作用没有。 ​​​​  
温带优势

【2016-10-24】

在文明化进程中,温带族群相比热带族群有着更佳表现——这一观察大概是成立的,虽然对此所提出的解释多属无稽之谈。 ​​​​

我能想到的最明显的理由是,温带季节周期波动强烈,俗话说四季分明,这带来几个后果:

1)食物来源的产出量季节性波动,对储存提出了要求,而库存对掠夺和保护构成激励,刺激了各种社会结构与组织发展,

2)食物产出的季节性,促成了延迟满足和审慎计划这两方面的能力发展,

3)季节周期及其与食物产出的关(more...)

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【2016-10-24】 在文明化进程中,温带族群相比热带族群有着更佳表现——这一观察大概是成立的,虽然对此所提出的解释多属无稽之谈。 ​​​​ 我能想到的最明显的理由是,温带季节周期波动强烈,俗话说四季分明,这带来几个后果: 1)食物来源的产出量季节性波动,对储存提出了要求,而库存对掠夺和保护构成激励,刺激了各种社会结构与组织发展, 2)食物产出的季节性,促成了延迟满足和审慎计划这两方面的能力发展, 3)季节周期及其与食物产出的关系,促成了天文、计时、立法、气象等知识的积累发展,而这些正是早期文明社会最初发展出的几个复杂知识系统(复杂到需要由专业阶层维护和传承) 等明天早上我再看看评论里是否已集齐了我听过的各种无稽之谈,晚安~  
文化距离

【2017-09-09】

@tertio 有一个猜想,两个人之间的语言交流,信息密度越大的(用更短的句子就能表达同样的意思),两个人关系就越近。最近的时候,就是不需要语言啦,表情就够了。但怎么测量信息密度倒是个不好解决的问题。 ​​​​

@whigzhou: 文化距离越近,1)共享的背景知识越多,2)共享的索引机制越精妙,1和2皆可缩短某一表达所需句子长度。

 

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【2017-09-09】 @tertio 有一个猜想,两个人之间的语言交流,信息密度越大的(用更短的句子就能表达同样的意思),两个人关系就越近。最近的时候,就是不需要语言啦,表情就够了。但怎么测量信息密度倒是个不好解决的问题。 ​​​​ @whigzhou: 文化距离越近,1)共享的背景知识越多,2)共享的索引机制越精妙,1和2皆可缩短某一表达所需句子长度。  
战争与精子

【2017-08-31】

综合185份研究的数据显示,1973-2011年间,西方世界男性平均精子产量下降59.3%,浓度下降52.4%,这很明显是西方社会整体阴柔化的生理表现。

或许并非巧合的是,这四十年西方各国没有经历任何重大战争,在此期间经历过大战(或越战之类中型战争)的人口逐渐被未经历任何战争的人口替代。

说起战争与文化的关系,想到另一件事情,美国四次大觉醒运动的后三次,完美对应三次重大战争:独立战争,内战,二(more...)

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【2017-08-31】 综合185份研究的数据显示,1973-2011年间,西方世界男性平均精子产量下降59.3%,浓度下降52.4%,这很明显是西方社会整体阴柔化的生理表现。 或许并非巧合的是,这四十年西方各国没有经历任何重大战争,在此期间经历过大战(或越战之类中型战争)的人口逐渐被未经历任何战争的人口替代。 说起战争与文化的关系,想到另一件事情,美国四次大觉醒运动的后三次,完美对应三次重大战争:独立战争,内战,二战,分别延迟15-20年,正好是一代新人成长起来所需要的时间.  
移民英语班

【2016-07-21】

很少有地方能像移民英语班那样让你一下子认识来自众多民族的人,而且还都有所交流,我的班里,上学期有——

一个索马里人,是5个孩子的妈,说话音乐感很好,手掌上常有各种彩绘,是医疗系统的重度使用者,从她那儿常能听到各种有关看医生的事情, ​​​​

还不确定,因为有几次看到的花纹好像不一样也可能是我记错,再观察观察 //@熊也會死麼:手掌上的彩绘确定不是纹身?

一个苏丹女孩,19岁,又瘦又高,典型东非牧民身材,很腼腆,不太说话,来了两三次后来就没见过,

一个伊拉克大妈,一儿一女,孩子都上学了打算找工作,所以来学英语(这也是1/3左右的学生来上课的动机)(more...)

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【2016-07-21】 很少有地方能像移民英语班那样让你一下子认识来自众多民族的人,而且还都有所交流,我的班里,上学期有—— 一个索马里人,是5个孩子的妈,说话音乐感很好,手掌上常有各种彩绘,是医疗系统的重度使用者,从她那儿常能听到各种有关看医生的事情, ​​​​ 还不确定,因为有几次看到的花纹好像不一样也可能是我记错,再观察观察 //@熊也會死麼:手掌上的彩绘确定不是纹身? 一个苏丹女孩,19岁,又瘦又高,典型东非牧民身材,很腼腆,不太说话,来了两三次后来就没见过, 一个伊拉克大妈,一儿一女,孩子都上学了打算找工作,所以来学英语(这也是1/3左右的学生来上课的动机),非常正统和刻板的穆斯林,经常对违反教规的行为表现的义愤填膺,上次受斋差点把自己饿晕了,不知何故对巴基斯坦充满仇恨,对此我百思不解, 一个伊朗大姐,已婚,有一个儿子,在发廊上班,第一语言波斯语,第二语言阿拉伯语,穿着打扮挺时髦,头脑也较开放,和前面那位伊拉克大妈好像混得很熟,还经常被后者提醒注意自己的宗教身份(或许她们都是什叶派?),以至她经常说出某些话后马上意识到宗教上不太正确赶紧闭嘴,呵呵, 最好笑的一件事情是,有次课上分组讨论安乐死问题,其中一个问题是『你是否相信人死后还有灵魂』,伊朗大姐脱口而出No,结果立刻被伊拉克大妈制止并纠正,她倒也很机灵的马上改口了,有趣, 一个塞尔维亚大姐,女汉子,身材像Brienne of Tarth,性格也很火爆,大学学的电子工程,毕业后在塞尔维亚某电信商做销售,正打算找工作,课间我们一起抽烟,她经常在课上直言不讳的批评绿俗,老师也不管(他们好像执行一种『确保自己百分百政治正确但要是你们自己吵起来我也绝不插嘴』的政策), 我从她这儿学到的一点是,原来塞尔维亚(和其他一些斯拉夫语)也和黑人英语一样使用多重否定,她经常把多重否定带进英语里来, 一个波斯尼亚大姐,疑似塞族,安静,木讷,寡言,老是病怏怏,缩手缩脚,和女汉子恰好相反,在超市上班,说经常被上司骂,她总是把自己收拾的非常整洁,衣着也很得体,相貌身材也很好,可惜就是有点笨且懦弱, 一个叙利亚大妈,长得像法国人,我一直以为是基督徒,结果最后发现是穆斯林, 看样子60多,完全跟不上课程节奏,好像耳朵也不太灵了,听说我是作家后,说她年轻时爱读诗,问我写不写诗,吓我一跳~ 一个香港姑娘,看着很年轻,但儿子也有几岁了,明显来自底层,从小跟老师关系很差,不怎么读书,来澳洲后在几家餐馆打过工,经常被老板欺负,有一次还被赖了工钱,疑似打黑工了,不久前找了个sleep school(我也是头一次听说这个行当)做护理,境况有所改善, 她的英语发音很奇特,吃掉大量音节,恨不得把每个单词都变成单音节,经常一副『生活就是一坨屎』的姿态,每天课上例行会在开始时让每个人说说昨天过得怎么样,结束时再说说明天有啥打算,她好像每次都会说『天天都一样没啥特别的』之类, 香港姑娘政治觉悟还是很高的,我们在前五个回合的对话中就已达成了女王万岁脱英要丸的共识, 上学期我是班里唯一的男人,本学期终于有了两个男的,一个是秘鲁人,刚从堪培拉搬来,奇怪的是,他的口音是我到目前为止最难听懂的,连猜个大意都很困难,我揣测原因之一或许是,西班牙语和英语共享的词汇太多,所以他在改说英语时,可能不必像其他语种的人那样大幅缩减词汇表?我再观察观察。 新学期班里换进不少新人,其中一个伊朗人,两个印度人,还不太熟,以后再讲,  
[译文]千禧一代并不像传说中那么风流

New Study: Millennials Don’t Deserve to Be Called the Hookup Generation
最新研究:千禧一代配不上『勾搭世代』的盛名

作者:Jessie Geoffray @ 2016-08-02
翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny),龟海海
来源:PLAYBOY,http://www.playboy.com/articles/millennials-the-hookup-generation

Remember when Vanity Fair published an article last year gleefully proclaiming we were at the dawn of a “dating apocalypse” and promiscuous millennials and their newfangled internet-enabled devices were on their way to destroying sex and romance as we know it? And remember when Tinder, affronted by this suggestion of base crassness, took to Twitter to unleash a savage, epic rant directed at the magazine and its indelicate fingering of the app as a prime catalyst of our rude new world?

还记得《名利场》去年发表的文章吗?它兴高采烈地宣称我们正迎来“约炮盛世”,谁都知道,性关系混乱的千禧一代和他们时髦的互联网设备正在破坏着性和浪漫。Tinder【译注:一款流行的交友软件】认为文章暗示自己粗俗不堪,大为光火,在推特上火力全开,大骂《名利场(more...)

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New Study: Millennials Don’t Deserve to Be Called the Hookup Generation 最新研究:千禧一代配不上『勾搭世代』的盛名 作者:Jessie Geoffray @ 2016-08-02 翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny),龟海海 来源:PLAYBOY,http://www.playboy.com/articles/millennials-the-hookup-generation Remember when Vanity Fair published an article last year gleefully proclaiming we were at the dawn of a “dating apocalypse” and promiscuous millennials and their newfangled internet-enabled devices were on their way to destroying sex and romance as we know it? And remember when Tinder, affronted by this suggestion of base crassness, took to Twitter to unleash a savage, epic rant directed at the magazine and its indelicate fingering of the app as a prime catalyst of our rude new world? 还记得《名利场》去年发表的文章吗?它兴高采烈地宣称我们正迎来“约炮盛世”,谁都知道,性关系混乱的千禧一代和他们时髦的互联网设备正在破坏着性和浪漫。Tinder【译注:一款流行的交友软件】认为文章暗示自己粗俗不堪,大为光火,在推特上火力全开,大骂《名利场》毫不客气地将Tinder斥为粗鲁新世界的主要催化剂。这些你都还记得吧?
-@VanityFair Little known fact: sex was invented in 2012 when Tinder was launched. — Tinder (@Tinder) August 11, 2015 -《名利场》知道个屁:性是在2012年Tinder面市时被发明的。 Tinder (@Tinder) 在2015年8月11号的推文
Tinder wasn’t the only collateral damage in journalist Nancy Jo Sales’s nearly 7,000-word piece: a widely circulated paper from Archives of Sexual Behavior claiming millennials have fewer sex partners than previous generations was bizarrely relegated to a dismissive parenthetical. Now, roughly a year later, the authors of that study are back and re-inviting us to the lively party that is speculating about millennials, and their perceived failings, on the internet. Tinder不是Nancy Jo Sales那篇7000字文章的唯一受害者:《性行为档案》上一篇广为转载的论文也莫名其妙地被她在文章注释里轻蔑地嘲讽了一番。论文宣称比起前面几代人,千禧一代的性伴侣更少。现在,大概一年之后,这项研究的作者再次站出来,邀请我们加入这场网上大讨论,审视千禧一代和他们的堕落。 The new Archives of Sexual Behavior study uses data from the General Social Survey—a nationally representative sample of American adults aged 18 to 96, conducted biannually since 1989—to examine patterns of sexual inactivity over time. The analysis shows that not only are people born in the 1980s and 1990s reporting fewer sexual partners than GenX’ers or Baby Boomers, but also that the marked change in sexual inactivity is independent of the effects of age or time period. In other words, it can be attributed to a generation alone. 《性行为档案》的这项新研究采用了“综合大调查”——一项自1989年以来每两年举行一次的调查,其样本代表了全美范围内18至96岁的成人——的数据来研究性行为不活跃程度(sexual inactivity)随时间的变化。研究发现,不只是80后和90后们比起X一代【译注:约略指1965年至1980年出生的人】和婴儿潮一代【译注:约略指1946年至1964年出生的人】拥有更少的性伴侣,而且这种性行为不活跃程度的显著变化同年龄和时代没有关系。换句话说,原因可能仅仅出在这一代人身上。 “Americans born in the 1990s were more likely to be sexually inactive in their early 20s.” “出生于1990年代的美国人更可能在20岁出头时表现得性行为不活跃。” The numbers are significant: Fifteen percent of millennials born in the 1990s and between 20 and 24 years old reported having no sexual partners since the age of 18. That’s more than double the six percent of GenX’ers born in the 1960s who reported having no sexual partners during the same age ranges. 数字颇能说明问题:出生于90年代且年龄在20至24岁之间的千禧一代中,有15%的人报告说他们从18岁起就没有性伙伴。这个数字同出生在60年代的X一代相比翻了一倍——相比之下,只有6%的X一代在这个年龄段报告自己没有性伙伴。 These comparisons are purely descriptive in the sense that they give us clues about what, exactly, defines the millennial generation: Americans born in the 1990s were more likely to be sexually inactive in their early 20s; women were more likely to be sexually inactive than men; and people who did not attend college were more likely to be sexually inactive compared to those who did. 到底是什么定义了千禧一代,这些对比给出的线索是纯粹描述性的:90年代出生的美国人在他们20多岁时性活跃程度可能更低;女性性活跃程度低于男性;没有上大学的人性活跃程度低于那些上过大学的人。 “We can say ‘Here’s the trend’ and isolate it down to saying it’s a generational thing, but we can’t exactly say why,” says Ryne Sherman, co-author of the study and associate professor of psychology in the Charles E. Schmidt College of Science at Florida Atlantic University. “我们可以说‘趋势便是如此’,然后孤立地看待这个问题并认为这是年代更替的自然结果,但我们却说不出来原因何在。”Ryne Sherman说道,她是该研究报告的共同作者,佛罗里达大西洋大学查理•施密特科学学院的心理学副教授。 Potential explanations explored in the paper include the rise of internet pornography, the economic downturn and its role in delaying millennials’ independence from their parents (think less independent lodgings to help facilitate sex), and the possibility that millennials are indeed hooking up with more partners, but engaging in penetrative sex less often. The explanation Sherman favors is that apps like Tinder—and the rise of the internet itself—provide an outlet for people to connect and be social without needing to pursue sex in real life. 论文讨论过的可能解释包括:网络色情的泛滥,经济下滑及其在推迟年轻人与父母分居上的作用(想想没有自己的房子多么不利于“房事”吧),以及这样一种可能:千禧一代确实有更多鬼混的伙伴,但更少进行插入式的性交。Sherman偏爱的一种解释是,像Tinder这样的应用软件以及互联网的兴起让人们能够相互联系和交往,却不必在真实生活中追求性关系。 Of course, another possible explanation is that different generations interpreted the survey’s key question—“Since the age of 18, how many sexual partners have you had?”—differently. 当然,另一个可能的解释是:不同年代的人对调查的核心问题——“从你18岁起,你有过多少性伙伴”——有着不同的理解。 Sherman thinks this is highly unlikely, saying that if interpretation of the phrase “sexual partners” was changing, it would show up in the period effect (i.e., everybody living in that time would experience a change in the meaning of the term) and not just the generational effect. It didn’t. Sherman 认为这几乎不可能,他说如果对“性伙伴”这个词的理解一直在变,那它就会体现在时间效应上(比如,生活在某一时间段的每个人都会感受到词意的变化),而不仅仅体现在代际效应上。实际上并没有。 But, I’d challenge Sherman to have a conversation with my grandmother about “sexual partners” and see if he still feels we’re all still on the same page about words and what they mean. 但是,我倒想请Sherman同我的奶奶谈谈“性伙伴”,看看到时候他是否仍坚持认为人们对该词的理解并未改变。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]山巴佬该醒醒了!

‘We Hillbillies Have Got to Wake the Hell Up': Review of Hillbilly Elegy
“我们这些山巴佬该醒醒了”——《山乡挽歌》书评
A family chronicle of the crackup of poor working-class white Americans.
一份贫穷糟糕美国白人工薪阶层的家庭编年史

作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2016-07-29
翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
校对:babyface_claire
来源:reason.com,http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/29/we-hillbillies-have-got-to-wake-the-hell

编注:hillbilly和redneck、yankee、cracker一样,都是对美国某个有着鲜明文化特征的地方群体的蔑称,本文译作『山巴佬』

Read this remarkable book: It is by turns tender and funny, bleak and depressing, and thanks to Mamaw, always wildly, wildly profane. An elegy is a lament for the dead, and with Hillbilly Elegy Vance mourns the demise of the mostly Scots-Irish working class from which he springs. I teared up more than once as I read this beautiful and painful memoir of his hillbilly family and their struggles to cope with the modern world.

阅读这本非凡之作的感受时而温柔有趣,时而沮丧压抑,而且,亏了他的祖母,还往往十分狂野,狂野地对神不敬。挽歌是对死人的悼念。Vance用《山乡挽歌》缅怀了苏格兰-爱尔兰裔工人阶级的衰亡,他自己便出身于此阶级。这本书描写了他的乡下家庭及其在现代社会中的挣扎,在阅读这本美丽而痛苦的回忆录时,我几度流泪。

Vance grew up poor with a semi-employed, drug-addicted mother who lived with a string of five or six husbands/boyfrie(more...)

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‘We Hillbillies Have Got to Wake the Hell Up': Review of Hillbilly Elegy “我们这些山巴佬该醒醒了”——《山乡挽歌》书评 A family chronicle of the crackup of poor working-class white Americans. 一份贫穷糟糕美国白人工薪阶层的家庭编年史 作者:Ronald Bailey @ 2016-07-29 翻译:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 校对:babyface_claire 来源:reason.com,http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/29/we-hillbillies-have-got-to-wake-the-hell编注:hillbilly和redneck、yankee、cracker一样,都是对美国某个有着鲜明文化特征的地方群体的蔑称,本文译作『山巴佬』】 Read this remarkable book: It is by turns tender and funny, bleak and depressing, and thanks to Mamaw, always wildly, wildly profane. An elegy is a lament for the dead, and with Hillbilly Elegy Vance mourns the demise of the mostly Scots-Irish working class from which he springs. I teared up more than once as I read this beautiful and painful memoir of his hillbilly family and their struggles to cope with the modern world. 阅读这本非凡之作的感受时而温柔有趣,时而沮丧压抑,而且,亏了他的祖母,还往往十分狂野,狂野地对神不敬。挽歌是对死人的悼念。Vance用《山乡挽歌》缅怀了苏格兰-爱尔兰裔工人阶级的衰亡,他自己便出身于此阶级。这本书描写了他的乡下家庭及其在现代社会中的挣扎,在阅读这本美丽而痛苦的回忆录时,我几度流泪。 Vance grew up poor with a semi-employed, drug-addicted mother who lived with a string of five or six husbands/boyfriends in the fading Rust Belt city of Middletown, Ohio. The only constants in his chaotic life were his grandparents, Mamaw and Papaw. Vance nearly failed out of high school but eventually graduated from Yale Law School. That personal journey is in the book, but Vance's main story is about the ongoing collapse of hillbilly culture as seen through the lens of his own family's disordered experiences. Vance在贫穷的环境中长大,他母亲半失业且吸毒成瘾,同她的五六个丈夫/男友生活在地处铁锈带、正在凋零中的俄亥俄州米德尔敦。他混乱糟糕的生活中唯一不变的是他的祖父母。Vance差点从高中退学,但最终还是从耶鲁法学院毕业。这段个人生活也被写进了书中,但书的主要情节是透过作者自己家庭颠沛流离的经历来描绘乡村文化的不断衰败。 Before going on, I should make a disclosure: Like Vance, I grew up as a hillbilly. Neither of my grandfathers could read nor write. My paternal grandparents, Mom and Daddy Bailey, left the Appalachian coal country of McDowell County, West Virginia, around 1950 and bought a dairy farm 80 miles away in Washington County, Virginia. I grew up on that farm. 在继续往下写之前,我要坦白:同Vance一样,我也是个山巴佬。我的爷爷外公都不会读写。我的爷爷、妈妈和爸爸Bailey在1950年左右离开了西弗吉尼亚州阿巴拉契亚山麓的煤城麦克道尔,在离弗吉尼亚州的华盛顿县80英里的地方买了处奶牛场。我便在那农场长大。 For most of my childhood, all six of my grandparents' adult children lived within 10 miles of the home place, as did my dozens of cousins. Every Sunday, a massive family midday "dinner"—somewhere around 40 to 50 people—convened at my grandparents' house. I left the farm at age 16, when my parents got divorced. I will spare you further details, but let's just say that the Baileys did not model their family life on the Waltons. Before I made my escape to the University of Virginia, I lived for a while with my mother and one of my sisters in a rented trailer. 在我童年的大部分时间,我祖父母的六个成年孩子都生活在离家10英里的范围内,我的表兄妹们自然也是如此。每个星期天中午,超级家宴——大约40到50个人——就会在我祖父母的家里上演。我16岁时离开那个农场,当时我父母离婚了。多的我就不讲了,我只告诉你,我们Bailey家后来在沃尔顿并没有继续那种家庭生活。在我逃到弗吉尼亚大学之前,我、妈妈和我的一个妹妹在一个租来的拖车里生活了一段时间。 HarperCollinsThough he mostly grew up in the Rust Belt, Vance identifies as a hillbilly—his family's roots are in the hollers of Breathitt County, Kentucky. Vance's Papaw and Mamaw, like tens of thousands of other mountain folk, left coal country in 1947 to find work and their shot at the American Dream in the booming steelworks 200 miles north. As a kid, Vance would accompany his grandparents as they traveled back nearly every weekend to visit with family in Kentucky. Middletown was Vance's "address," but the town of Jackson in Breathitt County where his great-grandmother Mamaw Blanton lived is his "home." 尽管Vance基本在铁锈带长大,但他自认为是个“山巴佬”——他家庭的根在肯塔基州布莱斯郡的溪谷中。Vance的爷爷奶奶,像成千上万其他山民一样,在1947年离开煤城到200英里以北的新兴钢铁企业寻找工作和实现美国梦的机会。小时候,每当他祖父母周末回到肯塔基,Vance总是陪伴他们左右。米德尔顿是Vance的“住址”,但他祖父母生活过的布莱斯郡的杰克逊才是他的“家”。 Today hillbilly culture is scarred by spectacular rates of joblessness, single motherhood, drug addiction, crime, and incarceration. Vance places most of the blame for this on the hillbillies' own shoulders. Globalization and automation decimated the manufacturing jobs that many low-skilled workers leveraged into a middle-class lives in the mid-20th century, he argues, but that's no excuse for fatalistic victimhood now. 今天的山巴佬文化被骇人的高失业率、单身母亲、毒品上瘾、犯罪和牢狱搞得遍体鳞伤。Vance认为责任主要在山巴佬自己。全球化和自动化削减了制造业的工作岗位,而20世纪中叶许多低技能的工人正是靠这些工作跻身中产阶级。但这并不能成为当下宿命论式的受害者情结的借口,Vance强调。 Throughout the book, Vance offers stories from family, friends, and neighbors that illustrate the growing cultural dysfunction among poor whites. For example, he takes a job at a floor tile warehouse for $13 an hour where one of his co-workers is a 19-year-old with a pregnant girlfriend. The warehouse owner gives the girlfriend a job as a receptionist. The 19-year-old and his girlfriend are warned about their increasingly frequent absences and tardiness, and eventually both were fired. The 19-year lashes out at the manager, saying, "How could you do this to me? Don't you know that I've got a pregnant girlfriend?" 通过这本书,Vance用自己家庭、朋友和邻居的故事向我们展示了贫穷白人中的文化失调。举个例子,他曾在一个地板瓷砖仓库工作,每小时13美元,他的一个同事是个19岁的小伙子,有个怀了孕的女友。仓库的主人给他同事的女友一份前台接待的工作。这个19岁的小伙子和他的女友因为越来越频繁的缺席和懈怠而被警告,并最终被解雇。小伙子对着经理大吼大叫,“你怎么能这样对我?你不知道我还有个怀孕的女友吗?” At another point, Vance meets an old acquaintance in a Middletown bar who tells him he recently quit his job because he was sick of waking up early. Later, the same guy was complaining on Facebook about the "Obama economy" and how it had affected his life. 还有一次,Vance在米德尔敦的一个酒吧碰见一位老熟人,那人告诉Vance,自己因为厌倦了早起而辞掉了工作。之后这个家伙又在Facebook上抱怨“奥巴马的经济政策”如何影响了他的生活。 Hillbilly culture is suspicious of outsiders and enforces a violent code of honor. Vance recalls that boys who got good grades in school were considered "sissies" or "faggots," an attitude that keeps people ill-educated and isolated. As their hopes for achieving the American Dream have faded, his hillbilly relatives, friends, and neighbors have come to see the institutions of society, government, and the economy as rigged against them. This has engendered a deep and debilitating pessimism among poor working-class whites. Hillbillies are killing themselves so effectively with drugs and alcohol that their life expectancies are actually falling. 山乡文化对外来者警惕怀疑并且极端强调荣誉。Vance回忆小时候在学校得了高分的男孩会被当成“娘炮”或“基佬”,这种态度让山巴佬无法受到良好教育并且被孤立。随着他们实现美国梦的机会逐渐消失,他的山巴佬亲戚、朋友和邻居逐渐认为社会体系、政府和经济都被操纵着跟他们作对。这在贫穷白人中催生了一股根深蒂固的、让人颓废的悲观情绪。山巴佬们用毒品和酒精毒害自己,他们的生活前景越发惨淡。 Does Vance offer any solutions for white working-class despondency and fatalism? "These problems were not created by government or corporations or anyone else. We created them, and only we can fix them," he argues. "We hillbillies have got to wake the hell up." He provides several examples of members of his extended family who have managed to leave poverty and family dysfunction behind. Tellingly, nearly all of them are women, got educations beyond high school, and married men who were not hillbillies. Vance是否为白人工薪阶级的悲观情节和宿命论提供了任何解决方案呢?“这些问题不是由政府或企业或任何人搞出来的。我们自己搞出了这些问题,只有我们自己能搞定它们,”他认为,“我们山巴佬们该清醒了。”他从他的亲戚中举了几个成功摆脱贫穷和家庭分崩离析命运的例子。值得一提的是,几乎所有人都是女性,在高中后继续接受教育并嫁给了不是山巴佬的男人。 "People sometimes ask whether I think there's anything we can do to 'solve' the problems of my community," Vance writes. "I know what they're looking for: a magical public policy solution or an innovative government program. But these problems of family, faith, and culture aren't like a Rubik's Cube, and I don't think that solutions (as most understand the term) really exist." “人们有时会问我是否觉得我们可以做些什么来‘解决’我们社区的问题,”Vance写道,“我知道他们想要什么:一个神奇的公共政策或一个创新的政府项目。但解决这些家庭、信仰、文化的问题不像玩魔方,我不认为存在什么通常意义上的解决方案。” Well, there is at least one "solution." Vance observes that all of his successful friends from Middletown did one other thing: They got the hell out of Middletown. They moved to where the jobs are. Just as Vance's hillbilly grandparents left the impoverished hollers of Kentucky to build middle-class lives in Middletown, today's urban hillbillies could get on the highway to opportunities elsewhere. In the meantime, the government should stop paying poor people to languish in Appalachian and Rustbelt poverty traps. 好吧,至少还是有个“药方”。Vance发现他所有来自米德尔敦的成功朋友都做了一件事:滚出米德尔敦。他们搬到有工作的地方。就像Vance的山巴佬祖父离开肯塔基毫无生气的溪谷并在米德尔敦过上中产生活一样,今天的城市山巴佬可以开车驶向高速公路,去别的地方找到机会。同时,政府应该停止向阿巴拉契亚和铁锈带陷入贫穷陷阱中的穷人发钱。 Vance calls himself a "cultural emigrant." By leaving his hillbilly culture behind, he has been able to create and enjoy a better life. I made much the same journey from Appalachian poverty to what has been a fascinating and fulfilling life. Vance clearly has some regrets about his cultural emigration; I have none. Vance称自己为“文化移民”。离开了山乡文化,他懂得了创造并过上了更好的生活。我走过相同的路,从我阿巴拉契亚的穷人生活中走出并过上了精彩充实的生活。Vance显然对自己的文化叛逃有几分悔意,而我没有。 Despite all their failings, Vance fiercely identifies with and loves his people. He is also a natural storyteller who makes compellingly personal the statistics and news stories about the cultural and economic coming apart of America. It hits close to home. 尽管山民在许多方面的失败,Vance仍视自己为其中一员并对他们怀着深厚感情。他天生会讲故事。关于美国在文化和经济上的分裂【编注:此处双关,Coming Apart是政治学家Charles Murray的一部著作】,在别处你会读到平淡的统计数字和新闻故事,但他能让你感同身受。这就是我们的家乡。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]留下孩子独处有多可怕?

