《群居的艺术》新书发布座谈会（6月16日）之后，《南方周末》记者石岩先生向我提出了一组问题，并且很慷慨的允许我略过我不想回答的，所以我就略过了其中两个。 1，书的三部分结构很有意思，它让我推测你写作的过程和思考的过程可能是相反的：你是身在一个秩序解耦的大型社会，再去反推秩序是怎么建立起来的，脚手架是怎么拆除的，是不是？ 答：实际上，我所经历的顺序是3-1-2，首先，对现代大型社会和市场体系，我自然有着直接而真切的认识，早些年专注于经济领域的写作时，也曾着力写过许多市场带给我们的种种好处，然后，当我读到邓巴的理论时，被他的深刻见解所打动，意识到这是观察早期人类社会的一条重要线索，也和我的已有知识相容，接着，一个困惑就很自然的冒了出来：如何看待现代大社会与传统小社会的强烈反差？这促使我去关注那些曾被我熟视无睹、却默默支撑着现代社会的制度和文化元素，最终，循着这条线索，我发现我对文化与社会的许多认识被串了起来，结果便是这本书。 2，三部分的关系：第一部分是战争史，是暴力建立秩序的过程；第二部分是“软实力”，是暴力之外的共同体的构成因素；第三部分是第一二部分的反过程，就像结构主义和解构主义一样，是不是这样？ 答：我选择略过这个问题。 3，书的三部分可以看到你的知识谱系，第三部分让人想起你做过程序员，大学学的是经济管理，大概大学时代对西方思想史、政治经济学有特别的兴趣；第一部分让人觉得你大概对人类学特别感兴趣；第二部分兼有人类学和世界史的背景。这些专业知识跟你的人生经历有什么关联？ 答：历史和人类学是我的长期兴趣，这是两个有很多素材和故事却没多少理论的学科，对历史的兴趣在小孩子当中大概是很普遍的，但传统或主流的历史著作有个问题，就是它们很大程度上是浮于表面的政治史，很少能告诉你古人究竟是怎么过日子的，生活在古代社会究竟是怎样一种体验，这就很难满足我的好奇心，年鉴学派也只是稍稍好一点，这方面的不满让我在成年后逐渐更偏爱人类学，其中理由依我看是很明显的。 至于理论方面，我受益最多的是经济学、博弈论和进化论，其中前两者和我的大学教育有关，我的专业虽然是信息系统，但也包含了许多经济学课程，进化理论则主要是靠自己的阅读。 4，你是怎么从一个专业知识分子变成一个知道分子，现在又变成一个哲学家的？ 答：我始终有一种抵抗专业化的倾向，并不是说专业化有什么不好，这只是我的个人选择，当然，这也是一种托辞，用来为自己未能混进专业学术圈作辩解。可是现在，要靠写作谋生就得有个头衔，免得在别人问“你是干嘛的？”时张口结舌，又因为我没有专业，就只好为自己挑了哲学家这顶帽子，因为依我看，哲学不是专业，而是一种态度。 5，好奇心从哪里来，你的大学生活，比如说水木清华bbs对你好奇心的养成有哪些帮助？课堂和图书馆呢？以前你在bbs上经常混哪个版？ 答：我是1993年毕业的，那时国内还没有互联网，水木清华也是两年后才建立，我没混过。说实话，我所接受的大学教育质量很烂，除了经济学和产业史方面的一些课程引发了我的持久兴趣之外，在社会科学方面，我长期处于无头苍蝇的状态，没有多少有益的启发和点拨，清华图书馆虽然不小，但在缺乏数字化检索的情况下，其实是很难利用的，况且你根本不知道该读些什么，完全是瞎蒙瞎撞，回顾起来，我的大学生涯绝大部分是虚度的。 这一状况直到互联网可用之后才开始改变，转折点大概在98年左右，那时我已毕业多年，网上开始出现大量电子书，然后又有了亚马逊和当当，我的系统化阅读从那时才开始。 我接触BBS也是在那时，或者稍晚，混得最多的是万科周刊论坛。 6，在1990年代，经管是大学“最好”的专业之一，你是怎么从经管专业出来去做程序员的？当然程序员也是那时候最好的工种。 答：当时的清华基本上是个纯工科学校，经管学院的前身是应用数学系，我的专业是信息系统，所以除了一些经济和产业类课程之外，我受的是标准的工科训练，程序员是我们专业的典型职业方向之一，一点不算出格，呵呵。 当然，我的个人兴趣始终在社会科学方面，但因为前面说到的无头苍蝇状态，我觉得在学院里寻求发展我的这项兴趣是毫无意义的。 不过我想补充一句：科学与工程方面的训练和职业经历，对我此后的思考与写作确实很有帮助，这是我从学校教育中的主要受益。 7，那天沙龙你说你不像哲学家那样，有个终极问题然后去求解。我觉得你思考的也许不是终极问题，但是是基本问题，比如这本群居的艺术其实就是在思考人类大型社会是怎么形成的。你是何时开始思考这种基本问题的？最初写的文章发在哪里？在给《二十一世纪经济报道》还是《经济观察报》写东西之前，你在哪里写东西？你和黄章晋是怎么认识的（其实我是关心，在你开始你的类哲学思考的时候，在线上或线下有没有一个“知识共同体”，大家可以一起讨论，评议彼此的想法）？ 答：诸如此类的基本问题，或者叫宏大问题，从来不是我的思考起点，我的思考通常都是零敲碎打的，这一点你从我的博客和之前的两本书都可以看得很清楚，只有在事后作阶段性回顾时，幸运的话，一个轮廓就会顺着某条线索、某个视角浮现出来，这个轮廓可能会显得比较宏大，结果就会导致一些听上去有点吓人的书名，但书名主要是用来唬人的，呵呵。 我2008年到2012年之间为《21世纪经济报道》写评论，开始了职业写作，在此之前，我只是偶尔写写文章，主要发在自己的博客上，另外给《万科周刊》投过几篇稿。 我在网上的互动早先主要发生在万科周刊论坛，后来有一年多是牛博网，再后来是自己的博客，然后是微博。在万科论坛的几年认识了很多朋友，包括黄章晋老师，他们都很有见识，也经常讨论一些有意思的话题，不过，那算不上知识共同体，因为大家的兴趣其实非常不同，虽然热门话题会引来不少议论，但很少能深入下去，所以你会发现，每次有饭局，聊天的焦点很快就会自动滑向那少数几个已经被重复了无数遍的老话题上，这是观察交流质量的一个很好指标，说实话，回顾十几年来我所参与的互动，无论在哪个圈子或平台，无论线上线下，都是乏善可陈的。 当然，话说回来，能认识一些朋友，这本身也是很有价值的事情。 8，为什么人类学成为你一个重要的思想资源？一定要把思考的上限推到那么久以前吗？在书中你援引的人类学成果都是西方的，这固然是因为人类学本来就是西方的学科，但人类学的西方视角会不会形成你思考问题时候的局限呢？比如书中说名字的出现在西方是很晚近的事情，可是据傅乐成的中国通史，中国在西周、乃至商代就有了姓、氏（不是一个概念），名字，后代文人还有号和字，中国人的名字在共同体中的作用显然已经不再简单是为称呼和收税的方便。 答：对于想多了解点人类社会的人，人类学是绕不开的，其他学科，比如经济学和政治学，可能有漂亮的理论，简洁的模型，但有关真实社会的素材却很少，这些理论和模型可以成为方便的推演起点，但是假如你不掌握大量素材，很可能会有意无意的把它们当成真实社会的进化起点，误以为某种『自然状态』果真普遍存在，社会契约的订立果真是重大历史转折点，那就太幼稚了，在我看来，大量阅读人类学材料是预防此类幼稚病的一个办法。 实际上，一种素材只要扎实可靠，我并不介意它来自哪个学科哪个学术传统，我个人对任何学科都没有情感包袱，这可能也是我们民科的一大优势吧，所以最大的局限倒是我自己的阅读视野，我相信这个局限肯定很严重，不需要具体的例证。 9，1972年作家柳青问他的女儿：“如果说秦始皇没有统一中国，一直延续了春秋战国时期的纷争局面，中国现在会不会成为像欧洲一样的经济发达地区?”你会怎么回答这个问题？战国变成秦国是小型社会变成大型社会的例子吗？上古时代，今天是中国的地方也是部落林立、征伐不断，为什么大一统对这个地方的人有那么强的内驱力？就算分裂时代每一个稍有实力的小国做的也还是大一统的梦。 答：假如春秋的封建系统能延续下去（它在战国已经差不多瓦解了），文化无疑会更繁荣，经济或许也会更发达，但即便如此，恐怕也很难指望从中发展出我们在西北欧所见到的宪政、法治，乃至整套市场制度，并由此引发工业革命，封建是宪政的良好土壤，但仅有土壤不够，还需要很多条件，其中有不少偶然性和运气成分，另外，周式封建和日耳曼封建虽然都被归为封建体系，但差异非常大，特别是在军事组织和财政安排上，这个话题太大，很难在此细讲。 10，西周的分封体系为什么玩不转的？按照你在书中的理论，分封亲友，让每个层级的核心人数都在邓巴数以内，这不应该是一个很稳固的体系吗？ 答：应该说是玩转了，转了好几百年，一个转了好几百年的系统，总不能说它是完全无效或失败的，对吧。 当然，最终它还是崩溃了，而且是不可逆的崩溃了。要我说，原因有两个，首先，周式封建缺乏一种成熟的、常规化的机制来维持其成员实体之间的紧密合作和一致行动能力，以便共同对抗外敌和压服内部的秩序破坏者，所谓霸主和会盟都是非常松散和随意的，没有制度化，其次，华夏共同体与北方蛮族之间有着一条漫长而缺乏屏障的边疆，结果是，要么共同体很容易被外力摧毁，要么某些边缘诸侯会在与蛮族的长期对抗中脱颖而出成为压倒性强权，从而打破内部均衡。 11，秦的迅速解体，秦汉之间各路反叛者重以战国时代各国国号为号召，乃至汉重新拾起分封制，这说明了什么？说明了当时的人们对于郡县制这种社会架构方式消化不良吗？ 答：秦的成功得益于它利用土地权利和军功晋升这两种强大激励工具而赢得了对平民的大规模动员能力，然而，作为帝国开创者，它在走向极权主义方面野心过大，而同时却不具备像现代极权主义那么高超的社会控制技术，特别是它对士大夫阶层的疏远和排斥，让它丧失了一项重要的组织资源。 相比之下，汉帝国较好的解决了这个问题，一方面维持了对平民的动员能力，一方面收编了士大夫，让他们服务于帝国权力，维护官方意识形态，并运营上层官僚机器，士大夫与权力的这一紧密结合，构成了此后大一统帝国的最重要支柱。 12，经历了大一统的汉代，合久必分的三国时代又说明了什么？人类是否有挣脱过于庞大的共同体本能？ 答：创建和维持集权帝国都是非常艰难的任务，能维持几百年已经算很成功了，将其最终失败归于某种人类本能的看法，是我难以赞同的。 除了种种外力打击，帝国权力结构有着内在的腐蚀倾向，其中最致命的一点可能是激励资源的耗尽，就是说，随着代际更替，所有可以用作激励诱饵来吸引社会精英效忠权力机器的资源最终都将分配消耗殆尽，因为分配出去的特权如果不能继承，激励效果就太弱，如果可以继承，就会永远被占住，定期清洗也只能部分解决这个问题，而且清洗和对清洗的担忧会导致激烈的内部冲突，一不小心就崩盘了。 13，你似乎认为共同体越大越丰富越好？可是有很多小而美的共同体。 答：我最希望看到的，是一个自下而上组织起来的多层次共同体，在最低层次上是众多紧密而同质化的小型共同体，相互间和平竞争，最高层次上则是一个类似北约的大型安全共同体，保障内部和平与安全，并维持最低限度的宪法原则和互通性，同时并不要求成员之间高度同质化（无论是文化上还是制度上），也不对个人施加强义务。 像瑞士这样的小共同体确实很美好，但她们只能在某些特定条件下存在于强权对峙的夹缝之中，或者强权所维持的和平秩序之下，假如国际社会果真是个丛林社会，而大国又有现代级别的武力，瑞士是无法存活的，安全永远是头号问题。 更极端的例子是阿米绪社群，他们本身也足够美好，但你很难想象，像他们这样彻底放弃了自卫权的和平主义者，假如脱离了美国的宪法秩序，来到更险恶的环境中，比如非洲和拉美，如何可能生存下去？事实上我们在盎格鲁世界之外确实见不到这样的美好小共同体。 14，用《群居的艺术》里的思考方法，你怎么看欧盟的成功和不成功？ 答：从消除市场壁垒，提升互通性，自下而上的组织方式这几点看，欧盟都是建立多层次大型共同体的成功典范，然而，在欧盟占主导地位的意识形态有着深厚的国家主义、福利主义和天真普世主义的传统，这些祸根正在不断腐蚀着欧盟的宪政、法治和市场制度，扼杀其创造活力，最终也会恶化其内部安全环境，而且这一趋势眼下还看不出有逆转的迹象，所以我对她的前景十分不乐观。 欧盟的例子或许会提醒世人：即便人类能够以完全和平自愿的方式建立起按以往标准衡量相当理想的大型共同体，也没有什么东西能确保它会继续朝着理想的方向发展，这是个令人无奈的现实。 15，就你书里呈现的构成大型社会过程，中国似乎绝大部分路都走完了，只差最后临门一脚。而这一脚似乎也不知道往哪里踢，因为普世主义在你看来是虚妄的。 答：这个问题风险太大，我还是不说了。 16，为什么你说推动和维护宪政的是二阶美德？ 答：大型社会对个人的美德提出了一些要求，才能确保其成员之间维持最低限度的和平、合作与互惠关系，其中有些是一阶美德，意思是它们能直接引出合作性行为（相对于对抗性或剥夺性行为），比如诚实无欺的美德，让我们的关系变得更具合作性，更多互惠和利他，更少欺诈、纠纷和冲突，还有一些是二阶美德，比如对独立司法裁判机构的尊重，对个人自卫权（包括持枪权）的执着，对私人财产权的珍爱，这些美德并不直接引出合作性行为，有时甚至还会引出对抗性行为，然而它们却在维持宪政上起着重要作用，而宪政以及由宪政所支持的法治与市场体系，却可系统性的引出大量合作性行为，尽管这一因果关系不容易看清，却有着基础性地位。 17，青春的躁动这件事在什么样的群体里最具离心力？ 答：如果一个社会没有为那些行动能力强又富有野心的年轻人留出足够的上升通道，同时也没有向外输出压力的释放口，那么青春躁动就会形成一股危险的力量。 如果年轻一代的人口大大高出上一代人口，或者经济繁荣度下降，问题就尤为严重，因为上升通道因萧条而变窄，同时却有更多人需要挤进去。 18，在群居的人类社会，从来就有一些离群索居的人，比如狂生隐士竹林七贤，今天日本的宅男、食草男、中国的空巢青年。你怎么看待这种现象？ 答：这是件很有意思的事情，一方面，人类是高度社会性动物，强社会性首先让我们建立了紧密合作的小共同体，继而又经历漫长过程发展出大型社会，而维系大社会的众多组织和制度元素同样高度依赖于我们的强社会性，但另一方面，当社会扩展到一定程度，分工日益精细化，在一个松耦合的市场体系之中，人际关系也可以变得十分单纯和简洁，结果就为宅男宅女创造了许多生态位，在市场中，一个人只要有一项谋生技能，就能在无须和外界发生很多关系的情况下舒适的生活下去。 然而，需要强调的是，这些生态位只是整个社会结构的一部分，虽然过去几百年中这个部分可能扩大了许多，但仍然只是一部分，重要的是，提供这些生态位的那整套市场制度，仍然要求人们积极参与并努力维护它，而这些维护工作需要人们结成各种社团和组织，从事大量社会活动，因而仍然离不开个人的社会性，简言之，市场为宅男宅女创造了更好的生存机会，但只有一群宅男是建立不了市场的，也没有能力维护它。  

封侯拜爵的神仙们 辉格 2016年12月11日 中国民间信仰以其神仙繁多而著称，宋代仅湖州一地的寺观祠庙里供奉的神祗，有史料可查者即有92个，扣除名号重复者，还有50多个，粗略估算，全国各地的神祗数量大约介于乡镇数和村庄数之间，看来古代中国人『积极造神，见神即拜』的名声并非虚浪。 如此多神仙得到敬拜，还要归功于神仙来源的多样化，和大众在神仙制造方式上的创造性；早期神祗来源大致和其他文化相仿，比如司掌某种自然力的自然神，或者被认定为某一族群共同祖先的始祖神，然而自中古以降，一种新型神祗开始大量涌现。 这些新神都是不久前还生活于人世的真实人物，因某种显赫成就或奇特经历而被认为拥有神力；认定神力的入门标准很低——担任过高官，参加过某次战役，遭受过冤屈，或者离奇死亡——总之，任何在大众眼里有点特别的地方都可以让他们获得候选资格，但真正确立其神灵地位的，是『灵验』事迹，即有人在向他祈求佑助时得偿所愿。 在《变迁之神》一书中，人类学家韩森考察了此类神祗的兴起，发现其数量在宋代经历了爆发性增长，而之所以神界能容得下如此规模的神口增长，是因为他们都是地方性的，其神力作用半径不过数十里，各地若想有神可求，就得自己造一个，而同时，造神逻辑本身确保了新神的供给：灵验的随机性意味着总是不断会有旧神失宠，新神崛起。 有趣的是，帝国朝廷对这场民间造神运动颇为热心，从11世纪初起，宋廷便挑选一些信众认可度较高的地方神祗予以官方承认，编入祀典，许多还授予官爵名号，拨给公款用于立碑修庙；一旦某神获得这样的官方地位，地方官便有责任定期组织祭祀敬拜活动，甚至提供财政和劳役支持。 韩森注意到，从1075年起，为地方神仙封授官爵的做法大面积铺开，并在此后成为政府的一项常规职能，其规模甚大，每年封授数十位神仙，每次封授都要经历一个繁杂的流程，涉及尚书省、礼部和太常寺的众多衙门，还有地方政府的两轮灵验性查证，那么，朝廷为何要花费大量行政与财政资源来做这样一件看起来没有实际功效的事情呢？ 要理解这一点，我们最好将它和帝国的另一项重要制度——科举——对照着看；表面上，科举只是为帝国选拔官员的（它也确实有这功能），但实际上，它最重要的功能是为全民提供一部开放、全面覆盖且贯通到底的社会上升阶梯，而在此之前，上升通道往往为数十个门阀豪族所垄断，其他人只能凭借战功、偶然的恩宠、内乱造成的重新洗牌等非经常性机会来谋求晋身。 科举的这一功能对赢取精英阶层的广泛效忠从而强化帝国权力起着极为根本的作用，它让人口中最富有、最有才智、最有野心的那些人将其视为实现抱负的好机会，而假如没有这样的机会，他们很可能去支持其他潜在的权力中心，或者以官方所不愿看到的方式施展抱负，因而对帝国权力构成威胁。 科举也是推行官方价值体系和历史叙事的工具，求取功名者心甘情愿接受和传播官方说辞，而一旦取得功名便成为这一体系的既得利益者因而有足够动机去维护它，并将其渗透植入到他们拥有巨大影响力的家族传统和地方文化中。 虽然只有百分之几的成年男性参与科举，取得功名者更少，但无论是巩固还是颠覆帝国权力基础，这都是最有能量的一群人，而且，科举功名带来的权力、财富、士绅特权，甚至仅仅是读写能力，都会将他们置于家族和地方社区的领袖地位，因而笼络他们就笼络了他们所在的家族和地方。 从唐代起，帝国通过封授土司对未归化地区实施羁縻政策，科举与士绅特权的结合，其实就是对政治结构中帝权难以直接通达的部分实施羁縻，通过士绅羁縻家族与地方，类似的，为地方神仙封授官爵，则是对民间信仰与崇拜活动的羁縻。 之所以神仙也需要羁縻，是因为，对于世俗权力，神是个危险的存在，每个神灵名下都可能凝聚起一套价值观，道德规范，行为准则，乃至行动纲领，其中每一样都可能与官方版本相冲突，都有潜力在权力竞争中成为敌方的动员与组织基础，特别是当它们被一个独立的僧侣团体所控制时，就更危险了。 凭借封授制度，朝廷有机会对神祗进行筛选、约束、引导、改造和控制，很明显，他们会竭力排除最危险的那些神，比如有着另一套行为准则的道德神，或一神教中极具动员力的排他性神，或有着现成经典因而其合法性可能被僧侣组织掌握的神，还有附带着行动纲领的弥赛亚，而最合他们胃口的，将是那些不具有全国性动员能力的地方神，以及能够提供现世佑助却又毫无道德要求的功利神，或许并非巧合的是，后两种恰是此后中国最流行的神灵。  

Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes. 伊斯兰教能够被改革吗？历史和人的本性告诉我们：能。 作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08 译者:Tankman 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here. 《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上：伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。 Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate? 伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退，激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗？或是能被改革，变得更加温和，现代且与邻为善呢？伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利，并给穆斯林信仰自由，接受现代金融和司法的基本原则，而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗？ A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that "radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution," the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, "He's wrong. Sorry about that." She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point. 越来越多的分析家认为不会，穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情，这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中，成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注：一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物，以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题，温和伊斯兰是解药”时，她说：“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕，追求同一目标，和相同的敌人战斗，但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。 My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge. 我的论述有两部分。第一，很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的；第二，革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。 Arguing Against Essentialism 对本质主义的驳斥 To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion's core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past. 声称伊斯兰不可被改变，则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解，而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误，因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切，包括对圣典的解读，随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。 Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran's interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of "no compulsion in religion," and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam. 只有不考虑人类本性，无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁，一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变，像圣战，奴隶，高利贷，“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且，我们容易想到过去的1400年，很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi'i，al-Ghazali，Ibn Taymiya，Rumi，Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。 However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam's scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country's history would lead to a distorted understanding. 可兰经和圣训也许是中心，而不是穆斯林经验的全部；从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国；忽略了这个国家的历史，会导致认知的扭曲。 Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today's Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline. 换一种说法就是，中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的，今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟，它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业，1969年我进入该领域时，我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起，到今天享有着巨大能量；如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大，那么它也可能衰落。 How might that happen? 这种变化可能会如何发生呢？ The Medieval Synthesis 中世纪整合 Key to Islam's role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia's prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much. 伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的；而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢？一个刑罚体系，要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争，遵循这禁令是不可能的；实际上，穆斯林发起的战争中，约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地，坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。 To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad. 为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求，前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法，允许放松一些伊斯兰法条，而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal（花招）和其他方式，遵循法律的形式，同时否定其实质。比如，为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家，很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。 This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam's "medieval synthesis" in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists: 沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》（1983）中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象，不切实际的要求，翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中，它减低了沙利亚的力度，使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行，同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali，在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话： One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to "compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court." As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, "Social patterns were in great contrast to the 'official' picture presented by these 'formal' sources." Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of "the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian." 律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时，“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。” While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12^th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18^th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability. 虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪，它并未克服一个基本的弱点：它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本，或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷，面对原教旨主义者的挑战，它仍然是脆弱的。实际上，前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战，包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中，原教旨主义的努力最终被软化，中世纪整合重新回到轨道，而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色，助长了其不稳定性。 The Challenge of Modernity 现代性的挑战 The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization. 中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断，传统观点来看，这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中，把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向：西方化或是伊斯兰化。 Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile. 西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象，他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法，代之以同类领域的西方做法，比如不利用法律确立宗教，妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前，这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运，对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。 But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back. 但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多，而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底，西方化表面上看起来强大，实则不然，因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高，有话语权的精英，而广大民众则被压制。 Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam. 从1930年代起，抗拒因素开始组织起来，发展他们自己的力量，尤其是在阿尔及利亚，埃及，伊朗，和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果，呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般，坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。 Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West. 虽然排斥西方，这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动，依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身，比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设，比如国家优先于个人，可以接受暴力斗争，和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术，尤其是军事和医疗方面。 Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways. 通过创造性的努力，伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长，最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者，霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中，显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件，和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序，在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步，用各种创新且极端的方式，变革社会，实行伊斯兰教法。 For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls' schools and music stores. The Islamists' influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas. 比如，在伊朗，什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者，并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗，塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身，你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱，头巾和罩袍。 Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country's established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism. 虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型，相比法西斯和共产主义，伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动，被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党（AKP）领导着，已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台，AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕，借助该国已经建立的民主制度，和良好的施政表现，逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量，而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。 The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction. 伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健，但是它们的势头并不是由来已久，也并不保证能持续下去。实际上，像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样，伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力，其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗，明确体现了这点。 Toward a Modern Synthesis 通向一个现代的整合 If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a "modern synthesis" comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps. 若要打败伊斯兰主义，反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景，来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点，他们可以回溯历史，尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力，对照“中世纪整合”，来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等，和不信伊斯兰者和平共存，并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。 Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans. 在此，把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较，不无益处。五个世纪前，犹太教徒，基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的，借贷收利息则不被允许。最终，经过了苦涩和反复的辩论，犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点；今天，没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。 Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, ("pretend" because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.) 然而在穆斯林当中，这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年，沙特阿拉伯在1962年，毛里塔尼亚在1980年，官方禁止了蓄奴，奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在（尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦）。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元，并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息，（“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。） Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else. 穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好，并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教，他们必须模仿其他一神教，改变自己宗教在蓄奴，利息，妇女权益，背教自由，司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。 When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy. 当一个改革的，现代的伊斯兰涌现，它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益，统治异教徒的观念，圣战，或者自杀性恐怖主义，它也不会要求对通奸，危害家族荣誉，渎神和背教者处以死刑。 Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women: 在这一新的世纪，一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下：

• Saudi Arabia's Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn't end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
• 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒，把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚，但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
• Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
• 土耳其神职人员已经同意，让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜，并且和男人一起祷告。
• The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
• 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
• Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
• 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
• A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
• 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议，认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰，事实上应该被惩罚。
• A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
• 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法，反对多妻制。

Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include: 其他显著进步，不一定局限于妇女权益方面，包括：

• The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
• 沙特政府终止了Jizya（向非穆斯林征收人头税）。
• An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
• 一个伊朗法庭，判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
• Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
• 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会，开始就处决背教者展开辩论。

