含有〈劳动〉标签的文章(12)

批量改造

【2016-06-07】

@熊也餐厅 服务生和理发师为什么要在大街上做军事化训练要打客人吗~

@whigzhou: 短时间成批量改造行为习惯(诸如用袖子擦鼻涕,死盯着客人看,间歇性怪叫,甩着抹布跳霹雳舞)的低成本简易方法,这事情跟你的雇工来源有关系,大学生虽然工资不高,但通常不愿去海底捞打工。

@whigzhou: 理由跟在贫困地区开工厂不能为工人提供自助午餐类似,要不然下午都撑得没法干活了

@whigzhou: 职业伦理和工业文化的形成是个漫长(more...)

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7202
【2016-06-07】 @熊也餐厅 服务生和理发师为什么要在大街上做军事化训练要打客人吗~ @whigzhou: 短时间成批量改造行为习惯(诸如用袖子擦鼻涕,死盯着客人看,间歇性怪叫,甩着抹布跳霹雳舞)的低成本简易方法,这事情跟你的雇工来源有关系,大学生虽然工资不高,但通常不愿去海底捞打工。 @whigzhou: 理由跟在贫困地区开工厂不能为工人提供自助午餐类似,要不然下午都撑得没法干活了 @whigzhou: 职业伦理和工业文化的形成是个漫长的过程,这一点从发薪周期的演变也可看出:最早是日薪,然后周薪、月薪、年薪,在成熟工业社会,这一驯化过程由社会(通过强大的文化压力)完成,而在过渡型社会,只能由雇主自己动手 @长空博云: 服从性训练 在大街上干这个也把那些不适合的都给剔除了 这两个行业自尊心太强没法干 你说的这些个东西是上上个世纪的事儿了 @whigzhou: 上上世纪?都是我耳熟能详的事情,我有这么老吗?  
[译文]小人物眼中的最低工资法

Seattle’s Coming $15 Minimum Wage
西雅图即将实施15美元最低工资标准

作者:Clinton Alexander @ 2015-10-28
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:The New American,www.thenewamerican.com/economy/economics/item/21844-seattles-coming-15-minimum-wage

In the city of Seattle, Washington, Joe Salvatore runs The Recycling Depot, a recycling business employing about 20 people. Not far away, Bobby Denovski is eking out a living at Padrino’s Pizza and Pasta with a handful of employees, and Remo Borracchini is busy running an Italian Bakery. The story is the same across Washington State and across the nation: Businesses are fighting every day to service customers, treat employees well, and simply stay open.

Joe Salvatore在华盛顿州西雅图市经营一家叫做“回收站”的回收企业,雇佣了大约20人。不远处,Bobby Denovski正惨淡经营着“帕记披萨和意粉”店,雇有少量员工。而Remo Borracchini则在为经营一家名为“意大利烘焙”的小店而上下奔波。这种故事在华盛顿州和整个美国都很普遍:为了服务顾客、善待雇员以及仅仅是保持开业,企业每天都在奋斗。

Unfortunately in the city of Seattle, it is about to get much more difficult for business owners to continue the fight. Pushed forward primarily by socialist city councilwoman Kshama Sawant, the first phase of a new minimum wage law went into effect on April 1, 2015, and the law will eventually bring all businesses to a $15 minimum wage, more than double the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour.

不幸地是,在西雅图市,企业主想要继续奋斗下去,将来会变得更加艰难。主要由信奉社会主义的女市议员Kshama Sawant推动的新最低工资法已于2015年4月1日进入第一阶段的实施,并最终将对所有企业实行15美元最低工资标准,相当于将目前时薪7.25美元的联邦最低工资翻了一倍以上。

The law is a graduated system with different pay scales and timelines for businesses above and below 500 employees. For businesses with 501 employees or more, the April 1, 2015 minimum wage was set a(more...)

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7090
Seattle’s Coming $15 Minimum Wage 西雅图即将实施15美元最低工资标准 作者:Clinton Alexander @ 2015-10-28 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:The New American,www.thenewamerican.com/economy/economics/item/21844-seattles-coming-15-minimum-wage In the city of Seattle, Washington, Joe Salvatore runs The Recycling Depot, a recycling business employing about 20 people. Not far away, Bobby Denovski is eking out a living at Padrino’s Pizza and Pasta with a handful of employees, and Remo Borracchini is busy running an Italian Bakery. The story is the same across Washington State and across the nation: Businesses are fighting every day to service customers, treat employees well, and simply stay open. Joe Salvatore在华盛顿州西雅图市经营一家叫做“回收站”的回收企业,雇佣了大约20人。不远处,Bobby Denovski正惨淡经营着“帕记披萨和意粉”店,雇有少量员工。而Remo Borracchini则在为经营一家名为“意大利烘焙”的小店而上下奔波。这种故事在华盛顿州和整个美国都很普遍:为了服务顾客、善待雇员以及仅仅是保持开业,企业每天都在奋斗。 Unfortunately in the city of Seattle, it is about to get much more difficult for business owners to continue the fight. Pushed forward primarily by socialist city councilwoman Kshama Sawant, the first phase of a new minimum wage law went into effect on April 1, 2015, and the law will eventually bring all businesses to a $15 minimum wage, more than double the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. 不幸地是,在西雅图市,企业主想要继续奋斗下去,将来会变得更加艰难。主要由信奉社会主义的女市议员Kshama Sawant推动的新最低工资法已于2015年4月1日进入第一阶段的实施,并最终将对所有企业实行15美元最低工资标准,相当于将目前时薪7.25美元的联邦最低工资翻了一倍以上。 The law is a graduated system with different pay scales and timelines for businesses above and below 500 employees. For businesses with 501 employees or more, the April 1, 2015 minimum wage was set at $11 an hour. For the next two years, on January 1 of each year, the wage increases, rising from the current $11 per hour to $13, reaching $15 an hour on January 1, 2018. 新法建立的是一个分级制度,对于雇员超过和低于(及等于)500人的企业分别设立了不同的工资标准和时间表。对于雇有501或更多雇员的企业,2015年4月1日开始最低工资是时薪11美元。在接下来的两年内,每年1月1日提一次工资,从现在的时薪11美元提到13美元,到2018年1月1日实现时薪15美元。 For companies paying at least $1.50 per hour toward a silver level medical benefits plan, the minimum wage goes to $12.50 on January 1 of 2016, then $13.50 in 2017, and finally $15 an hour in January of 2018. As stated on Seattle’s website seattle.gov, “Once Seattle’s minimum wage reaches $15.00/hour, payments toward medical benefits no longer impact employees’ minimum wage.” 如果企业每小时至少帮员工支付1.5美元给白银级医疗福利计划,那么它们的最低工资从2016年1月1日开始将是12.5美元,2017年是13.5美元,最终到2018年1月达到15美元。西雅图市的网站seattle.gov上称:“一旦西雅图的最低工资达到15美元每小时,那么医疗福利付费就不会再影响雇员的最低工资标准。” On April 1, 2015, small-business wages were set at $11 an hour as well. For companies at or below the 500-employee mark, the $15 minimum wage is set to be phased in over the course of the next decade. Again, counting medical benefits and other factors such as tips, the total compensation varies. By the year 2021, the minimum wage will be $15 with tips and health insurance factored in, and in 2025, small businesses must meet the $15 minimum wage without credit for tips or insurance. 2015年4月1日起,小企业的工资也被设定为时薪11美元。对于雇员数量在500名或更少的公司,最低工资标准将在接下来的10年内逐步施行。同样,把医疗福利和其他因素如小费算在内,总工资也会不同。到2021年,把小费和健康保险算在内,最低工资将是15美元,而到2025年,小企业必须符合刨除小费或保险后15美元的最低工资标准。 President Obama has repeatedly urged Congress to raise the federal minimum wage from $7.25 an hour to $10.10 an hour. For this reason it would behoove those across the nation to pay special attention to the city of Seattle. Seattle is tucked away in the northwestern corner of the nation; however, as the city squeezes its businesses for more and more money, it may become ground zero for the minimum wage fight. 奥巴马总统已经反复敦促国会将联邦最低工资从时薪7.25美元提升至时薪10.10美元。因此之故,全美理应特别关注西雅图市。西雅图深藏于美国的西北角落,不过,随着这座城市从其企业身上不断榨取越来越多的钱财,它可能成为最低工资之战的引爆点。 Reasons for the Law 立法理由 Since being first enacted in 1928, the idea of a “minimum wage” has been sold as a law that will benefit the poorest sectors of our society. According to Cornell Law School, “The minimum wage was designed to create a minimum standard of living to protect the health and well-being of employees.” 自1928年首次创设为法律以来,“最低工资”概念就被作为一种有利于社会中贫困群体的法律向大众兜售。根据康奈尔大学法学院的说法,“设计最低工资是为了制定一种最低生活水平,以保障雇员的健康和福利。” Likewise, from the city of Seattle’s own website we find, “Citywide minimum wage laws offer local governments a powerful tool for helping low-income workers and families in their communities. Such measures also have significant impact on businesses and how they operate.” Minimum wage advocates have held that it is possible to set a minimum pay scale and have no ill effect on jobs. 同样,我们也能从西雅图市自己的网站上看到,“全市范围内的最低工资法,能给地方政府提供一种强大工具,以帮助各自社区中的低收入工人和家庭。这种措施也将对企业及其运营方式产生巨大影响。”最低工资的鼓吹者历来相信,设定一种最低工资标准而不对就业产生任何不良影响是可能的。 Operating under the assumption that simply raising the minimum wage will guarantee said wage, the people pushing for the $15 minimum wage claim that it has the power to lift the poor to that “new standard of living.” Is this true? Will it indeed lift the needy in our communities to another level, or is it a false assumption, one that will cause irreparable damage to business and industry? 依着“简单地将最低工资标准提升一下就能实现这一工资收入”的假定行事,那些争取15美元最低工资的人就此宣称,这一标准有能力将穷人提升到“新的生活水平”。这是真的吗?它真的能将我们社区中的贫困人口提升一个水平?还是说这是个错误的假设,将会对企业和实业造成不可弥补的伤害? Asking the Businesses 问问企业 Several business owners in Seattle were kind enough to give their own opinions of Seattle’s minimum wage law and explain how it will have a negative impact not only on their businesses, but on those people it was designed to help. 承蒙西雅图一些企业主的好意,向我们表达了他们对西雅图最低工资法的个人看法,并解释了它会如何产生负面影响,而这种负面影响不仅仅会作用于他们自己的企业,而且会作用于立法本来意图帮助的那些人。 Walter McLaughlin has been in Small Business Administration (SBA) lending for 27 years. He won the Washington State Financial Services Champion award in 2005. Concerning the minimum wage law in Seattle, McLaughlin said in an e-mail statement: Walter McLaughlin已在“小企业管理局”(SBA)借贷项目工作了27年。他于2005年获得了“华盛顿州金融服务冠军”的称号。关于西雅图的最低工资法,McLaughlin在一份电邮声明中说:
In economics, there is a principal called “zero sum gain” in which an increase is offset by a loss of equal amount. When a small business (and per the SBA’s size standards, over 99% of U.S. companies qualify as small) sees its operating costs increase, it has three options: 1) absorb the cost, 2) raise prices or 3) lower expenses. Since businesses don’t operate with the intention of losing money, the irony of a drastic increase in the minimum wage is that in order for employers to adjust, the net effect may be higher inflation and unemployment, disproportionately hurting the very same group the $15 minimum wage was intended to help. 在经济学中,有个原理叫做‘零和受益’,其中增加值被等量的损失所抵消。如果一家小企业(按照SBA的规模标准,美国超过99%的公司算小企业)的运营成本上升,它就面临三个选项:1)承担这一成本,2)提高价格,或者3)降低开支。由于企业运营的目的并不是为了损失金钱,所以最低工资急剧提升的反讽在于,雇主为了实现调整,最终净效果可能是通胀升高及失业率升高,这对于15美元最低工资标准意图帮助的那个群体损害相对更大。
McLaughlin lays out three ways in which the new Seattle minimum wage law will play out as it’s implemented: a loss to the business owner (absorb the cost), a cost to the general public (raise prices), or a reduction in expenses (possible job loss). McLaughlin提出了西雅图最低工资新法实施之后最终将走向的三种路径:企业主出现损失(承担成本),一般公众的损失(提高价格),或者削减开支(可能出现工作岗位流失)。 A Loss to the Business Owner 企业主出现损失 For those people who have never run a business, the absorption of the additional cost may seem to be the easiest and most straightforward solution to the requirement to pay employees more. But contrary to what those who have never had the experience of sitting down with a company’s balance sheets might think, all business owners are not jet-setting CEOs with profits just flowing in. 对于从未经营过任何企业的人来说,为了达到支付雇员更高工资的要求,由企业承担额外成本似乎是最简单、最直接的解决办法。但与这些从未看过任何一个公司财务收支表的人所想的相反,并非所有企业主都是乘坐直升机的CEO,利润滚滚而来。 At The Recycling Depot, general manager Joe Salvatore stated, “What these people don’t take into consideration is that when you raise the wage, you’re raising the Labor and Industries Insurance cost because that amount is affected by the wages. I have already talked to several small businesses in the area and there’s not a single one who is making tons and tons of money where they’re just going to be able to absorb these costs.” “回收站”的总经理Joe Salvatore说,“这些人没有考虑到,如果提高工资,你还会提高劳动和工业保险成本,因为后者会受工资影响。我已经和本地区的数家小企业谈过,没有一家是在成吨成吨地赚钱,没有一家能够直接承担这些成本。” In other words, while the absorption of minor costs may be a normal and constant part of running a business, the bottom line is a major factor. At Padrino’s Pizza and Pasta, Bobby Denovski echoed Salvatore’s sentiment: “We aren’t a large company with huge profits. As a small business the cost of labor is one of the main factors. Fifteen dollars an hour, that’s a lot of money to ask from a small business.” 换句话说,尽管运营一家企业时,承受并消化小量的成本可能是个司空见惯、总在发生的事,但盈亏底线是个主要的因素。“帕记披萨和意粉”店的Bobby Denovski呼应了Salvatore的观点:“我们不是那种利润巨大的大公司。对于小企业来说,主要因素之一就是劳工成本。15美元一小时,这种要价对于小企业来说可是一大笔钱。” When asked what effect he could foresee the escalating minimum wage law having on his business, Denovski commented, “It could put us all out looking for jobs. We have a couple more years paying on the loan for our restaurant. If we end up paying this $15 an hour, we are honestly in danger of losing it.” 当被问及不断升级的最低工资法将来会对其生意产生何种影响时,Denovski评论说,“我们可能都会被迫出去找工作了。我们的餐馆还有几年贷款需要还。如果最终我们需要支付15美元的时薪,我们真的可能会失去餐馆。” Likewise, The Recycling Depot, as a metals recycling business, is subject to sometimes-dramatic market fluctuations. Metal values can skyrocket, allowing ample room to treat employees well, and values can plummet, leaving the business struggling to survive. Said Salvatore of the times when the market is up, “We do take care of our employees during those times. We give bonuses and things like that. However what about the lean times? This is going to have a dramatic effect on us during the lean times. You can’t just start taking the pay away.” 同样,从事金属回收生意的“回收站”也承受着市场波动,时不时还非常剧烈。金属价格可能飙升,此时企业就有足够的空间来更好对待员工,但价格也可能跳水,那样企业就只能竭力求生。谈及市场向好的时候,Salvatore说,“那种时候我们确实会照顾自己的员工。我们提供奖金等类似东西。但生意差的时候呢?在生意差的时候,这会给我们造成巨大的影响。减少支出都来不及。” A Cost to the General Public 一般公众的损失 If costs cannot be simply absorbed by the company, another option is to raise the price of the product. Bobby Denovski stated, “The only thing I can do is to raise the prices. I worry that the demand for pizza in the community will not support the prices we will have to go to when the wages go up.” How much is a pizza worth to those in his community? How about a gallon of milk? Those claiming the minimum wage will have no ill effect on the community should be asking themselves these questions, because at some point most small business owners such as Denovski must find a way to recoup these costs. 如果成本不能简单地由企业承担,还有一个选项就是提高产品价格。Bobby Denovski称,“我唯一能做就是提高价格。如果工资上涨,我们就必须抬高价位,我担心我所在社区的披萨需求不足以支持我们的这种要价。”在他的社区,一份披萨应该要价多少?一加仑牛奶呢?那些声称最低工资不会对社区产生不良影响的人应当问问自己这些问题,因为到了某个时候,绝大多数小企业主,如Denovski一样,都会想办法转移这些成本。 Referring again to fluctuating values in the metals market, Salvatore stated, “We’re very dependent on the global prices of metals. When the metal values drop, we’re making less money and our margins shrink. During times like this there are a lot of businesses just trying to stay afloat.” And so he is forced to try to pass on the costs in another manner. Salvatore再一次谈及金属市场的波动价格:“我们对全球金属价格有很大的依赖。金属价格下跌时,我们赚的钱就减少,利润收缩。碰到这种时候,大量的企业只是谋求维持下去。”所以他将被迫以另一种方式把成本传递出去。 As a metals recycling business, The Recycling Depot purchases metals from other businesses and from the general public, then sells those metals based on current market prices. Because Salvatore has no control over the sale price (dictated by global supply and demand), the only thing he can do is to drop the prices he is paying the public for those metals, illustrating the second point (a cost to the public) in another light. 从事金属回收行业的“回收站”从别的企业及一般公众手里收购金属,然后依照当前市场价格将这些金属卖出。由于Salvatore没有办法控制销售价格(它由全球供给和全球需求决定),他唯一能做的就是压低他支付给公众的金属收购价格,这从另一个方面说明了我们提出的第二点(公众的损失)。 Lower Expenses 降低开支 Absent the ability to absorb the higher wages or pass on the costs to someone else, a third way to compensate is to lower expenses. On the surface this sounds harmless enough. However, it often means the disappearance of jobs. 要是没有能力承担更高的工资或将成本传递给其他人,那么还有第三种弥补办法,那就是降低开支。表面看来这种做法相当无害。但是,它通常意味着工作岗位消失。 At Borracchini’s Bakery in Seattle, a business that has been open for 94 years, Remo Borracchini has a long history of hiring youth. “I myself have probably hired 1,500 young people over the years. I have had people come here as teenagers and stay here as much as 25 years, so they came and learned a trade,” said Borracchini. 西雅图的“博记烘焙”是一家已经开业94年的企业,店主Remo Borracchini 历来喜欢雇佣年轻人。“多年以来,我本人可能雇佣了1500个年轻人。我手下有些人,来的时候还是个少年,然后就在这工作了25年。他们来我这里,学会了一门生意”,Borrachini这样说道。 He has brought in high-school students who have never worked a job and started them washing pots and pans, stocking shelves, and mopping floors. While the wages many of these new hires make is not a large sum, Borracchini sees a bigger picture: 他曾招过一些从未干过任何工作的高中生,让他们从刷盘子洗碗、装货架、拖地开始干起。尽管这些新进员工所赚取的工资并不多,Borracchini看到的却是一幅更大的图景:
It’s not that we’re just looking for cheap labor. It’s the understanding that you’re doing something for these young people other than sending them out to wander aimlessly through the neighborhoods. You see, I do believe we have a responsibility to our young people. There used to be internships throughout industry. Now that has changed. 并不是说我们只是为了找些廉价劳工。我们的理解是,你是在帮这些年轻人做点什么事,没有让他们在社区中没头没脑地游窜。跟你说,我确实相信我们对年轻人负有责任。过去,各行各业都有实习。现在事情发生了变化。 They used to go into places like print shops, or bakeries and come to begin learning a trade; that was their reimbursement, they were learning something that would benefit them throughout their life. Now they’ve passed a law saying they have to be paid a wage. So what happens? If you’re going to have to pay someone who doesn’t know anything, you might as well pay someone who already knows something. 过去,他们要去文印店或面包店等类似地方,开始学习一门行当;那相当于他们的回报,他们是在学习某种将会受益终身的东西。现在有人制定一条法律,说是必须给他们支付工资。那会发生什么呢?如果有人啥都不懂,你也必须要支付他工资,那你还不如向那些懂点什么的人支付工资。
Continued Borracchini, Borracchini继续说,
Businesses like McDonald’s, they built their empire not on a philosophy of it being a high paying job, but to take kids who have never worked before, teach them a little bit about work ethic and how to perform, and they move on to better opportunities when they have shown they have a bit of ability. You’ll begin to see the order screens in every type of McDonald’s scenario. Look at the jobs they’re eliminating right there. Kids who would be learning to show up for work on time, learning how to interact with the public, how to have a bit of work ethic. 像麦当劳这种企业帝国,它的建基哲学并不是它之作为一种高薪职位,而是它招募此前从未工作过的人,教给他们一点工作伦理和如何履职,然后当他们表现出具备一定能力时,就能前进一步,迈向更好的机会。以后你会看到各式各样的麦当劳式情景,大家都开始用点菜屏。看看他们正在消灭的工作。孩子们本来可以学会按时上班,学会如何与公众打交道,如何具备一点工作伦理。
Salvatore echoed Borracchini, stating that in order to recoup labor costs, jobs would almost certainly be cut, “at least cutting hours back if not completely doing away with jobs. The well is not bottomless.” Salvatore呼应了Borrachini,并说,为了弥补劳工成本,工作岗位几乎肯定会被削减,“如果不是彻底废除岗位,至少需要减少雇佣时长。井中的水毕竟是有限的。” At Padrino’s, a clearly concerned Denovski stated, “Right now it’s [the minimum wage] at $11 an hour and it is already difficult for me and my partner to keep the bills paid and the employees paid. They’re going to be raising that expense up to $15, but none of our other costs will be going down. I honestly don’t know what we’re going to do.” “帕记”的Denovski明显很是担心,他说,“现在的最低工资是时薪11美元,而我和我的合伙人已经感到难以偿付账单、支付员工工资。他们还要将这一开支提高到15美元,而我们的其他成本都不会降低。我真的不知道我们有什么办法。” Salvatore then commented on a worst-case scenario, “Eventually we have to tighten the ropes, and then what happens when there’s nothing left in the reserve?” Indeed, what does happen? What happens to the low-skill workers looking for a job? Where will the teenager or young adult go for training when McDonald’s has automated order screens? As Borracchini said, “It is the internship and low-skill jobs which will be cut. We will have sent them back out onto the street.” 然后,Salvatore就最坏的情形作了评论,“最终我们必须拉紧裤腰带,如果没有剩下任何储备,那会发生什么呢?”确实,会发生什么呢?对于那些找工作的低技术工人,会发生什么呢?当麦当劳开始用自动点菜屏时,少年或刚刚成年的人们要去哪里接受训练?正如Borracchini所说,“被削减的会是那些实习岗位和低技术岗位。我们将不得不把他们送回街上。” Help or Harm? 帮助还是伤害? Seattle businesses obviously view the new minimum wage law with quite a bit of trepidation. It is easy to see why. These companies will have to find a way to recuperate the costs one way or another. No matter how it ends up happening, it will be a detriment to the community and the city. 西雅图的企业显然正以相当程度的恐惧看待最低工资新法。很容易发现原因所在。这些公司都必须寻找各种办法来弥补成本。不管最终会发生什么,它对于社区和整个城市都是一种损害。 In “The Tax & Budget Bulletin” by The Cato Institute dated March 2014, Joseph J. Sabia, associate professor of economics at San Diego State University, explains how a minimum wage affects the poor’s standard of living and employment opportunities: 在加图研究所2014年3月的“税收与预算简报”中,圣迭戈州立大学的经济学副教授Joseph J. Sabia就最低工资会如何影响穷人的生活水平和就业机会作出了解释:
The bulletin concludes that minimum wage increases almost always fail to meet proponents’ policy objectives and often hurt precisely the vulnerable populations that advocates wish to help. The weight of the science suggests that policymakers should abandon higher minimum wages as an antiquated anti-poverty tool. Minimum wages deter employment and are poorly targeted to those in need. 简报的结论是,提高最低工资几乎总是不能实现其支持者的政策目标,而且通常都会恰好伤害到鼓吹者们想要帮助的脆弱群体。科学表明,决策者们应当放弃提高最低工资这种早已过时的反贫困工具。最低工资伤害就业,而且对于身处困境的人们来说真是南辕北辙。
His words echo the business owners quoted here. Says Borracchini, “I can sympathize with someone who is trying to raise a family. Fifteen dollars is not a lot of money. It’s very difficult. However, there is an element of society who through laws like this are being denied a great privilege. The opportunity to learn how to work.” 他的言论正与我们此处所引企业主的言论互相呼应。Borracchini说,“有人要努力养活一家人,这我能够同情。15美元并不是很大一笔钱。世事艰难。但是,通过这种法律,社会中有一部分人将无法享有一项重要的权利。那就是学会如何工作的机会。” The bottom line is that the minimum wage law was supposedly created to help the poor and needy in our society. However, it is the low-skill and poor who will feel the effect first and foremost, and who will find it much more difficult to acquire the job skills needed to raise the value of their labor to or above the minimum wage. 这里的底线是,最低工资法的创设,本意是为了帮助我们社会中的穷人和急需帮助的人群。但是,首当其冲感受到其影响的就是低技术人口和贫困人口,他们将发现,要将自己的劳动价值提高到或超过最低工资,就必须获得工作技能,而这将变得比以前更难。 As voices cry ever louder for an increased federal minimum wage, the stories of small businesses across the nation need to be brought into the spotlight — businesses reaching out to unskilled youth willing to put in time training. Companies managing a tight bottom line can’t handle the extra expense of yet another increase in wages. 随着提高联邦最低工资的呼声与日俱增,有必要将全美小企业的故事带到台前——这些企业都在向那些技能不足但愿意花时间接受训练的年轻人敞开双臂。盈亏底线很紧张的公司没有办法应对未来工资再次上涨所带来的额外开支。 The heart of our nation does not lie within the halls of Congress but rather in the bakeries, pizza shops, recycling centers, and myriad other small businesses. It is not in the backroom deals between politicians where the effects of these laws will be felt, but rather in the checking accounts of struggling businesses. 我们民族的心脏并不位于国会的办公大楼里,而是位于各家烘焙店、披萨店、回收中心以及种种其他小企业中。要感受到这些法律的效果,不是去看政客之间的暗箱交易,而需要去看艰难度日的各家企业的存款账户。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]劳动报酬正在萎缩吗?

