含有〈制度〉标签的文章(261)

朗朗上口

【2016-06-26】

@whigzhou: @sw小橘子 问我『制度决定下限,文化决定上限』这句话是不是我说的,我说这么格拉德维尔的话不像是我说的,不过这句话确实道出了一些真相,并且和我的社会进化理论相合,我的理论就是雪球模型,从人性到文化到基础政治结构到制度到可见的繁荣状况,每一外层的可能性皆受制于内层的性质与禀赋,

@whigzhou: 所以从短期看,内层结构的性质限制着外层的可能性,而从长期看,特定性质的外层的持续存在,对内层也构成了选择压力,因而也改变着内层的性质,我将这一改变称为(广义的)鲍德温效应。

@whigzhou: 我也(more...)

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【2016-06-26】 @whigzhou: @sw小橘子 问我『制度决定下限,文化决定上限』这句话是不是我说的,我说这么格拉德维尔的话不像是我说的,不过这句话确实道出了一些真相,并且和我的社会进化理论相合,我的理论就是雪球模型,从人性到文化到基础政治结构到制度到可见的繁荣状况,每一外层的可能性皆受制于内层的性质与禀赋, @whigzhou: 所以从短期看,内层结构的性质限制着外层的可能性,而从长期看,特定性质的外层的持续存在,对内层也构成了选择压力,因而也改变着内层的性质,我将这一改变称为(广义的)鲍德温效应。 @whigzhou: 我也曾为这套理论找过一句格拉德维尔式的警句『英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会,德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民,犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……』,无奈还是不够短不够朗朗上口。 @whigzhou: 还要加上后半句『在长期经历不同制度之后,香港文化已不同于广州文化,东德人也已不同于西德人,北朝鲜人更不同于南朝鲜人』 @whigzhou: 有关个人认知能力和人格特质的研究很多,但针对族群比较的研究还很少,历时性的研究则更少,所以我们远未弄清那些特质(及相应的遗传基础)在支撑着宪政、法治、宽容、开放等文明的关键元素,但我们可以设想一下,某些重要特质的改变可能会引出何种结果。 @whigzhou: 不妨从一个分歧最小的特质开始,假如英国人的IQ分布拉低两个标准差,顶级科学家就消失了,再拉低一个标准差,整个科学社区就没了,这大概不会有疑问, @whigzhou: 再考虑经验开放性,假如一个民族的经验开放性的统计分布拉低两个标准差,该民族就不会有出色艺术家了,再拉低一个标准差,所有艺术活动都消失了,这一点不太确定,或许经验开放性不是很好的指标,但我很确信必定可以找到某项特质来评估这一点 @whigzhou: 再考虑法治,法治能够存续的前提是绝大多数人在绝大多数场合愿意自觉遵守规则,否则再强大的司法机器也没用,那么一个族群的尽责性分布拉低两个标准差结果会如何?情绪稳定性也拉低两个标准差呢? @whigzhou: 道德感又如何?普通法的要义便是:凭良心和常识即可自行判断某一行为是否正当,在一个普遍缺乏道德感的群体,这样的体系能够存续吗?道德感无关于人格特质吗? @沉默的马大爷: 智商拉低两个标准差,意味着有一半人是弱智,别说科学社区,整个社会都崩溃了。。大部分族群差异达不到这个量级,组内差异一般要高于组间差异 @whigzhou: 两个标准差是夸张了点,但绝非不现实,请看右表 http://t.cn/hByJ2N 不许随便说人弱智,人家要不高兴的 @whigzhou: 确实,消灭顶级科学家大概一个标准差就够了  
[译文]逃离蓝州的美国人

Nearly 1,000 People Move From Blue States to Red States Every Day. Here’s Why.
每天将近有1000人从蓝州搬到红州,这自有缘由。

作者:Stephen Moore @ 2015-10-9
译者:董慧颖
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:The Daily Signal,http://dailysignal.com/2015/10/09/nearly-1000-people-move-from-blue-states-to-red-states-every-day-heres-why/

The so-called “progressives” love to talk about how their policies will create a worker’s paradise, but then why is it that day after day, month after month, year after year, peop(more...)

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Nearly 1,000 People Move From Blue States to Red States Every Day. Here’s Why. 每天将近有1000人从蓝州搬到红州,这自有缘由。 作者:Stephen Moore @ 2015-10-9 译者:董慧颖 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:The Daily Signal,http://dailysignal.com/2015/10/09/nearly-1000-people-move-from-blue-states-to-red-states-every-day-heres-why/ The so-called “progressives” love to talk about how their policies will create a worker’s paradise, but then why is it that day after day, month after month, year after year, people are fleeing liberal blue states for conservative red states? 那些所谓的“进步人士们”喜欢谈论他们的政策将如何创造出一个工人的天堂。可是,为什么日复一日,月复一月,年复一年,人们总是在从自由派的蓝州逃到保守派的红州去呢? The new Census data on where we live and where we moved to in 2014 shows that the top seven states with the biggest percentage increase in in-migration from other states are in order: North Dakota, Nevada, South Carolina, Colorado, Florida, Arizona, and Texas. All of these states are red, except Colorado, which is purple. 2014年最新人口普查中关于居住地和搬迁地的数据显示,按照迁入量增长的百分比计算,有他州居民迁入的前七大州依次是:北达科他,内华达,南卡罗来纳,科罗拉多,佛罗里达,亚利桑那和德克萨斯。这些州中除了科罗拉多是紫色以外,其他都是红州。 Meanwhile, the leading exodus states of the continental states in percentage terms were Alaska, New York, Illinois, Connecticut, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Kansas. All of these states are blue, except Alaska and Kansas. 同时,以百分比计算,大陆州中主要的外流州是:阿拉斯加,纽约,伊利诺伊、康涅狄格,新墨西哥,新泽西和堪萨斯。这些州中除了阿拉斯加和堪萨斯外,其他都是蓝州。 The latest Rich States, Poor States document (which I co-author), published by ALEC, the state legislative organization, finds that nearly 1,000 people each day on net are leaving blue states and entering red states. This migration is changing the economic center of gravity in America—moving it relentlessly to the South and West. 最新的《富州和穷州》报告(我是合著者),由专注各州立法的美国立法交流委员会(ALEC)出版,发现每天离开蓝州进入红州的人数净值接近1000。这一迁徙正在改变美国的经济重心,使之持续不断地向南、向西转移。 Travis Brown, the author of the indispensable book “How Money Walks,” shows that two of the leading factors behind this movement of human capital are 1) whether a state has a right to work law (half of the states do) and 2) how high the top income tax rate is in the state. Nine states have no income tax today, and they are creating twice the pace of jobs as are high-income tax states. 特拉维斯·布朗写作了一本不可或缺的书:《钱如何走路》。他指出,在人力资本的上述流动背后,有两个主要的影响因素:1)该州是否有权制定工作法(一半的州都有),2)该州最高的所得税税率有多高。如今有九个州没有所得税,而他们创造的工作机会是高所得税州的两倍。 Data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) show a similar trend. Each year the IRS issues a migration data report that examines how many tax filers (and dependents) in the year changed their residency and how much income was transported from one state to another. The numbers for the most recent year (tax filing year 2013) are gigantic and put the lie to the claim that interstate migration is too small to matter in terms of the wealth and economic opportunity in one state versus another. 国税局的数据也显示了类似的趋势。每年国税局都会发布一份移民数据报告,分析当年度有多少报税人(及其家属)改变了他们的居住地以及有多少收入从一个州转移到另一个。最新一年(2013报税年度)的数字非常之大,证明下述断言就是扯谎:州际迁移太小,不会对各州之间财富和经济机会造成影响。 In 2013, Florida gained $8.2 billion in adjusted gross income from out-of-staters. Texas gained $5.9 billion—in one year. Five of the seven states with the biggest gains in income have no income tax at all: Florida, Texas, Arizona, Washington, and Nevada. New York was again the big loser, with another 112,236 tax filers leaving and taking $5.2 billion with them. (So much for those TV ads trying to lure businesses into America’s 2nd highest taxed state with temporary tax breaks.) Illinois lost nearly 67,000 tax filers and $3.7 billion of income it can no longer tax. 2013年,佛罗里达从外州来者身上获得了共计82亿美元的调整后总收益。德克萨斯在一年内获得了59亿美元。收益增加最多的七个州中有五个没有任何所得税:佛罗里达、德克萨斯、亚利桑那、华盛顿州和内华达。纽约州又是最大的输家,又有112236名纳税人离开,一并带走了52亿美元。(那么多电视广告企图用临时税收减免来引诱企业到全美税负第二重的州去发展,还是打住吧。)伊利诺伊失去了近67000名纳税人,可征税收入中流走了中37亿美元。 I’ve never met a Democrat who could come up with even a semi-plausible explanation for why families and businesses are hightailing it out of blue states. They are leaving states with high minimum wages, pro-union work rules, high taxes on the rich, generous welfare benefits, expansive regulations to “help” workers, green energy policies, etc. People are voting with their feet against these liberal policies. 我从来没有见过任何一个民主党人能想出半个理由,能解释为什么家庭和企业都在从蓝州逃离。他们正在离开的这些州,都有很高的最低工资,有利于工会的工作规定,对富人的高税收,慷慨的福利待遇,无孔不入的旨在“帮助”工人的管制,绿色能源政策,等等。人们正在用脚投票,反对这些自由派政策。 When I debated Paul Krugman this summer, I confronted him with this reality. His lame explanation for the steady migration from liberal North to conservative South was that “air conditioning” has made the South more livable. Americans are evidently moving because of the weather. 今年夏天当我和保罗·克鲁格曼辩论时,我用这样的事实与他对质。他对从自由派北部到保守派南部间的稳定移民的蹩脚解释是,“空调”使南部更适于居住。美国人显然是由于天气原因才搬家的。 There are two glaring problems with this theory: California and North Dakota. In the last decade ending in 2013, 1.4 million more Americans left California than moved into the once-Golden State. It’s a good bet these California refugees didn’t leave for more sunshine or better weather. 这个想法面临着两个突出的困难:加利福尼亚和北达科塔。到2013年为止的十年间,从曾经的黄金州加利福尼亚迁出的人口比迁入的多出140万。可以肯定地说,这些离开加利福尼亚州的难民并不是为了追寻更多的阳光或更好的气候。 And if warm weather is what is attracting people to the South—and surely there is some truth to that—why did the coldest state outside Alaska, North Dakota, have the biggest population gain in percentage terms in the most recent year? The answer is that workers went to get jobs created by the Bakken Shale oil and gas boom. By the way, California is one of the oil- and gas-richest states in the nation, but its “green” politicians are regulating that industry out of businesses. So much for caring about working-class Americans. 如果温暖的气候是吸引人们迁往南方的原因——当然这也有一定的道理——那为什么最近一年中,除阿拉斯加以外最寒冷的州——北达科塔——却有着最大的人口增长百分比?答案是,工人们是去追寻因巴肯页岩油气繁荣而创造出来的工作。顺便提一下,加利福尼亚是全国石油和天然气最为富集的州之一,但该州的“绿色”政治家们正通过管制逼死油气行业。别再说什么关心工薪阶层美国人了。 The latest Census and IRS data merely confirm what Americans can see every day with their own two eyes. Red states are a magnet. There’s a downside to this for sure. Conservatives have a legitimate gripe that as blue-staters come into their prosperous red states, they try to turn them blue. That’s happened in New Hampshire, where Massachusetts transplants vote for the left-wing policies they just fled. 最新的人口普查和国税局的数据只是证实了美国人每天用自己的两只眼睛都能看到的事情。红州是一块磁铁。这肯定会有消极面。保守派的抱怨合情合理,蓝州人在进入繁荣的红州后,正试图将他们的红州变蓝。这种事已经在新罕布什尔发生,来自马萨诸塞的移民投票支持他们方才逃离的左翼政策。 But the underlying trend is unmistakable: Liberal blue states are economic dinosaurs. Will they change their ways before they go the way of Detroit and become extinct? 但基本的趋势是显而易见的:自由派的蓝州是经济的巨大障碍。在重蹈底特律的覆辙走向灭绝之前,他们会改变自己的方式吗? (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

宪法对抗

【2016-05-18】

1)纳税额与投票权的分离是近代政治堕落的基础动力之一,

2)没有堕落的更彻底是因为庞大中产阶级的存在,

3)福利制度在不断放大食税阶层,

4)离开其社会结构基础,三权分立并不能自我维持,最高法院的刹车皮并非永远指望得上,

5)州权避免让事情变得更坏,但效果也颇为有限,

6)未来政治对立将更多表现为州际差异,

7)所以问题之一是保守派是否能赢得足够多的州从而控制参议院,而这取决于人口分布,食税人口向大城市化聚集或许是好事,

8)总有一天众议院也会拿参院开刀,就像当初下院对上院动手一样,

9)未来保守州会更强硬的抗拒联邦权力,

10)当这种抗拒达到禁止联邦官员入境执法的程度时,分裂便开始了

11)宗教是抵抗国家权力越来越深介入私人生活的另一把保护伞,宗教自由也是近年来能够帮助个人避免政府管制/干预的少数几条还在起效的宪法原则之一,但自由派正在不遗余力地摧毁这把保护伞,