All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times. 同时，倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法，如果不是着眼于改进，那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir，一个沙特女记者，大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利，和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴，包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责，但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论，在以前时代这是无法想象的。 Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad's example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today's Muslims make of it. 和其中世纪的先行者一样，面对原教旨人士的攻击，现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子，然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是，已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果，有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想，并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念；它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。 Policy Implications 政策含义 What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims? 反对伊斯兰教法，哈里发国，和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢？ For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process. 对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林，最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义，而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力，通过慷慨和无私，达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者，必须也经过可能是数十年的努力，发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态，然后推广它。在这个过程中，解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。 Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey's AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism. 非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰：第一，坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登，也可以是隐秘鬼祟，表面合法的政治性运动，如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍，但他却更有效，危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由，法律面前人人平等和其他人权，珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。 Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization. 第二，非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天，这些人物弱小零散，且面对着艰巨的任务，但是他们确实存在，他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权，代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。 Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum. Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。 July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title "What Is Islam?" 2013年7月7日更新： Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章，标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。 Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at "Islam's Future." 2013年10月1日更新：六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章，我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。 Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2^nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that "Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation." So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all. 2014年4月10日更新：虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段，并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道，“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以，她也许开始接受我的观点了。 Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that "When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history." 2016年2月4日更新：我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰，门外汉讨论文本，内行讨论历史。” Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking's illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's headquarters (as photographed by me). It's a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above. 2016年2月24日更新：这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片，也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划，这版本似乎并不让人激动。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Misogynist Origins of American Labor Law 美国劳动法的仇女起源 作者:Jeffrey Tucker @ 2016-02-17 译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 来源:FEE,https://fee.org/articles/government-s-war-on-women-1900-1920/ Many now credit government for past progress in gender equality, mostly because of late 20th-century legislation that appeared to benefit women in the workplace. This is a distorted view. Few know that government at all levels actually sought to prevent that progress. 如今许多人把过去在性别平等上的进步归功于政府，主要是因为二十世纪后期的立法看似让职业女性受益。然而这个观点与现实不符。鲜为人知的是，各个层级的政府都曾企图阻挠这种进步。 A century ago, just as markets were attracting women to professional life, government regulation in the United States specifically targeted women to restrict their professional choices. The regulations were designed to drive them out of offices and factories and back into their homes — for their own good and the good of their families, their communities, and the future of the race. 一个世纪前，正当市场吸引女性进入职场之际，美国的政府管制刻意将女性作为目标人群，限制她们的职业选择。这些管制措施的目的是把女性从办公室和工厂驱赶回家中——为了女性和她们家庭、社区，以及民族的未来。 The new controls — the first round of a century of interventions in the free labor market — were designed to curb the sweeping changes in economics and demographics that were taking place due to material advances in the last quarter of the 19th century. The regulations limited women’s choices so they would stop making what elites considered the wrong decisions. 这些新的控制措施——是整整一个世纪对自由劳动力市场的干涉浪潮的第一波——意在阻止由于十九世纪最后二十五年物质进步所带来的经济和人口统计上的巨大变化。管制措施限制了女性的选择，这样她们就无法做出当时社会精英眼中的“错误”决定。 The real story, which is only beginning to emerge within the academic literature, is striking. It upends prevailing narratives about the relationship between government and women’s rights. Many cornerstones of the early welfare and regulatory state were designed to hobble women’s personal liberty and economic advancement. They were not progressive but reactionary, an attempt to turn back the clock. Women’s Work Is Not New 女性工作不是什么新鲜事 It was the freedom and opportunity realized in the latter period of the 19th century that changed everything for women workers, opening up new lines of employment. The growth of industrial capitalism meant that women could leave the farm and move to the city. They could choose to leave home without having married — and even stay in the workforce as married women. They enjoyed more choice in education and professional life than ever before. New clerical jobs, unknown a century earlier, were everywhere to be had. Women’s wages were rising quickly, by an impressive 16 percent from 1890 through 1920. Nor were women working at “exploitative” wages. A Rand corporation study of wage differentials discovered an interesting fact: women’s wages relative to men’s were higher in 1920 than they were in 1980. 新的文书类工作在那之前一个世纪还不存在，而此时已经到处都是。从1890年至1920年女性的工资快速上升，涨幅高达16%。女性的工资并非是“剥削性”的。兰德公司一项关于工资差异的研究揭示了一个有趣的事实：1920年女性工资相对于男性工资的比率要高于1980年。 The Law Intervenes 法律介入 And yet, these were also the years in which we first saw government intervention in the labor market, much of it specifically targeting women. As historian Thomas Leonard argues in his spectacular book Illiberal Reformers (2016), an entire generation of intellectuals and politicians panicked about what this could mean for the future of humanity. 然而，在那些年政府首次开始介入劳动力市场，明确针对的目标主要是女性。正如历史学家Thomas Leonard在其力作《非自由的改革者（Illiberal Reformers）》中指出的，整整一代的知识分子和政治家恐慌于女性工资上升会给人类未来带来的影响。 Society must control reproduction and therefore what women do with their lives. So said the prevailing ideology of the age. We couldn’t have a situation in which markets enticed women to leave the control of their families and move to the city. 社会必须控制生育，因而也就必须控制女性的人生。那个时代盛行的意识形态如是说。市场引诱女性离开家庭的控制搬迁到城市，这种情况让人无法接受。 Though they are called Progressives, the reformers’ rhetoric had more in common with the “family values” movement of the 1970s and ‘80s — with pseudoscientific race paranoia playing the role that religion would later play. In many ways, they were the ultimate conservatives, attempting to roll back the tide of history made possible by the advance of the capitalist economy. 尽管他们被称为进步主义者，这些改革者的话语倒跟1970和80年代的“家庭价值观”运动有更多共同点——也包括日后宗教也运用的伪科学种族妄想狂那一套。在许多方面，这些人是终极的保守主义者，他们企图使资本经济的进步带来的历史浪潮倒流。 They were incredibly successful. Over a 10-year period between 1909 and 1919, 40 states restricted the number of hours that women employees could work. Fifteen states passed new minimum wage laws to limit entry-level jobs. Most states created stipends for single-parent families, specifically to incentivize women to reject commercial life, return to protected domesticity, and stop competing with men for wages. 他们大获全胜。1909年至1919年的十年间，40个州限制了女性雇员可以工作的小时数。15个州通过了新的最低工资法来限制初级工作职位。大多数州制定了对单职工家庭的津贴，特意激励女性抵制商业生活回归被保护的家庭生活，同时不再与男人在职场上竞争。 Such laws were completely new in American history (and in almost all of modern history) because they intervened so fundamentally in the right of workers and employers to make any sort of contract. The Progressive agenda involved government deeply in issues that directly affected people’s ability to provide for themselves. It also created unprecedented impositions on both employees and their employers. Such laws would have been inconceivable even 50 years earlier. 这些法律在美国历史上（同时也在几乎整个现代历史上）没有先例。原因在于它们如此根本性地介入了工人和雇主订立任意契约的权利。在一些直接影响人们自给自足能力的议题上，进步主义的议程和政府关联极深。同时进步主义创立了前所未有的税项，同时向雇主和雇员征收。这样的法律即使在五十年前也是不可想象的。 How did all this happen so fast, and why? 政府的干预如何迅速实施？为何能得逞？ The Inferiority of Women 女性的劣势 Richard T. Ely, the hugely influential founder of the American Economic Association and the godfather of progressive economics, explained the issue clearly, laying the groundwork for the laws that followed. His 1894 book Socialism and Social Reform expressed a panic about women’s entry into the workforce: Richard T. Ely 是美国经济协会极具影响力的创建者，也是进步主义经济学的教父。他曾清楚地阐述了这个问题，为之后产生的法律打下了基石。他在1894年发表的著作《社会主义与社会改革》中对女性加入劳动力大军表达了恐慌：

Restrictions should be thrown about the employment of married women, and their employment for a considerable period before and after child-birth should be prohibited under any circumstances. There should also be a restriction of the work-day, as in England, for children and young persons under eighteen, and for women. Such a limitation having beneficial effect upon the health of the community…. Night work should be prohibited for women and persons under eighteen years of age and, in particular, all work injurious to the female organism should be forbidden to women. 应该限制雇用已婚女性，在任何情形下，都应该禁止雇用处于分娩期前后的女性，禁止雇用期应该相当长。我们应该仿效英格兰，限制儿童、十八岁以下的年轻人和女性的工作时长。这种限制利于社会健康发展。……应该禁止女性和不满十八岁者上夜班，尤其应该禁止女性从事那些损害女性生理机体的工作。

If the reference to the “female organism” sounds strange, remember that this generation of intellectuals believed in eugenics — using state force to plan the emergence of the model race — and hence saw women mainly as propagators of the race, not human individuals with the right to choose. 如果书中所谓的“女性生理机体”听着别扭，请记住那一代知识分子相信优生学——即使用国家的力量来制定生产模范种族的计划，因此他们将女性主要看成生育者，而非拥有选择权利的个人。 For anyone who believed that government had a responsibility to plan human production (and most intellectuals at the time did believe this), the role of women was critical. They couldn’t be allowed to do what they wanted, go where they wanted, or make lives for themselves. This was the normal thought pattern for the generation that gave the United States unprecedented legal restrictions on the labor market. 对于任何相信政府有责任对人类生育做规划的人（当时大多数知识分子确实相信）来说，女性的角色至关重要。女性不能被允许做自己想做的事，去她们想去的地方，或过她们自己想要的生活。这就是当时一代人通常的思维模式，而正是这种思维模式让美国政府对劳动力市场进行前所未有的法律限制。 The Supreme Court Weighs In 最高法院的介入 Consider the Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which considered state legislation on maximum working hours and decided in favor of the state. Oregon was hardly unusual; it was typical of the 20 states that had already passed such laws directed at women’s freedom to choose employment. From the text of Colorado’s law passed in 1903: “No woman” shall “work or labor for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day … where such labor, work, or occupation by its nature, requires the woman to stand or be upon her feet.” 看一下Muller诉俄勒冈州这个最高法院案例，最高法院认可对最大工作小时数的州立法，并做了对州政府有利的判决。俄勒冈州并非特别，它只是已经通过此类针对女性选择工作自由的法律的二十个州的典型。在1903年通过的科罗拉多州的法律这样写道：“没有女性”应该“在一天的24小时中进行8小时以上的工作或劳动……这里指的是需要女性站立完成的工作、劳动或职业。” The decision in Muller v. Oregon, then, ratified such laws all over the country. Today, this case is widely considered the foundation of progressive labor law. What’s not well known is that the brief that settled the case was a remarkable piece of pseudoscience that argued for the inferiority of women and hence their need for special protections from the demands of commercial enterprise. That brief was filed by future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis. 于是，最高法院对Muller诉俄勒冈州案的判决正式批准了全国范围内此类法律。今天，该诉讼被普遍认为是进步主义劳动法的基础。而不为人所周知的是，终结该诉讼的那份简报是一篇令人称奇的伪科学文章，该简报论述了女性的劣势，认为女性需要特殊的保护使她们免受商业公司侵害。这份简报正是后来成为最高法院法官的Louis Brandeis提交的。 The Weird and Awful “Brandeis Brief” 奇怪又糟糕的“Brandeis简报” The “Brandeis Brief” argued that the law had to stop the massive influx of women into the workplace because women have “special susceptibility to fatigue and disease,” because female blood has more water in it than men’s blood. Their blood composition also accounts for why women have less focus, energy, and strength generally, according to the brief. “Brandeis简报”认为法律必须制止大量女性流入劳动力大军，因为女性“特别容易疲劳和生病”，原因是与男性相比，女性血液中含有更高比例的水分。按照这份简报的说法，女性的血液成分比例也解释了为何女性通常在注意力、精力和体力上逊于男性。。 “Physicians are agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in the powers of persistent attention and application.” “医生们认同女性在一切和耐力有关的方面从根本上弱于男性的观点：这些方面包括肌肉力量，神经系统的能量，持续保持注意力和坚持的能力。” Moreover, “In strength as well as in rapidity and precision of movement women are inferior to men. This is not a conclusion that has ever been contested.” 此外，“不仅在力量上，在速度和动作的精确度上，女性都劣于男性。这一结论从未受到过质疑。” Long hours are “more disastrous to the health of women than to men,” the brief explained. Government therefore needed to regulate work hours for the “health, safety, morals, and general welfare of women.” 长时间工作“对女性健康的损害要大于对男性，”该简报这样解释道。因此政府需要为了“女性的健康、安全、道德，以及生活幸福”对工作时长进行管制。 Restrictions on work hours were therefore essential. “It is of great hygienic importance on account of the more delicate physical organization of woman,” the brief said, “and will contribute much toward the better care of children and the maintenance of a regular family life.” 因此限制工作时间就至关重要。“考虑到女性生理组织更脆弱，（限制工作时间长度）在卫生上具有重大意义”，该简报这样写道，“这对关爱儿童和维持正常家庭生活都非常有益。” This brief is also notable for being the first to combine science, however bogus, and public policy in an appeal to the Supreme Court. 这份简报另一个闻名于世的原因，是它首次在向最高法院的上诉中将科学——尽管是冒牌货——与公共政策结合在一起。 Florence Kelley’s Dream of Nonworking Women Florence Kelley的女性不工作梦想 One might suspect that the entire effort was a male-driven one to stop female progress, but that’s not the case. A leader in the campaign for such labor interventions was writer and activist Florence Kelley. Modern progressives celebrate her activism for maximum work hours, the 10-hour workday, minimum wages, and children’s rights. Indeed, she is considered a great hero by the sanitized version of history that progressives tell each other. 现在可能有人会怀疑这整个事情都是男性驱使的，意在阻止女性进步，但事实并非如此。支持政府介入劳动力市场的运动的一位领导者Florence Kelley是一名作家兼激进分子。现代进步主义者颂扬了她在最大工作时长、十小时工作制、最低工资和儿童权益上的激进主义。没错，在进步主义者相互传颂的历史洁本中，她是一位伟大的英雄。 Before we cheer her accomplishments, however, we should look at Kelley’s driving motivation. Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, she explained that she wanted a minimum wage as a wage floor to stop manufacturing plants and retail outlets from employing women for less than they could otherwise employ men. 但在为她的成就欢呼之前，我们应该看看Kelley的动机。在发表于《美国社会学杂志》的文章上，她解释道，她支持最低工资标准是因为最低工资相当于工资门槛，可以不让工厂和零售商店以低于男性工资的标准雇佣女性。 Retail stores, she wrote, tend to “minimize the employment of men, substituting them for women, girls, and boys, employed largely at less than living wages.” It was precisely such competition from women and children that Kelley intended to stop, so that men could earn higher wages and women could return to traditional roles. 她写道，零售商店倾向于“将雇佣的男性数量最小化，取而代之的是以低于基本生活工资的薪酬雇佣女性，女孩和男孩。”Kelley希望制止的正是这些来自于女性和儿童的就业竞争，这样男性就可以赚更多工资，而女性则可以回归她们的传统角色。 In her book Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905), Kelley said that long working hours had to be ended for women because commercial life was introducing “vice” into communities (“vice” for this generation was the preferred euphemism for every manner of sexual sin). Worse, women were choosing commercial life over home “on their own initiative.” 在出版于1905年的《一些通过立法获得的伦理好处》一书中，Kelley认为女性长时间工作必须被阻止，因为商业化生活正在将“恶习”带入社区（那一代人更喜欢用“恶习”这一委婉说法来指代任何与性相关的罪孽 ）。而更糟的是，女性在商业化生活和家庭二者间选择了前者，完全是“自己主动的”。 Kelley considered it necessary to restrict women’s rights for their own “health and morality,” she said, and also to boost men’s wages so women would stay home under the care of their mothers, fathers, suitors, and husbands. Kelley认为有必要为了女性的“健康和道德”限制女性权利。在书中她写道，限制女性权利也是为了推动男性工资的增长，从而使得女性可以留在家中受她们的父母、求婚者和丈夫们的照顾。 Moreover, to make such work illegal would make “righteous living” more practical for women. If they stopped being rewarded in wages, they would return to domestic life. Kelley even regretted the invention of electricity because it allowed women to work late at factories, when they should be at home reading to children by firelight. 此外，将女性长时间工作定为非法会使得“正直的生活”对女性来说更为实际可行。如果女性不再受工资回报的奖励，她们就会回归家庭生活。Kelley甚至还为电的发明感到遗憾，因为是电让女性可以夜晚在工厂工作，而此时她们本应在家中的炉火旁给孩子们讲故事。 In Kelley’s view, the ideal role of women with children is not to enter commercial life at all: “Family life in the home is sapped in its foundation when mothers of young children work for wages.” It’s an opinion with which some may still sympathize, but should such an opinion be imposed on working families by coercive legislation? For this paragon of progressive social reform, it was clear that lawmakers had to force women back into the home. 在Kelley看来，女性面对孩子的理想角色是完全不进入商业化生活：“当小孩的母亲们为工资工作时，家庭生活的基础被削弱了。”现在有些人依然支持这样的观点，但这样的观点应该通过强制性立法被强加于双职工家庭吗？按照这种进步主义社会改革的范式，立法者必须强迫女性回家。 Florence Kelley and the movement she represented sought to disemploy women and get everyone back to a premodern form of domestic living. She wanted not more rights for women but fewer. The workplace was properly for men, who were to get paid high wages sufficient for the whole family. That was the basis for her support of a range of legislation to drive women out of the workforce and put an end to the new range of options available to them, options that many women were happy to choose. Florence Kelley与她代表的运动，追求的是女性不被雇佣以及所有人都回归现代之前的家庭生活。她要的不是女性拥有更多权利，而是更少。工作场所适合男性，因为他们在那里能获得高薪酬，足够养活全家人。就是基于这样的理念，她支持通过广泛的立法将女性从工作场所驱逐出去，使女性不再有一系列新的选项——很多女性乐于选择的选项。 Fear the Women of East Prussia 对东普鲁士女性的恐惧 All this scholarship and activism is one thing, but what about the popular press? 这些学术研究和激进主义是一回事，那大众传媒又怎么样呢？ Professor Edward A. Ross, author of Sin and Society, spoke out in the New York Times on May 3, 1908. In an article titled “The Price Woman Pays to Industrial Progress,” Ross warned that America’s “fine feminine form” was endangered by commercial society. Edward A. Ross教授是《罪与社会》一书的作者。他在1908年3月3日纽约时报上一篇题为《女性为产业进步所付出的代价》文章中警告了“精致的女性气质”正在被商业化社会所危害。 If women were permitted to work, an evolutionary selection process would govern their reproduction to the detriment of the human race. The graceful women who would otherwise bear beautiful children would be pushed out of the gene pool and replaced by “squat, splay-footed, wide-backed, flat-breasted, broad-faced, short-necked — a type that lacks every grace that we associate with women.” 如果允许女性工作，进化选择过程会主宰她们的生育，危害人类。本来会生养漂亮孩子的优雅女性会被挤出基因池，取而代之的将是“矮胖、八字脚、宽背、平胸、脸蛋平庸、脖子短的女性——这种类型的女性在任何方面都不能让我们把女性优雅与之相联系。” Ross’s example: “the women of East Prussia,” who “bear a child in the morning” and “are out in the field in the afternoon.” Ross举的例子是“东普鲁士女人”，她们“在早晨刚生完孩子”，“下午就下地”。 The professor explained that women who had worked in factories would not make suitable bearers of children. “Think of the discouraging situation of the young man who after he has been married two or three years finds he has a wife who at the age of 28 or 30 has collapsed, become a miserable invalid, suffering aches and pains all the time.” Why, she might find herself “unable to keep the home attractive.” And all of this “because of just a few extra dollars added to the profits of the employer or a few extra dollars saved to the consumer.” 该教授解释说，在工厂工作的女性不会是合适的生养者。“试想一下这样令人沮丧的情况：一个年轻男人在和他妻子结婚两三年后发现她在28或30岁的年纪垮掉了，终日一身病痛。”这样的妻子可能会发现自己“无法把家里弄得漂亮”。而这一切“仅仅是为了让雇主多赚几美元，或是让消费者多省几美元”。 Because of the dangerous combination of employment and natural selection, Ross contended, the government had to extend a hand to help these women by limiting working hours and establishing a high bar to enter the workforce: minimum wages. 由于雇佣劳动和自然选择的危险结合，Ross主张政府必须通过限制工作时长，并对进入劳动力市场设置高门槛——即最低工资——向女性伸出援手。 Only through such enlightened interventions could government save women from the workplace, so that they could return to the maternal duties of rearing “girls who have the qualities of fineness — grace and charm.” 政府只有通过这样高明的干预才能将女性从工作场所中拯救出来，这样女性才能回归母亲的角色，抚养“具有优雅和美丽这些优秀特质的女孩”。 Is This Satire? 讽刺否？ If this reads like satire, sadly it is not. Nor were such views unusual in a generation of ruling-class intellectuals, politicians, and activists that embraced eugenics and rejected capitalism as too random, too chaotic, too liberating. Their plan was to reestablish and entrench by law the family and marital structure they believed in, which absolutely precluded a generation of women making individual choices over their own lives. Every trend panicked the eugenic generation. They fretted about the falling birth rate among those who should be reproducing and the rising birth rate among those who shouldn’t be. They worried about morals, about competition, about health, about culture. Most of all, they regretted the change that a dynamic economy was bringing about. 所有的时代趋向都让相信优生学的一代人恐慌。他们担心本应生养的群体的生育率在下降，而那些本不应生育的群体的生育率却在上升。他们忧虑于道德、竞争、健康和文化。所有问题中他们最担心的是充满活力的经济即将带来的改变。 Thus, from 1900 through 1920, a period that set the stage for a century of interventions in the labor market, hundreds of laws stifling women were passed in every state and at the federal level, too. None dared call it misogyny, but this is real history, however rarely it is told. 因此，1900至1920年间，政府为干预劳动力市场打好了舞台，这种干预持续了一个世纪。数以百计窒息女性的法律在所有州以及联邦层面上通过。没人敢称之为厌女，但这是真实的历史，尽管很少被说起。 Feminists against Regulation 对抗管控的女权主义 Laws that disemployed thousands of women nationwide led to vast protests. The Equal Opportunity League, an early feminist organization in New York, lobbied the state legislature to repeal the bans on work. And it received quite the press coverage. 使全国范围内成千上万的女性失去工作的法律导致了大范围的抗议。机会平等联盟是一个位于纽约的早期女权组织，它游说州立法机构废除对女性工作的禁令，得到了相当多的媒体报道。 “So-called ‘welfare’ legislation is not asked for or wanted by real working women,” the league said. “These ‘welfare’ bills are drafted by self-styled social uplifters who assert that working women do not know enough to protect themselves.” “所谓的“福利”立法不是真正在工作的女性要求或内心想要的，”该联盟如是说。“这些“福利”法案由自封的社会提升者起草，他们认为工作的女性不知如何保护自己。” “Are women people? Women are no longer the wards of the State and a law that is unconstitutional for a man voter is equally unconstitutional for a woman voter.” “女性也是人吧？女性不再是州政府的被监护人，对男性投票人来说违宪的法律对女性投票人来说一样违宪。” “Working at night is not more injurious than working in the daytime,” the league argued. “Many women prefer to work at night because the wage is higher, opportunities for advancement greater, and women with children can enjoy being with their child after school hours in the day time.” “在晚上工作不比在白天工作更有害”，该联盟这样认为。“许多女性喜欢在晚上工作是因为工资更高，升职的机会更大，而且有孩子的女性可以在白天孩子放学后和孩子在一起。” In fact, the phrase “equal pay for equal work” was not created to mandate higher wages for women. It was a league slogan invoked to argue against laws that made it “a crime to employ women even five minutes after the eight-hour day.” The phrase emerged as a preferred slogan to protest in favor of free markets, not against them. 事实上，“同工同酬”这一警句的出现并非为了强制提高女性工资。它是联盟的一句口号，用来反对那些认定“8小时工作时间之外即使多雇佣女性5分钟也是犯罪”的法律。这一广受欢迎警句的是作为亲市场而非反对自由市场的口号而提出的。 The Equal Opportunity League also passionately opposed the minimum wage law. Such laws, it argued, “while purporting to be for [women’s] benefit, would really be a serious handicap to them in competing with men workers for desirable positions.” 平等机会联盟也积极地反对最低工资法。联盟认为这样的法律“尽管本意是为了照顾（女性）利益，实质上却让女性在与男性工人竞争好职位时受到严重妨碍”。 In short, the conclusion of the League is that these proposed bills and laws, ostensibly intended to protect and shield the woman worker, will, if permitted to stand, unquestionably work her industrial ruin and throw her back into the slough of drudgery out of which she is just emerging after centuries of painful, laborious effort to better her condition. ("Women’s Work Limited by Law," New York Times, January 18, 1920) 简单来说，联盟的结论是这些提议中的法案和法律表面上意在保护女性工人，实际上一旦通过则毫无疑问会毁坏女性的职业生涯，将女性赶回家务重活的泥沼。而女性在经历数个世纪痛苦艰难的努力后才刚刚脱离这一泥沼而改善了自己的状况。（《女性的工作被法律所限》，《纽约时报》1920年1月18日。） Restriction Becomes Liberation? 限制变成了解放？ The fairy tale version of history says that during the 20th century, government freed women to become newly empowered in the workplace. The reality is exactly the opposite. Just as the market was granting women more choices, government swept in to limit them in the name of health, purity, family values, and social uplift. Such laws and regulations are still around today, though they have been recharacterized in a completely different way. As Orwell might say, somewhere along the way, restriction became liberation. 历史的童话版本说，在20世纪政府给予了女性自由，让女性在工作场所拥有了权利。真相恰好相反。市场给予女性更多的选择，而政府却插手进来以健康、纯洁、家庭价值观和社会地位提升等名义限制女性的选择。这类法律和法规在今天仍然存在，虽然它们以完全不同的方式被重新描绘。正如奥威尔所说，在通往动物庄园路途中，不知从何处起，限制变成了解放。 (Author’s note: I’m grateful to Thomas Leonard’s Illiberal Reformers for providing the footnotes I followed to write this piece. Also, much more rethinking of Progressive Era politics and its impact on the family is discussed in Steven Horwitz’s Hayek’s Modern Family, newly published by Palgrave.) （作者附言：非常感激Thomas Leonard的《非自由的改革者》，循着该书提供的脚注，我写下了此文。另外，对进步时代的政治及其对家庭之影响的更多再思考，在Steven Horwitz所著的由Palgrave最新出版的《哈耶克的现代家庭》一书中有更多讨论。） （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