“小小奇迹”不再:美国劳动收入占比下降
A Bit of a Miracle No More:The Decline of the Labor Share

作者:Roc Armenter @ 2015-三季刊
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:Business Review,https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2015/q3/brq315_a_bit_of_a_miracle_no_more.pdf

How is income divided between labor and capital? Every dollar of income earned by U.S. households can be classified as either labor earnings — wages and other forms of compensation — or capital earnings — interest or dividend payments and rent. The split between labor and capital income informs economists’ thinking on several topics and plays a key role in debates regarding income inequality and long-run economic growth. Unfortunately, distinguishing between labor and capital income is not always an easy task.

收入是如何在劳动和资本之间分配的?美国家庭所赚取的每一块钱都可以被归类为劳动收入(工资或其它形式的劳动补偿)或资本收益(利息、股利和租金等)。收入在劳动和资本之间的分配为经济学家们关于许多经济学议题的思考提供了重要信息,并且在关于收入不平等和长期经济增长这些问题的争论中扮演着核心角色。不幸的是,将劳动收入与资本收入区分开并非总是一件易事。

Until recently, the division between labor and capital income had not received much attention. The reason was quite simple: Labor’s share never ventured far from 62 percent of total U.S. income for almost 50 years — through expansions, recessions, high and low inflation, and the long transition from an economy primarily based on manufacturing to one mainly centered on services.

一直以来,区分劳动收入和资本收入的问题并没有受到太大关注,直到最近才有所改观。原因很简单:在将近50年中,美国劳动收入在总收入中所占的比例从来不会偏离62%这个数字太远——不论经济是在扩张还是衰退,也不论通胀率是高是低,在美国经济从以制造业为基础向主要以服务业为核心的漫长转变过程中,这个比例一直很稳定。

As it happened, the overall labor share remained stable as large forces pulling it in opposite directions canceled each other out — a coincidence that John Maynard Keynes famously called “a bit of a miracle.” But the new millennium marked a turning point: Labor’s share began a pronounced fall that continues today.

劳动收入占比在多种强大力量的反向拉扯和相互抵消之下总体保持了稳定这件事情本身——按照约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的著名说法——可以称得上是个“小小奇迹”。但是新千年的到来却标志着一个重要的转折点:劳动收入占比开始明显下降,并且这个趋势一直持续到了现在。

Why did the labor share lose its “miraculous” stability and embark on a steep decline? To investigate this shift, economists must first be sure they are measuring the labor share correctly. Could measurement problems distort our understanding of what has happened to the labor share over time?

为什么劳动收入占比会失去它“奇迹般”的稳定性而开始急剧下降?要研究这一转变,经济学家们的首要任务是确保他们测量劳动收入占比的方法是准确的。测量方法存在问题会歪曲我们对于长期以来劳动收入占比所发生的变化的理解吗?

In this article, I explain the inherent challenges in measuring the labor share and introduce several alternative definitions designed to address some of the measurement problems. As we will see, the overall trend is confirmed across a wide range of definitions.

在这篇文章中,我将解释在测量劳动收入占比时所面临的内在挑战,并介绍几种旨在解决其中一些测量问题的替代性定义。正如我们将看到的,基于一系列不同定义的测量结果都证实了劳动收入占比总体上的下降趋势。

Economists do not yet have a full understanding of the causes behind the labor share’s decline. We can make some progress, though, by noting the impact of wage and productivity trends and shifts between industries. Finally, I discuss several popular hypotheses, based on concurrent phenomena, such as widening wage inequality and globalization, that may account for the labor share’s sharp decline.

经济学家们至今还未能全面地理解劳动收入占比下降背后的原因。即便如此,通过研究工资和生产率的变化趋势以及产业的变迁,我们仍然可以取得一些进展。最后,我将讨论一些流行的假设。这些基于诸如薪资不平等程度加深以及全球化等并发现象的假设也许能解释劳动收入占比的急剧下降。

MEASURING THE U.S. LABOR SHARE
测量美国的劳动收入占比

By construction, all income accounted for in the U.S. economy must be earned either by capital or labor. In some cases, we can easily see whether our income comes from labor or capital: when we earn a wage or a bonus through our labor or when we earn interest from our savings or investment account, which is attributed to capital income, despite the fact that most of us would not think of ourselves as investors.

