含有〈恐怖主义〉标签的文章(6)

[译文]一枚热爱本拉登的鸡蛋

Yuri Kochiyama, today’s Google Doodle, fought for civil rights — and praised Osama bin Laden
今天的谷歌Doodle:为民权作斗争并歌颂本拉登的河内山百合

作者:Dylan Matthews @ 2016-05-19
译者:bear
校对:Tiff
来源:VOX,http://www.vox.com/2016/5/19/11713686/yuri-kochiyama

Thursday, May 19, this year would’ve been the 95th birthday of Yuri Kochiyama, a prominent Japanese-American activist who passed away at 93 two years ago. Google is marking the occasion with one of its trademark doodles.

今年五月十九日的这个周四是河内山百合的95岁诞辰,这位生前著名的日裔美国激进分子,于两年前93岁时去世。谷歌把这一天标记为一个Google doodle。【译注:Google doodle是谷歌为了庆祝节日、纪念伟人以及其它伟大成就的临时主页标志。

Some of Kochiyama’s work was deeply, clearly admirable. As an associate of Malcolm X, she was an important nonblack ally to the more militant end of the civil rights movement. She endured forced internment during World War II, and was an outspoken advocate for reparations to internees, which would eventually be passed in 1988. She was a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War and advocate for inmates she viewed as political prisoners.

河内山的一些工作是值得被深刻地、清晰地赞颂的。作为马尔科姆·艾克斯【译注:马尔科姆·艾克斯与马丁·路德·金并称为20世纪中期美国历史上最著名的两位黑人领导人,但他反对后者的“非暴力”的策略,主张通过以暴力革命的方式获取黑人的权利。】的伙伴,她是民权运动中战斗在第一线的重要的非黑人同盟。她在二战时期被强制收容【译注:由于二战时日本是美国的敌对国,日裔美国人被强制收容】,并且成为“被收容者赔偿”法案的积极倡导者,而这项政策最终在1988年通过。她也为反越战发声,并且支持那些她视为政治犯的囚犯。

But other commitments of hers were more ambiguous. She was an outspoken admirer of Mao Zedong even after the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. She praised Malcolm X for his “admiration for Mao and Ho Chi Minh,” and worked closely with the Revolutionary Action Movement, an “urban guerrilla warfare” organization based on “a synthesis of the thought of Malcolm X, Marx and Lenin, and Mao Zedong.” The activist Robert Williams gifted her with a copy of the Little Red Book, and she later thanked him for “the gift of Mao’s philosophy.”

但是她其他的追求则更为暧昧一些。她是毛的直言不讳的崇拜者,即便是在大跃进和文革之后。她因为马尔科姆·艾克斯对毛和胡志明的赞赏而赞扬他,并且和“革命行动运动”组织亲密合作—这是一个基于马尔科姆·艾克斯思想、马克思列宁思(more...)

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Yuri Kochiyama, today’s Google Doodle, fought for civil rights — and praised Osama bin Laden 今天的谷歌Doodle:为民权作斗争并歌颂本拉登的河内山百合 作者:Dylan Matthews @ 2016-05-19 译者:bear 校对:Tiff 来源:VOX,http://www.vox.com/2016/5/19/11713686/yuri-kochiyama Thursday, May 19, this year would've been the 95th birthday of Yuri Kochiyama, a prominent Japanese-American activist who passed away at 93 two years ago. Google is marking the occasion with one of its trademark doodles. 今年五月十九日的这个周四是河内山百合的95岁诞辰,这位生前著名的日裔美国激进分子,于两年前93岁时去世。谷歌把这一天标记为一个Google doodle。【译注:Google doodle是谷歌为了庆祝节日、纪念伟人以及其它伟大成就的临时主页标志。】 Some of Kochiyama's work was deeply, clearly admirable. As an associate of Malcolm X, she was an important nonblack ally to the more militant end of the civil rights movement. She endured forced internment during World War II, and was an outspoken advocate for reparations to internees, which would eventually be passed in 1988. She was a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War and advocate for inmates she viewed as political prisoners. 河内山的一些工作是值得被深刻地、清晰地赞颂的。作为马尔科姆·艾克斯【译注:马尔科姆·艾克斯与马丁·路德·金并称为20世纪中期美国历史上最著名的两位黑人领导人,但他反对后者的“非暴力”的策略,主张通过以暴力革命的方式获取黑人的权利。】的伙伴,她是民权运动中战斗在第一线的重要的非黑人同盟。她在二战时期被强制收容【译注:由于二战时日本是美国的敌对国,日裔美国人被强制收容】,并且成为“被收容者赔偿”法案的积极倡导者,而这项政策最终在1988年通过。她也为反越战发声,并且支持那些她视为政治犯的囚犯。 But other commitments of hers were more ambiguous. She was an outspoken admirer of Mao Zedong even after the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. She praised Malcolm X for his "admiration for Mao and Ho Chi Minh," and worked closely with the Revolutionary Action Movement, an "urban guerrilla warfare" organization based on "a synthesis of the thought of Malcolm X, Marx and Lenin, and Mao Zedong." The activist Robert Williams gifted her with a copy of the Little Red Book, and she later thanked him for "the gift of Mao's philosophy." 但是她其他的追求则更为暧昧一些。她是毛的直言不讳的崇拜者,即便是在大跃进和文革之后。她因为马尔科姆·艾克斯对毛和胡志明的赞赏而赞扬他,并且和“革命行动运动”组织亲密合作—这是一个基于马尔科姆·艾克斯思想、马克思列宁思想以及毛思综合体的“城市游击战”组织。【译注:Revolutionary Action Movement是马尔科姆·艾克斯的伙伴Max Stanford建立的半秘密组织,制定了用马克思列宁主义建立黑人国家主义的运动纲领】社会活动家罗伯特·威廉姆斯送了她一本红宝书作为礼物,对此她以这是“一份毛思的礼物”为由表示了感谢。 Yuri Kochiyama was a supporter of the terrorist group Shining Path 河内山百合是恐怖组织光明之路的支持者 Two positions of Kochiyama's stand out as particularly alarming. First, she was an enthusiastic supporter of the Peruvian terrorist group Shining Path, a Maoist organization that has conducted a brutal insurgency killing tens of thousands of people since 1980.Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that Shining Path personally killed or disappeared at least 30,000. 河内山有两个立场尤其让人警觉。第一,她是秘鲁恐怖组织光辉道路的狂热拥护者——这是一个毛派组织,从1980年开始发起了一场导致数万人死亡的血腥叛乱。秘鲁真相与和解委员会认为至少三万人遭到了光辉道路的亲自杀害或导致失踪。 "Its tactics include the burning of ballot boxes and the public 'executions' of moderate local leaders and others, including nuns and priests, who are seen as rivals for the allegiance of the poor," according to a 1992 New York Times report. "In wildly exaggerated demonstrations of Maoist precepts, children have been killed for political 'crimes.' Amnesty International says the guerrillas routinely torture, mutilate and murder captives. 纽约时报在1992年的一则报道中提到:“它的策略包括烧毁投票箱和公开处决温和的本地领袖和其他人,包括修女和神父——他们被视为无产阶级的敌人”,“在疯狂的毛派戒律夸张示范中,孩子由于政治犯罪被杀害。大赦国际组织说这个游击队经常折磨,残害和杀害俘虏。” "We reject and condemn human rights because they are reactionary, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois rights," founder Abimael Guzmán declared in one document. "Rather than concentrate its attacks on the armed forces or police, Shining Path has predominantly singled out civilians," Human Rights Watch noted in 1997. "The Shining Path has pragmatically avoided taking captives unless it intends to execute them … Shining Path has been reported to torture captured civilians before executing them." Shining Path also used rape as a weapon of war. 创始人阿维马埃尔·古斯曼在一份文件中声称:“我们拒绝并谴责人权因为它是反动的,反革命的,资产阶级法权的。”“针对军队和警察的攻击还是次要的,光辉道路主要是甄选平民”人权观察组织在1997年写道,“光辉道路实用主义地避免抓俘虏,除非它打算处决他们……有报道称光辉道路在处决被抓的平民前会折磨他们。”光辉道路还把强奸作为一种战争武器。 This did not appear to bother Kochiyama, who joined a delegation to Peru organized by the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party, which defends the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. She read, in her words, "the kind of reading materials that I could become 'educated' on the real situation in Peru; not the slanted reports of corporate America. The more I read, the more I came to completely support the revolution in Peru." In other words, she read, and believed, Maoist propaganda denying Shining Path's war crimes. 这似乎并没有对河内山造成困扰,她曾加入过一个由支持大跃进和文革的毛派共产主义革命党组织的代表团去秘鲁。她读道——她的原话:“这类读物能让我知晓秘鲁真实的现状;有别于美国企业的那些带有偏见的报道。我越读越觉得我在变得更加支持在秘鲁进行的这场革命。”换句话说,她阅读并且相信毛派的宣传,并且否认光辉道路的战争罪行。 After her return from Peru, she declared, "What has been taking place in both Peru and the US is a serious campaign to discredit Guzmán and the Shining Path movement, tainting them as terrorists, undermining their struggle with lies, isolating them, and intimidating anyone who might support them." 在她从秘鲁回来后,她声称:“在秘鲁和美国正在发生的是一场严重的运动——抹黑古斯曼和光辉道路运动,污蔑他们是恐怖分子,用谎言破坏他们的斗争,孤立他们,并且恐吓任何可能支持他们的人。” Yuri Kochiyama declared Osama bin Laden "one of the people that I admire" 河内山百合声明本拉登是“我尊敬的人之一” Kochiyama was a thorough-going opponent of what she viewed as American imperialism, and like some radical anti-imperialists this occasionally led her to admiring truly loathsome figures, because she thought they were effective at combating American empire. Abimael Guzmán was one. Osama bin Laden was another. 河内山是所有被她视作美帝主义事物的死对头,并且,就像一些激进的反帝国主义斗士一样,这偶尔使她仰慕一些真正令人讨厌的人物,因为她认为他们在有效地和美帝战斗。阿维马埃尔·古斯曼是一个,本拉登是另一个。 In a 2003 interview for the Objector: A Magazine of Conscience and Resistance, Kochiyama explained: 2003年,在《反对者:一份良心和抵抗的杂志》的采访中,河内山解释道:
I’m glad that you are curious why I consider Osama bin Laden as one of the people that I admire. To me, he is in the category of Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Patrice Lumumba, Fidel Castro, all leaders that I admire. They had much in common. Besides being strong leaders who brought consciousness to their people, they all had severe dislike for the US government and those who held power in the US. 我非常高兴你对我将本拉登视为我尊敬的人之一的理由感到好奇。对我而言,他在我心中的位置和马尔科姆·艾克斯、切·格瓦拉、帕特里斯·卢蒙巴(译注:刚果民主共和国首任总理)、菲德尔·卡斯特罗,以及所有我尊敬的领袖是一样的。他们有很多共同点。除了以强大的思想领导他们的人民之外,他们都对美国政府和那些在美国掌权的人有着强烈的厌恶。 bin Laden may have come from a very wealthy family, but by the time he was twenty, he came to loathe the eliteness and class conduct of his family… 本拉登可能是来自非常富裕的家庭,但在20岁之时,他开始憎恨精英阶级和他家人所在阶级的做法…… …You asked, "Should freedom fighters support him?" Freedom fighters all over the world, and not just in the Muslim world, don’t just support him; they revere him; they join him in battle. ……你问:“自由斗士应该支持他吗?”全世界的自由斗士,不仅在穆斯林世界,不但支持他;他们尊敬他;他们在战斗中加入他。 …You stated that some freedom fighters responded that bin Laden’s agenda is more reactionary and does not speak to the needs of the masses of people who exist under US dominance. bin Laden has been primarily fighting US dominance even when he received money from the US when he was fighting in Afghanistan. He was fighting for Islam and all people who believe in Islam, against westerners, especially the US--even when he was fighting against the Russians. ……你提到一些自由斗士回应说本拉登的事业是更加反动的,并且没有为生活在美国主导下的人民群众的需求发声。即便是在他接受美国资金在阿富汗战斗的时期,本拉登的主要精力就已经放在和美国主导做斗争上了。他在为伊斯兰和所有信仰伊斯兰的人民和西方势力斗争,特别是美国——即便是在他和俄罗斯战斗的情况下。
To be clear, this is Kochiyama defending bin Laden — who, besides being a mass murderer, was a vicious misogynist and hardly the brave anti-imperial class traitor Kochiyama fancies him as — against other leftists who correctly noted that you can oppose American imperialism without allying or supporting violent jihadism. 需要明确的是,这是河内山为本拉登所作的辩护,而另一些左派人士正确地指出,在不支持暴力圣战主义或不与之结盟的情况下,也可以反对美帝国主义,对此她持反对意见。而本拉登,除了是一个大规模的杀人凶手外,还是一个恶毒的厌恶女性的人,并且他不可能像河内山赞许的那样是一个勇敢的反帝国主义的阶级反叛者。 Kochiyama's praise for Che Guevara and Fidel Castro is also controversial, and, I think wrong, but is at least somewhat common on the left. Sympathy for Shining Path and bin Laden, by contrast, is not a common left position basically anywhere. 河内山对切格瓦拉和卡斯特罗的赞美同样是有争议的。我认为这是错的,但至少在左派中还算常见。相比之下,对光辉道路和本拉登的同情在任何的左派阵营都不寻常。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]向死神投降

Surrendering to Death
向死亡投降

作者:Gavin McInnes @ 2016-5-14
译者:Tankman
校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:Taki Mag,http://takimag.com/article/surrendering_to_death_gavin_mcinnes/

Eagles of Death Metal recently finished a Canadian tour and I got to sit down with vocalist Jesse Hughes and discuss the Bataclan attack in Paris that killed 89 of his fans. You’d think he’d want to avoid the topic, but he was actually eager to get into it. He sees it as a catharsis.