BOOK REVIEW: ALBION’S SEED 书评：《阿尔比恩的的种子》 作者：SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27 译者：Tankman 校对：沈沉（@沈沉-Henrysheen） 来源：http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/ I. Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does. 《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注：阿尔比恩，英国旧称，据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松，而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何，我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书，他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上，此书做到了这点。 In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US. 在学校，我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”，这是一个最不多元化的群体，并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景，宗教，社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层，令其与其他阶层隔绝，而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。 I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects. 我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景：一个波多黎各生存狂，一个非洲财阀，以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险，相互竞争，来占领领土和资源。你能探索的，不单单只是对新世界拓殖，而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。 What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states. 当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展，不受其他群体影响时，你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢？《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。 Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s. Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种：在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒，在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”，在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会，以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注：指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。 II. A: The Puritans A：清教徒 I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity. 我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人，而后在接下来的364天，就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派，对英国国教会持异议，而且遵从他们特有的严厉，勤奋，厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。 Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors. 他们中的大多数，来自东英吉利，是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国，部分是因为他们感到被迫害，但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶，如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活，他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。 I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream. 我知道五月花，我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋，我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。 Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.” 清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派，其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民，其拥有读写能力的比例，是英国平均水平的两倍；在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代，大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方，受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响；历史学家Havelock Ellis发现，“相比英国的其他任何地区，该地很大程度上以文艺，科学和知识成就著称。” Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”. 而且，只有最好的清教徒，才能被允许来到马萨诸塞；Fischer写道，“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”，而且“不适合该地的移民，则被放逐到其他殖民地，或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”，这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。 INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS: 关于清教徒的一些有趣事实： 1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”. Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格，以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。 2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us'” 马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手，从他嘴里喊出五个词：‘来帮助我们’”。 3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark. 新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克 4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.” 马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力；Fischer记录了一个故事：一个旅行者问一个男人“您是在此地服侍的牧师吗？”被问者纠正了他的问题，“先生，我是统治此地的牧师。” 5. The Puritans tried to import African slaves, but they all died of the cold. 清教徒试图进口黑奴，但是黑奴全部死于严寒。 6. In 1639, Massachusetts declared a “Day Of Humiliation” to condemn “novelties, oppression, atheism, excesse, superfluity, idleness, contempt of authority, and trouble in other parts to be remembered”. 1639年，马萨诸塞发起了“羞辱日”，以谴责“新潮，压迫，无神论，纵欲，奢侈，懒散，轻视权威以及其他引人注目的麻烦”。 7. The average family size in Waltham, Massachusetts in the 1730s was 9.7 children. 1730年代，在马萨诸塞的Waltham，平均家庭规模是9.7个孩子。 8. Everyone was compelled by law to live in families. Town officials would search the town for single people and, if found, order them to join a family; if they refused, they were sent to jail. 按照法律，每个人都必须生活在家庭中。城镇官员会搜查镇中的单身者，如果发现，则会命令其加入一个家庭；如果单身者拒绝，则会被投入监狱。 9. 98% of adult Puritan men were married, compared to only 73% of adult Englishmen in general. Women were under special pressure to marry, and a Puritan proverb said that “women dying maids lead apes in Hell”. 98%的清教徒成年男子都结了婚，而英国成年男子总体的结婚率为73%。要求妇女结婚的压力特别大，一句清教徒格言说“没结婚的女人死后在地狱里带领着猿猴”。【译注：这一格言大意是谴责独身主义，但字面意思难考，一说是因为猿猴在当时人看来是没有价值的动物，肉不可吃，也不能做驼兽或者看家。】 10. 90% of Puritan names were taken from the Bible. Some Puritans took pride in their learning by giving their children obscure Biblical names they would expect nobody else to have heard of, like Mahershalalhasbaz. Others chose random Biblical terms that might not have technically been intended as names; “the son of Bostonian Samuel Pond was named Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”. Still others chose Biblical words completely at random and named their children things like Maybe or Notwithstanding. 90%清教徒的名字都取自圣经。一些清教徒引以为豪的是：用他们料想没人听过的圣经中的生僻词给孩子取名，并以此夸耀自己的学问，以至于他们可以预期人们从来没听过这个名字，比如 Mahershalalhasbaz【译者注：掳掠速临，抢夺快到。见圣经以赛亚书第八章1节】。另一些则随机取用圣经中的词，有些词技术上说本不是用来做名字的；“Bostonian Samuel Pond的孩子被起名为 Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”【译者注：前四个单词作为孩子的名，引自圣经但以理书第五章25节。四个单词都是亚兰文的度量单位，表示神已经数算过巴比伦的岁月，神已称量了巴比伦的道德】。也有些人，完全随机取用圣经中的词，给他们的孩子取名为Maybe或者是Notwithstanding。 11. Puritan parents traditionally would send children away to be raised with other families, and raise those families’ children in turn, in the hopes that the lack of familiarity would make the child behave better. 传统上，清教徒父母把孩子送给别的家庭寄养，作为交换，他们也寄养别人家的孩子，他们希望家中缺失亲情可以让孩子们被管教得更好。 12. In 1692, 25% of women over age 45 in Essex County were accused of witchcraft. 在1692年，Essex郡25%的45岁以上妇女被控为女巫。 13. Massachusetts passed the first law mandating universal public education, which was called The Old Deluder Law in honor of its preamble, which began “It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the scriptures…” 马萨诸塞通过了第一部强制普及公共教育的法律，被称为“老说谎者法案”，因为其前言的开头写道：“老牌说谎者撒旦的一个主要活动，就是阻止人们接触到经文的知识……” 14. Massachusetts cuisine was based around “meat and vegetables submerged in plain water and boiled relentlessly without seasonings of any kind”. 马萨诸塞的饮食基本上是“白水炖煮肉和蔬菜，不加任何调料”。 15. Along with the famous scarlet A for adultery, Puritans could be forced to wear a B for blasphemy, C for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, and so on. 除了著名的表示通奸的红字A，清教徒还因为渎神被强制穿上B（blasphemy），因为造假被穿上C（ counterfeiting ），因为醉酒被穿上D（ drunkenness ），如此种种。 16. Wasting time in Massachusetts was literally a criminal offense, listed in the law code, and several people were in fact prosecuted for it. 在马萨诸塞，浪费时间是一种犯罪行为，列在法条上，并有几人的确因此被起诉。 17. This wasn’t even the nadir of weird hard-to-enforce Massachusetts laws. Another law just said “If any man shall exceed the bounds of moderation, we shall punish him severely”. 这还不是难以被执行的马萨诸塞法律的极点。另一条法律说：“如果任何人超越了适度的界限，我们将对其进行严惩。” Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote of Massachusetts Puritanism: “The underlying foundation of life in New England was one of profound, unutterable, and therefore unuttered mehalncholy, which regarded human existence itself as a ghastly risk, and, in the case of the vast majority of human beings, an inconceivable misfortune.” Harriet Beecher Stowe就马萨诸塞的清教主义写道：“新英格兰生活的基础是一种深刻微妙，无法言说，因此也就未被说破的惆怅，即人类的存在本身就是一种可怖的风险，绝大多数人，其存在是一种不可思议的不幸。” And indeed, everything was dour, strict, oppressive, and very religious. A typical Massachusetts week would begin in the church, which doubled as the town meeting hall. There were no decorations except a giant staring eye on the pulpit to remind churchgoers that God was watching them. 而且的确，一切都是严厉，严格，压抑并且非常宗教化的。马萨诸塞典型的一周生活开始于教堂，其规模是镇议事厅的两倍。教堂里没有别的装饰，除了牧师讲道台上的一个巨大眼睛，提醒来教堂的人们上帝在看着他们。 Townspeople would stand up before their and declare their shame and misdeeds, sometimes being forced to literally crawl before the other worshippers begging for forgiveness. THen the minister would give two two-hour sermons back to back. The entire affair would take up to six hours, and the church was unheated (for some reason they stored all their gunpowder there, so no one was allowed to light a fire), and this was Massachusetts, and it was colder in those days than it is now, so that during winter some people would literally lose fingers to frostbite (Fischer: “It was a point of honor for the minister never to shorten a sermon merely because his audience was frozen”). Everyone would stand there with their guns (they were legally required to bring guns, in case Indians attacked during the sermon) and hear about how they were going to Hell, all while the giant staring eye looked at them. 在讲道开始前，镇上的人坦白自己的羞耻和劣迹，有时真的是被强迫匍匐在其他敬拜者前，乞求饶恕。然后布道者会开始连续两场两小时长的证道。整个过程可以花掉六小时，而且教堂里没有取暖设施（出于一些原因，人们把所有的火药储存在教堂，所以那里禁止生火），而且这可是马萨诸塞，那时候天气比今天更冷，所以在冬季，有人真的会因为冻疮失去手指。（Fischer：“对布道者来说，从不因听众冻僵而缩短证道是一种荣耀。”）每个人站在那里，带着他们的枪（法律上，他们被要求携带武器，以防印第安人在其听讲道时袭击），听着他们将会怎样下地狱，整个过程，那巨大的眼睛一直盯着他们。 So life as a Puritan was pretty terrible. On the other hand, their society was impressively well-ordered. Teenage pregnancy rates were the lowest in the Western world and in some areas literally zero. Murder rates were half those in other American colonies. 所以一个清教徒的生活是非常恐怖的。另一方面，他们的社会有着令人印象深刻的良好秩序。未成年人怀孕率曾是西方世界中最低的，在某些地方则实际上为零。谋杀率则只有其他北美殖民地的一半。 There was remarkably low income inequality – “the top 10% of wealthholders held only 20%-30% of taxable property”, compared to 75% today and similar numbers in other 17th-century civilizations. The poor (at least the poor native to a given town) were treated with charity and respect – “in Salem, one man was ordered to be set by the heels in the stocks for being uncharitable to a poor man in distress”. 收入差距很低——“10%最富者只占有可税财产的20%-30%”，对比而言，今天这个比例是75%，17世纪时的其他文明也近似这个数字。穷人（至少是在镇上的本地穷人）受到尊重和接济——“在Salem，一个男人因为不肯接济一位在苦难中的穷人，被罚上脚枷示众”。 Government was conducted through town meetings in which everyone had a say. Women had more equality than in most parts of the world, and domestic abuse was punished brutally. The educational system was top-notch – “by most empirical tests of intellectual eminence, New England led all other parts of British America from the 17th to the early 20th century”. 政府通过镇上的议事会议得以运作，每个人在会上都有发言权。比世界其他地方，妇女享有更多平等，而家庭暴力则会遭到严酷惩罚。教育系统是顶尖的——“从十七世纪到二十世纪早期，在大多数有关智识能力的经验测试中，新英格兰领先所有其他北美的英国殖民地”。 In some ways the Puritans seem to have taken the classic dystopian bargain – give up all freedom and individuality and art, and you can have a perfect society without crime or violence or inequality. Fischer ends each of his chapters with a discussion of how the society thought of liberty, and the Puritans unsurprisingly thought of liberty as “ordered liberty” – the freedom of everything to tend to its correct place and stay there. 某种程度上，清教徒似乎选择了经典的敌托邦方案——放弃一切自由、个体性和艺术，得到一个没有犯罪、暴力和不平等的完美社会。Fischer在每一章的结尾部分都会探讨该社会如何看待自由，而清教徒毫不奇怪地认为自由是“有秩序的自由”——在这种自由下，万物都处于正确的位置，并且保持这种状态。 They thought of it as a freedom from disruption – apparently FDR stole some of his “freedom from fear” stuff from early Puritan documents. They were extremely not in favor of the sort of liberty that meant that, for example, there wouldn’t be laws against wasting time. That was going too far. 他们认为这是一种免于被扰乱的自由——显然富兰克林·罗斯福从早期清教徒的文档中，偷取了一些创意，用于他的“免于恐惧的自由”的理念。他们非常不喜欢某些类型的自由，比如，没有禁止浪费时间的法律。这种自由实在是过度了。 B: The Cavaliers B：骑士党 The Massachusetts Puritans fled England in the 1620s partly because the king and nobles were oppressing them. In the 1640s, English Puritans under Oliver Cromwell rebelled, took over the government, and killed the king. The nobles not unreasonably started looking to get the heck out. 马萨诸塞清教徒在1620年代逃离英格兰，部分是因为国王和贵族压迫他们。在1640年代，英国清教徒在奥利弗·克伦威尔的领导下反叛，夺取了政权，处死了国王。贵族在此时开始想要尽快逃离并不是没有原因的。 Virginia had been kind of a wreck ever since most of the original Jamestown settlers had mostly died of disease. Governor William Berkeley, a noble himself, decided the colony could reinvent itself as a destination for refugee nobles, and told them it would do everything possible to help them maintain the position of oppressive supremacy to which they were accustomed. The British nobility was sold. The Cavaliers – the nobles who had fought and lost the English Civil War – fled to Virginia. 自从詹姆斯敦最初一批殖民者中的大部分死于疾病，弗吉尼亚一度沦落得像一片废墟。殖民地长官 William Berkeley自己就是个贵族。他决定殖民地应该转型为一个避难贵族的目的地。他告诉避难的贵族，殖民地将会竭尽全力，帮他们维持其久已习惯的压迫性支配地位。不列颠的贵族地位标价出售。骑士党——在英国内战中顽抗继而失败的贵族——逃至弗吉尼亚。 Historians who cross-checking Virginian immigrant lists against English records find that of Virginians whose opinions on the War were known, 98% were royalists. They were overwhelming Anglican, mostly from agrarian southern England, and all related to each other in the incestuous way of nobility everywhere: “it is difficult to think of any ruling elite that has been more closely interrelated since the Ptolemies”. There were twelve members of Virginia’s royal council; in 1724 “all without exception were related to one another by blood or marriage…as late as 1775, every member of that august body was descended from a councilor who had served in 1660”. 历史学家交叉对比了弗吉尼亚移民的名单和英国的记录，他们发现，对于英国内战，立场可知的弗吉尼亚人当中，98%是保皇党。他们绝大多数都是国教徒，大部分来自英国南部的农业区，互相之间都有贵族间内婚的血缘关系：“很难想到自托勒密王朝以来，统治精英还有比这更近的亲缘关系”。弗吉尼亚皇家议会有十二名成员；在1724年“无一例外的彼此有着血缘或姻亲关系……迟至1775年，这一庄严机构的每个成员都是其1660年委员的后代”。 These aristocrats didn’t want to do their own work, so they brought with them tens of thousands of indentured servants; more than 75% of all Virginian immigrants arrived in this position. Some of these people came willingly on a system where their master paid their passage over and they would be free after a certain number of years; others were sent by the courts as punishments; still others were just plain kidnapped. The gender ratio was 4:1 in favor of men, and there were entire English gangs dedicated to kidnapping women and sending them to Virginia, where they fetched a high price. Needless to say, these people came from a very different stratum than their masters or the Puritans. 这些贵族不想自己做工，所以他们带来上万的契约仆佣；超过75%的弗吉尼亚移民以这个身份【编注：即契约仆佣】到来。一些人是自愿而来，主人支付了他们的旅费，他们在服务一些年份后会获得自由；另一些人则被法庭判罚来到这里；还有些人明显是被拐骗的。男女性别比是4：1，存在专门贩卖妇女到弗吉尼亚的英国黑帮，他们从中赚取高价。无需多言，相比于他们的贵族主人或清教徒，这些人来自一个非常不同的阶层。 People who came to Virginia mostly died. They died of malaria, typhoid fever, amoebiasis, and dysentery. Unlike in New England, where Europeans were better adapted to the cold climate than Africans, in Virginia it was Europeans who had the higher disease-related mortality rate. The whites who survived tended to become “sluggish and indolent”, according to the universal report of travellers and chroniclers, although I might be sluggish and indolent too if I had been kidnapped to go work on some rich person’s farm and sluggishness/indolence was an option. 来到弗吉尼亚的人多数都死了。他们死于疟疾，伤寒，阿米巴病，和痢疾。不像在新英格兰，在那里欧洲人比非洲人更好的适应了寒冷气候，在弗吉尼亚，欧洲人有着更高的疾病死亡率。参考旅行者的报告和编年史，幸存下来的白人倾向于变得“低迷和懒惰”，当然，我也许也会变得低迷和懒惰，如果我被诱拐到某个富人的农场做工而且可以选择低迷/懒惰的话。 The Virginians tried their best to oppress white people. Really, they did. The depths to which they sank in trying to oppress white people almost boggle the imagination. There was a rule that if a female indentured servant became pregnant, a few extra years were added on to their indenture, supposedly because they would be working less hard during their pregnancy and child-rearing so it wasn’t fair to the master. Virginian aristocrats would rape their own female servants, then add a penalty term on to their indenture for becoming pregnant. 弗吉尼亚人竭尽全力的压迫白人。确实，他们干过这种事。他们试图压迫白人的深度，超乎想象。有一条规矩：如果女性契约仆人怀了孕，她们的服务期会被延长几年，大概是因为她们的产出在孕期和抚育期会下降，这就对主人不公平。弗吉尼亚贵族们会强奸自己的女性仆人，而后给她们的服务期加上基于怀孕的惩罚期限。 That is an impressive level of chutzpah. But despite these efforts, eventually all the white people either died, or became too sluggish to be useful, or worst of all just finished up their indentures and became legally free. The aristocrats started importing black slaves as per the model that had sprung up in the Caribbean, and so the stage was set for the antebellum South we read about in history classes. 这种无耻妄为令人印象深刻。但是虽然有这些努力，最终所有白人不是死了，就是变得太低迷以至于无用，或者最糟糕的是他们结束了服务期限，在法律上变得自由了。贵族开始按照加勒比地区涌现的那种模式引进黑奴，于是我们在历史课上读到的内战前南方的一幕幕已经预备好上演。 INTERESTING CAVALIER FACTS: 关于骑士党的有趣事实： 1. Virginian cavalier speech patterns sound a lot like modern African-American dialects. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out why, but it’s strange to think of a 17th century British lord speaking what a modern ear would clearly recognize as Ebonics. 弗吉尼亚骑士党的说话腔调听来更像是现代非裔美国人。不用多想就能推测出原因，不过想到17世纪的不列颠贵族讲一口现在听来是黑人英语的腔调，的确很奇怪。 2. Three-quarters of 17th-century Virginian children lost at least one parent before turning 18. 四分之三的17世纪弗吉尼亚孩子在十八岁之前至少丧失父母之一。 3. Cousin marriage was an important custom that helped cement bonds among the Virginian elite, “and many an Anglican lady changed her condition but not her name”. 堂亲结婚是弗吉尼亚精英加固联盟的重要习俗，“很多国教徒女士改变了她们的境遇，但不改变其姓氏”。 4. In Virginia, women were sometimes unironically called “breeders”; English women were sometimes referred to as “She-Britons”. 在弗吉尼亚，并非出于讽刺，妇女有时被称作“育仔员”；英国妇女有时被称作“女不列颠人”。 5. Virginia didn’t really have towns; the Chesapeake Bay was such a giant maze of rivers and estuaries and waterways that there wasn’t much need for land transport hubs. Instead, the unit of settlement was the plantation, which consisted of an aristocratic planter, his wife and family, his servants, his slaves, and a bunch of guests who hung around and mooched off him in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality. 弗吉尼亚没有真正的城镇；切萨皮克湾是众多河流、河口和水路组成的迷宫，并不需要陆路运输的集散地。相反，殖民的基本单位是种植园，由一位贵族种植园主，他的妻子和家庭，他的仆人，他的奴隶，以及一群借着古已有之的好客传统依附寄生于主人的宾客们组成。 6. Virginian society considered everyone who lived in a plantation home to be a kind of “family”, with the aristocrat both as the literal father and as a sort of abstracted patriarch with complete control over his domain. 弗吉尼亚社会认为每个生活在种植园中的人多少都算是“家庭成员”，而贵族既是真正的父亲，也是控制自己地域的抽象家主。 7. Virginia governor William Berkeley probably would not be described by moderns as ‘strong on education’. He said in a speech that “I thank God there are no free schools nor printing [in Virginia], and I hope we shall not have these for a hundred years, for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divuldged them, and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!” 按现代观点，弗吉尼亚殖民地长官William Berkeley很可能算不上“重视教育”。他在一次演说中说“我感谢上帝，（在弗吉尼亚）没有免费学校和印刷术，而且我希望我们一百年也不要有这些东西，因为学习给世界带来不服从、异端、和结党，印刷术则传播上述这些，以及对最佳政府的诽谤。上帝让我们远离学校和印刷术。” 8. Virginian recreation mostly revolved around hunting and bloodsports. Great lords hunted deer, lesser gentry hunted foxes, indentured servants had a weird game in which they essentially draw-and-quartered geese, young children “killed and tortured songbirds”, and “at the bottom of this hierarchy of bloody games were male infants who prepared themselves for the larger pleasures of maturity by torturing snakes, maiming frogs, and pulling the wings off butterflies. Thus, every red-blooded male in Virginia was permitted to slaughter some animal or other, and the size of his victim was proportioned to his social rank.” 弗吉尼亚的休闲活动大多涉及打猎和血腥运动。大领主猎鹿，小绅士猎狐，契约仆人玩着奇怪的游戏来肢解鹅，年幼的孩子“杀死和折磨鸣禽”，而“在这一血腥游戏等级体系底部的则是男性幼童，为了长大后享受更大的猎杀愉悦，他们折磨蛇、残害青蛙、扯掉蝴蝶的翅膀。因此，每个热血的弗吉尼亚男性都被允许屠杀这样或那样一些动物，其受害者的尺寸则和他的社会等级成比例。” 9. “In 1747, an Anglican minister named William Kay infuriated the great planter Landon Carter by preaching a sermon against pride. The planter took it personally and sent his [relations] and ordered them to nail up the doors and windows of all the churches in which Kay preached.” “在1747年，一个叫William Kay的国教会牧师因为一篇反对骄傲的讲道，激怒了大种植园主Landon Carter。种植园主认为这是对其个人的冒犯，派出了他的亲属，命其钉死所有Kay牧师曾讲过道的教堂的门窗。 10. Our word “condescension” comes from a ritual attitude that leading Virginians were supposed to display to their inferiors. Originally condescension was supposed to be a polite way of showing respect those who were socially inferior to you; our modern use of the term probably says a lot about what Virginians actually did with it. 我们的“屈尊”一词来自于，弗吉尼亚的领袖应该对自己的下级表示的一种礼仪性态度。最初屈尊应该是一种礼貌的方式，对社会等级比自己低的人表示尊敬；我们现在对这个词的用法，很可能反映了当时弗吉尼亚人是怎么使用它的。 In a lot of ways, Virginia was the opposite of Massachusetts. Their homicide rate was sky-high, and people were actively encouraged to respond to slights against their honor with duels (for the rich) and violence (for the poor). They were obsessed with gambling, and “made bets not merely on horses, cards, cockfights, and backgammon, but also on crops, prices, women, and the weather”. 在很多方面，弗吉尼亚是马萨诸塞的反面。他们的谋杀率非常高，而人们实际上被鼓励用决斗（富人）和暴力（穷人）来回应对他们荣誉的轻慢。他们沉迷于赌博，“不仅仅在马，扑克，斗鸡，和十五子棋上打赌，而且还在庄稼，价格，妇女和天气上下注”。 Their cuisine focused on gigantic sumptuous feasts of animals killed in horrible ways. There were no witchcraft trials, but there were people who were fined for disrupting the peace by accusing their neighbors of witchcraft. Their church sermons were twenty minutes long on the dot. 他们的饮食注重巨大奢靡的欢宴，充斥着用各种可怕方法杀死的动物。这里没有女巫审判，倒是有人因为指控其邻居是女巫而犯了寻衅滋事被罚款的。他们的教会布道只有20分钟那么长。 The Puritans naturally thought of the Virginians as completely lawless reprobate sinners, but this is not entirelytrue. Virginian church sermons might have been twenty minutes long, but Virginian ballroom dance lessons could last nine hours. It wasn’t that the Virginians weren’t bound by codes, just that those codes were social rather than moral. 清教徒自然认为弗吉尼亚人是完全不遵法纪的邪恶罪人，但是这并不是完全正确的。弗吉尼亚教会的讲道也许只有20分钟，但其舞池中的交谊舞教学课可以长达九小时。并不是弗吉尼亚人不受法规约束，只是这些法规是社交上的，而不是道德上的。 And Virginian nobles weren’t just random jerks, they were carefully cultivated jerks. Planters spared no expense to train their sons to be strong, forceful, and not take nothin’ from nobody. They would encourage and reward children for being loud and temperamental, on the grounds that this indicated a strong personality and having a strong personality was fitting of a noble. 而且弗吉尼亚贵族并不仅仅是混蛋，他们是被精心教化过的混蛋。种植园主不惜代价训练他们的儿子，令其强壮、坚决，不受任何人摆弄。他们会因孩子们声音洪亮、感情激烈而加以鼓励和奖励，因为这意味着强烈的个性，而有强烈个性和做一个贵族是相符的。 When this worked, it worked really well – witness natural leaders and self-driven polymaths like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. More often it failed catastrophically – the rate of sex predation and rape in Virginia was at least as high as anywhere else in North America. 当这种做法奏效时，它确实有很好的效果——天然的领袖和自我激励的博学者例如乔治·华盛顿和托马斯·杰弗逊即是明证。更多的时候，这做法导致了灾难性的失败，弗吉尼亚的性侵犯和强奸率至少和北美其他地方一样高。 The Virginian Cavaliers had an obsession with liberty, but needless to say it was not exactly a sort of liberty of which the ACLU would approve. I once heard someone argue against libertarians like so: even if the government did not infringe on liberties, we would still be unfree for other reasons. If we had to work, we would be subject to the whim of bosses. If we were poor, we would not be “free” to purchase most of the things we want. In any case, we are “oppressed” by disease, famine, and many other things besides government that prevent us from implementing our ideal existence. 弗吉尼亚骑士党着迷于自由，但是不用说，这自由不完全等同于美国民权自由联盟（ACLU）所支持的那种自由。我曾听某人和自由意志主义者做如此争辩：即使政府不侵犯我们的自由，我们仍然会因为其他原因不自由。如果我们必须工作，我们就会被老板的兴之所至所限制。如果我们贫穷，我们就不可能“自由的”购买我们所需的大部分物品。在任何时候，我们都会被疾病、饥饿和其他很多政府之外的事情“压迫”，来阻止我们达到理想的状态。 The Virginians took this idea and ran with it – in the wrong direction. No, they said, we wouldn’t be free if we had to work, therefore we insist upon not working. No, we wouldn’t be free if we were limited by poverty, therefore we insist upon being extremely rich. Needless to say, this conception of freedom required first indentured servitude and later slavery to make it work, but the Virginians never claimed that the servants or slaves were free. 弗吉尼亚人采纳了这个主意，并且践行了它——在错误的方向上。不，他们说，如果我们必须工作，我们不可能自由，所以我们坚持不工作。不，如果我们被贫穷限制，我们不可能自由，所以我们坚持要极度的富有。无需多言，要实行这种自由观念，起先要求契约仆人的服侍，而后要求奴隶的劳动，但弗吉尼亚人从来没有宣称仆人或奴隶是自由的。 That wasn’t the point. Freedom, like wealth, was properly distributed according to rank; nobles had as much as they wanted, the middle-class enough to get by on, and everyone else none at all. And a Virginian noble would have gone to his grave insisting that a civilization without slavery could never have citizens who were truly free. 问题不在这里。自由，像财富一样，按照等级进行恰当分配；贵族想要多少就要多少，中间阶层也得到了足够的，而其他人则什么也没有。一个弗吉尼亚贵族可能至死都会坚持：没有奴隶制的文明，不可能有真正自由的公民。 C: The Quakers C：贵格会 Fischer warns against the temptation to think of the Quakers as normal modern people, but he has to warn us precisely because it’s so tempting. Where the Puritans seem like a dystopian caricature of virtue and the Cavaliers like a dystopian caricature of vice, the Quakers just seem ordinary. Yes, they’re kind of a religious cult, but they’re the kind of religious cult any of us might found if we were thrown back to the seventeenth century. Fischer警告我们小心那种想要把贵格会看作正常现代人的倾向，但是他之所以不得不警告我们，恰好就是因为这种想法是如此诱人。清教徒看上去像关于德行的敌托邦讽刺画，骑士党看起来像关于邪恶的敌托邦讽刺画，而贵格会则看起来刚好正常。是的，他们是一种教派，但是他们是那种我们中任何人如果穿越回17世纪都会成立的教派。 Instead they were founded by a weaver’s son named George Fox. He believed people were basically good and had an Inner Light that connected them directly to God without a need for priesthood, ritual, Bible study, or self-denial; mostly people just needed to listen to their consciences and be nice. Since everyone was equal before God, there was no point in holding up distinctions between lords and commoners: Quakers would just address everybody as “Friend”. 其实贵格会是被一个纺织工的儿子George Fox创立的。他相信，人基本上是善的，而且人心有内在的光亮，可以把人和上帝直接联系起来，不需要牧师、仪式、解经或者自我否定；大部分时候，人只需要听从他们良心的召唤，为人友善。因为每个人在神面前都是平等的，所以没有任何理由坚持领主和平民之间的分别：贵格会对每个人都以“朋友”称呼。 And since the Quakers were among the most persecuted sects at the time, they developed an insistence on tolerance and freedom of religion which (unlike the Puritans) they stuck to even when shifting fortunes put them on top. They believed in pacificism, equality of the sexes, racial harmony, and a bunch of other things which seem pretty hippy-ish even today let alone in 1650. 而且因为贵格会在当时是最受迫害的宗派，他们发展出了对宗教宽容和信仰自由的坚持，这点不像清教徒。他们甚至在自身有幸掌权时，仍然坚持这点。他们信仰和平主义、性别平等、种族和谐，以及其他很多即使在今天看来都很嬉皮士的观念，更遑论在1650年。 England’s top Quaker in the late 1600s was William Penn. Penn is universally known to Americans as “that guy Pennsylvania is named after” but actually was a larger-than-life 17th century superman. Born to the nobility, Penn distinguished himself early on as a military officer; he was known for beating legendary duelists in single combat and then sparing their lives with sermons about how murder was wrong. 17世纪晚期，英国最重要的贵格会信徒是William Penn。对大多数美国人而言，他只是因“宾夕法尼亚以其得名”而广为人知。但其实，他是17世纪的超凡人物。生于贵族之家，Penn早年担任军官，崭露头角；他因以下事迹而著名：在一对一决斗中击败传奇般的对手们，而后饶过其性命，并发表讲道，指出谋杀是错误的。 He gradually started having mystical visions, quit the military, and converted to Quakerism. Like many Quakers he was arrested for blasphemy; unlike many Quakers, they couldn’t make the conviction stick; in his trial he “conducted his defense so brilliantly that the jurors refused to convict him even when threatened with prison themselves, [and] the case became a landmark in the history of trial by jury.” 渐渐的，他开始经历神秘的异象，退出军旅，改宗成为贵格会信徒。就像很多贵格会信徒一样，他因渎神被逮捕；和许多贵格会信徒不同，审判者没能给他定罪；在审判中，他“如此精彩的辩护，以至于陪审团成员甚至在面对牢狱之灾威胁时，都不肯定他的罪，而且该案成为了陪审团审判历史上的里程碑。” When the state finally found a pretext on which to throw him in prison, he spent his incarceration composing “one of the noblest defenses of religious liberty ever written”, conducting a successful mail-based courtship with England’s most eligible noblewoman, and somehow gaining the personal friendship and admiration of King Charles II. 当政府终于找到借口将其投入监狱时，他在狱中创作了“有史以来，对宗教自由的最高贵辩护之一的文章”，以信件形式向英国最有贵族资格的女士成功求爱，而且不知何故得到了查理二世的个人友谊和敬佩。 Upon his release the King liked him so much that he gave him a large chunk of the Eastern United States on a flimsy pretext of repaying a family debt. Penn didn’t want to name his new territory Pennsylvania – he recommended just “Sylvania” – but everybody else overruled him and Pennyslvania it was. 获释之后，国王如此喜爱他，以至于把美国东部的一大片以偿还家庭债务的单薄借口划给了他。Penn不想把他的新领地命名为宾夕法尼亚——他推荐的命名仅仅是“夕法尼亚”——但是其他所有人否决了他的意见，宾夕法尼亚就这样得名。 The grant wasn’t quite the same as the modern state, but a chunk of land around the Delaware River Valley – what today we would call eastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, southern New Jersey, and bits of Maryland – centered on the obviously-named-by-Quakers city of Philadelphia. 授予Penn的这份领地和现在宾州的疆域并不完全一样，而是德拉维尔河谷周围的一大片土地——今天我们称为宾夕法尼亚东部、德拉维尔北部、新泽西南部，以及很小一部分马里兰州的地区——该地区的中心的费城，显然是由贵格会命名的【编注：Philadelphia一词希腊文本意为“兄弟情谊”】。 Penn decided his new territory would be a Quaker refuge – his exact wording was “a colony of Heaven [for] the children of the Light”. He mandated universal religious toleration, a total ban on military activity, and a government based on checks and balances that would “leave myself and successors no power of doing mischief, that the will of one man may not hinder the good of a whole country”. Penn决定把他的新领土变成贵格会的避难地——他的原话是“一个面向圣光之子们的天国殖民地”。他强制实施普遍的宗教宽容，完全禁止军事活动，基于分权和制衡的政府将“不会给我自己和继任者留下作恶的权力，个人的意志不会妨害整个国家的益处”。 His recruits – about 20,000 people in total – were Quakers from the north of England, many of them minor merchants and traders. They disproportionately included the Britons of Norse descent common in that region, who formed a separate stratum and had never really gotten along with the rest of the British population. They were joined by several German sects close enough to Quakers that they felt at home there; these became the ancestors of (among other groups) the Pennsylvania Dutch, Amish, and Mennonites. 他招募了总共大约两万人——他们是英格兰北部的贵格会信徒，很多是小商小贩。不成比例地，他们中很多是那个区域很常见的具有北欧血统的英国人，构成了不列颠的一个特殊阶层，并且从未和其他不列颠人真正融合在一起。几个和贵格会近似的德国宗派加入了他们，教义相似使得这些人在那里能找到家的感觉；这些人和其他一些团体成为了德裔宾州人、阿米绪人和门诺派的祖先。 INTERESTING QUAKER FACTS: 关于贵格会的有趣事实： 1. In 1690 a gang of pirates stole a ship in Philadelphia and went up and down the Delaware River stealing and plundering. The Quakers got in a heated (but brotherly) debate about whether it was morally permissible to use violence to stop them. When the government finally decided to take action, contrarian minister George Keith dissented and caused a major schism in the faith. 在1690年，一帮海盗在费城偷了一艘船，在德拉维尔河上四处偷盗劫掠。贵格会信徒们展开了一场激烈（但是兄弟般的）辩论，讨论用暴力阻止这帮海盗在道德上是否合理。当政府最终决定采取行动，持反对意见的牧师George Keith表示不同意，并引发了信仰上的一次重大分裂。 2. Fischer argues that the Quaker ban on military activity within their territory would have doomed them in most other American regions, but by extreme good luck the Indians in the Delaware Valley were almost as peaceful as the Quakers. As usual, at least some credit goes to William Penn, who taught himself Algonquin so he could negotiate with the Indians in their own language. Fischer认为贵格会在他们的领土上禁止军事活动，在全美大部分别的地区可能都会给他们带来悲惨的命运。然而非常幸运的是，德拉维尔谷地的印第安人几乎和贵格会会众一样和平。和通常一样，这至少部分功绩归于William Penn，他自学了Algonquin语，所以他可以用印第安人的母语与其谈判。 3. The Quakers’ marriage customs combined a surprisingly modern ideas of romance, with extreme bureaucracy. The wedding process itself had sixteen stages, including “ask parents”, “ask community women”, “ask community men”, “community women ask parents”, and “obtain a certificate of cleanliness”. William Penn’s marriage apparently had forty-six witnesses to testify to the good conduct and non-relatedness of both parties. 贵格会信徒的婚姻习俗结合了令人惊讶的现代浪漫创意和极端的官僚化。婚姻过程本身有十六个阶段，包括“问询父母”，“问询社区里的妇人”，“问询社区里的男人”，“社区里的妇人问询父母”，以及“获得一个清白认证”。William Penn的婚姻显然有46位证人，见证夫妻双方都德行良好，没有亲属关系。 4. Possibly related: 16% of Quaker women were unmarried by age 50, compared to only about 2% of Puritans. 可能相关的事实：16%的贵格会妇女到50岁时都没有结婚，清教徒中这一数字仅为2%。 5. Quakers promoted gender equality, including the (at the time scandalous) custom of allowing women to preach (condemned by the Puritans as the crime of “she-preaching”). 贵格会推行性别平等，包括允许妇女讲道（在那时算是丑闻，被清教徒谴责为“妇女讲道”罪） 6. But they were such prudes about sex that even the Puritansthought they went too far. Pennsylvania doctors had problems treating Quakers because they would “delicately describe everything from neck to waist as their ‘stomachs’, and anything from waist to feet as their ‘ankles'”. 但是他们对性十分的正经，甚至清教徒都认为他们在这方面走得太远。宾州医生在治疗贵格会会众时会遇到麻烦，因为他们“故意把所有从颈到腰的部位都称为‘肚子’，而任何从腰到脚的地方都称为‘脚踝’”。 7. Quaker parents Richard and Abigail Lippincott named their eight children, in order, “Remember”, “John”, “Restore”, “Freedom”, “Increase”, “Jacob”, “Preserve”, and “Israel”, so that their names combined formed a simple prayer. 贵格会的一对父母Richard和Abigail Lippincott把他们的八个孩子按顺序起名叫做，“记得”，“约翰”，“恢复”，“自由”，“增加”，“雅各”，“存留”，“以色列”，他们的名字合起来构成一个简单的祷词。 8. Quakers had surprisingly modern ideas about parenting, basically sheltering and spoiling their children at a time when everyone else was trying whip the Devil out of them. 贵格会在教养孩童方面有着令人惊讶的现代观点，在那个其他人都试图从孩子身上赶出魔鬼的时代，他们基本上是保护和宠爱孩子的。 9. “A Quaker preacher, traveling in the more complaisant colony of Maryland, came upon a party of young people who were dancing merrily together. He broke in upon them like an avenging angel, stopped the dance, and demanded to know if they considered Martin Luther to be a good man. The astonished youngsters answered in the affirmative. The Quaker evangelist then quoted Luther on the subject of dancing: ‘as many paces as the man takes in his dance, so many steps he takes toward Hell. This, the Quaker missionary gloated with a gleam of sadistic satisfaction, ‘spoiled their sport’.” “一个贵格会的传道人，在更殷勤有礼的马里兰殖民地旅行时，遇到了一群年轻人在欢快的跳舞。他如复仇天使般闯入其中，停止了舞会，要求众人考虑马丁·路德是否是个好人。被惊呆的年轻人给出了肯定的答案。这位贵格会传道人接着引用了路德关于跳舞的评论：‘一个人在舞蹈中跳多少步，就朝地狱走了多少步。’这个贵格会传道人带着一种施虐的快感吹嘘，‘毁掉了他们的活动’。” 10. William Penn wrote about thirty books defending liberty of conscience throughout his life. The Quaker obsession with the individual conscience as the work of God helped invent the modern idea of conscientious objection. 终其一生，William Penn写下了约三十本书，为良心自由辩护。贵格会着迷于把个人良心看作是上帝的造物，这促进了因良心拒绝服兵役这一现代观念的产生。 11. Quakers were heavily (and uniquely for their period) opposed to animal cruelty. When foreigners introduced bullbaiting into Philadelphia during the 1700s, the mayor bought a ticket supposedly as a spectator. When the event was about to begin, he leapt into the ring, personally set the bull free, and threatened to arrest anybody who stopped him. 贵格会会众十分强力的反对虐待动物（在他们的时代，这是很独特的）。当外地人在18世纪把猎犬咬牛游戏引入费城时，市长买了一张票，本应作为观众呆在现场。当活动快开始时，他跃入场地，自己把牛放走，并威胁逮捕任何阻止他的人。 12. On the other hand, they were also opposed to other sports for what seem like kind of random reasons. The town of Morley declared an anathema against foot races, saying that they were “unfruitful works of darkness”. 在另一方面，他们借着各种任意的理由，反对各种其他运动。Morley镇宣布取缔长跑，因为长跑是“黑暗徒劳的工作”。 13. The Pennsylvania Quakers became very prosperous merchants and traders. They also had a policy of loaning money at low- or zero- interest to other Quakers, which let them outcompete other, less religious businesspeople. 宾夕法尼亚的贵格会信徒成了非常兴旺的商人。他们也有着一项以低利率或零利率贷款给其他贵格会成员的政策，这使得贵格会会众比其他更少宗教化的人更有竞争优势。 14. They were among the first to replace the set of bows, grovels, nods, meaningful looks, and other British customs of acknowledging rank upon greeting with a single rank-neutral equivalent – the handshake. 把英国的等级化问候动作，如鞠躬、下拜、点头、注目礼等等，更换为不具有等级意味的握手礼，贵格会是首先实施这种变革的群体之一。 15. Pennsylvania was one of the first polities in the western world to abolish the death penalty. 宾夕法尼亚是在西方世界首先废除死刑的政治体之一。 16. The Quakers were lukewarm on education, believing that too much schooling obscured the natural Inner Light. Fischer declares it “typical of William Penn” that he wrote a book arguing against reading too much. 贵格会会众对教育有些冷淡，认为太多学校教育会掩蔽人内心自然的灵性之光。Fischer宣称这是“William Penn的典型做法”，他写了一本书来反对过多的阅读。 17. The Quakers not only instituted religious freedom, but made laws against mocking another person’s religion. 贵格会会众不仅仅制定了宗教自由制度，还颁布法律，禁止嘲笑他人的宗教。 18. In the late 1600s as many as 70% of upper-class Quakers owned slaves, but Pennsylvania essentially invented modern abolitionism. Although their colonial masters in England forbade them from banning slavery outright, they applied immense social pressure and by the mid 1700s less than 10% of the wealthy had African slaves. As soon as the American Revolution started, forbidding slavery was one of independent Pennsylvania’s first actions. 在17世纪晚期，多达70%的上层贵格会人士拥有奴隶，但是宾夕法尼亚的确发明了现代废奴主义。虽然他们在英国的殖民地宗主们不准他们公然废除奴隶制，但是他们施加了巨大的社会压力，到18世纪中叶，少于10%的富裕阶层拥有黑奴。美国革命一开始，废奴就成为了宾州独立后的第一批举措之一。 Pennsylvania was very successful for a while; it had some of the richest farmland in the colonies, and the Quakers were exceptional merchants and traders; so much so that they were forgiven their military non-intervention during the Revolution because of their role keeping the American economy afloat in the face of British sanctions. 宾夕法尼亚曾非常成功；它拥有殖民地当中最肥沃的农地，贵格会会众是出色的商人；这些优势如此之大，以至于独立战争期间，他们的军事不干涉态度得到了原谅，因为面临英国的制裁，他们起到了支撑美国经济的作用。 But by 1750, the Quakers were kind of on their way out; by 1750, they were a demographic minority in Pennsylvania, and by 1773 they were a minority in its legislature as well. In 1750 Quakerism was the third-largest religion in the US; by 1820 it was the ninth-largest, and by 1981 it was the sixty-sixth largest. 但是到1750年代，贵格会信徒日渐式微；到1750年，他们变成了宾州人口上的少数派，到1773年，他们又变成了宾州立法机构中的少数。在1750年，贵格主义是美国的第三大宗教；到1820年，变成了第九大，到1981年，变成了第六十六大。 What happened? The Quakers basically tolerated themselves out of existence. They were so welcoming to religious minorities and immigrants that all these groups took up shop in Pennsylvania and ended its status as a uniquely Quaker society. At the same time, the Quakers themselves became more “fanatical” and many dropped out of politics believing it to be too worldly a concern for them; this was obviously fatal to their political domination. 发生了什么呢？贵格会信徒基本上是因宽容而使得他们自己逐步消逝。他们如此欢迎少数教派和移民，这些人占据了宾州，结束了宾州贵格会一统天下的状态。同时，贵格会自身变得更具属灵热忱，许多人从政治领域退出，他们认为该领域对于他们而言属于过于世俗的关怀；这对于他们的政治影响力显然是致命的。 