12)好消息是,这一对抗将让更多基督教派站到自由一边,或许libertarians也不得不创个教派才能在法庭赢得对抗国家干预的豁免权

13)从百年以上的长期看,保守派终将凭借生育率而取胜,问题是在此之前文明崩坏到何种程度,制度重建会有多艰难

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【2016-05-18】 1)纳税额与投票权的分离是近代政治堕落的基础动力之一, 2)没有堕落的更彻底是因为庞大中产阶级的存在, 3)福利制度在不断放大食税阶层, 4)离开其社会结构基础,三权分立并不能自我维持,最高法院的刹车皮并非永远指望得上, 5)州权避免让事情变得更坏,但效果也颇为有限, 6)未来政治对立将更多表现为州际差异, 7)所以问题之一是保守派是否能赢得足够多的州从而控制参议院,而这取决于人口分布,食税人口向大城市化聚集或许是好事, 8)总有一天众议院也会拿参院开刀,就像当初下院对上院动手一样, 9)未来保守州会更强硬的抗拒联邦权力, 10)当这种抗拒达到禁止联邦官员入境执法的程度时,分裂便开始了 11)宗教是抵抗国家权力越来越深介入私人生活的另一把保护伞,宗教自由也是近年来能够帮助个人避免政府管制/干预的少数几条还在起效的宪法原则之一,但自由派正在不遗余力地摧毁这把保护伞, 12)好消息是,这一对抗将让更多基督教派站到自由一边,或许libertarians也不得不创个教派才能在法庭赢得对抗国家干预的豁免权 13)从百年以上的长期看,保守派终将凭借生育率而取胜,问题是在此之前文明崩坏到何种程度,制度重建会有多艰难 14)另一个好消息是,到目前为止文明世界还足够大,一处之崩坏会让其他几处觉醒,从人口/社会结构看,比如澳洲在被食税者彻底绑架之前觉醒的机会比较大 15)第三个好消息是,欧洲在不久之后便会经历一次大觉醒,至少其中一些国家会,最快可能会在下届选举中就会表现出来 16)福利制度是食税阶层的创造,而最低工资和智能机器将是其放大器,后两项都正在大跃进之中,未来福利负担的膨胀将非常惊人 17)随着州际差异扩大,财富创造者逃离福利州,福利州财政崩溃,福利负担大规模向联邦政府转移,联邦增税不可避免,此时州与联邦的对抗将迅速加剧,到时候假如保守派能够长期控制参院,自由派可能会推动一场分州运动,比如把加州分成两个,旧金山和洛杉矶各归一州,这样他们在参院就多出两席,无论如何,一场大型宪法对抗不可避免,分州之争也是一种可能方式 @黄章晋ster:如果洲际差异足够大,我想保守派的洲未必有足够大的动力去与联邦权力对抗,至少我目前想不出来,难道会为类似同性恋婚姻这样的事情发生冲突吗?如果不涉及到广泛的经济利益冲突,这种冲突就是在一定范围内的。 @whigzhou: 仅仅出于抗拒联邦税的理由也可以让这事情发生 @Helen干杯:第7条不是很明白。大城市多聚集福利人口多倾向所谓自由主义者, 从德州情况看,其城市增长快,流入人口多,我觉得有生之年会看到德州从红州变蓝州的。老师为什么说福利人口向城市聚集对保守派是好事? @whigzhou: 我说的是只有少数一些州才有的超级大都市,向那里聚集占的州就少了嘛 @Helen干杯:目前, 有意加无意, 主动加被动, 北美欧洲都在进行各种风格的种族和文化的融合。福利制度不是这个社会大实验的产品,但其存在至少在欧洲减少了融合过程可能引起的不适症状。如果因"觉醒"而停止, 也会对融合过程有负面影响。甚为遗憾。 @whigzhou: 福利制度不可能有助于种族/文化融合 @whigzhou: 内战后美国的种族融合一直在加速,直到六十年代平权法案和福利大扩张才嘎然而止,参见索维尔的两篇书评:《拜托,别再帮助我们了》 《自由派带给黑人的福利》,还有这篇:《为何伊朗移民成于美国却败于瑞典》 @卫东屯的Porco:纳税额和投票权挂钩不会催生新独裁吗? @whigzhou: 从1295年模范国会直到1918年,选举权一直和纳税义务关联着,选出了几个独裁者?不负责任的选民才最喜欢独裁者,墨索里尼希特勒查韦斯无一不是在暴民无产者欢呼拥戴之下上台的 @書筆雅歌:糠港不就是如此,糠港不能有普选的理论依据找到了。 @whigzhou: 举香港为例实在是太恭维我了,当前香港迫切需要普选权是因为她正在一步步落入熊猫的魔爪,直选是抵抗熊猫的最后防线,不是因为原有的选举制不好,要不然她一个半世纪的自由繁荣是怎么来的? @whigzhou: 【给大家支个招】支持普选权最有说服力的理由是军事动员能力,从19世纪后半叶到20世纪前半叶,随着选举权扩展,欧洲各国动员能力越来越强,到二战时已经能把一大半适龄男性拉上战场,所以一旦一个大国开始推行普选,其他只好跟进 @whigzhou: 这一点从德国近代史可以看得最清楚,从普鲁士到德意志帝国到魏玛共和国,普选权/福利制度/动员能力/民族主义/社会主义/军国主义/全民战争,妖魔鬼怪相伴而生,普选权和福利制度是俾斯麦改革的两大重点 @whigzhou: 但这个理由现在已经不成立了,战争越来越不是劳动密集型产业了 @蚯蚓爱钩钩:问题是现在有什么办法剥夺一部分人的选举权呢?除了咱…… @whigzhou: 嗯嗯没办法,或许未来逃到火星上建新国家时可以考虑一下,反正这事情不归我管~ @蚯蚓爱钩钩:如果是为了防止民众的狂热无知,那么只能说没有根本解决方案。不可能有一个完全避免民众犯错而又不造成灾难的方案,如果民众必然犯错,在制度上能做到的只有设法拖延等待民众清醒。 @whigzhou: 对啊,没有什么根本解决方案,也不需要  
差强人意

【2016-05-07】

@whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。

@whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事(more...)

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【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情,但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要,因为当时关税再高,和运费比还是很低,所以只要拆除壁垒,效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2)管制,随便翻翻经济史就知道,18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛,但给人的印象很不一样,我猜这是因为,早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行,而较少以行为管控的方式进行,大量限制法规,但较少执行官僚,所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见,究其因,当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3)19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少,但州政府和市政府管的可不少,看看产业史,哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的,那时候联邦政府站在自由一边,多数州政府站在另一边,联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒,由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了,铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场,州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了,只好偏向自由化,但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4)政府规模,从财政开支和雇员数量看,那时候的政府确实小得多,但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看,也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5)福利制度,这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点,那时候基本上没有福利制度,济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中,国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊,仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级,何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的,所以不要相信什么自由天国,也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  
[译文]自由市场环保主义

Free-Market Environmentalism
自由市场环保主义

作者:Richard L. Stroup
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:EconLib, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FreeMarketEnvironmentalism.html

Free-market environmentalism emphasizes markets as a solution to environmental problems. Proponents argue that free markets can be more successful than government—and have been more successful historically—in solving many environmental problems.

自由市场环保主义强调将市场作为环境问题的解决办法。这一观念的倡议者认为,在解决许多环境问题方面,自由市场能够做得比政府更成功——历史上也一直更为成功。

This interest in free-market environmentalism is somewhat ironic because environmental problems have often been seen as a form of market failure (see PUBLIC GOODS and EXTERNALITIES). In the traditional view, many environmental problems are caused by decision makers who reduce their costs by polluting those who are downwind or downstream; other environmental problems are caused by private decision makers’ inability to produce “public goods” (such as preservation of wild species) because no one has to pay to get the benefits of this preservation.

对自由市场环保主义的关注多少有点反讽,因为环保问题一向都被看作是一种市场失灵的体现(见词条“公共物品”和“外部性”)。传统观点认为,许多环境问题之产生,是由于决策者会通过污染处于下风向或下游的人们来减少自身的成本;其他环境问题之产生,则是由于私人决策者无力生产“公共物品”(如野生物种保护),因为人们无需支付价格就能获得此种保护所带来的收益。

While these problems can be quite real, growing evidence indicates that governments often fail to control pollution or to provide public goods at reasonable cost. Furthermore, the private sector is often more responsive than government to environmental demands. This evidence, which is supported by much economic theory, has led to a reconsideration of the traditional view.

尽管这类问题相当实际,但是越来越多的证据表明,政府常常无法以合理的价格控制污染或提供公共(more...)

