含有〈制度〉标签的文章(253)

[译文]窗户税的故事

The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden
窗户税:税收超额负担的一个案例

作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar)
二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html

For economists, the “excess burden” of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn’t just the amount of money collected–it’s also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the “window tax,” first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows.

经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念:纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子,就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征,直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于,低(more...)

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The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden 窗户税:税收超额负担的一个案例 作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html For economists, the "excess burden" of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn't just the amount of money collected--it's also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the "window tax," first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows. 经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念:纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子,就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征,直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于,低收入人群就此选择生活在很少或没有窗户的房间里。 Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab review the history of the window tax and provide actual estimates of how it affected the number of windows per house in their article, "The Window Tax: A Case Study in Excess Burden," which appeared in the Winter 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (where I have toiled in the fields as Managing Editor since 1987). Wallace E. Oates 和Robert M. Schwab在《经济展望杂志》(2015/冬)的《窗户税:超额负担之案例分析》一文中回顾了窗户税历史,并给出了其影响家庭平均窗户数的估测值(我自1987年起担任杂志总编)。 The article popped back into my mind earlier this week when I learned that Oates, a highly distinguished economist based at the University of Maryland since 1979, died last week. One of Oates's specialties was the area of local public finance, and his 1972 book on Fiscal Federalism, is a classic of that subfield. 前几天,我听说Oates已于上周去世,心里不禁又浮现起这篇文章。这位卓越的经济学家自1979年起一直任教于马里兰大学。他擅长的领域之一是地方公共财政,其1972年出版的《财政联邦主义》正是这一领域中的经典。 Here are some facts about the historical window tax, courtesy of Oates and Schwab. 下面引用Oates与Schwab写到的一些历史。
  • William III intended it as a temporary tax, just to help out with the overhang of costs from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the most recent war with France. But it ended up lasting 150 years.
  • 威廉三世原本只是为了摆脱1688年光荣革命和上一次英法战争带来的财务超支而暂时实行窗户税,不料它最后却延续了150年。
  • "An important feature of the tax was that it was levied on the occupant, not the owner of the dwelling. Thus, the renter, not the landlord, paid the tax. However, large tenement buildings in the cities, each with several apartments, were an exception. They were charged as single residences with the tax liability resting on the landlord. This led to especially wretched conditions for the poor in the cities, as landlords blocked up windows and constructed tenements without adequate light and ventilation ..."
  • “该税的一个重要特征是:征收对象是住户而非房产所有者。因此,纳税人是租户而非房东。不过城区多套房公寓楼是例外。收税官将多套间整体看做单元住宅向房东征税。这就使得城市贫民的生活状况非常悲惨,因为房东们会把窗户封起来,所修套间的光照和通风都不足……”
  • The window tax was thought of as improvement on the "hearth tax," that Charles II had imposed in 1662. "The tax was very unpopular in part because of the intrusive character of the assessment process. The `chimney-men' (as the assessors and tax collectors were called) had to enter the house to count the number of hearths and stoves, and there was great resentment against this invasion of the sanctity of the home. The window tax, in contrast, did not require access to the interior of the dwelling: the “window peepers” could count windows from the outside, thus simplifying the assessment procedure and obviating the need for an invasion of the interior."
  • 窗户税是被当作“炉灶税”的一个改良版本而提出来的,后者由查理二世于1662年开征。“炉灶税极度招人厌,部分原因在于评估过程的侵犯性。‘烟囱工’(当时对估税员和收税员的称呼)必须进到房间里面数壁炉和火炉的数目。对于这种侵犯产权神圣性的做法,人们怨声载道。与之相比,窗户税则不需要进入住所内部:‘窥窗工’从外头就可以数清窗户数目,从而简化了评估程序,无需再闯进房内。”
  • The window tax was intended as a visible measure of ability to pay: that is, a high-income person would live in a place with more windows than a low-income person. But at the time, it was widely recognized that windows were a very imperfect proxy for wealth. Adam Smith wrote about this problem of window tax in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations: “A house of ten pounds rent in the country may have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet so far as his contribution is regulated by the window-tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state.”
  • 窗户税的本意是用有形的手段判断有支付能力的人:即高收入者所住之处的窗户多过低收入者。但在当时,普遍认为,拿窗户作为财富的表征并不十分完善。亚当·斯密1776年在《国富论》中就窗户税的这一问题写道:“乡间10镑租金的房屋,有时比伦敦500镑租金房屋的窗户还要多。前者的住户比后者的住户通常要穷得多,但尽管如此,只要是由窗户税来规定捐额,前者就得贡献更多金钱以支援国家。”
  • When the rates on the window tax went up, it was common for owners of homes and apartments to block or build over many or all of their windows. The results on human well-being were severe. "A series of studies by physicians and others found that the unsanitary conditions resulting from the lack of proper ventilation and fresh air encouraged the propagation of numerous diseases such as dysentery, gangrene, and typhus. ... A series of petitions to Parliament resulted in the designation of commissioners and committees to study the problems of the window tax in the first half of the 19th century. In 1846, medical officers petitioned Parliament for the abolition of the window tax, pronouncing it to be `most injurious to the health, welfare, property, and industry of the poor, and of the community at large'."
  • 一旦窗户税的税率上涨,宅子和公寓的所有者定会大量甚或全部封堵或筑死其窗户。人的福祉受到严重影响。“医疗工作者和其他许多人所做的一系列研究发现,缺乏适当通风和新鲜空气的不卫生环境,助长了如痢疾、坏疽和斑疹伤寒等众多疾病的蔓延……议会收到大量请愿书。于是在19世纪上半叶,众多专员和委员会得以受指派着手研究窗户税的问题。1846年,卫生部门官员向议会申请废除窗户税,称其‘对于贫民及整个社群的卫生、福祉、产权和勤勉极其有害’。”
  • Here's Charles Dickens writing in 1850 about the window tax in Household Words, a magazine that he published for a number of years: “The adage ‘free as air’ has become obsolete by Act of Parliament. Neither air nor light have been free since the imposition of the window-tax. We are obliged to pay for what nature lavishly supplies to all, at so much per window per year; and the poor who cannot afford the expense are stinted in two of the most urgent necessities of life.”
  • 1850年,查尔斯·狄更斯在他多年主持出版的杂志《家常话》中如此描写道:“‘像空气一样自由’这条谚语已经因议会而过时。自窗户税开征后,无论是空气还是光线都不曾免费过【译注:“自由”与“免费”的英文都是free】。我们被迫为大自然慷慨的恩赐付费,只要时间、窗户还在,而无法承担这笔开支的穷人,只能在这两样至关紧要的生活必需品上节约。”
Oates and Schwab work with a mix of data on the number of windows in a sample of houses in Shropshire and economic theory about household behavior when confronted with taxes to generate an admittedly rough estimate that on average, collecting a certain amount of money through the window tax created an excess burden--in terms of the costs of living in a place with fewer windows--equal to an additional 62% of the value of the tax. Oates和Schwab将什普罗郡样本住宅的窗户数据和面对个税居民行为经济理论结合起来,得出一个粗略的估计:整体说来,因窗户税那笔钱产生的超额负担——就人们选择住在窗户较少的住所这一行为成本而言——相当于税赋的62%。 Oates and Schwab ask why the window tax lasted so long, give its many problems, and offer an appropriately cynical answer: "Perhaps the lesson here is that when governments need to raise significant revenue, even a very bad tax can survive for a very long time." 既然窗户税问题如此之多,Oates和Schwab就追问为何它能持续如此之久。他们给出的回答是一种恰到好处的冷嘲:“也许,此处的教益就是,如果政府需要显著增加收入,那么即便是极为恶性的税种也能存活很长一段时间。” I didn't know Oates personally, but I had one other job-related interaction with him back. Along with his work in local public finance, Oates was also well-known as an environmental economist. His 1975 book, The Theory of Environmental Policy (written with William Baumol) was highly influential in setting the direction of what at the time was a fairly new and growing field. 我私下里和Oates并无深交,但之前曾因工作关系和他有过另外一次互动。除了在地方公共财政领域的成绩以外,Oates还以环境经济学家的身份知名。他1975年的著作《环境经济理论与政策设计》(与William Baumol合著)影响极大,为当时这个相当年轻、正在成长的领域设定了方向。 In 1995, Oates was a co-author in one of the most downloaded and cited exchanges the JEP has ever published on the subject of what is sometimes called the "Porter hypothesis." 1995年,以人称的“波特假说”为主题,Oates与人合作,为《经济学展望杂志》写了一篇文章,成为该刊史上下载和引用得最多的文章之一。 Michael Porter made the argument--bolstered by a large number of case studies, that when environmental goals are set in a strict way, but firms are allowed flexibility in how to achieve those goals in the context of a competitive market environment, firms often become quite innovative in meeting those environmental goals. 以大量案例研究为支撑,迈克尔·波特提出了如下论点:当环境目标被严格设定且企业在竞争中可以灵活发挥时,企业为达成这些目标通常会变得富有创造性。 Indeed, Porter argued that in a substantial number of cases, the innovations induced by the tough new environmental rules save enough money so that the rules end up imposing no economic costs at all. In the Fall 1995 Journal of Economic Perspectives, Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde make their case in "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship," (9:4, 97-118). 事实上,波特认为,在相当多的案例中,由严厉的环保新规所引发的创新能够省出足够的款项,使得这些规定最终不增加任何经济成本。在《经济展望杂志》1995/秋,波特和Claas van der Linde通过《环境/竞争力关系新概念一探》(9:4, 97-118)一文对此作了论述。 The authorial team of Karen Palmer, Wallace E. Oates, and Paul R. Portney respond in "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?" (9:4, 119-132). Oates and his co-authors took the position that while the costs of complying with environmental regulations do often turn out to be lower than industry predictions that were made when the rule was under discussion, it goes too far to say that environmental rules usually or generally don't impose costs. I wrote about some more recent evidence on this dispute in "Environmental Protection and Productivity Growth: Seeking the Tradeoff" (January 8, 2015). Karen Palmer、Wallace E. Oates和Paul R. Portney用《强化环保标准:收益/成本范式还是零成本范式?》(9:4, 119-132)一文做出回应。Oates和共同作者们的立场是:尽管遵守环保规制的成本最终总会低于起初制定时的业界预测,但却不能说它往往或一般情形下不会增加成本。我曾就此讨论提供了一些最新佐证,见《环境保护与生产率增长:寻找权衡》一文(2015-01-08) (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

总会起作用

【2016-08-10】

@海德沙龙 《噩梦般的底特律教育系统》 底特律自70年代以来就在持续衰败,居民不断逃离,工厂和住宅区一个个沦为废墟,犯罪率攀至榜首,随之一起沦落的还有它的公立教育系统,学生大量流失,出勤率、毕业率和学习成绩快速下降,然而这些学校的开支却并未减少,它正在从一个教育机构变成教师救济所…

@whigzhou: 选择机制总会起作用,问题是在哪个层次上起作用,假如你阻止自由市场在个体和企业层次上起选择作(more...)

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【2016-08-10】 @海德沙龙 《噩梦般的底特律教育系统》 底特律自70年代以来就在持续衰败,居民不断逃离,工厂和住宅区一个个沦为废墟,犯罪率攀至榜首,随之一起沦落的还有它的公立教育系统,学生大量流失,出勤率、毕业率和学习成绩快速下降,然而这些学校的开支却并未减少,它正在从一个教育机构变成教师救济所… @whigzhou: 选择机制总会起作用,问题是在哪个层次上起作用,假如你阻止自由市场在个体和企业层次上起选择作用,那么其他选择机制便会在产业、组织、城市、地区、国家等层次上起作用。  
一颗要命丸

【2016-07-18】

@whigzhou: 凯末尔主义终结之后,土耳其的一些可能发展:离开北约(主动或被动),占领叙利亚的部分地区,攻击伊拉克库尔德地区,在高加索和中亚扶植马仔因而与俄国发生冲突,为争夺中东霸权而与伊朗和/或沙特发生冲突……

@whigzhou: 七年前的诺贝尔和平奖不愧为史上最具预见性和最具激励效果的诺贝尔奖~

@龙与羊驼: 凯末尔主义是和纳赛尔一样的工业党,为什么不能被终结?经济只有自由化才能最终推动政治自由化,不自由的经济根本不可能推进政治社会风气的开放。

@whigzhou: 绿化是『一颗要命丸』,都不用第二颗,跟这个抉择相比,其他都不重要了

@whigzhou: 宪政基础是根,经济表现是果,经济政策、自由化、私有化,都只是小枝桠而已,都是很容易逆转的事情,花枝插在花瓶里不也能绚烂几天嘛,鸟用

@blue-tomato: 像土尔其这么大的一个国家,而且是一个有着一定经济能力的宪政民主国家,还需要依靠军队的协助才能摆脱宗教(绿化)的入侵,这是否说明绿化的强大与及宪政民主的无能呢?

@w(more...)

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【2016-07-18】 @whigzhou: 凯末尔主义终结之后,土耳其的一些可能发展:离开北约(主动或被动),占领叙利亚的部分地区,攻击伊拉克库尔德地区,在高加索和中亚扶植马仔因而与俄国发生冲突,为争夺中东霸权而与伊朗和/或沙特发生冲突…… @whigzhou: 七年前的诺贝尔和平奖不愧为史上最具预见性和最具激励效果的诺贝尔奖~ @龙与羊驼: 凯末尔主义是和纳赛尔一样的工业党,为什么不能被终结?经济只有自由化才能最终推动政治自由化,不自由的经济根本不可能推进政治社会风气的开放。 @whigzhou: 绿化是『一颗要命丸』,都不用第二颗,跟这个抉择相比,其他都不重要了 @whigzhou: 宪政基础是根,经济表现是果,经济政策、自由化、私有化,都只是小枝桠而已,都是很容易逆转的事情,花枝插在花瓶里不也能绚烂几天嘛,鸟用 @blue-tomato: 像土尔其这么大的一个国家,而且是一个有着一定经济能力的宪政民主国家,还需要依靠军队的协助才能摆脱宗教(绿化)的入侵,这是否说明绿化的强大与及宪政民主的无能呢? @whigzhou: 说明宪政存续条件之苛刻 @blue-tomato: 非常有意思。如果是这样,谁人可以在规则既定的条件下,推翻规则,扮演最后的救世主,而且有充足的理由得到人们的信任?貌似魔兽里的守护者最终却是引进兽人的作恶者 @whigzhou: 以前是英帝,后来是美帝,现在,恐怕已经没了 @whigzhou: 多年来我已反复强调宪政基础相对于中短期变革与增长的重要性,复习一下:《从摊贩胜诉看印度法治》 《不必对南非期望太高》 《下一块金砖在哪里?》 @安德鲁杰克逊蓝卫兵:但是弗里德曼说只要经济自由,社会必定开放,政治必定自由,这个怎么讲? @whigzhou: http://headsalon.org/archives/7107.html  
[译文]休斯顿:美国机会之城

America’s Opportunity City
美国的机会之城

作者:Joel Kotkin, Tory Gattis @ 2014-夏
译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢)
校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:City Journal,http://city-journal.org/html/america%E2%80%99s-opportunity-city-13662.html

Lots of new jobs and a low cost of living make Houston a middle-class magnet.
许多的新工作和低廉的生活成本使得休斯敦成为一个对中产阶级有着强大吸引力的城市。

David Wolff and David Hightower are driving down the partially completed Grand Parkway around Houston. The vast road, when completed, will add a third freeway loop around this booming, 600-square-mile Texas metropolis.

David Wolff和David Hightower正驱车行驶在部分完工的环休斯敦花园大道上。完工之后,这条宽阔道路会成为围绕这座蓬勃发展的600平方英里德州大城市的高速公路第三环。

Urban aesthetes on the ocean coasts tend to have a low opinion of the flat Texas landscape—and of Houston, in particular, which they see as a little slice of Hades: a hot, humid, and featureless expanse of flood-prone grassland, punctuated only by drab office towers and suburban tract houses.