The most famous Pennsylvanian statesman of the Revolutionary era, Benjamin Franklin, was not a Quaker at all but a first-generation immigrant from New England. Finally, Quakerism was naturally extra-susceptible to that thing where Christian denominations become indistinguishable from liberal modernity and fade into the secular background. 独立战争时期最著名的宾州政治家是本杰明·富兰克林。他完全不是贵格会信徒，而是来自新英格兰的第一代移民。最后，贵格主义自然而然地特别易于受这一趋势影响：即基督教派日渐变得和自由主义现代性难以区分，从而渐渐融于世俗背景中去。 But Fischer argues that Quakerism continued to shape Pennsylvania long after it had stopped being officially in charge, in much the same way that Englishmen themselves have contributed disproportionately to American institutions even though they are now a numerical minority. The Pennsylvanian leadership on abolitionism, penal reform, the death penalty, and so on all happened after the colony was officially no longer Quaker-dominated. 但是Fischer争辩说，在退出官方主导地位后，贵格主义的影响在宾州持续了很长一段时间，正如英国裔本身对美国的制度有着不成比例的巨大贡献那样，即使他们现在是数量上的少数派。宾州在废奴、刑罚改革、死刑等等方面的领袖地位全部出现在该殖民地官方不再被贵格会掌控之后。 And it’s hard not to see Quaker influence on the ideas of the modern US – which was after all founded in Philadelphia. In the middle of the Puritans demanding strict obedience to their dystopian hive society and the Cavaliers demanding everybody bow down to a transplanted nobility, the Pennsylvanians – who became the thought leaders of the Mid-Atlantic region including to a limited degree New York City – were pretty normal and had a good opportunity to serve as power-brokers and middlemen between the North and South. Although there are seeds of traditionally American ideas in every region, the Quakers really stand out in terms of freedom of religion, freedom of thought, checks and balances, and the idea of universal equality. 而且，很难忽略贵格会对现代美国理念上的影响——不管如何，现代美国创建于费城。清教徒严格要求服从他们的敌托邦集体主义社会，骑士党人要求每个人都在移植的贵族制度中鞠躬，介于两者之间，宾夕法尼亚人——作为中大西洋地区，一定程度上也包括纽约市的思想领袖——则相当正常，并且有很好的机会作为南方和北方的中间人和权力经纪人。虽然在每个区域都有美国传统观念的种子，贵格会在宗教自由、思想自由、分权制衡和普世平等理念上真的表现很突出。 It occurs to me that William Penn might be literally the single most successful person in history. He started out as a minor noble following a religious sect that everybody despised and managed to export its principles to Pennsylvania where they flourished and multiplied. Pennsylvania then managed to export its principles to the United States, and the United States exported them to the world. I’m not sure how much of the suspiciously Quaker character of modern society is a direct result of William Penn, but he was in one heck of a right place at one heck of a right time 我突然想到，William Penn也许真的是史上最成功的个人。一开始，作为一个小贵族，他皈依了一个人人蔑视的宗派，他尽力把该宗派的原则输出到了宾夕法尼亚，让其发扬光大。宾夕法尼亚则尽力把它的原则输出到美国，而美国则将之输出到全世界。我不确定现代社会的贵格会特征有多大可能是William Penn的直接成果，但他的确是一个在非常正确的时间，出现在非常正确的地点的人。 D: The Borderers D: 边民们 The Borderers are usually called “the Scots-Irish”, but Fischer dislikes the term because they are neither Scots (as we usually think of Scots) nor Irish (as we usually think of Irish). Instead, they’re a bunch of people who lived on (both sides of) the Scottish-English border in the late 1600s. 边民们经常被叫做“苏格兰-爱尔兰人”，但是Fischer不喜欢这个称谓，因为他们既不是如我们通常想象的苏格兰人，也不是如我们通常想象的爱尔兰人。相反，他们是一群17世纪晚期生活在苏格兰-英格兰边界两侧的人。 None of this makes sense without realizing that the Scottish-English border was terrible. Every couple of years the King of England would invade Scotland or vice versa; “from the year 1040 to 1745, every English monarch but three suffered a Scottish invasion, or became an invader in his turn”. These “invasions” generally involved burning down all the border towns and killing a bunch of people there. 如果没有意识到苏格兰-英格兰边境曾极其可怕，事情就说不通。每隔几年，英格兰的国王就会侵略苏格兰，或者反之；“从1040年到1745年，除了三个君主之外，每个英格兰君主都遭遇过苏格兰的入侵，或者反之变成了入侵者”；这些“入侵”总的来说，就是烧毁所有边境城镇，杀死那地区的一大批人。 Eventually the two sides started getting pissed with each other and would also torture-murder all of the enemy’s citizens they could get their hands on, ie any who were close enough to the border to reach before the enemy could send in their armies. As if this weren’t bad enough, outlaws quickly learned they could plunder one side of the border, then escape to the other before anyone brought them to justice, so the whole area basically became one giant cesspool of robbery and murder. 最终，双方都被激怒了，开始虐杀所有落入手中的对方平民，也就是任何住的离边境足够近、在敌方军队赶来前就能实施侵害的人。好像嫌这还不够糟，法外匪徒很快学到他们可以在边境一侧抢掠，而后在被绳之以法前，逃到另一边去。所以整个地区基本上是充满抢劫谋杀的血腥地狱。 In response to these pressures, the border people militarized and stayed feudal long past the point where the rest of the island had started modernizing. Life consisted of farming the lands of whichever brutal warlord had the top hand today, followed by being called to fight for him on short notice, followed by a grisly death. The border people dealt with it as best they could, and developed a culture marked by extreme levels of clannishness, xenophobia, drunkenness, stubbornness, and violence. 面对这些压力，边民武装了起来，在大不列颠岛的其他地方已经开始现代化之后很久，他们还保持着封建制度。生活由以下部分构成：耕种土地，这些土地属于当时军阀混战的胜利者，服从突然而至的上战场的征召，面对悲惨的死亡。边民在此条件下，竭力挣扎求活，发展出一种以极端小集团、排外、酗酒、倔强和暴力为特征的文化。 By the end of the 1600s, the Scottish and English royal bloodlines had intermingled and the two countries were drifting closer and closer to Union. The English kings finally got some breathing room and noticed – holy frick, everything about the border is terrible. 到1600年代末，苏格兰和英格兰的皇族变得血脉相连，两个国家开始接近并组成联邦【编注：1603年苏格兰国王詹姆斯六世继承英格兰王位，成为英格兰的詹姆斯一世】。此后的英格兰国王们终于缓过气来，并且发现——天哪，边境的一切都很可怕。 They decided to make the region economically productive, which meant “squeeze every cent out of the poor Borderers, in the hopes of either getting lots of money from them or else forcing them to go elsewhere and become somebody else’s problem”. Sometimes absentee landlords would just evict everyone who lived in an entire region, en masse, replacing them with people they expected to be easier to control. 他们决定让这个地区在经济产出上有效，这意味着“从贫穷边民身上榨出每一分钱，目的是要么从边民那里得到很多收入，要么强迫他们搬到别处，变成他人的麻烦。”有时候，外居的领主会直接把整个区域的居民驱逐，代之以他们预期会更好控制的人。 Many of the Borderers fled to Ulster in Ireland, which England was working on colonizing as a Protestant bulwark against the Irish Catholics, and where the Crown welcomed violent warlike people as a useful addition to their Irish-Catholic-fighting project. But Ulster had some of the same problems as the Border, and also the Ulsterites started worrying that the Borderer cure was worse than the Irish Catholic disease. So the Borderers started getting kicked out of Ulster too, one thing led to another, and eventually 250,000 of these people ended up in America. 许多边民逃到爱尔兰的阿尔斯特，英国人当时正要在此地殖民，将之变成新教针对爱尔兰天主教的堡垒。所以皇室欢迎暴力好战的人，用于补充他们和爱尔兰天主教的斗争工程。但是阿尔斯特也有一些和边境地区相同的麻烦，而阿尔斯特人也开始担忧，边民作为一种解药，也许比爱尔兰天主教这一疾病更糟。所以边民又开始被驱逐出阿尔斯特，事情接踵而至，最终边民中有25万人移居美国。 250,000 people is a lot of Borderers. By contrast, the great Puritan emigration wave was only 20,000 or so people; even the mighty colony of Virginia only had about 50,000 original settlers. So these people showed up on the door of the American colonies, and the American colonies collectively took one look at them and said “nope”. 25万人可是很大一批。对比之下，清教徒移民大潮只有2万人左右；即使是弗吉尼亚巨大的殖民地，也只有5万初始殖民者。所以当这些人出现在北美殖民地的大门口，各个殖民地一齐打量了他们一下，然后说“不”。 Except, of course, the Quakers. The Quakers talked among themselves and decided that these people were also Children Of God, and so they should demonstrate Brotherly Love by taking them in. They tried that for a couple of years, and then they questioned their life choices and also said “nope”, and they told the Borderers that Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley were actually kind of full right now but there was lots of unoccupied land in WesternPennsylvania, and the Appalachian Mountains were very pretty at this time of year, so why didn’t they head out that way as fast as it was physically possible to go? 当然，贵格会会众例外。贵格会内部进行了讨论，认定这些人也是上帝的孩子，所以他们应该彰显兄弟之爱，接纳边民们。他们尝试了几年，然后他们对自己的选择产生了疑问，也转向了说“不”。他们告诉边民，费城和德拉威尔河谷现在其实已经很满了，但是西宾夕法尼亚有很多无主之地，而阿巴拉契亚山脉在这个季节也很好，为什么不向那些方向尽快开拓，趁着自然条件还允许？ At the time, the Appalachians were kind of the booby prize of American colonization: hard to farm, hard to travel through, and exposed to hostile Indians. The Borderers fell in love with them. They came from a pretty marginal and unproductive territory themselves, and the Appalachians were far away from everybody and full of fun Indians to fight. 在那时，阿巴拉契亚的群山对北美殖民者来说，是分给最后一名的奖品：很难耕种，很难通行，暴露于充满敌意的印第安人面前。边民却爱上了它们。他们本就来自贫瘠的边缘化的故土，而阿巴拉契亚群山远离所有人，充满了与印第安人战斗的乐趣。 Soon the Appalachian strategy became the accepted response to Borderer immigration and was taken up from Pennsylvania in the north to the Carolinas in the South (a few New Englanders hit on a similar idea and sent their own Borderers to colonize the mountains of New Hampshire). 很快，阿巴拉契亚策略成为了对移入边民的既定策略，北到宾夕法尼亚，南到卡罗莱纳的殖民地都加以采纳（几个新英格兰殖民地也想出了相似的办法，把他们自己的边民打发到新罕布什尔的群山去殖民）。 So the Borderers all went to Appalachia and established their own little rural clans there and nothing at all went wrong except for the entire rest of American history. 所以边民们都去了阿巴拉契亚，建立了他们自己的小群农村宗族，一切都相安无事，除了整个美国历史被大大影响。 INTERESTING BORDERER FACTS: 关于边民的有趣事实： 1. Colonial opinion on the Borderers differed within a very narrow range: one Pennsylvanian writer called them “the scum of two nations”, another Anglican clergyman called them “the scum of the universe”. 对边民，殖民地人们的看法相去不远：一个宾夕法尼亚作家把他们叫做“两个国家之间的渣滓”，另一个国教会牧师把他们叫做“宇宙的渣滓”。 2. Some Borderers tried to come to America as indentured servants, but after Virginian planters got some experience with Borderers they refused to accept any more. 一些边民试图以契约仆人身份来美国，但是在弗吉尼亚种植园主得到了一些关于边民的教训后，他们不再接收边民。 3. The Borderers were mostly Presbyterians, and their arrival en massestarted a race among the established American denominations to convert them. This was mostly unsuccessful; Anglican preacher Charles Woodmason, an important source for information about the early Borderers, said that during his missionary activity the Borderers “disrupted his service, rioted while he preached, started a pack of dogs fighting outside the church, loosed his horse, stole his church key, refused him food and shelter, and gave two barrels of whiskey to his congregation before a service of communion”. 边民们大部分是长老会信徒，他们的成群到达开启了一场其他既有美国宗派转化他们的竞赛。基本上，这是不成功的；国教会传道人 Charles Woodmason是研究早期边民的重要资料来源。他说在他的传道活动期间，边民“打断他的侍奉，在其讲道时作乱，在教会外面斗狗，放了他的马，偷了他的教堂钥匙，拒绝给他食物和住宿，在一次擘饼聚会时，给他的会众两桶威士忌。 4. Borderer town-naming policy was very different from the Biblical names of the Puritans or the Ye Olde English names of the Virginians. Early Borderer settlements include – just to stick to the creek-related ones – Lousy Creek, Naked Creek, Shitbritches Creek, Cuckold’s Creek, Bloodrun Creek, Pinchgut Creek, Whipping Creek, and Hangover Creek. There were also Whiskey Springs, Hell’s Half Acre, Scream Ridge, Scuffle town, and Grab town. The overall aesthetic honestly sounds a bit Orcish. 边民的集镇命名规则非常不同于清教徒的圣经命名法，或者弗吉尼亚人的仿古英文命名法。早期边民殖民点中和溪流有关的名字有——糟糕溪，裸露溪，烂裤衩溪，戴绿帽溪，流血溪，吃不饱溪，鞭打溪，以及宿醉溪。当然，也有威士忌泉，地狱半英亩，尖叫岭，混战镇，揪住镇。总体审美的确听来有些野蛮。 5. One of the first Borderer leaders was John Houston. On the ship over to America, the crew tried to steal some of his possessions; Houston retaliated by leading a mutiny of the passengers, stealing the ship, and sailing it to America himself. He settled in West Virginia; one of his descendants was famous Texan Sam Houston. 第一代边民的领袖之一是约翰·休斯顿。在来美国的船上，船员试图偷窃他的财产；作为报复，他领导乘客发动事变，劫持了船，自己航行到美国。他在西弗吉尼亚安顿下来，后代之一，就是著名的德州佬山姆·休斯顿。 6. Traditional Borderer prayer: “Lord, grant that I may always be right, for thou knowest I am hard to turn.” 传统的边民祷词：“上帝，让我一直都走对路吧，因为你最清楚，我是难以回转的。” 7. “The back country folk bragged that one interior county of North Carolina had so little ‘larnin’ that the only literate inhabitant was elected ‘county reader'” “荒野的乡民吹嘘北卡的一个内陆郡是如此的缺乏‘蚊化’，以至于唯一识字的定居者被选为“‘郡阅读员’”。 8. The Borderer accent contained English, Scottish, and Irish elements, and is (uncoincidentally) very similar to the typical “country western singer” accent of today. 边民的口音包括了英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰元素，而且并非巧合，它和今天的“乡村西部歌手”腔调十分相似。 9. The Borderers were famous for family feuds in England, including the Johnson clan’s habit of “adorning their houses with the flayed skins of their enemies the Maxwells in a blood feud that continued for many generations”. The great family feuds of the United States, like the Hatfield-McCoy feud, are a direct descendent of this tradition. 边民在英格兰以家族世仇闻名，包括Johnson宗族的习惯：“在持续多代的血腥世仇中，用他们的敌人，Maxwells家族身上剥下来的皮装饰自己的房子”。在美国，大型的家族世仇，比如Hatfield家族与McCoy家族的世仇，则直接继承自这种传统。 10. Within-clan marriage was a popular Borderer tradition both in England and Appalachia; “in the Cumbrian parish of Hawkshead, for example, both the bride and the groom bore the same last names in 25 percent of all marriages from 1568 to 1704”. This led to the modern stereotype of Appalachians as inbred and incestuous. 在英格兰和阿巴拉契亚，宗族内婚都是边民流行的传统；“例如在Hawkshead的Cumbrian教区，从1568年到1704年，25%的新郎和新娘都有着相同的姓。”这导致了现代对阿巴拉契亚山民的刻板印象：近亲繁殖和内婚盛行。 11. The Borderers were extremely patriarchal and anti-women’s-rights to a degree that appalled even the people of the 1700s. 边民极端家长制，反对女权，其极端程度甚至吓坏了十八世纪的人们。 12. “In the year 1767, [Anglican priest] Charles Woodmason calculated that 94 percent of backcountry brides whom he had married in the past year were pregnant on their wedding day” “在1767年，国教会牧师Charles Woodmason统计，上一年度他主持结婚的乡下新娘中有94%在婚礼之日已经怀孕了。” 13. Although the Borderers started off Presbyterian, they were in constant religious churn and their territories were full of revivals, camp meetings, born-again evangelicalism, and itinerant preachers. Eventually most of them ended up as what we now call Southern Baptist. 虽然边民本来信长老会，但他们持续处于信仰流失中，而他们的领地上则充满了复兴、营会、重生福音主义和巡回布道者。最终，他们中大部分变成了我们现在所称的南方浸信会信徒。 14. Borderer folk beliefs: “If an old woman has only one tooth, she is a witch”, “If you are awake at eleven, you will see witches”, “The howling of dogs shows the presence of witches”, “If your shoestring comes untied, witches are after you”, “If a warm current of air is felt, witches are passing”. Also, “wet a rag in your enemy’s blood, put it behind a rock in the chimney, and when it rots your enemy will die”; apparently it was not a coincidence they were thinking about witches so much. 边民相信：“如果一个老妇人只有一颗牙，她就是个女巫”，“如果你在11点醒来，你会看到女巫”，“嚎叫的狗显示了女巫的存在”，“如果你的鞋带松了，女巫在跟着你”，“如果空气中有一股暖流，女巫正在经过”。而且，“用抹布沾湿敌人的血，把它放在烟囱里的一块石头后面，当它烂掉，你的敌人就会死了”；显然，他们如此多的考虑女巫，不是巧合。 15. Borderer medical beliefs: “A cure for homesickness is to sew a good charge of gunpowder on the inside of ths shirt near the neck”. That’ll cure homesickness, all right. 边民的医疗观念：“治疗思乡的方子是在衬衫靠近脖子的部位缝上大量火药”。好吧，这会治好乡愁。 16. More Borderer medical beliefs: “For fever, cut a black chicken open while alive and bind it to the bottom of your foot”, “Eating the brain of a screech owl is the only dependable remedy for headache”, “For rheumatism, apply split frogs to the feet”, “To reduce a swollen leg, split a live cat and apply while still warm”, “Bite the head off the first butterfly you see and you will get a new dress”, “Open the cow’s mouth and throw a live toad-frog down her throat. This will cure her of hollow-horn”. Also, blacksmiths protected themselves from witches by occasionally throwing live puppies into their furnaces. 边民的其他医疗观念：“如果发烧，活活剖开一只黑鸡，把它绑在你的脚底”，“吃掉尖叫猫头鹰的脑子是唯一可靠的治头痛药方”，“对风湿病，在脚上绑上撕开的青蛙”，“为了给腿消肿，劈开一只活猫，趁还温热敷上”，“把你见到的第一只蝴蝶的头拽掉，你会得到一件新裙子”，“把奶牛的嘴打开，扔一只活的癞蛤蟆到它喉咙里。这会治好它的空角病”。而且，铁匠们为了避免女巫的危害，会时不时把活着的小狗扔进他们的炉子里。 17. Rates of public schooling in the backcountry settled by the Borderers were “the lowest in British North America” and sometimes involved rituals like “barring out”, where the children would physically keep the teacher out of the school until he gave in and granted the students the day off. 边民乡村的公共学校入学率是“北美英国殖民地”中最低的，而且有些时候会发生“封门”的仪式，即孩子们会用身体阻挡教师进入学校，除非他让步并给学生们当天放假。 18. “Appalachia’s idea of a moderate drinker was the mountain man who limited himself to a single quart [of whiskey] at a sitting, explaining that more ‘might fly to my head’. Other beverages were regarded with contempt.” “阿巴拉契亚关于适度饮酒的理念是，一个山民会克制自己一次只喝一夸脱以下的威士忌，解释是喝更多‘也许会让我的脑袋发晕’。其他饮品则是被轻视的。” 19. A traditional backcountry sport was “rough and tumble”, a no-holds-barred form of wrestling where gouging out your opponent’s eyes was considered perfectly acceptable and in fact sound strategy. In 1772 Virginia had to pass a law against “gouging, plucking, or putting out an eye”, but this was the Cavalier-dominated legislature all the way on the east coast and nobody in the backcountry paid them any attention. Other traditional backcountry sports were sharpshooting and hunting. 一项传统的乡下运动是“混战”，一种无规则限制的摔角，在运动中挖掉对手的眼睛被认为是完全可以接受，且实际上非常有效的策略。在1772年弗吉尼亚被迫通过一项法律反对“抠，挖，挤出眼球”，但这是骑士党主导的法律，只在东海岸有效，在阿巴拉契亚的山民根本不理会。另一项传统的乡下运动则是射击和打猎。 20. The American custom of shooting guns into the air to celebrate holidays is 100% Borderer in origin. 美国向天鸣枪庆祝节日的传统100%来自于山民。 21. The justice system of the backcountry was heavy on lynching, originally a race-neutral practice and named after western Virginian settler William Lynch. 山民地区的法律体系非常依赖于私刑审判，这种做法（原本并无种族倾向）即以西弗吉尼亚殖民者William Lynch得名。【编注：lynch一词在内战后常常特指美国南方白人种族主义者针对黑人的私刑。】 22. Scottish Presbyterians used to wear red cloth around their neck to symbolize their religion; other Englishmen nicknamed them “rednecks”. This maybe the origin of the popular slur against Americans of Borderer descent, although many other etiologies have been proposed. “Cracker” as a slur is attested as early as 1766 by a colonist who says the term describes backcountry men who are great boasters; other proposed etymologies like slaves talking about “whip-crackers” seem to be spurious. 苏格兰长老会教徒曾在脖子周遭围上红布来象征他们的宗教；其他英国人昵称其为“红脖”。这也许是这一对美国边民后裔的流行贬称的起源，虽然有很多其他的语源学解释也被提出过。“大话精”则是另一个贬称，验证发现，早在1766年一个殖民者曾以该词表示边民们中的吹牛者；其他语源学解释包括奴隶们谈到的“挥鞭子的人”，看来是谬误的。 This is not to paint the Borderers as universally poor and dumb – like every group, they had an elite, and some of their elite went on to become some of America’s most important historical figures. Andrew Jackson became the first Borderer president, behaving exactly as you would expect the first Borderer president to behave, and he was followed by almost a dozen others. Borderers have also been overrepresented in America’s great military leaders, from Ulysses Grant through Teddy Roosevelt (3/4 Borderer despite his Dutch surname) to George Patton to John McCain. 并不是说边民普遍贫穷愚笨——如同每个群体一样，他们也有精英，有些精英成了美国史上最重要的历史人物之一。Andrew Jackson成为第一任边民总统，其作为和你预期的第一任边民总统会做的一样，他之后又有十多个边民总统。边民在美国伟大军事领袖中的比例也高得过分，从尤利西斯·格兰特到泰迪·罗斯福（3/4的边民血统，虽然他有个荷兰裔姓氏），再到乔治·巴顿，再到约翰·麦凯恩。 The Borderers really liked America – unsurprising given where they came from – and started identifying as American earlier and more fiercely than any of the other settlers who had come before. Unsurprisingly, they strongly supported the Revolution – Patrick Henry (“Give me liberty or give me death!”) was a Borderer. They also also played a disproportionate role in westward expansion. 边民真的很爱美国——考虑到他们来自何处，这不奇怪——而且他们产生美国人的自我认同比其他在他们之前到的殖民者更早，程度更强烈。并不奇怪的是，他们强烈支持独立革命——Patrick Henry(“不自由，宁毋死！”）是个边民。他们也在西进运动中发挥了不成比例的重要作用。 After the Revolution, America made an almost literal 180 degree turn and the “backcountry” became the “frontier”. It was the Borderers who were happiest going off into the wilderness and fighting Indians, and most of the famous frontiersmen like Davy Crockett were of their number. This was a big part of the reason the Wild West was so wild compared to, say, Minnesota (also a frontier inhabited by lots of Indians, but settled by Northerners and Germans) and why it inherited seemingly Gaelic traditions like cattle rustling. 革命后，美国实际上是180度转向，“内地”变成了“边疆”。对于深入荒野，和印第安人战斗，边民是最开心的，大部分著名的边疆拓荒者如Davy Crockett即是其中一员。很大程度上，这就是为什么狂野西部是如此狂野，相比于比如说明尼苏达（也是个有很多印第安人定居的边疆地带，但是由北方人和德国裔开拓殖民），这也解释了为何西部有套小牛的传统，这疑似是苏格兰盖尔人的传统。 Their conception of liberty has also survived and shaped modern American politics: it seems essentially to be the modern libertarian/Republican version of freedom from government interference, especially if phrased as “get the hell off my land”, and especially especially if phrased that way through clenched teeth while pointing a shotgun at the offending party. 他们的自由观念也存留下来并塑造了美国的政治：它看起来基本上是现代自由意志主义者/共和党版本的免于政府干涉的自由，特别是“滚出我的土地”这句话，尤其是这话以咬牙切齿的腔调说出，伴着指向入侵者的霰弹枪的时候。 III. This is all interesting as history and doubly interesting as anthropology, but what relevance does it have for later American history and the present day? 这些从历史学上来说，很有意思，从人类学角度来说，更有意思。但是这些和美国之后的历史以及今天又什么关系吗？ One of my reasons reading this book was to see whether the link between Americans’ political opinions and a bunch of their other cultural/religious/social traits (a “Blue Tribe” and “Red Tribe”) was related to the immigration patterns it describes. I’m leaning towards “probably”, but there’s a lot of work to be done in explaining how the split among these four cultures led to a split among two cultures in the modern day, and with little help from the book itself I am going to have to resort to total unfounded speculation. 我读这本书的理由之一，是想看看美国政治观点和一系列文化/宗教/社会特质（“红部落”和“蓝部落”）是否和该书描述的移民模式相关。我倾向“很可能”这一结论，但是还需要大量的工作来解释这四种文化之分裂是如何导致今日的两种文化之分裂，而且接下来我将要不依赖这本书的帮助，诉诸未经验证的大胆猜想。 But the simplest explanation – that the Puritans and Quakers merged into one group (“progressives”, “Blue Tribe”, “educated coastal elites”) and the Virginians and Borderers into another (“conservatives”, “Red Tribe”, “rednecks”) – has a lot going for it. 然而最简单的解释有很大的说服力——清教徒和贵格会融合成了一个团体（“进步派”，“蓝部落”，“受过教育的东西岸精英”），而弗吉尼亚人和边民则汇聚成另一个（“保守派”，“红部落”，“红脖子”）。 Many conservatives I read like to push the theory that modern progressivism is descended from the utopian Protestant experiments of early America – Puritanism and Quakerism – and that the civil war represents “Massachusetts’ conquest of America”. I always found this lacking in rigor: Puritanism and Quakerism are sufficiently different that positing a combination of them probably needs more intellectual work than just gesturing at “you know, that Puritan/Quaker thing”. 我所读到的很多保守派喜欢这一理论：现代进步主义来自于早期乌托邦式的新教实验——清教主义和贵格主义——而内战则代表“‘马萨诸塞’”征服了美国”。我总是发现这个说法缺乏严谨：清教主义和贵格主义有很大的不同，把他们合并起来很可能需要更多的智力工作，而不是仅仅陈述“你知道的，清教徒/贵格会的那套”。 But the idea of a Puritan New England and a Quaker-(ish) Pennsylvania gradually blending together into a generic “North” seems plausible, especially given the high levels of interbreeding between the two (some of our more progressive Presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, were literally half-Puritan and half-Quaker). 但是一个清教徒的新英格兰和一个贵格会的宾夕法尼亚逐渐融合在一起，被统称为“北方”，这一说法似乎有道理，尤其是考虑到两个群体之间很高的通婚率（我们一些更偏进步派的总统，包括亚伯拉罕·林肯，实际上是半清教徒半贵格会血统）。 Such a merge would combine the Puritan emphasis on moral reform, education, and a well-ordered society with the Quaker doctrine of niceness, tolerance, religious pluralism, individual conscience, and the Inner Light. It seems kind of unfair to just mix-and-match the most modern elements of each and declare that this proves they caused modernity, but there’s no reason that couldn’t have happened. 这种融合把清教徒对道德改革、教育和有序社会的强调，以及贵格会友善、容忍、宗教多元、个人良心和内在灵性之光的教义结合了起来。把两个宗派最现代化的元素混合对应起来，然后宣称这证明了他们导致了现代性，这似乎有点不公平，但是没有理由否定，这可能发生。 The idea of Cavaliers and Borderers combining to form modern conservativism is buoyed by modern conservativism’s obvious Border influences, but complicated by its lack of much that is recognizably Cavalier – the Republican Party is hardly marked by its support for a hereditary aristocracy of gentlemen. 骑士党和边民结合形成了现代保守主义这一看法，被现代保守主义明显受边民影响所支持。但更复杂的是，它缺乏可以被辨认为骑士党文化的成分——共和党在支持绅士们的世袭贵族政治方面并不突出。 Here I have to admit that I don’t know as much about Southern history as I’d like. In particular, how were places like Alabama, Mississippi, et cetera settled? Most sources I can find suggest they were set up along the Virginia model of plantation-owning aristocrats, but if that’s true how did the modern populations come to so embody Fischer’s description of Borderers? In particular, why are they so Southern Baptist and not very Anglican? 这里我不得不承认，我所知的南方历史，并不如我渴望的那么多。特别是，像阿拉巴马，密西西比这些地方是如何被开发的？我所找到的大部分资料都暗示，他们是按照弗吉尼亚那种拥有种植园的贵族模式发展，但是如果这是真的，为何现代这片土地上的人口和Fischer描述的边民如此相似？特别是，为什么他们如此倾向于南方浸信会，而不是国教会？ And what happened to all of those indentured servants the Cavaliers brought over after slavery put them out of business? What happened to that whole culture after the Civil War destroyed the plantation system? My guess is going to be that the indentured servants and the Borderer population mixed pretty thoroughly, and that this stratum was hanging around providing a majority of the white bodies in the South while the plantation owners were hogging the limelight – but I just don’t know. 而所有那些骑士党带来的契约仆人在被奴隶取代而不再做仆人后，又经历了什么？在内战毁灭了南方种植园系统后，整个文化经历了什么？我的猜想是契约仆人和边民人口深度融合，而这个阶层蔓延开来，构成了南方白人的主体，而与此同时种植园主们则吸引了太多关注——但是我就是不知道。 A quick argument that I’m not totally making all of this up: 以下的简易论证并非纯属编造： This is a map of voting patterns by county in the 2012 Presidential election. The blue areas in the South carefully track the so-called “black belt” of majority African-American areas. The ones in the Midwest are mostly big cities. Aside from those, the only people who vote Democrat are New England (very solidly!) and the Delaware Valley region of Pennsylvania. 这是2012年总统大选在郡层面的投票模式的地图。蓝色区域在南方精确地分布在大量非裔美国人聚居的所谓“黑带”上。在中西部的蓝色基本上是大城市。除了这些，选民主党的人只有新英格兰人（支持度很高！）和宾州德拉威尔河谷地区。 In fact, you can easily see the distinction between the Delaware Valley settled by Quakers in the east, and the backcountry area settled by Borderers in the west. Even the book’s footnote about how a few Borderers settled in the mountains of New Hampshire is associated with a few spots of red in the mountains of New Hampshire ruining an otherwise near-perfect Democratic sweep of the north. 事实上，你能一眼看出，贵格会开拓的东部德拉威尔河谷和边民开拓的西部区域之间的区别。即便是书中脚注提到的少量边民移居新罕布尔州群山也能对应图中新罕布尔州群山中的几个红点，如果不是这几个红点，民主党在北方就拥有了完美的全胜。 One anomaly in this story is a kind of linear distribution of blue across southern Michigan, too big to be explained solely by the blacks of Detroit. But a quick look at Wikipedia’s History of Michigan finds: 这个故事中的一个异常就是在南密歇根存在一种线性分布的蓝色，面积太大，不能仅用底特律的黑人来解释。但是快速浏览维基百科上密歇根的历史条目就会发现： In the 1820s and 1830s migrants from New England began moving to what is now Michigan in large numbers (though there was a trickle of New England settlers who arrived before this date). These were “Yankee” settlers, that is to say they were descended from the English Puritans who settled New England during the colonial era….Due to the prevalence of New Englanders and New England transplants from upstate New York, Michigan was very culturally contiguous with early New England culture for much of its early history…The amount with which the New England Yankee population predominated made Michigan unique among frontier states in the antebellum period. Due to this heritage Michigan was on the forefront of the antislavery crusade and reforms during the 1840s and 1850s. 在1820年代到1830年代，来自新英格兰的移民大量移居到今日的密歇根（虽然有少量新英格兰开拓者在之前就移居此地）。这些是“扬基”开拓者，这意味着他们是在殖民地时期住在新英格兰的英国清教徒的后裔……因为新英格兰人众多，以及从纽约上州移入的新英格兰人，在它早期历史的相当长时间，密歇根在文化上和早期新英格兰文化很相近……新英格兰扬基人口的庞大数量使得密歇根在内战前时期边疆州当中与众不同。因为这种传统，密歇根站在1840年代和1850年代的废奴十字军和改革的前列。 Alhough I can’t find proof of this specifically, I know that Michigan was settled from the south up, and I suspect that these New England settlers concentrated in the southern regions and that the north was settled by a more diverse group of whites who lacked the New England connection. 虽然我不能发现专门的证据，我知道密歇根是从南方被开拓的，我怀疑新英格兰开拓者集中于南部区域，而北部则被更多元的白人群体开拓，这些人缺乏和新英格兰地区的联系。 Here’s something else cool. We can’t track Borderers directly because there’s no “Borderer” or “Scots-Irish” option on the US census. But Albion’s Seed points out that the Borderers were uniquely likely to identify as just “American” and deliberately forgot their past ancestry as fast as they could. 还有更有趣的发现。我们不能直接跟踪边民，因为在美国人口普查中没有“边民”或者“苏格兰人-爱尔兰人”的选项。但是《阿尔比安的种子》一书指出，边民特别倾向于自我认同为“美国人”，并故意尽快忘记自己过去的先祖。 Meanwhile, when the census asks an ethnicity question about where your ancestors came from, every year some people will stubbornly ignore the point of the question and put down “America” (no, this does not track the distribution of Native American population). Here’s a map of so-called “unhyphenated Americans”, taken from this site: 同时，当普查问及关于你先祖来自何处的族裔问题时，每年都有一些人顽固的忽略这一问题的目的，而填上“美国”（不，这并不能代表印第安人的分布）。下面是所谓的“纯粹的美国人”的地图，来自这个网站。 We see a strong focus on the Appalachian Mountains, especially West Virginia, Tennesee, and Kentucky, bleeding into the rest of the South. Aside from west Pennsylvania, this is very close to where we would expect to find the Borderers. Could these be the same groups? 我们看到了该人群在阿巴拉契亚山脉区域有很高的密度，尤其是西弗吉尼亚，田纳西，和肯塔基，延伸到南方其他地区。除了西宾夕法尼亚之外，这和我们预期能发现边民的地区非常接近。这些可能是相同的人群吗？ Meanwhile, here is a map of where Obama underperformed the usual Democratic vote worst in 2008: 同时，这里还有奥巴马在08年民主党选举中表现最差的地区的一张地图： These maps are small and lossy, and surely unhyphenatedness is not an exact proxy for Border ancestry – but they are nevertheless intriguing. You may also be interested in the Washington Post’s correlation between distribution of unhyphenated Americans and Trump voters, or the Atlantic’s article on Trump and Borderers. 这些地图也许小且模糊，而且纯种美国人认同也不是边民先祖的精确表征——但是它们仍然十分吸引人。你也许会对《华盛顿邮报》在纯种美国人分布和川普支持者之间相关性的报道感兴趣，还有《大西洋月刊》关于川普和边民的文章。 If I’m going to map these cultural affiliations to ancestry, do I have to walk back on my previous theory that they are related to class? Maybe I should. But I also think we can posit complicated interactions between these ideas. Consider for example the interaction between race and class; a black person with a white-sounding name, who speaks with a white-sounding accent, and who adopts white culture (eg listens to classical music, wears business suits) is far more likely to seem upper-class than a black person with a black-sounding name, a black accent, and black cultural preferences; a white person who seems black in some way (listens to hip-hop, wears baggy clothes) is more likely to seem lower-class. This doesn’t mean race and class are exactly the same thing, but it does mean that some races get stereotyped as upper-class and others as lower-class, and that people’s racial identifiers may change based on where they are in the class structure. 如果我把这些文化偏好对应到祖先谱系，我是否也不得不回到我之前的理论上，即这些和阶层有关？也许我应该这么做。但是我也认为我们应该注意这些看法之间的交互作用。比如考虑一下种族和阶层的交互关系；一个黑人带着一个白人式的名字，带白人口音，适应了白人文化（比如听古典音乐，穿西装），则比取黑人名、带黑人口音、偏好黑人文化的黑人更可能是上等阶级；一个某方面像黑人的白人（听嘻哈，穿松垮的衣服）则更可能属于底层。这并不是说种族和阶层完全是一码事，但是这说明一些族群给人的固定印象是上层，另一些是底层，而基于人们在阶层结构中位置，人们的和种族相关的特征可能会变化。 I think something similar is probably going on with these forms of ancestry. The education system is probably dominated by descendents of New Englanders and Pennsylvanians; they had an opportunity to influence the culture of academia and the educated classes more generally, they took it, and now anybody of any background who makes it into that world is going to be socialized according to their rules. Likewise, people in poorer and more rural environments will be surrounded by people of Borderer ancestry and acculturated by Borderer cultural products and end up a little more like that group. As a result, ethnic markers have turned into and merged with class markers in complicated ways. 我认为族裔血统的构成中，很可能发生了相似的事情。教育系统很可能被新英格兰人和宾夕法尼亚人把持，他们更有机会普遍地影响学术界的文化和受教育阶层，他们把握了这个机会，现在任何背景的人，要进入他们的世界，都会按照他们的规则被社会化。相似的，更穷和更乡村化的人，被边民的先祖和边民文化的产物包围，最终变得有点像这个群体。结果，族裔标志以种种复杂的方式转化成了阶层标志并与之融合。 Indeed, some kind of acculturation process has to have been going on, since most of the people in these areas today are not the descendents of the original settlers. But such a process seems very likely. Just to take an example, most of the Jews I know (including my own family) came into the country via New York, live somewhere on the coast, and have very Blue Tribe values. But Southern Jews believed in the Confederacy as strongly as any Virginian – see for example Judah Benjamin. And Barry Goldwater, a half-Jew raised in Arizona, invented the modern version of conservativism that seems closest to some Borderer beliefs. 的确，某种同化过程一定发生过，因为这些地区今天的大部分人并不是初代开拓者的后代。但是这样一个过程很可能发生。仅举一个例子，大部分我所认识的犹太人（包括我自己的家庭），从纽约来到这个国家，生活在靠海岸的某处，拥有蓝色的价值观。但是南方犹太人曾和任何弗吉尼亚人一样，相信南部邦联——可以参考Judah Benjamin的例子。而且Barry Goldwater，一个长在亚利桑那的半血犹太人，发明了现代版本的保守主义，其观点看起来最接近一些边民信仰。 All of this is very speculative, with some obvious flaws. What do we make of other countries like Britain or Germany with superficially similar splits but very different histories? Why should Puritans lose their religion and sexual prudery, but keep their interest in moralistic reform? There are whole heaps of questions like these. 所有这些都是很大胆的假设，带有一些明显的缺陷。对于英国或者德国，这些国家表面上有类似的分裂，但是有很不同的历史，我们如何来解释呢？为什么清教徒失去了他们的宗教和在性上的规矩，但是仍然在道德改革上保持兴趣？还有一大堆类似的问题。 But look. Before I had any idea about any of this, I wrote that American society seems divided into two strata, one of which is marked by emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, academic/financial jobs, and Democratic party affiliation, and furthermore that this group was centered in the North. 但是看看，在我有这些想法之前，我就曾写道美国社会看来被分裂成两层，其中之一有以下特征：重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容，很低的未成年怀孕率，学术和财经工作，以及支持民主党，而且这个群体以北方为中心。 Meanwhile, now I learn that the North was settled by two groups that when combined have emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, an academic and mercantile history, and were the heartland of the historical Whigs and Republicans who preceded the modern Democratic Party. 同时，我现在知道了北方曾被两个团体所开拓，两个群体结合起来，拥有以下特征：重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容，很低的未成年怀孕率 ，具有学术和商业历史，而且是历史上辉格党和共和党（后来的地位被现代的民主党取代）的核心地域。 And I wrote about another stratum centered in the South marked by poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high teenage pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, country western music, and support for the Republican Party. And now I learn that the South was settled by a group noted even in the 1700s for its poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high premarital pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, accent exactly like the modern country western accent, and support for the Democratic-Republicans who preceded the modern Republican Party. 我还写到过另一个集中于南方的阶层，它以教育贫乏，枪文化，暴力文化，排外，高未成年人怀孕率，军国主义，爱国主义，西部乡村音乐，和支持共和党为特征。现在我知道，开拓南方的群体，在18世纪就以教育的贫乏， 枪文化，暴力文化，排外，高未成年人怀孕率，尚武精神，爱国主义，接近现代西部乡村的口音，以及支持民主-共和党为特征（后来地位被现代的共和党取代）。 If this is true, I think it paints a very pessimistic world-view. The “iceberg model” of culture argues that apart from the surface cultural features we all recognize like language, clothing, and food, there are deeper levels of culture that determine the features and institutions of a people: whether they are progressive or traditional, peaceful or warlike, mercantile or self-contained. 如果这是真的，我认为这给出了一个非常悲观的世界图景。文化的“冰山模型”认为，撇开我们都能识别的文化表面特征，例如语言、衣着、和食物，存在更深层次的文化，它们决定了上述特征和人们的制度：决定他们是进步的还是传统的，和平的还是好战的，爱经商的还是自给自足的。 We grudgingly acknowledge these features when we admit that maybe making the Middle East exactly like America in every way is more of a long-term project than something that will happen as soon as we kick out the latest dictator and get treated as liberators. Part of us may still want to believe that pure reason is the universal solvent, that those Afghans will come around once they realize that being a secular liberal democracy is obviously great. 当我们承认也许让中东在每一方面都变成和美国一样是一个长期过程，而不是如我们把最近的独裁者赶下台，像解放者般被接待那么快，我们就是在勉强承认这些文化特征的存在。我们中的部分人还想相信纯粹理性是普遍适用的答案，只要阿富汗人意识到一个世俗化的自由主义的民主制度明显很棒，他们就会觉醒。 But we keep having deep culture shoved in our face again and again, and we don’t know how to get rid of it. This has led to reasonable speculation that some aspects of it might even be genetic – something which would explain a lot, though not its ability to acculturate recent arrivals. 但是我们已经一而再地被深层文化打脸，我们不知道如何摆脱它。这导致了合理的猜想，深层文化的某方面可能是遗传性的——这可以解释很多事情，虽然这个因素不能解释其同化最近的新来者的能力。 This is a hard pill to swallow even when we’re talking about Afghanistan. But it becomes doubly unpleasant when we think about it in the sense of our neighbors and fellow citizens in a modern democracy. What, after all, is the point? A democracy made up of 49% extremely liberal Americans and 51% fundamentalist Taliban Afghans would be something very different from the democratic ideal; even if occasionally a super-charismatic American candidate could win over enough marginal Afghans to take power, there’s none of the give-and-take, none of the competition within the marketplace of ideas, that makes democracy so attractive. Just two groups competing to dominate one another, with the fact that the competition is peaceful being at best a consolation prize. 即便我们讨论的是阿富汗，这也是一枚难以下咽的药丸。但如果我们从现代民主制中我们的邻舍和公民同胞的角度来考虑这个问题时，难受程度又要翻倍。这到底有什么意义？一个由49%的极端自由派的美国人和51%的基本教义派的阿富汗塔利班组成的民主制恐怕和民主典范非常不同；即使有时，一个很有人格魅力的美国候选人能赢得足够的阿富汗人摇摆票，获得权力，这里也没有讨价还价，没有思想市场的竞争，而正是这些因素才使得民主制如此有吸引力。只剩两个团体相互竞争来统治对方，事实上，如果竞争是和平的，就已经是谢天谢地了。 If America is best explained as a Puritan-Quaker culture locked in a death-match with a Cavalier-Borderer culture, with all of the appeals to freedom and equality and order and justice being just so many epiphenomena – well, I’m not sure what to do with that information. 如果美国可以很好地被解释成一种清教徒-贵格会文化，和一种骑士党-边民文化锁在一起的拼死对决，并且所有对自由，平等，秩序，正义的呼求仅是众多附带现象——那么我不确定该如何处理这个信息。 Push it under the rug? Say “Well, my culture is better, so I intend to do as good a job dominating yours as possible?” Agree that We Are Very Different Yet In The End All The Same And So Must Seek Common Ground? Start researching genetic engineering? Maybe secede? 把它藏在桌布下？说“好，我的文化更好，所以我打算竭尽全力做做好事，来统治你？”同意我们是非常不同的，但最终我们会变得一样，所以我们必须寻求共同立场？开始研究基因工程？也许独立分裂？ I’m not a Trump fan much more than I’m an Osama bin Laden fan; if somehow Osama ended up being elected President, should I start thinking “Maybe that time we made a country that was 49% people like me and 51% members of the Taliban –maybe that was a bad idea“. 我不是个川普粉，就像我不是奥萨马·本·拉登粉丝一样；如果不知何故，本·拉登当选了总统，我应该开始思考“也许那时候我们由49%的像我这样的人和51%的塔利班组成了一个国家——也许这是一个坏主意”。 I don’t know. But I highly recommend Albion’s Seed as an entertaining and enlightening work of historical scholarship which will be absolutely delightful if you don’t fret too much over all of the existential questions it raises. 我不知道。但是我高度推荐《阿尔比安的种子》这本富有娱乐性和启发性的历史学著作。如果你没有过多地被它引起的实在性问题吓到，读它绝对会是非常愉悦的。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