Why are we so afraid to leave children alone?
为什么我们害怕让孩子独处?

作者:Pat Harriman & Heather Ashbach, UC Irvine @ 2016-08-23
译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:UC, http://universityofcalifornia.edu/news/why-are-we-so-afraid-leave-children-alone

Leaving a child unattended is considered taboo in today’s intensive parenting atmosphere, despite evidence that American children are safer than ever. So why are parents denying their children the same freedom and independence that they themselves enjoyed as children?
在今天这种强化父母责任的社会氛围中,留下孩子无人照看被视为禁忌,虽然有证据表明美国孩子比以往任何时候都更安全。那么,为什么父母拒绝孩子拥有从前他们自己是孩子时享受的同样的自由和独立呢?

A new study by University of Calif(more...)

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Why are we so afraid to leave children alone? 为什么我们害怕让孩子独处? 作者:Pat Harriman & Heather Ashbach, UC Irvine @ 2016-08-23 译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 来源:UC, http://universityofcalifornia.edu/news/why-are-we-so-afraid-leave-children-alone Leaving a child unattended is considered taboo in today’s intensive parenting atmosphere, despite evidence that American children are safer than ever. So why are parents denying their children the same freedom and independence that they themselves enjoyed as children? 在今天这种强化父母责任的社会氛围中,留下孩子无人照看被视为禁忌,虽然有证据表明美国孩子比以往任何时候都更安全。那么,为什么父母拒绝孩子拥有从前他们自己是孩子时享受的同样的自由和独立呢? A new study by University of California, Irvine social scientists suggests that our fears of leaving children alone have become systematically exaggerated in recent decades – not because the practice has become more dangerous, but because it has become socially unacceptable. 加州大学尔湾分校社会学家们的一项新研究认为,近几十年,我们对单独留下孩子的恐惧被系统性地放大了——不是因为这种做法更危险,而是它对社会已变得不可接受。 “Without realizing it, we have consistently increased our estimates of the amount of danger facing children left alone in order to better justify or rationalize the moral disapproval we feel toward parents who violate this relatively new social norm,” said Ashley Thomas, cognitive sciences graduate student and lead author of the work, published online this month in the open-access journal Collabra. “我们没有意识到这一点,所以不断提高对孩子被留下独处时所面临危险的估值,并以此更好地为我们对违反这个相对较新的社会规范的家长所做出的道义谴责加以正当化或合理化,”Ashley Thomas说。他是一名认知科学研究生,也是本月在开放获取期刊COLLABRA上在线发表的相关研究的第一作者。 The survey-based study found that children whose parents left them alone on purpose – to go to work, help out a charity, relax or meet an illicit lover – were perceived to be in greater danger than those whose parents were involuntarily separated from them. 一项基于调查的研究结果发现,(人们对被单独留下的孩子所面临危险的评估,和父母离开的原因有关,)比起情非得已的离开,因自己有事而离开,比如上班、助阵慈善、放松或与非法情人幽会,人们感知到的危险更大。 The researchers presented survey participants with five different scenarios in which a child was left alone for less than an hour. Situations ranged from a 10-month-old who was left asleep for 15 minutes in a cool car parked in a gym’s underground garage to an 8-year-old reading a book alone at a coffee shop a block from home for 45-minutes. 研究者为被调查者提供了五种不同场景,每个场景里有一个孩子独处不超过1小时。情景从10个月的婴儿独自躺在停于体育馆地下车库的凉爽小汽车里熟睡15分钟,到8岁孩子独自在离家一个街区的咖啡店看书45分钟。 “Within a given scenario, the only thing that varied was the reason for the parent’s absence,” said Kyle Stanford, professor and chair of logic & philosophy of science. “These included an unintentional absence – caused by a fictitious accident in which the mother was hit by a car and briefly knocked unconscious – and four that were planned: leaving for work, volunteering for a charity, relaxing or meeting an illicit lover. After reading each scenario and the reason behind each child being left alone, the participants ranked on a scale of 1 to 10 how much estimated danger the child was in while the parent was gone, 10 being the most risk.” “在每个给定场景中,唯一变量是父母离开的原因,”逻辑学和科学哲学教授Kyle Stanford说。“这些场景包括一个不得已的离开,比如虚构一个事故导致母亲被车撞暂时昏迷,另外四个是有计划的:工作,到慈善机构志愿服务,放松和与非法情人见面。了解每个场景和孩子被单独留下的原因后,被调查者从1到10给父母不在期间孩子独处的危险性评分排序,10最危险。” Moral disapproval inflates estimate of risk 道义谴责放大了风险评估 Overall, survey participants saw all of these situations as quite dangerous for children: The average risk estimate was 6.99, and the most common ranking in all scenarios was 10. Despite identical descriptions of each set of circumstances in which children were alone, those left alone on purpose were estimated to be in greater danger than those whose parents left them alone unintentionally. 总体上,被调查者认为所有场景对孩子都相当危险:平均危险值是6.99,而在所有场景中最常见值是10。尽管孩子独处的每个场景描述相同,但父母有意离开留孩子独处的危险评估比无意留下他们的情况更大。 “In fact, children left alone on purpose are almost certainly safer than those left alone by accident, because parents can take steps to make the situation safer, like giving the child a phone or reviewing safety rules,” said Barbara Sarnecka, study co-author and associate professor of cognitive sciences. “The fact that people make the opposite judgment strongly suggests that they morally disapprove of parents who leave their children alone, and that disapproval inflates their estimate of the risk.” “其实,有意让孩子单独留家几乎肯定比因意外让孩子单独留家更安全,因为父母可以采取措施让情况变得更安全,比如给孩子一个电话或重申安全准则,”认知科学副教授和研究共同作者Barbara Sarnecka说。“人们坚定做出相反判断的事实表明,他们在道德上不赞成父母离开让孩子独处,这种谴责放大了对风险的评估。” This is also born out in participants’ view of children left alone by a parent meeting an illicit lover as being in significantly more danger than children left alone in precisely the same circumstances by a parent who leaves in order to work, volunteer for charity or just relax. 这也是为何在完全相同的环境背景下,受调查者认为家长约会非法情人而把儿童留家独处比起父母因工作、参加慈善志愿服务或放松而离开让儿童留家独处更危险。 In scenarios where participants were asked to judge not only how much danger the child was facing, but also whether the mother had done something morally wrong, researchers expected the perceived risk ranking to be lower. 当受调查者不仅被要求判断孩子面临多少危险,还要判断母亲是否有失德行为时,研究人员预计在这些场景下所感知的风险排名会降低。 “We thought giving people an alternative way to express their disapproval of the parent’s action would reduce the extent to which moral judgments influenced perceptions of risk,” Thomas said. “But just the opposite happened. When people gave an explicit judgment about the parent’s conduct, estimates of risk to the child were even more inflated by moral disapproval of the parent’s reason for leaving.” “我们认为,给人们一种不喜欢父母行为的替代表达方式,能减少影响感知风险的道德评判程度。”Thomas说。“然而事实正好相反。当人们对父母行为给出明确评判后,对孩子的风险估计会因对父母离开原因的道义谴责而更加被放大。” In fact, people’s risk estimates closely followed their judgments of whether mothers in the scenarios had done something morally wrong. Even parents who left children alone involuntarily were not held morally blameless, receiving an average “moral wrongness” judgment of 3.05 on a 10-point scale. 事实上,人们的风险评估与母亲在场景中是否做了失德的事的判断密切相关。在10分制评价里,即便不得已导致孩子单独在家的父母也并非被认为在道德上无可指责,他们也要接受平均3.05分的“失德”判断。 Fathers given more leeway than mothers 父亲的回旋余地比母亲更多 The authors found another interesting pattern when they replaced mothers in the stories with fathers: For fathers – but not mothers – a work-related absence was treated more like an involuntary absence. This difference could stem from the view that work is more obligatory and less of a voluntary choice for men. 作者把故事里的母亲替换成父亲时,发现另一个有趣的现象:对于父亲——而不是母亲——因为工作离开更容易被当作不得已的情况对待。这种差异源于一种观念,认为工作对男人而言更义不容辞,是更不得已的选择。 “Exaggerating the risks of allowing children some unsupervised time has significant costs besides the loss of children’s independence, freedom and opportunity to learn how to solve problems on their own,” Sarnecka said. “As people have adopted the idea that children must never be alone, parents increasingly face the possibility of arrest, charges of abuse or neglect, and even incarceration for allowing their children to play in parks, walk to school or wait in a car for a few minutes without them.” “除了在孩子的独立性、自由和学习自己解决问题的机会方面的损失之外,夸大给孩子些无人看管时间的风险,有很大的代价。”Sarnecka说。“当人们都认为孩子们绝对不能独处的时候,家长越来越多面临逮捕,被指控虐待或疏忽的可能性,甚至因为允许孩子在公园玩,步行到学校或独自在车里待几分钟而被监禁。” “At a minimum,” she continued, “these findings should caution those who make and enforce the law to distinguish evidence-based and rational assessments of risk to children from intuitive moral judgments about parents – and to avoid investing the latter with the force of law.” “至少,”她继续说,“这些发现应该提醒那些制定和执行法律的人,把依据证据与理性地评估孩子的风险从对家长的直觉道德评判中区分出来——并避免因为法律的力量而将判断权交给后者。” The study involved survey responses by 1,328 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk ranging in age from 18 to 75, with a fairly even split of men and women and those with and without children. Females accounted for 52 percent of respondents, while 48 percent were male; and 56.43 percent had children, while 43.57 percent did not. More than 80 percent of the participants were white, and two-thirds had completed at least some college. 本研究在Amazon Mechanical Turk网站上调查了从18岁至75岁的1328人,男性与女性,有孩子与没孩子人的回答有相当差异甚至泾渭分明。受调查者中,女性占52%,男性48%;有孩子的占56.43%,没有的占43.57%。超过80%是白人,三分之二有大学文凭。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

读史笔记#24:声望与权力

声望与权力
辉格
2016年12月24日

建立与维护自己的声望(prestige)是人类行为的一大动机,经济学家早已注意到,这一动机是许多消费行为背后的推动力,它构成了某些门类商品的主要甚至唯一的价值基础,而且看来有着牢固的心理基础和古老的渊源。

考古学家发现,用于此类目的的物品——被称为声望品(prestige goods)——在远古人类遗存中占了很大比例,是识别社会复杂程度的重要线索;对声望品的追逐也是推动早期手工业和贸易活动的主要动力,甚至像青铜器制造这样里程碑式的技术进步,最初也是由声望追逐者的需求所促成。

当然,拥有声望品更多的是对既已建立的声望的展示,而非声望本身,这一展示所传达的信息大约包括:我具备不俗的才智与鉴别力,据此取得了相当成就,过着一份体面生活,赢得了其他社会成员的尊重,建立了良好的社会关系,甚至不乏仰慕与追随者,我对他们慷慨大方,乐于出手相助,总之,我是一个有价值的交往对象。

高声望者不仅有着出色的个人禀赋,更重要的是(用社会学家的话说)拥有雄厚的社会资本(social capital),正是后者赋予他们在社会交往中的吸引力,也让他们愿意投入资源去经营和维护社会关系,因为首先,社交魅(more...)

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声望与权力 辉格 2016年12月24日 建立与维护自己的声望([[prestige]])是人类行为的一大动机,经济学家早已注意到,这一动机是许多消费行为背后的推动力,它构成了某些门类商品的主要甚至唯一的价值基础,而且看来有着牢固的心理基础和古老的渊源。 考古学家发现,用于此类目的的物品——被称为声望品(prestige goods)——在远古人类遗存中占了很大比例,是识别社会复杂程度的重要线索;对声望品的追逐也是推动早期手工业和贸易活动的主要动力,甚至像青铜器制造这样里程碑式的技术进步,最初也是由声望追逐者的需求所促成。 当然,拥有声望品更多的是对既已建立的声望的展示,而非声望本身,这一展示所传达的信息大约包括:我具备不俗的才智与鉴别力,据此取得了相当成就,过着一份体面生活,赢得了其他社会成员的尊重,建立了良好的社会关系,甚至不乏仰慕与追随者,我对他们慷慨大方,乐于出手相助,总之,我是一个有价值的交往对象。 高声望者不仅有着出色的个人禀赋,更重要的是(用社会学家的话说)拥有雄厚的社会资本([[social capital]]),正是后者赋予他们在社会交往中的吸引力,也让他们愿意投入资源去经营和维护社会关系,因为首先,社交魅力本身对倾向于社会资本的投资策略构成一种比较优势,其次,社会资本是一种越用越多的东西:今天你动用关系资源帮助了我,我就成了你的互惠网络的一部分,日后你又可以利用这份新增资源办成其他事情。 假如你和很多人建立这样的关系,并且频繁动用这些关系帮助他人,从而成为所在社会的互惠网络的一个中心节点,便可为自己赢得巨大声望;在人类学家蒂莫西·厄尔(Timothy Earle)看来,如此建立的声望是早期社会政治权力的几大来源之一,也是推动社会从游团向部落继而向酋邦发展的关键组织元素;在诸如社区牧师这样的人物身上,我们至今仍可看到部落中凭借声望而取得权力的『大人物(big man)』的影子。 不过,和其他依赖网络效应([[network effect]])的东西一样,声望的建立也面临着启动障碍:经营社会关系的成本很高,需要经常设宴请客,需要大宅子招待客人,奢华体面的服饰、器具和摆设,频繁送礼,有时还要收留孤弱或供养门客,虽然社会资本最终会带来回报,但在突破盈亏平衡点之前,需要大量前期投入。 问题是,在高度均等化的简单社会中,谁有这样的资源呢?而且,在社会资本经历长久积累终于产生价值之前,谁愿意为这样不确定的远期回报作持续投入呢?所以在有些学者看来,基于声望的权力只有在社会地位已经发生相当程度的分化之后才可能出现,而不是最初引发社会分化的先行元素。 然而,人类学家约瑟夫·亨里克([[Joseph Henrich]])在其新书《人类的成功秘诀》(The Secret of Our Success)中却提出了不同看法,他认为,人类强烈的学习需求为声望建设提供了启动机制,因而声望在人类数百万年文化进化历程的早期便已开始起作用。 由于进化路径的特殊性,我们的绝大部分生活技能需要后天习得,而且与这些技能相关的知识多半是无法言传的know-how,需要在直接的观察、模仿和实践中学会,于是我们发展出了许多心理机制帮助我们高效学习,比如强烈的模仿倾向,领会他人意图从而更有效的模仿,以及挑选最佳模仿对象的能力。 在判断身边的人中谁最值得学习时,我们会利用多种线索:直接观察他运用某种技能时的表现,他以往取得的成就,以及能够证明这些成就的器物或信息;我们也会利用二阶线索:他的言行举止是否得到他人的关注?其见解和意见是否被众人听取?有多少人向他请教或求助? 亨里克指出,即便是蹒跚学步的幼儿,也天生的对这些线索极为敏感,甚至年龄越小对二阶线索的反应越强烈,因为小孩尚缺乏直接评判技能高下所需要的经验(这大概可以解释为何年轻人更热衷于追星);而同时,这些线索与构成声望的那些元素高度重合;或许正是生活技能,以及让某些人善于且乐于为后生言传身教的那些个人禀赋,为建立声望提供了启动资本。 学习者和他们的家长乐意为这些楷模提供各种互惠性报酬作为学费,比如帮助做家务、照看孩子,充当无偿或低报酬的助手(学徒制的先驱),为宴席提供食物或劳力赞助,在纠纷冲突中站在他一边,在择偶与结亲时给予优先考虑或优惠条件,等等;这些回报进而帮助他们建立更多社会关系,积累更多社会资本。 无论声望机制是否果真如亨里克所认为那样发端于学习需求(比如,不妨考虑,语言才华和社交技能也完全可能为建立声誉提供启动资本),声誉既经建立,确实可以带来政治权力,个人一旦占据互惠网络中心节点的位置,便会自动吸引更多追随者和拥护者,因为接近中心节点是这些追随者建立自身社会资本的捷径,这反过来又强化了中心节点的地位。 对声望与权力关系的剖析,可以帮助我们理解,为何在没有世袭制的国家,一些政治家族也可能长期兴旺,而另一些裙带网又因某个中心人物的垮台而树倒猢狲散?为何从几位贵妇的客厅里会涌出一轮轮社会运动甚至革命浪潮?为何学术权威越老越受其门徒推崇,即便其理论早已过时?为何一位气功大师身边会浮动着那么多巨商大贾的身影,即便他们看起来不太像是真信那套拙劣把戏?  
读史笔记#23:封侯拜爵的神仙们

封侯拜爵的神仙们
辉格
2016年12月11日

中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称,宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗,有史料可查者即有92个,扣除名号重复者,还有50多个,粗略估算,全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间,看来古代中国人『积极造神,见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。

如此多神仙得到敬拜,还要归功于神仙来源的多样化,和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性;早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿,比如司掌某种自然力的自然神,或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神,然而自中古以降,一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。

这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物,因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力;认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官,参加过某次战役,遭受过冤屈,或者离奇死亡——总之,任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方(more...)

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封侯拜爵的神仙们 辉格 2016年12月11日 中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称,宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗,有史料可查者即有92个,扣除名号重复者,还有50多个,粗略估算,全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间,看来古代中国人『积极造神,见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。 如此多神仙得到敬拜,还要归功于神仙来源的多样化,和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性;早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿,比如司掌某种自然力的自然神,或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神,然而自中古以降,一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。 这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物,因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力;认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官,参加过某次战役,遭受过冤屈,或者离奇死亡——总之,任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方都可以让他们获得候选资格,但真正确立其神灵地位的,是『灵验』事迹,即有人在向他祈求佑助时得偿所愿。 在《变迁之神》一书中,人类学家韩森考察了此类神祗的兴起,发现其数量在宋代经历了爆发性增长,而之所以神界能容得下如此规模的神口增长,是因为他们都是地方性的,其神力作用半径不过数十里,各地若想有神可求,就得自己造一个,而同时,造神逻辑本身确保了新神的供给:灵验的随机性意味着总是不断会有旧神失宠,新神崛起。 有趣的是,帝国朝廷对这场民间造神运动颇为热心,从11世纪初起,宋廷便挑选一些信众认可度较高的地方神祗予以官方承认,编入祀典,许多还授予官爵名号,拨给公款用于立碑修庙;一旦某神获得这样的官方地位,地方官便有责任定期组织祭祀敬拜活动,甚至提供财政和劳役支持。 韩森注意到,从1075年起,为地方神仙封授官爵的做法大面积铺开,并在此后成为政府的一项常规职能,其规模甚大,每年封授数十位神仙,每次封授都要经历一个繁杂的流程,涉及尚书省、礼部和太常寺的众多衙门,还有地方政府的两轮灵验性查证,那么,朝廷为何要花费大量行政与财政资源来做这样一件看起来没有实际功效的事情呢? 要理解这一点,我们最好将它和帝国的另一项重要制度——科举——对照着看;表面上,科举只是为帝国选拔官员的(它也确实有这功能),但实际上,它最重要的功能是为全民提供一部开放、全面覆盖且贯通到底的社会上升阶梯,而在此之前,上升通道往往为数十个门阀豪族所垄断,其他人只能凭借战功、偶然的恩宠、内乱造成的重新洗牌等非经常性机会来谋求晋身。 科举的这一功能对赢取精英阶层的广泛效忠从而强化帝国权力起着极为根本的作用,它让人口中最富有、最有才智、最有野心的那些人将其视为实现抱负的好机会,而假如没有这样的机会,他们很可能去支持其他潜在的权力中心,或者以官方所不愿看到的方式施展抱负,因而对帝国权力构成威胁。 科举也是推行官方价值体系和历史叙事的工具,求取功名者心甘情愿接受和传播官方说辞,而一旦取得功名便成为这一体系的既得利益者因而有足够动机去维护它,并将其渗透植入到他们拥有巨大影响力的家族传统和地方文化中。 虽然只有百分之几的成年男性参与科举,取得功名者更少,但无论是巩固还是颠覆帝国权力基础,这都是最有能量的一群人,而且,科举功名带来的权力、财富、士绅特权,甚至仅仅是读写能力,都会将他们置于家族和地方社区的领袖地位,因而笼络他们就笼络了他们所在的家族和地方。 从唐代起,帝国通过封授土司对未归化地区实施羁縻政策,科举与士绅特权的结合,其实就是对政治结构中帝权难以直接通达的部分实施羁縻,通过士绅羁縻家族与地方,类似的,为地方神仙封授官爵,则是对民间信仰与崇拜活动的羁縻。 之所以神仙也需要羁縻,是因为,对于世俗权力,神是个危险的存在,每个神灵名下都可能凝聚起一套价值观,道德规范,行为准则,乃至行动纲领,其中每一样都可能与官方版本相冲突,都有潜力在权力竞争中成为敌方的动员与组织基础,特别是当它们被一个独立的僧侣团体所控制时,就更危险了。 凭借封授制度,朝廷有机会对神祗进行筛选、约束、引导、改造和控制,很明显,他们会竭力排除最危险的那些神,比如有着另一套行为准则的道德神,或一神教中极具动员力的排他性神,或有着现成经典因而其合法性可能被僧侣组织掌握的神,还有附带着行动纲领的弥赛亚,而最合他们胃口的,将是那些不具有全国性动员能力的地方神,以及能够提供现世佑助却又毫无道德要求的功利神,或许并非巧合的是,后两种恰是此后中国最流行的神灵。  
读史笔记#22:塑造行为的多重机制

(本文删节版发表于《长江日报·读周刊》)

塑造行为的多重机制
辉格
2016年12月2日

人的行为方式千差万别且变化多端,这也体现在我们描绘行为的形容词的丰富性上:羞涩,奔放,畏缩,鲁莽,克制,放纵,粗野,优雅,勤勉,懒散,好斗,随和……这些词汇同时也被用来描绘个体性格,有些甚至用来辨识文化和民族差异,由此可见,尽管人类行为丰富多变,却仍可识别出某些稳定而持久的模式。

那么,究竟是哪些因素,经由何种过程,塑造了种种行为模式呢?在以往讨论中,流行着一种将遗传和环境影响对立两分的倾向,仿佛这两种因素是各自独立起作用的,最终结果只是两者的线性叠加,就像调鸡尾酒,人们关注的是各种原料的配比,五勺基因,两勺家庭,两勺学校,再加一勺『文化』,一个活蹦乱跳的文明人就出炉了。

这种将成长中的孩子视为受影响者或加工对象的视角,是不得要领的,实际上,成长是一个主动学习的过程,基因和环境的关系更像软件中代码和数据输入的关系,基因编码引导个体从环境中采集数据,以便配置自身的行为算法,把代码和数据放一起搅一搅不可能得到想要的功能,在软件工程中,也没人会谈论代码和数据对算法表现分别有多大比例的影响。

正如马特·里德利(Matt Ri(more...)

