含有〈历史〉标签的文章(134)

统一与武德

【2016-07-27】

狄宇宙在《古代中国与其强邻》中提出的观点很有意思,列出的事实很明显,但之前好像没见过讨论,

1)秦赵燕三国在战国后期对北方非华夏的游牧或畜牧民族发动了大型征伐,将控制线向北推进了数百公里,
2)秦赵燕的长城远非农耕与草原的生态边界,而是大幅远离这条边界,深入草原,特别是赵长城,
3)所以长城并非防御性策略的结果,而是扩张政策的结果,
4)秦统一后延续了这一扩张政策,但随后局面发生了逆转,
5)秦汉之际和汉前期是一个华夏大幅退缩的阶段,
6)武帝发动的大型战争是对此退缩的反弹,其对非华夏区的征伐规模此后任何华夏政权再也没达到(more...)

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【2016-07-27】 狄宇宙在《古代中国与其强邻》中提出的观点很有意思,列出的事实很明显,但之前好像没见过讨论, 1)秦赵燕三国在战国后期对北方非华夏的游牧或畜牧民族发动了大型征伐,将控制线向北推进了数百公里, 2)秦赵燕的长城远非农耕与草原的生态边界,而是大幅远离这条边界,深入草原,特别是赵长城, 3)所以长城并非防御性策略的结果,而是扩张政策的结果, 4)秦统一后延续了这一扩张政策,但随后局面发生了逆转, 5)秦汉之际和汉前期是一个华夏大幅退缩的阶段, 6)武帝发动的大型战争是对此退缩的反弹,其对非华夏区的征伐规模此后任何华夏政权再也没达到过。 说几点我的看法: 1)统一集权帝国抵御游牧入侵的能力不如割据状态,原因之一是因为他不敢把重兵放在远离权力中心的边境上,蒙恬是第一个例子, 2)统一集权帝国对进攻性政策的意愿也弱于割据的边缘国,因为和亲纳贡政策对它来说相对成本更低,而边地的相对价值也更低, 3)汉武的成就看来是个特例,这一特例之所以出现,有两个较明显的原因:A)帝国历史不长,人口压力尚轻,因而可动员资源较多,B)伴随大型帝国的和平化时间较短,战士禀赋尚未大幅削弱, 4)唐帝国勉强维持了那么久而没被冲垮,是因为它的集权程度不太高,后期近乎于割据状态, 5)明帝国看起来是个反例,可能的解释是:A)小冰期游牧势力大幅退缩,B)迁都北京+大运河部分解决了(1)所提到的难题 @黄章晋ster: 处于割据对立时,很容易形成普鲁士林立的情形,一旦统一为一个中央集权帝国,大约百年后就进入无人知兵、柔弱不武的军力下滑通道。 @whigzhou: 对 @黄章晋ster:一个超大帝国保持稳定,只能依靠一个庞大的具有相同信仰的文官和精英建立统一认同才能做到,而这个组织系统和它的价值观必然是排斥职业军人的。这样的帝国几亿人和几千万并无区别。但在一个军事贵族集团统治的农业社会,有五百万人就足够对付铁木真了。 @whigzhou: 贵帝国的历史就是一个不断打压尚武文化的历史,到最后军户甚至都变成贱籍了  
[译文]历史学家如何确定年代?

We know less about the ancient world than we think we do
我们对古代世界的认识,比我们以为的要少

作者:James Hannam @ 2015-1-9
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:Tankman
来源:Quodlibeta,http://bedejournal.blogspot.jp/2015/01/we-know-less-about-ancient-world-than.html

On 15 June 763BC, a near total eclipse of the sun was visible over a swathe of the Near East. As luck would have it, the event was noted in the official list of Assyrian high officials. This record provides the earliest absolute and uncontroversial date in ancient history. Using lists of kings and the chronicles of ev(more...)

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We know less about the ancient world than we think we do 我们对古代世界的认识,比我们以为的要少 作者:James Hannam @ 2015-1-9 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:Tankman 来源:Quodlibeta,http://bedejournal.blogspot.jp/2015/01/we-know-less-about-ancient-world-than.html On 15 June 763BC, a near total eclipse of the sun was visible over a swathe of the Near East. As luck would have it, the event was noted in the official list of Assyrian high officials. This record provides the earliest absolute and uncontroversial date in ancient history. Using lists of kings and the chronicles of events, historians have counted the years back from this date to construct the chronology of ancient history. 公元前763年的6月15日,在近东的大片地区都能看到一次近似日全食。幸运的是,这一事件被记录在了亚述国高官的官方系年表【译注:即名年官表,亚述以一年一任的“名年官”之姓名纪年,记录当年发生的重大事件】中。这一文献为我们提供了古代历史上最早的无争议的绝对日期。历史学家们利用历代国王名表和大事记,从这一日期开始倒排年代,已经构造出古代史的编年次序。 Radiocarbon analysis (which measures the decay of carbon 14, an unstable isotope) and the predicable styles of pottery found in digs both provide corroborating evidence. Dating the layers of archaeological remains from the artefacts found within them is called stratigraphy and can yield quite precise results. The vast amount of pot shards that has been unearthed allows archaeologists to use statistical methods to screen out random noise and anomalous samples that have found their way into the wrong strata. 放射性碳分析(该方法测量的是碳-14这种不稳定同位素的衰变)和出土陶器可确认的风格,均提供了佐证。从出土的人工制品来测定这些制品所在的考古遗迹各地层的年代,这叫做考古地层学,由此得出的结论相当准确。大量发掘出的陶器碎片,使得考古学家能够利用统计方法排除那些混入错误地层的随机噪声和异常样本。 Of course, pottery and radiocarbon methods need to be calibrated to produce absolute dates. This has been done using samples of wood whose age can be determined by matching patterns of tree rings, a technique called dendrochronology. We can count back sequences of tree rings from the present day, all the way to 2000BC. By carbon dating the oldest samples of wood, we can tie the tree ring record to the results from carbon 14 decay. 当然,陶器和放射性碳方法也需要经过校正,才能得出确切日期。我们现在通过木头样本来做校正,这些木头的年龄可以通过与树木样本的年轮模式进行对照来确定,这种技术叫做树轮年代学。我们现在可以从今天倒推树木年轮的序列,一直推到公元前2000年。通过对最早的木头样本进行碳年代测定,我们就可以将树木的年轮档案和碳-14的衰变结果结合起来。 By 1990, all these clues had yielded a multi-dimensional jigsaw which fitted together to almost everyone’s satisfaction. There were a few heretics like Peter James, who suggested in his book Centuries of Darkness that the conventional chronology included two hundred additional years around 1000BC. Thus remains that were conventionally dated to 1050BC actually occurred in 850BC. Although James’s book is an excellent read, it fails to convince. 到1990年为止,上述所有线索加起来构成了一个多维度的拼图,相互吻合,几乎能让所有人满意。当然也有一些异端,如Peter James曾在其著作《黑暗数世纪》中提出,传统的编年学在公元前1000年前后额外多出了200年。因此传统上定为公元前1050年的遗迹实际上产生于公元前850年。尽管James的书是一本优秀读物,但并不能让人信服。 Nonetheless, it has now turned out that the conventional chronology was not as secure as everybody else thought. While James was convinced ancient history was two centuries too long, new evidence has begun to pile up in the opposite direction: it now looks like the conventional chronology is up to 150 years too short. To put it another way, a cataclysm that everyone thought occurred in 1500BC actually happened before 1620BC. The event in question was the massive eruption of the island of Thera in the Aegean Sea. 尽管如此,现已发现,传统的编年学确实不如大家曾认为的那样可靠。James坚信古代史多出了200年,但新积累的证据却逐渐偏向另一个方向。如今看来,传统的编年学似乎短了多达150年。换句话说,过去人人都以为发生于公元前1500年的一次灾变实际发生于公元前1620年以前。这里所说的事件就是爱琴海锡拉岛的一次大规模火山爆发。 Conventional chronology dated the end of Minoan age in Crete to 1450BC. Archaeologists assumed that the Thera eruption (on the modern island of Santorini) and its resulting tsunami had destroyed the Minoan fleet leaving them vulnerable to raiders from the mainland. Certainly, the havoc wrought by the volcano can clearly be seen across the Eastern Mediterranean. When Thera exploded, it blasted 60 cubic kilometres of rock into the atmosphere which settled over Asia Minor. 传统编年学将克里特岛米诺斯文明的终结时间定在公元前1450年。考古学家猜测,锡拉岛的火山爆发(发生于今天的圣托里尼岛上)及其导致的海啸摧毁了米诺斯的舰队,使之难以抵挡来自大陆的入侵者。当然,由这次火山爆发导致的破坏在整个东地中海地区都清晰可见。锡拉爆发时,曾将60立方千米的岩石冲入空中,落在小亚细亚。 The resulting layer of ash and pumice is used to date the sites where it is observed. And the eruption had other effects. Sulphur dioxide released by the volcano spread across the northern hemisphere and fell to earth as acid rain, or more significantly as acid snow. At the poles, not all of that snow has yet melted and, from the 1990s, it provides a new strand of evidence to date the eruption. 由此产生的火山灰和浮石组成的地层,被用来确定地层中遗址的年代。这次火山爆发还有其他影响。火山中释放出来的二氧化硫席卷北半球,以酸雨或更厉害时以酸雪的形式降落地面。在极地地区,这些雪至今都还没有完全融化。从1990年代开始,这些降雪就为测定该次火山爆发的年代提供了一条新的证据链。 Ice cores, drilled from the icecap of central Greenland, record the depth of each annual snowfall. The ice holds within it information on the constitution of the atmosphere going back tens of thousands of years. Like tree rings, each layer can be counted so as to give an absolute rather than relative date. 从格陵兰岛中部的冰盖中钻孔取出的冰芯,记录着每年降雪的深度。这些冰中包含有过去数万年间大气成分的信息。跟年轮一样,每一层冰都可以数出来,因此能给出绝对年代,而非相对年代。 Big volcanic eruptions show up as spikes in the sulphur-content of the annual fall of snow: Krakatau in 1886; Tombura in 1815; Vesuvius in AD79. Despite the presence of literate civilisations in Egypt, the Levant and Babylon, no written record of the Thera eruption exists, but the ice cores should overcome that deficiency and provide an absolute date for the cataclysm. 大型火山爆发就表现为年度降雪中硫含量的突然增加。如1886年喀拉喀托火山爆发,1815年坦博拉火山爆发,以及公元79年维苏威火山爆发。尽管当时埃及、黎凡特和巴比伦都已产生能够书写文字的文明,但锡拉岛火山爆发并没有成文记录留存下来。不过,冰芯应该能够克服这一不足,为我们提供此次灾难的确切年代。 Actually, the fact that the Thera event went unrecorded is less surprising than it seems. Mankind has been remarkably unobservant of enormous volcanic eruptions. An event in 1257AD, less than 800 years ago, is indelibly imprinted into both the Greenland and Antarctic ice cores. It was greater in size even than Tombora and thus the largest eruption in the last ten thousand years. But remarkably, no one knows where it happened. Only in 2012 has Mt Rinjani in Indonesia emerged as a likely candidate. Another big eruption, as recent as 1809, remains unidentified. 实际上,锡拉事件没有留下成文记录并没有初看上去那么异常。人类对于大型火山爆发历来特别粗心。在不到800年前,公元1257年发生了一次火山爆发,确凿无疑地体现于格陵兰岛和南极的冰芯中。它在规模上甚至比坦博拉爆发还大,因此是过去一万年间最大的火山爆发。但是,引人注目地是,没人知道它发生于何地。直到2012年,印度尼西亚的林加尼火山才得以成为备选答案。另外一次大型火山爆发,晚至1809年,至今身份不明。 By 2000, the Greenland ice cores had revealed that Thera could not have happened when everyone thought it had. The most likely anomaly in the ice dated from 1640BC, but this turned out to be from a volcano in Alaska. At the same time, carbon dating an olive tree buried in the Aegean eruption yielded a date of around 1620BC. Sulphur traces in the ice have been found that correspond to this date, although they are not as strong as might be expected. 到2000年时,格陵兰岛的冰芯已经揭示,锡拉火山爆发不可能发生于此前人们所设想的年代。冰层中最有可能的一次异常发生于公元前1640年,但这源于阿拉斯加的一座火山。同时,通过对在此次爱琴海火山爆发中被掩埋的一颗橄榄树进行碳年代测定,得出的年代大概是公元前1620年。冰层中也发现了与这一年代吻合的硫磺痕迹,只是不如预期的那么强烈。 Now, the dendrochronologists have piled in. The Thera eruption would have caused unusually cold weather which stunted plant growth across the globe. Evidence from bristlecone pines in the western United States, oak trees in Ireland and Swedish pines all point to a cold snap in 1627BC. This is consistent with what we’d expect from a big volcano blowing its top in the Mediterranean. Evidence from the Antarctic ice cores should be in shortly, but for a northern hemisphere volcano, this is unlikely to be conclusive. 现在,树轮年代学家挤进来了。锡拉火山爆发应该会导致不同寻常的寒冷天气,从而会妨碍全球范围内树木的生长。美国西部的狐尾松、爱尔兰的橡树和瑞典的松树所提供的证据,都表明公元前1672年出现了一次突然的寒冷期。这与我们对地中海地区一次大型火山爆发的预期后果相吻合。来自南极地区冰芯的证据应该很快就会出现,但这对一场发生于北半球的火山爆发而言,恐怕并不具有结论性。 The lack of a definitive date for the Thera disaster is frustrating, but we can now be reasonably sure it occurred 120 years earlier than thought. The implications of this for ancient history are immense. The chronology of the New Kingdom of Egypt was thought to be rock solid. Finding that they need to find room for a dozen more decades has been too disconcerting for Egyptologists to tackle so far. There is a good chance that the extra years belong in a period after the well-documented New Kingdom called the Third Intermediate Period. 找不到锡拉岛灾难发生的确切年代,这令人沮丧。不过,我们现在可以合理地确信,它的发生,比原先所设想的要早120年。这对于古代史意义重大。埃及新王国时期的编年次序曾被认为如磐石一般确切。自从埃及学家发现他们需要找出空隙来摆放这多出来的100多年,就一直仓皇不安、无从下手。很有可能,多出来的这些岁月属于文献详实的新王国以后的一段时期,即“第三中间期”。 For historians of Babylonia, the crisis has been less existential. Absolute dates for the second half of the second millennium are based on ancient observations of the planet Venus. We know from modern calculations that a particular configuration of Venus recorded during the eighth year of the reign of a certain King Ammisaduqa must have occurred in 1702BC, 1646BC, 1582BC or 1550BC. 对于研究巴比伦王国的历史学家而言,危机尚没有那么严重。(公元前)第二个千年下半叶的确切年代,是根据古代对金星的观测记录推出来的。基于现代的推算,我们知道,文献记载中某个叫做Ammisaduqa的国王治下第8年出现的某种特定的金星形态,必定发生于以下年代之一:公元前1702年,前1646年,前1582年或前1550年。 Other events in Babylonian history, such as the reign of King Hammurabi (famous for his law code) and the sack of Babylon by the Hittites are arranged around whichever absolute date is most convenient. That some of these possible Venusian dates differ by 120 years, about the same length of time that the Thera eruption has been moved back, is highly suggestive to say the least. 巴比伦历史上的其他事件,如汉谟拉比国王(以其法典而闻名)的统治和赫梯人对巴比伦的洗劫,均参照上述确切年份中最合用的那个来排列。上述几个备选的金星日期中存在相隔120年的情况,大体上与锡拉火山爆发时间被推后的时长间隔相等,这至少可说是非常意味深长。 So, where does all this leave biblical chronology? That remains very unclear. But the redating of Thera shows that we know a lot less about when things happened in the ancient world than we thought we did. 于是,所有这些对圣经编年学而言意味着什么?这一点尚不清楚。但对锡拉火山爆发的重新追溯表明,对于古代世界中的事情何时发生,我们的认识比自认为的,要少得多。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]最受误解的自由意志主义者

The Most Misunderstood Libertarian
最为人所误解的自由意志主义者

作者:Alberto Mingardi @ 2015-9-28
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:Library of Law & Liberty,http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/the-most-misunderstood-libertarian/

To the surprise of many, scholarship on Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) has flourished in the last few years. A towering figure in Victorian Britain, Spencer was all but forgotten after his death. His works, which taken together form a “Synthetic Philosophy,” seemed alien to 20th century academics in an age of meticulous specialization. Also his commitment to individual liberty and (seriously) limited government has not been too common in the discipline that he helped establish, sociology. Talcott Parsons famously called him a victim of the very God he adored: evolution.

关于赫伯特·斯宾塞(1820-1903)的学术研究过去几年活跃了起来,这让许多人感到惊讶。斯宾塞是英国维多利亚时代的一位杰出人物,死后却几乎被人遗忘。他的各种著作构成一个“综合哲学”整体,与20世纪专业细分的学术界格格不入。并且,他对个体自由和(极度的)有限政府的信奉,在他所帮助建立的社会学学科中历来并不十分流行。塔儿科特·帕森斯曾出了名地把他称为他所推崇的那个上帝——进化——的牺牲品。

Toward the end of the 20th century, however, interest in Spencer began to revive. In 1974, J.D.Y. Peel published Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist and Robert Nisbet dealt at length with Spencer in his 1980 History of the Idea of Progress. In Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick adapted his “tale of the slave” on taxation and democracy from Spencer’s 1884 The Man vers(more...)