住在海岸城市的唯美主义者通常不喜欢平坦的德州地貌——尤其是休斯敦的地貌,他们将之视为一小片地狱:一片炎热潮湿且毫无特点的广阔区域,有洪水泛滥的草地,点缀着单调的办公大楼和郊区风格的大片房屋。

But Wolff and Hightower, major land developers on Houston’s outskirts for four decades, have a different outlook. “We may not have all the scenery of a place like California,” notes the 73-year-old Wolff, who is also part owner of the San Francisco Giants. “But growth makes up for a lot of imperfections.”

但是作为从业四十年的休斯敦郊区主要土地开发商,Wolff和Hightower有着不同的观点。“我们或许没有像加州那样的全部景色,”同时也是旧金山巨人队的共有者的73岁的(more...)

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America’s Opportunity City 美国的机会之城 作者:Joel Kotkin, Tory Gattis @ 2014-夏 译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 来源:City Journal,http://city-journal.org/html/america%E2%80%99s-opportunity-city-13662.html Lots of new jobs and a low cost of living make Houston a middle-class magnet. 许多的新工作和低廉的生活成本使得休斯敦成为一个对中产阶级有着强大吸引力的城市。 David Wolff and David Hightower are driving down the partially completed Grand Parkway around Houston. The vast road, when completed, will add a third freeway loop around this booming, 600-square-mile Texas metropolis. David Wolff和David Hightower正驱车行驶在部分完工的环休斯敦花园大道上。完工之后,这条宽阔道路会成为围绕这座蓬勃发展的600平方英里德州大城市的高速公路第三环。 Urban aesthetes on the ocean coasts tend to have a low opinion of the flat Texas landscape—and of Houston, in particular, which they see as a little slice of Hades: a hot, humid, and featureless expanse of flood-prone grassland, punctuated only by drab office towers and suburban tract houses. 住在海岸城市的唯美主义者通常不喜欢平坦的德州地貌——尤其是休斯敦的地貌,他们将之视为一小片地狱:一片炎热潮湿且毫无特点的广阔区域,有洪水泛滥的草地,点缀着单调的办公大楼和郊区风格的大片房屋。 But Wolff and Hightower, major land developers on Houston’s outskirts for four decades, have a different outlook. “We may not have all the scenery of a place like California,” notes the 73-year-old Wolff, who is also part owner of the San Francisco Giants. “But growth makes up for a lot of imperfections.” 但是作为从业四十年的休斯敦郊区主要土地开发商,Wolff和Hightower有着不同的观点。“我们或许没有像加州那样的全部景色,”同时也是旧金山巨人队的共有者的73岁的Wolff提到。“但是经济增长弥补了许多不完美之处。” A host of newcomers—immigrants and transplants from around the United States—agree with that assessment. Its low cost of living and high rate of job growth have made Houston and its surrounding metro region attractive to young families. According to Pitney Bowes, Houston will enjoy the highest growth in new households of any major city between 2014 and 2017. 许多新来者——外国移民和美国本土移居者——都同意Wolff的评价。低生活成本和高职位增长率使休斯敦和周围城区对年轻家庭很有吸引力。据Pitney Bowes公司预测,2014年到2017年期间,休斯敦将会享有所有大城市中最高的新住户增长率。 A recent U.S. Council of Mayors study predicted that the American urban order will become increasingly Texan, with Houston and Dallas–Fort Worth both growing larger than Chicago by 2050. 最近一份美国市长委员会的研究预测,美国的城市秩序越来越德州化,休斯敦和达拉斯-沃思堡(Dallas–Fort Worth)的城市规模在2050年前都会超过芝加哥。 The Grand Parkway, Wolff points out, continues Houston’s pattern of outward development. The vast ExxonMobil campus being built in the far northern suburbs—and surrounded by its own master-planned community, Springwoods Village—will eventually be the nation’s second-largest office development, after Manhattan’s Freedom Tower. Houston is already home to numerous planned communities with bucolic-sounding names: Cinco Ranch, Bridgeland, Sienna Plantation, the Woodlands, and Sugar Land. Wolff 指出,花园大道延续了休斯敦的外向型发展模式。位于北部远郊正在修建的巨大的埃克森美孚校园最终将会成为仅次于曼哈顿自由塔的美国第二大办公楼, 周围环绕着埃克森美孚自己总体规划的社区,Springwoods Village。休斯敦已经拥有众多名字听起来田园风格的规划社区:Cinco Ranch, Bridgeland, Sienna Plantation, the Woodlands, 和Sugar Land。 “Open space is the most precious amenity,” says Wolff, a primary developer of the Energy Corridor, a Houston neighborhood boasting 22 million square feet of office space and housing the headquarters of such key energy firms as BP America, ConocoPhillips, and CITGO. “What we are creating here is a place where business can grow and people can afford to live. This is the key to Houston.” Indeed, the Houston model of development might be described as “opportunity urbanism.” “开放空间是最宝贵的生活设施”, 作为Energy Corridor——一个休斯敦社区,拥有2200万平方英尺办公空间并且容纳了诸多重要能源公司的总部,如BP美国、康菲和CITGO——主要开发商的Wolff 说道。“我们在这正在创造的是一个商业能发展、人们能有钱生活的地方。这是休斯敦的关键所在。”确实,休斯敦发展模式可以被描述为“都市化机会”。 Houston’s economic success over the past 20 years—and, more remarkably, since the Great Recession and the weak national recovery—rivals the performance of any large metropolitan region in the United States. For nearly a decade and a half, the city has been adding jobs at a furious pace—more than 600,000 since early 2000, and 263,000 since early 2008. 休斯敦过去20多年的经济成功——并且从大衰退和疲弱的全国性复苏以来越发明显——超过了美国任何其他大都市区的表现。在大约15年时间里,这座城市以极快的速度创造着工作机会——2000年初以来超过60万,2008年初以来为26.3万。 The greater New York City area, by contrast, has added just 103,000 jobs since 2008, and Los Angeles, Chicago, Phoenix, Atlanta, and Philadelphia remain well below their 2008 levels in total jobs. In fact, Los Angeles and Chicago, like Detroit, have fewer jobs today than they did at the turn of the millennium. 对比之下,规模更大的纽约都市区自2008年以来仅创造了10.3万份工作机会,而且洛杉矶、芝加哥、凤凰城、亚特兰大和费城的总工作机会远低于它们2008年的水平。事实上,正如底特律那样,洛杉矶和芝加哥现在拥有的工作机会已经少于世纪之交那时了。 And many of Houston’s jobs pay well. Using Praxis Strategy Group calculations that factor in the cost of living as well as salaries, Houston now has the highest standard of living of any large city in the U.S. and among the highest in the world. Indeed, the average cost-of-living-adjusted salary in Houston is about $75,000, compared with around $50,000 in New York and $46,000 in Los Angeles. 而且很多休斯敦的工作薪水颇高。根据实践战略集团(Praxis Strategy Group)的推算,同时考虑生活成本和薪资,休斯敦目前拥有全美所有大城市中最高的生活标准,而且也是全世界最高的城市之一。事实上,休斯敦按生活成本调整后的薪水是大约7.5万美元,相比之下纽约为约5万美元,洛杉矶为4.6万美元。 Personal household income has risen 20 percent since 2005 in Houston, compared with 14 percent in New York, 11 percent in Los Angeles, and less than 9 percent in Chicago. Former Federal Reserve economist Bill Gilmer notes that, except during the energy bust of the mid-1980s, Houston’s per-capita income growth has outpaced the nation’s since the late 1960s. 从2005年以来,休斯敦的个人家庭收入已经上涨20%,相比之下纽约为14%,洛杉矶为11%,芝加哥为不到9%。前美联储经济学家Bill Gilmer提到,自1960年代末以来,除1980年代中期能源业危机期间【编注:原油价格在1979年第二次石油危机期间升至顶峰,1982年开始下跌,1986年暴跌至1973年第一次能源危机前的水平,此后直到2005年之前始终未能回到历史最高点。】,休斯敦的人均收入增长已经超过了全美水平。 Not surprisingly, given Houston’s reputation as an oil town, much of the job growth in its metro region (known as Greater Houston) is tied to energy—particularly, to the technological revolution now reshaping that industry. Once widely derided as a “colony” of California- and New York–based companies, Houston has increasingly become the location of choice for American energy firms. 不出所料,考虑到休斯敦作为石油城的名声,这一都市区(被称为大休斯敦区)相当部分的工作机会增长跟能源有关——特别是跟正在重塑该行业的技术革命【编注:即页岩革命】有关。虽然曾被广泛嘲笑为总部设在加州和纽约的公司的“殖民地”,休斯敦已经越来越多的成为美国能源公司的总部所在地。 In 1960, for example, Houston was home to only one of the nation’s top energy firms; by 2013, it was home to 22 from the Fortune 500, more than all other cities combined—and that doesn’t include major non-headquarter locations for ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, and BP. This past spring, Occidental Petroleum, Los Angeles’s last major energy firm, announced plans to move to Houston’s Uptown district, near the famed Galleria. 例如在1960年,仅有一家美国顶级能源公司的总部设在休斯敦;截至2013年,22家世界五百强企业总部设在休斯敦,超过其他城市的总和——这还不包括作为埃克森美孚、壳牌、雪佛龙和BP的主要非总部所在地。今年春季,作为洛杉矶最后一个大能源公司,西方石油公司宣布了迁往休斯敦城郊区域的计划,靠近著名的Galleria商场。 Since 2001, the energy industry has been directly responsible for an increase of 67,000 jobs in Houston, and it now employs more than 240,000 people in the area. These jobs include many technical positions, one reason that the region now boasts the highest concentration of engineers outside Silicon Valley. 从2001年开始,休斯敦的能源产业已经直接产生了6.7万份工作的增长,现在该区域的能源行业已经雇佣了超过24万人。这些工作包含了许多技术岗位,一个原因就是这一区域的工程师密度现已成为硅谷之外最大的了。 Since 2001, Houston has seen a 24.1 percent growth in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) employment, compared with less than 5 percent growth in New York and San Francisco. The jobs should keep coming: Gilmer estimates that $25 billion to $40 billion in new petrochemical facilities is on its way to Greater Houston. 自从2001年以来,休斯敦在STEM(科学,技术,工程和数学)雇佣上经历了24.1%的增长,相比之下纽约和旧金山增长率不足5%。工作机会还会增长:Gilmer推测将有250亿到400亿美元的新建石化设施会在大休斯敦地区崛起。 “Oil and gas used to feel old, but that’s changing,” suggests Samina Farid, cofounder of Merrick Systems, a 25-year-old oil-services firm with 45 employees. “Younger people are coming into the business because they see opportunities to use new technologies that can really make a difference.” Farid’s firm is one of the thousands of smaller companies—including a group of new, tech-savvy start-ups—that serve the energy industry. “石油和天然气以前给人感觉很老气,但是它们正在改变,” Merrick Systems的联合创始人Samina Farid提到,Merrick Systems是一家拥有45名员工和25年历史的石油服务公司。“年轻人正加入能源行业,因为他们看见了应用能真正带来改变的新技术的机会。” Allison Lami Sawyer, the 29-year-old president of Rebellion Photonics, is part of a movement of younger professionals clustering in the area, many of them in the city’s inner ring. “I came here kicking and screaming,” said the British-educated Alabama native, whose nine-person company, mostly engineers and scientists, provides image-sensing equipment to firms such as Exxon. “But this was the place to be—it works well to be in the oil and gas capital of the world if that’s who you are selling to.” Allison Lami Sawyer,29岁的Rebellion Photonics总裁,是往该区域聚集的年轻专家中的一员,大部分年轻专家住在城市内环。“我当初很不情愿地来到这里,”这位受英式教育的亚拉巴马州土著说道,他的九人公司主要由工程师和科学家构成,为埃克森之类的公司提供图像传感设备。“但这是休斯敦以前的情况——如果你想在石油天然气的资本世界中兜售产品,休顿斯是理想之地。” Houston has embraced not only the energy industry’s white-collar professional jobs but also its well-paying blue-collar industrial positions. The city has seen a surge in mid-skills jobs (usually requiring a certificate or a two-year degree) in fields such as manufacturing, logistics, and construction, as well as energy. 休斯敦不仅拥有能源行业白领专家的工作机会,也拥有薪资不菲的蓝领产业工人职位。这座城市见证了诸如制造业、物流业、建筑业和能源业等领域内中等技能工作(通常要求一份执照或者两年的学位)的爆发性增长。 Many of these jobs pay more than $100,000 a year, and since 2007, according to calculations derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the Praxis Strategy Group’s Mark Schill, Houston led the 52 major metropolitan areas in creating them, at a rate of 6.6 percent annually. In contrast, these jobs have declined by more than 10 percent in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco, which have not been friendly to such industries. 很多这类工作的年薪超过十万美元,而且根据实践战略集团(Praxis Strategy Group)的Mark Schill对劳工统计局数据的分析,休斯敦从2007年起就以每年6.6%的中等技能工作增长率领跑52个大都市区。相比之下,纽约、洛杉矶、芝加哥和旧金山的此类工作已经减少了超过10%,这几个地区一直对这些行业不友好。 Trade is robust. The Port of Houston, connected with the Gulf of Mexico by the 50-mile Houston Ship Channel, is now the nation’s Number One export hub, feeding off the energy revolution and expanding economic exchange with Latin America. Mexico and Brazil are by far the port’s largest trading partners. 贸易正如火如荼。休斯敦港通过50英里的休斯敦航道与墨西哥湾相连,得益于能源革命和与拉美经济交流的扩大,现已成为美国的头号出口中心。墨西哥和巴西是目前休斯顿港的最大贸易伙伴。 Houston’s port business has grown almost fourfold since 2000—far faster than either New York’s or Los Angeles’s. Port officials estimate that the trade sector contributes $500 billion in economic activity and more than 1 million jobs to the state of Texas annually. 休斯敦的港口生意自2000年以来几乎已经增长四倍——远快于纽约和洛杉矶的港口。港口官员认为,港口贸易部门为经济活动贡献了5000亿美元的产值,而且每年为德州增加100万工作机会。 Houston is also home to the Texas Medical Center, the largest concentration of hospitals and research institutions in the world and, by itself, the metro region’s third-largest source of jobs—employing 106,000 people, including 20,000 physicians, scientists, and other professionals. 休斯敦也是德州医学中心(TMC)——世界上最大的医院和研究机构综合体的所在地,此中心也是该都市区第三大工作来源——雇佣了包括2万名医生、科学家和其他专家在内的10.6万人。 Fifty-two separate medical institutions are located on the campus, equal in size to Chicago’s Loop. It currently has over 28.3 million square feet of office space, more than the downtowns of both Houston and Los Angeles. By the end of 2014, TMC top officials predict, the area will be the nation’s seventh-largest business district. 52个单独的医疗机构位于与芝加哥环区同等规模的园区内。它目前拥有超过2830万平方英尺的办公空间,比休斯敦和洛杉矶的商业区都大。TMC的高级官员预测,这一区域将在2014年末成为美国第七大商业区。 Houston is neither the libertarian paradise imagined by many conservatives nor the antigovernment Wild West town conjured by liberals. The city is better understood as relentlessly pragmatic and pro-growth. 休斯敦既不是许多保守派想象中的自由意志主义者的天堂,也不是自由派臆想的反政府狂野西部城镇。这座城市更应被理解为是冰冷的实用主义的和促进经济增长的。 Bob Lanier, the legendary three-time Democratic mayor who steered the city’s recovery from the 1980s oil bust, when the metro region bled more than 220,000 jobs in just five years, epitomized this can-do spirit. Bob Lanier 是这种充满干劲精神的典型代表,当1980年代的休斯敦地区在短短五年内减少了超过22万份工作时,这位连任三届传奇般的民主党市长带领这座城市从石油业危机中恢复过来。 Lanier was more interested in building infrastructure and promoting growth than in regulation and redistribution. That focus remains strong today. “Houston is getting very comfortable with itself and what it is,” says retired Harris County judge Robert Eckels. “We are a place that has a big idea—supporting and growing through private industry, and that’s something everyone pretty much accepts.” Lanier更喜欢修建基础设施、促进经济增长,而不是推动立法、实行再分配。这种偏向现在仍然很强烈。“休斯敦对于自身现状很满意,”退休的Harris县法官Robert Eckels说道。“我们是一个有远大理想的地方——通过支持私营企业来实现自身发展,这是这里每个人都深以为然的道理。” Low taxes are part of that idea. Texas has no income tax, as Governor Rick Perry frequently points out to businesses in other states, and its average state and local tax burden is 11th-lowest in the nation. New York, New Jersey, and California, by contrast, impose the three highest state tax burdens in the nation. 低税也是这理念的一部分。正如德州州长Rick Perry经常给其他州的生意人所说的那样,德州没有所得税,而且它的平均州税和本地税负担是全美第11低的。相比之下,纽约、新泽西和加州是全美州税负担前三名。 The friendly tax environment is one reason that Houston ranked as the most affordable city to do business in a recent survey of global metropolitan areas by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Partnership for New York City. It means a lot more money in their employees’ pockets, too. A family of three making $150,000 moving from New York City to Houston would save upward of $8,000 in taxes, an analysis conducted by the District of Columbia found. 最近由普华永道(PricewaterhouseCoopers)和纽约合伙人(the Partnership for New York City)发起的全球都市区调查中,休斯敦被评为最容易做生意的城市,其中一个原因就是友好的税收环境。这也意味着更多的钱落进雇员的口袋里。一份由哥伦比亚特区主持的分析报告发现,一个从纽约搬到休斯敦的收入15万美元的三口之家可以省下高达八千美元的税费。 An even bigger component of Houston’s growth, however, may be its planning regime, which allows development to follow the market instead of top-down government directives. The city and its unincorporated areas have no formal zoning, so land use is flexible and can readily meet demand. 然而,休斯敦的经济增长可能更多来自它的规划制度,遵从市场规律而不是自上而下的政府指令来促进发展。休斯敦和周围未并入地区没有正式的边界,所以土地使用很灵活而且能很好地迎合需求。 Getting building permits is simple and quick, with no arbitrary approval boards making development an interminable process. Neighborhoods can protect themselves with voluntary, opt-in deed restrictions or minimum lot sizes. Architect and developer Tim Cisneros credits the flexible planning system for the city’s burgeoning apartment and town-home development. 获得建筑许可简单迅速,没有专横的审批委员会使得土地开发变成没完没了的恼人流程。社区可以通过自愿的可选的限制性契约或者最小批量方法来保护自己。建筑师兼开发商Tim Cisneros将这座城市迅速崛起的公寓和联排住宅的开发归功于灵活的规划系统。 “There are a lot of people who come here for jobs but don’t want to live, at least not yet, in the Woodlands,” he notes. “We can respond to this demand fast because there’s no zoning, and approvals don’t take forever. You could not do this so fast in virtually any city in America. The lack of zoning allows us not only to do neat things—but do them quickly and for less money.” “有很多人为工作来到这里,但却不想住在伍德兰(Woodlands),至少现在还不想。”他提到。“我们可以迅速对这种要求做出回应,因为这里没有区域划分,审批也不会耗时太久。事实上,你在美国任何其他城市都不可能如此快速地获得审批。无区域划分让我们不仅做实事,而且做得迅速且省钱。” The flexible planning regime is also partly responsible for keeping Houston’s housing prices low compared with those of other major cities. On a square-foot basis, according to Knight Frank, a London-based real-estate consultancy, the same amount of money buys you almost seven times as much space in Houston as it does in San Francisco and more than four times as much as in New York. (See “Houston, New York Has a Problem,” Summer 2008.) Houston has built a new kind of “self-organizing” urban model, notes architect and author Lars Lerup, one that he calls “a creature of the market.” 相比其他大城市,灵活的规划制度也在某种程度上使得休斯敦房价较低。据位于伦敦的不动产咨询公司Knight Frank统计,以每平方英尺计,你花同样的钱在休斯敦能买的空间几乎七倍于旧金山,四倍于纽约。(参阅“休斯敦,纽约有一个问题”,2008年夏。)建筑师兼作者Lars Lerup表示,休斯敦已经建立起了一种新型的“自组织”城市模式,他称之为“市场的产物”。 Some cities—such as Los Angeles—grow as a progression of larger communities around a relatively small core. Others—such as New York and Chicago—form dependent communities surrounding a dynamic central core. Houston is different: it revolves around a patchwork of centers, such as the aforementioned Woodlands, home to some 40,000 residences and more than 50,000 jobs. 一些城市——比如洛杉矶——发展成一系列围绕相对较小中心的较大社区。其它城市——比如纽约和芝加哥——则形成了依赖并围绕唯一动态核心的社区。