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(本文删节版发表于《长江日报·读周刊》) 塑造行为的多重机制 辉格 2016年12月2日 人的行为方式千差万别且变化多端,这也体现在我们描绘行为的形容词的丰富性上:羞涩,奔放,畏缩,鲁莽,克制,放纵,粗野,优雅,勤勉,懒散,好斗,随和……这些词汇同时也被用来描绘个体性格,有些甚至用来辨识文化和民族差异,由此可见,尽管人类行为丰富多变,却仍可识别出某些稳定而持久的模式。 那么,究竟是哪些因素,经由何种过程,塑造了种种行为模式呢?在以往讨论中,流行着一种将遗传和环境影响对立两分的倾向,仿佛这两种因素是各自独立起作用的,最终结果只是两者的线性叠加,就像调鸡尾酒,人们关注的是各种原料的配比,五勺基因,两勺家庭,两勺学校,再加一勺『文化』,一个活蹦乱跳的文明人就出炉了。 这种将成长中的孩子视为受影响者或加工对象的视角,是不得要领的,实际上,成长是一个主动学习的过程,基因和环境的关系更像软件中代码和数据输入的关系,基因编码引导个体从环境中采集数据,以便配置自身的行为算法,把代码和数据放一起搅一搅不可能得到想要的功能,在软件工程中,也没人会谈论代码和数据对算法表现分别有多大比例的影响。 正如马特·里德利([[Matt Ridley]])在《天性经由教养》中所阐明,成长是遗传代码随教养进程依次执行的过程,然而,对于这一过程具体如何展开,迄今只有零散的论述,而缺乏一幅系统化的全景图,幸运的是,心理学家朱迪·哈里斯([[Judith R.Harris]])在《教养的迷思》中提出的开创性见解,为我们拼凑这样一幅系统流程草图提供了便利。 对于个人,最持久而一致的那些行为特征被称为人格,主流人格心理学识别了经验开放性、尽责性、外向性、亲和性、情绪稳定性这五个最具一致性的特征,它们很大程度上是先天的(遗传差异可解释一半以上的人格差异),并且至少从成年后就伴随终身,在不同场景中的表现也相当连贯。 但人格并不直接对应行为模式,个人在决定如何行事时,还会考虑所在群体的规范,并借助由文化所传承的整套符号,正因此,有着相似人格的两个人,在不同文化或同一文化的不同群体中,会表现出十分不同的行为,比如同样一个外向型高亲和度的人,在向客人表达亲热时,是拥抱、亲吻、抚手,还是捶胸、拍肩、摸头,将随文化而异。 在这方面,儿童有着非凡的学习能力,只须借助少量样本,便可构建出一个范本模式,据此判断在何种情景下怎么做才是地道的、妥贴的;而且他们十分清楚不同群体和不同性质的关系中适用不同规范,家人、亲戚、邻里、同学、朋友、陌生人之间的规范学习和范本建模将分别进行,学习结果独立存储,并在相应场景下被激活。 哈里斯指出,这一学习过程主要在年龄相近的同侪群体中自发进行,长辈的做法会被参考,但训导和传授的努力几乎是徒劳的,当孩子们从某些线索发现长辈的做法已过时落伍,会毫不犹豫的弃之不顾,甚至当缺乏可供参照的样本时,他们也会经由群体内协调而创造出一种全新规范,就像他们创造克里奥尔语和尼加拉瓜手语那样。 在规范学习中,并非所有样本都被同等对待,那些看起来更受青睐和尊崇,更具号召力和支配力——总之地位更高——的个体,其行为将被赋予更高权重,而青少年在识别哪些是高地位受尊崇个体方面,有着敏锐直觉(其中受异性青睐程度是关键线索之一,这也是性选择得以发生的重要途径),正是通过这样的学习和协调过程,社会等级结构代复一代自我再生。 识别、追随和效仿群体中的尊贵者,并努力为自己赢得体面和尊贵(因为这会为个体带来切实的利益),是文化进化的一大动力机制,它维持着社会的等级结构和价值阶梯,也推动着风尚潮流的循环轮替,值得一提的是,性选择也在其中发挥了殊为关键的作用,因为识别高地位者的一大线索便是受异性青睐的程度,同时这一青睐也是对追逐地位和追随群体价值取向的重要激励。 习得规范进入群体之后,下一步便是确立自己在群体中的位置,个体出于自身的人格特质和资源与天赋条件,在群体中寻找适合自己的生态位,个体差异也将随此选择而展开,同时其行为方式会在群体规范所给定的框架之下,按照自身地位及与群内他人的关系而调整。 上述『先同化后分化』的两阶段模型,可帮助我们理解青春期躁动这一极为普遍的文化现象,青春期躁动表现为跟风盲从,集体狂热,缺乏个性与独立思考,强烈且富有攻击性的团体意识和民族主义,这实际上是一个强化群体认同的机制,在部落社会,它常以严酷的成人礼和结伙对外攻击等更正规和有组织的方式进行。 在经历躁动过程的严酷考验之后,个体习得规范并被纳入群体,同时,考验过程中的表现也将决定他未来在群体内的地位,一旦这一过程结束,成员身份确立,各自找到自己的生态位,躁动与狂热便会消退,规范的强制性和集体义务将逐渐放松,大家分头过自己的小日子去了,但躁动中所建立的群体认同、团伙情谊和个人间关系纽带仍将长期存续,并服务于更为功利性的目标。 两阶段模型也可解释一个哈里斯所强调、且常被忽视的现象:尽管人格具有相当高一致性,但同一个人在不同社会情境中的行为模式仍可十分不同,不同到像两个人那样,比如一位长兄在家里对弟妹们表现出长子所常有的那种强势和支配性,在学校却可能甘做跟班小弟,一个在办公室里沉默寡言的人在兴趣社团中却滔滔不绝、能言善辩,一个父母跟前的乖孩子在街头帮派中也许是个狠角色,哈里斯将此称为人格多面性,或许也就是人们常说的多重人格。 这是因为从先天人格特质到具体行为模式之间,经过了自我生态定位和个性展现,而这是针对不同群体分别进行的,当个人进入这些群体时,将根据自身禀赋优势和价值取向与该群体规范和价值阶梯的匹配程度作出定位,从而展现人格的不同侧面:是争当其领导者?努力向上爬的积极分子?寻求庇护的弱势追随者?还是不太情愿的服从者?或三心两意的投机分子?不同定位的行为差异是显而易见的。  
[译文]美国文化的四颗种子

BOOK REVIEW: ALBION’S SEED
书评:《阿尔比恩的的种子》

作者:SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27
译者:Tankman
校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen)
来源:http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/

I.

Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does.

《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注:阿尔比恩,英国旧称,据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松,而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何,我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书,他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上,此书做到了这点。

In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US.

在学校,我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”,这是一个最不多元化的群体,并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景,宗教,社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层,令其与其他阶层隔绝,而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。

I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects.

我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景:一个波多黎各生存狂,一个非洲财阀,以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险,相互竞争,来占领领土和资源。你能探索的,不单单只是对新世界拓殖,而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。

What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states.

当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展,不受其他群体影响时,你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢?《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。

Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s.

Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种:在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒,在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”,在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会,以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注:指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。

II.

A: The Puritans
A:清教徒

I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity.

我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人,而后在接下来的364天,就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派,对英国国教会持异议,而且遵从他们特有的严厉,勤奋,厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。

Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors.

他们中的大多数,来自东英吉利,是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国,部分是因为他们感到被迫害,但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶,如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活,他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。

I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream.

我知道五月花,我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋,我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。

Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.”

清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派,其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民,其拥有读写能力的比例,是英国平均水平的两倍;在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代,大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方,受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响;历史学家Havelock Ellis发现,“相比英国的其他任何地区,该地很大程度上以文艺,科学和知识成就著称。”

Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”.

而且,只有最好的清教徒,才能被允许来到马萨诸塞;Fischer写道,“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”,而且“不适合该地的移民,则被放逐到其他殖民地,或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”,这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。

INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS:
关于清教徒的一些有趣事实:

1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”.

Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格,以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。

2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us’”

马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手,从他嘴里喊出五个词:‘来帮助我们’”。

3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark.

新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克

4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.”

马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力;Fischer记录了一个故事:一个旅行者问一个男人“您(more...)