死亡金属之鹰乐队最近结束了一个加拿大巡演,我有机会和主唱Jesse Hughes坐下来讨论巴黎的Bataclan剧院惨案。该事件中,他的89位粉丝惨遭杀害。也许你认为他想回避这一话题,但他其实很渴望提到它。他将此视为一种宣泄。

Hughes is not happy with the way the media has treated the story. Details are randomly pulled from his interviews and entire angles are edited in later that are diametrically opposed to his beliefs. Jesse Hughes has been ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church. He’s pro-gun, pro-Trump, and pro-life. He recognizes that Islam is the problem and political correctness is literally killing us.

Hughes 不满意媒体对待该故事的方式。他访谈中的细节被随意抽出,整个视角随后则被编写成与他的信念截然相反。Jesse Hughes 已经被任命为普世生命教会的牧师【译者注:该宗教流派鼓励行善,并允许牧师保持其原有信仰,无论是基督教、伊斯兰教和无神论等。】。他支持持枪权,支持川普,也反对堕胎。他认为伊斯兰教才是问题所在,而政治正确正在真真切切的杀死我们。

Takimag: It’s hard to talk about the attack without sounding like you’re blaming the victims, but it’s impossible to deny fear of Islamophobia and fear of guns led to a lot of deaths that night.

Taki杂志:谈论这次袭击,却避免听起来像是指责受害者,是很难的。但是不能否认的是:对伊斯兰恐惧症的恐惧,和对枪支的恐惧,导致了那晚很多人的死亡。

Jesse Hughes: I saw fear fall like a blanket on the whole crowd and they fell like wheat in the wind—the way you would before a god. I was totally alert from the very beginning. The first thing I needed to do was find my girl. Fear took a backseat and “where’s my girl?” took over.

Jesse Hughes:我看见恐惧如毯子一样盖在整个人群上,人群倒伏在地,如风中的麦子——就是那种面对上帝你会下拜的姿态。我从一开始就非常的警觉。首先,我需要做的是找到我的女朋友。恐惧退居第二位,而“我的女朋友在哪”则位居第一。

I could smell gunpowder in the backstage area and I knew someone fired a round back there. I saw a guy with an FAL and when he turned to face me his eyes looked like marbles. He was stoned out of his mind, and we now know they were on Xanax and cocaine. I recognized him. I’d seen him earlier in the day and noticed him staring at us.

我可以在后台区域闻到火药味,我知道某人往那边打了一梭子。我看见一个配有轻型自动步枪的人,当他面朝我时,他的眼睛看起来像玻璃弹珠一样。他整个呆住了,现在我们知道他们当时是嗑了蝴蝶丸和可卡因。我认出了他。当天早些时候,我看到过他并注意到他盯着我们看。

They were in the venue early. That implies some(more...)

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Surrendering to Death 向死亡投降 作者:Gavin McInnes @ 2016-5-14 译者:Tankman 校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 来源:Taki Mag,http://takimag.com/article/surrendering_to_death_gavin_mcinnes/ Eagles of Death Metal recently finished a Canadian tour and I got to sit down with vocalist Jesse Hughes and discuss the Bataclan attack in Paris that killed 89 of his fans. You’d think he’d want to avoid the topic, but he was actually eager to get into it. He sees it as a catharsis. 死亡金属之鹰乐队最近结束了一个加拿大巡演,我有机会和主唱Jesse Hughes坐下来讨论巴黎的Bataclan剧院惨案。该事件中,他的89位粉丝惨遭杀害。也许你认为他想回避这一话题,但他其实很渴望提到它。他将此视为一种宣泄。 Hughes is not happy with the way the media has treated the story. Details are randomly pulled from his interviews and entire angles are edited in later that are diametrically opposed to his beliefs. Jesse Hughes has been ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church. He’s pro-gun, pro-Trump, and pro-life. He recognizes that Islam is the problem and political correctness is literally killing us. Hughes 不满意媒体对待该故事的方式。他访谈中的细节被随意抽出,整个视角随后则被编写成与他的信念截然相反。Jesse Hughes 已经被任命为普世生命教会的牧师【译者注:该宗教流派鼓励行善,并允许牧师保持其原有信仰,无论是基督教、伊斯兰教和无神论等。】。他支持持枪权,支持川普,也反对堕胎。他认为伊斯兰教才是问题所在,而政治正确正在真真切切的杀死我们。 Takimag: It’s hard to talk about the attack without sounding like you’re blaming the victims, but it’s impossible to deny fear of Islamophobia and fear of guns led to a lot of deaths that night. Taki杂志:谈论这次袭击,却避免听起来像是指责受害者,是很难的。但是不能否认的是:对伊斯兰恐惧症的恐惧,和对枪支的恐惧,导致了那晚很多人的死亡。 Jesse Hughes: I saw fear fall like a blanket on the whole crowd and they fell like wheat in the wind—the way you would before a god. I was totally alert from the very beginning. The first thing I needed to do was find my girl. Fear took a backseat and “where’s my girl?” took over. Jesse Hughes:我看见恐惧如毯子一样盖在整个人群上,人群倒伏在地,如风中的麦子——就是那种面对上帝你会下拜的姿态。我从一开始就非常的警觉。首先,我需要做的是找到我的女朋友。恐惧退居第二位,而“我的女朋友在哪”则位居第一。 I could smell gunpowder in the backstage area and I knew someone fired a round back there. I saw a guy with an FAL and when he turned to face me his eyes looked like marbles. He was stoned out of his mind, and we now know they were on Xanax and cocaine. I recognized him. I’d seen him earlier in the day and noticed him staring at us. 我可以在后台区域闻到火药味,我知道某人往那边打了一梭子。我看见一个配有轻型自动步枪的人,当他面朝我时,他的眼睛看起来像玻璃弹珠一样。他整个呆住了,现在我们知道他们当时是嗑了蝴蝶丸和可卡因。我认出了他。当天早些时候,我看到过他并注意到他盯着我们看。 They were in the venue early. That implies some staff were in on it. 他们早先就在会场。这意味着有些工作人员参与了此事。 I got in a lot of trouble for saying that. I know for sure that they were in there early. I remember them staring at my buddy. I just chalked it up to Arab envy. You know what I mean? When a Muslim sees a cocky American dude with tattoos, he stares at him. 因为声称这点,我遭遇了很多麻烦。我很肯定他们早先就在那里。我记得他们盯着乐队成员看。我当时认为那只是阿拉伯式的羡慕。你懂吧?当一个穆斯林看到一个臭屁的纹着身的美国哥们,他就盯着那人看。 I realized later it was Abdeslam and he was staring at my buddy because they thought he was a threat. There’s no denying the terrorists were already inside, and they had to get in somehow. During the shooting I went outside and the backstage door was propped open. How did that happen? 之后我意识到那人是 Abdeslam【译者注:袭击参与者之一】。他盯着我哥们看,因为他们认为他是个威胁。无可否认,恐怖分子已经混进里面了,他们必须用某种法子混进去。在枪击中,我跑到外面去,而后台的门是大开着的。这是怎么发生的? Do you think political correctness is killing our natural instincts and making us vulnerable? 你认为政治正确正在杀死我们的自然直觉,并使得我们变得易受攻击吗? Definitely. There were two girls who were involved. They were at the venue and vanished before the shooting, and these women were in traditional Muslim garb. They knew people wouldn’t check them because of the way they were dressed. They got caught a few days later. 当然。有两个女孩参与了此事。她们曾在大厅里,但在枪击前又消失了。这些女士穿着传统穆斯林服装。他们知道因为她们的穿着,人们不会检查她们。几天后她们被抓获。 The fear of offending Muslims is a terrorist’s greatest weapon. 害怕冒犯穆斯林的心态是恐怖分子最有力的武器。 Look at the guys who bombed Brussels. They were wearing black gloves on one hand. Their luggage was too heavy to lift, but they didn’t want anyone helping them with it. Nobody brought any of this up until after the bombs went off. 看看那些在布鲁塞尔放炸弹的家伙。他们一只手带着黑手套,他们的行李太重举不起来,但是他们不想让任何人帮助他们搬行李。直到炸弹爆炸后才有人把这些线索联系起来。 We’d rather die than be called a bigot. 我们宁死也不愿意被称作是偏执狂。 How is a faith being associated with racism? Just take out the word “Islam” and replace it with “communism.” It’s an ideology. The same way the Rosenbergs could sell nuclear secrets from within America is the same way Muslim terrorists can attack us from within. It’s okay to be discerning when it comes to Muslims in this day and age. 一种信仰是如何被和种族主义联系起来的?只要把“伊斯兰”一词抽掉,换成“共产主义”。这就是一种意识形态。和卢森堡夫婦出卖美国的原子弹机密一样,穆斯林恐怖分子也从内部袭击我们。今时今日,一旦涉及到穆斯林,小心一点没错。 Where is this push coming from? Is it all our fault? 这动机从何而来?都是我们的错吗? Of course not. When you’re at a soccer game in Europe and you see the words “United Arab Emirates,” you know there is a lot of Arab money floating around and influencing the dialogue. The conversation is constantly being steered away from scrutiny. They think we’re fools. 当然不是。当你在欧洲的足球赛场看到阿联酋一词,你就知道有很多阿拉伯资金流入并影响了交流。这一交流始终得以避开审慎的检视。他们觉得我们是白痴。 Arab money is a pollutant. So many movies are made with Arab money. George Clooney doesn’t kiss the ass of the Arabs for no reason. American movies are the best way to influence the hearts and minds of the world. 阿拉伯资金是一种污染物。如此多的电影是在阿拉伯资金的支持下拍摄的。乔治·克鲁尼不是无缘无故跪舔这些阿拉伯人的。美国电影是影响这世界的心灵和思想的最佳方式。 You never see bad guys in movies who are Arab terrorists. It’s always Germans or French… 电影中,你从来看不到阿拉伯恐怖分子作为坏人出现。总是德国人或者法国人。 Or conservative Christian rednecks. They’re apparently what’s wrong with everything in the world now, including global warming. What about the other ice age we went through? There were no Christian Republicans back then. What caused that meltdown? 或者保守的红脖子基督徒。他们显然是这个世界当下各种麻烦的根源,包括全球变暖。那我们经历过的那个冰河时代呢?那时候可没有基督徒共和党人。那是什么导致了这场灾难呢? The other problem with that is, when you get rid of these Christian rednecks, you create a vacuum and it gets filled with people way worse. It gets filled with Islam. You end up replacing evangelism with sharia law. 另一个麻烦是,如果你排挤走这些红脖基督徒,你就创造了一个真空,让更糟糕的人来填补。伊斯兰填补了这真空。你的结局就是用伊斯兰教法代替福音主义。 Politicians behave better when they know people are watching. We behave better when we believe Jesus is watching us. 当知道人们在监督时,政客们的行为更规矩。当相信耶稣在看着我们时,我们的行为更规矩。 These atheists tell us we don’t need religion, yet everyone seems to be creating flimsy substitutes to replace it. Rehab is just Lent. Meditation is just Latin Mass. Seeing a therapist is just talking to your priest. 那些无神论者告诉我们,我们不需要宗教,不过每个人似乎都在创造轻浮脆弱的替代品来代替宗教。修复期实际是大斋期【译者注:在西方基督教国家,每年的大斋期是基督徒献供与苦修的时期,也是洗涤罪恶,承蒙天主启示的时期】。冥想实际是拉丁弥撒。去看治疗师实际上是和你的牧师谈话。 And the thing about the Bible is it’s written down. A therapist can change his diagnosis just like that and there’s no way of calling him out on it. 而圣经,就是那些被写了下来的(治愈谈话),它不像一个治疗师可以任意更改其诊断,而且人们无法在这事上挑战他。 Let’s get back to the attack. Why didn’t the cops come in earlier? It seemed like the killing went on forever. 让我们回到袭击这个话题。为什么警察不能更早来呢?当时看起来杀戮好像会永远进行下去。 The press heard some kids were locked away in rooms so they reported it as a hostage situation. Those kids were hiding. This misinformation meant the cops set up outside for a negotiation while inside dozens of people were dying. 媒体听说一些小孩被锁在房间里,所以他们当时把这事当作人质危机报道。那些小孩在躲藏。这种信息误导意味着警察在外面准备谈判,而内部的数十人则正在死去。 The terrorists would go up to bodies and stick them with the gun. If they budged, they’d shoot them again. One girl got up and said she was scared. The guy said, “Don’t be scared, you’ll be dead in two minutes,” and then he shot her, BOOM. 恐怖分子们会走近倒下的人,用枪戳他们。如果倒地者动了,就会被补枪。一个女孩爬了起来,说她很害怕。一个恐怖分子说“别怕,你在两分钟内就会死。”然后他开枪打了她,砰。 The French are so concerned with racism, they’re letting Muslims get away with murder. 法国人太在意种族主义,他们让穆斯林逍遥法外。 A day after, at the stadium, Muslims booed the moment of silence and we barely heard about it in the press. I saw Muslims celebrating in the street during the attack. I saw it with my own eyes. In real time! How did they know what was going on? There must have been coordination. 一天后,在球场上,穆斯林在默哀时刻发出嘘声,而我们很少听到关于这一情节的媒体报道。袭击的时候,我看到穆斯林们在街上庆祝袭击。我亲眼看到这事。就在袭击的那个时刻。他们怎么知道袭击正在发生?这些事情一定有联系。 I’ve heard you say you credit your childhood with your survival. You had a real dad who stuck around and taught you about guns. 我听说你提到你的童年经历帮你幸存了下来。你有个陪伴你的父亲,而且教给你关于枪支的知识。 I knew what gunfire was. I was able to think through it. I was also able to remember practical lessons of my life because I had to be in fights as a kid. My mom didn’t go sue anyone. I didn’t have playdates. I had some practical upbringing growing up in the desert where you got to get yourself out of your problems. 我知道开枪是怎么回事。我能把这事考虑清楚。我也能记起我生活中的实际经验,因为我小时候不得不参与打架。我妈妈没有起诉任何人,我也没有大人给我找的玩伴。我有些实际成长经验,在孤立无援的困境中你只能靠你自己走出来。 Also, the reason I’ve done well with this healing process is everything I was raised to believe was affirmed that night. In a way, that’s a blessing of God. When the first bullets started being fired, people looked at me. I remember that. It pissed me off because I knew right then and there it was going to be bad. I knew these kids had no idea what was coming. None. They’d never heard a gunshot in real life and it hit them so hard. 而且,我从此事件中恢复的如此之好的原因是,我长大成人过程中得到的一切信念都在那一晚被肯定了。某种程度上,这是神的保佑。当第一颗子弹出膛,人们看着我。我记得这点。这让我愤怒,因为就在那刻那地我知道事情要坏了。我知道那些孩子们对即将发生的事情毫无概念。没有一个知道。他们从未在现实生活中听到过一声枪响,这重重的打击了他们。 Political correctness kills. 政治正确在杀人。 Davey [bassist Dave Catching] was in the middle of the stage and when the lights went on, he saw shit he’d never seen before in his life, awful stuff. It has no parallel. It’s not just death. It’s the most unsuspecting, innocent victims you can imagine—people who are gripped in terror and can’t move as a result of it. 当灯光开启时,Davey(贝斯手Dave Catching)在舞台中间,他看到了他此生从未见过的可怕场景,可怕极了。没什么可以与此相比。不仅仅是死亡。那是你可以想象的最无辜最没有防备的受害人——人们被笼罩在恐怖中呆若木鸡。 It’s like a metaphor for all of Western civilization. 这好像是所有西方文明的一个隐喻。 I watched about seven people die. A couple of them were three feet from the barrier. They could have fallen backwards and been alive but they were too scared to even turn around. I remember a woman just standing with her hands up in a surrender pose. The terrorist finally saw her and all she did was go, “No no no.” She surrendered to death in front of my very eyes. I was yelling at her, “HEY!” and I don’t think she could hear me. She was so terrified, I think she’d already given up. 我目睹了大约七个人死亡。他们中一些离护栏就三英尺远。他们也许能翻越护栏逃生,但他们太害怕了甚至不敢转身。我记得一个女人就站在那里,高举双手作投降状。恐怖分子终于看见了她,而她只是一味的说“不,不,不。”就在我的眼前,她向死亡投降了。我向她呐喊,“嗨!”。我不认为她听到了我。她如此害怕,我想她已经放弃了。 Is it fair to say the liberal mentality created this need to surrender? 说自由派的精神气质创造了投降的需要,合理吗? I will lay the blame right in its lap. When you tell people they can’t help themselves and that they’re children, you weaken them to a point where three feet away is life and they can’t see it because they’re too scared. 对,我要责怪的正是他们。当你告诉人们他们不能自助,他们只是孩子,你就把他们变弱到一个连三英尺远的逃生机会都看不到的地步。他们看不到,因为他们太害怕了。 In a way we’re unarmed two fold. We’re literally unarmed and we’re also mentally unarmed. 某种程度上我们是双倍的赤手空拳。我们本来就赤手空拳,而且我们在精神上赤手空拳。 It’s like the bleating sheep from Animal Farm. You suggest anything that strays from the narrative and this chorus of bleats comes to drown you out. This attack didn’t happen by accident. 就像《动物庄园》中懦弱哀嚎的绵羊。当你的观点脱离叙述的主流,这懦弱哀嚎的合唱就把你的声音盖过。这个袭击不是偶然发生的。 I went to Paris after the attacks and was disgusted by the lack of rage. They didn’t blame Islam. In fact, many blamed the Jews. They seemed more concerned with us promoting xenophobia than laying blame on the terrorists. 我在袭击后去过巴黎,并对缺乏愤怒的程度感到恶心。他们没有谴责伊斯兰。事实上,很多人指责犹太人。比起指责恐怖分子,他们似乎更关心我们促进仇外情绪。 I hung out with plenty of Parisians who were fucking pissed off, but it was mostly cops and military. During the attack, one cop finally realized it wasn’t a hostage situation and yelled out, “It’s a turkey shoot” as he charged in, holding his gun. He got shot right through the hand and into the neck and kept going. He took a terrorist out, chased another one into the hallway, who then blew himself up, and did it to another guy, who blew himself up on stage. Our amplifiers were a gory mess. 我和很多出离愤怒的巴黎人交流过,但是这些主要都是警察和军人。在袭击期间,一个警察终于意识到这不是人质劫持,他持枪突入,并且大叫,“这是土耳其射击!”。他被子弹穿过手,击中脖子,仍然进击。他撂倒了一个恐怖分子,在走廊追击另一个。那恐怖分子就自爆了。之后又追击另一个,那人在舞台上自爆。我们的扩音器上血肉模糊。 Did that cop live? 那警察生还了吗? Yes, I met him in triage. I hung out with him. Great guy. 是的。我在急救站见过他。我们后来又聚了一次。很好的人。 You went to the hospital? 你进医院了? I had pieces of teeth and human bone pulled out of my face. A girl got shot right next to me by the shooter at the top of the stairs who I had met earlier. She stepped one step in front of me and her head just exploded. It blew pieces of her teeth and skull into my face. 从我的脸上取出了牙齿和人骨碎片。我旁边的女生被楼梯顶上我早先见过的枪手击中了,她在我面前踉跄了一下,接着她的头爆开了。她的牙齿和头骨碎片扎进了我的脸。 Why don’t we hear about this? 为何我们没听到此事? The media wants to summarize it, and important details get lost. The most important detail being when they started shooting, they were already inside. If they were hanging out enough to let three people go, then they knew security dudes. They knew bouncers. They knew doormen. 媒体想要总结事件,而重要的细节则丢失了。最重要的细节是,在他们开始射击时,他们早已经混入内部了。如果他们让三个人混入都能保持隐蔽,那他们一定认识保安。他们认识门卫。 Do you think a percentage of the security staff was Muslim? 你认为有一定比例的保安人员是穆斯林? I know they were. Look, security guards backstage are notorious for being dicks. They check your ID every few minutes and nobody goes back and forth without being checked, even if you’re in the band. This guy didn’t care what we did. He didn’t even look at me. 我知道他们其中一些是。听着,后台保安一般以严格著称。他们没几分钟就会查验你的证件。没人能不被检查来回穿梭,即使你是乐队的一员。而这次后台保安则不管我们是干什么的,他甚至没看我。 The only time he seemed remotely interested in us was when he said to my girlfriend, “Do you speak French?” and “Where are you from?” She said she was from Texas and he was getting frustrated because that’s not what he meant. Then she said, “I’m American” and he lost interest. I honestly think he was trying to determine if she was Arab or not. She’s Mexican and she could easily pass for Lebanese and I think he was going to warn her if she was Muslim. 唯一一次他看来对我们稍有兴趣是他问我女友“你说法语吗?”以及“你从哪里来?”她说她从德州来,而他则感到沮丧,因为这不是他所要问的。然后女友说“我是美国人。”他就失去了兴趣。坦率的说,我认为他试图判定她是不是阿拉伯人。她是个墨西哥人,很容易被错认成黎巴嫩人。我认为如果女友是穆斯林,他当时会警告她。 I kept opening up the back door to smoke and that’s usually a big no-no because of the sound ordinances. I’ve played there before and opening up that door to smoke got you in big trouble. This time, the security guy walks right past me and anxiously looks down the alleyway in either direction. 我让后门开着以便抽烟,通常这是绝不允许的,因为噪声管制。以前我在这里演奏过,开门抽烟会给你带来大麻烦。这次,保安径直从我身边走过,焦虑的打量通道的各个方向。 Maybe one of the reasons the cops are so much more pragmatic about this threat is that they are the ones who have to go into Les Banlieues and confront these people. Naïveté is a luxury they can’t afford. 也许对恐怖威胁,警察的态度现实得多的原因之一是,他们正是那些要去市郊移民聚居区,面对穆斯林的人。幼稚是他们负担不起的奢侈品。 When the cops went in after the attack, they shut down, what, 450 mosques? They found recruitment material in every single one of them. What the fuck is wrong with us that we don’t know about that? 当袭击后警察进入聚居区时,他们沉默了,什么,450个清真寺?他们在它们中的每一个都发现了招募材料。我们到底是怎么了,竟然不知道这事? Parisians think everyone is innocent, but the cops don’t. They even investigated you. 巴黎人认为每个人都是无辜的,但是警察不这么想。他们甚至会调查你。 I was a person of interest, yes. They interrogated me for four days. I ended up helping them a lot by getting cell-phone footage. It was the cops and the FBI who asked me about the promoter and the security. This isn’t something I brought up to them. 我是个需要被调查的人,是的。他们盘问了我四天。最终我通过现场手机视频帮了他们很多。是警察和FBI问了我关于演出组织者和保安的问题。这不是我提出来的。 We had eight police officers in our audience that night. They all had the same conversation with their wives, which was “Should I bring my gun or not?” All of them said no. When we went back and played Paris again they stood in the same places they stood at the original show and they opened their jackets and showed me their guns as if to say, “Not tonight, motherfucker.” It was beautiful. 当晚观众中有八个警察。他们全都和太太有过相同的对话,“我应该带枪吗?”。太太们全都说不。当我们回到巴黎再次演出的时候,他们站在我以前演出时他们站过的地方,而且他们打开外套,向我展示他们的枪,好像在说,“今晚狗杂种们休想再搞事”。真赞。 Islam is crying wolf about Islamophobia in order to anesthetize us and make us easier prey. 对伊斯兰恐惧症,伊斯兰教不断叫嚷“狼来了”,为了麻痹我们,使我们更容易被猎杀。 They know there’s a whole group of white kids out there who are stupid and blind. You have these affluent white kids who have grown up in a liberal curriculum from the time they were in kindergarten, inundated with these lofty notions that are just hot air. Look at where it’s getting them. 他们知道有一大群白人孩子都是愚蠢和无知的。有大堆的白人孩子自幼儿园起,就成长于自由派课程中,沉浸在热空气般虚无不切实际的幻想中。看看这些白孩子将要面对的吧。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