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The Most Misunderstood Libertarian 最为人所误解的自由意志主义者 作者:Alberto Mingardi @ 2015-9-28 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:Library of Law & Liberty,http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/the-most-misunderstood-libertarian/ To the surprise of many, scholarship on Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) has flourished in the last few years. A towering figure in Victorian Britain, Spencer was all but forgotten after his death. His works, which taken together form a “Synthetic Philosophy,” seemed alien to 20th century academics in an age of meticulous specialization. Also his commitment to individual liberty and (seriously) limited government has not been too common in the discipline that he helped establish, sociology. Talcott Parsons famously called him a victim of the very God he adored: evolution. 关于赫伯特·斯宾塞(1820-1903)的学术研究过去几年活跃了起来,这让许多人感到惊讶。斯宾塞是英国维多利亚时代的一位杰出人物,死后却几乎被人遗忘。他的各种著作构成一个“综合哲学”整体,与20世纪专业细分的学术界格格不入。并且,他对个体自由和(极度的)有限政府的信奉,在他所帮助建立的社会学学科中历来并不十分流行。塔儿科特·帕森斯曾出了名地把他称为他所推崇的那个上帝——进化——的牺牲品。 Toward the end of the 20th century, however, interest in Spencer began to revive. In 1974, J.D.Y. Peel published Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist and Robert Nisbet dealt at length with Spencer in his 1980 History of the Idea of Progress. In Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick adapted his “tale of the slave” on taxation and democracy from Spencer’s 1884 The Man versus the State. In 1982, the journal History of Political Thought published contributions on Spencer from John Gray, William Miller, Jeffrey Paul, and Hillel Steiner that remain a landmark. 不过,到20世纪快要结束时,人们又重新燃起对斯宾塞的兴趣。1974年,J. D. Y. Peel出版了《赫伯特·斯宾塞:一位社会学家的进化》;1980年,Robert Nisbet在其《进步观念史》中对斯宾塞进行了长篇讨论。在《无政府、国家与乌托邦》(1974)中,罗伯特·诺齐克讨论税收和民主问题时所用的“奴隶的故事”源自于斯宾塞1884年的著作《人与国家》。1982年,《政治思想史》杂志刊登了John Gray、William Miller、Jeffrey Paul和Hillel Steiner等人论斯宾塞的多篇文章,至今仍有里程碑意义。 New monographs and studies were later published, and today a number of scholars in different disciplines (history of political thought, sociology, anthropology) can be counted among the Spencer connoisseurs. But few of them have come from the classical liberal camp. (The most notable exception is George H. Smith.) 其后关于斯宾塞的新专著和新研究时有出现。时至今日,分处不同领域(政治思想史、社会学、人类学)的许多学者可以被视为斯宾塞行家。但其中几乎无人来自古典自由主义阵营。(George H. Smith是最著名的例外。) Spencer may be routinely included among the forerunners of modern libertarianism but it is rather uncommon to find a contemporary individualist thinker deliberately appealing to his insights. Take F.A. Hayek: Long ago, John Gray pointed out that Hayek and Spencer share the “same aspiration of embedding the defense of liberty in a broad evolutionary framework,” but Hayek himself appeared to have been largely unaware of this affinity. More recently, Gray wrote that Hayek told him he never read Spencer. 斯宾塞或许会被习惯性地列为现代自由意志主义的先驱之一,但要在当代个人主义思想家中找到一个刻意诉诸斯宾塞见解的人,这可并非易事。以F. A. 哈耶克为例:John Gray早已指出哈耶克和斯宾塞都具有“同一种抱负,那就是把对自由的辩护牢固树立于一种广义的进化论框架中”,但哈耶克本人似乎基本上没有意识到这种共鸣。最近,Gray写道,哈耶克曾告诉他说自己从没读过斯宾塞。 The paradox of one of the fiercest libertarians ever to be ignored by libertarians emerges vividly from Herbert Spencer: Legacies, edited by Mark Francis and Michael Taylor. Interestingly, the two editors have published extensively on Spencer in the past, but their interpretations of him do not overlap. 史上最为狂热的自由意志主义者之一却被自由意志主义者们所忽略,这一乖谬在由Mark Francis和Michael Taylor主编的《赫伯特·斯宾塞:遗产》一书中表现得极为生动。有趣的是,两位主编过去都已就斯宾塞发表过大量文章,不过他们各自对斯宾塞的解读并不相同。 Francis, as he attempts to rescue Spencer’s philosophy from oblivion, in his Introduction calls The Man Versus the State and also Social Statics (1851) “popular works” that, “while they were liberal and progressive, . . . were not scientific or philosophical.” Taylor, in contrast, deals at length with Social Statics—as Stephen Tomlinson does in his chapter in this volume. Francis尝试将斯宾塞的哲学从被人遗忘的状态中拯救出来,并在他为该书所写的“导论”中将《人与国家》和《社会静力学》(1851)称为“流行作品”,“尽管是自由主义、进步主义的……并不具备科学性或哲学性”。与之相反,Taylor则对《社会静力学》进行了长篇讨论——同书中由Stephen Tomlinson所写的一个章节也是如此。 Spencer’s legacy is plural, as the title of this collection suggests, and may have come to us mediated by subsequent developments in different fields. The plural nature of the “legacies” is stressed throughout, and has multiple dimensions: disciplinary, political, and even geographical given the “migration” of Spencerian theories all over the world. 正如这一文集的复数形式的标题所暗示的那样,斯宾塞的遗产是多重的。而且这些遗产可能是通过多个不同领域的后续发展传递给我们的。对“legacies”复数性质的强调贯穿本书首尾,并具有多个不同维度:学科维度、政治维度、甚至还有地理维度(因为斯宾塞的理论曾在全世界“迁移”)。 Sometimes, however, by looking far away you disregard what you have nearby. Bernard Lightman, for example, focuses his essay “Spencer’s British Disciples” on Beatrice Potter Webb and Grant Allen, quickly dismissing Auberon Herbert as a not very influential British disciple of Spencer. 不过,有些时候,由于过于关注远方,你会忽视眼前事物。比如,Bernard Lightman在他的文章“斯宾塞的英国门徒”中,主要聚焦于Beatrice Potter Webb和Grant Allen,却急匆匆地略过了Auberon Herbert,视其为斯宾塞的一位影响不大的英国门徒。 There might be a problem here: the influence the disciples themselves had may have to be disentangled from the thinking of the disciples qua disciples. Lightman presents in fascinating and plentiful detail the most interesting paths of Webb and Allen, who both turned socialist to the disappointment of the master. 这里可能有个问题:这些门徒自身所具有的影响力,可能必须和身为门徒的他们的思想区分开来。Lightman以引人入胜和细节丰富的方式为我们介绍了Webb和Allen所走过的最为有趣的道路。他们俩都转变成了社会主义者,令其师父大失所望。 It would be hard to overemphasize the emotional nature of the relationship between Webb and Herbert Spencer. He was a family friend and a confidant of Laurencina Potter, Beatrice Potter Webb’s mother. A solitary man, Spencer bestowed unlimited affection on his dear friends’ kids. Webb和赫伯特·斯宾塞之间的情感再怎么强调都不为过。斯宾塞是Webb一家的世交,是Beatrice Potter Webb的母亲Laurencina Potter的知己。未曾娶妻的斯宾塞将无限的情感倾注于他这位密友的孩子身上。【编注:Beatrice Potter Webb是著名经济学家,伦敦经济学院和费边社的核心成员,这两个机构也是20世纪初英国社会主义运动的主要推动者。】 Young Beatrice grew up thinking that he was her best ally and the only adult truly interested in her intellectual development. Spencer, as Webb later wrote, pressed her “to become a scientific worker” and to a certain extent he became a model, for the “continuous concentrated effort in carrying out, with an heroic disregard of material prosperity and physical comfort, a task which he believed would further human progress.” 小Beatrice在成长过程中一直把斯宾塞当成最好的伙伴,认为他是唯一真正对她的智识进步感兴趣的成年人。如Webb后来所写的那样,是斯宾塞敦促她“成为一个科学工作者”,而他在某种程度上已然是一个典范,因为,“为了实施一项他认为能够推动人类进步的事业,他能持续集中地努力,为此奋而不顾物质财富和生理舒适。” In her 1926 memoir My Apprenticeship, Webb described at length the old friend, in a portrait very familiar to modern readers. She saw in him “the mental deformity which results from the extraordinary development of the intellectual faculties joined with the very imperfect development of the sympathetic and emotional qualities.” 在其1926年的回忆录《我的学徒生涯》中,Webb花大量笔墨描绘了这位老朋友,其形象现代读者非常熟悉。她在他身上看到“一种精神上的畸形,它是智识能力非凡发达与同情和情感极度不完善两相结合的产物。” Webb’s Spencer is a human being obsessed with rationality and purpose who paid the price on the affective side. Though Webb is not stingy of kind words or affectionate recollections, it is hard not to speculate that her portrait of Spencer evokes magnificently all she disliked in unregulated capitalism: a purported organizational efficiency with little humanity to spare for those who are needy. Webb眼中的斯宾塞是个痴迷于理性和目的,并为此在情感方面付出相应代价的人。尽管Webb并不吝啬写出赞誉之词或深情回忆,我们仍很难不这样推测:她对斯宾塞的描绘极好地再现了她对毫无限制的资本主义——一种对匮乏者冷酷无情的所谓的组织化效率——的所有憎恶。 It is indeed true that Spencer was the one who, as Lightman writes, “originally taught” Beatrice Webb “to value the scientific method and to think about social issues from a scientific perspective.” One wonders, however, exactly how much of Spencer’s insights she kept in her later thinking. 毫无疑问,如Lightman所写的那样,正是斯宾塞“最初教导”Beatrice Webb去“重视科学方法,并从一种科学的视角来考虑社会问题”。不过,人们不禁会怀疑,在她后来的看法中到底保留有多少斯宾塞的观点。 As for Auberon Herbert, certainly a less grand figure, he was an advocate of a libertarianism “that verged on anarchism,” in Taylor’s words. Reading Spencer was for him a truly life-changing experience. It made him lose “faith in the great machine” of politics and convinced him to become an apostle of freedom. Herbert’s libertarian anarchism is one of the “legacies” Michael Taylor examines in his essay. 至于Auberon Herbert,相较而言当然没那么出名。用Taylor的话说,他鼓吹的是一种“接近于无政府主义”的自由意志主义。阅读斯宾塞对他来说确实是真正改变人生的一种体验,让他丧失了对于政治“这台大机器的信念”,并说服他成为了一位传播自由的使徒。Herbert的自由意志论无政府主义是Michael Taylor在其文章中检视的多重“遗产”中的一种。 He approaches Spencer as a historian of political thought. The Taylor chapter, on the one hand, presents Social Statics as a text that inspired multiple legacies, including the work of Henry George (who resented the fact that Spencer wanted the 1892 revised edition of this 1851 work to leave out the original chapter on land) and Piotr Kropotkin. Taylor以一种政治思想史家的方式讨论斯宾塞。他所写作的那一章,一方面将《社会静力学》呈现为一份激发了多重遗产的文本,其中包括Henry George(斯宾塞要求《社会静力学》1892年修订版删除1851年原版中论土地一章,George对这一做法感到非常不满)和Piotr Kropotkin的著作。【编注:Henry George是乔治主义改革运动的创始人,该运动最初主张以单一土地税代替其他所有税种,以便削弱地租收益而提高其他创造性活动的激励,但后来一些追随者将其改造成了土地国有化再分配主张。】 Taylor stresses how Spencer goes for voluntary and spontaneous arrangements, not necessarily for institutional settings based on the price system. But this won’t sound particularly controversial or new to libertarians, who, despite the caricature often made of them, understand that not everything in life is tradable at a money price. Their point is more subtle (and Spencerian): that is, top-down government intrusions may retard or altogether stop the spontaneous evolution (or adaptation to new circumstances) of human societies. Taylor强调了斯宾塞支持自愿和自发的安排,而不一定支持基于价格体系的制度设置的做法。但这对于自由意志主义者来说,并不会特别富于争议或新颖,因为尽管他们经常在这一点上遭到夸张嘲弄,但他们知道并非生命中的每样事物都可以用某种货币价格进行交换。他们的观点更精致(也更斯宾塞式):即,从上至下的政府干预可能会妨碍或完全阻止人类社会的自发进化(或对新环境的适应)。 On the other hand, Taylor puts in context Spencer’s later, famous polemics against an intrusive state. The articles included in The Man Versus the State were by and large a reaction to the “drift to the left” of William Gladstone’s 1880 government. Taylor emphasizes that “although Liberals were always suspicious of an overextended sphere of state action, the prevalent attitude was one of wariness of government overreach rather than an outright opposition to a positive role for the state.” 在另一方面,Taylor又结合语境分析了斯宾塞晚年反对干预性国家的著名论战文章。收在《人与国家》一书中的文章大体上都是针对1880年威廉·格莱斯顿政府“左倾转向”而发的反对。Taylor强调说:“尽管自由派历来对都国家行动范围的过度扩张心怀疑虑,但当时的流行观点只是对政府的过度扩张保持警惕,并不直接反对国家扮演积极角色。” In other words, Spencer belonged to a minority of truly committed minimal government types that was never hegemonic in the intellectual realm, let alone in the pragmatic world of politicians. Fair enough, though the younger Spencer certainly saw himself as surrounded by writers with ideas rather close to his, particularly after the abolition of the Corn Laws. 换句话说,斯宾塞属于真正信奉最小政府的少数派,这种人在知识界从未成为主流,更不用说在政客们所处的实务世界。这说得很对,不过,青年斯宾塞当然认为自己周围有许多作家持有近似于己的观点,特别是在《谷物法》废除以后。 But the opposite is also true. Many critics have used against Spencer the same argument they later employed against Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom: namely, that pointing to the slippery slope of state interventionism was ridiculous given that government was pursuing just limited (particularly in Spencer’s times) and benevolent interventions. In the 1870s, government spending was less than 10 percent of the British GDP—but increased rapidly in the new century. 然而,反对斯宾塞的也大有人在。许多批评者在反对斯宾塞时已经用到了他们后来用于反对哈耶克《通往奴役之路》的同一论证:即,认为国家干预主义会急剧膨胀恶化是可笑的,因为政府所追求的只是有限的(在斯宾塞的时代尤其如此)、善意的干预。在1870年代,政府支出还不到英国GDP的10%——尽管在接下来的新世纪里增长迅速。 One of the many take-aways of this book is that Spencer was a far more complex thinker than those who only know him as a diabolical “social Darwinist” may believe. Its essays might, for example, open the eyes of those who still have in mind the Herbert Spencer largely manufactured in the 1940s by Richard Hofstadter in a book that made history as a beautifully written and yet quite misleading tirade. 本书的诸多简便结论之一是,作为一位思想家,斯宾塞非常复杂,远超那些只知他是个凶恶的“社会达尔文主义者”的人心中所想。比如,有些人心目中的斯宾塞仍是由理查德·霍夫斯塔特写于1940年代的一本书(该书将历史编成一份整齐漂亮但却颇为误人子弟的长篇檄文)所塑造【译注:指《美国思想中的社会达尔文主义》一书】,而本书所收论文可以让这些人大开眼界。 Taylor explains that Spencer never thought that “social existence involved an unrelenting struggle for survival in which the richest were the most successful and the poor should go to the wall.” He quotes Thomas Leonard’s important study on the Hofstadterian myth. Taylor引用Thomas Leonard对“霍夫斯塔特迷思”的重要研究解释说,斯宾塞从未认为“社会存在中包含一种永不休止的生存斗争,在这场斗争中,最富裕的人就是最成功的,而最贫穷的人就应该碰壁失败。” Jonathan H. Turner explains Spencer’s view of evolution as a process of continuous differentiation, which entailed at the same time more interdependence among the parts of the “social organism” and the need for a flexible regulation that allows for ever further differentiation and specialization. The pace of civilization, so to say, is limited by the extent of the division of labor. Jonathan H. Turner将斯宾塞的进化观解释为一种持续分化的进程,而这就意味着“社会有机体”各个部分之间更大程度的相互依赖,而同时也要求实施弹性管理,以允许更进一步的分化和特化。可以说文明的步伐是受限于劳动分工水平。 Francis, who like his co-editor cites the Leonard monograph, also makes clear Spencer’s commitment to pacifism: “Spencerians believed that imperial conquest might have been a natural phenomenon when employed by ancient states, but was an archaic activity in modern times” and a most immoral one. The thread running through all of Spencer’s works is the idea that society progresses toward the minimization of violence, which had been needed at earlier stages of civilization. Francis跟共同主编Taylor一样引用了Leonard的论文,也明确指出了斯宾塞对和平主义的信奉:“斯宾塞主义者相信,当帝国征服发生于古代国家手中时,它们也许是种自然现象,但在现时代,它就是一种过时的活动”,同时也是最不道德的活动之一。贯穿斯宾塞所有著作的一条主线就是这样一种观念:暴力在文明的最初阶段是需要的,但社会进步的方向就是暴力的最小化。 This book may convey a sense of Spencer’s true understanding of complexity. In the last pages of Social Statics, which revolves around the idea of betterment and progress, he explains that “the institutions of any given age exhibit the compromise made by these contending moral forces at the signing of their last truce.” His magnificent The Study of Sociology (1873) would be a relevant work for those interested in the proper role of the social sciences and their limits, if only they read it. 本书可能向我们传达了一些斯宾塞对于复杂性的真正理解。在《社会静力学》的最后部分,斯宾塞讨论的是改良与进步。他解释说,“任何给定时代的制度都呈现出妥协,这些妥协是彼此竞争的道德力量在签订最终停战协定时所达成的。”对于那些对社会科学的恰当角色及其局限所在感兴趣的人来说,斯宾塞的皇皇巨著《群学肆言》(1873)很值得关注,当然前提是你能读一读。 Turner’s essay, possibly the most thorough in this collection, claims Spencer’s centrality in the development of sociology. Turner is sure that Spencer was “a theorist, not in the often sloppy and vague social theory sense, but in the hard-science view of theory as a series of abstract laws that explain the operation of some portion of the universe.” Unfortunately, he writes, though “many of his ideas have endured,  . . . most people do not know that they come from Spencer, so ingrained is the avoidance of anything Spencerian.” Turner的文章可能是这本文集中最为深入的,它认为斯宾塞在社会学的发展过程中占据中心位置。Turner认定斯宾塞是“一位理论家,这里所说的理论不是社会理论意义上的那种很马虎或含糊的理论,而是表现为一系列抽象规则、能够解释宇宙某一部分之运转的那种硬科学意义上的理论。”不幸的是,他写道,尽管“他的许多观点延续不朽……绝大多数人并不知道它们来自斯宾塞。对任何斯宾塞主义的东西都避而不谈的做法是如此顽固。” Turner signals, for example, that Spencer had a very perceptive and thorough vision of power and the dynamics of the mobilization of coercive resources, which also anticipates the analysis of political elites by Vilfredo Pareto (not by chance, an avid reader of Spencer’s). 比如,Turner表明,斯宾塞对于权力和强制性资源的动员过程持有一种认知透彻、细察入微的理解,这也早于维弗雷多·帕累托对于政治精英的分析(帕累托是斯宾塞的热心读者,这并非偶然)。 Spencer’s dichotomy of militant and industrial societies is not the naive teleology many assumed. “Militant societies are always centralized because they must deal with conflict and war, whereas” industrial societies “are not centralized and allow individuals and corporate units considerable freedom of activity.” Nations may go in one direction or another, depending on many factors. 斯宾塞对于军事社会和工业社会的二分并不是许多人所理解的那种幼稚的目的论。“军事社会总是中央集权的,因为它们必须应付冲突和战争”,而工业社会“并不中央集权,并允许个体和团体拥有可观的行动自由。”国家可能走向完全不同的方向,这取决于许多不同因素。 Spencer learnt it the hard way. His alleged “drift to conservatism,” or the fact that the tone of his articles and political pamphlets got drier, is due to his understanding of developments in England, which he considered revealed a resurgence of the militant spirit. 斯宾塞是历经艰难困苦才得出这一观点的。他那被指为“保守主义转向”的转变,以及他的文章和政论日益冷峻这一事实,源自他对于英国内部变化的理解。他认为这种变化表明了军事精神的复活。 If I had any quibble about this impressive collection, it would be that the propensity to consider The Man Versus the State as “just” a political pamphlet causes the contributors to overlook that this is perhaps the first work whose arguments are truly centered around the notion of unintended consequences. All in all, though, Herbert Spencer: Legacies may foster a better understanding of this seminal thinker and raise yet more interest in his underappreciated writings. 如果说我对这本令人印象深刻的文集还有什么挑剔的话,那就是作者们将《人与国家》仅仅视作一本政论册子的倾向导致他们忽视了一点:它可能是第一本真正集中围绕“非意图后果”这一概念进行论证的书籍。总而言之,《赫伯特·斯宾塞:遗产》可能增进我们对这位重要思想家的更好理解,同时进一步增加人们对于他的那些明珠蒙尘之作的更大兴趣。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

不拼人头

【2016-05-22】

@whigzhou: 大英帝国犯下的最大错误是让听任普鲁士统一德国,结果在一战时只好派自己的陆军上场,而不能像以前那样,只要花钱雇一批德国人打另一批德国人就行了。#后见之明

@whigzhou: 大英走的是弱共同体路线,这条路线有利于自由、繁荣和个人主义,以及为一个族群/文化高度混杂的社会建立普遍秩序,弱点是动员能力不足,难以像强共同体路线的德国那样建立庞大陆军,只能倚重于重资产轻人力的海军,拼钱不拼人头,(more...)

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【2016-05-22】 @whigzhou: 大英帝国犯下的最大错误是让听任普鲁士统一德国,结果在一战时只好派自己的陆军上场,而不能像以前那样,只要花钱雇一批德国人打另一批德国人就行了。#后见之明 @whigzhou: 大英走的是弱共同体路线,这条路线有利于自由、繁荣和个人主义,以及为一个族群/文化高度混杂的社会建立普遍秩序,弱点是动员能力不足,难以像强共同体路线的德国那样建立庞大陆军,只能倚重于重资产轻人力的海军,拼钱不拼人头,靠金钱、外交和战略性封锁勉力维持平衡。 @whigzhou: 但这就要求他必须阻止欧洲后院出现任何过于强大的民族国家,强大到能够建立一支他无法扶持装备几个盟友即可轻易打败的陆军  
吃饭的嘴

【2016-05-17】

@黄章晋ster 你很难说,猫主席发动史无前例时,到底是因为有运动群众的偏好,还是不得已才如此。我们也可以这样说,秦始皇当年不能像东德苏联一样把所有人都纳入专政机关的监督视线之内,不是他不想这么做,而是他没有足够的社会财富可以做到这一点。 °城市化率与清洗模式的选择 http://t.cn/RqDaFh2

@whigzhou: 另一组数字也值得注意,1911年时俄罗斯帝国人口1.67亿,扣掉波兰部分大概1.55亿,此后经历各种杀戮,和1932-33大饥荒,到1936年斯大林开始大清洗时,苏联人口仍不足1.6亿,对比猫国,1948-1966年间,人口约增长50%。

@Liittma是我:说明了什么(more...)

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【2016-05-17】 @黄章晋ster 你很难说,猫主席发动史无前例时,到底是因为有运动群众的偏好,还是不得已才如此。我们也可以这样说,秦始皇当年不能像东德苏联一样把所有人都纳入专政机关的监督视线之内,不是他不想这么做,而是他没有足够的社会财富可以做到这一点。 °城市化率与清洗模式的选择 http://t.cn/RqDaFh2 @whigzhou: 另一组数字也值得注意,1911年时俄罗斯帝国人口1.67亿,扣掉波兰部分大概1.55亿,此后经历各种杀戮,和1932-33大饥荒,到1936年斯大林开始大清洗时,苏联人口仍不足1.6亿,对比猫国,1948-1966年间,人口约增长50%。 @Liittma是我:说明了什么? @whigzhou: 说明那段时间苏联的马尔萨斯弹簧压的更低,因而剩余率更高,能够供养更庞大的专政机器 @whigzhou: 实际上,苏联的强行集体化和工业化过程,(无论是否故意)就是通过系统性的消灭部分农业人口,提高剩余率,从而供养更多非农人口,这方面猫国的力度远远不及 @whigzhou: 1932-33年的饥饿疗法直接消灭了乌克兰1/5的农民,在马尔萨斯极限边缘,农民主要是吃饭的嘴而不是创造余粮的工具 @黄章晋ster: 如果主席一直活到现在,中国的城市化率大概会跌到10%以下。 @whigzhou: 于是城市果真就被农村包围了~ @黄章晋ster:哈萨克斯坦和乌克兰官方的说法是,大饥荒消灭了他们近三分之一的人口。 @whigzhou: 嗯嗯,那可能还计入了几百万非直接饿死的受害者  
无形屏障

【2016-05-08】

@whigzhou: 现代邮政兴起之前,收信方付费是西欧私人通信中的普遍做法,有趣的是,这一惯例也是上流社会在他们和其他人之间建立无形屏障的一种手段,如果你不够有钱,就不敢混进他们的社交圈,因为连收信都收不起,在19世纪初的荷兰,一封信的收件费大约7stuivers(1stuiver=1/20盾),差不多是中下阶层一顿饭钱。

@whigzhou: 所以,若发信人预付了邮费,等于是在告诉收信人:(more...)

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【2016-05-08】 @whigzhou: 现代邮政兴起之前,收信方付费是西欧私人通信中的普遍做法,有趣的是,这一惯例也是上流社会在他们和其他人之间建立无形屏障的一种手段,如果你不够有钱,就不敢混进他们的社交圈,因为连收信都收不起,在19世纪初的荷兰,一封信的收件费大约7stuivers(1[[stuiver]]=1/20盾),差不多是中下阶层一顿饭钱。 @whigzhou: 所以,若发信人预付了邮费,等于是在告诉收信人:我知道你没钱,所以替你把邮费付了。而假如收信人自认为是圈内peer,便会将此视为严重羞辱,所以当荷兰国家邮政最初推行邮票制度时,遭到很多人抵制。  
差强人意

【2016-05-07】

@whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。

@whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事(more...)