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Free-Market Environmentalism 自由市场环保主义 作者:Richard L. Stroup 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:EconLib, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FreeMarketEnvironmentalism.html Free-market environmentalism emphasizes markets as a solution to environmental problems. Proponents argue that free markets can be more successful than government—and have been more successful historically—in solving many environmental problems. 自由市场环保主义强调将市场作为环境问题的解决办法。这一观念的倡议者认为,在解决许多环境问题方面,自由市场能够做得比政府更成功——历史上也一直更为成功。 This interest in free-market environmentalism is somewhat ironic because environmental problems have often been seen as a form of market failure (see PUBLIC GOODS and EXTERNALITIES). In the traditional view, many environmental problems are caused by decision makers who reduce their costs by polluting those who are downwind or downstream; other environmental problems are caused by private decision makers’ inability to produce “public goods” (such as preservation of wild species) because no one has to pay to get the benefits of this preservation. 对自由市场环保主义的关注多少有点反讽,因为环保问题一向都被看作是一种市场失灵的体现(见词条“公共物品”和“外部性”)。传统观点认为,许多环境问题之产生,是由于决策者会通过污染处于下风向或下游的人们来减少自身的成本;其他环境问题之产生,则是由于私人决策者无力生产“公共物品”(如野生物种保护),因为人们无需支付价格就能获得此种保护所带来的收益。 While these problems can be quite real, growing evidence indicates that governments often fail to control pollution or to provide public goods at reasonable cost. Furthermore, the private sector is often more responsive than government to environmental demands. This evidence, which is supported by much economic theory, has led to a reconsideration of the traditional view. 尽管这类问题相当实际,但是越来越多的证据表明,政府常常无法以合理的价格控制污染或提供公共物品。此外,私营部门通常比政府更能响应环保需求。此类证据得到了许多经济理论的支持,现已引导人们重新考量传统观点。 The failures of centralized government control in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union awakened further interest in free-market environmentalism in the early 1990s. As glasnost lifted the veil of secrecy, press reports identified large areas where brown haze hung in the air, people’s eyes routinely burned from chemical fumes, and drivers had to use headlights in the middle of the day. 在1990年代早期,东欧和苏联中央集权政府的控制失败进一步唤醒了人们对自由市场环保主义的关注。随着“公开性”政策拉开遮掩的帷幕,新闻媒体报道了在被黄色雾霾覆盖的大片地区中人们的眼睛经常因化学烟雾而刺痛,以及司机们大白天都需要开车灯。 In 1990 the Wall Street Journal quoted a claim by Hungarian doctors that 10 percent of the deaths in Hungary might be directly related to pollution. The New York Times reported that parts of the town of Merseburg, East Germany, were “permanently covered by a white chemical dust, and a sour smell fills people’s nostrils.” 《华尔街日报》在1990年曾引用过一些匈牙利医生的说法,即匈牙利10%的死亡与污染直接相关。《纽约时报》报道说,在东德梅泽堡,市镇的部分地区“常年覆盖着一层白色化学粉尘,一股股恶臭扑鼻而来。” For markets to work in the environmental field, as in any other, rights to each important resource must be clearly defined, easily defended against invasion, and divestible (transferable) by owners on terms agreeable to buyer and seller. 要让市场在环保领域发挥作用,跟在其他领域一样,对于重要资源的权利归属必须得到清晰界定(defined),对于侵犯行为能够轻松防卫(defended),并且权利所有人应当能基于买卖双方均能接受的条款而剥离(divestible)(或转让)之。 Well-functioning markets, in short, require “3-D” PROPERTY RIGHTS. When the first two are present—clear definition and easy DEFENSE of one’s rights—no one is forced to accept pollution beyond the standard acceptable to the community. Local standards differ because people with similar preferences and those seeking similar opportunities often cluster together. 简而言之,运转良好的市场要求存在这种“3D”财产权。一旦具备前面两条(某人的权利界定清晰并易于防卫),就没有任何人会被迫接受超过所在社群接受标准的污染。各地标准会有所不同,因为具有相同偏好的人和追寻相同机遇的人通常会聚集在一起。 Parts of Montana, for example, where the key economic activity is ranching, are “range country.” In those areas, anyone who does not want the neighbors’ cattle disturbing his or her garden has the duty to fence the garden to keep the cattle out. On the really large ranches of range country, that solution is far cheaper than fencing all the range on the ranch. But much of the state is not range country. There, the property right standards are different: It is the duty of the cattle owner to keep livestock fenced in. People in the two areas have different priorities based on goals that differ between the communities. 比如,在蒙大拿州的部分地区,关键的经济活动是牧场经营,可以说是“牧乡”。在这类地区,任何人如果不希望邻居的牧群打扰他或她的园子,自己就有义务修建花园栅栏,把牧群拦在外边。在牧乡的大型牧场上,这种解决办法远比给牧地上所有牧场都装上栅栏要来得便宜。但蒙大拿州许多其它地区并不是牧乡。在这些地方,财产权的标准就有所不同:牧群所有者有义务将牲畜用栅栏围住。不同地区的人们考虑的优先次序不同,根源在于不同社群拥有不同的目标。 Similarly, the “acceptable noise” standard in a vibrant neighborhood of the inner city with many young people might differ from that of a dignified neighborhood populated mainly by well-to-do retirees. “Noise pollution” in one community might be acceptable in another, because a standard that limits one limits all in the community. Those who sometimes enjoy loud music at home may be willing to accept some of it from others. 类似地,内城区年轻人很多的那些小区活力十足,这些地方的“可容忍噪音”标准可能就会不同于居民主要为生活优裕的退休人员的高端小区。某个社群的“噪音污染”在另外一个社群可能是可接受的,因为限制单个人的标准应当对于社群内的所有人都适用。偶尔喜欢在家里听听吵闹音乐的那些人很可能也愿意接受别人家里不时放放这种音乐。 Each individual has a right against invasion of himself and his property, and the courts will defend that right, but the standard that defines an unacceptable invasion can vary from one community to another. And finally, when the third characteristic of property rights—divestibility—is present, each owner has an incentive to be a good steward: preservation of the owner’s wealth (the value of his or her property) depends on good stewardship. 每个个体都有权反对对他本人及其财产的侵犯,且法院会捍卫这种权利。但在不同社群之间,如何界定不可容忍之侵犯的标准是可以不同的。最后,当财产权具备第三个特征(即可剥离性)时,每个所有者就都有做好管理人的激励:良好的管理才能维护业主的财富(财产的价值)。 Environmental problems stem from the absence or incompleteness of these characteristics of property rights. When rights to resources are defined and easily defended against invasion, all individuals or CORPORATIONS, whether potential polluters or potential victims, have an incentive to avoid pollution problems. When air or water pollution damages a privately owned asset, the owner whose wealth is threatened will gain by seeing—in court if necessary—that the threat is abated. 环境问题的根源在于财产权不具备或部分缺失上述特性。如果资源的权属界定清晰,对于侵权能够轻松防卫,那么所有个体或公司,不管他们是潜在污染者还是潜在受害者,就都具有激励去避免污染。当空气污染或水污染损害到私人所有的资产时,财富受到威胁的所有者通过确保威胁得以解除(必要时通过法院)就能获利。 In England and Scotland, for example, unlike in the United States, the right to fish for sport and commerce is a privately owned, transferable right. This means that owners of fishing rights can obtain damages and injunctions against polluters of streams. Owners of these rights vigorously defend them, even though the owners are often small anglers’ clubs with modest means. 比如,英格兰和苏格兰就与美国不同,以运动和商业为目的的钓鱼活动是私有的、可转让的权利。这就意味着钓鱼权的所有者能够从河流污染者那里获得赔偿或是用禁令禁止污染河流的行为。这些权利的所有者会积极地捍卫权利,尽管他们通常都只是些小型垂钓俱乐部,财产并不太多。 Fishers clearly gain, but there is a cost to them also. In 2005, for example, INTERNET advertisements offered fishing in the chalk streams of the River Anton, Hampshire, at 50 pounds British per day, or about $90 U.S. On the River Avon in Wiltshire, the price per day was 150 pounds, or $270. Valuable fishing rights encouraged their owners to form an association prepared to go to court when polluters violate their fishing rights. Such suits were successful well before Earth Day in 1970, and before pollution control became part of public policy. 钓鱼的人显然会得利,但他们也需承担成本。比如,2005年,网上广告说到汉普郡一条白垩河(安东河)上钓鱼每天需50英镑,合90美元;而在维尔特郡的埃文河上,价格更是高达每天150英镑,合270美元。价值高昂的钓鱼权促使其所有者组成联盟,一旦污染者损害他们的钓鱼权,就时刻准备走上法庭。早在1970年“世界地球日”诞生之前很久,早在污染控制进入公共政策之前很久,这类诉讼就已经很成功了。 Once rights against pollution are established by precedent, as these were many years ago, going to court is seldom necessary. Potential plaintiffs who recognize they are likely to lose do not want to add court costs to their losses. 一旦反对污染的权利经由先例得以确立,就像上述权利多年以前实现的那样,以后就很少有必要上法庭了。如果潜在的原告察觉到他们很可能会输掉官司,他们就不会愿意再往自己的损失上添一份诉讼开销。 Thus, LIABILITY for pollution is a powerful motivator when a factory or other potentially polluting asset is privately owned. The case of the Love Canal, a notorious waste dump, illustrates this point. As long as Hooker Chemical Company owned the Love Canal waste site, it was designed, maintained, and operated (in the late 1940s and 1950s) in a way that met even the Environmental Protection Agency standards of 1980. The corporation wanted to avoid any damaging leaks, for which it would have to pay. 因此,当工厂或其它有可能造成污染的资产为私人所有时,对造成的污染需付的责任就是一个强大的激励因素。发生在“爱河”这一臭名远扬的废料堆上的事件很好地表明了这一点。在胡克化学公司拥有“爱河”填埋场期间,它的设计、维持和运转(从1940年代晚期至1950年代)始终都做得很好,甚至能够满足美国环保署1980年的标准。公司希望能够避免任何有害泄露,要不然它就得出钱。 Only when the waste site was taken over by local government—under threat of eminent domain, for the cost of one dollar, and in spite of warnings by Hooker about the chemicals—was the site mistreated in ways that led to chemical leakage. The government decision makers lacked personal or corporate liability for their decisions. 只有在填埋场被当地政府接管(在政府威胁实施土地征用的情况下,胡克公司以一美元价格转让,并且当时它还就化学品提出过警告)以后,场地才遭到滥用,最后导致了化学泄露。政府决策者不需为他们的决定承担个体或公司责任。 They built a school on part of the site, removed part of the protective clay cap to use as fill dirt for another school site, and sold off the remaining part of the Love Canal site to a developer without warning him of the dangers as Hooker had warned them. The local government also punched holes in the impermeable clay walls to build water lines and a highway. This allowed the toxic wastes to escape when rainwater, no longer kept out by the partially removed clay cap, washed them through the gaps created in the walls. 他们在填埋场的部分地面上建了一所学校;移除了部分起保护作用的黏土盖层,用到另一学校工地去做填土;把“爱河”填埋场的剩余部分卖给了开发商,却没有像胡克公司那样附上危险警告。当地政府还在不渗水的黏土墙上开挖孔洞,用于建设水管和公路。由于黏土盖层部分被拆,挡不住雨水,结果有毒废弃物就被雨水从墙上的破洞里冲刷了出来。 The school district owning the land had a laudable but narrow goal: it wanted to provide EDUCATION cheaply for district children. Government decision makers are seldom held accountable for broader social goals in the way that private owners are by liability rules and potential PROFITS. Of course, anyone, including private parties, can make mistakes, but the decision maker whose private wealth is on the line tends to be more circumspect. The liability that holds private decision makers accountable is largely missing in the public sector. 拥有这片土地的学区所抱持的目标虽然值得称赞,但却过于狭隘:它就想为学区的孩子们提供便宜的教育。政府决策者几乎从来不会因更广泛的社会目标而遭到问责,这一点与私人所有者不同,后者需受责任原则和潜在利益的限制。当然,任何人都可能犯错,包括私方在内。但是,当决策者需要用个人财富来承担风险时,他会更加慎重。与对私人决策者问责的情况不同,在公共部门中,问责要求总体上是缺失的。 Nor does the government sector have the long-range view that property rights provide, which leads to protection of resources for the future. As long as the third D, divestibility, is present, property rights provide long-term incentives for maximizing the value of property. If I mine my land and impair its future PRODUCTIVITY or its groundwater, the reduction in the land’s value reduces my current wealth. 政府部门也不具备财产权所带来的长远视野,而这种视野会鼓励资源保护,以备未来之需。只要财产权具备第三个“D”即“可剥离性”,财产权就能提供将财物价值最大化的长期激励。如果我在我的土地上进行开采,破坏了它未来的生产率或其地下水,那么土地价值的减少就会导致我当前的财富的减少。 That is because land’s current worth equals the PRESENT VALUE of all future services. Fewer services or greater costs in the future mean lower value now. In fact, on the day an appraiser or potential buyer can first see that there will be problems in the future, my wealth declines. The reverse also is true: any new way to produce more value—preserving scenic value as I log my land, for example, to attract paying recreationists—is capitalized into the asset’s present value. 这是因为,土地的当前价值等于所有未来得益的折现值。未来得益减少或成本增加就意味着当前价值变低。事实上,只要有一个估价人或潜在买家首先看出未来会出问题,从这时起,我的财富就减少了。这话反过来也成立:任何能够产出更多价值的新办法(比如伐木时注意保护地面的观赏价值以吸引付费消遣的客人)都可以折算为资产的现值。 Because the owner’s wealth depends on good stewardship, even a shortsighted owner has the incentive to act as if he or she cares about the future usefulness of the resource. This is true even if an asset is owned by a corporation. Corporate officers may be concerned mainly about the short term, but as financial economists such as Harvard Business School’s Michael C. Jensen have noted, even they have to care about the future. If current actions are known to cause future problems, or if a current INVESTMENT promises future benefits, the stock price rises or falls to reflect the change. Corporate officers are informed by (and are judged by) these stock price changes. 财产所有者的财富取决于良好的管理,因此,即便是目光短浅的所有者也有动力表现出关心资源未来价值的样子。即便资产由公司所有,情况也是如此。公司管理者更多关心的可能是短期,但是正如哈佛商学院的Michael C. Jensen等金融经济学家所指出的那样,即便是这些人,也不得不着眼长远。如果人们知道当前行为在未来有可能引起麻烦,或者他们知道当前投资有望在未来获利,那么这种变化就会在股票价格的涨落上体现出来。公司管理人能够通过这种股票价格变化来获得信息,他们的工作成效也能由此得以判断。 This ability and incentive to engage in farsighted behavior is lacking in the political sector. Consider the example of Seattle’s Ravenna Park. At the turn of the twentieth century it was a privately owned park that contained magnificent Douglas firs. A husband and wife, Mr. and Mrs. W. W. Beck, had developed it into a family recreation area that, in good weather, brought in thousands of people a day. 政府部门缺乏行长远之事的能力和动力。这方面可以看看西雅图拉文纳公园的例子。20世纪初,这一公园属于私人所有,里面长有华贵的花旗松。W. W. Beck夫妇将公园打理成了一个家庭休闲场所,天气好的时候每天能吸引数千人来玩。 Concern that a future owner might not take proper care of it, however, caused the local government to “preserve” this beautiful place. The owners did not want to part with it, but the city initiated condemnation proceedings and bought the park. 然而,当地政府担心下一位所有者不会用心打理公园,因此要“保护”该公园。尽管公园所有者不愿意,但该市启动了征用程序,最终买下了公园。 But since they had no personal property or income at stake, local officials allowed the park to deteriorate. In fact, the tall trees began to disappear soon after the city bought it in 1911. A group of concerned citizens brought the theft of the trees to officials’ attention, but the logging continued. 然而,由于当地官员并不需要担心私人财产或收入受损,公园状况在他们的管理下日益恶化。事实上,在市政府于1911年买下之后,公园里面的高大树木很快就开始消失。一群热心市民还曾将偷树贼逮捕送官,但砍伐并没有停止。 Gradually, the park became unattractive. By 1972 it was an ugly, dangerous hangout for drug users. The Becks, operating privately at no cost to taxpayers, but supported instead by user fees, had done a far better job of managing the park they had created. 日复一日,这个公园不再有吸引力了。到1972年,它已经变成了一个丑陋危险的地方,只有吸毒者出没。Beck夫妇的私人经营没有花费纳税人一分钱,但他们能够得到使用者付费。在管理他们创造出来的这一公园方面,他们的成绩可漂亮多了。 Could parks, even national parks like Grand Canyon or Yellowstone, be run privately, by individuals, clubs, or firms, in the way the Becks ran Ravenna Park? Would park users suffer if they had to support the parks they used through fees rather than taxes? 公园、甚至是像大峡谷这样的国家公园是否能够以Beck夫妇经营拉夫纳公园的方式,由私人(包括个体、俱乐部或公司)来经营呢?如果公园使用者需要通过付费而非纳税的方式来维持他们所用的公园,他们因此就受损了吗? Donald Leal and Holly Fretwell studied national parks and compared certain of them with state parks nearby. The latter had similar characteristics but, unlike the national parks, were supported in large part by user fees. Donald Leal和Holly Fretwell对国家公园进行了研究,并将其中部分与临近的州立公园进行了比较。州立公园与国家公园在许多地方都很相似,但有一个区别:它们大部分都通过使用者付费来维持。 The comparisons were interesting. Leal and Fretwell noted, in 1997, that sixteen state park systems earned at least half their operating funds from fees. The push for greater revenue led park managers to provide better services, and more people were served. 比较结果非常有意思。Leal和Fretwell在1997年提到,有16个州立公园体系通过收费赚取到了一半以上的运营经费。为了获得更大收益,公园管理者愿意提供更好服务,公园也迎来了更多的游客。 For example, in contrast to nearby national parks with similar natural features, Texas state parks offered trail runs, fun runs, “owl prowls,” alligator watching, wildlife safaris, and even a longhorn cattle drive. Costs in the state parks were also lower. Park users seem happy to pay more at the parks when they enjoy more and better services. 比如,与附近自然景观相似的国家公园相比,德克萨斯的州立公园向游客开放山路跑、乐跑、“寻找猫头鹰”、鳄鱼观赏、野生动物游猎,甚至包括长角牛骑行等活动。州立公园的支出也更低一些。如果能够享受到更多更好的服务,逛公园的人似乎很乐意花更多钱。 Private individuals and groups have preserved wildlife habitats and scenic lands in thousands of places in the United States. The 2003 Land Trust Alliance Census Tables list 1,537 local, state, and regional land trusts serving this purpose. Many other state and local groups have similar projects as a sideline, and national groups such as The Nature Conservancy and the Audubon Society have hundreds more. 私人和私人团体已经在美国数千个地方对野生动物栖息地和风景胜地进行了保护。土地信托联盟2003年的普查表中列有1537个地方性、全州性以及地区性的土地信托在从事这一事业。还有许多其他全州性或地方性的团体业余举办类似项目,而全国性团体如“大自然保护协会”和“奥杜邦协会”则有数百个此类项目。 None of these is owned by the government. Using the market, such groups do not have to convince the majority that their project is desirable, nor do they have to fight the majority in choosing how to manage the site. The result, as the federal government’s Council on ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY has reported, is an enormous and healthy diversity of approaches. 这些团体全都不归政府所有。由于它们利用的是市场,它们在其项目值得与否的问题上不用去说服多数人。同样,在选择如何管理保护地的问题上,它们也无需和多数人争执。结果,照联邦政府环境质量委员会报告的说法,我们在保护方法上具备了极为丰富且极为有益的多样性。 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the government is still involved, even in the case of privately donated and privately owned trust lands. Most of these private conservation choices benefit from tax advantages, as conservers gain charitable deductions from taxable income. Tax law, therefore, influences what sorts of donations qualify; it also increases the total amounts by rewarding all qualifying choices by tax reductions. 不过,有一个重要之处值得注意,那就是这里仍然会牵涉到政府,即便是那些私人捐赠或私人所有的信托土地也是如此。绝大多数选择进行私人环保的经营者都会获得税赋优惠,因为保护者的应税收入能够获得慈善事业减免。因此,税法会影响到哪种捐赠符合条件。它也能通过税赋减免来奖赏所有符合条件的选择,从而增加此类捐赠总量。 Who gains from the increased conservation? Most often it is first and foremost the nearby landowners. When donors of trust lands retain adjacent property, they benefit from the existence of the trust lands to a degree greater than other citizens more distant. Open space usually raises the value of nearby lands. 谁会从环保增进中获益?绝大多数时候,首先是临近地区的土地所有者。如果信托土地的捐赠者保留有临近地产,他们就会从信托土地的存在中获益,且这种获益程度会高于离该信托土地相对更远的市民。开阔的空间通常都能增加附近土地的价值。 Further, when many polluters and those who receive the pollution are involved, how can property rights force accountability? The nearest receivers may be hurt the most, and may be able to sue polluters—but not always. Consider an extreme case: the potential GLOBAL WARMING impact of carbon dioxide produced by the burning of wood or fossil fuels. If climate change results, the effects are worldwide. 更进一步说,如果涉及到的污染者和受污者人数众多,财产权又如何能推动问责呢?离得最近的受污染者可能受损最大,也可能有能力起诉污染者,但情况并非总是如此。这里可以考虑一个极端例子,即燃烧木头或化石燃料所产生的二氧化碳可能造成的全球变暖影响。如果气候变化发生,其影响将会遍及全球。 Nearly everyone uses the ENERGY from such fuels, and if the threat of global warming from a buildup of carbon dioxide turns out to be as serious as some claim, then those harmed by global warming will be hard-pressed to assert their property rights against all the energy producers or users of the world. The same is true for those exposed to pollutants produced by autos and industries in the Los Angeles air basin. Private, enforceable, and tradable property rights can work wonders, but they are not a cure-all. 如果二氧化碳增加所导致的全球变暖最后确实像某些人所宣称的那么严重,由于几乎所有人都使用此类燃料所产生的能源,全球变暖的受害者就要针对全世界的能源生产者或使用者主张其财产权利,而这会相当艰难。同理,洛杉矶空气盆地中受到汽车和工业污染物影响的人也很难主张其权利。私人所有的、可强制生效的、可交易的财产权能发挥妙用,但并非万灵药。 Still, even the lack of property rights today does not mean that a useful property rights solution is forever impossible. Property rights tend to evolve as technology, preferences, and prices provide added incentives and new technical options. Early in American history, property rights in cattle seemed impossible to establish and enforce on the Great Plains. But the growing value of such rights led to the use of mounted cowboys to protect herds and, eventually, barbed wire to fence the range. 不过,即便目前缺失相关的财产权,也并不意味着可行的财产权解决方案永远不可能出现。财产权常常会跟着技术、偏好和价格所导致的激励和新技术的增加而发生演变。在美国早期历史上,大平原上似乎根本不可能建立和实施对牛群的财产权。但随着这一权利的价值增加,人们开始利用牛仔骑士保护畜群,最终还用上了带刺铁丝网来围护牧场。 As economists Terry Anderson and Peter J. Hill have shown, the plains lost their status as commons and were privatized. Advances in technology may yet allow the establishment of enforceable rights to schools of whales in the oceans, migratory birds in the air, and—who knows?—even the presence of an atmosphere that clearly does not promote damaging climate change. Such is the hope of free-market environmentalism. 经济学家Terry Anderson和Peter J. Hill已经表明,草原由此失去了公地地位,被私有化了。随着技术的进步,将来某个时候,对于海中的鲸群、空中的候鸟,甚至是(天知道呢)对于一种明显不会造成有害气候变化的气体的存在,我们都可能建立起一种可以强制生效的权利。这正是自由市场环保主义的愿景。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

按人头发钱

【2016-04-28】

@whigzhou: 最近现金福利这话题蛮热烈的,就是用直接按人头发钱代替其他所有福利制度,这事@tertio 十年前就跟我讨论过,他把这方案称为公民年金,并认为这是所有福利制度里最好的,我同意这比其他福利制度都好得多得多,但我仍坚称,马尔萨斯已经告诉我们,这种方案同样注定难以长久维系。

@whigzhou: 今天再讨论这话题的话,我会补充一句:将年金方案用于不同民族或不同文化背景的群体,你会看到截然不同的效果,而其中有些效果远远不是福利主义者原本想要的那种。

@whigzhou: 这里有 标签: |

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【2016-04-28】 @whigzhou: 最近现金福利这话题蛮热烈的,就是用直接按人头发钱代替其他所有福利制度,这事@tertio 十年前就跟我讨论过,他把这方案称为公民年金,并认为这是所有福利制度里最好的,我同意这比其他福利制度都好得多得多,但我仍坚称,马尔萨斯已经告诉我们,这种方案同样注定难以长久维系。 @whigzhou: 今天再讨论这话题的话,我会补充一句:将年金方案用于不同民族或不同文化背景的群体,你会看到截然不同的效果,而其中有些效果远远不是福利主义者原本想要的那种。 @whigzhou: 这里有一份相关文章汇集 @学经济家: 慈善倒是更适合搞P2P、PPP的(绕开衙门一刀切) @whigzhou: 有啊,最右帖子里提到有个叫GiveDirectly的机构正在非洲做按人头发钱实验,据说规模挺大,6000人每人每天1美元,等着看结果呢  
功利计算vs拇指法则

【2016-04-14】

@whigzhou: 最优化vs满意解,功利计算vs拇指法则,天堂墙外寻路者vs险恶世界幸存者,画出世界地图然后大步迈向天堂vs泥泞大雾中小步摸索,进步主义vs保守主义……所以这其实是个算法问题,在一个可行解分布极为稀疏且迷雾重重能见度极低的险恶世界中,保守主义是不二之选,可惜哈耶克死得太早没想明白这一点。

@whigzhou: 只要你是进化论者,就会认识到我们面临的选择空间中可行解分布极为稀疏,是进化算法帮我们找出了这些可行解孤岛,而不是世界恰好被上帝造得那么宜居,进步主义的乐观假定其实是一种幸存者偏(more...)