休斯敦与两者都不同:它是围绕着一系列中心的拼图,比如说之前提到的拥有4万居民和超过5万份工作的伍德兰(Woodlands)。 Other centers exist within the city limits, but Houston also retains a strong core that never imploded, as did those of so many American cities. The city turns the whole debate that dominates urban thinking today—whether to grow the suburbs or downtown—on its head. Rather than advocate one kind of housing, Houston prides itself on providing choices. 城市边界内还有着其他中心,但是休斯顿也保留了一个从未衰退的强大核心区,正如许多美国城市那样。这座城市让左右今日城市思维的整个辩论——是发展郊区还是中心商业区——变得易如反掌。休斯敦自豪于提供各种住房选择,而不是大力推进任何一种住宅形式。 In fact, as the city’s outer suburban ring has grown—last year attracting roughly 80 percent of all new home buyers—the downtown has also boomed. The city’s vibrant inner ring, notes demographer Wendell Cox, grew 3 percent during the last decade—four times the average in the top 15 metropolitan areas and more than Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. 事实上,随着城外的郊区不断发展——去年吸引了约80%的新房买家——城区也在繁荣向前。人口统计学家Wendell Cox提到,这座城市生机勃勃的内环在过去十年增长了3%【编注:大概是指人口增长。】——4倍于15个大都市区的平均水平,也高于芝加哥、洛杉矶、纽约和费城。 “Most cities would die for our in-fill,” says Jeff Taebel, director of Community and Environmental Planning at the Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC). No one would mistake downtown Houston for midtown Manhattan, true; but it represents 6 percent of the region’s jobs—a proportion 2.5 to 4.5 times greater than one finds, say, in downtown Los Angeles or Phoenix. Houston’s experience refutes the popular notion that urban density and central city development require heavy regulation. “大部分城市都会渴望我们这种重建”休斯敦-加尔维斯顿地区议会(HGAC)中的社区与环境规划主任Jeff Taebel说到。没人会把休斯敦市中心误认为曼哈顿中心区,前者确实不如后者繁华;但是休斯敦市中心贡献了整个区域6%的工作机会——这一比例是洛杉矶或费城市区的2.5-4.5倍。休斯敦的经验驳斥了城区密度和中心城区发展需要严厉管制的流行观念。 Houston’s housing-market flexibility has also benefited some of the city’s historically neglected areas. The once-depopulating Fifth Ward has seen a surge of new housing—much of it for middle-income African-Americans, attracted by the area’s long-standing black cultural vibe and close access to downtown as well as the Texas Medical Center. 休斯敦房地产市场的灵活性也有益于部分历史上被忽略的地区。曾经人口负增长的第五区现在新房激增——很多新房都是为中等收入的非裔美国人所有,他们被该区长久的黑人文化氛围和靠近市区与德州医疗中心的位置所吸引。 Rather than worry about gentrification, many locals support the change in fortunes. “In Houston, we don’t like the idea of keeping an image of poverty for our neighborhood,” explained Rev. Harvey Clemons, chairman of the Fifth Ward Community Redevelopment Corporation. “We welcome renewal.” 许多当地人都支持这种财富转变,而不是去担心衰败社区的中产化升级会排挤贫穷居民。“在休斯敦,我们不喜欢那种保持自己社区贫穷形象的想法,”第五区社区重建局的主席,牧师Harvey Clemons解释道, “我们欢迎事物更新。” By allowing and encouraging development in the inner ring and on the fringe, the city increases its attractiveness to younger people, who want to live close to the urban core, while also providing affordable suburban housing. “Houston thrives because it has someplace for young people to stay inside the city but also offers an alternative when they get older. Just because you grow up doesn’t mean you have to leave the region,” notes Gilmer, now head of the Institute for Regional Forecasting at the University of Houston. 通过允许、鼓励内环和外围的发展,这座城市提高了对于那些想住在市中心附近的年轻人的吸引力,同时也为提供了其他人负担得起的郊区住房。“休斯敦之所以繁荣发展是因为它既提供了年轻人在城里生活的地方,也提供了当他们变老时的去处。你变老了并不意味着你必须要离开这城市,”休斯敦大学的区域预测学会会长Gilmer说到。 Houston’s explosive economic growth has engendered another kind of boom: a human one. Between 2000 and 2013, Greater Houston’s population expanded by 35 percent. In contrast, New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago grew by 4 percent to 7 percent. 休斯敦经济的爆发式增长已经产生了另一种形式的迅速发展:人口的增长。2000年到2013年期间,大休斯敦地区的人口增加了35%。相比之下,纽约、洛杉矶、波士顿、费城和芝加哥仅增长了4-7%。 These figures reflect emerging migration patterns. Texas once sent large numbers of people to California and the East Coast, but now, considerable numbers of New Yorkers, San Franciscans, and Los Angelenos are picking up stakes and heading for Houston, Dallas, Austin, and San Antonio. 这些数字反映了正在浮现的移居模式。德州曾有很多人去往加州和东海岸,但是现在,相当数量的纽约人,旧金山人和洛杉矶人正带着财产向休斯敦、达拉斯、奥斯丁和圣安东尼奥进发。 As it grows, Houston’s ethnic demography is shifting. Two decades ago, Houston struggled to attract foreign-born immigrants, as did Texas generally. But since the 1990s, Texas’s immigration rates have surpassed the national average. 随着休斯敦的发展,它的少数种族人口也在转变。二十年前,休斯敦很难吸引到外国移民,整个德州也普遍如此。但是自从1990年代以来,德州的移民率已经超过全国平均值。 Over the past decade, Houston added 440,000 foreign-born residents, the second-most in the country, while New York, with more than three times the population, added 660,000. In a dramatic sign of changing trends, Houston attracted more than three times as many foreign-born immigrants as did Los Angeles, which is more than double its size. 在过去十年里,休斯敦增加了44万外国出生的居民,数量全国第二,而有着超过三倍人口的纽约增加了66万。这种变化趋势的重要信号就是,休斯敦吸引了超过洛杉矶三倍的外国移民,而洛杉矶的规模是休斯敦的两倍。 “This is the big deal for immigrants,” suggests HGAC’s Taebel. “We are a very attractive place for working-class people to settle.” The immigrant surge has turned what was once a conventional Southern city into a multiracial melting pot. “这对移民来说是件大事,” HGAC的Taebel表示。“我们是一个非常吸引工薪阶层人们前来定居的地方。”激增的移民已经把一座曾经保守的南方城市转变为多种族熔炉。 Indeed, a 2012 Rice University study claimed that Greater Houston is now the most ethnically diverse metro region in America, as measured by the balance between four major groups: African-American, white, Asian, and Hispanic. Hispanics alone constitute nearly half the core city’s population, while the Asian population has surged almost fourfold; whites constitute barely a quarter of the total. The entire Greater Houston metro region—roughly 6.3 million people—is now 60 percent nonwhite, up from 42 percent in 1990. 事实上, 2012年莱斯大学的一份研究声称,通过衡量四个主要族群之间的平衡:非裔美国人、白人、亚裔和拉丁裔,大休斯敦区现已成为美国种族多样性程度最高的都市区。仅拉丁裔就贡献了核心城区人口的近一半,同时亚裔人口激增了几乎四倍;白人仅占总人口的四分之一。整个大休斯敦都市区——大约630万人——在1990年有42%是非白人种族,如今增长到了60%。 Houston’s new diversity is not confined to one neighborhood or district. Suburban Sugarland is over 35 percent Asian and home to one of the nation’s largest and most elaborate Hindu temples. “This place is as diverse as California,” notes David Yi, a Korean-American energy trader who moved to the city from Los Angeles in 2013 and lives in the suburb of Katy, west of the central core. 休斯敦如今的种族多样性并不局限在一个社区或者区域。郊区的糖城超过35%都是亚裔,还拥有美国最大最精美的印度寺庙之一。“这地方跟加州一样多元化,”韩裔美国能源交易商David Yi提到,他于2013年从洛杉矶搬到休斯敦并住在中心区西侧的凯蒂城(Katy)郊区。 “But it is affordable, with good schools. Our kids, who are learning Spanish, can afford to stay and have a house, which is not the case in California.” Pearland, located 17 miles south of downtown, has also become a draw for upwardly mobile minorities and immigrants. “但是这边房子是能支付得起的,而且有着很好的学校。我们正学习西班牙语的孩子也有能力留在这里并买套房子,而加州情况就不一样了。”位于市中心以南17英里的梨城也成为了吸引向上流动的少数族裔和移民的地方。 “This is very different from Dallas, where I grew up, which was very segregated,” notes African-American entrepreneur Carla Lane, president of Lane Staffing, which works with energy, construction, and other local firms. “My daughter has a totally different experience—many of her friends are white, Hispanic, or Asian. Living out in Pearland, you can have that experience, and then you cross Highway 6 and you see people with big hats, boots, and straw in the mouth. That’s Houston to a tee.” “这里与我从小长大的达拉斯很不同,达拉斯是各自独立的,”非裔美国企业家、Lane Staffing公司主席Carla Lane说到,Lane Staffing与能源、建筑和其他当地公司都有合作。“我女儿有着完全不同的经历——她的很多朋友是白人、拉丁裔或者亚裔。在梨城生活,你会有这样的体验,当你越过6号高速公路,你会看到戴着大帽子、穿着大靴子、嘴上还有稻草的人们。这恰恰就是休斯敦。” Immigration is driving growth but also creating new challenges. Though skilled immigrants are beginning to flock to Houston, observes former state demographer Steven Murdock, Texas’s immigrants also include many lower-skilled workers, primarily because of the state’s proximity to Mexico. 移民促进了经济增长但是也带来了新的挑战。虽然如前联邦人口统计学家Steven Murdock观察的那样,技术移民正开始蜂拥向休斯敦,但是德州的移民里也包括很多低技能工作者,主要因为德州靠近墨西哥。 Leaders in the petrochemical and construction industries complain about looming shortages in the skilled trades. A dearth of plumbers and electricians is already affecting construction of new housing, offices, and industrial facilities, impinging on developers’ ability to expand, despite a thriving housing market. 石化和建筑行业的领导者抱怨即将到来的技术行业人才短缺。尽管房地产市场火爆,但管道工和电工的短缺已经影响了新房子、办公室和工业设施的建设,限制了开发商扩大生产的能力。 “We have all these jobs but not the people in the pipelines,” says Marshall Schott, associate vice chancellor at Lone Star community college. “Sure, we have need for more geologists and engineers; but by an order of magnitude, we need skilled workers such as welders and machinists. These jobs pay $80,000 a year, a lot better than being a barista at Starbucks.” “我们有这些工作机会却没有可用之人,”孤星社区大学的助理副校长Marshall Schott说。“我们确实需要更多地质学家和工程师;但是我们更需要十倍数量的技术工人,如焊工和机械工。这些工作年薪8万美元,比在星巴克当一个咖啡师要好多了。” To address these shortfalls, many companies have invested in workforce training programs, some in collaboration with local high schools as part of “cooperative education,” where students go to school part-time and work part-time. “This is a typically Houston solution—very pragmatic,” Mike Temple, director of the Gulf Coast Workforce Board, points out. “We are trying to tell kids that it’s not only what you know but also what you can do.” 为了解决这些短缺问题,许多公司已经投资了劳动力培训项目,一些与当地高校合作作为“共同教育”的一部分,这些项目的学生半工半读。“这是很典型的休斯敦式解决方法——很务实,”墨西哥湾沿岸劳动力委员会主管Mike Temple指出。“我们正尽力告诉孩子,你不仅要懂得知识,也要运用。” Enrollment at Houston’s largest community college, Lone Star, has exploded 58 percent, to 78,000 students, in just the past five years, and the college expects it to reach 100,000 students by 2018. 休斯敦最大社区大学,孤星社区大学的注册人数在过去5年暴涨了58%,达到了7.8万名学生,而且它预期2018年会达到10万名学生。 Often attacked for under-investing in education, Houston has actually shown encouraging educational progress. Many of the schools in the outer rings, often predominantly white and Asian, perform well in state performance rankings. Houston Independent School District, the largest district in Texas and seventh-largest in the country, has won the Broad Prize for urban education twice. 虽然常被批评对教育缺乏投资,但休斯敦事实上已经显示出了在鼓励教育上的进展。外环的很多以白人和亚裔为主的学校在联邦成就排名中表现不错。作为德州最大、全国第七大的学区,休斯敦独立学区已经两次赢得城区教育大奖了。 Houston has also been called “the Silicon Valley of education reform,” with several highly successful charter school networks such as KIPP, Harmony, and YES Prep setting up shop in the city. 休斯敦也被称为“教育改革的硅谷”,有一些十分成功的特许学校网络在城里了设立办事处,如KIPP、 Harmony和 YES Prep。 These schools and others within the Houston Independent School District will have much to do with Houston’s future success, which, in Murdock’s view, will come down to “how well minorities are going to do.” Murdock is optimistic, in part, because Houston’s minorities share the city’s basic culture of faith in hard work as a means of upward mobility. 这些学校和其他休斯敦独立学区内的学校跟休斯敦未来的成功息息相关,在Murdock看来,这也会影响到“少数族裔未来的表现”。在某种程度上,Murdock对此持乐观态度,因为休斯敦的少数族裔继承了这座城市的基本文化,相信向上层流动的方法就是努力工作。 According to Rice University’s Houston Area Survey, 85 percent of Houstonians—including 79 percent of blacks and 89 percent of Hispanics—agreed with the statement “if you work hard in this city, eventually you will succeed.” Nationwide, this sentiment is shared by only 60 percent of those surveyed. 根据莱斯大学的休斯敦地区调查,85%的休斯敦人——包括79%的黑人和89%的拉丁裔——同意“如果你在这座城市努力工作,最终你会成功”的说法。而全国范围内,这种观点只有60%的被调查者认同。 Not everyone is impressed by Houston’s growth and prospects. Critics dismiss the city’s development model as a disaster for the environment, quality of life, and civic culture. For the most part, they regard Houston as a cultural desert—a throwback to the sprawling postwar model of many American cities. “When one asks to see the social center of Houston,” scoffs architect Andrés Duany, “one is taken to the mall.” 休斯敦的发展和前景并没有让所有人都印象深刻。批评者将这座城市的发展模型斥为一场环境、生活质量和城市文化的灾难。多数情况下,他们都将休斯敦视为文化沙漠——倒退回了许多美国城市战后那种无计划模型。“当有人想要看休斯敦的社会中心,”建筑师Andrés Duany嘲弄道,“他就会被带去商场。” But such statements don’t reflect a city where opportunity urbanism is shaping an impressively vibrant cultural landscape. A 2012 survey by Economic Modeling Specialists International (EMSI) of the city’s creative economy found 146,000 jobs, generating an annual economic impact of $9.1 billion. 但是这些说法并不能反映这座城市的真实情况,注重机会的城市化正塑造一种其勃勃生机令人印象深刻的文化地貌。一份2012年由国际经济建模专家(EMSI)对城市创新经济的调查发现了14.6万份工作,每年产生了91亿美元的经济效益。 Houston is projected to have the largest gain in arts-related jobs by 2016 of any city in the study. Arts and culture expenditures totaled almost $1 billion per year in 2010, with total event attendance topping 16 million—numbers sure to grow, with almost 150,000 people per year moving into Greater Houston. 研究预测,到2016年休斯敦在艺术相关工作上的收益会超过所有被调研城市。2012年全年的艺术和文化支出总计约10亿美元,活动参与总人数以1600万高居榜首——随着每年大约15万人移居大休斯敦地区,这个数目肯定还会增加。 The city boasts permanent professional resident companies in all of the major performing arts, including opera, ballet, symphony, and theater, and its theater district has more seats than any rival in the country, except for New York’s. Houston’s 18 museums attract 8.7 million visitors a year. This is no cultural backwater. 这座城市在所有主要的表演艺术领域都涌现了大批常驻专业公司,包括歌剧、芭蕾、交响乐和戏剧,并且它的剧院区拥有的座位比除纽约外的任何城市都要多。休斯敦的18个博物馆每年吸引870万游客。这才不是文化的倒退。 With their higher real incomes and lower taxes, Houstonians dine out substantially more than residents of any other major American city—and they’ve got lots of options. “You used to go to New Orleans for food and music,” notes Chris Williams of Lucille’s, a cutting-edge Houston restaurant that serves sophisticated Southern food. “Now you go down the block.” 因为有更高的收入和更低的税费,休斯敦人外出用餐的次数明显多于其他任何美国城市的居民——而且他们有多样的选择。“你过去习惯去新奥尔良寻访美食和音乐,”Lucille’s餐厅的Chris Williams说到,Lucille’s是休斯敦一家提供精致南方食物的高端餐厅。 Taylor Francis, a 24-year-old advertising executive who moved recently from the Bay Area, points to restaurants like Underbelly, a popular Beard Prize–winning restaurant in the fashionable Montrose district. “My friends in the Bay Area rarely go out because it’s too expensive,” he said. “All their money goes to rent—but here, I can live in a roomy place and go out. There’s something attractive about that.” Taylor Francis是一位24岁的广告经理,刚从湾区搬到休斯敦,他指着类似Underbelly(一家很受欢迎的位于时髦的蒙特罗斯区的餐厅,曾获Beard奖)的餐厅说,“现在你只需走过街区就能找到美食。”他说:“我在湾区的朋友很少外出娱乐,因为太贵了。所有的钱都用来付房租了——但是在这里,我可以住在宽敞的地方,也可以外出娱乐。这点很吸引人。” Houston’s leaders hope to lure more young people like Francis away from coastal cities such as Portland, Boston, New York, and Los Angeles. The city is building one of the nation’s most extensive bike systems and constructing a $215 million park system along its long-disdained bayous. 休斯敦的领导人希望吸引更多的像Francis这样的年轻人远离像波特兰、波士顿、纽约和洛杉矶这样的沿海城市。这座城市正在打造全国最大规模之一的自行车系统,而且沿着长时间被鄙弃的长沼建设着价值2.15亿美元的停车系统。 Marcus Davis, who grew up in the hardscrabble Fifth Ward, says that growth is simply part of the Houstonian ethos. “This place is pure opportunity, including for African-Americans,” he said at his successful and usually crowded restaurant, the Breakfast Klub, just outside downtown. 在贫瘠的第五区长大的Marcus Davis说,追求增长已是休斯敦人精神特质的一部分。“这地方是真正的机会之城,即使对非裔美国人来说也是,”他在自己位于市中心外的餐厅Breakfast Klub里如是说,该餐厅很成功且常常人满为患。 Davis’s customer base includes young professionals and middle-class families. “This is a place where everyone wants to figure out how to do business. And since Houstonians like to do things over food, having a restaurant can be very lucrative.” Davis的顾客组成中包括年轻专家和中产之家。“这是一个人人都想搞清如何做生意的地方。因为休斯敦人喜欢做跟食品相关的事情,所以开家餐厅是十分有利可图的。” The growth-friendly attitude is what holds everything together in Houston, and it will be crucial whenever the next slowdown comes—when oil prices could drop, say, to below $100 a barrel. It remains to be seen whether a large influx of newcomers to Greater Houston from the ocean coasts will clamor, as they have elsewhere—notably, in Colorado—for a more controlled, high-regulation urban environment. 增长友好的态度将休斯敦的一切凝聚在一起,无论下次的增速减缓发生在何时,这态度至关重要——比如说,当油价降至低于100美元一桶时。从沿海城市移居到大休斯敦地区的大批新来者是否会像别的地方一样,特别是科罗拉多,引发对城市环境更多管控的呼吁?尚不得而知。 For now, though, most Houstonians see the city as a place that works—for minorities and immigrants, for suburbanites and city dwellers—and few want to fix what isn’t broken. “The key to Houston’s future is to keep thinking about how to be a greater city,” notes David Wolff as he passes a new set of towers off the Grand Parkway. “This road, it wouldn’t be built in many places. People might talk about these things, but in most places, they don’t get done. In Houston, we don’t just talk about the future—we’re building it.” 然而就现在而言,大多数休斯敦人都认为这城市运转正常——对于少数族裔和移民,对于郊区居民和城市居民来说都是如此——无人想去修复那未坏的东西。“休斯敦的未来关键在于要不断思考如何成为一座更伟大的城市,” 当David Wolff在花园大道上经过一幢幢新大楼时说道。“在许多地方,这条路根本不会建成。人们或许会谈论这些事情,但是大多数地方都不会真正实施。在休斯敦,我们不仅仅谈论未来——我们正在创造未来。” Joel Kotkin is a City Journal contributing editor and the R. C. Hobbs Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University. Tory Gattis writes the Houston Strategies blog, which covers topics including transit, economy, quality of life, city identity, and development and land-use regulations. Joel Kotkin是《城市杂志》的特约编辑,同时也是查普曼大学城市研究R. C. Hobbs研究员。Tory Gattis撰写了《休斯敦策略》博客,主题涵盖了运输、经济、生活质量、城市身份和发展与土地使用规则。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]司法竞争如何带来自由