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【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情,但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要,因为当时关税再高,和运费比还是很低,所以只要拆除壁垒,效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2)管制,随便翻翻经济史就知道,18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛,但给人的印象很不一样,我猜这是因为,早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行,而较少以行为管控的方式进行,大量限制法规,但较少执行官僚,所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见,究其因,当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3)19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少,但州政府和市政府管的可不少,看看产业史,哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的,那时候联邦政府站在自由一边,多数州政府站在另一边,联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒,由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了,铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场,州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了,只好偏向自由化,但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4)政府规模,从财政开支和雇员数量看,那时候的政府确实小得多,但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看,也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5)福利制度,这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点,那时候基本上没有福利制度,济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中,国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊,仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级,何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的,所以不要相信什么自由天国,也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  
[译文]列宁的幽灵

Lenin’s Ghost: How Did Marxist Professors Create a New Wave of Political Leaders?
列宁的幽灵:马克思主义学者是如何培养出新一拨政治领袖的?

作者:Mihail Neamtu @ 2016-1-12
译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:Law & Liberty,http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/01/22/lenins-ghost-how-did-marxist-professors-create-a-new-wave-of-political-leaders/

Europe has by no means recovered from its crisis. The new wave of migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has worsened the economic forecast. The economies of the Eurozone, with a collective growth rate of under 1.5 percent in 2015, are almost stagnant. Gone are the days of the German economic miracle. Nowadays, nearly 4.5 million young persons under 25 are unemployed in the EU-28 — a staggering figure, to which Chancellor Merkel just added an extra million refugees. Particularly in the Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is at very high levels: 47.9 percent in Greece, 47.7 percent in Spain and 39.8 percent in Italy.

欧洲还远未从危机中恢复过来,来自非洲、亚洲和中东的新一波移民令经济预测更加悲观。欧元区的经济发展几近停滞,其2015年整体增长率不足1.5%。德国创造经济奇迹的时期早已远去,如今欧盟28国25岁以下年轻人的失业人数接近4500万,令人瞠目结舌,而德国总理默克尔还刚刚再往上面增加了100万难民。年轻人的失业率在地中海沿岸国家尤其居高不下:希腊为47.9%,西班牙为47.7%,意大利则为39.8%。

Confronted with this bleak picture, politicians, journalists, religious leaders, and public intellectuals all search for an explanation. Why is the European dream failing so many young people? How long will the economic recovery last? Will the EU be able to cope with another massive crash of the financial international system?

面对这般凄惨景况,政治家、记者、宗教领袖以及公共知识分子都在寻找个中原因。为什么欧洲梦会让如此多的年轻人无法企及?经济复苏还能维持多久?欧盟有没有能力应对另一次国际金融系统崩溃的巨大冲击?

While experts ponder s(more...)

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Lenin’s Ghost: How Did Marxist Professors Create a New Wave of Political Leaders? 列宁的幽灵:马克思主义学者是如何培养出新一拨政治领袖的? 作者:Mihail Neamtu @ 2016-1-12 译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:Law & Liberty,http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/01/22/lenins-ghost-how-did-marxist-professors-create-a-new-wave-of-political-leaders/ Europe has by no means recovered from its crisis. The new wave of migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has worsened the economic forecast. The economies of the Eurozone, with a collective growth rate of under 1.5 percent in 2015, are almost stagnant. Gone are the days of the German economic miracle. Nowadays, nearly 4.5 million young persons under 25 are unemployed in the EU-28 — a staggering figure, to which Chancellor Merkel just added an extra million refugees. Particularly in the Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is at very high levels: 47.9 percent in Greece, 47.7 percent in Spain and 39.8 percent in Italy. 欧洲还远未从危机中恢复过来,来自非洲、亚洲和中东的新一波移民令经济预测更加悲观。欧元区的经济发展几近停滞,其2015年整体增长率不足1.5%。德国创造经济奇迹的时期早已远去,如今欧盟28国25岁以下年轻人的失业人数接近4500万,令人瞠目结舌,而德国总理默克尔还刚刚再往上面增加了100万难民。年轻人的失业率在地中海沿岸国家尤其居高不下:希腊为47.9%,西班牙为47.7%,意大利则为39.8%。 Confronted with this bleak picture, politicians, journalists, religious leaders, and public intellectuals all search for an explanation. Why is the European dream failing so many young people? How long will the economic recovery last? Will the EU be able to cope with another massive crash of the financial international system? 面对这般凄惨景况,政治家、记者、宗教领袖以及公共知识分子都在寻找个中原因。为什么欧洲梦会让如此多的年轻人无法企及?经济复苏还能维持多久?欧盟有没有能力应对另一次国际金融系统崩溃的巨大冲击? While experts ponder such questions, legions of university students face the grim, day-to-day reality. Still in their thirties, they cannot leave their parents’ homes. It would be hard to find university graduates from Thessalonica or Malaga with bank savings or with enough funds to allow them to establish a family of their own. Many rely directly on social benefits, while switching from one low-paid job to another. In the public square, the notion of individual responsibility has become unfashionable. Angry crowds demonstrating in Athens, Madrid, or Bucharest call for ever new governmental solutions. 专家们在思考这些问题,而众多大学生则日复一复地面对残酷现实。他们已经三十多岁,但仍未能脱离父母独立生活。在萨洛尼卡和马拉加的大学毕业生当中,极少人有存款或其他财务来源足以让他们组建自己的家庭。他们当中很多人不停地辗转于不同的低薪工作,转工期间仅能依靠社会救济过活。“个人责任”的观念在社会上不再那么时髦了,雅典、马德里和布加勒斯特都有愤怒的群众游行示威,要求政府提供更新的解决方案。 In this atmosphere, both far Right parties and far Left political platforms have been mounting radical proposals. Populism is on the rise, in the form of nationalism, or revolutionary Marxism, or in some cases a strange mix of the two—as can be seen in the “Red-Brown-White” coalition that constitutes Vladimir Putin’s motley political base. Odd as it may seem, the two extremes can, as with the far-Left Syriza and the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a new Rightwing party, march together shoulder to shoulder. 在这种氛围下,无论极右政党还是极左政治联盟都不停地提出激进的建议。民粹主义正在升温,表现形式有民族主义,有宣扬革命的马克思主义,也有两者的奇特组合——例如普京混杂政权基础中的“红-棕-白”政治联盟【译注:在俄罗斯的政治语境中,红色代表社会主义和共产主义,棕色代表极端民族主义,白色代表君主政体】。虽然看起来很古怪,但是位处两个对立极端的势力(正如希腊的激进左翼联盟(Syriza)和新右翼政党独立希腊人(ANEL)那样)却可以并肩前行。 The present essay will examine the Left side of the ledger to see what intellectual and cultural forces account for the resurgence of Left radicalism in various European countries. My claim is that old-school Marxists in Western academia have managed to produce a new class of revolutionary politicians, who are currently challenging the foundations of the Western capitalist order. 本文将研究政治光谱中的左翼,以寻找极左激进思潮在欧洲各国重新抬头背后的思想与文化推力。我的看法是,西方学术界中老派的马克思主义者已经培养出了新一批的革命政客,而这些政客正在对西方资本主义秩序的根基提出挑战。 We have, for example, the British Labor Party’s new leader Jeremy Corbyn, an anti-NATO politician and welfare devotee. He has called for a friendlier approach to Putin’s Russia. (In accord with the above-noted trend, this puts him in line with Rightwing populists in his country, of the UKIP Party, and Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France.) 例如,英国工党的新党魁科尔宾就是一个反北约的政客,也是福利主义的狂热信徒。他还呼吁以友善的态度对待普京治下的俄罗斯(在前文所述的趋势之下,科尔宾凭着他的这一主张,与英国独立党的右翼民粹主义者,以及法国民族阵线的马琳•勒庞,成为同道中人)。 In Spain, there has emerged Podemos, a Leftwing movement that ran candidates for the general elections under the motto Libertad, igualdad, y fraternidad, and that late last year won 20.65 percent of the national vote, vaulting to the position of third largest political organization in the country.A 37-year-old political science professor named Pablo Manuel Iglesias Turrión is the leader of Podemos, which means “We Can”—an echo of Barack Obama’s “Yes, We Can.” 而西班牙则冒出了一个叫“我们可以”的左翼团体,他们派出代表以“自由、平等、博爱”的口号参加大选,并在去年年底赢得全国20.65%的选票,一跃成为全国第三大政治组织。“我们可以”的领袖,是一个名叫伊格莱西亚斯的37岁政治学教授。“我们可以”这个名字,呼应了奥巴马的竞选口号“是的,我们可以”。 Iglesias, an admirer of the Bolshevik Revolution, was a member of the Spanish Communist Party until 1999. In 2014, Comrade Iglesias was elected to the European Parliament as a member of his new party. Its growth in the last election came after it gathered in representatives of Izquierda Anticapitalista, an organization that includes some Trotskyites and Gramscians. (Sample press release from that group: “Toward a Democratic Disruption and an End to Austerity”). 伊格莱西亚斯对布尔什维克革命心怀敬佩,他自己在1999年之前也是西班牙共产党员。2014年,伊格莱西亚斯同志以其新政党【译注:即“我们可以”】成员的身份,成为欧洲议会的议员。在去年的大选中冒升之前,“我们可以”吸收了政治组织“左翼反资本主义”的代表,而该组织网罗的是一些托派和葛兰西学派的人。(该组织对外发表的范文之一:“迈向民主之崩溃与紧缩政策之终结”。) Podemos takes pride in presenting youthful faces to the Spanish electorate, and advocates of liberation theology (in the person of Teresa Forcades, “the radical Catalan nun on a mission,” as London’s Guardian newspaper called her). In the land of Don Quixote, Pope Francis’ sympathy for the Bolivarian economic model did make a lasting impression. “我们可以”让年轻人更多地参与政治,让他们成为解放神学倡导者(例如被伦敦《卫报》称之为“肩负使命的加泰罗尼亚激进修女”的特蕾莎•福加德斯),并以此为傲。在这片诞生了堂吉诃德的土地上,教宗方济各对玻利维亚经济模式的同情的确令人经久不忘。 In fact among former leaders of Podemos, one counts Juan Carlos Monedero, an advisor to the late Hugo Chávez. Incidentally, Hugo Chávez and his successor in Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, have sponsored Spain’s Leftwing parties and associations in the same explicit manner that President Putin has channeled Russian rubles toward his political puppets from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 实际上,“我们可以”的前领袖之一胡安•卡洛斯•莫内德罗就在委内瑞拉总统查韦斯执政后期担任其顾问。顺便说一句,查韦斯和他的继任人尼古拉斯•马杜罗都毫不掩饰地为西班牙左翼的政党和组织提供资助,与普京总统向他在乌克兰、摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚的傀儡政权输送卢布同出一辙。 The European Left, in short, is very much alive and kicking. From Britain, Greece, and Spain to the Die Linke party in Germany, the heirs of Marx show a remarkable efflorescence, resembling the Greek mythological Hydra endowed with multiple serpentine heads, despite its one and only reptilian body. We may ask ourselves who the future Heracles will be, slaying the beast with the humor of Winston Churchill and the manly determination of Mrs. Thatcher… 简而言之,欧洲的左翼势力仍生机勃勃。从英国、希腊、西班牙,到德国的左翼党,马克思的继承人向世人展现了他们的欣欣向荣,一如希腊神话中的九头蛇,尽管只有一副羸弱的身躯,却生出许多个蛇头。我们也许可以问问自己,谁将成为未来的赫拉克勒斯,以丘吉尔的幽默和撒切尔夫人的铁腕,手刃这头怪兽。 Why are the ghosts of Marxism haunting the political life of Europe? Mainly because neither the structural evils of communist ideology nor its perpetrators in the former Soviet bloc have  experienced a proper Nurnberg-style scrutiny. After the Second World War, the dismantling of the Nazi network in Germany created the proper context for the carrying out of the Marshall Plan. 为何马克思主义在欧洲政坛阴魂不散?这主要是因为,无论是共产主义意识形态在体制上的恶性,还是前苏维埃统治集团中的恶徒,都没有经历过一场纽伦堡审判式的彻底清算。二战之后,纳粹主义机体在德国土崩瓦解,为实行马歇尔计划提供了适当条件。 After 1989, the EU’s expansion toward former Socialist republics did not require a similar political lustration. To this day, most of the societal and economic disasters produced by the communist experiment remain largely unknown to the general public from the Western European countries, particularly those not yet born at the time of the 1989 revolutions or who were young at the time 1989年之后,欧盟向前社会主义国家扩张,却并没有要求在政治体制上进行类似的清理。时至今日,共产主义实验在社会制度和经济上所造成的重大灾难,大多仍不为西欧普通民众所知,尤其是那些在1989年还没出生——或当时还很年轻——的民众。 It was widely expected that these revolutions would put Leftist academics, or at least most of them, out of business. Their voices were certainly muted for a time, but that time has expired. Rejecting the notion of public penance, old Marxist professors have resumed their project, and carried on with their negation of historical facts. By spinning their simplistic understanding of the relationship between labor and capital, Marxist ideologues in the North-Atlantic hemisphere have hatched a new generation—one that seeks, and in many cases finds, electoral validation. 人们曾普遍预期,在经历了那些革命之后,就算不是全部,起码绝大部分的左翼学者不会再有市场。他们的确销声匿迹了一段时间,然而这段时间已经过去了。那些老派马克思主义学者又开始重操旧业,他们仍然拒绝接受公开忏悔的理念,继续否定历史事实。基于对劳动力与资本两者间关系的粗浅理解,北大西洋区的马克思主义追随者们牵强附会地虚构编造,孵化出了新一代——他们寻求通过参选得到承认,有好些已经获得成功。 Just as the young Barack Obama absorbed Frank Marshall Davis’ worldview in the 1970s, so too have European elites imbibed the vapors of the Maoist philosopher Alain Badiou in Paris, the late historian Eric Hobsbawm in London, cultural critic Slavoj Žižek in Ljubljana, or the Hungarian writer G.M. Tamás in Budapest. Such Marxist professors are responsible, indeed, for the birth of a new generation of historically ignorant opinion-makers in Europe. 和巴拉克•奥巴马年轻时吸收了1970年代弗兰克•马歇尔•戴维斯的世界观一样,欧洲精英阶层也受到了马克思主义学者影响,当中有巴黎的毛主义哲学家阿兰•巴迪欧,伦敦的当代历史学家艾瑞克•霍布斯鮑姆,卢布尔雅那的文化评论家斯拉沃热•齐泽克,以及布达佩斯的匈牙利作家贾斯伯•米克罗斯•塔马斯。欧洲出现了对历史愚昧无知的新一代意见领袖,这些马克思主义学者对此难辞其咎。 The economic crisis of late 2008 proved to be a good moment for high-brow academics and social justice street activists. They came together with the dream of rekindling the May 1968 movement against the bourgeois, middle-class establishment in France. Alienated youth flooded social media with Marxist jingles about American imperialism, the existence of banks and mortgages, the privatization of state assets, and the hierarchical structures of traditional family (depicted as sexist and homophobic). 2008年末爆发的经济危机,成了撮合高高在上的学术界和追求社会公义的街头行动家的大好时机。他们梦想着重燃法国1968年5月反资产阶级风暴之火,走到了一起。离群索居的年轻人在社交媒体大肆张贴马克思主义的宣传短曲,攻击美帝国主义,反对银行与抵押贷款、国有资产私有化以及传统家庭等级制度(认为这是性别歧视和恐同的表现)。 Day and night during—and since—the Great Recession, on television and radio programs, at public rallies, and throughout academic colloquia, utopians recycle the mantras of “equality,” “identity politics,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination.” At times, the fresh young European Marxists may speak more eloquently than the worn-out Bernie Sanders does in the Democratic Party’s primaries. However, this lyrical exaltation of Marxism brings nothing new in terms of understanding economic cycles or the way out of poverty. 自2008年经济大衰退开始,不切实际的空想家们无论在电视和电台节目、公众集会,还是学术界的研讨会上,都日以继夜地把“平等”“身份政治”“偏见”和“ 歧视”等概念像咒语一样翻来覆去地念诵。有时候,年轻的欧洲马克思主义者说起话来,比疲惫的桑德斯在民主党党内初选的演说还要滔滔不绝。然而,无论听起来多么激动人心,马克思主义仍然不能为研究经济规律和摆脱贫穷带来任何新东西。 Podemos and Syriza won their respective elections by vaguely promising the voters another future—a distant reality in which decisions about individual happiness would be made through a Rousseau-styled “collective deliberation.” How would poverty be eliminated? Through cooperatives, we are told, which would be less profit-driven than the “neoliberal enterprises” but which would benefit from a state-controlled redistribution of wealth. “我们可以”和激进左翼联盟通过含糊其辞地承诺选民“另一个”未来,赢得了西班牙和希腊的大选。而在这个遥远的未来中,有关个人幸福的问题则需要通过卢梭式的“集体研究”来决定。该怎样消灭贫穷呢?据说可以通过合作社,因为合作社不像“新自由主义企业”那样唯利是图,还可以从国家控制下的财富再分配中获益。 The call to ideological warfare from Podemos (be it in the form of political correctness, student strikes, militias on campuses, or voluntary sit-ins) flirts with the image of a cosmic deliverance from the “hegemonic powers” of capitalism. The relationship between the individual and the crowd is construed erotically. Comrade Iglesias’ speeches set the stage for a quasi-spiritual, if not mystical, interpretation of the revolutionary endeavor. “我们可以”所宣扬的意识形态斗争(无论是以讲求政治正确、学生罢课、校园民兵组织,还是自愿静坐的形式)引发了全球摆脱资本主义霸权这一遐想。个人与集体的关系被描绘得很诱人。伊格莱西亚斯同志的演讲令人容易对革命行动产生类似宗教般的,甚至神秘的理解。 The Leftist revolutionaries accuse “the agents of laissez-faire capitalism” of having created a new class of underpaid employees. They depict students, workers, and trade unionists as innocent victims of a vast conspiracy set up by the owners of multinational companies. In response to the selfish individualism of the Right, the new Marxists celebrate the collectivist frenzy of anti-bourgeois demonstrators. By singing the litany of “fairness,” they forget the importance of moral virtue, human character, and individual responsibility. They avoid addressing the psychological dimension of behavioral traits such as laziness, low-esteem, or procrastination. 左翼革命家们谴责“自由放任的资本主义代理人”制造了新的受剥削阶层,他们认为跨国公司股东之间互相勾结,而学生、工人、工会会员则是这一巨大阴谋的无辜受害者。针对右翼利己的个人主义,新马克思主义者为反资产阶级示威者的集体主义狂热唱赞歌。在喋喋不休地歌颂“公正”的时候,他们忘却了道德伦理、人类本性与个人责任的重要性,而且对诸如懒惰、缺乏自尊和拖延等行为特征的心理因素避而不谈。 Professor Claude Karnoouh (who taught Marxist sociology at a prominent university in the central Romanian region of Transylvania) argues that free markets produce social disasters by destroying neighborhoods and towns. He nowhere takes into account the creative nature of capitalist disruptions, so powerfully defended by Joseph Schumpeter and strikingly visible in the recent replacement of old postal offices by email (or in the mass-production of electronic tablets and the rapid decline of desktop computers). 在位于罗马尼亚中部特兰西瓦尼亚地区某知名大学教授马克思主义社会学的克劳德•卡努教授认为,自由市场摧毁了社区和小城镇,制造了社会灾难。但他完全没有考虑到资本主义式破坏的创造性本质,而这一点已经得到了约瑟夫•熊彼特强有力的论证,并且在近年来电子邮件取代传统邮局(或者平板电脑盛行和桌面电脑式微)的范例中得到清晰的体现。 The Marxist revolutionaries of 21st century Europe ignore the subtle contrivances of human motivation and organizational behavior, which typically make people leave behind the poor conditions of their ancestors, acquire new skills, and transcend the national barriers in search for a better life. 那些针对人类动机和组织行为的微妙设置,能够驱使人们挣脱先辈的困境,学习新的技能,超越国家壁垒,以求改善生活,而二十一世纪欧洲的马克思主义革命家忽略了这一点。 Also based on false assumptions is Podemos’ rhetoric against corruption. It underestimates the welfare state’s role in diminishing individual freedom and economic opportunity for young Spaniards and young people everywhere. In search of the heroic proletariat, Professor Iglesias is still obsessed with the class struggle and the victory of workers through larger trade unions and more frequent strikes. He ignores that every individual is paid for the skills, and for the needs, that he or she brings to the marketplace. “我们可以”针对贪污腐败的激烈言辞,也建基于错误假设之上,他们低估了福利制度对西班牙乃至世界各地的年轻人的个体自由和经济发展的抑制作用。怀着对英雄无产阶级的向往,伊格莱西亚斯教授仍然沉迷于阶级斗争,渴望工人阶级通过更大规模的工会和更频繁的示威来获得胜利。每个人的薪水都是由其在市场上展现出来的技能和对这种技能的需求决定的,但他完全无视这一点。 The leaders of Podemos and Syriza are blind to the differences between an Anglo American approach to economic competition (as a cure to favoritism) and a South American (but of course not uniquely South American) support for state monopoly. Rampant corruption stems not only from the ills of human nature (“the greed of the Wall Street party,” as Iglesias puts it). Corruption is the result of poor institutional arrangements: volatile property rights, overregulation, laws preventing the free association of individuals, rigged contracts pushed by central governments, as well as high taxes for small businesses. It is corruption that kills the natural instinct for entrepreneurship, individual freedom, personal growth, and economic development. 英语美洲鼓励经济竞争(以避免偏袒徇私),南美洲(当然也不仅限于南美洲)支持国家垄断,但“我们可以”和激进左翼联盟的领袖对两者间的差异却视而不见。猖獗的贪污腐败行为不仅仅源于人性中之恶(伊格莱西亚斯谓之为“华尔街派对中的贪婪”),也源于糟糕的制度安排:产权缺乏保障、过度监管、法律限制自由结社、中央政府非法操纵合同,以及对小企业高额征税。正是贪污腐败扼杀了与生俱来的创业精神、个体自由、个人成长与经济发展。 Speaking of poverty and wealth, the Jacobins haven’t managed to create a single socialist success story. No one in contemporary Cuba, Laos, or North Korea goes to “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, and criticize after dinner.” Except for the privileged nomenklatura and the party apparatchiks, ordinary people from socialist countries have never experienced the coexistence of these leisurely activities. 说到贫穷与财富,雅各宾派并没能创造出社会主义的成功案例,一个都没有。在当代的古巴、老挝或者朝鲜,都没有人能够“上午打猎,下午捕鱼,晚上喂牛,晚饭后搞批判”【编注:语出马克思《德意志意识形态》(1845)第9页】。除了拥有特权的某些阶层和党员,社会主义国家的平民百姓从未过上这种悠闲生活。 Why should we believe that Syriza or Podemos will unchain millions of unemployed people through the shameless rescue of Lenin? In recent times, countries run by radical socialist governments have made no significant contribution to the flourishing of scientific research or to the groundbreaking technological innovations which have spread across the world. 我们为什么要相信,“我们可以”和激进左翼联盟搬出列宁的那一套,就能解救数以百万计的失业人口呢?在近代社会,科学研究百花齐放,科技创新突破惠及全球,但激进社会主义政权领导的国家从未对此做出过任何重大贡献。 Neither Communist China nor authoritarian Russia can boast impressive advances in the field of medical science. Such achievements still crown the healthcare systems of the free world. From its very first political application in real time and real history, Marxist ideology has been a painful failure of astonishing proportions. 无论是共产主义中国,还是威权主义俄国,都没能在医学研究领域取得引以为豪的突破进展。那些令人瞩目的成就,仍然出自自由国度的医疗系统。从其历史上第一次付诸政治实践开始,马克思主义意识形态带来的从来都是极其惨痛的失败。 What about the scientific claims made by Karl Marx (1818–1883)? As Dr. Paul Aligică from George Mason University once put it, Marxist economists currently employ epistemic tools that resemble the phlogiston theory used by the 17th century physicists. Das Kapital can explain the wealth and the poverty of nations with the same measure of clarity that Johann Joachim Becher’s (1635–1682) alchemist views of combustion help us understand a Ferrari engine. 那么马克思在科学方面的论断又是否有过什么贡献呢?正如乔治梅森大学的保罗•阿里吉卡博士曾经说的那样,马克思主义经济学家如今使用的认知工具,类似于17世纪物理学家使用的燃素理论。用《资本论》来解释国家的财富和贫穷,和以约翰•约钦姆•贝歇尔(1635-1682年)炼金术的燃烧理论来研究法拉利引擎,效度不相伯仲。 A century and half since the Communist Manifesto was published, the entire scientific scaffolding of Marxism has fallen to pieces. Marx got it all wrong when he spoke about the future developments of the Western society. As a reductionist theory, Marxism today cannot account for the economic transformation of the West. 自《共产党宣言》发表一个半世纪以来,马克思主义的整个科学理论框架已经分崩离析,支离破碎。马克思对西方社会的未来展望,无一应验。作为一种还原主义理论,如今马克思主义完全无法解释西方国家的经济转型。 Let us compare the income and lifestyle of a 19th century worker from a steel factory in Manchester, England with the monthly salary and the spare time enjoyed by a Google employee at the dawn of the third millennium. Would a ship worker from Gdansk in the early 1980s have dreamt of possessing a satellite home television or a mobile phone in his pocket? What is, then, left of all Marxist “prophecies”? 我们不妨将19世纪英国曼彻斯特钢铁厂工人的月薪和生活方式,和21世纪初谷歌员工的月薪与闲暇时间进行对比。1980年代初格但斯克的船坞工人能想象家里装上卫星电视,兜里揣着手机吗?那马克思主义的“预言”还剩下些什么? Since Marxist doctrine has no scientific grounding, it would seem to follow that its popularity ought to be examined from the perspective of rhetoric, theology, or literary studies. Decades ago, Robert C. Tucker convincingly argued that myth is a central category in the writings of the young Marx. 马克思主义学说没有科学基础,因此要分析它为何盛行,似乎应该从修辞艺术、宗教信仰和文学研究角度入手。数十年前,罗伯特•塔克就已经很有力地论述过,神话是马克思年轻时写作的中心主题。 From time immemorial, people cherished the eschatological promise of a savior (rebranded by Marx as “the proletariat” and by Stalin under the name of “the Party leader”). Since Marxism is neither a serious economic theory nor a rigorous social science, we would understand it better as the secular religion of modernity, which uses a redemptive language for the alienated masses. 自古以来,人们就对承诺拯救万民于水火的救世主心怀向往(马克思将其包装为“无产阶级”,而斯大林则称其为“党的领袖”)。鉴于马克思主义既不是严肃的经济理论,也不是严谨的社会科学,因此要更好地理解这一理论,我们应该将其视作追求现代性的世俗宗教,它运用救赎的语言来面对异化了的普罗大众。 Alain Besançon identified the presence of Gnostic themes in the Marxist narrative of class warfare, while the University of Chicago’s Mircea Eliade has shown the extent to which the historicist myth of a classless society projects the image of a Golden Age into modern times. 阿兰•贝桑松指出,马克思主义对于阶级斗争的叙述中包含了诺斯替派的主张,而芝加哥大学的米尔恰•伊利亚德则指出,消除社会阶级乃历史必然这一迷思,其实很大程度上只是一厢情愿地将希腊的黄金时代投射到现代社会之中。 Traditional societies had foundational stories about charismatic, heroic individuals who fought against an evil enemy and promised a radical, not an incremental, improvement of the human condition. Marxists revolutionaries have taken up this apocalyptic imagery. The new small “c” catholic church is the international socialist movement, which brings to the afflicted world a message of a redeemed humanity. 传统社会总流传着一些英雄故事,这些英雄魅力非凡,勇于对抗恶势力,他们许诺的不是渐进的改良,而是一夜之间改善人们的生活现状。马克思主义革命家宣扬的就是这种末日天启般的景象。这一新的全人类的教会就是国际社会主义运动,他们宣称,要为这个受尽磨难的世界带来人性救赎的福音。 Prime Minister Tsipras (known as the Greek “Che Guevara”) said that “the communist regime . . . at least had humanity at the center of their thinking.” Young and radical politicians such as he do not feel the need to explain the criminal deeds of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 被称为“希腊的切•格瓦拉”的希腊总理齐普拉斯说,“共产主义政权……起码以人道主义作为核心考量。”像他那样年轻激进的政客们,似乎从不觉得有必要解释1917年布尔什维克革命所犯下的罪行。 Instead of looking at the horrors of the Gulag, the leaders of Syriza and Podemos offer their audience the same toxic and yet mesmerizing incantations that make people forget about the Ukrainian Holodomor or about the Stalinist labor camps of Perm, Volga Canal, and Pitești (the latter experiment being described by Vladimir Tismăneanu in his 2014 book on The Devil in History). 激进左翼联盟和“我们可以”的领袖们也无视古拉格的丑陋和残酷,他们拿催眠咒语来荼毒信众,让他们忘记乌克兰大饥荒,忘记设在彼尔姆、伏尔加运河与皮特什蒂的斯大林式劳改营(弗拉迪米尔•蒂斯马尼努在他2014年出版的《历史中的魔鬼》中对皮特什蒂的实验项目也有所描述)。 When a freely elected leader of a European nation can say that “humanity” was “at the center” of the communist experiment, we must pause and ask ourselves: How can Europe regain the vast amount of moral clarity it has lost since the 1989-1991 period? Will perhaps the foe of the former evil empire make a Reaganite comeback to help Europe find its way? Might we believe that a future President of the United States will call out the new Jacobins? May we hope that future leaders of democratic parties will stop indulging in a shameless nostalgia for Marx and Lenin? 连一个欧洲国家自由选举产生的领导人,都能说出“人道主义”处于共产主义实践的“核心位置”这样的话来,我们必须停下来问问自己:欧洲如何能重新厘清自1989-1991年巨变以来就已经变得模糊的道德观念?过往邪恶帝国的敌人会不会以一个里根式的王者归来,帮助欧洲重回正轨?我们会不会相信美国未来的总统会请新雅各宾派重出江湖?我们可不可以希望未来民主政党的领导人不要再不知廉耻地缅怀马克思和列宁? It is a matter of historical record that, like the victims of the Shoah, the prisoners of communism underwent unimaginable physical degradation and psychological torture. Who will educate the Prime Minister of Greece and tell him of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s long-lasting witness? Who will enlighten Pablo Iglesias Turrión about the black mass which, in the name of humanity, the KGB proxies organized at Pitești Prison during the late 1950s? Students of theology living under communism were forced to denounce God, to mock Christ, and to blaspheme the name of the Virgin Mary under the burden of extreme beatings and despicable sufferings. 就如同电影《浩劫》中的受害人那样,共产主义的囚徒经受了无法想象的身体摧残和心理折磨,这是铁一般的历史事实。难道没有人教育一下希腊总理,告诉他索尔仁尼琴长期以来所目睹的那些惨况?难道没有人告诉伊格莱西亚斯,1950年代末克格勃特工以人道主义的名义在皮特什蒂监狱组织的黑色弥撒是什么?生活在共产主义国家的神学学生,在酷刑的胁迫之下,要被迫批判上帝,嘲笑耶稣基督,亵渎中伤圣母玛利亚。 Such was the “love” for “humanity” that millions of people witnessed during the 20th century. Such are the untruths that vote-seeking, parliament-leading Marxist revolutionaries want to pour into the minds of ordinary men and women, who may begin their adult life by searching for a better job, but might end their pursuit of happiness by embracing an obsolete and evil ideology. 这些就是数以百万计的民众在20世纪所亲眼目睹的“人道主义”之“爱”,这些也是唯选票是图的马克思主义革命家们想对普通民众灌输的颠倒黑白的谎言。人们原本不过是想在成年后找一份好点的工作,但却可能只因向一种过时而邪恶的意识形态张开怀抱,而令追求幸福的梦想彻底破灭。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