The Paranoid, Supremacist Roots of the Stabbing Intifada 捅刀起义的种族优越论根源，一种妄想症 作者:Jeffrey Goldbery @ 2015-10-16 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 一校:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha) 来源:The Atlantic,www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/the-roots-of-the-palestinian-uprising-against-israel/410944/ Knife attacks on Jews in Jerusalem and elsewhere are not based on Palestinian frustration over settlements, but on something deeper. 耶路撒冷及其他地区发生的针对犹太人的持刀攻击，并非出于巴勒斯坦人因以色列定居活动而产生的挫败感，而是存在某些更深层次的原因。 In September of 1928, a group of Jewish residents of Jerusalem placed a bench in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, for the comfort of elderly worshipers. They also brought with them a wooden partition, to separate the sexes during prayer. Jerusalem’s Muslim leaders treated the introduction of furniture into the alleyway in front of the Wall as a provocation, part of a Jewish conspiracy to slowly take control of the entire Temple Mount. 1928年9月，耶路撒冷的一群犹太居民为了老年礼拜者的舒适着想，在圣殿山的哭墙前安放了一条长凳，还带去了一张木质隔板用来区隔异性祈祷者。耶路撒冷的穆斯林领袖认为，这种在过道安放家具的行为是挑衅，是犹太人缓图全面掌控圣殿山的阴谋的一部分。 Many of the leaders of Palestine’s Muslims believed—or claimed to believe—that Jews had manufactured a set of historical and theological connections to the Western Wall and to the Mount, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in order to advance the Zionist project. 巴勒斯坦的许多穆斯林领袖曾相信——或曾宣称其相信——犹太人捏造了一整套其与哭墙及圣殿山这一阿克萨清真寺和圆顶清真寺所在地之间的历史和神学联系，目的是为了推进犹太复国主义计划。 This belief defied Muslim history—the Dome of the Rock was built by Jerusalem’s Arab conquerors on the site of the Second Jewish Temple in order to venerate its memory (the site had previously been defiled by Jerusalem’s Christian rulers as a kind of rebuke to Judaism, the despised mother religion of Christianity). Jews themselves consider the Mount itself to be the holiest site in their faith. The Western Wall, a large retaining wall from the Second Temple period, is sacred only by proxy. 这一观念完全不顾穆斯林历史——圆顶清真寺是征服耶路撒冷的阿拉伯人为追思先人而在犹太人第二圣殿的旧址上建造的（原址被耶路撒冷的基督教统治者破坏，以谴责犹太教这一遭到鄙视的基督教母宗教）。犹太人自己则视圣殿山为其信仰的至圣之地。哭墙作为第二圣殿时期留存下来的巨大护墙，只是因其象征性才变得神圣。 The spiritual leader of Palestine’s Muslims, the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, incited Arabs in Palestine against their Jewish neighbors by arguing that Islam itself was under threat. (Husseini would later become one of Hitler’s most important Muslim allies.) Jews in British-occupied Palestine responded to Muslim invective by demanding more access to the Wall, sometimes holding demonstrations at the holy site. 巴勒斯坦穆斯林的精神领袖、耶路撒冷的“穆夫提”【译注：教法说明官】Amin al-Husseini认为是伊斯兰本身受到了威胁，以此来煽动巴勒斯坦的阿拉伯人反对他们的犹太邻居（Husseini后来成为希特勒最重要的穆斯林盟友之一）。英国治下的巴勒斯坦犹太人对穆斯林的谩骂进行了回应，要求提高哭墙对他们的开放程度，有时还会在这一圣地举行示威。 By the next year, violence directed against Jews by their neighbors had become more common: Arab rioters took the lives of 133 Jews that summer; British forces killed 116 Arabs in their attempt to subdue the riots. In Hebron, a devastating pogrom was launched against the city’s ancient Jewish community after Muslim officials distributed fabricated photographs of a damaged Dome of the Rock, and spread the rumor that Jews had attacked the shrine. 次年，由其近邻发动的、针对犹太人的暴力变得愈发常见：当年夏天阿拉伯暴徒就夺走了133条犹太人性命，而英国军队则在镇压暴乱的行动中杀死了116名阿拉伯人。在希布伦市，穆斯林官员四处传播圆顶清真寺遭到破坏的虚假照片，并散布谣言说犹太人攻击了这一神殿，随后该市最为古老的犹太人社区遭到了令人震惊的大屠杀。 The current “stabbing Intifada” now taking place in Israel—a quasi-uprising in which young Palestinians have been trying, and occasionally succeeding, to kill Jews with knives—is prompted in good part by the same set of manipulated emotions that sparked the anti-Jewish riots of the 1920s: a deeply felt desire on the part of Palestinians to “protect” the Temple Mount from Jews. 以色列当下正出现一种“刺杀起义”，巴勒斯坦年轻人试图用刀砍杀犹太人，并且偶尔能够成功。这一具有半暴动性质的行动，很大程度上被同一套人为操纵的情绪所推动，正是这种情绪在1920年代点燃了反犹暴乱——即巴勒斯坦人内心深处的想要“保护”圣殿山不被犹太人染指的强烈情感。 When Israel captured the Old City of Jerusalem in June of 1967 in response to a Jordanian attack, the first impulse of some Israelis was to assert Jewish rights atop the Mount. Between 1948, the year Israel achieved independence, and 1967, Jordan, then the occupying power in Jerusalem, banned Jews not only from the 35-acre Mount—which is known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, the noble sanctuary—but also from the Western Wall below. 1967年6月，以色列占领了耶路撒冷古城区域以报复约旦的攻击，部分以色列人的第一反应就是主张犹太人在圣殿山上的权利。在1948年（此年以色列实现独立）至1967年间，耶路撒冷的占领国约旦不但禁止犹太人进入圣殿山周围35英亩范围内——这块区域在穆斯林中以Haram al-Sharif，即“高贵的避难所”著称，而且也禁止他们靠近山下的哭墙。 When paratroopers took the Old City, they raised the Israeli flag atop the Dome of the Rock, but the Israeli defense minister, Moshe Dayan, ordered it taken down, and soon after promised leaders of the Muslim Waqf, the trust that controlled the mosque and the shrine, that Israel would not interfere in its activities. Since then, successive Israeli governments have maintained the status quo established by Dayan. 伞兵控制旧城以后，在圆顶清真寺顶上升起以色列国旗，但以色列国防部长Moshe Dayan命令降旗，随后很快就向穆斯林“瓦克夫”（受托控制清真寺和圣堂的组织）的领袖承诺，以色列不会干涉他们的活动。自此以后，历届以色列政府均对Dayan所立态势萧规曹随。 There is another status quo associated with the Temple Mount, however, that has been showing signs of weakening. This is a religious status quo. The mainstream rabbinical view for many years has been that Jews should not walk atop the Mount for fear of treading on the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctum of the Temple that, according to tradition, housed the Ark of the Covenant. The Holy of Holies is the room in which the Jewish high priest spoke the Tetragrammaton, the ineffable name of God, on Yom Kippur. 但是，与圣殿山相关的另一态势则显现出弱化的迹象。这是种宗教态势。多年来，主流的拉比教义观认为犹太人不应该在圣殿山顶行走，以免踩踏了“至圣所”。这是圣殿中一直用于存放有约柜的内部圣所，是犹太大祭司在赎罪日讲述神圣而需避讳的上帝之名“Tetragrammaton”的地方。 The exact location of the Holy of Holies is not known, and Muslim authorities have prevented archeologists from conducting any excavations on the Mount, in part out of fear that such explorations will uncover further evidence of a pre-Islamic Jewish presence. This mainstream rabbinical view concerning the Mount—that it should be the direction of Jewish prayer, rather than a place of Jewish prayer—has made the lives of Jerusalem’s temporal authorities easier, by keeping Muslim and Jewish worshippers separated. “至圣所”的确切所在并不为人所知，而穆斯林当局一直阻止考古学家对圣殿山实施发掘，一部分也是担心此类勘探有可能会发现更多的证据，证明犹太人先于伊斯兰教存在于此。这种主流的拉比教义观认为圣殿山应是犹太信徒祷告时的朝向而非他们应该出现的地方。这让耶路撒冷的世俗政府由此轻松一些，因为穆斯林礼拜者和犹太礼拜者被泾渭分明的隔开了。 In recent years, however, small groups of radical religious innovators who oppose the mainstream rabbinical view have sought to make the Mount, once again, a site of Jewish prayer. (Here is a New York Times Magazine story I wrote about these radical groups.) These activists have gained sympathizers among some far-right political figures in Israel, though the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not altered the separation-of-religions status quo. 然而，近年来，一些反对主流拉比教义观的激进宗教改革者小团体已在寻求将圣殿山重新确定为犹太祷告之地。（我为《纽约时报》所写的一篇文章所论的正是这些激进团体。）这些积极分子已获得以色列某些极右政治人物的同情，尽管总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡领导下的政府仍未改变两种宗教分离的现状。 One of the tragedies of the settlement movement is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict. 定居行动的悲剧之一是它可能模糊了中东冲突的真正起因。 Convincing Palestinians that the Israeli government is not trying to alter the status quo on the Mount has been difficult because many of today’s Palestinian leaders, in the manner of the Palestinian leadership of the 1920s, actively market rumors that the Israeli government is seeking to establish atop the Mount a permanent Jewish presence. 要让巴勒斯坦人相信以色列政府无意改变圣殿山的现状，这一直很困难。因为巴勒斯坦当今的许多领袖采用了1920年代巴勒斯坦领导层的做法，积极地散布谣言，声称以色列政府想要在圣殿山顶建立永久性的犹太人驻地。 The comments of the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas—by general consensus the most moderate leader in the brief history of the Palestinian national movement—have been particularly harsh. Though Abbas has authorized Palestinian security services to work with their Israeli counterparts to combat extremist violence, his rhetoric has inflamed tensions. 巴勒斯坦民族权力机构（自治政府）总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯的评论尤其尖锐。在巴勒斯坦民族主义运动的简短历史中，他已是公认的最温和的领袖。尽管阿巴斯已下令巴勒斯坦安全部门配合以色列的相关部门打击极端主义暴行，他的说辞却是在火上浇油。 “Every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem is pure, every martyr will reach paradise, and every injured person will be rewarded by God,” he said last month, as rumors about the Temple Mount swirled. He went on to say that Jews “have no right to desecrate the mosque with their dirty feet.” 上个月，关于圣殿山的谣言甚嚣尘上之时，他说：“洒在耶路撒冷的每一滴血都是纯洁的，每一个殉难者都将上天堂，每个受伤的人都将得到上帝的奖赏。”他接着说，犹太人“无权用他们的脏脚玷污清真寺。” Taleb Abu Arrar, an Israeli Arab member of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, argued publicly that Jews “desecrate” the Temple Mount by their presence. (Fourteen years ago, Yasser Arafat, then the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, told me that “Jewish authorities are forging history by saying the Temple stood on the Haram al-Sharif. Their temple was somewhere else.”) 以色列议会中的一位阿拉伯议员，Taleb Abu Arrar，公开发表言论说，犹太人的出现就是对圣殿山的“玷污”。（14年前，巴勒斯坦解放组织时任领导人亚瑟·阿拉法特曾告诉我，“犹太当局说圣殿位于‘高贵的避难所’，这是伪造历史。他们的庙在别的地方。”） These sorts of comments, combined with the violence of the past two weeks—including the sacking and burning of a Jewish shrine outside Nablus—suggest a tragic continuity between the 1920s and today. For those who believe not only in the necessity, but in the practical possibility, of an equitable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and in particular, for those who believe that the post-1967 settlement project is the root cause of the conflict—recent events have been sobering. 诸如此类的言论，再结合过去两周发生的暴力活动——包括洗劫和焚烧纳布卢斯市外的一处犹太圣地——表明在1920年代与今日之间存在一种可悲的持续性。对于那些相信巴以冲突不仅必须、而且实践上也能够通过双方平等建国方案来解决的人来说，尤其是认为1967年后的定居点计划才是冲突根源的人，近期的事态发人深省。 One of the tragedies of the settlement movement is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict: the unwillingness of many Muslim Palestinians to accept the notion that Jews are a people who are indigenous to the land Palestinians believe to be exclusively their own, and that the third-holiest site in Islam is also the holiest site of another religion, one whose adherents reject the notion of Muslim supersessionism. 定居行动的悲剧之一是它可能模糊了中东冲突根本原因：许多巴勒斯坦穆斯林不愿意接受一个观念：犹太人是巴勒斯坦人自信为其所独有的土地上的原住民族，且伊斯兰教的第三大圣地同样也是另外一个宗教的至圣之地，而该宗教的信徒拒斥伊斯兰教的取代论。【译注：又称替换神学，是探讨基督教与犹太教和犹太人民关系的一种基督教神学观点，认为基督教徒已取代以色列人成为上帝的子民、新约已取代旧约。（译自wiki词条）】 The status quo on the Temple Mount is prudent and must remain in place. It saves lives, lives fundamentalist Jewish radicals would risk in order to advance their millennial dreams. But it is the byproduct of the intolerance of Jerusalem’s Muslim leadership. 圣殿山的现状是明智的，且必须继续保持。它确实挽救了人命，那些原教旨主义犹太教激进分子为了推进其千禧年之梦而愿意牺牲的人命。但它也是耶路撒冷的穆斯林领导层不宽容政策的副产品。 When violence against Jews occurs inside Israel, or on the West Bank, a consensus tends to be reached quickly by outside analysts and political leaders, one that holds that such violence represents the inevitable consequence of Israel’s occupation and settlement of Palestinian territory. John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of state, said in an appearance earlier this week at Harvard that, “What’s happening is that unless we get going, a two-state solution could conceivably be stolen from everybody. And there’s been a massive increase in settlements over the course of the last years.” He went on to say, “Now you have this violence because there’s a frustration that is growing, and a frustration among Israelis who don’t see any movement.” 当针对犹太人的暴力发生在以色列内部或约旦河西岸时，外部的分析人士和政治领袖倾向于迅速达成一种共识，认为这些暴力行为是以色列占领并定居于巴勒斯坦领土的必然后果。美国国务卿约翰·克里在本周早些时候出席哈佛的一个公开活动时说：“现状是，除非我们开始采取行动，否则可以预见两国方案将再无可能。而在过去的几年中，定居点已经有了极大的增加。”他接着说：“这些暴力之所以出现是因为挫败感在弥漫，而看不到任何进展的以色列人也很失望。” (On Friday morning, speaking with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, Kerry revised and extended his comments, criticizing Abbas—in a passive way — for the violence: “There's no excuse for the violence. ... And the Palestinians need to understand, and President Abbas has been committed to nonviolence. He needs to be condemning this, loudly and clearly. And he needs to not engage in some of the incitement that his voice has sometimes been heard to encourage.”) （周五早上，参加美国国家公共电台Steve Inskeep的节目时，克里对他的前述评论进行了修正和扩展，就发生的暴力活动（以一种消极方式）批评阿巴斯：“暴力没有任何借口……巴勒斯坦人需要明白，阿巴斯总统也承诺了非暴力，他需要就此高调且清楚地谴责这些暴力行为，并且应当避开使用有时被人当作鼓励的煽动言辞”。） Many Palestinians believe that “this is not a conflict between two national movements, but a conflict between one national movement and a colonial and imperialistic entity.” 许多巴勒斯坦人认为，“这并非两个民族运动之间的冲突，而是一个民族运动和另一个殖民和帝国主义实体之间的冲突。” It is sometimes difficult for policymakers such as Kerry, who has devoted so much time and energy to the search for a solution to the Israeli-Arab impasse, to acknowledge the power of a particular Palestinian narrative, one that obviates the possibility of a solution that allows Jews national and religious equality. 如克里这样的政策制定者，由于他们已经为解决以巴冲突僵局付出了太多时间和精力，有时候难以认识到一种特定的巴勒斯坦叙事的力量，这种叙事排除了允许犹太人获得民族和宗教平等的方案可能性。 Writing in Haaretz, the left-center political scientist Shlomo Avineri describes an important disconnect that often goes unnoticed, even in times like these: Many Palestinians believe that “this is not a conflict between two national movements but a conflict between one national movement (the Palestinian) and a colonial and imperialistic entity (Israel).” 在《国土报》上，中左翼的政治学家Shlomo Avineri描述了一个通常不被注意（即便是当下也是如此）的重要断裂。许多巴勒斯坦人相信，“这并非是两个民族运动之间的冲突，而是一个民族运动（巴勒斯坦）和一个殖民和帝国主义实体（以色列）之间的冲突。” He goes on to write, “According to this view, Israel will end like all colonial phenomena—it will perish and disappear. Moreover, according to the Palestinian view, the Jews are not a nation but a religious community, and as such not entitled to national self-determination which is, after all, a universal imperative.” 他接着写道，“根据这种观点，以色列会跟其他所有殖民现象一样，终将走向灭亡。而且，根据巴勒斯坦人的观点，犹太人不是一个民族，而是一个宗教共同体，因此没有民族自决的权利，毕竟这是一条普遍诫规。” Avineri, like most sensible analysts, understands the many and variegated reasons for the continued failure of the peace process: 跟绝大多数明智的分析家一样，Avineri认识到了和平进程不断失败的原因众多而繁杂：