恐怖主义温床:贫穷or石油美元?

【2015-11-14】

@朱海就 “恐怖主义”与“资本主义”互为敌人:前段时间看到有文章说秘鲁政府通过产权改革、推动市场化,成功地消除了反政府武组织“光辉道路”的威胁。确实,如能通过商业改变自己命运,那总比搞恐怖强。恐怖组织在资本主义文明之光未照耀到的地方更容易出现,而恐怕分子可能更多的是寄生虫。

@高贤林l:德索托强调:正如1980年代和1990年代的秘鲁所证明的(就是他的《另一条道路》打败了“光辉道路”),只有合理的经济授权和对企业家精神的鼓励才是根治全球恐怖主义顽疾的良药。

@朱萧木: 天天为生计和发财梦打(more...)

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【2015-11-14】 @朱海就 “恐怖主义”与“资本主义”互为敌人:前段时间看到有文章说秘鲁政府通过产权改革、推动市场化,成功地消除了反政府武组织“光辉道路”的威胁。确实,如能通过商业改变自己命运,那总比搞恐怖强。恐怖组织在资本主义文明之光未照耀到的地方更容易出现,而恐怕分子可能更多的是寄生虫。 @高贤林l:德索托强调:正如1980年代和1990年代的秘鲁所证明的(就是他的《另一条道路》打败了“光辉道路”),只有合理的经济授权和对企业家精神的鼓励才是根治全球恐怖主义顽疾的良药。 @朱萧木: 天天为生计和发财梦打拼,谁搞恐怖袭击 @whigzhou: 德索托的书很好,但光辉道路的溃败不需要用他的理由来解释 @whigzhou: 苏联解体后全球倒了无数马列毛党,但发生藤森式改革的地方没几个 @whigzhou: 贫穷能提供恐怖分子,但造不出恐怖主义,假如战后美国托管中东全部油田,收入转交听话的地方政府,今天就不会有这些烂事了 @战争史研究WHS: 伊朗的巴列维国王和利比亚的伊德里斯国王都表示这条路走不通。 @whigzhou: 根本没走过,美国从来没形成过这样的政治意愿 @whigzhou: 假如你家附近来了群整天喊打喊杀的邻居,又不肯坐下来跟你谈,你的选择:1)控制其行为——成本可能很高,难度可能超出你能力,2)削弱其加害能力,定期打断他的腿,让他爬不进你家篱笆——可能相对容易做到,3)等死——容易倒是容易,就看你愿不愿意。 @PlusKing2022:假设美国不是70年代至今对瓦哈比教派的扩张睁只眼闭只眼,事态也不致于如此。穆斯林几十年,在某些地区是几百年的世俗化进程完全逆转了 @whigzhou: 与其叫瓦哈比派不如叫石油土豪金派,没被文明驯服的人就不能让他有钱,就好比我家猫没学会收好自己爪子,我就只能把它们都剪了~
[译文]教育会减少恐怖主义?

More Education = Less Terrorism? Studying the Complex Relationship Between Terrorism and Education
教育会减少恐怖主义?对教育与恐怖主义之间复杂关系的研究

作者:Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks @ 2015-12-04
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Political Violence @ a Glance, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/12/04/more-education-less-terrorism-studying-the-complex-relationship-between-terrorism-and-education/

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, education is often advocated as an antidote to terrorism, the idea primarily being that education may make individuals less vulnerable to the false promises of extremist ideologies. For instance, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, Eli Wiesel – the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize laureate – argued:

在恐怖袭击的余波中,教育经常被提出来作为疗治恐怖主义的解药。基本的想法是,教育可以增强个人对于极端主义意识形态虚假承诺的免疫力。比如说,在2001年纽约和华盛顿特区的911恐袭发生之后,Eli Wiesel(1986年诺贝尔和平奖得主)声称:

What is it that seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate terrorism.

“究竟是什么把一些年轻人推向恐怖主义?就是因为它简单粗暴。盲从狂热者没有问题,只有答案。而教育就是消除恐怖主义的方法。”

While intuitive, the academic evidence on the terrorism-education nexus tends to be more pessi(more...)