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6818
【2016-04-14】 @whigzhou: 最优化vs满意解,功利计算vs拇指法则,天堂墙外寻路者vs险恶世界幸存者,画出世界地图然后大步迈向天堂vs泥泞大雾中小步摸索,进步主义vs保守主义……所以这其实是个算法问题,在一个可行解分布极为稀疏且迷雾重重能见度极低的险恶世界中,保守主义是不二之选,可惜哈耶克死得太早没想明白这一点。 @whigzhou: 只要你是进化论者,就会认识到我们面临的选择空间中可行解分布极为稀疏,是进化算法帮我们找出了这些可行解孤岛,而不是世界恰好被上帝造得那么宜居,进步主义的乐观假定其实是一种幸存者偏见(喂,这才是幸存者偏见的正确用法, @whigzhou: 只要你认识到人类认知局限,就会同意我们面对的(认识论上的)世界迷雾重重,能见度极低,随便乱走很危险。 @whigzhou: 在这两个前提下,就有了对待功利主义的两种态度:功利主义(至少流行的版本)总想在给定价值函数之后寻求最大化,保守派天然讨厌功利主义,因为我们不要最大化,世界太险恶,如何保住我们所珍视的东西才最重要,所以,在弄清进化如何带给我们这些珍宝之前,不如先找出一组拇指法则。 @whigzhou: 这些拇指法则只能从那些有幸成功保有了这些珍宝的前辈的实践中去寻找,(基于前述局限)不可能是从头算出来的,正如我们已经看到的,功利主义算法对条件过于敏感,略微改变一个条件,或者稍稍多考虑一步,结论就可能完全翻转(黑话叫很混沌),如此便无法为我们提供一个可用的行动指导。 @战拖拉夫卡: "中国模式"到底是更接近于辉总所说的“功利最大化计算”,还是更接近于中国情境意义下的“拇指法则”?毕竟,摸石头过河这一策略也算得上实用主义范畴吧。需要甄别的是在中国现有路径依赖之上的实用主义,算是画地图大步迈向天堂还是在泥泞大雾中小步摸索? @whigzhou: 彼之珍宝,吾之敝履 @whigzhou: 我说的保守主义/进步主义,是元政治哲学层次上的分野,不涉及保守的具体是什么东西,哈耶克没想明白的,正是这一层次之别 @whigzhou: 正如契约主义/普世主义之别,是元伦理层次上的分野,不涉及具体契约内容 @whigzhou: 摸着石头过河这句话本身是契合保守主义的,问题是说这句话的人心目中的珍宝是什么?如果他的意思是“咱们就此散伙吧,让各省人民自己摸着石头爬向美国去”,那自然好~  
制度差异不能解释全部

个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把Charles MurrayGarett JonesGregory Clark的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。

这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的,然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认,文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。(more...)

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6808
个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把[[Charles Murray]],[[Garett Jones]]和[[Gregory Clark]]的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的,然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认,文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。 转变最初起于对南北欧的比较,北欧(包括英德)在制度上也有种种问题,但表现总是比南欧强很多,日耳曼/拉丁这条分界线实在太清晰了,怎么辩解否认都不可能,想来想去,一个直觉上的印象反而比种种“客观原因”更有说服力:南欧的政治家(和他们的民众一样)普遍没有责任感,没有政治担当,没有认错然后做个决断的能力,只会命苦怪别人,就这么简单。 看看希腊人在债务危机后的丑态,一门心思只想着赖账,从不想想自己有什么问题,和西班牙政府在历史上无数次赖账如出一辙,这种事情北欧人就做不出来,默克尔移民大放水这件事情虽然是做得很坏,但不得不承认她是有担当的,在非常清楚代价的情况下勇于承担责任的,这种事情你在南欧永远看不到。 我曾经认为夏威夷是个支持制度主义的鲜明案例,但后来发现,直到几十年前,欧裔和日裔加起来还占夏威夷人口多数。 然后我又看了一下波多黎各和英属洪都拉斯(包括伯利兹),很明显的制度主义反例。可以设想一下,其他条件不变,把波多黎各或洪都拉斯的70%人口全部换成日裔,会是什么样,要我说,答案很明显。 外部强加的制度当然可以造成很大差别,这个以前说过很多了,现在我想强调的是,对于某些文化,某些族群,外部再怎么强加制度,可能都不会达到很好的状态,当然,正面外部力量可以让它避免最坏的状态(比如变成朝鲜) 简单说,在所有拉丁社会中,波多黎各当然已经非常好了,再怎么说,因为有美国,它不会变成阿根廷,或委内瑞拉,或古巴,而我的意思是,它也不大会变成夏威夷,变成韩国,变成香港,论制度条件,英属/美属加勒比的条件再理想不过了,但并未冒出任何加勒比小龙。 再看以色列,不考虑文化/遗传因素的话,当初的条件真是恶劣到无以复加,建国者满脑子共产主义,沉重战争负担,重税,重管制,恶性通胀,啥坏事都摊上过,最后愣是给拗过来了。 转个两年前的旧帖,大意如此。

@whigzhou @ 2014-8-29 12:25 随着技术/文化/制度的丰满成熟,地理因素对社会间差异变得越来越无关,地理大发现以来,英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会,德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民,犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……,换句话说:更成熟的文化与制度更有能力控制和适应各种环境。

 
呼之欲出

【2016-04-16】

@whigzhou: 个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把Charles MurrayGarett JonesGregory Clark的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。

@whigzhou: 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但(more...)

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7107
【2016-04-16】 @whigzhou: 个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把[[Charles Murray]],[[Garett Jones]]和[[Gregory Clark]]的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。 @whigzhou: 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的,然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认,文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。 @whigzhou: 转变最初起于对南北欧的比较,北欧(包括英德)在制度上也有种种问题,但表现总是比南欧强很多,日耳曼/拉丁这条分界线实在太清晰了,怎么辩解否认都不可能 @whigzhou: 想来想去,一个直觉上的印象反而比种种“客观原因”更有说服力:南欧的政治家(和他们的民众一样)普遍没有责任感,没有政治担当,没有认错然后做个决断的能力,只会命苦怪别人,就这么简单 @whigzhou: 看看希腊人在债务危机后的丑态,一门心思只想着赖账,从不想想自己有什么问题,和西班牙政府在历史上无数次赖账如出一辙,这种事情北欧人就做不出来,默克尔移民大放水这件事情虽然是做得很坏,但不得不承认她是有担当的,在非常清楚代价的情况下勇于承担责任的,这种事情你在南欧永远看不到 @whigzhou: 我曾经认为夏威夷是个支持制度主义的鲜明案例,但后来发现,直到几十年前,欧裔和日裔加起来还占夏威夷人口多数 @whigzhou: 然后我又看了一下波多黎各和英属洪都拉斯(包括伯利兹),很明显的制度主义反例 @whigzhou: 可以设想一下,其他条件不变,把波多黎各或洪都拉斯的70%人口全部换成日裔,会是什么样,要我说答案很明显 @养猪专业户王福贵:特别想听听您对南北朝鲜,东西德国的解读。 @whigzhou: 外部强加的制度当然可以造成很大差别,这个以前说过很多了,现在我想强调的是,对于某些文化,某些族群,外部再怎么强加制度,可能都不会达到很好的状态,当然,正面外部力量可以让它避免最坏的状态(比如变成朝鲜) @whigzhou: 简单说,在所有拉丁社会中,波多黎各当然已经非常好了,再怎么说,因为有美国,它不会变成阿根廷,或委内瑞拉,或古巴,而我的意思是,它也不大会变成夏威夷,变成韩国,变成香港,论制度条件,英属/美属加勒比的条件再理想不过了,但并未冒出任何加勒比小龙 @whigzhou: 再看以色列,不考虑文化/遗传因素的话,当初的条件真是恶劣到无以复加,建国者满脑子共产主义,沉重战争负担,重税,重管制,恶性通胀,啥坏事都摊上过,最后愣是给拗过来了。 @whigzhou: 转个两年前的旧帖,大意如此。//@whigzhou: 随着技术/文化/制度的丰满成熟,地理因素对社会间差异变得越来越无关,地理大发现以来,英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会,德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民,犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……,换句话说:更成熟的文化与制度更有能力控制和适应各种环境。  
一包补丁

【2016-04-14】

@海德沙龙 《历史如何造就美国人》 在常见历史叙事中,移民北美的清教徒,早在五月花号尚未靠岸时,便已确立了日后美国宪政的基本原则,清教徒的文化气质也构成了美国精神的核心内容,但真实历史往往没有这么理想,在本文所介绍的新书中,历史学家Malcolm Gaskill讲述了一个十分不同的故事

@whigzhou: 有关制度起源的简单叙事基本上都是错的,制度就是陆续积累的一大包补丁,其实复杂的软件系统也有点类似,虽然软件系统的整体设计成分要多一些,但大量功(more...)

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【2016-04-14】 @海德沙龙 《历史如何造就美国人》 在常见历史叙事中,移民北美的清教徒,早在五月花号尚未靠岸时,便已确立了日后美国宪政的基本原则,清教徒的文化气质也构成了美国精神的核心内容,但真实历史往往没有这么理想,在本文所介绍的新书中,历史学家Malcolm Gaskill讲述了一个十分不同的故事 @whigzhou: 有关制度起源的简单叙事基本上都是错的,制度就是陆续积累的一大包补丁,其实复杂的软件系统也有点类似,虽然软件系统的整体设计成分要多一些,但大量功能其实仍是打补丁打出来的,只不过这个版本的补丁,到下一个版本可能就成了设计方案中的组件了,所谓迭代演进是也。 @whigzhou: 最具误导性的一种观点被我称为同态论,即把我们事后从制度中找出的一些原则,等同于当初打补丁的码农头脑里的观念,研究思想史的那帮人特别痴迷于这种念头 @辻郖杉:记得有一阵子辉总在刷《技术史》。那么辉总是否认为新技术的出现也是这种“打补丁”呢? @whigzhou: 是啊,汽车的早期发展就是在四轮马车上不断打补丁嘛 @whigzhou: 另外军队也类似,有句名言说每支军队都是为上一次战争设计的,无论事先考虑多周到,一旦开打,立马手忙脚乱狂打补丁,等战争结束,军校里又手忙脚乱一通研究,这些补丁(中的大部分)就变成下一代军队的标准组件了  
[译文]农作物类型如何影响制度进化

Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy
谷物、可收夺性和等级制

作者:Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:VoxEU,http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions

Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers.

传统理论认为,等级制和国家产生的缘由在于:人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出,上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此,仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区,才会产生等级制和国家。

What explains underdevelopment?
欠发达的原因是什么?

One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equato(more...)