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BOOK REVIEW: ALBION’S SEED 书评:《阿尔比恩的的种子》 作者:SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27 译者:Tankman 校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen) 来源:http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/ I. Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does. 《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注:阿尔比恩,英国旧称,据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松,而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何,我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书,他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上,此书做到了这点。 In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US. 在学校,我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”,这是一个最不多元化的群体,并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景,宗教,社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层,令其与其他阶层隔绝,而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。 I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects. 我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景:一个波多黎各生存狂,一个非洲财阀,以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险,相互竞争,来占领领土和资源。你能探索的,不单单只是对新世界拓殖,而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。 What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states. 当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展,不受其他群体影响时,你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢?《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。 Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s. Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种:在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒,在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”,在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会,以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注:指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。 II. A: The Puritans A:清教徒 I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity. 我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人,而后在接下来的364天,就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派,对英国国教会持异议,而且遵从他们特有的严厉,勤奋,厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。 Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors. 他们中的大多数,来自东英吉利,是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国,部分是因为他们感到被迫害,但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶,如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活,他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。 I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream. 我知道五月花,我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋,我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。 Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.” 清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派,其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民,其拥有读写能力的比例,是英国平均水平的两倍;在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代,大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方,受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响;历史学家Havelock Ellis发现,“相比英国的其他任何地区,该地很大程度上以文艺,科学和知识成就著称。” Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”. 而且,只有最好的清教徒,才能被允许来到马萨诸塞;Fischer写道,“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”,而且“不适合该地的移民,则被放逐到其他殖民地,或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”,这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。 INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS: 关于清教徒的一些有趣事实: 1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”. Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格,以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。 2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us'” 马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手,从他嘴里喊出五个词:‘来帮助我们’”。 3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark. 新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克 4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.” 马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力;Fischer记录了一个故事:一个旅行者问一个男人“您是在此地服侍的牧师吗?”被问者纠正了他的问题,“先生,我是统治此地的牧师。” 5. The Puritans tried to import African slaves, but they all died of the cold. 清教徒试图进口黑奴,但是黑奴全部死于严寒。 6. In 1639, Massachusetts declared a “Day Of Humiliation” to condemn “novelties, oppression, atheism, excesse, superfluity, idleness, contempt of authority, and trouble in other parts to be remembered”. 1639年,马萨诸塞发起了“羞辱日”,以谴责“新潮,压迫,无神论,纵欲,奢侈,懒散,轻视权威以及其他引人注目的麻烦”。 7. The average family size in Waltham, Massachusetts in the 1730s was 9.7 children. 1730年代,在马萨诸塞的Waltham,平均家庭规模是9.7个孩子。 8. Everyone was compelled by law to live in families. Town officials would search the town for single people and, if found, order them to join a family; if they refused, they were sent to jail. 按照法律,每个人都必须生活在家庭中。城镇官员会搜查镇中的单身者,如果发现,则会命令其加入一个家庭;如果单身者拒绝,则会被投入监狱。 9. 98% of adult Puritan men were married, compared to only 73% of adult Englishmen in general. Women were under special pressure to marry, and a Puritan proverb said that “women dying maids lead apes in Hell”. 98%的清教徒成年男子都结了婚,而英国成年男子总体的结婚率为73%。要求妇女结婚的压力特别大,一句清教徒格言说“没结婚的女人死后在地狱里带领着猿猴”。【译注:这一格言大意是谴责独身主义,但字面意思难考,一说是因为猿猴在当时人看来是没有价值的动物,肉不可吃,也不能做驼兽或者看家。10. 90% of Puritan names were taken from the Bible. Some Puritans took pride in their learning by giving their children obscure Biblical names they would expect nobody else to have heard of, like Mahershalalhasbaz. Others chose random Biblical terms that might not have technically been intended as names; “the son of Bostonian Samuel Pond was named Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”. Still others chose Biblical words completely at random and named their children things like Maybe or Notwithstanding. 90%清教徒的名字都取自圣经。一些清教徒引以为豪的是:用他们料想没人听过的圣经中的生僻词给孩子取名,并以此夸耀自己的学问,以至于他们可以预期人们从来没听过这个名字,比如 Mahershalalhasbaz【译者注:掳掠速临,抢夺快到。见圣经以赛亚书第八章1节】。另一些则随机取用圣经中的词,有些词技术上说本不是用来做名字的;“Bostonian Samuel Pond的孩子被起名为 Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”【译者注:前四个单词作为孩子的名,引自圣经但以理书第五章25节。四个单词都是亚兰文的度量单位,表示神已经数算过巴比伦的岁月,神已称量了巴比伦的道德】。也有些人,完全随机取用圣经中的词,给他们的孩子取名为Maybe或者是Notwithstanding。 11. Puritan parents traditionally would send children away to be raised with other families, and raise those families’ children in turn, in the hopes that the lack of familiarity would make the child behave better. 传统上,清教徒父母把孩子送给别的家庭寄养,作为交换,他们也寄养别人家的孩子,他们希望家中缺失亲情可以让孩子们被管教得更好。 12. In 1692, 25% of women over age 45 in Essex County were accused of witchcraft. 在1692年,Essex郡25%的45岁以上妇女被控为女巫。 13. Massachusetts passed the first law mandating universal public education, which was called The Old Deluder Law in honor of its preamble, which began “It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the scriptures…” 马萨诸塞通过了第一部强制普及公共教育的法律,被称为“老说谎者法案”,因为其前言的开头写道:“老牌说谎者撒旦的一个主要活动,就是阻止人们接触到经文的知识……” 14. Massachusetts cuisine was based around “meat and vegetables submerged in plain water and boiled relentlessly without seasonings of any kind”. 马萨诸塞的饮食基本上是“白水炖煮肉和蔬菜,不加任何调料”。 15. Along with the famous scarlet A for adultery, Puritans could be forced to wear a B for blasphemy, C for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, and so on. 除了著名的表示通奸的红字A,清教徒还因为渎神被强制穿上B(blasphemy),因为造假被穿上C( counterfeiting ),因为醉酒被穿上D( drunkenness ),如此种种。 16. Wasting time in Massachusetts was literally a criminal offense, listed in the law code, and several people were in fact prosecuted for it. 在马萨诸塞,浪费时间是一种犯罪行为,列在法条上,并有几人的确因此被起诉。 17. This wasn’t even the nadir of weird hard-to-enforce Massachusetts laws. Another law just said “If any man shall exceed the bounds of moderation, we shall punish him severely”. 这还不是难以被执行的马萨诸塞法律的极点。另一条法律说:“如果任何人超越了适度的界限,我们将对其进行严惩。” Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote of Massachusetts Puritanism: “The underlying foundation of life in New England was one of profound, unutterable, and therefore unuttered mehalncholy, which regarded human existence itself as a ghastly risk, and, in the case of the vast majority of human beings, an inconceivable misfortune.” Harriet Beecher Stowe就马萨诸塞的清教主义写道:“新英格兰生活的基础是一种深刻微妙,无法言说,因此也就未被说破的惆怅,即人类的存在本身就是一种可怖的风险,绝大多数人,其存在是一种不可思议的不幸。” And indeed, everything was dour, strict, oppressive, and very religious. A typical Massachusetts week would begin in the church, which doubled as the town meeting hall. There were no decorations except a giant staring eye on the pulpit to remind churchgoers that God was watching them. 而且的确,一切都是严厉,严格,压抑并且非常宗教化的。马萨诸塞典型的一周生活开始于教堂,其规模是镇议事厅的两倍。教堂里没有别的装饰,除了牧师讲道台上的一个巨大眼睛,提醒来教堂的人们上帝在看着他们。 Townspeople would stand up before their and declare their shame and misdeeds, sometimes being forced to literally crawl before the other worshippers begging for forgiveness. THen the minister would give two two-hour sermons back to back. The entire affair would take up to six hours, and the church was unheated (for some reason they stored all their gunpowder there, so no one was allowed to light a fire), and this was Massachusetts, and it was colder in those days than it is now, so that during winter some people would literally lose fingers to frostbite (Fischer: “It was a point of honor for the minister never to shorten a sermon merely because his audience was frozen”). Everyone would stand there with their guns (they were legally required to bring guns, in case Indians attacked during the sermon) and hear about how they were going to Hell, all while the giant staring eye looked at them. 在讲道开始前,镇上的人坦白自己的羞耻和劣迹,有时真的是被强迫匍匐在其他敬拜者前,乞求饶恕。然后布道者会开始连续两场两小时长的证道。整个过程可以花掉六小时,而且教堂里没有取暖设施(出于一些原因,人们把所有的火药储存在教堂,所以那里禁止生火),而且这可是马萨诸塞,那时候天气比今天更冷,所以在冬季,有人真的会因为冻疮失去手指。(Fischer:“对布道者来说,从不因听众冻僵而缩短证道是一种荣耀。”)每个人站在那里,带着他们的枪(法律上,他们被要求携带武器,以防印第安人在其听讲道时袭击),听着他们将会怎样下地狱,整个过程,那巨大的眼睛一直盯着他们。 So life as a Puritan was pretty terrible. On the other hand, their society was impressively well-ordered. Teenage pregnancy rates were the lowest in the Western world and in some areas literally zero. Murder rates were half those in other American colonies. 所以一个清教徒的生活是非常恐怖的。另一方面,他们的社会有着令人印象深刻的良好秩序。未成年人怀孕率曾是西方世界中最低的,在某些地方则实际上为零。谋杀率则只有其他北美殖民地的一半。 There was remarkably low income inequality – “the top 10% of wealthholders held only 20%-30% of taxable property”, compared to 75% today and similar numbers in other 17th-century civilizations. The poor (at least the poor native to a given town) were treated with charity and respect – “in Salem, one man was ordered to be set by the heels in the stocks for being uncharitable to a poor man in distress”. 收入差距很低——“10%最富者只占有可税财产的20%-30%”,对比而言,今天这个比例是75%,17世纪时的其他文明也近似这个数字。穷人(至少是在镇上的本地穷人)受到尊重和接济——“在Salem,一个男人因为不肯接济一位在苦难中的穷人,被罚上脚枷示众”。 Government was conducted through town meetings in which everyone had a say. Women had more equality than in most parts of the world, and domestic abuse was punished brutally. The educational system was top-notch – “by most empirical tests of intellectual eminence, New England led all other parts of British America from the 17th to the early 20th century”. 政府通过镇上的议事会议得以运作,每个人在会上都有发言权。比世界其他地方,妇女享有更多平等,而家庭暴力则会遭到严酷惩罚。教育系统是顶尖的——“从十七世纪到二十世纪早期,在大多数有关智识能力的经验测试中,新英格兰领先所有其他北美的英国殖民地”。 In some ways the Puritans seem to have taken the classic dystopian bargain – give up all freedom and individuality and art, and you can have a perfect society without crime or violence or inequality. Fischer ends each of his chapters with a discussion of how the society thought of liberty, and the Puritans unsurprisingly thought of liberty as “ordered liberty” – the freedom of everything to tend to its correct place and stay there. 某种程度上,清教徒似乎选择了经典的敌托邦方案——放弃一切自由、个体性和艺术,得到一个没有犯罪、暴力和不平等的完美社会。Fischer在每一章的结尾部分都会探讨该社会如何看待自由,而清教徒毫不奇怪地认为自由是“有秩序的自由”——在这种自由下,万物都处于正确的位置,并且保持这种状态。 They thought of it as a freedom from disruption – apparently FDR stole some of his “freedom from fear” stuff from early Puritan documents. They were extremely not in favor of the sort of liberty that meant that, for example, there wouldn’t be laws against wasting time. That was going too far. 他们认为这是一种免于被扰乱的自由——显然富兰克林·罗斯福从早期清教徒的文档中,偷取了一些创意,用于他的“免于恐惧的自由”的理念。他们非常不喜欢某些类型的自由,比如,没有禁止浪费时间的法律。这种自由实在是过度了。 B: The Cavaliers B:骑士党 The Massachusetts Puritans fled England in the 1620s partly because the king and nobles were oppressing them. In the 1640s, English Puritans under Oliver Cromwell rebelled, took over the government, and killed the king. The nobles not unreasonably started looking to get the heck out. 马萨诸塞清教徒在1620年代逃离英格兰,部分是因为国王和贵族压迫他们。在1640年代,英国清教徒在奥利弗·克伦威尔的领导下反叛,夺取了政权,处死了国王。贵族在此时开始想要尽快逃离并不是没有原因的。 Virginia had been kind of a wreck ever since most of the original Jamestown settlers had mostly died of disease. Governor William Berkeley, a noble himself, decided the colony could reinvent itself as a destination for refugee nobles, and told them it would do everything possible to help them maintain the position of oppressive supremacy to which they were accustomed. The British nobility was sold. The Cavaliers – the nobles who had fought and lost the English Civil War – fled to Virginia. 自从詹姆斯敦最初一批殖民者中的大部分死于疾病,弗吉尼亚一度沦落得像一片废墟。殖民地长官 William Berkeley自己就是个贵族。他决定殖民地应该转型为一个避难贵族的目的地。他告诉避难的贵族,殖民地将会竭尽全力,帮他们维持其久已习惯的压迫性支配地位。不列颠的贵族地位标价出售。骑士党——在英国内战中顽抗继而失败的贵族——逃至弗吉尼亚。 Historians who cross-checking Virginian immigrant lists against English records find that of Virginians whose opinions on the War were known, 98% were royalists. They were overwhelming Anglican, mostly from agrarian southern England, and all related to each other in the incestuous way of nobility everywhere: “it is difficult to think of any ruling elite that has been more closely interrelated since the Ptolemies”. There were twelve members of Virginia’s royal council; in 1724 “all without exception were related to one another by blood or marriage…as late as 1775, every member of that august body was descended from a councilor who had served in 1660”. 历史学家交叉对比了弗吉尼亚移民的名单和英国的记录,他们发现,对于英国内战,立场可知的弗吉尼亚人当中,98%是保皇党。他们绝大多数都是国教徒,大部分来自英国南部的农业区,互相之间都有贵族间内婚的血缘关系:“很难想到自托勒密王朝以来,统治精英还有比这更近的亲缘关系”。弗吉尼亚皇家议会有十二名成员;在1724年“无一例外的彼此有着血缘或姻亲关系……迟至1775年,这一庄严机构的每个成员都是其1660年委员的后代”。 These aristocrats didn’t want to do their own work, so they brought with them tens of thousands of indentured servants; more than 75% of all Virginian immigrants arrived in this position. Some of these people came willingly on a system where their master paid their passage over and they would be free after a certain number of years; others were sent by the courts as punishments; still others were just plain kidnapped. The gender ratio was 4:1 in favor of men, and there were entire English gangs dedicated to kidnapping women and sending them to Virginia, where they fetched a high price. Needless to say, these people came from a very different stratum than their masters or the Puritans. 这些贵族不想自己做工,所以他们带来上万的契约仆佣;超过75%的弗吉尼亚移民以这个身份【编注:即契约仆佣】到来。一些人是自愿而来,主人支付了他们的旅费,他们在服务一些年份后会获得自由;另一些人则被法庭判罚来到这里;还有些人明显是被拐骗的。男女性别比是4:1,存在专门贩卖妇女到弗吉尼亚的英国黑帮,他们从中赚取高价。无需多言,相比于他们的贵族主人或清教徒,这些人来自一个非常不同的阶层。 People who came to Virginia mostly died. They died of malaria, typhoid fever, amoebiasis, and dysentery. Unlike in New England, where Europeans were better adapted to the cold climate than Africans, in Virginia it was Europeans who had the higher disease-related mortality rate. The whites who survived tended to become “sluggish and indolent”, according to the universal report of travellers and chroniclers, although I might be sluggish and indolent too if I had been kidnapped to go work on some rich person’s farm and sluggishness/indolence was an option. 来到弗吉尼亚的人多数都死了。他们死于疟疾,伤寒,阿米巴病,和痢疾。不像在新英格兰,在那里欧洲人比非洲人更好的适应了寒冷气候,在弗吉尼亚,欧洲人有着更高的疾病死亡率。参考旅行者的报告和编年史,幸存下来的白人倾向于变得“低迷和懒惰”,当然,我也许也会变得低迷和懒惰,如果我被诱拐到某个富人的农场做工而且可以选择低迷/懒惰的话。 The Virginians tried their best to oppress white people. Really, they did. The depths to which they sank in trying to oppress white people almost boggle the imagination. There was a rule that if a female indentured servant became pregnant, a few extra years were added on to their indenture, supposedly because they would be working less hard during their pregnancy and child-rearing so it wasn’t fair to the master. Virginian aristocrats would rape their own female servants, then add a penalty term on to their indenture for becoming pregnant. 弗吉尼亚人竭尽全力的压迫白人。确实,他们干过这种事。他们试图压迫白人的深度,超乎想象。有一条规矩:如果女性契约仆人怀了孕,她们的服务期会被延长几年,大概是因为她们的产出在孕期和抚育期会下降,这就对主人不公平。弗吉尼亚贵族们会强奸自己的女性仆人,而后给她们的服务期加上基于怀孕的惩罚期限。 That is an impressive level of chutzpah. But despite these efforts, eventually all the white people either died, or became too sluggish to be useful, or worst of all just finished up their indentures and became legally free. The aristocrats started importing black slaves as per the model that had sprung up in the Caribbean, and so the stage was set for the antebellum South we read about in history classes. 这种无耻妄为令人印象深刻。但是虽然有这些努力,最终所有白人不是死了,就是变得太低迷以至于无用,或者最糟糕的是他们结束了服务期限,在法律上变得自由了。贵族开始按照加勒比地区涌现的那种模式引进黑奴,于是我们在历史课上读到的内战前南方的一幕幕已经预备好上演。 INTERESTING CAVALIER FACTS: 关于骑士党的有趣事实: 1. Virginian cavalier speech patterns sound a lot like modern African-American dialects. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out why, but it’s strange to think of a 17th century British lord speaking what a modern ear would clearly recognize as Ebonics. 弗吉尼亚骑士党的说话腔调听来更像是现代非裔美国人。不用多想就能推测出原因,不过想到17世纪的不列颠贵族讲一口现在听来是黑人英语的腔调,的确很奇怪。 2. Three-quarters of 17th-century Virginian children lost at least one parent before turning 18. 四分之三的17世纪弗吉尼亚孩子在十八岁之前至少丧失父母之一。 3. Cousin marriage was an important custom that helped cement bonds among the Virginian elite, “and many an Anglican lady changed her condition but not her name”. 堂亲结婚是弗吉尼亚精英加固联盟的重要习俗,“很多国教徒女士改变了她们的境遇,但不改变其姓氏”。 4. In Virginia, women were sometimes unironically called “breeders”; English women were sometimes referred to as “She-Britons”. 在弗吉尼亚,并非出于讽刺,妇女有时被称作“育仔员”;英国妇女有时被称作“女不列颠人”。 5. Virginia didn’t really have towns; the Chesapeake Bay was such a giant maze of rivers and estuaries and waterways that there wasn’t much need for land transport hubs. Instead, the unit of settlement was the plantation, which consisted of an aristocratic planter, his wife and family, his servants, his slaves, and a bunch of guests who hung around and mooched off him in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality. 弗吉尼亚没有真正的城镇;切萨皮克湾是众多河流、河口和水路组成的迷宫,并不需要陆路运输的集散地。相反,殖民的基本单位是种植园,由一位贵族种植园主,他的妻子和家庭,他的仆人,他的奴隶,以及一群借着古已有之的好客传统依附寄生于主人的宾客们组成。 6. Virginian society considered everyone who lived in a plantation home to be a kind of “family”, with the aristocrat both as the literal father and as a sort of abstracted patriarch with complete control over his domain. 弗吉尼亚社会认为每个生活在种植园中的人多少都算是“家庭成员”,而贵族既是真正的父亲,也是控制自己地域的抽象家主。 7. Virginia governor William Berkeley probably would not be described by moderns as ‘strong on education’. He said in a speech that “I thank God there are no free schools nor printing [in Virginia], and I hope we shall not have these for a hundred years, for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divuldged them, and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!” 按现代观点,弗吉尼亚殖民地长官William Berkeley很可能算不上“重视教育”。他在一次演说中说“我感谢上帝,(在弗吉尼亚)没有免费学校和印刷术,而且我希望我们一百年也不要有这些东西,因为学习给世界带来不服从、异端、和结党,印刷术则传播上述这些,以及对最佳政府的诽谤。上帝让我们远离学校和印刷术。” 8. Virginian recreation mostly revolved around hunting and bloodsports. Great lords hunted deer, lesser gentry hunted foxes, indentured servants had a weird game in which they essentially draw-and-quartered geese, young children “killed and tortured songbirds”, and “at the bottom of this hierarchy of bloody games were male infants who prepared themselves for the larger pleasures of maturity by torturing snakes, maiming frogs, and pulling the wings off butterflies. Thus, every red-blooded male in Virginia was permitted to slaughter some animal or other, and the size of his victim was proportioned to his social rank.” 弗吉尼亚的休闲活动大多涉及打猎和血腥运动。大领主猎鹿,小绅士猎狐,契约仆人玩着奇怪的游戏来肢解鹅,年幼的孩子“杀死和折磨鸣禽”,而“在这一血腥游戏等级体系底部的则是男性幼童,为了长大后享受更大的猎杀愉悦,他们折磨蛇、残害青蛙、扯掉蝴蝶的翅膀。因此,每个热血的弗吉尼亚男性都被允许屠杀这样或那样一些动物,其受害者的尺寸则和他的社会等级成比例。” 9. “In 1747, an Anglican minister named William Kay infuriated the great planter Landon Carter by preaching a sermon against pride. The planter took it personally and sent his [relations] and ordered them to nail up the doors and windows of all the churches in which Kay preached.” “在1747年,一个叫William Kay的国教会牧师因为一篇反对骄傲的讲道,激怒了大种植园主Landon Carter。种植园主认为这是对其个人的冒犯,派出了他的亲属,命其钉死所有Kay牧师曾讲过道的教堂的门窗。 10. Our word “condescension” comes from a ritual attitude that leading Virginians were supposed to display to their inferiors. Originally condescension was supposed to be a polite way of showing respect those who were socially inferior to you; our modern use of the term probably says a lot about what Virginians actually did with it. 我们的“屈尊”一词来自于,弗吉尼亚的领袖应该对自己的下级表示的一种礼仪性态度。最初屈尊应该是一种礼貌的方式,对社会等级比自己低的人表示尊敬;我们现在对这个词的用法,很可能反映了当时弗吉尼亚人是怎么使用它的。 In a lot of ways, Virginia was the opposite of Massachusetts. Their homicide rate was sky-high, and people were actively encouraged to respond to slights against their honor with duels (for the rich) and violence (for the poor). They were obsessed with gambling, and “made bets not merely on horses, cards, cockfights, and backgammon, but also on crops, prices, women, and the weather”. 在很多方面,弗吉尼亚是马萨诸塞的反面。他们的谋杀率非常高,而人们实际上被鼓励用决斗(富人)和暴力(穷人)来回应对他们荣誉的轻慢。他们沉迷于赌博,“不仅仅在马,扑克,斗鸡,和十五子棋上打赌,而且还在庄稼,价格,妇女和天气上下注”。 Their cuisine focused on gigantic sumptuous feasts of animals killed in horrible ways. There were no witchcraft trials, but there were people who were fined for disrupting the peace by accusing their neighbors of witchcraft. Their church sermons were twenty minutes long on the dot. 他们的饮食注重巨大奢靡的欢宴,充斥着用各种可怕方法杀死的动物。这里没有女巫审判,倒是有人因为指控其邻居是女巫而犯了寻衅滋事被罚款的。他们的教会布道只有20分钟那么长。 The Puritans naturally thought of the Virginians as completely lawless reprobate sinners, but this is not entirelytrue. Virginian church sermons might have been twenty minutes long, but Virginian ballroom dance lessons could last nine hours. It wasn’t that the Virginians weren’t bound by codes, just that those codes were social rather than moral. 清教徒自然认为弗吉尼亚人是完全不遵法纪的邪恶罪人,但是这并不是完全正确的。弗吉尼亚教会的讲道也许只有20分钟,但其舞池中的交谊舞教学课可以长达九小时。并不是弗吉尼亚人不受法规约束,只是这些法规是社交上的,而不是道德上的。 And Virginian nobles weren’t just random jerks, they were carefully cultivated jerks. Planters spared no expense to train their sons to be strong, forceful, and not take nothin’ from nobody. They would encourage and reward children for being loud and temperamental, on the grounds that this indicated a strong personality and having a strong personality was fitting of a noble. 而且弗吉尼亚贵族并不仅仅是混蛋,他们是被精心教化过的混蛋。种植园主不惜代价训练他们的儿子,令其强壮、坚决,不受任何人摆弄。他们会因孩子们声音洪亮、感情激烈而加以鼓励和奖励,因为这意味着强烈的个性,而有强烈个性和做一个贵族是相符的。 When this worked, it worked really well – witness natural leaders and self-driven polymaths like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. More often it failed catastrophically – the rate of sex predation and rape in Virginia was at least as high as anywhere else in North America. 当这种做法奏效时,它确实有很好的效果——天然的领袖和自我激励的博学者例如乔治·华盛顿和托马斯·杰弗逊即是明证。更多的时候,这做法导致了灾难性的失败,弗吉尼亚的性侵犯和强奸率至少和北美其他地方一样高。 The Virginian Cavaliers had an obsession with liberty, but needless to say it was not exactly a sort of liberty of which the ACLU would approve. I once heard someone argue against libertarians like so: even if the government did not infringe on liberties, we would still be unfree for other reasons. If we had to work, we would be subject to the whim of bosses. If we were poor, we would not be “free” to purchase most of the things we want. In any case, we are “oppressed” by disease, famine, and many other things besides government that prevent us from implementing our ideal existence. 弗吉尼亚骑士党着迷于自由,但是不用说,这自由不完全等同于美国民权自由联盟(ACLU)所支持的那种自由。我曾听某人和自由意志主义者做如此争辩:即使政府不侵犯我们的自由,我们仍然会因为其他原因不自由。如果我们必须工作,我们就会被老板的兴之所至所限制。如果我们贫穷,我们就不可能“自由的”购买我们所需的大部分物品。在任何时候,我们都会被疾病、饥饿和其他很多政府之外的事情“压迫”,来阻止我们达到理想的状态。 The Virginians took this idea and ran with it – in the wrong direction. No, they said, we wouldn’t be free if we had to work, therefore we insist upon not working. No, we wouldn’t be free if we were limited by poverty, therefore we insist upon being extremely rich. Needless to say, this conception of freedom required first indentured servitude and later slavery to make it work, but the Virginians never claimed that the servants or slaves were free. 弗吉尼亚人采纳了这个主意,并且践行了它——在错误的方向上。不,他们说,如果我们必须工作,我们不可能自由,所以我们坚持不工作。不,如果我们被贫穷限制,我们不可能自由,所以我们坚持要极度的富有。无需多言,要实行这种自由观念,起先要求契约仆人的服侍,而后要求奴隶的劳动,但弗吉尼亚人从来没有宣称仆人或奴隶是自由的。 That wasn’t the point. Freedom, like wealth, was properly distributed according to rank; nobles had as much as they wanted, the middle-class enough to get by on, and everyone else none at all. And a Virginian noble would have gone to his grave insisting that a civilization without slavery could never have citizens who were truly free. 问题不在这里。自由,像财富一样,按照等级进行恰当分配;贵族想要多少就要多少,中间阶层也得到了足够的,而其他人则什么也没有。一个弗吉尼亚贵族可能至死都会坚持:没有奴隶制的文明,不可能有真正自由的公民。 C: The Quakers C:贵格会 Fischer warns against the temptation to think of the Quakers as normal modern people, but he has to warn us precisely because it’s so tempting. Where the Puritans seem like a dystopian caricature of virtue and the Cavaliers like a dystopian caricature of vice, the Quakers just seem ordinary. Yes, they’re kind of a religious cult, but they’re the kind of religious cult any of us might found if we were thrown back to the seventeenth century. Fischer警告我们小心那种想要把贵格会看作正常现代人的倾向,但是他之所以不得不警告我们,恰好就是因为这种想法是如此诱人。清教徒看上去像关于德行的敌托邦讽刺画,骑士党看起来像关于邪恶的敌托邦讽刺画,而贵格会则看起来刚好正常。是的,他们是一种教派,但是他们是那种我们中任何人如果穿越回17世纪都会成立的教派。 Instead they were founded by a weaver’s son named George Fox. He believed people were basically good and had an Inner Light that connected them directly to God without a need for priesthood, ritual, Bible study, or self-denial; mostly people just needed to listen to their consciences and be nice. Since everyone was equal before God, there was no point in holding up distinctions between lords and commoners: Quakers would just address everybody as “Friend”. 其实贵格会是被一个纺织工的儿子George Fox创立的。他相信,人基本上是善的,而且人心有内在的光亮,可以把人和上帝直接联系起来,不需要牧师、仪式、解经或者自我否定;大部分时候,人只需要听从他们良心的召唤,为人友善。因为每个人在神面前都是平等的,所以没有任何理由坚持领主和平民之间的分别:贵格会对每个人都以“朋友”称呼。 And since the Quakers were among the most persecuted sects at the time, they developed an insistence on tolerance and freedom of religion which (unlike the Puritans) they stuck to even when shifting fortunes put them on top. They believed in pacificism, equality of the sexes, racial harmony, and a bunch of other things which seem pretty hippy-ish even today let alone in 1650. 而且因为贵格会在当时是最受迫害的宗派,他们发展出了对宗教宽容和信仰自由的坚持,这点不像清教徒。他们甚至在自身有幸掌权时,仍然坚持这点。他们信仰和平主义、性别平等、种族和谐,以及其他很多即使在今天看来都很嬉皮士的观念,更遑论在1650年。 England’s top Quaker in the late 1600s was William Penn. Penn is universally known to Americans as “that guy Pennsylvania is named after” but actually was a larger-than-life 17th century superman. Born to the nobility, Penn distinguished himself early on as a military officer; he was known for beating legendary duelists in single combat and then sparing their lives with sermons about how murder was wrong. 17世纪晚期,英国最重要的贵格会信徒是William Penn。对大多数美国人而言,他只是因“宾夕法尼亚以其得名”而广为人知。但其实,他是17世纪的超凡人物。生于贵族之家,Penn早年担任军官,崭露头角;他因以下事迹而著名:在一对一决斗中击败传奇般的对手们,而后饶过其性命,并发表讲道,指出谋杀是错误的。 He gradually started having mystical visions, quit the military, and converted to Quakerism. Like many Quakers he was arrested for blasphemy; unlike many Quakers, they couldn’t make the conviction stick; in his trial he “conducted his defense so brilliantly that the jurors refused to convict him even when threatened with prison themselves, [and] the case became a landmark in the history of trial by jury.” 渐渐的,他开始经历神秘的异象,退出军旅,改宗成为贵格会信徒。就像很多贵格会信徒一样,他因渎神被逮捕;和许多贵格会信徒不同,审判者没能给他定罪;在审判中,他“如此精彩的辩护,以至于陪审团成员甚至在面对牢狱之灾威胁时,都不肯定他的罪,而且该案成为了陪审团审判历史上的里程碑。” When the state finally found a pretext on which to throw him in prison, he spent his incarceration composing “one of the noblest defenses of religious liberty ever written”, conducting a successful mail-based courtship with England’s most eligible noblewoman, and somehow gaining the personal friendship and admiration of King Charles II. 当政府终于找到借口将其投入监狱时,他在狱中创作了“有史以来,对宗教自由的最高贵辩护之一的文章”,以信件形式向英国最有贵族资格的女士成功求爱,而且不知何故得到了查理二世的个人友谊和敬佩。 Upon his release the King liked him so much that he gave him a large chunk of the Eastern United States on a flimsy pretext of repaying a family debt. Penn didn’t want to name his new territory Pennsylvania – he recommended just “Sylvania” – but everybody else overruled him and Pennyslvania it was. 获释之后,国王如此喜爱他,以至于把美国东部的一大片以偿还家庭债务的单薄借口划给了他。Penn不想把他的新领地命名为宾夕法尼亚——他推荐的命名仅仅是“夕法尼亚”——但是其他所有人否决了他的意见,宾夕法尼亚就这样得名。 The grant wasn’t quite the same as the modern state, but a chunk of land around the Delaware River Valley – what today we would call eastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, southern New Jersey, and bits of Maryland – centered on the obviously-named-by-Quakers city of Philadelphia. 授予Penn的这份领地和现在宾州的疆域并不完全一样,而是德拉维尔河谷周围的一大片土地——今天我们称为宾夕法尼亚东部、德拉维尔北部、新泽西南部,以及很小一部分马里兰州的地区——该地区的中心的费城,显然是由贵格会命名的【编注:Philadelphia一词希腊文本意为“兄弟情谊”】。 Penn decided his new territory would be a Quaker refuge – his exact wording was “a colony of Heaven [for] the children of the Light”. He mandated universal religious toleration, a total ban on military activity, and a government based on checks and balances that would “leave myself and successors no power of doing mischief, that the will of one man may not hinder the good of a whole country”. Penn决定把他的新领土变成贵格会的避难地——他的原话是“一个面向圣光之子们的天国殖民地”。他强制实施普遍的宗教宽容,完全禁止军事活动,基于分权和制衡的政府将“不会给我自己和继任者留下作恶的权力,个人的意志不会妨害整个国家的益处”。 His recruits – about 20,000 people in total – were Quakers from the north of England, many of them minor merchants and traders. They disproportionately included the Britons of Norse descent common in that region, who formed a separate stratum and had never really gotten along with the rest of the British population. They were joined by several German sects close enough to Quakers that they felt at home there; these became the ancestors of (among other groups) the Pennsylvania Dutch, Amish, and Mennonites. 他招募了总共大约两万人——他们是英格兰北部的贵格会信徒,很多是小商小贩。不成比例地,他们中很多是那个区域很常见的具有北欧血统的英国人,构成了不列颠的一个特殊阶层,并且从未和其他不列颠人真正融合在一起。几个和贵格会近似的德国宗派加入了他们,教义相似使得这些人在那里能找到家的感觉;这些人和其他一些团体成为了德裔宾州人、阿米绪人和门诺派的祖先。 INTERESTING QUAKER FACTS: 关于贵格会的有趣事实: 1. In 1690 a gang of pirates stole a ship in Philadelphia and went up and down the Delaware River stealing and plundering. The Quakers got in a heated (but brotherly) debate about whether it was morally permissible to use violence to stop them. When the government finally decided to take action, contrarian minister George Keith dissented and caused a major schism in the faith. 在1690年,一帮海盗在费城偷了一艘船,在德拉维尔河上四处偷盗劫掠。贵格会信徒们展开了一场激烈(但是兄弟般的)辩论,讨论用暴力阻止这帮海盗在道德上是否合理。当政府最终决定采取行动,持反对意见的牧师George Keith表示不同意,并引发了信仰上的一次重大分裂。 2. Fischer argues that the Quaker ban on military activity within their territory would have doomed them in most other American regions, but by extreme good luck the Indians in the Delaware Valley were almost as peaceful as the Quakers. As usual, at least some credit goes to William Penn, who taught himself Algonquin so he could negotiate with the Indians in their own language. Fischer认为贵格会在他们的领土上禁止军事活动,在全美大部分别的地区可能都会给他们带来悲惨的命运。然而非常幸运的是,德拉维尔谷地的印第安人几乎和贵格会会众一样和平。和通常一样,这至少部分功绩归于William Penn,他自学了Algonquin语,所以他可以用印第安人的母语与其谈判。 3. The Quakers’ marriage customs combined a surprisingly modern ideas of romance, with extreme bureaucracy. The wedding process itself had sixteen stages, including “ask parents”, “ask community women”, “ask community men”, “community women ask parents”, and “obtain a certificate of cleanliness”. William Penn’s marriage apparently had forty-six witnesses to testify to the good conduct and non-relatedness of both parties. 贵格会信徒的婚姻习俗结合了令人惊讶的现代浪漫创意和极端的官僚化。婚姻过程本身有十六个阶段,包括“问询父母”,“问询社区里的妇人”,“问询社区里的男人”,“社区里的妇人问询父母”,以及“获得一个清白认证”。William Penn的婚姻显然有46位证人,见证夫妻双方都德行良好,没有亲属关系。 4. Possibly related: 16% of Quaker women were unmarried by age 50, compared to only about 2% of Puritans. 可能相关的事实:16%的贵格会妇女到50岁时都没有结婚,清教徒中这一数字仅为2%。 5. Quakers promoted gender equality, including the (at the time scandalous) custom of allowing women to preach (condemned by the Puritans as the crime of “she-preaching”). 贵格会推行性别平等,包括允许妇女讲道(在那时算是丑闻,被清教徒谴责为“妇女讲道”罪) 6. But they were such prudes about sex that even the Puritansthought they went too far. Pennsylvania doctors had problems treating Quakers because they would “delicately describe everything from neck to waist as their ‘stomachs’, and anything from waist to feet as their ‘ankles'”. 但是他们对性十分的正经,甚至清教徒都认为他们在这方面走得太远。宾州医生在治疗贵格会会众时会遇到麻烦,因为他们“故意把所有从颈到腰的部位都称为‘肚子’,而任何从腰到脚的地方都称为‘脚踝’”。 7. Quaker parents Richard and Abigail Lippincott named their eight children, in order, “Remember”, “John”, “Restore”, “Freedom”, “Increase”, “Jacob”, “Preserve”, and “Israel”, so that their names combined formed a simple prayer. 贵格会的一对父母Richard和Abigail Lippincott把他们的八个孩子按顺序起名叫做,“记得”,“约翰”,“恢复”,“自由”,“增加”,“雅各”,“存留”,“以色列”,他们的名字合起来构成一个简单的祷词。 8. Quakers had surprisingly modern ideas about parenting, basically sheltering and spoiling their children at a time when everyone else was trying whip the Devil out of them. 贵格会在教养孩童方面有着令人惊讶的现代观点,在那个其他人都试图从孩子身上赶出魔鬼的时代,他们基本上是保护和宠爱孩子的。 9. “A Quaker preacher, traveling in the more complaisant colony of Maryland, came upon a party of young people who were dancing merrily together. He broke in upon them like an avenging angel, stopped the dance, and demanded to know if they considered Martin Luther to be a good man. The astonished youngsters answered in the affirmative. The Quaker evangelist then quoted Luther on the subject of dancing: ‘as many paces as the man takes in his dance, so many steps he takes toward Hell. This, the Quaker missionary gloated with a gleam of sadistic satisfaction, ‘spoiled their sport’.” “一个贵格会的传道人,在更殷勤有礼的马里兰殖民地旅行时,遇到了一群年轻人在欢快的跳舞。他如复仇天使般闯入其中,停止了舞会,要求众人考虑马丁·路德是否是个好人。被惊呆的年轻人给出了肯定的答案。这位贵格会传道人接着引用了路德关于跳舞的评论:‘一个人在舞蹈中跳多少步,就朝地狱走了多少步。’这个贵格会传道人带着一种施虐的快感吹嘘,‘毁掉了他们的活动’。” 10. William Penn wrote about thirty books defending liberty of conscience throughout his life. The Quaker obsession with the individual conscience as the work of God helped invent the modern idea of conscientious objection. 终其一生,William Penn写下了约三十本书,为良心自由辩护。贵格会着迷于把个人良心看作是上帝的造物,这促进了因良心拒绝服兵役这一现代观念的产生。 11. Quakers were heavily (and uniquely for their period) opposed to animal cruelty. When foreigners introduced bullbaiting into Philadelphia during the 1700s, the mayor bought a ticket supposedly as a spectator. When the event was about to begin, he leapt into the ring, personally set the bull free, and threatened to arrest anybody who stopped him. 贵格会会众十分强力的反对虐待动物(在他们的时代,这是很独特的)。当外地人在18世纪把猎犬咬牛游戏引入费城时,市长买了一张票,本应作为观众呆在现场。当活动快开始时,他跃入场地,自己把牛放走,并威胁逮捕任何阻止他的人。 12. On the other hand, they were also opposed to other sports for what seem like kind of random reasons. The town of Morley declared an anathema against foot races, saying that they were “unfruitful works of darkness”. 在另一方面,他们借着各种任意的理由,反对各种其他运动。Morley镇宣布取缔长跑,因为长跑是“黑暗徒劳的工作”。 13. The Pennsylvania Quakers became very prosperous merchants and traders. They also had a policy of loaning money at low- or zero- interest to other Quakers, which let them outcompete other, less religious businesspeople. 宾夕法尼亚的贵格会信徒成了非常兴旺的商人。他们也有着一项以低利率或零利率贷款给其他贵格会成员的政策,这使得贵格会会众比其他更少宗教化的人更有竞争优势。 14. They were among the first to replace the set of bows, grovels, nods, meaningful looks, and other British customs of acknowledging rank upon greeting with a single rank-neutral equivalent – the handshake. 把英国的等级化问候动作,如鞠躬、下拜、点头、注目礼等等,更换为不具有等级意味的握手礼,贵格会是首先实施这种变革的群体之一。 15. Pennsylvania was one of the first polities in the western world to abolish the death penalty. 宾夕法尼亚是在西方世界首先废除死刑的政治体之一。 16. The Quakers were lukewarm on education, believing that too much schooling obscured the natural Inner Light. Fischer declares it “typical of William Penn” that he wrote a book arguing against reading too much. 贵格会会众对教育有些冷淡,认为太多学校教育会掩蔽人内心自然的灵性之光。Fischer宣称这是“William Penn的典型做法”,他写了一本书来反对过多的阅读。 17. The Quakers not only instituted religious freedom, but made laws against mocking another person’s religion. 贵格会会众不仅仅制定了宗教自由制度,还颁布法律,禁止嘲笑他人的宗教。 18. In the late 1600s as many as 70% of upper-class Quakers owned slaves, but Pennsylvania essentially invented modern abolitionism. Although their colonial masters in England forbade them from banning slavery outright, they applied immense social pressure and by the mid 1700s less than 10% of the wealthy had African slaves. As soon as the American Revolution started, forbidding slavery was one of independent Pennsylvania’s first actions. 在17世纪晚期,多达70%的上层贵格会人士拥有奴隶,但是宾夕法尼亚的确发明了现代废奴主义。虽然他们在英国的殖民地宗主们不准他们公然废除奴隶制,但是他们施加了巨大的社会压力,到18世纪中叶,少于10%的富裕阶层拥有黑奴。美国革命一开始,废奴就成为了宾州独立后的第一批举措之一。 Pennsylvania was very successful for a while; it had some of the richest farmland in the colonies, and the Quakers were exceptional merchants and traders; so much so that they were forgiven their military non-intervention during the Revolution because of their role keeping the American economy afloat in the face of British sanctions. 宾夕法尼亚曾非常成功;它拥有殖民地当中最肥沃的农地,贵格会会众是出色的商人;这些优势如此之大,以至于独立战争期间,他们的军事不干涉态度得到了原谅,因为面临英国的制裁,他们起到了支撑美国经济的作用。 But by 1750, the Quakers were kind of on their way out; by 1750, they were a demographic minority in Pennsylvania, and by 1773 they were a minority in its legislature as well. In 1750 Quakerism was the third-largest religion in the US; by 1820 it was the ninth-largest, and by 1981 it was the sixty-sixth largest. 但是到1750年代,贵格会信徒日渐式微;到1750年,他们变成了宾州人口上的少数派,到1773年,他们又变成了宾州立法机构中的少数。在1750年,贵格主义是美国的第三大宗教;到1820年,变成了第九大,到1981年,变成了第六十六大。 What happened? The Quakers basically tolerated themselves out of existence. They were so welcoming to religious minorities and immigrants that all these groups took up shop in Pennsylvania and ended its status as a uniquely Quaker society. At the same time, the Quakers themselves became more “fanatical” and many dropped out of politics believing it to be too worldly a concern for them; this was obviously fatal to their political domination. 发生了什么呢?贵格会信徒基本上是因宽容而使得他们自己逐步消逝。他们如此欢迎少数教派和移民,这些人占据了宾州,结束了宾州贵格会一统天下的状态。同时,贵格会自身变得更具属灵热忱,许多人从政治领域退出,他们认为该领域对于他们而言属于过于世俗的关怀;这对于他们的政治影响力显然是致命的。 