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More Education = Less Terrorism? Studying the Complex Relationship Between Terrorism and Education 教育会减少恐怖主义?对教育与恐怖主义之间复杂关系的研究 作者:Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks @ 2015-12-04 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Political Violence @ a Glance, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/12/04/more-education-less-terrorism-studying-the-complex-relationship-between-terrorism-and-education/ In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, education is often advocated as an antidote to terrorism, the idea primarily being that education may make individuals less vulnerable to the false promises of extremist ideologies. For instance, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, Eli Wiesel – the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize laureate – argued: 在恐怖袭击的余波中,教育经常被提出来作为疗治恐怖主义的解药。基本的想法是,教育可以增强个人对于极端主义意识形态虚假承诺的免疫力。比如说,在2001年纽约和华盛顿特区的911恐袭发生之后,Eli Wiesel(1986年诺贝尔和平奖得主)声称: What is it that seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate terrorism. “究竟是什么把一些年轻人推向恐怖主义?就是因为它简单粗暴。盲从狂热者没有问题,只有答案。而教育就是消除恐怖主义的方法。” While intuitive, the academic evidence on the terrorism-education nexus tends to be more pessimistic. On the national level, education is usually found to share little relationship with terrorism. What is more, on the individual level, there is evidence that the more educated are more likely to become terrorists. 但是,关于恐怖主义与教育之间的联系,尽管听起来很直观,但学术依据却寥寥无几。在国家层面上,人们发现,教育一般与恐怖主义联系甚微。更有甚者,在个人层面上,有证据表明接受过更高教育的人群反而更可能会变成恐怖分子。 For instance, education may fuel terrorism by raising the probability of terrorist success (i.e., the “productivity of terrorists”) through the use of high-capacity (i.e., well-educated) operatives. Indeed, due to the positive effect of individual human capital endowment on terrorist success, terrorist organizations tend to be particularly interested in selecting more educated members. 比如说,受过教育的恐怖分子会因为实行高技能(也就是受过良好教育)行动而在恐怖活动成功率(也就是“恐怖分子的生产率”)上有所增加,这样,教育可能就加剧了恐怖主义。实际上,由于个人的技能天分对于恐怖行动成功与否具有积极影响,恐怖组织特别倾向于选召受过更好教育的成员。 In our new study, we provide a framework to better understand the apparently complex interaction between terrorism and education, trying to reconcile the popular narrative that education may remedy terrorism with the prevalent academic viewpoint that education – if anything – is associated with more terrorism. 在一项新研究中,我们提出了一个理论框架来更好地理解恐怖主义与教育之间看似很复杂的关系,并且尝试调和两个观点:即教育可以纠正恐怖主义这一大众叙事,和教育只会与恐怖主义增加相联系的流行学术观点。 We argue that there is some truth to both the optimistic and pessimistic views regarding the terrorism-education nexus. The ultimate effect of education on terrorism is linked to country-specific circumstances which moderate whether the pacifying or inflammatory effects of education on terrorism prevail. 我们认为,对于恐怖主义-教育关系的悲观和乐观看法各有可取之处。教育对于恐怖主义的最终效用是与特定的国家环境相联系的,在不同的国家环境中,教育可能缓和也可能加剧恐怖主义的流行。 Education always increases the individual and society-wide prospect of socioeconomic and political participation as well as individual productivity and intellectual capacity (where the latter may further magnify individual expectations about one’s politico-economic position in society). That is, education always creates “great expectations.” 教育总是会增加个人和全社会的社会经济和政治参与度,同时也会提升个人的创造能力和才智(而后者也许会进一步提高个人对于自己在社会中政治经济地位的期望)。也就是说,教育总是会创造“远大前程”抱负。 Sound country-specific conditions help these expectations to materialize, thus reducing incentives for terrorism. For instance, more educated individuals unsurprisingly expect higher wages; however, higher wages are only likely to materialize when country-specific conditions are sound (e.g. as the economy grows, as labor market competition due to demographic pressures is limited, or as corruption and nepotism do not strongly distort labor market outcomes). 健康的特定国家状态能帮助这些理想成为现实,因此减弱恐怖主义的动机。例如,受过更高教育的人群不出意料会期望更高的薪水;然而,更高薪水只会在特定国家状态很健康时才可能实现(例如经济保持增长,因人口压力而导致的劳动力市场竞争不大激烈,或者腐败和裙带关系并未强烈扰乱劳动力市场运转)。 By contrast, when country-specific conditions are poor (e.g. slow economic growth, strong labor market competition, and distortions due to youth bulges and corrupt institutions), the same “great expectations” are likely to end in frustration, consequently facilitating recruitment to terrorist violence. 与之相反,当特定国家状态很差劲时(比如经济增长缓慢,劳动力市场竞争激烈,青年人口膨胀和制度腐败),同样的“远大前程”就很可能会以受挫告终,因此就会为恐怖分子的暴力行动提供后备力量。 Under such circumstances, education may actually facilitate mobilization by amplifying feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement that arise from unaddressed socioeconomic and politico-economic grievances and unrealized socioeconomic and political participation. This is because education is expected to make it easier for individuals to recognize injustice and discrimination, leading to the uncomfortable – but plausible – situation where more education facilitates radicalization. 这样的情况下,因为社会经济和政治经济方面的不满没有得到解决,同时社会参与和政治参与愿望没能实现,教育实际上会增强由此产生的挫折感和权利受损感,从而促进社会动员。这是因为,教育很可能会使个人更容易察觉不公正和歧视,从而导致那种令人不安却合情合理的情况:更多的教育反而促进极端化。 What is more, the highly-educated may find “careers” in terrorism particularly attractive. When country-specific conditions are poor, the rewards offered by terrorist organizations to skilled operatives (wages, political influence, but also martyrdom) may be closer to the especially high expectations of the educated about personal income and political influence than anything the regular labor market can offer. 不仅如此,高学历人群可能还会发现恐怖主义的“职业生涯”特别具有吸引力。当特定国家状况非常不堪时,恐怖组织提供给技术人员的酬劳(工资、政治影响力、还包括殉道感)会更加符合高学历人群对于个人收入和政治影响力的极高期望,这是任何常规劳动力市场都不能提供的。 We test our theoretical framework on a sample of 133 countries for the 1984-2007 period. Our findings can be summarized as follows: 我们用1984年至2007年间133个国家的样本检验了我们的理论框架。我们得出的结果可以归结如下:
  • A “naïve” statistical model for the complete sample of 133 countries, we find that education – in line with the narrative of the academic literature – tends to correlate positively, albeit only weakly, with terrorism.
  • 一个针对133个国家的完整样本的“幼稚”统计模型中,我们发现教育——与学术文献的描述一致——与恐怖主义趋向于正相关,尽管仅仅是弱相关性。
  • To account for country-specific conditions we identify two groups of countries that differ strongly with respect to their economic, politico-institutional, and demographic conditions. Conditions in the first group are markedly poorer, exhibiting a weaker rule of law, poorer protection of human and property rights, slower economic growth, but higher levels of corruption, population growth, and inflation.
  • 为了阐明特定国家状况,我们区别出经济、政治制度和人口条件完全不同的两组国家。第一组的状况明显较差,表现出较差的法治环境、人权和财产权利保护不力、经济增长缓慢、而且腐败问题更严重、人口增长过快、通货膨胀严重。
  • For the group of poorly developed countries (often located in Latin America, Asia, or Sub-Saharan Africa), we find that variables reflecting lower education (primary education, literacy rate) are associated with more terrorism, while higher education (university enrollment) does not play a role.
  • 在发展状态较差的这组国家(普遍位于拉丁美洲、亚洲或者撒哈拉以南非洲)中,我们发现反映初等教育水平的参数(小学教育、识字率)与滋生更多恐怖主义相关联,而高等教育水平(大学入学率)则并没有什么影响。
  • For the group of countries in which conditions are more favorable, we find no positive association between lower education and terrorism. Instead, we find a negative (terrorism-reducing) and statistically significant effect of higher education (university enrollment) on domestic terrorism.
  • 对于另外一组情况更好的国家,我们发现初等教育和恐怖主义之间没有什么正相关。相反,我们发现高等教育(大学入学率)对于国内恐怖主义的影响为负(即会减少恐怖主义),且这种效应在统计上很显著。
In sum, our empirical analysis thus provides support for our theoretical framework, where the eventual effect of education on terrorism depends on the presence of further moderating conditions. We argue that our theoretical framework  not only explains the Middle Eastern experience of terrorism by rather well-educated terrorists, but also explains the recent series of popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, which similarly seem to have been fueled by advances in education and a lack of economic and political participation. 总而言之,我们的实证分析为我们的理论框架提供了支持:教育对恐怖主义的最终影响是由更进一步的约束条件决定的。我们认为,我们的理论框架不仅能解释中东地区产生高学历恐怖分子的恐怖主义经验,也能解释最近阿拉伯之春中的系列人民起义,两者相似,似乎都是因教育进步而经济与政治上的参与度却很低而导致的。 Similarly, historical events in the West – such as the revolutionary waves in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th century – where educational advances, when coupled with poor structural conditions,  promoted instability are in line with our theoretical framework. 类似的,西方世界的一些历史性事件——比如西欧在十八和十九世纪的革命浪潮——也与我们的理论框架相一致:当时教育实现进步,同时存在糟糕的结构性条件,两相结合导致了不稳定。 Our study indicates that the linkage between terrorism and education is likely to depend on country-specific (macroeconomic, institutional, etc.) conditions. We invite future research to analyze further which country-specific conditions matter the most to the mechanics of the nexus. Also, studying the role of education content, gender disparities in education, and education inequality may prove helpful to furthering our understanding. 我们的研究表明,恐怖主义和教育的联系很可能依赖于特定国家状态(宏观经济、国家制度等)。我们期待更进一步的研究能够深层次分析究竟是哪一种特定国家状态在这一相关机制中有着最大的影响。同时,研究教育内容、教育上的性别差距和教育不平等等因素扮演的角色,也会对深化我们的理解有所助益。 From a policy perspective, our findings indicate that education produces “great expectations” and may result in “hard times” (terrorism) when those expectations are not met. This suggests that a sole strengthening of education in less developed countries may not help in the war on terror and may even prove – at times – counterproductive. 从政策角度看,我们的分析指出,教育会产生“远大前程”,而当这些抱负没有实现时,就可能导致“艰难时世”(即恐怖主义)。这提示了,在欠发达国家单独加强教育可能不会对反恐战争有帮助,甚至结果可能是——至少偶尔是——帮倒忙。 Rather, the promotion of education should be accompanied by domestic and international efforts to ameliorate poor socioeconomic, politico-institutional, and demographic conditions to make it possible for the promise of education to actually materialize. 实际情形是,提升教育水平应当伴随有国内和国际共同努力来改善社会经济上的、政治制度上的以及人口上的糟糕状态,这样才可能使得教育所许诺的希望真正变现。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]马里:恐怖主义的新前线

Why Mali was attacked
马里缘何被袭击

作者:Ian Birrell @ 2015-11-20
译者:黑色枪骑兵(@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Capx,http://www.capx.co/166181-2/

So here we go again. First the tragic slaughter of innocents in Paris, followed by that tense, bloodstained hunt for the murderers. Now 170 largely-foreign hostages have been seized by gunmen in an upmarket hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako.

一而再、再而三。首先是无辜巴黎人民遭受悲惨屠杀,然后是紧张而又血腥的追凶。现在,170名主要为外国人的人质,又被武装分子扣押在马(more...)