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Cereals, appropriability, and hierarchy 谷物、可收夺性和等级制 作者:Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali @2015-9-11 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:VoxEU,http://www.voxeu.org/article/neolithic-roots-economic-institutions Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers. 传统理论认为,等级制和国家产生的缘由在于:人类在新石器时代农业转向时出现了生产率增长。而本专栏则指出,上述社会发展是掠夺者和新生的精英分子收夺谷物的能力上升的结果。因此,仅仅是在那些易于收夺的谷物比其他不易收夺的块根和块茎作物在产量上拥有充分优势的地区,才会产生等级制和国家。 What explains underdevelopment? 欠发达的原因是什么? One of the most pressing problems of our age is the underdevelopment of countries in which government malfunction seems endemic. Many of these countries are located close to the Equator. Acemoglu et al. (2001) point to extractive institutions as the root cause for underdevelopment. Besley and Persson (2014) emphasise the persistent effects of low fiscal capacity in underdeveloped countries. 我们这个时代最为紧迫的问题之一就是存在许多欠发达国家,而政府失灵在这些国家极为常见。它们大多数都位于赤道附近。Acemoglu等(2001年)认为,榨取型制度是欠发达的根本原因。Besley和Persson(2014年)强调,欠发达国家财政能力的低弱具有持久影响。 On the other hand, Diamond (1997) argues that it is geographical factors that explain why some regions of the world remain underdeveloped. In particular, he argues that the east-west orientation of Eurasia resulted in greater variety and productivity of cultivable crops, and in larger economic surplus, which facilitated the development of state institutions in this major landmass. Less fortunate regions, including New Guinea and sub-Saharan Africa, were left underdeveloped due to low land productivity. 而另一方面,Diamond(1997年)则提出,地理因素能够解释为什么世界某些地区会停留在欠发达状态。具体来说,他指出,欧亚大陆的东西走向使得适合驯化的谷物产量更大、种类更多,也使其经济剩余更多,后者为这块大陆上的国家制度的发展提供了便利。至于那些不那么幸运的地域,诸如新几内亚、撒哈拉以南非洲等,就因为土地生产率低下而停留在了欠发达状态。 In a recent paper (Mayshar et al. 2015), we contend that fiscal capacity and viable state institutions are conditioned to a major extent by geography. Thus, like Diamond, we argue that geography matters a great deal. But in contrast to Diamond, and against conventional opinion, we contend that it is not high farming productivity and the availability of food surplus that accounts for the economic success of Eurasia. 在最近的一篇论文(Mayshar等,2015年)中,我们主张:财政能力和国家机构的维系,很大程度上受地理条件限制。因此和Diamond一样,我们认为地理条件异常重要。不过与Diamond和其他传统观点不同的是,我们认为欧亚大陆的经济成功并非源于高农业生产率和获得粮食盈余的可能性。
  • We propose an alternative mechanism by which environmental factors imply the appropriability of crops and thereby the emergence of complex social institutions.
  • 我们提出了一个(用于解释国家起源的)替代机制:环境因素决定谷物的可收夺性,从而决定了复杂社会制度的产生。
To understand why surplus is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of hierarchy, consider a hypothetical community of farmers who cultivate cassava (a major source of calories in sub-Saharan Africa, and the main crop cultivated in Nigeria), and assume that the annual output is well above subsistence. 为了理解为什么粮食盈余既不是等级制产生的必要条件,也不是充分条件,让我们假设:有这么一个种植木薯(撒哈拉以南非洲的一种主要热量来源,尼日利亚的主要农作物)的农民群体,并且假设每年的产量远远超过生存所需。 Cassava is a perennial root that is highly perishable upon harvest. Since this crop rots shortly after harvest, it isn't stored and it is thus difficult to steal or confiscate. As a result, the assumed available surplus would not facilitate the emergence of a non-food producing elite, and may be expected to lead to a population increase. 木薯是多年生宿根植物,收获以后很容易腐烂。既然这种作物在收获后不久就会腐烂,它就不会被贮藏,因此很难被盗取或征用。结果就是,这种假定可以获得的粮食盈余将不会促成那些不事农业生产的统治精英的产生,而且可能会导致人口增长。 Consider now another hypothetical farming community that grows a cereal grain – such as wheat, rice or maize – yet with an annual produce that just meets each family's subsistence needs, without any surplus. Since the grain has to be harvested within a short period and then stored until the next harvest, a visiting robber or tax collector could readily confiscate part of the stored produce. Such ongoing confiscation may be expected to lead to a downward adjustment in population density, but it will nevertheless facilitate the emergence of non-producing elite, even though there was no surplus. 现在设想另外一个种植谷类作物的农民群体——比如小麦、稻米或者玉米,且假定这些作物的年产量只能刚好满足每个家庭的生存需求,没有任何盈余。因为粮食作物要在很短时间内收割完毕,并需要一直贮藏到下次收获,所以袭击而来的盗贼或者税吏可以很容易地拿走储藏量的一部分。这种不断出现的损失,可能会导致人口密度下降,但是它却会促进不事生产的统治精英的产生,尽管完全没有粮食盈余。 Emergence of fiscal capacity and hierarchy and the cultivation of cereals 财政能力及等级制的产生与谷物栽培的关系 This simple scenario shows that surplus isn't a precondition for taxation. It also illustrates our alternative theory that the transition to agriculture enabled hierarchy to emerge only where the cultivated crops were vulnerable to appropriation. 这个简单的设想表明,粮食盈余并不是税收的前提条件。同时,它也说明了我们所提出的新理论——农业转向促成了等级制的萌生,但这一过程只会发生在所培植的作物很容易被掠夺的地方。
  • In particular, we contend that the Neolithic emergence of fiscal capacity andhierarchy was conditioned on the cultivation of appropriable cereals as the staple crops, in contrast to less appropriable staples such as roots and tubers.
  • 具体来说,我们认为,财政能力与等级制在新石器时代出现,需要一个前提条件:以易于收夺的谷类为主要作物,而不是以不易收夺的块根和块茎作物等为主要作物。
According to this theory, complex hierarchy did not emerge among hunter-gatherers because hunter-gatherers essentially live from hand-to-mouth, with little that can be expropriated from them to feed a would-be elite. 根据这一理论,狩猎采集者群体中间没能产生复杂的等级制,是因为他们本质上是现挣现吃的,在他们身上很难征用到足够的资源来供养潜在的统治精英。
  • Thus, rather than surplus facilitating the emergence of the elite, we argue that the elite only emerged when and where it was possible to expropriate crops.
  • 因此,并非粮食盈余促进了统治精英的出现。我们认为,只有在粮食收成容易被征用的地方和时期,才会产生统治精英。
Due to increasing returns to scale in the provision of protection from theft, early farmers had to aggregate and to cooperate to defend their stored grains. Food storage and the demand for protection thus led to population agglomeration in villages and to the creation of a non-food producing elite that oversaw the provision of protection. 鉴于防备盗窃所带来的收益是随规模递增的,远古时代的农民们必须聚集在一起共同合作来守护他们的储粮。因此,食物贮藏和保护的需要使得人口集聚成村落,并且创造了负责提供保护而不事农业生产的精英。 Once a group became larger than a few dozen immediate kin, it is unlikely that those who sought protection services were as forthcoming in financing the security they desired. This public-good nature of protection was resolved by the ability of those in charge of protecting the stored food to appropriate the necessary means. 而一旦某个群体的数量超过了几十个直系亲属的规模的话,那么这些寻求保护性服务的人们就不太可能心甘情愿地支付维持众人渴望的安全所需的费用。解决安全保卫的这种公共物品性质,要求那些负责保护储粮的人提高自身对于必要财产的征用能力。
  • That is, we argue that it was this transformation of the appropriation technology, due to the transition to cereals, which created both the demand for protection and the means for its provision.
  • 也就是说,我们认为,是由于征用技术随着谷物种植出现而发生转变,才既创造了对于安全保卫的需求,也创造了提供安全保卫的手段。
This is how we explain the emergence of complex and hereditary social hierarchy, and eventually the state. 这就是我们解释复杂的、世袭性的社会等级制乃至国家最终形成的方法。 Applied to Diamond's prototypic contrast between Eurasia and New Guinea, our theory suggests that the crucial distinction between these two regions is that farming in Eurasia relied on the cultivation of cereals, while in New Guinea it relied mostly on the cultivation of tubers (yam and taro, and, more recently, sweet potato) and bananas, where long-term storage is neither feasible (due to perishability) nor necessary (because harvesting is essentially non-seasonal). 应用于Diamond对比欧亚大陆和新几内亚的原型理论,我们的理论表明:这两个地域之间最关键的差别是欧亚大陆的农业依赖于谷物栽培,而新几内亚依赖的主要是块茎作物(白薯,芋头,最近也有甘薯)和香蕉,这些作物既不可能长期保存(因为易腐性),又没有必要长期保存(因为收获时节基本上是非季节性的)。 This provided farmers in New Guinea with sufficient immunity against bandits and potential tax collectors. More generally, we contend that the underdevelopment of tropical areas is not due to low land fertility but rather the reverse. Farmers in the tropics can choose to cultivate highly productive, non-appropriable tuber crops. This inhibits both the demand for socially provided protection and the emergence of a protection-providing elite. It is a curse of plenty. 这使得新几内亚的农民们对抢匪和潜在的税吏有足够的免疫力。更一般地说,我们认为,热带地区的欠发达原因并不是土壤产出低,而是恰好相反。热带地区的农民可以选择种植高产量而不易收夺的块茎作物。这样就既抑制了对于作为社会公共品提供的保护的需求,也妨碍了负责提供保护的统治精英的出现。这是一种资源诅咒。 In the empirical section of our paper we demonstrate that, contrary to the standard productivity-and-surplus theory, land productivity per se has no direct effect on hierarchy. We also show that, consistent with our theory, the cultivation of roots or tubers is indeed detrimental to hierarchy. 在论文的实证部分,我们证明了,与标准的生产率—盈余理论不同,土地生产率本身对于等级制形成没有直接影响。我们同时也表明,种植块根和块茎作物确实是不利于等级制的形成,这与我们的理论一致。 Empirical finding 实证结果 These results are established by employing two datasets with information on social hierarchy: a cross section and a panel of countries. For our cross-sectional analysis we use Murdock's (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, which contains information on cultural, institutional, and economic features of 1,267 societies from around the world at an idealised time period of first contact with Europeans. Our main outcome variable is ‘jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community’. The Ethnographic Atlas also provides information on the major crop type grown by societies that practice agriculture. 上述结果是基于应用两个包含社会等级制信息的数据集而得出的:一组是截面数据,一组则是面板数据。在截面分析中,我们使用了Murdock的“民族志图集”(1967年),其中包含了世界各地1267个社群在刚刚接触欧洲人的理想化时间段内的文化、制度和经济特征方面的信息。我们主要的结果变量是“超越地方性社群的管辖层级”。“民族志地图”里面也提供了各个从事农业的社群所种植的主要作物种类的信息。 Since the cultivated crop is a decision variable, we instrument for the crop type by using data on land suitability for different crops from the Food and Agriculture Organisation. We first show that the decision whether to cultivate cereals as a main crop depends positively on the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers (in terms of potential caloric yields per hectare). 因为农作物是我们模型中的决策变量【编注:指模型中可加以控制或先于其他参数而改变的主动变量】,我们利用联合国粮农组织有关土地对不同作物之适宜性的数据,来推测各社群的农作物类型。首先我们分析表明,是否将谷物作为主要作物,实际上依赖于谷物对于块根和块茎作物的生产率优势(以每公顷的潜在热量产出计算)。 We then find that societies tend to have a more complex hierarchal organisation where the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers is higher, as predicted by our theory. Furthermore, we find that societies that practice agriculture are more hierarchical only where they cultivate cereals. This means that societies that cultivate roots and tubers have similar levels of hierarchy to those of pastoral or foraging societies. 而后我们发现,那些谷物比根块茎作物拥有更高生产率优势的社群,往往会拥有更复杂的层级机构,这与我们所提理论的预期相符。此外,我们发现,在从事农业生产的社群中,只有种植谷物的那些才具有更多的等级性质。这意味着,种植根块茎的社群与游牧社群或采集社群具有相似的社会分层水平。 We also show that land productivity, measured by the potential yield of calories per acre of the most productive crop in each area, does not affect hierarchy once we control for the productivity advantage of cereals. Thus, our empirical findings challenge the conventional argument that it is increased land productivity that leads to more hierarchical societies. 我们还展示了,一旦控制了谷物的生产率优势,土地生产率(以每个地方最适应生产的作物的每英亩潜在热量产出计算)就不会影响社会等级性。因此,我们的实证结果质疑了土地生产率提高导致社会等级性增强的传统理论。 Although this cross-sectional analysis accounts for a wide range of confounding factors, we cannot rule out completely that omitted variables may bias the estimates. To overcome this concern, we employ another dataset compiled by Borcan et al. (2014). This is a panel, based on present-day boundaries of 159 countries, with institutional information every five decades over the last millennium. 虽然这个截面分析考虑到了很多干扰因子,但我们依然不能完全排除遗漏某些变量造成推算偏差的可能性。为了解除这一疑虑,我们应用了另外一个由Borcan等人(2014年)编制的数据集。这是一项历时性数据,以159个国家的现代边界为基础,包含有过去一千年中每隔五十年的制度信息。 This panel enables us to exploit the ‘Columbian exchange’ of crops across continents as a natural experiment. The new crops that became available after 1492 in the New and the Old World changed both the productivity of land and the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers in the majority of the countries in the sample. 这项历时性数据使得我们可以把农作物跨越各大陆的“哥伦布交换”当作一个自然实验来利用。对于样本国家中的大多数而言,新旧两个大陆在1492年之后所得到的新型农作物都既改变了他们的土地生产率,也改变了谷物相对块根块茎作物的生产率优势。 Consistent with our theory, the panel regressions confirm that an increase in the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers has a positive impact on hierarchical complexity, while an increase in land productivity does not. 与我们的理论一致的是,基于历时性数据的回归分析证实:如果谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势增加,那就会对社会分层的复杂性产生正面影响,而土地生产率的增加则不会引发这种正面影响。 Concluding remarks 结论 These findings support our theory that it is not agricultural productivity and surplus per se that explains more complex hierarchical societies, but rather the productivity advantage of cereals over roots and tubers, the type of crop that is cultivated as a result, and the appropriability of the crop type. Given that the productivity of roots and tubers is typically high in the tropics, these results also support the claim that deep-rooted geographical factors may explain the current weakness of state institutions in these regions. 这些发现支持了我们的理论:农业生产率和粮食盈余本身并不能解释更为复杂的等级制社会的出现,毋宁说,它们之出现,原因在于谷物作物相对于块根块茎作物的生产率优势,也就是由此导致的栽培农作物的种类选择以及此种农作物的可收夺性。鉴于块根块茎作物在热带地区产量一般来说更高,上述结论也支持这样一种说法:这些地域的国家机构的孱弱现状,可能从深层次的地理原因方面可以得到解释。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]历史如何造就美国人

Making Americans
造就美国人

作者:Will Morrisey @ 2015-11-25
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Online Library of Law and Liberty, http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/25/making-americans/

English settlers in America might have intended to transmit the traditions of the mother country to subsequent generations. This didn’t exactly happen—partly because the settlers disagreed amongst themselves about which of those traditions deserved preservation, and partly because the experience of life in North America challenged many of the traditions they did want to preserve. The disagreement and the adaptation together led, eventually, to a political revolution.

来到美洲的殖民者们也许曾经试图让来自祖国的传统在他们的后代身上延续下去,但这最终未能实现——部分是因为这些殖民者无法就哪些传统值得被保留达成一致,部分是因为在北美的生活经历让许多他们曾希望保留的传统受到了挑战。他们的这些分歧和适应行为最终导致了一场政治革命。

Malcolm Gaskill puts it bluntly: “Migrants did have one thing in common: they were no longer in England, and they had to get used to it.”

Malcolm Gaskill直言不讳地写道:“这些移民的确有一个共同点:他们不再生活在英格兰了,而他们必须去适应这种新生活。”

His new book tracks what happened to the English in their three (very different) principal area(more...)