军令如丝

【2016-04-22】

@whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时,我常常为其(操作主义意义上的)精确性所折服,与其他系统中常见的(看不出操作性含义的)泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照,这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础,每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示,再往前追究,这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系,

@whigzhou: 和其他文书相比,军令应该是最讲究(操作意义上的)明确性的——你,和谁谁谁一起,(more...)

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7109
【2016-04-22】 @whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时,我常常为其(操作主义意义上的)精确性所折服,与其他系统中常见的(看不出操作性含义的)泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照,这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础,每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示,再往前追究,这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系, @whigzhou: 和其他文书相比,军令应该是最讲究(操作意义上的)明确性的——你,和谁谁谁一起,带上这个那个,于某月某日几点前,到达某地。——读令状的感觉就像这样。史家也曾指出,在亨利二世之前,司法令状和其他令状并没有明确区别,依我看,他们都有着军令的背景。  
权力积木#3:马尔萨斯弹簧

权力积木#3:马尔萨斯弹簧
辉格
2015年12月21日

考古学家在判断一个社会的文明程度时,常依据这样一些线索:显著的社会地位分化,宏大工程,复杂的文字系统,精致的工艺品,以及职业分工的迹象;所有这些线索都指向一个共同点:部分社会成员脱离了生存必需品的生产,从而能够专注于其他技艺的发展,保存和积累起复杂的知识系统。

确实,文明发展的主线,便是知识系统的不断积累和膨胀,若将它比做基因组,那么各种可见的文明创造物便是表现型,正如道金斯所言,身体易朽,基因永生;但假如没有一个脱离食物生产的专业群体,知识积累便极为缓慢,并不断被遗忘和讹变所侵蚀,恰如我们在前文明社会的朴陋文化中所看到的情况。

部分成员脱离食物生产,意味着食物(以及其他生存必需品,下同)的劳动生产率超出了仅仅满足食物生产者自己生存繁衍所需的水平,超出的部分常被人类学家称为“剩余”(注:并非马克思所说的那种剩余);一个社会剩余率越高,用于支撑其文明活动的资源便越多,文明就越繁荣,这是显而易见的。

然而,在“剩余从何而来”这个问题上,却有着一种流传极为广泛的深刻误解:认为技术进步提高了劳动生产率,即单位劳动生产了更多食物,从而带来剩余;可是正如马尔萨斯所指出,技术进步确实可在短期内提高劳动生产率,但人口增长很快又会将劳动生产率拉下来,结果只是增加了人口,这一过程只须几代或十几代人即可完成。

所以,除非技术进步连续涌现,或永远存在可供拓垦的新土地,从长期看技术进步不会提高剩余率;实际上,在定居农业之前,人类也取得过许多技术进步,标枪、弓箭、石器、掘棒、渔网、陷阱,火的控制,还有团队合作与狩猎计谋,这些进步帮助人类散布全球,占据了广阔生态位,但并未带来经常性的剩余和积累,因而也没有发展出文明。

如今,越来越多的经济史家相信,工业革命之前,人类和其它动物一样,长期处于马尔萨斯陷阱(毋宁说是常态)之中,证明这一点的最佳证据是工资铁律(Iron Law of Wages):非技术工作的工资始终徘徊在生存线附近;可是,文明毕竟诞生了,那么,究竟是什么带来了剩余?很明显,必定存在某种力量,阻止人口增长到耗尽全部剩余的程度。

有两种力量起了这样的作用:国家权力和私人财产权;原理如下图所示:

【图1】马尔萨斯弹簧

权力积木#3.图1

随着人口增长,投入于单位土地的劳动增加,但新增产出却不断降低,在没有赋税(或租金)的条件下,会一直降到仅够新增人口勉强维生,此时人口便达到自然极限(Pa),但有了赋税,食物产出被拿走一部分,所以人口增长会在边际产出率降至最低生存需求加赋税的水平时提前停下来,此时人口为Pb,而由于B点的边际产出率高于A点,因而剩余率也更高(即Sb>Sa)。

上述原理可归结为这样几条:当人口接近极限水平时,1)无论出于什么原因,减少人口将提高剩余率,从而提高脱离食物生产的人口比例,因而使文明更加繁荣,同时也让受益于赋税和租金的群体要么更庞大,要么更富裕;2)通过改变分配结构,赋税和财产权会压低人口,3)若统治者有能力压低人口,他可能更容易获取赋税。

形象的说,文明就像一块巨型浮石,压在人口弹簧之上,它在压低人口总量的同时,也获得了更大弹力来支撑其体量。

认识到这一点,可以帮助我们更好的理解人类历史,消除一些陈腐谬见,比如许多人将人口增长视为社会繁荣的指标,或者认为,除非有灾难性事件发生,文明总是趋向于进步,相对的,战乱、瘟疫和饥荒总是降低文明水平;然而,有着大量历史事实与这些传统见解相抵触,而且,一旦我们采取马尔萨斯的视角,许多貌似“反常”甚至不可思议的事情,就变得顺理成章了。

考虑到脱离食物生产的人多数生活在城市,而且除了早期城邦,城市居民绝大多数不是农民,因而城市化率是衡量文明繁荣程度的很好指标;许多传统农业社会在开始现代化进程之前,城市化率都不足10%,你可能会认为这是农业社会的常态,但实际上,当人口压力没到最高程度时,农业社会的城市化率完(more...)