The most famous Pennsylvanian statesman of the Revolutionary era, Benjamin Franklin, was not a Quaker at all but a first-generation immigrant from New England. Finally, Quakerism was naturally extra-susceptible to that thing where Christian denominations become indistinguishable from liberal modernity and fade into the secular background. 独立战争时期最著名的宾州政治家是本杰明·富兰克林。他完全不是贵格会信徒,而是来自新英格兰的第一代移民。最后,贵格主义自然而然地特别易于受这一趋势影响:即基督教派日渐变得和自由主义现代性难以区分,从而渐渐融于世俗背景中去。 But Fischer argues that Quakerism continued to shape Pennsylvania long after it had stopped being officially in charge, in much the same way that Englishmen themselves have contributed disproportionately to American institutions even though they are now a numerical minority. The Pennsylvanian leadership on abolitionism, penal reform, the death penalty, and so on all happened after the colony was officially no longer Quaker-dominated. 但是Fischer争辩说,在退出官方主导地位后,贵格主义的影响在宾州持续了很长一段时间,正如英国裔本身对美国的制度有着不成比例的巨大贡献那样,即使他们现在是数量上的少数派。宾州在废奴、刑罚改革、死刑等等方面的领袖地位全部出现在该殖民地官方不再被贵格会掌控之后。 And it’s hard not to see Quaker influence on the ideas of the modern US – which was after all founded in Philadelphia. In the middle of the Puritans demanding strict obedience to their dystopian hive society and the Cavaliers demanding everybody bow down to a transplanted nobility, the Pennsylvanians – who became the thought leaders of the Mid-Atlantic region including to a limited degree New York City – were pretty normal and had a good opportunity to serve as power-brokers and middlemen between the North and South. Although there are seeds of traditionally American ideas in every region, the Quakers really stand out in terms of freedom of religion, freedom of thought, checks and balances, and the idea of universal equality. 而且,很难忽略贵格会对现代美国理念上的影响——不管如何,现代美国创建于费城。清教徒严格要求服从他们的敌托邦集体主义社会,骑士党人要求每个人都在移植的贵族制度中鞠躬,介于两者之间,宾夕法尼亚人——作为中大西洋地区,一定程度上也包括纽约市的思想领袖——则相当正常,并且有很好的机会作为南方和北方的中间人和权力经纪人。虽然在每个区域都有美国传统观念的种子,贵格会在宗教自由、思想自由、分权制衡和普世平等理念上真的表现很突出。 It occurs to me that William Penn might be literally the single most successful person in history. He started out as a minor noble following a religious sect that everybody despised and managed to export its principles to Pennsylvania where they flourished and multiplied. Pennsylvania then managed to export its principles to the United States, and the United States exported them to the world. I’m not sure how much of the suspiciously Quaker character of modern society is a direct result of William Penn, but he was in one heck of a right place at one heck of a right time 我突然想到,William Penn也许真的是史上最成功的个人。一开始,作为一个小贵族,他皈依了一个人人蔑视的宗派,他尽力把该宗派的原则输出到了宾夕法尼亚,让其发扬光大。宾夕法尼亚则尽力把它的原则输出到美国,而美国则将之输出到全世界。我不确定现代社会的贵格会特征有多大可能是William Penn的直接成果,但他的确是一个在非常正确的时间,出现在非常正确的地点的人。 D: The Borderers D: 边民们 The Borderers are usually called “the Scots-Irish”, but Fischer dislikes the term because they are neither Scots (as we usually think of Scots) nor Irish (as we usually think of Irish). Instead, they’re a bunch of people who lived on (both sides of) the Scottish-English border in the late 1600s. 边民们经常被叫做“苏格兰-爱尔兰人”,但是Fischer不喜欢这个称谓,因为他们既不是如我们通常想象的苏格兰人,也不是如我们通常想象的爱尔兰人。相反,他们是一群17世纪晚期生活在苏格兰-英格兰边界两侧的人。 None of this makes sense without realizing that the Scottish-English border was terrible. Every couple of years the King of England would invade Scotland or vice versa; “from the year 1040 to 1745, every English monarch but three suffered a Scottish invasion, or became an invader in his turn”. These “invasions” generally involved burning down all the border towns and killing a bunch of people there. 如果没有意识到苏格兰-英格兰边境曾极其可怕,事情就说不通。每隔几年,英格兰的国王就会侵略苏格兰,或者反之;“从1040年到1745年,除了三个君主之外,每个英格兰君主都遭遇过苏格兰的入侵,或者反之变成了入侵者”;这些“入侵”总的来说,就是烧毁所有边境城镇,杀死那地区的一大批人。 Eventually the two sides started getting pissed with each other and would also torture-murder all of the enemy’s citizens they could get their hands on, ie any who were close enough to the border to reach before the enemy could send in their armies. As if this weren’t bad enough, outlaws quickly learned they could plunder one side of the border, then escape to the other before anyone brought them to justice, so the whole area basically became one giant cesspool of robbery and murder. 最终,双方都被激怒了,开始虐杀所有落入手中的对方平民,也就是任何住的离边境足够近、在敌方军队赶来前就能实施侵害的人。好像嫌这还不够糟,法外匪徒很快学到他们可以在边境一侧抢掠,而后在被绳之以法前,逃到另一边去。所以整个地区基本上是充满抢劫谋杀的血腥地狱。 In response to these pressures, the border people militarized and stayed feudal long past the point where the rest of the island had started modernizing. Life consisted of farming the lands of whichever brutal warlord had the top hand today, followed by being called to fight for him on short notice, followed by a grisly death. The border people dealt with it as best they could, and developed a culture marked by extreme levels of clannishness, xenophobia, drunkenness, stubbornness, and violence. 面对这些压力,边民武装了起来,在大不列颠岛的其他地方已经开始现代化之后很久,他们还保持着封建制度。生活由以下部分构成:耕种土地,这些土地属于当时军阀混战的胜利者,服从突然而至的上战场的征召,面对悲惨的死亡。边民在此条件下,竭力挣扎求活,发展出一种以极端小集团、排外、酗酒、倔强和暴力为特征的文化。 By the end of the 1600s, the Scottish and English royal bloodlines had intermingled and the two countries were drifting closer and closer to Union. The English kings finally got some breathing room and noticed – holy frick, everything about the border is terrible. 到1600年代末,苏格兰和英格兰的皇族变得血脉相连,两个国家开始接近并组成联邦【编注:1603年苏格兰国王詹姆斯六世继承英格兰王位,成为英格兰的詹姆斯一世】。此后的英格兰国王们终于缓过气来,并且发现——天哪,边境的一切都很可怕。 They decided to make the region economically productive, which meant “squeeze every cent out of the poor Borderers, in the hopes of either getting lots of money from them or else forcing them to go elsewhere and become somebody else’s problem”. Sometimes absentee landlords would just evict everyone who lived in an entire region, en masse, replacing them with people they expected to be easier to control. 他们决定让这个地区在经济产出上有效,这意味着“从贫穷边民身上榨出每一分钱,目的是要么从边民那里得到很多收入,要么强迫他们搬到别处,变成他人的麻烦。”有时候,外居的领主会直接把整个区域的居民驱逐,代之以他们预期会更好控制的人。 Many of the Borderers fled to Ulster in Ireland, which England was working on colonizing as a Protestant bulwark against the Irish Catholics, and where the Crown welcomed violent warlike people as a useful addition to their Irish-Catholic-fighting project. But Ulster had some of the same problems as the Border, and also the Ulsterites started worrying that the Borderer cure was worse than the Irish Catholic disease. So the Borderers started getting kicked out of Ulster too, one thing led to another, and eventually 250,000 of these people ended up in America. 许多边民逃到爱尔兰的阿尔斯特,英国人当时正要在此地殖民,将之变成新教针对爱尔兰天主教的堡垒。所以皇室欢迎暴力好战的人,用于补充他们和爱尔兰天主教的斗争工程。但是阿尔斯特也有一些和边境地区相同的麻烦,而阿尔斯特人也开始担忧,边民作为一种解药,也许比爱尔兰天主教这一疾病更糟。所以边民又开始被驱逐出阿尔斯特,事情接踵而至,最终边民中有25万人移居美国。 250,000 people is a lot of Borderers. By contrast, the great Puritan emigration wave was only 20,000 or so people; even the mighty colony of Virginia only had about 50,000 original settlers. So these people showed up on the door of the American colonies, and the American colonies collectively took one look at them and said “nope”. 25万人可是很大一批。对比之下,清教徒移民大潮只有2万人左右;即使是弗吉尼亚巨大的殖民地,也只有5万初始殖民者。所以当这些人出现在北美殖民地的大门口,各个殖民地一齐打量了他们一下,然后说“不”。 Except, of course, the Quakers. The Quakers talked among themselves and decided that these people were also Children Of God, and so they should demonstrate Brotherly Love by taking them in. They tried that for a couple of years, and then they questioned their life choices and also said “nope”, and they told the Borderers that Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley were actually kind of full right now but there was lots of unoccupied land in WesternPennsylvania, and the Appalachian Mountains were very pretty at this time of year, so why didn’t they head out that way as fast as it was physically possible to go? 当然,贵格会会众例外。贵格会内部进行了讨论,认定这些人也是上帝的孩子,所以他们应该彰显兄弟之爱,接纳边民们。他们尝试了几年,然后他们对自己的选择产生了疑问,也转向了说“不”。他们告诉边民,费城和德拉威尔河谷现在其实已经很满了,但是西宾夕法尼亚有很多无主之地,而阿巴拉契亚山脉在这个季节也很好,为什么不向那些方向尽快开拓,趁着自然条件还允许? At the time, the Appalachians were kind of the booby prize of American colonization: hard to farm, hard to travel through, and exposed to hostile Indians. The Borderers fell in love with them. They came from a pretty marginal and unproductive territory themselves, and the Appalachians were far away from everybody and full of fun Indians to fight. 在那时,阿巴拉契亚的群山对北美殖民者来说,是分给最后一名的奖品:很难耕种,很难通行,暴露于充满敌意的印第安人面前。边民却爱上了它们。他们本就来自贫瘠的边缘化的故土,而阿巴拉契亚群山远离所有人,充满了与印第安人战斗的乐趣。 Soon the Appalachian strategy became the accepted response to Borderer immigration and was taken up from Pennsylvania in the north to the Carolinas in the South (a few New Englanders hit on a similar idea and sent their own Borderers to colonize the mountains of New Hampshire). 很快,阿巴拉契亚策略成为了对移入边民的既定策略,北到宾夕法尼亚,南到卡罗莱纳的殖民地都加以采纳(几个新英格兰殖民地也想出了相似的办法,把他们自己的边民打发到新罕布什尔的群山去殖民)。 So the Borderers all went to Appalachia and established their own little rural clans there and nothing at all went wrong except for the entire rest of American history. 所以边民们都去了阿巴拉契亚,建立了他们自己的小群农村宗族,一切都相安无事,除了整个美国历史被大大影响。 INTERESTING BORDERER FACTS: 关于边民的有趣事实: 1. Colonial opinion on the Borderers differed within a very narrow range: one Pennsylvanian writer called them “the scum of two nations”, another Anglican clergyman called them “the scum of the universe”. 对边民,殖民地人们的看法相去不远:一个宾夕法尼亚作家把他们叫做“两个国家之间的渣滓”,另一个国教会牧师把他们叫做“宇宙的渣滓”。 2. Some Borderers tried to come to America as indentured servants, but after Virginian planters got some experience with Borderers they refused to accept any more. 一些边民试图以契约仆人身份来美国,但是在弗吉尼亚种植园主得到了一些关于边民的教训后,他们不再接收边民。 3. The Borderers were mostly Presbyterians, and their arrival en massestarted a race among the established American denominations to convert them. This was mostly unsuccessful; Anglican preacher Charles Woodmason, an important source for information about the early Borderers, said that during his missionary activity the Borderers “disrupted his service, rioted while he preached, started a pack of dogs fighting outside the church, loosed his horse, stole his church key, refused him food and shelter, and gave two barrels of whiskey to his congregation before a service of communion”. 边民们大部分是长老会信徒,他们的成群到达开启了一场其他既有美国宗派转化他们的竞赛。基本上,这是不成功的;国教会传道人 Charles Woodmason是研究早期边民的重要资料来源。他说在他的传道活动期间,边民“打断他的侍奉,在其讲道时作乱,在教会外面斗狗,放了他的马,偷了他的教堂钥匙,拒绝给他食物和住宿,在一次擘饼聚会时,给他的会众两桶威士忌。 4. Borderer town-naming policy was very different from the Biblical names of the Puritans or the Ye Olde English names of the Virginians. Early Borderer settlements include – just to stick to the creek-related ones – Lousy Creek, Naked Creek, Shitbritches Creek, Cuckold’s Creek, Bloodrun Creek, Pinchgut Creek, Whipping Creek, and Hangover Creek. There were also Whiskey Springs, Hell’s Half Acre, Scream Ridge, Scuffle town, and Grab town. The overall aesthetic honestly sounds a bit Orcish. 边民的集镇命名规则非常不同于清教徒的圣经命名法,或者弗吉尼亚人的仿古英文命名法。早期边民殖民点中和溪流有关的名字有——糟糕溪,裸露溪,烂裤衩溪,戴绿帽溪,流血溪,吃不饱溪,鞭打溪,以及宿醉溪。当然,也有威士忌泉,地狱半英亩,尖叫岭,混战镇,揪住镇。总体审美的确听来有些野蛮。 5. One of the first Borderer leaders was John Houston. On the ship over to America, the crew tried to steal some of his possessions; Houston retaliated by leading a mutiny of the passengers, stealing the ship, and sailing it to America himself. He settled in West Virginia; one of his descendants was famous Texan Sam Houston. 第一代边民的领袖之一是约翰·休斯顿。在来美国的船上,船员试图偷窃他的财产;作为报复,他领导乘客发动事变,劫持了船,自己航行到美国。他在西弗吉尼亚安顿下来,后代之一,就是著名的德州佬山姆·休斯顿。 6. Traditional Borderer prayer: “Lord, grant that I may always be right, for thou knowest I am hard to turn.” 传统的边民祷词:“上帝,让我一直都走对路吧,因为你最清楚,我是难以回转的。” 7. “The back country folk bragged that one interior county of North Carolina had so little ‘larnin’ that the only literate inhabitant was elected ‘county reader'” “荒野的乡民吹嘘北卡的一个内陆郡是如此的缺乏‘蚊化’,以至于唯一识字的定居者被选为“‘郡阅读员’”。 8. The Borderer accent contained English, Scottish, and Irish elements, and is (uncoincidentally) very similar to the typical “country western singer” accent of today. 边民的口音包括了英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰元素,而且并非巧合,它和今天的“乡村西部歌手”腔调十分相似。 9. The Borderers were famous for family feuds in England, including the Johnson clan’s habit of “adorning their houses with the flayed skins of their enemies the Maxwells in a blood feud that continued for many generations”. The great family feuds of the United States, like the Hatfield-McCoy feud, are a direct descendent of this tradition. 边民在英格兰以家族世仇闻名,包括Johnson宗族的习惯:“在持续多代的血腥世仇中,用他们的敌人,Maxwells家族身上剥下来的皮装饰自己的房子”。在美国,大型的家族世仇,比如Hatfield家族与McCoy家族的世仇,则直接继承自这种传统。 10. Within-clan marriage was a popular Borderer tradition both in England and Appalachia; “in the Cumbrian parish of Hawkshead, for example, both the bride and the groom bore the same last names in 25 percent of all marriages from 1568 to 1704”. This led to the modern stereotype of Appalachians as inbred and incestuous. 在英格兰和阿巴拉契亚,宗族内婚都是边民流行的传统;“例如在Hawkshead的Cumbrian教区,从1568年到1704年,25%的新郎和新娘都有着相同的姓。”这导致了现代对阿巴拉契亚山民的刻板印象:近亲繁殖和内婚盛行。 11. The Borderers were extremely patriarchal and anti-women’s-rights to a degree that appalled even the people of the 1700s. 边民极端家长制,反对女权,其极端程度甚至吓坏了十八世纪的人们。 12. “In the year 1767, [Anglican priest] Charles Woodmason calculated that 94 percent of backcountry brides whom he had married in the past year were pregnant on their wedding day” “在1767年,国教会牧师Charles Woodmason统计,上一年度他主持结婚的乡下新娘中有94%在婚礼之日已经怀孕了。” 13. Although the Borderers started off Presbyterian, they were in constant religious churn and their territories were full of revivals, camp meetings, born-again evangelicalism, and itinerant preachers. Eventually most of them ended up as what we now call Southern Baptist. 虽然边民本来信长老会,但他们持续处于信仰流失中,而他们的领地上则充满了复兴、营会、重生福音主义和巡回布道者。最终,他们中大部分变成了我们现在所称的南方浸信会信徒。 14. Borderer folk beliefs: “If an old woman has only one tooth, she is a witch”, “If you are awake at eleven, you will see witches”, “The howling of dogs shows the presence of witches”, “If your shoestring comes untied, witches are after you”, “If a warm current of air is felt, witches are passing”. Also, “wet a rag in your enemy’s blood, put it behind a rock in the chimney, and when it rots your enemy will die”; apparently it was not a coincidence they were thinking about witches so much. 边民相信:“如果一个老妇人只有一颗牙,她就是个女巫”,“如果你在11点醒来,你会看到女巫”,“嚎叫的狗显示了女巫的存在”,“如果你的鞋带松了,女巫在跟着你”,“如果空气中有一股暖流,女巫正在经过”。而且,“用抹布沾湿敌人的血,把它放在烟囱里的一块石头后面,当它烂掉,你的敌人就会死了”;显然,他们如此多的考虑女巫,不是巧合。 15. Borderer medical beliefs: “A cure for homesickness is to sew a good charge of gunpowder on the inside of ths shirt near the neck”. That’ll cure homesickness, all right. 边民的医疗观念:“治疗思乡的方子是在衬衫靠近脖子的部位缝上大量火药”。好吧,这会治好乡愁。 16. More Borderer medical beliefs: “For fever, cut a black chicken open while alive and bind it to the bottom of your foot”, “Eating the brain of a screech owl is the only dependable remedy for headache”, “For rheumatism, apply split frogs to the feet”, “To reduce a swollen leg, split a live cat and apply while still warm”, “Bite the head off the first butterfly you see and you will get a new dress”, “Open the cow’s mouth and throw a live toad-frog down her throat. This will cure her of hollow-horn”. Also, blacksmiths protected themselves from witches by occasionally throwing live puppies into their furnaces. 边民的其他医疗观念:“如果发烧,活活剖开一只黑鸡,把它绑在你的脚底”,“吃掉尖叫猫头鹰的脑子是唯一可靠的治头痛药方”,“对风湿病,在脚上绑上撕开的青蛙”,“为了给腿消肿,劈开一只活猫,趁还温热敷上”,“把你见到的第一只蝴蝶的头拽掉,你会得到一件新裙子”,“把奶牛的嘴打开,扔一只活的癞蛤蟆到它喉咙里。这会治好它的空角病”。而且,铁匠们为了避免女巫的危害,会时不时把活着的小狗扔进他们的炉子里。 17. Rates of public schooling in the backcountry settled by the Borderers were “the lowest in British North America” and sometimes involved rituals like “barring out”, where the children would physically keep the teacher out of the school until he gave in and granted the students the day off. 边民乡村的公共学校入学率是“北美英国殖民地”中最低的,而且有些时候会发生“封门”的仪式,即孩子们会用身体阻挡教师进入学校,除非他让步并给学生们当天放假。 18. “Appalachia’s idea of a moderate drinker was the mountain man who limited himself to a single quart [of whiskey] at a sitting, explaining that more ‘might fly to my head’. Other beverages were regarded with contempt.” “阿巴拉契亚关于适度饮酒的理念是,一个山民会克制自己一次只喝一夸脱以下的威士忌,解释是喝更多‘也许会让我的脑袋发晕’。其他饮品则是被轻视的。” 19. A traditional backcountry sport was “rough and tumble”, a no-holds-barred form of wrestling where gouging out your opponent’s eyes was considered perfectly acceptable and in fact sound strategy. In 1772 Virginia had to pass a law against “gouging, plucking, or putting out an eye”, but this was the Cavalier-dominated legislature all the way on the east coast and nobody in the backcountry paid them any attention. Other traditional backcountry sports were sharpshooting and hunting. 一项传统的乡下运动是“混战”,一种无规则限制的摔角,在运动中挖掉对手的眼睛被认为是完全可以接受,且实际上非常有效的策略。在1772年弗吉尼亚被迫通过一项法律反对“抠,挖,挤出眼球”,但这是骑士党主导的法律,只在东海岸有效,在阿巴拉契亚的山民根本不理会。另一项传统的乡下运动则是射击和打猎。 20. The American custom of shooting guns into the air to celebrate holidays is 100% Borderer in origin. 美国向天鸣枪庆祝节日的传统100%来自于山民。 21. The justice system of the backcountry was heavy on lynching, originally a race-neutral practice and named after western Virginian settler William Lynch. 山民地区的法律体系非常依赖于私刑审判,这种做法(原本并无种族倾向)即以西弗吉尼亚殖民者William Lynch得名。【编注:lynch一词在内战后常常特指美国南方白人种族主义者针对黑人的私刑。22. Scottish Presbyterians used to wear red cloth around their neck to symbolize their religion; other Englishmen nicknamed them “rednecks”. This maybe the origin of the popular slur against Americans of Borderer descent, although many other etiologies have been proposed. “Cracker” as a slur is attested as early as 1766 by a colonist who says the term describes backcountry men who are great boasters; other proposed etymologies like slaves talking about “whip-crackers” seem to be spurious. 苏格兰长老会教徒曾在脖子周遭围上红布来象征他们的宗教;其他英国人昵称其为“红脖”。这也许是这一对美国边民后裔的流行贬称的起源,虽然有很多其他的语源学解释也被提出过。“大话精”则是另一个贬称,验证发现,早在1766年一个殖民者曾以该词表示边民们中的吹牛者;其他语源学解释包括奴隶们谈到的“挥鞭子的人”,看来是谬误的。 This is not to paint the Borderers as universally poor and dumb – like every group, they had an elite, and some of their elite went on to become some of America’s most important historical figures. Andrew Jackson became the first Borderer president, behaving exactly as you would expect the first Borderer president to behave, and he was followed by almost a dozen others. Borderers have also been overrepresented in America’s great military leaders, from Ulysses Grant through Teddy Roosevelt (3/4 Borderer despite his Dutch surname) to George Patton to John McCain. 并不是说边民普遍贫穷愚笨——如同每个群体一样,他们也有精英,有些精英成了美国史上最重要的历史人物之一。Andrew Jackson成为第一任边民总统,其作为和你预期的第一任边民总统会做的一样,他之后又有十多个边民总统。边民在美国伟大军事领袖中的比例也高得过分,从尤利西斯·格兰特到泰迪·罗斯福(3/4的边民血统,虽然他有个荷兰裔姓氏),再到乔治·巴顿,再到约翰·麦凯恩。 The Borderers really liked America – unsurprising given where they came from – and started identifying as American earlier and more fiercely than any of the other settlers who had come before. Unsurprisingly, they strongly supported the Revolution – Patrick Henry (“Give me liberty or give me death!”) was a Borderer. They also also played a disproportionate role in westward expansion. 边民真的很爱美国——考虑到他们来自何处,这不奇怪——而且他们产生美国人的自我认同比其他在他们之前到的殖民者更早,程度更强烈。并不奇怪的是,他们强烈支持独立革命——Patrick Henry(“不自由,宁毋死!”)是个边民。他们也在西进运动中发挥了不成比例的重要作用。 After the Revolution, America made an almost literal 180 degree turn and the “backcountry” became the “frontier”. It was the Borderers who were happiest going off into the wilderness and fighting Indians, and most of the famous frontiersmen like Davy Crockett were of their number. This was a big part of the reason the Wild West was so wild compared to, say, Minnesota (also a frontier inhabited by lots of Indians, but settled by Northerners and Germans) and why it inherited seemingly Gaelic traditions like cattle rustling. 革命后,美国实际上是180度转向,“内地”变成了“边疆”。对于深入荒野,和印第安人战斗,边民是最开心的,大部分著名的边疆拓荒者如Davy Crockett即是其中一员。很大程度上,这就是为什么狂野西部是如此狂野,相比于比如说明尼苏达(也是个有很多印第安人定居的边疆地带,但是由北方人和德国裔开拓殖民),这也解释了为何西部有套小牛的传统,这疑似是苏格兰盖尔人的传统。 Their conception of liberty has also survived and shaped modern American politics: it seems essentially to be the modern libertarian/Republican version of freedom from government interference, especially if phrased as “get the hell off my land”, and especially especially if phrased that way through clenched teeth while pointing a shotgun at the offending party. 他们的自由观念也存留下来并塑造了美国的政治:它看起来基本上是现代自由意志主义者/共和党版本的免于政府干涉的自由,特别是“滚出我的土地”这句话,尤其是这话以咬牙切齿的腔调说出,伴着指向入侵者的霰弹枪的时候。 III. This is all interesting as history and doubly interesting as anthropology, but what relevance does it have for later American history and the present day? 这些从历史学上来说,很有意思,从人类学角度来说,更有意思。但是这些和美国之后的历史以及今天又什么关系吗? One of my reasons reading this book was to see whether the link between Americans’ political opinions and a bunch of their other cultural/religious/social traits (a “Blue Tribe” and “Red Tribe”) was related to the immigration patterns it describes. I’m leaning towards “probably”, but there’s a lot of work to be done in explaining how the split among these four cultures led to a split among two cultures in the modern day, and with little help from the book itself I am going to have to resort to total unfounded speculation. 我读这本书的理由之一,是想看看美国政治观点和一系列文化/宗教/社会特质(“红部落”和“蓝部落”)是否和该书描述的移民模式相关。我倾向“很可能”这一结论,但是还需要大量的工作来解释这四种文化之分裂是如何导致今日的两种文化之分裂,而且接下来我将要不依赖这本书的帮助,诉诸未经验证的大胆猜想。 But the simplest explanation – that the Puritans and Quakers merged into one group (“progressives”, “Blue Tribe”, “educated coastal elites”) and the Virginians and Borderers into another (“conservatives”, “Red Tribe”, “rednecks”) – has a lot going for it. 然而最简单的解释有很大的说服力——清教徒和贵格会融合成了一个团体(“进步派”,“蓝部落”,“受过教育的东西岸精英”),而弗吉尼亚人和边民则汇聚成另一个(“保守派”,“红部落”,“红脖子”)。 Many conservatives I read like to push the theory that modern progressivism is descended from the utopian Protestant experiments of early America – Puritanism and Quakerism – and that the civil war represents “Massachusetts’ conquest of America”. I always found this lacking in rigor: Puritanism and Quakerism are sufficiently different that positing a combination of them probably needs more intellectual work than just gesturing at “you know, that Puritan/Quaker thing”. 我所读到的很多保守派喜欢这一理论:现代进步主义来自于早期乌托邦式的新教实验——清教主义和贵格主义——而内战则代表“‘马萨诸塞’”征服了美国”。我总是发现这个说法缺乏严谨:清教主义和贵格主义有很大的不同,把他们合并起来很可能需要更多的智力工作,而不是仅仅陈述“你知道的,清教徒/贵格会的那套”。 But the idea of a Puritan New England and a Quaker-(ish) Pennsylvania gradually blending together into a generic “North” seems plausible, especially given the high levels of interbreeding between the two (some of our more progressive Presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, were literally half-Puritan and half-Quaker). 但是一个清教徒的新英格兰和一个贵格会的宾夕法尼亚逐渐融合在一起,被统称为“北方”,这一说法似乎有道理,尤其是考虑到两个群体之间很高的通婚率(我们一些更偏进步派的总统,包括亚伯拉罕·林肯,实际上是半清教徒半贵格会血统)。 Such a merge would combine the Puritan emphasis on moral reform, education, and a well-ordered society with the Quaker doctrine of niceness, tolerance, religious pluralism, individual conscience, and the Inner Light. It seems kind of unfair to just mix-and-match the most modern elements of each and declare that this proves they caused modernity, but there’s no reason that couldn’t have happened. 这种融合把清教徒对道德改革、教育和有序社会的强调,以及贵格会友善、容忍、宗教多元、个人良心和内在灵性之光的教义结合了起来。把两个宗派最现代化的元素混合对应起来,然后宣称这证明了他们导致了现代性,这似乎有点不公平,但是没有理由否定,这可能发生。 The idea of Cavaliers and Borderers combining to form modern conservativism is buoyed by modern conservativism’s obvious Border influences, but complicated by its lack of much that is recognizably Cavalier – the Republican Party is hardly marked by its support for a hereditary aristocracy of gentlemen. 骑士党和边民结合形成了现代保守主义这一看法,被现代保守主义明显受边民影响所支持。但更复杂的是,它缺乏可以被辨认为骑士党文化的成分——共和党在支持绅士们的世袭贵族政治方面并不突出。 Here I have to admit that I don’t know as much about Southern history as I’d like. In particular, how were places like Alabama, Mississippi, et cetera settled? Most sources I can find suggest they were set up along the Virginia model of plantation-owning aristocrats, but if that’s true how did the modern populations come to so embody Fischer’s description of Borderers? In particular, why are they so Southern Baptist and not very Anglican? 这里我不得不承认,我所知的南方历史,并不如我渴望的那么多。特别是,像阿拉巴马,密西西比这些地方是如何被开发的?我所找到的大部分资料都暗示,他们是按照弗吉尼亚那种拥有种植园的贵族模式发展,但是如果这是真的,为何现代这片土地上的人口和Fischer描述的边民如此相似?特别是,为什么他们如此倾向于南方浸信会,而不是国教会? And what happened to all of those indentured servants the Cavaliers brought over after slavery put them out of business? What happened to that whole culture after the Civil War destroyed the plantation system? My guess is going to be that the indentured servants and the Borderer population mixed pretty thoroughly, and that this stratum was hanging around providing a majority of the white bodies in the South while the plantation owners were hogging the limelight – but I just don’t know. 而所有那些骑士党带来的契约仆人在被奴隶取代而不再做仆人后,又经历了什么?在内战毁灭了南方种植园系统后,整个文化经历了什么?我的猜想是契约仆人和边民人口深度融合,而这个阶层蔓延开来,构成了南方白人的主体,而与此同时种植园主们则吸引了太多关注——但是我就是不知道。 A quick argument that I’m not totally making all of this up: 以下的简易论证并非纯属编造: This is a map of voting patterns by county in the 2012 Presidential election. The blue areas in the South carefully track the so-called “black belt” of majority African-American areas. The ones in the Midwest are mostly big cities. Aside from those, the only people who vote Democrat are New England (very solidly!) and the Delaware Valley region of Pennsylvania. albion1 这是2012年总统大选在郡层面的投票模式的地图。蓝色区域在南方精确地分布在大量非裔美国人聚居的所谓“黑带”上。在中西部的蓝色基本上是大城市。除了这些,选民主党的人只有新英格兰人(支持度很高!)和宾州德拉威尔河谷地区。 In fact, you can easily see the distinction between the Delaware Valley settled by Quakers in the east, and the backcountry area settled by Borderers in the west. Even the book’s footnote about how a few Borderers settled in the mountains of New Hampshire is associated with a few spots of red in the mountains of New Hampshire ruining an otherwise near-perfect Democratic sweep of the north. 事实上,你能一眼看出,贵格会开拓的东部德拉威尔河谷和边民开拓的西部区域之间的区别。即便是书中脚注提到的少量边民移居新罕布尔州群山也能对应图中新罕布尔州群山中的几个红点,如果不是这几个红点,民主党在北方就拥有了完美的全胜。 One anomaly in this story is a kind of linear distribution of blue across southern Michigan, too big to be explained solely by the blacks of Detroit. But a quick look at Wikipedia’s History of Michigan finds: 这个故事中的一个异常就是在南密歇根存在一种线性分布的蓝色,面积太大,不能仅用底特律的黑人来解释。但是快速浏览维基百科上密歇根的历史条目就会发现: In the 1820s and 1830s migrants from New England began moving to what is now Michigan in large numbers (though there was a trickle of New England settlers who arrived before this date). These were “Yankee” settlers, that is to say they were descended from the English Puritans who settled New England during the colonial era….Due to the prevalence of New Englanders and New England transplants from upstate New York, Michigan was very culturally contiguous with early New England culture for much of its early history…The amount with which the New England Yankee population predominated made Michigan unique among frontier states in the antebellum period. Due to this heritage Michigan was on the forefront of the antislavery crusade and reforms during the 1840s and 1850s. 在1820年代到1830年代,来自新英格兰的移民大量移居到今日的密歇根(虽然有少量新英格兰开拓者在之前就移居此地)。这些是“扬基”开拓者,这意味着他们是在殖民地时期住在新英格兰的英国清教徒的后裔……因为新英格兰人众多,以及从纽约上州移入的新英格兰人,在它早期历史的相当长时间,密歇根在文化上和早期新英格兰文化很相近……新英格兰扬基人口的庞大数量使得密歇根在内战前时期边疆州当中与众不同。因为这种传统,密歇根站在1840年代和1850年代的废奴十字军和改革的前列。 Alhough I can’t find proof of this specifically, I know that Michigan was settled from the south up, and I suspect that these New England settlers concentrated in the southern regions and that the north was settled by a more diverse group of whites who lacked the New England connection. 虽然我不能发现专门的证据,我知道密歇根是从南方被开拓的,我怀疑新英格兰开拓者集中于南部区域,而北部则被更多元的白人群体开拓,这些人缺乏和新英格兰地区的联系。 Here’s something else cool. We can’t track Borderers directly because there’s no “Borderer” or “Scots-Irish” option on the US census. But Albion’s Seed points out that the Borderers were uniquely likely to identify as just “American” and deliberately forgot their past ancestry as fast as they could. 还有更有趣的发现。我们不能直接跟踪边民,因为在美国人口普查中没有“边民”或者“苏格兰人-爱尔兰人”的选项。但是《阿尔比安的种子》一书指出,边民特别倾向于自我认同为“美国人”,并故意尽快忘记自己过去的先祖。 Meanwhile, when the census asks an ethnicity question about where your ancestors came from, every year some people will stubbornly ignore the point of the question and put down “America” (no, this does not track the distribution of Native American population). Here’s a map of so-called “unhyphenated Americans”, taken from this site: 同时,当普查问及关于你先祖来自何处的族裔问题时,每年都有一些人顽固的忽略这一问题的目的,而填上“美国”(不,这并不能代表印第安人的分布)。下面是所谓的“纯粹的美国人”的地图,来自这个网站。 albion2 We see a strong focus on the Appalachian Mountains, especially West Virginia, Tennesee, and Kentucky, bleeding into the rest of the South. Aside from west Pennsylvania, this is very close to where we would expect to find the Borderers. Could these be the same groups? 我们看到了该人群在阿巴拉契亚山脉区域有很高的密度,尤其是西弗吉尼亚,田纳西,和肯塔基,延伸到南方其他地区。除了西宾夕法尼亚之外,这和我们预期能发现边民的地区非常接近。这些可能是相同的人群吗? Meanwhile, here is a map of where Obama underperformed the usual Democratic vote worst in 2008: 同时,这里还有奥巴马在08年民主党选举中表现最差的地区的一张地图: albion3 These maps are small and lossy, and surely unhyphenatedness is not an exact proxy for Border ancestry – but they are nevertheless intriguing. You may also be interested in the Washington Post’s correlation between distribution of unhyphenated Americans and Trump voters, or the Atlantic’s article on Trump and Borderers. 这些地图也许小且模糊,而且纯种美国人认同也不是边民先祖的精确表征——但是它们仍然十分吸引人。你也许会对《华盛顿邮报》在纯种美国人分布和川普支持者之间相关性的报道感兴趣,还有《大西洋月刊》关于川普和边民的文章。 If I’m going to map these cultural affiliations to ancestry, do I have to walk back on my previous theory that they are related to class? Maybe I should. But I also think we can posit complicated interactions between these ideas. Consider for example the interaction between race and class; a black person with a white-sounding name, who speaks with a white-sounding accent, and who adopts white culture (eg listens to classical music, wears business suits) is far more likely to seem upper-class than a black person with a black-sounding name, a black accent, and black cultural preferences; a white person who seems black in some way (listens to hip-hop, wears baggy clothes) is more likely to seem lower-class. This doesn’t mean race and class are exactly the same thing, but it does mean that some races get stereotyped as upper-class and others as lower-class, and that people’s racial identifiers may change based on where they are in the class structure. 如果我把这些文化偏好对应到祖先谱系,我是否也不得不回到我之前的理论上,即这些和阶层有关?也许我应该这么做。但是我也认为我们应该注意这些看法之间的交互作用。比如考虑一下种族和阶层的交互关系;一个黑人带着一个白人式的名字,带白人口音,适应了白人文化(比如听古典音乐,穿西装),则比取黑人名、带黑人口音、偏好黑人文化的黑人更可能是上等阶级;一个某方面像黑人的白人(听嘻哈,穿松垮的衣服)则更可能属于底层。这并不是说种族和阶层完全是一码事,但是这说明一些族群给人的固定印象是上层,另一些是底层,而基于人们在阶层结构中位置,人们的和种族相关的特征可能会变化。 I think something similar is probably going on with these forms of ancestry. The education system is probably dominated by descendents of New Englanders and Pennsylvanians; they had an opportunity to influence the culture of academia and the educated classes more generally, they took it, and now anybody of any background who makes it into that world is going to be socialized according to their rules. Likewise, people in poorer and more rural environments will be surrounded by people of Borderer ancestry and acculturated by Borderer cultural products and end up a little more like that group. As a result, ethnic markers have turned into and merged with class markers in complicated ways. 我认为族裔血统的构成中,很可能发生了相似的事情。教育系统很可能被新英格兰人和宾夕法尼亚人把持,他们更有机会普遍地影响学术界的文化和受教育阶层,他们把握了这个机会,现在任何背景的人,要进入他们的世界,都会按照他们的规则被社会化。相似的,更穷和更乡村化的人,被边民的先祖和边民文化的产物包围,最终变得有点像这个群体。结果,族裔标志以种种复杂的方式转化成了阶层标志并与之融合。 Indeed, some kind of acculturation process has to have been going on, since most of the people in these areas today are not the descendents of the original settlers. But such a process seems very likely. Just to take an example, most of the Jews I know (including my own family) came into the country via New York, live somewhere on the coast, and have very Blue Tribe values. But Southern Jews believed in the Confederacy as strongly as any Virginian – see for example Judah Benjamin. And Barry Goldwater, a half-Jew raised in Arizona, invented the modern version of conservativism that seems closest to some Borderer beliefs. 的确,某种同化过程一定发生过,因为这些地区今天的大部分人并不是初代开拓者的后代。但是这样一个过程很可能发生。仅举一个例子,大部分我所认识的犹太人(包括我自己的家庭),从纽约来到这个国家,生活在靠海岸的某处,拥有蓝色的价值观。但是南方犹太人曾和任何弗吉尼亚人一样,相信南部邦联——可以参考Judah Benjamin的例子。而且Barry Goldwater,一个长在亚利桑那的半血犹太人,发明了现代版本的保守主义,其观点看起来最接近一些边民信仰。 All of this is very speculative, with some obvious flaws. What do we make of other countries like Britain or Germany with superficially similar splits but very different histories? Why should Puritans lose their religion and sexual prudery, but keep their interest in moralistic reform? There are whole heaps of questions like these. 所有这些都是很大胆的假设,带有一些明显的缺陷。对于英国或者德国,这些国家表面上有类似的分裂,但是有很不同的历史,我们如何来解释呢?为什么清教徒失去了他们的宗教和在性上的规矩,但是仍然在道德改革上保持兴趣?还有一大堆类似的问题。 But look. Before I had any idea about any of this, I wrote that American society seems divided into two strata, one of which is marked by emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, academic/financial jobs, and Democratic party affiliation, and furthermore that this group was centered in the North. 但是看看,在我有这些想法之前,我就曾写道美国社会看来被分裂成两层,其中之一有以下特征:重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容,很低的未成年怀孕率,学术和财经工作,以及支持民主党,而且这个群体以北方为中心。 Meanwhile, now I learn that the North was settled by two groups that when combined have emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, an academic and mercantile history, and were the heartland of the historical Whigs and Republicans who preceded the modern Democratic Party. 同时,我现在知道了北方曾被两个团体所开拓,两个群体结合起来,拥有以下特征:重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容,很低的未成年怀孕率 ,具有学术和商业历史,而且是历史上辉格党和共和党(后来的地位被现代的民主党取代)的核心地域。 And I wrote about another stratum centered in the South marked by poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high teenage pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, country western music, and support for the Republican Party. And now I learn that the South was settled by a group noted even in the 1700s for its poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high premarital pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, accent exactly like the modern country western accent, and support for the Democratic-Republicans who preceded the modern Republican Party. 我还写到过另一个集中于南方的阶层,它以教育贫乏,枪文化,暴力文化,排外,高未成年人怀孕率,军国主义,爱国主义,西部乡村音乐,和支持共和党为特征。现在我知道,开拓南方的群体,在18世纪就以教育的贫乏, 枪文化,暴力文化,排外,高未成年人怀孕率,尚武精神,爱国主义,接近现代西部乡村的口音,以及支持民主-共和党为特征(后来地位被现代的共和党取代)。 If this is true, I think it paints a very pessimistic world-view. The “iceberg model” of culture argues that apart from the surface cultural features we all recognize like language, clothing, and food, there are deeper levels of culture that determine the features and institutions of a people: whether they are progressive or traditional, peaceful or warlike, mercantile or self-contained. 如果这是真的,我认为这给出了一个非常悲观的世界图景。文化的“冰山模型”认为,撇开我们都能识别的文化表面特征,例如语言、衣着、和食物,存在更深层次的文化,它们决定了上述特征和人们的制度:决定他们是进步的还是传统的,和平的还是好战的,爱经商的还是自给自足的。 We grudgingly acknowledge these features when we admit that maybe making the Middle East exactly like America in every way is more of a long-term project than something that will happen as soon as we kick out the latest dictator and get treated as liberators. Part of us may still want to believe that pure reason is the universal solvent, that those Afghans will come around once they realize that being a secular liberal democracy is obviously great. 当我们承认也许让中东在每一方面都变成和美国一样是一个长期过程,而不是如我们把最近的独裁者赶下台,像解放者般被接待那么快,我们就是在勉强承认这些文化特征的存在。我们中的部分人还想相信纯粹理性是普遍适用的答案,只要阿富汗人意识到一个世俗化的自由主义的民主制度明显很棒,他们就会觉醒。 But we keep having deep culture shoved in our face again and again, and we don’t know how to get rid of it. This has led to reasonable speculation that some aspects of it might even be genetic – something which would explain a lot, though not its ability to acculturate recent arrivals. 但是我们已经一而再地被深层文化打脸,我们不知道如何摆脱它。这导致了合理的猜想,深层文化的某方面可能是遗传性的——这可以解释很多事情,虽然这个因素不能解释其同化最近的新来者的能力。 This is a hard pill to swallow even when we’re talking about Afghanistan. But it becomes doubly unpleasant when we think about it in the sense of our neighbors and fellow citizens in a modern democracy. What, after all, is the point? A democracy made up of 49% extremely liberal Americans and 51% fundamentalist Taliban Afghans would be something very different from the democratic ideal; even if occasionally a super-charismatic American candidate could win over enough marginal Afghans to take power, there’s none of the give-and-take, none of the competition within the marketplace of ideas, that makes democracy so attractive. Just two groups competing to dominate one another, with the fact that the competition is peaceful being at best a consolation prize. 即便我们讨论的是阿富汗,这也是一枚难以下咽的药丸。但如果我们从现代民主制中我们的邻舍和公民同胞的角度来考虑这个问题时,难受程度又要翻倍。这到底有什么意义?一个由49%的极端自由派的美国人和51%的基本教义派的阿富汗塔利班组成的民主制恐怕和民主典范非常不同;即使有时,一个很有人格魅力的美国候选人能赢得足够的阿富汗人摇摆票,获得权力,这里也没有讨价还价,没有思想市场的竞争,而正是这些因素才使得民主制如此有吸引力。只剩两个团体相互竞争来统治对方,事实上,如果竞争是和平的,就已经是谢天谢地了。 If America is best explained as a Puritan-Quaker culture locked in a death-match with a Cavalier-Borderer culture, with all of the appeals to freedom and equality and order and justice being just so many epiphenomena – well, I’m not sure what to do with that information. 如果美国可以很好地被解释成一种清教徒-贵格会文化,和一种骑士党-边民文化锁在一起的拼死对决,并且所有对自由,平等,秩序,正义的呼求仅是众多附带现象——那么我不确定该如何处理这个信息。 Push it under the rug? Say “Well, my culture is better, so I intend to do as good a job dominating yours as possible?” Agree that We Are Very Different Yet In The End All The Same And So Must Seek Common Ground? Start researching genetic engineering? Maybe secede? 把它藏在桌布下?说“好,我的文化更好,所以我打算竭尽全力做做好事,来统治你?”同意我们是非常不同的,但最终我们会变得一样,所以我们必须寻求共同立场?开始研究基因工程?也许独立分裂? I’m not a Trump fan much more than I’m an Osama bin Laden fan; if somehow Osama ended up being elected President, should I start thinking “Maybe that time we made a country that was 49% people like me and 51% members of the Taliban –maybe that was a bad idea“. 我不是个川普粉,就像我不是奥萨马·本·拉登粉丝一样;如果不知何故,本·拉登当选了总统,我应该开始思考“也许那时候我们由49%的像我这样的人和51%的塔利班组成了一个国家——也许这是一个坏主意”。 I don’t know. But I highly recommend Albion’s Seed as an entertaining and enlightening work of historical scholarship which will be absolutely delightful if you don’t fret too much over all of the existential questions it raises. 我不知道。但是我高度推荐《阿尔比安的种子》这本富有娱乐性和启发性的历史学著作。如果你没有过多地被它引起的实在性问题吓到,读它绝对会是非常愉悦的。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]文化与生物性如何协同进化

HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION
A Conversation with Joseph Henrich 
文化如何推动人类进化:与Joseph Henrich对话

时间:@ 2012-09-04
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution

Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 

导言:我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信,我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。

JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia.

约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家,同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。

[JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I’ve been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it’s so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it.

约瑟夫·亨里奇:过去几年,我反复追问自己的一个主要问题,大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指,观念在代际间不断积累,从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西,下一代人又添加一点点东西,如此接力,直到最后得出的工具无比复杂,以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。

This was a really important line in human evolution, and we’ve begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information.

这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索,我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点,这种观点认为,人脑增大的真正动力就是,文化信息以这种方式不断累积,由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息,存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the t(more...)

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HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION A Conversation with Joseph Henrich  文化如何推动人类进化:与Joseph Henrich对话 时间:@ 2012-09-04 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution.  导言:我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信,我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。 JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia. 约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家,同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。 [JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I've been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it's so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it. 约瑟夫·亨里奇:过去几年,我反复追问自己的一个主要问题,大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指,观念在代际间不断积累,从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西,下一代人又添加一点点东西,如此接力,直到最后得出的工具无比复杂,以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。 This was a really important line in human evolution, and we've begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information. 这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索,我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点,这种观点认为,人脑增大的真正动力就是,文化信息以这种方式不断累积,由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息,存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the things that culture creates—like tools. Compared to chimpanzees, we have high levels of manual dexterity. We're good at throwing objects. We can thread a needle. There are  aspects of our brain that seem to be consistent with that as being an innate ability, but tools and artifacts (the kinds of things that one finds useful to throw or finds useful to manipulate) are themselves products of cultural evolution. 随着时间推移,两个系统开始相互作用。在人类进化的过程中,最重要的选择压力正是文化所生成的事物,比如工具。与黑猩猩相比,我们的手要灵巧得多,比如我们善于抛掷东西,我们能够穿针引线。我们大脑的某些方面与此高度协调,使得这种能力看上去似乎与生俱来,但工具和人工制品——那种我们觉得扔出去有用或操作起来有用的东西——本身则是文化进化的产物。 Another example here is fire and cooking. Richard Wrangham, for example, has argued that fire and cooking have been important selection pressures, but what often gets overlooked in understanding fire and cooking is that they're culturally transmitted—we're terrible at making fires actually. We have no innate fire-making ability. But once you got this idea for cooking and making fires to be culturally transmitted, then it created a whole new selection pressure that made our stomachs smaller, our teeth smaller, our gapes or holdings of our mouth smaller, it altered the length of our intestines. It had a whole bunch of downstream effects. 另外一个例子就是用火和烹饪。Richard Wrangham就提出,用火和烹饪一直都是非常重要的选择压力。但在看待用火和烹饪的问题上,经常容易忽略的一点是,它们实际是通过文化进行传递的——人类原本是不怎么会生火的。我们不具备生火的先天能力。但一旦烹饪和生火的观念通过文化得以传递,就创造出一种全新的选择压力,使我们的胃容量变小、牙齿变小、嘴能张开的幅度变小,一口能吃下的东西也变少,而且我们肠道的长度也发生改变。这就带来了一系列的下游效应。 Another area that we've worked on is social status. Early work on human status just took humans to have a kind of status that stems from non-human status. Chimps, other primates, have dominant status. The assumption for a long time was that status in humans was just a kind of human version of this dominant status, but if you apply this gene-culture co-evolutionary thinking, the idea that culture is one of the major selection pressures in human evolution, you come up with this idea that there might be a second kind of status. We call this status prestige. 我们研究的另一个领域是社会地位。有关人类社会地位的早期研究只是简单地假定,人类的地位有其非人类时期的根源。黑猩猩和其他灵长类社群中都有拥有宰制地位的个体。长期以来,人们假定,人类的地位属性只不过是动物群体中的宰制地位的人类版本。但如果运用这种“基因和文化协同进化”的观念,也就是说把文化作为人类进化中的一种主要选择压力,你就会意识到或许存在另外一种类型的地位。我们称其为“威望地位”。 This is the kind of status you get from being particularly knowledgeable or skilled in an area, and the reason it's a kind of status is because once animals, humans in this case, can learn from each other, they can possess resources. 当你在某个领域的知识特别丰富或技能特别熟练时,你就能得到这种地位。这之所以能成为一种地位,是因为一旦动物(此处就是人)能够彼此学习,它们自身便可拥有资源【编注:此句较绕口,意思是相互学习的可能性,使得个体所拥有的知识成为一种对他人也有价值的人力资源】。 You have information resources that can be tapped, and then you want to isolate the members of your group who are most likely to have a lot of this resources, meaning a lot of the knowledge or information that could be useful to you in the future. This causes you to focus on those individuals, differentially attend to them, preferentially listen to them and give them deference in exchange for knowledge that you get back, for copying opportunities in the future. 如果存在可资利用的信息资源,那你就会想把你所属团体之中最有可能拥有大量此类资源的人单独区分出来,这是一大堆你将来有可能用得上的知识或信息。这会促使你关注这些人,特别地留意他们,更乐于倾听他们的意见,敬重他们,以此作为从他们那里获得知识、在未来运用这些知识的回报。