When Courts Compete for ‘Business,’ Liberty Wins
当法庭之间争夺“生意”时,自由就是赢家

作者:Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty

Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong.
那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的

Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it’s curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn’t that which produced liberty be up to preserving it?

考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果,很奇怪的是,现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢?

When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone’s objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an “invisible hand.” That’s how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek’s, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson).

当我说竞争产生自由时,我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了,就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的(和坏的)后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果(这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅)。

We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge(more...)

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When Courts Compete for 'Business,' Liberty Wins 当法庭之间争夺“生意”时,自由就是赢家 作者:Sheldon Richman @ 2015-12-06 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/12/06/competition-produces-liberty Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong. 那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的 Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it's curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn't that which produced liberty be up to preserving it? 考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果,很奇怪的是,现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢? When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone's objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an "invisible hand." That's how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek's, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson). 当我说竞争产生自由时,我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了,就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的(和坏的)后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果(这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅)。 We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge unintentionally. It should give us hope for the future; if the libertarian movement is deficient, we need not assume that liberty has no chance. (I have more to say about liberty as an unintended consequence in the context of Magna Carta here.) 得知像自由那样美好的事物会非意图地产生,我们应该感到高兴。这会给我们的未来带来希望;如果自由意志主义运动是有缺陷的,我们却不必认为自由已经没有了机会。(关于自由在《大宪章》语境中是个意外产物,我还有更多的话要说,戳这里。) Many authors from the 18th century onward have written about the unintended good consequences of competition, i.e., the absence of central control. They emphasized that in the West the rivalries between church and state, between nobles or parliament and crown, and between nation-states yielded zones of liberty that endure to this day, however diminished in particular matters. 18世纪以来,许多作者已经描写过竞争(即中央控制的缺失)所带来的意外好处。他们强调,西方世界中教会和世俗国家的斗争,贵族或议会和王权的斗争,以及民族国家之间的斗争,产生了延续至今的自由空间,不管这一空间在一些特定方面衰减得有多么厉害。 Competition among legal institutions—courts and bodies of law—within overlapping jurisdictions played a large role in this centuries-long beneficent process. These of course are not examples of anarchism; on the contrary, states existed. But competitive overlapping legal regimes are an element of market anarchism. 管辖界限互相交错的司法制度——各法庭和各法体【编注:一个法体是指有着独特渊源和内在一致性的一组法律规则,比如衡平法、海事法、战争法分属不同法体。】——之间的竞争在这场持续数个世纪的有益历程中扮演了重要角色。这些当然不是无政府主义的例证,恰恰相反,国家是存在的。但是司法制度之间的交叉竞争是市场无政府主义的一个组成元素。 So where a state coexisted with a polycentric legal order, we may say, with Bryan Caplan, that there existed "less than the minimum" state, that is, something that fell short of the nightwatchman state favored by limited-government libertarians. 所以当一个国家存在一种多中心的法律秩序时,我们可以用Bryan Caplan的话来说,这里就存在着一种“比最小国家更弱一点”的国家,也就是说,比喜欢有限政府的自由意志主义者所期待的守夜人政府更弱一点的东西。 A good place to read about competition in law and dispute resolution is Todd J. Zywicki's highly accessible Northwestern University Law Review article "The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis." Todd J.Zywicki发表在Northwestern University Law Reviews上的文章“普通法中的效率兴衰史:一种供给侧分析”是一篇了解法律和争端解决机制中的竞争情形的深入浅出的文章。 An important feature that "influenced the common law's evolution," Zywicki writes, "was the competitive, or 'polycentric,' legal order in which the common law developed. During the era that the common law developed, there were multiple English courts with overlapping jurisdictions over most of the issues that comprise the common law. As a result, parties potentially could bring a particular lawsuit in a variety of different courts. In turn this created competition among these various courts for business." 一个“影响到了普通法进化的重要特征”,Zywicki写到:“是竞争性的,或者说是“多中心”的法律秩序,普通法就是在其中演化的。在普通法产生的时代,在构成普通法的绝大多数问题上都有很多管辖界限重叠的英格兰法庭(存在竞争)。结果就是当事人有可能从很多不同的法庭中选择一个来进行特定的诉讼。于是,这些法庭之间就产生了生意上的竞争。” The idea of courts competing for "business" sounds strange to modern ears, but it was commonplace before the 20th century. (The extent of private arbitration in international commerce is largely unappreciated.) 对于现代人来说,法庭在“生意”方面进行竞争这个想法听起来很怪,但是在二十世纪之前这是很常见的。(在这方面,私人仲裁在国际贸易中的普及程度并没有受到应有的注意)。 Zywicki's paper shows that the common law, which featured this competition, was efficient in the eyes of those who used its services. Monopoly is inefficient even (especially?) in matters of security, dispute resolution, and justice. Moreover, it's a mistake, as Hayek explains in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (volume 1)  to assume that government is the source of law. Zywicki的论文指出,有这种竞争特色的普通法在那些使用其服务的人们眼中是有效的。垄断性司法甚至(或者说尤其是?)在安全、调解纠纷和司法制裁方面都是效率低下的。此外,哈耶克在《法律、立法与自由》中指出,认为政府是法律源头的想法是极其错误的。 Moves away from competition and the common law, then, aren't adequately explained by shortcomings in its services to its consumers. Political ambition provides a more satisfactory explanation. (In the case of the criminal law, see this.) 因此,对司法竞争性与普通法传统的偏离,单从当事人所得服务有所欠缺这一角度是不能充分解释的。政治野心是一个更为令人满意的解释(至于刑法的情况,参见这里) Zywicki draws on the legal historian Harold Berman, who wrote, "Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems." Zywicki引用了法律史学家Harold Berman的话:“也许西方法律传统的最与众不同之处在于多样化的司法管辖权和多种法律体系在同一个共同体内部共存和竞争。” The legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller went further: "A possible objection to the view [of law] taken here is that it permits the existence of more than one legal system governing the same population. The answer is, of course, that such multiple systems do exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems." (Emphasis added.) 法哲学家Lon L.Fuller进一步指出:“对这种(法律)概念的一个可能的反对意见是,它允许多个司法体系管辖同一个人群。当然,对此的回答是:这样的重合体系确实存在,并且在历史上比一元化的(司法)体系更为常见”。 The limited-government libertarian who insists that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisiction is like the apocryphal aerodynamicist who calculated that a bumblebee couldn't possibly fly. One needed only to point out the window, saying, "Behold!" Likewise, the anarchist need only point to history. 有些相信有限政府的自由意志主义者坚持认为,市场无政府主义行不通,因为它缺乏能够实行最后裁决的垄断性法院。这就像假冒的空气动力学家计算得出大黄蜂根本无法飞起来一样。实际上我们只需要朝窗外指指说:“看呐!”。同样,无政府主义者只需要拿出历史事实。 Berman also wrote (quoted by Zywicki), "The same person might be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king's courts in another, his lord's courts in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court in a fifth, [and] a merchants' court in a sixth." This sounds as though the courts were not really competitive, but rather that the variety of courts constituted specialization and a division of labor. Berman又写道(引用自Zywicki):“同样的一个人可能在某种案子中服从于宗教法庭,在另外一种案子中则可能服从国王的法庭,也可能是其领主的法庭,又可能是庄园的法庭,城镇法庭,甚至是商人法庭。”听起来好像各个法庭并不存在真实的互相竞争关系,不同法庭之间存在专业区分和劳动分工。 But that inference would be wrong. To see this we may turn to a keen contemporaneous observer, Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations Smith notes that despite a de jure division of labor, courts in fact competed with one another, even to the point of entrepreneurially finding ways to lure cases from other courts. 但是这样的推断是错误的。为了了解这一点,我们可以求助于同时代的一位敏锐观察者,亚当·斯密。在《国富论》中,斯密提到,尽管从法理上来说,法庭之间存在劳动分工,但事实上他们是相互竞争的,竞争甚至到了多方钻营以从其他法庭中诱拐案件的程度。 Why do this? Because the courts obtained their revenues from fees paid by parties to cases. The more cases a court heard, the more money it earned, a state of affairs that Smith, no anarchist of course, approved of: "Public services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them." 为什么要这样做呢?因为法庭的经费来自案件各方所支付的费用。一个法庭开审的案件越多,那么得到的金钱就越多,斯密当然不是一位无政府主义者,但他赞成这样的一种状态:“公共服务办好才给予酬劳,并且按勤勉的程度决定酬额,这样才能办好。” Smith described the legal environment of his day: 斯密这样描述他那个时代的法律环境:
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. 英格兰各法院最初似乎主要仰赖于法院诉讼费。各法院都尽可能兜揽诉讼事件,那怕本来不是归自己管辖的案件,也乐于受理。例如,单为审理刑事案件而设的高等法院,居然接受民事案件,而以原告声称被告对他所行不义是犯了非法侵害罪或轻罪为受理的口实。 The court of king's bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognisance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognisance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king because the defendant would not pay him. 王室特别法院的设立,本来单是为了征收国王收入和强制人民偿清对于国王所欠债务的。但它后来居然受理关于一切其他契约债务的诉讼,原告陈诉的理由是,被告不偿还对他的债务,所以他不能偿还对国王的债务这个理由。 In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. 由于这种种的假托,结果许多案件,究竟归哪个法院审理,全由诉讼当事人选择,而各法院要想为自己方面多多招徕诉讼案件,也在审理上力求迅速公平。 The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for every sort of injustice. [Emphasis added.] 英格兰今日的法院制度,是值得赞赏的,但一探其究竟,恐怕在很大程度上须归因于往昔各法院法官的相互竞争,对一切不正当行为,各个力求在自己法院就法律许可的范围内给予最迅速最有效的救济这个事实。
Zywicki also quotes from Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence: Zywicki也引用了斯密在《法学讲稿》中的话:
Another thing which tended to support the liberty of the people and render the proceedings in the courts very exact, was the rivalship which arose betwixt them. 另一件倾向于支持人民的自由和使得法庭程序更为严谨的事务,是法庭之间的竞争关系。
It may be argued that the state provided a backdrop to the competitive legal order, such that a forum of last resort was always available. This argument loses its force, however, when one realizes, as Edward Stringham teaches, that private dispute-resolution procedures arose in matters where states abstained from involvement, such as the nascent stock markets. (For more on the weakness of the "shadow of the State" argument, see this.) 有人可能会认为,竞争性的法律秩序总有国家站在后面,因此终极的裁决平台总是存在。然而,就如Edward Stringham教导的那样:当国家放弃参与时,私人的纠纷解决程序才会出现,就像最初的股票市场那样。只要意识到这一点,上述论调就变得苍白无力。(关于“国家的影子”论调的弱点,详见这里)。 "In short," Zywicki sums up, "a market for law prevailed, with numerous court systems competing for market share in order to increase their fees. This competitive process generated rules that satisfied the demand of consumers (here litigants) for fairness, consistency, and reasonableness." “总而言之,”Zywicki总结道:“法律市场繁盛起来了,很多法庭系统为市场占有率和从中所获费用进行竞争。这一竞争过程产生了符合顾客(这里指诉讼当事人)对公平性、一致性和合理性的需求的规则。” Bumblebees fly and reasonably pro-freedom dispute resolution emerges without the state, no matter what a cloistered theoretician may think. 不论纸上谈兵的理论家们怎样思考,大黄蜂会飞,公道的、促进自由的纠纷解决方式无需国家也能产生。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