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Making Americans 造就美国人 作者:Will Morrisey @ 2015-11-25 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Online Library of Law and Liberty, http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/11/25/making-americans/ English settlers in America might have intended to transmit the traditions of the mother country to subsequent generations. This didn’t exactly happen—partly because the settlers disagreed amongst themselves about which of those traditions deserved preservation, and partly because the experience of life in North America challenged many of the traditions they did want to preserve. The disagreement and the adaptation together led, eventually, to a political revolution. 来到美洲的殖民者们也许曾经试图让来自祖国的传统在他们的后代身上延续下去,但这最终未能实现——部分是因为这些殖民者无法就哪些传统值得被保留达成一致,部分是因为在北美的生活经历让许多他们曾希望保留的传统受到了挑战。他们的这些分歧和适应行为最终导致了一场政治革命。 Malcolm Gaskill puts it bluntly: “Migrants did have one thing in common: they were no longer in England, and they had to get used to it.” Malcolm Gaskill直言不讳地写道:“这些移民的确有一个共同点:他们不再生活在英格兰了,而他们必须去适应这种新生活。” His new book tracks what happened to the English in their three (very different) principal areas of settlement: Virginia, New England, and the Caribbean. He also keeps an eye on what the English who stayed at home—financing these expeditions and attempting to rule them from afar—thought and did, especially in competition with the Spanish, who had settled large swaths of the New World a long time before their geopolitical rivals in London really got started. 他的新书追踪了弗吉尼亚、新英格兰和加勒比这三个(差别非常大的)主要殖民区域中发生在这些英国殖民者身上的历史。在书中,他同样关注了那些为这些殖民者的远征提供财力支持,并试图在遥远的英国统治他们的英国人的所想所为,尤其是他们与西班牙人之间的竞争——西班牙人早在他们伦敦的地缘政治对手开始向“新大陆”进军之前很久就已经在那里占据了大片土地。 This gives Between Two Worlds: How the English Became Americans a lot to do, but the author, a professor of early modern history at the University of East Anglia, manages his unruly topic by considering each of the first three settler generations in turn. 这些内容让写作《两个世界之间:英国人是如何成为美国人的》这本书成了一项繁重的任务,但本书作者,一位在东安格利亚大学研究早期现代史的教授,通过分别研究最初的三代殖民者,成功地处理了他所面对的这一难以驾驭的课题。 Gaskill deals in his prologue with the inauspicious 16th century beginnings of the project, remarking that the English understandably modeled their efforts on the recent conquest of Ireland, the wild tribes of which reminded them of their own pre-Roman-conquest ancestors and of the North American peoples. Gaskill在本书序言中讨论了16世纪初英国人开拓北美殖民地时所遇到的不顺利的开端,并提到英国人当时的殖民行为仿照的是他们最近对爱尔兰的征服,这并不稀奇,那里的蛮族部落让他们想起了自己的祖先在“罗马征服”之前的样子和现在的这些北美原住民。 The first settlement, at Roanoke, “Virginia” in 1585—named for Elizabeth, the Virgin Queen, of course—vanished from the earth like Prospero’s insubstantial pageant. To this day, we don’t know what happened to its more than 100 inhabitants. 他们1585年在以“童贞女王”伊丽莎白命名的“弗吉尼亚”的罗阿诺克建立了第一个殖民地,后来就像莎翁笔下普罗斯彼罗的虚幻盛宴一样从地球上消失了。直到今天,我们还是不知道那一百多位居民身上发生了什么。 The years 1607 to 1640 mark Gaskill’s first generation of permanent settlers. Of the four million English in 1600, thousands would journey to the New World during this period. Half of them went to the West Indies, slightly more than a third to the Virginia/Chesapeake area, only 15 percent to New England. 从1607年到1640年,Gaskill所定义的第一代永久殖民者来到了北美。1600年生活在英国的四百万人口中,有数千人将在这一时期踏上前往“新大陆”的旅途。他们中的一半去了西印度群岛,略多于三分之一去了弗吉尼亚/切萨皮克地区,仅有15%去了新英格兰。 Motives varied, but as the “southerly” movement of the new arrivals  suggests, the prospect of a mild climate fit for rich plantations and an interest in “resisting Spanish Catholics—the dark lords of an American empire”—figured prominently in English ambitions. 虽然动机各不相同,但这些新来者们向南方的迁移说明,对适宜大型种植园的温和气候和“抵抗美洲帝国的黑暗领主——西班牙天主教徒们”的兴趣是英国人的主要野心所在。 To wrest land from the infidels of Spain and from pagan indigenes—better still, while converting the latter to Protestant Christianity—reconciled, at least to the satisfaction of the English, desires for both liberty and empire. (Two centuries later, Thomas Jefferson’s formula, “the empire of liberty,” would address the same paradox, albeit in very different terms.) 至少对于英国人来说,从西班牙异端以及异教的土著人手中夺取土地——要是能同时将后者转变为新教基督徒就更好,这恰好将英国人既追求自由又寻求建立帝国统治的两个目标统一了起来。(两个世纪之后,托马斯·杰弗逊提出的“自由帝国”一词也回应了同一悖论,虽然是以一种非常不同的形式。) Upon ascending the throne in 1603, James I followed a two-track strategy with Spain. He made peace while endorsing some New World plantations. King James’ restraint in New World settlement bespoke not only diplomatic caution but also the worry (prescient, as it would happen) that large English settlements in the New World might upset England’s place “in the hierarchy of nations.” 自从1603年登上王位,詹姆士一世就以一种“双轨策略”来对付西班牙。在向“新大陆”的一些种植园提供支持的同时,他也维持着与西班牙之间的和平关系。詹姆士国王在“新大陆”殖民事业上的克制不仅仅显示出他在外交上的谨慎,同时也表现出他的一种担忧:英国在“新大陆”的大规模殖民活动可能会打乱本国在“国家的层级体系”中所处位置(之后发生的事情也证明了这一担忧的确很有先见之明)。 The New World tail might someday wag the Old World dog. He took care not to use the Crown’s money for investment, leaving colonization to private speculators who nonetheless remained under royal control. Hence the Virginia Company and the Plymouth Adventurers, both established in 1606. “新大陆”的发展终有一天会对“旧大陆”构成尾大不掉之势。他小心翼翼地避免使用皇室的钱进行投资,将殖民活动留给那些仍然处于皇室控制之下的私人投机客们。正是在这种背景下,弗吉尼亚公司和普利茅斯探险者公司同时在1606年成立了。 The former reached the Chesapeake Bay under the command of Captain John Smith the following year, founding Jamestown and meeting resistance above all from the Indian chiefs or Paw-Paws, who recognized a rival form of worship when they saw one. As Gaskill puts it, “Indian suspicion on one side, and a haughty sense of entitlement on the other, guaranteed an Anglo-Indian future steeped in misery and bloodshed.” 弗吉尼亚公司的船队在John Smith船长的指挥下于次年来到了切萨皮克湾,他们建立了詹姆斯敦,并且遇到了一些印第安首领(也称Paw-Paw)【校注:根据原书,此处应为paw-waw,印第安人中的神职人员】的抵抗,他们把任何与他们有着不同崇拜的人都视为敌人。正如Gaskill所写道的,“一边是多疑的印第安人,而另一边则是英国人傲慢的特权感,这为之后盎格鲁-印第安人之间血腥而悲惨的历史埋下了伏笔。” And this notwithstanding the marriage of the entrepreneur John Rolfe to “Pocahantas” (her real name, Mataoka, concealed from the English), optimistically renamed “Rebecca,” after the Biblical mother of two nations. She died less than a decade later, after a publicity tour of England, taking the rather faint hope of peaceful intermarriage and Christian conversion of the Indians with her. 尽管来自英国的企业家John Rolfe娶了土著公主“宝嘉康蒂”(她的真名Mataoka却不为英国人所知),并且她还起了一个富有乐观精神的新名字“Rebecca”——圣经中两个民族的母亲【编注:据《旧约·创世纪》,利百加(Rebecca)为以撒(Issac)之妻,生孪生子雅各(Jacob)和以扫(Esau),分别为以色列人和以东人(Edomites)的始祖,有些说法认为阿拉伯人是以东人后裔。】,但仅仅过了不到十年,她在一次宣传性质的英国之旅后就去世了,同时也带走了本就十分渺茫的和平联姻以及将印第安人转变为基督徒的希望。 The real answer to lasting English settlement in America was political thought. “Adventurers had to learn that merely installing English settlements in America was not enough,” Gaskill writes. “They had to identify things that made England work socially, politically, and economically and reproduce them. Peopling the land was the key.” 英国人在美洲维持长期殖民的真正答案在于政治思想。“探险者们必须懂得,仅仅在美洲建立英国殖民地是不够的,”Gaskill写道。“他们必须找出那些让英国在社会层面、政治层面和经济层面得以运转下去的东西,并将这套东西移植到新大陆上,让其生根发芽。在这片土地上繁衍生息才是关键。” If ever a people were, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous phrase, forced to be free, it was the English in North America. More specifically, they were forced to think, and to think politically. It was a habit that would eventuate in independence and republicanism, nearly two centuries later. 如果历史上确有一群人——用卢梭的名言来说——是被迫成为自由人的,那说的就是北美洲的英国人了。更准确的说,他们是被逼着去思考政治问题。这个习惯最终在大约两个世纪之后孕育出了美国的独立和共和主义。 The Indian nations and tribes, who had been engaged in fierce geopolitical struggles amongst themselves for centuries, quickly saw the danger of any substantial territorial encroachments by the newcomers. At best, the white strangers might be deployed against traditional enemies. 那些已经陷入彼此之间的地缘政治斗争长达几个世纪的印第安民族和部落们,很快就发现了新来者们带来的巨大的领土入侵威胁。对他们来说,在最好的设想之下,可以利用这些白种陌生人攻击自己的宿敌。 Incidentally, one of the merits of Between Two Worlds is its treatment of the Indians—a treatment free of the American triumphalism of the old accounts, and also of the condescending sympathy for “Native Americans” fashionable in the past half-century. 顺便提一下,《两个世界之间》这本书的优点之一就是其中对印第安人的处理——它摆脱了陈腐的美国必胜心理,同时也摆脱了过去半个世纪中流行的那种带有优越感的对“美洲原住民”的同情心态。 Gaskill describes but makes no attempt to justify the sudden attack on Jamestown masterminded by the apparently friendly Powhatan chief, Opechancanough, whose men murdered 387 unsuspecting settlers in March 1622, then mangled the carcasses. Gaskill仅仅是描述了由那位之前表现得明显很友好的Powhatan部落酋长Opechancanough所策划的对詹姆斯敦的突袭,而完全没有试图为其辩护,在这场发生于1622年3月的突袭中,Opechancanough酋长的部下们杀死了387名毫无戒心的殖民者,之后还将他们的尸体砍得支离破碎。 After that, “Throughout the Atlantic world, men decided that Indians could not be trusted.” Settler eminences now began to speak not of intermarriage, peaceful trade, and conversion but of the right of war and the law of nations exercised against savages. 在那之后,“在整个大西洋世界中,人们决定不再信任印第安人。”殖民地的精英们不再谈论与印第安人通婚、和平贸易或者说服他们皈依基督教,而开始谈论战争权利以及针对野蛮人的国际公法。 As for the Plymouth Adventurers and their descendants, the New Englanders faced analogous circumstances but with a different set of Indian nations, in a harsher climate; and they arrived with more intense religious aspirations. A band of Protestant dissidents landed at “New Plymouth” in 1620, settling in territory where the local tribe had been eradicated by disease. 而对于普利茅斯探险者公司及其后继者们,这些新英格兰人所面临的处境与弗吉尼亚公司非常类似,只是他们所面对的是一些不同的印第安民族,和更加严酷的气候,而他们在到达时也怀揣着更加强烈的宗教愿望。一群持异见的新教徒在1620年到达了“新普利茅斯”,并在一个被疾病所消灭的当地部落所在地建立了殖民地。 Interestingly, Gaskill notes that the Mayflower Compact was no “democratic constitution but a company contract to bind the strangers to order upon landing, a quick fix before formal authority was established.” (Many of the Pilgrims were Dutch.) 有趣的是,Gaskill提到,“五月花号公约”实际上并不是什么“民主宪法,而是一份为了让那群陌生人上岸之后能够服从命令的公司合同,是在正式权力机构建立之前的一条权宜之计”。(这些最初的移民中很多都是荷兰人。) In the same vein, he points out that this and similar settlements in New England didn’t establish beachheads for political liberty; John Winthrop’s 1630 Salem founding was a theocracy supervised by God’s vicegerent, Mr. Winthrop. 同样地,他还指出,该殖民地和新英格兰地区的其他殖民地所建立的,并非是政治自由的桥头堡;John Winthrop于1630年在塞勒姆建立的殖民地是一个在上帝的代理人——也就是Winthrop先生本人——监督之下的神权政体。 The settlements were democratic only in Tocqueville’s social sense: No titled aristocrats made the trip. By “liberty” the settlers meant, in the frank words of one, a world free of bishops. 这些殖民地仅仅在托克维尔所说的社会意义上,才有些民主的样子:越洋而来的人群中不存在拥有头衔的贵族。对于这些殖民者而言,借用他们中某人的坦率说法,“自由”仅仅意味着一个没有主教的世界。 As for the West Indies, settlers worried less about Indians than about the heat, the hurricanes, and the disease-carrying mosquitoes. There, a new aristocracy began to take shape, based on slaves who were imported from Africa to work in a climate Europeans could not bear to work in. By the 1630s the Virginia settlers were beginning to do the same thing. The portentous social distinction between South and North had begun to take shape. 对于那些来到西印度群岛的殖民者们,相比印第安人,更加困扰他们的是炎热的天气,狂暴的飓风,还有蚊虫带来的疾病。在那里,一种新的贵族政治开始成型,而它的基础则是从非洲引入的黑奴,只有他们才能在欧洲人无法忍受的气候里劳作。而到了1630年代,弗吉尼亚的殖民者们也开始做同样的事情。北美大陆的南部和北部之间令人不安的社会差异开始逐步成型。 Having made his peace with Spain, James I faced increasingly sharp resistance to his rule from Protestants at home, their suspicions roused especially by the king’s attempts to marry his eldest son to one Catholic princess after another (success came in 1625, when the future Charles I wedded Henrietta Maria of France). By the time the second generation of English Americans took charge, relations with Indians had become foreign relations, slavery was giving rise to a set of New World aristocrats, and civil war loomed in England itself. 在与西班牙握手言和之后,詹姆士一世国王面临着来自国内新教徒日益锐利的抵抗。国王不断地试图让自己的长子迎娶一位又一位天主教公主的行为(最终在1625年,未来的查理一世成功地迎娶了法国的Henrietta Maria公主)特别激起了他们强烈的质疑。第二代英裔美洲殖民者登上历史舞台之后,他们与印第安人之间的关系已经成为了一种外交关系,而奴隶制则成就了一批新大陆的新贵,与此同时,内战的阴霾开始笼罩在英国上空。 With the war, second-generation colonists, writes Gaskill, “were forced to examine their consciences and allegiances to decide what being English meant and what it meant to belong physically and spiritually to America.” Gaskill写道,随着英国内战的进行,第二代殖民者“被迫去审视他们的良知和忠诚,以确定英国人的身份究竟意味着什么,以及在肉体和精神上都归属于美洲又意味着什么。” The First English Civil War— which pitted a new and more absolutist monarch, Charles I, against Oliver Cromwell and his Puritan “Roundheads”—stirred existing factions in North America, engaging them not only in the political thought forced upon the first generation but in regime-changing political thought. These passions mixed with passions aroused by the already worsening settler-Indian relations. 第一次英国内战——这次内战让一位更加崇尚专制的新国王查理一世陷入了与奥利弗·克伦威尔和他的清教徒“圆颅党”们的斗争——搅浑了北美英国殖民者之间本已存在的分歧,这让他们不仅仅需要面对上一代殖民者们被迫进行的政治思考,还需要作出与政权更替有关的新政治思考。而更糟的是,这些感情还与被已经持续恶化的殖民者和印第安人之间的关系所激起的感情杂糅在了一起。 Puritan victory in England meant that it became, briefly, more like New England. A new Reformation was imposed, this one described as a “Reformation of manners,” including capital punishment for adultery and what Gaskill calls “a united front against popery.” (The draconian law against adultery never saw rigorous enforcement—probably a good thing for the sake of continued English population growth. One emigrant to Virginia wrote that the deer in his new country were as numerous as cuckolds in England.) 简单地说,清教徒的胜利意味着英国变得更像新英格兰了。清教徒们实施了一次新的宗教改革运动,这次叫做“礼俗改革”,包括对通奸行为实施死刑以及Gaskill所说的“对罗马天主教的联合抵制。”(惩罚通奸行为的严厉法律从来没有被严格执行过——也许对于人口的持续增长来说,这反而是件好事。一位来到弗吉尼亚的移民曾写道,在他的新国家里,鹿的数量几乎和英国戴绿帽子的男人一样多。) Puritan victory did not bring dismantlement of the king’s wartime bureaucracy, which the Puritans simply took over, continuing extralegal absolutism but in clerical garb. The new republic saw the abolition of the House of Lords, the established church, and the monarchy, but the empowered Cromwell and Parliament had no more intention to frame a liberal republic than had the Puritan fathers of New England. 清教徒们的胜利并没有清除掉服务于国王的战时官僚体系,他们直接接管了这个体系,并继续维持着凌驾于法律之上的专制主义,只是站在它背后的换成了一群穿着牧师衣服的人。新的共和政府废除了议会上院,废黜了国教和君主,但是大权在握的克伦威尔和议会并不比那些建立了新英格兰殖民地的清教徒们更希望建立一个自由的共和国。 Although a bit lax in enforcing the adultery laws, both England and New England went after suspected witches, with England initiating the attacks and (surprisingly, given subsequent accounts) surpassing the New England courts in handing down convictions. At least New England magistrates “insisted on proof of a satanic pact,” unlike their more ardent English-Puritan counterparts. 虽然在执行惩罚通奸的法律上有些松懈,但在英国国内和新英格兰都掀起了搜捕女巫的运动,这事情最初在英国发起,且英国法庭判定的有罪女巫多于新英格兰的法庭(与后世的记录相对照,这一点很令人吃惊)。至少新英格兰的地方法官们会“坚持要求拿出女巫与魔鬼订过契约的证据”才会定罪,而不像他们更加富有激情的英国清教徒同僚们那样随意。 Fleeing in defeat, Royalists went to the West Indies, sometimes to Virginia. When Parliament threatened to pursue them across the water, they allied themselves with local champions of self-government as putative advocates of—what else, if not the tradition of the English common law (for which the Stuarts and their allies had previously shown little regard). 在经历了失败之后,英国的保皇党们逃向了西印度群岛,也有一些去了弗吉尼亚。当议会威胁要跨过大西洋追捕他们时,他们与当地的自治拥护者们结成了同盟,并把他们假想为——除了英国普通法的传统之外,还能是别的什么呢——的拥护者(但斯图亚特王室及其同盟者在之前可并没有对这一传统表现出多少尊重)。 Cromwell’s designation as “Emperor of the West Indies” put English republicanism, such as it was, on the side of statist centralization. Because the monarchy had sold off most of its lands under the Tudors, the new statists had no choice but to obtain revenues through taxation. 克伦威尔的“西印度群岛皇帝”头衔将英国本已破败不堪的共和主义完全变成了中央集权。由于王室已经在都铎时期卖掉了大部分土地,新来的中央集权者们别无选择,只能通过征税来获得收入。 Back along the Chesapeake, Catholics and Protestants fought each other in Maryland, with Protestants from as far away as Massachusetts joining the fight, which the Protestants eventually won at the Battle of Severn (near Annapolis) in 1655. 再看切萨皮克湾沿岸,天主教徒和新教徒们此时正在马里兰打得不可开交。新教徒一边的参战者甚至有从马萨诸塞远道而来的,最终于1655年在赛汶河(靠近安纳波利斯)战役后获得了最终的胜利。 By the time of Cromwell’s assassination in 1658, New England and Virginia had established themselves economically. Trade began to eclipse religiosity in both places. As it did in England: Charles II, crowned in 1660, proved considerably more latitudinarian in doctrine and in morals than were the Puritans. 到1658年克伦威尔被刺杀时,新英格兰和弗吉尼亚已经能够在经济上自食其力了。在这两个地区,贸易的影响力都已大大超过宗教。在英国也是如此:1660年登上王位的查理二世表明自己在宗教和道德方面比之前的清教徒们要开明得多。 Increased trade also brought greater demand for slaves, especially in the West Indies; not only Africans but English prisoners, Scottish rebels, and the ever-beleaguered Irish were “barbadosed.” Charles II did prove disappointing to merchants in one important respect: Needing revenues as much as his father and as much as Cromwell, he renewed the stiff regulation of trade. 贸易的繁荣同样刺激了对奴隶的更大需求,在西印度群岛尤其如此。不但是非洲人,甚至连英国犯人、苏格兰反叛者和那些一直处于英格兰围困下的爱尔兰人都被放逐到了巴巴多斯充当奴隶。查理二世的确在一个重要的方面让商人们大失所望:他和他的父王还有克伦威尔一样,需要大量的收入,所以他恢复了之前对贸易的严厉管制。 As Gaskill observes, the English civil/revolutionary wars proved to Americans that their difficulties with the mother country arose not simply as a result of defective regimes—monarchs and parliaments alike exacted revenues and demanded obedience—but as a result of the empowerment of the modern state, quite apart from its regime form. A century later, their descendants’ Declaration of Independence excoriated not only the monarch/tyrant but also the Parliament for, among other things, sending tax collectors to eat out their substance. 正如Gaskill所观察到的,英国的革命和内战向美国人证明:他们与祖国之间的问题不仅仅出于有缺陷的政权——不论是君主还是议会,都向他们榨取大量的收入,并且要求他们的绝对服从——而更是肇源于现代国家的权力,不仅仅是政体形态的问题。一个世纪之后,他们的后人发表的“独立宣言”中不仅仅严厉地声讨了暴虐的君主,也同样声讨了英国议会派遣税务官来剥削他们财富的行为。 Increased trade also spelled trouble for the Indians. The more prosperous the American English became, the more numerous they were; the more numerous they were, the more land they wanted. In Virginia, especially, where plantation owners had locked up the best land, new settlers pressed westward. 贸易的繁荣同样给印第安人带来了麻烦。北美的英国人越是兴旺,他们的人数就会变得越多;而他们的人数越多,就会想要越多的土地。特别是在弗吉尼亚,那里的种植园主们已经圈定了最好的土地,而新来的殖民者则不得不向西去开拓新的土地。 Meanwhile the British Empire set down its own, grander, imperial policy. In the words of diarist John Evelyn: 与此同时,大英帝国则确定下了它自己更加宏大的帝国政策。用日记作者John Evelyn的话来说就是:
Whoever Commands the Ocean Commands the Trade of the World, and whoever Commands the Trade of the World Commands the Riches of the World, and whoever is Master of that Commands the World it self. 谁控制了海洋,谁就能控制全世界的贸易,而谁控制了全世界的贸易,也就控制了全世界的财富,而他也就成为了整个世界的主宰。
Charles II resumed the strategy that had been set down decades earlier by the disgraced Francis Bacon, that of “merg[ing] politics, profit, and natural philosophy”—the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate, and particularly the British estate. 查理二世重新采用了由失势的弗朗西斯·培根【译注:培根于1621年被控贪污受贿,被判罚金和监禁,后来虽被豁免,但政治生涯却因此终结】在几十年前所定下的策略,也就是“将政治、利益和自然哲学合而为一”——通过征服自然来解放人的状况,特别是英国人的状况。 By now, about 60,000 English settlers lived in New England. Metacom, or “King Philip” of the Wampanoags, began a major war against them. “This was for the second generation what sea crossings and scratch-building had been for the first: a hardening, defining experience.” 此时已有大约6万名英国殖民者生活在新英格兰。Metacom,即万帕诺亚格部落的“菲利普王”发动了一场针对这些英国人的大规模战争。“对于第二代殖民者们来说,这场战争的意义就像是乘船渡海和白手起家对于第一代殖民者的意义一样:这是一次定义并强化他们身份的经历。” Using what we now call guerrilla tactics, the coalition of Indian tribes fought through the bitter winter of 1675-76, taunting their captives with the question, “Where is your God now?” Gaskill describes the “extravagant cruelty” of Indian and Englishman alike: “Indians tortured because martial ritual required it, the English to obtain intelligence.” 通过使用今天被称为游击战的战术,印第安部落联军在1675-76年的寒冬里奋勇作战,并讥讽他们的俘虏,问他们“现在你的上帝去哪儿了?”Gaskill在描述印第安人和英国人时都使用了“过分残忍”这个相同的字眼:“印第安人折磨俘虏,因为这是他们尚武仪式的要求,而英国人折磨俘虏则是为了获得情报。” Two thousand settlers died before the Indian coalition surrendered in July 1677. Sporadic Indian raids continued, and the colonists duly noted that their British brethren had offered no protective aid aside from parish collections, “which were mere gestures.” Nor did the British prove any more helpful in Maryland, where settlers put down a similar uprising. 在1677年7月印第安联军投降之前,有两千名殖民者死于这场战争。此后,印第安人零星的袭击仍在持续,而这些殖民者们也很好地意识到:他们的英国同胞除了搞一些教堂募捐之外,并没有为他们提供什么别的保护,“而这完全是一些象征性的帮助。”而在马里兰,英国人也并没有证明自己能够提供更多的帮助,那里的殖民者们也镇压了一场类似的印第安人起义。 By the third generation, writes Gaskill, “experience set the colonists apart, creating opposition internally and with England.” Struggles with Indians continued; in the north the tribes began to ally with the French, another Catholic enemy. Catholic James II ascended the throne in 1685, after Charles II died, intensifying the worries of Anglo-American Protestants. 到第三代殖民者的时候,“在北美不同地区的经历将这些殖民者们分隔开来,在他们内部和他们与英国之间造成了对立。”Gaskill写道。与印第安人的斗争仍在继续;在北部,印第安部落开始与英国殖民者的另一个天主教敌人法国结盟。信奉天主教的詹姆士二世于1685年查理二世死后登上英国王位,而这进一步加剧了盎格鲁-美利坚新教徒们的担忧。 West Indian and Virginian settlers added to their slave populations and simultaneously to their worries about slave rebellions. Along the Chesapeake, in the 1680s alone the slave population rose from 4,500 to 12,000. This increase also decreased incidences of manumission; a people engaged in demographically-based dominance of the Indians had no intention of being overwhelmed by emancipated African slaves. 西印度群岛和弗吉尼亚的殖民者增加了他们的奴隶数量,而这也同时加剧了他们对奴隶叛乱的担忧。在切萨皮克湾沿岸,仅仅在1680年代奴隶数量就从4500人上升到了12000人。而这种数量增加也降低了奴隶解放运动事件的几率;一群忙于在人口数量上对印第安人形成优势的殖民者绝不希望自己在数量上被那些被解放的非洲奴隶们超过。 No solution—even in theory—to any of these ethno-political or religio-political dilemmas was available to Americans until a writer of the time, John Locke, began publishing. A political regime founded upon the principle of equal natural rights could form the basis of racial and religious peace in a political community that actually framed laws to conform to that principle. 即使从理论上说,当时也没有任何办法能够帮助美国人解决这些民族政治和宗教政治难题,直到那个时代的一位作家开始著书立说,他就是约翰·洛克。如果一个政治共同体的法律确实能遵从平等的自然权利原则,那么它那建立在此原则之上的政权就能够为种族间和宗教间的和平提供基础。 Gaskill mentions Locke in passing but mistakes his natural rights philosophy for “pragmatism.” What made the third generation of Americans react against the excesses of the last witch-hunting spasm, in 1690s Salem, was not pragmatism but an understanding of Christianity that Americans in New England were the first to begin to integrate into their laws. Gaskill在书中顺带提到了洛克,但却将他的自然权利哲学误认为是“实用主义”。面对1790年代塞勒姆掀起的最后一场追捕女巫的过分风潮,第三代美国人奋起反对,而促使他们这么做的并不是什么“实用主义”,而是基于对基督教义的理解,新英格兰的美国人也率先将这种理解整合到了他们的法律中。 Writes Gaskill: “Boston’s Brattle Street Church was founded in 1698 not upon scriptural literalism, the ‘New England way,’ or a covenant, but upon nature, reason, and inclusiveness”—in other words, upon a combination of Christianity and Lockean philosophy. What remained of the older generations, he concludes, was a legacy of “extraordinary courage.” Gaskill写道:“波士顿Brattle街教堂建立于1698年,它的建立并非基于‘新英格兰式’的圣经字面主义,或基于一个宗教誓约,它的基础是自然、理性与包容。”——换句话说,它建立在基督教和洛克哲学的结合之上。他总结道,老一代人为新的殖民者们所留下的遗产仅仅是他们“非凡的勇气”。 The commercial republic of the future would prove battle-ready, to the dismay of its enemies for centuries to come. 这个未来的商业共和国将会证明它已经做好了战斗的准备,而这将让它此后数个世纪的敌人们都感到沮丧。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]挪威度假小屋的产权故事