[M]utual distrust between the two populations, internal pressures from the rejectionists on both sides, Yasser Arafat’s repeated deceptions, the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the electoral victories of Likud in Israeli elections, Palestinian terrorism, continuing Israeli settlement activities in the territories, the bloody rift between Fatah and Hamas, American presidents who did too little (George W. Bush) or too much and in a wrong way (Barack Obama), the political weakness of Mahmoud Abbas, governments headed by Netanyahu that did everything possible to undermine effective negotiations. All this is true, and everyone picks and chooses what fits their views and interests—but beyond all these lies a fundamental difference in the terms in which each side views the conflict, a difference many tend or choose to overlook. “两个群体之间的互不信任，双方抵制派所造成的内部压力，亚瑟·阿拉法特反复无常的欺诈，对伊扎克·拉宾总理的谋杀，利库德集团在以色利选举中的胜利，巴勒斯坦恐怖主义，以色列在该地区持续不断的定居活动，法塔赫和哈马斯之间的血腥纷争，美国总统的无所作为（乔治·W·布什）抑或在错误的方向上做得太多（巴拉克·奥巴马），马哈茂德·阿巴斯的政治软弱，内塔尼亚胡为首的政府干尽了一切有可能破坏有效和谈的事。这些都是对的，每个人都能从中挑选出与合于自身观点和利益的原因——但在此之外，还存在一个易被人忽略的因素，即双方看待这一冲突的角度存在根本性的差别。”