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Why Mali was attacked 马里缘何被袭击 作者:Ian Birrell @ 2015-11-20 译者:黑色枪骑兵(@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Capx,http://www.capx.co/166181-2/ So here we go again. First the tragic slaughter of innocents in Paris, followed by that tense, bloodstained hunt for the murderers. Now 170 largely-foreign hostages have been seized by gunmen in an upmarket hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako. 一而再、再而三。首先是无辜巴黎人民遭受悲惨屠杀,然后是紧张而又血腥的追凶。现在,170名主要为外国人的人质,又被武装分子扣押在马里首都巴马科的一所高档酒店里。 The 140 guests being held reportedly include people from France, China and Turkey, along with 30 hotel staff; at least we can give thanks that members of Western air crews along with many others escaped amid the chaos of the assault. There are reports of deaths, while special forces are moving in. 据报道,与30名酒店工作人员一同被扣押的140名房客来自法国、中国和土耳其。值得庆幸的是,“西部航空”的职员以及其他一些人借着袭击时的混乱而得以逃脱。报道称,特种部队进入时,有死亡消息传出。 There are strong chances, sadly, that this is instant blowback from the shocking events in France. The rather soulless Radisson Blu hotel is a well-known landmark in the dusty Malian capital; a British journalist who interviewed one of the country’s famous musical bands told me he stayed there just weeks ago. The capital felt secure when I was last there a couple of years ago, yet sadly it is no surprise to see that the jihadists have struck back in this beautiful yet battered nation. 令人沮丧的是,这次事件很可能是之前震惊世人的巴黎事件的即时反弹。那座没有灵魂的丽笙酒店是灰蒙蒙的马里首都的知名地标建筑,一个曾经采访过该国最著名乐队的英国记者告诉我,仅在两周前他还住在那里。几年前我在那里时,这座都城还能让人感到安全,但是令人伤感的是,伊斯兰圣战者杀回这个美丽而又饱受折磨的国度并不让人感到意外。 For two decades Mali was seen as a model democracy, with many analysts ignoring its corrosion through corruption and drug trafficking across the desert. Then it collapsed three years ago following an almost-accidental coup led by a disgruntled army captain, which was seized immediately by Toureg rebels seeking independence in the north. 二十年来,许多分析人士忽略腐败和穿越沙漠的贩毒活动对马里的侵蚀,一直视其为民主政治的模范。三年前,在一场由一位心怀不满的陆军上尉发动的近乎偶然的政变中,这个国家倒下了,之后她迅速被一直寻求北部独立的图阿雷格反抗军掌握。 They were well-armed after returning from fighting for their long-term supporter Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and one key figure had fallen under the spell of Islamic radicals; soon, moderates were forced aside and the huge desert areas fell under the control of fundamentalists. 他们曾为其长期支持者——利比亚的穆哈迈尔·卡扎菲——作战,归来之后就变得武装精良。而且他们的一位核心人物已经中了伊斯兰激进分子的魔咒。很快,温和派被迫让位,这片广阔的沙漠地区落入原教旨主义者之手。 Islamist groups allied to al Qa’ida had grown rich exploiting traditional Saharan smuggling routes as cocaine began to carve its way through west Africa en route to Europe, then boosted their income by kidnapping tourists visiting cities such as the wondrous Timbuktu. Having captured the region, foreign fighters poured in to create a caliphate in the desert. 与基地组织关系密切的各种伊斯兰组织,先是抓住可卡因开始经西非由空运输往欧洲的机会,利用传统的撒哈拉走私线路大发横财,之后又通过绑架古城(例如神奇的廷巴克图城)的游客来增收。在控制这个地区之后,来自其他国家的伊斯兰武装分子涌入当地,在沙漠中建立了一个哈里发国。 Yet it is important to note their imposition of hardline sharia law – with women forced to cover up, tombs destroyed, adulterers stoned and thieves having hands cut off – was alien to both Tuareg tradition and the sufistic Islam of the south. The banning of music in a nation famous worldwide for so many of its astonishing artists was especially shocking. 值得注意的是,他们强制推行的强硬伊斯兰教法——强迫妇女裹紧全身,毁坏墓穴,对通奸者施以石刑,砍掉偷窃者的手——既非图阿雷格传统,也和南部苏菲派伊斯兰格格不入。在一个因杰出艺术家层出不穷而蜚声国际的民族中禁止音乐,这种做法尤为令人震惊。 So there was immense popular support when a 4,000-strong French force invaded in support of the inept and poorly-equipped Malian army two years ago. They took rapid action when it looked like the bustling trading port of Mopti with its population of 120,000 people was about to fall to the militants. 因此,两年前一支4000人的法国部队进入马里,支援作战力弱、装备差的马里部队时,受到了热烈的欢迎和支持。当莫普提这一繁华的贸易港口和当地12万人口即将落入武装分子之手时,他们采取了快速行动。 Yet while they drove away Islamist militias and re-imposed a veneer of democracy, the fissures in this alluring country remained close to the surface. The new president has done little to restore faith in politics, while tensions remain between Tuaregs and southerners. 然而,尽管他们把伊斯兰武装分子驱逐了出去,并再次扶持建立起名义上的民主,但这个美丽国度的裂痕依旧呼之欲出。新总统没能重建民众对政治的信任,图阿雷格人和南部人民之间的紧张关系依旧持续。 In Mali, as elsewhere in parts of Africa, Muslim fanatics tapped into faultlines created through corruption, discrimination and poverty. And as we see again today, the jihadists may have been defeated but never disappeared. It was easy for them to melt back into the desert, surfacing again and again to strike back at their enemies. 就像非洲的其他地方一样,马里的穆斯林狂热分子利用了腐败、歧视和贫穷所造成的社会裂痕。正如我们今天再次看到的一样,圣战分子可以被打败,但是绝不会消失。对于他们来说,藏身沙漠,然后再次出来回击他们的敌人相当轻松。 United Nations blue helmets have been attacked so often it was seen as the most dangerous of their missions around the world, with 53 peacekeepers killed. There have also been deadly attacks on hotels and restaurants popular with foreigners, even in Bamako. 联合国维和部队多次被袭,53名维和人员丧生,使得驻防此地被看作全世界最危险的。即使在巴马科,针对外国人经常光顾的酒店和餐馆的致命袭击也时有发生。 These depressing events in Bamako prove two things. First, there are huge hurdles ahead in the fight to restore stability in the Sahel, many of which policymakers blinkered by the past have barely begun to understand. And second, that the worldwide war with Islamic militants has few boundaries. This is perhaps the most terrifying aspect of the latest attack. 在巴马科发的这些令人沮丧的事件证明了两件事:第一,想要重建萨赫勒地区的稳定局势的话,还有很多巨大的障碍亟待破除,然而许多眼光局限于过去的决策者尚未意识到这个问题;第二,伊斯兰激进分子在世界范围内发起的战争没有边界。这可能是最近这次袭击最令人恐惧的地方。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]ISIS编年史

ISIS简史:全球最可怕的恐怖组织是如何长成的
ISIS, a history: how the world’s worst terror group came to be

作者:Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-11-19
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:VOX,http://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9760284/isis-history

To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria — why it exists, what it wants, and why it commits terrible violence of which the Paris attacks are only the latest — you need to understand the tangled story of how it came to be.

如果想了解伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国(ISIS)——为什么它会存在,它想要什么,还有为什么它会犯下诸如最近的巴黎恐怖袭击之类可怕暴行——你需要了解在它成长历程中所发生的曲折故事。

The group began, in a very different form, in 1999. In the 16 years since, it has been shaped by — and has at moments helped to shape — the conflicts, physical and ideological, of the Middle East.

该组织始建于1999年,但它在当时的形式与现在大不相同。在之后的16年中,它被中东的武力和意识形态冲突所塑造,也时而塑造着这些冲突。

Here, then, is a concise history of the rise of ISIS from its earliest origins to the present day. It is the story of one of the richest and most powerful terrorist organizations ever to exist — but it’s also a story that reveals the ways in which ISIS has proven much weaker than you might think.

在这里,我将呈现ISIS从最初的起源直到今天的一部简明历史。这是关于史上最富有也最强悍的恐怖组织之一的故事——但这个故事也同样揭示了,ISIS的一些所作所为,证明了它实际上比人们所想象的要脆弱得多。

1989–1999: The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the beginning of ISIS
1989-1999:苏联的阿富汗战争和ISIS的发端

57533492【Abu Musab al-Zarqawi(即扎卡维)在伊拉克。】

You cannot understand ISIS without understanding al-Qaeda and the history they share, as well as the differences, there at the beginning, that would ultimately divide them. And al-Qaeda’s origin story begins with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

如果不了解基地组织以及它和ISIS的共同历史,还有它们之间一开始就存在的差异(正是这些差异让它们最终分道扬镳),你就无法真正地了解ISIS。基地组织的故事最初始于苏联在1979年入侵阿富汗。

Soviet aggression shocked the Muslim world, galvanizing roughly 20,000 foreign fighters to help Afghans resist Soviet forces. That’s where Osama bin Laden met a number of other young radicals, who together formed the core of the al-Qaeda network.

苏联的侵略震惊了整个穆斯林世界,并激起了大约2万名外国战士帮助阿富汗人抵抗苏联军队。正是在那里,奥萨马·本·拉登遇上了一群年轻的极端分子,他们共同组建了基地组织网络的核心团队。

The Soviets withdrew in 1988, but they left a puppet regime in place, and the war continued. The next year, a Jordanian man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah joined them.

苏联人在1988年撤离了阿富汗,但是他们留下了一个傀儡政权,而战争也还在继续。第二年,一个名叫Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah的约旦人加入进来。

Al-Khalaylah would, years later, achieve global infamy under his nom de guerre, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He would found the group that became what we today call ISIS.

几年后,al-Khalaylah以他的别名Abu Musab al-Zarqawi(即扎卡维)在全球臭名昭著。他创建了在今天被我们称之为ISIS的恐怖组织。

When Zarqawi first traveled to Afghanistan, in 1989, he wasn’t all that religious: He was, as Mary Anne Weaver writes in a definitive Atlantic profile, something of a petty thug. But once there, he met a man named Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading proponent of violent, fundamentalist Islam. Maqdisi converted Zarqawi to his cause.

当扎卡维在1989年第一次来到阿富汗时,他并不是那么满怀宗教热情:正如Mary Anne Weaver在《大西洋月刊》发布的一份权威传略中所写道的,他当时只不过是个小流氓。但一到阿富汗,他就遇上了一个名叫Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi的暴力伊斯兰原教旨主义的主要倡导者。Maqdisi按照自己的理念改造了扎卡维。

Zarqawi would not meet bin Laden for years, and the two men built up allies and followers independently from each other — a dynamic that made Zarqawi’s network even more extreme than bin Laden’s.

在之后的数年中,扎卡维都还没有遇上本·拉登,两人各自独立地建立起了自己的盟友和追随者网络——在此过程中,扎卡维的网络甚至比本·拉登的更极端。

“Whereas bin Laden and his cadre grew up in at least the upper middle class and had a university education, Zarqawi and those closest to him came from poorer, less educated backgrounds,” Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes. “Zarqawi’s criminal past and extreme views on takfir (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) created major friction and distrust with bin Laden when the two first met in Afghanistan in 1999.”

“本·拉登和他的核心骨干都至少是在上层中产阶级长大的,而且也都受过大学教育,而扎卡维和他的亲信们则来自较贫穷,教育程度也较低的阶层,”华盛顿近东政策研究所的学者Aaron Zelin如此写道。“1999年扎卡维在阿富汗首次见到本·拉登时,他的犯罪前科和他关于塔克菲(通过将另一名穆斯林控诉为异教徒,而为将他杀死的行为提供穆斯林教法上的合法性)的极端观点在两人之间造成了很大的摩擦和不信任感。”

2003–2009: The rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Iraq
2003-2009:伊拉克基地组织的兴衰

Iraqi_insurgents_with_guns_2006.0【2006年,伊拉克北部不明身份的反美武装。】

Zarqawi returned from Afghanistan, and in 1999 in Jordan formed his own group, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ), or the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. For the first few years, Zarqawi’s group was a bit player among jihadists, overshadowed by al-Qaeda. But this was the group, then little known, that would later become ISIS.

从阿富汗回来之后,扎卡维1999年在约旦建立了自己的组织,名为Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad(JTWJ),或叫“一神论与圣战组织”。在最初的几年中,扎卡维的组织和基地组织相比相形见绌,在众多伊斯兰圣战组织中只是个小玩家。但这个在当时还默默无闻的组织就是日后ISIS的雏形。

In 2003, the US led its invasion of Iraq and changed, in the world of jihadists, everything.

2003年,美国领导了对伊拉克的入侵行动,这完全改变了伊斯兰圣战者的世界。

The American-led war, by destroying the Iraqi state, left much of the country in chaos. Foreign fighters and extremists began moving into Iraq, assisted by Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, which sought to bog down the US. Zarqawi and his group were among them.

由美国所主导的伊拉克战争摧毁了伊拉克的国家机器,让这个国家的大部分地区陷入混乱的深渊。在力图将美国拖入泥潭的叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的帮助下,来自外国的战士和极端分子开始涌入伊拉克,而扎卡维和他的极端组织也在其中。

The Sunni extremists who arrived found a friendly audience among former Iraqi soldiers and officers: The US had disbanded Saddam Hussein’s overwhelmingly Sunni army, which was disbanded in 2003, creating a group of men who were unemployed, battle-trained, and scared of life in an Iraq dominated by its Shia majority.

这些来到伊拉克的逊尼派极端分子在伊拉克前政权的士兵和军官中找到了一批知音:美国在2003年解散了效忠于萨达姆·侯赛因,以逊尼派占压倒性多数的军队,从而创造了一个受过实战训练的失业军人群体,他们对于生活在一个由占人口多数的什叶派统治的国家感到十分恐惧。

Zarqawi’s group, as it fought in Iraq, grew to prominence, attracting al-Qaeda’s attention. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, for which he would receive access to its funds and fighters. His group was renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and it became the country’s leading Sunni insurgent group.

扎卡维的组织在伊拉克的战斗中不断成长壮大,最终吸引到了基地组织的注意。2004年,扎卡维宣誓向基地组织效忠,以换取基地组织所提供的资金和战士。他的组织被更名为伊拉克基地组织(AQI),而该组织也成为了伊拉克境内最主要的逊尼派武装力量。

AQI didn’t just fight the Americans, it also attacked fellow Iraqis. It bombed Shia mosques and slaughtered Shia civilians, hoping to provoke mass Shia reprisals against Sunni civilians and thus force the Sunnis to rally behind AQI. It worked, and it’s a tactic ISIS still uses today. It also helped spark a civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shia.

伊拉克基地组织不仅仅与美国人作战,它同样也攻击伊拉克同胞。它炸毁什叶派的清真寺并且屠杀什叶派平民,力图煽动什叶派对逊尼派平民的大规模报复,从而迫使逊尼派聚集在自己的羽翼之下。这一策略取得了成功,并且直到今天ISIS还在使用这样的策略。而这也引发了一场伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派之间的内战。

But these methods were too vicious even for al-Qaeda, which warned Zarqawi to cool it. He ignored the warnings, and AQI came to hold a swath of territory in Sunni parts of Iraq, roughly along the lines of what ISIS controls there today. Yet between 2006 and 2009, it all came crashing down:

但即使对于基地组织而言,这样的方法也显得太恶毒了,于是基地组织警告扎卡维,让他把事态冷却下来。但扎卡维无视这一警告,而伊拉克基地组织则进一步占领了伊拉克逊尼派聚居的一片土地,与ISIS今天在这里所控制区域的边界相仿。然而在2006年和2009年之间,这一切几乎都土崩瓦解了:

Al_qaeda_in_iraq_and_sunni_insurgents_march_2008

【由AQI和其他逊尼派叛乱团体控制的领土。(more...)