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6798
权力积木#3:马尔萨斯弹簧 辉格 2015年12月21日 考古学家在判断一个社会的文明程度时,常依据这样一些线索:显著的社会地位分化,宏大工程,复杂的文字系统,精致的工艺品,以及职业分工的迹象;所有这些线索都指向一个共同点:部分社会成员脱离了生存必需品的生产,从而能够专注于其他技艺的发展,保存和积累起复杂的知识系统。 确实,文明发展的主线,便是知识系统的不断积累和膨胀,若将它比做基因组,那么各种可见的文明创造物便是表现型,正如道金斯所言,身体易朽,基因永生;但假如没有一个脱离食物生产的专业群体,知识积累便极为缓慢,并不断被遗忘和讹变所侵蚀,恰如我们在前文明社会的朴陋文化中所看到的情况。 部分成员脱离食物生产,意味着食物(以及其他生存必需品,下同)的劳动生产率超出了仅仅满足食物生产者自己生存繁衍所需的水平,超出的部分常被人类学家称为“剩余”(注:并非马克思所说的那种剩余);一个社会剩余率越高,用于支撑其文明活动的资源便越多,文明就越繁荣,这是显而易见的。 然而,在“剩余从何而来”这个问题上,却有着一种流传极为广泛的深刻误解:认为技术进步提高了劳动生产率,即单位劳动生产了更多食物,从而带来剩余;可是正如马尔萨斯所指出,技术进步确实可在短期内提高劳动生产率,但人口增长很快又会将劳动生产率拉下来,结果只是增加了人口,这一过程只须几代或十几代人即可完成。 所以,除非技术进步连续涌现,或永远存在可供拓垦的新土地,从长期看技术进步不会提高剩余率;实际上,在定居农业之前,人类也取得过许多技术进步,标枪、弓箭、石器、掘棒、渔网、陷阱,火的控制,还有团队合作与狩猎计谋,这些进步帮助人类散布全球,占据了广阔生态位,但并未带来经常性的剩余和积累,因而也没有发展出文明。 如今,越来越多的经济史家相信,工业革命之前,人类和其它动物一样,长期处于马尔萨斯陷阱(毋宁说是常态)之中,证明这一点的最佳证据是工资铁律([[Iron Law of Wages]]):非技术工作的工资始终徘徊在生存线附近;可是,文明毕竟诞生了,那么,究竟是什么带来了剩余?很明显,必定存在某种力量,阻止人口增长到耗尽全部剩余的程度。 有两种力量起了这样的作用:国家权力和私人财产权;原理如下图所示: 【图1】马尔萨斯弹簧 权力积木#3.图1 随着人口增长,投入于单位土地的劳动增加,但新增产出却不断降低,在没有赋税(或租金)的条件下,会一直降到仅够新增人口勉强维生,此时人口便达到自然极限(Pa),但有了赋税,食物产出被拿走一部分,所以人口增长会在边际产出率降至最低生存需求加赋税的水平时提前停下来,此时人口为Pb,而由于B点的边际产出率高于A点,因而剩余率也更高(即Sb>Sa)。 上述原理可归结为这样几条:当人口接近极限水平时,1)无论出于什么原因,减少人口将提高剩余率,从而提高脱离食物生产的人口比例,因而使文明更加繁荣,同时也让受益于赋税和租金的群体要么更庞大,要么更富裕;2)通过改变分配结构,赋税和财产权会压低人口,3)若统治者有能力压低人口,他可能更容易获取赋税。 形象的说,文明就像一块巨型浮石,压在人口弹簧之上,它在压低人口总量的同时,也获得了更大弹力来支撑其体量。 认识到这一点,可以帮助我们更好的理解人类历史,消除一些陈腐谬见,比如许多人将人口增长视为社会繁荣的指标,或者认为,除非有灾难性事件发生,文明总是趋向于进步,相对的,战乱、瘟疫和饥荒总是降低文明水平;然而,有着大量历史事实与这些传统见解相抵触,而且,一旦我们采取马尔萨斯的视角,许多貌似“反常”甚至不可思议的事情,就变得顺理成章了。 考虑到脱离食物生产的人多数生活在城市,而且除了早期城邦,城市居民绝大多数不是农民,因而城市化率是衡量文明繁荣程度的很好指标;许多传统农业社会在开始现代化进程之前,城市化率都不足10%,你可能会认为这是农业社会的常态,但实际上,当人口压力没到最高程度时,农业社会的城市化率完全可以达到15-25%。 据经济史家赵冈统计,(按两千人以上标准)战国时期城市化率达15.9%,南宋更高达22%,汉唐介于两者之间;以物质丰富度和文化多样性衡量,两宋也是中国古代文明的巅峰期,此后,随着人口压力渐增,城市化率一路下滑,到近代前夕已降至不足7%,据施坚雅测算,清代繁荣程度最高的江南,城市化率也只有7.8%。【注1】 【图2】中国若干历史时期的城市化率 权力积木#3.图2 城市衰微也体现在顶级都市的规模缩减上,明清最大城市不过80万人口,而唐长安、北宋开封、苏州,南宋临安,人口都过百万,宋代还有一大批人口数十万的大城市,其中武昌、泉州、建康等都市若放在清代皆可与京城比肩;人口压力和城市退化的关系,从华北城市的衰弱中也可见一斑,由于华北平原开发历史更久,人口更早饱和,那些著名的古代中原大城在中古之后再也没有复兴过。 同样的情况也出现在江户时代的日本,在德川幕府结束战国时代之后,日本进入了长期和平阶段,人口持续增长,起初带来了城市繁荣,据斋藤修(Osamu Saito)和高岛正德(Masanori Takashima)测算,(按万人标准)城市化率从1600年的6%上升到1721年的12.6%,但随着人口逼近极限,人口压力渐增,城市开始萎缩,到1874年明治初期,城市化率已跌到10%。 德川家于1615年攻克大阪,发布一国一城令,弭平全境,到1721年重新落入马尔萨斯陷阱,满清于1681年平定三藩,到1796年爆发白莲教之乱,被许多史家视为人口压力开始起作用的标志,这两个长度极为接近的周期,或许并非巧合,和历史上典型中原王朝的人口恢复周期大抵一致。 【图3】日本江户时代的人口与农业产出 权力积木#3.图3 【图4】日本江户时代的人口密度与城市化率 权力积木#3.图4 人口压力的增长也伴随着众多文明元素的消逝,当我们追溯各种器物、技术、工艺、文学和艺术形式,乃至思想观念、组织模式和制度元素的古代渊源时,常会发现,那些能够找到的渊源,多数出现在宋代,还有一部分在南北朝,更早的,就要到先秦去找了,并非巧合的是,这些历史时期都是人口压力相对松弛的阶段。 宋代的产业生态很像工业革命前夕的英格兰,其核心特征是广泛采用非人力能源和劳动节省型机械,水力作坊遍地开花,包括大型水力纺车;然而到清代,王祯《农书》中所描绘的农业和工业机械几乎消失殆尽,铁鎝锄头代替了耕牛,推磨的水力换成了人力;明清江南纺织业尽管规模庞大,但黄宗智的研究发现,纺织工作绝大部分以家庭副业的形式完成,宋代那种集中使用水动力设备的规模化工场作坊已不复存在。 人口压力和城市繁荣之间的关系,从相反的方向可以看得更清楚,14世纪中后期的黑死病,消灭了欧洲1/3到1/2的人口,并且此后黑死病反复流行,长期抑制了西欧的人口增长;然而正是从那时起,欧洲的城市化率开始快速持续上升,(按五千人标准)从1300年的9.5%升至1400年的12.5%,这明显早于文艺复兴和地理大发现,更远远早于工业革命。 在2007年发表的《增长的三驾马车:瘟疫、战争和城市化》这篇论文中,经济学家Nico Voigtlander和Hans-Joachim Voth指出,正是黑死病加上连绵不绝的战争,让欧洲长时期内大幅远离马尔萨斯极限,才促成了数个世纪的城市扩张和经济繁荣,并为此后的工业革命创造了条件。 黑死病提高城市化率,并非因为它消灭了更多农村人口,恰相反,正如历史学家麦克尼尔所指出,古代城市的极高人口密度和恶劣卫生条件,令其在瘟疫中的死亡率远高于农村,这一点在欧洲尤为突出,因为不存在粪肥市场,欧洲城市的卫生条件远比中国城市差;但是,由于瘟疫大幅提高了工资率,在恩格尔定律作用下,对城市所生产的非农业产品需求大增,带来更多城市就业机会,不断吸引大批农民进入城市,这反过来又提高了瘟疫带来的死亡率。 在极限水平附近,降低人口将提高剩余率,从而让国家更容易征收税赋,供养一个更大规模的政府,这一原理为我们理解国家权力的基础提供了两个启示:首先,和传统的国家起源理论相反,国家的征税潜力和财政基础并非基于技术进步所带来的剩余,而只需要足够的暴力手段和组织能力,通过食物产出再分配压低人口水平,提高剩余率,便可获得可持续的税赋基础。 其次,尽管古代政府规模远不如现代政府那么大,但也并非都像晚期帝国的政府那么小,实际上,在人口压力还没那么大的古典时代,政府规模明显比后来的更大,相对于其人口水平,秦汉的行政系统不仅数量更多,专业化程度更高,组织更严密,对社会的控制也更深入和细致,这从简牍材料中可以得到一个直观印象。 施坚雅的研究发现,从西汉到清代,尽管人口增长了六倍,有效疆域扩大了一倍多(西汉整个南方基本上处于未开发状态),但基层行政单元并未增加,汉初1580个县,清初1510个;更有意思的是,越是战乱、分裂的人口低谷期,县反而越多,南北朝晚期只有四千万人口,却供养着2300个县政府,还有三个中央政府;同理,每个王朝初建之际,县的数量通常也处于峰值水平的1500多,随着王朝稳固,人口恢复,便逐渐下降到1200上下。 当人口压力特别巨大,以至难以征税以维持政府时,统治者甚至可能刻意压低人口;阿兹特克晚期的人口密度达到每平方公里200多,其中宜耕地区更高达500多,远高于其他早期文明,时常为饥荒所困,这一状况催生了一种独特的战争形态,这些战争并非起因于冲突或纠纷,也不是为了劫掠勒索或征服扩张,其主要目的就是尽可能多的获取俘虏,杀死并吃掉,武士的战功和晋升条件皆以捕获俘虏数量为依据。 在阿兹特克诸城邦中拥有霸主地位的三巨头,特诺奇蒂特兰、特斯科科和特拉科潘,几乎持续不断的对其他城邦发动战争,起初这些战争是为了建立纳贡和贸易关系,但后来,常规战争已满足不了对俘虏越来越大的需求,为此,城邦之间时常安排一场“花式战争”([[xochiyaoyotl]]),在约定的时间和地点开战。 此类战争并不带来任何政治后果,也不改变外交关系,唯一的功能就是消灭部分人口并获取肉食;在阿兹特克,被用作人牲的俘虏数量非常庞大,一些重大仪式上,首先被献祭然后被吃掉的人牲,可多达8万,而一个普通城邦的人口也就几万,对于这些蛋白质高度匮乏的群体,大规模屠杀俘虏既是人口控制手段,也是重要的蛋白质来源。 印加帝国的人口密度虽没有阿兹特克那么高,宜耕区每平方公里超过120人,但安第斯高原的土地十分贫瘠,因而人口压力也很高,经济学家Louis Baudin将其称为马尔萨斯定律的绝佳案例;不过,印加人的解决方案不是杀了吃,而是计划生育和强制迁徙。 印加帝国在每个行省设有国营手工作坊,名为“太阳神处女院”,每隔一两年,行省官员便从所辖社区中挑选出一批少女,称为“选妇(aqllakuna)”,名义上,她们是印加王的候选嫔妃,实际上,其中少数被用作献祭人牲,还有少数被分配给功绩卓著的武士或贵族作为配偶,但绝大多数被终身幽禁在作坊内,纺织和酿酒,不得结婚生育,若被发现怀孕立即处死;选妇数量很庞大,规模较大的处女院可容纳数百人,而处女院在考古遗址中占有相当比例,这一制度明显有着控制生育率、压低人口的用意。 缓解人口压力的另一个办法是大规模迁移,人口过密地区的村社,被强行整体迁移到数百上千公里之外人口较稀的地区;强制迁移也是印加帝国的重要统治手段,通过彻底打散和重组原有的族群分布,传统的族群合作纽带被破坏,政治控制变得更容易,那些较为忠诚的族群被迁往边境要地,并以免税或分配大量他族女性作为补偿,不够驯服的族群则被迁入腹地,置于陌生邻居的监视之下。 印加与阿兹特克的高强度人口压力和极端人口控制手段,或许和它们的土地制度有关,这些社会始终没有形成私人土地财产权,土地皆由社区集体所有,这样,抵抗人口压力以免剩余被其耗尽的力量,就只剩下国家权力了。   ---------------------- 注1:赵冈对宋代城市化率的估算在各家中偏高,但并非最高,斯波义信估算的上限为30%,而最低估算数(柳平生与葛金芳)是13-14%,但同时,赵冈对清代城市化率的估算同样偏高,按施坚雅的较保守数据,1843年的城市化率仅为5.1%,所以,无论取高估数还是低估数,清盛期城市化率都只有南宋鼎盛期的约1/3。  
偷窥上帝账本

【2016-04-01】

@whigzhou: 我评价历史小说/电影的指标之一,是对历史感的把握,在我看来,三流的历史感是一种同态谬论,总是将他试图表现的历史趋势、几种相互竞争的可能走向、关键转折点……之类,擅自植入当事人的自觉意识中,甚至通过他们的嘴巴喋喋不休的说出来,仿佛当事人个个都偷窥过上帝的账本,有着后见之明的便利,

@whigzhou: 二流作品要好一点,能够表现出历史洪流中当事者被浪涛推拉撕扯的无力感,但真正的好作品,既能表现个体的理(more...)

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【2016-04-01】 @whigzhou: 我评价历史小说/电影的指标之一,是对历史感的把握,在我看来,三流的历史感是一种同态谬论,总是将他试图表现的历史趋势、几种相互竞争的可能走向、关键转折点……之类,擅自植入当事人的自觉意识中,甚至通过他们的嘴巴喋喋不休的说出来,仿佛当事人个个都偷窥过上帝的账本,有着后见之明的便利, @whigzhou: 二流作品要好一点,能够表现出历史洪流中当事者被浪涛推拉撕扯的无力感,但真正的好作品,既能表现个体的理想、野心、阴谋、奋斗、挣扎,又能把握历史大线索、大节点,同时又不陷入同态谬论,大概只有那些真正领会“非意图后果”的作家才写得出来, @肮脏的哈利:辉总推几部好的 @whigzhou: 还真想不出哪部历史片符合我的一流标准,Deadwood有点这意思,但不知道算不算历史片  
[大象]犹太人为何那么聪明

犹太人为何那么聪明
——两种选择力量如何塑造少数族群的独特禀赋
辉格
2016年2月27日

“犹太人特别聪明”——这恐怕是最难反驳的一句种族主义言论了。

自诺贝尔奖设立以来,犹太人共拿走了19%的化学奖、26%的物理奖、28%的生理与医学奖、41%的经济学奖;在其它顶级科学奖项中,这个比例甚至更高,综合类:38%的美国国家科学奖、25%的京都奖,数学:25%的菲尔兹奖、38%的沃尔夫奖,信息科学:25%的图灵奖、37%的香农奖、42%的诺依曼奖;在非科学领域,犹太人还拿走13%的诺贝尔文学奖,1/3以上的普利策奖,1/3以上的奥斯卡奖,近1/3的国际象棋冠军。

犹太人在科学和艺术上的成就着实令人惊叹,他们以世界千分之二的人口,在几乎所有科学领域都拥有1/5到1/3的顶级学者;究竟是什么原因让他们取得了如此惊人的成就?

考虑犹太民族的独特性,就难免想到他们在大流散(The Diaspora)之后所面临的特殊文化处境;丧失故国、散居各地的犹太人,无论最初在罗马帝国境内,还是后来在西方基督教世界和东方伊斯兰世界,皆处于少数族地位,而且因为拒绝改宗,长期被排斥在主流社会之外,不仅文化上受歧视,法律上也被剥夺了许多权利,屡屡遭受迫害、驱逐、甚至屠杀。

在中世纪欧洲,经济活动、财产权利和法律地位都与宗教有着难分难解的关系,作为异教徒,犹太人不可能与基督徒君主建立领主-附庸关系从而承租土地,无法组织手工业行会(因为行会也须以附庸身份向领主获取特许状),也无法与贵族通婚以提升社会地位,甚至无法由教会法庭来保障自己的遗嘱得到执行……总之,作为封建体系之基础的封建契约关系和教会法,皆与之无缘。

这样一来,他们就被排斥在几乎所有重要的经济部门之外,留给他们的只有少数被封建关系所遗漏的边缘行业,比如教会禁止基督徒从事(或至少道德上加以贬责)的放贷业,替贵族征收租税的包税/包租人,与放贷和收租有关的私人理财业,以及少数未被行会垄断的商业。

这些行当的共同特点是:缺乏垄断权保护因而极富竞争性,需要一颗精明的头脑,读写和计算能力很重要;这些特点提示了,犹太父母可能更愿意投资于孩子的教育,提升其读写计算能力,以及一般意义上运用理性解决问题的能力。

这一投资策略迥异于传统社会的主流策略,在传统农业社会,人们为改善家族长期状况而进行的投资与积累活动,主要集中于土地、上层姻亲关系、社会地位和政治权力,但犹太人没有机会这么做,因而只能集中投资于人力资本,而且在随时有着被没收和驱逐风险的情况下,投资人力资本大概也是最安全的。

正如一些学者指出,按古代标准,犹太人确实有着良好的教育传统,比如其宗教传统要求每位父亲都应向儿子传授妥拉(Torah)和塔木德(Talmud)等经典,在识字率很低的古代,仅从经文学习中获得的基本读写能力也相当有价值。

然而这一解释有个问题,假如犹太人的智力优势仅仅来自其教育和文化传统,那就无法说明,为何近代以来,当这一文化差异已不复存在(或不再重要),他们的智力优势却依然显著?实际上,现代杰出犹太科学家的教育和成长经历中,犹太背景已无多大影响,甚至犹太认同本身也已十分淡薄了。

为解开犹太智力之谜,犹他大学的两位学者格里高列·科克伦(Gregory Cochran)和亨利·哈本丁(Henry Harpending)在2005年的一篇论文中提出了一个颇为惊人的观点:犹太智力优势是近一千多年中犹太民族在严酷选择压力之下的进化结果,因而有着可遗传的生物学基础;在2009年出版的《万年大爆炸》(The 10,000 Year Explosion)一书中,他们专门用一章介绍了这一理论。

他们认为,犹太人中表现出显著智力优势的,是其中被称为阿什肯纳兹人(Ashkenazi)的一个分支,其祖先是9-11世纪间陆续从南欧和中东翻越阿尔卑斯山进入中欧的犹太移民,和留在地中海世界的族人相比,他们遭受的排挤和限制更加严厉,职业选择更狭窄,而由于前面所说的原因,这些限制对族群的智力水平构成了强大的选择压力。

如此特殊的社会处境,使得聪明好学、头脑精明的个体有着高得多的机会生存下去,并留下更多后代,经过近千年三四十代的高强度选择,与高智商有关的遗传特性在种群中的频率显著提高;据乔恩·昂蒂纳(Jon Entine)和查尔斯·穆瑞(Charles Murray)等学者综合多种来源的数据估算,阿什肯纳兹人的平均智商约110(科克伦的估算值更高,为112-115),比美国同期平(more...)