The violence of the past two weeks, encouraged by purveyors of rumors who now have both Israeli and Palestinian blood on their hands, is rooted not in Israeli settlement policy, but in a worldview that dismisses the national and religious rights of Jews. There will not be peace between Israelis and Palestinians so long as parties on both sides of the conflict continue to deny the national and religious rights of the other. 过去两周发生的暴力活动受到了谣言散布者的鼓动，他们的手上现已沾满了以色列人还有巴勒斯坦人的鲜血。这种暴力并非根源于以色列的定居政策，而是源于一种拒绝承认犹太人享有民族和宗教权利的世界观。只要冲突双方继续否定彼此的民族和宗教权利，以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间就不会出现和平。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

《超级社会：人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评 Review of "Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth" 作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/ Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader. Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中，通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析，来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果，让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。 What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation. 什么是历史动力学？我能给出的最佳定义是：这是一种研究历史的科学方法，它试图通过量化的方法去检验，排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。 Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours. Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣：是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力，完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢？他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年，也就是超过260亿工时。 The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale. 下一个容易想到的问题就是，这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢，例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔，还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场，以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式，是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上的进步呢？ As an economist my bias is to see human actions in terms of self-interest, competition and conflict, where through the invisible hand the interaction of self-interested individuals can lead to productive outcomes. But like the fish who is blind to the vast ocean of water they live in, I realised I was blind to the ocean of cooperation that was the back-drop to my focus on self-interest and competition. 作为一个经济学家，我倾向于通过自利、竞争和冲突的视角来看待人类行为，在这些视角之下，自利个体之间能够通过“看不见的手”达致有效率的经济产出。但就像大海里一条对于自己所生存的广阔水域一无所知的鱼一样，我意识我对于合作行为这片广阔的大海实际上几乎一无所知，而这是我所关注的自利和竞争的基础。 In “Ultrasociety” Turchin provides a way to see and measure cooperation – to quantify its existence on a massive scale. Once you are able to see the great ocean of cooperation that dominates human society, it leads you to interesting and challenging lines of scientific inquiry. The puzzling question is then how a world dominated by ultra social human cooperation can also frequently succumb to large scale war and conflict? 在《超级社会》一书中，Turchin教授提供了一种看待并衡量合作的方式——在大尺度上将它的存在进行量化。当你能够看清合作这片统治着人类社会的汪洋大海，它就会将你的引向有趣而又富有挑战性的科学探索。之后的一个问题就是：为什么一个充盈着超大型社会合作的人类世界还会经常屈就于大规模的战争和冲突？ Turchin’s answer, and one of the big ideas in the book, is that war between social groups is the mechanism by which cooperative behaviour develops “within groups”. It is a fundamental evolutionary process happening between societies at a large scale. He elevates war as a selection mechanism for cooperation, and values it above many of the technological factors like domestication of plants and the advent of agriculture. Turchin对这个问题的答案，同时也是本书的主要观点之一，是认为社会群体之间的战争是合作行为在群体内部发展的机制。它是一种基础性进化过程，发生于在各社会之间的大尺度上。他提升了战争在历史进程中的地位，将其视为对合作行为的一种选择机制，并且将其价值置于许多技术性因素之上，例如植物的驯化和农业的出现。 Turchin debunks many standard stories that “explain” the path to civilisation and eliminates glaring inconsistencies in the archaeological record. The naive view that the invention of agriculture “…set the ball rolling, and the entire history of civilisation followed from that” is a satisfying common story. But it seems a stretch to claim that the small scale practice of seasonally collecting and planting seeds nearby small permanent settlements, leads directly to the large-scale institutions observed in ancient civilisations. Turchin推翻了许多自称能够“解释”通向文明路径的标准叙事，认为它们忽视了自身与显而易见的考古学事实之间的重大矛盾。有一种天真的观点认为，农业的发明“……让雪球滚动了起来，而整个文明的历史则随之展开”，这是一种令很多人满意的常见叙事。但是，认为小规模永久定居点附近季节性的收集和播种行为可以直接导致古代文明中所呈现的一些大规模社会制度，这似乎有点太过牵强了。 The “agricultural snowball” story is also hampered by the fact that early agricultural societies had “a markedly negative effect on human health” as the poorer nutrition compared to hunter gatherers lead to smaller stature, higher sickness and the spread of pathogens through the high density settlements. Yet agriculture did spread and ultimately outcompeted nomadic hunter-gather societies. 早期的农业社会“对人类的健康水平产生了显著的负面影响”这一事实也削弱了“农业的雪球”这一叙事的说服力，相比于狩猎-采集社会，农业社会更差的营养水平导致了更小的体形，更多疾病，以及高密度的聚居区内病原体的传播。尽管如此，农业社会的确在之后得到了扩张并最终超过了游动性的狩猎-采集社会。 I have long been hesitant about “just so” explanations of social institutions based on historic physical and technological conditions that turn simple correlations into plausible causal mechanisms. Turchin provides the evidence that although all early large scale civilisations had agriculture, it was not the agriculture alone that directly caused large scale civilisation. 这种对于社会制度“原来如此”解释【编注：『原来如此故事』又称特例假设（ad hoc hypothesis），是一种为某一解释设置无法或难以验证的特殊条件，从而消除或降低该解释之可证伪性的做法。】，立足于物质和技术方面的历史条件，把简单的相关性当成了煞有其事的因果关系，我因此而一直对此抱有怀疑态度。Turchin教授提供了证据以显示虽然所有早期的大型文明都拥有农业，但并不是农业这一单一因素直接导致了大型文明的出现。 I felt foolish to have not recognised the array of “just so” stories in the study of history before Turchin pointed them out. In my field of economics, the existence of money is still explained in the textbooks as arising automatically once someone in human prehistory realised that some kind of currency made commerce easier than trying to directly trade a quarter of a cow for three baskets of vegetables. 对于没能在Turchin教授指出之前认出这些“原来如此”故事，我感到自己有点傻。在我所研究的经济学领域中，货币的存在仍然在教科书中被解释为在史前时代的某个时刻有当人意识到某种形式的通货比直接使用四分之一头牛去交换三筐蔬菜变得更加容易的时候自动产生的。 Yet many alternative social arrangements also solve the physical problem of a “double coincidence of wants”. We need look no further than current tribal societies that do not have or desire money despite their specialisation into many roles. They have instead resolved their double coincidence of wants dilemma through various other rituals, hierarchies, and institutions. 然而，许多其他的社会安排也同样解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这个实际问题。我们只需要看看一些现存的部落社会，虽然这些社会中已经出现了众多专业化的分工角色，但他们至今既没有货币，也看不出对货币有任何需求。取而代之的是，这些部落社会通过多种仪式，层级结构和社会制度的安排解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这一困境。 Turchin, through his cliodynamics research agenda, aims to rid the historical study of civilisation from these “just so” explanations. In the aim of scientific progress this research agenda uses quantifiable historical data to pit multi-level selection theory and its various components against many others, and in doing so eliminate bad theories and open up new avenues of inquiry. Most chapters of the books contain references to this emerging field of research which themselves are intriguing and enlightening. Turchin教授希望通过他的历史动力学使文明史的研究摆脱这些“原来如此”解释。为了推进研究的科学化进程，他的研究里使用了可量化的历史数据让多层次选择理论以及它的不同组成部分与众多其它的理论进行竞争，通过这种做法排除那些较差的理论并为之后的研究打开新方向。书中的大多数章节都包含了对这一蓬勃发展的研究领域的描述，而这本身已经足够有趣和富有启发性了。 Turchin argues that human societies, tribes, and groups, did not simply take a linear path from small hunter-gatherers tribes to large-scale civilisations. It was the competition through conquest and war between societies that lead to those with more effective weaponry and military organisations arising from greater internal cooperation, to survive at the expense of others. Turchin认为，人类社会，部落和群体并不是简单地通过一条线性的道路从小规模的狩猎-采集部落发展为大型文明的。不同社会之间在相互征服和战争中所展开的竞争，使得那些通过更好的内部合作发展出了更高效的武器和军事组织的社会生存了下来，而代价则是其对手的消亡。 The following excerpt summarises: 以下引文对此作了总结： “Here’s how I think these peaceful, stable societies came about. As war created large states, empires, and nation-states, societies evolved measures to suppress internal conflict and violence. Reduced internal violence is the obverse of increased cooperation. “我认为这些和平而稳定的社会是以这样的方式诞生的。随着战争创造出大型的城邦，帝国和民族国家，社会也演化出了一些压制自身内部的冲突和暴力的机制。内部暴力行为减少的另一面是更多的内部合作。 “Surprising as it may seem, the trend towards greater peace was already noticeable during the Ancient and Medieval historical eras, long before the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Of course, wars between empires dwarfed intertribal conflicts in scale. Huge armies fought increasingly bloody battles, and the numbers of casualties mounted. “也许看起来让人吃惊，但向更加和平的状态演化的趋势，实际上在古代和中世纪这些历史时期中就已经显而易见了，这要远远早于18世纪的启蒙运动。当然，帝国之间的战争在规模上让部落间冲突相形见绌。大型军队间战争的血腥程度持续上升，而战争中的伤亡人数也随之水涨船高。 “But the key point is that these wars moved away from imperial centers, towards the frontiers. More and more people—those living far from frontiers where battles were fought—never experienced conflict, and could enjoy relative prosperity. “但关键在于这些战争不再发生于帝国的中心区域，而被移到了前线。越来越多的人——那些生活在远离战争发生的前线地区的人——从来没有经历过冲突，他们享受到了相对的繁荣。 “There is no contradiction between larger armies and larger butcher’s bills from warfare, on the one hand, and on the other, a greater part of the population enjoying peace. What is important from the point of view of quality of life is not how many people, in total, are killed, but what the chances are that I (or you, or someone you care about) will be killed. In other words, the important statistic is the risk of violent death for each person.” “一方面，军队规模更大，战争的死亡人数更高，而另一方面，总人口中更大比例的人群却能够享受和平，这两点并不冲突。从生活质量的角度来看，重要的并不是总体上有多少人在战争中被杀死，而是作为社会中的个体，我（或者是你，或者是你所关心的人）有多大的可能被杀死。换句话说，对每个人而言，更重要的统计量是死于暴力的风险大小。” The power of this view is in the way the apparent contradiction of how war leads to peace becomes obvious once understood through an evolutionary lens. It changed my mental model of history from a series of inevitable linear events, to one of a branching tree of evolutionary paths, complete with many dead-ends of failed civilisations and their cultures, with many more merging and growing from conquest. 这一观点的强大之处在于，“战争是如何导向和平的？”这一看似矛盾的问题一旦通过进化的视角来理解，其中的逻辑就显而易见了。它将我理解历史的心智模型从一系列不可避免的线性事件的串联转变为一棵包含多种进化路径的分叉树，这棵树的许多分支都终结于失败的文明及其文化，但更多的分支则是通过征服合并在一起并继续成长的文明。 In short, I have shifted away from the popular but incorrect view of evolution as linear and subject only to environmental stresses rather than intra-species conflict. The left panel of the below image epitomises this popular confusion that I ignorantly held in the context of the study of history. 简而言之，我已经摒弃了那种流行却是错误的以线性视角看待文明演化的方式，该方式认为它仅仅受到外部环境的压力影响而不理会种群内部冲突的作用。下图左边的部分代表了之前的我出于无知而在历史研究中所采用的这种带有很强迷惑性的流行视角。 A more correct view of biological evolution is in the right panel, complete with mixing of genes and extinctions. It is more subtle and complex view, but provides a more useful story of the path of history, the dying out of civilisations and merging of cultures as a result of inter-group warfare. 而下图中右边的部分则代表了一种更加准确的看待生物进化的视角，进化是在众多基因的混合与消亡中完成的。这是一种更加精细也更加复杂的视角，但它提供了一种对历史路径更加有用的叙事，文明的消亡和文化的合并实际上是族群间战争的结果。 Even more interesting is that when there is little external warfare and competition, the successful groups find it difficult to curtail infighting amongst sub-groups within their society, and their lack of internal cooperation begins to make them vulnerable to attack from outsiders. In Turchin’s own words, from Chapter 2: 更有趣的是，当来自外部的战争和竞争压力较小时，那些成功的族群会发现控制自身内部小群体间的明争暗斗变得更困难了，而缺乏内部合作将会让这些曾经成功的族群在面对外来者的攻击时变得脆弱。用Turchin在书中第二章的话来说就是： “Here’s how war serves to weed out societies that “go bad.” When discipline, imposed by the need to survive conflict, gets relaxed, societies lose their ability to cooperate. A reactionary catchphrase of the 1970s used to go, “what this generation needs is a war,” a deplorable sentiment but one that in terms of cultural evolution might sometimes have a germ of cold logic. “战争是以这样的方式淘汰掉那些“衰朽腐败”的社会的。当因生存压力而施加的纪律开始变得松弛的时候，社会就失去了合作的能力。1970年代曾经有一句反动标语，“这代人需要经历一场战争，”虽然这句话里满是可悲的情绪，但从文明进化的角度上说，也许其中的确包含着一些冷冰冰的真知灼见。 At any rate, there is a pattern that we see recurring throughout history, when a successful empire expands its borders so far that it becomes the biggest kid on the block. When survival is no longer at stake, selfish elites and other special interest groups capture the political agenda. The spirit that “we are all in the same boat” disappears and is replaced by a “winner take all” mentality. As the elites enrich themselves, the rest of the population is increasingly impoverished. Rampant inequality of wealth further corrodes cooperation. 无论如何，我们都能看到历史中不断重演的一种模式，当一个成功的帝国将自己的疆域扩展得如此之广以至于它成了“街区里的孩子王”，当生存的压力已不再迫在眉睫，那些自私的精英和其它一些特定的利益集团就会夺取帝国的政治议程。“大家同处一条船”的精神消失了，取而代之的是“赢者通吃”的心态。随着精英们发家致富，其它人则持续地变得更加贫困。肆无忌惮的贫富不均进一步腐蚀了合作的基础。 Beyond a certain point a formerly great empire becomes so dysfunctional that smaller, more cohesive neighbors begin tearing it apart. Eventually the capacity for cooperation declines to such a low level that barbarians can strike at the very heart of the empire without encountering significant resistance. 在超过一个临界点之后，一个曾经的伟大帝国就会变得机能失调，以至于它的那些更小但更具凝聚力的邻居们开始将它分裂。最终帝国内部的合作能力降到了一个太低的水平，以至于外来的野蛮人可以在几乎遇不上任何值得一提的抵抗的条件下直捣帝国的心脏。 But barbarians at the gate are not the real cause of imperial collapse. They are a consequence of the failure to sustain social cooperation. As the British historian Arnold Toynbee said, great civilisations are not murdered – they die by suicide.” 但那些“门口的野蛮人”并不是帝国崩溃的原因。他们的入侵只是帝国没能维持内部社会合作的结果。正如英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比所言，伟大的文明从来不会被谋杀——他们全都死于自杀。” I have explored this process of disintegration of groups into competing clans in small scale in experiments before. Yet I failed to see the link to the large scale selection processes occurring even at such large scales at the nation-state. The talk of sclerosis and the death of large scale cooperation made me recall the chart below on the growth of partisan policy in the US which shows the striking decline in cross-party cooperation on legislative changes. 我之前曾经用小规模实验的方式研究过族群瓦解为多个相互竞争的部落的情况。但我并没有意识到，即使在民族国家这么大的尺度上，也有类似的选择过程发生。书中关于社会固化和大规模合作的消亡的讨论，让我联想起了下面这幅关于美国党派政策演化的图中所显示出在立法变更上的党际合作水平的显著下降。 Each node in the visual is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949–2012, with Republicans in red and Democrats in blue. Edges are drawn between members who agree on legislative decisions more often than expected by chance, and the nodes are spaced out in a way so that those with more edges connecting them are closer together. The clustering therefore visualises who is cooperating with who in terms of developing legislation. 图中每个节点都代表美国在1949-2012年间的一位众议院议员，红色代表共和党人，而蓝色则代表民主党人。如果两位议员在立法决策上达成一致的频率高于由随机概率所预期的水平，那么他们所对应的节点之间就会被一条线连接，节点在图中的排列方式使得那些相互之间有更多连接的议员靠得更近。这样图中的聚类就从视觉上反映出了哪些议员在推进立法上相互合作。 Without the external threats to the nation as a whole after WWII, and later the Cold War, the ability to maintain a cohesive national whole in political terms appears to have broken down into partisan scrambling. No longer can we see a cooperative whole, but instead competing fairly arbitrary tribes of blues and reds. 在第二次世界大战和随后的冷战结束后，来自外部的对于美国作为一个整体的威胁都不复存在了，而从政治角度上看，似乎维系一个有凝聚力的国家整体的能力也随之分崩离析，取而代之的则是喋喋不休的党派纷争。在图中我们不再能看到一个富有合作性的整体，而是一些分别由红点和蓝点组成的武断分隔的竞争部落。 I was left in a state of deep reflection after reading the book. Many other big ideas are woven through it to make you reconsider the popular but overly simplistic stories we tell ourselves to explain historical events. From the long term Z-shaped arc of quantifiable violence in human civilisation, to the role of horses, long range weaponry and population size in the success of inter-group warfare, and finally to the rise of God-kings and oppressive hierarchies. 在读完这本书后，我陷入了深刻的反思。本书中还贯穿了许多其它重要想法，它们会让你重新思考我们在解释历史事件时所常用的那些流行但过分简化的叙事。从人类文明中以可量化方式衡量的暴力水平在长期中所呈现出的Z型曲线，到马、远程武器和人口规模在族群间战争中所发挥的作用，以及最后君神合一政体和统治阶级的崛起。 Even Turchin’s incidental detours explore rather significant questions, such as in Chapter 4 when he clarifies a point about culture in human societies with the off-handed comment “Incidentally, why do we have culture? ” 即使是Turchin教授在书中偶然从主线上岔出的一些分支也讨论了相当重要的问题，例如在第四章中澄清关于人类社会中文化的作用的一个观点时，他随性地评论道“顺便问一句，为什么人类会拥有文化？”。 The same lesson applies in economics. Firms in highly competitive markets constantly face threats to their existence, leading to a type of destructive creation that ensures that surviving firms are internally highly cohesive and cooperative; economically efficient. 同样的道理也适用于经济学领域。高度竞争市场中的企业经常会面临威胁到自身生存的问题，这导致了一种毁灭性的创造过程以保证最终生存下来的企业在内部都具有极强的凝聚力和合作能力，我们称之为经济效率。 Yet the process of competition is highly inefficient in economic terms as only very slightly different production facilities are duplicated by competitors. For me the trade-off is rather radical just to think about. That the gains to internal cohesion require a cost of an external threat or else large-scale groups will be undermined by the interests of sub-groups within them. 然而从经济角度上说，竞争本身是非常低效的，因为众多互相竞争的对手所复制的生产设备之间的差别其实非常小。对我来说，其中的利弊权衡已经是一个相当深刻的问题了。即获得内部凝聚力所带来的收益需要以面对外部威胁为代价，否则大规模的群体将会被内部众多小团体的利益慢慢腐蚀。 Like any books that cover grand ideas about human civilisation there are probably some finer details to squabble about. I certainly don’t have the expertise to do so. Instead I want to share some of the thoughts that occupied my mind after reading Ultrasociety. These thoughts and comments should sufficiently signal the compelling nature of the discussions and ideas of the book. 与任何涉及关于人类文明的宏大观点的著作一样，书中几乎肯定会有一些值得争论的细节。我显然不具备足够的专业水平来这么做。但我希望与各位分享在读完《超级社会》这本书之后一直占据我脑海的一些想法。这些想法和评论应该足够说明这部大作的引人入胜之处以及其中的一些主题。 First, if sustained group cooperation relies on external competition, is there value in creating fictitious interstellar enemies to sustain better global cooperation? I’m thinking here of the film The Village, where the elders invented an outside enemy to sustain internal peace. The idea of creating an enemy for solidarity is popular, and even gets a run in the economics comics. 首先，如果持续的群体合作依赖于外部竞争，那么创造一些假想中的外星敌人是否对于维持更好的全球合作具有价值呢？这让我想起了一部名为《神秘村》的电影，在这部电影中，老人们创造出了一个外部敌人来维持村子内部的和平。为了维持团结而创造出一个敌人的想法现在很流行，即使在一些经济学漫画中也能看到它的影子。 Or perhaps the major modern religions fulfil this type of role so well that they can’t be displaced[1]? And surely it is the moral thing to do to promote human cooperation on an even larger scale without actual conflict and violence, if that indeed is possible. 或者也许主要的现代宗教已经扮演了这一角色而因此变得无可取代[1]？ 毫无疑问，在不引发实际的冲突和暴力的前提下推进更大规模的人类合作在道德上是无可厚非的，如果这真的可能的话。 Second, and following directly on from the first, the use of the term morality is widely used with its common meaning as conforming to the cooperative norms of a group. Yet I can’t shake the nagging feeling that, like Darwin’s work on evolution, the idea that war with outsiders promotes peace is ripe to be corrupted for political gain because it can be so easily argued to be a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ position. 第二，紧跟第一点的思路，现在人们对于“道德”的惯常理解与维持社会的合作规范是一致的。然而我还是无法摆脱一种令人不安的感觉，正如达尔文在进化论上的贡献一样，认为与外来者的战争能够推进内部和平这一观点很容易被政治利益所利用，因为它很容易被说成是一种“自然的”或是“道德的”立场。 Third, how are these great feats of cooperation realised in practice? Is there a common recipe that can be adopted into 21st public policy? There is a brief mention of how tribes and groups ‘tag’ each other with signals of group membership as one way to create cooperation in the following passage from Chapter 10. 第三，这些宏大的合作是如何在实践中实现的？对于21世纪的公共政策而言，存在一种通用的实践模式吗？书中第十章的以下段落简要地提到了部落和群体是如何用“标签”来标识彼此群体身份的方式来创造合作的。 “An important evolutionary breakthrough was the capacity to tag cooperating groups with symbolic markers such as language and dialect, styles of clothing and ornamentation (including tattoos), and behavioral characteristics—for example, participation in collective rituals. Symbolically-tagged cooperative groups, or tribes and nations, allowed us to increase the scale of cooperation beyond the circle of people personally known to us. Of course, the downside of increasing cooperation within a tribe or a nation was greater intensity of conflict with other tribes and nations.” “一个进化上的重大突破就是人们通过诸如语言和方言，衣着和装饰（包括纹身）的风格，以及行为特征——举例来说，对于集体仪式的参与——这些符号化的标记来为与自己合作的群体贴上标签的能力。通过符号化标签来标记与自己合作的群体，或者部落和国家，让我们能够在熟人小圈子之外扩大合作的规模。当然，在部落或国家内部增进合作的负面效应是与其它部落和国家之间冲突强度的加剧。” But like many of the minor points in the book, this single paragraph opens, then closes, a massively interesting puzzle about how humans actually organise into tribes at all levels. While as outsiders we easily observe tags, or the signals and rituals of a cultural group, as insiders we often overlook the amount of resources devoted to these tagging rituals. 但与书中其它一些次要观点一样，书中的这个段落首先提出了一个重要而有趣的难题，也就是人类是如何在实际中被组织为各种层次的“部落”的，并在之后回答了这个问题。作为外人，我们很容易观察到一个文化群体的标签，或者信号和仪式，但作为群体内部的人，我们却通常会忽视投入到这些标记仪式上的大量资源。 The whole fashion industry is almost exclusively about signalling social status, religious, sporting, or gender loyalties. People don’t buy cars just for transport; otherwise there would be little demand for more than a few different models. 整个时尚产业的存在几乎就是为了标识人们的社会地位，宗教信仰，体育爱好或性别取向。人们买车的目的并不仅仅是为了交通，否则除了有限的几种不同车型之外，不会有多少对其它车型的需求。 Instead we buy into marketing messages about how purchasing different types of cars tag us with different traits in the minds of others. At a national sale with have flags, anthems, national colours, sports teams and more that promote a sense of belonging. 但实际上人们买车也是在购买一种营销符号——通过对不同车型的选择而为自己贴上标签——你开的车显示出你是什么样的人。而国家则通过国旗，国歌，国家的代表性颜色，各种体育项目的国家队以及诸如此类的东西来让人们产生认同感。 While I’ve always considered much of our conspicuous consumption to be wasteful, in the same way that the devotion of military resources often appears wasteful on the surface, a picture is emerging of the amazing gains from these types of tagging behaviours and rituals in terms of promoting high levels of cooperation. While not the direct focus of the book, I think more details on this part of the evolutionary view of cooperation and conflict would have been valuable. 虽然我之前一直认为大多数炫耀性消费都很浪费，正如我们投入在军事上的资源通常从表面上看来都很浪费一样，但一幅由这类“贴标签”的行为和仪式通过在更高层次上提升合作水平而带来巨大收益的图景正在我的脑海中浮现。虽然这并不是本书直接关注的内容，但我认为，就有关合作和冲突的进化观点的这一侧面挖掘更多细节将是非常有价值的。 Fourth, what role does the massive advance in long-range weaponry since the dawn of the nuclear age mean for inter-group warfare? Turchin explains vividly how technology that allows for killing enemy combatants from a distance was a recipe for success in most warfare; starting with our evolved physical ability to accurately throwing rocks and spears, to the invention of bows and arrows, to the use of horses to mobilise armies over great distances. In the age of intercontinental missiles, drones, and nuclear weapons, how does the function of long-range of weaponry play out when the whole world can be anyone’s target? 第四，自从核武时代以来，远程武器技术的巨大进步将在群体间战争中扮演怎样的角色？Turchin教授在书中生动地描述了为什么那些能够在远程杀死敌军战士的技术在大多数战争中都是制胜的法宝，从早期人类演化出的准确投掷石块和长矛的能力，到弓和箭的发明，到使用马匹来让军队获得远程的机动性。在这个洲际导弹，无人机和核武器的时代，当整个世界都可以成为任何人的打击目标，远程武器又将如何发挥其作用？ Fifth, if the cooperative effort required to wage large scale war is a major part of the causal story of the history of civilisation, how significant is the legacy of previous wars in the current economic landscape? I have in mind the major industries of modern society, such as passenger airlines arising from industrial investment in aerial warfare, and the digital age legacy of military investment in remote communications. 第五，如果合作的努力是为大规模战争服务的这一因果叙事的确占据了大部分的文明史，那么之前的战争所留下的遗产在当今经济版图中又有着怎样的重要性？我所能想到的现代社会的一些重要产业，例如客运航空业，就是从对空中战争的产业投资中崛起的，而当今的数码时代也起源于军工行业对远程通信技术的投资。 Most major industrial firms of the modern age were intricately involved as military suppliers or were privatised former military organisations. Many modern cities only exist because of the strategic benefits of their local military bases, while public major works such as highway and rail systems, ports and airports, were products of military strategy more than peaceful economic investment. 现代大多数主要工业企业都曾经以各种复杂的方式扮演过军队供应商的角色，或者本身就是由之前的军工组织私有化而来。许多现代城市存在的原因就是处于当地的军事基地所带来的战略性优势，而高速公路，铁路系统，港口和机场这类重大的基础设施则更多都是军事战略的产物，而非和平时期经济投资的产物。 And, surprisingly to me, the cooperative legacy of previous wars is not simply technological, but also institutional; from the organisational structures of firms, to the welfare state, to international treaties on money and trade. The employer-worker relationship looks a lot like the soldier-army relationship, requiring induction, uniforms, codes of conduct, and hierarchal rule. 让我感到意外的是，之前的战争所带来的合作遗产并不仅仅存在于技术方面，它同样存在于组织制度中，从现代公司的组织结构，到福利国家，到国际货币和贸易条约。雇主和工人的关系看起来很像军队与士兵的关系，两者都要求正式入职程序，统一制服，行为准则以及层级化管理。 Modern provisions of the welfare state, including housing, health services and cash payments, were often originally created for returned soldiers following wars. It is no leap to suggest that our international monetary system, and the various international organisations and treaties that accompany it, is the direct result of resolutions in the shadow of the WWII. And perhaps the apparent breakdown of the social equality nurtured by post-war institutions observed since the late 1970s in many western countries is merely there result of the absence of external threats which breed infighting and abuses of power. 当代福利国家提供的各种供应品，包括住房，医疗服务和现金支付，最初通常都是在战后提供给退役士兵的。当今的国际货币体系以及与之配套的各种国际组织和条约，都是在第二次世界大战的阴影之下所达成的一系列决议的直接后果，这并不是什么新鲜的观点。而也许从1970年代晚期开始，许多西方国家中由战后建立的机构所导致的社会平等局面的崩塌，也仅仅是因为外部威胁的缺失为它们提供了内部斗争和权力滥用的温床。 As you can see, “Ultrasociety” will leave you pondering many big questions you may never have thought to ask before. I certainly see the world differently now. And that, to me, is the sign of a profound and insightful work. 正如你所看到的，《超级社会》这本书将会让你去深思一些之前不曾想到过的大问题。在读完这本书后，我眼中的世界变得明显不同了。对我来说，这意味着我读到了一部意义深远而富有洞见的大作。 尾注： Turchin cites Ara Norenzayan’s book Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict when explaining the role of religion in large scale cooperation, and I recommend reading it as well. 在解释宗教在大规模合作中所扮演的角色时，Turchin引用了Ara Norenzayan的著作《大神：宗教是如何改变合作与冲突的》一书中的内容，我也推荐读者阅读这本书。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-07-27】 狄宇宙在《古代中国与其强邻》中提出的观点很有意思，列出的事实很明显，但之前好像没见过讨论， 1）秦赵燕三国在战国后期对北方非华夏的游牧或畜牧民族发动了大型征伐，将控制线向北推进了数百公里， 2）秦赵燕的长城远非农耕与草原的生态边界，而是大幅远离这条边界，深入草原，特别是赵长城， 3）所以长城并非防御性策略的结果，而是扩张政策的结果， 4）秦统一后延续了这一扩张政策，但随后局面发生了逆转， 5）秦汉之际和汉前期是一个华夏大幅退缩的阶段， 6）武帝发动的大型战争是对此退缩的反弹，其对非华夏区的征伐规模此后任何华夏政权再也没达到过。 说几点我的看法： 1）统一集权帝国抵御游牧入侵的能力不如割据状态，原因之一是因为他不敢把重兵放在远离权力中心的边境上，蒙恬是第一个例子， 2）统一集权帝国对进攻性政策的意愿也弱于割据的边缘国，因为和亲纳贡政策对它来说相对成本更低，而边地的相对价值也更低， 3）汉武的成就看来是个特例，这一特例之所以出现，有两个较明显的原因：A）帝国历史不长，人口压力尚轻，因而可动员资源较多，B）伴随大型帝国的和平化时间较短，战士禀赋尚未大幅削弱， 4）唐帝国勉强维持了那么久而没被冲垮，是因为它的集权程度不太高，后期近乎于割据状态， 5）明帝国看起来是个反例，可能的解释是：A）小冰期游牧势力大幅退缩，B）迁都北京+大运河部分解决了（1）所提到的难题 @黄章晋ster: 处于割据对立时，很容易形成普鲁士林立的情形，一旦统一为一个中央集权帝国，大约百年后就进入无人知兵、柔弱不武的军力下滑通道。 @whigzhou: 对 @黄章晋ster:一个超大帝国保持稳定，只能依靠一个庞大的具有相同信仰的文官和精英建立统一认同才能做到，而这个组织系统和它的价值观必然是排斥职业军人的。这样的帝国几亿人和几千万并无区别。但在一个军事贵族集团统治的农业社会，有五百万人就足够对付铁木真了。 @whigzhou: 贵帝国的历史就是一个不断打压尚武文化的历史，到最后军户甚至都变成贱籍了  

New documents allege Mugabe’s complicity in 1980s massacres 新文档指证穆加贝参与了80年代的一系列屠杀 作者：STUART DORAN @ 2015-05-18 译者：Tankman 校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 来源：Dailymaverick,http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-05-18-new-documents-allege-mugabes-complicity-in-1980s-massacres/#.V0ShIfkrKwU Thousands of historical documents are becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and allege what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of Matabeleland's mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 导言：海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文档涉及多个领域，并指证了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并得以系统性实施的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的主要策划者。