从定义上说,美国经济中任何的收入要么被资本赚取了,要么就是被劳动赚取了[i]。在一些情形中,我们可以很容易地看出我们的收入是来自于劳动还是资本:当我们通过劳动赚到一份工资或者奖金时,这部分收入显然来自于劳动;虽然我们中的大部分人并不认为自己是投资者,但当我们从储蓄或投资账户中获得利息或投资收益时,这部分收入很明显应该被归为资本收入。

However, it is not always immediately apparent that all income eventually accrues to either capital or labor. For example, when we buy our groceries — creating income for the grocer — we are only vaguely aware that we are also paying the producers, farm workers, and transporters as well as for the harvesters, trucks, trains, coolers, and other capital equipment involved in producing and distributing what we purchase. However, when the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) constructs the national income and product accounts, it combines data from expenditures and income to ensure that every dollar spent is also counted as a dollar earned by either capital or labor.

然而,所有的收入最终都会被归为资本收入或劳动收入这一点并不总是那么显而易见。举个例子,当我们从杂货店里买东西时——这显然为杂货店主创造了收入——我们仅仅模糊地意识到我们所付的钱同样也为货物的生产者、农场工人、运输工人创造了收入,除此以外,我们还为投资于收割机、卡车、制冷装置和其它一些参与我们所购买货物的生产和分销过程的设备的资本创造了收入。而国家经济分析局(BEA)在构建国民收入和生产账户时将来自支出和来自收入的数据合并在一起,以保证任何一美元的支出也同样要么被资本赚取,要么被劳动赚取。

Of course, nothing is ever so simple economic statistics. First, we lack the detail necessary to split some components of the income data between labor and capital returns. As I (more...)