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犹太人为何那么聪明 ——两种选择力量如何塑造少数族群的独特禀赋 辉格 2016年2月27日 “犹太人特别聪明”——这恐怕是最难反驳的一句种族主义言论了。 自诺贝尔奖设立以来,犹太人共拿走了19%的化学奖、26%的物理奖、28%的生理与医学奖、41%的经济学奖;在其它顶级科学奖项中,这个比例甚至更高,综合类:38%的美国国家科学奖、25%的京都奖,数学:25%的菲尔兹奖、38%的沃尔夫奖,信息科学:25%的图灵奖、37%的香农奖、42%的诺依曼奖;在非科学领域,犹太人还拿走13%的诺贝尔文学奖,1/3以上的普利策奖,1/3以上的奥斯卡奖,近1/3的国际象棋冠军。 犹太人在科学和艺术上的成就着实令人惊叹,他们以世界千分之二的人口,在几乎所有科学领域都拥有1/5到1/3的顶级学者;究竟是什么原因让他们取得了如此惊人的成就? 考虑犹太民族的独特性,就难免想到他们在大流散(The Diaspora)之后所面临的特殊文化处境;丧失故国、散居各地的犹太人,无论最初在罗马帝国境内,还是后来在西方基督教世界和东方伊斯兰世界,皆处于少数族地位,而且因为拒绝改宗,长期被排斥在主流社会之外,不仅文化上受歧视,法律上也被剥夺了许多权利,屡屡遭受迫害、驱逐、甚至屠杀。 在中世纪欧洲,经济活动、财产权利和法律地位都与宗教有着难分难解的关系,作为异教徒,犹太人不可能与基督徒君主建立领主-附庸关系从而承租土地,无法组织手工业行会(因为行会也须以附庸身份向领主获取特许状),也无法与贵族通婚以提升社会地位,甚至无法由教会法庭来保障自己的遗嘱得到执行……总之,作为封建体系之基础的封建契约关系和教会法,皆与之无缘。 这样一来,他们就被排斥在几乎所有重要的经济部门之外,留给他们的只有少数被封建关系所遗漏的边缘行业,比如教会禁止基督徒从事(或至少道德上加以贬责)的放贷业,替贵族征收租税的包税/包租人,与放贷和收租有关的私人理财业,以及少数未被行会垄断的商业。 这些行当的共同特点是:缺乏垄断权保护因而极富竞争性,需要一颗精明的头脑,读写和计算能力很重要;这些特点提示了,犹太父母可能更愿意投资于孩子的教育,提升其读写计算能力,以及一般意义上运用理性解决问题的能力。 这一投资策略迥异于传统社会的主流策略,在传统农业社会,人们为改善家族长期状况而进行的投资与积累活动,主要集中于土地、上层姻亲关系、社会地位和政治权力,但犹太人没有机会这么做,因而只能集中投资于人力资本,而且在随时有着被没收和驱逐风险的情况下,投资人力资本大概也是最安全的。 正如一些学者指出,按古代标准,犹太人确实有着良好的教育传统,比如其宗教传统要求每位父亲都应向儿子传授妥拉([[Torah]])和塔木德([[Talmud]])等经典,在识字率很低的古代,仅从经文学习中获得的基本读写能力也相当有价值。 然而这一解释有个问题,假如犹太人的智力优势仅仅来自其教育和文化传统,那就无法说明,为何近代以来,当这一文化差异已不复存在(或不再重要),他们的智力优势却依然显著?实际上,现代杰出犹太科学家的教育和成长经历中,犹太背景已无多大影响,甚至犹太认同本身也已十分淡薄了。 为解开犹太智力之谜,犹他大学的两位学者格里高列·科克伦([[Gregory Cochran]])和亨利·哈本丁([[Henry Harpending]])在2005年的一篇论文中提出了一个颇为惊人的观点:犹太智力优势是近一千多年中犹太民族在严酷选择压力之下的进化结果,因而有着可遗传的生物学基础;在2009年出版的《万年大爆炸》([[The 10,000 Year Explosion]])一书中,他们专门用一章介绍了这一理论。 他们认为,犹太人中表现出显著智力优势的,是其中被称为阿什肯纳兹人([[Ashkenazi]])的一个分支,其祖先是9-11世纪间陆续从南欧和中东翻越阿尔卑斯山进入中欧的犹太移民,和留在地中海世界的族人相比,他们遭受的排挤和限制更加严厉,职业选择更狭窄,而由于前面所说的原因,这些限制对族群的智力水平构成了强大的选择压力。 如此特殊的社会处境,使得聪明好学、头脑精明的个体有着高得多的机会生存下去,并留下更多后代,经过近千年三四十代的高强度选择,与高智商有关的遗传特性在种群中的频率显著提高;据乔恩·昂蒂纳(Jon Entine)和查尔斯·穆瑞([[Charles Murray]])等学者综合多种来源的数据估算,阿什肯纳兹人的平均智商约110(科克伦的估算值更高,为112-115),比美国同期平均水平高出10个点,相当于2/3个标准差。 对个体来说,10个点的智商优势或许不算很大,但对于一个上千万人的大群体,这一差距有着非常惊人的含义,假如智商确如查尔斯·穆瑞的研究所显示,在群体内呈正态分布,那么均值高出2/3个标准差便意味着该群体内智商高于140的个体的比例,大约是基准群体(此处是美国总人口)的6倍。 科克伦和哈本丁的假说还得到了一些遗传学证据的支持,有多种与神经系统相关的遗传病在阿什肯纳兹人中比例奇高,这些疾病涉及一些与神经突触形成有关的基因变异,它们倾向于增加神经元之间的突触连接,据两位作者推测,这些变异在恰当组合下会导致高智商,而在不恰当组合下则带来神经疾病。 这意味着,在偏爱高智商的高强度选择作用下,阿什肯纳兹人一方面提升了获得高智商的机会,同时也承担了罹患若干神经疾病的高风险,就像在疟疾肆虐的西非,一些族群获得了一种与血红蛋白相关的变异,在杂合子组合下,该变异将提高疟疾存活率,而不幸的纯合子组合则带来致命的镰刀型细胞贫血症。 不过,这一假说尚未得到广泛认可,主要的障碍是,将这样一个重大优势归因于短短一千年内的进化过程,很难让人接受,因为通常生物学家在谈论进化改变时,涉及的时间尺度至少几十万年,虽然在理论上,只要选择压力足够大,并且种群基因池里有足够多可供自然选择起作用的遗传多样性,几十代时间足以将一些原本罕见的变异的分布频率成倍提高,从而产生显著的族群间差异。 俄国遗传学家德米特里·别列耶夫([[Dmitry Konstantinovich Belyaev]])从一群野生银狐开始,只用了二十多年时间,便选育得到了非常温顺驯服的品种,它们在性情、毛色、耳朵、颅形等方面表现出一系列鲜明的驯化特征;原则上,没有什么可以阻止类似事情发生在人类身上。 实际上,正如两位作者在《万年大爆炸》的其他章节中列举的,以及尼古拉斯·韦德([[Nicholas Wade]])在2014年出版的《棘手遗产》([[A Troublesome Inheritance]])中讨论的更多例子所显示,人类在走出非洲后的几万年里,尤其是农业起源后的一万多年里,已经发生了许多显著且有重大意义的进化改变,其中有涉及乳糖消化,抵抗疟疾或饥荒,抵御寒冷,维生素D代谢,黑色素合成,骨密度等等与生态条件和生活方式有关的改变。 但阿什肯纳兹的分化历史毕竟只有千年,而现有的遗传证据也是间接的,尚没有直接证据可以说明究竟何种变异如何提高了智力;所以,一些学者便尝试考虑其他可能性,罗格斯大学人类学家布莱恩·弗格森([[R. B. Ferguson]])认为,阿什肯纳兹的独特性源自族群形成之初的奠基人效应([[founder effect]])。 奠基人效应的意思是,基因池毕竟不像充分搅匀的理想溶液,随便舀一勺,其成分构成都和整体一样;最初翻越阿尔卑斯的阿什肯纳兹祖先或许恰好携带了一些与神经系统有关的罕见变异,由于构成奠基人的最初移民人数很少,所以即便只有一个家族携带这些变异,它在未来壮大后的种群里也可能占很高比例。 这是一种诉诸偶然性的解释,假如涉及阿什肯纳兹智力优势的只有一个变异,那么奠基人效应便足以解释,问题是,科克伦列举的阿什肯纳兹中比例奇高的神经系统遗传病有四五种,涉及许多变异,而这些变异恰恰都与神经元突触形成有关,把它们都归之于奠基人效应,就很难让人信服了。 两位经济学家马里斯泰拉·波第西尼(Maristella Botticini)和兹维·埃克斯坦(Zvi Eckstein)在2012年出版的著作《蒙择之民》(The Chosen Few)中为我们开辟了另一条思路;他们首先注意到一个重要事实:从公元1世纪大流散时期到15世纪末,犹太人口在其所在社会总人口中的比例,始终在快速下降,从公元65年的10%降至1490年的1.1%。 但同时,并没有证据显示他们的生育率低于其他族群,很明显,不断有大批犹太人改宗为基督徒或穆斯林;考虑到他们作为少数教派面临着极为不利的社会处境,大批改宗也在意料之中;重要的是,哪些犹太人更可能选择改宗,并非随机,据一些早期基督徒作家观察,多数改宗基督教的犹太人都是穷人和文盲。 于是两位作者对犹太人的改宗决定进行了成本收益分析,发现这样的选择倾向是完全合理的;因为作为宗教少数派,流散的犹太人若要维持自己的宗教和文化传统,保持身份独特性,就需要花大量精力阅读和向孩子教授宗教经典,然而,对于那些从事农耕等体力劳动的家庭,这些投入没有额外价值,相反,对于那些从事精细手工业、商业、金融和管理类职业的家庭,由读经而获得的读写能力可以带来额外回报。 所以,坚持不改宗的,大多是从事城市的、需要读写能力和精明头脑的非体力职业者,而这些职业都是偏于高端和精英的,这一逻辑反过来也成立:那些天资聪颖,发现自己在读写学习上表现出众,因而有望由读经而获得上述职业机会的孩子,更有可能坚持读经而不改宗,总之,保留犹太身份的,要么是祖上智力较高因而有能力从事精英职业的,要么自己智力较高因而有望并希望从事精英职业的。 这样,个体对是否改宗的权衡,实际上对族群的智力构成了一种选择压力,但这一选择不像自然选择那样,是以影响个体生存机会和繁殖数量而起作用,被“淘汰”的个体并未死亡或绝后,只是离开了群体,但是就塑造族群的遗传特性而言,两种选择机制的效果是等价的。 而且,这一基于自我选择的解释,和科克伦与哈本丁的自然选择解释并不排斥,可以共同起作用;在分工和贸易不发达的中世纪,能够让犹太人发挥智力优势并抵消因社会地位低下而造成的生存劣势的职业机会十分有限,只有优势最显著者才能生存下来并保持犹太身份,而改宗的可能性加速了这一选择过程——这可以部分消除质疑者对“一千年是否足够长”的疑虑。 不过,和科克伦与哈本丁的理论一样,波第西尼与埃克斯坦的理论也仅仅是一种假说,正如一些历史学家所指出,他们对改宗与职业选择行为的经济学分析只是推测性的,尚缺乏经验证据的支持;然而,无论它是否能解释犹太智力优势,改宗权衡(或其他自我选择机制)在塑造少数族群文化特性上的作用却是毋庸置疑的,有众多同类例子可以佐证。 经济史学家格列高利·克拉克(Gregory Clark)便采纳了波第西尼与埃克斯坦的核心论点,并援引穆罕默德·萨利赫(Mohamed Saleh)2013年发表的一项研究指出,残存于伊斯兰世界的各种非伊斯兰小教派,包括犹太人,祆教徒(Zoroastrian),希腊正教徒,亚述基督徒,亚美尼亚基督徒,其精英化程度全都远高于穆斯林,表现为他们在医生、工程师、机械师、外语教师等精英职业中的比例奇高,而且这些族群的1/2到2/3都居住在汇集着富人和精英的大城市。 萨利赫认为,这一状况是伊斯兰政权统治政策的结果,他们一方面不强迫被征服者改宗,同时又对非穆斯林征收歧视性的人头税([[jizya]]),于是这些群体中付不起人头税的下层成员就只好改宗,只有那些从其宗教与文化传统中获益最多且足以抵偿人头税和其他少数派特有成本的成员,才愿意坚守其传统身份,这样,统治者的歧视性政策实际上是在替这些少数族群不断清除资质禀赋较差,因而难以在精英职业中取得成就的成员。 虽然萨利赫没有提到,但人头税只是少数派生活在多数派中间所需负担的诸多成本中的一项,除了社会地位低下,法定权利缺失,他们还要遭受多数派邻居的歧视、排斥和攻击,这项成本在农村比在城市高得多,和城市流动性社会相比,农村熟人小社会的文化更单一和封闭,更排他,更难以容忍少数派的存在。 从阿什肯纳兹人在基督教欧洲和众多小教派在伊斯兰世界的经历中,都可以看到,基于个人禀赋在特定社会条件下给个体带来的比较优势而做出的自我选择,在塑造少数族群的文化和遗传特质上扮演了关键角色,这一选择机制也可通过另一条途径——跨国移民——表现出来,它在美国这个移民国家产生了两种对比鲜明的结果。 在2015年出版的《儿子照样升起》([[The Son Also Rises]])第13章里,格列高利·克拉克分析了美国社会一些少数族群的精英化程度;克拉克使用各族群在医生律师等精英职业中的相对代表率来度量这一指标,所谓相对代表率,是指某群体在某职业中的出现频率与它在总人口中所占比例的比值,基准值为1。(这一度量方法的有效性,在该书其他章节中已得到验证,克拉克用来衡量社会地位的数据来源包括收入与财产水平,遗嘱档案中的出现频率,顶级大学入学率,在大学教授、政府高官和国会议员中的代表率,获得科举功名的比例,等等,结果显示,基于不同来源的衡量结果有着很强的相关性。) 犹太人为何那么聪明.图1 【图1】若干精英度偏高的美国少数族群在医生中的相对代表率 上图列出了在医生职业中的相对代表率高于1的16个少数族群,其中有些可能出乎许多人的意料,高居榜首的埃及科普特基督徒尤为惹眼,科普特人血缘上属于埃及土著,在罗马帝国后期皈依了基督教,并且直到阿拉伯征服之前,始终构成埃及人口的多数,在罗马和拜占庭帝国统治下,科普特人长期处于社会底层,与“精英”二字完全无缘,正是在阿拉伯人统治下,前述选择机制将它从一个底层多数群体改造成了少数精英族群。 然后,向美国的移民过程又发生了二次筛选,科普特人尽管在埃及有着较高精英度,但相对于发达国家仍是贫穷者,只有其中条件最优越、禀赋最优秀者,才能跨越移民门槛而进入美国,可以说,他们是精英中的精英。 但不是所有移民群体都有着较高的精英化程度,如下图所示,拉美人、柬埔寨人、赫蒙人([[Hmong]],即越南苗族),在医生中的代表率皆远低于基准水平。 犹太人为何那么聪明.图2 【图2】若干精英度偏低的美国族群在医生中的相对代表率 比较两组族群不难看出,造成这一差别的关键在于移民机会从何而来,不同性质的移民通道有着不同的选择偏向;拉丁裔移民大多利用靠近美国的地理优势,从陆地或海上穿越国境而来,柬埔寨人和赫蒙人则大多是1970年代的战争难民,这两类移民通道,对移民的个人禀赋都不构成正向选择;相比之下,其他移民通道——上大学、工作签证、投资移民、政治避难、杰出人士签证,都有着强烈的选择偏向。 观察这一差别的最佳案例是非洲裔美国人,在上面两张图表中都有他们的身影,图2中的黑人是指其祖先在南北战争前便已生活在美国的黑人,他们在医生中的代表率仅高于美洲原住民,图1中的非洲黑人是指南北战争后来自撒哈拉以南非洲的黑人移民,医生代表率4倍于基准水平,5倍于德裔和英裔美国人。 这一差别显然源自不同移民通道的选择偏向,老黑人的祖先是被贩奴船运到美洲的,而新黑人的祖先则是凭借自身优势或个人努力来到美国,往往来自母国的精英阶层,奥巴马便属于后一类,他来自肯尼亚的一个富裕家族,其曾祖父娶了5位妻子,祖父曾为英国军队服役,精通英语和读写,娶了至少3位妻子,父亲6岁便进入教会学校,后来又在夏威夷大学和哈佛大学取得学位,回国后先后在肯尼亚交通部和财政部担任经济学家,虽然只活了46岁,却娶过4位妻子,生了8个孩子。  
[译文]农作物类型如何影响制度进化

Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy
谷物、可收夺性和等级制

作者:Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:VoxEU,http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions

Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers.

传统理论认为,等级制和国家产生的缘由在于:人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出,上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此,仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区,才会产生等级制和国家。

What explains underdevelopment?
欠发达的原因是什么?

One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equato(more...)

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Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy 谷物、可收夺性和等级制 作者:Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:VoxEU,http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers. 传统理论认为,等级制和国家产生的缘由在于:人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出,上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此,仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区,才会产生等级制和国家。 What explains underdevelopment? 欠发达的原因是什么? One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equator. Acemoglu et al. (2001) point to extractive institutions as the root cause for underdevelopment. Besley and Persson (2014) emphasise the persistent effects of low fiscal capacity in underdeveloped countries. 我们这个时代最为紧迫的问题之一就是存在许多欠发达国家,而政府失灵在这些国家极为常见。它们大多数都位于赤道附近。Acemoglu等(2001年)认为,榨取型制度是欠发达的根本原因。Besley和Persson(2014年)强调,欠发达国家财政能力的低弱具有持久影响。 On the other hand, Diamond (1997) argues that it is geographical factors that explain why some regions of the world remain underdeveloped. In particular, he argues that the east-west orientation of Eurasia resulted in greater variety and productivity of cultivable crops, and in larger economic surplus, which facilitated the development of state institutions in this major landmass. Less fortunate regions, including New Guinea and sub-Saharan Africa, were left underdeveloped due to low land productivity. 而另一方面,Diamond(1997年)则提出,地理因素能够解释为什么世界某些地区会停留在欠发达状态。具体来说,他指出,欧亚大陆的东西走向使得适合驯化的谷物产量更大、种类更多,也使其经济剩余更多,后者为这块大陆上的国家制度的发展提供了便利。至于那些不那么幸运的地域,诸如新几内亚、撒哈拉以南非洲等,就因为土地生产率低下而停留在了欠发达状态。 In a recent paper (Mayshar et al. 2015), we contend that fiscal capacity and viable state institutions are conditioned to a major extent by geography. Thus, like Diamond, we argue that geography matters a great deal. But in contrast to Diamond, and against conventional opinion, we contend that it is not high farming productivity and the availability of food surplus that accounts for the economic success of Eurasia. 在最近的一篇论文(Mayshar等,2015年)中,我们主张:财政能力和国家机构的维系,很大程度上受地理条件限制。因此和Diamond一样,我们认为地理条件异常重要。不过与Diamond和其他传统观点不同的是,我们认为欧亚大陆的经济成功并非源于高农业生产率和获得粮食盈余的可能性。
  • We propose an alternative mechanism by which environmental factors imply the appropriability of crops and thereby the emergence of complex social institutions.
  • 我们提出了一个(用于解释国家起源的)替代机制:环境因素决定谷物的可收夺性,从而决定了复杂社会制度的产生。
To understand why surplus is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of hierarchy, consider a hypothetical community of farmers who cultivate cassava (a major source of calories in sub-Saharan Africa, and the main crop cultivated in Nigeria), and assume that the annual output is well above subsistence. 为了理解为什么粮食盈余既不是等级制产生的必要条件,也不是充分条件,让我们假设:有这么一个种植木薯(撒哈拉以南非洲的一种主要热量来源,尼日利亚的主要农作物)的农民群体,并且假设每年的产量远远超过生存所需。 Cassava is a perennial root that is highly perishable upon harvest. Since this crop rots shortly after harvest, it isn't stored and it is thus difficult to steal or confiscate. As a result, the assumed available surplus would not facilitate the emergence of a non-food producing elite, and may be expected to lead to a population increase. 木薯是多年生宿根植物,收获以后很容易腐烂。既然这种作物在收获后不久就会腐烂,它就不会被贮藏,因此很难被盗取或征用。结果就是,这种假定可以获得的粮食盈余将不会促成那些不事农业生产的统治精英的产生,而且可能会导致人口增长。 Consider now another hypothetical farming community that grows a cereal grain – such as wheat, rice or maize – yet with an annual produce that just meets each family's subsistence needs, without any surplus. Since the grain has to be harvested within a short period and then stored until the next harvest, a visiting robber or tax collector could readily confiscate part of the stored produce. Such ongoing confiscation may be expected to lead to a downward adjustment in population density, but it will nevertheless facilitate the emergence of non-producing elite, even though there was no surplus. 现在设想另外一个种植谷类作物的农民群体——比如小麦、稻米或者玉米,且假定这些作物的年产量只能刚好满足每个家庭的生存需求,没有任何盈余。因为粮食作物要在很短时间内收割完毕,并需要一直贮藏到下次收获,所以袭击而来的盗贼或者税吏可以很容易地拿走储藏量的一部分。这种不断出现的损失,可能会导致人口密度下降,但是它却会促进不事生产的统治精英的产生,尽管完全没有粮食盈余。 Emergence of fiscal capacity and hierarchy and the cultivation of cereals 财政能力及等级制的产生与谷物栽培的关系 This simple scenario shows that surplus isn't a precondition for taxation. It also illustrates our alternative theory that the transition to agriculture enabled hierarchy to emerge only where the cultivated crops were vulnerable to appropriation. 这个简单的设想表明,粮食盈余并不是税收的前提条件。同时,它也说明了我们所提出的新理论——农业转向促成了等级制的萌生,但这一过程只会发生在所培植的作物很容易被掠夺的地方。
  • In particular, we contend that the Neolithic emergence of fiscal capacity andhierarchy was conditioned on the cultivation of appropriable cereals as the staple crops, in contrast to less appropriable staples such as roots and tubers.
  • 具体来说,我们认为,财政能力与等级制在新石器时代出现,需要一个前提条件:以易于收夺的谷类为主要作物,而不是以不易收夺的块根和块茎作物等为主要作物。
According to this theory, complex hierarchy did not emerge among hunter-gatherers because hunter-gatherers essentially live from hand-to-mouth, with little that can be expropriated from them to feed a would-be elite. 根据这一理论,狩猎采集者群体中间没能产生复杂的等级制,是因为他们本质上是现挣现吃的,在他们身上很难征用到足够的资源来供养潜在的统治精英。
  • Thus, rather than surplus facilitating the emergence of the elite, we argue that the elite only emerged when and where it was possible to expropriate crops.
  • 因此,并非粮食盈余促进了统治精英的出现。我们认为,只有在粮食收成容易被征用的地方和时期,才会产生统治精英。
Due to increasing returns to scale in the provision of protection from theft, early farmers had to aggregate and to cooperate to defend their stored grains. Food storage and the demand for protection thus led to population agglomeration in villages and to the creation of a non-food producing elite that oversaw the provision of protection. 鉴于防备盗窃所带来的收益是随规模递增的,远古时代的农民们必须聚集在一起共同合作来守护他们的储粮。因此,食物贮藏和保护的需要使得人口集聚成村落,并且创造了负责提供保护而不事农业生产的精英。 Once a group became larger than a few dozen immediate kin, it is unlikely that those who sought protection services were as forthcoming in financing the security they desired. This public-good nature of protection was resolved by the ability of those in charge of protecting the stored food to appropriate the necessary means. 而一旦某个群体的数量超过了几十个直系亲属的规模的话,那么这些寻求保护性服务的人们就不太可能心甘情愿地支付维持众人渴望的安全所需的费用。解决安全保卫的这种公共物品性质,要求那些负责保护储粮的人提高自身对于必要财产的征用能力。
  • That is, we argue that it was this transformation of the appropriation technology, due to the transition to cereals, which created both the demand for protection and the means for its provision.
  • 也就是说,我们认为,是由于征用技术随着谷物种植出现而发生转变,才既创造了对于安全保卫的需求,也创造了提供安全保卫的手段。
This is how we explain the emergence of complex and hereditary social hierarchy, and eventually the state. 这就是我们解释复杂的、世袭性的社会等级制乃至国家最终形成的方法。 Applied to Diamond's prototypic contrast between Eurasia and New Guinea, our theory suggests that the crucial distinction between these two regions is that farming in Eurasia relied on the cultivation of cereals, while in New Guinea it relied mostly on the cultivation of tubers (yam and taro, and, more recently, sweet potato) and bananas, where long-term storage is neither feasible (due to perishability) nor necessary (because harvesting is essentially non-seasonal). 应用于Diamond对比欧亚大陆和新几内亚的原型理论,我们的理论表明:这两个地域之间最关键的差别是欧亚大陆的农业依赖于谷物栽培,而新几内亚依赖的主要是块茎作物(白薯,芋头,最近也有甘薯)和香蕉,这些作物既不可能长期保存(因为易腐性),又没有必要长期保存(因为收获时节基本上是非季节性的)。 This provided farmers in New Guinea with sufficient immunity against bandits and potential tax collectors. More generally, we contend that the underdevelopment of tropical areas is not due to low land fertility but rather the reverse. Farmers in the tropics can choose to cultivate highly productive, non-appropriable tuber crops. This inhibits both the demand for socially provided protection and the emergence of a protection-providing elite. It is a curse of plenty. 这使得新几内亚的农民们对抢匪和潜在的税吏有足够的免疫力。更一般地说,我们认为,热带地区的欠发达原因并不是土壤产出低,而是恰好相反。热带地区的农民可以选择种植高产量而不易收夺的块茎作物。这样就既抑制了对于作为社会公共品提供的保护的需求,也妨碍了负责提供保护的统治精英的出现。这是一种资源诅咒。 In the empirical section of our paper we demonstrate that, contrary to the standard productivity-and-surplus theory, land productivity per se has no direct effect on hierarchy. We also show that, consistent with our theory, the cultivation of roots or tubers is indeed detrimental to hierarchy. 在论文的实证部分,我们证明了,与标准的生产率—盈余理论不同,土地生产率本身对于等级制形成没有直接影响。我们同时也表明,种植块根和块茎作物确实是不利于等级制的形成,这与我们的理论一致。 Empirical finding 实证结果 These results are established by employing two datasets with information on social hierarchy: a cross section and a panel of countries. For our cross-sectional analysis we use Murdock's (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, which contains information on cultural, institutional, and economic features of 1,267 societies from around the world at an idealised time period of first contact with Europeans. Our main outcome variable is ‘jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community’. The Ethnographic Atlas also provides information on the major crop type grown by societies that practice agriculture. 上述结果是基于应用两个包含社会等级制信息的数据集而得出的:一组是截面数据,一组则是面板数据。在截面分析中,我们使用了Murdock的“民族志图集”(1967年),其中包含了世界各地1267个社群在刚刚接触欧洲人的理想化时间段内的文化、制度和经济特征方面的信息。我们主要的结果变量是“超越地方性社群的管辖层级”。“民族志地图”里面也提供了各个从事农业的社群所种植的主要作物种类的信息。 Since the cultivated crop is a decision variable, we instrument for the crop type by using data on land suitability for different crops from the Food and Agriculture Organisation. We first show that the decision whether to cultivate cereals as a main crop depends positively on the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers (in terms of potential caloric yields per hectare). 因为农作物是我们模型中的决策变量【编注:指模型中可加以控制或先于其他参数而改变的主动变量】,我们利用联合国粮农组织有关土地对不同作物之适宜性的数据,来推测各社群的农作物类型。首先我们分析表明,是否将谷物作为主要作物,实际上依赖于谷物对于块根和块茎作物的生产率优势(以每公顷的潜在热量产出计算)。 We then find that societies tend to have a more complex hierarchal organisation where the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers is higher, as predicted by our theory. Furthermore, we find that societies that practice agriculture are more hierarchical only where they cultivate cereals. This means that societies that cultivate roots and tubers have similar levels of hierarchy to those of pastoral or foraging societies. 而后我们发现,那些谷物比根块茎作物拥有更高生产率优势的社群,往往会拥有更复杂的层级机构,这与我们所提理论的预期相符。此外,我们发现,在从事农业生产的社群中,只有种植谷物的那些才具有更多的等级性质。这意味着,种植根块茎的社群与游牧社群或采集社群具有相似的社会分层水平。 We also show that land productivity, measured by the potential yield of calories per acre of the most productive crop in each area, does not affect hierarchy once we control for the productivity advantage of cereals. Thus, our empirical findings challenge the conventional argument that it is increased land productivity that leads to more hierarchical societies. 我们还展示了,一旦控制了谷物的生产率优势,土地生产率(以每个地方最适应生产的作物的每英亩潜在热量产出计算)就不会影响社会等级性。因此,我们的实证结果质疑了土地生产率提高导致社会等级性增强的传统理论。 Although this cross-sectional analysis accounts for a wide range of confounding factors, we cannot rule out completely that omitted variables may bias the estimates. To overcome this concern, we employ another dataset compiled by Borcan et al. (2014). This is a panel, based on present-day boundaries of 159 countries, with institutional information every five decades over the last millennium. 虽然这个截面分析考虑到了很多干扰因子,但我们依然不能完全排除遗漏某些变量造成推算偏差的可能性。为了解除这一疑虑,我们应用了另外一个由Borcan等人(2014年)编制的数据集。这是一项历时性数据,以159个国家的现代边界为基础,包含有过去一千年中每隔五十年的制度信息。 This panel enables us to exploit the ‘Columbian exchange’ of crops across continents as a natural experiment. The new crops that became available after 1492 in the New and the Old World changed both the productivity of land and the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers in the majority of the countries in the sample. 这项历时性数据使得我们可以把农作物跨越各大陆的“哥伦布交换”当作一个自然实验来利用。对于样本国家中的大多数而言,新旧两个大陆在1492年之后所得到的新型农作物都既改变了他们的土地生产率,也改变了谷物相对块根块茎作物的生产率优势。 Consistent with our theory, the panel regressions confirm that an increase in the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers has a positive impact on hierarchical complexity, while an increase in land productivity does not. 与我们的理论一致的是,基于历时性数据的回归分析证实:如果谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势增加,那就会对社会分层的复杂性产生正面影响,而土地生产率的增加则不会引发这种正面影响。 Concluding remarks 结论 These findings support our theory that it is not agricultural productivity and surplus per se that explains more complex hierarchical societies, but rather the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers, the type of crop that is cultivated as a result, and the appropriability of the crop type. Given that the productivity of roots and tubers is typically high in the tropics, these results also support the claim that deep-rooted geographical factors may explain the current weakness of state institutions in these regions. 这些发现支持了我们的理论:农业生产率和粮食盈余本身并不能解释更为复杂的等级制社会的出现,毋宁说,它们之出现,原因在于谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势,也就是由此导致的栽培农作物的种类选择以及此种农作物的可收夺性。鉴于块根块茎作物在热带地区产量一般来说更高,上述结论也支持这样一种说法:这些地域的国家机构的孱弱现状,可能从深层次的地理原因方面可以得到解释。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]历史如何造就美国人

Making Americans
造就美国人

作者:Will Morrisey @ 2015-11-25
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Online Library of Law and Liberty, http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/25/making-americans/

English settlers in America might have intended to transmit the traditions of the mother country to subsequent generations. This didn’t exactly happen—partly because the settlers disagreed amongst themselves about which of those traditions deserved preservation, and partly because the experience of life in North America challenged many of the traditions they did want to preserve. The disagreement and the adaptation together led, eventually, to a political revolution.