Family hut sharing: how Norway avoids cabin fever
家庭小屋分享:挪威如何避免度假小屋“热”
——如何分配度假别墅小木屋遗产的问题

作者:Simone Abram @ 2015-10-1
译者:Horace Rae(@Sheldon_rae)
校对:龟海海
来源:The Conversation,https://theconversation.com/family-hut-sharing-how-norway-avoids-cabin-fever-46640

Mountain cabins and seaside houses are part of the Scandinavian dream. Europeans are right to envy their Nordic compatriots, who can gather with family and friends at a simple house for hiking, skiing, mushrooming, or just relaxing in front of a magnificent landscape.

山间小屋和海景房是斯堪的纳维亚梦的一部分。欧洲人很有理由羡慕他们的北欧同胞——北欧人可以和家人朋友们在一间房子里团聚,出去远足、滑雪、采蘑菇,或者在壮美的风景前悠然沉醉。

About half of all Norwegians have access to a summer house of some kind. The first boom in cabin ownership was in the 1960s, when intrepid Norwegians hiked into the mountains to build themselves a little hideaway. Another boom in the 2000s saw increasingly sophisticated summer houses coming onto the market in many upland areas.

约一半挪威人能享受某种形式的夏日度假屋。第一次小屋抢购潮发生在1960年代,那时,无畏的挪威人跋涉进大山,给自己搭建一个小小的世外桃源。另一次风潮发生在2000年代,那时日益成熟精致的夏日度假屋开始进入高地区域的房产市场。

At this time of year, many Norwegians have already closed up their summer cabins and are back at work, perhaps already looking forward to autumn half-term holidays at the end of September.

每年这个时候【编注:本文发表于10月1日】,挪威人已经锁上(more...)