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“小小奇迹”不再:美国劳动收入占比下降 A Bit of a Miracle No More:The Decline of the Labor Share 作者:Roc Armenter @ 2015-三季刊 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:Business Review,https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2015/q3/brq315_a_bit_of_a_miracle_no_more.pdf How is income divided between labor and capital? Every dollar of income earned by U.S. households can be classified as either labor earnings — wages and other forms of compensation — or capital earnings — interest or dividend payments and rent. The split between labor and capital income informs economists’ thinking on several topics and plays a key role in debates regarding income inequality and long-run economic growth. Unfortunately, distinguishing between labor and capital income is not always an easy task. 收入是如何在劳动和资本之间分配的?美国家庭所赚取的每一块钱都可以被归类为劳动收入(工资或其它形式的劳动补偿)或资本收益(利息、股利和租金等)。收入在劳动和资本之间的分配为经济学家们关于许多经济学议题的思考提供了重要信息,并且在关于收入不平等和长期经济增长这些问题的争论中扮演着核心角色。不幸的是,将劳动收入与资本收入区分开并非总是一件易事。 Until recently, the division between labor and capital income had not received much attention. The reason was quite simple: Labor’s share never ventured far from 62 percent of total U.S. income for almost 50 years — through expansions, recessions, high and low inflation, and the long transition from an economy primarily based on manufacturing to one mainly centered on services. 一直以来,区分劳动收入和资本收入的问题并没有受到太大关注,直到最近才有所改观。原因很简单:在将近50年中,美国劳动收入在总收入中所占的比例从来不会偏离62%这个数字太远——不论经济是在扩张还是衰退,也不论通胀率是高是低,在美国经济从以制造业为基础向主要以服务业为核心的漫长转变过程中,这个比例一直很稳定。 As it happened, the overall labor share remained stable as large forces pulling it in opposite directions canceled each other out — a coincidence that John Maynard Keynes famously called “a bit of a miracle.” But the new millennium marked a turning point: Labor’s share began a pronounced fall that continues today. 劳动收入占比在多种强大力量的反向拉扯和相互抵消之下总体保持了稳定这件事情本身——按照约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的著名说法——可以称得上是个“小小奇迹”。但是新千年的到来却标志着一个重要的转折点:劳动收入占比开始明显下降,并且这个趋势一直持续到了现在。 Why did the labor share lose its “miraculous” stability and embark on a steep decline? To investigate this shift, economists must first be sure they are measuring the labor share correctly. Could measurement problems distort our understanding of what has happened to the labor share over time? 为什么劳动收入占比会失去它“奇迹般”的稳定性而开始急剧下降?要研究这一转变,经济学家们的首要任务是确保他们测量劳动收入占比的方法是准确的。测量方法存在问题会歪曲我们对于长期以来劳动收入占比所发生的变化的理解吗? In this article, I explain the inherent challenges in measuring the labor share and introduce several alternative definitions designed to address some of the measurement problems. As we will see, the overall trend is confirmed across a wide range of definitions. 在这篇文章中,我将解释在测量劳动收入占比时所面临的内在挑战,并介绍几种旨在解决其中一些测量问题的替代性定义。正如我们将看到的,基于一系列不同定义的测量结果都证实了劳动收入占比总体上的下降趋势。 Economists do not yet have a full understanding of the causes behind the labor share’s decline. We can make some progress, though, by noting the impact of wage and productivity trends and shifts between industries. Finally, I discuss several popular hypotheses, based on concurrent phenomena, such as widening wage inequality and globalization, that may account for the labor share’s sharp decline. 经济学家们至今还未能全面地理解劳动收入占比下降背后的原因。即便如此,通过研究工资和生产率的变化趋势以及产业的变迁,我们仍然可以取得一些进展。最后,我将讨论一些流行的假设。这些基于诸如薪资不平等程度加深以及全球化等并发现象的假设也许能解释劳动收入占比的急剧下降。 MEASURING THE U.S. LABOR SHARE 测量美国的劳动收入占比 By construction, all income accounted for in the U.S. economy must be earned either by capital or labor. In some cases, we can easily see whether our income comes from labor or capital: when we earn a wage or a bonus through our labor or when we earn interest from our savings or investment account, which is attributed to capital income, despite the fact that most of us would not think of ourselves as investors. 从定义上说,美国经济中任何的收入要么被资本赚取了,要么就是被劳动赚取了[i]。在一些情形中,我们可以很容易地看出我们的收入是来自于劳动还是资本:当我们通过劳动赚到一份工资或者奖金时,这部分收入显然来自于劳动;虽然我们中的大部分人并不认为自己是投资者,但当我们从储蓄或投资账户中获得利息或投资收益时,这部分收入很明显应该被归为资本收入。 However, it is not always immediately apparent that all income eventually accrues to either capital or labor. For example, when we buy our groceries — creating income for the grocer — we are only vaguely aware that we are also paying the producers, farm workers, and transporters as well as for the harvesters, trucks, trains, coolers, and other capital equipment involved in producing and distributing what we purchase. However, when the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) constructs the national income and product accounts, it combines data from expenditures and income to ensure that every dollar spent is also counted as a dollar earned by either capital or labor. 然而,所有的收入最终都会被归为资本收入或劳动收入这一点并不总是那么显而易见。举个例子,当我们从杂货店里买东西时——这显然为杂货店主创造了收入——我们仅仅模糊地意识到我们所付的钱同样也为货物的生产者、农场工人、运输工人创造了收入,除此以外,我们还为投资于收割机、卡车、制冷装置和其它一些参与我们所购买货物的生产和分销过程的设备的资本创造了收入。而国家经济分析局(BEA)在构建国民收入和生产账户时将来自支出和来自收入的数据合并在一起,以保证任何一美元的支出也同样要么被资本赚取,要么被劳动赚取。 Of course, nothing is ever so simple economic statistics. First, we lack the detail necessary to split some components of the income data between labor and capital returns. As I will show, the foremost example is the income of self-employed workers, who simply collect the income of their business without distinguishing whether it resulted from their work or their investment. In addition, the housing and the government sectors have their total income arbitrarily assigned as labor and capital income, respectively, in the national income accounts. 当然,经济统计中从来不会有这么简单的事情。首先,我们缺乏将收入数据的某些组成部分划分为劳动或资本回报的一些必要细节。正如我将说明的,这其中最典型的例子就是那些个体经营者的收入,他们仅仅从自己的生意中获得收入,而不区分这些收入是自己的劳动成果还是投资收益。此外,住房部门和政府部门在划分各自国民收入账户中属于劳动收入和资本收入的部分时也都很随意。 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes the most widely used estimate of the labor share, which combines several data sources and estimates in order to get around some of the measurement problems. However, these problems remain significant enough that economists routinely create alternative definitions and compare results across them, since a single definition of the labor share is unlikely to fit all purposes. 目前使用最广泛的关于劳动收入占比的估计是由国家劳动统计局(BLS)发布的,它将来自多个数据源的数据和估值放在一起,以规避一些测量方法上的问题。但即便如此,这些测量上的问题还是带来了足够明显的影响,这使得经济学家们通常会创造一些对于劳动收入占比的不同定义,并将这些定义下的结果进行比较,因为单一的定义方法不可能适合所有的测量目的。 And what would these purposes be? First, workers and investors respond differently to the same economic conditions and policies. So if we wish to understand how aggregate output will respond, we need to know how to weigh the responses of workers and investors. 那么测量劳动收入占比的目的又有哪些呢?首先,劳工和投资者对于相同的经济状况和政策的反应是截然不同的。所以如果希望了解某种经济状况和政策将如何影响加总的产出,我们就需要知道如何分别衡量劳工和投资者的反应的权重。 Second, assets are notoriously unevenly distributed across households; hence, an increase in the share of income earned by capital contributes to income inequality, as richer households would receive an even larger share of total income. 其次,资产在家庭之间的不均分布一直以来都饱受诟病,而资本收入占比的上升会加深收入不平等的程度,因为更富裕的家庭会在总收入中获得更大的比例。 Third, the tax code treats labor and capital income differently. Labor income is subject to payroll taxes and the usual income tax rate schedule. Corporate profits (the main source of capital income) are subject to corporate taxes as well as dividends and capital gains taxes when profits are distributed to households. A shift in the labor share will impact not only tax revenues but also how the burden of taxation is distributed across households. 第三,税法在对待劳动收入和资本收入时所采用的税收政策是不同的。劳动收入所适用的是工资税和普通的所得税率表。公司利润(资本收入最重要的来源)所适用的则是公司税。而当公司利润被分配给家庭时,这部分利润所适用的则是股利和资本利得税。劳动收入占比的变化不仅将会影响税收的总额,而且还会影响到不同家庭所承担税赋的份额。 Economists also need an estimate of the labor share when determining how much of economic growth can be attributed to labor force growth, capital accumulation, or technological changes — which in turn are key inputs for long-term growth forecasts. 此外,经济学家们也需要对劳动收入占比进行估算来确定经济增长分别在多大程度上可归因于劳动力增长、资本积累以及技术进步——这些因子又都是对长期经济增长进行预测所需的重要变量。 Components of income 收入成分法 The BEA measures output, or gross value added, two different ways in its national income and product accounts (NIPA). The expenditure approach aims to measure the total amount spent on goods and services throughout a year; the income approach instead adds up all the income earned by households. In theory, both measures should yield the same number. In practice, alas, they do not. The discrepancy is due to data limitations and measurement error, though the discrepancy is quite small. 国家经济分析局使用两种方法来测量国民收入和产出账户(NIPA)的总产出(也称总附加值)[ii]。支出法的目标是测量一年中花费在产品和服务上的总支出额;而收入法则将家庭部门的所有收入加总在一起。理论上,两种方法所得到的最终数值应该是相同的。但遗憾的是,实际并非如此。两者间的差异是由数据局限和测量误差所导致的,虽然这个差异其实很小。 The labor share is measured using the income approach. Every dollar of output must be earned by factors of production and distributed to households. What exactly is a factor of production? Were we to measure the output of a factory, we would count as factors of production the workers and managers, all the equipment, the building and land occupied by the factory as well as the electricity, security service, and all the other intermediate inputs used. 劳动收入占比这个指标是使用收入法测得的。总产出中的每一美元都会被各种生产要素所赚取,并最终分配到家庭手中。而生产要素到底是什么呢?在测量一家工厂的产出时,我们会把工人和经理人,所有的设备,工厂所占据的建筑和土地,以及电力,安保服务和所有其他中间投入都当作生产要素。 But because we are measuring the output of the whole economy, we must recognize that the intermediate goods, utilities, and services were produced by some other firm, which in turn uses its own factors of production. Were we to check with, say, the firm producing electricity, we would once again find some workers and managers, equipment, and so on. Now, we could try to track each and every input of production in the U.S., but we would quickly realize that the only factors of production whose income accrues directly to households are labor and capital. 但是由于我们所测量的是整个经济的总产出,我们必须认识到那些中间产品、设施和服务实际上都是由另外的一些企业生产的,而那些企业在生产过程中又会用到它们自己的生产要素。如果我们去看看另一家企业——比如说生产电力的公司——的生产要素,我们会再一次找到一些工人和经理人,生产设备以及其它种种要素。我们可以尝试去追踪美国经济产出中的每一项投入,但是我们会迅速意识到,只有两种要素——劳动和资本——产生的收入将直接归属于家庭收入。 The BEA classifies output into seven groups, as detailed in the table. The second column provides the share of each component relative to the total for 2013. The classification of most income sources as capital or labor income is quite unambiguous. For example, compensation of employees clearly accrues to labor, while corporate profits, rental income, and net interest income are returns to capital. Of the three remaining components, the main challenge is proprietor’s income. 国家经济分析局将产出分为7个大类,如下表所示。表的第二列提供了2013年各个大类占总体的比重。将大多数的收入来源归为劳动收入或资本收入的这种分类方法实际上是相当明确的。举例来说,对雇员的劳动补偿很显然应该归为劳动报酬,而企业利润、租金收入和净利息收入都属于资本收入。在剩下的三个大类中,最主要的挑战是如何界定经营者收入的性质[iii]#95-6 Proprietor’s income is defined as the income of sole proprietorships and partnerships — in other words, the income of self-employed individuals. There is no question that their income is the result of both labor and capital. For example, a freelance journalist may work long hours to document and write a story using a computer and a camera that she or he financed through savings. However, self-employed individuals have no need, economic or fiscal, to distinguish between wages and profits. However, economists do. 经营者收入被定义为个人独资以及合伙企业的收入——换句话说,也就是个体经营者的收入[iv]。毫无疑问,他们的收入同时是劳动投入和资本投入的结果。举例来说,一名自由记者可能会为了撰写一篇报导工作很长时间,而他使用的电脑和相机则是用自己的积蓄购买的。但是,个体经营者完全没有经济或财务上的理由将自己的收入区分为工资和利润。遗憾的是,经济学家们却需要这么做。 The main BLS measure 国家劳动统计局的主流测量方法 The BLS is well aware of these problems and goes to great lengths to disentangle proprietor’s income into its labor and capital income components. First, the BLS uses its data on payroll workers to compute an average hourly wage. The BLS then assumes that a self-employed worker would pay himself or herself the implicit wage rate. Then, using data on hours worked by self-employed workers, it obtains a measure of the labor compensation for self-employed individuals simply by multiplying the average hourly wage by the number of hours worked by the self-employed. The result is then assigned to labor income. The rest of the proprietor’s income is considered capital income. 国家劳动统计局对这些问题心知肚明,它在如何将经营者收入分解为劳动收入部分和资本收入部分这个问题上走得更远。首先,它使用领薪劳工的数据计算出一个平均时薪。然后假设一名自雇者将会按照这个时薪来给自己发工资。之后,使用自雇工人工作时长的数据并通过简单地将自雇者的平均时薪和工作时长相乘,国家劳动统计局就获得了对自雇者劳动报酬的测量数据。这个结果会被归为劳动收入,而这名经营者收入中的剩余部分则被认为是资本收入[v]。 Figure 1 plots the BLS’s headline labor share at an annual frequency from 1950 to 2013. Up until 2001, the labor share displayed some ups and downs, and perhaps a slight downward trend, but it never strayed far from 62 percent. From 2001 onward, though, the labor share has been steadily decreasing, dropping below 60 percent for the first time in 2004 and continuing its fall to 56 percent as of 2014. 图1描述了按国家劳动统计局主流方法计算出的自1950年到2013年的年度劳动收入占比[vi]。直到2001年,劳动收入占比一直都在一个很轻微的下行趋势中起起落落,但是它从来没有离62%这个数字太远。但自2001年以后,劳动收入占比一直在持续下降,在2004年首次跌破60%,并一直持续跌落到2014年的56%[vii]#95-7 An alternative measure 一种替代测量方法 Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin have pointed out that some of the fall in the labor share in the past 15 years is due to how the BLS splits proprietor’s income. Indeed, until 2001, the BLS’s methodology assigned most of proprietor’s income to the labor share, a bit more than four-fifths of it. Since then, less than half of proprietor’s income has been classified as labor income. Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn和Aysegul Sahin指出,劳动收入占比在过去15年中的下降可部分归因于国家劳动统计局分割经营者收入的方法。事实也的确如此,直到2001年,国家劳动统计局都将经营者收入中的大部分归为劳动收入,比例略高于五分之四。而2001年之后,经营者收入中仅有不到一半的比例被归为劳动收入。 How important is this shift? It is fortunately very easy to produce an alternative measure of the labor share in which a constant fraction of proprietor’s income accrues to labor. Setting that fraction to its historical average prior to 2000 — 85 percent — we can figure out what would be the current labor share under this alternative assumption. 这一变化的影响有多大?幸运的是,我们可以很容易地用一种替代测量方法来对劳动收入占比进行估值,这种方法就是把业主收入按照一个固定比例计算为劳动收入。如果将该比例设定为2000年以前的历史平均值——85%——我们就能计算用该替代方法测量的当前的劳动收入占比。 Figure 2 contrasts the previous headline number against this alternative measure from 1980 onward. 图2对比了国家统计局公布的自1980年以来的劳动收入占比和使用替代方法得到的同时期劳动收入占比。 #95-8 First, we confirm that through 2000, both the headline and the alternative measure pretty much coincide. Since 2001, though, they diverge, with the drop being noticeably smaller in the alternative measure. Indeed, this divergence suggests that at least one-third and possibly closer to half of the drop in the headline labor share is due to how the BLS treats proprietor’s income. 首先,我们确认直到2000年,按国家劳动统计局的主流方法和这里的替代方法得到的结果基本是吻合的。而自从2001年开始,两者之间的差异开始扩大。按替代方法计算的结果中,劳动收入占比的下降幅度明显要小得多。两者间的差异事实上表明,按国家经济统计局的主流方法计算所得的结果中至少三分之一,甚至很可能接近一半的劳动收入占比降幅是由该方法对待经营者收入的方式所引起的。 Alternatively, we can also proceed by the centuries-tested scientific method of ignoring the problem altogether and compute the compensation or payroll share instead of the labor share. That is, we can assume that none of proprietor’s income accrues to labor. 另外,我们还可以采用一种经过多个世纪检验的“科学方法”——彻底忽略以上不同测量方法的问题,仅仅计算受雇劳工获取的劳动报酬占比,而不计算劳动收入占比。那么,我们就可以假设,经营者的所有收入都不会被归为劳动收入。 This is actually a quite common approach, since detailed payroll data exist for all industries, allowing us to pinpoint which sectors of the economy are responsible for the dynamics of labor income. The compensation share is, obviously, lower than the labor share — but its evolution across time is very similar: stable until the turn of the millennium and a decline since then. 实际上这也是一种很常用的方法。由于所有的行业都有非常详细的工资单数据,这让我们能够详细地查明经济中的哪些部门对劳动收入的变化产生了影响。劳动报酬收入占总收入的比重显然要低于总的劳动收入,但是它随时间变化的轨迹与劳动收入占比的变化轨迹非常相似:在新千年到来之前一直都很稳定,而从那以后就开始持续下降。 Yet another measure 另一种替代测量方法 There is yet another possible way to circumvent the ambiguity regarding proprietor’s income. The data allow us to zoom in to the non-financial corporate business sector. By law, corporations must declare payroll and profits separately for fiscal purposes, so there is actually no proprietor’s income. The downside is, of course, that we are working with only a subset of the economy, albeit a very large one. 还有另外一种可能的方法可以绕过处理经营者收入时面临的模棱两可问题。数据让我们可以更仔细地观察非金融企业部门。在法律上,由于财务方面的原因,公司必须分开报告工资单和利润,因此实际上这里就不存在经营者收入这个概念。但这个方法的缺点在于,我们只能研究整体经济中的一个子集,尽管这是一个相当大的子集[viii]。 Figure 3 plots the BLS headline measure and the labor share of income of the non-financial corporate sector from 1950 to the latest data available. The two series overlap for most of the period, though the headline labor share was consistently about 1 percentage point below that of non-financial firms from 1980 onward. In any case, the message since 2000 is unmistakable: The large drop in the headline measure is fully reflected in this alternative measure. 图3描述了从1950年开始到最近可获取数据的时间段内,分别使用国家劳动统计局的主流方法和非金融企业部门的劳动收入占比数据所得到的结果。虽然自1980年开始,主流方法测得的的劳动收入占比相对非金融企业中的劳动收入占比一直都低了1%左右,但在大多数时间段内,两条曲线的走势都是趋同的。不论在哪种情形下,2000年以来的数据所传递的信号都是明确无误的:主流方法中劳动收入占比的巨大降幅在这种替代方法中也得到了完全的反映。 #95-9 So, despite the inherent measurement problems, the data are clear: First, the labor share was stable from 1950 to at least near the end of the 1980s. Second, it has fallen precipitously since 2001. While the exact magnitude of the drop may be open to debate, there is no doubt that the downward trend in the labor share since 2001 is unprecedented in the data and, at the time of this writing, shows no signs of abating. 所以如果将这些测量方法所固有的问题放在一边,数据的含义是非常清晰的:首先,从1950年到至少1980年代末,劳动收入占比一直都保持了稳定。第二,从2001年开始,劳动收入占比开始急剧下降。虽然精确的降幅到底是多少仍然有待讨论,但毫无疑问的是,从数据看来,2001年之后的劳动收入占比下降趋势是前所未有的。而直到撰写本文时,这个趋势也丝毫也没有减弱的迹象。 A BIT OF A MIRACLE: 1950-1987 “小小奇迹”:1950-1987 We now take a closer look at the period in which the labor share was stable — roughly from the end of World War II to the late 1980s — by breaking it down by sector. In doing so, we will understand the logic behind the “bit of a miracle” quip. The cutoff date is necessarily 1987, since the industry classification changed in that year. Fortunately, it is also the approximate end date of the stable period for the labor share. 大约从二战结束一直到1980年代末这一时期的美国劳动收入占比一直都很稳定。现在我们来分阶段地仔细审视一下这个时期。这将有助理解这个“小小奇迹”背后的逻辑。我们只能将这一时期的终点选在1987年,因为在1987年,行业的划分标准发生了变化。幸运的是,这一年也恰好几乎是劳动收入占比保持稳定的时代终结的年份。 Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has gone through large structural changes to its sectorial composition. The most significant was the shift from manufacturing to services. In 1950, manufacturing accounted for more than two-thirds of the non-farm business sector. By 1987, manufacturing was just half of the non-farm business sector. Over the same period, services increased from 21 percent to 40 percent of the non-farm business sector. 自从二战结束后,美国经济的产业构成经历了巨大的结构性变化。最明显的变化是经济从制造业向服务业的转型。在1950年,制造业在非农经济中占据的比重超过了三分之二。而到1987年,制造业在非农经济中仅仅占据了一半的比重。同一时期,服务业在非农经济部门中所占的比重则从21%提升到了40%[ix]。 The reader would not be surprised to learn that different sectors use labor and capital in different proportions. In 1950, the manufacturing sector averaged a labor share of 62 percent, with some sub-sectors having even higher labor shares, such as durable goods manufacturing, with a labor share of 77 percent. Services instead relied more on capital and thus had lower labor shares: an average of 48 percent. 对于不同的经济部门中劳动和资本的构成比例不同这一点,相信读者们并不会感到吃惊。在1950年,制造业部门中的平均劳动收入占比是62%,而其中某些子部门的劳动收入占比还要更高,例如在耐用品制造业中,劳动收入占比到了77%[x]。与之相反,服务业则更加依赖于资本,因而其劳动收入占比也更低:平均水平是48%。 Thus, from 1950 to 1987, the sector with a high labor share (manufacturing) was cut in half, while the sector with a low labor share (services) doubled. The aggregate labor share is, naturally, the weighted average across these sectors. Therefore, we would have expected the aggregate labor share to fall. But as we already know, it did not. 也就是说,从1950年到1987年间,劳动收入占比较高的部门(制造业)在经济中的占比下降了接近一半,而劳动收入占比较低的部门(服务业)在经济中的占比则上升了一倍。加总的劳动收入占比很自然地应该等于不同部门劳动收入占比的加权平均值。既然如此,我们应该可以预期,加总的劳动收入占比会下降。但正如我们已经知道的,它并没有下降。 The reason is that, coincidentally with the shift from manufacturing to services, the labor share of the service sector rose sharply, from 48 percent in 1950 to 56 percent in 1987. Education and health services went from labor shares around 50 percent to the highest values in the whole economy, close to 84 percent. In manufacturing, the labor share was substantially more stable, increasing by less than 2 percentage points over the period. 而其中的原因则是在经济从制造业向服务业的转型过程中,服务业中的劳动收入占比却巧合地经历了大幅的上升,从1950年的48%上升到了1987年的56%。教育和医疗服务业中的劳动收入占比从50%左右上升到了整个经济各部门中的最高水平,接近84%[xi]。制造业中的劳动收入占比则持续保持稳定,在整个期间内上升了不到2%。 And this is the “bit of a miracle” — that the forces affecting the labor share across and within sectors just happened to cancel each other out over a period of almost half a century. 而这就是所谓的“小小奇迹”——在接近半个世纪的时间内,部门间和部门内影响劳动收入占比的各种力量恰恰抵消了各自的影响。 A BIT OF A MIRACLE NO MORE: 1987-2011 “小小奇迹”不再:1987-2011 I start by repeating the previous exercise, now over the period 1987 to 2011. As it had from 1950 to 1987, the manufacturing sector kept losing ground to the service sector, albeit at a slower rate. 下面我首先会采取和之前相同的方法来分析美国经济的劳动收入占比,只是将时间段换成1987年-2011年。和1950年-1987年间一样,尽管速度有所下降,但制造业部门在经济中的占比仍然持续被服务业部门所抢占。 By 2011, services accounted for more than two-thirds of U.S. economic output and an even larger fraction of total employment. However, the differences in the labor share between the two sectors were much smaller by the early 1990s, and thus the shift from manufacturing to services had only small downward effects on the overall labor share. 到2011年,服务业在美国经济总产出中所占的比重已经超过了三分之二,而在总就业中的占比甚至更高。然而这两个部门之间劳动收入占比的差异相比1990年代初却缩小了不少,因此,经济从制造业向服务业的转型对总体劳动收入占比仅仅会造成很小的下行作用。 We readily find out which part of the economy is behind the decline of the labor share once we look at the change in the labor share within manufacturing, which dropped almost 10 percentage points. Virtually all the major manufacturing sub-sectors saw their labor shares fall; for non-durable goods manufacturing it dropped from 62 percent to 40 percent. The labor share within the service sector kept increasing, as it had before 1987, but very modestly, only enough to cancel the downward pressure from the shift across sectors. Indeed, had the labor share of income in manufacturing stayed constant, the overall labor share would have barely budged. 只要看看在制造业中劳动收入占比的变化,我们就能很容易地发现经济中的哪一部分是造成劳动收入占比下降的主因。在制造业中,劳动收入占比下降了接近10个百分点。基本上所有主要的制造业子部门都经历了劳动收入占比的下降。在非耐用品制造业中,劳动收入占比从62%下降到了40%。而服务业部门的劳动收入占比相对1987年之前的水平仍然保持了增长,但是增幅非常缓慢,仅仅足够抵消掉由经济从制造业向服务业转型所产生的下行压力。的确,假如制造业中的劳动收入占比能够保持不变,整体经济中的劳动收入占比就几乎不会下降。 Note that in one sense, the bit of a miracle actually continued from 1987 onward: As manufacturing continued to shrink, decreasing the share of income accruing to labor, services picked up the slack by increasing their share of income accruing to labor, albeit more modestly than before. What ended the “miracle” was the precipitous decline in the labor share within manufacturing. 从这个意义上说,“小小奇迹”实际上在1987年之后也得到了延续:制造业在整体经济中占比的持续收缩减少了总收入中劳动收入的比例,而服务业则在一定程度上通过提升部门内的劳动收入占比收拾了残局,虽然提升的速度相比之前已经减缓了许多。终结“奇迹”的实际上是制造业内部劳动收入占比的急剧下降。 Wages and productivity 工资与劳动生产率 It is worth investigating a bit further what determinants are behind the fall in the labor share within manufacturing, since it played such an important role in the decline of the overall labor share. To this end, note that the change in the labor share in a particular sector is linked to the joint evolution of wages and labor productivity. 由于制造业内部的劳动收入占比下降在整体劳动收入占比的下降中发挥了如此重要的作用,更深入地研究其中的决定因素就显得很有价值了。从这个意义上说,我们需要注意到,某个特定部门内的劳动收入占比是与工资和劳动生产率的联合演化联系在一起的。 Consider a machine operator working in a factory for one hour to produce goods that will have a gross value to the factory owner of $100. If he is paid $60 per hour, labor’s share is approximately 60 percent. For the labor share to change, there are only two possibilities: Either the value of the goods produced must change or the hourly wage must. Conversely, for the labor share to stay constant, the value of the goods and the hourly wage have to move in unison. 假如一名机器操作员在工厂中工作一小时能够生产出对于工厂主而言价值100美元的产品,如果他的时薪是60美元,那么劳动收入占比就大约是60%。一旦劳动收入占比发生变化,仅仅有两种可能的情况:要么是产出的价值发生了变化,要么是操作员的时薪发生了变化。反过来说,如果劳动收入占比保持不变,产出的价值和操作员的时薪就必须总是等比例变化[xii]。 So which one — productivity or wages — brought down the labor share in manufacturing? Fortunately, we do have reliable data on output, wage rates, and hours worked in manufacturing. Figure 4 displays the evolution of labor productivity (that is, output per hour) and wage rates from 1950 onward. Both series are set such that their value in 1949 equals 100. 那么在生产率和工资水平中,究竟是哪一项将制造业中的劳动收入占比拖了下来呢?幸运的是,我们拥有制造业中关于产出,单位时间工资和工作时长的可靠数据。图4显示了自1950年以来劳动生产率(也就是每小时产出)和单位时间工资的演化过程[xiii]。两条曲线都将1949年的水平设定为100[xiv]#95-10 Once again we see two clearly separate periods. Until the early 1980s, labor productivity and wages grew at a very similar rate — if anything, the wage rate out-paced productivity, which, as described earlier, implies that the labor share in manufacturing inched up. By mid-1985, labor productivity took off, while wage growth was very sluggish. Since then, the gap between productivity and wages has kept growing, depressing the labor share. 我们又一次地看到了两个被明显分隔开的时期。直到上世纪80年代早期,劳动生产率和工资都一直在以很接近的速度增长——如果有不同的话,也是工资的增长速度超过了劳动生产率。按照之前的描述,这意味着制造业中的劳动收入占比提高了。到上世纪80年代中期,劳动生产率开始突飞猛进,而工资的增长则变得非常缓慢。从那以后,劳动生产率和工资之间的差距就开始持续扩大,从而不断压低劳动收入占比。 Because an index is used to scale both series, it is a tad difficult to grasp from the figure whether labor productivity accelerated or wage rates stagnated from the 1980s onward. The answer is both things happened. In the 1980s, productivity grew at about its long-term trend rate, but wages were virtually flat, growing less than half a percentage point a year on average over the decade. Wage growth recovered in the 1990s, but productivity actually took off, further increasing the gap. Overall, though, it appears that the fall in the labor share is explained mainly by the sluggish growth of wages rather than above-trend labor productivity. 由于我们使用同一个坐标来衡量两条曲线的变化,想要从图中分辨出1980年后究竟是劳动生产率的增长加速了还是单位时间工资的增长停滞了似乎有些困难。答案是两件事情都发生了。在1980年代,劳动生产率的增长速度基本上等于它的长期平均增长率,但是工资增长则相当平缓,这十年中的年均增长率不到0.5%。工资的增长在1990年代有所恢复,但是生产率的增长则突飞猛进,让两者间的差距越来越大。但是整体看来,劳动收入占比的下降更为主要的原因还是缓慢的工资增长速度,而不是增长的劳动生产率。 CONCURRENT PHENOMENA 一些并发的现象 What is the ultimate cause behind the decline of the labor share in the U.S.? The honest answer is that economists have several hypotheses but no definite answer yet. Rather than go over the sometimes-intricate theories behind these hypotheses, I will discuss the main observation or phenomenon anchoring each one. 美国劳动收入占比下降背后的终极原因到底是什么?诚实的回答是,经济学家们目前只是提出了一些假说,但还没有得到确定的答案[xv]。在本文中,我并不准备把这些假说背后的那些有时看起来错综复杂的理论复述一遍,而将讨论与每个假说相关的主要观察结果或现象。 Capital deepening 资本深化 This is by far the most popular hypothesis: Workers have been replaced by equipment and software. Who has not seen footage of robots working an auto assembly line? Older readers may remember when live tellers and not ATMs dispensed cash at banks. Software is now capable of piloting planes and, even more amazingly, doing our taxes! 这是至今为止最流行的假说:工人正在不断地被设备和软件所替代。今天谁还没有见过机器人在汽车流水线上的身影呢?年纪大一些的读者们可能还记得,在过去银行是使用出纳员而不是ATM机来分发现金的。当时的软件还不具备为飞机导航的能力,而更令今人惊讶的是,它们甚至还无法计算我们的税单! There is more behind this hypothesis than anecdotes. Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman document a fall in equipment prices. Lawrence Summers proposes that capital should be viewed as at least a partial substitute for labor — more and more so as technology develops. In both models, the idea is similar: Better or cheaper equipment replaces workers and redistributes income from labor to capital. The result is that production becomes more intensive in capital, which is why these theories are often referred to as capital deepening. 这个假说背后有着远比这些旧日轶闻深刻得多的内容。Loukas Karabarbounis和Brent Neiman证明了设备价格的下降趋势。Lawrance Summers则提出,资本至少应该被看作劳动力的一种部分替代——而随着技术的发展,替代的程度也越来越高。在这两个模型中,观点是相似的:更好或者更便宜的设备替代了工人的劳动,并且将之前属于劳动的一部分收入重新分配给了资本。结果就是生产过程的资本密集程度越来越高,这也是这些理论通常被人们称为“资本深化”的原因。 It is important to understand that the capital deepening mechanism must operate at the level of the overall economy. So, when we see a robot replace, say, five workers, we need to remember that the production of the robot itself involved workers, so we are swapping auto assemblers with robot assemblers. It is, of course, still possible that the robot tilts income toward capital, but it is not a foregone conclusion. 重要的是,我们必须懂得资本深化机制只有在整体经济的尺度上才能发挥作用。所以当我们看到一个机器人替代了5名工人时,我们应该记住,机器人的生产本身也需要工人,所以我们只是把汽车装配工换成了机器人装配工而已。当然,机器人的确很有可能会让收入的天平向资本倾斜,但这并非已成定局。 The main challenge to capital deepening is that if a sector is substituting robots for workers to save money or improve the quality of the good being produced, the remaining workers should therefore become more productive and, overall, the sector should be expanding. In other words, capital deepening can reduce the labor share of income, but it does so by making labor productivity accelerate rather than making wages stagnate. As we saw earlier, this does not fit the actual picture of the manufacturing sector at all. 对资本深化理论的主要挑战是,如果某个部门通过使用机器人代替工人来节省成本或者提高所生产的产品质量,那么剩下的工人的生产效率就应该变得更高,而在整体上,这个部门应该会在扩张之中。换句话说,资本深化会降低劳动在总收入中所占的比例,但这是通过让劳动生产率获得提升来完成的,而不是让工资的增长停滞。就像我们之前所看到的,这与制造业所呈现的实际图景完全不相符[xvi]Income inequality 收入不平等 The increase in income inequality in the U.S. has lately received a lot of attention. The decline of the labor share is a force toward income inequality because capital is more concentrated across households than labor is. 最近,美国收入不平等的加剧获得了大量的关注。劳动收入占比下降显然是一种加剧收入不平等的力量,因为相比劳动力,资本在家庭间的分布集中度显然更高[xvii]。 It should be noted, though, that the main driver of the increase in income inequality is not capital income but rather wages themselves, particularly at the very top of the pay ladder. As Elsby and his coauthors document, the increase in top wages has actually sustained the labor share. In other words, the decline in the labor share actually understates the increase in income inequality. 但值得一提的是,收入不平等加剧的主要驱动力并不是资本收入,而是工资收入本身,尤其是在工资收入阶梯的顶端[xviii]。正如Elsby和他的合作者们所证明的,顶端工资的增长实际上会起到维持劳动收入占比的作用。换句话说,劳动收入占比的下降实际上还低估了收入不平等程度的加剧。 An interesting question is whether whatever is driving up inequality is also driving down the labor share. Several economists have proposed that technological change is skill biased — that is, it augments productivity more for highly skilled workers than for low-skilled workers. Combined with the idea that capital helps highly skilled workers be more productive but makes unskilled workers redundant, skill bias can explain both the increase in wage inequality and the decline in the labor share. 一个有趣的问题是,任何加剧收入不平等程度的因素是否也同样会降低劳动收入占比呢?一些经济学家提出,技术进步对于工人技能的影响是有偏的——也就是说,相对于低技能的工人,技术进步会更大地提升那些高技能工人的生产力。与之前得出的资本在帮助高技能工人提高生产力同时,让低技能工人变得冗余的观点相结合,“技能偏好”能够同时解释工资收入不平等程度的加剧和劳动收入占比的降低[xix]。 Let us return once more to the car manufacturer example. The robot may be replacing five unskilled workers but may require a qualified operator. The demand for unskilled workers falls, and so do their wages; but the demand for qualified operators increases, and so do their wages. So it is possible to have an increase in wage inequality while factories undergo capital deepening. 让我们再次回到汽车制造商的例子。机器人可能会替代掉5名不熟练的工人,但同时却会需要一名合格的操作员。对不熟练工人的需求下降了,他们的工资收入也会同时下降;但是对合格的操作员的需求和他们的工资水平则会同步提升。所以随着工厂经历资本深化的过程,工资收入的不平等程度也很可能会加剧。 Globalization. 全球化 Another popular hypothesis links the fall in the labor share with the advent of international trade liberalization. There is no question that there has been a substantial increase in trade by U.S. firms in the past few decades. In particular, firms have shifted parts of their production processes to foreign countries to take advantage of cheaper inputs — which, from the perspective of a country like the U.S. that has more capital than other countries, means cheap labor. Industries that are more intensive in labor, such as manufacturing, will be more likely to outsource their production processes abroad, and thus the remaining factories are likely to be the ones that rely more on capital. 另一个流行的假说将劳动收入占比的下降与国际贸易自由化的出现联系在了一起。毫无疑问,在过去的几十年中,美国公司所进行的国际贸易经历了非常显著的增长。尤其值得一提的是,许多美国公司都将它们的一部分生产流程转移到了国外以利用更加便宜的生产要素——对于美国这样一个比他国拥有更多资本的国家来说,也就是劳动力。劳动力更加密集的那些行业,例如制造业,将更有可能将生产流程外包到国外,而那些留在国内的工厂则更可能属于那些对资本依赖程度较高的行业。 Surprisingly, there is not a lot of evidence to support this view. The main challenge to the hypothesis is that U.S. exports and imports are very similar in their factor composition. That is, were trade driving down the labor share, we would observe the U.S. importing goods that use a lot of labor and exporting goods that use a lot of capital. Instead, most international trade involves exchanging goods that are very similar, such as cars. 令人吃惊的是,并没有多少证据能够支持这个观点。这一假说所面临的主要挑战是,美国的进口和出口在要素构成上其实非常相似。也就是说,如果说国际贸易降低了美国的劳动收入占比,那么我们会观察到美国所进口的产品的生产要素中包含大量的劳动,而出口产品的生产要素中则包含大量的资本。但实际上,大多数的国际贸易中所交换的产品都非常相似,例如汽车[xx]。 Another prediction of the globalization theory is that countries the U.S. exports to should see their labor shares increase and — as noted in the accompanying discussion, it appears that the decline in the labor share is a global phenomenon. 支持全球化降低了美国劳动收入占比的理论所作出的另一项预测是,那些从美国进口多于向美国出口的国家的劳动收入占比应该会上升——而我们在之前的讨论中已经提到过,劳动收入占比下降似乎是一个全球性的现象。 Some studies, though, do support this hypothesis. Elsby and his coauthors find some evidence that the labor share fell more in sectors that were more exposed to imports. There is a large body of literature on the impact of trade on wage inequality that only recently has started to consider the impact on the labor share. 事实上,也的确有一些研究支持这个假说。Elsby和他的合作者们发现了一些证据证明在那些受进口冲击更强的行业内,劳动收入占比的确下降得更厉害。已经有大量的文献研究国际贸易对于工资收入不平等的影响,而直到最近,人们才开始考虑它对于劳动收入占比的影响[xxi]CONCLUSIONS 结论 Despite several measurement issues and alternative definitions associated with the labor share, the message is quite clear: The 2000s witnessed an unprecedented drop in the labor share of income. Exploring the early period, we saw that the U.S. economy had been able to accommodate the surplus workers from manufacturing only until the late 1980s. 除了一些测量方法上的问题,以及与劳动收入占比相关的一些不同定义之外,我们所获得的信号是非常清晰的:21世纪的前十年见证了美国劳动收入占比的一场史无前例的急剧下降。通过对更早的时期进行研究,我们发现直到1980年代末期,美国一直都能够容纳制造业中多余的劳动力。 We also saw that the stagnation of wages, rather than accelerated labor productivity, has been behind the drop in the labor share from 2000 onward. The review of possible hypotheses behind the decline in the U.S. labor share was, admittedly, quite inconclusive: Economists do not yet have a full grasp of the underlying determinants. 我们还发现,工资增长的停滞,而不是劳动力产出的提升,才是2000年之后劳动收入占比下降的主要原因。需要承认的是,对于一些可能解释美国劳动收入占比下降的假说的回顾并没有得出什么明确的结论:经济学家们仍然没能完整地把握这一现象背后的那些潜在因素。
[i] 收入中的一小部分实际上直接被政府获取了,我将在之后更详细地讨论这一点。 [ii] 关于NIPA,国家经济分析局提供了多种入门级别的指导教程,可通过访问http://www.bea.gov轻松获得。 [iii] 折旧和税收也分别会遇上一些测量方法上的问题,但我们可以安全地规避它们:本文附带的讨论《其它测量方法上的挑战》对这些额外的问题进行了简要的描述。还可参阅Paul Gomme和Peter Rupert发表于2004年的论文,以获得对所有劳动收入测量方法问题的完整描述。 [iv] 实际上其中还包括一些其它的小成分:例如非盈利机构的收入等。 [v] 国家劳动统计局所采用的方法实际上远非完美:例如,一些岗位上受雇佣劳工的比例可能远高于自雇人员,而这可能导致一些误导性的结果。 [vi] 国家劳动统计局使用的主流劳动收入占比,也被称为“头条劳动收入占比”,包含了所有行业的劳动收入占比数据。可访问http://www.bls.gov/lpc/lpcmethods.htm以了解该测量方法的构建细节。 [vii] 劳动收入占比也会表现出一定的弱周期性,在经济下滑时劳动收入占比通常会上升。但本文关注的焦点是劳动收入占比的长期趋势。 [viii] 需要说明的是,我们只考虑非金融企业。金融部门的收入不稳定是众所周知的,并且存在一些与其自身相关的测量问题——即股票期权和类似的一些支付手段常常被作为支付劳动报酬的方式。 [ix] 这里的占比数据指的是占总经济增加值的比重。与此同时,就业人口的比例结构也发生了类似幅度的转变。在这个时期内,农业部门也经历了相当严重的收缩。 [x] 数据来源于Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn,和Aysegul Sahin三位作者2013年的论文。这里的劳动收入占比指的是所有受雇劳工的劳动报酬占总经济增加值的比例。 [xi] 服务业中劳动收入占比的提升与William Baumol提出的“服务业的支出病”这一可追溯到上世纪60年代的概念有关,它指的是生产率在服务业中提升的难度本身就较高。可参阅Baumol 2012年的论文获取他最新的观点。 [xii] 这里的计算忽略了之前所提到过的对经营者收入的分解。不过对于制造业部门来说,经营者的收入本来也不会很高。 [xiii] 单位时间“工资”实际上也包含了福利和奖金,它们在总的劳动报酬中所占的比重一直在增加。 [xiv] 图4采纳了Susan Fleck, John Glaser和Shawn Sprague 2011年发表的论文中使用的方法,按照制造业产出的隐含价格指数对于产出的数值进行调整,并按照消费者价格指数对工资率的数值进行调整。 [xv] 一些同行可能会认为“还没有”这个说法并不是很诚实,因为对于经济学家们而言,在他们面临的任何问题面前,他们总是会提出一系列的假说,而得不到确定性的答案。 [xvi] 公平地说,上世纪90年代的情形并不是很符合这个理论,因为劳动生产率的提升在这个阶段的确加速了,而劳动收入占比的下降主要发生在本世纪的前十年中。参阅原文第6页对于技术和工资差异把高技能劳工和低技能劳工区分开来的讨论。 [xvii] 可参阅Margaret Jacobson和Filippo Occhino 2012年的论文对于劳动收入占比对收入不平等影响的研究。 [xviii] 可参阅Thomas Piketty和Emmanuel Saez 2003年的论文以及Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony Atkinson, Piketty和Saez 2013年的论文。 [xix] 学术界关于技术进步对于工人技能的有偏影响以及技能和资本的互补关系这两个论题已经作了大量的研究,Lawrance Katz和Kevin Murphy 1992年的论文,Per Krussel及合作者2002年的论文是这些领域重要的参考文献,但是两篇文章的技术性都很强。可以参阅Keith Sil 2002年发表在《商业评论》上的文章,以获得关于这些问题的更易于理解的讨论。 [xx] 最初观察到这个现象的是Wassily Leontif。可参阅Daniel Trefler 1993年的论文以获得使用更新的数据对国际贸易的要素内容的评估结果。然而,也有一些研究结果挑战他得到的结论,例如可参阅John Romalis 2004年的文章。 [xxi] Avraham Ebenstein及其合作者2013年的论文是一个典型的例子。若想获得对于之前研究结果的综述,可参考Stephen Golub 1998年的论文。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