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ISIS简史:全球最可怕的恐怖组织是如何长成的 ISIS, a history: how the world's worst terror group came to be

作者:Zack Beauchamp @ 2015-11-19 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:VOX,http://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9760284/isis-history To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria — why it exists, what it wants, and why it commits terrible violence of which the Paris attacks are only the latest — you need to understand the tangled story of how it came to be. 如果想了解伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国(ISIS)——为什么它会存在,它想要什么,还有为什么它会犯下诸如最近的巴黎恐怖袭击之类可怕暴行——你需要了解在它成长历程中所发生的曲折故事。 The group began, in a very different form, in 1999. In the 16 years since, it has been shaped by — and has at moments helped to shape — the conflicts, physical and ideological, of the Middle East. 该组织始建于1999年,但它在当时的形式与现在大不相同。在之后的16年中,它被中东的武力和意识形态冲突所塑造,也时而塑造着这些冲突。 Here, then, is a concise history of the rise of ISIS from its earliest origins to the present day. It is the story of one of the richest and most powerful terrorist organizations ever to exist — but it's also a story that reveals the ways in which ISIS has proven much weaker than you might think. 在这里,我将呈现ISIS从最初的起源直到今天的一部简明历史。这是关于史上最富有也最强悍的恐怖组织之一的故事——但这个故事也同样揭示了,ISIS的一些所作所为,证明了它实际上比人们所想象的要脆弱得多。 1989–1999: The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the beginning of ISIS 1989-1999:苏联的阿富汗战争和ISIS的发端

57533492【Abu Musab al-Zarqawi(即扎卡维)在伊拉克。】

You cannot understand ISIS without understanding al-Qaeda and the history they share, as well as the differences, there at the beginning, that would ultimately divide them. And al-Qaeda's origin story begins with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 如果不了解基地组织以及它和ISIS的共同历史,还有它们之间一开始就存在的差异(正是这些差异让它们最终分道扬镳),你就无法真正地了解ISIS。基地组织的故事最初始于苏联在1979年入侵阿富汗。 Soviet aggression shocked the Muslim world, galvanizing roughly 20,000 foreign fighters to help Afghans resist Soviet forces. That's where Osama bin Laden met a number of other young radicals, who together formed the core of the al-Qaeda network. 苏联的侵略震惊了整个穆斯林世界,并激起了大约2万名外国战士帮助阿富汗人抵抗苏联军队。正是在那里,奥萨马·本·拉登遇上了一群年轻的极端分子,他们共同组建了基地组织网络的核心团队。 The Soviets withdrew in 1988, but they left a puppet regime in place, and the war continued. The next year, a Jordanian man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah joined them. 苏联人在1988年撤离了阿富汗,但是他们留下了一个傀儡政权,而战争也还在继续。第二年,一个名叫Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah的约旦人加入进来。 Al-Khalaylah would, years later, achieve global infamy under his nom de guerre, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He would found the group that became what we today call ISIS. 几年后,al-Khalaylah以他的别名Abu Musab al-Zarqawi(即扎卡维)在全球臭名昭著。他创建了在今天被我们称之为ISIS的恐怖组织。 When Zarqawi first traveled to Afghanistan, in 1989, he wasn't all that religious: He was, as Mary Anne Weaver writes in a definitive Atlantic profile, something of a petty thug. But once there, he met a man named Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading proponent of violent, fundamentalist Islam. Maqdisi converted Zarqawi to his cause. 当扎卡维在1989年第一次来到阿富汗时,他并不是那么满怀宗教热情:正如Mary Anne Weaver在《大西洋月刊》发布的一份权威传略中所写道的,他当时只不过是个小流氓。但一到阿富汗,他就遇上了一个名叫Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi的暴力伊斯兰原教旨主义的主要倡导者。Maqdisi按照自己的理念改造了扎卡维。 Zarqawi would not meet bin Laden for years, and the two men built up allies and followers independently from each other — a dynamic that made Zarqawi's network even more extreme than bin Laden's. 在之后的数年中,扎卡维都还没有遇上本·拉登,两人各自独立地建立起了自己的盟友和追随者网络——在此过程中,扎卡维的网络甚至比本·拉登的更极端。 "Whereas bin Laden and his cadre grew up in at least the upper middle class and had a university education, Zarqawi and those closest to him came from poorer, less educated backgrounds," Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes. "Zarqawi’s criminal past and extreme views on takfir (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) created major friction and distrust with bin Laden when the two first met in Afghanistan in 1999." “本·拉登和他的核心骨干都至少是在上层中产阶级长大的,而且也都受过大学教育,而扎卡维和他的亲信们则来自较贫穷,教育程度也较低的阶层,”华盛顿近东政策研究所的学者Aaron Zelin如此写道。“1999年扎卡维在阿富汗首次见到本·拉登时,他的犯罪前科和他关于塔克菲(通过将另一名穆斯林控诉为异教徒,而为将他杀死的行为提供穆斯林教法上的合法性)的极端观点在两人之间造成了很大的摩擦和不信任感。” 2003–2009: The rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Iraq 2003-2009:伊拉克基地组织的兴衰

Iraqi_insurgents_with_guns_2006.0【2006年,伊拉克北部不明身份的反美武装。】

Zarqawi returned from Afghanistan, and in 1999 in Jordan formed his own group, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ), or the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. For the first few years, Zarqawi's group was a bit player among jihadists, overshadowed by al-Qaeda. But this was the group, then little known, that would later become ISIS. 从阿富汗回来之后,扎卡维1999年在约旦建立了自己的组织,名为Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad(JTWJ),或叫“一神论与圣战组织”。在最初的几年中,扎卡维的组织和基地组织相比相形见绌,在众多伊斯兰圣战组织中只是个小玩家。但这个在当时还默默无闻的组织就是日后ISIS的雏形。 In 2003, the US led its invasion of Iraq and changed, in the world of jihadists, everything. 2003年,美国领导了对伊拉克的入侵行动,这完全改变了伊斯兰圣战者的世界。 The American-led war, by destroying the Iraqi state, left much of the country in chaos. Foreign fighters and extremists began moving into Iraq, assisted by Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, which sought to bog down the US. Zarqawi and his group were among them. 由美国所主导的伊拉克战争摧毁了伊拉克的国家机器,让这个国家的大部分地区陷入混乱的深渊。在力图将美国拖入泥潭的叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的帮助下,来自外国的战士和极端分子开始涌入伊拉克,而扎卡维和他的极端组织也在其中。 The Sunni extremists who arrived found a friendly audience among former Iraqi soldiers and officers: The US had disbanded Saddam Hussein's overwhelmingly Sunni army, which was disbanded in 2003, creating a group of men who were unemployed, battle-trained, and scared of life in an Iraq dominated by its Shia majority. 这些来到伊拉克的逊尼派极端分子在伊拉克前政权的士兵和军官中找到了一批知音:美国在2003年解散了效忠于萨达姆·侯赛因,以逊尼派占压倒性多数的军队,从而创造了一个受过实战训练的失业军人群体,他们对于生活在一个由占人口多数的什叶派统治的国家感到十分恐惧。 Zarqawi's group, as it fought in Iraq, grew to prominence, attracting al-Qaeda's attention. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, for which he would receive access to its funds and fighters. His group was renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and it became the country's leading Sunni insurgent group. 扎卡维的组织在伊拉克的战斗中不断成长壮大,最终吸引到了基地组织的注意。2004年,扎卡维宣誓向基地组织效忠,以换取基地组织所提供的资金和战士。他的组织被更名为伊拉克基地组织(AQI),而该组织也成为了伊拉克境内最主要的逊尼派武装力量。 AQI didn't just fight the Americans, it also attacked fellow Iraqis. It bombed Shia mosques and slaughtered Shia civilians, hoping to provoke mass Shia reprisals against Sunni civilians and thus force the Sunnis to rally behind AQI. It worked, and it's a tactic ISIS still uses today. It also helped spark a civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shia. 伊拉克基地组织不仅仅与美国人作战,它同样也攻击伊拉克同胞。它炸毁什叶派的清真寺并且屠杀什叶派平民,力图煽动什叶派对逊尼派平民的大规模报复,从而迫使逊尼派聚集在自己的羽翼之下。这一策略取得了成功,并且直到今天ISIS还在使用这样的策略。而这也引发了一场伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派之间的内战。 But these methods were too vicious even for al-Qaeda, which warned Zarqawi to cool it. He ignored the warnings, and AQI came to hold a swath of territory in Sunni parts of Iraq, roughly along the lines of what ISIS controls there today. Yet between 2006 and 2009, it all came crashing down: 但即使对于基地组织而言,这样的方法也显得太恶毒了,于是基地组织警告扎卡维,让他把事态冷却下来。但扎卡维无视这一警告,而伊拉克基地组织则进一步占领了伊拉克逊尼派聚居的一片土地,与ISIS今天在这里所控制区域的边界相仿。然而在2006年和2009年之间,这一切几乎都土崩瓦解了: Al_qaeda_in_iraq_and_sunni_insurgents_march_2008

【由AQI和其他逊尼派叛乱团体控制的领土。】

Starting in 2006, AQI's extremism began to backfire. Sunni tribal leaders, who had always hated living under AQI's harsh and often violent rule, became convinced that the Shias were starting to win Iraq's sectarian civil war. To avoid being on the losing end of a bloody war, they up took arms against AQI in a movement called the Awakening. 从2006年开始,伊拉克基地组织所贯彻的极端主义开始遭遇挫折。那些对于生活在伊拉克基地组织严酷而暴力的统治之下一直心怀怨恨的逊尼派部落长老们开始相信,什叶派将会赢得这场伊拉克的宗派内战。为了避免在一场血腥战争中成为失败的一方,他们发起了一场称为“觉醒”的运动,武装反抗伊拉克基地组织。 Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a US airstrike, and the US increased its troop presence in Iraq that year and the next. But it was, more than anything else, the Awakening that defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq. 扎卡维在2006年死于美军空袭,而美国在当年和次年都往伊拉克增派驻军。但是在打败伊拉克基地组织的过程中,“觉醒”运动所发挥的作用还是超过了任何其它因素。 By 2009, almost all of AQI's fighters were dead or in prison, and the group was a shadow of itself. But it had learned a valuable lesson: Dissent from Sunnis under its rule could be disastrous. That's why, years later, ISIS has slaughtered members of Sunni tribes, such as Iraq's Abu Nimr, en masse. It sees brutality as the best way to prevent a replay of the 2006 uprising that led to its downfall. 到2009年,几乎所有伊拉克基地组织的战士都已被歼灭或是被关进了监狱,组织几乎名存实亡。但是它学到了宝贵的一课:受其统治的逊尼派的不满可以带来灾难性的后果。这也是为何在几年之后,ISIS屠杀了一些逊尼派的部族成员,例如对伊拉克Abu Nimr部落的集体屠杀。为防止类似2006年那场导致它衰落的起义重演,它将残酷暴行视为最佳的预防措施。 2010: Iraq begins unraveling, setting the stage for AQI's comeback 2010年:伊拉克开始解体,并为伊拉克基地组织的回归创造了舞台

maliki_speech【伊拉克前总理Nouri al-Maliki(马利基)。】

ISIS was able to rise from AQI's ashes in no small part because of Iraq's catastrophic internal politics. ISIS之所以能从伊拉克基地组织的废墟之上重新崛起,很大程度上是由于伊拉克灾难性的国内政治。 "Iraq was the essential incubator," according to Fred Hof, who for part of 2012 served as the Obama administration's special adviser for the transition in Syria. “伊拉克是ISIS成长所必需的孵化器”,Fred Hof如此评论道。2012年有段时间,他曾担任奥巴马政府关于叙利亚过渡时期问题的特别顾问。 By 2010, "Iraq finally had relatively good security, a generous state budget, and positive relations among the country’s various ethnic and religious communities," Zaid al-Ali, author of The Struggle for Iraq's Future, wrote in Foreign Policy. But it was squandered. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stripped political opponents of power, appointed his cronies to run the army, and killed peaceful protestors. 到2010年,“伊拉克终于拥有了相对较好的安全局势,宽松的国家预算,国内各种族和宗教群体之间的关系也比较积极,”《挣扎中的伊拉克》的作者Zaid al-Ali在《外交政策》杂志上写道。但这些有利形势最终都被浪费掉了。伊拉克总理Nouri al-Maliki(马利基)剥夺了政敌们的权力,安排自己的亲信控制军队,并且杀害了一些和平抗议者。 Most importantly, he reconstructed the Iraqi state on sectarian lines, privileging the Shia majority over the Sunni minority. This exacerbated Iraq's existing sectarian tensions: Sunni Iraqis falsely believed themselves to be Iraqi's majority (owing to Saddam-era propaganda) and saw Maliki as depriving them of their rightful control of the state. He only deepened their belief that the Iraqi state was fundamentally illegitimate. 而最重要的是,他按照宗教派别重塑了伊拉克,让占人口多数的什叶派获得了比占人口少数的逊尼派更多的特权。这加剧了伊拉克国内本已存在的宗派紧张局势:伊拉克的逊尼派总是误以为他们才是伊拉克真正的“多数派”(这要归因于萨达姆时期的宣传),因而觉得马利基在剥夺他们对国家应有的控制权。逊尼派认为伊拉克现政府根本不具有合法性,而马利基的做法加深了他们的这一信念。 By this time, al-Qaeda in Iraq had a new leader: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi who had a background in serious religious scholarship. Under his leadership, AQI began allying with former officers from Saddam Hussein's army and recruited disaffected Sunnis. Iraq's own government, unintentionally, gave them exactly the opening they needed to regain strength. 此时,伊拉克基地组织有了一位新领袖:巴格达迪,他是一个拥有着严肃宗教学术背景的伊拉克人。在他的领导下,伊拉克基地组织开始与一些前萨达姆军队的军官建立同盟,并且招募了一些对伊拉克现政府极度不满的逊尼派穆斯林。伊拉克政府在不经意间为他们的东山再起提供了绝佳机会。 "Raw political sectarianism in Iraq was the main causal factor [in ISIS's rise]," Hof writes. “伊拉克国内原始的政治宗派斗争是ISIS再次崛起的主要原因,”Hof如此写道。 August 2011: AQI's remnants move into Syria — with a little help from Assad 2011年8月:在阿萨德的一点帮助下,伊拉克基地组织的残余力量进入叙利亚