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Family hut sharing: how Norway avoids cabin fever 家庭小屋分享:挪威如何避免度假小屋“热” ——如何分配度假别墅小木屋遗产的问题 作者:Simone Abram @ 2015-10-1 译者:Horace Rae(@Sheldon_rae) 校对:龟海海 来源:The Conversation,https://theconversation.com/family-hut-sharing-how-norway-avoids-cabin-fever-46640 Mountain cabins and seaside houses are part of the Scandinavian dream. Europeans are right to envy their Nordic compatriots, who can gather with family and friends at a simple house for hiking, skiing, mushrooming, or just relaxing in front of a magnificent landscape. 山间小屋和海景房是斯堪的纳维亚梦的一部分。欧洲人很有理由羡慕他们的北欧同胞——北欧人可以和家人朋友们在一间房子里团聚,出去远足、滑雪、采蘑菇,或者在壮美的风景前悠然沉醉。 About half of all Norwegians have access to a summer house of some kind. The first boom in cabin ownership was in the 1960s, when intrepid Norwegians hiked into the mountains to build themselves a little hideaway. Another boom in the 2000s saw increasingly sophisticated summer houses coming onto the market in many upland areas. 约一半挪威人能享受某种形式的夏日度假屋。第一次小屋抢购潮发生在1960年代,那时,无畏的挪威人跋涉进大山,给自己搭建一个小小的世外桃源。另一次风潮发生在2000年代,那时日益成熟精致的夏日度假屋开始进入高地区域的房产市场。 At this time of year, many Norwegians have already closed up their summer cabins and are back at work, perhaps already looking forward to autumn half-term holidays at the end of September. 每年这个时候【编注:本文发表于10月1日】,挪威人已经锁上了夏日度假屋回去工作了,他们或许已经在期待九月末的秋季假期了。 For some of them though, the future of their cabin might be a little less straightforward than organising a shared calendar. As the first generation of owners leave cabins to their descendants, they often face difficult decisions. 但是,对于他们中的某些人来说,其小木屋的前途可没有安排共同日程那么简单直接。当第一代小木屋的主人想把木屋留给继承人时,他们往往需要面对艰难的决定。 Obscure agreements 模棱两可的条款 The main principle of Norwegian inheritance law is “partible inheritance”. This means that at least two thirds of a couple’s goods are expected to be divided equally between their children. 挪威继承法的主要原则是“遗产分割继承”。这意味着一对夫妇至少三分之二的财产应该被子女平均分配。 When it comes to a family home, inheritors who are already homeowners most commonly sell the house and share the proceeds, but the same does not necessarily apply to a cabin. Cabins are much more likely to stay in the family and be shared in different ways 对于家庭房屋,已拥有住房的继承人们通常会把房子卖掉,分配所得,但是这种原则并不适用于度假小屋。度假小屋更可能被留下,并以不同的方式分享。 One way that cabins can be shared is to split the ownership equally between siblings. This appears straightforward in principle, but if this happens over two or three generations, there may be so many owners that it becomes impossible to manage. 分享小屋的办法之一是,将所有权在子女间均等分割。这看似是最直接的原则,但是如果接连两三代都发生这样的分割,由于共有产权的人太多,小屋将变得无法管理。 As shares in the cabin move through the different branches of the family, and are split between various siblings, people can end up with 3/72 or 18/60 of a cabin, making ownership complex. 当小屋的所有权在家族不同分支中流传并被不同子女继承时,人们可能最终拥有小屋继承权的3/72或18/60,这就使得所有权状况十分复杂。 A popular option is to give ownership of the cabin to one child (or inheritor) and grant user rights to the others. To avoid disputes, many people add a clause to their will so that the owning inheritor cannot sell the cabin without giving the others the option of buying it first. 常规处理办法是把小屋的所有权给予一名子女(或继承人),然后保证其他人(直系亲属)拥有使用的权利。为了避免争端,许多人会在遗嘱中添加一个条款,规定如果不给其他共有人优先购买权,屋主不能出售小屋。 However, things can get even more complicated. Until the Norwegian government recently abolished inheritance tax, many couples would arrange to sell their cabins to their offspring in advance, still retaining usage rights themselves for up to four weeks a year. 并且,事情还能变得更复杂。在挪威政府近期废除继承税法之前,许多夫妇都已打算提前向其子女出售小屋,并且保留他们自己每年使用小屋四个月的权利。 There were good tax reasons to do this, which have now disappeared, but there are still good moral reasons behind the practice. 从税务的角度看来,这种做法大有裨益,虽然现在税务问题已经消失,但这种做法仍有良好的道德理由。 Parents who want to ensure their children remain on good terms with each other once they are gone, might settle their inheritance well before they are likely to die. This way, if the children are unhappy with the settlement, they can be unhappy with their parents, rather than with each other. 想要让孩子们在他们死后依然保持良好关系的父母,可能在他们去世前很久就安排好自己的财产。这样,如果孩子们对财产的分割不满意,他们可以对父母生气,而不至于亲人反目。 Despite attempts to keep the peace, things do go awry. Summer houses on the coast have become particularly valuable properties, because of the restricted areas where they may be built (despite the long coast, there are limits to coastal building). 尽管父母尝试保持和平,事情依然会弄糟。海滨的夏季度假屋已经成为相当珍贵的财产,因为它们的建造区域有限制(虽然挪威的海岸线很长,但是对海岸小屋的建造也有限制)。 Inheritance tax often priced inheritors out of taking on a cabin that may have been built 40 years ago for next to nothing, but is now a multi-million pound property. That problem has now disappeared. 之前,令人咋舌的继承税经常使继承人们不得不放弃一间40年前建造的,孤零零的临海小屋,它此时已是价值数百万磅的财产。这一问题现已不复存在。 However, issues still exist and there are good reasons why Norwegians often talk about stress and sadness in relation to cabins. “Everyone has a cabin story,” I am often told. 然而,问题依然存在,挪威人仍有很多理由谈论与小屋有关的压力和哀伤。“人人都有一段与度假屋有关的故事”,常有人对我说。 For example, say three siblings inherit a cabin equally and one wants out of the share, that then leaves the other two with a major bill to buy he or she out. This can often cause tension within the whole family. 举个例子,有三兄妹平分了一间小屋的所有权,然后其中一人想要卖掉自己的所有权,这就使得另外两人不得不花一大笔钱买下他或她的所有权。这种事情经常在整个家族内制造紧张气氛。 Worldwide lessons 各国的经验 There are many “blended” families in Norway due to exceptionally high divorce and remarriage rates. However, this doesn’t necessarily make things more complicated, as inheritance can go to direct heirs rather than step-children. 因为居高不下的离婚率和再婚率,挪威有许多重组家庭。然而,这未必会让事情变得更为复杂,因为遗产可以直接传给亲生子女,而不是继子继女。 When marrying, couples can retain property in their personal ownership, not necessarily bringing everything into joint ownership with their new spouse. 在结婚时,夫妇双方可以各自保留自己的财产,而不和新配偶共同拥有所有财产。 For example, if “Britta” owns a cabin that her parents built, she does not have to leave it to her new husband’s children from his previous marriage. 举个例子,如果Britta拥有一间父母建造的小屋,她不必把这间房子留给新丈夫在之前的婚姻中所育子女。 These days, so many families have cabins that there may be several to pass on. Each child might get a different one, and any significant difference in value might be compensated through a cash settlement. 如今,很多家庭都拥有小屋,所以会有很多小屋被传承。每个孩子可能得到不同的一间,并且任何价值上的显著差异都可以通过现金弥补。 By default however, this can also reinforce the difference between “legal” siblings (including birth and adopted siblings) and step-siblings, often quite subconsciously. 但是在默认情况下,这也会强化“法律上的”兄弟姐妹(包括亲生子女和收养子女)以及非同一对父母所生的兄弟姐妹之间的差异,这往往是潜意识地发生的。 Sharing a cabin doesn’t only bring a family together in the holidays, but it can also define what relations the different family members have with each other. 分享一间小屋不仅仅让一个家庭在假期相聚,这也能定义家庭成员之间的亲疏。 Perhaps surprisingly then, given the heightened emotions associated with a family cabin, startlingly few inheritance disputes end up in court. 纵然挪威人都有很深的小屋情结,令人吃惊的是,只有很少的继承争端最终走上法庭。 The abolition of inheritance tax has been seen as a potential threat to the “Equal Society” that the Norwegian welfare state has produced. But whether these changes will have an effect on the method of shared ownership and use of holiday cabins, remains to be seen. 继承税的废除,被视作对挪威这个福利国家之前创造的“平等社会”的威胁。但是这些改变是否能影响使用和分享度假小屋的方式,还得拭目以待。 It is quite likely that Norwegian families will continue to create equality – at least within the family – through sharing-arrangements at cabins. Whether equality can survive beyond the family is a different question. 很可能,挪威家庭将会通过分享小屋的方式继续创造平等——至少是在家庭内部。这种“平等”是否能衍生到家庭以外,就是另外一个问题了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]自由派带给黑人的福利

The Legacy of Liberalism
自由主义的遗产

作者:Thomas Sowell @ 2014-11
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
来源:National Review,http://www.nationalreview.com/article/392842/legacy-liberalism-thomas-sowell

The current problems facing blacks in America owe more to the Great Society than to slavery.
美国黑人目前所面临的问题更多要归结于大社会的理念,而不是奴隶制

Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said there were “phrases that serve as an excuse for not thinking.” One of these phrases that substitute for thought today is one that depicts the current problems of blacks in America as “a legacy of slavery.”

最高法院大法官Oliver Wendell Holmes曾说,使用某些习语是“停止思考的借口”。当今的一个代替思考的此类习语,就是将美国黑人眼下面临的问题描述为“奴隶制的遗毒”。

New York Times writer Nicholas Kristof (more...)

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The Legacy of Liberalism 自由主义的遗产 作者:Thomas Sowell @ 2014-11 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 来源:National Review,http://www.nationalreview.com/article/392842/legacy-liberalism-thomas-sowell The current problems facing blacks in America owe more to the Great Society than to slavery. 美国黑人目前所面临的问题更多要归结于大社会的理念,而不是奴隶制 Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said there were “phrases that serve as an excuse for not thinking.” One of these phrases that substitute for thought today is one that depicts the current problems of blacks in America as “a legacy of slavery.” 最高法院大法官Oliver Wendell Holmes曾说,使用某些习语是“停止思考的借口”。当今的一个代替思考的此类习语,就是将美国黑人眼下面临的问题描述为“奴隶制的遗毒”。 New York Times writer Nicholas Kristof asserts that there is “overwhelming evidence that centuries of racial subjugation still shape inequity in the 21st century” and he mentions “the lingering effects of slavery.” But before we become overwhelmed, that evidence should be checked out. 《纽约时报》作者Nicholas Kristof 断言:“有压倒性的证据显示,几个世纪以来的种族奴役依旧塑造着21世纪的不平等”,他也提到了“徘徊不散的奴隶制影响”。但在我们被这些证据“压倒”之前,应对它们进行仔细的检验。 The evidence offered by Mr. Kristof in the November 16 issue of the New York Times seems considerably short of overwhelming, to put it charitably. He cites a study showing that “counties in America that had a higher proportion of slaves in 1860 are still more unequal today.” Has he never heard statisticians’ repeated warnings that correlation is not causation? Kristof先生在11月16日的纽约时报上提供的证据看起来——说得好听一点——相当的缺乏“压倒性”。他引用了一项研究指出“美国那些在1860年保有更多奴隶人口的县今天仍然(比其他地方)更不平等。”他难道没有听过统计学家一直重复的关于相关性并非因果性的警告么? The South long remained a region that blacks fled by the millions — for very good reasons. But, in more recent years, the net migration of blacks has been from the North to the South. No doubt they have good reasons for that as well. 历史上数百万黑人一直在逃离美国的南部各州,他们有很充足的理由。但是,在近些年里,黑人净流动的方向是从北向南的。毫无疑问,他们一定也有很好的理由这么做。 But there is no reason to believe that blacks today are unaware of the history of slavery or of the Jim Crow era in the South. Indeed, there are black “leaders” who seem to talk about nothing else. Yet blacks who are moving back to the South seem more concerned with the present and the future than with the past. 但是我们没有理由相信当今黑人会不知道有关黑奴的历史,或是Jim Crow时期的南部【译注:Jim Crow时期系指1876-1965年,其间美国南方各州陆续制订种族隔离法,这些法律被统称为Jim Crow法】。的确,有很多黑人“领袖”每天谈论的都是以上这些黑历史。然而朝南方移居的黑人们看起来更关心现在和未来,而不是过去。 Kristof’s other “overwhelming” evidence of the current effects of past slavery is that blacks do not have as much income as whites. But Puerto Ricans do not have as much income as Japanese Americans. Mexican Americans do not have as much income as Cuban Americans. All sorts of people do not have as much income as all sorts of other people, not only in the United States, but in countries around the world. And most of these people were never enslaved. Kristof关于过去奴隶制对现代影响的另外一个“压倒性”的证据是黑人的收入比白人要少。但是波多黎各人的收入也比不上日裔美国人。墨西哥裔美国人的收入也比不上古巴裔美国人。不仅仅是在美国,在全世界任何一种人都和另一种人的收入不一样。而这些人里的绝大多数都不曾被奴役。 If we wanted to be serious about evidence, we might compare where blacks stood a hundred years after the end of slavery with where they stood after 30 years of the liberal welfare state. In other words, we could compare hard evidence on “the legacy of slavery” with hard evidence on the legacy of liberals. 如果我们想要严肃地对待证据,我们应该将生活在奴隶制结束100年后的黑人与在自由派的福利国家生活了30年之后的黑人做比较。换句话说,我们可以比较一下“奴隶制的遗毒”和自由派的遗产。 Despite the grand myth that black economic progress began or accelerated with the passage of the Civil Rights laws and “War on Poverty” programs of the 1960s, the cold fact is that the poverty rate among blacks fell from 87 percent in 1940 to 47 percent by 1960. This was before any of those programs began. 尽管盛行的谬见声称,在1960年代民权法案通过和“对贫困宣战”项目实行后,黑人在经济地位上才开始进步或是开始加速进步。冰冷的事实却是黑人的贫困率从1940年的87%下降到了1960年的47%。而这是在任何相关法案或项目实行之前就已经发生了的。 Over the next 20 years, the poverty rate among blacks fell another 18 percentage points, compared to the 40-point drop in the previous 20 years. This was the continuation of a previous economic trend, at a slower rate of progress, not the economic grand deliverance proclaimed by liberals and self-serving black “leaders.” 在之后的20年里,黑人贫困率又下降了18%。相对应的,之前的20年里的降幅是40个百分点。这只是一个之前经济趋势的延续,只是进度放缓了,而并非自由派和自谋私利的黑人“领袖”所宣称的伟大经济援救的成效。 Ending the Jim Crow laws was a landmark achievement. But, despite the great proliferation of black political and other “leaders” that resulted from the laws and policies of the 1960s, nothing comparable happened economically. And there were serious retrogressions socially. 种族隔离制度的结束是一个里程碑式的成就。但是, 1960年代的法律和政策,除了导致政治上或是其他方面的黑人“领袖”数量激增之外,在经济上并没有什么与之相称的成就,而在社会问题上则有严重的倒退。 Nearly a hundred years of the supposed “legacy of slavery” found most black children being raised in two-parent families in 1960. But thirty years after the liberal welfare state found the great majority of black children being raised by a single parent. 在1960年代,生活在近百年的所谓“奴隶制遗毒”影响下的绝大多数黑人儿童是由双亲家庭抚养长大的。然而在自由主义福利国家建成30年之后,我们发现大多数黑人儿童是由单亲家庭抚养长大的。 The murder rate among blacks in 1960 was one-half of what it became 20 years later, after a legacy of liberals’ law-enforcement policies. Public-housing projects in the first half of the 20th century were clean, safe places, where people slept outside on hot summer nights, when they were too poor to afford air conditioning. That was before admissions standards for public-housing projects were lowered or abandoned, in the euphoria of liberal non-judgmental notions. And it was before the toxic message of victimhood was spread by liberals. We all know what hell holes public housing has become in our times. The same toxic message produced similar social results among lower-income people in England, despite an absence of a “legacy of slavery” there. 自由派的执法政策留下的遗产是,1980年代的黑人谋杀率提高到了20年前的两倍。公共住房项目在20世纪前半叶是干净而安全的地方,是人们在炎热夏夜无法负担空调费用时在外的居所。那时候公共住房项目对于住户的接纳标准还未被昏了头的自由派出于“不评判”的理念而降低或完全废除。而且当时自由派所鼓吹的有关黑人受害者身份的有毒思想还未被广泛传播。我们都清楚公共住房项目在我们的时代里成了怎样的黑暗地狱。同样的有毒思想在低收入的英国人身上也体现出了同样的社会效应,尽管在那里没有任何“奴隶制的遗毒”。 If we are to go by evidence of social retrogression, liberals have wreaked more havoc on blacks than the supposed “legacy of slavery” they talk about. Liberals should heed the title of Jason Riley’s insightful new book, Please Stop Helping Us. 如果我们追寻社会倒退的证据,就会发现,自由派给黑人造成的破坏要比他们口中所谓的“奴隶制遗毒”严重的多。自由派应当听听Jason Riley在他富有洞察力的新书的标题中提出的建议,《不要再帮助我们了》。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

一楼一凤

【2016-01-08】

@sonicblue3: 在你国舆论场共和党似乎通过小布什的两场战争就取得了永远的鹰派名声,这是民主党总统通过两次世界大战和韩战越战都做不到的

@whigzhou: 美国两党制,隔几代就阵营重组,无限往前刨根说民主党祖上也鹰过毫无意义

@whigzhou: 一楼一凤制下形成的两党格局,和比例代表制下的多党格局,虽然都叫“党”,性质完全不同,前者是被选举制度强行压合到一起的大杂烩,后者才是有着明确纲领的主义式(more...)

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【2016-01-08】 @sonicblue3: 在你国舆论场共和党似乎通过小布什的两场战争就取得了永远的鹰派名声,这是民主党总统通过两次世界大战和韩战越战都做不到的 @whigzhou: 美国两党制,隔几代就阵营重组,无限往前刨根说民主党祖上也鹰过毫无意义 @whigzhou: 一楼一凤制下形成的两党格局,和比例代表制下的多党格局,虽然都叫“党”,性质完全不同,前者是被选举制度强行压合到一起的大杂烩,后者才是有着明确纲领的主义式政党,甚至可以是单议题或单族群政党,前者的进化逻辑是:找出有望获得简单多数的政策组合,而后者只须越过比例代表最低门槛即可存在。 @whigzhou: 正因此,当原有的某种组合已无望获得简单多数时,党派格局便发生裂变重组,这种重组可以是小幅度的,也可以非常彻底,比如60年代那次,所以,说何种倾向是哪个党的,这种说法只有最多在几代人之内才有意义。