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From January 1983, a campaign of terror was waged against the Ndebele people of western Zimbabwe, an outbreak of obscene violence that remains the darkest period in the country’s post-independence history, notwithstanding the bloody notoriety of the last decade-and-a-half. 自1983年一月，一场针对津巴布韦西部恩德贝勒人的恐怖运动被发起，这是一场不堪入目的暴行的开端，至今仍是这个国家独立后历史中最黑暗的时期。尽管该国近十五年来的历史之血腥也已臭名昭著。【译注：2000年该国政府启动了强制土改政策。】 But now, the new light is being shed on these days of horror. 但是现在，这些恐怖的岁月正被重新审视。 Thousands of historical documents that appear to expose the perpetrators are now becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and include, among others, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence assessments and raw intelligence garnered by spies recruited from within the Zimbabwean government. 海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文件似乎揭示了屠杀的真凶。这些文件涉及多个领域，包括但不限于：外交文书，情报评估和津巴布韦政府内部线人收集的原始情报。 These papers—augmented by the testimony of Zimbabwean witnesses finding courage in old age—appear to substantiate what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 一些津巴布韦目击者在晚年鼓起勇气做出的证言进一步增加了这些文档的分量。目前看来，这些文件证实了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并被系统实施的大屠杀的主要策划者。 The documents appear to show that the massacres were closely associated with an effort by Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party to eliminate opposition groups in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s independence. Zapu, a party led by nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, represented the main obstacle to that objective. Given that Zapu enjoyed overwhelming support among Ndebele, the Ndebele as a whole came to be seen as an impediment. In the words of Mugabe, the people of Matabeleland needed to be “re-educated”. 这些文件似乎表明，大屠杀和穆加贝的政党——津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线（简称津民盟）——在国家独立后试图消灭反对派的努力紧密相连。津巴布韦非洲人民联盟（简称津人联）是由对手、民族主义者加西亚·恩科莫领导的政党，是津民盟达到该目标的主要障碍。津人联在恩德贝勒人中拥有压倒性优势，故而恩德贝勒人整体被视作一种障碍。按照穆加贝自己的话说，马塔贝莱兰当地人需要被“再教育”。 The little that Mugabe has said since the 1980s on this taboo subject has been a mixture of obfuscation and denial. The closest he has come to admitting any form of official responsibility was at the death of Nkomo (1999), when he remarked that the early 1980s was a “moment of madness”—an ambivalent statement that perhaps reflected a fear of Ngozi (avenging spirits) more than anything else and one he has not repeated. More recently, he blamed the killings on armed bandits who were allegedly coordinated by Zapu (the original smokescreen) along with occasional indiscipline among soldiers of the army’s North Korean-trained 5 Brigade. 自1980年代以来，穆加贝甚少谈及这个禁忌话题。他对此事的稀少评论，其实是混淆和否认的混合物。他最接近于承认官方对屠杀负有任何责任的一次，是在恩科莫1999年过世时。当时他评论说，八十年代早期是个“疯狂时刻”——这个暧昧的表述也许反映了他对怨灵复仇的恐惧甚于其他任何事，而且此后他也再未提过。后来，他将杀戮的责任归咎于据称由津人联负责协调的武装土匪（这是最早释放的迷雾），以及军队第五旅士兵偶发的违纪行为，该旅是朝鲜训练出来的。 In the documents, his alleged co-conspirators tell a different story. In doing so, they controvert theories that Mugabe was poorly informed about the activities of errant subordinates. By March 1983, when news of the atrocities had leaked, prompting Western ambassadors and others to ask awkward questions, government ministers who were overseeing the operation quickly pointed to Mugabe, documents allege. 在文档中，穆加贝所称的阴谋分子讲述了一个不同的故事。他们否定了有关穆加贝对下属违纪行为知之甚少的说法。文档称，到1983年3月，暴行的消息已经走漏，促使西方大使们和其他人问起令人尴尬的问题，监督行动的政府部长们很快指向穆加贝。 Sydney Sekeramayi, the minister in Mugabe’s office with responsibility for Defence, was one. In a conversation with Cephas Msipa, one of the few remaining Zapu ministers of what had been a government of national unity, Sekeramayi, said that “not only was Mugabe fully aware of what was going on—what the 5th Brigade was doing was under Mugabe’s explicit orders.” Msipa later relayed this discussion to the Australian High Commission, which in turn reported it to headquarters in Canberra. 悉尼·塞克拉马伊，穆加贝内阁负责防务的部长，是其中之一。矶法·姆西帕是早先的联合政府中仍在位的少数几个津人联部长之一，在一次与他的对话中，塞克拉马伊说穆加贝“不仅完全知道事件的状况——而且第五旅的所为乃是基于穆加贝的明确命令。”之后姆西帕把这次讨论发送给澳大利亚高级专员公署，后者随即向堪培拉总部做了报告。 Msipa appears to be a credible witness in view of his amicable relationship with Mugabe. He had, for instance, shared a room with Mugabe for two years during their earlier career as teachers. Msipa had also welcomed Mugabe into his home when the latter returned from Ghana in 1960 and joined the struggle against white rule. 从和穆加贝的友好关系来看，姆西帕似乎应是可信的证人。例如，在两人早年一起当教师时，他和穆加贝做过两年室友。1960年，穆加贝从加纳回国加入反对白人统治的斗争时，姆西帕也欢迎他住在自己家。 Between 1980 and 1982, when tensions were rising between Zapu and Zanu, Msipa had served as a regular go-between and had spoken to Mugabe often. He continued to do so during the killings. Within Zapu, Msipa, a Shona-speaker, had consistently advocated amalgamation with Zanu, a line that had attracted the ire of Ndebele-speaking colleagues. 在1980年到1982年间，当津人联和津民盟关系紧张时，姆西帕常常作为一位中间人，频繁的和穆加贝对话。他在屠杀期间也继续这么做。在津人联中，姆西帕作为说绍纳语的一位，一贯支持和津民盟的合并，这一立场曾引起了很多说恩德贝勒语的同事的愤怒。 He was, therefore, considerably more sympathetic to Zanu and its leader than most in Zapu. And yet, after speaking to Sekeramayi and others in Zanu, he was convinced (as he told the Australians) that “the Prime Minister was right behind what had been happening in Matabeleland.” He added that he had never before had such a “crisis of my conscience” about remaining in government. 所以相比于大多数津人联成员，他明显更加同情津民盟及其领导人。然而，在和塞克拉马伊和一些津民盟成员对话之后，他确信（正如他告诉澳大利亚方面的那样）“站在马塔贝莱兰事件后面的正是总理。”他补充道：对于留在政府内任职，他以前从未有过现在这样严重的“良心挣扎”。 Sekeramayi was more circumspect in direct discussions with Western representatives, but nevertheless made clear that the massacres were no accident. The “army had had to act ‘hard’”, he told the British defence attaché, “but … the situation was now under control”. Later, Sekeramayi admitted to the British High Commissioner that “there had been atrocities”. 塞克拉马伊在直接和西方社会代表讨论此事时说话更为谨慎，但他还是很清楚地表明，大屠杀不是意外事件。“军队不得不采取‘酷烈’行动”，他告诉英国武官，“但是……现在形势已经得到了控制”。后来，塞克拉马伊向英国高级专员公署承认“曾有暴行发生”。 The documents also record that Msipa talked to other members of Zanu who revealed that the killings were not simply the whim of a small coterie, but the result of a formal and broad-based decision by the leadership of Zanu-PF. Eddison Zvobgo, a member of Zanu’s 20-member policy-making body, spoke of a “decision of the Central Committee that there had to be a ‘massacre’ of Ndebeles”. That statement squared precisely with 5 Brigade’s ethnocentric modus operandi. 文档也记录了姆西帕和其他津民联成员的谈话，那些成员揭露出屠杀绝不是一个小团伙的心血来潮，而是出自津民联领导层正式且广泛认同的决定。艾迪森·祖沃布戈，津民盟的二十人决策层之一，提到了一份“中央委员会的决定：必须要有一场针对恩德贝勒人的‘屠杀’”。这一说法和第五旅种族中心主义的作案手法完全吻合。 Mugabe’s heir apparent, the current First Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was a member of the Central Committee. But so, too, were others who have subsequently developed a reputation for moderation, not least because of their latter-day rivalry with Mnangagwa. Former Vice President Joice Mujuru heads that list. 穆加贝的指定继承人，现任第一副总统的埃默森·姆南加古瓦曾是中央委员会的一员。当然，后来展现出温和形象的许多其他人当时也在中央委员会中，他们之所以变温和，相当程度是因为他们此后需要与姆南加古瓦竞争。前副总统乔伊斯·穆朱鲁在这份名单上居首位。 The army commanders who directed the killings, many of whom still retain key positions in a security sector that underwrites the regime, are also shown in the documents to have been eager accomplices. Zvobgo commented that the first commander of 5 Brigade, Perence Shiri, had said the “politicians should leave it to us” with regard to “settling things in Matabeleland”. 文件也曝光了指导屠杀的部队司令官是积极的从犯，其中不少人仍然在强力部门身居高位，维持着这个政权的统治。祖沃布戈提到第五旅的司令官佩伦斯·希里曾说过，对于“搞定在马塔贝莱兰的事情”，“政治家们应该交给我们去做”。 Shiri is now the head of Zimbabwe’s air force. 希里目前是津巴布韦的空军司令。 Testimony from witnesses provides evidence that Shiri worked closely with many former members of Mugabe’s guerilla army, Zanla, notwithstanding a myth that 5 Brigade operated separately from the rest of the army. Those who assisted Shiri allegedly included the now chief of Zimbabwe’s defence forces, Constantine Chiwenga, who was this month awarded a doctorate in ethics by the University of KwaZulu–Natal. 证人证言提供证据说明：希里曾和许多穆加贝游击部队——津巴布韦民族解放军——的前成员密切共事，尽管仍有传言说第五旅是脱离全军单独行动的。那些据称曾协助希里的人包括现任津巴布韦国防部长康斯坦丁·奇温加。他在这个月被夸祖鲁－纳塔尔大学授予了伦理学博士学位。 During the killings, Shiri frequently consulted with Chiwenga, who was then using the nom de guerre Dominic Chinenge and was head of 1 Brigade based in Bulawayo. Chiwenga’s unit also provided a range of practical assistance, including logistical support for 5 Brigade and a base from which Shiri’s men operated when they made punitive raids on Bulawayo’s townships. 在屠杀期间，希里经常向奇温加请教，后者那时化名多米尼克·奇内格，是驻扎在布拉瓦约的第一旅的旅长。奇温加的部队也提供了各种实际支持，包括对第五旅的后勤支持，以及在希里士兵向布拉瓦约的城镇发动惩戒性打击时，为其提供基地。 The first six weeks of 5 Brigade’s attacks were massive in their intensity, but the documentary record shows that an order was given to curtail this phase after news of the massacres began to leak to the outside world. However, the killing did not end, but was instead scaled back and conducted in a more covert manner. 在第五旅袭击的头六周，攻击的烈度极大。但文档记录显示，当大屠杀的消息开始往外界泄露时，上面有命令要求进行收缩。然而，屠杀并没有终止，只是缩小了规模，采取了更秘密的形式。 Estimates of the death toll are frequently put at 20,000, a figure first mooted by Nkomo when the campaign was still underway. But on-the-ground surveys have been piecemeal and vast areas of Matabeleland remain under-researched. Fear and the death of many witnesses provide further challenges. 通常的估计认为死者有约两万人，这个数字最早是恩科莫提出来的，当时屠杀还在进行中。然而现场调查一直是零星散乱的，而且马塔贝莱兰很大部分区域仍未被调查。人们的恐惧，加之很多目击者死亡，也增加了调查难度。 A forensically-accurate number will never be possible, yet it seems possible that the standard estimate is too conservative. Oral testimony from Zimbabweans who were in key government positions during the 1980s disinters a host of killings that were previously unknown. Cumulatively, this testimony suggests that the breadth of the violence and the extent of official involvement could have been significantly underestimated. 一个法医学标准的精确数字也许永远不可能得到，然而通常的估计可能太过保守。1980年代在津巴布韦政府重要岗位任职的一批人的口头证言揭示了许多以前不为人知的杀戮事件。总的来说，这证言暗示暴力的程度和官方牵涉的程度可能被显著低估了。 Observers have always wondered how much of this was known to Western governments—and what they did about it. It is clear from the documents that they knew a great deal, even if some of the detail remained obscure. It is also clear that the polite questions asked by diplomats were—along with courageous representations by churchmen and their allies in Zimbabwe—pivotal to the government’s decision to reduce the violence. 观察家一直好奇于对此事西方社会的政府已经知晓多少？他们对此又做了什么？文档显示，他们无疑知道很多，即使细节仍不清楚。文档也很清楚的表明，外交官有礼节的质询，和教会人士及其津巴布韦盟友们的勇敢发声，这些是政府决定收敛暴行的关键。 Up to that point, there was no indication that the brutal force of the massacres would be curtailed. Nevertheless, Western governments did little once the massacres were brought down to a lower, but still savage, intensity. Perhaps as a sign that Western censure had its limits, the campaign in Matabeleland North continued during the remainder of 1983; 5 Brigade was redeployed further south in 1984. 到那时为止，没有迹象表明当时大屠杀的野蛮暴力会终止。但是一旦大屠杀的烈度变低，即使其仍然残酷，西方社会的政府却没什么作为了。在1983年剩下的时间，北马塔贝莱兰省的战争一直在持续，这仿佛代表了西方抗议的局限性；第五旅在1984年被重新部署到更南部。 It is a fact that the Western response to violence toward black countrymen in the 1980s was a pale shadow of the reaction to his attack on white farmers in 2000. Many Ndebele remain bitter about this inconsistency. While historians debate the dimensions of Zanu’s violence, for Western policy-makers and the domestic constituencies that are meant to hold them to account there's a need to reflect again on the price of inconsistency in the developing world. Aside from the human cost, Western advocacy of democracy and international justice will continue to be viewed with skepticism while such glaring contradictions remain. 事实上，西方对2000年时穆加贝袭击白人农场主做出了强烈反应，与之相比，他们在1980年代针对黑人村民所遭受暴行的反应要小得多。许多恩德贝勒人仍对这种前后不一心怀怨愤。当历史学家争辩津民盟暴力的程度时，西方的政策制定者和想让他们承担责任的国内选民则需要再次反思这种在发展中国家采取双重标准的代价。如果这么显眼的自相矛盾继续存在，除了生命成本外，西方对民主和国际正义的支持也会继续被人怀疑。 At the same time, an inordinate focus on the international dimensions of the Matabeleland massacres is to miss the point. Mugabe has instinctively sought to racialise and internationalise internal controversies of which he is the principal author or to invoke the spectre of neo-colonialism in the hope of support from fellow African leaders. 同时，对马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的关注过多聚焦于国际视角，这没有切中要害。出于本能，穆加贝常把主要由他引起的国内争端国际化和种族化，或者试图召唤新殖民主义的幽灵，希望借此获得非洲领袖们的支持。 Zimbabwe’s Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko recently made the claim that the Matabeleland massacres were “conspiracy of the West” and that Mugabe had nothing to do with them. Yet the new documentary material appears to underline once more that post-independence Zimbabwe’s greatest crimes and deepest wounds lie squarely at the feet of Mugabe and Zanu-PF. 津巴布韦的第二副总统费列克佐拉·姆波科最近声明：马塔贝莱兰大屠杀是“西方的阴谋”，穆加贝和此事没有任何干系。然而新的文档材料似乎再次昭示穆加贝和津民盟－爱国阵线应该为津巴布韦独立后最大的罪行和最深的创伤负责。 The documents appear to show that the killings were an internal affair, neither provoked nor sustained by outsiders, and that the atrocities were driven from the top by Zanu-PF in pursuit of specific political objectives. 现在看来，文档揭示了屠杀是个内政事件，并非由外部力量发起或支持，而且是津民盟－爱国阵线的领袖为了达到特定政治目的而发动。 Viewed across a period of several years and hundreds of files, the documents appear to provide evidence that—far from being a “moment of madness” in which supporters of rival parties went at each other— the massacres were but one component of a sustained and strategic effort to remove all political opposition within five years of independence, as Zanu leaders were determined to secure a “victory” against non-existent opposition in elections scheduled for 1985, after which there would be a “mandate” from the people to impose a one-party state. 经几年时间把数百份文件放在一起审阅，文档似乎证明了大屠杀绝对不是所谓的对立政党支持者相互攻击的“疯狂时刻”。津民盟领袖决意要压制尚未出现的反对，确保在计划于1985年举行的大选中“取得胜利”，以便之后顺应“人民的选择”施行一党专制，因此，大屠杀只是独立后五年内消灭一切政治反对派的持续行为和战略努力中的一环。 Dr Stuart Doran is an independent historian and author of a forthcoming book based on the new documentary material—Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, Zanu and the quest for supremacy, 1960–87. 【作者】斯图加特·道朗博士是一位独立历史学家，基于新的文档材料，他所著的《国度，权柄，荣耀：穆加贝，津民盟和对权力巅峰的追求，1960-87》一书即将问世。 Photo: A file picture dated 25 March 2005 shows Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe gesturing during a ZANU-PF rally near the town of Mbaira south of Harare, Zimbabwe. EPA/STR 【图注】一份摄于2005年3月25日的档案照片显示，在哈拉雷以南的玛巴拉镇，津巴布韦总统罗伯特·穆加贝在津巴布韦非洲民族联盟－爱国阵线（ZANU-PF）的集会上振臂高呼。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组，致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

【2016-05-22】 @whigzhou: 大英帝国犯下的最大错误是让听任普鲁士统一德国，结果在一战时只好派自己的陆军上场，而不能像以前那样，只要花钱雇一批德国人打另一批德国人就行了。#后见之明 @whigzhou: 大英走的是弱共同体路线，这条路线有利于自由、繁荣和个人主义，以及为一个族群/文化高度混杂的社会建立普遍秩序，弱点是动员能力不足，难以像强共同体路线的德国那样建立庞大陆军，只能倚重于重资产轻人力的海军，拼钱不拼人头，靠金钱、外交和战略性封锁勉力维持平衡。 @whigzhou: 但这就要求他必须阻止欧洲后院出现任何过于强大的民族国家，强大到能够建立一支他无法扶持装备几个盟友即可轻易打败的陆军  

【2016-05-17】 @黄章晋ster 你很难说，猫主席发动史无前例时，到底是因为有运动群众的偏好，还是不得已才如此。我们也可以这样说，秦始皇当年不能像东德苏联一样把所有人都纳入专政机关的监督视线之内，不是他不想这么做，而是他没有足够的社会财富可以做到这一点。 °城市化率与清洗模式的选择 http://t.cn/RqDaFh2 @whigzhou: 另一组数字也值得注意，1911年时俄罗斯帝国人口1.67亿，扣掉波兰部分大概1.55亿，此后经历各种杀戮，和1932-33大饥荒，到1936年斯大林开始大清洗时，苏联人口仍不足1.6亿，对比猫国，1948-1966年间，人口约增长50%。 @Liittma是我:说明了什么？ @whigzhou: 说明那段时间苏联的马尔萨斯弹簧压的更低，因而剩余率更高，能够供养更庞大的专政机器 @whigzhou: 实际上，苏联的强行集体化和工业化过程，（无论是否故意）就是通过系统性的消灭部分农业人口，提高剩余率，从而供养更多非农人口，这方面猫国的力度远远不及 @whigzhou: 1932-33年的饥饿疗法直接消灭了乌克兰1/5的农民，在马尔萨斯极限边缘，农民主要是吃饭的嘴而不是创造余粮的工具 @黄章晋ster: 如果主席一直活到现在，中国的城市化率大概会跌到10%以下。 @whigzhou: 于是城市果真就被农村包围了～ @黄章晋ster:哈萨克斯坦和乌克兰官方的说法是，大饥荒消灭了他们近三分之一的人口。 @whigzhou: 嗯嗯，那可能还计入了几百万非直接饿死的受害者  

【2016-05-08】 @whigzhou: 现代邮政兴起之前，收信方付费是西欧私人通信中的普遍做法，有趣的是，这一惯例也是上流社会在他们和其他人之间建立无形屏障的一种手段，如果你不够有钱，就不敢混进他们的社交圈，因为连收信都收不起，在19世纪初的荷兰，一封信的收件费大约7stuivers（1[[stuiver]]=1/20盾），差不多是中下阶层一顿饭钱。 @whigzhou: 所以，若发信人预付了邮费，等于是在告诉收信人：我知道你没钱，所以替你把邮费付了。而假如收信人自认为是圈内peer，便会将此视为严重羞辱，所以当荷兰国家邮政最初推行邮票制度时，遭到很多人抵制。  

【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始，libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任，许多追随者也人云亦云，他们的用意很好，但说法是错的，实际上，即便西方世界中最自由的部分，（除了少数袖珍国之外）距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远，只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点：1）自由贸易，古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒，而关税始终很高，各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多，关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情，但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要，因为当时关税再高，和运费比还是很低，所以只要拆除壁垒，效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2）管制，随便翻翻经济史就知道，18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛，但给人的印象很不一样，我猜这是因为，早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行，而较少以行为管控的方式进行，大量限制法规，但较少执行官僚，所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见，究其因，当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3）19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少，但州政府和市政府管的可不少，看看产业史，哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的，那时候联邦政府站在自由一边，多数州政府站在另一边，联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒，由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了，铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场，州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了，只好偏向自由化，但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4）政府规模，从财政开支和雇员数量看，那时候的政府确实小得多，但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看，也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5）福利制度，这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点，那时候基本上没有福利制度，济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中，国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊，仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级，何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的，所以不要相信什么自由天国，也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  

【2016-04-22】 @whigzhou: 在阅读普通法的早期文献时，我常常为其（操作主义意义上的）精确性所折服，与其他系统中常见的（看不出操作性含义的）泛泛空洞之辞形成鲜明对照，这种精确性显然源自其司法程序的令状基础，每种令状对一项程序应如何执行有着明确指示，再往前追究，这一特性大概和诺曼君主的军事背景不无关系， @whigzhou: 和其他文书相比，军令应该是最讲究（操作意义上的）明确性的——你，和谁谁谁一起，带上这个那个，于某月某日几点前，到达某地。——读令状的感觉就像这样。史家也曾指出，在亨利二世之前，司法令状和其他令状并没有明确区别，依我看，他们都有着军令的背景。  

We know less about the ancient world than we think we do 我们对古代世界的认识，比我们以为的要少 作者：James Hannam @ 2015-1-9 译者：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy） 校对：Tankman 来源：Quodlibeta，http://bedejournal.blogspot.jp/2015/01/we-know-less-about-ancient-world-than.html On 15 June 763BC, a near total eclipse of the sun was visible over a swathe of the Near East. As luck would have it, the event was noted in the official list of Assyrian high officials. This record provides the earliest absolute and uncontroversial date in ancient history. Using lists of kings and the chronicles of events, historians have counted the years back from this date to construct the chronology of ancient history. 公元前763年的6月15日，在近东的大片地区都能看到一次近似日全食。幸运的是，这一事件被记录在了亚述国高官的官方系年表【译注：即名年官表，亚述以一年一任的“名年官”之姓名纪年，记录当年发生的重大事件】中。这一文献为我们提供了古代历史上最早的无争议的绝对日期。历史学家们利用历代国王名表和大事记，从这一日期开始倒排年代，已经构造出古代史的编年次序。 Radiocarbon analysis (which measures the decay of carbon 14, an unstable isotope) and the predicable styles of pottery found in digs both provide corroborating evidence. Dating the layers of archaeological remains from the artefacts found within them is called stratigraphy and can yield quite precise results. The vast amount of pot shards that has been unearthed allows archaeologists to use statistical methods to screen out random noise and anomalous samples that have found their way into the wrong strata. 放射性碳分析（该方法测量的是碳-14这种不稳定同位素的衰变）和出土陶器可确认的风格，均提供了佐证。从出土的人工制品来测定这些制品所在的考古遗迹各地层的年代，这叫做考古地层学，由此得出的结论相当准确。大量发掘出的陶器碎片，使得考古学家能够利用统计方法排除那些混入错误地层的随机噪声和异常样本。 Of course, pottery and radiocarbon methods need to be calibrated to produce absolute dates. This has been done using samples of wood whose age can be determined by matching patterns of tree rings, a technique called dendrochronology. We can count back sequences of tree rings from the present day, all the way to 2000BC. By carbon dating the oldest samples of wood, we can tie the tree ring record to the results from carbon 14 decay. 当然，陶器和放射性碳方法也需要经过校正，才能得出确切日期。我们现在通过木头样本来做校正，这些木头的年龄可以通过与树木样本的年轮模式进行对照来确定，这种技术叫做树轮年代学。我们现在可以从今天倒推树木年轮的序列，一直推到公元前2000年。通过对最早的木头样本进行碳年代测定，我们就可以将树木的年轮档案和碳-14的衰变结果结合起来。 By 1990, all these clues had yielded a multi-dimensional jigsaw which fitted together to almost everyone’s satisfaction. There were a few heretics like Peter James, who suggested in his book Centuries of Darkness that the conventional chronology included two hundred additional years around 1000BC. Thus remains that were conventionally dated to 1050BC actually occurred in 850BC. Although James’s book is an excellent read, it fails to convince. 到1990年为止，上述所有线索加起来构成了一个多维度的拼图，相互吻合，几乎能让所有人满意。当然也有一些异端，如Peter James曾在其著作《黑暗数世纪》中提出，传统的编年学在公元前1000年前后额外多出了200年。因此传统上定为公元前1050年的遗迹实际上产生于公元前850年。尽管James的书是一本优秀读物，但并不能让人信服。 Nonetheless, it has now turned out that the conventional chronology was not as secure as everybody else thought. While James was convinced ancient history was two centuries too long, new evidence has begun to pile up in the opposite direction: it now looks like the conventional chronology is up to 150 years too short. To put it another way, a cataclysm that everyone thought occurred in 1500BC actually happened before 1620BC. The event in question was the massive eruption of the island of Thera in the Aegean Sea. 尽管如此，现已发现，传统的编年学确实不如大家曾认为的那样可靠。James坚信古代史多出了200年，但新积累的证据却逐渐偏向另一个方向。如今看来，传统的编年学似乎短了多达150年。换句话说，过去人人都以为发生于公元前1500年的一次灾变实际发生于公元前1620年以前。这里所说的事件就是爱琴海锡拉岛的一次大规模火山爆发。 Conventional chronology dated the end of Minoan age in Crete to 1450BC. Archaeologists assumed that the Thera eruption (on the modern island of Santorini) and its resulting tsunami had destroyed the Minoan fleet leaving them vulnerable to raiders from the mainland. Certainly, the havoc wrought by the volcano can clearly be seen across the Eastern Mediterranean. When Thera exploded, it blasted 60 cubic kilometres of rock into the atmosphere which settled over Asia Minor. 传统编年学将克里特岛米诺斯文明的终结时间定在公元前1450年。考古学家猜测，锡拉岛的火山爆发（发生于今天的圣托里尼岛上）及其导致的海啸摧毁了米诺斯的舰队，使之难以抵挡来自大陆的入侵者。当然，由这次火山爆发导致的破坏在整个东地中海地区都清晰可见。锡拉爆发时，曾将60立方千米的岩石冲入空中，落在小亚细亚。 The resulting layer of ash and pumice is used to date the sites where it is observed. And the eruption had other effects. Sulphur dioxide released by the volcano spread across the northern hemisphere and fell to earth as acid rain, or more significantly as acid snow. At the poles, not all of that snow has yet melted and, from the 1990s, it provides a new strand of evidence to date the eruption. 由此产生的火山灰和浮石组成的地层，被用来确定地层中遗址的年代。这次火山爆发还有其他影响。火山中释放出来的二氧化硫席卷北半球，以酸雨或更厉害时以酸雪的形式降落地面。在极地地区，这些雪至今都还没有完全融化。从1990年代开始，这些降雪就为测定该次火山爆发的年代提供了一条新的证据链。 Ice cores, drilled from the icecap of central Greenland, record the depth of each annual snowfall. The ice holds within it information on the constitution of the atmosphere going back tens of thousands of years. Like tree rings, each layer can be counted so as to give an absolute rather than relative date. 从格陵兰岛中部的冰盖中钻孔取出的冰芯，记录着每年降雪的深度。这些冰中包含有过去数万年间大气成分的信息。跟年轮一样，每一层冰都可以数出来，因此能给出绝对年代，而非相对年代。 Big volcanic eruptions show up as spikes in the sulphur-content of the annual fall of snow: Krakatau in 1886; Tombura in 1815; Vesuvius in AD79. Despite the presence of literate civilisations in Egypt, the Levant and Babylon, no written record of the Thera eruption exists, but the ice cores should overcome that deficiency and provide an absolute date for the cataclysm. 大型火山爆发就表现为年度降雪中硫含量的突然增加。如1886年喀拉喀托火山爆发，1815年坦博拉火山爆发，以及公元79年维苏威火山爆发。尽管当时埃及、黎凡特和巴比伦都已产生能够书写文字的文明，但锡拉岛火山爆发并没有成文记录留存下来。不过，冰芯应该能够克服这一不足，为我们提供此次灾难的确切年代。 Actually, the fact that the Thera event went unrecorded is less surprising than it seems. Mankind has been remarkably unobservant of enormous volcanic eruptions. An event in 1257AD, less than 800 years ago, is indelibly imprinted into both the Greenland and Antarctic ice cores. It was greater in size even than Tombora and thus the largest eruption in the last ten thousand years. But remarkably, no one knows where it happened. Only in 2012 has Mt Rinjani in Indonesia emerged as a likely candidate. Another big eruption, as recent as 1809, remains unidentified. 实际上，锡拉事件没有留下成文记录并没有初看上去那么异常。人类对于大型火山爆发历来特别粗心。在不到800年前，公元1257年发生了一次火山爆发，确凿无疑地体现于格陵兰岛和南极的冰芯中。它在规模上甚至比坦博拉爆发还大，因此是过去一万年间最大的火山爆发。但是，引人注目地是，没人知道它发生于何地。直到2012年，印度尼西亚的林加尼火山才得以成为备选答案。另外一次大型火山爆发，晚至1809年，至今身份不明。 By 2000, the Greenland ice cores had revealed that Thera could not have happened when everyone thought it had. The most likely anomaly in the ice dated from 1640BC, but this turned out to be from a volcano in Alaska. At the same time, carbon dating an olive tree buried in the Aegean eruption yielded a date of around 1620BC. Sulphur traces in the ice have been found that correspond to this date, although they are not as strong as might be expected. 到2000年时，格陵兰岛的冰芯已经揭示，锡拉火山爆发不可能发生于此前人们所设想的年代。冰层中最有可能的一次异常发生于公元前1640年，但这源于阿拉斯加的一座火山。同时，通过对在此次爱琴海火山爆发中被掩埋的一颗橄榄树进行碳年代测定，得出的年代大概是公元前1620年。冰层中也发现了与这一年代吻合的硫磺痕迹，只是不如预期的那么强烈。 Now, the dendrochronologists have piled in. The Thera eruption would have caused unusually cold weather which stunted plant growth across the globe. Evidence from bristlecone pines in the western United States, oak trees in Ireland and Swedish pines all point to a cold snap in 1627BC. This is consistent with what we’d expect from a big volcano blowing its top in the Mediterranean. Evidence from the Antarctic ice cores should be in shortly, but for a northern hemisphere volcano, this is unlikely to be conclusive. 现在，树轮年代学家挤进来了。锡拉火山爆发应该会导致不同寻常的寒冷天气，从而会妨碍全球范围内树木的生长。美国西部的狐尾松、爱尔兰的橡树和瑞典的松树所提供的证据，都表明公元前1672年出现了一次突然的寒冷期。这与我们对地中海地区一次大型火山爆发的预期后果相吻合。来自南极地区冰芯的证据应该很快就会出现，但这对一场发生于北半球的火山爆发而言，恐怕并不具有结论性。 The lack of a definitive date for the Thera disaster is frustrating, but we can now be reasonably sure it occurred 120 years earlier than thought. The implications of this for ancient history are immense. The chronology of the New Kingdom of Egypt was thought to be rock solid. Finding that they need to find room for a dozen more decades has been too disconcerting for Egyptologists to tackle so far. There is a good chance that the extra years belong in a period after the well-documented New Kingdom called the Third Intermediate Period. 找不到锡拉岛灾难发生的确切年代，这令人沮丧。不过，我们现在可以合理地确信，它的发生，比原先所设想的要早120年。这对于古代史意义重大。埃及新王国时期的编年次序曾被认为如磐石一般确切。自从埃及学家发现他们需要找出空隙来摆放这多出来的100多年，就一直仓皇不安、无从下手。很有可能，多出来的这些岁月属于文献详实的新王国以后的一段时期，即“第三中间期”。 For historians of Babylonia, the crisis has been less existential. Absolute dates for the second half of the second millennium are based on ancient observations of the planet Venus. We know from modern calculations that a particular configuration of Venus recorded during the eighth year of the reign of a certain King Ammisaduqa must have occurred in 1702BC, 1646BC, 1582BC or 1550BC. 对于研究巴比伦王国的历史学家而言，危机尚没有那么严重。（公元前）第二个千年下半叶的确切年代，是根据古代对金星的观测记录推出来的。基于现代的推算，我们知道，文献记载中某个叫做Ammisaduqa的国王治下第8年出现的某种特定的金星形态，必定发生于以下年代之一：公元前1702年，前1646年，前1582年或前1550年。 Other events in Babylonian history, such as the reign of King Hammurabi (famous for his law code) and the sack of Babylon by the Hittites are arranged around whichever absolute date is most convenient. That some of these possible Venusian dates differ by 120 years, about the same length of time that the Thera eruption has been moved back, is highly suggestive to say the least. 巴比伦历史上的其他事件，如汉谟拉比国王（以其法典而闻名）的统治和赫梯人对巴比伦的洗劫，均参照上述确切年份中最合用的那个来排列。上述几个备选的金星日期中存在相隔120年的情况，大体上与锡拉火山爆发时间被推后的时长间隔相等，这至少可说是非常意味深长。 So, where does all this leave biblical chronology? That remains very unclear. But the redating of Thera shows that we know a lot less about when things happened in the ancient world than we thought we did. 于是，所有这些对圣经编年学而言意味着什么？这一点尚不清楚。但对锡拉火山爆发的重新追溯表明，对于古代世界中的事情何时发生，我们的认识比自认为的，要少得多。 （编辑：辉格@whigzhou） *注：本译文未经原作者授权，本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利，如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容，请私信联系，我们会立即作出响应。

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