来到美洲的殖民者们也许曾经试图让来自祖国的传统在他们的后代身上延续下去,但这最终未能实现——部分是因为这些殖民者无法就哪些传统值得被保留达成一致,部分是因为在北美的生活经历让许多他们曾希望保留的传统受到了挑战。他们的这些分歧和适应行为最终导致了一场政治革命。

Malcolm Gaskill puts it bluntly: “Migrants did have one thing in common: they were no longer in England, and they had to get used to it.”

Malcolm Gaskill直言不讳地写道:“这些移民的确有一个共同点:他们不再生活在英格兰了,而他们必须去适应这种新生活。”

His new book tracks what happened to the English in their three (very different) principal area(more...)

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Making Americans 造就美国人 作者:Will Morrisey @ 2015-11-25 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Online Library of Law and Liberty, http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/25/making-americans/ English settlers in America might have intended to transmit the traditions of the mother country to subsequent generations. This didn’t exactly happen—partly because the settlers disagreed amongst themselves about which of those traditions deserved preservation, and partly because the experience of life in North America challenged many of the traditions they did want to preserve. The disagreement and the adaptation together led, eventually, to a political revolution. 来到美洲的殖民者们也许曾经试图让来自祖国的传统在他们的后代身上延续下去,但这最终未能实现——部分是因为这些殖民者无法就哪些传统值得被保留达成一致,部分是因为在北美的生活经历让许多他们曾希望保留的传统受到了挑战。他们的这些分歧和适应行为最终导致了一场政治革命。 Malcolm Gaskill puts it bluntly: “Migrants did have one thing in common: they were no longer in England, and they had to get used to it.” Malcolm Gaskill直言不讳地写道:“这些移民的确有一个共同点:他们不再生活在英格兰了,而他们必须去适应这种新生活。” His new book tracks what happened to the English in their three (very different) principal areas of settlement: Virginia, New England, and the Caribbean. He also keeps an eye on what the English who stayed at home—financing these expeditions and attempting to rule them from afar—thought and did, especially in competition with the Spanish, who had settled large swaths of the New World a long time before their geopolitical rivals in London really got started. 他的新书追踪了弗吉尼亚、新英格兰和加勒比这三个(差别非常大的)主要殖民区域中发生在这些英国殖民者身上的历史。在书中,他同样关注了那些为这些殖民者的远征提供财力支持,并试图在遥远的英国统治他们的英国人的所想所为,尤其是他们与西班牙人之间的竞争——西班牙人早在他们伦敦的地缘政治对手开始向“新大陆”进军之前很久就已经在那里占据了大片土地。 This gives Between Two Worlds: How the English Became Americans a lot to do, but the author, a professor of early modern history at the University of East Anglia, manages his unruly topic by considering each of the first three settler generations in turn. 这些内容让写作《两个世界之间:英国人是如何成为美国人的》这本书成了一项繁重的任务,但本书作者,一位在东安格利亚大学研究早期现代史的教授,通过分别研究最初的三代殖民者,成功地处理了他所面对的这一难以驾驭的课题。 Gaskill deals in his prologue with the inauspicious 16th century beginnings of the project, remarking that the English understandably modeled their efforts on the recent conquest of Ireland, the wild tribes of which reminded them of their own pre-Roman-conquest ancestors and of the North American peoples. Gaskill在本书序言中讨论了16世纪初英国人开拓北美殖民地时所遇到的不顺利的开端,并提到英国人当时的殖民行为仿照的是他们最近对爱尔兰的征服,这并不稀奇,那里的蛮族部落让他们想起了自己的祖先在“罗马征服”之前的样子和现在的这些北美原住民。 The first settlement, at Roanoke, “Virginia” in 1585—named for Elizabeth, the Virgin Queen, of course—vanished from the earth like Prospero’s insubstantial pageant. To this day, we don’t know what happened to its more than 100 inhabitants. 他们1585年在以“童贞女王”伊丽莎白命名的“弗吉尼亚”的罗阿诺克建立了第一个殖民地,后来就像莎翁笔下普罗斯彼罗的虚幻盛宴一样从地球上消失了。直到今天,我们还是不知道那一百多位居民身上发生了什么。 The years 1607 to 1640 mark Gaskill’s first generation of permanent settlers. Of the four million English in 1600, thousands would journey to the New World during this period. Half of them went to the West Indies, slightly more than a third to the Virginia/Chesapeake area, only 15 percent to New England. 从1607年到1640年,Gaskill所定义的第一代永久殖民者来到了北美。1600年生活在英国的四百万人口中,有数千人将在这一时期踏上前往“新大陆”的旅途。他们中的一半去了西印度群岛,略多于三分之一去了弗吉尼亚/切萨皮克地区,仅有15%去了新英格兰。 Motives varied, but as the “southerly” movement of the new arrivals  suggests, the prospect of a mild climate fit for rich plantations and an interest in “resisting Spanish Catholics—the dark lords of an American empire”—figured prominently in English ambitions. 虽然动机各不相同,但这些新来者们向南方的迁移说明,对适宜大型种植园的温和气候和“抵抗美洲帝国的黑暗领主——西班牙天主教徒们”的兴趣是英国人的主要野心所在。 To wrest land from the infidels of Spain and from pagan indigenes—better still, while converting the latter to Protestant Christianity—reconciled, at least to the satisfaction of the English, desires for both liberty and empire. (Two centuries later, Thomas Jefferson’s formula, “the empire of liberty,” would address the same paradox, albeit in very different terms.) 至少对于英国人来说,从西班牙异端以及异教的土著人手中夺取土地——要是能同时将后者转变为新教基督徒就更好,这恰好将英国人既追求自由又寻求建立帝国统治的两个目标统一了起来。(两个世纪之后,托马斯·杰弗逊提出的“自由帝国”一词也回应了同一悖论,虽然是以一种非常不同的形式。) Upon ascending the throne in 1603, James I followed a two-track strategy with Spain. He made peace while endorsing some New World plantations. King James’ restraint in New World settlement bespoke not only diplomatic caution but also the worry (prescient, as it would happen) that large English settlements in the New World might upset England’s place “in the hierarchy of nations.” 自从1603年登上王位,詹姆士一世就以一种“双轨策略”来对付西班牙。在向“新大陆”的一些种植园提供支持的同时,他也维持着与西班牙之间的和平关系。詹姆士国王在“新大陆”殖民事业上的克制不仅仅显示出他在外交上的谨慎,同时也表现出他的一种担忧:英国在“新大陆”的大规模殖民活动可能会打乱本国在“国家的层级体系”中所处位置(之后发生的事情也证明了这一担忧的确很有先见之明)。 The New World tail might someday wag the Old World dog. He took care not to use the Crown’s money for investment, leaving colonization to private speculators who nonetheless remained under royal control. Hence the Virginia Company and the Plymouth Adventurers, both established in 1606. “新大陆”的发展终有一天会对“旧大陆”构成尾大不掉之势。他小心翼翼地避免使用皇室的钱进行投资,将殖民活动留给那些仍然处于皇室控制之下的私人投机客们。正是在这种背景下,弗吉尼亚公司和普利茅斯探险者公司同时在1606年成立了。 The former reached the Chesapeake Bay under the command of Captain John Smith the following year, founding Jamestown and meeting resistance above all from the Indian chiefs or Paw-Paws, who recognized a rival form of worship when they saw one. As Gaskill puts it, “Indian suspicion on one side, and a haughty sense of entitlement on the other, guaranteed an Anglo-Indian future steeped in misery and bloodshed.” 弗吉尼亚公司的船队在John Smith船长的指挥下于次年来到了切萨皮克湾,他们建立了詹姆斯敦,并且遇到了一些印第安首领(也称Paw-Paw)【校注:根据原书,此处应为paw-waw,印第安人中的神职人员】的抵抗,他们把任何与他们有着不同崇拜的人都视为敌人。正如Gaskill所写道的,“一边是多疑的印第安人,而另一边则是英国人傲慢的特权感,这为之后盎格鲁-印第安人之间血腥而悲惨的历史埋下了伏笔。” And this notwithstanding the marriage of the entrepreneur John Rolfe to “Pocahantas” (her real name, Mataoka, concealed from the English), optimistically renamed “Rebecca,” after the Biblical mother of two nations. She died less than a decade later, after a publicity tour of England, taking the rather faint hope of peaceful intermarriage and Christian conversion of the Indians with her. 尽管来自英国的企业家John Rolfe娶了土著公主“宝嘉康蒂”(她的真名Mataoka却不为英国人所知),并且她还起了一个富有乐观精神的新名字“Rebecca”——圣经中两个民族的母亲【编注:据《旧约·创世纪》,利百加(Rebecca)为以撒(Issac)之妻,生孪生子雅各(Jacob)和以扫(Esau),分别为以色列人和以东人(Edomites)的始祖,有些说法认为阿拉伯人是以东人后裔。】,但仅仅过了不到十年,她在一次宣传性质的英国之旅后就去世了,同时也带走了本就十分渺茫的和平联姻以及将印第安人转变为基督徒的希望。 The real answer to lasting English settlement in America was political thought. “Adventurers had to learn that merely installing English settlements in America was not enough,” Gaskill writes. “They had to identify things that made England work socially, politically, and economically and reproduce them. Peopling the land was the key.” 英国人在美洲维持长期殖民的真正答案在于政治思想。“探险者们必须懂得,仅仅在美洲建立英国殖民地是不够的,”Gaskill写道。“他们必须找出那些让英国在社会层面、政治层面和经济层面得以运转下去的东西,并将这套东西移植到新大陆上,让其生根发芽。在这片土地上繁衍生息才是关键。” If ever a people were, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous phrase, forced to be free, it was the English in North America. More specifically, they were forced to think, and to think politically. It was a habit that would eventuate in independence and republicanism, nearly two centuries later. 如果历史上确有一群人——用卢梭的名言来说——是被迫成为自由人的,那说的就是北美洲的英国人了。更准确的说,他们是被逼着去思考政治问题。这个习惯最终在大约两个世纪之后孕育出了美国的独立和共和主义。 The Indian nations and tribes, who had been engaged in fierce geopolitical struggles amongst themselves for centuries, quickly saw the danger of any substantial territorial encroachments by the newcomers. At best, the white strangers might be deployed against traditional enemies. 那些已经陷入彼此之间的地缘政治斗争长达几个世纪的印第安民族和部落们,很快就发现了新来者们带来的巨大的领土入侵威胁。对他们来说,在最好的设想之下,可以利用这些白种陌生人攻击自己的宿敌。 Incidentally, one of the merits of Between Two Worlds is its treatment of the Indians—a treatment free of the American triumphalism of the old accounts, and also of the condescending sympathy for “Native Americans” fashionable in the past half-century. 顺便提一下,《两个世界之间》这本书的优点之一就是其中对印第安人的处理——它摆脱了陈腐的美国必胜心理,同时也摆脱了过去半个世纪中流行的那种带有优越感的对“美洲原住民”的同情心态。 Gaskill describes but makes no attempt to justify the sudden attack on Jamestown masterminded by the apparently friendly Powhatan chief, Opechancanough, whose men murdered 387 unsuspecting settlers in March 1622, then mangled the carcasses. Gaskill仅仅是描述了由那位之前表现得明显很友好的Powhatan部落酋长Opechancanough所策划的对詹姆斯敦的突袭,而完全没有试图为其辩护,在这场发生于1622年3月的突袭中,Opechancanough酋长的部下们杀死了387名毫无戒心的殖民者,之后还将他们的尸体砍得支离破碎。 After that, “Throughout the Atlantic world, men decided that Indians could not be trusted.” Settler eminences now began to speak not of intermarriage, peaceful trade, and conversion but of the right of war and the law of nations exercised against savages. 在那之后,“在整个大西洋世界中,人们决定不再信任印第安人。”殖民地的精英们不再谈论与印第安人通婚、和平贸易或者说服他们皈依基督教,而开始谈论战争权利以及针对野蛮人的国际公法。 As for the Plymouth Adventurers and their descendants, the New Englanders faced analogous circumstances but with a different set of Indian nations, in a harsher climate; and they arrived with more intense religious aspirations. A band of Protestant dissidents landed at “New Plymouth” in 1620, settling in territory where the local tribe had been eradicated by disease. 而对于普利茅斯探险者公司及其后继者们,这些新英格兰人所面临的处境与弗吉尼亚公司非常类似,只是他们所面对的是一些不同的印第安民族,和更加严酷的气候,而他们在到达时也怀揣着更加强烈的宗教愿望。一群持异见的新教徒在1620年到达了“新普利茅斯”,并在一个被疾病所消灭的当地部落所在地建立了殖民地。 Interestingly, Gaskill notes that the Mayflower Compact was no “democratic constitution but a company contract to bind the strangers to order upon landing, a quick fix before formal authority was established.” (Many of the Pilgrims were Dutch.) 有趣的是,Gaskill提到,“五月花号公约”实际上并不是什么“民主宪法,而是一份为了让那群陌生人上岸之后能够服从命令的公司合同,是在正式权力机构建立之前的一条权宜之计”。(这些最初的移民中很多都是荷兰人。) In the same vein, he points out that this and similar settlements in New England didn’t establish beachheads for political liberty; John Winthrop’s 1630 Salem founding was a theocracy supervised by God’s vicegerent, Mr. Winthrop. 同样地,他还指出,该殖民地和新英格兰地区的其他殖民地所建立的,并非是政治自由的桥头堡;John Winthrop于1630年在塞勒姆建立的殖民地是一个在上帝的代理人——也就是Winthrop先生本人——监督之下的神权政体。 The settlements were democratic only in Tocqueville’s social sense: No titled aristocrats made the trip. By “liberty” the settlers meant, in the frank words of one, a world free of bishops. 这些殖民地仅仅在托克维尔所说的社会意义上,才有些民主的样子:越洋而来的人群中不存在拥有头衔的贵族。对于这些殖民者而言,借用他们中某人的坦率说法,“自由”仅仅意味着一个没有主教的世界。 As for the West Indies, settlers worried less about Indians than about the heat, the hurricanes, and the disease-carrying mosquitoes. There, a new aristocracy began to take shape, based on slaves who were imported from Africa to work in a climate Europeans could not bear to work in. By the 1630s the Virginia settlers were beginning to do the same thing. The portentous social distinction between South and North had begun to take shape. 对于那些来到西印度群岛的殖民者们,相比印第安人,更加困扰他们的是炎热的天气,狂暴的飓风,还有蚊虫带来的疾病。在那里,一种新的贵族政治开始成型,而它的基础则是从非洲引入的黑奴,只有他们才能在欧洲人无法忍受的气候里劳作。而到了1630年代,弗吉尼亚的殖民者们也开始做同样的事情。北美大陆的南部和北部之间令人不安的社会差异开始逐步成型。 Having made his peace with Spain, James I faced increasingly sharp resistance to his rule from Protestants at home, their suspicions roused especially by the king’s attempts to marry his eldest son to one Catholic princess after another (success came in 1625, when the future Charles I wedded Henrietta Maria of France). By the time the second generation of English Americans took charge, relations with Indians had become foreign relations, slavery was giving rise to a set of New World aristocrats, and civil war loomed in England itself. 在与西班牙握手言和之后,詹姆士一世国王面临着来自国内新教徒日益锐利的抵抗。国王不断地试图让自己的长子迎娶一位又一位天主教公主的行为(最终在1625年,未来的查理一世成功地迎娶了法国的Henrietta Maria公主)特别激起了他们强烈的质疑。第二代英裔美洲殖民者登上历史舞台之后,他们与印第安人之间的关系已经成为了一种外交关系,而奴隶制则成就了一批新大陆的新贵,与此同时,内战的阴霾开始笼罩在英国上空。 With the war, second-generation colonists, writes Gaskill, “were forced to examine their consciences and allegiances to decide what being English meant and what it meant to belong physically and spiritually to America.” Gaskill写道,随着英国内战的进行,第二代殖民者“被迫去审视他们的良知和忠诚,以确定英国人的身份究竟意味着什么,以及在肉体和精神上都归属于美洲又意味着什么。” The First English Civil War— which pitted a new and more absolutist monarch, Charles I, against Oliver Cromwell and his Puritan “Roundheads”—stirred existing factions in North America, engaging them not only in the political thought forced upon the first generation but in regime-changing political thought. These passions mixed with passions aroused by the already worsening settler-Indian relations. 第一次英国内战——这次内战让一位更加崇尚专制的新国王查理一世陷入了与奥利弗·克伦威尔和他的清教徒“圆颅党”们的斗争——搅浑了北美英国殖民者之间本已存在的分歧,这让他们不仅仅需要面对上一代殖民者们被迫进行的政治思考,还需要作出与政权更替有关的新政治思考。而更糟的是,这些感情还与被已经持续恶化的殖民者和印第安人之间的关系所激起的感情杂糅在了一起。 Puritan victory in England meant that it became, briefly, more like New England. A new Reformation was imposed, this one described as a “Reformation of manners,” including capital punishment for adultery and what Gaskill calls “a united front against popery.” (The draconian law against adultery never saw rigorous enforcement—probably a good thing for the sake of continued English population growth. One emigrant to Virginia wrote that the deer in his new country were as numerous as cuckolds in England.) 简单地说,清教徒的胜利意味着英国变得更像新英格兰了。清教徒们实施了一次新的宗教改革运动,这次叫做“礼俗改革”,包括对通奸行为实施死刑以及Gaskill所说的“对罗马天主教的联合抵制。”(惩罚通奸行为的严厉法律从来没有被严格执行过——也许对于人口的持续增长来说,这反而是件好事。一位来到弗吉尼亚的移民曾写道,在他的新国家里,鹿的数量几乎和英国戴绿帽子的男人一样多。) Puritan victory did not bring dismantlement of the king’s wartime bureaucracy, which the Puritans simply took over, continuing extralegal absolutism but in clerical garb. The new republic saw the abolition of the House of Lords, the established church, and the monarchy, but the empowered Cromwell and Parliament had no more intention to frame a liberal republic than had the Puritan fathers of New England. 清教徒们的胜利并没有清除掉服务于国王的战时官僚体系,他们直接接管了这个体系,并继续维持着凌驾于法律之上的专制主义,只是站在它背后的换成了一群穿着牧师衣服的人。新的共和政府废除了议会上院,废黜了国教和君主,但是大权在握的克伦威尔和议会并不比那些建立了新英格兰殖民地的清教徒们更希望建立一个自由的共和国。 Although a bit lax in enforcing the adultery laws, both England and New England went after suspected witches, with England initiating the attacks and (surprisingly, given subsequent accounts) surpassing the New England courts in handing down convictions. At least New England magistrates “insisted on proof of a satanic pact,” unlike their more ardent English-Puritan counterparts. 虽然在执行惩罚通奸的法律上有些松懈,但在英国国内和新英格兰都掀起了搜捕女巫的运动,这事情最初在英国发起,且英国法庭判定的有罪女巫多于新英格兰的法庭(与后世的记录相对照,这一点很令人吃惊)。至少新英格兰的地方法官们会“坚持要求拿出女巫与魔鬼订过契约的证据”才会定罪,而不像他们更加富有激情的英国清教徒同僚们那样随意。 Fleeing in defeat, Royalists went to the West Indies, sometimes to Virginia. When Parliament threatened to pursue them across the water, they allied themselves with local champions of self-government as putative advocates of—what else, if not the tradition of the English common law (for which the Stuarts and their allies had previously shown little regard). 在经历了失败之后,英国的保皇党们逃向了西印度群岛,也有一些去了弗吉尼亚。当议会威胁要跨过大西洋追捕他们时,他们与当地的自治拥护者们结成了同盟,并把他们假想为——除了英国普通法的传统之外,还能是别的什么呢——的拥护者(但斯图亚特王室及其同盟者在之前可并没有对这一传统表现出多少尊重)。 Cromwell’s designation as “Emperor of the West Indies” put English republicanism, such as it was, on the side of statist centralization. Because the monarchy had sold off most of its lands under the Tudors, the new statists had no choice but to obtain revenues through taxation. 克伦威尔的“西印度群岛皇帝”头衔将英国本已破败不堪的共和主义完全变成了中央集权。由于王室已经在都铎时期卖掉了大部分土地,新来的中央集权者们别无选择,只能通过征税来获得收入。 Back along the Chesapeake, Catholics and Protestants fought each other in Maryland, with Protestants from as far away as Massachusetts joining the fight, which the Protestants eventually won at the Battle of Severn (near Annapolis) in 1655. 再看切萨皮克湾沿岸,天主教徒和新教徒们此时正在马里兰打得不可开交。新教徒一边的参战者甚至有从马萨诸塞远道而来的,最终于1655年在赛汶河(靠近安纳波利斯)战役后获得了最终的胜利。 By the time of Cromwell’s assassination in 1658, New England and Virginia had established themselves economically. Trade began to eclipse religiosity in both places. As it did in England: Charles II, crowned in 1660, proved considerably more latitudinarian in doctrine and in morals than were the Puritans. 到1658年克伦威尔被刺杀时,新英格兰和弗吉尼亚已经能够在经济上自食其力了。在这两个地区,贸易的影响力都已大大超过宗教。在英国也是如此:1660年登上王位的查理二世表明自己在宗教和道德方面比之前的清教徒们要开明得多。 Increased trade also brought greater demand for slaves, especially in the West Indies; not only Africans but English prisoners, Scottish rebels, and the ever-beleaguered Irish were “barbadosed.” Charles II did prove disappointing to merchants in one important respect: Needing revenues as much as his father and as much as Cromwell, he renewed the stiff regulation of trade. 贸易的繁荣同样刺激了对奴隶的更大需求,在西印度群岛尤其如此。不但是非洲人,甚至连英国犯人、苏格兰反叛者和那些一直处于英格兰围困下的爱尔兰人都被放逐到了巴巴多斯充当奴隶。查理二世的确在一个重要的方面让商人们大失所望:他和他的父王还有克伦威尔一样,需要大量的收入,所以他恢复了之前对贸易的严厉管制。 As Gaskill observes, the English civil/revolutionary wars proved to Americans that their difficulties with the mother country arose not simply as a result of defective regimes—monarchs and parliaments alike exacted revenues and demanded obedience—but as a result of the empowerment of the modern state, quite apart from its regime form. A century later, their descendants’ Declaration of Independence excoriated not only the monarch/tyrant but also the Parliament for, among other things, sending tax collectors to eat out their substance. 正如Gaskill所观察到的,英国的革命和内战向美国人证明:他们与祖国之间的问题不仅仅出于有缺陷的政权——不论是君主还是议会,都向他们榨取大量的收入,并且要求他们的绝对服从——而更是肇源于现代国家的权力,不仅仅是政体形态的问题。一个世纪之后,他们的后人发表的“独立宣言”中不仅仅严厉地声讨了暴虐的君主,也同样声讨了英国议会派遣税务官来剥削他们财富的行为。 Increased trade also spelled trouble for the Indians. The more prosperous the American English became, the more numerous they were; the more numerous they were, the more land they wanted. In Virginia, especially, where plantation owners had locked up the best land, new settlers pressed westward. 贸易的繁荣同样给印第安人带来了麻烦。北美的英国人越是兴旺,他们的人数就会变得越多;而他们的人数越多,就会想要越多的土地。特别是在弗吉尼亚,那里的种植园主们已经圈定了最好的土地,而新来的殖民者则不得不向西去开拓新的土地。 Meanwhile the British Empire set down its own, grander, imperial policy. In the words of diarist John Evelyn: 与此同时,大英帝国则确定下了它自己更加宏大的帝国政策。用日记作者John Evelyn的话来说就是:
Whoever Commands the Ocean Commands the Trade of the World, and whoever Commands the Trade of the World Commands the Riches of the World, and whoever is Master of that Commands the World it self. 谁控制了海洋,谁就能控制全世界的贸易,而谁控制了全世界的贸易,也就控制了全世界的财富,而他也就成为了整个世界的主宰。
Charles II resumed the strategy that had been set down decades earlier by the disgraced Francis Bacon, that of “merg[ing] politics, profit, and natural philosophy”—the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate, and particularly the British estate. 查理二世重新采用了由失势的弗朗西斯·培根【译注:培根于1621年被控贪污受贿,被判罚金和监禁,后来虽被豁免,但政治生涯却因此终结】在几十年前所定下的策略,也就是“将政治、利益和自然哲学合而为一”——通过征服自然来解放人的状况,特别是英国人的状况。 By now, about 60,000 English settlers lived in New England. Metacom, or “King Philip” of the Wampanoags, began a major war against them. “This was for the second generation what sea crossings and scratch-building had been for the first: a hardening, defining experience.” 此时已有大约6万名英国殖民者生活在新英格兰。Metacom,即万帕诺亚格部落的“菲利普王”发动了一场针对这些英国人的大规模战争。“对于第二代殖民者们来说,这场战争的意义就像是乘船渡海和白手起家对于第一代殖民者的意义一样:这是一次定义并强化他们身份的经历。” Using what we now call guerrilla tactics, the coalition of Indian tribes fought through the bitter winter of 1675-76, taunting their captives with the question, “Where is your God now?” Gaskill describes the “extravagant cruelty” of Indian and Englishman alike: “Indians tortured because martial ritual required it, the English to obtain intelligence.” 通过使用今天被称为游击战的战术,印第安部落联军在1675-76年的寒冬里奋勇作战,并讥讽他们的俘虏,问他们“现在你的上帝去哪儿了?”Gaskill在描述印第安人和英国人时都使用了“过分残忍”这个相同的字眼:“印第安人折磨俘虏,因为这是他们尚武仪式的要求,而英国人折磨俘虏则是为了获得情报。” Two thousand settlers died before the Indian coalition surrendered in July 1677. Sporadic Indian raids continued, and the colonists duly noted that their British brethren had offered no protective aid aside from parish collections, “which were mere gestures.” Nor did the British prove any more helpful in Maryland, where settlers put down a similar uprising. 在1677年7月印第安联军投降之前,有两千名殖民者死于这场战争。此后,印第安人零星的袭击仍在持续,而这些殖民者们也很好地意识到:他们的英国同胞除了搞一些教堂募捐之外,并没有为他们提供什么别的保护,“而这完全是一些象征性的帮助。”而在马里兰,英国人也并没有证明自己能够提供更多的帮助,那里的殖民者们也镇压了一场类似的印第安人起义。 By the third generation, writes Gaskill, “experience set the colonists apart, creating opposition internally and with England.” Struggles with Indians continued; in the north the tribes began to ally with the French, another Catholic enemy. Catholic James II ascended the throne in 1685, after Charles II died, intensifying the worries of Anglo-American Protestants. 到第三代殖民者的时候,“在北美不同地区的经历将这些殖民者们分隔开来,在他们内部和他们与英国之间造成了对立。”Gaskill写道。与印第安人的斗争仍在继续;在北部,印第安部落开始与英国殖民者的另一个天主教敌人法国结盟。信奉天主教的詹姆士二世于1685年查理二世死后登上英国王位,而这进一步加剧了盎格鲁-美利坚新教徒们的担忧。 West Indian and Virginian settlers added to their slave populations and simultaneously to their worries about slave rebellions. Along the Chesapeake, in the 1680s alone the slave population rose from 4,500 to 12,000. This increase also decreased incidences of manumission; a people engaged in demographically-based dominance of the Indians had no intention of being overwhelmed by emancipated African slaves. 西印度群岛和弗吉尼亚的殖民者增加了他们的奴隶数量,而这也同时加剧了他们对奴隶叛乱的担忧。在切萨皮克湾沿岸,仅仅在1680年代奴隶数量就从4500人上升到了12000人。而这种数量增加也降低了奴隶解放运动事件的几率;一群忙于在人口数量上对印第安人形成优势的殖民者绝不希望自己在数量上被那些被解放的非洲奴隶们超过。 No solution—even in theory—to any of these ethno-political or religio-political dilemmas was available to Americans until a writer of the time, John Locke, began publishing. A political regime founded upon the principle of equal natural rights could form the basis of racial and religious peace in a political community that actually framed laws to conform to that principle. 即使从理论上说,当时也没有任何办法能够帮助美国人解决这些民族政治和宗教政治难题,直到那个时代的一位作家开始著书立说,他就是约翰·洛克。如果一个政治共同体的法律确实能遵从平等的自然权利原则,那么它那建立在此原则之上的政权就能够为种族间和宗教间的和平提供基础。 Gaskill mentions Locke in passing but mistakes his natural rights philosophy for “pragmatism.” What made the third generation of Americans react against the excesses of the last witch-hunting spasm, in 1690s Salem, was not pragmatism but an understanding of Christianity that Americans in New England were the first to begin to integrate into their laws. Gaskill在书中顺带提到了洛克,但却将他的自然权利哲学误认为是“实用主义”。面对1790年代塞勒姆掀起的最后一场追捕女巫的过分风潮,第三代美国人奋起反对,而促使他们这么做的并不是什么“实用主义”,而是基于对基督教义的理解,新英格兰的美国人也率先将这种理解整合到了他们的法律中。 Writes Gaskill: “Boston’s Brattle Street Church was founded in 1698 not upon scriptural literalism, the ‘New England way,’ or a covenant, but upon nature, reason, and inclusiveness”—in other words, upon a combination of Christianity and Lockean philosophy. What remained of the older generations, he concludes, was a legacy of “extraordinary courage.” Gaskill写道:“波士顿Brattle街教堂建立于1698年,它的建立并非基于‘新英格兰式’的圣经字面主义,或基于一个宗教誓约,它的基础是自然、理性与包容。”——换句话说,它建立在基督教和洛克哲学的结合之上。他总结道,老一代人为新的殖民者们所留下的遗产仅仅是他们“非凡的勇气”。 The commercial republic of the future would prove battle-ready, to the dismay of its enemies for centuries to come. 这个未来的商业共和国将会证明它已经做好了战斗的准备,而这将让它此后数个世纪的敌人们都感到沮丧。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]伊斯兰的新教运动