自动时代的福利国家

昨天和小聂吃饭,聊起自动驾驶、机器人、失业和福利制度这一连串问题,早先我在《机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗?》一文中曾谈论过这事情,后来在微博上也有过讨论,自那以来的几次交谈,让我又有了些新想法,整理一下。

(我觉得这事情还是用对话体更容易表达清楚)

M:就像你在那篇文章里说的,随着机器智能与生产率提高、成本下降,到某个点之后,人类(或者可以更安全的说,大部分人类)的劳动在经济体系中将变得没有雇佣价值,那时候失业率岂不是会很高?

W:嗯,好像是这样。

M:这些失业者没有了收入,但手里仍然握着选票,所以到时候福利制度的大幅扩张就是不可避免的,对吧?

W:那倒不一定,失业者没有了工资收入,但可以有其他收入,只要他还拥有一些在当前经济体中租得出去的要素便可,或者更简单的说,只要他持有一份(比如)谷歌的股票便可。

M:可(more...)

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昨天和小聂吃饭,聊起自动驾驶、机器人、失业和福利制度这一连串问题,早先我在《机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗?》一文中曾谈论过这事情,后来在微博上也有过讨论,自那以来的几次交谈,让我又有了些新想法,整理一下。 (我觉得这事情还是用对话体更容易表达清楚) M:就像你在那篇文章里说的,随着机器智能与生产率提高、成本下降,到某个点之后,人类(或者可以更安全的说,大部分人类)的劳动在经济体系中将变得没有雇佣价值,那时候失业率岂不是会很高? W:嗯,好像是这样。 M:这些失业者没有了收入,但手里仍然握着选票,所以到时候福利制度的大幅扩张就是不可避免的,对吧? W:那倒不一定,失业者没有了工资收入,但可以有其他收入,只要他还拥有一些在当前经济体中租得出去的要素便可,或者更简单的说,只要他持有一份(比如)谷歌的股票便可。 M:可是我们没有理由认为,多数失业者恰好都持有足以维生的股权或其他资产,要点在于,劳动力要素是每个人生出来就自动拥有的,但其他资产则有很大偶然性,重要的是没有什么机制确保每个人自动带着它。 W:嗯,有道理,不过其实劳动力资本也不是人人自动带着的,比如很多类型的残疾人可能生来就不自动带着在市场上租得出去的人力资本,所以你的问题其实是:未来社会能够应付(比如)80%的残疾人比例吗?对此,历史经验确实无法告诉我们什么。 M:所以并不能排除这样的可能:半数以上的人失业且无产,因而大规模福利制度不可避免,对吧? W:但我们还可以考虑另一种可能性。假设80%的人失业了,但这些失业者还拥有一些土地(先别管这土地是怎么来的),这些土地和他们的劳动力一样,在当时的经济体系中已经没有出租价值,那么,这些人能否在这块土地上重新建立起一个自己的经济体系(姑且称为系统B)呢? 退一万步讲,即便他们采用18世纪的技术和生产模式,似乎也没有理由认为他们不能维持一个自足的经济体,尽管因为效率太低,系统B的产品在那个主流经济体(姑且称为系统A)中完全没有销路,但只要系统A的人不把阳光遮起来,系统B便可以存在,就像18世纪的世界(或者14世纪的美洲经济体)可以存在一样。 M:嗯,而且留在系统A里的人总会有一些慈善家,只要他们向系统B捐赠一些现代玩意,系统B的日子就会比18世纪的好得多。 问题是,为什么他们恰好有这块土地呢? W:或许系统A的人会大发善心,向系统B捐赠一块土地,让他们自己玩去,毕竟,这么做的代价要比一套巨型福利制度低多了,而且,现在不是也有自然保护区吗,他们难道不想保留几个文化公园? M:要是他们不发善心呢?这不仍是诉诸偶然性吗?和假设他们恰好拥有其他值钱要素有何不同? W:但是考虑到国家边界的存在,就没那么偶然了。当系统A的自动化程度不断加深,逐渐排除人类劳动力时,被排除者并非均匀分布于各国,考虑到人力禀赋、资源禀赋和制度条件的巨大差异,总会有一些国家被完全排除出系统A,于是它们便组成了系统B。 M:所以世界经济体在未来将发生两极分化,最终变成两个孤立的体系? W:看起来是这样,当然两个系统之间还是会有一些贸易,但贸易量微不足道,不具有系统性重要性,系统A基本上用不着系统B的任何资源,而系统B基本上买不起系统A的任何东西。 M:那留在系统A里的失业人口呢?不是仍然要福利制度养活? W:好像也不一定,理论上,若没有福利制度,这些失业者的较优选择是移民到系统B,当然搬家也有成本,所以系统A为了避免福利制度造成的代价,可以为他们支付船票和安家费。 M:嗯……不过以我对现实政治的经验,搬家的恐怕不是他们。 W:对!留在系统A里的显然将是少数派,而且他们是最有能力迁移的。 M:嗯嗯,实际上系统A的运行大概不需要太大的地方,实在不行漂在公海上都可以。 W:对,所以他们未必需要拼选票,只要有处可逃就行。 M:这一点又如何保证? W:依我看,只要仍然存在众多分立国家即可,那些坚持福利制度的国家,似乎更可能最终留在系统B里,所以千万别有全球统一政府。 M:就是说,就算美国再好,也不能只剩一个美国? W:没错。  
[微言]最低工资法

【2015-08-06】

@海德沙龙 自去年奥巴马开始发起提高最低工资的运动以来,康涅狄格率先响应,立法要求最低时薪两年内提高至$10.10,此后一些城市也迅速跟进,其中以加州城市最为积极,目前流行的口号是15美元,西雅图也于去年6月通过了法案,本文介绍了最低工资法的一种荒唐后果 http://t.cn/RLYmuRB

@whigzhou: 最低工资法是常见干预措施中最恶劣的一种(我本来想用恶毒/卑劣/无耻等道德意味更明确的词汇,不过想想还是算了,总不能完全排(more...)

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【2015-08-06】 @海德沙龙 自去年奥巴马开始发起提高最低工资的运动以来,康涅狄格率先响应,立法要求最低时薪两年内提高至$10.10,此后一些城市也迅速跟进,其中以加州城市最为积极,目前流行的口号是15美元,西雅图也于去年6月通过了法案,本文介绍了最低工资法的一种荒唐后果 http://t.cn/RLYmuRB @whigzhou: 最低工资法是常见干预措施中最恶劣的一种(我本来想用恶毒/卑劣/无耻等道德意味更明确的词汇,不过想想还是算了,总不能完全排除愚蠢的可能),它把最脆弱无助但又愿意通过自身努力改善生活的人残忍的驱逐出了劳动市场。正因其荒谬和恶劣程度,它也是观察公共政策氛围已恶化到何种程度的一个风向标。 @whigzhou: 对于无知起哄者,最低工资法是表达其伪善的最廉价方式,其主张无异于宣称,为改变穷人命运,你无须任何努力,只要改改数字就行,就像以为只要在脸书上点点赞就能帮助非洲难民,而这种廉价良心安慰法,正是某些政客最乐意兜售的 @whigzhou: 对于某些精明政客,借助最低工资法将最弱势群体驱逐出劳动市场,也为其继续兜售福利主义政策创造了需求,这一手法类似于秃蚣当年在农村发动割命时,通过破坏刻意农民的生计基础、制造仇恨,来为自己创造“群众基础”和炮灰来源 @lion_kittyyyyy:最低工资在美国历史上第一次出现就是为了挤出劳动力的。1911年在马塞诸塞州,妇女的收入在每周5刀-7刀,低于当时的最低生活标准。于是,最低工资倡议者H. LaRue Brown写道:“我们付出社会最宝贵的财富…(劳动)毁掉了那些本该成为高效的美国公民的女孩的身体。” @lion_kittyyyyy:1912年,马塞诸塞州通过了全国第一个最低工资法案,仅针对妇女与18岁以下儿童。
[译文]沃尔玛正在转变雇佣策略

Walmart Is Changing Its Labor Model: How Many Workers Will Lose Their Jobs?
沃尔玛正在改变其劳工模式:有多少工人会因此而失业?

作者:Tim Worstall @ 2015-9-06
译者:黑色枪骑兵(@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:福布斯,http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/09/06/walmart-is-changing-its-labor-model-how-many-workers-will-lose-their-jobs/

Walmart is quite significantly changing its labor model. Moving from a near hire any live body and let them get on with it one to something where people are well trained, well paid and presumably of rather higher productivity.

沃尔玛正在对其劳工模式进行大刀阔斧的改革。从之前的“几乎是个活人就愿意雇佣,并让他们一直干下去”逐步转变为“让员工接受更好的培训,拿到更高的薪水,以期带来更高的生产率”。

This is what many have been crying out for the company to do for years of course: move to something closer to the Costco model than the one that Walmart has traditionally pursued.

当然,许多人一直就迫切呼吁沃尔玛采取这些行动:从沃尔玛的传统模式转向更类似于Costco的模式。

However, as some like me have been pointing out all along there is a flip side to that change in models. Which is that the end aim is of course to employ fewer of those more productive people at those higher wages.

然而,一些人,比如我,自始至终认为这一模式改变存在负面影响。这种改革的最终目的,是以更高的工资雇佣数量更少但是生产率更高的员工。

The point (more...)