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From this we've argued that humans have two separate kinds of status, dominance and prestige, and these have quite different ethologies. Dominance [ethology] is about physical posture, of size (large expanded chest the way you'd see in apes). Subordinates in dominance hierarchies are afraid. They back away. They look away, where as prestige hierarchies are quite the opposite. 基于此,我们认为人类存在两种不同类型的地位,分别是宰制和威望,分别对应着不同的动物行为学。宰制(行为学)核心在于身体块头的展示(你能在猿类身上看到的那种大块胸肌)。在宰制等级中,处于从属地位的个体会感到害怕。他们会退缩。他们不会正视上级,而在威望等级中情况则正好相反。 You're attracted to prestigious individuals. You want to be near them. You want to look at them, watch them, listen to them, and interact with them. We've done a bunch of experimental work here at UBC and shown that that pattern is consistent, and it leads to more imitation. There may be even specific hormonal profiles with the two kinds of status. 你会被有威望的个体所吸引。你渴望亲近他们。你渴望看着他们,观察他们,倾听他们,与他们交往。在UBC(不列颠哥伦比亚大学),我们已经就此做过一连串实验,证明了这种模式总是存在,而且会引发更多的模仿。这两种不同的地位可能还对应着各自不同的激素配置。 I've also been trying to think broadly, and some of the big questions are, exactly when did this body of cumulative cultural evolution get started? Lately I've been pursuing the idea that it may have started early: at the origins of the genus, 1.8 million years ago when Homo habilis or Homo erectus first begins to emerge in Africa. 此外,我也一直在试图思考一些更为宏大的问题,比如,这一累积性的文化进化体到底是从什么时候开始的?最近,我一直致力于澄清一个想法,那就是它可能开始得很早:很可能在人属出现时就开始了,也就是180万年前能人或直立人最早出现于非洲的时候。 Typically, people thinking about human evolution have approached this as a two-part puzzle, as if there was a long period of genetic evolution until either 10,000 years ago or 40,000 years ago, depending on who you're reading, and then only after that did culture matter, and often little or no consideration given to a long period of interaction between genes and culture. 通常,研究人类进化的人在处理这一问题时,会把它看作是一个“两部分谜题”,就好像从一开始直到距今1万或4万年以前(具体时间取决于你正在阅读谁的研究),曾经存在过一个长时段的基因进化,自此以后,文化才开始发挥作用。他们很少或根本不会考虑基因和文化之间曾长期相互作用这种情形。 Of course, the evidence available in the Paleolithic record is pretty sparse, so another possibility is that it emerged about 800,000 years ago. One theoretical reason to think that that might be an important time to emerge is that there's theoretical models that show that culture, our ability to learn from others, is an adaptation to fluctuating environments. If you look at the paleo-climatic record, you can see that the environment starts to fluctuate a lot starting about 900,000 years ago and going to about six or five hundred thousand years ago. 当然,我们能得到的旧石器时代证据相当少。因此,另一种可能性是,这一文化进化体开始于大约80万年前。这个时间点之所以成为一个重要的起源时间选项,一个理论依据在于,已经有理论模型表明,文化——即我们从他人身上学习的能力——是我们对持续的环境变动的一种适应。翻一翻古气候记录就会发现,环境大概在距今90万年前的时候开始剧烈变动,直到距今60或50万年前才消停。 This would have created a selection pressure for lots of cultural learning for lots of focusing on other members of your group, and taking advantage of that cumulative body of non-genetic knowledge. 这有可能创造出一种选择压力,催生了更多的文化学习,促使人更多关注团体中的其他成员,也促使人们更多地利用那种累积性的非基因的知识体。

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Another signature of cultural learning is regional differentiation and material culture, and you see that by about 400,000 years ago. So, you could have a kind of late emergence at 400,000 years ago. A middle guess would be 800,000 years ago based on the climate, and then the early guess would be, say, the origin of genus, 1.8 million years ago. 文化学习的另外一个鲜明特征是地区分化和物质文化,这一点在大约40万年前可以看到。所以还有一种说法,认为这一文化进化体始于40万年前。这一时间比较晚,持中的猜测则是基于气候的80万年前起源说,更早的猜测则是人属出现的时候,即180万年前。 Along these same lines, I've been trying to figure out what the ancestral ape would have looked like. We know that humans share a common ancestry with chimpanzees about five or six million years ago with chimpanzees and bonobos, and the question is, what kind of ape was that? 沿着同样的思考线索,我还一直试图弄清祖猿长成什么样子。我们知道,大概500万或600万年前,人类和黑猩猩、倭黑猩猩拥有共同的祖先,问题是,这是种什么样的猿? One possibility, and the typical assumption, is that the ape was more like a chimpanzee or a bonobo. But there's another possibility that it was a different kind of ape that we don't have in the modern world: a communal breeding ape that lives in family units rather than the kind of fission fusion you might see in chimpanzees, and that actually chimpanzees and bonobos took a separate turn, and that lineage eventually went to humans spurred off a whole bunch of different kinds of apes. In the Pliocene, we see lots of different kinds of apes in terms of different species of Australopithecus. 其中一种可能是,这种祖猿更像黑猩猩或倭黑猩猩,这也是通常的假设。但还有另外一种可能性,它们可能是一种当今世界已经不存在的完全不同的猿:一种以家庭为单位、合作繁殖的猿,而不是黑猩猩那种裂变融合群体【译注:指群体的规模和成员不断变动】,而且黑猩猩和倭黑猩猩实际上是往另外一个不同方向上演变了,而最终进化出人类的那一谱系则进化成为一系列不同种类的猿。在上新世,我们可以看到大量不同种类的猿,他们都是南猿的不同种。 I'm just beginning to get into that, and I haven't gotten very far, but I do have this strong sense that we now have evidence to suggest that humans were communal breeders, so that we lived in family groups maybe somewhat similar to the way gorillas live in family groups, and that this is a much better environment for the evolution of capacities for culture than typical in the chimpanzee model, because for cultural learning to really take off, you need more than one model. 我才刚刚开始研究这一问题,成果还不多,但我强烈地感觉到,我们现在已经有证据说人类曾是合作繁殖的,因此我们是生活于家庭群体之中的,某种程度上就像大猩猩现在的那种家庭群体生活一样。相比黑猩猩的那种模式,这一模式为文化能力进化提供的环境要好得多,因为文化学习要真正实现飞跃,必须得有多种模式。 You want a number of individuals in your social environment to be trying out different techniques—say different techniques for getting nuts or for finding food or for tracking animals. Then you need to pay attention to them so you can take advantage of the variation between them. If there's one member of your group who's doing it a little bit better, you preferentially learn from them, and then the next generation gets the best technique from the previous generation. 这需要你所在的社会环境中拥有许多个体去尝试各不相同的技术,比如说取出果仁或找到食物或追踪猎物的不同技术。然后你就需要细心关注他们,以便能充分利用他们彼此之间的差异变化。如果群体之中有一个成员比其他成员做得稍微好一点点,你就更乐于向他们学习,于是下一代就能从上一代学到最好的技术。 Other things I've been thinking about along these lines are just trying to think through all the different adaptations that would have resulted from this gene culture interaction. One thing that's been noted by a number of people is that humans are strangely good at long distance running. We seem to have long distance running adaptations. 沿着这条线索,我还在考虑其他一些问题,那就是基于这种基因与文化的相互作用,到底我们会出现哪些不同的适应性变化。其中许多人已经注意到的一点是,人类特别善于长距离奔跑,这一点相当令人诧异。我们身上似乎出现了长距离奔跑的适应性变化。 Our feet have a particular anatomy. We have sweat glands and we can run really far. Hunter-gatherers can chase down game by just running the antelope down until it collapses. We run marathons. We seem generally attracted to running, and the question is, how did we become such long distance runners? 我们的脚具有一种独特的生理构造。我们拥有汗腺,可以跑得很远。狩猎采集者要追捕羚羊的话,只需要追着它跑,直到猎物筋疲力尽自己倒下。我们能跑马拉松。我们似乎全都对跑步感兴趣。问题是,我们是如何变得这样善于长跑的呢? We don't see this in other kinds of animals. We think if it was an obvious adaptation, we'd see it recurring through nature, but only humans have it. The secret is that humans who don't know how to track animals, can't run them down, so you need to have a large body of tracking knowledge that allows you to interpret spoors and identify individual animals and track animals over long distances when you can't see the animal, and without that body of knowledge, we're not very good at running game down. 在其他动物身上,我们看不到这一点。我们认为,如果这是一种简单的适应,那我们就应该能在自然界中看到它重复出现,但这一现象只有人类身上有。这里的隐秘在于,如果有的人类不知道如何追踪猎物,那他就不可能尾随追捕,所以你需要拥有一大套的追踪知识,以便你能在看不到猎物的时候分析足迹,能正确辨识猎物个体并能长距离追踪到它。如果没有这一知识体系,我们是不善于把猎物追倒的。 There's an interaction between genes and culture. First you have to get the culturally transmitted knowledge about animal behavior and tracking and spoor knowledge and the ability to identify individuals, which is something you need to practice, and only after that can you begin to take advantage of long distance running techniques and being able to run animals down. 在基因与文化之间存在着相互作用。首先你需要拥有那套关于动物行为和追踪的知识、足迹知识和辨识猎物个体的能力,而这是通过文化传递的,是一种需要练习的东西,只有这样,你才能用上长跑技巧,才能把猎物追倒。 That's a potential source for figuring out the origins of capacities for culture, because to the degree that we have information about the anatomy of feet, we can use that to figure out when it started. The same idea follows from cooking and fire. Since we know that those are culturally transmitted now, when we begin to see evidence that that affected our anatomy, that gives us clues to the origins of our capacities for culture. 要弄清人类文化能力的起源,这是一个可以思考的方向,因为凭借对人类足部构造的了解,我们可以弄清文化进化开始的时间。同样的思路也可以用在烹饪和用火问题上。因为我们现已知道烹饪和用火都是通过文化传递的,因此,如果我们能够找到它们影响身体构造的证据,就有了探究我们的文化能力之起源的线索。

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Most recently I've been also thinking about the evolution of societal complexity. This is the emergence of complex societies that happens after the origins of agriculture, when societies begin to get big and complex and you have lots of interactions among strangers, large-scale cooperation, market exchange, militaries, division of labor, substantial division of labor. We have a sense of the sequence of events, but we don't have good process descriptions of how it was. What are the causal processes that bring these things about? 最近,我还在思考社会复杂性的进化问题。这里说的是农业起源之后复杂社会的出现,社会开始变大、变复杂,在其中你能看到陌生人之间的大量互动、大范围的合作、市场交换、军队、劳动分工、深度劳动分工。我们对这些事件的发生次序有所了解,但对于它们到底是如何发生的,我们还没能形成一个很好的过程描叙。引发这些事件的因果过程到底是什么样的? One of the ideas I've been pursuing is that after the origins of agriculture, there was an intense period that continues today of intergroup competition, which favors groups who have social norms and institutions that can more effectively expand the group while maintaining internal harmony, leading to the benefits of exchange, of the ability to maintain markets, of division of labor and of higher levels of cooperation. Then you get intense competition amongst the early farming groups, and this is going to favor those groups who have the abilities to expand. 我一直在思考的一个想法是,在农业出现之后,曾有过一个群体之间激烈竞争的时期,一直持续到现在。这种竞争使得拥有社会规范和制度、从而能够更有效地在扩张的同时维持内部和谐的一类群体脱颖而出,进而凸显出了交易、维持市场的能力、劳动分工和更高水平的合作所能带来的好处。早期农耕群体之间存在激烈竞争,那些拥有扩张能力的群体在这种竞争中更占优势。 You need to be precise about what you mean by these cultural traits and norms. I've worked in a couple of different areas on this, and one is religion. We just got a big grant to study the cultural evolution of religion with the idea being that the religions of modern societies are quite different than the religions we see in hunter gatherers and small scale societies, because they've been shaped by this process over millennia, and specifically they've been shaped in ways that galvanize cooperation in larger groups and sustained cooperation amongst non relatives. 在谈及文化特征和规范时,需要精确界定它们表达的意思。我在许多不同领域中都研究过这一问题,其中一个领域就是宗教。我们刚刚拿到一大笔资金,来研究宗教的文化进化,主要的观点就是,现代社会的宗教与狩猎采集群体和小规模社会中的宗教大不相同,因为它们已经被这一进程不断塑造了几千年,特别是,它们已经被塑造得能够有助于大规模群体中的合作,以及非亲属之间的持续合作。 The emergence of high-moralizing gods is an important example of this. In small-scale hunter-gatherer religions, the gods are typically whimsical. They're amoral. They're not concerned with your sexual behavior or your social behavior. Often you'll make bargains with them, but as we begin to move to the religions in more complex societies, we find that the gods are increasingly moralizing. They're concerned about exactly the kinds of things that are going to be a problem for running a large-scale society, like how you treat other members of your religious group or your ethnic group. 这方面的一个重要例子就是具有高度道德教化意义的神的出现。在小规模狩猎采集群体的宗教中,神通常都是反复无常的。它们是非道德的。它们并不关心你的性行为或社会行为。通常你会跟它们讨价还价。但在更为复杂的社会中,我们发现神会变得越来越具有道德教化意义。它们所关注的,恰好就是会对大规模社会运行构成麻烦的那一类事情,比如你如何对待同一宗教团体或本种族中的其他成员。 Experiments run at UBC and elsewhere have shown that when you remind atheists, it doesn't matter, but if you remind believers of their god, believers cheat less, and they're more pro social or fair in exchange tasks, and the kinds of exchange tasks that they're more pro social in are the ones with anonymous others, or strangers. UBC和其他一些地方所做的实验都表明,如果你提醒无神论者注意自己的言行,基本没有什么效果,但如果你提醒有神论者,并抬出他们的神,他们就会更少说谎,在参与交易时也会表现得更亲社会或更公平,而且他们在其中表现得更亲社会的这类交易,其对象都是匿名人士或陌生人。 These are the kinds of things you need to make a market run to have a successful division of labor. We've been pursuing that hypothesis and, in fact, we've just sent a number of psychologists and anthropologists to the field, and we'll be doing more of that in the coming years to do these kinds of experiments in a diverse range of societies, seeing if the moralizing gods of a variety of religions create these same kinds of effects. 这恰好是维持市场运转、成功维系劳动分工所需要的特征。我们近来一直在研究这个假说,事实上,我们不久前刚派出了一批心理学家和人类学家就此去做田野研究,未来几年还会加大力度,在大量不同社会群体中去做这类实验,以检验不同宗教中的教化性神是否都能造成以上同样的效果。

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We also think that ritual plays a role in this in that rituals seem to be sets of practices engineered by cultural evolution to be effective at transmitting belief and transmitting faith. By attending a ritual, you elevate the degree of belief in the high-moralizing gods or the priests of the religion by the ritual practice. If you break down rituals common in many religions, they put the words in the mouths of a prestigious member of the group, someone everyone respects. That makes it more likely to transmit and be believed. 我们还认为,仪式在文化进化中发挥了作用。仪式似乎是文化进化所创造出来的一整套行为,有助于信念和信仰的传递。通过参与仪式,你就能通过仪式行为提高对高度教化性的神或传教者的信仰程度。如果你分析一下在许多宗教中都能找到的仪式行为就会发现,它们会借群体中某个威望很高、大家都尊重的人物之口来宣之于众。这会令其更易传播、更可能被相信。 People also engage in what we call credibility-enhancing displays [during rituals]. These are costly things. It might be an animal sacrifice or the giving of a large sum of money or some kind of painful initiation rite like circumcision, which one would only engage in if one actually believed in it. It's a demonstration of true belief, which then makes the observers more likely to acquire the belief. (在仪式过程中,)人们也会参与我们称为“提升可信度”的行为。这是一种代价颇高的事情。可能是以动物献祭,或者捐出大笔钱财,或者是某种痛苦的加入仪式,比如割礼,这些事都是只有真正的信徒才会参与的,是真信仰的展示,并能增加旁观者接受这些信仰的可能性。 Speaking in unison, large congregations saying the same thing, this all taps our capacity for conformist transmission; the fact that we weight what everybody believes in deciding in what we believe. 齐声说话,大规模集会倾诉同样的内容,这些都是在利用人们实现从众传递的潜力——也就是说我们在选择自己要相信什么的时候会考虑其他人都相信些什么。 These seem to want to tap our cultural transmission abilities to deepen the faith, and one of the interesting kind of ways that this has developed is that high-moralizing gods will often require rituals of this kind, and then by forcing people to routinely do the rituals, they then guarantee that the next generation acquires a deepened faith in the god, and then the whole thing perpetuates itself. It creates a self-perpetuating cycle. 这就像是要利用文化传递能力来加深信仰,它发展出来的有趣方式之一是,高度教化性的神通常都要求执行这类仪式,通过强迫人们经常性地履行仪式,就能保证下一代人对神能够拥有更深一层的信仰,然后整套体系就能实现永续。它创造出了一个自我存续的循环。 We think religions are just one element, one way in which culture has figured out ways to expand the sphere of cooperation and allow markets to form and people to exchange and to maintain the substantial division of labor. 我们认为,文化已经发展出了许多方式来扩大合作领域、允许市场形成、促进人们之间的交易,并维持明确的劳动分工,而宗教只是其中之一。 One of the interesting things about the division of labor is that you're not going to specialize in a particular trade—maybe you make steel plows—unless you know that there are other people who are specializing in other kinds of trades which you need—say food or say materials for making housing, and you have to be confident that you can trade with them or exchange with them and get the other things you need. 关于劳动分工,有一点非常有趣:你要选择专门从事某一特定行业,比如打造铁犁具,这需要一个前提,那就是你得知道有人专门从事你对之有需求的其他一些行业,比如食品或建材,而且你需要确信,自己能与他们进行贸易或交换,能够得到你需要的其他东西。 There's a lot of risk in developing specialization because you have to be confident that there's a market there that you can engage with. Whereas if you're a generalist and you do a little bit of farming, a little bit of manufacturing, then you're much less reliant on the market. 发展专业分工有很大的风险,因为你必须确信存在一个你能够利用的市场。如果你是个多面手,能做一点农活,再从事一些制造,那么你对这个市场的依赖度就大幅降低。 Markets require a great deal of trust and a great deal of cooperation to work. Sometimes you get the impression from economics that markets are for self-interested individuals. They're actually the opposite. Self-interested individuals don't specialize, and they don't take it [to market], because there's all this trust and fairness that are required to make markets run with impersonal others. 市场的运转需要很高的信任和大量的合作。你会从经济学得知,市场是由自利的个体组成的。实际上正好相反。自利的个体没法专业化,不能形成市场,因为要使市场在素昧平生的陌路人之间运作,那需要非常高的信任和公平。

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In developing this line of thought, one of the things you need to be clear about is what you mean by culture and culture evolution. Culture is one of those terms that has lots of different meanings, and people have used it lots of different ways. In the intellectual tradition that I'm building on, culture is information stored in people's heads that gets there by some kind of social learning—so imitation, teaching, any kind of observational learning. 沿着这条思路想问题时,你需要清晰界定的事物之一就是文化和文化进化的含义。文化是那种带有很多不同含义的词汇,人们已经在用不同方式使用它。在我所背靠的智识传统中,文化指的是人们通过某种形式的社会化学习——如模仿、教育或任何形式的观察学习——而获得并储存在自己头脑中的信息。 We tend to think of cultural transmission, or at least many people think of cultural transmission as relying on language, but that's in part because in our culture, especially among academics, there tends to be a lot of talking, but in lots of small-scale societies, it's quite clear that there is a ton of cultural transmission that is just strictly by observational learning. 我们,或至少很多人,都倾向于认为文化传递是依赖语言的,但造成这种理解的部分原因在于,在我们的文化里,特别是在学术界,人们倾向于进行大量的语言交流,但是在众多小型社群中,很明显大量的文化传递纯粹是依靠观察学习来实现的。 If you're trying to make a tool, you're mostly watching the physical movements of the hands and the strategies taken. You might get tips that are transmitted verbally as you go along. In building a house, you're looking at how the house is built together, again with verbal comments as supplements to getting a sense for how the house goes together. 如果你想学习制造工具,就得主要观察手部的物理运动,以及其中的技巧。在这个过程中你可能会获得一些口头传达的指点。如果要学建房子,你要观察房子到底是怎么建造起来的,当然也会得到一些口头评论,帮助你理解房子到底如何拼起来。 If you're copying how to shoot an arrow, you're watching body position and bow position and aiming, and you're not listening to a lot of exposition on it, although clearly the verbal part of the transmission helps. We think and there's experimental evidence that show you can transmit lots of stuff without using any words. 如果你是在学习射箭,你观察的是身体的姿势、弓箭的位置及如何瞄准,你不会去听一大堆阐释,虽然很明显这种传达的口头部分也是有帮助的。我们认为,而且也有很多实验证据表明,无需使用任何词语,也能传达很多信息。 This is information stored in people's brains, and when we look at other animals, we find that the evolutionary models of culture make really good predictions about culture in fish. Fish will learn food foraging preferences from each other, and non-human primates can learn from each other, but what we don't see amongst other animals is cumulative cultural evolution. The case in which the cultural transmission is high enough fidelity that you can learn one thing from one generation, and that begins to accumulate in subsequent generations. 这是储存在人脑中的信息,当我们观察其他动物的时候,我们发现文化的进化模型能够很好地预测鱼类的文化。鱼类能够相互学习觅食偏好,人类之外的灵长类也能相互学习,但我们在其他动物身上看不到累积性的文化进化。也就是那种能从一代人身上学会某样事物,然后在接下来的数代人中间开始逐步累积的足够准确的文化传递。 One possible exception to that is bird song. Bird songs accumulate in such that birds from large continents have more complex songs than birds from islands. It turns out humans from smaller islands have less complex material culture than humans from larger islands, at least until recently, until communication was opened up. One of the interesting lines of research that's come out of this recognition is the importance of population size and the interconnectedness for technology. 此处有一个可能的例外,那就是鸟鸣。鸟类的鸣叫方式能够累积,以至于大陆鸟类的鸣叫方式要比海岛鸟类的更复杂。我们还发现,直到不久之前,也就是直到交流开放之前,在物质文化的复杂程度方面,来自小型海岛的人群不如来自更大型海岛的人群。源于这一认知的有趣研究领域之一,就是人口规模和互联程度对科技的重要影响。

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I began this investigation by looking at a case study in Tasmania. Tasmania's an island off the coast of Southern Victoria in Australia and the archeological record is really interesting in Tasmania. Up until about 10,000 years ago, 12,000 years ago, the archeology of Tasmania looks the same as Australia. It seems to be moving along together. It's getting a bit more complex over time, and then suddenly after 10,000 years ago, it takes a downturn. It becomes less complex. 调查开始之初,我回顾了一个关于塔斯马尼亚岛的案例研究。塔斯马尼亚岛是澳大利亚的维多利亚州南部海洋上的一个岛屿,这里的考古记录非常有趣。直到约1万年前,和1.2万年前,塔斯马尼亚岛的考古记录看起来都跟澳洲大陆是一样的。两者似乎是齐头并进的,随着时间推移而变得日渐复杂。但在距今1万年以后,突然它就衰退了,变得没有澳洲大陆复杂了。 The ability to make fire is probably lost. Bone tools are lost. Fishing is lost. Boats are probably lost. Meanwhile, things move along just fine back on the continent, so there's this kind of divergence, and one thing nice about this experiment is that there's good reason to believe that peoples were genetically the same. 生火的能力可能丢失了。骨制工具丢失了。不会打渔了。船可能也没有了。与此同时,大陆上的事物则照常发展,所以就出现了这种分化。这一案例特别好的一点在于,我们有很好的理由相信两地的人群原本拥有相同的基因。 You start out with two genetically well-intermixed peoples. Tasmania's actually connected to mainland Australia so it's just a peninsula. Then about 10,000 years ago, the environment changes, it gets warmer and the Bass Strait floods, so this cuts off Tasmania from the rest of Australia, and it's at that point that they begin to have this technological downturn. 最开始两个群体在基因方面是相互混杂的。塔斯马尼亚最早是跟澳大利亚本土连在一起的,因此只是个半岛。大约在距今1万年前,气候发生了变化,越来越暖,于是巴斯海峡形成了,把塔斯马尼亚岛和澳大利亚其余部分分隔开来。也就是在这时,他们开始出现这种技术上的倒退。 You can show that this is the kind of thing you'd expect if societies are like brains in the sense that they store information as a group and that when someone learns, they're learning from the most successful member, and that information is being passed from different communities, and the larger the population, the more different minds you have working on the problem. 假如把各个社会群体比作不同人的大脑,就可以说发生上述这种事情毫不奇怪。因为社会群体以集体的方式储存信息,如果某人要学习,他就会向最成功的成员学习,而且这种信息会在不同社群之间传播,人口规模越大,你在处理问题时所能依靠的不同头脑就更多。 If your number of minds working on the problem gets small enough, you can actually begin to lose information. There's a steady state level of information that depends on the size of your population and the interconnectedness. It also depends on the innovativeness of your individuals, but that has a relatively small effect compared to the effect of being well interconnected and having a large population. 如果处理问题时能够依靠的头脑数目少到一定程度,你实际上会开始丢失信息。信息的稳态水平依赖于人口规模和互联程度。它也依赖于个体的创造性,但后一方面的影响相对而言比较小,良好的互联水平和大量的人口更加重要。 There have been a number of tests of this recently, the best of which is this study by Rob Boyd and Michelle Kline in which they took the fishing technologies of different Oceanic islands from the time when Europeans first arrived, and they looked at how the population size of the island relates to the tool complexity, and larger islands had much bigger and more complex fishing technologies, and you can even show an effective contact. Some of the islands were in more or less contact with each other, and when you include that, you get the size effect, but you also get a contact effect, and the prediction is that if you're more in contact, you have fancier tools, and that seems to hold up. 在这方面,最近已经有了很多测试,其中最好的当属Rob Boyd和Michelle Kline所做的研究。他们研究了自欧洲人初次抵达以后大洋洲不同岛屿上的捕鱼技术,考察了岛上人口规模如何影响渔具的复杂度,结果发现更大的岛屿拥有更大型、更复杂的捕鱼技术。有效接触也会发挥作用。其中某些岛屿跟其他岛屿之间存在或多或少的接触,如果把这个考虑在内,就既能发现规模效应,又能发现接触效应,理论上的预测是,更多的接触就意味着更好的渔具,这似乎也得到了验证。 If you follow this idea a little bit further, then it does give you a sense that rates of innovation should continue to increase, especially with the emergence of communication technologies, because these allow ideas to flow very rapidly from place to place. 如果你顺着这一想法再进一小步,它就会促使你产生一种想法,那就是创新的速度应该还会继续提高,特别是在通信技术出现以后,因为这使得观念从一地到另一地的流动速度变得非常快。 An important thing to remember is that there's always an incentive to hide your information. As an individual inventor or company, you're best off if everybody else shares their ideas but you don't share your ideas because then you get to keep your good ideas, and nobody else gets exposed to them, and you get to use their good ideas, so you get to do more recombination. 这里要记住的重要一点是,对于你自己知道的信息,你总是有动力进行隐瞒。对于个体发明家或单个公司而言,如果其他所有人都分享他们的想法,而你不分享你的想法,那你就是最受益的。因为这种情况下你能保守自己的好想法,别人没法知道,而你却能使用他们的好想法,这样你就能尝试更多的组合。 Embedded in this whole information-sharing thing is a constant cooperative dilemma in which individuals have to be willing to share for the good of the group. They don't have to explicitly know it's for the good of the group, but the idea that a norm of information sharing is a really good norm to have because it helps everybody do better because we share more ideas, get more recombination of ideas. 信息分享本身就存在合作困境,这种情形是一致存在的。为了集体的利益,个体要有分享的意愿。他们不需要明确地知道这是为了集体的利益,但他们需要建立一个观念,即认为有一个信息分享的规范是件好事,因为这能帮助所有人过得更好,因为我们分享的观念越多,我们得到的观念组合就越多。