日式封建

【2016-07-12】

@whigzhou: 日本封建系统区别于西欧封建系统的一个重要方面,是缺乏教会和自由市镇这两类契约主体,相应的,后来的宪政结构中也缺少这两条腿,日本的产业界多半由贵族和武士阶层转变而来,并且转变过程很短,保留了许多封建特性,这对日本社会影响深远,政治结构,产业模式,财阀体系,企业文化中,皆可看出痕迹。

@琉璃魄新年要认真: 近代以来上级武士从政居多,下级武士“创业”也是成功者寥寥,居于财阀顶点的三井和住友都是商业世家,三菱创始人来自地下浪人,安田是从两替店小伙计(more...)

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【2016-07-12】 @whigzhou: 日本封建系统区别于西欧封建系统的一个重要方面,是缺乏教会和自由市镇这两类契约主体,相应的,后来的宪政结构中也缺少这两条腿,日本的产业界多半由贵族和武士阶层转变而来,并且转变过程很短,保留了许多封建特性,这对日本社会影响深远,政治结构,产业模式,财阀体系,企业文化中,皆可看出痕迹。 @琉璃魄新年要认真: 近代以来上级武士从政居多,下级武士“创业”也是成功者寥寥,居于财阀顶点的三井和住友都是商业世家,三菱创始人来自地下浪人,安田是从两替店小伙计干起的足轻之子,谁都算不到封建传统上去。 @whigzhou: 嗯嗯,原po说『贵族直接转变成财阀』不太对,说『财阀克隆了封建结构』可能更准确 @琉璃魄新年要认真: 这要看怎么定义这两种主体了,就组织形态和实际效果来说,日本从来就不缺少宗教和商业性质自治体,即使近世统一时期也有门前町,檀家体系以及城下町,只不过近似于英国存在着统合自治体的“王权”。 @whigzhou: 谢指教~我的意思是宗教和工商业者没有像西欧那样被纳入封建结构 @whigzhou: 比如在英格兰,起初修道院长/主教以封臣身份领有土地,在与土地相关的封建权利/义务方面,其地位与其他封臣一样,市镇以特许状取得自治地位,也成为封建结构的一个常规主体,后来,两者分别通过在上院的席位和下院的代表而在宪政结构中取得地位 @whigzhou: 相比之下,日本的宗教团体和工商业者似乎没有类似的政治组织资源,他们或许也有组织,但并未进入封建结构,因而只能以非制度性的关系依靠某位领主,比如三菱之于土佐,三井之于幕府,其组织模式也在相当大程度上克隆了土地贵族,而不像自由市镇那样自有一套。  
[译文]勿忘普通法

Remember the Common Law
勿忘普通法

作者:Jim Harper  @ 2016-4
译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
校对:小橘子
来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law

Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.”

优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论,这个理论说明了,在可见的经济活动之下,可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户,就要买一扇新的,所以人们很容易认为,通过促进生产和贸易,打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上,打破窗户使社会境况恶化了;财富被破坏了,而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。

A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly u(more...)