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Walmart Is Changing Its Labor Model: How Many Workers Will Lose Their Jobs? 沃尔玛正在改变其劳工模式:有多少工人会因此而失业? 作者:Tim Worstall @ 2015-9-06 译者:黑色枪骑兵(@忠勇仁义诚实可靠小郎君) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:福布斯,http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/09/06/walmart-is-changing-its-labor-model-how-many-workers-will-lose-their-jobs/ Walmart is quite significantly changing its labor model. Moving from a near hire any live body and let them get on with it one to something where people are well trained, well paid and presumably of rather higher productivity. 沃尔玛正在对其劳工模式进行大刀阔斧的改革。从之前的“几乎是个活人就愿意雇佣,并让他们一直干下去”逐步转变为“让员工接受更好的培训,拿到更高的薪水,以期带来更高的生产率”。 This is what many have been crying out for the company to do for years of course: move to something closer to the Costco model than the one that Walmart has traditionally pursued. 当然,许多人一直就迫切呼吁沃尔玛采取这些行动:从沃尔玛的传统模式转向更类似于Costco的模式。 However, as some like me have been pointing out all along there is a flip side to that change in models. Which is that the end aim is of course to employ fewer of those more productive people at those higher wages. 然而,一些人,比如我,自始至终认为这一模式改变存在负面影响。这种改革的最终目的,是以更高的工资雇佣数量更少但是生产率更高的员工。 The point being that if one can raise productivity levels by more than the increase in cost then of course profits will rise: that being the end goal for all shareholder owned companies. 这个观点的核心在于:如果提升的生产率超过所增的花费,收益就会提升——这是所有股份制公司的终极目标。 The interesting question is going to be how many people either lose or don’t get jobs as a result of this strategic change: and I’ll suggest a method by which we can calculate this a little later. 那么一个有趣的问题就来了:有多少人会由于这种战略性转变而失去或者得不到工作呢?稍后我会推荐一个计算这个数值的方法。 There’s two prongs to Walmart’s new approach. The first is to take a leaf from Henry Ford’s book with that $5 a day thing: 沃尔玛的新方案包括两部分。第一部分是照着亨利·福特的“每天五美元”画葫芦:
One motive is better public relations at a time when inequality is a hot-button political issue. But bottom-line calculations also play a role. 当分配不均成为一个热点政治话题的时候,更好的公共关系就成了动机之一。但实际利益计算也发挥了作用。 Employee turnover costs money—by industry estimates as much as $5,000 per front-line worker, or 20% to 30% of an entry-level salary. 员工的流动替换是要花钱的——按业内估计,每位一线工人的流动所费多达5000美元,也就是入门级薪水的20%到30%。 Standard turnover in retail is 50% in the first six months. If Wal-Mart can reduce this churn, persuading people to stay at least 12 to 18 months, it will save “tens of millions of dollars a year,” according to Ms. Oliver. 零售业员工在工作头六个月内的流动率通常是50%。如果沃尔玛能减少这种流动,劝说员工至少工作12到18个月,照Ms. Oliver 的估计,“每年能省下数千万美元”。
As I explained way back here, Henry Ford’s $5 a day was not what most people think it was. It was most certainly not, as all too many would have it, so that the newly richer workers could all buy a Model T. 我老早之前就已说过,亨利·福特的“每天五美元”并不是大多数人想象的那个样子。这么做的目的,根本就不是许多人所理解的那样,要让那些新富工人都能买T型轿车。 That would have been a great way to lose lots of money. A company cannot pay its own workers more, then see profits rise as they spend that cash on the company’s products. 想大把亏钱的人才会那么干。一个公司不能向他的员工支付更多薪水,并期待员工会把钱花到自家公司的产品上,然后公司利润会增加。 This is trying to raise yourself by your bootlaces. It also wasn’t about trying to create a vibrant midle class. What it was about was reducing the job churn on the assembly line. 这相当于是要拎着自己的靴带把自己提起来。这么做,也不是为了塑造一个有活力的中产阶级。它要做的,只是减少装配线上的人员流动。 Ford was getting through 50,000 workers a year in order to have 13,000 working on the line at any one time. That had vast recruitment and training costs. 福特每年雇佣50000名工人,以保证生产线上时刻都有13000名工人工作。这需要庞大的招募和训练费用。 So, that’s what Walmart is doing here. Let’s see if we can reduce those costs by having less churn. 所以,这就是沃尔玛现在要做的事。让我们看看减少人员流动能否减少这些花费。 That, in turn, means perhaps not bottom fishing in the labor market but improving pay relative to others so that people will stick around a little longer. 这反过来意味着,也许不再从劳动市场底层招人,而是比别家支付更高的工资,以期员工能待得更久。 This could well be a good move too but only time will tell. 这可能是一招好棋,但是效果只能交给时间检验了。 There’s also a second prong to the new strategy: 这项计划还有另一部分。
Front-line employees—cashiers, cart pushers and sales associates—will now spend their first months at the company in a supervised on-the-job training program. 现在,一线员工,比如收银员、手推车整理员和销售助理,入职后的头几个月会在公司接受有人指导的在职训练计划。 In the past, they sat through a few days of orientation and safety drills, many of them focused on compliance with environmental and health regulations. 过去,他们会耐着性子接受几天新人指导和安全训练,这些训练大多数集中在遵守环境条例和卫生条例上。 The only real job training happened in the store—knowledge passed on by more experienced employees. 在店里接受的唯一真正的工作培训是由更有经验的员工传授的知识。
There’s two sides to this. One is the obvious point that if you’re expecting your workers to stick around longer then you’re also going to be willing to invest in them rather more. 这件事是有两面性的。一方面很明显,那就是如果你预期你的雇员会待得更久,那么同样,你也将会更加乐于在他们身上投资。 Because you’ll be able to amortise your investment in them over that longer period that they’re working for you. 因为你在他们身上的投资会随着他们为你工作时间的增长而分期收回。 And there’s the more obvious point of that end goal: better trained workers will be, ceteris paribus, more productive. And thus we can see that Walmart is trying to move from one labor model to another: 另一个更为明显的作用就是终极目标的实现:训练更好的员工,让他们在相同条件下生产率更高。因此我们能明白沃尔玛正在推进劳工模式的转变:
Economists who study retail distinguish between “low-road” and “high-road” employers. One group keeps labor costs down, the other invests more in workers and reaps the benefits in higher productivity. Cost-conscious Wal-Mart is trying to move toward the high road. 研究零售的经济学家区分“低端”和“高端”雇主。前者压底劳工成本,后者会给员工更多的投资,然后通过更高的生产率获益。注重节约成本的沃尔玛正在向“高端”的方向靠拢。
This is all entirely traditional labor economics by the way, there’s nothing mysterious about any of it. However, there is a sting in the tail here. 顺便说一下,这全部都是传统劳动经济学的内容,没什么神秘的。然而,这里有一个令人始料未及的缺陷。 For well over a decade now I’ve been pointing out that yes, sure, Costco pays its workers very much better than Walmart does. But it also uses, per unit of sales, about half the labor that Walmart does. 十多年来,我一直在说,是的,没错,Costco支付给员工的薪水比沃尔玛要多很多。但是达成单位销量时,它用的劳动力大约是沃尔玛的一半。 Thus the shouting that Walmart can and should pay its workers like Costco does comes with that sting in that tail: for moving to the same pay structure would entail at least attempting to move to the same productivity levels. 因此“沃尔玛能够且应该像Costco一样支付工资”这种呼吁就有个意料之外的缺陷:因为采取相同的工资结构就意味着至少需要尝试把生产率拉到相同的水平。 Meaning that Walmart would employ about half the number of people per unit of sales than it currently does. 这就意味着,将来沃尔玛单位销量的雇工数量将只有目前数量的一半。 And now we’re seeing that Walmart is taking at least baby steps to that higher road labor model. And the interesting thing is going to be, well, is the prediction about employment levels going to come true too? 现在我们正目睹沃尔玛在向着“高端”劳工模式蹒跚学步。值得关注的事情将是,关于雇佣水平的预期真的会实现吗? Just in a little more detail. Productivity is the amount of work (really, the amount of value added) that we get from one hour of labor. Raising productivity thus means getting more value added from one hour of labor. 再说得详细一点。生产率是劳动力每小时的工作量(实际上,是增加的价值量)。那么提高生产率就意味着从单位劳动量里得到更多的增加值。 And if sales are static that then obviously also means using less labor per unit of sales. 如果销售不变,那么这就明显意味着用更少的劳动力达成单位销量。 Thus raising productivity is the very same thing as saying that less labor is going to be used. This still holds even if sales or output rise: there’s still less labor going to be used than there would have been at the earlier, lower, level of labor productivity. 那么提高生产率就等同于使用更少的劳动力。销量或者产出上升的时候,这一点依然成立:需要用到的劳动力比之前劳动生产率水平更低的时候更少。 And the way to test it is pretty simple, because we can find the numbers we need to measure labor productivity in the Walmart accounts. 验证的方式很简单,因为我们能从沃尔玛的账目中找到所需的用来衡量劳动生产率的数字。 We know the number employed in the US….some 1.4 million….and we know what sales are in the US…$288 billion….so labor productivity is $205,000 and change per worker. 我们知道沃尔玛在美国的雇员数量,大约一百四十万,我们也知道它在美国境内的销售额,2880亿美元,所以劳动生产率是大约是每个员工205000美元多一点。 That’s actually sales not value added but that still gives us what we want, a number to compare over time (Costco’s sales per employee are about double this). 这个数据事实上是销售额而不是增加值,但是我们还是能从中得到我们想要的,即可以进行跨时段对比的数据。(Costco的每位雇员销售额大约是这个数字的两倍) As labor productivity rises as a result of more training and lower churn from the pay rises then we would expect to see this number rise. 当劳动生产率随着培训增加以及工资提升导致的流动率降低而增长时,我们可以预期上述数字会增加。 More sales per employee. And then we will also be able to calculate how many jobs have been lost to this rise in productivity. 每个员工将对应更多的销售量。然后我们就能计算出有多少工作岗位会由于生产率的上升而减少。 For, say, that sales rise to $250k per employee. We can then calculate how many employees would have been needed if productivity was still the old, lower, number. 因为,假设人均销量上升至25万美元。我们可以计算,如果生产率还是之前的老的、比较低的数值,那将需要多少雇员。 The number of jobs lost will therefore be the difference between the number actually employed and the number who would have been without the productivity gain. 工作岗位的流失量就是实际雇佣员工数和生产率增加之前本该雇佣的人数的差额。 Yes, obviously, we would need to discount this for the general inflation rate. 当然,我们要给这个数字打个折,因为存在通胀因素。 My prediction is that productivity will indeed rise at Walmart in the coming years. And also that sales per employee will rise, meaning that the number employed will fall. 我的预期是,沃尔玛的生产率确实会在未来几年逐步上升,人均销售额也会提升,这就意味着被雇佣的人数会减少。 Not fall necessarily from the current absolute level, but fall relative to where it would have been absent the productivity increase. 这种减少不是说其绝对值一定会低于当前水平,而是说它会相对地低于生产率没有增加时本该达到的水平。 Anyone want to bet against that prediction? 有人想跟我赌赌这个预测吗? (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[微言]快递业的格雷欣法则

【2015-04-17】

@whigzhou: 劳动力供给急剧萎缩,各小快递又撑着不敢涨价,服务质量只能劣化,#名义价格刚性#又一例,原理和#格雷欣法则#类似,名义价格最容易比较,服务质量不容易比较,率先涨价者容易找死,除非另起品牌,否则谁都不敢涨价,问题是谁有能力乘机创立新品牌。

 

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【2015-04-17】 @whigzhou: 劳动力供给急剧萎缩,各小快递又撑着不敢涨价,服务质量只能劣化,#名义价格刚性#又一例,原理和#格雷欣法则#类似,名义价格最容易比较,服务质量不容易比较,率先涨价者容易找死,除非另起品牌,否则谁都不敢涨价,问题是谁有能力乘机创立新品牌。  
[微言]行业特征与罢工

【2015-03-02】

@黄章晋ster 具有哪些特征的行业最容易罢工?目前我能想出的最难罢工的应当是律师。又,喜欢并且能够灌输类似『狼性』的企业是不是大都位于这个坐标的中间位置?而且,一般能够灌输类似狼性教育,多半意味着罢工风险已被极大降低?@whigzhou

@whigzhou: 以罢工相威胁的集体议价只是劳工卡特尔谋求垄断租金的一种方式,另一种是人为抬高准入门槛,律师和医生等professional行业用的是第二种,因为集体议价需要满足一些条件:专业技能要求不高,劳动生产率在行业内大致无差别,不需要复杂的激(more...)

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【2015-03-02】 @黄章晋ster 具有哪些特征的行业最容易罢工?目前我能想出的最难罢工的应当是律师。又,喜欢并且能够灌输类似『狼性』的企业是不是大都位于这个坐标的中间位置?而且,一般能够灌输类似狼性教育,多半意味着罢工风险已被极大降低?@whigzhou @whigzhou: 以罢工相威胁的集体议价只是劳工卡特尔谋求垄断租金的一种方式,另一种是人为抬高准入门槛,律师和医生等professional行业用的是第二种,因为集体议价需要满足一些条件:专业技能要求不高,劳动生产率在行业内大致无差别,不需要复杂的激励结构(因而报酬结构简单),才可能议出一套统一工资率。 @黄章晋ster:另外,企业灌输的狼性教育,其抽象出来的价值观与党性教育推崇的价值观有多大重合度? @whigzhou: 不知道狼性是啥东东 @whigzhou: 实际上律师和医生在人为抬高准入门槛方面做得很成功,因此获得了相当高的垄断租金,老弗里德曼好像专门讲过这事情 @whigzhou: 至于独立开业或身为(或有望成为)合伙人的律师或医生,算不上雇员,不在讨论之列 @skywide:呵呵,编剧薪酬差距大薪酬结构非常复杂,但是其罢工并不罕见。 @whigzhou: 这里的“罢工”指的是以工资议价为目的的集体行动,不包括个人罢工或其他目的(比如政治性目的)的罢工 @skywide:就是工资议价为目的啊,好莱坞编剧罢工过。还有NBA和棒球联盟的球员,他们的薪酬差距和薪酬结构更大更复杂,也经常性的罢工或威胁罢工。 @whigzhou: 哦,那我不知道
[微言]机器与失业

【2013-07-28】

@whigzhou: 旧#饭文#机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗? http://t.cn/zQxHVEY ……常见的乐观说法是,机器在一些岗位上取代人时,因为提高了生产率,将抬高总产出,从而在别处创造出新的就业机会;这没错,问题是,上述过程所创造的新就业机会是否足以弥补它所消灭的呢?没有任何经济学原理能够保证这一点,具体效……

@慕容飞宇gg:如果过了临界点会发生什么?我能想到的就是绝大多数人都去做自耕农…?…另外,如果机器能够自动制造机器……

@whigzhou: 如果他有一块自己动手种就够养活自己的土地,他坐着收租大概也够养活自己……也就是说,很大一部分人将靠劳动力以外的要素的租金生活

@飞洒过:单纯的体力劳动和脑力劳动都可以被机器代替,所以人们可能必须更(more...)

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【2013-07-28】 @whigzhou: 旧#饭文#机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗? http://t.cn/zQxHVEY ……常见的乐观说法是,机器在一些岗位上取代人时,因为提高了生产率,将抬高总产出,从而在别处创造出新的就业机会;这没错,问题是,上述过程所创造的新就业机会是否足以弥补它所消灭的呢?没有任何经济学原理能够保证这一点,具体效…… @慕容飞宇gg:如果过了临界点会发生什么?我能想到的就是绝大多数人都去做自耕农…?…另外,如果机器能够自动制造机器…… @whigzhou: 如果他有一块自己动手种就够养活自己的土地,他坐着收租大概也够养活自己……也就是说,很大一部分人将靠劳动力以外的要素的租金生活 @飞洒过:单纯的体力劳动和脑力劳动都可以被机器代替,所以人们可能必须更多的从事具有创造性的工作。 @whigzhou: 未来的机器也会从事创造性工作 @abada张宏兵:极多人都失业了,没有收入了,那么开动机器生产的大量产品又卖给谁呢?可能:机器产的东西十分便宜,以至于人每周工作几小时就可买到比以往更高质量的生活。这几小时的服务业工作,机器暂无法替代,例如广告创意、工业或时尚设计、美容 @whigzhou: 失业≠没有收入,可以有非劳动要素的租金收入 @abada张宏兵:可能:机器产的东西十分便宜,以至于人每周工作几小时就可买到比以往更高质量的生活。这几小时的服务业工作,机器暂无法替代,例如广告创意、工业或时尚设计、美容、为人按摩或洗脚,等等等等 @whigzhou: 对,可能永远会有一些消费者介意服务者是否真人,届时洗脚之前会要求先看出生证明? @西风独步2012:有不动产者生存?人口怎么变化 @whigzhou: 也可以是机器奴隶或谷歌股票啊 @Stimmung:长期来看收入都是地租?房地产才是唯一有前途的行业啊 @whigzhou: 我们图灵教徒认为更可能是算法:) @月光疾风_玄间雷同:因为生产力提高而担心的失业率其实是杞人忧天。生产力不足才是担心的,而担心生产力太高很奇怪 。如果高到很多人不用工作,吃喝不愁,这有什么不好呢?即使就业不充分(这个其实也不一定,人的需求不断变高会不断创造新的行业 @whigzhou: 如果我让你看出我担心了,那是我表情肌没控制好:) @喂羊的月亮熊:我们意面飞天教认为是美食~ @whigzhou: recipe也是算法 @_dailu_:可能我们又到了一个大的转型期,要开始面对少数人工作即可养活全世界、多数人无工可干的社会,这在政治上,可能意味着回到精英政治(相对现在的民主政治),文化上,恐怕就不会再以劳动、自立为荣,而树立新的价值衡量标准了。 @whigzhou: 嗯,我想的比较近,至少,继续把失业率作为一个重要政策指标是很过时的做法了 @I__人__I:拥有了智能的新物种-AI还会傻傻的为满足人类的需求而工作吗,到时候大概是人类和AI之间的生存竞争了。给人类看的电影黑客帝国满足人类的意淫,人类救世主拯救人类,现实一点的话我 @whigzhou: 人类的优势是有机会在机器强大到能够无视人类意志之前加以阻止,不过这确实不容易,可能比防止核扩散更难 @衰尾道人秦假仙:劳动产值提高了,大家生活水平提高了,自然欲望和需求就增多了,文化产业和消费行业会进入更鼎盛的阶段。就业率担忧只看到了增长的物质生产,却没有看到人们也不断增长的物质需求。50年前的人能想象现在软件业的规模吗? @whigzhou: 问题是多数肉人在未来“文化产业和消费行业”也未必有优势  
[饭文]机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗?

机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗?
辉格
2013年3月4日

近年来,随着信息技术变得日益强劲,它正在向产业链的各个角落迅速渗透,从设计、加工、物流,到办公、管理、供应链组织、市场交易、娱乐、社交,乃至研究部门,无孔不入,计算能力和自动化设施正在越来越多的工种和岗位上取代人力。

有人甚至认为,金融危机后的复苏过程中,就业率的回升明显滞后于消费、投资、资产价值和企业盈利等各大指标,原因之一便是企业在危机后的新一轮扩张中,更多的投资于自动化设施而非劳动力,包括制造业向美国的局部回归,也将是一次基于深度自动化的回归。

那么,机器真的会将大批劳动力挤出就业市场吗?对此,常见的乐观说法是,机器在一些岗位上取代人时,因为提高了生产率,将抬高总产出,从而在别处创造出新的就业机会;这没错,问题是,上述过程所创造的新就业机会是否足以弥补它所消灭的呢?