156824770.0【叙利亚叛军哀悼战友的死亡。】

Around this same time, Syria erupted in Arab Spring protests that became a civil war. In March 2011, Syrian demonstrators took to the streets to demand Bashar al-Assad step down. Almost right away, the Syrian regime began slaughtering protestors in an attempt to provoke a civil war. 几乎在同一时间,叙利亚 爆发了“阿拉伯之春”运动,而这最终演变成了一场内战。在2011年3月,叙利亚的抗议者占领了大街小巷,要求巴沙尔·阿萨德下台。叙利亚政权很快开始屠杀抗议者,以图引发内战。 "It was very much a strategic decision that the regime made, to militarize the conflict right away," Glenn Robinson, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me in a phone conversation. "I think, in their mind and correctly, if this becomes a political battle where populations matter, the regime probably only has support of a third of the country ... the opposition has the numbers." “迅速地将这场冲突军事化,实际上是阿萨德政权所采取的一项相当有战略意义的决策”,美国海军研究生院的副教授Glenn Robinson在一次电话采访中如此对我说。“我认为,在他们看来,如果这场冲突演变成一场人口因素起重要作用的政治斗争,阿萨德政权可能仅仅能获得全国三分之一人口的支持……反对派则占据着人口的大多数,这个判断是正确的。”【编注:叙利亚1700万人口中,74%为逊尼派,控制政权的阿拉维派(什叶派的一个支派)仅占12%。】 Perhaps the most devious part of this strategy was Assad's deliberate effort to promote Islamic extremism among the opposition. In amnesties issued between March and October 2011, Assad released a significant number (exact counts are hard to know) of extremists from Syrian prisons. Hof called this an "effort to pollute the opposition with sectarianism": Assad gambled that if his enemies were Islamic militants, then the West wouldn't intervene against him. 也许这一策略中最为邪恶的部分在于,阿萨德蓄意地在反对派中散布伊斯兰极端主义。在2011年3月到10月的大赦中,阿萨德从叙利亚监狱中释放了相当数量(很难得知准确数字)的极端分子。Hof称之为“一项试图用宗派主义污染反对派阵营的举措”:阿萨德赌了一把,如果他的敌人是伊斯兰激进武装分子,那么西方各国就不会采取针对他的干预行动。 In August 2011, Baghdadi sent a top deputy, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, to Syria to set up a new branch of the AQI in the country. Joulani succeeded, establishing Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012. Joulani's fighters quickly proved themselves to be some of the most effective fighters on the Syrian battlefield, swelling their ranks with new recruits. 2011年8月,巴格达迪将他的得力副手Abu Mohammad al-Joulani派往叙利亚,以在叙境内建立伊拉克基地组织的新分支。Joulani的行动获得了成功,他在2012年1月建立了一个名为Jabhat al-Nusra(即努斯拉阵线)的组织。Joulani的战士们迅速证明了他们是叙利亚战场上最高效的战斗群体之一,并通过招募大量新成员提升了组织的地位。 At this point, Baghdadi's original group was still in Iraq alone. It had not become ISIS. But to understand how it did, you have to see the larger forces that opened his way. 巴格达迪的组织此时仍仅限于在伊拉克境内活动,它还没有成为那个令人谈之色变的ISIS。如果想要了解它后来是如何做到这一点的,你需要了解一下为巴格达迪铺平道路的那些更加强大力量。 Early 2012: Syrian jihadists get their "angel investors" 2012年初:叙利亚的圣战者迎来了他们的“天使投资人” Today, ISIS is the world's richest terrorist group, its funding coming mostly from various extortion schemes in the territory it controls. But back in 2012, foreign donations played a crucial role in growing the group from the poor organization it was then into the monster it is today. 今天,ISIS是世界上最富有的恐怖组织,它主要依靠在控制区进行各种掠夺来获得资金。但回到2012年,在这个当时还穷困潦倒的组织成长为今天这头恐怖怪兽的过程中,来自国外的捐助扮演了关键角色。 In 2012, money flew into Syria from the Gulf Arab states — places like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The key investments in ISIS didn't come directly from those countries' governments, but rather from private individuals living there who wanted to see the Assad regime fall — and perhaps to promote extremism itself. 2012年,来自波斯湾阿拉伯国家(例如科威特、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔)的资金涌入了叙利亚。ISIS所得到的主要投资并不直接来自这些国家的政府,而是来自生活在这些国家的国民,他们希望看到阿萨德政权倒台——也可能只是为了推行伊斯兰极端主义。 "These rich Arabs are like what 'angel investors' are to tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred," former US Navy Admiral and NATO Supreme Commander James Stavridis told NBC last June. "Groups like al-Nusra and ISIS are better investments for them [than moderates]." “这些阿拉伯富豪所扮演的角色就像是科技初创企业的‘天使投资人’,唯一的区别在于,他们的目的是创立一些旨在煽动仇恨的极端组织,”前美国海军上将和北约总司令James Stavridis将军在去年6月向NBC表示,“(相对于温和派),像努斯拉阵线和ISIS这样的组织对他们而言是更好的投资。” Though these donors have since faded in importance, they were invaluable at the time. "The individuals," Stavridis explained, "act as high rollers early, providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly capable of raising funds through other means, like kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling women into slavery, etc." 虽然这些捐款人的重要性自此逐渐减退,但他们在当时对ISIS是无价之宝。Starvridis将军解释道,“这些富人在早期一掷千金,为极端组织提供了种子基金。而一旦这些组织能够站稳脚跟,他们就完全有能力通过其它的手段获得资金,例如绑架人质,走私石油,将妇女贩卖为奴等等。” But while the Gulf financiers' intent may have been to hurt Assad, they actually ended up propping him up by playing into his strategy of promoting extremism. 虽然这些波斯湾“投资人”最初可能是为了打击阿萨德政权,但结果却是通过散布极端主义而成了阿萨德的棋子,最终帮助了阿萨德。 "It was a service of incalculable value to the Assad regime: It enabled him to say — albeit inaccurately — that he was the alternative to terrorism and sectarianism," Hof told me via email. “这对阿萨德政权是无价之宝:这让他可以说——虽然并不准确——自己是恐怖主义和宗派极端主义之外的另一个选项,”Hof通过电子邮件对我说。 July 2012: The great ISIS prison break begins 2012年7月:ISIS的大规模劫狱行动开始

84960787【伊拉克在2009年重开阿布格莱布监狱。大约四年之后,ISIS从这里释放了500-1000名囚犯。】

There's one chapter of the story of ISIS's rise that very rarely gets mentioned: its spectacular series of attacks on Iraqi prisons in 2012 and 2013. These prison breaks supplied it with a huge infusion of recruits, and also illustrates how effectively ISIS took advantage of the Iraqi government's weakness. 在ISIS的崛起中,有一个很少被人们提起的重要章节:它在2012年和2013年间对伊拉克境内的监狱发动了一系列惊人的袭击。这一系列的劫狱行动为它注入了大量新鲜血液,而这同时也显示了ISIS多么懂得利用伊拉克政府的弱点。 In July 2012, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a statement to his loyalists. "We remind you of your top priority, which is to release the Muslim prisoners everywhere," he said, "and making the pursuit, chase, and killing of their butchers from amongst the judges, detectives, and guards to be on top of the list." 巴格达迪在2012年7月向他的效忠者们发布了如下声明:“我们在此提醒你们,当前的首要任务是在各地解放被关押在监狱里的穆斯林,而从法官、警探和守卫中找出那些迫害他们的人,追捕并杀死这些刽子手,也是你们极其重要的任务。” This was, unambiguously, a call to break former Iraqi insurgents out of jail — and ISIS followed their leader's order. Over the next year, they attacked a number of prisons across Iraq, freeing somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 inmates. 毫无疑问,巴格达迪这是在号召自己的支持者帮助伊拉克的前叛乱分子越狱——而ISIS成员也忠实执行了领袖的命令。在接下来的一年中,他们袭击了伊拉克境内的多所监狱,并放出了其中的大约1000名囚犯。 These included, former CIA analyst Aki Peretz writes, "many terrorists [that] elite US military forces caught over the years and then handed over to the Iraqi government when the United States turned over custody of its prison facilities in 2010." 前中央情报局分析员Aki Peretz写道:“这其中包括许多由美军精英部队在过去数年中抓捕的恐怖分子,在美国2010年向伊拉克移交监狱设施时,他们也被交给了伊拉克政府。” People incarcerated for common crimes were also recruited. "Prisoners convicted of criminal charges provide advantages to the terrorist group, because they could have been recruited during their incarceration," Peretz writes. "Even if common criminals were able to resist jihadist persuasion efforts while in prison, they may now feel indebted to their 'liberators.'" 一些之前因普通罪行而被送进监狱的人也在ISIS的招募之列。“受过犯罪指控的囚犯对恐怖组织很有价值,因为他们可能在服刑期间就已经被招募了,”Peretz写道,“这些普通罪犯即使在狱中能够经受住圣战分子的劝说,他们在逃出监狱之后也可能对这些‘解放者’心存感激。” This won ISIS a rapid infusion of manpower — and also illustrates that well before the 2014 crisis, we had signs that the Iraqi state was falling apart in a way that would empower extremists. The ISIS crisis didn't come out of nowhere, in other words: It was a slow motion disaster with plenty of advance warning. 这为ISIS迅速注入了大量人力——同时也表明,早在2014年的危机之前很久,已经有了一些迹象让我们就能够看到伊拉克国家的解体方式将会增强极端势力。ISIS危机并不是凭空出现的,换句话说:这实际上是一场“慢动作”的灾难,而且有着大量的预先警示。 April 2013: ISIS officially becomes ISIS — and divorces al-Qaeda 2013年4月:ISIS正式成为“伊斯兰国”——并与“基地组织”分道扬镳

feature-main.0【一个ISIS战士拿着组织的旗帜。】

As all this was happening, Baghdadi's organization was still named al-Qaeda in Iraq. But Baghdadi worried that Joulani — his commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, the group in Syria — was acting too independently and would quit AQI to make Jabhat al-Nusra a separate group. 发生了那么多事情,巴格达迪的组织在此时仍然叫伊拉克基地组织。但是巴格达迪开始担心,他的手下Joulani——也就是叙利亚努斯拉阵线的首领——行动变得过于独立,而这可能会让他决定退出伊拉克基地组织,将努斯拉阵线变成一个独立的组织。 In April 2013, Baghdadi did something dramatic: He asserted unilateral control over all al-Qaeda operations in both Syria and Iraq. To demonstrate this change, he renamed AQI "the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria" — or ISIS, for short. 2013年4月,巴格达迪做了一件戏剧性的事情:他声称自己单方面控制了叙利亚和伊拉克境内所有的基地组织行动。为了证明这一点,他将伊拉克基地组织更名为“伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国”——简称ISIS。 This didn't sit well with Joulani, who appealed to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, who'd never really trusted AQI, sided with Joulani — a decision that Baghdadi rejected. ISIS and al-Qaeda eventually split, dividing the jihadist movement in Syria. 而Joulani则对此感到不满,他向基地组织领导人Ayman al-Zawahiri(即扎瓦赫里)申诉此事。扎瓦赫里从来就没有信任过伊拉克基地组织,他站在了Joulani一边——而巴格达迪则抵制了他的这一决定。ISIS和基地组织最终分道扬镳了,叙利亚境内的圣战运动也就此分裂。 This left ISIS to "gradually emerge as an autonomous component within the Syrian conflict," Brookings Doha's Charles Lister writes, by absorbing Nusra fighters and territory in northern and eastern Syria. It ended up taking firm control of much of this territory, establishing a de facto capital in the northern city of Raqqa. 在这之后,通过在叙利亚北部和东部地区吸收努斯拉阵线的战士和领地,ISIS“作为一个完全独立的组织逐渐在叙利亚内战中成长壮大”,布鲁金斯学会多哈分会的Charles Lister写道。最终,ISIS牢牢地控制了该区域的大部分地区,并在叙利亚北部城市拉卡建立了一个实质上的首都。 Assad, for his part, was perfectly happy to leave ISIS alone — particularly as it primarily fought other rebel groups. "ISIS almost never fought the Assad regime," Robinson says. "They were much more focused on fighting other opposition groups and gaining land their opponents had already acquired." 对于阿萨德来说,他非常乐于对ISIS置之不理——部分原因是它主要在与叙利亚的其它叛军组织作战。“ISIS几乎从来没有和阿萨德政权打过仗,”Robinson说。“他们更专注于和其它反对派组织作战,并且抢占他们的领地。” By February 2014, Zawahiri had had enough. He formally exiled ISIS from al-Qaeda, leading to what Zelin describes as "open warfare in Syria" between the groups. Today, the groups continue to struggle over territory and ideological control over the global jihadist movement. 到2014年2月,扎瓦赫里终于受够了ISIS的所作所为。他正式将ISIS逐出了基地组织,这导致了这两个组织间开始爆发冲突,Zelin称之为“叙利亚境内的公开战争”。直至今天,ISIS和基地组织仍然在争夺领地,以及对全球伊斯兰圣战运动的意识形态控制权。 This dynamic, in part, drives ISIS's brutality: One of the group's key means of capturing foreign fighters' hearts and minds is through public, over-the-top slaughter that wins their attention. 这在一定程度上也助长了ISIS的残暴作风:该组织在吸引外国战士的人心方面最强的杀手锏之一,就是通过公开而极端残暴的屠杀行为来吸引注意。 June 2014: ISIS sweeps northern Iraq and declares a caliphate 2014年6月:ISIS横扫伊拉克北部,并宣布建立哈里发国家

Abu_Bakr_451738080.0【Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi。(巴格达迪)】