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Remember the Common Law 勿忘普通法 作者:Jim Harper  @ 2016-4 译者:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 校对:小橘子 来源:Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2016/remember-common-law Good economists are familiar with Frédéric Bastiat’s parable of the broken window, which illustrates that visible economic activity may have unseen costs. When a broken window leads to the purchase of a new window, it’s easy to think that the broken window helped society by increasing production and trade. In fact, breaking a window makes society worse off; wealth has been destroyed, not increased. Bastiat’s essay on this topic was titled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” 优秀的经济学家都熟知弗雷德里克•巴斯夏的破窗理论,这个理论说明了,在可见的经济活动之下,可能潜藏了不可见的成本。打破一扇窗户,就要买一扇新的,所以人们很容易认为,通过促进生产和贸易,打破窗户会改善社会境况。而实际上,打破窗户使社会境况恶化了;财富被破坏了,而不是增加了。巴斯夏给讨论此问题的那篇论文起的标题正是“看得见的和看不见的”。 A similar dynamic exists in the legal world. Legislative and regulatory processes are easy to see. Elections routinely draw public attention to legislative and administrative government. Elected and unelected regulators have media operations to tell reporters what they are doing. Common-law rules, on the other hand, are mostly unseen. Legal doctrines such as property and contract emerged quietly from series of court decisions over decades and even centuries, so they often go unconsidered and unspoken. Many people may believe that legislation and regulation do most of the work of ordering society. 在法律领域,类似的情况也同样存在。立法与监管程序是显而易见的。大选会定期让民众注意到立法与行政机构,选举的与非选举的官员会通过媒体来阐述他们的举措。相比之下,普通法下的规则绝大部分是看不见的。有关财产与契约等范畴的法律原则,在数十年甚至数百年来的法庭判例中悄无声息地形成,因此往往既不为人留意,也未经言明。许多人可能会认为,规范社会的,主要是法典与规条。 Libertarians should remember the common law and generally prefer it. The common law process for making the rules of a free society has much to commend it. And where it falls down, it is more readily fixable than legislation and government regulation. 自由意志主义者应该谨记普通法,并将其置于优先地位。普通法体系在形成自由社会规则方面确有不少令人赞许之处。而且与成文法和行政规制体系相比,普通法在其失足跌倒之处也更便于调整修正。 American law students learn early that the common law is an important inheritance from England that differs from the civil-law tradition dominant on the European continent. In the common-law tradition, the basic rules that govern our interactions arise from years of experience over generations. Our forebears learned that justice is served and benefits accrue when people avoid violence, stick to their promises, and allocate things in an orderly way. 美国法学学生很早就认识到普通法体系是继承自英国的一项重要遗产,该法系与欧洲大陆盛行的民法传统大相径庭。在普通法传统下,基本法律规范由一代代人的长期经验积累而来。我们的祖先发现,当人们免于暴力,信守承诺,分配有序时,正义便得到伸张,福祉便得到增长。 The law of battery, contract law, and property law all emerged as common practice solidified into common law. It’s often called “judge-made” law, but at its best common law is “judge-found” law— that is, judges discover law in common practices that are deeply ingrained in society. 有关殴打的法律、契约法以及财产法,都是由惯例凝结固化而成的普通法。普通法常被称为“法官制造的”法律,但最恰当的说法应该是“法官发现的”法律——意思是说,法官们发掘出社会上根深蒂固的惯例中所蕴含的规则。 In contrast, the source of rules in civil-law countries is the code books issued by rulers and governments. Civil codes establish the rules governing contracts, trade, property, criminal law, and so on. The civil-law tradition extols the great law-givers—Solon, Hammurabi, Napoleon—who wrote down the law codes purporting to govern their societies. 对比之下,民法体系国家的规则来源是统治者与政府颁布的法律条文。有关契约、商业、财产、刑法等各方面的规则,均由民法法典确立。民法传统推崇伟大的立法者——梭伦、汉穆拉比、拿破仑——他们一手制订治理社会的法典。 But the founding of civil law is something of a myth. In the times when civil law originated, the bulk of most populations was illiterate. These citizens did not have copies of the civil codes that purported to govern them. The civil-law tradition relies on the fiction that certain powerful men produced laws—but they actually arose like common law from the time-worn habits and customs of their subjects. 然而,民法起源于一个神话。在民法最初形成的时候,大部分民众还是文盲,他们并没有读过那些用来管辖他们的民法法典。民法传统建基于强人立法的虚构故事——实际上它们和普通法一样,源自于古老的习惯与惯例。【编注:作者的意思大概是,有关强人立法的虚构故事为民法赋予了其被广泛接受所需的权威性。】 Part of the genius of the common law is its mix of adaptability and consistency. When new circumstances arise, common-law courts, urged on and educated by the parties to disputes, adapt existing rules in ways that they believe produce the most just and fair outcomes. 普通法的优越之处,部分表现在它在适应性和连贯性之间的平衡。当新的环境条件出现时,普通法的法庭在争讼各方的敦促与启发下,会灵活理解运用现有规则,以期达到一个他们都认为公正公平的结果。 They look for comparable cases in their own and other jurisdictions to learn what adaptation of existing law will produce the best results. Over time, new doctrines emerge and old ones may die out. But at any given time there is a stable rule-set people can use to organize their lives and business activities. 法庭将在本身与其他司法管辖区中查找可供比附的案例,以研究如何调整现有规则才能达致最佳的结果。随着时间的推移,新的法律原则形成,旧的则被淘汰。但在任何一个时间点上,人民生活经商都有一套相对稳定的规则可供遵循。 THE COMMON LAW OF PRIVACY 有关隐私的普通法 The field of privacy protection illustrates how common law develops. In 1890 a Harvard Law Review article entitled “The Right to Privacy” made the original argument that law should address privacy. Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, later to become a U.S. Supreme Court justice, catalogued the legal doctrines that might control certain abuses of private life arising from photography and mass circulation newspapers. They argued that the law should explicitly protect privacy. 普通法规则的发展演变,从保护隐私领域就可觅一斑。1890年,一篇刊载在《哈佛法学评论》上题为《隐私权》的文章首次提出,法律需要处理隐私问题。萨缪尔•沃伦与后来成为美国最高法院大法官的路易斯•布兰代斯,整理出了能够制止因拍照和大发行量报纸而引致侵犯私生活的法律原则。他们认为法律应明确保护隐私。 Over time, a new branch of common law was born. Courts across the country began to recognize privacy torts—legally recognized wrongs that give victims of privacy invasions the right to sue invaders. In 1960 eminent legal scholar William L. Prosser documented how privacy as a legal concept had come to constitute four distinct torts: intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of name or likeness. 随着时间推移,普通法的一个新分支出现了。全国的法庭都开始承认隐私侵权——从法律上确认侵犯隐私是错的,受害者可以控告侵权者。1960年,杰出的法律学者威廉•普罗萨总结了隐私权这一法律概念,并界定了四种不同的侵权类型:侵扰他人独处或私人领域;曝光令人困窘的私人信息;不当报道,以造成对个人的错误印象;盗用人名等个人标记。 The common law of privacy continues to develop and advance. In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized invasion of privacy as a tort in that state for the first time. The case was Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores. The defendant’s photo-developing shop failed to deliver two women their vacation photos, but an employee distributed a photo of the two showering together, spurring the court to adopt the “public disclosure” branch of the privacy torts. 有关隐私权的普通法不断地发展和推进。1998年,明尼苏达州最高法院首次裁定侵犯隐私在该州构成民事侵权行为。该案为“莱克诉沃尔玛”(Lake v. Wal-Mart)案。被告的照片冲印店未能交付两位女顾客度假时拍的照片,但被告的一名员工却对外散布了这两名女顾客一起淋浴的照片。法庭认为此举适用于隐私侵权分类中的“公开泄露私人信息”。 Like most law, the privacy torts work in the background, through the threat of lawsuits and not actual days in court or big damage awards. The rarity of lawsuits under the privacy torts may show how consistent these baseline privacy rules are with society’s general mores. Some would argue, of course, that they’re not strict enough and that debatable uses of information should produce successful privacy lawsuits more often. Legal evolution will decide who is right. 与大多数的其他法律一样,隐私侵权的法规在社会背景中默默运作,通过潜在的诉讼威胁,而不是大量的实际庭审或高额赔偿来发挥作用。有关隐私侵权的实际案件之少,可能正说明了保护隐私的法律规则与社会上普遍的道德观念高度一致。当然,可能有些人会认为这些法规不够严厉,信息的争议性使用应该产生更多的隐私案胜诉。孰是孰非,在法律演变中自有定夺。 Privacy law may be in tension with free speech and the First Amendment, so it’s not clear that the privacy torts are a permanent fixture in the common-law pantheon. On the other hand, privacy-law professors and others often use the phrase “privacy harm” in a tacit effort to impress into common language— and ultimately common law—that more offenses against privacy or data security should be recognized as legally actionable harms. It’s all part of a quiet but important debate about our privacy values and what may become our privacy laws. 隐私法也许与言论自由和宪法第一修正案有一定的矛盾,因此隐私侵权能否成为普通法神殿的永久基石之一,并未有定论。而在另一方面,隐私法领域的教授与其他学者经常引用“隐私伤害”来试图与普通用语挂钩——最终与普通法挂钩——并试图将更多侵害隐私或信息安全的行为纳入可采取法律行动的伤害行为。 这些争论虽然悄然进行,但对于我们确立有关隐私的价值观,以及确立针对隐私的法律,都非常重要。 But people don’t often ask how common law torts, property rights, and contracts protect privacy. They ask: “What will Congress and our state legislatures do?” Legislation and regulation get most of the attention. 但人们并不会经常过问,隐私权如何得到普通法的侵权法、财产法,以及契约法的保护。他们会问:“国会和我们的州立法机构会怎么做?”。引人注目的是立法与规制。 The top-down process that established federal privacy regulation of health information illustrates some differences between understated common-law development and cacophonous civil-law-style rule-writing. 有关健康信息隐私的联邦管制规则,是通过一个由上至下的程序确立的,从中可以看出低调的普通法发展与喧闹的民法式规则制定之间的某些区别。 In 1996 Congress revamped the rules around health insurance. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) also addressed health privacy, but it didn’t set new privacy rules. Instead, Congress instructed the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make recommendations about the privacy of individually identifiable health information. It told HHS to go ahead and write privacy regulations based on those recommendations if Congress did not act. 1996年,国会对有关医疗保险的法规进行修订。《健康保险隐私及责任法案》(HIPAA)也涉及健康隐私,但其并未对隐私做出新规定。相反,国会要求卫生及公共服务部(HHS)部长就个人可辨识医疗信息的隐私提供建议,并指示HHS,如果国会没有采取相应行动,该部可根据这些建议撰写隐私相关规定。 When HHS reported back to Congress, it downplayed many safeguards for privacy that already existed. These included medical ethics, explicit and implied contract rights, malpractice claims, and state privacy torts— non regulatory privacy protections that got only a few cryptic lines buried deep in the report. In addition to largely ignoring them, HHS advocated eliminating some of them. 此后,当HHS向国会汇报时,对已有的隐私保护措施予以淡化处理,这些措施包括医疗道德,明确及隐含的契约权利,针对专业失当的索赔,以及各州的隐私侵权法——即非行政的隐私保护,仅在报告的某个角落以寥寥数行隐晦提及。HHS不仅对其几近无视,甚至建议将它们当中的一部分予以剔除。 Today, with the HIPAA privacy regulations in place, people seeking health care sign a lot of forms and see a lot of notices discussing health privacy—but it’s not at all clear that their privacy is well protected. The HIPAA rules preserved and helped solidify behind the- scenes information-sharing practices in the health care industry that may or may not serve consumers and society well. Every year, it seems, there is less and less of a free market in health care to test for and discover consumers’ true interests in health privacy and every other dimension of health care. The common law of health privacy is widely ignored. 如今,由于HIPAA的隐私条文已付诸实施,人们接受医疗保健服务需要签署大量表格,阅读大量讨论健康隐私的告示,但他们的隐私是否得到很好的保障,却根本不清楚。医疗行业幕后的信息共享机制未必能很好地满足消费者和社会整体的要求,而HIPAA的条文则保护了这一机制,并使之更加稳固。年复一年,自由的医疗保健市场似乎正在日益萎缩,我们难以探知与发掘消费者在健康隐私乃至医疗保障其他方面的真正利益之所在。健康隐私方面的普通法原则被普遍忽略了。 INDUCTIVE COMMON LAW VS. DEDUCTIVE REGULATION 归纳式的普通法与推论式的立法 Common law is inductive. Building on experience in case after real-world case, common- law courts accrete knowledge about the rule-set that best serves society. Because rule development occurs with reference to real life cases, it takes advantage of local knowledge about the precise disputes that occur. This allows better approximation of what the truly just rules will be for most cases. 普通法是归纳性的。在众多真实案例的经验基础上,普通法法庭在不断积累认知,寻求最适合社会的法则。由于规则在参照真实案例的过程中发展,其优势是能够利用实际发生的真切争议中所包含的局部知识。在绝大多数情况下,这种方式都能达致较为接近公平法则的效果。【编注:此处作者援引的是哈耶克在1948年的论文《社会中的知识利用》中阐述的思想,哈耶克认为,中央计划者或理性建构者的根本困难在于,无法收集和利用作出正确决定所需的分散的局部知识。】 Hayek emphasized the value of local knowledge in economic decision making. He also emphasized the distinction between common law and top-down legislation in his three-volume work Law, Legislation and Liberty. The Italian lawyer Bruno Leoni is another great thinker in this area. His book Freedom and the Law extolled the virtue of English common law compared to Roman jus civile. The two systems have very different ways of developing rules. Common-law systems hew closer to common justice. 哈耶克强调过局部知识对于经济决策的重要价值,也在他的三卷本著作《法律、立法与自由》中强调了普通法与由上至下立法的区别。意大利律师布鲁诺•莱奥尼在这一领域也颇有研究,他在其著作《自由与法律》中赞扬了英式普通法较之罗马市民法的优点。两套体系在发展法规方面大相径庭,普通法更倾向于追求常理上的正义。 Legislation and regulation more often produce rank re-ordering of rights and liabilities because legislation is deductive. At a single point in time, based on all the knowledge it has drawn together at that moment, a legislature establishes the rule-set that it believes to make the most sense. This is often what it perceives as pleasing the most— or the most important—constituencies. That imperative to please constituencies means that the information legislatures codify often comes from well-organized interests with substantial resources. Special- interest pleading is a hallmark of legislation and regulation. 由于立法是演绎性的,因此权利与义务的轻重经常通过订立法律与规章来编排。在某个给定的时点上,立法机关基于当时所知,建立一整套它认为最合理的法规。这又被认为是在迎合最多数或者最重要的选民。迎合选民,意味着立法机关为之编写法规的诉求,经常会来自于掌握重要资源的有组织团体。因而,制定法律与规章带有满足特殊利益诉求的印记。 Judges in common law courts have fewer of the perverse incentives that legislators and regulators do, particularly when judges are appointed for life terms. A tenured judge gets professional acclaim from developing a reputation for fairness, from clearing dockets, and from suffering few reversals in higher courts. Judges generally don’t anticipate growing their courts’ budgets, getting post-service perks, or being re-installed in office due to the outcomes in their cases, as legislators and regulators often do. Legislation and regulation are systematically subject to a kind of intellectual corruption in which self interest diverges from the public interest. 与立法者和监管者相比,普通法法庭的法官带有的不当动机较少,尤其当法官职位是终身制的时候。为赢得专业上的赞誉,一个终身制的法官需要建立断案公正的名声,避免案件积压,以及减少其裁定被高一级法院推翻的案件。与立法者和监管者不同,法官一般来说并不需要担心他们的判决会对法庭的收入,个人离任津贴,或者恢复职位造成影响。而立法与监管机构则由于自身利益与公众利益有所偏离,容易系统性的滋生智识上的腐败。 WRITING THE RIGHT RULES 编写正确的规则 Rules produced by the deductions of legislators and regulators don’t always fail, of course, and they aren’t always wrong. But it is better to arrive at just rules through a long, society-wide deliberation than through a legislative debate. To illustrate this subtle point, consider the rules that govern the liability of interactive computer services like YouTube, Yelp, craigslist, and Facebook. 当然,立法者与监管者通过推导演绎编写的规则并非必然失败,也并非总是错的。但为了得到公正的规则,经由全社会参与的长期讨论始终还是比经由立法辩论为好。为了体现这当中的微妙之处,让我们来研究规管诸如YouTube、Yelp、Craigslist和Facebook等电脑互动服务供应商之责任的规则。 In the mid-1990s courts were considering whether interactive online services would be considered publishers of the information people uploaded and posted to them. If they were publishers, websites might be liable for defamation and other causes of action because of the material users contributed to them. Had this rule taken hold, operators of online services would probably have allowed only tightly controlled and monitored interactions among users. The rollicking, interactive Internet we know today would have been sharply curtailed. 1990年代中期,法庭在研究在线互动服务是否应该被视为其用户张贴上载信息的发布人。如果是的话,这些网站可能将会因为其用户所提供的信息,而负上诽谤及其他法律责任。如果确立了这一规则,在线服务运营商就很可能会对用户间的交流进行严密的控制与监视,我们今天所见到的生动活泼、积极互动的互联网必将大打折扣。 In response to this concern, Congress passed legislation saying that interactive computer services are not publishers or speakers of any information others provide using their services. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is one of the most important protections for online speech in the United States. 出于这一顾虑,国会通过法案表明,电脑互动服务供应商并非其用户上载信息的发布人或发言人。《通信规范法案》(CDA)第230条,便是美国网上言论最重要的保障之一。 But CDA section 230 is often talked about as an “immunity” Congress gave to online service providers, a carve-out from general liability rules, put in place to advance a certain public policy goal. The perception of CDA section 230 as a special-interest favor means that other interests are on relatively strong footing when they come to Congress seeking to overturn it. Today, CDA section 230 is under attack from groups who would like to see it reversed. The rule against liability for online service providers would be stronger if courts had arrived at a rule of “no liability” based in considerations of natural justice. 但CDA第230条经常被认为有异于一般的责任条款,是国会旨在推动某一特定的公共政策,而赋予网络服务运营商的“豁免权”。该条款给人以一种照顾特殊利益的印象,这意味着当其他利益的代表寻求在国会推翻这一条款的时候,将会有较强的理据。如今,一些持反对立场的团体正在挑战该条款。如果在线服务供应商的“免责”是经由法庭考虑自然正义原则之后确立的话, 该规则就将会有较强的说服力。 When the rules that organize our society are temporal products of legislation, they may always be “in play” for a legislative reversal. Online service providers must always remain vigilant in Washington, D.C., for attempts to undercut their special “immunity.” The rules that govern online liability were established quickly, which is good, but they are less settled than they otherwise would be, and there is one more reason for private businesses to maintain a stable of lobbyists and lawyers in Washington. 如果规制社会的规则是因应时势的立法产物,那么这些规则就处于一种随时可能被立法推翻的状态之下。在线服务供应商就必须在华盛顿特区保持高度警觉,以防有人破坏他们的特殊“豁免权”。迅速订立规制网上责任的规则是好事,但这些规则的认受性本来可以更高一些,而且这也为私营企业在华盛顿豢养着一班说客和律师提供了多一个理由。 There is no guarantee, of course, that the common-law rule would be the same right now as what CDA section 230 produced. The common-law process might still be searching for the right rule. Common-law development would probably find, though, that online service providers are not liable for the acts of others. 当然,普通法体系下订立的规则,未必就和CDA第230条的内容一样。在普通法程序下,我们可能仍在寻找恰当的规则,当然,普通法体系很可能会认为在线服务供应商无需为他人的行为负责。 FAR FROM PERFECT, BUT BETTER IN PRACTICE 虽远未完美,但在实践中占优 This is no argument that common-law courts are perfect. They are not. It takes a very long time for just rules to be found out and settled on through common-law development. Elected judges often have incentives to please powerful constituencies. The class-action mechanism is prone to abuse and often used to reward plaintiffs’ lawyers. Punitive damages are too often a source of windfalls to lucky plaintiffs. The rules about who pays for litigation may be changed to improve the delivery of justice in the courts. 没有人会认为普通法法庭运作得很完美。并非如此。在普通法体系下,确立公平规则,并得到认受,需要很长的时间;选举产生的法官常有动机去迎合强大的利益团体;集体诉讼机制容易被滥用,而且常常有利于原告的律师;幸运的原告经常从惩罚性赔偿中大捞一票;为了正义能更好地在法庭上体现,诉讼费用的分担规则可能需要进行修改。 But these challenges are more correctable than the dynamics in legislation and regulation. Public choice economics teaches that actors in all these rule-making processes will pursue their own self-interest, but the interests of legislators and regulators are likely to diverge from justice more often than the interests of judges. 但这些难题,要比立法与规制过程中的纠葛易于解决。公共选择经济学指出,在规则制定的过程中,相关各方会追求自身的最大利益,但与法官比起来,立法者与监管者的利益很可能更容易与社会公义有分歧。 There is a fair argument that legislation and government regulation create certainty, which may make it worthwhile to accept their many costs. This is particularly acute in the area of high tech, where the application of common law may be unclear. 一种意见认为,明文立法与政府规章带来了确定性,因此随之而来的众多代价也就变得可以接受。这不是没有道理,特别在普通法的适用性并不明确的高科技领域,这显得尤其突出。 But regulation produces certainty in theory better than it does in practice. Witness the recent “BitLicense” fiasco in New York State. When Bitcoin, a digital currency, first captured public attention a few years ago, New York superintendent of financial services Ben Lawsky saw it as an opportunity to make his mark in a hot new area. He proposed an ill-defined “BitLicense” that would require registration of Bitcoin businesses in New York. During the rule-making process, his office declined to release “research and analysis” backing the necessity of a BitLicense, in violation of New York’s Freedom of Information Law. 成文法规理论上能带来确定性,但在实践中却未必。近来“比特登记证”(BitLicense)在纽约州的惨败便是一例。当电子货币比特币在几年前引起公众关注的时候,纽约金融服务主管本•洛斯基将其视为他在这个炙手可热的新领域留名的机会。他提议推出含混不清的“比特登记证”条例,要求纽约的比特币业务进行注册登记。在条例制定过程中,他的部门不惜违反纽约的《信息自由法》,拒绝提供与证明“比特登记证”之必要性相关的“研究与分析”。 The final “BitLicense” was a hodgepodge of regulations like the ones that burden the mainstream financial services sector. They were an ill fit with this emerging technology and a hindrance to innovation because they drove up the cost of starting new businesses. They didn’t acknowledge the technology’s inherent capability to provide consumer protections that surpass existing financial services. Shortly after the “BitLicense” was finalized, Lawsky stepped down from his post to establish a financial regulation consultancy. 和那些为主流金融服务增加负担的规章一样,最终出台的“比特登记证”条例是个大杂烩。这些条例完全不适应这一新兴技术,并且因提高创业成本而妨碍了创新。它们无视新技术内在的保护消费者的能力,这种保护超越了现有的金融服务。“比特登记证”条例推出不久,洛斯基就下台创立了一家金融监管咨询公司。 Today, it is anyone’s guess whether and how the New York Department of Financial Services will amend or enforce the technology- specific regulation that Lawsky produced. The “BitLicense” did not create certainty about the rules of the road for Bitcoin businesses in New York, and it did not create an upwelling of Bitcoin business activity in New York. America’s financial capital appears to be ceding ground on financial innovation to London, in the birthplace of common law. 今天,大家都在猜测纽约的金融服务管理局是否会修订或者执行洛斯基留下来的这一针对特定科技的条例,以及具体如何修订或执行。“比特登记证”并没有为比特币业务在纽约的发展之路带来确定性,也没有令比特币业务在纽约蓬勃发展。美国的金融之都在金融创新方面似乎正在让位于伦敦,普通法的发源地。 Common-law rules foster innovation because they allow anyone with a new idea or process to experiment with it, subject only to background rules, such as “stick to your promises” and “do no harm.” There are no forms to fill out or licensing fees. There is no oversight body that must examine how an innovation fits into pre-existing regulation. “Permissionless innovation” does mean some more risk to consumers and society, but our experience with high tech shows just how great the reward is when behavior is controlled with light-touch, simple, fair common-law rules. 普通法规则有利于创新,因为它允许人们去试验新主意和新方法,只要遵守诸如“履行承诺”、“避免伤害”等基本规则即可。不需要填表格,不需要付牌照费,也没有监管部门去检验一项创新在现行规章下如何自处。“免许可创新”的确意味着消费者和社会将面对较高的风险,但经验已经告诉我们,当我们的行为处于简单、公平的普通法规则的规制之下时,高科技将会给我们带来多么巨大的回报。 The United States and England today live under a dual system. In many areas, they continue to enjoy the benefits of the common law. But legislatures increasingly insert themselves, making temporal judgments that rejigger the rules that people and businesses must live by. In many fields, people look to legislation and regulation first, rather than examining how time-honored rules can be adapted to solve new problems. 现今的美国与英格兰生活在一个双重体系之下。在很多方面,她们继续享受着普通法的益处。但立法机关正不断强化自己的作用,用世俗的判断来改变日常生活与商业活动所需遵守的规则。在很多领域,人们首先寄望于立法与规管,而不是去审视自古以来的规则可以如何调适,以解决新生的问题。 Legislatures and regulatory agencies have a lot of smart people working in them. They universally believe they are pursuing the best interests of their jurisdictions. But the system they work in has perverse incentives, and they have little of the knowledge that common-law processes gather and pass down through the ages. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” wrote jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his 1881 book, The Common Law. 立法机关与监管部门当中不乏能人,他们普遍认为他们在为其辖区的最大利益而努力。但他们所供职的体系有着不当的激励,并且他们对普通法体系经年累月累积传承下来的知识知之甚少。法学家小奥利佛•温德尔•霍姆斯在他1881年所著的《普通法》一书中写道,“法律的生命从不在于逻辑,而在于经验,” The common law is an important part of structuring and ordering a free and prosperous society. It is preferable to legislation and government regulation. Even when we confront new problems, we lovers of liberty should remember the common law. 构建与规范一个自由繁荣的社会,普通法体系乃重要一环,它比成文的法律与政府规章更为可取。即便遭遇新的挑战,热爱自由的我们也不应该忘记普通法。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