没有任(more...)

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机器会将人挤出劳动市场吗? 辉格 2013年3月4日 近年来,随着信息技术变得日益强劲,它正在向产业链的各个角落迅速渗透,从设计、加工、物流,到办公、管理、供应链组织、市场交易、娱乐、社交,乃至研究部门,无孔不入,计算能力和自动化设施正在越来越多的工种和岗位上取代人力。 有人甚至认为,金融危机后的复苏过程中,就业率的回升明显滞后于消费、投资、资产价值和企业盈利等各大指标,原因之一便是企业在危机后的新一轮扩张中,更多的投资于自动化设施而非劳动力,包括制造业向美国的局部回归,也将是一次基于深度自动化的回归。 那么,机器真的会将大批劳动力挤出就业市场吗?对此,常见的乐观说法是,机器在一些岗位上取代人时,因为提高了生产率,将抬高总产出,从而在别处创造出新的就业机会;这没错,问题是,上述过程所创造的新就业机会是否足以弥补它所消灭的呢? 没有任何经济学原理能够保证这一点,具体效果将视所在产业和整个经济体的要素结构而定,假如机器渗透发生在一个劳动密集型产业,而由其产出提高所带动的、以及因总收入提高而拉动的其他产业,若劳动密集程度远低于前者,那么总的效果便可能是降低了劳动需求,从而压低工资率或抬高失业率。 也就是说,伴随着结构变动的收入增长,未必惠及每个人,在新的生产函数所对应的要素结构中,某些要素的地位可能下降了,因而将得到更少的报酬;对此有人可能会说,这种情况下工人会降低工资要价,从而在较低的均衡位置上重新实现充分就业。 问题是,当机器变得足够廉价,乃至雇佣某人的交易和管理费用超出雇佣同等能力机器的成本时,即便工资降到零也没有雇主会雇佣他,这是完全可能的,比如今天的可乐罐装厂大概不会雇佣任何搬运工去替代自动传送带,即便工资为零。 或许有人会说,假如机器果真会让大批工人失业,那么这些失去劳动报酬的人很快就会饿死,于是就业市场又会在一个较低水平上实现均衡,但实际上当代社会不大会出现这种局面,首先,失业者未必是无产者,可能拥有其他要素,而这些要素在新的生产结构中仍得到了雇佣,其次,即便他们得不到任何要素报酬,也可能得到政府或慈善组织的援助而继续生存下去,并处于毫无指望的长期失业状态。 说明机器排挤效果的最有力案例,是马的命运,历史上,马曾被大量雇佣于农业和交通运输业,但在蒸汽机和铁路发明后,它们很快被排挤出内河与陆地干线运输,内燃机出现后,更被全面排挤出支线与城市运输、农耕和军事领域;这一过程生产率和总收入都有巨大提高,但并未为马创造出多少就业机会,休闲、竞技和博彩业雇佣的马匹或许增加了一些,但与消失的岗位相比,只是九牛一毛。(见Gregory Clark: A Farewell To Alms, p.12) 当然,马被排挤后并未抬高长期失业率,因为马的数量很快减少了,但被机器排挤的人类却更可能继续生存下去并生育同样多、甚至更多的后代,结果,人口中越来越大的部分将处于长期失业状态,这个比例将随机器能力提高和成本下降而扩大,并且没有什么原理显示它存在一个上限。 乐观者最后一根稻草是诉诸经验:工业革命以来机器渗透已持续了两百多年,每轮浪潮会造成阶段性失业,但此后更繁荣的经济总是创造了更多就业机会和更高的工资率,在机器化最为深入的美国,失业率并不高,而且多半都能用其他因素来解释。 迄今为止确实如此,但那可能只是因为我们尚未越过临界点,当生产模式所对应的要素结构中劳动还占很高比例,人所能完成的任务大部分还未能被机器有效率的替代,机器因推动增长而带来的岗位就可能弥补它所挤掉的,但假如这一比例翻转过来,当生产结构中的大部分岗位,人对机器都已丧失比较优势,情况就不同了。 临界点的位置,取决于人类与机器的能力对比,由于我们不能指望人类禀赋在可见未来会有所改变,而机器则在迅猛进步,因而只能相信:临界点迟早会被越过;或许我们正在逼近它,或者全球经济作为整体已经越过了它,只是大规模失业并未均匀分配,而更多的被留在了南欧和非洲?  
饭文#W9:苹果和富士康的成功不是他们的罪证

苹果和富士康的成功不是他们的罪证
辉格
2012年2月17日

苹果最近厄运连连,而且都与中国有关,一边是iPad商标案败诉,产品被大面积下架,而同时在美国又遭遇了一轮大规模抗议和抵制浪潮,抗议它无情压榨中国工人血汗;对于后者,苹果很快表现出了屈服姿态,宣布邀请公平劳工协会(FLA)开展对包括富士康在内的代工企业劳动状况的调查。

乍看起来,这场抗议显得有些突兀,因为最近并未发生涉及劳动条件的事件,或揭露出什么人所未知的丑陋现象,也没有报道显示这方面状况正在恶化,《纽约时报》上月25日发表的那篇长篇报道(它是抗议的最初导火索),提到的事实多半算不(more...)

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苹果和富士康的成功不是他们的罪证 辉格 2012年2月17日 苹果最近厄运连连,而且都与中国有关,一边是iPad商标案败诉,产品被大面积下架,而同时在美国又遭遇了一轮大规模抗议和抵制浪潮,抗议它无情压榨中国工人血汗;对于后者,苹果很快表现出了屈服姿态,宣布邀请公平劳工协会(FLA)开展对包括富士康在内的代工企业劳动状况的调查。 乍看起来,这场抗议显得有些突兀,因为最近并未发生涉及劳动条件的事件,或揭露出什么人所未知的丑陋现象,也没有报道显示这方面状况正在恶化,《纽约时报》上月25日发表的那篇长篇报道(它是抗议的最初导火索),提到的事实多半算不上新闻,连用作篇首引子的富士康成都工厂爆炸案,也是发生在八个月前的旧闻。 不过,有两个背景可以帮助我们理解这场抗议,第一个解释了为何它发生在现在,奥巴马的任期就快结束了,可是,他曾许下无数诺言,也用尽心思、耍尽手腕试图解决的失业问题,却始终不见起色,眼看大选来临,他需要一个替罪羊,他在汇率和劳工条件上对中国的种种指责,无非是想告诉选民:是他们抢走了你们的饭碗;在这一点上,他和民主党、制造业工会、以及同属左派阵营的劳工维权组织和进步派媒体形成了共鸣。 第二个背景解释了为何苹果被选为目标,iPhone带给苹果的成功太辉煌了,短短几年内让它从一个刚刚摆脱困境而小有起色的企业,变成了全球最赚钱、市值最高的公司,也就难免让它成为反资本主义力量的头号目标;其次,iPhone的高利润率确实太令人羡妒了,它以1/3左右的市场占有率,获取了智能手机市场2/3以上的利润,在最新发表的一份报告里,它甚至仅以8.7%的市场占有率,获取了整个手机市场3/4的利润,如此丰厚的盈利,相对于微薄的代工收入,让苹果成了描绘“血汗压榨者”形象的理想模特。 然而,指责和抗议苹果的人,忽视了一个关键的道理:你不能用代工成本在产品的整个成本结构中所占的比例,来评估这个产品的“血汗”程度,否则你会得到荒谬的结果;代工成本比例低,首先是因为苹果的毛利高,手机行业的平均毛利是百分之十几,而iPhone高达60-70%,所以代工成本只占2、3个百分点,低于行业水平,假如苹果将价格降低一半,毛利便与平均水平相当,代工成本比例也就翻了一番,但很明显,这个价格决定与代工厂工人的待遇没有丝毫关系。 假如成本比例是评估血汗的恰当指标,那就意味着,过手材料越昂贵、最终产品越有价值的制造业,就越血汗,而最血汗的劳工大概就是金融交易所的雇员了,交易商从每笔大额交易中获取的佣金常常只有万分之几,而最不血汗的,将是那些手工编织草席的工人,他们的加工费构成了产品成本的绝大部分——很难找到比这更荒谬的评估方法了。 实际上,到达代工厂的材料成本已经占了手机成本的一大半,所以尽管代工成本只占4、5个百分点,但绝大多数手机制造商仍只能苦苦挣扎在盈亏点附近,唯独苹果有能力将价格定的这么高,这是因为它拥有一些无可替代的独特资源,包括技术、设计、工艺、口碑和品牌感召力,而这些都是苹果员工数十年心血与汗水换来的,他们有完全正当的理由对他们的血汗成果收取租金,你不能仅仅因为他的成功而指责他。 代工成本所占比例低,也是因为代工业的高度发达,以富士康为代表的台湾代工企业,将大规模制造的效率潜能发挥到了极致,这是一项值得赞美的产业成就,它不仅改进了产业效率,也大幅提升了中国大陆的劳工条件,这是不能用成本比例来衡量的;试想,同样一条百人流水线,假如每天过手1000部iPhone,比每天过手500部,在成本结构中的比例可能降低了30%,但每位工人的收入却可能提高了60%。 技术创新、设备改良、流水线设计、工艺和管理改进,专业化和规模化,都可能带来这样的变化,这是值得欣慰的进步,你不能仅仅因为代工厂商让每位工人在单位时间内制造出了更多产品同时也获得更多收入而指责他,但有些人只顾用简单数字和错误逻辑拼凑修辞效果,这么做只能哗众取宠,对于探察真相没有任何好处。 那些在劳工问题上指责苹果乃至将制造业转移到中国的其他跨国公司的人,或者完全不了解中国劳动市场上正在发生的事情,或者他们很清楚但故意装聋作哑——这里的劳动条件正在以人类史上罕见的速度迅速改善;已经连续几年,中国境内的企业遭遇着一年比一年严重的招工困难,短短几年之内,劳动市场已全面转变为卖方市场。 这一变化,既不是远在万里之外的美国或国际劳工组织努力的结果,也不是政府制订更严厉劳动法规的结果,它首先是人口形势扭转的结果:劳动力供给正在以每年一两百万的速度萎缩,其次,也是制造业全球转移的结果,这其中就包括了苹果这样的代工大客户,得益于过去20年大转移过程中所建立的产业体系和基础设施,如今虽然劳动成本猛涨,中国在制造业全球分工中仍占有相当优势。 近几年随着富士康实施内迁战略,其工厂所到之处,地区工资水平和工人对雇主的待遇要求,都立即会被抬高,如此立竿见影、实实在在的效果,还没有任何一部法规或任何劳工组织能够做到,这些,难道不是那些宣称以劳工权益为奋斗目标的组织和抗议者们所乐意看到的结果吗?
饭文#78: 衰退期的裁员策略

衰退期的裁员策略
辉格
2009年1月6日

近日盛传微软和IBM将于本月实施大规模裁员,涉及人数都在一万以上。随着金融危机向实体经济蔓延,大企业裁员的消息接踵而来,或许人们早已习以为常,视为理所当然之事了。但如果你仔细观察这些裁员安排,会发现它们背后的动机,其实十分的不同。

最易于理解的是那些遭受危机直接冲击、业务量大幅下降而导致大量员工空闲的企业,比如海运市场的大起大落导致目前集装箱和船舶制造业几乎全面熄火,裁员是必然的;有些企业业务量虽能维持,但利润被大幅压缩,也被迫紧缩成(more...)

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衰退期的裁员策略
辉格
2009年1月6日

近日盛传微软和IBM将于本月实施大规模裁员,涉及人数都在一万以上。随着金融危机向实体经济蔓延,大企业裁员的消息接踵而来,或许人们早已习以为常,视为理所当然之事了。但如果你仔细观察这些裁员安排,会发现它们背后的动机,其实十分的不同。

最易于理解的是那些遭受危机直接冲击、业务量大幅下降而导致大量员工空闲的企业,比如海运市场的大起大落导致目前集装箱和船舶制造业几乎全面熄火,裁员是必然的;有些企业业务量虽能维持,但利润被大幅压缩,也被迫紧缩成本来维持盈利,而裁员是紧缩成本的常规手段;另一些企业,销售量和利润均能维持,但由于金融危机造成信贷条件恶化,从银行和外部投资者那里,不再能像以前那么容易的获得运营和投资所需的现金,因而必须为自己储备更多现金,他们也常常借助裁员等成本压缩手段来改善现金流。

上述几种情况是容易看出的,也是被观察者们最多提及的裁员动机,这里我想说明的,是常常被忽视的另一种情况:有些企业在业务量、利润和现金流方面均无困难,但也会大量裁员,他们的目的是利用衰退所造成的有利的劳动供需局面,来改善他们的雇员结构,简单说就是,1)抛掉他们早就想抛掉的包袱,2)腾空位置以便伺机吸纳大批优秀员工;关键在于,他们在衰退期做这两件事的代价比在繁荣期低得多,而成功的机会则大得多。

一个好企业,在确保组织结构稳定性的同时,必须维持一定的员工流动性,以便时时淘汰不胜任工作、不适合岗位或不适应企业文化的员工,吸纳更优秀、更合适的新人。管理者在寻找稳定性和流动性的平衡点时,会考虑更新雇员的成本,无论批量裁员还是个别解聘,都会产生不小的代价:岗位交接带来的学习与磨合成本,遣散费和招聘费用,工会的抵制,公共关系损害,法律义务和政策代价,其它员工的心理影响,对雇主品牌的损害,等等。因为存在这诸多成本,新来者的劳动价值必须比被替换者的高出很多,更新才是值得的。

衰退从两方面改变了成本收益算式,从而将均衡点移向了流动一侧。首先,它大幅提高了新来者和被替换者的价值落差,在裁员浪潮汹涌、失业率高涨的条件下,大批平时求之不得的优秀人才突然间变得唾手可得,且代价低廉;同时,充足的供给也降低了招聘和猎头费用;企业要想抓住这一难得机遇,必须事先腾空足够的位置,并做好结构重组和岗位调整的预案,而裁员计划是其中重点。

其次,衰退大幅降低了裁员成本:高失业率削弱了工会的谈判地位和抵制能力;衰退前景会迫使政府放松严苛的劳工法和雇佣管制,以避免大规模倒闭潮;衰退期内的规模裁员被视为理所当然,因而其公共关系损害和员工心理影响都小于平时,对雇主品牌的影响也较为温和,相反,通过事先腾空位置,当他们在合适的时机再次出手时,他们有望成为招聘会上的白马王子,甚至救世主,成为被热烈追捧的对象,这对增进他们的雇主品牌形象极为有利。

上述分析如果成立,将意味着在衰退期内几乎所有具规模的企业都有批量裁员的动机,但同时也意味着,其中许多企业在裁员之后的几个季度内将重新招聘,在宏观上,将表现为失业率首先将有一个急剧的上升,然后缓慢回落,虽然在两三年内都可能难以回到危机前的水平。雇佣制度的灵活性,是市场机制所带来的灵活性的重要组成部分,好的企业将利用它度过危机甚至谋得比危机前更好的地位,对此,政府不必加以干涉,让市场机制自行发挥作用,只有保持活力的企业才能带来下一轮繁荣。