Tom Holland: We must not deny the religious roots of Islamic State
Tom Holland: 我们不能否认伊斯兰国的宗教根基

作者:Tom Holland @ 2015-3-17
译者:Horace Rae
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:News Statesman,http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/03/tom-holland-we-must-not-deny-relgious-roots-islamic-state

Its jihadis call for a global caliphate. So why deny religion drives Isis?

伊斯兰圣战者呼吁建立一个全球哈里发帝国。所以,我们何以否认伊斯兰国乃由宗教所驱动?

in 1545, a general council of the Western Church was convened by Pope Paul III in the Tyrolean city of Trent. The ambition of the (more...)

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Tom Holland: We must not deny the religious roots of Islamic State Tom Holland: 我们不能否认伊斯兰国的宗教根基 作者:Tom Holland @ 2015-3-17 译者:Horace Rae 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:News Statesman,http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/03/tom-holland-we-must-not-deny-relgious-roots-islamic-state Its jihadis call for a global caliphate. So why deny religion drives Isis? 伊斯兰圣战者呼吁建立一个全球哈里发帝国。所以,我们何以否认伊斯兰国乃由宗教所驱动? in 1545, a general council of the Western Church was convened by Pope Paul III in the Tyrolean city of Trent. The ambition of the various bishops and theologians in attendance was to affirm Catholic doctrine in the face of the Protestant Reformation. Accordingly, when the council issued its first significant decree on 8 April 1546, it was targeted very precisely at what the delegates saw as most noxious about Luther and his followers. 1545年,教皇保禄三世主持的天主教会大公会议在提洛尔地区的塔兰托召开。与会的主教和神学家们想要在新教改革如火如荼之际巩固天主教信条的地位。于是,1546年4月8日,当会议发布第一条重要教令时,其对象很明确,就是被代表们视为罪大恶极的路德及其追随者。 Whereas Protestants, following Luther’s lead, aspired to strip away the cladding of tradition and learn the will of God from scripture alone, the Council of Trent condemned this ambition as a pernicious heresy. Divine revelation, it declared firmly, was not confined to the Bible. Tradition, too, “preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession”, expressed the essence of Christ’s teachings. To doubt this was no longer to rank as Christian. 跟随路德指引的新教徒们决意打破传统,只从经文中领悟上帝的意志。塔兰托大公会议谴责这种想法,称其为罪大恶极的异端邪说。会议坚持,神圣启示并非只存在于《圣经》之中。传统——“经由连续传承而被保存在天主教会中”——也同样能传达上帝教导的实质。质疑这一说法的人将被剥夺基督徒身份。 It is in a kindred spirit that Mehdi Hasan, in his article in last week’s issue of the New Statesman, would deny the title of Islamic to Islamic State, also known as Isis. That Isis militants, in justifying their actions, can quote the Quran, or the example or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, does not necessarily make them orthodox Muslims. 在上周New Statesman 杂志刊登的一篇文章中,Mehdi Hasan也表达了类似的想法:否认伊斯兰国的“伊斯兰”特性。尽管伊斯兰国的战士们在为其行为辩解时大可引用《古兰经》或先知穆罕默德的行迹或言论,但这并不能令他们成为正统的穆斯林。 Islam, like Christianity, is more than the sum of its scriptures. Over the course of its near 1,500 years of existence, an immense corpus of commentary and interpretation has accrued. “. . . the religion’s teachings in every age are determined by scholarly consensus on the meaning of the complex scriptural texts.” So declares Timothy Winter, the director of the Cambridge Muslim College, as quoted by Hasan. It is an assertion that would not have looked out of place in the decrees of the Council of Trent. 就像基督教一样,伊斯兰教的内涵远比经文总和丰富得多。在它1500余年历史中,无数人对它做过解释和评论,“……在每个时代,教义都是由关于复杂经文之内涵的学术共识决定的。” Hasan 引用剑桥穆斯林学院院长Timothy Winter如此说到。这种主张如果插到塔兰托会议的纲领中去,也不会令人觉得格格不入。 The problem faced by the orthodox religious authorities in the Muslim world, however, is very similar to that which confronted the Catholic Church in the 16th century: escaped genies are tricky things to get back into bottles. The same impulse that prompted Luther to affirm the primacy of scripture over Catholic doctrine has also long been at work in Islam. 然而,正统穆斯林权威现在面对的问题与16世纪困扰天主教会的问题很相似:逃脱的精灵很难回到瓶子里。促使路德把经文置于天主教信条之上的念头在伊斯兰教中也是由来已久。 As far back as the 13th century, a scholar based in Damascus by the name of Ibn Taymiyya proposed that the surest way to know God’s purpose was to study the practices of the first three generations of Muslims: the “forebears”, or “Salafs”. Reports of what Muhammad and his earliest followers had done, so he argued, should always trump subsequent tradition. Like Luther, Ibn Taymiyya was condemned as a heretic; but he also, again like Luther, blazed a momentous trail. 早在13世纪,大马士革一位名叫Ibn Taymiyya的学者就认为,领悟真主意图最稳妥的方法就是研习最早三代穆斯林(“先贤”,或称“萨拉菲”)的事迹。他宣称,关于穆罕默德及其最早期追随者所作所为的记载,永远比后来形成的传统更为权威。正如路德一样,Ibn Taymiyya也曾被斥为异端;但是,还是跟路德一样,他同样开辟了一条重要道路。 Salafism today is probably the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world. The interpretation that Isis applies to Muslim scripture may be exceptional for its savagery – but not for its literalism. Islamic State, in its conceit that it has trampled down the weeds and briars of tradition and penetrated to the truth of God’s dictates, is recognisably Salafist. 萨拉菲主义可能是当今世界扩散最迅速的伊斯兰教运动。伊斯兰国对伊斯兰经文的解释,在其野蛮性上或许颇为罕见,但是在字面主义上却绝对正宗。伊斯兰国幻想自己消灭了宗教传统中的毒草,洞悉上帝的旨意,这很明显是萨拉菲主义的特质。 When Islamic State fighters smash the statues of pagan gods, they are following the example of the Prophet; when they proclaim themselves the shock troops of a would-be global empire, they are following the example of the warriors of the original caliphate; when they execute enemy combatants, and impose discriminatory taxes on Christians, and take the women of defeated opponents as slaves, they are doing nothing that the first Muslims did not glory in. 当伊斯兰国战士毁坏异教神祗的雕像时,他们效仿的是先知的先例;当他们宣称自己是未来统治世界的帝国的骁勇之师时,他们效仿的是最早的哈里发国的军队。当他们处决敌军战士,对基督徒征收歧视性的税目,以及把被打败对手的女人当作奴隶时,没有一件不是初代穆斯林引以为豪的。 Such behaviour is certainly not synonymous with Islam; but if not Islamic, then it is hard to know what else it is. 这种行为与伊斯兰教肯定不是百分之百相符的;但要是说这种行为不是伊斯兰的,那就很难说它到底是什么了。 Admittedly the actions of those signed up to Islamic State are unlikely to have been inspired exclusively by religious teachings. Many of those fighting for Isis may indeed, as Hasan points out, be varnishing their taste for violence or power with a sheen of piety. But the same was true of those inspired by Luther’s teachings – not to mention the early Muslims themselves. 诚然,伊斯兰国的这些行为不可能仅仅由宗教教义驱动。Hasan指出,isis的许多斗士,可能仅仅是将他们对权力和暴力的欲望粉饰为了对神的虔诚。但是,被路德的教导所鼓舞的人也是如此呀——更不要提那些早期的穆斯林们了。 Back in the time of the Salafs, avarice and religiosity frequently coincided. When a slave revolt erupted in Syria and Iraq less than 50 years after the death of Muhammad, the Arab conquerors were outraged. “These slaves are our booty,” one of them exclaimed. “They were granted us by God!” 在萨拉菲们的时代,虔诚与贪婪往往同时发生。穆罕默德去世不到50年,叙利亚和伊拉克爆发了奴隶起义,阿拉伯征服者们大发雷霆,其中一人宣称“这些奴隶是我们的战利品,他们是真主赐予我们的!” Jihadis in Raqqa have tweeted in similar tones about uppity Yazidi slaves. To imagine that religious motivation can somehow be isolated from the complex swirl of ambitions, fears and desires that constitute human nature is to fall for an illusion: that religions, contingent as they are, and as subject to evolution as any other manifestation of culture, exist as abstract ideals. 在推特上,拉卡的圣战者对不易控制的雅兹迪奴隶也有相同的论调。如果我们假想宗教驱动力可以从构成人类本性的野心、恐惧、欲望所组成的复杂漩涡中独立出来,我们就会陷入一种幻觉:宗教飘忽不定,并且如同其他文化表现形式一样总在持续演变,只是作为抽象理念而存在。 The truth is that in Islam today, as in Christianity during the Reformation, the spectrum of those who practise the faith is widening to convulsive effect. Hasan’s dismissal of two Isis recruits from Birmingham as “religious novices” echoes the horror of Catholic scholars such as Thomas More at the pretensions of Protestant tailors and tinkers. 真相是,今日的伊斯兰教就如同宗教改革期间的基督教一样,信徒们的思想差异极大,造成了令人震惊的后果。Hasan对Isis从伯明翰招募的两名成员不屑一顾,称之为“宗教菜鸟”,这种反感与Thomas More等天主教学者面对新教裁缝和修补匠的主张时的感觉一样。 Just as in the early 16th century the printing press and the efforts of translators such as Luther and Tyndale served to democratise knowledge of the Bible, so in the 21st century has the ready availability on the internet of the Quran and the hadiths in the vernacular enabled rappers, security guards and schoolgirls all to bandy scripture. 正如16世纪时出版印刷业以及路德和廷代尔等翻译者曾对《圣经》知识平民化作出过贡献一样,在21世纪,网络上译成本地语言的《古兰经》及《穆罕默德言行录》唾手可得,这也使得说唱艺人、保安和女学生们都能把经文挂在嘴边。 To complain that quranic verses which mandate crucifixion or beheading are being cited without reference to the traditions of Islamic jurisprudence is to miss the point. It is precisely because Isis militants imagine themselves the equivalent of Muhammad’s companions, blessed with an unadorned understanding of God’s commands, that they feel qualified to establish a caliphate. 指责他们不参考伊斯兰教法传统就直接引用那些鼓励刑罚和砍头的《古兰经》经文,这种批评没有抓住要点。正是因为Isis战士认为他们自己等同于穆罕默德的同伴,被赐予了对真主旨意的准确理解,他们才认为自己有资格建立哈里发国。 “My people,” so Muhammad is once said to have warned, “are destined to split into 73 factions – all of which, except one, will end up in hell.” Who, then, Muslims have often wondered, will gain paradise? Isis, like so many of the various other sects that have emerged in the course of Islamic history, appears confident of the answer. 据说穆罕默德曾经警告过:“我的人民注定要分裂成73个派别,除了一个,其他的都要下地狱。”穆斯林们一直在疑惑:究竟是谁会上天堂?正如历史上涌现出的其他伊斯兰教派别一样,Isis对这个问题的答案似乎很自信。 It is not merely coincidence that IS currently boasts a caliph, imposes quranically mandated taxes, topples idols, chops the hands off thieves, stones adulterers, executes homosexuals and carries a flag that bears the Muslim declaration of faith. If Islamic State is indeed to be categorised as a phenomenon distinct from Islam, it urgently needs a manifest and impermeable firewall raised between them. At the moment, though, I fail to see it. 现在,IS夸口自居为哈里发,征收《古兰经》要求的税目、推倒偶像、砍掉盗贼的手、把通奸者石刑处死、处死同性恋者,并且采用穆斯林的见证言作为旗帜,所有这些都并非巧合。如果伊斯兰国一定要被定义成与伊斯兰教毫无关系的现象,那么两者之间就需要树立一堵明白无误、密不透风的防火墙。现在,我还没有看到这堵墙。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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