朗朗上口

【2016-06-26】

@whigzhou: @sw小橘子 问我『制度决定下限,文化决定上限』这句话是不是我说的,我说这么格拉德维尔的话不像是我说的,不过这句话确实道出了一些真相,并且和我的社会进化理论相合,我的理论就是雪球模型,从人性到文化到基础政治结构到制度到可见的繁荣状况,每一外层的可能性皆受制于内层的性质与禀赋,

@whigzhou: 所以从短期看,内层结构的性质限制着外层的可能性,而从长期看,特定性质的外层的持续存在,对内层也构成了选择压力,因而也改变着内层的性质,我将这一改变称为(广义的)鲍德温效应。

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【2016-06-26】 @whigzhou: @sw小橘子 问我『制度决定下限,文化决定上限』这句话是不是我说的,我说这么格拉德维尔的话不像是我说的,不过这句话确实道出了一些真相,并且和我的社会进化理论相合,我的理论就是雪球模型,从人性到文化到基础政治结构到制度到可见的繁荣状况,每一外层的可能性皆受制于内层的性质与禀赋, @whigzhou: 所以从短期看,内层结构的性质限制着外层的可能性,而从长期看,特定性质的外层的持续存在,对内层也构成了选择压力,因而也改变着内层的性质,我将这一改变称为(广义的)鲍德温效应。 @whigzhou: 我也曾为这套理论找过一句格拉德维尔式的警句『英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会,德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民,犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……』,无奈还是不够短不够朗朗上口。 @whigzhou: 还要加上后半句『在长期经历不同制度之后,香港文化已不同于广州文化,东德人也已不同于西德人,北朝鲜人更不同于南朝鲜人』 @whigzhou: 有关个人认知能力和人格特质的研究很多,但针对族群比较的研究还很少,历时性的研究则更少,所以我们远未弄清那些特质(及相应的遗传基础)在支撑着宪政、法治、宽容、开放等文明的关键元素,但我们可以设想一下,某些重要特质的改变可能会引出何种结果。 @whigzhou: 不妨从一个分歧最小的特质开始,假如英国人的IQ分布拉低两个标准差,顶级科学家就消失了,再拉低一个标准差,整个科学社区就没了,这大概不会有疑问, @whigzhou: 再考虑经验开放性,假如一个民族的经验开放性的统计分布拉低两个标准差,该民族就不会有出色艺术家了,再拉低一个标准差,所有艺术活动都消失了,这一点不太确定,或许经验开放性不是很好的指标,但我很确信必定可以找到某项特质来评估这一点 @whigzhou: 再考虑法治,法治能够存续的前提是绝大多数人在绝大多数场合愿意自觉遵守规则,否则再强大的司法机器也没用,那么一个族群的尽责性分布拉低两个标准差结果会如何?情绪稳定性也拉低两个标准差呢? @whigzhou: 道德感又如何?普通法的要义便是:凭良心和常识即可自行判断某一行为是否正当,在一个普遍缺乏道德感的群体,这样的体系能够存续吗?道德感无关于人格特质吗? @沉默的马大爷: 智商拉低两个标准差,意味着有一半人是弱智,别说科学社区,整个社会都崩溃了。。大部分族群差异达不到这个量级,组内差异一般要高于组间差异 @whigzhou: 两个标准差是夸张了点,但绝非不现实,请看右表 http://t.cn/hByJ2N 不许随便说人弱智,人家要不高兴的 @whigzhou: 确实,消灭顶级科学家大概一个标准差就够了  
宪法对抗

【2016-05-18】

1)纳税额与投票权的分离是近代政治堕落的基础动力之一,

2)没有堕落的更彻底是因为庞大中产阶级的存在,

3)福利制度在不断放大食税阶层,

4)离开其社会结构基础,三权分立并不能自我维持,最高法院的刹车皮并非永远指望得上,

5)州权避免让事情变得更坏,但效果也颇为有限,

6)未来政治对立将更多表现为州际差异,

7)所以问题之一是保守派是否能赢得足够多的州从而控制参议院,而这取决于人口分布,食税人口向大城市化聚集或许是好事,

8)总有一天众议院也会拿参院开刀,就像当初下院对上院动手一样,

9)未来保守州会更强硬的抗拒联邦权力,

10)当这种抗拒达到禁止联邦官员入境执法的程度时,分裂便开始了

11)宗教是抵抗国家权力越来越深介入私人生活的另一把保护伞,宗教自由也是近年来能够帮助个人避免政府管制/干预的少数几条还在起效的宪法原则之一,但自由派正在不遗余力地摧毁这把保护伞,

12)好消息是,这一对抗将让更多基督教派站到自由一边,或许libertarians也不得不创个教派才能在法庭赢得对抗国家干预的豁免权

13)从百年以上的长期看,保守派终将凭借生育率而取胜,问题是在此之前文明崩坏到何种程度,制度重建会有多艰难

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【2016-05-18】 1)纳税额与投票权的分离是近代政治堕落的基础动力之一, 2)没有堕落的更彻底是因为庞大中产阶级的存在, 3)福利制度在不断放大食税阶层, 4)离开其社会结构基础,三权分立并不能自我维持,最高法院的刹车皮并非永远指望得上, 5)州权避免让事情变得更坏,但效果也颇为有限, 6)未来政治对立将更多表现为州际差异, 7)所以问题之一是保守派是否能赢得足够多的州从而控制参议院,而这取决于人口分布,食税人口向大城市化聚集或许是好事, 8)总有一天众议院也会拿参院开刀,就像当初下院对上院动手一样, 9)未来保守州会更强硬的抗拒联邦权力, 10)当这种抗拒达到禁止联邦官员入境执法的程度时,分裂便开始了 11)宗教是抵抗国家权力越来越深介入私人生活的另一把保护伞,宗教自由也是近年来能够帮助个人避免政府管制/干预的少数几条还在起效的宪法原则之一,但自由派正在不遗余力地摧毁这把保护伞, 12)好消息是,这一对抗将让更多基督教派站到自由一边,或许libertarians也不得不创个教派才能在法庭赢得对抗国家干预的豁免权 13)从百年以上的长期看,保守派终将凭借生育率而取胜,问题是在此之前文明崩坏到何种程度,制度重建会有多艰难 14)另一个好消息是,到目前为止文明世界还足够大,一处之崩坏会让其他几处觉醒,从人口/社会结构看,比如澳洲在被食税者彻底绑架之前觉醒的机会比较大 15)第三个好消息是,欧洲在不久之后便会经历一次大觉醒,至少其中一些国家会,最快可能会在下届选举中就会表现出来 16)福利制度是食税阶层的创造,而最低工资和智能机器将是其放大器,后两项都正在大跃进之中,未来福利负担的膨胀将非常惊人 17)随着州际差异扩大,财富创造者逃离福利州,福利州财政崩溃,福利负担大规模向联邦政府转移,联邦增税不可避免,此时州与联邦的对抗将迅速加剧,到时候假如保守派能够长期控制参院,自由派可能会推动一场分州运动,比如把加州分成两个,旧金山和洛杉矶各归一州,这样他们在参院就多出两席,无论如何,一场大型宪法对抗不可避免,分州之争也是一种可能方式 @黄章晋ster:如果洲际差异足够大,我想保守派的洲未必有足够大的动力去与联邦权力对抗,至少我目前想不出来,难道会为类似同性恋婚姻这样的事情发生冲突吗?如果不涉及到广泛的经济利益冲突,这种冲突就是在一定范围内的。 @whigzhou: 仅仅出于抗拒联邦税的理由也可以让这事情发生 @Helen干杯:第7条不是很明白。大城市多聚集福利人口多倾向所谓自由主义者, 从德州情况看,其城市增长快,流入人口多,我觉得有生之年会看到德州从红州变蓝州的。老师为什么说福利人口向城市聚集对保守派是好事? @whigzhou: 我说的是只有少数一些州才有的超级大都市,向那里聚集占的州就少了嘛 @Helen干杯:目前, 有意加无意, 主动加被动, 北美欧洲都在进行各种风格的种族和文化的融合。福利制度不是这个社会大实验的产品,但其存在至少在欧洲减少了融合过程可能引起的不适症状。如果因"觉醒"而停止, 也会对融合过程有负面影响。甚为遗憾。 @whigzhou: 福利制度不可能有助于种族/文化融合 @whigzhou: 内战后美国的种族融合一直在加速,直到六十年代平权法案和福利大扩张才嘎然而止,参见索维尔的两篇书评:《拜托,别再帮助我们了》 《自由派带给黑人的福利》,还有这篇:《为何伊朗移民成于美国却败于瑞典》 @卫东屯的Porco:纳税额和投票权挂钩不会催生新独裁吗? @whigzhou: 从1295年模范国会直到1918年,选举权一直和纳税义务关联着,选出了几个独裁者?不负责任的选民才最喜欢独裁者,墨索里尼希特勒查韦斯无一不是在暴民无产者欢呼拥戴之下上台的 @書筆雅歌:糠港不就是如此,糠港不能有普选的理论依据找到了。 @whigzhou: 举香港为例实在是太恭维我了,当前香港迫切需要普选权是因为她正在一步步落入熊猫的魔爪,直选是抵抗熊猫的最后防线,不是因为原有的选举制不好,要不然她一个半世纪的自由繁荣是怎么来的? @whigzhou: 【给大家支个招】支持普选权最有说服力的理由是军事动员能力,从19世纪后半叶到20世纪前半叶,随着选举权扩展,欧洲各国动员能力越来越强,到二战时已经能把一大半适龄男性拉上战场,所以一旦一个大国开始推行普选,其他只好跟进 @whigzhou: 这一点从德国近代史可以看得最清楚,从普鲁士到德意志帝国到魏玛共和国,普选权/福利制度/动员能力/民族主义/社会主义/军国主义/全民战争,妖魔鬼怪相伴而生,普选权和福利制度是俾斯麦改革的两大重点 @whigzhou: 但这个理由现在已经不成立了,战争越来越不是劳动密集型产业了 @蚯蚓爱钩钩:问题是现在有什么办法剥夺一部分人的选举权呢?除了咱…… @whigzhou: 嗯嗯没办法,或许未来逃到火星上建新国家时可以考虑一下,反正这事情不归我管~ @蚯蚓爱钩钩:如果是为了防止民众的狂热无知,那么只能说没有根本解决方案。不可能有一个完全避免民众犯错而又不造成灾难的方案,如果民众必然犯错,在制度上能做到的只有设法拖延等待民众清醒。 @whigzhou: 对啊,没有什么根本解决方案,也不需要  
差强人意

【2016-05-07】

@whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。

@whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事(more...)

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7129
【2016-05-07】 @whigzhou: 从老弗里德曼那辈开始,libertarians总是宣称18/19世纪的英国和美国有多么自由放任,许多追随者也人云亦云,他们的用意很好,但说法是错的,实际上,即便西方世界中最自由的部分,(除了少数袖珍国之外)距离古典自由主义的理想制度始终很遥远,只不过那时候国家干预经济和私人生活的方式不同而已。 @whigzhou: 略举几点:1)自由贸易,古典自由主义时代推动自由贸易的主要方式是破除非关税壁垒,而关税始终很高,各国财政对关税的依赖也比现在高得多,关税大幅下降到个位数水平是二战后的事情,但这并不是说早期的贸易自由化不重要,因为当时关税再高,和运费比还是很低,所以只要拆除壁垒,效果仍很显著。 @whigzhou: 2)管制,随便翻翻经济史就知道,18/19世纪的管制同样多如牛毛,但给人的印象很不一样,我猜这是因为,早先的管制主要以准入限制和特许垄断的方式进行,而较少以行为管控的方式进行,大量限制法规,但较少执行官僚,所以看到国家之手四处挥舞的景象不多见,究其因,当时政府的组织执行力还不行。 @whigzhou: 3)19世纪的美国联邦政府管的事情确实非常少,但州政府和市政府管的可不少,看看产业史,哪个新产业不是从一大堆政府限制法规里挣扎出来的,那时候联邦政府站在自由一边,多数州政府站在另一边,联邦主义者的努力拆除了很多壁垒,由此也可见在此之前的市场并没有那么自由。 @whigzhou: 当然后来局面颠倒了,铁路和电报把北美大陆连接成单一大市场,州政府管的太过分就把人逼跑了,只好偏向自由化,但此时联邦政府开始伸手了 @whigzhou: 4)政府规模,从财政开支和雇员数量看,那时候的政府确实小得多,但政府对市场和私人生活的干预强度不能仅从其有形规模看,也要从它所维护的壁垒、限制性法规和垄断特权看 @whigzhou: 5)福利制度,这是老弗里德曼叙事中唯一完全成立的一点,那时候基本上没有福利制度,济贫法的影响规模不大 @王弼正: 依稀记得宪法中,国会只有针对州际贸易有立法权也许就是这么来的吧。不过沿海州的国际贸易很繁荣啊。 @whigzhou: 没说不繁荣啊,仅仅清除海盗和运费降低这两项即可将潜在贸易量提升两个数量级,何况还有新世界的人口急速增长 @whigzhou: 从现世的污浊泥潭中赢得一点差强人意的自由空间从来都是艰难而侥幸的,所以不要相信什么自由天国,也无须为此一时彼一时的跌宕沦陷而悲观发愁。  
按人头发钱

【2016-04-28】

@whigzhou: 最近现金福利这话题蛮热烈的,就是用直接按人头发钱代替其他所有福利制度,这事@tertio 十年前就跟我讨论过,他把这方案称为公民年金,并认为这是所有福利制度里最好的,我同意这比其他福利制度都好得多得多,但我仍坚称,马尔萨斯已经告诉我们,这种方案同样注定难以长久维系。

@whigzhou: 今天再讨论这话题的话,我会补充一句:将年金方案用于不同民族或不同文化背景的群体,你会看到截然不同的效果,而其中有些效果远远不是福利主义者原本想要的那种。

@whigzhou: 这里有 标签: |

7116
【2016-04-28】 @whigzhou: 最近现金福利这话题蛮热烈的,就是用直接按人头发钱代替其他所有福利制度,这事@tertio 十年前就跟我讨论过,他把这方案称为公民年金,并认为这是所有福利制度里最好的,我同意这比其他福利制度都好得多得多,但我仍坚称,马尔萨斯已经告诉我们,这种方案同样注定难以长久维系。 @whigzhou: 今天再讨论这话题的话,我会补充一句:将年金方案用于不同民族或不同文化背景的群体,你会看到截然不同的效果,而其中有些效果远远不是福利主义者原本想要的那种。 @whigzhou: 这里有一份相关文章汇集 @学经济家: 慈善倒是更适合搞P2P、PPP的(绕开衙门一刀切) @whigzhou: 有啊,最右帖子里提到有个叫GiveDirectly的机构正在非洲做按人头发钱实验,据说规模挺大,6000人每人每天1美元,等着看结果呢  
呼之欲出

【2016-04-16】

@whigzhou: 个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把Charles MurrayGarett JonesGregory Clark的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。

@whigzhou: 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但(more...)