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I've done a lot of work on marriage systems with the evolution of monogamy. We have a sort of human nature that pushes us towards polygyny whenever there are sufficient resources. Eighty-five percent of human societies have allowed men to have more than one wife, and very few societies have adopted polyandry which would be the flip side of this, and then there's actually a number of societies that allowed both, but they tended to be polygynous because, assuming you have enough resources, the men are going to be more interested in having more wives than the wives are interested in having more husbands, and the husbands aren't inclined to be second husbands as much as the women are willing to be second wives. 我在婚姻体制方面下了很多功夫,研究过一夫一妻制的进化。我们有某种天性,促使我们在资源充分的前提下追求一夫多妻。85%的人类社会曾允许男人拥有一个以上妻子,极少有社会采用过这一制度的对立面,即一妻多夫制。有些社会实际上两者都允许,但最终更可能出现一夫多妻,因为假定有充足的资源,男人会对拥有更多妻子更感兴趣,女人对于拥有更多丈夫就没那么感兴趣,而且丈夫们并不太愿意成为别人的二号丈夫,而女人在做别人的二号妻子方面意愿相对更强。 But in the modern world, of course, monogamy is normative, and people who have too many wives are thought poorly of by the larger society. The question is, how did this ever get in place? And of course, it traces back through Europe. 但是在现代社会,当然一夫一妻制是规范性的,而且那些拥有很多妻子的人会被更大社群当中的人瞧不起。问题是,到底怎么会变成这样的?当然,这要从欧洲往上追溯。 One of the things that distinguished Europe from the rest of the world was something called the European Marriage Pattern, and part of that was normative monogamy, the idea that taking a second wife was wrong as long as you still had the first wife, and this actually traces back to Rome and eventually to Athens. Athens legislates the first rules about monogamous marriage just before the Classical period. 欧洲区别于世界其他地方的一个要点就是欧洲婚姻模式,规范性一夫一妻制就是其中之一。认为只要你的第一个妻子还在,娶第二个妻子就是错误的,这种观念实际上可以追溯到古罗马,甚至古雅典。在古典时代开始之前,雅典人就正式奠定了一夫一妻制的最初规则。 This was an example of a case where people are ready to moralize it, and I like to view it as the evolution of this marriage system of monogamy. It's peculiar. It doesn't fit with what we know about human nature, but it does seem to have societal level benefits. It reduces male-male competition. 人们会把一些东西道德化,婚姻制度就是例证之一,而且我倾向于从一夫一妻制婚姻体制的进化这个角度来考虑。这是很特别的。它跟我们对人性的认知相左,但确实具有社会层面的好处。它能减少男性之间的竞争。 We think there's evidence to say it reduces crime, reduces substance abuse, and it also engages males in ways that cause them to discount the future less and engage in productive activities rather than taking a lot of risks which include crime and other things. Depending on what your value systems are, if you think freedom is really important, then you might be for polygyny, but if you want to trade freedom off against other social ills like high crime, then you might favor the laws that prohibit polygamy. 我们认为,有证据表明这一制度可以减少犯罪,减少毒品滥用,而且它还能吸引男性更多地重视未来,更多地参与生产性活动,而不是到处冒险,制造犯罪及其他事端。这取决于你的价值观体系,如果你认为自由非常重要,那么你可能会支持一夫多妻,但如果你愿意为了减少社会麻烦(如高犯罪率)而牺牲一些自由,那么你可能就会支持立法禁止多偶制。 When I talk about success and un-success, I don't mean anything moralizing. I'm talking about the cultural evolutionary processes that favor the spread of one idea over another. If I talk about normative monogamy as being successful, I mean that it spread, and in this case the idea is that it spread despite the fact that it's contrary to some aspects of human nature. It does harness our pair bonding in some aspects, so it's a complex story there, but it creates societal level benefits. 我所说的成功或不成功,并不具有任何道德意味。我要表达的只是,在文化进化的过程中,某个理念的传播压倒了另外一个理念。当我说规范性一夫一妻制成功了的时候,我的意思只是它传播开了,而且在这个例子中,尽管它与人性某些方面相抵触,但仍然得以传播开来。它确实在某些方面约束了我们的结成配偶的行为,所以这个故事很复杂,但它带来了社会层面的好处。 Societies that have this are better able to maintain a harmonious population, increase trade and exchange, and have economic growth more than societies that allow polygamy, especially if you have a society with widely varying amounts of wealth, especially among males. Then you're going to have a situation that would normally promote high levels of polygyny. 实行一夫一妻制的社会更能维持人与人之间的和谐,增加贸易和交易,实现更快的经济增长,而允许多偶制的社会在这些方面就要差一些,特别是如果这一社会里财富差异非常大时(尤其是在男性之间)。如果存在上述情形,通常都会加剧一夫多妻的程度。 The absolute levels of wealth difference of, say, between Bill Gates and Donald Trump and the billionaires of the world, and the men at the bottom end of the spectrum is much larger than it's ever been in human history, and that includes kings and emperors and things like that in terms of total control of absolute wealth. 比如说,一边是比尔·盖茨、唐纳德·特朗普以及世上的亿万富翁,另一边则是处于财富分配末端的众多人口,财富差异绝对水平远远超过人类历史上的任何时候,而且这还把历史上那些国王、帝王等人物都考虑了在内,他们可是绝对财富的全权控制者。 Males will be males in the sense that they'll try to obtain extra matings, but the billionaires are completely curbed in terms of what they would do if they could do what emperors have done throughout the ages. They have harems and stuff like that. Norms of modern society prevent that. 男性作为男性,就会力图拥有更多的配偶,但现在的亿万富翁在这一点上却受到了完全的约束;本来如果他们可以这么做,他们会这么做的,历史上的所有帝王都不例外。他们会形成后宫体制,或类似的体制,但现代社会的道德规范阻止了他们。 Otherwise, there would be massive male-male competition, and even to get into the mating and marriage market you would have to have a high level of wealth if we were to let nature take it's course as it did in the earliest empires. It depends on what your views are about freedom versus societal level benefits. 否则的话,如果我们像早期帝国那样,让天性不加阻碍地发展,那将会出现大规模的男性竞争,甚至是仅仅想进入配偶和婚姻市场,你就得拥有很多的财富。这取决于你如何看待自由和社会层面利益之间的取舍。

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Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 我的研究课题之一就是要说服人们相信,人们应该停止在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们希望将所有这些事情整个当作生物进化看待。 We want to distinguish genetic evolution and cultural evolution, and then at some point we may have epigenetic evolution, and there are other kinds of inheritance systems. 我们要区分基因进化和文化进化,在某些情况下我们可能还发生了表观进化,此外还有其他种类的继承机制。 It's going to be a little bit more of a complex story. Culture is part of our biology. We now have the neuroscience to say that culture's in our brain, so if you compare people from different societies, they have different brains. Culture is deep in our biology. 接下来的故事更加复杂一点。文化是我们生物属性的一部分。现在,神经科学告诉我们,文化存在于我们的大脑中,所以如果你把来自不同社会的人进行比较,会发现他们拥有不同的大脑。文化深嵌于我们的生物属性之中。 We have people with different cultural backgrounds that have different hormonal reactions as well as having different brains on the MRI scan. So culture is just part of our biology, and we shouldn't take this dualistic view that there's this realm of ideas that somehow are separate from this realm of biology, and you're either talking about the realm of ideas or the realm of biology. 我们看到,来自不同文化背景的人会有不同的激素反应,而且在核磁共振扫描上显示的大脑也不一样。所以文化只是我们生物属性的一部分,我们不应该采取一种二元区分的观点,认为存在一个观念领域,和一个生物领域,两者截然分开,只能分别谈论。 Cognition and our ability to think are all interwoven, and we're a cultural species, which means one of our genetic programs is to be able to acquire ideas, beliefs and values and weave them into our brain such that they then affect our biology. A good example of this is the placebos. 认知和思考能力是相互交织的,我们就是一个文化物种,这就是说我们的基因程序之一就是使我们获得观念、信念和价值观并将它们编入我们的大脑,我们的生物属性也因而受到影响。 Placebos are something that depend on your cultural beliefs. If you believe that something will work, then when you take it, like you take an aspirin or you take a placebo for an aspirin, it initiates the same pathways as the chemically active substance. 这方面的一个恰当例子就是安慰剂。安慰剂的作用取决于你的文化信念。如果你相信某物会起作用,那在你服用它之后,比如把安慰剂当作阿司匹林来服用,那么安慰剂就会像阿司匹林那样开启同样的路径。 Placebos are chemically inert but biologically active, and it's completely dependent on your cultural beliefs. If you don't believe that cures come in pills, then taking a placebo aspirin does not have any effect on you. That's a case where it shows the ability of a cultural belief to activate biological processes, and then it's something we know a little bit about. 从化学角度来说,安慰剂是不会起效的,但从生物学上来说,它能起到跟阿司匹林一样的作用,这完全取决于你的文化信念。如果你不相信药能治病,那么服用阿司匹林安慰剂就不会对你产生任何效果。这是表明文化信念能够激发生物过程的一个案例,我们对此稍微有所了解。

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One of the large research projects that I run in an effort to understand human sociality is called The Root of Human Sociality Project. In the mid '90s I was working in the Peruvian Amazon and I was working with a group called the Machiguenga. Traditionally, the Machiguenga lived in single-family units scattered throughout the forest. I had been exposed through my advisor, Rob Boyd, at the time to something called the Ultimatum Game, and the Ultimatum Game seemed to provide evidence that humans were innately inclined to punish unfairness. 为了理解人类社会,我正在做的大型研究项目中包括一个“人类社会性探源项目”。上世纪90年代中期我在秘鲁的亚马逊地区工作,跟一个叫做Machiguenga的群体一起。传统上,该群体的人们以独户家庭为单位分散居住在森林里。通过我的导师Rob Boyd,我那时知道了一个叫做“最后通牒博弈”的东西,而这个博弈似乎能够证明人类天性倾向于对不公加以惩罚。 In the Ultimatum Game, two players are allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer a portion of this $100 to the second player who can either accept or reject. If the second player accepts, they get the amount of the money, and the first player gets the remainder. If they reject, both players get zero. 在“最后通牒博弈”中,两个参与者会拿到一笔钱,比如100块。参与者A可以开价,将100块中的一部分给予参与者B,后者既可以接受,也可以拒绝。如果参与者B接受,他就能拿走提议数目的钱,剩下的归参与者A。如果他拒绝,那两个参与者都拿不到钱。 Just to give you an example, suppose the money is $100, and the first player offers $10 out of the $100 to the second player. If the second player accepts, he gets the $10 and the first player gets $90. If he rejects, both players go home with zero. If you place yourself in the shoes of the second player, then you should be inclined to accept any amount of money if you just care about making money. 举个例子,假设总数为100块,参与者A开价将100块中的10块给参与者B。如果B接受,他就得10块,而A得90块。如果他拒绝,两人都只能空手而归。如果你站在参与者B的角度想问题,如果你只关心赚钱与否,那你就应该接受任何开价。 Now, if he offers you zero, you have the choice between zero and zero, so it's ambiguous what you should do. But assuming it's a positive amount, so $10, you should accept the $10, go home with $10 and let the other guy go home with $90. 如果A提出不给你钱,那无论如何选择,你都只能空手而归,在这种情况下你应该如何选择就是不确定的。但是,假定A提议分给你一个正数,比如10块,那你就应该接受这10块钱,拿着10块钱回家,让另外那个家伙拿90块回家。 But in experiments with undergraduates, Western undergraduates, going back to 1982, behavioral economists find that students give about half, sometimes a little bit less than half, and people are inclined to reject offers below about 30 percent. 但在实验中,在1982年针对大学生——西方大学生——的实验中,行为经济学家发现,学生们会开价给一半,有时候是略少于一半,一旦开价低于30%,人们就倾向于拒绝接受了。 Subsequent work with non-student adults in the West show that it's an even a stronger result. The older you get, even if you have more wealth and more income, you're especially inclined to only offer half, and you'll reject offers below 40 percent. 针对非学生的西方成人的后续研究显示出了比这更强的结果。随着年龄增长,不管你多么有钱收入多高,你都会特别倾向于只拿出一半钱来分享,而且你会拒绝任何低于40%的开价。 In 1995, it had been done in a number of different countries, and it seemed to be robust. I was thinking that the Machiguenga would be a good test of this, because if they also showed this willingness to reject and to make equal offers, it would really demonstrate the innateness of this finding, because they don't have any higher level institutions, and it would be hard to make a kind of cultural argument that they were bringing something into the experiment that was causing this behavior. 到1995年,研究者已在许多不同国家做过同一实验,这一关系都很明显。我当时想,拿Machiguenga人做个测试会相当好,因为如果他们也显示出拒绝的意愿和平等分享的意愿,那就真的能证明这一发现确属天性,因为这个群体中并没有任何高层次的制度,因此我们很难提出一种文化论证,说他们在参加实验时带入了某些(文化方面的)东西,影响了他们的行为。 I went and I did it in 1995 and 1996 there, and what I found amongst the Machiguenga was that they were completely unwilling to reject, and they thought it was silly. Why would anyone ever reject? They would almost explain the subgame perfect equilibrium, the solution that the economists use, back to me by saying, "Well, why would anybody ever reject? You lose money then." And they made low offers, the modal offer was 15 percent instead of 50, and the mean comes out to be about 25 percent. 我1995年和1996年去那里做了实验,而我从Machiguenga人那里得到的结论是,他们绝不愿意拒绝,而且他们觉得拒绝是愚蠢的做法。为什么有人会拒绝?而且他们几乎都能跟我解释经济学家使用的那个解,即子博弈完美均衡:“为什么会有人拒绝呢?拒绝了你就会损失钱啊。”而且他们还会给出很低额度的开价,开价的众数是15%而非50%,而平均值则是大约25%。 Rob Boyd then was my advisor, and we went to the MacArthur Foundation for some funding, and they funded us, and we were able to put together a team of anthropologists. We brought them to UCLA. We had some economists there, including Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles, and Herb Gintis, and we taught them some game theory. Rob Boyd那时候是我导师,我们跑去麦克阿瑟基金会要资助,他们资助了我们。我们由此得以组建了一个人类学家团队,把他们带到加州大学洛杉矶分校。我们在那还有一批经济学家,包括Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles和Herb Gintis,我们就教了他们一些博弈论。 There was large discussion about methods, about whether we could actually pull this off, and then over the next two summers these field anthropologists went to the field and conducted the ultimatum game as well as a few other games—not systemically across the societies— but it gave us insight that we would then later use, and what we found is that societies vary dramatically, from societies that would never reject, to societies that would even reject offers above 50 percent, and we found that mean offers ranged across societies from about 25 percent to even over 50 percent. We had some of what we called hyper fair societies. The highest was 57 percent in Lamalera, Indonesia. 当时就方法论有很多争论,还争论到了我们到底能否做成这事。但接下来的两个夏季,我们的田野人类学家就到了实地,实施了“最后通牒博弈”和其他一些博弈(并没有在不同社群中系统性实施),这给我们提供了一些见解,后来都能够用上。我们发现的是,社群与社群之间差别极大,有些社群绝不会选择拒绝任何开价,而有些社群甚至连高于50%的开价都会拒绝。而且我们发现,不同社群的平均开价从25%到高于50%不等。有些社群我们称为“极度公平”社会。其中最高的是印度尼西亚的Lamalera人,(开价)高达57%。 We found we were able to explain a lot of the variation in these offers with two variables. One was the degree of market integration. More market-integrated societies offered more, and less market integrated societies offered less. But also, there seemed to be other institutions, institutions of cooperative hunting seemed to influence offers. Societies with more cooperative institutions offered more, and these were independent effects. 我们发现,我们可以用两个变量解释开价方面的很大一部分差异。其中一个变量是市场整合的程度。市场整合度越高的社群开价越高,整合度越低的社群开价越低。不过似乎也还有其他的机制,比如合作狩猎的机制似乎也会影响开价。合作机制越多的社群开价越高,而且两者是独立发挥作用的。 This then led to a subsequent project where we measured market integration much more carefully along with a large number of other variables, including wealth, income, education, community size, and also religion. We did the Ultimatum Game along with two other experiments. The two other experiments were the Dictator Game (the Dictator Game is like the Ultimatum Game except the second player doesn't have the option to reject) and the Third Party Punishment Game. 这又引出了我们后来的项目,我们更加细致地测量了市场整合度,以及很多其他变量,包括财富、收入、教育、社区规模,还有宗教。除“最后通牒博弈”之外,我们还一同做了另外两个实验。一个是“独裁者博弈”(跟“最后通牒博弈”类似,只是参与者B没有拒绝的选项),另一个是“第三方惩罚博弈”。 In the Third Party Punishment Game, there are three players and the first two players play a Dictator Game. They're allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer any portion of the $100 to the second player, player B. Now, player B in this game can't do anything, and they just get whatever they're offered. But there is a third player, player C, and player C is given half the amount that A and B are dividing up, and he can use some of his money (20 percent of it actually) to pay to take money away from A at three times the rate. If he's given $50, he can use $10 of it to take $30 away from player A. Suppose player A gives only $10 to player B and keeps $90 for himself, then player B will go home with $10. Now, player C can pay $10, so he goes home with $40 instead of $50 in order to take $30 away from player A. Player A would go home with $60 instead of $90, because he got punished. Player B goes home with $10, and player C goes home with $40 instead of $50 because he chose to punish. 在“第三方惩罚博弈”中有三个参与者,头两个进行“独裁者博弈”。他们会得到一笔钱,比方说100块。然后参与者A可以提议将100块中的任意数目分给第二个参与者,参与者B。在这个游戏中,参与者B不能做任何事,A给他多少,他就只能得到多少。但是还有第三个参与者,参与者C。参与者C手里有相当于A和B所分数额一半的钱,他可以拿出其中的一部分(20%)去抵消掉参与者A手中的一部分钱,而且能1抵3。比如,C手里有50块,他就能花掉其中的10块去抵消掉参与者A手中的30块。假设参与者A只分了10块给B参与者,自己留下了90块,那么参与者B就得10块。但因为参与者C拿出了10块钱,那他拿回家的就是40块而非50块,又因为参与者A手中钱被抵消掉了30块。A拿回家的就是60块而非90块,因为他遭到了惩罚。参与者B拿回家10块,参与者C拿回家40块而非50块,因为他选择进行惩罚。 This gives us two different measures of willingness to punish strangers, ephemeral interactions—people that you don't know and won't see again. In the experiment, one is rejection in the Ultimatum Game, and then this Third Party Punishment measure, and it gives us three measures of fairness in this kind of transaction. 对于我们惩罚陌生人和一次性交往(那些你不认识并且以后也不会再见到的人)的意愿,这就提供了两种测量办法。在试验中,一种测量是看“最终通牒博弈”中的拒绝选项,另一个则是看“第三方惩罚”。并且,它还给我们提供了此类交易中关于公平的三种测量方式。 It gives us offers in all three games and what we found there is that market integration again predicts higher offers in all three games, and size of the community predicts willingness to punish and this fits with a lot of theoretical work, suggesting that if you have small communities, you don't need punishment. You don't need costly punishment. You need some kind of sanctioning system to keep people in line, but you're probably not going to do it with single individuals punishing. You have some other mechanism. It could be some kind of reputational mechanism like if they don't cooperate in this situation, then you won't interact with them in some other situation. It's a withdrawal of interaction rather than direct punishment. There's a number of different ways to create norm systems that operate like that. 在三种博弈中都有出价,而且我们再次发现,在三种博弈中,市场整合度能够预测出价的高低,社区的规模能够预测惩罚的意愿,而且这跟许多理论研究成果相吻合;这意味着,如果社区规模足够小,根本不需要惩罚。根本不需要代价高昂的惩罚。你需要建立某种处罚机制,以便人人都能守规矩,但你可能无需对个体施加单独的惩罚。你还有其他一些机制。可能是某种声誉机制,比方说如果他们在这种情况下不能够合作,那碰到其他情况你就不会与他们互动。这是取消交往,而不是直接惩罚。有许多办法可以创造出按照这个模式运行的规范制度。 In a big society punishment can be most effective because reputational mechanisms can be weak. If you're in a big society and you encounter somebody, you probably don't have friends in common through which you could pass reputational information for which punishment could be generated. You might want to punish them right on the spot or someone who observes the interaction might want to punish them right on the spot or call the authorities or whatever, which is also costly. 在大型社群中,惩罚可能是最有效的,因为声誉机制的效力可能很微弱。如果你在一个大型社群中与某人打交道,你和他之间可能并没有共同的朋友,那你就没法传递声誉信息,也就无从构成惩罚。你可能希望当场惩罚他,或者你们打交道时的某个旁观者可能想要当场惩罚他,或者诉诸权威,这样的代价都是很高的。

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This creates a puzzle because typically people think of small-scale kinds of societies, where you study hunter-gatherers and horticultural scattered across the globe (ranging from New Guinea to Siberia to Africa) as being very pro social and cooperative. This is true, but the thing is those are based on local norms for cooperation with kin and local interactions in certain kinds of circumstances. 这就给我们制造了一个谜题。因为通常人们认为,小规模的社区——比如当你研究的是散布全球各地的狩猎采集者群体(从新几内亚到西伯利亚到非洲)——都是非常亲社会的、非常具有合作精神的。事实的确如此,但问题是这只是基于地方性的与亲族合作的的规范,以及在特定情形下的地方性交往规范。 Hunter-gatherers are famous for being great at food sharing, but these norms don't extend beyond food sharing. They certainly don't extend to ephemeral or strangers, and to make a large-scale society run you have to shift from investing in your local kin groups and your enduring relationships to being willing to pay to be fair to a stranger. 狩猎采集者在食物分享上的慷慨是出了名的,但这些规范并不会延伸到食物分享以外。它们绝对不会延伸到一次性交往或陌生人身上。要维持一个大型社会运转,你必须要转型,从投资于你的本地亲族群体和长久关系,转变为愿意为了公平对待陌生人而付出代价。 This is something that is subtle, and what people have trouble grasping is that if you're going to be fair to a stranger, then you're taking money away from your family. In the case of these dictator games, in order to give 50 percent to this other unknown person, it meant you were going home with less money, and that meant your family was going to have less money, and your kids would have less money. To observe modern institutions, to not hire your brother-in-law when you get a fancy job or you get elected to an office is to hurt your family. Your brother-in-law doesn't have a job now. He has to have whatever other job he has, a less good job. 这种情形非常微妙。人们不容易理解的是,如果你想要公平对待陌生人,那就会让你家里的钱变少。在上述独裁者博弈中,如果你要拿出50%的钱给另外一个陌生人,那就意味着你拿回家里的钱会变少,也就是你家的钱会变少,你孩子的钱会变少。要遵守现代的制度,比如在你得到一个好工作或被选为官员以后不要雇佣自己的小舅子,这就会对自己家庭造成伤害。你的小舅子现在没有工作。他必须自己去找其他工作,一个没那么好的工作。 A commitment to something like anti-nepotism norms is something that runs against our evolutionary inclinations and our inclinations to help kin and to invest in long-term close relationships, but it's crucial for making a large-scale society run. Corruption, things like hiring your brother-in-law and feathering the nest of your close friends and relatives is what really tears down and makes complex societies not work very well. In this sense, the norms of modern societies that make modern societies run now are at odds with at least some of our evolved instincts. 服膺于像反裙带关系这种规范,这是与我们的进化偏好相悖的,与我们帮助亲族、投资于长期亲密关系的偏好相悖,但它对大型社群的运转则至关重要。腐败,比如雇佣自己的小舅子、为自己的好友和亲属谋私利这种事,才真正会撕裂复杂社会,并令其不能良好运转。在这个意义上,令现代社会得以运转的现代社会规范是与我们进化形成的至少一部分本能相违背的。 Lately we've been focused on the effects of religion. One of the things I didn't mention from the experimental games project is that in addition to market integration in the second project, we found independently that adherence to a world religion matters. People from world religions were willing to give more to the other person in the experiment, the anonymous stranger. 近来我们研究的焦点是宗教的作用。关于我们的博弈实验项目,有一件事我还没有提到,那就是在第二个项目中,除了市场整合度之外,我们还独立地发现,人们对世界宗教的信仰也有关系。在实验中,信仰世界宗教的人会愿意分更多钱给另外一个人,另外一个匿名的陌生人。 We've been using these experiments in the context of behavioral games. There's since been a number of additional papers coming out of economics showing the relationship between market integrations using measures like distance from market and people's willingness to build impartial institutions. Part of this is your willingness to acquire a norm of impartial roles; that we have a set of rules that governs this system. 我们还将这些实验应用到了行为博弈的情境中去。自那以后至今,经济学领域已经又发表了很多论文,证明市场整合度(用与市场的距离之类方式测量)与人们建构公平制度之意愿之间的关系。内容之一包括,你习得一套关于公平角色的规范的意愿,也就是我们有一套规则来管理这个体系。 Sometimes historians or political scientists call it the rule of law. We have an impartial set of rules that we're going to follow, and those rules apply independently of the identities and our emotional reactions towards the participants. 有时候,历史学家或政治科学家会把它叫做法治。我们有一套需要遵守的公平规则,而且不管我们的身份如何,不管我们对其他参与者的感情态度如何,这套规则都适用。 One of the things we find with the relationship between norms and these risk-managing institutions is that when you have risk managing institutions these impartial norms can spread. Otherwise, people are strongly biased towards maintaining these local relationships. If you want the rule of law to spread or to be maintained, you need conditions in which you're managing risk. 关于规范和这类风险管理机制之间的关系,我们有一个发现是,如果你拥有风险管理机制,那么这种公平规范就能得以传播。否则,人们会强烈偏向于固守他们的地方性关系。如果你希望法治得到传播或维持,那就需要一个有风险管控的环境。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家

【2016-09-06】

@whigzhou: 好像很少有人提到这个事实:基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家里,有6个在阿拉伯半岛,仅仅是regression to mean吗?不太像

 

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【2016-09-06】 @whigzhou: 好像很少有人提到这个事实:基督徒数量增长最快的10个国家里,有6个在阿拉伯半岛,仅仅是regression to mean吗?不太像