This is the moment when everything that had happened before in ISIS's rise came to a head. On June 10, 2014, a force of about 800 ISIS fighters defeated 30,000 Iraqi government troops to capture Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. In the next two days, ISIS fighters swept through Iraq's heavily Sunni northwestern and central provinces — coming, at their peak, extremely close to Baghdad. 经过之前所发生的一切之后,ISIS的崛起迎来了高潮。2014年6月10日,一支由800名ISIS战士组成的军队战胜了3万名伊拉克政府军,攻占伊拉克第二大城市摩苏尔。其后两天,ISIS战士横扫了逊尼派人口集中的伊拉克西北部和中部省份——在他们推进到最远的时候,曾一度非常接近巴格达。 This blitzkrieg built on months of ISIS momentum. In January, ISIS had seized control of Fallujah, a former AQI stronghold in western Iraq. The Iraqi government's repeated inability to retake Fallujah in the following months illustrated the depleted and incompetent state of the Iraqi army after years of Maliki's mismanagement. 这场闪电战建立在ISIS持续数月的凌厉攻势之上。在1月份,ISIS已经占领了费卢杰——伊拉克基地组织之前在伊拉克西部的重要堡垒。伊拉克政府军在之后几个月中数次试图夺回对费卢杰的控制权,但全都无功而返,这也表现出在马利基多年的糟糕治理之后,伊拉克政府军已经筋疲力尽,无力回天。 The conquest of Mosul and much of northern Iraq led a triumphant Baghdadi to declare his territory a "caliphate" on July 4. By this, Baghdadi meant that ISIS was now a state — and not just any state but the only Islamically legitimate state in the world. All Muslims, Baghdadi said, were obligated to support the nascent Islamic state in its struggle to hold and expand its land. 征服摩苏尔以及伊拉克北部大片地区,令志得意满的巴格达迪在7月4日宣布在他领地上建立了一个“哈里发国”。巴格达迪想借此宣示ISIS现在是一个国家——不是一个平常的国家,而是全球唯一在伊斯兰教义上合法的国家。巴格达迪表示,所有的穆斯林都有义务支持这个新生的伊斯兰国守卫并扩张领土。 Establishing a caliphate had long been the goal of the entire jihadist movement. By declaring that he had actually created one, Baghdadi gained a huge leg up on al-Qaeda in the struggle for global jihadist supremacy. 建立一个哈里发国一直以来都是整个伊斯兰圣战运动的目标。通过宣称建立一个这样的国家,巴格达迪在对全球伊斯兰圣战运动领导权的争夺中,获得了相对于基地组织的巨大优势。 Since then, ISIS has "succeeded in attracting far, far more recruits" than al-Qaeda, Will McCants, the director of the Brookings Institution's Project on US Relations With the Islamic World, told me. This has also has allowed it to gain a following among foreign terrorist groups, with major ISIS franchises in Libya, Egypt's Sinai desert, and Nigeria. 从那以后,ISIS比基地组织“成功地招募到了多得多的新鲜血液”,布鲁金斯学会美国与伊斯兰世界关系研究项目主任Will McCants如此对我说。这还使得ISIS能够获得其它境外恐怖组织的效忠,这些追随者主要在利比亚,埃及的西奈沙漠和尼日利亚。 But ISIS had also taken a task with burdens beyond what it can perhaps sustain. By committing to actually governing a swath of territory in Syria and Iraq as a state, ISIS couldn't rely purely on insurgent tactics or hiding among civilians. It needed to engage in pitched conventional battles to defend its land. 但与此同时,ISIS也承担了一项超出其能力的任务。由于承诺将叙利亚和伊拉克的一片土地作为一个国家来治理,ISIS不能继续仅仅依赖武装暴乱或是藏身于平民之中这类策略。它将要面对守卫领土的常规战斗。 "When they declared the caliphate, their legitimacy came to rest on the continuing viability of their state," Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told me last October. In the coming year, this would prove to be a serious problem for the group. “当他们宣布建立哈里发国,他们的合法性就建立在这个国家持续生存的状态之上,”保卫民主基金会的一位资深研究员Daveed Gartenstein-Ross去年十月对我说。在之后的一年中,事实证明这是ISIS所面对的一个严重问题。 August 2014: ISIS makes its first huge mistake — invading Kurdistan 2014年8月:ISIS犯下第一个大错——入侵库尔德斯坦

497401962【2015年,一个身处与ISIS战争前线的库尔德战士】

Ever since its AQI days, ISIS had been prone to ideological and political overstretch. 从伊拉克基地组织年代开始,ISIS就已经热衷于在意识形态和政治上的过度扩张。 "To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law," Graeme Wood explains in an excellent Atlantic feature on ISIS's theology. One condition is that "the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law." Once the caliphate is established, "the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph." “一个人如果想成为哈里发,就必须满足逊尼派教法中所规定的诸多条件,”Graeme Wood在一篇发表在《大西洋月刊》上的关于ISIS宗教意识形态的出色专题文章中写道。其中一个条件就是“哈里发必须拥有一块他能够实施伊斯兰教法的领土。”一旦建立了哈里发国家,“发动战争以扩张哈里发国的领土就成为了哈里发本人的一项重要责任。” Everything we know about ISIS suggests that both its fighters and Baghdadi himself earnestly believe this. This is what led them to attack Iraq's Kurds. 从我们对ISIS的了解来看,不论是ISIS战士还是巴格达迪本人都虔诚地相信这一点。而这也导致了他们攻击伊拉克库尔德人。 Iraq's Kurdish minority controls a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Iraq, and has a powerful military force known as the peshmerga. For the first half of 2014, they had been content to sit out the ISIS conflict. 伊拉克的库尔德少数民族控制着伊拉克东北部一块半自治的区域,并且拥有一支被称为“自由战士”的强大军事力量。在2014年上半年,他们还安于与ISIS井水不犯河水的状态。 But in August 2014, ISIS decided to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, quickly advancing to within several miles of the capital, Erbil. It also launched a genocidal campaign against a minority group known as the Yazidi, who are ethnically Kurdish. 但在2014年8月,ISIS决定入侵伊拉克的库尔德斯坦,并迅速推进到库尔德斯坦首府阿尔比尔之外仅仅数英里的地方。它还发动了一场针对少数教派雅兹迪派的种族清洗行动,而雅兹迪人在种族上属于库尔德人。 This brought the peshmerga into the war, which have since dealt ISIS a series of stinging defeats. It also drew the United States into the war: President Obama's bombing campaign against ISIS initially began as a limited intervention to protect American personnel in Erbil and stem the slaughter of the Yazidis. ISIS的这一行径令库尔德“自由战士”加入战团,并多次痛击ISIS。美国也卷了进来:奥巴马总统对ISIS的轰炸行动最初就是为了保护阿尔比尔的美国人并阻止对雅兹迪人的屠杀而实行的一项有限干预措施。 ISIS's progress into Kurdistan was reversed. Pressed by Kurds, a regrouping Iraqi military, Iranian-backed Shia militias, and US aircraft, ISIS began to fall back. By early 2015, ISIS began taking losses: The heavily Sunni city of Tikrit fell to Iraqi forces in April. ISIS进军库尔德斯坦失败了。在库尔德人,重新集结的伊拉克军队,由伊朗支持的什叶派武装,以及美国空军的共同打压之下,ISIS开始撤退。到2015年初,ISIS开始遭受进一步的损失:逊尼派居民占多数的提克里特的控制权在4月被伊拉克军队夺走。 "The Islamic State ... will lose its battle to hold territory in Iraq," Douglas Ollivant, the former national security adviser for Iraq under both George W. Bush and Obama, wrote in War on the Rocks this February. "The outcome in Iraq is now clear to most serious analysts." “伊斯兰国...将无法守住他们在伊拉克的领地,”曾在布什政府和奥巴马政府担任伊拉克问题国家安全顾问的Douglas Ollivant在今年二月发表在网站War on the Rocks上的一篇文章中写道。“绝大多数严肃的分析家都已经看清了他们在伊拉克的结局。” June 2015: ISIS's capital comes under threat 2015年6月:ISIS的首都受到威胁 Military-Situation-in-N-Syria-25-JUN-2015.0

【6月25日左右叙利亚北部战线的地图。注意库尔德人的阵地离拉卡有多近。】

In Syria, things had long looked better for ISIS than they had in Iraq: the multi-sided civil war meant that there was no unified, reliable force to challenge them. But in mid-2015, Syrian Kurds began threatening ISIS's territory. 一直以来,ISIS在叙利亚所面临的局面看起来都要比在伊拉克好得多:多方内战意味着不会有联合武装力量持续向他们发起挑战。但是在2015年年中,叙利亚的库尔德人也开始威胁ISIS在叙境内的领地。 ISIS, as in Iraq, had attempted to invade and conquer the territory within Syria that is dominated by Kurdish groups — and came damn close. In October 2014, ISIS nearly seized Kobane, a Kurdish stronghold on Syria's northern border with Turkey. 就像在伊拉克一样,ISIS也曾经在叙利亚境内试图侵略并征服由库尔德人统治的领地——并且差一点就得逞了。2014年10月,ISIS几乎攻占了库尔德人在叙利亚北部与土耳其接壤的边境要塞科巴尼。 But the Kurds held out for months. In January, aided by US support and US-led coalition air strikes, they pushed ISIS out of Kurdish territory. Then they kept going, seizing ISIS territory elsewhere in Syria. They advanced to within 30 miles of ISIS's de facto capital at Raqqa. 但是库尔德人坚守了数月。2015年1月,在美国的支持以及美军主导的多国联合轰炸之下,他们将ISIS从库尔德人的领地中赶了出去。之后他们进一步攻占了ISIS在叙利亚境内的一些其它领地,甚至推进到离ISIS的实际首都拉卡不到30英里的位置。 The Soufan Group, a private intelligence firm focusing on terrorism, described the Kurdish-led advance on Raqqa as the "most serious symbolic and meaningful threat [to ISIS] since it declared itself a caliphate almost one year ago." 专门关注恐怖主义的私人情报公司Soufan集团,将库尔德人领导的向拉卡进军的行动称作“自从大约一年前ISIS宣称成为一个哈里发国之后,它所遭受的最具象征意义和实际意义的威胁。” These Kurdish victories showed that ISIS was running up against the limits of its military strategy. Since last June, the group has been fighting too many enemies on too many different fronts. Its ability to maneuver rapidly around its territory has been limited by coalition airstrikes. Slowly but steadily, it has been losing ground. 库尔德人的胜利表明,ISIS所采取的行动超出了其军事能力的上限。自从去年6月开始,他们已经在太多的战线上与太多的敌人作战。它在自己领地内部的快速机动应变能力也受到了多国联合空袭的限制。事实上,它正在缓慢而稳定地失去根据地。 ISIS "lost something like 25 percent of their territory" since its peak last summer, McCants says. 相比去年夏天的顶峰,ISIS已经“失去了他们大约25%的领地”,McCants说道。 Autumn 2015: ISIS turns to international terrorism 2015年秋:ISIS开始发动国际性恐怖袭击

GettyImages-497374290【巴黎Bataclan音乐厅周围的哀悼者】

On November 13, terrorists attacked several locations around Paris, killing more than 130 and wounding more than 380. ISIS claimed responsibility, and the French government has said that it believes the group was responsible. 在今年11月13日,恐怖分子在巴黎的多个地点发动了恐怖袭击,造成130多人死亡,380多人受伤。ISIS宣称对此次恐怖袭击负责,而法国政府在之前也已表示他们相信ISIS应对此次事件负责。 So why, as it slowly loses ground in Iraq and Syria, bit by bit losing the caliphate that has been its primary focus, might ISIS be sending fighters abroad at this critical moment? 那么,当ISIS正慢慢地在伊拉克和叙利亚丧失阵地,一点点失去这个曾是它主要奋斗目标的哈里发国之时,为什么却在这个生死攸关的时刻将它的战士们送到国外去发动恐怖袭击呢? ISIS thrives on a narrative of victory. In order to sell itself as the prophesied return of the caliphate, it needs to show that its victories are inevitable and divinely inspired. If it's losing territory, then it needs to sell its narrative through other means. That means claiming "victory" over foreign enemies by hitting them with terrorist attacks. Indeed, Paris wasn't the only foreign attack ISIS has launched: ISIS suicide bombers have hit Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. It also claimed responsibility for taking down a Russian civilian airliner in Egypt's Sinai desert. ISIS是建立在一个关于胜利的叙事之上的。为了将自己塑造成伊斯兰预言中的哈里发帝国的形象,它需要展示出它的胜利是必然而神启的。如果它正在失去领土,那么它就必须通过其它方式来延续这个胜利的叙事。通过向外国敌人发动恐怖袭击来表示 “战胜了”他们,便是一种方式。显然,巴黎惨案并不是ISIS在国外所发动的唯一恐怖袭击:ISIS在科威特,黎巴嫩和沙特阿拉伯都发动过自杀式炸弹袭击。它还宣称对在埃及西奈沙漠中炸毁俄罗斯民用客机的事件负责。 "Much of ISIS's ideological support and recruiting strength emanates from a narrative that it is victorious," J.M. Berger, the co-author of ISIS: A State of Terror, explains via email. The Paris attack "changes the conversation from 'ISIS is contained' on November 12 to 'ISIS is rampaging uncontrollably' on November 14." “ISIS在意识形态上所获得的支持以及招募新员的能力在很大程度上都建立在一个它是胜利者的叙事之上,”《ISIS:一个恐怖国家》的合著者J.M. Berger在电子邮件中向我解释道。巴黎恐怖袭击“将人们所谈论的话题从11月12日的‘ISIS已经受到遏制’转变为了11月14日的‘ISIS的疯狂行为完全不受控制’。” Moreover, ISIS may believe that terrorist attacks are its best way of striking back against — and maybe, it believes, deterring — foreign attacks. (The French are part of the US-led coalition bombing ISIS in Syria and Iraq). That conclusion would likely be wrong, but ISIS may still believe it. 此外,ISIS可能还相信恐怖袭击是回击——甚至是阻止——外国敌人攻击的最佳方式。(法国参与了美国主导的对叙利亚和伊拉克境内ISIS的联合轰炸)。这个结论很可能是错误的,但ISIS也许仍然执着地相信这一点。 "I think it has made the calculation that it can no longer pursue its expansion strategy in Syria and Iraq without changing the calculations of the enemies currently halting its expansion," McCants says. "These attacks would be a way of inflicting costs on them." “我认为ISIS应该已经算计过,凭借自己身的实力,如果不改变那些正在阻止它扩张的敌人所面对的利害格局,它就无法继续实施在叙利亚和伊拉克的扩张策略,”McCants如此说道。“这些恐怖袭击就是对敌人们造成伤害的一种方式。” But here's one final scary twist: ISIS may not have planned it at all. The attack could have been independently undertaken by European IS