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【2016-04-16】 @whigzhou: 个人禀赋可遗传性,社会阶梯对个人禀赋的选择,择偶的同质化倾向,阶层内婚,阶级分化,族群禀赋差异化,地区经济分化,大国-单一民族国家-城邦小国的根本区别……,把[[Charles Murray]],[[Garett Jones]]和[[Gregory Clark]]的工作合起来看,貌似就通了,有关社会演化和长期经济表现的一幅新图景呼之欲出。 @whigzhou: 这几年我在经济问题上经历了一次思想转变,越来越相信culture matters, genetic matters,在写作《自私的皮球》时,我基本上还是个制度主义者,虽然也相信文化重要,但认为其对宏观经济表现的影响是通过制度间接发生的,然而越来越多的事实让我难以否认,文化的作用是直接的和压倒性的。 @whigzhou: 转变最初起于对南北欧的比较,北欧(包括英德)在制度上也有种种问题,但表现总是比南欧强很多,日耳曼/拉丁这条分界线实在太清晰了,怎么辩解否认都不可能 @whigzhou: 想来想去,一个直觉上的印象反而比种种“客观原因”更有说服力:南欧的政治家(和他们的民众一样)普遍没有责任感,没有政治担当,没有认错然后做个决断的能力,只会命苦怪别人,就这么简单 @whigzhou: 看看希腊人在债务危机后的丑态,一门心思只想着赖账,从不想想自己有什么问题,和西班牙政府在历史上无数次赖账如出一辙,这种事情北欧人就做不出来,默克尔移民大放水这件事情虽然是做得很坏,但不得不承认她是有担当的,在非常清楚代价的情况下勇于承担责任的,这种事情你在南欧永远看不到 @whigzhou: 我曾经认为夏威夷是个支持制度主义的鲜明案例,但后来发现,直到几十年前,欧裔和日裔加起来还占夏威夷人口多数 @whigzhou: 然后我又看了一下波多黎各和英属洪都拉斯(包括伯利兹),很明显的制度主义反例 @whigzhou: 可以设想一下,其他条件不变,把波多黎各或洪都拉斯的70%人口全部换成日裔,会是什么样,要我说答案很明显 @养猪专业户王福贵:特别想听听您对南北朝鲜,东西德国的解读。 @whigzhou: 外部强加的制度当然可以造成很大差别,这个以前说过很多了,现在我想强调的是,对于某些文化,某些族群,外部再怎么强加制度,可能都不会达到很好的状态,当然,正面外部力量可以让它避免最坏的状态(比如变成朝鲜) @whigzhou: 简单说,在所有拉丁社会中,波多黎各当然已经非常好了,再怎么说,因为有美国,它不会变成阿根廷,或委内瑞拉,或古巴,而我的意思是,它也不大会变成夏威夷,变成韩国,变成香港,论制度条件,英属/美属加勒比的条件再理想不过了,但并未冒出任何加勒比小龙 @whigzhou: 再看以色列,不考虑文化/遗传因素的话,当初的条件真是恶劣到无以复加,建国者满脑子共产主义,沉重战争负担,重税,重管制,恶性通胀,啥坏事都摊上过,最后愣是给拗过来了。 @whigzhou: 转个两年前的旧帖,大意如此。//@whigzhou: 随着技术/文化/制度的丰满成熟,地理因素对社会间差异变得越来越无关,地理大发现以来,英国人无论到哪里都能建立起自由社会,德国人和日本人无论到哪个自由社会都会成为模范公民,犹太人和华人无论到哪个自由社会都比其他民族会挣钱……,换句话说:更成熟的文化与制度更有能力控制和适应各种环境。  
一包补丁

【2016-04-14】

@海德沙龙 《历史如何造就美国人》 在常见历史叙事中,移民北美的清教徒,早在五月花号尚未靠岸时,便已确立了日后美国宪政的基本原则,清教徒的文化气质也构成了美国精神的核心内容,但真实历史往往没有这么理想,在本文所介绍的新书中,历史学家Malcolm Gaskill讲述了一个十分不同的故事

@whigzhou: 有关制度起源的简单叙事基本上都是错的,制度就是陆续积累的一大包补丁,其实复杂的软件系统也有点类似,虽然软件系统的整体设计成分要多一些,但大量功(more...)

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7076
【2016-04-14】 @海德沙龙 《历史如何造就美国人》 在常见历史叙事中,移民北美的清教徒,早在五月花号尚未靠岸时,便已确立了日后美国宪政的基本原则,清教徒的文化气质也构成了美国精神的核心内容,但真实历史往往没有这么理想,在本文所介绍的新书中,历史学家Malcolm Gaskill讲述了一个十分不同的故事 @whigzhou: 有关制度起源的简单叙事基本上都是错的,制度就是陆续积累的一大包补丁,其实复杂的软件系统也有点类似,虽然软件系统的整体设计成分要多一些,但大量功能其实仍是打补丁打出来的,只不过这个版本的补丁,到下一个版本可能就成了设计方案中的组件了,所谓迭代演进是也。 @whigzhou: 最具误导性的一种观点被我称为同态论,即把我们事后从制度中找出的一些原则,等同于当初打补丁的码农头脑里的观念,研究思想史的那帮人特别痴迷于这种念头 @辻郖杉:记得有一阵子辉总在刷《技术史》。那么辉总是否认为新技术的出现也是这种“打补丁”呢? @whigzhou: 是啊,汽车的早期发展就是在四轮马车上不断打补丁嘛 @whigzhou: 另外军队也类似,有句名言说每支军队都是为上一次战争设计的,无论事先考虑多周到,一旦开打,立马手忙脚乱狂打补丁,等战争结束,军校里又手忙脚乱一通研究,这些补丁(中的大部分)就变成下一代军队的标准组件了  
一楼一凤

【2016-01-08】

@sonicblue3: 在你国舆论场共和党似乎通过小布什的两场战争就取得了永远的鹰派名声,这是民主党总统通过两次世界大战和韩战越战都做不到的

@whigzhou: 美国两党制,隔几代就阵营重组,无限往前刨根说民主党祖上也鹰过毫无意义

@whigzhou: 一楼一凤制下形成的两党格局,和比例代表制下的多党格局,虽然都叫“党”,性质完全不同,前者是被选举制度强行压合到一起的大杂烩,后者才是有着明确纲领的主义式(more...)

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【2016-01-08】 @sonicblue3: 在你国舆论场共和党似乎通过小布什的两场战争就取得了永远的鹰派名声,这是民主党总统通过两次世界大战和韩战越战都做不到的 @whigzhou: 美国两党制,隔几代就阵营重组,无限往前刨根说民主党祖上也鹰过毫无意义 @whigzhou: 一楼一凤制下形成的两党格局,和比例代表制下的多党格局,虽然都叫“党”,性质完全不同,前者是被选举制度强行压合到一起的大杂烩,后者才是有着明确纲领的主义式政党,甚至可以是单议题或单族群政党,前者的进化逻辑是:找出有望获得简单多数的政策组合,而后者只须越过比例代表最低门槛即可存在。 @whigzhou: 正因此,当原有的某种组合已无望获得简单多数时,党派格局便发生裂变重组,这种重组可以是小幅度的,也可以非常彻底,比如60年代那次,所以,说何种倾向是哪个党的,这种说法只有最多在几代人之内才有意义。  
[译文]逃离蓝州的美国人

Nearly 1,000 People Move From Blue States to Red States Every Day. Here’s Why.
每天将近有1000人从蓝州搬到红州,这自有缘由。

作者:Stephen Moore @ 2015-10-9
译者:董慧颖
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:The Daily Signal,http://dailysignal.com/2015/10/09/nearly-1000-people-move-from-blue-states-to-red-states-every-day-heres-why/

The so-called “progressives” love to talk about how their policies will create a worker’s paradise, but then why is it that day after day, month after month, year after year, peop(more...)

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Nearly 1,000 People Move From Blue States to Red States Every Day. Here’s Why. 每天将近有1000人从蓝州搬到红州,这自有缘由。 作者:Stephen Moore @ 2015-10-9 译者:董慧颖 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:The Daily Signal,http://dailysignal.com/2015/10/09/nearly-1000-people-move-from-blue-states-to-red-states-every-day-heres-why/ The so-called “progressives” love to talk about how their policies will create a worker’s paradise, but then why is it that day after day, month after month, year after year, people are fleeing liberal blue states for conservative red states? 那些所谓的“进步人士们”喜欢谈论他们的政策将如何创造出一个工人的天堂。可是,为什么日复一日,月复一月,年复一年,人们总是在从自由派的蓝州逃到保守派的红州去呢? The new Census data on where we live and where we moved to in 2014 shows that the top seven states with the biggest percentage increase in in-migration from other states are in order: North Dakota, Nevada, South Carolina, Colorado, Florida, Arizona, and Texas. All of these states are red, except Colorado, which is purple. 2014年最新人口普查中关于居住地和搬迁地的数据显示,按照迁入量增长的百分比计算,有他州居民迁入的前七大州依次是:北达科他,内华达,南卡罗来纳,科罗拉多,佛罗里达,亚利桑那和德克萨斯。这些州中除了科罗拉多是紫色以外,其他都是红州。 Meanwhile, the leading exodus states of the continental states in percentage terms were Alaska, New York, Illinois, Connecticut, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Kansas. All of these states are blue, except Alaska and Kansas. 同时,以百分比计算,大陆州中主要的外流州是:阿拉斯加,纽约,伊利诺伊、康涅狄格,新墨西哥,新泽西和堪萨斯。这些州中除了阿拉斯加和堪萨斯外,其他都是蓝州。 The latest Rich States, Poor States document (which I co-author), published by ALEC, the state legislative organization, finds that nearly 1,000 people each day on net are leaving blue states and entering red states. This migration is changing the economic center of gravity in America—moving it relentlessly to the South and West. 最新的《富州和穷州》报告(我是合著者),由专注各州立法的美国立法交流委员会(ALEC)出版,发现每天离开蓝州进入红州的人数净值接近1000。这一迁徙正在改变美国的经济重心,使之持续不断地向南、向西转移。 Travis Brown, the author of the indispensable book “How Money Walks,” shows that two of the leading factors behind this movement of human capital are 1) whether a state has a right to work law (half of the states do) and 2) how high the top income tax rate is in the state. Nine states have no income tax today, and they are creating twice the pace of jobs as are high-income tax states. 特拉维斯·布朗写作了一本不可或缺的书:《钱如何走路》。他指出,在人力资本的上述流动背后,有两个主要的影响因素:1)该州是否有权制定工作法(一半的州都有),2)该州最高的所得税税率有多高。如今有九个州没有所得税,而他们创造的工作机会是高所得税州的两倍。 Data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) show a similar trend. Each year the IRS issues a migration data report that examines how many tax filers (and dependents) in the year changed their residency and how much income was transported from one state to another. The numbers for the most recent year (tax filing year 2013) are gigantic and put the lie to the claim that interstate migration is too small to matter in terms of the wealth and economic opportunity in one state versus another. 国税局的数据也显示了类似的趋势。每年国税局都会发布一份移民数据报告,分析当年度有多少报税人(及其家属)改变了他们的居住地以及有多少收入从一个州转移到另一个。最新一年(2013报税年度)的数字非常之大,证明下述断言就是扯谎:州际迁移太小,不会对各州之间财富和经济机会造成影响。 In 2013, Florida gained $8.2 billion in adjusted gross income from out-of-staters. Texas gained $5.9 billion—in one year. Five of the seven states with the biggest gains in income have no income tax at all: Florida, Texas, Arizona, Washington, and Nevada. New York was again the big loser, with another 112,236 tax filers leaving and taking $5.2 billion with them. (So much for those TV ads trying to lure businesses into America’s 2nd highest taxed state with temporary tax breaks.) Illinois lost nearly 67,000 tax filers and $3.7 billion of income it can no longer tax. 2013年,佛罗里达从外州来者身上获得了共计82亿美元的调整后总收益。德克萨斯在一年内获得了59亿美元。收益增加最多的七个州中有五个没有任何所得税:佛罗里达、德克萨斯、亚利桑那、华盛顿州和内华达。纽约州又是最大的输家,又有112236名纳税人离开,一并带走了52亿美元。(那么多电视广告企图用临时税收减免来引诱企业到全美税负第二重的州去发展,还是打住吧。)伊利诺伊失去了近67000名纳税人,可征税收入中流走了中37亿美元。 I’ve never met a Democrat who could come up with even a semi-plausible explanation for why families and businesses are hightailing it out of blue states. They are leaving states with high minimum wages, pro-union work rules, high taxes on the rich, generous welfare benefits, expansive regulations to “help” workers, green energy policies, etc. People are voting with their feet against these liberal policies. 我从来没有见过任何一个民主党人能想出半个理由,能解释为什么家庭和企业都在从蓝州逃离。他们正在离开的这些州,都有很高的最低工资,有利于工会的工作规定,对富人的高税收,慷慨的福利待遇,无孔不入的旨在“帮助”工人的管制,绿色能源政策,等等。人们正在用脚投票,反对这些自由派政策。 When I debated Paul Krugman this summer, I confronted him with this reality. His lame explanation for the steady migration from liberal North to conservative South was that “air conditioning” has made the South more livable. Americans are evidently moving because of the weather. 今年夏天当我和保罗·克鲁格曼辩论时,我用这样的事实与他对质。他对从自由派北部到保守派南部间的稳定移民的蹩脚解释是,“空调”使南部更适于居住。美国人显然是由于天气原因才搬家的。 There are two glaring problems with this theory: California and North Dakota. In the last decade ending in 2013, 1.4 million more Americans left California than moved into the once-Golden State. It’s a good bet these California refugees didn’t leave for more sunshine or better weather. 这个想法面临着两个突出的困难:加利福尼亚和北达科塔。到2013年为止的十年间,从曾经的黄金州加利福尼亚迁出的人口比迁入的多出140万。可以肯定地说,这些离开加利福尼亚州的难民并不是为了追寻更多的阳光或更好的气候。 And if warm weather is what is attracting people to the South—and surely there is some truth to that—why did the coldest state outside Alaska, North Dakota, have the biggest population gain in percentage terms in the most recent year? The answer is that workers went to get jobs created by the Bakken Shale oil and gas boom. By the way, California is one of the oil- and gas-richest states in the nation, but its “green” politicians are regulating that industry out of businesses. So much for caring about working-class Americans. 如果温暖的气候是吸引人们迁往南方的原因——当然这也有一定的道理——那为什么最近一年中,除阿拉斯加以外最寒冷的州——北达科塔——却有着最大的人口增长百分比?答案是,工人们是去追寻因巴肯页岩油气繁荣而创造出来的工作。顺便提一下,加利福尼亚是全国石油和天然气最为富集的州之一,但该州的“绿色”政治家们正通过管制逼死油气行业。别再说什么关心工薪阶层美国人了。 The latest Census and IRS data merely confirm what Americans can see every day with their own two eyes. Red states are a magnet. There’s a downside to this for sure. Conservatives have a legitimate gripe that as blue-staters come into their prosperous red states, they try to turn them blue. That’s happened in New Hampshire, where Massachusetts transplants vote for the left-wing policies they just fled. 最新的人口普查和国税局的数据只是证实了美国人每天用自己的两只眼睛都能看到的事情。红州是一块磁铁。这肯定会有消极面。保守派的抱怨合情合理,蓝州人在进入繁荣的红州后,正试图将他们的红州变蓝。这种事已经在新罕布什尔发生,来自马萨诸塞的移民投票支持他们方才逃离的左翼政策。 But the underlying trend is unmistakable: Liberal blue states are economic dinosaurs. Will they change their ways before they go the way of Detroit and become extinct? 但基本的趋势是显而易见的:自由派的蓝州是经济的巨大障碍。在重蹈底特律的覆辙走向灭绝之前,他们会改变自己的方式吗? (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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